House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

Report on RuSsian 

Active Measures 

March 22, 2018 

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Classified by. 5888841 

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PROPERTY OF Tl IE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNES 



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j Kellogg 

Kemp 

(U) Referenced Persons (cont} 

j undsay -

L I Chucl< 

! Hope 

Keith 

1 Brian 

Director of Nation.:,! Security of Donald Trump's 2.016 presidential 

campaign _____________ __;_ ____ _ United States Senator from South C~rolina (2003 -present}; former 

member of the United States House of Representatives from South 

. C~_rolina_(~9~3·2.~0]_ ... - ---------------1 

United Stateg Senator from Iowa {:1981-present}; former member of 

the United States House of Representatives from Iowa (1973-1981) - - · ·- - - White House Director of Communications (2011-present}; former 

White House Director of Strategic Comrnu nicc)tion!I (J;muary 201'· 

September 2017); National Press Secretarv of th e Presidential Tran5ltlon Team; Communications Director of Donald Tl'ump's 201G 

prr:sldcn~i a! cnmpaign; former employee of the Trump Organi1.atlon 

-- ·- f.ormr.r Sccrntory of Homc1land Scc1J rlty {2013·201,) 

E1<eculive S~m:i tary and Chief of Sto H o'i'thoNat1onal .5ecurity CoL1ncll (February 2017-pre, e11t); Aeling Ntitional SecuriL-y Advisor 

(February 2017); foreign policy .1dviso1· of Donald Trump's 201G presfd cntial camp air,n 1 

Secretary of State of the Stat e of Georgla (2010-pre5P.nt) 

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j"i>~ul 

I Senior Advisor to the Preside nt; s.on•in-l~w of the Presfdent (m.:mied 

. lvanka Trump in 2009); real-estate developer 

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· Andrew Former Deputy Director ol the Federal 13ureau of lnvostigatio11 (2016 

-2018) 

PROPER r Y 01- f HE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTr'\T1VES Iv 
(U) Referenced Persons (cont} 

r-·- - ---·-- ·- ---,.. .. - - ---· ..------------~ McConnell Mitch · Senate Majority Leader (2015,present); UnHed Stales Senator from 

M cCord 

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McGahn 

Merlcel 

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Mary 

! Do~ 

l Angela 

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l Kentuc:l(y ( 1985-prcsent) 

I Former /\cling As~istant At1orney Genr.ral of the U1)ited.Statcs {2016 

1-2017); former Principal Deput'f Assistant Attorney Genr.rar for r<Ja· 

lional Security (2014-2016) 

\ ~'hit~ Hou.-;e Counsel (Jan~ary 2017- prnsent); General Counsel of 

the Presidenti.ll Transition Team {November 2016-Januarv 2017); 

Counsel to the Trump campaign during Donald 1rump's 2016 presidential C:lmpaign 

Chancellor of Germany {2005-present) 

[ MuellC!r I Robert Special Counsel for the United States Deportment of Justice (May 

2017-present); farmer Dlrnctor oi the Federnl Bureau of lnvestii1ation {2001-2013) ! 

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Obairm Bilfi"lCk f ormr.r Prcr.ldr.n ~ of thr. Ullitfid St.itc!s {200B·20l 7} 

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(201l·presant); former Spe.ikcr of the Unitr.d St<ltes House of Representatives (2007 °2011); member of the United St ates House of 

Roprescnmtives from Cr1lifornia (1987-prescnti 

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Vice President of the United St at~ {2017-prc."nnt}; former Governor 

of tncliana (2013-2017); forrner member of the Un1ted Stc1res House 

of Representatives from Indiana {2001-2013) 

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Podast.i 

- " Pompeo 

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John -- ' Chul~n-;;;--ot Mi'll~ry Clinton;s 2016 prosi<lentinl ciln"lpc.)lgn: formcir 

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_ ___ ....:._M_l_k __ c _ _ _ S~ct~a-syof Stcite no~lne; (M~rch 2018); oiract;r of the Centra l 

lr'lt~lllgt:nce Ag1.mcy (Januarv 2017·prC5Cl'lt); former member of t he 

,..__ _____ _____ ___ _,~d SE1.?S Mouse of Representatives from Kan9a, (2011-2017) 

PROP~R1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTJ\TlVES V 
(U} Referenced Persons (cont} 

~P-L1~n - - -·-- - ..,._-~-'i'a-d-rn-,1-r·--·~~---'T"=PresldOfll of the Russian Federollon (7.012,-prr.s(m·t)-- -·· I 

Reid Harry - · I Forrne/ Mfnofity Leader of the United Srntr..~ Sennto (2015 ·2017); ·- 1.: 

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fom1er United Stat.es Senator froo1 N1:vadc1 (1987-2017) 

St1~<ln Formef National Security Advisor {20l3-2.0:1.7}; former United · ·\ 

Statr.s Arnbnss,1dor to the United Nations {2009-2013] 

Rice 

Romney Mitt Former Rcp-~blican.no'niineefor President {2012); former Governor I 

of Massachusetts (2.003-2007) !---------~------+--------- - ---···- - --- Ryan 

I _-_ 

Schiller 

Schmitz 

-

Sosslans 

Paul 

-

-

Spe;iker of the United Scatcis House of Rr.prescnt<Jtive.~ (2015· 

present}; rnember of the United States. House of Representatives 

from Wisconsin (19!}9-present) 

Former Deputy Assistant to the Pre~ident ,md Director of 011al 

Office Opercttions (January 20:L7-Septeinber 2017); former Director 

of Security for the Trump Organization (2004-2017} 

1 Former forejgn policy advisor to Donald Trump; formr.r tnspcctor 

I General of the United Stale~ Departn~ent of ~-~fe1m_i~902-~ . _ 

- - --- ·Jr.ff . Attorney General of the United St<ltes {2017-prese i,t); momber of 

J the 2016 Prnslr.hmtlal 1 r.1nnll1on Tnam ;ind Don-ild Trump's 2016 

prosldcntlol campalgr); form<Jt United Stnt~s Senator from Alabama 

1rn91.2011} 

,___ ______ ... _____ --- · - - ·· ·-··· - - ·- - · \ 

I~ • 1 StC?elC! Christopher 

I ~- Founder of Britfsh research firm Ofbls Rusiness Intelligence; former 

British intelligence profe~sional 

stoneSulllvan 

-

Trump 

Tr ... mp, Jr. 

· 1 Roger 

I Jake 

• 

Don;ild J. 

- - --- ---- - -··-- --- - ·- - Former advisor of Donafd Trump's 2016 presidential camp.1ign 

Senior Policy Advisor of Hfllary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign; former National Security Advisor to the Vice President (2013 · 

2014) 

I President of the United Stclces (2017-present); career real estate 

developer .ind television hast and producer 

- --·- --- ------ -~ D~ 'llo _ _ __ _ _ l~esident Trtimp's son; Trump Organization execu\ive 

PROPERTY 01= THC: u_s. liOUSE.OF RCPRESE:NT/\TIVES vi 
I Y,mulcovlch 

I Yates - -

(U) Referenced Persons (cont) 

--

Vlktor 

l S.il,ly 

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. ... .,. .. - ---· rormcr President of Ulm1ine (2010-2014) 

J

I t=ormcr Acting Attorney Gr.ncrill of thr. United States (J~~Oi7}; 

forn1e, Depllty P,nornr.y Gener.ii of ,hr. United Statc~5 (201S-2017} . - -·----- ·- - ~-- -· -· ---- · 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEMTJ\TIVES vii 
.,. 

(U) Preface 

(U} In 2015, Russia began engaging in a 

covert influence campaign aimed at the U.S. 

presidential election. The Russlan govern· 

ment, at the direction of President Vladimir 

Putin, sought to sow discord in American 

society and undermine our faith In the democratic process. Now, more than a year 

after the election, the American people 

rightfully want to know what the Russians 

did; how they did it; with whose suppo1t, if 

anyone's; and what can be done to counter 

any election tampering by foreign adversaries in the future. 

(U) With this charge1 the House Pem1anent Select Committee on Intelligence (the 

Committee) initiated an investigation in January 2017 with the mandate to examine (1) 

what Russian cyber activity and other active 

measures (covert influence activities run by 

the Russian lntelltgence services) were di· 

rected against the United States and its alllcs; (2) whether the Russian active 

measures include links between Russia and 

individuals associated with presidentia I 

campaigns; {3} what was the U.S. govern .. 

ment response to these Russian active 

measures and what do we need to do to 

protect ourselves and our allies in the future; and (4) what posslble leaks of classified information took place related to the 

Intelligence Community's assessment of 

these matters. Our goal was to provide, to 

the greatest extent practicable, a full accounting of what happened, how it happened, and recommendations for protecting 

our democratic processes and Institutions in 

the future. 

{U) From the investigation's inception, 

we were determined to follow the facts 

w herever they might lead within the agreed 

-upon scope and refer any criminality (if 

found) to the appropriate authorities. During the investigation we identified numerous shortcomings, including counterintelligence concerns, classified leaks, puzzling 

legal processes, and inappropriate or questionable behavior. All of these are enumerated in this report through findings, recon,-

mendations, and conclusions. 

(U) we reviewed every piece of relevant evidence provided to lJS and interviewed ·every witness we assessed wou Id 

substantively contribute to the agreed-upon 

bipartisan scope of the investigation. We 

acknowledge that Investigations by other 

committees, the Special Counsel, the media, 

or interest groups will continue and may 

find facts that were not readily accessible to 

the Committee or outside the scope of our 

investigalion. We will ensme any new discoveries are considered in the due course of 

the Committee's continuing oversight re-· 

sponsibillties. 

(U) We.would like to recognize the tireless work of the Committee's staff, which 

remained professional and dedica_ted 

throughout this inquiry. They deserve our 

nation's gratitude. We would also like to 

thank the thousands of men and women 

who serve in the IC. They will wal<e up toPROPE;ffl'Y (W 'l'i'll: U.S. HOUSE 01! ~1:.r>1~1~SUM l'AI tVGB viii 
morrow and continue their watch to protect 

the American people against further threats 

from Russia and other adversaries. 

(U) Nevertheless, the Committee remains concerned that Russia will continue 

to undermine western democracies by stoking social strife, political unrest, and division. As a country, it is time for us to reflect, understand what happened, fix the 

discovered problems, and unify around the 

common purpose of countering any future 

influence campaigns by Russia or any other 

nation. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES lx 
(U) Introduction and Overview 

(U) Russia's interference in the 2016 

U.S. presidential election was nothing novel 

for the Kremlin. The Kremlin aspires to sow 

chaos and discord and advance its agenda in 

targeted nations, particularly in Europe and 

former Soviet republics such as the Baltics 

and Ukraine. To do this, Russia effectively 

combines decades of experience in propaganda and psychological warfare techniques 

with its vast media apparatus, a strata of 

well-educated and proficient technicians, 

and a robust intelligence and security corps. 

(U} In the United States, Russian 

cyberattacks related to the 2016 elections 

starkly highlighted technical vulnerabilities 

in U.S. digital infrastructure and bureaucratic shortcomings that were exploited by 

the Kremlin. Russia's active measures campaign achieved its primary goal of inciting 

division and discord among Americans. For 

more than a year, U.S. politics have been 

consumed by bitter recriminations, charges, 

and counter-charges about the attacks. The 

reliability of the democratic vote-the bedrock of the U.S. republic-was widely and 

repeatedly questioned. 

(U) At the time of the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle, the Committee was 

already concerned with Russian malfeasance and aggression in levels that had not 

been seen since the Cold War. In fact, the 

IAA for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included 

multiple provisions to improve the United 

States' ability to counter Russian aggression. 

However, the Kremlin's malicious activities 

during the 2016 U.S. presidential election 

triggered the Committee to announce a specific inquiry into Russia's campaign (see Appendix B). The bipartisan parameters focused the investigation and this report-this 

Committee examined: (1) Russian cyber activity and other active measures that were 

directed against the United States and its 

allies; (2) whether the Russian active 

measures include links between Russia and 

individuals associated with presidential 

campaigns; (3) the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures 

and what we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future; and (4) 

what possible leaks of classified information 

took place related to the Intelligence Community's assessment of these matters.1 The 

Committee interviewed 73 witnesses, conducted 9 hearings and briefings, reviewed 

approximately 307,900 documents, and issued 20 subpoenas. This allowed the Committee to find answers crucial for identifying 

and addressing institutional weaknesses to 

assist the United States with identifying and 

responding to inevitable hostile acts in the 

future. 

(U) While the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election helped focus American attention on 

Russian cyber and information operations, 

the Russian government has conducted active measure campaigns in Europe for years. 

Believing it is engaged in an information war 

with the West, Russia's influence activities 

employ an array of tactics-usually tailored 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

1 
to the target country's population and environment-in an effort to accomplish t he 

Kremlin's goals. These goals generally include influencing an opponent's leadership 

and population, advancing a narrative, or 

inducing a behavior change. The factors 

that make these campaigns successful also 

make them hard to counter. However, governments, non-governmental organizations, 

and media organizations in Europe have begun taking actions to address and mitigate 

the threat that Russian influence campaigns 

pose. 

{U) The Russian active measures campaign against the United States was multifaceted. It leveraged cyberattacks, covert 

platforms, social media, third-party intermediaries, and state-run media. Hacked material was disseminated through this myriad 

network of actors with the objective of undermining the effectiveness of the future 

administration. This dissemination worked 

in conjunction with derisive messages posted on social media to undermine confidence 

in the election and sow fear and division in 

American society. 

(U) The U.S. government's subsequent 

response to the Russian active measures 

campaign during the 2016 election was slow 

evolved, the FBl's notification to victims and 

oversight committees was inconsistent in 

timeliness and quality, which contributed to 

the victims' failure to both recognize the 

threat and defend their syst ems. State and 

local governments were slow to grasp the 

seriousness of the threat and when notified 

of breaches continued to resist any action 

that implied federal direction or control. Some states opted not to cooperate 

with important defensive measures offered 

by the DHS. While no tabulation systems, or 

systems that count votes, were impacted, 

the overall security posture of the U.S. federal, state, and local governments was 

demonstrated to be inadequate and vulnerable. 

(U} The Committee's investigation also 

reviewed the opening, in summer 2016, of a 

FBI enterprise counterintelligence investigation into-Trump campaign associates: 

- Because of "the sensitivity of the 

matter," the FBI did not notify congressional 

leadership about this investigation during 

the FBl's regular counterintelligence 

briefings.2 Three of-original subjects of the FBI investigation have been 

charged with crimes and the Committee's 

review of these cases covers the period prior to the appointment of Special Counsel in 

May 2017. 

{U) While the Committee found no evidence that the Trump campaign colluded, 

coordinated, or conspired with the Russian 

government, the investigation did find poor 

judgment and ill-considered actions by the 

Trump and Clinton campaigns. For example, the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower 

between members of the Trump campaign 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

2 
and a Russian lawyer who falsely purported 

to have damaging information on the Clinton campaign demonstrated poor judgement. The Committee also found the 

Trump campaign's periodic praise for and 

communications with Wikileaks-a hostile 

foreign organization-to be highly objectionable and inconsistent with U.S. national 

security interests. The Committee also 

found that the Clinton campaign and the 

DNC, using a series of cutouts and intermediaries to obscure their roles, paid for opposition research on Trump obtained from 

Russian sources, including a litany of claims 

by high-ranking current and former Russian 

government officials. Some of this opposition research was used to produce sixteen 

memos, which comprise what has become 

known as the Steele dossier. 

(U) The effectiveness and relatively low 

cost of information operations, such as the 

dissemination of propaganda, make it an 

attractive tool for foreign adversaries. Unless the cost-benefit equation of such operations changes significantly, the Putin regime and other hostile governments will 

continue to pursue these attacks against the 

United States and its allies. Based on the 

investigation, the Committee recommends 

several solutions to help safeguard U.S. and 

allies' political processes from nefarious actors, such as the Russians. 

1. HPSCI Press Re lease, Intelligence Committee Chairman, Ranking Member Establish Parameters for Russia Investigation, 

Mar. 1, 2017. 

2. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures Investigation Open Hearing," Mar. 20, 2017. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

3 
(U} Summary Table of Findings 

(U) Finding #1: The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democracies to conduct active measures in Europe. 

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations 

in Europe to further the Kremlin's agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians 

and groups seen as hostile to Moscow. 

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European 

governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat. 

(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, political, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests. 

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Kremlin's goals, message displeasure, or inflict punishment. 

(U) Finding #6: European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activities to combat Russian influence campaigns. 

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016. 

(U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the 

dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations. 

(U) Finding #9: The Russian government used RT to advance its malign influence campaign 

during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

(U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social discord and to undermine the·u.s. electoral process. 

(U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's notification to numerous Russian 

hacking victims was largely inadequate. · 

(U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state 

election officials was impeded by state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach 

coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

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(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont) 

C~APTER 3: ·AM~Rlt;A REA<;:TS'(CONT) 

(U) Finding #13: The joint Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of 

Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffective. 

(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's post-election response was insufficient. 

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on 

Russia's election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft. 

(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic 

intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft. 

(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump 

(U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump 

campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence 

investigation into Carter Page. 

(U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an 

application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance 

on Carter Page. 

(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges, 

none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the 

Trump campaign and the Russian government. 

(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Kislyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception 

during Flynn's interview. 

(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials did not notify the Trump campaign that members of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns. 

(U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Russian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 
(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign 

business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign. 

(U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate 

Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to 

serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopoulos and Carter Page. 

{U) Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in 

a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul 

Manafort was involved. 

(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or 

publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous 

ill-advised contacts with Wikileaks. 

(U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump 

campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his 

activity in Moscow. 

(U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos' attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facilitate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful. 

(U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9, 

2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive-but did not ultimately obtain-derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources. 

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly met with a Russian government official at the 

2016 National Rifle Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that 

the two discussed the U.S. presidential election. 

(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associates-including Jeff Sessions-and official representatives of the Russian governmentincluding Ambassador Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the 

Russian government. 

TOP SECRET /NOFORN 6 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) 

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(U) Finding .f#35: Possible Russian efforts to set up a 11back channelu with Trump associates 

after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the communication associated with collusion would have rendered such a "bacl< channel" unnecessary. 

(U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting opposition research targeting candidate Trump's business dealings, Fusion GPS conducted research benefitting Russian interests. 

!U) Finding #37; The law firm Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton campaign and the Democratic National Committee to research candidate Trump's Russia ties. 

I U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims to have obtained his dossier information secondand third-hand from purported high-placed Russian sources, such as government officials 

with links to the Kremlin and intelligence services. 

(U} Finding #39; Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was provided directly to Fusion GPS and Perkins Coie c1nd indirectly to the Clinton campaign. ,• 

·e.)ijl\PT-.ER§S':;lJNir.El!l.t<iENCE CO.Mfyl,UNITV ASS.~S~~ENT LEAl~S ~- I 

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(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified information regarding Russian intentions to sow discord 

in the U.S. presidential election began prior to the election day-November 8, 2016. 

(U) Finding #41; Leaks of classified information alleging Russian intentions to hetp elect 

candidate Trump increased dramatically after the election day- November 8, 2016. 

(U) Finding 1#42: The leaks prior to the classified Intelligence Community Assessment's publication, particularly leal<s occurring after the U.S. presidentia I election, correlate to specific 

language found in the Intelligence Community Assessment. 

(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classified information have damaged national security 

and potentially endangered lives. 

(U} Finding #44: Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN national security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about his contacts 

with the media, jncluding CNN. 

PRCPERTY or n~G U.S. MO USE OF REPHl;SI-; NT" TIVFS 7 
{U) Summary Table of Recommendations 

·- . It -· 

l~frfhfPliiR,t~ RWSS AN·©AMP.AIGNS1IN EUROP.E . . .... . .. - ~ - - . . 

(U). Recommendation #1: European governments, non-governmental organizations, businesses, think tanks, and academia should strengthen legal and regulatory environments, 

promote media pluralism, build professional media associations, and improve the financial 

sustai11ability of legitimate news outlets. 

(U) Recommendation #2: European governments, non-governmental organizations, businesses, think tanks, and academia should implement and encourage multi-pronged, country-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian propaganda, technical, and cyber operations. 

(U) Recommendation #3: European governments, non-governmental organizations, businesses, think tanks, and academia should implement more stringent cyber security practic· 

es, such as multifactor authentication and encryption of sensitive da1a, as well as educating 

workforces on basic cyber security topics and best practices. 

(U) Recommendation 114: European.governments should look to long-term solutions to 

lessen economic dependence on Russia . . ~ ,..,., ~..,.. ... I,,. . ~ .. . ~ - . - ' 

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{U) Recommendation #5: Congress should identify options available to the private sector 

and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities exploited by 

the Russian government. 

(U) Recommendation #6; Congress should consider updating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to cover malicious international cyber actors. 

{U) Recommendation tt7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should improve cyberattack 

victim notification. 

(U)Hecommendation #8: Threats identified by the Intelligence Community to state and local elections infr'1structure should be immediately briefed to .ippropriate state and local 

officials. When threats are Identified, the federal government should conduct an expedited declasslfication review to ensure that the threat information can reach all necessary 

state and local officials In a tfmely manner. 

(U} Recommendation ti9: The Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain designated state and local election officials ;;ippropri.ate security clearances to enable those officials to respond to election-related threats. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPHESE'NTAilV!:-S 

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(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.} 

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(U) Recommendation #10: Significant threats to U.S. elections Identified by the Intelligence 

Community, including cyberatta cl<s directed at politicill organizations, should be immediately reported to the Congressional intelligence committees. 

(U) Recommendation #11: Congress should encourage the adoption of National Institute of 

Standards and Technology cyber security stendards, such as those adopted by the Elections 

Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to 

facilitate such adoption. Funds should be ti~d to the adoption and certification of elections 

systems to appropriate standards. 

(U} Recommendation #12: Congress should consider additional fu nding for the National 

Institute of Standa rds and Technology to enable better outreach to state and local governments. 

{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local 

election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies' computer systems. 

(U)-Recommendation #i4: Congress should consider strengthening the Help Americn Vote 

Act of 2002. to ensure that both stiltewide voter registration and tabulation systems are 

better protected from foreign cyber threats. 

(U} Recommendation ff 15: The Deportment of Homelilnd Security should provide the owner or operator of any electronic election infrasttucture affected by any significant foreign 

cyber intrusion with a briefing and include steps that may be taken to mitigate such intrusions. 

(U) Recommendation #16: State .ind local governments should be encouraged to establish 

redundancies that are not dependent on current elections infrastructure, such as a mechanism that retains individual vote records, ensuring the integrity of the vote In the event of 

a compromise of voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a 

redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record reflecting the voter's selections. 

(U} Recommendation #17: While it is important to implement lessons learned from the Ex· 

ecutive Branch's response, Congress should not hamper the Executive Branch's ability to 

use discretion in responding to a particular foreign threat. 

{U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act. 

PROl'l:l~TY OF THE U.S. HQUSt, OF Rl.:Pl'{l':8E:M rATIVl:.S 9 
{U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.) 

.., - - .-

Cltl'~PiflER-:r~.& 3: Rl!JS'Sl'A:A1ifA€l(S'1iHE'llfNITEm1SifAT-ES,AN1!>1~MERlt'!.I,\ RE~€lS 

. f~0Nw!) ~ - - .! _, . ~ 

(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified counterintelfigence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention. 

(U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Community should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legitimate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress. 

(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to 

receive an annual counterintelligence awareness briefing. 

- "'·-··- . I ... ,· 

i GHA.J'iliER-iiUe~MPAIGN~UNKS if©!RUSSV~ . - T . .• ~ - - -~- .- -- ~- = h h -

(U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforcement should ensure that 

their counte rintelligence defens es a pproprlately account for the role of cut-outs and Intermedial'ies. 

(U) Recommendation #23: Congress should consider amending curre nt campaign finance 

laws to furthe r increase transparency rega rding services provided by fore ign persons or 

e ntities. 

·-

[ 

GH~p:;fLE~S.:i l ~fu~lfULG~Elil GE:(tQr,11'1\itUNl1F'f,'~SS ESS tylE Nl .ti~~r(S - . ~ "'- ·--

(U) Recommendation #24: Each component of t he Intelligence Community should update 

its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee, 

including senior officials. 

(U) Recommendation #25: Congress should consider legislation to increase the penalties 

f~r unauthoriz~d disclosures of classified information. 

(U) Recommendation #26: 'rhe Executive Branch should consider instituting mandatory polygra phs for all non-confirmed polltlcal appointees that have top secret d earances. ·--..... .. ·---·-· --·-~····- -···- -- -··-

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF, REPR.ESENTAllVES 10 
{U) Chapter 1-Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe 

Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other a~tive measures were directed 

against the United States and its allies? 

(U) While Americans became ncutely 

aware of Russian cyber and information operations a-fter the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election, these activities were not new to 

-

UNCLASSIFIED 

SOVIET PROPAGANDA TARGETING THE 

WE;ST AFTER WORLD WAR II 

Tj~•<}.J('.,... S..1':l\:IHt'(I! /\h(,~ . ...,,,f\f'Q'I•' 

!'.u.,1,,.1 Ui'lit,"'-4( f:l;t,ft., ,l.,l,«Ju 

UNCLASSfFIED 

{U) l~ussla conducts information warfare in an effort to manipulate the populace 

and leadership of the nations lt targets. To 

these ends, Russia employs on am:iy of tactics for its influence activities in an effort to 

advance the Russian government's interests. When successful, these aclivities can 

influence an opponent's leadership and 

population to advance a narrative and induce a b'ehavior change, concurrently serving multiple Russian objectives. 

(U) Russia's goals for: these campaigns 

include: to advance the Krernlin's intereslSi 

discredit the West; confuse or distort events 

that threaten Russia's image; break Western 

political cohesion; and defend Russia's role · 

as a vital global power. More specific and 

country-tailored goats also include to: weak· 

en, divide, and halt further expansion of 

consensus-driven institutions like NATO and 

the EU; sow confusion and amplify divisions 

among segments of Western populations; 

challenge establishment politics; damage 

U.S. foreign policy goals; advance Russia's 

version of world events; distract from controversial Russian policies and activities; reverse perceived anti-Russian policies; improve bilnteral relations; and strengtt1en 

economic ties. 

PROPERTY OF TH[: U.S. HOUSE or: REPRESENTATIVES 

11 
(U) Aiding in Ru ssia's influence aclivitives, the modern world's widespread use of 

lhe Internet and socia I media for news and 

communications has allowed Russia to: 

quickly and easily weapon;ze data stolen In 

cyber breaches; disseminate propaganda, 

misinformation, and disinformation; and 

aggravate social, racial, and political divisions. 

(U) Finding fll: The Kremlin exploits free or 

Independent media spaces ancf open democracies to conduct active measures in 

Europe. 

{~) Russia also exploils free media 

spaces and open democracies through a 

network of Russian state-owned news out· 

lets and media platforms, such as Sputnik 

and RT, whld1 promote Russia's image 

abroad and show foreigners world events 

from a Russian perspective (see Appendix 

C}. 

(U} The Kremlin's active measures, or 

Information warfare, strategy includl':!S sev- · 

eral tactics: 

-

• (U) After alleged Russian interference in the Brexit vote, in October 

2013, the U.I<. Electoral Commission 

announced a probe into this activity. 

According to open source reporting, 

Russian-based Twitter accounts posted more than 45,000 messages 

about Brexit in 48 hours during the 

2016 referendum vote.

7 

PROPFRTY OF THF U.S HOUSF OF ~1:-PHl~SFMTA11VI::; 

12 
(U) Plant and propagate false news stories: Russia uses "troW' armies to set up fake 

social media accounts and biogs, Including 

through an organization l<nown as the Internet Research Agency {IHA}. ti A study by the 

European Endowment for Democracy described larp,c numbers of paid Russian 

"trolls" on social media.

12 -

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations in Europe to further the Kremlin's 

agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians and groups seen as hostile 

to Moscow. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

HEADQUARTERS OF RUSSIA'S 

:INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY 

UNCLASSIFIED 

PROPERTY OF 1'HF U S HOUSE OF RF.PRl::Sl:.N fATI\IES 13 
(U) In a tactic dating back to the Soviet 

era, Moscow also denigrcites and discredits 

people and groups seen as hostile to its in-

-· (U) Kremlin-linked journalists and media 

outlets also will engage In misinformation: 

weaving truth and falsehoods together to 

create misleading reports intended to impugn the target's character or reputation. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

AN11-MERKEL PROlESiS FOLLOWING A 

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U} In another example during the recent French Presidential elections, Russiancontrolled media l1igl1Ughted defamatorv 

stories ;)bout the private life and campaign 

funding of the more RwisJa.skepLic canclidate Emmanuel Macron. Two days before 

the final presidential election, data hacked 

from Macron's En Marche party was posted 

on a data sha ring website. Cybersecurity 

researchers attributed the hack to the same 

GRU group that hncked the DNC.u 

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat. 

14 
I 

I 

,•,-. -.. C"\ I ' . ,.'''"•• l.k r:+ 1 f • .. ·, -t. ' 

•• 0 

(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected 

European populations and exploits social, 

political, and racial divisions in an effort to 

sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite 

protests. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15 
I 

--··- ' I 

. -----~-

I 

I 

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business 

and economic ties in Europe to achieve the 

Kremlin's goals, mes.:.-age displeasure, or 

inflict punishment . 

{U} Russia is adept at utif!zing economic 

ties to its advantage. Moscow aims to 

deepen business ties v:1ith individua Is that 

PRO?anY OF THE: U.S. HOUSC Of" REP~ESENTATIVES 

16 
can be used as agents of influence, and 

countries whose dependence on tr~dc with 

Ru ssia create vulnerabHltic s to Russian influence. Economic vulnerability-such as reliance on Russia for trade or energy-can be 

leveraged to change behavior, message displeasure, or Inflict punishment. For example, Germanv imports about 40 percent of 

its natural gas from Russia. Because of this, 

,11any business leaders are lobbying for the 

removal of sanctiqns against Russia_:P 

... 

.... 

(U) Finding #6: European governments and 

media outlets are conducting a va(lety of 

activities to combat Russian influence campalgns. 

(U) According to a 2016 study by the 

RAND Corporalion, Russia's various tactics 

for conducting information operations, 

combined with its lack of a consistent, ideological goal, make countering these activities difficult. This study found that the factors that make Russian disinformalion effective-the high volume of stories, its rapid, 

continuous nature, and lack of consistency-are the same factors that make it difficult to counter . .:li. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

2017 EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON 

BOLSTERING RESILJENCE TO ACTlVE 

MEASURES CAMPAIGNS 

t 

UNCLASSIFIED 

{U) Many European governments are 

taking proactive steps to counter Russian 

propaganda and disinformation efforts. 

NATO has prioritized efforts to counter 

"hybrid threats" by developing a strategy 

that includes strengthened coordination 

with the European Union, a s well as training 

and exercises t hrough its new Intelligence 

Division. The Strategic Communications 

Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia and the 

Cooperalive Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia also contribute to 

these efforts. In addition, several NATO alPROPl,RW ()j! Tt-11: U.S. HOUSE OF m: l'RFSr'NTATIVl:::S ]7 
lies and European Union members signed a 

Memorandum of Understanding to establish a European Center of Excellence for 

Countering Hybrid Threats in April 2017.

43 

(U) In France, the French newspaper Le 

Monde launched a web platform to allow 

readers to check the reliability of French 

and interr:iational websites with an Internet 

browser extension that will alert readers 

when they come across false or unverified 

stories.46 

(U} In 2017, Ukraine banned Russian 

social media platforms, as well as RT and 

Sputnik-though the latter two c_an still be 

accessed online. Additionally, media 

platforms such as StopFake are used to 

identify false news stories.50 

(U} In November 2016, the European 

Parliament adopted a resolution to counteract-anti-EU propaganda by third parties.5 1 

-

.. , ··-· -· 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 18 
(U) Russia's active measures campaign 

In Europe is nothing new, but the growing 

rnittee to Counter' Active Me·asures 

by l:he Rllssian Federation to Exert 

Covert Influence Over Peo pies and 

Governments. 

• (U) FY 2017 lAA, Section 502. Travel 

of Accredited Diplomatic and Consular Personnel of the Russian Federation in the United States. 

• (U) FY 2017 fAA, Section 503. Study 

and Report on Enhanced lntelfigence 

and Information Sharing with Open 

Sides Treaty Member States. 

I 

frequency and intensity of Russian influence I 

efforts pose an increasingly significant 

threat to the United States and its allies. 

The Comn,ittee has taken significant 

measures to hlchlieht this growing threat to 

the American peopll) since at least 201.5. 

Specificatiy, the Intelligence Authorizat1on 

Act (IAA) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included multiple provisions to improve the 

United States' ability to counter Russian aggression: 

• (U) FY 20'16 IAA, Section 502. Assessment on funding of political parties and nongovernmental organi2ations by the Russian Federation. 

4 (U} FY 2016 IAA, Section 503. Assessment on the use of political assassinations as a form of statecraft 

by the Russian Federation. 

• (U} FY 2017 IAA, Section 501. Com-

(U) Additionally, in 2016 the Committee 

held two hearings and seven br!efings for 

Committee Members on Russia and related 

issues. and the Chairman and Members of 

the Committee sent six fC!lters to the Adm inistration urging stronger action against Russia. For example, Committee Members 

urged the Obama administration to hold 

Russia accountable for multiple violations of 

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty, and expressed concern over likely 

Russian attempts to utili2e the Open Skies. 

Treaty for intelligence collection purposes. 

Additionally, in spring 2016, Chairman 

Nunes declared the inability to predict the 

plans and intentions of the Putin regime 

''the biggest intelligence failure since 

PROPC;RTY OF TM! U.S. MOUSC! or, RUPRr.!SEMT1\ TIVC;S 19 
9/11."56 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

::I x.,~ u ... ,.,. ,· .. ..... . "' ... ~ .. 

7. Alexi Mostrous, Mark Bridge, Katie Gibbons, "Russia Used Twitter Bots and Trolls "To Disrupt" Brexit Vote," The Times 

8. 

9. 

10. 

UK, Nov. 15, 2017. 

11. Sonam Sheth, "Our Task Was to Set Americans Against Their Own Government": New Details Emerge About Russia's 

Trolling Operation, Business Insider, Oct. 17, 2017. 

12. European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality ond Balance to the Russian Language M edia Space, June 25, 

2015. 

13. 

14. HP5CI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017. 

15. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017; XE Currency Converter, EUR to USO, ::Jww.xe.coml 

curr encyconverter/convert/?Amou,1t- ~.&FrnnrEU R& To=U5D. 

16. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. TrendMicro, "From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities ove r the Past Two Years," Apr. 25, 2017. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. -

27. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017; LexisNexis, Discovery Services Fact Sheet: "How Many 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

Pages in a Gigabyte?," Dec. 23, 2017. 

34. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Chisinau, Moldova, Sept. 19, 2017. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

20 
41. 

42. 

43. 

-

NATO, "NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats," Apr. 11, 2017. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. HPSCI, HPSCl Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017. 

50. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Kiev, Ukraine, Sept. 21, 2017. 

51. European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communications to counteract propaganda against it by third parties," Nov. 23, 20:1.6. 

52. 

53. 

54. GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Tokes o Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, May 2017. 

55. 

56. Bridget Johnson, "Chairman: Biggest Post 9/11 Intelligence Failure was Misreading Putin," Pl Media, Apr. 13, 2016; Saagar Enjeti, "US Response to Rusian Spying is 'Biggest Intelligence Failure Since 9/11," Sept. 15, 2016; Susan Jones, "Rep. 

Devin Nunes: We've Been Warning Administration About Russian Hacking 'And They Did Nothing,"' CNS News, Jan. 9, 

2017. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 21 
(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States 

Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed 

against the United States and its allies? 

(U) The Russian government's multifaceted malign influence campaign was the 

subject of extensive public reporting in the 

months before the January 5, 2017, publication of the classified ICA titled Assessing 

.Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent 

US Elections. While ma.ny of the facts concerning the attack have been widely disseminated, there are important elements of the 

Russian campaign that remain classified. 

(U) The purpose of the Committee's review of the Russian information operations 

was to establish the facts, as well as the federa I government's understanding of those 

facts. This chapter specifically examines (1) 

the cyberattacks that targeted U.S. political 

organizations (including the method of the 

attack and its attribution); (2) the dissemination of hacked material; and (3) the role of 

Russian state media and social media in 

Russia's malign influence campaign. 

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted 

cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 

2015-2016. 

(U) The Committee agrees with this 

statement and finds the ICA assessment of 

Russian responsibility to be based on compelling facts and well-reasoned analysis . . 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

22 
• 

I 

UNCLASSIFIED 

SPEAR PHIS HING is a cyber;ittack that uses email 

to !ure ,, vjct;in, into opening at..ichn1ents, following 

llnks or dlscfostng their credenti.lls. The.se mess;ig. 

cs ;ire highly specific ,1nd soo'l1 ,1uthentic to the 

recipiont. 

CREDENTIAL HARVESTING rs the procc.~, of ldC!llti· 

fying the uscirmimcs, p,1sswords, ;ind hnshes of t;ir· 

r::ots which can thon bn usocl to (:ilin un,1 L1thoriz~d 

uc:cess to ci user'~ syslti'Tl. I i 

1 ·- - -

j 

I 

i__ _____ _ J 

PROPcRW or, TH!! U.S. HO US(: or Rt::PRt::SENTJ\ TIVCS 23 
PROPER

TY OF nIE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRESE~lTATIVES 

24 
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSI: OF REPRESENTI\TIVES 25 
, ·:,,,:. 

(U) Attribution is a Bear 

-

I 

26 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

·-
PROPl:RTY or. THE U.S. MOUSE OF REPRt::Sf::NTAilV~S 
I 

I 

-

I 

(U) While the intelligence case for 

attribution to Russia is significant, alternative scenarios have been examined to in~ 

dude an insider threat or another cyber actor. No credible evidence was found supporting either alternative, including a review 

of information contained in classified intelligence reports. 

{U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and 

third-party intermediaries were responsible for the dlssemination·of documents 

and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations. 

(U} Russlan-stc1te actors and third party 

intermediaries were responslble for the selective dissemination of information from 

hacked U.S. political systems. This represents a "significant escalation in directness, 

level of activity, and scope of G!ffort" In Russia's "longstanding desire to undermine the 

US-led liberal democratic order." It is therefore likely that high-level Russian government approval was required in both planning and execution of the operation. 10 

{U} Russian-state Actors 

(U} Guccifer 2..0 and DC Leaks 

UNCLASSIFIED 

GUCCJFER 2.0 TAKES CREDIT FOR 

DNC HACK ON WORDPRESS.COM 

Sour,~: WouJpress.com (guec1re,2 .wordpresuom) 

UN~LASSIFIED 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATWES 28 
(U) From their fl,st appearances, both 

Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks sought to conceal 

the[r identities. During a media interv[ew 

on June 21, 2017, Guccifer 2.0 identified 

himself as a Romanian "hacker, manager, 

philosqpher, women lover," and a "freedom 

fighter." He.further explained in broken 

English hls desire to follow in Marcel Lazar's 

(the original Guccifer) footsteps to "fight for 

freedom of minds-and for a world without 

illuminati."l

9 

{U) Meanwhile, DC Leaks identified itself as a group of American hacktivists engaged in "a new level project aimed to analyze and publish a large amount of emails 

from top-ranking officials and their lnnuence agents all over th e world." The selfdescribed premise of the OC Leaks effort 

was that "politicians have forgotten that in a 

democracy the people are the highest form 

of political authority."~u 

li ' ' 

• (U) Both Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks 

worked to conceal their true Iden ti .. 

ties, physical locations, and motivalions; 

• 

• 

• {U) Guccifer 2,0's first appearance 

online and claim of responsibility for 

the DNC hack occurred within 24 

hours of the public announcement 

by-that the DNC had 

been hacked by actors affiliated w[th 

• 

2'l the Russian gov~rnment; 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 29 
• (U) Multiple cybersecurlty firms 

have evaluated Gucclfer 2.0's activity and have published evidence that 

the online persona used a Russianbased VPN service to transmit files 

and communicate. Additionally, 

posted documents were processed 

on a computer using Russian language settings;2

..i 

• {U} During interactions with the media, Gucdfer 2.0 denied any relationship with the Russian government 

and claimed to be Romanian. However, when pressed to explain how 

he hacked into the DNC in his n ative 

Romanian language, he failed to 

demonstrate fluency. Gucclfer 2.0 

terminated the Interview when challenged on this point;b 

• 

{U) Wikiteaks 

(U) Wikileaks played a key role in Russia's malign influence campaign and served 

as a third party intermediary for Russian int elligence during the period leading up to 

the 2016 U.s.· presidential election. 

(U) The global reach of Wikileaks and 

its established ties to the media makes it an 

attractive outlet for the dissemination of 

stoten documents intended to undermine 

the United States and fts electoral process. 

In addition, Wikileaks' historic actions , 

whlch have undermined U.S. interests and 

been beneficial to Russia, make the organization an ideal intermediary for Russian intelligence.27 

UNCLASSIFIED 

GUCCIFER 2.0 & WIKILEAKS 

n 

~ ~tl.NbO ;-~.,- .;.,. · ~ CV 

·~ rf$, ~ i;,..<;£: r1>oP<>.-1<.,.1:,,...,,...,,1 

THE .;:~~ 

·p EOOES

MA~

·T.A ,. 

;;;

. 

\ 9, ~ "1 . 

Sourca: T~!cr 

UNCl.ASSIFIEO 

(-U-) Wll<ILeaks renes on hackers, leakers, and othfa!r criminal ngents to acquire 

personal, confidential, and classified material for publication. 

As part of that 

dissemination, Wikileaks sent 118 tweets 

promoting the hacked material. Wikileaks 

messaging was then magnified by 426,000 

other users' tweet s. According to Twitter, 

as much as 25% of these tvveets could have 

PROl't:.rtTY Or 'THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE11RESENTA'l'IVES 30 
' ""' 

been the result of automated activity associated with Russia's malign influence campaign. 28 

UNClASSIFIED 

WfKILEAKS DJSSEMtNATES HACK~D 

MATERIAL 

f ~ ,;.- • • ., I . 

T"ce 

Podesta. 

~ u;-:e.: \'foo1..eats "1~-L!e 

~ 

'i·._. 

. 

. 

. 

(:\ ... ~ = . 

~~.._....,.o

~ 

,a:..::-...,~ .... uw~· .... -yeo......-~ ~~M ~ t ""ll.l!O"I .. W 

~~~·=~==o~~Nt"ti--:t 

UNCLASSIS:IEO 

Finding #9: The Russian government used 

RT to advance its malign influence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential 

el@ction. 

{U) The Committee finds ample evidence that RT is not only a state-enterprise, 

but is subject to the editorial control of the 

Russian government. This control allowed 

the Kremlin to use RT to advance its malign 

influence efforts during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

(U) RT, formerly Russia Today, became 

an international news channel in 2005 .. lt is 

available in more than 100 countries and 

has its largest viewer base in Europe. fU's 

stated goal is to "create news with an edge 

for viewers who want to question more" 

and produces content which appeals to · 

skeptics of both the mainstream media and 

the e-stablishrnent. 3{) 

(U) RT is subject to the control of the 

Russian government. The State Department 

describes it as a "State-own ed international 

satellite news network broadcasting in mul~ 

tiple languages," which "'spreads Russian. 

propaganda tailored to international markets.'' The IC has identified RT as nthe Kremlin1s principal international propaganda outlet.'131 

PROPERTY OF TI-!E U.S. HDUSE OF REPRES'cl-H ATIV!::S 31 
(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential 

erections, RT ran stories consistent with its 

past editorial bias against the West and suggested that tl1e U.S. electoral proces~ had 

been con·upted. RT was critical of presidential candidates from both major parties but 

was consistently cfitical of candidate Cllnton 

through the election. 

{U) RT's attacks against candidate C1into~ ·were wide-ranging, Including the Insinuation that the Clinton family were crfmlnals. 

RT also used advertising to promote material leaked by Russian intelligence, which tar--

geted candidate Clinton and the Democratic 

Party.32 . 

(Ul finding #10: Russian intellfgence leveraged social media ln an attempt to sow social discol'd and to undermine the U.S. electoral process. 

(U) The Internet Research Agency (IRA), 

a Russra-based ''troll farm" with ties to the 

Kremlln, was ,·e.sponsible for placing ads and 

maintaining both human operated and au-

. to mated social media accounts for the malign influence campa[gn/'11 

. (UJ Twitter 

UNCLASSIFIED 

RT-SPONSORED TWEETS 

@ ATO 

S times whe11 th'? Ciintons escaped foderal 

charg~ 

11PoJ~~t<1B: Wikileak~ refc,u1is l.il~t hi>tch 

of emails from Clinton campaign <.h3lr 

~ ! ~l.tc+Mtfo'l.~~,;,/1~~. 

~ .o. .. ,~~11 ;U:w,l"'"1-11lll~-t".2!M"'-

h••.W ftt-tvf ti...,.,~~, '--'*""~C. ... r'N'\ ll"Y\ 

~ti• 

Source: Twitter 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) The 2016 Russian Twitter operation 

was coordinated with the use of other social 

m~dia platforms to undermine the U~S. political process :and divide Americans. Both 

presidentia I candidates (@Hilla ryClinton 

and @realOonaldTrump) were directly engaged through "retweets" :a nd "likes," as 

were various p·olitically active and divisive . 

PH0Pf:R1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPREGENTATIVl::'.S 

32 
factions of American society. 

(U) In total, Twitter identified 36,746 

automated Russian accounts which were 

responsible for producing 1.4 milllon unique 

tw~ets. In addition, Twilter identified 2,752 

human-operated accounts. Some of these 

accounts masqueraded as the news media, 

activists, and political organizations. One 

Russian accolint, @TEN_GOP, successfully 

Impersonated the Tennessee Republican 

Party and grew.to have significantly more 

followers than the legitimate Twitter ac~ 

colmt. After tweeting "We Love You, Mr. 

President" to Donald Trump, @TEN_GOP 

received a thank you from the preside'ntial 

candidate.

35 

(U) @TEN GOP and other Russianlinked accounts incited racial divisions, antiMusrim, and anti-immigrant messages. 

They also promoted the dissemination of 

material stolen from U.S. political organizations by the GRU. The Russian cyber personas DC Leaks and Guccifer 2.0 used 

Twitter to promote stolen material, as did 

UMCLASSIFIED 

RUSSIAN TWEETS USING 

@HlllaryClinton and 

@realDonaldTrump 

32,:?5,, ((

1

l•))1_- ro1,~ 416.632 

Tw<:Oll. /4 f! TwOOIG ~ • A 

1' 1,326 480,3-16 

l.,i(es l~ea 

T~fGC!lng @Hill~l')'Clinton 

follower.. 

Russl~n 

T\1Jlt1e, 

Acco.unto 

TBrgortina@<2alOonnldTrump 

I 

fonowen; 

Wikileak~. 

{U) Facebook 

(U) Russian operators also used Facebook Pages and advertising to advance their 

malign Influence campaign. The company's 

internal revtew found the creation and ·promotion 9f 120 ~nique Facebook Pages by 

the IRA. These pages 13enerated approximately 80,000 posts over the two year period preceding the election. These posts appeared ln 29 million users' Facebook ''News 

Feeds." When Facebook calculated the cumulative lmpact of "Shares" " Likes" and 

"Follows,'' the company estimated. that 129 

million people may have been served Russia's malign Influence content.JG 

{U} According to Facebook, much of the 

Russian activity was-designed to promote 

divisive soclal and political me~sages across 

the ideological spectrum and that advertising was intended to drive f611owership of 

divisive Pages. Four of the top lrnpressiongenerating (or number of times an ad was 

on screen) advertisernents\1o1ere from fictitious personas claiming to represent organizations lncll1dln3 "B.ick the Badge," 

"Bfacktivist," "Being Patriotic," and "Woke 

Blacks.''37 

(U) Russian malign influence activities 

on Facebook were significant but they were 

not well-funded or large-scale operations 

relative to the overall scope of electionrelated .:ictivlty on these platforms: 

• Prior to the election, Russian operators used paid advertising on Facebook to reach s million Americans 

PROPE;Rrf OF '1116 U.S. HOUSE OF REPR"$ENTA'rlVES 33 
. M..--.th~ 

,., • "-""' f l"IJ-.0.""41 '"'l"'"= 

~ u....s -Mi6,4 ~~-- "4 fcniJA 1,1, PW 

·"f'~~\,C:; -.l~·~r.t V"ffl l<.·~ lffl C1 

l• I(~ 

U NCLASSI Ff ED 

RUSSIAN ADS ON FACEBOOK 

'i... 

~.......... """"'" . t ei: • • , Ofl.'\li:I .... ' "· • U••"'-

~ r~ fct ail~ r,~,;,i l G8t' ro,rr-~ o,;rir.,, ll"o -

23 

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w , 1v C..!i'~z. 

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,_ . ~ 

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:-4, N"3,i),,,~ ... t"I.I 

~-....... 

-W.9'MY.t!_-,_,,_,M_ ~IJQIINl-ot 

c-, l'lwlo"-- t ~,~!l.)~At.:!, ~ 

Source: Facebook 

---

UNCLASSIFIED 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRl::SENTA1'1VES 34 
{based on Impressions). At the same 

time, 33 trillion stories were served 

on Facebook Pages and ust~rs averaeed 220 per day; 

• 56% of the 11.4 million impressions 

associated with Russian Facebook 

advertisfng occurred after the election; 

• 99% of Russian Facebook ads were 

funded with less than $1,000 and 

25% were never seen. 

{U) Google 

{U} Google also was used as a media 

platform for Russia's malign influence campaign. The company's investigation revealed that $4,700 was spent promoting 18 

channels and 1,100 YoliTUbe videos (43 

hours of content). 

{U) Google describes this as a limited 

investment compared to overall electionrelated spending on Google. In total, 

0.0002 percent of 2016 U.S. election advertising was found to be associated with Rl1Ssian malign actors. In addition, Google noted that this Russian-funded media had very 

low view counts with onty 3% reaching 

views of 5,000 or mo~e. 

(U) However, it sl)ould be noted that 

Google and its services have been and continue to be used by Russia for the dissemination of propaganda through RT. This is 

partly evidenced by RT's 2.2 million subscribers on You Tube, but also by the fact 

that RT propaganda is served to Americans 

by Google in the same manner as legitimate 

news sources. 

(U) The Committee's Investigation 

found that.Twitter, Facebook, Google, and 

other social .media platforms face slgoificant 

challenges In tt1eir effort to identify and act 

on malign influence campaigns. Some of 

those challenges include: 

• Sophisticated actors adapt to auto· 

mated defenses; 

• Social media does not requlre true 

name usage; 

• Users can easily conceal thef r physical location wrth virtual pr.ivate network connections; 

• Social media seeks authentic exchanges and does not want to censor speech; and 

• Social media platforms do not have 

access to intelligence reporting. 

PROPERTY 01' 1HP. U.S. HOU9F. OF REPRESENTATIVES 35 
}_ 

4. -

5_ 

5_ 

7_ 

8_ 

9.. 

10. 

ll. 

....... _,_ 

13. HP.SO, Full Ccmmitte.! Briefing cm Russia Cyber .Al:tivhy (Oosed Session), Sept 6, 201~: HPSO, f ull C=mitto!e Brwmr.gon 

Russia Cyber Acti\'ity {Close-d Se~n), Jan_ 10, 2016; Hj,.so, fun Commiuee Bri~ng oo Russia CV~r Act1Ylty {Closed SesSicnL Dec. S, 2016; -Droft Jnd!Jent ifl'Jestiga:jon Report fer the De,'?UJ0vi::c Nationof Ccmmittee, Aug. 24, 

Wl6; , Droft tn::Ident lnr.1esO{;(Jt1"on Report f or tile OeJtlocrG!ic Congcesslor.a! C!I«:f!Glgn Committee, 1\ug. 8, 

2016. 

l<l, I)rajt !.'lcident investig(]rion Repoafcrthe ~100'!1:ic NationoJ Committee, Aug. 24, 2016; 

Draft fncident lm,e:s:tgation Report jot #r~ D,;mcaaffr:. G;mgres;s.jorr1,I (;Dmpr;ig:: Committee, J..»g. 3, 2016. 

15. Draft Jnddent Jqv=ti!!Off,m P.eporr far the Demrr.:rco,;;nationc! Commi!t.:e, A11:s, 24, Wl5; 

Dr oft faddent lnvesr>9aticm Repor. fer the Demomror; Cangresslcnaf Compqign Camr_rnttee, Au!;. 8, 2016; Lexis Nexis, D1scover.f Ser,f.res FJ:le! S.°iie.et: MJ.Jow Mani' P<19es in a G,gal:ryte}" 0..-"<. :W, 2017 _ 

PROPERTY Of r riE US. !iOUSE;. o,= REPRESENTPiTIVES 36 
16. ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, Jan. 5, 

2017; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee 

Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed), Jan. 10, 2016; 

17. 

; ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Cyber Threats ta the 2016 US Presidential Election (/CA 2016-37HC), Sept. 12, 2016. 

18. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; , "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of Events," 

Politico, Dec. l, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's new 

findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017; 

prise in Cyberspace Operations (NICM 2017-06), Jan. 30, 2017. 

owing Risk of Strategic Sur19. , "Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 

20. Twitter, @DCLeaks_ 

21. 

22. "Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee," Crowd Strike Blog, June 15, 

, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, Associated 

Press, Nov. 4, 2017; "All Signs Point ta Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack," VICE, July 25, 2016; 

"Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 

23. 

24. -; "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Gucci/er 2.0: All Roads Lead 

Back to Russia," July 26, 2016; 

25. , "Interview with Guccifer 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 

26. ThreatConnect, "Does a BEAR Leak in the Woods? ThreatConnect Identifies DCleaks as Another Russian-Backed Influence Outlet," Aug. 12, 2016 

D. ~ 

Becker, Steven Erlanger, and Eric Schmitt, "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," 

The New York Times, Aug. 31, 2016. 

28. Wikileaks.org, About Wik/Leaks (www.wlkileaks.org), Dec. 22, 2017; Felke Hacquebord, "Two Years of Pawn Storm," 

Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Guccifer 2.0: All Roads Lead Back to Russia," July 26, 2016; 

; HPSCJ, Full 

Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016. 

29. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on 

Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; Matthew Nussbaum, "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of 

Events," Politico, Dec. 1, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's 

new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Past, July 11, 2017; 

30. RT.com, About, Dec. 23, 2017; 

31. U.S. Department of State, Media organizations controlled and funded by the Government of the Russia Federation 

32. 

33. 

(Report 002580), Nov. 7, 2017. 

34. Written testimony o Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017; HPSCI, "Russia Investigation 

Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017. 

35. Written testimony of , Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017. 

36. Written testimony of , General Counsel, Facebook, Nov. 1, 2017. 

37. HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 37 
(U) Chapter 3 -America Reacts 

Key Question 113: What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures 

and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future? 

(U) As disct1ssecl in Chapter 2, the IC 

w<Js at the tip of the spear of the U.S. government's response to Russia's nefarious 

cyber activities. While the NSA focused on 

detection and attribution, the FBI took the 

lead on victim notification, and the OHS was 

the primary agency responsible for providing assistance to victims and coordinating 

with state and local election officials. 

(U} The federal government's ability to 

effectively respond to cyber threats depends on the IC's ability to pc;1ss information 

efficiently to the FBI at the lowest classification level possible. It is also dependent on 

the sufficiency of the lnteractions between 

the federal government and victim, whether 

that victim Is a private organizalion such as 

tlie DNC, or a state or local government entity. Given the response to Russia's malign 

influence campalgn,-the Committee believes 

that FBI and OHS need to Improve the processes used to engage with victims and 

stakeholders, who independently control 

their respective systems. 

(U) The Executive Branch's policy response to Russia's active measures campaign induded extensive deliberation, but 

not significant pre-election action. This is 

explained by two factors. First, the Executive Branch was jt1stifiably concerned about 

raising an alarm so close to the election. 

Second, elections are not run by the federal 

government. State and local governments 

are under no obllg;ltion to cooperate w ith 

federal officials, nor are political or3cm izations that operate their own networks. In 

short, the developing intelligence on Russian active measures throt1ghout 2.016, the 

complexity of the political situation, and the 

lack of federal authority to act limited the 

options for aggressive pre-election actions. 

The Executive Branch t ook some actions, to 

include a Joint OHS and ODNI public statement issued on October 7, 2016. 

(iJ-, the CIA created a fusion cell on Russian election interference, 

which was comprised of analysts from the 

CIA, FBI, and NSA. This fusion cell produced 

a series of papers for the White House, directors or each of the three agencies, and 

the DNI. The cell operated through the 

election, standinc down in mid-November. 

(U) On December 6, 2016, President 

Obama directed CIA Director John Brennan 

to conduct a review of all Intelligence relating to Russian involvement in the 2016 

elections, and produce a single, comprehensive c;1ssessment. The result, an ICA titled 

Assessing Russian Actjvities and Intentions 

in Recent US Elections, was drafted by. 

and was coordinated with 

the NSAand the FBI. While most of the 

analysis contained in the ICA held up to 

scrutiny, the Committee investigation found 

that ICA judgments on Putin's strategic obPHOPEkTY OP THE U.S. HOUS1: OF RePRESENTATIVE3 38 
Jectives failed to meet most of the analytic 

standards set forth In th<:! primary guiding 

document for IC analysis, Intelligence Corn, 

munity Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Stand~ 

ards. 

{U) Another component of the Executive Branch's response to the Russian gov, 

ernment's efforts to interfere in the 2016 

presidential campaign was FBl's opening of 

a counterintelHgence investigation into "the 

nature of any links betw9en individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the 

Russlc:in government and whether there was 

any coordination between the campaign 

and Russia's efforts." 1 

{U) The Committee collected facts related to the FB1's investigation through May 

2017, until the appointment of Special 

Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee 

dld not examine events that occurred thereafter in order to avoid interfering with Special Counsel Mueller's ongoing investigation. 

While this chapter addresses the FBl's investigation, facts identified by the Committee 

relating to Russia contacts with Trump campaign associates, including the individuals 

under FBI investigation, are addressed in 

Chapter 4. 

{U) finding #11: The Federi!I Bureau of Investigation's notification to numerous Rus~ 

sian hacking victims was largely inadequate. 

... 

-· (U) The Commlttee is also concerned 

that many, perhaps even a majority, of Russia's known victims were never contacted 

by the r-01. In November 2017, the Associated Press (AP) reported that it contacted approximately 80 people out of a 11st of approximately SOD victims. Only two w ho 

were contacted by the AP "learned of the 

hacking attempts of their personal Gmall 

accounts from the FBl."8 Although the ComPROPcRTt OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA,IVES 39 
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

0 

LI 

.. 

.... 

C: 

ti 

LJ 

(. 
mittee cannot verify the accuracy of the 

AP's r~porting, Clinion campaign senior policy advisor Jake Sullivan testified to the 

Committee that, consistent with the AP's 

analysis, his personal Gmail account" was the 

subject of numerous hacking attempts, but 

tha t he never received any sort of notification from FBL~ 

(U) tnteraction with the DNC illustrated 

that even when the FBI expeditiously made 

contact with a victim, and conveyed relative!\, detailed information, the engagement 

failed to elicit the desired responsenamely, the DNC's swift and serious attention. Director Corney testified that, in retrospect, "[w}e w ould have sent up a much 

larger flare. Yeah, we would have just kept 

banging and banging on the door, kno1.ving 

what I know now. We made extensive 

efforts to notify. I might have walked over 

there myself, knowing wha~ I know now." 10 

Similarly, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson 

reflected that, ''You know, in retrospect, it 

would be easy for me to say that I should 

have brought a sleeping bag and camped 

out in front of the DNC in lat_e summer, with 

the benefit of hindsight."11 

(U) Anding #12: Communication between 

the Department of Homeland Security and 

state election officials was impeded by 

state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach coupled with an unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions. 

(U} QHS was the first agency to raise 

awareness to state election officials and the 

general public regarding cybersecurlty concerns with the 2016 election infrastructure. 

1n August 2016, Secretarv Johnson hosted a 

confere.nce call with the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS} and other 

Chief Election Officials. This call was followed in September and October 2016 by 

four statements encouraging state and local 

elections officials to request DHS's cybersecurity assistance.

12 

(U} During the August 2016 phone call, 

Secretary Johnson offered assistance to 

state officials in managing risks to voting 

systems in each state's jurisdiction. He also 

encouraged state officials to implement recommendations from the Department of 

Commerce's NIST and the U.S. EAC on securing election infrastructure. At that time, 

DHS was "not aware of any specific or credible cybersecurity t hreats relating to the upcoming general election systems," and, on 

the CQll with state officials, uSecretary Johnson reiterated that OHS, the Election Assistance Commission, NIST, and DOJ are available to offer support and assistance in protecting against cyber attacks."13 

(U) On August 18, 2016, the FBI Cyber 

Division, in an effort to aid cyber security 

professionals and system administrators to 

guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber crirpinals, issued an alert to 

states entitled, "Targeting Activity Against 

State Board of Election Systems.n2'1 The bulletin warned that in rate June 2016, an 

"unknown actor scanned a state's Board of 

Election website for vulnerabilities."15 The 

FBI recommended that all states search activity logs for any escalation attempts and 

suggested three recommendations as prePROPERTY OF 'fliE U.S. HOUSE OF REPR'ESENTATI\/ES 41 
cautionary measures.16 

UNCLASSIFIED 

FBI WARNS STATES OF 

MALICIOUS CYBER ATTEMPTS 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) In a Septembe, 161 2016 statement, 

Secretary Johnson announced "we have 

seen cyber intrusions involving political institutions and personal communications. 

We have also seen some efforts at cyber 

intrusions of voter registrntion data maintained in state election systems."" Secretary Johnso,, encouraged election ofiictals 

to reach out to OHS and also offered a variety of cybersecurity services to state and 

election officials, Including; 

• Scans on internet~facing systems, 

including reporting of vulnerabilities 

and mitigation recommendations; 

• Risk and vu lnerabiiity assessments; 

• Support from the National Cybersecu1·1ty ,md Comn1lr'nications Integration Center {NCCIC) to provide onsite assistance In identifying and remediating a cyber Incident; 

• Information sharing of relevant 

cyber incidents, threats, and vulnera bllity rnforrnation; 

• Best practices for securing voter registration databases and addressing 

potential thre ats; and 

• Field-based cybersecurity advisors to 

assist with planning and incident 

rw)nagement. 1~ 

{U) Also on September 28, 2016, Speaker Ryan and Leaders McConnell, Pelosi, and 

Reid sent a letter to the National Association of State Election Dfrectors, "urg[ing) 

states to take full advantage of the robust 

public and private seC'tor resou rces available 

to them ... " and informing thern that "[iJn 

addition, the Department of Homeland Security stands ready to provide cybersecurity 

assistance to those states that choose to 

request it." I.!> 

(U) On OGtober 1, 2016, Secretary Johnson e:<pressed gratitude for the letter from 

congressional leadership, and noted that 

there were a few cases in which malicious 

actors gained acces~ to state voting-related 

systems. He also encouraged state and local election officials to seek OHS' cybersecurity assistance. "So far, 21 states have contacted us about our services. We l1ope to 

see mor~,'".Johnson said at the time.;,0 

(U} DHS and ODNI released a joint public statement on October 7, 201~. DHS continued to urge state and local election offi~ 

ciats to remain vigilant and seek its assistance with cybersecurity.n On October 10, 

2016, Secretary Johnson provided an update on DHS election cybersecurity s.ef'\lices . . 

PROPlliW Of" l HE U.S. HOU$t: OF REPRESt:.NIA llVT:S 

42 
that "to date, 33 states . , . election agen· 

cies have approached the Department of 

Homeland Sec1;rlty about our Cybersecurity 

services." Johnson stressed that time was 

an important factor, with only 29 days until 

election; it cou Id take up to two weeks for 

OHS to run scans and identify vulnerabilities, and an additional week for elect;ion 

officials to mitigate any vulnerabilities. This 

was the Secretary's final public attempt to 

encourage state and local election officials 

to reach out to OHS for assistance.22 

Jh l ,h"-"S\'IM ,.. 

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•JO,fH r.r:i,J.111){)..-,..wh 

(U) Challenges encountered by OHS included the unprecedented slze <:lnd sco pe of 

Russian active rneasures, lack of public 

attention, and m istrust from state and local 

election officials-many of whom lacked 

access to classified information. Ultimately, 

36 states took advantage of DHS's assistance, but many election officials were resistant to the idea of designating election 

infrastructure as c·ritical infrastructure. 23 As 

former Secretary Johnson explained to the 

Committee, "one thing I discovered in this 

conversation, State election officials are 

very sensitive about what they perceived to 

be Federal intrusion into their process. I 

heard that firsthand over and over: This is 

our process. It's ou,· sovereign responslblllty. We're not Interested in the Federal 

ta keove r."24 A clear example of mistrust was 

a letter sent from Georgia's Secreta1y of 

State Brian Kemp to Secretary Johnson on 

December 8, 2016, which accused DHS of 

attempting to breach the Georgia Secretary 

of Stat e's firewall. "I am writing to ask you 

whether OHS was aware of this attempt 

and, if so, why DHS was attempting to 

breach our firewall," Mr. Kemp stated.i.s 

Nevertheless, oh January 6, 2017, OHS designated election infrastructure as a subsector of the existing Government Facilities 

critic~I Infrastructure sector?• 

(U) Finding 1113: The Joint Office of the Di· 

rector of National 1ntelligence and Departm ent of Homeland Security public statement attributing election Interference to 

_ ··-· ) Russia was ineffective. 

UNCLASSIFIED (U) No major public actions were taken 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENrATfVES 43 
between October 7, 2016 and election day. 

It is unclear exactly when policymakers began focusing on Russian efforts to influence 

· the election. As further dlscl1ssed below, 

Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalls being 

briefed by Fl31 senior leadershi~ 

that 

the Counterintelligence Division had essentially uncovered some information or received information involving Russian intelligence operatives."27 

(U) On May 18, 2016, speaking at the 

Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, 

D.C., DNI Clapper stated, "we've [the IC] already had some indications of that 

[attempts of cyberattacks on presidential 

campaign websites] and the combination of 

DHS and FBI a re doing what they can to educate both campaigns against potential 

cyber threats."28 

(U) By summer 2016, CIA Director Bren• 

nan had l:>ecorne aware of information 

aboul "specific Russian efforts to Influence 

the election," 7~ and the National Security 

Council (NSC) Principals Committee began 

discussing actions to take In response to 

what the Russians had been doing.30 As Director Brennan continued to brief the Prin· 

clpals Committee on Russia, the CIA-:-as 

discussed previously in this report- "pulled 

together experts rrom the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA}, NSA, and FB-

- to focus on the issue, drawing in multi pte perspectives and subject matter ex· 

perts with broad experti~e to assess Russian 

attempts to interfere iri the U.S. Presidential 

election."3 

While Dl1S was providing assistance to 

states to conduct cyber reviews of their 

electoral mechanisms, the Prlnclpals Committee was awaiting "with urgency whatever the lntellrgence Community could provide" that "would illumrnate !their] understanding of {Russian interest in the election]."i3 

UNC LA.SSIFf ED 

lC CONFIDENT OF RUSSIAN PREELECT!ON HACKING 

Joint Statement from the Department O( . 

Hom£1land Sccuri('! an~ Office! of th~ Dlrector of 

National lntelllgencc on Election Securlly 

.,. __ 

l)"l..._,tw,..., 

C..,U,1<1 W.il) 

"'-\oj_ ~·C.~t lAO•U-..•,.,h~l(~-..--~.....,_y 

~--""""\4·-•- 1-.--....rn.-.,,..,,.\t ...... ~T'-.-t--a.lt\..,...~.....,. ._.._ ... .._.,,. CCl-• ... ,.-J..w.-•,,.,'t••~••...,_~,,.,_.._.,.,.- .. .-...~ .._.,,..,._..w"- .. - .a.,o t._.,._,, ... .-._,....,u,.,..... ... ,,. "'~ ... .,..,.....,.~-,·-\)~,-.'--,._.~,_.....,,."-""~~ l>.'"wtAN.V• .. - • •....,__. ~¥_,.._..,..~-.,,,,.t..-'",,,,..__..,'1., 

UNCLASSIFIED 

{U) On August 4, 2016, Director Brennan, in a scheduled call with Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security 

Bureau (FSB), became the first U.S. official 

to raise the Issue of Moscow's meddling::~4 

Brennan told Bortnikov that a campaign 

against the United States would certainly 

"backfire" and that all Americans "cherished 

their ability to elect their own leaders without outside interference or disruption."35 

Additionally, former Attorney General 

PROPC!RfY OF me U.S. HOUSE OF REPl<E8EN IAT1VES 

44 
Loretta Lynch testified that the decision was 

made to have "the President of the United 

States speak directly to President Putin, 

confront him with knowledge that we were 

aware of his efforts on a variety of fronts 

and that it was unacceptable, and that that 

discussion took place during a pu II-aside ... 

at one of the G- either 7 or 20 meetings in 

the early fall. 1136 Former National Security 

Advisor Susan Rice corroborated in testimony before the Committee that President 

Obama and President Putin discussed Russian meddling in the 2016 election at the 

end of bilateral discussions during the G20 

Summit in China in early September 2016.

37 

(U) The most significant pre·election 

public action was the October 7, 2016, joint 

OHS and ODNI statement, indicating In part 

that the IC "is confident that the Russian 

Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from us persons and institutions, lncludf ng from the US political organizations. "38 The IC assessed that the disclosures of alleged hacks on websites such 

as DCLeaks.com, Wikileaks, and by Guccffer 

2.0 were consistent with Russian methods 

and motivations. According to Secretary 

Johnson, the statement "did not get the 

public attention. that it should have, franRly, 

because the same day the press was focused on the release of the 'Access Hollywood' video. That's what made ou r news 

below-the-fold news that day."39 Additionally, the public dissemination of Podesta's 

emails commenced on October7.

40 

(U} In considering a public response, 

the Executive Branch was in a unique posi~ 

tion-lt was dealing with extremely sensi~ 

live intelligence and had to consider the impacts of jeopardizing sources and methods 

when declassifying intelligence.~1 Furthermore, In the midst of an ongoing campaign, 

it had to carefully consider any public statements or actions, as it did not want to be 

perceived as taking sides and politicizing the. 

election-or, according to former Secretary 

Johnson fueling claims that the election was 

"rigged." 4:1 

{U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's 

post-election response was insufficient. 

(U) In the weeks following candidate 

Trump's victory over candidate Clinton.in 

the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Execu-

.tive Branch officials began brainstorming 

options for punitive actions against Russian 

activities. On December 6, 2016, President 

Obama ordered D1rector Brennan to conduct a review of all Intelligence relating to 

Russia and the 2016 elections, i1,ctudfng a 

comprehensive assessment that would 

eventually be mad~ public.43 

(U) On December 29, 2016, among other measures, President Obama announced 

the expulsion of 35 Russian intelligence operatives under diplomatic cover, the closure 

of Russian compounds in Maryland and New 

York, sanctions against nine entities and individuals associated with Russian intelligence services, and the Treasury Qepartment's designation of two Russian individu~ 

als for "using· cyber-enabled means to cause 

misappropriation of funds and personal 

identifying information."4'

1 Also on December 291 the FBI and DHS released a Joint 

PROPERTY OF THE u:s. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 45 
Analysis Report of declassified technical fnform~tion on Hussian cyber activity to help 

notwork defenders identify and disrupt Russian malicious cyber activity. 

(U) On January G, 201.7, DHS designated 

election infrastructure as a subsector of the 

existing government f~cillties critical Infrastructure sector.11

~ The same day, a declassified version of the ICA was released to the 

public.

4

& 

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments 

on Russia's election activities employed 

proper analytic trade craft. 

(U) The IC produced three versions of 

the ICA: (1~ a highly compartrnented document, which Included all sources and references to the underlying intellrgence, (2) a 

Top Secret version that omitted details from 

compartmented reports, irnd (3) an unclassffied version. The fu II ICA was briefed to 

Pr'csldent Obama on Jam1ary 5, 2017 and 

President-elect Trump on fonuary 6, 2017. 

The unclasslfied version of the ICA was also 

reteased to the public on January 6, 2017. 

While the level of detall varies greatly 

among the three versions, the fim:il conclusions and key judgments of each are the 

same. 

(U) The Committee determined that the 

majority of the ICA judgments on Russla's 

eleclion activities employed proper analytic 

tradecraft. The~e were m~stly well reasoned, consistent with observed Russian 

actions, properly do~umented, andparticularly on the cyber intrusion sections-employed appropriate caveats on 

sources and Identified assumptions. Some 

of the key ICA judaments that the Committee found credible because they were 

based on proper anarytic tradecra~ are 

summarized below: 

• (U) Russian efforts to influence the 

2016 U.S. presidential election represent the most recent expression of 

Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic order. 

• (U} Russian intelligenc~ services, 

acting on the orders of Russian President Vladimir Putin, launched cyber 

and conventional influence operations-notably by leaking politically 

sensitive emalls obtained from computer intrusions-during the 2016 

election. 

{U) Finding #16: The lntelllgence Communi· 

tv Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic intentions did not employ proper ana· 

lytic tradecraft. 

(U) While the Committee found that 

most ICA analysis held-up to scrutiny, the 

investigation also identified significant intelligence tradecraft failings that undermine 

confidence in the JCA judgments regarding 

Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic 

objectives for disrupting the U.S. election. 

Those judgments failed to meet longs~andPROP~lY OFiHC! U.S. HOUSE OF RCPHl:S!:NTATIVES 46 
ing standards set forth in the primary guiding document for IC analysis, ICD 203, Analytic Standards including: 

• {U) ''Properly describe quality and 

credibilit:y of underlying sources." 

• {U) "Properly express and explain 

uncertainties associated with major 

analytic judgments." 

. (Ut ".Incorporate analysis of altematives ·- [particularly] when major 

judgments must contend w ith significant uncertainties or ... highimpact results." 

• (U} Base confide-nee assessments on 

"the quantity and quality of source 

material." 

• (U) "Be informed by all relevant information available." 

e (U) "Be independent of political 

considerations."

41 

{U) The Committee emphasizes that the 

tradecraft failures identifie<l in this investigation should not be broadly ascribed to 

ClA, NSA or FBI analysis, as the shortcomings were confined to select judgmentsspecifically, a key assessment on Putin1

s 

strategic intentions-and not to the entire 

ICA product. Moreover, the ICA was 

writte~ CIA analysts and their 

draft was subjected to an unusual_ly constrained review and coordination process, 

which devcated from established QA practice. The Committee is not aware of these 

problems being prevalent In o'""Jler CIA, FBI, 

or NSA products. 

(CfNF) 

101 The Committee's find.ings on lCA 

tradecraft focused on t he use of sensitive , 

• intelligence - cited by the 1CA. 

This presented a significant challenge for 

dassifa:ation downgrade. The Committee 

worked with inteltigence officers from the 

agencies who own the raw reporting cited 

in the ICA t o downgrade the classification of 

compartmented findings -

-

(U} The Committee is planning additional action regarding this information in early 

spring 2018. 

{U) Finding #17: lhe Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump 

campaign after receiving information related to Trump campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos. 

(U) !n addition to tile other Executive 

Branch responses described above, in late 

July 2016, the FBI opened an enterprise Cl 

investigation into the Trump campalgn fol~ 

lowing the receipt of derogatory information .about f9reign policy advisor George 

Papadopoulos. Tne purpose of an enter; 

prise Cl investigation is to obtain information of intelligence value, umost times .. 

. not with any kinci of intent or objective of 

reaching a criminal charge."~ FBl's enterprise C1 investigation Into the Trump campaign wss ied by a small team a~ FBI headquarters.49> The timeline of t his investigation can be found on the next page. 

flRQPS'(TY OF THE U.S. H-OUSE or- ~6PR~6JITATl',f"t::S 47 
(U) The derogatory inforn1ation result-

~d from the relationship between Papadowas 

anonymized In Papadopoulos' charging doc-

~o ument as "the Professor"}. Based on the 

charging documents, the two firsL met in 

Italy on or about March 14, 2016, and 

"P~padopoulos was interested in -

because . . . fhe] claimed to have substantial 

connections with Russian government officials, which Papadopoulos thought could 

increase his tmportance as a poiicy advisor. 

• • " ~

1 

- was interested in Papadopoulos because of his r~le in the Trump campaign.52 The first meeting withlailllloccurred approximately one week pri'or to 

candidate Trump publicly naming Papadopoulos as a forergn policy advlsor.!:,3 

(U) In late March, Papadopoulos had a 

follow-on meeting with- London, 

where-ntroduced Papadopoulos to 

a woman who claimed to be a relative of 

President Putin "with conn ections to senior 

Russian government officials."s,i Papadopoulo!? informed the campaign about this 

meeting, with a campaign supervisor proclaiming that Papadopoulos conducted 

"great work.1155 Papadopoulos coi:1tinued to 

correspond with- who connected 

Papadopoulos with an.individual1111 claiming to.have connections with the 

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.56 Papadopoulos communicated with this Russian 

contact throughout the summer of 2016, 

attempting to arrange meetings between 

the·Russian government and campaign officlals.57 

(U) On April 26, 2016, over brea kfast at 

a London hotel, - told Papadopoulos 

"that he had Just returned from a trip to 

Moscow where he had met with high-level 

Russian government officlals."ss - further indicated he had learned that the Russians had obtained 'dirt' on candidate Clinton. Specrfically that '"the Russians had 

emails of Clinton,' 'they have thousands of 

emaits.w

59 However, the Committee was 

unable to discern if the referenced emails 

were the missing emails from candidate 

Clinton's server while she was Secretary of 

State or the emails that were stolen from 

the DNC . . 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 48 
P~OPERTf OF THE U.S. !slOUeE OF Rl:.-PRt::Sc--:NT/\TIVcS 
-

{U) finding #18: As part of the enterprise 

counterintelligence investigation into the 

Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation opened an lndlvidu;:il counterintelllgence Investigation Into Ca~er 

Page. 

(U} By the time Page was announced as 

a Trump campaign foreign ·policy advisor on 

March 211 2016, he was already a subject of 

interest for the FBI. Page previously lived 

and worked rn Russra and maintained contact with known Russian intelligence officers, including -who was 

described in a 2015 court filing as an SVR 

officer posted to the Russian Mission to the 

United Nations. Page previously worked 

with the FBI in the prosecution ofand other Russian intelligence officiais.68 · 

PROPERTY 01' THE U.S. HOUSI:! OF REl-'Rl:~ENf'ATIVES so 
(U} finding #19: The dossier compifed by 

Christopher Steele formed an essential part 

of an application to the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court t6 obtain electronic surveillance on carter Page. 

(U) In late October 2016, DOJ sought 

from the Foreign Intelligence SurveiUance 

Court (FIS(} an order authorizinmittee did not find-any evidence of any 

cooperation or conspiracy between Page 

and Papadopoulos. Additionally, the socalled "dossier" complied by Christopher 

Steele formed a substantial and essential 

(For additional information about the St eele dossier, see Chapter 4.) 

-

(U) finding #20: Special Counsel Robert 

Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several 

charges, none of which relate to aUegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the 

_Russian government. 

(U) Paul Manafort joined the Trump 

campaign on March 29, 2016, and was etevated to _campaign chairman on May 19, 

2016. Manafort became campaign manager 

after the campaign removed 

- on June 20, 2016. The Committee 

agreed to avoid, to the greatest e;..1:ent practical, any potential interference with Special 

Counsel Mueller's investigation. Given the 

ongoing litigation concerns associated with 

Manafort, the Committee.will only discuss 

information in this report t hat has been 

publicly disseminated by the Special Counsel's office. Although the Committee would 

have appreciated the opportunity to interview Manafort regarding his role on the 

Trump campaign, the Committee is fimited 

in this regard due to Special Counsel 

M1:1eller's investigation and indictments. 

{U} On October 27, 2017, a gran·d jury 

indicted Manafort and his associate, fellow 

lobbyist and deputy Trump campaign manager Rick Gates, for various financial crimes, 

as well as making false statements.

74 All of 

the financial crimes took place prior to Manafort serving as Trump campaign manager, 

and nothing in the indictment relates to any 

potential collusion, conspiracy, or conspif"Qcy between the Trump campaign and the 

Russian government. 

{U} On February 22, 2017, a grand jury 

issued a superseding indictment for Manafort and Rick Gates, which included additional allegations of financial crimes, indud51 
ing bank fraud. Sfmilar to the October 27, 

2017, indictment, the superseding Indictment does not include any reference to the 

Trump campaign, Including no mention of 

collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian 

government. 

(U) While the Committee will not go 

Into further detail on the charges against 

Manafort due to ongoing litigation concerns, Special Counsel Mueller's indictment 

of Manafort illustrates the necessity for U.S. 

presidential campaigns to better investigate 

individuals who serve in sen for positions 

within the campaign. If the accusations 

against Manafort are true, he should have 

never served as a senior official wfth a campaign for the U.S. presidency, much tess 

campaign chairman or manager. 

(U) G~neral Flynn b~gan advising the 

Trump campalgn on or before february 

2016 and subsequently became a central 

figure on the campaign trail. He was the 

former Director of DIA and was one of candidate Trump's closest advisors on national 

security issues. Following the election, and 

during the transition period, he was designated as the future National Security Advisor to the President. General Flynn served 

as President Trump's National Security Advisor for less than a month, resigning on February 13, 2017. According to FBI Director 

Corney, General Flynn's resignation occurred after it came to light that he hacl misled Vice President-Elect Pence about his 

contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey 

l<lslyak during t he tronsltion period. 's 

{U) Prior to his trip to Moscow, Genera l 

Flynn and his son met with Russian Ambassador Kislyak at the ambassador's private 

residence in Wa shington, D.C. on December 

2, 2015. The r.neeting was later described 

by General's Flynn's son In an email to the 

Russian embassy as "very productive."

79 

The email indicates that the meeting was 

arranged at the request of General Flynn or 

his son.80 The Committee was unable to in· 

terview General Flynn and his son because 

of their written intent to assert t heir Fifth 

Amendll)ent rights against selfincrimination. 

Pnore:RTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRES!:NrnTIVES 

52 
I {U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded 

guilty to making a false statement to the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding 

his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Kislyak, even though the federal 

Bureau of Investigation agents dld not detect any deception during Flynn's interview. 

(U) According to the charging documents, on or about December 22, 2016, "a 

very senior member of the Presidential 

Transition Team" {PTI) directed General 

Flynn to contact representatives of foreign 

e..; 

governments. This request concerned a 

resolution about Israel[ settlements submitted by Egypt to the U.N. Security Councii 

around December 21, 2016.ss Later, on December 22, General Flynn contacted Ambassador Kislyak and "requested that Russia 

L. l/ 

vote against or delay the resolution."80 The 

next day, Ambassado r Kislyak informed 

General Flynn that Russia would not comply 

with the request.87 

(U) On December 29, 2016, President 

Obama "authorized a number of actions'' -

including new sanctions-"in response to 

the Russian government's aggressive harassment of U.S. officials and cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election in 2016."85 

Following this announcement, the charging 

documents state that General Flynn dis- · 

cussed "what, if anything, to communicate 

to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S. 

sanctions," with a senior PTT official.as 

-

PROPER1Y OF TliE: U.S. HOUSE CF REPREScNTA"TIVES 53 
{U) Finding #23: Executive Branen officials 

did not notify the Trump campaign tha1 

members of the campaign were assessed 

to be potential counterintelligence concerns. 

(U} The Committee found that the 

Trump campaign was not notified that 

members of the campaign were potential 

counterintelligence concerns. This lack of 

notification meant that the campaign was 

unable to address the problems with each 

campaign member and was ignorant about 

the potential national security concerns. AG· 

Lynell recalled that, during her first meeting 

with Director Corney and McCabe about 

Page, "one of t he possibllltles the three of 

us discussed was wheth~r or not to provide 

what is called a defensive briefing to the 

campaign, wherein there would be o 

m eeting wlth a senior person with the 

Trump campaign to alert them to the fact 

that .. . there may be efforts to compromise 

someone with their campaign." 102 

(U) Such a defensive briefing would not 

have been unusual. According to Lynch, _ 

"[i]t is not an uncommon thing t o do . . . in 

rntelligence matters."103 However, the FBI 

did not provide any such warning about 

Page, although it was again discussed b.y the 

administration's most senior policymakers 

after Director Corney briefed t he National 

Security Council Principals about the Page 

information in "!ate springn 2016.m 

PROPERTY t1f THE t).S. HOUSI:: OF REPRESl:.N1'AilVES 54 
(U) The Trump campaign did not receive a general counterintelligence briefing 

until August 2016, and even then, it was 

never specifically notified about Papadopoulos, Page, Manafort, or General Flynn's 

Russia ties. 1o.; Further, the counterintelligence briefing provided to Trump and his 

top advisors did not identify any individuals 

by name, but rather focused on the general 

threat posed by adversaries, including Russia and China. 

(U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indictment ·of the Internet Resee1rch Agency and 

Russian nationals exposes Russian actors 

and their intent to spread distrust towards 

the candidates and the political system in 

general. 

(U) In mid-February 2018, the Department of Justice charged 12 Russians and the 

Russia-based Internet Research Agency LLC 

with interference operations targeting the 

United States political and electoral process· 

es. The lndictment claims that th~ stated 

goal of the Russian actors was to " spread 

distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general" and provides insight into the metl10ds used by the IRA, 

such as the use of stolen identities, travel to 

the U.S. for the purpose of collecting intelligence, and the procurement of computer 

infrastructure to hide t he Russian origin of 

activities. ~

05 The indictment by Special 

Counsel Mueller contains assertions that are 

· consistent with information examined by 

the Committee during its investigation. Specifically, according to an accompanying DOJ 

announcement, "There ls no allegation in 

the indictment that any American was a 

knowing participant in the alleged unlawful 

activity. There is no allegation in the indictment that the charged conduct altered t he 

outcome of th~ 2016 election.''

107 

PROPERTY OF :HE u .s_ HOUSE OF REPRESECl.'TA.Tl\ic S 55 
v, 

l . Hr SCI, "RuS$la1l /\clive Mca~ure~ lnve5ti;:otion", Mar. 20, 201,, 

7.. HPSCf, ''Russla11 Actlvn Moasuw~ lnvc~tlgot1on", M.:ir. 20, 2017, 

3. 

d . 

s. 

G. 

7. 

8. 

9. Hr SCI, Executive Session Interview oUake Sullivan, Dec. 21, 2.017, 

10. I-IPSCJ, "Russian Active rvteasurns investigation», Mar. 20, 2017. 

11. HPSCI, "RUS5ia Investigative Task Force Heating with former Secretaf'/ of Homeland Setu rity Jeh Johnson," June .21, 

2017. 

12. HPSCI, "Russia Investigative Task Force HearinB with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh JohnsQn/ June 21, 

2017. 

13. DHS, Reodovt of Secretary Johnso11's Cali Wit/1 State Election Officials About Cybersecurity, !J!t.eWwww.dhs.eov/ 

news/2016/08/15/[e<1dout·~ecret<lry-iohnsgns-calr-$\ii\e-elec.lfQD:.officials-£Ybersecu ri 1·,•. Aug.15, 2016. 

1c1. F01, FBI Flos/J: Targeting ActMry Against Stat~ Boord of Election Systems, Aue. 18, 2016. 

l S. Flll, FB/1-"lash: TorgetingAclivity Agajnsc Srate Board of Election Syscems, Aug. lll, 2016. 

'16. Fill, FDI F!os/1: Toryetfog Activity Ayoin~t Stote Boarcl of[lection Systems, Avg. 18, 2016. 

17. or~s. Stotemenr /Jy Secrera.ry Joh11son Concemlng the Cybersecurliy of rlle Nation's Election Sy:,cems, hltu;LL 

www .d h ~.ll,ov/11ow1:/7.Q11:./~/ 1 6/.i,t;i tom" n1 ·MtWH~Q!· ttlhnr.on•r.onr..,ml nrt-cy br:(!.<'Cllr I ty-na !inn·~-e:cc1ion · S'll!m, 

SopL 16, 2016. 

18. DHS, Statement [)y Sccrc101y Jat1 nson Concr:rn/11y tlt1.• Cyb,ll'.11:cuflly of lhe Na.lion's E(ecttun Sym ims, b.\Sn.:LL 

v~~,cih<.&2_,•/ nf!.filJ2,016/0'iW,6/;,!1)lCmr. n.1:[,n111.r.:t~11v•)Qhl1HlJ)•Ci)l\r,gmln~,lCmrtl!>Y•llt1tirm';· r:l1!~1tP.t)~ 

Sopl. 16, 1016. 

19. Puul O. Rynn, Nancy 1>01osl, Mitch McConnull, Harry Rold, Li:11,1r to Toud Vulci1t/11a, Sept. 281 2016. 

20. DHS, Statement by Sacretory Johnson About EICGtton Systems' C}'IJC!rsccurlty, ~ !!d.lli!Y.l:.~.l?-OJ.6ll..QL!11.L 

~li>kpir.nt·secr<~lilrY- 1ohn;o1\.,,~0lrt•sl,1c11oq-&YW\(JIS•c;:r:bN~ Oct. l, 2016. 

21. DH~. Joint Stotemunr from the Deportment of liomeland Secut/1)' otld 0,(Jice of tile Director of Noo·onal lntelllat:nce on 

Election Security, Z!Jt1l~Jb·1ww,t1hu:cw/"Q~ 01 C,/10/07 llnl Qt;llilteme~ P..a!.!mJl 111-lrotM ln nd•security·il nd-office · 

dlrector-na1fonaJ, Oct. 7, 2016. 

22. DHS, Update Dy Secretcrry Johnson On OHS Election Cybersecurlty Services, btt1?$://wv,w.d l!J!.4.Qy/t1ewsn.01G/lO/lO/ 

Jtl2f!.itiP,·5PC{P,tary· loh nson,d lls,eJectlon-cybe rs<lcurity-servlce.~. Oct. 10, 2016. 

23. HPSCI, "Ru~lll lnYestiR'aiive Task force Hearing with Fomier S(melar,, of Homeland S-ecur\ty Jeh Johnsont June 21, 

2017. 

24. HPSCI, "Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary oi Hamel.ind Securit>1 Jeh Johnson.'' Jtme 21, 

2017. 

25. The Office of Secretary of State of G eorgla, Letter to Secretary Jeh lohnsor\ Dec. 8, 2016. 

26. DHS, Statement by ~ecretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure SubsecLor, .l:!StmJb:.VV-'W.d hs.gov/ncws/2017l01/0&/~totament-~?.cret:irv•loimson-6oslgnallon-election-lnf;astructure crirtc.al, 

Jan. 6, 2017. · 

27. HPSCI, Executive Session lntarvlew of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2Q1/. 

28. '"The Global DlglLaJ Challenge Initiative - Xey11ote Address,'' .llil)arl:isan Policy Center video, 38:2S, http://br.ove.me/ 

zff9r41)q, May 18, 2016. 

29. HPSCI, E:<ecutiva Ses~lon lnterYit~w of Loretta Lynr.h, Oct. 20, 2017. 

30. HPSCI, hecutivc Scs~lon lnterYlew of LOrutta Lynd,, Oct. 20, 2017; llw Prl11r.lpols Committee, convon~d nnd chaired by 

tl1c Not1onol S.r.curlly /\dvisor, l~ a Cnl>lne1 level h1teragc11c~· forum for r.o nsldcrlnr, pollc11 l$~u os that MftH:t the national 

u:curlty lntcro~ts of the United Stutes. Regular attendees of tho Prlnd p.ils Commlttc<e Include : the SccretJry of Stntc, the 

SocroLorv of the Trc~surv. tho SocroLory of l>ofori~f.', tho At\ornuv Goncrol, thu Sor.retary ol l:norgy, tho C:hfaf of Staff to 

the Pro~ldcnt. tho Director of Notion ul rntclllgtmr.o, the CJiurrmon of the Joint Chlo#$ oi Stnlf, the Director of th~ Centro I 

lntolll11oncv Ai;oncy. the Nat1onol Soc~ulty Advisor, tho Homeland Security A<Msor, Md tho Ropr<:5r."1miva or tho Un1totl 

Stot11~ to the Unlted Nol1ons. 

31. HPSCI, "Russian AcL~v11 Measuras Dunne the 2016 Election Campalen,N Mo\' 23, 2017. 

32. The Gang of 8 is comprised of the Speaker of the House of Represr.otiltlvc-s, the Minority I.ender of the Mouse of Representatives, the Chairman and Rankine Member of the Permanont Select Con1mittce on lnt~lliRllnce of t hP. House o r Rep. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT,'!>.TIVt:S 

56 . 
,esemati~s. the Majcf.ty .,rui Minority lead= of the U..S. Senate, 3J:td the Chai!mrll\ and V:~ Chairman of !:he Sc!Ed 

Com mitt~ on ln.effigC11ce of tr£ U.S. ~ate. 

33. >-IPSO, Ex!:cutive 52S1icn lnteNle:.v of Susan Riro, Sap. 8, 2017. 

34. l-ll'SCT, "Russian Aclive Measures Ou ring the 2016 Election Cam~ai!;O. ~ May 23, 2017. 

35. HFSO, ·Russi,:m Aai'-'e r·Jl.!asurcs Duri:,g 'the 2016 Election Ca."n~;;ign." May 23, 2017. 

36. H?SC!, Ell!!<uti\'-e Session lnter.ri::w of Lorena tynci1, Oct. 20, W17. 

37. 1-if'SO, fxe.:um•e Session loter>f,...,., ofS!tSa n Rke,Sep. 8, 2011. 

38. Dl"iS,Joinr Statemellt from the OeporrmeflC of Hame/cr.d Secvrizy and Ojficeof the Ui:ecto, of Nutionof lntelfig.:m:e on 

Eleaion Secority, N ~ps, f /ww,.-.,.dt-s.go·,./ r'l;!w .!}201 G/10/ 07 Ao<nt-s tiltt2.-ner,t-deoa rt-nent-homaland-secu rit'{•a:1d-uificedin~g:cr-rc1tio ni!I, Oct. 1, 201E. 

3!t. HPSCI, "Russia ?1westigai;,;e Task Force Hearing wi,h R;rmerSecreu,ry of Homeland ~curity Jeh lohn5on,0 June 2.l. 20'.i.7. 

40. H~I, &.2cuti-1e Session lntel\liew of John !locksra, Jun€! 27, 201'1. 

41. Hl>.:-Ct, uRussia Investigative T~5k Force Hearing wflh Fomter Secretary of Hoimiland ~curity leh Johmon,° June 21, 20l7. 

42. HPSCI, "'Russia lm.·~tigative Task Force Hearing wi,h Fe<mer Secretary of llcmel.ir,d Security Jah Jofmson, .. June 2i. 2017. 

-13. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

so. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

S7. 

58. 

S9. 

60. 

61. 

52.. 

o3. 

in Septenbet 2015-Shari!d similar information in a or.2-on-one meeting 

with nt G2r.eral COvns~ James Baker. KPSO, Executi-.'e Sessicn cf , Oec. 18, 2017. il.rcund the same 

time as ms meeting with fBI,-shared tfle information with jcurnatiru, lttclodir. of Slate, who published an 2rticle at the e.nd of October. r!PSO, E.~ecut:v2 S~ion of Dec. :!13, 2017; "'Wa5 

a Trump ~fceCcmmunicating With Russia?," Slate, Oct. 3!, 2016. Candidate Ointon promoted tile:- artidetv lier 

soti;;! media follCT,.,crs ,f-,e same day it wc1s published. Twitt:er, @Hil~iClintoo. Oct. 31, 2.016, 4:32 PM. 

White House. Stotemenr by Che PreslrteJlt on A.ccrons in RespMSe to R!!ssi'an Mclidous Cyb.?1 Ac:clllicy am; Harcssmer.t, 

D~ 29, 201.6. 

DP.S, Sta~emenc !rt Secretory Jen Johnson on the Des:gnotfoa of Election lnfrost.wcwr:! as a C!ictcol fflfrc;;r:-ucture Subsector, ntt !ls: l l·,•N Lw.dhs. ec,·/ news/2017 iOl/06/5 t-.!rement-se c:,Hary-jchr .son-d~sie nati!: r,-elccti un--irr<3~t="= re--:rit! ca I, 

JEill..6,2017. 

OONI, Assessing Russian Activ:cies and i'ntenr:ions ln R~enl US cfeettons. Ian. 6, 2017. 

OONJ, ,'nte/fr9eme Comrn11nity Directive 203: Analytic Stonr!o;d5, Ja". 2, 2015. 

HP5CI, EXc:cutr,e Se,slon lllteivlew of Mary McCord, No .... 1, 2017. 

HPSCI, E:r.crotiva So...sslol'l lntuMew of A.nprew McC,1be, Dec. 19, 2017. 

U.S. v. Ge:irge ?opadciμoulos {3:17-cr-182, District of Columbia). 

U.S. v . Gecrge ?ap,.d-0~oufos (!:17-cr,182, Distrli:t ofCclumbe}. 

U.S. v. GEC'ge Pap ad Dpi;,ulos (l:l 7-cr-UR District of•Col umhe}. 

Post Opimons Staff, "A crans.crlpl of Deana!d Trump'!. meeting with The Wilsh,n~o,~ Post e i:frtoriai board/ ;•/mh,r.gtan 

Fort. Mar.21, 2016. 

U.S.·;. Ge-:lfge Pa~;iopoutos (1:17~-1S2, District: of Cohani'.!1,iJ. 

U.S. v. Geotgc P~dopou:os (l:l?-c.-1&2, District of Cof11ml;;;1); Email from George Fapadop<,ulos to 

#Re: Me~ti.."lg ·,,•il:r. Russi-am leaderst-,ip- indud'ifll; P(itin," Ma~. 14, 2016. [DJTFP00010i1ll. 

U.S.~·- Gecrge 

Fwd: 

~dcp0".1fo5 

(R1mian Outreadl)t 

(1:.17-cr-182,-District 

May 4, 2016 {O

of 

J1FFO()!}U40S}

Columbia}; Ema

. 

il from Georg•:? f'.;ipado;;oulos t!>--

U.S.•:. George Popcdopo,..ifos (l:17-cr-182, Distric:: of Colu~t.iJ). 

U.S. v. G2org~ !>~padopc•.Jlos (1:11-cr-1S2, Dislrict ofColum~}. 

J 

PP.O?ERTY OF TIIE U.S. HOU~ OF REPRE:.S~NTATl\fES 57 
64. 

65. 

66. 

67. 

68. U.S. v. Evgeny Buryakov, a/k/a "Zhenya," ·, and U.S. Southern District of New York, Janu69. 

70. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

ary 23, 2015; "Russian Spies Tried to Recruit Carter Page Before He Advised Trump," The New York 

Times, Apr. 4, 2017; DOJ, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, Oct. 21, 2016, which was made available for 

review by HPSCI members and staff on.March 17, October 31, November 2, December 14, December 15, and December 

18 2017. 

74. U.S. v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates ill (l:17-cr-201, District of Columbia). 

75. HPSCI, "FBI Counterintelligence Investigations," Mar. 2, 2017. 

76. 

77. 

78. 

79. Michoel G. Flynn, Email messages !o Russian Embassy in United States, Flynt) Intel Group Production, 

FLYNN_HPSCi_OOOOOSOO, 00007542. 

80. Michael G. Flynn, Email message to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production, 

Fl YN N _H PSCl_ 00000.500, 00007542. 

81. 

82. 

83. 

84. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

85. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

86. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

87. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

88. Barack Obama, "FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment," The White 

House, Dec. 29, 2016. 

89. U.S. v. Michael T. Fiyr,n (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

90. 

91. 

92. 

93. 

94. 

95. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 58 
96. 

97. 

98. 

99. 

100. 

101. 

102. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017. 

103. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of toretta Lynch, Oct. 20, ·2017. 

104. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct, 20, 2017. 

105. HPSCI, Staff meeting with Bill Pries tap, FBI Assistant Director, Head of the Counterintelligence Division, Oct 31, 2017. 

106. U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (1:18-cr-32, District of Columbia). · 

107. DOJ, "Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United 

States Politi ca I System," Feb. 16, 2018. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 59 
(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia 

Key Question 112: Did the Jlussian active measures ;nclude links between Russia and individuals associated with political campa;gns or any other U.S. persons? 

(U) A key focus of the Committee's 

investigation was whether Russian active 

measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election 

(see Chapter 3) ''include[d) links between 

Russia and individuals associated with 

political campaigns or any other U.S. 

persons."1 The first part of this chapter 

reflects the Committee's answer to that 

question w ith respect to the Trurnp 

campaign. The second part of this chapter 

addresses the Clinton campaign. 

(U} The ''llnl<s" between individuals 

associated with u,e campaigns and Russra 

have often been publicly described as 

inqulril':!s Into whether them was "collu.sion" 

between individuals associated with either 

ca.ndidate Trump or Clinton and the Russian 

government. One challenge with describing 

potential "links11 wrth the Russian 

government as "collusion11 is that the term 

"collusion" may mean different things to 

different people, as exemplified in witness 

testimony before the Committee. 

Particularly in light of Special Counsel 

Robert Mueller's continuing criminal 

investigation-which has a different focus 

and the Committee agreed not to impt::!dr.-

it is important to note that the term 

"c:oUusion" does not, by itself, describe a 

criminal offense. Unlike the closely-ref atcd 

concept of "conspiracy," there is no 

a pplicable statute that sets out the 

elements of " colluslon." "Collusion" is 

therefore an ambiguous tenn, not a precise 

legal one. 

Trump Campaign 

(U) The Committee cast a wide net, 

generally asking each witnesses whether 

they had evidence of any "collusion," 

"coordination," or ''conspiracy" between 

Russia and candidate Trump or any of his 

associates. The Committee also 

investigated potential Trump campa;gn links 

with Russia, focusing on credible af legations 

within the scope of the anreed-upon 

parameters. Matters investigated by the 

Committee Include allegations pertaining to: 

• candidate Trump's business 

dealings; 

, the campaign's policy positions and 

personnel; 

• involvement in or knowledge about 

the publication of stolen emails; and 

• meetings with Russians. 

{U) In the course of witness interviews, 

reviews of document productions, and 

investigative efforts extending well over a 

year, the Committee did not find any 

evidence of collusion, conspiracy, or 

coordination between the Trump campaf3n 

and the Russ ians. While the Committee 

found that several of the contacts between 

Trump assoc;ates and Russians- or their 

proxies, including Wiklleak s- .were illPRO!JE:RlY CF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TIVF:S 60 
advised, the Committee did not determine 

that Trump or anyone associated wjth him 

assisted Russia's active measures campc,lign. 

DIRECT EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION, 

CONSPIRACY, OR COORDINATlON 

{U} Finding #25: When asked directty, none 

of the interviewed witnesses provjded 

evidence of collusion, coordination, or 

conspiracy between the Trump campaign 

and the Russian government. 

{U) The Committee interviewed highranking current and former government 

officials, along with numerous Trump 

campaign members, Trump administration 

officials, and other Trump associates. None 

of the witnesses testified they had evidence 

of collusion between the campaign and 

anyone affiliated with the Russian 

government. In most of the Committee's 

witness interviews, the witness was asked 

directly for any evidence of "collusion, 

coordination or conspiracy" with any 

element of the Russian government to 

influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. This question was 

asked wfth respect to the w itness' own 

actions; the actions of candidate Trump; the 

actions of anyone officially affiliated with 

t he campaign; or the actions of anyone 

unofficially affiliated with the campaign, 

defined as including '.'v.rannabes,"

2 "hangerson,"3 and upeople who represented 

themselves as being part of the campaign."4 

Each witness was given wide latitude in 

answering these questions, but none 

produced any evidence. For example, 

Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor Jared 

Kushner stated categorically that the Trump 

campaign "'did not collude, cooperate, 

whatever other 'C' words you used, with • ,.,5 anyfore,gn governments. 

{U) Several former government officials 

testified that, even though there was no 

evidence of collusion between Trump 

campaign associates and the Russian 

government, they were aware of contacts 

and interactions of potential concern. For 

example, former CIA Director John Brennan 

stated in open session, "I encountered and 

am aware of information and intelligence 

that·reveated contacts and interactions 

between Russian officials and U.S. persons 

involved in the Trump cam-paign that .I was 

conc~rn·ed about because of known Russian 

efforts to suborn such individuals, and it 

raised questions in my mind .. . whether or 

not the Russians were able to gain the 

coo~ration of those indi•Jiduals."0 Brennan 

continued, however, "'l don't know whether 

or not such collusion . .. existed."

7 

{U) Similarly, forme r ON! James Clapper 

stated that he was aware of the same 

information to which Brennan referred, 

"that my dashboard warning lights were on 

just because of that." 5 However, 

reaffirming his prior public statements, he 

told the Committee that, "I didn't have a~y 

evidence-l don't care how you want to 

caveat it-of collusion."

9 

BUSINESS DEALINGS 

{U) Finding #26: The Committee found no 

evidence that President Trump's pre--

campaign business dealings formed the 

PROPERTYOF'IBE: U.S. HOUS!::OF RS'RE~NTATI\IES 61 
basis for collusion durinB the campaign. 

{U) As a politic.ii outsider who had 

never ru_n for office, Donafd Trump did not 

have a polftical record to analyze, criticize, 

or rely upon during the 2016 campaign. 

Therefore, his long and varied business 

career garnered significant attention from 

supporters, opponents, and opposition 

researchers alike. Eventually, as described 

in the second half of this chapter, candidate 

Trui:np's pre-campaign business dealings 

with Russians became a subject of 

significant opposition research. 

(U) As noted above, the Committee's 

investigation was focused on the tirne 

period of the 2016 election. Trump's pre~ 

campaign dealings were within scope only 

to the extent they formed the basis for , or 

were otherwise llnked to, Improper conduct 

during the elections. As one of the 

Committee Members said during an 

interview, the key question was if any 

business "relationships, whether directly or 

indirectly or just by some other means, had 

the effect that there was a preexisting 

relationship with Russia, and that that 

preexisting relationship may have in some 

way inspired the Trump campa.ign to have a 

contact with the Russian Government to 

coordinate, collude, or conspire to help 

them win the election over HIiiary 

Clinton.1110 

(U) The Committee focused only on any 

potential financial improprieties relating to 

the eteclion. In particular, the Committee 

examined the Miss Universe pageant in 

Moscow in 201.3; the Trump Organization's 

unsuccessful efforts to build a Trump Tower 

fn Moscow in late 2015 and early 2016; and 

other assorted claims of Russian financial 

ties to the Trump family . The Committee 

did not uncover any evidence that any of 

those matters formed the basis for 

collusion, coordination, or conspiracy 

between Trump or his associates and the 

Russian government during the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election. 

(U) Miss Universe 2013: Before he was 

a political candidate, Trump owned the Miss 

Universe Organization. The decision to hold 

the 2013 Miss Universe annual pageant in 

Moscow was a unanimous one made by 

representatives of the Trump Organization 

and NBC-the event's broadcaster-with 

approval of the president of the Miss 

Un lverse organization. u Michael Cohen, an 

attorney and former Executive Vice 

President of the Trump Organlzation, told 

the Committee 50 percent of the fees 

earned for the pageant went to NBC.12 "[01 

f the $12.2 million in foreign income that 

lthe Miss· Universe pageant] earned [in 

2013), a substantial portion of it was 

attributable to the Moscow event."13 

(U} The 2013 pageant's hosts were Aras 

and Emin Agalarov, father and son of a 

wealthy Azerbaijani-Russian family in 

Moscow. The Agalarovs' company, Crocus 

Group, owned the venue where the pageant 

was held. 1~ The Agalarovs and Crocus 

Group wanted to host the event in Moscow 

because tl1ey wanted to have the pageant ln 

their company's building, Crocus City Hall, 

arid It was a way to promote Emin's music 

62 
career, who performed atthe pageant.~; 

The Agalarovs have connections with senfor 

individuals and elements of the Russian 

government/6 and Aras received the Order 

of Honor from Vladimir Putin.17 The 

decision to hold the pageant in Moscow 

originated from an "off-the-cuff" discussion 

between Emin Agalarov, his manager, and a 

representative from the Miss Universe 

pageant.

18 

UNCLASSIFIED 

EMIN AOALAROVATTHE 2013 MISS 

UNlVERSE PAGEANT IN MOSCOW 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) The Agalarovs first met Trump in 

person in 2013 in connection with the Miss 

USA pageant in l.as Vegas.19 The Agalarovs 

and Trump signe-d the contract to hotd the 

pageant in Mosc.oi.v during the weekend of 

the Miss USA pageant In January 2013.20 At 

the conclusion of the 2013 M iss USA 

pageant, Trump and the Agalarovs 

announced on stage that the Miss Universe 

pageant that year \"Jould be held in 

Moscow.21 In a June 18, 2013 tweet, Trump 

publicly asked, "Do you think Putin will be 

going to The Miss Universe Pageant in 

November in Moscow-if so, will he 

become my new best friend?"v 

(U) Leading up to the Miss Universe 

page,int, the issue of President Putin 

possibly attending came "up a number of 

times" among those planning the pageant.23 

Emin's manager Robert Goldstone and the 

head of the pageant organization had 

"casual'' conversations w·ith one another, 

but every time Goldstone asked Emin about 

it, En1in replied the pageant would have had 

to go through "official channels" to make 

the request, indicating that the event was 

not officially related to the Russian 

government. 

24 At the time, according to 

Goldstone, Emin cast doubt on whether 

President Putin would attend, stating "if this 

was in America, would Barack Obama 

attend? Probably not. It's a beauty 

pageant. But there is a chance, maybe, of 

some kind of meeting."

25 Before the 

pageant, however, President Putin's press 

secretary called and told Trump and others 

that President Putin would not attend the 

pageant, and he did not.26 

{U} While in Moscow, Trump, along . 

with his head of seturity, attended the 

pageant and several pageant-related 

events.27 for example, Trump attended an 

event hosted by the Agalarovs at a wellknown restaurant with local businessmen.28 

(U) Although there were allegations in 

the Steele dossier that Trump engaged in 

illicit activities with prostitutes in the 

presidential suite at the Ritz-Carfton hotel, 

the .Committee found no evidence to 

support these allegations. Trump's former 

head of security,-· testified that 

PROPERTY OF THE U -S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

63 
although somebody during a meeting fn 

Moscow-did not rrnow who-

''mentioned sendfng women to ITrunw's] 

room,'-responded "absolutely not, 

we don't do that." 29 - told the 

Committee he advised Trump of the 

comment, and they both laughed about it. 

- also festified he walked Trump to 

his room that nlght, remained for a few 

nilnutes, and did not observe anybody enter 

the roorn.

30 

(U) Trump Tower Moscow: While in 

Russia for the Miss Universe pageant, 

Trump met with the Agalarovs and 

discussed a possible joint real estate 

development in Moscow.:.u The proposed 

project was a Trump Tower in Moscow 

adjacent to the Agalarov-owned Crocus City 

Hall; according to Donald Trump Jr., "it 

fizzled out" after a few months. 32 

(U] Trump Organization lawyer Mlc:hael 

Cohen was not Involved In those orlglnal 

discussions regarding Trump Tower 

Mc.)scow. In c1pproximately September 

2015, he received a separnte prnpos.il for 

Trump Tower Moscow from a businessman 

named->

1

~ According to Cohen, 

the concept of the project was that "[t]he 

Trump Organ ization would lend its name 

and management skills, but It was not going 

to borrow any money and it would not have 

any resulting debt for the purchase of the 

land and the building of the facility.";~ 

Cohen worked on this idea wlth 1111111 and 

his company, the Bayrock Group, a real 

estate consultancy that had previously 

worked with the Trump Organization. 111111 

has a unique and colorful background, and 

described for the Committee his path from 

Wall Street banker to white-collar criminal 

35 to governmen~ Informant. 

(U) After signing a letter of intent with 

a local developer in October 2015,36 Cohen 

andlllll exchanged a number of emails 

and text messages in late 2015 detailing 

their attempts to move the project forward. 

For instance, in December 2015,lllllltried 

to get Cohen and candidate Trump to travel 

to Russia to work on the projecLn 

(U) Several of-communications 

with Cohen lnvolved an attempt to broker a 

meeting or other ties between candidate 

Trump and President Putin, and purported 

to convey Russian government interest in 

the project.;s Perhaps most notably, .. 

told Cohen in a November 3, 2015, emaif, 

"[b)uddy our boy can l)ecome President of 

the USA and we can engineer it." 39 -

continued that if "Putin g~ts on stage with 

Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump 

Moscow, . .. Donald owns the republican 

nomination."

10 This asserlion apparently 

;;irose from- rather grandiose theory 

that cementing a dea l with a hostile U.S. 

adversary would Increase candidate 

Trump's foreign policy bona fides.41 

(U} .. testified that his 

communications with Cohen regarding 

President Putin were ''mere puffery," 

designed to elicit a response from the 

· Trump Organjzation to move the project 

along.42 1111 explained that "(u]ntil the 

bank wrftes the check, it's all salesmanship 

and promotion to try to get many, many, 

PROPCJRTY OF ffol l:. U.S. I tOlJSF.: OF REPRl:S!:NTA'TIVES 64 
many parties towards the center to try to 

get the deal done.,,.:3 Cohen similarly 

characterized .. as "a salesman" who 

"uses ver1 colorful language."4~ 

{U) When the project started 

proceeding too slov..r[y for the Trump 

Organlzation,45 Cohen and .. began to 

exchange acrimonious text messages.

46 As 

part of those text messages-told 

Cohen that President Putin's people were 

backing the deal, including "this is thru 

Putins [sicJ administration, and nothing gets 

done there without approval from the top," 

as well as meetings in Russia with 

"Ministers" and "Putins (sic] top 

administration people.":] 1111111 also 

mentioned Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's 

spokesman) would "most likely" be 

included.

48 

{U} Cohen thus attempted to reach out 

to members of the Russian government in 

an attempt to make the project proceed, 

but apparently did not have any direct 

points of contact. for example, Cohen sent 

an email to a general press mailbox at the 

Kremlin in an effort to reach Peskov.4n 

Cohen's message notes that he has been 

working with a local partner to build a 

Trump Tower in Moscow and that 

communications have stalled with the local 

partner.50 The email further seel'-s contact 

._ • .,ith Peskov so they may " discuss the 

specifics as well as arrang{e] meetings with 

the appropriate individuals."!,1 Based on the 

documents produced to the Committee, it 

does not appear Cohen ever received a 

response from anyone affiliated with the 

Russian government. 

{U)-testimony likewise made 

clear that neither Presldent Putin nor any 

element of the Russian government was 

actually directly involved in the project. For 

in~ance, in one exchange,~ testified he 

was offering the Trump Organization access 

to one of-acquaintances. This 

acquaintance was an acquaintance of 

someone else who is "partners on a real 

estate development with a friend of 

Putin1s."

52 .. testified that he was 

unaware of "any direct meetings with any 

[Russian) government officials" in 

connection with the Trump Tower Moscov.: 

project.5> In addition, neither candidate 

Trump nor Cohen traveled to Russia in 

support of the deal.54 

(U) ... was unequivocal in his 

testimony that none of the Russians 

affiliated with the Trump Tower Moscow. 

project had any communications with him 

uin which {heJ w{as] asked to do something 

on behalf of the Russian government that 

[he] knew was on behalf of the Russian 

Government1' with respect to the U.S. 

election.S!, None of those communications 

"were intended for - to take action to 

have a ccmmunic:ation w ith or take some 

action to influence the 2016 Presidential 

election."":.6 The Committee t herefore 

assesses tha ... was attempting to 

leverage polttical contacts for business 

purposes, rather than the othe-r way 

around. 

{U} It appears the Trump Tower 

Mo~cow project failed in January 2016.57 

i'.'ROPERTY OF 11-IE U.S. HOUS£ OF REPRESENTATIVES 

65 
Trump Jr. testified that, as of early June 

2016. he beffevecl the Trump Tower 

Moscow project was dormant.53 The 

project failed because "[t]he due dfligence 

did not come through11 and the Trump 

Organization's representative "lost 

confidence in the licen.see, and {he] 

abandoned the project."59 In fact, the 

Trump Organization did not have a 

confirmed site, so the deal never reached 

the point where the company was 

dlscussins financing arrangements for the 

project.uo The Committee determined that 

the Trump Tower Moscow proj~ct did not 

progress beyond an early developmental 

phase, and that this potenli"al licensing dear 

was not related to the Trump campaign.61 

(U) Other Alleged Financial Dealings: In 

addition to the Miss Unlvl:!l'S<:l and Trump 

Tower- Moscow projects, a number of 

witnesses were asked about Trump family 

financial dealings, sometimes stretching 

6~ back decades. For example, Trump Jr. was 

asked about Russians: ·buying units in 

Trump Tower in 1984 (wh~n he was seven 

years old)/3 btJylng properties in soutf,ern 

Florida for which the Trump brand was a 

!icensor;6'' being involvQd in the Trump 

lntern~tional Hotel in Toronto for which the 

Trump Organization was the brand and not 

the developer;65 and having unspecified 

Involvement in a licensing project for the 

Trump Ocean Club in Pariama.66 The 

Committee does not have any evidence that 

there is a nexus between these activities 

and the 2016 <:.impaign, or information that 

contradicts representations made in a 

March 8, 2017 letter from Trump's lawyers 

regarding his Russia-related fina1)cfal 

dealings over the previous ten years.67 

POLICY POSITIONS 

(U) During the campaign, candidate 

Trump and several of his campaign advisors 

expressed policy views towards Russia quite 

different than those espoused by much of 

the Republfcan foreign policy establishment, 

including previous Republican nominee Mitt 

Romney, wt;io labeled Russia "our number 

<.me geopolltkal foe" durrng the 2012 

election, In factJ a significant nu niber of 

Republican foreign policy experts made 

statements d~irh,g the campaign that they 

would not work for the Trump campaign. 

As a result, the c;;m1palgn relied on many 

lesser-k11own-or in some cases unknownadvisors on foreign policy issues. 

{U) Additionally, a plank of the 2016 

Republican pl~tform pertaining to the 

Ukraine has been the subject of substantial 

controversy. The question for the 

Committee was whether candidate Trump's 

pollcy positions-and the campaign's 

involvement fn the debate over the Ukraine 

platform plank-reflected legitimate policy 

positions, or somuthing more nefarious. 

The Committee found no evidence that the 

policy positions of the Trump campaign 

were the reslAlt of collusion, coordination, 

or conspiracy with the Russians. In the 

words of Trump campaign 

policy offici~I involved in the platform issue, 

"lt]here was no coordination or tt,ought for 

coordination. The idea to have better 

relations with Russia was a Mr. Trump idea 

PROPERTY OFTHe U.S. HOU5EOF REPRESENTATIVES 66 
that I thought was reasonable to support 0 63 

{U} Finding #27: The Republican national 

security e.stablishment's opposition to 

candidate Trump created opportunities for 

two less-experienced indi\liduals with proRussia views to serve as campaign 

advisors: George Papadopoulos and Cart~r 

Page. 

(U) The Republican foreign policy 

establishment was critical of candidate 

Trump, w~o had to turn elsewhere for 

support. On March 2, 2016, 122 self. 

de.'icribed "GOP National Security Leaders" 

signed an uopen Letter to Donald Trump" 

refusing to support then-candidate Trump.;S' 

The next day, Trump announced Senator 

Jeff Sessions as chairman of his National 

Security Advisory C9mmittee {NSAC}. A few 

we_eks later, following continuing media 

criticism of his failure to publicly name a 

foreign policy team, 10 candidate Trump 

named five foreign policy advisors in a 

March 21, 2016 meeting with The 

Washington Post editorial board: Wa[Jd 

Phares, Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, 

.1oe Schmitz, and Keith Kellogg. 71 

(U) The opposition to Trump's 

candidacy by the ,.,ast majority of the 

conservative national securitv 

establishment paved the way for lesserknown individuals, such as the then 28-yearold Papadopoulos, t o join the Trump 

campaign. Page was another unknown 

. brought into the periphery of the Trump 

campaign to fill the vacuum left by more 

experienced national ~erurity specialists 

who were unwilling to acivise candidate 

Trump. There is no evidence that anyone 

on the Trump campaign was aware of 

Page's past ties to Russian intelligence 

services-or Papadopoulos' more r.ecent 

contacts with a Russian-connected 

professor-when these two individuals 

were included among the advlsors that 

wt:!re publicly announced on March 21. In 

fact, as Kushner candidly put it, "we put 

together that list because we vi1ere getting a 

Jot of pressure from the rr.edia to put out a 

list of foreign policy advisers.'' 12 

UNGLASSIFtED 

GOP National Security Leaders 

Open Letter to Donald Trump 

5().1To).l~r.r UY f O!tr.ll:R :>tA"flllNAl ill'l,JRnY i:ffll1ALS 

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21'.':1.'r.len1 o!'(!)( , •n:i: J S1&".o 

UNCLASSIFIED 

{U) These five advisors were 

subsequently incorporated into the NSAC, 

which was part of the campaign's O.C.-

based policy shop. 7·

3 The NSAC was chaired 

by Senator Sessions and directed by J.O. 

Gordon, a retired Navy officer and former 

Department of Oefense spo!<esman. '~ Some 

members of the NSAC met with candidate 

Trump in Washington, D.C. on March 31, 

2016. Page did not attend. Each advisor in 

attendance, including Papadopoulos, 

briefed the group on a topic of their choice. 

Papcidopoulos spoke about Russia. 

PROPER1Y Or THE U.S. HOUSE CF= REPRE..."'E.NTATl\>cS 
However, in lhe opinion of one advisor, 

wafid Ph,ues, the primary purpose of the 

meetina was about optics rather than 

substance: 11tl1e meeting was about the 

picture and to send the rnes/jage that: I ha:ve 

f · II t "75 a ore,gn po cy earn. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

NSAC MEETING WITH 

CANDIATE TRUMP 

~~_.. ........ .,"' .. . ,•a.,:;.,1 

-'-'" ....... ..... -... .:,:. ~, ........ "t u.. 

--•-,;-1.1"'<1•'" •••-

- _:......,._- U/1#- , • • _,, ...... ~~C.T. 

1, \ - .C.."'10':il ·~.) 

-

_..., "'"''' ., ... W\.""''lo'. .. ""'"'"~,.-.,,, ...... , . ~ ... 

-'vJ ~e.. l,.la.. -r..--··---- i...-

. ,, ..... 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Page was, according to NSAC 

director Gordon, "very loosely affiliated 

with the campaign and had really no roles 

or responsibillties." 76 The Committee 

assesses that Page played no major role rn 

the campnign, and had no meaningful 

access to senior leadership. 

{U) Pag·e did not attend the March 31, 

2.016, NSAC meeting with then-candidate 

Trump, and has never met him.n Although 

members of the NSAC occasionally gathered 

for meals in the Washington, D.C. area, they 

never again met as a group with candidate 

Trump. 78 Kushner provided a blunt 

assessment of the role, qr lack thereof, 

played by the individuals on t~e initial Ii.st of 

·publicly-announced foreign policy advisors: 

"[Tihe amount of Interaction they had with 

the actual campaign or in'fluence they had 

·on anything that happened in the campaign 

I was 1179 G d virtually nonex stent. or on 

testified to the Committee that he agreed 

with the ass~rtior, that the NSAC was 

minimally Influential In the context of the 

• /l{l broader campaign. 

(U} Finding #28: The change in the 

Republlca·n Party platform regarding 

Ukraine resulted in a stronger position · 

against Russia, not a weaker one, and 

there is no evid~nce that Paul Manafort 

was involved. 

{':J} It has been widely reported that the 

2.016 Republican Party plotform was 

weakened with respect to Ukraine, perhaps 

as a favor to Russia or some other nefarious 

reason. Arter reviewing the Republican 

Party platform amendment process, 

Interviewing those involved, and revfewing 

document productions, the Committee 

determined that the original plank was 

strengthened, rather than weakened-and 

there is no evidence that language 

advocating for the provisions of "lethal 

defensive weapons'' was Improperly 

removed. 

(U) on July 11, 2016, the Republican 

National Committee Platform Committee 

met to discuss and debate amendments to 

the platform. As drafted, the platform 

referenced "a resurgent Russia occupying 

parts of Ukraine/ but incfudep no langu.age 

about support to Kiev.{see inset}. 11111 

of Texas, a member of the National 

Security/Military Platform Subcommittee, 

offered an ~mendment that would "support 

Pf~OP!oRTY OF nu: U.S. HOUSG OF REPRESENTATIVES 68 
maintaining {and, if warranted, increasing) 

sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's 

sovereignty and territory integrity are fully 

restored."3 l ~roposed 

amendment further called on the United 

States to provide "lethal defensive weapons 

to Ukraine's armed forces and greater 

coordination wjth NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] on defense 

planning."u 

U NCLASSIFll:D 

Original RNC !)tank 

(U) In the int~mational arena. weakness invites 

aggression. The results of the (Obama} Administration's unilateral approach to disarmament are 

already clear: An emboldened China in ti\e South 

China Sea, a resurgent Ru:.s!a occupying parts of 

Ukraine and tnreatening neighbo:s from the Baltic 

to the Caucasus, an aggressive lstamist terrorist 

networ.~ !n Middle East. All our adversaries heard 

th~ message in the {Obama] Arlminlstratio"n's cutbac!G: Americil is weak~ arid retreating: 

UNCLASSIRED 

(U} Much of-amendment was 

sdopted, but-following debate among the 

delegates-the final version called for the 

United States to provide "appropriate 

assistance" rather than "lethal defensive 

weapons."83 The Committee assesses that 

aappropriate assistance" provided flexibility, 

and could encompass lethal defensive 

weapons as well as humanitarian aid, 

medical supplies, and meals-ready-to eat. 

In any event, even without the words 

"lethal defensive weapons," the final draft 

of the platform UV".las tougher against 

Russia0 than the orlginal after incorporating 

all but three v.iords oamendment.s.1 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Final RNC Plank 

(U) Wr:;. support maintaining and, ff warranted, 

increasing sanctions, togcthff with our allies, 

against RllSSia unless and until Ukraine's soverei.gnw and territorial integ_rity are :u'.ly re~t.ored. 

We also support provldi:'lg approprla~ assistance. 

to the armcci forces of Ukraine and great& coordination with NATO defense planning. 

UNCLASSlF1ED 

(U} The Committee also investigated 

,...,hat role, if any, Paul Manafort played in 

the Trump campaign's response to 

0€nman's amendment. Manafort, a 

veteran of numerous Republican 

camp.algns,

85 had long represented the 

government of Ukraine, the pro-Russian 

former presid~nt of Ukraine Viktor 

Yanukovich, and Yanukovich's Party of 

Regions.

86 In late March 2016, candidate 

Trump hired Manaforno-lead "delegatecorralling efforts at the Republican National 

Convention."s7 Then--campaign manager 

testified that, when 

Manafort was hired, ~ade no 

attempt to vet him and was entirely 

unaware of Manafort's past work in 

Ukra.ine.85 In May 2016, Manafort was 

promoted to campaign chaim,an and, after 

~as fired the next month, 

aevolve[d}" into the role of de facto 

campaign manager.69 

{U) Manafort left the campaign in 

August 2016 following news reports that he 

PRO?€Ri'Y OF "THE U.S. 1l0US£ Or REPRESSI.TAnv-eS 

69 
had rece_ived $12. 7 million In secret 

payments for his work on behrilf of 

Yanukovlch's Party of Regions; news 

reporling also alleged that Manafort and hls 

aide Rici< Gates had "dirnctly orchestrated a 

covert Washington lobbying operation" on 

behalf of the partv-:-while failrng to register 

90 C . as foreign agents. ampa1gn press 

secretary Hope Hicks recalled that, after 

receiving press inquiries about Manafort's 

"professional history," a major story broke 

. 91 

on the evening of August 14, 2016. 

According to Hicks, "Trump had made a 

decision to make a change ln lendership on 

the campaign outside of Paul's ;ssues that 

were being publicly reported," but those 

issues "certainly contributed to expedllinn 

and Intensifying the way in whfch his roJe 

changed, and then ultimately he was fired 

at the end of thnt weck.''92 Trump directed 

his son-in-law Jared Kushner to ensure 

Manafort departed the campaign on August 

19, which he did.'13 As Kushner put it, ''[tf 

here was a lot of news that was out there1 

and the decision was tflat lt was time for 

UNCLASSIFIED 

PAUL MANAFORT RESIGNS 

FROM TRUMP CAMPAIGN 

l •rtt ~t0, •.-t:ATt.,"tftt~~,f'\l~ri.1,..-... ~n11.0.. li'• U fV'lrt UU:, Wlt'I tft .. l'\,J IO '' 

UNCLASSIFIED 

hlrn to resign. 

,,!M 

(U) Given Mana fort's past work in 

Ukraine, If the Ukraine plank change was 

made as a favor to the Russian government, 

it seems likely that then-campaign chairman 

Manafort would have known about it. 

However, campaign records produced to 

the Commlltee show that Manafort had no 

role in, or contemporaneous knowledge of, 

the platform change. On July 30, 2016, 

Manafort sent an emall, copying Gates, to 

Rick Dearborn, then a senior campaign 

policy official and Sessions' chief of staff: "I 

gather that there was a change In the 

platform that ren,oved arming Ukraine. I 

don1t know anythlnc about this change. 

I It d Who ?11 fl!I pushed for it and w w was one. 

(U} In response, Dearborn generated a 

memorandllm, dated August 1, 20:l.6, 

outlining a detailed sequence of events th<lt 

96 occurred between July 10 and 12, 2016. 

As part of that memo, J.D. Gordon created a 

tlmeline that noted candidate Trump's 

poticy statements-including at a March 31, 

2016, national security meeting-served as 

the basis for the modification of Den man's 

amendrnent.9' Gordon's timeline made it 

clear that the change was initiated by 

c<1mpaign staffers at the ·convention-not 

by Manafort or senior o_fficials. Although 

Page expressed support after the fact, the 

Committee did not find any evidence that 

he actively parliclpat:ed in the modificati on 

o-f Denr.nan's "red line ~mendment 

I I 1198 providing lethal assistance to U m1 ne. 

PUBLICATION OF STOLEN EMAILS 

70 
(U} Finding #29: Thel'e is no evidence that 

Trump associates were involved in the 

theft or publication of Clfoton campaignrelated emails, although Trump associates 

had numerous ill-advised contacts wlth 

Wikileaks. 

{U} There is no evidence that Trump or 

anyone associated with him played a role in 

the hacking of emails from the DNC and 

Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta, 

among other entities and individuals, 

detailed in Chapter 2. A5 also discussed in 

Chapter 2, the Committee concurs with the 

IC's assessment that Wikileaks was one of 

the vehicles for the public dissemination of 

emails stolen by Russians. As noted in 

Chapter 3, on October 7, 2016, the 

Department of Homeland Security and 

Office of tt,e Director of National 

Intelligence releas.ed a public statement 

that "[t]he U.S. Intelligence Community is 

confident that the Russian Government 

directed the recent compromises of e-mails 

from US persons and institutions, including 

US political organizations."1!' The statement 

also specifically tfed Wikileaks to the 

Russian-directed disclosures. 

(U} Trump campaign communications 

made ample use of the publicly available 

emails, which were reported by virtually aU 

major media outlets. Regarding Wikileaks, 

Trump Jr. testified that "[aJt the time, I 

looked at them as essentially a media 

outlet" and an "opportunistic organization" 

that would have also put out negative 

information on Trump if it had it. 10° For 

Senator Sessions, reference to Wikileaks 

material in campaign statements was the 

product of deliberation: "And so, I 

remember making a decision that it [a trove 

of hacked emails) was in the public domain, 

and it wouJd be silty not to use it. So I used 

it, although I could understand somebody 

else not wanting to." 101 For campaign press 

secretary Hope Hicks, use of emails 

published by Wikileaks was uncontroversial 

because such information was available in 

the public domain.102 

U Nct.ASSIF!ED 

WIKILEAKS RELEASES CLINTON EMAILS 

. _ _._..,,.._ 

-· 

·~-1:.. · - 0.-11 .- ,..,,, 

.,.,. ... .,,.I:).----· ... ~ .. .--,~~~ .. ~ ... -- ·,""'·-Qr·'":.'---..!.• .., __ ""' '-'•' 

--'-.....:i,..-»,., - " - . - · · r.:11" 11 <: . ... ,. ~--0,--

r_ ._, ..,,I..._ ...._ __ ,_~~ ----

·--,--__ .,.,.,~ .... '-

, _ _,_ ...... ~ •11-.... ··-

,..,,._._, ..... -----:;--:-.';: ........ -... -· 

'-- ---··---·~ - ye., : .. -,o..----··!K.,,.:...- ,-· 

UNCLASS1FIED 

(U) Similarly, candidate Trump stated at 

a rally on October 10, 2016-three days 

after the release of Podesta's emails began 

and the IC publicly tied Wikileaks' 

dissemination to " Russia's senior-most 

officials" -that "I love Wikileaks."

10

?. Trump 

had earli~r encouraged the Russians to "find 

~e 30,000 emails that are missing" from 

Hillary Clinton's privateserver.10' {These 

emaHs. which were the frequent subject of 

campaign talking points, should not oe 

TOP SECRET/ /NOFOR~ 

PROPERlY OF THE lJ.S. liOUSE OF R~ESENTA"TlVES 

71 
conflnted with the DNC emails. The stolen data. Nor did any witness shed llght on 

Committee did not receive evidence that the the provenance of the emails, or clarify that 

emails from Clinton's private server were Mifsud was reforrlng to emails actually stolen 

stolen by the Russians-or anyone elsel05 by the Russians (as opposed to, for example, 

(U} Particularly in light of candidate emails missing from Clinton's private server.) 

Trump's expressed enthusiasm for Wikileaks, The Committee also found no evidence that 

the Committee examined the relationship Papadopoulos told anyone affiliated with the 

between his associates and the stolen emails. Trump campaign about M ifsud's claims that 

The Committee did not find any evidence that . th_e Russians had "dirt" on candidate Clinton. 

Trump associates .were involved in the (U) Michael Flynn: On Jul~ 15, 2016, 

publication of emails by Wikileaks and other 

outlets-or had access to such emails or other 

stolen Information prior to their becoming 

publicly available. 106 

(U} The Committee did find that multiple 

Trump associates went beyond mere praise 

and established ·uncs of communication with 

W ikileal<s during the campaign. Such contacts 

were Imprudent in light of Wlkileaks' role In 

disseminating stolen emails in line wlth 

R1.1ssian interests-and CIA Director Mil<e 

Pompeo's post-election characterization of 

Wikileaks as a hostile non-state interllgence 

service that "overwhelmingly focuses on the 

United States, while seeking support from anti 

-democratic countries and organizations" such 

as the Russian military intelligence service 

(GRU).l07 

(U) George Papadopoulos: Foreign policy 

advisor Papadopoulos was told by Russianlinked academic Joseph Mifsud in April 2016 

that the Russ1am; had "dirt'' on Clinton In the 

form of "emails of Clinton.''1~ However, the 

Committee found no cvldenc;e that 

Papadopoulos obtained these emails or that 

the Trump campaign had a role in facllltating 

the Russian government's dissemination of· 

retired Lieutenant General and Trump 

national security advisor Michael Flynn 

forwarded an email to communications 

advisor-in an attempt to connect 

.i friend from the military with tl,e campaign's 

social media operation. Flynn included the 

following edltorlal comment: "There are a 

number of things happening (and wlll happen} 

this election via cyber operatio11s (by both 

hacl<tivists, nation-states and the DNC) ."

109 

This stateme.nt does not nece.ssarily indicate 

non-public knowledge, and could have instead 

reflected commentary on .then-current public 

events-including the mid-June attribution of 

the DNC hack to Russia by the security firm 

CrowdStrike, and the subsequent claim of 

credit by the t hen-unkn own persona "Guccifer 

2.0." (See Chapter 2.) 

(U} Donal~ Trump Jr.: During the course 

of-the Committee's interview with Trump Jr., a 

news report from CNN appeared onllne 

clalmine he was given a pre-release 

notification of a Wlkileal<s release of Podesta 

emails.Ho The article appeared clt 1:01 p.m., 

while Trurnp Jr. was still being interviewed by 

the Committee behind closed doors, which 

concluded at 5:51 p.m.111 CNN's Initial report 

72 
claimed Trump Jr. received an email on 

September 4, 2016, alerting him to an 

upcoming release of hacked emails. 

(U) The email in question was from an 

individual named , who 

sent a lengthy email to a number of 

individuals associated with the Trump 

Organization, including Trump Jr., providing 

access to hacked DNC emails. 112 The email . 

was actually dated September 14, 2016, the 

day after Wikileaks published a tranche of 

Podesta emails, and thus did not 

substantiate allegations of prior knowledge 

of the release.

113 CNN subsequently issued 

a correction, noting the error. 114 

(U) When asked about the email by the 

Committee, Trump Jr. testified that he did 

not have any recollection of the email, 

stating that he "get[s] stuff from people that 

-you know, people put my email address 

online every few months, and I get a bunch 

of people that do the same thing and then 

they start bombarding you with stuff."rn 

Trump Jr. went further to state that while 

he may have met a at 

some point in time, he was not sure of the 

identity of this individual.116 

(U) At the outset, Trump Jr. told the 

Committee that, although he was not aware 

of any coordination "between the Trump 

campaign and Wikileaks to disseminate 

information acquired from the Podesta 

email or the DNC server,"117 he did 

exchange Twitter direct messages with 

WikileakS' beginning on September 20, 

2016, and October 3, 2016.118 Wikileaks 

initiated both exchanges. 119 Trump Jr. 

testified that he was not aware of the 

reasons why Wikileaks decided to reach out 

to him directly, but hypothesized that such 

direct messaging was likely due to the fact 

that he "was retweeting a bunch of their 

stuff . . . " and that he has "a relatively 

formidable social media platform."120 

(U) In the first exchange, on September 

20, 2016, Wikileaks sent a direct message 

to Trump Jr. to alert him to a "PAC run antiTrump site" that was about to launch. 

Wikileaks "guessed the password" and sent 

it to Trump Jr. and asked for comments.

121 

Trump Jr. responded the next day, "[o]ff the 

record I don't know who that is but I'll ask 

around."122 Trump Jr. subsequently logged 

into the site using the Wikileaks-supplied 

password, which had also been made 

publicly available. 

123 

(U) Following that exchange, Trump Jr. 

emailed some Trump campaign officials, to 

include Kellyanne Conway, Steve Bannon, 

and Jared Kushner to advise them of the 

contact and seek their advice.124 In a follow 

-up email, Trump Jr. noted the Wikileaks 

message intimated "some connection we 

[the Trump campaign] should be aware 

of."125 The Committee did not receive any 

documents or information that reflected a 

response to Trump Jr.'s email, although 

Hope Hicks recalled that-after being 

forwarded the email by Kushner-she 

"might have expressed concern to 

somebody about putting passwords in 

unknown websites, just as a general 

practice, not specific to Wikileaks." 126 

{U) On October 3, Wikileaks passed 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 73 
along a story reporting Clinton's comments 

about Julian Assange and noted "{i)t'd be 

Breat If you guys could comment on/push 

this story." 1J·

7 Trump Jr. responded about 

90 minutes later: ''Already did that earlier 

today. It's amazing what she can get away 

with." 1'a Trump Jr. then wrote: " What's 

behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading 

about?"n 9 Trump Jr. was seeking 

Information on what was purported to be, 

another future leak of Podesta-related 

emails.130 There was no response. 

{U} After October 3, 2016, Trump Jr. 

received numerous messages from 

WiklLeaks that: 

• suggest a website llf'.lk to use if the 

campaign refers to Wikileaks In a 

tweet and suggests having 

supporters search through the 

leaked Podesta emails, noting 

• 

• 

• 

Wikf Leaks "just released" "Part 4" of 

those cmails;

13

l 

seek then-candidate Trump's tax 

returns <1nd suggests leaking them to 

"improve the perception of 

[Wlkileaks'] impartiality'';m 

suggest challenging the results 

should Trump lose the election;m 

describe an election-night message 

of "(w]ow" and noting Obama 

administration witl delete records as 1~d they leave;-

• suggest the President-elect push 

Australia to make Julian Assange 

that country's ambassador to the 

United States;135 

• 

• 

forward what appears to be a video 

with the cap\i on "Fake N~ws";13G and 

on the date the news of the June 9, 

2016, Trump Tower meeting broke, , •

1 n·, seek copies of Trump Jr. s ema1 s. 

With respect to the latter, Trump Jr. 

published those emails himself on 

his Twitter account. 

{U) Trump Jr. testified that he did not 

reply to any of these messages, nor did he 

have any communications with Wikfleaks 

before September 20 or aft~r October 3, 

2016.

138 He testified that the direct 

message exchanges discussed above "is a 

complete record of any communications 

[he] had with Wikileaks." 139 

(U) Cambridge Analytica: In addition to 

Trump Jr.'s communlcations with Wikileaks, 

Cambridge Analytica, a British firm the 

Trump campaign used for data analytics, 

reached out to Julian Assange in an effort to 

confirm whether Wlklleaks possessed the 

,;missing" ema!ls deleted from Clinton's 

private server.

140 That contact occurred In 

approximately June 2016,1~

1 between an 

employee of Cambridge Analytica and the 

speaker's bu reau (a separate third party) 

representing Assange.142 Wikileaks replied 

through the bureau that "they did not wish 

to take a telephone earl or othe rwise .. 

[ . A I . ) ,,1 .. :s engage with us Cambridge na ytica . 

{U} Trump campaign digital director 

- testified that he did not 

participate in, nor' was he aware o f, 

Cambridge Analytica' s attempted outreach 

to Assange.

144 The Chief Executive Officer 

PROPERTY oi: THE U.S. MOUSE OF' Rl:PRE:G6NTATIV1!S 

74 
{CEO} of Cambridge Analytica confirmed in 

his testimony that he "did not share this 

with anyone on the Trump campaign.uHs In 

fact, the C:EO testified that the outreach 

occurred before the company was even 

retained by the Trump campaign.w; 

(L!} Roger Stone: Roger Stone has had a 

series of business relationships with Donald 

Trump dating back to at least 1981, and 

served as a paid campargn advisor for 

several months in 2015.147 During 

testimony to the Committee, Stone 

addressed three public statements 

suggesting he might have important 

information about, and potentially advance 

knowle_dge of, disclosures during the 2016 

campaign: (1) an August 2016 Twitter 

message regarding Clinton campaign 

chairman John Podesta, {2} an August 2016 

public speech about purported contacts 

with Julian Assange, and (3) the March 2017 

acknowledgement of pre-election direct 

communications with Guccifer 2.0. 

{U) Stone denied that he "knew in 

advance about and predicted the hackin$ 

of .. . Podesta's email," notwithstanding his 

cryptic statement in an August 21, 2016, 

Twitter message-''Trust me, it will soon be 

Podesta's time in the barrel"-that 

predated by several weeks the initial public 

release of Podesta's hacked emails.

14s 

Stone noted that his Tweet 0makes no 

mention whatsoever of Mr. Podesta's 

email. ,,149 Furthermore, it was posted "at a 

time that my boyhood friend and colreague, 

Paul 1"~'1anafort, had just resigned from tile 

Trnmp campaign over allegations regarding 

u .. I 

his business activities in Ukraine. I thought 

it manifestly unfair that John Podesta not be 

held to the same standard" regarding his 

alleged business activities. 150 In Octob.er 

2017, John Podesta's brother Tony resigned 

from the lobbying firm the brothers cofounded amid revelations about the 

Podesta Group's role in pro-Ukraine 

lobbying efforts that also involved Manafort 

and his associate Rick Gates.:..: .. 

(U} Stone also addressed his August 

2016 public statement that "l've a'ctually 

communicated with Julian Assange. I 

believe the next tranche of his documents 

pertain to the Clinton Foundation, but 

there's no telling what the October surprise 

may be."m In his testimony to the 

Cornmittee, Stone sought to "darify that by 

saying the communication I refer to is 

through a journalist who I ask {sic) to 

confirm what Assange has tweeted, himself, 

on July 21st, that he has the Clinton emails 

and that he will publish them."153 He 

subsequently identified the intermediary, 

but denied any access to non-public 

information. t

54 Stone further disputed, 

under oath, that he "had advance 

knowledge of the source or actual content 

of the Wikileaks disdosures." 155 

(U)·ln his testimony, Stone described a 

series of direct messages exchanged with 

Guccifer 2.0 in August and September 

2016-which he first publicly disclosed in 

March 2017-as "innocuous," and denied 

taking action in response to G uccifer 2.0' s 

messages.

156 He subsequently provided 

additional messages with Wikileaks 

?ROrcRTY OF T.-fE= U.S. HOUSE: OF REPREScNTA11VES 

75 
extending from October 2016 to August 

2017. 157 

(U} Despite these multiple contacts, the 

Committee did not find any evidence 

contradicting Stone's claim that "(a]ny 

information ... disseminated via social 

media regarding the timing of the release of 

the DNC data or others was from publicly 

available sources" and "he In no way 

conspired, colluded, or coordinated with 

any agent of the Russian state."

152 

MEETINGS WITH RUSSIANS 

(U) The Committee examined meetings 

between Trump campaign associates and 

Russians, to include both official and 

unof1iclol representatives. The Russlan5 

found wllllng interlocutors in foreign policy 

advisorsllllllland Papadopoulos. These 

advisors, however, were peripheral figures, 

and neither was in a position to influence 

Trump or his campaign. The Russians 

engaged Trump associates via official 

channe[s and-niore notably-used 

apparent cut-outs and intermediaries to 

make contact with senior officials. 

However, questionable contacts like the 

Trump Tower meeting resulted in collusion, 

conspiracy, or coordination with the Russian 

government. 

(U} Finding #30:-did not travel 

to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the 

Trump campaign, but the Committee is 

concerned about his seemingly incomplete 

accounts of his activity in Moscow. 

(U)-traveled to Moscow in early 

July 2016 to deliver a conimencement 

speech at the New Economic Scl1ool-the 

first American to do so since then-President 

Barack Obama in 2009. At the time, -

served as a foreign policy advisor for the 

Trump campaign. The Trump campaign 

made it clear to - that the trip was not 

on behalf of the Trump campaign,.a point 

- acknowledged In his testimony to the 

Committee.

15

"' J.D. Gordon, the NSAC 

director, strongly advised against the trip, 

calling it "a bad idea." 1€0 However, Trump 

campaign manager 

authorized lllto make the trip "out side 

of [his] role with the DJT {Donald J. Trump I 

for President campaign.''16L -

mentioned the upcoming trip to Sessions at 

one of the occasional NSAC meals, 

161 

although Sessions did not recall the 

interaction. 

1

1>3 

(U) On July 9, 2016, while In Russia, 

- sent an "executive summary" of 

"Feedback From Russia" that stated in part 

''Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES 

[New Economic School} Board Member 

Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the 

event. In a private conversation, 

Dvorkovich expressed strong support for 

Mr. Trump and a desire to work together 

toward devising better solutions in response 

to the vast range of current international 

problems. Based on feedback from a 

diverse array of other sources close to the 

Hussian Presidential Administmtion, It was 

readily apparent that this sentiment is 

widely held at c1 ll levels of government." 1(',11 

alfldmltted to briefly greeting 

Dvorkovlch before or after one of their 

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE::3 

76 
I V ,J 

speeches, but minimized the interaction in 

testimony before the Committee.

165 

(U) Ultimately, - failed to clearly 

explain whom he meant when he referred 

to sources close to Russian government in 

his executive summary. He denied having 

any private meetings with any senior 

Russian officials during his July 2016 trip, 

and stated that he mostly met with 

"scholars."

1

c-E The Steele dossier, a 

document compiled by former British 

intelligence officer Christopher Steele, 

alleges that while in Moscow in July 2016, 

Page secretly met with Igor Sechin, CEO of 

Russian state oil comp~my Rosneft, and Igor 

Diveykin, a senior Russian Intelligence 

official. :QJ Further, the Steele dossier claims 

that Sechin offered Page a brokerage fee in 

connection with the sale of 19 percent of 

Rosneft in exchange for the lifting of 

sanctions. i6!! 

UNCLASSIFIED 

CHRISTOPHER STEELEJ THE MAN 

BEHIND THE TRUMP DOSSIER 

UNCLASSIFIED 

(U) Since the allegation of meeting with 

Sechin and Diveykin was first w idely 

reported in September 2016, - has 

repeatedly and consistently denied meeting 

either Sechin or Diveykin, including under 

oath in testimony to the Committee. !e9 The 

Corn mittee has no information that 

confirms the Steele dossier's assertions 

regarding the purported meetings in 

Moscow, much less an offer by Sechin to 

- for such a role in a potentially lucrative 

transaction. After ret urning from Moscov:, 

- took a "leave of absence" from the 

Trump campaign, and played no role in the 

transition or administration.170 

(U} Finding #31: George Papadopoulos' 

attempts to leverage his Russian contacts 

to facilitate meetings between the Trump 

campaign and Russians ,,yas unsuccessful. 

{U} Papadopoulos made minor 

contributions to the Trump campaign as a 

foreign policy advisor. He briefly served as a 

Trump campaign surrogate, a role cut short 

in May 2016 when he publicly insulted UK 

Prime Minister David C3meron.

171 He alsoin an apparent effort to increase his 

standing within the Trump campaign- tried 

to insert himself into any· number of 

international engagements. As described 

below, his particular focus was trying to 

broker meetings \fJith foreign officials, but 

he often acted on his ovm w ithout the 

official backing of the Trump campaign. 

(U) On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos 

sent an email to several members of the 

policy team pitching a " [m]eeting with 

Russian leadership-including Putin" -and 

also volunteered to travel to meet the " next 

prime minister of Vietnam,,- alongside 

Mifsud (whom he had first met just ten days 

PROPi:RTY OF TH£ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNE5 

77 
before but nonetheless described as a 

"good friend of mine"). i"' Campaign cochair and chief polfcy advisorresponded that "we probably should not go 

forward with any meetings with the 

Russians until we have had occasion to sit 

with our NATO allies, especially France, 

Germany and Great Britain."

11:, In the same 

exchange, Papadopoulos then Immediately 

switched gears, indicating that "[i)f we need 

any assistance with setting up meetings 

here in London or Paris, I have some good 

contacts that can open doors immediately 

to the leadership." 174 

(UJ Durh1e the NSAC meeting with 

Trump on March 31, 2016-the only time 

Papadopoulos is known to have engaged 

directly with the candidate- Senator 

Sessions told the team that they were not 

~uthorized to speak for the campaign .

175 In 

his words "[t]hls committee was not . . . a 

croup of people ~uthorized to speak for 

[candidate) Trump, and they absolutely 

weren't authorized to go around the world 

pretending to represent him."

176 That 

sentiment was, according to Sessions, ''a 

good statement to make quite clear." 177 

(U) When Papadopoulos offered that he 

could engage, and possibly travel to, Russia 

on behalf of the campaign, his suggestion 

was swiftly rebuffed by Sessions, who 

testified that "I felt like·-and I'm the 

chairman of this group-I should not do 

anything that indicated to Mr. 

Papadopoulos that he was authorized to go 

to Russia or anyplace else to represent the 

Trump campaign and do some sort of 

negotiations. So I pushed back pretty 

sharply on that.''178 Sessions' account of his 

response has been corroborated by another 

attendee,-. l/'j- also 

attended and similarly recalled that when 

Papadopoulos raised the issue of obtaining 

contacts with the Russian government on 

behalf of the campafgn, Senator Sessions 

Interrupted and began "talking about the 

Logan Act," which criminalizes unauthorized 

negotiations with foreign governments.

180 

(U) Although the Committee has no 

information to indicate that Papadopoulos 

was successful in setting up any meetings 

b~tween the Tl'urnp campaien and the 

Russian government, he worked with 

campaign chief executive Steve Bannon to 

broker a September 2016 meeting between 

candidate Trump and Egyptian president 

Abdel Fatah el-Sisi.181 Trump was 

apparently pleased with the meeting, which 

he described In an Interview as "very 

productive," describing el-Sisi as "a fantastic 

guy."1s2 

(U) While on a trip to Athens, Greece in 

May 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to 

Manafort stating that he expected to soon 

receive "an official invltijtion for Mr. Trump 

to visit Greece sometime this summer 

should his schedule allow."18~ In the same 

email to Manafort, Papadopoulos also 

forwarded a meeting Invitation from rvan 

Timofeev, Director or Programs for the 

Russian International Affairs Council, and 

claimed that "Russia has been eager to 

meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and 

have been reaching out to me to discuss. 

PROPERTY OF TME U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

78 
thought it would be prudent to send to 

you."1e4 

(U} As of May 2016, Manafort had not 

yet been elevated to campaign chairman, 

but had a long track record of wor'f( abroad. 

Manafort forwarded Papadopoulos' email 

to his business and campaign deputy. 

- noting that a(wJe need someone to 

communicate that D[onald} T(rump] fs not 

doing the.se trips."

185 Manafort andagreed to assign a response of a "general 

letter" to "our correspondence 

coordinator.'' the person responsible for 

"responding to all mall of nonimportance."1ss 

{U) In June 2016, Papadopoulos sought 

a paid position and reimbursement for 

expenses from -a sessions 

aide, who along with , ran 

the Trump campaign's D.C. policy shop-for 

an upcoming trip "to DC for a high level 

meeting (with) the director of the Israel 

National Security Counciin and past trips to 

"the UK, Israel and Greece over the past 

month engaging in some senior level 

meetings .. . . 

11

1B

1 -forwarded the 

message to Gordon and_ 

Mashburn then replied as follows: "He cost 

us a lot more in having to deal with what he 

said about [then-UK prime minister David) 

Cameron 2 months ago ... he got no 

approval for the travel and did it on his own 

in[i]tiative .. .. Let him eat the cost and 

maybe he will learn to play nice with the 

team, not go off on his m.vn. ·-

would never have approved 

his going off on world travels at campaign 

expense without asking permission first."ts 

- replied to-with one 

word : "agreed.''l!>~ 

(U}~espondedto 

Papadopoulos that he could take the 

me~ting, but he "should do that as a private 

citizen.''® Making the point explicit, 

- wrote: "You' re not authorized to 

meet with him by {sic] the campaign, nor 

can you reflect the views of the campaign 

on security issues in that meeting."

191 

{U} finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared 

Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a 

June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower 

where they expected to r&-eive-but did 

not ultimately obtain-derogatory 

information on candidate Clinton from 

Russian sources. 

(U) tn July 2017, the Committee became 

aware of a June 9, 2016, meeting in Trump 

Tower, which became a key focus of the 

investigation. The Committee's findings 

were informed by interviews with six of the 

eight participants in the meeting. 

{U} Although they did not attend the 

meeting, the Agalarovs w ere the driving 

force to arrange it. ru previously noted, _the 

~aalarovs and Gof~tone had gotten to 

know businessman Donald Trump when the 

Agalarovs worked with Trump to host the 

.Miss Universe pageant at the Agalarovs' 

building, the Crocus City HaU, in Moscow in 

2013.192 The Agalarovs also had discussions 

with Donald Trump in 2013 to facilitate the 

possible development of a Trump Tower in 

Moscow.m The 2013 M iss Universe 

PROPERTY OF THE u_s.. HOUS~ OF REPRESENTA'i'!VcS 

79 
UNCLASSIFIED 

PARTICIPANTS OF THE JUNE 9, 2016 

MEETING AT TRUMP TOWER 

Oonllct J, YNmp, Jt, 

Longtlm6 l1oputilic a11 

on1paig11 ~~r at~ 

ln:unll'lionol tol>ttrl~. 

Son 9< c,nd ldr:\"I Ootltld ~,ln-ur,. t~ crondfcllltt> Londo~ prolltlltfr 

wl'IO M~~d Ol)p l.tX 

Eiflin {A,t11,rovj. Lho V.c11 

i'roiJdCJnt of !hu Cr0<u~ 

G1011p. 

Trump, TNll'I), Jt: !:etv@od :!.$ 3 0ol'llld_l'n,n,p, i(W,g ~N!d 

Sllnior Q1.l~rtott111c1mpa,;, a 1u11Mc. DdvlJOno l/lo 

M\l'\JIO>"t '41"'1d l'lS llilMtOf 

of 1he Tturl'lp c~p;11gn 

runmng di,y,to-d/ly-OP"'...Uans c~pmr,n 

AUAl ll(l lt,Nyar, Wh~ 

r~i:ra1et1t'1d ~ 

PrllYCIZ!>n in ~(Ml 

leldelwr~ rn~ II\ Hta 

fl!<f6ral <<Wn: In ~w 

VOii!, 

<«>tn Ntw York 

Ctt,fotni~uitd 

man~~, .of \he 

Ctoc.JJ s Gtoui,. 

R/n.u A~m,uhfn 

RutJl anj,rr,orican 

IQ!lbyt!Z. 

~ m,a, .imp)l)ya~ .it th<i 

U.$. Oe!p.art~t iM Srtu, 

S1ll'!C1rd',0!nO,, ll'iltl~,o 

for Vo:1;1it\Jt ~~·· rt. VtD 

J11n& S\n r110otln11. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

pageant formed the basis of a casual 

friendship between the Trumps and the 

Agalarovs.1.!H Trump appeared in one of 

Ernln Agala rovs's music videos with the 

2013 pageant winner,195 and Trump 

maintained a frfendly correspondence with 

Aras 1:i.galarov- includlng during the busy 

2016 carnpaign.196 

{U) Events. leading to the meeting were 

set in motion by a June 3, 2016, email from 

Goldstone to Tru·mp Jr,, stating: "Emin just 

called and asked me to contact you with 

something very interesting. The Crown 

prosecutor of RllSSia [possibly referri"g to 

Ru ssian Prosecutor General Yuri Chatka) 

met with his father Aras this morning and in 

their meeting offered to provide the Trump 

PROPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

80 
campaign with some official documents and 

infor.mation that would incriminate Hillary 

and her dealings with Russia and would be 

very useful to your father. This is obviously 

very high level and senslti\le information but 

is part of Rus·sia and its government's 

support for Mr. Trump - helped along by 

Aras and Emin.''

197 Trump Jr. replied to 

Gold.stone's June 3 request by indicating "if 

rt's what you say I love ft especially in the 

summer."1~ 

(U) This exchange indicates that Trump 

Jr. was open to discussing derogatory, 

information from Russian government 

sources that could be useful to candidate 

Trump. Goldstone proposed to deliver 

information concerning Hillary Clinton via a 

Russian government attorney. t~ Trump Jr. 

indicated that he had invited Kushner and 

Manafort, 2!iO underscoring his belief in the 

importance of the information. 

- with connections to the 

Agalarov family, was one of the individuals 

who attended the June 9 meeting at Trump 

Tower. The Committee discovered that the 

participants.of the June 9 meeting did not 

all have the same understanding as to the 

re~sons for the meeting, with -

testifying that he thought it was odd that al! 

three senior Trump campaign officials would 

be taking a meeting on the Magnitsky Act, a 

U.S. human rights law that imposes certain 

sanctions on Russian interests. Accordingly, 

- called , a close 

associate of Emin .4.galarov based in the 

United States, t o inquire about the purpose 

s J 

of the meeting. -explained that 

he believed the scheduled meeting at 

Trump Tower was about providing negative 

information on candidate Clinton to the 

• 201 Trump campaign. 

(U) Based on Trump Jr.'s testimony and 

the documentary evii;lence received by the 

Committee, there is no evidence ~o support 

that there were any prior communications 

between the Trump campaign and the other 

attendees: - ; Russian lawyer 

Natalia Veselnitskaya; Russian-Amer<can 

lobbyist and former Soviet intelligence 

officer ; or Russianwho served 

as a Russian interpreter. furthennore, the 

Committee found no evidence that Trump 

Jr. knew the identities of these individuals 

before the meeting,202 or that he discussed 

rt with candidate Trump beforehand.203 

(U) The Committee interviewed all 

attendees other than Manafort, due to the 

Special Counsel's ongoing investigation, and 

Vese!nitskaya, who is a Russian national 

located overseas without a valid visa to 

enter the United States. Despite the pretext 

for the meeting, every person with direct 

knowledge of what occurred confirmed that 

· there was no m~ntion of derogatory or 

incriminating information directly relatir:ig to 

Hillan.., Clinton during t he June 9 meeting. 

Goldstone testified that he had no ~vidence 

that the Russian government supported or 

favored Donald Trump, and admitted to 

embellishing the contents of the email 

solely for the purpose of gaining a response 

from Trump Jr., namely by using inaccurate 

?HO?ERlY OF T;;E U.S. XOUS:: Of RE.." R!;S£NTA Tl\r=S 81 
information. 204 

{U) Vesclnitskayc1, Samochornov, 

Kavcdadze, and Akhmetshin met for lunch 

before the Trump Tower rneeting.

205 During 

lunch, there was a discussion regarding the 

Trump Tower meeting. Vesel'nitskaya 

shared an approximately 10-page document 

in Russian to provide the lunch attendees 

with a synopsis of what would be discussed 

at the meeting, a summary that contained 

much of the same information as a similar 

document reportedly shared with Russian 

prosecutor gener~I Yuri Chaika.10b Based on 

this discussion, the lunch attendees 

believed the Trump Tower meeting was 

about tl1e Magnltsl<y Act.201 The lunch 

attendees then met Goldstone at Trump 

Tower shortly beforf! the meeting.208 They 

proceeded to the 25th Floor where they 

me1 Trump Jr., and he led the group to a 

conforence room. 200 

(U) The June 9 meeting lasted as little . no 

as 20 minutes. Kaveladze testified that 

he believed Trump Jr. started the meeting 

and then turned it over to Veselnitskaya.211 

Interviewed meeting attendees agreed that 

Veselnitskaya presented information 

concerning-the Magnitsky Act and the Ziff 

Brothers, including their alleged role in 

evading taxes in Hussia and political 

contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton 

I 2 12 campa gn. Seve,·al attendees also 

recalled discussion of Russian adoptions, 

which the Russian government suspended 

in retaliation for the Magnitsky Act.213 

(U) Goldstone further testified that 

Kushner, Manafort, and Trun1p Jr. seemed 

visibly uninterested In the Ma3nltsky Act 

briefing provided by Veselnitskaya.

2

H 

Manafort, according to Goldstone, "never 

looked up from his cell phone from the 

moment we began the meeting until the 

moment we ended."'15 Manafort and 

Kushner complained to one another via text 

message during the meeting that the 

meeting was a "waste of time."21G Kushner 

asked his assistants to call and give him and 

excuse to leave, which one of them did 

shortly after the text.m At the end of the 

meeting, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr. 

for the "bait-and-switch ta!k about 

something which we !mew nothfng about, 

which was, acain, Russian adoption and the 

rvtagnitsky Act." 218 

(U) t<aveladze testified thut he received 

two calls from Aras Agalarov aft er the 

meeting. Durir:ig the second call, l<aveladze 

explained that the meeting was a "complete 

loss of time and about nothing. 1121~ Aras 

Agalarov and Kaveladze did not discuss t he 

"dirt" on Hillary Clinton. 22° Kaveladze also 

sent an email to his daughter after the 

meeting indicating that the "meeting was 

boring. The Russians did not have any bad 

info [o]n Hillary"

221-a reference back to his 

conversation with Beniaminov, which he 

had apparently relayed to his daughter. The 

Committee received no testimony or 

documentary evidence indicating that the 

purpose of the meeting was to discuss 

Wlkileal<s, J1.1lian Assange, the hackin.e of 

DNC servers, and/or the John Podesta 

emails. 222 

(U) No witness, including the attendees, 

82 
testified that candidate Trump was aware of 

the meeting prior to fts public exposure in 

June 2017. Steve Bannon, who had been 

previously quoted as saying ''{t]he chances 

that Don Jr. did not walk [the meeting 

participants] up to his fathers office is 

zero," conceded under oath that he had no 

evidence to support that ciaim. 223 The 

Committee also investigated a public 

statement made by candidate Trump during 

a speech after the final Republican primary 

contests on June 7, 2016, the same day as 

Trump Jr. exchanged emails with Goldstone 

regarding meeting attendees and 

logistics.224 According to campaign press 

secretary Hope Hicks, Trump's publicly 

st(lted intent "to give a major speech .. . 

next week . . . discussing all of the things 

that h~ve taken place with the Clintpns" did 

not reflect knowledge about t he upcoming 

meeting; instead, it referred to a planned 

speech uthat w.as an outline of the book 

Clinton Cash," and was ultimately derivered 

approximately two weeks later after being 

delayed by a domestic terrorist attack. us 

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. bri~fly 

met with a Russian government official at 

the 2016 National Rifle Association annual 

meeting, but the Committee found no 

evidence that the two discussed the U.S. 

presidential election. 

{U}Jn the weeks leading up to the 

r,.iational Rifle Association's (NRA) 2016 

annual meeting, there were a series ~f 

emails sent to-a member of the campaign 

discussing Russian interest in the campaign 

a5 it related to the NRA meeting. Despite 

., 

the emails' rhetoric about setting up a "back 

channel'' between the United States and 

Russian governments, the relevant 

testimony obtained in the Committee's 

interv[ews showed these email inquiries 

resulted in a brief meeting between Trump 

Jr. and a Russian government official that 

centered on shooting and hunting. It did 

not focus on the U.S. presidential election. 

(U) from May 19-22, 2016, the NRA held 

its annual meeting and exhibits in Louisville, 

Kentucky. 226 In an intervie\'.' w ith t he. 

Committee, TrumpJr.'testified he received 

an invitation from "[v]arious people at the 

NRA" to attend the 2016 meeting.-~v In 

addition to Trump Jr.'s invitation, there 

were several emails sent to_ 

seeking to establish a connection at the NRA 

meeting between an emissary of the 

Russian government and candidate Trump. 

(U} In the first email, dated May 16, 

2016, a business executive emailed 

~ith the po~sibilit':( of candidate 

Trump meeting with Alexander Torshin, the 

Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, the 

country's central bank.228 The email 

mentions an "overture t o Mr. Trump from 

President Putin."]

29 - responds he 

will be "[\·1}orking on this first thing in the 

am.":!30 

(U} - forwarded the email to 

Manafort, Gates, and Kushner, noting the 

"interesting request." B1 - email 

highlighted the entrepreneur's request that 

Torshln "meet with a high level official in 

our campaign'' during the NRA meeting to 

di~cuss "an offer he {Torshin] claims to be 

PROPER'N OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REf'RcSENTATIVES 

83 
carryln{l from President Putin to meet with 

DJT." In response to that email, Kushner 

wrote: "Pass on this. A lot of people come 

claiming to carry messages. Very few we 

are able to verify. For now I think we 

decline such meetings," as well as "(b]e 

careful."23' - replied to the 

executive seeking the meeting: "I've asked 

about a mtg but we are not able to 

accommodate it at that event in KY."'

33 

(U) In addition to the emails discussing 

a possible meeting with Torshln, on May 10, 

201.6, -' who had previously 

approathecalllllllllll about advising .a. 

prospective Trump transition,234 sent 

- an e1T1ail about meeting with 

Russians at the NRA event.735 The email 

discusses- purported "backchannel to President Putin's Kremlin," that 

"Russia is quietly but actively seeking a 

dialogue with the U.S. that isn't forthcoming 

under the current administration," and.that 

"the Kremlin believes that the only 

possibility of a true re-set in this 

relationship·would be with a new 

Republican Whit~ House."7.36 

{U) The email goes on to note that 

"Presidenf Putin's emissary11 wFII be at the 

NRA convention and hopes to make contact 

with candidate Trump and present Mrs. 

Tm mp with a gift.'~-, The email discussed 

Putin's desire to build a relationship with 

candidate Trun,p, to Include e)(tending an 

invitation to the l<remlin. The email also 

asked-to "talk through what has 

transpired and Sen. Sessions' advice on how 

to proceed.''238 When asked about this 

email in his Jntervlew before the 

Committee, Attorney General Sessions 

testlried he was not c1ware of this email..B9 

- testified that he may have met 

-once, and did not remember 

replying to hrs email.

7

,1{) 

(U) Atthough the campaign declined to 

hord a meeting, Trum·p Jr. was introduced to 

Torshin, at the request of an acquaintance, 

at a restaurant where they were dining 

separately .

241 During their brief 

introduction, they spoke about "stuff as it 

related to shooting and hunting . .. 

exchanged casual hellos" but did not 

exchange contact information. 2-1z In his 

brief exchange with Torshin and a 

subsequent exchange wrth Torshln's 

assistant, Marla Batina, Trump Jr. testified 

he·dld not recall any discussion of the 

upcoming U.S. presidential e!ection.20 No 

other witn~ss provided a contrary 

recollection to the Committee. 

(U) The Committee reviewed several 

emails discussing a meeting with Russians at 

the NRA meeting, an attempt to establish a 

back channel of communication betw~en 

the U.S. and Russian governments, and a 

possible meeting between candidate Trunip 

and President Putin. However, the 

Committee found that all of those email 

exchanges resulted in just one, brief 

meeting between Mr. Torshin a'nd the 

candidate's son that did not include any 

discussio1, related to the U.S. election.

2

~d 

(U} Finding #34: The Committee found no 

evidence that meetings between Trump 

associates-including Jeff Sessions-and 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. !iOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 84 
official representatives of the Russian 

government-including Ambassador 

Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination, 

or conspiracy with the Russian 

government. 

(U) Meetings between U.S. senators 

and foreign government officials are 

considered a routine part of the job. 

However, there have been multiple media 

articles raising concerns about contacts with 

former Russian Ambassador to the United 

States Sergey l(islyak, particularly those 

involving then-Senator Sessions. 

(U) Mayflower Hotel Speech: In April 

2016, Senator Sessions, an early endorser of 

Trump and later a key figure during the 

transition, attended a foreign policy speech 

by Trump at the Mayflower Hotel in 

Washington, D.C.245 l<ushner also attended 

and recalled meeting 20 to 25 guests, 

including Ambassador Kislyak for the first 

time.246 Kushner stated that the 

conversation between him and Ambassador 

Kislyak mainly consisted of pleasantries, and 

concluded with an offer for Kushner to visit 

the Russian Embassy for lunch, which 

Kushner never attended. 247 

{U) Attorney General Sessions similarly 

described a pre-speech reception of maybe 

24 people; immediately following the 

speech, he went to a media stakeout to 

answer questions about the speech.248 

Attorney General Sessions reca lled "no ... 

discussions with the [Russian] Ambassador 

or any other representative from the 

Russian Government or their surrogate" at 

the Mayflower.249 

(U) Republican National Convention: In 

July 2016, then-Senator Sessions attended 

the Republican National Convention in 

Cleveland, Ohio. Because he used his 

campaign funds to pay for his travel and 

lodging while in Ohio, his schedule focused 

primarily on his Senate campaign-related 

events. 25° For the five days that Sessions 

was in Cleveland, he attended numerous 

Trump campaign-related events.251 

(U) Over 50 ambassadors to the United 

States also attended a reception associated 

with the 2016 Republican Convention. 252 

Sessions addressed this group of 

ambassadors, as the keynote speaker, at the 

Heritage Foundation's Embassy Row 

Ambassador's Buffett Lunch. 253 According 

to Sessions, his interaction with 

Ambassador Kislyak following that speech 

was brief, unexpected, and occurred in the 

presence of several other people.254 

(U) J. D. Gordon testified about briefly 

encountering Kislyak twice at convention 

events in July 2016, including a brief 

conversation that occurred during a 

networking event that was also attended by 

1111.

255 ... recalled seeing Gordon and 

chatting casually with Kislyak at the same 

event.256 The Committee found no evidence 

that these brief public interactions related 

to the hacking of emails or collusion, 

coordination~ or conspiracy between the 

Trump campaign and Russia. 

(U) Senate Office Meeting: On 

September 8, 2016, Senator Sessions met 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 85 
Ah1bc1ssc1dor Kislyak In his Senate office:

2

!)t 

As a Senator, such meetings In his Capitol 

Hill office are common. Notes of the 

meeting taken by Sessions' staff, and 

provided to the Committee, verified that the 

approximately 30-minute meeting was 

official in nature and not related to any role 

that Senator Sessions held with the Trump 

campaign.258 Sessions testified that the 

conversation mainly revolved around 

Ukraine, and the two "had a little testy 

conversalion" about Ukraine given Sessions' 

support for the urm1inian cause.259 The 

Committee's investigalion did not uncover 

anything improper about Senator Sessions' 

meetin~s with the Russian ambassador. 

Finding #35: Possible Russian efforts to set 

up a "back channel" with Trump associates 

after the election suggest the absence of 

collusion during the campaign, since the 

communication associated with collusion 

would have rendered such a "back 

channel" unnecessary. 

JU) The Committee investigated 

meetings during the post-election transition 

period betv-Jeen Trump associates and 

Russians-with a focus on individuals who 

may have been acting as unofficial 

representatives of Moscow. In December 

2016, l<ushner met with the head of Russian 

bank VEB, Sergei Gorkov, at the urging of 

Russian Ambassador Serr,ei Kislyak, with 

whom J<ushner and Flynn had met earlier in 

the month.260 Kushner took the meeting 

partly because he hQd been told Gorkov 

could provide "Insight into what Putin's 

thoughts were on a potential new 

relationship" between Russia and the 

United States. 

2

bl l(ushner testified that the 

meeting primarily entailed Gorkov telling 

Kushner about VEB, w ith which Kushner was 

entirely unfamiliar, and "that was really the 

extent of it."16i Gorkov gave Kushner two 

gifts, which l<ushner registered with the 

transition. 263 

(U) In January 2017, businessman and 

former Navy officer-was 

introduced through Emirati associates to 

Russian investor Kirill Dmitriev in the 

Seychelles.2c

4 - had no official or 

unofficial role in the transition, btJt had met 

twice wlth Bannon at Trump Tower.

2

G

5 

- testified that his meeting with 

Dmitriev lasted 20-30 minutes and focused 

on "trade matters," and "how the United 

StatC!s and Russia should be working 

together to defeat Islamic terrorism."2~ 

- stated that he and Dmitriev did not 

discuss sanctions, the Russian government' s 

"desire to have a relationship with the 

Trump administration," or "any channel of 

communications between the United States 

and Russia.''267 -furthE:r stated that he 

had had "no communications or dealings 

with {Dmitriev] or any of his colleagues 

before or after that encounter last 

January."26a 

(U} The Committee did not find 

evidence that Kushner or-did 

,mything Inappropriate during or following 

their meetings with Gorkov and Dmitriev. 

To the extent that one or both meetings 

reflected an unsuccessf ul attempt by 

intermediaries of the Russian government 

PROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

86 
to set up a "back channel" to the incoming 

Trump administration, that purpose was not 

shared with or accepted by Kushner or 

--and potentially reflected an 

absence of such channels during the 

campaign.269 Kushner, who was connected 

to Gorkov by Kislyak, asserted that "the fact 

that we [we]re going through the normal 

channels during the transition hopefully 

serves to show that there were no existing 

channels through the campaign." Similarly, 

- noted his meeting with Dmitriev 

"didn't happen until ... more than 2 

months after the election. So if there was all 

this collusion [before the election], why 

would there even need to be any other 

followup meetings?"270 

Clinton Campaign 

(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the 

Democratic National Committee (DNC) and 

Hillary for America (Clinto·n campaign) paid 

a research firm to conduct opposition 

research on candidate Trump and his ties 

with Russia. As part of this effort, research 

from n_umerous purported Russian sources 

was obtained and provided to the Clinton 

campaign, thereby constituting indirect, but 

substantial, links "between Russia and 

individuals associated with political 

campaigns" relevant to the 2016 U.S. 

election. 

{U) Fusion GPS (Fusion) is the trade 

name of a Washington, D.C.-based 

company, Bean LLC, that conducts research 

primarily on behalf of corporate clients.271 

According to longtime Wall Street Journal 

reporter and Fusion co-foundeiallll 

- Fusion "specialize[s] in finding 

records and reading things and digesting 

large volumes of information."272 Fusion's 

general practice is to "do engagements on a 

30-day basis, and at the end of the 30 days 

we write a report about what we found .... 

And if you think what we told you was 

interesting and you want more, we can sign 

up again.''273 Founded and led by former 

journalists,274 Fusion maintains relationships 

with numerous reporters, and provides 

information to ne·ws outlets on behalf of 

clients that include law firms, media 

organizations, and lobbying 

organizations.275 

{U) As described below, Fusion was 

hired in spring 2016 by 

-· who represented the DNC and the 

Clinton campaign. Fusion was paid to 

conduct opposition research on candidate 

Trump. Fusion subsequently hired 

Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor to 

obtain information from sources purported 

to be current and former Russian 

government officials. The information 

Steele collected was reported back to the 

Clinton campaign via Fusion and-276 

{U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting 

opposition research targeting candidate 

Trump's business dealings, Fusion GPS 

conducted research benefitting Russian 

interests. 

{U) Prior to conducting opposition 

research targeting candidate Trump's 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 87 
business dealings, Fusion conducted 

research benefil1.ing Russian Interests. i n 

Specifically, in 2013, Fusion was retained by 

a law firm to assist w ith representation of a 

Russian defendant in a civil forfeiture case 

arising out of alleged money laundering 

activities uncovered by the late Sergei 

Magnitsky {whose name was subsequently 

given to the U.S. human rights law, the 

IV1agnitsky Act). 278 -acknowledged 

that the Kremlin's interests in the case were 

aligned with his client and against the U.S. 

government.279 

(U) Russian lawyer Natalia 

Veselnitskaya hired the law firm for which 

Simpson was workfng, and that fjrm 

retained the services of Russian-Amerkan 

lobbyist Rinat Akhmetshln, both of whom 

attended a meeting at Trump Tower on June 

9, 2016, described in the first part of this 

chapter.280 During the litigation, 

Veselnitskaya receive~, via the law firm, 

memoranda summarizingresearch:m Certain topics-including the 

Ziff Brothers (a venture capital firm 

specializing in capital investment)-were 

the-subject of both {1) memoranda 

Veselnitskaya received from - and 

{2} the presentation Veselnitskaya made to 

Trump campaign officials.2R

2 -

acknowledged being with Veselnitskaya at a 

court hearing in New York on the morning 

of June 9, 2016, prior to her meeting at 

Trump Towef.

283 He further recalled having 

drinks and dinner with her and others, 

including Akhmetshfn, in W(lshlngton, D,C, a 

day or two later. m However, he denied 

discussing the Trump Tower rTi eeling with 

her before or after it occurred, and claimed 

not to have learned about it until 2017.281·• 

(U) Finding #37: The 

hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton 

campaign and the Democratic _National 

Committee to research candidate Trump's 

Russia ties. 

{U} 

., is longtime counsel to the DNC.n ° 

-.alllatso represented the Clinton 

campaign, from which it received $5.6 

million in 2015 and 2016.

287 Pursuant to 

that representation, d~ring the 2016 

campaign, "[tJhere was an expectation that 

- would hire the consultants, 

including rese<Jrch consultants, necessary to 

e11able us to provide services to the 

campaign."288 

{U} In approximately March or April 

2016,289 Fusion principals- and 

- approachecal "and indicated 

that they might be a good fit for doing work 

to support the legal efforts" oial 

clients.290 llllllltestffied that Fusion "had 

been retained ... by a wealthy Republican , 

.. to do research on t hen candidate Trump . 

. . and thought that if I was going to be 

looking to hire a consultant to help me 

advise the cami>aign on issues relating to 

Trump, that they wot1ld be a good fit."m 

lllwas looking for a consultant to, among 

other things, sort tf1rouuh the multitude of 

public records pertaining to Trump's 

business dealings.<

92 Although he had not 

previously worked with Fusion, he chose to 

PROPERTY OF THE: U.S. HOUSE. OF R!:PRESl::NTATiVF.S 88 
hire the company based on its familiarity 

with Trump's dealings, including "his 

business holdings, his financial holdings, and 

the kinds of litigation he had been involved 

in."293 • · further testified that "[t]hey 

were recommended ... [and} thought 

highly of in the community." 294 

(U) The Committee determined the 

"wealthy Republican" who funded Fusion's 

the Beacon retained Fusion to conduct 

opposition research on Trump. 295 

leadership have publicly stated they "had no 

knowledge .of or connection to the Steele 

dossier, did not pay for the dossier, and 

never had contact with, knowledge of, or 

provided payment for any work performed 

by Steele."296 

- testified that-based on a careful 

review of the relevant documents-he had 

identified "zero overlap in the work 

product" between the dossier and what 

Fusion providecl 297 

(U) lllllsought and received "budget 

approval to be able to spend money in 

order for me to retain consultants," from 

Clinton campaign managerbut did not specifically identify Fusion to 

- .• 

298 Fusion's Simpson was "definitely 

aware that-· represented the 

DNC and that they were the client in this 

matter" based on a general understanding 

that-· represents the DNC.299 

Fusion's expenses, including the hiring of 

Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor, 

were passed on to -,

300 and 

ultimately to the Clinton campaign and 

DNC.301 In total, Fusion paid Steele (and 

charged-) approximately 

$160,000; Steele's efforts were part of a 

larger opposition research project for which 

- · paid Fusion over $1 million.302 

{U)-testified that Fusion began 

its opposition research work by "review{ing] 

what we had learned over the previous 

months," presumably including 

"information about candidate Trump's 

business ties in Russia," although - had 

not been aware of Russia-specific research 

at the time he engaged Fusion.303 Fusion 

"began to develop more specific lines of 

inquiry," and eventually hired Steele, whom 

- had known since approximately 

2009.

304 

signed off on the decision to hire Steele as a 

sub-contractor in June 2016-around the 

same time he learned that Fusion was 

beginning to focus its opposition research 

on Trump's ties to Russia-but was not 

aware of Steele's identity until July 2016.305 

{U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims 

to have obtained his dossier information 

second- and third-hand from purported 

high-placed Russian sources, such as 

government officials with links to the 

Kremlin and intelligence services. 

(U) Between June a·nd November 2016, 

Steele produced sixteen reports for Fusion, 

which comprise what has become known as 

the Steele dossier, "concerning Russian 

efforts to influence the US Presidential 

/ l\l 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

89 
election and Hnks betwC?en Russia and 

Donald Trump."

30G Steele did not travel to 

Russia to con~plle these reports.io, Instead, 

Simpson stated that "!Steele] hire(d) people 

who can travel and talk to people and find 

out what's going on.

1130R 

(U) Of the separate claims the 

Committee identified within the dossier, 

almost all are attributable to Russian or 

Russia-based sources, such as: a "senior 

Russian governn,ent figure," a "senior 

Russian leadership figure," an "official close 

to [the] Russian Presidential 

Administration," a "Kremlin insider," a 

"former top Russla1"1 officer," a "senior 

Russian financial official," a "senior Russian 

Foreign Mil\istry figure," a 1'Kremlin official 

involved In U.S. relntions," cind a "former 

top level Russian Intelligence officer still 

active inside the l<remlin."31w 

(U) The Committee is concerned with 

the degree to which the Kremlin may have 

sought to influence information that was 

ultimately provided to Steele-through the 

.Potential provision of disinformation or 

otherwise-consistent with its ongoing 

efforts "to undermine public faith in the US 

democratic process ... . 

11310 In addition, the 

vast majority of witnesses the Committee 

interviewed, includinEIII, did not know 

the Identity of Steele's sources:" 1 Steele 

declined to testify before the Committee, 

and the two witnesses who cialmed to 

know some of Steele's sources-Simpson 

and-, a former U.S. 

Depvrtment of State offic.lal-decllned to 

identify them:m 

(U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's 

information from Russian sources was 

provided directly to fusion GPS and 

- and indirectly to the Clinton 

campaign. 

(U) Fusion began receiving written 

reports from Steele in June 2016. 313 At the 

same time, Fusion provided updatesapproximatety weekly and usually orally-to 

•

3

1A - recalled 

receiving some of the information later 

included ln the dossier '

1

maybe late June, 

early July. " .. 

115 - exchanges with Fusion 

were not one-way communications: he 

specifically recalled directing follow-up 

work on lnformalion eathered by Steele.a.1r; 

Elias recalkid persont1lly bl:tlng briefed by 

Steele on his findinf.ls d~iring a late 

September or early October meeting at 

office and 

formed the impression that ''the Fusion 

foll<s thou~ht jt was important that Mr. 

Steele hear from me directly that I was 

aware of his work and was appreciative."3n 

The Committee requested 

records related to this meeting1 but the firm 

wc1s not able- to locate any.315 

(U). led regular briefings that 

contained Steele's Information for senior 

Clinton campaign staff, which included 

Clinton campaign manag~r-and 

campaign chairman John Podesta.319 -

also began '

1

relaying ... information 

received from Fusion GPS to the DNC . .. 

around . .. convention time."

320 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEN'rAn~s 90 
1. HPSCI, · 1nrelligenve Committ$!; Chairman, Ranking Me moor Establish Parameters for Russia lmre:otigot.on,~ httru:/l 

!J.m:.li'icl:!'lce.hou!e.eov /nev;sicoc..rm•"'ntsinglea:s!li?DOClimen;:1~767, Mar. 1.1, ::>.l)l.7. 

2. HP-SCI, Ex2cuti1ie Session lnterif.sw of Jefferson 8. Sessicns, Nov. 30, 2017. 

3. HPSCI, executf,,e $eS,s!on lnt~-iew of Don ~rd f n:m p, Jr •• !)~::.. 6, 2017; H PSCI. Executr,re $e$slon fnterviev, cf Jeffe.rson B. 

Sessions. Nov. 30, 2017. 

4. H!K.,CI, Execufi,,e Ses.sian ln1i:l'~ w oflefferson B. Ses-.slcr.s. Nov. 30, 2017. 

5. HPSCI, E>?-cutive: Session !nt.<:Pliew of !ared Kusimer, July 7.5, 201?. 

6. HPSCI, ·1wssi.1n Aclfve Measut~ During the 2016 Election Campaign," May 23. 2017. 

7. HPSCi, .,,...I\Ussian Active Meawres Ounng the 20!6 Election Campaign;" Mav 2.3, 2017. 

8. HPSC!, &.ecutiVe Session fntetvie\'1 afJames Clapp,;r, July 17, 2017. 

9. HPSC!, Executive Session rnter\'iew cf James Clapper, Ju~'( 17, 2017. 

10. HPSCI, E.-.:ecutive Session Int~ ~ ... of Donald Trump,.:!,., Dec. 6, 2017. 

11. HPSCI, o:ecutlve: Session lnteIViE't/ of Michael uihen, Get. 24, 2017. 

li'~ HPSO, ~cutlve Session !ntenne,., of Michael Cohen, Oc.t.14, 2017. 

13. Morgan, lewis & Bockius UP, Letter fro m Sheri A. Dillor. ~mi Williom !'. Nelsof\ to President Don<1ld J. Trump. Mat. 8, 

2017. 

14. HJ>SO, fxecudlli? Ses1ion lnteNicwof !\•1!chael Cohen, Ocr. 24, 2017. 

15. H!7S.CT. Executive Se~sion lnte.-view cf Ike Kaveladze, lfov. 2, 2017. 

16. I-IPSO. Execudve Sessron ln!el'VH!w~f lite KaYel;;d:ze, l-lD'1. 2, 2017. 

!7. HPS.O, Executive Session lnter\'iewof Rob Goldstone Dec- 18, 2017. 

18.. HPSO, ExecuUYe Session Lnter>Aew cf Rab Goldstone. Dec. 18, 1017. 

1.9. HPSO, Executive Session lnter.iew of Rob Golc!stone, Oec.18, 2017; HPSCI, uecutw.: Session Interview of 1-1:lidiaef c~ 

hen, Oct. 24, ion. 

20. H·Psa, ~utive S:asslon lntennewof Ike Kavcf.idz11, Nov. 2, 2017. 

2..!.. HPSO. f:xecutive Session Interview of Rob GoJdsrone, Dec.18, 2.017. 

2)_ Twitrer.@re.al DonaJdr,ump, .fune 18, 2013, 8:17 PM. 

2.3. BPSO, W!uttve Session ln,e1viawcf Rob Goldstone,Dec.. 1S, 20!7. 

24. HPSO, EY.ecutfveSession lnter.Jiewof Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017. 

2.5. HPSO, b.;;cutive Ses~lon lnt~vaf Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017. 

26. HPSCJ, EY.ecutive Session lrm:rJiew of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017. 

27. H?sa, E.xecut:•1e Ses~lon lntecrviewof Keith Sdiiller, Nov. 7, 2017; HPSCI, £xe-cunve ~on Inte rview of Roll Go!dstone, 

Dec.18, 2017. 

2$. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

~2. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42.. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

so. 

51. 

52 

H!K...O, Executive Session lnt eiview of Rob Goldstone, Dcc. lS. 2017. 

HPSCJ, &.ecut1•1e Session Interview of Keith Schiller, Nov. 7, 2017. 

HPSO, becutive Sessicn ln~nf.e...,- af Y.eitk Schiller, Nc-1. 7, 2017. 

HPSO. Executive 5'>....ssion lnt2n-ie'.v o~ Rob Goldstone, Oec. !8, 2Cl17. 

HP5Cl, Executive Session ln~e-.v af Oonalc! Trump, 1r., De~ 6, 2017. 

!IPSO, &.ccucive Session lm:e.-vie-A' of Michaef Cohen, Oc-.. 24, 2017. 

HP50, o:ecutive Session Inti::\~ "' at Micbae! Cohen. Oct. 24, 2017. 

Hl'SCl, Execuctve ~e!.sian lnterv'~w of , Oec. 20, 2017. 

HPSO, E.'<eeutive Session lntenr.ew of Michael Cohi:m, oa. 24, 2017. 

HPSO. Executive S~~io!i lnteJ¥..ew of felix ~,er, Oec. 20, ::2017. 

Text ME:SSaee: Exchange SetWcen Mtch<!el Cohen anci ~ Satar, De-:. 29-31, 2015. [FSHR001!2.-30) 

.Email ftom f.elix Sater to Midael Colten, "fb1 :Puti11/T rump,~ No,,. 3, 2.01.5. [MOC-H-0©6921 

Email from Felix Sater to Mii:hael Coho!!n, "Re:Putin/Trump,• Nov. 3, 2015. [MO.C-H-O!ID592] 

HPSO, Executr,e Session lnterlievt of Dec. 20,·2.017. 

HPSO, E.xecutivo!! Session lntavlew of !)ec. 20, 2.017. 

I-IPSO, Executive Session ln,eiviewof ,Dec. 2.0, 2017. 

HPSO, &acutive S~sion lntan,iewofMichael Cohen, Cd. 24, 2017. 

HPSCI, aecume Session lmsvlewof Mlchael Cohen, Oct. 24, l.017 . 

Text M=age E."<diange Betw;....cn M~el Cohen ,md f~ Sater,~. 3G-31, 2015. [fSHR00112-30] 1-l?SO, ~~u.ti•1e 

Session !nte!"Vlew of Felix Saer, De-.;. 20, 20!7. 

Text M=ge from F~lix Sater to Mi;:;hael Cohen, Oec. ~ . 2015. [FSHR00ll4·7.5J 

Text Messaee from Felix Sate:< wMicllael Cohen, Doc. 30, 20:15. [FSHR00125] 

€mall fea.m Michael Cahen to imo@p.;:,res..s.i;ov..n,, QTnm1p TcweHvlos~ow,» Jan.14, 2016. {MC:H:-t-'r-0005!:-J} 

Email from Michael Cohen to lnfo@prpre.ss.gov.t1.1. "Trump Tcwar-Moscow," Jan. 14, 2016. {MtlC-H-OIX\f.Su] 

Err.all frcm Mkhae\ Cohen to info@p,press.i::ov.ru, 'Tn...'ITip Taw-er·Mo5cow," .lan.14, 2.016. (MDC·H·000690J 

HIX.1J. Executive Session I ntcN'.e.'./ of felix Sater, De~ .20, 2017. 

PROPERTY Or THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 91 
53. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, 

Oct. 24, 2017. . 

54. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

55. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017. 

56. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017. 

57. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

58. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

59. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

60. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

61. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

62. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

63. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

64. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

65. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

66. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

67. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Letter from Sheri A. Dillon and William F. Nelson to President Donald J. Trump, Mar. 8, 

2017. 

68. 

69. 

70. 

71. 

72. 

73. 

74. 

75. 

76. 

77. 

78. 

79. 

80. 

81. 

82. 

83. 

84. 

85. 

86. 

87. 

88. 

89. 

90. 

91. 

92. 

93. 

94. 

95. 

96. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

Eliot Cohen, Bryan McGrath, et al., "Open Letter On Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders," War an the 

Racks, Mar. 2, 2016. 

Daniel W. Drezner, "Why can't Donald Trump close the deal with any foreign policy advisers?," Washington Post, Mar. 9, 

2016. 

Missy Ryan and Steven Mufson, "One ofTrump's foreign policy advisers is a 2009 college grad who lists Model UN as a 

credential," Washington Post, Mar. 22, 2016. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Walid Phares, Dec. 8, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2, 2017. 

HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Dec. S, 2017; - RNC National Security/ Military 

Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated. [DENMAN 000012] 

- RNC National Security/MIiitary Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated. 

000012] 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018. 

U.S. v. Paul J. M anafort, Jr., and Richard W. Gates Ill, "Superseding Indictment" (1:18-cr-83, Eastern District o f Virginia), 

Feb. 22, 2018. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018; Alexander Burns and Maggie Haberman, 

"Donald Trump Hires Paul Manafort to Lead Delegate Effort," The New York Times, Mar. 28, 2016. · 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope 

Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 

Andrew E. Kramer, Mike McIntire, and Barry Meier; "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Cam paign 

Chief," The New Yark Times, Aug. 14, 2016; Jeff Horowitz and Chad Day, "Trump advisers waged covert influence campaign," Associated Press, Aug. 19, 2016. · 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. 

Email from Paul Manafort to , "Arming Ukraine," July 30, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-07-30- Arming 

Ukraine] 

Email from 

Memorandum from 

to Brian Jack, "Fwd: ukraine," Aug. 1, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-08--01- Fwd: ukraine]; 

, "GOP Platform: National Security, Ukraine Amendment-Sequence of Events,'' Au g. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

92 
1, 2016. [Ses:sivns production: 2016-08--01-fw-d: Ukraine-ATIACHMEIIT MEi>.50-Ul:raine Arnendme::tt (l}.pdf] 

97. M emo from J.D. Gordon,. ''GOP Pl~tfo,m: National ~rlty, Ur.r<ll ne Ame:~dment-Sc:quimce of Events,"' Aug. 1, 2016. 

[DJTF1'00004693] !:ma:i from John Hemen--.·,,ay roJatre\• 0 . Gordon, "Ukrair:,e-~llised F(lfl'l't~t,M Aug_ l, 2016. 

[DJTFl'OOD04692-93J 

98. HPSCI, Testimony of Car.er Page, Nov. 2, 2017. 

99. DH.S and OOtJI, Jo;n r Src.tement from the Dep!1!!.-nen, of f/t1me/01i d Sew.'TI'f mid Office of the DI re aor af Notionai lntr:lligence on Eleetii:m .Security, t::tto.;;:/ /yjww.drn.. ;zm·fns~·:s i20i~/lQ/Q7 /joint::StiiRrae:rt-4l eo;;rtm-ent-homei::o~~a •rip.,-andcff:,ce- director-nation::l, Oct. 7, 20.16. · 

100. HPSCl, Executive S=ion Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

lOL H?SCJ, Executive SBsron Interview of Jeffersan !l. S.."'55ion~. Nov. 30, 2017. 

!.02.. Hf'SCl, Executive Session lntervf= of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 

103. Mark Hencn, "'Trnmp; 'llOlle Wifdl.eak;.'" Tr.e Hili, Oct.10, 2016. 

1.04. Ashl;iy Parkru- anc Da-.-id E. Sanger, "Dena.Id Trump Calls on Russia to Find ..!illary CEnton'.s Messing E~ils; The 1V2·;>/ York 

Time5, July 27, 2016. 

105. HPSG, Execut:iye S~:on lnteN~v,' of Matlh£!w F. Tait, 0 Li. 6, 2017. 

106. HPSCI, Ei,;ec1:ti" e ScS>ion Interview of Hope Hid:s., f€!:J. 'l7, 2018; HPSCI, Ex=Jti>.,e Session Interview of Dorn,1Jd Trump, Jr., 

Dec. 6, 2017; H~Cf. Execudve '.!<?S$IC.1 rntel"..ri!lwof letf~rson 8. Session~, Nov. 30, 1017. 

107. CIA, "Director Pompeo De!i•,ers Rem~rks ct CSIS,' hrt.::d/www.oa.gnv/~w:;;4lfo;m;;t;onhp;;edies-1esrmonvn 0l ,-

saceches·te;timonv/c.omoco-<leilvers·r~mzrks-at-csis/htn1I, Apr. 13, 2017. 

108. U.S. v. George Papadcpoulos. "Stcternent of ihe Offc...nse" (1:17-cr-182, Oistr:ctof C!!lum!iia), Oct. 5, 20l7. 

109. f m.iil from Michael ffyim to - July 15, 2016. (Fl YNN HPSCI 00002980-8:!j. 

110. Manu Raju a nd Jerer.r, Herb, ME:mall poln~ 1rump .:ampaign to Wikile.t.l:s dactJ~nts," CNN, Oec. S, 2-017. 

ill. h.'!:>SCI, Eicec mve Se~o.~ I rview of Donald Tn..'llliJ, Jr., Dec. G, 20i 7. 

112. Em aU from ~o Donald J. Trump, e:t2!., ''Trump : AnotllerWll:il..eaks DNC Upload,N Sept.14, 2.016. 

[TIWMP_ORG 

113. Email from o IJooald J. Trump, et al., "Trump: Another \'!ikileaks DNC Uploa d." Se;,t. 14, 2016. 

[TRUMP _ORG_ l3_0...fit,Q1] 

114. O!ive r D~rcy, aCNN corrects story on email w Trumps about W1kilea~.s.N CNN, De<. 8, 2017. 

115. HPSCI; Execufa·e Sess!ot1 fn~n1iew of Dona!d T rnrnp, ;,., D~c. 6, 2D17. 

116. HFSCI, Executive Ses:slan ln~entiew of Donald Trurni;, ir., Dec. 6, 2017. 

117. H?-SC!, E~ecutive Session !nteNiew of Donald Trurnp,ir .• Dec. 6.2017. . 

ill. Direct Message from l.'Tii.'.ileaks to Donald Trump 1f., Sept. 20, 1016, 11:59 PM; Direct Message from Dcn?ld Trump Jr. to 

Wckileaks, Sept. 21, 2016, l l:50 AM; Direct Messar;e from Wikileaks to Do.,a!dTrump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM; Direct 

Mes.sage from Do9ald Trump Jr. to Wikileaks, Oct. 3, 20l6, 3 :0! PM.; O:rei:tMessagc from Donald Trump Jr. to Wik-· 

il£aks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. [Dm R01265-65.j 

1.19. Ok ed Message from V.'ikil.eaks to Donald Tromp Jr., Sept. 2.0, 2016, 11:59 i'M; Oilcct Me ssage from 'Niki!.cal-s to Ooneltl 

Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM. 

12<}. HFSCI, Executi~·e S~on lnh!r,ie:w of Donald Trump, Jr., Oec. 6, 2017, p. 101. 

:l2'i. Direct Message from l!J'ib1.eaks to Oonald Trump fr., Sept. 20, 2016, 11:59 PM. [OITJR01265] 

122. Direct Message from Dooald Trump Ir. to INikileaks.. 5'.!pt. 21, 2016, 11:50 AM .. [DJTJR0126~j 

i23_ KPSCJ, Executive Ses,ii!)n lntenliew of Dona!c Trump, Jr., Dec-. 6, 20l'l'. 

1£4. Email from Conald Trump Jr. to Keflyanne Conw.1y, ct al., "Wil<i!!!aks," Sept. 21, 2016. [TRUMPORG_11_0000007J 

125. Email horn Dona ld Trump Jr. to Ke:llyannc: Conway, et al., ~Wikl!eaks," Sefrt. 21, 20l6, [TRUMPORG_l i_OOC'(JOO?j 

126. !-;?SCI, Executive Ss5i:>n tnterliew of Hope Hlcks, ~. 27, 2018. 

127. Direct Me!>sage from 't .ftkileak.s to Donald Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2016, l:25 P~- {OJTJR D1265-66J 

128. Direct Mern,ga.frvm C-or.ald Trump Jr. to \Vikit.eaks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:01 PM. !OJTJR01266] 

H 9. Dr:ect M~ssage from Donaid -Trump Jr, to \"d'iidlea!::s, Ott. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. {DJTJR01266] 

13u. HPSCI, fxa:lltivc Session lnte.Niew of Donald irump,lt., Dec. 6, 2017. 

131. Direct Message from Wi'.~il.eaksto Donald Trump Jr., Oct.12,.20!6, 8:31 Al•t {DJTJRO:i267] 

132. Orrecr Message from w r,<lteai<s to Donald Trump J(., Oct. 21, 2Dl6, 9:46-9:5?AM. [OJTJRD1267-69] 

133. Direct Message from Wikil.eaks to Don;ild Trurr.p Jrv ,J,'.)v, 8, 2016, 6;35 FM. [D1TJROU6i:'-70] · 

134. Direct Message from Wi"ollleaks to D0n;1ld Trump 1rv Nov. 9, 2016, 12:49-12:51AM. !DJTJR01270] 

:135. Direct Mess2g12 from >M~ileaks lo Donald Trump k, 02c. 16, 2016, 12:38 i'M. [0JrJR01271] 

13ii. Di;-.;ct M~ssage from l;'.Jiklte.:ks to Don;1ld T;ump Jr.,.Apr. 26, 2017, 12:0 l AM. {DJTJR0!272J 

B7. Direct Message from \,V'oole.1ks to Donald Trump~., .lu:y 11, 2017; 9:2.9 A.I\~. {DJTJR0121S-74j 

~ HPSCJ, Exs!cul:i·,•e Sess,on lntet·.<i;;;w of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

i39. H!}5(l, Exectrtiye Session lntet'\'iew of Donald Trump, Jr .• Dec. 6, 2017. 

140. n1'5Ct faf!CUtive SeSQo:1 fn terviaw of Ale,ramle~ tux, tl,;c. 14, 20!7. 

PROPERTY OF THI:: U.S. HOUSF.. OF RF.PR...CSb""'ITA TIVES 93 
I'. - -·-- .,, 

?.41. fmail from Alexander NI.~ to F~:er Sciwn!lz.er, et al.. "ne: Rernernh-er m e? I h;1•1e ari idea !:O v/in; t.ug. 26, 2016. 

f(P.000C.'.l77] 

142. HPSCI, Eltec;:uthc.e Session Interview of Alexander Nr,;, !;;c. 14, 20,-7. 

143. HPSCl, EltecutiV-2 Se!>sio..-1 lnten:iew oi-Ale>:~nrlet Nil: Ci:c. 14, 2017. 

144. HPSCl, f~cuti,,e Sessicn Inte rview of ct. 24, 2017. 

1115 . ~.PSCI, E:oc1:cutvc: Session lntervt<:w cf Alex~nder Nb:, O~c. 1-4, 2017. 

146. ~iPSCI, E:tecuti~"e Sets1cm Interview cl A'e>!2rn:ler Nix, De.c. 14, 2017. 

147 .1-i."SCI, !::xecu~ Sei.s:on lntervi~w of Rci3er Stone, Sept. 26, 2017. 

148. HP$CI, l:xer;ut'...-~ Se!.Sicn Interview cf !!oiler ~ one, 5-ept. 26, 2017. 

149· . ..tP:SCl, ~cut',>,e Se55lon lnte.Niew o f Reger Stone,~pt. 25, 2.0l7. 

l~G. HPSO, Executive Session lnte-rview cf Roger Stone, S2pL 26, 2017. 

151. Kenn 11th P. Vogel. "'Under Mueller Sc:1 .. -tiny, Cemocrath; O<inot Tony Pc-desta Restf;FIS from Lobb')--:n~ Firm,= Thl! Ue.w York 

7imas, Oct. 30, 20l7; HPSCI, E:r..erunVc&:ssions lntet'#ie-,.v i;f :ohn ?Qd.,sta, fone 27, 2D17; U.S. v. Paul.J. Mc1nafor.. Jr., am: 

liicr.arci W. G3<CS Ill, '"1.1:dJctme:nt" (!:!7-cr-201, District of Columbla), Oct. 30, 2017 (descrihing role of "Ccmparrv A" and 

&CornpallY il·'}. 

152. HPSC!, l:r.:-cut=<,te Session !nte rview !lf Roger Stone, ~pt. 26, 2017. 

1.53. H?SC!, E.'<e cu I:!\'{: S~sion lntervi~w of !roger Stone, Sepi. 2 6, 2017. 

154. Letter ftam R~rt C. !wschel to The Honor .. ble K. Michael Coo3L'Ja"t/, "'Re; Follqv, Up to Appearanc.e of P.cger Stone on 

~p~eml;e-r 26, 2017, and Supp!em~l 10 May 9. 2017 ReQL:e.st to ~oduce {)('Cum:nts"' 04 1.3, Wi7. 

155. i-li'SG, Exe-cut'...-<? Se.s.sio.-. Interview of Roger ~ne, 5<?pt. 26, 2017. 

1SI>. Andrew Shike. ~~oger Stene, Tr.imp comldant, ackr.owledge:s 'in=ous' Twitter con•,er.;at:ion wi:th DNC hack~,,· 

Wo,hirrgmn Tur.es, C\far.10, 2Gl"/; Hl'SO, Eicecutiva S=lon !.,te,v:ew cf R.nger St00<:, Sei:;t. 26, 2017. 

157. Letter f:°<?m RO!!~rt C. Busche! to The Ho.,orat-!e K. ri.i"ocnael Coo,avr.,y "Ri!: Fcl!ow Ur, to A;i;,:ear.ir,,;;~ or Rogar Stfrne on 

·Sep,em!lE-r 26, 2il17, and Supp!ement to May 9, 2017 ReqUo..st to Pl"oduce Documents~ Oct. J.3, 2017. 

158. lette:- frcm Ro!:i-ert C. 6'..:schel to The Honor;;ble K. M"icr-aeJ Coo<1way"lle: rd low Up to ,!ip~atalla! of P..oger Stone on 

S3pternt.er 26. 2017, and Sup~~ment to May 9, 2017 Reque5c to Prod~ 0...""'Cu=r:o" Oct:. 13, 1vl7. 

159. 1-:PSCi, fo;;"tfrneny crf ov. 2, 20li. 

iGO . .-!?SCI, Exccuti1.'c Sc~s:Jc11 lnte!'.i ew ot Jl;ifre~ Gordan, Juh• 26, 2017. 

l6l. E'mail fmin Caner Page to Je!'f~ D. Gordon et 21., ·Re: Commencerrientfuidress, Oass of lOl&, rtew !;CDil()mic School 

{NES.}. Ju;y 7, 2016. i:OJlFP000038921 H?SCI, .uecui:Wi: 5es.srcn fr.te:view m' .Jeffrey Gotrlon, July 26, 2017. 

162. HPSO, Te~mo., 'f of-Nov. 2,. 1017. 

163. i-'.i'Su, &.ecum.'2 Session ir;ten..;ew o; .reffer:son B, SQ>ions, Nr;-v, 30, -!017. 

164. E.m;iil fr-0m Caner Pa~e to Jeff:"ev D. Gordon, Ter.:i Dal1I. and Walld Ph;ires, "Feedb-ad< from Rllssi::- Executive Surruna:y,: 

July 8, 2016. [DflFPOOC'<l4023-24] 

165. HPSCI, Testimany of Car.:er Page, Nc'V. 2, 2017; Jos.'I Rogi11, "Trumi::;'s Russia acMs~ speaks out e2lls =~tions 

'canmJetc gar~ge.''' Wo,h/ng!on Pasr. Sept. 26, 20!6. 

166. HPSO, Testima,ly of Car~r Pag~. Nov. 7~ 2017. 

167._HPSQ, RU$sla A..rtive Measur~ l.mest!gadon, /.1.ar. 20, 2017; HPSC!, Te.stimo:iy of Camu Page, NC'1. 2, 2017. 

_168. HPSO, ·Russia P.ctive Me,m.rres lnlle5tigation,M Mar. 20, 20.17. 

16~. HPSQ, Testimony O! Car.er Pase, Nov. 2, 2017;Josh Ragin, "frump's Rus.sia acMse.r speaks out, calls a cc~ations 

'wmp!et: g~ rh;:ge; 0 Wa..hi1Jgt1:1n Past. Sep. 25, 20:i.6. 

!."ID. P.PSCI, Testirr,o:r>' of Caner Page, Nov. 2, 2017. 

17'.l. Sha rOll larra nl€.re, Mark Mau£ttf, and Matt Apuz20, gi-low the Rus:sfa lnqu'u-y Beg,m: A Cam!)a ign Aide, Drinks a nd ialk of 

Pclltical Olrt,» V.!ashingtr:;n Post, Dec. 30, 2D17; Err.3i! frcm Jah11 tvlashburn to Rick Dearb:::rn and Jeffrey 0 . Gordon, »?.e: 

Tra'lel re:imburscerllent ~ceived emai1 from Michael G:aSSllcr],"" J1..r:i:e 24, W:iG. [ DJTFPD002i91<lJ 

172. E!nail from Gecrge Paμacopaulos ! t ai., ~Re: Meedng vilth Russian le.adershi]:o-induding 

Putin/' Ma~ !)JTfPOOOlOill-12] . 

!"!3. Email frornllllllllllll!lo Geotg~ Paparlnpm.:los ~t a l, "Re: ME-etlng with Russian ieadersl-tij)-lnduding Putin,· Mar. 24, 

2016. {DJTFPO,Jill.01B] 

1.74. Entail from Ge;:,1ge Pap.:dopo~'.os tc-t al. ~Re: M ~ting with Rcssian Rade~.shi;l-in.duding !'-Jtin,": ~-~ar. 24, 

2015. ~D:TfPG-J.OlOlilj 

l 75. HPSCJ. Executi.-:! Session Interview of JEffersc-11 5. Session~, Nov. 30, 20l 7. 

l"IG. HPSO, f;,:ecuti\.'e s~ssjon lntenr~w cf .leJfers1J11 B. Se£Ian>, ~~ov. 2tl, 2017. 

i77. HPSC, C!:CLJtive S~ssian lntentiew ;:,f Je.-'fers:;;n B. Sessions., Nov. :W,-Z0.17. 

17S. }-:il$CI, B,.;wti-.•e Session lritt"!f'Jt~W oi J«fersot1 B.. Ses$!oni, Nov . .JO. 2017. 

!79'. i-!PSCJ, Elrecutive Se~iM lnter..<ie•N o , DE-C. 8, 2017. 

!80. HPSCI, 5.ecutl\<.:! Session lnter.-iew of Jr., D.;c. 12, 2017. 

181. Sharon taFraniere, Mar'.: !J,a.rzctti, a nd Man Apuzzo. "1-f.owthe Russia !oqu[T'f .Sega11: A Camp;;ig11 Aide, Drinks an(! Ti!U: of 

PROPc:R1"Y OFTHE:: U.S. HO!ISE: OF' P.EFR!:S'"t::NTATIVES 94 
Political Dirt," Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session lnter•~iew of -ec. S, 2017, ,:ip. 79-

80; E1nall from Goarr,e Popadopoulos 101 l"Tr.:insltton," Nov. ll, 2.016 {"I made the lntroduct1oo between l~r 

Trump [a)l,d presitlcnt 5!sl bu5ed pr!morlly on the trvvt the ronior, h~i M rHY wo,'$: otc.") [DJTFP0002117Si1] 

182. Lou Dobbi, Interview with Oon,Jld Tr11rnp.Fc,x 811s,·11ess, Sept. 22, 2016. 

183. Email from Georse PijpijOOJ>OUlos to Paul ManijfOrt, "Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAT-HPSCl-0000025B] 

184. Email from George P;ipadopou1osto Paul Mar,afort. "Fwd,'' May. 21, 2016, [GAT-HPSC1·000002S8·SgJ 

l8S. E:m.:ill from Paul Manaiort t 'Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAHiPSC:1·00000:!SB) 

186. En,all frt>1'r1 P~ul MoMfort to 'lla:H M.i~·. 21, 2016: (GAT·MPSCl·OC0002SSJ 

167. Email from George Papadopou os o re Dtrnrbom, "Trtwel reimbursement {received emiill from Mld,~el Gl3s5ner)," 

June 24, 7.016 [OJTf P00022915-16} 

1SS. Email fro nd Jeffrey D. ~ordon, "r-WD: Tra'lel reimbursemem (received email from 

Michael Glassner)," June 24, 2016. [DJTFP00022915] 

189. Emilll from ind Jelfroy D. Gordon, NIie: Tr.wol reimbur~ormint {rc,1,1lvod urnnil fcom 

Michat!I C31.is~n,u)," JuM :.!4, 2016. [OJTFP00022~1S] 

190. Emallfronj o George Papadopoulos, "Re: Travel reimbursement (received email from Michael Glassner)," 

June 24, 2016. [DJTfP0002291BJ 

191. Email from~ Georgl! Papa<;lopoufos, "Re: Trave!I reimburS!!lll4'rlt (reci,iv!!d l!ffiail from Micha!!I Glasrnl!r)," 

June 24, 20~29181 

192. HPSCI, Executive Se~slori Interview of Rob Gold~tone, Dec. 18, 2017; Executive Session lritervlewof Donald Trnmp, Jr., 

Dec. 6, 2017, Email from to Rob Goldstone, "FW-Message-from '26-Cople r·E>:ec,'" Apr. 25, 2016 (p;;s5ing 

along haodwritten response from candidate Trump to email from Aras Agalarov) [RG000033i 

193. HPSCI, Erncutivl! S1,s,sion lnt!!rview of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017. 

194. HPSCI, E~etutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. G, 2017, 

l9~. rll'SCl, l!J<ocv ti•;<r ~stlon lnt"rvluw of Roll GoldslOnu, Due. 18, 2017. 

l96.'Emall 1rorralllllllllllao [REDACTED], 11~rom the otriceof DoMldJ. Trump,"' Mn.-, 18, 2016 (passing along hand· 

w ritten res~te Trump to typewritten note from Aras Agalarov) (DJTJR00408·09l; Email from Rhona 

Groff to Rob Goldstone, NFV1,i-Mesx1ge-from '26·Copler·E.:<e1:,"' Apr. 25, 2016 (po.ssing along handwritten re5ponse from 

p,ntiicfott: Tr\1mt1 to em.iii from AriJ$ Ag~laro11J [RG000033) 

197. Email irom Rob Gold~tono to DcrniJld Trurnp Jr.; ~Ro: no : Rus5ia - Clinton - prlv,1tc and crmAdemial," Ju ne 3, 2016. [DJTJR00464} . 

l'il8. Email from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Gold~tone, "Re: Russia - Ointon- private and confidential, 0 fone 3, 2016. 

[DJTJR00464J 

199. Em.ill from _Rob Gold1tone to Oon;Jfd Trunii, Jr., "Re: Russia - Clintorr - privati, and confidenti<JI," June 7, 2016. 

[OJTJR00467] 

200. l:mofl from Donofd Trump Jr to Rob Goldstone!, "Re: Russt.i -Cl Into~ - private and conft<fo11tfol," June 7, 2016. 

(DJTJR00469) 

201. HPSCI, l::xe!culivE! S-=5s1on lntervil!v,• of Ike l<aveladze, Nov. 2, 2017. 

202. HPSCI, E~ecutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dei;, 6, 2017. 

2.03. HPSCI, Excic1.1tive Se~5lo11 lntcr•,lcw of Dorinld Trnmp, ,Ir,, Ocr,. 6, 2017, 

204. HPSCI, ExuculiVI.! SC!~SIOrl lnl1Jr•Jl1Jw l)f Rab Goldslono, O~c. lR, 2017. 

20S. HPSCI, E~!!CLHiv~ Si,s.sion lntE!rvlew of Rinat Akhrlll!tshin, Nov. 13, 2017; HPSCI E:tecutive Se:;.slon Interview of Anatoli 

Samochornov. Nov. 28, 2017. · 

206. HPSCI, Executive Session lnter'lie•!v of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; Sharon la r-ranieri! and Andrew E. Kramer, "Talking 

Po!r,ts Brought to Trurnp Tower M(!1.t11,,g Wt!rn Shacl!d With l<r1irnlir)," Tl)(! Now Yorr. Times, Oct. 27, 2017. 8ns<.id on publie reporting. Vc~lolt~knyn prcvlomty shurcd n version c,f the memo or t alklni,: points with Yuri Chnll<a. 

207. HPSCI, h~cutive Stt5sion Interview of Ike Kavel.iclze, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, Executive 5e5sion Interview of Rlnat AkhmetstJjn, Nov.131 2017; HPSCI, E.xecutlve Ses~lon lntE!l''i'l!!W of Anatoll 5nmoehornov, Nov. 28, 2017. · 

208. HPSCJ, E.xecutive Session lntel'View of lke Kavl!Jadze, Nov. 2, 2017. 

209. HPSCI, Executive Ses~ion Jriterview of Oona Id Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

210, HPS<:I, l:1«m1t1vo Session lntel'1lcw of Analoli S3moc1X>rnov, Nov. 2~, 2017. 

21i. HPSCI, E:tl.!Cutive Session lnlel'1lew of Ike Kijveladze, l~ov. 2, 2017. 

212, HPSCf, Executive Se.5sion Jntel'V[e•.v of Ike Kavcladz!?, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, EKE!Cutive S!!!>Sion lnt1<r•Jiew of Donald Trump, 

Jr., Dec. 6, 2017; HPSCI, l:xecutive Session Interview of Anatoli Samochorno11, Nov. 2B, 2017; HPSCI, Exe~utive Session 

lnteiview of Rlnat Akhmetshin, Nov. 13, 2017; HPSCI, Ex!!C1,1!ive S,m ion lnl.l!rvi!!w of Rob Goldstor,11, OE!c.' 18, 2017 

213. HPSCI, E>:ccl11ive Sc~~lon Interview of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; lir-SCI, Execunvo Sa~lon lntorvl~w oi Oon~ld Tr-urn1l, 

Jr., Dr,c. 6, 2017; Hl'SCI, Executive 5cS$IOn Interview of Amrtoll S..~rnochornov, Nov. 28, 2017; HPSCI, Execl1tivc Session 

lnteN lew of J<1red Kushner, July 2S, 2017. 

214. HPSCJ, l:x!!cutfve Sesslon lntervl!!w of Rob Goldstor,..,, Dec.18, 2017. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES 95 
. ..., -,-,,, 

21S. HPSO, e")(ecutive Ses.slo1,.lr.te.n:few of Roh Goldstone, flec.18. 2017. 

216. Text r..,1es.sage Exchange Betv.een lar~ Kushne:-,;nd 1'4ul ;".1an.;;.furt, June 9, Wl5. (!'lHPSCTOOD0014Sj 

i17. 1-iPSO, E,cec utive S-essiol) lntr:tvlew of Jared Kushne.r, July 25, 2017. 

218. !IPSO, &.ec1Jtfve S£ss,on ln:enii-ew of Donald Trump,Jr., Oec. G, 2017. 

:?J.S'. HPSQ, E;icee:.itive Session lnt.etvl'i'!w of r.~e Kavaradze, ND'.'. 2, 2017. 

220. HPSCI, &.ecutive ~IM lnt= ..:Niew of L\:e l~vefadz.e, NQv. ?, 2017. 

221. Email from Ike Kavelaoze to A. Ka~!adte, llRe: how are yo:i=," June 14, Z016. [K:C-i<AV _00-0201 

222. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o{ Ro h Goldstone, Dec. la, 2017. 

223. HPSCI, Executive Se:sr~n tn~ew of Stephen &mncm, Ja:t. 26, 2 018. 

224. Ryan Teague Beckwith, ~Read Dona ld Trump's Suhdued Victory Speech After \\finning Ne.w J2rsey,r. TIM£, !1;ne S, 2017; 

CITl3il from Donald Trump l r to R!>l:t.Goklsto1,e, ~"Re: Rll:iSia- 0 1 nton - pr,vate :mtl CCl'\fidential, ~ Ju:ie 7, 2016. 

[DJTJR0'14S9J. 

225. HP.SCI, Executive Session lotcn<iew of Hope ~jicks, f-eb. 27. 2.018~ "full ;:rariscri;n: O=!d Trump NYC.speech on stakes ~f 

.he election," POUTlCO, June 12. 2018. 

225. lJRA, " 2016 NRA Ann\Jo l Meetings &Exhibits Fvll .EventSv..:oule." httos://v,•ww.-uaam.cn/rricdia{l641/dalJ·.r-e,eflts,hedule.odf. undated. 

227. HPSC:!, Execlltive Se.ssio~onold Trump, Jr., Cec. 6, 20l7. 

228. email fm-m o --'Russian b-;;;ckc!oor overture and dinner inwre;" May 16, ].016.(Sessior.s pt"Qduc-

.ion: 2016~ l}~r overture and dinn:r imite (35)] 

229. ~al fro~ o ....... "Russlan hackdoorovertureanci dinnerrn#te,• Ma)· 16, 2016. !Sessions iuoduc-

.icn: 201~ Ru~!.!an bacl'<door overtura .md dfrut.2r inYlte (:!6)] 

23;1: Email fro~~0Russion b.ad:.door G',-erture and dinn.er irr,m,• May 16, 2016_ [sP..ssi= production: :m.!.6-05-16--Re ~ r Olferrure and diMQf ln·~ltc (3.6)! 

231. i:maif from~ Paul Manafort, et ~I., Rf'.\lrl; Russian backdror 01.reo~-re an.I di11ner invite/ May 17, 2016. 

[Se~io.;, production: 2016-uS-l.7--twd Russian b~:doot o\·ertute and dlnr,er invite (28)] 

232. Email from Jared Kirshner ~ "Re: Russian b.;;d:door avei:ture ar;d dinner mvi~e, u f\•lay 17, 2016. 

iRGOQOW:11 

233. ·EmaH!ro~ o - Ra: KY R~uecst, ~ M~y 18, 2016. [Scs.slcm ?roducticn: 2015-05:18-~ KY Re-

{llleslJ 

-n. 17, 2018. 

"Kr2mtin u;.-mEction;• May 10, 2016. [RD 000.078] 

236. Email from '·'Kremfin Ccnnection,~ May 10, 2015. 1RD000078] 

237. Email rrom "Krem!in~n..-wction;'' May 10, 2016. [RD000078] 

238. ~au fro:n "Kremfin Conneaion," Ma•/ 10, 2015. (RD OW078] 

239. HPSQ, c.""<ecutive S<!Ss.fon lntetvi':.•,v o~ Nm·. 30, 2017. 

240. HPSCI, £:c~tSve Sassion lntel'.r.e·,v ~ ao. 17, 2018. 

241. H?SQ, Exe-cutive Session lnter.icw of Oona Id Trump, Jr., Oec. 61 2017. 

242. iiPSCI. &e,1Jti•,e So...,,fon lnte.rview of Donald Trump, Jr., o~ 6, 2017. 

243. HPSCI, Exec-.itive Session lnre.-view of Donald Trump, J_r,, Oec. 6, 2017. 

244. HPSCI, E.xecutwe S5.>Ssion int:2rvr'2w of Donald Trump, Jr., occi 6, 2017. 

24S. HPSCI, a.~utiYe Sessi on lntciview of Jefferson B. SBslOlli. Nov.30.2017. 

246. h"P50, executive Sess1on lnt.:n.·i:w of Jared Kllshner, J:ity 25, 2017. 

247. HPSCI, EY.ecuHve SP..5$ion Interview of Jarad Kushner, Ju~· 25, 2017. 

248. HPSO, i:xe.:utive Session lnte'"'oliew of Jefferson B. Y-"-.$Sicns, Nov. 30, 2.017. 

249. HPSCJ, &.erutive Y..5.Sion !nte.-view of Jeffecson B. S2S...eu>rts, Nov. 30 :io11. 

250. F~e!1il Election Commission, "HiUart for America Disbursan<!nts t~om 2.0!5-2016, w.,w,.fui'...§0'."; ·JBS 

Sthedule," July 16, 2016. i201 6-07-!6-Unlitled (15}- ATIACHMEN~ ~nSchedulewith Drop By (Saessior.s 

Prod uctlon)) 

251. ·JBSSdledule," Jul,; lti, 2016.. (~ssJons Production: 2016-07-16--Uotitled (15)-ATIACH~~eNT JBS Conventbn Sc.h-edulc 

"'ith Orop Byi 

252. HPSCJ, Executive Session lnte;.,i !:111 of Jeffrey Gorcon, July 26, 2017; Courtney Omi>;.. DU5. Senator 8!)b Cor!:er S;:i-eaks at 

Global Cleveland's Global Parmers in Oiplomacv Event." Grc,!Jalclevefa r.d.org, Jan. 31, 2017. 

253. 0!6S Schaoule," Juty 16, 2016. [Sessions Production: 20!6-07-16-Untitled ( 15)-ATiACH~..ENT JBS Ccnve-nl!on Sdiedulc 

·,•mh Drop B~·} 

23ol. HPSCI, Exerutive Sasslon ln!~ -,.-,,;w of Jeffer,;on. l:L Sessions, l'Jov. 30, 2017, p. S6 i~l met '>'ilth him, as i recall. twice. rnere 

w-i!S an ~cOLJn1er af.er I m;eccie a sp~ech at the Repubt~n Conventfon. .1 didn't-d":d.n't know he W2S golr.g to be ;;1ere. 

~kE to .i nulll ber of ;;.mba»a<lors and other peep!~ and was standing in front en the poclum and h~ and l cilatted a :)~ dlPR.CFEJHY OF THE U.S. HCl.t"SE OF REPRESEtJTATNcS 96 
255. HP50. ExeC\JtiveSes io11 lrr.enri voi Jeffrey Gordon.July :25, 2DJ7 .. 

255. H?SO, T2:stimony of Nov. 2, 2017. 

257. "JBS Schedule," July 16, 20iQ.. Sessi-ons Produaion: 2•Jla-07-15-Untitled (15)----ATTACHMENT JBS Conyen t;i;m Sdtaiule 

\\rtth Drop Byl calendar ir"w it~ · Meeting with Russl~n Ambas.sado, Kislyak;" $£pt. s. 2016. [2016-09-0!!-."ieEtlng wlth 

Russran AmbasEdc,r Kisl-,.ak] 

2.58. Senator Sessions' Staff Noto, iID.ssian Ambassador," 5....~. 8, 2016 (Sessiom Suμpleniernal Protfuctiol\]; Caler,dar flwite, 

«Meethg with Russian Ami:ass.,d.-;il iGsh•ak," Sept, 8, l016. [Ses.sii;;ns prO<;luciion: 201G-09-08- Me.,ting with Rllssicn 

Ambas.sador Kistvakl, 

25S. H?SO, loXecutive Session ln~-viewof J2ffetson B. Se.s.sic-.-.s, Nov. 30, 2017. 

260. H?SO, Executive Session rntervie•Nof Jared Kusliner, Ju~ 25, 2017. 

26L HPSO, £,cecutive Ses.s ion lnt!!r.iew of Jared Kushni!r, JL:t-; 25, 2017. 

262.. HP5Cl. Executive Session lnten'iEv1 of Jared Kushner, ! u.'y ~5, 2017. 

263. HPSO, 'Executive Session lr.renliew of Jared Kushner, July 25, 20l 7. 

2.64. HPSO, Executi'Je S1a?Sslon lnteNlew of Nov. 30, 2017. 

265. HFSO, 81:ecutive Session lr.tcr.iiew of t\10'1. 30, 2017. 

265. HP5Q, Executive s~ssfon lnt~rvlew of Nov. 30, 2017. 

267. I-IPSO, firecutive Session lnt-cl\.-ie'o of Nov. 30, 2017. 

268. HPSCI, E>:.ecuti'le Session lnreNiewof Nov. 30, 2017. 

269. HPSO, ExE,cutive Sessiori l~ewof Jared Kushner, July 25, 20!7. 

270. HPSO, T~-timony of l:.rik P(inc;'!, N!?~. 30 2017. 

271. HPSO, Executive Sesslori ln!c1viewo. 

272. 1-lPSCI, Execuw,e Session tm.,vie,•ro, 

273. HPSO. Executive Sesslori ln~rvie1u o 

274. HPSO. Ex~cuti1Je Session lnta"~ , 

Jo,.,_ 14, 2.017. 

Jvv.14, W17. 

'ov.14, 2017. 

l.:n. 14, 2017. 

275. HPSG, Executive Se.sslon lntel'llie>N o , 1c-\.'. 14, 2.0.17. 

2.76. HPSCl, Executive Ses~ion lnterv',ew of .lake Sut!ivan, Dec. 21, 2017~ntral rot1:: In the dossfer was first re-.-ealed in a 

pros a rticle. Adam Entous. D.:~lil Barrett, and Rosalind S. Helderman, NCllnton camp;;ign, DrK paid for re.seorm tf-..;it led 

to RU£Sia dossier.~ Woshll,gton Po:;;t, Oct. 2.4, 2017. Pn o;-to its pub!i.c.itk;n, £rras elected to reprcsent thre2 witn~es -

induc1ne form2r Clil\ton campaign ,chairman 1ohl) Podesta-before, the Committee In CO!ll'H!ction with this im'!!.;tiiration. 

HPSO, :.,te~t!= Se~lon lrl!e.....;ew of John Pooeste, Jur.e 27, 20l7; HPSCf, Exea.,.iv<,S2Ssro11 lnte rvili!w ofAug. JD, 2017; HPS01 Execi.lti\R ~ sion lnterv~w ofYarlHi Tamene Wolcle-Yohann~. Aug. 30, 2017. Th.a!: decision was 

q~onable, since Eli,1~ was h.imselfin possession of facts relevant to. the Commitice's inve.tig.ation. HPSCI, ~ecutive 

Sessl:m Interview of Marc Ellas. Dec.. 13 2017. 

277. HPSO, Executr,e Session lnteiview , 

278. liPSO, Executive Session Interview or 

sJ'jr~ !'.ov. 13; Jcel Schectman and Na 

279. HPSO, Executive S~ssio n Interview 

280. HPSCI, &:ecutive Session lntcl"\/i~w o 

shin, r;cv. 13, 2017. 

2.81. H?SO, Executive Sessiol\ lm:l!!Me-.•1 of 

282. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 

shin, Nov. 131 2.017; HPSCI, mcutive 

2.83. HPSQ, Exect.'tive Ses~ion lnteNiew of 

284. HPill, fxecuti11e 5.!ssion lnter ... 1&,,.1 of 

285. HPSCl, ~tive Session ,mervrew or 

2.86. HPSO, ~ii-cutive Sesslon tnt&"'l.oie•,.,- cl 

2fi7. fece-ral Election Commissloa, "'Hillary ·o 

H!X..CJ, El(ecuti',e Session irrtaview of 

288. HPSCI, &.a:cutive Session lm;,rvie-.-1 cf 

289. HPSCl, Executive Session ln.t.En.1ew 

2SO. HPSO, =x;Cuti'I~ Session lrrterview o: 

291. HPSCI, Execvtive Se.ssion trtteNiew of 

2S2. HPSO, ExecutiVeSllssiOll l~ nria:wof 

293. HPSQ, Executive Session lrlEMewaf 

294. HPSO. ~ cutiue S~ssion lcrtentmw ., 

295. H?Sa, E.'Cecutive Session lritetvlew 

29'5. Miitth-ew Continetti and Midtoel Go! 

27,2017. 

4ov. 14, 2017. 

lo-1. 14, 2017: HPSCI, £.xewtive Session Interview crf ffinat Akmet· 

" .S. sattles Russian money laundanng case," Reuters, May 13, 2017. 

tlov. 14, 2017. 

Nov. i4, 2017; HPSCI, E.xecuti...-~ Session lntel\llew o; Rit\at AI<metlov.14, 2017. 

~0'~.14, 2017; HPSCI, Exerotive Session l11terview of Rin.,""t Akhmet-

,, oflke Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017. 

1

/;l'J . 14, 2017. 

c Dlshurs-=ments to P.erklns Cole from 2D15 to 2016", •M·.,.-J.!e<.:;:o,·; 

e-c. 13, 2017. 

ec. 13, 2017. 

11,t:.13, 1017. 

ec. 13, 2017. 

~c..13, 2017. 

et. E , 2017. 

c. !3. 2017. 

13 2017. 

ec.12, 2017. 

l':i and the Washington f ree Beacon.'' Washington Fri!e Beacon, Oct. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATil/"ES 97 
297. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 

298. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 

299. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 

300. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov. 14, 2017. 

301. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of-ec. 13, 2017. 

302. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of . Nov. 14, 2017; Mark Hosenball, "Ex-British spy $168,000 for Trump 

dossier, U.S. firm discloses," Reuters, Nov.1, 2017. 

303. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o-Nov. 14, 2017. 

304. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o . Nov. 14, 2017. 

305. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of ec. 13, 2017. 

306. Guba rev et al. v. Orbis et al., Defense, (Claim No. HQ17D0413, Queen's Bench Division), Apr. 3, 2017. 

307. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov.14, 2017 (stating that, as a known ''former undercover British 

Intelligence officer who worked In Moscow," Steele would not have been able to travel to Russia safely). 

308. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov. 14, 2017. 

309. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 

10, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer," Dec. 19, 2017. 

310. ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities In Recent U.S. Elections, Jan. 6, 2017. 

311. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Dec. 13, 2017. 

312. letter from Robert M. Weinberg to K. Michael Conaway and Adam Schiff, Aug. 21, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Glenn Simpson, Nov. 14, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer, Dec. 19, 2017. The Committee issued a subpoena to Kramer, but Kramer still refused to Identify Steele's sources. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer, Jan. 10, 2018; letter from Lawrence S. Robbins to Representative Devin Nunes and Representative Adam Schiff, "Re: December 27, 2017, Subpoena Issued to David Kramer," Jan. 10, 2018. 

313. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Glenn Simpson," Nov. 14, 2017. 

314. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 

315. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 

316. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 

317. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 

318. Email for Katherine Ruemmler to HPSCI Staff, "RE: Production," Jan. 24, 2018. 

319. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec. 21, 2017. 

320. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec. 

21, 2017; Jennifer Palmieri, "The Clinton campaign warned you about Russia. But nobody listened to us," Washington 

Past, Mar. 24, 2017. 

I • •....., • ....., • ,, 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 98 
(U) Chapter 5 - lnteUigence Communfty Assessment Leaks 

l(ey Question 114: What possible leaks of cfas!;if/ed ;nformation took place re/c1ted to the Intelligence Community's assessment of these matters? 

(U) Leaks of classified information are 

criminal acts, and have the potential to 

damage U.S. national security interests, at 

horne and abroad.1 Even more concerning 

is that the lives of IC employees or assets 

may be placed in danger due to unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 

Finally, when leaks of classified information 

come from congressional sources, such 

leaks jeopardize the effective oversight role 

Congress plays over the IC. Therefore, as 

part of the Committee's Investigation, the 

Committee reviewed lenl<s related to the 

classified ICA on the Russli!n active 

measures campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. 

presidential election, focusing primarily on 

leaks that occurred between the IC's establishment of the CIA Director's. fusion cell I 

and the publication of the JCA 

in January 2017. 

{U) On January 6, 2017, the DNI released the unclassified ICA. The ICA states 

that Russia conducted lts active measures 

campaign for the dual purposes of (1) sow· 

ing discord in and undermining the U.S. 

presldential election process, and (2} helping elect Donald J. Trump by denigrating 

Secretuy Hillary Clinton.' Unfortunately, 

the publfc release of the unclassified version 

of the ICA was not the first time that the 

public had seen the IC's various assessments 

re lated to the Russian aclive measures campaign. Although outside the scope of this 

chapter, leaks related to the Russian active 

measures were already happening in 2.015 

and 2016. For example, there were press 

reports regarding the hack of the DNC, as 

well as the potential hacks of pro-Trump 

and Republican groups.~ Du ring this time, 

the Committee carried out a healthy dialogue, whlch included briefings, with the IC 

related to these matters as part of its oversight responsibilities.~ 

{U} In addition, this chapter covers 

leaks of information about IC assessments 

that were likely classified at the time this 

Information found its w ay into the press, 

espedally In light of the fact that the reaks 

reportedly came from government sources. 

This chapter does not make any determination as to the accuracy or analytic integrity 

of the information leaked to the press and 

· subsequently produced in the ICA. 

(U} Finding #4-0: Leaks of classified information regarding Russian intentions to sow 

discord in the U.S. presidential election be~ 

gan prior to the election day-November 8, 

2016. 

(U} The leaks related to Ru ssian intentions to sow discord in the U.S. presidential 

election took place prior to the November 8, 

2016 election, and notably, after the IC's 

establishment of the fusion cellPROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

99 
Almost a week 

later on October 7, 2016, the U.S. government formally accused Russia of hacking 

politi~I institutions, but did not attribute a 

specific hack to the Russians.11 

(U) At the time of these lea ks, the information contained within them was still classified. These leaks of classified information 

endangered U.S. national security by revealing key information about U.S. Intelligence 

capabilities to its adversaries, including assessmen~s on adversary intentions. The 

Committee finds the timing of these leaks 

particularly concerning. These leaks happened during the early stages of the iC' s ongoing assessm~nt of Russian active 

measures, thus permitting adversaries to 

not only potentially di scover U.S. intelligence capabilities, but also provided adverPRO?ER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

100 
saries, including the Russians, the opportunity to thwart or manipulate the IC's ongoing assessment. 

(U} Finding #41: Leaks of classified information alleging Russian intentions to help 

elect candidate Trump increased dramaticaUy after the election day-November 81 

2016. 

- r -. - , .. __ 

5, 2016, the administration had not 

acknowledged any attempt by Moscow to 

influence the election in favor of candidate 

Trump. 

('I'S/NF) ~ However, four days later on December 9, Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and 

Greg MIiier of The Washington Post reported that the CIA concluded a new assessment that Russia intervened in the 2016 

U.S. presidential election to help candidate 

Trump wrn the presidency, rather than for 

the sole purpose of undermining confidence 

in the U.S. electoral system. 16 

PROPsr.-Y or: THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

101 
UNCLASSIFIED 

SECRET CIA ASSESSMENT SAYS 

RUSSIA WAS TRYING TO HELP 

TRUMP WIN WHITE HOUSE 

~ r;;,. ":J .... :!'lc~""('~ ~~.,...,~~ ~~~ *4,,,;!Jl.a 

UNCLASSIFIED 

~ 

(C/NF) (U) ln addition, on December 10, 2016, 

fahn Walcott of Reuters reported that a U.S. 

official familiar with the !C's findings stated 

_that as the 2016 U.S. pres[dential campaign 

progressed, Russian government officials 

devoted increasing attention to assisting 

candidate Trump's efforts to win the eiection.21 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTAilVl:S 102 
TOP SECRET/ 

·-

-

TOP SECRET/ 

NOFORNNO~OR~ 

FRO?ERTY OF TtlE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

103 
(U) It is irnporta1:it to note that Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein of CNN reported on January 12, 2016, 

that President-elect Trump was briefed on 

classified information indicating that the 

Russians have compromising personal or 

financial information that the Russians 

could use against President-elect Trump.39 

The Committee's investigation revealed that 

President-elect Trump was indeed briefed 

on the contents of the Steele dossier and 

when questioned by the Committee, former 

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper admitted that he confirmed the exFstence of the dossier to the media . .:o 

(TS/NF) ·-(1:f; In reviewing the various lea!<s both 

before and after November 8, 2016, a trend 

becomes e'~ident-prior to the election, 

teaks of potentially classified information 

focused on Russia's attempts to sow discord 

with the U.S. presidential e~ection. -

(U} Finding #42: The leaks prior to the classified Intelligence Community Assessment's publication, particularly leaks otcurring after the U.S. presidential election, 

correlate to specific language found in the 

Intelligence Community Assessment.. 

(U} During this review, the Committee 

found that leaks of potentially classified information permeated thro.ughout t he media 

both before and after the November 8, 

2016, U.S. presidential election. -

PROPERr { OF rnE U.S. HOUSE OF RtP.RESENTATiVES 

104 
-a 

;u 

0 

~ 0 

.,, 

:i! 

(ti 

f:= 

~ 

::i: 

0 

Wi 

a 

il 

~ i{l 

en 

m 

~ :::l 

(J) 

~ 

I. JP 11,-.~ -· ---:-- ... , . . ' .. . - .. •. - ~ ~!'"-...'\ 

lro@~tillfl1:mtfutn1Ll©1:fl:&~.wll:r£r.il ~Mt~ 

.d 

Artide I Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA Final ICA Findings ~----~---···-~ 

"Secret CrA ;issessmrmt says Russia was trying to : "The CIA has concluded In s secret assessment that 

help Trump win White House" i Russia intervened in the 2016 election to help Don-. 

Pase 1; "We further asses~ Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for Preslclent-Elect 

• Date: Doccmbor 9, 20l6 

• Outlet: me Washington Post 

1 aid ~romp win thl? 11residcncy, rot her th.in Just to Trump." 

I undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system, l according to officl.lls brkifed on the mmer." 

I . -·· - - --- ---, -------··-----·--- ·:·it Is Lhe a5sessmcnt.or the Intelligence community ,· &>age 1: "Nonetheless, Putin publicly lndlct1ted "preference 

that RllSSla's BO.ii hero was to fnvor one ,::nndldate for Presfdent-cJoct Trump's stated poJJcy to work with Rusover the other, to help l'rump get elected,' sald a ' . senior U.S. ofllclal briefed on an intelll{lence presentation m;ide to U.S. senators. 'That's the con~ensus 

view.'" 

$ia, and pro-r<remlin figures spolcc highly about what they 

I

. saw as his Russici-frlendly positions on Syria and Ukraine. 

Putin publicly concrrssted tfle Presldent-eJect's r,pproac{110 

; Russia with Secretory Clinton's 'aggres~lve rhetoric."' 

l 

--- I . ''Ru~sian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in 1:lection. , '"We now· have hi~h con Viuence .that they hacked the I P.ige 3: "Russia collected on some Republlcar,-afflllated 

U .S, S ilYS~ ; D. N .C. and the R.N.C., and conspicuously released no : taq~ets but did not conduct o comparable disclosure cam• 

• Date: Dewmber 9, 2016 ' documents' from the Repubf/can organfzation, one I pa/gn." 

• Outlet: The New York Times senior administrc,tion officiitl said, referring to the 

Russi;ins." 

;-,r 'A.P.'r. 28,' Is believed to have created two outletr. on rhe internet, Guccirer 2.0 orad 

DCLcaks. to make Democratic documents public. 

Page 2: "We <"lSsess with high confidence thanh 

DCLuaks.com, and WJIOLl:a 

~ I I J P I I t£1 lried lr1 cyber operotf ons public· 

! ly and in exclusives to medi,i outlets. 

Many of th!:! documents w~re also provlcJud to Wik· 1 

lleal~s, which releasecl them over many weeks be· 

, fore the Nov. 8 election." 

I 
.J 

:t, 

~ 

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,, 

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!= 

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•-.f i t .'f.» ....- Pi . 4111!> .:p~! -~ ·v .. ;T;\--vll ~ -- ,,r.:· .. -· - , -- . - ~ ''4-·, ' - , • . J -_ J ' f!.ff:,t,.,...r,,==.,. , . 1 _ ..f L~ .:...':':' ""' .. ·-" • 

• .&.J~~:..r.....J.lq, .~., . """ m,c4::_w.,illt~ml1~~~1~1~Mlr~n:~~~ . . · ==-1· ·. -· . . -...:, • ...... ...-...~ '. • •... ~!l(., . . • . . ' . "1 .~-~J~iffl,. - .... ll ,_. ;~_,:, . - ··j{1"; . . .. ~ . : 

Article ,n ........ ,,. .. ;,. r.~ ..... 1 .... +-h~t, M:Y~n~ lf"I\ : I c· 1-"3 I 1-1\ I c· frl-lrlfflr' .. • • - ! 

.. ··- .. - ·- - ____ _. ___________________________ _ "U.S. Officlnls: Putin Personally Involved ir'I U.S. Electior, ''Two seniot officials with direct access to the Page 1: "We assess with high confidence thot Hussian Pl'esldcmt Vladimir P11tin. ordared an lnfluenco campolg111ti 

2016 aimed :it lhe US prc~ldr.nti.'ll clr.ction ... '' 

Hack" 

• Datu: Oocernl.>er 15, 2016 

• Outlet: NOC News 

information say new fntell(gence :shows tl,at 

P11tin ,,ersonal/y dlrectad how hflclted moterlt:ll 

I from Democrats was leaked and otherwise used. i The intellige~r,r. came from diplomatic sources I and spies working for U.S. allies, the officials 

i said." 1 

fl "Pul1n'~ obj~ellv.es were multlfDr.eted, u hleh· r;igc 1: ~Pul1n most likely wnnted to discredit Socrut.iry 

level lntelllsenc0 source told NHC News. What Clinton because he lw.v publ/cly blamed her since 2011 for 

I 

began as a 'vendettc11 against H{l/ory Clinton inc1iin(! moss pro,cst~ egalnst hi$ regime ln l,He 2011 and 

morphed into an effort to show corrupHon in I early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments 

j American poHtfcs and to 'split oft ke\' American j' he almost certainly saw as disparaging him." · 

I i!llles by creating the lmi'lge th.:it !other coun, 

l tries] couldn't depend on the U.S. to be a credi- i Page 1: "In tryir'lg to inftuence the US election, we assess 

; bl~ globi.ll ltii'lder unymort:,' the offlclill said," : the J<rcmlin soucht to i:!dv.irw: Its longstondlnr, dcslro to 

. undermine the US-lerl liberal democratic order, the pro· 

motion of which Putin and other senior Ru~sian leaders 

view as a threat to Russia and Putin's regime." 

1-- - - - ·- --- ·- ------------- ·- - - - 11

lntel 11 naly!ll s shows Putin il?proved election hacking" 

• Data: December 15, 20l,G 

• Outlet: CNN 

"Repqrt: Putin, Ru~sia Tried to Help Trump By 

'Discrediting' Clinton" 

• DaLe:J :muory G, 2017 

• Out lGt: NfJC News 

"'The intelliBCnce community hns a~scsscd that 

, In order for this operation to hove been execut· 

,.ad, It could not h,Ml L1 een done without tM 

J highest levels of the go11emment, lncl1Jdfn9 the 

i President himsetf."' 

Pa~c 2: "We .issess that lnf:luenw carnpc1lgns m~ approved 

at the hi!}hest levels of the Russian Gavernme11tp(lrtic11l t1l'ly lhoso LhElt would be polillcoll11 sensitlv~." 

- - ___ ,____. --------···-·-····-· ---·--· "The un classified report doe~ not Identify who 

transmitted the information or how. A senior 

o1Acl.il with direct knowledge, however, told 

NOC News Thl11·sdny that the U.S. has lde11tlftcd 

the ftusslcm actors who turned over stolen Dem· 

. ocratic rmiterial to Wikll..cal<s." I 

; Page 3: "We assess wi th high confidence tha 

layed mott?rial it acquired from the DNC ;ind senior Demor.rntlc officlols to Wi!(Jloaks." 
(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classified information have damaged national 

security and potentially endangered lives. 

(U) Finding #44: Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. now a CNN 

national security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about 

his contacts with the media, including CNN. 

(U) When initially asked about leaks 

rel~ted to the ICA in July 2017, former ONI 

Clapper flatly denied "discuss ling] the dossier [compiled by SteeleJ or any other intelligence related to Russia hacking of the 2016 

eledion with joumalists."~5 Clapper subsequently acknowledged discussing the 

"dossier with CNN journalist Jake Tapper," 

and admitted that he might have spoken 

with other journalists about the same topic.45 Clapper's discussion with Tapper took 

place in early January 2017, around the time 

IC leaders briefed President Obama and 

President-elect Trump, on "the Christophe r 

Steele information,'' a two-page summary 

of which was " enclosed in" the highlyclassified version of the ICA."47 

(U) On January 10, 2017, CNN published 

an article by Tapper and others, which 

. ?RO?ERTY OF 1HE U.S. HOUSE OF RcPRESS·ITATil/ES 

107 
claimed that "classified documents presented last week to President Obama and President-elect Trump included aHegations . .. 

about Mr. Trump'' that were (1} "1?r1:=sented 

in a two-page synopsis ... appended to a 

report on Russian interference in the 2016 

election" and (2} derived from "memos 

compiled by a former British intelligence 

operative.'"8 Those claims were sourced to 

"multiple U.S. officials with direct 

knowledge of the briefings."49 The next day, 

Clapper issued a statement describing a call 

with President-elect Trump in which Clapper 

"expressed my profound-dismay at the leaks 

that have been appearing the in press" and 

"emphasized . . . that I do nof believe the 

leaks came from w[thin the lC."

30 

(U) The Committee assesses that leaks 

to CNN about the dossier were especially 

significant, since CNN's report "that~ twopage synopsis of the report was given to 

President Obama and Trump" w as the proximate cause of BuzzFeed News' decision to 

publish the dossier for the first time just a 

few hours later.51 Until that point, the dossier had been "circulating among elected 

official, intelligence agents, and journalists," 

but remained unpublished.

52 As the accompanying article explained, "[n]ow BuzzFeed 

News rs publishing the full document so that 

Americans can make up their own minds 

about allegations about the president -elect 

that have circulated at the highest levels of 

government."5; 

{U} In approximately early August 2017, 

shortly after his t estimony to the committee, Clapper joined CNN as a n~tional securi-

-t 

ty analyst:'' 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRF.5!:NTATIVES 

108 
1. Espionc.ga Act of 1917 {codr.:~ as amended at !8 U.S.C. §§ 793-7gSJ. 

2. ODNI, Assessing Russ,·oo Activities mtd lntentior1s i"n Recen t US fledions, Jar\. 6, 2.017. 

3. Ellen Nak-oShima, ~Ru:.sian Go~,;,..-nment Hackers Penetrat,;rl DI-IC, Stole Oppo-sition ~arch on Trump," Wa.hittgrot. 

Post, June 14, 201.6; Joseph Menn, Mark f losenbal.1, and ;ohtl Walcott, "H ac!(ers Targettd Trump Ca mp,iig11, Re~uh!i::an 

Party Groups: Sources,'' .'?e!.erers.. Au& 19, 2016. 

'1.. HP-~, Staff Briefing on Cyb<?r Targ-en.ng of PolitiuJJ Parties, !une 14, 2016; HP.SO, Swfi' Briefing on Wi}.il;;a k5 ,ma Hadcin; 

of Camp:2ig11 Systems, Aug. 3, 20!6; 1-!rSCI, Mernb~ Bri1=f.rig on Hussian C•1b;,r AcL,~ti~. Sept. 6, 2016; Gais of S 

Briefing, "Russian 0 1•ber Acfu:ities,0 Sep;. 8, 2016. 

S. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

11. DliS and ODNl,.'"Joint Stiltemem from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of Nanor.ai inte!-

12. 

13. 

14. 

lignncc oo Election Socurlty,"' Oct. 7, 2016. 

15. - 16. Adam Entous, .Ellen Nakashlma, and Greg Mlller. wSecretOAA5s~ment Says Russia W,as Trting to Help Trump Win 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

2!. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

3L 

White House;" Wczshlt1yton Pas!, oer:.. 9, 2016. 

-

• John \-'Jaloott, "Russia inter,ened to help Trump-win .election: inte!lfgence officials;" R~urers, Dec. 10, 2016. 

-

-

--· 

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT.ATM=S 109 
32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 

compromise him," CNN News, Jan. 12, 2016. 

40. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

45. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. 

46. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Regarding his communication with Tapper about the 

dossier, Cla.pper stated: "I don't know exactly the sequence there, but It was pretty close to when we bri~fed it and when 

It was out all over the place. The media had it by the way. We were kind of behind the power curve, because the media, 

many media outlets that I understood had that, had the dossier for some time, as did people on the Hill." 

47. liPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Former CIA Director Brennan testified publicly that 

the dossier was "not In any way used as a basis for the lntelll(lence Community Assessment." HPSCI, Russian Active 

Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign, May 23, 2017. However, NSA Director Rogers clarified that, In late December 2016, a two-page summary of the Steele dossier was "added" as an "Appendix to the ICA draft," and that his consideration of the Appendix was "part of the overall !CA review/approval Process." Letter from Michael S. Rogers to the Hon· 

orable Devin Nunes, Mar. 5, 2018. See also Evan Perez, "Blden confirms Obama, VP were briefed o_n unsubstantiated 

claims against Trump," CNN, Jan. 12, 2018. 

48. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 

compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017; Twitter, @cnnbrk, Jan. 10, 2017, 2:13 PM (reflecting the story's initial publication 

time). 

49. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 

compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017. 

50. ODN I, "DNI Clapper Statement on Conversation with President-elect Trump," Jan. 11, 2017. 

51. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 

10,2017. . 

52. Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017 

("originally posted ... at 6:20 p.m.). 

53. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Repo,ts Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 

10, 2017. 

54. Transcript, "President Trump Takes Working Vacation; Analysts Examine President's Recent Poll Numbers," CNN, Aug. 7, 

2017 ("Joining us now to talk more about this is CNN's new national security analyst, James Clapper."). 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

110 
-· - - ·--·11 

(U} Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts 

(U) During the course of the Committee's investigation into Russian active 

measures targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the Committee identified several issues within its jurisdiction t hat required additional attention and oversight 

outside of the broader investigation. 

Sufficiency of "Unmasking'-' Procedures 

(U) In March 2017, the Committee became aware of senior Obama Administration officials' requests for U.S. person identities related to President-elect Trump's transition team. These U.S. person identities 

were previously redacted in IC reporting. 

The Committee initiated its investigation of 

the ptoce.ss for requesting identities, colloquially referred to as "unmasking," to determine the sufficiency of existing policies and 

procedures related to the release of U.S. 

person identities. As a result, the Committee recognized gaps in the "unmasking" 

processes, including the lack of IC-wide 

standards related to the justification for requesting U.S. person identity information. 

Therefore, the Committee's findings related 

to these processes necessitated an immediate change in policy. 

(U} The Committee believed that the JC 

should use specific procedures related to 

the "unmasking" of U.S. person identities in 

IC r~porting, including additional review requirements for "unmasking" presidential 

transition team officia1s during a presidential transition. 1 The Committee felt that a 

change in policy was necessary for the IC to 

protect U.S. person privacy 13nd the sanctity 

of t he peaceful transition of presidential administrations, all ._ • .,hile resulting in no operational impact. As part of negotiations of 

the FISA Amendments Act of 2017, DNI 

Coats and the White House agreed to devefop a new IC-wide policy for handling 

"unmasking" requests. Therefore, on January 11, 2018, DNI Coats signed lnte!ligence 

Community Policy Guidance 107.1 (see Appendix 0), which includes requirements for: 

• IC element heads or designee approval 

for requests for U.S. person identity information; 

• Documentation for names or titles of 

individuals who will receive the U.S. person identify information; 

. • A fact-based justification for each U.S. 

person identity request; and 

• IC element General Counser concurrence 

for U.S. person identity requests that 

relate to Presidential transition team 

members prior to those identities being 

approved for release. 

-

{U) Using a series of intermediaries, the 

DNC and Hillary for America {Clinton campaign} pald a research firm to conduct opposition research on candidate Trump and 

his ties with Russia. Fusion GPS (fusion) is 

the trade name of a Washington, D.C.-based 

company that conducts research primarily 

PROPrniY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESaITA TIVES 

111 
on behalf of corporate clients.2 Marc Elias, 

chair of Perkins Coie's election law practice 

w ho represented the DNC and the Clinton 

campaign, hired Fusion in spring 2016 and 

paid Fusion $1 million to conduct opposition 

research on candidate Trump. Fusion subsequently hired former British Secret Intelligence Service officer Christopher Steeie for 

$160,000 to obtain information on candi· 

date Trump via a Russia-based primary subsource and numerous sub-sub-sources network who were purported to be cunent and 

former Russian government officials. The 

information Steele collected was reported 

back through a series of memos to Fusion 

and Perkins Coie. Steele produced sixteen 

memos, which comprise what has become 

known as the Stee.Je dossier.

3 

(U) By the end of September 2016-in 

addition to Fusion and Perkins Coie-Steele 

provided the information in the Steele doy 

sier to the DOJ, Department of State, nume;ous press outlets, and the FBI. -

1. ~-P- J:::78, § l.07, 115''' Cong. 

(U) After uncovering this information, 

the Committee voted to publicly release two 

memos, one written by the Majority on January 18, 2018 (see Appendh( E) and another 

written by the Minority on January 29, 2018 

(see Appendix f}. In additi'?-n to the.Committee's oversight of this matter, the Senate 

Judidary Committee identified the same 

issues in a criminal referral sent by Chairman Grassley and Senator Graham to the 

DOJ on January 4, 2018, describing Christopher Steele's exploits in detail (see Appendix G}. 

(U) Ongoing lines of effort include (1) 

continued oversight of DOJ and FBI (see Appendix H for.relevant correspondence}; (2} 

inquiries into the State Department's handling of information from Steele, including 

the dossier;

4 and (3} post-election antiTrump research by Steele and/or Fusion 

GPS.-; 

2. HPSC1, "~.:utive Session Interview ofG!.:-nn Slrnp.son,n Nov. 14, 2017. . . 

3. ,ne dossier; however, has ru:, fixed ccmpasltion. The version pubUshed by BuzzFeed doe; not net:essanly enr.rely correspond with documents provfC:eli to oll'~ pattil!S. 

112 
4. !=crmer S..a,e Department cff.aal has stated pub!id\• that, over a pen..--o of approximate}; t,•ro years, he 

providi:d ever N 100 of Steele's teycrts with the Rus!:ia experts at the State D;;;:iartme..t,' i nc!u ding ;\ssistant &;cretary of 

S12t~ V:ctoria Noland. In Se~"":'ll:)er 2016, Winer was personaUv briefed by Staele on the dossi~r, 2nd shared a two-pag;; 

summar-., with r-£uland, Y.'ho en..cured th:a t Secret2iy of State John Kerry was m3:le aware of Steele's information. Addi-

"3onally.--eceivetl from C!inmn associate nformatioo collecterl l:y an indi\'iciual namedShearenvhid, "alleged the RU3sians had compromisinRinfurmationon Trump of a sexual and financial nature.· Winer 

shared , .. ;th r iriform.ition with Steele, wh;;i provided it to t he FBI. , c~..<in Nune:; 

is lrr~stic.,ating me. H~re's the truth.," Washington PDSl, Feb. 8, 2018; Susart 6. Gia=, "Victoria Nu land: The Fu!J Transcripr. • POUT/CO, Feb. 5, 20J8; A;:,per.dix G. Tne Committ~ believe, that additional State Deparrment offi~ were 

.;1ware of Steele's efforts In 2016.. 

S. •,ho currentiy leads ~a research and inve-sttgatory ad>1isory" called the ?enn Quarter Group {PQG). ls a 

former a:ipJoyee cf The Dasdlle G:-cup, U.S. Senate Select Committee on lntcltigence (SSO). and FBJ; while a~ SSO, he 

serv~ ~ the "chief author" of "The Ccrnmitte-e Studi' of the Central lntefligence At;ffiqs Detention and lr,tef"Ogatt,111 

P1oyan"_ ~ The Pclln Quarter GrOVJ), aour t.eade~hip, N th~:1 . .:cq,/te,am/leaciershJO; Linlcedln, httns:i/ 

w\w1.h11<.:din.c.:itr1/in/danie!if~~s. tn late _March 2017, Jones met ,•Jlth FBI reg.anilna PUG, which M descr~ as 

~exposil\3. forei8J1 influence in Woti:m elcctions.1111111 mkt, FBI that PQ.G was being funded by 7 to 10 we:il!hy dortors 

located prcmarily in New Vork and California, who provided appro:<imately $50 mil~on. - further stated tiet PQG had 

s:cured th~ services of Steele, hi!. aucciatf! and Fus.ion Gi'S to roritinue expos ins lwssian interforarice in 

,he 201S U.S. !'residential election. -planned to sharalhe lnformalio,, he obtained ,.,.,i~h polieymalters 0:'1 Capitol Hitl 

and with the press, and c1lso ofkred .:o provide PQG's e ntfre holdings to the F'31. f!B!. FD-302, Mar. 28, 2017. 

PROPERTY Of THE U.S. HOUS;: Of REPR!:SENTATIVES 

113 
{U} Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations 

Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe 

(U) For at least the la.st decade, Russia 

has aggressively engaged in an information 

war against the West. The Kremlin takes 

advantage of the openness, freedom of expression, and respect for legal norms enjoyed in Western democracies by conducting targeted, multi-faceted influence 

operations against its adversaries. Each influence c2mpaign is unique to the populace, 

media environment, and internal dynamic 

of the country being targeted. 

{U} The factors that make Russian operations effective also make them difficult to 

counter. Nonetheless, countries throughout the West are taking a variety of actions 

to impede, counter, and where possible, 

eliminate Russian influence operations. 

(U) The vast majority of Russian tactics 

share a common denominator: proliferation 

through mass media. Therefore, thls chapter's recommendations primarily focus on 

ways to degrade the impact of nefarious 

media activities and make them more difficult to conduct. 

{U} Recommendation #1: European governments, non•governmental organizations, 

businesses, think tanks, and academia 

should strengthen legal and regulatory environments, ·promote media pluralism, 

build professional media associations, and 

impn:>ve the financial sustainamlity of legitimate news outlets. 

,..._ •JI 

(U} Russia exploits free media spaces 

and open democracies through a neti.-vork of 

Russian state-owned news o.utlets and media platforms. Those platfon-ns amplify proRussian views in Russian-funded and local 

media, provoke doubt and disagreement, 

and propagate false news stories. In many 

Eastern European and Baltic countries, local, 

_independent media outlets often operate 

with extremely limited resources, limiting 

their ability to acquire and produce highquality con.tent. In contrast, the high production value of Russia-owned content presents an attractiw alternative. Russian intelligence services or their agents of influence also purchase, invest in, or partner 

with exlsting TV and radio channels, providing editorialized content for redistribution. 

Furthermore, Russian p~opaganda is occasionally re-broadcast by legitimate news 

outlets. 

(U) Strengthening legal .and regulatory 

environments, promoting media pluralism, 

building professional media associationsJ 

and improving the financia l sustainability of 

legitimate news outlets will help to: increase access t-0 legitimate news reporting, 

improve production quality and financial 

sustainability of-local media, and prnfes--

sionalize journalists_ 

(U) Countries that contain sizable ~ussian-speaking populations are more vulnerabte to the effec-t.S of media-enabled Russian 

rnformation operations. As described 

~ROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RI:PRE:SENTATI'o'ES 

114 
above, for many of these populations, Russian media saturates local markets, providing few alternatives for news and entertainment and non-Russian editorial viewpoints 

{U} For countries with large Russianspeaking populations, strengthening legitimate Russian-language broadcasters and 

independent media outfets that disseminate 

fact-based content would provide both balance to the media space and more viewing 

options for residents of those countries. 

(U} Recommendation #2.: European governments, non-governmental organizations, 

businesses, think tanksr and a.cademia 

should implement and encourage multipronged, country-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian 

propaganda, technical, and cyber operations. 

(U) Russia utilizes a \l'.'hole-ofgovernment approach in its information operations, mobilizing a variety of tools to 

achieve its goals. From hacking of government nen•.:orks, think tanks, and universities 

to spreading propaganda via social media, 

Russia 's tentacles are many and far reaching. 

{U) It is therefore imperative that Western nations implement country-\•Jide efforts 

to educate its populations and inoculate 

their governments, media outlets, and other 

organizations from Russian influence cam~ 

paigns. To do this, Western nations should 

encourage increased partnership between 

public and private entities in order to combat Russian information, technical,. and 

cyber operations. 

(U} Re<:ommendation #3; European governments, non-governmental organizations, 

businesses, think tanks, and academia 

should jmplement more stringent cyber 

security practices., such as multifactor authentication and encryption of sensmve 

data, as well as educating workforces on 

basic cyber s&urity topics and best practices. 

(U) In the last decade, Russian cyber 

operations have targeted governments, militaries, industrial control systems, businesses, think tanks, and universities worldwide. 

Whjle Russian intelligence services can employ extremely sophisticated means for 

gaining access to sensitive data, often simple tacti~s such as spear phisiling can prove 

just a$ effective. 

(U) Given that cyber operations are relatively low risk/high reward, difficult to 

attribute, and even harder to consistently 

combat, it is likely that Russia will continue 

to utili2e this tactic in its influence C3mpaigns. Network defenses have to be right 

1_00% of the time; a cyber intruder. only has 

to be right once. Therefore, it is imperative 

that governments, NGOs, businesses, think 

tanks, ~nd academia invest more r-e.sources 

in cyber security-defenses, imp1ement more 

stringent cyher security practices, and con~ 

duct regular workforce education and training on these topjcs. 

(U) Recommendation #4: European govern~ 

PROPERTY OF TliE U.S . HOl>SE OF REPRESEtITATIVES 115 
ments should look to long-term solutions 

to lessen economic dependence on Russia . 

.(U} Russia utilizes economic ties to its 

advantage. Economic vulnerability - such as 

reliance on Russia for trade or energy- can 

be leveraged to change behavi-0r, send a 

message of displeasure, or inflict punishment. This is especially true for smaller 

countries within Russia's periphery, such as 

Moldova, where Russia is among their largest trading partners. Yet even large, economically secure countries like Germany 

depend on Russia for a large percentage of 

its energy needs. 

'{U) The United States should look for 

opportunities to lessen European countries' 

eco·nomic dependen-ce on Russia. Exploring 

alternative sources of energy and diversifying trade relationships would diminish one 

of Russia's tools for imposing influence on 

its neighbors. 

Russia Attacks the United States & America 

Reacts 

(U} The Committee's findings conterning the Russian government's malign lnfluence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election are largely consistent with 

the facts outlined in the IC~. The Russian 

effort was multifaceted, persistent, and 

effecnve in sowing division. The effort included cyber operations (hacking}, the use 

of social media, the creation of automated 

accounts and fake cyber p_ersonas, the use 

o f third party intermediaries, and state-run 

media. 

-

(U) Evidence reviewed by the Committee also shows that the Russcan government and its proxies used social media to 

advance Russia's malign interests. While 

PROPERTY Of THE·u.s. HOUSE OF REPRESE:NTATIVES 116 
these efforts were limited - some even 

came after Election Day-they were effective at SO\.'!ing divisions within American society and promoting false information. 

(U} America's reaction t o the Russian 

active measures campaign consisted of a 

whole of government response, with various activities conducted by the IC, law enforcement, and policy makers. Despite arguably the best of intentions in addressing 

the Russian cyber menace before and during the 2016 election cycle, the Execu_tive 

Branch's response fell short of deterring the 

Russians from conducting such activity in 

the future. 

(U) After analyzi.ng the Executive 

Branch' s responses to the active measure 

campaign, the Committee identified various 

gaps in current lai.v and policy that must be 

addressed in order to help protect U.S. election systems and increase the efficacy of 

victim notifications in the future. In addition, the Executive Branch must diligently 

inform U.S. presidentiaf campaigns in the 

future of counterintelligence threats, to the 

extent consistent w ith national security and 

law enforcement equities. 

(U) Recommendation #5; Congress should 

identify options aiJailable to the private 

sector and federal government that would 

address the social media vulnerabilities ex.-

plaited by the Russian government. 

{U} The exploitation of social media 

platforms by the Russian government for 

malign purposes demonstrated a significant 

vulnerability. The- response of social media 

platforms to this threat should be examined 

closely and evaluated against ongoing 

threats. Furthermore, social media 

platforms should consider implementing 

m~thods to help counter malign foreign activity. 

(U} Recommendation #6: Congress should 

consider updating the foreign lntetligenc~ 

Surveillance Act to cover malicious international cyber actors. 

{U) As part of the Committee's initial 

FISA Amendments .C\.ct reauthorization discussions in 2017,·the Committee sought to 

address the changing threat environment as 

it relates to malicious cyber activitv 

threi;iting the U.S. national security. Given 

the difficulty in attributing a specific cyber 

actor, the lines betv,een independent hacker and government cyber operator are often 

blurred. U.S. ad,Jersaries are consistently 

attempting to obfuscate their i~entity and 

location in order to evade detection. Unfortunately, current national security authorities are inadequate to counter the growing 

cyber threat. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 117 
I O 

(U) Unfortunately, the proposed addition to the FISA "foreign power'' definition 

did not make it into the final version of the 

FJSA Amendments Act of 2017 given concerns that such a designation would dHute 

the ·key distinction between two djfferent 

legal purposes: intelligence collection and 

law enforcement. This concern, while understandable! fails to take into account the 

changing threat environment, as evidenced 

by Russian cyber actors, such as the Internet 

Research Agency, that attempted to meddle 

in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. 

{U} The-Commfttee renews its call for 

Congress to update the definition of 

"foreign power" and 11agent of foreign power' in FISA to account for entities engaged 

in international malicious cy'oer activity that 

threatens the national defense or security 

of the United States. Adding this new entity 

to the definition of "foreign power' would 

permit the IC to ta met intemational cyber 

groups without having to connect that 

group to a foreign government or terrorist 

organization, so long as the C'{ber entity is 

threating US. national security or defense. 

Such an addition provides the IC with much 

needed flexibility and will help keep the 

United States ahead of its adversaries. 

(U) Recommendation #7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation shoufd improve 

cyberatlack victim notification. 

(U) When a state-sponsored cyberattack 

is dire.cted against U.S. critical infrastructure 

or systems related to _national elections, i~ is 

essential for the appropriate federal officials 

to work quickly to both understand the nature of the threat and aid the vi~m's defense. 

(U) Although the FBI maintained an ongoing dialogue with the DNC related to the 

Russian intrusions, the engagement remained at the-working level. These interactions continued for months, despite no signs 

of effective mediation to the problem. In 

• Director Corney testified that, had he 

known at the time the seriousness o f the 

- problem, he wouid have "walked over 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RESENTATM::S 118 
there" himself. 

{U) On the other side of the notification 

process, the Committee found that 

cyberattack victim organizations did not a!- · 

ways grasp the information conveyed by the 

FBr, even when that information was reasonably dear. As a result of both government- and private-sector failures, Russian 

Intelligence agencies were afforded critical 

time on breached systems. During this 

time, extensive amounts of data were stolen for later use as part of Russia' s malign 

influence campaign. 

{U) While the DNC failed to handle the 

intrusions with the level of seriousness it 

deserved-given the severity and national 

security implications of the particular intrusion sets-the FBI should have engaged 

more vigorously at the senior management 

level. The FBI cannot, and should not, force 

a victim of a malicious cyber event to take 

specific remedial measures. However,. the 

FBI should update its internal processes to 

make it clear that if a victim is neither willing nor able to take remedial measures in 

the event of a significant national security 

cyber event, FBI leadership should contact 

the victim and engage at the leadership leveL 

{U) One way to implement these procedures is to provide specific guidance to FBI 

agents conducting victim notifications as to 

the circumstao,es under which the agent 

should elevate the situation. Additionally, if 

the cyber intrusion is attributed to a foreign 

government entity and the victim is a political party or campaign, FBI senior management should be responstble for victim engagement immediately. 

{U) The Committee therefore recommends that notifications associated with 

state-sponsored cyherattacks should be 

conducted as soon as possible, and at the 

highest levels of the victim organization. If 

intelligence sources and methods are 

threatened by dissemination of information, 

the IC should work with the Department ·of 

Homeland Security (DHS) to p~ovide specific 

recommendations on what actions can be 

taken by system owners to defend their networks from the state-actor. The DHS and IC 

should designate personnel and resources 

to carry out this task and should establish a 

triage system to prioritize tasking during 

periods of high demand. 

(U) Recommendation #8: Threats identified 

by the Intelligence Community to state and 

lo~al elections infrastructure should be immediately briefed to appropriate state and 

local officials. When threats are identified, 

the federal government ~hould conduct an 

expedited decJassification review to ensure 

that the threat information can reach all 

PnOPERTY OF THE u_s_ HOUSE OF REPRESENTA"O\r"::S 119 
necessary state and local officials in a timely manner. 

(U} The Committee found insufficient 

information sharing between the federal 

government and state election officials ln 

2016 regarding cybersecurity threats to federal elections. The Committee has attempted to address this deficiency in the FY 2018 

Intelligence Authorization Act {IAA}. 

(U) Section 502 of the House-passed tAA 

would require the Director of National Intelligence {DNI}, jn coordination with the Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and the FBI Director, to 

post on the internet an advisory report on 

foreign counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to election campaigns for federal 

offices. 

(U) The provision also allows the FBI 

and DHS to make available additional information to appropr[ate representatives of 

any campaign for federal office if those 

agencies determine that such campaign is 

subject to a heightened foreign counterintelligence or cybersecurity threat. 

(U) The Committee has seen some recent improvement in this area on a general 

level. In February 2018, the Office of the 

Director of Nati~nal Intelligence, FBI, and 

DHS held a classified briefing for election 

officials of all 50 states. 

(U} Recommendation #9: The Secretary of 

Homeland Security should provide certain 

designated state and local election officials 

appropriate security.clearances to enable 

those officials to respond to electionrelated threats .. · 

(U) Even if all parties recognize the interest in sharing information, the classification-or even the knowledge of the exist~ 

ence-of a threat may impair timely sharing 

with state and local election officials. Consistent with the need to protect sources and 

methods, the Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain state and local 

election officials with necessary security 

dearances in order to share information. 

(U) The Senate Select Committee on 

lntelligence~passed FY 2018 IM also 

attempted to address this issue. Specifically, Section 402 of the IAA would require the 

DN! to support the Under Secretary of 

Homeland Security for intelligence and 

Analysis and any other DHS officfal in sponsoring a security clearance up to the top secret level for each eligible chief election official of a state. In addition, the DNI may issue interim clearances to a chief election 

official for the purposes of receiving appropriate classified information regarding cybersecurity threats to election systems. 

(U) Recommendation #10: Significant 

threats to U.S. elections identified by the 

Intelligence Community, including 

cyberattacks directed at political organiza~ 

tions, should be immediately reported to 

the congressional intelligence committees. 

(U) The House and Senate Intelligence 

Committees should be informed whenever 

the IC dete,mines with medium confide,:ice 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSe C!'" REPRES::.NTATIVES 120 
- ··- 3 

that a significant cyber intrusion or active 

measures campaign by foreign actors is intended to influence an upcoming election 

for any federal office. Accordingl'I, the 

Committee recommends that the FBl Direc:-

tor, the DN!, and the Secretary of Homeland 

Security jointly provide a briefing to the 

Congressional intelligence committees no 

later than 14 days after a determination of a 

significant cyber intrusion. 

{U) Recommendation #11: Congress should 

encourage the adoption of National Institute of Standards and Technology tyber 

security standa~ds, such as those adopted 

by the Elections Assistance Commission, by 

providing federal resources to state and 

local governments to facilitate such adop· 

tion. Funds should be tied to the adoption 

and certification of elections svstems to 

appropriate standards. 

(U) Election systems are owned and operated by state and local governments. 

Their acquisition and installation is costly 

and recapitalization is infrequent. 

(U) The federal government largely operates within the limits of establishing vol· 

untary standards through NrST, providing 

technical assistance and sharing threat information. 

(U) NIST is working with state and local 

election officials to develop further enhancements to election agencies' system 

security. 

(U} The adoption of new standards may 

involve system replacement, particularly for 

- - - - -~ 

aging systems. To encourage adoption and 

in recognition of the federal government's 

responsibility to protect the nation against 

foreign threats, the Congress .should consider providing significantly more resources to 

state and local governments. These investments could be tied to appropriate enhancements in election system security. 

(U) Recommendation #12: Congress sho~ld 

consider additional funding for the National Institute of Standards and Technology to 

enable better outreach to state and local 

governments. 

{U} With additional resources, NIST 

could host more frequent engagements 

around the United States to promote the 

adoption of new standards and to provide 

more technical support to state and local 

officials. Furthermore, separately identifying the budget for this activity within the 

NIST would further convey the importance 

of this effort and allow Congre.ss to more 

closely track progress. 

{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should 

consider a one-time grant to state and local 

election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies' computer systems. 

{U} Because voting is admrnistered at 

the state and local level, even for federal 

candidate elections, there is a patchwork of 

electronic voting systems: In addition, 

those varied systems are not subject to consistent maintenance and replac~ment regimes. 

(U) Congress should consider allocating 

FROPERTY OF THE u.s_ HOIJSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 121 
funds to be transferred to state and local 

election agencies to conduct a risk assess~ 

ment of their systems. Doing this would, 

the Committee believes, further demonstrate the need for the implementation of 

the NIST cyber security standards for election agencies. 

(U) Recommendation #14: Congress should 

consider strengthening the Help America 

Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both statewide voter registration and tabulation systems are better protected from foreign 

cyber threats. 

., 

(U) As noted above, OHS Secretary Jeh 

Johnson designated U.S. election systems as 

critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017, 

which was one day after the ref ease of the 

classified ICA and the same day as the release of the uncla~-sified version. By labeling 

election systems as critical infrastructure, 

DHS can "prioritize cybersecurity assistance11 for those who request it, as well as 

provide election systems the same international legal protections afforded to other 

critical infrastructure. Implementation of 

such a designation takes time. As of September 1, 2017, the U.S. Election f!..s.sistanc.e 

Commission reported that the election critical infrastructure subsector plans v,rere progressing, in hopes of finalization in time for 

the 2018 elections. The Committee applauds this designation because it helps address the threats to the nation's voting infra.structure. 

(U) However, as articulated in recent 

news.reports, even with election systems 

designated as critical infrastructure, the DHS 

"risk and vulnerabiiity" assessments take 

time and resources, and there appears to be 

a lengthy wait list. Therefore, in preparing 

for the 2018 midterm elections, OHS should 

continue to work with the states on prioritizing these assessments for election systems - and other stakeholders must do 

more. 

{U) Recommendation #15; The Department 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. liOIJSEOF REf'Ri:SENTAnvES 122 
of Homeland Security should provide the 

owner or operator- of any electronic election infrastructure affected by any significant foreign cy.ber intrusion with a briefing 

and include steps that may~ taken to 

mitigate such intrusions. 

{U) The Committee found that commercial providers of electronic election infrastructure were not informed of foreign 

cyber intrusions to their systems. While the 

IC and federal government may be aware of 

malicious cyber activity targeting election 

systems, the information is of little value if 

appropriate threat information cannot be 

shared with the owners and operators of 

affected systems. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that OHS provide a 

briefing and mitigation steps to the owner 

or operator of election infrastructure systems targeting by a foreign cyber intrusion. 

{U) In addition, DHS has offered state 

and local governments a network monitoring tool t hat alerts election system operators about known forejgn threats using information obtained by the IC. Not all states 

have adopted this tool. 

(U} Recommendation #16: State and locaf 

governments should be encouraged to establish redundancies that are not dependent on current elections ~nfrastructure, 

such as a mechanism that re~ins individual vote records, ensuring the Integrity of 

the vote in the event of a compromise of 

voting infrastructure due to a foreign 

cyberattack. An example of such a redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record reflecting the voter's selections. 

{U} The vulnerabilfty of state and local 

erection infrastructure has been well documented. These systems, which are not frequently updated or replaced, are not developed to defend against state-sponsored 

cyber threats. The fact that voting machines themselves, as well as tabulation systems, are not directly connected to the internet does not offer adequate security. 

Rather, it can create a false sense of security. 

(U) To help p-rntect the integrity of t he 

process, state and local election authorities 

should consider building in additional redundancies to ensure an audit trail in the 

event of a compromise of the electronic 

voting systems. An example of this is a contemporaneously printed record of votes 

that is securely stored at the polling place 

and transported to the relevant election 

office at the end of Election Day. The Committee is mindful of the reason most jurisdictions replaced the paper ballot, but 

building [n a redundancy using a paper record of a vote will help guard ag~inst the potential for manipulation of voting results in 

the event of a breach of the electronic 

voting machines. 

{U} Recommendation #17: While it is important to implement iessons learned from 

the Executive Branch's response$ Congress 

should not hampet the Executive Branch's 

. ability to use discretion in responding to a 

?:'<O?ERTY Of: THE U.S. HOOSE OF RE.PRESENTATM::S 123 
particular foreign threat. 

{U) The Executive Branch's response to 

the 2016 Russian active measures campaign 

was neither timely nor effective. As discussed above, the Execulive Branch did not 

publicly attribute Russian attempts to hack 

into various political institutions or compromise emails of U.S. people until October 7, 

2016-roughly one month before the 2016 

U.S. presidential election. The Executive 

Branch also waited to issue sanctions 

aga(nst Russia, expel Russian diplomats, and 

close Russian diplomatic facilities until December 29, 2016. Further, DHS did not designate US election systems as critical infrastructure until January 6, 2017, which was 

two months after the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election. While the previous administration 

made attempts in diplomatic channels to 

dissuade Russia from its ongoing activities, 

such attempts apparently feil on deaf ears. 

(U} However, despite the fact that the 

Executive Branch's remedial actions were 

arguably too little too late, any efforts by 

Congress. to introduce certain legislative 

"solutions" are misguided. The President is 

the primary recipient of the intelligence 

produced by the IC, as well as the individual 

constitutionally empowered to command 

the armed forces of the United States. As 

such, if a foreign government conducts active measures targeting U.S. elections in the 

future, the Executive Branch should have 

the abilrtyto craft a response based on the 

interngence known at the time of the interference and, if necessary, the readiness of 

U.S. military forces. These are variables that 

the Congress cannot possibly anticipate in 

drafting potential legislation. Therefore, 

despite potential calls from both Democrats 

and RepubHcans to legislate the threshold 

necessary to ttigger attribution or reaction 

by the President in the wake of foreign hostilities, the Committee urges Congress not 

to hamper the Executive Branch's role in 

responding to foreign threats. 

{U) Recommendation #18: Congress should 

consider repealing the Logan Act. 

(U) Congress passed the Logan Act and 

President Adams signed it into law on January 30, 1799. Broadly stated, the Logan Act 

prohibits U.S. dtizens to influence any foreign government vis-a-vis any disputes that 

government may have with the United 

States. It provides a punishment of a fine 

and three years' imprisonment. 

{U} Qver the course of the Act's morethan-200-year history, there has never been 

a conviction for its violation, and there have 

only been a handful of indictments that never reached trial. 

(U) Oe..,;pite its demonstrated disuse, 

the law has gained occasioO?l congressional 

interest. In 1978, Senator Ted Kennedy unsuccessfully sought to remove the Logan 

Act. In 1980, Congressman and former 

House Intelligence Committee Chairman, 

Anthony Beilenson, introduced legislation to 

repeal the Logan Act, stating that the primary use of the Logan Act was to prpvide for 

"periodic calls for prosecution motivated by 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 124 
TOP SECRET/ 

opposition to the cause b2ing expressed instead of actual concern about treason." In 

1994, Congress updated-the log,m Act by 

changing the $5,000 fine to "shall be fined 

under this title." 

{U) Due to the lack of prosecutions under t he Logan Act and despite the various 

apparent violations since its passage, Congress should evaluate the la1.-v's utility and 

consider repealing it. 

(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified counterintelligence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination con· 

vention. 

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential 

election campaign, candidate Trump and 

candidate Clinton did not receive a classified 

intelligence briefing until after their respective nomination conventions. Since 1952, 

the sitting President typically offers the U.S. 

presidential candidates classified briefings 

as a matter of courtesy, but only after the 

nomination conventions. However, the 

Committee's investigation found that a 

counterintelligence briefing before the 

nomination convention, even at the unclassified lev~I. would be a significant benefit to 

the candidates and enhance the integrity of 

the campaign. 

{U) U.S. presidential campaigns are a 

significant target of interest to America's 

foreign adversaries. It should be expected 

that various foreign intelligence services will 

conduct offensive operations to penetrate 

TOP SECRET/ 

NOFOR~ 

such campaigns in the hopes of influencing 

U.S. policy and discourse. Therefore, it is 

critical that the IC educate presidential campaigns on counterintelligence issues as an 

important protection measure for campaign 

operations. 

(U) For example, at an appropriate 

time, the lC could host unclassified counterintelligence tt'clining sessions for each campaign. Such training would assist the candidates and campaign leadership in understanding the severity of this issue, and 

should cover a range of topics, including: 

• (U) The intelligence collection process; 

• (U) Reasons why foreign intelligence services, generally, would 

want to penetrate a U.S. presidential 

campaign; 

• (U} How to better secure campaign 

communications and practice good 

cyber operational sec~rity; and 

• (U) Hypothetical examples of suspicious behavior that may warrant 

questioning or t he dismissal of campafgn staff. 

(U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Community should jmmedlately Inform U.S. presidential candidates when rt 

discovers a legitimate counterintelligence 

threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress. 

{U} The Committee is not aw3re of any 

NOFORN .. 

f:P.O?ERf'I' OF THE U.S. HCUS£ 0 ~ RE.PRE$EtITA"llV£$ 

125 
noti-fication to candidate Trump that the 

U.S. government conducted counterintelligence investigations of people associated 

directly or indirectfy with the campaign. 

While the Committee understands and appreciates the !C's reasons for not disdosing 

such information to protect classified 

sources and methods, the FBI should have 

provided candidate Trump some s-ort of notification, even if it is general and at the unclassified level, that th~ IC is concerned that 

a potential counterintelligence threat exists 

to the campaign. 

{U) The DNI should issue an ICD to provide guidance on how and when the IC 

should notify a U.S. presidential campaign 

of a legitimate counterintelligence threat. 

Similar to victim notifications in the cyber 

context, 1ivhen the re has an individual under 

an active counterintelligence investigation 

and the JC becomes aware of that individuaf' s affil iation with a U.S. presidential campaign, the IC should have a responsibility t o 

notify the candidate, when consistent with 

national security. There may be instances 

where such notifications are not consistent 

with nationai security, such as jf the candidate himself or herself is under a counterint elligence investigation. 

(U} Further, given the sensitivities associat~d with counterintelligence investigations, if the IC decides that campaign notification is required, the IC should promptly 

notify Congress of the campaign notification, induding the classified details under~ 

pinning the counterintelligence threat. Depending on the sensitivity, such notifications 

can be made to the leadership of the House 

and Senate, as well as the chair and ranking 

Members of the House and Senate intelligence committees - known as the Gang of 

8. 

(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of 

Congress should tons.ider requiring aU staff 

to receive an annuat counterintelligence 

awareness briefing. 

(U) As with.presidential campaigns, 

corigressional staff members are targets for 

foreign intelligence collection. The IC 

should coordinate, and Congress should 

consider requiring, an annual counterintelligence briefing for staff. 

(U) The briefing should be unclassifie d, 

cover both physical and cyber threat awareness, and should emphasize that all staff are 

targets fo r foreign intelligence services. The 

Committee's investigation of the 2016 election demonstrated that many campaign 

staff members were unaware of the-ir status 

as a potential target for foreign intelligence 

services. Congressional staff may also be 

unaware of the counterintelligence risks associated with their positions. Increasing the 

awareness of staff-even in an unclassified 

Setting-that they are potential targets 

would enable them to take precautionary 

measures and be better prepared to counter the threat. 

Campaign links to Russia 

(U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforcement should ensure 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESS'ITAT!VES 126 
that their counterintelligence defenses appropriately account for the role of cut-outs 

and intermediaries. 

{U} Russian attempts to influen<;e the 

American political process, including via intermediaries and cut-outs, did not end on 

Election Day. The universe of pre- and postelection contacts between Russjan intermediaries and Trump associates described in· 

Chapter 4 sugg·est a sophisticated effort to 

target unwitting Americans by leveraging 

existing relationships, interests, and opportunities.3 Therefore, both U.S. government 

entities and campaigns in particular must 

strengthen their defenses against such subversive tactics, beginning \:nth expanding 

counterintelligence education and training. 

(U) The IC ~hould work to provide as 

much infonnation to campaigns and law 

enforcement agencies about foreign intelli~ 

gence agencies' efforts to target them. _The 

Committee is mindful that sensitive counterintelligence issues often involve some of 

the most highly classified secrets the U.S. 

government has, but the IC should work to 

provide some basic training at the unclassified level about foreign adversaries' use of 

intermediaries. 

(U} Recommendation #23: Congress 

should consider amending current campaign finance laws to further increase· 

transparency regarding services pro~ded 

by foreign persons or entiti~s. 

{U} The Committee is concerned that 

current campaign finance reporting Is insufficiently transparent. For example, the 

DNC and Hillary for America used Perk.ins 

Coie, which they billed as "legal services" or 

"legal and compliance consulting," to finance opposition research by Fusion GPS, 

which In turn utilized Christopher Steele, a 

foreign person, t o comprle the dossier that 

he created for use against candidate 

Trump.11 

{U) Under current federa l election law, 

foreigners are prohibited from making contributions or donations in connection with 

any campaign in the United States.. 5 However, it is not iflegal to contract with a foreign 

person or foreign entity for services, including conducting opposition research on a U.S. 

campaign, so long as the service was paid 

for at the market rate. 

(U) ln light of the use of foreign people 

and foreign companies for services by the 

2016 U.S. presidential election campaigns, 

the Committee encourages Congress, in 

consultation with the Federal El~ction Commission (FEC), to consider whether Congress 

should amend campaign finance laws to require gr~ater transparency when U.S. campaigns obtain services from foreign persons 

or entities. Congress should consider 

whether U.S. campaigns that contract with a 

foreign person or entity for services should 

immediately disclose to the FEC a contract 

with a foreign person or foreign entity, a? 

well as a lengthy summary of the types of 

services provided by the foreign person or 

entity. 

PRO?ER'fY OF THE U..S- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV"":=S 

127 
Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks 

{U) Based on the extraordinary number 

of leaks of classified information over the 

pa.st year, it is apparent th~t government 

officials are not afraid of the criminal penalties for such unauthorized and illegal con- · 

duct. 

(U) This leaves the Committee with an 

impression that criminal statutes related to 

leaks of classified informatiqn are not strong 

enough to deter potential criminal acts of 

leaking classified information. 

{U) Recommer:idation #24: ~ach component of the Intelligence Community should 

update its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee, indudrng senior officiaJs. 

{U) The Committee found significant 

leaks of classified information around the 

time of the ICA. The Committee believes 

many of those leaks were likely frol)1 senior 

officials within the IC. This recommendation 

is similar to a provision of the FY 2013. Intelligence Authorization Act tl_1at expired in 

early 2014. That provision required a notification to the congressional intelligence 

committees in the event of an authorized 

disclosure of classified information to the 

media or anybody else who had the intent 

to make the information public.

6 The purpose of the law was to ensure that congressional int elligence committees were informed on a timely oasis when there w as a 

disclosure of classified information to the 

media, and the stat ute specifically carved 

out disclosures made under the Freedom of 

Information Act, in litigation or administrative proceedings, under executive orders, or 

to any federal employee with an active security clearance and a need to kno•N. 

(U) Recommendation #25: Congress 

should-consider legistation to increase the 

penalties for unauthorized disclosures of 

classified information. 

(U) To date, based on pubUcly available 

information, there have not been any prose-. 

cutions of leaks p~rtaining to. the Russian 

active measures campaign. ~s evidenced by 

the lack of leak prosecutions, difficulties 

often arise in finding a culprit behind leaks 

of classified information. However, when 

the Executive Branch is successful in identifying an alleged leaker, there should be no 

bar to prosecuting that ,ndivid ual. While 

prosecutors may utilize multiple ~riminal 

statutes to prosecute individuals who leak 

or mishandle national defense information, 

the construct of the Espionage Act does not 

lend itself in favor of prosecution and as a 

sufficient deterrent from individuals breaking the law for their own political purposes. 

Therefo re, Congress should consider legislation to clearly articulate stronger penalties 

for those individuals who make unauthor· 

ized disclosures of classified information to 

the media. 

(U) For example, enactment of Congressman Chris Stewart's bill - HJL 3448, 

the Classified lnform.;tio n Protection Act -

would strengthen the Espionage Act. Unlike 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOL."SE OF REPRESB"1TATIVES 

1 ) 8 
current unauthorized disclosure statutes 

which, by virtue of their complexity, create 

difficulties in building cases, H.R. 3448 d early prohibits any current or former individual 

who had lawful access to classified information from knowingly providing such information to a person who is not authorized to 

access the information. If someone is found 

guilty under this proposal, the leaker will be 

fined, imprisoned for up to three years, or 

bod-.. This legislation originally passed both 

chambers of Congress in 2000, but President Clinton vetoed-the bill. Given the proliferation of leaks, it is essential for Congress 

to examine amending the Espionage Act to 

strengthen our laws needed to protect dass[fied information. 

(U) Furthermore, given the significant 

number of leaks and instances of mishandling classified information coming from 

within the JC in the past several years, Congress should consider ways to strengthen 

the protection of dassified information. 

·This legislation·could include requirlng the 

head or a federal agency to suspend the security clearance of an individual vJho intentionally or recklessly fails to comply with 

security procedures for handling classified 

information. The legislation could also provide fur the ability of an agency's Inspector 

General to make recommendations to the 

President related to potential violations of 

seq.Jrity procedures by senior agency officials. Finally, the legislation should consider 

mandating annual training for an individuals 

with access to classified information on se-

- ._ I 

curity procedures for handling classified information. 

{U} Recommendation #26: The Executive 

Branch should consider institu~ng.mandatory polygraphs for all non-confirmed political appointees that have top secret 

clearances. 

(U) Despite employees in the Executive 

Branch having extraordinary access to a significant amount of highly classified information, there are very few processes in 

place to ensure that these individuals handle such information appropriately. 

(U) The DNI is responsible for policies 

and procedures governing "eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility t~ 

hold a sensitive position made by any agency_." However, pursuant to ICD 704, the DNI 

detegated the authority to grant .access to 

an IC element's Sensitive Compartmented 

Information (SCI} and other controlled access program information to the heads of 

such element. As it relaies to the administration of polygraphs during personnel security vetting, the DNI issued lntel!igenc~ 

Community Policy Guidance {ICPG) 704.6. 

{U} ICPG 704.6 provides basic instruction as to the types of polygraphs and circumstances by which polygraphs should be 

administered. While IC elements should 

have ~iscretion in terms of the timing and 

circumstances by which to conduct S!Ps, 

every employee not subject to Senateconfirmation that is granted access to TOP 

SECRET classified information should be 

PROPERTY OF THE u.s_ HOUSE Of' Rl:PRESl:NTA11\IES 129 
--~·-., 

subject to at least a counterintelligence 

scope polygraph (CSP). As a result, the DNI 

should revise ICD 704 and ICPG 704.6 to 

specifically reflect this requirement. 

1. so u.s.c. § 1804. 

2. so u.s.c. § 1801. 

3. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures During the 2016.Election Campaign," May 23, 2017, pp. 31-32. 

4. Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley v. Democratic National Committee and HIiiary for America, 

"Complaint," Federal Election Commission, www.campaignlegalc1:nter.org/document/fec-complaint-hillary-america-dncfailure-disclose. Oct. 25, 2017. 

5. 52 U.S.C. § 30121; 11 CFR 110.20. 

6. Pub. L No. 112-277, § 504 (2013). 

---- ---

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 130 
(U} Appendix A - Scope and Methodology 

(U} On January 25, 2017, Chairman 

Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff released 

a joint statement detailing the Committee's 

inquiry into the Russian active measures 

campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election.1 The final parameters of the 

Russia investigation were ~greed to by 

Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member 

Schiff on l'v1arch 1, 2017.2 The review's key 

questions were: {1) what Russian cyber activity cJnd other active measures were directed against the Unite~ States and its allies; (2} did the Russian active measures include links between Russia and individuals 

associated with political campaigns or any 

other U.S. persons; (3 } what 1.-vas the U.S. 

government response to t hese Russian active meas.ures and what do we need to do 

to protect ourserves and our allies in the 

future; and (4} what possible lea!<s of classified information took place related to the 

Intelligence Community's assessment of 

these matters?The Committee remained 

focused on investigating the answers to 

these four questions and designed the investigation's methodofogv around them. 

(U) Tne Committee interviewed and/or 

transcribed testimony from 73 witnesses, 

conducted 9 open and closed hearings and 

briefings, and issued 20 subpoenas. The 

Committee identified witnesses to interview 

by reviewing open source material, including news reports; official U.S. government 

documents, including classified lntellrgence 

IC source material; IC agency briefings; and 

following up on leads acquired from formal 

transcribed interviews with current and former administration officials, as well as volunteers who offered pertinent testimony or 

documents to the Committee. In some instances, prospective witnesses were unresponsive or unwilling to be interviewed. 

When appropriate, Congressman K. Michael 

Conaway, in consultation with the Ranking 

Member, made a recommendation to the 

Committee Chairman Devin Nunes in accordance with Rules of Procedure for the 

Permanent Select Committee on intelligence 

to issue a subpoena:~ Subpoenas were used 

to compel witnesses to appear as well as t o 

compel the production of pertinent documents in compliance with the Committee's 

lal<'.rful authority. Six of the witnesses the 

Committee requested to inteNie\•.., invoked 

their 5th amendment protections from selfincrimination, which resulted in the Committee not being able to obtain pertinent 

information from those particular individuals. 

(U) During the interviews, the Committee Members and staff questioned the 

witnesses about activities that generally 

took place bet\veen April 2015 and January 

2017. lf the Committee discovered anything 

that arose before April 2015 or after January 

2017, the Committee made a determination 

of its relevancy. If it was identified to have 

an impact on the campaign or election, the 

Committee defined it as relevant and included it within the scope. However, none of 

FRCPffilY OF THE U.S. EOUSE OF REPRE:SE~ITATlVES 131 
the witnesses interviewed indicated potential collusion that would have led the Committee to adapt a broader scope. The Committee also collected over 307,900 documents and 230 hours of witness testimony. 

{U} What Russian cyber activity and other 

active measures were directed against the 

Unim<l States and its allies? 

(C//NF) tts, The Committee collected and analyzed IC products on Russian influence operations and activities from the period beginning with the summer of 2015 and ending in 

January 2011:~ The Committee did not examine the motivation of the Russian actors, 

but instead focused on w ilat it found about 

the Russian's activities. The Committee also 

spent approximately 1,200 hours reviewtng 

the classified Intelligence Com_munity Assessment on Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent Elections {ICA), -

- In addition, the Committee interviewed the Chief of the CIA Director's fusion 

cell, which was an interagency analytic 

group run by the CIA that \.~s stood u'9 

- to produce products focused on 

Russian cf ber and other influence activities 

targeting the United States. The Committee 

also interviewed the FBl's Section Chief for 

the Bureau's Count~rintelHgence Analysis 

Section. rn addition, the Committee traveled 

to Buigari3, Cypress, Estonia, Germany, f\."IOI· 

dova, Ukraine,_andthe Unite~ K1ngdom to 

intervie\v these nation's foreign inteliigence 

services about the Russ;an active measures 

against their governments. 

(U} Did the Russian active measures include links between Russia and individuals 

associated with political campaigns or any 

other U.S. persons? 

{U) The Committee investigated facts 

r~!ated to the FBl's investigation through 

May 20171 until the appointment of Special 

Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee 

avoided examining events thereafter to 

avoid interfering with the Special Counsel's 

investigation. The Committee also examined allegations of collusion by investigating 

the interaction between the political campaigns and Russian agents of influence during the 2016 election cycle. The election 

cycle was defined as April 12, 2015, when 

Hillary Clinton launched her campaign fo_r 

President through November 8, 2016, or 

election day. To answer this question, the 

Committee met \Mith the head of Counter-intelligence for the DOJ to understand the 

context ;;u;d events surrounding the investigation into the Trump campaign. The Committee afso interviewed several officials 

from the FBI and DOJ to collect official testimony about the investigation. In addition, 

the. Committee collected and reviewed pertinent FBI and DOJ documentsaboutth_e 

counterintelligence investigation. The Committee also coordinated do~ely with the 

Office of Special Counsel. For example, the 

Committee shared the list of witnesses that 

the Committee interviewed and kept the 

Special Counsel's omce apprised of any 

changes or developments on a monthly baPROPERTYOFTh"F.: IJ.S. HOUSl: OF RE:PRF:Sr:NTATM:S 132 
sis. 

(U) What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures 

and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future? 

The Committee interviewed current and 

former officials at the NSA, FBI, and CIA. The 

Committee interviewed these witnesses 

about Russia's active measures, the 1mpact 

these active measures had on U.S. intelligence relationships and alliances, as well as 

the agencies' response to these attacks. In 

addition, the Committee t raveled to seven 

countries in Europe and met with IC, Department of State, and foreign intelligence 

service representatives to obtain other nations' perspectives about the Russian active 

measures, the pot@ntial impacts of these 

measures, and the U.S. government and its 

allies' response. 

(U) What possible leaks of classified 

information took place related to the Intelligence Community's assessment of these 

matters? 

{U} The Committee collected, reviewed, 

and analyzed open source articles containing leaks that occurred between the IC's establishment of the OA Director'.s fusion cell 

and the publication of the 

classified and declassified version of the ICA 

in January 2017. In addition, the Committee 

collected and analyzed laws and policies 

pertaining to the release or publication of 

classified information. Finalty, the Committee also compared the leaks found in the 

identified articles to the classified and u nclassified Intelligence Community Assessment to determine any similarities. 

1. HPSQ, NJ;;int Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSO lnc;uiry Into Russian Activa M e;isuras," Press Relea!.eS_ intelli· 

,!€£lce..h;:;=.eov,J~n- 2 5, 10::.7. 

2. HPSO, "lrr.ellieence Commtcee Chairman, R:rnkiog.Member fstabli.;h Parame:ters for Russia ln'Jestigation/ in,elftl!Ence.i:c.~.!~.gov, MM. l , 101'7. 

3. HPSC1, Rl:!e.S of Procedure f or ,lre Pcrmcnent Sc.'eer Commirrec on llllel!lger.ce, United Statas House of Repte_=_ntativ<:S, 

1l5:l>Con~....s5. 

4. The IC comprtses n dlfforent o:-gani?ot:ons, or IC e lemo,ts, to include the Offu;e of~ Director of Nation.ii !n-re:ligenre, 

the Ce.,!ra I Intelligence /\gency, .r.e Federal Bureau of Jn-.odgation, ttie Office of lnteillgence and Count~nte3fge nce at 

the Department of EMrgy, !he! Office of National Security Intelligence a t the Di!partrnent of Justke's Drug Enforcerr.eot 

Adm,r-.istration, the Office of !.T.elfjgenc.e and Analysi5 at the Department of Hcmeland Securtw, the Bureau oi lnt!:111· 

ger.ce ar.rl Research <1t tl\e Oepamnen, of S~ate, the Olr.ce of IJ'lte!Ugenc.e and Analysis a, the Department ofT~ury, Air 

force fmefligence, Arm\' lntelrigence, Coast Guard lnt<!lligC?Jltc, Defense Intelligence .~gency, r•Aa ritle Corps 1n!efiigence, 

National Goospatial-!ntelligance Jl.gency, N.itional Reconnai:.sance Office, !{ational Sea..crity Agency, and Navy tmelligente. For the pu,pose5 of this review, tho Commlttoe re-.rie,...oed lntenigence products fro.n the Central ln~ence AgenC'i, Federal Bureau of lnYestiifcjtion, and National security ~ncy berousl? ttlllSe aeencieswere the IC pan:neu for community-v.'id~ assess,net\t of It~" a~tiva l\'l~asur~. 

FRCPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

133 
{U} Appendix B - Russia lnvestig_ation Parameters 

----. - ----·- ·---... - -- - - ---- ----

TOPIC 

· HPSCI TNQl)lRIES At"'l"D INVESTIGATIONS 

SCOPE. OF t't'VESTIGATIO~ 

BI-PARTTSA."l l:"rQtlRYINTO RUSSIAl"' ACTIVE MEASURES 

An examination imo Russia., cyber activity 3.1d mher active measures o1rccred· at 1hc 2016 l J .S. 

election. · 

PL'RPOSE 

Whal probl= are you frytr:g if1 s11lo,e? 

One ofHPSCI's highest priorities is oversighi oftk Intelligence Community"., aclivilic:; to 

c.ounter Rus:-i<L"l aggn:s:;ion, including th:: cyucr-a1tacks directed 9.gain,--:t the United Seate;: in the 

last year. As pl!rt ofttiis ovi:r.,ight respv,;~bility, lht.: Comrailtee isnnd~ga bi-parJsan 

invcstigi:tion imo these activitie~ di reeled at the 20! 6 election and tt,c imdcr!ykg intclligc:1cc 

used to draftlhefurelligel'..ce Conwuruty 1~eu~ ~aussiru\ Actr~irn:sand lntcnfoms m . RQCcnl us Ele-.-t:ans." The investigation will ~p lli Octtenmde;staw.Russi..P.n acti,,e mcasun:S 

agcirn,i the United States and our allies and infonn efforu co prcv~ simlk cpisod~ in lhe 

future, bolh bcrc arid abroad. 

1J'f10 is >-OW' fntende;J ii~rJienur_ . 

Tnc inteudcd imciCilcc is tlre Members oi BPSC! and- to the extent jl:mJiUt:c by classification 

and .~ecurily ruks-thc b.rwocr House ofR~tativcs itml th: An:~ pceople. · 

What (JTe tilt! key qu.1?Stio11s y<1ll l·e:ek to answer?_ 

• \','hat R.;ssfan cyber activity all:d other active measmes ,\'C!"C di,cctcd i,ga)n:it the·tJniled 

Slllles mid lts anic:s? 

• \'lhai: co.m:e..•inrelligc:1ice conee.-ns eXist related to Russia and.the 20l6 U.S. election);. 

including any intelligence regarding lin.1<5 ~ctwccn Russia a."'!!! intff\.'itl!!l!l~ a;;sociated v.1th 

!)Oliticul =npaign3? 

• What was tlk USG respot1~e IO !hes;: Rns:;ian active mea;;ur,;s an:d t>,11a! impact, if any, 

did the Ri.s.,i:m activity have oo intellig=e relationships li!iO u~ditfom,l ul!iances? 

• ·V..ilJat po5:>:.b1e ieaks of classified info!m:iti.o.:i took place rc1Rted lo th: lnlcllig~t1ce 

Community·s z..,~essmCflt of th= maue.s? 

WltaJ is your inrerutd olltcome prot!ud(s)? . 

The Con1mi1tce i:niends to C<\mplelc a FepOrt al the highest c]asi;i lic:ition net.-e.ssat;' to ans~cr the 

key qu~-tions ~ where possio!e, rcpo.t(s) at !ewer clas.~iicntlon );;Vcls rel~--ai:ile to the House 

ofRcprescntati,;cs a:id d1e public, as ;apjl!Oy-i-at::. 

i 

PROPER1Y OF THE U..S_ HO<JS!:: OF REPRE:S~NTA71VES 134 
· Wltat i11te11ded impact will tltere be/or budget, legislatio11, or press? 

The inquiry and report may uncover vulnerabilities within the Intelligence Community and/or 

USG agencies or institutions. Ifso, the Committee may identify avenues of improvement that 

would be reflected in IAA provisions, stand-alone legislation, IC budget adjustments, and/or 

further areas to focus HP.SCI's oversight efforts. 

The Committee also expects that there will be significant interest from the press, given the 

delicate poli~ical issues surrounding the topic. Staff will remain bi-partisan and focus solely on 

the facts u.ncovered in our investigation. 

What i11te11ded effect do yo11111a11t those products to have? How does that fit i11to the 

Committee's overl·lgllt p/a11? 

The objective is lo better understand Russian active mcusures directed at the 2016 U.S. election, 

and to better position the re and the broader USO to respond to and defend against the threat. 

SCOPE 

What are the boundaries of your review? Please co11sider time, s11bsta11ce, 11ge11cy, and ra11ge 

of activities. . · 

Time: 

The Committee. will focus primarily on Russian active measures deployed during the 2015-2017 

timeframe,·but may pursue activities germane to the investigation that took place outside this 

window. · 

Substance: 

• What: The Committee will investigate Russian activities airried at USG agencies, political 

parties, NGOs, individuals, and private industry, .as appropriate. 

The investigation will also assess whether there is any 

intelligence that identifies insider threat or CI concerns, including whether Russian 

activity involved any USPs, including those on or associated with campaigns. 

o · The investigati<>n will also consider what USG officials believe to be the impact 

. to U.S. intelljgence of both Russian active measures related to the election·and the 

associated recent disclosures. 

• How: The Committee will investigate the methods by which Russia -targeted the 

aforementioned groups. 

• Why: The investigation will consider Russian leadership plans and intentions, including 

whether and in what ways Russia intended to influence U.S. policy or undermine U.S. 

political systems and democratic institutions. 

• USG response: The Committee will examine how the U.S. government responded to 

Russian active measures. 

It will also·include an assessment of the process used to generate the !C's 

report and any deviations from standard practices in the !C's report. 

2 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

135 
and an accounting of whether a person or persons in the IC or 

the.White House leaked information on the report prior to its dissemination to the Gang 

of Eight, Congress, or the public. 

o The report will also assess whether intelligence relating to U.S. persons was 

collected and disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies. 

• Recommendations: Several recommendations are likely to come out of this investigation. 

Agencies: 

• The Committee expects to be in contact with CIA, NSA, DHS, FBI, DTA, and ODN!. 

However, The Committee will pursue all avenues of inquiry, which may include agencies 

not listed here, 

• The Committee will also engage current and former JC and USG personnel, private 

industry, and any other parties with knowledge relevant to the investigati9n. 

• The Committee will examine the process by which the Intelligence Community 

Assessment, "Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." was created and 

the intelligence underlying tbe assessment to determine whether the JC comported with 

all relevant Intelligence (:ommunity Directives and security precautions when 

researching, writing, analyzing, and releasing their product, and whether the assessments 

meet a reasonable stand~rd of credibility as determined by the investigatory team. The 

Committee will focus on evaluating the IC's work on the Asse~sment with regard to IC 

rules and procedun:s, but not create a new or separate assessment of Russian activities. 

Given the above, a11d competing priorities, whe11 do you expect to complete the project? 

The Committee expects the investigation to take several months, at least, and the drafting of a 

report and any declassification review to·takc additional time thereafter. Above all, the 

investigation will prioritize comprehensiveness over completion by a particular date, while still 

· seeking to move as quickly as possible to ensure the report is timely and useful. 

What if!a11y political or jurisdictio11al issues exist? 

The inquiry's subject matter carries political sensitivities. ~everthelcss, staff will proceed in a bipartisan and objective manner, both in conducting the inquiry and in drafting the report. 

• The CommitteJ's investigation will not interfere with any ongoing criminal or 

counterintelligence investigations. Staff wiil, however, seek relevant law enforcement or 

coun\erintelligence information consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction 

and investigative responsibilities. The objective of seeking such information will be to 

assess whether any collusion occurred between Russians and USPs, and the leaks of 

classified information. 

• The investigation could implicate the work of the agencies within the jurisdiction of 

Homeland Security, Judiciary, Oversight, and Forcigry Affairs Committees. However, 

because the investigation will focus on an active measures campaign by a foreign 

adversary, the investigation clearly lies within the jurisdiction ofHPSCI. Additionally, 

House Rule IO provides that HP SCI shall study the sources and methods of the IC on an "exclusive basis." 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

3 

136 
Wllat if /a11}' c.ampa.ro11entJJ.tio11 l.'in4:s aist? 

Staff ::nd l\·1embcrs conductinft the invo.;6.gflliun \viii nee,j access to G:img of Eigln: mat,;rial. This. 

:iecessi1atei; a sn\llll, nimble group, w,.<l will rc;;quire special nmmgeu::cnts for proper storage of 

· compartmented 1nfonnation al TlPSCl: . 

;\U~11IODOLOGY 

Wi/I it b2 bipartisan? Wlw will be involved? 

This in,-estlgation is bi-JJaIB-'1!1. Gang, of~r access will be: requirci for~ invcstigzrory team. 

• Lead· (),fajority)' (Miuo~) 

• Counsel: 0,..hljority): ~1inority) 

• and {Majorily} 

• {Minorilyj 

{Bi--p"-l"iisan Fellow) · 

What iliformatiotz do ]'(JU anticipate will be Jt~ary to ac/Ileve J,YJW p;uposd 

• Access to and cusroriy of all underlying imelligence used to c=e ti1eintclli~-tn1:e 

Conununity Assessment, "Russia(! Acti,rues and ln(cntions in~ US Elections.'' 

This ii.tcludcs P..porting cturently only ss.--ailabtc fo the Gang of Eight and lhcir Staff 

Directors. . 

• Access to im:I cu:stc,dy of o(hcr relevant -~orting on R.ussfon acti~ mi;a5ure:; 25 ii relates 

co !he timcfiami;o and tupi e:1 described ia th; Scoi:i-e of Investigation, as r_-=ted. 

• In.tcrvie"'-;; i.mh. lJSG and non-USG individmls with lmowkdg1: ofRussi!lll active 

measures. i!icluding those in the fotellig_enee Commwiity, pm ':lll: i.'l!fustry, NGOs, 

pofi1ical · .:s, and.for niher groups. 

• The 

Committee may aL~ wish to engage cyb:cr cxpc;ns fulm oi.:r NaGorr.11 L.<lbs, both resident 

at HPSCI and out:ri.dc the comm.itt~c. 

·-

• Access to d~ and infonnatiotl reg;'.ltdi.ng law enforcement aid <:0U1itcritttelligence 

investigmons, COOS!S!cnt with the Committee"s ovcrsightj urisdi_cti.<lll and invcst.igat.h': 

rcsμousibilli:ies, s fwthcr described ~ho .. c. -

Whal roles wl/1 :'l.femf;ers play? At what poir.1$ will they be brought in !o pruviik fec;.aback or 

guide tire project? Whar Committee evl!l1ts ma)' be necesstuJ•? 

• 'fhe investigation is ofhighc$t interest co HPSCT Membi:,-s. The-7 will ne::d to l~ updated 

on the sla!u:s of ire invc:~tigu1icn at rcguhr mletVals, likely lhrougb bi-partisan 

investigabl;:y t= m~us :ind 11..fajorily- ~,d :,..1inorily-spt:ciijc coon~els, as necessary_ 

• Members mar also re inter~Ced in joinhJ.s interviews if lhc:y are of high intere&. 

• As nccdod, the Comrnitt_cc will hold hcaing:;, both open aoo closed, on clements llfthc 

invc:stigafa,n. 

PRCPEITTY Of THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 137 
i · 

How will yo11 go.tlur infonttatfoo (what types of 4oo.uht!n1 reqll!!sts do you plan. to suim:it; w!,o 

do yo:u plan to inJ.en.•few; wha2 do J'OU iniimtI IQ tra~{)? · 

• Thi: Comrulttc,;: lms.a!r~d}' r equested froni tlreODNlaci;:ess to and cusrody of all 

i,:tel [isence reporting included in the i.ntdlig=.--c Comml.Ulity ;1ss.:ssm;:nt, "Rt1~1111 

Acti \·ittes and hllentions in Recent US Elcc!i<ms. '' 

• ·The Co,:rucitc~ vrill submit forthcr rcquc.st5 fo:r documents. am:! for in1cPticws. as the 

inquiry proc=k 

• The Committee wi!l in tee.view CUITCI+t and former USG j)e:-:,0ru,~J, indUS'lsy pi:~mmel, 

those wlio work or worked in NGOs n.mlinr pDlitic~I p..-.tie5, wit! milers as the Committee 

<lo.:ms app_..-opriate. · 

• The Cornmirtec will al...o00 seek ex.i..'<ling lC in.fomJ.atlon on Russian actr,;ity agam..""t U.S. 

~llit:s during their clecoons. 

llow will yau fde, organiu, mrct retain all of lhe infonI1f11it)11 ~eci.-ed? Hm:e you /(,ctottti in 

su.fficiurt time for dttl<usfjlt'<ltion rt!,'l'e-,9, if r..itcessa.-yl flow will !flat ocaul 

• The CommiltQc: will o~ to 11oo:lllllll0datc document l'C\'i.ew and storage lit HPSC!-

. particularly as it relu!.es to (;(Jrn~meriti:d infomiatiori. Tot Commiue:: will also ~ to 

fuctor in th:c time it may take ~g,:n~ to rt:spond to d<JCUl'l".cnt access requests, 

da:lassiflc~ion reviews, au.d/or ma.lcin~ av.tilcl-ile individutls for interY~Ws wiih me 

investigatory team or l!PSC[ Mei:11),o..rs. . 

• The CommiU=e sl.lffha~~ alrt w.ly s,;t-r .. i, <.UgiW fo[decs on the: fiPSC! clo.~ified system . 

t<> bold all ~evant non-(r.iog ofEight planninsand scoping documcrms, wlth the propt:r 

p,.."DJl.issious ba:ied on re!pOnsihilitie,; and hfajority!'.Ylinori.Iy st~rus. 

Tl:MELINE 

Prol•ide specific intended deadlines for e!lt:ft phase of yow revi;w (drita gmlur/11g, amil,sis.. 

writifzg. Ct1m·di.Jiation/editb1g,publis/Jing.-) 

Tr.e Committee will pim;\fe ii ~ed. bialdiog-biocks c1:pproncl1 II) the inves!igmion, \.,.hlle 

prio.itizing compreh1!nsiveness zbove completion by a fixed end <l.:!.te.. The stri.cluring of the 

im,csngation imo PiY.!..-;es, end the cnnseqw..n!. p;ioritizntion of sp,:qfically identified in~gativc 

acti viti~ or research, will nor re coc1strued to iimit s1aff s ability <O gather or analyze n:krnmt 

lnformation. 

The Co:runittc:e ::;qr~ ca,;h prn;sc will take weeks t" monlht- 1o complet.c. 

• Ph.!s,; l 1,111 focus on initial, g1:11crnl knowledge a1:quis:lhm ~boul lhe Russ[a c!Cti\"E 

measures ~pai!!;l'I, tlJ.c·u.s. ~e, e-01:ntmntelligeneeconcerns, 2nd tlie othar key 

~t!estions id~tified .:.bo\--e. 

o Phas; l will im:l~e rcadin,g ur.tl analy7ing intd ligai~ ~~ relevrint to the 

R.u..~a cyb<::r ~t, inclurJingcll underlying intetligenee usecf:o product th~ 

Intelligence Communhy Asse;s:inent, ~Russian Activities and ktcntions in Ro:.:ent 

US Elections:= 

o Phase ! also \\ill iuclude meetings with USG a1id h:.-dustry pcr:-oo.ncl g~nerally 

knowledgeable abm.r.: the lhrcar; m~io.gs 'hitb USG perso,,n~ koowled~~ 

~boUl th¢ IC"s.malytic proc,:..<s;,and mcctings with furm~-r USG ~trtS 

FROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE.ORES!:l'-JTA n vES 

5 

138 
1 

lrnowlc:dBc;1blc; about tJSG posture against the Rus~in 1.3.IBct, to include 

countorintclligcnce.. 

o Ph«~c 1 also will include witness testimony, following investigative leads, and 

docwnem pro~uction relative co the IC As.~essrnent, counteri1ltelli3ence concerns, 

the USG responst:, nnd lellk nllr;g.~(ltw;. 

o Throughout rh~ l , the Commi ttet will pun;ue tlocumi:nt ACc1uisition and 

schedule ioterYiews neces..~Qt)' to conduct l'h,ise 2. 

,, Phase 2 wjll build on tlie baseline knowledge acquired ill Pha.;e 1 through a focused and 

spcci.fic'invcstigation. · 

o Phase 2 will include a detailed analysis of the intelligence producti~n process and 

oonclu~ions in the .Intelligence Community Asscssme..llt, "Russian Acti,,.[ties and 

Intentions in Recent US ElectioilS" to assess whcilier the IC componcd wifo all 

re.Jevnnt Intcl!igenc:c Community Dh~ctives and sccur:ity pri:cuutions wh~n 

~~rching., w,iting, iurnl:1?:ing, 11ml rclca~i:n~ 1hcir n~~m1.mt. 

·o Phase 2 will include inten•icws wi!h ~pecil.ic; USG uml industry personnel 

knowledgeclile obout rhc specilic !opics discusml in Uie !C's ~port ;mJ tl1e 

·process u~d 10 ~rn\pile, ~ view, 110\l 1lissr:minlltc \he IC's reporl. 

o Phnw 2 may inclu1lc dclllilctl inlcr..·icws nm1 unuly~is regarding the Russhm nctivc 

owm,urc:s cumpaign i the U.S. rcspon.sc; countorintclllicncc con\lcm:;; lhe impuct 

or H,,~~i ~n acth10 m~,i, urc~ on U.$, ;,Illes; mid whether 1ho IC or the \~~1itc Hou~c 

lont<ed lnfonnullon oo rhc report prlor 10 i~ 11i~~cmln11tion 10· ll1e Gnng or night, 

C.:ongrcss, or t11~ public. · 

• Phui;e 3 wlll loco:i oa wr1tinu. ooordlnnt Ing, cdi11n{l, u:onsmltlinfl fol' doclossilication 

review (if nc~ssary), imd rclonslug tho Commlltr.c's reports ot appropriutc clnSlli!lcaiicm 

lcvc;!:;. 

• TI1ru111>hout nil three phases; the Committee. will engage Members for ru1y fc\'.:db~s:k imd 

incolJlorn\~ thnt f~back lnlo our proccsii'. · 

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Com:mittee' s Ruh:s of Pro~un:., I 15th c:ong~s. we hereby jointly 

agree to the scope of investigation descnoed above. 

- t;i?J!6_ <lnm Schiff 

Date: Fcbruruy 2?, 2017 

6 

PROPERTY OF 1HE U.S. HOUSE OF REP RESENTATJV!':S 139 
(U) Appendix C- Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus 

{U} Rossiya Segodn ya 

{U} Created by Putin in 2013, Rossiya 

Segodnya is Russia's overarching state media company. Rossiya Sogodnya acts as an 

umbrella fur outlets like RT and Sputnik. 

· ''Rossiya Segodnya" is translated as "Russia_ 

Today,~ but it is different from the television 

channel with the same name. According to 

Russian press reporting, in September 2014, 

Moscow tripled Rossiya Segodoya's budget 

to 6.4S billion rubles and increased RT's 

2015 budget by 41 percent to 15.38 billion 

rubles, which is equivalent to roughly $600 

million. 

(U) Russia Today (RT} 

{U) This 24-hour worldwide television 

(iV) and online network was created in 

2005 to promote Russia's image abroad and 

to show foreigners world events from a Russian perspective. Nominally independent 

. but Kremlin-controlled and funded, Russia 

..... To deemphasize its Russian origin, 

Russia Today was rebranded RT in 200S: . 

{Uj RT employs 2,000 staff to ~rovide 

coverage in Russian, English, Arabic, French, 

· German, and Spanish in 100 countries and 

on the Internet from its studios in Moscow 

and \Vashington DC. Rrs central slogan, 

"Question More," is indicative of its overarching goal to urge viewers to do·ubt everyI 

thing they see in Western media and from 

its leaders. 

(U) Sputnik 

(U) A l:\ussian state-owned network o f 

media platforms producing radio, social media, and news content, Sputnik was created 

[n 2014 to act as Russia's multimedia hub. 

Sputnik is based in 28 countries and operates in 3 3 differen~ languages, broadcasting 

pro-Russian messaging and disinformation. 

A recent GAO study found that Sputnik·promotes anti-West narr~tives and undermines 

(U) Russia Beyond the Headlines 

(U} Less ideologically hostile than RT 

and Sputnik, Russia Beyond the Headlines 

(RBTH) pays for printed inserts in many 

leading European newspapers and targets 

Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, 

[taly, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, 

and the UK. Comparatively less antiAmerican in tone, RBTH provides another 

avenue for Russian propaganda to reach 

wide audiences in these European coun-
1. 

2. GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformati'on Overseas; May 2017. 

3. 

4. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
(U) Appendix E - HPSCI Majority Memo about FISA Abuses 

To: 

From: 

Subject: 

1:XCLASSH11ED 

Junuart; rs, io 18 

Hl'SCl M.1jority Members 

f-'reign m1.dlir;:m .. ~ Survci\lw= Act Abl!!;eS 01 the nej)1Utm=11r &f:Jus1ice and 1he 

Fcd,ml1 Bur~u oflllwstig:uion 

Thil. mi::rrll.)t~t!<:lnm pr0vi~~ ::'i.iember. llil update ao ~ignifi~ fact!'. r.:laring to t~ 

~mmittee's 1rngoin~ i;wc,"'ti~atiCM1 i11ro rr.e De;,2t1mem .s·.iuruce (OOJ} and F~ral Bu~ of 

ln•.vslig:u-fon ('iBl) 3!ld thi3ir use oflh,: i:'01ei~ .!ntt'llli~ Sut,·cill~ A~ (.f!SA) durio~th::: 

"2016 pr~dc:itbl <Jlection cyck Our findings. which ~<l.;t~]cd !,;low, I) rn.is:;c.:,nuems 1;1:1!.h 

lhc kgitin~scy and leg:ility of ~anru:i OOJ and FBT intcrwio;;s wi!h the for.:isn !ntellig~~ 

S!!r1eill.mcc c~urt (FffiC), :i:ncl 2) r.:pu:~i!lli 11 ~ling bn:cl.do1,0n one~ p~s est~bii:sll.«I 

to prote~'1 Qie Amcn~.!ll p,:,Jple lhnu abuse; tclato:il to cm F!SA pro=. 

ln"estlgqtio11 l '~fate 

On 0...-i:ob.rr 21, 2016, DO.I=.! l;BI ..ougl-tt ant! received .i r'!SA prol>tb-lc c-au~c ord.:r 

(!:!fi uud~r Tille VII) oi.."tilori1_iilg : fectrorlic sur\-c:1llnn~ ,'!l ~~ P~g.; fa:,m tb.~ P1SC. t>ag;;, is ~ 

U.S. citizeil vmo serve..! flS a vo!t~r adv~no th~ Tromp p1esid~ial ~ip:ugn. C.On.-ir.'--ot 

witll_r.:quircm~c..~ und~FISA, tl1~applic:uio11 l-~~ t., he fi_r,;tcc:tjfi=d oy the Director or Drput1 

Di!tctor orth.: FBT. It lh~"'ll !\.'l{uir.;,d ihc appro•~ ol'th:: Attorm:y G::neml, D~p~• Attom:y 

~eml (??AG}, 01· the S=nn!s!-ccmfrrmcd -~~t Att~~~ (i~:ieral for the ~a:tioro\ Sec;n:ity 

Di\'i.sio11. 

'!be E'Br rid OOJ o'ht.rirn:d on.c :niti!il FJSA wammt .argeting c.:rt.:r l'as<! imd mree r!S~\ 

r~wals fam ih<! FISC. As ret{Uired by~Wtu!c(50 li.S.C. §180:i{di{l)), n FISAord;;r on .m 

-~meric:m citiz.::n must be =~wed :i.y 1he rll>C every 9(1 day;; ,incl ;..-:!!cl) r.:T>Ct\•111 £>aqw.res a 

1"~t)'.1I"<1te finding or prubab!..: cause. Th~n-Dir.::.:ior Jamc:s Corney sig..ed tbrc:e FISA app!icatiom 

u.1 qnestion :.'.!11. b.!lwf oft11'! FBl, and Deputy Dir¢C1or .-\!u:hew Mewl>:: signed Oll<}. Tncn-DAG 

Silly Y~. th~-Acting DAG !>meBoe:ne, ana DAG Rod Rommcin c~h !-igw.d orw or rr<Q,-:o 

FISA npplicdiun~ on ru:lulfofOOJ. 

nu~ tot~ sensitive nature of fu:ciei., imcl.Li5cncc n~·. FJSA S?1b1nis.~ions (including 

.rcnev. :ils) bcfon:: the FiSC arc dassifi-::d. A.-, such, !11:> public•; a.:cnfid~uce in !he wt~ grity ofth~ 

fiSa\ proc~ <.!~pends on me court's llbtlityto hold the ~ovi:rn.·nan IQ the hlghes!,;,mndl'Jdp.'.ll!icu[ruiy ~ ii rc)nt::s to "tl:('vciil=.cc of Amcri~.!n ci~ How.: .. -cr. the FI'SC's 1isor hi 

prot.:~1i:l~ 1he righls of Amcric:cns, wbich i~ remfurc::d b:.g.Q.J::y reG:::WillS of =cillar= 

ilrd!:n;, is n=sarily d~dent on the sov=t' ~ production to tfle court of al! m:\t,ri.:tl :iad 

~-v.:u1l fa ~. •• 11rls shocld inoh1de in.formation potentially fuvornbl~ ,o th,e !Mgd. of the FJSA 

t;XCLASfiTFlED 

PROPERTY OF THE lJ.S. !-=.OUSE: OF RcFRESEl';fATIVES 

142 
UNCLASSIFIED 

application that is known by the goven.uuent. In the case of Carter Page, the government had at 

least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide an accounting of the 

relevant facts. However, our findings indicate that, as described below, material and rel evant 

infonnation was omitted. 

1) l11e .. dossier" compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the 

Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Hillary Clinton campaign fom1ed an 

essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was u longtime FBI source wh9 

was paid over SI60,000 by the DNC and Clinton campaign, via the law finn Perkins Coie 

and research firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory infonuation on Donald Tnimp's ti es 

to Russia. 

a) Neitl1cr the initial application in October 20 t6, nor any of the renewals, disclose or 

reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding 

Steele's effo11S, even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then· 

known to senior DOJ and FBI officials. 

b) l11e initial FISA application notes Steele was worlcing for a muned U.S. person, but 

docs not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid'by a U.S. law 

finn (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known b y DOJ at the 

time t hat political actors were involved with the St.::ele dossier). ·me application does 

not meution Steo:le was u!timati:ly working on behalf of-and paid by-the DNC mid 

Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately B\lthorized payment to Steele for the 

same inJ:onnation. 

2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited c>."tensively n September 23, 20 l6, Yahoo 

News article by Michael Isikofl: which focuses 0 11 Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow. 

·111is article docs not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from infonnation 

leaked ~v Steele himself to Yahoo News. 111e Page PISA application incorrectly usscsses 

that Steele did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in 

British court filings that he met with Yahoo News- and se\leral other outlets- in 

September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele's 

initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C. in 

2016 with Skele and Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed. 

a) Steele was suspended and then tem1inated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines 

as Ilic most serious of violations-an unauthorized disclosure to the media of his 

relationship with the FB[ in an October 30, 2016,Mmher Jones article by David 

Corn. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with 

Yahoo and otlJ.eroutlets in September- before !lie Page application was submitted to 

UNCLASSIFillD 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 143 
UNCLASSIFIED 

the FISC in October- but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about 

those contacts. 

b) Steele's numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rnle of source 

handling-maintainingconiidentiality- and demonstrated that Steele had become a 

less than reliable source for the FBI. 

3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via 

then-Associate Deputy Attorney General l:lmce Ohr, a senior DOJ ollicial who w~rked 

closely with Deputy Attorneys Gen eral Yates and later Rosenstein. Shortly after the 

election, the FBJ began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele. 

For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against thencandidate Tntmp when Steele said he "was desperate tlmt Donald Trump not get 

elected and was passionate about him not being president." TI1is clear evidence of 

Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the lime and subsequently in official FBI files-but 

not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications. 

a) During this same time period, Ohr's wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in 

the cultivation of opposition research on Tmmp. Ohr later provided th e FBl with all 

of his wifo's opposition reseal'ch, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via 

Fusion GPS. The Ohrs' relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably 

concealed from the rise. 

4) According to the head of the FBl's counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill 

Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier wns in its "infancy" at the time ofthe initial 

Page F[SA application. After Steele was tem1inatcd, a source validation roport conducted 

by an independent u nit within f:BI assessed Steele's reporting as only minimally 

corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Corney briefod President-elect Trnmp 

on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was- accordiug to his Ju11e 2017 

testimony-"salacious and unv,:ri!ied." While the FISA application relied on St.:ele's 

past record of credible reporting on other unrelated matters, it ignored or concealed his 

anti-Tmmp fmancin! and ideological motiva\ions.· Furthennore, Deputy Director 

McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrnnt 

would have been sought from the FISC without the S1c:ele dossier information. 

UNCLASSIFIED 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

144 
UNCLASSIFIED 

5) TI1e Page FISA application also mentions i.nfonnation regarding fellow Tmmp campaign 

advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence ol' any cooperation or conspiracy 

b.itwecn Page and Papadopoulos. ]11e Papadopoulos infom1ation triggcrcd the opening 

ofan FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by rm agent Pete Strzok. 

Slrwk was reassigned by tbc Special Counsel's Office to fBI Hurnnn Resources for 

improper tell.1 mess.ages with his mistress, FBI Attomey Lisa Page (110 !mown relntion to 

Carter Page), ,vherc they bolh demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of 

Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. TI1c Strzok/Lisa Page texts also reflect 

e:1.1e11sive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the media, and 

include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an "insurance'' policy agaiiist 

Presidf!nt Trump's election. 

UNCLASSII<IED 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 145 
{U) Appendix F --HPSCI Minority Memo about FISA Abuses 

TO! AH Mcmbc:Ts of\hc Hollo~ qf R~prucntotivcs 

FROM: HPSCl Mi110rity 

DATE: J11nuary29.2018 

RE: Corcectiiig tuQ RctOTd :-T.hl! [tlisji:t Jn,'c-stigation" 

Tile HPSCI Majori(y's m:>ve to rclc= tot~ House cf Rcp~..itivcs its llllcs:3tioo.:s agair.st lhc 

Federal Burent1 ofinv1mis;itio~ (Fnl) end the Di:~rmmt of Ju.siicc (DOJ) is a rrans~cnt effort 

to und.?rmin~ those agcncks, the Special Cou,1!CI, a.'lrl. Congress' in\-cstig.itions. II 11lso risk! 

publ:c C.'<pOSUTC of scnsiti\·c sou= am:'I methods (OT no tcgitim!!c p1U'\JO& 

FBI and DOJ officials did w "nbuse" 1h:: Forcign ln1cllf~c:t1er.: Sun•cillancc Ac1 {FISA) ~ess. 

omit moterlnl infoIJTl.'ltion. or sub\lcrt this vital tool to spy on the Trump camp;i;ign. 

ln foct, DOJ and the FBI would hawi teen nmiss in thecr ciucy to p:ote-.."'1 the C'O'JnUy !rad mC}' not 

soug,u ct FISA wzrrnnt and ~cd n:n.cmi!>. to wr.du.ct lcmporccy sur,..cilhl=: of uutcr ~ .. ~c. 

someone tlte f.BI asse.'i$1:d to be an 11gcru oflhc RUSS'".an go\'rmumnL DOJ met the .!imrs 

lransi,arenc.:, ~ud C\i£i.!J~i bmis ·11~ to nteet FlSA ;s prooob!e i:.iuse rTaquiremen(. by 

dem:::.i.slntt!ng: 

o contampor:uteolli evirlenc~ of ~!.Si.o's ek-..tion interf=~; 

o concerning Ru~an link:, nnd o~ac-h Ir> Trwnp co.m~in c>niciJi.ls; 

o Paie's history wilhRussian int.cllf-sencc; nnrl 

o P.age's su::plcious nctMtlcs io 2016, including in Mi&Ow. 

·rt:i.e Committee's Minority 1!53 thcrefore Jm!parcd !his memorandum to corrc:1 the record: 

• Cb'r.tslophcr Steele•, raw iotclligm~ rcpo rli.Dg did not lnforn1 the rn.rs decision ,a 

initle1c !a counf~rinlcUigcnce im·estig•tion in lste July 1016. In fuct. ~ rBl'si:loscly-

!leld inV1:S1ipth~ team only received Steele's ·rqioning in mid-Scp1tml;,,;r- more lnmt S-e\'tn 

weeks le1er. TI:e FBI - 8ml, subscqmntly, the SpccfaJ Coun~I 's - i nvesti~tion in!o links 

between I.he R~inn GOVC!iJ,"r11:nl ll.n.d Trump cMOp..1ign '1Ssoi:btcs bas be.en based l>ll 

troublins law enfortr:mrnt and intcllig_cm:c inform:?tlon t1nn:1'ltcd lo the ... dossier."' 

• DOJ's Octo~rll, 2016 FISA 01>plii:.,Hloa..11.11d tflr~c suln-cqu_ent renm-nls cru-~fully 

outlinetl f()r the Cnurt ~ multi-pronged mtlonnlc !o:-sitl"\·eilling Page, who, at me tirne of 

d~c fir.it npplicatiot1, v.ns oo longer ~ith the Trump CArn))llig~ DOI detrukd Pege's past 

rebt!onslilps \\ith Russi!ln S!Res nnd imcrnctfo:, with Russinn officie.ls during the 2016 

campaign • DOJ cited multiple soonxs to support lhc; c~c for 

s!!::vcil!ing Pnge-buI ~de only narrow ll!lo ofinfonnatlon fr~m Srccle's source:;i !!bout 

Psge's specific acfo'i1il:s in 20 l 6, chiefly his s~<red July 2.016 meeti.r..gs in M~oow \\i th 

R~iu., officiirls. la f&el. 

tbc FBl i.nlen•kwcd P(l:ge io Murch 2016 nbout hi; conta.:r.,ith Russian iatclligeocc. lh-: \'cry 

m;:>nlh ~ndidale Don'1d Trump n~ bim a fordgn policy &.,·iso,. 

As OOJ informed tlic Com in suhseqneru rene,~-a!s, 

Ste.cl~·., reporting 11b~I11 Page's MC5cow nte~tia~ • DQj's 

appliea1ions did not o!h=n..ce rely on Steele's rcpotlin2. incl"Jding any "si!oi:iou:s" nlle~:itio11!; 

l 

' 1/ 

P"OP::RlY OF THE U.S . HOUSE OF RFPRESENiATll/ES 

Redactions match 

previously released 

version--no 

additional 1 

redactions taken 

146 
nbout Trump, 11mJ 1h1: F8l n1:var pttld Stcuh: fo1this reporting. Whllc: t;(pln[ninB why Iha FBI 

vlcwed $tC(tk's roporting ond ~ources ~ relir1hh: ant\ m·dibh:, DOJ ruso dl~loscd: 

o St~le'$ J1rior rclntionsltip with lhci Fl31: 

o tho foot of ond rcfuion for his termlnotlon ns n :s.ou~; nnd 

o 1h1a1 uss~sstd polilh:al motiva\ion of thos~ who hln:tl him, 

• TIJ.t Co111mlll1:c MnjoriJy'~ xur:.111onind1.11111 which druw, .,c1~1lvrtr on highly llrn~ltlw 

('l11JsffietJ 1nrorm11tJon, tr1clude~ orhcr Lllslorrlons on<l mlsrcprc.scbllltlons lho111re 

contradicted by. lfle underlyins ~!a:ssi!ied clouumenlS, which the vast rruijority ofM~mbers of 

the Commltte~ and the House hnvc not h1l.~ the; oppol1uni1.:, to l""vicW-· and whi;h Choirmun 

Nunes chose not lo read hini;c:Jf, 1 

Background 

Ou Jwumrr J 8, 20\8, the Committee Mojority, during nn unrelated busincs~ meeting, forced c. 

surpriat: vote 10 ~h:111111 to the (ull Hause lil profpundl)" mis!C11ding,memonmdum alleging s~rious 

ob1iscs by lhe FBI and DOJ. Mnjority slafl'drulkd !ho docwtli:nl iri secrcl rm bdialforCh.iirmM 

Devin NUC\es (w,d rcpo11tdl)> v.ilh gu!tfon~e und inpul from R~p. Trey Oowdy), 11od lheo ru.:slw.J 

1111any-ti.ru: volo \~hhout pripr noti~c. 

Thi.s was by dc-!ign, The oYcrwhelntlng nmJorI1y or Commillco Mornbtrs oovcr rccckro DOJ 

nuU1orlin1lon 10 ncc~ss the: uoderlyhli ~liu,lfied lnform111\01'1, Md th~~rorc could 11 0-t judgo lh~ 

vomc'tty of Chrurm1m Nuoc~' clni~. Due to son~Wve souroC:1 nod 111ctbod.~, DOJ providt;d m:cess 

only 10 Ul1l Commilll!ll1$ Chnir nod Ttmud11s Mcmb\lr (orrespeciive d~~is.um}1 l:\nd limitcc! :;to.ff, 

to fllcllltntc thu Com111lh~':1 itwc~li!!otion Into Rus,ln's coven cumpnisn lo lnnucnce the '201 G 

U.S. cleciions? M DOJ ILi!, cauf1m1~ publicly, it did nol t1ulhorize tho bron~~r relt.Uc ofrh).$ 

informuUon within Congress or to lhtl' public, nnd ChlllJJDll[I Nwic., r~u.s«i to nUow OOJ mid lhc 

FBI lo review his tlocumen1 lllllil lie p<:rmiw:d lhe F61 Director 10 sec it for \he first time lo 

HJlSCl's secure spnccs late on S11ndny, Janu11ry 28 - 10 dayi; nncr diS(:losurc 10 \he J:lou~.' 

ln its Oclober 20 J 6 FISA opplicBHon aod sub~μenl ri!IlewaT!!, DOJ ll(curntely fnfo.nncd the 

Court t)lat 1h.e FB[ initiated its collntcrin1elligc_n~c investiga1ion on Juiy 31, ~0·10, nfl~r r~~ving 

information---.. OcoJllc P1ipadopolllos re~ealetl __ _ 

-thpl~ll. who,t~oklntcrest ioP11pad~ulo~mp 

=Jia.ign foreign- polic 1uMser, infilJ"lll~ him in lute April 20l61.ha1 Russitt 

. Papadopoulos's disclosure, 

mo:n:over, ~cllm:d 11s11irin Jhc: b11~kdrop o( ijiw;iit's os.grei:th·C) c:9vcrt 1:1nnpalgn fo I nffucn tt• 

our c:Jc:dions, which th~ FDJ WM 11tre11dy monitoring.. \Vo W(l\l]d J:11cr lcwa in Pnpadop,.11ilos'1, 

pliai th~tlh~l t~I) infonnat!ort th-c Rtt<tSlnos co!,1111 n~ist b)'llflC1J1yntously relea.~ing were 1hou.!m11ds 

9fHlllory Clint<m1~ cmo.ils.3 

DOJ 1otd the Court the lruth.11.s rC'J>resm1aH011 WtJS consisleol wilh the fBl's undcrl,Ying , 

inve.stlgutivc rccor~, wlJich curm1111ml fonncr:rcnior officiuls I Mei· corruoonw~i.J In extensive 

2 

I' 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. 1-JOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 147 
Committee testimony. Christopher S!eete's Rp,;rting, wlrlgi he beg;m to sh~ ,\ilh ru:i Alf Ggtnt 

thro!J&b the end of October 1016, planed no rnlc in launching tho 

FBl's c:ounterint.elligence investigation into RtiSSian in!erferencc ~rid lin;:s to thr! Trump 

campaign. ln f5ct, Steele's rcponing did no1 rcru:h the counieri~tellig~nc:c; tcam_invc:stiS'ling 

R=ia_ at FBi headqu:mers until mid-Septcmbcr2016, more tbll!l seven Weeks: nfter the fBI 

Q?ened its um:sti'gatfaa, ~!lu~ 1.he prore's existence ,,m; so cl0£e!y held wilhin \he FBf.6 By 

tr~n. the FBl had ~dy opened rub-inquiries into U)divldll,11$ linked to th, TrumP 

can;pnign 

As Committee tcslimo:iy bea.ra <>ill, tM FBI WQuld h.wc conlinucd iu investignticn, incluiμng 

::gain intlividu:ils, c:i;e..,. ifit h;ui :,e\-er received in(ormation from Stcefa, ncve: :ipplied 

for a FISA warmn[ lJe!!ll!! Pu..~. or if the FISC hnd rej:ctcd tho a~l~tion.' 

DOJ's FJSA Aru,ILC!ltion !lnd.R£newal5 

The initial w-arrnnl ~pplica1ion :md sul>seq11cnt rC'llCWills ctt<:lved indcpemle.n1 sautiny m:d 

llJ)prova! by fullt' different federal judges, three of whom were appoin_1cd by l?=it!enl G~rp:; W. 

8~h ilnd oi::e liy Pr~i<l1:nl Roiald Rengsi. DOJ ftrst ~plied to the FISC on October 21, 2016 

for a warnmt to pcnrrit ibe FBI to inittale clmn:mic su.rvcillancc imd physkel ~arch of Page for 

90 dayS: con..~s1ent with RSA reqcit~ena The Couit 31>-p..-o,id tr.tee renewids- in cariy 

January 2017, early April 2017. a.-id Jot~ Juae 2!H7 -'-'ill'cl1 authcnizi:d the FBI to mafoiain 

~ ,\'eiUane¢ on Page until !Ille: Scptem~r101?. Seni<1rD0J m,d FBl offid.als spp<1int~ by lte 

Obama end Tr.llTI p A~nisunlions, including accing Atton-.~y Gero...rol Dan.. B-0ente and Deputy 

Attorney General Rod Rd5enstcin, certified th:: applic:ntions with the Court, 

FlSA wns not used le spy on Trump or ho carn1111ign. Af the Trump c.-.mpai~ and Pa~ ®''C 

1aclmowtcdg.cd, Pn£e: :ndcd his £omni 11ffilk!ti~:; wilb lh:=paign months~ OOJ spplied 

for a \v:rmint. DOJ, moreo\-cr, ,;ubmitted the initial applica~o l~than lh.ree .... ui:s be(ore !bi: 

. clcctlon. e,·crr ilioug!t the FBJ's im·estlg.ntioo had bcc:n ongoing sin:a lbc c:nd of July 2016. 

DOJ's v~t requ::s1 wos based on cornpellin5 e\idcm:eand prob.:bl<: caus~ to bcUc\·c Page was 

knowingly i=isting ciandcstinc Russi/In i.nlcUiicr.cc o~livitles in l.l:e U.S.; 

• Page's Connections ro Russi::in Go\·~rnm~nt 11.ml tnlcllig.cncc Officla~ TI,e FBI h:!d on 

indep;.'lrlent basis for investieotjng Pose's mo1ivnfio11s and actions durin2 the cnmpajm 

lrnnsition. and followinl! the irul'Jgμration. As DOJ d=ribcd in detail to r!::c Court, ~l!l? had 

nn c.xtl!DSi\·e recmd es -

•>i prior te> jornin~ th~ Tnunp crunpsis,,. He ~d~ in Mcw...ow from '2004-

2007 and pursued husin.:5.'i dcaJs with Ruma's sUtC-il\"llcd tnel'g.y comp.my O~.oro3 

PROPERTY o.= aHF.: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

148 
Redactions match previously released version-no additional redactions taken 

Page rcmsiotd on (h~ rndllr oJ Ruisi11n in lelligen~c nnd the F8l. ln 20)3, prosecutor.. 

indicted thr~ omu 1qissian spies, two of whom 1;lfgetetl llESg-e for re....uitmenL The FBI also 

intc.viewcd Pagi:; mcl.tiple times ai>D11t hi! Rw.siun. intelllgr:ncc con~. ir.tluding in Marth 

2016.u The FBI's can~ about and kno\dedgi;:- of Pag,e's cc:1iYi1~ tlrerc:forc long predate 

the FBI's 1ccei5=t ofS!~tl:'s 1nrorm!l.llon. 

• Page's StJSpiciom Ac.ri-Yity Do.ring the 2016 C:impnign: The FJSA .app!;c;,lions also detail 

Pl!gc·s 5USpic:om nctivity nl'\l?r joining the Trump ccmpaign io March 2016. I 

Pose oaw:Ied ra Y...o:scow u; July 20!6; during 

wliich he gev~ e uniYCJStt"J comm~e<meal e:!;;h,:ss -an honor 1.L9'eJJy RServeiJ for ·wcllkno..n luminaries. 

o 3t 4 ln [b~ $'.ll~ifi~ ,ult-s~lillll C)f 1be application$ rh11 I OOJ 1'1!fe~ to ~tceJc's 

nporting on P.1:,:; 4nd hb alk,g~d coonlin11tilln wltl1 'Runirul aI&fab. Ste~Je's 

infonnetionnlxnn Page \YnS consisteru. ,.;lb~ fB1's ~ent ofRussl!ln 

intelligem:: effora to ffl:ruit him nnd 1'.i.s-connections to Russmn _r.r-...0113 oflntere~. 

o ln p:uticuia;, Stec!e·s soum3 rqioited UIB\ Page met s~aratcly wt:Ue ia Russia wilh 

Igor. ~run, a clDseess1fola1C t'lfVlsaimir Put.in end ei<ecuti'!c c~i:ma:n of Rosneft, 

RlWicl.'s .51:l1c;-omrcd oil comp;mj•, mid igor Di\'}"<;kJn, .a s.eitlor Kmnlin official. Scdun 

al legC'dly disi:us5ed die prospect of futu.-e U.S.-Russfo. i:OCfEY ~-peraticm and "an 

ossocinted mm-e tD l.ifl Uknii:at·rclat~d v.es.tem ~ctions ascinst Rus!i.l." Divyckln 

al legcdly <fuclo.."61 ro Pa.gc llml ihe Kremlin J_)l)S?..ssed comproIPJ~mg info~iion o:i 

Clintan ("kamproma1") 8Ild not~d ><the possibilily of its bdng rcle=i;i to Candidate 

# \ '$ campaign."12 [No1e ! "Cnndkla.<e #l" rerers to candid:1.tc Trump.] This c!O:Scl v 

1rack3 what o!hs RnssillJl conhlci, ~-e infomiin& anotb~ To.mp !~tgo policy 

advisor, Geer};:. ~daponlo;;, 

• Tn subsequenl FJSA renewals, DOJ JH"Ovld.cd llddilion;d inform"lion obtiunrd thro!lgb 

multiple: ~udcpcndcnt sourc~ lhnt c11rrabor:1r~d Stc~Jt', rrportlng.. 

0 

This information ccntrod.~ :Pa_ge's No\·mb:r 2, 2017 tcsJimonyto the Conirnittee, ln which 

he i.niliu.lly cic:nfod.any ~ incetings~d tb:;i \~ forced to ·Ddmi1 spea'<fag w~lh 

4 

IU ~I:. 149 
DvorF.ovich !lilt! fl'll!'<:tln& wilh Rosncfi's S~hln..-ttcd im-cslor rcl;.tfu.'JS'. cchi;f, Andrey 

Bmanov. · 

• Th~ Court-:ippro-.,ed sun·cillancc: orl':.J!e illlowed Fm: to rollc-ct \'lllm1b!c in li:lligcn~ 

The F1SA 1\."'tlewals cfcrr..onstrorc WI lhD f'BJ .:olk><:lcd hnpcu1o.nf iri~·~igat:\>t= in{armotfon 

and !tads by cc·nducring Court-nppro\'ed sun-ei!lancc. FOf insta.ricc. 

Pllge's c.ffoits to 

sworn testimony to our Comn,jtl.ec. 

DO.l't Tr.a.nspnr~ncY about Chri.~1onhC!r Stvtlli! 

FAr (rom .. omitti.Dg" m~tc~nl fucu nhcut St~Ye. ,u thi:: Majority da.lm,,~ DO.I rcptatcdly 

lnformccl the Court 11boutSt~c?c'll bnt1,gro1md, ~rcdlbllity, 11nd porenti:il bills. DOJ 

explained in dellli._l Stecl~s p,-for ri;lntionsl1ip ~ithu.1d compcllSlltion from lru: FEH; hrs 

credibility, reporting hi:slory, illld source m:lwnrk; tl'l!! fact of and n:-~ fil'r his h:rminlllcon as fl 

sourc¢ in late October20I6; ruid the likely pmi~ motivn1ion."I of lt.ose who i>Jred Slee le. 

• DOJ w~t tmrupnrcnrwlth Coutt2hootSt~lc's.$0Urdng: Tl'le Committe~Mnjori:y, 

which hcd ea.ii.ie-r att1.tScd ObllJlU\ A<imia.istmion officials of improp:r '"unmasldng. •r f!tults 

DOJ for not r.ev~ling the ru\l'lt~ of specific U.S. ~r.;ons ~ ·entiti~ in the FISA npplkation 

ond subsequec1 renewa~- ln. re.ct, OOJ .lpJ!!'OJlrilllely upheld its i9ngsraudiog. prnctic.e of 

protc,:ting U.S. ~tizcn infomiation Ir; p~fully r.cl "unnui.,king'' U.S. pc-rson and entlty 

names, unless they we~ thcm:;eh-es lM subjc::t of I\ cowiten'ntcllig~tie in.-.·es1ign1ion. ·nru 

1nstead uscl g:nerlc identifiers t1m! pro'i'ided lh.e Court with mere than sufficient info,-mitti<: n 

to undl:TSt!lnd I~~ politic:al conle:ct ofStttk's ~seatch. In an ~leJ\Sl~-c cxplanution·to ~ 

Court, DOJ dlsdoS::?5 that Steel~ 

"i,tLS" flpprcached by (;11 fdan1{/ied U;S.. P~~n/1 wlro fr.diCll/M (0 S:J=~ :Jl{S!eeleJ11 t1Mt a 

U.S.-based f= jlritr'1 r.ad hlwi lr<E irkn.tifi~d U.S, Pl!r.ton ((1 r!or.thta re~!J!'Ch regarding 

Candidate ;;1 •~'I 1it.s to R1wfa. {Ir.;: JdrrJiffecl U.S. fer.fjm and &iI1r&t !1i have o !1mg• 

stcmdlJtg b!lli<;-s:! r~fotlo,uhtp.) T~ i:.lmcijt1J U.S, per um hf~d ~ J.S J Jo ~onduct fh~ 

res~nrr:h. 71>-: /dcnl{jled U.S. Pt:rwn n!!,'eJ' IUNf.red St,111'~ JI.I as !o tl!i! l!:J)!im/!an bchir,,J lite 

re.march m:c Candldaro -fl] '.r ties 10 Jlus:r:D... 11r,1. FBf s~CJrm/es ll-,a; ,Fr,, filirr;1i((ed U.S. Pcr,roq 

w<1s li~/y lookfrr~ {or fnformt1tion ,r.m °rou!,J be user! lo ,(isr::rr;dil Cgr.:Nefarc Ii I 's f(lf12J?(~n. "" 

Co!ltr.>..ry tc> th.: Majority's osscrtiort tltill DOI falls to mentlo:-i ~ Steele's r~c-h {\'2.$ 

commissi'1ned by "P:Olit:cCal w::tors" ,o "obmrn derogatory informa.ioo on Donald Tn.1mp's 

lies to Rusn11,~ DOJ t, fnct lnfomird Ott Court e~urnhily th::it S!ccle WA! blrctl by 

PIWPERiY OF THE; U.S. liOUSE OF R£::PRESENTA llVE.S 150 
polilic:tlly-moth--:itcd U.S. per.sons .11.nd c,nl!tks nod th:it bi! r~~rth np~nrtd"inrN1tkd 

for use "lo disercdil" Tnimp1s ,:ump11lgn. 

• DOJ CXJ)llliocd lhc flll', rca~onnbk bllsb for findin Stcdi: credible: The npplicalions 

correctly dcscn~-"d Stecle os 

. The 2ppltc11ions also ~ S'jen~d Stcclc:'11 rim Ill-yea; 

hi.story of cro:iible .eponins on RU$sia and oll:tr msttcrs, includins..info.rra:itioli OQJ us~ in 

criminal pro~c:-cdings. 27 Senior FBI and DOJ ollicirilis lia~·c r.:~rolly affirmed tot~ 

Committee the reliab:@y and credibility ofSt~le·s ~porting, nn ~;ii\ also rdle1;,cd in 

!lie FOl's ur.der}y;ng sawce documcnlS.21 The FB! Jms uml~na1:cn li rigomos proc~ 10 vet 

allesolions fro:n Steele's reporting, includir.g wilh regard to Pcge.'1 

• The FDI propErly uodficif thi f'ISC i:ifttr II rennf11.2..ltd Sttck .U"ll s~lln:t for n1aklog 

un{lothol"l:ted disdosu«:S to tlii mtdill.. 1hc MajoriLy dt~s no ~ ·ider.~ fr..il \he FBI, prior 

10 filing in; initial 0~ 21, 2016 oppli~i~n, ~loolly knew or should bave kriovm of nny 

nUesedly iru1pp~oprie1c mediCL contacts l>y St.e:I~. Nor do they ei~ niden::e tlult S1cele 

disclosed 19 Yill-.DD! d~111Us iru:luded 511 lhe FlS!, wm'ront, since the.British Couit filings to 

wbich they refer rlo ilDl edtlrcss. wont Steele may have said to Yahoo!. 

DOJ informed the Coun in iis rencwD}s lhat the FBI ~I~ promptly to t~innlc Steele afu:r 

l"1tning f(om hlm {afle; DOJ fili:d tht· first ~t application) tr.at he mrl discus..~ his 

work with a media outkl in [ate lxtom. Tu Januuy 2018 r~wt1\ f11rt.~r e~plaincd to 1he 

Coun that Slccle I.Old 1.he FBI lhVJ he made his unauthorized mC'd.io disclosure betouse of his 

fMlralion 111 D~ Camey's public rmacunccment ,hwtly before the e!c~tion lira! the ffil 

rcopc~ its investigation in((} cnttdidate Clin:on'.s email use •. 

• OOJ·n~nr p,-.hJ S~e !or the "dossier": The Majority assms that 1l1s FBl had "separately 

outho~ pn>menr !a-St~ele fer his n:~rclt on 'Tnnnp but ne_gl«tS to ffi!mtion Ui:it 

payment wns ~~~l!ed ond never Uittde. As the FBl's records m-:1 Commiltee tcsti,mllll)I 

confum.s, althoogh the fBI inilialfy considered c:omp:nsntlon 

St~clo ullho~lcly ncv~r rccclvctl p:iymcnt from the FBI tor 

nny "dosilcr"-rcbkd iDfonnntlo11 • .ll DOJ acaimtely infon:ocd the Coi:rt th111 Steele hntl 

been o.n FBI. c~ human source ~irice •• for which he •,\';li ... cmnpensatcd 

by I.he FB1" - payms for pre\;ow;!y,th:u-cd information of \·sl u.e 

Wlt'l!lated tQ 1be FBI'~ R:nssui invc-stigotion.:;, 

,-\dd itional Omission!.. Error.11 11nd Dislortions in the l',1Ajoritv•5 Memorandum ~ -- . - .. . • DOJ :lppropriaid)" provided lfo: Court wilh .Q cor:nprcb~11slv~ CXJllll:Il:lllon of Russi.n's 

election interfcrcn~. rocludi.llg c~·itlcnce th:11 R11UI11 courr.-d :in.o!bcrTrump c:nmpoign 

~tlt·uor, Pap~ct\l!X'"ulOJ, .\IHI nrnt Ruuilln ~sen~ prcYiC\Ytil tbtir hnck rui(I 

d~semfo11tion ohtokn cmPib, In cfaimiog 1J-~ there is "no cvi~ t}f any coop~ro1ion or 

conspiracy bct\\,:en Fagc aml PapadopoulllS,.-.).1 lhe ~iajori1y milii.ates t1E ffl!Son wiiy DOJ 

spmfa:ally expl~td Russia's ~ounfag of Papadopoulos. Popadopoufo.s's imerattion _\.,ith 

~!l!.11 agents, COllpkd ·with real-time cvidzn;,; ofRltSSian d~i~n inte.fere!JCC, provided 

th1: Ccurt withe bro* ~1."Xt in whicll 1t> 1:l~luatc RI.ISSia's c!antfeitir.-e octMlies PDd 

P:lge's- hi~ory and alleged con~ct ,,ith RUS$t.""lll offic:iols. Mori:o'rtt, ~ only i'iigc6 

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESeITATIVES 

151 
I no cvldtnec ofll..so~tc co~piracy lieiwc:cn him and _ 

Pepadopou'los was required. DO.f ,'l"(Ju!tl hnv1: bun utgligi:nt in omillcng ~-lh•l in{'ormalion 

:1bouC Pupmlopoufos nnd Ruulo'5 conc.erutl efforts. 

• In it, Court filingi, DOJ made prop~ use of n~,·s con rage. The l!.tijcrity fals:ly claims 

rhet thi:. f"ISA materials '"'relied hea\'jly" on B Scp!cm_licr23. 2016 Yahoo( News .micle by 

Mkh:ic:l Tsikoff :uid th.at thi~ artick ''docs not conoboratc lho Stcctc Dossi~ becQusc·ii is 

derived from infonn~tioo leaked by S(Cck: hlllL"Clf." lS In fuc!, DOI fl:fcreo~cd 1sikofi's 

4'.lticle, nlongside onothc:r article th¢ Majoril)' fruts lo menlion. not to provide sc~te 

co:-roboration for Steel:'s repqning. but instenct 10 inform the Court of Page's public da.1it1l 

ofhi3 ~uspected meetings in MoS(:()w, which Ps" 11lso ecr.o...e.,1 i1111 Septeml:>ct 25, 2016 letter 

to FBI Direc.torConiey. I -"' 

• Tbc Majority'5 n~rcncc'to Bruce Ohr ii mislell<ling. The Majority mischnmclcl'lZ\?S 

!}ru-cc Ohr's role, ove~ lbe ~ignific;mce ofh.i3 tnren:icticms with Stcclc, lil!d misl~::s 

ab-Jut the timefrome ofOh:'s con.,mUJlkntion .,.,,th the FBI. In fol~ Novm1bcr 2016, Ohr 

info:-mel the FOi of his p.•-ior pn:>iemoaa.I rdotionship with Srecle and information tillt 

S~ele sl1ared \\ith him (i!'tiuding S-teele.'s ccncezc: a~t J ruinp bci11g ~mpromisrd by 

Russia), He nlso described hill wife's con!rac~ wt1rk with Fusio~ GPS, th: Hnn th~t him! 

St~?e separate!)'. This oCCWl'ed ween after U1e ele..-tion mid more than a month~ tho 

Cau."1 ;ipprovcd ~ initin\ F!SA DP?1i~ion. The M11jo:ity des~n"bes Bruce Ohr as a g n.for 

DOI officfot wl:-0 "\\~rl:cd cfoscfy ,,.;th lhc: Dcpul;- AUom~i' Otncrel~ Y Gtts 11nd lnter 

Rosenstein," io order to imJ)!y tht11 Ohr \\,1lS somehow involved in.1he Ff SA process, b!!l there 

is no indication this is the e2..ce. 

Bru~e Ohr is o well-respected career professional whose ponful io rs drugs and orgmized 

~rimi:, not counterln1ellig~u. There i! rro ~\'idence t.1i!lt he woa[d ba\·ct!cnown o.bou! tfa::. 

Pag~ F(SA niiplicntions and their c:onter.ts. The Y..sjo:ity'iii;ssmicms, mo~ver, Qr1! 

izTo..kv:mt in detcrm1:iing lb: '\'l:rw:iiy ofSlee[e's reporting, By 1he: time O_hr.debri.efs \'rich the 

FBl, i1 had nll'¢ilci)' termic~ Steele as a sow-c:e Q.r\d ,vns iridependcntl;• corroborating 

Steele's ~n.ini about P.ng~·~ oc1hities..13ruc1l Ohr rook the initiative!o inform tra: FBI of 

whs.t he krew~ mid the Majo:ity do:::s hi1112. gr.n,~ diss:e..-i.1re by suggcslin! he is part of som~ 

malign ccnspir2C.y. 

• Finalty,1'eterS.tn.okan~ Lba Pc.gels h:~t messages arc im:levant'to ~e FISA . 

upplkation. The f\.fajority gratJJitD'.J.S!y includ1$ rc~nce to Strzok 1μ1d P.ige ot the end of 

theh· memoran-dum, in mi effort 10 imply that pclitie,.l ~ias infec:ed the f81'5 lii=tig_ation 

orA DOJ's FISA applications. J11 ract, neither Strz.ok nor P0&e se:-\'fd as cllil).lits en lh-:-

opp!ic::ations, wnkh \\'ere the prodl.lCl of e.xtensh·c! and senior DOJ and FBI m•il:'lv.37 !n 

dcmonizir:g both cam:i ptefc:ssionllls. th.: Majority ac~ thtm o·r~otclf:=5trnlin:g tc-aks to 

the media." -:nscriou:; charge, omits ir.convcniect !ei,:im,:5.~~. in which they critiqtr!:d ;i 

wide :range of other o fficicls a11d candidates from bolh parties; docs nql disclo.sc !hat FBI 

Deput}' Din:c:or McCibe te!\if!cd to the Committee toot ~ had n-0 idea wlut P:i.ga ml:1 

Stnok were referring to in their l'insurencc policy .. tcxtsr1 emi ignores Strzok's 

11r:tnowl~dged ro!e in prep:.1rins Cl public.declnrallon, b)' 1hen Director Corney, about former 

So=wy Clinton's ·•e.~: careJeSSlle3S'' in h-:.'ld!1og clasiitied inform.alien-which greatly 

~a.'1la~ed Clmion's·puolic ~11\ti~n in lhednysjust prior to the presider;lbl el~1ioo. 

1 

?ROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

152 
1 

~tr 111 HPSC I Ch1dmllln Dcvln N11n~. Awlrwll Auomcy Gcm~I Su:pl1en 80yd, ~pnrunc1u of Juui,t, 

Jll!lunry 2•1, 2013. 

, l.ctti!i to IIPSCI Cholrmlln 0.:'l'in Nune;s, AMnllll\t J\,HPm~y O~rul Sttplicn 8Qy,I, Dcpnnmcr,1 of 11.t$1it~. 

Jomr.uy24, 2018. OOJ ~lie ccnflJlTll!d In \\'rillnsl.O Ml"Of!lY ~ffDOJ ~ml FDl's c,erm~orrtv[c1.1; 

the D:p111tmt~t h,-u ntcO!)lmodU1ttl HPSCI'~ 01'C·~iSht rcqun-1 b'y ~Uuwms ttpa:llei;f Jn ,;,i,rr,;<ll re~ltw, or 

'Ille rr.!lerfal in ~n npprojlriJLl~~c~ facility u_odc:r Ilic g. nm1l s•ipμllllions ll·..a: ( IJ 1)111 Chiilr (or hb 

d~l~I~) rwd tht RJ1:11k1Dc Member (or h~ dr{~qJt} a11d tv.·o 1131T r:.d!, '1ill1 arproprbt, .ii.:urlty 

dCVTIID~~ bf ellDYtd lo "'d;I)' OD li-rbulr Uf \11~ Con:,l'Jlllt«, (2) \hat 1/):-revfew ~ Fl:i;e in~ readlijg 

room SC'! up lll lhe !xf.1,tmc.111, eM (3} lh::!t the documctJcs not le-;iwe1lu! p!lY5knl control or tho DGj,p(tl11en1, 

and (S) th!,l Ilic re~lcw oppM\lllitic:i ~ bl~~ilnn in rto~. 1liougb weori.gi!tJllly l'llqJJ'l=$!c:d lhll\ no l!D1~ 

~ \:lr.cn, ln 111'.:lowwkd:smt'n~ of o ~~, b)' 1l1e CPmrnit1t-e.1md 11:WJITJ.zlnl! lh~t Ill¢ YOlianc ofd~nu 

hl!!f fom-ui:d whh ti111c, \hc Dcpai(mcn, cvrnnu1ily allttwtd no1~ 10 b:! u\cn 10 rll'CJlitnlc Hl'SCI', rc\·Icw. 

Auo, lnlti~l .rt:Vfew~ oflh; mnlcrio.l indwk f~icJ s!tott bri~lin!J3 b:( Ocp;,Jlmcnl offiti,;,Js 10 pcut the init~~l 

In (On!e.\H.lld lo prov-ido somC' addit~.al informalioa.. 

F.muil from Stephnl lk,yd 10 HPSCI Mlntirlty S~«. Jtumniy,.18, 20 IS (i:mphn!h rnppl)ed). 

l lAlli:r 111 HPSCI Chnlrmlll] I>e-.·in N11nt1,, tU.1~111 AICl>m~y Ornml S1cp~11 tlo)'I), ~p~n111en1 or JtGrf~~. 

Jflrwnry 24.2018. 

j rap~dopoulos'$ Otlob(r -'• 2017 1111lt1y PIN ~ddJ fi111'lt'f Jo:\lt11c 10 •hit Jolllal tip, by dnrlfyin11111111 o Rm,ln11 J1$~n1 

111hl l'lljl(td'1JIOuli:n ll111t "'They f rhc Rrmuini] li.11-0 dlt1 oo h<r"; "tho Ru,,1~11s hDll cmalh 11fC!ln1on"; "'th~y hltvc 

1hom11mb orc~lll.'' l};S. ... Oro,gr 11upmlqpo11/or (1 :1"/~r-ll!l, D1,tri~1otCalu111blD), p, 7. 

1 Um!~ Iii.: SpccW Co)lli!d'.i dircttioo, Fl,YM cr,d l'ilpndopouJos h.11·a bot~ plwlcd r.ullly 10 l,yi.Jlg ro l(drnil 

lnvcstl&"(ltO~Md lll't coopcr.iling .~lib she Spc:cl:il C.011.11.1~1'3 i,w~tlgolltn~ whit!l t,h.nororr ~d l~ l~n&·tlrn~ cl«!e, 

funner Trvn:rp drro111y ,CUDpaizn t11Mo11er Rkk G!lltt, hovo b«n lndkttd on niulttplc: co~01s Q~d lll'e 1111.iitln3 11'lnl. 

Src U.S. 1•. lrlldwJ T. F/y1111 (I: J 7-cr-:~n. D!ilrltl i1rColuJ1Jbl:i); V.S. ~. Paul J. lilana/tJfJ, Jr.,aM Rlr.:lr11rd )Y, 

Go1u /l/(l:17..;,-201, ot,.iri;t Df Col11mbi~). U.S. v. 0~B·P~IN(l:lkr•l82, 01$\rkt ofColwn\;ia). 

-~cc nl!;o, V.S. i•. i»'l,~fl}'Jllll]'tl ov. (II a, Z ID:~ .. -.gw, f]«)'S iv, Ctt 'lrror 

1 norncwYorl<,Jll!lulll)'2J,2015. 

11 Dcpastlll':llt of111~1kv. Fwclsn lncclllsrnce S11mill:mcc Covn i\pphc~llon, O;Jo:t>r,2 t, io lo, p.Ji . RepcniCll in 'l'Ul>5equcn1 n:ncw~I Dpplft11lloru 

'' Dcpwirr~ot of Ju.Mltt, l'otei&n lnt~l111Jc1Ki: S111"·cill~1m, C®rt ,\prlkatlim, Jv11c 29, 2017, ~P· 20.2 1. 

8 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 153 
,; !be FOi ~ b=der ln:e.'li_se11,c Co,n;:,:;·.tt111)"s hle,b 

c.:,nlode-ncJ ==en1 th.tl ~ R.u$~i~n ~~nu:,1,r.uc~S3scJ in :, «:\-:rt inksfcn:occ camptign lD bi!=a: the 

2016 c[eclico., in.:::"uding tlizt R~e., mttlligc:ncc aC"oJIJS ~~mpromi>:11 the DNC-<!tid \Yil:i[.Qb subscq..m:lj> 

!:!.'.cl in !oly10l6 •·4tro~nofONC cziails. Dcpmm:::l of JII.Sl.i-:e. Fortl£)'\ l.e!tl!iae~Su:rvcilllllci Cn:.i:t 

A;:plrcnlfoo, 0-et!lbCT 2 (,2016, pp. ~ i , ~led a:l c;,dsted 11il.h r.cw infcrntl'.:,:m ir. sc:imq2':r.l n:nc1>'Z1 

~~OOiMi. O~rnl ci"JU5t[::&, F=i.!,i, T.nfclligcrcc Survcllbc;,::Court Apps~ioo, Jun; :?9, lO [7. r;i. Ji!.:? I. 

u Dt~rln::nl c{.fuslitc, Fc.-rig;i Tn:e.l!i:,acc S:.n-~e Cmirt Aj!fliutior.-, l= 29, 2Dl 7, ll?- 36, 46, 4S. 

s, O~! ofJ!lSllc~, Fo:e)a,n ln~cll!5"..-:cc SU!\IO!ii1•..-rc C<Jart A!lll!t.;diori. JLU 29, 20l7, p.. %. 

i,, P.PSct M11;t1tt;· Mctno..::r.~, For~ig.J lfllrifiger.~ S~ro.-.:I{ftf11r~ACI Al:111.e: cl 1ht ~p,,r:;:-,~U,J Ji=:.'ol am! 

11:~ Federal B:u= o/ lrr::qr{,ef!,1ci,;,'1, J=:Q· rs, 20l 8. i:1'- 2•J (cClllll:1ltlr.is Monis.si.oos .. llf f::-d n:go.rda:g S;c~le 

sr.d b.is ec'"-:hi~ from 1.t,c P-ogc flSA. ~ licoli<llll). 

H Clcnn Sfo:F=-

!J PetYins Coi: l.l.P. 

~ l)o,,3Jd tr=[l. 

-::i ~, or J~!c:e, Fll<'e~ lmellig=c: Sl:f'--eI!tc.,:,: Co1111 A;r,,,'il:a1ioo, Ocl.obcr 21, '.2016, pp. 15-1?, n. 8. 

~d !n s-.:Jm,;jucot·rrc-tmll wlionlo;r;. 

s HPSCI ?,bjori:y Mcm~"mUI>. Fcirdg:J l,,i~lligt.~ Sl;m:i!{c1Ji.-.; ,!~ Abusc.t o. 1J:,: ~y,;1c:w11 of ~=::e c-..1. 

I~ Ftdmu lhre,."110/lrtr~lfa:, .. J:i.n=)' 18, 20J9 .. ~.2. 

;; P:pllrll'llt1ll of!'..1Mlcc. Fo:-:{an l~emse= ~-eilb-~ Cc= Ap;ir.:!uon, O.:-..:-oa2l, 20i6, p. IS. r~e s. 

Rci*-lted tD ~ent r~al applicm-...m. 

-:1 fr:lo-vicw ot.~.s,fn:w M!Oik (Fl3l ~ ly Pirffi1r}. Ho~~ St:leciClmltlillee~.!l Lit?l!ia;<~ 

Oc«mbct 19, 2011, p. 46. 100; L'"ll(rvl:£< o(Sillt Yatc, {fo:m{r D~.;[)· Alto~--y G<nr:ral). He,~ P~=nt Sd~1 

C!!mmittceon J~Jlie,cn~ Nov:rnbtr ;, 1017, ·p. 16; J~cwr..h Jnlto Cerli.i {f~= A~t!!ll Alll)me}' ~~I 

~ Ncll¢n::} ScC1/rl[)I)., Ho~ P6maacot Sck,t CQrnmi:Jrt on !R:cllig?t:~. lufy, Wl7, p. 35. <1 tn!miewof A:.dtcw Y~c {fBf Depucy !)~=:}, Hen= P~t Select Committee= lntcl!i~ 

D=mbcr 19, 2617, p. lOC'-101,: 15. 

n lntcl:'(jc"'·c!fal Ag~n:. ~(C ~=1 Seleet ,Cei;:;,,,iri~ c:, ln~IHs~c:e. Oe--...ell'.~r .20, '.Ull 7, p. 112.. 

n ~~=:ru c! fostice. Fo..igo lnlelf~~ SuNci~t: C-oort Ai:,iikcifon. O:ro~r 21: 2016. pp. Is. !-6.. n. S. 

Repeated hi ~enc :e-~,.,,I aP£1l1c::ii~.s. 

;c t!PSCI .Mi:y.my Men~uro, Fore!'gr. lnt<lf~ cr.w S;,,wili= Act .ibiues u1. 1Jre lkpt:.roT.FJ ef Ji:rJ~ t!F..d 

,b frd~rci &r~,m o/hr-re J.iJ;r:tfa,,, Jon~')' 18, ::!018, p. 4 f'TM 1'3z~ FISA ap;,licati<,n a.~ir.t11,lo~ iuforo!:Slfo:i 

re;i~l~s (elk= l'rurnp ='i"lfp, n,i.-i~r GcQ('!<: P~p<)11los, l,,..:t t.'tm is r.o :ville= or w./ coo~~ or 

ro.-upirncy W."= P;,gc .;r..i P.19,>:l.opm.,.'cs.. ") 

;s !lPSCT M1jnru'1 Mtmo:"'.J:nUlll. F«~ f11u!fi~~ S:,n.-eil~~ .id A~1t1~ c: JJ,z Dq>;1r:3.lm c>f Jasria <1)'.!l 

;;;~ Fed~r:;.f S.~ -:,u of f,ry~li"{', 1=11 Is., :!.O 1g, i'-.2. Ne,ithcr bilcrliT lfflf Y.=.'::;o(>I ~"C specir=lly t&!iliflro in 

!b.: FIS/I. M:itcricl~. in ke"ep~ "lil.'l 1he fBJ's g~mif i;octicc of .:M 1~:isit)'bl U.S. pc= 

J.c ixp:lrtment of Ji.st1ts Ftnigr. lnic!tig,.*!1~ Su.,·ci!t:ctt C-0un AppC-c:uciC111, Ccober 21, iGI 6,_ p. 2~; ~ = mt 

ci lt:11!ce, F~ lnl~lliru=..S,.;;v~flm.~ Col..'i /\pp!'?:aion.1"1=r"f Ii. 201;, p. JI~ C~TJ;;r ?a~ Lsu (l) FBl 

0:=1cr J"-!Tlt1Corn~j,. Sc~ crr.tu2.S, :l:OH!. 9 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. 1-'.0USE Cr REPRES8'ITATIVES 

154 
1a lr.tcrvic,irof Ao~ MeCa!:c(F81 Oq>u!}' l)lr,,cwJt f.= f'tm:::a1m11Se~ ~~ on ["telliie1:~ 

Oe.-emlxr 19, 2017, f , JS7. 

10 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSc: OF REPRtSENTATIVSS 

155 
{U) Appendix G-Senate Judiciary Memo about Steele Referral 

TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN 

(UNCIASSIFraDwhcn ~rated from atmchmen1} 

YlA ELECTRONIC TRA."iSMISSIQN 

Th? HOOCl'nlble Rod J. Rosmrui.n. 

Deputy Attorney C-=al 

U.S. Otpc:<.mart of I~cc 

950 ~mmylvm!aA~ NW 

Washington, DC 2053-0 

J=:sry 4. 2C l8 

Toe Hoconblc Chm~ A. Wray 

Dirtd.ct 

Fcdml!B~ofm~ 

9'35 Pecnsyh-anm A~ NW 

W~on, DC20S35 

DCl!t 0epazy Atnr!M)' G=al Roscnstcin ilad ~ Wra'j: 

AtlXbcd p~ fil)d I i:u.t:11.ficd mcm~ releicd. to email!. comcurua:tiom ~tween 

Chrimpbcr Stccle aod multipk U.S. ncwsOIIL.lct! reprding the ~led "'Trump~~ ~ Mr. 

S~le tOnlptled Oil behili offmfon OPS {qr Ebe Clinron Ca,np.-dga Md the Dem~ NNtioiw 

Com.m.itte: amt iblo prmi<b! ~ the FRI 

8-=:d on !he mt'Dffll3lkln cwu:aino:I. thcmB. Wll an: r:1pectlully ref:mng Mr. ·st«le ll) )'IN fir. 

investig,ttfon of po!a!tW viol.$tkins of t8 U.S.C. § 100!, fur mtmii:nb ti» Cammittee has re-om to 

bdlm Mr, S>.ecle-~ n:ga.diog l.u:i ~!:xmon cf i.nfonnatlon t£1rusir'.!d l!\ l~ ~~. 

11:itnk. yoa fw ;-our prompt are:mion In 1h:h nflPQrtl!!nt matter. If }"OU. h.we =.ny qμatl om. 

pl=~ Patridt Dam c:rr DcLis3. L:.J ofChlinnan Ormley·• rtalT il{l02) 224-S225. 

S:ikomminec an Cril=~T~ 

Comm.!~ on die Judiciuy 

TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN 

{UN'Cl..~PIED ~separated fn:im at~tJ 

PROPERTY Ot= THE'c ll.S. tiO-USE OF REPRESENT:'>Ti\lF.S 

156 
cc: The HonQroblc Di~oc f'cinltcln 

Hllnkina Member 

Committee on the JudkllU)I 

The Ho.'lOTa.bhi Rlchatd Burr 

Chaimwi 

Senate Se!«! Committ(I; oil In1clligcne<: 

The ll~Mf*blc Mmk W~r 

VioeCho.irrruw 

S=te Scl«t Cooimi~ Oil l!Uelli~ 

1be Honomblc Devi.SJ Nunai 

Chainnan 

~ All~ Oolltrll R.onm11in M:I Olrc<;ot Wr&y 

hnuuy o!, 'lOUI 

~2af2 

House Pcrmnruml Scled Conunitt.ce on ~Ulgt'.nu 

The Honornblc Acwn Schiff 

R1mking Mcmbct 

Jlouse Pcrinlllle'.III Selca Commin« on IMcllig~ 

f I 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 157 
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s ...... .... e .... a ... ,; · • I.~ o t ,s: • ..... ,1 • r c ...... o.a : r ·• • 1 : JC ...... .c, : ...... : ..... .ta, r.sn 

~{ORA,'\fDUM 

(tf) FROM: Cb!!rks 2. Gr-J.!.Slcy, Chainr.n, U.S. S«:nr.te Commiu~ 011 the J::diciuy 

Li~y 0. Gnilurn, Chaimwi. Su~mmitl~ un Crim:: and Tcirerism, 

U.S. Semie CoUUil!u« on Irie JuiditilU')' 

TO: Th.e Honorable Rod J. R~nstein, Ixputy Attorney <ii."'!l.erol. U.S. 

~tofJUSiicc 

RE: 

~ HoJl!)mb[c Christopher A. Wray, Diro:1or. federal Bureau of 

fa\ 'rS!i g"..!iO n 

Rem-nu o.f ~pbcr S~!e ((){' Po1colisl Violation of J & U.S.C. § l 00 l 

(U} As you know. iortna Orhh.'l Intclli~~ Officx:r Chruto~-r Skclc was hircl by(~ 

privste furn Fmion -OPS in JU!".e 2016 10 ~r infurm:nion obo-,n "links be.n"ffl! R~llaod 

fthi:o-pri:£i<icmial caooidBle] Donald Trump. .. 1 Pltr.ruanl to that l-mir= arrangcmcnl., ~.r. Sr~le 

prepared e series of docum,?Dts. s.-J!ed iii itltelligenre repom. some of which i,wre kn~ cmiplled 

into a "'tlos5i.er·• !!nd p11bliwd by Bi=F~tdill Jan~·y 20l 7.2 On tM foce orthe ~er, it 

a:ppe:?6 th.at Mr. S~e gru.heccl much of his informwou from Riwien go\'e.rnn-.enr !¢1.ll'ttS 

inside Russia.1 A!wrding to lhc 111w furn Pclil'I!! Coic. Mr. Sleck'sdossfcr-n:latro efforts wc:rc 

runded tfo,:iugh Fmion GPS by Ula! li!,w fum on ~ 1:clf oflfo: Ixma.;rauc: N.tL'OIW.I Committee: 

and the Clinton C~!!ll-~ 

(1.J} ln rcspo~ to rq,orting by the WC?1hi11i1cm f>osJ obotn Mr. Steele·~ relotkmship v..ith 

the FBI rcluling 10 uri, p:inis..m douitt 9t0ject. lhe JU(i~ilU)' Coi'?'IMictee began taf.s.ing :i seri.?s of 

questioll!l to the FBI and thl!' Jn.ruce ~l abcut ~ mane.IS ns part o!the Committee'9 

c:onstitutioncl. o,-enisht respcJJSibiliCies.s 

(U} The .FBI has~ providd th: C«nmillr:1: Jiec~ ~ c:~jlic;d documents re!e<rant lo 

the FBr, relationship v.ilh Mr. Steele :md -.hctl,cr &.c ffiI relied on hi, dossier wori:.. As 

apJain::d in grcmi:r dcmrl below, wt.en W'onnalion in l1u:lse classilicd docWit::flts is ev.1h.,J?.ted m 

light ofsvmm stlW'n.ents by Mr: S1~le ~ Brit~h liligation, it~ tha ei!1ler Mr. Steele lied 

to tm FBI or lhe· Brlti5h tt>Wl. or 1hot w.: cl.a.s$ilicd d..~umcn,5 m ·icw«J by ~ Commiuee 

coninin mnteru!ly false statements. 

I (U) ~. Vzlxva Cl. ,IJ ,-, Orru B~ la!l~UJcitr..,J cUd O..mffJb;,hu Stttlz.. Crum )la. 

11Q1mooo3.Qll(e:a·, &nsb(Apr. 4. 2(111}, p:= 9{Hcn:i:o~·~-,:1c S!Jl:m.ccn n 1~ ,.i 

'(ll) tit ;,: pan.. 10: Kffl B~. ~rlam Eti."f, l!lxi M11..1. ~ ~~ .'~~s ,r[{c,g,, r .... .-p /i4$ o.....,., nu 

ta lil<Ui:T- Bl•zzFE:m{h::i. 10. ?017). 

't'U) 1.! 

• {U) Adz.'!! Enl :!D, Dc.lm &m5t i1:d it.<MJ!D,:I~ !Id,~~~. Glri.,:;,, C~..,,, DNC f>atf /11" R=-k tbat L4:J 

u, Jam..'o lJn:.Iitf', T:r.; WA.'<1~ rt'IST(O:t. 2..t,1i:l17).. 

'\ U) Y-cm Hamb~ cd Rol.ll1r~ S. lkldtm=. FBI Orrct i'!~ ,a P.zy Ft!ff/Jf!'I BrJrW. ~· >tlto A ~l:.£tttl 

('<lJUraWTrla! 1'nmlp 0<=1#, Th"E W~GTOSl'c:sT {f'cb. 2t . l0!7). 

., 

PROP!aRTY OF T1-IE U.S. HOUSE OF RtPRES~TA TIVES 

158 
(U) ln mpom'C co lhr: CommilC«'s inqu.lrics, lh,: Chainnnn nnu Rwlkinu Member 

reecived o tnknnu on Mitrctl 15, 2017. from lhl."n-Dln:ctc,r Jrunr:3 B. Corney. Jr. 

-nllll briefing 1uldre.S$ed the Ru:.~lo in\'~\ifllllion, the rDI ':i n:latioruhlp will1 Mr. 

Steele, nnd thi: FBl's reliance on M.r. Steele', d@iCf in two opp)i~tioll.! it filed for survcitlwicc 

under lhc Foreign Jntcllig~cc: Surveillance Act (FlSA}. Then, on MNch \ 7, 2017. the Chuinnan 

an<l Run}dng Member were pro\lided copie$ ofth~ cwo relevnut flSA applicntions, Y.bi~h 

requostcd aulhorit)• IO coodntl sqrveil~ ofCar1cr F2g~. Doth relied heavily on Mr. S1oelc':1 

dotsie.r cle.imi, Md bo!h ll?Plienlif)ns Wt1" glUillcd by the Fcmigo lw:lligcncc Surveillance 

Court (FJSC). In Dcccmbcr of2(JJ7, lhc Chairmnu, Rankin; Membe1, nnd S1Jbcommittee 

Chnirman Grabs.DI were clJowed to review a totol offo1U' f'ISA applicatioons relying oo 1he 

dossier to seek :;W\•elllance of Mr. Caner P11gc, f\S well cs mimcro\1$ otn:r FBI doetunc:nts 

rcla1fos 10 Mr. Srecle. 

(U) SimUurly. in Jw,e 2017, fomt« FBl OlrcctO!' C01My testified publioly before the 

Sc-111,.10 Select Commlttcc on 1t11elllgcn~c 1]1Al lie hod bticrcJ PN:dilcnt•Elc:-ct Trump on 1hc 

tlw.,si~r ollcgations In JanlW)' 2011, whith Mr. Comcy described us ·'sQlnclous·· o.nd 

MunvClifi:<l. o,G 

•

)lheo ~ lll lhr: M111ch 2017 briefing why Hl<l FBI n:llad on lhc d003ict in the 

FISA 4119 1c.>ns 11bs.m1 mcanlui;rul c11nohor11Llon-Md in lliil1l oftl~ h!ghly politicnl ,.nod~ 

rurrour.dint! iU cn.-.illoll-\l1en-Dirci:ior Cnmcy s1111~ tl\ll \ho FBI inclu~ llJc dossia 

l\lleJ?Blions about Cl'.ll1t:t ~ lo lhc F1SA upplic.\tfon~ ~use: Mr. St1:elc hims<:lf was 

(Oll!icltffl.l reliable du.c to hu pns1 worl; wilh 1he Uurc4111. 

-[ndocd, th!: doc=lll.! we hiwe revie)\~ sbow lhn1 the FBI ~ool< impQtt:ml 

iJm:st.ignth-e steps wgely oos«t on M.r. Steele's. infonr.o.tlon-onr.l ~lyiTJll h:JWily Qn his 

credlbillly. Spei:iJkally, on Cktobt, l J. 20l6, Ille FBI filod iu first ·~1 applic:uion untie• 

flS/\ for Cener .Pnge. This iniLi&l appliCLJtion relks in Pift on cllc:gc:d past ~ am.~mpt:!i lo 

recroit ~e )'ellJ'S aso. That portion is lc.5:i llwl five JP..J;C$. llie bulk of Im: L1PW01.1ion con~ 

of !)llcgruions o.g4m51 Pngc lllll-t l.\~re di~lD~cJ !o the FBI by Mt. Sx~!e 11nd aro 111~ outline<! in 

the- S1ecleoo53ic:r. ~ application appears IO cont111n l30 :u.kl.ilional information tO~bQsaflns 

\ho: dossier allcg11tions ~ainst Mr. Page. although it does cite-10 a news B11!1:hnbn1 appear~ 10 be 

solUWd to Mr, S(cdc's dos.,itt 11., w~l1. 

G (U) SllllCmetil o! J~ta1 U. Conicy, Jr .• Hcurills or lhc l.J .S. Sm. Sclric:t C'cr.:rJo. on lnteUlgrnN (lune 11, 2017). 

TOP SECRET NOFORNIII 

PROPERTY OF THF. U.S. HOUSE OF RF.PRF.SENTAilVES 

159 
TOP SECRET /NOFOR'9111a 

-11'.e fBl di~u.ssed lhc ttlitlbilir: of tlti!I um·CTi[i~ iubmuliim pn:widd hy Mr. 

St~lc in fooUlO(c:s 8 aruf 18 ofll:li; flSA wam::nt !!pplianioa Fim. lhc FB! noted to a vaguely 

limi!rd extent the politioil ori~ns of th~domer. fu f~e 8 lile FBI ~iai rf:11.t 1he dos..ier 

lnformetlon wnsc:o;npiledpllJSlJllnt lo thedi=<i.onQf a Taw ffiro wht!~ tr.m:g .i.n 'id;entilied 

U.S. pa-son"--nowt.nowa as Glc:nn S"nnpsoa ofFusi<tn GPS-"ia to.5ia:t =,i,"Ch.rcgiurling 

[Tnunp'sl tii:s .o Russie. .. The FBI funhcr-spccui311:[drtha1 Mr. Sir.ipson °'Q1!.5 likely Jooking 

ror information lh&t cou1d ~ used to diseredil lTl:UmP'S} campaigp." The SWlioli<m. railed Co 

<fuel~ ~l !he fdc:ntitks or Mr. Simp.wn' s ultimalc: c£ienls 1n-en= th;; Clintm:J campnign XU'ld Im 

DNC. 

~ fBt ~ w lh; r1SC th:il. "'wscd on [Steele's) ~'ious rc~ing hislo;y 

with l~~y [St«k} provided n:liw'.<:: i:tformnJicn to \he FB-L tr.a FOi belifl",I~ 

[Steclc:'s} rtporti.ngto be cmfiblc." Ir, :sher., itappc:mi me FGI relied c;nadmin-'"<lly 

LmWrrobotn1ed infom1.a.uoo1 funded by md ~cd fbr S«:rctaiy Cllirlfil\'s p=idc11~al 

~fflj>W$0, in orde; to G<lOOUel 5-urvtillo.ntt of Qt :lSSOCinte of the opposing jires?denlinl candidate. 

It did so~ on Mr. Stei:lc".s pcm>nnl cre.ficility mw:I presumably haling fl!ith in ~ls ~ of 

obl.un.ing the mfcrmlilim. 

(U) But ti,ae is YJbsun1ial ~i:kooe suggc:ning lhst Mr. Stedc mntc.ricl[y misled~ FBJ 

!lbolll a~ t of hi$ dossic:r effons.. one which b:llr.l on hiHrc:<lib,1ily. -In lhc ()cfgb.;r 2016 FISA ~i-;Qtion,aod in ca,-cn cft.'>e three l'C.1141wals, ai\er 

relaying S\i:c:Jc·s dorner o.llcgsrions agaimt C!neT Page, lhe Fl:31 suircs: '"!Stttlfi told the FBJ 

tb1t he/she on.Iv prgyidNI this iftlorntttioo ta the bu~ln~ MJ2t\S'1 Jfu.sf913 GPSI !]Id Uic 

fil!!."7 (c:mplwis added>. tndm thi: fJS/\ iw.ewa! appfie:tlion fa lanu:.r, 2017 fl()lf:S 1hZ1t 

Steele had received· a 

---ct the PISA 4t>plialio.ru not-e the- aistence of 4 ne,,s .:rticle d:!!cd Septeltbcr 

23, 20 t 6, whM1 in pmicu!az containod some of lhc .wne d~iei: infonn:l!iDn eboul Mr. ~ 

oompikd by Mr. S1e11le and on which li:e FBI re.lied in iu 4pplica1ioo.. Whllc rc0t c.wlicitfy 

slated. !his is ~3bcy lht! micle by Miclt;;d f.s:ikoff of Yah~ N~.e.:., fiU:d .. U.S. In•cl 

Offic h1ls .[>ro~ Tics &IWrtll Tl'Ualμ A.cvisc:r ~ KmnliD, M /\flc:T mning thzu }.'tr, S~lc hsJ 

cll!.imed to the F.B.l he lu!d. only provide<.f lhls informatlon ICI lhe FBI and M.. Simpson. ~ 

applicatian .at~ to explain uway It~ ir.c{lnsis.mcy betw~"n Mr. Sttel.e'i ~ion lo the FBI 

and lh~ c:~ce cftr.c mi.cl~ DpPl)rcr.ily to shidd Mr. S:..eclc'l i;red.ibJ1ity o.nv.i1kh it roU . 

relied for !he im='Sl mt!le$1. The applic:atian to the l:1SC .!:.lid: "~ that t~ infoml!tion 

conlainod in th: Sq,!rmber 23rd n.}\l,'S a-tlefe ~ml!y ~tehe, lhe infurmatiuu about '11~ !hat 

{Steele J discovert"d coing histher re~h., 

) 

f'ROf'E:RTY OF TiiE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

160 
17re FBI dJHS no/ trli= that f Steelc} dmctly provided this 

inform111ion to lhc yICSS" {miphnsi, tl<lckd). 

1111111» f«M()tc 9 ofiisJ:wllW)' 2017 eppliC4Woo 10 n:new ,re%: f!S.I\ wlmUll! for Mr. 

&,gi:., the FBI~ add..11:SS:d Mr. Stm.e's CRdibility. AI that Ii.me, the Fm t:0ltd that it had 

~dc:,1 iu ~letiomhlp with Mr. S1eel: in Ocwbe" 2016 ~use of~·~ ·'unmnhori'Zi\d 

rlis1:losnre of informllilim co 11-.e presiJ.,. The FBI relayed d)ar. Sceele hM be1:r? bc,!lien>d oy the 

FRJ 's notifies!] cm to C('l'".gre!S in October 2016 ebo\21 tlM: rcoJ=m& of~ Ciinl~ invcstigm.ion, 

i.nd as aresull "{Sk:eicJ ind:pmdrnUy end~ the prior admonishment from ilie rBl lO 

~ only wilh th.i: F.!ll on thiJ ll14tlef, ~lwi:d tiN rcpcnu,g dlSCU$SCO hmm {do$.'lier 

cllegarloos £1.sninst ~ ) Ill s:n ilknlified oor.-s ~-mi1.alioa." HOWt:\'CS', \he FBI coatinutd 10 

cite to Mr. Sit.tie'!!.~ wrk l!5 i:vi~c.c ofhi3 rclinbility, e:rid st111etl t.~t "l;hc iilcidenl thzt led 

to the FDJ ~ing iU in:ti.omhip .,.,;lh [Mr. ~e.elcJ uccum:d after [Mr. Sttclcl pro\i<li;d" ti¥.: 

fel mlh the~ infonnation dt3ml>«I in the i5JlPlicalion. The FBI furthc- a;scrtal in 

fuotoote 19 t1mt it d_,;d rot bclh:\"t: tha1 Steele dm!c1ly ga'Je informE!lion lo Yaht>o Ntw~ thst 

"p-.ibli~~ du; Scpc.cmbcr 23 Ne\'15 Article." 

lallllo.. !!.$ documc:nt.¢d in the Fl SA R:DC\va.!:;, th 1: Fm &rjll ~ to bc:I i c\~ Mr. 

Stee'Je~ tba1 be had only provided~~ ioform.Eilion to the FBI and Fuson-

,;m nol to \be ~07 lD bis ~ med:11 C'01UBc.t !hid resulted in me FBI suspemii123 the 

mlitiOllS'jp. Accordingly, cl,;: FBI still d«mi.>d die information he p.>nvided prior to th¢ October 

dlS':lQ!JU!C LO bo ~li.Bhk. Aim all. the FB1 all\'Zdy believed Mr. Steclt Wi!S mirdlle, he had 

previo~y ioJd the fBl he ~ not shattd the mfonnatlon v.i 1h the press - rad l)ina to the Fm is 

, crime. 1n dd1?odio& Mr. Slce[e's credihility lOlhe F'lSC. l1P! FBI h:srl po-~ an ii,n~us 

cxplaoafum for 1he Sept2mber 23 emcle, based on the nsromptlon Jr.Ol Mc. St.oelc hfl.d tt,Jd lhc 

FBI the trUfh abou1 hB}'.tt:SS con\ru:l.&. The FBI 1heiJ .. ~ ior him twia: mo~. U$Ulg lbo ~c 

rationnte, in s11bscq=t l'eDe'.\'3.1 npplieatiom fil.~ \.\-il.b. llx P-0mgn Jn~m,~ Sur.·dltmcc 

Coll:11. in Aprll llJ)(} l= 2011. 

(U) How~'l!f. ?"J.bii; rcpor1s, COlct ~ l!l1d infonnlll:ion obiainai O}' the Commitlee 

duriDg wunc:ss iDkr.:ic:ns in the coune ofi~ ongo1:tS io-.~i;rst~n i.ndi~ thtl Mr. Strcle oo1 

cnly pro11ideddo.s:sier infomration 10 lhe F.BI. bUI also to n.u:m~rOU3 media orgimiz.etioD.3 prior to 

U-.f end of his relation.ship with the Fm in Oclobcr 2016.s 

(t,') Jn Steele's m-om cou.-t filingsm lilip.tion in.London, bt"lldmi!ierl!hat be ugaveoff 

lhc ~ord briefings 10.t 9.Ill'lll number of journalists itbout tbr.! prc-ct,eclion 0H:moram.L1 [i.e .• !be 

ei'.IS5kr] in lat,; ~v·au~ 2016.'~ 1n Zlliltht:r sworn filing in nw case. ~tr. Sl~le further 

: (l.l} Sn Su:el~ SW=c."'J:l J; O.:r~· lte$pom,: 5o ~I~' 11.:q.x:,I Cw fur .. '!tf ~f~, Pun~ so CPR 

P2n. t &, Gdxzr.?v ft, Al 'I'. o.-b-~ l!~1 l111dhg-..., 1.!!,;:Ud arxl Ckilrt;pf,rr SUrk. 0.l:i:l Na. HQ 17WD413. 

~D'$ 8ei:Y.h {M~y la.;.'017), ~ "Slcdl? ~.atlml.2'11~~ 131'; Ttllll fu:&..~v imd·Roulilld 

.S. Hcldennan. FBJ Or,= Pll'Jf!l,.-zl to Pt1J1 ForYt>r. Braim Sn ,rle:; . .fwhr,ml C~ Tr2!f1.Dw.rf u , "OE 

W ASJIINOTO.~ l'OST (f!b-2!, l011); ~ T~ eJ filo .,.itf. Sc,i. C'M!l!l.. a; ur.> k<:Jcmy. ~ {U) Steele St..mmtnt I ?! μa J2. 

FRCPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRESENTATIVES 

161 
staled th.sl jourMfu.13 from "'1.,ic N!:W Y Olk Timo, lhe \Vashlrie,ton ~. Y:aboo New11, the New 

Yorker, and CNN-were -brl~feQ 1c tbecll.11 or SeptcDlb~r- 2016 by {Strot!} and r1.1&ion nt 

Fuslon' s instruttic~ "10 The filing futlrer Slates that Mt, St:eefe "subs!<i_uer.tly p:i.rtifi?,lltcd in 

funlier ~n~ m Fusion's wt=1t<>n ~ith F<Gion mid lhe Nr;w Yort; T'tTID:S. the Wa..<t.ingtcn 

Po.st, Md Y11.bro N;ws. wh.i~ took ~cmid-Ott-0ber 2016.->.11 AcrotifJtlS to these cowt filings, 

~itlhc briefing$ in;-uh-ed the disclosure of limi!ed inti:l!i~e rl.!1:Jlt'ding, imfia,.tions of Russinft 

interf~ in tht: US dc,;fion process md tht; p:;,s;sil>k co-otdirumon of mcmb:rs orTni.mp's 

• campaign teM\Md Rlmim .govemm~toffidals.~r. rn his intcnitw ·.iri.th tlu: Comminee, 

Glenn Simpson of Fmion GPS confinnNi this lh.'l:Ount by Mr. S!eele and l"d! c:.otnpM}' as filed in 

the Brifuh COOl't.11 

-

~ fir!% of tl>.ts~ tilings WilS pooiidy reported in the U.S_ m~ia in April of 

2017, re did 110( subsequcn1ly di~lo~ t<i Lh~ rlSC lhb evldenre SUJ:&C!llf1S 1ha1 Mr. 

Steele 111:d lied to !:be FBI. inste.ad !he appik.llio!I still tefied prnmrily en his c:redibHh}' prior to 

!he October mroia inci~at. 

fl::U n:ccis::d simi12r infom,:ition from a lmili:! .D:pamneaJ 

offici • ruce • '-''at! maintuinol ~PU!cl:5 v.ith Mr. Si1I1JOOD l!IDd Y.r- Sl:clc a.bout •~r 

dcsi.i1:r wi;m. .er.d whose wife 11150 1vork.¢d for F\lsion GPS on the Russi! projcc,. ln ill1 interview 

with the: FBI ·oa Na\.'cmbc:r 2Z1 20l 6, Mr. Ohr~ tlul Mr. Simpson gave the 

same intetvic:w Iha! Mr. :Steele v.-as "rkspcr~tc" 10 see th.ct }r'flo, Trump v.-ns not cl!!c1ed 

presidrn1.1' None oflh~ infonnmion prcvJd«t by Mr. Ohr !n bis ititem&S wifu the fB[ wns 

indudcd in the FISA renc:wal l!pplicaI!o:u, dt:!pi~ rts relcvmc.e ro \\ie1het ML Steele hm! lied to 

lhe fBl sbout his c:onta~U wi:th the ~M well as its bro~c:r ~lc-..uitc to hll ro:dibollity and 

his stated poUtl~ mati\'1:. 

.. 

I 

.. 

0n tue tritb lbc Sea C-=!l:.. r.i ~ Jlidii:~ 11120s...o; . • 3"~ {NC>Y: l:l, ~Cll 5) • 

F0-.302 {u«.. 12,. 20 ( 6; 

FD-l-07{Ncw_ 22, 201si 

5 

"'ROPERTY OF Tl-iE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRE:SENTATl'JES 162 
-h~·thet Mr. Sleek lied to 1bc FBI ubout hi$ rnedii1 eon\.lri:l) i~ o:lcvunl ror 111 

Jca,i \v.t> rct\!Ul'"· f'irsl, hi~ rc:lc:\'Ulll lo hiJs crc<liblllly IL" 11 souroe, putlcula.rly W"cn 1hc hick of 

corrobom1iu11 for his clnlm,, u1 lc.ut :11 \hQ limo lhcy were iru:Juded ia the FlSA. applicdotlOf\ll. 

Scoond. it is ~l~VMI to the 1cli1)1lillly of hi, infonnation-glll.htrlng tffor1.1. 

(U) Mr. S1cclc condum:d his wort for Fu,ion OPS compiling lhc "Jlrt.. olection 

lllL'CllOrnilda~ ''(b]t't\\WII Jwie Md enrly Novcmbi!r io 16.~n lo the Brilish litigmlan. Mr. S1celu 

ncktlowJ~dgcd brieftngjoumnli~ ntx>u1 thct do9sie: /Tlffl1Cln:lndll "io lnh! summer/muumn 

20l6. "18 Uusw-ptisingly, durills Im: summa- of2016, n:port.'I of 111 lemt some oflhc: ~c:r 

allegations bcf:l!UI cimilllling amQll3 rcponcrs and people invclved io Ru.s.siim i~cs. 19 Mr. 

Steele oJsn admi11cd in the llri1i!ih li1igruion ro t,riefing joumnlisis.from 1hc WaJJt/11gran Pc.v, 

Y'1MO New~. tlie New iar*-u, IS1\d CNN m Scpttmbcr of Wl6.:w Simply put. tlte mo~ p:opl~ 

who contcmpOranco!J!ly .k.miiv tluit Mr. Steele: W8.'l. ~mpilins his do:isia, the more 1ikdy it \\Ill:\ 

vul11erable 10 ro.nnipQlo1ion. 1n· fact, in I.be British litigaiioo, whicb ID\'O.h"t'.S s J'IO!l<kc:ticm 

do.55ia mmiorandllID. Mr. S!celc: oomitted lhnl he received lllld. indudcd in it unsoficlt ::f--ilnrl 

unvcrified-nllcgatiom. lJ That fitiog ~plies lhat hs! siotilarly :recd1,Gd UilSOlidted ir.tcl.ligence 

on these moners prior to the election a, Y.--eil. Slitting that Mr. Steele. Mcorrtfnutd 10 ,~ull'e 

UMOl/dJed }IJ/tlllgtnu on the ms~ covered by d1e pre-elci!lioo mcm.Pram.b rillc!r ~ tJS 

Prcsiden'!iCl.l cl~tion."12 · 

. (U) Olk! memomndum b Mr. St~lt lli:u WM not ublishL-d by Bu=(cl!d is dnl.ed October 

19 2016. Thuttponnllegc.5tl Cl.'lweil~ 

Mt. Stet lo' s memonu wn ~llltcs I us complln}' "ru«ivcd lhls JeJJ()lt f'r<>m Jon 

S SUlli! Dc:p.1rtmcn1," Jluu the repott won the StCQntl In u $t'Ji,c ti I n 

t c ,e from o forcl2l) sub,,s(lUY(:e who ·~.~ in 101.1 

frl~ ot' th~ Clioiom, who ~13od h 11 11 i~ troubling cnoull,h 

thul c Ch111011 Com1):)18Jl ful'\dcil Mr. Stet:le'~ work. btlt 1hu1 thQ~ Cliruon A:Uo~ln.tc! were 

c:-0ntcmpoTM1towly feeding M,. Stttle alltSolions roi~ oddilioMl concmu nbout hi5 

credibility. 

11 (U) SUolt Suuomcnt I Cl p:,t'I, ii. 

i. (lJ) St~k s~1cmm1 r at JlC1L. )l 

tt (U) hhknlP~hiri Tl'IIO~ On fi~ whb 11'.: Sat. Cc,otru. Cfl 1hr 1\ldlcW')' (Mt. ~ bfn IJ\r~rn,cd 1hr, 

Comrnliltt fh~I flt!~ hwt~ l\'oin J!Nmdilu IIOOll1 thl: \10$.Jlll' bet~ It 'II'~ p,_blbhod, DiKI 1/ioos&,'IJ h Y'11S lll~ 

·5\IJlllllCf af:?ll 16). 

"'{IJ)Stcck swemem 2 a1 ~ 111 tcurpba.lu lldd1:d). 

1, {IJ) ~l, S1t1mocn1 I 111 ~ I~ Md 20C. . 

u (U} Id; -s~1c S~til!lttll 2 ~t 4 rStM:b lne~IH"1)C.C .-M>I e,.;ti\Tly iOUgb\. i\ \l"t.! rncnly ~ !"o:d.") 

6 

PROP!:RTY Of iHE: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRl:SENTA11VES 

163 
~-Steele Ihm apparently p=ec.i lhls repo:t to the FBi. 

-.S:mply put, Mr. Steele toId . the fBI he ood oo1 roi..~ ~ Cmn- PAgl? doss-ier 

info~d his clit:m imd the Fl3l Th: Dfpamnra repc:!led Iha! dnim to u~ FISC. Yet 

Mr. St~Je ad.:nowla:lgai in =m fili~ thaJ he-did bnt?f Yahoo Nn,,~ and other.media 

Ol't]animtions nbom die d<mier-around. the timi! of the [1Ublicar.ion of the r ahoo Ne1r$ rutiele llat seems to be~ en the ~r. 

(U) On Sej>tetnber 23, 2016, >".koo Nfm pubtls.hal Hs ortlek entiikd "'tl.S. in tel 

Official$ Frobe "Tie$ &tween Tromp AdYise:r and Kii:mlia.»ll That Ql'ti~e ~Dt'rl cl!lllI15 

about meetings bc-t\,ttn C.mer J>uge md Russians, includ.ing rgor ~n. Mc. Si:cnin is 

described in tlR: article a5 <>a longtime Putin aS!OCfate nnd form~ Russian d~..1ty pri.mc rrunJncrundl:1' ~rui by~ Treasury Departm..."llt in respon:si:. ID Rusm's e,ai_cuis in lhc Ukrainc.2i ~ 

article ouribittc:i (he lniormaticn lo ''ll \\"elt-ttlaad WC$C~l intelligence sour.;e," who repotto.ily 

said tool "'[~rt their =Ileged ~tins, Seehin r:w=i lhe issi:re of!he lining of ~ tiol'ls wilh 

Page:.z, Ta:is infurm-ation also appears in or~ltip!c "'m<!mornrtds'" [}";it ~ up the dossir:r. ~ 

(l;1 in $UlD. erouoo lire 5llmC lim c r af.;c,o-Neir.s publisfu:'d its sru..-u: co nlafoing doss.icr 

infonnnt:ion l0JUl est~ Page., Mr. Siu!~ ll!fd F-,l!.ioo GPS had brle~ Yal!oo i\~;1' 111:1d O'(het 

oi:w.. outlets 

~ 

them infrunlMion conl.ained in the dassler. 

fai::ts app,ear to direc!iy ccntradkl the fBl · .s ass..-rticns ill iis inili.sl 

sppli~~-~e PISA w11rr11m.as "7i'::llas subsequent renev.al 1.pplic:aiom. Toe FBI 

repear~dly ~cd to lhe court thlll Mr. Sttcli:: !Did Iha FBI he dkl ,rot m.'t'l! ur.mi\horizcl 

contacts wilh !ht: p r,:s:, ~boui the dos.1itt prior ~o Ocl.1'.ll:wWl6. Tbe FISA !!.pplic.il1ions mllke 

!.htse cl.e.itm spec:ifitl!lly in ~ context of .the 5.e?1ember Ult ti l~ l..'&-setide. Bw Mr. 

Stt:dc ha, ~-publicly before a cou:t of ra-truu he till hA\-e ~ CQl:W:~ with·il'.e 

pr=~ this time, i>!'.<I his lb.-mer busl~S$ ~ Mr. Simpson ~ COllfrrmed it to toe 

Committee. TI.ro5. ~ RSAcppllca1kmsar¢ci1Mrnwaially fslse in daimingths\ Mr. Steele 

said he did not pl'(ni de doss!~ iD.form~ to~ p=s prior lo~ .WI 6, OJ Mr. S~h; 

made materially i~ S1a1emcal9 to lbe FBl ,vhm he claim~ h<: only ~idcd the do$$i.er 

inft1rmation to hiJ bu!i=u prutna- !Uld lhe F9f. 

1111111n this ~c. Mr. Sta:!e•s <1pp.trsn deception !!Cem.5 io ~-ve ~ significanL.. 

m.st~riat ~u~tts on the F Bt' s in\~th-c decisions wxl reprcscntlllions lO 1hc ~Wt. Mr. 

Steele's !!lfoJT!lDtion.fqrmei;l s $igJJifi~.t portion arl.hll fl31'll w~t ::ippli~Ii~a. and lb:: FIS.A 

.:ipplicotioa rt:li<.-d rogre fu:a.~'i.ly on Stecte•s cn:dihUiiy tl'!lln on any wdtpcndc:n vcrific;.wion or 

oormboranon £'or his dsims.. ThllS lile ~ fo;- ~ we.mu1l l'Wthori_zmg wr.-cilhmce 011 a U.S. 

citi7.tn rtsts l.argcly oo Mr. Steele's crc-dibiliiy. Tho O.:~t or l~~ I= a l'C$pomi.hility to 

:u (U) fl.I ~l lsillC.{[ U.S. fmd Of!l<"1/s f?o.."'« Tic e~ Tra:tl\p Mrti'lf' or.d K!'ecfl::i. Y Ml'"...O N1:.11;s ~cpt. i..;, 

Z0\6). 

"(U} Id. ., (Up.:/. 

?> (U) &o.,m&tt ~-:::i, lit.:Tfte:o. 

7 

PROPERlY OF THI::: U.S. HOUSE OF RE:PRCoSr:;NTATIVES 164 
1kto?rmins? wh!!thcr 1'.lr. Steele proviucd falsi: informu1iu11 lu tl:t: FBI u11u \' hcthcr !he F Bi's 

rcprcsematkms 10 ll1e eourt \\<!re in c.m,r. 

(U) Accordingly. we are ,cforrins Christopher S1edc to the lkp:irtmcn1 of Justice for 

invo:s1igotion ofpot,mlial ..-iolaiion(s) of 18 ll.S.C. ~ J(){)J. 

8 

I 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

165 
UNCLASSIFtEO ATTACHMENT A 

--~TM 

166 

FROPERiY OF THE U.S.. fiOUSE OF REPRESENrATl'v'£S 
IN THE HIGH COURT Of JUSTICE i. CW~Q170Q0413 

QUEE:.N'S SEHCH DJVISION ) 

- ~ APR 2BV · 0ETWfEN:• 

{1) Al.EKSEJ GUBAR.!f1< - ~.::,0 Q.l....; 

(2) WEBZIUA B.V. '<,,- >,·-N n<cY m w~~tJ,.A l-JMm:o ~:..-~1:...~ .P· 

{4) xaT HOLDINGS 5.A. 

-and• 

{1} ORB1S BUS1NE5S INTELLIGENCE l lMITI:D 

{2) CHRlSTOPHER STEELE 

DEFENCE 

Cl11lma.nj~ 

Defafldonts 

~ ., t!i~ veffin~ ....-e !o pw.,gr-~ in lhs P~ al Oain wte.1e olhetY;ll!O 

Gtmd 

1. Sa\se 1h51 R Is admltted lhal lr.!t Sece9d a.id Thlro O;ilm3re. 1;1ra tM;.11liog 

lnlm:!!rucM'e =npanle: t;es.ed in e-~ NeQ)ertands and ~rm !8!.pe~. no 

!l<!rnlsl~ ~ tr.ede 0$ lo persorsphs 1 f!od 2. 

~- Th9 Se:oM Oe!enaanl es'.d CM:;!opoor B;.urC'\'4 ""9l'O ~ Ae~ end 

eipe~ Cii;znn .satWl'ltl: In !h~ ~~n ltnd ~mmo~'?h ~ 

5. ~ .Atdtr1N Wood G"CMG ~ ina 8'1tkn .Am~r lo M~..al'tl ~ 1995 a!JJ 

2000. He ta an ~ le i=e!bw C>f k'li& Ru!J!a mil Eurasia Programme at the RQYal 

11'1:!llillJI& !or lnlemafiCl1lll Aftainl el Chca'il'.sm Ho~ He ~ oho on A;sociale ol Oro!~ 

1 

I/ 

PROPERTY OF r...;E U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

167 
6. FUJi:)(; GPS {'FU3/,cn'}l$ a alffli.1£sl1C'j l::i85ad In Wastihglcn DC pro'~ fll$(M!TCl1. 

11fro:eitc in\~ arxt tlL11;1 ::!~'tee SCfV!ce~ ro cllM\l$. 

7. Pnc:v to 1,)6 O't'OO~ In 1$Sw In~=~ Ifie Oefendanls ,'la'tl <iewloped 8 l'iOJ1LTJlg 

roiator:st.fp ~th Rlslon OV!!t a n.srnhEr of}'88ft;. 

8. Al cB .T~lWl! U.'11M F\1~1-0l'I w.3~ ~~ to a11 ObligaUon rtil t~ ~ -!O th.."11 

pertle.s confide~ lnte~ mo!~m!! p.rovldcd ~ ii by ~.!I nerend2nts tn tlii, 

CCtl1SQ of tl'la! ~~no rolal~ ~'W..i! a,s ssraemern or iff.l DE!Sld.imi. 

e. Bo~= J1.'nll am eiar1y Nov-emt« 1016 Obis Wi'J';!, (Jnnai;-eo ~ F~ to prepara :i 

&()(Jes°' ~~v:1531 1'11~-.da ~ I);') 11\~I~ a.ir~ Rici:sien effocta to 

Inf!~ ::ha US Froo/dr.nlial ~cGci.'I ~ .!l'ld llMll bal',Y2!l:'l ~ ~~ 0Q(\31d 

tn.im,>. 

10. The De~s.;dsn1~ produced ~ lhJctl marnorar.da. ThwJ '1£J be re'..elTBd to for 

i;oo\~Jer<C8 as '"Iha pra.e~n ~·. l'l.a\,rag b$81\ prop.a;.!d ~oro C'>O 

2018 us Prc~a1 erect!a.'l. TI"dS iatt ooc ~ ~ in aie tauar p,srt or 

Cc»~ rote. Nc:1D won, p;od~ h Ne\~ 2018. Noc» a1 tl'le p<lHlleruoo 

memM:rida. C011ts!r4d 8ttf ~ }o_ or ln~lll;«ic::& about. L"ie ~ 

11. A!i .en Asscciato er ~ ~ MCrrM.Wood wu tvrure or in'3 s~ oereridar:t's 

ln!e2lga.~ gsthef.r;g f« tl)ci ~*"-n memooandq. 

12. ~!Cl J-,iu, McCflin I! jhe Chmr ci !.fl8 us Sllnia'.O Armed S!~~s ~ltt(IO Md 

:s me.m::.er of~ US $aroiile ~ on Hemo!anc! ~ Vl<I G<Mltnn1an~l 

Alfulra.. 

1 :t 03-41 Kramer )a a !ocmer us ~-e ~(!fll cl','!I sa1w:rt ano ~ ·us AiSi1.tani. 

s~ of S"1la ~ Desrn:icn,q, Hun-an Right!!, and ub.:ic fro:'r. ~ to 2000.. H5 

ls ~ Senb" Dir"-~cr tcf Hum.so RJs1t15 SJ'ld Human fnasr:loa;q si Sat'abr LtcCatn's 

lr.sli!W!tcr !fitem~tonol Lez~Jp. 

1od... Meir ~J) O:loclfon of Oot'ulld Trul'l'lp 8 ! t!Je 45" Pc.isidonl d 6"' Un:"lcd S1altm Oil a 

No...::r..tm Zil1 e. Sir M!Jrtn/ WOC4 r.:et l.!t" Krnnrs1 e.no ~~-A> it R.&\iit 

of the:r (f~fOris S1r Arl:!.rew anM.,g,!!d for the Sacood ~ &ri meet Mr 

Knsmer, as Iha ~resootatlw of ~« McO.ln, In ~ to 6hc:?H him the p~ 

ill9clioo msmcranda on a conf.<ler.tia! ~ 

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REF'RESENTATl\iQ 168 
1. 

l 

1 

15. The rn&.:±)g t:..a:Jl9e!I tM Seco.nd Os&ndMI end Mt 1(.'E;Tl'B( t::.x p\OC8 Oil 2B 

N!M!rnber 2P18 !."I &"ffey. Mt l<ror~ ~the S=ul Oefondo.ll! lha1 :he ln~~e 

oo had gaihelrl r,ijS6(j ~ of ¢.es?s l na~I ~ ~ -

,6. An arrangancnl w::s IOOsT m200 upc:1 Mr Kramslis teUJm ~ Wash;.T,.tlOn lo, Fu...<>lon 

to ,:wt.!l_s Sm. Mt"Caln ~:I\ tl'W ~ of the P'JHll~ r:;-emnranda QO ~ 

00/l~ ~ V:>3 +k Ktmnsr. 

17. On b1!11',a.'f of Son !l~n, Mr l<rermr requo:iled lO bo pro,."l~ ...-:th oriy hL"ther 

lnfEIUl!Js.-r;e ga~ by It\!! Def~ ~u:11llegod ~n ~ e.S11cs In Iha US 

Prll'!lde.'"l!i~ e-ac:Uon. 

18. Toe Defer~ c:i.'ltlnued to~ ~.ell&.1 lMeUlci&nca or, h tr.aEar.i CO'rara<S 

by th& pre~ memonmd11 ~ 8'~ US Presdenllal ~, l!1l:i the condl.!S.00 

cl Ula assigrtme:11 f0t Fuakln.. 

19. Aller r=.'Y.ng ~me wtll Weill~ the Second Defc,x!;m\ J:tepen!d !he 

COrlfiOGn~ t:loeomw ~ refe~ 10 et ~ph a,. c:n h~ own 

!nllla1hiie en 111" el"Q'.io;i 13 Dewmbet 20ta. 

20. The De!~ anu collSldored, ~,. lhi?lt Cho iaw lni.Glfqence in tl'"' Decernbor 

mem~ 

lL w:ea of c:.nsid~ lmPol'lllnoe in relf.\lio1l LO all!Jge.-J ~ rruerrorer,ce m 

tro US P<oskJi;q-itlal a.lac6oo; 

i,. ~ ir,;,;,ica!.kull; ror· 1.lJ!l naSOnai sec:.,.'k,. of !ho US a~ fh:, UK; .,111';1 

c. rir.«!c<i IO be anaiylsed anti~ ITTV!;3.ti;zaledlvanfi~. 

21. Acz:ordinQ~1 lh8~ OclendDl\t .r,.-ot~ & ro-r,y d the~ ~orarullrn 

to: 

a. A !~r UK ~ er.t nafon?J 10:::u't.'Y offlcl&J a~ in tis ~cial ~fy. 

o., o ~n!.c!antiDl rir..is 1n ti&rn w:;,-; rem,: a.rad 

b. FUliO:t, ~ ettQPhattd emu!! ~ ~11 IO!lruefion to Fusion !O pmwle a ~ 

~ ll) ~-McCthl '<UI ~ ~:st. 

Uabrnty for the publication comp!!llned ct 

22. Snw 1.'13! !t is edmlt1ed Ula! ~ ffilfC~ com~ of Md ~l!l oo.rt !llOmf1 1,1,<:?HI 

con\2illed in ~ eonfldanfral Dac8mber memara~. ptHagmph 61! ~-

PROFE.C!TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE CF P.E?RESENTATIVES 

169 
23. 11 Is denied ihf,i In ~r n&t!.r.l! e.od ~ roea.rimg, i:': lherr ~er tantiro. ~ 

wt,rtls wmpilltnoo of bore oc Wl!fo i;spaNei of beef.;-ig ttie .meenng pk!aasd s1 

pcragrn~ 7. 

24. Rea.I in conraxs !he nawrnl Ml! ocrl!ruuy mminirlQ ot Iha YKl(CS ~oo o( -

~t m9m 'ffl!rn ~n:,ur.:l:a !o lm.1'S'.l;rB1e ~ the O~lltll ~ bG6cl coe,n::ect hy 

R.uwa ln!O tis~ .be cc:nputu'!: ~ tly 1.11!3 US ~traSc ~ ~~

IJansnittlng ¥fro-.;. P8~ b<~-;g. s1es11og da-ta entl i:ca-~ llltal:"ITTl OpEScl~ 

25. S9YS iJ: ... <s0lar as a Is aclmltl~ etove paregl'!-PII S.1 19 t*l'~. 

2$. Tl',s, flm sentor~ QI ·parag-:oj:h 8.2 13 notDt3. Thh Is uooo.-sraod3blo. lM 00tl1Cl)3j Of 

ths O!;-QJm~r mo..w.orancrwn 'W'ln? h'igr.!y sen~itr.ia aoo ~.a Ce'fe~ rr:i.'y 

alssem!.iatod ~P~ ce u In st:ia eonn~co Be alO!IKak:I. 

26. Sub~raptis 8..2. , . 8.Z.2 ~ 6.2.4 im, cdmltte<I. 

29. A$ to sub-~ a.2.3: 

L The Int gel'l{mc:o is «,o w;ue for Iha OefeMarts to plesd to rn £nY 

tn!ar/..~l way. 

t Thll &"Et ~llntenr;a ~ again IQO ~ fa; :J)Q Ocl'~:a ID plcx! IO t.'\ 

any mea~ way. The~ mr;mo,~ndum ~ pto~ed (:) 

(t",e rec_~ I~ ebcr.-e SC Uu!t !hal lho !mon;-.atoo Ill ll was 

known to (ha Uniliid Slat~ 6r,d Uniled ~ go<;'QITlffliv.is el a 

higll l!n~ by~ wltfl ~tiiltY fo; iwU!x'ral s~ 

30. To.:t Rrs1 sc;nts=ci $l!>~h 8.2.S!s noted.~ Defendants did no\. ltG'_,.'!f, 

prov!t1a .n)' ot l~ p.-la~ r.'.8~ b:) !Ueda Olg"'...Jl~~ or p.ime.li5ls. far 

orl lhby ilUtho,.rt?o an,'Me to oo ao. ~ did l?i§y prowlo u-11i l;Otl!ide.?°..:al Dece.-n'ixif 

mF-roorenc!tim fl) medb o~ns or Jo~. Nor di! !hey auihorizll am.,-one to 

do 60. 

4 

?ROPEP.lY OF THE u.S. HOUSE OFREPRES::NTATIVES 

170 
32. Sl!Vtl lhltt it b 41<1mitt«l U'lcrt Iha SQQan(I Ool00!1Dnt (Jt1vo off IIIQ r~etm.l IA!lingi; to ll 

ll!niili · m11111>0t of Joumnl~ riboul !hi, pr0-0IC1Clion mnmornndo r, llltl'!I 

:iurnmor/® h.rnn 201e, AUl).~rogn.ipll o.2e 13 <knlod. 

35. Parngrnph B..5 i9 O!!:ll!Gd. The Del~ \s ara oot·Tiebta for ptt~liOrl by 8~. 

Quatlfktd prlvUeg-~ 

:ie. Further o, in Ula nltsmeGv", the <XK1/idonUel 090Bmbor men:.0111ndum Yfil!i ptmfi~hltu 

by Wi Dofond3nts. as !HB!lrmd 111 pa.mo raph 21 above, In good tallh, QO un QC:CllSlol1 

of qulllllied pi1.,,.3eoe. 

37. In the cltf.lJrnetanCl(Jll or,t cul cbDll'ft Iha OD!l)O(l.,11111 woro t.JWr,r p l,l\rty lo puCI.$ tho 

fniormollori fn U1u 0 11com"81 m~ni le ~ nor,trJ1 VK QO','(lrnmont nllUonnl 

i.,cullty officio! 11.nd &n. Jkenln co th.11 It ~1 koown to the Llnl~d KJngekJm M d 

Ul\llod Stotoa govomrnonlt Ill i:t hloh klvul by PoriOII& wi.h rMfl(lni,Jblllly IOI nnUoMI· 

t.OCUIII)', ~ mcl;,l«lnl!I had O C:Of,OJ jmlllllnlJ duty (Jf ll'llc!,ost Ill t1)01'llvo It Ill !Mir 

c.ipoc,l11>u WI Ur«>t ~ nllllMl:.ot lh«lo uovommonta ~ •vcll rnnpoooiblrillu.!l. 

SO. The fncldc,nt.et f)vbllcolloNI v.i F~ ulld Mt Kmmor WCl«l rcosol\(1blo Oft a moann of 

bnnl)kl{) U1hs uDMUVft d()aumon1 , '10\mll)' to lho •Uon.Uon o( S&n. MoCul11. 

39. Tho Dofernhmll) old ·"ot publr.h tho DtlCC1mb01 momo~ to any of !ho wxl 

rociplenlo wRh mo lnt"1l)on II ~k1 bo ropubil~hod lo tho world at 1D:rzy, not" r:Sld tt,(ry 

n!Jc llMY ol them to ropub~!!h lhfl Ou<>ernb?:r 1nemorv11dum to o\l'IOJ'S. It any or loo rociplonla dill '° with lhlJ roa\JI lhAt It ~ s pubfi~l1od ~ tho world al laly11 Iha 

Oofondonw, In tho clrwtn~ llCell.. rl!mln I.lie pro'..!)Ct!cn of qi.ziuC'lll:d pi'filege. 

40. L, J1;1lation to parzigrapn 9, It ~ @t!mltti;d ihet publ[callon Qf .l>i& '>\'Oros comp'~ oo of 

by 8uzzfood ("' EJJY 51.Jbs&qu~I ft>ltm'lill repubflcalion ~ tl'IOOO IIIO«hl by U,..ird 

parties) WBS likely !ti ca"<lSll S!!rlrus ha(m to Iha rer,umtion ol lho Flrol Claim:anL Save 

as nfomsoid, po1tlg(Clph 9 hs no; !ldmlllod. In parlli::ul.11, II ~ riot adrnifsd that the 

publication or 1m words ~!HI o/ by BuzzFeed (or an~ 11uch S~LICnt 

ropublloo\ion) h~ o.mm1d 8000llS fiflllndal lollll w any of Ito CtalrnaA\3 °' the< it b 

tik91y to do r.o In future. The Cm mmls il!t(I roqvll9CI Ill prow ttl9 nXl1lUtnoo and ~tent 

of or,y ~i r!OM()IOI IO?is ci.ndlor eny ·1111.ry rwo 'flnunckit toe,.,. llllO!led hy th6 

pvbllc.it/,Qn of tiw. W()rdn r.o/llp!tllood 1;1f, 

5 

PROPERTY OF THF. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 171 
-41. Pa~ra;h 10 is rot:c. It~ r.ocr.dlrottod~i lh1:> ~wor sadtQf too ~ .sd"~ic(o.s it! ~> 

Eur~'\ Uni= in Y.°h!i;l'l lhe ;wrtis c.om~ ol wen, rx,ibll&hed ~ iir.d IS, ~ fe: 

as m1t:9dal, \hs S£1lle as Ole ia.,, r:J England ard W.ile5. 

42. /n7tlilal!On to~ f1: 

t>. Sub-porag;e;>'I n2 l3 ednulled bul it is ~1'ia:I l!tru ~ Qe(e~·.a ~ llshll:l 

or CG~od ft;:i '11)b!icnfo:a of Iha wo,'d:; OOi!lp.:.linod ofeoan:mefyw;dely. 

44. !fl re>.all:>n 1!l tllO secoo1 Snnlllfl::& of ~ t; 12. II is ~>ad !Bll lt\15 C!L,."Tialn 

are ~ ~Jeo to ~ ®meg~. w~r aggr.r.~led or Q~. agatzw. !!l8 

Oa~6f'ldalts ll~ o~ lo Bu27.Fe8d. 

45. In~ to~~ 1i,1 ana 12.2. u"' adrntUl!lG !!lat !he D~ dld not 

contac! the Ctai;411l"i$ p.rklr ?D 11",e l)l.lbbl!® of Ire 'fflmls ~ined of by 

Bu::zFaed. In f:::Jltl of :he mal!el'S p!aa.delS aboYa ih8 0~111 h:::d n) ~ to 

con~ lt\11 Oei:m~ I'll rclaS~, ta Iha p1.-b..";callon oflho Deoomber tr..:~trm I:?/ 

Bum~. 

'6. Pa~ 1'2.3 la~-The Fil!t. Sl?C.)l1d ar.d Thkd C',a:msr,'!s mr.ta IQUer blita 

IH:!JDI\ lo !M 0e1~rlda,:r,.~ Oi1 ;l3 J!JU..l!t'/ .2017. fhe i)efeodanls A<:k/JaMedgad ~I 

of '111 !«tor bofn u~ lhrouQbl! letiet fran !hair fomietllofTci'.Qte. ~a. en :m 

JMua.rJ 2017. Tho Oo!enda....,.3 !tEn J)tQ'Vlded a d~ response 10 the let\er beflx8 

aeljon fO'Jt day& ~ on 3 F~ 20T7. Jha Defendani$ t,Oln~ o:Jt tl'ISl t?lD 

Ctalmsr.ts' 1au,1 b!l!orl, action ifxl not me..: the mqlin!manls ca:itei.-:ed rn the ~ 

A.cl.lo!\ Prot~ toe Ol:!£amt1tlon. tn ~ailar rJte liUe.r M!att ;ietion; 

a. stst&d tl'lal t~(JOO;l Y/Q) 3, en«Y ~l'& ~..ictcd tr'/ •e_filfire~ ot ~ 

~lld and Thirtl Ov~ts.. bU1 ca not pro'lidA! Iha ~ or Mr/ d019!'~ t;f 

:i'loi!:o 'ell:~ . Nor (ijcf ft 5La1$ ~ r M~!l1\0tt Wil & Ems,y ~ 

r.struct9d by ea Fau.~ Cta~nl; 

b. @ not !~n(f'/ Liie ~r ~i.on{e) lt!Sl ~ I.ho ~J~ o£ lllB 

~pe~ om, c;:oo!la:ry to p:irag;-aph 3.2 of illo l':,t-Acc&:t» Prot~ool fo.-

0:sfamBl<::n: 

c. c.id net ~ffy L'18 ~ t.10l Iha F'iB! !o Thi:d Cfa~b !db'tlul&d ta ~ 

'l!ffllS co.'T!p!2i;:-ad of, cx:otmry IO ~ra;,.'l 3.3 eJ lhG ~,oaoo ~ ti:" 

C>Efama~ 

The Defenc'an.!q lhe!oCoro n:q~ l!l6 ~nrs to proi.ic5e Ula ri~ 

:otomiatGn In c:der IO ieuab:e tll<;J Defffldar!l5 to prov.oo. a rl.lll ~ io ir~ 

6 

I•• 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RES=NTA 1WES 

172 
IU 11111 

proposed cln•m Notwithstond,ng thP- l:1cl thi\l the Oefondants provldad a tJolcl1lcd 

response lo ll'ie C!alm11nls' lelter belo10 action wllhm 11 clay:i of ti1nt teller being ser.l, 

end nolwil.'lstancllng the r,umorous dr.llclenc1cs 1n tno lotte:r oefore aaion, on J 

Febni.iry 2017 lh9 Claimants Issued nnd served proccedi1Y;JS on tho Defendants. In 

the circurnstanccs. tho Oaim.inls' decision to ,ssue procoedings less than rNo wooks 

anor the !cUer before oclion was 11recipitous, i ncompa:ib)e .,..,,ti the ove,,1e11r.g 

ol>jcct1vc In lho Civ,I Proccduro Rul!ls, ond b,e.,chod tllo roqu1rllrncn;!; of tho Pm, 

ac!ion Pro:urol /or Dc:lwnullon. 

4 '( 11,s <1F.riP.<I thill the ClalmR'llS R•e t:nlllled lo ;in 1n;unc1ron againsl ltl!l Oe(el"\1.11:I~ ::is 

pl~~dCXJ ·n parngropll 13 ol tr,e Particulars (t/ Clo:m or m <111. 

GAVIN MILLAR q.c. 

EDWARD CRAVEN 

STATEMENT OF TRUTH 

I ho Dotondonts t:ollavo tnat lhe facts set out ,n these Port>culors of Claim ore hue. 

Sign9d: 

Po~1tion: 

Dille: 

t~tv~-- Chrtstopt,er Steele 

Director, Orbls Business lntcllig1Jn::o L1r1 

03 Apill 2017 

7 

PROPERTY OF THE U .S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

173 
UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT B 

174 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE 

llUl:EN'S B!!NCH DIVISION 

Cl:ilm no. HQ17000413 

BETWEEN 

11) Ai.EKSEJ GtJBAAEV 

(2) WEB21L.1.A B.V. 

(3) WEBZJLL.11.1.IMITED 

(4) X8T HOLDING 8.A 

{1) ORB15 BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE l.lMIT!:O 

(::Z) CMRISTOPH!!R S"tEEll: 

OEffHDANT5' ReSPONSE TO CLAWANTS' REQUEST fOR FIJRTIU!R 

INFORMAllON PURSUA~T TO CPR J>AAT 18 

---------------·-----------

(Jndo, p.11rngr•ph, ? ond ll 

Of: 'Al IJII mmonnt tlmoc F111'JM ~ :wl>}tlcr 10 ar, oOJ/gation ntX 10 ~Q(JO 10 //lY'tJ 

(/0/lilN• r:or1/if.fq,,,//(II lntonlgcmo ,rwsorr.,1 prol'idacl 10 tt by /ht, O(r{DJldar:ni ltl tho 0011{111> 

ol /fhtl WOffllnr, l~~p \VIIIIOI.~ tllo oOMCllllM/ o//JIO Dllfflfldi1J1/~ • 

~ 

I. Wtinlhetr Iha o,ooed <Si>\)' of CClt1Jldontio11ty is smd 10 flt!~ by eon1roe1 or in 

eqully. 

2. !I by coolmcl. sum, \lthelhot too duly llf0$0 under (P) n gooorru coocroct ol 

rotuln171; o< (b) '$pCCir11. coolnlQa relt,llno lo Ute ~oflc wot~ 

3. In eIDler e,'!N'll ~la\D lllhe\her ony C1)1l!r~~) ie!oo on were wr11~ Ot ~ II 

Of'lll, sb1firl$ ~ $nil betv..e<in v.tiam IN)y W@ffi made. 

RESPQl:,ISE 

The duty 11= both by i;onlract end ln ~. A l'lrllliln non--Olsclcxwle 

agm9ment was eonciuded between 1he F'!ta1 Oefe!idan\ and e rep~lr"9 of 

Fusion In JeJ'lUltY 2010 In ra!lll\on to ld(lJ'1( condudim 11y Ftl~ for \hQ ~t 

Oafendsnt. S:!ath!Rmon1, Fus!O., wM !r'lliere of \ha eo111ldenllalily oS lnl.e~ 

t'Df)Olit, throuQ.h tllCI course of t>ulllll= \llitn Uis DefElll(Janl& and, ln miatlon to 

~ di,clo.sure cf !ho memo..inda le ftlt t<ra:ru?t, 1h11 ~ Oe/erdellt ani:s 

Fl.1£loo hM oac, s~ ~OG Jn "rrtch ll'ltl con11conlilt~ty or the 

memornncla had boon ernptau;IS&d ll ncl Fur.'On v,as ln:iU-.. <CJed IO lntonn Mr· 

l<IBmer al their conTIOeollB!l',y. 

REQUEST 

. , . 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOVSE OF REPRESE~ITATNES 

175 
4. S!!l!e 'ttflelhe< 11\e a.."eged d,cy ~ w dl&dQ:.e s~ 1n1e,.,genca ID l~ ~-

Vli(ho::t tho pi'.!lf a;J"CKm9nl er fl'I.; Def~ 'II lhe coull!D ~ U-,9 w~ 

reJatk),-.ship e.$!1Cfci:! ~ <II~~ 'by FWCII to :Mir o.irn i;;fl(JrJs (ic Ola clkl<,~ 

v.i\o hacl com..'?lisslooed u» in~cllC8 m11lcrieJ: s!IS pa~J]h 5 of !he 

Del~). 

IriSPQNSf 

1n sastion to tl\8 ;iro-e!ection m.werooort thr: dtty f"IOl b d':~l.w.i !r.!e;.i~ tc 

thifcS patties "':thwl ll\il prior agreenlEUll. -Of Ina Def~ did not extllOO to 

dl~~ by ~ Co II); t!;en:{lt), olthough l!le 01:r~.ots ~lend ~111 

~s ct !he rr:e.."Tln."'3.IGa ·:.-e:."B tt.it m~ bY F\@Cn to ::s cfierll{s}. 

(n.ra.'n)ion !() the Oecen'lo!lllr rr.ert<ll'B!ldurn, ttrls was r.OI ~cl p.;,~lll,;t'll to 

ar,y CC!ll!llCI DI W!!l.d Ill ii3rag.-.iph 1a cC !!\a Oe{sn;a Tl'.e 0\/?Y ~ '.a ~lc-S9 

~ ~'lC8 rip!l't to thi:d ~ ;,,ilhout lh9 ';)dot ~:"il of lhs 

Cefemia:ita 1.1-.e.1'&'= dlli er.sod !o ef.~ b:, Fu,lcn to it.. c!;ef$). 

REQ JA::."1: 

5. Slalt> ~tullh<l, OIC Oafclld:m:s GQed any rocip'ocai duly cl ~ Ill f'usioo 

an~ FU:;.io(l's t:;e."'l.~ in ro~i::,c\ ~ !l'>ll lr,!cffigorGQ lh8y pro•,fdoo. 

S:'.nt:e i4 vra.G not p~a ~tto Iha enguQerrrent wi!h FuS>Qn ~'b~ l!-l 

~ph SI c4 tho Oorenco. Ibo '0$fcll<!al"..la did not o:-,oo ony c~!lllon o/ 

~nllden:o lo FUilen ondl'or F~'11 d!i!,t\1(111 .1:1 r~llon to lr4 ::uJrtgenoe 

eonl:a.ln$d kl ~ Oe(:e-:nb,,r rr~n<lum. 

6. Slal9 ¥r!Y.lther Fu*JI·.$ ~11e'1:i. it'COfat 8$ tfscrosure to lt~m \'fa$~~~ {~it 

Ri)ql1¢Sl 4). were ~erciry (Mylo lr1'1 O~ffld•,inb 11n:S:oc Fue.'Qn r.at to (a) ~i? 

nndlor {l>} d~ Ifie ln\'Olligana; • .m;j, ii ..o, eiva lilm ~n as b h£Nf ll'lal 

<My ~ aleQ8d to~-

"Th& ra;pon~ to qoos.lkfl 4 ®~ ~ repeated. The De!~e;;nts u-nde.~d ll',at 

!lie arrangement ~$1 ~ ~ ~ di:W(t.) wu 1tra1 lntc!5geme would 

ool be a~ed. As eipt~ ~ IJle December m~ \llt!IS ooi 

~ooed ~~ to ll'le c.'l",,a~elll re~ to at paregtaprt 9 of Ul9 

Otll'e~ and C'knl~ore Ill..~ of lt.e oecen:oor memot2M!!r1 to u-.w 

clia!'l'!{S}Vfflll Mt ~1ted. 

Undor p.anrgr•¢18 9 and to 

O! ·s~ ~'l.llfJ eno iH!-'fy Ncwr.:~ 2G16 01i!5 wzs eng.ll~ 1:/i' Fw..e, io ~ e 

o ~.'os ol coo5dcnt1ai memanmrfs ba~ or, ~nro C1:JtlCem&lfi Rus:ief; effc;rt: to 

frJNience the US PresiiG.~I ~ trCXlO!;!J ll!'/d llnlrs bo~"l?M RussJa ;;.-i<:t ~'d 

Tromp". 

. ,_ 

I 

PROPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

175 
7. f>l.oii,oo 1dal\01y (r.oe pornornpn 6 ot tl'lrJ Dn/ol'\CI)) Fu~l\'o Glioro{n) ,n rt11t11ion to thlt 

pa11i<:tl!ll1 {l~on'(lnl. 

RESPONSE 

111.6 roquosi IS /leithor rGOsooab!y net1>1>SB,y nor 1>1opo,lion~1e lQ enab!;e \ho 

Cffl~iwn1~ to propore 1h0lr own.c.uo nos 10 iR'Hlmlana tho case \llo)' l'IBW 10 moot 

OI ·11re Otlfend.inls fTO(SuCf!d sixleiin ~di memoroflda. Thew ~ bf> lllfem:d IO fa: 

come~ es ~ha~ memr:rrutdt1~ l)BVinp been prepe,-ed bolot6 Ille 2016 

US Pr.zsfdonllal e#eclfon. T1't9 ~sf l)f)O 'or.ls prodllCe{J in lrie 1$(18( ~ o/ Oclobar 201ti 

NDna = producoo .it) NfJVM?l),:.< WtCl. /'l<Jt10 al lh8 j:,r~lon memomMa 

COl!ItJ.'11~ any ro~ to, or k1toNgcn,» ~ . tho ClolmlJllts·. 

8EO!JEST 

8. In \'lew qf lho =«tlon 1,.>uu no rnEJT!Omnda -e pl'Ddul;oo 10 Novembat 2010, 

p:el'it:a 111111t1 !rt& nature CJf 111e ol"l!lll9omOl'll rn oart,. UO'tl9'1\txlr 2018 on 1"8/erred 

lei In j}Mlgraph 9, ontt wt)Gthflr t.llls ongngement Wl!.!I porfoJmcd end what 

intollkJcmcc ll roolod lo. 

uese0Ns1; 

nm nllluro o! tno Dolondnnt&' OJ1g11gernont by Fu.skin dl<l not GtulnlJ<I dunr4 too 

polled txJIWoon lhu pro1Wrnl\oo of kltt1 lonl pco--01<i1(llliJn mr,mornndum ori 20 

OC\Dbttr 2016 MO ttia <Into ol UV., OS Pt1111dantllll i:,6eellon liOWl'tl/1lt r~noo th& 

OolondllnlJ> dld nol rlM'lClivo eny r~l&Vllnl lrttollgoooo c<111~mlng flu,ah111 otlOftll 

ID lnlNllJICO tht US PruklMlint olt.llllloo pt(.)C4>M 11nd llnka btllwvnn Rui1la ond 

Donnld Trump tl~ng lhlo pe(.rxl, oo mt11no1111lda we,o p,oduCQd p111t1J~I to 

tho Ofl!)l)(JOl'llOOI rinC)( 20 OClobor 21) 1 O. 

Un~r l)l)1111Jfl'.1Ph, 12 ond 13 

OI ·s~nr1Ior John Ml:Caln Js I/to Cl'laJt Qf thlr us SOrniU, Nfnr,q Serviwo Ccmmiltoe 

Q/ld a mombor ol //IQ Us Sonll.la Commiltoo on HomoJIJnd 5ocl.uftr ar,d Gl)Yt!(1Ut'l(N'Js1 

A(fahv anti '~vi,J ~ k, O fomvl,r US Sffllr;r Psps,frrlDl'I( r::MI tllmrMl tlncl WM US 

A!d:sltdll $(1(:ttilety 6( Stitto !tr ~. Huil>M RJQhw. arid Lr.W from iooo lo 

~009. Ho f!J tho Serr:« ~ fCI ffuman Rights and HU71JfN1 Ftwr!Qw.l 1;11 ~enalt:Y 

McC£Jfn·s fnst/Ulra fer tnJemollonaJ t.DfJtkJrohJp". 

REQUEST 

9. Pfeesa confl,m (as l)!IJ'9Qroph 29b{ij of \Jla O.ifoocs ~IS) ~t S:JNlor 

McCain and ti< Kremor a~ il\leg(ld (a) lo hsva bo.M e.cons In ~11 offic;L,I 

capaclUe~; a.,o (b) Mly In· relation to ~ C8')0d~ In tn,: ccurse or the mntlorn ploo<IOO ln paragraphs 14 lo 17 end 21b; .ood, i! not, Lcfenllly anyo\h~r 

cap~clly In vm!ch tmy wero 8Ciliig ord whorl and forwh."lt pc,1poe.<l{a). 

-~· 

PROPEHTY OF lHE U.S. HOUSI:. OF REPRES1cNTA71Vl:aS 

177 
The Oefendar:15 b<'..iifM!d Iha[ S!maror M::Qlui am! Mr KR.mer ""-sri: ~":9 «:fy 

il'l their cffic;;!i ca.Decitie!. sna ~ ,.i« nt:xmei:l of ~ other Cl!?!clly er 

~upose L"I ;,,tJ.::h ~ were &;511!;1. There weto no gro\.roo$ that led !Tie 

Dofoooorns to~ lhnf ~<o, ~k;Caln and Mr Kramer ;a."6re not a:t'!.9 lri 

ll'lofr otrJCW ca~ at eriy ,l!ma ~;> ~ i:md S'ldudklg llle !1'Jll!icaoon af lhe 

Ol?cernt,,,;; m=o-nmsndwl IQ Mr l<ra!M!. 

Undar paragraph 1• 

or •.4s a =l d 0-=:1: a:'¢"~ssfotls s~ .Ar!rit.:-N ~ for the Se,:;a,d D:e~.tf.6nf to 

niaot J.Jr K'mtroe!, ~ !~ ro,nt:1/'llallv~ CJ{ S9rH!Dr McCain. j1) Otdsr lo :;t;:;-1( r.im /hD 

~ion m<Jm:r.m<I;; oo a ~loon!i&J be.sis'. 

REOt.l§§I 

10. S!Slo whot .a mearJ by 'on a ccnrld~bssii;', ~g preasat;-..t-.al 11Sa or 

usaa ~or Mte.oo wB.Ylllen; penn;tled 10 m~lla of 1:1\8 pre-e!6t1lor; 

mamOfatld~ and Ylttether ~ ~~, e.pedn.d \0 ~lw McQirl and Mr 

l<r&JneJ. 

ffi;§f'.QNSf 

The Oe~o!a ~<006 lhst th& ~811~ of l,t,o memo.-and3 v ..ul;f be 

trenllld i.'l ll".a ~!l$1 ttinllde,r.co ttlld ~ onl~ be used Ir! Sa,.,,.1~ Mc:CmrT In 

hl<i offlc!at ~ (Qt the $0<& puJ3X?$8 c! ~ng. {I\~~ ,anr;i ~!'IQ 

of 

their 

proted:r~ 

~ 

us 

lo ensble 

natSoool 

51Jch 

~rfty

t.~lon 

. The 

te be 

Secood 

takll!t 3$ 

Oe!el"ldant 

n11~,. ~ for &.e ~ 

lnCcrmoa 

Mr Km= ti:81 ~ ?l'e,-e!edlon ~n!la were only ~ be tJ5ed far !ht& 

axclLIS"t'9 ~e boforo he shM,&(5 t.!r Ktamer any cf CM m1;~. M, 

Krsrner was ~ $l t11le llm11 praMad v&h a,pr~ of ~ ~ tmn h$d 

been i:ir~ n~ ti.n data, b~ wa,~~-

Uncle-r p_aragtaph 1!! 

OI "Th& Del!:nda!".ls cor.(!.."tlJtd to ~Ive llf"~Q"tc,J itlio,'figence M lfu l;ll!Uar~ 

ccvr:rt1d by the ~ momorailda at:er me US PresidCMfie! oiocBc,, 0/ttJ /tie 

,;or,c;J-.1~ ol !f>e as...•<nenl kJr FIJ.$kxl•. 

11. Pte.a&& st1:ate v.ft5lne( SlJCtl nle:9'9er.ca "'/&$ a~ =.-ghl tiy !ha- ~d 

acroOG?ru or rr.e."ely ttteeNe<i (ss pre!,!.,U-/ pleruie-.!J. 

R%}PONSE 

Sucf) I~~ wu rlOI acL'vely s:o~t;:; Ji w:lS manslv re~w. 

Un!fM paragraph 'i9 

. j. 

PROPERTY Of THE LLS. HOUs;: OF REPRESENTATIVES 178 
01 'Altur rnco,•,ing OOffl<I r.uch lnfo/llgu11eo 11w, Sor,orrcJ DotcntJonl PfOIWfC<I (fl{) 

~ nlidomlnl Oocomboi mom<l('1f>cfwn, t(l{t/ft()(l lo hi PMJWtl/.)11 8.1. OIi hi8 own Inll/11Uvo °" or (l!Olllltl 13 Doco~, :io1a·. 

12. Plllntilt c.1,110 whlltoor tho ~ 'on hl:i = lnlllallvu' moan tnat tho [)(Jcember 

memororuhsm ""1fl not (fl) C!&Hltw; or (t>) pro,.ided lo Fuoion r,umun11t lo eny 

r..:,ntmcl. II 001, plimae vpoe1fy \ho CQnlrool in que:iUon. 

~~PONSE 

Tho Dllcember memorandum wa~ not created 01 ~1/Jdoo to Fus.on p,x&uanl In any cootta ct 

uni:ier pnrooreph 20 

Of "The Del'ornto..ts considered, COITTlGl,ly. 1/'ull tho rlJVI inloll/g!Jnc& in !ho Dilccmbpr 

m.imortmd~m: e. was of crmsi,;!erab!e im~onct)· ln m/Mlon to ~ Ru:;st;Jn 

mltll181'0t1Cf> In Illa US f>ros/dsn~·lil ~; b. (1£Jd ~km~ [Qr nw nE16onat sec,.sify 

a! lJw US 8ltd thtt UK; Md o. r,seded IQ l,e or.~/ysw end Tc.trl:tr&r inv&sti:}s!edlv~rifleo'. 

13. Ptoo&ll 6\ale wt-.e!Nlr 1M Sbooro De(oodant only r!!rl'lehod thla eonciuSliOn on bohell or n-.a Flfs\ Dafc,ndB.il <II' '*'1cther Chri&topht'lr Burrow& Mi11o1 Sat Ar.dtew 

were parly to his aliSassrnenl 

Ss5Pl'.?N~E 

Tho Ocfood1Lnlo' 11~110:wnonl that t/10 pttM>lodl.On momoomdo ontJ ;ny . 

r.ubr,oq110l'II rolcuwt tnlOU!oor,eo wtrlch lho~ ~C>d MOIJl.'J bo ~ lo the 

lndMdu11I) ntlom,d lo a l pffllOmph 21 of !hi> .Oofa~ wno roochod lolJc\Mp 

ooi,~rcito l!bcu,ulo~ botwoon lho Sowfl"d OOfoO<Jnn\ unO. ll) Cl11l~Nflho: 

Oun=• of 1h11 Firul ooronoont; (f1} !llr h-tdJtM Wood ~ h04 ~\\011 wltl'l 

~11n.110( ~); (QI 011v'd Knimcr (,tho WO\\ ocllno on t>Qlu.\W of S0l)Clto1 

Mr.Com) oncJ (IV) Ulo lJI< n&tbnal 11acun1y ost~illl ,ctfuntld to ul poruvruph i llbl 

ot tho C)orcncu. Mr Burrow, e.htlro~ tno Suceo<r ()U(oll(l,:11'11'0 u~soum11nt 1:11 tho 

l'lllavoo1 Omo. 11'<1 Oofor.ot1n1, oonokJ016d thllt lho ,~1111:i v.1110 oo:t,-0Y1"onuy 

n:,JO"'t)l"I! ~ lhO oolioll(II r.oc:urlly ot \lln US, UK Md 1~ 11 o\Sea 11.!1d !mil 

nul>Do:iuonc 11\lbllil)onco rallbng to thOMi mauttG oul))n 10 be dlsdo(md lo lho 

lndlvk11.lllb rolonoo 10 01 p011>i]rnph 21 of 1ho Doloncu. Eoch OI Iha tndMdlJlll& 

\IIIU1 miom \fin 80<:0lld OctondMI ol&CIJWJd Ulo lllOve Nll"llod &ill vlS¥J 11t rho 

IIMo and, 10 lhcl Soc:oocl Deiond!Ull'a lulov/edtra Md ool'81. contiouo to ilo!d 

lh:81 "4cw. 

·~· 

PROPERTY OF TME U.S. HOUSE OF Rl:PRESENTATIVl::S 

179 
B.EOUEST 

14. ~se elote !~ !he O..accrr.t>er memoran~um ,~ ~llY~ kl (sl 1Jl8 UK 

~!loriru 5et.~ clfrot?t and,!c,r to) F!ISlon: aM/C!l' (tj Mt Kra.,na( ili'ld Sonil!o" 

~in wiih the 30'.Hl:.e or ;,,a e~ ew;imt Ire r.&u1man1s racacroo C< 

~l 

,r.torma!ion ~!Ilg b tho 2bl11JS ol Lit!! ~ce{s} n! !he ~t~~,ce to:nl:<liOOd 

'4'!iron tne O~bef mamOfli!Xfum WI:~ no! r~ted whon ~ wa, prov~ :o 

e:1her !.">a UK ~1)31 ~ cit~ ,mdlnr F~ aridl01 M( Kra-t:lor ~ 

59nator ~- Tos 1nl~n contained wntun ctl!l 1n.~1co mix,ru 

i,;ertalC!~ le tl'le stl!tus of U,e soun:e{sl v,zs coll$Wlt ~ith lhe Oe{u,65,.1!5' 

COT\G~ eff~ !O ~c:! tha rcerilly d O!B~s}. . 

1 ~ P.aaso sl.a!a whslhel l!,s !Afl...ru;;!'.M to rutaon co!ltclned any e~s:s: l'Sf«~ 

to eodld8!'.lialily {cootr.tst para,grapn 21.> ~ a~ ri!fcrs to 'c,11 11 

cor,~~·}. 

RES?ONSg 

!n Ole Seo:,od Dere.-.dan\'5 ::cmmu~ wrtli F~ ,;tino<,mn9 U'!9. 

pro>tl6ion of tne ~ tiy ~nerea en-~ f( ~~a~~ 1110.t !.'1~ 

4lemoranda ~-e oo.'y ID be r,,~:,oad 10 Mr -K~ fa:- 100 ~ ¢ pa~'-lg 

L1'.im oo !o s~~ f~. ~~ ~ -werssi~ ~ lll9 ~ 

Oefenaant arr:s Fusitn na:,J;a~ Eo lti5 ma\.~ wera !:alduded us!r.,g .!:l!al.'B 

teleptic;:ie c:cmar..r-l0"j;n$. ~ o-~ =re- com:nunt~ ~ Sna:-n:I 

Oefrm!1ant ~,.l'GSSly e.r~~c.a ~l fOO Da-~"er IJ=ll'.012ldi.1m ~s stil;f~ 

\0 Uie ~a ~ tew1ctlon:s. on~ to iliird ~ a& -..aro eoo.!all>.e!'S In 

IJ")e wri2n 8g=na~ de$cr.~ ~ ltut l'IMl)O("Ga ~ /~~ 1 !O l abO\le. 

U.nd-ttr p::in11mph 21a Md b 

Of 'J.!;l;q1Jinfly the S=;n.rt Def~/Tlhr,t PTJomed 8C®'r <;;( ll1e Do~~ 

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g3,~r~::, pro-.i~ in ~ere!~ 

-e -

FROPERTY Of TtlE U.S. llOUSE. OF REPR~ NTATIVES 180 
....... 

Ri:SPQNS; 

lotllllll)onoo pro·,lela.d by 100 OotQr.<11Jot8 to Fv,lon w11ri provl<k!d socv,oly.iM 

\1-hwo J>ro«od oloct101'1alll'/ ii w11~ p,0\-ttled li'I on<:lpllllrod (crm. 

Unaar pMonmptu 23 nttd 24 

Of '1l IS donilld tllor In lhDfr f)(l(l,lf'O/ Md QlrPrrtJfy mr:ottlfll'/, In tholt f)IOpor 0011/eJd. Uio 

words complo!nod of lxYD at !I/Em (;{1l,l/tlJh1 d ooarmg the meanmg pie.oded at 

pera!J(t}Ph 7" and ·Re.act In GOMm tho rA<1tuts/ er.cf crdinwy me&J!ng of th<t war1S 

comf))DJt>IJa of was lnl!l l!We weu, grO\Jflda lo trwo:ffgat& whether too Clsim8llf3 fi-0!1 

mn ~ by RU3Sia info lulclri/'lf/ tho compulo,.s USBd by Jh(> us DortlWll/&: PaJty 

lon(J~fp, lrtlm.millirrrJ wu~on, {X(IIllft~ bull$, s!oallf'l/1 ""'" ooo ~clln1111111Nin9 

o:>C,TUtlons~ 

17, Please kfBnlify the context Ol!iO!l on and Iha 1'1l8118,<1.1) !O ~ n wa:a o!leli,led!;• 

knooNn. 

Tile reaclers ~:.cm.I ID sre lhe roadors of ti'ID O~bet rt'l8mornndU1'r1 Yltio 

acx:eue<i and r""8d the v.c~ complalne6 of via ~ Bfllt!o Iha! waa ptiblistxla 

on !ho auuFOOd ~toon ,o Jlffiuury 2017. 

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'11t1W1tf(i~, o.ncJ fX)lo.ntl{J{ty ,mverlfloblr, DIIOO(ll/oo.~·. Tho .euttclo nc;tc!G<J I.hot 

'Buwoad Nmva ropatl~ Kl tlra. VS and C:wvpr, huvo l:it>On /nvostJaorlrrg IM 

Rliogcd 18cl~ In {he rkwi9r but hmlll "°' vri1«J OF,~ lhDlfl.' Tho w1!du 

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oHegattom In th~ ll~ler ·~~false·. 

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loml cJld not pwpo1t lo raproMlfll} lj(lriliod fact£. bul YMro raw illto,.'!Jgooco .which 

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rl\tmlOl'Mdum WGl'O ~:y to hOIIO been 11ppmachod IOI CtJnliTlOO!,. rutd 

ttmmfom mony or ttio.~o PQr&Qns \11$~ lilloly lo dony 1tio·t1U<tgotlon, oonlziinccf tn 

\I~ rnw lntoJHl)onco: and (81) whll6 lho 004ombtlr rnomomn<lum w111 pni;innid In goOd lolth, I~ oontont ~, bo .criliclllly lliowoo In Uuht of tho ptll'ptll:o fot n.nd 

cltcumelnn<:~ In wh~ ll'oe inlomiotlon wa:s c;.o!laclsd 

., . 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 181 
Under pu.igroph · 'li 

or ·s.iwi !hBf ll 1:s l!dmJi1Cd cr.ar .ne> &cJoo ()..lf'!md2r,r fl3'.f9 o.7 rt.e recad or~, la s 

!Jrn-~ nu.r,-.w /JI jc,.Jmafisls a.."v.;,.Jt Uia p!l>-;te:tlon rr.oot,;r~ !it1 la!~ svmmf;:f&:ttmtn 

20t~. S®-pstllgr;;p/1. IJ.2.6ilrcferwd". 

~ 

tB. P1~ l!!enliJy !he Jc...~(,&t& t;ri$!8'1 by !Ile~ Deter.6ant and ata:a wr-l 

a,,d her"' t!1:e ~!"!!lg ~ don,e in eaai CMa 111-..d m glsl 'Jf wtml ~ co;;yeyed. 

R!;§PQ7§!; 

ni... lol,l!llll~~ illi!laffy l:.ooroo at l:"ll et1t1 cl Se\:lrembJ>..r 2018 b1 t.')e se.tona 

Dnl'e{!di.:i: er.o Fu~lcm l!l F®,:-,cr's i.-.21T1Jciioo W'l!!'O Crtirn 11'.G, ~ Y«,; Tlmos, 

l2'l'l W~!on Post. YaJ\oo News. t!'..o ~ YGl"1.er tir~ CNN. To; Sacctid 

D.?:!onder,t so~u~1 p:μtcpaled in ru~r n-.e(;1.~9s el F\J~'s tr..\'-'Uctt.lr> 

~ FIJS!en l>.~ !he New YO!'!( Tim!!!. 1/\e W~w\Oll Pou BOO Yoh::ic ~'6, 

whlch fe>:l( ~ ln rrJ~-Ocl®'lr 2016. In ~h Q( 0'.0$6 C2i6:i ltia or'~ ~ Yl'i!S 

=idueied \erc:a,ty !fl !)Ot"'..on. rr; ~. a:tt:I SIJa)'i al Fusion'~ w!r..don. in 

iel!e ~ r 10 f6 the Second Da!®danl br'oe!od a jootnalist Crom MoU. ~looOeS 

l:J,J ~ . 1..o ~ ol the p:s~~loll memor.1r.da ~re e\'el' s;.)'ll'J1 or 

p.'Olllded !o any joumef:Jb tiv. o, ~ \t'>8 ll~\lon oJ, !rl(I Do~~ n, n 

b<ie!ino~ ~.cl'lla!I tho ~=ra oi t,(tljbJd: lr.!el%er.cG ~ins !n~ cl 

RuslYlltl l:1~ert'.:won~!!l me tJS ~ ~ soo tM poa!ibl&co,c,-cI,~n 

al mi:tmbe13 of Ttump'I campal2fl IDa'll ond R\d&~~ gowm.'T>0Rl eHlc:R..~ 

REQUEST 

1S. P'~a e!st!! l'lt'.et '5 rn=I ~ 'off In~ reot!,"ti' !Ult!, ln psrtlcu\Sr ~ i! 

maa~: 

(a) Tho i~ Coo ptt:,i.~ was rot to be pu~ {butm~I be vae:l~ 

te) Tho 1rJ~ ~J 011 QIJbf:s.'Je~ tM ~~ i;m-d:JutS<J ,o the e>&r~"dY!ta tr, 

arwway: 

{~> AFi (bl, tJ;i;t Liu! Daa:mnts tt:hM t~ ~flGl'1>:3Jly ~ctUYA, tll.rl tio1 IJ'i nam&. 

RESPONSE 

~ S.."="rd D!lftt!IWlt uno~ ltat lb1I imoona-.i(m pro\1/(fed ffiiihl re used for lhe 

pUfPDSC cf f\Jcther rel!e!!mh, b<Ji woolj not t;e pubf.sheo or &llrib~: T~ DErfflc!a.l1ts 

ta~al Illat no c!f the n!O;>l'tl brt&f,-,g ~ (OOK pi.."1:$ COOOiMin,g IM Oecsrnbo: 

tneff'.orandum, llnti M ~ cf any oi ti» )!t~or, mgrnotaDM er-Oi8 C«el'!l!!et 

me~dum wero e-.~ pn:;\'ded le ~~ b),. t'if v.Wt U'l9 euthcr'cu&.a cl, !h.o 

081~.:fimh;. 

REOUEST 

20. ~ SGt& ...mstr.8t ll".ese le.tm:i ~ agru,d IO~ mo ~i:d.~t:l~-

-SPROPERTY OF THE LJ.S. tlOUSE Or- REPRl=.SENTATIVES 182 
Tho Stlcond l)cll)rufonl W1l4 totd by fu5'oll llloll U10 lt1rm11 htld boon uxpl/J1noc.l l0 

tho tOloVMI }oumu~I& In OOvt}t\C() by ~l)Jl'I llnd UIO Socond Dofcndonl 

rf>JoforCG<I !ho bi»itl on wnlc:h ho wan opoaJdng lo .a~h o# Ole joLIITlllll.11tc ho mm 

In potaan. Nono or tho Jou1Mll~8 mlsl!(J any ob)odioii. 

Under pnrogr.ap~ 36 lQ 39 

2,. Prasso slate whllth_er tho 00191\CD or quarirti.x, prlvi~o 13 rillied oo by tt,fj 

DeCO(lcl&11ts If tticy um held lo be liable to, pub!icaUon ta lh9 wolld el Iorgo oe "dlslnct from tt,e admitl.'Jd pot,acallon lo lh& 1/\divld~s ldMtif"ied by IJle 

Dafemlants In Ula DefBf1cs. 

Yea. 

STAlEl1ENT OFTRUTli 

The Defendonlo beli8'\/8 that lhe fatts !!tllod In lhlt Ro~Pon10 111m truo. 

Si{J;wid; 

D.llo: 

Nic:.cla Cnln 

L~ot J}lroctor. RPC; 00Pond11nb' klgol 101)1'1).cunwtivc 

18 fAay2017 

PROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RePRESEN l'ATIVE'S 

183' 
- ,. 

Trtt'fi.\Tnl'n- •• 1 

Cl:1lm No. HQ17000413 

IN THI: HIGH COURT OF JUSTICI: 

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION 

BETWEEN 

(1) ALEKSEJ GUBAREV 

(2) WEBZlLLA B.V. 

(3) WEBZILLA LIMrreD 

(4) XBT HOLDINGS.A. 

Claimrinta 

ilnd 

(1) ORBIS BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE 

LIMITED 

(2) CHRISTOPHER STEELE 

Dafendenu 

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE ro 

PART 18 REQUEST 

RPC 

Tav.,er 8ridoo HaJS<J 

Sr l(a\Mrir,c', W"Y 

Lon~oo 

E1W IAA 

T: 020 3000 C-00-J 

Re!ere-:1oe. ORSA.! 

Solicitors for thu 0ter~11:Janls 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

184 
(U) Appendix H - Committee Corres(?ondence about FISA Abuses 

Appendix H Table of Contents 

{U) letter to Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente (March 8, 2017) 187 

(U) letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer {March 17, 2017} 188 

(U) letter to FBI Director James Corney et al. {March 15, 2017) 189 

(U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower {Aprll 4, 2017) 191 

(U) letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions {May 9, 2017) 192 

(U) letter to Acting Attorney General Marv McCord (May 9, 2017) 194 

(U) letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 7, 2017) 196 

(U) Letter .to FBI Acting Director Andrew McCabe (May 161 2.017) 197 

(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 27, 2017) 199 

(U) Lette.r to Special Counsel Mueller and FBI Acting Director McCabe (May 17, 2017) 200 

{U) Letter from FBI Acting Director Gregory A. Brower (July 26, 2017) 202 

{U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. 1, 2017) 204 

(U) letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray {Sept. 1, 2017) 206 

(U) letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. s, 2017) 208 

(U) Letter to FBI.Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 5, 2017) 209 

(U} letter to Attorney _General Sessions and FBI Director Wray (Sept. 15., 2017} 210 

(U) Letter from Deputy Attorney Genera1 Rod J. Rosenstein (Sept. 22, 2017) 212 

(U} Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein {Sept. 26, 2017) 213 

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein {Nov. 2, 2017) 215 

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 28, 2017) 216 

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Jan. 4, 2018} 218 

(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Corney (Nov. 8, 2.017) 220 

(U) Letter from former FBI Director James Comev {Feb. 1, 201~) 222 

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 6, 2017) 223 

185 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
. (U) Appendix H (Cont.} 

{U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 14, 2018) 225 

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 12, 2017) 227 

(U} letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Dec. 12, 2017} 228 

(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Jan. 19, 2018) 230 

{U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and FBI Director Wray (Jan. 25, 2018} 233 

{U) letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower (Feb. 2, 2018) 235 

(U) Letter to Assista1Jt Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Feb.16, 2018}. 236 

{U) letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd {March 7, 2018) 237 

(U) letter to Former t:Bl Director James Corney {Feb. 20, 2018) 238 

(U} Letter to FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe (Feb. 20, 2018) 240 

{U} letter to Attorney General Jeff sessions {March 1, 2018} 242 

186 

rROPcR1Y OF. t HE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA11VES 
... , .,, ........... . . .. , .... ; . . -:. . -, . ..... ~ .. ' I · - & , • 

. ..... ,, .. :., ... ,. ' '"'· ... UNCLiiSSIFJF.D 

~- .. =. ::.:. : ~: .. ·.7. (.~ . ., . ,,. .. ·· .. :, ...... -.,, _, __ ..! • • 

,. : , .. ; . .,. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ,t,..· , ......... ;., - ...... . , :. ,_ , t. • ,• • • , I ,' • . •1 ' -• 

-: . ..... ·~ .. : ;· .. •• 

.... · - . •J - 1 .. ,_ .. •. ,. . .. . ... · ... , ... ••• • <II' • 

-· ....... ~ .... :- · ... · ....... ..... -·•:· 

. " , . 

F't;tr."·~~r,fN I" e:F.J~Ci"' Cc,r.c~ :'"'TEE 

~1 J:-:n:u .1~;ENC1c 

M=h 8, 2017 

The Honor:ibJe Dana &ente 

Actir.g Depur;r A:tomey General 

United S:a..es Depamnem of J1Jsticc 

9SO Pmnsyh"$Ilia Ave, NW 

WashiOJIOD, D.C. 2{)530 

D~ Acting Deputy ;\nomcy Gcnaal Boentc, 

...... ·c: ~ i'-lt,(..:.-.;.;. 

""1.,.l,! M "'C:: k)'\t et: ;f,f',J ::' 

-:>aJ": n~ . .a< 1 

... ··.·· " ::. 

·~· 

The Ho~ Pcmianrnt Se!~ Committee on Inte1liil!nfe (the C=ittee) is av.we o( 

T"..tP...nt media reports iodie:lting ih.c possi'blc wsteri:¢e of Foreign rnteili~ Sun-eifla::u:e A~ . (F!SA) appli;a.uons subm:ued '] the 0.:pPrtltLO~ of Justice {DoJ) in 2016, and'm- r<lrelgn ln1¢11igcnoc SUN:etllencc Court F1SCJ orders o-r criminal warrants ~t to T'uk m of 11te 

Omoi"bus Crim! Cont.o! 2::!d Sa e Slrccts Act of 196B !hill msy h1W¢ iwthori~ ~ .:atleciicn ;;ii' 

communkatlons and/or infonnarlon ~~ins Presidei1tii;t tandid8.lf: D=1d J. T=iy OT hl5 

;w..Q~i:;ites in 2016. ~ 

Porth: pwposes oithis lellf:t', -associ~Ies' includes =IJY Trump cam])8tgn SUITOSJ!!C!>, er.)v.isors, or e:mP.loy::es; U."f TTWnp Org_4nization si.-m,gn1es. sdvfaor5, or employees; a.>til fe.rnily. friends, 1111d business ~ates ot Mr.Trump. 

Acoo::dingly, (bi: Committee m:.=ts ~ fo!lo,\fog ln~orm::ti<m. i fil exis:is: 

1. Any· 11.nd 11n r;apies of er.y FrS,upPfie.ni ons subwiC'.ed to tt.e FISC by ~ DoJ in 

20r 6 regilltfiog then Presidential arndidate Don-el.d J, Trump or bis as:-.cci:I:~ . 

2. A,,y lUld cl1 ca~<if any orders issued b1 lb.e FISC in 20l!> regarding then 

Pr--..sid~lial c:indidnle Dmla!d J. Trump or his s=fates. 

3. kl.y and .;11 coplesof ~ we:mnt is!l.1Cd by a Fdcni.l Judge or MllgiS!l""...!e ~.muan1 to Tit!~ UI of the Omn.ibt.ls ~rime- Ceontrol a..-,d Safe Street:. Act of 1968 in :W f6 

~ding then Prcs.idai:i:11 e£ndtd:itx: Donald J. Trump or his a,.socfarcs. 

We seek coi:,:~ of the for~ins do=umenis, iith,:y c:ds1, r.o la!¢r than Merch 13, 20 i7. 

P:vlnNtz= 

Chai!'Tlll!Il 

Copy to: Tne Ho:iorcl)lc 1AmfS Co~. Ditedca-, Fcd.:~l l3= of lrwi:s.tig:ition 

UNCLASSIFIBD 

[__ - ----------- ------ ------ _ ___________ _ j 

,,,...., PROPE.~TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REFRESENTATM:eS 187 
.I 

-------- ---

(I . ' 

OffiL-e of the Assis•.11nt Attorney Gcncntl 

The Honorable ~vi:i Nunes 

Chairma.., 

P1:r.mmcnt Scle(:t Committc: on lnt,:IIig~ 

U.S. House ofRepreSi!ll[:i.rive:s 

Washing~n, OC 20515 

Tii~ Hom)mhlc Adam B. Schiff 

Ronking Mcmb.:r 

Pcimam:m Scle.-::t Committee: on lntcllig= 

U.S. Bouse of R.ep.resenlfili ves 

Washington. DC 20.515 

Dear Chatrm2n Nwles and Congresmian Schiff. 

U.S. D~:irtmt<trt<lf Justice 

omce oftegi5lll!ive ./IJfairs 

Washington. D_C 20530 

March 1 i, 20i7 

Endo.Scd p!eas.e find ctessifiro documenls re!ponsi\'e to your ~ which w:: a.re 

providing for te\iew only by each of )~u an1 fur ri:turn 10 us !CX!ny. q1 !!i.!dilion, pun.mm! to 01-'T 

asreernen1, one s~mcmb::r for e.ndi of yo.u, who lru the rcguisi~_~ra:ru:cs, also ~ ny review 

lhe matc:rials. ln the cvcr.t that either cfyau is not available today ro mi.aw these mareriols, you 

may designare one staff mcm~rwim the rcqmsitc clearan~s to review ~min you. sc~d- A;-i 

attomey from :his office will r<:m11in with lhe: docu.rt1cn1s at ol! times and R:tt.'nl with lhcm to tile 

D1.:parun¢t1I today. 

We hope chat Chis intbnnruio.n :s ~"lfut P!~e do not ::esit;Ue to ~niact tnis oflic~ if 

we mny pn11:idc additioaal ;;,ssjst~iK-.: regimling this or any other rm.tn::r. 

I 

_ ___ _ j 

1 

FROPERiY OF"iHE U.S. tIDUSEOF REPRESENTATf\JES 188 
' ·""''.;a..l~(""""'\· -:,. ... , 

::;',~~: ~::'-'~-~-:. J••v~ 

UNCLASSIFIED 

fh(lfftn.:.r..:c.N1.,,r""'"'"' ·r~,.,..,J ~.~ L111h1<1:1"1, no""' r,,•~t."Vt~ ti l,,•r,,-r, 1)1,.., 

U•t(I ~ \\rr.,ti,11i,,l.'hoo l:"1~ '\11'1'1-.,,1 , lll•II ilf\, ,tJ,.,•,dlA·4. l~\ ,.1-:"" 

t,1,y <io-Nd'),~4'h t.w,.1•.,111 , .... ., 11 S~k....,'1',-\ 

w,, n..,;,1,. ro~;i~ 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

,\.;v11, i;i.;1•J!, .:.,: ... •11•n,.,, t.•-.vr•, •J~u:,, .. 

• 1..,,r11H,,\. •l,~:::,,,,,,,:1or-11f 

1 ...... o\:t.-.....:1.,1 .. i.'"",;, 

Aoi,s• .. 1,;.t,.·,u., ll>-il'on~ 

. 1 .. 0 , .. :ir,rr, t":l1rr.111o, 

V.l•(Jl.t-."'-r.,...-vw r,i,L..-.1,~,,. C'•'•hlt't'• ""'~"''~"~'"' f,1•,o h.111, .. , ••r.,A,, v,.~.,_,,,,rori 

•,i., :., r.,, ... ,.s • ._ ... , •• e.;~ o : .r:-4; ,, .. , ...,,,::11, c-,, .. :, ,u,•.·.,..,,, ..... 

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITIEE 

ON INTELLIGENCE 

March 15,2017 

The Honorable Admiral Michael Rogers 

Director, National Security Agency 

Fort Meade, MD 20755 

The 1 Ionorablc James Corney 

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Washington, D.C. 20535 

The Honorable Mike Pompeo 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

Washington, D.C. 20SOS 

Dear Directors Rogers, Corney, and Pompeo: 

HVC- 304, THE C:l\l'IIOl 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515 

(202) 22~121 

D• U"i,, N,1'51UJ 

!i•~r0Hl"t~ 

As you know, the Committee bas been very concerned regarding the purported 

unauthorized disclosures of classified information, po.rticularly when they pertain to intelligence 

collection on, or related to, U.S. persons (USP). To take a prominent example, a January 12, 

2017 article in a mojor newspaper was the first to claim that "Retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, 

[then President-Elect] Trump's choice for national security adviser ... . phoned Russian 

Ambassador Sergcy Kislyak several times on Dec. 29." 

Such stories would appear to contain the unauthorized disclosure of USP identities. This 

potential misuse is a key reason why the Intelligence Corrununity (IC) has developed robust 

''minimization procedures" for the protection of USP information, including requiring the 

"masking" of USP identities in most circumstances. 

However, as recent news stories seem 10 illustrate, individuals talking 10 the media would 

appear to have wantonly disregarded these procedures. The Commillec is concerned that USP 

identifiable information may have been mishandled in violation of approved minimization and 

dissemination procedures pursuant to statulc and/or Executive Order 12333, as amended. 

Therefore. no later than Friday, March 17, 2017, each of your agencies should provide the 

Committee with the following: 

UNCLASSIFIED 

.,. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 189 
- ·----~ - - - .. ~---

UNCLASSIFIED 

I. All spt<i(ic l)()ticlcs Md/or proi.:cdures c11ch ag;mcy employs to make II dc1~rmin111ion It> 

un~kand disseminate 1hc i1kmi1y ofa USI'; ~ifically, the Commluee rtqueru the 

:ipprovnl process requirt'd co autll-Orizc such a di.s£eminalion within a11d outside the: 

llflcn,;y, mchidi11g lhc nU111bt.-r ofimlh•idWt(g who cen uw,ove an unmu:t!<ing in ci:ch , 1111,cncy: 

2. The.toral number of d~in.itions of ruiy unmu~ked USP id<:nlitics between June 2016 

and January 2017, it'lheJ' e.xist; 

3. lfthi::y e.xist, the names of any unrnas.lu;:d USPs. whose identitf.es were dlsscmi~<:d in 

TCSJl<lllSe to requests from IC agencies, ww cnfurcemcnl, or senior Executive Branch 

officlals betv.>een June 2016 and Janiwy 2017, and thet n.:lntc to Prc:si\31:ntinl candidntcs 

Donald J. '!'.!'ump w.rl HillBJ}' Rodho.m Clinton a11d their C$0cillles in 2016; 1 

4. lflh~y oxist, tl1c rumics ofiiny lC ngcnciC81 law er:uorccmcm agencies, nnd/or senior 

Executive Brunch ofl1ciD.ls 1lwt r1:qucstcd nnd/or nu1hori1.ed the w,rm1sllins nnd 

dl&.'!t'lttinutlon of USP infomintion n:la1ins to too specific [ndlviduals and entities 

11pcctfkd in request t,J abov~. AS well II$ the 11~,:~ ofull ~pcclftc retlpient.s oflhat 

11nmiukcl LISP informnllon; m\<l 

5. 1 fit exists, th~ s1mcd reason, pursu.im \O the ri:lcvant m1t,lml.1.n1lon pruc~dur;;u, for 

unm'a.,il<ing crn:h USP idcmJty rclntinc 10 request IIJ ~bovc. 

We Opprt¢io1c your prom pr mtcntJon 10 tl1is request .• If you han: any questions rcg:irdln& 

the forcaolr,S, please COTIIOCI 11~ Commill~o ~\ (21>2) ?.2S•412 I, 

Cupy to: 

Devin Nunes 

Chainnnn 

Sin~~n:ly, 

Ad4m F3. Schiff 

Rooking J't,kmber 

~ Honorable Michael Dcm!l!lcy, Aeling Director of-:-Jatiunal lmclligeIB:r: 

' For 1bc 11~1j)0.1Q or this )011~,, ··iu,orlJ>1•'1• lndu<k o..,ry c.111n;111f!!)l ~w1ogo1C$, advhON., er cmplo)'ilc:31 M)' iNmp 

~&11!rA!l~1n cir Clinlll~ Poμn<C..ll1.1:i wrroi:,>IG~. 11dvi~. «· cn,pto~~"ct; "2id fo111llr, frl~As. lllld bu~lru.'11~ 11.!MlClacc, of Mr. Tnimp lllld Mn, CUncorL 

lJNCLASSIFLHO 

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 190 
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HoMriL.Ole Devin l\'tu1i:s 

Chm.an 

l'=ent So:Jec; Cvmmiu~ 011 Jntcllie= 

U.S. Home of Rcprescnt~th-es -

WE.tillglO:l, DC 105!5 

H="l!.hlc: Adam B. Sc..l1iff 

l{Jm);ing Member 

r~ Stlecc Comrni!lfc en !:nti:mb=c: 

U.S. llouse:ofR.~tati-,.-cs 

W:ciiing1t1n. DC 10S13 

April 4. 20! 7 

Thls re.spor.ds toy= le~d~tcd March iS, 2017 to Admiral Rog-ers, National S=ily 

A~~J; Director ?o~pco, Ccntra.l lntcllig~me Agency. :..'ld Di,relor Come:y, Fcc!en:l Bure~ of 

Jn\·~~tio;i {FBI), ,:=qt.:cstlns. ir.:orm:.1ion con~"11ing ~ci> ~ncy's po!iciese.rid pra.."'\'.ldUr=! 

cdz.1.ms lo the di~=unawm of U.S. :;;,erson infor.nsticn. 

J\s 'l\'l: ha\-e dlscu~ with your s1s.ffa on :s¢,'eraJ oc:::asioos, vn: .ve?co= :au oppoctllliliy 

to hr.ff lb~ Commi1rec <:0.nceming !he F'Bl's poric:icsMJ! procc-!ur,;s motd~r t.J identify 

inf=.ni<>n h~lc.l by me- FBI th..·u is of in~;:;;t co the Committee. 

'},le 2;)i)rccutc )'OU::-.:orttinued supp,on for the FBl aiKI ill llliS£Dn. P~ <:anact this 

oiikc is we c:2.0 be of f urtha nssis'.a!ire. 

Siaooely, 

~ 

~\ -~---- Gregory A. Bro= 

A~t i)i~ctor 

Off.ce of v.ing.r=ro,1:al .A..mir.s 

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PROPERTY OF lHE U.S.. HOUSE OF REPRESEN:ATWES 

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191 
UNCLASSU:CED//COMMITIEE SE.NSll'lVB 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

P"Jl,081N1.Sfu.c.1ct f•IHor'.I H'1"1:'fhQl.~1c:1.tA~ 

Pl!AMANEN'I' St!UlCT COMMrrTGG 

ON INTI!LLIG!l'NCE 

May9.20l7 

VIA CElQlFJBD u.s.~ND ELECTRONIC MAIL 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

U.S. Artorocy Gcoeral · 

U.S, Department of JUSlice 

950 Pennsylvania Avenu,: N.W. 

Washingwn, D.C. 20530 

Denr General Sessions: 

HVC•'.)04, Tu" CA1'1ToL YIAmt:N0.101'1, 0C 20$i0 

(202f 22!>* 1121 

Clu.atwN'I\ ....... 

fl1Nf0ftla1r'..I 

Moc1¥n~ t.-t'lqtmlw•tun"QII 

Ju part ofits bipartisan investigation into R\1$UU1 nclh·e m~surcs directed at the 2016 U.S, 

election, the House Permanent SeleQt Commit!~ on lntelligence requests that you prodUGC 

certain documents nnd 01her matcrla.ls 10 the Commlttet: nnd nmmgc for your partictpation in o 

voluntnry, transcribed Interview at cho Committee's ofrtces. 

First we respectfully ask that you produce lo the Committee, 1,y L10 later tha.11 the olo~c of 

business on M!ill, the following;: 

Any documents, rccor&, elce(ronlcally stored inform.1tlon 111cludiog <:•mo.ii, 

communic111iou. rccordingo, dotn nnd tnnglblo Lhlngs (tncluding, b'Jt OQt limlt\XI to, 

grnf)hs, clu:u1:J, photogruph.s, images and other documents) rlll£tlrdlc:is of form, other thnn 

tho:.e widely ovnilnblc (e.g., nowspnpcr nrtlcles) that reasonably could lund to U1e 

discovery ofuny fucts within lh.c iovesUgntion's publlcly..unr1oun~d pnrnmct~. 

In complying with this rcqu.cst, we nsk th:.t }'OU furnish to the Committee, in Ulll'1!dacted form, 

:my OJ\d o.11 resix>nsive materi11l in youacrual or constntctive possei.sion, custody, or control or 

otherwise available to you. including rcsJ>Onslve material possessed by any ~ party to be 

transferred to your possession and shaced whh the CQmmin~. This ~uesl ;s also made on an 

ongoing b-.!sis: If after making an initial production to the: Committee you find addltional 

responsive material. you should produce that material to the Committee. 

To the extent not encompassed by the above requesi. this leuer also ri::quests ~ervatio.n of all 

docuine.nts, rcccmis, electronically stored infonnation, recc.rdings, data and 1angible things 

(including, but not limited to, graphs, cfwts, photographs, images .and other documents) 

regan:lless offonn, other than those widely availaole: (e.g .• n~wspapcr llI1icle3), ralateQ to the 

Cornmittee"s investigation, your interview, and any anclllmy mauers. 

PROPERTY OF rne U.S. HOUSE or, Rf.iPRGSE NTATIVES 

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19:2 
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UNCLI\SS!l-1ED/JCOMMITTEE SENSITrVE 

Shoufo ft hcromc nec:tssery t~ do m, ti:~ <:9mmi1~ m::n, suppl£mcnt the rlo"im~nt reot1est 

ronl:iincd in tyis lcttcc::it :mv tim£: 

Cornmilli:>.: staff will work wiih you 10 m:\uge }'O\lf illt.:'.rview, at a tirnem111 <fu,e S!lbsettU>.:m to· 

)'0\1.f prcduc:Lion of do-..-;::n~n\s tO tll~ Commi:!.i!~. The m£i: .. 1::w m11y co~·cr miy hlpic within the 

Ett.blic:ly•:wiou."'JCC'd paramc:<crs oftht: Comcni1~c·i; im.estigziion, iccluding Rl.!ssiw cy~r 

::etM,ies diCl!C~ ~1 lh~ 2')16 U.S. ek~tion, po11:n1izil li.n:."<s betW<cn Rt!S'Siu ~~ indiv;d113Js 

assi:>:i.l~ ·wilh p,ol!ti~ I cam~sns. lh~ U.S. g.ovemmcnt•s ~n.se 10 these Ru.ssfan ict!\•c 

m~o..u=, aod relared leclcs of classified it1fi:rn.,a1ion. 

Shollld }'GLL !1:..-,'<! any q=Liot1:s at l!ny tii"D<?, p~se contru:t C-Qn-,mitt~ sufT a.t (202) 225-4 i 21. Jr 

:,-ou = r,:pn:~tcd by !!n attorney, pl=r forward thl.., lc.ncrto your anomcy. tmd i!.a\·e h.iiu or 

!-.tt con=t the Committee o::i your bdclf. 

Sincerel;: :.o-· -:- ·- - • f·· . 

~~;2~7-~ 

!':,fembeJ- of Congn:.ss Tt:.n!dr.g Mcmb;r 

.iUradunrot: l'or2roeters for Rl!Ssia !n\'estigorion 

2 

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PRC~ERTY OF THE U.S. 1-iOUSE OF Rc?RESEJ\<f A 'flVES 

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193 
u,..tnH-.,, 0,1~.ata_ CH.•J •"IAN 

; ~~::::~ Joo UNCLAS$1Fl80//COMM1TT£E SENSlTIVi;. 

rr,,,, ~a11~ro.,t:kt1r,, 

~~~~::«::;::::Nr~ M~-._,.,.,..,on~ 

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'11r\Ql'lll"' .. tl.lllU9'U n.,Gb.i...,.~C,n,h• 

Cue&&. Juhtil4 ""' v,1• 1.~tll""6, fUH 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Pl:flMANENT SE.Lr.er Cor.,wrree 

ON lNTf!UJGElNCE 

HVC-300, T11u C,,,rr('-

W.•!.i111toro11, CC 20~16 

f:02l 21S-4121 

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1T"'*'CWitNM 

A<.,..,,9.t-1'-" .. c.al7b'N,, PhtU'"-:ia.bf~ 

"'~a~ "N;WTTT s,u, l.'W<#'f71 

hrr-A. fi'ln. Cttlnt:(tu1 TIMA.a."4\.J\Jtbf-n. 

ArJ1i,C..111"\trd1n, 

~~~~fhl •Mt~t C11.1,mit J"'111•<...-..r, ... btm,~"lllbhl\)lm 

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Mll)'9,2017 

VIA CERTIFIED U.S. AND ELECTRONIC l\fAJL 

Ms. Macy McCord 

Actillg Assismnt Auomey Genera! 

U.S. Departmmi of Justice 

National Security Division 

950 Pcmmylvania Avenue N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20530 

Dear Ms. McCord: 

As part or its bipllctisan invcslig:itlon lnto Russilm nctlvc imnsurcs directed et the 2016 U.S. 

election, 1ho House Pmtnnncnt Se.lcct CQmmittco on Intelligence requests thAl you produce 

ccrt!lln dOC\.lnlcnlS nnd 0U1er m11tc.rials to the Conunittcc and pnrtlclpotc in a voluntnry, 

1ronscribcd il){crvicw nt the Committee's offi~s. 

First we r~ccUi.dly nsk ltwt you produce to the Commi«ec, by no Inter 1hru1 lhc close of 

businosson~. the following: 

Any documcnlll, records, olectronJ~lly scored itifonnntlon including o•mllil, 

communlcutior1, 1ecordinge, data ru1d tansiblo lhing.s (hwludlng, but not limited n:i, 

nroph:,, chnru, photographs, imas~ and ·other documrnts)' regnrdless of fom11 other 1han 

those widely o.vn.Unble (c.g., lle\V5papcr LUticloo) tbatzeasonably oould lead to the 

discovery of uny facts within the invcstisntfon's publicly-announced p[IJ'8fflclers. 

hi complying v.ith this request, we ask lb.at you fumi~h to the Committee, In an.redacted form, 

any and all rcspon.5ive material in your actual or c·onstmctlve possession, custody, or control or 

oUierwise available to you, including responsive mnteri1d possessed by any third party co be 

tnulSfurTed to your possession· and shat~d with the Committee. Th[s r~est is also made on an 

ongoing basis! ifiuler making an lnilia! production to the Committee you find additional 

responsive material, you should produce ttiat material to the Commltt~ 

To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation of all 

documents, records. eteetronically stored informalian, recordings, d!rta and tangible things 

(ineludlng, but oot limited to, graphs, char!s, photographs, imnges and other documents) 

PROPERTY or- THI: U.S. HOUSG oi:- REPf<ESeNTATIVES 194 
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UNCL.-\SSlf,'fF.i}{iCOMM!TIEE 8I!NSIT!VE 

regardless of fonn, cli;er th.ar; rhllSe widcly lf'tailable {e.g., n::-,v:;p:3per n,1icks). related 10th.: 

Commi~'s im'l-srigation, your ittll!!",i ew, :ind any 2r.!:.l1!ary martct'!I. 

Sboutll it hccom.e n~e.rv to do so, the Committc~ m!lv .su~plem~nt tbe document n:~rui:-.st 

co11taint!I In chis letter at am,- time, 

Ccmminee suff 11;ill work wi1 h yon h) nrra.~ y.:iur interview, at :i time ::md d~e subsequent to 

y:,;,ur r,mrlw:rion of rl..~wn:nls to !he 0.:imntitt~-Tl?t! imer.-icw may ccve. any topic ·\,ithln tlie 

pub! i c;ly-mwcunced ~m meters of lh¢ C-On::mit1« 's inv,;stigaiion, i.~cl uding l{ussian cyb;:r 

ac:livili~ directed against the 2016 U.S. elceti-Or., potaitinl links between Russia and indi\'idml3 

assocfarc,d v.;111 politiea.1 ~mpaig.'lS, lhe U$. go,•emment's respcmse to thi:sc Russian a.-ti,-e 

measures. end refaterl leaks of cl,'>S3ified cnfumi2.tion. 

Shoufd you have ar,yquestions many lime, pk::ii~ i;on~-ct Commiuee staff at {202) 2254121- ff 

you ~ ~resented by an attorney, ph:asc for\,.'an.l lhis le.·t:!T 10 yo,,.ir uttomey, and tia-.•e bic:. or 

her contact tfo:- Commi!itt on your l:cl,alf. 

2 

?RO~!:RTY Of TI-IE U_S.. HOUSE a.= REPRES::NTA71\'ES 195 
• 

Tho Hon.orablc K. Mlcliacl Conaway 

· Pcrrr.llncnt Select Committee o:i lnt.:lllgencc 

U.S. Efo= ofll~entntiv~ 

w~~bi.ogton, DC 20515 

11ic Honor&1le Ad~m Sc.hiff 

Ra..~J.:w.g Member 

P=~~t Select COJllll\illee 011 lntclligcnt.o 

CJ.S. House ofRcp1-u.."C®tives 

WllShington, DC 2Q5l5 

U.S. l>cpnnooont of Juslicd 

Office ofLcf,i:1l~tivc Affuir.i 

Wa$hin.r:ton. D.C. ,10S50 

JUL O· 7 2017 

near Congressman Coruiway and CongmmI'.an Schiff: 

Thi, rc::pouds l.o youz lcttlll's to the Attowoy Gooorol and to 1hllll•Actin,e Assfot:1111 

Ar.lnniey Cicnmil l'>'llll'Y McCord ofthe N111ionnl Sc;,cmity Division, both dated f\{Jly 9, 2017, 

will.oh. requested do~umeots in oonuecUon with \fa~ C:ommiUc:e'N 1m·1:Nlig11\ion int.o Rll!lslmt acrivc 

moos rues directed 111 tho 20 16 U.$. eleotlrm. 

A:i )'OU )mow, on Moy 17, 2017, 'Ille Dcpartmoot of Juutico (O.iplll'tmcnl) announced the 

ni1pol11.trr11:nt of Robert S. Mudlcr m to sc:we 11~ S11cclol COWLSel to ovorsc;Q too ;rrovh)tL'!ly- . 

oon11nnod FBI invosllgat!on of R~i~n !)O\'t:mmcnl offor(IJ to infl~1011ca the 20 L6 prc.?idcntiot 

election nnd rolntml numerJ. We o.ro odvlSlld I hat tho 8pcci:tl Cow1sol ho, ~sun to lnke r.tep~ tn 

l\1JJill U1 cse rospcmm'bilitics. Under these c!rcwnstanoc~ ruid co1wistcnt with the IJ<:plll'll.Ue.ul's 

hmg-~t~ndiog polity rcgnrdlng thu '°nfitlcntiwily uncl scn1iliYity oflnforrnntion rc:ioting to 

J)Olldh1g n1.1ltCTS, the Depnrunen( is not p~t W rc:&ponJ furthor to yo11r rcquosts ut Uus time. 

We nppreci.nte the Commiltee's luterests in Ulis ut.11tcr ond hope that tb4; infonnetion !R 

helpful. Plc&e do not hesitnto to oontn.ct this office Jf we may provide a:fditioual :is~ist:Ulce 

11bout nny otbc-r m.1tter. 

&

sm~.~ 

uel R. Rnmer 

g Ass.stant Attorney (!Cll~al 

L_ 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RC:PRESEN l'A'l'IVl:S 

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196 
~..UUl'lfll,c..t.l:;:1.lL~ 

r..w.t:n11t,~·-- iJNCI.AS SlFIEO/IL"()MMlTIEE SENSITiVE 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

~~~:t~~,_ Ii\~·- T\.a; C.P.=t. 

.a..·~.-cv":f'-. DC ~ 5 

!:~l2cS-i121 

:"IIUl:.UJ.•ra~~ 

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CN f,'fTE!.!.,G:eic:c 

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:'-.fay 16, 2017 

L __ 

VIA CERTIJ.'IED U.S. AND ELECTRONIC MAlL 

Aaing Di.rwor Andrew McCal:e 

FBI Hf:a.dqU211.erS 

9<..S Pe11.1lsylv~ AVet°t'.!C, NW 

W3Shingtoa. D.C. 20535-000t 

t.~ Act.ioi Di~r Mcl:abc: 

. As part oi'its bipmis~n investigation ic..10 Rus:san ~Clive me~s ci~cted at the 2.\1]6 U.S. 

ekction, tr.e HCU3e Petmf!lCll.t Si:ltx.t Commine= on. ~er.ce req~ ~ you prod= 

ce:tlBin doclJIJ'lea?s .!lld ot!::er meieri.als to I.he Comminee !l.!ld 2rnmge fo:- YQ1.1r pe:rticip:.Ui® in a 

•,olwlwy. trans::n.1>od inll:n'icw at~ Ccmmittce's (If.ice:;, 

Fi~ we respectfully cl that you prorlu.-:e to tf'l..e Committee, by no tarer i.,an \.he; close of 

Ir~ on Jl.!av 23. the following: 

Any d0¢s.!l:.!Ct1lS, :i:cotds, elcdr~i:.nlly st¢rcd infcrmE!icm including e-mail. 

ccn:muni~oo. t1:corclir,gs.. dau. and t.ogiblc lrungi {incl~ but Mt lil:ruted to, 

~ . clw1s, pruitograpru, umacs and ocl1er documr:n.~) ~~ of form. oth<:r lhwt 

those widely a-.'.llW>le (e.g., De'>\'S;>al)U .!..4:ic!es) that i:ea.ou~bly eould !e9d to the 

di;oovery of any ucts witliin the bvestigatio:J's publicli'·llnC~ Faram.e:cnt. 

fn complj'ing with lhi:1 ~ul;St. we Ask tct yo;i furaisb to the Committee, in ~edat'.ed fOffll,. 

=y arui an ~'l~"e nweri4l in your ect\l8I ar~ons(nlCti \"<: possession, cc.s:tody, or control i)r 

olh:::wisc ~"~ to )'Ou, inclumoi rcsptmsi;·c ma!:ml possi:ssod by .any u:ircl paey to be 

~ca to y<Wr pcs:::es,ion end shsred with the Comznircee. nus requ~t is alS<> ma& ca im 

orsoing leis: if ~tter mtki og a.'I illitial i:;roduc:tion ~o Ille Committee rou finrl additi=al 

re;sponsive roaterial, you ~ u!d _produc:: tha.t m~~tW to the Commi~ 

To the no:cnt not encompasso:! by tlte shove request. thjs ltUJ:r also TI:1,.u:sts ~ent:tion cf al [ 

d1:a1rncotS. r~ords, c!cc:tr.lni<:al:y stored information, n:cordmgs, da~ and l:l.ngible c..'lings 

(mcludinE, but Mt lil-...ited to, ~s. charts. photographs, im1:ges ar.i.ct.'ler6'.lcume.ltS} 

regardless of fuim, O<he! thllll tfa:ise widely available {e.g .. ne.WSP'!P!l' anides}, rel21:d to ~ 

Ccmmilte:'s i.'!,:CS!igatlon, yoU? in!et\'iew, !lllli ~y znciJ:!wy :n.attei:s. 

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PROPERTY o; m E U.S. HOUSE OF RE?ReSEITTATM:5 197 
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L 

l.'NCLI\SSlPIBD//COMMITJ'EE SENSITIVB 

SJtuLLld ii l)CC,ODll) IIC~.'lslln' to d() ~n, thc Con\ntltMS! nil)]' sunnlollut~Ul t{le ~ocum~nl regugt 

sonlllipcd In lill11 ldtcr 1't 11ny func, 

C<1mmittoc ~taff will work with you to ammgc yo\tr intcrvfow, at a. time and date: ~ubseqlJ<:[ll 16 

yout production of documco\S to tho Comauttee, T11e lntcn-iew 10.~ <:over o.ny topic within the 

publicly•an:nounccd pua:ne:er.; oftl1e Cammitt~'s investiga.lion, including Rl.l.~an cybor 

wivltle:.c; dicected age.inst the 2011? U.S. eh,ction, J>Olcntial links b~eeo Russia nnd lndivldunls 

llll!ociated with politlcal ~J.'Vgns, 11\e U.S. go\'trna1cnt's rcsponoo to th~ Russian active 

me11surcs, and reh1tcd leaks of classified infomu1tlon. 

ShO\l.lcl. you irnvc 11n:r q~~ns ~t .any time, ple8Se contact Committee stoff at (202) 225-4)21. If 

you~ represented by an anomey, please fol'WlUd this lette? to your attorney, and lun•e him or 

her i:.on~t the Committee on your bob!!lf. 

Sincerc:ly, 

K:7.':!7 

Member ofCMgtc:!i'S 

AWichmcnt: Parameters ror Russl11 lnvcstisation 

2 

Mam Schiff 

Ronkins Membct 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF nEPR~SENTA'rlVES 198 
• 

The Hm:orab'.~ l<. ~l Cmlll.way 

!'~ s~J:e,::t Col:Il71itt~ on Int=lligca.o:. 

U.S. H'omie ofR.er,!r&l:ffitiv~ 

Washiog(oo. DC 20515 

The &itoral>!: .tui= Schiff 

R:.r~lci~ M,:;;rnbc:-

Peml2!!-' .... at Se~"f Committee ;:in brelligoooo 

V-S. H= of~,.,:s 

\V;;shin_giO!!., DC 20515 

U.S. DepQrtm:nt of J.ustlce 

Ofiloe of Legis!ative A.ffiim 

Washlr.grc,n, D_C. 20530 

JUL 2 7 2017 

~ Congrcssirum COil3W'f:Y arid Congr~ Sclilii: 

Thli responds lo your .cttcr to Fcd..-zal Burcm of fu.~ {FBI} Ac~g Oiteen 

kl:lr~'t McCuic, dJ;red Mr.y I~ 2017. ,-.-hit::l ceqvtiled doe:uIUenIS i.n ~on ..ith tk 

Qir.lnlith=c:'s imi=stigatfon into Rus..qan activ:ro~-urcs diroe:l.o:,l iuihe 2016 U.S. cie¢il>n. 

As )'Oil ~w. 11:0.:Moy 17, 2Dl7 !lle Di:panment of JllS1lce tD:pattm!!Ilt) :m;)Qtlet~ tile 

,'JfJ>Oizmm:nt cfRJ)b=t S. Mveller JlI to &.."IW ~ Sp--~ Cmmscl.to O\iasee oc prcvi=lyco~ FBI i.o.,~.,aiion of~gm'<::C!lmelll elmru to .influ.~~ tbc 2016 F=1l~ 

electicc mid rilit.ed ~.~- We en::i::hrii;cil thut t::.e Sp,;:;;.id Co~fh~-: bcgoa b tak.c ;teps to 

fu?fiU fu.;sc ~onsibilities. Unrler mes~ cir~~ eoo C-Ollsimo.t with l!?e ~!:llt's 

long-~flg po1ic-t ~Ilg 1!1e ~fidcn!Wity ~ .scnsithity oiinfo:rmoc,n rclatittg 10 

pcndin&matte=s, the Depa.rttniem is not prepared to r,espond funh.t:r ,o Yt>UI t1:qu~~t ct this om e. 

We tipprec;iate the Ccr.I,miue's illt.ere."!9 io ibis mQtlft aud irope ~ this inf=zfum is 

n~pful. Please <!o no,i:e.iliae to colllact thl.s-0ffioe-if we !Itl.Y pro\.'id~ ::dditfon.al esst!f'<:11.CC 

ebou, ecy ott matter_ 

Sir.-ccral}-, 

t(l/~j!.. ~~/ S!twiel R- Rttm!:r 

Acru:i.g Assiscan. Auomey ~ 

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PROPER TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE 0~ REPRESS-lTA'JWES 199 
I 

(l~'kl.Dd.~-r~ .... ¢,~',/-

X..1'0:tc!bu.-,. ':.11& 

~~~~J~ Thl--r.v.J~ .. At'l'tiai f.UPCM~,;..Jbr'1 

~qr~~ 

D&ti "'-. Y • ..-.nt.a.OUa ~'1'5'\."'a'l.3.~...,. 

P.'"c:t.~~, •• , 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

J:.U'Jw(. 

~~~~~ lt,;_. 

~.t.:t;s..'"':.C,,1~-a,. 

~,tf_c.ll~ 

~"CU.~·~tT~~ • 

.ltrT!.w.:.r.:=s-.. btl,1 .. ~~'(U">,fil 

~t.~~.~ ~Ccc,a.:..c;u 

~~~a~Jft 

Mr. Robcrt.M\t.eller 

Special Cou.osel 

U.S. ~aitmcnt of JUSl!te 

Washington, D.C. 20530 

Mr. Andrew McCebe 

Acting Director 

Federal Bureau ofTm-cstigt:!i~ 

WasbingtOll, D.C. 20S3S 

·PE~MliENT Sft.S::TCoMMnTEE 

ON l~Ell.lt?!:NCC:: 

Mayl7,2ul7 

0--...ar ~- Muellr;;r and AC!ing !)irel:(or McCabe: 

HI/ C-:J~ n-.s C...."rnX. 

'IV~sw=i. CC.l!!:S:3 

~226-<1121 

p..., ..... ~ 

~,l)qv;,. 

S. .... "Ma(\{1.-.• 

~,,fl..,..Cnc::::::a. 

Mr •. M.uelJ~·s sppo{C!meI!l a.i S!)':l:litd OJun~e:1 fa e.1'lCOc5S81Y an!! Jioslt.'Y.: de\'~en.t in the 

Depe.-tmcm of Justkc·s ia~1egttding Russi!I. As~ qf.'.hrs O'Ml. ~ inquiry into 

Russian utive ~ io ir.crudt cowteiil'!teIH~ i:anccms, theCamtnittecl'>iU be 

=dutting rigorousO\'~&htto ensUR: !i.Mlfle De~of Juslice's1.Vorl; ~mcludeili.: 

ongoing COl!Iltmatellig=e im-eEtlgat!O!I rcg&nling Rwsiaby the f~1 Bur-"..au of 

Invc:stig!itior,. is not ~d cc interfen:d w.th in eny way. 

A.c:cotclitl&l:r the~ teqne~ts tha!:til~ ~-rmer.t of Justice, including the.Fodetal 

Borom ofin'l2St.igatio;,. pre=ve&ld produce !Xl th: Cammin:ee: 

(I) cc,~ of all docu==.nt$, reeo.."lis, elec-.m::~cally ~QTCd in.!i)~cm i::clwiing e-rr&lil, 

ecmmumicmca, ~rdlati, dat11 end ~le thingS. ~cdl~s of f<r.m. ~ than 

~widely ~le (e.g., ~y.:r ~!es) that tcferenco Mr. Oamoy's dfamissal 

es FBI ~~. 3itd-tbilt m: po~ttlC\'lUlt tti the B=u's ~tdligence 

i~on. 

(Z.) cll dO(!U!D.enlS =orializing con~ between t~ P~ end Mi. C1;Uncy 

re~ bis tctivrties M Direclor. n:, inciuck all :r.~rn~ no?es, er ~lher 

documems ~ canv~, Ihm ar.e ~lly rclcv2:nr ro the Buc-eau's 

coU!lterin!cllig¢~ iavestigafon. 

L _ _ _ 

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.,.,....., 

f>ROFERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE c;= REPRESENTATr,'Es 200 
We would appreciate your written reply, and the fulfillment of this request, by no later than the 

close of business on May 23. 

Should you have any questions at any time, please contact Committee staff at (202) 225-4121. 

+:.Kj~C;, 

Member of Con:~! ! 

Sincerely, 

2 

Adam Schiff 

Ranking Member 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 201 
I 

j 

L 

Jio.noroblc K. Michaol Con:iwny 

ML'll'loor of Congmfl!l 

Perrnancnt Select Commit.rec on lntellf£ence 

U.S. House of~nw.tiw,,:, 

Washingtoa, DC 205l5 

Ifonnrnb[c AdlUll Sohlff 

Rol)Jdng Member 

Pen:,anent Select Committee on Imolligencc. 

U.S. House ofRq,~ntath·es 

W:isbington. DC 20515 

U.S. DopartnM,nt or Justice 

Fc<loro.1 Duroau of h1vc$tlgnllon 

July 26, 2017 

Denr Concrc,sm~n Com\\Vl'IY 1md Rimkfog Member Schiff: 

This is in rospo:iro to your letter to Acting Director McCabe and Special Cowisel Robe.i:t 

Mueller dated May 17, 2017, seeking all dOCU,"D.cnts, .recorrls, and data l,iat reference 

"'Mr. CtJmt=y's dismiss.it as FBI Directnt" dun are ''potentially relev(lJ)t to the FBJ's 

countcriniolllgen~ invostig:i.tion" ofR\lllsinn intcrfci'Onco in the 2016"Pr~oo:nilll clootfon. 

As you know, Acting A:Wmey Gcner'J.l Roocmtcin wmoum:cd the appoinblent of a 

Special COUllsel "to conduct the investigation confinncd by thcn--FBI Oto;r.tor J= B. Comcy 

in tcs.timony before the House Permanent Sel~t C-Ommittte on Int.el~c on MtlfCh :w, 2017, 

including: (i) any links ;ind/or coordination be.tween Ina Russnn covcrnment nnd J.i,dividuaJs 

oGsor.intcd with tho campaign of PrO,,",idrmt [)(lnald Trump; and (li) rmy mortcn fu.lt :i~oso or may 

arise dirci:lly from 1ho l.nv~gntion; lllld (Iii) eny olbor matter.; within the 5COpe of28 C.F.R. § 

600.4(a)." A'S a xcsult, }'Q\:..t' r~ue~ ~~ch lovM.tig11tive mlttcrfals re.laced to rui ongoing 

investigation, arxl, consistent witb l<ml?,'lhmcf.ng Department of Justice policy, .~'C would decline 

to produ;e tho~ mattrlklS ot this lime. 

ln -addition, yoQ r~'.IC,tcd nil d~cumen11: memorl~lizinB communicntion~ bctwcr>n lM 

Pre$idcnl rn>d then P.Bl Director Com<.'Y, We 11te advl~cd that -:be Spociat Counsel'~ Office :md 

the Department of Justice have provi<lcd tbe Committee with at'ltlSS to lhe mcmo[I\Jl.(]zi Md . 

documents of foanor FBI Director Comq. fo light l)f tha!. ~.mmodatiori, we believe lbis 

requc~t h!IS bc:cn :i-dw=.c!. 

l 

._. _ _J 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 202 
Pk3.5c: ~ntici tn:s offi.~ ifw.: cw oe of as.istu~e ~~g ,){he~ mattetS. 

We ~illt~ )~Ill' cm:.l.itnu,;l sippart for the FBf w ifs mh.:ion. 

Sie::e:tely, 

~ As3istanr. D:rec~r 

Offic-e ofCongre::sional A!fhli:s 

_J 

203 

PROPERlY OF TriE U.S. iiQμSE OF REPRl':'.S91TATIVES 
. . .. .. ···---·------------

~,r;,,1a.~ma.o..,.,,., 

' · "t'!'l.~(.(nN.,:,,·,n,>1 ,.._T..110.1n.~t-tvt 

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k.are.".\.h."11,.wt'I\Jffl~ :\I-..,~...,,,, ...... 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

l'H!W,,1,NEtrr Saeo,· OoM!JJlTE.e 

OM INTf::U.lliiENCE 

SepteO'b<:r l, 20 l 1 

'f11c: Honc,r.1b)e JoJT Sc~iQ111 

A~yGcncl'll1 

Unitea S111tcs Dc:pactm.cnt of Justice 

950 P~IUl3yl\~niu Ave:, N .W. 

Washingt<Jn, D.C. 20530 

DCClt' Attomc:, Ciaoural Sc.,~lon::: 

Hvt"-~. n,t c~mo~ \'IM,000"1'°'4 Ot! 20~15 

11011220-.1121 

,..., t,tit.h~ 

:S1•Uliolll.._, (lillll 

f..,-t,11• 8,:!o~o, "'<O()"M,,.8 hl'..O:!l, ,4(,"II!)' 

On August 24, 2017. lho Ho\We .Permanent &tt:l:1 Committee oo.1Dt2lli[lencc ("Committee") 

li>Crved su~nas on tbe Atton1ey Qenml, In bis ~p~cicy ~ h~ of the Ixpartm1m1 of J~J.i;e 

("DOJ"), and tho Diroctar of the P~deral Bureau of !nvesdgation ("F.Br') fM J)t"O(f11t-tlon of 

de>cumeuts retcvtwt lo the Conuuittl.le'11 ongoiug luve.-run:itilm ofR\10ail'ln ln1cif1:renco i.a t.hQ 201G 

U.S. presldcnlfal Qloction, fnc:ludlng ullegations of coUus(on between tbe Trump cr.tnpal.gu 3nd 

me~ 

The:: :;iibp<.1~:i.s di~ccfOOJ and FB1 to produce any o:m.l !LU doc.ur.umts re Wing IQ the: ilgcncie:1' 

1-elnllo11.111iip with funner Brltbh ~n:t lntcllitt:n~ Scnicc offica Chrilltoμbor St<10 Jo c.mdlor the 

so-calkd '"l"tump Duu~icr." inolut.ling thMC meml)tlollilng Fi3l'!l tClt\tlon!lblp w.ilh Mt. Steel•>, 

any p.iymtnts OlOdo to Mr. Slilele, and effort':! to oorroborare lnfotmation pJ'Ovided by Mr. Ste,e.le 

l!nd hi.~ ~ub-SOlll'l:(&-whcilicr directly onia l-\1.Sion GPS. The subpoelll.lS also directed "DOJ and 

FB1 to prnvide c~pie.s of any Foreign Imclligi:nr,e SUNelll~ Acr (FISA) &pplications 

subm:lted to the Fnreign Tntemgenoe Survcilloo~ C~ (FJSC)-wheUler or l);O( opproYW by 

tbo FlSO-incorporatiag informntlnn f,t'lwidoo 1:>y Mr, ~tcclc, tila S\lb-:;QurccG, a.octlor f'uslon 

GPS. 

"Re90rt to compuloorypro~ was ~563'}. bCQIU~ ofDOl's ~d FBr$ in:.ull'i.eient 

TCll\1¢ns1venc:ss to llie Committee's !;\umaou, Russia-1nveAisatlou tclllted reque$1.! ove.r the patt 

sovoml m®ths. On .ruultiplo ~iQns, throurJ1 wri11.cn ?'1;QUC513 11nd dlr<:cl c:og11E!1:1TI¢11l11 the 

Cort'lmitt40 ha: soueh1 but fui.lod to r«iclv~ ~po!l!Jvo tcl&tun<my or documen<s fi'o111 DOJ ~d 

FBI. For exnmplc, to do.te 1h1: Coinn1it1ee has not received n me:'lningl:\ll .rt3Pome to il9 "Moy 9, 

2017, request to AttOffley Genera.l Sessions. Addltionu.Dy, oo May 16, 2017. the Coiuntiue,; tt-lll 

a lel:t..er a~ then-Acting Dh:cctor Andrew Me.Ce.be tn piini:lipl\!¢ it,-! ~9luntnzy interview, and 

p,-od11c;,: rele,-mit i:!ocnm~Cs. The Coinmlnee niceived no rq,ly until Miif27-mcm:: thnn 1wo 

iuontl1:, lutc:r-when DOJ d«Hned the inwrvlew .request 1m:I. indir:11ttd lhnt "ll\Q D~Jt(T\(!111 !.s 

not Jl("CJ>trred to It"toponcl furth~ to yourrcquc,i t1l thia tfmo." 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA"lWES 204 
i 

I 

Prcvi=ly. on March 8, th; Com.mi~ sought fu>m DOI ·certnh documents, incrudin;g rcle-1ao.t 

FISA applicatio:tS e.idflSC or&:rs, and Oil Mucb.17 "~ allotted t~,_, billets to Ie'.tie\11 

respinsi.c do~ on a read"'1!.<kanm basis.. The Commim:c ,,-as not povitlc..1 a CO?}' of 

these c.foc=e::-.ts, mul the Committee'5 reqt.-est to review them again was iiecied. 

the sub--~ iss1r>...i on Aagu:sl JA ~uiJ~ production JIO !stcr than l2:00pm cm~ 1, 

2017. Neithet DOJ nur FBI provid~ any~ by thedeMline. Onrl:e ~nn of 

August 31. lessthrui 24 hears bcfo~ lhe d~ dw:, the Co.-nmittc::. {t:eei~dz.'l initial ~ns:: 

fCO!Il the UOJ Office ci ugislmve Affaiis 1:eq~a. bcb.tlf of oolh DOI an.i FB[-

1ui::ii.t:cy;:at time tr> ~ply w.hh-tite ~~- · 

The Commiue.: requires timely ~C)ll <1fth.e :iubpo-ecaed ~"-Ul:C>:r.!$ in Qrdc:c to ~"'UCC irs 

o·~bt ttspaMifr.!itfcs <1n bcllalf c! 1:.-ie A~ J)Qblic :zid ni[ly w,cl:us.u: the s.ctioll3 of both 

DOJ an<i me FBI. Th.ere is no !cgi&.JJ!e besis fur DOl,s· fuilute co w~ullr t:!i~ aic 

Com:nin~ wuil lhe eve of the de,.cilinc: or oc2Jn prodtu:tion as a show of good E:ilih. 

Moreaver, mere is n.o legμimak basis fur DOJ'sreqi=t !ora&h1uinal time to comply. b-eCl:l:ISc 

DOJ a:.d tbo FBI im: well ewm of the identity ar~ ~ed dccum:ms. Indeed, as a.ow;:! 

abovi:. c.tlrastS<lm.eofthem havt alreidy been~ed n.c.d made temporarily availchle for the 

Commi~s rcvh~"·, l!Jld. ~ n:mafum~T(:~\li:~t;.ci \!OQ.lmc:nts an: n:~ id.entiftable. 

NoMitllstrrodlngU-,e.se ~ms, uieComminee h«eby gnats m~liottal !..birt=i (13) da:.,-s 

for full oompttance and production. ,o ooc.ur-nD Jaror llllin 9:00 am. an September 14, 2017, at· 

ilie ~ Sji¢Cifed in ~ Gligin.:l suhpoc.~t. 11iis revised dcadlin: will a.Qt be extsw!ed 

In thf a!tem.ati,i:, if Ell tes;-ons.i\·e ci=in1~ a:o oo.. prcdu.~ed by the revise.I d~lnc, !hi: 

Attvmey 0:entl'at r..d the Dueck){ ofth.: FBI slull .eppes hef1,11; the Committee st 9:00 ~ on Sc¢:mbi:r I~ 2017, i11 Room HVC·210 afthc U.S. Capilo! dur.lllg .s:i open ~g, w cxplam 

unds oamDOJ';i et.dFBrs umvi~ er i:12hilli"Jto =ply m full witl: the ru~ 

iuucd on August 24. 

?lease be £.dviscd tha1, in~ 0\-ml that DOJ or FBI mis to.provid: th:; doo=Ct'.!s ia filU Ci 

1estimony. d¢.scn1icd !ll!O\'C, !he CDm:nitt~ e:x~ly reserves llS rlf,lu to prceeed with~ end 

:ill liVl!i!cl!k lei!,!!. options-includbg reporting !O the full Ho~: ofR::pce~ves a n:solut:on 

to bold the Attomey G~I e.1ld Di=tor oftiw FBl in c~pt of Con~. p=,t tn 2. 

u.s.c. §§ ll12, l94. 

Sincerely, 

l)~M./17~ 

Devin Nu;;~ . Cl:tl'irm::in 

L._ _ __ J 

PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. HOt;SE OF R&-"REfil:N'fAT!VES 205 
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ti~!:~'11~ i~~ fll\~..J ... (<hf1, c.,,1 ~ 4°11tll. S"Mla14i, N#N~ ,,u~r.na 

Ac1.crO..~K,C .... ,.,.;,, ~-....,::,~·,-.. 

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Nll"Q"7tl""\D1,..,,~u<t: 1.L..r(~ 

PEiFWArlf'.Nt Sl:Ll:CT Cot,Ui.lTT~.i;; 

o:~ IN,a.~10ENCE 

Ser,<ember l, 2()17 

Tht: Horn.'fflblt, Chri,;tophcr W.my Dtn,ccor 

Federal Bureau of Illve-..t.igalion 

935 PcnnsylvaruaAve, N.W. 

Wosbin~on, D.C. 205::30 

Klo'C...;JO,$, T.><. C•rrrm 

WA:.i .. ~r,1011, oc 2c~,s 1:mm,u~1 

lHC"?MtC.U.•1 :;,,,,.,ClliN.,~ 

i,.u-"l,:LC,(F.Qt«,lr 

k.O.,.... c:-.,.1r CMP:ti1i' 

On August 24, 20 l 7, the Ho~ PcllllinCnt Se[ecl C-QmmiUc:c {ln, J,,!,clligeim ("Commi!tce") 

served ruhpoenas on the Atto.mey Oe:l\e,a!~ in hls ~!y llS head of die D¢ps.rtm~t of J1tstice 

("DOJ"), a11d the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inv~ga.tion ("JiB1'1 forproQuction of 

documenti1 relevant ro the Commitloo'~ 01:going ir1v~~g~1l11n ofRu~sh111 in.terlcrcnce in the '7.0lo 

U.S. pre.~ideutlnl t:.lci:lion, including tllcg&lions of collusion ~vci:n th~ Tnnnp campalen and 

tb~Rw:sians. · 

The subMtnas direetcd DOJ and FBI 10 produce My and 3.11 doeumente. relating to lhc agencies' 

n:J11tio1:1sbip with fonnc.-r 13.rituh Secl'ct lnt.elligence Servlu offfoer Chri!llophct Stei,le At1dlot the ~-o-c:.uUr:d "'J'rum.p Dossier." l.ncrutlin,g those mcmorfoll:t.lJ13 fBl's rollltlonsbip with Mr. Steele. 

Ol'lY pnyrucnts ma.do 10 Mr. Stcctc-, and effoits to corroborat.e information provi.dcd b)• Mr. Sto:1c 

t111d his sub-sourtcs-whcUt~dlrectl.y or\'ia.Fullion GPS. The $Ubp~nas also din:cted DOJ ~:I 

rnr ~ pt\Wide copies of ant Fotcign Intellist®e SUn'eiUaiic~ Act (Fl$A) upp[icauons 

51.lbmitted to ilio Foreign Intr.lligcnce Su.rvellliill.C-0 court (FISC)-whether or nol llpJ)roved by 

1hr. Fl.SC-lnr.0111()rttting iothnmilion prct'ided. l>y M~. St«le. hi~ Mlb-SO'.lt«S, o.m!/or Pu.~lon GPS. 

!w;ott to compulsory prllc.¢$$ W!IS ne~ry l;,ec:a~e ofOOJ'.s and 1'81's iusufficlcJ:u: 

respo.c.siv.nie~~ to the Comniuee's numerous Ru:isia-inVtStigati011 relati:d 1c:qutsts over1h¢ put 

revi:m.l mcmt11s. O.ri muldple ocmv1/on.'i1 throu)lh writtell l"e1jUests and dlte,.'t etlg:ig~ments. lhc 

Commitc~ ha, ::our.I.It but ~ilc<I to lllQlivc rcSp1)mlvo le:J!hnony 0r <lMlunen<s ftom DO.t ru;d 

FB1. For CXlllllplc, to date the Commltt~ hs not r,1,10Civcd a ,nc:mingful respDDSa 10 ell! M11y 9, 

2017. request to Atl{]r11c:y Oen~ Sesitiln!;. /\dditionally. 011 May l6, 2Dl7, llie Commil\1;1; ~I 

a. letter 81!king tben,Actin~ Director An<lrew McCabe t~ J~ttfolpate ~~!untaey interview, and 

pmdu~ r-E:lc;·.ll~i QQCIUIJ.•;:n!S., Tht: Comrolttl.."v twc:ivcd no Nply nntil "rfiJ! '27-:ncrc th:m two 

rno:iUas lntr.1'-Whtn DOT declined the interview 1\lqi1em. .md lnd!ca1ed tht\.t "'the Depnrtra1:nt i$ 

not propntcd to ie~pond further to yo11r m-t'llesl Qt th[~ tl!lle . " 

PROPERn' OF THE U.S. 1-iOUSF, OF Ri:PR.F.SF.NTATM:S 206 
Pr..·•vfou.~ly, on ~fare!-! 8. the; C.ommitte= $Ought from. DOI Cfflain 00(.'btnent:., including rele=t 

FlSA ep-plicatians and flSC orom-, !ii!d en Much I 'i w=s allotted 0,,.-0 biJ!c;ts to r~i cw 

respon:s:v~ <!o=na O:J !l read-and-rerurn bw. Y~ Com::ilicl:e ..........,,..:; r.ct pro,~oed a OO?Y of 

theAe dccumcnrs, un!ftl\; Corc-.anitt-ae 's reqUeSt to review theta agitin was den..~ d. 

T11e suhpoenns iss(2j llll. Au gt.st 24 required p,.--odt.>ct:on no lem tru'::!:112: OOpm 011 S:pten:ilitr l, 

2017. N.."I'Jm OOJ nor fBT ptQvided imy ~ots by !he df:adlir.-::.. On the aftcmf:Jon of 

Aognst31, less ihan 24 lx>urs ~fore ~~d>Jc ~. J}x'. Co1m11itt~ i=ivcd an ini"tial ~= 

from the DOJ Office of Lcgislauve Affilits reque!l.!ing-<in bdl~lf of botb DOI a:td FBI-

~ i(iOJW time to comply \\'ith die scl,;l~ 

The Cammi~ requirs timely production oft.he s,hpoeosed do<:uments i.o order 10 t,xeC!.l?e i.!.s 

ov=i&}it ?Csponsx"billiics oo bciielf of :he Ameri= pci)Uc ~ ful lycwluntc the s.dions of :Qth 

DOJ ~d the FE£. T.oe:::e is no Jesitimate basi3 fur FBrs failure to o>..Mingfully engage :he 

Com.'Tlitrc: until ti:o e-.•c oflhc.ie:icllinc or begin p~l.ion a3 a sh~ of goc.d faith. 

Moro/Jvtr, thm i3 no l~ilime~ basis for FBrs mt~ fi>:r additiot\3l 1:im~ to comply, f=rse 

DO.I ~ the FBI ve well aware of the k!l:Dtity of the requem-:i dOCillD.CtllS.. fudced, 4S noted 

cl!~ u !east WRi: of.r,an have alccady bi:en compiled ml m.adet=pc:-.rmi!.>• n•..-iub.blc for the 

C:lmmia.='s ~iew, 212d the remaining 1¢:!U!:Skd ch::t.'Ill~ts me n:edily idectifisbic. 

Notwithstanding~ com:i:rns, the Committee lu:«b}- g:rao~ an eddlciona\ Ulirtecc (t..,") days 

fur full ccmplience all'! production, to oceur no li:!er (Olm ~:00 e..m. cm Se?lt:mh~ 14, Wl 7. i.. 

!1,e lo-ccl ~cifi~d in the orisi~ su~ Thl3 rc-.-is~ deadline will not be exr.eod::,d. 

!n che 1:l.t=l!live, if rut teSpOClSii,e dCQ!!:re8U ..re not prod~cd by th:: rcvi~ deiutlini::., the 

/-~y Gt:llero! .and !he Direct« of dte FBl sl:!tt.l. ~ ~ii>.re th: Commilrec at 9:00 am~ 

Sep-~ 14, 2017, in Room HVC-210 of the U.S. Cspilt>l durinB sn open lteering. to t:Xplcin 

w;dei- oll!h DO.ts ll.tl:d FB£'s unuillingncss or in:ibllity to oo:nply in full 'l'.'itb tilC subpoena,; 

issued on Augt!St 24. 

P!ettSe be adv.Iseli th4?, in 1he evmt th3l OOJ or FBI fulls to provide~ docuuimts i.: full or 

~csrimoir/ described abo\-e, the Cuill!IliUce c:i..~ly ide!'VeS i~ ri.._w to prccecd with. any ei:d 

i;ll avai!?.cle Cegal options-including reporting to the fu!l.Housi: of Re~= a a"e$01ulicn 

ta ho:!d ~ Attomcy Gcm:ral m:d D[~. oftl:t f-BI hl co"templ of Con~, purro:nt ro 2 

u.s.c. §§ l.~ 194. 

-------~ 

PROP~1YO~ "In!: 1J.S. HOU$EOF RO!RESEITTA71VES 207 
1-· 

1 C111hr.u.M, C'dlur1-..Qt.-••• 

~:;:,·:.•i1~~U!'..,~1~--· 

n,,,.,,. 1.ol'Mt,h1, ,. ...... ,f'111 

"'~• J, PIK.1111,Hmt 

~.;~~~:.~~.~' .. e,1, ~ ,·,,~1,uu, ~,. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

:r::~~~ ~'~. t'f', GctA'A,,t\·rnt1(;.1•11ft 

'",_ K. 'l,r)"k '~"'""' \Y1~MJIG. ft.i. 

F'ER~t/\NP.ST Si:WC'I' COM.'.IITTbli 

01~ INTELLIC:lE.NOE 

.-...._ 11 Ot\f'lC•"''""-' l\,"'1M11f("""" 

~~::!.icn:,',G:~!111 

.,,,_ ... ,c.,~l\ltdu• .'cl:la.t,.tir,C,r'l\lr.'11 

~~1'~;1', ~OJ~~ • . -.,:u1 C.nu, 1n,. e>w, ... , l:'f.\'li)tJ'l\tJ!ef'I 

Th:! Ho!lOmble Jeff'Sc~ons 

Attomey GeaetXll _ 

Uni~ States Dqxinment of Justi~ 

950 P~>•lvnnu:. Ave:, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20SJO 

De& Attorney General SC11sioas: 

S<!pteuiber 5, 20 l7 

HV~. TII~ CA~ITC,. 

w,1.~111•mo11, oci~~:~ 

tm) 2:lll-4\11 

f\,,.,.-.,,.., .. ,"' fJ .,,,n1~ 

,-,_..,!J DIMMlHI 

w~,~.,,t\,1c,u:t 

A$ explained in nw lett~ of [September t, 2017], if lhe Otpartment of J1mioe uils to comply in 

full \\1th w ~-:ubpoc1111 for produc\ign cu docurncn(s is~ by 1hu Ho\1Si: Pmn~ent Scl~t 

Committee on Tntolligence (Committee) on August 24, 2017, the Committee rcqu[rns thlrt 

Atto:ncy Ocnorol Jeff Session.~ appcnt before Ille Comminee on September 14, 2017 to cxpl.llin 

tlllll failure, The nccon,~nylug ~ubpoen.a, !s&iietl todlly, 18 ialt2uJt:d lrJ L'fl)= cu,;nplioocc: wilb 

lhO: l'C<lttircrnuut, Shoul,J lhe 0~1tmen1 of Ju.'itiiXl comply in full Md In o limcly monMr with 

tho Commiu~'ll subp.:,cun of AugQ~t 24, 2017, lh~n lhe A!ttlmcy Cler:eml'o O])Jlcn~ ...,ill n.ot 

b~-c«C11SnfY, 1md U1a llf'PC'MUICC subp<Jeno dilled Scpttmb« S, 2017, will bi, wilhdnwm. 

fl..,.._ . ..._ __ 

Pl"<C)PE;RTY OF TliE U.S. HOUSF. OF REPRESEtffATIVES 208 
~~-..a.~a.~ 

t.xo.~c~·-~ 

l~t~~.-., 

'tllt"tJ J ~auu:, .,...Azo1J1.r~Fb"n "".,..••.r~ ... a,a 1.t.Y> .. "'41.a:;\0'{11 C,f\1:~4-"\~, J.aC"'.-..i.U"4.A.~ 

'"ttt~r~•C-,,1-ht 

1,~ .... ~-a:.1..-· ... ~· ,.),:.u,q_ T.r.:n 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

P~MENT SE.I..ECT CcMr.1.'11'EE 

ON INTELUSE!'.CE 

.. ,.-iii!.l\..f..J.~~ 

._~ l.hr-"111.2 

~ .... :) Sl ... '\,~l::.OC'r'Ckl:t 

... ,.,~,-~t,~ 

Toe Horumtble C-~t1" Wrey 

Di~or 

.Federal Buteau of 1Dves.:igatfo.!I 

935 P~lva.nh! Ave, N.W. 

Wa.sbin&b:Jn, D.C 205~ 

Deer DL"eCtot Wray; 

Sep.e!nbcr s. 2017 

~:>."t,30~, T.c c~ ... ,o. W"""1.,<;rcr,;;,OC U-!II!:. 1ro21 2~1;; .......,.....,.. 

~~-~oa• 

t"U.OA'T3~~ 

~Y:llt~~tc:> 

AsGXJ)iaiQQd ii.my lett:f of[~ l,2011], cth.: F~l D=u l)fl.:ive:stigatianfai.!s to 

comply m full with ~ subpocm for (?IOduo.tion of ili!--..unu:ms i:Ji.u:d by !be !I= P=nt 

Selei..i Ccmmitt= oo IiuUigeice (Can-.mitte?j oo Ang'.!St 2-f.i 2017, the Committee requl~ (i,,.at 

Dlreclor Chdstaphe.r Wnry app:ar before the Olm.mittec on Sc;,tember l 4, 2017 to e.'<t)l,ain that 

fai111re. Thi: ac.:ompaeying su!lpo~ issued today, is intc!ld~ to ensw,: comp~e with fr JU 

rcquin:~L Should ~ F~ B!!l'e.ail ofln"lestig?iion comply (n full ar..i in 3 t:inety :a:zo.:?er 

with 1e.i: Com:mttee's ~..bpo~.:if ~ 24, 2017, L};eD the DiR>..-:or's 811?-=<=<: will O;Y. be 

ttoocssarf, and lb, aJ)]St!:lNll~~ ~td S~r 5. :2017, will be willidrewn. 

ffiOPl:R'TY a:= THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPR'ESENTATIVES 209 
Qr-.all11"9\C•tbrl,o.,....,,., 

Jt.Wl-a,.: =-.u~ ?'Jn, ,. .... ~.otat,....Y\fic rfYI? '-,!£.Wb.-d:l, 11t1#.J1H1•.- T•....,., .... ~ "*~ 

~:!i':-i:~~~~·U• 11,u.,, •,,,,.11'li.,uu, a:::-, 9ic"""'fU U!Jlh ~t,('1'"'4,>ilhU•u 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPAESENTATlVES Pi!l'lMI\NONT $1!UIOT CClMl,{ITTliP. 

~t.-~ltl:~M~· ,n,n..ne. ,..,.,. 

~n>!,,~1;11 Ctllc~ RU.<•,:ti!Vlta 

r'DJ.tQ. t'y2\ S,.,..n11 ct.,...,r ... « r.11atn, .,.at,\D1'-'!:-u.~ ... ;,.i.u.1t 

'llto J-IQ1t0<u~ JcffSos3fons 

Altomey C'n:vel's.l 

United Sti:crs Depa11meo.t of Justice 

950 Pcnnsyh'WtiaAVC. N.W. 

\Va;hingt0rt., D,C, 20$30 

·nw Honorehle Chri&Cl.)pb.ec Wmy 

Dic0010r 

Fcdtrel Bnr~ ofJ'1Vi:.,ti~tlon 

93S P<;nnsyl\'ania Ave, 'N.W. 

Washln)l.con. D,C. 20530 

ON lt.n'EUIGENOE 

~ptcmba 15, 2017 

Dear Anomey Ul!n(l.Ul.1 Sessions nnd Olrecmr Wray: 

HYC-..'>)O, TIO! C,,,n()\ 

\'11.:>t1m.101•, DC 2061S t~lt?...'8..CIZI 

)\1,1'"":o,:;, .iu119,-..~,,.. 

=-~t.~ 

v.,.1',tr.1,1, 0.01~ 

On_September 14, 2017, tepresentllli\~ frorn the Dopot(lnez.t o! JI.IS~ ("OOf') ~ F~= 

Blrte1\l oftnvesdgotion. ("FBP') informed Ille ~unittee that they vreroitot prcpmtccl tti }X(ldure 

a11y dCJcumc:cl!i rt:(;JNJ11:1ivo lo tho ~ubpoi:nll3 i,:n1Q() on AuEU31 .24---<kspltc 11 13·doy c.xlcrurlon <ii 

tho originn.l Scptclllh<:r l dcadlinu that 'l\'(l!; gp.ntcd ot DOJ13 n:qucr.t. [ \Vil$ p:3l'tic:ulr.rly 

«m~d.t.Q !cam that, in tho past~ v,-uk.,, efforill to assemble SUl}b documc.nb l1ad no! 

· advanced beyond~ p~lim~· 54~. 

A$ noted In~· letter of Scptcmb~ 1~ the C<>mmit(ce conli111:es lo ::eok an)' (l~ IQ)"ICIJ~ ,i;gwlins 

lhQ ox tent or your 11u.cncii.w.;' rolnllonshtp with forom Bnttsb &x:ri:t llltelligcocc S01, 1l<ir. officer 

Chrl~upJLet St~lo 11ml/o.. lhc so-cwkcl. "Tc:I.UtlP Do~io.r'' tclevAnt to th¢ Conunince'll oogo~ 

imeatigation orRussiM in~rferanct in the 2016 U.S. presidential clctt.ion-ioc:h1ding 

e.llegatforu; of coJlwsioii b~cn the Tro.mip tAnl~ and !he ~iftIU. The C::ommittee has c:lso 

00!.lght any Foreign Int~U.{gence Coltrt SwveiUanro Act (PISA) apPliations submitted lo tho 

foroign Intell!gei1o0i: Survcill,111ce CQllrt (FJSC)-who1het or not ilpprove<I by the RBC - thlit 

muy htJ.vc i11C1:1rpc,t1.1tctl .ioy inform11tlon pru~ by Mi•. 81e¢lu llD()/or fu81110 0 118. To dfitc, 110 

document., M\'c beeu provided. 

L'nfottlmllt.ely, DOJ's ond FBI'~ li.st-Mtt1u.ts cng~nant with th.e Cornroiuc~ t"egnrdinJ; 

subpoc:ne. COJTIJ)li~ ff!'ld f$il~ to prodiJcc a,zy do,:.ulll.enb-includlc& !hose pmvh>usl.y mode 

aVllUllbler-fiu into u oontinllm8 puttcru ofiosufficico1 t.;Sp<>N5lvena111 ta wrilfcn Comm!~ 

J"OI\IICSC, daili1g bock over S mootho, lnalwllne ll>i· documco~ md t~U1v.ony 6'om A1101uoy 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSc OF l=lC:PRESENTA.TIVES 210 
J 

(k;o.e:a! S~[ons, FBI Di:pu;y Dircetor A'!Uire;v Mc0:t1le, end funner Acting Ass:..<1ll..a"!t Arrorrey ~ ~JBI)' lV..cC-0.rd. 

The Commitr.ee ~ aommitttrl to exezclsi!lg its ~on.al ov~tre~Msibi[itles, a!ld 

wiU c:onnr.uc seckhl,gyour co,;ip=.tio.n \'ti.th there df~:tts.. :oOJ !nd FBI a.e theref~ ~t¢i eu 

c:x-.raordinaty e.\.emion r}j en add.'tiora.l se,..-en (7} days :or prod.uctkin tJmt .smsfies d:e Aug;..ist 

24 ~s,, t.o oocm no 1filf:r than 9:C-0 a.m. on St:ptembf:r 22, 20 l 7. ID mea.!tenl3live. !!D;I. 

~t to dtetmimonrel s~iss>;:s;d on Sep~ S, th.c At.tome,,/ ~era!~~ 

DircctoT <lf the FBI sha.11 ~ fur mi op,:n heufug attJ:9{l em on S!ptembe.r 2.8, 2017, ill Room 

HVC.210 of tlie U.S. Cepitol, to temfy UI!dtx oath. 

Jn .he e\o"Cllt of c.~d &ar'..ccropli~t. tr& Commi.~rcs:= i~ rigbtto pmc.:ed witheny 

arui £.!t s:;ailabfe Iege! opti~r.clmfing reporticg ro th:: full .Hou:s-e of Repre:.~(iv::s <1 

rescforioi:I tc b.Qtd !he.A.tti~Ir .. cy Go:iacl and Direi.:w: (If fui;: FBI iu Ct!nlcmpt of Congress, 

!JIIl'.SllIDt to:2 U.S.C. §§ L92. l94. 

st.,,._ore!y, 

~/1~ 

Devi:!!K= 

Cbcirm.111 

- -- --- - - ·------ - -

?RCPERTY DF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REP'RESENTATIVcS 

_ _ j

211 
I 

I 

<Offirt 1,C ll1t ptpnl~ J\t!Llr111u <Kifl1rr~i 

Jtl .. ,i{1l,t!1)~11, !'.ll. !IUUO 

Tiw I huwrabh: Devin Nun~s 

Chatn11m, 

Scptcm't,:r 2J, 20 J 7 

Pemuinent Select Cnmmiltee on Int<:lligi:nco 

U.S. HouS<J ofR~rescni,.1h•i:-s 

Woshir.~1011, DC 205!5 

Dear Cht1i.rm(in N11~; 

Our Legis!ati~c .Affairs Offic.! h!!S been cun5\llling with ,!'(l\lr ~iaff In~, clfit.>rC co 

nrr:mic for me to tncct \\ilh yo\1 tn di~cl.l~$ 1111: Commitll:~'11 inqu,h'ie:1. T undtrntond thn1 

ynu h:ivc been ot1 foreign tJ·,net tbl3 \.\-eek l ,~1ll llc on for,:ign lrt\vcl for the 111:.-:c nv1: 

d11y3. I 1htreforc rcque~t lh~t you c'1ltc11d lhe deodllne 4te1ed In your Scpt~ub~r l 5 letter 10 

the ,\\lorro:y Gc11e1'8l .111d the fBl Dircctur, s1.1 tlmt we can ~rmng11 tu ~uclfC!!~ ynur 

requc=1~; withoan nndul~ damasi11!) notioMI sec uiity mtd dil!(up(ing .'.l.11)' ongoing criminal 

i11vesli;i,i1ion. 

I 11pr,,recitl1~ our btid' 1clcphonc: \'.01WCt5alic111 la:i1 w~ok. l 1'now lhM y-,u 

unJcisrsnd th~1 tht' exWJth,e br.mch's ~,blii;ntlon tl> ~tegu3rcJ ih(e!Hgenee wurces and 

m1;tbods :IDd protei..1 ~~ integrity of invc.stigatious sometimes wnm1111s =ommode.tion. 

Tnii; is not a no,-el issue, nnd II is ncil a p~«isim ir.sue. Law enfon;emcnt ruid 

nurion:11 securil)' mo.11cr; 11rt: kt..-pl ll0110<len1lal for .gouil r~;isons. 

Wi5e lcgiNlative ru,d e:tcculh~ br.inch of{lcb1I~ haw wotked iogell1er for 11111,t)· 

de.cad~•o dct~11d uur nation'$ ton~ •term inter~ts by protc..:tiog the confidenliality or 

lJcpnti,nent 11f Ju~icc invt:~liglllions ilfld pteS~·ing the Dcpartmcm·s indcpc:ndcncc trom 

1hc pollrical ,vcnn. 

I h(1.J1c: thm loni~rundinu m1dition will cont[nuc 011 our watch. 

Thank you for youc contlOUlni OOllrtesies. 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEN1ATlVES 

212 
e...h~>:.:LC:a~e...w1. r44..--.if,0.-.o,.r-..c. P,i,,1 1r'.t..:;r41-~c., 

nm: .ti...:.::i::1~1tu b-"ni' n,.r.,,ai.:..fo.t~!".:-ea 

l\:,.,. k..L.tfac,~.,h <iot ,..,,_,,.,_7h~.~ Al'~l'- .. ,Jt,tct:.i~~ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES .t:n: .. !..~.b.l. nc..';l:Mio:i-$.~ 

r ... ec-t,.s-c.ec-~ il"J•\t~~~ 

~H.S'.U.Tn:::2 

J.d.n::..~Y.C>tb-olla. 

~H'llt-"¥"• al.-...&~ 

.h.~-ON',.~=-.& 

1..lm~l.~ 

hwrl~~ ~.s,....-.,.~~-~ '-\S.tC..V•r.lJ~ 1:•c-!;~•.Cllf;n :io .)t} ... ~~ba,, 

-::.....-~~"''·•'·"°"" 

ra;:t D,l>ffl.!>-6,.,,Uatoa~ 

N -"'1:,, l°'t",:1L~""""""~:.:..,..U41 

'fb.! H!inorable Rod RilSe!!Stein 

D~puty A1teraey &!ueml 

f>'EAt.V,«c,'>IT 5al:CT Col.\Mi'i,cE 

ON lr,n.n.-LIGENC!: 

Umte'l Surt~ De:,mrneot of Ju..<tire 

950 Pcmisylv.mie-Av~ NW 

Wahingto::;. D.C. 20530-0001 

Ii~ . l\<c Ct,Pm>\. 

w,.~,. ilC:t051f-

~ z_.-c:...:.1.21 

ll.'Cl'l .. ~ . .........__ 

L~flt~ •rfC:~r~ 

1l=1c you fur yol!!: letter ofS~bct 22, 20!i. As yw 1Ue wcll avrm; the lfcu..ac 

Pemwient s~lect Comm!~onhlrelligem:e (the C~) is miiq,~yequ:ppcd u, $efegi=d 

in~lig,= WU?c.!$and mc:!ho&. Othe:r~;·e b..-=cl? ~cic:, ~ prtradcd tl:e 

Camm.Ill= wllh the e<;x::mr>=•s =nsy to cor~uct its ongoiug lav~oa into~ 2016 

p.."csirlemfa! electi.m, in.crc.:dif'.gllighly-classtfied info!1m'.tion ofo:ttannilnlnJ' saisl-ti.ify. ~ 

Com."'Iliru:c has ~ to greaI Jeng,i~ tQ avu:d irJi:r£l:~ Wlih Uk'j «igoi~ a=im~ brancll 

inv~~. oo.i we~ r:tSrly to won. with :i,-~u ill this reg::ID!. r l!lso takcthl5 o~-tlty to 

~ooro that ow: requests for i:nfurniatfan are lil«ily to be fu-.lJCI' itt 1l!lillber and smsli~ in 

.scc,pe th!tJ,. l!I(:: l;pic:tl qusons Judges and attnm..ys 'Pi'Qll).i 3* i;,1 crunmal pr,,bi:s.. 

Furihfnncre.,jillt fS the ~ of JDstiee (00.J)-ruid Fe~ Buretiu of !nv~tii:;.Licn 

(FBI) b3.\•e eonsf.i.tltionlll o~tiom, so too rloes Congre~, whlch is respons:i~!e Co. ov=e.zg 

beth DOJ =! FBL \Vb11e tb:: Cc=!!mittce h:.~ been vt:ry pe&n! Ov'Ct ~ hrstsiX. llJ;:llll]-,.s, !kt 

patience is cot wil:hottt limiL Todi!C', r=ittgful c:o~ce wrt.~ mi: Commfucti's == 

re,;~ts has been ~ and th: Coll!mitte: has not =ivro my docu.mc:n!s pu.=t to 

~~a month i:tgo fer which the-deadltne h?$ k= twice e.'.!endfd. The fs:ci. U'.!d 

~ mf.xrmatfmt may h~ ~i.ng u1 c:i.stDOJ er FBI en-. ligm )'<l'J pi'Clcr to a.--oid is not 

suffi~--nt grounds ro deny me Contlnittce ~ to m~.ds relev~ t~ its O•~Sht 

~biliti~ Nc.r'a:re there an"f lawfuljurufi~ons.forsuch ad~ co Co~ Thrs ~ i>f raspott.S!veness from the w-0rld's p=i.i~ law e.:i:on::crnmt agency is una-r-ccptmle. 

For cxlm'.lpl~ <rn Much.} 7, tiiQ Cammi~ W'S.$ !J!O!tcd tWO, biHr;ts to re\lU::W dQci.=tl;s 

r~ivo to areip.JJ::tt fur Foreign Jntel~cc Sμo<~ Act (PISA) applicztlon:s~ 

Foc:igo In~g= Snr.rcillaru:e Coon (F1SC) <mkrs. r n.e ~ill 7,'Crv provid~ ()D a rc:arll!llG-i"ctum bss~md th.c C=m!tt~'s .cequaat CD rcvl=, th.c.."ll again v.--as dcoii:d. [ .om 

paI"tlCU!.arly frust!:a!ed by DOJ's ~ of coop~o,n in prov{~ documents t(! whidi the 

I 

_ _ , 

PROPERTY OF iHE U.S. HOUSE C~ REPRESENTATIVES 213 
,------ - --· . ·--.. - · ··----- . ----- - - ---·- ---

Commi(<cc hri.s al.Icudy ~ sivcn nccc:.10, and addilion11tly h!W(l renson to believe tha1 

rcspon:;lve docwnenl.s were improperly withheld from the Maren 17 pro<l11ctiou. 

WiJh ?CSJ>Clct to the pending subpo~ tbe l'Cf,e.:itcd latt·D1illute re:!pQJl&es by DOJ and 

FBI to gcnerou:i <leradlincs have b~n wholly i~cqu:itc. Given tJte Congrcss':s obll8{ltiotu co the 

Amcrica.n J)(;IOple. Conwi:ss needs answers. TherofCY.ll, l look fomzml to d.istussing these matters 

in p~1:ion witb you oo Thu11d.ay. 

-,A/~ ......... _ 

Copies to: Th~ Honotnble Jeff Session.., Attorney General 

The: Honorable Chrisropher V/-,ay, Oi:icdor, Fedetal Bureau oflnves~tion 

214 
,V.\1>.lt4'' Cd'l::'n • .)c.Tf'N"f"I 

Ut,._,.ff;•--,.-.-

~ ~t."f~~H'VWT r~.:.n,,n,.':"u,1~ ~,,,~rU\~·• ~n.:L Tltnr. "1.:a U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES i, .. R.~ ....... !'-:u: .:u...c.s.~ . .i.cm. U:.t ~ M".d, : .. •El!ll !''f't~.~"'1~1'4' 'i~..,..,.a.::nh,C't.lhw1'1M'\ ·ta,11J.~T1M:,. 

Pi;i"2,W-IENT SELs:;.° C<-.uw:rrr££: 

cm INTElLGH~E' 

""""'~f:\J~~ •• :.i.~~ .. ~ ..... 

1,.t-, ~ .,~~,~b.t : ... : 1,,.$).rrlO-...::U, 

4...CriC.h.«.~T1- , •• #~Nl•.~ W:W.Chb,.,..,:t..""U& Ll<C-":.'-.t..-:f\~-t. 

l up';,.:O>v.T-_ C,-nt ;,.~,. UtW:>p"'!I\ 

l"bJC ~ ~•. 4'1-"o&1'~--~ b'IX(~w;.~r,ct,,r:Nr,, 

'DcirutY Dictttor Rod Ros:t'.s.o:?in 

U.S. [xpartment of J~1itt 

<>SO Pel'ltUYlv-cnia Av~c, NW 

Waswnglor., DC 20530-00m 

Dtptit)' Dir.:ctar RtNl Rosca.'-t_.:in, 

NG'1e~2, 2017 

;,:,1~,~-':',o c,.;,.r.-... 

WJ.Slrsx;n:i."1.0C lt~lS 

;20211Z5-&12l 

o.r,...,,.,~~ ::,..,.~ 

•,-.o· .. .-1,.~'a?'• 

""""'"7,5r..,,~..,...__.. 

I herelrJ Jcsig.we Cooircssr-.An Trey C"!O,.tly as my proxy fot un in ewicra. WJic.w of 

dc=erus ~ :i.vlrila:ile per tllc subpocias is~ to A<tom,;-; Gt!ll:ml ~;ens ani FBI 

Direcr.oc Wray d&tec ,\u.glEI. 24, 20!7. This d.csignatioa. ls ,~;t1,ou1 p.cjudia: to, ar.di shaJ· uo\ 

limit or v.'<rl~ ~ aulrn.lrity oi ill M:mb:~ of tl:e Hoi:se P~rrr,31:cnt S,elt:e, Comminee oa 

Tn1eiligence from rcvie\\rjng the docwn<nlS ~ta l::.t~ d:;te upon requesL 

JL i~ lli/ requestthe.t this ~\·fowo=r by cwse of busitl':SS on Nc>\'~ober 2. 2011. 

Best Rcguds. 

b,AI[/~ Th:11in r.'u:i~ ,.. 

Chaim= 

PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

215 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Pl!FIMMJEliT SE:I.EtlT Co!AIAmE.E 

on INTEL1.1GEN¢E 

Deoembct· 28, 2011 

The HQllorab!eRod Ro~tein 

Oojltlty l\ttomey Geuernl 

U .s. Deptutment of Ju3ticc 

l 20l POlllJay!vMin Ave, NW 

Wamlnnton, D.C. 20004 

Dear Mr. Rosc:m.toin: 

liVC~d, THI ~-1QI 

WA!l""-'a!DN, DC ~S15 12(J~j:12S,-.4121 

The Hoip;e Perm.Anent Select Committee on lnlellis~ {the Commiltee) writeJ 111 

rc:i,pollD\l to th-.: Depwtrocnt of Ju.1rloe's (DO)) ;md the Federal Bur"o.uof lnvestigutlo11's(Fal) 

foiluro ti> fully pro du~ responslvc doCUJllcnl.$ o.nd prov Ide. lho requested wltnOS1Jos lo CQ:7lJ)llnnco 

with tho subpoenas issued over four nron!h.t ago, 011 Au11,ust 24, 20] 7. 

Several v;,,clcs l!l!C>, DOJ informed the Commlttce that the ba~c investigatory ~ocurmmt:1 

de.mimded 't;y dt.e .subpoen.o.s. F}}J Fom:1 F0-302. interview ~cs. did not wst. Howevtf, 

shortly before my mooting with }'Ou in early Dcccmbo::r, DOJ sub..sc:quently local~ flJld produced 

nwnei:oua f'D..J02s pact.a.in mg to the Steclc doom, lMreby rendering the initial respan~ 

disingenuous sr bc:st, As it cums out. aot O:lly di;t dc)cum,:nts e:,:igt tha.t wett. directly r~13onsive 

to the: QiaJ1:nitn:e's subpoenM, bi.1 lhey Lll',olved =ior DOJ and FBI o~cials who w-c.e swiflly 

ressGigor:d whm th.air rofas in mnttera under 1he Commi«e~'s lnvesligaticn. w.tre bs:ousht to 

!igbl. Olven th~ conlent and 1.mp:a<:l of these suppoi:erll.y newly-di!covered FD-302s, the . 

CoJtunil.te\: is no longer ru:re to accept yoor pmporled basis. for DO J's blfillket retir.sal to pim1de 

.responsive FBI FO!Tll FD-l023s-<iocumenting m~ bc\wi:cn FBI officials and fB! 

confidential hl.llUllll sources.---or 1111ythlng less !h.en furl aJtd eortlJJlete eamplianoe with iis 

~ubpoen;i.s. 

Al.i1 :i.=ult1Jf1.lle nwncrou.& d~lnys Md W!!CreJ)RnCie:i tha! hiwe h1UJJpc:ted !he pfOOC.SII of 

sub~'\ compllanet:, the Comml\lec no l~r a-edits the rop~tAfions madD by DOJ *3:tcl(or 

the FBI l'C68.fdins theflel matters. Aooortiing)y, DOJ arid the FB r ure in~tructed to promptly 

protlucu ta tho Commitcec.-no tnter th.on JMunry 3, 2018-ALL outs!aJlding teem'do £dentlficd es cer;pon~ivc m tl1c Augw.t 24 robpQc1111S, inoludit1g but not U1V1[tl:<? 10: 

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSI: OF REPRESENTATIVES 216 
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•vr 

• All responsj,{e FD-l 023s, i.i.clooing 1l! reports th3! summarize nm:tings betw«n 

FBl conn~~, humm !l:>urees aid.FBI o1l1cim ~to~ ~le cl«s:icr, 

• All responsi1,~ FP-3023-not pn.'Vivu.sl.y provided to theComrnitree; 81'.d 

• In adcfition 10 the R>.302s e,,d FD·l023s. cemm ~cf,rc: er.alyt!~ end 

reference dacumenls ll:e.t w~rc ~ly identii-'ied end rur.icsted by Irie 

Cammittt.c,andt.~Y subjea to ~mt~on. es of Da=b:r IS. 

Sb®ld DOJ decid:: lll withhold my mpanm"C ~ ot po.lions thereof, from the 

Cc:nmittee, it must, co~ with .be n:bj)ocne irmuctions, provide c wrluca respaiu.e. un~ 

yuur si~ dewfuJ.s tile Jegalju.,~(>11 re. Lriling to comply wilh ~ ~o~~ 

su'\)poi:ns~ 

AdditL":laily, by Il2 =e ~ ~p:ovtdo-,-.;.D wtitiri~l.ehla~ in 

J~J ~ 18 fad~;:ws with the. following offi::ws. 

• Filttner DOJ .~soci~ D~,cy ~y 0~ Bm~Ohr. • A3l S-0.peNOO?Y Sp::ci?.1 ~ P:ti::r (SSA) S02Xlk; 

• fB( AUcmey James Bah:r. 

• F.Bl Atmmey UsaP~ 

• FBI AJumJ..sy Sally Mc.yet; and 

• FBI Assisti:nt Direcw. fot ConS[CSS:oll31 Affairs G!eg 8ro'9r=t. 

11'.e ~e f.ath.er ronim3s you (}f ti= othu outstanding reqi:essfur ~on: 

• Details mnrernin.& en~ April 2.irl 7 meeting with the media iJn,o}.ing 

001/FBl ~nnel, ii:rclu.iing DOI Anorr,ey Al:ldrewWc:is=E:n (d~ Occe:.nber 

13) ecd 

• Toe ~g~l mi:osages be~ SSAS~ and M~ ~-c {doc D=mbet 

15). 

Unforomately, DOYFBl's ~pee with respc,:t lO 1he Auguc.;t 24 ~ow;s is pert 

oiabroader~ af~wr that ~1U)lot1!!(T:>e tolerated. As I said mapublic~mt 

S";"~-;:.al we(:}cs sgo, when the reasDn fu1 SSA Strzd:'s n:moval from L~ Sp?cisl Collll~ 

irr.'CStigntian Wl.3 leeked to lfui JYashtngtvt-t J'()Sl be!bte .hat reason was provided tn this 

Co;:J:nittee, at1ni! paint itseem11ihe00111mJ FBI~ to hr: invcrlipti!!.g themstlY~ 

I look forward tD }"OU?. timely wrr.t= response. 

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PRO~cRlY OF THc U.S. HOUSc OF REPRES!:r,JTAYIV~ 217 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

?ERM.ANENT SEl.2Cr COW,fiTTE~ 

0Fi lN'l'RU.ICENC~ 

H'JC•304, THe C!J'l"j'lll. 

w~~o~0a,. OC~15 

~02) :2:l5-4 t:?.! 

The Honorable Rod R~em 

Deputy Anorni:y G=al 

U.S. Dep;uunent of~ 

120! Pennsylvania A·~-e. NW 

W2.Shinstor., D.C. 20004 

Dear Mr. RoS!:llS!ein: 

Js.nll8.tjl 4, 2i.ll 8 

Pwsuan1 to our phal?- call ;-esterdey evsning. .i writ:? to memorial~ th= a~ wt! teacbccl 

rcgerdi.ng compli11llec wi!.b the subPo=na:s i~ by the Ko= Permso::ill Select Comrnitttt: an 

futelligcnce (the Co=ittee) on Augu.st 24. 2.017, to 1hc Department of l ustke(DOJ} and 

Federal. Bu..-eau of In¥estign!ior. (FBl}, as well ~$1:Vt:tal other o~nding tc:qta::S'.s by L'1e 

Committ~ fur infummfion and in[crvi~ws. JI fa my hope tr.al thls ~en, w,Jl provide the 

C.Omnuttce wirlt tall o,.J1mnding docum.cius and"'~ n~=ll?Y to .xirnpl.ete itli 

invi:stig:mons lo.to =n= ~alving DOJ ll!ld FBI. 

Al agreoo. d-:slgns.ted Co=ninee i.cl""es-Jgators w-m:ffwill be p~videil ~ to all ~~g 

inv~siir;ati vc d~\l!Ilen!S, in unredncted form, furtt'l'i,ew at DOI on Fn&y. ]~f S, 2018. The 

documo:ors to be wli~~ Y>ill include all FBI Fo.m FD-J 0"'"3s ll.Jld all remainh::g FBl rorm FD31)')...s responsl~ to.~ Co=ittee'~ Au~ 24, 20!7 subpo;:.1as. The o.tly ~n 

e:cecption pcnains to a singi~ FD-302, which. dui. ;o ruaiomd security~ ~ill be ~o,m 

~aratcly by D~r Wca.1 IX) myself 2nd lllY s,ex;for inv~tiga{QIS during the: w~ c,f JIIJtl1AtY'&, 

2018. 

Yo\lfurt.1:er eonfam~ ~ tbtrc mt: ~Qthere:<tmti11~~ive doc:i.'t)lelll3 iliE!~11.re to!he 

Committee's inv23"'Jgarl= in.o (a) Russfa., im·c!."1:ull:llt in~ 2016 ~d::ri21 :[ectloo or (b) 

DOJ/FBl'& related s.ctloos dunQg this time perloo. Tt.is im:ludes FD-302s, ~Hl23s, and £ny 

t:..r.i;:r in,~tigatory d~ genmuto to the Cc:l]:lllitt~'s invesliSlltio.,s, ~$ of fom'I 

aad/or title. lf. someh.ow, '"n..-vr or"oth.a" rcspoMJy; dot~cs 8K ~ E!3 di$'CU$.~ 

yoc. will nutify me i:r.medi2l.e.!y utd aUow my =-:.OrinVl:stlg~tor&.to ~w the.::i shortly 

t~Ci. 

1.Jrllh cespeet to the '\\oitnBs ~s 1equ~ by the Co:um~ ;,;,ii have ~ct! cha1 all :1ucll 

•.:titil.t:I~ - i=r.cly, ~ OOJ Assaciile Dt!pllt)· Attorney Genr;,,'al Sni-ce Ohr. FB1 

Supervfaort Spet:ial Age::tPetet Stnolc; fo=r FBI Genmil Cou~l i~ ~ FBl 

~ Lisa f88e; FB1 Attnrr .. e"/ Sally Moyei,; PBI A.5sist:nt Dltcctar C-reg Brvvtcr; FBI 

ASS!s!attc Dircctor Bill Pricstsp; and FB[ .Speci!! ..\gent Jmnc. Rybicki -wi11 be"rruide avoUahlc 

fur in~cvi~ to bei:onaucte:i m JlillUafy. 

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOLISE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

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Lw.ly, as to the~ioings.pproxim~dy 9,SOOt::xl ~~~ w..t.,,,·= FBI~ Special 

Agent Pl:ler Stnak-L'ld his mi~ fBl Ai..-omey u~ Pego, it is my-t:nd:rst=ling b~ 0-ll 

your rep~catiom tmt l!ltother search is being ccndm:u:d 11r.d all reii:V""...at ~ will be 

p,.-ovidcc!, A~Cl4i!l.&IY, ~ Coimaitti:c fdltl~ p;onuctiro. -Of ;i;CS~ r.ll!SSt\~ by no &l.tt:rtrtl!J'I 

cl= of busm~. Th~y. Jim=y 11 , 2018. Shoil~y. I ~8l>d !t'i::n yo~ offi;c is 

(e$S.--clwig reco~ds re!aled ~ the d£tail, of Bil A.prll '2017 m~g b~--=en 001 Atto.,iey 

Arakcw Weis:mia,; (now &be seniar m11;)mey for S~~ Counsel Rob--~ M.uet!er) and the ~~a. 

wti:b will also b: pro•lid::d to this Committee by close of busi!::ss on 111\m;day, Jamiuy ! ~ ,· 

2018. 

rt wa."t furtba ~¢,d ll-.1.1 d! <!OC~t$ i:ode ai.uilable to the C<mJmin::e will elso be ;,;v.illal:fa 

10:-review by th~ minority Ra a king: M~r a.-d dcsign.r.«i stdf. 

Tne Jlulll:!W9 we are rcqi."'Cltiog ;.re ·,itd to the Commntec's :nve.."'tig~on oi po~al abure.s 

into iraems~~ and taw eaforcx:ir..mt ~cncics' h~cilmg oi the Chris::.opber Steele d.assier, The 

Cm.lrr.ittee is f:X",.,cme(y ron.cemeil b)• inctcatioGS that top U.S. Gavm.illlCQt ofl~I.$ who -..i= 

i~311. ptes!dffllW camp3ignr~on ~verified L.fommioa di;;t was funded by the 

~ng pc!itfcl csmpcign and 'A'3S ~ on Rnssian ~= Goi11& fonvm-d, it'i; cmcial ch1t 

we =r.nrleli~ C1llf COl1\'~miriollS on chis is~. Bnd thllt v.~·re as tF~t !IS])O.UiI:,h: ,filth 

the Ameri=i people, who oo:.sm~ 1!1),SWiZ to du: questions ~ C:i=itt~ is :nw.stiplin3. 

Co¢e3 to: 

The Hontr."..h!e Jef!°Sc:$!k-m, A~):' Gen.e':21 

~Hon~le Chrutop~ Wray, D1re<:ter, Fwera. Bureau ofl::,;estig.ation 

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RC-PREScNT?.11VES 219 
r-Owoa.'.DC.:::~a.::......•-

<.14:,1~.':'Mr..l• 

hf:ut~~.sci.t,-t n, .. A 1.11SouQ. r,>:,,,,J,•.=..r n.7'n .1.f~;__Je, ... :r. t~QOI..~~· 

l.~.S.~at:D aidJll..,~a.. 

C>Ml~~ 

.:t.,~..,,,..->~ 

'l)e,i,~~~')LJ 

;; ... N.,E."4;..,;,c,.tJ&<t.\\i,t ~ I MC..~ 

,.:., ,, a.. :.cc. co:n-. !'WJ-Mif';.~A 

;,,u:?:.J\,c.rt.~GJ~t'.R-..U 

!1.-uc,t"li,.~.~~.:cu:.a.:::a.a 

\-lA U.S.MAlL 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMAN.Em" SELcCT COllt.l.'JTTE.E 

ON INTEU.!SEIIICE 

Novtmbct &, 2017 

The HolUltahl.e Jam.~ 13. ~~y 

Dear Mr, Cotney; 

H','C-~.1)i~ C...,C-"'"1. 

WAS><JI"""", 0C %:515 

1:,,127.s-,!, :a 

Thank you fur yourte:stimoay before the House Jl~cn: Selt:-et CQrr,mttti:e va fnWligroo; on 

Marc:li 20, 2017 and h~ 4. 2017 in. the C.OlJIIIlittl:c's bipar.isan itl~ in!O Rlls!aan active 

measures directc:i st the Wi6 U.S. cltctlon. In light of add:ttiQ!W facts~ during tho 

investigation,~ Commi11ee ~ ue.sts tr.at you pc.rti.clpa.te ina voluntary, transaibe::I iQlelView at 

cbe Cor:nrnicree' s offi~ 

Commim:e stllffvdll ;,,'Orl: ~-ith you to t'!fflltige )'C!!l" in~• f<>r either~ week of~ocmbo: 4 

or December 11. ~ iim:mew may c;ov;;r s:ny topi~ within the pi.1blic}y-llJ100'..inc:cd paraIDa<:I:i 

cftbe ComJnj&c's nr,~oo (see~), im:ludingRllssian cyWac:rl.iti?S directed 

a~t the 2016 U.S.. ~an. pm~tfol :illlcs 1:~ Russia Md i11dh.:i.duaa asoociatcid \l,ilh 

p,,!itical csmpaigns. the U.S. gpverruuent's mspo,.:ise to these-Russian s:tive m=es, and 

rel~tod0 I~ of c!:;tjffad i:nfurmation. 

We n:specliully ask~ yo.: pmdw:,c to th~ Com~ by m> Istcr lhn th<:: ¢klse ofbus'.r1;,ss on. 

Nonmbu· 24, ~ availabilit'Y for lhe i.mi;rn~.v ~ring the time: idc.mificd ah:>-.:c.. 

This lett.,;_, also ~ quc::;.s prcsq,,ation aixl producruri of ell dix:un1ems, records, cl~onically 

st=d information, re::o."'limgs, data ;ind tangibletaiugs. (mcluding. bu1 not limib:d to, gt!!plu, 

c:iart.,;, pr.nrogx-.q>bs, im5ses ~ 0~ dc-cwnetlts} !'egnrdle~ orfomt, otbatha!I tho so wid~ly 

available (e.g., nev.sp,..peratleles), related to the C<>mmiru:e's inves!i&=,tio», yow interview, Jllld 

~Y anctll:ny matt=. 

Should you have any~ at any !h:u:, plei= contact Committee S'.zff itt ('202:) 225-4121. If 

you are ~e:;1:nted by en lll!Omil)', p!csse fotwud this 1~ co ~·oiir ~-O<llCY, .:c<i tm,~ him or 

hcrconl.l!Ct 11\e {'A)mll"Jnee on :,our bchili'. 

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r,ROPfRTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE O F REPRESENTATIVES 

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K SiIJCl:rely, 

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K.lvilclie~lC~"'~Y 

Mcmb::r of Congrc...<:S 

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Adam Stbiff 

lo.ol<llli; Mcrnb-::r 

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Uuited States House ofRepri?Scntativcs 

Pennari.mt Select Committeo on [ntelligl!llce 

ATTN: Nick Ciadimtc 

HVC-304, U.S. Capitol 

Washing.on. D.C. 20515 

Dea-Mr. Ciarlante: 

February 1. 2018 

I r~oeived your JanuBJ')' 24, 2018 lcltcr, forwnrding a November 8, 20\ 7 l~cr that 

\Vllll sen~ to nn old mailing address of mine.. 

1 respectfully decline the i!).vilation ton voluntary interV{cw. I nm confident you 

cnn ob1ain the best information from cumnt .r'FH cn1pl0}1ees. Please give my b~l lo 

Messrs. Conaway nnd Schiff. 1 hn.ve1 lhnd recollections of our pnst int ... -ractioo~. 

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES 

PE:RJ.'A.'IEl>tT $Eu;CT CO.\~.;: 

01'-1 [Ni"El.UCJSitcE 

The HOllOl'ahle Rod ~n 

Deputy Att=,ey 0~ 

Uni~ S~ ~ent of Justlre 

1201 Pen::JS)'lVll:!l:a Ai,,e, NW 

W~oo, D.C. 2n004 

Deee:mbe?<i, 20l 7 

i!'Jc-JC-1, Tfl.C.U..Ta::t:. 

WA!.W~OC2C6t5 !2:-~22~121 

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i am vmtins y{)I,\ as e follo-.v-op too~ rec~ converelii!!\ about the ~stl:ll.i prcll!tin QI 

uns.n.lhmmd w..ks ofinfmmal:io!i. r.o the .tnf:~ ~m ~ti~ bra:clt Z.,"'lmeies. 

In F~ 20 li, Imoto a fci.!.i!r to tf->..n-Fec!t'nl Bur(all ofl"l~g.atlcn (FBI) Direcw. J,~ 

Comeyex~my eoni:em cegaromg~ "epi~~of ~discio~to th: 

press:", i:.:::;1uy ofwh~ pwpar.cd to cootcin ;Iass:ifiEd infom£ti0ll, partirule.rly thea!!c~ lcelc: 

<Jf Lt. G<>..n. Mi~ FJ..vnn's namer~ e oonve!:S!Iionmat ~ repaztl'Aly bad ":\1th fomicr 

RUl!S2n Amb~r Setf,ci Kislyek. In ~ 2017, r .,,-rote mother I~ to the mwtigmce 

Co=uciiy lnspectcr Ge=al mid y~ ex.P=5U"..g 11 gi:ave CWCEm a.bOct a i=di:l& .a,ticl¢ biased 

en a., mir,ropcr lellk. Unful1llrul"..e[)', itis .stilit10tclee:z~ tbeHOt!Se PermMC;:t Se!~ 

Com:ni:r...ce on h.-iclli~c.i (HPSCI) "lmell:~Jie Dcp;!:$:r..eitl of !1L."il.c.e{DOJ) fa investig;:dng 

ll:i~~ 

fn the pas.s:evual momlts, nmnemusznciti~I leaks, soma oomp.isicg p!.!tpcrtclly ::las:sffici! 

it.fo:cnai!on, h.rt\-<: ~ in tt-a press in «~-.ion to the ~ ins inv$lgarlon cf Russian 

ir.t~'"l:io;:i with the Tnnap cempeign. 

! am p~ly coneemcd :iliout th~~ rote of DO] ~$on:iel in ~'"lillrllling sucli lm(~. 

HPSCl ras !~ th?.t Oll « ah cot A+n1 H, Wl 7, !It me bechest: m 11. ~~ ~am:ey assigned t!> 

S,i=ial CmmscJ. R.obe.t Ml.16..llet III, !,ndrew W~ 1hc:n bud of1)().)'ll Crimin&l 

DMSt<lll's Ftaud Scctron, m::t, t.!ong "vith FBI~ with agrol.ip of~~ £tom a =jcr 

~~ o~atfoo to discuss tile 0Qg!ins-R=l:8in'IS~ In light cf this in~o.1, l 

roque:-t thu >'-cu provide HPSCI vii th ~ to the fulrowillg qusions: 

• Did lfur. ~.ccrun,g bcti\.'(';Cfl DOJ r,v.,/c. FB! officials N.d ~t=oel!;lll'? 

• Iftms·~o::==d: 

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- \Vb.y \vt\S it Wll b1fofod to l[l'SCI oroth11.r relevant ov1::1'5ight committees? 

- Who from tho oor nnd/or 1:-"Hl approved ~ meCiing? - Which tepc;>rl!s:s and n:prcserusuves ftom DOI and/or FBl attended. the: 01eetlng? 

• Did the ammgll)i and CQndactoftbe meeting follow all R:le·r.urt DOJ and/or r-m 

~roiocola? - At lhc mcetili.g, dld nuy OOJ and/or FB) ottio!a!s provide nny inforrnntfoll to du: 

rcpo1·ter:1 ubou1 tho FBI lnve:J\lgation or confirm MY infom1ution provided by ll'e 

rep~ 

~ Dl.d anyone from OOJ ond/or-FBI file a cornplni11t about thls meeting? - :Did any DOJ and/or FBI rc~tivce tA.\e nows during the meeting? 

- lo ill.is mc.eti.11~ the ~1~ 01' a. lG mvc-~ti{:llti~? 

Cop~ to: The Honorable Mk:hw::l ~. rJotOWil"Z., !n&p1.-etor Gee.era.I, U.S. ·oepmtmcnt of Ju.,lice 

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The l:1.-cnCl.,abic !>min Nm1es 

Chmm2:o 

?~..anent Sel«t C=tnl~ on lnt=lli.geoce 

U.S. Ho:= of Rcprcsentati.vcs 

Washlag,-..un~ DC 20St5 

U.S. D~_partm.eat of Ju.'ltl~ 

Office <ifLegisJ:itivc Affai!s 

Thls r~Dds to Yi!W: lener-to the D-'vpmy A:mroey Geoet':!! d!lted Deeer.i~ 6, 20!7. 

Yen: 1~ e.'(presses concern abau.;: anaumorizcl dlsclOS'Um! of classi.fi.e<l infomiation. ro the 

!!leili:a from eucutii.•e brancb age.ncies, and notes yocr panreul.ar ronrem cilout t!te )JIF'teotiei rule 

oflJap:mment cf lustice (Dc:pa."trnc.nt) pmsollllcl in fa.cilitaimg such discl=e;:. Dqo..rliI'.enl 

polrcy- does not ~ collillm2.ti.on of the existence of migomg invesugatlons, fuciu<ilng 

mveslig.;;l:liIDS' of~orizcd msc!ruures of coosificd infumlatfon. HoWe""{et'., the- llipattm.en;: 

~eS ;,our con..-.;ms about u~ disclosi;rra m clES<,,--i/ied in:fuanatlon, UMJS!ig3res such 

disclnsun:s, and ~-i.rtes offenda.is 'l'ffi.ell 8PJifO-pP..:dc.. It cert.m'Jy would bEl tclpfu! ro any 

i.nvestigatiim thE the Oepmme:.rt :rm.y be oondu.:tlng for y,ou m share any iciomiation your.av<:: 

ll!:lolii the it:-emity of any !ll!'.ilvicmals :n. any hirtncls.. of gevemment wbo have disclosed cl!tsslfied 

infol!Wltfon to 1m: m:dia m to a:nyo~ witcout a =.d to knotV t:ie i11fu:rom,13i, The DepDJ'tOlen, 

wil.1 wo:rk ll'iitll you to recei¥e :;ny sucll. infu.:mai!Jn -oonfi:deruially at ye,11r con\.'2:!li~ 

You h.a\.e aJs.i aske-1 wheme:- a meeting occurred 8n101ig ~ent pez-.:x:iull::l and 

reporters or. April 11, 2017 to "discs= the ongobg Rns.<ifr. fu.vestig~" TI-,e Dep;,...Jt::!'!clli is 

;;.waze of no sucli r.r.e:a!ing n whi<lh.1hls w--..s the topic af d~cussion. On. tha ~ -~ t 

oiTicla!s did m~=t w'itl1 ,¢.POrtacs from lhe Associated~ {AP) 11t ~ tqxmer5' rcqn,:st. Th.e 

Depa::rtment <lfficials in'Cluit:d .<\nd.ew W~i.n1~ Chief ofthe Fraiu! Semjon of 1he CriminD.! 

Dlvition; tll:ree AJI ?go:::nts; a Dep.arnn~m rci~ ~ ; rui.d.mi A.lists~ U.S. Atti111l.ey from. t.'ic 

E~ DiSttiCT of.Vi.-gina r.our AP reporters~ A.ti AP tepor~ eontaared Yi.. 

W~ to waa&l! the rneetfoB., ooo.Mr. Wci5'S=n did so . 

.DuriUg fii<? ~ting, th<: AP ~;1c;s pro.·iili:11 i.,fomu1ri.m. to rili:: DepartmCilt th.at jiey 

lud. kamed as a 1esult of tlleir mves5gtcioo of Paul Mannfurt. Thc.y des~ 2-."'U\•i:ties 

umclat~ to any role Mr. I,E...enafurt !!!:ll.Y mM: bi.d ~ifu:thc campaign of Preside.,t Donald J. 

Trnmy and focused pmnarilyaa.his busini::ss p.--::-cL~ fuia:;iclal ad'rities, aa.dielatio$hlps 

with :mrcign ir.divicmals or entities. The AP ttparters askm questi= of 1-~ Depa..~ 

offit:ial~ who declinal w OJI!lmCilt 011 the-q,.i¢:;tfons. Th"Dcpu;r.m~ undm~ frm:notcs 

were t!!kc:n C!iling them~ Ba~ cm-~ Dcpmmc::rit's ,:1i:=nt 1.>nde:rsrending. it~ Eot 

sppe.s-1r.-.a1 De~ ofikiels ll'llpi-operly d[sclcsed aiy .:vnfiderrtild fofumiati.{11). 

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PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. liOUSE Or REPRE3ENTATIVES 225 
The Honomblc Devin Nunes 

'PnBc Two 

rnc: Oepu:me1\t ba:11efcrred 10 thd lnspcctor Gcnernl youc o,.uc~Uom, os tn whether 

an}'Ona :6b:d n oompl.nlnt about the mcotlnS ond wll\!th81' [he mcctin(I; fa Ule .robj~ict of Lin 

Inspector Genera] inves1ig.11ioo. 

J>l~ do nnt hcsitme to contact tbi~ offi0t:: ifwc may pwvic!e additiolJ!ll as~istan~ 

r1,:9;111iiing this or any nther .. matter. · 

~= The IJonor..ible Adam B. Schlff 

Ri!L'<lllg Mt!Pl her 

Sincciily, 

Stcpb<'.n E. Hoyo 

Assistant Attorney General 

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PROPERTY OF rHe U.$ MOUSE: OF ft!:PR!2Sl:.NTA1WES 

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Do.t\il.~~-=:,.:,,o~ 

,;~o.v ....... ~ 

~t" J:. Pta."'-"~- rruts...~,m~~ l\~.:s...ai~ 

!i~~~~ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ..,.1,.1t.~•ea-. 

~i~~ PEnl-~J,6"¥J" SB£C'r Go,..eL•tTTEE ~11~~~~~ 0V Jf'fJEll.1:3~E" '\\M11.l:-t.,f';1JI 

Tnelfo::.,ol'!.i:!li!: 

~ Aitorney 

~ 

G' .... --eru 

~ 

U.S. D~:rtt of.hmic~ 

l20l frnlisy!varus.Ave. NW 

W:.shfagton, D.C. 20004 

Dee Mc. R=stes:o: 

KYC-:;.t. Tlii: C:...1\TCl 

V/"51'.=i!lN, OC2Co1S 

~=-'l;ll 

b,,=-a.:..~:t 

~~~.rf~l)II 

This lcttrs ~It s.er.sc :;s the CO?m!1l!e!:'s mis! ~ to tl-x: ~--mnent cf Jusfu.e {001) ~ 

1M ~l 3tzre,.a.offo·.~tion (FBI) for,=opi~cf 11!1 ~ii:aio11= (li> m-:,lm:-e~ rn~ 

ea:em, ano~ otl>et-ca.p.urc,:l =.."It~)~ FBI~ Pctu-SD:mkami PSI At!i;-m;y ~ 

P~ SSA S-trznk s;.:dMa. ~ bl!-.-e hr:,::;;m!::11:ified in mtdfa.reponilig astwo=ilar--lc\'cl !'a[ 

cmp~'ets'Yit..o botll ~ ia ~ FBl'sez:11.m~rcllis= i~ o:,n~i.irtg3l0 Hillmy 

Cli:J!!m e--mEib i!!Dd lite 2016 prtsl~lal ele.:tlll11. 

SSA S1120.hras inc Deputy !l~=cfifter.Bl'a ~igcnceDivis~ v.i,~. o~ 

~Cr:!! rl\V"'~ Ms. P~ ls a FBI ~ cf~[ C..,~ J Bl:iJcney, wflalil lhctim,;.. ..-~~~ 

to i>.i:ur.,· l):i:a'.:1t'Ji' n11drew M~'s om:c end pnmd--d 1C£!d sup;;,an: » ~ io~~1J'-o,,..s. &tll 

SSA S'.r~ ~lld !,,!s. l'ag,1.1sL<o ~ fOTSpcda:! ~] Robii:,t J\-faB]JE? =li~6i3 y= tiara bal.s 

qu.~ydismiised u:p.:n me diffil~l:l)'~Ulm-~tal srru.~c!me~of == pc-!iml1y 

c~ ~~ d:imigtlie a:11rSc of booi ln\'¢3tlgMOll$ Lh.!..t "'= ail'c~edl-.1~Tru:np u:I ~ 

C!mI.la. 

Th:,~ktl!e ~r:.os.Jy~~e.~~~1 ro:-!n-~CD ~be:'2, 

2017, n.-ai ~ ott ~ ~. 2.0!7. I :a~ made~ reg= fur t'le commmicatfoll5 dmiag my !l1~ai:Jg 

wirl:r.Jill1 M ~~. 2!ll7. TI'~ Ca~ c:,;:p:rr.u to i=:ivc =--~ rop~t>f !Ill ~uest:d 

ctr:mD1mic,,ticll5, ~ wiJJ ~ t to ~mpnl=y proeos if ell .si:cli filX:im!Ul~ m:e m;t del fverc::! b th!, 

Cacmi~kforo9:00 AM, ~~e:- 15, 2,017_ 

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PROPERTY OF THE U..S. J;OUSE OF RE'f>REt:ENTATIVES 227 
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Office • of the Ati~IIDlt At1nmey Oe:iorol 

Tut: Honocl>le lxvin Nunes 

Cl!.ajnnan 

Pemmnent ~1C"..t C11mmittte on lm.cllisencc 

U.S. Hou5e of~~vcs 

W;:.shingtoo, OC 2{1515 

D:nr Cruu.nrum NUDo", 

U.S. Ocpartwcnt or JusllNJ 

Ofike orL~&lslath·o Aflblrs 

JF"ashfngton. .b.C. 20S30 

DEC I 2 2811 

Thi5 r~onds to the Couu.11.iltoo's rcqucst that1he DeprutJ.nent of Iwaice (Dcparuncnt) 

pr<Jvltle llte1 Commi~ with copicJ of text mcs11.1go communio:itloDs botwe.:11 F11dcit,l l1'U'CIII). or 

lnvosiJsntlon {PB!} omployec.1i'Pet1:r St17Jlk imct LJS11 I>11g1>. Wu o~u s;nxllng icltc4;11 nnd Identical 

analosum, to b n~ml,er or Coogrc8nioool Cornmitttiou Ulut t..nvo mfldc bimll:1r ,re.quests. 

M, )'OU mny kllQW, on.Jru,uuty 12, 2016, UmDcpmmcntof.T~CA:'t,, Oilko oflcupwtnr 

OcTJer:it (OIG) pub11uty =~1U1rod lhnt the 010 would cevicw ''uUup;1\lc:m.~ thin:D1ipt1rtmcntc,r 

POI [1-0llclcs or pin«d~, 'M 1101 follow¢\! ~l 001\llOQt/cm with, or 1n actil"n~ Jcntlln,i up co or :relntcd co, tbe Fnl Dircctnt'!t publlo onnounoc.mcnt on July$, 201611 :uid thll lllructor's fonom to 

Crmgn:~1 on Octoher28 ru.ul.Novcrober 6, 20l6, 11.tld Umt ccitn:in. untl.llrl)IUIS iovc:UliBJLtlve 

deut~ion.o v.i:rc b;iscd 011 ~pct con$l~ro.tlooJ1?" ,\$ fll1t oftli.'\t ~vfow, the QIO o'bw.incd, 

lllllC1J1g oth rr tb.ing:1, taxt mcw1gl:.'I t:<mvoou Mr. SllZOk and Ms. Poge. 

Tile D~p:uuncot cxpcctcd thedoatll7\Cnts pwvldcd·h:rc~ to beprovlded ai. r,act or.a 

cnmpktcd OIG reporL How~ver. public tq'lmJ.ns about the exis\ellce of the !ext IJU:S..~ 

prompted Coogres...-lonnl Cc,TDI11i!tcc n:~3ts for th~ cext ~ - Pl=e.fm.d cnclrn;ed. = 

initiol dJsclarurn nf spproxmuiw]y 37S text mc~5ngo <:ol!llllunic.rtiOOJJ, 4lue4Allgusl 16, ~OJS tQ 

~b~ I, 2016, th.tt I.a,-.: been ic!cntiticd as JJcr'\incnt to~ OJG tcVicw l'Cfi:It-"I'lecd :i.tiove. 

'!'he ~ do~UIDC!lt!! contain mfairnnl. n:dacllooo that1)nltccl the ]l!ivac;.y C~!s of third 

partic~ and sensitive law enfor=nmt lllfa.rmation, nrnl.rcmgve ~cvlU'it inf¢tmation. Tbe 

Dq,llrtment co11.tin'l]e;!l to review dc<=ier.ts mu.I will pm,<i&: ~riincm. ~e!lrs·os 11\ey ~ 

nvel!ablc. · 

' On 1hnc di!,:. thcn-Ffl! Dirow 1~ I!. Qimoy IC!DOuucad thJJt t~ l'll(was 1-c.:on~ to 1hc Ocpanm-:nl of 

hull~ chit w cll!rgeg ~Gold bi! flied mlldng to~· 8cv1~tocy or Sb.to flil!ar,· ~:i'a ~ 1>f u _priVllc emc'1 -· . 

'UO/ OIO A=ooic~ 1uitlarloo orRcvio)f. Jarnmy 12, 2017, n"-'11.ti~ a~ htlps:f/ciiju)..;o,,,i:o,·/tnu.VWli/201 '1• 

Ql-11,J!dl 

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PROPERTY OF THE U . .S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 228 
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;\?; he.,; b'ero pct-~:ly t;:pQ:tz:c, Mr. s~ previously 9t:i"'cl Q1l tl-.;: ur,esti~iv::: ttai-u !.o:i 

by Spec>.=! C~.:mel Romt M~TI~- ~ Om mfon .. cd th,; Spe61 ~clef the ~s== Qf 

lh:atd=:.i l::o;t~On;>:' aoottJuJy27, 2017. ?,:fr. ·!.{ucl]::rirr.m«liat,:.ly«m.cl~ ~ 

).fr. Sttriik oo;.ld 11!1 IOD£Cf pi:rticip= m ~ ~\Cesli¢ol!, .r.d !:.e = rc:r.ovcd f.-=r ilic ~ 

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~ cm! cir=n~ qfwis ~E?"!Il2lter- 1be~~s:ppnciatestho WO"..koflh:e 

OJG on thl;i ;::aU~, !ooh fot,,.'Cl"d to~ :lhdi11g5 ~ r=mi=c.d3tiom:aj..<ri~g .frcm tb$t;~kw, 

i::ll ¥ti£l W.~ ~ ~an IIS V."ll:ml:ll!ed. • I 

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Rf.ilkmg Me!:lilet 

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.. PRO?ERTY _(.'F THE U.S. HOUSE=: OF ~EPiU~SE.'ITAliVES 229 
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Office • of I.he Assista.n.t .... ~ vene~l 

The Honorable De"i"It.l Nm:es 

CIJ:linnrm 

P~"1l Sr;Jc,ctiQlJ Cc=itt:e (,Ill In!i!!Hgerice 

U.S. House of~.;.:s 

Ws..<htog(ou, DC 20515 

U.S. De:parlment of ,l~ 

WashingtoJ~ D.C. 2053!) 

JA:N 1 9 20ffl 

Iilis respon:!s to yom :-equi:st w tile D~t of Jnstlc-1} (Dcp:mm=nt) ;o provide the 

Committee 'With ccpies <lf te:n meSsage Cf.llllmll!l!~011S bm\=. Fedes:21 Bm= of 

lnvcstig-.,.uoo (FBI) .:m~"S Peter SII:z.Ok =I Llst. I'n.ge. 

As you lllZIY know, m Jamii~y 12, 2016, !be Dcpartm=Dl'~ O.flfoe Gf !Dspccto: Ot::ni::ral 

{OlG} publioly c,nnounc;d thin the OrG would r:-,-5::w '\Jlegations !hai ~ er FBl 

polici~ or prooed= w= t:!!< followed in conn~n \\ilh. or in ~ar,s l~g llJ> to or 

7elatei to, 1ho FBI Uircctw's pablic arm=i::emem on July 5,2016, 1 and~ !F_<e::!or's lettcr3 ti:> 

Coi:si=, on Octo~ 28 w Novembi::r 6, 2016, md lWlt ~ein undctl)'ing Un5t:g;itive 

decisioos 'M:n: 00$:d n::I llEpOf.CI c0n.,;ide1llt!DnS.. ~ As pan o.f fhe.t Te'\.i-:,.,.•, Ule 0[G ob(afoed, 

among c,(hez thin_s:s, t::!ttm~~ 1:etw= Mr. Snzok :ind :Ms. Page. 

I:c. Deccmbct1017, = provxlcd you ,<ritt. s iuitil\l production of ~~ly 375 t~1 

=segecommuni~ons,&-iro August 16, 2015,o December!, 2016. in:respall.."'e m the 

rcq=tS for the tcl\'!S ~ . !he !JeI)2!1lrulnl collt:ctt:J Hi leJ(t messages ~ !-.1r. S!!.zok 

md Ms. Page avcil~l" !roal.the FBI for~ pc:rioo. July,!,2015 to Juty2S, 2017,l which w~ !he 

salilfil r,ciod re~ by the: rna. The Dep-J?!lllart beg;in reviewing tll6e do=ts in an 

effctt to pro>'ide yc,.1 thoac n-=sagr.s thai were cilher-work-n:Jntod or 1h21 p;ovi&d llIJY insi&hf 

llllO Im: politi(::11 Vtc>\S of tile plltl:CiPQDl5. 

1 on tlla~ ~~. lb-:a·FBl DiJ= I=s 3, Ccmq anoc-mc:,d tl!st di<> FBI wa~ reco~to t!tt Dq,artm;::n of 

.'imi,o 1im no ~h.n~s ~,d ~ fil:d reol~lir.~coio.-merS~ ilfS::U: Hil~· Cllr.:ro's = :;f~ PITT;ir¢ ~ro:Jl 

= · 1 DOJ O!G Anooul!.C:S lufmlio:: <lfRcvltw, bt=l)' 12. 2017, a.,,~la'l,.l~;tt }l~-".)1.,)';t~.~Q!V~2:: 

fil:!1Jldf 

'A!l~OtJ&!llMTIX1=i:.~=titr0ugb Ju!y.lS, 20]7.,ii= -..-er:aoitxt lll~~~~Mr. Str7.<>k 11:.-><1 

Ms. l'".r.i_;~w Jul)' I, 201?, mlfth: m:!stgcs ef.o-J~25, '.20!7• 'oJCrep:m>n.!I in a= 

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PROPERTY o:= THE U.S. HOUSE Or REPRESE:NTA TIVES 230 
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The H=tzabl~ DcVi."l Ni:nes 

Ps,;:cTwc 

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Tre Dep,irtnient ti not pa>\'u:lillg ~ ~"'(S .nat ·=c pu:-dy pew.mal in cmure. 

Far.Ji.e=-<iro, ~ Depenn:.c.o.tll3s ~<1 from ;om? v.-ork-rehlocl .:xt me-;s:.ges ponions tli:!i 

were pu:ely p~~!l.al. 1M Dcpmmcnt's aim ia witt.!m1'1lns ;::urcl)· pmon~ t:xt ~~~~ =:J 

~atting ~ ponicos of .. .:irlc·rdzt~ ~ m~cs 1\\-a:i prinll!,Jy to fe::i\itsk. 1be 

Commm~·s 6,C;:e:;$ 10 pct~ntitlly rcl~t text mo.ss:iges wilooat lm,ingto cull dtro~h ~ 

qU3?lti1.ies of m!:!d'ial U!\relaled to ei'O:er t!.-c i.~igwion. of fumier ~retmy of Sta.a Rilfart 

Gin.tttn's use of a perso!ol e!lliU1 se1vtr Qt' llic :r.vestigl!tion iclO Russ:i:aa e.ffir!".s to in.~ with 

!he 20 !6 :Presid::miru cl:don. A I~ th~ wilhholding of p::r:sir,a! infomiztioii in sc,m: i.osi.u,;:es . 

m:olds ~ =!mra=cntor~ to fuird p!l11!1:' ~ could l':;S\l)l f= pul:fu.: 

:clf:aSeoi':sucli inforam:!ioa. Ile= ~Ln:ductal lh:Dim:.o:s of emplo)·ees who are r.o: SES· 

le,;~ c:mo1loyec>., .m!I. in 5<lT!lC ins~ r.:dtct:.1 SES cmplo:i=s' =cs to e:.-oid unw.immll:d 

~liDn:.;, lh.tls-; ~i;rn'id:rals when colJl!"l1t;D\s wc:t"e ~us l!Drl md not pteT-de re!C'll.a.nl 

i:t1mna1bn W 1%igQmg Congtc,,--s:ioi:il U!J!l:lirics. 

in a m~ mstaoocs, ihc ~ Jw ffi!ecl;d portions of Wt!dc-,-,,~,!(f telttS !ha! 

con<:cm «i?ff i.avesdgtllious. fir.ally, ths Dcpetment c-0llSult.,d with the Special Co:=el's 

Offi-;:,e (SCO) m1 ~ some redactio:?S related ro uiemucture, op;.~~ Sll~e cf~ 

SCO im-cstigation because it is o~i.og. 

'fo ll'i'Oid any cot-cem cil:lt the D.:parlmeot h~ \ruhll.e!d rel~,mt info=atia.; :f e 

Ccmmi~ ha.. sp«ffie qucstior.s :tbom: why a panic,w u:>.'l was per.wly r~ctoo o, abo:n the 

cmun: of r.cr5omJ text mess:ige v.ithheld, tllC Ikpartm~ will worl:: with t:ba.t COlllt:litt.ee to 

~UJP.J' furlhcr de=:ire cz disclose ud21:1:trl infommtio:a in !1 closed ~ . Afllu)ugh the onp l 

;p!~cetco

~ 

nll1iilcd ocly w1w. the D~e::t believed to be ~'Qri::-o:Jak.d tc~t ~. 

teviews identified Si:Jme l:IC!dillonlll p,::r9~ t«:rtn::=ll£l'S within !ht ~,-:in. 

Ta.erefore, lhe doc.umcnl produt.6i today c:cmt.s:Jl.9 a ~ lll.lllL~i-of fully r~ed W-!'l~'\'S 61tt 

were cleteonined to be y.:i:s<irral Jl"~gel f:llhs,;q_u~-nt ~ tocir initial intlUSlon in the :P{C",ioll3ly 

providt;,:! ~ '?b: c:r,c!~ ~mcnt :.!so e,;~1-:~s cotwnm ofinfonnatio:l that 

COl!I2inoi 011.ly ce<:hr.iul fomrmatifto such 11, phone numbas er email &1drcs..scs in :m effort <o 

pre-.ide a mo~ n: .. dily 1,:vicwsi!fc sd of d~~umi:nt.:i. In the at~:hed. lt.c ..,~oo:t;' d&;umeDt3 ere 

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frcOl ML S:o.ox to Ms. P;tgc:. 2I1d the "()...nbox" d~im:ii:r.ts arc from !.is. Psgc co M.r. Strrok. 

. The Dejmtmt:nl =~ to bring xi yo:.ir ntkat!on thet the FBPs ~kal s;'Sl::m for 

i:etilini.o~ ~xt =~cs ~t ruidr~cci\.,:d on F.Bl Ill.Omle rievice.9 fa.Hed to presen,e ~rr-=ges 

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· for Mr. &i=k21dM9. P:lgefro:nD=be:r !4, 2016to~~tol\!ay 17, 2017. The 

. 

, .fBI fo1s infom~ m this many i'BI-pw-;i.J~d S3msun:g 5 mobile d~ies did fiOl ca~ 01 stOJ'<°l 01 

text mc:ssae~s d-.ia tt; mi.=nligura1i09 iss:uos rel .. ~c! to r<l'llo1<i3: pro\-L.ioning. aad sof:ra"l!re I L~ ili..t i;;o.tflictcd v.ilh 1hr:;.FBl'5 ccU~tic;:, ~c:s. 1'11.e =It was thaldsa tll.2f 

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~oou."d lll.'\'e ~=o~lycoll~~..d.re:Snedfar !ong-tenn 5loClgc and tetri:v-.tl wzs 

ru>t ~ll=ed. Tni:s probkm wuld line btoen ~ with t!'.i: .rolliro1 cflhe Snn:..cung 7JJ m ; 

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PrtOPERTY OF THE U.S.. HOUSE: Of REPR=SENTATIVES 

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·n1c Honorable De.,.in Nunes 

Plle11 TIU'« 

Mr. Smznk's San~ung S phouc Inst coo.nt,(;ted to the stonii;e sy:.1c:nl oo June 18, 2016. 

He recch·~d his new SatnSWtg 7 phoi:u! on or about July 5, 1017. Ms. :Page·~ Samsun~ .S pbone 

last conn,?Ctt'd to tho stOJ11ge aystem on December 13, 2016. She tee&i,-i::.d her n~w S:J.1T1Sung, 

phono on or abouc M:ty 22, 2017.' 

Tut! O.ffic:e of r.o,~or Gc111ll'!l! pit:e,;d together I~ te.\'l mc:mi.gcs l)C(wocn M1·. Stt1.ok 

and Ms. Pase fromJwie 18, 2016. 10 necembel 13, 2016, ll.illlgtbe data from t.u. P11gc', p.hcne 

notll the connt"Ction to lhesto~ sysn:mstowctl ot1 Dcccm\x-.r 13, 2016. Ou May 17, 2017, 

Mil, P11sc's dnm cDll.:ctinn n:-iiutiotcd v.hcn she roccivcd her new pho11e. 

Plc11SC !cl !his office know If you b:wt: ony qu~llons TCgnrtllug tl1J:; prod1101ion, 

ce: The Honomblo Adam Sob.16" 

R.nnki.u& Mcmbt.'1' 

• Altl\oup,h FBI ldcniHlcd M•)' l.2, 2011 nHhc u;illt() dncg tor M~. Pt,~·, rho,ic, uoll<Xticn r~tmcdan Moy 1a, 

2017. ·11io FBI Im not yet be\':'I able to ni,0111\tfOf lhl1tlbetcJ:Qn<Y. 

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PROl~!=RTY Of THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 232 
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c..-.uc.~~p.:,.,Y:O \U~ =.T~ 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

~:stcntt. c.t.nrr-. Fl~,IJ.....:::;. 

~ttr-,1.w~,:;:i:.,...-: 

1=-.:A.~t...a NQ;I~~. ,_,.,,. .. ~ 

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f'.UC !Nn..~'!L.u,4<'f._:,:=;:r 

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flt:rn.tMlENT a:,LECIT Qo:W,IITT£l! 

0~ lNTE.t.l.lGBICE 

YJ,,I\. F.LE:CT.RONIC Mt!:Cb 

Ute Hoooral:le Ri1d I. RMenstcm 

Do/'-ty ~rney ~end 

lf.S. ~1niea.tof.Juuice 

9~ Pert.'IS'.fl\.-:m.i:i.Avenne, "NW 

Wa.<hi.'lgtan, D.C. 20~3Q 

The Honnmble Chmtop!ifr Wray 

Di:cctor 

Fedcre.l Bareau af Investigation 

935 Pmnsyi""1llli3 Avc:w:e, NW 

WashhistmJ, D.C. 2053S 

t-,\'C~, T1,:c.r= w~~"· oc.~15 r,..."?}~~121 

OQ,cwCf•=.:: 

'!~PU,..~ 

• __ ... .,, !tar.:ID.~ 

M~:i.:111 ~11 

For cnonrls, tho HtJusc. Pcm.anmr Sol~ Commm.io OJ"J InteUi.,=cc bas boc:n cone=~ aooor 

~~·s and~ ~eral Bure;m of lnVesligati.r,n's actk,as inanumbe..of ~. ~ 

v.=kcod':. ~·cl~ that the Dcpsrtmc:ot end !he FBI fa.!Jc:4 to p~~-e -and tooey's media 

rcponing ~ the ~'s ~rGC!l~ has fare::u:iC2lly re.co.et"~ -~p.?Qidma.tely 

f.-ve monlhs of text m=&e OKCimngcs b..."'1:W1:lell S~w Ag.::nt Peter Slr.zok a."l!i FBI sttomey 

Lisa Pa_~ h..~ only ~e(i lb:>ie C(!!ll".CDlS. 

To eC1:,"1ll'e ti!l!1 my Committi:.: ic.quiry is as thorollB,h a:l!i cc..-.ipk:tc llS r,os.<u"hle. v..12 ~~ 

req~ (hat the Dcpar°c.lllecl and t1:ie FE[ ensme doctll7?.Gts llDd m:fommioo. ~ to the 

following L~ a-e pn:ser-red fur porentr.21 prnch.l,:tfon to !ha Cc,mmittee: 

• Arzy ccmmllllicauons devioes lssllec110 A&<Slt &17.0k and :M·s. F.:g::!; 

• A."ly eii'o.rts to r1:ttic-..c infon:muion frQm Agci:it Sr:zd:'i and :Ms. Page's £.O,cmn:i<mt· 

iss~ devices.; 

• .t..rry d..ta on the SMISllllg 5 p.'wn~ iss!l'M to AE.~ Strzok....nri! on er about July .S, 

2017; 

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?~OFeRT'( OF THE U:S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 233 
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• Any infum.ation ooot.'t 1he alleged "misconii~on i=s retiued w rollo ... "ts, 

1=visio::ililg. md sofiware tlpgxa<!fs that ccnfficted witl:i. the FB!'s ~ion 

~litie.3" tru.t caused ''=y FBi-provlded Samruog·s-l'tlObile<leYices" J10! Io 

"'ca:pttiR OT store to?lG: mes~*'; :::ld' 

• Any in,·cstiga!ion by'fue DcP3]'1mcnL or the FBI inio che ci~u1r4,11m= related to the 

il:ilure to p;csen>c the ~t mes~ 

Thf) Dejl3J"u-m:ill And FBl !.lwuld in!crpret '']ll\!Senratfo::1ft in !ht: b~ possibie i::o.annc:., 

includrag e:i...'>nri.ag the discoll!imi!tfon of imy z:uto-®!z-..e or~rmDar fimctions tt>.n era,e n;;m;rlals 

ilftcr a cer.ain pet.i-Od of time. Tcis ~'alion requ~ = Bll ~ts, reroros, 

e!e()1ronic..fly stored mfal'<O,\Uon, n:coroill8J', d!!u1, M4 w,gible ~ [:."'!cluciin3, bm not lim.lt~ 

lo, sraPm. cimts, pl-,<1tograpbs. imaga; :md ~ rloci.1!lltnts), ~gt..-dless. of form and Jllc.dil!:C of 

!forage, .frmn Janua..'3' l, 2016-~ · 

1hc ~e also :i:eq=ts th:u you: 

l . Elc=is~ rc:~able cffo.tS t0 identify a:ld notl fy fonner ~ployee." mid .::onttv.c.:v:rs, 

~11booirtract01s and conscltmts "'~ r:i-.JlY ha\l.c ~ to such el~ recards thla! the-.t 

are to-·ix:, prc=ed; 

2, E..".w~i:.¢ ~bl: c[QJl$ I.Q ida.tify. rc:caver, a.id ~;c: ,my cl~c1~ 

whl.c:h h.a~oe b= Jdt:ted er r.:wked. fuy cieletfon 1ml are still tee011crable; :?:!id 

3. lfit is ibe romme practioei ofa.'IY ageru:j· cmpleyec or ronmaru-to destroy O!"otb~"e 

-alee such elearonie reetmlq, eitb:r hall such~ or llm.lge for the~ of 

comp!ece an:i a~ duyli~s o~ ~of~ records. scilabl.e for pn:,dui;tion, if 

~~-

We wculd a~e yunr coofuming tha all ~1<:Vam documerus and inriJ.r:matio:i aro being 

_p~-e.d rui later tha:i lhe close of business oa J:uwarv 29. :?OJ 8. 

~; Mich.act Horowitz, Jnsp~r G¢netal, l i.S, Dc:param:nl of J~ce 

• ~ :to:.. S<9-ie;l E. i3o)'O, ,"\ssj!;t:;nl Alt)· Oa:i. o,...,., DF l.e~n ~ RJ!EI. ~;,, l'iuncs. Ch!!lmum,. U.S. 

Hco~Pcran:=S•li:ct~at>1'1:<!lliS-Cr.a;h l9,:201S. 

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234 
l be HcnOJBOle Devin Nunes 

C."'3irm:ln 

Pcrm~tU S::kd Commiuee on fote!ligc:r..ct 

U.S. House ofRtp.rCSel!toth~ 

Wasbin',!l(ln, DC 20$15 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

U.S. Depucro.,bt ofJias~ce 

federal Burc::.tu 1~f In,esli gation 

i 

fxl:/,/r~~.P.':. MSf _wi0/11 

M1ruary 2, 20 I~ 

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I v."Tite ir. r1:sponse to :?~)ut lc,ti:t dal.~d Ji.,nuary 25, 2018, rc64roicg FBI reter.tilm .:nd 

prcsetvation ob6gations. Your :t:qr..~ il:15 bi:er: forwimied l!> ~e P1l's Ofllce of\he o--~eral 

~;!D!>'CI fOl" ~opria:c: nctlcn. Plt:3-.~ n~le, llov.-c\ld", that p=t'o'ai1~ rcquc:st.:; nolai~~ the 

FBi-isi.1.ll?d mobile dcvkt:s 1:SSiSncd to Ms. Page e:1d Ms. Strzok dunng th,; rcl.:\•Mt ~riods 

shollla be di~t.."1 10 the OOJ Olficc oft/!~ !nsp~or <'.reocral, as th1

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se de,,icc11 arc not in 1he 

physical C\!SiOify of ttr- FBl. 

ThB1lk ~o\.l foryourccntioual suppDttof~ PB!. ,. 

l • The I lonanblc ,\dam Sdli l'f 

Rankins Mtt11bcr 

Pcrrn:mcnl Select Cornmith!e on i.,uclligc11cU.S. HOU$:! or Rcp.~tatives 

\V11shinstcn. DC 20515 

Sincerely, 

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f'RCPERTY OF THE U.S. HOOS:: OF REPRESENTA1iVE.S 

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~M'_nUC£-~.i._Tn.s. 

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~1:.T,,-,D~ 

~"--..,,.,.<Ill> U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1r.~l11,. Ti<EC.;>r.;;;:t. 

'll.>J:i<..no!I. CC .:!<)!;16 

m2) 2."S-<1n1 

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~~e::.~ 

c:a..,:u:o1..on..t:rctflt• 

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ai.l::1Q.t) ...... Ur(ff ~.a.:s..:11:\.~t'k,,<b 

~C:.11?.\MU Qnr"'....,-'""-'~ 

lil'..c:!l.~~ra,,,an,o:::i.&\.b...u 

Nrc:, .. 'hi .. b~..uc~ 

Srepbt:!! E. Boyd 

As.sistn.'lt Ano~ G~cral 

U.S. Oc:partmcnt cf .1mtkc 

9SO Penmylvs.-ua A,-e, NW 

Wa8h~an, D.C. 20530 

Dw :Mr. Boyd: 

PE~'tEMT S::!...:C! Co~ITTES 

CN lf-rtaU13ENCE 

F~16,2018 

Oa P~iy 7, 2018, I wm:e ia1be Honorsb!c R=uy M..Cc!Jye,-, ~!U(f~ of1!tc U.Dlied 

SI.ms foreign ~cc SuM:illlllla: Conrt {FtSC_), :n:quc:stir.g tha1 tfie Q;;,.u:r. ;:i:ro:fuce lnmaipr.s of 

eny ci:h:vant FlSC h=ingse=iaried v.i!.'i~ inil:hl FISA awlica1ioii ar :.~t r=:.-ewals ~ to 

lho elWJ,onl~~r.-clrlM.coof~ ~-

rn lier~ ta :he CmmnineellWgl: C~~ ..... ynu. i:r.ay note tl.a tl-.:: ~1:11.t of J~ 

pcm-dus {O!"=i c:;sily olltl!io)thc ~e~~ imbnnstianthe<;o:uti:cig:;l p=s, imd ... is b:ttu 

pr,sttiC'l'.ai ?h~ ~ Coart t:m:spood qicia.ly." 

Theltfu,-:; in mi ~.en LG mf,;mn the: Cc=nlttce's cmgoiag i11~ao, the~ s<:ebs 1hc 

tnlnscn]ils af my n:!CY!!llt FlSC he.Itri~ =.soi::h:cd with tfl1:. initkl fl.SA ~~ c, spt,.x:qieem 

renewals~ to eh:ctrcmic ~ QfCtit,:.-~ The Comcitu:e ~.:fl.Illy n,qu.c:m ~ no 

Inter th!n Februzy26, 20 Ir. DOJ infuml toa Com:r.iiu= whi:thu ~ucb tm!!=:lpt$ ci.:, smt, if'~ pl:ate 

prcvcdc them. 

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PRO?!:RTYOF THE U..S. HOUSE OF RE:PRESENTATIVE:S 236 
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~rma., 

P=t Select Co1Ullll:trae on !c.tclli~ 

U.S. House ofR~ti\'eS 

We.,hmg'..c,:i, DC 20515 

Office of!.cgisJ:&•ivo Affulra 

MAR O 7 2018 

This responds to yum I~ dated Fclmmy 16, 2018, ti:que~ting trr.ustripls of any 

rele.--znth::ari.ngs of~.Fa:cign Ia:td.l.igen,.-c Slln'Cill~ Court{FIBC) associ*d '-'i'rtlI the fu!li.al 

FlSA. ~li~cm. or sub~i:nt ~e'l\"'.lll ~Iar~ tti 1ht: c!ectro;iic so.n:ei..llanct: 01' r..e.w Pa~ 

As is typical in the coJ'lSitktatron ot wal?'"..nt applli:aiicns 6anera.'!y, mchidi!Js ~pli~~ t\) the 

Pf&~ th~ fjSC cons:dt:re.1 the .ewlk:a1k= ba=l up011 ~ , 'll'it;en s1llllllissicn, aoo.he!d r.o 

hea.,jnss. AcC(lrdmgly. no mpop,,ive ~p-.s cxisL For your reff:reooc. '9.~ hare ~1»i a 

cm 

letter 

O;: 

detcd 

Jl!diciai:y 

July 

lh;;n~ 

29, 201'.3 frcm. F1SC 

P:atrickJ. 

Pzes!din.g 

~ 

Judge 

t.hatmrtlr.u:11 

R1,.ggii;, B. 

file 

\II 

FlSC 

alron 

prac!i~ 

to the Sena 

when 

~ 

con...<i&ricg FJSA appli~. 'lmich. it:clndei. cotl3i~n o:' clrci;m_<t;mces in whwh s.h"..aring 

=.a.y be rcquh-ed. 

We h~ this infb:imalkm is helpful. Pl~c do~ )Jesit.,re to cm-i!act this office ifw~ 

TIJ.P.Y provide a.dcfuiomil a.5Si.... o:tanci: rcgi?tding this c,r any other matter. 

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PR0PER1Y OF i HE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RESENTA Tl\/ES 237 
M111e.~.~ 

lt~.)WJJIJ 

J,'MI06.MJN111.f.S11HHJ,d. 

,.,,; ~ t tut1 ~ li\lMll1\,i ,,.,1,cu,,-. 1,-, ..... ,U;1J1i)1'A',(M'f .. ;,. 

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h"'~''>·"""' t4 1~ ..... ,.r .. 11~,L1 :,.a,,:t)n Cllln.. 1.:μt UTIW\ tQc-1. ,'fuH I'll,., 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

P1:F1MANSN1' se.eC"T COt--41,\ln'l'.iG 

01'1 lrffEl..UGe!NCe 

rebru51')" 20, 20 lS 

Deur DinN«n CO!noy; 

HVC-,0~, ft1e =~• W~SH!llnTO'I, DC2C~15 

11~) rJ&-<111.1 

Cl,1.1,,lhlMfl""' 

~ J.l" Dw;atlt 

,._.,,."'~~t"' •~,,.,,...,,. 9 .. ,.:-w 

Enolo~ please fmd Heri~ af questions ~~ing1h.c infoimariDn conrairu:d in ll\e Sle\lle dor.sicr, 

wt,i.cl\ was fundro by the Democnuic Nntiolllll Comm1n~ (PKC) and Hillsry fer America (Clinton 

c&n1p11lgn) and n~ed in II Foreign Intelligence Surveilhmcc Act(FlSA) e.wllce.don targeting C~er 

l"u~ 

Please provide ¢0tt1plc1e written respo~es llS soon es possll,la, and no l~tcr lll,on !:Ii~, Martll 2. 

1013. tG 1he stnmthm of the Committee's chief cler~ Ni-.1:. Ci~tUU1tc. Jf you do not pcovide timely 

IIJ:IS\t/eta on a volUPtllrY ba~,. 1M Cornmittte wm initiate compulsol)' ~i:.s. 

Thnnk. you for ~our prompt nl!cntlon 1h16 m11t~r. lfyo11 h:we c,ny questioru, pf~i\ con!AC't 

Con1mh~~fht202-22S-412,. 

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PROPERTY Of" THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESE~IT ATIVES 

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1. Wtt:ti and bow aid yo~ fira1 b;;ome a!A.~ Qf !:Dy of th.: mfunnation contained in 11:: 

S!c:ele dil5:stet? . 

2. In ,,,hat furm(s) wis 1h~ inibnnAtion in Ute Stec.\! dom::r pr~tea lC yoi// By whom? 

(Please ~rfbe ~h i.nsmnce) 

3. 'M:r.o did )"01.1 sm:e this iafom:ation mfrt7 Wh;n? Tn ;1:h:at fb::m? (Pki;.se ~be ~;h 

[l!Sa.-11!.e) -

4. What official acticms did you ttke .as a result of ro:eMng the infu.m.E!ion confainci in tho 

~le i:lcwkr-? 

S. Ord you eanvane any =eti.ugs wit.11 the Intdlige!!ce ~mmt.:city :md/c.r lr.tW .:nfo=em 

o:>mmn:riliies as a re3Ult of the lnfu=.tfon co,-...tainod in the Sti:ele dossier? 

6. ~n did }'mt fut I~« o.Jtne to bclie-.'e l:hat the St~le dm.:ri~ 'rffiS. fmid;:d by a 

Di:mot:rat-alignM entity'? 

1, \lf1ten did you fut Jeam or ccme t<> believe !fu4 me S=Je dossier was fimckd by~ 

DfmOC!?lie N111iml.Bl Cammi~~ (ONC) IU\dfar .Hill~ry for Ametica {Clinton~~)? 

S. Wh~ diet you first ~me-~~ tild $C1:::ck ~sicr we, tJS«l :p obtain .aPISA ord:::r L'{l {'.at1i;c Pllge? 

9. Wl:.3 President Cham~ 1::riafw Oll any iniocmaliml ami:aincd m the das3.ier prior to 

]ElllUIJY 5, 20J7? 

10. Did youdiscus3 me i.nt'cmna!i<:m contair.ed in the Stee.~dossier with any repo~ er 

other ~vi:i of the media? If iso_ who md when? 

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u. ERTY OF THE U.S. _Hou_~ O.F REPREScNl'AllVES 

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'L·"M'-.rute~.._.r,,a,4" 

~::'a) ~.~~1:::'\ ~~ J1rnir nM•I' ,.,.«nf,-, f111l1l1, ~~::~~,~~,~~Wirn U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES """tt.\1'11J,..c\ rt1b PE.AMANEITT $ELE:CT COMMlTTEI: C1o-4lS,~l".Ultl, 

c.fc't ,., .... ~~LU-14* T~,~~o~lt,C,.-Jrrn 

~I\IIJe. S'tlri:Q, IO.Y"'~• ~v,u,r..e~ fci.M 

J.~L:!NY.~Mtil•, l\.tlil.Uf\t M w,n 

Mt, Andrew McCnbo 

l!«Jera{ )3urcau oflnvcstigation 

935 Pe.11nsylvani11Av1:, NW 

Wasl1lngton, D.C. 2053S 

Dt:ir Mr. McC.'l!x: 

ON INTCLUGENCE 

February 20, 201& 

H\1Co30l, 7l•e CArr:oL 

\Vl-911.~TDrl, DC ,r/.515 

IW1)'2Hl2l 

t,/~ thu,:.O,, 

, w,n...-eutt 

,.uow,.,\ s t'J,l-tJrll'-1 

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Etieloscd please find n. series of q_~lou5 regardin!! tile information con1ained m the Stec.to d~cr. 

wllich Wl.\5 ft;ndcd by the Oemocro.tlc N atiorul Commiueo (DNC) and } tillacy for America (Clinwn 

cnrup~igr,) on<l 1mcd In II foreign ln\lllfjl!i::nce SurvoJllonco Ad (FISA) nppli1;0.tfo11 tnrsetlng caner 

Pngo. 

Plcllsc provide complete wrl~n respo~e3 215 soon os po~ibl~ and tHI ~<!!.' than f)ridoY, ~h 2, 

~ to the anMtion of~ Committee's chief c!erl(, Nick Cis.i:lan~. rfyou do not provide timely 

1mswor~ on a v-ohmu1ry"bo..sis, the CoJnJ11ittce will. inltintc «impulsory process. 

Tim1k you for you.r prompt nt1MtlnL1 this maner. If you hn,·e nny que.ot\lons. plensc oontnct 

C<immitlee sUiff at 2()2.2~ 412 l . 

PROPERTY OFil-11: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 240 
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l. 'wuen and how did ;'QU first he-c<mi.e aw-~ of e;ey of !he iiifmui:atior. containtd in ~ Steele do:;si~ 

2. £n what f0m1(s) was the iafunnat.ion iu Ebe Steele ciostier prese:.'lted to yau? Br whelm? 

(Plc:asc describe eaeh in~) 

.3. Wno &d you shMe this- inf~ with? Wh£:.J? Ill wf•M fom1? (Plea;e dcsw:e caciJ 

instance) 

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4. 'What official acru= did y\lu ta.11-c ~ s rr;awt of~vfag: the ir!furms:icn coutained iD the 

St~i=lc d.:!Mi::r? 

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5. Did yoo convene my !lleetings. 'wim the i:n!e.llig~ oommunity arui/llr l.e:w ~ t 

ccmm1lllilies as n Te;ult of~ fofomtJJtiOJl cox:t~ ir:i. the Steele <lossier? 

6. When did you. first !t:Slil or ~me to b~!ievc thfil the Stecle dostler was funded by a 

Democ.""dt-cligned emity? 

7. Wbro. did you first !cam or ~ to lx:l~ thst Ch¢ Ster;lc dossier ~ func:cl by the 

Daruicr.atfo Na~ Cormnit£={DNC} en4/~ Hillary fuT Amm¢ll (C!iaton ca.~)? 

S. ~ did you first becoi:ne awa .. re that the St.ecle do...<:1:iec "i\'BS UScd tp o~ a fIS:\ mtler 

-vn~~Page? 

9. Was Presi~ Oooma briefed on my :infooua.tfon coo~d in the d~er p.riCf to 

J.a:.nuery s, 2017? 

!O. Did you disoiss the i!lfu~on oamawi:u in~ Steele oosaii:u-with any reporters or 

~!he.n:preseZl!ativ¢$ oi'tlte mcata? ff $0, who e:nd when? · 

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

,~,~ .. r\~<:s-~ .. , 

~~euzW•.ct-,:-.c..,o, 

The ![Qn.o.tebJc J ;il" Sc=ic,n:s 

.Atrom:y Omeral 

u .s. Depsrtrnea1 of 1!:Sttee 

~O i'c:i::insyh,ani1t.Av=2~ NW 

W~!m,p;tcm,DC 20530-0001 

PeR.!.w/5:IIIT Se..ECT Q:il.O.ld1"'J"E"e ON !tiTI::lLlc3cJ(CE 

;r;c..,,~ T><$ CAr.fe-. 

V.:•::n.tr-TON, CC~!5 ~an~12i 

Thef~ Sim:a-u oflnvestigatiou (FBI) i~clmged mm pnm:cting tile Am:ricanpeo)l!e·and 

i:n.tbmo.g our !~:: in accordance with the U.S. Coostm.1imi. To carry om:tbis ~d mi1::tlon,. 

the FBI ~ a slriet 9et oriffil!ro8l rules imd p~ cm.bodied in the Domsi~Inv~cms 

SJsl Op:ratic:ns Guide (DIOO). The DIDO v.'8S crelll.~ by cha Bureau~ and~ by tb.e 

Ocpemiem of Jmt.ice (DOJ). 

Toe~ tmredected ~ of the Dl-OG available 10 ~ Committee (d;aed ~ber 15. 201 l) 

dci~ ~ th-: "FBI rr.ust.ful!ow wf:en subtnilling-q,pli~mm to the Fo."eign 

!!uelligence Surveillance Court (rISC) for o.-ders to ~SJrlleilimce thrm:gQ £!-.e Fo.-eii!ll 

blt~~ee:Sun:eill~ Act. (F~A). ~gtQ lheDO!G: 

• FJSA sl.lfVeill~ is a v,:ry irr'..w.siveme:lll!S of ~rinB il'~:.on .htt m;m hai!mce 

thi; r.ccil-11> ob1ain ~live~ ~urity~ori ~eMI iib~i:::.. 

• W.hec striking 1hls b!ihnce, s "\>-enn~n ~ mu!-t be con~ fur alt FISA 

applications. 

o Undar tht sub$ection ''P1SA V~rifi.catimi of A=iracy ~dμres," the FBI jl::stjf 

acl<no>'iiedges tbi5 mi~ "Th;: rusen.-ac:y cfm.f"onnm()a co:rtakied wimin 

Frs.A eppllcatlom is of~ imp-.:.i~..... O.nl1 doct=!'.ed and verified 

_ i:n~n .r-.ey be w:trl to sc:pp,.1rtFBI cpplicetfol!S lFISAJ to fue~ourt lFISq.n 

• Tne DIOG pro\-ides d*-i!cd lnstnt~ for &FBI to followw = th3tinfu:maμon 

epp..._.-uig in a FISA applics:ti<lll tbrti~ ~t~ 10 tbi;,FlSC bs reen maroughly vencd 

and co:nfinned. 

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In light of what ~ '!Q b¢ a cltsc vioWio:J of fBl pro~ls:, t.'r! Committee dra:cis tlid 0 0.J 

~ I, '"2 l?W than March 8. 201S, provide answe.s m the fo1ICT,\--u;~ questions: 

•· Were these ~..s ~ed ~ r t1te 2.().11 veis:oo :o all<lw for the use of wiv~ 

w:omiatfon to suppon Fai FJSA. appfu:ations t-> ~ FISC? 

• If 11{1!., wlurt st::ps ha the !)OJ Ellldfar the }:Bl~ to hold i!lX:Qtmtaf)li: tho_se officla:ls 

who viollltc:d lb= proio.cols? · 

I will~ you tha1-esidc from uic violation of these protocol.!, the preser.tilWlll of fe!se and/or 

unverified i:J::lformuion m the FL..~ in tC!nn:aion with the Car.er Psgr: ~ nt ~ ceto:ozs cm.id 

dail viob:tiolJ.$ of!he following~ ~es; 

• 18USC242 

• souse tro9 

·~ • O"t'5tIU.Clion~fjmxice 

• Co!:i!etnpt of Court 

Toe FBI DIOG provi~--s mtemal o,,-ersight md corttrols cm: a11thomi:d FBI eci.itios so tl:e 

Amerirao. p;lhlic cm be 8SSU?ed .he Bweau is QODduc:mig ilS vital mission in w.ord.en:e mlh 

law a.nii ~_blishe,d pddelinas. Heiweve:, in thl3 illsw=; it's Cllenfutbasie ~ ~ 

wss viol.2.ed.. 

CoD~ ov=ight is dc$iiC,.-d to bold~~ ~cnttible. I -i:ust 1m! y.ou lhm:e ~ 

view, ~ will .mitt me Committee's !nvcstigc:lon l.no ,iclatluns o! 0100 _prc~es related to 

thG us: ofth: S~el.: dos:rlcr in BSA ~~?:S. 

cc: Mlcbe:l Horowitt, lilSJ>llCIC? C~l2ll -Of ili= Dcp:.:m=t of J~ 

Th2 Himorahle Cl:cistopber \\'ray, Diicctoz. Federal &!eau ofim'atigalion 

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