Note that each of the nine decision
requirements is relevant during pre-mission
planning, preparation, and mission execution.
In nearly every building clearing operation, the
plan developed prior to the mission will break
down to some extent during its execution.
Therefore the platoon leader will be forced to
adjust the plan on-the-spot, as the environment
presents unexpected obstacles or additional information cues. For the purposes of this project, we
have focused on the decisions and adjustments a platoon leader must make during mission
execution. While the planning and preparation stages present their own variations of these unique
challenges, it is during mission execution that decision making becomes time pressured, the
situation continuously changes, stakes are high, and uncertainty runs rampant. This is the time
when decision making becomes the most challenging for the platoon leader.

a
“The plan only lasts until the first bullet goes
down range.”

(This quote and the quotes to follow can be

attributed to one of the seven interviewees.)
|

Task-Focused Decision Requirements

The task-focused decision requirements correspond to distinct stages of the building
clearing operation. In this section of the report we introduce the five task-focused decision
requirements and provide a discussion of some of their corresponding issues. Due to the
immense size of the data set, we do not present all data within the main body of this report.
Instead, we introduce the data here and refer interested readers to the unabridged DRTs in
Appendix A.

Decision Requirement: Determine how to secure the perimeter

The task addressed by this decision requirement has to do with strategically placing units
around the outside of the objective building in order to provide fire support to the clearing units
and maintain external security. Depending on the mission, the support element will provide cover
and/or backup fire during all stages of the mission (the approach, the entry, and the clearing), will
prevent people from entering or exiting the area surrounding the building, and will serve as an
overwatch or early warning function for the platoon leader and higher command. Without a
secure perimeter, the clearing units and their mission will be in severe jeopardy.

Determining how to secure the el
perimeter occurs to a great extent during the “A support by fire position will make or
planning stage prior to the mission. However, break you.”
given the difficulty of pinpointing the a

environmental conditions under which the

mission will occur, most plans will require at least minor adjustments once the mission begins.
The DRT for this decision requirement, found in Appendix A, presents the critical decisions and
judgments related to adjusting perimeter security once the mission has begun, as well as the cues
and factors that influence the platoon leader's decisions and strategies that are used to make the
determinations. The critical decisions and judgments within this decision requirement include:

10



and interpret, the factors that he must take into account when making decisions, and the strategies
and rules-of-thumb that have been developed by MOUT experts.

Training cognitive aspects of decision making for MOUT operations, in this case the
building clearing task, can perhaps be best accomplished by employing a scenario-based
instructional approach that can boost the expertise of lieutenants through practice in MOUT
decision making. One scenario-based approach that has been employed with units of the U.S.
Marine Corps is the Decision Skills Training (DST) program developed by Klein Associates
(Klein, 1997; Klein, McCloskey, Pliske, & Schmitt, 1997). The DST program is highly
contextual, oriented around decision requirements identified for a specific task and group of
people. The decision requirements can be used to guide the development of a series of training
scenarios called Tactical Decision Games (TDGs), as well as other training tools that can
enhance the use of the TDGs (these are described in more depth in the following sections).

We envision using the identified task-focused decision requirements of this research
effort to provide the context for TDG scenarios to be used to train Army platoon leaders. The
contextual elements are apparent primarily through the cues that have been identified in each
decision requirement. These are the pieces of information a platoon leader must be trained to
recognize and interpret, since they will have great impact on each decision. In contrast, the
task-independent decision requirements can be used to guide the development of supplemental
training tools to be used in conjunction with the TDGs. These decision requirements detail the
cognition that must be active throughout the building clearing operation, and therefore would be
applicable to each TDG developed, regardless of which task-focused decision requirement is
emphasized in a particular TDG.

Tactical Decision Games

TDGs, in their standard form, are low-fidelity, paper-and-pencil simulations of incidents
that might occur in battlefield environments. The TDG presents a dilemma, with high levels of
uncertainty. Participants have a restricted time limit in which to consider how they would react,
which adds time pressure to the exercise. These TDGs are intended to provide indirect
experiences, and to allow practice in rapid decision making.

TDGs work in the following manner, as described by John Schmitt, the originator of the
TDG:

Playing a tactical decision game is very simple. Putting yourself in the role of the
commander, you read (or have described to you) the situation; within an
established time limit you decide what plan to adopt and communicate that plan
in the form of the orders you would issue to your unit if the situation were “for
real.” You provide an overlay of your plan. Then -- and this is an important part
of the process -- you explain the plan as a means of analyzing why you did what
you did (Schmitt, 1994, p. 3).

31



The most experienced squad will initiate the breech. 2" squad is in
security positions around the intersection. They launch a series of smoke
grenades and thick, gray smoke fills the intersection. The sound of automatic
weapons fire fills the air from the building, and the rest of the platoon returns
fire. A fire team from 1“ squad charges into the smoke, and toward the wall
and begins cutting away the wire. Sure enough, a sniper begins to fire into the
smoke from the tower across the street. “Gotcha”, the LT thinks as his security
team quickly returns fire and eliminates the threat.

A minute later, the fire team from 1* squad returns. The wire has
been cut and explosives have been placed on the wall about 3 meters left of
the main door. They all wait for the explosion, and when it occurs, the LT
sends 1* squad into the clearing smoke. Then he waits for word on the radio.

The smoke is clearing now, and there is scattered fire coming from
inside the building. After about 10 very long seconds of fire exchange, the SL
calls on the radio. “LT, we have the entrance secured. Three enemy casualties,
one apparent civilian casualty, no friendly casualties. Approximately 10 enemy
have retreated down the main hallway right in front of me.”

“Nice work sergeant,” the LT replies. The LT knows his experienced
squad leader well, and can tell by his voice that he has the immediate situation
well under control. Based on the SL’s report, the enemy appears to have
moved down the hallway. The gunfire sounds suggested the enemy had the
weapons they were expected to have. The LT decides to let the SL continue to
clear the hallway: “Start the clearing, sergeant. Let me know when you’ve got
the first two rooms cleared. Then, I’m coming behind you with 3% squad,” the
LT tells the SL.

Upon hearing from 1" squad leader, the LT enters the building, and,
for the first time, sees part of the internal layout. The main hallway heads
south from the entrance, with rooms branching off on both sides. There
appears to be a T-intersection at the far end of the hallway, and a stairway
heading to the second floor. By this time, 1 squad has cleared the first three
rooms and has encountered only frightened civilians. Unfortunately, one of the
less-experienced members of 1“ squad, with an itchy trigger finger, shot one of
the civilians in the shoulder. The LT quickly scans the faces of 1 squad, and,
seeing a couple glassy stares, decides a change is due.

27

Decision: determine how to
employ personnel
Difficulty: troops are still
vulnerable in smoke

Decision: the LT must assess
the situation and direct
subordinates

Cues: scattered fire inside
building, 10 seconds of rapid
fire, number of enemy and
friendly casualties, layout of
hallway

Decision: assess situation
inside building

Cue: level of panic in SL’s
voice

Implication: situation is
currently under control
Cue: weapon sounds
Implication: enemy is using
expected weapons
Decision: determine flow of
clearing, determine how to
employ personnel and teams,
maintain control of
subordinates

Cues: internal layout, number
of rooms cleared, status of
people in the rooms, civilian
casualties

Decision: determine how to
employ personnel

Cue: glossy stares
Implication: have a different
fire team clear the next few
rooms



This scenario represents a greatly simplified version of how a TDG might develop from the
decision requirements of Army platoon leaders. Critical to successful learning from this TDG is
good facilitation. The TDGs should be presented in seminar formats in which a facilitator
presents the scenario to a group of participants, and the participants develop individual solutions
to the problem under time pressure. As participants provide their solutions to the class in the
form of orders (to get practice in effective communication), the facilitator questions them
regarding their decision-making process, possibly using the Decision Making Critique.

It is important to note here that maps and photographs would be developed as part of the
TDGs and provided to the platoon leaders. These visual aids are critical elements of the TDGs.
They provide the visual context that cannot be presented within a textual description. The
pictures or photographs need to be designed to show the critical cues that are important when
making the decisions associated with a particular scenario. Given this requirement, it is easy to
understand the need for high fidelity and realism here. Sketched pictures are better for helping
the participants envision the situation and recognize critical cues than is text. Photographs are
better than sketches. Video is better than photographs because it allows multiple perspectives and
can provide visual cues.

In summary, the decision requirements identified in the CTA can guide the development
of MOUT TDGs and supplemental training tools aimed at new lieutenants who may serve as
platoon leaders. The primary goal of such scenario-based training would be to boost expertise
and enhance decision-making skill. A refined understanding of MOUT tactics would likely be a
secondary benefit.

Future Directions

This project presents evidence that the building clearing task is highly cognitive in nature.
It demonstrates that effective platoon leaders will have to make a number of difficult judgments
and decisions, under time pressure and uncertainty. It also suggests that CTA methods can be
used to identify the decision requirements of the MOUT building clearing task, and that these
decision requirements are directly related to the training requirements for that task. Previously,
without a means of specifying cognitive training requirements, training developers have been
severely limited in their efforts to support cognitive tasks. No longer must that be the case. This
study demonstrates the value of CTA methods for MOUT training development. The remaining
Piece is to demonstrate that CTA methods also yield materials that can be used in the training
program itself.

One potential future direction of this line of research is to broaden the range of study to
include other MOUT tasks. This would entail conducting a CTA on each additional MOUT task
with the end objective being to identify training requirements for each. A second potential
direction is to immediately begin development of a scenario-based MOUT training program
aimed at teaching lieutenants the cognitive and decision-making components of building clearing
operations from the platoon leader’s perspective. Based on DRTs from the present research, this

36



purpose of the Task Diagram is to provide a very broad overview of the task and an indication of
which steps are cognitively challenging. The steps also provide a common frame of reference
from which the interviewer and interviewee can work.

Critical Decision Method. The CDM is a knowledge elicitation strategy based on
Flanagan’s critical incident technique (Flanagan, 1954). Using recollection of a specific incident
as its starting point, CDM employs a semi-structured discussion with specific, focused probes
designed to elicit particular types of information (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989;
Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, in press). The specific episode carries context with it and reveals
how particular aspects and events in the environment impel the decision maker to action.

The incident account is generated by the interviewee in response to a specific open-ended
question posed by the interviewer, and it provides the structure for the questioning that follows.
Once the participant identifies a relevant incident, he or she recounts the episode in its entirety,
with no interruptions from the interviewer. When the report of the incident has been completed,
the interviewer conducts three information-gathering sweeps through the incident. These sweeps
are: Timeline Verification and Decision Point Identification, to structure and organize the
account into ordered segments; Progressive Deepening, to develop a comprehensive, detailed,
and context-specific account of the incident from the perspective of the decision maker; and
What-if Queries, in which the decision maker discusses the incident in terms of potential errors
and expert-novice differences.

Solicited information includes goals that were considered during the incident; options that
were generated, evaluated, and eventually chosen; cue utilization; contextual elements; and
situation assessment factors specific to particular decisions. CDM protocols provide detailed
records of the information gathering, judgments, interventions, and outcomes that surround
problem solving, judgment, and decision making in a particular task or domain. CDM interviews
last approximately 2 hours.

Knowledge Audit. The Knowledge Audit is a method designed to efficiently survey
various aspects of expertise (Militello & Hutton, in preparation). It identifies ways expertise is or
is not used in a domain and provides examples based on actual experience. The Knowledge
Audit draws directly from the research literature on expert-novice differences (e.g., Chi, Glaser,
& Farr, 1988; Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Feltovich, Ford, & Hoffman, 1997) and
our own CDM studies of decision making (e.g., Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993; Crandall,
Kyne, Militello, & Klein, 1992; Klinger et al., 1993; Militello & Lim, 1995).

The Knowledge Audit was developed as a relatively inexpensive and simple method for
applying CTA to the process of training development. It focuses on the categories of knowledge
and skills that distinguish experts from others, using elicited examples that are based on actual
experiences. These categories include: diagnosing and predicting, situation awareness, perceptual
skills, improvising, metacognition, recognizing anomalies, and compensating for equipment
limitations. The Knowledge Audit employs a set of probes which elicit examples of the types of
skills used on the job. As training developers, we seek to discover the nature of these skills,



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A-15



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A-3



Table 1. Indicators of Building Fortification
Cue Significance
freshly upturned dirt | potential booby trap
broken out windows enemy firing position
wire behind windows enemy is preventing
grenade attack into that

room — potential
housing of people or

resources
gun ports in wall enemy firing position
sandbags reinforced position
stacked materials reinforced position
gaps in wall bunker or reinforced
position

Once an assessment of the building’s strengths and vulnerabilities has been made, the
platoon leader can use that assessment to judge the best entry point and determine the entry
technique. Generally the platoon leader will
choose an entry point and technique which will
shield his soldiers from danger, to the greatest
extent possible. If a “safe” entry point does not
exist, which happens frequently, then a good
platoon leader is likely to choose the point and
method that can be executed most quickly, so
that the unit is subject to danger for only a small length of time. In many situations the safest and
quickest entry point is the roof of the building. Furthermore, top-down clearing is the preferred
method. However, there are situations in which a helodrop onto the roof is not realistic, perhaps
because the roof is slanted, or the enemy has strong air defenses, or the unit does not have access
to a helicopter transport. When the platoon leader is forced to enter from the ground (whether
through a door or window or wall breach), he may take measures to distract and disorient the
enemy in order to buy time to enter the building. This disorientation might entail, for example, a
feigned attack by another unit or a subset of the leader’s own platoon. Another strategy used by
experienced leaders is to choose an entry point that is not the most logical one. The idea is to
surprise the enemy by entering at a location that is not expected, and thereby gain an advantage
over the enemy. One way a platoon leader might foil the enemy’s expectation is to choose an
entry point and technique different than what his unit and adjacent units have recently employed.
A key to a successful entry is the ability to think like the enemy.

“Don’t expect to get in easy. If you do get in
easy, expect to find a surprise waiting for

you.
EE

Every situation is different, which means that building entry points and entry techniques
can vary drastically. What is completely inappropriate in one operation might be the best or only
option in another operation. For example, one interviewee told of a building clearing in which
they helodropped onto the roof of the building, and then hung over the side of the building and

14



TDGs have a wide range of potential benefits. Schmitt outlines the key benefits of TDGs
as follows:

Not only will you improve your ability to make decisions quickly and effectively
through TDGs, but your appreciation and mastery of tactics will improve also...
(As you practice), you begin to make sense of situations that made no sense
before, you begin to see patterns, and in those patterns you spot opportunities and
options that previously did not exist for you. As you become more experienced you
become more comfortable with a variety of different situations. You have the
opportunity to experiment with different tactical ideas without having to worry
about paying the price in terms of casualties. Your tactics become more
ambitious... Your tactics become more advanced... A valuable fringe benefit of
TDGs is that you become more familiar with weapons capabilities and
employment techniques...and other technical details (Schmitt, 1994, p. 3).

In the past, TDGs have been used primarily to train tactical skills and strategies (e.g., how
to out-flank the enemy) as well as declarative knowledge (e.g., the firing ranges for different
guns). In the DST program developed by Klein Associates, the training value of the TDG has
been broadened to include cognitive and decision-making skills. We use TDGs as a framework in
which students can practice making difficult decisions and judgments within a wide range of
situations. The design of the TDGs is typically guided by an understanding of the cognitive
demands of a task. Students gain exposure to the cognitive challenges and practice handling
those challenges (e.g., recognizing and interpreting subtle environmental cues), with input from
the instructor, in order to become better decision makers.

Subjective measures of the usefulness of TDG training (in the context of the DST
program, which also includes supplemental training tools) have been favorable. USMC squad
leaders participating in the training rated the usefulness of the TDGs very highly, and their
supervisors reported improvement in their decision skills over time. More concrete performance
measures for TDG training programs are currently under investigation. These measures address
the quality of the participants’ decisions within specific TDGs. To judge the usefulness of TDG
training, the performance measures for each participant can be compared over time. Presumably,
decisions will improve as participants gain practice in TDG decision making. The performance
measures that have been tested and show promise include goodness of the plan (or decision),
clarity of the description, appropriate level of initiative, fit within the larger plan, and goodness
of the rationale (McCloskey, Pliske, Klein, Heaton, & Knight, 1997).

It is important to note that TDGs can provide participants with practice in battlefield
decision making in a safe and cost-effective manner. While they can never fully simulate the
stresses of real military conflict scenarios, TDGs can expose the participants to a wide range of
challenging battlefield decisions, if they are developed properly. When development is guided by
decision requirements, TDGs appear to be effective training tools.

32



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B-5



FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) is
conducting research to understand the challenges of Military Operations in Urban Terrain
(MOUT). These operations place demands on military personnel for new types of technical
skills. They also generate cognitive requirements related to the judgments and decisions
necessary in an urban setting. For example, a platoon leader who has learned to estimate the time
needed to set up a hasty defense or a movement to contact will have to judge the time/distance
relationships for tasks such as building clearings. It is critical that the military be prepared for
MOUT because the U.S. is a victim of its own success. Few adversaries will be tempted to
engage in conventional warfare against the U.S., and at the same time, urban conflicts offer
attractive advantages to adversaries: the potential loss of civilian life, destruction of landmarks,
ease of access for media coverage, increased potential to inflict injuries on our soldiers, using
relatively unsophisticated weapons systems. To make matters worse, the U.S. military has spent
much less time preparing for MOUT than conventional warfare, and has comparatively less
expertise to draw upon.

This report describes the result of a pilot study of MOUT, using Cognitive Task Analysis
methods to identify the types of expertise needed to make difficult judgments and decisions. The
project focused on a single task: clearing a building. The report makes a number of
recommendations for developing training that would improve judgment and decision skills. The
methodology used in this project will also make it possible to identify training objectives and
develop materials for improving cognitive skills for other aspects of urban warfare. The report
will be of value as background material for all persons involved with MOUT and will help
training developers address decision requirements of tasks that are central to the MOUT
environment.

ZITA M. SIMUTIS
Technical Director



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B-8



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B-7



As they approach the building to be cleared, the LT gets his first
good look at the objective. His mind is processing at a mile a minute, and in
about 10 seconds as they draw closer to the building, the LT considers the
following: “One or two civilians around the building, but they’ll clear out
when they see us. The rest of the civilian populace has been doing the same.
No mobs forming; no adverse reaction to our presence; no reason to expect
trouble from them. We'll leave them alone for now in accord with the rules of
engagement (ROEs).”

“Our plan calls for speed; crashing through the main door, but that’s
not going to work. We’d be walking into a trap.” The LT at once notices
many things that tell him this: The civilians are avoiding that door like the
plague. There is wire strung all the way around the front of the building except
for the door. Other barricades block the other entrances in the front of the
building. “The enemy expects us to come through that door,” he thinks.
“They’Il be waiting for us. If I was them, I’d have a bulk of my inside forces —
including the AK-47s they tend to use — focused on that door...and maybe
some outside forces!” Thinking of where he would put a sniper if he was the
enemy, the LT scans the surrounding buildings. He sees the perfect spot: A
two-story tower across the intersection from the building. A sniper in that
second story would have a perfect vantage point of the main door. “Alright,”
he thinks, “we can’t let that sniper get a shot.”

The LT is also looking at the building material. Non-reinforced
concrete...not too thick. “We could blow through that,” he thinks. Earlier, the
LT had planned for such a contingency, and had members of his platoon carry
enough explosives to breach the building by blowing a hole in the wall. They
had to leave behind some other ammunition, but the LT now sees it was a
good trade-off. “If we blow through the wall, we’ll catch the enemy inside off-
guard, but we’ll be exposed outside for a longer time. In this case, the element
of surprise is worth the risk.”

25

Decision: maintain awareness
of civilians in the area

Cue: civilians clear out, there
are no mobs

Implication: civilians are not
likely to cause trouble
Factor: ROE must be taken
into consideration

Decision: determine strengths
and vulnerabilities

Cue: civilians avoiding the
door, wire strung around front
of the building, other entrances
are blocked

Implication: the enemy wants
them to enter through the front
door

Decision: put self in the
enemy’s situation

Decision: identify hazards,
constraints, and constrictions
Cue: two-story building across
from the front door
Implication: likely spot for a
sniper

Decision: determine the entry
technique and equipment to be
used

Cue: non-reinforced concrete
Implication: explosives are
needed to breach the wall
Decision: tradeoff between
stealth and speed; catching the
enemy off guard is worth the
tisk

Decision: projecting into the
future



Determine how to seal off the area
Determine where to place security assets
Determine which assets and people to employ
Determine where to concentrate fires
Determine how to synchronize and shift fires

Sealing off the area is a decision for which the goal is to prevent unwanted people from
entering or exiting the area. The first thing a platoon leader must do is determine what the “area”
consists of. Experienced platoon leaders know that if the conflict is one of high intensity the area
will probably be relatively large, since the company will most likely be clearing more than one
building. In lower-intensity conflicts, the sealed off area will generally be smaller. Other factors
that come into play when sealing off the area surrounding the building include the enemy’s
capabilities to engage (i.e., their weapons and their suspected locations) and the proximity of the
objective building to other buildings and intersections. For example, if the enemy is known to
use relatively long-range weapons, then a larger area surrounding the building might be sealed
off. And if the objective building is in close proximity to other buildings, the sealed-off area may
be smaller; the buildings within close proximity must be sealed off since they enable observation
and firing access to the objective. On the other hand, buildings and areas further from the
objective are masked by those which are closer. In this case, even though the area to be sealed off
is smaller, a significant number of security personnel would likely be involved due to the
increased cover and concealment opportunities offered by the buildings.

Another interesting decision within this decision requirement is the judgment regarding
which assets and people to use for a security position. A skilled platoon leader will determine the
security assets best suited to the situation, and will then match individuals to those assets based
on their capabilities, since some soldiers are better with some weapon systems than others.
Generally these match-ups occur prior to the mission, but on occasion the situation will call for
some switching of personnel and assets within the security element.

Decision Requirement: Determine how to approach the building

The platoon leader’s goal in this decision requirement is to get his units to the building in
the safest, quickest, and most effective manner. Sometimes the approach will be by air (via
helicopter), sometimes by ground (on foot or in vehicles), and sometimes under ground (through
sewer systems or tunnels). Although transportation of soldiers may seem simple enough, the
challenge occurs when you factor in the will of the enemy to keep friendly forces from
accomplishing their mission. This stage of the mission is characterized by high-threat areas (e.g.,
open areas surrounding the objective, open streets, and intersections) and the potential presence
of several hidden threats (e.g., snipers hiding in upper stories of buildings, booby traps, and other
obstacles). In addition, as will be discussed, some aspects of expertise related to this decision
requirement seem counter-intuitive on the surface, which makes it difficult for less-experienced
platoon leaders to effectively approach and gain access to the objective building. The critical
decisions and judgments within this decision requirement include:

11



While simultaneously assessing the situation and determining what actions to take to
clear the building, the platoon leader also judges how best to employ his subordinates in order to
accomplish the clearing tasks (e.g., clearing a room, moving down a hallway, or providing
security). This decision has to do with determining the number of people required for each task
and judging which individuals will be able to
accomplish each task. The platoon leader may

decide that the threat in the building is “A soldier’s adrenaline is so high when he’s
relatively low, and subsequently will split an clearing rooms that he can get fatigued pretty
element (i.e., squad) to cover the area more easily. That’s why we leapfrog a fresh team to
quickly. He will also need to make an continue the clearing after the first team has
assessment of each individual’s and team’s taken care of three or four rooms.... But it
level of fatigue in order to determine how will all depend on the situation.”

they can be employed. A skilled platoon
leader will go into a mission having
developed a personality profile of sorts for each of his soldiers. He will know which individuals
freeze up in the face of danger and which soldiers function well under stressful conditions. While
conducting the operation he will judge levels of fatigue based on what the team or individual has
encountered thus far, and more importantly, the look in their eyes. An experienced platoon leader
can see fear in peoples’ eyes and judge whether a person is ready for action or needs a break from
the clearing. As a rule, skilled platoon leaders leapfrog clearing elements so that a fresh unit
enters the picture every 3-4 rooms, depending on the situation. Also, teams or individuals who
are too fatigued may be tasked to provide security in a room or area (see the decision requirement
to extend and maintain security), rather than continue the extremely physically and mentally
exhausting room clearing tasks. If the platoon leader determines that enough of his subordinates
are too fatigued to continue clearing in a safe manner, he may decide to request reinforcements
from the company commander.

Decision Requirement: Determine how to extend and maintain security

During the process of the actual clearing it is imperative that the clearing unit secure areas
of the building that have already been cleared. The overall purpose of this decision requirement is
to protect the clearing unit while in the building. The critical decision within this decision
requirement is:

e Determine where to place security elements

The decision regarding placement of security elements serves both to maintain areas that
have already been cleared and also protect the platoon from threats in areas that have not yet been
cleared (and may not be cleared at all). As discussed in the previous section, the technique
frequently used by platoon leaders to maintain security entails tasking one clearing team
(generally four soldiers) to clear three or four rooms (depending on the building and the
circumstances of the mission) and then remain in or near the rooms to keep them secure. A
second clearing team will leapfrog the first and take responsibility for clearing the next set of
rooms, securing them, and so on. This technique not only enables good security, but also
maximizes the effectiveness of the clearing unit in that it assists in controlling fatigue levels.

17



engaged. A good platoon leader can use the environmental cues and other factors to build a story
(the ambush prepared by the enemy), mentally simulate the next chapter in the story (the
platoon’s lack of ability to counter), and subsequently make a decision. In this case the platoon
leader might choose an alternate route to the objective building. If no alternative exists, he may
need to provide this information to his company commander, who may then decide to abort the
mission.

Note that this scenario provides a nice example of how the task-independent decision
requirements become mandatory in implementing the task-focused decision requirements. In this
case, the platoon leader was forced to view the situation from the enemy’s perspective, and
project events into the future in addition to identifying the hazards, constraints, and constrictions.

Decision Requirement: Determine how to enter the building

This decision requirement involves determining an entry point. The entry point must be
relatively accessible, must provide a good starting point, and must not present a significant threat
to the clearing unit. The entry may be from the roof, through a top story window, through a
ground level wall, through a door, and even through underground sewer pipes. Given the wide
variety of entry point possibilities, the need for mentally representing the MOUT environment in
three dimensions becomes apparent. The critical decisions and judgments related to entering the
building are:

Determine the strengths and vulnerabilities of the building and its inhabitants
Determine the point of entry (where to enter the building)

Determine entry technique, and equipment to be used (how to enter the building)
Consider tradeoffs between stealth and speed

The platoon leader’s first critical

assessment in this stage of the mission will “If you see that there are people in the
be to size up the building in order to building, but they’re all avoiding the front
determine its strengths and vulnerabilities. door, then the door’s probably booby

This is often difficult for the platoon leader trapped.”
as he often has so little time to reconnoiter
the area and make an assessment. Instead, he
must rely on subtle cues in the environment to make his assessment. He will look for signs that
the building has been fortified (see Table 1) or signs of a potential ambush. He will also watch
for aspects of the building (or its inhabitants) that have changed since he last saw it (if he has
previously operated in the area), or aspects that seem out of the ordinary. For example, if the
local people appear to be avoiding an area around the building, like a patch of ground or the front
door, then it is likely that the area is dangerous. In addition to relying on environmental cues to
determine the building’s strengths and weaknesses, skilled platoon leaders work under a set of
rules-of-thumb when the situation allows. One “rule” is to avoid doors altogether. Doors are
referred to as “fatal funnels” because the enemy frequently fortifies them heavily with the
understanding that they are the most easily accessible entry point for invaders and because
doorways act as a frame that allows the enemy to be more likely to hit the assault element.

13



Only a few seconds have passed since the LT saw his objective for
the first time. The platoon is now at the intersection where the building is
located. The LT knows that intersections are death traps, so he has the platoon
take cover short of the intersection. No movement from the objective or other
surrounding buildings can be detected. The LT informs the SLs that the plan
has changed. The main door is no longer an option. Since the other platoons
are coordinating their actions off the LT’s moves, there is no time for a rear
assault. The LT has to find another front entry. Observing the intersection, and
noticing the possible sniper tower, the LT positions the security squad. He is
careful that, in his placement, they can cover all critical areas around the
building, given the ranges of their weapons. He is also careful that they are
concealed and aren’t set up for possible fratricide.

“Now, getting into the building...” the LT thinks, “We’ve got to move
quickly. There are no other doors nearby and the windows would all require
some climbing. With all the heavy gear and climbing, the time to build a step
to the window, and a waiting enemy inside, we would be sitting ducks both
inside and outside the windows.” The LT envisions a breach at a window: The
cutting of the wire, and the building of a step, with a chokepoint of soldiers
bunched outside the window, while loaded with gear, each man slowly climbs
in virtually unprotected to whatever waits inside. He quickly dismisses the
idea. He quickly scans the area to the left of the main door...not heavily
barricaded...no holes...no windows. The concrete does not appear to be
reinforced. “That’s it,” he decides. “We’re blowing a hole 3 meters to the left
of the door.”

Since they are still making a frontal assault, and since he is concerned
about snipers, the LT realizes that they will need to obscure their approach.
There is little time for a feigned assault, and the LT does a quick wind and
temperature assessment and decides that smoke will conceal the approach
well.

“No more time to replan...the rest of the company is waiting for us to
go,” the LT thinks. “If this mission is going to work, it means that this platoon
has to assault this building now.” The LT lays aside the multitude of other
uncertainties and starts the assault.

26

Factor: intersections are death
traps

Implication: find cover near
the intersection so you can
defend yourself

Cue: no movement from
surrounding buildings
Decision: communicate clearly
with subordinates, determine
placement of security

Cue: intersection and possible
sniper tower

Factor: are all areas covered,
possibility of fratricide

Cues: location of doors and
windows

Decision: project ahead as to
what would happen if they
entered through the windows
and if they breached a hole
near the window

Difficulty: the soldiers are
vulnerable waiting to enter
building

Cue: no barricades, gun ports,
or window left of the main
door

Implication: the LT can project
ahead and determine this is the
optimal entry point

Decision: determine how to
obscure the assault

Cue: frontal assault, possibility
of snipers, wind, temperature
Implication: obscuring the
approach is optimal and smoke
will be effective

Decision Requirement:
maintain the big picture and
situation awareness



these cues for the mission. For example, when approaching a building the sight of freshly turned
dirt may indicate the presence of mines. We walked the interviewees through the different tasks

of clearing a building, using Knowledge Audit and CDM probes to reveal cognitive components
and elicit concrete examples when possible.

The information from these interviews was then incorporated into the DRTs. These
updated tables were used to conduct two additional interviews during the third round of
interviews. The DRTs were again used as a stimulus for discussion of concepts and specific
incidents, which led to a deeper understanding of the cognitive aspects of clearing a building.
The data collected during these interviews was then analyzed and integrated into the existing
DRTs.

FINDINGS

The findings of this investigation are represented within DRTs which encompass the data
from all nine interviews. Each DRT centers on one identified decision requirement, and the
information within the table details the cognitive aspects related to that decision requirement.
These cognitive aspects include the critical decisions and judgments relevant to each decision
requirement, the unique challenges of each critical decision or judgment (i.e., why the decision is
difficult), the subtle cues (i.e., pieces of information that are directly perceived from the
environment) and other factors (e.g., pieces of general background knowledge) that shape the
decision, and the strategies employed or aspects of expertise possessed by the decision maker.

The decision requirements identified in this effort fall into two distinct, yet related,
categories. The first category includes the task-focused decision requirements. These
requirements are directly related to the subtasks involved in a building clearing operation. They
are linear in nature in that the platoon leader will generally address them one at a time and in the
order presented below. The task-focused decision requirements are:

Determine how to secure the perimeter
Determine how to approach the building
Determine how to enter the building
Determine how to clear the building
Determine how to maintain and extend security

eerceeve

The second category is comprised of task-independent decision requirements. These
decision requirements encompass the task-focused requirements; they are critical across all
stages of a building clearing mission. At any point during the operation all of these decision
requirements should be active. The task-independent decision requirements are:

Maintain the enemy’s perspective (Think like the enemy)
Lead subordinates

Maintain the big picture and situation awareness

Project into the future



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A-13



COGNITIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALL UNIT LEADERS IN MILTARY
OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background: The Problem and Opportunity
OD jectives.....ssssccsseseccssseessseecssssnsscessnececnnnesensass

METHODS .....ssssssssesssessesscssscssvcssvessscesscenscesscsncencsscossssansssscanecnsequecanccscessnnscnscenananeussesssessesseeseee 2

Cognitive Task Analysis.....
Data Collection and Analys:

Task-Focused Decision Requirements
Task-Independent Decision Requirements
A Mission in Sonaly: One Lieutenant's Experience ....

DISCUSSION ....cssscsssssessscssssceecessssccsesscsssensensssccseenecaencavenscnscacaneansancnscaccnsascsssoncasensnesaseneeesegeee 30

Implications for Training
Future Directions

REFERENCES

APPENDIX A. Task-Focused Decision Requirement Tables ........:.ssssssersssessesssserssseseesseensnees A-1

APPENDIX B. Task-Independent Decision Requirement Tables...

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Indicators of building fortification ..........:sscsssssesesresssesserssennseneesnecstensensennecnesnssnnees 14



Decision Requirement: Project into the future

At all points during the mission the platoon leader must think ahead to the next steps in
the operation. He must consider how current actions are achieving the mission objectives and
therefore what subsequent actions must take place to further the accomplishment of the
objectives. This entails mentally simulating how current actions will change the situation, and
being prepared to make decisions regarding next steps within that new context. In addition, he
must mentally simulate the results that might be achieved through the projected next steps to
determine whether those are favorable results, and thus adjust his directions to his unit
accordingly. Within this decision requirement, the critical decisions and judgments are:

e Determine where to proceed next
e Determine the personnel and unit size necessary for mission accomplishment
¢ Determine where to locate oneself to best direct and support the unit

It is crucial that these decisions occur well ahead of actual events, otherwise they cannot be
implemented in time to have the desired effect.

The difficulty in this decision requirement lies in the inherent challenge of thinking ahead
while faced with the urgency and chaos of the immediate situation. However, successful mission
accomplishment is contingent on a logical sequence of actions that contributes to the desired end
state. One of the errors of less-experienced platoon leaders is an over-reliance on the plan, even
when it has become obsolete. It is easy to project and take future actions that are in line with the
plan. However, when the plan no longer fits the situation, the prescribed actions fail to have a
positive impact.

In addition to the cues and factors listed in the DRT in Appendix B, the decisions within
this decision requirement are shaped by the expectancies set by the platoon leader (see decision
requirement to maintain the big picture and situation awareness). The function of expectancies is
to predict logical next events, whether they have to do with enemy actions, features of the
building, or even civilian involvement. And while expectancies will not always be met, they
nonetheless provide the best basis from which to anticipate the future and thus determine which
actions will best address the future situation. By acting on projected future situations rather than
reacting only to the immediate situation, the platoon can stay ahead of the enemy’s decision cycle
and thereby maintain the edge.

A Mission in Sonaly: One Lieutenant’s Experience

The following is a fictitious yet realistic story of a building clearing operation from the
perspective of a platoon leader, LT Gasko. The purpose of the story is to enhance the previous
sections describing the findings of the CTA, by illustrating a sampling of platoon leader decision
requirements within a context-rich tactical scenario. The story’s narrative is on the left below.
Margin notes are included on the right to indicate decisions, cues, factors, and difficulties
identified in the CTA and brought to life in this scenario. See Appendixes A and B for a more
detailed description of the decision requirements.

23



Appendix B:
Task-Independent Decision Requirement Tables

B-1



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Maintaining the enemy perspective is a SS

more complicated decision requirement than it “You have to put yourself in his shoes. You
often appears at face value. Soldiers at all say to yourself... If I was him, what would I
experience levels will tell you that it is do to accomplish my objectives?”

important to think like the enemy. However, —————————————

only those soldiers with extensive practice and

experience can do it. The requirement is to actually put oneself in the enemy’s presumed mindset
and plan from that perspective. What are the vulnerabilities of enemy's enemy (i.e., the
friendlies)? How can he best exploit his strengths against those vulnerabilities? What are the key
leverage points (e.g., buildings with good vantage points, intersections, or well-constructed
buildings) in the environment? These questions mirror the aspects of OCOKA that Rangers use
to guide their consideration of the enemy’s perspective: observation; cover and concealment;
obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of approach. The goal of this decision requirement is to
internalize the enemy’s objectives and the most promising strategies for achieving those
objectives, so that actions can be taken to deny the enemy his objectives.

The DRT for this decision requirement presents additional cues and factors that assist
platoon leaders in predicting the enemy. The DRT also describes strategies used by experts to
maintain the enemy perspective, and lessons that have been learned in terms of assessing enemy
actions.

Decision Requirement: Lead subordinates

This decision requirement is about managing a distributed team in order to sustain a
contiguous flow of operation. The platoon leader will lose the ability to maintain his situation
awareness and orchestrate the operation if he cannot maintain leadership over his subordinates.
The critical decisions and judgments within the decision requirement include:

© Clearly communicate with and direct subordinates
© Maintain control of subordinates
© Judge the combat effectiveness of individuals

All three of these critical decisions can be difficult due to the distributed nature of the team, the
frequently chaotic environment in which it works, and the tendency for communications gear to
break down.

The importance of the first decision task, to clearly communicate with and direct
subordinates, lies in the need for calibration and integration of the efforts of each squad and fire
team. As the platoon approaches the building, all individuals must have a shared understanding
of the approximate route to be taken and the role of each team in getting to the building. For
example, in a high-threat situation where the platoon is approaching on foot, the platoon leader
may designate a certain squad or fire team to support or cover the movement of another. Upon
entering the building, all subordinates must have a shared understanding of where and how the
entry will take place, which fire team will enter first, and how much time is available to conduct
the entry. This last piece of information is crucial, and the platoon leader must have an effective

20



COGNITIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALL UNIT LEADERS IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

In recent years Army combat operations have moved from traditional rural battlefields
toward urban settings. These Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) and their cognitive
demands vary considerably from traditional battlefields. Troops now fight within close quarters,
against an underdefined enemy, and amongst hostile and non-hostile civilians. The situation is
exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. Army as a whole has relatively less MOUT experience than
conventional warfare experience. Further, MOUT training tends to emphasize procedural rather
than cognitive tasks, and is most often conducted by specialized personnel such as the Rangers
and Special Operations Forces.

Procedure:

The focus of the project was restricted to the building-clearing task from the perspective
of a platoon leader. Klein Associates conducted a cognitive task analysis (CTA) with seven
active duty or retired soldiers of varying ranks (from Sergeant to Colonel) and types of
experiences (from MOUT training exercises to actual MOUT missions). In-depth interviews
served as the means for data collection. The interview methods used include the Task Diagram,
Knowledge Audit, and Critical Decision Method. The interview data were analyzed to identify
the cognitive challenges of building clearing operations. These were specified in the form of
decision requirements: the critical decisions, difficulties, cues, factors, and strategies used in
clearing a building. Identified decision requirements were then presented within Decision
Requirement Tables.

Findings:

Nine decision requirements were identified, each of which represents an overarching
grouping of similar cognitive demands. Two categories of requirements emerged from the data:
task-focused decision requirements (those that occurred during a specific stage of the building
clearing) and task-independent decision requirements (those that were active during all stages of
the clearing). The task-focused decision requirements were: determine how to secure the
perimeter, determine how to approach the building, determine how to enter the building,
determine how to clear the building, and determine how to maintain and extend security. The
task-independent decision requirements were: maintain the enemy’s perspective, lead
subordinates, maintain the big picture and situation awareness, and project into the future. Each
of the decision requirements and their related cognitive aspects were represented within Decision
Requirement Tables, which were then used to guide recommendations for training development.

vii



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project reflects the efforts of several individuals whose contributions benefited the final
product. The authors would like to acknowledge:

MAJ Jim Reeves, Army Research Institute at Fort Benning, for coordinating access to
subject matter experts and acting as a resource for domain knowledge;

Dr. Kenneth Evans, Army Research Institute at Fort Benning, who was helpful in
providing technical guidance throughout this project; and

Dr. Rebecca Pliske, Klein Associates, for her feedback and contributions at several stages
of the project.

Finally, we wish to thank those who served as subject matter experts and shared their time and

expertise with us. Their insights, feedback, and cooperation were critical to the project and we
gratefully acknowledge their contributions

vi



Figure 1 depicts the relationships among the decision requirements. The decision
requirements inside the box are task-focused. The decision requirements in the circles are task-
independent, and apply across all of the task-focused decision requirements. While each decision
requirement has a distinct nature, there is tremendous overlap among requirements. Placement of
perimeter security will influence the decisions made during the approach, entry, and clearing of
the building. Information collected during the approach and entry will impact the manner in
which the platoon leader instructs the clearing to occur. The method by which the platoon leader
decides to clear the building will affect the location and technique by which he will decide to
approach and enter the building. Furthermore, the task-independent decision requirements have a
large impact on each of the task-focused requirements and on each other. The platoon leader’s
situation awareness and projection of future events will shape his decision making as he secures
the perimeter, approaches, enters, and clears the building, and maintains security within the
building. Moreover, his situation awareness will be molded by his ability to think like the enemy,
and in turn, his situation awareness will mold his projection of future events. Throughout the
mission, the platoon leader’s leadership abilities are crucial.

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nen

Figure 1. Decision requirements within the building clearing operation. The decision
requirements within the rectangle are task-focused. The decision requirements in ovals are task-
independent, and are operative across all of the task-focused decision requirements.



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Decision requirements within the building clearing operation ..........ssssssssesstecssseeesseeees 9

2. Maintaining security while clearing a floor of a building ..0.......c.sesssssssesssesseeesecnseensees 18



entered through a third floor window. This left them extremely vulnerable to the enemy, but it
was their only realistic option.

Decision Requirement: Determine how to clear the building

This decision requirement involves the actual clearing of the building, room by room and
floor by floor. Many challenges arise for the platoon leader during this stage of the operation. His
job is to orchestrate the clearing, which entails split-second decisions to direct his clearing teams,
limited yet critical communication with the clearing and support (outside the building) teams,
construction of situation awareness inside and around the building, and judgments of the welfare
and morale of the platoon. The DRT for this decision requirement, shown in Appendix A, details
the decision-making issues during the actual clearing stage of the operation. The nine critical
decisions and judgments within this decision requirement are:

Assess the situation within the building

Determine the flow of the clearing

Determine how to employ personnel and teams

Determine how and where to proceed

Communicate directions and information

Determine how and when to evacuate casualties

Determine whether to request reinforcements or call for fire
Determine the mental and physical state of the soldiers
Determine when the clearing is completed

Assessing the situation within the building is a high-impact decision task. The platoon
leader’s assessment enables him to continually build his situation awareness and form
expectancies about how the remainder of the mission will go. It also assists him as he makes the
other eight decisions and judgments. The assessment will influence his determination of the flow
of the clearing, employment of personnel, determination of where to proceed, communication
with his subordinates, casualty evacuation strategy, calls for reinforcements and fires, and
determination of when the clearing is completed.

The assessment task can be quite challenging for an inexperienced platoon leader. It
requires him to process visual and auditory cues from the environment and produce a mental
picture of the situation. The mental picture must encompass not only what is occurring in the
present, but also what is likely to occur in the near future (e.g., What will happen when we move
to the next floor? This is related to the task-independent decision requirement, project into the
future). Given that the platoon leader generally stations himself behind the lead element, much of
the information he uses to assess the situation comes through verbal communication with the
lead element. Furthermore, voice communication is minimized to prevent the enemy from
gaining information about the platoon. Squad and fire team leaders are trained to communicate in
quick, short phrases, and only describe what they see rather than attaching an inference to the
information. The onus to develop an assessment falls completely on the platoon leader.

15



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1728

Cognitive Requirements for Small Unit Leaders in
Military Operations in Urban Terrain

Jennifer Phillips, Patricia L. McDermott, Marvin Thordsen,
Michael McCloskey, and Gary Klein
Klein Associates Inc.

440 7011866)

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4 September 1998

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



REFERENCES

Bowden, M. (1997, November 16 — December 14). Blackhawk down, The Philadelphia
Inquirer, Philadelphia, PA: Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.

Chi, M. T. H., Glaser, R., & Farr, M. J. (1988). The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.

Crandall, B., & Getchell-Reiter, K. (1993). Critical decision method: A technique for
eliciting concrete assessment indicators from the “intuition” of NICU nurses. Advances in Nursing
Sciences, 16 (1), 42-51.

Crandall, B. W., Kyne, M., Militello, L., & Klein, G. A. (1992): Describing expertise in
one-on-one instruction (Contract MDA903-91-C-0058 for the U.S. Army Research Institute,
Alexandria, VA). Yellow Springs, OH: Klein Associates Inc.

Ericsson, K. A. (Ed.). (1996). The road to excellence. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ericsson, K. A., & Smith, J. (Eds.). (1991). Toward a general theory of expertise:
Prospects and limits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feltovich, P. J., Ford, K. M., & Hoffman, R. R. (1997). Expertise in context. Menlo Park,
CA: AAAI Press/The MIT Press.

Flanagan, J. C. (1954). The critical incident technique. Psychological Bulletin, 51, 327-
358.

Hoffman, R. R., Crandall, B. W., & Shadbolt, N.R. (in press). A case study in cognitive
task analysis methodology: The Critical Decision Method for the elicitation of expert knowledge.

Journal of Human Factors.

Glenn, R. W. (1996). Combat in hell: A consideration of constrained urban warfare.
Prepared for U.S. Army and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND.

Klein, G. (1997). Developing expertise in decision making. Thinking and Reasoning, 3(4),
337-352. East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press Ltd.

Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D. (1989). Critical decision method for
eliciting knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 19(3), 462-472.

Klein, G., McCloskey, M., Pliske, R. & Schmitt, J. (1997). Decision skills training.
Proceedings of the 41% Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Albuquerque, NM.

Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., & Zsambok, C. E. (Eds.). (1993). Decision

39


Among those selected soldiers having substantial levels of MOUT experience, the opportunity
exists to capitalize on their uncommon expertise to identify critical cognitive aspects of decision
making and to subsequently enhance current Army training programs. Soldiers with extensive
experience in actual MOUT missions have learned lessons that cannot be found in any training
manuals. By using an arsenal of cognitive task analysis (CTA) methods to elicit these lessons, we
can identify the decision requirements of MOUT missions: the critical and challenging decisions
and judgments, the informational cues and factors that influence those decisions, the reasons why
the decisions and judgments can be so difficult, and the strategies used by expert decision makers
(the aspects of expertise). We can then use those decision requirements to formulate training
development recommendations for MOUT. Improvements to MOUT training cannot create
experts of new platoon leaders overnight, or even within a few months, but they can dramatically
ramp up their learning curve and better prepare them for the judgments and decisions they will be
required to make when they are given MOUT assignments.

This report details the findings of a CTA conducted with a selected group of seven
MOUT-experienced soldiers. From the perspective of a platoon leader, the CTA focused on the
task of clearing a building, which was selected for its paramount importance. The report
describes how the CTA findings (i.e., the decision requirements) suggest training development
issues for lieutenants likely to face MOUT assignments in the future. Recommendations for
implementing decision-centered MOUT training are also discussed. The report is organized as
follows: The Introduction presents the background which underlies this effort as well as the
objectives of the study. The Methods section describes CTA methods in general terms and details
the manner in which they were applied in this research effort. The Findings section discusses the
decision requirements identified by the CTA, and offers a fictitious account of a building clearing
operation in order to better illustrate the findings in context. The Discussion describes
implications for training and discusses future research directions. Appendixes A and B contain the
complete CTA data set presented within Decision Requirement Tables (DRTs).

Objectives

The overall objective of this effort was to understand the critical elements of decision
making in a MOUT environment, and to employ this understanding to develop recommendations
for improved MOUT training. Specifically, we endeavored to explore building clearing
operations from the perspective of a platoon leader. Our technical objectives were to conduct a
CTA of the building clearing task and to use the CTA findings both to develop MOUT training
recommendations for new and inexperienced platoon leaders and to determine the feasibility of
using CTA methods to identify and develop training recommendations for other MOUT tasks.

METHODS
Cognitive Task Analysis

The cornerstone of our approach to identifying the MOUT decision-making requirements
of platoon leaders in building clearing operations is CTA methodology. CTA is the process of

2



Cognitive Requirements for Small Unit Leaders in
Military Operations in Urban Terrain

INTRODUCTION

Background: The Problem and Opportunity

The Army is facing an ever increasing frequency of urban-based military operations
(Glenn, 1996). Bosnia is one example. Termed Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT),
these types of operations and their decision-making requirements vary considerably from the
more traditional operations which occur in rural settings. The unique MOUT-related decision
challenges are exacerbated by the fact that most Army personnel, with the exception of
specialized personnel such as the Rangers and Special Operations Forces, have relatively little
actual MOUT experience, and that most institutional and unit training is not MOUT-directed.

Although all Army personnel receive some MOUT training, this MOUT training typically
emphasizes the procedural aspects of tasks, such as where each soldier involved in a room
clearing operation should stand and the area in the room for which each is responsible. While
procedures are very important, especially in tightly restricted operations such as room clearing,
they do not prepare soldiers for critical decision-making issues unique to MOUT environments.
In most cases, MOUT judgments and decisions are extremely difficult to make. For example,
these decisions often must be made under extreme time pressure, with high degrees of
uncertainty, and in a setting of high vulnerability. MOUT is not about arranging long distance
artillery duels. It is about missions like finding the best way to immediately extricate soldiers
from an urban ambush where the threats are operating in three, rather than two, dimensions.

MOUT missions include a wide range of “decision requirements,” which specify the
cognitive demands facing leaders. One potential reason for the virtual exclusion of decision-
making training within instructional programs is that it is so hard to identify the decisions and the
cognitive strategies used by skilled soldiers. It is generally only the experts in a field who have a
bank of knowledge regarding how to effectively deal with these critical decisions. And, like
experts in most fields, they often cannot articulate the tacit knowledge surrounding their decision
making without the assistance of an outside party trained in eliciting such information.

The danger here is that soldiers, no matter how well-trained and prepared to carry out
difficult actions, cannot be protected from the consequences of their poor decisions. MOUT
places platoon leaders in highly demanding situations where they have to operate with a high
degree of independence. Thus, relatively junior officers are going to be facing high risks and
demanding situations with little preparation for handling the decision requirements of MOUT
missions. As we have seen in Chechnya, Mogadishu, Berlin in WWII, Hue City, and many other
urban battlefields, the casualty rates can be staggering compared to warfare conducted in open
terrain as in Desert Storm (Glenn, 1996; MCIA, 1997).



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Translating MOUT Decision Requirements into Training Interventions

In order to provide a clearer idea of how decision requirements can be translated into
meaningful TDG scenarios and training tools, we will discuss an example. Let us start with the
task-related decision requirement of determining how to secure the perimeter of a building. As
this has been determined to be an important task in MOUT operations, it could be the basis for a
series of TDGs. Using the information from the DRT for this task, as well as from general
information elicited in SME interviews, we can develop the background for the scenario:

You are an Army platoon leader of XXX UNIT. Your unit has been operating for
two weeks as part of a U.N. task force providing security for humanitarian relief
efforts. Sonala is a Third World country torn by civil war, the result of which has
been a total breakdown of the country’s infrastructure creating widespread
outbreaks of disease and starvation. There are, known to date, at least three
different terrorist organizations, fighting for control of the country. The local
populace is rapidly growing weary of the terrorists and are no longer hiding
them. Enemy infantry forces have infiltrated and have recently begun occupying
defensive positions around the capital city of Mondishu in an effort to seize
control of the city and assume power. The capital city contains approximately 50
buildings and has a population of about 1000 people. Intelligence reports that the
enemy is operating in 2-4 man assault teams on the outskirts of the city,
occupying some of the perimeter buildings. They are equipped with AR-15s and
grenades. They seem to have little mutual support between buildings, but do have
several sniper teams in the area.

Within this decision requirement of securing the perimeter, there are several critical
decisions that must be practiced. The platoon leader must know, for example, how to seal off the
area and where to place his security assets. The DRT for securing the perimeter includes these
critical decisions and suggests why they are difficult to make, while identifying the cues and
factors experienced soldiers use in making such decisions. Using this information, we might
construct a scenario that forces participants to deal with these decisions. This might look like the
following:

Your platoon has been assigned to clear a building in the war-torn city. You have
planned to secure the perimeter by placing your support unit in a partially
walled-in courtyard northwest of the building. However, upon reaching the area
around the building you find that civilians are running frantically all around the
building, and several currently occupy the courtyard. Your support unit will have
to provide security from a different location. To make matters worse, you know
that enemy snipers could strike at any time in this inflammatory environment, so
you will need to get your units in place quickly.

34



Assessing mission progress against the plan assists the platoon leader in judging when
and how to adjust the plan, and assessing the morale and combat effectiveness of his platoon. His
assessment of the big picture helps to shape his decisions about future actions and prepares him
for what he may encounter next, especially once the clearing is completed and he must exit the
building. Maintaining awareness of civilians
in the area is of great importance because a
civilians add complexity to MOUT “One day you’re giving candy to a kid, and
operations, especially when their disposition the next day he’s giving grenades to the
toward friendlies is unknown or questionable. enemy.”

The platoon leader has to dynanically 2ss¢SX
whether civilians are impacting the current

operation. He must know their involvement in the past: whether they have been a threat to the
platoon (in which case they may be viewed no differently than the enemy), whether they have
been an asset (e.g., are willing to collect intelligence for friendlies), or whether they remain
neutral. Regardless of their actions in the past, it is always possible their disposition will change,
and the platoon leader must keep an eye out for such indications.

The decision task to maintain awareness of friendly sectors of fire is critical to the
prevention of fratricide. While sectors of fire for each platoon generally remain the same
throughout the course of a mission, the platoon leader must be prepared for the sectors to change.
Finally, the decision task regarding setting expectancies is a critical one because it enables the
platoon leader to use his situation awareness to project into the future. The importance of
projection will be described in the section that follows.

The judgments within this decision requirement tend to be difficult, especially for an
inexperienced platoon leader, due to the numerous inputs contributing to situation awareness and
the broadness of the big picture, not to mention the high-stress, chaotic nature of close quarters
battle. When the platoon is in the building and conducting the clearing, for example, less-
experienced leaders tend to focus on aspects of the physical clearing rather than the big picture.
That is, they have difficulty juggling all the pieces of information, so they filter out less relevant
pieces and attend to the ones that seem to be most relevant to the immediate situation. Those
information cues generally have to do with the layout of the building (location of rooms,
hallways, and stairwells), potential for fratricide, level of threat, and location of the enemy. The
cues they pay less attention to are often communication from units outside the building, or cues
inside the building that point to enemy intentions, civilian disposition, or other intelligence that
might be useful for setting expectancies in the near or far future.

Furthermore, platoon leaders find that much of the information they use to assess the
situation is based on voice communication from subordinates that they must integrate into their
mental picture of the situation. When communications gear goes down, so do the opportunities
for building situation awareness.

22



making in action: Models and methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Klinger, D. W., Andriole, S. J., Militello, L. G., Adelman, L., Klein, G., & Gomes, M. E.
(1993). Designing for performance: A cognitive systems engineering approach to modifying an
AWACS human-computer interface (Contract AL/CF-TR-1993-0093 for Department of the Air
Force, Armstrong Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH).

Yellow Springs, OH: Klein Associates Inc.

McCloskey, M. J., Pliske, R.M., Klein, G., Heaton, J., & Knight, B. J. (1997). Decision
skills training: Preparing Marine squad leaders for Hunter Warrior. Technical report submitted to
SYNETICS Corporation for Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory, Special Purpose Marine
Air-Ground Task Force under contract No. N00178-95-D-1008, King George, VA.

MCIA (March, 1997). Russia’s war in Chechnya: Urban warfare lessons learned 1994-
1996. Paper presented at Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s Urban Warfare Commanders

Course, Quantico, VA.

Militello, L.G., & Hutton, R. J. B. (in preparation). Applied Cognitive Task Analysis
(ACTA): A practitioner’s toolkit for understanding cognitive task demands. Ergonomics.

Militello, L., & Lim, L. (1995). Patient assessment skills: Assessing early cues of
necrotizing enterocolitis. The Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing, 9(2), 42-52. Aspen
Publishers, Inc.

Schmitt, J. F. (1994). Mastering tactics. Marine Corps Association: Quantico, VA.

Zsambok, C. E., & Klein, G. (Eds.). (1997). Naturalistic decision making. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum

40



way of expressing time criticality to his platoon, especially among less-experienced members.
During the actual clearing of the building, the platoon leader must impart to his squads and fire
teams exactly what their roles are at any given time, and at least an approximate understanding of
the roles of other teams. That is, each fire team should know how its current task relates to the
tasks of other fire teams, and how the various tasks each support mission accomplishment.

The decision task of maintaining control of subordinates comes strongly into play in
building clearing because of the chaotic and high-stress nature of the environment. Under these
circumstances, subordinates often want to just clear the building and then get out, without
waiting for direction from the platoon leader. However, it is the platoon leader’s job to make sure
this does not happen. On one hand, a clearing conducted without the orchestration of a leader
may result in an increased number of friendly casualties (e.g., due to rooms that share a wall
being cleared simultaneously) or a loss of potentially critical intelligence (e.g., due to information
cues about the enemy being overlooked for the sake of simply finishing the operation and leaving
the area). Furthermore, when the platoon leader loses control of his subordinates, they will be
forced to make decisions for which they are not responsible and ,indeed, are not trained to make.

The final critical judgment within this
decision requirement, judging the combat
effectiveness of subordinates, comes into play
especially when the unit has taken casualties.
This assessment is judged not only on the
physical nature and seriousness of the
injuries, but also on the mental toll they have
taken on the unit. It is important to note here that although the platoon leader makes his
assessment of combat effectiveness, the company commander decides how to address the
situation by either sending in reinforcements or instructing the platoon to pull out.

“You don’t really realize you’re taking fire
until you see a buddy die. Then your feeling
of invincibility goes out the window.”

Decision Requirement: Maintain the big picture and situation awareness

This decision requirement has to do with keeping track of the events and status within
and surrounding your mission. The platoon leader’s situation awareness will continually be
updated as he takes in additional pieces of information. This information will come from his own
visual input, communication with his clearing and support units, communication with his
company commander and/or adjacent platoon leaders, and auditory cues from the environment
including gunfire, running footsteps, and the like. He will use his situation awareness at all stages
of the mission to make decisions. In addition, he will use his situation awareness to set
expectancies for what he should or should not encounter, thus projecting into the future. The
critical decisions and judgments within this requirement include:

Assess mission progress against mission plan and objectives
Assess the big picture situation

Maintain awareness of civilians in the area

Maintain awareness of sectors of fire for all friendly units
Set expectancies

21



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Utilization of Findings:

Based on interviews with subject matter experts who were experienced in MOUT tasks
such as clearing buildings, the following conclusions were drawn:

Expertise does exist within the building clearing task.

CTA is an effective method for capturing decision requirements in MOUT
environments.

There are many critical decisions, cues, factors, difficulties, rules, and strategies used
in the building clearing task that are gained with experience but are not currently
being addressed in training.

Once decision requirements are identified, they can be used to directly guide training
applications.

The following are recommendations for using the decision requirements identified during
the project:

Training the cognitive aspects of MOUT decision making can best be accomplished
through a scenario-based approach that boosts expertise by enabling decision-making
practice in context.

Task-focused decision requirements can provide context for these tactical scenarios.
Task-independent decision requirements can be used in creating tools to supplement
the scenarios by spotlighting cognitive aspects of decision making.

The CTA could be broadened to include different perspectives, both subordinate (e.g.,
squad leader) and superior (e.g., company commander) to a platoon leader.

The CTA could also be broadened to include other MOUT tasks in addition to
building clearing.

viii



Determine route and/or method of approach
Determine how to navigate streets

Identify hazards, constraints, and constrictions
Determine how to obscure the assault

Ideally, the decision of determining the route and method of approach will occur largely
during the planning phase, but will inevitably be altered to some extent during mission execution.
The driver for this decision is to maintain the safety of the platoon while accomplishing the
mission. This requires avoiding open areas which make soldiers easy targets, taking advantage of
cover and concealment opportunities (e.g., wooded areas, walled-in courtyards, and buildings),
and choosing the best route possible. In situations where it is difficult to find a safe route, it is
important to obscure the assault (which is another critical decision in itself).

While approaching an objective on foot, it is likely that the platoon will be forced to
navigate to reach the objective. Usually this navigation is through streets. Experts have learned
the importance of moving quickly down the streets, as well as the danger involved in hugging
heavy-duty walls, such as concrete, while moving down a street. This is one aspect of expertise
that seems counter-intuitive to most inexperienced platoon leaders. Typically, soldiers will think
of walls as a form of protection, but in reality a wall acts almost as a bullet magnet, since bullets
that hit walls tend to ricochet off and travel closely along them.

During the approach, whether by air, land, or underground, the platoon leader must
identify hazards, constraints, and constrictions. The goal of this decision is to detect threats in
order to avoid or neutralize them, thereby

maintaining the safety of the unit and the eS
accomplishment of the mission. This can be “We need to keep an eye on the tall buildings
challenging because the potential threats are since the enemy might have snipers up there.
numerous and often hidden from view, troops We also want to look out for anything out of
moving on foot are very vulnerable, especially the ordinary that might suggest a trap. For
when in open spaces, and accurately example, freshly dug dirt in an area would
determining sectors of fire can be complicated. make me think there’s a booby trap nearby.”

In order to identify the hazards, the platoon ee

leader must look for specific cues in the

environment and interpret the pattern of cues to make a determination as to what is a hazard,
whether the hazard must be neutralized or avoided, how to do so, and whether the hazard can be
used to his own advantage. For example, the platoon leader might notice a series of obstacles that
tend to force (channelize) his unit in a certain direction. He might also notice that the obstacles
lead his unit to an intersection or other open area. Or, he might note that one or more tall
buildings in the area have windows with line of sight to his unit’s location if he allows the
obstacles to channelize the unit. In addition, suppose the platoon leader’s company has operated
in this area for a few weeks, and other platoons have reported instances in which the enemy has
led friendly units into ambushes. This pattern of cues and factors suggests a likely enemy
ambush. Moreover, suppose the platoon leader has placed his security element in a location that
does not have line of sight to the presumed kill zone. This factor makes a potential ambush all
the more threatening to the unit since the platoon would have little ability to counter once

12



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A-17



Fortunately, in this case, most of the enemy eventually retreat back
into the city, and in less than an hour, the building is cleared. LT Gasko places
security elements in the four upper corners of the building to ensure that all
possible entrances are covered, and the building cannot be “unsecured” by the
enemy without a fight.

All in all, the LT was relieved. Many things that could have gone
wrong did not. His platoon had only one casualty...a surface bullet wound
taken by a corporal as he entered one of the last remaining rooms. The LT did
not have to deal with the evacuation of friendly casualties. Only one civilian
was hit, and that, unfortunately, was fatal. The LT understood, though, that
given the chaos of building clearing, they were lucky. His subordinates acted
superbly, and when they tired, the LT switched them effectively. The enemy
was disorganized, and for the most part, did not want a fight. The enemy had
expected the platoon to enter through the front door and fall into their hands.
When that did not happen, they fell apart. That would change, the LT knew,
for just as he had learned lessons from this experience, so would the enemy.
They would not make the same mistakes again, and the next clearing surely
would not go off as smoothly.

29

Cue: enemy location
Decision: determine when the
clearing is finished

Cues: friendly casualty,
civilian casualties, fatigue



DISCUSSION
Implications for Training

As previously stated, current Army training does not adequately address the unique
considerations of MOUT environments, primarily because the need for such training has only
recently become critical. For this reason, one objective of this effort was to identify training
requirements for platoon leaders in building clearing operations in order to determine the
feasibility of using CTA methods to identify the training requirements of other MOUT tasks.

During this effort we were able to:

¢ Confirm that expertise does exist within the building-clearing task

e Demonstrate that CTA methods can capture decision requirements in an important
MOUT task

e Elicit critical decisions, cues, factors, difficulties, rules, strategies, and other relevant
knowledge gained from MOUT experience.

The CTA described in the previous section of this report has identified some of the cognitive
challenges faced by platoon leaders during building clearing operations. The identified decision
requirements highlight four factors about building clearing operations that are central to the
platoon leader’s perspective:

e Decisions, judgments, and assessments that are crucial to mission accomplishment

e Aspects of decisions, judgments, and assessments that are difficult for inexperienced
platoon leaders

e The critical pieces of information (cues and factors) that platoon leaders should take
into account when making decisions and judgments

e The strategies and rules that MOUT experts have developed to improve their decision
making and execution.

Each of these items represent knowledge that resides within SMEs, but can also be passed on to
less-experienced personnel through appropriate training applications. Therefore, the decision
requirements can be used to guide training development recommendations for MOUT. If an
instructor wants to teach a lieutenant how to clear a building, the lieutenant must learn how to
secure the perimeter, approach the building, enter the building, actually clear the building, and
then set up and extend security once areas of the building have been cleared. While conducting
each of these steps, the lieutenant must also learn how to think like the enemy, maintain his
situation awareness, lead his subordinates, and project into the future. In order for an instructor to
teach these cognitive skills to the lieutenant, he can refer to the training points revealed in the
DRTs (Appendixes A and B). These points include the cues that the lieutenant will need to notice

30



Aupauny pue
sanjesodura} uo Surpuedap
years 2S Jou Kew ayoug «
sapisaq poyyoul asn os ‘fay Aypruny aiqeyreae
St poods ‘uorssrur yoyeus jf amjeroduioy, « sAeme JOU SI OxOWS «
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Surpping ey) yovoadde 0) Moy auyuiaj;9q

A-6



The latter purpose, to protect the unit from potential threats in areas that have not been
cleared, entails placing small security teams (or individuals) in strategic locations such that they
can identify and address threats coming from areas that the clearing team has not reached. For
example, imagine a square or rectangular building in which the hallway follows the walls of the
building, with rooms on either side of the hallway (see Figure 2). The platoon leader will

typically direct the clearing to occur down
one hallway ata time, such that the clearing et

team(s) will end up at the place they started. “You can never put a security unit in a

The platoon leader will probably NOT allow position where it'll be approached by a

two clearing units to clear simultaneously clearing element. Always keep that team one
down different hallways, such that eventually turn back.”

they meet up in the middle of one of the LT

hallways. This would put the platoon at a

high risk for fratricide, especially if the enemy threat within the building is high. Given that the
clearing will most likely occur in one direction, one hallway at a time, it is imperative that a
security unit be placed to address any threats coming from the last hallway to be cleared (i.e.,
threats that attempt to sneak behind the clearing element). However, the placement of the security
element in this case is a bit tricky, because the platoon leader will need to ensure the security
personnel do not mistake the clearing team for the enemy. To avoid fratricide here, the platoon
leader will designate non-overlapping sectors for the security and clearing elements.

:
bees
bs

Figure 2. Maintaining security while clearing a floor of a building. The circles and arrow in the
upper right hand corner represent the position and orientation of the security element. The arrows
circling counterclockwise and then back clockwise represent the direction of the clearing
element. Note that the clearing element stops and turns around prior to reaching the security
position.

18



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A-9



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A-18



Research Report 1728

Cognitive Requirements for Small Unit Leaders in
Military Operations in Urban Terrain

Jennifer Phillips, Patricia L. McDermott, Marvin Thordsen,

Michael McCloskey, and Gary Klein
Klein Associates Inc.

Infantry Forces Research Unit
Scott E. Graham, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

September 1998
i EE
Army Project Number Small Business Innovative Research
20665502M770

‘Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

iii



training program could be developed either in paper-and-pencil form or through the use of
multimedia technologies. Another potential direction is to expand the CTA to include
information from the perspectives of different echelons. This could include subordinates such as
squad leaders or fire team leaders. It could also include higher levels, incorporating the critical
decisions and judgments of the company commander. Research into the unique cognitive
demands of MOUT environments appears to be both important and potentially fruitful, and could
be expanded in any or all of these directions.

37



The cues that MOUT SMEs identified as critical when determining how to place their
security assets included:

Whether streets are singular

Whether foot paths branch off the streets

Known and suspected enemy locations

Whether structures can provide concealment, or interfere with firing
Optimal angles to support fire

Anticipate layout of the building

Windows in the building

We can use these cues to develop multiple versions of the scenario to teach the participants the
importance of these cues. For example, one version of this TDG may state:

You know that the building to be cleared is surrounded by singular streets. You
have also received intelligence reports that enemy snipers have been known to
take up positions in the buildings directly to the east and north of the building.

To give participants practice in recognizing these cues, the continuation could read a different
way, for example:

The streets to the west and east of the building are two-lane roads with moderate
auto traffic. To the north and south are single streets with multiple foot paths
running off in all directions.

Again using information from the DRT as guidance, a contingency may then be
introduced (i.e., an unexpected event that forces the decision maker into action). This event may
be guided by the “Why Difficult?” column of the DRT. For example, suppose this particular task
of securing the perimeter is made especially difficult when the rules of engagement state that,
under no circumstances may civilians be mistreated. This information could be used to create the
following quandary within the TDG:

The civilians around the building are now beginning to form into an organized
mob. They are refusing to leave the area, and are starting to pick up sticks and
rocks. Suddenly, one of the civilians throws a rock at your 1" squad leader, the
leader of the squad designated to provide security. The squad leader has been
knocked unconscious. Seeing this, one of your platoon members strikes the
rock-thrower, knocking him to the ground. This angers the crowd even more, and
as you wonder how you are going to solve this problem, your company
commander calls you, instructing you to immediately get that building cleared.
What do you do?

35



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B-2



to identify specific events as required, and to determine strategies that capitalize on these skills.
This information can then be used to guide the focus of training.

Knowledge Representation

Knowledge collected during the course of this study is represented within Decision
Requirement Tables (DRTs), which can be found in Appendixes A and B. The DRT is a format
Klein Associates developed to decompose and represent data on judgments and decision making.
It does not rely on any single knowledge elicitation method and benefits from multiple data
sources.

The DRT organizes detailed and specific data so that one can get an overview across
situations and events. DRTs can also provide insights into how tasks are similar or different in
terms of the cognitive activities they involve. They can point the way to effective training
applications by identifying and decomposing the high-impact (key) decisions involved in
proficient performance, and providing direction for training curricula and techniques. It is
important to keep in mind that the DRTs are focused on use, rather than abstract analysis. The
DRTs permit training developers to center on the judgments and decisions as training objectives
(rather than having to make overt behaviors the focus). The DRTs show the training developer
the areas of difficulty, and the cues, patterns, and strategies used by skilled decision makers. This
front-end CTA work is essential for developing an effective program of instruction.

The DRTs that were developed highlight the considerations experts take into account
when making platoon leader decisions in the context of building clearing operations. They
indicate the nature of the critical decisions and judgments faced by platoon leaders, the reasons
certain decisions are difficult, the typical errors novices make, the subtle cues and other factors
that impact the decisions, and the strategies used by or aspects of expertise characteristic of
experienced decision makers. This information will guide recommendations for training, and will
make the job of curriculum development more tractable.

In formulating a program for training Army platoon leaders to manage MOUT operations,
a training developer can go down many different paths, and monopolize the entire course with
factual information relevant in these settings. However, consider what happens if we incorporate
decision requirements. A host of materials from historical incidents becomes relevant for
illustrating issues such as how teams were employed, how routes were determined, and where
mistakes were made. Elements can be taught in the context of the cues and factors that are
considered when assessing a situation. Scenarios can be developed that pose dilemmas around
those decision requirements, create certain types of ambiguity, and require the trainee to judge
which types of information are necessary and are easy to obtain within the time constraints.
Feedback sessions can be directed at the strategies used to assess a situation, along with the
strategies for carrying out the responsibilities. An understanding of decision requirements is
important for identifying and framing these types of interventions.

In using decision requirements to guide training, it should be possible to extend current
systems approaches to training which concentrate on the behavioral tasks to be performed.

5



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A-14



building clearing task and enabled us to identify cognitively complex elements. In conducting the
Task Diagram interviews, we asked the interviewees to identify the primary four to six steps
involved in clearing a building. Once these steps were elicited the interviewee was asked to
identify which steps required difficult cognitive skills: critical judgments, assessments, and
problem solving. Once the major tasks in clearing a building had been identified, we used
Knowledge Audit and CDM probes to elicit further details about each task.

We developed a list of Knowledge Audit probes designed to describe the nature of
perceptual, diagnostic, metacognitive, recognitional, and compensation skills. In addition, we
elicited the circumstances surrounding specific operational events in which they were required.
Probes such as the following were used:

e What is important about the big picture when clearing a building?

e Ifthe platoon leader had to turn over command to a subordinate, what would he tell
them?

e What are the major elements a platoon leader has to know and keep track of?

e When clearing a building, have parts of the situation ever “popped out” at you and
you noticed things that others didn’t catch?

e Can you think of a time when you noticed an opportunity to do something better?

The strength of the Knowledge Audit is that it enabled us to rapidly survey the nature of
expertise in MOUT environments.

The Critical Decision Method probes centered on specific, personally experienced
incidents in which the interviewees felt especially challenged while clearing a building. The
incidents anchored the interviewees so they could speak in specific terms versus describing a
generic building clearing operation. The fact that it was a difficult mission assisted in the recall
of specific cues, judgments, decisions, challenges, expectancies, and leverage points. For
example, when eliciting critical cues we used probes such as the following:

What information did you actively seek to make your decisions?

What cues did you notice that a less-experienced leader would not?
What did you interpret those cues to mean?

Describe your situation awareness at different points during the incident.

eoeee

By probing in the context of a specific building clearing incident we were able to elicit rich
contextual information.

The information gathered during the first five interviews was subjected to initial analysis,
and the findings were catalogued into DRTs. The two interviews conducted during the second
round of interviews used the DRTs as a point of departure. We explained to the interviewees that
the tables represented some of the cognitive aspects of clearing a building and that the purpose of
the interview was to complete some of the gaps in the tables. These gaps consisted of both
information that required expansion and information that was absent. These interviews focused
on the cues and patterns of cues that an experienced soldier notices, as well as the implications of

7



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1, REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (from. . . to)
September 1998 Final January-July 1998
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sa, CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER
Cognitive Requirements for Small Unit Leaders in Military Operations in | DASWO01-98-M-0886
Urban Terrain
5b, PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
65502
6. AUTHOR(S) 5c. PROJECT NUMBER
Jennifer Phillips. Patricia L. McDermott. Marvin Thordsen. M770
Michael McCloskey, and Gary Klein 5d. TASK NUMBER
6901
Se, WORK UNIT NUMBER
C12
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Klein Associates Inc.
1750 Commerce Center Blvd. North
Fairborn, OH 45324
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. MONITOR ACRONYM
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
ATTN: TAPC-ARI-U ARI
500! ne pay 0 11, MONITOR REPORT NUMBER
candria, 56
~“ Research Report 1728

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

COR: Kenneth L. Evans

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) create unique cognitive demands for small unit leaders, particularly platoon leaders. Years of
experience are typically needed to master these demands. However, most platoon leaders tend to have limited experience in Army operations
generally, and MOUT operations specifically. A cognitive task analysis, based on in-depth interviews with subject matter experts (n = 7),
was conducted to expose the cognitive aspects of expertise existing within one important MOUT task, building clearing operations. From
the perspective of platoon leaders, the cognitive demands of this task were defined within the context of decision requirement tables.
Decision requirements detail critical decisions and judgments, the reasons why they can be difficult to make, cues and factors that influence
decision making, and rules and strategies employed in the decision making process. The findings of the cognitive task analysis guided the
development of training recommendations, particularly the need for a scenario-based MOUT training program aimed at improving platoon
leader expertise through practice in decision making.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Military Operations in Urban Terrain Cognitive Task Analysis Naturalistic Decision Making _ Cognitive Skills Training
19. LIMITATION OF | 20. NUMBER | 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON

ECURITY classi

ABSTRACT OF PAGES (Name and Telephone Number)
16. REPORT 17. ABSTRACT | 18. THIS PAGE Dr. Ken Evans
Unclassified | Unclassified | Unclassified | Unlimited 7 (106) 545-2565



The LT knows that clearing buildings is about as mentally and
physically demanding as any task can be. He quickly considers splitting the
squad, having the obviously overstressed members establish security, and
letting the rest of the squad continue, but quickly dismisses this thought. When.
forces are split, they are more likely to accidentally shoot each other, he
knows. The LT decides to leapfrog 3" squad, and have 1“ squad maintain and
extend security in the rooms they’ve just cleared. He knows that security is a
telatively easy task, and a good relief to clearing.

At this point, the LT envisions 3 squad getting to the T-intersection.
He knows that there is not only a hallway branching off to the east and west,
but also a staircase leading to the second floor. He knows that this could be a
chaotic, confusing intersection, and communications could get hectic, so he
decides to establish some communication protocols. He quickly specifies
certain locations within the building as numbered checkpoints. That way, when
different teams are facing different directions, and are on different floors, they
can quickly share situation assessments and movements by referring to the
checkpoints instead of trying to determine directions, floors, or individual lefts
and rights. This should help with radio communications, and even reduce
confusion should the radios go out, the LT thinks.

The clearing continues with the LT frequently leapfrogging teams
when he feels that the clearing teams need breaks. Throughout the clearing, the
LT is constantly reassessing the situation within the building. This assessment
allows the LT to maintain his situation awareness and make judgments about
what resources are needed to complete the job, as well as what should be
reported to the company commander. Throughout the operation, the LT is
maintaining a picture of where his soldiers are both inside and outside the
building. At one point, the LT realizes that his platoon is too spread out. If the
enemy were to organize a counter-attack, some of the platoon would be left
with too little self-protection. So he reconfigures his personnel and ensures
that they can defend themselves.

The LT is also noticing that, although some of the enemy forces have
decided to barricade themselves and fight to the bitter end, most of them are
continually retreating within the building. Since his mission is to clear the
building, and since the LT realizes that a cornered enemy creates a situation
that is in no one’s favor in this case, he decides to alter the flow of the mission.
He redirects the clearing operation, so that it pushes the enemy toward a
corner of the building where they have the option of retreating back into the
city. Giving the occupants a way out will make the clearing much easier, the
LT realizes.

28

Difficulty: clearing a building
is mentally and physically
challenging

Decision: determine how to
employ personnel and teams,
determine whether to split
forces, determine where to
place security assets

Cue: internal layout

Benefit of experience: a
branching hallway and
staircase could be a confusing
and hectic intersection
Decision Requirement: lead
subordinates

Decision: clearly communicate
directions and information
Difficulty: radio
communications may go down

Decision: determine flow of
clearing, determine level of
fatigue, assess the situation and
maintain situation awareness,
determine how to employ
personnel

Cue: location of soldiers
Implication: troops are too
spread out

Decision: determine how the
enemy might counter attack
Cue: whether the enemy are
fighting back

Factor: a cornered enemy will
fight back harder

Decision: determine flow of
the clearing



As evidenced by the DRT for this requirement, several information cues feed the platoon
leader’s assessment of the situation. For less-experienced platoon leaders, it is often difficult to
attend to and interpret a large number of cues, as well as a wide range of different types of cues.
Moreover, platoon leaders are challenged to continually make ‘next step’ decisions based on their
assessment, even as they continue to update that assessment.

The judgment regarding how and where to proceed is a ‘next step’ decision. It is difficult
for a number of reasons, most notably the high degree of uncertainty related to each potential
move, the challenge of assessing the tradeoff between mission accomplishment and safety of the
unit, and the need to prioritize aspects of the clearing effort. The determination is based on the
platoon leader’s assessment of the overall situation, but especially on the specific cues and
factors listed in the DRT for determining how to clear the building. One important factor is the
mission's objectives. These frame the platoon leader’s decision making in that the actions he
takes must work toward accomplishment of the objectives. If the objective is to gain control of
the entire building, it is likely that the platoon leader will clear every room in every area of the
building. If he is conducting a snatch mission in which the objective is to capture a person or
persons, he may actually clear only the areas where he believes the suspects are located (while
guarding his flanks to address any potential threats from other areas of the building). As
discussed above, the cues that will shape the platoon leader’s decisions and actions will largely
come through verbal communication with his forward clearing team(s), in addition to direct
visual cues. An experienced platoon leader will watch and listen for the following:

Indications of the building’s level of fortification

Weapon and ammunition stores, maps, equipment, and medical supplies

Reports from clearing teams regarding number of enemy encountered

Enemy weapons

Friendly casualty reports

Reports from the security element regarding whether enemy personnel have exited the
building (generally if the enemy is exiting the building, the platoon leader might infer
that they are not prepared to stay and defend the building)

e Reactions of civilians within and outside the building

Various combinations of these types of information will mold the platoon leader’s judgment of
what to expect in an area of the building and thus how to prepare his soldiers accordingly. For
example, he may instruct them to change their weapons or ammunition once the enemy’s
capabilities have been identified. The platoon leader might also make the determination that the
threat within the building is too great, and that the clearing must either be aborted or
reinforcements must be attached to his unit to complete the mission. (Note that the company
commander is the one who actually decides whether to abort the mission or send reinforcements;
the platoon leader only makes a recommendation.)

16



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

Research accomplished under contract
for the Department of the Army

Klein Associates Inc.

Technical review by

Kenneth L. Evans
Michael J. Singer

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI.
Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001
Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Research Report may be destroyed when it is no longer
needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official
Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.



Appendix A:
Task-Focused Decision Requirement Tables

A-l



Lieutenant Gasko felt a tightness in his stomach as he walked out of
the building where the all too brief meeting had just concluded. His company
commander had just informed him and his fellow platoon leaders that a rapid
clearing of three buildings on the outskirts of Sonaly had to occur this morning
to establish a foothold in the city for the rest of the battalion. The LT was
assigned to clear a two-story dwelling directly to the east of his fellow platoon
leaders (PLs).

Clearing a building is a tricky deal regardless of the circumstances,
but this one was going to be especially tough. The company had just arrived
on the edge of the war-torn village of Sonaly the night before. Little
intelligence was available on the village. They had used maps to do some
rapid planning and coordination among the platoons for the assault, and so
they knew the general layout of the buildings, but many things remained
uncertain. In what shape were these war-torn buildings? Just how hostile and
organized has the local militia become? How will the civilians react to our
presence? During their brief planning meeting, the company CO repeatedly
answered, “Good question. We’ll find out when we get there.” Unfortunately,
there was no time for certainty on any of these issues. The LT was just going
to have to do his reconnaissance online, as the mission unfolded.

The LT spent the next few minutes briefing his squad leaders (SLs)
on the situation, and formulating a rough plan. He had one truly seasoned SL,
and he chose this squad to conduct the breach. He knew this could be a tricky
one, and he wanted his best men to handle it. The LT also spent a few extra
minutes with his newest SL, who had limited experience in this area. The LT
gave the SL a quick briefing on what supplies the squad should be carrying.
He reminded the SL that soldiers will go through water very quickly in these
situations. Be sure to bring enough. The LT also had a suspicion that heavy
explosives might be necessary for breaching if the doors were not an option,
so he told the SL to drop a couple of the shotguns in favor of the explosives.

“It’s time to move out!” the LT calls. The platoon moves toward the
edge of the city, using a treeline for cover. Surprise is always a good thing to
have in these assaults, the LT knows, but, once they reach the city, they may
have to compromise surprise for speed. As the platoon nears the edge of town,
the LT observes that the buildings are packed tightly together, and seem pretty
much intact, and the walls appear to be made of thin concrete. He also notices
that there are several metal barrels on both sides of the streets. He calls out to
his SLs: “1 squad take the left side of the street, 2" squad the right! Let’s be
quick and quiet!” Knowing that bullets would ricochet close to the concrete
walls, he also tells his SLs to stay away from the walls. He also reminds them
that bullets will go through the barrels, just in case they try to use them for
cover.

24

Receipt of Commander’s Intent
and Mission Objectives

There is little background
information available; the LT
will have to depend on cues
identified at the building

There is a high degree of
uncertainty: type of buildings,
organization of militia, attitude
of civilians

Imparting Commander’s Intent
is part of decision requirement
to Lead subordinates

Factor: personnel strengths
Implication: assignment of
tasks, how much information to
impart

Decision: what supplies to take
with you

Rule of thumb: each person
will drink about a gallon per
hour

Decision: how to navigate;
how to clearly communicate
with subordinates

Conflicting goals: surprise
versus speed

Cue: density and makeup of
buildings

Implication of concrete: bullets
will not penetrate, they will
travel along the wall

Cue: metal barrel
Implication: it can be used for
concealment but not for cover
since bullets can penetrate the
barrel



Supplemental Training Tools

While TDGs emphasize contextual learning and the development of expertise in a well-
defined domain, supplemental training exercises enhance the TDGs by spotlighting cognitive
aspects of general decision making in order to improve future decisions. The supplemental
exercises appropriate for platoon leaders conducting building clearing operations would focus on
refining skills on the four task-independent decision requirements: thinking like the enemy,
maintaining the big picture and situation awareness, leading subordinates, and projecting into the
future. The following are two examples of supplemental training tools that have been designed
for and used in DST by U.S. Marines:

The Commander’s Intent Exercise. The goal of the Commander’s Intent exercise is to
improve participant skill in communicating the Commander’s Intent (which is the leader’s
rationale underlying a particular order or plan of action). This exercise is administered in
coordination with a TDG. Participants describe their solutions to the TDG in the form of a set of
orders to their subordinates and also provide a description of their intent. The facilitator then
identifies a plausible, but unexpected, event that will interfere with that plan. The participant
role-playing the leader then writes down how he or she expects all of the subordinates to react. At
the same time, the subordinates write down how they would actually react. Next, the two
interpretations are compared. Typically, everyone is surprised by the different interpretations of
intent. This exercise improves Commander’s Intent statements, not by providing a checklist of
what to say, but rather by providing direct feedback to enable the participants to find out how
subordinates are interpreting their orders.

The Commander’s Intent exercise may be a useful training intervention for Army soldiers
in MOUT environments. We found that one of the challenging key decision requirements for
platoon leaders is leading subordinates. This suggests that some aspect of their training should
focus on providing clear instructions and ensuring that their orders are understood by
subordinates. The Commander’s Intent exercise addresses those specific issues.

The Decision Making Critique. Another tool that has been used with Marines is the
Decision Making Critique. After completion of a TDG exercise, the decision requirements of the
task are highlighted within the context of the Decision Making Critique to show participants
what they did right and where they went wrong in making judgments and decisions. Currently,
TDG feedback sessions typically concentrate on the specific actions taken. This is important, but
it misses the opportunity to use the feedback sessions to teach why the mistakes were made so
that the decision makers can learn what they are doing wrong. Without a Decision Making
Critique, students can learn poor habits during the exercise, and get a chance to practice these
poor habits, without ever learning that they are doing things wrong. Because the Decision
Making Critique covers the decision process and the way experienced Marines handle decision
requirements, the effect of the training exercise is greatly leveraged at little cost. The Decision
Making Critique is best employed when it is embedded within the context of the exercises
already being run.

33



Task-Independent Decision Requirements

The task-independent decision requirements represent judgment and assessment skills
that should be operative throughout a building clearing operation and that should shape decision
making within each stage of the operation. For this reason, a significant degree of overlap exists
between the data in the task-independent and task-focused decision requirements. Still, we
discuss the task-independent decision requirements separately in order to highlight their
criticality to each and every building clearing operation. In this section we introduce each of
these decision requirements; the complete DRTs are presented in Appendix B.

Decision Requirement: Maintain the enemy’s perspective (Think like the enemy)

According to subject matter experts SMEs, this is one of the most critical yet most
difficult decision requirements. Throughout mission execution a good platoon leader will
continuously put himself in the enemy’s position and think like the enemy in order to guide his
own decision making. The critical decisions and judgments within this requirement are:

¢ Identify the most likely enemy course of action
e Identify the most likely enemy location
© Identify how the enemy can exploit friendly vulnerabilities
e Anticipate enemy deception techniques

These judgments will influence every action and decision that the platoon leader makes
during the course of the mission. They will serve as additional cues to shape decision making.
For example, an experienced platoon leader will use his understanding of the enemy’s presumed
goals and his assessment of leverage points (e.g., tall buildings or key intersections) within the
area to predict enemy actions and positions. In addition, he will use cues from the immediate
environment to determine the enemy’s plan or location. Signs of fortifications around a building
such as wire behind windows or gun ports in the walls may indicate that the building is a
strongpoint. By making an educated guess as to what the enemy is doing, platoon leaders can
most effectively accomplish their own missions.

One of the most critical skills in taking on the enemy’s perspective has to do with
thinking about situations in three dimensions. When SMEs talk about the three dimensions of the
MOUT battlefield, though, they are referring to more than what most of us think of as three
dimensions. Those dimensions are forward and backward, up and down, and left and right. For
MOUT platoon leaders, it becomes crucial to mentally extend these dimensions. That is, when
thinking about what is on one’s left and one’s right, the platoon leader must be able to expand his
visual field to include what is on the other side of the walls. The enemy may be on the other side,
or perhaps even friendly soldiers.

19



understanding the cognitive complexities of a task. It provides a set of tools for eliciting and
representing general and specific knowledge pertaining to a particular activity, in this case,
MOUT building clearing operations. CTA allows us to go beyond procedural knowledge and the
behavioral aspects of MOUT operations. The purpose is to get inside the soldier’s head, and try
to understand the “cognitive map” that guides his decision-making processes. We must
understand how both novice and experienced soldiers view their environments, and what critical
cues, expectancies, and goals they require to make a good decision in a specific context.
Employing CTA methods allow us to understand many of the cognitive aspects involved in the
judgment, decision-making, and problem-solving skills that are so critical in the uncertain and
ever-changing MOUT environment.

CTA methods evolved from the study of Naturalistic Decision Making (Klein, Orasanu,
Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993; Zsambok & Klein, 1997). They comprise techniques for both
eliciting and representing knowledge, and provide a means to identify and articulate the cognitive
demands and skills related to a given task. In MOUT environments, proficient task performance
places cognitive demands on the platoon leader as well as physical ones. These cognitive
demands include such activities as decision making, judging, problem solving, and assessing the
situation. These cognitive demands serve as the drivers of the physical tasks. That is, the platoon
leader often must make some judgment or decision before knowing which procedure or action to
implement. CTA provided us with a set of tools for eliciting general domain knowledge as well
as specific knowledge pertaining to the cognitive demands for MOUT environments. (These
tools will be discussed in further detail below.) The results of the CTA provide a framework for
developing training applications by treating human decision processes explicitly and
incorporating them as a basis for the final product.

It is important to note that there are two facets of CTA: knowledge elicitation and
knowledge representation. The knowledge elicitation aspect of CTA comprises a “tool kit” used
to delve into the MOUT soldier’s decision-making environment. The knowledge representation
aspect of CTA guides documentation and codification of data into formats that can be used to
anchor the design of the training program. We represented the CTA data through Decision
Requirement Tables. The Decision Requirement Tables then become the basis for
decision-centered training.

Knowledge Elicitation

There are several different knowledge elicitation methods in our toolkit. The methods
relevant to this project are the Task Diagram, Critical Decision Method (CDM), and the
Knowledge Audit. Each of these are described in detail below.

Task Diagram. The Task Diagram is intended to serve as a road map to the rest of the
CTA (Militello & Hutton, in preparation). It acts as an advance organizer, providing an overview
of the task and identifying the cognitively complex elements. In conducting the Task Diagram
interviews, we ask the interviewee to identify the primary four to six steps involved in the task
being studied. Once these steps are elicited, the interviewee is asked to identify which steps
require difficult cognitive skills: critical judgments, assessments, and problem solving. The

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A-4



Decision requirements will enable us to enhance current approaches by incorporating the
cognitive aspects of proficient task performance. And if we can help trainees learn how to size up
situations and make decisions, we can do a better job of teaching cognitive skills that can
generalize across domains and across contexts.

Data Collection and Analysis

Klein Associates conducted nine semi-structured, two-hour interviews with a total of
seven active duty or retired soldiers (two were interviewed twice). These participants were all
Ranger qualified, with a wide range of backgrounds and a wealth of experience. During the first
round of interviews, we talked with a Sergeant, a First Sergeant, two Lieutenants, and a Captain.
The Sergeant had a total of 12 years in the Army including experience in conventional light
infantry, in scouts, at the Ranger Training Brigade as an instructor, and in MOUT operations in
Somalia, including the “Blackhawk incident” (Bowden, 1997). The First Sergeant had over 18
years experience in the Army. He had been a platoon sergeant and had acted as the platoon leader
when the platoon was without a Lieutenant. One of the Lieutenants interviewed participated in
Special Forces as an enlisted soldier for approximately three years with training in Belgium,
Rwanda, and Denmark. He also had participated in several Joint Readiness Training Center
MOUT exercises, and several MOUT exercises at Fort Benning. The other Lieutenant had eight
years in the Army, which included MOUT training in England and a deployment to Bosnia. The
Captain was an instructor with the Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Benning, with 7 years
experience including a year as a platoon leader and deployments to Haiti and Bosnia.

During the second round of interviews, we interviewed a retired Sergeant Major and a
retired Colonel. The Sergeant Major had over 26 years experience in the Army with Special
Operations deployments to Nicaragua and Grenada. The retired Colonel also had extensive
experience in MOUT environments at levels much higher than the platoon, and thus provided
aspects of the bigger picture involved in clearing a building. On the third round of interviews we
conducted follow-up interviews with two of the previous participants: the First Sergeant from the
first round and the Sergeant Major from the second round.

Interviewing MOUT subject matter experts (SMEs) with a wide variety of roles,
positions, and experiences allowed us to analyze the building clearing task from different
perspectives. The three non-commissioned officers we interviewed had a total of 57 years of
experience implementing orders and carrying out missions in places such as Somalia, Germany,
Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Grenada. The Captain and Lieutenants were able to discuss building
clearing operations from a platoon leader’s perspective. The retired Colonel supplemented the
data collection by providing information and constraints from the perspective of a platoon
leader’s superior.

Interview Methods

Our first five interviews were structured by the Task Diagram, one of the knowledge
elicitation techniques in the CTA toolkit. The Task Diagram provided us an overview of the

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