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to trial. Hill v. Lockhart,474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 

Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the 

inquiry must be shown. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 

(1984). 

First, appellant claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file a motion to have the victim undergo a psychological evaluation. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Appellant's initial 

counsel filed such a motion and was in the midst of litigating it when he 

withdrew and Jackson was appointed to replace him. Because the motion 

was still pending, Jackson was not unreasonable in not filing a new 

motion. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in 

denying this claim. 

Second, appellant claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to 

impeach the victim with her criminal record and prior false accusations of 

sexual assault. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. 

Because no evidentiary hearings were held between his appointment and 

appellant's guilty plea, counsel had no opportunity or need to impeach the 

victim. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

this claim. 

Third, appellant claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to 

reinstate appellant's bond. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or 

prejudice. An attorney has no authority to reinstate a bond. Further, 

counsel successfully moved to have bail reset after appellant was taken 

back into custody. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err 

in denying this claim. 
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Fourth, appellant claimed counsel was ineffective because he 

had a conflict of interest and because he made appellant accept the State's 

plea offer. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency or prejudice because 

he failed to support these claims with specific facts that, if true, would 

have entitled him to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 

686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (holding that "bare" or "naked" claims are 

insufficient to grant relief). To the extent appellant claimed that counsel's 

failure to reinstate his bond forced appellant to accept the plea offer, his 

claim failed for the reasons stated above. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying these claims. 

Next, appellant raised two claims of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel. To prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a 

petitioner must demonstrate (a) that counsel's performance was deficient 

in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (b) 

resulting prejudice such that the omitted issue would have a reasonable 

probability of success on appeal. Kirksey,112 Nev. at 998, 923 P.2d at 

1114. Appellate counsel is not required to—and will be most effective 

when he does not—raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. Jones v. 

Barnes,463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), as limited by Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259, 288 (2000); Ford v. State,105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 

(1989). Both components of the inquiry must be shown. Strickland,466 

U.S. at 697. 

First, appellant claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to 

raise the bail-revocation issue. Appellant failed to demonstrate deficiency 

or prejudice. Because counsel successfully moved to have bail reset and 

appellant did not allege that he was denied presentence credit for the time 
he was in custody after his bail was revoked, he failed to demonstrate a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome on appeal. See generally 

Application of Knast, 96 Nev. 597, 614 P.2d 2 (1980) (recognizing a right to 

have bail set); Anglin v. State, 90 Nev. 287, 292, 525 P.2d 34, 37 (1974) 

(holding that a defendant unable to post bail has a right to credit for time 

spent in county jail awaiting adjudication). We therefore conclude that 

the district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Second, appellant claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to 

argue that the district court violated the Confrontation Clause when it did 

not state its reasons for imposing the sentence it did. Appellant failed to 

demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. The Confrontation Clause does not 

apply to sentencing hearings. Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 1332-33, 

148 P.3d 778, 782-83 (2006). Further, even if it did, it would not convey 

any right to hear a court's rationale for a sentence imposed. See U.S. 

Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 

the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." (emphasis 

added)). Finally, appellant's claim was belied by the record because the 

district court did announce its reasons at a subsequent hearing on 

appellant's motion to reconsider the sentence. See Hargrove, 100 Nev. at 

502-03, 686 P.2d at 225. We therefore conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying this claim. 

Appellant also claimed that his guilty plea was invalid. 

Specifically, he claimed that the district court "might have suborned" 

actions of counsel and the State in revoking his bail to force the plea 

negotiations. A guilty plea is presumptively valid, and appellant carried 

the burden of establishing that the plea was not entered knowingly and 

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intelligently. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986); 

see also Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). In 

determining the validity of a guilty plea, this court looks to the totality of 

the circumstances. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d 442, 448 

(2000); Bryant, 102 Nev. at 271, 721 P.2d at 367. 

Appellant failed to demonstrate that his guilty plea was 

invalid. First, appellant did not state how simply being in custody could 

force his agreement to a plea offer. Second, appellant acknowledged in his 

guilty plea agreement and during his plea colloquy that he was entering 

his plea freely, voluntarily, and without threat or force. Finally, the 

district court revoked appellant's bail because appellant allegedly made 

death threats against the deputy district attorney prosecuting his case, 

and, although appellant denied threatening to kill anyone, he admitted 

that he said he would "hurt somebody." We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying this claim. 

Finally, appellant claimed that the State had insufficient 

evidence to convict, that there was a conspiracy regarding his family court 

case, that he was denied the right to a fair trial and impartial jury, and 

that the district court judge was biased and engaged in misconduct. These 

claims were outside the scope of claims permissible in a post-conviction 

petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging a judgment of conviction 

based on a guilty plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a). We therefore conclude that 

the district court did not err in denying his petition. 

Post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus (credits) 

In his petition, filed on February 17, 2012, appellant 

challenged the computation of time he has served, claiming he was 

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entitled to additional statutory credits. Appellant failed to serve his 

petition on the officer by whom he was confined and on the Attorney 

General. NRS 34.730(2). We therefore conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying his petition without prejudice. Cf. Miles v. State,120 

Nev. 383, 387, 91 P.3d 588, 590 (2004). 

For the foregoing reasons, we 

ORDER the judgments of the district court AFFIRMED. 2 

Gibbons 

J. 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge 

Albert Leon Williams 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in 

proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude 

that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent 

that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those 

submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings 

below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance. 

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