FILED

December 31, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

OCTOBER 1998 SESSION

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) 

) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9711-CR-00538 

Appellee, )

) Davidson County

V. )

) Honorable Walter C. Kurtz, Judge

)

JAMES THOMAS JEFFERSON, ) (Resentencing: First Degree Murder) 

) 

Appellant. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

Karl F. Dean John Knox Walkup

Metro Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter 

Jeffrey A. DeVasher Timothy Behan

Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General

1202 Stahlman Building 425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37201 Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Victor S. (Torry) Johnson III

District Attorney General

Roger Moore

Assistant District Attorney General

Washington Square, Suite 500

222 Second Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37201

OPINION FILED: ___________________

AFFIRMED

PAUL G. SUMMERS,

Judge

O P I N I O N
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The defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated

murder; the same jury simultaneously sentenced him to forty years incarceration. 

On direct appeal this Court affirmed the defendant's conviction but remanded the

matter for resentencing. See State v. Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d 1, 23 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1996). On remand the defendant was sentenced by a jury to life

imprisonment. In this direct appeal the defendant contends that the trial court

erred when it 1) denied his motion to impanel a jury to determine his guilt or

innocence; 2) admitted into evidence the minute entry from the prior trial which

showed the jury's verdict of guilty but from which had been redacted its

imposition of the forty year sentence; and 3) instructed the jury that the only

sentence it could impose was life imprisonment. Finding no merit in these

complaints, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant first contends that because this Court previously found the

convicting jury's verdict “void,” he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of his guilt

or innocence. He argues, “Since the jury at [his] 1993 trial was exposed to

inaccurate sentencing information, its verdict as to both guilt and innocence is

void.” We disagree. In the initial direct appeal of this matter this Court held as

follows:

In this case, the verdict returned by the jury was void

because the punishment set by the jury was below

the minimum punishment for the offense of murder in

the first degree. The trial court did not have the

authority to change the jury's verdict from forty (40)

years to confinement for life in the Department of

Correction. Since the jury found the appellant guilty

of premeditated murder and the evidence contained

in the record supports the verdict, the verdict of the

jury finding the appellant guilty of premeditated

murder is affirmed. However, this case must be

remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing

hearing.

Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d at 23 (footnote omitted). Prior to so holding this Court

noted, but obviously declined to adopt, the defendant's argument that “if the

punishment was below the minimum punishment for murder in the first degree, .
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. . the judgment of the trial court [should be reversed] and remand[ed] for a new

trial.” Id. at 20. Clearly, then, this Court has already decided that the convicting

jury's verdict is not void in its entirety but only as to sentencing. Significantly, our

Supreme Court denied the defendant's application for permission to appeal from

this decision.

On resentencing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a jury to

determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of the judicial doctrine of “the law of

the case.” The trial court was correct. As noted by our Supreme Court in

Clements v. Pearson, 

<A ruling or decision once made in a particular case

by an appellate court, while it may be overruled in

other cases, is binding and conclusive both upon the

inferior court in any further steps or proceedings in

the same litigation and upon the appellate court itself

in any subsequent appeal or other proceeding for

review. A ruling or decision so made is said to be

“the law of the case.” '

352 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tenn. 1961) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, Third Ed.). 

The doctrine applies to issues that were actually before the court as well as to

issues that were necessarily decided by implication, see Ladd v. Honda Motor

Co., 939 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Tenn. App. 1996), and it applies to decisions that the

Supreme Court has declined to review. Id. at 91. Clearly the doctrine applies

here and this issue is therefore without merit.

The defendant next complains about the minute entry of the convicting

jury's verdict admitted into evidence at the resentencing. Upon the state's

motion and over the defendant's objection, the trial court ruled that the minute

entry should have redacted from it the jury's assessment of the defendant's

punishment at “forty years in the penitentiary.” The defendant claims that the

redacted document misled the sentencing jury and “falsely indicated” to it that

the convicting jury had not earlier sentenced the defendant. We are

unpersuaded. The convicting jury's sentence of the defendant was clearly
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irrelevant in the context of his resentencing. “Evidence which is not relevant is

not admissible.” Tenn. R. Evid. 402. The only evidence of the prior jury's action

which was relevant in the context of the resentencing proceeding was its verdict

of guilt. The redacted minute entry accurately reflected that information. This

issue is without merit.

Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred when it instructed

the jury, “The sentence for murder in the first degree is the sentence of life

imprisonment.” We disagree and return to this Court's earlier opinion in this

matter: “In summary, this Court is bound by the Supreme Court's decision in

Miller [v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979),] that the only possible punishment

for first degree murder is life imprisonment.” See Jefferson, 938 S.W.2d at 21. 

Thus, the trial court did not err in so instructing the resentencing jury. This issue

is without merit.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

__________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge

CONCUR:
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_____________________________

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge

_____________________________

JOE G. RILEY, Judge