[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-11422

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cr-00031-HLM-WEJ-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDWIN THOMAS SEFTON, 

 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(September 23, 2013)

Before DUBINA, WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Edwin Thomas Sefton appeals his twenty-seven-month total sentence, 

imposed after he pled guilty to one count of possession of an unregistered, sawedoff shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861(b), and 5871, and one count 

of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). On appeal, Sefton argues that his total sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because he possessed the shotgun while he was alone in the woods, 

and he did not intend to harm or even encounter another person. He argues that his 

case is outside the heartland of typical federal gun cases, and that his twentyseven-month total sentence is greater than necessary. Upon review of the record 

and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007). A 

defendant challenging his sentence bears the burden of establishing that it is 

unreasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam). 

A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it does not achieve the purposes 

of sentencing stated in § 3553(a). Id. The analysis “involves examining the 

totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors 

in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 

F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

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The factors to be considered are:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness 

of the offense, respect for the law, and the need to provide just 

punishment; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the 

public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational 

or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences 

available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy 

statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid 

unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide 

restitution to victims.

Talley, 431 F.3d at 786 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). “The weight to be accorded 

any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the 

district court, and we [do] not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant 

factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In terms of the reasonableness of the sentence imposed, we have held “that 

there is a range of reasonable sentences from which the district court may choose, 

and when the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines

range, we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.” Talley, 431 

F.3d at 788. In addition, a sentence that is well below the statutory maximum 

supports a finding of reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324.

Sefton’s twenty-seven-month total sentence is substantively reasonable. 

First, it was within the guideline range of 27 to 33 months. Second, it was far 

below the ten-year statutory maximum penalty carried by each count. Third, 

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Sefton’s sentence was supported by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the goals 

of sentencing. In reaching its decision, the district court relied in part on Sefton’s 

long criminal history, which included seventeen convictions. The district court 

explained that it would have sentenced him at the upper end of the guidelines 

absent the letters of support and other mitigating evidence he presented. With 

regard to the weight assigned to each factor, we will not substitute our judgment 

for that of the district court absent a clear error of judgment. See Gonzalez, 550 

F.3d at 1324.

Sefton does not seem to argue that the district court made any clear error in 

judgment. Rather, he simply claims that the sentence was “too high to satisfy the 

parsimony principle” and that he had “no intention of harming . . . another person.” 

He provides no supporting precedent for the implicit proposition that either of 

these assertions indicate clear error on the part of the district court.

Moreover, the fact that this court has affirmed large variances in what Sefton 

asserts are “much more serious cases” is inapposite. The standard of review is 

abuse-of-discretion; Sefton bears a much heavier burden in asking this court to 

vacate his sentence than did the appellees who sought affirmance of their sentences

in those cases. He has failed to meet his burden. 

AFFIRMED. 

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