Falcons against the Jihad 

Israeli Airpower and Coercive 

Diplomacy in Southern Lebanon 

KENNETH C. SCHOW, JR., LT COL, USAF 

School of Advanced Airpower Studies 

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE 

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, 

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR 

COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, 

ACADEMIC YEAR 1993–94. 

Air University Press


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


November 1995 
Disclaimer 

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of 

academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views 

expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 

of the Department of Defense or the United States government. 

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for 

public release. 

ii 
CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii


ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v


ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii


1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2


2 THE LEBANON PERIOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3


Israeli Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3


Airpower’s Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7


3 THE ISRAELI STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9


Defining the Israeli Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9


The Israeli Airpower Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11


4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . . 13


The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


Hizbollah and the PLO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


5 EFFECTIVENESS OF IAF REPRISAL RAIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . 17


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19


6 WHY THE AIR STRIKES FAILED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


Asymmetry of Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22


Inability to Create Fear of Unacceptable Escalation . . . . . . . . 23


Lebanon Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23


Israeli Air Strikes Could Not Increase Costs on Attackers . . . . . 24


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25


7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27


Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27


Key Lessons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28


Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29


APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31


BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39


iii 
 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

Illustrations 

Table Page 

Palestinian Targets of IAF Air Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


Guerrilla Attacks against the IDF in Southern Lebanon . . . . . . . 17


IAF Air Attacks in Southern Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


Targets of Israeli Air Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


IAF Air Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34


1983 IAF Air Attacks versus Palestinian/Shi’ite Guerrilla


Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35


7 1984 IAF Air Attacks versus Palestinian/Shi’ite Guerrilla


Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35


8 1985 IAF Air Attacks versus Palestinian/Shi’ite Guerrilla


Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36


9 1983 IAF Air Attacks (Target Breakdown) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36


10 1984 IAF Air Attacks (Target Breakdown) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37


11 1985 IAF Air Attacks (Target Breakdown) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37


iv 
About the Author 

Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr. (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MAS, 

Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University) is an F-16 pilot currently assigned to the 8th 

Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base, Korea. A recent graduate of the School of 

Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Alabama, Colonel 

Schow also attended the Air Command and Staff College and Squadron Officer 

School. An experienced fighter pilot, Colonel Schow flew 47 combat missions in the 

F-16 during Operation Desert Storm, was an instructor at the F-5 Fighter Weapons 

School at Williams AFB, Arizona and an aircraft commander and instructor pilot in 

the A-10 at Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina. His military decorations include the 

Distinguished Flying Cross with one oak leaf cluster, the Air Medal with three oak 

leaf clusters, the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, and the Air 

Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster. 

v 
vi

Abstract 

From the dust-filled skies over northern Iraq to the fog-covered valleys of Bosnia,

American airmen are finding themselves at the center of US efforts to solve the

problems of an increasingly fragmented world. Airpower’s new role as the tool of

choice for US policymakers confronts the Air Force with challenges never envisioned

during the cold war. These challenges include nonstate actors, ethnic hatred,

nationalist tensions, and an increasing array of regional conflicts. If our experiences

in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and North Korea are any indication, the United States is

moving toward a general policy of coercive diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts

and the challenges they present. Accordingly, USAF planners will continue to find

themselves asked to use airpower to support the strategy of coercive diplomacy. 

Given that the Air Force has focused on supporting cold-war strategies for the last

40 years, it is reasonable to expect that planners would look to the experiences of

other air forces to help develop our own coercive strategies. The Israeli Air Force

(IAF) presents an ideal candidate for this type of evaluation. Since its creation in

1948 the IAF has had a long history of supporting coercive strategies employed by

Israeli leaders to deal with threats posed by the surrounding Arab states. A

particularly effective period to evaluate is the experience of the Israeli Air Force in

Lebanon between January 1983 and June 1985. This period is significant for USAF

planners because Lebanon confronted the IAF with an environment that one RAND

analyst concluded is likely to be representative of armed conflict worldwide in the

last quarter of the twentieth century: a mixture of conventional warfare, classic

guerrilla warfare, and campaigns of terrorism. 

During the Lebanon conflict, the IAF employed the most advanced combat aircraft

in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of

guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the

effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. 

The analysis of this subject begins by demonstrating that Israeli air strikes in

Lebanon supported a strategy of coercive diplomacy—an approach adopted when

Israeli ground efforts proved unable to reduce the number of guerrilla attacks. In the

course of this effort, the Israeli Air Force executed 28 air raids, all of which would 

have little effect on the decision calculus of the Palestinians and Shi’ite organizations

in southern Lebanon. The most interesting aspect of this strategy is the fact that 90

percent of the Israeli air strikes were directed against the Palestinian organizations

while the evidence shows that the Shi’ites in southern Lebanon were responsible for

many of the guerrilla attacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) ground troops.

This study concludes that the decision to minimize air attacks against the Shi’ites

was an effort on the part of senior Israeli leaders to gain long-term security on their

northern border by “signaling” their willingness to work with Nabih Berri and other

Amal leaders. In addition to this, Israeli leaders were concerned that massive raids 

vii 
on organizations like Hizbollah would have little impact on their willingness to

attack the IDF, or worse yet, would inspire them to even greater violence.

In light of these political realities, the Israelis focused the air attacks on the

radical Palestinian groups. Although the Israelis had an extensive intelligence base

built up on the Palestinian organizations to assist them in developing their attack

plans, the Israeli air strikes failed to affect the PLO. As a result, they combined with

an increasingly angry Shi’ite population to execute a succession of guerrilla attacks

against the IDF, which eroded the will of the Israeli leadership to stay in Lebanon.

This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry

of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a

“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for 

the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the

inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations.

The lesson in this experience for American policymakers is that even though the

Israelis possessed the most advanced aircraft in the world, capable of delivering an

impressive array of technologically advanced weapons, these advantages meant little

when it came to coercing the Palestinians and the Shi’ites. This was because the

Israeli strategy was based on the assumption that air strikes could inflict such pain

on the target organizations that they would give in to Israeli demands rather than

suffer at the hands of Israeli airmen. What the Israelis did not count on was the fact 

that the PLO and Shi’ites were already paying tremendous costs, and neither

precision guided munitions nor iron bombs could add to these costs in any significant 

manner. 

Given that many experts believe the United States will face similar situations in

the future, US policymakers must understand that the ability to destroy targets with

surgical accuracy does not automatically translate into the ability to inflict

“significant pain” on an adversary. Consequently, we must be selective in choosing

where we employ our “shrinking” air forces, or risk squandering the few advantages

we enjoy. 

viii 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

From the dust-filled skies over northern Iraq to the fog-covered valleys of

Bosnia, American airmen are finding themselves at the center of US efforts to

solve the problems of an increasingly fragmented world. Airpower’s new role

as the “tool of choice” for US policymakers confronts the Air Force with

challenges never envisioned during the cold war. These challenges include

nonstate actors, ethnic hatred, nationalist tensions, and an increasing array

of regional conflicts. If our experiences in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and North

Korea are any indication, the United States is moving toward a general policy

of coercive diplomacy to deal with regional conflicts and the challenges they

present. Accordingly, USAF planners will continue to find themselves asked

to use airpower to support the strategy of coercive diplomacy. 

Since the Air Force has focused on supporting cold-war strategies for the

last 40 years, it is reasonable to expect that planners would look to the

experiences of other air forces to help develop our own coercive strategies. The

Israeli Air Force (IAF) presents an ideal candidate for this type of evaluation.

Since its creation in 1948, the IAF has had a long history of supporting

coercive strategies employed by Israeli leaders to deal with threats posed by

the surrounding Arab states. A particularly effective period to evaluate would

be the experience of the Israeli Air Force in Lebanon between January 1983

and June 1985. This period is significant for USAF planners because Lebanon

confronted the IAF with an environment that one RAND analyst concluded is

likely to be “representative of armed conflict worldwide in the last quarter of

the twentieth century: a mixture of conventional warfare, classic guerrilla

warfare, and campaigns of terrorism.”1 

During the Lebanon conflict, the Israeli Air Force employed the most

advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon

in support of a coercive strategy designed to compel the Palestine Liberation

Orgaization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla

attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness

of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. 

Overview 

The analysis of this subject begins in chapter 2 with a description of the

Lebanese Period: focusing on Israeli and PLO/Shi’ite objectives, events 

1 
leading up to the use of airpower, and specifics on the Israeli application of

airpower. Chapter 3 discusses the coercive airpower strategy employed by the

Israelis in Lebanon. This discussion will show that the Israeli use of airpower

between January 1983 and June 1985 is consistent with the tenets of coercive

diplomacy as defined by Alexander George. 

Chapter 4 identifies factors that influenced the execution of the Israelis’

coercive strategy. Here, this study concludes that the decision to minimize air

attacks against the Shi’ites was an effort on the part of senior Israeli leaders

to gain long-term security on their northern border by signaling their

willingness to work with Nabih Berri and other Amal leaders. In addition to

this, Israeli leaders were concerned that massive raids on organizations like

Hizbollah would have little impact on their willingness to attack the Israeli

Defense Forces (IDF), or worse yet, would inspire them to even greater

violence. In light of these political realities, the Israelis focused their air

attacks on the radical Palestinian groups. 

Chapter 5 uses data gathered from the Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service (FBIS) and the Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS) to evaluate the 

effectiveness of airpower in controlling the behavior of Shi’ite and Palestinian

resistance forces. This analysis involves a comparison of the total number of

air attacks by the Israeli Air Force against Palestinian and Lebanese targets

to the total number of attacks by those actors against Israeli military

personnel. Results of this analysis led to the conclusion that Israeli air

strikes, flown between November 1983 and June 1985, had little impact on

reducing the willingness of these nonstate actors to attack the IDF in

Lebanon. 

Chapter 6 follows with insights into why the air raids failed to support the

objectives of the Israeli coercive strategy. It contends there were two reasons

for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites in

southern Lebanon, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a “carrot.”

Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for 

the target organizations: a dilemma brought on by the Lebanese environment

and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the

target organizations. 

Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the evidence, identifying key lessons

from the IAF experience in Lebanon, and providing recommendations for Air

Force planners facing similar situations. 

Notes 

1. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: New Modes of Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND,

1983; reprint, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Library Document No. M-30352-1-U No.

3302). 

2

Chapter 2 

The Lebanon Period 

Israeli Objectives 

When Israel decided to invade Lebanon, its primary purpose was to

“destroy the terrorist organizations in Lebanon in such a way that they

[would] not be able to rebuild their military and political base.”1 To 

accomplish this objective, the Israelis turned to their military. Under the

guidance of Israel’s hawkish defense minister, Ariel Sharon, plans were

developed for a large-scale military invasion of Lebanon designed to crush the

PLO forces in the region. Final approval for this plan was given on 5 June

1982, and Israeli forces were sent into Lebanon the next day. Although there

had been some concern about the level of PLO resistance, the three-pronged

attack into Lebanon succeeded far better than Sharon had expected. Within

two days Israeli forces reached their objective: a line 45 kilometers north of

Israel. Although they were supposed to stop at this point, Sharon convinced

senior Israeli leaders that the only way to create a final solution to the

terrorist problem was to allow Israeli forces to press all the way to Beirut.

Within six days of this decision Israeli forces were at the doorsteps of the city. 

From a tactical viewpoint, the Israeli invasion was a huge success: They

had driven much of the PLO from Lebanon, inflicted a devastating defeat on

the Syrian Air Force, and now controlled large portions of Lebanon. From a

strategic viewpoint the invasion would prove to be a failure. Although the IDF

had forced the PLO out of Lebanon, a large portion of their forces were

allowed to escape to Tunis under UN protection. Those who did not escape to

Tunis fled to Syria, where they regrouped and continued operations against

the Israelis from the sanctuary provided by Hafez Assad. Worse yet, the

Israeli invasion ignited hatred among the Shi’ite population in Lebanon, who

turned to terrorism and guerrilla warfare against the Israeli troops. 

The Israelis quickly discovered that the long-term security they so

desperately sought would not be gained by a short-term invasion. To ensure

the security of their northern border, Israel was forced to keep 15,000 to

20,000 troops deployed as far north as the Beirut-Damascus highway. These

troops were to “serve as a buffer between the terrorists and the civilian

population.”2 The problem with this approach was that the buffer forces

quickly became the object of terrorist attacks. In September 1982, Lebanese

and Palestinian terrorists began a rearguard war against the IDF forces in

southern Lebanon. 

3 
The purpose of the terrorist attacks was clear: to make life so intolerable

for the Israeli soldiers in Lebanon that Israel would be pressured into a

unilateral withdrawal from the country.3 Yasser Arafat described the strategy

as follows: 

In accordance with the resolution of the PLO Military Council and the Palestine

National Council (PNC), we have not only succeeded in escalating our military

attacks on the Israeli forces in Lebanon, but in coordination with the Lebanese 

resistance, we have turned these attacks into a war of attrition against the Israeli

presence in Lebanon . . . . Thus, what they thought was going to be a three-to-five

day journey into Lebanon against our forces has become a trap against their continued presence in Lebanon.4 

To counter these attacks the Israelis relied on a coercive strategy based on

a combination of retaliation and preemptive measures. This strategy was

rooted in the concept that every act of violence committed against an Israeli

soldier would be met with a quick and often violent response. The objective of

the Israeli policy was to create an environment in which the cost of attacking

Israeli troops would be far greater than the return. Between October 1982

and November 1983 the primary tool for executing this policy was the Israeli

ground forces. During this period Israeli foot patrols, using “techniques

developed in the Jordan valley and the Gaza Strip,” began a campaign of

arrests, reprisals, and curfews designed to uncover “terrorists” and disrupt

the resistance organizations.5 

Rather than reducing the determination of the Palestinians and Lebanese,

the coercive tactics only incited them to greater violence.6 The “concrete” 

indicator of Palestinian and Shi’ite determination was the dramatic rise in 

the number of attacks against the IDF in southern Lebanon. In the first

seven months of 1983 the number of attacks against the IDF almost doubled.7 

These figures would prompt Israeli military correspondent Shmu’el Tal to

report: “Despite the effort the IDF devotes to security in southern Lebanon,

the terrorist effort[s] to attack IDF soldiers are increasing and their actions

are daily becoming more sophisticated and daring.”8 

As the number of casualties increased, pressure began to build on Israeli

political leaders to bring the troops home. For the first time in Israel there

were massive antiwar protests organized by groups with such names as Peace

Now; No To the War Medal; and Parents for the Withdrawal from Lebanon. 

To bring the message home to the Israeli leadership, one group began a daily

march outside Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s home in which they would

carry a scoreboard updating the death toll in Lebanon. These protests clearly

had an effect on the Israeli leadership. In June 1983 Prime Minister Begin

observed, “Every soldier who falls tears one’s heart.” Meanwhile Foreign

Minister Yitzak Shamir stated, “The effort of every cabinet member . . . must

be devoted to [overcoming] the difficulties the terrorist organization

rearguard [war] is causing us.”9 The casualty figures also galvanized the

Israeli cabinet, which “firmly demanded an explanation of the defense

establishment’s plans to prevent continued casualties among the IDF soldiers

in Lebanon.”10 

4 
Although Israeli leaders wanted to remove their troops from Lebanon, they

feared a pullout would allow terrorist elements to begin the cycle of attacks

against northern settlements that had prompted the June invasion. In an

effort to reduce their casualties, yet still retain control over South Lebanon,

the IDF pulled back in August 1983 to the Al-Awali River. Once there they

set up observation posts, dug trenches, built bunkers, and set up a

sophisticated communications and electronic system along the high ridges of

the valley. This, in combination with mobile patrols and a system of

roadblocks, was used to strictly control the flow of traffic in and out of the

region.11 

Even before the move was complete there were those within the IDF who

doubted its ability to reduce casualties. IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Levy would

state that he did not expect a major reduction in casualties, adding that the

redeployment to the Awali River was driven by political rather than military

considerations.12 Palestinian journalist Yezid Sayigh would predict in the Fall

1983 edition of the Journal of Palestine Studies that “the temptation to use

the air force and artillery . . . will grow if the IDF redeployment [to the Awali

River] fails to reduce casualties.”13 True to Levy’s prediction, the Awali line

did little to stem the rising tide of attacks against the IDF, and, as the number

of attacks continued to rise, so did the calls for “a more aggressive retaliatory

policy.” A central feature of these calls was a request that the IDF “use the air

force and artillery . . . as they were used against Jordan in 1968 to 1970.”14 

Airpower’s Role 

True to Sayigh’s prediction, on 3 November 1983, two months after the

redeployment to the Awali River failed to reduce the number of IDF

casualties, the Israelis launched their first air strikes in over a year against

terrorist targets in Alley, Bhamdoun, and Sofar. This raid would mark the

beginning of Israel’s use of airpower to support their efforts to control the

behavior of the Palestinian and Lebanese organizations during this period. 

In making this decision, Israeli leaders were not making a “radical” change

to their airpower doctrine. Israel had first introduced airpower as a

countermeasure to terrorist/guerrilla attacks in 1966, and since that time it

has played an integral role in their efforts to reduce attacks against Israeli

personnel.15 This was especially true of their counterterrorism effort, where

for every act of Palestinian terrorism committed both inside and outside the

boundaries of the State of Israel, an IAF retaliatory air raid had become an

expected occurrence.16 Massive air raids against terrorist headquarters,

training camps, and installations had followed such terrorist incidents as the

1972 Munich Olympics massacre, the May 1974 Ma’alot massacre, and the

June 1982 attempted assassination of Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. 

The air raids developed for Lebanon involved the IAF’s principal combat

aircraft: the A-4 Skyhawk, the F-4E Phantom, the F-15, F-16, and the Kfir. 

5 
Each air raid was designed as a quick surgical stroke meant to destroy vital

terrorist targets while preventing large-scale civilian casualties.17 During this

period, Israeli fighters would fly 28 air raids against terrorist targets in

southern Lebanon (table 5). Twenty-five of these missions were directed

against Palestinian targets and three were against the Shi’ites. 

Israeli leaders designed these raids to operate as both a “carrot” and a

“stick.” Their primary aim was to act as a stick, coercing the radical PLO and

Shi’ite organizations to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks by

destroying resources deemed vital to the execution of those attacks. These air

raids would also “create a situation of uncertainty for the terrorists so that

they [could not] feel safe in perpetrating their attacks.”18 This would reduce 

the frequency of attacks by forcing the terrorists to expend energy and

resources on defensive precautions, rather than on offensive strikes against

Israeli targets.19 Many of these raids also involved overt and implicit

retaliation. In these cases air raids were directed at specific organizations in

response to attacks against the IDF. These raids were designed to increase

the psychological “costs” for the targeted organizations by sending a clear

message that “we know who you are and we know where to find you.” There

were also attempts to signal the PLO/Shi’ites that they were approaching the

limits that Israel would tolerate in the conflict. 

While Israeli leaders used the destructive power of the Israeli air raids as a

stick against the radical PLO and Shi’ite organizations, their ability to

withhold these strikes was used as a carrot against the moderate ones. This

was the case with Nabih Berri’s Amal organization. During this period,

Berri’s organization was not targeted by the IAF. As chapter 5 will point out,

evidence indicates that the decision to limit IAF attacks against the Amal

organization was a result of Israeli leaders trying to signal their willingness

to work with Nabih Berri. 

Although military leaders designed the tactics, the Israeli prime minister

and his cabinet selected the targets and were the final approval authority for

all the air raids.20 When selecting these targets, Israeli leaders sought

maximum coercive effects by attempting to focus the air attacks directly at

the “parties involved,” while structuring them so as to minimize the political

costs to Israel.21 In the case of retaliation raids, this meant selecting targets

that were both proportional and directly connected to specific terrorist

actions. 

To assist the senior leaders in making their decisions, Israeli intelligence

compiled comprehensive target lists for each one of the terrorist groups

believed to be operating against Israel. Included with these lists would be an

assessment of the value of each of the targets to the organizations. When one

of the terrorist groups would conduct an attack in Lebanon, the prime

minister and the cabinet would select an appropriate target from the list. The

target would then be sent down to IAF headquarters where air force planners

would determine the aircraft and weapon best suited for the mission. 

The missions themselves involved small packages of A-4, Kfir, or F-16

ground attack aircraft escorted by F-15s. Most of these missions did not 

6 
require defense suppression since the greatest threat was from small arms

fire and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The F-15s were brought

along to prevent interference with the missions by Syrian MiGs. The choice of

weapons on these missions would vary depending on the nature of the target.

By 1983 the Israelis had a variety of precision guided munitions (laser guided

bombs and TOW missiles) provided by the US. The increased accuracy and

reduced collateral damage promised by the weapons expanded the list of

targets that could be struck on these retaliatory raids. This became especially

important in Lebanon since the terrorists tended to locate their strategic

targets (headquarters, communications, and weapons storage) inside heavily

populated areas. 

In addition to the problems involved in minimizing collateral damage, one

of the greatest challenges facing IAF pilots was achieving the element of

surprise. As one IAF pilot put it “if [the terrorists] hear you they will run. If

they are running out into the bushes you can’t hit them.”22 To maximize the 

element of surprise the IAF increasingly turned to night operations in

executing their reprisal raids in Lebanon. These attacks not only minimized

the threat of ground fire to the crews but also reduced the ability of the

targets to “run away.” 

The desire to achieve the element of surprise also spurred the use of

helicopters. With their nap of the earth flying capability, the AH-1S Cobra

and Hughes 500 MD Defender allowed IAF pilots to “sneak up” on their

targets or even wait by the roadside to ambush selected vehicles. Helicopters

also had the advantage of not being tied to an airfield. This allowed the IAF

to keep a number of helicopters forward deployed in alert positions where

they could respond quickly to requests for reprisal or counterforce raids from

Israeli leaders who wanted to punish those who attacked the IDF. 

The helicopters were also used to support special raids. During these raids,

one or two platoons of paratroopers were inserted by helicopter near a

guerrilla/terrorist base.23 The troops would then approach on foot, attack the

camp with automatic fire, propel grenades and mortars, then be withdrawn by

helicopter again. This form of attack, along with selective air strikes, was

designed to maintain pressure on Israel’s enemies and to keep them off balance. 

Notes 

1. Ze’ev Shiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (New York: Simon and Schuster,

1984), 42.

2. Interview with Moshe Arens, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 16 June 1983. 

3. “Arens on Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon, Withdrawal,” FBIS, 12 June 1983. 

4. Ibid. 

5. “IDF Commander in Lebanon on Anti-Terrorist Battle,” FBIS, IDF Radio, 15 June 1983. 

6. Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1987), 115. According to Evron the efforts to suppress Shi’ite attacks against the IDF

“turned the Shi’ite population into a new and dangerous enemy which was quite willing to

resort to terrorism and guerrilla warfare.” 

7 
 7. Clifford Wright, “The Israeli War Machine in Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12 

(Winter 1983): 52.

8. FBIS, 4 May 1983.

9. “Interview with Shamir,” FBIS, 11 June 1983. 

10. “Schiffler Assesses Cabinet Meeting,” FBIS, 12 June 1983. 

11. In a 1983 interview Yasser Arafat observed the continuing attacks on the IDF. “This

has been confirmed by Israeli military sources and is considered one of the reasons for the

Israeli government to redeploy it forces to the Awali River in order to minimize casualties,”

Journal of Palestine Studies, Fall 1983, 1. 

12. Yezid Sayigh, “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982,” Journal of 

Palestine Studies 13 (Fall 1983): 64.

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward A Policy Analysis of 

Countermeasures (Santa Monica: RAND, 1980), 39.

16. Samuel Katz, Guards Without Frontiers: Israel’s War against Terrorism (London: Arms

and Armour Press, 1990), 17.

17. This was in keeping with the Israeli policy of Tohar Haneshed (Purity of Arms), that

forbids the killing of innocents. “All the Inefficiencies of Any Intelligence Service,” Armed 

Forces Journal International, October 1973, 47. 

18. “IDF Commander in Lebanon on Anti-Terrorist Battle,” FBIS, 15 June 1983. 

19. Katz, 168. 

20. IAF officer, interview with author, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., 20 February 1994.

21. Katz, 170. 

22. IAF officer interview. 

23. Ibid. 

8

Chapter 3 

The Israeli Strategy 

Defining the Israeli Strategy 

The premise of this thesis is that air raids executed by Israeli fighters were

part of a strategy of coercive diplomacy designed to influence the behavior of

Arab nonstate actors. This strategy was based on the assumption that

airpower could be used to undermine the will of PLO and Shi’ite

organizations to execute guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground forces in

southern Lebanon. An effective way to interpret this strategy is through the

theories of Alexander George. In The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, George

identified two strategies for using military force as an instrument of foreign

policy: the quick, decisive military strategy and coercive diplomacy.1 

According to George, in the quick, decisive military strategy, military force is

used to 

destroy a significant portion of the opponent’s military capability to contest what is

at stake in the conflict. Accordingly, this strategy largely dispenses with threats,

diplomacy, or subtle modes of persuasion to alter the opponent’s policy. It relies,

rather, on military force to provide a “war winning” strategy.2 

Under this strategy, military force renders the opponent incapable of 

resisting the demands of the attacker. In contrast to this approach, the

strategy of coercive diplomacy uses “just enough force . . . to demonstrate

resolution to protect well-defined interests and also to demonstrate the

credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.”3 It is a 

strategy that uses military force “in discrete and controlled increments, to 

induce the opponent to revise his calculations and agree to a mutually

acceptable termination of the conflict”4 (emphasis added). As Barry M.

Blechman noted in his dissertation, “The Consequence of the Israeli

Reprisals,” it is a distinction between violence used to attain an objective

directly and violence used as a form of bargaining.5 

An important aspect of coercive diplomacy is communication between the

attacker and target. In contrast to the quick, decisive military strategy, where

communication between the attacker and the opponent only occurs “after the 

effort to apply force” (emphasis added), in coercive diplomacy the attacker

communicates with the target throughout the application of military force.6 

Communication between the two adversaries allows the attacker to 

demonstrate his “resolution to protect well-defined interests and also to

demonstrate the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if 

9 
necessary.”7 According to George, this communication is the distinctive aspect

of coercive diplomacy that makes it “a much more flexible, refined, [and]

psychological instrument of policy.”8 

In explaining the concept of coercive diplomacy, George identified two variants

of the strategy. Known as the try-and-see approach (the weaker version) and the

tacit-ultimatum (the strongest version), these variants represent “the endpoints

of a continuum; intermediate variants are also possible.”9 

In the try-and-see approach, “the defending power in an attempt to persuade

its opponent to call off or curtail its encroachment takes only one step at a

time. It deliberately postpones the decision to take additional action until it

becomes clear whether the steps already taken will have a sufficient coercive

impact on the opponent.”10 

Under this strategy the attacker may make demands on the opponent but

does not “create a sense of urgency for his compliance with the demand.”11 In 

contrast to this approach, the tacit-ultimatum combines the threat of future

punishment with a time limit. Under this variant, “at the same time the

defending power takes its initial actions it communicates to the opponent that

other, more damaging steps will follow in short order if he does not comply

with the demand made on him.”12 According to George, the tacit-ultimatum

uses all three elements of a classical ultimatum: 

1. a specific demand on the opponent; 

2. a time limit (explicit or implicit) for compliance; and 

3. a threat of punishment for noncompliance that is sufficiently strong

and credible. 

The Israeli Airpower Strategy 

The Israeli use of airpower between January 1983 and June 1985 is

consistent with the tenets of coercive diplomacy as defined by Alexander

George. To begin with, the execution of IAF air raids met George’s

requirement that the application of military force be both discrete and

controlled. This becomes evident when comparing the use of airpower in

Lebanon with its employment during the 1967 War, which George describes

as an example of the quick, decisive military strategy. 

During the 1967 War, the Israeli Air Force executed a series of decisive

strikes designed to incapacitate the Egyptian Air Force in a short period. This

effort required hundreds of sorties and was completed in less than four days.

By comparison, during the Lebanon period evaluated in this study, the Israeli

Air Force would fly four-to-eight missions per month, followed by lulls in

which none or only one air strike was flown. The total number of missions

flown in Lebanon between January 1983 and June 1985 was less than that

flown during the first day of the 1967 War. 

Further indication that airpower was supporting a strategy of coercive

diplomacy in Lebanon comes from the fact that Israeli air raids were often 

10 
“proceeded, accompanied, or followed by appropriate communications to the

opponent.” For example, the first series of air strikes against Palestinian and

Shi’ite targets in southern Lebanon was followed by the pronouncement from

Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir that “Middle East peoples should realize that

if Israel is provoked, the hand extended in peace will turn into an iron fist

that will strike at terrorism to the bitter end.”13 This is consistent with 

George’s statement that the central task of a coercive strategy is to “create in

the opponent the expectation of unacceptable costs of sufficient magnitude to

erode his motivation to continue what he is doing.”14 

As to the question of which variant of the strategy was being used: The

Israeli decision to avoid executing any air strikes against the PLO and

Shi’ites for over a year (October 1982–October 1983) indicates that the

Israelis were engaged in a try-and-see approach. Further support for this

view comes from the periodic lulls in air attacks. Between January 1983 and

June 1985, there were three months in which the Israeli Air Force did not 

execute any air strikes against targets in southern Lebanon (table 5). These

lulls could be the result of Israeli leaders waiting to see whether the air

strikes were having the desired effect on the PLO and Shi’ites. This is

consistent with the try-and-see approach in which the coercing power

“deliberately postpones the decision to take additional action until it becomes

clear whether the steps already taken will have a sufficient coercive impact

on the opponent.”15 

Although evidence indicates that the strategy used by the Israelis in

Lebanon was a weak variant of coercive diplomacy, other aspects of the

strategy show that it was not the “weakest” variant of the try-and-see

approach. Of the three elements that indicate the strength of a particular

variant, the Israeli use of airpower during this period possesses two of the

three: a specific demand and the threat of punishment for noncompliance.

Both elements are present in the statement made by Prime Minister Shamir

after the air strikes against the PLO and Shi’ites in November 1983. Since

the air strikes that preceded this announcement were executed in retaliation

for the bombing of IDF headquarters in Tyre, the assumption is that the

provocation Shamir refers to are terrorist attacks against the IDF. The

implied message is that should the target organization continue to provoke

Israel by continuing to attack the IDF, Israel will respond with punishment

delivered by the “Iron Fist.” This approach is consistent with George’s view

that the coercing power “may not need to state a specific time limit or define

the threat of punishment for noncompliance to reinforce its demand on the

opponent. Either or both may be sufficiently implicit in the structure of a 

situation”(emphasis added).16 

Notes 

1. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive 

Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), 16–17. 

11 
 2 Ibid., 16.


3 Ibid., 18.


4 Ibid.


5 Barry M. Blechman, “The Consequence of the Israeli Reprisals: An Assessment” (PhD


diss., Georgetown School of Government, 1971), 10.

6 George et al., 17.

7. Ibid.,18. 

8 Ibid. 

9. Ibid., 27. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 4 November 1983, ii. 

14. George et al., 26–27. 

15. Ibid., 27. 

16. Ibid., 28. 

12

Chapter 4 

Factors Influencing the Airpower Strategy 

As stated in the previous chapter, although the Shi’ites were responsible

for many of the attacks against the IDF, almost all the Israeli air attacks 

were directed at the PLO, in particular the hard-line, pro-Syrian organizations

located in the Bekka Valley. The choice of Palestinians as the primary target

was a matter of political reality (table 1). As Yitzak Shamir stated in a 1984

interview, “The Lebanon issue, is not a matter of principle . . . it is a matter of

determining what is the most effective means of attaining security for the

north.”1 

Table 1


Palestinian Targets of IAF Air Strikes


PFLP DFLP ABU 

MOUSSA 

PFLP-GC PPS 

F 

SAIQ 

A 

*NOT 

SPECIFIED 

TOTAL 

4 4 2 2 1 1 11 25 

Legend:


Abu Moussa Syrian Leader


DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine


PFLP Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine


PFLP-GC Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command


PSF Popular Struggle Front


SAIQA Palestinian Guerrilla Organization


*In these cases there was enough information to determine that an air attack was

flown against a Palestinian group, but not enough to determine which organization. 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan Air Base (AB), Korea, June 1994. 

The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security 

With the Shi’ites comprising one-half of Lebanon’s three million

people, and 60 percent of those living in the South, Israeli leaders felt

they could not afford to risk making the whole community its

implacable enemy if Israel was to have any hope of coming to a

long-term solution with Lebanon on security arrangements for its

northern border.2 As Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin would say, “If

as a result of the war in Lebanon we will have succeeded in 

eliminating to a large extent the PLO terrorists, but will have 

13 
brought about Shi’ite terrorism, one would have to think twice about

what really proved to be the results of this war.”3 

In an effort to remove their troops from southern Lebanon

without jeopardizing the security of their settlements, the Israelis

attempted to get Amal to accept responsibility for ensuring the

security of their northern border. Unfortunately, the political

environment in South Lebanon prevented this from happening.

Augustus R. Norton framed the situation as follows: 

If Amal provided the overt security assurances sought by Israel, it would

jeopardize its competitive position vis-à-vis Hizb Alla, with which Amal

[was] compet[ing] for the political heart of the Shi’i community.4 

With overt assurances a political impossibility, the Israelis attempted

to engage the Shi’ite in a tacit agreement. In an effort to signal their

willingness to coexist with Nabih Berri’s Amal organization, Israeli

leaders forced the IDF to exercise restraint in reacting to Shi’ite attacks. Under a policy described as the velvet glove, Rabin and other

cabinet members would issue occasional threats that Israel would not 

cease fighting terrorism, and Israeli agencies would continue to

gather information about Shi’ite networks and organizations, but the

IDF in southern Lebanon was forced to react defensively rather than

offensively to the guerrilla attacks.5 Limiting IAF attacks against

Amal seems to have been another of the signals being sent by the

Israeli leadership to the Shi’ites. In an article that appears to reflect

the thinking of Israeli leaders, Hirsh Goodman, journalist, noted:

“The danger with [the Israeli policy of automatic retaliation] is that

the IDF could find itself retaliating against precisely the people we

want to be our allies in the southern security zone.”6 

Hizbollah and the PLO 

In addition to minimizing attacks against Amal, the IAF did not

execute many attacks against the radical Hizbollah organization.

This appears to have been the result of limitations imposed on the

IAF because of the nature of the Hizbollah organization. Unlike other

organizations in Lebanon, Hizbollah was a popular movement based

on Islamic teaching, not a political party with a fixed address. This

made it difficult for the Israelis to pinpoint and attack individuals

responsible for carrying out attacks against the IDF.7 It was this 

same problem that prevented the United States from launching

reprisal attacks against Hizbollah after the bombing of Marine

barracks in Beirut. The Israelis were also concerned that massive 

raids on radical Shi’ites might not reduce their willingness of

attacking the IDF, and might even inspire them to even greater

violence. As early as 1983, members of the Hizbollah organization, 

14 
mindful of the martyrdom of the Prophet Mohammed’s son, had

shown themselves quite willing to die for their cause.8 The Israelis 

were well aware of this fact and it seems to have been reflected in 

their targeting strategy. 

With attacks against the Shi’ites largely ruled out for political and

practical reasons, the IAF was left to focus on the Palestinian

organizations who had returned to Lebanon and were operating out

of bases in Syrian controlled territory. Interestingly, Yasser Arafat’s

Fatah organization was largely excluded from these attacks. This

was because six months before the first air attack, Arafat had been 

driven out of Lebanon by a group of pro-Syrian hard-liners led by

A’akid Muhamad Sa’id Musa (Abu Moussa). This reduced Arafat’s

stature in the PLO during this period and seems to have made him a

nonfactor in Israeli eyes. 

The hard-line organizations on the other hand presented a threat.

Abu Muossa and the other PLO forces (PFLP, PFLP-GC, DFLP,

SAIQA, PSF, PLF) who had returned to Lebanon included the most

violent anti-Israel factions within the PLO. Unlike Arafat, they were

opposed to any compromise with Israel and advocated violence as

the sole means of achieving a solution to the Palestinian question.9 

These forces were heavily supported by the Syrians and were

executing attacks against the IDF from bases behind Syrian lines in

the Bekka Valley. Since the location of these bases made it very

difficult for Israeli ground forces to attack them, the Israelis turned

to airpower which provided a safer method to reach these bases. 

Notes 

1. Jerusalem Post, 29 November 1984. 

2. Scott Mcleod, “Israel’s Iron Fist - Deterrence or Revenge?,” Middle East 

International, 8 March 1985, 22. 

3. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli 

Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 279.

4. Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon 

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), 121.

5. Yaniv, 279. 

6. Jerusalem Post, 17 May 1985.

7. Mcleod, 22. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Rashid Khalidi, “The PLO as Representative of the Palestinian People,” The 

International Relations of the Palestine Organization, eds. Augustus R. Norton and Martin

H. Greenberg (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 62. 

15

Chapter 5 

Effectiveness of IAF Reprisal Raids 

In terms of sorties flown and material destroyed, the retaliation raids were

termed a success by the Israeli Spokesman.1 In terms of the one measure of 

merit that really mattered—stemming the rising tide of terrorist violence

against Israeli troops—they were a failure. In the six months prior to the

initiation of air strikes (period one: May 1983–October 1983), there had been

60 attacks against IDF personnel in southern Lebanon (table 2). Following

this period, the IAF flew 14 air raids against Palestinian targets and Shi’ite

targets. The effect on the target organizations during this period appears 

negligible. In fact, the number of guerrilla attacks against the IDF during

six months in which there were no air raids against the PLO and Shi’ites

(period one) was exactly the same as the first six-month period (period two) in

which no air raids were flown against them. Results during periods three and

four bring the effectiveness of the air raids further into question. During

these periods, the number of attacks against the IDF skyrocketed—from 74

attacks during period three (May 1984–October 1984) to 157 attacks during

period four (November 1984–May 1985). These increases occurred despite the

fact that the IAF continued to execute air raids against the PLO and Shi’ites.

This evidence seems to indicate that the air strikes did not reduce the 

willingness of the PLO and Shi’ites to execute these attacks. 

Table 2* 

Guerrilla Attacks against the IDF in Southern Lebanon 

(6 month intervals) 

Attacks against 

the IDF 

IAF Air Attacks 

*See appendix for detailed information on data collection and coding.

**IAF air strikes begin. 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

Period One Period Two Period Three Period Four 

May ‘83– 

October ‘83 

**November ‘83– 

April ‘84 

May ‘84– 

October ‘84 

November ‘84– 

May ‘85 

60 60 74 157 

0 14 7 6 

17

Although an argument can be made that the rise in guerrilla attacks

following period two occurred because the IAF reduced the number of air

attacks it flew during subsequent periods (three and four), an equally

effective argument can be made against this view. To begin with, air attacks

flown during these periods were designed to prevent future attacks on the

IDF. To accomplish this the IAF focused on destroying resources that the

target organizations needed to execute future attacks. The destruction of

these resources was designed to inflict pain on the target organizations,

followed by signals from Israeli leaders that to avoid further pain (i.e., air

strikes), the target organizations need only stop attacking the IDF. If the air

strikes flown during period two had been effective at destroying critical

resources or inflicting great pain on the target organizations, one would

expect to see a reduction in the number of guerrilla attacks in period three.

The data shows that this did not occur. This same argument can be applied to

periods three and four. During these two periods, the number of air attacks

remained relatively equal, yet the number of guerrilla attacks in period four

is more than double those in period three.

While this evidence does not prove that by flying more air attacks against

the PLO and Shi’ites the Israelis might not have been able to affect the 

willingness of the target organizations to attack the IDF, it seems to

conclusively prove that the air raids flown during this period did not reduce 

the number of attacks against the IDF. The Shi’ite response to the Israeli

Iron Fist policy in early 1985 adds further credence to this view. During this

period, IDF ground forces inflicted a degree of suffering on the Shi’ite

population of southern Lebanon, comparable to that of large-scale air strikes.2 

Despite the brutal punishment inflicted on the Shi’ites by the Iron Fist, the

number of guerrilla attacks against the IDF more than doubles during this

period. Based on this experience it is hard to imagine how even directing all

28 air strikes against the Shi’ites would have caused them to react

differently.

As a result of airpower’s inability to coerce the Shi’ites and Palestinians,

these forces continued to engage in a relentless battle of attrition which

eventually eroded all domestic support for the occupation of Lebanon. By the

summer of 1984, the press began referring to Lebanon as Israel’s Vietnam.

Public opinion polls showed that a majority of Israelis no longer supported the

war and many in both the right and the left wing of Israel’s political parties

were calling for an immediate pullout.3 By the time Israel’s national unity

government was elected in August 1984, it became clear that one of its main

functions would be to extricate Israel from the Lebanese quagmire.4 On 18 

January 1985 the Peres-led government took the first steps in this direction

when it announced a three-stage withdrawal plan from Lebanon. Six months

after this announcement the last Israeli troops returned home. 

18

Notes 

1. A review of the public statements made by the IDF Spokesman showed that all comments 

made concerning the effectiveness of the IAF missions indicated that the missions were

successful. 

2. Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experiences in 

Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 281. According to Yaniv, “The Iron Fist

policy began on February 20, 1985 with a raid on the Village of Bazouriyeh, east of Tyre. The

next day there was a similar raid on the villages of Burj Rahal, Burj al Shemali, and Bedias.

The following week the area under attack was further expanded. This phase in the policy came

to a climax a week and one-half later with a massive raid on Ma’arakhe, the largest of these

villages. The raids were conducted methodically. A large force in armored cars would suddenly

surround a village chosen for a raid. Israeli soldiers would take the hills around it and block all

entrances to the village with physical barriers. The troops would enter the village shooting at

anything that moved while commanding the residents through loudspeakers to stay at home.

They would search every home thoroughly and round up all the men ages sixteen to sixty and

assemble them in the village square. Then, assisted by hooded informants, the Israelis would

begin to identify suspected al Amal supporters and take them for further interrogation. Houses

owned by suspected supporters of al Amal would be blown up. Any attempt to resist would lead

to shooting. Fifteen Shi’ites were killed in this way within the first ten days of the new policy.

When the first phase of the policy failed to reduce the number of guerrilla attacks, Israeli’s

response was to escalate the reprisals further. The day after a car bomb attack, a large Israeli

force crossed the IDF line of deployment and raided the village of Zrariyeh. Thirty-four

Lebanese Shi’ites were killed and much damage was done to the village. Ten days later a large

helicopter-borne Israeli force, supported on the ground by a great deal of armor, performed a

similar raid on nine other villages. The raid was so large that one Beirut radio station called it

a new invasion. By evening, however, the IDF force withdrew, leaving behind scores of

blown-up homes and taking with it scores of prisoners.

3. Yaniv, 271. This was reflected in public opinion polls showing that 84 percent of the

population supported staying in Lebanon in June 1982. This figure dropped to 64 percent at the

end of 1982, 51 percent at the end of 1983, and was down to 36 percent by early 1985.

4. According to Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon 

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987): “Until late 1984, the dilemma was framed as follows:

we want to get out, but how can we afford to, given the security risks? But in late 1984, the

question became: given the risks of staying, how can we afford to stay?” 

19

Chapter 6 

Why the Air Strikes Failed 

The question that hangs over the Lebanese experience is “How could air

raids, which were so successful in destroying their assigned targets, be so

unsuccessful in reducing the number of attacks against the IDF?” The short

answer to this question is that while the air strikes were successful, the

strategy failed. The Israeli strategy was based on the assumption that the

destruction of resources vital to the execution of guerrilla attacks and the

“psychological costs” of the air strikes could undermine the will of the PLO

and Shi’ite organizations to attack the IDF. This strategy failed for two reasons.

First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the

effectiveness of air strikes as a carrot. Second, the air strikes were unable to 

create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This resulted from two factors:

the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly

to the costs of the target organizations (tables 3 and 4). 

Table 3 

IAF Air Attacks in Southern Lebanon 

(6 month intervals) 

May ‘83– 

October ‘83 

November ‘83– 

April ‘84 

May ‘84– 

October ‘84 

November ‘84– 

May ‘85 

Total 

0 14 7 7 28 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

Table 4


Targets of Israeli Air Attacks


Total Number of 

Air Attacks 

Air Attacks 

Against Palestinians 

Air Attacks 

Against Shi’ite 

28 25 3 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

21 
Asymmetry of Motivation 

When the Israelis invaded Lebanon in the summer of 1982, many of the

500,000 Shi’ites in the South greeted them as liberators. It was a situation

that would quickly change. As one Israeli journalist would state: 

It is a fact that with the conquest of the villages and hamlets of southern Lebanon, we

were received with rice and flowers. Now we are received with grenades and explosives.

Something has happened to the Shi’a sect. The joy about our arrival as people liberating them from the terrorist burden has changed with time into burning hatred. This is

not something to be surprised about: We have behaved as a military government, with

all that involves, and caused much suffering to the population.1 

As outlined in the previous chapter, Israel initially responded to the Shi’ite

attacks by forcing the IDF to react “defensively,” which appears to have

included preventing the IAF from attacking them. This was an attempt by the

Israeli leadership to “signal” their willingness to work with moderate Shi’ite

leaders like Nabih Berri.2 In effect, airpower was being used as a carrot.

Based on the Shi’ite response the carrot clearly was not effective. 

The failure of airpower to act as an effective carrot occurred because an

“asymmetry of motivation” existed between the Israelis and the Shi’ites.

According to George, the motivation of the coercing power and his opponent

are key variables which effect the outcome of coercive diplomacy. He contends

that the motivation of the coercer dictates the nature of the demand made on 

the opponent, which in turn effects the motivation of the opponent to resist.

He goes on to say, “The chances that coercive diplomacy will be successful will

be appreciably greater if the objective selected—and the demand made—by

the coercing power reflects only the most important of its interests that are at

stake, for this is more likely to create an asymmetry of motivation favoring

the coercing power.”3 The situation in southern Lebanon appears to have

favored the Shi’ites rather than the Israelis. 

As chapter 2 pointed out, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon was

born of a desire to enhance the security of their northern border. While one

would expect this to provide Israel with a high degree of motivation, this is

not the case. Although it was true that maintaining their security was a

matter of national interest for Israel, the country and its leaders were divided

as to whether the occupation of Lebanon was an effective method for

maintaining that security.4 Rather than creating a strong consensus within

Israel, the occupation provoked much dissent within the country, robbing its

leaders of the motivation needed to prevail in coercive diplomacy. 

Israeli efforts were not helped by their misestimation of Shi’ite resentment

to the Israeli occupation. The Israelis mistook the warm welcome they

received from the Shi’ites in the summer of 1982 as a willingness on the part

of the Shi’ite population to tolerate an extended IDF presence in South

Lebanon. In reality, the politically “awakened” Shi’ite community was

unwilling to tolerate domination by any foreign power, Arab or Israeli. As

Augustus R. Norton observed, “Having begun to throw off the shackles of the 

22 
PLO presence, the Shi’i community was not about to wrap itself in the chains

of Israel’s occupation.”5 

The depth of Shi’ite commitment was evident in their willingness to endure

the Iron Fist. Norton also observed, “As the occupation of the South wore on,

with debilitating effects for the economy and political stability of the area,

moderation was discredited and extremism was validated. As a result, Israeli 

officials found that no significant Shi’i leader was even willing to respond to

their quiet advances.”6 In the face of this asymmetry of motivation, the Israeli

effort to coerce the moderate Shi’ite forces using the carrot of airpower was an

exercise in futility. 

Inability to Create Fear of

Unacceptable Escalation 

The second factor that undermined the effectiveness of Israeli airpower 

was the inability of the air strikes to create fear in the minds of the

Palestinians and Shi’ites that unacceptable escalation could occur. According

to George, “coercive diplomacy is enhanced if the initial small steps taken

against the opponent begin to arouse his fear of unacceptable levels of

warfare.”7 During this period, Israeli air strikes did not create that fear in the

minds of the Palestinians and Shi’ites: therefore, the coercive value of the air 

strikes was eroded. In examining the situation one can identify two causes for

this failure. The first was the Lebanese environment, which limited the 

ability of the IAF to attack the guerrillas, and the second was the inability of

the air strikes to significantly raise the costs for the target organizations. 

Lebanon Environment 

The coercive value of the Israeli air attacks was undermined by the

environment in Lebanon which made it easy for the guerrillas to attack the

IDF but difficult for the IAF to respond. As Clifford Wright observed, “With

its high population density and hilly terrain, Lebanon was perfectly suited to

the ‘hit and run’ tactics employed by the terrorists.”8 It allowed small groups

of guerrillas to strike their targets and merge quickly back into the

population. This made it difficult for the Israelis to determine which groups or

individuals were responsible for the attacks. Further confounding the Israeli

effort was the fact that “the population of South Lebanon [was] far more

politicized, organized and armed than populations of the surrounding Arab

states.”9 Consequently, they were more than willing to provide support and

assistance to the various guerrilla factions. In addition to this, the structure

of the resistance organizations made it difficult for the Israeli intelligence

agencies to gather information needed to execute air attacks against

particular organizations. This was especially true of the Shi’ites, who tended 

23 
to be made up of “small, hard to penetrate, locally based cells of militant

youths.”10 A final complication for the IAF was the fact that the PLO and

Shi’ites often put high-value targets, such as supply depots and headquarters,

in high-density areas. The political sensitivity to collateral damage caused by

air strikes sometimes reduced the willingness of Israeli leaders to use

airpower against these targets.11 

Israeli Air Strikes Could Not 

Increase Costs on Attackers 

Even when airpower could locate and destroy the terrorist targets, it did

not significantly increase the “cost of doing business” for the Palestinians and

Shi’ites. The Israeli strategy aimed to destroy resources vital to the

Palestinian and Shi’ite “war of attrition,” imposing extreme costs on the

target organizations that would undermine their will to continue. Evaluation

of this strategy depends on whether the targets destroyed by air attacks

significantly increased the costs which the Palestinians and Shi’ites had to

pay. By this criterion, the Israeli strategy had little hope of success. 

The basic problem was that the Palestinians and Shi’ites were already

paying a tremendous price in blood to evict the Israelis from southern

Lebanon. Before the first air strike in November 1983, the Shi’ites had 

already lost 19,000 people at the hands of the Israeli invaders, while the PLO

suffered 1,000 killed and “several thousand” fighters captured during the

Israeli invasion.12,13 Furthermore, during the first year of their occupation,

Israeli efforts to control the Shi’ite and Palestinian population decimated the

economy of South Lebanon.14 The local population suffered even further when

Israel abandoned its “defensive” efforts in dealing with the Shi’ites and

adopted a ruthless Iron Fist policy. 

The air strikes failed to coerce the PLO and Shi’ites because they added

little to the costs already being endured by the resistance groups in southern

Lebanon. First, the air strikes did not cause many additional casualties.

Second, even though the air attacks were successful in destroying resources

needed to conduct the guerrilla war, both the Shi’ites and Palestinians had

the capability to replace these resources. In the case of the PLO, their annual

budget during this period included 100 million dollars for military operations

and 200 million dollars to ease the suffering of Palestinians living in

Lebanon.15 While subsidies from Syria and Iran were not generous, they

easily allowed the Shi’ites to replace equipment and facilities destroyed by the

Israeli raids. Money also helped ensure that both the organizations had little

difficulty replacing manpower losses. This was especially true for the

Shi’ites, where as a result of the horrendous economic climate of South 

Lebanon, the salary paid a Shi’ite militiaman was often his families only

available source of income.16 Even the deaths inflicted by the IAF did not

increase the level of pain. In study on the effectiveness of Israeli terrorist 

24 
countermeasures, Hanan Alon would observe, “There is no proof that the

strikes reduced the willingness of the Palestinians to join the organizations

and to die for their cause. One may assume that, on the contrary, the strikes

led to rage which may have encouraged (emphasis added) joining terror

organizations and taking part in their operations.”17 The same case appears

to have held true in Lebanon. 

Notes 

1. Yisre’el Zamir, “The Bluff Called Security Arrangements,” ‘al Hamishar, 23 February 1984.

2. In the year and one-half leading up to the Israeli pullout in June 1985, the IAF would

fly 28 air attacks against “terrorist” targets in southern Lebanon. In the course of these

attacks, the Israelis would execute 25 attacks against Palestinian targets and three attacks

against Shi’ite organizations. Because 90 percent of the air strikes were directed against

Palestinian targets, one would expect to find that the Palestinians were responsible for most of

the attacks against the IDF. Contrary to this expectation, the evidence indicates that by the

spring of 1984 it was the Shi’ites in southern Lebanon who were responsible for most of the

attacks against the IDF.

3. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive 

Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1971), 26.

4. One year into the occupation polls showed that support for the occupation amongst

Israelis had dropped from 84 percent in June 1982 to 51 percent in May 1983. Israeli leaders,

such as Shimon Peres would question the soundness of the occupation while “reiterate[ing] his

party’s position that the IDF should withdraw from Lebanon as soon as possible since it [was]

impossible to unify Lebanon by military means.” The party in power would also underscore the

limits of Israeli commitment when foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir stated “all of us want to

get out of Lebanon.” There were other signs of discontent as well. For the first time in Israeli

history, Israeli antiwar organizations developed and began to protest the government’s policy.

Even the IDF was not immune as one of its most highly decorated generals resigned in protest

over the occupation.

5. Augustus R. Norton, Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin:

University of Texas Press, 1987), 114.

6. Ibid. 

7. George et al., 225. 

8. Clifford Wright, “The Israeli War Machine in Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12 

(Winter 1983): 52.

9. Yezid Sayigh, “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982,” Journal of 

Palestine Studies 13 (Fall 1983): 64.

10. Norton, 112. This also applied to the Palestinians, who had broken down into smaller

bands of radicals following their eviction from Lebanon in August 1982.

11. Sayigh, 22. Using these advantages, PLO and Shi’ite guerrillas were able to execute

nearly one guerrilla attack a day causing over 150 Israeli deaths. The Israeli response resulted

in 15 killed or captured. It was the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that

Israeli forces suffered worse than one-to-one casualties. 

12. PLO figures from Sayigh, 62.

13. Shi’ite figures from Norton, 113.

14. Norton, 118. In November 1982, Israel began to isolate the South from the rest of

Lebanon, making crossing into the Israeli-controlled sector an arduous and time-consuming

process that seriously impeded commerce. Israel aggravated this by dumping agricultural

produce in South Lebanon at prices that made even locally produced fruits and vegetables

uncompetitive.

15. Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the PLO (New York: William Morrow and

Co., 1990), 163. 

25 
16. Shi’ite figures from Norton, 106.

17. Hanan Alon, Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward A Policy Analysis of 

Countermeasures (Santa Monica: RAND, 1980). 

26

Chapter 7 

Conclusions 

Summary of Findings 

This study has followed a trail that ended with the failure of Israeli air

strikes to reduce the willingness of PLO and Shi’ite resistance fighters to

execute attacks against the IDF. The analysis began by demonstrating that

Israeli air strikes during this period supported a strategy of coercive

diplomacy—an approach adopted when Israeli ground efforts proved unable

to reduce the number of guerrilla attacks. In the course of this effort, the

Israeli Air Force executed 28 air raids, all of which would have little effect on 

the decision calculus of the Palestinians and Shi’ite organizations in southern

Lebanon. The study contends there were two reasons for this failure: First,

the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the

effectiveness of air strikes as a carrot. Second, the air strikes were unable to 

create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This resulted from two

factors. The first of these was the “Lebanese environment,” which severely

limited the ability of airpower to target the Shi’ite and PLO organizations. In

this case, the combination of terrain perfectly suited to “hit and run” tactics;1 

a highly politicized population willing to provide aid and assistance to the

resistance forces; “small, hard to penetrate, resistance cells”; and targets

located in high-density areas, made it difficult to gather the intelligence

information needed to execute air strikes. The second was the fact that when 

the IAF was able to execute air strikes, the damage inflicted by these strikes

did not significantly increase the costs the Palestinians and Shi’ites had to

pay for attacking the IDF. 

In addition to the reasons why the strategy failed, this study also identifies

factors that influenced the Israelis to select this strategy. Here the study

concludes that the decision to minimize air attacks against the Shi’ites was

an effort on the part of senior Israeli leaders to gain long-term security on

their northern border by “signaling” their willingness to work with Nabih

Berri and other Amal leaders. In addition to this, Israeli leaders were 

concerned that massive raids on organizations like Hizbollah would have

little impact on their willingness to attack the IDF, or worse yet, would

inspire them to even greater violence. 

In light of these “political realities,” the Israelis focused the air attacks on

the radical Palestinian groups. This decision may have been influenced by the

fact that the Israelis had an extensive intelligence “base” already built up on 

27 
the Palestinian organizations, and that PLO camps in the Bekka Valley were

difficult to attack with ground power. Ultimately, the Israeli air strikes failed

to affect the PLO. 

Key Lessons 

Clifford Wright would observe in an article published in the Journal of 

Palestine Studies: “The fact that a state-organized military apparatus of

massive proportions waged war against a non-state guerrilla group was, as

one American analyst put it, like ‘the Wehrmacht against the Apaches.’ ”2 The 

irony of this observation is that the Palestinian and Shi’ite “Apaches” won.

With no air force, no navy, and no mobile armor to support them, Palestinian

and Lebanese fighters were successful in forcing one of the world’s largest

military powers to bend to their will. There is a valuable lesson in this for

American policymakers who seem ever willing to use American airpower to

deal with similar situations. Simply stated, that lesson is: Technology and

size does not guarantee “coercive” victories. 

Even though the Israelis possessed the most advanced aircraft in the world,

capable of delivering an impressive array of technologically advanced

weapons, these advantages meant little when it came to coercing the

Palestinians and the Shi’ites. This was because Israeli strategy was based on

the assumption that air strikes could inflict such pain on the target

organizations that they would give in to Israeli demands rather than suffer at

the hands of Israeli airmen. What the Israelis did not count on was the fact 

that the PLO and Shi’ites were already paying tremendous costs, and

precision guided munitions and iron bombs could not add to these costs in any

significant manner. In fact, as stated in chapter 3, even if all 28 air strikes

had been directed at the Shi’ites (who were causing most of the damage

against the IDF) it probably wouldn’t have changed the outcome. 

One factor which clouded Israeli thinking was an over reliance on

technology. This was identified by one Israeli analyst, who conceded “. . . the

tendency of the (Israel Defense Force) IDF to concentrate on technological

solutions, at the expense of tactical originality that constituted its traditional

forte, led to a relative decline in the quality of its performance against the

Arabs.”3 This is an important lesson for the United States—a country which

currently possesses the most technologically advanced air force in the world,

and appears ever willing to use it to make recalcitrant nonstate actors

conform to internationally established codes of behavior. Our experiences in

Somalia and Bosnia appear to reinforce the IAF “lessons” from Lebanon—that 

massive technological advantages do not translate into coercive victory. 

Given that many experts believe we will face more, not less, of these

situations in the future, US policymakers must understand that the ability to

destroy targets with surgical accuracy does not automatically translate into

the ability to inflict “significant pain” on an adversary. We must be selective 

28 
in choosing where we employ our “shrinking” air forces, or risk squandering

the few advantages we enjoy. The bottom line is that “high-tech aircraft and

weapons” can never substitute for sound thinking and clear judgment.

Recently, it seems as if the success airpower enjoyed in the Gulf War, and the

feeling that “we have the technology so we must use it,” have clouded our

judgment about where we want to commit our air forces, and what they can

do for us once they get there. Giving in to these urges, without first

establishing a clearly defined strategy, is a recipe for disaster which allows

“the Apaches” to win every time. 

Notes 

1. Clifford Wright, “The Israeli War Machine in Lebanon,” Journal of Palestine Studies 12 

(Winter 1983): 52.

2. Ibid., 39. 

3. Ibid. 

29

Appendix 

Data Analysis 

Data Characterization 

Data analyzed during this study fell into two categories: 

1. air attacks by Israeli fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter aircraft against

Palestinian and Shi’ite targets in southern Lebanon, and

2. attacks by Palestinian and Shi’ite resistance forces against Israeli

Defense Force (IDF) ground troops in southern Lebanon. Weapons and tactics

used in these attacks included 

hand grenades;


bazookas;


rocket propelled grenades;


kaytusha rockets;


shootings;


ambushes;


mine incidents which resulted in IDF casualties; and


car bombs.


Data Sources 

Data included in this study was derived from the following two sources. 

1. The “Chronology of the Israeli War in Lebanon” was produced by the

Journal of Palestine Studies to catalogue events which occurred during the

Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon. This chronology is

compiled by reviewing articles from over 80 publications, including the major

US, European, Israeli and Arab English-language press. The data gathered

for this study was contained in sequential editions of the Journal of Palestine 

Studies from Summer/Fall 1982 up to Fall 1985.

2. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is compiled by

reviewing articles from a variety of publications, including the major US,

European, Israeli and Arab English-language press. The data gathered for

this study was contained in sequential editions of the Middle East section of

the Foreign Broadcast Information Service between 30 October 1982 and 30 

June 1985. 

31

Methodology 

All attacks were recorded by date in a database using Microsoft Excel 5.

These attacks were grouped into “IAF Air Attacks” and “Palestinian/Shi’ite

Guerrilla Attacks.” The number of attacks were totaled using the Excel

“Countif” formula. 

Table 5: 

All IAF air attacks were indexed by date of attack, the organization they

were directed against, the location of the attack, the type of attack

(retaliation or counterforce), and the asset used. An air attack was classified

as a “retaliation” attack when a representative of the Israeli government

publicly claimed that the attack was executed in response to, or in retaliation of,

an attack by Palestinian or Lebanese resistance forces against IDF troops in

southern Lebanon. Attacks not labeled as retaliation were classified as 

“counterforce.” 

Tables 1–3: 

IAF air attacks were then grouped by month of occurrence into three

general categories:

1. Shi’ite: attacks directed against Shi’ite organizations;

2. Specified Palestinians: attacks in which it was possible (based 

on the information in the two data sources) to

determine the specific Palestinian organization

being targeted; and

3. Unspecified Palestinian: attacks in which it was possible to

determine (based on the information in the 

two data sources) that a Palestinian organization 

was the target of the attack, but it was not possible 

to determine the specific organization. 

Tables 4–6: 

These tables present the number of “IAF Air Attacks” and the number of

“Palestinian/Shi’ite Guerrilla Attacks” which occurred in each month between

1 January 1983 and 30 June 1985. 

Uncertainties 

The uncertainties involved in the investigation originate from two sources.

First, most of the source literature is distinctly partisan. This results not only

in differing interpretations of the significance of events, but at times, in

disputes as to whether specific events actually occurred or not. Second, as the 

32

Middle East conflict remains an active issue, much of the source material 

remains the subject of governmental or individual censorship. This problem is

particularly significant with regard to military interactions.

Because of this fact the author was not allowed access to material which 

would have made the study more comprehensive. This was the case for source

material requested from Israel, the US State Department, and the RAND

Corporation. Inquiries to the Israeli embassy about Israeli Air Force flight

records, planning materials, and Israeli defense force casualty figures did not

evoke a positive response. Similar requests to the US State Department and

to RAND regarding the number of Middle East terrorist attacks during this

period and information regarding counterterrorist policies, also met with

negative responses.

In lieu of these central sources, the author constructed a set of data 

representing the military interactions between Israel and the Lebanese and

Palestinian forces by using the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) 

and the “Chronology of the Israeli War in Lebanon and the Israeli Palestine

Conflict” produced by the Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS). These two 

sources comb unclassified sources (newspapers, magazines, etc.) to create a

daily record of significant events occurring in the Middle East. Because of

source limitations involved with FBIS and JPS this data set is incomplete.

This is especially true in regard to the number of attacks against IDF and

Israeli personnel. All sources, including FBIS and JPS are to a large extent

dependent upon the whims of the nations involved for their information.

Thus, minor events, particularly those not involving casualties, could or could

not be reported depending upon the then current wishes of the pertinent

governments and organizations. As a result, one encounters a phenomena

associated with conditions of unstable equilibrium. That is, as hostilities

increase, each nation/organization tends to report a larger fraction of minor

incidents, thus making hostilities appear to increase at an even greater rate.

This thesis attempted to alleviate that problem by reporting only those

incidents in which casualties were sustained. The assumption was made that

casualty figures are less vulnerable to reporting variability than simple

incident frequencies. The fact that casualties are sustained indicates a

minimum level of incident seriousness which generally leads to inclusion of

the event in the printed news, media, and consequently in the data set. In all

cases, substantial efforts have been made to uncover all views on issuers for 

which uncertainties exist and particular efforts have been extended to avoid

any implications of partisanship in the analysis. 

33

Table 5


IAF Air Attacks


Date Target Location Type of Attack Asset Used 

1. 4 Nov 83 PFLP HQ Aley, Bhamdoun, & Sofar Reprisal (Bombing of IDF HQ, Tyre) Aircraft 

2. 16 Nov 83 Islamic Amal & Hizbollah Training 

Camps, Ammo Dump 

Nabih Chit (near Baalbek) Reprisal (Bombing of IDF HQ, Tyre) Aircraft 

3. 20 Nov 83 Sa’iqa, Syrian Ba’ath Party, PFLP-GC 

Guerrilla Bases 

Sofar, Falougha, & Bhamdoun Counterforce Aircraft 

4. 6 Dec 83 DFLP Bases Near Beirut Reprisal (IDF soldier killed in South 

Lebanon) 

Aircraft 

5. 19 Dec 83 Palestinian Terrorist Base South Lebanon Counterforce Aircraft 

6. 21 Dec 83 Iran-Backed Terrorist Base South Lebanon Counterforce Aircraft 

7. 3 Jan 84 PLO Command Ctr Bhamdoun Counterforce Aircraft 

8. 4 Jan 84 PLO Terrorist Base Baalbek Counterforce Aircraft 

9. 10 Feb 84 PLO Terrorist Base Bhamdoun, Mansuriya, Baalchmay Reprisal Aircraft 

10. 19 Feb 84 PLO Terrorist Base Bhamdoun, Mansurya, Baalchmay Counterforce Aircraft 

11. 21 Feb 84 PLO Terrorist Base Bhamdoun, Ain al-Jadida, Bikh Shtay & 

Mansuriya 

Counterforce Aircraft 

12. 23 Feb 84 PLO Terrorist Base Bhamdoun & Mansuriya, Rweisat Counterforce Aircraft 

13. 5 Mar 84 PLO Terrorist Base Aly Counterforce Aircraft 

14. 7 Apr 84 PLO Terrorist Base Bhamdoun Counterforce Aircraft 

15. 21 May 84 Shi’ite Villages Janta & Deir al-Ghazal Counterforce Aircraft 

16. 24 May 84 PFLP Bar Elias Counterforce Aircraft 

17. 28 Jun 84 PLO Terrorist Base Nahr Island (near Tripoli) Counterforce Aircraft 

18. 1 Aug 84 PLO Terrorist Camp Nahr al-Bared Counterforce Helicopters & Aircraft 

19. 16 Aug 84 PFLP-GC Bar Elias Counterforce Aircraft 

20. 28 Aug 84 PFLP Majdal Anjar Counterforce Aircraft 

21. 10 Sep 84 DFLP Base Bhamdoun Counterforce Aircraft 

22. 27 Nov 84 DFLP Base Qubb Elias Counterforce Aircraft 

23. 9 Jan 85 Abu Moussa & Popular Struggle Front 

Bases 

Mar Elias & al-Marj Counterforce Aircraft 

24. 10 Feb 85 DFLP Base Ta’lbaya Counterforce Aircraft 

25. 11 Feb 85 Abu Moussa HQ Ta’lbaya Counterforce Aircraft 

26. 13 Mar 85 As’iqa Base Bar Elias Counterforce Aircraft 

27. 9 Apr 85 Popular Struggle Front Base Shamlan Counterforce Aircraft 

28. 17 Apr 85 DFLP Base Bar Elias Counterforce Aircraft 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 
Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

35

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

36

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

Source: Lt Col Kenneth C. Schow, Jr., 8th Fighter Wing, Kunsan AB, Korea, June 1994. 

37

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