1

Twelve of the twenty states deemed by the Failed 

States Index (FSI) to be at greatest risk of collapse 

in 2010 are in Africa.1 These fragile and failed states 

account for much of the continent’s ongoing conflict, 

instability, and humanitarian catastrophes. State failure raises the risk of personal insecurity, lawlessness, 

and armed conflict. Such persistent and randomized 

insecurity undermines all aspects of ordinary life, forcing people to stay in their homes and close their businesses for fear of violence. Under such circumstances, 

residents become willing to support or accept virtually any groups that are able to restore order—be they 

warlords, local gangs, or organized criminal syndicates.

Among the violent actors that fill the power 

vacuums of Africa’s fragile and failed states are IsAFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Africa’s Fragile States: Empowering 

Extremists, Exporting Terrorism

By Zachary Devlin-Foltz

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Africa’s fragile states create political and security environments that enhance the leverage of Islamist 

extremists in their ongoing struggle with moderates for influence. Countering extremism in Africa, 

therefore, cannot be separated from building stronger, more legitimate states.

◆ Robust state security operations can neutralize extremists in the short term. However, they are an 

insufficient long-term counterextremism strategy unless coupled with opportunities for moderates to 

engage in the political process.

◆ In fragile states, maintaining moderate Islamist support for the state should be a central stabilization objective.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 6 / AUGUST 2010

lamist extremists. By providing security and basic 

services, they hope to gain greater public acceptance 

of their ideological agendas. A state’s failure to assert 

a monopoly on legitimate force accordingly opens 

the door for extremists to build their bases of political power. Of the twelve “high-risk” states in Africa, 

eight have populations that are one-third or more 

Muslim,2 a feature that more than doubles a state’s 

risk of instability3 and provides fertile ground for Islamist extremists.

Many of these countries have seen the increasing influence of Islamists in recent years. Islamists 

share the belief that politics, as well as personal 

life, should be based on Islam. They envision an 

ideal Islamic state in which shariah, Islamic law, 
2

forms the basis for political authority. Most Muslims in Africa are not Islamists. And most Islamists 

are not violent. But their rising influence coincides 

with recent threats posed by violent African extremists. In July 2010, Somalia’s Islamist militia al 

Shabaab detonated three simultaneous explosions 

that targeted two venues in Kampala, Uganda, 

showing the final World Cup match, killing nearly 80 Ugandans and foreigners. Islamic militancy 

has also been growing across the Sahel, fueling 

concerns that this will spawn more terrorism in 

Africa. African Islamists, furthermore, have been 

implicated in terror plots on the continent and 

abroad. Perhaps the most high-profile case concerned Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, a Nigerian 

who attended Islamist schools in Yemen and allegedly attempted to set off a bomb on a U.S.-bound 

airliner on December 25, 2009. 

The platform certain Islamist movements provide extremist ideologies can also create an incubator for international terrorists, much as the rise of 

the National Islamic Front in Sudan and the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s led to the sheltering of al Qaeda. If not properly engaged, then, Africa’s active Islamist movements pose a serious danger 

to security at the individual, national, and international level. However, common misperceptions of 

Islamist movements have led to misguided policies 

to curb their influence. A better understanding of 

Islamists and how their relationship with broader 

society changes in the context of state fragility can 

inform more effective counterextremism and counterterrorism policies in Africa. 

F R A G I L E S TAT E S A N D 

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

Though their adherents often share broad longterm goals, moderate and extremist Islamists do not 

work together in most stable states. Both may seek a 

shariah government, but extremists’ use of violence 

strikes most moderates as counterproductive, costly, 

and wrong. Conversely, extremists judge moderates 

to be in dereliction of their religious duties for their 

refusal to adopt jihad, or holy war.

This changes when a state is weak or fails. If a 

government does not credibly provide security and a 

peaceful means for moderates to pursue their political 

ends, moderates may come to see violence as their 

best or only option. If moderates remain nonviolent 

under such conditions, they risk loss of credibility, not 

to mention attacks and intimidation from groups that 

do use force. But if moderate Islamists’ use of violence 

helps to reestablish local stability, they can gain support even from those who do not share their ideology. Once moderates take this step, however, whether 

out of political strategy or necessity, the main barrier 

to their cooperating with extremists disappears. The 

effect is to empower extremists, who gain greater 

credibility and acceptance from larger swaths of the 

population. 

In short, there is a general inverse relationship 

between extremist Islamists’ influence and state 

strength. In stable contexts, extremists tend to occupy a marginal fringe of the political space. As the 

level of fragility increases, however, they tend to 

move to center stage. The state, moderates, extremists, and other actors accordingly adapt their goals 

and strategies to changing circumstances. This fragility-extremism nexus has unfolded in a variety of 

ways in Africa.

Egypt and Algeria: Capable Security Sectors 

and Isolated (but Enduring) Extremists. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is Egypt’s most well known 

moderate Islamist organization. Its extremist counterpart, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), has waged violent jihad for over 30 years and is a key component 

of al Qaeda. Both groups believe that Muslim societies should be governed by Islamic shariah states. 

However, the Muslim Brotherhood has remained 

Zachary Devlin-Foltz is coauthor with Binnur OzkececiTaner of “State Collapse and Islamist Extremism: Reevaluating the Link,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, 

no. 1 (April 2010).

“if moderate Islamists’ use of 

violence helps to reestablish local 

stability, they can gain support 

even from those who do not share 

their ideology”
3

essentially peaceful for the last few decades, pursuing its agenda through social programs and electoral 

competition. By contrast, Egyptian Islamic Jihad 

has employed violence consistently throughout its 

existence. The MB and EIJ criticize each other bitterly. The Brothers call the jihadis’ terrorism dangerous and counterproductive while the extremists 

denounce the MB for luring young Muslims away 

from holy war.

EIJ’s founding leaders began their Islamist careers 

in the Brotherhood. They broke away in the late 

1970s following over a decade of brutal state oppression in which hundreds of Brothers were arrested and 

many executed. The crackdowns convinced many of 

these young Islamists that the Egyptian regime was 

waging a war on Islam and that Muslims had a duty to 

resist violently, however high the costs. By contrast, 

the MB’s moderate leaders concluded that violence 

would only invite more oppression while alienating 

an Egyptian public that preferred peace.

Egypt’s capable security sector exploited this 

wedge between moderates and extremists to further 

weaken the EIJ. It launched another round of violent 

oppression, this time specifically targeting extremists for imprisonment and torture. Such repression 

raised the costs of Islamist violence such that only 

those who saw holy war as a duty, or at least a glorious pursuit, remained committed to it. Though it 

officially remains banned, the Brotherhood became 

Egypt’s primary opposition party, and many experts 

believe it would win a truly free and fair election 

today. Meanwhile, as the extremists were isolated 

and were languishing in jails or in hiding, their political clout waned. Intermittent domestic terrorist 

campaigns during the 1990s kept EIJ and other extremists in the headlines but never translated into 

political power. By the late 1990s, most extremists 

had renounced violence, whereas the remaining EIJ 

hardcore ultimately moved abroad and joined al Qaeda’s international jihad.

Algeria provides a similar example in which the 

state used a combination of oppression and amnesty to push moderate Islamists away from violence. 

However, just as in Egypt, that policy unintentionally drove Algeria’s most extreme Islamists to join 

al Qaeda, forming al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM) in 2006. During a bloody civil war that 

raged for most of the 1990s, brutal violence won Islamist rebels little more than heavy-handed repression from the state and political alienation from the 

public. Many Algerians originally sympathized and 

supported the Islamists after the military nullified the 

1991 elections they were likely to lose. However, as 

the civil war raged on and the violence grew more 

shocking and seemingly gratuitous, the public and 

most Islamists grew tired of the destruction. Violence, 

for them, was a means to an end, and they abandoned 

it once it proved ineffective. By the mid-2000s, only 

the extreme Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, known by its French acronym GSPC, remained 

armed and active.

Just as had happened in Egypt, Algerian extremists who refused to renounce violence alienated the 

general populace and a mainstream Islamist movement that preferred peace. Whereas the GSPC’s 

extremist predecessor recruited up to 500 new fighters a week during the 1990s, recent estimates of the 

GSPC’s and AQIM’s manpower rarely exceed 1,000.4

Stripped of its moderate members and politically marginalized, the group joined al Qaeda hoping to find 

abroad the relevance it lost at home.

Algeria’s and Egypt’s robust security measures 

were able to target extreme Islamists and dissuade 

moderates from pursuing strategies of violence. 

However, while extremist violence proved a costly 

and unproductive strategy in Egypt and Algeria, 

moderates have been provided few opportunities 

for nonviolent political participation. This perpetuates the ongoing tension among Islamists over the 

respective benefits of peaceful engagement versus 

violence. Moreover, while the extremist threat is 

subdued, it persists.

Nigeria: Limited State Capacity and Restrained 

Extremism. Moderate Islamists have considerable 

“while extremist violence proved 

a costly and unproductive 

strategy in Egypt and Algeria, 

moderates have been provided 

few opportunities for nonviolent 

political participation”
4

influence within the political system in predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria. In 1999 and 2000, 

with the somewhat reluctant consent of the national 

government, several northern states made shariah official criminal law. Secular laws continued to apply to 

non-Muslims, but state governments could now enforce their interpretation of Islam among those they 

deemed Muslims. Using legal official means, northern 

leaders had taken a significant step toward establishing Islamic governance.

Muslim leaders differed in their zeal for Islamic 

law. Some were genuine Islamist ideologues, while 

others were political opportunists seeking to bolster 

their own credibility. In every case, however, proponents of official shariah claimed that the national 

government’s shortcomings in maintaining law and 

order justified the introduction of religious law. If 

the secular state could not secure the streets, they 

argued that Muslims should be allowed to do so via 

Islamic law.

Subsequently, many northern states saw the 

growth of shariah enforcement militias called Hisbah. 

In addition to destroying alcohol and harassing filmmakers, the militias arrested common criminals, helped 

direct traffic, and responded to public emergencies and 

accidents. These gangs were not sanctioned by the national government. Nevertheless, by replacing or outperforming the government in many ways, the Hisbah 

gained popular support and made it easier for Islamist 

politicians to justify backing them and harder for nonIslamists to avoid, at minimum, condoning their work.5

In the words of one national Islamic group, “The Nigerian police force as constituted today cannot by any 

stretch of imagination be a substitute for Hisbah.”6

The Hisbah themselves are diverse and difficult 

to categorize. Many of their rank-and-file members 

are unemployed youth who need no more motivation 

than the minimal salaries and social prestige afforded 

to militiamen. Some Hisbah activity, however, suggests extremist intentions. In several cases militias 

have summarily punished Muslims for insufficient 

piety rather than turn them over for trial in official 

religious courts. In other instances the Hisbah are accused of violence against minority groups and Islamic 

sects even though the victims did not necessarily 

contravene shariah.

7

Indeed, the Hisbah are often more extreme than 

the state politicians and ordinary citizens who support them. Accordingly, that support has limits. The 

police have clashed with the Hisbah in some states,

attempting to curb their zealotry and prevent them 

from threatening state authority. In Borno State, for 

example, the state government and national police 

launched an aggressive crackdown on the extremists of Boko Haram. The group demands Islamic rule 

throughout Nigeria and had launched a wave of 

violence against the state’s Christians as well as the 

government. During clashes with police in July 2009 

hundreds of extremists were killed, some allegedly 

while in detention. Northern Islamist leaders condemned the extremists and expressed their solidarity 

with the Borno government.8

Mainstream Islamists have a stake in the current 

system: they run northern state governments. As beneficiaries of the status quo, these leaders are unlikely 

to support attempts at radical change. However, many 

moderate Islamist leaders cooperate with militant extremists such as the Hisbah because they fill the many 

security gaps left by the national government. Appeasing and exploiting the extremists without threatening officialdom, moderate Islamists have adapted to 

Nigeria’s limited but enduring state. Whether moderates will be able to permanently keep the lid on these 

competing pressures remains to be seen.

Somalia: A Security Vacuum and Powerful 

Extremists. If the Nigerian state’s failings provided 

limited opportunities for extremists, the Somali state’s 

complete collapse provided a much broader political 

opening. Since its 1991 civil war, Somalia essentially 

has been without a government. Left stateless for so 

long, Somalis have created various local institutions 

designed to fill in for official government in essential 

areas. Starting in the mid-1990s, neighborhood leaders established shariah courts to provide law and order. 

“by replacing or outperforming 

the government in many ways, 

the Hisbah gained popular 

support and made it easier for 

Islamist politicians to justify 

backing them”
5

Originally, most courts focused on securing the streets, 

limiting their activities both geographically and politically to reflect the priorities of ordinary residents and 

clan and business leaders.

By 2005, however, more ambitious Islamists had 

managed to organize many courts into a loose coalition called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). 

The UIC’s leadership included both moderates, concerned mostly with security and maintaining public 

support, and extremists bent on coercing their way 

to an Islamic state. They joined together to fight 

Somalia’s many predatory warlords. For moderates, 

defeating the warlords consolidated the UIC’s power 

and pleased their constituents. For extremists, the 

warlords, some of whom received U.S. support to 

pursue al Qaeda suspects, were agents of the West 

and the chief obstacle to jihad in Somalia. Protracted state collapse and its attendant chaos unified these enemies and temporarily superseded their 

many differences.

The UIC never achieved full unity of command, 

and its more moderate leaders struggled to control 

their extremist allies. Nevertheless, the coalition 

might have held for some time had Ethiopia not invaded Somalia in December 2006 to remove what it 

saw as a threat on its border. The incursion split the 

Islamists. The extremists, most notably the group al 

Shabaab, launched an underground insurgent campaign, while many moderate UIC leaders decided to 

negotiate with the Ethiopians. In effect, the presence 

of Ethiopian troops made violence less productive for 

the moderates, who could no longer build support by 

taking and securing territory. 

For the extremists, however, the Ethiopian invasion brought a foreign, non-Muslim army into the 

equation—and against which they could rally nationalist and Islamist sentiments. Al Shabaab went 

on to declare itself an al Qaeda affiliate. Though al 

Qaeda operatives had long used Somalia as a place to 

hide and stage attacks elsewhere, al Shabaab provided 

the organization its first significant foothold in local 

Somali politics.

The Islamist split in Somalia continues. Even after Ethiopian troops withdrew in 2009 and the moderate Islamist Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed became 

president of a government of national unity, al Shabaab remained in the armed opposition, preferring to 

fight the moderates rather than join them in peace. 

For their part, most non-Islamist power brokers, be 

they clan elders or businesspeople, continue to prioritize security and their own local authority. Some 

strike deals with al Shabaab, some with other armed 

groups, and still others with the government. Though 

each no doubt has ideological preferences, the overriding necessity of securing self, family, and business 

drives them to side with whoever can most credibly 

protect or threaten them.

Mali and Senegal: Legitimate States and Sustained Security. In West Africa, Mali and Senegal, 

low-income states with considerable legitimacy, represent an alternative model for confronting extremist 

threats. Both use a combination of political openness 

and relatively robust security institutions to defuse 

radicalism. As a result, they have avoided the turbulence posed by violent Islamists seen in Somalia, 

Egypt, and Algeria. 

In Mali, the 1990s brought political liberalization after years of autocracy. This created space 

for segments of civil society, including Islamists, to 

expand their role in social and political life. Some 

Islamists subsequently began challenging the government’s handling of intergroup inequality and 

economic underdevelopment.9 Despite their criticism of the state, however, most Islamists have 

chosen to influence it rather than overthrow it. 

The legitimacy of the state, moreover, provided it 

great credibility in dealing with these competing 

interests, allowing it to define the parameters of this 

engagement within the context of the broader interests of society.

Mali has simultaneously engaged in active counterterrorism operations and security cooperation, 

with both international and regional players ensuring 

a strong state response to extremists who choose to 

use force despite the peaceful opportunities available 

to Islamists.10

Senegal has also cultivated a long tradition of 

religious moderation and military professionalism. 

This has been reinforced by a decades-long strengthening of democratic processes and state institutions 

in which the interaction between religious groups 

and politics can be freely debated and even publicly 
6

challenged in a constructive effort to define the 

boundaries and linkages between the secular and 

the religious.11 Accordingly, relationships between 

Senegalese politicians and Islamic leaders, though 

complicated and evolving over time, have generally 

been harmonious. When Senegalese Islamic leaders break or bend historical norms by opining on 

politics, the official response has been to tolerate 

and engage them rather than confront them.12 For 

example, marches against government policies by 

Islamic youth groups in the 1990s prompted government officials to publicly consult with opposition 

leaders and undertake reforms that addressed some of 

their grievances while marginalizing those pursuing 

solely violent strategies.13

At the same time, the state has shown itself willing and able to counter hard-line extremist threats. 

Leaders of more radical Islamist groups who persistently incited and organized violence have been arrested and prosecuted. Restrictions have also been 

applied on radical groups until they have proven able 

to organize and operate peacefully.14 Under these circumstances, the professionalism and capacity of the 

Senegalese security forces engenders considerable 

trust and cooperation from the general public, facilitating valuable information sharing.

This approach of consultation and openness 

coupled with firm but lawful responses to obstinately 

violent actors has managed to foster a mature and 

flexible political environment in which opposition 

views, including those of moderate Islamists, are aired 

peacefully. While not without problems, the balanced 

approach taken by Mali and Senegal, combining political legitimacy and inclusivity with robust security 

institutions, has proven effective in maintaining stability while mitigating extremism.

THE FRAGILITY-EXTREMISM NEXUS

Islamism is a complicated ideology, and its interaction with national politics and the state only 

adds to the complexity. Nevertheless, as experiences in Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia, Mali, 

and Senegal demonstrate, certain patterns emerge. 

States with capable security sectors, such as Egypt 

and Algeria, make violence a costly strategy, driving a wedge between moderates and extremists by 

prompting the former to renounce violence. By contrast, in states that are unable to provide adequate 

security, moderates may adopt violent strategies to 

capitalize on the public’s desire for stability and to 

defend themselves from those who take up arms. 

Indeed, where no overarching authority can punish 

those using violence for political means, all politics 

is likely to become violent. This enables extremists 

to find common cause with moderates without any 

change in either group’s underlying ideologies.

Such political gains make extremists much 

more influential in failed states than in stable ones. 

That influence allows them to frustrate subsequent 

stabilization efforts. Somalia’s al Shabaab is a prime 

example of this phenomenon. Having exploited the 

state’s weakness to form coalitions with moderate Islamists and gain backing, or at least acquiescence, 

from non-Islamist leaders, the group continues to 

forcefully resist efforts to rebuild the Somali state, 

in part because al Shabaab recognizes that its influence would decline dramatically in a stable society. 

In contrast, while Nigeria is in many ways a deficient 

state, it has sufficiently capable institutions to make 

violence a costly strategy for extremists. Armed resistance would provoke a powerful government response 

and cost moderates the influence they enjoy within 

the current system.

But state strength alone provides only a temporary fix to the threat of extremists. The Egyptian and 

Algerian states maintain their control with heavyhanded methods and have accumulated poor human 

rights records. Their brutal approach, however, further 

radicalizes extremists, pushing them toward al Qaeda. 

With their moderate members sheared off, prospects 

for domestic political gains slim, and their own passions hardened by conflict, imprisonment, and torture, extremists have more reason than ever to join 

the global jihad.

By contrast, Mali and Senegal provide plenty of 

room for Islamists to pursue their agendas within a 

“where no overarching authority 

can punish those using violence 

for political means, all politics is 

likely to become violent”
7

transparent, democratic political framework. As a result, moderate Islamic leaders in both countries are 

invested in the status quo and see little reason to 

undermine the government. While both countries 

have faced some largely externally driven security 

challenges, their reasonably capable security forces 

have wisely refrained from indiscriminate responses 

against Islamists. This reinforces the credibility of 

the state while ensuring that neither extremists nor 

state responses to them damage the accommodation 

between moderates and government.

S TA B I L I Z I N G A N D S U P P O R T I N G F R A G I L E 

STATES TO COUNTER EXTREMISM

A key lesson from this analysis is that proactively 

strengthening fragile states is a strategic investment 

with payoffs for both stability and narrowing the 

space available for extremists. This means that counterextremism and counterterrorism strategies in Africa cannot be separated from building stronger, more 

legitimate states. Moreover, stabilizing fragile states 

is not just a matter of building security institutions 

but a multisectoral effort. As the cases of Mali and 

Senegal demonstrate, legitimacy counts enormously. 

Creating inclusive environments empowers moderate 

Islamists relative to extremists. This is the case even 

in low-income states.

When confronting extremist threats, Africa’s 

leaders should adopt a nuanced approach that combines aggressive but consistent law enforcement 

against true extremists while maintaining nonviolent 

political options for moderates. A vibrant religious 

civil society with the right of political participation 

will draw most Islamists away from violence. Meanwhile, a reliable security apparatus will prevent extremists from sabotaging these peaceful accommodations and imposing violent politics on non-Islamists 

and Islamists alike.

Where extremists in failed states pose an international threat, external military intervention or 

individual strikes provide only short-lived results. 

Counterterrorism operations alone do not address 

the opening that state weakness offers violent extremists to expand their influence. Indeed, such 

strikes or operations without concurrent and sustained efforts to stabilize failed states can backfire. 

This was the case in Somalia where, despite the 

Ethiopian army’s vastly superior military power, 

blunt and indiscriminate tactics were extremely 

unpopular among the Somali public. It had the 

long-term effect of generating more popular support for al Shabaab than it could have earned on 

its own while simultaneously pushing extremists 

toward al Qaeda. 

Stabilization efforts must also be careful to 

protect civilian lives and respect local institutions. 

Where residents have established their own security 

arrangements, stabilization actors should work with 

them even—and perhaps especially—if they are operated by moderate Islamists. By cooperating with such 

forces, governments gain influential local partners 

while simultaneously empowering moderates and 

pulling them away from extremists.

These policies will expose the ideological gap 

between extremists and the rest of society. Left 

alone at society’s margins, intractable extremists 

will be dangerous in their reliance on violence but 

politically weak. Carefully targeted law enforcement, which respects civilians and moderates, can 

contain these individuals without abusing the innocent, radicalizing the moderate, or exporting 

the extremist.

NOTES

1

 The FSI is a joint effort of the Fund for Peace and Foreign 

Policy that produces an annual ranking of world states based on 12 

measures of weakness and the risk of collapse: available at <www.

fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie

w&id=452&Itemid=900>.

2

 Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone are other “at-risk” African countries with 

large Muslim populations.

3

 Monty Marshall, “Conflict Trends in Africa, 1946–2004: 

A Macro-Comparative Perspective,” Center for Systemic Peace, 

2005. 

4

 Lauren Vriens, “Backgrounder: Armed Islamic Group,” 

Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved June 13, 2010 from <www.

cfr.org/publication/9154/armed_islamic_group_algeria_islamists.

html>.

5

 “Council Donates Materials to Hisbah,” Daily Trust, September 19, 2008. 
8

6

 “Sharia Council Cautions Government over Local Enforcement,” Vanguard, July 2, 2001.

7

 Conerly Carole Casey, “‘Marginal Muslims’: Politics and the Perceptual Bounds of Islamic Authenticity in Northern Nigeria,” 

Africa Today 54, no. 3 (Spring 2008), 86–87.

8

 “Northern Govs Meet, Condemn Boko Haram Crisis,” Vanguard, August 4, 2009.

9

 David Gutelius, “Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 25, no. 1 (January 

2007), 64–65, 71–72.

10 “Mali Army ‘takes al-Qaeda base,’” BBC, June 17, 2009.

11 M. Sani Umar, “Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa: Overcoming the Dichotomies,” in Islam and the Public Sphere in Africa, 

Selected Proceedings of a Conference Organized by The Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Program of 

African Studies, Souleymane Bachir Diagne and M. Sani Umar, eds. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, May 17–19, 2007), 1–8.

12 Leonardo A. Villalón, “Senegal: Shades of Islamism in a Sufi Landscape,” in W.F.S. Miles, ed., Political Islam in West Africa: 

State-Society Relations Transformed (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 171–176.

13 Alexander Thurston, “Why Is Militant Islam a Weak Phenomenon in Senegal?” in Diagne and Umar, 1–8.

14 Ibid., 11–13.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

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