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ZIMBABWE AFTER MUGABE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 28, 2018

Serial No. 115–114

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

KAREN BASS, California 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Charles A. Ray (former U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe) ........... 7

Ms. Elizabeth Lewis, regional deputy director, Africa Division, International 

Republican Institute ............................................................................................ 16

Mr. Ben Freeth, executive director, Mike Campbell Foundation ........................ 25

Chipo Dendere, Ph.D., visiting assistant professor, Amherst College ................ 36

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Charles A. Ray: Prepared statement ........................................... 12

Ms. Elizabeth Lewis: Prepared statement ............................................................. 19

Mr. Ben Freeth: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 27

Chipo Dendere, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 39

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: 

Congressional Statement on the Importance of Property Rights in 

Zimbabwe, by Craig J. Richardson, Ph.D. ...................................................... 64

The Campbell Case Timeline .............................................................................. 72

(1)

ZIMBABWE AFTER MUGABE 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will come to order, and welcome to all 

of you. 

Today’s hearing has been a long time in the making. For some 

37 years, since the birth of modern Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has 

dominated the political landscape of this resource-rich and promising country: First, as Prime Minister, then as President, and always as strongman. 

It was a 37-year rule which sadly betrayed the post-colonial aspirations of freedom, one which was marked by misrule, mismanagement, and mistreatment of Mugabe’s fellow citizens. 

For many Zimbabweans, and for many years, envisioning a 

Zimbabwe without Mugabe was considered a fool’s errand. Elections, some more flawed than others, had come and gone, opportunities for reform fallen by the wayside. And through it all, the 

domineering presence of one man haunted the dreams of his countrymen. 

Then in a matter of weeks, culminating last November, the landscape changed. The once invincible ruler in October 2017 set into 

motion a series of events which left him not only ousted from the 

Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, or ZANU-PF, 

but pushed off his Presidential perch. 

The drama began in earnest when Mugabe sought to prop up his 

wife Grace’s standing as his designated successor by ousting one of 

his two Vice Presidents, Emmerson Mnangagwa, presumably to 

elevate his wife to the position, while simultaneously moving 

against Mnangagwa’s allies in the government and in ZANU-PF, 

promoting a younger generation allied with Grace. 

Mnangagwa was part of an older faction of ZANU-PF, the generation that fought for liberation with roots and strong connections 

in the military. As Rhodesian Bush War veterans and political survivors, Mnangagwa and his comrades could draw upon a reservoir 

of experience and cunning. They would not be so easily pushed 

aside. 

2

While Mugabe sought to tighten the reins of control in favor of 

his wife and her allies, the other Vice President and head of the 

Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Constantino Chiwenga, made a bold 

statement on November 13, and I quote, ‘‘. . . matters of protecting our revolution, the military will not hesitate to step in.’’

This was declared treasonous, but before Chiwenga himself could 

be arrested, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces did, in fact, step in and 

confine the long-serving President to his quarters, while taking 

control of key points around the country. 

What followed were spontaneous popular demonstrations against 

Robert Mugabe, indicating that the spell had been broken. ZANUPF convened a meeting which declared Mnangagwa to be interim 

leader of the party. And in the face of impeachment proceedings 

against Mugabe, the 93-year-old President reluctantly stepped 

down, allowing Mnangagwa to assume the vacancy. 

This series of actions preserved the veneer of constitutional process such that neither our country nor the African Union could label 

the events that took place a coup. Indeed, if it were a coup, it was 

a popularly supported one and one which subsequently received 

high court ratification. 

So where does that leave us? Who is Emmerson Mnangagwa, the 

man who was sworn in as Zimbabwe’s President on November 21? 

Critics have called him the ‘‘crocodile’’ and recall his role as 

Mugabe’s right-hand man and confidante, including during the brutal period in the early 1980s, when in the newly independent nation, Mugabe waged an internal campaign of repression against fellow revolutionary leader Joshua Nkomo, killing thousands of ethnic 

minority individuals who were followers of Nkomo. 

During this time, Mugabe was assisted by military advisers from 

East Germany and North Korea, and his Minister of State Security, one Emmerson Mnangagwa. 

Others more charitably admit that Mnangagwa was, indeed, once 

the crocodile, but maintain that he has changed, undergoing a religious conversion to evangelical Christianity. Indeed, his rhetoric 

since acceding to power has been reassuring, stating that he will 

restore democracy, rule of law, economic prosperity, and trade, 

while addressing endemic corruption. 

On the issue of land tenure, he said he would end the seizures 

of property that Mugabe had used to punish enemies and reward 

cronies. 

So they stand at a crossroads, perhaps facing a once-in-a-lifetime 

opportunity where Zimbabwe can chart a new course. Yet, we cannot forget and cannot be Pollyanish about it, nor disregard the wise 

words of Pete Townshend, who once said: ‘‘Meet the new boss. 

Same as the old boss. We won’t get fooled again.’’ Hopefully, none 

of that will be true. 

On the issue of land seizures, for example, one notes that the 

newly retired general, as of December 28, 2017, the new Vice President, Constantino Chiwenga, who issued the treasonous challenge 

that led to Mugabe’s ouster, is alleged to be a beneficiary of 

Mugabe’s past largesse with other people’s land. This is perhaps 

something which all of our witnesses today might want to speak to 

and clarify. 

3

Indeed, as we attempt to read the tea leaves and discern what 

is in the future, we will be assisted by a stellar panel. While the 

State Department is unable to send a witness due to the immediacy of issues concerning the budget and Secretary of State 

Tillerson’s impending trip to Africa, we have with us a former Ambassador of the United States, a very distinguished one at that, to 

Zimbabwe, as well as one of the key implementers of our democracy promotion policy in Zimbabwe. 

We also have two Zimbabweans with us who are extremely wellversed and involved in the contemporary events in the country. 

Today’s hearing will look at the prospects for true democratic 

and governance reform, as well as the potential restoration of the 

rule of law. We truly hope that the arrival of a new government 

signals an opportunity for establishing a mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Zimbabwe, and as the near 

future unfolds, events will allow us to reevaluate some of the sanctions that were imposed during the Mugabe years. 

I would like to yield to my good friend and ranking member, Ms. 

Bass. 

Okay. I will go to the chairman of the full committee. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you. Congresswoman, thanks for allowing me 

to make an opening statement as well. And let me thank the both 

of you for your engagement on the continent, an engagement that 

has been consistent. And now there are some new opportunities. 

I recall just about 20 years ago that I was in Harare and 

Bulawayo, and the emotional feeling of listening to Morgan 

Tsvangirai’s supporters, and later him, speak about that issue of 

human rights, and going back later and not being able to get into 

the country, but having the opportunity to meet with some of those 

who had been tortured or had gone through a lot. And not just 

members of that Movement for Democratic Change. Also some of 

the ZANU-PF members who I talked to who tried to speak out. 

Tried to speak out. 

And this is the problem of a society in which you have a totalitarian aspect that takes hold. And slowly, economic freedom erodes, 

opportunity erodes, and you have a situation where people have absolutely no ability any longer to choose their leaders or to choose 

the future for their country. 

Now that is in play again. Now there is that opportunity. And 

I know the international community and NGOs and those concerned with leading on human rights have great hope at this point 

in time. 

We watched here on this committee as the regime stripped away 

the opportunity that existed for people. But Zimbabwe, as you all 

know, was once the breadbasket for the region. And we had a 

Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act that we passed 

here in 2001 in which we tried to shape events there. 

But today we have got to be clearheaded, I think, as we look at 

the prospects for democracy. Some members of the current government did have a role in the oppressive and violent policies that 

characterized the Mugabe regime. Some are responsible for some of 

the worst abuses. 

But on the other hand, we do have that opportunity. And we 

have a lot of people in Zimbabwe today who have second thoughts 

4

and are looking back at what happened and how it happened. And 

I think a lot of those individuals are really determined to make certain that Zimbabwe now has that chance to chart its future. 

We remember Morgan Tsvangirai, recently deceased of course, 

but we remember him for his unwavering struggle. And I think the 

July elections that are quickly approaching, this will be an important test. I think the people of Zimbabwe, at this point, it is their 

time. It is their opportunity. 

But elections have got to be credible. They have got to be peaceful. They must be transparent. I think the government must take 

steps to combat corruption, to protect freedom of expression, to end 

state-backed violence and intimidation, and address other issues in 

terms of the rights of the people. 

The U.S. should see meaningful progress toward these reforms 

before we revise our current policy, because we need a little leverage in this. And I think the U.S. would be a partner in all of these 

reform efforts. I think we will have bipartisan support for that 

partnership. And I think it is through these reforms that we will 

see again prosperity and opportunity. 

I am not sure I should say ‘‘see again.’’ I think maybe see for the 

first time. Because Zimbabwe had a long, struggled, tortured history. But finally, that chapter is over. And like the previous chapters in that history, it has been tough on the people of Zimbabwe. 

So let’s all of us do what we can do, but I appreciate these witnesses traveling so far to testify. 

I have got a meeting with an Ambassador here adjacent. But I 

want to again thank you, Chris, Chairman, and thank you very 

much, Congresswoman, for your engagement here. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce. Thank you 

for taking the time from what I know is an extremely busy schedule to be here. Your commitment and concern about Africa is legendary. So thank you for being here. 

I would like to now yield to Karen Bass again, the ranking member, for any opening comments she might have. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and ditto to the words that you 

just said about our chairman and his long history of support for Africa. 

In November 2017, we all know that Robert Mugabe’s 30-year 

Presidency ended. The circumstances under which he left office included a military operation, paramilitary proceedings, preliminary 

proceedings to impeach him, and most importantly, ordinary citizens dancing, cheering, and waving flags in the streets. 

Why would Zimbabweans march alongside the military celebrating and demanding the resignation of Mugabe? Well, there are 

a host of reasons. The answer is pretty simple. As our witness Dr. 

Dendere will point out, for the first time Zimbabweans felt a sense 

of hope. Hope for their political and economic future. 

There are many ways to read this current moment, and today we 

will attempt to consider how the U.S. can best reengage the Government of Zimbabwe. It will be tempting to tie everything to the 

next elections, to focus on allowing international observers, ensuring free, fair, and transparent elections to make sure that elections 

take place this year. And although we know this is important, norVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Apr 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AGH\022818\28825 SHIRL
5

malizing relations with Zimbabwe requires more than a good election. 

First, we have to consider that while this is not exactly a traditional military coup, it also wasn’t a regular democratic transition 

of power. The military has a long history of partisanship with the 

ruling party interfering in the nation’s political electoral affairs in 

ways that adversely affected the ability of citizens to vote freely. 

The partisanship of the security forces’ leadership has translated 

into abuses by these forces against civil society, activists, journalists, and members and supporters of the opposition political party 

the Movement for Democratic Change. 

The military played a key role in this transition and while some 

citizens expressed support for the transition of power, recent polling by the Afrobarometer shows that 69 percent of Zimbabweans 

are against military rule and 75 percent prefer democracy over any 

other form of government. This should give the Mnangagwa government a sense of what their citizens want. 

Going forward, it will be important for the military to show that 

they will comply with the Constitution by staying out of the electoral process. The military should have no role in the upcoming political campaigns. 

And I don’t say this lightly. Everyone in this room is well-aware 

that here in the U.S. we are going through our own challenges with 

protecting U.S. electoral systems, including dealing with external 

interference to voter suppression. It is vitally important that countries not leave their political systems vulnerable. 

A key part of ensuring the credibility of Zimbabwe’s elections is 

to ensure that the electoral commission is independent, impartial, 

and nonpartisan. It is also essential that every citizen has the right 

to voice their views and opinions individually and collectively; that 

they have the ability to vote; that elections are free from violence; 

that opposition parties are able to operate and campaign freely 

without harassment; that the election is transparent; that the institutions can operate independently; and that the military does not 

engage in politics. 

The current administration has an opportunity to break with the 

past to set the country on a new course by strengthening democratic institutions and rule of law, improving human rights and 

civil liberties, including allowing freedom of assembly and expression, and enacting economic and political reforms that will better 

the lives of Zimbabwean citizens. But they also have an opportunity to address many of the challenges that were not resolved 

during Mugabe’s Presidency so that the country can truly enter a 

post-Mugabe era. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass. 

I would now like to welcome our very, very distinguished panel, 

beginning with Ambassador Charles Ray who served as U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe as well as Cambodia. 

Ambassador Ray retired in 2012—although he can’t call what he 

is doing now retirement. He is now more active than ever—after 

a 30-year career in the U.S. Foreign Service that included postings 

in China, Thailand, Sierra Leone, and Vietnam. He also served as 

the first U.S. Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. 

6

Prior to joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Ray spent 20 

years in the U.S. Army, retiring with the rank of major during his 

Army career. He did two tours in Vietnam, served in military intelligence, special operations, and public affairs, with assignments in 

Germany, Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and the United States. 

Since his retirement, he has been a writer, lecturer, and consultant, and has done research on leadership and ethics. He is the author of more than 60 books of fiction and nonfiction. 

Ambassador Ray is a member of the American Foreign Service 

Association. He is on the board of directors of the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Cold War Museum at Vint Hill, Virginia, 

and is director of communications for the Association of Black 

American Ambassadors. 

We welcome your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, and thank you for 

your service to our country, both in uniform and in the Foreign 

Service. 

We will then hear from Elizabeth Lewis, who is a regional deputy director for Africa at the International Republican Institute, or 

IRI, where she oversees field offices in 12 nations, including 

Zimbabwe. In her role at IRI she focuses on the implementation of 

local governance, elections, conflict mitigation, and civil society programs. 

Since 2009 Ms. Lewis has managed IRI programs in sub-Saharan 

Africa, specializing in the Horn and Southern African regions. She 

observed Tunisia’s December 2014 Presidential runoff election, Nigeria’s March 2015 general election, and Ghana’s December 2016 

national elections. 

Ms. Lewis has a BA in political science and economics from St. 

Mary’s College in Maryland and an MS in political economy of late 

development from the London School of Economics and Political 

Science. 

Thank you for being here as well. 

We will then hear from Ben Freeth, MBE. He is the executive 

director of the Mike Campbell Foundation, an organization fighting 

for human rights and property rights in Zimbabwe. 

Together, with his late father-in-law, Mike Campbell, the owner 

of Mount Carmel Farm in central Zimbabwe, Mr. Freeth took 

President Robert Mugabe’s government to court in the Southern 

African Development Community’s regional court, the SADC Tribunal, contesting the regime’s ongoing attempts to unlawfully seize 

Mr. Campbell’s farm and for engaging in racial discrimination and 

violence against White commercial farmers and their workers. 

Mr. Campbell, his wife, and Mr. Freeth were abducted and tortured in 2008 and later suffered the destruction of their home by 

fire. Since 2011, Mr. Freeth has been involved in initiatives to restore the SADC Tribunal after it was shut down by the SADC head 

of state, thus denying individual citizens access to the human 

rights court. 

Mr. Freeth also works closely with Foundations for Farming, an 

organization that provides training in conservation and agriculture 

and teaches impoverished farm workers and others how to feed 

their families. 

We welcome back Mr. Freeth, who testified before this subcommittee in 2015. 

7

Then we will hear from Dr. Chipo Dendere, who is a 

Zimbabwean political scientist currently serving as a Consortium 

for Faculty Diversity fellow and visiting assistant professor of political science at Amherst College. 

Dr. Dendere’s research expertise is in democracy, elections, and 

migration, with a regional interest in African politics. She writes 

about the impact of voter exit, migration, and remittances on the 

survival of authoritarian regimes. Her new research is on the role 

of technology and social media in new democracies. 

We welcome her testimony before the subcommittee and thank 

her for being here as well. 

Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES A. RAY (FORMER 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ZIMBABWE) 

Ambassador RAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Bass. I am 

very honored to be able to appear here today to discuss the path 

forward in U.S.-Zimbabwe relations. 

I served as U.S. Ambassador to Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2012, 

during the period of the ZANU-PF/MDC coalition government, a 

time of relative peace and a certain amount of economic stability, 

but, unfortunately, also a time of lost opportunities to put 

Zimbabwe on the path of a truly representative government and a 

prosperous economy. 

Most Americans probably know very little about Zimbabwe, but 

for a brief time this past November it was again very prominent 

in the American media. After several weeks of increasing political 

turmoil, primarily within Mugabe’s ruling party, the First Vice 

President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, was accused of disloyalty and 

sacked. He then fled to South Africa, claiming that his life was in 

danger. 

Around the same time, Mugabe’s wife Grace began to appear 

more and more in public, stating that she should be the one to succeed the aging leader, statements that Mugabe, to his discredit, did 

nothing to deny. 

In an unprecedented for Zimbabwe move, General Constantine 

Chiwenga, chief of the defence staff, made a public statement that 

the military would not stand idly by and allow liberation figures 

to be removed from the government or from the party. 

He was accused of treason. But shortly thereafter, the military 

made its move. It took control of key installations in Harare, placed 

Mugabe and his family under effective house arrest—although it 

was very quick to publicly state this is not a coup. But as one opposition figure said, if it looks like a duck and it walks like a duck, 

it is a duck. 

Make no mistake about it, even though it was a palace coup with 

the military moving against members of its own party or the party 

that it supports, it was, in fact, a coup d’etat, a relatively nonviolent one and done in a most unusual way. 

Mugabe was allowed to meet with the press, to engage in a 

phone conversation with the former President of South Africa, and 

his meeting with the leader of the coup, with General Chiwenga, 

at least on the surface, appeared to be very cordial, and he was 

even allowed to call a cabinet meeting. But it was still a change 

8

of government initiated by force of arms, rather than through the 

ballot box. 

However, how the military’s actions in this case will be dealt 

with I think is something for Zimbabweans to handle. For the rest 

of the world, and for the U.S. in particular, I think the key questions now are: Where is Zimbabwe going from here, and what role 

should we play in that journey? 

We should start, I think, with a bit of background on the new 

interim President, Emmerson Mnangagwa. I think the question on 

many minds is: Will he be any different from Mugabe? 

He is, after all, someone who worked closely with Mugabe for 

more than 37 years after the country’s independence and served as 

an intelligence officer during the war for independence, and who, 

because of his actions in support of the crackdown on the Ndebele 

political opposition in the 1980s and MDC supporters in the 1990s, 

has earned the nickname ‘‘the crocodile.’’

Prior to being appointed to the First Vice President position, 

Mnangagwa served as Defence Minister and also as Justice Minister. Though he lacks Mugabe’s charisma, it appears that he enjoys the firm support of many of the senior military officials. 

I think, moving forward, his first priority will be to reassert control over ZANU-PF, a party that is fractured along generational 

lines with many of those in their forties and fifties, known as the 

G-40, supporting Grace Mugabe against the older liberation era 

party members. 

A united ZANU-PF is essential if the party is to retain power. 

This won’t be an easy task for Mnangagwa as the rift between the 

two demographics was worsened by some of the actions and rhetoric during September-November of last year. 

The issue is further complicated by the presence of former 

ZANU-PF number two Joice Mujuru. She was First Vice President 

until she was canned a few years ago. She is now the head of the 

People First or ZIM-PF Party. 

Until Grace Mugabe engineered her ouster, she was in competition with Mnangagwa to be Mugabe’s successor. A veteran of the 

liberation struggle, as a fighter with a fierce reputation, she also 

enjoys some military support, although probably not as much as 

Mnangagwa. 

The second priority, I believe, will be to ensure ZANU-PF’s continued control of power in the country. If he can somehow pull all 

of the factions together and overcome the possible threat from 

Mujuru, he will have to decide whether or not to proceed with elections in July 2018. I realize that he has publicly stated that he 

will, but we will have to see what really happens. 

While violence and chicanery are still possibilities that cannot be 

cavalierly dismissed, a united ZANU-PF is likely to be able to do 

well against the current opposition party lineup. The Movement for 

Democratic Change, or MDC, is still split between the faction led 

by the late Morgan Tsvangirai, now with an interim President, 

Nelson Chamisa, and the one led by Welshman Ncube. 

As the parties that pose the greatest challenge to ZANU-PF, especially in the urban areas, if they were united, they would surely 

do well, but it is unlikely that they will unite. The remainder of 

the opposition parties, with the exception of Joice Mujuru’s party, 

9

will only take votes away from the two MDCs, which is to ZANUPF’s advantage, unfortunately. 

In the rural areas, ZANU-PF has, in the past at least, had an 

advantage and Mnangagwa is sure to capitalize on this. So while 

it is too early to predict that the 2018 elections will be free, fair, 

and nonviolent, let’s assume for a moment that they will be. Where 

do we go from that point? 

During my time as Ambassador to Zimbabwe, one of the most 

frequent topics of conversation was U.S. sanctions. Put in place in 

response to the violent land seizures and electoral violence of the 

late 1990s, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, 

or ZDERA, was passed in December 2001, and a Presidential executive order targeting individuals and entities involved in the violence and other anti-democratic acts was issued in March 2003. 

Both of these actions were intended to encourage a return to democracy and representative government, something that had not 

happened by the time of my arrival in 2009. After the MDC won 

the 2008 elections, although without the necessary 51 percent majority, there was more violence. But under South African pressure, 

a coalition government was formed. 

That government, with the MDC in a decidedly subordinate position to ZANU-PF, lasted until the 2014 elections in which ZANUPF got the required majority and subsequently formed a government without the MDC. 

The sanctions, in my view, were clearly not having the desired 

effect, and Mugabe’s party’s hardliners were using their existence 

as an excuse for every ill that the country suffered. My response 

to the many questions of, ‘‘When will the sanctions be lifted?’’ was, 

‘‘When there is a return to nonviolent elections and democracy.’’

In fact, during one of my final media interviews before I departed 

in 2012, I said that sanctions were a response to a violent electoral 

process. A credible electoral process free of violence would make 

our current policy somewhat irrelevant. 

If this year’s elections are held, if they are determined to be credible, and if there is no violence, the ball will be in our court. If we 

truly want to see Zimbabwe develop to its potential, we must be 

prepared to work with the winner of a credible, nonviolent election 

regardless of the political party. 

Even if the election is credible and nonviolent, any new government is almost certain to contain officials who bring a lot of historical baggage with them to their positions. I firmly believe, however, 

that we should in such a situation put the past behind us and focus 

on the policy statement in the introduction of ZDERA: ‘‘It is the 

policy of the United States to support the people of Zimbabwe in 

their struggle to effect peaceful, democratic change, achieve broadbased and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule of law.’’

I leave development of the precise modalities of our actions to the 

policymakers and the professionals in the foreign and civil services 

of our foreign affairs agencies, primarily State and AID, but I 

would offer a few humble suggestions on a way forward. 

First, I think we should instruct our Embassy in Harare to make 

contact with Mnangagwa and his current government to reiterate 

firmly our policy regarding sanctions and to inform him that if upVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Apr 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AGH\022818\28825 SHIRL
10

coming elections are credible and nonviolent we are prepared to 

recognize and work with the new government. 

While we would continue to monitor the human rights situation, 

our initial focus should be on actions to reinvigorate the country’s 

economy and empower the private sector to revitalize the agricultural sector, and rebuild stagnant industries with a view to creating meaningful employment and broad economic security. 

We should encourage the new government to develop an investorfriendly climate, take steps to curb corruption, while at the same 

time encourage American businesses to explore the opportunities to 

increase two-way trade and investment. 

You might note, I said nothing about lifting sanctions. I think 

that that should be the stick. The carrot, I think, would be our 

offer to deal with the government. The stick is, if they don’t deal, 

sanctions stay in place. 

During my time as Ambassador, we experimented with a local 

economic development program modeled on an Asian village financing scheme that I encountered when I lived in Korea back in the 

1970s. Women in a few poor rural villages were taught to organize 

local savings clubs in which deposits were loaned out to members 

at low interest for income-producing ventures. These programs, 

though they were known to the government, were outside government control, and within months of establishment, totally self-reliant. 

Consideration should be given to implementing such a program 

in rural and suburban communities throughout the country. People 

who are economically self-sufficient are less vulnerable to political 

exploitation. 

The elephant in the room which can’t be ignored is the 

Zimbabwean military. Existing laws and regulation will limit what 

we can do with the military. But for the long-term, peaceful development of Zimbabwe, at some point we will have to figure out a 

way to work with this institution. 

Initially, I believe the primary focus should be on inculcating in 

the military establishment an ethos of service to the nation as a 

whole rather than identification with a specific political party. 

In my limited contact with senior military officials when I was 

Ambassador, I was convinced that there exists within the military 

establishment a small cadre of people who would like to be professional and who would like to depoliticize the institution. The challenge will be to identify those individuals and develop effective 

ways of working with them. 

One possibility, I think, might be to establish a working relationship with the SADC peacekeeping academy, which happens to be 

located in Harare, and allowing properly vetted Zimbabwean military officials to participate in courses of instruction on military professionalism. 

Again, I leave it to State and Defense, working with Congress, 

to determine if such a program could be implemented and just how 

it should. 

While I have in making these recommendations assumed that 

elections will be held in July 2018 and assumed that they will be 

credible and nonviolent, I must make clear at this point that I am 

not making a prediction. I do believe that if everyone in Zimbabwe 

11

approaches the coming months with an earnest desire to see the 

country pull itself out of the doldrums and take its rightful place 

in the region and in the world, it can happen. 

If it does happen, if everyone then puts the past behind them 

and focuses on the future, a new and more vibrant Zimbabwe can 

arise phoenix-like from the ashes. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ray follows:]

12


28825a-1.eps

Statement by Ambassador (ret) Charles Ray 

To the Africa Subcommittee of the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

THE FUTURE OF ZIMBABWE AFTER MUGABE 

Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 1 am honored to be able to appear 

before you today to discuss the path forward in US-Zimbabwe relations. I served as US 

Ambassador to Zimbabwe from 2009 to 2012, during the period of the ZANU-PF/MDC coalition 

government, a time of relative peace and economic stability, but, unfortunately, also a time of 

lost opportunities to put Zimbabwe on the path of truly representative government and a 

prosperous economy. 

Most American today know very little about Zimbabwe, but for a brief time in November 2017, 

it was again prominent in the American mass media. 

After several weeks of increasing political turmoil, primarily within Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF 

party, the first vice president, Emmerson D. Mnangat,>wa was accused of disloyalty and sacked. 

He then fled to South Africa, claiming that his life was in danger. Around this same time, 

Mugabe' s wife, Grace, began to appear more and more in public, making statements that she 

should be the one to succeed the aging leader, pronouncements that Mugabe did nothing to deny. 

In an unprecedented-for Zimbabwe-move, Constantine Chiwenga, chief of the Zimbabwe 

Defense Staff, made a public statement that the military would not stand idly by and allow 

liberation figures to be removed from government or the party. 

Shortly thereafter the military made its move. lt took control of key installations in Harare, and 

placed Mugabe and his family under effective house arrest-although, it was quick to publicly 

announce that what it was doing was not a coup. As one opposition figure said, though, if it 

walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck It was a palace coup, with the army moving 

against elements of its own party, but make no mistake about it, it was a coup d'etat. Relatively 

nonviolent, and done in a most unusual way; Mugabe was allowed to meet the press, to phone 

the South African president, to meet with the coup leader in what on the surface appeared a 

cordial encounter, and even to call a cabinet meeting; it was still a change of government 

initiated by force of arms rather than the ballot box. 

How the military's actions will be dealt with is something for Zimbabweans to decide. For the 

rest of the world, and the United States in particular, the key questions are; where does 

Zimbabwe go from here, and what role should we play in that journey? 

We should start with a bit of background on Zimbabwe's new ruler, Emmerson Mnangab>wa. 

The question on many minds is, will he be any different from Mugabe0 He is, after all, someone 

who worked closely with Mugabe for more than 3 7 years after the country's independence, who 
13


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served as an intelligence ofilcer during the war for independence, and who, because of his 

actions in support the crackdown on Ndebele political opposition in the 1980s, and MDC 

supporters in the 1990s, has earned the nickname, 'Crocodile.' Prior to being appointed to the 

first vice president position, Mnangagwa served as defense minister and justice minister. Though 

he lacks Mugabe's charisma, he enjoys the support of most senior military ofilcials. 

Moving forward, his first priority will be to reassert control over ZANU-PF, a party that has 

fractured along generational lines, with many of those in their 40s and 50s, known as the G-40, 

supporting Grace Mugabe against the older liberation-era party members. A united ZANU-PF is 

essential if the party is to retain power. This won't be an easy task for Mnangagwa, as the rift 

between the two demographics was worsened by some of the actions and rhetoric during 

September-November of last year. The issue is further complicated by the presence of former 

ZANU-PF number two, Joice Mujuru's Zimbabwe People First (ZIM-PF) Party. Mujuru, until 

Grace Mugabe engineered her ouster, was first vice president, and at the time was in competition 

with Mnangagwa, a successor to Mugabe. A veteran of the liberation struggle, as a fighter with a 

fierce reputation, she also enjoys some military support, although probably not as much as 

Mnangagwa. 

Mnangab>wa's second priority, I believe, will be to ensure ZANU-PF's continued control of the 

reins of power in the country. If he can somehow pull all the ZANU factions together, and 

overcome the possible threat from Mujuru, he will have to decide whether or not to proceed with 

elections in July 2018. He has indicated that he will do so. While violence and chicanery are still 

possibilities that can't be cavalierly dismissed, a united ZANU-PF is likely to be able to do well 

against the current opposition party lineup. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is 

still split between the faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the one led by Welshman Ncube. As 

the parties that pose the greatest challenge to ZANU-PF in the urban areas, if they were united, 

they might do well, but it is unlikely that they will merge. The remainder of the opposition 

parties, with the exception of ZTM-PF, will only take votes away from MDC, which is to ZANUPF's advantage. In the rural areas, ZANU-PF has, in the past at least, had an advantage, and 

Mnangagwa is sure to capitalize on this. 

So, while it's too early to predict that the 2018 elections will be free, fair and nonviolent, let us 

assume, for the moment that they will be. 

Where do we go from that point? 

During my time as US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, one of the most frequent topics of 

conversation was US sanctions. Put in place in response to the violent land seizures and electoral 

violence of the late 1990s, the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act was enacted 

in December 2001, and a presidential executive order, targeting individuals and entities involved 

in the violence and antidemocratic acts was issued in March 2003. Both actions were intended to 

encourage a return to democracy, something that had not happened by the time of my arrival in 

2009. After the MDC won the 2008 elections, although without the necessary 51% majority, 

there was more violence, but under South African pressure, a coalition government was formed. 

That government, with the MDC in a subordinate position to ZANU-PF, lasted until the 2014 
14


28825a-3.eps

elections, in which ZANU-PF got the required majority and subsequently fonned a government 

without MDC. 

The sanctions, in my view, were clearly not having the desired effect, and Mugabe's party 

hardliners were using their existence as an excuse for all of the country's ills. 

My response to the many queries of, 'when will sanctions be lifted/', was, 'when there is a return 

to nonviolent elections and democracy. In fact, during one of my final media interviews before 

my departure in 2012, at the end of my tour, 1 said, "Sanctions were a response to a violent 

electoral process. A credible electoral process, free of violence, would make our current policies 

irrelevant." 

lfthis year's elections are head, they are detennined to be credible, and there is no violence, the 

ball will be in our court. 

lfwe truly want to see Zimbabwe develop to its potential, we must be prepared to work with the 

winner of a credible, nonviolent election, regardless of the political party. Even if the election is 

credible and nonviolent, any new government is almost certain to contain officials who bring a 

lot of historical baggage with them to the positions they occupy. I firmly believe, however, that 

we should, in such a situation, put the past behind us and focus on the policy statement in the 

introduction of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of2001, 'it is the policy 

of the United States to support the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to etiect peaceful, 

democratic change, achieve broad-based and equitable economic growth, and restore the rule of 

law." 

I leave development of the precise modalities of our actions to the policy makers and the 

professionals in the Foreign and Civil services of our foreign affairs agencies, primarily State 

and USAID, but I would offer a few suggestions on the way forward. 

First, we should instruct our embassy in Harare to establish contact with Mnangagwa and his 

current government to reiterate our policy regarding sanctions, and to inform him that, if 

upcoming elections are credible and nonviolent, we are prepared to recognize and work with the 

new government. While we should continue to monitor the human rights situation, our initial 

focus should be on actions to reinvigorate the country's economy and empower the private sector 

to revitalize the agricultural sector, and rebuild stagnant industries, with a view to creating 

meaningful employment and broad economic security. We should encourage the new 

government to develop an investor-friendly climate, and take steps to curb corruption, while at 

the same time, encouraging American business to explore opportunities to increase two-way 

trade and investment. 

During my time as ambassador, we experimented with a local economic development program 

modeled on an Asian village financing scheme. Women in a few poor rural villages were taught 

to organize local savings clubs, in which deposits were loaned out to members at low interest 

rates for income-producing ventures. These programs, though known to the government, were 

outside government control, and within months of establishment, totally self-reliant. 

Consideration should be given to implementing such a program in rural and suburban 
15


28825a-4.eps

communities country-wide. People who are economically self-sufilcient are less vulnerable to 

political exploitation. 

The elephant in the room, which can't be entirely ignored, is the Zimbabwean military. Existing 

laws and reb'lllations will limit what we can do with the military, but for the long term, peaceful 

development of Zimbabwe, at some point we will have to figure out a way to work with this 

institution. Initially, I believe the primary focus should be on inculcating in the military 

establishment an ethos of service to the nation as a whole rather than identification with a 

specific political party. In my limited contact with senior military officials when I was 

ambassador, I was convinced that there exists within the military establishment a cadre of people 

who would like to professionalize and depoliticize the institution. The challenge will be to 

identify those individuals, and develop effective ways of working with them. One possibility 

might be to establish a working relationship with the SADC Peacekeeping Academy, which is 

located in Harare, and allowing Zimbabwean military participation in courses of instruction on 

military professionalism. I leave it to State and Defense, working with the congress, to detennine 

just how such a program would be implemented. 

While I have, in making these recommendations, assumed that elections will be held in July 

2018, and that they will be credible and nonviolent, I must make clear at this point that I am not 

making a prediction. I do believe that if everyone approaches the coming months with an earnest 

desire to see Zimbabwe pull itself out of the doldrums and take its rightful place in the region 

and the world, it can happen. lf it does happen, if everyone then puts the past behind them and 

focuses on the future, a new and more vibrant Zimbabwe can arise Phoenix-like from the ashes. 
16

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, Ambassador Ray. 

Ms. Lewis. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH LEWIS, REGIONAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AFRICA DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN 

INSTITUTE 

Ms. LEWIS. Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, it is an 

honor to testify before you today on the upcoming elections in 

Zimbabwe and the prospects for genuine democratic reform following the end of President Mugabe’s 37-year rule. 

I work for the International Republican Institute, which is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that is committed to advancing 

freedom and democracy worldwide. Since the early 1990s, IRI has 

supported pro-democracy activists in their struggle to bring real 

and lasting democratic reform to Zimbabwe. 

Over the course of the last few months, Zimbabwe has turned a 

page in its history. On the evening of November 14, several leaders 

within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces led a coup against the government of President Robert Mugabe, which ended in his resignation 

a few days later. Then, just 2 weeks ago today, opposition leader 

and former Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai succumbed to his 

battle with cancer. 

The departure of both Mugabe and Tsvangirai has upset the political order, and while some see the present situation as an opportunity for positive change, it is also a very fragile period for the 

country. 

ZANU-PF remains in full control of Zimbabwe’s governing institutions and chose former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa to 

serve as the country’s third President. Mnangagwa’s reputation 

precedes him, leaving many, including myself, skeptical of the prospects for genuine democratic reform under his leadership. One of 

his first acts as President, for instance, was to appoint a 22-member cabinet that included ZANU-PF hardliners and several military 

leaders who led the coup to put him in power. 

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe’s fractured political opposition is represented by several loose and evolving coalitions of political parties 

from both the historical opposition, including Tsvangirai’s MDC-T, 

and defectors from ZANU-PF, including Joice Mujuru. 

To date, the three main opposition coalitions, which include the 

MDC Alliance, the People’s Rainbow Coalition, and CODE, have 

been unable to unite under a single cohesive electoral and governing coalition. 

According to Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution, barring a dissolution 

of Parliament, the 2018 elections must occur between July 23 and 

August 22. In recent statements, though, President Mnangagwa indicated the elections would occur before July and that they would 

be free, fair, credible, and free of violence. 

However, in observing the biometric voter registration process 

that began on September 14, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network, or ZESN, indicated that turnout for the registration process 

was low, particularly among young people. The group cited limited 

voter education, intimidation of registrants, and misrepresentation 

of ID requirements as contributing factors to low turnout. 

17

The challenge of high rates of voter illiteracy must be addressed 

through extensive voter education efforts in the leadup to election 

day. However, the short and still unannounced electoral timeline, 

combined with the challenges of misinformation, fears of violence, 

and the historical legacy of election fraud, makes all of this a significant undertaking. 

Additionally, the environment in which campaigns and elections 

occur must be conducive to genuine political competition. For this 

to happen, several laws in Zimbabwe used to limit freedom of 

speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press, and also restrict access to information, must be repealed or reformed to align 

with the 2013 Constitution. 

Finally, the importance of a viable opposition capable of competing in the electoral process cannot be understated. A critical 

benchmark for the opposition in the coming elections is the prevention of a supermajority in the National Assembly, to prevent, 

among other things, amendments to the Constitution that would 

restrict political space and fundamental freedoms or grant additional powers to the Presidency. 

It is vital that the U.S. stand by the Zimbabwean people in the 

movement for democratic reform in this period of transition, and 

with that goal in mind, I would like to offer the following recommendations. 

First, the United States must be ardent in its support for free 

and fair elections. The citizen movements of last year are evidence 

of the strong desire for genuine change. The current government 

lacks electoral legitimacy and has a stated interest in returning to 

a full constitutional order. 

Considering this alignment of interests, the U.S. must redouble 

its efforts to work with our Zimbabwean and regional partners, 

namely, SADC and the African Union, to stand for nothing less 

than a transition to democratic rule. 

Relatedly, and over the longer term, the U.S. and our democratic 

allies must provide support to foster a competitive multiparty political system and the establishment of democratic institutions in 

Zimbabwe. This would include judicial, criminal justice, and security reform, opening the information space, the full implementation 

of the 2013 Constitution, responsive and participatory governance 

and service delivery, and a legitimate truth and reconciliation process. 

Third, the United States should be prepared for numerous scenarios in a post-Mugabe era. ZANU-PF and the military complex 

that plays an increasingly visible role in the political party have 

everything to lose from a shift in the power dynamics of the country. Political repression and disregard for fundamental human and 

political rights is an ongoing problem in Zimbabwe and we need to 

be vigilant under the new dispensation in the leadup to and following elections. 

And finally, the United States must hold the line with targeted 

sanctions and within international financial institutions. This is 

our strongest point of leverage in the push for democratic reform 

and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. Reforms 

must be required as a precondition for lending and debt or sanctions relief. 

18

I thank you for your time and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis follows:]

19


28825b-1.eps

Congressional Testimony 

Zimbabwe After Mugabe 

Testimony by Elizabeth Lewis 

Regional Deputy Director, Africa Division 

International Republican Institute 

U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global 

Human Rights, and International Organizations 

February 28, 2018 
20


28825b-2.eps

Introduction 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and Members of the House Committee on Foreign 

Aflairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International 

Organizations, it is an honor to testify before you today on the upcoming elections in Zimbabwe 

and the prospects for genuine democratic reform following the end of Robert Mugabe's 37-year 

rule. 

The International Republican Institute (IRI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization established in 

1983 that is committed to advancing freedom and democracy worldwide. Since the early 1990s, 

IRI has supported pro-democracy activists in their struggle to bring real and lasting democratic 

reform to Zimbabwe, with activities including capacity-building support for democratic political 

parties, public opinion research, civic education, and fostering citizen and civil society engagement 

with local elected officials to address service delivery challenges. 

Over the course of the last four months, Zimbabwe has turned a page in its political history. On 

the eyening of 14 Noyember 2017, several leaders within the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) 

led a coup d'etat against the government of Robert Mugabe, which led to Mugabe grudgingly 

resigning the presidency. Just two weeks ago today, the Zimbabwean opposition leader and former 

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai succumbed to his battle with cancer - a significant loss to 

Zimbabweans' struggle for greater democracy in their country. 

Zimbabwe has arrived at a critical waypoint in its journey toward democracy. The departure of 

Mugabe and Tsvangirai has upset the political order and left a leadership vacuum. Mugabe's 

ZANU-PF and Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) had already been 

engaged in succession battles prior to Mugabe's resignation and Tsvangirai's passing, and while 

some see the present situation as an opportunity for positive change, it is also a very fragile time 

for both the opposition and ruling factions. The next 6-12 months will proye decisiYe in 

determining the trajectory of Zimbabwe's democratic development. 

Prospects for Democratic Reform: The Post-Coup Political Scene 

Between the start of the military coup on November 14, 20 {7 and. Mugabe's resignation on 

November 21, thousands of Zimbabweans poured onto the str~ts of Harare in a euphoric 

expression of free speech, shouting "Mugabe must go!' This experience encouraged reformers and 

democracy activists to push for more signitlcant·change iri the post-Mugabe period, While 

Mugabe's ouster was an important moment, it is important not to overstate its impact in achieving 

democratic change. At the same time Zimbabweans were on the streets clamoring for democratic 

change, the leaders of the coup were busy negotiating .with ZANU-PF on plans for a tightly 

controlled non-democratic transition. 

Today, ZANU-PF remains in full control of Zimbabwe's governing institutions and has chosen 

Mugabe's former vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa, who Mugabe fired in the days prior to 

his resignation, to serve as Zimbabwe's third president. In many ways, the country's leadership has 
21


28825b-3.eps

engaged in an exercise of simply shifting the deck chairs. Mnangagwa, known from his days in 

the liberation struggle as the "Crocodile," was also Mugabe's Minister of Defence and Minister of 

Justice. While in charge ofthe country's security and intelligence apparatus, he is widely believed 

to have played a central role in Gukurahundi- a series of massacres of Ndebele citizens by the 

Zimbabwe National Army from 1983 to 1987. 

Mnanga!,>wa's reputation precedes him, leaving many skeptical of the prospect for genuine 

democratic reform under his leadership. In fact, one of his first acts as president represented just 

how little has changed since Mugabe's resignation. He appointed a new 22-m ember cabinet that 

included ZANU-PF hardliners with strong links to the liberation struggle and several military 

leaders who led the coup that put Mnangagwa into power. For instance, General Major Sibusiso 

Moyo, the soldier who announced Mugabe's ouster on the state broadcaster - now occupies a 

crucial cabinet post as Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Zimbabwe's fractured political opposition is represented by several loose and evolving coalitions 

of political parties from both the historical opposition- including Tsvangirai's MDC-T- and 

defectors from ZANU-PF, including Joice Mujuru and her National People's Party. To date, the 

three main opposition coalitions- the MDC Alliance, People's Rainbow Coalition, and Coalition 

of Democrats (CODE)- have been unable to unite under a single cohesive electoral and governing 

coalition. In fact, attempts to do so have only bred further disagreement over coalition leadership, 

member parties, and the division of elective seats. 

Opposition parties have been in a state of general disarray since the 2013 elections. The days 

immediately surrounding Tsvangirai's death have put a spotlight on MDC-T's internal challenges 

to unifY and compete for votes in just a few short months. While Tsvangirai's funeral reinvigorated 

many opposition supporters-bringing out thousands dressed in MDC-T's signature red colorviolence and harassment targeting Vice President Thokozani Khupe, Secretary General Douglas 

Mwonzora and other senior party leaders cast a shadow over the occasion. This violence was fueled 

in part by a very public scramble for control of MDC -T following Tsvangirai's death. 

Zimbabwe's Electoral Outlook 

According to Zimbabwe's 2013 Constitution, barring a dissolution ofParli.ilJTient, the 2018 

elections must occur between July 23 and August 22. However, in recent state)]'jents (including at 

the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland) PresidentM11angagwa·indicated that elections 

would occur before July 2018, and pledged that "thislttne around, Zimbabwe is open and 

transparent. We want to have free, fair, credible elections, free .of violence." Yet Zimbabwe's 

electoral history malces the prospect of holding free ·arid fair elections in just a matter of months 

questionable; moreover, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commissiol) (ZEC) has yet to announce its final 

operational plan for managing the elections. 

The biometric voter registration (BVR) process began in Zimbabwe on September 14,2017. In 

observing the process, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) indicated that turnout for 

the BVR process was low, particularly among young people. The group cited limited voter 

education, intimidation of registrants and misrepresentation of ID requirements (particularly in 

rural areas), and absence of signage marking registration centers as contributing factors. By the 
22


28825b-4.eps

end of the voter registration blitz on December 19, the total number of voters registered amounted 

to only 65 percent of the ZEC' s stated goal of 7.2 million. 

Following calls by political and civil society stakeholders to extend the process arguing the coup 

changed people's motivations to vote, the ZEC held a "mop-up" exercise from January 10 to 

February 8, registering nearly 400,000 additional voters. However, ZESN reported that "it is clear 

that judging by the turnout in urban areas, there is still a large number of people that were not 

served by 08 February 2018, when the mop-up exercise ended." While voter registration continues 

untill2 days following the confirmation of candidates, the process now turns to the de-duplication 

procedure and inspection of the voter roll-important tasks that will need to be completed very 

quickly for elections to occur on time. 

The challenge of high rates of voter illiteracy, as evidenced through the voter registration process, 

must be addressed through extensive voter education efforts in the lead up to Election Day. 

However, the short and still unannounced timeline to Election Day, combined with the challenges 

of misinformation, fears of violence and intimidation, and a historical legacy of election fraudmakes this a significant undertaking. The lack of transparency around many of the processes and 

decisions made by the ZEC and doubts over the competitiveness of the electoral environment will 

continue to feed high levels of voter apathy and political tension, especially among youth. 

In addition to the technical capacity and financial needs required for the ZEC to hold a free, fair 

and credible election (which the African Union has pledged to support), the environment in which 

campaigns and elections occur must be conducive to genuine political competition. For this to 

happen, several laws in Zimbabwe used to limit freedom of speech, free press and assembly, and 

restrict access to information must be repealed or reformed to align with the 2013 Constitution. 

These repressiye laws include the Public Order and Security Act, the Access to Information and 

Protection of Privacy Act, the Interception of Communications Act, and the Criminal Law 

(Codification and Reform) Act. The Electoral Law itself requires a substantial overhaul to align 

with the 2013 Constitution, including making the ZEC entirely independent and addressing the 

issue of diaspora voting. 

Finally, the importance of a Yiable opposition capable of competing in the electoral process cannot 

be understated. A critical benchmark in achieving this is the prevention of a supernwjority in the 

Zimbabwean National Assembly - which ZANU-PF curre~tly has·. . to· prevent 'further 

amendments to the 2013 Constitution that would restnct politic;Il space·and fundamental freedoms 

or grant additional powers to the presidency. In the po~teelection pe~iod, it is critical that the 

opposition demonstrate its cohesiveness and capacit)'til serve aS a check on goYernment power 

and advocate for the interests and priorities of its constituents 

Recommendations 

It is vital that the U.S. stand by the Zimbabwean people and the movement for democratic reform 

in this period of transition. With this goal in mind,. I would like to offer the following 

recommendations: 
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1/w Uniled S!a/es mus/ be arden! in ils supporl offi·ee and.fair e/eclions. The citizen movements 

of last year, including #ThisFlag and Tajamuka, and the outpouring of citizens who took to the 

streets to celebrate the resignation ofMugabe are evidence of the strong desire for genuine change, 

and the 2018 elections will be a pivotal point for Zimbabwe. The current government lacks 

electoral legitimacy and has a stated interest in returning to full constitutional order. Considering 

this alignment of interests, the U.S. must oiler its unwavering support for a free, fair, transparent 

and credible electoral process. Key U.S.-based, regional and international partners, including IRI, 

are already doing important work to support stakeholders including the ZEC, civil society and 

political parties ahead of the 2018 election, but this support must be expanded 

Key areas requiring additional attention include: civic education, in order to ensure that citizens 

are informed of the process and their rights ahead of Election Day; initiatives to combat fake news, 

disinformation and restrictions to the media and access to information; e±Iorts to safeguard the 

vote, including the unhindered observation of the process by political parties and domestic and 

international observers; and activities to deliver an open and non-violent electoral process at all 

stages, from campaigning to electoral dispute resolution. 

To achieve these objectives, the United States must redouble its efiorts to work with our 

Zimbabwean and regional partners - especially the Southern African Development Community 

(SADC) and African Union- to stand for nothing less than a transition to democratic rule through 

a free, fair, transparent and credible electoral process 

Over the longer term, !he U.S. and our democratic allies must provide support to .foster a 

competitive multi-party-political sysrem and the esrablishmenr of democratic insTitutions. As those 

of us who work in the field of democracy and governance assistance understand all-too-well, 

elections are just one part of a much larger democratic process. The overall health and maturation 

of Zimbabwe's democratic system requires a strong multi-party system. 

Despite many challenges, Zimbabwe's democratic opposition has a number of advantages that 

should be recognized and leveraged, including a base of support among the population; access to 

young leaders rising through the ranks and talcing on leadership roles; and governing experience 

under the Government of National Unity (a power-sharing agreement with ZANU-PF following 

the disputed 2008 elections), when despite the limitations of their positwn,they were able to 

achieve some successes in the management of the economy. A viable bpposit.lcrn is essential to a 

healthy Zimbabwean democracy, particularly in serving as acounterb&ianceto the ruling party's 

ability to expand its powers through the legislative process. · 

In addition to increasing political competition, other critical areas requiring attention include 

judicial, criminal justice and security reform; ·opening . :the infmmation space; the full 

implementation of the 2013 Constitution; the ne'ed for responsive and participatory governance 

and service delivery; and a legitimate truth and reconciliation process. Again, engagement and 

support to Zimbabwean and regional partners in these areas is critical. 

The United States should he prepared.filr numerous scenarios in a post-Mugahe era. The coming 

elections will be pivotal in determining the tolerance and space for future democratic deYelopment, 

but democratic progress is by no means certain. ZANU-PF and the military complex that plays an 
24


28825b-6.eps

increasingly visible role in the party has everything to lose from a shift in the power dynamics of 

the country. Political repression and disregard for fundamental human and political rights is an 

ongoing problem in Zimbabwe, and we need to be <igilant under the new dispensation in the lead 

up to and following elections. U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe should be formulated to consider the 

multitude of scenarios that could unfold in the coming months. 

1/w Unired Srares must hold rhe line with targeted sanctions and wirhin international finance 

institutions to require the implementation ()( key refiwms as a precursor to lending or 

debt. sanctions relief: Prior to the coup, one of the top issues discussed in the international arena 

regarding Zimbabwe was the clearing of its arrears with international finance institutions, namely 

the World Bank and African Development Bank, with the intent of making Zimbabwe eligible to 

participate in new lending programs. Under the new dispensation, debate over these issues has 

intensified, as the revival of Zimbabwe's long-sufl'ering economy is a top priority for the 

Mnangagwa administration and the international community. 

Other international partners, especially the United Kingdom, hm-e been quick to support and 

engage with the new regime, and China has a historical legacy as a patron of ZANU-PF. Unlike 

the EU, which lifted sanctions on Zimbabwe on January 25 (except for two individuals Robert 

and Grace Mugabe), the US. recently renewed its targeted sanctions on individuals including 

President Mnangagwa. 

Sanctions and U.S. influence in international financial institutions are our strongest points of 

leverage in discussions over democratic reforms and respect for fundamental human rights and 

freedoms. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced on February 2 that it will only lend 

to Zimbabwe if it clears its debts with other multilateral institutions. Given the leadership role that 

the U.S. holds in the World Bank, it is vital that we hold the line until true progress and good will 

is demonstrated by the Mnangagwa administration and ZANU-PF officials. 

I thank you for your time and look forward to your questions. 
25

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Lewis, thank you very much for your recommendations and your testimony and your work. Thank you. 

Mr. Freeth. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BEN FREETH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

MIKE CAMPBELL FOUNDATION 

Mr. FREETH. Thank you very much. It is a great honor to be here 

once again in Washington, DC, and to be able to testify straight out 

of Zimbabwe as to where we are at this point. And it is really 

heartening to hear so much talk about the rule of law and the importance of the rule of law in our country. 

And I think when we look back and we see what has taken place, 

with 25 percent of the population having left our country, with the 

education systems, which were the best in Africa, being trashed, 

with the social systems ending up in a total state of disrepair, with 

the economy in total tatters, with people queuing outside the banks 

just to try and withdraw their money, we have to look at the cause 

of these things. And the cause is the destruction of the rule of law 

and the destruction of property rights. 

So we have just had a coup. We are 100 days in, or thereabouts, 

not quite. And where are we now? Are things getting better? Are 

reforms taking place? And I think if we listen to the rhetoric, it 

sounds all very good. There is a massive charm offensive taking 

place at the moment and many people are taken in by that charm 

offensive of the President and others in trying to make it look as 

though things have changed because the guy at the top has 

changed. 

But when you look at it on the ground, unfortunately, not a lot 

has yet changed. There is talk about 99-year leases on land, but 

when you look at the small print, those 99-year leases are actually 

only 90-day leases, and there is a clause that allows government 

to cancel those leases with no notice in 90-days’ time. 

We are seeing talk about the rule of law coming back, property 

rights coming back, but at this stage, we have seen no laws actually changed. Even the Indigenization Act has not been repealed. 

We see the militarization of many parts of government. We have 

obviously got the former Minister of State Security as the President. We have got the former Minister of Defence, and after that, 

of the Armed Forces, as the Vice President. We have got the guy 

who was in charge of Fifth Brigade that massacred 20,000 people 

in Matabeleland as the Minister of Lands. And then, within the 

civil service, there are many military figures actually coming in, 

and within the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission as well. 

So we have got a situation where there is a huge amount of 

charm, but we have still got the same situation on the ground. So 

I think we have to look at that, and we have to look at what needs 

to be done in order to restore rule of law and to restore property 

rights. 

And I think ZDERA was a very far-thinking program or act that 

was put in place in December 2001, and I would like to recommend 

very strongly that ZDERA does remain in place. One of the aspects 

of ZDERA was respect for ownership and title to property, one of 

the main issues relating to the destruction of the economy. 

26

And I believe that the judgment that came in from the SADC 

Tribunal, an African solution to an African problem, this tribunal 

that gave judgment in favor of property rights back in 2008, that 

should be incorporated within ZDERA so that it becomes the international legal obligations, as per the SADC treaty, should be 

brought in as part of ZDERA. 

I think also we have talked a lot about free and fair elections. 

It is absolutely imperative that there are people on the ground observing now as to what is taking place in terms of the militarization of ZEC, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, and of the intimidation that is going on in the rural areas ahead of the election. 

And I think the third thing that is so important is that the 

SADC Tribunal, this court that was set up for the 280 million people in Southern Africa, is brought back into being. And at this 

stage we have done an awful lot. We are actually expecting a judgment tomorrow in South Africa regarding our case against President Zuma for his part in destroying that SADC Tribunal, and we 

expect a good judgment. 

But we need to have other governments being brought to task 

within the SADC region, or other heads of state, for their part in 

signing a new protocol that takes away the rights of the individual 

to be able to go to that court as a court of last resort. 

We hope for a better country, and I think a major step has been 

taken with President Mugabe not being in place any longer at the 

head. But we need the next step to be taken where the rule of law 

is brought back, where democracy is able to take place, and where 

human rights are respected along with property rights. 

I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Freeth follows:]

27


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U.S. CONGRESS: House Subcommittee on Africa hearing: 

"The Recommended Focus of Future U.S. -Zimbabwe Relations" 

By Ben Freeth, Executive Director, 

Mike Campbell Foundation 

28 February 2018 

We need to get the root of the problem in Zimbabwe: 

What is it that caused the fastest shrinking economy in the recorded history of the world in a 

peace time situation? 

What is it that brought the most industrialized country in sub-Saharan Africa -after South 

Africa- into a state of 85% plus unemployment? 

What is it that made the bread basket of southern Africa into a country that would have had 

widespread death by starvation if food aid had not come in from the U.S. and the West 

every year for 16 years after the farm invasions began? For example, in 2002, just two years 

into the chaotic farm grab, Western governments had to give the World Food Program $300 

million to feed some 5.5 million Zimbabweans, nearly 50% of the country's population. (At 

the height of the Ethiopian famine, international donors fed just 20% of Ethiopia's citizens.) 1 

What is that has caused an estimated 25% of the entire Zimbabwe population of between 12 

and 13 million people to flee the country of their birth in such a short period of time? 

Most critically: 

How can Zimbabwe be rebuilt from the ruins that have been created by the 37 years of former 

President Robert Mugabe's reign? 

THE RECOMMENDED FOCUS FOR FUTURE U.S.- ZIMBABWE RELATIONS 

The U.S. needs to focus on the current drive by Zimbabwe's leaders to bring in investment and 

financial aid given that some of the extremely negative and counterproductive laws, policies and 

practices remain in place. The Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001 (ZDERA) 2

, 

passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2001, stipulates that the restoration of the rule of law in 

Zimbabwe includes "respect for ownership and title to property." {Section 4 {d}{l}] 

Restoration and expansion of property rights 

Commercial agriculture, underpinned by property rights, has always been the backbone of the 

economy. Prior to 2000, the year the farm invasions began, commercial agriculture with titled land 

accounted for approximately 30% of the land area of Zimbabwe. 
28


28825c-2.eps

This accounted for 20% of Zimbabwe's GDP, which rose to 60% when agri-based industries, including 

services, came into the equation. It also accounted for over 40% of national export earnings. 

In addition, over 20 percent of the population lived and was employed on commercial farms, with 

commercial agriculture-related employment comprising a third of the formal labour force3

. The 

destruction of property rights and the nationalisation of the vast majority of titled land has been 

catastrophic for the economy. On that nationalised land, no dams have been built, nor any 

meaningful development undertaken since the date of nationalisation. In fact, the vast majority of 

irrigation schemes have fallen into disuse, thousands of hectares of valuable forex-earning orchards 

have died, and thorn trees have begun to take over in many of the agricultural fields. 

Comparison: {Left) Communal/and vs (right) property-rights titled land in 2005 

{Credit: Notional Geographic Society) 

There is no doubt that if property rights were restored and expanded, there could be a very quick 

recovery in the agricultural sector. This would bring massive employment, a huge inflow of 

desperately needed foreign currency, a return of skills lost through the mass exodus of skilled 

Zimbabweans, and a revival in the local downstream industries, 60% of which were primarily focused 

on agriculture. 

Bankable, transferable and inheritable property rights now only exist on less than 10% of the total 

land area in Zimbabwe. As a result, virtually no development or meaningful production and 

employment is able to take place because no investment is secure and nobody can take a long-term 

view- something essential for agriculture. Former commercial farms have become as unproductive 

as- or even less productive than their communal neighbours. A system of feudal patronage has 

developed throughout the land where everyone lives in fear, insecurity and poverty for the purposes 

of being easily controlled. 
29


28825c-3.eps

Three steps need to be taken to free the land, unlock its potential and bring it to life so that the 

remarkable human capital that Zimbabwe has available at its disposal can get involved with 

development, production and employment on the land: 

1. Property rights need to be re-established in the recently nationalised commercial land 

[approximately 11 million hectares]. 

2. Property rights need to be re-established in the formerly nationalised commercial land that 

was bought by government for resettlement but on which no formal bankable or 

transferable property rights were given [3.6 million hectares]. 

3. Property rights need to be established for the first time in the communal areas [17 million 

hectares]. 

It is interesting to look at the country where the land nationalisation ideology that has been used in 

Zimbabwe originally came from. A little over a century ago, the great Russian Prime Minister and 

courageous reformer, Stolypin, began reforming the communal lands of Russia to give individual 

ownership to over 6 million peasant households in a decade. This increased total agricultural 

production by 50% in that decade because with individual ownership came development on those 

farms. Stolypin was murdered. 

When Lenin took over immediately afterwards, he began his "command economy" and the peasants 

who had ownership had their property rights taken away with the infamous "land decree". With 

property rights destroyed, Russians starved by the million, despite having such a vast agricultural 

land area on which they could have fed the world. 

Every land nationalisation program carried out around the world since Lenin's land decree of 26 

October 1917, has had equally disastrous effects. 

It is interesting to note that in line with the Leninist nationalisation in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe has also 

instituted "command agriculture," mirroring Lenin's "command economy". The State commands 

and controls farmers in terms of whether they can grow and what they grow, as well as where they 

must market their produce. Last year the State paid farmers double the world price for maize and 

sold it on for half what they bought it for. This helped lead to a good harvest; but a record loss by 

the Grain Marketing Board of over 200 million dollars. Such madcap schemes from a cash-strapped 

government and a cash-strapped people who have to pay for such schemes, are totally 

unsustainable. 

One of the sons of the Zimbabwean soil, Allan Savory- a visionary and a man very influential in world 

agriculture, including in the U.S., once said: "Without agriculture it is not possible to have a city, 

stock market, banks, university, church or army. Agriculture is the foundation of civilisation and any 

stable economy." 

To be successful, agriculture has to be founded on secure, bankable and transferable property rights. 

The current 99-year leases with the clause that government can cancel them in 90 days, are simply 

perpetuating the problem of dead capital. 

If we are able to marry the resurrection of currently dead land capital to the resurrection of 

effectively dead human capital, Zimbabwe would become the fastest growing economy in the world 

in a very short period of time. 
30


28825c-4.eps

Section 72 of the new Constitution (2013) 

The primary focus initially needs to be on Section 724 of the Zimbabwe Constitution (2013) which 

was struck down in its previous form (as Amendment 17 to the previous Constitution) by the 

Campbell Judgment5 in the SADC Tribunal. We need to ensure that this Judgment does not continue 

to be ignored. 

[Amendment 17 was added to Zimbabwe's Constitution on September 14, 2005 to vest ownership of 

certain categories of land on the Zimbabwean government and to eliminate the courts' jurisdiction to 

hear any challenge to the land acquisitions. Commercial former Mike Campbell initiated proceedings 

in court on May 15, 2006, challenging the validity of Amendment 17.] 

IN THE SOUTHERN AfRICAN .DE\'l:lOl'M:E"N"T 

COi\:I},!:UNITY (SAOC) TRIBUNAL 

BELD AT wL))DHO.EK 

J.ma: CAMPRt:LL (PRIVATE) LfillTED 

'WILLIAM ':\!ICHAfL CA~Il'JlELL 

RO.IIEltT GABlUE.L l!.IDG.Ul': N.O. 

D< HIS CAPACITY .>lS THI: PR.ESIDE:.T OF 2J::\flii\BWE 

First AppHcant 

Mike Campbell takes on President Robert Mugabe at the SADC Tribunal in Namibia in 2007 

Section 72 allows the Zimbabwe Government to acquire any right or interests in private land by 

notice in the Gazette after which that land vests in the State with full title. "No compensation is 

payable in respect of its acquisition ... " [Section 72(3)(a)). "The acquisition may not be challenged on 

the grounds that it was discriminatory ... " Section 72(3)(c). "An act of Parliament may make it an 

offence for any person, without lawful authority to possess or occupy agricultural land ... " 

The SADC Tribunal Judgment is a final and binding judgment. Section 72 is an anathema to human 

rights and the rule of law and will continue to stifle investment so long as it is not changed. No 

moves are being made to even discuss the removal of Section 72- which is in conflict with the rest 

of the Zimbabwe Constitution- and the continued contempt of the Zimbabwe Government to the 

Campbell Judgment which strikes it down. Section 72 goes against the SADC Treaty, international 

law and all the human rights charters that Zimbabwe is signed up to. 

If the new Zimbabwe Government was to decide to comply with the court orders that President 

Mugabe chose to defy (instead of continuing to be in contempt of court) 6 and the Campbell 

Judgment was to be recognised, there would be no stronger or better signal that investment and 

financial assistance could now pour into Zimbabwe. This would be the clearest possible signal to 

herald significant and immediate recovery of the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole. 

4 
31


28825c-5.eps

Until the Zimbabwe Government complies with the court orders- and does so publicly- it is 

important that financial institutions and governments continue to raise the issue as a prerequisite 

for normalisation of relations and financial assistance. 

Restoration of the rule of law 

At the root of the Zimbabwe problem is the breakdown of the rule of law and its replacement with 

"rule by law." We have a "command economy" with a military system of command in Government. 

We have already covered the Campbell farm case in relation to Section 72 of the Constitution. My 

father-in-law, Mike Campbell, was abducted and severely beaten- and later died because he took 

President Mugabe to court in the regional court, the SADC Tribunal. This is what has happened in 

the past to those standing for the rule of law. Mike gained a final and binding judgment from the 

Tribunal in November 2008. 7 This needs to be recognised and adhered to. 

(Left): Ben Freeth and Mike Campbell in hospital after their abduction and torture at the hands of 

President Mugabe's youth militia, 30 June 2008 

The Gonda torture case: In January 2011, the SADC Tribunal awarded damages of nearly US$17 

million to nine Zimbabwean torture victims, in a landmark ruling that yet again exposed Harare's 

flagrant disregard of the rule of law. The judgment in the Gonda case8

, which was handed down on 9 

December 2010, followed a case in which the victims of organised violence and torture sued the 

Zimbabwean government for failing to comply with the orders of the country's High Court. 

After the Zimbabwe Government was found to be in contempt of court in the Campbell case, and 

the ruling of the Tribunal in the Gonda case was handed down, Mugabe managed to persuade the 

SADC Heads of State to suspend the SADC Tribunal in May 2011. The following year the SADC Heads 

of State closed down the Tribunal, depriving 277 million people in the 15 countries in southern Africa 

of a court of last resort when the justice systems in their own countries failed them. 

The decision to do this and attempt to sign a new Protocol into place in 2014, the mandate of which 

would be confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between 

Member States, thus blocking the Tribunal from hearing any human rights cases at all, is currently 

being challenged in the region. I am one of the applicants in a case against former South African 

President Jacob Zuma9 for his part in the process. We expect a judgment before the date of this 

Congressional Hearing. 
32


28825c-6.eps

Other Laws: Detrimental laws remain in place despite lip service to their removal. 

The lndigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 200810 effectively stops white 

Zimbabweans or foreign investors from having a controlling share in any business; 

The Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act of 200611 continues to prosecute white 

farmers criminally for still farming their land and living in their homes as per Section 72 of 

the 2013 Constitution; 

The Public Order and Security Act (POSA) 12 of January 2002 and 

The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) 13 of 2002 continue to stifle 

fundamental freedoms. 

There is only one case where a white farmer has been restored to his farm. Rob Smart, his son 

Darryn and their families were evicted violently by police last year after a bishop, reportedly 

connected to former first lady Grace Mugabe's 'G40' political faction, was given the farm. 

Regrettably Rob Smart's restoration is against Zimbabwe law as it now stands. The court order that 

evicted him has not been revoked and nothing has yet been put in place to change the law that led 

to his eviction. This demonstrates how we live in a rule by decree State. Laws need to be reformed 

so that violence against people and their property is able to be curbed. 

[The Smarts have been told they will get a 99-year lease where, having received no compensation 

for their farm- which is now considered State land- they can lease their homes and land back from 

the State for an as yet unspecified amount of money each year. In the convoluted 48-page 99-year 

lease agreement, the State can evict the lessee with 90 days notice- even if he has crops in the 

ground]. 

Farm workers and their children were overjoyed when commercial formers Darryn Smart and his 

father, Rob, were allowed to return to their Lesbury form in December 2017 
33


28825c-7.eps

The U.S. continues to play a crucial role in Zimbabwe 

America's values continue to guide foreign policy in Zimbabwe by supporting democratic movements and 

human rights organizations, as well as contributing very significantly to humanitarian projects. 

We are deeply grateful to the U.S. for continuing to post exceptional diplomats such as former Ambassador 

James D. McGee to Harare. Ambassador McGee was prepared to risk his life by going out to witness statesponsored violence against Zimbabweans in the rural areas first-hand- with the press. 

On February 24, 2009 shortly after the swearing in of Zimbabwe's Government of National Unity, 

Ambassador McGee addressed students at the African University in Mutare. His words apply equally today to 

the new government led by President Emmerson Mnangagwa: 

"Despite all the challenges I remain hopeful that true change is coming. I hope that the new [unity] 

government represents a beginning. We are watching closely and will judge this new government on its 

actions. If it takes concrete steps to meet the conditions the international community laid out long ago for reengagement, the United States will be at the forefront in providing assistance. 

"However before that can happen, we need to see restoration of the rule of law, commitment to the 

democratic process and respect for human rights, a commitment to timely and internationally supervised 

elections, full and equal access for all Zimbabweans to humanitarian assistance, and commitment to 

macroeconomic stabilization in accordance with guidance from relevant international agencies. An important 

and necessary first step is the release of all political detainees. If we see signs that this is taking place our 

support will expand. If we do not see these signs, we will continue to provide humanitarian relief while 

pushing for these changes .... " 

per capita (current), o 

20.00% 

00.00%. 

60.00% 

40.00% 

20.QQ0,f.; 

~I IiI I--~~-~---~~ ~r~--~ i ~ Botswana "'--Zambia -Mozambique 

Zimbabwe's GOP per capita, compared to neighbouring countries, 1990-2012 

7 
34


28825c-8.eps

GOP (PPP) per capita (int'l $)) 199(}-2014 

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 ?012 2014 

Zimbabwe's GOP (PPP) per capita compared to sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2014 

World Economic Forum 

http://www3. weforum.orq/docs/qcr/2015-2016/Gioba/ Competitiveness Report 2015-2016.pdf 

Ben Freeth MBE 

Executive Director 

Mike Campbell Foundation- Zimbabwe Website: www.mikecar1pbellfoundation.com 

Mobile: +263 773 929 138 E-mail: benfrceth7@gmail.com; info@mikecumpbellfoundation.com 

8 
35


28825c-9.eps

1 "How to Kill a Country" by Samantha Power, The Atlantic, December 2003: 

~en.wiklpedia.org/wi~~:1fke Campbell (Pv~) Ltd v z:mbabwe 

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe, background and rulings: 

!i'i!f!...;f1.www.mik~I:Q.QQel!foQ!lfl_;!tion..:£_Ql!1{.paeejthe~campbell-case-backgn~und:.[ldll!_1gs-461 

6 "The Zimbabwe Government remains in contempt of court and continues to flout the rule of law", opinion by Sir 

Jeffrey lowell QC, The Zimbabwean, 18 May 2017: 

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe, judgment, South African Legal Information Institute, 2008: 

'rttto:U~'I!i_W safUL.q_cg[?a/cas~·-illQUQG8/2.htmi 8 The Gonda torture case judgment, World Courts website, 9 December 2010: 

Hearing of SADC Tribunal court case set down for 5-7 February 2018, PoliticsWeb, 2 February 2018: 

Solidarity Peace Trust Report "Policing the State", summary 

on pg 4, 14 December 2016: 

hll p:/ /::,olldarilVpPac<'t r us1 .nrg/dov-mlodd/r Pport fiiL's/policirlg the <;lat•'.pdf 13 The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002: Wikipedia: 

httos:l/en.wiklpedia org/wlki/AcC?'SS to !ntor~ation a~d Protection of Privacy Act (Zimbabwe) 

9 
36

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much, Mr. Freeth. 

We now go to our fourth and final panelist, Dr. Dendere. 

Thank you again for being here. 

STATEMENT OF CHIPO DENDERE, PH.D., VISITING ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR, AMHERST COLLEGE 

Ms. DENDERE. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Karen Bass, for the invitation to testify today. 

The United States and Zimbabwe have had a long and supportive relationship. The United States remains Zimbabwe’s biggest donor and has already given $1 billion in aid since 2001. 

The ouster of Mr. Mugabe in November 2017 after a military-led 

guardian coup that ended in his resignation is an outcome that 

many of us would not have predicted. I believe I also speak for my 

generation, those of us born after independence, when I say the 

idea of a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe is quite surreal. 

Mr. Mugabe’s 37-year tenure was complex. While he made significant improvements in welfare provisions, his authoritarian rule 

resulted in much suffering, notably, the 1983 Matabeleland genocide and violence again political opponents. 

In response to the declining economy, at least 2 million 

Zimbabweans emigrated. At least 80,000 of those found refuge in 

the United States. Zimbabweans in the United States are highly 

skilled and many of them have been educated at top universities, 

including MIT, Harvard, and Yale. 

Zimbabwean Americans have also made significant contributions 

in the arts. For example, the brilliant ‘‘Black Panther’’ actress 

Danai Gurira. 

While Zimbabweans celebrated the change in the government, 

this quickly turned into allowing the continued involvement of the 

military in otherwise civilian affairs. When I flew into the Harare 

International Airport in early December, soldiers required everyone 

arriving to show our IDs. This was new for Zimbabwe. 

It is unlikely that an unreformed ZANU-PF government will 

usher in a democratic system. It is also unlikely, following the 

death of Morgan Tsvangirai, that a divided opposition climate will 

spread democratic growth. 

It is my expert opinion that additional government-to-government aid and investment will not solve Zimbabwe’s problems in the 

absence of significant reforms that address elections, corruption, 

and economic development. 

While President Mnangagwa has stated his commitment to free 

and fair elections, state media is heavily controlled by the ruling 

party. Democracy cannot thrive when the media is stifled. State institutions such as the police and the military remain partisan. The 

peacefulness of the 2018 election is thus at risk. 

Zimbabwe’s high youth unemployment has also created a readily 

available marketplace of youth who can be paid to harm others. 

Interparty violence is also a growing concern. 

However, despite the restricted access to state media, initiatives 

such as the Open Parly platform and BusStopTV, a political satire 

group, have effectively utilized social media and have a combined 

reach of over 1⁄2 million citizens. 

37

Voice of America remains an important media platform, reaching 

nearly 700,000 citizens weekly. I recommend that the United 

States continue providing funding for VOA and independent media. Zimbabwe loses between $1 billion to $2 billion from corruption 

each year. President Mnangagwa has promised zero tolerance of 

corruption. However, to date, corruption investigations have targeted only those affiliated with the losing pro-Mugabe faction of 

ZANU-PF. At least five members of President Mnangagwa’s cabinet have been implicated in corruption worth billions of dollars. 

Although President Mnangagwa recently announced that some 

officials have heeded his call to return stolen funds and to declare 

assets, no specifics have been shared about those returns. 

Corruption is an epidemic. For this reason, it is important for the 

United States to engage the new government very strongly and 

firmly on corruption. 

ZANU-PF often blamed Zimbabwe’s stunted economic growth on 

economic sanctions, in particular the United States’ Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, ZDERA. Lack of clarity on 

both the Zimbabwe and U.S. investor side on the requirements of 

ZDERA have had some negative implications on investment. 

For example, Zimbabwean businesses have been denied credit by 

American banks who are not clear on the policy requirements 

under ZDERA. Clarity on the types of business-to-business engagements acceptable within the confines of ZDERA is required. 

I also recommend that the United States reconsider sanctions on 

state-owned businesses. Justifiably, the United States has long 

been concerned with the links between ZANU-PF and state enterprises. Indeed, much of the corruption has occurred in the stateowned businesses. 

However, it is my expert opinion that in the post-Mugabe era, 

legislative independence has been bolstered and the Parliament is 

now equipped to hold government officials to account. 

Regarding individual sanctions, the onus is on those listed to 

prove their commitment to democracy. Many on the list have allegedly committed horrible crimes against humanity. It would be a 

greater injustice to lift these sanctions before a thorough investigation has been conducted. Zimbabwe cannot have economic growth 

that is divorced from addressing human rights abuses. 

Robert Mugabe’s exit from politics is not enough to absolve individual crimes. President Mnangagwa’s motto is that Zimbabwe is 

open for business. Zimbabwe has long been open for business, but 

poor governance bottlenecked efforts by local and foreign investors. 

President Mnangagwa has said all the right things necessary for 

a conducive business environment in Zimbabwe. The real test will 

be whether he follows through on his promises. His government 

has thus far made adjustments to unpopular policies, including the 

Indigenization and Empowerment Act, which should help increase 

investor confidence. 

While the United States faces tough competition from China and 

Russia in sourcing Zimbabwe’s natural resources, Zimbabweans 

that I have spoken to have indicated a preference for American 

business. A democratic Zimbabwe and strengthened U.S.-Zimbabwe 

economic partnership remains mutually beneficial for the two countries. 

38

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dendere follows:]

39


28825d-1.eps

'l'estimony of Dr. Chipo Dendere 

Consortium for Faculty D1versity Fellow & Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, 

Amherst College 

TTousc Foreign .-'\ffairs Cornn1ittcc 

Subcommittee on Africa, Clohal Health and Human Rights 

hbruary 28, 2018 

Chipo Dendere is~ Zimb~bwe~n politic~! scientist. Dr. Dendere is currently~ Consortium for 

!'acuity Diversity Pellow ;md Visiting "\ssistant Professor ofPolitic1l Science ;,t Amherst College. 

Dr. Dcndcrc's research expertise is on dcrnocracy, elections, and, rnigration, \\1ith a regional focus on 

Africrtn politics. She \Vtites about the in1prKt of voter exit., n1igration rtnd ren1ittances on the sun,iv~ll 

of authoritarian reg-imes. Dr. Dcndcrc's nc\v research is on the role of technology and social tncdia 

in ne"\v democracies. 
40


28825d-2.eps

Th~nk you, Ch~irm~n Christopher H. Smith, R~nking Member Kmen lhss ~nd other members of 

the Subcommittee, for the invitation to testify today on d1e future of Zimbabwe in a post-Robert 

'v!ugabe era. As a scholar of Afncan politics, I can say d1at this is an outcome many of us would not 

h~ve predicted. I believe I speak for most young Zimb~bwe~ns, my gener~tion hom ~fter 

independence, "\vhen I S<iY the ideti of a post-1\Iugabe Zin1bab"\ve is quite surrettl. 

Robert 'V!ugabe was ousted from oHice in Nowmber 2017 in a series ot· military-led events that 

beg,m as a guardi~m cour resulting in his resign,ttion. 

The lnited States and Zimbabwe have a long history of a mutually beneficial and productive 

relationship. Tn 1080, the United States was the first country to open an crnbassy in the nc\:vly 

independent Zimb;,bwe ;md extended a state visit invit;~tion to then Prime Minister Robert 'v!ugabe. 1 

Over the last t\vo decades as 71rnbabwc faced severe cconornic and political crises, the relationship 

has been str;uned, but the United States h;,s remained committed to providing support for 

democracy and alleviating poverty. 'lhe lnited States remains d1e big;g;est donor and has g;iven nearly 

c:-;D$1 billion dollars in foreign assistance since 2001 2 Tn 2001, the Cnited States Congress passed 

d1e Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZlDEIL-\),' commonly referred to as 

.randion.r in Zimlnb"\ve. 1\Iugabe and his govetntnent blamed 1nany of the countrie~' economic \Voes 

on these s:mctions. Debates on s~mctions are con1plex, and there is a lot of :-tctdenllc evidence that 

suggests sanctions negatively affect the poorest and most vulnerable. ·"-t the same time, targeted 

s:-u1ctions ~tlso constr:-tin the behav-ior of rog-t.le politici<lns \vho '\vould othet\vise hrtYe free :-tccess to 

resources around the \vorld \vhile denying their O\Vn citi?.ens the satne opportunities. 

It is rny goal in this tcstirnony to provide a broader political and cconon1ic context of Lirnbabwc 

post-T'vfut:~abe and give sorne suggestions on future that will bolster political stability and 

den1ocratic consoli<ion. lt is unlikely that the ne'\v P l i government \vill usher in a 

democratic system that alleviates and civil liberties. Tt is also unlikely following the 

death Clf key Of1f'OSitlO!l figure ~[org;m that the opposition will spur demOCLltic g;rowth. 

At the heart of 'Lin1babwc's dctnocratic challenges in the post-1\'lugabc era is debilitating poverty. ln 

the ~bsence of rigorous efforts to address high unemployment rates, poor he~lth care and violence, 

Zin1babwe's dcrnocratic future rernains grin1. 

BackgrOtmd on Zimbabwe 

Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980 after almost two decades of protracted war between black 

nationalists and a \vhite n1inority governn1ent. At independence, Robert 1Vlugabe \vho \Vas then 

Prime 'V!inis ter made a public promise to uphold democracy. Pres1dent 'V!ugabe's 37 -year tenure was 

complex: \vhile his govemtnent tnade signitlcmt itnprovements in \velfare provision and universal 

access to education, his authoritarian rule also resulted in much suffering, notably the 1983 genocide 

in 'v!atabeleland and targeted violence ag;unst the opposition led by the recently deceased iV!r. 

Tsvangirai. Tn the early 2000s, the economy went into rapid decline, in part because of failed 

1 U.S. Department of State, "7.-imbab\ve." 2 U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Foreign --'\.id to Zimbabwe." 3 \\/iham Bill Frist, Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). 
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28825d-3.eps

go\-ernance, a poorly· executed land refom1 policy, sanctions and state sponsored violence on 

citizens and the opposition. 

The declining econornic and political conditions in Zin1babwe led to a rnassive exodus of an 

estimated 2--1 million Limhahwems who sought refuge abroad. An estimated 80,000 Limhahwe;ms 

found refuge in the lnited States. 'l'he Limbabwean immigrant population is highly skilled and 

makes significant contributions to the Cnited States econotny~ many ot· thetn having been educated 

at top universities including '!he !Vlassachusetts institute of'l'echnologv (r'vlfl), llarvard and Yale. 

Zimbabweon-i\mericons hove olso mode their mork in the arts, including, for example, the brilliant 

Bbck P;mther rtctress Danai CurieL 

Current political climate 

Zimbabwe is headed towards elections in a few months. President Mnangagwa who succeeded 

Robert "v!ugabe is eager to move past elections and has hinted at an early election, likely in July. 

Limbabwe is going through a delicate transition following d1e military-assisted removal of Robert 

'v!ug;rbe from oft!ce by then Vice President Mn:mgagwa in November 2017. lv!ugabe's ouster from 

office marked the first change in power since independence. Ald10ugh Zimbabwe's process differed 

t-fotn traditional coups in Africa that\VCTe bloody and violent. it"\vas not a ·wholesome democratic 

tLlnsition either, rts President 1\'ln;.lng<tg'-Va did not become rresident virt the ballot box. 

Drawing on more ilian 30 e;xtensive interviews conducted wid1 elites and ordinary citizens during 

and after the coup 1 observed that while Limbabweans celebrate and welcome the change in 

govermnent, people remain concerned about the visible presence of the tnilitary in everyday politics. 

Pres1dent 'v!nangagwa appears to have rewarded the military by appointing fonner generals to top 

governn1ent positions. Porn1er Ceneells "\vho played significtmt roles in the military tlkeover, 

Const;mtino Chi\venga ;.md Sibusiso lvloyo, "\Vere appointed Vice President and J\linister of Uoreign 

:\ffairs respectively. \\il1en T flew into the Harare International •\irport in early December, soldiers 

asked me and everyone else arriving to show our IDs. This is new for Zimbabwe. The presence of 

d1e military stood in stark contrast to d1e eerie absence of d1e police. During Mugabe's tenure, 

Zimlubwe h:rd become a heavily policed state, with police roadblocks every few meters and 

commonplace police demands for bribes poor motorists. 

\Vhile a lot ot- challenges remain, T have also noticed that since '\'ovember 2017, Zimbabweans are 

rnore hopeful. 11

'ollowing President .:'vlnangaf';\va's inauguration, we saw the celebrated return of 

pron11ncnt exiles. Atnong these is the anticipated return of farnous nlL!siClan Thon1as .i\Iapfun1o. In 

Decen1ber \Ve also sa\v the return of some \vhite f1rmers "\vho had sought exile abro;td <lfter the lttnd 

rcfonn process tumed violent. An estimated -1,000 white farmers and thc1r black farn1 workers were 

displaced in the e;rrly 2000s.' It is very unlikely that the "new" ZANC PI' will reverse land reform, 

but President ~lnangag'-va has pron1ised a n1ore progressive cmd inclusive policy. 

Generally, Lin1babweans are n1ore confident to speak out, ·although nuny worry that the new 

government vv~ll restrict freedom of speech at the slightest hint that its hold on power is under 

thre;Lt. It is n1y expert opinion thttt once people h<tve found their voice, it is <tlot harder for 

go\-crnrncnts to shut thcn1 dov,m. Th1s shift in citizen attitudes provides a unique opportunity for the 

Cnited States <lnd other friends of Zimbrtbv·le to en1po\ver the 'rver,1ge citizen. 

'

1 ''\Xbite Fanner Gets Land Back under Zimbabwe's :\Jew Leader." 
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28825d-4.eps

Challenges and opportunities in a post-Mugabe society 

In n1y inten,..ie\vs, Zimbab\veans expressed th;tt they <lte tired of being rt globrll <lgendrt item for the 

\vrong reasons. 71rnbab\vcans arc eager to get back to the business of rebuilding their country and 

bringing back dignity. Most feel that a post-Mugabe era will open doors for development. This 

sentin1ent is shared by a lot of investors and donor countries who have been quick to extend a 

helping hand to the new government. 

While I slure the hope of m~ny Zimbabweans, it is my expert opinion that additional ~id and 

investment \vill not solve Zimbabvle's pn)l)len1s in the absence of significmt ref<)fll1S to reduce 

poycrty and strengthen institut1ons. If President i\lnangcl~va's go\'CrTHncnt or the next govcrnn1cnt 

that \vins in elections in 201 H does not ttddress deeply entrenched corruption, violation of various 

human tights, including property nghts and punitive economic policies the Cnited States, other 

donors and investors "\viii not see positive reh1ms on their investments. Investment partners are 

likely to sec better returns on their efforts if they shift fron1 govcrnrncnt-to-govcrnrncnt 

partnerships and focus on engaging at the local level, supporting entrepreneurs, local businesses, 

independent rncdia houses and civil society. 

The political environment: is Zimbabwe ready for elections? 

On Febmary 26, 2018, Zimbabwe's Election Commission chair announced that elections would be 

held between July and August 2018. At least 5.3 million out of fhe 7 million eligible voters have 

registered to vote. }u:nong those registered, the tnajority, son1c 65°/u, arc youth. There is no 

indication that the ne.v govenltnent"\vill put in place substmtial electoral refonns to even out the 

playing field but that docs not mean that the country is not ready for elections. In the last 18 years 

Zin1bab\vetU1 politics has been very tumultuous. And yet, the opposition has n1<ide significant strides 

even \vinning the 200H election. 

Factors tlut will h~ve ~ m;~jor imp~ct on the elections include access to free medi;~, youth bulge, and 

violence: 

Afedia 

State media is heavily controlled by the mling party but there arc new opportunities for independent 

coverage via social n1edia. Zimbab\ve has one teleYision channel that is state n1n. 'l'he n1ain 

ne-.vspaper, the Herald, is also state-n1n and proyides partisan coverage. Democracy cannot thrive 

when the n1edia is stit1ed. There are also a nurnber of independent n1edia house in circulation 

including the daily news but they have litnited resources. \\'1Iilc the environtnent is certainly 

challenging, entrepreneuritJ youth h;rve taken adY;mt,lge of the gro\ving <lccess to soci<ll n1edia to 

provide citizens \vith alternative sources for news. ()ne exarnplc 1s the #openparl y platforrn founded 

Youth Africm Leaders Initiative (YALI) alumni their social media platforms re;,ch at least 200,000 

citizens daily. Another independent media source is BusStop'l'V, a political satire group fhat has a 

reach of over halt- a million on their popular segments. The Cnited States Embassy has already 

begun efforts to provide funding for these inforrnal news outlets and should continue to do so. 

\Toice of _A.rnericl rem;lins <ll1 in1port;mt n1edia platforn1. In the n1ost recent sun-.-ey conducted in 

20 15, VO A's past-week reach in Zimbabwe stood at 5.8° o, an impressive figure in a market which 

linlits access to internation,ll bnMdcasters. In a n1ore recent qualitative study conducted in 2017, 

Zimbabweans reported that VOA delivers unique content because it broadcasts information that 

they are unable to get elsewhere. Tn addition, VO,\'s cowrage of political news is not biased or 
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28825d-5.eps

censored like the local news. As long as censorship continues in L:imbabwe, panelists feel diat 

VOA's Studio 7 will remain a valuable source of intom>ation. VOA's audience reach is steadily 

increasing because of their efforts to use social media pLttforms. I regt.llrtrly engage 'i-vith listeners as a 

panelist of\FOi\ shOY\/S and Tarn happy to report that we receive calls frorn ycry diverse and often 

remote ctreas of Zimbab\ve. 1 \vould recomn1end thrtt the United St;.ltes continue pro\-iding funding 

for VOA. 

1 ~Oiifh, U!iemp!oyment, Po!itiea! Violence a111i Restridion oldzi! !i/mtzes 

While die President _\tnangagwa has stated his commitment to a violent free election, the 2018 

political climate may not be free <md tiur. Zimbabwe's high youth unemployment has cre;Ited a 

readily available and chetp marketplace for young people who can be paid to harm others. 

Substance abuse that can be traced back to poverty and trauma caused by politicalmstability is on 

the rise especi;-tlly ;-tmong recent gradu;-ttes. 

l.letween November and December 2017, the Counseling Services Cnit, an '\GO tasked with 

documenting incidents of polittcal violence and providing care for die affected, reported 89 attacks 

on men1bers of the opposition. The police continue to respond to public protests \vith excessive ;1nd 

needless violence. Intra and inter party v10lencc is also a gro\:ving concern in Zitnbab\1,1C's "ne\v 

dispensation." 5 Particularly troubling is ... -iolcncc targeting "\vomcn. Tt is important to emphasize that 

the culture of violence is a result of years of authoritarianism and has been made worse by growing 

unetnployment) citizen ~3tigue and a very harsh kind of poverty. 

The challenge for ZANC PF and the opposition is that die perpetrators of violence-many of them 

youth~ ;1t the local level are unlikely to change their beh<lvior and attitude tow<trd political 

opponents unless there is direct conunitn1ent fron1 all political actors to educate against political 

violence. Years of unstable governance have completely changed the political climate and social 

stntctures in Zimbabwe. In a country with a significant youd1 population serious efforts have to be 

made to manage political violence. 

Zimbabwe has experienced significant youd1 bulge. ~"'-ccording to the 2013 census, die majority, 

76%, of the population were under the age of 3-l. This presents both opportunities and ch,Jlenges 

for Zimbabwe. On one hand, Zimbabwe's youth arc also highly educated and on the other hand 

most ot- the youth are unemployed or underemployed. Every year at least 2,000 young people 

graduate with a diverse C:Ulge of degrees in Engineering, Business, Law, !\'lath and Science. As 

Zimbabwe transitions, if the gowmment partnerships with big trade partners like the Cnited States 

yield signiticant econotnic gains, then the youth bulge \\'ill prove advantageous for 'Lin1babwe. As 

the econon1y gro\vs, Zin1babwe's dependency ratio -the proportion of non-\vorking population to 

working popubttion- will decline. The United States government has alretdy implemented numerous 

con1n1unity-based prograrns that have had a positive irnpact on the youth. For exan1plc, the work 

re:-Hliness progelm "Zimbabv·le:\vorks'~ has generated over $31 n1illion in revenue r1nd created 6,000 

jobs". The Youth African Leaders Initiative (Y~-\Ll) participants are some of die most active youd1 

and leaders in job creation. Six ot- the youth "hub" or job centers were founded by Yali alumni; 

togedic-r they have created over 100 jobs in less than two years. 

5 "Zimbab\ve: ZLHR Condemns _:-viDC-T Intra-Party Violence- alL\h-ica.com." 6 "Zimbabwe." 
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Jiowner, these efforts are not enough. At least 90% of Limbabwe's youth are unemployed and this 

is a big challenge for democracy and peace. Youth arc used by political parties to mobilize voters 

and to rJso terrorize voters. In my inten,..ie\vs, voters hrtve expressed fertr of party-<tffiliated youth 

\vho arc easily lured by prorniscs of srnall payrncnts and access to drugs. 

The L:nited States can continue working with and within the civil society on youth targeted 

educational programs that promote peace and democracy. Tn 2017, the United States spent an 

estimated S !58 million on health programs focused on Jll Y /AIDS, malaria, malnutrition, "l'B, 

maternal/child health, family pbnning, and water sanitation. These programs are critical and must 

continue. A healthier Zimbabwe creates important trade opportunities t(>r the United States. 

Corruption 

:\t the heart of Zimbabwe's problems is endemic com1prion. Zimbabwe loses between USD~ 1-2 

billion ~-rom corn1ption each year.

7 To put that in perspective, 7imbab\ve's annual budget hovers 

just above $4 billion. Limbabwc is ranked in the top 30 most corrupt countries in d1e world.H In 

public opinion sun'eys conducted by 1-Tichigan Cniversity's Afrobaromter, at least 72~ o of 

Zimbabweans believe d1c majority of government officials to be corrupt., Perceived and real 

corn1ption scares serious investors a"\vay frotn Zitnbab"\ve, creating opportunities for rogue 

businessn1en "\Vho cause n1ore harnl from their business [)rttctices. 

President _\lnangagwa has promised zero tolerance of corruption. However, to date corruption 

investigations have targeted d10se affiliated wid1 the G-40 faction of LANU Pb. 9 President 

~ifnrmgag"\vtt grtve officials a February dertdline to return ;tny stolen funds rmd to declare assets. The 

Pres1dcnt has said some ofiicials have retumed funds, but he has not shared any specifics about 

those returns. In his o"\vn administration, President 1-'lnttng;tbr",:va's h;ts appointed individuals accused 

of corrurtion. 11'ive of his ctbinet n1embers httVe been implicated in corntption \.VOrth billions of 

dollars 10 

In2016, President li-Iugabc announced that Zimbabwe had lost CSD$15 billion in diamond ren·nue 

to corntpt.ion. These numbers have not been verified but during a recent hearing on dian1ond 

revenues, the commission on diamonds revealed that d1ey bad expected at least CSD$2 billion from 

diamonds sold since 2009. To date only $189 million had been tendered to the government between 

2009-2016. A plurality (40%) of Zimbabweans believe that goYernment ofiicials in all sectors are 

corrupt. 

As long as poverty is not addressed, corruption will continue to be an epidetnic. Troubling mcidents 

of dehum<mization of vulnerable persons have been reported by the Ul'\C:HR, the over 19,000 

refugees in Zitnbabwc's can1ps arc often forced to pay bribes to corrupt govert1n1ent oft1cials in 

exchange for access to basic con1n1odities. Por this reason, it is in1portrmt for the Cnited States to 

engage the ne\v governn1ent very strongly and firn1ly on corntption. The L:nited States, must 

continue engaging in local level programs that can be msulated from government com1prion. \Vhile 

'"Limhahwe Losing $1 Dillion a Ye:u· ro CmTuption." 8 "Transparency Tnten1ational- 7.-imbab\ve." 9 "Ponncr Zimhalnvc .i'viinistcrs Loyal to .:viugahc Charged with Corruption." 

111 "5 _i'vfinistcrs in I\hungagwa's cabinet that have been imphcatcd in corruption scandals" 
45


28825d-7.eps

low level everyday citi:z:en corruption exists, the cost of that type of corn1ption is n1ininul when 

cornparcd to the value of n1oncy lost via govcn1n1cnt channels. 

Economic Development 

Robert _\lugabe often blan1ed Lin1babwe's stunted econornic growth on econotnic sanctions in 

particular the United States' Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery :\ct (7TDFR•\). 

Confusion on both the Limbabwe and l.S. investor side on the requirements of LID ERA. has 

neg:ltively impacted inveshnent in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean businesses have been denied loans by 

Americrtn banks 'i-vho <tre not clear on the policy re4uiren1ents under ZIDERA ... 

iior n1ost investors perception is re;-tlity. 'l'he fact th;-tt Lin11Hlr•;ve is identitled as tt country under 

sanctions has scared away potential investors. T have recommended that the United States provide 

clarity on the types of business to business engagements acceptable within the con tines of 7TDER:\. 

1 would also recommend that the lnited States support efforts by Limbabweans asking for debt 

relief from international funding agencies including the \~'odd D:mk and l:V!F. Such efforts will 

bring much needed relief to millions of Zimbabweans, especially fam1ers, who could increase food 

product1on if they have access to credit. Extending credit to startt1ps can allow bus mess o"a1crs like 

Sin1brtrashe 1\lhuriro, 32, founder and ..\lttnrtging Director a rene'\vable energy developn1ent con1p;-1ny 

to employ more people thereby providing sustainable solutions to poverty. :\ddressing poverty will 

have a direct and positiYe in1pact on den1ocratic gro'\vth in 'Limbab'\ve. 

\\lith regrtrds to individuals rmd government institutions under the targeted sanctions list., the post-

'v!ugabe era provides new opportunities for engagement between Zimbabwe and the United States. I 

recomn1end that the Cnited St;Ltes reconsider s;mctions on state o'\vned businesses. I recognize th;Lt 

the United States has long been concerned \Vith the link bet\veen 'L_,_'\_" U Pii and state enterprises. 

Indeed, much of the corn1ption T discussed earlier has occurred in state O\vned businesses. 

However, it is my expert opinion that in the post-'v!ugabe era parliament has been bolstered in their 

independence and arc better equipped hold government officials account. I would like to draw 

attention to those parastrtt,tls engaged in <tgriculture ;md mining industries . .:..-fost S111<lll holder 

farmers depend heavily on funding fi-om the state funded agriculture bank which in turn depends on 

support from big financial institt1tions. 

State o\vned and other enterprises under targeted sanctions include: 

AGRlBANK 

INDl TSTRL~ DEVTILOPME'H C:ORPOIL'\.T!Ol' OJi ZIMBAB\v'C LTD INJi!L'\.STRCC:Tl TRJ: 

llr:VrLOI''vlr:r<J' rlA 'll<. OF/JMrlArlWr: 'vll'lr:RALS MAR.I-.Yi'I'lG COR.l'OR.i\'J'IO'l Or /IMrlArl\Vr' 

Zll Fll'i\KCL\.L HOLDI"GS LI'vl!TED 

INTLIL'vL'\.RKl:t' l!OlDII'. GS LIMITED 

SCCHFI'l I .I \Irl'r:Jl 

ZIMKlliWE IRO'll\KD STEEL CO'v!PA'lY 

ZIMBABWE A!li'.J'l(~ DEVLLOP_\!IJNT C:ORPOIL'l.TION 

ZTMRF HOT.Dl'!CS T.TMTTFD 

OST.FC (PV'T) LTD 

ORYX DL\'VIONDS (PTY) LTD 

ZIMBABWE DUE'-_C:E INDIJSTRIES (PV'l) LTD 

Regarding inch vidual sanctions; the onus is on those listed to prove their cornn1itrncnt to dcrnocracy. 

'v!any on the list have :Jlegedly committed horrible crimes agilinst hum:mity. It would be a greater 

injustice to uplift these sanctions before a thorough investigation has been conducted. Zimbabwe 
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cannot have econornic gtO\\'th divorced fron1 addressing hutncu1 rights abuses. Robert !vlugabe's exit 

from politics is not enough to absolve individual crimes. 

President ~\lmtngag-.vcl's n1otto is "Zimbab"\ve is open for business". 'l'he truth is th~tt Zimbabwe has 

long been open for business but poor governance bottlenecked efforts by investors. President 

\{nangag>.va has said all the right things necessary for a conducive business environment in 

Limbabwe. Jhe real test will be whether he follows through on his promises. Since corning into 

power he h;~s m;~de few adjustments to unpopubr policies including the 201(, Indigeniz;~tion and 

En1po\vern1ent Act11 • This ;1mendn1ent should incretse investor confidence rtnd \Voo _A .. merican 

investors who had rnoved away frorn investing in Zirnbab\ve. \Xl1ilc the United States faces tough 

con1petition fron1 Chinrt and Russi~t in sourcing Lin1b<ll)\Ve's naturrtl resources, aveL1ge 

Zimbabweans T have spoken to over the last three months have a preference for ,\merican 

businesses .. Little kno\-x.-11 is the extensive collaboration bet\veen Atnerican and Zitnbab\vean fanners .. 

Increased investment in agriculture will provide much needed food security for bod1 countries as d1e 

\vorld faces troubling \Veather chrmges. Zitnb;liNle's high literacy rates also create important 

opportunities for Atnerican businesses seeking to expand their tnarket and tnanufacturing basis. 

Such partnerships can bolster employment in both countries in exciting and mutually beneficial 

\Vrrys. 

Conclusion 

While Limbabwe faces a long and hard road to economic and political recovery the current 

govermnent ;md the govemtnent that \vins the 2018 elections have the opportunity to change the 

narrative. The new govemment must implement reforms to open up political space and policies d1at 

\vill incre1se the ease of doing business ;md rlddressing corruption. A post~lv'lugabe Zimbab\ve \vill 

not thrive if the governn1ent only focuses on the econonry \vhile ignoring the need for politictl 

reFonns .. 

The Cnited States also has an opportunity to revise some of the conditions of the Zimbabwe 

Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERl\.). It is beneficial to the Cnitcd States to provide 

for _An1ericln businesses \vorking \\~ith Zimbab\veans :~tnd to <llso support efforts by 

u'cm>ctL""'"'" seeking debt relief for their country. The Zimbabwean government should engage in 

extensive investigations on hun1an rights abuses before individuals on the targeted list of sanctions 

have been ren1oved. 

The quality ot- the 2018 elections will determine the "new" Zc\NC PF's commitment to democracy. 

It is also clear that d1e average Limbabwean is more hopeful d1an d1ey have ever been and support 

for civil society organi"ations will bolster d1is support for democracy among regular citizens. 

11 "Govt ~'\.mends Indigenisation La\v I The Herald." 
47

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I thought you might have had one final 

statement to make. I appreciate it. 

Let me begin the questioning. First, maybe, Ambassador Ray, if 

I go to you, but others who would like to answer these questions, 

please do. 

We know that Mnangagwa was obviously head of state security 

and the CIO during some very, very brutal periods, hence, the 

name ‘‘crocodile,’’ perhaps, but also people would suggest that 

maybe he is a changed man today. 

It is important to know, past sometimes is prologue. Far too 

often it is prologue. I wonder, however, how many political prisoners years-to-date have there been in Zimbabwe? 

And if you could expound upon the use of torture. I have authored four laws on torture victims. It is called the Torture Victims 

Relief Act. And here in this room I have heard testimony, as has 

my staff, as well as in countries all over the world, at torture centers, as well as in prisons, the Laogai, in Jakarta, the Soviet 

Union. The use of torture is often endemic. 

And Mr. Freeth—and, without objection, your full statement, like 

all of your full statements, will be made a part of the record—you 

have a picture of both you and Mike Campbell, your father-in-law, 

who was killed by way of a beating, and you with blood all over 

your face. And you point out, obviously, that will be another question, about the SADC courts—and, Ambassador, you might want to 

speak to that as well—which were done away with in 2012. 

Is that something that would come back? Is that something that 

the Trump administration and the European Community and especially the African countries need to say that needs to be returned. 

Legacy human rights issues are as important as current day 

human rights issues. There is no statute of limitations on torture 

and other kinds of horrific misdeeds or murder. 

So if you could speak to that, if you would, as an opening. 

And then I have some additional questions about the Dr. FristFeingold legislation, which we have already heard a lot of talk 

about, ZDERA, that had to do, obviously, with loans and no more 

debt relief. And you may recall debt relief during those years was 

one of the most popular issues around. Bono certainly helped to 

make it very popular. But debt relief is off the table when you are 

dealing within an abuser, abusing country. 

I think, Mr. Freeth, you at least alluded to or maybe you even 

said how important it was that SADC restoration, especially judgments, ought to be part of lifting of sanctions. And maybe you want 

to speak to that as well. 

Ambassador RAY. All right. Thank you, sir. 

As to the number of prisoners, I am afraid I don’t know—either 

currently or historically, I don’t know currently and historically, if 

I was told. I have reached an age where my brain cells don’t retain 

such things. 

On the issue of the SADC Tribunal, I would strongly suggest 

that we reach out to whoever we can to encourage the return of 

that. One of the issues and lectures I have given on Zimbabwe over 

the last 6 years, one of the points I make repeatedly is that a lot 

of the issues in Zimbabwe arise from historical incidents that have 

never been resolved, going back, of course, to Gukurahundi in the 

48

1980s when some 20,000 Ndebele were killed over a 2-year period. 

And I think it was by the fifth brigade, which is trained by the 

North Koreans. But it even goes beyond that. And a lot of these 

issues have just been brushed under the rug. People don’t like to 

talk about it. 

One of the things I learned from my time in Cambodia in dealing 

with the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is that, if nothing else, creating a 

venue where these issues can be brought to light and discussed. 

Whether they result in judicial punishment or not is actually less 

important than having them officially and formally acknowledged. 

So I would definitely argue that the SADC Tribunal, or some similar institution, should be put in place, and it should be a permanent institution to deal with these issues, not just in Zimbabwe, 

but across the region as a whole. South Africa has issues that are 

still unresolved that need to be taken care of. 

In terms of the issue of sanctions. You have the ZDERA on the 

one hand, which addresses the country’s debt and its international 

loans. And if I am not mistaken, actually Zimbabwe is not even eligible to apply for loans currently because of its arrears to the international financial institutions. And so leaving ZDERA in place, it 

is a handy tool to have for later, but it has no impact. 

Now, the other issue, the people often get confused between 

ZDERA and the administrative sanctions, which came in 2 years 

later. These, I think, are the real immediate stick that we can use. 

But people have to understand that these sanctions are not against 

the country in its entirety, but against specific individuals and specific entities. I think a lot of people here in the U.S. misunderstand 

that. 

And it does not limit or prohibit commercial transactions. I am 

still a firm believer in revitalizing and strengthening the private 

sector as a counterweight against an out-of-control government. 

One of the ways that ZANU-PF and the military and security services manage to maintain such control is people have no place else 

to turn. If you had a stronger private sector, as we have seen in 

places like Korea, I was in Korea in the 1970s when it was still 

a dictatorship. Watching the development of a vibrant middle class, 

and of an economy that was growing and creating jobs, has created 

a completely different career. It went from a military dictatorship 

still evolving, but it is now, I think, the 13th largest economy in 

the world, and growing. 

This, I believe, can be done in places like Africa as well. 

Zimbabwe has the infrastructure. It has an educated population; 

has an energetic population, when given the opportunity to act. 

And if the private sector were invigorated and strengthened, I 

think you could see eventually incrementally, over time, changes in 

the right direction in the country. 

Mr. SMITH. Do we know where Mnangagwa stands on the SADC 

issue? 

Ambassador RAY. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think anyone but 

Mnangagwa knows where he stands on any issue. 

Mr. SMITH. But is it something you think we should press with 

him? 

Ambassador RAY. I think we should press with him the return 

of the SADC Tribunal. As I said in my statement, we should reach 

49

out now to this government and lay out our wishes, if you will, or 

our vision for where things should go. And that, I think, should be 

one of the things on the list of to-do items. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I appreciate that. 

Would anyone else on the panel want to address any of those 

questions? 

Yes. 

Mr. FREETH. Just briefly on the United Nations convention 

against torture. Zimbabwe is one of the very, very few countries 

around the world that has not signed that United Nations convention against torture. It is one of the few blank spots on the world 

map. And so, torture is able to take place in Zimbabwe without 

that U.N. convention coming into being. So that is something that 

we need to look at. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ms. DENDERE. I was going to add that while the numbers are the 

people have been arrested for political engagement unclear. In the 

new dispensation, as it has been called, they remain quite a few 

people who are in prison for politically related protests. And the 

numbers are quite alarming when you look at women. But beyond 

that, there have been individuals who have been disappeared during the Mugabe regime, and those individuals we have not had any 

feedback from the government on whether they have been increase. 

In particular, Itai Dzamara, who disappeared a few years ago, 

President Mnangagwa at the time was the minister of justice and 

promised that there was going to be an inquiry and a hearing on 

where this man went, because his family has not been able to 

grieve for him to or bury him. 

And so such incidents is—it is really important for the government to address that. And if Itai Dzamara is alive, that he should 

be released; and if, God forbid, he has passed on, then his family 

deserves to know that as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Last week, I chaired a hearing with Marco Rubio on 

Tibet. We cochair the China Commission. And from a trip there, 

many trips there in the past from work on China since I got elected 

to Congress in 1981, China is in a terrible, terrible race to the bottom with North Korea on human rights abuses. Xi Jinping has 

crushed religion, crushed NGOs that don’t really exist, but any 

semblance of an NGO. And the consolidation of power harkens 

back to the Cultural Revolution. 

We know that General Chiwenga was in Beijing immediately 

prior the entire unfolding of the Mugabe situation. I wonder if any 

of you have any insights as to where China was or might have been 

in orchestrating or giving a wink or a push for his ouster. And in 

terms of good or bad governance, what is China’s influence? We 

have had hearings on this subcommittee about China’s bad governance rule of law model that it promotes. It is certainly not democracy. It is absolutely not human rights-oriented. So if—perhaps, 

Ambassador, I think you are getting ready to respond. 

Ambassador RAY. Well, my experience with China, 4 years serving in China, and 3 years of dealing with my Chinese counterpart 

in Zimbabwe, first and foremost, what the Chinese look for in countries like Zimbabwe is their version of stability, because they are 

basically there to get access to resources. I would, and this is a 

50

wild guess, say that I don’t think that necessarily it is Chinese-engineered or ordered or orchestrated, the change in government. But 

I would be quite surprised to find out that that was not part of the 

discussions that Chiwenga had with his counterparts when he was 

in China, and that the Chinese answer was probably ‘‘Keep it simple. Get it done.’’

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Yes, Ms. Lewis. 

Ms. LEWIS. I think I would agree with Ambassador Ray that 

while it may not have been an overt push for the coup, that I am 

sure there was a seeking of approval or assertions that they 

wouldn’t resist the outcome. 

I think more broadly, in looking at the Chinese development 

model, it is much more exploitative looking for resources, but also 

employment for Chinese workers. Chinese investment tends to not 

benefit the African economies. And so we should also be very aware 

and monitor Chinese actions. 

Of course, we know that the Chinese have been supporting the 

Mugabe regime for many years, hosting his birthday parties very 

lavishly, recipients of elephants being exported, things of that nature. And so it is certainly not a productive relationship in the way 

that we would like to see for democracy and human rights in 

Zimbabwe. 

Mr. FREETH. Just very briefly on the Chinese. 

It was quite interesting when, under President Mugabe, some of 

their diamond claims were taken away from them in the Marange 

diamond fields. And I happened to have breakfast with the European Union Ambassador just after that, and I said, Have you had 

any interaction with the Chinese Ambassador regarding this situation where the diamond claims have been taken away? And he 

said, Yes. And I asked, Well, what did the Chinese Ambassador 

have to say? And he said, Well, normally the Chinese Ambassador 

is inscrutable. But he said, In this case, it was very clear that he 

was absolutely mad about what had taken place. 

So whether that had contributed to Mugabe falling out of favor 

with the Chinese or not, we don’t actually know. But they are 

about whatever resources they can get out of a country, and I 

don’t—I suspect that that had something to do with it. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask. One of the Achilles heels in many 

elections everywhere is the election commission or electoral commission. 

What are the strengths or weakness, or is there an Achilles heel 

with the ZEC in Zimbabwe, as far as you know? We have raised 

this in hearing after hearing after hearing. If you don’t get that 

right, if you don’t have free and fair going in, people that will ensure that all the ballots are counted, that all the candidates who 

could be eligible and meet the—you know, a predetermined criteria 

are put on the ballot without arbitrarily being excised. How would 

you assess the ZEC? 

Secondly, the faith community, we know that on human rights, 

they had spoken out, whether it be the Catholic Church or the 

other Christian churches, very boldly on human rights abuses. 

Your thoughts on that? I know that the Catholic Church is talking 

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perately, I think, want to see a transition to an all-inclusive 

Zimbabwe, where everyone really feels a part of it. Your thoughts 

on the faith community and what role they should play. 

And, thirdly, we did invite, again, the administration to be here. 

Ambassador Yamamoto would most likely be the person who would 

be here to testify. And I think it is valid that they did say that with 

the trip coming up with Secretary Tillerson, he had to postpone. It 

is a matter of delay and not a ‘‘I won’t show up.’’

So we will have that hearing, but we are in a very tight window, 

with the anticipation of this election coming up. I am not sure how 

that gets pulled together in a credible way so fast. And are the 

election monitors AU, European American, others being invited to 

participate with, you know, on-the-ground election monitoring in 

Zimbabwe? 

Ms. DENDERE. This is something I can speak to very eloquently, 

because it is my area of expertise. 

So the first thing is that election monitors will come on invitation 

at the moment the President has indicated that the European 

Union could likely monitor elections, that it could monitor elections. But I think what is most important is what you have already 

pointed out, too. What happens with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission? And this is where the new dispensation could be a problem for ZANU-PF. 

ZANU-PF was able to keep Robert Mugabe out because they had 

the support of Zimbabweans. They had the support of 

Zimbabweans because Zimbabweans are now primed to protest. In 

2016, I was at home, and I attended about five different protests. 

We got tear-gassed, we were water-canned, and various things happened. 

But in the last week, we saw ZEC announce something they have 

never done before. They announced that we have had at least 5.2 

million people register to vote out of the expected 7 million. I think 

that the number is a little bit lower because we don’t have diaspora 

vote. Of those 5.2 million that have registered to vote, 60 percent 

are young people under the ages of 40. Now, it is going to be very 

difficult for ZEC to oversee a stolen election. And I would show us 

back to the 2008 election. 

The 2008 election, Zimbabweans knew that Morgan Tsvangirai 

had won. The world knew that Morgan Tsvangirai had won because what happened is that Zimbabweans were posting the results 

of the election as it went on. So it is—for me, it is not so important 

that we have physical monitors if the government puts up 

pushback on that. What is really, really important is that we support the civil service, the civil organizations that are working on 

elections right now. 

The young people, in particular, have created over 20 organizations that are training Zimbabweans every single day on the importance of participating in elections. So the numbers that we received 

yesterday that say 5.2 million people have registered to vote are incredible. 

Now, the question is will the election be violent-free? We know 

that once there is violence, women, in particular, and young men 

will withdraw from the political process.

52

Mr. FREETH. Just on not so much ZEC, but on the way that the 

process takes place and intimidating people, particularly in the 

rural areas where I absolutely come from. What happens is the 

military, certainly in the 2008 election, came around in the runoff 

election after Morgan Tsvangirai was persuaded to have the runoff. 

What happened was the military came around from ward to 

ward, to every constituency. And at night, indoctrinated people and 

used torture and violence against people in a very brutal way so 

that by—and this is—this comes from China. This is a Maoist system of intimidation. So the whole ward is brought together in one 

central point, and everyone then is indoctrinated through the 

night. Various people are then pointed out as having sympathized 

in some way with the opposition. And those people are then tortured publicly in front of everyone else in the early hours of the 

morning. Sometimes very brutally, sometimes to death in front of 

the whole village within the ward. 

And then morning comes, and everything is peaceful. But what 

has happened also within that process is that, certainly, in our 

area, what was happening was people were divided up into groups 

of 10. And then each group of 10 had an order to go to the polling 

booth. And so if you were in the third group of 10, and you were 

third in your group of 10, you would be the 33rd person to vote at 

that polling booth. That is how regimented it was in 2008. 

So what we need is not observers that are just going to be there. 

We tried desperately to get the observers to come out from Harare. 

They refused to come. They said it was too dangerous for them to 

come out and actually witness these pungwes, as they are called. 

We cannot have that kind of situation happening again. At the moment what they are doing is saying ‘‘remember 2008.’’ It is not happening yet, but we need people to be brave enough from the international community to come and witness this kind of system so 

that it cannot happen in 2018. 

Ms. LEWIS. On the ZEC question. Looking at the historical legacy 

of the institution, there will be considerable challenges to holding 

a free, fair, and credible election. But just a few points on where 

we stand with, at most, 5 months to an election. 

The voter registration exercise is continuing to be ongoing, 

though the blitz has ended. There still remain voter roll challenges, 

including deduplication auditing the list, things that have not been 

completed. And the ZEC has not published an operational plan to 

date for the elections, which would also include things like procurement of ballot papers and other very key technical elements of the 

electoral process. 

We also have the challenge of a new chair of the commission and 

despite some differing feelings about her personally, new leadership in any electoral commission so close to an electoral process is 

always a challenge. 

And then, finally, African election commissions usually require 

significant technical resources and the financial resources to hold 

free, fair, and credible elections. And last week, the AU did pledge 

to support that, because with only 5 months left at most, I think 

it is a real uphill battle for the ZEC to be able to pull off a process 

that would meet international standards. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

53

Ambassador RAY. The only thing that I would——

Mr. SMITH. Oh. 

Ms. BASS. Go ahead. 

Ambassador RAY. Well, the only thing that I would add to that, 

I think having the international observers on the ground is important. But, as I learned in Sierra Leone in the 1990 and 1996 elections there, the real important check on a lot of these issues is having local observers who are on the ground who understand the culture and the language, but also, that they have the freedom and 

ability to communicate what they see. And this is something that, 

particularly in Zimbabwe, is important, and that is, people having 

free access to means of communication, the ability to freely assemble and to get messages out. 

One of the things that we did when I was there as Ambassador, 

we were forced to do because of the hardliners’ determination that 

I would not meet with too many groups of young people, is we 

started convening electronic meetings, which they found impossible 

to control or to interdict. This is an issue, I think, that needs to 

be looked at. Almost every Zimbabwean over the age of 16 has a 

smartphone with internet access and onboard camera. Mobilizing 

these people to observe and report, I think, would go a long way 

to at least discouraging some of the more egregious actions. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Following up on this, I believe, Ms. Lewis, you mentioned that 

the civil service organizations that are in—or that might have been 

Dr. Dendere. But the importance of, instead of having out-of-thecountry election observers, having people who are there. 

So my question was is IRI on the ground now? And if so, are you 

doing the training with Zimbabweans? And if not, are you planning 

to? 

Ms. LEWIS. In terms of observations, we have not—I don’t believe, any American organizations have been accredited. I know 

that that is something that the Embassy is engaging on. However, 

we are conducting programming focused on civic and voter education, mainly through Zimbabwean partners. And, IRI, in general, 

would say that this kind of partnership with Zimbabweans to have 

local solutions to local problems is a priority. There are some really 

fantastic local organizations engaging in civic and voter education 

on the ground. 

I think one of the challenges they face is the very dramatic shift 

in the political landscape that has happened. And so, there are opportunities that exist that didn’t exist a couple of months ago, perhaps you could say. And so, being able to help them mobilize mainly with resources, I think, is something that the U.S. and other 

international and regional partners need to look at in the months 

leading up this electoral process to make sure that Zimbabweans 

are fully aware of their rights and choices on election day. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Dr. Dendere, what more do you think is needed in terms of potential support from us? 

Ms. DENDERE. I think strengthening the independence media, 

which I mentioned earlier. Access to information is really critical. 

For example, with Voice of America, I am often invited to be a panelist. And what I really like is that Voice of America allows 

54

Zimbabweans from very remote areas to call in. We have also seen 

a lot of participation through what is up on other social media platforms. But the internet is very expensive. But young people have 

come up with very creative ways to reach wider audiences. So these 

are things that certainly need to be taken care of. 

And I think Mr. Freeth is absolutely right that in rural areas 

where the fear of violence is very real, a lot of people still remember what happened before independence. They remember the violence of both the Smith regime and even the guerillas that we were 

fighting for freedom. So I think being able to work with organizations that educate people and their rights, how to report to the police when violence has occurred, and also how to hold the police accountable. 

So this is a really good time to work with the police, because the 

police is kind of on the outs. Their faction lost in the ZANU-PF 

war, so the government will be quite eager to hold them to account. 

Ms. BASS. So what do you think the prospects are for keeping the 

internet intact during this whole—you know, during the elections, 

whether or not it would be shut down? 

Ms. DENDERE. So——

Ms. BASS. Whether access would be shut—well, you know, that 

this happened in? 

Ms. DENDERE. Yes. In 2016, Pastor Evan Mawarire and others, 

going back to Chairman Smith’s question on religious organizations. Pastor Evan Mawarire and others called us together and 

called for a shutdown. We woke up in the morning. No one had any 

plans to leave home. 

I went for a run. I came back, and my phone wasn’t working. But 

this is the brilliance of having a country of young people. As I was 

trying to figure out how to get online, people were wondering, Why 

aren’t you online? And someone sent me a text message that said 

the internet is not working. They said, Well, do you know what 

VPN is? 

And even as we think about China as a problematic partner, 

young people in China were actually the ones sending VPN codes 

to young people in Zimbabwe. 

Ms. BASS. Wow. Really? 

Ms. DENDERE. So within an hour, we were all back online. We 

had figured out—I still don’t know how to use the VPN, but my 16-

year-old niece had put VPN on my phone. The shutdown was going 

on. And so—and even in my new research, I have been looking at 

the incidence of shutting down the internet across African countries, if the OPI has learned how to do that. 

But I think what also works with Zimbabwe is that the government officials really like being online. One of the first things that 

President Mnangagwa did when he came into office was to legitimize his Facebook page. So he had a live video. He had a live video 

and Twitter. 

So the way internet works is that they cannot shut it down for 

the rest of the country and keep it for themselves. So we just hope 

that their passion for being online will outweigh their needs to restrict our access for the rest of the country. 

Ms. BASS. That is very hopeful. That is a very hopeful sign. 

Mr. Freeth, did you have something you wanted to add to that? 

55

Mr. FREETH. Not really. I think the big difference between 2008 

elections and 2018 is this very thing, that everyone now has got a 

cell phone. Yes, in 2016, we all had that same experience, and it 

was incredible how people got around it, and how suddenly we 

were all able to be online when they are trying to switch us all off. 

So people make a plan. We are a country of people that make a 

plan. 

Ms. BASS. Well, you mentioned in your opening comments something about a decision that was going to be signed tomorrow, and 

I didn’t know what you were referring to. 

Mr. FREETH. That is a decision in South Africa in the high court 

of South Africa from the judge president and two other judges 

who—we took a case against President Zuma, along with the law 

society and various other legal groups which aims to show that 

President Zuma’s actions in signing away—or signing the new protocol to the SADC Tribunal which takes away the individual’s 

rights to go to the SADC Tribunal makes the SADC Tribunal into 

an interstate court. So if Zambia and Zimbabwe had a dispute over 

an island in the Zambezi, for example, it could possibly be used for 

an interstate dispute. 

But that wasn’t what the original protocol was all about. It 

wasn’t what the SADC Treaty was all about. It is not what SADC, 

which is there to promote human rights, rule of law, and democracy is all about. And so when President Zuma signed that bit of 

paper, he did it without the cabinets’ approval, without Parliament 

even looking at it, without a consultation of the people of South Africa. 

So we took a case against President Zuma to say that he acted 

unconstitutionally; that he acted against the SADC Treaty; that he 

had acted irrationally, in fact. And we are going to get that judgment tomorrow, and we are very hopeful that it will be a good 

judgment and it will set the tone for other SADC countries to then 

say, you are right, South Africa. Our President also did the same 

thing, and it was irrational and unconstitutional against the SADC 

Treaty. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Ambassador Ray, thinking about moving forward in U.S. policy, 

you know, you made a few comments about the carrot and stick. 

You talked about actions that I believe we could take to invigorate 

the economy, but you also specifically said you didn’t see lifting 

sanctions. So I wanted to just ask you about that. I mean, you said, 

you know, the possibility of it if things got better. But, for example, 

we have travel sanctions against Mnangagwa. So what if the election is determined to be fair and free, should that be lifted? And 

then, how do we move our policy forward to help reinvigorate the 

economy if we also have the economic sanctions? You talked about 

the Korean example. And if we promoted something like that in 

Zimbabwe, then how would it be overseen? 

So I kind of wanted you to talk about, more specifically, how we 

would move forward in changing our policy as things develop, hopefully in a positive direction, in Zimbabwe. 

Ambassador RAY. Well, I will take the issue of sanctions first. 

The administrative sanctions against certain individuals, and 

Mnangagwa is on that list of individuals, seizes their assets here 

56

in the U.S., bank accounts and property, and limits their travel to 

the U.S., other than for U.N. events. I think——

Ms. BASS. What about coming here to meet with the State Department? 

Ambassador RAY. I am sorry? 

Ms. BASS. What about—the human events is one thing. But what 

if he were to come here? 

Ambassador RAY. There are—the way it worked when I was 

there, if a Zimbabwean official was in New York at the U.N., and 

wanted to meet with someone in the State Department here in 

Washington, they apply for a special permission to do that. There 

are—it is a convoluted process, but there are ways to work it. 

While I am against a wholesale lifting of all of the sanctions, one 

of the things I argued vehemently for when I was Ambassador is 

a more flexible administrative sanctions regime. And I think that 

is what we should look at in case the election is free and fair, and 

we have a President Mnangagwa in July or August 2018, to allow 

a more—an easier process to enable us to engage him to the degree 

we should to try be able to push him in the direction we want him 

to go. 

And so, there is nothing in the administrative sanctions that 

says we cannot say—for example, say to a person, You are the 

President of the country. You can travel to Washington. You can 

travel to New York. And I think that is probably one way that we 

can, shall we say, tighten the screw. 

I once said to someone when I was asked if I was averse to twisting arms, I said, No, but I have to be able to take the hand first 

before I can twist the arm. And so I think we need to look at that. 

And other sanctions, when I talk about reinvigorating, or invigorating, if you will, the private sector, actually, the sanctions regime except for the fact that a couple of Zimbabwe’s banks are on 

the list, shouldn’t have an impact on that. There is a certain 

amount of two-way trade currently existing between our countries, 

and there are—I think FedEx, or one of the big packaging companies has a presence there. Ford has a presence there. Cargill is 

there. Coca-Cola is there. And several other American companies 

have presence in Zimbabwe, have investments in Zimbabwe. They 

are not that huge. 

But I think that if we looked at ways to strengthen the private 

sector contacts between nonsanctioned economic entities in 

Zimbabwe, and commercial entities here, you create a stronger 

middle class, which is a little harder to intimidate and to coerce. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much—oh, I am sorry. 

Go ahead. 

Ms. LEWIS. Just to add one thing, in terms of the sanctions, in 

looking at, perhaps, some relief in that area, it is important that 

these elections be considered free, fair, and credible. But that is not 

the end point of, you know, what our conditions should be. Elections are just one point in the democratic process and the reform 

process. There are many, many other areas of governance and policy in Zimbabwe that need to be looked at to help ensure us that 

we are on the right path moving forward. 

Really, the elections we should be concerned about are the ones 

after the 2018 elections, when there is a more conducive political 

57

environment to free and fair competition. And so we should 

keep——

Ms. BASS. Well, I agree with you in terms of these elections. As 

a matter of fact, in my opening comments, I stated that. Specifically, the reason why I asked is because of the President and because he is specifically named. 

But having said that, what is our policy moving forward? How 

do we—I mean, I would like to be hopeful. If it doesn’t turn out 

in a hopeful way, then clearly we can stay with the status quo. But 

if it does, what is the pathway and what is the best thing for us 

to do? 

Ambassador RAY. I think that is why it is important that we engage, because in order to achieve this, everyone on the Zimbabwean 

side and on our side has to have a clear understanding of what it 

is we are asking or demanding, if you will, they do. 

Ms. BASS. Exactly. 

Ambassador RAY. And so that is why I think our application of 

the sanctions to individuals needs to be flexible to enable the degree of engagement that can achieve that. We need to sit down 

with them—well, we need to sit down with ourselves first and decide just what it is we want them to do——

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Ambassador RAY [continuing]. So that we don’t ask them for 

more than they are capable of giving but that we don’t fall into the 

trap of accepting from them less than they are capable of giving. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. And on that last point, Mr. Ambassador, that is exactly why we are having this hearing. We wanted to hear from four 

experts, people who have lived it and are knowledgeable, so that 

we could hopefully craft a good response. And our next hearing will 

be with the administration. 

Before you go, I do have just two final questions. 

If the other three panelists, if you would like to speak to the 

issue of the faith-based community, the clergy, what role they are 

playing. You know, in DR Congo, and I have been there, as a matter of fact, Greg Simpkins, who is now at USAID now—Greg, we 

miss you—we have been to the DR Congo together, and I can tell 

you that the church plays a major role in elections, not just things 

of the spirit, humanitarian efforts, human rights advocacy, which 

they do so superbly well, but also, they do great work in the election area. Is that something that they are being brought in to in 

Zimbabwe? 

And, secondly, Zimbabwe gets a ‘‘not free’’ designation from Freedom House when it comes to press freedoms. Have you seen any 

amelioration of that stranglehold that Mugabe had on the media of 

all kinds? Is there maybe an opening, a little bit more independence, the ability of an editor to write an editorial that is more critical without fear, because that would be certainly a very positive 

trend line? 

Anybody want to address this? 

Ambassador RAY. I can’t really speak too authoritatively to the 

circumstances after I left in 2012. 2009 to 2012, there was a little 

modification of the press space. There were a number of indeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:35 Apr 02, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Z:\WORK\_AGH\022818\28825 SHIRL
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pendent newspapers, not very super performers but at least they 

were there. There was at least one, perhaps two, radio stations 

that were independent. 

Where there was an absolute government iron fist was on televised—on television. One TV network in the entire country controlled by the government. So it was a mixed bag. I mean, you had 

independent print journals that weren’t, in my opinion, very professional. You had a state-controlled newspaper. The only thing you 

could trust were the sports scores. The radio—I think, a lot of 

Zimbabweans, even in ZANU-PF, got a lot of their credible news 

from VOA and BBC. 

So there is a lot of work to be done there. And, again, I think, 

this goes to the whole issue of invigorating the private sector, because in order to be effective, the newspapers, the radio, or to set 

up an independent TV network, it requires money. And if you have 

a reasonably affluent middle class, you have a private sector that 

is growing, then you have the source of funds to be able to create 

these things. A lot of the independent newspapers, for example, 

were the toys of some wealthy Zimbabwean who had an ax to 

grind, and that is just not a—that is not a recipe for a very good 

professional independent press. 

Ms. DENDERE. So on the faith-based communities, it is interesting to talk about the faith-based communities and corruption in 

one hand. So in my statement, I say that the single biggest problem for Zimbabwe is corruption. And how does this relate to the 

church? 

Over the last 5 years, we have seen an increase in evangelical 

changes that sometimes have 5,000 to 10,000 people showing up. 

But what we have also seen is that the church has been used as 

a football, in some ways, between the ZANU-PF factions. So in the 

last week, we have seen one of the most popular young prophets 

now being brought in on acts of corruption. 

Where I saw some green light was at Morgan Tsvangirai’s funeral, where members of the Methodist church spoke very openly 

and said things that we haven’t heard from the church in a long 

time. They say that since 2009, they were very involved in engaging with Morgan Tsvangirai on the unity government. We also saw 

Father Korneri (ph) playing an important role during the coup/non 

coup situation in November. 

So I think when the government does not punish people for 

speaking up, then even the church will be strengthened. But as 

long as Zimbabwe doesn’t address its corruption, then every sector 

from the church to the media to the banks is in serious trouble, because now you had churches that were being used to funnel funds 

outside for ZANU-PF people. And then you can’t say with certainty 

whether this church actually represents the interests of the people, 

or whether the church represents the interest of the individuals. 

So corruption is very epidemic, and it now affects every single 

facet of Zimbabwean life in very problematic ways. And so if we are 

able to address that, that could be a solution. 

And then on the independent media, the media is not free and 

fair. The Herald still controls the media. I doubt that they would 

publish that someone like—something that I would write, right? 

59

They wouldn’t publish that regardless of how I feel about the government. And I think that is a problem. 

At the same time, we also have a lot of print media. But as the 

Ambassador has said, sometimes the quality is problematic. But I 

do want to highlight that the U.S. Embassy in Zimbabwe is doing 

amazing work working with journalists already. And as we transition to the next Ambassador, I hope that those programs will continue to receive funding. Beyond the work that the United States 

is doing, independent journalists have also been training themselves and being very engaged. But, again everyone I have spoken 

to is really worried that once this phase has passed, and if the government starts to feel that they are under threat, then maybe this 

veneer of freedom that we are seeing might be taken away so 

that—I mean, we are not sure what would happen with that. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. FREETH. I think you can be sure that the state media will 

report us all in the Herald and other more radical newspapers like 

the Patriot tomorrow or in the coming days. It is a foregone conclusion. 

As far as faith-based communities are concerned, the Christian 

community in Zimbabwe is huge. And there is no politician that 

can draw people like the churches can draw people. And so there 

has been a kind of—over the years, there has been—people have 

lost all kind of faith, as it were, in political transition. And it is 

the churches that have become the area of focus for people. And so, 

when Pastor Evan rose up and started for the first time as a 

church leader speaking out strongly, people just flocked to him. 

And what happened in July 2016 was one of the most phenomenal 

things that I have ever been a part of. 

In the past, the church has been very afraid. But I think that 

cloak of fear is being gradually thrown off. And there are church 

leaders that are starting to stand up for justice issues and starting 

to talk about justice issues for the first time. And I think this 

needs to be really encouraged in a major way. I think it is exciting. 

I think it is very important that the church is able to be the moral 

voice of the nation, and I think it is starting to happen. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank all of you for your tremendous testimony. 

Hopefully, we can take this and really have an impact in terms of 

policy, because your insights have been outstanding. 

I would just note parenthetically that Greg Simpkins, again, who 

is here, used to be our chief of staff on the subcommittee, and now 

Piero, who is our general counsel. In 2015, they were in Zimbabwe 

and were called American spies by the media. You know, it reminds me, when I was in China on one of my human rights trips, 

Wei Jingsheng, the father of the democracy world movement, who 

spent about 20 years in the gulag, the loud guys they call it there, 

tortured horribly in China. When I met with him when he was let 

out briefly before getting rearrested, they interrogated him and 

said I was a CIA spy. One big lie. I mean, I am a Member of Congress. They’re top staffers who have a huge impact. We do have a 

CIA, but we are not part of it. But it is amazing how they think 

that somehow it is a slur. And it is just like a boomerang that says 

what kind of media are you that would do that? 

60

Without objection, we have a number of testimonies for the 

record. This is from Craig Richardson, Dr. Richardson, and also the 

timeline of Mike Campbell, which has been provided, of course, in 

the Campbell case. Without objection, these will be made a part of 

the record. And if our distinguished witnesses would like to add 

anything to the record, please do. Just send it to us, and we will 

include it, because we want it to be as thorough as possible. 

Thank you so very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organ.Uations 

Chris!oJlhcr H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman 

February 21, 2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

A±Iairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and 

International Organizations in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available 

live on the Committee website at hltp//wwvv.ForeignA±Tairs.housu;Q_y): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, February 28,2018 

2:00p.m. 

Zimbabwe After Mugabe 

The Honorable Charles A. Ray 

(Former US. Ambassador to Zimbabwe) 

Ms. Elizabeth Lewis 

Regional Deputy Director 

A±rica Division 

International Republican Institute 

Mr. Ben Freeth 

Executive Director 

Mike Campbell Foundation 

Chipo Dendere, Ph.D. 

Visiting Assistant Professor 

Amherst College 

By Direction of the Chairman 

accessihle to persrms -o,t:J!h dz.\'clhlfifws. 

111 cufVa1lCC tJf the Cl'Cilt, """'"'""" nh-,cllca/'1'. 

matenals 1~ cllternattve fOrmclfS 
63

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COMMITTEE ON _FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMNI1TTEE ON Ajricrr, Global Ile«ltlt, Global Hnuum Rights, mtd Jntenwlioual Orgl11ri~atiom HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date. ___ -'--'2"-12"-8"-11'-'8 ___ Room __ __:2:.::1_:_:72=-----

Starting Time -----"2_,_,:0,__,1:.~<V"'II"--I ___ Ending Time ----'3'-':--'4-=-5"-pll"-1'------

Recesses [] ( __ to ___ )( _ _to. 

Presiding Memher(s) 

Cit airman Smillt 

Check all uftltefollmvlug tlwt apply: 

Open Session 0 

l:xecutive @sed) Session D Televised LJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Zimbabwe After Mugabe 

SUHCOMMI1TJ<:J<: MJ<:MHERS PRESENT: 

Ranking llfember Bass 

) ( __ to __ ) L__to __ ) L__to __ ) L__to __ ) 

Electronically Reconlm_{tapell) D 

Stenographic Record LLl 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of filii committee.) 

Clwimum Royce 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes m NoD 

ar I' no", please list below and include title, age-ncy, department, or nrganfzathm.) 

STATJ£MENTS FOR THJ£RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

-Smith: Congre.l'sional Statemeut on tlte Importance of Properly Rights ill Zimhahwe, by Cmlg J. 

Riclwrtlsou, Plt.D. 

-Smith: Tlte Campbell Case Time/ine 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

01' ,/l/j//---. '~ TIME ADJOURNED ____ _ 

Su bc_p~~ittee Staff Associate I 
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


28825e-1.eps
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28825e-2.eps

country fonnerly known as the breadbasket of Africa (which had exported its agricultural 

surplus) was now dependent upon food aid from the outside world, as the new fanners often had 

little knowledge of farming. To make matters worse, the fanns' assets, such as its tractors, 

buildings, and irrigation equipment, were often stripped and sold by the new owners, who 

pocketed the cash. 

By 2005, the loss of the country's wealth from the land seizures alone-at $5.3 billion-was 

calculated to be more than all the foreign aid Zimbabwe had received since its independence in 

1980. 

The government filled the gap by printing money. According to the OECD, the acute food 

shortages caused by the land refonns meant that the country, which was once a net exporter of 

maize, had to print billions of Zimbabwean dollars to import food. The government even ran out 

of hard currency to buy the imported ink needed to manufacture its own money; as a result, bills 

were only printed on one side. By March 2006, it took Z$60,000 to buy one loaf of bread, even 

as a new Z$50,000 note was being printed to "keep up" with the demands of higher prices. The 

hyperinflation increased each month at an exponential rate. Johns Hopkins University economist 

Steve Hanke calculated that, by November 2008, Zimbabwe's annual inflation was the second 

highest in history, at 79.6 sextillion percent. To put that in perspective, Hanke calculated that 

prices were doubling every 24.7 hours. After dollarization in early January 2009, inflation 

immediately fell to -2.3 percent by the end of the month and stabilized thereafter 

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Dollarization in 2009: Stopping the freefall, but not fixing the true problem 

Since dollarization stabilized the economy, Zimbabwe could now collect taxes far more 

efficiently than it could with hyperinflation, which had made accounting nearly impossible for 

anyone in business or government. By comparison, at the end of2008 only a paltry $133 million 

in taxes was collected, but by 2011 tax revenue had jumped to $2.6 billion, according to the 1M F. 

There were pressing needs for infrastructure improvements in roads, bridges, schools, and 

hospitals, and government wages needed adjustment because of the previous decade's 

hyperinflation. But despite the more than 1,800 percent rise in tax collections over those three 

years, government expenditures rose even faster. As a result, deficits climbed from $124 million 

in 2008 to $583 million in 2011. 

Thus, dollarization failed to discipline the government's deficit spending. One reason for this 

failure is that the TMF and the Chinese government have given Zimbabwe hundreds of millions 

of dollars in grants and loans since 2009. As a result of the worldwide financial crisis, the TMF 

gave the Zimbabwean government a one-time $500 million hardship grant in 2008, issued in 

special drawing rights (SDRs), and encouraged Zimbabwe to spend the money internally on 

projects such as power stations, railways, and agricultural inputs. Yet in searching for ways to 

pay for its deficit spending, the Zimbabwean government is finding it increasingly difficult to 

borrow from the outside world. The government has been in default on most of its external debt, 

which in 2011 was estimated to be around 10 billion U.S. dollars, or 108 percent of Zimbabwe's 

nominal GDP. Thus, these grants effectively forestalled real and significant economic reforms. 

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Given its status of default, Zimbabwe is not currently eligible for new loans from the World 

Bank or the lMF. This debt stems primarily from loans made in the 1980s and 1990s by private 

lenders such as banks; foreign governments, including France, Germany, and the United 

Kingdom; and multilateral institutions including the World Bank, African Development Bank, 

and (until recently) the lMF. By 2009, the largest multilateral creditor was the World Bank ($1.3 

billion in loans outstanding), followed by the African Development Bank ($660 million in loans 

outstanding). 

Gideon Gono, Zimbabwe's Federal Reserve governor, noted in a 2012 government report that its 

default status in the Western world prevents Zimbabwe from taking on even more debt, saying, 

"The continued accumulation of external payment arrears has seriously undermined the 

country's creditworthiness, and severely compromised the country's ability to secure new 

financing from both bilateral and multilateral sources." 

Unlike richer countries, which can sell bonds to attempt to restructure their debt, Zimbabwe only 

has its natural and physical assets left But even if Zimbabwe sold all of its mineral rights to the 

future receipts of diamonds, gold, and platinum, the IMF estimates the present discounted value 

still wouldn't be enough to pay off all it owes. 

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe's true wealth-land's ability to transform equity into economic 

development by serving as collateral for loans- is locked up. Billions of dollars of this "dead 

capital", far exceeding the potential receipts of its natural resources, are inaccessible due to 

property being nationalized instead of privately owned. 

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Property rights- the foundation of all economic development and builder of trust 

The main problem of Zimbabwe's economic collapse is directly tied to the government's severe 

weakening of property rights, particularly in its agricultural sector. Without these rights, a person 

without a land title has little ambition to plan and invest over the long term. Titles in farmland 

lead to long-term investment in capital equipment as well as soil and water management. Thus, 

they vastly increase agricultural activity; more importantly, they diversify the economy as 

described earlier and shield it from commodity price shocks. An analogy is a retirement fund that 

has investment in one stock versus a broad portfolio. The healthiest economies in the world 

exhibit this diversification, leading to more stable growth, making it a far easier place to plan for 

one's future. 

The current system of nationalized land constrains poor Zimbabwean farmers to a life that will 

likely never get much better. It makes the country ever more dependent on the help of hundreds 

of millions of dollars in outside aid each year. Even worse, a person without a land title has little 

ambition to plan and invest over the long term, since there is no way to capture the accrued value 

in the land by selling it. This creates an ongoing "need" for aid agencies to provide food, dams, 

training, and the like, instead of the economy generating a self-sustaining system. When all the 

aid is added together, it is enormous in scale-jumping from $350 million in 2009 to an 

estimated $770 million in 2011. This was equal to 30 percent of all government spending in 

2011, and 8.6 percent of GDP. 

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A lack of property rights also heightens Zimbabwe's vulnerabilities to changes by donor 

countries in their international priorities. In 2018, The Trump administration says it is 

threatening to substantially cut aid to Zimbabwe. For example, the US AID program that 

addresses climate change-induced drought in Zimbabwe was launched by the U.S. government in 

2013, with $175 million in long- and short-term funding is in jeopardy. Today, USAID-funded 

projects aimed at curbing the worst effects of climate change can be found across Zimbabwe, and 

those projects are currently benefiting more than a million people in food insecure rural areas. 

That could easily change according to the whims of one administration. 

Recent changes since Mugabe' s departure- are 99 year leases enough? 

Since Mugabe's departure last year, there have been some positive moves towards reversing 

some of the damaging land reform policies, by the government halting the ongoing seizures. 

President Mnangagwa announced the formation of99-year leases for government-owned 

farmland, which are a large improvement over previous leases of just 5 years. However, this 

arrangement will ultimately limit the recovery of Zimbabwe and trust by the outside world in 

terms of foreign direct investment. 

For example, these leases still create much uncertainty both within Zimbabwe and beyond. Will 

domestic banks accept these leases as collateral? If so, will the land be able to be transferred to 

banks, and then sold by auction to other individuals? Will foreigners buy this land if they have 

the same concerns? Can these leases be sold and transferred to other individuals? 

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The answers to the above questions are a likely "no." What is clear is that all of this uncertainty 

lowers the value of the land and thus the potential for the country to rebound. 

Freehold land titles involve a much simpler transfer of deeds between institutions and owners. 

They communicate effectively to the rest of the world in a language all developed countries 

understand, that private property rights are the key to economic development and progress. 

These types of property rights ultimately improve a country's economic complexity due to the 

rich variety of enterprises that spring from bank financing and collateral. For example, a farmer 

who uses his land to buy a tractor creates a demand beyond just the farming equipment. New 

auxiliary enterprises spring up, including retail enterprises selling spare parts (tires, engine 

parts), specialized labor (mechanics, tractor drivers), new types of seeds, irrigation equipment, 

and more. Farmers also invest in dams and reservoirs, enabling them to mitigate the damaging 

consequences of droughts and climate change. By enabling a sharp increase in labor 

productivity, the tractor creates a wide variety of jobs and businesses that are far more stable 

than subsistence farming. These are some of the subtle benefits of property rights often hidden 

from view and unmeasured. Without freehold property titles, wealth is locked up and only the 

meager income from the land itself can be obtained. 

Concluding thoughts and observations: Mitigating the costs of social change 

It would be naive to suggest that a quick moving of land ownership from 99-year leases and 

communal ownership will proceed without problems. Any change has its costs. Local village 

chiefs often (but not always) oppose moves to freehold titles because they no longer can exercise 

control over who owns what land and for how long. The cultural and social status of the chief 

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becomes diminished with the introduction of private property, unless the chief is persuaded of 

the benefits to both him and his people in the long run. Villagers may also like the stability of 

knowing who their neighbors will be, without fully appreciating how communal property rights 

can also trap them in subsistence living. Care thus must be taken to appreciate these cultural 

factors, using models of villages that have allow visitors to see how property rights transform 

people's standard ofliving. Villagers can see how a rich variety of choices improve chances for 

better jobs and career paths for their children, along with better health outcomes. If chiefs can 

take on new roles in the village, or given some form of compensation, the road to property rights 

may enjoy a smoother path that allows all Zimbabweans to rise to a higher level of economic 

development. Foreign investors are waiting in the wings for this to happen. When it does, 

Zimbabwe will eventually return to being the "bread-basket" of Africa, with little to no need for 

ongoing foreign aid. 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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D July 2004: A new notice of intent to acquire Mount Carmel was published in the official 

Government Gazette, but no acquisition notice was actually issued. However, two 

months later, according to court filings, "persons purported to occupy the farm on 

behalf of ZANU PF spokesman Nathan Shamuyarira, claiming the former minister had 

been allocated the farm." After three more preliminary notices to take the farm were 

published in 2004, Campbell applied to the High Court for a protection order. 

Note: The Government of Zimbabwe had been attempting to seize Mount Carmel since 

July 2001 but these were at first thwarted by the High Court of Zimbabwe. 

o 14 September 2005: The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act of 2005 

came into effect. Amendment 17 transferred title of all land previously "acquired" for 

resettlement purposes to the State. It prohibited court challenges to the acquisitions 

and allowed the Government to acquire any land that had been agricultural land in the 

last 50 years by simply publishing a notice of acquisition in the newspaper. 

o 15 May 2006: Lawyers for Mike Campbell launched proceedings in the Supreme Court of 

Zimbabwe challenging the constitutional validity of Amendment 17. This served to delay 

the eviction of the applicant, but it became clear that no permanent protection would 

be found within the Zimbabwe legal system since the court heard the constitutional 

challenge but reserved judgment for 6 months. 

o December 2006: The Gazetted Land (Consequential Provisions) Act passed into law, 

requiring all farmers whose land was compulsorily acquired by the Government- and 

who were not in possession of an official offer letter, permit, or lease, to cease to 

occupy, hold, or use that land within 45 days and to vacate their homes within 90 days. 

Failure to comply is a criminal offence punishable by a fine and a maximum prison 

sentence of up to two years. Only a small number of farmers received an offer letter or 

lease. Although 800 commercial farmers subsequently applied for Government authority 

to remain on their farms, none was granted. (Dale Dore) 

o October 2007: 11 white commercial farmers, including Mike Campbell, appeared before 

the Chegutu magistrate's court accused of failing to leave their gazetted farms. Their 

appeal against the conviction was rejected. The Zimbabwe Government started 

prosecuting Campbell for the unique offence of farming his own land- which he had 

developed into a thriving agricultural enterprise- and living in his own home on the 

farm. 

o 5 October 2007: As the Supreme Court had not responded to enquiries about the 

challenge to Amendment 17 mounted in May 2006, it was assumed that it had declined 

to exercise its jurisdiction. Mike Campbell therefore sought relief from the SADC 

Tribunal in Windhoek, Namibia. (Dale Dare) 

[Note: The Tribunal was set up to ensure that SADC member states, including 

Zimbabwe, adhere to the SADC Treaty and Protocols, protect the rights of citizens, and 

ensure the rule of law. The scope of the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal, as stated in 

Article 15 (1) of the SADC Protocol, is to adjudicate upon "disputes between States, and 

between natural and legal persons and States". In terms of Article 15 (2), no person 

may bring an action against a State without first exhausting all available remedies, or 

unless the person is unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction of such State.] 

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D 11 October 2007: Mike Campbell filed a case with the Tribunal challenging the 

acquisition of Mount Carmel farm. His application contended that the land acquisition 

process was unlawful under international customary law, the SADC Treaty and the 

African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Since the case was filed after the 

Supreme Court in Zimbabwe failed to issue a judgment on the challenge to Amendment 

17, Campbell's application was deemed to be within the base and scope of the 

jurisdiction of the Tribunal. (Dale Dare) 

Campbell's application sought an order from the Tribunal declaring, first, that 

Constitutional Amendment No. 17 violated his fundamental rights protected under 

Article 6 of the SADC Treaty and, second, requesting an interdict to stop the 

Zimbabwean Government from acquiring his farm. 

o The Tribunal concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the case because the dispute 

concerned "human rights, democracy and the rule of law", which are binding principles 

for members of the SADC. 

o This landmark case, which was supposed to start on the 20 November 2007, marked the 

first case to be heard by the SADC Tribunal. Unfortunately the case was delayed since 

the fax machine in the office of President Mugabe was reportedly broken and the 

number to which the notice had been sent could not be verified. 

The case was postponed to 4 December 2007, after which it was postponed again to 11 

December 2007. 

o 11 December 2007: In reserving judgment after the hearing, the Tribunal issued an 

interim protection order which stipulated that the Zimbabwe Government should "take 

no steps- or permit no steps to be taken, directly or indirectly, whether by its agents or 

by orders, to evict from or interfere with the 'peaceful residence' on and beneficial use 

of the farms occupied by the farmers, their employees and the families of the 

employees." Government representatives assured the Tribunal it would abide by the 

decision. 

This interim relief order was repeated for the other interveners on 28 March 2008. 

o 13 December 2007: The SADC Tribunal, in its first decision since becoming functional in 

April 2007, ruled in favour of Campbell. 

o 22 January 2008: The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe finally delivered its judgment in the 

15 May 2006 case (Campbell and other white farmers). The effect was to dismiss the 

applicants' entire challenge. Contrary to the accepted norms of natural justice and 

international law, it ruled that Parliament had the right to oust the jurisdiction of the 

courts to prevent judicial arbitrations between citizens and the State. The court also 

refused to countenance the charge that Amendment 17 discriminated against the 

applicants on the basis of race or colour. (Dale Dore) 

This served to confirm the applicants' prior contention that all legal remedies within 

Zimbabwe had been exhausted. The only objection to the jurisdiction of the SADC 

Tribunal advanced by the Government of Zimbabwe was a failure on the part of the 

applicants to exhaust domestic remedies. 

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D End January 2008: Additional white commercial farmers who were still occupying their 

farms applied to be joined as interveners in Campbell's pending application before the 

Tribunal. 

The Tribunal ordered the applications to be heard in March 2008 because the Zimbabwe 

Government said it required more time to consider and respond to the intervener 

applications. 

D 25 March 2008: The final hearing of the main action in the SADC Tribunal case was 

scheduled to commence but was postponed to 28 March. 

o 28 March 2008: Following the hearing, a total of 77 additional commercial farmers were 

granted leave to intervene. Interim relief similar to that given to Mike Campbell on 13 

December 2007 was granted to 74 farmers since three were no longer residing on their 

farms. 

o 7 May 2008: In a letter to the Registrar of the Tribunal dated 7 May 2008, Zimbabwe's 

Deputy Attorney-General indicated that he would not be ready to proceed on 28 May 

2008 and requested a postponement. 

D 27 May 2008: The legal representatives received information that a group of black 

resettled Zimbabweans intended to apply to intervene in the court proceedings. 

o 28 May 2008: The Tribunal convened and had to first deal with the application for 

further intervention on the behalf of the black resettled farmers. Approximately 300 

farmers wished to intervene but the supporting documents were not in order. 

The lawyer representing the black farmers admitted to having been approached at short 

notice and had therefore not had enough time to obtain all the necessary 

documentation. This was seen as a deliberate delaying strategy and after a brief 

adjournment the Tribunal ruled that the application for intervention was not in order, 

thereby refusing it. 

An oral application for postponement of the main case by the Zimbabwe Government 

was then moved. This was on the basis that the Government had insufficient resources, 

particularly manpower, to complete the papers on time and, particularly, to gain access 

to the Applicants' authorities. The Tribunal granted a postponement, directing the 

Government to file all its papers by 18 June 2008. The hearing was postponed to 16, 17 

and 18 July 2008. 

D 29 June 2008: Mike Campbell, his wife Angela and their son-in-law, Ben Freeth, who also 

lived on and farmed Mount Carmel farm, were abducted and brutally assaulted for nine 

hours late into the night by "war veterans" and Government militia. After being forced 

at gunpoint to sign a paper stating that they would withdraw from the SADC Tribunal 

case, they were driven to the small town of Kadoma, where they were abandoned, but 

managed to seek help. They were rushed to hospital for emergency medical treatment. 

o 16 July 2008: The case of Mike Campbell and the 77 farmers was heard in Windhoek. 

o 17 July 2008: The first contempt application: Filed a month previously, the first 

contempt application was also heard. The Zimbabwe Government attempted to block 

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the application on the grounds that they wanted further time to file papers. This 

request was refused because their explanation for the delay was deemed to be feeble. 

The Government's legal team was given 30 minutes to take instructions and to present 

their argument because they had already had more than 30 days to respond. 

When they came back, they indicated to the Tribunal that they were not prepared to 

proceed and staged a walkout of the Tribunal led by the Zimbabwean ambassadress to 

Namibia, who was sitting with the legal team. 

o 18 July 2008: The Tribunal ruled that the applicants had presented "abundant material" 

to show the existence of the failure on the part of the respondent (the Zimbabwe 

Government) and its agents to comply with the interim relief order of the Tribunal. 

o 11 September 2008: The Tribunal reserved judgement on the application. Tribunal 

Registrar David Mkandawire said the court was adjourned for judgement to study 

objections from the Zimbabwe Government lawyers. 

o 28 November 2008: The Tribunal's decision on this date addressed four main issues: 

(1) Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the case; 

(2) Whether the plaintiffs had been denied access to domestic courts in violation of the 

SADC Treaty; 

(3) Whether the Zimbabwean Government had discriminated against the plaintiffs on 

the basis of race, and 

(4) Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. 

Decision: 

(1) The Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, because Amendment 17 

had eliminated the plaintiffs' access to the domestic courts, and the plaintiffs were 

therefore entitled to seek remedy before the Tribunal. 

(2) The Tribunal found that the plaintiffs had been deprived of their right to a fair 

hearing before being deprived of their rights. 

(3) On the racial discrimination issue, the Tribunal held that the actions of the 

Zimbabwean Government constituted indirect or "de facto" discrimination because 

implementation of Amendment 17 affected white farmers only. 

(4) Finally, the Tribunal held that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation for the 

expropriation of their lands. 

The Tribunal announced in its judgement that "by unanimity the Respondent [the 

Zimbabwe Government] is directed to take all necessary measures through its agents to 

protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the lands of the Applicants." 

o The three exceptions were commercial farmer Christopher Jarrett [Luchabi Ranch, 

Nyamandlovu], and agricultural companies Tengwe Estates (Pvt) Ltd [Andrew Kockott, 

Urungwe] and France Farm (Pvt) Ltd [Lawrence Cumming, Victoria Falls] who had 

already been evicted from their lands. The Zimbabwe Government was directed to pay 

them fair compensation, on or before 30 June 2009. 

Note: The amount of compensation was not laid down by the court and the applicants 

were required to submit comprehensive details of what fair compensation would entail. 

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Since this would be a critical test case that would determine the compensation 

parameters for the more than 4,000 dispossessed Zimbabwean farmers, it was vital for 

the Zimbabwean government that the compensation case should not be heard by the 

SADC Tribunal. 

Immediately after the Judgement, the State-owned Herald newspaper reported that the 

then Minister of State for National Security, Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement in the 

President's Office, Didymus Mutasa, had responded that the Tribunal was 

"daydreaming." 

o 23 December 2008: Mike Campbell made an urgent application to register the 

judgement in the High Court of Zimbabwe. The urgency of the application was not 

accepted but no reasons were ever given. Thereafter, a number of other applications 

were made to have a hearing to register the judgement but none of them were heard 

either. Meanwhile approximately two hundred additional white farmers were 

prosecuted for remaining on their farms, despite the SADC Tribunal judgement. 

o January 2009: The Deputy Chief Justice from the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe rubbished 

the SADC Tribunal Judgement by saying "it is clear that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction." 

Prince Machaya, the deputy Attorney General, also wrote stating that it was 

Government's position to continue the prosecution of farmers, despite the SADC 

Tribunal judgement. 

o February 2009 and March 2009: Mike Campbell faced a number of threatening invasion 

situations on his farm. 

o March 2009: The Zimbabwe High Court nullified the SADC Tribunal ruling which said 

white farmers whose farms were acquired by Government for resettlement purposes 

could remain on the farms because they had legal title to the farms. The court claimed 

the SADC Tribunal's decisions did not apply and could not be enforced in Zimbabwe 

unless Parliament ratified the Protocol that set up the Tribunal. 

o 3 April 2009: Mike Campbell's home was invaded by a gang led by Lovemore 

Madangonda (known as "Landmine") who worked for ZANU PF heavy weight Nathan 

Shamuyarira, a former minister and retired Information Secretary. Over the next few 

days various workers were badly beaten by the invaders- one of them sustaining a 

fractured skull. Mike Campbell and his wife were eventually forced out of their fully 

furnished house on 5 April 2009 and were unable to return as the invaders based 

themselves there. 

o 9 April 2009: All150 farm workers were forced to stop working and the invaders took 

the guards' weapons and threatened them with death. The 50 tons of export mangoes 

in the pack-shed were left to rot. Invaders broke into the shed and took Mike 

Campbell's tractors to reap the rest of the crops for themselves. Hundreds of thousands 

of US dollars of crops were stolen. 

o 17 April 2009: Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, along with both Ministers of 

Home Affairs in the coalition Government, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's 

Office and the Minister of Lands, visited Mount Carmel farm. They said that Campbell's 

workers could continue to work and that he could live in his house and reap the 

remainder of his crops. They stipulated that the invaders must abide by any High Court 

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Orders that might come out. That afternoon, in defiance of the Ministers, the farm 

workers who assembled to try to resume farming activities were all chased away again 

by the invaders and were not allowed to work. 

o 20 April 2009: The Zimbabwean High Court gave a provisional order evicting the 

invaders. This was served on them the next day, but the situation became very hostile 

as almost all the invaders were armed with guns. The police consistently failed to give 

assistance to the deputy sheriff to evict the invaders as per the High Court Order over 

the next 6 months while the invaders reaped Campbell's crops. 

o 27 April 2009: Armed invaders chased Ben Freeth's workers away on the other side of 

Mount Carmel farm. Freeth subsequently received death threats from the invaders. 

o 30 April 2009: Another provisional order was gained in the High Court reinforcing the 

first, but still nothing was done by the police to ensure that it was enforced. 

o 5 May 2009: In response to the second High Court Order being served on the invaders, 

Ben and Laura Freeth's garden and driveway were ploughed up in the night inside the 

fence right outside their house by "Landmine" and his invaders. There were threats to 

burn down their house and burning sacks were lit under the thatched roof. Peter Asani, 

one of Campbell's foremen, was abducted from his house by the invaders who beat his 

feet so badly that he was on crutches, with a cast on one of his feet, until July. All the 

workers then had their electricity and water cut off by the invaders in an effort to force 

them to move off the farm. 

o 7 May 2009: The invaders surrounded the Freeths' house with armed men and guns 

were pointed through the windows. The invaders chased away the 40 linen workers on 

Laura's linen project. Spanish journalists were in the house at the time and the Freeths 

were concerned for their safety. The invaders eventually left but returned the next day, 

again with guns, to chase the workers away. They were unable to work for some weeks. 

o 14 May 2009: "Landmine" arrived at the Freeths' house and threatened "bloodshed" 

while waving a handgun at the back door and pointing it at a guest. 

o 25 May 2009 {Africa Day): The invaders lit a substantial fire in the Freeths' garden and, 

with threats and further efforts to intimidate the family- which included making a great 

deal of noise- tried to get them out of their house. The next night approximately 15 of 

the invaders broke into the thatched homestead and brought burning lyres through the 

front door and into the courtyard. The Freeths young children (aged 4, 7 and 9) were 

threatened and one of the invaders shouted that they would eat them. Another invader 

made frightening hyena noises. When the invaders finally left, they circled the house, 

whooping like hyenas. 

On other SADC Tribunal-protected farms similar state-sanctioned invasions were also 

taking place with total impunity. No move was made by the Zimbabwe Government to 

compensate those farmers who were off their farms, despite the Tribunal's order to do 

so. 

o 5 June 2009: The second contempt application: The SADC Tribunal heard a second 

contempt application against the Zimbabwe Government where Campbell and another 

applicant, Richard Thomas Etheredge, filed a new application to declare the Government 

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NOTE: The preceding document has not been printed here in full but may be found 

at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=106914

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of Zimbabwe in contempt of court. Their objective was to persuade SADC to take action 

regarding the Zimbabwe Government's failure to uphold the SADC Treaty- and to 

enforce the Tribunal's judgement of ZS November ZOOS. 

o Despite the SADC Tribunal judgments, "Landmine" continued to use the tractors he had 

stolen from Campbell to steal the entire maize, sunflower and orange crops without 

Campbell, the rightful owner of those crops, being able to reap a single maize cob, 

sunflower head or orange. This theft was reported to police on various occasions during 

the ensuing weeks and months but the police did nothing to stop it. 

o March, April, November 2009: Various letters were hand-delivered to Morgan 

Tsvangirai, Prime Minister in the coalition Government, regarding the breakdown in the 

rule of law and the contempt, and an investigation into this was requested. However, 

no replies were received. 

o 20 August 2009: The SADC Tribunal issued a costs award (or "taxation award" as it is 

known in legal terminology) in favour of the farmers (the complainants) in the Campbell 

contempt case of 5 June Z009. In total, the bill was taxed at US$5,816.47 or R11Z,780. 

No payment was forthcoming from the Zimbabwe Government. 

o 30 August 2009: Four worker families were made homeless, as well as the Freeths, when 

their houses were burnt down. The home industry factory that employed 40 women 

was also burnt down. Although arson could not be proved, the fire was lit in the south 

from which a strong wind was blowing and being a Sunday, the arsonists would have 

known that the workers were not there to fight it. The invaders were busy driving 

around with a stolen Z,OOO litre spray tank on a stolen tractor that day and would not 

come to assist. If the Campbells and Freeths had been able to use their own equipment, 

they would have been able to put out the fire before it burnt down the houses and 

factory. The Freeths and their workers lost almost everything they possessed. 

o 31 August 2009: 10 tons of fertiliser and other items were stolen by the invaders on 

Mount Carmel but the police did not arrest any of them. 

o 2 September 2009: Mike and Angela Campbell's house was also burnt down, along with 

almost all of its contents. 

o 8 September 2009: A bomb was exploded by the army and the police near to the 

Campbell's house. This was presumably to intimidate the Campbells and Freeths and 

prevent them from returning to the house. When Ben Freeth went to the house some 

days later to conduct a loss assessment, he was arrested by two policemen who said 

that he was not allowed there. One was bare-chested and carried an FN assault rifle. 

Freeth was taken to the police station along with a news crew that was with him. He 

challenged the police, explaining that he had every right to be there as there were High 

Court Orders and a SADC Tribunal judgment that allowed him and his family to farm and 

live there. The police explained that the law under which he was being taken away was 

"private and confidential". He was eventually released later that day. 

o 2 September 2009: The Zimbabwe Government announced its decision to withdraw 

from the Tribunal. This was despite having among other things signed the SADC Treaty 

and its amendments, as well as the Protocol establishing the Tribunal. The Government 

had also appointed a judge to the Tribunal, had participated in the Tribunal proceedings 

8