April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 1 of 108

Highway Evacuations 

in Selected 

Metropolitan Areas: 

Assessment of 

Impediments

 April 2010

FHWA-HOP-10-059

 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 2 of 108

Notice

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the 

interest of information exchange. The U.S. Government assumes no liability for the use of the information 

contained in this document.

The U.S. Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trademarks or manufacturers' names 

appear in this report only because they are considered essential to the objective of the document.

Quality Assurance Statement

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) provides high-quality information to serve Government, 

industry, and the public in a manner that promotes public understanding. Standards and policies are used 

to ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of its information. FHWA 

periodically reviews quality issues and adjusts its programs and processes to ensure continuous quality 

improvement.
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 3 of 108

Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No.

FHWA-HOP-10-059

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.

4. Title and Subtitle

Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

5. Report Date

April 2010

6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)

Kimberly C. Vásconez and Mark Kehrli

8. Performing Organization Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

Federal Highway Administration, Office of Transportation Operations, 

Washington, DC 20590

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

Emergency Transportation Operations

Office of Transportation Operations

Federal Highway Administration

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

Technical Report

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

HOTO

15. Supplementary Notes

The FHWA recognizes the interviewers (Sandra Jackson, Tim Lane, Ray Murphy, Paul Olson, Nathaniel Price, Laurel J. Radow, and 

Chung Tran) and the numerous State and local officials who gave their expertise and time to aid in producing this report.

16. Abstract

Almost 5 years after hurricanes Katrina and Rita battered Louisiana and Texas, respectively, public officials remain focused on the 

Nation’s ability to safely evacuate large numbers of people. As a part of the Fiscal Year 2010 U.S. Department of Transportation 

(DOT) appropriations (Public Law 111-117), the U.S. Congress requested the DOT, in cooperation with the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), to:

• assess mass evacuation plans for the country’s high-threat, high-density areas and identify and prioritize deficiencies on 

those routes that could impede evacuations and 

• conduct an analysis of how national highway system (NHS) projects under construction west of the National Capital Region 

(NCR) could increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity and provide a detailed plan to accelerate such projects.

The following information addresses both assessments and involves a broad view of what local authorities in 26 metropolitan areas 

view as the greatest impediments of their NHS routes in supporting a mass evacuation within their region, as well as a section 

dedicated to assessing construction and options for accelerating work along NHS routes west of the NCR that would facilitate the 

movement of NCR evacuees from danger as necessary.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) led the multiagency effort to gather and consolidate information. The planning, interview 

and review teams included representatives of various FHWA offices, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, the DHS Office of 

Infrastructure Protection, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offices of Response and of the National Capital 

Region Coordination (NCRC). Inquiries on the report should be directed to the authors: Jeff Lindley, Associate Administrator, FHWA 

Office of Operations; Mark Kehrli, Director, FHWA Office of Transportation Operations; or Kimberly C. Vásconez, Team Leader, FHWA 

Emergency Transportation Operations. 

17. Key Words

Evacuations plans, best practices, National Capital 

Region, traffic control, quick clearance, training, 

communications, 

18. Distribution Statement

No restrictions.

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

Unclassified

20. Security Classif.(of this page)

Unclassified

21. No. of Pages

107

22. Price

 Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
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Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

Foreword

Almost 5 years after hurricanes Katrina and Rita battered Louisiana and Texas, respectively, public 

officials remain focused on the Nation’s ability to safely evacuate large numbers of people. As a 

part of the Fiscal Year 2010 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) appropriations (Public Law 

111-117), the U.S. Congress requested the DOT, in cooperation with the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), to:

• assess mass evacuation plans for the country’s high-threat, high-density areas and identify 

and prioritize deficiencies on those routes that could impede evacuations and 

• conduct an analysis of how national highway system (NHS) projects under construction 

west of the National Capital Region (NCR) could increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity 

and provide a detailed plan to accelerate such projects.

The following information addresses both assessments and involves a broad view of what local 

authorities in 26 metropolitan areas view as the greatest impediments of their NHS routes in 

supporting a mass evacuation within their region, as well as a section dedicated to assessing 

construction and options for accelerating work along NHS routes west of the NCR that would 

facilitate the movement of NCR evacuees from danger as necessary.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) led the multiagency effort to gather and consolidate 

information. The planning, interview and review teams included representatives of various FHWA 

offices, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offices of Response and of the National 

Capital Region Coordination (NCRC). Inquiries on the report should be directed to the authors: 

Jeff Lindley, Associate Administrator, FHWA Office of Operations; Mark Kehrli, Director, FHWA 

Office of Transportation Operations; or Kimberly C. Vásconez, Team Leader, FHWA Emergency 

Transportation Operations. The FHWA recognizes all of the FHWA interviewers (Sandra Jackson, 

Tim Lane, Ray Murphy, Paul Olson, Nathaniel Price, Laurel J. Radow, and Chung Tran) and the 

numerous State and local officials (listed in Appendix A) who gave their expertise and time to aid 

in producing this report.
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Table of Contents

Foreword.....................................................4

Executive Summary.....................................6

Introduction..................................................12

Regional Findings..........................................17

Atlanta, GA

Baltimore, MD

Boston, MA

Charleston, SC

Chicago, IL

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX

Denver, CO

Detroit, MI

Hampton Roads, VA

Houston, TX

Jacksonville, FL

Las Vegas, NV

Los Angeles, CA

Miami, FL

Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN

National Capital Region (DC, MD & 

 northern VA)

New Orleans, LA

New York, NY

Philadelphia, PA

Phoenix, AZ

Portland, OR

San Diego, CA

San Francisco, CA

Seattle, WA

St. Louis, MO

Tampa-St. Petersburg, FL

Options for Accelerating Projects to Increase Evacuation Capacity 

West of the National Capital Region....................................................................................................77

Summary of Findings..................................................................................................................................94

Appendix 1: Acknowledgments: Interviewees & Respondents.....................................................98

Appendix 2: References & Plan Summary..........................................................................................103

Appendix 3: Acronyms & Terms............................................................................................................106
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Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

Executive Summary

Almost 5 years after hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

battered Louisiana and Texas, respectively, public 

officials remain focused on the Nation’s ability to 

safely evacuate large numbers of people. As a part of 

the Fiscal Year 2010 U.S. Department of Transportation 

(DOT) appropriations (Public Law 111-117), the U.S. 

Congress requested the DOT, in cooperation with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to:

• assess mass evacuation plans for the country’s highthreat, high-density areas and identify and prioritize 

deficiencies on those routes that could impede 

evacuations, and 

• conduct an analysis of how national highway system 

(NHS) projects under construction west of the National 

Capital Region (NCR) could increase the NCR’s 

evacuation capacity and provide a detailed plan to 

accelerate such projects.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) addressed 

this request in two phases. First, it collaborated with 

DHS and internal stakeholders to identify the top 26 

metropolitan areas in the country that would meet the 

“high-threat, high-density” criteria, but would also be representative of areas based on 

geographic locations and threat variances (e.g., hurricanes, hazardous materials releases, 

wildfire-urban interface issues, floods, and terrorist threats). The FHWA reviewed existing plans 

from the 26 locations and conducted interviews of FHWA Division staff, State and/or local 

transportation officials and State and/or local emergency management and homeland security 

professionals. The interviews resulted in the State and local descriptions of their plans, as well 

as their view of the top impediments that would frustrate mass evacuation operations. The 

following chart illustrates a general summary of the top impediments reported by the 

jurisdictions. The FHWA decided not to extrapolate further findings from these as differences in 

local situations make definitive findings difficult to capture. However, it is clear that

jurisdictions share several common perceptions of what might impede their mass evacuation 

plans (e.g., day-to-day congestion, infrastructure constraints, and communications equipment 

and frequencies). Many of the interviewees noted that while contraflow operations, or reversal 

of lanes, may be practical for hurricane-prone States, it would not constitute a viable option to

a quick-onset incident. However, some interviewees also noted that large-scale, mass 

evacuations would be extremely unlikely, especially in the case of certain “quick-onset”

incidents, and for many incidents it would be preferable for citizens to shelter-in-place rather 

than evacuate.
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Summary of Jurisdictional Perceptions of Impediments by Location

Location Top Impediments/Challenges

Atlanta, GA Contraflow Constraints; Infrastructure Limitations; Arterial Road Systems with Overpasses Cannot Accommodate Trailer 

Heights; Bridge Weight Restrictions Impede Movements; and Traffic Data is Scattered Throughout the Region

Baltimore, MD Evacuation Plan Needs Updating; Infrastructure Impediments-Roadways; and Region Lacks a Coordinated Signal Timing 

System

Boston, MA Contraflow Constraints; Shoulders May Not be Able to Support Additional Evacuation Traffic; and No Place for Sheltering

Charleston, SC Infrastructure Constraint I-26; East-West Evacuation Routes; Lane Restrictions; ITS Capabilities along Evacuation Routes; 

and Incident Responder Coverage Along I-26, Charleston to Columbia

Chicago Traffic Congestion; Emergency Vehicle Access; Railroad Crossing/Street Blockage; Contraflow Operations Would Impede 

Evacuations; and Real-Time Highway Information for Responders and Public 

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX Infrastructure Limitations; Lack of Cameras along Key Routes; and Evacuation Plans Do Not Exist 

Denver. CO No Evacuation Plan; No Evacuation Routes Identified; No Lane Assignments for Emergency Services; Infrastructure 

Limitations; Traffic Flow Analysis on Evacuation Routes; and Weather Hindrances

Detroit, MI Infrastructure Conditions Impede Responder Operations; Congestion; and Bottlenecks on Freeways, including Narrow 

Freeway Lanes and Limited Shoulders

Hampton Roads, VA Traffic Signal Timing; Number of Water Crossings; Limited ITS Deployment Along Key Evacuation Routes; Flood-Prone 

Infrastructure; and Human Resources to Manage Evacuation Operations and Tools

Houston, TX Bottlenecks; Communications with the Public; Number/Type of Resources to Deploy; More CCTV Cameras; and Modeling 

Timeliness 

Jacksonville, FL Work Zones; Limited Fueling Stations; No DMSs on westbound I-10; and No ITS Deployment on Key Interstates

Las Vegas, NV Insufficient Lanes and Daily Congestion; Coordination with Other States on Evacuation Routes; Communications Systems 

Would Not Support Evacuation Operations; Deployable Traffic Signs and Evacuation Route Signage; and Traffic Flow 

Monitoring

Los Angeles, CA Congestion and Evacuation Route Capacity; Communications Capabilities; and Public Outreach and Understanding 

Evacuation Process

Miami, FL Insufficient Road Capacity; Damage to Critical Infrastructure; Work Zones on Major Routes; Traffic Signal Timing; and Lack of 

ITS Devices on Major Arterial Roads

MinneapolisSt. Paul, MNInfrastructure Capacity and Congestion; Lack of Coordinated Plan and Universal Agreement on the Benefits of Evacuation; 

Disconnected Transportation and Emergency Operations Centers; Need for More Signage and Public Education; 

Coordination of Signal Timing Plans; Address Equipment Gaps for Pedestrian Movements; and Develop Multiple Options for 

River Crossing

National Capital 

Region (DC, MD & 

northern VA)

Regional GIS Database; Traffic Signal Coordination on Arterials; Limited Roadway Capacity; Institutional Coordination; 

Communication Interoperability and Protocols; and VIP Movements and Security

New Orleans, LA Highway Flooding; Additional ITS Capacity; Insufficient Capacity; and Lack of Emergency Lanes 

New York City, NY Infrastructure Condition and Limitations; Need Improved Coordination between State/Local Transportation Officials and 

Responders; Limited Deployment of ITS Impact on Sharing Situational Awareness Data; Weather Impacts; and Need for 

Public Information Campaign

Philadelphia, PA Expressway Congestion; Need for Situational Awareness; Emergency Signal Timing Coordination; Operational Coordination; 

and Toll Waivers

Phoenix, AZ Communication Capabilities; Community Outreach and Education Program; Rural Evacuation Route Signing and Information 

(public outreach) Strategy; Mass Evacuation Regional Command and Control Center; and Evacuation Route Signing

Portland, OR Bridge Vulnerability; Capacity and Infrastructure Limitations; Communications and Coordination with Neighboring 

Jurisdictions and the Public; Communications and ITS Technology for Incident Operations; Improved Traffic Management 

and Safety; More Robust Planning for Evacuation Operations; and Identification and Use of Resources

San Diego, CA Communication Capabilities; Evacuation Route Capacity; and Need Public Outreach Campaign

San Francisco, CA Communication Capabilities if Damaged; and Infrastructure (Roads, Bridges and Overpasses) along Evacuation Routes 

Seattle, WA Congestion; Limited Infrastructure; and Insufficient Responder Resources to Manage an Evacuation

St. Louis, MO Limited Capacity; and Highway Capacity and Bridges

Tampa-St. 

Petersburg, FL

Highway Infrastructure Capacity; Bridge Infrastructure Capacity; Bridge Vulnerability to Damage; Highway Vulnerability to 

Damage; and Limited Evacuation Routes due to Geographic Limitations 
 April 2010

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Summary of Jurisdictional Perceptions of Top Impediments:

General Categories 1

General Categories Location Reporting as Top Impediment

Communications Equipment & Frequencies, 

Including Interoperability

Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, National Capital Region (NCR), Phoenix, 

San Diego, San Francisco

Communications with Responders or Public Houston, Portland

Congestion/Capacity Chicago (2), Detroit, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Miami, NCR, 

New Orleans, Philadelphia, Portland, San Diego, Seattle, St. Louis, Tampa (2)

Contraflow Issues Atlanta, Boston, Chicago

Coordination, including with internal 

Partners, Responders & other States

Las Vegas, Minneapolis-St. Paul, NCR, New York City, Philadelphia, Portland

Evacuation Route Identification Denver

Infrastructure-Bridges & Overpasses Atlanta (2), Charleston, Portland, San Francisco, St. Louis, TampaSt. Petersburg(2)

Infrastructure-Roads including Bottlenecks, 

Condition, Emergency Vehicle Access Lanes, 

etc.

Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Charleston(2), Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, 

Denver(2), Detroit(5), Hampton Roads, Houston, Las Vegas, Miami(2), NCR, 

New Orleans(2), New York City, San Francisco, Seattle

ITS2 Charleston, Hampton Roads, Jacksonville, Miami, New York City, Philadelphia, 

Portland

Infrastructure General 

ITS-DMS Jacksonville

ITS-CCTV Traffic Cameras & Detectors Dallas/Ft. Worth, Houston, New Orleans

ITS-Ramp Metering Hampton Roads

Plans Need Updating or Developed Baltimore, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Denver, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland

Plans-Alternate Modes of Transport Minneapolis-St. Paul

Public Outreach/Education Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York City, NCR, Philadelphia, 

Phoenix(2), San Diego

Real-Time Data Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia

Resources-Equipment for Pedestrian 

Movements

Minneapolis-St. Paul

Resources-Fueling Stations Jacksonville

Resources-Responder Staff Charleston, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Hampton Roads, Houston, Portland, Seattle

Safety/Service Patrols-Increased Presence Charleston

Sheltering Boston, Portland

Signage-Evacuation Route or Other Chicago, Las Vegas, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Phoenix

TMC Data Sharing & EOC Connectivity Atlanta, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York City, Phoenix

Toll Waivers Philadelphia

Traffic Analysis or Modeling Denver, Houston 

Traffic Control & Monitoring Chicago, Las Vegas

Traffic Signal Timing Baltimore, Hampton Roads, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, NCR, Philadelphia 

VIP Movements & Security NCR 

Weather or Geographic Hindrances Denver, Hampton Roads, New Orleans, NCR, New York City, TampaSt. Petersburg

Work Zones Jacksonville, Miami

 1 Where a parenthesis and number follow a location, e.g., Charleston (2), that indicates that two of Charleston’s top impediments fall into this 

category.

2 Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) includes Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) Closed Circuit TV (CCTV), Traffic Cameras, Traffic 

Management Centers (TMCs), Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), etc.
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The second part of this study addressed how NHS projects under construction west of the NCR 

could increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity. The FHWA conducted research and extensive 

interviews with FHWA Division staff and authorities from the States of Maryland and West 

Virginia, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Washington Council of Governments to discuss 

corridors and planned construction on the NHS and arterial routes that evacuees departing the 

NCR would use to evacuate the region. 

Through this research and interviews FHWA: 

(1) identified NHS roads that would qualify 

for this study, (2) analyzed NHS projects (or 

phases of large multi-phase projects) west of 

the NCR currently under construction that 

could increase evacuation capacity, and (3) 

provided options to accelerate NHS projects 

(or phases of large multi-phase projects)

under construction.

The FHWA reviewed the areas considered 

outside and to the west of the NCR and NHS 

routes in the following counties:

Virginia: Albemarle, Alleghany, Augusta, 

Bath, Clarke, Culpeper, Fauquier, Frederick, 

Greene, Highland, Madison, Nelson, Orange, 

Page, Rappahannock, Rockbridge, 

Rockingham, Shenandoah and Warren.

Maryland: Allegany, Frederick, Garrett, and Washington.

West Virginia: Barbour, Grant, Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hardy, Harrison, Jefferson, Marion, 

Monongalia, Pendleton, Pocahontas, Preston, Randolph, Tucker, and Upshur.

Corridors studied include the following as depicted on the map below:

• Northern Route: I-270 (MD) to I-70 (MD) to I-68 (MD) to I-68 (WV) 

• Central Route: I-66 (VA) to I-81 (VA) to the Appalachian Corridor H Alignment (VA-55 and 

WV-55)

• Southern Route A: I-66 (VA) to I-81 (VA) to I-64 (VA) to I-64 (WV)

• Southern Route B: US 29 (VA) to I-64 (VA) to I-64 (WV)

The FHWA gathered and analyzed information on ongoing highway projects (or phases of large 

multi-phase projects) west of the NCR that had the potential to increase evacuation capacity. 

This analysis revealed no ongoing projects that have the potential to increase evacuation 

capacity on either of the two southern NHS routes (US 29 to I-64 and I-66 to I-81 to I-64). 

Therefore, FHWA dropped both of these two routes from further analysis. 

Through its research and interviews, FHWA identified opportunities to accelerate construction 

projects on the various routes studied. Since most opportunities to accelerate construction
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U.S. Department of Transportation 10 of 108

depend on innovative means to carry out project financing, project development, and contract 

administration, the research team consulted with numerous FHWA, Maryland State Highway 

Administration (MDSHA), Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT), and West Virginia 

Department of Transportation (WVDOT) specialists in order to identify viable options for the 

identified projects. The FHWA has been a leader in identifying and advocating the use of 

contract administration and project finance options to accelerate construction time on all 

highway projects, with particular focus on large and complex projects. The table below 

summarizes which specific project finance and contract administration options examined in this 

study have been, or will be, considered by the MDSHA and the West Virginia Department of 

Highways (WVDOH) to accelerate construction, or time to construction, for the six projects (or 

phases of large multi-phase projects) identified that would increase evacuation capacity on key 

NHS evacuation routes west of the NCR. 
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Summary of Project Options to Accelerate Construction

Options Projects to Consider Option

Project Finance Options:

Potential Revenue Sources:

• User Fees

• State/Local Taxes

• Value Capture

Federal-aid Grants Management:

• Advance Construction I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

• Partial Conversion of Advance Construction I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

• Flexible Match

• Tapered Match

• Toll Credits (Soft Match) I-70 Phase 4

• Transfers Between States Corridor H (All Phases)

• Advances Between States Corridor H (All Phases)

• Transfers Between Projects Corridor H (All Phases)

Federal Credit Programs:

• Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 

Innovation Act (TIFIA)

• State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs)

• Section 129 Loans

Bonds/Debt Financing:

• Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEEs) Corridor H (All Phases)

• Availability Payments Corridor H (All Phases)

• Shadow Tolls

• Private Activity Bonds (PABs)

• 63-20 Issuance

• Build America Bonds (BABs)

Contract Administration Options:

Construction Manager At Risk

Cost-Plus-Time I-70 Phase 4

Design-Build I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

Design-Build-Maintain (Operate)

Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) Provisions for Early 

Contract Completion

I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

Interim Completion Dates Corridor H (All Phases)

Multi-Parameter Bidding including Quality (A+B+Q 

Bidding)

No Excuse Incentives

Stipulated Sum I-70 Phase 4

Project Phasing I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

Lane Rental

Partnering I-70 Phase 4
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Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

Introduction

Almost 5 years after hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita battered Louisiana and Texas,

respectively, public officials remain 

focused on the Nation’s ability to safely 

evacuate large numbers of people. As a 

part of the Fiscal Year 2010 Department 

of Transportation Appropriations

Conference Report (Public Law 111-117), 

the U.S. Congress requested DOT, in 

cooperation with DHS, to:

•

• assess mass evacuation plans for the country’s highthreat, high-density areas and identify and prioritize 

deficiencies on those routes that could impede 

evacuations, and 

• conduct an analysis of how national highway system 

projects under construction west of the National Capital 

Region (NCR) could increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity

and provide a detailed plan to accelerate such projects.

The section titled “Regional Findings” addresses the first 

assessment and involves a broad view of what local 

authorities view as the greatest impediments on their NHS 

routes in supporting a mass-evacuation operation within 

their region. The portion titled “Options for Accelerating 

Projects to Increase Evacuation Capacity 

West of the National Capital Region” will address the 

second study outlined in 2010 Conference Report 

accompanying P.L. 111-117.

Background

Evacuation operations occur daily throughout the Nation. Local jurisdictions manage 

evacuations, involving a single building, a neighborhood or an entire city. As such, evacuation 

expertise—including evacuation routes and potential impediments—lies with local authorities. In 

“Ensuring the success of mass 

evacuations—The conferees direct the 

Department of Transportation (DOT), in 

cooperation with the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), to assess mass 

evacuation plans for the country’s most –

high-threat, high-density areas and identify 

and prioritize deficiencies on those routes 

that could impede evacuations. The 

conferees also direct DOT, in cooperation 

with DHS and the Office of the National 

Capital Region Coordination, to conduct an 

analysis of how national highway system 

projects under construction west of the 

National Capital Region (NCR) could 

increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity and 

provide a detailed plan to accelerate such 

projects. DOT shall submit its report to the 

House and Senate Committees on 

Appropriations no later than 90 days after the 

enactment of this Act.”

Departments of Transportation & Housing & Urban 

Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 

2010 Conference Report (111-366) to

Accompany HR 3288 & Public Law 111-117,

FY 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act 
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U.S. Department of Transportation 13 of 108

a 2005 Nuclear Regulatory Commission report titled, “Identification & Analysis of Factors 

Affecting Emergency Evacuations,” the Sandia National Laboratories studied events that 

triggered evacuations over a 13-year period. Researchers discredited the common belief that 

hurricanes constitute the primary trigger of evacuations. They found that wildfires constituted 

the number one trigger of evacuations and that an evacuation of 1,000 or more people occurs 

every 2 to 3 weeks in the United States. The FHWA publishes “Evacuations in the News” on its 

Emergency Transportation Operations Web site-http://opsdev.fhwa.dot.gov/eto_tim_pse. This 

data informally demonstrates the validity of the NRC report, which identifies the triggers of 

evacuations depicted in Figure 4-2.

The importance of this research as applied to this report is that many of the metropolitan areas 

included below often experience evacuations, generally on a localized, small scale. Those 

jurisdictions not threatened by storms or hurricanes that may be provided with advance warning 

often stated that contraflow operations—a key tool to evacuate populations along the East Coast 

and Gulf States—would not work in their area. They commented that the proclivity of incidents 

Transportation 

Accident

7%

Figure 4-2. Principal Causes of Large-Scale Evacuation in the United Sates 1/1/1990-6/30/2003

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “Identification & Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations,” 2004

2.3%

10%

Earthquakes

1%

1%

Malevolent Acts

6%

Tornadoes 1%

Floods

20%

Other

2%

Fixed Site 

HazMat 

Incident

14%

Pipeline

Rupture

3%

Railroad 

Accident

11%

Wildfire

23%

Tropical 

Storm

2%

Hurricanes

10%
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 14 of 108

common to their area do not offer an advance warning. As such, readers should keep in mind 

that potential evacuation-level events will vary depending upon the jurisdiction. For example, 

while hurricanes and tropical storms may plague Louisiana and Florida, wildfires, flash flooding, 

or hazardous materials incidents may be the primary evacuation trigger in places like Denver, 

Chicago, or the Northeast. 

This study complements assessments published in June 2006. Immediately following hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Congress requested that DOT team with DHS in conducting two 

complementary studies of the efficacy of existing mass evacuation plans for Gulf Region States 

and emergency plans for local jurisdictions at risk from major hurricanes and other catastrophic 

events. In Section 10204 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity 

Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) (P.L. 109-59) and Section 187 of the FY 2006 Department 

of Transportation Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-115), Congress specified that this assessment 

should include: 

(1) all safe and practical modes of transportation available for 

evacuations; 

(2) the extent to which evacuation plans are coordinated with 

neighboring States and adjoining jurisdictions; 

(3) methods of communicating evacuation plans and preparing 

citizens in advance of evacuations; 

(4) methods of coordinating communication with evacuees during 

plan execution; 

(5) the availability of food, water, restrooms, fueling stations, 

and shelter opportunities along the evacuation routes; 

(6) the time required to evacuate under the plan; 

(7) the physical and mental strains associated with the 

evacuation; and 

(8) the costs of the plans. 

Congress directed that the Gulf 

State Evacuation Plan study also 

include the unique issues that arose 

during the evacuations in connection with hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita along with lessons learned in evacuations associated with 

other major catastrophic events.

Concurrent with the study of mass evacuation plans for the Gulf 

Coast Region, DOT collaborated with DHS on a study of 

catastrophic planning in States, territories, and major urban areas 

called for in the Conference Report (H.R.109-241) to the 

Department of Homeland Security Fiscal Year 2006 Appropriations 

Act (P.L. 109-90). Congress requested that DHS assess the status 

of catastrophic planning in all States and in 75 of the Nation’s 

largest urban areas. This report, titled National Plan Review II, 

included a section assessing whether plans addressed three mass 

evacuation criteria. 
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This study differs from the 2006 reports. Congress asked that DOT and DHS focus on identifying 

and prioritizing deficiencies within the NHS that would impede effective mass evacuation 

operations. Where the Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation3 and the National 

Plan Review4 evaluated the strategic elements of the plans, this assessment focuses on a 

singular tactical component—the road systems—as a part of effective evacuation plans. 

Therefore, readers should not construe large-scale, mass evacuations via the National Highway 

System as the only means by which localities respond to incidents. Nevertheless, many lessons 

learned from the 2006 studies are useful in establishing a frame of reference for this report.

Methodology

For this study, the DOT used a structured methodology to collect, review and assess information 

on mass evacuations in high-risk, high-population locations around the country. Based on the

conference report language, FHWA used the following definitions in preparing the report: 

• “...identify and prioritize current deficiencies on the recommended evacuation routes that 

could impede evacuations if not addressed” — Deficiencies were interpreted as any highway 

infrastructure, operations and ITS impediments perceived by local jurisdictions as a likely 

impediment to evacuation traffic flow.

• “To assess the mass evacuation plans for 

the country’s most high-threat, highdensity areas...” — The country’s most highthreat locations include areas at risk from 

all hazards, whether natural or man-made, 

and will be included among the DHS Urban 

Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions. 

• “...The conferees also direct DOT, in 

cooperation with DHS and the Office of the 

National Capital Region Coordination, to 

conduct an analysis of how national 

highway system projects currently under 

construction west of the National Capital 

Region (NCR) could increase the NCR’s 

evacuation capacity and provide a detailed 

plan to accelerate such projects....” — This portion of the requirement will be covered in a 

separate section within this report, titled “Options for Accelerating Projects to Increase 

Evacuation Capacity West of the National Capital Region.” This section differs from the 

“Regional Findings” section that precedes it due to the specific geographic requirements and 

the need to address how accelerating projects currently under construction might address 

impediments in those specific geographies. 

• “...to conduct an analysis of how national highway system...” — Although mentioned in 

reference to the second study on deficiencies and suggested improvements west of the NCR, 

 3 http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/hurricanevacuation/

4 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf

Regions Included in the Study 

Atlanta Minneapolis-St. Paul

Baltimore National Capital Region

Boston (DC, MD & northern VA)

Charleston New Orleans

Chicago New York City

Dallas/Ft. Worth Philadelphia

Denver Phoenix

Detroit Portland, OR

Hampton Roads, VA San Diego, CA

Houston San Francisco

Jacksonville Seattle

Las Vegas St. Louis, MO

Los Angeles Tampa-St. Petersburg

Miami, FL
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 16 of 108

the researchers determined that the focus of this study would also be restricted to a review 

of highways, not arterial routes. This study does not address transit issues; therefore, the 

deficiencies refer only to the use of highways to evacuate populations, not the interrelated 

transit and highway systems often used in major metropolitan areas during evacuations. 

Again, readers should understand that the road system is only one aspect of an overall 

approach localities would implement to protect residents in the event of an incident.

Because the DHS Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) requires that 75 UASI areas develop an 

evacuation plan, FHWA elected to select the areas for this study from the UASI locations. Time 

constraints prohibited an assessment of all 75 UASI areas. As a result, FHWA narrowed the list of 

candidate regions to include in the study. Researchers used the following criteria to identify

jurisdictions. The target areas had to be:

• subject to a range of threats that would trigger mass evacuations that include, but are not 

limited to, hurricanes/tropical storms, wildfires, floods, hazardous materials accidents and 

releases, and terrorist threats; 

• among the top 100 most populated areas based on the U.S. Census (2000);

• geographically dispersed so that all regions of the Nation were represented in the study; and

• actively involved in emergency planning, increasing the likelihood that such that plans would 

be available for review.

Next, FHWA gathered stakeholders to discuss the requirements. The group included 

representatives of the DOT Office of the Secretary; the FHWA offices of Operations, 

Infrastructure, Policy, and Planning; the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Office of National Capital Region Coordination (NCRC) 

and Office of Response.

The FHWA collected plans from selected metropolitan areas and assembled a research team. 

After reviewing the plans and discussing the planned methodology with the DOT and DHS 

stakeholders, FHWA decided to supplement the plan review with interviews of the local planners

since local jurisdictions possess the most relevant information on the highway impediments that 

would frustrate mass evacuation operations. The FHWA interviewed local jurisdiction points of 

contacts and included State DOTs and the FHWA Division Offices in the interviews. The results 

of these interviews constitute the primary source of the information that follows. Therefore, this 

report reflects the perceptions of interviewees as to the impediments they might face in an 

evacuation and should in no way be misinterpreted as a scientific analysis of data validating

impediments likely to occur.
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 17 of 108

Regional Findings

The study found that almost every city cited daily 

congestion as one of the greatest impediments to 

planning for mass evacuations. As a result, the 

following snapshots of the studied metropolitan 

areas include results from plan assessments, 

interviews with local planners, and information 

contained in the INRIX® National Traffic 

Scorecard: 2009 Annual Report.

5

The information presented below represents a composite assessment of plans provided by the 

 The INRIX® 

scores indicate how severe congestion is relative to 

other parts of the country and provides a starting 

point for how severe day-to-day congestion is when 

considering how to plan for a highway-based 

evacuation. The data provides additional insight 

into the highway impediments that will frustrate 

area attempts to execute a mass evacuation. The 

INRIX® study looks at 100 metropolitan areas and 

the routes shown below in green. The areas in red constitute the worst bottlenecks along these 

routes, as described in the report, and on the individual city maps in the case studies.

 5 INRIX® authorized FHWA to use data from its copyrighted report, INRIX® National Traffic Scorecard: 2009 Annual Report

Figure 1. Map from INRIX® National Traffic Scorecard: 2009 Annual Report
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 18 of 108

locations and interviews with city, State and Federal highway division officials, as noted in 

Appendix 1. The plans are referenced in Appendix 2. However, a few plans are considered 

“Sensitive,” and the full document may not be available to the public. 

The Plan

While localized evacuations occurred 

in the fall of 2009 due to inundating 

rain, Georgia’s most recent largescale, mass evacuation occurred in 

2004. A chemical fire impacted 

Rockdale County, to the east of 

Atlanta. Authorities evacuated 

approximately 8,000 people, giving 

instructions based on the direction of 

the plume. Since then, the State and 

local jurisdictions have discussed how 

best to update evacuation plans.

The March 2009 plan provided to 

FHWA for this study represents the 

Atlanta Region’s most current 

evacuation plan proposal. This plan 

assumes a no-notice trigger. Once 

local plans are updated and the 

regional plan has more detail, the goal is to incorporate the plan into the State plan. It includes 

the 10 counties of the Atlanta Regional Commission’s (ARC) planning area and 10 of the 

transportation planning area’s 18 counties. The ARC6

, one of 12 regional commissions in Georgia 

and a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), led this planning effort. Several years ago, the 

Georgia DOT (GDOT) hired a consultant firm to undertake an evacuation study of a 1-mile radius 

around the State Capitol in downtown Atlanta. The study provided data and input into the 

Atlanta Regional Evacuation Plan. 

The March 2009 plan resulted from an 18-month effort that included transportation staff, public 

officials, emergency management agency directors, American Red Cross representatives and 

Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) staff. The mayor of Atlanta asked the ARC 

Board to work cooperatively to develop a regional evacuation plan, resulting in the strong 

support of elected leadership. The GEMA and the Fulton County Emergency Management Agency 

pooled funds and leveraged DHS grants with ARC transportation funds, using an MPO staff 

representative to participate on the Planning Advisory Team to develop the plan. The Fayette 

County manager, a former county Emergency Management Agency director and a former chair of 

the Area 7 All Hazards Council was a key leader and visionary of regional evacuation planning 

 6 The Atlanta Regional Commission membership includes chief elected officials of the region and appointed citizen 

members.

Atlanta, Georgia #11-Most Congested #8-Population (5,376,000)

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U.S. Department of Transportation 19 of 108

and participated in the process. The ARC has a strong history of developing multidisciplinary 

plans as an MPO, an Area Agency on Aging, and other planning responsibilities in the areas of 

workforce development, regional development planning and water supply planning. 

The most recent planning effort used a community-wide workshop concept, drawing more than 

100 representatives from all levels of government, the United Way, the American Red Cross and 

other private and non-profit stakeholders. As a result, the plan emphasizes roles and 

responsibilities among responders. The Atlanta Regional evacuation plan includes a discussion of 

mutual aid agreements that arose from post 1996-Olympics legislation, as well as a discussion on 

how to incorporate the concerns of the special needs population into the plan. 

Currently, authorities plan to include the following in the next iteration of the March 2009 plan: 

• local annexes; 

• discussion of database under development to identify special needs populations;

• updated arterial study; 

• updated discussion on mutual aid and cooperative agreements to address liability 

weaknesses; 

• section on how to use buses since school buses are not available for 4 hours to enable 

schools to evacuate school children, alleviating congestion on rural routes caused by 

parents heading toward schools; 

• information on a traffic clearance tool, which is a database that may be populated with 

real-time traffic information so the public and authorities can get up-to-date traffic 

conditions information, and 

• traffic signal coordination. 

The next revision will be done within 3 years. The current plan identifies 12 evacuation zones 

and describes how people should travel out of those zones. Interviewees noted that the revised 

plan should include local participation to ensure that the localities agree with those evacuation 

zones. During the next planning cycle, officials will update the regional transportation plan by 

addressing the next level of detail, specifically at the local government level. The ARC notes 

that the next Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) will include activities that support the 

following goals: promote safety, improve congestion, and integrate public safety and 

transportation efforts. Also, ARC will incorporate evacuation policy and assumptions into the 

next update of the 2005 Regional ITS architecture. 

The GDOT is currently implementing a coordinated traffic signal project that will allow the 

Department to actively manage 300-400 traffic signals on certain key, cross-jurisdictional 

corridors. The corridor identification has not been finalized, but evacuation route designation 

was not a criterion for selection. It is possible that one or more routes selected by GDOT are 

designated for primary evacuation purposes. While the primary purpose of the project is to 

alleviate peak-hour congestion, it could also serve as an improvement for evacuation purposes. 

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported that the following impediments would impact a large-scale, mass 

evacuation from the Atlanta area: 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 20 of 108

1. Contraflow Constraints – Authorities believe that they will not be able to organize and 

execute a contraflow operation if needed. The current plan assumes that the expressway 

system will serve as the major evacuation route for cars, but interviewees indicate that they 

may not be practical for contraflow operations. For this reason, planning must include an 

emphasis on moving evacuees over arterial roads as 

well as freeways.

2. Infrastructure Limitations – Absent a contraflow 

operations plan, roads may lack sufficient lanes for a 

mass evacuation event. Also, poor drainage results in 

flooding and road closures (particularly during 

hurricane events), and the current designation of NHS 

routes does not exactly align with strategic 

evacuation routes.

3. Arterial Road Systems with Overpasses Cannot 

Accommodate Trailer Heights –The NHS includes 

many arterial systems. In Atlanta, NHS arterial roads 

include overpasses whose design complicates the 

accommodation of the height of 18 wheelers as well 

as military equipment moved on flatbeds. This might 

lead to potential blockages and clearance issues that would impede an evacuation along NHS 

arterial roads.

4. Bridge Weight Restrictions Impede Movements - Weight limits on bridges in parts of the 

Atlanta area would force heavier truck traffic onto NHS roads, increasing congestion on those 

roads and slowing an evacuation operations. 

5. Traffic Data is Scattered Throughout the Region – There is no single source for mobility 

performance data in the Metro Atlanta Region. Instead, most local jurisdictions collect, 

manage, and maintain their own data to address their own local needs. The GDOT Office of 

Transportation Data maintains a statewide traffic counting program called STARS (State 

Traffic and Report Statistics), which is Web accessible. STARS includes historic and current 

traffic count data, and is either updated or estimated on a 2-year cycle (updated 2009 data 

will be available in mid-2010). As part of the regional Congestion Management Process 

(CMP), ARC is developing an architecture for maintaining a regional performance data 

clearinghouse that will allow local jurisdictions, as well as regional planning partners, to 

upload their data into a single location. The ARC is also exploring ways to encourage 

planning partners and jurisdictions to collect mobility data that meets certain minimum 

specifications and parameters (e.g., intersection turning movement counts must include a 

consecutive 48-hour time period).

The ARC is currently undertaking a Strategic Regional Thoroughfare Plan, which will 

incorporate assumptions, findings, and recommendations of the 2009 Regional Evacuation 

Plan to help develop the Regional Thoroughfare Network (TFN) as well as associated policies 

and guidelines. 

Top Highway Impediments

ATLANTA

• Contraflow Constraints

• Infrastructure Limitations

• Arterial Road Systems with 

Overpasses Cannot 

Accommodate Trailer Heights

• Bridge Weight Restrictions 

Impede Movements 

• Traffic Data is Scattered 

Throughout the Region
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 21 of 108

The Plan

The Baltimore evacuation plan, 

written in 2004, is the oldest of the 

plans currently in use. The MDSHA 

plans to finish the modeling portion 

for evaluating and monitoring the 

plan. 

All of the State’s evacuation plans 

link together to ensure that should 

motorists need to evacuate from 

whatever city or site, they can be 

directed to the appropriate roads. 

As funding becomes available and 

when major changes in the roadway 

network occur, the older plans are 

updated. The Southern Maryland 

plans were completed about 18 

months ago; the Eastern Shore plan 

is updated annually or bi-annually 

depending on any recent changes. 

The Eastern Shore plan is developed collaboratively with Delaware. The Anne Arundel County 

plan was completed about a year ago and links both the Washington, Baltimore, and Southern 

Maryland plans with the Eastern Shore and vice versa. 

New planning efforts in the Baltimore metropolitan area will focus on Harford and Cecil counties 

north of Baltimore. This will also help address the needs for evacuation from such places as 

Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Peach Bottom Nuclear Plant, and other hazards including hurricane 

scenarios as well as routes to Delaware. This effort will be completed by the summer of 2010. 

When the Baltimore plan is updated, the transportation plan will incorporate a number of the 

many technologies and tools that the MDSHA has developed in recent years. One such tool used 

in this plan is the Regional Evacuation Traffic Monitoring and Management tool which relies on 

vehicle detection deployed in critical junctions along the roadway network which is the basis for 

real-time information and modeling for the Eastern Shore, Washington, DC, region, and, soon, 

the Baltimore region. As a result of including these tools, the Baltimore plan will be more 

dynamic. The use of real-time information and modeling will provide dynamic information that 

will allow for real-time changes and decisions. During an evacuation, operators can monitor 

evacuation routes to see which roads are at capacity and will be able to shift traffic in real time. 

What remains is to get the necessary infrastructure in place to accommodate these traffic shifts.

In addition, work is being done to see which roads out of Baltimore can be used for contraflow 

operations. Multimodal models and how transit can help to evacuate both Baltimore and the 

NCR will also be incorporated into the plan. 

Baltimore, Maryland #16-Most Congested #20-Population (2,667,000)

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U.S. Department of Transportation 22 of 108

The MDSHA staff facilitates the preparation of the evacuation plan and relies on local 

stakeholders to develop the plans. Virginia, Delaware, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania 

coordinate with MDSHA in the development of their plans. Pennsylvania approached the MDSHA 

as they were developing their plans to coordinate border plans for Harford County. Eventually, 

through the All Hazards Consortium, the Maryland plans 

will reach to West Virginia.

Top Highway Impediments

Study respondents reported that the most significant 

impediments along NHS routes that may impact effective 

large-scale, mass evacuations from the Baltimore 

metropolitan area include: 

1. Evacuation Plan Needs Updating – The Evacuation 

Plan is the oldest provided for the study, but it will 

be updated in the near future.

2. Infrastructure Impediments-Roadways – In the unlikely event that contraflow were to be 

implemented, to be effective for moving large numbers of people out of Baltimore, Route 295 

does not have enough receiving lanes and would require some reconfigurations and 

crossovers. While there are not enough lanes, when the shoulders are used, movement is 

less constrained. Improvements would also be needed for the medians.

3. Region Lacks a Coordinated Signal Timing System - Baltimore does not have a regional, 

coordinated traffic signal timing system.

The Plan

The Boston evacuation planning 

documents provided by the 

Massachusetts Department of 

Transportation (MassDOT) constitute 

the State’s most current evacuation 

plan for the region. The plan 

extends as far as Route 128 and to 

I-95. The city of Boston has not had 

a reason to evacuate, except in a 

limited response to the 

September 11, 2001, attacks. 

Though Cape Cod has prepared plans 

to evacuate should a hurricane hit, 

they have not had to execute the 

evacuation plan.

The MassDOT plans to augment the 

Top Highway Impediments

BALTIMORE

• Evacuation Plan Needs 

Updating

• Infrastructure ImpedimentsRoadways 

• Region Lacks a Coordinated 

Signal Timing System

Boston, Massachusetts #8-Most Congested #10-Population (4,523,000)

INRIX® National Traffic Scorecard 2009 
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U.S. Department of Transportation 23 of 108

plan with further updates in 2010. To date, the Massachusetts State Police has identified 184 

traffic control points in the Metropolitan Boston area that would require the deployment of law 

enforcement personnel and transportation resources to facilitate the flow of traffic away from 

the city. The MassDOT plans to review these points with the State Police and identify what 

specific MassDOT resources in the form of equipment, systems, vehicles and personnel would be 

best deployed to the points to support the flow of traffic. Plans to procure consultant support 

for this endeavor are being activated. This will be followed by a traffic modeling study to be 

completed by the Central Transportation Planning Staff that will validate assumptions and/or 

identify other considerations, including how transit organizations could support the effort. 

The MassDOT reports the revision will be completed during the summer of 2010, and the 

modeling study completed by the end of the year. Once the work addressing the traffic control 

points has been completed, the results will become an annex to the State’s comprehensive 

emergency management plan. 

Should an evacuation occur, MassDOT would rely on the Massachusetts Emergency Management 

Agency (MEMA) to activate mutual aid agreements with local cities and towns. The State’s 

concept of operations comes from the working relationship that includes MassDOT, the Executive 

Office of Public Safety and Security, the Massachusetts State Police, MEMA and the Department 

of Fire Services.

Boston currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation planning as a 

part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program 

(RCPGP) provides catastrophic events planning grants to the 10 highest risk urban areas and 

surrounding regions, including: Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, 

Washington, DC, Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and Seattle. 

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported that the following

impediments would impact a large-scale, mass 

evacuation from the Boston area: 

1. Contraflow Constraints – Many of the roads in the 

Boston metropolitan area do not lend themselves to 

contraflow as the roads have multiple access points 

and off ramps. As the roads are very “exit heavy” it 

would be very labor intensive to manage a contraflow effort. 

2. Shoulders May Not be Able to Support Additional Evacuation Traffic – Shoulders—or the dirt 

area off the road commonly called the breakdown lane—in the Boston area may not be used 

to consistently to support the safe flow of traffic. While motorists may use these to get 

through congested areas, shoulders cannot support the added traffic associated with an 

evacuation for extended periods of time, and their use would negatively impact the ability to 

use the shoulders for emergency service operations. 

3. No Place for Sheltering – Once evacuees have left the city center, there are no large areas 

along the roadways that could be utilized to shelter motorists and large populations.

Top Highway Impediments

BOSTON

• Contraflow Constraints

• Shoulders May Not Be Able to 

Support Additional Evacuation 

Traffic

• No Place for Sheltering 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 24 of 108

The Plan

South Carolina improved its 

evacuation plans after Hurricane Floyd 

moved through the southeast in 1999, 

triggering one of the largest 

evacuations and contraflow operations 

in U.S. history until Katrina devastated 

Louisiana. Since then, South Carolina 

and its at-risk jurisdictions have been 

reviewing, revising, exercising, 

integrating, and improving their 

evacuation plans annually in 

preparation for hurricane season. 

South Carolina officials stated that the 

Charleston evacuation plan is current 

and is incorporated into the State and 

local emergency management 

agency’s Emergency Response and 

Evacuation Plans. 

The South Carolina DOT established and continues to sustain strong partnerships with the 

Highway Patrol and local communities to maximize the plan’s effectiveness and efficiency. 

Every other year South Carolina conducts a table top exercise of the plan. On the opposite years 

a full field test of the plan is conducted with deployment of personnel and equipment. 

Authorities use lessons learned and good practices to enhance the plan during its annual 

revision.

The existing plan covers jurisdictions along the entire coastline. It establishes Evacuation Zones

designed to minimize “clearance time,” which is defined as the time it takes to move the first 

person to the last person out of an affected or high-threat area. The zones cover:

• Zone One (North) - Myrtle Beach, Georgetown, North Myrtle Beach, Surfside Beach, Garden 

City, Pawley’s Island, and Conway

• Zone Two (Central) – Charleston, Mt. Pleasant, Isle of Palms, Johns Island, James Island, 

Kiawah Island, Sea Brook Island, and Edisto Island

• Zone Three (South) - Hilton Head and Beaufort

Authorities designed the plan with the assumption that they must move the affected population 

100 miles away from the coast.

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported that the following impediments would impact a large-scale, mass 

evacuation from the Charleston area: 

Charleston, South Carolina #69-Most Congested #80-Population (645,000)

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U.S. Department of Transportation 25 of 108

1. Infrastructure Constraints - I-26 – Current capacity on 1-26 would be exceeded during a 

mass evacuation event.

2. East-West Evacuation Routes –East-West evacuation out 

of Charleston, as well as other coastal areas to include 

the Hilton Head Island/Beaufort and Myrtle Beach areas, 

would be improved by additional routes and crossings.

3. Lane Restrictions – Respondents stated that a significant 

deficiency exists along current evacuation routes where 

traffic lanes reduce from four to two travel lanes, e.g., 

US 521/SC 261 from Andrews S.C. to US 378.

4. ITS Capabilities along Evacuation Routes - Expand the 

ability to share real-time information with Highway 

Patrol and Emergency Responders by adding surveillance 

cameras and Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) to routes.

5. Incident Responder Coverage Along I-26, Charleston to Columbia - Safety/Service Patrols 

and Law Enforcement officers constitute important resources to clearing NHS roadway 

incidents on a daily basis. However, most are concentrated along roads within major 

metropolitan areas. Charleston believes that the limited coverage outside of the metro 

Charleston area would impact the flow of evacuation traffic along the I-26 corridor between 

Charleston and Columbia if such responders were not available and positioned along the 

corridor to address incidents during the evacuation.

The Plan

In Cook County, Illinois, (home to 

Chicago) during certain incidents, 

authorities may ask selected County 

residents to relocate for their safety. 

Illinois law delegates the responsibility 

for the protection of life and property, 

including evacuation decisions, to the 

affected jurisdictions’ Mayor/ Village 

President and the County Board 

President of Cook County. 

Interviewees report that the Illinois 

Emergency Operations Plan (IEOP) is 

the most current. The Illinois 

Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) 

Bureau of Disaster Assistance and 

Preparedness maintains and updates 

the IEOP. This document addresses 

Top Highway Impediments

CHARLESTON

• Infrastructure Constraint I-26 

• East-West Evacuation Routes

• Lane Restrictions

• ITS Capabilities along 

Evacuation Routes

• Incident Responder Coverage 

Along I-26, Charleston to 

Columbia

Chicago, Illinois #3-Most Congested #3-Population (9,570,000)

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 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 26 of 108

evacuation as part of Emergency Support Function #1 (ESF #1), Transportation. The Illinois 

Department of Transportation - Highways (IDOT-H) serves as the primary State agency for ESF #1 

under the plan, and collaborates with the Illinois Commerce Commission, Illinois Department of 

Central Management Services, Illinois Department of Corrections, Illinois Department of Human 

Services, Illinois Department of Military Affairs, Illinois Department of Natural Resources, Illinois 

Department of Transportation - Division of Aeronautics, and the Illinois State Police. State 

officials are currently updating the 2-year-old IEOP after a recent annual review with the city of 

Chicago and to address after-action comments following the fall 2009 tabletop exercise. The 

update will be completed by the end of 2010 and will include new gated-ramp locations, 

improved exhibits for field personnel use, and better definition or correction of assumptions 

made in previous issues of the documents. The statewide plan incorporates the Chicago Central 

Business District (CBD) evacuation plan.

Each jurisdiction must develop a primary evacuation plan and transportation annex specific to 

community needs that will guide evacuation decisions and ensure a coordinated evacuation 

operation. The Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 

(DHSEM) coordinates the development of a county-wide evacuation plan, and the Cook County 

Sheriff’s Police Department and suburban law enforcement conduct evacuation efforts, 

designate evacuation routes, provide traffic and movement control, and establish security in 

evacuation areas. Officials have identified basic primary, secondary, and tertiary relocation 

routes and described an implementation methodology in various Cook County emergency plans. 

A Regional Catastrophic Planning Team (RCPT) develops and maintains a multi–State, county, 

local jurisdiction evacuation plan.7

 The Sheriff’s Police Department Command Center and the 

Cook County EOC house appropriate Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and maps displaying 

these pre-determined evacuation routes. 

As a post 9-11 preparedness action, Illinois and Chicago considered plausible scenarios that 

would trigger a mass evacuation and identified vulnerabilities, hazards and risks to build into a 

plan. In Chicago’s case, this would entail evacuating about 660,000 people from the Chicago 

CBD. The evacuation plan, shared with the Regional Transit Security Working Group (RTSWG), is 

reviewed annually and includes Pace Bus as a resource.

The city evacuation plan includes evacuation of the city of Chicago out to the far suburbs and 

beyond and procedures to notify suburban officials. The new draft addresses how the Chicago 

agencies will work together and recognizes the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) plan because 

exiting the Chicago CBD requires either personal transportation or CTA resources. The Chicago 

evacuation plan includes various evacuation components from CTA, Metra, and IDOT. While the 

plan generally addresses evacuation within Cook County, planners recognize that they would 

require resources from other metropolitan Chicago counties. The CTA plan goes no further than 

the outer limits of the CTA service area, but covers the northern and southern boundaries of 

Cook County, Lake Michigan on the east and State Route 83 on the west. As part of the 

DHS/FEMA RCPGP, planners will extend the scope of the evacuation plan to the 10 northeast 

Illinois counties, Kenosha County, Wisconsin, and five northeast Indiana counties.

Chicago currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation planning as a 

part of catastrophic planning. The RCPGP provides catastrophic events planning grants to the 10 

 7 The RCPT includes the Cook County DHSEM, Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC), other Metro County 

Emergency Management Agencies, and the IEMA.
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 27 of 108

highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding regions, including: Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, 

New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and Seattle. 

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported the following impediments 

along NHS routes that may impact effective large-scale, 

mass evacuations from the Chicago metropolitan area. 

Respondents also stated that impediments on arterials 

and other endemic challenges will frustrate efforts to 

move citizens out of harm’s way. 

1. Traffic Congestion – Traffic congestion in the CBD 

constitutes the most significant deficiency. There 

are various pinch points along many routes as they 

leave the city. In considering evacuating Chicago,

IDOT considers the 1⁄2 million cars that transit into the 

CBD each morning and trying to get them out of the 

area, as well as those that will depend on transit to 

access their vehicles parked outside the CBD. 

2. Emergency Vehicle Access – The city needs clear routes reserved solely for movement of 

emergency vehicles into and out of the zone being evacuated.

3. Railroad Crossings/Street Blockage – Traffic attempting to evacuate an area without 

sufficient traffic control can create blockages of at-grade rail crossings and arterials being 

utilized as evacuation routes.

4. Contraflow Operations Would Impede Evacuations – After extensive review of contraflow 

operations as an option to conduct mass evacuations, it is the consensus of local 

metropolitan officials that using contraflow would be a deficiency impacting the overall goal 

of moving people out of the CBD in the case of a “no-notice” event that required massevacuation. The IDOT addresses contraflow operations as a tab in its evacuation plan. 

However, because respondents believe contraflow operations could not be implemented in 

an immediate emergency situation, Chicago planners have not fully developed these plans. 

Only one NHS route in the area has reversible lanes established to ease contraflow. 

However, after careful review, respondents concluded that contraflow planning and 

operations would not be effective and could serve to congest an entire roadway that could 

be used for emergency vehicles. Officials concluded that impediments would impact the 

time and cost for conducting evacuations. They noted that while contraflow may work well 

in hurricane scenarios where there is time to coordinate and execute such an operation, they 

doubt the effectiveness of contraflow for immediate-impact incidents or no-notice events. 

Chicago officials expressed a major concern about their ability to execute a contraflow 

operation along any of their highways in response to a “no-notice” catastrophic event. 

Officials indicate that such an operation would require a very complex command and control 

system that would involve representatives of all the jurisdictions along those evacuation 

routes. This would entail integrating regional plans, designation of Incident Commanders, 

development of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) among all local governments, and 

Top Highway Impediments

CHICAGO

• Traffic Congestion 

• Emergency Vehicle Access 

• Railroad Crossing/Street 

Blockage 

• Contraflow Operations Would 

Impede Evacuations 

• Real-Time Highway Information 

for Responders & the Public
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 28 of 108

coordination of communication (e.g., radio, data, GIS sharing) resources and activities among 

all involved agencies. 

5. Real-Time Highway Information for Responders and the Public – From an emergency 

management perspective, accurate and timely information and directions issued to the 

impacted populations on what actions to take is critical and must be provided through a Joint 

Information System (JIS), which will coordinate information among agencies across 

jurisdictional lines. Real-time situational awareness information on highway conditions, 

alternative routes, and evacuation instructions is critical to the evacuees and responders. 

The Plan

The Texas DOT (TxDOT) does not have 

a mass evacuation plan for the DallasFt. Worth area. In 2007, the North 

Central Texas Council of Governments 

for the Dallas/Ft. Worth (DFW) region 

hosted a workshop to discuss 

evacuations and incident response. 

Participants did not produce a plan 

since they concluded that citizens 

would be better to shelter-in-place 

rather than on the freeway system. 

The city’s plans for large events with 

sufficient advance notice such as a 

hurricane work well, but short-notice, 

localized incidents would be difficult 

to plan for in advance.

Respondents noted that based on 

potential threats endemic to the 

region, emergency officials would 

rather have people shelter-in-place. For example, a high wind event (e.g., tornado) constituted 

the most serious concern to DFW responders, and they would rather residents stay home in their 

basements than be out on the road in their cars. During the interview, DFW officials also 

commented that they do not see a need for contraflow plans or operation in the region. They 

said that it would not be clear which direction to push the evacuation and felt that contraflow 

was more appropriate for coastal areas where there is a clear direction to send people (e.g., 

inland).

The DFW region received an Integrated Corridor Management Grant from DOT which when 

complete will greatly enhance the ability to manage traffic on the pilot corridor. These systems 

and experiences will then be spread throughout the DFW region and would greatly assist the 

region’s ability to respond to an evacuation, if needed.

Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas #5-Most Congested #4-Population (6,300,000)

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Top Highway Impediments

Local officials noted that mass evacuation is not their 

top transportation planning priority. However, through 

responses to the FHWA survey, the following would 

impede a large-scale, mass evacuation in the DFW 

region, should one be ordered:

1. Infrastructure Limitations – Specific impediments 

include lane reductions on I-35W north of the I-30 

interchange, which constrains north- and southbound movements, as well as limited capacity on I35W, Loop 820 north, and SH-121. 

2. Lack of Cameras along Key Routes – Officials stated that traffic cameras and staffing at the 

TMCs to monitor the video input are insufficient to provide full situational awareness during 

evacuation operations on key Interstates and State highways. 

3. Evacuation Plans Do Not Exist –Officials could more effectively coordinate evacuation 

operations if a scenario-based evacuation plan existed. Officials could then coordinate 

plans with potentially impacted neighboring jurisdictions and exercise them to identify their 

strengths and areas for improvement. 

The Plan

Currently, no Colorado DOT (CDOT) 

plan specific to evacuation 

operations exists. However, 

individual communities develop 

and maintain evacuation plans to 

address events such as fires or 

floods. The North Central Region, 

which is comprised of 10 counties 

in the Denver metropolitan area, 

has begun to develop an 

evacuation plan that covers a 25-

mile radius outside the Denver 

metropolitan area. The plan is 

titled the North Central Region 

Mass Evacuation Plan (draft-June 

2008). This plan is only focused on 

evacuation of some parts of the 

metro area and not all areas at one 

time. An interviewee noted that 

the reason an evacuation plan was 

Top Highway Impediments

DALLAS-FT. WORTH

• Infrastructure Limitations

• Lack of Cameras along Key 

Routes 

• Evacuation Plans Do Not Exist 

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developed for the North Central Region was because it is part of the DHS UASI, which requires 

that 75 UASI areas develop an evacuation plan.

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported that the following impediments would frustrate large-scale, mass 

evacuation efforts in the Denver and the North Central Region of Colorado: 

1. No Evacuation Plan – Interviewees noted that since there is no final plan, there are no 

elements that would be identified in a plan, such as evacuation routes and signs or 

directional indicators to identify evacuation routes. One respondent stated that the next 

step for the North Central Region is to hold a workshop and to start working through some of 

the more specific issues identified in the North Central Region Mass Evacuation Plan, such 

as the risk-based areas of exit. This workshop is scheduled for May 2010. The plan does not 

address contraflow operations.

2. No Evacuation Routes Identified - No evacuation routes are identified. 

3. No Lane Assignments for Emergency Services – Denver authorities maintain no designated 

lane assignments for the movement of evacuees and emergency services equipment.

4. Infrastructure Limitations – Respondents noted that

the Denver area has only one major highway running 

north to south (I-25) and one running east to west 

(I-70). These highways have significant restrictions in 

the number of lanes, curves and choke points which 

severely affect traffic throughput. These two 

highways are the only major roads which exit the 

metro area. Several other smaller highways feed 

these two which will also increase traffic volume in 

the event of an evacuation. Those interviewed 

indicated that the biggest limitation is that all the 

routes out of Denver turn into two lanes outside the 

metropolitan area. An evacuation study that 

collected additional information regarding system 

choke points would aid evacuation planning and 

operations.

5. Traffic Flow Analysis on Evacuation Routes – During the interview, it was noted that one 

analysis that has not been done is a traffic flow analysis to determine the maximum capacity 

of highway infrastructure, particularly on I-25 and I-70 and some of the arterials that would 

support an evacuation. Most of those interviewed do not believe that any time-model studies 

exist on the capacity of infrastructure that might be used for an evacuation. These studies, 

for example would consider how long it would take to move 50,000 people during off-peak 

and peak hours. However, one respondent associated with the North Central Region planning 

effort noted that their traffic management committee conducted a general analysis for all of 

the major routes, looking at the different levels of service and capacities. The draft North 

Central Region Plan includes a diagram showing the city and its major highways including 

contraflow lanes leaving the city. The committee made an assumption that inside the C-470 

loop there is not a lot that can be done to control traffic movement. 

Top Highway Impediments

DENVER 

• No Evacuation Plan

• No Evacuation Routes Identified

• No Lane Assignments for 

Emergency Services

• Infrastructure Limitations

• Traffic Flow Analysis on 

Evacuation Routes

• Weather Hindrances
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U.S. Department of Transportation 31 of 108

6. Weather Hindrances – Depending on the time of year the incident occurs, another 

impediment may be weather-related, specifically snow, rain, or flooding. Officials noted 

that one assumption about the potential for evacuating populations from Denver is there are 

no events that could occur within the State of Colorado that would give enough advance 

notice to execute an evacuation. As a result, instead of evacuating to escape harm’s way, 

officials may evacuate to mitigate any threats to the population, such as a chemical spill or 

some type of nuclear device detonation where there is little to no notice. 

Planners in the Detroit metropolitan 

region believe that since the area is 

not subject to the type of 

emergencies and disasters that affect 

other parts of the country the 

potential for mass evacuations is low. 

As a result, they do not dedicate many 

county or local resources to plan and 

prepare for a mass evacuation. For 

this reason, Detroit lacks a mass 

evacuation plan.

The Plan

Nevertheless, city of Detroit officials 

reported that a few years ago they 

developed internal, baseline 

evacuation plans within each city 

police district. In downtown Detroit, 

an area called Eastern Market, sits 

near multiple expressways. Officials, 

concerned about a tornado scenario 

given only 20 minutes notification, started to develop a program to address evacuations in this 

area. Another scenario involved mass evacuations for a planned special event, particularly the 

4th of July fireworks in downtown Detroit that typically includes up to 1 million people 

concentrated along the river. In that plan, Detroit officials plan for contraflow operations, 

basically turning every route outbound. Detroit officials noted that historically most evacuations 

are localized, not “mass”—or larger scale—evacuations. Detroit officials conceded that they 

must consolidate all of the District-based plans into one plan to assess the plan from a strategic 

perspective.

Michigan uses three plans as the basis for organizing and conducting mass evacuations. These 

include the:

• Emergency Highway Traffic Regulation (EHTR) plan, which also addresses disaster 

recovery and moving responders into an area while evacuating large populations and is 

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updated every 1 to 3 years and coordinated with various State and Federal governmental 

agencies. It currently is being updated. 

• Michigan Department of Transportation’s (MDOT’s) Emergency Response Plan, updated 

every 3 to 6 months; and

• State of Michigan Emergency Management Plan, updated every 5 years. Since Michigan 

last updated the Emergency Management Plan in 2005, it is due for a revision in 2010.

Michigan authorities established these plans to manage and control the use of highway systems 

in a post-nuclear attack or other severe situation. Although it is not called an evacuation plan 

by name, it provides a framework and the related authorities to move traffic in a severe 

situation. To prepare for various scenarios, MDOT stated that they have addressed traffic 

planning for special events, but not for natural disasters or catastrophic events that would cause 

mass evacuations. During the interview, officials 

indicated that the mobility issues addressed in 

consideration of planned events that occur in the 

downtown Detroit area may be applied to organizing 

and conducting a mass evacuation triggered by natural 

or man-made events. 

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported the following most 

significant impediments along NHS routes that may 

impact effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the 

Detroit metropolitan area. 

1. Infrastructure Conditions Impede Responder Operations – Poor conditions of NHS roads 

would impede responder attempts to manage traffic incidents during an evacuation or reach 

motorists in distress. For example, the shoulder width and disrepair along many stretches 

wide would frustrate responder attempts to reach incidents or motorist efforts to pull 

disabled vehicles to the side of the road. 

2. Congestion – County respondents indicated that some of the areas within the Detroit CBD 

could become very congested because the potential evacuation routes constitute existing 

three-lane Interstates with narrow shoulders.

3. Bottlenecks on Freeways, including Narrow Freeway Lanes and Shoulders - Freeways and 

Interstates would impede an evacuation in key congested areas such as I-75, I-94, I-96, I-275, 

and I-696 as travelers go west. The eastbound traffic will be limited due to the two existing 

vehicular border crossings including the approaches. 

The MDOT reported that although contraflow operations are addressed at a very high level 

within the Emergency Response Plan, they have never been tested—nor is testing desired—

because it would be extremely complicated and would apply only to the State highways.

Top Highway Impediments

DETROIT

• Infrastructure Conditions Impede 

Responder Operations

• Congestion

• Bottlenecks on Freeways, 

including Narrow Freeway Lanes 

and Limited Shoulders 
 April 2010

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The Plan

Authorities updated the Hampton 

Roads evacuation plan in 2009 

(updates occur annually). The 2009 

version includes transportation 

changes. Authorities integrated the 

Hampton Roads evacuation plan into 

State and local EMA plans.

The Commonwealth of Virginia 

maintains an evacuation plan only 

for Hampton Roads though they are 

currently working on a plan for the 

National Capital Region. The 

Commonwealth shares their 

evacuation plan with North Carolina. 

Every spring, North Carolina and 

Virginia meet to share plans with 

both the State and local agencies. 

The meeting rotates between 

Virginia and North Carolina each 

year. Although Virginia has never ordered an evacuation of the Hampton Roads area, 

North Carolina has had to evacuate its Eastern shore populations several times, particularly in 

response to a hurricane or tropical storm. In addition to coordination meetings with North 

Carolina, Virginia meets with neighboring States, including Delaware and Maryland, to update its 

plan. This occurs quarterly, where Virginia, Delaware, and Maryland representatives discuss 

issues of mutual concern, including evacuation planning.

The Commonwealth’s Emergency Response plan incorporates the entire State due to the 

potential need for sheltering populations. Most pre-identified shelter sites lie along the I-81 

corridor or other locations in western Virginia. The pre-identified shelters large enough to take 

care of people and animals are located on the campuses of universities in the western part of 

Virginia, including the University of Virginia and James Madison University.

Norfolk, one area within the Hampton Roads region, currently benefits from a Homeland Security 

Grant to address evacuation planning as a part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA RCPGP 

provides catastrophic events planning grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding 

regions, including: Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, 

Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and Seattle.

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported the following most significant impediments along NHS routes that 

may impact effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the Hampton Roads region: 

Hampton Roads, Virginia #31-Most Congested #35-Population (1,658,000)

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1. Traffic Signal Timing – The limited ability to 

properly adjust traffic signal timing could impact 

the region’s ability to evacuate populations.

2. Number of Water Crossings – The Hampton Roads 

area has five bridge-tunnel crossings that hamper 

the ability to evacuate the population. These 

crossings are known bottlenecks during daily traffic 

and would be expected to be more so during 

evacuations. 

3. Limited ITS Deployment Along Key Evacuation

Routes - The ITS technology is only deployed along 

the Interstates, though most evacuees would use US 

routes 460 and 58 and possibly 60 and 17. Having ITS on these routes would help manage 

evacuations.

4. Flood-Prone Infrastructure – The Tidewater region is a low lying area and routes 17, 460, 

and 58 are prone to flooding so they would need to evacuate residents before the floods. 

The biggest concern would be back-to-back storms that would limit the ability to get to 

people before or during the second storm.

5. Human Resources to Manage Evacuation Operations and Tools - Highway Advisory Radio 

(HAR) covers Tidewater routes in the Hampton Roads area. Also, statewide 511 provides 

real-time traveler information to regional motorists. However, both staff and contractor 

availability remains a significant issue that would limit the effectiveness of an evacuation. 

Though Virginia would depend on Commonwealth employees to staff contraflow operations, a 

contractor manages I-64. Though the contractors are supposed to help during these events, 

currently the task to do so is not included in their contract. The contract comprises a 

number of subcontractors, and it is unknown if the subcontractors will be available if 

needed. To staff the lane reversal, VDOT would have to pull in hundreds of VDOT staff from 

outside the area to help manage the activity. 

Top Highway Impediments

HAMPTON ROADS

• Traffic Signal Timing

• Number of Water Crossings

• Limited ITS Deployment Along 

Key Evacuation Routes

• Flood-Prone Infrastructure 

• Human Resources to Manage 

Evacuation Operations & Tools
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 35 of 108

The Plan

The June 2006 plan provided by the 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

(DPS) for this study represents the 

most recent version of the State 

evacuation plan. State authorities 

rely on local officials to develop 

their portion of the State plan. 

Though local involvement previously 

existed in plan development, 

involvement in plan updates 

increased at all levels of 

government as they discovered gaps 

from recent major events, including 

Hurricane Rita. 

Good communication exists between 

the coastal area and the cities some 

30 to 50 miles away, such as 

Houston. This enables decisionmakers to ensure timely actions are taken to evacuate coastal populations first. Often, 

these authorities make evacuation decisions in real-time as updated weather and road 

conditions information is received. Recent plan changes include who makes the evacuation 

decision. Before the change, the State decided when and who would be evacuated. 

In the six months prior to the start of the Atlantic hurricane season, Houston authorities 

update public maps, share them with the public, and coordinate on improvements for the 

upcoming season. Houston area leadership meets regularly at TranStar, Houston’s regional 

traffic and emergency management center which also houses public safety and Houston 

Metro, to discuss hurricane, hazardous materials or other triggers that might lead to an 

evacuation. Often, the team discusses the evacuation and shelter-in-place plans, the latter 

used for chemical release or weather events. Galveston and Austin collaborate through a 

formal agreement in which Austin would shelter Galveston evacuees. In addition, other 

cities in Galveston County partner with sister cities that agree to accept the evacuees. 

Some cities issue monitoring wrist bands to allow the State’s EMA to track evacuees.

The local MPO may support evacuation planning by developing tools for their jurisdictions 

and aiding in regional coordination. For example, the Houston-Galveston Area Council of 

Governments (HGAC), as the Region’s MPO, developed a database with all of the traffic 

management locations. This information is shared with the DPS, and the MPO shares it with 

other agencies as requested. The Houston MPO is much more active in the development of 

the plan than the receiving cities’ MPOs. The respondents noted that the officer making the 

Houston, Texas #6-Most Congested #6-Population (5,728,000)

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calls in the local region maintains the updated version, from which local decision makers 

base their evacuation decisions. 

Each year, regional DPS officers meet with local jurisdictions 

to review the plan and update it to reflect new road 

construction and other changes. While individual plans are 

edited, the State-approved plan does not reflect these edits. 

The lengthy review process before the revised State plan can 

be approved results in a time lag between changes in local 

plans and changes to the State DPS-approved plan. 

Those areas that are more likely to evacuate meet regularly 

to ensure the plan is up-to-date. As a result from what was 

learned from Hurricane Rita, Houston realized that their 

evacuation plan needed to extend 100 miles outside the city. 

In such an event, Dallas would serve as a receiver city. 

Dallas and Houston meet annually to discuss updates to the 

plan that concern both cities. Dallas and Houston exercise 

and train together annually to test their portion of the plan. 

Galveston and Houston meet annually to discuss plans and 

updates. County judges, who are the officials responsible 

for making the 

decision for the 

county to evacuate, 

host these meetings. 

For Houston, police 

monitor the traffic 

control points during an evacuation, and consider 

improvements to the transportation portion of the 

plan. More critical to the success of the plan is that 

both the police and emergency managers make 

changes to the plan together. Both the police and 

emergency managers talk to the transportation 

operation people about routes, roads, including 

talking with engineers regarding traffic signals to 

ensure that the plan includes updates and that they 

understand current limitations. An example of one 

such limitation recently addressed dealt with Highway 

6 which goes through several jurisdictions. Though it 

is a TxDOT facility, Highway 6’s signalized traffic 

control system in some cities is operated by those 

cities. As a result of shared control, officials 

undertook a coordinated effort to develop a plan for the corridor.
 April 2010

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The interviewees reported that communication among agencies, including the Department of 

Public Works, continues to improve due in part to the success in migrating to the Regional 

Radio System (800MHz). In addition, the city of Houston is implementing a completely new 

public safety communications system (700 MHz). The communications equipment purchased 

by Houston works on both the 700 MHz and 800MHz to allow integrated communications.

Figure 2. Evacuation of Houston prior to Hurricane Rita on I-45

In early April 2010, the Houston TranStar announced the launch of a new Web-based emergency 

evacuation mapping system that will improve the coordination of major evacuation efforts in the 

Gulf Coast region. The interactive evacuation status map will allow transportation managers, 

law enforcement and other first responders to use real-time information to coordinate and 

monitor traffic flow, personnel deployment, weather and other conditions during large-scale 

evacuations. Houston TranStar created the state-of-the-art evacuation system by incorporating 

the latest ITS technologies to improve the safety and efficiency of major evacuation efforts. 

Houston currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation planning as a 

part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA RCPGP provides catastrophic events planning 

grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding regions, including: Chicago, 

Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and 

Seattle. 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 38 of 108

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported the following most significant impediments along NHS routes that 

may impact effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the Houston metropolitan area. 

1. Bottlenecks – As the population of Houston travels 

outward, they would encounter roads that narrow to 

2 lanes which may create bottlenecks under certain 

heavy outflow scenarios. TxDOT is developing plans 

to limit bottlenecks. For example, authorities can 

order a halt to construction/work zone operations 

to alleviate bottlenecks when an event occurs. 

2. Communications with the Public – State officials 

work with local authorities on thresholds and how to 

inform people when to evacuate. During Hurricane 

Ike in 2008, local officials demonstrated that they 

had made progress to communicate a consistent 

message. Since Texas has increased technology that enables decision makers to see 

conditions far beyond the local area, such as where traffic is moving, they are now able to 

tell those who do not need to evacuate to stay.

3. Number and Type of Resources to Deploy – Officials continue to struggle with how many, 

what types, and where to deploy responders and other resources to support evacuation 

operations. 

4. More CCTV Cameras – The various cameras along the evacuation corridors allowed officials 

to observe traffic and make better projections on when the congestion will dissipate. 

5. Modeling Timeliness – The local MPO is investing in modeling software to aid decisions to 

evacuate. However, most software programs take a long time to process data. The MPO 

seeks a software package that will take 2 to 3 hours (versus overnight) to provide 

information. As part of that effort, the MPO is working with three universities on different

models as well as looking at different technologies. 

Top Highway Impediments

HOUSTON

• Bottlenecks

• Communications with the Public

• Number/Type of Resources to 

Deploy

• More CCTV Cameras

• Modeling Timeliness 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 39 of 108

The Plan

Florida is one of the States that is on 

the forefront of emergency readiness, 

response and planning. In 2005, 

Florida developed the Contraflow plan 

for the Florida Interstate Highway 

System (FIHS). This plan identified the 

following routes that could be used for 

evacuation: Sarasota County’s I-75 

Shoulder Use Plan, Jacksonville’s I-10 

Contraflow Plan, Space Coast’s SR 528 

(Beeline Expressway) Contraflow Plan, 

Tampa Bay’s I-4 Contraflow Plan, 

Florida Turnpike Contraflow Plan for 

Southeast Florida and Southeast/ 

Southwest Florida, and Contraflow 

Plan for I-75/Alligator Alley. The 

Florida Department of Transportation 

(FDOT) State Traffic Engineering office 

in Tallahassee keeps the plans current. 

Within this office, the Deputy Traffic 

Engineer for Incident Management manages this program. 

Florida has spent close to $1 billion to deploy ITS technology to enhance highway operations. As 

a part of that effort, the State migrated to a single statewide TMC Software (SunGuide) 

beginning in 2004. All TMCs across the State in Miami, Tampa, Jacksonville, Fort Myers, Fort 

Lauderdale, Orlando, and the Florida Turnpike in Orlando and southeast Florida use the 

SunGuide software. The State EOC in Tallahassee also installed the SunGuide software for use 

by the Emergency Support Function #1 (Transportation) liaison that operates at the EOC when 

activated during time of emergency operations. This single platform enables the State to share 

controls of cameras and other devices in real-time. 

In November 2006, FDOT and the Florida Department of Emergency Management—in concert with 

FEMA—initiated the development of the comprehensive “Florida Catastrophic Planning 

Project,” which considers two, large-scale incidents resulting in projected consequences of 

catastrophic proportions: a breach of the Herbert Hoover Dike (HHD) around the waters of Lake 

Okeechobee and a Category 5 hurricane impacting the entire South Florida peninsula, which has 

a population of nearly 7 million. 

This project includes data collection and comprehensive capability assessments of local, State, 

and Federal resources to support response to a failure of the HHD and a Category 5 hurricane 

striking South Florida. Analysis of the assessments and draft county plans will help to identify 

resource gaps, inconsistencies, and competing interests for limited resources. 

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For the purpose of this study, respondents reported that the State plan is current, the Florida 

Catastrophic Plan will be completed soon, and the FIHS Contraflow plan, published in 2005, 

undergoes continuous updates. While Florida maintains a robust support system for evacuations, 

local authorities call for an evacuation, and coordinate evacuation decisions with neighboring 

counties. The State views evacuation operations from a strategic view and supports the local 

efforts by ensuring requested assistance is available.

The FDOT also provides support to local jurisdictions during evacuation operations, for example, 

with FDOT service patrols. In addition, FDOT makes available DMS to support evacuations and 

maintains a vendor list of those that have these resources available during an incident. The 

demand for these units is at a premium during mass evacuations.

In the Jacksonville area, Florida District 2 (FDOT–D2), covering Central Office, the city of 

Jacksonville, Duval County, St. Johns County, and the First Coast MPO, developed a 

comprehensive plan for evacuation of the First Coast region. Officials from FDOT-D2 also 

implemented a comprehensive ITS program to support this activity, as well as a service patrol 

program which could support the evacuation efforts when needed.

The only evacuation plan that FDOT controls related to the Jacksonville area is the I-10 

Contraflow Plan. In Florida, the county Emergency Manager is statutorily responsible for 

determining the evacuation routes in their county. The highest elected official (Sheriff or 

Mayor) is the only person that can call for an evacuation of a county in Florida. The FDOT only 

operates in a support role during evacuations. Every State road in Florida is considered an 

evacuation route.

The city of Jacksonville and Duval County maintain numerous evacuation plans, including those 

for countywide evacuations, downtown evacuations, beach evacuations, etc. They also retain 

scenario-based plans that deal with all incident types that could cause an evacuation, such as; 

hurricanes, tornadoes, nuclear release, terrorist attack, fire, etc. The FDOT sits as a member of 

their Planning Council and offers input and direction on all evacuation routes. Ultimately, the 

city/county authorities make the final decision on the implementation of an evacuation.

Respondents noted that authorities update all plans discussed during the interview on at least an 

annual basis. The Jacksonville evacuation plan covers 

an area approximately 60 miles to the west on I-10 from 

the western border to I-75. Once they approach I-75, 

the evacuee would then have the choice of going northsouth or continue west into the Panhandle.

Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported the following most 

significant impediments along NHS routes that may 

impact effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the 

Jacksonville metropolitan area. 

1. Work Zones - Work zones on I-10 at the interchange 

with I-95 and the addition of Interchanges on I-10 west of Jacksonville could impede 

evacuations in the short-term. These are the only issues on the NHS at this time. Provisions 

Top Highway Impediments

JACKSONVILLE

• Work Zones 

• Limited Fueling Stations

• No Dynamic Message Signs 

• No ITS Deployment on Key 

Interstates
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 41 of 108

in the construction contracts note that during times of evacuation, the contractor will halt 

work and make available all lanes possible to handle evacuation traffic. Also, the 

contractors make available for FDOT use of all DMS, barricades, cones, etc., that are already 

set up on the construction site. 

2. Limited Fueling Stations - along the I-10 route.

3. No Dynamic Message Signs - for westbound traffic on I-10.

4. No ITS Deployments on Key Interstates – The lack of ITS tools on key roads could impede 

mass evacuations on I-10 west of I-295 and on I-95 in St. Johns County. For example, 

motorists being evacuated from South and Central Florida take this route, which has DMS and 

CCTV cameras up to the Flagler/St. Johns County line. From there, no ITS exists until the 

Duval County line. 

The Plan

The following information provides 

some details regarding evacuation 

planning statewide, with the focus 

on the large metropolitan area of 

Clark County (Las Vegas). The 

Southern Nevada Evacuation/ 

Emergency Planning project 

reviewed the Clark County 

Emergency Operations Plan and 

found the plan comprehensive and 

generally complete. Moreover, DHS 

gave the plan high marks. The 

review also found that the Clark 

County local area plan does not 

delineate extensive roles and 

responsibility for Nevada 

Department of Transportation 

(NDOT) participation. 

The project recommends that 

future updates to the Clark County emergency plans would benefit if NDOT ensured that the 

local area emergency plans include more detail on NDOT’s roles, responsibilities, and 

capabilities. Respondents indicated that this could be achieved by simply referencing the NDOT 

emergency plans—primarily the District-Level plan—in the local area emergency plans, rather 

than expanding the emergency plans with extensive NDOT-specific detail. Moreover, with the 

relatively recent expansion of Advanced Transportation Management Systems (ATMS) in the 

Freeway and Arterial System of Transportation (FAST) TMC and on the Las Vegas Metropolitan 

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area freeway system, the region would benefit from an ATMS inventory and capabilities and 

better understanding of how ATMS applications could be used by emergency managers.

Respondents provided the following plans for this study, all of which are the most recent:

• State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP) 2005

• NDOT State Level Emergency Operations Plan

• NDOT District Emergency Operations Plan

• Clark County Emergency Plan 2004

The NDOT, when possible, obtains copies of the evacuation plans for each jurisdiction within the 

State to determine any identified tasks that would require NDOT participation. The large 

majority of pre-determined evacuation routes are State/Federal highways, which fall under 

NDOT’s responsibilities. Once NDOT determines its roles, NDOT incorporates these details into 

the District-level plan.

The NDOT Maintenance and Operations Division, Emergency Management Section, is covered by 

performance measures which are reported to the State legislature. These performance 

measures require that each NDOT staff be trained and exercised on the Emergency Operations 

Plan and that NDOT updates the Plan on a 3-year cycle. 

The statewide plan covers the entire State at a high level. The NDOT also maintains a Southern 

Nevada Evacuation Plan, but it is principally a strategic plan. It does not provide details on 

NDOT response to an evacuation event. The NDOT currently is involved in the development of a 

statewide evacuation plan being funded with a DHS Grant. The statewide evacuation plan is 

currently conducting a traffic study to determine the most appropriate evacuation routes and 

the responsibilities of the different agencies, both State and local, to support an evacuation 

along those routes. The current focus of this planning effort is Northern Nevada.

Top Highway Impediments

Study respondents reported that the most significant 

impediments along NHS routes that may impact 

effective large scale, mass evacuations from the Las 

Vegas metropolitan area include: 

1. Insufficient Lanes & Daily Congestion - The 

Las Vegas area has designated the following major 

evacuation routes in the event a large-scale 

evacuation is needed: I-15 North to Mesquite, NV; 

U.S. 95 North to Reno, NV; I-15 South to Southern 

California; U.S. 95 South to Laughlin, NV; and 

U.S. 93 East to Kingman, AZ. Considering the 

current population of the Las Vegas valley along 

with the high numbers of visitors in the area on a 

daily basis, in the unlikely event of a large-scale, 

mass evacuation, capacity would be exceeded if 

the evacuation were implemented in a short period 

of time. 

Top Highway Impediments

LAS VEGAS

• Insufficient Lanes & Daily 

Congestion

• Coordination with Other States 

on Evacuation Routes

• Communications Systems Would 

Not Support Evacuation 

Operations

• Deployable Traffic Signs and 

Evacuation Route Signage 

• Traffic Flow Monitoring 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 43 of 108

2. Coordination with Other States on Evacuation Routes – Most evacuation routes designated 

by Southern Nevada emergency managers lead to other States. Coordination with the other 

involved States is currently taking place through quarterly meetings of the emergency 

managers from the DOTs of each State. There is currently no formal structure to these 

coordination meetings. Details have not yet been determined on the specific logistics of 

moving large numbers of people from one State to the next. 

3. Communications Systems Would Not Support Evacuation Operations - Respondents stated 

that the communications system, including older analog cellular communications technology 

and equipment on portable DMSs, would not be adequate to support communication needs 

among responders working on the NHS roads or connecting the responders with TMCs or EOCs 

as they relay critical information.

4. Deployable Traffic Signs & Evacuation Route Signage - Agencies within the area maintain a 

supply of portable trailblazer signs that can be quickly deployed and operated to guide 

motorists on detour routes during an emergency evacuation. However, the signs currently 

cannot be enabled remotely. In addition, local and regional emergency and traffic 

management agencies are considering a permanent signing program that would designate 

primary evacuation routes, similar to signing programs that designate hurricane evacuation 

routes in other States.

5. Traffic Flow Monitoring - Local agencies are working cooperatively with FAST to develop a 

plan for the deployment of limited permanent traffic flow monitoring capabilities at strategic 

locations outside the beltway on the primary mass evacuation routes.

The Plan

Respondents noted that the 

evacuation plan is incorporated into 

the State Emergency Plan (SEP), 

which is still in draft pending 

official signature. Authorities last 

reviewed the plan in July 2009. 

Those interviewed commended 

Los Angeles County, which has been 

very proactive in developing their 

plans and is in the process of 

expanding them to accommodate 

large-scale evacuations. The 

County’s annex plan serves as a 

framework or template from which 

the County’s various municipalities 

can use to incorporate their own 

plan. The County’s mass evacuation 

Los Angeles, California #1-Most Congested #2-Population (12,873,000)

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plan is currently in draft form. The County plan generally does not extend beyond the County 

limits. Evacuation plans are reviewed every 3 years, or when the need presents itself after a 

major event. After-action reports are evaluated and may potentially affect the overall 

evacuation plan.

The California SEP establishes the California Emergency Functions (CA-EFs) as a key component 

of California’s system for all-hazards emergency management. The California Emergency 

Management Agency (Cal EMA) initiated the development of the CA-EFs in cooperation with 

California’s emergency management community including Federal, State, tribal and local 

governments, public/private partners and other stakeholders to ensure effective collaboration 

during all phases of emergency management. The development of the CA-EFs involves 

organization of the participating stakeholders and gradual development of emergency function 

components. This development also includes a process to maintain each of the CA-EFs as a 

permanent component of California’s emergency management system.

As described in Section 13 of the SEP, the CA-EFs consist of 17 primary activities deemed 

essential to addressing the emergency management needs of communities in all four phases of 

emergency management. Based upon authorities and responsibilities, a lead agency has been 

designated for the development of the State government level CA-EFs. As the CA-EFs 

development expands to include other stakeholders from the emergency management 

community, the CA-EFs will determine a governance structure. The governance structure will be 

developed with the 

administrative direction of 

Cal EMA and be flexible to 

allow for the participation 

of future stakeholders. 

Evacuation Planning is one 

of the listed 17 CA-EFs.

In the Los Angeles 

Operational Area, an 

alliance of emergency 

responders—including but 

not limited to the 

California Department of 

Transportation (Caltrans), 

Los Angeles County Police, 

Sheriff, and Fire 

Departments—formed to 

establish guidelines for 

mass evacuation. The Mass Evacuation Guide is almost complete. The alliance is currently 

working on a Mass Care and Shelter Guide. As part of the alliance’s efforts, the Los Angeles City 

Emergency Management Department (EMD) and Los Angeles County Office of Emergency 

Management (OEM) will share responsibility for coordinating the maintenance and updates of the 

Guide.

Los Angeles currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation planning as 

a part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA RCPGP provides catastrophic events planning 

Figure 3. Long Beach Evacuations from Battering Storms 2010
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 45 of 108

grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding regions, including: Chicago, 

Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and 

Seattle.

Top Highway Impediments

Those interviewed identified four key impediments to 

evacuating populations from the Los Angeles 

metropolitan area:

1. Congestion and Evacuation Route Capacity –

Currently identified evacuation routes are 

congested and often filled to capacity during peak 

travel periods on a daily basis. The strength of the 

existing evacuation plan(s) and a comprehensive communication infrastructure may serve to 

minimize this deficiency.

2. Communication Capabilities - The capability or capacity of the existing communication 

infrastructure meets current needs, but evacuation planners stated that a failure in the 

communication system would have a significant impact on regional evacuation operations. 

3. Public Outreach and Understanding Evacuation Process – Officials noted that more effort in 

public outreach should focus on getting the public to understand the evacuation process. 

They cited recent mudslides as an example. A review of evacuation operations during this 

incident found that people may not understand when they need to evacuate and why they 

may not be able to return to their home when they (the homeowner) perceive the threat is 

over. This greatly affected evacuation operations. The public also lacks an understanding of 

the responsibilities of first responders versus the rights of those that do not wish to 

evacuate.

Top Highway Impediments

LOS ANGELES

• Congestion & Evacuation Route 

Capacity 

• Communications Capabilities

• Public Outreach & Understanding 

Evacuation Process 

Figure 4. Evacuations from the 2009 Wildfires that Plagued LA County
 April 2010

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The Plan

Florida is one of the States that is at 

the forefront of emergency readiness, 

response, and planning. In 2005, 

Florida developed the Contraflow plan 

for the Florida Interstate Highway 

System (FIHS). This plan identified the 

following routes that could be used for 

evacuation: Sarasota County’s I-75 

Shoulder Use Plan, Jacksonville’s I-10 

Contraflow Plan, Space Coast’s SR 528 

(Beeline Expressway) Contraflow Plan,

Tampa Bay’s I-4 Contraflow Plan,

Florida Turnpike Contraflow Plan for 

Southeast Florida, and 

Southeast/Southwest Florida 

Contraflow Plan for I-75/Alligator 

Alley. The FDOT State Traffic 

Engineering office in Tallahassee vetted 

and keeps the plans current. Within 

this office, the Deputy Traffic Engineer 

for Incident Management manages this program. 

Florida has spent close to $1 billion to deploy ITS technology to enhance highway operations. 

As a part of that effort, the State migrated to a single statewide TMC Software (SunGuide) 

beginning in 2004. All TMCs across the State in Miami, Tampa, Jacksonville, Fort Myers, Fort 

Lauderdale, Orlando, and the Florida Turnpike in Orlando and southeast Florida use the 

SunGuide software. The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee also installed 

the SunGuide software for use by the Emergency Support Function #1 (Transportation) liaison 

that operates at the EOC when activated during time of emergency operations. This single 

platform enables the State to share controls of cameras and other devices in real-time. 

In November 2006, FDOT and the Florida Department of Emergency Management—in concert with 

FEMA—initiated the development of the comprehensive “Florida Catastrophic Planning Project,”

which considers two, large-scale incidents resulting in projected consequences of catastrophic 

proportions: a breach of the Herbert Hoover Dike (HHD) around the waters of Lake Okeechobee 

and a Category 5 hurricane impacting the entire South Florida peninsula, which has a population 

of nearly 7 million. 

This project includes data collection and comprehensive capability assessments of local, State, 

and Federal resources to support response to a failure of the HHD and a Category 5 hurricane 

striking south Florida. Analysis of the assessments and draft county plans will help to identify 

resource gaps, inconsistencies, and competing interests for limited resources. 

Miami, Florida #13-Most Congested #7-Population (5,415,000)

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For the purpose of this study, 

respondents reported that the State 

plan is current, the Florida Catastrophic 

Plan will be completed soon, and the 

FIHS Contraflow plan, published in 2005, 

undergoes continuous updates. 

While Florida maintains a robust support 

system for evacuations, local authorities 

call for an evacuation, and coordinate 

evacuation decisions with neighboring 

counties. The State views evacuation 

operations from a strategic view and 

supports the local efforts by ensuring 

requested assistance is available. The 

FDOT also provides support to local 

jurisdictions during evacuation 

operations, for example with FDOT service patrols, known as Road Rangers. In addition, FDOT 

makes available DMS to support evacuations and maintains a vendor list of those that have these 

resources available during an incident. The demand for these units is at a premium during mass 

evacuations.

The FDOT District 6 (D-6) covers the Miami area, which has one of the most mature ITS programs 

in Florida. Miami’s TMC was one of the first to integrate law enforcement operations. Over 

time, Miami developed unique partnerships with other transportation providers to ensure the 

best operation within the area. The FDOT D-6 integrated operations with District 4 (D-4) 

Fort Lauderdale, District 8 (D-8) Florida Turnpike, city of Miami and Miami-Dade Expressway (toll 

authority). These transportation agencies meet regularly to ensure cross coordination across all 

domains within their transportation system. Miami also maintains a very robust safety/service 

patrol program. Partners meet on a regular basis.

The State’s most current plan will be updated in 2010. The State plan addresses area threats 

and responses regionally. The Florida’s Turnpike Enterprise also maintains contraflow plans. 

Interviewees caution that voluntary evacuations will overlay mandatory evacuations, skewing the 

outcome of planning assumptions (Florida manages 

mandatory evacuations by locations; however, others 

moving into the evacuation stream cause congestion on 

the facility.) State and regional plans undergo annual 

updates. However, after each incident, authorities also 

conduct an After-Action Review (AAR) to evaluate every 

component of the plan. As the AAR process uncovers 

deficiencies, authorities adjust corresponding plans. 

Top Highway Impediments

Information provided by those interviewed identified 

five impediments to evacuating the Miami metro area as 

follows: 

Top Highway Impediments

MIAMI

• Insufficient Road Capacity

• Damage to Critical Infrastructure

• Work Zones on Major Routes

• Traffic Signal Timing

• Lack of ITS Devices on Major 

Arterial Roads
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1. Insufficient Roadway Capacity – Roadway capacity in the Miami area would be exceeded 

during large scale mass evacuation.

2. Damage to Critical Infrastructure – Damage to infrastructure such as bridges and overpasses 

would greatly reduce the ability to evacuate the population.

3. Work Zones on Major Routes – Work zones on key routes such as I-595, I-95, etc., would 

seriously impede an evacuation of the Metro-Dade area, particularly if given little to no 

notice. 

4. Traffic Signal Timing – Authorities must coordinate local traffic signals for optimization.

5. Lack of ITS Devices on Major Arterial Roads – FDOT D-6 deployed many ITS devices on the 

Interstates. However, these tools—which provide critical situational awareness information, 

can aid in transportation operations and may be used to alert the public to changes in traffic 

patterns or dangers on the roadways—are not deployed along major arterial roads, which may 

be used as evacuation routes.

The Plan

Officials developed the Metro 

Evacuation Traffic Management Plan

in 2005. Respondents noted that this 

plan serves more as a traffic 

layout/plan, or only one piece of the 

puzzle when discussing evacuations. 

The Metro Evacuation Traffic 

Management Plan covers multiple 

jurisdictions and exceeds the 

boundaries of the cities of Minneapolis 

and St Paul. The development of this 

plan included the nine counties within 

the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area 

(Hennepin, Dakota, Ramsey, 

Washington, Scott, Anoka, Wright, 

Carver, and Chisago).

The Director of the Office of Emergency 

Management in St. Paul concurred that 

the 2005 plan submitted for this review is only a traffic study that all agreed served as a good 

starting point for the traffic management aspect of a comprehensive regional evacuation plan. 

He noted that moving forward proved difficult for three reasons: 

• The 2005 regional evacuation planning effort has been suspended, as at this time, 

stakeholders have allocated staffing resources to higher priority projects. 

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota #12-Most Congested #16-Population (3,230,000)

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• Planners struggle to identify scenarios that would require a mass evacuation – an entire city 

or a major portion of the metro region. It’s been difficult to develop a credible scenario that 

would require evacuation of the entire metro area. 

• Planning efforts are not well-coordinated. The approach has been piece-meal, and if it must 

be done, the region must dedicate significant resources and support a concerted effort to 

address all of the areas.

Officials recently renewed efforts to restart efforts to revise the Minneapolis-St. Paul 

Metropolitan Regional Evacuation Plan, which is the transportation component mentioned above. 

Updating this plan is a combined effort by the counties, cities and Minnesota DOT (MnDOT). 

Respondents noted that the new version should incorporate a traffic routing tool produced by 

the University of Minnesota to aid in evacuation efforts. The MnDOT would manage the tool and 

the plan.

One interviewee noted that evacuation planning to date has taken a local/sub-regional 

perspective focused on high-risk areas or areas with large people concentrations. These plans 

focus on evacuating several blocks, not the whole metro region. One of the respondents 

observed that if a mass evacuation was needed, the NHS routes would quickly fill not because of 

impediments, but because the NHS alone cannot serve the role by itself and must be supported 

by the overall transportation system.

A respondent from the city of Minneapolis noted that they have a tremendous amount of 

evacuation experience. He relayed a local-level scenario, stating that the city conducted a mass 

evacuation and a shelter-in-place operation for “one of our Hawkins Chemical fires.” One of the 

first actions taken by the fire department was to pull situation maps that were laminated based 

on “box-runs” – a system set up in the late 1890s that’s still in place today. For this particular 

incident, box 419A, this means 4th district, 19th ward which is a footprint within the city. The 

city used these maps as a template to go door to door to notify the public of their order to 

evacuate or shelter-in-place. In conjunction with that, he noted that the city is working with 

the MnDOT on maps and strategies. 

It appears that evacuation planning is moving forward in the region. Minneapolis-St. Paul and 

Minnesota officials provided several late 2009 and early 2010 products for this study that 

demonstrate forward movement in the construction of a Regional Evacuation Plan. The products 

indicate that the new plan will include more than transportation route plans.

Top Highway Impediments

Those interviewed identified the following as potential impediments to a large-scale, mass 

evacuation in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region: 

1. Infrastructure Capacity and Congestion – Roadways are currently congested. There is no 

capacity in the system for accommodating large numbers of people and vehicles.
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 50 of 108

2. Lack of Coordinated Planning and a Universal Agreement on the Benefits of Evacuation –

One respondent noted that “evacuation” is not a universally acceptable public protection 

action. The individual continued to explain that there are other more feasible actions that 

may have higher priority and effectiveness. A MnDOT respondent noted that MnDOT can 

identify choke points, but MnDOT does not control citywide evacuations. The Twin Cities 

area mass exodus scenario has not been a critical issue in MnDOT’s planning activities.

3. Disconnected Transportation and Emergency 

Operations Centers – TMCs and local Emergency 

Operations Centers are not connected except by 

phone. As a result, emergency responders and 

managers lack good situational data to create a 

common operational picture. 

4. Need More Signage and Public Education - The 

public needs to know what to do, in the event an 

evacuation is ordered. Moreover, the region needs 

more signs on certain routes and increased DMS 

capabilities to give direction to the public during 

an evacuation. 

5. Coordination of Signal Timing Plans – Authorities 

noted that effective signal timing involved 

multijurisdictional coordination. 

6. Address Equipment Gaps for Pedestrian 

Movement - Authorities should address equipment 

gaps that support pedestrian traffic, which will be 

significant during an evacuation of the Central 

Business Districts in both Minneapolis and St. Paul.

7. Develop Multiple Options for River Crossing – Planners should consider non-traditional river 

crossing options, particularly between the Twin Cities Central Business Districts. 

Top Highway Impediments

MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL 

• Infrastructure Capacity & 

Congestion

• Lack of Coordinated Plan & 

Universal Agreement on the 

Benefits of Evacuation

• Disconnected Transportation and 

Emergency Operations Centers

• Need for More Signage & Public 

Education

• Coordination of Signal Timing 

Plans

• Address Equipment Gaps for 

Pedestrian Movements

• Develop Multiple Options for 

River Crossing
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 51 of 108

The Plan

According to interviewees, authorities 

update the New Orleans evacuation 

plan annually. The current plan is 

integrated into the Louisiana State 

Evacuation Plan, which is maintained 

by the Louisiana Emergency 

Management Agency. The New Orleans 

plan was developed right before 

Hurricane Katrina, and it has evolved 

based on lessons learned, corrective 

actions taken after Katrina and a 

couple of subsequent storms, and the 

adoption of good practices. Since 

Katrina, authorities expanded the 

designation of evacuation routes into 

Mississippi for the southeast and southcentral parts of the State. Officials 

treat the plan as a “living” document 

which requires continual updates. 

The New Orleans evacuation plan covers areas from New Orleans proper extending to all of 

southeast Louisiana, including Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. John the Baptist, Tangipahoa, and 

St. Tammany parishes, as well as Plaquemines and St. Bernard parishes located south and east of 

New Orleans. The plan designates routes that continue into Mississippi. Officials coordinate 

New Orleans plans with other State and parish highway agencies, including Mississippi DOT. One 

interviewee mentioned that they would like to add evacuation routes through the southeast and 

south-central parts of Louisiana, especially through the Lafayette area, which is along the 

Mississippi coast.

Top Highway Impediments

Those interviewed identified the top five impediments 

to evacuating the New Orleans metropolitan area, as 

follows:

 

1. Highway Flooding - Flooding of low lying portions 

of I-10 east of downtown New Orleans and flooding 

of low lying areas along US 90 in St. Charles Parish.

2. Additional ITS Capacity - Authorities noted that ITS 

camera and detector coverage along I-10 east and 

west would improve evacuation operations.

3. Insufficient Capacity - Capacity on National Highway System routes out of New Orleans 

would be exceeded during a large scale mass evacuation.

Top Highway Impediments

NEW ORLEANS 

• Highway Flooding 

• Additional ITS Capacity

• Insufficient Capacity

• Lack of Emergency Lanes 

New Orleans, Louisiana #41-Most Congested #46-Population (1,134,000)

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4. Lack of Emergency Lanes - The highways designated for evacuating populations lack an 

emergency lane for emergency vehicles. Officials reported that once contraflow operations 

commence, they lose the ability to move emergency vehicles along those routes. They noted 

that emergency vehicles use other nearby routes, but no in-bound access routes exist for that 

purpose, other than Airline Highway. Respondents reported that the twin-span does not 

present a problem, since emergency responders use the shoulder of the twin-span as a third 

lane and contraflow is not conducted on that section. Emergency vehicles have some return 

access options, such as US 51 that parallels I-55. However, flooding problems at a couple of 

interchanges along US 51 could impede movement along US 51, although a project to correct 

the flooding is underway. Authorities report similar problems with routes that parallel I-55.

The Plan

The New York State DOT (NYSDOT) 

supports local agencies in the New 

York City (NYC) region in their 

evacuation planning. In New York 

State, such planning is handled by 

individual localities

Respondents noted that some of 

the local jurisdictions maintain 

very robust plans, but the 

authorities coordinate the plans 

largely through the county. All 

plans are updated on an annual 

basis and reviewed as needed. 

Current efforts include evacuation 

planning for lower Hudson Valley, 

NYC, Long Island coordinated by 

the Regional Catastrophic 

Planning Team (RCPT), Regional 

Evacuation Liaison Team (RELT) 

and the group from the Hudson Valley TMC.

The respondent from the NYC Office of Emergency Management commented that the NYC plan 

extends beyond the five boroughs in a couple of ways: 

1. The hurricane evacuation study conducted for the region covered NYC, Nassau, Suffolk and 

Westchester counties, so clearance times of these areas serve as a foundation for timelines 

and decision-making. 

2. The plan factors in traffic from Long Island through NYC, which makes the plan regional in 

nature.

New York, New York #2-Most Congested #1-Population (19,007,000)

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3. Developing the NYC plan involved working closely with the Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority (MTA) and the Port Authority and their transportation assets which extend upstate. 

4. The plan addresses the operations of the RELT, which is a regional coordination mechanism.

A combination of the 

regional plans developed 

for jurisdictions within the 

NYC metropolitan area have 

been coordinated with 

outside jurisdictions. All 

planning efforts include 

coordination with 

organizations that serve 

multiple jurisdictions in the 

area, such as MTA and the 

Port Authority of New York 

and New Jersey for very 

practical operational 

purposes. For example, if 

MTA or Port Authority 

bridges are to close, 

information must be 

relayed to Long Island 

authorities about 3 to 6 hours before the closure to ensure that people using these facilities have 

enough time to evacuate or do not journey to these facilities only to find that bridges are 

closed, and they are stranded. Another example includes Nassau and Suffolk counties, which 

based their plans on a 120-hour, advance-notice coastal storm that would trigger an evacuation. 

Most of the transportation agencies for rail and buses as well as the electrical provider, the Long 

Island Power Authority (LIPA), coordinate closely with each other because of the time involved 

in getting the rolling stock secured and out of surge zones. Most plans tend to be coastal storm 

oriented. Future plan improvements will address intermodal coordination and 

intergovernmental coordination. 

New York City currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation planning 

as a part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA RCPGP provides catastrophic events planning 

grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding regions, including: Chicago, Houston, 

Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and Seattle.

Top Highway Impediments

Respondents noted the following impediments might frustrate the evacuation of the New York 

City metropolitan area:

1. Infrastructure Condition and Limitations – The condition of the roadway infrastructure 

within NYC (vertical clearance restrictions, bridge loading limitations) would frustrate 

evacuation operations. Limitations associated with transportation infrastructure (e.g., 

limited bridge/tunnel capacity) and facilities—especially in the Central Business District in 

Manhattan—would impede a mass evacuation of people from NYC. Within the NYC network, 

there are a number of transportation agencies that manage facilities that connect to State 

Figure 5. Pedestrian Evacuation after 9/11 Terrorist Attack on NYC
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 54 of 108

highways. One respondent noted that they are moving toward some type of integration 

between the NYC and NYSDOT facilities. Moreover the area lacks gates to inhibit traffic flow 

when needed for an evacuation or other traffic incidents. The limited infrastructure would 

impede emergency responders—including 

transportation authorities—from conducting logistics 

support operations on the roadways, including 

towing, safety/service patrols, gasoline trucks or 

City National Guard (CNG) transporters. 

2. Need Improved Coordination between State/Local 

Transportation Officials and Responders - The 

coordination between State and local 

transportation, law enforcement, and response 

agencies in the region could be improved. 

Moreover, State and local DOTs require close 

coordination during disaster responses or major 

road incidents. One interviewee noted that the 

jurisdictions surrounding NYC, but considered part 

of the region, are somewhat different than other 

regions because they do not have their own 

maintenance forces and depend on NYC DOT for 

support. He noted that the jurisdictions contract 

for highway maintenance, but do not maintain inhouse forces. As such, maintenance requires coordination and planning, which is as not easy 

when an emergency occurs. Planners should collectively look at timelines, including 

evacuation start vs. time needed to move all people.

3. Limited Deployment of ITS Impact on Sharing Situational Awareness Data - The ability to 

collect and disseminate real-time traffic information to the public due to the limited 

deployment of ITS technologies. An ITS deployment covers just under 200 center lane miles 

with some type of ITS deployed on about 140 miles. One interviewee noted that this 

constitutes about 2/3rds of the planned deployment program. Another respondent shared 

that the City embarked on an effort to develop the NY Metro Transportation Project, a realtime common operating environment to be shared among the operations agencies. The 

NYSDOT is working closely with the Army Corp of Engineers to develop decision-making tools 

to provide more real-time insights into each agency’s operations. This project will use 

freeway management data sharing components to capture information and provide it quickly 

to all users.

4. Weather Impacts – During coastal storms, the approaches to bridges to the mainland and 

other low-lying roads flood, and high winds cause the closing or slowing of traffic on bridges 

to the mainland.

5. Need for Public Information Campaign – Respondents noted that the public would benefit 

from a public information campaign. Many area residents lack knowledge of planned shelter 

locations and when to begin an evacuation. A public education campaign could reduce the 

effect shadow evacuations could have from clogging roads and transportation networks. 

Top Highway Impediments

NEW YORK CITY 

• Infrastructure Condition &

Limitations 

• Need Improved Coordination 

between State/Local 

Transportation Officials and 

Responders

• Limited Deployment of ITS Impact 

on Sharing Situational Awareness 

Data

• Weather Impacts

• Need for Public Information 

Campaign
 April 2010

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The Plan

The Philadelphia urban area 

published the “Southeastern 

Pennsylvania Emergency 

Transportation Plan” in June 2009. 

The regional plan includes routes to 

be used and provides for the 

estimation of evacuation times and 

covers four suburban Pennsylvania 

counties surrounding the city of 

Philadelphia—including Bucks, 

Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery 

counties—plus the city of 

Philadelphia. Philadelphia maintains 

its own plan, and planners 

integrated the Philadelphia City plan 

into the regional plan. It also 

integrates the five county-specific 

Emergency Response plans created 

by the Emergency Management 

Agencies into a unified plan for the 

region. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force coordinated plan development with 

Lancaster, Berks, Lehigh and Northampton counties, the States of New Jersey and Delaware, and 

turnpike authorities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The Task Force conducted postdevelopment outreach on the plan with adjacent regions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, 

and Maryland, as well as other Pennsylvania partner task forces that adjoin the Southeastern 

Task Force and cover Allentown and Harrisburg. Currently the plan encompasses five southeastern Pennsylvania areas (estimated population of 4.3 million) and ranges from about 30 miles 

west of Philadelphia to 30 miles north and south. 

City officials note that additional work needs to be performed, especially analyzing individual 

evacuation routes through the conduct of traffic modeling studies. Officials report that they do 

not expect the routes being used for evacuations to change as a result of the traffic modeling 

exercise. Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force members do anticipate that this effort 

will help improve regional coordination over time. Interviewees also expect improvements 

through the use of task forces that will support and manage key locations during an event. 

Responders with jurisdiction over the specific areas indicate that ITS tools will aid in situational 

awareness and enhance the use of available resources. The plan will be updated to further 

study each evacuation route in more detail. The Task Force hopes to update the regional plan 

and maps every 2 years. Municipal and county evacuation plans may be reviewed as often as 

every 12 months.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania #10-Most Congested #5-Population (5,838,000)

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Top Highway Impediments

The interviewees reported the following most significant impediments along NHS routes that 

may impact effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the Philadelphia metropolitan area. 

1. Expressway Congestion - Major expressway routes 

in the Philadelphia area would not be able to handle 

surge in traffic from a large-scale, mass evacuation. 

Lack of dedicated HOV or bus lanes would also 

hamper attempts to conduct mass evacuations. 

Long-term construction also adversely affects 

available capacity. In most cases, only a two-lane 

Interstate/expressway would be available for use by 

evacuees. This would physically limit the Region’s 

ability to use a contraflow strategy to reverse lanes. 

Moreover, most NHS arterials that lead out of the 

area are single lane, which would cause 

considerable congestion during an evacuation 

operation.

2. Need for Situational Awareness - There is a lack of situational information available about 

congestion, construction activity, or incidents on arterial highways. Those interviewed 

stated that ITS and signal timing (see #3, below) constitute key elements to ensuring 

expeditious travel. Philadelphia’s EOC and 911 Center have benefited greatly from their 

ability to view real-time traffic cameras on the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 

(PennDOT) system since 2004. However, current technology implementation of CCTV and 

DMS has only reached the Interstates/urban expressways in the area and is not yet deployed 

on the arterials. Philadelphia needs consistent situational awareness capability shared by the 

EOCs, DOT TMC, and State and local police and local municipalities.

3. Emergency Signal Timing Coordination - Municipalities own and operate traffic signals in 

Pennsylvania. Even though most of the NHS arterials have signal systems, it will be nearly 

impossible to implement emergency signal timing plans. Potentially 100+ municipalities will 

have to be contacted and told which timing plans to implement, and many municipalities do 

not have the expertise to quickly change timing plans. Those interviewed noted that the 

management of signals (placing emergency timings into place to aid an evacuation) by the 

TMC would be an important function that could be carried out by the operators when 

needed.

4. Operational Coordination - Coordination is a major issue. In the Philadelphia urban area 

there are 9 counties, 375 municipalities (this includes both the NJ and PA portions of the 

region), and 6 toll authorities; and this does not include Delaware, less than 40 miles from 

Philadelphia. Due to local home rule, most municipalities operate their own police and 

public works departments; municipalities can have multiple fire companies. To develop and 

execute an evacuation plan requires working with the municipalities, counties, State police, 

and toll authorities. Ultimately, they will be responsible for closing expressway ramps, 

staffing traffic control points, and directing lost motorists. Additional connectivity of ITS 

tools (such as cameras), additional monitoring systems along corridors, and TIM equipment 

and resources (such as Safety/Service Patrols and TMCs) among States would greatly enhance 

operational coordination of mass evacuations.

Top Highway Impediments

PHILADELPHIA 

• Expressway Congestion

• Need for Situational Awareness 

• Emergency Signal Timing 

Coordination

• Operational Coordination

• Toll Waivers
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U.S. Department of Transportation 57 of 108

5. Toll Waivers – With tolling affecting two States involved in mass evacuations in the 

Philadelphia area, the question “Who will decide to waive tolls during an emergency?” 

remains an important topic in the region.

The Plan(s)

The most current plans were provided 

for the Phoenix metropolitan area, 

including: 

• State of Arizona Mass Evacuation 

and Reception Plan 

• Maricopa County Emergency 

Evacuation Strategy Plan (July 2004)

• Maricopa County Emergency 

Evacuation Strategy Plan – Phase II

(Dec 2007)

All three are integrated into the State 

EMA’s evacuation plans. It has been 

agreed upon by participating 

jurisdictions that the State plan will 

serve as a model plan for the design and 

implementation of the overall 

evacuation strategy. The plans are 

reviewed, evaluated and updated 

annually, as required by the Arizona 

State EMA. The reviews are directed at the overall strategic and tactical value of the plan as 

well as progress toward integrating rural evacuation strategies into the overall State plan.

A unique approach or design of this plan is that it adopts a statewide evacuation and reception 

strategy. The plan incorporates the plans for the two largest counties, Pima and Maricopa, and 

serves as a model plan for rural jurisdictions currently working on evacuation/reception 

strategies. Additionally, this plan establishes a corridor coalition that supports strategies 

outside State boundaries. A featured aspect of the plan outlines stress points specifically for 

reception protocols. For example, Yuma County is identified as a primary reception area based 

on past evacuation experiences, primarily involving southern California. Transportation 

infrastructure capabilities and necessary support services/impediments have been identified.

Top Highway Impediments

The most significant impediments along NHS routes that may impact effective large-scale, mass 

evacuations from the Phoenix area include: 

Phoenix, Arizona #14-Most Congested #12-Population (4,282,000)

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1. Communication Capabilities - The capability or capacity of an aging communication system 

puts the overall success of the State evacuation and reception plan in jeopardy. Evacuation 

planners agree that the most significant deficiency affecting the plan is communication. The 

system currently depends on an analog processor. 

This system is over 20 years old and is approaching 

the end of its life expectancy. 

2. Community Outreach and Education Program - It 

has been established that a more aggressive 

outreach/education effort is needed to maximize 

effectiveness of the current plan.

3. Rural Evacuation Route Signing and Information 

(Public Outreach) Strategy - Developing and 

implementing an effective strategy to foster 

community awareness and buy-in on developed 

evacuation plans.

4. Mass Evacuation Regional Command and Control 

Center - Current emergency operation center 

capabilities fall below plan expectations. A more 

robust and comprehensive system is needed.

5. Evacuation Route Signing - Developing a clear and effective system of signing is critical to 

the overall success of the plan. 

The Plan

Portland and Oregon State officials 

noted that to address mass 

evacuations, planners must first 

answer the question “What would 

cause us to evacuate the city?” 

Portland urban area residents are 

vulnerable to no-notice events, such 

as earthquakes, wildland/urban 

interface fires, landslides, and 

volcanoes; however, none of which 

would trigger a full-scale evacuation. 

These no-notice events complicate 

transportation responses due to the 

range of locations that might need to 

be evacuated. Moreover, in most 

cases, authorities would encourage 

residents to shelter-in-place.

Top Highway Impediments

PHOENIX

• Communication Capabilities

• Community Outreach &

Education Program

• Rural Evacuation Route 

Signing & Information (Public 

Outreach) Strategy 

• Mass Evacuation Regional 

Command & Control Center 

• Evacuation Route Signing 

Portland, Oregon #22-Most Congested #23-Population (2,207,000)

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The city of Portland conducted a 2008 Gap Analysis that identified regional planning as a needed 

component of the City of Portland Evacuation Annex update. Information from the 2008 

workshop series examined roles and responsibilities, alternate transportation routes, route 

carrying capacity, and a decision matrix to determine mass-care site criteria. These three 

reports, or “Technical Memoranda,” along with the emergency exercise and incident reports, 

will support regional evacuation planning efforts in 2010. 

State and city authorities met recently to discuss deficiencies of the transportation system. The 

group addressed transportation as related to mass evacuations. The group agreed that:

• there would be no or little notice for most events which would cause populations to 

evacuate; 

• no current hazard faced by the region would trigger a mass evacuation; 

• planning must focus on localized evacuations if one was deemed necessary; 

• notification of the public will be problematic; 

• planning must be adaptable to population diversities and behaviors; 

• regional planning for evacuation is necessary because of shared assets, resources and 

liabilities; and 

• the current ground transportation system is at its capacity.

Transportation, police, emergency management and fire agencies also concluded that 

contraflow techniques, although highly unlikely and situation dependent, could be planned for 

and accomplished for localized and small scale events. 

Top Highway Impediments

Respondents identified the most significant impediments 

along NHS routes that may impact effective large-scale, 

mass evacuations from the Portland metropolitan area. 

These include:

1. Bridge Vulnerability – Portland evacuees must 

navigate over many bridges that may be vulnerable to 

damage or closure during an event. The city of 

Portland is divided by the Willamette River and 

bordered to the north by the Columbia River which 

divides the States of Oregon and Washington. Four 

highway bridges traverse these rivers. Only 2 of the 

four bridges have been earthquake-retrofitted, and 

all of the bridges sit in liquefiable soil adding to the 

instability of major transportation corridors. The 

bridges pose a highly vulnerable link in the 

transportation infrastructure, so the region is 

affected if the bridges are impacted.

The city owns 157 overpasses and bridges, none of which 

cross the Columbia or Willamette rivers. In an 

earthquake, these overpasses could fall onto the major 

Top Highway Impediments

PORTLAND

• Bridge Vulnerability

• Capacity & Infrastructure 

Limitations

• Communications & 

Coordination with Neighboring 

Jurisdictions & the Public 

• Communications & ITS 

Technology for Incident 

Operations

• Improved Traffic Management & 

Safety

• More Robust Planning for 

Evacuation Operations

• Identification & Use of 

Resources
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 60 of 108

thruways of the region and interfere with emergency response vehicle transport. Emergency 

Transportation Routes8 have been identified and listed in priority order for damage assessment 

and coordination. 

2. Capacity and Infrastructure Limitations – In Portland, the NHS roadway infrastructure 

operates at capacity during peak periods. This is most noticeable at the slightest stall of a 

car in rush hour, which delays traffic and impedes response vehicles. This situation would be 

greatly exacerbated if officials conducted an evacuation operation over these roads. Several 

choke points in the urban area cause problematic congestion and would greatly restrict 

evacuation operations in these areas. Through a 2007 study, the Portland Operations 

Steering Committee identified the primary reasons for congestion and made 

recommendations. Information gathered from this report will be included in mitigation and 

education plans in preparation for evacuation. 

3. Communications and Coordination with Neighboring Jurisdictions and the Public –

Regional coordination needs to address coordinated use of technology, collaborative 

planning, communication between agencies and between agencies and the public, 

management of multiagency responses and cooperative agreements that document the 

decisions between agencies, jurisdictions and disciplines. Authorities continue to plan public 

communication strategies. Regional public information concept of operations and public 

messaging templates are currently being validated within the region. Warning Annexes, DMS, 

cameras and Web site capabilities are being examined with the intent of greater cooperation 

in traffic management during extreme situations. Authorities also noted that the region must 

develop agreements for response and mitigation of roads traversing and impacting multiple 

jurisdictions.

A focal point of communication was consistent messaging and the strategy to develop and 

implement agreed upon messages for the public. Different from the technology tools, 

communication strategies relates to what is in the message, who is involved in the message 

transmission and what the content of the different messaging strategies are (e.g., policy, 

decisions, warning or education). 

4. Communications and ITS Technology for Incident Operations – Authorities noted that the 

region must make better use of communication and other ITS technology. Transportation 

agencies in the Portland urban area have many technological tools at their disposal for use in 

communicating with the public and with each other. The problem and the deficiency in 

these tools are their interconnectivity, interoperability and integration into emergency 

response. An ITS for the region includes the typical metropolitan systems: CCTV video 

recording, DMS, TOCs at both Oregon DOT (ODOT) and the city of Portland, traffic signal 

operations and highway system cameras. Regional partners use ITS primarily for day-to-day 

traffic and incident management. An adequate number of DMS on arterial streets and 

enough to be placed at a distance from an incident were identified as needs.

Some TIM corridors exist where the counties, Portland and ODOT have placed route guidance 

and improved signal operations on parallel routes to the highway system. Deficiencies in 

networking capability and the interoperability of communications between agencies were 

 8 An Emergency Transportation Route is a route needed during a major regional emergency or disaster to move response resources such as 

personnel, supplies, and equipment to heavily damaged areas. 
 April 2010

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identified as top impediments to the operations of evacuations. With so many tools to use, 

the difficulty becomes the reliability and consistency of the message. Internet 

communications technologies such as Twitter, Facebook, TripCheck, transit Automated Rider 

Boards, public alerts, Web EOC and Ops Center all are rapidly developing and must be 

included, tracked and documented through agreements, plans and policies. Public Radio 

broadcasts and Reverse 911 messages need to be a part of the communications technology 

plan. A regional Gap Analysis for Public Works regarding interoperability of radio and 

telecommunications is in the first stage of development as part of a DHS UASI Initiative grant 

project. 

5. Improved Traffic Management and Safety – Authorities concluded that the region should 

focus upon improving safety and traffic flow on multiple road interchanges within the 

highway system. 

6. More Robust Planning for Evacuation Operations – Respondents commented that the 

Portland urban area would like to do more with planning for evacuations. They noted that 

they must strategically plan to manage multiple modes of transportation and describe it 

in an evacuation annex. They would like to look at different areas over a 24-hour period 

and determine the different evacuation needs based on time of day. The urban area 

population centers, geography and transportation system (including mass transit, 

bridges/overpasses, road capacity) impact decisions of evacuation planning. Planners are 

reviewing assets and risks that could impede or improve public service recovery, evacuation 

or isolation. Regionally, counties are conducting continuity of operations planning to 

determine service capabilities that could aid the public when disaster strikes and evacuation 

is or is not implemented. Reception planning has begun through the identification of 

emergency needs for congregation sites and the criteria for each site’s operation. Such sites 

reviewed are sheltering, transportation connection, points of distribution, medical care 

points and feeding facilities. The research conducted in 2008 will enhance discussions about 

adjacent counties within the urban areas reception centers in the next phases of evacuation 

planning.

7. Identification and Use of Resources – Respondents noted that they need to look at their 

transportation assets, regional response route map, and regional roles and responsibilities 

prior to an emergency to identify what might be used, the parameters of use, and how the 

resource might be adjusted for evacuation operations. While Portland urban area planners 

have discussed the use of buses for mass evacuation, more understanding of their plans and 

capabilities are needed. C-Tran has a Bus Mobilization Plan that is coordinated with Clark 

Regional Emergency Services Agency. However, Tri-Met has no plan and there is no regional 

emergency management agency with a governance structure to manage such an agreement. 

Authorities must know the limitations of public and private transportation resources during 

disaster, and agreements need to be drawn between the agencies. Many multicounty 

agreements have been created that allow sharing of resources and accountability for those 

resources in disaster. But there is a regional shortage of current private resources that can 

be used in any response including evacuation. Part of future planning will be to identify the 

shortage gaps and ways to fill them. 
 April 2010

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The Plan

California and San Diego officials 

affirmed that the draft plan 

provided is the most current 

version, having been reviewed in 

July 2009, and that the San Diego 

evacuation plan is incorporated into 

the State plan, which is awaiting 

final signature. The San Diego plan 

generally does not extend more than 

30 miles beyond the metropolitan 

area. Evacuation Plans are reviewed 

every 3 years, or when the need 

presents itself after a major event. 

After-action reports are evaluated 

and may potentially affect the 

overall evacuation plan.

The California, State Emergency 

Plan (SEP) establishes the California 

Emergency Functions (CA-EFs) as a 

key component of California’s system for all-hazards emergency management. The California 

Emergency Management Agency (Cal EMA) initiated the development of the CA-EFs in 

cooperation with California’s emergency management community including Federal, State, 

tribal, and local governments, public/private partners and other stakeholders to ensure 

effective collaboration during all phases of emergency management. The development of the 

CA-EFs involves organization of the participating stakeholders and gradual development of 

emergency function components. This development also includes a process to maintain each of 

the CA-EFs as a permanent component of California’s emergency management system.

As described in Section 13 of the SEP, the CA-EFs consist of 17 primary activities deemed 

essential to addressing the emergency management needs of communities in all four phases of 

emergency management. Based upon authorities and responsibilities, a lead agency has been 

designated for the development of the State government level CA-EFs. As the CA-EFs 

development expands to include other stakeholders from the emergency management 

community, the CA-EFs will determine a governance structure. The governance structure will be 

developed with the administrative direction of Cal EMA and be flexible to allow for the 

participation of future stakeholders. Evacuation Planning is one of the listed 17 CA-EFs. 

Top Highway Impediments

Respondents identified the most significant impediments along the NHS routes that may impact 

effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the San Diego metropolitan area. 

San Diego, California #17-Most Congested #17-Population (3,001,000)

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1. Communication Capabilities - Although the 

capability or capacity of the existing communication 

infrastructure meets current needs, evacuation 

planners stated that a failure of the communication 

system would significantly impact evacuation 

operations. 

2. Evacuation Route Capacity – Currently identified 

evacuation routes remain congested and are often 

filled to capacity during daily operations. The 

strength of the existing Evacuation Plan(s) and comprehensive communication infrastructure 

could minimize this 

deficiency.

3. Need Public Outreach 

Campaign - Outreach would 

help authorities and the 

public understand evacuation 

plans. Authorities believe 

that improving outreach 

programs would benefit 

current evacuation plans. 

Respondents indicated that 

this is a priority and would 

improve the likelihood of a 

successful evacuation 

operation. 

Top Highway Impediments

SAN DIEGO

• Communication Capabilities

• Evacuation Route Capacity 

• Need Public Outreach 

Campaign
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The Plan

Respondents confirmed that the 

July 2009 State plan provided for 

this study is the most recent and 

that it serves as a model for county 

and local plans. The State Plan was 

reviewed during a 2008 grantfunded planning session and 

addressed in 2009 under a Grant 

Planning Validation Workshop. 

Planners review the California State 

plan annually, with additional 

planning and review sessions 

occurring as needed, particularly 

after a major incident, such as last 

year’s wildfire-related evacuations 

throughout the State. Available on 

the California Emergency 

Management Agency Web site, the 

State plan does not address 

evacuations. The State did produce 

an evacuation Guideline document 

for use by local governments in developing their plans. 

Interviewees noted that the Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation/ 

Evacuation Plan (January 22, 2010, DRAFT) addresses needs for a worst-case scenario, or 

earthquake in the San Francisco area. The regional plan incorporates the major cities of 

San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose while including the surrounding nine counties of Alameda, 

Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. The 

comprehensive plan takes into account the possibility of catastrophic damage to the existing 

surface transportation infrastructures. Regional Mass Evacuation Planners agree that a full 

evacuation of the San Francisco metropolitan area is improbable, while a more regionalized 

evacuation scenario is more likely. The Mass Evacuation Strategy is comprehensive and adaptive 

to all likely scenarios. 

San Francisco currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation planning 

as a part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA RCPGP provides catastrophic events planning 

grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding regions, including: Chicago, Houston,

Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, Honolulu, Norfolk, and Seattle.

Top Highway Impediments

Respondents identified the most significant impediments along NHS routes that may impact 

effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the San Francisco area as follows: 

San Francisco, California #7-Most Congested #13-Population (4,275,000)

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1. Communication Capabilities if Damaged - The 

communications infrastructure constitutes one of 

the strengths of the regional plan. However, if a 

catastrophic event occurs and disrupts 

communication, this may present a significant 

evacuation deficiency. Efforts are underway by 

evacuation planning partners to improve “real-time” 

information exchange. The California Highway 

Patrol is prepared to utilize aircraft and existing 

systems to accomplish this effort. Efforts are 

underway to improve the regional communication capabilities, such as expanding use of ITS. 

However, expanding and upgrading regional communications capabilities involves inherent 

challenges due to funding constraints that limit inclusion of robust system redundancies and 

continuous system maintenance and operations. 

2. Infrastructure along Evacuation Routes: Roads, Bridges, and Overpasses - To date, 

authorities have retrofitted more than 2,000 bridges and overpasses on the State Highway 

System to current earthquake standards. Certain structures identified along “life-line 

routes” have been retrofitted or constructed to higher standards, such as the new span of 

the Benicia-Martinez toll bridge. Retrofit work continues on only a handful of highway 

bridges. While the Bay Area toll bridges in general exceed minimum standards, other more 

typical highway structures, which do not, may sustain damages in case of a significant 

seismic event, impacting respective routes and mass evacuation. Another constraint to 

evacuation capability is the variant changes in roadway geometrics along facilities, 

particularly shoulder width and number of auxiliary lanes. Authorities have investigated the 

potential use of contraflow schemes for mass evacuation in some areas.

The Plan

Washington State DOT (WSDOT) 

respondents reported that while Seattle 

has no evacuation plan, they maintain a 

well-developed Emergency Response 

Plan that addresses many areas critical 

to evacuating at-risk populations. Many 

of the plausible scenarios envisioned by 

Puget Sound planners are limited to 

smaller communities and groups of 

people so the thought of evacuating the 

whole city seems extremely remote. 

Nevertheless, they noted that the plans 

are regularly activated so they have 

significant experience in executing 

emergency operations. For example, in 

2009, WSDOT coordinated and planned 

Seattle, Washington #9-Most Congested #15-Population (3,345,000)

INRIX® National Traffic Scorecard 2009 

Top Highway Impediments

SAN FRANCISCO

• Communication Capabilities if 

Damaged

• Infrastructure along Evacuation 

Routes: Roads, Bridges & 

Overpasses
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 66 of 108

for evacuations in response to flooding risks in the Green River Valley. The WSDOT also worked 

with the State Emergency Management Division on evacuation planning along with local 

jurisdictions including Seattle and conducted a technical assistance visit to San Diego to discuss 

evacuation practices. 

Authorities noted that they would rather have people stay put, given the threats endemic to the 

region. For example, if Mt. Rainier erupted violently and suddenly, Puget Sound authorities 

would direct people to higher ground and avoid putting thousands of people on the highway 

network that would be vulnerable to debris flows and flooding. Respondents expressed the view 

that for the type of threats they face, conducting mass evacuation operations would not be the 

first thing that they would want to do.

The Puget Sound Region recently received a Federal grant to address evacuation planning. The 

DHS/FEMA RCPGP provides catastrophic events planning grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas 

and surrounding regions. The objectives of the grant funding include: (1) addressing 

shortcomings in existing plans, (2) building regional planning processes and communities, and (3) 

linking operational and capabilities-based planning with resource allocation. 

The Puget Sound Catastrophic Preparedness Planning Region constitutes an eight-county region 

that includes Island (city: Oak Harbor), King (cities: Bellevue, Kent, Renton, and Seattle), 

Kitsap (city: Bremerton), Mason (city: Shelton), Pierce (city: Tacoma), Skagit (city: Mount 

Vernon), Snohomish (city: Everett), and Thurston (city: Olympia) counties. 

Top Highway Impediments

During the interview, they noted that Seattle has higher 

priorities than mass evacuation planning. Moreover, 

Seattle must deal with moving people around bodies of 

water or mountain ranges that constrain transportation 

and limit the potential for evacuation routes. However, 

information presented in the interview identified a few 

impediments that may impact effective large-scale, mass 

evacuations from the Seattle area, including:

1. Congestion – Based upon everyday congestion, Puget 

Sound officials know where their bottlenecks would constrain a mass evacuation. 

2. Limited Infrastructure –Although interviewees indicated known road bottlenecks would 

constrain a mass evacuation, interviewees suggested that building a roadway network large 

enough for a possible mass evacuation of the city would not constitute good fiscal 

stewardship since excess capacity would either be wasted, immediately filled with traffic 

from new development, or create negative environmental impacts from such construction in 

the area. 

3. Insufficient Responder Resources to Manage an Evacuation – Authorities noted that, even if 

they could accommodate a mass evacuation, they don’t have the responder resources 

available to direct and manage a mass evacuation operation on the NHS roads.

Top Highway Impediments

SEATTLE

• Congestion

• Limited Infrastructure

• Insufficient Responder 

Resources to Manage an 

Evacuation 
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The Plan

Missouri Department of Transportation 

(MoDOT) officials reported that mass 

evacuation and predetermined events 

are not scenarios that they plan for and 

that they use a very high-level statewide 

plan that is not prescripted. As such, 

interviewees indicate that St. Louis 

does not have an emergency plan for the 

metropolitan area. The closest to a 

regional plan is the bi-State Gateway 

Guide produced by the St. Louis MPO. 

In Missouri, evacuation is the 

responsibility of the Office of the 

Governor. The Missouri State Emergency 

Operations Plan does not contain an 

evacuation section, although MoDOT is a 

supporting agency along with many other 

agencies to the State Emergency 

Management Agency in executing the 

Plan. The MoDOT maintains an Incident Response Plan (IRP), but not an "evacuation plan," per 

se. The MoDOT IRP is an "all-hazards" plan that focuses on process rather than specific prescripted responses. The MoDOT official said that there are no scenarios that would result in a 

mass evacuation anywhere in Missouri and that all 

anticipated situations would be localized. 

Top Highway Impediments

Interviewed officials noted that since mass evacuation is 

not an anticipated response in Missouri, it is difficult to 

identify highway impediments that would curtail an 

evacuation. However, they did offer some insights on 

the highway system that suggest that an evacuation could be impeded by various infrastructure, 

operations, technology, and resource impediments. 

These are as follows:

1. Limited Capacity - Based on several Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exercises focused 

on bridge attacks and chemical releases in very small areas, officials found that if city 

leadership called for a no-notice mass evacuation of St. Louis, existing capacity would not be 

sufficient. At best, the DOT can use DMS, service patrols and the tools currently available to 

help move the traffic, but will never alleviate the congestion in the unlikely event a mass 

evacuation is ordered.

Top Highway Impediments

ST. LOUIS

• Limited Capacity

• Highway Capacity & Bridges 

St. Louis, Missouri #21-Most Congested #18-Population (2,817,000)

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2. Highway Capacity and Bridges - In St. Louis, the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers present the 

greatest obstacle to evacuation. St. Louis lacks the highway capacity for a mass evacuation. 

Contraflow is not realistic due to physical constraints and the manpower required. This is 

complicated by the fact that the most likely evacuation events are no-notice events in the 

Midwest. The MoDOT officials recognize that while more highway capacity is the best way to 

address any potential for mass evacuations, it is not very practical.

The Plan 

Florida is one of the States that is at 

the forefront of emergency readiness, 

response, and planning. In 2005, 

Florida developed the plan for the 

Florida Intrastate Highway System 

(FIHS). This plan identified the 

following routes that could be used 

for evacuation: Sarasota County’s I75 Shoulder Use Plan, Jacksonville’s 

I-10 Contraflow Plan, Space Coast’s 

SR 528 (Beeline Expressway) 

Contraflow Plan, Tampa Bay’s I-4 

Contraflow Plan, Florida Turnpike 

Contraflow Plan for Southeast 

Florida, and Southeast/Southwest 

Florida Contraflow Plan for I75/Alligator Alley. The FDOT State 

Traffic Engineering office in 

Tallahassee keeps the plans current.

Within this office, the Deputy Traffic 

Engineer for Incident Management manages this program.

Florida has spent close to $1 billion to deploy ITS technology to enhance highway operations. As 

a part of that effort, the State migrated to a single statewide TMC Software (SunGuide) 

beginning in the early 2000s. All TMCs across the State in Miami, Tampa, Jacksonville, 

Fort Myers, Fort Lauderdale, Orlando, and the Florida Turnpike in Orlando and southeast Florida 

use the SunGuide software. The State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Tallahassee also 

installed the SunGuide software for use by the Emergency Support Function #1 (Transportation) 

liaison that operates at the EOC when activated during time of emergency operations. This 

single platform enables the State to share controls of cameras and other devices in real-time.

In November 2006, FDOT and the Florida Department of Emergency Management—in concert with 

FEMA—initiated the development of the comprehensive “Florida Catastrophic Planning 

Project,” which considers two, large-scale incidents resulting in projected consequences of 

catastrophic proportions: a breach of the Herbert Hoover Dike (HHD) around the waters of Lake 

Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida #29-Most Congested #19-Population (2,734,000)

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Okeechobee and a Category 5 hurricane impacting the entire south Florida peninsula, which has 

a population of nearly 7 million. 

This project includes data collection and comprehensive capability assessments of local, State, 

and Federal resources to support response to a failure of the HHD and a Category 5 hurricane 

striking south Florida. Analysis of the assessments and draft county plans will help to identify 

resource gaps, inconsistencies, and competing interests for limited resources. 

For the purpose of this study, respondents reported that the State plan is current, the Florida 

Catastrophic Plan will be completed soon, and the FIHS contraflow plan, published in 2005, 

undergoes continuous updates.

While Florida maintains a robust support system for evacuations, local authorities call for an 

evacuation and coordinate evacuation decisions with neighboring counties. The State views 

evacuation operations from a strategic vantage and supports local efforts by ensuring requested 

assistance is available.

The FDOT also provides support to local jurisdictions during evacuation operations, for example, 

with FDOT service patrols. In addition, FDOT makes available DMS to support evacuations and 

maintains a vendor list of those that have these resources available during an incident. The 

demand for these units is at a premium during mass evacuations.

The FDOT’s District 7 (D-7) serves the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg metropolitan region. The region 

hosts a number of major routes that could support the mass evacuation of its inhabitants, 

including I-75 to the north and south, the Veterans Expressway and US 19 to the north, and I-4 to 

Orlando. Critical infrastructure in the greater Tampa region includes bridges and a causeway: 

The Howard Frankland Bridge, Grandy Bridge, and Courtney Campbell Causeway constitute three 

major facilities that support the evacuation of Pinellas County (St Petersburg). Damage to the 

bridges or causeways would significantly affect an evacuation operation in this area.

As with other major regions within Florida, the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg region maintains an 

evacuation plan and dedicates staff to the upkeep of the plan. The FDOT D-7 continually works 

with the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council, its MPO, to enhance the plan and other evacuation 

activities. As with all Florida regions, Tampa Bay–St. Petersburg region may provide the following 

assets to support evacuation:

• FDOT safety/service patrols, known as “Road Rangers,” in the Greater Tampa Bay Area.

• “Asset Contractors” as well as FDOT Maintenance personnel for maintenance and work 

zone issues.

Respondents noted that the Greater Tampa Bay area maintains a number of well-coordinated, 

frequently reviewed and updated evacuation plans, which are incorporated into the State and/or 

local emergency management agency’s evacuation plan. These include three “Reverse Lane” 

plans that impact the Tampa Bay-St. Petersburg area. The I-4 plan is well-established and has 

been tested twice for “set-up” response times. The I-75 plan is not complete and has not been 

tested. Finally, authorities recently completed the Leroy Selmon Crosstown Expressway Plan, 

and all involved agencies approved the product.
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 70 of 108

The current plan provided for the study represents the most recent version; however, the Tampa 

Bay Regional Planning Council is in the process of updating the regional evacuation study as part 

of the Statewide Regional Evacuation Study program. The study relating to the Tampa Bay area 

was finished by March 2010. In addition, the Statewide Regional Evacuation Study program 

should be completed for the four-county (Hillsborough, Manatee, Pasco, and Pinellas) area in 

March. The findings will be incorporated into district and county plans. The area is in the 

process of implementing the use of new transportation analysis, evacuation models and user 

interface which should provide a much greater planning capability within the State of Florida.

Overall agreement within Florida dictates that the counties will cover motorist assistance on 

arterials within their boundaries during evacuations and the FDOT will be responsible for the 

Interstates. These plans have not been formalized and could be considered as the region 

without a formalized regional evacuation plan, per se. This may be viewed as a deficiency.

Preliminary discussions have taken place regarding transit plans and intra-regional light rail, 

especially a connection between Pinellas/Tampa International Airport/Tampa (USF area), to 

support evacuation from vulnerable areas to safer areas within the region. Preliminary 

discussions regarding the use of high speed rail for evacuation will be contemplated when the 

completion date for the first phase is known. 

Top Highway Impediments

Respondents identified the most significant impediments 

along NHS routes that may impact effective large-scale, 

mass evacuations from the Tampa-St. Petersburg region, 

as follows:

1. Highway Infrastructure Capacity - The capacity of 

existing facilities would be significantly exceeded 

during a mass evacuation. .

2. Bridge Infrastructure Capacity - Tampa Bay– 

St. Petersburg has a number of bridges and a 

causeway. These are the critical locations and 

bottlenecks for evacuation. 

3. Bridge Vulnerability to Damage – Some of these 

structures could be susceptible to “hydraulic lifting” 

which will impact the evacuation process.

4. Highway Vulnerability to Damage - Hurricane winds or other hazards could damage the 

highway facilities and other devices on the facility.

5. Limited Evacuation Routes (Geographic Limitations) – Tampa Bay–St. Petersburg has a very 

limited number of routes for evacuation due to waterways surrounding the region.

Top Highway Impediments

TAMPA-ST. PETERSBURG

• Highway Infrastructure Capacity

• Bridge Infrastructure Capacity

• Bridge Vulnerability to Damage

• Highway Vulnerability to 

Damage

• Limited Evacuation Routes due 

to Geographic Limitations 
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U.S. Department of Transportation 71 of 108

Various definitions exist for the 

area referred to as the National 

Capital Region (NCR). For this 

report, FHWA selected the 

characterization established by the 

DHS’s NCRC, as defined by 

Congress pursuant to the National 

Capital Planning Act of 1952, 40 

USC 71. The Act defines the NCR 

as the District of Columbia; 

Montgomery and Prince George’s 

Counties in the State of Maryland; 

Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and 

Prince William counties in the 

Commonwealth of Virginia; and all 

cities existing in Maryland or 

Virginia within the geographic area 

bounded by the outer boundaries 

of the combined area of these 

counties.

Today, the NCR includes the 

District of Columbia plus 11 local jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the 

Commonwealth of Virginia. (See 

map)

The Plan

The Metropolitan Washington Council 

of Governments (MWCOG) is a 

regional organization of Washingtonarea, local governments comprising 21 

local governments surrounding the 

Nation’s Capital, plus area members of 

the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, 

the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of 

Representatives. The MWCOG provides 

a focus for action and develops 

regional responses to such issues as the 

environment, affordable housing, 

economic development, health and 

family concerns, human services, 

National Capital Region #4-Most Congested #9-Population (5,358,000)

(District of Columbia, Maryland & Northern Virginia) INRIX® National Traffic Scorecard 2009

Montgomery County

Prince William 

County

Loudoun County

Arlington County

District of 

Columbia

Prince 

George’s 

County

Fairfax County

Alexandria
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 72 of 108

population growth, public safety, and transportation. The MWCOG serves the region by 

coordinating evacuation and other disaster planning. 

District of Columbia: The District of Columbia’s (DC) EMA produced the 2009 District of 

Columbia Evacuation Plan, DC’s most current evacuation plan. The District of Columbia 

Department of Transportation (DDOT) updates the Emergency Transportation Annex (ETA) in 

this Plan. The most recent ETA update occurred in late 2008 through early 2009. Each year, 

the District’s DHS, which manages District ESF responsibilities, spearheads the annual review 

and plan update. Since the District hosts many special events, it must review the evacuation 

plan on an ongoing basis. For example, DDOT evaluates the plan through their 

implementation of events such as the 2009 Presidential Inauguration or the 4th of July live 

regional test of the plan that looks at evacuation routes, traffic signalization, congested 

intersections with a review of and where to send resources including staff and portable 

dynamic message signs; how to set up evacuation routes; and how to communicate across 

jurisdictions. Each year, DDOT tests the plan and focuses on a different corridor to find 

weak spots and looks for ways to address those weaknesses. In addition, DDOT uses other 

regularly scheduled special events such as the home baseball games to test the required 

external and internal coordination to ensure that these communication flows are in place. 

Officials continually update the plans based on lessons learned from recent events (e.g., 

2010 snow incidents). The next plan update, including the transportation annex, is expected 

to occur in the summer or fall 2010. Though the base plan will not change significantly with 

the emergency routes expected to stay the same, DDOT will reexamine secondary routes and 

expects to increase the use of technology into the plan. 

The District EMA’s evacuation plan integrates the DDOT annex into the overall plan. More 

importantly, plans developed by other jurisdictions within the NCR also incorporate DDOT’s 

plan. When first developed and throughout the updating process, DDOT coordinated with its 

regional partners, including other DOTs, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

[WMATA], and the Metropolitan Police Department. Any time DDOT revises its plan, DDOT 

uses the MWCOG ESF-1 (Transportation) meetings to vet the plan, as most of those 

representatives on the MWCOG mirror the agencies DDOT invited in the initial discussions of 

the plan. The DDOT believed it very important to include all of these stakeholders during 

the development of the plan since evacuation routes lead into Virginia and Maryland via 

District bridges, tunnels, and roads. As such, DDOT needs the support of those jurisdictions 

to ensure a transparent evacuation. 

Moreover, an evacuation could likely involve a pedestrian walk-out operation. In this case, 

numerous other key agencies, including the Capitol Police and the National Park Service, 

must know where pedestrians would congregate and where they would go in Virginia, and to 

a lesser degree, Maryland. The District requires a pedestrian walk-out because many of the 

people who work in the District during the day do not live within the District. 

The DDOT seeks to move those evacuating out of the city to the receiving jurisdiction safely. 

To ensure that the motorists have choices, the District plan directs evacuees going to 

Maryland out toward the Beltway and beyond, but not as far as I-270. For those who 

evacuate to Virginia, the District plan directs them to the Alexandria or Arlington, Virginia, 
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side of the bridges that begin in Washington, DC. The District attempts to create a very 

transparent plan so that the adjoining jurisdictions will not change routes as a way to limit 

confusion for those who are driving out. This approach is based on what has been learned 

from the twice-daily commutes which moves a major portion of the region’s population 

among the two States and the District.

Communication among agencies continues to improve. Through the past decade, DDOT has 

participated in more coordination with agencies and individuals talking about their specific 

needs. What hadn’t been made clear prior to these discussions was the concerns and needs 

that are specific to Washington, DC, as the seat of the Federal Government. As a result of 

these conversations, DDOT now has a far more realistic understanding and perspective of 

what is needed to move both Congress and the President should an evacuation occur. The 

DDOT has come to understand how to coordinate the evacuation of these principals without 

affecting the rest of the city. In the past couple of years, DDOT has asked to have that 

process explained to them so that evacuation won’t have an adverse effect on the 

evacuation of District citizens.

Washington, DC, currently benefits from a Homeland Security Grant to address evacuation 

planning as a part of catastrophic planning. The DHS/FEMA RCPGP provides catastrophic 

events planning grants to the 10 highest risk Urban Areas and surrounding regions, including: 

Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, Washington, DC, Boston, 

Honolulu, Norfolk, and Seattle. 

Maryland: Maryland currently is engaged in an effort to finish the Maryland portion of the 

NCR evacuation plan. The MDSHA staff expects to complete this section no later than the 

fall 2010. Modifications will involve a different approach to how Maryland has prepared 

plans. Changes include adjusting the plan by considering employment sites that can be 

considered soft targets such as National Institutes of Health, the National Naval (Bethesda) 

Medical Center, as well as other large campuses and how to evacuate these sites. As these 

sites are large employers and some involve large patient populations, the plan will 

incorporate another level of complexity. For example, one site has 17,000 employees and 

another has 4,500. Further complicating the development of the evacuation plan is that two 

of these key sites are essentially across the street from each other, which could result in a 

bottleneck in the evacuation’s initial phase.

As part of how best to deal with large campuses, the plan currently under development will 

also incorporate pedestrian movement, vehicles, and on-campus traffic control points. 

Other new components that will be added include the use of transit assets as well as the use 

of pick-up points - if Metro is running – to allow transit users to walk from Metro rail to pickup points where they can board vehicles that will take them to reception centers.

Maryland coordinates its portion of the NCR plan with Virginia and the District. As part of 

the regional effort, the three jurisdictions are attempting to consolidate critical information 

into one database. To discuss common transportation concerns, MDOT, DDOT, and VDOT 

meet regularly. 
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Currently, the only two active evacuation plans include the Maryland DOT evacuation plan 

and the Virginia EMA evacuation plan. Maryland agreed that it was important that these two 

plans are coordinated and will work to do so in the future. Though the person interviewed 

from Maryland is a member of the NCR Emergency Managers Working Group, he was not 

aware that the Maryland plan is part of the NCR’s EMA plan. Maryland did note that the 

initial NCR plan lacks information on how best to address Traffic Control Points.

Maryland reviews, evaluates and updates their plan as budgets allowed. The accuracy of the 

plan depends on regular review by local agencies in order to update it based on changes in 

local roads. As a result, the State works with local agencies to ensure those updates, such 

as when a traffic control point changes. Maryland uses a regional GIS database to facilitate 

changes to the plan. Unfortunately, no such database exists that would allow Maryland, 

Virginia and the District to update the plan in one place or in a consistent way. 

The Maryland portion of the NCR regional plan goes beyond Maryland’s border to US-301 into 

Virginia; across the Bay Bridge to Delaware; and west to I-270 to wherever motorists choose 

to go. The plan also looks at traffic volumes and traffic patterns to understand how best to 

keep traffic on the Capital Beltway moving. An important aspect of the plan is that it is 

designed to restrict motorists from portions of the Beltway which may force people to go 

west on I-270 and then force them to go through Frederick or go further west in a very large 

loop before allowing them to go home. Another portion of the plan is to deny access onto 

the Beltway to those motorists exiting Washington, DC, on the Indian Head highway.

Virginia: Though no studies exist to verify this, Virginia estimates that should an evacuation 

occur, 70 percent of the traffic will not use the Interstates. Even if the exact percentage is 

unknown, what is known is that all usable routes will serve as evacuation routes. Interstates 

in the Virginia plan are the essential routes and every other route can be considered as a 

potential route. 

The State emergency manager provided the most recent Northern Virginia Evacuation Plan 

developed by the State EMA. The Virginia DOT has the lead to develop the transportation 

component of the VEMA Emergency Operations plan and, as such, works with VEMA to 

develop that portion also known as ESF-1 or transportation annex of VEMA’s State Evacuation 

Plan for Northern Virginia. The VDOT works closely with VEMA to determine the evacuation 

routes for the Interstate and the arterials. The VEMA as the lead State agency updates the 

State plan every 4 years with the next update expected in January 2013. In addition, VDOT 

is developing its transportation operations plan, which differs from the State’s evacuation 

plan, and expects that operations plan to be revised before the 2013 VEMA plan update is 

released. One updated component of the VDOT operations plan is transportation models. 

The VDOT will provide the updated section to VEMA once completed. The distinction 

between the two plans is that VEMA’s transportation plan is written at a strategic level, and 

the VDOT plan is more operational in its focus. The DHS funding that VEMA received enabled 

VDOT to do more comprehensive planning work for signal work for the arterials and the 

Interstate, as well as where to locate the more critical locations for the evacuations.
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The VDOT’s more detailed operational plan is constantly being updated as lessons learned 

are incorporated into the plan. As part of its constant review, the VDOT plan is revised 

based on the current level of equipment they have and, based on the funds VDOT has 

available, the technology they can purchase. As part of a mutual agreement, VEMA, as part 

of the team, reviews the VDOT proposal to the evacuation plan to make sure all of the 

agencies agree with the plan. In addition to coordinating with VEMA, VDOT also coordinates 

their plan with localities.

 

The VEMA’s State Evacuation Plan for Northern Virginia only addresses the NCR. Though the 

governor has approved the evacuation routes in the Northern Virginia plan to go as far west 

to I-66 and as far as Richmond to the south, if at all possible, VDOT would rather not 

evacuate people any further than a 30-mile range or to the boundary of the NCR. The VDOT 

portion of the plan has as its prime focus to evacuate people out of the District. As such, 

VDOT works with their regional partners and with 

FEMA on how to manage a no-notice event out of the 

District into Maryland and Virginia. 

With the understanding that an event in one part of 

the State will force them to move people away from 

the incident, VDOT has as part of its Tidewater plan 

to evacuate those residents into the NCR should a 

hurricane hit the southern part of the State. Should 

people need to be evacuated, it is the intent of the 

State that whenever possible to keep their citizens 

in the State. 

Top Highway Impediments

District, Maryland, and Virginia respondents identified 

the most significant impediments along NHS routes that 

may impact effective large-scale, mass evacuations from the NCR, as follows:

1. Regional GIS Database – The region would benefit from a database that consolidates all 

critical infrastructure and operational ability.

2. Traffic Signal Coordination on Arterials – Maryland and Virginia identified the coordination 

of traffic signals on arterial corridors as a critical deficiency.

3. Limited Roadway Capacity – The roadway network capacity in Northern Virginia would be 

exceeded in a mass evacuation. Limited capacity on bridges from Virginia to Maryland would 

also impede evacuations. Maryland also reports that choke points exist on return roads that 

may make the reentry after the event difficult. Bottlenecks exist on I-270 where the road 

narrows from six lanes to four lanes in some stretches.

4. Institutional Coordination – Northern Virginia could benefit from closer coordination among 

VDOT, law enforcement and local jurisdictions since VDOT must work with them to restrict 

traffic movement.

Top Highway Impediments

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION 

• Regional GIS Database

• Traffic Signal Coordination on 

Arterials

• Limited Roadway Capacity

• Institutional Coordination

• Communication Interoperability & 

Protocols 

• VIP Movements & Security
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U.S. Department of Transportation 76 of 108

5. Communication Interoperability and Protocols – Although VDOT does have interoperability 

capabilities, the agency does not yet have the ability to communicate among the multiple 

agencies needed to conduct a successful evacuation. The VDOT noted that they need 

protocols on how best to communicate among agencies including first responders.

6. VIP Movements and Security – The movement of key government officials, including the 

President of the United States—during an incident would create severe gridlock as security 

details impede the travel of other evacuees. To address these concerns, DDOT and its 

Federal partners recently worked through various scenarios that would involve the 

evacuation and movement of the President and how to implement different evacuation 

plans. Based on this exercise, DDOT recognizes that different streets within the District have 

different levels of importance. As the President moves on a daily basis, DDOT gains insight 

from a traffic-management perspective about how VIP movements will affect an evacuation. 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 77 of 108

Options for Accelerating Projects to Increase

Evacuation Capacity West of the National Capital

Region

Introduction

This section of the report examines how 

construction projects that would increase 

evacuation capacity on NHS evacuation routes 

west of the NCR could be accelerated. It differs 

from the preceding section in that it provides a 

discussion of options that may be further 

considered by State departments of 

transportation in Maryland, West Virginia, and 

Virginia to accelerate NHS construction projects 

discussed in this study. This portion of the 

report focuses only on routes leading westward 

from the confines of the NCR and provides:

• A description of the major NHS evacuation 

routes that lead westward from the NCR;

• Identification of large (often multi-phase) 

ongoing projects included in Capital 

Construction Plans and Statewide 

Transportation Improvement Programs 

(STIPs) and Transportation Improvement 

Programs (TIPs) in Maryland, Virginia, and 

West Virginia that could increase evacuation 

capacity on the major NHS evacuation routes 

west of the NCR; and 

• Identification of options for accelerating large (often multi-phase) ongoing projects that 

could increase evacuation capacity on NHS evacuation routes west of the NCR. 

For this section of the report, FHWA asked Federal, State, and regional highway contacts in 

Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia about specific NHS routes under major construction and 

suggestions on how to accelerate work on key projects. A list of those interviewed is included in 

Appendix 1.

Background

In order to understand the scope of this report, a description of both the NCR and the NHS are 

provided. In addition, existing (pre-study) information on the issue of evacuating west of the 

NCR is provided.
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The National Capital Region: Various definitions exist for the area referred to as the NCR. 

In order to analyze and describe options for accelerating construction projects to the west of the 

NCR, this report: (1) adopts one definition for the NCR, and (2) identifies the NHS roads that 

will be analyzed for this report. The FHWA selected the definition established by the DHS’s 

NCRC for the NCR. 

Congress established the geographic definition used 

in this report pursuant to the National Capital 

Planning Act of 1952, 40 USC 71. The Act defines 

the NCR as the District of Columbia; Montgomery and 

Prince George’s counties in the State of Maryland; 

Arlington, Fairfax, Loudon, and Prince William 

counties in the Commonwealth of Virginia; and all 

cities existing in Maryland or Virginia within the 

geographic area bounded by the outer boundaries of 

the combined area of these counties. Today, the 

NCR includes the District of Columbia plus 11 local 

jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the 

Commonwealth of Virginia. (See map)

The MWCOG9

 9 The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, or MWCOG, constitutes a regional organization of Washington-area local governments 

comprising 21 local governments surrounding the nation’s capital, plus area members of the Maryland and Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, 

and the U.S. House of Representatives. MWCOG provides a focus for action and develops regional responses to such issues as the environment, 

affordable housing, economic development, health and family concerns, human services, population growth, public safety, and transportation.

defines the NCR differently. It 

specifically includes the city of Frederick and 

National Capital Region Facts

2,500 square miles 

11 local jurisdictions, the State of 

Maryland, Commonwealth of Virginia, and the 

District of Columbia 

3 branches of Federal Government (executive, 

judicial, legislative) 

271 Federal departments and agencies 

340,000 Federal workers 

Over 5 million residents 

More than 20 million visitors annually 

4th largest U.S metropolitan area 

Gross Regional Product (GRP) of nearly $288.3 

billion (4th nationally) 

Headquarters for the World Bank, the 

International Monetary Fund and the 

Organization for American States 

Over 2,100 non-profit organizations 

More than 40 colleges and universities –

over 130,000 students annually 

2nd largest rail transit system and the 

5th largest bus network in the U.S. 

2 major airports serving more than 40 million 

passengers a year 

Source: DHS/FEMA Office of National Capital Region 

Coordination

Montgomery County District of 

Columbia

Loudoun County

Arlington County

Alexandria

Fairfax County

Prince William 

County

Prince 

George’s 

County
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U.S. Department of Transportation 79 of 108

Frederick County, Maryland. For the purposes of this report, the congressionally mandated 

definition was adopted, so Frederick County is considered west of the NCR.

The National Highway System: The NHS is approximately 160,000 miles (256,000 

kilometers) of roadway important to the Nation’s economy, defense, and mobility. The NHS 

includes the following subsystems of roadways10:

• Interstate: The Eisenhower Interstate System of highways retains its separate identity within 

the NHS. 

• Other NHS Routes: These are highways in rural and urban areas which provide access 

between an arterial and a major port, airport, public transportation facility, or other 

intermodal transportation facility.

• Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET): This is a network of highways which are important 

to the United States’ strategic defense policy and which provide defense access, continuity 

and emergency capabilities for defense purposes. 

• Major STRAHNET Connectors: These are highways which provide access between major 

military installations and highways which are part of the STRAHNET. 

• Intermodal Connectors: These highways provide access between major intermodal facilities 

and the other four subsystems making up the NHS. 

The NHS was developed by the DOT in cooperation with the States, local officials, and MPOs. 

The FHWA Office of Planning offers maps of the NHS on its Web site at www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/nhs/.

This report focuses on the portion of the NHS that extends westward from the NCR. To 

understand what routes evacuees would take from the NCR, an understanding of the NHS roads 

that cover each area is necessary. 

In addition, a brief description of the Appalachian Development Highway System (ADHS) is 

being provided as one of its corridors, Corridor H from the Virginia State line to Elkins, 

West Virginia, will be included in the analysis to identify options for accelerating large (often 

multi-phase) ongoing construction projects that could increase evacuation capacity on NHS 

evacuation routes west of the NCR. The ADHS was created by the Appalachian Regional 

Development Act of 1965. Its purpose was to provide a system of development highways and 

access roads which would contribute to economic development opportunities in the Appalachian 

regions of 13 States—Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North 

Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. 

West Virginia has six corridors (D, E, G, H, L, and Q) on its portion of the ADHS. The only 

unfinished ADHS corridor in West Virginia is Corridor H. 

Evacuating the Populations Westward from the NCR: After monitoring evacuations of 

New Orleans and Houston resulting from the 2005 hurricanes Katrina and Rita, West Virginia 

officials expressed concern regarding the potential effect of westward-moving evacuees from 

the NCR that would enter the State. West Virginia authorities raised their concerns about 

 10 A specific highway route may be on more than one subsystem.
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U.S. Department of Transportation 80 of 108

the impact of an NCR evacuation at a number of All Hazards Consortium meetings during the 

past several years11. In 2005, the State of West Virginia commissioned an Urban-to-Rural (U2R) 

Task Force12 to address the potential for receiving populations evacuating from the NCR 

including Northern Virginia and Maryland in response to an evacuation order. In September 

2006, the West Virginia U2R Evacuation State Planners Workshop was held with key participants 

from surrounding States to discuss evacuation routes leading into West Virginia. During the 

workshop, the West Virginia EMA shared findings from a survey conducted by West Virginia 

University which included identification of target destinations for those selecting to selfevacuate in the event of a natural disaster in the Washington, DC, metro area. As shown in the 

figure, the survey found approximately 33 percent would potentially evacuate to or through 

West Virginia. 

However, Maryland 

and Virginia believe 

that West Virginia 

will be minimally 

affected by an 

evacuation from the 

NCR. In 2005, the 

University of Virginia 

conducted a poll of 

1,071 NCR 

households to 

determine if 

residents would 

practice community 

shielding, or staying 

in place while 

responders deliver 

supplies to the 

affected area, if 

attacked with a dirty 

bomb or a biological agent.13 Virginia, Maryland, and District officials interviewed for this study 

note that most events would cause NCR residents to shelter-in-place, not evacuate. For 

example, a detonation of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosive (CBRNE) device, 

such as may be used during a terrorist attack or other malevolent event, would result in a 

shelter-in-place order until first responders determine the hazards and if an evacuation is 

warranted. For those that would evacuate, the University of Virginia study found that 

approximately 40 percent would evacuate to Virginia, 31 percent to Maryland, and less than 3 

percent to West Virginia.14

 11 The All-Hazards Consortium helps create new resources and funding opportunities for the States to support regional multistate collaboration 

efforts among its stakeholders from government, private sector, higher education and non-profit/volunteer organizations. Member States include: 

the Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia 12 The U2R Task Force included representatives from the WV State police, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), American Red Cross, 

School board authorities, and WVDOT. 13 Community Shielding in the National Capital Region: A Survey of Citizen Response to Potential Critical Incidents, Prepared for the Critical 

Incident Analysis Group University of Virginia National Capital Region Project June 2005 14 NCR Behavioral Survey: Behavioral Aspects of Sheltering and Evacuation Planning for the National Capital Region – Preliminary Results 

December 18, 2009 – Slide Presentation, Center for Survey Research, University of Virginia, slide number 66. 
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Methodology

The FHWA assembled a team that included more than 15 technical experts from the FHWA 

Division office in the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia (See Appendix 1). 

The group’s charge was to:

1. Identify NHS roads that would qualify for this study, e.g., corridors leading west from the 

NCR,

2. Analyze NHS projects west of the NCR currently under construction that could increase 

evacuation capacity, and 

3. Provide options to accelerate NHS projects under construction.

Assumptions: To delineate parameters for the study, the following assumptions were used:

• Since the study specified westward movement, the following corridor routes were not 

considered:

o north/south routes leading through Maryland into Pennsylvania, 

o north/south routes through Virginia into North Carolina, and 

o eastbound routes through Maryland or Virginia into eastern Maryland or Delaware.

• The requirements of the study specified examination of projects west of the NCR. However, 

there are some large projects within the boundaries of the NCR (including Fairfax and 

Loudoun counties) that have the potential to increase evacuation capacity west of the NCR. 

Discussion of such projects, and options to accelerate them, are not included in this report.

• The study called for a review of “how highway system projects currently under construction 

west of the NCR could increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity.” Large construction projects, 

that increase system capacity, can often consist of multiple smaller projects (or phases) that 

are advanced based on availability of funding. In this study, projects (or phases of large 

multi-phase projects) were identified and options for accelerating each were provided, 

depending on where in project development cycle it currently stands. 

• In terms of providing a “detailed plan to accelerate such projects,” a list of specific options 

the State has considered, or plans to consider, to accelerate construction, or time to 

construction, for each ongoing project (or phase of a large multi-phase project) was 

developed.

Identification of Routes for Study: FHWA reviewed the areas considered outside and to 

the west of the NCR and NHS routes in the following counties:

• Virginia: Albemarle, Alleghany, Augusta, Bath, Clarke, Culpeper, Fauquier, Frederick, 

Greene, Highland, Madison, Nelson, Orange, Page, Rappahannock, Rockbridge, Rockingham, 

Shenandoah and Warren.

• Maryland: Allegany, Frederick, Garrett, and Washington.

 
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U.S. Department of Transportation 82 of 108

• West Virginia: Barbour, Clarksburg, Grant, Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hardy, Jefferson, 

Marion, Monongalia, Pendleton, Pocahontas, Preston, Randolph, Tucker, and Upshur.

Identification of Construction Projects: After selecting the corridors that met the above 

criteria, Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia STIPs and TIPs, were collected and reviewed. 

Based on this initial information, planning staff in all three FHWA Division Offices were asked to

provide additional information (description, location, phasing, scope, etc.) for ongoing projects 

(or phases of large multi-phase projects) west of the NCR that could increase evacuation 

capacity on key NHS routes.

Identification of Options to Accelerate Construction: Through its research and 

interviews, FHWA obtained information offered through the plans and interviewed officials on 

opportunities to accelerate construction projects on the various NHS roads that form an 

evacuation corridor. These opportunities would accelerate construction on the corridor routes, 

thus potentially expanding the capacity for evacuees to flow westward if parts of the NCR were 

ordered to evacuate. The team interviewed officials, including engineers and planners, from the 

FHWA Division Offices, State DOTs, and the MPOs in Maryland, Virginia and West Virginia. Since 

most of the opportunities to accelerate construction depend on innovative means to carry out 

project financing, project development, and contract administration, the research team 

consulted with numerous FHWA, MDSHA, VDOT, and WVDOT specialists in order to identify viable 

options for the identified projects. The FHWA has been a leader in identifying and advocating 

the use of contract administration and project finance options to accelerate construction time 

on all highway projects, with particular focus on large, complex and often multi-phased 

projects. 

Findings

This section includes the results of the study, including a map and description of the key NHS 

evacuation routes west of the NCR, a description of the ongoing highway projects (or phases of 

large multi-phase projects) on each of these routes that could increase evacuation capacity, and 

a listing and discussion of options that have been, or will be, considered to accelerate 

construction, or time to construction, on these projects.

The NHS Evacuation Routes: The FHWA’s Office of Planning produced a map to aid in 

visualizing the routes under study for this report. This map identifies the location of four key 

NHS evacuation routes that lead NCR residents westward away from the region. 

Northern Route: I-270 (MD) to I-70 (MD) to I-68 (MD) to I-68 (WV) 

• I-270 (MD) is a four-lane freeway (two lanes in each direction) from Montgomery County line 

to I-70 with interchanges located at MD80, MD85, and I-70. 

• I-70 (MD) is a four-lane freeway between its interchange with I-270 in Frederick County and 

its interchange with I-68 in Washington County.

• I-68 (MD & WV) is a four-lane limited access highway between I-79 at Morgantown, 

West Virginia, and I-70 at Hancock, Maryland. I-68 handles westerly traffic to/from the 

Baltimore-Washington area, heading to the Ohio Valley and west.
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Central Route: I-66 (VA) to I-81 (VA) to the Appalachian Corridor H Alignment (VA 55 and 

WV 55)

• I-66 is a four-lane limited access highway.

• I-81 is a four-lane limited access highway and is used in this routing for about 4 miles 

between exit 300 (I-66) and exit 296 (VA 55). 

• VA 55 (the eastern most portion of the Appalachian Corridor H Alignment) has limited 

capacity as it is a two-lane road. Traffic volumes are low at only about 5,000 vehicles per 

day (vpd). There are currently no planned capacity improvements along this portion of the 

corridor. This situation diminishes the effectiveness of this alternative as a key NHS 

evacuation route into western Virginia and destinations further west.

• WV 55 and the West Virginia portion of the Appalachian Corridor H Alignment. This portion of 

the alternative is being constructed in several separate projects (or phases). Two of the nine 

projects (or phases) have been completed and are open for traffic. When complete, the 

facility will be a four-lane limited access divided highway with roughly two breaks in access 

per direction per mile. Somewhat similar to the comment above regarding VA 55, this 

situation (seven incomplete Corridor H project [or phases]) diminishes the effectiveness of 

this path as a key NHS evacuation route into West Virginia and destinations further west.

Southern Route A: I-66 (VA) to I-81 (VA) to I-64 (VA) to I-64 (WV) 

• I-66 is a four-lane limited access highway. 
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• I-81 is a four-lane limited access highway between I-66 (exit 300) and I-64 west at Lexington 

(exit 191). It is a significant freight corridor, with trucks accounting for 30 percent of total 

traffic on I-81 between Lexington and Staunton (I-64 overlap section). 

• I-64 from Charlottesville to the West Virginia State line is a four-lane limited access 

highway.

• I-64 between the Virginia State line and its intersection with I-77 near Beckley, WV, is a 

66-mile, four-lane rural Interstate. Approximately 50 percent of the corridor was 

constructed in the early 1970s with the remainder completed and opened to traffic in 1988.

Traffic counts range from 13,000 vpd to 23,000 vpd. Traffic volumes are higher nearer to 

Beckley (MP 118 to MP 125) and in the vicinity of Lewisburg and White Sulphur Springs (MP 

156 to MP 170). Generally, bridge clearances all meet or exceed standards. There are 12 

interchanges along this section, all servicing small towns and smaller rural roads.

Southern Route B: US 29 (VA) to I-64 (VA) to I-64 (WV) 

• US 29 is a divided highway (between four and eight lanes) between Gainesville and I-64 in 

Charlottesville. Sections of US 29 around Culpeper and Charlottesville are limited access 

facilities. There are sections of US 29 in the Charlottesville area carrying more than 50,000 

vpd. Similar traffic volumes exist on US 29 near Gainesville. Currently, there are no planned 

capacity improvements on US 29.

• I-64 from Charlottesville to the West Virginia State line is a four-lane limited access 

highway. It runs jointly with I-81 from Staunton to Lexington. 

• I-64 between the Virginia State line and its intersection with I-77 near Beckley, WV is a 

66-mile, four-lane rural Interstate. Approximately 50 percent of the corridor was 

constructed in the early 1970s with the remainder completed and opened to traffic in 1988.

Traffic counts range from 13,000 vpd to 23,000 vpd. Traffic volumes are higher nearer to 

Beckley (MP 118 to MP 125) and in the vicinity of Lewisburg and White Sulphur Springs (MP 

156 to MP 170). Generally, bridge clearances all meet or exceed standards. There are 12 

interchanges along this section, all servicing small towns and smaller rural roads.

 

The FHWA gathered and analyzed information on ongoing highway projects (or phases of large 

multi-phase projects) west of the NCR that had the potential to increase evacuation capacity. 

This analysis revealed no ongoing projects (or phases of large multi-phase projects) that have 

the potential to increase evacuation capacity on either of the two southern routes (US 29 to 

I-64 and I-66 to I-81 to I-64). Therefore, FHWA dropped both of these two routes from 

further analysis, leaving only the Northern Route and the Central Route for consideration. 

The Construction Projects: State and local agency highway contacts identified two large 

multi-phase ongoing projects on the Northern Route and the Central Route that could increase 

capacity for NCR evacuees to travel westward. 

Northern Route: I-270 (MD) to I-70 (MD) to I-68 (MD) to I-68 (WV) 

• Project #1 - I-70 Phase 4 Project in Frederick County: I-70 is planned to be widened in the 

westbound and eastbound direction to construct a third travel lane in each direction from MD 

85 to MD 144 to meet current highway standards. The project is located in Frederick County, 

Maryland, and extends from I-270 to Mt. Phillip Road. This project is currently on hold due to 

lack of funding. The project is currently in the STIP, and the environmental document for 

Phase 4 is complete. However, due to traffic growth and land use changes, a possible 

reevaluation of the environmental document and the proposed design may be needed. An 
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inside widening of I-70 is being considered. Estimated project cost is $90 million, and 

construction timeframe is 2018 to 2020.

Central Route: I-66 (VA) to I-81 (VA) to the Appalachian Corridor H Alignment (VA 55 and 

WV 55)

• Project #2 - Corridor H (Bismarck to Forman Phase): This section is partially under 

construction. The WV Department of Highways (DOH) approved an amended Record of 

Decision (ROD) in May 2001. Final design is underway for the 14.5-mile Bismarck to Forman 

section in Grant County. Portions of this section have some ongoing construction activity, 

and the remaining sections are included in the approved STIP. The WVDOH anticipates that 

the Bismarck to Foreman section of Corridor H will be completed in late 2013. Estimated 

cost for this phase is $260 million (2007 dollars).15

• Project #3 - Corridor H (Davis to Bismarck Phase): The environmental and design 

components of this portion of Corridor H have been completed. The remaining preconstruction issue to resolve is the purchase of right-of-way from corporate land holders.

The project is currently in the STIP, and the amended ROD was completed in April 2001. 

Final design is underway for the 16.2-mile Davis to Bismarck section in Tucker and Grant 

Counties. A contract, including a bridge, west of Bismarck is anticipated to be advertised in 

early 2010. Estimated cost for this phase is $215 million (2007 dollars), and construction 

timeframe is 2012 to 2015.

• Project #4 - Corridor H (Kerens to Parsons Phase): The Kerens to Parsons section of 

Corridor H is located almost entirely within the Monongahela National Forest. The FHWA and 

the WVDOH are working with the United States Forest Service, to finalize the alignment.

Final design for the 15.5-mile section through Randolph and Tucker Counties is anticipated to 

begin in 2014. This project is currently in the long-range plan, and the WVDOH anticipates 

that the Kerens-to-Parsons section will begin construction in 2018. Estimated cost for this 

phase is $350 million (2007 dollars). 

• Project #5 - Corridor H (Parsons to Davis Phase): The environmental work for this 10-mile 

section is not complete. As part of a court-approved Corridor H Settlement Agreement that 

allowed other phases of the corridor to advance, a Supplemental Environmental Impact 

Statement was performed on this section. The FHWA is working with WVDOH to complete 

the environmental process, allowing for the execution of an amended ROD. Estimated cost 

of this phase is $150 million (2007 dollars), and design component is expected to be 

completed between 2025 and 2031. 

• Project #6 - Corridor H (Wardensville to VA State Line Phase): The FHWA approved the 

amended ROD on the 6.8-mile section of Corridor H connecting Wardensville to the Virginia 

State line on May 16, 2003. Final design of the section through Hardy County is anticipated 

to begin in 2020. Construction tentatively is scheduled to begin in 2027. However, the 

Corridor H Settlement Agreement places certain restrictions on WVDOH’s ability to advance 

this phase of the project. As a part of the settlement agreement, construction of this 

section would be postponed for 20 years until certain traffic conditions are met. If traffic 

increases on WV 55 meet the agreed to threshold and evacuation strategies suggest an 

increased need, this section could potentially be accelerated in the funding plan for Corridor 

 15 June 27, 2007 letter from WVDOH to FHWA regarding Financial Plan for APD Corridor H
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H. However, as mentioned earlier in this report, without a plan to construct the VA 55 

portion of Corridor H, the effectiveness of evacuating along the Central NHS route would be 

diminished as a viable option to increase evacuation capacity into West Virginia. Estimated 

cost of this phase is $63 million (2007 dollars) and is not expected to begin construction until 

beyond the 2027 to 2031 timeframe. 

Options to Accelerate Construction: During the interviews and research, FHWA found 

that both the MDSHA and the WVDOH are both planning to consider and use some of the 

innovative project finance and contract administration options available to all States to 

accelerate construction on all six of the projects (or phases of large multi-phase projects)

identified above. The following includes: (1) the myriad of tools available to them to accelerate 

construction, and (2) suggested tools that are appropriate to the six projects (or phases of large 

multi-phase projects) described above.

1. General Project Finance and Contract Administration Options: There are 

numerous Project Finance and Contract Administration tools available to States. These options 

are listed below.

• Project Finance Options: With the demand for highway improvements exceeding 

funding resources nationwide, State governments have adopted techniques that move the 

financing process from a single strategy of Federal funding on a grant reimbursement basis to 

a diversified approach that reduces the time to get projects underway and extends, or 

leverages, the value of existing resources. This approach includes Federal-aid grant 

management techniques that can be used separately or in conjunction with project finance 

tools that raise upfront dollars through the incurrence of debt. 

Decisions about project finance are sometimes combined with decisions about project 

procurement, such as the contract administration options shown below. In most 

procurement processes, the public sector retains control of – and most of the risk associated 

with – the project. Public-Private Partnerships (P3) offer an alternative procurement method 

that shifts more control and risk, together with more potential reward, to the private sector. 

As such, the public sponsor must assess multiple objectives when considering whether a 

project is suitable for a P3 approach.

Project finance is typically used for large capital projects in cases where using “pay-as-yougo” does not make good planning and programming sense; that is, because the project’s 

capital needs would consume most if not all available funding – and still often fall short of 

being fully funded. Further, given long-term benefits of transportation infrastructure, it can 

be economically sound to spread the project costs over the asset’s life-cycle. 

However, project finance comes at a cost, because interest is paid over the long-term for the 

money that is borrowed today. To borrow money, of course, the creditor must identify a 

repayment source. This can require the development and imposition of a new revenue 

source to pay back bonds or loans issued to support investment.

Potential Sources of Revenue to Support Project Financing: Non-Federal revenue sources 

can be categorized into several broad areas, within which can be found many options.
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• User Fees: This fundamental tool raises revenues directly from the transportation system 

user. A commonly utilized user fee is a toll, collected from drivers for use of a specific 

facility such as a limited access highway, bridge, or tunnel. Tolls can be fixed or 

variable.

• State/Local Taxes: These are often dedicated taxes, subject to voter approval, to 

support specific transportation investment. Local-option sales, vehicle or property taxes 

are often used to fund transportation.

• Value Capture: This approach attempts to capture some of the increase in value due to 

the infrastructure improvement. Revenues can be in the form of one-time charges, or 

impact fees, on the new development that requires the infrastructure improvement. Tax 

increments capture the increase in property value resulting from the development 

facilitated by the infrastructure. Specific development contributions (or exactions) for 

land, in-kind donations, or services can be negotiated as part of the development 

permitting process. 

Federal-aid Grants Management Techniques: Existing law affords States much flexibility in 

managing Federal-aid highway funds. Although State and local governments typically must 

provide 20 percent of the funding for projects benefiting from Federal-aid, flexibility exists 

to ease restrictions on the timing of obligations and reimbursements and to create a range of 

options for meeting matching requirements. In addition to the challenge of obtaining fund 

sources, States and other project sponsors have to align the flow of projects with the 

availability of local funding. Grant management mechanisms provide cash flow tools that 

help to leverage Federal funding and expedite projects.

• Advance Construction (AC) and Partial Conversion of Advance Construction (PCAC): 

AC construction and PCAC are cash flow management tools that allow States to begin 

projects with their own funds and only later convert these projects to Federal assistance. 

Advance construction allows a State to request and receive approval to construct Federalaid projects in advance of the apportionment of authorized Federal-aid funds. Under AC, 

States typically "convert" projects to Federal-aid once sufficient Federal-aid funds and 

obligation authority are available, and do so all at once. Under PCAC, a State may 

obligate funds in phases, including the annual repayment of debt service in conjunction 

with the issuance of Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicle (GARVEE) debt (see below).

• Flexible Match: A wide variety of public and private contributions can be counted 

toward the 20 percent State/local match for Federal-aid projects. In practice, this 

flexibility has been achieved primarily through use other Federal funds or third party 

donations as sources of the matching funds.

• Tapered Match: A project's Federal share can vary from year to year as long as the final 

amount of the Federal contribution does not exceed the project's maximum authorized 

share. The tapered match technique allows States to vary the required matching ratio 

over the life of a project. For example, the Federal share could start out at 100 percent 

and taper off to zero as the project nears completion.

• Toll Credits (Soft Match): States can substitute certain previous toll-financed 

investments for State matching funds on current Federal-aid projects, providing the nonFederal share of a project's cost through a "soft match" of toll credits. By allowing States 
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to use toll revenues when other State highway funds are not available to meet nonFederal, share-matching requirements, toll credits help States use existing resources 

more effectively. In most cases, the Federal share of a project can be increased 

effectively to 100 percent.

• Transfers between States: This option allows a State to transfer, without repayment, 

funds appropriated or allocated under Title 23 to another State to finance a project 

eligible for assistance with those funds under provisions in Title 23 Section 104(k)(3). The 

States would be required to document their concurrence in a transfer agreement.

• Advances between States: This option would allow one State to advance funding to 

another and have the funds returned in the future, similar to the process used by the 

Forest Highway Program (an allocated program). However, this option would require 

congressional action for use on ADHS-funded projects.

• Transfers between Projects: This option allows a State to advance a project from a 

program, under which the project would be eligible, and later restore these funds under 

provisions in SAFETEA-LU, P.L. 109-59, Section 1936. Since ADHS funds aren’t included 

under Section 1936, this option would require congressional action for use on ADHS 

funded projects. 

Federal Credit Programs: The FHWA can also provide direct credit assistance to project 

sponsors or allow State DOTs to loan Federal-aid funds for projects. These credit programs 

can provide critical sources of financing for projects assembling a variety of funding sources.

• Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA): The TIFIA Credit 

Program provides Federal assistance in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and 

standby lines of credit to finance surface transportation projects of national and regional 

significance. Eligible project costs, of which TIFIA can provide up to 33 percent of 

funding, must equal at least $50 million. A TIFIA borrower must pledge repayment with 

dedicated revenue sources such as tolls, user fees, special assessments (taxes), or other 

non-Federal sources.

• State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs): SIBs are State-run revolving funds that provide loans, 

credit enhancements, and other forms of non-grant assistance to surface transportation 

projects. The SIB Program allows States to capitalize loan funds with regularly 

apportioned Federal-aid highway funds.

• Section 129 Loans: Section 129 (a)(7) of Title 23 allows States to lend apportioned 

Federal-aid highway funds to toll and non-toll projects generating dedicated revenue 

streams. Revenue sources can include tolls, excise taxes, sales taxes, real property 

taxes, incremental property taxes, and motor vehicle taxes.

Bonds/Debt Financing: Federal programs also support borrowing from the capital markets, 

either by allowing borrowers to pledge anticipated Federal-aid funding to secure public debt 

GARVEEs or by providing special tax status that lowers financing costs. If permitted by State 

law, project sponsors can use Federal-aid funds to repay debt via contracts that may involve 

private entities, such as contractors.
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• Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEEs): A GARVEE is a debt instrument—such 

as a bond, note, certificate, mortgage, or lease—whereby a State DOT pledges its future 

Federal-aid funds as a source of repayment. When implementing a GARVEE, the State 

uses these Federal-aid dollars to pay debt service, rather than construction costs funded 

with the debt proceeds. The State uses partial conversion of AC (see above) in order to 

obligate funds as debt service becomes due. A GARVEE is an obligation of the State, not 

the Federal Government.

• Performance-based Payments: In keeping with its transfer of risk to the private sector, 

a P3 transaction can feature a schedule of payments to a concessionaire that combine 

aspects of debt service with requirements for performance. Federal-aid funds may be 

used to pay the capital, or principal, portion of payment installments for:

o Availability Payments: Regularly scheduled payments to a concessionaire, or private 

contractor, based on meeting project milestones or performance standards.

o Shadow Tolls: Also known as “pass-through” tolls, these regularly scheduled 

payments are based on actual usage of the facility built and/or managed by the 

concessionaire.

• Private Activity Bonds (PABs): PABs are debt instruments issued by State or local 

governments where the proceeds are used to finance a public use project either 

developed by a private entity, or featuring significant private involvement. Providing 

private developers and operators with access to tax-exempt interest rates considerably 

lowers their cost of capital. The SAFETEA-LU amended the Internal Revenue Code to add 

highway and freight transfer facilities among eligible projects, and provided the Secretary 

of Transportation the authority to allocate up to $15 billion in PAB authority for such 

projects. Using a conduit public issuer, the private entity finances the project and is 

responsible for debt service on the PABs.

• 63-20 Issuance: State and local governments can issue tax-exempt debt through 

nonprofit corporations created pursuant to Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Revenue Ruling 

63-20. Bond proceeds issued by the nonprofit corporation can be used by private 

developers to finance and build transportation facilities. The 63-20 conduit issuance can 

be used to finance a transportation project when there is both a reasonable expectation 

of future user fee/toll revenues to repay the bonds and no alternative public issuer. A 

63-20 credit does not count toward State or local government statutory debt limitations, 

providing access to debt for a project that has a dedicated revenue source, such as user 

fees.

• Build America Bonds (BABs): The February 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment 

Act (ARRA) authorized these taxable bonds, which are eligible for an interest payment 

subsidy paid directly from the U.S. Treasury. States and local governments can issue 

BABs through December 2010, and proposals to extend this date appear to have 

legislative support. Surface transportation projects are among other public infrastructure 

projects (public buildings, courthouses, schools, water and sewer projects, etc.) eligible 

for BAB financing, which because of its direct Federal subsidy may result in net lower 

interest costs than a comparable tax-exempt bond.
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• Contract Administration Options: States have at their disposal a number of contract 

administration tools that may be used to plan and accelerate construction on NHS routes. 

These include the following:

• Construction-Manager-at-Risk: The vertical building industry has been using a 

contracting technique called construction-manager-at-risk for many years. Under this 

procedure, an owner selects a design and construction management consultant on the 

basis of qualifications, experience, fees for management services and prices for the 

target cost of construction as well as an estimated ceiling price. The consultant then 

proceeds with the preliminary design. At some point in the design process (typically at 

the 60 to 90 percent design completion), the owner and the consultant will agree on a 

guaranteed maximum price for the construction of the project. Many owners favor this 

contracting technique as it gives them greater control of the design process, yet it still 

provides for innovation and constructability recommendations in the design phase.

• Cost-Plus-Time Bidding: Cost-plus-time bidding, more commonly referred to as the A+B 

method, involves time, with an associated cost, in the low bid determination. Under the 

A+B method, each bid submitted consists of two components:

o The “A” component is the traditional bid for the contract items and is the dollar 

amount for all work to be performed under the contract. 

o The “B” component is a “bid” of the total number of calendar days required to 

complete the project by the bidder. (Calendar days are used to avoid any potential for 

controversy which may arise if work days were used.) 

The bid for award consideration is based on a combination of the bid for the contract 

items and the associated cost of the time, according to the formula: (A) + (B x Road User 

Cost/Day). This formula is used only to determine the lowest bid for award and is not 

used to determine payment to the contractor. The contractor's estimate for the 

completion of critical work becomes the contract time, and an Incentive/Disincentive 

provision is usually used to keep the bidding-playing field level. 

• Design-Build: The design-build concept allows the contractor maximum flexibility for 

innovation in the selection of design, materials and construction methods. With designbuild procurement, the contracting agency identifies the end result parameters and 

establishes the design criteria. The prospective bidders then develop design proposals 

that optimize their construction abilities. The submitted proposals may be rated by the 

contracting agency on factors such as design quality, timeliness, management capability, 

and cost. These factors may be used to adjust the bids for the purpose of awarding the 

contract.

• Design-Build-Maintain (Operate): Several States have initiated design-build-operatemaintain projects. Adding operational maintenance to the Design-Build process, this 

method is often incorporated into toll roads/toll agreements. 

• Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) Provisions for Early Contract Completion: The I/D 

provisions for early completion are intended to motivate the contractor to complete the 

work on or ahead of schedule. It allows a contracting agency to compensate a contractor 

a certain amount of money for each day identified that critical work is completed ahead 

of schedule and assess a deduction for each day the contractor overruns the I/D time. 

The contracting agency specifies the time required for critical work and uses this 
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provision for those critical projects where traffic inconvenience and delays are to be held 

to a minimum. The I/D amounts are based upon estimates of such items as traffic safety, 

traffic maintenance and road user delay costs. Some States have used a variation of the 

incentive/disincentive provision that provides a variable I/D amount relative to the time 

of early or late completion. For example, a larger incentive is provided for a 10-day early 

completion than for a one-day early completion.

• Interim Completion Dates: Interim completion dates are a means of encouraging the 

early completion of a specific phase of a contract such as a ramp, an interchange or 

another component of a larger construction contract. The particular phase or component 

should be selected with great caution as this will impact the scheduling of the overall 

project.

• Multi-Parameter Bidding including Quality (A+B+Q Bidding): Similar to cost-plus-time 

bidding, this concept envisions a contracting system where a bidder would bid the cost 

for completing the work -A, the time for completing critical work –B (optional), and the 

level of quality or performance that would be achieved over a specified period of time -

Q. A warranty bond or a method of making payment in future years would be necessary 

to implement this system. 

• No Excuse Incentives: “No Excuse Incentive” (NEI) clause, also known as No Excuses 

Bonus16 contracts give the contractor an incentive to complete the contract work on 

time. The contractor is given a “drop-dead date” for completion of a phase of work or 

the entire project. If the work is completed in advance of this date, the contractor will 

receive a bonus. There are no excuses, such as weather delays, for not making the 

completion date. On the other hand, there are no disincentives (other than normal 

liquidated damages) for not meeting the completion date.

• Stipulated Sum: Stipulated, or lump, sum payment is commonly used for design-build 

contracts, but has been increasingly applied to traditional low-bid highway contracts for 

various bid items and more recently for contracts involving categories of work that lend 

themselves more to lump sum pricing. In contrast to a traditional unit-priced bid item, 

the DOT will not provide quantity estimates for lump sum items in the bid package. The 

plan sheets for a lump sum project typically will not include detailed quantity tables. 

The contractor is responsible for developing quantity take-offs from the plans for 

estimating a lump sum item or items for a project.

• Lane Rental: Lane rental is a contract provision that incentivizes contractors to schedule 

and work during non-peak periods by charging rental fees for lane and shoulder use, with 

higher fees during peak periods. This technique is similar to the A+B (cost-plus-time) 

technique in that contractors bidding on a lane rental project determine the number of 

days lanes will be closed during work and use this determination in their bid process. The 

owner will add the total lane rental bid to the standard bid to decide the award. Awarded 

contractors using more lane rental days than bid will be charged lane rental fees.

 16 The term incentive is preferred rather than ‘bonus.’ The incentive amount should be based on a public savings for opening the project early 

(road user cost, or other as appropriate). The term bonus implies something paid in addition to what is expected - sometimes not having a basis in 

cost or benefit.
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• Partnering: The owner should include a formal partnering item in the contract 

documents to ensure that all parties understand the requirements of the project and to 

foster relationships that facilitate resolving issues that arise during the project. 

Discussions should include contingency plans to address potential problems such as 

insufficient equipment, equipment breakdowns, inclement weather, and inexperienced 

personnel, as well as logistical issues related to timing of materials, equipment, public 

notices, and multiple moves within the same window.

2. Specific Project Options to Accelerate Construction West of the NCR:

During the interviews and research, FHWA found that the MDSHA and the WVDOH both plan 

to consider and use some of the innovative project finance and contract administration 

options available to accelerate construction on all six of the projects identified above. 

Maryland Projects: The MDSHA typically considers a wide range of options to accelerate 

large projects. Examples of specific accelerated construction techniques anticipated for the 

I-270/US-15 and I-70 projects at this time include: 

• Advance Construction: I-70 Phase 4

• Partial Conversion of Advance Construction: I-70 Phase 4

• Toll Credits: I-70 Phase 4

• Cost-Plus-Time: I-70 Phase 4

• Design-Build: I-70 Phase 4

• I/D Provisions for Early Contract Completion: I-70 Phase 4

• Stipulated Sum: I-70 Phase 4

• Project Phasing: I-70 Phase 4

• Partnering: I-70 Phase 4

The MDSHA is using TIFIA financing for its Intercounty Connector (ICC) Major Project. However, 

those interviewed indicated that the State of Maryland would probably be reluctant to 

aggressively pursue additional innovative financing options, such as GARVEE Bonding, TIFIA, 

tolling, express toll lanes, etc., to accelerate construction on the two projects at this time due 

to State budget constraints, but such options would likely be considered as part of the normal 

project development and programming process for each project. 

West Virginia Projects: Like MDSHA, WVDOH typically considers a wide range of options to 

accelerate construction of large projects. The WVDOH authorities and their partners 

participating in this study discussed other options they have considered, or will consider, to 

accelerate work on this portion of the NHS. Many of the suggestions reflect innovative project 

financing options. However, West Virginia traffic volumes, and lack of an independent revenue 

source, do not support strategies such as tolling, TIFIA, SIBs, and PABs. Examples of specific 

accelerated construction financing and contract administration techniques anticipated for 

Corridor H projects at this time include: 

• Advanced Construction

• Partial Conversion of Advance Construction

• Transfers between States
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• Advances between States

• Transfers between Projects

• GARVEEs

• Availability Payments

• Design-Build

• I/D provisions for early Contract Completion

• Interim Completion Dates

• Project Phasing

The table in the following section summarizes which specific project finance and contract 

administration options examined in this study have been, or will be, considered by the MDSHA 

and the WVDOH to accelerate construction, or time to construction, for the seven projects 

identified that would increase evacuation capacity on key NHS evacuation routes west of the 

NCR. Depending on where each project currently is in the project development process, will 

determine when such options will be considered. For example, for those projects that 

construction is ongoing or planned for the near term, it would be appropriate for the State DOTs 

to be considering many of the identified project finance and contract administration options at 

this time. For future projects that will not be in actual construction for many years, it would be 

appropriate for the State DOTs to be considering many of the identified project finance options 

at this time. 
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Summary of Findings

The summary of findings addresses both the input from the respondents from the 26 regions and 

a summary of the West of the NCR report that immediately precedes this section.

Summary of Top Impediments as Reported by the 26 Regions Included in the Study

Jurisdictional respondents and interviewees provided thoughtful responses and insightful 

dialogue. The table below categorizes the input into general and common areas that would 

impede an evacuation from the jurisdiction. The FHWA decided not to extrapolate further 

findings from these as differences in local situations make definitive findings difficult to 

capture. However, it is clear that several impediment areas (e.g., day-to-day congestion, 

infrastructure constraints, and communications) are common to many of the areas studied. 

Options for Accelerating Projects to Increase Evacuation Capacity West of the

National Capital Region

The second part of this study addressed how NHS projects under construction west of the NCR 

could increase the NCR’s evacuation capacity. The FHWA conducted research and extensive 

interviews with FHWA Division staff and authorities from the States of West Virginia and 

Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the Washington Council of Governments to discuss 

corridors and planned construction on the NHS and arterial routes that evacuees departing the 

NCR would use to evacuate the region. Through 

this research and interviews, FHWA (1) identified 

NHS roads that would qualify for this study, e.g., 

corridors leading west from the NCR; (2) analyzed 

NHS projects (or phases of large multi-phase 

projects) west of the NCR currently under 

construction that could increase evacuation 

capacity; and (3) provided options to accelerate 

NHS projects (or phases of large multi-phase 

projects) under construction.

Through its research and interviews, FHWA 

identified opportunities to accelerate 

construction projects on the various routes 

studied. Since most opportunities to accelerate 

construction depend on innovative means to carry 

out project financing, project development, and 

contract administration, the research team 

consulted with numerous FHWA, MDSHA, VDOT, and WVDOT specialists in order to identify viable 

options for the identified projects. The FHWA has been a leader in identifying and advocating 

the use of contract administration and project finance options to accelerate construction time 

on all highway projects, with particular focus on large and complex projects. The table below 

summarizes which specific project finance and contract administration options examined in this 

study have been, or will be, considered by the MDSHA and the WVDOH to accelerate 

construction, or time to construction, for the six projects (or phases of large multi-phase 

projects) identified that would increase evacuation capacity on key NHS evacuation routes west 

of the NCR. 
 April 2010

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Summary of Jurisdictional Perceptions of Impediments by Location

Location Top Impediments/Challenges

Atlanta, GA Contraflow Constraints; Infrastructure Limitations; Arterial Road Systems with Overpasses Cannot Accommodate Trailer 

Heights; Bridge Weight Restrictions Impede Movements; and Traffic Data is Scattered Throughout the Region

Baltimore, MD Evacuation Plan Needs Updating; Infrastructure Impediments-Roadways; and Region Lacks a Coordinated Signal Timing 

System

Boston, MA Contraflow Constraints; Shoulders May Not be Able to Support Additional Evacuation Traffic; and No Place for Sheltering

Charleston, SC Infrastructure Constraint I-26; East-West Evacuation Routes; Lane Restrictions; ITS Capabilities along Evacuation Routes; 

and Incident Responder Coverage Along I-26, Charleston to Columbia

Chicago Traffic Congestion; Emergency Vehicle Access; Railroad Crossing/Street Blockage; Contraflow Operations Would Impede 

Evacuations; and Real-Time Highway Information for Responders and Public 

Dallas/Ft. Worth, TX Infrastructure Limitations; Lack of Cameras along Key Routes; and Evacuation Plans Do Not Exist 

Denver. CO No Evacuation Plan; No Evacuation Routes Identified; No Lane Assignments for Emergency Services; Infrastructure 

Limitations; Traffic Flow Analysis on Evacuation Routes; and Weather Hindrances

Detroit, MI Infrastructure Conditions Impede Responder Operations; Congestion; and Bottlenecks on Freeways, including Narrow 

Freeway Lanes and Limited Shoulders

Hampton Roads, VA Traffic Signal Timing; Number of Water Crossings; Limited ITS Deployment Along Key Evacuation Routes; Flood-Prone 

Infrastructure; and Human Resources to Manage Evacuation Operations and Tools

Houston, TX Bottlenecks; Communications with the Public; Number/Type of Resources to Deploy; More CCTV Cameras; and Modeling 

Timeliness 

Jacksonville, FL Work Zones; Limited Fueling Stations; No DMSs on westbound I-10; and No ITS Deployment on Key Interstates

Las Vegas, NV Insufficient Lanes and Daily Congestion; Coordination with Other States on Evacuation Routes; Communications Systems 

Would Not Support Evacuation Operations; Deployable Traffic Signs and Evacuation Route Signage; and Traffic Flow 

Monitoring

Los Angeles, CA Congestion and Evacuation Route Capacity; Communications Capabilities; and Public Outreach and Understanding 

Evacuation Process

Miami, FL Insufficient Road Capacity; Damage to Critical Infrastructure; Work Zones on Major Routes; Traffic Signal Timing; and Lack of 

ITS Devices on Major Arterial Roads

MinneapolisSt. Paul, MNInfrastructure Capacity and Congestion; Lack of Coordinated Plan and Universal Agreement on the Benefits of Evacuation; 

Disconnected Transportation and Emergency Operations Centers; Need for More Signage and Public Education; 

Coordination of Signal Timing Plans; Address Equipment Gaps for Pedestrian Movements; and Develop Multiple Options for 

River Crossing

National Capital 

Region (DC, MD & 

northern VA)

Regional GIS Database; Traffic Signal Coordination on Arterials; Limited Roadway Capacity; Institutional Coordination; 

Communication Interoperability and Protocols; and VIP Movements and Security

New Orleans, LA Highway Flooding; Additional ITS Capacity; Insufficient Capacity; and Lack of Emergency Lanes 

New York City, NY Infrastructure Condition and Limitations; Need Improved Coordination between State/Local Transportation Officials and 

Responders; Limited Deployment of ITS Impact on Sharing Situational Awareness Data; Weather Impacts; and Need for 

Public Information Campaign

Philadelphia, PA Expressway Congestion; Need for Situational Awareness; Emergency Signal Timing Coordination; Operational Coordination; 

and Toll Waivers

Phoenix, AZ Communication Capabilities; Community Outreach and Education Program; Rural Evacuation Route Signing and Information 

(public outreach) Strategy; Mass Evacuation Regional Command and Control Center; and Evacuation Route Signing

Portland, OR Bridge Vulnerability; Capacity and Infrastructure Limitations; Communications and Coordination with Neighboring 

Jurisdictions and the Public; Communications and ITS Technology for Incident Operations; Improved Traffic Management 

and Safety; More Robust Planning for Evacuation Operations; and Identification and Use of Resources

San Diego, CA Communication Capabilities; Evacuation Route Capacity; and Need Public Outreach Campaign

San Francisco, CA Communication Capabilities if Damaged; and Infrastructure (Roads, Bridges and Overpasses) along Evacuation Routes 

Seattle, WA Congestion; Limited Infrastructure; and Insufficient Responder Resources to Manage an Evacuation

St. Louis, MO Limited Capacity; and Highway Capacity and Bridges

Tampa-St. 

Petersburg, FL

Highway Infrastructure Capacity; Bridge Infrastructure Capacity; Bridge Vulnerability to Damage; Highway Vulnerability to 

Damage; and Limited Evacuation Routes due to Geographic Limitations 
 April 2010

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Summary of Jurisdictional Perceptions of Top Impediments:

General Categories 1

General Categories

7

Location Reporting as Top Impediment

Communications Equipment & Frequencies, 

Including Interoperability

Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, National Capital Region (NCR), Phoenix, 

San Diego, San Francisco

Communications with Responders or Public Houston, Portland

Congestion/Capacity Chicago (2), Detroit, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Miami, NCR, 

New Orleans, Philadelphia, Portland, San Diego, Seattle, St. Louis, Tampa (2)

Contraflow Issues Atlanta, Boston, Chicago

Coordination, including with internal 

Partners, Responders & other States

Las Vegas, Minneapolis-St. Paul, NCR, New York City, Philadelphia, Portland

Evacuation Route Identification Denver

Infrastructure-Bridges & Overpasses Atlanta (2), Charleston, Portland, San Francisco, St. Louis, TampaSt. Petersburg(2)

Infrastructure-Roads including Bottlenecks, 

Condition, Emergency Vehicle Access Lanes, 

etc.

Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Charleston(2), Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, 

Denver(2), Detroit(5), Hampton Roads, Houston, Las Vegas, Miami(2), NCR, 

New Orleans(2), New York City, San Francisco, Seattle

ITS18 Charleston, Hampton Roads, Jacksonville, Miami, New York City, Philadelphia, 

Portland

Infrastructure General 

ITS-DMS Jacksonville

ITS-CCTV Traffic Cameras & Detectors Dallas/Ft. Worth, Houston, New Orleans

ITS-Ramp Metering Hampton Roads

Plans Need Updating or Developed Baltimore, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Denver, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland

Plans-Alternate Modes of Transport Minneapolis-St. Paul

Public Outreach/Education Los Angeles, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York City, NCR, Philadelphia, 

Phoenix(2), San Diego

Real-Time Data Chicago, New York City, Philadelphia

Resources-Equipment for Pedestrian 

Movements

Minneapolis-St. Paul

Resources-Fueling Stations Jacksonville

Resources-Responder Staff Charleston, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Hampton Roads, Houston, Portland, Seattle

Safety/Service Patrols-Increased Presence Charleston

Sheltering Boston, Portland

Signage-Evacuation Route or Other Chicago, Las Vegas, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Phoenix

TMC Data Sharing & EOC Connectivity Atlanta, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York City, Phoenix

Toll Waivers Philadelphia

Traffic Analysis or Modeling Denver, Houston 

Traffic Control & Monitoring Chicago, Las Vegas

Traffic Signal Timing Baltimore, Hampton Roads, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, NCR, Philadelphia 

VIP Movements & Security NCR 

Weather or Geographic Hindrances Denver, Hampton Roads, New Orleans, NCR, New York City, TampaSt. Petersburg

Work Zones Jacksonville, Miami

 17 Where a parenthesis and number follow a location, e.g., Charleston (2), that indicates that two of Charleston’s top impediments fall into this 

category.

18 Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) includes Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) Closed Circuit TV (CCTV), Traffic Cameras, Traffic 

Management Centers (TMCs), Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), etc.
 April 2010

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Summary of Project Options to Accelerate Construction

Options Projects to Consider Option

Project Finance Options:

Potential Revenue Sources:

• User Fees

• State/Local Taxes

• Value Capture

Federal-aid Grants Management:

• Advance Construction I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

• Partial Conversion of Advance Construction I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

• Flexible Match

• Tapered Match

• Toll Credits (Soft Match) I-70 Phase 4

• Transfers Between States Corridor H (All Phases)

• Advances Between States Corridor H (All Phases)

• Transfers Between Projects Corridor H (All Phases)

Federal Credit Programs:

• Transportation Infrastructure Finance and 

Innovation Act (TIFIA)

• State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs)

• Section 129 Loans

Bonds/Debt Financing:

• Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEEs) Corridor H (All Phases)

• Availability Payments Corridor H (All Phases)

• Shadow Tolls

• Private Activity Bonds (PABs)

• 63-20 Issuance

• Build America Bonds (BABs)

Contract Administration Options:

Construction Manager At Risk

Cost-Plus-Time I-70 Phase 4

Design-Build I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

Design-Build-Maintain (Operate)

Incentive/Disincentive (I/D) Provisions for Early 

Contract Completion

I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

Interim Completion Dates Corridor H (All Phases)

Multi-Parameter Bidding including Quality (A+B+Q 

Bidding)

No Excuse Incentives

Stipulated Sum I-70 Phase 4

Project Phasing I-70 Phase 4, Corridor H (All Phases)

Lane Rental

Partnering I-70 Phase 4
 April 2010

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Appendix 1

Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

Acknowledgments:

Interviewees & Respondents

Atlanta, Georgia (Interview: February 26, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA HQ Office of Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Representing the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC): Tommy Griffin, Emerson Bryan, and 

Kofi Wakhisi

Baltimore, Maryland (Interview: February 23, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA HQ Office of 

Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Alvin Marquess, Maryland State Highway Administration 

• Information provided by the FHWA Maryland Division

Boston, Massachusetts (Interview: February 25, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA HQ Office of 

Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Lorenzo Parra, Emergency Coordinator, Mass DOT

• Paul M. Connelly, Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security, Executive Office of Public 

Safety and Security

Charleston, South Carolina (Interview: February 16, 2010; conducted by Tim Lane, FHWA HQ Office of 

Operations)

Interview conducted by: Tim Lane, FHWA, ETO

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Dan Hinton, FHWA, SC

• Dick Jenkins, SC DOT

Chicago, Illinois (Interview: February 11, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Robin Helmerichs, FHWA

• Tom Korty, EMC/Homeland Security – Illinois DOT

• Steve Travia, Bureau Chief of Traffic, Illinois DOT

• Earl Zuelke Jr., Special Assistant to the Director Illinois EMA

• John Plante, CTA 

• Steve Brink, Illinois DOT

• Julia Fox, Illinois DOT

• Robert King, Cook County EMA 

Online/Interview Responses:

• Michael McCabe Pace Suburban Bus Security Coordinator 

• Ryan Rockabrand, City of Chicago Office of Emergency Management & Communications
 April 2010

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Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas (Interview: February 11, 2010; conducted by Paul Olson, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

Jimmey F. Bodiford, Director of Transportation Operations, TxDOT - Fort Worth District

Richard Schiller, Director of Maintenance, TxDOT - Fort Worth District

Denver, Colorado (Interview: February 24, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Bruce Holloman, Deputy Director, Chief of Operations - Colorado Div of EM 

• Elbert Hunt, CDOT EM Preparedness Coordinator 

• Lori Hodges, North Central Region Field Manager - Colorado Div of EM

• Ken DePinto, CDOT ITS Director 

• Scott Kellar, Homeland Security Coordinator North Central Region 

• Richard Santos, FHWA Colorado Division

Detroit, Michigan (Interview: February 12, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Eileen Phifer, Safety & Security Administration & Emergency Management, Michigan DOT 

• Darryl Lundy, City of Detroit

• James Buford, Director, Wayne County EMD

• Ron Krauss, FHWA Michigan Division 

Hampton Roads, Virginia (Interview: March 5, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA HQ Office of 

Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Perry Cogburn, Emergency Manager, VDOT 

Houston, Texas (Interview: February 26, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA HQ Office of Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Christy Willhite, Chief Transportation Planner, Houston-Galveston Area Council of 

Governments

• Stuart Corder, Director, Transportation Operations, Texas DOT- Houston District

Jacksonville, Florida (Interview: February 15, 2010; conducted by Chung Tran, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Peter Vega, ITS Engineer – District 2 – Jacksonville

• Ed Ward, Emergency Coordination Officer – District 2 – Jacksonville

Las Vegas, Nevada (Interview: February 17, 2010; conducted by Chung Tran, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Christopher Joncas, Nevada DOT (NDOT) 

• Information provided by the FHWA Nevada Division

Los Angeles (Interview: February 24, 2010; conducted by Tim Lane, FHWA HQ Office of Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Sonja Brown, California Emergency Management Agency–Southern Region 

• Keith Harrison, Los Angeles County 

• Randy Warden, FHWA California Division
 April 2010

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Miami (Interview: February 11, 2010; conducted by Chung Tran, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Rory Santana – FDOT District 6 (Miami) ITS Engineer

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota (Interview: February 25, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource 

Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Rick Larkin, Director of Emergency Management, City of St. Paul 

• Bonnie Bleskachek, City of Minneapolis

• Jon Wertjes, City of Minneapolis 

• Thomas Deegan, City of Minneapolis

• David Scott, FHWA Minnesota Division 

• Gerald Libbe, Statewide Planning Engineer, FHWA Minnesota Division

• Craig Strand, MnDOT Emergency Management 

• Gary Fried, MnDOT 

• Jim Michael, Maintenance Superintendent, MnDOT

• Lisa Dressle, City of Minneapolis

• Beverly Farraher, MnDOT

National Capital Region and for the Study of the NHS West of the NCR (Interview: various times in 

March 2010, conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA Headquarters, and Sandra Jackson, FHWA DC Division)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

District of Columbia (Interview: March 11, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA Headquarters Office of 

Operations)

• Natalie Jones-Best, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, DDOT

Maryland (Interview: March 15, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA Headquarters Office of Operations, 

& Sandra Jackson, FHWA DC Division)

• Jitesh Parikh, Team Leader, Maryland/DELMAR Division

• Jorismar Torres, Area Engineer, Maryland/DELMAR Division

• Sajid Aftab, Senior Area Engineer, Maryland/DELMAR Division

• Reena Mathews, Regional Planner, Maryland/DELMAR Division

• Kwame Arhin, Maryland/DELMAR Division

• Alvin Marquess, Emergency Manager, Maryland State Highway Administration

• Subrat Mahapatra, Planner, Maryland State Highway Administration 

• Reena Mathews, Planner, Maryland State Highway Administration 

• Robert Piazza, Planner, Maryland State Highway Administration 

Virginia (Interview: March 4 & 23, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA Headquarters Office of 

Operations)

• Danny Jenkins, FHWA Virginia Division 

• Perry Cogburn, Emergency Manager, Virginia DOT

• Ling Li, Operations Engineering Manager for the Northern Region Operations (NRO), 

Virginia DOT

• Virgil W. Gray, Region 7 Coordinator, Virginia Dept. of Emergency Management
 April 2010

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New Orleans, Louisiana (Interview: February 8, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Cindy Montz, Louisiana DOTD

• Steve Strength, PTOE District 02 Traffic Operations Engineer, Louisiana DOTD

• Stephen Glascock, Louisiana DOTD – ITS Director

• Scott Boyle, Louisiana DOTD

New York, New York (Interview: February 25, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center & Tim 

Lane, FHWA HQ Office of Operations )

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Fred Lai, NYSDOT 

• David Williams, NYSDOT

• Robert Limoges, NYSDOT 

• Nelson Castillo, Office of Emergency Response, NYC-DOT 

• Amy Post, NYC Office of Emergency Management 

• Arthur O’Connor, NYC Office, FHWA

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Interview: February 4, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• MaryAnn E. Tierney, Deputy Managing Director, Emergency Management, City of 

Philadelphia 

• Stan Platt, Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission David Brown, Montgomery 

County 911 

• Manny Anastasiadis, PennDOT District 6-0

Online Interview Input:

• Carmine Fiscina, FHWA Pennsylvania Division

• Leo Bagley, Montgomery County Planning Commission 

Phoenix, Arizona (Interview: February 10, 2010; conducted by Tim Lane, FHWA HQ Office of Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Bill Tait, ADOT

• Bill Hahn, MCDOT

• Jennifer Brown, FHWA Arizona Division

Portland, Oregon (Interview during Regional meeting: April 9, 2010; conducted by Nathaniel T. Price, FHWA 

Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants: 

• Geoff Bowyer, ODOT

• Ted Miller, ODOT

• Greg Ek-Collins, ODOT

• Kate Freitag, ODOT

• Bill Whitson, Multnomah County Roads

• Jerry Griffin, Multnomah County Roads

• Dave Houghton, Multnomah County Emergency Management

• Lonny Welter, Columbia County Roads

• Dana Robinson, Clackamas County Emergency Management

• Todd Watkins, Washington County Roads

• John Wallace, Clark County, Washington Emergency Management 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 102 of 108

• Mike McGuire, Tri-Met (light rail & bus) 

• Bob Medcraft, C-Tran (Clark County Washington Transit) 

• David Harrington, Portland DOT 

• Larry Stevens, Portland DOT 

• Patty Rueter, Portland Office of Emergency Management 

• Laureen Paulsen, Portland Office of Emergency Management 

San Diego, California (Interview: February 22, 2010; conducted by Tim Lane, FHWA HQ Office of Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Scott Marotte, California Emergency Management Agency-Headquarters

• Joanne Phillips, California Emergency Management Agency-Southern Region

• Jeff Wood, California Emergency Management Agency-Southern Region, 

• Jeri Siegle, California Emergency Management Agency-Southern Region 

• Stasia Place, San Diego County

• Herby Lissade, Caltrans

• Randy Warden, FHWA California Division

San Francisco, California (Interview: February 26, 2010; conducted by Tim Lane, FHWA HQ Office of 

Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Cathy Wayne, Commander, California Highway Patrol

• Shawn Nozzari, CALTRANS

• Randy Warden, FHWA California Division

Seattle, Washington (Interview: February 14, 2010; conducted by Paul Olson, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• John Himmel, Emergency Operations and Safety Program Manager, Washington DOT

• David Ochs, FAA, Regional Transportation Representative, Seattle, WA

St. Louis, Missouri (Interview: February 4, 2010; conducted by Ray Murphy, FHWA Resource Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Lisa Vieth, PE, Incident Response Coordinator, MoDOT 

• Rick Bennett, Traffic Liaison Engineer, MoDOT

• Edward Stephen, FHWA Missouri Division

Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida (Interview: February 23, 2010; conducted by Chung Tran, FHWA Resource 

Center)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

Chester Chandler, FDOT District 7

West Virginia (Interview: March 12, 2010; conducted by Laurel Radow, FHWA HQ Office of Operations)

Discussion/Interview Participants:

• Henry (Ed) Compton, West Virginia FHWA Division Office

• Chuck Runyon, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Transportation, West Virginia & 

WVDOT’s Emergency Manager
 April 2010

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Appendix 2

Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

References & Plan Summary

Citations preceded with an asterisk (*) indicate that the report has sensitive material included. Those desiring to see the

referenced document must contact the owning jurisdiction or Agency for information on that report.

References

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Identification & Analysis of Factors Affecting 

Emergency Evacuations,” 2004

Transportation Research Board, NCHRP Synthesis 20-05/Topic 39-05 [Final Synthesis] 

Emergency Evacuation and Reentry 

Respondents provided the following plans for review during this study:

Summary of Plans Submitted for Review

Arizona - Phoenix 

Mass Evacuation and Reception Plan

Emergency Evacuation Strategy Plan Final Report (July 2004)

Emergency Evacuation Strategy Phase II for Maricopa County: Final Report (December 27, 

2006) 

Emergency Evacuation Strategy Phase II for Maricopa County: Executive Summary

(December 2006)

Emergency Evacuation Strategy Phase II for Maricopa County: Existing Conditions/ 

Inventory Report (December 27, 2006)

California 

• San Diego

Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization Operational Area Emergency 

Plan: Annex Q – Evacuation (April 2007)

• San Francisco

Regional Catastrophic Earthquake Mass Transportation/Evacuation Plan (January 22, 2010, 

DRAFT)

• Appendix B: Maps

• Appendix D: Hayward Fault Earthquake Scenario

Colorado - Denver 

North Central Region Mass Evacuation Plan (draft-June 2008)

North Central Region Mass Evacuation Plan Shelter Subcommittee Report (August 2007)

Florida

Contraflow Plan for Florida Interstate Highway System (June 13, 2005)

Reverse Lane Plan: Plan for One-Way Evacuation of Florida’s Turnpike (no date) Motorist 

Information brochure (Florida Highway Patrol, FDOT and Florida Department of Emergency 

Management) 
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 104 of 108

• Miami

Reverse Lane Plan: Plan for One-Way Evacuation of Interstate-75 (Alligator Alley South)

(no date) Motorist Information brochure (Florida Highway Patrol, FDOT and Florida Department 

of Emergency Management) 

• Tampa-St. Petersburg

Reverse Lane Plan: Plan for One-Way Evacuation of Interstate-4 (no date) Motorist 

Information brochure (Florida Highway Patrol, FDOT and Florida Department of Emergency 

Management) 

Georgia - Atlanta

Atlanta Regional Evacuation Coordination Plan (March 2009)

Atlanta Clearance Time Tool

Illinois - Chicago

*Evacuation Plan for Chicago Central Business District & Chicago Expressway System

(January 2008) Produced by the Illinois Department of Transportation – Highways

Louisiana – New Orleans 

Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide SOUTHWEST (No date) Citizen’s 

guide with critical information and maps

Maryland – Baltimore

* Baltimore Region Contingency Transportation Emergency Management Plan Prepared by 

the Baltimore Regional Operations Coordination Committee and Transportation Emergency 

Preparedness Task Force (January 8, 2004)

Massachusetts - Boston

*Metro Boston Traffic Evacuation Plan Overview (March 18, 2009)

City of Boston Evacuation Routes Map (December 2005)

Minnesota – Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro Area 

*Metro Evacuation Transportation Plan (October 31, 2005

Metro Evacuation Transportation Plan Executive Summary

Metro Evacuation Traffic Management Plan Executive Summary

*Citizen Evacuation Shelter in Place Capability Assessment Tool Results for Part 2 -- CESIP 

Capability Assessment

*Citizen Evacuation Shelter in Place Gaps & Funded Proposals (12-09-09 & 01-21-10 versions

National Capital Region

NCR National Highway System Projects List 

Greater Washington Events Route Map (November 26, 2002)

NCR Behavioral Survey: Behavioral Aspects of Sheltering and Evacuation Planning 

for the National Capital Region (December 18, 2009); Power Point Summary of subject study

• District of Columbia

*District Response Plan-Emergency Transportation Annex (August 2006)

Transportation Tips During an Emergency Incident (February 2008); Motorist Brochure

Nevada – Las Vegas

Southern Nevada Evacuation/Emergency Planning Project (November 2008) 
 April 2010

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Executive Summary--Southern Nevada Evacuation/Emergency Planning Project (November 

2008)

State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (SCEMP) (2005)

NDOT State Level Emergency Operations Plan

NDOT District Emergency Operations Plan

Clark County Emergency Plan (2004)

Pennsylvania - Philadelphia

*Southeastern Pennsylvania Emergency Transportation Plan (June 2009)

South Carolina - Charleston

Hurricane Evacuation Plan for All Lane Reversal of I-26 from I-526 (Charleston) to I-77 

(Columbia)

Texas

Hurricane Evacuation Routes: Rio Grande Valley - Pharr District (July 15, 2009); Motorist 

Advisory Brochure

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Routes: Rio Grande Valley U.S.-83 & U.S.-281 

(November 3, 2008); Motorist Advisory Brochure

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Route: Corpus Christi to San Antonio Interstate-37 

(September 1, 2009); Motorist Advisory Brochure

I-37 Hurricane Shoulder Evacuation Lane (July 15, 2009); Motorist Advisory Brochure

• Dallas-Ft. Worth

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Route: Houston to Dallas Interstate-45 (June 12, 2009); 

Motorist Advisory Brochure

• Houston

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Route: Houston to San Antonio Interstate-10 

(November 3, 2008); Motorist Advisory Brochure

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Route: Houston to Dallas Interstate-45 (June 12, 2009); 

Motorist Advisory Brochure

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Route: Houston to Austin, Bryan, College Station, Waco 

U.S.-290 (November 3, 2008); Motorist Advisory Brochure

Hurricane Evacuation Contraflow Route: Houston to Nacogdoches U.S.-59 (June 12, 2009); 

Motorist Advisory Brochure

Virginia – Hampton Roads Region

Virginia Hurricane Guide (May 2009)

Tidewater Evacuation Routes Map 

Washington – Seattle/Puget Sound Region

Puget Sound Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Program (Puget Sound RCPP)-Federal Grant 

Project Summary Sheet
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 106 of 108

Appendix 3

Highway Evacuations in Selected Metropolitan Regions:

Assessment of Impediments

Acronyms & Terms

The following will aid in review and understating the acronyms and terms used throughout this 

document.

Acronym/Term Description

511 National traveler information call number

911 Emergency services call number

AC Advanced Construction

ACTT Accelerated Construction Technology Transfer

ATMS Advanced Transportation Management Systems 

BIA Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior

CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Explosive

CCTV Closed Circuit Television (video monitoring of the roads—one of the ITS tools used by DOTs)

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DHSEM Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (Illinois)

DMS Dynamic Message Signs

DOT Department of Transportation

DPS Department of Public Safety

EHTR Emergency Highway Traffic Regulation

EMA Emergency Management Agency (either a name or a generic description of the office)

EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a State-to-State mutual aid agreement 

activated during a major disaster

EOC Emergency Operations Center

ESF Emergency Support Function, associated with the National Response System that divides 

response efforts into like groups, for example, ESF-2 is Communications (See ESF-1)

ESF-1 Emergency Support Function #1, or Transportation, as designated under the National 

Response System and used by State and local emergency management agencies to group 

transportation functions together.

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency, a component of the Department of Homeland 

Security

FHWA Federal Highway Administration, a modal Administration within the Department of 

Transportation with Division offices in each State /territory and which manages the highway 

surface transportation component of the U.S. Department of Transportation

FOUO For Official Use Only (Sensitive, but not classified)

GARVEEs Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicle

GIS Geographic Information Systems

HAR Highway Advisory Radio

HOV High Occupancy Vehicle (lanes)

I- Interstate (U.S.)
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 107 of 108

Acronym/Term Description

I/D Incentive/Disincentive (Acceleration Technique) 

INRIX® A private-sector company that produces an annual traffic scorecard (and other studies) used 

in this report

IRP Incident Response Plan

IRR Indian Reservation Roads

ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems

MOU(s) Memorandum of Understanding

MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization

NCRC Office of the National Capital Region Coordination, FEMA, DHS

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act

NHS National Highway System

NIMS National Incident Management System

NPR II National Plan Review, Phase 2 (2006 study of response plans from around the region by the 

Department of Homeland Security 

PCAC Partial Conversion of Advanced Construction

RCP Regional Catastrophic Preparedness

RCPGP Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (DHS program)

RCPT Regional Catastrophic Planning Team (New York)

ROD Record of Decision

RWIS Road Weather Information System

SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, (P.L. 

109-59)

SH- State Highway

SR- State Road

STIP State Transportation Improvement Plan

STRAHNET Strategic Highway Network

TIP Transportation Improvement Plan

TMC Transportation or Traffic Management Center

TOC Transportation Operations Center

TSA Transportation Security Administration, an Administration within DHS

UASI Urban Area Security Initiative (as identified by the Department of Homeland Security)

VE Value Engineering

vpd vehicles per day

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
 April 2010

U.S. Department of Transportation 108 of 108

Contact Information

For additional information on this report, 

contact Kimberly Vasconez, via email at

Kimberly.Vasconez@dot.gov

Federal Highway Administration

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

April 2010

Publication FHWA-HOP-10-059