i

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................iii

Preface............................................................................................................................v

Introduction: Russian Naval History: From the Kievan Rus’ to Today’s Russia...................xiii

Chapter One: Strategy – Fulfilling National Missions........................................................1

 The Evolution of Naval Strategy.......................................................................................1

 Soviet Navy Roles and Missions......................................................................................2

Chapter Two: Russian Navy: Structure and Leadership.....................................................7

 Organization ..................................................................................................................7

 Admiral Viktor Chirkov ...................................................................................................9

 Future Leadership ...........................................................................................................11

Chapter Three: Procurement: Shift to Quality Over Quantity...........................................15

Procurement....................................................................................................................15 

Quality............................................................................................................................15

 The Future Fleet..............................................................................................................17

 Naval Aviation................................................................................................................30

Chapter Four: Personnel – Movement Towards a Professional Force................................39

Outlook ..........................................................................................................................43

Additional resources:

Posters of the Russian Navy Major Forces by Fleet, Russian Navy New Construction, and the Russian Federation Navy (map) are located 

inside the back cover.
ii

This report contains copyrighted material. Copying and disseminating the contents are prohibited without the permission of the copyright owners. When feasible, 

copyright permission has been sought for those pictures where copyright was known, and attribution to those sources, when known, has been given.

Published by the 

Office of Naval Intelligence

December 2015

Cleared for public release by Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review (DOPSR Case 16-S-0274)
iii

Executive Summary

This publication, The Russian Navy – A 

Historic Transition, is intended to provide 

the reader with a basic introduction to the 

Russian Navy and an appreciation of current 

developments that will shape Russia’s navy 

and its operations in the 21st century. 

Because the U.S. Navy operates worldwide 

and the Russian Navy is an advanced, globally 

capable force, its history, capabilities, missions, 

and role within the Russian state and armed 

forces should be clearly understood. The 

new technologically advanced Russian Navy, 

increasingly armed with the KALIBR family of 

weapons, will be able to more capably defend 

the maritime approaches to the Russian 

Federation and exert significant influence in 

adjacent seas. This multi-purpose force will be 

the forward-layered defense of Russia and its 

maritime exclusive economic zone and will be 

able to promote Russian diplomatic interests, 

advance maritime science, combat piracy, and 

provide humanitarian assistance.

It will also provide a flexible platform for 

Russia to demonstrate offensive capability, 

threaten neighbors, project power regionally, 

and advance President Putin’s stated goal of 

returning Russia to clear great power status.

Over its 320-year history, the Russian Navy 

has been instrumental in securing Russia’s 

maritime access to the world, periodically 

battled to maintain that access, directly 

supported Russia’s land forces in times of 

imperial expansion and in the expulsion of 

invaders, been part of the strategic nuclear 

deterrence triad, and demonstrated a global 

presence in the national interest. Political and 

military strategy and the role and mission of 

the Navy evolved as the Russian state grew, 

faced challenges, was transformed into the 

Soviet Union by revolution, repelled invasion, 

and encountered disintegration. 

Throughout, the navy retained, with some 

adjustment for the passing years and 

events, many of the basic organizational, 

procedural, and personnel practices that 

were laid down by its founder, Peter I 

(the Great), at the beginning of the 18th 

century. As the years passed, Russia’s naval 

activity and the shipbuilding and weapons 

“The Russian Navy is being equipped with the 

newest; including precision long-range strike 

weapons, and has big nuclear power. Naval 

forces today are capable of operating for a 

long time and with high combat readiness in 

operationally important areas of the global 

ocean.”

- Admiral Viktor Chirkov 

Commander-in-Chief, Russian Navy
iv

production capabilities required to advance 

it became ever more sophisticated and 

varied. In addition to production for its own 

needs, foreign sales shifted from selling 

masts, caulking pitch, and rope to a variety 

of highly capable ships, submarines, and 

related weapons systems today sold to or coproduced with a number of foreign states.

As Russia asserts itself on the world stage, 

it is giving priority of effort and funding to 

recapitalizing its navy, which is going through 

a major transition from the legacy Soviet Navy 

to a Russian Navy that should reflect the latest 

achievements of Russian advances in science 

and technology. 

On the basis of currently available data it is 

projected that the Russian Navy will retain its 

core missions. Although the national defense 

mission of the strategic and general purpose 

navy has remained, today’s fiscal realities 

require that the decreased number of major 

naval platforms be multi-mission capable 

and armed with the latest capabilities in 

weapons; sensors; and command, control, 

communications, computer, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

systems. Russia has begun, and over the next 

decade will make large strides in fielding a 

21st century navy capable of a dependable 

national defense, an impressive but limited 

presence in more distant global areas of 

interest, manned by a new generation of postSoviet officers and enlisted personnel.

The research, technical development, and 

production enabling the achievement of 

these goals have and will continue to be 

accompanied by a robust program of naval 

arms sales to other countries. The quantity 

and quality of the ships, submarines, and 

armaments sold will transform the current 

capabilities of recipient states and, in some 

cases, potentially enable them to improve the 

quality of indigenous arms production.

“Thanks to the bravery of sailors, the talent 

of shipbuilders, and the daring of explorers, 

pioneers, and naval leaders our nation has 

held fast as a great maritime power. This 

status is a huge responsibility for us as we 

face history, our ancestors who created 

Russia’s maritime glory, and, of course, future 

generations to whom we must pass a modern 

and strong Navy.” 

- Vladimir Putin, President

Russian Federation Navy Day, 26 July 2015

NOTE: The contents of this publication reflect information gathered from a broad range of publicly available 

source material that is considered to be effectively accurate and authoritative.
v

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 

December 1991, Russia inherited the majority 

of the former Soviet Navy, including its afloat 

assets, naval bases, and an extensive network 

of shore facilities.

The immediate post-Soviet period was fraught 

with major difficulties as the Soviet Navy first 

became the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (CIS) Navy and finally transitioned 

to the Russian Federation (Russian) Navy 

(RFN). These early years were marked by 

organizational disarray and financial neglect as 

the Russian leadership focused on the priorities 

of national transformation from the framework 

of the totalitarian and socialist Soviet state into 

a fledgling democracy embracing a market 

economy. During this “time of troubles,” 

most naval programs were either suspended 

or halted altogether. Only efforts to improve 

command and control systems and lessexpensive new design work continued to be 

pursued.

Preface

Admiral Kuznetzov at anchor Severomorsk
vi

Russia inherited virtually all of a huge legacy 

Soviet Navy, however—largely because Fleet 

Admiral of the Soviet Union Sergey Gorshkov, 

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy for 

almost 30 years, wanted to keep what he had 

built—many of the Soviet Navy’s submarines, 

surface ships, and auxiliaries had long outlived 

their usefulness, but were retained to maintain 

impressive numbers. The post-Soviet naval 

leadership faced daunting decisions to triage 

this legacy. Once assessments were made 

and decisions taken, fully three-quarters to 

five-sixths of the Soviet-era inventory was 

written off. Even some submarines and surface 

ships that were both combat-capable and 

had service lives remaining were removed if 

deemed no longer cost-effective to maintain 

(about one-third had long expired service 

lives; another third was composed of units 

deemed no longer combat-effective under 

current warfare conditions). Difficult decisions 

were justified on the basis that it was better to 

concentrate limited funds and effort and save 

some of the best and most useful ships and 

submarines rather than attempt to save all and 

thereby save nothing.

Since 2000, as Russia’s governmental order 

and economy have stabilized, there has been 

a focused and funded effort to revitalize 

the Russian military—including the Navy. 

Suspended construction programs are 

now moving toward completion and new 

construction programs are beginning to 

provide the Navy with 21st-century submarine 

and surface platforms.

Another issue, dividing the Black Sea portion 

of the Soviet Navy with newly independent 

Ukraine, was settled only in 1997. As part of 

this process, Russia concluded a base lease 

agreement with Ukraine under which Russia 

retained use of more than 100 naval facilities 

on the Crimean Peninsula through 2017. The 

lease agreement provided for the possibility of 

bi-laterally agreed extensions, and in 2010, it 

was mutually agreed to extend the agreement 

for 25 years through 2042 with a possible 

additional five years (through 2047) through 

the Russian-Ukrainian naval base for gas 

agreement, or Kharkiv Pact.

In March 2014, Russian military actions led 

to its annexation of Crimea, an act which 

abrogated the lease agreement. The United 

States does not recognize Russia’s annexation 

Russian Naval Infantryman participating in an of Crimea. 

amphibious landing
vii

Ministry of Defense

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense 

website addresses the missions of the Russian 

Armed Forces. These have evolved due to the 

changing foreign political situation of recent 

years and new domestic priorities to ensure 

national security. These missions are structured 

along four basic directions:

•	 Deterrence of military and militarypolitical threats to the security or interests 

of the Russian Federation

•	 Ensuring the economic and political 

interests of the Russian Federation

•	 Conducting operations by armed forces 

in peacetime

•	 Use of military force (wartime)

The peculiarity of the development of the 

world military-political situation makes it 

possible for the execution of one mission 

to grow into another, because the more 

problematic political situations—from Russia’s 

point of view of its security—have a complex 

and multi-dimensional character.

One of the forms of resolving political, 

national-ethnic, regional, territorial, and other 

conflicts is using armed warfare when the state 

(or states) participating in military actions does 

not transition to the particular condition called 

war. As a rule, the parties pursue individual 

military-political goals in armed conflict.

The Russian Armed Forces train for direct 

participation in the following types of defined* 

military conflicts:

Armed conflict. An armed conflict can have 

an international character (involving two or 

more states) or an internal character (with the 

conduct of armed combat within the borders 

of one state’s territory).

An armed conflict can be the consequence 

of the growth of an armed incident, a border 

conflict, armed actions, and other armed 

collisions of limited scale, in which means of 

armed combat are used to resolve the conflict. 

Local war. A war between two or more states, 

limited in political goals, in which military 

actions are conducted, as a rule, within 

the boundaries of the belligerent states and 

dominantly touch only the interests of these 

states (territorial, economic, political, etc.).

A local war can be conducted by groups of 

troops deployed in the conflict region, with 

possible reinforcement by the deployment of 

supplementary forces from other axes and 

with the conduct of a partial mobilization. 

Under certain conditions, local wars can grow 

into a regional or large-scale war.

Regional war. A war with the participation 

of two or more states (groups of states) or a 

region with national or coalition armed forces, 

using both conventional and nuclear means 

of attack on a territory defined by the bounds 

of one region and its adjacent maritime 

or oceanic waters, air, and outer space, in 

the course of which the parties will pursue 

important military-political goals.

*these are Russian definitions
viii

The full deployment of the armed forces, 

economy, and the great intensity of all of the 

forces of the participating states are necessary 

for the conduct of regional war. In case states or 

their allies having nuclear weapons participate, 

a regional war is characterized by the threat of 

transitioning to the use of nuclear weapons.

Large-scale war. A war between coalitions of 

states or major states of the world community 

that can be the result of the escalation of 

armed conflict or a local or regional war by 

the involvement of a significant number of 

states from various regions of the world. In a 

large-scale war, parties pursue radical militarypolitical goals, and the mobilization of all 

available material resources and spiritual forces 

of the participating states is required.

Russian Military Planning

Contemporary Russian military planning is 

based on a realistic understanding of the 

current resources and capabilities of the 

Russian Federation. It assumes that the Russian 

Armed Forces, together with other troops, 

must be ready—together with the strategic 

deterrent forces and the maneuver of the 

permanent ready forces—to:

•	 repulse an attack and to attack the 

aggressor,

•	 conduct active operations (defensive as 

well as offensive) under any variant of 

the unleashing and conduct of war and 

armed conflict with the enemy, massively 

using current and future means of attack, 

including all types of weapons of mass 

destruction.

In doing the above, the Russian Armed Forces 

must be able to:

•	 In peacetime and in emergency 

situations, while preserving the potential 

for strategic deterrence and fulfilling the 

missions of maintaining combat readiness 

by permanent ready troops without 

conducting supplementary mobilization 

activity, successfully execute missions 

in two armed conflicts of any type, and 

also conduct peacekeeping operations 

both independently and as part of a 

multinational coalition. 

•	 Were the military-political and militarystrategic situation to become more acute, 

ensure the strategic deployment of the 

Russian Armed Forces and deter an 

escalation of the situation. 

•	 In wartime, use available forces to repulse 

an enemy aero-space attack, and after a 

full-scale strategic deployment, execute 

missions in two local wars simultaneously.

Russian Naval Midshipmen in parade formation
ix

The Armed Forces 

The Armed Forces structurally comprise three 

services:

•	 Ground Forces

•	 Air and Air Defense Forces

•	 Navy

and three branches:

•	 Strategic Missile Troops (Strategic Rocket 

Forces)

•	 Aerospace Defense Troops (Space Troops)

•	 Airborne Troops

Navy

The Navy is the Russian Armed Forces’ service 

whose mission is the armed protection of 

Russia’s interests and the conduct of combat 

operations in maritime and oceanic theaters 

of military operations. The Navy is capable 

of delivering nuclear and conventional strikes 

against an enemy’s land facilities, destroying 

enemy naval formations at sea and in base, 

interdicting enemy maritime and oceanic sea 

lines of communication while protecting its 

own shipping, cooperating with ground forces 

in continental theaters of military operations, 

making amphibious landings, repelling enemy 

landings, and fulfilling other missions.

The Russian Navy is composed of 

interconnected components, spanning the 

gamut from combat forces to all elements of 

supporting infrastructure:

•	 Command staff

•	 Submarine forces

•	 Surface forces

•	 Naval auxiliaries

•	 Naval aviation

•	 Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile and 

Artillery Troops

•	 Naval shore establishment (headquarters, 

communications, intelligence, maintenance 

and repair, education and training, etc.)

The Navy’s peacetime missions are:

•	 Deter. Maintain strategic nuclear deterrent 

forces—strategic nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile submarines (SSBNs)—in permanent 

ready status, able to deliver a timely 

retaliatory strike or deploy in times of 

growing tension to deter an attack against 

Russia.

•	 Defend. Maintain and deploy constant 

ready general-purpose naval forces to 

protect and defend Russia’s national 

interests both in adjacent seas as well as in 

more distant waters.

•	 Demonstrate. Use the select deployment 

of general-purpose forces as an 

“instrument of state” to support Russian 

foreign policy.

In times of increased tension and war, the 

Navy’s priority missions are:

•	 Protect. Protect the sea-based strategic 

deterrent force.

•	 Interdict. Interdict or blunt an aero-space 

attack against Russia from the maritime 

directions.

Strategic Deterrence

The Russian Navy contributes to Russia’s 

strategic nuclear deterrent forces by 

maintaining nuclear-powered ballistic 

missile-armed submarines (SSBNs) carrying 
x

intercontinental range 

ballistic missiles. 

These missiles can be 

launched while the 

SSBNs are surfaced 

and moored at their 

homeports, while 

they are on patrol in 

protected waters in 

seas adjacent to Russia, 

or after surfacing 

through the ice when 

patrolling under the Arctic ice pack.

Strategic “Bastions”

SSBN patrol areas in adjacent seas, generally 

referred to as “bastions,” are protected against 

enemy forces by a combination of fixed 

sensor installations, and anti-submarine forces 

composed of submarines, surface ships, and 

aircraft.

Layered Defense

The Navy is Russia’s only armed forces service 

capable of providing for an extended layered 

defense of Russian territory. This approach is 

predicated on engaging potential enemy forces 

as soon as their long-range weapons can 

threaten and be brought to bear on Russian 

territory. For the purposes of illustration, such 

threat weapons could be long range land 

attack cruise missiles. 

Forward defense. In order to provide for 

forward defense, the Russian Navy could 

deploy anti-ship and anti-submarine missilearmed nuclear-powered submarines, major 

surface ships, and 

aircraft out to about 

1,000nm from 

Russia’s frontier, 

with the intention 

of eliminating or 

blunting the effects 

of such long range 

land attack cruise 

missiles by attacking 

their launching 

platforms (surface 

ships, submarines, and aircraft). These forwarddeployed forces could be protected by their 

own self-defense means as well as by fighter 

aircraft deployed on an aircraft carrier.

Intermediate/close-in defense. Were enemy 

naval forces to more closely approach Russian 

territory, they would encounter smaller surface 

combatants and diesel submarines armed with 

anti-ship and anti-submarine cruise missiles 

and torpedoes. The immediate approaches 

would be defended by coastal defense antiship cruise missiles and mine fields. Direct 

assaults on coastal territory would encounter 

Naval Infantry and Ground Forces.

Legal Basis

Russian military and naval activity and 

organization are defined by a series of 

fundamental documents at the national level. 

They are:

•	 Russian Federation Constitution, 12 

December 1993

•	 Russian Federation law “On Security,” 15 

December 2010

SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy at sunset
xi

•	 Russian Federation law “On the State 

Defense Order,” 29 December 2012

•	 Russian Federation law “On Defense,” 31 

May 1996 (as amended)

o Section IV. Russian Federation Armed 

Forces, other Troops, and military 

formations and organizations

o Article 10. Russian Federation Armed 

Forces and their purpose, Para 2. The 

purpose of the Russian Federation 

Armed Forces is to repulse aggression 

directed against the Russian Federation, 

the armed protection of the integrity 

and inviolability of Russian Federation 

territory, and the conduct of missions in 

accordance with federal constitutional 

laws and the Russian Federation’s 

international treaties.

•	 Military Doctrine, Presidential decree of 5 

February 2010, as updated December 2014

•	 Russian Federation Maritime Doctrine 

through 2020, Presidential decree of 27 July 

2001, updated through July 2015 

•	 Regulation “On the Ministry of Defense,” 

Presidential decree of 16 August 2004, as 

amended through 27 June 2007

•	 Russian Federation National Security 

Strategy through 2020, Presidential decree 

of 12 May 2009 (superceded National 

Security Concepts of 1997 and 2000)
xii

“Any ruler that has but ground troops 

has one hand, but one that has also a 

navy has both.”

 - Peter the Great
xiii

Today, the Russian Federation (Russia), though 

smaller than at any time since Catherine the 

Great in the 18th century—contemporaneous with Colonial America—is still the largest 

country by area in the world. A little noted fact 

is that its coastline is more than 2.5 times as 

long as its land frontiers. 

Although Russia has one centrally managed 

Navy, due to Russia’s geography, it should 

be viewed as functionally four and one half 

navies: the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black 

Sea Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and the Caspian 

Flotilla. In October 2016, the Russia Navy will 

celebrate the 320th anniversary of its founding 

by Peter I (the Great) in 1696.

Early Days

Russian seafaring goes back to Kievan Rus’ in 

the 9th century when medieval commerce 

was active along the north-south riverine trade 

route “from the Varangians (Vikings) to the 

Greeks” connecting the Baltic and the Black 

Seas. In the south, direct access to the Black 

Sea carried trade to Constantinople (Istanbul). 

From the 12th century on, coastal residents of 

the north voyaged to Novaya Zemlya and to 

what is today called Spitsbergen. The Mongol 

invasions of the 12th century displaced Kievan 

Rus’ and unrestricted commercial access to 

the Black Sea was lost. As the Rus’ battled the 

Mongols, tenuous access to the Baltic was lost 

to the Teutonic Knights and the Swedes. The 

center of power shifted from Kiev to Moscow.

Only during the reigns of Ivan III (the Great) 

and Ivan IV (the Terrible) in the 16th century 

did Russia begin seriously to roll back the 

invaders and take steps to regain maritime 

access to the south. By this time, Russia was 

already engaged in international maritime 

trade with Europe through the port of 

Arkhangelsk on the White Sea. This port had 

access to the Barents and Norwegian Seas and 

beyond but was seasonally blocked by ice. 

In the early years of the Romanov dynasty 

in the mid-17th century, Russia reached the 

Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific, eventually 

acquiring Alaska, establishing a colonial capital 

at Novo-arkhangelsk (“New Arkhangelsk”), 

Introduction:

Russian Naval History

From the Kievan Rus’ to Today’s Russia . . .

Three Centuries Toward a Modern Navy

Painting depicting Peter the Great as a naval leader
xiv

now Sitka, Alaska, and a coastal provisioning 

outpost at Fort Ross just 65 miles north of San 

Francisco, California.

The Imperial Navy Established

The foundation of today’s Russian access to 

the western seas and the Russian Navy was 

laid by Peter I (the Great) when he ordered the 

establishment of a regular navy in 1696. In the 

early 18th century, Russia gained permanent 

access to the Baltic Sea by defeating Sweden, 

then the preeminent Baltic Sea power, in 

the Great Northern War. The Russian Baltic 

Fleet was established in 1703. Peter the 

Great also personally drew up the first Naval 

Regulations, the form and design of the Navy’s 

St. Andrew’s flag, ensign, signal flags, signal 

code, and established the Admiralty Board. 

Even the focal point of the urban design of 

St. Petersburg, Russia’s imperial capital and 

“window to the West,” was and remains the 

Admiralty, the headquarters of the Russian 

Navy, built on Peter’s order.

In the late 18th century under Catherine II 

(the Great), Russia finally gained a permanent 

foothold on the Black Sea and access to the 

Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits. The 

first Russian naval squadron to operate in the 

Mediterranean was formed from the Baltic 

Fleet and fought victoriously against the Turks, 

sinking the Ottoman fleet at Chesme in 1770. 

In 1783, the city of Sevastopol was founded 

and the Black Sea Fleet came into existence.

The 19th century saw the Russian Navy 

transition from the “Age of Sail” to the “Age 

of Steam.” It also witnessed three more wars 

with Turkey to ensure the Black Sea Fleet 

access to the Mediterranean. The first was in 

1806–1812, when Russia dispatched a naval 

squadron to the Mediterranean composed 

of Baltic Fleet ships under the command 

of F.F. Ushakov. The Crimean War came 

in 1853–56 and saw both the world’s last 

naval battle under sail at the Battle of Sinope 

and then the first between steam-powered 

ships. In the end, Russia was out-gunned 

The Admiralty in St. Petersburg
xv

and out-maneuvered by an allied force of 

dominantly steam-driven ships. The third 

war, in 1877–78, saw the first use of what 

can be considered the forerunner of modern 

torpedoes. There were also two wars with 

Persia in 1803–1813 and 1826–1827 in 

which the Caspian Flotilla participated and 

gained a secure foothold along the northern 

Caspian Sea.

The Russian naval advances and achievements 

in the 1800s were brought to an end at the 

beginning of the 20th century by the Battle 

of Tsushima Straits in the Russo-Japanese War 

of 1904–1905. The Russian Pacific Fleet was 

unprepared for the developed might of the 

Japanese Navy. In an early engagement the 

cruiser Varyag perished in an uneven battle at 

Chemulpo (Incheon). To reinforce the Pacific 

Fleet, a late decision was made to send a 

sizable portion of the Baltic Fleet, Russia’s 

largest, around Africa and through the Indian 

Ocean to attempt to turn the tide of battle. By 

the time the fleet neared Japan, it was weary 

and worn from the 220-day transit. The 

Japanese Navy made short work of the pride 

of the Russian Navy.

Plans were made to rebuild the Navy. In 1913, 

the lead unit of the NOVIK Class destroyers 

was delivered, capable of an impressive 37.7 

knots.

The navy that was lost at Tsushima was barely 

beginning to be replaced when the next blow 

fell—the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The Soviet Navy

When the Bolsheviks finally established 

control over all of Russia after the Russian 

Civil War that followed the Revolution, the 

naval forces were tattered and scattered. A 

significant portion of the remainder that had 

survived Tsushima and World War I had 

fled the country, carrying refugees to various 

Western countries. A large part of the Imperial 

Black Sea Fleet found is last anchorage in 

Bizerte, Algeria.

The institutions of the Navy carried on, led 

by officers who considered themselves 

apolitical and wished to remain to serve their 

country. The new order accepted them, but 

with conditions. They were never fully trusted 

and “political officers” were assigned to watch 

over their actions and decisions, which had 

to be countersigned by the political officers in 

order to be valid. The final chapter for many 

of them was written by bullets in blood when 

the purges (“repressions”) of the 1930s swept 

away the loyal and experienced vestiges of 

the past. Under Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin), 

the forced fulfillment of ambitious plans for 

massive industrialization was undertaken. 

These plans included the recapitalization of 

shipyards, including the large shipyards in 

Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Nikolayev, and 

the construction of an entirely new shipyard 

at Severodvinsk (originally called Sudostroy, 

then Molotovsk) on the White Sea. Likewise, 

designs were drawn up for new warships, 

both surface and submarines. Once again, the 

construction of a new navy had begun.
xvi

The Great Patriotic War

And, once again, catastrophe intervened. 

On 22 June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded 

the Soviet Union: Operation Barbarossa had 

begun. Though there had been indications of 

eastward German troop movements, the only 

formation of the Soviet Armed Forces that was 

fully combat-ready that day was the Baltic 

Fleet. Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral 

N.G. Kuznetsov had taken upon himself the 

responsibility for issuing the readiness order 

without waiting for the normal functioning of 

the military bureaucracy.

The German forces laid siege to Leningrad 

for 900 days and advanced to the outskirts of 

Moscow. Many Baltic Fleet ships managed 

to retreat to Leningrad where they continued 

to function as slightly mobile long-range 

artillery and anti-aircraft batteries. While 

the German Navy dominantly succeeded in 

“bottling up” the fleet in the Gulf of Finland 

using thousands of mines as “corks,” some 

Soviet diesel submarine crews managed to 

thread the minefields and inflict considerable 

damage on German shipping in the Baltic. 

Many of the fleet’s sailors and officers and all 

of the Naval Infantry joined the ranks of the 

ground forces to stop the invader and pushed 

him back.

German advances in the north effectively 

contained counterattack operations by the 

Northern Fleet operating out of the Kola Gulf 

and the White Sea. And here also, submarine 

crews were able to slip out and inflict 

damage.

The southern front saw the Germans 

overwhelm Crimea. The forces of the Black 

Sea Fleet retreated to Novorossiysk and 

from there assisted the counter-offensive that 

eventually repelled and ejected the invader. It 

was in these actions that then Rear Admiral 

S.G. Gorshkov, in charge of the naval forces, 

came in close contact with N.S. Khrushchev 

and L.I. Brezhnev, both of whom were political 

officers in this sector of the war.

To illustrate the extent of the German 

invasion of the Soviet Union and its 

consequences in terms more familiar to 

a U.S. audience, envision the following: 

Nazi Germany geographically abutting 

the United States’ eastern seaboard with 

no intervening land or water. In the early 

morning of 22 June 1941, the invading forces 

would have simultaneously advanced on a 

front stretching from Boston, Massachusetts 

to Savannah, Georgia. The United States 

would be forced to move all of its east coast 

heavy industries to the Rocky Mountains. 

The farthest point of German penetration 

would be Des Moines, Iowa, and the great 

tank Battle of Kursk would take place in 

Cincinnati, Ohio. Instead of the WWII U.S. 

military death toll of some 400,000, there 

would be upward of at least 12 million (25+ 

million by others), counting both servicemen 

and civilians, with most of their blood shed 

into their own soil. This traumatic event 

was seared into the consciousness of every 

Soviet citizen and all would continue to 

sacrifice much to ensure that war would 

not come again.
xvii

Once Germany was defeated, the wartime 

alliance between the U.S., U.K., and the 

Soviet Union evaporated and the chill of the 

Cold War soon set in. Interpreting the Soviet 

advance into Eastern Europe and the retention 

of control there differently, both East and West 

warily eyed each other.

The development and use of the atom bomb 

cast the long shadow of its mushroom cloud 

over all military calculations. The world did 

not yet know all of the consequences and 

after-effects of radiation exposure and many 

considered the development of nuclear 

arsenals to be yet another step in future 

warfighting.

On the naval side, the Soviet Union once 

again developed programs to rebuild. 

The acquisition of German technology, 

documentation, and scientists allowed both 

the USSR and the West to advance their naval 

capabilities. The war had shown the utility of 

longer-range weapons: the German V-1 “flying 

bomb” cruise missiles and the V-2 ballistic 

missiles became the starting points for the 

development of whole families of ground- and 

sea-launched weapons. The launch of the USS 

Nautilus ushered in the age of naval nuclear 

power and true submarines—warships that 

could dive and operate submerged, limited 

only by the endurance of their human crew. 

When cruise and ballistic missiles were 

added to submarines, the capability to hold 

an adversary at risk or the ability to launch a 

surprise attack was greatly increased. 

When cruise missiles were added to surface 

ships in the 1950s, the age of long-range naval 

artillery duels was a thing of the past. Of 

course, every advance in a capability to attack 

called forth efforts to provide for an effective 

defense. Extensive efforts were focused on 

developing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 

capabilities by using submarines, surface ships, 

helicopters, long-range aviation, and fixed 

sensor systems.

By the late 1960s, under the able and 

visionary leadership of Fleet Admiral of the 

Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov and his close 

personal connections with the leadership 

of the Communist Party and Government, 

the USSR had built and was continuing to 

construct an impressive navy. In response to 

the mention of the huge numbers of hastily 

built platforms with a tone that questioned 

their quality, a Soviet naval officer reportedly 

said, “Quantity has a quality of its own.” The 

1974 first edition of the U.S. Department of the 

Navy publication “Understanding Soviet Naval 

Developments” noted the general-purpose 

Soviet Navy as having 245 active nuclearpowered and diesel-electric submarines and 

222 major surface warships. In addition, there 

were 61 nuclear-powered and diesel-electric 

ballistic missile submarines.

By the 1970s, the leadership of both the U.S. 

and the USSR decided that the arms race 

could not go on unchecked. Negotiations led 

to treaties limiting strategic nuclear arms, first 

SALT and then START. Other negotiations 

led to a bilateral agreement aimed at making 
xviii

close encounters at sea more safe and less 

hazardous—the 1972 Agreement for the 

Prevention of Incidents On and Over the 

High Seas (INCSEA)—which continues to 

function today.

Disintegration of the USSR

With the passing of the WW-II generation 

from the leadership of the Soviet Union, new 

thinking and new opportunities arose. When 

the middle-aged M.S. Gorbachev succeeded 

the quickly dying geriatric parade of Brezhnev, 

Andropov, and Chernenko, a time of change 

came to the USSR. For the first time since 

the Revolution, things could be described 

as they really were, rather than as the Party 

ideology insisted they be. Growing global 

communications capabilities broke down the 

barriers of radio jamming and press censorship. 

The massive but fragile Soviet edifice began 

to show cracks, and on Christmas Day, 25 

December 1991, it disintegrated.

A wave of information and change swept away 

the fossilized dogmas of the past. Both sides 

realized that, absent the Communist ideology 

that had preached an inevitable clash and 

even a nuclear war between the U.S. and 

the USSR, a mortal confrontation was not 

inevitable and a nuclear war was unwinnable. 

Greater transparency showed that neither 

side wished to attack or invade the other. This 

specifically led to the realization that there was 

much to be done to rebuild and renew Russia 

after some 70 years of isolation. The Armed 

Forces could be downsized and refocused on 

essential defensive missions and on providing 

stability for internal development.

New Russia and Its Navy

The historical transition from communism to 

capitalism, and the end of the Communist 

Party at the end of the 20th century, turned 

out to be extremely painful and bordering 

on the chaotic. The Russian ship of state was 

sailing into stormy, unknown waters with an 

experienced captain (Boris Yeltsin) at the helm, 

Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union 

S.G. Gorshkov
xix

but one unfamiliar with this class of ship and 

lacking accurate charts. Its crew was new, their 

uniforms were tattered, and its threadbare 

pockets were almost empty. Everybody was 

thrown into a crash course of survival and onthe-job-training as Russia turned yet another 

momentous page of its history.

Sailing into uncharted waters, the Navy could 

not avoid the shoals and shallows. With the 

now-acceptable ability to see and speak the 

truth, it was obvious that much of Admiral 

Gorshkov’s once-impressive Navy was 

inoperative, obsolete, or in need of more 

attention than the results would merit. In the 

course of some 10 years, from 1995–2005, 

naval leadership made painful triage decisions. 

The choices were stark: try to save most and 

lose all, or try to maintain the most capable 

and invest in the future. The latter was the 

wise choice. As a result, the Russian Navy 

today is about one-sixth to one-quarter the 

size of the Soviet Navy in its heyday. The 

fallow years of the 1990s were used to 

develop new, more modern and capable 

designs and systems.

The organization and fiscal stability achieved 

since 2005 has permitted budgeting for 

and financing of critically needed new 

construction. The Russian Navy still retains 

the essential missions of its Soviet predecessor, 

all geared toward the defense of the territorial 

integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state 

and the protection and promotion of its 

interests. Today’s global realities may allow 

it to accomplish these missions with fewer 

means and lesser cost, which would be 

advantageous, because navies are expensive 

and each generation of armaments takes more 

than a decade to develop, design, and build.

Today, the Russian Navy once again stands 

at a point of transition and renewal, as it has 

at various times in the preceding centuries of 

its history. The 21st century is beginning with 

different challenges and opportunities, and 

Russia envisions its new 21st-century Navy 

to be built and manned to effectively face 

those challenges and fulfill its missions while 

carrying on the best traditions of its illustrious 

but often rocky and painful past.

Russian Navy Honor Guard in Norfolk, VA
xx
1

Over three centuries, Russian naval strategy 

has transitioned from developing approaches 

and capabilities to acquire access for 

commerce to open seas in the west to 

developing effective and credible anti-access 

approaches and capabilities to deter or defend 

against long-range aerospace capabilities to 

attack Russia from the sea in the west, north, 

and east. However, even today, Russia’s 

need for access to open seas remains a vital 

concern in the Baltic and Black Seas. 

Russia’s early requirement for a regular Navy 

during the reign of Peter I (the Great) in the 

early 18th century was occasioned by the need 

to break out of its riverine constraints and to 

secure access to the open sea. To do so, Russia 

needed a fleet that could both support the 

actions of the army and effectively confront 

enemy ships at sea. The focus of Russian Navy 

actions at this time was to defeat Turkish forces 

blocking access to the Black Sea via the Sea of 

Azov and Swedish forces preventing access to 

the Baltic through the Volkhov and Neva Rivers. 

Russia’s approach was to build numerous 

relatively small but easily-maneuverable oared 

sail-augmented galleys and watercraft mounting 

cannon. The use of such craft gave Russia 

an asymmetrical advantage over the larger 

sail men-of-war of its adversaries, permitting 

Russian naval victories in both theaters.

Russia’s early expansion to the north with 

maritime access to the White and Barents 

Seas and to the east with access to the Sea of 

Okhotsk and the North Pacific Ocean beyond 

was not met with opposition and did not 

necessitate the development of any serious 

either offensive or defensive naval capability 

in those directions.

In the 19th century, Russia continued to work 

to secure access to open seas in the face of 

the developing European naval capabilities 

often arrayed against it. The only strategy 

available was to develop better ships and 

weapons and to train and educate its naval 

leaders and ship’s crews to fight better. 

Because the essence of Russian military power 

lay in its ground forces, it was the success of 

those forces that backed the diplomacy and 

naval actions that eventually secured access 

to the open seas. That access from the Baltic 

Sea and the Black Sea is still more dependent 

on the combination of diplomacy and the 

existence of military power than on the 

massive demonstration of it. 

Due to Russia’s internal economic and 

political situation at the beginning of the 

20th century and into World War I, the 

Russian Navy had not received sufficient 

governmental support and was not in a 

Chapter One:

Strategy – 

Fulfilling National Missions

The Evolution of Naval Strategy
2

position to significantly contribute to the 

operations of a weak Russian army in the 

context of a ground war in Europe. In the Far 

East, the limited capabilities of the Pacific Fleet 

and the basing of a portion of it in China at 

the leasehold of Port Arthur did not permit 

mounting an adequate defense against attack 

by a more capable and numerically larger 

Japanese Navy. The geographic reality of 

Russia’s widely separated maritime frontage 

did not in 1904 and still does not today 

support the strategic utility of sending ships 

from one fleet to support another in their 

defensive missions.

Each fleet and the Caspian Flotilla must 

be effectively self-sufficient to perform its 

missions in its region of responsibility in 

conjunction with whatever other armed forces 

branches are directly available.

Soviet Navy Roles and Missions

The early Soviet Period saw the virtual 

disappearance of the Navy with most of its 

ships either sunk or scuttled during World War 

I or removed to foreign ports by departing 

contingents of forces opposing the Bolshevik 

Revolutions and Communist rule. Prior to 

World War II, the Soviet Union worked 

steadily to rebuild its navy and the navy’s 

mission together with that of the Red Army 

was limited to protecting the gains of the 

Revolution.

World War II - the Great Patriotic War. The 

onset of World War II found the Soviet Navy 

in a defensive posture at its bases. The rapid 

advance of the German Army in its surprise 

attack on the USSR (Operation Barbarossa) 

supported by the German Navy effectively 

bottled up the Baltic Fleet once it withdrew 

to bases in and near Leningrad in the Gulf 

of Finland. Even the fact that the Soviet 

fleet was put on war readiness just before 

the start of the offensive was not enough to 

stall the German advance in the Baltic. The 

Soviet Northern Fleet, which was just being 

developed in the 1930s, was also forced 

into a defensive posture. The same fate befell 

the Black Sea Fleet, which was significantly 

diminished with the capture of Sevastopol. 

Most naval personnel ended up fighting 

ashore alongside the army as the entire 

nation fought to expel the invader.

By the end of the war, resistance and exploits 

by a handful of submarine crews in the Baltic 

and North and the construction of numerous 

small craft in the Black Sea allowed the Soviet 

Navy to support the Red Army in rolling back 

the invader. In the Pacific, the modest forces 

of the Pacific Fleet entered the war close to 

the last moment in order to join in the spoils 

of victory. This overall experience left an 

indelible imprint on the Soviet political and 

military establishment, and for many years, the 

Navy’s role remained the support of the Army. 

In fact, Soviet military theoreticians asserted 

that because of the nature of the Soviet Navy, 

there could not be a “naval strategy” as 

distinct from “military strategy.”

Post-war Soviet Navy. After the war, the Soviet 

Union once again embarked on building a 
3

navy; however, the pace was slow and the 

Navy’s mission remained ill-defined. 

Post Cuban Missile Crisis. When the Soviet 

Union was embarrassed over the 1962 Cuban 

Missile Crisis, it provided Admiral Gorshkov, 

Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy 

for almost 30 years, with the opportunity 

and justification to promote equipping the 

Navy with capabilities significantly beyond 

those required for the direct support of 

the Army. Gorshkov postulated that the 

Navy, acting relatively alone, could achieve 

decisive strategic goals in Oceanic Theaters 

of Military Operations (Oceanic TMOs; in 

Russian: Oceanic TVD). Pursuing his vision 

and using his close wartime connections with 

the Soviet political leadership, he was able 

to push through robust weapons and sensor 

development as well as shipbuilding programs. 

These programs gave the Soviet Navy a role 

in strategic defense by creating more capable 

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 

that could threaten the United States and 

its NATO allies with nuclear weapons. The 

construction of a large number of generalpurpose conventional and nuclear-powered 

submarines together with numerous surface 

combatants—all armed with cruise missiles—

further threatened U.S. and Allied naval 

forces deployed in the Atlantic, Indian, and 

Pacific Oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea. 

The Soviet posture took on very offensive 

dimensions as the temperature of the Cold 

War rose.

Strategic Deterrence. The development of 

the ballistic missile submarine changed the 

strategic playing field. The adversary could 

now be threatened with assured destruction 

from invisible platforms lurking in the offshore 

ocean depths. At first, Soviet submarinelaunched ballistic missiles were of relatively 

short range, necessitating long transits to get 

within target range. They also made noisy 

Soviet submarines vulnerable to detection 

and prosecution by fixed acoustic sensor 

systems, shore-based maritime patrol aircraft, 

and attack submarines and surface ships. The 

development of longer-range ballistic missiles 

allowed the submarines that carried them to 

patrol closer to their home bases where they 

could be protected by various general-purpose 

forces and even reach their targets from their 

home piers or after surfacing through the 

Arctic icecap. 

Conventional Forces. Robust, general-purpose 

forces were developed and built to support 

the layered defense of the homeland. Small 

combatants and minesweepers protected 

adjacent home waters and were tasked to 

ensure that naval forces could not be bottled 

up in their bases. Larger, more seaworthy 

forces with greater endurance were deployed 

beyond adjacent seas to guard against 

incursions into the outer approaches to 

the Soviet Union. At the height of the Cold 

War, the Soviet Navy deployed submarine 

and surface forces globally to confront and 

monitor U.S. and Allied naval forces in 

order to preclude a surprise attack against 

the USSR. This constant shadowing posture 
4

was characterized as “the battle for the first 

salvo.” Due to an objective regard for Western 

capabilities, the Soviet sailors who manned 

the forward-deployed submarines and ships 

were under no illusion that they would survive 

the initial stages of a war, but their mission was 

to preempt or blunt the expected attack, to 

attempt to “kill the archer” and thereby lessen 

the number of incoming “arrows” aimed at 

their homeland that would have to be dealt 

with by other defending forces.

Local Conflicts and Proxy Wars. Because the 

confrontation between East and West had not 

only a military but also an ideological and 

political component, each side embraced 

a “zero sum” calculus whereby any win by 

one was automatically seen as a loss by the 

other. The USSR chose to support various 

anti-colonial or anti-Western movements in 

the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and 

Southeast Asia. This East-West contest of 

wills played out in “proxy wars” where the 

warring sides were openly or clandestinely 

supported and equipped either by the 

Soviet Union or the United States. In many 

cases, Soviet advisors accompanied the 

equipment to provide training, and in some 

1000nm range rings – Perceived TLAM threat to Russian homeland

Layered Defense. Having 

acquired the means to 

strike targets at long ranges 

using ballistic missiles 

launched from nuclearpowered submarines, it 

was now possible to 

directly protect them 

and the country against 

attacks from the sea. To 

accomplish this, the Navy 

developed a layered 

defense strategy. Today, 

the outer limit of this 

layered defense can be 

generally defined as 

about 1,000 nautical 

miles (TOMAHAWK land 

attack cruise missile range) 

from the Russian frontier 

or from Moscow. For 

western Russia, this outer 
5

cases, to actually operate weapons systems 

in wartime conditions. This activity provided 

opportunities to slough off excess or outdated 

equipment, test new battlefield weapons 

or applications, and gain intelligence on the 

equipment and tactics of the opposing side.

Today. Russia’s wartime naval strategy remains 

focused on nuclear deterrence and layered 

defense as described above. Russia is paying 

specific attention to peripheral defense, 

particularly in the Arctic where it assesses the 

effects of global climate change will potentially 

increase foreign maritime presence and where 

it has filed a claim to extended continental 

shelf rights in accordance with United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 

mandated procedures. Russia is taking steps 

to enhance its ability to protect its exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ), monitor and control the 

use of the Northern Sea Route within that EEZ, 

and improve its ability to affect search and 

rescue (SAR) operations in the Russian Arctic. 

1000nm range rings – Perceived TLAM threat to Russian homeland (Pacific)

bound runs through the 

Greenland-Iceland-United 

Kingdom gap separating 

the North Atlantic from 

the Norwegian Sea. In 

the Mediterranean, the 

line runs roughly northsouth at the boot of Italy 

defining the eastern and 

western Mediterranean. 

In the Pacific, there are 

no easily identifiable 

geographic bounds at the 

1,000 nm range (distances 

from three points provide 

general orientation). The 

disintegration of the USSR 

did more to change Russia’s 

strategic defense depth on 

land (a loss of about 300 

miles) but had negligible 

effect on seaward concerns. 
6
7

The Russian Navy is composed of 

interconnected components, spanning the 

gamut from combat forces to all elements of 

supporting infrastructure:

• Command staff

• Submarine forces

• Surface forces

• Naval auxiliaries

• Naval aviation

• Naval Infantry and Coastal Missile 

and Artillery Troops

• Naval shore establishment 

(headquarters, communications, 

intelligence, maintenance and repair, 

education and training, etc.)

The headquarters of the Russian Navy was 

recently relocated from Moscow to its 

historical home in the Admiralty building in 

St. Petersburg. The move is complete and the 

new Navy Command Center is functioning. 

Operations are directed and administrative 

orders and actions taken emanate from 

St. Petersburg. The Commander-in-Chief 

(CINC) of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor 

Viktorovich Chirkov, officially runs the Navy 

from the new headquarters, but will always 

share time between the seat of government 

in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Like his U.S. 

counterpart, Admiral Chirkov oversees and 

is ultimately responsible for all new weapons 

acquisitions of strategic importance, i.e. the 

SEVERODVINSK and the DOLGORUKIY 

submarine projects. This will include 

management of the Russian aircraft carrier 

project as well.

Historically, the CINC Navy exercises 

command authority over and provides 

administrative direction to the Navy. In this 

respect, this position somewhat combines 

the historical functions of the U.S. Chief of 

Naval Operations and the Secretary of the 

Navy. 

The Chief of Staff/First Deputy CINC is the 

second in command and is responsible for 

all operational issues and direct support. His 

organization includes the Main Operational 

Directorate and the Navy’s Main Command 

Post, as well as direct support elements such 

as communications and intelligence. 

The Deputy CINC, the third person at the 

top, oversees on a day-to-day basis all of the 

administrative elements such as personnel, 

education, shipbuilding and armaments, 

logistics, and engineering and billeting. 

He has command authority over naval 

operations only when functioning as the 

Acting CINC. 

Chapter Two:

Russian Navy: Structure and Leadership

Organization
8

The CINC Navy and the Main Navy Staff, 

responding to orders from the National 

Command Authority and in accordance 

with procedures and guidelines issued by 

the General Staff, and likely in coordination 

with the appropriate new Joint Strategic 

Commands, issue commands and directives 

to the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and 

Pacific Fleets as well as the Caspian Flotilla.

The command structures of the individual 

fleets and the Caspian Flotilla parallel those 

of the headquarters organization.

The practice of the commander having two 

deputies extends down to all major fleet 

combatants. Aboard first line ships and 

submarines, the Commanding Officer has 

both a Senior Assistant (Executive Officer) 

and another Assistant.

Within the fleet order of battle, individual 

ships and submarines are classified as 1st, 

2nd, and 3rd rank. The rank of commanding 

officers (Captains 1st – O-6, 2nd – O-5, and 

3rd – O-4 Rank) nominally corresponds to 

the rank of ship commanded.

•	 1st Rank – SSBNs, SSGNs, newest SSNs, 

CV, CGNs, CGs.

•	 2nd Rank – older SSNs, SSs, DDGs, DDs, 

FFGs, FFs, LSTs.

•	 3rd Rank – PGs, PGGs, etc.
9

Admiral Chirkov, appointed Commander-in-Chief 

of the Russian Navy in May 2012, is a lifelong 

surface officer with extensive experience in the 

Pacific and Baltic Fleets. He replaced Admiral 

Vysotskiy at a time when the chiefs of all three 

services—Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Navy—

were apparently losing their direct command 

functions to the Main Operational Directorate 

of the General Staff. In the case of the Navy, this 

occurred in November 2011. In the new Armed 

Forces structure, the focus of the Main Navy Staff 

is concentrated on man, train, and equip issues. 

However, imprecise press reports indicate that 

the specific command functions of the service 

CINCs remain unresolved. This senior personnel 

transition also came as the Navy’s Main Staff 

moved from Moscow to its historic home at the 

Admiralty building in St. Petersburg, located on 

Palace Square across from the headquarters of 

the recently established Joint Strategic Command 

West/Western Military District housed in the 

building of the former Imperial General Staff.

Chirkov came to the helm as the Navy embarked 

on a very ambitious shipbuilding, infrastructure, 

and personnel development program to create 

a new, modern, 21st-century Russian Navy. 

Upon his appointment, Chirkov said, “The most 

important thing for Russia is to build the fleet with 

support of the president and like-minded persons. 

My experience of commanding the fleet on the 

country’s western maritime frontier will allow me 

to assess the full importance and responsibility 

of this appointment.” He gave his assurance that 

within the framework of the underway reform, 

the Navy will continue to defend and ensure the 

country’s security along all of its maritime frontiers. 

Continued executive support and reliable funding 

are critical to the fulfillment of Russia’s national 

plans for renewing and developing its naval might.

Because of the longstanding process by which 

senior officers are groomed for high command 

as well as the procedures and traditions of the 

Russian Armed Forces, no significant changes 

of focus or policy were expected in the change 

from Vysotskiy to Chirkov and none have been 

observed. Political policy is developed, set, and 

promulgated by the Presidential executive. Military 

policy also flows from the Russian president and is 

developed and executed in conjunction with the 

Minister of Defense and the General Staff.

In the course of his career, Chirkov gained at-sea 

operational experience as a junior officer in the 

Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). Continuing to serve in the 

Pacific, he rose to command of an UDALOY I 

destroyer, higher to group command, and then 

to combined force command in charge of all 

Russian forces—submarine, surface-, air-, and 

land-based on the Kamchatka Peninsula. With 

his posting to the Baltic Fleet, he gained broader 

insight and exposure to the European theater 

and visited most of the Baltic countries while 

also hosting many visitors to the Baltic Fleet at its 

main base in Baltiysk, Kaliningrad Oblast, and to 

St. Petersburg. Prior to his appointment as CINC 

Russian Navy, there were rumors that he would 

return to Vladivostok and be posted to command 

the Pacific Fleet, but clearly higher command 

decided otherwise and appointed him to head the 

Russian Navy.

(Chronology next page)

Admiral Viktor Chirkov

Commander-in-Chief

Russian Navy
10

Admiral Viktor Chirkov

Chronology

08 Sep 1959 Born in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan SSR

1979–1982 Attended and graduated from S.O. Makarov Higher Naval School, Vladivostok, 

 USSR

 Commissioned as Lieutenant (U.S. O-1 equivalent)

Commander of Mine-Torpedo Department, Patrol Ship, Pacific Fleet

 Assistant to CO of PACFLT patrol ship

Executive officer, KOTLIN DD VOZBUZHDENNYY, Pacific Fleet

1986 Attended Advanced Special Officers’ Classes, Leningrad

(U.S. SWOS and PXO/PCO courses equivalent)

1987–1990 Commanding Officer, KRIVAK I FF STOROZHEVOY, Pacific Fleet

1990–1993 Commanding Officer, UDALOY I DD ADMIRAL SPIRIDONOV, PACFLT

1993–1998 Deputy Chief of Staff, ASW ship formation, Pacific Fleet

Deputy Commander, ASW ship formation, Pacific Fleet 

Commander, 44th Brigade of ASW ships, Vladivostok, Pacific Fleet

1997 Graduated N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy, St. Petersburg (by correspondence)

 (U.S. Naval War College equivalent)

1998–2000 Attended and graduated from General Staff Academy, Moscow

(requirement for senior flag positions at fleet and national level)

2000–Jun 2005 Chief of Staff/1st Deputy Commander, Northeast Group of Troops and Forces, 

Pacific Fleet

Jun 2005–Feb 2007 Commander, Primorsk Combined Forces Flotilla, Vladivostok, Pacific Fleet

Feb 2007–Sep 2009 Chief of Staff / 1st Deputy Commander, Baltic Fleet

Sep 2009–May 2012 Commander, Baltic Fleet

6 May 2012–present Appointed Commander-in-Chief, Russian Federation Navy

Decorations:

Order “For Service to the Nation in the Armed Forces”, 3rd Degree

Order “For Military Achievement”

Order “For Naval Achievement”
11

The Russian military leadership structure is 

the product of many decades of history and 

tradition. Due to the enormity of the Russian 

land, and for the most part, the difficulty 

and expense of moving and finding suitable 

housing, most of the Russian officer corps, 

Navy as well as Ground Forces, have tended 

to remain relatively geographically stationary. 

Service schools are the predominant path 

to service as an officer and a young man 

aspiring to a naval career normally chooses 

to attend one of five naval commissioning 

schools, usually the one near his home. The 

curricula of these schools reflect the political, 

ethical, and moral expectations Russia sets for 

future officers through a rigid set of training 

requirements. The exception to a near home 

choice would be choosing to attend the St. 

Petersburg Naval Institute Peter the Great 

Corps (established in 1701), the premier school 

of the naval service, with an eye on a future 

high leadership position. Once commissioned, 

he will be assigned to serve in a unit located 

within the immediate or adjacent geographic 

region. Once settled in, he has the potential 

to progress in rank through Captain 1st Rank 

(O-6 equivalent) within the same overall 

military unit, possibly on the same ship. 

Promotions in rank through Captain 3rd Rank 

(O-4) are dominantly within the purview of the 

immediate commanding officer. Promotion to 

higher ranks involves decisions by formation 

and fleet commanders. Flag ranks are the 

combined purview of the Navy Command 

and the Ministry of Defense.

The only alternate path to service as an 

officer is through what are called “military 

faculties” of a very limited number of civilian 

university level educational institutions. These 

are rough equivalents of the U.S. Reserve 

Officer Training Corps (ROTC) units. There is 

no Officer Candidate School (OCS) path in the 

Russian military.

Only when an officer is identified as having 

the potential to rise to higher flag rank and 

assume senior command is it likely that he 

may be rotated to a different geographic area. 

At this rank, some of the difficulties otherwise 

inherent in making permanent change of 

station changes are overcome by seniority and 

deference to command position. Even so, large 

geographic shifts are still rare for the majority 

of the Russian officer cadre. 

Future Leadership

Russian sailors on the bridge of USS Fort McHenry 

(LSD 43)
12

Career Ladders

The Russian Armed Forces, and specifically 

the Navy, have fairly rigid careers ladders. The 

Russian military system does not train and 

educate “generalists”; the focus is on “masters 

of their craft.” Newly commissioned officers 

are screened and selected for command 

possibilities early. This selection is dominantly 

made by commanding officers at the Captain 

2nd Rank (O-5) and Captain 1st Rank (O-6) 

level, since these same officers are responsible 

for awarding the early promotions in rank. 

As noted previously, only once reaching 

the Captain 2nd Rank level are promotion 

considerations usually made by senior 

organizational staff and senior commanders. A 

young, newly commissioned officer coming 

to his first ship or submarine places his career 

fate in the hands of his commanding officer. 

The military educational system focuses on 

qualifying officers for their initial assignments 

in specific specialties. A fleet/unit assignment 

choice preference is given to those graduating 

at the top of their class (gold medalist/red 

diploma). This qualification also plays a 

significant role in the perception of selecting 

commanding officers. 

Career paths are set early. Young officers with 

specialties in navigation and weapons have 

the best chance for advancement to command 

positions. Officers with specialties in engineering, communications, and so on, dominantly 

will only have career paths in those specialties and will not qualify for command. In this 

regard, the Russian Navy functions similarly to 

many European navies.

Path to Command

The classic path to command, both at sea and 

at the higher leadership levels of the Navy, 

is through the navigation specialty—with 

weapons as a close second. Navigation and 

weapons specialists are always “where the 

action is.” They constantly work in close 

proximity to, in coordination with, and under 

the direct command of their commanding 

officers. Under such working conditions, they 

have the opportunity to closely observe the 

workings and practice of the art of command, 

and conversely, they are constantly under the 

watchful eyes of their seniors. 

A typical path is to rise from commander of a 

specific team to division and department head. 

From there, the decision is made whether a 

promising officer is deemed fit for command, 

at which point he would be considered for the 

position as assistant to the Executive Officer 

of that ship, or effectively, third in Command. 

This position is typically held for three to five 

years, and then the transition to Executive 

Officer is made; this position is held for four 

to five years. With a background of success, 

he will then move on to be Commanding 

Officer. Command may be aboard that vessel 

or transition to another ship to serve as the 

Commander. It is not at all the exception that 

this entire portion of a naval career can be 

spent on a single ship or submarine or those 

of the same class. There are, of course, some 

breaks for en route courses; however, there 

are no ship-shore rotations. The only times 

of relatively prolonged “shore” periods is 

when the assigned ship or submarine is 
13

down for maintenance or overhaul. In this 

way, the first twenty years of a naval career 

becomes the “ship” rotation. Only when 

an officer is assigned to a group staff does 

a “shore” rotation truly begin. However, 

even as a member of a group staff, there 

are still extended periods spent at sea 

overseeing training, exercises, certifications, or 

deployments.

With all of this as prologue, the path to the 

very top of the naval leadership pyramid is 

a combination of many early pre-selections. 

Many early-made decisions preclude 

options to rise to the top. When reviewing 

candidates for senior formation and fleet 

command, only those officers who are the 

top performing commanders at lower levels 

are in the running. Again, the only path to 

high command is for those firmly entrenched 

in the “command” line. 

Once an officer reaches one of the two senior 

deputy positions at the formation or fleet 

level, usually the Chief of Staff has been the 

one who will succeed to the Commander’s 

chair. There have been exceptions where the 

Deputy Commander has gone on to be the 

Commander, but those are rare.

When a senior vacancy is rumored or arises, 

one should look at the pool of the immediately 

subordinate commanders, first locally, and 

then perhaps more widely afield. The wider 

look obviously mostly applies to appointments 

to the senior three positions at the overall navy 

and fleet levels. All flag officer appointments 

are scrutinized at the Navy Main Staff and 

Defense Ministry levels, but those to fleet 

command positions also are reviewed at 

the presidential level. These are executive 

decisions; no legislative review or approval is 

required.

According to standing legislation, the age 

limit for service in the rank of admiral is 60. 

This can be extended “at the pleasure of the 

President” in one-year increments.

Current information regarding Russian Navy 

leadership is available on the pullout inside the 

back cover.
14
15

Chapter Three

Procurement: 

Shift to Quality Over Quantity

Udaloy II DD and Kuznetsov CV at anchor Severomorsk

Procurement

Naval procurement is a multi-stage 

process. The navy assesses and develops 

its requirements for platforms and their 

characteristics in light of its assigned missions 

to support and fulfill the officially promulgated 

Russian Federation security and defense 

policies and doctrine. These requirements 

are developed in close coordination with the 

Ministry of Defense and, when approved, are 

included in the multi-year State Armaments 

Plan. The State Defense Order is the vehicle 

which puts specific requirements into 

development and production. This entire 

process involves close coordination between 

the Defense Ministry and major scientific and 

industrial organizations belonging to other 

ministries.

At the national level, defense related arms 

production is managed both for domestic 

use and for foreign sale. The proceeds from 

foreign arms are used both as a general source 

of federal revenue and to defray or subsidize 

the cost of domestic weapons development 

and production. In the naval arena, Russia, 

as the Soviet Union before it, offers a wide 

variety of military products for sale. In recent 

years Russia has sold KILO Class submarines 

to Algeria and Vietnam, GEPARD Class 

frigates to Vietnam, TALWAR II Class frigates 

and a modified KIEV Class aircraft carrier to 

India. High performance missile systems of 

the CLUB weapons family (export version 

of the domestic KALIBR family) have been 

sold and heavily advertised for sale for over 

a decade. The BRAHMOS anti-ship missile, 

closely related to the S-N-26 STROBILE, was a 

joint Russia-India development program. The 

marketing showcases for these and other naval 

arms merchandise have included the biennial 

International Maritime Defense Show (IMDS) 

held in St. Petersburg and various other major 

arms shows held both in Russia and around 

the world.

We have multiple reflections in the intelligence 

record of state-of-the-art weapons systems, 

Russian technical assistance, and related 

arms traffic from Russia to many non-peer 

foreign actors. This proliferation of high grade 

weapons is one of the most troubling aspects 

of Russian Federation adventurism worldwide.

Quality

In the post-Soviet era, the Russian government 

has taken a more cost effective approach to 

military procurement in an attempt to find 

and cut waste, fraud, and embezzlement 

of procurement funds. Significant steps 

have been taken to ensure that the defense 

procurement ruble results in a “ruble’s worth” 

of equipment. The management of the State 

Defense Order, the government’s military 

purchase plan, is overseen by a Ministry of 

Defense department. 
16

For naval platform purchases, the emphasis 

has been—with the sole exception of strategic 

systems—on multipurpose platforms designed 

with sufficient capability and margin for future 

modernization in order to maximize the use of 

the basic hull and propulsion systems.

Renewal Imperative 

In late 1991, when the Russian Navy inherited 

its current order of battle of Soviet legacy ships 

and submarines, these platforms had already 

seen years of service.

The waning years of the USSR and the 

formative decade of post-Soviet Russia were 

marked by drastically cut 

military budgets. The result 

was the further degradation of 

a fleet already badly in need 

of maintenance and repair.

The charts (see foldouts) 

depicting the Russian Navy’s 

current major combatant 

order of battle (OOB) clearly 

show that the average age 

of most of the ships and 

submarines is more than 20 

years. A nominal service 

life for most Soviet ships 

and submarines when built 

was considered to be 25 

years. With diligent care and 

appropriate maintenance, 

the service lives of the larger, 

more robustly built units 

can be extended by five to 

ten years—possibly fifteen. These fleet OOB 

charts depict such selected extended service 

lives and also clearly illustrate the current age 

of Russia’s Soviet legacy fleet. 

Overall, these charts, a more accurate and 

detailed version of which undoubtedly graces 

a wall in the Russian Navy’s shipbuilding 

and repair directorate, clearly shows that the 

Russian Navy faces the imperative of new 

construction in order to avoid disappearing 

in the 2020 timeframe. An additional chart 

depicts the staus of new construction 

programs.

Russian Navy Strategic and General Purpose Forces 

Order of Battle (OOB) 2015

Northern FleetBaltic 

Fleet

Black 

Sea Fleet

Caspian 

Flotilla

Pacific 

Fleet Totals

SSBN 7 5 12

SSGN/SSN 17 9 26

SS 6 2 4 8 18

Submarine totals 56

CV 1 1

CGN 2 2

CG 1 1 1 3

DD 4 4 8

DDG 1 2 1 2 6

FFG 1 1

FF 6 2 2 10

Major Surface totals 31

FFL 6 6 9 21

PGG 6 11 9 4 15 45

PG 7 4 11

LST 4 4 7 4 19

LCU 2 1 3

Minor Surface totals 99
17

Russia’s national leadership has recognized future naval needs, and has approved and funded 

a broad shipbuilding program that will result in a new 21st-century Russian Navy. The Navy’s 

major combatants will dominantly comprise multipurpose submarines and surface ships capable 

of conducting aerospace defense, anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare unlike their mostly single 

mission Soviet predecessors. The following briefly describes both the major programs underway 

and several that are expected to be pursued in the future. (See the chart, similar in format to that 

showing the current major combatant order of battle, depicting the status of new construction.)

The Future Fleet

“The nuclear submarine fleet is the priority in the 

Navy shipbuilding program.”

- Admiral Viktor Chirkov, 

Commander-in-Chief, Russian Navy

6 July 2015

Submarines are the capital ships of the Russian 

Navy. This is dictated by Russia’s geography— 

constrained direct access to major ocean 

areas everywhere but in the Pacific makes 

surface ship operations vulnerable to potential 

enemy action. The inherent covert nature 

of submarines enhances their survivability 

whether operating locally or when transiting 

into more open sea areas.

Placing a priority on strategic deterrence 

and defense, Russia’s recapitalization of its 

submarine forces began with its strategic 

ballistic missile submarines. Construction of 

general purpose nuclear and non-nuclear 

submarines was second in importance.

DOLGORUKIY Class SSBN

(in series construction)

The Yuriy Dolgorukiy, first unit of the 

DOLGORUKIY nuclear-powered ballistic 

submarine (SSBN) Class, also known as the 

Borey or Design 955, was designed by the 

Rubin Design Bureau in St. Petersburg and 

laid down in late 1996, initially to complement 

and eventually to replace the DELTA III Class 

SSBNs. The class, with each submarine 

equipped with 16 launchers for launched 

ballistic missiles (SLBM), will form the core 

of Russia’s naval strategic nuclear forces for 

most of the 21st century. (Note: SLBMs can be 

launched from a submarine moored at a pier, 

i.e., not submerged.) The DOLGORUKIY Class 

is equipped with the SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM, an 

inter-continental, sea-based ballistic missile with 

a reported range of 8,500 km. The missile test 

program encountered many difficulties, delaying 

the submarine’s expected 2009 acceptance 

into the Navy. The missile’s shortfalls were said 

to have been caused by technical malfunctions 

and quality control issues in final assembly; 

however, testing continued and the flaws were 

investigated and eliminated. 

Submarines

DOLGORUKIY Class 

Basic Characteristics:

Type SSBN

(Russian) Borey

Design # 995/995M

Length 170 meters

Displacement (full) 24,000 tons

Propulsion Nuclear

Speed 29 knots

Crew 107

Main Armament 16x SS-N-32 BULAVA
18

The Yuriy Dolgorukiy was finally accepted into 

the Russian Fleet on 10 January 2013, several years later than originally expected. The 

second unit, Aleksandr Nevskiy, was delivered 

in late December 2013 and the third—Vladimir Monomakh—is completing sea trials. Two 

more units, Knyaz Vladimir and Knyaz Oleg, 

are under construction in Severodvinsk, Russia. 

It has been publicly announced that construction program is to deliver eight units by the 

end of 2020. 

SEVERODVINSK SSGN 

(in series construction)

The SEVERODVINSK SSGN, also known as 

the Yasen and Design 885, is a 4th generation 

submarine designed as a multi-purpose 

nuclear attack submarine. The lead submarine, 

Severodvinsk, designed by the Malakhit 

Bureau in St. Petersburg, was laid down at 

Sevmash Shipyard on 21 December 1993. 

The specific missions of SEVERODVINSK 

SSGN include anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 

anti-surface warfare (ASuW), as well as land 

attack missions. This submarine class will be 

armed with a wide range of advanced cruise 

missiles to destroy enemy ships and targets 

ashore. The lead unit was launched on 15 

June 2010 and commissioned for trial service 

on 17 January 2014, some ten years after 

construction began. Eight are planned to be 

built through 2020. 

The construction of the lead submarine has 

taken an extensive period of time, suggesting 

there has been considerable scope for redesign, technical upgrades, and the use of 

modern design techniques and the inclusion 

of up-to-date materials and systems. 

Fifth Generation SSN/SSGN

Nuclear General Purpose Submarine

(projected, not in construction)

In early 2006, then Russian Navy 

Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir 

Masorin discussed the future composition 

of the Russian submarine force. As part of 

this force, he noted that a nuclear submarine 

of an unknown type was currently under 

development. Speaking later, Rear Admiral 

Shlemov in charge of naval shipbuilding 

expanded on this, highlighting that this new 

type submarine would have a displacement 

of 5,000–6,000 tons. This new, smaller 

submarine’s main mission would be the 

protection of the DOLGORUKIY Class SSBN, 

allowing the multi-mission SEVERODVINSK 

to perform other navy missions. As of 2006, 

both the Rubin Design Bureau and Malakhit 

Design Bureau were said to be interested in 

undertaking the design of this submarine. The 

general designer of the Rubin Bureau has 

reiterated the requirement of future Russian 

submarines to be smaller in displacement. 

However, there has been no further public 

discussion of the design or announcement that 

SEVERODVINSK Class 

Basic Characteristics:

Type SSGN

(Russian) Yasen

Design # 885/885M

Length 120 meters

Displacement (full) 11,800–13,800 tons

Propulsion Nuclear

Speed 31 knots

Crew ~80

Main Armament 32x VLS KALIBR
19

PETERSBURG Class 

Basic Characteristics:

Type SS

(Russian) Lada

Design # 677

Length ~67 meters

Displacement (full) ~1,800 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed ~20 knots

Crew ~35

a final design has been approved. Based on 

typical timelines for submarine development, a 

launch prior to 2020 is unlikely.

PETERSBURG Class SS

(limited series construction uncertain)

The PETERSBURG SS, also known as Lada 

and Design 677, is a diesel-electric submarine 

intended to be a technological advance on 

the KILO Design 636, specifically with regard 

to propulsion, sonar, and combat information 

support. The class is the product of the Rubin 

Central Marine Equipment Design Bureau and 

was built by the Admiralty Shipyard, both are 

in St. Petersburg. The lead hull Sankt Peterburg, 

laid down in 1997 and commissioned in 

2010 for trial operation, is now located in the 

Northern Fleet. During initial trials problems 

were encountered with the electric propulsion 

system, the main sonar, and combat 

information system. It has been reported that 

these issues have been resolved and work has 

restarted on hull two Kronshtadt, laid down 

in 2005. The future of hull three, laid down in 

2006, remains uncertain.

Advanced Non-Nuclear General Purpose 

Submarine

(projected, not in construction)

Work on a future non-nuclear submarine, 

design covername Kalina, has been 

announced with work underway at the Rubin 

Design Bureau. It is expected to have an airindependent propulsion plant (AIP). Laydown 

of the lead unit is projected soon after 2020.

Unlike the case with submarines, the Navy 

approached the recapitalization of its surface 

fleet starting with smaller sized units and 

progressively building larger ones.

KILO Class 

Basic Characteristics:

Type SS

(Russian) Varshavyanka

Design # 636.3

Length 73.8 meters

Displacement (full) 3,950 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed 20 knots

Crew 52

Main Armament KALIBR from torpedo tubes
20

Minor Combatants

ASTRAKHAN Class PG

Patrol Combatant

The Astrakhan is the lead ship of the Buyan 

or Project 21630 PG designed by Zelenodolsk 

Project Design Bureau and built by the Almaz 

Shipyard in St. Petersburg. The lead unit was 

laid down 30 January 2004, was launched 10 

September 2005, and was commissioned 13 

September 2006. This class is dominantly being deployed in the Caspian Sea.

The Astrakhan was first displayed during 

the annual Navy Day parade on the Neva 

River in St. Petersburg before delivering it 

to the Russian Navy’s Caspian Flotilla on 1 

September 2006. Two more units, Volgodonsk

(originally Kaspiysk) and Makhachkala were 

delivered to the Russian Navy 29 June and 4 

Dec 2012, respectively.

The engineer of Astrakhan, Guard Capt 3rdRank Sergey Parfeyev, stated the PG’s two 

diesel engines drive a reversible water jet 

steering unit for high maneuverability. 

SVIYAZHSK PGG Guided Missile Patrol Ship

(in series construction)

The Buyan design was modified to the 

increased displacement Buyan-M Design 

21631 to include an eight-cell vertical launch 

system (VLS) capable of firing the KALIBR 

family of missiles as well as the YAKHONT 

anti-ship missile (see missile section). Grad 

Sviyazhsk in the Caspian is the lead unit of this 

design with additional units in construction 

for both the Caspian Flotilla and the Black Sea 

Fleet. The export variant of these designs is 

called Tornado.

Surface Combatants

ASTRAKHAN Class 

Basic Characteristics:

Type PG

(Russian) Buyan

Design # 21630

Length 62 meters

Displacement (full) ~500 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed 26 knots

Crew 30–35

Main Armament 1x 100mm gun

SVIYAZHSK Class 

Basic Characteristics:

Type PGG

(Russian) Buyan-M

Design # 21631

Length 74 meters

Displacement (full) ~950 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed 25 knots

Crew 30–35

Main Armament 8x VLS KALIBR
21

Major Combatants

BYKOV Class FFLG Guided Missile Corvette

(in series construction)

The Design 22160 BYKOV Class was 

designed by the Severnoye (Northern) Design 

Bureau in St. Petersburg and is being built at 

Zelenodolsk Shipyard. At about 1,500 tons 

displacement and armed with KALIBR family 

and Yakhont missiles, these corvettes will 

perform adjacent water patrol duties likely in 

the Black and Baltic Seas. Two units, Vasiliy 

Bykov and Dmitriy Rogachev, were laid down 

in 2014, with the first to be commissioned as 

early as 2016.

STEREGUSHCHIY Class FF Frigate/FFG 

Guided Missile Frigate

(in series construction)

The Design 20380 STEREGUSHCHIY Class 

was designed by the Almaz Central Naval 

Design Bureau in St. Petersburg and is 

being built by the (Severnaya Verf) Northern 

Shipyard in the same city. Construction 

of additional units is also underway in the 

Far East at the Amur Shipyard in the city of 

Komsomolsk on the Amur River. 

The warship is designed for operations in 

adjacent maritime zones, fighting enemy 

surface ships and submarines, as well as to 

provide naval gunfire support for amphibious 

landings. It is also a replacement for the 

GRISHA Class frigates (FFL). The ship has a 

helicopter landing pad and hangar (for 1x Ka27) and is equipped with the latest electronic 

equipment and communications systems.

Steregushchiy, the lead hull, was laid down 

in December 2001, launched in May 2006, 

and began initial sea trials in November 

2006; it required 15 months of trials and 

equipment testing before commissioning in 

late February 2008. As of August 2015, four 

hulls (Steregushchiy, Soobrazitelnyy, Boykiy, 

and Stoykiy) have been launched and 

commissioned in St. Petersburg. Beginning 

with Boykiy, the design included a VLS cell 

for the REDUT/POLIMENT (SA-NX-28) air 

defense missile system; this changed the type 

designation from FF to FFG. At the Far East 

Amur Shipyard, workers laid the keel for their 

first STEREGUSHCHIY hull, the Sovershennyy, 

in late June 2006 with an estimated delivery 

date of 2011. It was finally launched in 

May 2015. A second unit, Gromkiy, was 

reported laid down on 17 February 2012. 

The STEREGUSHCHIY design has an export 

version, Design 20382 Tigr.

Modified STEREGUSHCHIY Class FFG 

Guided Missile Frigate

(in series construction)

The Design 20385 Gremyashchiy is a 

modification of the original 20380 design with 

the installation of improved radar system and 

a VLS cell capable of launching the KALIBR 

family of missiles and the YAKHONT anti-ship 

cruise missile. Due to problems arising from 

economic sanctions against Russia related to 

STEREGUSHCHIY Class 

basic characteristics:

Type FF

Design # 20380

Length 104.5 meters

Displacement (full) 2,220 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed ~27 knots

Crew ~100
22

Ukraine, the inability to acquire German diesel 

propulsion systems will likely limit this design 

to two ships, Gremyashchiy and Provornyy. 

There have been reports of work on another 

improved 20386 design.

GRIGOROVICH Class FFGS

Guided Missile Frigate

(in series construction)

The GRIGOROVICH Class, Design 11356, 

was designed by the Severnoye (Northern) 

Design Bureau in St. Petersburg, and built by 

the Yantar Shipyard in Kaliningrad. It is the 

latest variation of the long-produced KRIVAK 

FFG and in some respects could be called a 

KRIVAK V design. (KRIVAK I and II – Soviet 

Navy; KRIVAK III – Soviet Border Guards; 

KRIVAK IV – the TALWAR Class for India.) 

The lead unit, Admiral Grigorovich, is in sea 

trials and the second unit, Admiral Essen, was 

launched on 7 November 2014. It was to be 

followed by four additional units: Admiral 

Makarov, Admiral Butakov, Admiral Istomin,

and Admiral Kornilov. Admiral Makarov will 

be completed but the last three have been 

cancelled because of Russia’s inability to 

acquire marine gas turbines from Ukraine due 

to imposed sanctions.

Due to delays in constructing the new design 

GORSHKOV Class frigates and a critical need 

to replace the aging inventory of the Black Sea 

Fleet, the decision was made to order six units 

of this proven design. An additional benefit 

was the fact that the Yantar Shipyard already 

had proven assembly experience with this 

design, having built a series for India. All six 

GRIGOROVICH units were expected to be in 

the Black Sea by 2020.

GORSHKOV Class FFG

Guided Missile Frigate

(in series construction)

The GORSHKOV Class, Project 22350, also 

known as the “Admiral Class”, was designed 

by the Severnoye (Northern) Design Bureau in 

St. Petersburg.

The lead hull, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet 

Union Gorshkov, was laid down in February 

2006 at St. Petersburg’s Northern Shipyard. 

Then Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov 

stated that hull 1 would be launched in 2011. 

Surprisingly, it was launched in late October 

STEREGUSHCHIY (GREMYASHCHIY) Class 

basic characteristics:

Type FFG

Design # 20385

Length 104.5 meters

Displacement (full) 2,200 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed ~27 knots

Crew ~100

Main Armament 8x VLS KALIBR

GRIGOROVICH Class 

basic characteristics:

Type FFG

Design # 11356

Length ~130 meters

Displacement (full) 4,500 tons

Propulsion Diesel-Gas Turbine

Speed ~30 knots

Crew 190

Main Armament 8x VLS KALIBR
23

2010. However, it has undergone a long postlaunch fitting out period. FADMSU Gorshkov 

may be commissioned in 2015, and assigned 

to the Baltic Fleet.

The GORSHKOV Class is a multi-mission 

missile frigate for air, surface, and submarine 

warfare roles. It is intended for combat 

operations in distant and close-in maritime 

zones, as well as for participating in the 

execution of missions in the oceanic zone. 

The Russian Navy’s original plans called for 

20 GORSHKOV units (five units for each of 

its four fleets). However, pending cost overruns and issues with weaponry performance 

as well as issues with the acquisition of 

marine gas turbines from Ukraine may 

reduce the number of FFGs actually 

produced or greatly extend the construction 

schedule, or both. Russian re-tooling of 

domestic production to provide the required 

marine gas turbines may result in a two-year 

or longer delay. 

New Generation Destroyer (DDG)

(projected, not in construction)

A design development program, covername 

Lider [Leader] and possibly Design 23560, is 

underway to replace the aging UDALOY and 

SOVREMENNYY class inventories. Depending 

on propulsion type, the design could be a 

8,000 to 18,000 ton ship combining both 

destroyer and cruiser characteristics with 

robust air, surface, and submarine warfare, as 

well as anti-missile defense capabilities. 

Russia reportedly intends to build six such 

ships for both the Northern and Pacific fleets 

(12 total). The lead unit is not likely to be built 

earlier than the mid-2020s.

Press reports have mentioned that the 

propulsion for this class, whether conventional 

gas turbine or nuclear, is not yet determined. 

The resolution may depend on decisions yet 

to be made regarding a new aircraft carrier 

which, if built, is likely to be nuclear-powered.

GORSHKOV Class 

basic characteristics:

Type FFG

Design # 22350

Length 130 meters

Displacement (full) 4,500 tons

Propulsion Diesel-Gas Turbine

Speed ~30 knots

Main Armament 16x VLS KALIBR

New generation destroyer

basic characteristics:

Type DDG/CG(N)

(Russian) Lider

Design # 23560

Length ~200 meters

Displacement (full) 8,000–18,000 tons

Propulsion Gas Turbine/Nuclear

Speed ~30 knots

Crew ~300

Main Armament ~32–64x VLS KALIBR
24

New Generation CVN

Vice Admiral (retired) Anatoliy Shlemov, of 

the United Shipbuilding Corporation, spoke to 

design progress as of 2009 on a future aircraft 

carrier program. Russian designers are currently 

working on the aircraft carrier’s requirements 

and tactical-technical tasks. This preliminary 

design work is being conducted by the Neva 

Planning and Design Bureau in conjunction 

with the Krylov State Scientific Center in St. 

Petersburg, which also designed the previous 

KIEV and KUZNETSOV Class carriers. A model 

of a new carrier, preliminary Design 23000 

covername Shtorm (Storm), was displayed at 

the International Maritime Defense Show in St. 

Petersburg both in 2013 and 2015. 

Very preliminary published characteristics 

reveal that the new aircraft carrier will carry a 

new generation of jet fighters and unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs). Unlike the KUZNETSOV 

CV that was built with 12 SS-N-19 anti-ship 

cruise missiles, the new carrier will not carry 

surface-to-surface cruise missiles. Its propulsion 

plant would be nuclear-powered, providing 

the ship with a full power speed around 29 

knots. At least three nuclear-powered aircraft 

carriers have been discussed; one for the 

Northern Fleet, one for the Pacific Fleet, and 

a third hull—a replacement carrier—would be 

undergoing scheduled repairs. Former Navy 

CINC Vladimir Masorin stated in 2007 that six 

aircraft carriers would be necessary, three each 

in the Northern and Pacific Fleets: one active, 

one in training, and one in maintenance. 

Construction of a new CV poses a challenge 

for Russia. The KIEV and KUZNETSOV Class 

carriers were built at Chernomorskoye Shipyard 

in Nikolayev, Ukraine, now unavailable to the 

Russians. Two shipyards in Russia that could 

solicit such a contract are the Baltic Shipyard 

in St. Petersburg and Sevmash Shipyard 

in Severodvinsk. These two shipbuilding 

enterprises reportedly have requested to be 

retooled and reequipped. They also want 

new technologies to be introduced in order 

to increase their plant’s production efficiency. 

However, there have been plans to close Baltic 

Shipyard by the 2020s and ambitious shipyard 

development plans for Sevmash have been 

discussed. In addition to manufacturing issues, 

the Russian Navy will have to solve issues of 

basing, support, new frigate/destroyer escorts, 

training, and billeting for thousands of carrier 

crew members.

Although recent statements by the naval 

leadership continue to promote the 

construction of aircraft carriers, it is likely that 

there will be extensive discussion and debate 

before final decisions are made. In light of the 

extensive work required to enable Russia to 

build an aircraft carrier, construction is not 

likely to begin until about the mid-2020s.

New generation CVN

Basic Characteristics:

Type CVN

(Russian) Shtorm

Design # 23000

Length ~300 meters

Displacement (full) ~100,000 tons

Propulsion Nuclear

Speed ~30 knots

Crew 4,000–5,000

Main Armament 80–90 aircraft
25

GREN Class 

basic characteristics:

Type LST

Design # 11711

Length 120 meters

Displacement (full) 5,000 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed 18 knots

Crew 100

Main Armament 1x AK-176 76mm gun

GREN Class LST

Tank Landing Ship

(in construction, series production uncertain)

The GREN Class, Design 11711, tank landing 

ship was designed by the Neva Project Design 

Bureau in St. Petersburg.

Ivan Gren, the lead hull, was laid down on 

23 December 2004 at Kaliningrad’s Yantar 

Shipyard. It was planned that the new LST 

would be built in three and a half to four 

years resulting in a launch possibly in 2008. 

However, due to financial issues, the Ivan 

Gren was not launched until late May 2012, 

and work continues. A second unit, Petr 

Morgunov, was laid down on 11 June 2015.

The amphibious lift capacity will be on the 

order of 13x main battle tanks (or 40 BTR), and 

up to 300x assault troops. 

Its main difference from the amphibious 

ships used presently by the Navy is that it 

will disembark landing troops on a beach in 

a new way. The new, contact-less unloading 

method assumes the use of series-production 

engineer pontoons, which are normally used 

by the ground troops when they ford water 

barriers. A pontoon bridge is formed from 

several pontoons extended from the bow, 

along which heavy and light vehicles can be 

moved and disembarked onto the beach. The 

LST will also be able to transport standard 20-

foot sea containers carrying all kinds of cargo. 

There is a cargo crane with a capacity of 16 

tons for loading and unloading operations on 

the ship.

MISTRAL Class LHA 

(Built, delivery to Russia cancelled)

In 2011, the Russian president approved 

the negotiation of a contract with France to 

purchase two MISTRAL Class amphibious 

assault ships. Four total units had been planned; 

the initial two units were to be built in France. 

Russia stated that a decision would be made on 

whether to construct hulls 3 and 4 via external 

contract or indigenously in 2016, after the 

Russian Navy had operated hulls 1 and 2.

This contract has allowed Russia to benefit 

from the French builder’s experience in 

Amphibious ships
26

Mistral Class 

basic characteristics:

Type LHA

Length 199 meters

Displacement (full) 21,300 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed 18.5 knots

Crew 177

modular surface ship construction concepts 

that are critical for short build times (two 

years for the MISTRAL vice up to six for 

standard production at a Russian shipyard). A 

fully integrated digital system to manage and 

operate all ships’ systems was incorporated in 

the MISTRAL design. The actual construction 

of the first two ships was a joint effort with 

the forward halves built in St. Nazaire, France, 

and the stern halves, housing the well deck 

and helicopter hangar, built at the Russian 

Baltic Shipyard, St. Petersburg. Final assembly 

and initial sea trials were conducted in 

France. The acquisition of MISTRALs and 

their basing in the Pacific Fleet would have 

provided the Russian Navy with significant 

power projection options and also would 

allow Russia to more effectively participate in 

humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) 

operations.

The original French MISTRAL design was 

modified for Russian use by incorporating a 

stronger in-water hull to allow for possible use 

in ice conditions and a higher hangar deck 

clearance to accommodate the size of the 

Ka-29 assault and the naval version of the Ka52 Alligator attack helicopters planned to be 

deployed aboard. The ship was to be able to 

carry up to 16 helicopters and the helicopters, 

weapons, and military communications 

capability would be of Russian origin. When 

completed, these units would be able to 

embark 450 Naval Infantry and varying loadouts of armored personnel carriers and/or tanks.

The first ship, Vladivostok, was to be delivered 

to Russia by the end of 2014 to complete 

outfitting before being assigned to operational 

forces. The second, Sevastopol, had initial 

sea trials planned for 2015. Both units were 

expected to be operational in late 2015 and 

were to be based in Vladivostok as part of the 

Pacific Fleet.

However, due to current events in Ukraine, the 

purchase contract has been cancelled with 

France in possession of the two ships and 

obligated to refund Russia’s investment in the 

construction.
27

Auxiliary Vessels

IVANOV Class AGI

Communications/Intelligence ship

(in series construction)

The lead unit of the IVANOV Class AGI, 

Design 18280, Yuriy Ivanov, was laid down in 

December 2004 and launched in September 

2013 at the Northern Shipyard, St. Petersburg. 

It was designed by the Aysberg Central Design 

Bureau in the same city and will be the first 

of four such intelligence/reconnaissance units, 

one for each fleet, to be built at this yard. All 

of these ships likely will be named for past 

directors of Russian Naval Intelligence. This 

design will augment and eventually replace 

the existing ocean-going BALZAM and 

VISHNYA Class units. The second unit, Ivan 

Khurs, was laid down on 14 November 2013.

BELOUSOV Class ASR

Submarine rescue ship

(in series construction)

The BELOUSOV Class, Design 21300, 

submarine rescue ship (ASR) Igor Belousov was 

designed by the Almaz Central Naval Design 

Bureau, St. Petersburg and built at the city’s 

Admiralty Shipyard. It was designed to rescue 

submarine crews, provide assistance to surface 

ships, feed compressed air and electric power 

to submarines and surface ships, and detect 

and examine ships in distress in specified areas.

Major features of the new vessel include 

a deep-sea rescue vehicle (DSRV) with a 

submergence depth of up to 700 meters, a 

deep-water dive suit for operating at a depth of 

about 500 meters, a decompression chamber 

for 60 men, one-atmosphere rigid diving suits, 

and two rescue boats. The upper deck of the 

vessel accommodates a helicopter landing pad. 

BELOUSOV Class 

basic characteristics:

Type ASR

Design # 21300

Length 105 meters

Displacement (full) 5,310 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed ~15 knots

Crew ~100

IVANOV Class 

basic characteristics:

Type AGI

Design # 18280

Length 95 meters

Displacement (full) ~4,000 tons

Propulsion Diesel

Speed 20 knots

Crew ~120
28

Oceanographic Research Vessels

The Russian Navy signed a contract in February 2009 for two classes of oceanographic 

ships. “These ships are designed for studying the seas and oceans and will pave the way 

for the rebirth and revival of Russia’s powerful science and research fleet,” said Vice 

Admiral Aleksey Burilichev, the head of the Defense Ministry’s Main Directorate for Deepsea Research. Both were designed by the Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau and will be 

constructed at Yantar Shipyard, Kaliningrad.

SELIGER

Oceanographic Research Vessel 

The SELIGER Class research vessel was 

designed by the Almaz Design Bureau, St. 

Petersburg and built by Yantar Shipyard in 

Kaliningrad.

The lead unit, Seliger, was laid down in July 

2009 and finally delivered to the Navy in the 

Black Sea in August 2012, about one year later 

than originally planned (June 2011).

Seliger is intended to conduct trials of 

special technical devices, armaments, and 

military equipment; participate in search and 

rescue; and perform scientific research and 

oceanographic work. Russia plans to use 

the vessel to test and use both manned and 

unmanned deep-sea vehicles. It is reported 

that the vessel will be used in closed seas, e.g., 

Black Sea. 

YANTAR class

Oceanographic Research Vessel

(built, series intended)

Design 22010 was also designed by the 

Almaz Design Bureau, St. Petersburg. The 

The lead unit, Igor Belousov, was laid down 

on 24 December 2005. Planned delivery to 

the Navy was to be in 2011. As of mid-2015 

the lead unit is undergoing trials and has not 

been commissioned. Former Navy CINC 

Fleet Admiral Vladimir Masorin said that a 

production order for four hulls (one for each 

fleet) would be requested. 

SELIGER Class 

basic characteristics:

Type AG

Design # 11982

Length 59.7 meters

Displacement (full) 1,100 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed ~12 knots

Crew 16+ ~20
29

YANTAR Class 

basic characteristics:

Type AG

(Russian) Kryuis

Design # 22010

Length 108 meters

Displacement (full) 5,230 tons

Propulsion Diesel-electric

Speed ~15 knots

Crew 50

lead hull, Yantar, was laid down on 8 July 2010, 

launched in December 2012, sea trials and 

delivery to the Navy was planned for 2014. 

Yantar concluded sea trials in early 2015, was 

commissioned, and embarked on its maiden 

voyage into the Atlantic in August 2015 to 

further test all of its installed equipment.

YANTAR is an ocean-going vessel intended 

for conducting research globally throughout 

the water column and at the ocean floor. It 

will carry two manned deep submergence 

vehicles capable of working at 6,000-meter 

depths. The desire for additional units has 

been voiced but no further developments 

have been observed. 
30

Naval Aviation

The Russian Navy’s aviation arm comprises shore-based and shipborne aircraft. The mediumrange IL-38 MAY and long-range Tu-142 BEAR F maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare 

(ASW) aircraft, Su-24 FENCER frontline bombers, and a variety of rotary- (helicopter) and 

fixed-wing transport aircraft make up the shore-based naval aviation force. Shipborne 

aircraft are the Ka-27 HELIX helicopters which have ASW and search and rescue (SAR) 

variants. The unique Independent Shipborne Fighter Regiment, the nucleus of KUZNETSOVclass aircraft carrier air wing, is composed of Su-33 FLANKER D and Su-25 UTG FROGFOOT 

D. The regiment focuses on frontline aircraft as well as future aircraft development efforts. 

Only new developments are addressed below.

IL-38 MAY Maritime Patrol Aircraft

(upgrade modification program)

The Ilyushin IL-38 MAY is a four-engine 

turboprop, shore-based, maritime patrol 

aircraft in operation since 1968. Its nominal 

operational range is said to be over 2,500 

km (1,360 nm). The aircraft is capable of 

supporting traditional search and rescue (SAR) 

missions as well as being the Navy’s medium 

range anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and 

reconnaissance aircraft (analogous to the U.S. 

P-3 ORION aircraft).

The IL-38 has undergone numerous updates 

over the decades. The latest development 

recently operational is the IL-38N (Novella) 

variant, said to have upgraded ASW 

systems installed. The plan to progressively 

upgrade older variants through depot-level 

maintenance has a goal to modernize 20 

airframes by 2020. IL-38s are based in the 

Navy’s Northern and Pacific Fleets.

ASW Aircraft

Fighter Aircraft

PAK-FA Future Fifth-Generation Fighter 

(in developmental testing)

The first Russian fifth-generation fighter program, called the PAK-FA, is a single-seat, 

medium-heavyweight, multi-role fighter aircraft designed primarily by the Russian company Sukhoy. The term “PAK-FA,” as used by 

Russian and Indian officials, is an acronym for 

“Perspektivnyy Aviatsionnyy Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatsii,” or “Advanced Aircraft System 

for Frontline Aviation.” Sukhoy has publicly 

used the designator “T-50,” while at least one 

Indian publication has called it “PMF.” This 

developmental weapons system has a number 

of informal names as its air force and naval 

designators have not been announced.
31

In terms of concept, the PAK-FA is supposed 

to conform to all the basic attributes of the 

fifth-generation fighter. [Concepts integral to 

the definition of 5th Generation capability 

are platforms capable of sharing information 

to increase the availability of the Common 

Operating Picture (COP).] These include low 

radar cross-section and infrared signature, 

a high level of integration of the onboard 

equipment, weapons disposed in internal 

compartments, a supersonic cruising speed 

without the use of afterburners, and supermaneuverability.

PAK-FA flight tests began in January 2010. 

Russia has four PAK-FA test aircraft in its 

inventory, with two more to be added in 2015. 

Series production of the T-50 aircraft could 

start as early as 2015 scheduled for Russian Air 

Force’s acceptance in 2016.

It can be logically considered that the further 

development of the PAK-FA program could 

include the future fighter for a new aircraft 

carrier that could become operational by the 

early 2030s, if Russia decides to build it. 

MiG-29K 

The operational life span of the Su-33 fighter, 

currently operating aboard Admiral Kuznetsov ̧ 

is coming to an end in 2015 and the Russian 

Navy has chosen the MiG-29K as a replacement 

because of lower costs. The MiG-29K was 

originally ordered by the Indian Navy for the 

INS Vikramaditya and the job of developing 

and fielding the aircraft was financed by the 

Indian government. Billed as a 4++ generation 

fighter, the aircraft features advanced air-to-air 

and air-to-ground radar capability along with 

digital touch displays and HOTAS in the cockpit. 

The avionics used by the MiG-29K allow for the 

incorporation of advanced PGM munitions. 

The aircraft is substantially strengthened to 

survive the carrier environment. It also features 

a four-channel fly-by-wire system, allowing 

for precise control when coming aboard the 

aircraft carrier. Additionally, the operators will 

enjoy the added feature of folding wings to aid 

in the movement of the aircraft in the carrier 

environment. The Russian Navy expects to 

acquire 24 fighters at a total cost of 1 billion 

dollars.
32

Helicopters

The Russian MISTRAL was 

to deploy with at most 16 

helicopters, and Russia 

wanted to deploy with 

an “8 + 8” format (eight 

attack helicopter plus eight 

transport/search and rescue 

(SAR) helicopters). The eight 

attack helicopters would be 

newly built Kamov Ka-52K 

with the remainder of the 

helicopters being Ka-29 

Helix B and Ka-27PS Helix 

D, for transport and SAR.

Ka-52 Alligator

The Ka-52 HOKUM B, nicknamed “Alligator,” 

is a two-seat, coaxial rotor, day-and-nightcapable attack helicopter. The Ka-52 was 

designed primarily as an air-to-ground attack 

helicopter with side-by-side seating. Weapons 

load includes unguided rockets, antitank 

guided missiles (ATGMs), and machine guns. 

The Ka-52K, nicknamed “Katran,” was initially 

reported as the Ka-52MD (Morskogo Desanta/

assault) and will be a Ka-52 modified for 

maritime operations. The modifications likely 

include folding rotor blades and weapons 

pylons. Internal modifications include 

upgrades to the wiring and the electrical 

instruments, which will need to be more 

resistant to an aggressive damp and salty 

environment. The helicopter will also be 

equipped with rescue rafts/vests, airframe 

floats, and a new crew escape system. Lastly, 

the under-frame supports will be strengthened 

because under rolling/pitching conditions 

a helicopter may strike the helicopter deck 

harder than when landing on the ground. The 

future delivery from the Arseneyev’s Progress 

Aircraft Plant of up to 32 Ka-52K helicopters is 

set to begin in 2015. 

Ka-29 

The Russian Navy has used some variant of 

the HELIX platform for the past 40 years. The 

aircraft is inherently stable because of the 

double counter-rotating rotor blades, which 

makes it ideal for application in the maritime 

environment. 

Designated as the Ka-29TB (Transportno 

Boyevoy/Combat transport), it features a crew 

of three who sit side-by-side. The center seat 

is the weapons operator, responsible for firing 

the weapons on the hard points and the 

cannon on the starboard side of the aircraft. 

The aircraft has nighttime assault capability 

as well. The complement of aircraft aboard 

the MISTRAL class amphibious vessels was to 

feature up to 16 Kamov products, up to eight 

of which would be the Ka-29TB.
33

Weapons

Ballistic Missiles 

Russia maintains 

a substantial 

force of nuclearpowered 

ballistic missile 

submarines 

(SSBNs) with 

intercontinentalrange missiles; 

the country is 

developing new and improved SLBM weapon 

systems to replace its current inventory of 

Cold War-era systems. Upgrades to the SS-N23, named SINEVA and LINER, are replacing 

the original SS-N-23 on DELTA IV Class 

SSBNs. The SS-N-32 BULAVA SLBM is the 

new solid-propellant SLBM deployed on the 

new DOLGORUKIY Class SSBNs. Russian 

SLBMs are capable of launch from surfaced 

and submerged SSBNs and from a variety 

of launch locations, including while moored 

at their home pier or on patrol and after 

surfacing through polar ice cover.

Anti-ship Cruise Missiles 

The Russian Navy continues to increase its 

maritime strike capability through anti-ship 

cruise missile (ASCM) and sea-launched landattack cruise missile (LACM) research and 

development programs. Missile designs are 

focused on increasing missile speed, range and 

employment flexibility in addition to improving 

the ability to penetrate ship defensive systems. 

ASCMs are deployed on multiple launch 

platforms—surface combatants, submarines, 

aircraft, and coastal defense sites—that provide 

the Russian Navy and Russia’s export customers 

with multiple maritime strike options. The 

development of new ASCM systems should not 

discredit the threat of “legacy” ASCMs.

SS-N-22 SUNBURN (MOSKIT)

The first variant of the ramjet-powered 3M-80 

MOSKIT (SS-N-22 SUNBURN) was accepted 

into service in 1984 and still presents a 

stressing threat. The 3M-80 utilizes speeds of 

Mach 2.0+, terminal maneuvers, and good 

stand-off range to maximize the probability 

of kill. Key variants include the 3M-80E 

(range 120 km) and the high-altitude cruise 

3M-80MVE (range 240 km), both of which 

have been exported to China. All variants are 

capable of being launched in salvos of up 

to eight missiles, with as little as 40 seconds 

between the first and last missile. These salvo 

launches are intended to overwhelm ships’ 

defenses, increasing the probability that at 

least one of the weapons will reach its target. 

SS-N-25 SWITCHBLADE (URAN)

On the other end of the speed spectrum 

is Russia’s entry into the small, lightweight, 

lower-cost ASCM market, the 3M-24E* URAN. 

Utilizing a turbo-jet engine, the URAN can 

be launched in salvos targeted against a 

single ship or a group of ships up to 130 km 

away. Due to the 3M-24E’s small size and light 

weight, it can be installed on a wide variety of 

platforms including ships and aircraft, giving 

SS-N-22 SUNBURN

SS-N-32 Bulava launch

*The “E” denotes the export version. Russian domestic variants assessed to be more capable.
34

considerable range and firepower to a smaller 

vessel. In addition to being used by Russia, 

where it is designated the 3M-24, the export 

version (3M-24E) has been purchased by 

Algeria, India, and Vietnam. 

SS-N-26 STROBILE (YAKHONT/ONIKS)

The recently-fielded 3M-55E* YAKHONT 

(SS-N-26 STROBILE), also known as ONIKS 

(ONYX), succeeds previous SS-N-7, -9, -12, 

and -19 anti-ship cruise missiles. This 300 

km-range (export variant) missile flies Mach 

2.5, is equipped with an advanced radar 

seeker, and conducts evasive maneuvers to 

increase its survivability. Unlike the MOSKIT 

missiles, which are launched from inclined 

launchers, the YAKHONT can be launched 

vertically. Vertical launch decreases reaction 

time against targets in any direction, while 

also reducing a ship’s radar signature by 

eliminating protrusive launch canisters above 

deck. The YAKHONT can also be salvo 

fired, and is currently launched from ships, 

coastal defense launch vehicles, and the 

SEVERODVINSK SSGN. Russia has exported 

the YAKHONT as part of the Bastion coastal 

defense missile system. 

KALIBR weapons family

KALIBR is the more capable Russian 

domestic version of the export KLUB family of 

weapons, one of Russia’s most comprehensive 

export offerings. Heavily marketed for 10 

years, the KLUB system was designed for 

ship, submarine, air, and coastal-launched 

applications. The KALIBR family includes:

•	 a land attack cruise missile (LACM), the 

SS-N-30

•	 an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), the SSN-27 SIZZLER, and 

•	 an anti-submarine missile, the 91R. 

Although all are capable of being launched 

vertically using a vertical launch system (VLS), 

they are also launched from an inclined 

orientation, from ground launchers, or from 

submarine torpedo tubes. The ASCM and 

LACM incorporate salvo capability and 

waypoint navigation. These technologies allow 

multiple weapons to be launched against 

either a single or group of ships, and approach 

from different directions, significantly 

complicating the target’s defensive task. 

Information on the export versions is used 

below in lieu of unavailable details on the 

domestic variants.

SS-N-26 STROBILE

Russia plans to deploy KALIBR capability 

on all new design construction nuclear and 

non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, 

and larger surface ships. KALIBR provides 

even modest platforms, such as corvettes, 

with significant offensive capability and, 

with the use of the land attack missile, all 

platforms have a significant ability to hold 

distant fixed ground targets at risk using 

conventional warheads. The proliferation 

of this capability within the new Russian 

Navy is profoundly changing its ability 

to deter, threaten or destroy adversary 

targets. It can be logically assumed that 

KALIBR capability will be retrofitted 

on those larger Soviet legacy ships and 

submarines that undergo major overhauls 

and/or modernization1

. 

1

 High ranking Russian defense industry official, 

12 December 2011

KALIBR
35

DRAFT 

10/2015

SS-N-30

1

Russian President V. Putin in Novorossiysk on 23 September 2014

2

Andrey Kokoshin, former Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense and Secretary of the Russian Security Council, 24 March 2011

SS-N-30 (3M-14) Land Attack Cruise Missile

The 3M-14E* LACM is visually similar to 

the 3M-54E1. Equipped with a 450 kg 

conventional warhead, waypoint navigation, 

and a 300-km range, the 3M-14E delivers a 

high range of land-attack options for ships, 

submarines, aircraft, and ground launchers. It 

is generally accepted that Russian domestic 

variants of export systems have improved 

operational characteristics over their export 

counterparts. In this regard the reported 

operational range for the KALIBR family 

3M14 SS-N-30 LACM is 300 to 1,5001

/2,5002

kilometers (160 to 930/1,550 mi). Responding 

to a question from President Putin in 

September 2014, Black Sea Fleet commander 

Admiral Vitko said that new units joining the 

fleet will have weapons with a range in excess 

of 1,500 km (930 mi). (Map depicts nominal 

1,000-mi range rings from possible launch 

points in Russia’s adjacent seas.)

1000nm range rings – Nominal KALIBR LACM ranges from fleet areas

KALIBR LAND ATTACK cruise missile ranges
36

SS-N-27 SIZZLER (3M-54) Anti-ship Cruise 

Missile

For anti-ship applications, the KLUB family 

offers the choice of either the 3M-54E* or the 

3M-54E1. The 3M-54E is a three-stage missile 

with a booster, subsonic cruise stage, and 

supersonic terminal/kill stage. With a 220 km 

(119 nm) range, supersonic kill vehicle, and 

terminal maneuvers, the 3M-54E represents 

a unique anti-ship weapon. The 3M-54E1 is 

a subsonic anti-ship cruise missile. Although 

it cruises at a similar speed as the 3M-24E, 

the 3M-54E1 features a larger warhead and a 

much longer range: 300 km versus the smaller 

3M-24E’s range of 150 km. 

91R Anti-submarine Missile

The final parts of the KLUB system, available 

only for submarines and ships, are the 91RE1 

(submarine) and 91RTE2 (ship-launched) antisubmarine missiles. The submarine-launched 

91RE1 has a range of up to 50 km, and the 

ship-launched 91RTE2 has a range of 40 

km. These weapons have a longer range 

and quicker weapon delivery time than a 

conventional torpedo. When fired in a salvo, 

up to four weapons can be deployed against a 

single target.

It is expected that Russia will continue to 

develop its ASCM capabilities, pursuing faster, 

more flexible missiles with longer-range and 

improved electronic and kinematic defense 

penetration features. Russian ASCM research 

is expected to focus on achieving hypersonic 

speeds and improving seeker capabilities, 

including the possible use of advanced radar 

seekers that allow improved countermeasure 

discrimination. The ongoing development of 

ASCMs with improved design features such 

as supersonic speed, evasive maneuvers, 

and advanced terminal seekers will present 

continuing challenges to U.S. and allied naval 

forces.

Torpedoes

Russia maintains the world’s largest and most 

diversified inventory of torpedoes. It continues 

to develop, produce, and export both AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface 

Warfare (ASUW) torpedoes; the most recentlydeveloped heavyweight torpedoes are dualpurpose, utilizing wake-homing in the ASUW 

role and active/passive acoustic homing in 

the ASW role. Russian torpedoes and torpedo 

countermeasures are often proliferated to other 

countries as part of the sale or lease of Russian 

submarines.

Russia has historically been a leader in 

developing and implementing new technology 

for torpedoes. It was the first country to field 

wake-homing torpedoes, a super-cavitating 

torpedo, and a super heavyweight 65-cm 

torpedo. One of Russia’s newest torpedoes 

is the multi-purpose depth homing torpedo 

(UGST), which entered service in 2002. The 

UGST has a monopropellant-fueled axial 

piston engine with pump jet propulsor. It is 

capable of acoustic, wire-guided, and wakehoming modes and is designed to be fired 

from both submarines and surface ships. It is 

advertised as being able to reach speeds of 

up to 50 knots and having detection ranges of 

up to 2.5 km for submarines and 1.2 km for 

SS-N-27 SIZZLER
surface ships. Technology from this weapon is 

believed to have proliferated to China. 

Mine Warfare Capabilities

Mines are one of the oldest and most effective 

naval weapons. Mines are attractive for 

many reasons, including low cost, minimal 

training, and the ability to remain in place 

for extended periods. Russia maintains the 

world’s largest and most diversified inventory 

of mines. Despite a number of years of likely 

reducing funding for mine warfare, Russia 

now appears to be revamping and increasing 

its capability with renewed interest. Russia’s 

inventory now includes a variety of moored 

contact, moored influence, bottom influence, 

mobile, propelled-warhead, and very shallow 

water mines. Although many of the mines in 

Russia’s inventory are likely vintage moored 

contact mines, its mine design has moved 

forward into the modern era. Newer mines 

include microprocessor-controlled stealthy 

mines designed to hinder mine countermeasure 

(MCM) efforts, and encapsulated-torpedo mines 

designed to launch Russia’s most advanced antisubmarine warfare lightweight torpedo.

Mine delivery is accomplished by aircraft/

helicopters, surface vessels, and submarines. 

The Russian Navy likely would employ mines 

to deter an amphibious landing in defense 

of their homeland and as part of a layered 

defense.

As a global expert in mines, Russia maintains 

and is renewing a complete MCM force 

capable of countering mines in a variety 

of environments. Since World War II, 

improvements in the Russian MCM forces 

include a large number of minesweepers, 

the introduction of nonmagnetic hull 

minesweepers, and the introduction of 

fleet-size mine-hunters. In addition, Russia 

maintains a complete suite of MCM 

equipment, including mechanical, magnetic, 

acoustic, and combined minesweeping 

systems, as well as remotely operated vehicles 

for mine-hunting and mine neutralization.

Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs)

Russia, which produces capable naval surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs), has not only continued 

to equip its own ships but has demonstrated 

a willingness to sell its leading air defense 

weapons on the export market. In recent years, 

the Russians have primarily exported two 

naval SAM systems, the medium range SHTIL-1 

and the longer range RIF-M. The SHTIL-1 is 

the primary air defense weapon onboard 

the three Russian-built Indian TALWAR Class 

Frigates, the four SOVREMENNYY (956 and 

956E) Class destroyers sold to China, and the 

two LUYANG I Class destroyers built in China. 

The RIF-M was sold to China for use on the 

two LUZHOU Class destroyers operated by 

the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N)). In 

both cases, the introduction of these weapons 

represented a significant increase in the overall 

naval air defense capability of both the Indian 

and Chinese navies.

The intent of the SHTIL-1 is to engage 

maneuvering aircraft, helicopters, and antiship missiles out to a maximum range of 45 

km. The engagement of targets is possible out 

to the radar horizon, provided that a sufficient 

quantity of radar energy reflects back into the 

seeker. Optimizing the effectiveness of the 

SHTIL-1 is possible by adjusting the missile’s 

control system and warhead for the type of 

37
38

target it is engaging. The system is effective 

to a minimum altitude of five meters and 

maintains its effectiveness in the presence of 

intensive jamming.

The RIF-M is an advanced, long-range naval 

SAM system intended to provide area air 

defense from aircraft, cruise missiles, and 

ballistic missiles out to a maximum range 

of 200 km (108 nm). The engagement of 

targets is possible at a minimum altitude of 10 

meters through approximately 27,000 meters 

at speeds of up to 2,700 m/s. The system 

can engage as many as six targets with up 

to twelve missiles and can operate in the 

presence of intensive jamming. 

Lasers

Russia’s directed energy weapons program 

utilizes radio frequencies in order to use 

electromagnetic energy to damage or disrupt 

electronics. The lasers use a high-intensity 

light to disrupt sensors and thermally damage 

structures. Low-energy devices are already 

being completed for use in electro-optic 

countermeasures. Russia’s long-term goal is 

a high-energy weapon with anti-satellite and 

cruise missile defense capability. 

Russia maintains a mid-term high-energy 

system of chemical and gas lasers and solidstate lasers as medium-energy systems. The 

development trends of radio-frequency 

weapons are based on the observed effects 

with little modeling or simulations. Different 

waveforms are being utilized, including 

ultra-wide band and complex waves. Their 

capabilities are yet to be fully evaluated; 

problems such as system life and targeting 

are still key challenges. The other challenge 

for Russia is weaponization. This involves 

combining the beam into a solid state, 

which is dependent on its quality as well as 

atmospheric compensation. These systems 

require a high quality of manufacturing using 

mirrors, lenses, and exotic laser materials like 

diodes and non-linear optical crystals.

Rail Guns

Electro-dynamic gun systems are being 

developed that use electrical energy for 

2,000+ m/s muzzle velocity. The near- and 

mid-term combustion-based technologies are 

a transitional step to the creation of a railgun. 

The major issue for Russia is maintaining 

rail life through material science, transition 

management, and rail geometry. Another 

continuing issue remains pulse power. To 

increase and maintain pulse power, Russia’s 

new developments comprise of capacitor 

inductors, rotating machines, and flux 

compression generators. Non-traditional 

designs of the system include reconnection 

launchers and linear accelerators.
39

Draft and Recruitment 

The Russian military is currently reorganizing 

its personnel structure to more accurately 

reflect the needs of modern warfare. The 

goal of a professional, volunteer-based, 

highly skilled military is augmenting the 

traditional obligated service conscription 

system for all males between the ages of 18 

to 27. The military is also looking to develop 

a new curriculum for educational institutions 

involved in training young men for military 

service in order to combat a prevailing 

negative attitude toward the service.

The Russian Navy consists of an officer corps, 

non-commissioned officers (NCO), enlisted, 

and conscripted personnel. Conscripts are 

drafted twice a year during the spring or fall, 

and serve a one-year commitment as of 2008. 

Local conscription centers decide who is sent 

to which service. The military will retain a 

mix of enlisted and conscript soldiers, but will 

continue steps toward an all-volunteer force 

to man all permanent ready combat units. In 

addition, reportedly the rank of warrant officer 

will be phased out and re-assigned to the 

NCO corps.

Women began to join the ranks of the 

Russian Navy in the mid-1980s and make 

up a small portion of the officer and enlisted 

corps on a voluntary basis. The majority of 

female uniformed personnel serve in the 

communications, finance service, medical 

corps, and as cultural directors.

Training and Education

Officer. The Russian Navy officer corps consists 

almost exclusively of high school educated 

males who successfully compete (academic, 

physical, and psychological examinations) for 

admission to and graduate from regional or 

specialty Naval Institutes and are commissioned 

as Lieutenants (U.S. Ensign equivalent). There 

are military departments at some civilian 

universities analogous to U.S. ROTC units but 

their contribution to the career officer corps is 

very small. There is a slow but emerging trend 

to allow females admission to Naval Institutes. 

RFN midshipmen will attend a Naval Institute for 

five years. Those five years are counted toward 

overall military service time for retirement. Naval 

Institutes (formerly called Higher Naval Schools) 

are located in Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and 

Vladivostok. These naval institutes include:

•	 F.F. Ushakov Baltic Naval Institute 

(Kaliningrad)

•	 St. Petersburg Naval Institute - Peter the 

Great Naval Corps

•	 Naval Polytechnic Institute (the recent 

combination of the Naval Engineering 

Institute (St. Petersburg, Pushkin) and A.S. 

Popov Naval Radioelectronics Institute (St. 

Petersburg, Petrodvorets)

•	 S.O. Makarov Pacific Naval Institute 

(Vladivostok).

Chapter Four

Personnel – Movement Towards a 

Professional Force
40

A midshipman can specialize in 

navigation, weapons systems, engineering, 

communications, computer and information 

systems, meteorology, hydrography, naval 

architecture, or intelligence. The five 

years of study and included fleet practical 

experience are structured to prepare the 

young officer specifically for the duties of his 

first assignment in one of the four fleets or the 

Caspian Flotilla.

Russian naval 

aviators first graduate 

from an Air Force 

commissioning and 

flight training school 

and then transfer to 

naval aviation where 

they undergo more 

specialized training 

for specific aircraft 

and over water 

operations.

Naval Infantry 

officers attend 

Combined Arms 

commissioning 

schools.

More specialized 

officers, such as 

those in the technical 

communications 

and civil engineering 

fields, also graduate 

from appropriate 

specialty commissioning schools and not from 

the above mentioned Naval Institutes.

In the course of his career progression, an 

officer may be sent to obtain specialized 

qualifications or qualification upgrades at 

the Advanced Special Officers Courses (St. 

Petersburg). This institution also provides 

specific courses for prospective Executive 

Officers and Commanding Officers.

Commissioned Officers of the Russian Navy1

Warrant Officers and Enlisted Rates of the Russian Navy1
41

At the mid-career point (O-4, O-5), officers 

can sit for examinations to attend the N.G. 

Kuznetsov Naval Academy. The modern 

Russian Naval Academy is similar to a 

combination of the U.S. Naval War College 

and the Naval Postgraduate School. The Naval 

Academy traces its origins to the Naval Guards 

Academy established in 1715 in St. Petersburg 

where students studied navigation, artillery, 

fortifications and naval architecture. In 1960, 

the Soviet Union combined the Voroshilov 

Naval Academy and Krylov Shipbuilding and 

Armaments Academy. And, in 1980 it became 

the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union 

N.G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy, normally 

referred to as the Kuznetsov Naval Academy 

and sometimes even shortened to KNA. 

Graduation from the Naval Academy is a 

prerequisite for further advancement to senior 

ship and shore positions at the fleet and naval 

headquarters level. 

A select group of identified prospective 

or serving flag officers attend the General 

Staff Academy (U.S. National Defense 

University equivalent) for higher level officer 

education. General Staff Academy credentials 

are required for assignment to senior fleet 

command, joint command, and Defense 

Ministry positions.

In January 2009, a major reorganization of the 

Navy’s educational system was announced. 

Plans called for the creation, on the basis of 

the Naval Academy, of a composite naval 

education and research center to be located in 

Kronshtadt on Kotlin Island at the sea entrance 

to St. Petersburg. This center, using the Naval 

Academy as a core, would incorporate several 

smaller institutes across a broad spectrum of 

naval disciplines and provide undergraduate, 

graduate, and postgraduate education. Adjunct 

to this core would be training facilities for 

enlisted specialists and accommodation for 

the pre-naval institute preparatory Nakhimov 

School and the Naval Cadet Corps for younger 

boys. This ambitious plan for the creation 

of a single large naval educational-training 

campus was apparently considered too costly. 

However, all of the above mentioned naval 

educational institutions were combined under 

the umbrella organization named the MilitaryEducational Center “N.G. Kuznetsov Naval 

Academy” providing centralized management 

of naval training and education.

Professional Enlisted. Russian Navy enlisted 

personnel are contracted for a certain term of 

service and receive technical training in their 

specific subject matter area. The Russian Navy, 

as well as other services, is currently working 
42

to create a fully functional non-commissioned 

officer corps. In principle, the Russian Navy 

has had enlisted personnel whose rate 

designation would be equivalent to U.S. 

Navy Chief Petty Officers; however, actual 

equivalency is yet to be achieved. 

Conscripts. Conscripted sailors are required 

to serve a minimum of one year of service 

and receive four to six weeks of basic training 

prior to their first assignment. Although 

unpopular in media reporting, the draft is 

necessary to replace previously conscripted 

sailors and retirees throughout the fleet. With 

a renewed emphasis on force readiness, within 

the navy conscripts normally are assigned 

to either shore duty or to ships in extended 

maintenance. Relatively few serve on 

deployed ships.

Reform in Progress

The Russian military is in the process of 

a significant draw-down in forces and a 

further down-sizing restructuring. As Russia’s 

perception of NATO as a threat has evolved, 

irregular and asymmetric threats have arisen, 

and market forces have emphasized costeffectiveness, the Russian leadership decided 

that the country no longer needs the massive 

force structure of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 

legacy military came with large numbers 

of officers at the O-5 and O-6 level. These 

numbers were incompatible with the new 

Armed Forces structure and the Defense 

Ministry moved to trim this portion of the 

officer corps and provide for early retirements 

for personnel deemed no longer required. 

Relative to the other services, the Russian Navy 

began to seriously assess its organizational 

structure and manning early in the first decade 

of the 21st century. Significant adjustments had 

already been made prior to the announcement 

of the latest Defense Ministry reforms. As 

a result, among the main services (Ground 

Forces, Air Forces and Navy) the Navy has 

been the least affected by ongoing changes. 
43

In the next 10–15 years, the Russian Navy 

will continue its historic transition to a new 

21st-century navy. A modest number of new 

class ships and submarines will enter the 

Navy by the turn of the decade. Continuing 

series construction and the start of several 

more sophisticated and complex new classes 

are projected for the next decade. The new 

construction will be accompanied by the 

maintenance and extension in service of the 

most capable Soviet legacy units.

The new submarine and ship classes will 

incorporate the latest advances in militarily 

significant areas such as: weapons; sensors; 

command, control and communication 

capabilities; signature reduction; electronic 

countermeasures; and automation and 

habitability. More technologically advanced 

total ship systems requiring smaller crews 

will be complemented with personnel better 

trained and educated to exploit the full 

potential of their combat systems.

Outlook 

Newest Russian SSBN Class: Yuriy Dolgorukiy
44

The development of extended and interlinked 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

systems within the “World Ocean” Federal 

Targeted Program initiated in 1997 was 

intended to make Russian naval and other 

military and civilian systems more integrated 

and interoperable, and, if successful, was 

planned to support better informed and timely 

direction of the Navy by commanders both 

afloat and ashore.

The continued improvement of Russian Navy 

uniformed personnel’s quality of life, increases 

in pay and allowances, improved housing, 

and public recognition of achievements will 

reward their dedication and restore and 

enhance the prestige of naval service. 

Challenges

The achievement of these goals will not be 

without challenges. Continued understanding 

of the role and capabilities of the Navy by 

Russia’s leaders, securing sufficient and reliable 

long-range funding for ship construction 

and maintenance, overcoming the impact of 

current sanctions, and the recapitalization 

of related infrastructure will not be easy to 

sustain and will require constant effort.

Future Forces

The future 21st-century Russian Navy is 

projected to be more capable on a unit-byunit basis than at present but not significantly 

larger in overall order of battle numbers. 

Barring unexpected changes in the global 

political and economic environment, the 

Navy’s missions are expected to remain the 

same: to deter potential adversaries with 

strategic sea-based nuclear forces, to defend 

the nation and its interests using the navy’s 

general purpose forces, and to use the Navy 

as an “instrument of state” to support Russia’s 

diplomatic efforts, initiatives, and national 

interests. 

Proposed Ka-52K naval attack variant