Air University

Donald A. Lamontagne, Lt Gen, Commander

Air War College

Bentley B. Rayburn, Maj Gen, Commandant

Stephen O. Fought, PhD, Dean

Lawrence E. Grinter, PhD, Series Editor

Frederick Strain, Col, Essay Advisor

Air University Press

Shirley B. Laseter, DPA, Director

John E. Jordan, Content Editor

Lula Barnes, Copy Editor

Prepress Production: Mary Ferguson

Cover Design: Daniel Armstrong

Please send inquiries or comments to

Editor

The Maxwell Papers

325 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1401

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427

Tel: (334) 953-7074

Fax: (334) 953-1988

E-mail: lawrence.grinter@maxwell.af.mil
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Operation Allied Force

Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns

MICHAEL W. LAMB SR.

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 27

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

August 2002
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the AU Press Web site http://au

press.maxwell.af.mil and the Air University Research

Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force

(OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of

lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from

this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden

nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed,

there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the

campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of

intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions

that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the

spectrum of military operations. 

Colonel Lamb’s examination of some key lessons

learned provides nuggets that airmen need to remember in

future campaigns. From the coalition operations and organization to targeting, from logistics to rapid response

contingencies, these lessons are essential elements to be

remembered in future campaigns. Each of these nuggets

suggests discussion points for war fighters and planners.

They are not intended to be critical, but to raise questions

and suggest areas that should be examined and debated

as part of the campaign planning process. The questions

are the end items of an analysis of the lessons derived from

OAF. Many of the lessons raised in this analysis are tough

ones, but they should frame the strategic and operational

issues to pursue during the course of any postconflict examination. All persons involved in this process must put

aside parochial differences and personal pride, and answer

the questions honestly. Duty to our nation demands nothing less.

Each war is different, and OAF was especially so. While

it was chiefly an operation conducted from air and space,

that does not mean that ground forces have now been relegated to secondary status or rendered obsolete. Hardly

so. One must be cautious not to draw the wrong conclusions, particularly as the Department of Defense undergoes transformation.

OAF was successful largely because of the flexibility and

training of a well-disciplined and joint team of soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines. Though successful, enough uncomfortable lessons turn up from the OAF experience to

iii
suggest that instead of attributing the success of OAF

solely to airpower’s solo performance, students and practitioners of air and space warfare should give careful

thought to the hard work that lies ahead to bring to

fruition air and space power’s fullest potential in joint and

combined warfare. The experiences in OAF indicate the

need to continuously improve our strategy development

and campaign planning. When one takes a look back at the

OAF campaign, its most notable and distinct accomplishment was not that Slobadon Milosevic finally withdrew his

forces from Kosovo, but rather that air and space power

prevailed despite senior leaders’ reluctance to take major

risks and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance

held together.

As with all Maxwell Papers, we encourage discussion

and debate of Colonel Lamb’s important lessons––golden

nuggets––from Operation Allied Force.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Michael W. “Chox” Lamb Sr. is currently the commander of the 66th Mission Support Squadron at

Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts. His Air Force career includes tours in space and missile research and development engineering, technical engineering, flight-test

engineering, intelligence operations and assessments, the

National Intelligence Council, and the Air Force Doctrine

Center and as an executive officer. Colonel Lamb has participated in or launched some 86 missile systems for research tests, including Atlas, Thor, Minuteman I, Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper. He is the Air

Force’s only fully qualified technical engineer on Minuteman I, Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper

missile systems. While attached to the 410th Bombardment Wing, he performed duties as a flight-test engineer

responsible for developing new operational tactics for the

B-52 Stratofortress and saw action in Operation Desert

Storm. As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s

(DIA) Science and Technology Advisory Board, his hallmark performance on time-sensitive critical national intelligence issues was recognized with DIA’s highest award,

the Director’s Medal. As chairman of the Science and

Technology Intelligence Committee for Collections, National Intelligence Council, he published the “Science and

Technology Gaps Study” and created an interactive database that provided analysts up-to-date databases for detailed intelligence assessments for which he received the

Director for Central Intelligence Medal of Merit. Colonel

Lamb is uniquely qualified to write on the lessons from Operation Allied Force due to his deployment to Joint Forge

where he authored the report to Congress and subsequently incorporated many of the lessons learned into joint

and Air Force doctrine publications. He also coauthored

the White Paper on “Effects Based Operations” as part of

the 2001 CSAF Billy Mitchell Doctrine Symposium. He has

a master’s degree from West Coast University in astronautical engineering and from the Air War College (AWC) in national security studies. He is a graduate of the AWC Class

of 2002.

v
Operation Allied Force

Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns

Operation Allied Force was a conclusive NATO and American

military success.

—Gen Henry H. Shelton

—Chairman

—Joint Chiefs of Staff

Operation Allied Force (OAF) provides the United States

and our allies an opportunity to glean valuable insights

about military operations as this century unfolds. As Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated, “Kosovo . . . illuminates in many ways how America and our allies and

adversaries are going to approach the art of war well into

the next century.”1

OAF was a successful undertaking. In fact, it was an extraordinarly successful military campaign by almost any

measure. The operation achieved its stated strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and more. It has been called

the “most precise and lowest collateral damage” air campaign

in history. A total of 38,004 sorties were flown with all but

two aircraft returning safely during 78 days of around-theclock operations.2 It is not difficult to argue that OAF was

successful. The Serbs left Kosovo and the killing ended,

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are enforcing the peace, and refugees eventually returned to their villages and towns. 

However, like any military operation, there are many lessons—golden nuggets—that need to be learned and applied

to future campaigns. Of note, each war is different, and OAF

was especially so. While it was primarily an air campaign,

that does not suggest that land forces, “boots on the ground”

will now be relegated to lesser status or rendered out of date.

After OAF ended, airpower’s detractors lost no time in seeking to denigrate NATO’s achievement. For example, Lt Gen

William Odom, USA, retired, charged that “this war didn’t do

anything to vindicate airpower. It didn’t stop the ethnic

cleansing, and it didn’t remove Milosevic”—as though those

were ever the expected goals of NATO’s airpower employment

to begin with.3 Yet, because of the air war’s ultimate success

1
in forcing Slobodan Milosevic to yield to NATO’s demands,

the predominant tendency among most outside observers

was to characterize it as a watershed achievement for airpower. One needs to be cautious not to draw the wrong conclusions, particularly as the Department of Defense (DOD)

and its services embark upon a new round of transformation,

shifting from a threat-based planning model to a capabilitiesbased model.

NATO proved to be flexible and adaptable during one of the

most challenging times in its history. Despite the pronouncements of skeptics and critics, the alliance held together and proved its unity, resolve, and ability to defend its

interests and values. Despite domestic pressure, geopolitical

concerns over relations with Russia and China, refugee problems, and collateral damage, the nations of the alliance held

firm and saw the operation through to a successful conclusion. Furthermore, 14 of 19 alliance members contributed

forces to the operation, totaling 305 aircraft that flew more

than 15,000 sorties.4 Just as important, the alliance demonstrated the dramatic ability to quickly transform from the

role of the war fighter to the role of the peacekeeper with the

rapid implementation of the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force

(KFOR) immediately following the cessation of hostilities.

There is much to be learned from the operation. The problems and questions arising out of OAF are many and cut

across the spectrum of military operations. The efforts of

OAF were successful primarily because of the flexible application of joint doctrine and training by a well-disciplined and

cooperative team of soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines.

The Campaign

The OAF campaign was not a traditional military conflict. There was no direct clash of massed military forces.

President Slobodan Milosevic of the Former Republic of

Yugoslavia (FRY) was unable to challenge superior allied

military capabilities directly. Therefore, he chose to fight

chiefly through indirect means by

1. use of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians,

2. attempts to exploit the premium the alliance placed on

minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage,

2 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
3. creation of enormous refugee flows to create a humanitarian crisis, and

4. the conduct of disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

Milosevic’s military forces were forced into hiding throughout most of the campaign, staying in caves and tunnels and

under the cover of forest, village, or weather. He was forced

to conserve his antiaircraft missile defenses to sustain his

challenge to our air campaign. He chose his tactics in the

hope of exploiting our legitimate political concerns about target selection, collateral damage, and military operations

against enemy forces intermingled with civilian refugees. His

ultimate goal was coalition disunity; however, he failed despite all these efforts. 

At the outset of the air campaign, NATO’s mission statement was to “conduct air operations against military targets

throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to attack Serbian capability to continue repressive actions against ethnic

Albanians in Kosovo.”5 From this mission statement, NATO

set specific strategic objectives for its use of force in Kosovo

that later served as the basis for its stated conditions to Milosevic for stopping the bombing. These objectives were to

1. deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his

attacks on helpless civilians and create conditions to

reverse his ethnic cleansing and

2. damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo

in the future or spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military

operations.6

At the outset of the campaign, Milosevic was not deterred from escalating the ethnic cleansing. Although there

were expectations on the part of some that this would be a

short campaign, the United States made clear to our allied

counterparts that OAF could well take weeks or months to

succeed and that the operation should only be initiated if

all were willing to persist until success was achieved. Alliance leaders agreed in advance that if the initial strikes

did not attain NATO’s goals, NATO would have to persist

and indeed expand its air campaign.

LAMB 3
Originally, OAF was planned to be prosecuted in five

phases under NATO’s operational plan, which had been in

development since the summer of 1998.

• Phase 1 – Deployment of air assets. 

• Phase 2 – Establish air superiority over Kosovo and

degrade command and control over the whole of the

FRY. 

• Phase 3 – Attack military targets in Kosovo and those

FRY forces south of 44 degrees north latitude, which

were providing reinforcement to Serbian forces into

Kosovo. This was to allow targeting of forces not only

in Kosovo but also in the FRY south of Belgrade.

• Phase 4 – Expand air operations against a wide range

of high-value military and security force targets

throughout the FRY.

• Phase 5 – Redeploy forces as required.7 

A limited air response relying predominantly on cruise

missiles to strike selected targets throughout the FRY was

developed as a stand-alone option and was integrated into

phase 2. Within a few days of the start of NATO’s campaign,

alliance aircraft were striking both strategic and tactical

targets throughout Serbia as well as working to suppress

and disrupt the FRY’s integrated air defense system. 

During OAF, US diplomacy had several objectives. The

first was to ensure that NATO remained united and firm.

To this end, the president, the secretary of state, and other

US officials spoke almost daily with NATO counterparts

throughout the 78-day campaign. NATO unity and resolve

not only remained firm but also strengthened overtime. At

the NATO Summit in Washington on 23 April 1999, alliance

leaders approved intensifying the air campaign; allowed

the target set to include military-industrial infrastructure,

media, and other strategic targets; and announced the deployment of additional aircraft.8 The alliance also clearly

outlined its political conditions to end the operation. As

proclaimed in the NATO Statement on Kosovo, President

Milosevic had to

1. ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the

immediate end of violence and repression in Kosovo,

4 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
2. withdraw his military, police, and paramilitary forces

from Kosovo,

3. agree to the stationing of an international military

presence in Kosovo,

4. agree to the unconditional and safe return of all

refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations, and

5. provide credible assurance of his willingness to work

for the establishment of a political framework based

on the Rambouillet accords.9

The second US diplomatic objective was to help directly

effected countries deal with the humanitarian crisis and to

prevent the conflict from widening. To this end, the secretary of state was in regular contact with her counterparts

from the region. The United States, its NATO allies, and, in

fact, many other countries and nongovernmental organizations from around the world contributed immense

amounts of emergency assistance to help meet the needs

of the tide of refugees then pouring out of Kosovo into

neighboring countries.10

The third US diplomatic objective was to work constructively with Russia. History will show that, after a somewhat

rocky start, the relationships between the United States

and Russia, and between the NATO alliance and Russia,

over the issue of Kosovo were maintained effectively over

the course of operations. While there continued to be

sharp differences with Russia over the conflict itself and

the kind of international presence that would be required

in Kosovo after the conflict ended, these differences did not

preclude agreement on the conditions that Belgrade would

have to meet to bring an end to the air campaign or indeed

on the roles for Russian army units in the NATO-led

KFOR.11

In the end, NATO proved to be flexible, effective, and ultimately successful during a uniquely challenging time in

its history. Despite domestic pressures in many NATO nations, an enormous humanitarian crisis, and isolated instances of unintentional collateral damage, the nations of

the alliance held firm and saw the operation through to a

successful conclusion. 

LAMB 5
Some say that working within NATO unduly constrained

US military forces from getting the job done quickly and effectively. It was no surprise that conducting a military campaign through an alliance would be a challenge. Nevertheless, OAF could not have been conducted without the NATO

alliance or without the infrastructure, transit and basing access, host-nation force contributions, and, most importantly,

political and diplomatic support provided by the allies and

other members of the coalition. These immense contributions from NATO allies and partners, particularly those nations near the theater of conflict—Hungary, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and others—were in large part a

dividend of sustained US and NATO engagement with those

nations over the previous few years. This engagement, including vigorous participation in Partnership for Peace activities, helped to stabilize institutions in these nations so they

were better able to withstand the tremendous burden inflicted upon them by the humanitarian crisis and the conduct of the operation itself. 

Admittedly, gaining agreement among the 19 NATO nations was not easy and was achieved only through considerable dialogue and diplomacy. After the air war ended, Secretary of Defense Cohen conceded in a statement to the

Senate Armed Services Committee, “It was very difficult

to take 19 different countries and get an effective campaign under way without some bumps in the road.” Cohen

concluded the alliance was “slow, in some cases too slow,

to achieve a consensus” and labeled the problem as “selfinflicted wounds in asymmetric warfare.”12 However, NATO

held together and that became its greatest strength. It is

true that there were differences of opinion within the alliance, and this is to be expected in an alliance of democracies. But building consensus generally leads to sounder

decisions. If NATO—as an institution—had not responded

to this crisis, it would have meant that the world’s most

powerful alliance was unwilling to act when confronted

with serious threats to common interests on its own doorstep. 

It is important to remember that the alliance had been

addressing this crisis through diplomatic activities and

military planning for some time before the onset of the military campaign itself. Because NATO had been engaged in

6 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
trying to settle this conflict before military operations commenced; because it had conducted planning for the operation itself; because of its member nations’ respect for differences of opinion and the need for consensus; and, simply,

because the alliance is the most effective existing means

for addressing European security issues; it was both natural and inevitable that the United States would work

through NATO. Without the direct support of our NATO allies and key coalition partners, the campaign would not

have been possible. There are, of course, golden nuggets to

be found for our decision-making processes during crises

and for alliance capabilities, but we must not forget the

fact that NATO stood up to the challenge and succeeded.

Lessons learned from OAF will be gleaned for several

years to come. The golden nuggets that follow are just a

few, but they will be vital to our success in future crises,

especially those that include coalition operations. Some of

these lessons we may have forgotten from previous operations, and we must relearn them; others will carry us forward into this new century and help us to meet future

challenges. 

Golden Nuggets

It will be virtually impossible to use the devastating power of

modern military forces in coalition operations to the fullest extent.

—Gen Klaus Naumann

—DSACEUR and 

—Chairman, NATO Military Committee

This section discusses 13 lessons learned from Operation Allied Force in detail. For the reader’s convenience,

the golden nuggets and the discussion are summarized in

the appendix to this paper. 

1. Alliances and coalition forces are only as strong as

their weakest elements.

Having to get approval for targets from 19 different nations with varying levels of commitment to the operation

made targeting difficult. The varying levels of commitment

to the operation also led to security concerns that drove

LAMB 7
the implementation of parallel NATO and US-only planning

and air tasking order (ATO) processes.

OAF was a comprehensive coalition effort. Although the

US contribution constituted the vast majority of the effort,

14 nations contributed forces to the effort, providing 305

aircraft that flew more than 15,000 sorties.13 Furthermore,

allied support was critical regarding host-nation support

for basing and overflight access. The alliance sustained 78

days of around-the-clock operations, with 38,004 sorties

flown while losing only two aircraft to hostile fire.14 Both

pilots were successfully rescued. The campaign achieved

the most precise targeting results with the lowest collateral

damage in history. OAF was a success; it met the campaign objectives of the commander in chief (CINC) and the

joint force commander (JFC).

While recognizing that “gaining consensus among 19

democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved

through discussion and compromise” and that “there were

differences of opinion within the alliance,” both Secretary

Cohen and Gen Henry H. Shelton stressed that “the NATO

alliance is also our greatest strength.”15 They also noted

that “building consensus generally leads to sounder decisions.”16 Every alliance nation has its own interests and

viewpoint based on its history, tradition, economic development, and other considerations. The key in alliance or

coalition building is to find the common ground and reach

consensus. 

Gen Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander, Europe

(SACEUR), acknowledged that “every single nation had a

domestic political constituency, and every single nation

had a different set of political problems. In some there

were government coalitions. In others there were historic

relationships. Some bore the agony of defeat in a previous

conflict and the word ‘war’ couldn’t be mentioned. Others

were long-standing partners with American efforts elsewhere in the world.”17 However, he also noted that “despite

their differences, the allies pulled together and their cohesion and resolution got stronger.”18

General Clark also noted despite differences among alliance members that hindered the conduct of “a more

rapid, overwhelming campaign with more strike power,”

the fact remained that “sustaining unity in the face of ef8 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
forts to destabilize the countries around Yugoslavia, a sustained propaganda campaign, ethnic cleansing, and the efforts of certain nations to halt our actions sent a powerful

message to the international community [which was] that

NATO stood together, we could win, and we would win.”19

With regard to the use of force Clark said, “Once the

threshold is crossed and you are going to use force, that

force has to be as decisive as possible in attaining your

military objects.”20 However, he also observed that with regard to OAF, the consensus of 19 nations was required to

approve action, and many countries had preconceptions

about how to apply force. 

Gen Klaus Naumann, former deputy supreme allied commander, Europe (DSACEUR) and chairman of the NATO Military Committee, confirmed General Clark’s views stating

that to conduct coalition operations one has “to accept that

the pace and the intensity of military operations will be determined by the lowest common denominator and that there

will be restrictions due to differing national legislation.” General Naumann also pointed out that coalitions have difficulty

responding rapidly to situations when, as he put it, “The

slowest ship determines the speed of the convoy.”21

2. Timely tactical and operational intelligence is a constant requirement.

There has to be a commitment to acquire aircraft which are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft—the socalled ISR. We had a shortage of that capability and when you

have a shortage of that capability; it also impacts on your ability to deliver precision-guided munitions. So the two act in concert.

—William S. Cohen

—Secretary of Defense

For coercive operations to be successful, relevant, timely,

and predictive, intelligence is required. Knowing what would

cause Milosevic to back down was a problem right from the

start of OAF. It was the majority opinion within NATO that

three days of punitive strikes would be enough to force Milosevic to concede, but the majority was wrong. 

Collection and battle management of air and space intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets were extremely effective, but there were shortfalls in the number and

LAMB 9
capability of platforms, communications, and personnel that

limited intelligence capabilities. These shortfalls allowed for

situational awareness but often came up short on target-level

information. The coalition was largely unable to “see the battlefield” to the detail needed to impact the operations of Serb

ground forces.

All US service components have shortfalls in trained intelligence analysts, particularly in imagery interpreters and linguists. These shortfalls hampered intelligence support to

force protection, threat warning, targeting, battle damage assessment (BDA), and situational awareness. They highlight

the need for increased theater ISR platforms, a dedicated ISR

communications structure, and more trained personnel to

provide intelligence support to operations across the full

spectrum of conflict.

3. Gaining and maintaining the initiative in the information operations arena, especially public affairs,

are critical.

IO was both a “great success . . . and perhaps the greatest failure of the war.” IO is “not yet understood by war fighters [and

is] classified beyond their access.” A property executed information operation “could have halved the length of the campaign.”

—Adm James Ellis Jr.

—Commander

—Joint Task Force Noble Anvil

Despite OAF being called one of the most precise air operations ever and having one of the lowest collateral damage to

bombs dropped ratios in history, Milosevic took the initiative

in the information operations (IO) arena by exploiting the few

instances of collateral damage. In what might be labeled the

“moral hardening of targets,” he flooded the media with pictures and information portraying the effects on the civilian

populace. Public affairs (PA) needs to be part of the planning

from the beginning. Commanders need to involve PA early in

the campaign planning process, even before the start of the

operation, and they must stay ahead of the crisis event curve

by dealing with bad news openly, quickly, and accurately

(e.g., the Chinese Embassy bombing).

Information operations played a major role in OAF. The

Serbian “information isolation” strategy and well-practiced

10 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
propaganda campaign limited our ability to influence the

Serbian population against its leadership. On the opposite

side, our IO efforts maintained strong resolve within NATO

and contributed significantly toward FRY capitulation.22

National IO policy and resource limitations precluded a robust, continuous IO campaign in advance of hostilities. An

earlier, more comprehensive IO campaign led by an interagency team might have contributed to earlier compliance

with the March 1999 Rambouillet accord.

Information operations must be fully integrated into all

theater operations and engagement plans. These need to

be thoroughly detailed in deliberate and crisis action plans

as well as becoming an essential part of all exercises. We

must restructure our organizations to incorporate IO considerations and tactics at every level. IO should be imbedded within all campaign plans. When a crisis develops, information operations should be part of the operation in

every aspect, from policy discussions to routine logistical

efforts.

During an actual crisis or operation, information operations planning must be continuous. Channels of communication must be exercised daily. Constant feedback is required to determine means and methods that are having

the greatest effect (i.e., a form of IO battle damage assessment). In addition, we need to address organizational

structure, as these efforts will require additional permanent IO manning throughout.

A capability to intrude on the propaganda machine that

holds such regimes as Milosevic’s in power needs to be developed, exploited, and enhanced. Better programming

that will capture an audience is required if the IO effort is

to be more than a technology oddity for the targeted population. Through satellite systems, or more powerful airborne systems, this capability can be extended, allowing

for complete disruption of enemy propaganda and the injection of truthful information across an entire country.

Overall effectiveness of IO is difficult to assess. However,

the fact that by the end of OAF Milosevic had to contend

with revolt in some of his cities and discontent within the

ranks of his armed forces (themes advanced by the leaflet

and broadcast campaign) is impossible to overlook.

LAMB 11
Early synchronization of alliance IO capabilities and

greater alliance interoperability, combined with an established mechanism to provide a type of BDA of IO and psychological operations methods, will allow adjustments as the

campaign progresses and will greatly improve IO effectiveness. We need to include IO measures of effectiveness (MOE)

and IO BDA requirements during planning at every echelon

and to ensure that IO MOE and BDA requirements are resourced and tasked in intelligence collection plans and

tracked during execution. We should leverage existing technology and software to create unitary BDA reporting and

tracking that incorporates target data, target folder, reconnaissance data, mission data and reports, and combat video. 

Admiral Ellis noted, “One important lesson learned is that

IO should not be confined solely to periods of crisis or conflict. Rather, IO activities should be continuous and must be

integrated with campaign plans and targeting activities from

their inception. The cessation of hostilities does not result in

an end to IO planning and execution; rather, it simply signals

the commencement of a new phase. Maintaining a robust IO

during peacetime can potentially avert a crisis and the need

for combat. Maintaining continuous IO ensures the presentation of a consistent message, regardless of the mode, which

is critical to success.”23

Thus, we should ensure all operational plans (OPLAN),

concept plans (CONPLAN), and functional plans (FUNCPLAN)

have a complete and integrated IO plan in their annexes. We

should include IO in all exercises under various conditions

that include operations under severe information degradation. Plans must include defining end-states, especially after

cessation of hostilities, which in IO often will flow from the

post-hostilities phase into the redeployment phase. 

4. No matter how wedded to strategic targeting the

combined forces air component commander is, if the

CINC, president, or secretary of defense is not supportive, it will not work.

Once the threshold is crossed and you are going to use force,

that force has to be as decisive as possible to attaining your

military objects.

—Gen Wesley Clark

—SACEUR

12 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
The combined forces air component commander

(CFACC) during OAF wanted to conduct a hard-hitting

strategic operation right from the start. Facing political necessity, the CINC and the political leadership constrained

the CFACC. As the operation continued and it became apparent that incrementalism was not the answer, splintering appeared between the CFACC and the CINC. In the

end, the CFACC, as the subordinate, must know when to

salute smartly and then conduct the operation within the

guidance.

It must be noted that at no time in the OAF target development process did targeting personnel shy away from selecting targets because they were considered unlikely to receive approval due to risk or political sensitivity. Under joint

doctrine the target development process considers all potential facilities that meet CINC objectives and guidance.24 These

facilities make up what is characterized as a master target

file (MTF). Following MTF development in OAF, a full workup

that contained an assessment of military significance and

collateral damage, including unintended civilian casualty estimates (UCCE), was done for each target. At this point, all of

the MTF targets were forwarded to the JFC and ultimately to

the CINC, who passed them to US, NATO, and allied political

leadership for approval. 

The United States needs to conduct a complete review of

the benefits of effects-based operations as a method to

more effectively achieve the desired outcome. No matter how

quickly the military decision cycle can be completed (target

approval to strike), it will always be governed by the speed

of the political decision cycle. This is truer for an alliance/

coalition where decisions can be cumbersome. Any future

agile and intelligent enemy will understand this. 

The United States must examine the targeting process

and determine areas where the process can be streamlined

and speeded up. This may require improving the system

for target approval at the highest levels as encountered

during OAF. Improvements in this process could be accomplished through preapproved target packages, essentially getting all targets identified prior to execution, or

through scheduling high-level target review on a regular

basis, so the operational commander would know in a

matter of hours vice days whether a target was approved.

LAMB 13
Another approach to speeding target approval would be to

delegate this authority to the operational commander as

much as possible. Limited target approval authority was

granted to the commander in chief, Europe (CINCEUR),

after two weeks of the OAF campaign. This streamlined the

approval process and allowed the operational commander

more flexibility on the battlefield, but it still complicated

prosecution of targets. 

The United States cannot limit itself in future conflicts to

an air-only targeting methodology. True effects-based targeting needs to include provisions for target engagement by all

available systems to preclude unnecessary lengthening of the

conflict. Multiple-Launch Rocket System, attack helicopter,

gunship, naval gunfire, and special operations forces all need

to be included in the targeting process when available. Our

goal in any conflict is to end the conflict as quickly as possible on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Artificially limiting the resources available to the combatant

commander only lengthens the conflict and makes the

enemy’s job less complicated.

As a final point, target approval decisions were based on

an unproven method of determining unintended civilian casualty estimates that continually overestimated the number

of civilians at risk. This potentially discouraged approval of

valid military targets. There is a need for a formalized UCCE

methodology using actual civilian casualties from OAF, along

the lines of the tier analysis used for collateral damage, to

allow decisions to be based on more realistic estimates.

5. Proper preparation of war-fighting commanders is

critical.

“Combat is not the first time for one to train in new procedures. Training should be accomplished before engagement.”25 Commanders need to be as well versed in how to

conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) as

they are in conducting unlimited conventional war. The

highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and politically

motivated targeting process implemented during OAF

more closely resembled MOOTW than the level of effort

otherwise indicated by the Air Force. In fact, Air Force

leadership felt that the level of effort was the equivalent of

a major theater war in terms of assets used. 

14 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
Air Force Lt Gen Marvin R. Esmond noted, “The sum

total of OAF and ongoing contingency operations equaled a

Major Theater of War (MTW) level of effort for many portions of the Air Force. The combined effects of a smaller

force structure, reduced forward basing, and a high level

of ongoing steady-state contingency operations created severe and lasting impacts on some USAF units and personnel.”26 The CFACC and the planners in the combined air

operations center (CAOC) had difficulty applying their

training for war, strategic attack, and effects-based operations to this MOOTW scenario. Operations in the future

are more likely to resemble OAF than Operation Desert

Storm, highlighting the need for more preparation.

Joint Task Force Noble Anvil was not formed around a

predesignated (and trained) theater staff. In fact, our models have focused on training and planning for “three star”

joint force air component commanders (JFACC) only, but

major coalition operations of this magnitude require decisive and senior US leadership “(four star).” Allied Forces

Southern Europe/commander US Naval Forces, Europe

(AFSOUTH/CNE) was uniquely positioned to synchronize

US and alliance operations in this operation, and the commander in chief, US Naval Forces, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) staff, largely surface-centric, formed the core

cadre. This was an effective measure, even though OAF

was mainly an air-centric operation, but it was not optimal

and shows the need for changes in manning, infrastructure, and training. 

Planning should include fully functional joint task force

(JTF) and component staffs using preidentified facilities

with necessary connectivity and standardized operating

procedures. An augmentee database and training program

should also be developed to more quickly transition into a

task force and facilitate deployment schedules. One crucial

factor is that these JTFs also have a predeveloped and detailed information management plan and a command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) facility that includes the staff, components, and alliance

members.

6. Logistics is a key concern for an expeditionary

force.

LAMB 15
Conducting military operations in far-away places with technology and tactics that greatly reduce the potential for loss of

American lives is necessary, but expensive. It consumes supplies, wears out equipment, and tests the ingenuity of even the

best-trained military in the world.

—Lt Gen John W. Handy

—Deputy Chief of Staff

—Installations and Logistics

As OAF grew in intensity and the restrictions on collateral damage became tighter, stocks of precision-guided

munitions (PGM) were quickly depleted, putting a strain on

the supply system. Use of older weapon systems with their

higher maintenance costs also stresses the supply chain,

which can impede effectiveness. An additional burden on

the logistics system occurred because of the long distances

tankers had to fly as well as their reliability. To ensure

strike packages were supported, extra tankers had to be

launched, depleting fuel and tanker parts. 

Munitions supply/resupply met the needs of OAF. However, shortages were developing in precision munitions, especially with respect to joint direct attack munitions

(JDAM), AGM-130s, and shipboard supplies. If the air

campaign had continued for more than 30 additional days,

the complete depletion of the US inventory of these munitions would have resulted. 

When the in-theater requirement is expanded to what a

MTW would require, resupply capability is a major concern.

This issue attracted Joint Staff attention because the requirements during operations diverted PGM stocks from

other CINC regions. It was also raised at the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment and Joint Requirements Council reviews. 

Finally, the Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System (JOPES) does not currently provide inherent visibility on what capability has closed from a deploying force.

When a unit line number (ULN) is used to represent a unit,

the ULN does not show closed in JOPES until the entire

ULN is closed. Senior leadership requires a process to rapidly determine what specific forces of a unit have closed.

Such a process would allow for an exact determination of

when a unit is combat ready and highlights a need for improvements in in-transit visibility (ITV) capabilities. There

16 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
are currently insufficient doctrine, policy, and plans for intratheater ITV and a lack of theater infrastructure to support ITV. Inability to capture data accurately and expeditiously at the source is a major impediment to achieving

ITV and asset visibility. The lack of theater ITV doctrine

and supporting policy leads to ad hoc planning that results

in fragmented theater ITV. Lack of adequate feeder systems and associated communications support preclude

timely capture and transmission of ITV data to the Global

Transportation Network (GTN). Lack of data or delays in

receiving data, in turn, adversely affected airfield and seaport planning and management.

7. Basing is a primary concern for expeditionary

forces.

As noted by the National Audit Office, in OAF even a

comparatively small force of strike aircraft—the equivalent

of just two squadrons—needed a surprising number of

bases. “Although each basing decision may have made

sense individually, as a whole the result was to complicate

support.”27 Global reach can reduce the need for forward

bases but not completely. Gaining access to adequate

bases is a fundamental requirement for success for an expeditionary force. However, with access come potential restrictions. Host nations maintain veto power over US aircraft operating out of bases on their soil. Also, bases that

the United States had access to were often far from the

fight, putting a strain upon aircraft, aircrew, planners, and

the logistics system.

The United States has dramatically decreased its overseas basing of military forces since the end of the Cold War.

Consequently, the success of US military operations

around the world often hinges on the combat capability of

the few forces already in theater and on US ability to rapidly deploy forces to distant conflicts or hot spots. For very

small operations, a deployment of forces from within the

theater might be adequate. However, such large campaigns

as OAF require deployment of military units from the continental United States (CONUS) or from other theaters to

augment the forces on hand. In such situations, transportation planners must rapidly develop movement schedules for the deployment of these forces. For OAF, planners

LAMB 17
drew upon forces deployed worldwide, including forces

based in the United States. Even with an extremely compressed planning timeline for the operation and vast distances to move, the deployment of US forces to OAF was,

from an overall standpoint, successful.

Bedding down and employing such a massive force were

challenging. Despite Partnership for Peace, NATO, and

other organizations, there were issues that, although eventually solved, initially delayed or beleaguered operations.

Host-nation support is a complex, diverse, and diplomatic

long term set of negotiations that, in many cases, are often

never satisfactorily finalized. Avoiding these problems in

future conflicts could be possible by developing appropriate checklists to ensure international agreements address

critical host-nation support for military plans and contingencies. Suggestions for the content of such a checklist,

though not exhaustive, include designated points of entry

and departure, customs, overflight authorization, use of

radio frequencies, air traffic control, blanket diplomatic

clearances, basing rights, facility access agreements, coalition contracting procedures, connectivity, force protection,

site surveys and update process, site explosive material

handling plan, and weapon storage. Implementation of

such agreements would facilitate quick access and assist

in rapid deployment, rapid employment, and immediate

sustainment. Each of these areas has unique challenges

and some mutually exclusive areas of concern. Rapid employment and immediate sustainment necessitate more

extensive efforts with customs and diplomatic clearances

than do rapid deployment concepts. Base infrastructure

support for rapid deployment is not as extensive as support requirements for rapid employment and immediate

sustainment.

In OAF the austere transportation infrastructure—airports, seaports, roads, and railroads—in and around Albania limited deployment options and increased deployment

timelines. Poor infrastructure conditions, most likely the

norm in future conflicts, slowed aircraft turnaround times,

limited throughput at the ports, and slowed onward movement of forces and humanitarian supplies. Such problems

can be mitigated to some extent by an early assessment of

infrastructure limitations. This enables proper matching of

18 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
transportation infrastructure capability to operational requirements. As a result, deployment packages can be optimized and required transportation support can be more

efficiently allocated. In preparation for deployment, US Air

Forces Europe (USAFE) conducted extensive beddown

planning by surveying, preparing, and publishing new

beddown assessments for 27 sites in 11 NATO and Eastern European countries.28 These assessments were critical

and allowed logistics planners from deploying units to reduce the equipment necessary for deployed operations.

This, in turn, decreased the requirements for both intratheater and intertheater airlift. However, there were still

instances where deploying units brought more capability

than required, which needlessly increased airlift sorties. It

is critical that deployment planners obtain all necessary

information on potential beddown locations as soon as

possible. In addition, assessment teams should be given

better training and more useful tools to gather and distribute information to effected units.

In contrast, ground and sea infrastructure capabilities

were not assessed until later in the operation. As a result,

planners lacked sufficient information to make informed

decisions about the desirability of employing additional capabilities such as Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore or strategic sea lift. Similarly, the CINC or JFC could have deployed

engineers or planners to deploy things they plan and mobilized contractors to enhance the transportation infrastructure as necessary. Decisions to deploy these forces

need to be made early in the operation to increase transportation throughput capacity. 

8. As technology improves, the effects of collateral

damage and losses of friendly forces increase, impacting

friendly centers of gravity.

As a cautionary note, given the severe restriction on collateral

damage, it was noted that precision guided is no longer “good

enough.”

—Adm James Ellis Jr.

—Commander

—Joint Task Force Noble Anvil

As the public becomes more accustomed to bloodless

conflicts where no (or few) friendly personnel are lost and

LAMB 19
the loss of lives on the enemy side, especially for civilians,

is extremely low, any loss of friendly forces or collateral

damage takes on greater importance. The inadvertent

damage to a hospital in downtown Belgrade had the effect

of stopping all bombing within the city. These restrictions

make it harder for commanders to conduct reasoned campaigns to achieve desired results.

It is a major tribute to US and NATO air forces in Kosovo

that there were no aircrew combat losses in 38,004 sorties,

minimal casualties due to accidents, and no cases of fratricide or “friendly fire.” NATO lost only two men in a training accident during an intensive 11-week campaign, much

of it flown out of austere bases, in poor weather, and in

mountainous terrain. 

The problem with such success is that it may help create unrealistic expectations and demands for “perfect” or

“bloodless” war. It is far from clear that the US public really does demand few or no casualties: public opinion polls

strongly suggest that Americans will accept casualties if

they believe in the war or peacekeeping mission and the

quality of its leadership, and if they believe American men

and women are properly equipped and supplied. Somewhat ironically, American politicians and the media seem

to be more sensitive to casualties per se than the public.29

Nevertheless, there is no casual tolerance of casualties by

either the American public or that of any other member of

NATO.

This is not to make an argument for more casualties,

but it is a strong argument for the DOD to better educate

the public in the true risks of war through the use of public information campaigns that stress the real-world risk of

casualties throughout any conflict. Wars like Kosovo may

be training political leaders, military planners, the media,

and the public to treat every casualty as a mistake and any

significant number of casualties as failure. Such thinking

can ultimately become a critical political and operational

constraint on effective action, as well as leading policy

makers to underestimate the risk of using force. The risks

are obvious:

• Over commitment because risks are minimized.

20 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
• Rules of engagement that reduce losses but reduce

military effectiveness even more.

• Political and strategic vulnerability to even minimal

losses. 

• Exploitation of the above by US adversaries.

In the specific case of Kosovo, there is also a good argument for reviewing such operational constraints as the altitude ceilings imposed during the war. Effective military

planning and operations cannot simply accept some set of

rules because the issue is controversial and the trade-offs

are difficult to analyze. If “minimal casualties” is becoming

a rule of Western-conducted warfare, planning and operations must treat the issue honestly and explicitly. These

points are reinforced by the political and strategic impact

of collateral damage on OAF. NATO made a detailed effort

to review the range of possible collateral damage for each

target and to plan its strikes so that the weapon used, the

angle of approach, and the aim point would minimize collateral damage. This process was so exhaustive that NATO

often had more strike aircraft available than cleared targets, and many important targets were avoided or repeatedly sent back for review.

Collateral damage presents other problems, including

the issue of how to count and assess collateral damage and

how to treat the issue during and after a conflict. There is

no way to know how many cases occurred in which collateral damage of some kind took place by the time the war

ended. Nevertheless, one lesson is that exaggerated or false

claims regarding collateral damage may well come back to

haunt the United States and its allies. There have already

been many critical assessments of the impact of the bombing and missile strikes by those on the ground.30 For example, peacekeeping forces have found numerous unexploded bomblets from US cluster munitions scattered over

the areas that NATO attacked. US cluster munitions have

presented this problem since Vietnam, and anyone who

visited the sites of air attacks during the Gulf War saw

large numbers of cluster munitions scattered about. Subsequently, the use of cluster munitions was halted during

the campaign due to political pressure.

LAMB 21
The United States and its allies will also face a climate

in which wartime reporting on collateral damage can be expected to steadily improve, and in which any hostile power

or movement will use collateral damage and targeting errors as a political weapon—often creating its own “myths”

and false images of such damage when these are politically

desirable. Like it or not, collateral damage has become a

weapon of war.

9. Commanders need to keep all options open when

conducting an operation.

Kosovo . . . illuminates in many ways how America and our allies and adversaries are going to approach the art of war well

into the next century.

—William S. Cohen

Because the United States announced ground forces

would not be used, the Serbs gained some freedom of

movement they would not have otherwise had. The lack of

a land component also restricted NATO’s ability to operate.

Without a land component, the JFC and the CFACC did

not have a viable intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) capability with respect to fielded enemy forces.

The Air Force provides great IPB for operational and strategic targeting but relies upon the Army to provide the tactical-level IPB. The lack of tactical-level IPB hampered the

JFC’s ability to carry out the CINC’s guidance to strike

fielded forces.

Regardless of conflicting interests among alliance members, another key to success is to preserve uncertainty in

a potential opponent’s mind. One way to accomplish this is

to keep all options open. As noted by General Naumann,

NATO did not do this. Rather, when NATO began to prepare for military options, some alliance members ruled out

the use of ground forces and did so publicly. According to

General Naumann, “This allowed Milosevic to calculate his

risk and to speculate that there might be a chance for him

to ride the threat out and to hope that NATO would either

be unable to act at all or that the cohesion of the alliance

would melt away under the public impression of punishing

air strikes.”31

22 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Admiral Ellis, commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil,

stated that ruling out the use of ground forces “probably prolonged the air campaign.” He also noted that Task Force

Hawk represented Milosevic’’s “worst nightmare.”32 Gen

Montgomery Meigs, commanding general, US Army Europe,

stressed much the same thought during his 30 June 1999

appearance on ABC’s Nightline when he indicated that the

presence of Task Force Hawk no doubt made Milosevic reposition his forces along the Kosovo–Albanian border and rethink NATO’s intent.33

In conjunction with preserving uncertainty, another lesson learned concerning military power is that an alliance

should never threaten the use of force unless fully prepared to immediately use it. In the spring of 1998, long before any consensus existed among the NATO members,

NATO ministers began threatening the use of force to end

the fighting in Kosovo. Unfortunately, according to General

Naumann, NATO was not prepared to intervene militarily

at that time, a fact of which Milosevic was well aware. Accordingly, he continued his offensive against the Kosovo

Liberation Army.

10. Expeditionary capability, power projection, lift,

and sustainability are crucial to rapid response contingencies.

OAF demonstrated that the United States and its allies

have very different levels of expeditionary capability and

strategic lift. The United States provided almost all of the

dedicated military air and sea lift used during the campaign.

It was clear that the United States had a distinct advantage

in many areas of expeditionary capability, although some of

its services proved more capable than others.

Further, OAF demonstrated the value of Air Force planning for rapid deployment of expeditionary packages. However, the Air Force was forced to use over 90 percent of its

total expeditionary assets in a war in which it could operate securely from highly advanced friendly air bases. Serious questions exist about the size of the planned inventory

of expeditionary assets. Current plans need to be reviewed

to determine whether they provide enough forces and

equipment. The United States needs to make a compreLAMB 23
hensive review of its rapid deployment and expeditionary

capabilities, and create the capabilities it needs.

There was a tendency outside the US European Command (USEUCOM) theater to view OAF as a short-duration

operation rather than a full-fledged campaign. This view

often caused frustration and hindered efforts to acquire

the necessary assets for the theater of operations. It was

noted that the requirement to adhere to the Roberts

Amendment imposed significant limitations at the beginning of the campaign that hindered our ability to deploy

and prepare properly.34

US ground troops were not allowed into the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia to integrate and prepare

with other NATO forces. Site surveys of Albania and other

countries were delayed, preventing proper transportation requirement and capability analysis. The application of peacetime global military force policy and global naval force presence levels delayed the deployment of critical EA-6Bs, joint

surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS), and other

assets. Not having a carrier battle group in the area of responsibility at the start of the campaign was particularly difficult. Given the level of effort required to successfully execute such a campaign, all wartime allocations need to be

reviewed in relation to a major theater war. This is especially

true of such high-demand/low-density assets as the EA-6B

and carrier battle groups.

Although the Roberts Amendment was not renewed by

Congress and is no longer applicable, demands placed

upon the military by congressional legislation often have

significant impact on our capabilities and options. It is important that the military effect of such limitations be

clearly understood and articulated to national decision

makers. We need to identify better “triggers” to allow a

quicker transition to wartime levels. Wartime levels must

be reanalyzed for adequacy, and assets must surge faster

to meet theater requirements.

11. Video teleconferencing was indispensable as a battlefield synchronization tool and greatly improved communication at the highest levels, but there are dangers

in its use.

24 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
As General Clark stated, “Used properly, video teleconferencing (VTC) is a powerful tool, one that can shorten decision

cycles dramatically. During OAF video teleconferencing was

indispensable as a battlefield synchronization tool and

greatly improved communication at the highest levels.”35

However, unwritten VTC guidance is subject to misinterpretation as information and guidance filters down to lower staff

levels, and VTCs, unfortunately, draw senior leaders into

lower-level decision processes. In the case of OAF, senior decision makers were involved at a level of detail normally reserved for the operators. This occurred for three reasons: the

risks were high, the payoffs tenuous, and simply because

they could. Discipline is required by senior leaders to ensure

that they function at the appropriate level of engagement and

command and control.

The management of information and the ability to rapidly exchange key information between all forces played a

vital role in the execution of OAF. Connectivity within the

theater was adequate to support the effort. However, the

demand on the system rose as various sites occasionally

overloaded, and it caused system failures. The use of web

technology helped the sharing of information throughout

the campaign. 

NATO commanders used VTC for the first time as a major

instrument for exercising command and control. Daily commanders’ video teleconferences were held to review progress

of operations, coordinate future operations, and promulgate

intentions. These conferences spanned the chain of command from the SACEUR to the JFC and onward to component commanders. In other words, the conferences spanned

the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command,

thus greatly compressing normal command and control

processes. As a result, strategic and operational commanders were able to directly influence tactical operations. Joint

Vision 2020 anticipated these phenomena—from use of technologies such as video teleconferencing—by observing:

“Higher echelons will use these technologies to reduce the

friction of war and to apply precise centralized control when

and where appropriate. Real time information will likely drive

parallel, not sequential planning and real time, not prearranged, decision making. The optimal balance between

centralized and decentralized command and control will have

LAMB 25
to be carefully developed as systems are brought into the inventories.”36

The ability of high-level commanders to influence tactical

operations directly had positive as well as negative aspects.

Among the positive developments was the speed with which

commanders and key staff officers could perform essential

coordination. One critical challenge is the timely documentation and dissemination of the most essential items of the

VTC, such as the commander’s intentions, to those key personnel who did not attend. A thorough review should identify

improvements that can be made in the use of VTCs as a

major tool for exercising command and control. Where appropriate, revisions to doctrine should be incorporated. The

compression of time in exercising command and control

made possible by VTC and other technologies is already a

topic for joint experimentation.

12. Coalition operations present significant interoperability problems when alliance members have disparate technological capabilities.

“Because of the growing need to disseminate large volumes of information and data quickly, especially with regard to transmitting high-priority imagery of emerging targets, ground-based communication capabilities must be

improved.”37 Problems with connectivity between NATO

and US systems often plagued rapid effective information

sharing. Improvement in sharing information requires development of a multi-level security (MLS) system that will

also resolve connectivity problems and establish clear policy guidance to facilitate information sharing within the

NATO alliance. At the start of the campaign there were only

two fully operational Standardized Tactical Entry Point

(STEP) sites within the theater that provided critical access

to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET),

the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network

(NIPRNET), the Defense Switched Network (DSN), and

other essential communications. The STEP sites would

have been overwhelmed if they had not been supplemented

by the rapid installation of two more sites by accelerating

the contracted schedule.

Expanded air operations could not have been supported

without commercialization of forward bases. Commercial26 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
ization of communications at forward operating locations

was the single biggest factor that ensured the war fighter

had communications throughout the conflict. The lack of

joint, secure digital communications capability was a key

shortfall, which prevented “sensor to shooter” transmission of targeting data and impeded targeting of emerging,

relocatable, and time sensitive targets (TST).38 Surface, air,

and space sensors need a capability to transmit target data

in real time to platforms or PGMs poised to rapidly engage

emerging targets. An example would be allied artillery

radar locating enemy artillery then being able to send target coordinates directly to strike aircraft overhead. 

Maintaining operational security is more challenging

and complex than ever given the speed of information

transfer enabled by the World Wide Web and the myriad of

such 24-hour news agencies as Cable News Network

(CNN), Fox News, and Microsoft National Broadcasting

Company (MSNBC). Inadvertent or deliberate exposure of

information in CONUS can have immediate impact on the

modern battlefield.

Federated architecture and collaboration greatly contributed to the overall targeting success in OAF. Webbased technology facilitated the movement and sharing of

TST data among all key nodes in the target development

and exploitation federation. SIPRNET and Linked Operational-Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) infrastructure

were the primary information systems used by the US and

NATO operations planning community. Many of the collaborating organizations participating in the targeting

process lacked sufficient SIPRNET or LOCE terminals to

engage fully in the process. Federation and collaboration

could be greatly enhanced, and response time on mission

essential targeting reduced, if SIPRNET and LOCE infrastructure were more robust and more terminals made

available at CONUS locations participating in the federation process. An alternative is to tie SIPRNET and LOCE

into other systems used for collaborative targeting.

CONUS-based federated partners must ensure their locations have sufficient connectivity to support a theater’s

combat operations.

LAMB 27
13. Shortages of preferred precision-guided munitions posed a significant threat to overall success of

the operation.

PGMs were employed in OAF at a much higher rate and

in much higher proportions than previously anticipated for

small-scale contingencies. Allied forces were neither as

well equipped with PGMs nor as well trained to use them

as were US forces. The Air Force expended more than

25,000 bombs and missiles during OAF of which nearly

8,500 were PGMs, and these became a contentious commodity.39 In the end, low theater inventories threatened

the OAF mission, and this in turn required resupply from

other theaters, which put those theaters at risk.

Technology allowed the United States to own the night,

but poor weather created sanctuaries and operational lulls.

During OAF there was greater than 50 percent cloud cover

more than 70 percent of the time (and it was not the worst

season of the year). As General Clark noted, “Precision

Guided Munitions (PGM) proved very effective and demonstrated immense potential by allowing highly accurate

strikes while minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties.”40 He also commented that “of particular note was the

success of the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). This

low cost, highly accurate weapon provided the capability to

strike during adverse weather conditions.”41 It should be

noted, however, that the expenditure of JDAMs equaled the

production rate. PGMs were indispensable in their ability to

hit high-value targets in urban areas while minimizing collateral damage. Future operations will rely more heavily on

PGMs. PGM stocks and funding must be increased to a level

required to realistically support combatant commander requirements for contingencies, training, and MTW readiness. 

OAF corroborated the requirement to maintain and fund

nonprecision weapons and platforms. The accuracy of nonprecision platforms using Global Positioning System (GPS)

satellites and other means has reached the point where

“nonprecision” is almost a misnomer. These munitions were

highly successful in attacking many high-priority targets not

suitable for PGMs, such as fielded force staging areas, large

military storage complexes, and airfields. This nonprecision

capability was also critical during the final days around

28 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
Mount Pastrik when Serb forces massed to engage the

Kosovo Liberation Army.

Deep underground targets posed a great challenge during

the campaign. There were leadership bunkers that could not

be taken out due to their depth, reinforcement, or location in

highly populated areas. Development of better penetrators

remains a priority. The success of all-weather PGMs in this

campaign is well known and documented; however, a more

robust all-weather PGM capability is still required to prevent

weather from providing an enemy sanctuary. There is a need

to continue improvement in ability to strike through bad

weather. 

Conclusion

After full consideration at the highest levels, strikes on

the enemy homeland may be inevitable and mandatory in

future wars. An enemy will possess key facilities within its

territory that are integral to its war effort. These targets

could include political and military leadership, weapons of

mass destruction (WMD), command and control nodes for

operational forces, sources of national wealth, military

sustainment depots, satellite ground stations, satellite

tracking facilities, power projection forces (missile launch

sites, bomber bases), and national information networks.

Successful strikes against these targets will have a critical

effect at the strategic and operational levels.

Planners should expect significant political restrictions on

attacks in future conflicts. These limiting factors will derive

from a myriad of world and national political concerns as well

as proliferation concerns (WMD use). Planners will need to

reconcile the requirement to disable strategic targets within

an enemy’s homeland with such restrictions; indeed, all

campaign planning should anticipate such restrictions. Existing plans should be carefully reviewed in light of such restrictions and be adjusted to meet the desired strategic effects. Operation Allied Force can serve as the model for such

planning given the many operational constraints placed on

war fighters during the conflict.

At the same time, policy makers should not learn the

wrong lessons from OAF. Although OAF was considered a

successful campaign, the policy constraints placed on the

LAMB 29
combatant commander unnecessarily lengthened the conflict. Longer conflicts mean greater risks assumed by US

military personnel. Policy makers must understand that

acceptance of some risk in the near term is essential to

long-term success. OAF established an unrealistic standard against which to measure future conflicts: campaign,

allied, and national military objectives must be defined

and obtained before a policy of zero risk acceptance is

adopted. To do otherwise jeopardizes the accomplishment

of those objectives. The commander’s intent must be up

front, early, and clearly defined so as to allow for proper

planning and execution to meet objectives.

There still remains the problem associated with holding

TSTs or dispersed ground forces at risk. In OAF the limited

effects on FRY integrated air defenses, particularly antiaircraft artillery and man-portable air defenses, resulted in altitude restrictions throughout that hampered weapons effectiveness. Beyond analyzing tactical methods, we may find

that using other weapons may prove far more effective. Nonlethal weapons should prove especially effective against

massed ground mobile forces. Such weapons as high-power

acoustic generators, high-power microwaves, electromagnetic pulse, anti-POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) agents,

and antirubber chemicals applied against units in road

march should cause bottlenecks and disorganized advances.

Conventional attack could then inflict more permanent and

serious damage. As satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles

identify large logistics bases, the JFACC can task appropriate munitions and delivery platforms to strike them. Logistics may well prove to be an aggressor’s greatest vulnerability. In the face of informed and precision attack, an enemy

will be unable to develop sufficient logistics infrastructure for

multidivisional invasion or occupation.

While many firsts occurred in information operations during OAF, there were also some areas where the United States

was less successful. There were problems associated with the

fusion of the data collected from all sources and subsequent

distribution in a timely and filtered method to users. The

United States was not successful in degrading information

networks as the enemy continued to control all media internal to its populace. The United States did detect enemy intrusions in friendly information networks, but should expect

30 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
and be prepared for far worse. Indeed, the United States

should expect an enemy to focus more on US deployment efforts through attacks on such information systems as the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) network. Given the dependence on the ATO, the United States should also expect

possible attacks that delay, alter, or destroy ATO data transmissions. It should also not be unexpected that an enemy

would attack US logistics through the supply or JOPES networks. Information management and IO will be crucial to future successes in any conflict.

Information management and IO also include hardware

and systems. OAF points to the need for more bandwidth

and faster transmission paths. Such could be said for almost any operation, present or future. Platforms must

have the ability to incorporate the latest information hardware and software, employ information obtained by offboard sensors, and transmit information garnered by onboard sensors to other weapon systems. Systems must

also be capable of operating in a corrupted information environment. Lastly, as Admiral Ellis cautioned, “Regardless

of the acknowledged benefits associated with the use of

state-of-the-art technology, commanders and planners

must never lose sight of the fact that technology is only one

aspect of waging a successful campaign.”42

OAF did demonstrate new technologies, greater levels of

joint and combined interoperability, and many improvements. They included 

• general execution interoperability; 

• precision targeting, stand-off weaponry, and massed

effects; 

• selective application of violence, kinetic destruction,

and nonkinetic weapons effects;

• limitation of collateral damage;

• coordination and focus of joint and coalition air and

sea forces;

• information processing and sharing;

• limited NATO combined force projection out of area

operations;

• massing of weapons effects and not maneuver elements by land and sea-based aviation maneuver elements;

LAMB 31
• increased exploitation of spaced-based information,

guidance, and intelligence systems;

• integration, coordination, and focus of joint and combined tactical air and missile striking power; and

• efficient and effective use of limited aviation resources,

precision weaponry, and aircraft in an iterative combat

cycle.

The bottom line is that OAF clearly was an operational

success, and this success should not be understated. It

was an inherently complicated undertaking, beset with

complexities brought about by the myriad of military and

political constraints. Yet, more than 38,004 sorties were

flown with all but two planes returning safely, and no casualties were suffered—an incredible achievement! Dr. Ben

Lambeth summarized OAF as:

The most intense and sustained military operation to have been

conducted in Europe since the end of World War II. It represented

the first extended use of military force by NATO, as well as the first

major combat operation conducted for humanitarian objectives

against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. It was

the longest US combat operation to have taken place since the war

in Vietnam, which ended in 1975. At a price tag of more than $3

billion all told, it was also a notably expensive one. Yet in part precisely because of that investment, it turned out to have been an unprecedented exercise in the discriminate use of force on a large

scale. Although there were some unfortunate and highly publicized

cases in which innocent civilians were tragically killed, Secretary of

Defense William Cohen was on point when he characterized Allied

Force afterward as “the most precise application of airpower in history.”43

In Operation Allied Force there were many individual

areas of success, ranging from the outstanding accomplishments of our men and women in the field and at sea

to the unequalled performance of their equipment, material, and technology, to name just a few. These successes

do not detract from the need to critically examine the operation and glean some golden nuggets from which we

must learn.

Notes

1. Senate, Joint Statement on the Kosovo After-Action Review presented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and General Henry H.

Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed

32 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
Services Committee, 14 October 1999. Hereafter cited as Cohen and Shelton.

2. Report to Congress: Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, Department of Defense, 31 January 2000, xvii.

3. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and

Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Project Air Force,

2001), 220.

4. Ibid., 78.

5. Ibid., 7.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 8–9.

8. Clara Anne Robbins, Thomas E. Ricks, and Neil King Jr., “Milosevic’s Resolve Spawned Unity, Wider Bombing List in NATO Alliance,” Wall

Street Journal, 27 April 1999.

9. Cohen and Shelton. 

10. Public Law 106-31, the 1999 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.

11. Brad Sherman, “U.S. Must Have Realistic Objectives,” Thousand

Oaks Star, 15 April 1999. 

12. Lambeth, 207.

13. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 78.

14. Ibid., vii.

15. Ibid., 5.

16. Ibid., 3.

17. Ibid., 1. See also Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, Public Affairs (New York: Perseus Books), 161–89.

18. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 1. See also Clark, 422.

19. Clark, 456.

20. Ibid., 457–58.

21. Klaus Naumann, Statement of General (Ret) Klaus Naumann, German Army, Former Chairman NATO MC Before the Senate Armed Services

Committee Hearing on Kosovo After-Action Review, 2 November 1999.

22. Cohen and Shelton. 

23. Senate, Combined Prepared Statement of General Wesley Clark,

USA; Admiral James Ellis, Jr., USN; and Lieutenant General Michael Short,

USAF; of the United States European Command to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 October 1999. Hereafter cited as Clark, Ellis, and

Short. 

24. Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002, chap. 2.

25. USEUCOM briefing with slides, Kosovo After-Action Conference,

16 September 1999.

26. Lt Gen Marvin R. Esmond, deputy chief of staff, Air and Space Operations, Department of the Air Force, in minutes of H.A.S.C. No. 106–29,

Lessons Learned from The Kosovo Conflict—The Effect of the Operation on

Both Deployed/Non-Deployed Forces and on Future Modernization Plans,

Hearing before the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the Committee on

Armed Services House of Representatives, 19 October 1999. 

27. Ministry of Defence, Kosovo: The Financial Management of Military

Operations, House of Commons, 5 June 2000.

LAMB 33
28. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 37.

29. John E. Rielly, American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy

1999 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

30. Rebecca Grant, “True Blue: Behind the Kosovo Numbers Game,”

Air Force Magazine 83, no.8 (August 2000).

31. Ibid., 9.

32. Clark, Ellis, and Short. 

33. “Apaches in Kosovo: Lessons Learned” (transcript), Nightline, ABC

NEWS broadcast, n.d., n.p., Internet, 30 June 1999, available from http://

abcnews.go.com/onair/nightline/transcripts/nl990630_trans.html.

34. Congress adopted an important amendment to the Defense appropriations bill, referred to as the Roberts Amendment. It required the

president to certify to Congress by 15 May 1998 that the continued presence of US forces in Bosnia was in the national interest and why. The

president had to state the reasons for deployment and the expected duration of deployment; had to provide numbers of troops deployed, estimate the dollar cost involved, and give the effect of such deployment on

overall effectiveness of US forces; most importantly, had to provide a clear

statement of the mission and objectives; and had to provide an exit strategy for bringing the troops home. If the president did not meet these conditions, funding for military deployment would end in May 1999. Public

Law 105–262, Sec. 8115, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999,

105th Cong., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1999.

35. Clark, Ellis, and Short.

36. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 28.

37. Cohen and Shelton.

38. JP 3-60 defines TSTs as “those targets of such high priority to

friendly forces that the JFC designates them as requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces

or they are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.”

39. Lambeth, 87.

40. Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report, 12.

41. Ibid., 15. See also Lambeth, 89–94.

42. Clark, Ellis, and Short.

43. Lambeth, 219.

34 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 
APPENDIX

OAF GOLDEN NUGGETS

1. Alliances and coalition forces are only as strong as

their weakest elements. Having to get approval for targets

from 19 different nations with varying levels of commitment to the operation made targeting difficult. The varying

levels of commitment also led to security concerns that

drove the implementation of parallel NATO and US-only

planning and ATO processes.

2. Timely tactical and operational intelligence is a constant requirement. For coercive operations to be successful,

relevant, timely, and predictive, intelligence is required.

Knowing what would cause Milosevic to back down was a

problem right from the start of OAF. Most planners anticipated that three days of punitive strikes would be enough

to force Milosevic to concede; they were wrong. 

3. Gaining and maintaining the initiative in the information operations arena, especially public affairs, are critical.

Despite OAF being one of the most accurate air operations

ever (with one of the lowest collateral damage to bombs

dropped ratios in history), Milosevic took the initiative in

the IO arena by exploiting the few events of collateral damage by flooding the media with pictures and information

portraying the effects on the civilian populace. PA needs to

be part of the planning from the beginning. Commanders

need to get PA going early, even before the start of the operation, and they must stay ahead of the crisis event curve

by dealing with bad news openly, quickly, and accurately.

4. No matter how wedded to strategic targeting the

CFACC is, if the CINC or NCA is not supportive, it will not

work. The CFACC during OAF wanted to conduct a hardhitting strategic operation right from the start but was

constrained by the CINC and the political leadership. As

the operation continued, and it became apparent that incrementalism was not solving the problem quickly, fractures appeared between the CFACC and the CINC. In the

end the CFACC, as the subordinate, must know when to

salute smartly and then conduct the operation within the

guidance given. 

35
5. Proper preparation of war-fighting commanders is critical. Commanders need to be as well versed in how to conduct MOOTW as they are in conducting unlimited war. The

highly restrictive ROEs and politically motivated targeting

process implemented during OAF more closely resembled

MOOTW than the level of effort otherwise indicated. The

planners in the CAOC and the CFACC had difficulty applying their training for war, strategic attack, and effectsbased operations to this MOOTW scenario. Operations in

the future are more likely to resemble OAF than Operation

Desert Storm.

6. Logistics is a key concern for an expeditionary force.

As the operation grew in intensity and the restrictions on

collateral damage became tighter, stocks of PGMs were depleted, putting a strain on the supply system. Use of older

weapon systems with their higher maintenance costs can

hamper effectiveness. Additional tankers needed to be

launched to ensure enough tankers were airborne to support the strike packages, adding to the burdens on the logistics system.

7. Basing is a primary concern for expeditionary forces.

The reciprocal of this rule is that global reach can lessen

the need for forward bases. Gaining access to adequate

bases is a fundamental requirement for success for an expeditionary force. With access though come potential restrictions. The British maintained veto power over US

bombers operating out of bases in the United Kingdom.

Also, bases that we had access to were often far from the

fight, putting a strain on aircraft, aircrew, planners, and

the logistics system.

8. As technology improves, the effect upon friendly centers of gravity caused by collateral damage and losses of

friendly forces increases. As the public becomes accustomed to bloodless conflicts where no (or few) friendly personnel are lost and the loss of lives on the enemy side (especially civilians) is extremely low, any loss of friendly

forces or collateral damage has greater impact. The inadvertent damage to a hospital in downtown Belgrade had

the effect of stopping all bombing within the city. Such restrictions make it harder for commanders to conduct coherent campaigns to achieve results.

36
9. Commanders need to keep all options open when conducting an operation. Because there was an announcement

that land forces would not be used, the Serbs gained freedom of movement they would not have otherwise had. The

lack of a land component also restricted NATO’s ability to

operate. Without a land component, the JFC and the

CFACC did not have a viable intelligence preparation of the

battle-space capability with respect to fielded enemy

forces. The Air Force provides excellent IPB for operational

and strategic targeting, but relies upon the Army to provide the tactical level IPB. The lack of tactical level IPB

hampered the JFC’s ability to carry out the CINC’s guidance to strike fielded forces.

10. Expeditionary capability, power projection, lift, and

sustainability are crucial to rapid response contingencies.

Operation Allied Force demonstrated that the United

States and its allies have very different levels of expeditionary capability and strategic lift. The United States provided almost all of the dedicated military air and sea lift

used during the air and missile campaign. It was clear that

the United States had a distinct advantage in many areas

of expeditionary capability, although some of its services

proved more capable than others.

Further, Allied Force demonstrated the value of USAF

planning of expeditionary packages for rapid deployment.

However, the Air Force often was forced to use over 90 percent of its total expeditionary assets in a war in which it

could operate under sanctuary conditions from friendly

and highly advanced air bases. Serious questions seem to

exist about the size of the planned inventory of expeditionary assets. Current plans need review to examine

whether they provide enough forces and equipment. The

United States needs to make a comprehensive review of its

rapid deployment and expeditionary capabilities, and create the capabilities it needs.

11. Video teleconferencing was indispensable as a battlefield synchronization tool and greatly improved communication at the highest levels, but there are dangers to using

VTC. Unwritten VTC guidance is subject to misinterpretation as information and guidance filter down to lower staff

levels, and VTCs, unfortunately, draw senior leaders into

lower-level decision processes. In the case of OAF, senior

37
decision makers were involved at a level of detail normally

reserved for the operators. This occurred for three reasons:

the risks were high, the payoffs tenuous, and, simply, because senior leaders could. Discipline is required by senior leaders to ensure that they remain at the appropriate

level of engagement and of command and control.

12. Coalition operations present significant interoperability problems when alliance members have disparate technological capabilities. Problems with connectivity between

NATO and US systems often plagued rapid, effective information sharing. To correct this problem requires development of a MLS system that will also resolve connectivity

problems and establish clear policy guidance that facilitates information sharing within the NATO alliance. 

13. Shortages of preferred precision-guided munitions

posed a significant threat to overall success of the operation.

Preferred munitions were employed in OAF at a much

higher rate and in much higher proportions than previously anticipated for small-scale contingencies. Allied

forces were neither as well equipped with PGMs nor as well

trained to use them as were US forces.

38