1

In November 2009, on a dry lakebed in the 

desert of northern Mali, United Nations (UN) investigators found traces of cocaine amid a Boeing 

727’s charred and stripped fuselage. Its owners had 

apparently torched the plane after it had been damaged, probably to destroy evidence of their identity 

and cargo. With a payload capacity of 10 tons of 

cocaine fetching a wholesale value of $580 million, 

West Africa’s emerging cocaine traffickers could afford the loss.

The flight path of this 727 may have included 

layovers in Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, and Guinea 

Bissau, but it assuredly originated from South America. Its cargo added to the mounting cocaine traffic 

from Latin America that transships West Africa on 

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons 

from Latin America and the Caribbean

By Davin O’Regan

A P U B L I C AT I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S

◆ The dollar value of cocaine trafficked through West Africa has risen rapidly and surpassed all other 

illicit commodities smuggled in the subregion.

◆ Experience from Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrates that cocaine traffic contributes to dramatically higher levels of violence and instability.

◆ Co-opting key government officials is the preferred modus operandi of Latin American cocaine traffickers. African governments need to act urgently to protect the integrity of their counternarcotics 

institutions to prevent this threat from developing deeper roots on the continent.

H I G H L I G H T S

N O . 5 / J U LY 2 0 1 0

its way to European consumers. Estimates of annual 

cocaine transshipments through West Africa range 

between 60 and 250 tons, yielding wholesale revenues of $3 billion to $14 billion.

Beginning in 2006, several West African countries seized extremely large volumes of cocaine—

measured in the hundreds and thousands of kilograms—in single hauls. These seizures were often 

accidental, indicating that actual traffic was likely 

much higher. Cocaine departs Venezuela, Colombia, and elsewhere in South America in shipping 

containers, on yachts, and by small planes and jets. 

South American organized criminal and militant 

groups commonly deliver bulk shipments to West 

African traffickers in Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, and 
2

Guinea Bissau, countries that the UN Office on 

Drugs and Crime (UNODC) frequently characterizes as the subregion’s cocaine “hubs.” The cocaine 

is then repackaged and moved to neighboring countries before being transferred to syndicates in Europe, often composed of African expatriates, who 

handle wholesale and retail sales. Seizures in West 

Africa have resulted in the arrests of African, South 

American, European, and other nationals.

While West Africa is the current locus of this 

activity, the continent as a whole is an ideal transshipment center—poor, with limited oversight and 

weak policing—making for a low-cost and low-risk 

environment. Since Africa is not a producer or major 

consumer of cocaine, some assume that its domestic effects will be minor. Yet evidence of cocaine’s 

destabilizing impact is already emerging. The assassinations of Guinea Bissau’s president and the head of 

the army in early 2009 were likely linked to cocaine 

transshipment. In January 2010, a senior officer of 

Guinea Bissau’s Presidential Security Service was arrested in a narcotics sting, prompting senior military 

officials to publicly lament the regular involvement 

of security personnel in cocaine transshipment. In 

late 2009, Ghana extradited three Malians who 

claimed links to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

to the United States on cocaine trafficking charges. 

The sheer value of the trade poses not only a threat 

to security but also real risks of distorting the region’s 

economy, investment flows, development, and steps 

toward democracy.

Cocaine transshipment in Africa is new, but Latin American and Caribbean countries have over 30 

years of experience dealing with narcotics trafficking 

and its destabilizing effects. Hard-earned lessons from 

Latin America’s experience, then, hold potentially 

invaluable insights for Africa as it engages this new, 

pernicious enemy.

N O O R D I N A RY I L L I C I T C O M M O D I T Y

Trafficking in illicit goods is common in West Africa. Arms, counterfeit medicine, cigarettes, and crude 

oil all move illegally to and through West Africa. Traffickers in the subregion also have a history of smuggling heroin around the world. The “mule” method of 

hiring travelers to swallow narcotics in small parcels 

and travel by air is probably a Nigerian innovation.

But cocaine is an order of magnitude more seductive than other goods already smuggled across 

the subregion. Kilogram for kilogram, it is immensely 

more valuable. According to a UNODC assessment 

of trafficking in West Africa, the estimated value of 

cocaine transshipments in 2008 rivaled crude oil for 

the most valuable smuggled commodity. Yet the volume of cocaine traffic was comparatively minuscule 

compared to the 55 million barrels of oil that were 

stolen and transported for the same return.

The yields from cocaine transshipment also 

dwarf the subregion’s official resources. During one 

incident in January 2008, Malian security officials 

seized 750 kilograms of cocaine following a shootout. This one haul represented 36 percent of Mali’s 

entire 2007 military expenditures. Similarly, the 350 

kilograms of cocaine seized on one occasion in August 2007 in Benin represented the annual per capita 

income of 31,000 Beninois.

Cocaine traffic may prove to be a fixture in West 

Africa. Transshipment has emerged in part because 

demand is growing in Europe. According to the UN 

International Narcotics Control Bureau, cocaine use 

has doubled and tripled in some parts of Western Europe since 2000. Traffickers, it would seem, are not 

shifting traffic to service preexisting demand but establishing a new route for a growing market.

Market dynamics also explain why heroin traffic 

through West Africa has not been nearly as destabilizing. West Africa plays a small role in global heroin 

traffic because consumer markets in North America 

and Europe are supplied through the Balkans, Middle 

East, and South Asia. Only 167 kilograms of heroin 

was recovered in West and Central Africa in 2007, or 

less than one-thirtieth the amount of cocaine seized 

in just West Africa for the same year. There are growing concerns, however, that instability in East Africa Davin O’Regan is a Research Associate in the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University.

“cocaine is an order of magnitude 

more seductive than other goods 

smuggled across the subregion”
3

is attracting heroin traffic (contributing to an estimated 200,000 heroin addicts in Kenya), which may 

merge with West African cocaine routes.

C O C A I N E , G O V E R N A N C E , 

A N D C O R R U P T I O N

Over the last decade West Africa has emerged 

from widespread instability and benefited from a period of declining violence and growing democracy. 

Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire are emerging 

from civil wars. Mali, Ghana, and Benin continue to 

consolidate democratic gains. Cocaine traffic poses a 

direct threat to these advances.

Traffickers abhor attention. Any state response—whether parliamentarians passing laws to 

enhance border security or investigators prosecuting 

smugglers—raises transaction costs and lowers profits. Consequently, traffickers will attempt through 

co-optation, bribery, and corruption to prevent and 

deter a state’s response in order to protect their profits. Rather than guard cocaine cargoes with heavily 

armed security and gunfights, traffickers would rather 

pay politicians, judges, and police officers to ignore 

their trade altogether. The strategy is to make these 

officials beneficiaries early to ensure low costs over 

the long term.

In the Caribbean, narcotics traffic has been a 

major factor in expanding and deepening corruption. 

Jamaica has struggled for years against endemic corruption, clientelist politics, and a lack of checks and balances within government—a familiar combination in 

West Africa. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, its 

strategic location between the United States and drugproducing countries in Latin America attracted rising 

cocaine transshipment. By 2003, Jamaica had become 

a leading transit country for cocaine destined for the 

United States. The quality of governance on the island 

soon worsened. Jamaica’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index fell from 

45th in 2002 to 99th in 2009. The sharp drop in public 

Cocaine Traffic and Seizures in Kilograms, 2005–2009
4

integrity coincides with regular efforts by transnational 

and Jamaican criminal groups “to corrupt functionaries 

in critical state agencies—particularly the police and 

customs—political party functionaries and grass roots, 

community organizations.”1

Narcotics trafficking has penetrated government and undermined governance elsewhere in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2009, Leonel 

Fernández, president of the Dominican Republic, dismissed 700 police and 535 military officers, including 

31 senior leaders, citing links to cocaine traffic. In 

Mexico, the Zetas, a criminal group renowned for assassinations on behalf of drug traffickers, was formed 

by officers who deserted the military. In Brazil, São 

Paulo’s narcotics traffickers train their members to 

pass Brazil’s civil service exam, thereby gaining influence within the government bureaucracy.

As cocaine transshipment grows, West Africa’s fragile governance institutions may be further 

weakened. African media reports and independent 

research already suggest that narcotics transshipment proceeds may be financing political parties and 

campaigns in Ghana.2 A Nigerian politician arrested before boarding a plane from Lagos to Germany 

with more than 4 pounds of cocaine in his stomach 

explained that he needed the funds to finance his 

upcoming election campaign. Authorities believe 

he may be part of a wider network of smugglers.3 In 

Sierra Leone, the minister of transport and aviation 

was dismissed after trial proceedings revealed that 

he allegedly provided landing clearance to a plane 

carrying 700 kilograms of cocaine.4 There are similar 

reports of senior level police officers involved in cocaine trafficking from Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana.5

C O C A I N E , C R I M E , A N D V I O L E N C E

Narcotics trafficking is not intrinsically violent. 

Violence within the international trade in cannabis 

and Ecstasy, a popular hallucinogen/amphetamine, is 

comparatively low. But the overwhelming evidence 

from Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that 

where cocaine traffic moves, so too do homicide rates 

and conflict.

If efforts of co-optation and bribery prove unsuccessful, traffickers may resort to violence to deter or resist attempts by government authorities to curtail drug 

flows and arrest traffickers. Trafficking groups also use 

violence to maintain loyalty and discipline as well as 

target other traffickers to resolve disputes, enforce agreements or contracts, and protect or acquire market share.

In such environments, violence can spiral. Studies have shown that when violence within one criminal activity rises, all crimes can become more violent, 

gangs proliferate, and frustrated citizens may resort to 

mob justice including lynching suspected criminals.6

Often, the average age of violent criminals falls and 

the prevalence of violent youth behavior grows. In 

short, a culture of violence emerges.

Evidence from Latin America bears this out. The 

homicide rate there, the highest in the world, is more 

than three times the global average. Guatemala’s homicide rate rose 50 percent between 2004 and 2008, 

an increase that paralleled cocaine traffic. According 

to a World Bank report on crime in the Caribbean, the 

“strongest explanation for the relatively high rates of 

crime and violence in the region—and their apparent 

rise in recent years—is narcotics trafficking.”7

Jamaica has one of the highest homicide rates in 

the world, and an estimated 40 percent of all murders 

are related to narcotics disputes. Indeed, there are 

268 local and transnational gangs in Jamaica alone, 

comprising tens of thousands of members. Police 

shootings have correspondingly risen sharply while 

relations with civilians have suffered. Within the last 

10 years, almost 2,000 Jamaicans have been killed by 

the police—slayings often followed up by the most 

cursory of internal investigations.

Such conditions can contribute to severe bursts 

of violence in Jamaica. In May 2010, authorities attempted to arrest and extradite to the United States a 

powerful Jamaican gang leader and reputed drug trafficker, Christopher “Dudus” Coke. Over the course 

of 3 days, Jamaican army and police units swept a 

subsection of the nation’s capital in search of the suspect. Their increased presence was met with hostility 

“the overwhelming evidence from 

Latin America and the Caribbean 

indicates that where cocaine 

traffic moves, so too do homicide 

rates and conflict”
5

by gang-controlled neighborhoods. Over 70 people 

were killed in clashes and gun battles.

Trafficking-associated violence can reach even 

more dangerous levels. In Mexico, traffickers frequently battle one another and the state to protect 

and expand their business. Government officials estimated 9,000 drug-related deaths in 2008, a dramatic 

upsurge from recent years that claimed the lives of 

many bystanders. Mexico has surpassed the 1,000 

deaths-per-year benchmark used to designate a state 

of civil war every year since 1995. This high toll has 

occurred despite government expenditures of $2.5 

billion per year to reduce drug-related violence and 

fund the deployment of 45,000 troops.

The upsurge in cocaine-related violence in Mexico follows a prolonged period in which cocaine traffic 

was largely ignored by the state, likely due to successful 

efforts by traffickers to co-opt officials. Traffickers accumulated much power and influence, and some became de facto authorities in several regions, effectively 

creating “ungoverned spaces.” When the government 

eventually confronted traffickers, the groups responded 

fiercely, revealing that the state no longer held its presumed monopoly on violence and security.

Cocaine traffic has provided a vital financial resource to insurgency groups as well. Recent reports 

from Peru indicate that the military is encountering resurgent elements of the Shining Path, which 

apparently has been able to reconstitute itself with 

proceeds from cocaine trafficking. The 40-year-old 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 

rebel group grew substantially during the 1990s when 

it began to traffic cocaine. Recently, the FARC diversified its cocaine trade from the United States to 

Europe by way of West Africa, a presence that could 

encourage insurgencies in West Africa and facilitate 

trade in strategies and tactics. According to independent reports, terrorist and armed groups in West Africa’s Sahel region are entering the drug trade.8

 The 

same is true in the Niger Delta, where militias have 

accepted in-kind cocaine as payment from traffickers.9

 This permits a move into the wholesale market 

and sharply increases revenues.

West Africa today sustains many of the conditions that enabled and fanned narcotics-related 

violence and conflict in Latin America and the 

Caribbean. The subregion hosts many insurgencies 

and terrorist groups who may view cocaine traffic as 

a prime opportunity to access financial resources. 

Likewise, West Africa’s already capable traffickers 

in small arms, cigarettes, and humans may diversify into cocaine. In Latin America, these problems 

quickly metastasized into national security challenges, often before the state was able to implement 

effective responses.

O B S T R U C T I N G T R A F F I C , P R O T E C T I N G 

I N S T I T U T I O N S 

In 2009, indications of small-scale cocaine processing emerged in Guinea and processing labs were 

thought to be active in Ghana. This represents a dangerous evolution beyond cocaine transshipment and 

is further evidence that quick and robust responses 

are necessary. Lessons drawn from Latin America’s 

experience offer critical insight into West Africa’s 

emerging counternarcotics playbook.

Address the Problem Vigorously Now. The 

threats posed by cocaine trafficking in West Africa are daunting, but they will be much harder to 

reverse if left unchecked. According to the World 

Bank, the Caribbean’s rising homicide and crime 

rates have exhibited “strong inertia effects.” This 

means that “once crime rates are high, it may be 

difficult to reduce them. At the same time, crimereduction efforts in the short term are likely to have 

huge long-term gains.”10 Since cocaine traffic in 

West Africa is still maturing, there is an opportunity 

to prevent its expansion. Deterring cocaine traffic 

is much cheaper, too. If West Africa can prevent 

further expansion of traffic, it can avoid the attendant spikes in crime and violence, flight of foreign 

investment, proliferation of gangs, overcrowded 

prisons, overburdened courts, and the rising defense 

and police expenditures seen in Latin America and 

the Caribbean.

“West Africa today bears many of 

the conditions that enabled and 

fanned narcotics-related violence 

and conflict in Latin America and 

the Caribbean”
6

Thus, West African political and civic leaders 

should strenuously press responsible government 

agencies to accelerate their counternarcotics efforts. Unfortunately, current indications suggest 

that recently devised strategies remain unused and 

poorly distributed. In October 2008, the Economic 

Community of West African States developed a 

regional action plan to counter drug trafficking 

based on five themes: data collection, law enforcement, legal frameworks, drug abuse prevention, 

and political and budgetary support. The action 

plan explores specific challenges and identifies 

aims, strategies, lead agencies, and potential partners for addressing them. However, assessments of 

country capabilities and needs by the UN Office 

in West Africa did not commence until November 

2009 and only in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 

assessments found that many national agencies in 

Liberia were not even aware that the regional action plan existed.11 That said, the Liberian government’s collaborative work with U.S. authorities 

led to the extradition of several West African and 

South American nationals attempting to bribe 

Liberian officials to facilitate large-scale cocaine 

transshipments in June 2010.

Safeguard the Integrity of Counternarcotics 

Institutions. The effectiveness of a government’s 

ability to marshal resources to prevent and deter 

threats is, at bottom, a function of public integrity. 

Advanced training, new military equipment, and 

other capacity enhancements will have limited effect 

if institutions and public officials remain corruptible.

Institutional integrity at even the highest levels 

of government in Latin America has been compromised by the proceeds of narcotics trafficking. Perceptions of a political-narcotrafficking nexus remain 

strong among citizens there, according to studies by 

the Organization of American States. Recognizing 

this, West Africa’s leaders should vigorously implement their regional action plan’s recommendation 

to target “corruption among law enforcement and 

judicial personnel” as a priority impediment to effective counternarcotics efforts and strengthen oversight 

bodies, prosecute offending officials, and train state 

institutions and civil society organizations to monitor 

and report corruption.

Credible politicians and elections are also vital 

to public integrity. Accordingly, West African states 

should devise systems to properly restrict, audit, and, 

when appropriate, sanction political parties, politicians, and donors who engage in influence peddling. 

A critical component of implementing such a system is 

developing the capacity, both within government and 

among watchdog groups, for forensic accounting so authorities can trace the intricate money trail involved. 

An immediate and simple reform African states can 

take is to expand requirements for disclosure of political parties’ and candidates’ financial information such 

as balance sheets and cash flow statements, measures 

that have gained widespread support among Latin 

America’s citizen groups and business community. This 

disclosure information should be updated regularly and 

made easily accessible so as to help expose suspicious 

accumulation of wealth to voters.

Latin America’s experience also underscores 

the critical importance of protecting judicial institutions. Until recently, Guatemalan criminal groups 

had extensive influence within government agencies, 

which they exploited to protect their activities. Murders of uncooperative law enforcement officials were 

not uncommon. In response, Guatemala’s legislature 

created an independent International Commission 

Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which in 

2007 was expanded through a partnership with the 

United Nations. The independent commission detailed jurists from developed and developing countries 

to work with Guatemalan counterparts to devise legal 

reforms and protect jurists and judicial integrity. Subsequent reforms to the tax secretariat and penal code 

helped dismantle illegal groups and identify sources 

of obstruction to good governance. As a result, 130 

individuals have been convicted and 2,000 police officers, an attorney general, and three supreme court 

justices have been dismissed. One former president 

has been indicted and another exonerated. Attitudes 

“advanced training, new military 

equipment, and other capacity 

enhancements will have limited 

effect if institutions and public 

officials remain corruptible”
7

have since changed and judges, prosecutors, and police officers in Guatemala’s cities and countryside are 

now more able to do their jobs. The CICIG serves as 

a possible model in West Africa, whose legislatures 

should move to create and adequately empower similar commissions partnered with international organizations such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 

or the Inter-Governmental Action Group against 

Money Laundering in West Africa.

Raise Transaction Costs. Trafficking cocaine 

through West Africa is comparatively cheap. Make 

it expensive. Counternarcotics strategies need to focus on raising transaction costs. Arresting traffickers, prosecuting cases, tracking smuggling routes, and 

undertaking other counternarcotics operations are 

vital to stemming cocaine traffic. Moreover, efforts 

that merely hinder the business of moving cocaine 

through West Africa make it more arduous, expensive, and unappealing to traffickers. The more expensive it is, the less inclined cocaine traffickers will be 

to use West Africa as a transit route.

Operations that amount to no more than harassment have produced impressive results in the Caribbean. From very low levels in 2000, annual cocaine 

seizures in the Netherlands Antilles reached 9 tons by 

2004. To counter rising traffic, Antillean and Dutch 

airport security officers stepped up searches of arriving 

and departing passengers. But, rather than arresting 

offenders (the low-level mules), police offered them 

the opportunity to cooperate. If mules were carrying 

less than 3 kilograms of drugs, they were not arrested 

but were returned to their point of origin and given 

receipts explaining the drug seizures so they would 

not face retribution from their employers. This tactic 

raised the cost of transporting drugs through the Antilles. Meanwhile, the number of mules transiting the 

Netherlands Antilles dropped 96 percent.12

Efforts to raise costs do not solely entail interdiction. Nicaragua has had great success reducing 

the labor supply for cocaine trafficking through its 

youth engagement strategy, which offers occupational alternatives, specialized corrections programs, 

and rehabilitation for former gang members. The 

National Police also work with partners in government, the media, the private sector, and civil society to implement a Prevention of Juvenile Violence 

program. This initiative has stymied the expansion 

of Central America’s large transnational gangs, 

which play critical roles in transshipment. While 

gang members in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala number in the tens of thousands, Nicaragua’s tally dropped from 8,500 in 1999 to 4,500 by 

2008. Nicaragua’s success comes despite its lower per 

capita income relative to its neighbors. Drug trafficking is still a problem for Nicaragua, but a country 

with limited resources can apply novel approaches 

to hamper narcotics trafficking.

The corrosive influence of narcotics trafficking 

across Africa threatens to become institutionally entrenched and poses severe and persistent security challenges. Such has been the case in many parts of Latin 

America and the Caribbean, even where narcotics production and abuse have remained low. Applying these 

lessons will help Africa minimize the debilitating effects 

of this trade and the risks it poses to the continent’s 

recent governance, economic, and stability gains. 

N O T E S

1

 Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, “National Integrity 

Systems Country Study Report: Jamaica 2003,” Transparency International, 51.

2

 “I’m Not a Cocaine Baron,” Daily Guide, April 21, 2010; 

Stephen Ellis, “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” African 

Affairs (2009), 192.

3

 “‘Cocaine Smuggling’ Nigerian Politician Held in Lagos,” 

BBC, May 17, 2010.

4

 Tanu Jalloh, “Kemoh Sesay Sacked for Police to Arrest,” 

Concord Times, August 5, 2008.

5

 For reports from Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria, respectively: 

“Screening Out Morally Unfit Crime Fighters,” UN Integrated 

Regional Information Network, October 29, 2008; Emmanuel Akli, 

“MV Resurrected Benjamin Cocaine Affair,” Ghanaian Chronicle, 

April 21, 2010; Idowu Sowunmi, “Funding, Operational Problems 

Cripple NDLEA,” This Day, November 28, 2009.

6

 William C. Prillaman, “Crime, Democracy, and Development in Latin America,” Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, June 2003, 15.

“trafficking cocaine through West 

Africa is comparatively cheap— 

make it expensive”
8

7

 World Bank, “Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean,” March 2007, i.

8

 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Security Council Debates ‘Devastating Impact’ of Drug Trafficking,” December 9, 2009.

9

 Mike McGovern, “Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa,” testimony before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, U.S. 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 23, 2009. See also Ellis.

10 World Bank, 33.

11 “Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Office for West Africa,” UN Security Council, December 31, 2009, 11.

12 World Bank, 98.

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Africa Center for Strategic Studies

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