COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

ALFONSO LAWRENCE RUSH, III 

 

v. Record No. 2060-94-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA APRIL 2, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 

Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge 

 Norman Lamson for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Alfonso Lawrence Rush, III (appellant) was convicted in a 

jury trial of possession of cocaine in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-250(a). On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred 

in finding the indictment sufficient to inform appellant of the 

nature and cause of the charge against him and in failing to 

order a bill of particulars. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 On September 7, 1993, Officer Dana Slater (Slater) of the 

Albemarle County Police Department went to appellant's house to 

execute a capias for his arrest. Slater found a pipe with 

cocaine ashes and a wallet containing a single-edged razor blade 

with white powder residue. Slater arrested appellant, who was 

later indicted for possession of cocaine in December 1993. The 

indictment cited Code § 18.2-250(a) and read as follows: 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 On or about September 7, 1993, in the 

County of Albemarle, ALFONSO LAWRENCE RUSH, 

III did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly 

possess cocaine, a Schedule II controlled 

substance. 

 Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds 

that it failed to state the nature and cause of the charge 

against him and did not identify the quantity, nature, and 

ownership of the cocaine. Appellant did not request a bill of 

particulars and contended that a bill of particulars would not 

cure the defects in the indictment. The trial court denied 

appellant's motion. 

 Code § 19.2-220 provides as follows: 

 The indictment or information shall be a 

plain, concise and definite written 

statement, (1) naming the accused, (2) 

describing the offense charged, (3) 

identifying the county, city or town in which 

the accused committed the offense, and (4) 

reciting that the accused committed the 

offense on or about a certain date. In 

describing the offense, the indictment or 

information may use the name given to the 

offense by the common law, or the indictment 

or information may state so much of the 

common law or statutory definition of the 

offense as is sufficient to advise what 

offense is charged. 

The indictment should also "cite the statute or ordinance that 

defines the offense or, if there is no defining statute or 

ordinance, prescribes the punishment for the offense." Rule 

3A:6(a). "Both the United States and Virginia Constitutions 

recognize that a criminal defendant enjoys the right to be 

advised of the cause and nature of the accusation lodged against 
 3 

him. The important concerns evident in these provisions are 

fully honored by Virginia Code §§ 19.2-220, -221." Simpson v. 

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 109, 114, 267 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1980) 

(footnote omitted). See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Va. Const. art. 

I, § 8. "[I]t is no longer necessary to include in the 

indictment an allegation of every fact in the chain of 

circumstances comprising the offense charged." Howard v. 

Commonwealth, 221 Va. 904, 906, 275 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1981). 

 In the instant case, the trial court did not err in refusing 

to dismiss the indictment. "As the indictment named the accused, 

described the offense charged and cited the applicable statutes, 

identified the city in which the offense was committed, and 

recited that [appellant] committed the offense on or about a 

certain date, it met the requirements of Code § 19.2-220 and Rule 

[3A:6(a)]." Id. Appellant's argument that the Commonwealth was 

required to allege every fact that supported the charge against 

him is without merit. If appellant desired more information 

about which facts the Commonwealth intended to rely upon, he had 

the right to ask for a bill of particulars. 

 Additionally, the trial court did not err in failing to 

order a bill of particulars. "[A] defendant is not entitled to a 

bill of particulars as a matter of right. Whether the 

Commonwealth is required to file a bill of particulars rests 

within the discretion of the trial court." Quesinberry v. 

Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. 
 4 

denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991). "[A] bill of particulars is not 

required if the indictment gives an accused notice of the nature 

and character of the offense charged." Breard v. Commonwealth, 

248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 442 

(1994). The trial court was not required to sua sponte order a 

bill of particulars. Appellant never requested one and, in fact, 

argued that a bill of particulars would not cure the indictment's 

defects. The indictment met the requirements of Code § 19.2-220 

and thus adequately notified appellant of the nature and 

character of the charge against him. 

 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.