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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

US Military Force and

Operations Other Than War

Necessary Questions to

Avoid Strategic Failure

R. A. ESTILOW

Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 3

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 1996
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environme

the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense re

concepts. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author an

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U

States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities a

cleared for public release.

ii
Foreword

Lt Col R. A. Estilow explores the possibility that much 

operations other than war (00TW) may be incompati

with the use of US military force. He believes political le

ers may properly focus the diplomatic, political, econom

and informational elements of power on OOTW; but, of

place too little regard on the specific object of the milit

element of power. Colonel Estilow reviews the military m

sions compiled today under OOTW, and then assesses 

acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of using milit

combat force to pursue those missions. He observes t

the decision to commit US military force to OOTW is cr

cally important today. First, future trends of a chang

world point toward developing a strategy that deman

nontraditional forms and uses of military force. Second, 

have already moved in this direction by rejecting the We

berger Doctrine, which provided traditional criteria 

commitment of military force. Most importantly, we h

adopted a National Security Strategy of Engagement a

Enlargement, which relies heavily upon and even aggr

sively seeks the more active involvement of the US milit

in OOTW.

Colonel Estilow’s close examination of these issues hi

lights the purpose and importance of establishing expl

criteria for employment of US military force (combat fo

in hostile environments). Such a commitment of com

force abroad may present critical differences from the u

of (noncombat) military forces in benign environments; 

example, military engineers providing disaster relief. Ne

he develops specific, qualitative criteria for the strate

decision to commit combat force. These criteria could gu

the decision-making process to test the acceptability, fea

bility, and suitability of using US military force for 

specific mission under consideration. In broad terms, 

test seeks to answer the following questions: Will politi

leaders and ultimately the American people support 

mission? Are mobilized and usable resources sufficient 

implementing the mission? Will the mission (if prope

executed) attain, promote, or protect the political aim?

iii
Colonel Estilow then examines doctrinal military m

sions of OOTW to determine the risk of combat. He no

that current doctrine embraces no less than 28 OO

missions. His analysis breaks these missions into th

categories: category I (high risk), clearly combat missio

category II (moderate risk), benign intent but signific

combat potential; category III (low risk), clearly humanit

ian missions. The missions of each category are then 

sessed against the acceptability, suitability, and feasibi

criteria to determine if military force is an appropriate 

strument of power for these mission groups. Finally, 

paper draws conclusions and makes recommendations 

guide the future use of US military force for OOTW.

D. BRUCE SMITH

Major General, USAF

Commandant

Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col R. A. Estilow, USMC, is a career infantry officer. 

holds master’s degrees from the Naval Postgraduate Sch

and the School for Advanced Military Studies. Colonel Esti

commanded 1st ANGLICO and served as an advisor to 

Royal Saudi Marine Corps during Desert Storm. He i

graduate of the Air War College, class of 1995.

v
US Military Force and

 Operations Other Than War

Necessary Questions to

Avoid Strategic Failure

Though our current doctrine for employment of milit

force relies heavily on Clausewitz’s concepts (center 

gravity, culminating point, sphere of influence of victo

etc.), world conflicts decreasingly are resolved by nat

states wielding traditional military force in traditio

ways. Future war will become increasingly complex at 

levels. Tactically, technology may relegate direct action 

highly trained, highly sophisticated special operatio

forces. The high cost of conventional ground warfare m

reduce standing forces worldwide. Operationally, succ

in war in the information age may depend on the care

integration of not only military but also of other forc

Strategic influence may be wielded by, and may more of

have to contend with, an increasing number of import

nonstate players. Indeed, competition may replace conf

with preparation for war that is constant and more imp

tant than conduct of war. Preventive war may take n

forms, and states may be forced to use their military for

boldly to ensure the (relatively) uninterrupted ‘‘commer

of the information age. Questions of when, where, and h

to employ US military force will become increasingly d

cult. The day may arrive when Clausewitz’s most quo

dictum, ‘‘War is an instrument of policy,’’ becomes his o

idea still in vogue. Nevertheless, his most overlooked cor

lation will grow in importance also: There are some pol

cal aims for which military force is not appropriate. 1

 U

mately, strategic decision makers must accurately det

mine ‘‘the kind of war on which they are embarking; n

ther mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, someth

which is alien to its nature.’’

2

By defining a set of conditions for the employment of 

military forces abroad, the Weinberger Doctrine attemp

to ensure such a match between military means and pol

cal ends. It proposed a series of six tests to determine 

appropriateness of using military force. Explicitly, Sec

1
tary Weinberger put the burden of proof on the situati

realizing that many such situations clearly did not supp

the use of combat force. He highlighted the caution 

must observe before committing forces to overseas comb

emphasizing the moral requirement not to risk liv

through an inappropriate use of military force. In additi

the tests served a practical purpose. Moral high grou

aside, will the use of US military force bring success? T

Weinberger Doctrine provided guidelines for determin

acceptability (political support of our leadership and ev

tually our populace), feasibility (appropriate levels of for

and resources), and suitability (well-defined objecti

matched by an effective plan).3

The Weinberger Doctrine came under immediate atta

In the press, from the right and the left, deliberately triv

summaries of the doctrine criticized it as too restricti

The media venom centered on Weinberger’s test for pol

cal and ultimately popular support. In essence, critics 

that political leadership should employ US military for

ahead of popular support for ‘‘vital interests’’ (on the rig

or for ‘‘the rightness of the cause’’ (on the left).4

 The tou

est criticism of the Weinberger Doctrine came from 

State Department.

George Schultz also focused on the ‘‘popularity test.’’ 

stated that public support was not required in advance 

such clearly legitimate uses of military power as liberat

a people or preventing abusive aggression when milit

force was to be applied in measured doses.5

 This last it

forms the crux of the State Department argument. We

berger viewed military force as a separate element of n

tional power, equal to the diplomacy, economic, or inf

mational (psychological) elements as a policy tool. As su

it was properly the element of last resort to protect only 

most vital interests. Schultz saw military force as a sub

of the diplomatic element of power, the stick to the car

of other diplomatic tools. Any restriction on the use of m

tary force threatened to limit ‘‘coercive diplomacy.’’ We

berger obviously felt that, while the threat of force m

usefully enhance diplomacy, the actual use of force 

serves more careful scrutiny. Ultimately, there may ex

2 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
some political aims for which the employment of force 

not appropriate.

The current National Security Strategy of Engagem

and Enlargement definitely adopts the Schultz view. One 

the central goals of this new direction in national secur

policy focuses our resources to promote democracy abro

While acknowledging the traditional role of our arm

forces to deter, fight, and win conflicts over vital interes

the new national security strategy seeks to become m

proactive in the OOTW environment. Engagement and 

largement promises not just containment but a rollback 

nondemocratic, nonfree market states. It proposes the u

of specialized units and general purpose forces against 

expanded array of OOTW; however, criteria for determin

when to use military force receive too little definition.

The new national security strategy seeks to focus 

gagement and enlargement in areas which most affect o

strategic interests: large economies, critical locations, n

clear weapons, and potential refugee problems. In light 

employment of US military forces in Bosnia, Soma

Rwanda, and Haiti, these criteria may not narrow the fi

enough. The strategy proposes the further guides of m

sured use of force, multilateral efforts, and reasona

cost. It also asks critical questions, the most important 

which are:

1. Have we considered nonmilitary means that offe

reasonable chance of success?

2. What types of US military capabilities should 

brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefu

matched to our political objectives?

3. Do we have reasonable assurance of support from 

American people and their elected representatives?

4. Do we have time lines and milestones that reveal 

extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we ha

an exit strategy?6

These questions touch on acceptability, feasibility, a

suitability issues; but are much more open-ended than 

Weinberger Doctrine. Their generally less restrictive nat

points to more frequent use of US military forces as well 

military (combat) force. More frequent use may not be b

ESTILOW 
but each specific use of US military force abroad must 

carefully evaluated to ensure it is appropriate. Specifica

we must ensure that the use of military force in OOTW 

not counterproductive for the particular situation or lo

term national security. However important to long-te

employment, the strict ‘‘popularity test’’ of the Weinber

Doctrine may not be appropriate to the short-term use 

the US military in OOTW. Nevertheless, thorough analy

before employment of US military force is always releva

We should develop clear and specific criteria to judge 

acceptability, feasibility, and suitability of employing m

tary force in general; and then to test the proposed m

sions for OOTW specifically. These criteria should addr

the restrictive and exclusionary criticisms of the Weinb

ger Doctrine, but provide more definition to thought p

cess than the criteria for engagement and enlargement.

New Criteria for Employment

of US Military Force

Acceptability is probably the first prerequisite for the u

of US military force to attain a political aim abroad. T

Weinberger Doctrine as well as the new national strat

highlight the ultimate requirement for the broad suppor

the American people. Perhaps such support does not r

resent the relevant acceptability for short-term, limi

force employments in OOTW. Acceptability in broad ter

answers the question: Will the proposed use of US milit

force obtain the support of political leaders? But, t

question only hints at the acceptability questions to c

sider first in obtaining, then to retain political supp

throughout the operation.

Assuming that the president directs the use of milit

force in OOTW, his support only begins the test of acce

ability. Even within the constitutional authority as co

mander in chief, a president must quickly engage the su

port of Congress for action. Since Vietnam, Congress h

become an almost equally important player in determin

initial acceptability. Are there War Powers Act implicatio

to the proposed action? Will Congress try to restrict 

employment of the US military through its control of 

4 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
purse strings? Answers to these acceptability questio

can be affected by nonrelated but important issues.

Is an election year dynamic at play? Proposed milit

action in OOTW during a presidential or congressio

election season generally has difficulty in obtaining bipa

san support. This weakens the president’s hand in bu

ing a consensus of support for acceptability. Initial congr

sional support may be accelerated by rapid employmen

US military force. Supporting an actively engaged milit

commonly unifies Congress, but a heavy burden of pr

remains on the president particularly as the employm

lengthens. How long is the proposed military action? C

gress has greater difficulty supporting an apparently op

ended commitment.

Time plays an important role in determining supp

from another critical component of the acceptability eq

tion----the media. In a large measure, sympathetic ne

coverage may prompt the use of US military force 

OOTW. But generally, the media provides fickle support 

acceptability over the long-haul. Highlighting divided su

port among the executive and legislative branches provi

great news. The media usually race to be first to divine 

shaping of public opinion on the issue of employment 

US military forces in OOTW. What is the probable affec

the media on establishing public support for the issu

Polls track over time possible public reaction.

As the OOTW extends over time, support of the natio

populace becomes more important to the acceptability 

sue. Is there a requirement for a reserve call-up? Use 

‘‘voluntary reserve’’ support (approximately 25 percent 

the reserve component) may avoid this issue in the sh

term; but, as the current drawdown continues, reser

increasingly become required for every employment of 

military force. What is the impact on the domestic econo

(tax increase)? What is the impact of perceived or act

casualty potential? These issues over time increase 

public input to the acceptability equation and, in fact, 

come critical. They receive their scope by the public p

ception of importance. Presidential, congressional, and m

dia rhetoric aside, public support becomes the k

question of acceptability, particularly in the OOTW en

ESTILOW 
ronment. How critical (really) are the US interests 

volved?

International or coalition support at the onset of 

military action in OOTW usually enhances domestic 

ceptability. Indeed, President Reagan’s Caribbean coalit

for Grenada and President Clinton’s similar, early attem

for Haiti reflect this phenomenon. As the action extends 

time, international or coalition support must provide m

material influence to continue to contribute to the acce

ability of the action. The coalition built under US auspi

for Somalia is an example. As such, international supp

may also contribute to feasibility.

Superficially, feasibility looks less dynamic than acce

ability, but feasibility should go well beyond the size of 

US military force to be employed in the proposed acti

Fundamentally, feasibility is concerned with the questi

Are the mobilized and usable resources sufficient for 

proposed use of military force in the specific OOTW? Sin

OOTW normally require rapid employment of forward 

ployed forces, the character of standing forces (operatio

and logistical) becomes critical. What is the size, compo

tion, and training of the forces at hand? What is th

doctrine for employment in OOTW? These questions 

particularly critical to the fundamentally nontraditio

missions involved in OOTW. Another important conside

tion for feasibility is opportunity cost.

Assuming the character of the standing forces indica

feasibility: What was the impact on the force’s warti

mission capability to achieve this character? Cost in d

lars as well as in training time must be explicitly cons

ered. While not mutually exclusive, tasks for conventio

war and OOTW are not considered totally compatib

Some OOTW missions may have no combat applicati

More importantly, combat units employed for extended 

riods in OOTW require significant retraining for comb

Has the force been specifically resourced (personn

money, time) for the increased mission requirements 

OOTW? What is the impact on force morale of increas

operations tempo? More importantly----How many Soma

Rwanda, Haiti missions can the collective morale of 

force withstand? Major recruiting commands in the Ar

6 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
and Marine Corps report a negative effect from OOTW m

sions in Somalia and Haiti. Do the tactics required for 

specific OOTW create problems beyond feasibility? For 

ample, does the tactical neutralization of insurgent inf

structure become politically unacceptable as with 

French in Algeria? This consideration touches on the su

ability issue.

Is the proposed employment of US military force tech

cally capable of promoting, defending, or protecting 

political aim? In OOTW this issue becomes much m

than a military question. Success in OOTW usually 

quires the operational orchestration of the diplomatic, 

litical, economic, informational/psychological, and milit

elements of power. To ensure success, this orchestrat

must occur much lower than the national level. Within 

theater of operations in conventional war, we synchron

tactical victories into major operations to achieve strate

success. What analogous method will we use in the OOT

theater to ‘‘operationalize’’ the use of military and ot

elements of power?

In conventional war, command dominates control 

guiding the synchronization of subordinate military 

tions. This relationship promotes operational unity of eff

and preserves tactical flexibility. Normally, this situat

reverses in OOTW. Complex and changing rules of enga

ment (ROE) rigidly control action at the lowest tacti

level. Disparate actors at the theater level must struggle 

unity of effort. What is the command and control archit

ture for OOTW?

The broad range of OOTW missions exacerbates qu

tions of suitability. Purely humanitarian operations or 

saster relief efforts usually occur in low-threat envir

ments. Suitability issues are relatively simple. Multilate

peacekeeping, such as efforts under United Nations a

pices, tend to be highly suitable for US military partici

tion. Under some circumstances, however, they carry 

danger of US personnel presenting too tempting a tar

for opposition forces. Missions in volatile environme

(unilateral peacekeeping, peace enforcement, countern

cotics, counterterrorism, and insurgency) can turn fr

benign to open combat overnight. How do we protect 

ESTILOW 
force? How do we wrest initiative from the adversary? H

our military forces been reduced to important targets? T

nature of some OOTW missions and environments po

even deeper suitability questions for US military forces.

Our Constitution places careful strictures on the e

ployment of our military forces domestically. The Found

Fathers viewed the use of military force for domestic tr

quillity skeptically, as creating more problems than 

solved. How tolerant can we expect the target or host n

tion populace to be of foreign forces promoting domes

tranquillity? Will success of the OOTW mission lead 

greater or lesser acceptance by the local population? W

are we trying to legitimize by our actions? These suitabi

problems may be exacerbated----not resolved----by a clea

defined exit strategy or timetable. The perceived transi

nature of US resolve may enhance domestic acceptabi

at the expense of in-theater suitability. It may put time 

well as initiative on the side of our adversaries.

The use of US military forces in OOTW clearly is a co

plex issue. Trends in future war, rejection of such restr

tive employment criteria as the Weinberger Doctrine, a

the new National Security Policy of Engagement and E

largement point to more, not less, OOTW. We must u

explicit criteria for acceptability, feasibility, and suitabi

to evaluate the specific employment of military force. 

should examine critically the nature of the many missio

of OOTW. Ultimately, some may indeed represent politi

aims for which the use of military force is not appropriat

Military Missions in

Operations Other Than War

The greatest problem with operations other than war 

that the military missions hidden under this rubric 

war. Most of the 28 OOTW missions, identified in joint a

service doctrine, involve a significant risk of direct com

for the military force involved. The danger of generaliz

these missions with the misleadingly benign OOTW u

brella is that strategic leaders easily miss Clausewi

critical dictum: ‘‘The first, the supreme, the most far rea

ing act of judgment that the statesman and comman

8 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war 

which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, n

trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its n

ture.’’

7

 Joint doctrine defines military operations ot

than war as ‘‘encompassing a wide range of activities wh

the military instrument of National Power is used for p

poses other than large-scale combat operations usually 

sociated with war.’’ The same document also lists rai

strikes, and insurgencies as other than war missions. D

trine seems to focus on the key words ‘‘large-scale,’’ 

success may depend more on the key words ‘‘combat 

erations.’’

Unless focused on a nonstate actor, each of these m

sions is an explicit breach of another nation’s sovereign

Such action usually results in war or at least a warl

reaction. One nation’s OOTW easily becomes a survi

issue for the other nation or nonstate actor. Witness 

hunt for Mohammed Farah Aidid in Somalia. For the U

this operation represented the UN sanctioned arrest o

criminal. Aidid and the Somali clans who regard him a

national hero saw things quite differently. One hund

Ranger casualties and three posthumous Medals of Ho

later, the US was forced to withdraw in failure ----not of 

heroic military personnel but failure of strategic policy. T

OOTW rubric masked the real intent of what the politi

and military leaders expected the US military force to 

complish.

The military missions of OOTW must be thoroughly a

lyzed to determine risk of combat. This risk measure c

be used to distinguish between the wide variety of m

sions, whose specific, critical natures are disguised un

OOTW. Those missions presenting a significant risk 

combat must be treated as such. US military force comm

ted to them is committed to combat. These commitme

must be submitted to rigorous tests of acceptability, fea

bility, and suitability to ensure that US military power 

not squandered on failure.

Potential risk of combat for the doctrinal military m

sions of OOTW can be evaluated independently of spec

circumstances. The first critical issue is the mission’s 

pact on the sovereignty of another nation. Clearly, 

ESTILOW 
more overt the breach of sovereignty the higher the risk 

combat. Some breaches of sovereignty are supported 

international law or supra national organizations. Wh

such support may reduce international outcry, it does li

to reduce the risk of combat. A further measure is 

hostility of the environment or the status of belligerents.

The anarchy surrounding failed governments, organi

forces and weapons densities of civil wars, or the milit

resolve of an ‘‘international outlaw’’ state could incre

the risk of combat for even benign missions. Humanitar

relief to Somalia, peace enforcement in Bosnia, and aid 

the Kurds in Iraq illustrate this contention. Humanitar

assistance to the Kurds may have been quite different h

we not been dealing with a recently defeated Iraq. Anot

important aspect of assessing the risk of combat lies w

which side retains the initiative or controls the timing 

the proposed military action. Initiative must be evalua

beyond the initial action to include which side has 

capacity to unilaterally escalate the situation to a hig

risk level. Initiative also lies with which antagonist c

create a protracted conflict. This issue has particular 

port for the US, which has developed a quick success 

exit mentality for most military operations.

Using the points discussed above to evaluate risk 

combat, current OOTW missions can be arrayed as follow

Category I (High Risk)

Raids

Strikes

Counterdrug (direct action)

Noncombantant evacuation operations (nonperm

sive)

Recovery operations

Quarantines

Insurgency

Counterinsurgency

Counterterrorism

Category II (Moderate Risk)

Peace enforcement

Enforcement of sanctions

Enforcement of exclusion zones

10 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Maritime interception

Ensuring freedom of navigation

Protection of shipping

Peacekeeping

Show of force

Arms control

Category III (Low Risk)

Noncombantant evacuation operations (permissive)

Peace building

Nation assistance

Security assistance

Foreign internal defense

Humanitarian assistance

Counterdrug support

Support to US domestic civil authorities

Disaster relief

Peacemaking

Clearly, category I missions require US combat act

and invite a combat response from the adversary. From 

perspective of strategic decision making, category II m

sions may pose even greater danger. They present a pol

cally alluring but dangerous mix of peaceful intent w

volatile environment. These missions are most suscepti

to an ends-means dysfunction. In contrast, category 

missions are distinctly nonbelligerent, mostly humanit

ian efforts, occurring in benign environments.

Category I missions present a clear breach of sov

eignty, when exercised against nation states. Against n

state actors, they are acts that will be challenged if pos

ble. Raids and strikes are deliberate combat actions 

inflict punishment. Planned withdrawal notwithstandi

they are acts of war that place military forces in dang

Counterdrug direct action closely resembles a raid 

strike, if it occurs within the sovereign territory of anoth

state. Even though counternarcotics receives wide supp

from the international community, unrequested count

drug direct action risks combat with the sovereign nat

as well as the drug cartel.

Recovery operations, quarantines, and insurgency s

port also threaten sovereignty. Though a quarantine is 

ESTILOW 
by definition an act of war under international law, it co

easily provoke the same response as a blockade. Count

insurgency and counterterrorism usually do not prov

sovereignty problems, since US policies normally rest

our efforts to support of host nation forces not involv

direct combat. However, even these missions involve h

tile environments and capable belligerents.

Each of the category I missions involves the employm

of military force (combat action) against an interactive 

emy. Raids, strikes, and recovery operations are milit

actions against point targets. If these are importa

enough to attack, we must assume that our adversary c

siders them important enough to defend. Furthermore, 

recovery operation, or nonpermissive noncombatant eva

ation operations (NEO) leaves the advantage with the 

emy. Unlike the raid or strike, the enemy knows exac

where we must act.

Most category I missions (less raids or strikes) may a

present the adversary with opportunities to escalate 

level of combat action. Insurgency support and counter

surgency both occur in a distributed battlefield and rep

sent protracted conflicts. Never does there exist the opp

tunity for a single, knockout blow. The adversary h

ample opportunity to react, change strategy, or otherw

seize the initiative. The same holds true for a counterdr

or counterterrorist activity that exceeds a single strike-l

event.

The issues of sovereignty, hostility of environme

status of belligerents, and reciprocal ability to seize 

initiative all conspire to require US military force for ca

gory I missions. Risk of combat approaches the absol

and the strategic decision to execute a category I mission 

clearly a decision for war (or a politically more palata

euphemism); however, ‘‘other than war’’ it is not.

Category II missions may pose even greater dangers 

the strategic decision maker. Though reduced, the risk 

combat remains strong. There is a great danger that 

strategic decision maker may use ‘‘hope’’ as a course 

action. Category II missions pose little or no threat to 

sovereignty of recognized nation states. Where intent is 

clearly benign, strong international sanction often redu

12 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
any threatened sovereignty reactions. Some of the missio

clearly reduce the risk of challenge by even an interact

adversary. But for many of these missions, the hostile 

vironment and opportunities for the adversary to seize 

initiative or to escalate the action destroy the ability of 

US to escape combat.

The enforcement missions of category II normally ar

from United Nations action. Freedom of navigation a

protection of shipping result from long-standing inter

tional law. Maritime interception and show of force usua

result from positions of overwhelming superiority. All 

these factors reduce the risk of combat from category 

missions to below that encountered in category I. But, 

we move from missions which provide stand-off distan

and from purely sea or air interventions to inland missio

among belligerents, the risk of combat increases. Furth

more, all of these missions are protracted offering the 

portunity for our adversary to counter or escalate.

Enforcement of sanctions over a hostile territory, ar

control, and the peace missions require close contact w

the belligerents. Over time the adversary can challen

sanctions in ways that may provoke combat. Arms cont

action inside another country, as in the weapons of m

destruction (WMD) inspections of Iraq, may even provo

the same combat response as a challenge to sovereign

Even the ‘‘peace’’ missions occur in a hostile environmen

Peace enforcement requires the insertion of US milit

force between two active belligerents to separate comb

ants and to effect a cease-fire. Peacekeeping entails 

insertion of troops between two formerly active bellig

ents, who agree to have a cease-fire enforced. For ea

category II mission except peacekeeping, we rely on 

notion of overwhelming threat of force for success. So 

the all-important threat to be credible, category II missio

still require the US to commit military force.

Unlike the other category II missions, peacekeeping p

sumes a technically benign environment. US milit

forces, other than combat units, technically can fu

peacekeeping duties. But, while hostilities are reduced a

belligerents less active, danger remains. Unless the bel

erents are absolutely exhausted, either can escalate 

ESTILOW 
breaking the cease-fire. This places peacekeepers in po

tion of choice. Any action beyond reporting the infract

changes the situation from peacekeeping to peace enfor

ment, requiring combat action and military force.

Category III missions clearly present a low risk of co

bat. They do not require US military force. In fact, for m

category III missions, combat service support person

are preferable. Engineers, civil affairs, medical personn

and other noncombat specialties provide the forces 

choice for nation assistance, humanitarian assistance, a

disaster relief. Breach of sovereignty is not an issue a

the hostility of the environment is not connected to bel

erent combat forces. When such conditions do not exist, 

in the humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, the s

cific situation may bump the mission up to category II. B

generally, category III missions occur in benign envir

ments with low risk of combat action.

The permissive NEO represents an emergency remova

threatened noncombatants from a foreign country, but 

risk is not usually imminent combat. US support to ma

category III missions is limited to training programs fo

host nation’s forces. Nation assistance, security ass

tance, and foreign internal defense may even involve tra

ing in combat skills. However, US military forces so 

volved are precluded by law from combat missio

Likewise, counterdrug support is limited to peaceti

training or intelligence support to host nation com

forces. Peacemaking may involve some military personn

but the term refers to purely diplomatic efforts dur

peace operations. Similarly, peace building refers to dip

matic and economic efforts for rebuilding government 

frastructure and institutions after peace is restored.

Military operations other than war is clearly a misnom

with regard to risk of combat. Category I missions are u

formly combat missions, requiring the use of military for

The status of belligerents and hostile environments of ca

gory II missions also require military force. Only categ

III missions warrant the operations other than war head

Strategic decision makers must move beyond the rubric 

OOTW and analyze specific missions for the acceptabil

feasibility, and suitability of military force.

14 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
New Criteria and Military Missions

of Operations Other Than War

Category I and category II missions pose a signific

risk of combat. They require the employment of US milit

force as opposed to noncombat military personnel. Th

are essentially fighting missions and require rigorous sc

tiny by strategic decision makers before the engagemen

combat troops. The strategic decision to commit US m

tary force to a category I or II mission, even if not tech

cally an act of war, should meet the rational standards 

acceptability, feasibility, and suitability. Because of a s

nificantly lower risk of combat, category III missions m

not have to meet the same standards. Paradoxically, 

proximity of category I missions to traditional acts of w

and their self-imposed limit on duration, may make th

more acceptable, feasible, and suitable than category 

missions. Category II missions pose the most serious pr

lems for the strategic decision maker in each area.

Category I missions present great appeal in acce

ability, usually obtaining the support of political leade

Raids and strikes (quick retaliatory actions) pose no W

Powers Act implications. They fall well within the consti

tional purview of the commander in chief and require 

special funding from Congress. The nonpermissive N

and recovery operations present the imperative of prote

ing US citizens and property abroad, a political aim wit

long tradition of acceptability. Quarantines, as impo

during the Cuban missile crises, also receive political 

ceptability if clearly seen to further important US interes

Counterterrorism and counterdrug direct action rece

support in theory, but the dangers in application of

deny mission acceptability. Sovereignty considerations 

acerbate this consideration when hunting terrorist or d

targets in another country. Also, respected governme

are held to a higher standard for acceptability than 

targets they seek. For example, the British killing of I

gunmen in Gibraltar brought widespread political cr

cism. Insurgency and counterinsurgency normally find 

tle support in Congress. Overt overthrow of a legitim

government is rarely acceptable. Likewise, the US explic

refrains from the direct involvement of military force 

ESTILOW 
counterinsurgency. The protracted nature of both missio

presents Congress with ample opportunities to dem

strate unacceptability by cutting off funding. Howev

with the exception of these missions, category I missio

usually pass the acceptability test. They also receive h

marks for feasibility: a sufficiency of mobilized and usa

resources.

Properly resourced for their wartime requirements, 

military forces possess the exact capabilities required 

category I missions. The active force structure embodie

redundant capability for all of these missions, norma

without a major reserve call-up. Each is explicitly 

dressed in current war-fighting doctrine. Successful e

ployment in category I missions enhances the force’s w

time mission capability. If even an extended series of th

missions otherwise supports national security strate

they will not exhaust the collective morale of the force. N

only are these missions exceptionally feasible, they a

display a high degree of suitability.

Current and proven tactics, techniques, and procedu

exist for each of these missions and contribute to the te

nical capability for success. Wartime command and cont

architecture facilitates category I mission accomplishme

More importantly, in execution most of these missions 

quire little or no interface at the theater level with the oth

elements of power. They are military events orchestrated 

such at the operational or theater level in a time prov

fashion. The military force employed for category I m

sions provides its own protection. Timing for each of th

missions or the initiative lies with the US military force. 

decide when, where, and under what conditions to acc

or decline ‘‘battle.’’

The one major suitability exception in category I is cou

terinsurgency. This mission’s suitability problems even 

ceed those of acceptability. The critical factors revo

around the protracted nature of the conflict, the requ

ment for population acceptance, and the possibility of 

gitimizing the wrong elements with our actions. Counter

surgency requires the fusion of all elements of power at 

operational level. The US currently has no proven capac

to do this for counterinsurgency. US policy properly 

16 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
stricts direct combat action in counterinsurgency. Li

wise, counterdrug and counterterrorist actions are p

scribed to training and intelligence support. Counterins

gency suitability problems would plague counterdr

direct action and counterterrorism, if these missions 

came a campaign or series of actions rather than a fin

strike-type mission.

As war (or at least warlike), category I missions genera

are acceptable, feasible, and suitable for the employmen

US military force. There is a high probability that the 

litical aim of these military missions will be supported a

achieved with standing operating forces. The hostile en

ronment is met with equally hostile applications of US m

tary force. Such is not normally the case with category 

missions. These missions may well make demands of 

military force that are not acceptable, feasible, or suitabl

Congress is presently considering legislation to rest

the authority of the commander in chief to commit milit

force to some category II missions. This manifestation 

unacceptability springs not only from the combat risk b

also from past feasibility and suitability problems. Enfor

ment of sanctions in Bosnia, peace enforcement in 

malia, and peacekeeping in Beirut have all proved to 

dangerous, prolonged, and high cost. Such missio

therefore, are politically difficult applications of US milit

force. US Marines suffered 241 killed in the Beirut bom

ing, the highest one-day total since Vietnam. 8

 The two-y

Somalia peace intervention cost $2 billion and resulted 

30 American peacekeepers killed in action and 1

wounded.9

 In terms of achieving US political aims, resu

for both have been judged mixed at best.

Enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, ens

ance of freedom of navigation, and protection of shipp

have normally been acceptable politically as within our 

ternational rights. This support tends to erode over tim

however, especially as feasibility and suitability proble

arise. For example, continued protection of shipping ope

tions in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War fac

serious acceptability challenges with the Iraqi attack 

the USS Stark or the USS Vincennes shootdown of 

Iranian airliner. In general, the protracted nature of ca

ESTILOW 
gory II missions generates most acceptability problem

Prolonged involvement, combined with moderate risk 

combat, invites War Powers Act debate in Congress; ch

lenges to continued funding; and general erosion of su

port from the public. Political leaders demand an ‘‘

strategy’’ before committing military force. This only co

plicates the feasibility and suitability of those missions, 

which time is already on the side of our adversary. It s

nals that escalating the risk of combat might precipit

our withdrawal.

Conventional wisdom states that combat ready, conv

tional military force is most feasible for category II m

sions.10 Generally, such force does provide the most imm

diate, flexible, disciplined response; however, it does 

negate several feasibility problems. Prolonged category 

missions often require extended use of selected rese

component personnel. They also add to the already sign

cant operations tempo of our downsized regular force. T

increased tempo, combined with the difficulty of measur

success in Beirut, Somalia, or Haiti, negatively affects 

collective morale of the military force so employed.

In valuable training time, these transitions to and fr

OOTW impose a significant opportunity cost for milit

forces used in category II missions. UN guidelines show 

necessity for combat units or military forces to undergo 

to six months predeployment training for peacekeeping d

ties. Only patrolling skills from unit combat training 

ceive emphasis in US sponsored peacekeeping traini

More importantly, individual members of the military fo

must fundamentally change combat trained attitudes a

responses. Furthermore, those nations with most exp

ence in UN peacekeeping recommend one year of po

peacekeeping combat training.11 Repeated transitions fr

combat training to peacekeeping duties also carry ot

significant hidden costs. Continuous rotation of US m

tary force into category II missions may pose an ev

greater feasibility problem: combat ready forces may 

repeatedly transition well from war to ‘‘other than w

from destruction and death to building and saving, fr

combat to noncombat.

18 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Evidence exists that a military force may face difficu

adjusting to repetitions of this cycle. Since World War 

the Canadian Airborne Regiment has provided Cana

with her most elite infantry force. NATO recognized 

regiment as one of its most rigorously combat trained

also has been one of the most experienced in 

peacekeeping. In the 1980s, the regiment successfu

completed at least three, six-month peacekeeping depl

ments around the globe. But in 1993 Somalia, the re

ment failed to make the transition. General lack of dis

pline in the use of combat force and failure of leadership 

adjust resulted in peace mission failure and disgrace 

the regiment and Canada. A series of courts-martial a

reorganization of the regiment to a battalion proved uns

cessful in restoring this formerly distinguished combat f

mation. Subsequent discipline scandals resulted in 

regiment’s total disbandment in March 1995.

Peaceful intent in a hostile environment may best be m

by disciplined, military force, but such employment is 

without cost. The US 10th Mountain Division participa

in Florida disaster relief, Somalia peace enforcement, a

Haiti nation building in quick succession. They perform

each mission superbly. But, how many OOTW missio

can the collective morale of the force withstand? The f

mer commander of the division cited no signs of mor

degradation. The failed Canadian Airborne Regiment a

the remainder of Canadian armed forces suffered mu

Though the US military may not have approached it, th

may be a similar limit to feasibility of US military force 

category II missions.

US military force in category II missions has faced sev

suitability problems. It has had difficulties in its techni

capability for promoting, defending, or protecting the 

litical aims of category II missions. We have experien

many tactical failures in these missions. A failed naval 

strike in addition to the Marine barracks tragedy, preced

our mission failure in Beirut as peacekeepers. Furth

more, tactically successful naval surface fire supp

against mountain artillery emplacements may have p

cipitated the Marine barracks attack, thus, representing 

operational failure. As noted, we did not successfully p

ESTILOW 
tect the fleet in Gulf oil tanker reflagging during the Ira

Iraq War. Clearly, protecting the force has been a recurr

problem.

If suitability problems in protecting the force reduce 

personnel to targets, the initiative goes to the adversa

Category II missions rely on ‘‘threat of force’’ for unc

tested success. Not only are these missions extended 

time but the ‘‘battlefield’’ is also distributed geographica

The adversary usually has a surplus of opportunities 

strike. Once lost, wresting the initiative from our advers

ies has proven difficult. Although we recovered the ini

tive after USS Stark and USS Vincennes incidents, 

never rebounded in Beirut from the Marine barracks or 

Somalia from the Ranger attack. Ironically, successfu

protecting the force may prove equally as disastrous 

mission success as failure to protect the force.

The suitability dilemma for category II missions is t

successful use of force may create more enemies than 

eliminates. Even a provoked movement from threat of fo

to use of force coalesces opposition to our interventi

Category II peace missions, especially, manifest this 

lemma. Any action in peace enforcement benefits one s

over another. Provocation during peacekeeping, which e

its more than a reporting response, creates at least 

appearance of choosing sides. Nonresponse may reduce 

military force to an important target.

Much of this suitability dilemma revolves around 

notion of a foreign military force promoting domestic tr

quillity. Aside from being instinctively unpalatable, this 

tion presents practical problems for the ‘‘legitimate’’ g

ernment we presume to support. The first prerequisite 

legitimate government is a demonstrable ability to prot

its own people. Having US military force provide constab

lary services (services a nation would rather not see ev

from its own military force), only exacerbates the issue

addition to the possibility of denying legitimacy, US m

tary force may confer legitimacy on the wrong elements.

Unintended lending of legitimacy often occurs becau

of the historic difficulty in synchronizing the diploma

economic, informational, and military elements of power 

the theater level. What message do we send when we esc

20 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Mohammed Aidid to high-level diplomatic meetings o

day and hunt him with military force the next? Campa

plans for category II missions must fuse all elements 

rationalize events. Otherwise, military force can ea

work at cross purposes with diplomatic or economic m

sures, or diplomatic initiatives and requirements can r

der military force unprotected. Current joint and serv

doctrine only tritely prescribes cooperation, flexibility, a

perseverance to resolve this issue. Fortunately, grou

breaking work at the Joint Warfare Center establishes d

trine for a civil military operations center and other inno

tive command and control architecture to address this k

suitability problem.12

Continuing development in this direction also w

greatly enhance our capability in the truly ‘‘other than w

missions. Category III missions easily achieve political 

ceptability. The permissive NEO rescues or protects 

citizens. Nation assistance, security assistance, and f

eign internal defense form long and broadly suppor

parts of our foreign policy. Who can argue about the 

ceptability of disaster relief or humanitarian assistan

Most political leaders and the nation are proud of our 

forts in flood-torn Bangladesh, in famine stricken Soma

or for the homeless Kurds. Peacemaking and peace bu

ing, largely diplomatic and economic activities, are cl

behind in acceptability. From riots in Los Angeles, to 

fighting in the Pacific Northwest to hurricane relief in Fl

ida, US military forces recently have answered the call 

support of domestic civil institutions. The benign, em

gency use of military personnel eliminates most of the 

ceptability problems of using US military force.

Feasibility problems are also minimized for category 

missions. Eliminating combat from the equation nega

most feasibility challenges. The one critical feasibility pr

lem remaining is the opportunity cost in combat capabi

for a military force involved in any significant number 

these other than war missions. While the combat fo

provides disciplined, organized, capable manpower to m

these emergencies, category III missions do little to 

hance or preserve combat capabilities. These missio

however noble, can exhaust the combat capability of 

ESTILOW 
military force. This is especially true when political lead

enhance acceptability by absorbing the cost of category 

missions in the military budgets required for maintain

combat capability.

An unbroken string of success in all category III m

sions undertaken to date attests to the suitability of 

military force for these missions. Suitability problems o

lurk where early success creates ‘‘mission creep.’’ Huma

tarian assistance in Somalia worked; peace enforcem

failed. Strategic danger surrounds a decision to use 

military force without proper analysis of the (new) missi

Mission creep easily occurs when military force is used 

category III missions because, after all, the force is alrea

available. Thus even category III missions, far from be

‘‘no brainers,’’ require the strategic decision maker to f

understand the character of the other than war activ

upon which he is about to embark.

Conclusions

Strategic decision makers have long recognized 

paramount importance to the state and to the people 

decisions for war or peace. Such decisions must be tak

with utmost deliberation. Careful evaluation of a spec

situation against rigorous criteria should always prec

each decision to employ US military force (e.g., com

force in a hostile environment). As a minimum, these cr

ria must establish for the strategic decision maker an 

sessment of acceptability----political support of our lead

ship and eventually our populace, feasibility----appropr

levels of forces and resources, and suitability----well-defi

objectives matched by an effective plan.

Current US Strategy for Engagement and Enlargem

recognizes the importance of such criteria but fails fully 

develop rigor in its application. The rejected Weinber

Doctrine may have been too restrictive for strategic de

sion makers in the rigor of its acceptability test. We m

develop comprehensive acceptability, feasibility, and su

ability criteria that correct these polar deficiencies or r

strategic failure by incorrectly determining the kind 

‘‘war’’ on which we are embarking.

22 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Nowhere is this risk greater than in operations ot

than war. The military missions disguised by this misle

ingly benign rubric must be carefully analyzed for poten

risk of combat. When measured against threat to sov

eignty and hostility of environment, the 28 doctrinal m

tary missions of OOTW clearly demonstrate a broad ran

high risk (category I), clearly combat missions; moder

risk (category II), benign intent but significant combat 

tential; low risk (category III), clearly humanitarian m

sions. Each of these categories possesses its own uniq

acceptability, feasibility, and suitability challenges; ho

ever, unless the specific use of combat force or milit

mission is critically examined, a political ends to milit

means dysfunction can occur.

This dysfunction is most dangerous for strategic de

sion makers entertaining OOTW involving category II m

sions. They present a politically alluring but dangero

mix of peaceful intent with volatile environment. Th

challenges to any comprehensive acceptability, feasibil

and suitability criteria are almost overwhelming----accou

ing for our strategic failures in Beirut, Somalia, and p

haps eventually Bosnia. The enforcement, protection, a

especially peace missions of category II require special 

assessment. We must ensure that strategic decision m

ers do not pursue with military force political aims 

which such force is not an appropriate element of power

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard 

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 608.

2. Ibid., 88.

3. Caspar W. Weinberger, ‘‘The Use of Military Power,’’ Defense 

January 1985, 2--11.

4. William F. Buckley, ‘‘The Causes of War,’’ National Review, 28 

cember 1984, 3 and William Safire, ‘‘Only the Fun Wars,’’ New 

Times, 3 December 1994, A23.

5. ‘‘U. S. Must Be Ready to Use Its Power, Schultz Declares, ’’ New 

Times, 10 December 1984, A10.

6. President of the United States, A National Security Strategy of 

gagement and Enlargement (Washington, D.C.: Government Prin

Office, February 1995).

7. Clausewitz, 88.

8. ‘‘Out of Harm’s Way,’’ Washington Post, 23 October 1994, C2.

ESTILOW 
9. Jeane Kirkpatrick, ‘‘Sticky Foam and Rubber Bullets,’’ The B

more Sun, 7 March 1995, 9.

10. US Army FM 100-5, Operations, 14 June 1993.

11. JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, vol. 6-7, 1993.

12. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander’s H

book for Peace Operations, preprinting copy, 28 February 1995, 21.

24 US MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR