Page—i—No folio Page—ii—No folio

Asian Perspectives

on the 

Challenges of China

Papers from the 

Asia-Pacific Symposium,

March 7 and 8, 2000,

cosponsored by the

National Defense University and 

U.S. Pacific Command

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

2001
Page—ii—No folio

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do

not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
iii

Contents

Summary....................................................... 1

China’s National Insecurity: Old Challenges at the 

Dawn of the New Millennium..................................... 5

Dru C. Gladney

China’s Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities..................................................... 15

Paul H. B. Godwin

Balancing U.S. Alliance and Chinese Cooperation:

Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge............................... 29

Taeho Kim

Southeast Asian Security: A Regional Perspective .................... 39

Marvin C. Ott

China’s Precarious Balance: Cohesiveness and Stability in a Fast-Changing Society........................................ 49

Minxin Pei

The Challenges of China: Australian Perceptions 

and Reactions................................................... 57

Michael Wesley

Challenges for Sino-U.S. Relations:

Issues and Problems ............................................. 67

Jiemian Yang 
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)

held its annual Pacific symposium on “Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China” at the National

Defense University in Washington on March 7 and 8,

2000. This event brought together representatives of

the policy community and academe from Australia, the

People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, the Republic

of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. It

focused on how perceptions of China influence

defense and foreign policies in key nations of the AsiaPacific region, how the likely course of developments

in China might affect the future policies of countries

in the region, and how such changes might impact on

their security relations with the United States.

The symposium was keyed to two areas of ongoing

INSS research. First, it was integral to a study on U.S.

Regional Military Presence in the 21st Century. This

effort seeks to identify perceptions of the factors that

will shape the regional security environment over the

next decade. These perceptions will affect the security

policies of both allied and friendly nations and could

cause them to adjust their expectations for security

relations with the United States. The study will assist

security planners in developing U.S. regional military

presence for the future. Second, because Chinese intentions and capabilities will continue to be a key determinant in shaping the regional security environment,

INSS and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military

Affairs are conducting research on China as an emerging great power. The symposium formed a crucial element in that research project as well.

Despite news accounts on China prevalent at the

time, the symposium was not dominated by headlines

on tensions across the Taiwan Strait or the latest Chinese white paper.

Major Conclusions

Regional views of the “Challenges of China” and

how best to respond depend upon respective views of the

nature of the future regional security environment.

However, regional analysts are as uncertain as their U.S.

counterparts about the future. The first and most dominant view is that the United States will remain

“engaged and present” and, moreover, that the next

decade will witness the expansion of U.S. economic,

technological, and military dominance. The hub-andspokes model will prevail, albeit with some adjustment in basing, operational tempo, and so on. Proponents of a second view hold that the next decade will

see movement toward building multilateral economic

Summary

This summary was prepared by the Asia-Pacific research team of

the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National

Defense University. Please address any comments or questions on

the summary or the papers in this publication to James J. Przystup

of INSS at przystupj@ndu.edu.
2 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

and security institutions to manage and regulate the

broad spectrum of regional activities. A third and

decidedly minority view postulates the prospect of a

U.S. withdrawal from active military engagement. Beijing, like its regional neighbors, is constantly assessing

the state of play and will respond according to its

interests. Generally speaking, Beijing will seek to

encourage those forces and trends that limit or attenuate U.S. influence and provide opportunities for China

to increase its own standing.

Regional powers do not wish to see the rise of a hegemon from within the region. Discussion of multilateralism notwithstanding, the majority of regional analysts

take a realpolitik view of international relations. There

is a clear preference for an external presence with a level

of comprehensive national power sufficient to balance

any and all regional powers, including China and, presumably, Japan. It is understood that the external power

would itself be balanced from within the region.

China is determined to achieve the status of a great

power. This mandates two imperatives. The first is building a world-class economy and military force. The second

is the completion of national reunification, which

involves restoring Taiwan and the disputed territories of

the South China Sea to Chinese sovereignty. Participants

agreed that Beijing is not likely to be deflected from

either goal. There was a clear consensus that once Taiwan was dealt with China would turn its attention to

the South China Sea. Regional powers believe that

both issues have the potential to evolve toward violence and instability. But they also perceive that Beijing

is aware that pursuing reunification could have an

adverse impact on its quest for economic development,

and that China is engaged in a continuing balancing

act. However, there was general acceptance of the judgment that, in both cases, Beijing would use military

force to achieve reunification, if necessary.

China will become a great power, but the process will

not be an easy one. There was a strong consensus that

the region should prepare itself to deal with a new

great power. At the same time, however, there was a

judgment that, although the elite as a whole is reasonably unified, the leadership remains separated from the

people. There is also a view that, apart from nationalism, China lacks a coherent ideology to bind the

nation together, that Chinese political institutions are

extremely weak, and that Chinese society lacks coherence. Leadership inability to promote social cohesion is

both a cause and an effect of the rise of competing

nationalisms. These involve both ethnically-based

nationalisms evidenced by China’s Muslim populations and competing regionally/economically based

nationalisms, such as those between the north and the

south and the developed coastal regions and the less

developed regions of the interior. On balance, the

regional view is that China will make it but that the

process willnot be smooth. The major difference

between the views of regional analysts and their U.S.

counterparts lies in the apparent readiness of the

region to accept the idea of ultimate Chinese success

and to discount the seriousness of the difficulties Beijing is likely to encounter along the way.

Most participants feel China does not pose a nearterm military threat to the nations of the Asia-Pacific

region. China’s military capabilities are growing along

with other components of its comprehensive national

power. Those improvement are not and will not be

seen across the full range of forces or capabilities, but

will be confined to those of greatest relevance to Chinese needs, that is, those relevant to Chinese objectives

with respect to Taiwan. This judgment holds only for

the next 10 to 15 years. There is considerable uncertainty about the longer term. Regional observers

believe that any impulse of the current regime to use

military means to achieve its objectives—with the

exception of Taiwan and/or the South China Sea—is

tempered by the need to maintain stability in the interest of economic development. While most believe Beijing would prefer to avoid the use of force to reclaim

Taiwan, there is growing anxiety in the region about

cross-strait conflict due to miscalculation.

Taiwan is a major, pressing concern. But it is a

United States problem. The region expects the United

States to handle this problem well. This means two

things: managing events in such a way that conflict

does not occur and, if it does occur, intervening

quickly and effectively to limit the negative consequences. The forms, levels, and perceptions of U.S.

forward military presence are important factors in

managing the issue in that they clearly have deterred

Chinese military action. Regional powers do not wish

to be asked to become involved, at least not publicly,

and they absolutely do not wish to be asked to lend

support to any U.S. military operations against China

in the Taiwan Strait. That said, the region regards U.S.

willingness to act in the Taiwan Strait as a test of

American commitment. Failure to intervene to keep

the peace would send an extremely negative message

and do irreparable damage to the American position

in the region. It is worth underscoring that regional
Summary 3

analysts did not hedge their comments with qualifiers

such as “it depends on how the conflict starts.” Discussion on the Taiwan issue left a strong impression

that Beijing cannot be swayed from “one unified

China” and that the only real solution is the reintegration of Taiwan.

Regional powers find the cyclical pattern of U.S.

relations with China to be disturbing. They are particularly concerned about what they perceive to be a present

major decline in the tenor and substance of bilateral ties.

Participants reaffirmed the long-standing concern that

the ups and downs of U.S.-China relations complicate

their ability to maintain stable ties with Beijing. They

do not wish to be placed in a position of having to take

sides between Washington and Beijing. This is of particular concern because, in their words, they and Beijing “share the same neighborhood.” Some participants

reluctantly expressed a desire for greater consistency

and predictability in the U.S. approach to Beijing.

China should join the World Trade Organization.

Regional participants strongly supported arguments of

a business-oriented U.S. panel to advocate Chinese

accession and passage of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). The region sees WTO membership as a

means of speeding Chinese integration into the global

economy, as a means of encouraging China and Taiwan to resolve issues of common interest, as a means

of improving U.S.-China relations, and as a help to

China’s economic development. All of these are perceived to be in the interests of the regional powers,

which view Chinese membership as a means of ensuring stability and their own economic well-being.

China should be integrated fully into the political

and economic life of the region. The region wants to see

a China that plays by the rules. There is virtually no

support for containment, confrontation, or opposition

to a more outward looking China. The most widely

held view is that the underlying assumptions of Chinese foreign and national security policies are evolving. Beijing is increasingly integrated into regional

affairs, driven primarily by its economic interests. The

region seems reasonably confident that this process

will reach a successful conclusion and is prepared to

live with an inconsistent China until it does. At the

same time, the regional powers clearly value the U.S.

military presence as a counter to Beijing’s growing

national power.

Implications for the Future

In general, we agree with the symposium conclusions. A number of the issues raised need to be incorporated into and/or emphasized in our continuing

research. Similarly, and from our point of view surprisingly, a number of issues did not arise. These omissions also suggest subjects for future research.

There is a clear need to focus more directly on

China’s military modernization program and assess the

prospects for improving the military capabilities of the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Ultimately, this

requires analysis of such factors as economics, science

and technology capability, demographics, production

capabilities, systems integration, and training. At the

same time, we need a better understanding of the views

of Chinese leaders on the use of military force, including its utility as a means of achieving national objectives and the conditions under which they might actually resort to force. These issues will be the top research

priorities of the newly-established Center for the Study

of Chinese Military Affairs.

There is also a need to take our work on regional

perceptions of the forces and trends shaping the

regional security environment to the next level and to

integrate it more fully into our study of the future U.S.

regional military presence. Specifically, we need to evaluate the extent to which multilateral institution building is viewed as a useful exercise and how regional powers are thinking about applying the concept in their

security determinations. A related question concerns

the preferences and attitudes of allies and friends

regarding an emerging U.S. tendency to develop multilateral forms of military exercises and training.

We were surprised that regional participants failed

to mention either theater missile defense, national missile defense, or Japan’s apparently expanding security

role as factors shaping the future regional security

environment. We had thought that discussion of the

challenges of China would eventually lead to a consideration of these issues. Our view is that these events are

likely to have significant impact, a view that prompted

agreement when shared with regional participants.

Accordingly, we see a need to begin work in these

areas. Finally, participants noted the significance of,

but did not develop their ideas on, generational change

as a factor supporting pressures for changes in the

security orientations of Japan and Korea. This need

reinforces our view that research on this subject would

be of great value.

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5

Foreigners and the Chinese themselves typically picture China’s population as a vast monolithic Han

majority, with a sprinkling of exotic minorities living

along the country’s borders. This understates China’s

tremendous cultural, geographic, and linguistic diversity—in particular, the important cultural differences

within the Han population. It also ignores the fact

that China is officially a multinational country, with

56 recognized “nationalities.” More important, recent

events suggest that China may well be increasingly

insecure regarding not only these official nationalities,

but also national integration.

China is seeing a resurgence of pride in local

nationality and culture, most notably among southerners such as the Cantonese and Hakka, who are now

classified as Han. The differences may increase under

economic pressures, such as inflation, the growing

gap between rich and poor areas, and the migration of

millions of people from poorer provinces to those

with jobs. Chinese society is also under pressure from

the officially recognized minorities, such as the

Uyghurs and Tibetans.

For centuries, China has held together a vast multicultural and multiethnic nation, despite alternating

periods of political centralization and fragmentation.

But cultural and linguistic cleavages could worsen in a

China that is weakened by internal strife, inflation,

uneven growth, or a post-Jiang struggle for succession. At the National Day celebrations in October

1999, commemorating 50 years of Communist Party

rule, frequent calls for “National Unity”underscored

the importance China’s many ethnic populations will

play in its national resurgence.

Ethnic Nationalism

At the beginning of the last decade, not a single

observer of international politics predicted that the

former Soviet Union would now be fragmented into a

melange of strident new nations and restive ethnic

minorities. When Russian troops first marched into

the Chechen capital of Grozny in 1996 in hopes of

keeping what remained of the former Soviet empire

together,1 few analysts drew parallels to China’s

attempts to rein in its own restive minorities.

China is thought to be different. Cultural commonality and a monolithic civilization are supposed

to hold the country together. While focus on ethnic

nationalism generally has been absent from Western

perspectives and reporting on China, the peoples of

the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have often

demonstrated otherwise. Continuing separatist activities and ethnic unrest have punctuated border areas

since a major Muslim uprising in February 1996 led

to bombings in Beijing and frequent eruptions on its

periphery.2 Quick and violent responses to thwart

China’s National Insecurity:

Old Challenges at the Dawn 

of the New Millennium

by Dru C. Gladney

Dru C. Gladney is Research Professor in the Asia-Pacific Center

for Security Studies at the College of Security Studies in

Honolulu, Hawaii.
6 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

localized protests—27 “splittists” reportedly killed in

an uprising in December 1999 outside of Khotan in

southern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—

indicate rising Chinese concern over the influence of

separatist sentiment spilling over from the newly

independent Central Asia nations into China’s Muslim areas. In these areas, more than 20 million Turkic

Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, Kazaks, and other Muslims are a visible and vocal reminder that China is linked to Eurasia. For Uyghur nationalists today, direct lineal

descent from the Uyghur Kingdom in 7th century

Mongolia is accepted as fact, despite overwhelming

historical and archeological evidence to the contrary,

and they seek to revive that ancient kingdom as modern Uyghuristan.3

Random arrests and detentions continue among

the Uyghur, who are increasingly being regarded as

China’s Chechens. A report in The Wall Street Journal

of the arrest on August 11, 1999, of Rebiya Kadir, a

well-known Uyghur businesswoman, during a visit to

the region by a delegation from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, indicates that China’s suspicion of the Uyghur people continues.4

China is also concerned about the “Kosovo

effect,”5 fearing that its Muslim and other ethnic

minorities might be emboldened to seek outside

international (i.e., Western) support for stopping continued human rights abuses. Just before the National

Day celebrations in October 1999, the State Council

hosted its first 3-day conference on “the nationalities

problem” in Beijing, and issued a new policy paper,

“National Minorities Policy and its Practice in

China.”6 Though this White Paper did little more than

outline all the “good” programs China has carried out

in minority areas, it did indicate increasing concern

and a willingness to recognize unresolved problems,

and several strategic think tanks in Beijing and Shanghai initiated focus groups and research programs to

address the issues of ethnic identity and separatism.7

But ethnic problems in Jiang Zemin’s China go far

deeper than the official minorities. Sichuanese, Cantonese, Shanghainese, and Hunanese cafes [“cafes”

correct word?] avidly advocate increased cultural

nationalism and resistance to Beijing central control.

As the European Union experiences its difficulties in

building a common European alliance across linguistic, cultural, and political boundaries, we should not

imagine China to be less concerned about its persistent multiculturalism.

If the Roman Empire were around today, it would

look much like China. Two millennia ago, the Roman

Empire and the Han dynasty were at their peaks. Both

empires barely lasted another 200 years. At the beginning of the last millennium, China was on the verge of

being conquered by the Mongols and divided by a

weakened Song dynasty in the south and the Liao

dynasty in the north, whose combined territory was

equal only to the five northern provinces in today’s

PRC. Indeed, it was the Mongols who extended China’s

territory to include much of what is considered part of

China today: Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Sichuan, and

Yunnan. Over the last two millennia, China has been

divided longer than it has been unified. Can it maintain

national unity throughout the next century? History

suggests not. Indeed, with the reacquisition of Macao

in late 1999, China is the only country in the world that

is expanding its territory instead of reducing it. Will

China be able to continue to resist the inexorable forces

of globalization and nationalism?

Chinese linguists, such as John DeFrancis, speak

of the linguistic diversity within China. Attention to

cultural diversity should force observers to give further weight to the plurality of Chinese peoples in

national politics. An American President once

claimed to know the mind of the Chinese. This is as

farfetched as someone claiming to know the European

mind. Have any U.S. policymakers spent time talking

to disgruntled entrepreneurs in Canton and Shanghai,

impoverished peasants in Anhui and Gansu, or angry

Central Asians in Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet?

While ethnic diversity does not necessitate ethnic separatism or violence, growing ethnic awareness and

expression in China should inform policymaking and

take into account the interests of China’s many peoples, not just those in power. China policy should represent more than the interests of those in Beijing.

China’s Han Nationality

Officially, China is made up of 56 nationalities—

the majority nationality known as the Han, and 55

recognized minority groups. The peoples identified as

Han comprise 91 percent of the population from Beijing in the north to Canton in the south, and they

include the Hakka, Fujianese, Cantonese, and other

groups.8 These Han are thought to be united by a

common history, culture, and written language; differences in language, dress, diet, and customs are

regarded as minor and superficial.
China’s National Insecurity 7

The rest of China’s population is divided into 55

official minority nationalities that are mostly concentrated along the borders, such as the Mongolians and

Uyghurs in the north and the Zhuang, Yi, and Bai in

southern China, near southeast Asia. Other groups,

such as the Hui and Manchus, are scattered throughout the nation, and there are minorities in every

province, region, and county. An active state-sponsored program assists these official minority cultures

and promotes their economic development (with

mixed results). The outcome, according to China’s

preeminent sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, is a “unified

multinational” state.9

But even this recognition of diversity understates

the divisions within the Chinese population, especially the wide variety of culturally and ethnically

diverse groups within the majority Han population.10

These groups have recently begun to rediscover and

reassert their different cultures, languages, and history. Yet, even as the Chinese worry and debate over

their own identity, policymakers in other nations still

take the monolithic Han identity for granted.

The notion of a Han person (Han ren) dates back

centuries and refers to descendants of the Han dynasty

who flourished at about the same time as the Roman

Empire. But the concept of Han nationality (Han

minzu) is an entirely modern phenomenon that arose

with the shift from the Chinese empire to the modern

nation-state.11 In the early part of the 20th century,

Chinese reformers were concerned that the Chinese

people lacked a sense of nationhood, unlike Westerners and even China’s “other” peoples such as Tibetans

and Manchus. In the view of these reformers, Chinese

unity stopped at the clan or community level rather

than extending to the nation as a whole.

Sun Yat-sen, leader of the republican movement

that toppled the last imperial dynasty of China (the

Qing) in 1911, popularized the idea that there were

“Five Peoples of China”—the majority Han, the

Manchus, the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Hui (a

term that included all Muslims in China, now divided

into Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Hui, etc.). Sun was a Cantonese, educated in Hawaii, who feared arousing traditional northern suspicions of southern radical

movements. He wanted both to unite the Han and to

mobilize them and all other non-Manchu groups in

China (including Mongols, Tibetans, and Hui) into a

modern multiethnic nationalist movement against the

Manchu Qing state and foreign imperialists. The Han

were seen as a unified group distinct from the “internal” foreigners—within their borders the Manchus,

Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui—and from the “external”

foreigners, namely the Western and Japanese imperialists. Professor Frank Dikötter, Director of the Contemporary China Institute at the University of London, has argued a racial basis for this notion of a

unified Han minzu,

12 but I suspect the rationality was

more strategic and nationalistic—the need to build

national security around the concept of one national

people, with a small percentage of minorities supporting that idea.

The Communist Party expanded the number of

peoples from 5 to 56 but kept the idea of a unified

Han group. The Communists were, in fact, disposed

to accommodate these internal minority groups for

several reasons. The 1934–1935 Long March, a

6,000-mile trek across China from southwest to

northwest to escape the threat of annihilation by

Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) forces, took

the Communists through some of the most heavily

populated minority areas. Harried on one side by the

KMT and on the other by fierce “barbarian” tribesmen, the Communists were faced with a choice

between extermination and promising special treatment to minorities—especially the Miao, Yi (Lolo),

Tibetans, Mongols, and Hui—should the party ever

win national power.

The Communists even offered the possibility of

true independence for minorities. Chairman Mao frequently referred to Article 14 of the 1931 Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) constitution, which “recognizes the right of self-determination” of the national

minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and their right to the formation of

an independent state for each minority. This commitment was not kept after the founding of the People’s

Republic.13 Instead, the party stressed maintaining the

unity of the new nation at all costs.

The recognition of minorities, however, helped

the Communists’ long-term goal of forging a united

Chinese nation by solidifying the recognition of the

Han as a unified “majority.” Emphasizing the difference between Han and the minorities helped to

deemphasize the differences within the Han community. The Communists incorporated the idea of Han

unity into a Marxist ideology of progress, with the

Han in the forefront of development and civilization,

the vanguard of the people’s revolution.14 The more

“backward” or “primitive” the minorities were, the
8 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

more “advanced” and “civilized” the so-called Han

seemed and the greater the need for a unified

national identity. Cultural diversity within the Han

has not been admitted because of a deep (and wellfounded) fear the country would break up into feuding warlord-run kingdoms, as happened in the 1910s

and 1920s.

China historically has been divided along

north/south lines—into Five Kingdoms, Warring

States, or local satrapies—as often as it has been

united. Indeed, China as it currently exists, including

large pieces of territory occupied by Mongols, Turkic

peoples, Tibetans, and so forth, is three times larger

than China was under the last Chinese dynasty, the

Ming, which fell in 1644. Ironically, geographic

“China” as defined by the People’s Republic was actually established by foreign conquest dynasties, first by

the Mongols and finally by the Manchus. A strong,

centralizing Chinese government (whether of foreign

or internal origin) has often tried to impose ritualistic, linguistic, and political uniformity within its borders. The modern state has tried to unite the various

peoples with transportation and communication networks and an extensive civil service. In recent years,

these efforts have continued through the controlled

infusion of capitalist investment and market manipulation. Yet even in the modern era, these integrative

mechanisms have not produced cultural uniformity.

Invented National Unity

Although presented as a unified culture—an idea

also accepted by many Western researchers—Han

peoples differ in many ways, most obviously in their

languages. The supposedly homogenous Han speak

eight mutually unintelligible languages (Mandarin,

Wu, Yue, Xiang, Hakka, Gan, Southern Min, and

Northern Min). Even these subgroups show marked

linguistic and cultural diversity; in the Yue language

family, for example, Cantonese speakers are barely

intelligible to Taishan speakers, and speakers of the

Southern Min dialects of Quanzhou, Changzhou, and

Xiamen have equal difficulty communicating.15 Chinese linguist Y. R. Chao has shown that the mutual

unintelligibility of, say, Cantonese and Mandarin is as

great as that of Dutch and English or French and Italian.16 Mandarin was imposed as the national language

early in the 20th century and has become the lingua

franca, but like Swahili in Africa it must often be

learned in school and is rarely used in everyday life in

many areas.

Cultural perceptions among the Han often involve

broad stereotypical contrasts between north and

south.17 Northerners tend to be thought of as larger,

broader-faced, and lighter-skinned, while southerners

are depicted as smaller and darker. Cultural practices

involving birth, marriage, and burial differ widely.

Fujianese, for example, are known for vibrant folk religious practices and ritualized reburial of interred

corpses, while Cantonese have a strong lineage tradition, both of which are almost nonexistent in the

north. One finds radically different eating habits from

north to south, with northerners consuming noodles

made from wheat and other grains, open to consuming lamb and beef, and preferring spicy foods, while

the southern diet is based upon rice, eschews lamb and

beef in favor of seafood, and along the coast includes

milder dishes. It is interesting, in this regard, that Fei

Xiaotong once argued that what made the Han people

different from minorities was their agricultural traditions (i.e., minorities were traditionally not engaged in

farming,18 though this failed to take into account

groups like the Koreans and Uyghur who have farmed

for 1,400 years). Yet Fei never considered the vast cultural differences separating rice-eaters in the South

from wheat-eaters in the North.

This process of national unification based on an

invented majority at the expense of a few isolated

minorities is widely documented in Asia and is not

unique to China.19

Identity Politics and National

Minorities

China’s policy toward minorities involves official

recognition, limited autonomy, and unofficial efforts

at control. The official minorities hold a significance

for China’s long-term development that is disproportionate to their size. Although totaling only 8.04 percent of the population, they are concentrated in

resource-rich areas, cover nearly 60 percent of the

country’s land mass, and exceed 90 percent of the

population in counties and villages along many border areas of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Yunnan. While the 1990 census recorded 91 million members of the official minorities, the 2000 census is

estimated to report an increase in the minority population to 104 million.20
China’s National Insecurity 9

Shortly after taking power, Communist leaders

sent teams of researchers, social scientists, and party

cadres to the border regions to identify groups as official nationalities. Only 41 of the more than 400

groups that applied were recognized, and that number

reached 56 by 1982. Most of the nearly 350 other

groups were identified as Han or lumped together

with other minorities with whom they shared some

features for generally political reasons. Some are still

applying for recognition, and the 1990 census listed

almost 750,000 people as “unidentified” and awaiting

recognition—which means they were regarded as ethnically different but did not fit into any of the recognized categories.

In recognition of the minorities’ official status as

well as their strategic importance, various levels of

nominally autonomous administration were created—

five regions, 31 prefectures, 96 counties (or, in Inner

Mongolia and Manchuria, “banners”), and countless

villages. Such “autonomous” areas do not have true

political control, although they may have increased

local control over the administration of resources,

taxes, birth planning, education, legal jurisdiction, and

religious expression. These designated areas have

minority government leaders, but the real source of

power is still the Han-dominated Communist Party—

as a result, they may actually come under closer

scrutiny than provinces with large minority populations, such as Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan.

While “autonomy” seems not to be all the word

might imply, it is still apparently a desirable attainment for the minorities in China. Between the 1982

and 1990 censuses, 18 new autonomous counties were

established, three of them in Liaoning Province for

the Manchus, who previously had no autonomous

administrative districts. Although the government is

clearly trying to limit the recognition of new nationalities, there seems to be an avalanche of new

autonomous administrative districts. In addition to

the 18 new counties and many villages whose total

numbers have never been published, at least 8 more

new autonomous counties are to be set up. Five will

go to the Tujia, a group widely dispersed throughout

the southwest that doubled in population from 2.8

million to 5.8 million from 1982 to 1990.

The increase in the number of groups seeking

minority status reflects what may be described as an

explosion of ethnicity in contemporary China. Indeed,

it has now become popular, especially in Beijing, for

people to declare themselves to be Manchus or members of other ethnic groups, admitting they were not

Han all along. While the Han population grew a total

of 10 percent between 1982 and 1990, the minority

population grew 35 percent overall—from 67 million

to 91 million. The Manchus, a group long thought to

have been assimilated into the Han majority, added

three autonomous districts and increased its population by 128 percent, from 4.3 million to 9.8 million,

while the population of the Gelao people in Guizhou

shot up an incredible 714 percent in just 8 years.

Clearly, these rates reflect more than a high birth

rate; they also indicate “category shifting” as people

redefine their own nationality from Han to a minority

or from one minority to another. In interethnic marriages, parents can decide the nationality of their children, and the children themselves can choose their

nationality at age 18. One scholar predicts that if the

minority population growth rate continues, there will

be a total of 100 million minorities in the year 2000

and 864 million in 2080.21 China has recently begun

to limit births among minorities, especially in urban

areas, but it is doubtful that authorities will be able to

limit the growing number of applications for redefinition and the hundreds of groups applying for recognition as minorities.

Why is it popular to be officially ethnic in 1990s

China? This is an interesting question, given the negative reporting in the Western press about minority

discrimination in China. If it is so bad to be a minority in China, why are the numbers of minorities

increasing? One explanation may be that in 1982

there were still lingering doubts about the government’s true intent in registering the nationalities during the census. The Cultural Revolution, a 10-year

period during which any kind of difference—ethnic,

religious, cultural, or political—was ruthlessly suppressed, had ended only a few years before.22 By the

mid-1980s, it had become clear that those groups

identified as official minorities were beginning to

receive real benefits from the implementation of several affirmative action programs. The most significant

privileges included permission to have more children

(except in urban areas, minorities are generally not

bound by the one-child policy), pay fewer taxes,

obtain better (albeit Chinese) education for their children, have greater access to public office, speak and

learn their native languages, worship and practice

their religion (often including practices, such as

shamanism, that are still banned among the Han),
10 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

and express their cultural differences through the arts

and popular culture.

Indeed, one might even say it has become popular

to be ethnic in today’s China. Mongolian hot pot,

Muslim noodle, and Korean barbecue restaurants

proliferate in every city, while minority clothing,

artistic motifs, and other expressions of cultural styles

adorn Chinese bodies and private homes. In Beijing,

one of the most popular new restaurants of the young

Han nouveau riche is the Thai Family Village (Dai Jia

Cun), which offers a cultural experience of the Thai

minority (known in China as the Dai), complete with

beautiful waitresses in revealing Dai-style sarongs and

short tops, sensually singing and dancing, and exotic

foods such as snake’s blood. It is not unusual to learn

of Han Chinese prostitutes representing themselves as

Thai and other minorities to appear more exotic to

their customers.23 Surprisingly, the second-most popular novel in China in 1994 was The History of the

Soul (Xin ling shi), which concerned personal and religious conflicts in a remote Muslim region in northwest China. It was written by Zhang Chengzhi, a Hui

Muslim from Ningxia. This rise of ethnic chic is in

dramatic contrast to the anti-ethnic homogenizing

policies of the late 1950s’ anti-Rightist period, the

Cultural Revolution, and even the late 1980s’ “spiritual pollution” campaigns.

Foreign policy considerations have also encouraged changes in China’s treatment of minority groups.

China has one of the world’s largest Muslim populations—nearly 20 million, more than the United Arab

Emirates, Libya, or Malaysia—and has increasing contacts with trade partners in the Middle East and new

Muslim nations created on its borders. China provides

the Middle East and Central Asia with cheap labor,

consumer goods, weaponry—and increasing numbers

of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.24 These relations will be

jeopardized if Muslim, especially, Uyghur, discontent

continues over such issues as limitations on mosque

building, restrictions on childbearing, uncontrolled

mineral and energy development, and continued

nuclear testing in the Xinjiang region.

Foreign policy considerations also argue for better

treatment of Korean minorities, since South Korean

investment, tourism, and natural resources have given

China’s Koreans in Liaoning and Manchuria a booming economy and the best educational level of all

nationalities (including the Han). Another factor has

been the increase in international tourism to minority

areas, including the “Silk Road” tours to Xinjiang and

package tours to the “colorful” minority regions of

Yunnan and Guizhou that are marketed to Japanese,

Taiwanese, and Southeast Asian Chinese tour groups.

The most striking change in Chinese policy

toward a single minority as a result of international

relations has been the initiation—just after the

improvement in Sino-Israeli relations in 1992—of

discussions about granting official nationality status

to Chinese Jews (Youtai ren), once thought to have

disappeared entirely. As Sino-Israeli relations

improve, and China seeks increased tourism dollars

from Tel Aviv and New York, one would assume the

Chinese Jews will once again reappear as an official

nationality in China.

The creation of several new nations on China’s

Central Asian frontier with ethnic populations on

both sides of the border has also made ethnic separatism a major concern. The newly independent status of the Central Asian states has allowed separatist

groups in Xinjiang to locate some sources of support,

leading to over 30 reported bombing incidents in the

Xinjiang region in 1999 claimed by groups militating

for an “Independent Turkestan.” At the same time,

freer travel across the Central Asian borders has made

China’s Muslims well aware of ethnic and political

conflicts in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, and also

demonstrated that they are often better off economically than their fellow Muslims across the border. Several meetings of the “Shanghai Five” (PRC, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia) since April

1997 concluded treaties to strengthen border security

and establish the refusal to harbor separatist groups.

In April 1999, for example, Kazakhstan returned to

China three Uyghurs who were accused of separatism.

Beijing’s challenge is to convince Chinese Muslims that they will benefit more from cooperation

with their national government than from resistance.

In the south, a dramatic increase in cross-border relations between Chinese minority groups and Myanmar

(Burma), Cambodia, and Thailand has contributed to

a rising problem of drug smuggling. Beijing also

wants to help settle disputes in Cambodia, Vietnam,

and Myanmar, because it fears ethnic wars will spill

over the border into China. In Tibet, frequent reports

of ongoing resistance and many arrests continue to

filter into the media, despite Beijing’s best efforts at

spin control.
China’s National Insecurity 11

Internal Divisions Among the Han

Majority

Not only have the official minorities in China

begun to assert their identities more strongly, pressing

the government for more recognition, autonomy, and

special privileges, but different groups within the socalled Han majority have begun to rediscover, reinvent, and reassert their ethnic differences.

The dramatic economic explosion in South China

has encouraged southerners and others to emphasize

their cultural and political differences. Cantonese rock

music, videos, movies, and television programs, all

heavily influenced by Hong Kong, are now popular

throughout China. Whereas comedians used to make

fun of southern ways and accents, southerners now

scorn northerners for their lack of sophistication and

business acumen. And, as any Mandarin- speaking

Beijing resident will tell you, bargaining for vegetables

or cellular telephones in Guangzhou or Shanghai

markets is becoming more difficult due to growing

pride in local languages; nonnative speakers always

pay a higher price. Rising self-awareness among the

Cantonese parallels the reassertion of identity among

the Hakka, the southern Fujianese Min, the Swatow,

and a host of other generally ignored peoples now

empowered by economic success and embittered by

age-old restraints from the north.

Interestingly, most of these southern groups traditionally regarded themselves not as Han but as Tang

people, descendants of the great Tang dynasty

(618–907 A.D.) and its southern bases.25 Most Chinatowns in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia

are inhabited by descendants of Chinese immigrants

who came from the mainly Tang areas of southern

China. They are built around Tang Person Streets

(tang ren jie).

The next decade may see the resurgence of Tang

nationalism in southern China in opposition to northern Han nationalism, especially as economic wealth in

the south eclipses that of the north. There is also a

newfound interest in the ancient southern Chu kingdom as key to modern southern success. Some southern scholars have departed from the traditional Chinese view of history and now argue that by the 6th

century B.C., the bronze age culture of the Chu had

spread north and influenced the development of Chinese civilization, rather than the culture originating in

the north and spreading southward. Many southerners

now see Chu as essential to Chinese culture, to be distinguished from the less important northern dynasties—with implications for the nation’s economic and

geopolitical future. Museums celebrating the glory of

Chu have been established throughout southern

China. There is also a growing belief that northerners

and southerners had separate racial origins based on

different histories and contrasting physiogenetic types,

a belief influenced by highly speculative 19th century

notions of race and Social Darwinism.26

There has also been an outpouring of interest in

Hakka origins, language, and culture on Taiwan,

which may be spreading to the mainland. The Hakka,

or “guest people,” are thought to have moved southward in successive migrations from northern China as

early as the Eastern Jin (317–420 A.D.) up until the

late Song dynasty (960–1279 A.D.), according to many

Hakka (who claim to be Song people as well as Tang

people). The Hakka have the same language and

many of the same cultural practices as the She minority, but they have never sought minority status themselves—perhaps because of a desire to overcome their

long-term stigmatization by the Cantonese and other

southerners as “uncivilized barbarians.”27 This low

status may stem from the unique Hakka language

(which is unintelligible to other southerners), the isolated and walled Hakka living compounds, or the

refusal of Hakka women during the imperial period

to bind their feet.

Nevertheless, the popular press in China is beginning to note more frequently the widely perceived but

difficult-to-establish rumors of the Hakka origins of

important political figures (even Deng Xiaoping, Mao

Zedong, Sun Yat-sen, former party General Secretary

Hu Yaobang, and former President Ye Jianning). People often praise Zhou Enlai by stressing his Jiangnan

linkages and Lee Kuan-yew as a prominent Hakka

statesman; and even Chiang Kai-shek is lauded as a

southerner who knew how to get money out of the

United States.

National Disintegration

China’s economic vitality has the potential to fuel

ethnic and linguistic division, rather than integrating

the country further, as most would suppose. As southern and coastal areas get richer, much of the central,

northern, and northwestern regions are unlikely to

keep up, increasing competition and contributing to
12 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

age-old resentments across ethnic, linguistic, and cultural lines.28 Southern ethnic economic ties link

wealthy Cantonese, Shanghainese, and Fujianese (also

the majority people in Taiwan) more closely to their

relatives abroad than to their political overlords in

Beijing. Already, provincial governments in Canton

and elsewhere not only resist paying taxes to Beijing,

but they also restrict the transshipment of goods

coming from outside the province across provincial—

often the same as cultural—lines. Travelers in China

have seen an extraordinary expansion of toll roads,

indicating greater interest in local control.

Dislocations from rapid economic growth may

also fuel ethnic divisions. Huge migrations of “floating populations,” estimated to total over 150 million

nationally, now move across China seeking employment in wealthier areas, often engendering stigmatized identities and stereotypical fears of the “outsiders” (wai di ren) within China. Crime, housing

shortages, and lowered wages are now attributed most

often to these people from Anhui, Hunan, or Gansu

who are taking jobs from locals—complaints similar

to those heard in West Germany about the influx of

Easterners after reunification. Reports that 70 percent

of those convicted of crimes in Beijing were outsiders

have fueled criticisms of China’s increasingly open

migration policy.29

The result of all these changes is that China is

becoming increasingly decentered. This is a fearsome

prospect for those holding the reins in Beijing. Perhaps it was a factor in the decision to crack down on

the June 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.

At that time, central authorities had begun to lose

control of a country, which they feared could quickly

unravel. That such fears have not eased is shown by

the increased calls during the National Day celebrations for National Unity and efforts to reduce corruption. Worker and peasant unrest reported throughout

China cuts across, and may at times exacerbate, cultural and ethnolinguistic differences between the

haves and the have-nots, who in today’s China

increasingly interact along lines marked by multiethnic diversity.

National Disunity?

Although ethnic separatism will never be a serious threat to a strong China, a China weakened by

internal strife, inflation, uneven economic growth, or

the struggle for succession after Deng Xiaoping’s

death could become further divided along cultural

and linguistic lines. It was a southerner, born and

educated abroad, who led the revolution that ended

China’s last dynasty; and when that empire fell, competing warlords—often supported by foreign powers—fought for local turf occupied by culturally distinct peoples. And, the Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s

and 1860s that nearly brought down the Qing dynasty

also had its origins in the southern border region of

Guangxi among the so-called marginal Yao and

Hakka peoples.

These events are being remembered as the generally well-hidden and overlooked “others” within Chinese society begin to reassert their own identities in

addition to the official nationalities. At the same time,

China’s leaders are moving away from the homogenizing policies that alienated minority and nonnorthern groups. Recent moves to allow and even

encourage the expression of cultural diversity, while

preserving political unity, indicate a growing awareness of the need to accommodate that diversity. This

development will be important to watch over the next

2 years, as China prepares to incorporate Hong Kong,

a city that operates on cultural and social assumptions

very different from those of Beijing.

The construction of Chinese national identity has

always been tentative. In June 1989, while China’s

future hung in the balance, there was significant concern over which armies would support Deng’s crackdown—those based in Sichuan, Hunan, Canton, or

Beijing; all had their own local concerns. The military

has since been reshuffled and somewhat downsized,

attempting to uproot any local attachments and professionalize the command structure. However, this

only underscores the growing importance of regional

and local ties. China, as of now, is a unified country

militarily, and perhaps, politically. As a result of

Jiang’s continuance of the Deng Xiaoping reforms,

China is increasingly less unified economically. Yet

how can China continue to withstand the forces of

globalization and nationalism without a government

legitimized through popular elections, transparency

in the political process, adherence to the rule of law,

and good governance?

Last November, an ambassador from one of the

Muslim nations friendliest to China remarked privately to this writer that, by the end of the next

decade, China would be divided into nine republics.
China’s National Insecurity 13

Historians debate whether a foreign threat has been

the only thing that has held China together. Now that

the encirclement doctrine, upon which President

Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

built the Sino-American alliance, is no longer valid,

and containment has been replaced by improving

U.S.-China relations based on a policy of engagement,

China faces only enemies from within.

The Chinese press reported more than 5,000

organized social protests in 1998 alone, with many

more in 1999, culminating in the widespread Falun

Gong uprising and crackdown. Most of these protests

have been organized by labor unions and peasant

associations, but, increasingly, ethnic and religious

groups such as the Falun Gong have begun to speak

out. The fact that China is becoming dangerously

decentered perhaps may be the main reason for the

recent rush on Beijing’s part to finalize international

border agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and most recently, Vietnam.

U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan predicted

that there will be 50 new countries in 50 years. The

trend began with the breakup of the Soviet Union in

1991 and has continued throughout much of Africa

and Asia, particularly Indonesia. Why should China

be immune from such global diversification? While

ethnic separatism alone will never be threatening

enough to pull a strong China apart, a China weakened by internal strife, inflation, uneven economic

growth, or the struggle for (un)democratic succession

could certainly fragment along cultural and linguistic

lines. Ethnic strife did not dismantle the former

Soviet Union; but it did come apart along boundaries

defined in large part by ethnic and national differences. The generally well-hidden and overlooked

“others” within Chinese society—the Cantonese,

Shanghainese, Sichuanese, and Fujianese—are beginning to reassert their own identities in addition to the

“official” nationalities on China’s borders. Increasing

Taiwanese nationalism has caused great consternation

in Beijing, an “internal” ethnic nationalism that few

Chinese nationalists can understand.

The rising politics of difference are of concern not

only in Lhasa and Urumqi, but in Canton and Shanghai as well. The “Kosovo effect” may very well turn

into the “Chechnya effect,” whereby ethnic groups,

especially Muslims, are stereotyped as separatists, and

cleansing is launched as an internal affair. The problem for China, however, is that many of its internal

threats may not come from official nationalities who

are more easily singled out by race or language.

China’s Chechnya, like Indonesia’s Aceh problem, may

very well come from within its own peoples who are

seeking economic and political advantage. The next

decade promises to be as momentous for China as the

last was for Europe and Russia.

Notes

1 Russian troops marched on Chechnya, a secessionist, selfproclaimed “independent” republic in the Northern Caucasus, in

1996. Russia again began bombing the territory of Chechnya in

September 1999. 2 See the critical report, People’s Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous

Region (London: Amnesty International, April 21, 1999).

3 The best “Uighur nationalist” retelling of this unbroken

descent from Karakhorum is in the document “Brief History of

the Uyghers,” originating from the Eastern Turkestani Union in

Europe, and available electronically at www.geocites.com/CapitolHill/1730/buh.html. For a recent review and critique, including

historical evidence for the multiethnic background of the contemporary Uyghur, see Dru C. Gladney, “Ethnogenesis and Ethnic

Identity in China: Considering the Uygurs and Kazakhs,” in Victor

Mair, ed., The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age People of Eastern Central Asia: Volume II (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of

Man, 1998), 812–34. For a discussion of the recent archeological

evidence derived from DNA testing of the desiccated corpses of

Xinjiang, see Mair, “Introduction,” The Bronze Age and Early Iron

Age People of Eastern Central Asia, 1–40. 4 Ian Johnson, “China Arrests Noted Businesswoman in

Crackdown in Muslim Region,” The Wall Street Journal, August

18, 1999. 5 Referring to the international effort to prevent the “ethnic

cleansing” of the largely Muslim Albanian Kosovars in the Serbian

province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. 6 China State Council, “National Minorities Policy and its

Practice in China,” Beijing, October 1999. 7 The China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), under the State Council, has initiated a “Nationality Studies Project” in order to examine security implications of

China’s minority problems (Chu Shulong interview, November

14, 1999). 8 Colin Mackerras, China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1994), 25. 9 Fei Xiaotong, “Ethnic Identification in China,” in Fei Xiaotong, ed., Toward a People’s Anthropology (Beijing: New World

Press, 1981), 20. 10 Emily Honig, Creating Chinese Ethnicity (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1992). 11 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 47. 12 Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
14 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

13 Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the

People’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996),

60–75.

14 Dru C. Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,” The Journal of Asian Studies

53 (1994a), 97. 15 Jerry Norman, Chinese (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1988), 27. 16 Yuen Ren Chao, Aspects of Chinese Sociolinguistics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 83. 17 Fred C. Blake, Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Chinese

Market Town (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1981). 18 Fei Xiaotong, “Zhonghua minzu de duoyuan jiti juge”

(“Plurality and Unity in the Configuration of the Chinese Nationality”), Beijing Daxue Xuebao 4 (1989), 12. 19 See Dru C. Gladney, ed., Making Majorities: Constituting

the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the

United States (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 20 Zhang Tianlu, “Xiandai Zhongguo Shaoshu minzu renkou

zhuangkuang” (“Analysis of the Contemporary China Minority

Nationality Population Situation”), paper presented at the Conference on Contemporary Migration and Ethnicity in China,

Institute of Nationality Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, October 7–8, 1999.

21 Ibid.

22 The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution ran from 1966

until the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. 23 Gladney, “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring

Majority/Minority Identities,” 92–123. 24 Dru C. Gladney, “Sino-Middle Eastern Perspectives and

Relations Since the Gulf War: Views from Below,” The International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, November 2000. 25 Leo J. Moser, The Chinese Mosaic: The Peoples and Provinces

of China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). 26 Mair, The Bronze Age and Early Iron Age People of Eastern

Central Asia. 27 Blake, Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Chinese Market

Town.

28 See Wang Shaoguang, et al., China’s Inequality (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 29 Fei Guo, “Beijing’s Policies Towards Ethnic Minority/Rural

Migrant Villages,” paper presented at the Conference on Contemporary Migration and Ethnicity in China, Institute of Nationality

Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, October

7–8, 1999.
15

Assessing Beijing’s defense modernization programs

in the midst of increasing apprehension over the

growth of China’s military power is a daunting task.

During the Cold War, despite some concern over the

long-term implications for the United States, assessments were viewed through the prism of China’s role

in containing the Soviet Union. Improvements (however marginal) in Beijing’s military power were seen

as serving U.S. interests by requiring Moscow to divert

resources from the possible confrontation with the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.

By the mid-1990s, this perspective had shifted. Many

observers perceived Beijing’s confrontation with Taiwan and its aggressive, nationalistic approaches to territorial claims in the South China Sea as indicators of

the belligerent policies China will pursue as economic

enrichment and improvements in indigenous science

and technology capabilities enhance its military

power. Swelling defense budgets and military technology links with Russia, Israel, and Europe are viewed as

giving China the potential to destabilize East Asia and

challenge U.S. military preeminence.

A divide among analysts of Beijing’s progress in

defense modernization is accompanying this changing

perception. Although observers have followed the pattern and progress of Chinese defense modernization

programs in detail since reforms were initiated in the

late 1970s, their assessments of that progress have

diverged in the past few years. On one side stand

those who interpret much of the writing coming out

of China as indicating the aspirations of the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA).1 Although recognizing the

importance of the weapons and technologies being

acquired, these analysts tend to be skeptical of the

extent to which China is achieving the capabilities to

meet these aspirations. On the other side of the divide

are those whose research demonstrates to them that

major improvements in China’s military capabilities

are closer at hand than the skeptics recognize.2

This divide in assessments is created by two factors: the changed perspective from which China’s

defense modernization is now viewed, and the differing estimates of the speed with which China can

develop and produce weapons and technologies associated with the revolution in military affairs (RMA).

Whatever the source of the rift, the issues dividing the

skeptics and the optimists,3 as I shall refer to them, are

clear. The purpose of this essay, however, is not to

resolve these differences or bridge this divide. Rather,

the differences will be identified to underscore the difficulties in assessing the progress China has made in

two decades of defense modernization.

The Debilitating Legacy of the Past

Despite differing assessments, both camps agree

that the defense reforms and modernization programs

China’s Defense Modernization:

Aspirations and Capabilities

by Paul H. B. Godwin

Paul H. B. Godwin is a former professor in the National War

College at the National Defense University.
16 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Beijing has undertaken since 1978 encompass far more

than its armed forces. After Soviet assistance ended in

1959–1960, the Chinese defense industrial base and

research and development (R&D) infrastructure

eroded into obsolescence. By the mid-1970s, with the

possible exception of the nuclear weapons programs,

Chinese defense industries were only capable of producing weapons and equipment based on Soviet technologies from the 1950s. Defense R&D also was weakened and was incapable of developing arms to meet

the demands of late 20th century warfare.

Extensive involvement in Mao Zedong’s radical

domestic campaigns, especially the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976, had done equal

harm to the armed forces. As Chairman Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping critically observed in the summer

of 1975, the PLA had degenerated into an aging, overstaffed, obsolescent, arrogant giant incapable of conducting modern warfare.4 The poor performance of

the PLA against Vietnamese forces in 1979 verified

Deng’s critique.5 The PLA may have been capable of

conducting a 1930s-style protracted war of attrition

against a massive Soviet assault designed to defeat and

occupy China, but that was an improbable scenario.

Even if Deng Xiaoping had placed the highest priority on reforming and modernizing the defense

establishment, overcoming the extensive constraints

developed over the previous two decades would have

been difficult. Deng, however, made modernization of

national defense his lowest priority. Deng’s approach

to defense modernization was long term and part of a

broader strategy to bring China into the ranks of the

world’s strongest powers. Rebuilding the defense

establishment would occur not at the expense of

Deng’s broader strategic objectives for China’s future

but in balance with the reform and modernization of

civil industry and science and technology. A selfreliant (to the extent possible) defense industrial

capability was to be derived from the modernization

of China’s civil industries and science and technology

infrastructure.

The armed forces themselves had to be reconstructed and reformed before the PLA could move forward. A new, younger officer corps capable of planning and conducting contemporary and future

warfare had to be created. The armed forces’ organization and training had to be revised before modern

weaponry and equipment could be integrated into

strategy and concepts of operations. Logistics, sustainment, and maintenance procedures had to be prepared

for the complexity of more modern arms. In short,

defense modernization was to be incremental and

based on a long-term development process. Leaders

clearly recognized that no quick fix could overcome

the two decades of neglect and deterioration that had

eroded the PLA ability to conduct modern warfare.

Defense Modernization and Threat

Perception

Changing threat perceptions in the first decade of

reform added to the preexisting constraints on building the PLA into a more capable defense force. In

1978, the national military strategy was one of continental defense against the Soviet Union. The military

objective for this strategy was to defeat a major Soviet

assault as close to China’s borders as possible. Before

this objective was fully integrated into planning, concepts of operations, force deployments, and training,

Beijing’s threat perception changed. In 1985, Deng

Xiaoping concluded that a major, possibly nuclear, war

with the Soviet Union was no longer probable. Future

wars—including a potential military confrontation

with the Soviet Union—were more likely to be limited,

local wars on the periphery of China. PLA planners

therefore shifted their focus to contingency planning

for short, high-intensity wars in which the adversary’s

political objective would be limited and the combat

confined to localized theaters of operations.6

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 came as the PLA

was getting more comfortable with the new national

military strategy. In many ways, this war was a model

of the type of military conflict PLA researchers had

been assessing since 1985. It was a high-intensity war

fought for limited political objectives within a confined geographic area. Nonetheless, Operation Desert

Storm stunned the PLA. Military analysts observed the

effectiveness of high-technology weaponry and equipment implemented with joint service operations and

saw this war as demonstrating that an RMA was under

way. Senior Chinese military leaders concluded that

their armed forces were incapable of conducting military operations at this level of sophistication and

intensity. Chinese forces lacked more than just the

weaponry and critical support systems so central to

the coalition’s overwhelming military success in the

Gulf; the basic PLA military doctrine and concepts of

operations had not kept pace with late 20th century
China’s Defense Modernization 17

warfare. This conclusion led to the modification of the

guiding principle for PLA modernization from local,

limited war to limited war under high-tech conditions.

Even as China pressed forward with two decades

of reform and modernization of its defense establishment, Beijing found that military technologies, doctrines, and concepts of operations for contemporary

and future warfare were outpacing the progress the

PLA was clearly making. Confounding this problem,

these two decades also saw the quasi-alliance that

once linked China and the United States transformed

into mutual suspicion and, in Beijing’s eyes, hostility.7

This perception became evident in years following the

American response to the Tiananmen slaughter of

1989. The exultation that swept over the United States

with the end of the Cold War, the brilliant military

victory over Iraq, and the disintegration of the Soviet

Union led Beijing to conclude that as the remaining

superpower, the United States would seek to dominate

the post-Cold War world.

This perception of the United States was paralleled by the emergence of democracy in Taiwan and

its quest for greater international recognition. As the

image of China became ever more blemished in the

United States, Taiwan’s grew ever more attractive. The

U.S. sale of advanced military technologies to Taiwan,

especially the sale of 150 F–16s in 1992, increased

Chinese suspicion that the United States was covertly

committed to an independent Taiwan. President Lee

Teng-hui’s “private” visit to his alma mater, Cornell

University, in 1995 served to enhance Beijing’s perception of a hostile, duplicitous United States. From the

Chinese perspective, this hostility was confirmed in

1996 when the United States dispatched two aircraft

carrier battlegroups (CVBGs) to the Taiwan area in

response to the Chinese use of tactical ballistic missiles in so-called exercises off Taiwan. Beijing’s blatant

use of coercive diplomacy focused both China and the

United States on the distinct possibility that they

could confront each other in a military conflict over

the future of Taiwan.

The United States as Probable Adversary

Identifying the United States as its most dangerous potential opponent and focusing on the Taiwan

Strait as the most likely arena for confrontation were

to have a critical influence on Chinese defense modernization programs. Whereas the programs followed

after 1985 promised to transform the PLA into a more

capable and flexible defense force, a possible military

confrontation with the United States raised more

complex and difficult issues for the PLA to contemplate. Before the early 1990s, preparing for a local,

limited war was actually considered contingency planning. A number of potential threats existed, but with

the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991, none would

likely require large-scale use of force. Identifying the

United States as a potential adversary, however,

demanded careful assessment of what was required to

prevail against the world’s most advanced military

power in a high-intensity limited war.8

Chinese military analysts’ focus on Taiwan and on

a potential conflict with the United States did not

escape the attention of American observers.9 Cold

War terms began to enter the lexicon of American

analysts, who began asking when China would

become a peer competitor and develop sufficient

force projection capabilities to threaten U.S. interests

in East Asia.10 Thus, by the late 1990s, both the United

States and China viewed each other with increasing

apprehension. The exchange of summit meetings in

1997 and 1998 improved the climate of bilateral relations, but the potential for a military confrontation

over Taiwan was recognized as a continuing hazard to

Sino-American relations. That such a confrontation

would be between two nuclear powers only added to

the underlying tensions.

The Nuclear Dimension11

Allegations that China had acquired detailed

specifications of U.S. nuclear weaponry, including

warhead design and missile technology, through espionage activities heightened the apprehension shared

by Beijing and Washington. These allegations led

some to believe such information could dramatically

increase the accuracy, reliability, and lethality of

China’s nuclear forces, thereby enhancing the threat

they posed to the United States.12

Despite the conclusions of the congressionally

appointed Cox Committee,13 specialists in Chinese

defense modernization programs have not split into

skeptical and optimistic camps in their assessments of

Chinese nuclear forces and strategy. There is consensus that, until recently, Beijing has sought the capability known in Western analyses as minimum deterrence: relying on a small number of warheads capable

of threatening what is hoped will be unacceptable

damage in a second strike after receiving a nuclear

first strike from an adversary. Analysts generally

accept that beyond seeking the status of being a
18 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

nuclear power, China is trying to prevent nuclear

blackmail. From Beijing’s point of view, if an adversary believes it will receive a punitive retaliatory

strike, it will not seek to deter or threaten China with

nuclear forces.

China’s inventory of weapons reflects this minimum deterrence logic. It contains some 20 DF–5

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of

striking targets across the United States. Augmenting

these are 20 DF–4 limited-range ICBMs capable of

striking targets in the U.S. northwest and the northern Pacific. Neither weapon can be maintained at high

levels of readiness because they are liquid-fueled, prohibiting the rocket launchers from staying on

extended alert. The warheads are stored separately

from the launchers, and loading the liquid fuels and

warheads can take 2 to 4 hours. This extended preparation time, together with the inherent inaccuracy of

the weapons, limits their role to a retaliatory “citybusting” strike. Beijing’s declared policy of no first use

probably reflects the deficiencies of its weapons as

much as it does the intent behind their employment.

The second component of China’s nuclear forces

consists of around 100 intermediate-range ballistic

missiles (IRBMs) capable of striking targets in the central and western Pacific. With the exception of the 48

DF–21As, these missiles are liquid-fueled and suffer

the same constraints as the DF–4/5. Some suggest that

the latest Chinese short-range ballistic missile

(SRBM), the DF–11/15, may be nuclear-capable. The

final missile component is formed by Beijing’s single

nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)

carrying 12 missiles of 1,000-mile range. Following a

long and difficult development life, this ship entered

service in the early 1980s. Because it rarely if ever goes

on patrol, China’s SSBN is not considered operational.

Joining the missile forces are approximately 100

B–6 (Tu–16) and A–5 (modified MiG–19) nuclearcapable bombers. Although updated with a variety of

more advanced imported and Chinese-developed

improvements, these aircraft were originally designed

and built with 1950s-era Soviet technologies. Consequently, their ability to penetrate contemporary air

defenses is minimal, limiting their utility as a regional

and tactical nuclear bomber force.

The U.S. Arsenal

Although China definitely has a menacing capability, it confronts approximately 8,000 U.S. strategic

weapons deployed on 575 ICBMs, 102 strategic

bombers, and 17 SSBNs. A single Trident-armed U.S.

SSBN carries 24 multiple-warhead missiles capable of

delivering 144 extremely accurate weapons. Just one

American SSBN can carry more than seven times the

total number of warheads carried on all of China’s

D–5 ICBMs—and at a much higher degree of readiness. These conditions seem to assure deterrence.

Future Chinese nuclear strategy and force structure

may well change. The aging, slow-reacting, inaccurate

liquid-fueled weapons constituting most of China’s

deterrent are to be replaced by far more capable systems. The solid-fueled, tactically mobile, and presumably more accurate DF–31 and DF–41 will replace the

DF–4 and DF–5. Solid fuel provides quicker and more

reliable reaction time than liquid fuel, and tactical

mobility makes the DF–31 and DF–41 less susceptible

to the counterforce capability found in the extreme

accuracy of U.S. and Russian weapons.

A Minimal Deterrence Strategy

A possible review of the strategy guiding China’s

nuclear deterrent may be as important as its system

upgrades. For the past decade, some Chinese military

strategists have been questioning the future viability

of a minimum deterrence strategy.14 The incentive to

revise its core nuclear strategy stems from a variety of

conditions that Beijing considers threatening to the

credibility of its deterrent posture.

First, with ballistic missile defenses on the horizon, the size of China’s strategic forces becomes an

issue. Should the United States deploy even a thin

national missile defense (NMD), the current number

of ICBMs would not satisfy Beijing’s requirement for

an assured second strike. China is therefore under

considerable pressure to increase the number of

deployed weapons. India’s nuclear and ballistic missile

tests add to the pressure for increased deployments. A

sizeable increase could well occur.

Second, ensuring survivability may result in

China’s current SSBN program coming to fruition. A

missile has already been derived to fill the launch

tubes of the DF–31. Although tactically mobile

ground-launched missiles could ease Beijing’s apprehension over the survivability of its deterrent force,

building several SSBNs may add to its confidence that

China’s deterrent force is viewed as credible.

The final issue influencing the future of China’s

nuclear forces is whether minimum deterrence will

be replaced by what Beijing’s strategists refer to as
China’s Defense Modernization 19

limited deterrence (you xian hewei she). Some Chinese strategists consider relying on a single countervalue punitive strike to deter a nuclear adversary to

be passive and incapable of fulfilling what they see as

a future requirement for a more flexible nuclear

response. As conceived by analysts in Beijing, a strategy of limited deterrence would significantly increase

the number of weapons available in order to enable

Beijing to respond to any level of attack, from tactical

to strategic. Increasing the number of weapons

would permit some degree of escalation control,

because China could retain sufficient forces for

extended exchanges.

These same analysts, however, also recognize that

China lacks much of the supporting infrastructure

required for such a strategy. For example, China does

not have the space-based reconnaissance and early

warning systems required to determine in near-realtime the size and origin of the attack. Strategists in

Beijing are well aware of this and numerous other

deficiencies constraining the implementation of a

limited deterrence strategy. Thus, although programs

to correct these constraints are very expensive and

complex to build, it would be wise to assume that they

are under way. Prudence probably will lead the United

States to assume that over the next two decades the

size and capabilities of China’s missile forces will

increase, despite some disagreement over the extent of

the enlargement.15 The number of ICBMs capable of

targeting the United States could substantially

increase, together with the number of IRBMs capable

of targeting U.S. territories and bases in the Pacific.

Some of these weapons will likely be armed with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles

(MIRVs) to ensure that their warheads penetrate ballistic missile defenses.16 The number of conventional

and nuclear-armed SRBMs also will increase as Beijing anticipates the introduction of theater missile

defense (TMD).

Without a major change in the mutual suspicions

and the dynamic driving the military strategies and

objectives of both Beijing and Washington, in the

next two decades, China probably will increase the

number of deployed weapons and possibly alter the

strategy directing their use. At the very least, the

number of weapons will be increased to offset anticipated TMDs and NMDs.

China’s Aspirations

As the PLA focuses more and more directly on

the United States, China’s defense modernization programs— including the growing arms and military

technology linkage with Russia and Israel—have been

observed and analyzed in detail.17 Indeed, since the

mid-1970s, U.S. analysts have continuously scrutinized Beijing’s efforts to bring its defense establishment into the late 20th century, including the acquisition of foreign arms and military technology from

multiple sources.18 The Chinese defense industrial

base has received particular attention.19 With very few

exceptions, these two decades of assessments provide

the skeptics with their evidence to question whether

the aspirations so clearly expounded in Chinese military journals can be achieved in the next decade or

even further in the future.

The skeptic’s conclusion is based upon a number

of variables encompassing factors beyond the acquisition of arms and military technology. Skeptics do not

question that, at least within the PLA’s preeminent

research center, the Academy of Military Science,

there is now clear recognition of the demands of 21st

century warfare. Nor do they disagree with the proposition that since the Gulf War, PLA researchers have

analyzed at great length a combat environment in

which information technologies allow space, air, sea,

and land to be integrated into a single operational

environment.

The RMA has made this battlespace increasingly

transparent, allowing extremely accurate targeting for

over-the-horizon land-, air-, and sea-launched precision-strike munitions. Information technologies not

only guide the ordnance but also are equally valuable

for near-real-time command, control, and intelligence,

allowing dispersed forces and weapons to exploit battlefield opportunities. Because information technologies are critical for the prosecution of contemporary

and future military operations, these analysts conclude

that the forces achieving electromagnetic dominance

would hold the initiative. Forces losing this aspect of

modern warfare will be rendered operationally deaf

and blind. Consequently, the hard damage inflicted by

munitions is intensified by the soft damage made possible by information warfare (IW).

Doctrine and Operations

Chinese assessments of future warfare have created a basic pattern in the doctrinal and operational

aspirations filling the pages of its military journals.
20 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

First, gaining battlespace initiative is viewed as essential in defeating an adversary distinctly superior in the

arms and technologies of warfare. That adversary is

clearly the United States—“our new rivals.”20 Such

operations will require offensive and possibly preemptive operations. This approach to military operations

fits the PLA’s traditions and experience. Mao Zedong

placed the highest emphasis on gaining battlefield initiative, directing his field commanders to set this as a

primary military objective. In particular, his commanders were to win the first battle of an operation,

for this gave them great flexibility. Mao saw flexibility

in employing his forces as the clearest indicator of a

commander’s dominance of the battlefield.21

These operational analyses have folded IW into

their focus on offensive and preemptive operations.

Assessing U.S. military doctrine and operations, current PLA analyses identify the growing dependence of

advanced technology forces on information technologies as a potential critical weakness. In this assessment, dependence on information technologies has

led to nodes linking together systems for acquiring,

processing, and disseminating information. Offensive

or preemptive operations attacking command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

nodes are seen as eroding if not disrupting U.S. hard

attack and joint operational capabilities. Attacking

these critical information nodes is perceived as a force

multiplier—reducing an opponent’s ability to conduct operations will effectively increase the PLA’s

offensive strength.22

Weapons of choice for the hard attack component

of offensive or preemptive operations are standoff,

precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Such munitions

are air-, land-, and sea-launched and are directed to

their targets by various means, including terminal

guidance, satellite guidance, and other informationbased technologies. Of critical importance, these

munitions can be launched outside the adversary’s

defenses. The range and accuracy of cruise missiles has

convinced many Chinese analysts that offensive operations can now be initiated at any time and in any

weather, granting distinct advantage and quite possibly

battlespace initiative to the forces that attack first.

As PLA analysts now view a possible confrontation with the United States, the operational preference

seen in their analyses is clear:

First, the PLA’s core operational doctrine from the

1930s remains central to its assessments: Defeating a

superior adversary requires gaining the initiative in

the opening phase of a campaign.

Second, because technology has greatly enhanced

the speed, accuracy, and lethality of military operations, gaining the initiative in current and future battlespaces requires offensive and possibly preemptive

operations. Hence, PLA planners must consider “gaining the initiative by striking first” (xianfa zhiren).23

Fulfilling the Vision

The skeptics and optimists begin to diverge in

their assessments of when and if the PLA will achieve

the capabilities required to fulfill its vision. Most

observers agree on the doctrinal and operational

focus found in China’s military journals. They do not

all agree on whether or when China’s defense industrial and R&D capabilities can fulfill the vision, even

when they consider imported technologies and technical assistance in their assessments.24 The skeptics are

equally doubtful that the PLA can develop the joint

operational skills required to implement the vision

any time in the foreseeable future. The optimists

argue that the skeptics focus too closely on the more

conventional means of warfare. They agree with the

skeptics that “conventional PLA ground, air and naval

forces are woefully inadequate, and it is difficult to

believe that they will be able to overcome these shortcomings in the short to mid-term.”25

The optimists insist, however, that the skeptics’

myopic focus on conventional forces leads them to

overlook what may well prove to be the most significant aspect of China’s defense modernization programs—the quest to achieve information dominance

(zhixinxiquan), which they argue26 forms the core of

the PLA’s emerging doctrine.27 The optimists therefore focus their attention on new and emerging

aspects of China’s military R&D priorities, which primarily involve developing a spectrum of capabilities

to enable the PLA to locate and destroy critical targets

ranging from satellites to military bases and CVBGs.

Beijing’s defense R&D and industries concentrate on

developing ground-, air-, and space-based sensors to

give the PLA information dominance around China’s

periphery. Information collection is paralleled by

R&D that focuses on information attack by targeting

command and control nodes, computers, and air and

space assets. Hard attack programs are focused on

developing a long-range precision attack capability.
China’s Defense Modernization 21

Both cruise and ballistic missiles are being developed

with the ability to penetrate TMDs and NMDs, allowing no critical target to avoid attack.

These programs are joined by development projects that seek to defend China’s information infrastructure. Major Mark Stokes has detailed the extensive research and development under way to defend

China’s critical assets against low-visibility (stealth)

aircraft and cruise missiles. During the opening phase

of the Gulf War, China observed that the U.S. military

objective was to destroy or degrade Iraq’s air defenses

and command and control centers. Accordingly,

countering air and missile attacks with an integrated

air defense system has extremely high priority in

China’s R&D programs. Ideally, however, the People’s

Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would seek to

destroy the adversary’s weapons before they are

launched from the ground, ships, or aircraft carrier

decks. Counterspace and ballistic missile defenses

form yet another priority.

The great value in Stokes’ work is the detailed listing of China’s defense R&D projects and the particular institutions having priority and joint responsibility

for these programs. Further, he reveals that each program is designed to counter a specific capability

employed primarily by the United States. Nonetheless,

Stokes notes that with such a diverse and demanding

set of R&D programs, success is far from certain. He

cautions, however, that even modest success in a few

areas over the next decade or two “could significantly

hamper U.S. operations in the region.”28

Wendy Frieman,29 Director of the Asia Technology Program at Science Applications International

Corporation, joins Stokes in suggesting that specific

high-priority sectors of China’s science and technology program are more advanced and capable than

skeptics have assessed. She emphasizes that over the

past 15 years, China has undergone a technological

revolution. Frieman recognizes there is little evidence

that this revolution has thus far had a major effect on

China’s defense industries, but she suggests the capability is present, especially in those areas closely associated with the RMA. “Spectacular progress,” she

explains, has been made in such areas as “computer

sciences and artificial intelligence, electrical engineering, telecommunications, physics, and certain

branches of mathematics.”30

Citing Western analysts, Frieman maintains that

the essential discriminators of future battlefields

“involve the ‘soft’ side of military capability: the

telecommunications, sensors, and the entire information technology infrastructure available to the military forces in question.”31 Under these conditions, size

and capability of ships and aircraft will be far less significant than they are today. The ability to destroy or

inflict serious damage to an adversary’s information

infrastructure could well be more important than

holding an overwhelming advantage in firepower.

Further, Frieman suggests that the important technological innovations associated with the RMA are not

derived from deliberately focused defense R&D, as

were Cold War innovations, but from commercial

R&D.32 Thus, Frieman argues, overlooking China’s

potential for placing these achievements at the service

of the defense R&D and industries would be unwise.

The skeptics’ differences with the optimists are

partly found in interpretations of the force structure

the Chinese military leadership seeks. Although not

disagreeing with the RMA focus found in China’s military journals, the skeptics perceive that Beijing will,

over the next 20 to 40 years, seek a multidimensional

force structure capable of conducting joint military

operations across a battlespace spectrum embracing

the electromagnetic, space, atmospheric, land, and sea

environments. This therefore requires them to assess

China’s defense R&D and industrial capabilities

within a broader framework. They assess the wide

range of Beijing’s weapons and technology imports as

demonstrating that China’s defense industrial base

and R&D infrastructure are unable to provide such a

force structure. Beijing has had to import not only

major combatants such as ships, submarines, and aircraft, but also the weapons, target acquisition suites,

and powerplants that make these platforms effective

combat systems. China’s indigenous programs for

major conventional weapons programs also depend

on technology imports, with the domestic content

derived largely from reverse engineering.33 Some

skeptics are particularly doubtful that China can

achieve its objectives in such critical technology areas

as space systems, sensors, lasers, guidance, navigation

and vehicle control, and information system technologies.34 Thus, the skeptics insist that with the single exception of China’s ballistic missile and nuclear

weapons programs, the PLA’s most advanced military

capabilities either have been acquired through purchases or have originated in imported technologies.
22 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Given the divergence between the optimists and

skeptics, how should one approach the question of

assessing China’s military capabilities in the next

decade? The skeptics and optimists agree that Beijing

does not anticipate transforming the entire PLA into a

21st century defense force any time in the foreseeable

future. Nor is Beijing seeking to replicate the U.S.

armed forces, especially the force projection capabilities that drive so much of the American force structure. Skeptics and optimists agree that Chinese concerns are focused on their periphery and maritime

claims. Of greater concern to both skeptics and optimists is the distinct possibility that selected advanced

technology programs and air, naval, ground, and missile force units have been given priority based upon

potential near-term needs.

Focused Acquisitions and

Development Programs

The most problematic contingency the PLA anticipates is a potential confrontation with the United

States over Taiwan. In this scenario, the entire range of

technological disadvantages the PLA faces becomes

part of the scenario. In addition to opposing the

world’s most advanced conventional and strategic

forces, Chinese military planners have to integrate the

consequences of future U.S. TMD and NMD into their

planning. Furthermore, whereas Yugoslavia’s ability to

withstand NATO’s precision-guided munitions during

the Kosovo intervention may give some comfort to

planners assessing China’s defensive capabilities, it also

indicates that Taiwan’s ability to resist air and missile

attack is greater than Beijing would hope.35

If the single most dangerous potential military

confrontation for China is with the United States over

Taiwan, secondary priority is given to possible conflicts over Chinese maritime and territorial claims in

the South China Sea. Nevertheless, China’s naval and

air power deficiencies would only come into play

should the PLA confront either the combined forces

of states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) or the United States. Although there is no

resolution in sight, the participation of ASEAN in

seeking to minimize the likelihood of a major clash

suggests this probability is extremely low. A third priority would be China’s inner Asian borders. Because

Beijing continues diplomatic work to minimize the

potential for large-scale conflict on these borders, the

prospect for major confrontations is very small.

Should a conflict break out, these borders can be

defended with the current force structure. Assuming

the PLA did not contemplate force projection beyond

50 miles and applied appropriate strategy and operational concepts to the evaluation, the kinds of reforms

and limited modernization of weapons and equipment implemented and under way since the mid1980s are sufficient for a defensive land war. Under

these conditions, quantity can compensate for any

qualitative advantages the PLA may face.

Taiwan: The Troubling Scenario

Conflict across the Taiwan Strait is the most disturbing potential scenario. Although agreeing that

Taiwan has top priority in PLA contingency planning,

skeptics and optimists diverge in their assessments of

PLA capability to conduct the strategy and military

operations implied in China’s military journals and

supported by its operational traditions. The greatest

obstacle to Beijing being able to subdue Taiwan by

military force is the almost certain participation of

the United States in the island’s defense.36 Certainly,

PLA contingency planning has to assume a decision

by the United States to intervene militarily.

Planning for a probable U.S. involvement appears

to drive the PLA quest for a quick, decisive neutralization of Taiwan’s ability to defend itself before the

United States can intervene. Blockades, low-level

harassment of Taiwan’s shipping lanes, and frequent

crossing of the Taiwan Strait’s imaginary center line

with air and naval combatants would alert the United

States to possible escalation and provide time for a

buildup of deployed forces and concentrated intelligence collection. Such low-intensity military activities

would provide strategic warning to both Taiwan and

the United States.

A military strategy designed to present the

United States with a fait accompli has a specific political objective. Assuming the strategy was successful,

the United States would be required to roll back the

military success China had already achieved rather

than assisting in Taiwan’s defense. This scenario

would almost certainly require the United States to

attack PLA command and control centers, missile

sites, air defenses, air bases, and naval facilities. Such

actions present the possibility of a wider war than

would a military confrontation confined to the

defense of Taiwan. If the United States did not take
China’s Defense Modernization 23

military action, Beijing could well anticipate Taipei’s

capitulation. Seeking rapid suppression of Taiwan’s

defenses would therefore in part be designed to deter

the United States by raising the political and military

cost of intervention.

A Potential Taiwan Scenario for 2010

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has

already assessed the dimensions of a potential PLA

campaign in a report to Congress.37 The DOD

appraisal of security in the Taiwan Strait states is that

over the next decade, China’s SRBM force is expected

to “grow substantially” and that land attack cruise

missiles (LACMs) will enter the PLA inventory.

Although expressing doubt that the PLA could coordinate missile attacks with concurrent military operations, the DOD report states that these weapons

would be most effective when used in “high-volume,

precision strikes against priority military and political

targets, including air defense facilities, airfields, Taiwan’s C2 [command and control] infrastructure and

naval facilities.” Furthermore, it assesses that missile

defenses “will not sufficiently offset the overwhelming

advantage in offensive missiles which Beijing is projected to possess in 2005.”38

DOD’s assessment, however, raises a more complex problem for the PLA to counter. Although

China’s SRBM and future LACM forces will play a

central role in quickly subduing Taiwanese defenses,

their function is to open the way for follow-on operations. Accomplishing Beijing’s military objective

depends upon the success of these operations in

exploiting the suppression of Taiwanese defensive

capabilities. Consequently, the campaign’s success

ultimately depends on the cumulative result of

sequential military operations.

With so much depending on missile forces to suppress Taiwan’s defenses in the critical opening phase of

a campaign, three issues become central: (1) target

acquisition, (2) missile accuracy, and (3) the PLA ability to coordinate missile attack with other concurrent

military operations. A fourth issue to be addressed is

the potential role to be played by IW.

Target Acquisitions

Obtaining detection and tracking sensors is high

among PLA priorities.39 Space-based and airborne sensors are being developed, with Beijing working on

reconnaissance satellites and long-range drones. Airborne early warning (AEW) capabilities are entering

the PLAAF with the acquisition of the Israeli Phalcon

AEW system mounted on Russian Il–76 aircraft. The

Navy is acquiring the British Skymaster radar system

for surface surveillance. These emerging capabilities

must be joined with China’s access to commercial satellite imagery, with resolution down to 2.5 meters. Taken

collectively, the PLA will soon be able to detect and

track targets and to develop digital maps for mission

planning, target identification, and missile guidance.

Missile Accuracy

China has sought to improve the accuracy of its

strategic, theater, tactical, and cruise missiles for many

years. Presumably, the PLA is hoping to achieve the

capability to pinpoint a target40 within 50 meters for

its tactical and cruise missiles. The degree of its accuracy significantly affects the missile’s mission.

Extremely accurate missiles can be used to cut runways and damage specific port facilities, air defense

radar sites, surface-to-air missile sites, and other targets. The less accurate the warhead, the more missiles

will have to be assigned to the target, thereby significantly increasing the numbers of weapons required

for the operation. Less accuracy also increases potential collateral damage, which Beijing may wish to

avoid for political reasons.

Joint Military Operations, Logistics, and

Sustainability

Reports in Chinese military journals reflect the

difficulties the PLA is facing as it attempts to prepare

for joint operations. Updating and reorganizing logistics to sustain joint warfare has proven equally difficult.41 Nonetheless, the fact that the PLA considers

joint operations and logistics to be a requirement for

current and future warfare is significant. Units

assigned to the Taiwan contingency plausibly could

receive priority in terms of weapons, equipment,

training, logistics, and sustainability in preparation

for a possible military confrontation. Further, the

DOD report notes that the PLA is considering implementing a joint command structure at the theater

level that would exercise operational command over

all forces assigned to the theater.42 This concept has

been discussed since the late 1980s; thus, the theater

responsible for Taiwan (Nanjing Military Region)

probably would be the most likely location for setting

up and exercising a joint command.
24 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Information Operations

Over the past decade, China’s military researchers

have spent considerable effort investigating the various facets of IW. Speculating on IW has developed

into a veritable cottage industry in PLA research centers, especially the Academy of Military Science.43 In

the process, Chinese authors have incorporated the

principles found in U.S. concepts for the role of information operations (IO) in future warfare in their

publications. Consequently, much of the language and

terminology that Chinese analysts use reflects the

influence of American concepts. However, grasping

the fundamental principles that could be used to

implement IO does not equal having the capability to

do so. Nonetheless, China is investigating both defensive and offensive information operations.

The DOD report states that China’s primary

effort is focused on defensive measures, including

electronic countermeasures. Chinese technological

capabilities augmented by the procurement of Western technology make offensive operations plausible in

the future. These operations could include computer

warfare, electronic warfare, and antisatellite (ASAT)

programs. Ground-based stations can be used to jam

and interfere with satellite communications, and

China now has the ability to track satellites with accuracy sufficient for targeting. A nuclear-armed ballistic

missile can damage a satellite, but China also is

researching lasers as an ASAT weapon. The report

suggests that China may even now have the capability

to damage a satellite’s optical sensor.44 These developments strongly indicate that by 2010, the PLA’s ability

to conduct IW as a component of a cross-Strait scenario may be quite robust.

A 2005–2010 Taiwan Scenario

When focused on future PLA capabilities, the elements of a possible Chinese strategy become ominously evident. Although missiles form the central

core of the strategy, the follow-on military operations

provide potency to the strategy. The most dangerous

scenario can be outlined as follows: 45

■ Initial Attack. Cruise and ballistic missile attacks would be

coordinated with IO to quickly degrade Taiwan’s command

and control capabilities, air defenses, and early warning

radar systems. These attacks would be paralleled by missile

strikes on air bases and naval facilities. If successful, this

opening phase would temporarily paralyze Taiwan’s air

force, significantly degrade ground-based air defenses, and

damage naval vessels in port.

■ Second Round of Attacks. The second phase would exploit

the paralyzed air defenses, with aircraft striking the same

and additional targets using conventional munitions and

PGMs. Special operations forces could strike at specific targets, especially command and control centers, radar sites,

and other facilities essential for a coordinated defense of

the island but that missile attacks could not neutralize. This

second set of attacks would make it very difficult for Taiwan’s air and naval forces to sustain the operations

required to achieve and maintain air superiority and sea

control of the Taiwan Strait. Without air superiority, Taiwanese naval forces would be dangerously exposed to

standoff antiship cruise missiles, while air-dropped mines

would threaten their entrance and exit from port facilities.

When these dangers are heightened by aggressive operations by the sizable Chinese submarine force, the ability of

Taiwan’s navy to control the seas adjacent to the island

would be significantly eroded.

■ Final Assault. Assuming China gains air superiority and sea

control, Taiwan would be open to escalating attack, including the insertion of airborne forces. If the shock effect of

the previous two phases were effective enough, the airborne assault forces would not face a coordinated defense.

Further, if the PLAAF had gained air superiority, then the

inserted forces would have the distinct advantage provided

by close air support and battlefield interdiction strikes. The

lack of effective command and control, together with the

inability to defend against air attack, would counteract Taiwan’s ground forces manpower advantage.

Assessing the Scenario

Evaluating the probability of success in such a

complex scenario is problematic. Even though Stokes

recognizes the difficulties involved in such an intricate

campaign, he believes that China’s military R&D programs and the PLA concepts of operations are sufficiently mature that they could “decisively tip the

cross-Strait military balance in Beijing’s favor.”46

Three years ago, Jencks speculated on a similar scenario (among others) and suggested that—although it

was very unlikely to succeed—it is “so crazy it just

might work.”47

The simple reality is restricted to unclassified

information; it is impossible to judge whether in 10

years the PLA will have the capability to conduct a

campaign so dependent on both initial success and

the follow-on sequential operations. Beyond the

issues of the arms and military technologies required

for success, there are questions of training, command

and control, logistics, and all the other non-hardware

facets of military operations required to transform
China’s Defense Modernization 25

concepts of operations into a successful campaign.

Equally important is the extent to which Taiwanese

forces will have adjusted to the capabilities represented by improvements in the PLA, including the

deployment of an effective missile defense system. Ten

years is a long time to forecast, and it would be a

major error to conjecture a decade ahead based upon

principles that apply today.

Similar questions surround American participation in the defense of Taiwan—a definite focus of Beijing’s concerns. R&D programs under way in China

are almost certainly conceived as preparation for a

possible confrontation involving the United States.

U.S. dependence on overseas basing and CVBGs for

force projection offers specific targets for PLA planners. Space-based sensors capable of tracking U.S.

naval forces joined with long-range precision strike

munitions are a definite PLA priority and present an

emerging threat to U.S. operations in the western

Pacific. Looking ahead a decade, if these programs are

coupled with improvements in the PLA air and naval

forces, as they almost certainly will be, then operating

several hundred miles off China’s coast could become

far more hazardous than it is today. U.S. base facilities

would be equally threatened.

This same decade, however, will see significant

improvements in U.S. defensive and offensive capabilities. TMD and NMD should be likened to the tip of a

technology-driven iceberg. Given the American technological and industrial advantage, defensive and

offensive IO could be many times more robust than

they are today. China’s search for information dominance may well run into an impenetrable American

electronic wall, even as the PLA information defenses

become easier to penetrate and degrade. U.S. strategic

and tactical reconnaissance and strike capabilities will

be far more advanced than demonstrated in the Gulf

War and after. Chinese naval and air forces could be

dangerously exposed from distances far greater than is

the norm today.

Nevertheless, a decade hence is just too far for

accurate prediction. Rather, when focused on specific

scenarios, such prognostications should be viewed as

potentially valuable speculations. Here, the optimists

have performed a significant service by requiring the

skeptics to think more carefully about China’s future

capabilities, especially the implications of research

and development in those areas of technology and

warfare associated with the RMA.

Prospects and Implications

The optimists made a valuable contribution by

focusing research on Chinese high-technology programs, especially those that could be used to exploit

what strategists in Beijing interpret as U.S. weakness.

Nonetheless, what must be kept in mind when assessing Chinese military capabilities is the distinction

between long-term trends and current or near-term

capabilities. A vast gap exists between the vision of a

future the PLA describes in many journal essays and

the capability of China’s defense industries and armed

forces to achieve the vision.

The record of Chinese defense industries in

development and innovation supports the skeptics’

assessment that bridging the aspirations-capabilities

gap will be difficult. Nevertheless, when looking a

decade or two into the future, advances in the civil

sector of the economy, together with extensive foreign military technology assistance, have the potential to reverse this dismal history. Such potential must

be taken into account in assessing the future of

China’s defense programs.

Although Chinese planners are not even attempting to transform most of the PLA into a late 20th century defense force, they definitely are striving to bring

selected units to a higher level of competence and

readiness. Acquisitions, indigenous production, and

development programs demonstrate that the objective

is to build a multidimensional force that is capable of

conducting joint operations by integrating air, sea,

and land forces. The current focus is on a Taiwan contingency, but the emerging force structure could be

employed in the South China Sea and elsewhere on

China’s maritime periphery.

Chinese acquisitions and development programs

provide ample evidence of Beijing’s intent. Although

currently few in number, procurement and construction of fourth-generation fighter aircraft, aerial refueling, airborne warning and control system aircraft,

and advanced surface and subsurface naval combatants demonstrate PLA priorities. China’s emphasis on

cruise and tactical ballistic missiles, including a longrange reconnaissance strike capability, is part of this

overall package. These programs are linked with projects to strengthen capabilities in IW, electronic warfare, imagery reconnaissance, early warning, command and control, surveillance, and sensors for

detection and targeting. Concentrating on software

deficiencies accompanies enhancing the means to
26 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

conduct war. Exercises designed to advance joint

operational capabilities together with revisions to its

logistics and sustainment management demonstrate

that the PLA is seeking to correct these critical defects.

Focused efforts to improve the effectiveness of

PLA conventional general-purpose forces are complemented by China’s longstanding commitment to

building a more robust strategic deterrent. Tactically

mobile strategic weapons in greater numbers, some

armed with multiple warheads, will constitute a more

viable deterrent than China currently possesses.

A decade hence will not see the PLA transformed

into a military superpower capable of global power

projection. This is not the purpose of the defense

modernization programs Beijing has pursued since

the late 1970s. China’s objective is to be capable of

operating much more effectively on its periphery, and

this requires a multidimensional force structure.

Assuming current trends continue and the diverse

advanced technology programs under way have reasonable success, Beijing’s armed forces will be

approaching such a capability—and under the shield

of a more credible strategic deterrent.

Given the current state of Sino-American relations, the improving Chinese military capabilities are

troubling. Beijing continues its efforts to intimidate

Taipei with the threat of military force. PLA publications continue to assess ways to exploit the weaknesses they see when U.S. forces are engaged in military operations far from home and are dependent on

foreign basing rights. For the time being, this stance

reflects more a deterrent strategy than a war plan. A

decade ahead, will such a conclusion be viable? 

Even if the Taiwan dilemma is somehow resolved,

Beijing will sustain its defense modernization programs. The Chinese quest for international status and

the requirement to defend the country’s interests

around its extensive maritime periphery require powerful, flexible forces. When China’s inner Asian borders are added to this pattern, strong ground forces

are also required. Whether these developments will be

for good or ill is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if the current hostility and suspicion marking

Sino-American relations continues, the future will be

covered by an ominous shadow.

Notes

1 I am grateful to Bates Gill for introducing the “aspirations

versus capabilities” concept in his “Chinese Military-Technical

Development: The Record of Western Assessments, 1979–1999,”

delivered at the 1999 CAPS/RAND Conference, State of the PLA

on the Eve of the Millennium: A Retrospective of the Last Twenty

Years, Radisson-Barcelo Hotel, Washington, DC, July 8–11, 1999. 2 See, for example, Michael Pillsbury, “PLA Capabilities in

the 21st Century: How Does China Assess Its Future Security

Needs,” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the

21st Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, December 1999), 93. 3 This term is used by John Culver, “Session 5: Defense Policy and Posture II,” in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald Montaperto,

eds., Strategic Trends in China (Washington, DC: Institute for

National Security Studies, National Defense University, 1998), 69. 4 Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at an Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee” (July 14,

1975), in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing, July 1, 1983), in Joint Publications Research Service,

China Report (hereafter JPRS-China), October 31, 1983, 19. 5 See Harlan W. Jencks, “China’s ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam:

A Military Assessment,” Asian Survey 19, no. 8 (August 1979):

801–815.

6 See Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Military Strategy Revised:

Local and Limited War,” The Annals of the American Academy of

Political and Social Science 519 (January 1992): 191–201, for an

analysis of the logic behind this shift and the consequences for

PLA doctrine and concepts of operations. 7 For a current assessment of PLA views of the United States,

see David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Views the World:

Ambivalent Security,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter

1999–2000): 62–67. 8 For a recent discussion of the United States as a military

adversary, see Yao Youzhi and Zhao Dexi (both from the PLA

Academy of Military Science), “How Will China Handle War in

the 21st Century,” Liaowang, No. 2 (January 10, 2000), in FBISChina, February 14, 2000. 9 See James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the

Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: National Defense University

Press, 1997), for assessments of the 1995–1996 confrontation. 10 Culver, “Session 5: Defense Policy and Posture II,” 71. 11 For a recent appraisal, see Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s

Nuclear Forces: An Assessment,” Current History 98, no. 629

(Summer 1999): 260–265. 12 United States House of Representatives, Select Committee

on United States National Security and Military/Commercial

Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, The Cox Report on

Chinese Espionage, prepared by Representative Christopher Cox

(R–CA) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May

1999) [hereafter cited as the Cox Committee Report]. 13 Ibid. 14 For an illuminating analysis of the ways in which Chinese

strategists are approaching the issue of a revised strategy for their

country’s nuclear forces, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New

‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995–1996): 5–42. Much of the

discussion below is drawn from this essay.
China’s Defense Modernization 27

15 See, for example, Tom Woodrow, “Session 6: Nuclear Issues,”

in Binnendijk and Montaperto, Strategic Trends in China, 87. 16 Although China has had the capability to develop multiple

reentry vehicles for some years, it has not yet done so. Western

analysts believe Chinese deployment of MIRVs for mobile missiles

to be many years in the future. Jeremiah Commission, The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment on the Implications of China

Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information on the Development of Future Chinese Weapons, Key Findings, April 21, 1999. 17 For recent analyses, see, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,

Chinas Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in

the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994);

Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack,

China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA:

RAND, 1995); Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Lilley and Downs, eds.,

Crisis in the Taiwan Strait; David S. Shambaugh and Richard Yang,

eds., China’s Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1997); Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and

the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W. W.

Norton & Co., 1997); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds.,

China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,

1999); James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The People’s

Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND

1999); Srikanth Kondapalli, China’s Military: The PLA in Transition (New Delhi: Knowledge World in association with the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 1999); and Wortzel, ed., The

Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century. 18 See, for example, Paul H. B. Godwin, Doctrine, Strategy, and

Ethic: The Modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: The Air University Press, 1977); Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism

in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1982); David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1983), Paul H. B. Godwin, ed., The Chinese Defense

Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s (Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1983); and Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 19 In addition to individual chapters in the works cited above,

see Paul Humes Folta, From Swords to Plowshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), and

Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein, eds., Mixed Motives,

Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China (Boulder, CO:

Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997). 20 See, for example, Senior Colonel Huang Xiang, “Holding

the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations, Giving

Full Play to Our Advantages to Defeat Our Enemy: A Study of the

Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of Our Army,” Zhongguo

Junshi Kexue, No. 4 (November 20, 1996), FBIS-China, November

20, 1996. 21 Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), “On Protracted War” (May

1938), in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972) [hereafter cited as Selected Military

Writings], especially 228–254. 22 See, for example, an untitled article presented by Professor

Liu Kejun at the September 15, 1997, Defense Modernization

Symposium organized by the Chinese Electronics Society, Beijing

Yuguangtong S&T Development Center, and Zhongguo Dianzi

Bao held at the PLA General Staff Department Research Institute

61, reported in Zhongguo Dianzi Bao (October 24, 1997), in FBISChina, January 14, 1998. For an assessment of PLA information

warfare developments, see James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” in Mulvenon and Yang, The People’s Liberation

Army in the Information Age, 175–186. 23 See Lu Linzhi, “Preemptive Strikes Crucial in Limited High

Tech Wars,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-China,

February 14, 1996. 24 For a detailed analysis of this question, see Bates Gill, “Chinese Military-Technical Development: The Record for Western

Assessments.” 25 Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College, September 1999), 5. 26 Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future Warfare

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997). 27 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 9. 28 Ibid., 140.

29 Wendy Frieman, “The Understated Revolution in Chinese

Science and Technology: Implications for the PLA in the TwentyFirst Century,” in Lilley and Shambaugh, China’s Military Faces the

Future, 247–267. Frieman has consistently been an optimist in

assessing the development of China’s defense industries. See, for

example, “Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernization,” in

Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr., and Bruce W. Watson, eds., Chinese Military Reforms: International and Domestic Implications (Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 1986). 30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 248.

32 Ibid.

33 For a recent analysis of these issues, see John Frankenstein,

“China’s Defense Industries: A New Course?” and Rear Admiral

Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.), “Systems Integration in China’s People’s Liberation Army,” both in Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age; and Richard A.

Bitzinger, “Going Places or Running in Place: China’s Efforts to

Leverage Advanced Technologies for Military Use,” presented at the

Conference on the People’s Liberation Army, September 10–12,

1999, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 34 Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin, “Advanced Military Technologies and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the

21st Century,” in Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st

Century, especially 176–184. 35 For an interesting assessment that includes but goes

beyond the military issues involved, see Arthur Waldron, “The

Kosovo War: Implications for Taiwan,” presented at the Conference on the People’s Liberation Army, September 10–12, 1999,

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 36 The primary foundation for this expectation is the Taiwan

Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 (Public Law 96–8). The TRA stipulates that the United States will “consider any attempt to determine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means ... a threat to

the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave

concern to the United States.” Further, Congress and the administration will “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and

defense services as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain

a sufficient self-defense capability.”
28 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

37 U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursuant to

the FY99 Appropriations Bill: The Security Situation in the Taiwan

Strait (DefenseLINK, February 26, 1999). [Hereafter Report. Page

numbers refer to the version downloaded from

http://www.defenselink.mil/. 38 Ibid., 18.

39 Ibid.

40 Circular error probable (CEP) is the radius of a circle

within which 50 percent of the warheads fired will achieve impact. 41 See, for example, Tai Ming Cheung, “Reforming the

Dragon’s Tail: Chinese Military Logistics in the Era of High-Technology Warfare and Market Economics,” in Lilley and Shambaugh, China’s Military Faces The Future, 228–246.

42 DOD Report, 15. 43 For a thorough analysis of PLA work on information warfare, see James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” in

Mulvenon and Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army in the

Information Age, 175–186. 44 DOD Report, 11. 45 This scenario draws from DOD Report, 18; Harlan W.

Jencks, “Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the Taiwan

Strait,” in Lilley and Downs, Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, 131–165,

and Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 136–140. 46 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, 140. 47 Jencks, “Wild Speculations,” 160. Jencks discusses several

scenarios in his interesting speculation.
29

Despite the beginning of the new millennium, some

fundamental policy dilemmas in U.S. relations with

China and Japan remain unsettled and have implications for Korean security. One of the principal foreign

policy challenges for the United States during the

1990s has been how to give China implicit recognition

for its rising status and influence and assuage its deepseated suspicions that America’s post-Cold War

alliance with Japan was targeted at it, while at the

same time offering Japan security commitments and

credibility and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.1

China’s policy conundrum since the Tiananmen

Square incident in 1989 has been that the United

States remains the country that is most important to

its economic development and foreign policy but, at

the same time, is posing the greatest threat to continued communist rule in China and to prospects for

reunification with Taiwan.2 Finally, although U.S.

alliance ties with Japan and the Republic of Korea

(ROK) are strong and are likely to remain so in the

foreseeable future, will they continue to be robust

enough to withstand future regional challenges and

crises in which the “China factor” looms largest?

These security uncertainties and policy dilemmas

have combined to produce sophisticated and multifaceted hedging strategies by the states in that region,

as the recent increase in high-level diplomatic and

military-to-military contacts shows. In particular,

concerns about how best to cope with the challenge of

an ascendant China to regional prosperity and security have occupied these states’ strategic plans. Korea

is no exception to this trend.

To assess the security implications of China’s

modernization of its Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA)

for U.S. allies in East Asia, it is first necessary to take

stock of the linkage between Sino-U.S. relations and

the relations of both countries with Korea and Japan.

In light of the sustained discord between the United

States and China in the 1990s, their policies and interests concerning the Korean Peninsula are far more

likely to diverge than to converge in the future, especially when it comes to concrete policy issues and

longer-term agenda. This reality could complicate

Korean security planning, because that requires cooperation—or at least acquiescence—on the part of

both the United States and China to resolve an array

of relevant issues. Korea’s optimal approach would be

to continue to differentiate how it relates to the

United States and China, even if it continuously and

systematically pursues a specific set of confidencebuilding measures (CBMs) with the latter.

Balancing U.S. Alliance and Chinese

Cooperation: Korea’s Emerging

Security Challenge

by Taeho Kim

Taeho Kim is a Senior China Analyst and Director of Research

Cooperation for the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)

in Seoul, and Nonresidential Research Associate at the Mershon

Center of Ohio State University. 
30 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Diverging U.S and Chinese Interests

in Korea

One useful way to assess the future of East Asian

stability—in light of the perceptions of the states in

this region about security uncertainties—is to inquire

about the health of the Sino-U.S. relationship. China

and the United States are the two most powerful

actors in that region as well as on the Korean Peninsula. Ideally, an amicable relationship between the

United States and China, especially renewed security

cooperation, would contribute to regional and peninsular stability and the attainment of their respective

objectives in East Asia.

In reality and contrary to popular belief, the

prospects for improved Sino-U.S. relations remain

cloudy, if not bleak, for the foreseeable future.3 Few of

their outstanding issues—including the status of Taiwan, human rights, trade, nuclear espionage, and proliferation—show signs of early or conclusive resolution. On the contrary, there seem to exist some

fundamental differences between the two countries—

primarily in terms of their political systems, social

values, and strategic objectives. Given the ongoing

and internal political dynamics in Beijing and Washington, compromise on these differences will be difficult to achieve in the near term.

Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989, there has

been widespread discussion—accentuated by events

in 1999—among Chinese strategists and scholars over

how to assess a series of “adverse currents” in China’s

external security environment and what kinds of policy options Beijing should choose to cope with these

currents, separately or collectively. One of the few

emerging consensus opinions in China—at least discernible to the outside analyst—is that U.S. global

“hegemonic” behavior is the source of the threat to

“world peace” (i.e., China’s interests).

Such U.S. global behavior, some Chinese leaders

and strategists conclude, clashes directly with China’s

national interests (such as economic priority, reunification with Taiwan, and continued rule of the Communist Party) and strategic visions (such as multipolarity, anti-hegemony, anti-power politics, and the

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). In particular,

U.S. regional “hegemonic” behavior in East Asia—the

locus of Chinese diplomatic and economic activity—

includes the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance

and their joint development of theater missile defense

(TMD), and, most seriously, its continued weapon

sales to Taiwan.4

The depth of Beijing’s fear of an American dominated world is manifest in such newly minted code

phrases as “new hegemonism,” “the Asian edition of

NATO,” “a global intervention mechanism,” “Asian

Kosovo,” and “the next Serbia.”5 Particularly worrisome to China’s leadership is a possible connection

between the strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance and the

Taiwan question, from the scope of regional contingencies in “areas surrounding Japan” to TMD and

Taipei’s overall relations with Washington and Tokyo.

In short, China finds the prospects of a re-armed

Japan unnerving and a Taiwan armed with TMD

unacceptable. The United States is the key link to

either of these scenarios.6

The Korean Peninsula also occupies a central place

in the crowded bilateral and regional agendas of the

United States and China. Despite the long list of their

disputes at both levels, China and the United States

have time and again argued—at the official and

declaratory level, at least—that they share a set of

common interests over Korea—namely stability on the

peninsula, dialogue between the North (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and the South, and

peaceful reunification. Yet, in light of their vast differences in strategic visions, political systems, social values, and objectives, let alone diverging interests over

bilateral and regional issues, it is far more logical and

more empirically valid to say that the United States

and China are likely to remain divergent over peninsula issues as well. Beneath the façade of the “strategic

constructive relationship,” their interests could significantly conflict with one another over some concrete

issues and longer-term agendas. Prominent examples

include, but are not limited to, a North Korean contingency, future status of the U.S. force in Korea, the

North’s possible possession of weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), and the military capability and

strategic orientation of a unified Korea.

The U.S. commitment to Korean defense and unification remains strong and is highly likely to remain

so in the future. But their divergent perceptions of

(and policies toward) a series of recent North Korean

crises illustrate that the South Korean and U.S. Governments need to coordinate their policies toward

North Korea more tightly and coherently in the

future. For example, the emphasis on a “soft landing”—which is not a policy—may mitigate the consequences of an economically crippled North Korea, but
Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge 31

it by no means constitutes a viable long-term strategy

for either alliance maintenance or regional security.

On the contrary, as long as this concept persists, both

the ROK and the United States will not only be subject to various domestic criticisms, primarily for being

“soft” on North Korea’s brinkmanship, but also their

policy toward North Korea will remain adrift as a

consequence.

This does not bode well for the long-term development of the U.S.-ROK alliance, especially if the

parties have to prepare for the day when they “run out

of enemies.”7 Korea needs to take into consideration

these kinds of specific policy issues and longer-term

questions when formulating its strategic plan for the

future security environment.

The “China Factor”

Fundamental to understanding the importance

of the China factor in the South Korean security calculus are:

■ China’s geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula,

■ China’s continuing influence on North Korea,

■ Growing bilateral ties between China and South Korea, and 

■ Strained relations between Beijing and Washington.

China is certain to remain a major player in

Korean affairs, including the unification process. To

understand why, a brief overview of Sino-South

Korean relations leading to normalization in 1992 and

of China’s place in the South’s diplomatic and security

calculus in the post-Cold War period is necessary.

For most of the Cold War, relations between

China and South Korea were locked in mutual hostility and suspicion. The Chinese intervention in the

Korean War, the bipolar configuration of the world’s

power structure, and China’s continuing rivalry with

the Soviet Union for influence over the Korean Peninsula made relations between the ROK and Beijing a

negligible factor for three decades after the cessation

of hostilities on the peninsula. Because China recognized North Korea as the only Korean state on the

peninsula, there were no contacts between South

Korea and China until the late 1970s.

Toward the end of the 1970s, however, two principal developments presaged major changes in China’s

traditional stance toward North and South Korea. One

was China’s adoption of reform and the “open door”

policy in 1978, which allowed unofficial and indirect

trade between China and South Korea to begin, albeit

slowly. During the early to mid-1980s, China gradually

but unmistakably pursued a de facto “two-Korea” policy, which included cultural, academic, and sports contacts with South Korea. Another principal development was the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in

the mid- and late 1980s, which undercut the rationale

behind their rivalry over North Korea.

By 1988, the growth of still unofficial but substantial ties between China and South Korea made their

improving relations unmistakable. Indirect trade

between the two countries exceeded $3 billion; China

participated in the Seoul 1986 Asian Games and 1988

Olympics; and the ROK government announced a

major diplomatic initiative known as “Northern

Diplomacy,” or nordpolitik. Northern Diplomacy, in

particular, was aimed at creating a condition favorable

to peaceful unification of the Koreas through

improved ties with then-socialist countries. Beginning

with Hungary in January 1989, South Korea established diplomatic relations with all East European

states, the Soviet Union (September 1990), and China

(August 1992).

For Beijing, the primary factor motivating the

decision to normalize relations with South Korea was

the domestic economic imperative. The passing of the

Cold War not only enhanced the value of economic

ties with South Korea, but also saw the end of the

Sino-Soviet/Russian rivalry over North Korea.

Another important motive for Beijing was to expand

China’s diplomatic influence across the region—

which had suffered from post-Tiananmen isolation—

by consolidating ties with neighbors such as South

Korea, a major regional U.S. ally.

To the government in Seoul, normalizing relations with China was a diplomatic tour de force. First

and foremost, normalization helped culminate its

Northern Diplomacy initiative and symbolized its victory in the decade-long diplomatic competition with

North Korea. Furthermore, the ROK hoped normalization would help to bring China’s influence to bear

on North Korea to facilitate dialogue with the South,

open up its society, and restrain its provocative

actions against the South. Less immediate but still

important considerations were the economic and

political benefits that flowed from Seoul’s strengthened relations with China.

Sino-South Korean relations have expanded rapidly on most fronts. Bilateral trade reached $6.4 billion
32 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

in 1992, the year that diplomatic relations were established. Bilateral trade for the past three years reached

$23.7 billion, $18.4 billion, and $20.2 billion,8 respectively, making China and South Korea each other’s

third largest trading partner. Over half a million people visit the other country annually, and passenger airlines now make about 100 round-trip flights over the

Yellow Sea each week. By the end of 1998, over 1,500

Korean companies were operating in China, and numbers of registered, long-term Korean residents in

China exceeded 35,000, including 12,000 students.

Growing economic and social ties between China

and South Korea are further buttressed by an increase

in investment, tourism, and sea/air routes. To help consolidate these growing ties, the three most senior Chinese officials (President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng,

and CCP Standing Committee member Hu Jintao)

have visited Seoul. These remarkable developments

between the two nations over the past few years have

led to a shift in the South Korean public’s perception of

China as now a benign, pragmatic economic partner.

Regarding how this new perception of China

affects the U.S.-ROK alliance, a recent series of surveys

of the Korean public, media, and policy elite indicates

that the public remains “somewhat critical” of the

United States and “fairly friendly” toward China. However, members of the ROK policy elite air the opposite

view—that is, they are “somewhat critical” of China

and “fairly friendly” toward the United States.9 The

media are divided between “progressive” (pro-China)

and “conservative” (pro-American) newspapers, even

if the majority of all major Korean newspapers are

critical of U.S. trade policy toward Korea. Interestingly

enough, younger Koreans, who are most vocal about

U.S. policy toward Korea, have consistently supported

the continued presence of the U.S. military force in

Korea for security and other practical reasons. A vast

majority of the Korean public and elite, on the other

hand, have responded that China’s influence over

peninsular affairs would grow in the future and that

Korea’s military-to-military exchanges and cooperation with China should be expanded.

In the so-called “military exchanges and cooperation” area, there have been more frequent, regular, and

higher-level visits between the two countries in recent

years.10 In August 1999, in particular, ROK Minister of

National Defense, Cho Seong-Tae, made a visit to

China to attend the first-ever ROK–PRC Defense

Ministerial Talks with his counterpart, General Chi

Haotian. General Chi reciprocated with an official

visit to Seoul in January 2000, which made him the

highest-ranking Chinese officer to visit that capital in

the history of Sino-South Korean military relations.

In the early years after normalization of relations

in August 1992, it became increasingly clear to

observers of Sino-South Korean relations that Korea’s

two specific sets of goals for China policy—i.e., facilitating inter-Korean relations and improving bilateral

ties with China per se—remained largely independent

of one another. Moreover, most Korean observers

concluded that no appreciable outcomes had resulted

from its political or security relations with North

Korea or with China. In light of the remarkable and

more balanced developments in economic, diplomatic, and military ties between South Korea and

China in recent years, however, the earlier assessments

should be revised to focus on the longer-term consequences of a close Sino-South Korean relationship for

the United States, China, and Korea.

The changing strategic environment reflects

increased uncertainties about the future U.S. and Chinese roles on the peninsula and in the region, as well

as South Korea’s continued concern about the security

challenges North Korea poses. It is against this backdrop of regional uncertainty that China’s military

modernization should be assessed.

Implications of PLA Modernization 

China’s actual and perceived ability to project

power along and beyond its borders has a direct bearing on whether it will achieve its foreign policy goals

and act to destabilize regional security. An adequate

assessment of China’s power projection capability

should go beyond the examination of conventional

“bean counting”; it also should involve a comprehensive analysis that is as detailed as possible regarding

capabilities, such as in long-distance operations, C3I,11

air- and sea-lift, missile defense, logistics, and joint

and combined operations. As this analysis is done

capably elsewhere,12 the following discussion surveys

the PLA’s ongoing efforts in this area.

Power projection capability can be defined as a

relative military capability to launch and to sustain

combined combat operations at a reasonably long distance and over a long period. By this rigorous definition, China currently and for the next decade or more

lacks critical capabilities in projecting force over a
Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge 33

long distance. Even in conventional categories such as

weaponry, the PLA inventory is roughly 10 to 20 years

behind that of advanced Western militaries.

On the other hand, the PLA has gradually but

considerably improved its fighting capability over

some fifteen years, through an across-the-board

defense modernization program in command and

control, organization, weapons systems, education,

and training. Since 1990, in particular, it has been

procuring new weapons domestically and advanced

systems from abroad, most notably from Russia.

On balance, however, the PLA remains an antiquated force compared with many of its neighbors’

militaries, let alone those of its advanced Western

counterparts. Occasional improvements in the PLA’s

naval and air capability make their way into newspaper headlines in China and elsewhere, but they are not

integrated into an overall fighting capability, and they

primarily reflect stated goals rather than actual qualitative changes.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) has placed a priority on

defense modernization since the early 1980s, as

China’s reform and open-door policies significantly

elevated the importance of protecting China’s maritime interests in overall national development and

security planning. The PLAN’s capability to conduct

and to sustain long-distance operations is quite limited, however. Among the 18 destroyers and 35

frigates it currently operates, approximately 10 are

judged to be relatively modernized. They are

deprived, however, of effective defense systems and

electronic countermeasures. For example, the Luhu

and the Jiangwei are indigenously designed, secondgeneration vessels, which are better equipped than

their predecessors in terms of engines, command and

control, and armament. But they reportedly lack several sophisticated pieces of equipment, such as electronic support measures (ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM), and air defense systems, which

might expose them to enemy attack in sustained,

high-sea missions. Similarly, the PLAN’s submarine

force remains seriously outmoded, despite its full

inventory of over 100 submarines. It is not known

how many of them are actually operational at any

time, but they seem increasingly likely to spend longer

maintenance hours at the docks. To the Chinese aging

submarine fleet, the Russian Kilos would be a significant addition. Two export-version Type-877EKMs

and two of the more advanced Type-636 Kilos were

delivered to China by the end of 1998.

Overall, the PLAN’s vessels are mostly outdated

and lack anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine

defense systems as well as modern radar and electronic equipment. Furthermore, the PLAN has not

yet conducted long-distance naval exercises, and its

replenishment at sea (RAS) capability is believed to

be rudimentary. Given the lack of effective air cover,

the PLAN’s vessels remain dangerously exposed to

enemy air and surface attack if they were to operate

far from shore.13

The long list of advanced systems and technologies that the PLAN has purchased recently or shown

considerable interest in obtaining—including the

Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyer (the

Hangzhou), the A–50 airborne early warning and control aircraft, airborne radar systems, and anti-ship

cruise missile technologies—indicates that PLA leaders understand fully the glaring deficiencies in the

application of its naval power.14 The PLAN is doubtless committed to developing and acquiring high-tech

naval systems and technologies, but a considerable

amount of time and resources will be needed to bring

this objective to fruition.

The quantitative superiority of China’s submarine

force remains a concern to other nations, but the

noise of the submarines makes them vulnerable to

detection by a variety of anti-submarine capabilities.

The current limitations in PLAN naval weapon systems and electronic equipment, naval air power, and

RAS capability—let alone the fact that it has no carrier force—will deprive it of an effective long-distance

operational capability for many years to come.

The least modernized service branch is the PLA

Air Force (PLAAF), despite its huge inventory of over

5,000 different types of aircraft. Compared with its

counterparts in neighboring countries, this is especially the case. Together with the 3,000 J–6s, China’s

version of the Soviet MiG–19, virtually all of its

domestically manufactured combat aircraft are based

on 1950s- and 1960s-vintage technologies.

PLA leaders are well aware that air power plays a

crucial role in modern warfare and that the air force is

the most technologically oriented service in the armed

forces. But China’s relatively backward aviation industry has long failed to meet PLAAF requirements. Intermittent contacts with selected Western aircraft manufacturers in the 1970s and the 1980s produced no

breakthroughs in either upgrading its existing inventory or developing a new generation of fighter aircraft.
34 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

On the other hand, the current PLA strategy of

fighting “local wars under high-technology conditions” will require rapid mobility and effective firepower for contingencies along and beyond its borders.

The PLAAF obviously has been ill equipped to meet

the new challenges. Thus, it is the gap between the

doctrinal requirements and the existing aircraft

inventory that sharpens the sense of urgency among

the top leaders of the PLA. Air force modernization

has received a top priority in Chinese defense plans

and foreign weapons acquisitions, especially purchases from Russia.

Although China has been in the process of

acquiring several different types of modern combat

aircraft over a long period of time, of particular

importance is the J–10 (XJ–10) and the Su–27. Recent

reports indicate that the prototype of the J–10 has

been developed by the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation

with Israeli assistance and that the first flight test

would be made soon.15 But the details of the J–10 program and the Israeli involvement are largely shrouded

in secrecy, partly because of Israel’s transfer of aircraft

subsystems and technologies.16 In addition to the 26

Su–27s acquired in 1992, China secured an additional

22 Su–27s in 1996 with an agreement to license-produce the Su–27s in China.

To build a modern air force, it is also necessary

for the PLAAF to acquire a wide array of advanced

capabilities that could multiply the effectiveness of air

operations. Included in this category are various C3I,

airborne early warning, surveillance, and mid-air

refueling capabilities. These assets remain China’s top

priority in preparing for high-tech warfare, yet it

would take many years for Beijing to acquire and to

field such force multipliers.

Until then, in a future air campaign against the

modern air forces of China’s neighbors, the PLAAF’s

outmoded aircraft will be rigorously tested. Even

worse, the combat readiness of the PLAAF forces is

known to suffer from insufficient flying hours, lack

of combined operations, and limited repair and

ground logistics support.17 The prospect that the

PLAAF could significantly improve its air power by

the year 2010—even with Russian technological

assistance—is not bright. Before then, if it were to

attempt to overwhelm a rival air force with a large

number of aircraft compared with regional militaries, losses could well be severe.

The PLA Ground Force is the world’s largest at

1.8 million, after the 1985–1987 reductions of 1 million troops in overall PLA manpower; it is being further reduced as a result of a half-million drawdown

plan. The PLA weapon inventory, while diverse and

huge, is still outmoded and obsolete. For this reason

alone, modernization of the PLA Ground Force has

been very selective and has received the lowest funding priority among the three PLA service branches.

Chinese leaders have apparently concluded that the

current size and armament of the Ground Force are

adequate to meet any land attack and that prospects

for land attack in the foreseeable future are slim.

In particular, China’s amicable relations with Russia, coupled with rapprochement with Vietnam and

India, have allowed its leaders to reduce substantially

the number of ground troops and to divert the budget

savings from these troop reductions to other areas,

including better living standards for PLA soldiers,

operation and maintenance of the select rapid reaction

units (RRUs), and the development or purchase of

modern weapon systems. In this regard, there seems to

be an unmistakable linkage between troop reduction

and the acquisition of modern weapon systems.18

In sum, a combination of financial, operational,

and organizational constraints will force the PLA

Ground Force to remain a huge defensive army in the

near future. But the PLA military strategy of “limited

local warfare,” embodied in the strategic shift at the

1985 Central Military Commission (CMC) meeting,

emphasizes the offensive operations in limited

regional conflicts as well.

Most Western PLA specialists concur that China’s

nuclear force, with approximately 300 deployed

nuclear warheads, is primarily dedicated to its strategy of minimum deterrence, which means that no

potential enemy would launch a nuclear strike

against China without suffering retaliation. Since the

end of the Cold War, China has reconfigured some of

its nuclear-tipped intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to make conventional missions. Apparently, it has done so to boost that capability in

regional contingencies.

There is little indication that the role of nuclear

weapons in overall Chinese security has declined in

the post-Cold War era. China instead has vigorously

pursued a nuclear modernization program to

improve the survivability, reliability, and safety of its

nuclear arsenal, in conjunction with its conventional

military modernization efforts. China’s ongoing
Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge 35

major nuclear and missile modernization programs,19

which predate the post-Cold War period, is evident in

all three branches.

Future improvements in China’s nuclear capability would reinforce its nuclear weapons’ minimum

deterrent value and even facilitate a nuclear doctrinal

shift to “limited deterrence.”20 As long as China aims

at improving the level of technological sophistication

of its nuclear arsenal to that of advanced Western

nations, it may be reluctant to join the international

arms control and disarmament process. It could also

try to retain as much as possible the military value of

its nuclear and missile programs, which compensate

for the lack of air power.

In the foreseeable future, the chance of a nuclear

threat to China is extremely low. But its nuclear and

missile capability provides China with the international status and prestige to which it should be entitled. Thus, China’s nuclear and missile modernization

programs will continue to be a source of concern for

international nonproliferation, arms control, and

regional security. In particular, the psychological

impact of China’s nuclear and missile capability is

more likely to fall on its neighbors than on extraregional powers. China remains strongly opposed to

neighboring countries’ deployment of missile or

strategic defense systems, which could dilute the military value of its nuclear and missile capability.

On balance, the PLA’s power projection capability

will take at least a decade or more to materialize.

Although the current military strategy emphasizes the

continued development of this capability, to equate

China’s growing military capability with an intention

to resolve by force outstanding issues with its neighbors would be incorrect.

China vs. U.S.-Japan-Korea: A Future

Strategic Configuration in East Asia?

Despite its own global pretensions, China remains

a regional power in Asia. Chinese foreign policy and

security concerns also revolve around Asia, where its

current and future capability to project power is limited, rarely reaching remote areas of the globe. Thus,

Beijing feels most threatened by events close to the

homeland, such as those involving Taiwan, Japan, and

Korea. In light of China’s new anti-American tone and

the extent of its involvement in potential East Asian

areas of tension, the United States, Japan, and Korea

should consider Chinese sensitivities in their threeway cooperation for security or in their bilateral interactions with China.

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

Probably the most fundamental dilemma China

has faced in the post-Cold War era regarding the

future direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance is that it

wants that alliance neither too tight and strong nor too

loose and weak. If too loose, it could eventually lead to

Japan’s more independent posture in East Asia—a

Damocles’sword in Chinese eyes. Too tight an alliance,

on the other hand, means China’s disadvantageous

position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan.

Throughout the 1990s, however, Chinese strategists

have had good reason to worry about the latter.

In terms of future regional stability, questions in

the late 1990s concerned the type of relationship that

would develop between the two major regional powers.

It would be either strong and cooperative or weak and

confrontational. In addition, the diverse yet uncertain

impact of this evolving relationship on the future of

East Asian security is unclear, particularly in light of

the absence of a unifying Soviet threat and a continued

U.S. policy dilemma vis-à-vis Japan and China.

Despite their huge and growing stakes in maintaining an amicable relationship, China and Japan will

continue to have difficult and often tense relations.

The persistence of their traditional rivalry and long

distrust suggests that their relations may have more to

do with deeply ingrained cultural, historical, and perceptual factors than with the dictates of economic

cooperation or shared interests in regional stability,

which are mutually beneficial.21 Also underlying their

complex but competitive ties are fundamental differences in terms of their political systems, social values,

and strategic objectives in Asia and beyond.

As befits their traditional rivalry for regional influence and their present-day status as the two most powerful East Asian states, Japan and China have a broad

range of bilateral concerns. Many scholars note that

the enduring dual images of superiority and inferiority permeate their perceptions in ways that often make

official and public perceptions of the countries and

each other different, divergent, and distorted. They

also note that currently there seems to be no strong

constituency in either China or Japan to promote their

lasting friendship and cooperation. In a recent study

on Japan’s cultural diplomacy toward China, Diana

Betzler and Greg Austin convincingly argued that “the
36 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

main impulses for official interaction between the two

countries [China and Japan] remain outside what

might be called the popular imagination.”22

Regular high-level visits between the countries,

such as President Jiang Zemin’s visit in November

1998 and Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s in July 1999,

emphasized that the countries need to put aside their

historical enmities toward each other. Moreover,

growing bilateral trade and investment activity is

largely restraining open criticism of each other. Military diplomacy reached a new level in the 1997–1999

period, including frequent military-to-military contacts, an accord on maritime accident prevention, and

plans for future joint drills and port visits. But the traditional rivalry and historical distrust still linger.23

The Taiwan issue also factors into the ongoing

debate about Japan’s regional security role. At issue is

a definitional shift in Japan’s defense contribution

from “defense of the Far East” (Article Six of the U.S.-

Japan Mutual Security Treaty) to the defense of “areas

surrounding Japan,” as stipulated in the November

1995 National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO)

and reconfirmed in the April 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint

Declaration on Security and the September 1997

Review of the Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense

Cooperation (the “new Guideline”).

China has always been wary of Japan’s expanded

regional role, of course, but this time it would like to

know whether the phrase about “situations in areas

surrounding Japan” includes Taiwan—a controversy

that recurred during and after the final revision of the

new Guideline in September 1997. Given Chinese and

other neighboring nations’ sensitivity on Japan’s

regional security role, Japan’s official policy on this

issue seems to be “not [to] offer a specific definition,”

echoing the U.S. position that the scope of the new

Guideline is “situational, not geographical.”

China sees the U.S.-Japan security ties as crucial

in restraining Japanese military power and in maintaining regional stability. Beijing adamantly opposes

the revised Guideline on the grounds of a possible

U.S.-Japan collaboration in a Taiwan crisis and Japanese militarism.24 However, despite China’s pessimistic

view of the revised Guideline and the U.S. role in

post-Cold War East Asia, China is well aware that

U.S.-Japanese security relations remain the primary

linchpin of the current stability in East Asia. In addition, Chinese analysts believe that the disappearance

of the common foe and new dynamics in American

and Japanese domestic politics could lead to a further

redefinition of U.S.-Japanese security relations in the

years ahead. The so-called “double containment” role

of U.S. forces over Japan’s possible unilateral military

role is largely seen in a positive light among many

Chinese security analysts, even if not without debate.

In a litchi nutshell, notwithstanding the remaining regional controversies over the interpretation of

“areas surrounding Japan,” the NDPO and the new

Guideline are steering Japan’s security role and policy

toward a new direction, which may enhance common

regional security if it is guided by prudence.

The U.S-Korea Alliance

There is no doubt that a combined South KoreaU.S. deterrence against a possible North Korean

attack—a wider assault rather than a conventional

full-scale war—remains the U.S.-ROK alliance’s primary security mission in the foreseeable future. As

long as the North Korean military threat persists, any

ROK and U.S. efforts to engage China should complement the goal of deterrence. Additionally, the ROK

and the United States should seek to bring Chinese

influence on North Korea to bear in achieving common interests on the peninsula, namely continued

peninsular stability, improved North-South Korean

relations, and North Korean economic reform.

Mutual understanding would not only offer a potential solution to the current stalemate in North-South

Korean relations but also create a favorable condition

for peaceful unification of Korea.

However, China’s more confrontational posture

toward the United States and Japan is likely to continue for years to come. A sustained confrontation

between the regional superpower and the global

superpower could sharply exacerbate their differences

over a host of peninsula-related and regional issues.

In particular, China’s growing influence over and

interdependence with South Korea despite the rivalry

between the United States and China could well make

untenable the proposition that the countries can

cooperate to resolve a myriad of concrete policy issues

and longer-term questions on the peninsula. South

Korea’s balancing act between its alliance with the

United States and its cooperation with China, in

short, could well turn out to be the most prominent

security challenge of the 21st century.

To avoid possibly stark strategic decisions, South

Korea should be able to “walk on two legs”—to paraphrase the Maoist slogan—by maintaining a strong

security relationship with the United States while
Korea’s Emerging Security Challenge 37

charting out a long-term, comprehensive strategy

toward China. This envisions post-unification relations between Korea on the one hand and the United

States and China on the other.

South Korea’s economic cooperation with China,

augmented by increased diplomatic and cultural contacts, is essential for the expansion of bilateral ties.

Military-to-military relationships need to be set up as

well. Given the current and expected influence of the

PLA in Chinese domestic and external policies, it

seems only prudent for the ROK to foster personal

ties and eventual institutional relations with the Chinese military gradually. In addition, South Korea

needs to formulate a panoply of security and confidence-building measures (SCBMs) that are specifically designed to address China’s potential concerns,

such as a unified Korea’s intention to promote

friendly relations with China, the creation of a buffer

zone in and joint development of Sino-Korean border

areas, and the establishment of a three-way security

dialogue among China, the United States, and the

unified Korea.

U.S. Policies Toward China

For its part, the United States should continue to

pursue the strategy of comprehensive engagement

with China, especially in areas of mutual benefit (such

as Chinese economic reforms and trade). Additionally, America’s China policy must be firmly linked to

its overall Asia policy, carefully weighing the costs and

benefits of the former to the latter. Conflict between

the two policies would require strong political will

and leadership in Washington to resolve.

Finally, the United States must differentiate

national interests from universal values, strategic flexibility from policy reversals, and long-term goals from

short-term gains. If and when the above efforts yield

no reciprocity from the Chinese, the United States

must consider alternatives to its strategy of comprehensive engagement, although the consequences may

be difficult to predict.

All in all, to advance the longer-term goal of a stable and prosperous East Asia, not only should the

United States and East Asian nations recognize China’s

differing yet often legitimate security requirements, but

they also should make genuine efforts to build confidence with China, which is time-consuming but the

least threatening way to make China more transparent.

The paths China and the United States choose will

influence East Asia’s regional economic and security

developments as well as the individual states’ strategic

soul-searching.

Notes

1 For a detailed analysis of U.S. policy dilemmas vis-à-vis

China and Japan, see Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalizing of the U.S.-Japan

Alliance,” Asian Survey, April 1997, 383–402. 2 See Xiaoxiong Yi, “China’s U.S. Policy Conundrum in the

1990s: Balancing Autonomy and Interdependency,” Asian Survey,

August 1994, 675–91. 3 For a comprehensive but focused discussion on the current

state of relations between, and different internal political dynamics in, Washington and Beijing, see David Shambaugh, “The

United States and China: A New Cold War?” Current History, Vol.

94, No. 593 (September 1995), 241–47; Denny Roy, “Current SinoU.S. Relations in Strategic Perspective,” Contemporary Southeast

Asia, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1998), 225–40; Arthur Waldron,

“Bowing to Beijing,” Commentary, Vol. 106, No. 3 (September

1998), 15–20; Melvin Gurtov, “Fragile Relationship: The United

States and China,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999), 111–41;

Harry Harding, “The Uncertain Future of US-China Relations,”

Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1999), 7–24. For Chinese perspectives, see Zhu Chenghu, ed., Zhongmei guanxi de fazhan bianhua ji qi qushi [Development and Change of Sino-U.S. Relations

and Their Trends] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1998).

For a Chinese “democratic peace reversed” perspective, see Liu

Jixian and Xu Xikang, eds., Haiyang zhanlue huanjing yu duice

yanjiu [Research on Maritime Strategic Environment and CounterMeasures] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1996) (internal publication).4 Xie Wenqing, “Observing US Strategy of Global Hegemony

from Nato’s Use of Force against FRY,” International Strategic

Studies, No. 53 (July 1999), 1–9; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Wary

of ‘East Asian Nato’ Threat,” South China Morning Post, May 31,

1999, 8; “Paper Comments on US Hegemonism,” Beijing Review,

June 14, 1999, 7. 5 See footnote 3 above.

6 Tom Plate, “East Asia Racing into Arms Escalation,” South

China Morning Post, July 10, 1999, 10. 7 For an excellent analysis on the future security alternatives

of the ROK-U.S. alliance, see Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo

Cha et al., A New Alliance for the Next Century: The Future of U.S.-

Korean Security Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,

1995).8 Data for 1999 include January through November.

9 See, for example, Jae Ho Chung, “The Korean-American

Alliance and the ‘Rise of China’: A Preliminary Assessment of Perceptual Changes and Strategic Choices,” Discussion Papers,

Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, February 1999. 10 For a comprehensive treatment PLA military diplomacy in

the 1990s and China’s military relations with both Koreas, see

Kenneth Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military

Relations (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, October 1999), especially 66–68. 11 C3I refers to command, control, communications, and

intelligence capabilities.
38 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

12 See the special issue on China’s military in transition,

China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996); Paul H. B. Godwin, “Force

Projection and China’s National Military Strategy,” in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloom, and Dimon Liu, eds., Chinese Military Modernization (London and Washington, DC: Kegan Paul

International and the AEI Press, 1996), 69–99; Mark A. Stokes,

China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States

(Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,

September 1999); Michael Pillsbury, ed., Chinese Views of Future

Warfare, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. National Defense University, 1998); Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions

from Abroad: A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons’ (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1995). 13 Shen Zhongchang, Zhou Xinsheng, and Zhang Haiying, “A

Rudimentary Exploration of 21st Century Naval Warfare,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [Chinese Military Science], No. 1 (February 20,

1995), 28–32, in FBIS–CHI, June 13, 1995, 26–32. See also Bo

Jiansheng and Yang Sancheng, “Prospects for Naval Weapons in

[the] 21st Century,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 17, 1996, 2, in

FBIS–CHI, 51–52. 14 “China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly, January 15, 1997, 5; “Russian Imports Step in to

Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 10, 1997,

27–28; U.S. Department of Defense, Selected Military Capabilities

of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1997); Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Says Russians Sell Destroyers to China,” The Washington Times, January 10,

1997, A1; Richard D. Fisher, “Dangerous Moves: Russia’s Sale of

Missile Destroyers to China,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

No. 146, February 20, 1997, 1–14; “Russian Kamovs Set to Boost

Chinese ASW,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 1998, 14; Mikhail

Urusov, “Cooperation: ‘Arsenal for China’,” Moskovskiye Novosti,

No. 4 (February 1–8, 1998), 15, in FBIS–CHI (98–051), February

20, 1998 (Internet version). 15 The J–10 and Su–27 programs are discussed in Hsiao

(Xiao) Yusheng, “China’s New-Generation Main Military Aircraft,” Kuang Chiao Ching, No. 278 (November 16, 1995), 70–72,

in FBIS–CHI, January 31, 1996, 28–30. See also David A. Fulghum, “China Pursuing Two-Fighter Plan,” Aviation Week & Space

Technology, March 27, 1995, 44–45; “China Plans Progress While

Others Look On,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 22–26, 1998,

22–26; “First Flight for F–10 Paves Way for Production,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly, May 27, 1998, 17; John Wilson Lewis and Xue

Litai, China’s Search for a Modern Air Force,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), 64–94. 16 For the Israeli assistance in China’s early warning capability, see Steve Rodan, “Israel Pushes China Aircraft Deal Despite

U.S., Russian Objections,” Defense News, January 6–12, 1997, 22.

See also Yitzhak Shichor, “Israel’s Military Transfers to China and

Taiwan,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), 68–91. 17 For an excellent study on the PLAAF’s history, organization, training, and operational capability, see Kenneth W. Allen,

Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enter the 21st

Century (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995). See also Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Logistics and Maintenance: What

Has Changed?” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds.,

The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1999), 79–98.

18 Robert Sae-Liu, “PLA Reorganises Group Armies,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly, September 15, 1999, 3. 19 For an overview of the history and current capability of

Chinese nuclear and missile force, see Yen Chun, “Unmasking the

Secrets of Communist China’s ‘Nuclear Counterattack’ Force,”

Kuang Chiao Ching, No. 282 (March 16, 1996), in FBIS–CHI,

April 10, 1996, 65. For the Chinese development of surface-to-air

and anti-ship missiles, see Paul Beaver, “China Prepares to Field

New Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 24, 1999, 3; Zong

Shu and Xiao Zhu, “Several Chinese Air Defense and Antiship

Missiles,” Hangkong Zhishi, No. 5 (May 6, 1995), 8–10, in

FBIS–CHI, January 23, 1996, 30–33; An Hua, “China-Made LY–60

Surface-to-Air Missile Weapons System,” Bingqi Zhishi [Ordnance

Knowledge], No. 6 (November 15, 1995), 4–5, in FBIS–CHI, February 16, 1996, 21–22. For the development of M–series missiles,

see Ta Wen, “Second Artillery Corps and M–Class Guided Missiles,” Ta Kung Pao, March 9, 1996, A1, in FBIS–CHI, March 14,

1996, 24–26. 20 For a fuller discussion of China’s limited nuclear deterrence, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’:

The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol.

20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), 5–42. 21 For an exposition on the role of perceptual and cultural

factors in Sino-Japanese relations, see Min Kyu Park and Taeho

Kim, “Anchoring a New Pattern of Interdependence and Strategic

Rivalry: China-Japan Relations Toward the 21st Century,” Korean

Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1998),

121–40; Akira Iriye, China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); idem, “Chinese-Japanese

Relations, 1945–1990,” in Christopher How, ed., China and Japan:

History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1996), 46–59. 22 Diana Betzler and Greg Austin, “Gulfs in Sino-Japanese

Relations: An Evaluation of Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy Toward

China,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer-Fall

1997), 611–12. 23 There exists a substantial body of Chinese literature on

Beijing’s concerns over Japan. More recent examples include Xi

Laiwang, ed., Ershiyi shiji Zhongguo zhanlue da cehua: waijiao

molue [China’s Strategic Grand Plan in the 21st Century: Diplomatic

Stratagem] (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1996), 133–44; Lu

Guangyue, “The Impact of Reinforcement of Japan-U.S. Military

Alliance on the Asia-Pacific Security and World Peace,” International Strategic Studies, Serial No. 53 (1999), 21–24; Zhao Dawei,

“Riben junshi anquan zhanlue ji qi qianjing” [Japan’s Military and

Security Strategy and Its Prospects], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International Studies], No. 2 (1999), 49–54. 24 For a Chinese critique of U.S.-Japan security ties,especially

the new Guideline, see “Cadres Voice Concern over U.S.-Japan

Ties,” South China Morning Post, September 6, 1997, 9; Liang

Ming and Ding Zengyi, “How Can One Win the Trust of Others

by Shifting His Troubles Onto Others,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 18,

1998, 5, in FBIS–CHI, June 2, 1998; Robert Karniol, “Japan Promotes Regional Security with US Accord,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,

October 1, 1997, 15; “Hashimoto Warned on Scope of Security

Plans,” South China Morning Post, September 5, 1997, 10; Steven

Lee Myers, “Risking China’s Wrath, U.S. and Japan Bolster Military Ties,” The New York Times, September 24, 1997, A7.
39

For Southeast Asia, as for the West, the end of the

Cold War was a seminal event. The region had been a

major Cold War battleground. Communism was a

clear and present danger to the survival of regimes

and, in the case of Cambodia, to the very existence of

a people and culture. Marxism left its mark in the

three wars and failed economies of Indochina; in the

mid-1960s upheaval in Indonesia; as a contribution to

societal disruption in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines; and, even to a degree, in the militarization of

some Southeast Asian polities.

In the years immediately following the Cold War,

this picture changed dramatically. The collapse of

Soviet power meant the withdrawal of the Russian

Pacific Fleet back to port and the end of subventions

to the Vietnamese economy. In September 1989, the

Vietnamese army ended its occupation of Cambodia.

In the Philippines, the communist New People’s

Army, which in the mid-1980s posed a genuine and

growing threat to the Philippine government, had

begun to ebb. The Khmer Rouge, who also posed a

serious threat to take power, had by the beginning of

the 1990s misplayed their hand and become politically isolated and increasingly ineffective.

Thus, for the first time, the Southeast Asian countries faced no major security threats from within or

without the region. With relatively marginal exceptions, governments were secure, societies stable, the

status quo accepted, economies were growing, and

external powers posed no immediate danger. To a

degree that far exceeded that which existed anywhere

else in the Afro-Asian world, the Southeast Asian

states had developed regional institutions and patterns of interaction that gave the region increasing

coherence as a single political, economic, and even

security entity. The centerpiece of that achievement

was the establishment in 1967 of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which subsequently spawned the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement

(AFTA), soon to be followed by the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Meanwhile China was preoccupied with the task

of consolidating the far-reaching domestic reforms

initiated by Deng Xiaoping. By any historical measure, this was (and is) an extraordinary moment that

could prove short-lived, or it could be an opportunity

to consolidate regional security for the long term. As

Jusuf Wanandi of Indonesia’s Centre for Strategic and

International Studies has warned, “If this opportunity

is missed and these countries go their separate ways, it

would be much more difficult five or ten years down

the road to construct a security arrangement.”

The urgency Wanandi expressed reflected a pervasive uneasiness among the foreign policy elite of the

region that seemed to disprove their recent record of

success and a palpable growth in national and regional

Southeast Asian Security:

A Regional Perspective

by Marvin C. Ott

Marvin C. Ott is professor of national security policy in the

National War College at the National Defense University.
40 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

self-confidence. This uneasiness derived from a number of perceived vulnerabilities, latent threats, and

related concerns. Economics did not loom large in

most calculations, but it was a crushing economic

downturn that brought Southeast Asia’s post-Cold

War reverie to a sudden end.

As senior foreign affairs and defense officials in

Southeast Asia assess the regional security environment, the vulnerabilities that they see begin but do

not end with economic reconstruction.

Economic Recovery

The financial/economic crisis that began in Thailand in late summer 1997 and rolled across the region

was (and still is) deeply unsettling. It revealed that the

extraordinary economic growth and modernization

of the last three decades—a phenomenon characterized by the World Bank as the “Asian Miracle”—was

not as solid as nearly everyone had believed. The

image of a kind of regional money machine gave way

to a quite different picture of ineffective regulatory

institutions, illusory bank balance sheets, wildly irrational investments, excessive corruption, and conspicuous consumption. As the value of the baht, rupiah,

and ringgit collapsed, Southeast Asians were

reminded that not just living standards, but also social

order, political stability, and even national security

rested ultimately on economic performance. The

hubris so evident in statements associated with the

“Asian values” debate of the 1980s and early 1990s

gave way to a more chastened, far more worried tone.

Political Fragility

The political dangers embedded in economic failure were graphically revealed in Indonesia. For 32

years, the New Order regime of President Suharto had

been a fixture of the Southeast Asian scene. Indonesia

had been politically stable (if not static), economically

successful, and socially dormant. But under the

impact of the financial crisis, the framework of the

New Order cracked, triggering mass political demonstrations, widespread street violence, and a change in

regime. Next door in Malaysia where Dr. Mahathir

had been entrenched as Prime Minister for 17 years, a

somewhat analogous but less virulent chain of events

ensued. A confrontation between the Prime Minister

and his deputy over how to respond to the economic

crisis took an ugly turn with the arrest and imprisonment of the latter on sexual misconduct and other

charges. Mass demonstrations of a kind not seen in

Malaysia for 30 years shook the government to its

foundations. In Thailand, the Chavalit government,

paralyzed and ineffective in the face of the economic

collapse, was replaced by parliamentary vote amid

statements by senior military officers pledging that

there would not be a coup. In sum, the political stability that had seemed almost as assured as continued

economic growth was now clearly questionable.

Ethnicity

Although ethnic disputes have not proven to be

as lethal in post-Cold War Southeast Asia as in some

other regions of the world, ethnic/minority issues

are a significant source of domestic tension. In

Burma [Myanmar], a simmering civil war between

the lowland Burmese and highland minorities (such

as the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Wa, and Kachin) has

continued at varying levels of violence for nearly

fifty years. A series of agreements beginning in the

late 1980s between the Rangoon government and

several of the minority groups has dampened the

fighting, at least for the moment. In Malaysia, the

latent tension between the Malay majority and the

over one-quarter Chinese population pervades

national life. The spectacular economic growth of

the Federation in the years since the communal riots

of 1969 has been seen by many as almost imperative

to preserve domestic stability.

Recurring communal tension and occasional violence gave way to something much more serious in

Indonesia in 1997–1998. Under the strain of economic deprivation, widespread anti-Chinese violence

destroyed not only property, but also the confidence

of the Chinese business community in regard to their

future as citizens of Indonesia. Violence against the

Chinese seemed to trigger a chain reaction of ethnic

and religious strife involving other communal groups

that make up the complex patchwork of Indonesia.

The secession of East Timor produced the bloodiest

tableau of all—inflicted by “militias” associated with

the Indonesian army. The potential for a still more

violent confrontation looms in the province of Aceh.

Territory and Boundaries

Although the territorial status quo is broadly

accepted by the Southeast Asian states, there are a

number of specific disputes that have been minor

irritants for some time and that could assume more
Southeast Asian Security 41

serious dimensions if the security climate in the

region were to change. These include:

■ The claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian state of

Sabah;

■ Claims to the Spratly Islands by China, Vietnam, Taiwan,

Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines;

■ Disputed ownership by Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra

Blanca Island;

■ Disputed ownership by Malaysia and Indonesia of the

islands of Sipadan, Sebatik, and Ligitan;

■ Clashes along the Thai-Myanmar border;

■ A dispute between Thailand and Malaysia over the land

border and offshore demarcation line;

■ Boundary disputes between Malaysia and Vietnam and

between Indonesia and Vietnam over their offshore demarcation lines;

■ A boundary dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam; and

■ A dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang and

offshore boundaries.

Among these issues, the South China Sea is the

most serious for several reasons. It is the only dispute

to involve more than two Southeast Asian states and

the only one to which outside powers (China and Taiwan) are a party. Large, potential offshore gas (and

possible oil) reserves elevate the economic stakes to a

higher level than elsewhere. Also, any conflict in these

essential, heavily traveled sealanes would immediately

jeopardize the interests of the United States, Japan,

and other major powers.

External Powers and a Changing

Security Environment

Two extra-regional powers, China and Japan, are

a continuing source of uneasiness to security planners

for the medium and long term, even as they assume

roles in the present that are largely welcomed.

China

China is simply too large and too near not to be a

major factor in Southeast Asian equations and not to

be viewed with some trepidation. With certain isolated exceptions, China does not have a history of

seeking imperial control over Southeast Asia. Moreover, for roughly three centuries comprising the European colonial epoch, China ceased to be a serious

geopolitical factor in Southeast Asia. But this was an

abnormal circumstance that has now passed into history. China’s postwar support for communist revolutionary movements in the region marked the reappearance of Chinese power in Southeast Asia. This,

coupled with the presence of economically influential

Chinese populations in nearly every Southeast Asian

city, has bred distrust. Beijing’s explicit claim that

nearly all of the South China Sea constitutes Chinese

territorial waters (and its refusal to disavow the use of

force to back up those claims) has caused alarm in a

number of quarters. Growing Chinese influence in

Burma and Cambodia has been a further source of

concern. Finally, the burgeoning of China’s economy

in the recent years has been welcomed by some

(mostly ethnic Chinese) Southeast Asian businessmen

as a major new investment opportunity while feared

by others because of the potent competition from

emergent, ultra-low wage Chinese industries.

The prevailing uneasiness and ambivalence concerning China is evident not only in official statements and actions but also in some suggestive public

opinion data. For example, in U.S. Information

Agency (USIA) polls, about 45 percent of respondents

in Thailand and the Philippines view China as an

“expansionist power,” but only a small percentage in

both countries regard China as a direct security

threat. In a survey of regional executives (many of

whom presumably were ethnic Chinese), the Far Eastern Economic Review found large majorities “concerned about the security situation in the South

China Sea.” A similar survey found majorities ranging

from 53 percent (in Thailand) to 80 percent (in

Indonesia) who favor a “greater [Chinese] leadership

role in world affairs.” This desired leadership role

emphasizes the prevailing strategy among Southeast

Asian governments to draw China into a role as a rising but status quo power by binding China to the rest

of the region with ties of mutual economic advantage.

From Southeast Asia’s perspective, the best China

is one that is domestically preoccupied, much like the

China of the last decade. The fear is that as China gets

its domestic house in order, gains economic and military strength, and is largely freed of its historic security concerns to the west (Russia) and the east

(Japan), it will feel increasingly free to turn its energies southward.

Japan

Japan labors under the shadow of the recent

memories of its often harsh wartime rule over the

region. However, these memories vary significantly by

demography, ethnicity, and location. Political power

has passed to a postwar generation that has no direct
42 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

personal recollection of the New Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere. Also, some populations like the overseas Chinese and the Filipinos experienced an often brutal

occupation. But others like the Burmese and Indonesians recall the Japanese invasion as the critical event

that broke the hold of European colonialism in the

region and, in some instances, gave local nationalists

their first taste of political power. Thailand effectively

acquiesced to Japanese occupation and thereby

escaped its most adverse effects. Since the war, Japan’s

interaction with Southeast Asia has been largely confined to economics—as trader, investor, and aid

provider. In recent USIA polls, 92 percent of Indonesian respondents gave Japan an overall “favorable” rating compared with 77 percent for the United States.

In Thailand, a plurality of opinion regards Japan as

the Kingdom’s “closest economic partner.”

Today Japan is valued as an economic engine that

powers much of Southeast Asia’s economic growth.

Japan plays no direct security role in the region, and

the Southeast Asian states want to keep it that way. As

long as the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty remains viable,

the Southeast Asian governments are confident that

Japan will be content to leave to the United States the

task of protecting the vital Southeast Asian sealanes

through which the bulk of Japan’s oil supplies are

transported. The great fear is that if Japan were to feel

the need to use its own navy for that purpose, it will

provoke China into military countermeasures. The

last thing that the Southeast Asians want is a competition for military preeminence in the region between

China and Japan.

The United States

Finally, Southeast Asians are uneasy about the

United States—about America’s commitments and its

staying power. The reasons for doubt on this score are

not hard to discern. Despite repeated assertions by

American officials to the contrary, many Southeast

Asians do not regard the United States as an inherently Asian power. In time, so the thinking goes, it will

withdraw to its natural geographic sphere of influence

in the eastern Pacific. Perhaps ironically, such doubts

were reinforced by America’s Cold War victory. The

end of that contest provided the obvious rationale, if

one were needed, for a substantial reduction of the

U.S. security presence in Asia. Without a worldwide

adversary, America acted logically by pulling back its

overseas military deployments to gain a peace dividend. For the harshest skeptics, America’s post-Cold

War record of military engagements overseas provided additional evidence. Prime Minister Mahathir

of Malaysia put the matter in characteristically blunt

terms: “The presence of a Western power will not

make a difference especially after Haiti, Somalia,

Bosnia, and Rwanda. It takes only one soldier to be

killed before the whole force will be withdrawn.”

All Southeast Asian governments were keenly

aware of the downward pressures on the U.S. defense

budget in the immediate post-Cold War period. Most

watched with dismay as the U.S.-Philippine negotiations to extend the U.S. military lease of its base at

Subic Bay failed. Nor were they reassured by the

defeat of President George Bush by a little known

small state governor in a campaign that stressed U.S.

domestic concerns to the almost total exclusion of

foreign policy. Finally, the Gulf War, when U.S. troops

were deployed through the Mediterranean rather than

Southeast Asia, seemed to suggest yet one more reason why the United States might deemphasize its

security role west of Guam. This is ironic because the

primary route for logistical supply to that battlefield

(mostly by sea) was across the Pacific and through the

Indian Ocean.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. naval deployments

in response to the Taiwan crisis of 1996 and the U.S.-

led NATO operations in Kosovo provided a welcome

degree of reassurance regarding American capacity

and determination to retain its global security role.

When U.S. warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy in

Belgrade, at least some senior military officers in

Southeast Asia reacted, first by assuming the bombing

was deliberate and second by welcoming it as a signal

reminding China who is boss.

At the same time there is tangible uneasiness

among the policy elite concerning another implication of Kosovo—a growing predilection on the part

of the United States to engage in “humanitarian

intervention.” The specter of the United States and

its allies deciding what values are to be enforced

internationally evokes not too distant memories of

Western colonialism.

The Regional Response

The ASEAN response to this changing security

environment has occurred along three dimensions:

unilateral, multilateral, and bilateral (with the

United States).
Southeast Asian Security 43

Unilaterally, the ASEAN governments have done

two things. First, they have continued to act on the

same central principle that they followed for nearly

three decades: the foundation of national security is a

successful and growing economy. “Resilience,” a formulation connoting social stability, economic success,

and a general ruggedness, was coined in Singapore

and soon spread as a kind of regional mantra to the

other states. All of the successful ASEAN states have

kept their focus on the priority objective of economic

growth and modernization.

At the same time, these states began to invest

more heavily in their respective military establishments. This growth has been sufficiently noteworthy

to lead many observers to refer to a regional arms

race. In the early 1990s, Southeast Asia was the one

growth area in an otherwise contracting global arms

market. Indonesia purchased much of the former East

German navy—29 ships in all. Malaysia purchased

FA–18s and Russian MIG–29s. Singapore, Indonesia,

and Thailand purchased F–16s. Thailand purchased

Chinese tanks and armored personnel carriers, German helicopters, and American P–3s. The complete

list of such acquisitions was long, but it was misleading to refer to a regional arms race.

What was going on was a reorientation of armed

forces away from domestic counterinsurgency missions toward external defense coupled with a modernization and upgrading of forces by countries that now

could afford it. The growth in military spending was

within planned national budgets and generally tracked

or only slightly exceeded aggregate economic growth.

Other factors at work included (1) an effort to

improve national capabilities to defend offshore territorial claims, particularly in light of China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, (2) a response to the considerable political influence enjoyed by the armed

forces in several countries, and (3) some undeniable

competition and one-upmanship among the states of

the region, notably between Singapore and Malaysia.

One of the consequences of the Asian economic

crisis that began in 1997 was a scaling back of military

procurement budgets throughout the region—most

notably in Thailand’s decision to rescind its purchase of

FA–18s from the United States. If a feeling emerges in

the region that the economic crisis is effectively over,

military budgets can be expected to benefit accordingly.

The most interesting developments in terms of

regional security have a multilateral character. ASEAN

has become the centerpiece in this process. When the

association was created in 1967, its declared purpose

was to foster economic and cultural (and by implication, political) cooperation among its members. The

founders of the organization were emphatic and

explicit that ASEAN was not, nor would it become, a

security organization (that is, a military alliance). In

fact, ASEAN was, from the outset, an organization

that had an overriding security purpose. Its achievements in terms of fostering cultural contact and

understanding have been constructive, but hardly

earthshaking. Its various initiatives in the direction of

regional economic cooperation have come to little for

the basic reason that the economies of the member

states are competitive rather than complementary.

But security is another matter. ASEAN was

founded in the aftermath of Indonesian “confrontation” against Malaysia, exacerbated by the Philippines

territorial claim to Sabah. The clear intent in creating

ASEAN was to prevent the outbreak of another conflict among the five founding members. This has been

one of ASEAN’s great successes. Patterns of consultation and collaboration have been fostered; mutual

trust has been nurtured; and political and foreign policy elites have become closely acquainted with one

another. In short, ASEAN has become a “security

community” defined as a collective in which military

conflict among its members has become almost

unthinkable. For example, despite recurring acrimony

over a number of issues, a military clash between Singapore and Malaysia is about as unlikely as one

between Spain and Great Britain over Gibraltar. Disputes exist, but they are either resolved through negotiations or adjudication or set aside until they become

negotiable at some future time.

The second major achievement of ASEAN came in

response to Vietnam’s 1978–1979 invasion and occupation of Cambodia. ASEAN took the lead in coordinating a remarkably effective diplomatic campaign

that denied Cambodia’s UN seat to the Vietnameseinstalled government in Phnom Penh. Three governments (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) also

worked with the United States (and China) in providing covert assistance to the various Khmer guerrilla

organizations conducting military resistance against

the Vietnamese. These efforts, along with the U.S.-led

economic embargo, were instrumental in persuading

Vietnam to withdraw finally from Cambodia.
44 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Although ASEAN is not a military pact, several of

its members have been engaged in bilateral cooperation for many years on security-related issues of

shared concern. Examples include Thailand and

Malaysia on their common border (long a haunt of

the Malayan Communist Party and Thai Muslim

secessionists), the Philippines and Indonesia regarding smuggling, and Singapore and Indonesia concerning piracy. Since the U.S. decision to evacuate the

Clark and Subic Bay bases, each of the ASEAN countries has offered to make appropriate facilities accessible to U.S. naval and air forces. Beginning in 1992, a

multilateral dimension was introduced when security

issues were explicitly included on the agenda of

ASEAN ministerial meetings and uniformed officers

were included in senior officials’ meetings. In the

same timeframe, the annual meeting of the ASEAN

foreign ministers with ASEAN’s “Dialogue Partners”

began to encompass security issues. In 1993, this security dialogue was expanded to include China, Russia,

and India. Meanwhile, Vietnam, Laos, Burma (Myanmar) and Cambodia have become full members of

ASEAN. All of this official dialogue has been supplemented by semi-official meetings and conferences

conducted by academics and policy institutes in the

ASEAN countries with invited outside experts and

devoted to security issues.

Eventually, the participants will have to decide

whether to extend multilateral security cooperation

beyond discussions to embrace operational activities,

including possible multilateral joint exercises and

training, and coordination of some equipment purchases (such as maritime patrol aircraft) to allow for

possible joint use and interoperability. However, there

is little or no likelihood that ASEAN will ultimately be

transmuted into a full-fledged military alliance. There

is no serious sentiment within the organization for

such a step. The region remains too diverse with too

little consensus regarding the identity and extent of

security threats. Thailand and Vietnam, for example,

have distinctly different views of China in this regard.

Even if an alliance were established, the collective military strength of the region would be insufficient to

cope with aggression or intimidation by a large power.

Finally, nonalignment still exerts a significant tug on

official sentiments within the region.

The latest development is an ASEAN decision to

establish a formal arrangement to manage the official

security dialogue—the ASEAN Regional Forum. The

ARF hosted its first annual meeting in Bangkok in

July 1994. Comprising 19 Pacific Rim countries,

including China, Japan, Russia, India, and the United

States, the ARF had the potential of becoming a significant arena for addressing such common security

concerns as piracy and such regional disputes as the

Spratly Islands. In reaction to the discovery of Chinese military construction on Mischief Reef in 1995,

the ARF became the vehicle for a serious initial

attempt to resolve conflicting interests and claims in

the South China Sea. Yet when additional Chinese

construction was detected during the most acute

phase of the Asian economic downturn, the ASEAN

countries could not muster an effective response

within the ARF. At this stage, the jury is still out as to

whether the ARF will become a viable diplomatic

vehicle for addressing security issues in the region. A

current test is provided by efforts within ASEAN to

use the ARF to negotiate a “code of conduct” for managing disputes in the Spratlys.

The U.S. Role

As a consequence—and somewhat paradoxically—the ASEAN states still look to external powers

as the ultimate guarantors of their security. The Five

Power Defense Pact links the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. But it is

the United States that is overwhelmingly the region’s

preferred security partner. This shows up clearly, as

noted above, in USIA polling of regional opinion (for

example, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and the

Philippines), in official public statements (for example, Singapore) and in government actions and private

comments by officials (for example, Malaysia). Even in

nominal outliers like Vietnam and Burma, it does not

take long for some senior military officers to reveal

their preferences for a continued robust American

defense presence in the region.

Since the demise of the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO) in 1977, the United States has

been party to only one multilateral Asian alliance with

Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS). But America

does have bilateral defense agreements with Thailand

and the Philippines. More important, the U.S. 7th

Fleet, headquartered in Hawaii and forward based in

Guam and Japan (composed of permanently assigned

units and those deployed for 6-month periods from

central and eastern Pacific bases), operates on a conSoutheast Asian Security 45

tinuing basis in the region. U.S. air assets deploy to

the region out of Japan and Alaska, and forces from

all services, including ground forces, regularly go to

the region from the continental United States for a

variety of exercises. Altogether, and on a continuing

basis, approximately 100,000 American military personnel are forward deployed.

At the most basic level, U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia have remained consistent over the last five

decades:

■ Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon,

■ Keep open the sea and air routes that transit the area, and 

■ Maintain commercial access to the economies of the region

and the peace and stability that commerce requires.

Pursuit of these interests has carried U.S. security

policy through five historical phases over the past half

century: (1) The war against Japan in the 1940s,

(2) The counterinsurgency/nation-building period of

the 1950s and 1960s, culminating in the Vietnam War,

(3) The Nixon Doctrine and the focus on strengthening the 7th Fleet as a counter to the Soviet military

presence based at Cam Ranh Bay in the late 1970s, and

(4) Pressure (working with and through some of the

ASEAN governments) against the Vietnamese military

occupation of Cambodia, culminating in the 1989

Vietnamese withdrawal and the signing of the 1991

Paris Agreements establishing a framework for a possible political resolution of the Cambodian conflict.

Coincidentally, the demise of the Soviet Union

and the end of the Cold War removed Russian military power from the region. Since 1991, the United

States has entered a fifth phase with the termination

of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines. The

loss of facilities at the Clark and Subic Bay bases compelled a rethinking of U.S. strategy that involved a dispersal of U.S. presence in the region through access

arrangements in a number of countries, but no large

U.S. bases. With the advent of the Clinton administration, there also was a change of emphasis that was

more accommodating to multilateral approaches to

security. The new approach embraced the advent of

ARF and explicit intra-ASEAN discussions of security

issues as fully compatible with existing U.S. bilateral

security ties and activities in the region.

The United States now faces a substantially

changed security landscape in Southeast Asia, one

that reflects the essential success of its postwar policies. America currently is without challenge as the

preeminent military power in the region and, from a

Southeast Asian perspective, that presence is largely

benign because it comes without territorial or overt

hegemonic ambition.

Security regimes generally develop in response to

or in anticipation of threats. What makes the U.S.

security role in Southeast Asia so distinctive and challenging in intellectual and policy terms is the absence

of a clear threat. Instead, there is the regional sense of

uneasiness noted earlier. The Southeast Asians want

the U.S. presence as an insurance policy—a benevolent cop on the beat to protect them against potential

external threats, against the unknown, and, to some

extent, against each other. As long as the U.S.-Japan

Security Treaty is operative and the U.S. 7th Fleet

patrols the Southeast Asian sealanes, Tokyo will not

need to contemplate its own military presence in the

region. Disputes or potential disputes within the

region are less likely to flare up or to provoke a local

arms race if a neutral third party is by far the

strongest military presence in the area. The day may

come when the combination of growing economies,

militaries, and multilateral institutions and processes

will give the region sufficient strength and coherence

to make a U.S. security presence largely superfluous—

but not yet.

Other considerations that underlie Southeast

Asian support for a continued U.S. presence include

the preference among the armed forces of the region

for American weapons and equipment and for the

United States as a source of common military doctrine and shared intelligence. U.S. forces treat Southeast Asia as a single security area. Moreover, joint

exercises, exchanges, and interactions with local

armed forces give the region what coherence it now

has in military terms. Finally, the U.S. military presence is valued as a means to maintain U.S. interest in

the region and to encourage an increase in American

economic involvement. The United States remains

Southeast Asia’s largest single market. Since exports

and foreign investment have largely driven the economic growth of the region, the American connection

remains hugely important to its future. Southeast

Asian governments also want to encourage increased

American investment as a counterweight to the massive presence of Japan in that sector. If Southeast

Asian industry is going to compete successfully with

lower wage Chinese competitors, an infusion of foreign technology will be required in many cases.

Note that significant constraints exist on American

influence in the region. First, until recently, the most

obvious were limitations on U.S. defense budgets. It is a
46 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

great irony that if the Philippines Senate had approved

the tentative agreement for renewal of the lease at Subic

Bay, the United States would have faced significant difficulties in fulfilling the financial terms of that agreement. In a new era of federal budget surpluses, it is no

longer so evident whether budget limitations pose an

insuperable hurdle to maintaining a major, capital, and

personnel-intensive presence in Southeast Asia, like at

the Clark and Subic Bay bases. That will become clear

only if an opportunity for such a facility presents itself.

Second, nationalism constrains the willingness of

Southeast Asian states to accept a close, visible tie with

the United States. ASEAN has a long-standing formal

commitment to the objective of establishing a Southeast Asian Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality

(ZOPFAN), which would amount to the exclusion of

the external great powers from the region. ZOPFAN

has taken on no role beyond the declaratory, but it

accurately reflects a widely held determination not to

be the cat’s paw of others outside the area. This

impulse received a recent impetus from Indonesia’s

selection in 1993 to serve a 5-year term as leader of

the Nonaligned Movement. One consequence of all

this is a desire to minimize the size and visibility of

the American military presence in each of these countries. None of the states want to have the raucous

equivalent of Angeles City or Ilongapo that serviced

American airmen and sailors outside the gates of

Clark and Subic in the Philippines. Visiting Forces

agreements establishing legal jurisdiction over U.S.

military personnel have become a lightning rod for

such concerns.

Third, there have been a number of recurring irritants in U.S. relations with the region, most related to

trade disputes and human rights. Examples include a

long-running and acrimonious quarrel with Thailand

over protection of intellectual property rights; a public argument between the United States (including

President Clinton) and Singapore (including former

Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew) over the proper punishment for an American teenager found guilty of

vandalism in Singapore; and the congressionally mandated cancellation of some International Military

Education and Training (IMET) aid programs due to

criticisms related to human rights—notably,

Malaysia’s policy toward Vietnamese refugees and

Indonesia’s handling of East Timor. During the 1990s,

the mood in several of the ASEAN governments

became palpably more resentful of, and resistant to,

U.S. pressure on behalf of a human rights/democratization agenda. Singapore and Malaysia were particularly outspoken concerning U.S. “arrogance” and “cultural imperialism.” The Asian financial crisis tended

to override and to mute these issues, while diplomatic

negotiations resolved some of them. If Indonesia’s

newly empowered democracy takes hold, the political

climate on these issues in the region will presumably

become more receptive to U.S. views.

At the same time, the Asian financial crisis

injected a new discordant element into the picture—a

sense of acute vulnerability to the forces of the new

globalized economy. Malaysia’s combative Prime Minister Mahathir angrily blamed international currency

speculators for triggering Asia’s meltdown and the

International Monetary Fund for running roughshod

over local sovereignties in responding to the crisis.

Mahathir’s view that the West (and the United States

in particular) had acquired too much economic

power over Southeast Asia is widely shared by other

less outspoken leaders in the region.

In sum, U.S. security planners face a complex

environment in Southeast Asia that requires an intelligent, sensitive (even subtle) diplomatic touch; that

integrates political, economic, and military considerations; and that looks beyond the immediate to at least

the mid-term future. The names of the game are

anticipation, prevention, deterrence, and reassurance.

Looking Ahead

Southeast Asian attitudes and approaches toward

U.S. policy and presence will be shaped, in the first

instance, by developments within the region. These

will include performance of the major Southeast

Asian economies, the viability and unity of Indonesia, and the cohesion and effectiveness of ASEAN.

Beyond these obvious factors, there are some wildcards in the deck, including a potential political

upheaval in Burma.

Economic success breeds confidence and stability—or, in the parlance of the region, “resilience.” Economic growth also provides the budgetary resources to

upgrade national military capabilities. Economic

growth undergirds the development and strengthening

of regional institutions, including ASEAN and its various elaborations and spin-offs. A prosperous and

modernizing Southeast Asia will deal more confidently

with the major external powers, such as Japan, China,
Southeast Asian Security 47

the United States, and, in the future, India. Such a

Southeast Asia will be more inclined to draw lines in

the sand (or sea) regarding China and to insist on conditions and quid pro quos regarding the U.S. security

presence. Conversely, a Southeast Asia unable to regain

its pre-1998 economic footing will be less assertive visà-vis outside players and more prone to intraregional

disputes. Such a region will be more vulnerable to

growing Chinese influence and, at the same time,

more inclined to look to the United States both for

markets and for security support.

Indonesia is a huge factor in this regard. If it

holds together and begins to restore economic growth

under a moderate democratic government, Indonesia

can regain its role as the linchpin of a modernizing,

increasingly interactive Southeast Asia. In the worst

case, a disintegrating Indonesia will fundamentally

alter the balance of power in East Asia. Opportunities

for Chinese ambition will grow, and the tendency of

regional states to strengthen bilateral security

arrangements with the United States will probably

grow as well.

All of this is intimately connected to ASEAN. The

association as we have known it cannot survive a

breakup of Indonesia; it will survive only as a shell if

Indonesia becomes the chronic sick man of Southeast

Asia. ASEAN is already confronting major difficulties

as a result of the Asian financial crisis and the illadvised and rapid decision to expand its membership

to include Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. ASEAN today

is a distinctly less cohesive and effective organization

than it was in 1996.

The second broad set of factors that will affect U.S.

attitudes concerns the policies and actions of major

powers in East Asia—notably China and the United

States. The foreign policies of Southeast Asian governments generally are predicated on the hope and the

expectation that China will give the highest national

priority to economic development and modernization,

which will in turn require good relations with its

neighbors. A China focused on economic growth

would logically desire increased trade with and investment from Southeast Asia. Such a China would eschew

provocative, destabilizing policies in the South China

Sea or elsewhere that would jeopardize such relations.

Southeast Asian policies toward China have been

designed to reinforce such logic and tendencies.

But few Southeast Asian officials are confident

beyond doubt that Beijing will prove to be such a

benign presence in the region. Unlike the United

States, China is geographically next door and does

have territorial ambitions. There is an undercurrent of

apprehension present in every Southeast Asian government to varying degrees. The possibility that

China may pursue a strategy designed to assert its primacy in the region cannot be ruled out. Chinese statements and actions in the South China Sea validate the

danger in the minds of many regional defense and

intelligence officials.

A China with hegemonic tendencies poses

another danger: Japan strengthening its military capabilities and assuming a more “normal” security role in

the region. In short, a logical consequence of growing

Chinese power could be a great power rivalry with

Japan along Asia’s rim. None of this would be welcome in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. economic presence in Southeast Asia has

never been seriously controversial. Not only was it a

source of needed imports, technology, managerial

expertise, and investment, but it was also, most

importantly, a natural concomitant of America’s most

important contribution—its market. As far as one can

see into the future, that market will remain absolutely

vital to economic well-being in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. security presence has been welcome in

Southeast Asia since the early days of the Cold War

for the measure of protection that it provided. In

some instances that protection was direct and tangible, as with U.S. assistance to the Philippines against

the Hukbalahap insurgency. In one case—Vietnam—

it was direct, massive, and unsuccessful. But generally

the U.S. presence has been valued for the general climate of stability and security that it has provided. As

long as the strongest military power in the region was

an outside player without territorial ambition, Southeast Asians could be confident that nothing really

bad—for example, a hostile hegemon or a major

interregional conflict—would be allowed to happen.

That confidence in turn was key to foreign investment

and other economic development initiatives that

made the Asian Miracle possible.

In sum, the regional context in which Southeast

Asians view the U.S. security role is remarkably

dynamic and indeterminate. China’s strategic direction—aspiring regional hegemon or increasingly satisfied status quo great power—remains entirely

uncertain. In all probability, the China of the next 10

to 15 years will emerge as a complex amalgam of the

two. Just as China’s strategic direction is a question, so
48 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

too are its economic and political prospects. The Chinese economy of today faces huge problems, including hopelessly inefficient state enterprises, a technically insolvent banking system, and an alarming and

unsolved environmental crisis. A substantial slowing

of economic momentum has profound implications

for a regime that has lost Marxism/Maoism as an

effective source of political legitimacy and relies

instead on an improving economy. Future historians

may see the ongoing crackdown on the Falun Gong

group as the first clear signal of a systemic Chinese

political crisis.

Uncertainties concerning China extend to other

elements in the strategic environment. As the Taiwan

dispute becomes more acute, the confident expectations of a few years ago that the situation could be

managed and contained are no longer prevalent.

ASEAN is still reeling under the impact of the financial crisis in Asia and suffering acute indigestion from

trying to incorporate too many new members too

fast. The association’s future is very much in doubt.

The economic crisis has raised a number of other

uncertainties, the most basic being whether the region

will make a full recovery. There are some hopeful

indicators in that regard, but whether they represent a

real or false dawn is still a question. Even larger questions surround Indonesia, including whether the

archipelago will remain politically unified.

All of these uncertainties tend to impel the

region, however reluctantly, toward increased reliance

on the U.S. security presence as an anchor in stormy

seas. This will be true only as long as the United States

is really seen as an anchor. Southeast Asian states will

become increasingly sensitive to any signs of declining

U.S. interest in or disengagement from the region.

Assessments of U.S. resolve will become even more of

a cottage industry for Southeast Asian governments

than they have in the past. For this reason, the continuing (and even growing) ambiguity concerning U.S.

policy toward the South China Sea does not bode

well. What exactly is America prepared to defend and

under what circumstances? Few in Southeast Asia are

confident of the answer. Those that are uncertain will

tend to hedge that uncertainty. The logical alternative

to reliance on the U.S. security presence will be some

sort of regional accommodation to Chinese primacy.
49

Concerns about China’s political and social stability

figure prominently—and rightly—in Western governments’ formulation of policy toward Beijing. Unlike a

strong, stable, but less-than-friendly China, an unstable (and presumably weak) China presents a different

set of strategic and political challenges to Western

policymakers. Instability—whether economic, social,

or political—makes it difficult to protect some of the

important interests that have been pursued by the

West during the last two decades (such as improvements in human rights, governance, and access to the

Chinese market). Internally, political instability usually triggers large-scale violence and loss of government authority. In the case of China, which has a

large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, a likely

fallout from such instability would be ineffective control regimes over the exports of such weapons and

related technologies.

Despite these profound concerns about the consequences of instability in China, however, reliable predictions about Chinese politics have been quite rare.

Few analysts, for instance, foresaw the downfall of two

of Deng Xiaoping’s chief liberal lieutenants (Hu

Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang) or the bloody Tiananmen

events in June 1989. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin,

was derided as a lightweight and thought incapable of

managing a smooth transition of power from the

Deng era. On the eve of China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the conventional wisdom in

the West was that China would “kill the goose that

lays the golden eggs.” Shortly after President Clinton’s

visit to China in June–July 1998, there was much optimism about the prospects of political liberalization.

And immediately before China and the United States

signed a historic trade agreement paving the way for

China’s entry into the World Trade Organization

(WTO), such a deal was considered unlikely because

the top leadership in Beijing was judged to be hopelessly divided and paralyzed.

These and other similar instances of wrong predictions about Chinese politics in general, and political instability in particular, may be attributed to an

analytical approach that focuses exclusively on elite

politics. Given the thick secrecy with which Chinese

leaders conceal their decisionmaking process, this elite

approach can yield guesswork at best.

To examine the issue of political stability more

comprehensively, the emphasis here is not on the

characteristics of individual leaders, but on a set of

environmental factors that influence decisionmaking

and politics. The central premise of this analysis is

that stability (or its opposite, instability) is the product of a dynamic process of change: The economic,

social, and political transformation that has been

going on in China in the last two decades has generated forces of both instability and stability, disintegration and cohesion. As the transformative process

China’s Precarious Balance:

Cohesiveness and Stability in a 

Fast-Changing Society

by Minxin Pei

Minxin Pei is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace in Washington, DC
50 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

unfolds, the forces of disintegration and instability

may assume different forms and manifest their effects

in different ways, as do those of cohesion and stability.

What matters most is the overall dynamic balance

between such forces.

Generally speaking, four primary types of cohesiveness—elite, ideological, institutional, and social

cohesiveness—influence China’s political stability.

Looking at changes in these four variables will provide an overall assessment of the balance of forces of

disintegration and cohesion in China today.

Elite Cohesiveness

Elite cohesiveness is generally considered one of

the most important factors in determining the stability

of a regime. Obviously, deep division within the elite,

especially the ruling elite, is often a source of political

conflict and paralysis in decisionmaking. Elite cohesiveness itself is also an aggregate consisting of a set of

measurable and intangible primary characteristics of

the members of the elite. Such characteristics may

include ideological outlook (which will be discussed in

the next segment), political experience, sociological

background (education and class background), and

generational identity. In addition to these primary

variables, elite cohesiveness is also affected secondarily

by the norms and procedures governing elite politics.

Although the primary variables are crucial in determining the degree of cohesiveness among the elite, the

role of norms and institutional procedures in enhancing or reducing such cohesiveness is considerable,

though often overlooked.

Historically, political instability in the People’s

Republic of China (PRC) was, almost without exception, triggered initially by a power struggle within the

ruling elite. Such struggle, in turn, was caused by a

lack of elite cohesiveness. For analysts, elite cohesiveness is a relative concept, especially when it is used in

the context of contemporary China.

It is thus unavoidable to compare the degree of

elite cohesiveness of Maoist China with that of postMao China. One can make a strong case that, other

things being equal, the lack of elite cohesiveness during the Mao Zedong regime (1949–1976) was a major

source of political turmoil. The low level of cohesiveness in the Mao regime was the result of many factors.

First and foremost, the fact that the Chinese revolution was won by a coalition of nationalist, Leninist,

and liberal forces determined that the new ruling elite

would comprise individuals from diverse sociological,

political, and ideological backgrounds. Conflicts soon

emerged inside the young PRC, both within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and between the CCP

and its former allies (mostly liberal intellectuals).

Some conflicts led to internal purges and claimed, as

their victims, some of the senior revolutionary leaders

in the CCP hierarchy (such as Gao Gang and Peng

Dehuai) and sowed the seeds for future power struggles. Other conflicts resulted in the split between the

CCP and the intelligentsia, as in the tragic Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 that destroyed the lives and

careers of half a million people, most of whom were

members of the intelligentsia.

Table 1. Elite Cohesiveness in China’s Regimes, 1949–1999

Mao Deng Jiang

Ideological Outlook Diverse Less diverse Similar

Political Experience Diverse Similar Similar

Sociological Background Diverse Diverse Similar

Generational Identity Strong Weak Strong

Elite Norms Weak Improving Strong

Ultimately, the ideological conflicts within the

elite over the fundamental CCP policy—“class struggle vs. economic construction”—escalated to irreconcilable levels and culminated in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). With the help of the radicals and

the control of the military, Mao Zedong was able to

purge those who advocated a more moderate policy

and took China on a disastrous path to self-isolation

and bloody civil turmoil.

It must be pointed out that diversity in the backgrounds and ideological outlooks of the elite should

not be a necessary condition for conflict. In Maoist

China, what made intra-elite conflict inevitable and

uncontrollable was not merely the above-mentioned

diversity, but the lack of institutional procedures

within the CCP for managing such conflict and containing its political devastation. As in other totalitarian regimes, the supreme leader, in this case Mao,

enjoyed unrestrained power and discretion, especially

in the appointment and removal of members of the

top leadership. Job security for the elite throughout

the regime was minimal, as there was no due process
Stability in a Fast-Changing Society 51

or set of principles providing a basic level of protection for the elite. Worse still, there was no guarantee

of the physical security of the elite. Fall from power

was immediately followed by public humiliation,

physical abuse, torture, show-trial, incarceration, and

worse. In most instances, even the family members of

the disgraced officials were not spared. This created a

“winner-take-all and loser-lose-all” environment in

which power struggles became extremely vicious and

uncompromising.

Two additional factors intensified power struggles

among the elite during the Mao era. First, the CCP

had no internal procedures to marginalize or reduce

the power of extremists. In fact, the radicalized Communist ideology under Mao legitimized leftist

extremism, and the rapid promotion of radicals during the Cultural Revolution provided further incentives for displaying extremist outlook and behavior.

Second, the Mao regime had no reliable system of

promotion and retirement. As a result, elite circulation was slow and frustrated the ambitions of the

younger generation, many of whom were thus easily

recruited into rival factions with the prospects of better political careers.

The Deng era saw many reform measures aimed

at correcting the flaws of the Maoist regime. As a

result, the ruling elite became more homogenous and

were protected by more reliable rules and norms. The

homogenization initially occurred due to a combination of political purges and institution-building. After

Deng consolidated power in 1979, he began a systematic purge of the radicals inside the regime and a

simultaneous campaign of rehabilitating and recruiting moderates. Consequently, although Deng retained

a considerable number of ideological conservatives

leery of rapid economic reform and gave them some

political space, his efforts to promote younger and

more educated individuals gradually built a solid core

of moderates within the elite.

Deng also pushed through one of the most important political reform measures in post-Mao China—a

mandatory retirement system for government officials.

Under the new system established in 1982, strict retirement rules were set for officials at different levels

inside the government (but not the CCP). This greatly

accelerated elite circulation and helped inject muchneeded fresh blood into the regime. It also removed a

source of political instability—the frustration of capable and ambitious individuals whose political

prospects would otherwise be utterly hopeless under

the old system. To better manage intra-elite conflicts,

Deng introduced a set of rules that spelled out the

procedures for resolving policy and political disputes.

He also made sure that losers in internal power struggles enjoyed a minimal level of physical security and

material comfort (he violated this policy only once,

when he personally ordered the persecution of Bao

Tong, chief aide to Zhao Ziyang, after the Tiananmen

crackdown in 1989). To prevent the rise of radicals on

either end of the ideological spectrum, Deng mandated limited competition for certain CCP posts. Over

the years, such competition was responsible for preventing some of the more controversial political figures (mostly hardliners and princelings) from rising to

important positions inside the regime.

By and large, Deng’s efforts were very successful in

increasing the degree of cohesiveness within the ruling

elite. However, the Deng regime had a more mixed

record in dealing with China’s nonruling elite. Members of the nonruling elite, or societal elite, are business leaders, professionals, and intellectuals. If

coopted, these elites can be an important source of stability. If alienated, they can become potent opponents.

The regime astutely adopted a divide-and-rule strategy

in dealing with societal elites. It gave considerable

gains in freedom, status, and material rewards for

business and professional elites because their primary

interests—economic and professional opportunities—

were compatible with the regime modernization program and could be satisfied without threatening its

hold on power. It was the liberal intelligentsia, a perennial opposition in all authoritarian regimes, who

posed a constant challenge to the regime.

Although Deng initially relied on this group to

dislodge the radicals and formulate an ideologically

palatable theory (“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”) to justify his economic reforms, their demands

for political reform and democratization soon collided with his precepts on the supremacy of CCP rule.

The subsequent conflict between the regime and the

intelligentsia formed the most visible schism in Chinese politics in the last two decades. Its most violent

and tragic expression was the 1989 Tiananmen Square

pro-democracy movement. Interestingly, it was the

bloody setback of the Tiananmen movement, which

led to the imprisonment and exile of the leaders of

the intelligentsia, that transformed the relationship

between the regime and the intelligentsia.
52 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

The crackdown itself produced a surprising

result: With the removal of the radical liberals (mostly

through exile) and their intraregime patrons, the

moderates inside the intelligentsia gained dominance.

Their ascendance also coincided with two epochal

events and one interactive trend: (1) the collapse of

communism in the former Soviet bloc, (2) Deng’s

tour of southern China in 1992, and (3) rising Chinese nationalism and China-bashing in the West.

These three factors produced an unanticipated political realignment that led to the re-incorporation of the

moderate intelligentsia into the regime and the further marginalization of the liberals. The social and

political turmoil following the Soviet collapse graphically demonstrated to the moderates the costs of radicalism and the undesirability of hasty reforms. Deng’s

tour, which reenergized China’s lagging reform, gave

the moderate intelligentsia new hopes as well as

opportunities to rejoin the regime or seek business

prospects in the private sector. The more controversial

and not-so-well-understood factor—the interaction

between rising Chinese nationalism and China-bashing in the West—did much to undermine the intelligentsia’s admiration and support, which was very

deep in the 1980s, for Western values.

As a result, the threat posed by the intelligentsia,

which used to obsess the regime in the 1980s, greatly

diminished toward the late 1990s. But the incorporation of the intelligentsia into the regime may have

been only a temporary trend, because the fundamental goal of the moderate intelligentsia—reforming

China’s economic and political systems—conflicts

with the declared CCP goal of maintaining its

supremacy. At the moment, China’s deteriorating

external environment (unstable relations with the

United States and the increasing prospects of a military conflict with Taiwan) makes it hard for this

group to push their political reform agenda. Should

the external environment improve and, more important, should this group eventually come to realize the

basic incompatibility of their interests with those of a

CCP intent on perpetual monopoly of power, they are

likely to turn against the CCP. The probability of an

intraregime power struggle will increase because

many members of the moderate intelligentsia are now

inside the regime.

Ideological Cohesiveness

The concept of ideological cohesiveness refers,

first, to the degree to which professed ideological values are consistent with actual policy and, second, to

the degree to which the elite and the public identify

with such values. Ideological cohesiveness on both

dimensions is politically important. A relatively high

degree of consistency between a regime’s professed

ideological values and its policy tends to inspire confidence and loyalty, among both the ruling elite and the

public. On the other hand, a high degree of dissonance between ideology and policy usually generates

cynicism. A regime’s professed ideology must also

have an intrinsic appeal to its elite members and the

public at large. Without such an appeal, the degree of

overall ideological cohesiveness may be low.

It has been obvious to students of Chinese politics

that, if measured by these two standards, China’s official Communist ideology has declined considerably in

the last two decades. On the whole, this decline has

positively contributed to political stability and

progress of reform. At the elite level, declining Communist ideology has marginalized the leftist forces that

previously had dominated Chinese politics. Pragmatism has replaced ideology as the guiding force for policy. The decline of the official ideology has nevertheless created subtle difficulties for the regime. Because it

has not yet officially jettisoned the Communist ideology, the dissonance between the regime’s professed

values and policy has increased greatly and become a

source of cynicism. This dissonance also makes the

regime vulnerable to occasional attacks launched by

the dwindling leftist forces. Sometimes, it becomes an

important obstacle to economic reform (such as massive privatization). Bereft of ideological appeals, the

regime has no effective means to mobilize the emotional support of its people. As institutionalist economists have noted, ideologically inspired voluntary

compliance and cooperation can significantly cut

monitoring and enforcement costs (and increase efficiency). Loss of the regime’s ideological attractiveness

may have become an important, though not quantifiable, source of internal decay (such as corruption and

erosion of CCP authority) as well as popular resistance

expressed in a variety of forms (such as tax evasion,

open defiance of authority, and noncompliance with

government rules). The ideological void created by the

declining Communist orthodoxy has led to the proliferation of new values that pose direct and indirect
Stability in a Fast-Changing Society 53

challenges to the regime. Among those values are

Western liberalism (especially strong among the intelligentsia), various religions and cults (such as the

Catholic Church, Islam, and quasi-religious groups

like the Falun Gong).

The relationship between the regime and society

has been affected by the ideological shift. The valuebased bond (however false, in retrospect) that connected the regime with the Chinese people has evaporated. Faced with a people deeply disillusioned with

its official ideology and distrustful of its policies, the

regime has grown increasingly reliant on a new set of

instruments, the most prominent of which are pragmatist policies aimed at maintaining high economic

growth and improving people’s livelihoods, appeals to

Chinese nationalism, and selective repression.

It remains too soon to judge whether this ad hoc

approach can adequately offset the loss of ideological

appeal suffered by the regime. Pragmatist policies

under Deng and Jiang Zemin have contributed greatly

to China’s economic growth and rising standards of

living. However, pragmatism is no ideology—it may

provide ad hoc political justification of policy, but it

does not supply an alternative vision. Its appeal

remains strong at the moment because most Chinese

people seem to assign a high value to economic development. Such appeal may decline as, ironically, the

standards of living rise to a certain level and people

begin to demand changes in the political system.

Appeals to nationalism can produce, at best,

short-lived support. Such appeals tend to be more

effective when the country faces acute external

threats. Without such threats, it is hard to translate

nationalism-generated emotions into political support for the regime’s domestic policy. On many issues,

nationalism is simply irrelevant to China’s most pressing problems (rampant official corruption, rising

inequality, environmental degradation, and restructuring of unprofitable state-owned enterprises). Overplaying nationalism could also backfire because it

risks jeopardizing the regime’s other goals. Obviously,

fueling anti-Western nationalism could undermine

China’s relations with the West and investors’ confidence. The nationalism card could also be played by

the dissident groups to embarrass the regime.

On balance, declining ideological cohesiveness

does not pose an immediate threat to political stability. Its impact on Chinese politics is subtle, indirect,

and impossible to measure. In all likelihood, the

regime will face greater challenges—mainly from the

rise of competing ideologies and beliefs—in the

future, especially if it fails to offer a more coherent

ideology that is fundamentally compatible with the

Chinese political reality.

Institutional Cohesiveness

Institutional cohesiveness—the degree to which

the principal institutions of a political system perform according to a set of rules and norms—affects

political stability in several ways. In a polity in which

the main political institutions have a well-defined

scope of authority and norms are enforceable, the

political process tends to be more stable and the government functions more effectively. This does not

mean the total absence of conflict in such systems—

conflict of interests exists in any political system.

However, well-defined and enforceable rules and

norms can help manage such conflicts and contain

their effects. In contrast, polities in which the principal institutions perform according to poorly defined

or unenforceable rules and norms often experience

paralysis as institutional rivalry develops into an

uncontrolled fight for power.

In the Chinese context, an analysis of institutional

cohesiveness must examine two sets of institutional

relationships—those between the ruling Communist

Party and the state and those among the various institutions of the state.

The central characteristic of the Chinese political

system is its party-state. A peculiar product of the 20th

century, the party-state differs from the nation-state

because of the supremacy of the ruling party over the

state and the existence of a parallel system of rule

which embodies and ensures such supremacy and performs the basic functions of government. The emergence of the party-state in China was largely a product

of history. The Chinese Revolution forged a wellorganized political party that later established the Chinese state after winning the revolution. For a developing country ravaged by revolution and civil war, the

Communist Party became a central organizing force.

Its hierarchical structure, organizational networks, and

political ideology could easily be tapped to meet the

urgent needs of state-building. Despite the claims that

the Communist Party built the modern Chinese state,

the truth is that the state was established on the back

of the Communist Party. The short-term advantages
54 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

of a party-state were evident: State authority was

swiftly established; the young communist state, against

monumental odds, was able to perform its most critical functions (law and order, national security, and

provision of basic public goods).

However, the party-state has numerous long-term

degenerative flaws. The effective administration of the

state by the ruling party perpetuates the weakness of

the state. Political risks in a party-state are highly concentrated, because the health of the state depends on

the vigor of the ruling party. Ideological and organizational decline of the ruling party inevitably impairs

the effectiveness of the state. Internal division and

power struggle of the ruling party often affect the

integrity of key state institutions. Most important, the

supremacy of the ruling party politicizes the basic

state institutions, such as the military and courts,

which are supposed to be autonomous in modern

political systems.

The tensions between the ruling party and the

state are thus unavoidable, for the basic needs of the

party (maintaining its monopoly of power) and those

of a modern state (keeping itself autonomous from

political forces) inevitably conflict. To be sure, such

conflicts of party interests vs. state interests in the

Chinese case have been often disguised as intraregime

disputes (such as over the party’s policy priorities). In

the Deng era, the ruling elites became increasingly

aware of the need to define the party-state relationship and proposed, in 1987, to separate the party from

the state. The reform initiative, which was associated

with soon-to-be-disgraced CCP General Secretary

Zhao Ziyang, failed miserably in the conservative

backlash of 1989. After the Tiananmen crackdown,

the regime reemphasized the supremacy of the CCP

and never seriously entertained any thought of withdrawing itself from the state. Consequently, the longaccumulated tensions between the party and the state

remain and, if anything, are expected to increase in

the future as the contradictions between the central

characteristics of a monopolistic party regime and the

requirements of a modern state intensify and become

more visible.

The cohesiveness of a state is not only influenced

by the relationship between the ruling political forces

and the state apparatus, but also by the relationship

between the various components of the state apparatus itself. In the Chinese case, these two sets of relationships are interdependent. This interdependence

poses highly complicated challenges to reform efforts

aimed at creating a more decentralized and flexible

state. It is generally recognized that, despite dramatic

economic decentralization of the last twenty years,

political authority in China remains highly centralized. Such centralization has been usually attributed

to China’s perceived need for it and to the country’s

proverbial fear of disintegration. Much less wellunderstood, however, is the fact that, although centralization of power has long been a historical feature

of the Chinese political system, the monopoly of

power by the Communist Party has made the centralization of state not only necessary but sustainable.

Without the party-state, such centralization may be

possible, but its perpetuation is unlikely. On the other

hand, a highly centralized state serves the needs of the

Communist Party effectively.

Centralization, however, has come at great costs.

Intrastate institutional relations, especially those

between the central government and provincial governments, remain unstable. As a result, policy changes

are frequent and sudden, creating ample incentives

for both the center and provinces to cheat. This state

of affairs has created a unique paradox: centralization

and ineffectiveness. It is marked by the oft-observed

low capacity of the central government to implement

its policies and enforce its rules in provinces, despite

the apparently high degree of centralization of decisionmaking power. Without restructuring China’s

constitutional framework to create a federalist state,

this paradox will only worsen in the future.

The greatest failure of the Deng era was that of the

regime to establish institutions capable of effectively

managing state-society relations. Although significant

progress in legal reform has created increasing, but

limited, institutional channels through which the Chinese people can seek protection of their personal and

property rights, the overall institutional framework of

managing state-society relations remained almost

nonexistent. For example, there are few legitimate

institutions and procedures that can represent independently organized social interests. Those that are

accessible to the public—such as the press, the People’s

Congress, and the courts—have not demonstrated sufficient effectiveness to gain credibility. In any case, they

provide only individual relief, but no collective assistance. State-society relations are thus treated more or

less as crisis management: The ruling elites are galvanized into action only after long-accumulated statesociety tensions develop into crises. Without a complex and sophisticated institutional framework to
Stability in a Fast-Changing Society 55

address such tensions, the regime typically resorts to

repression, rather than manipulation or diversion, to

deal with such crises (the most recent example being

the crackdown on the Falun Gong movement). This

modus operandi tends to create short-term instability

without any long-term benefits. The fundamental

solution to this systemic flaw is a gradual, but significant, expansion of democratic participation and social

autonomy in China—a highly unlikely prospect given

the current political climate in Beijing.

Social Cohesiveness 

Two factors determine the degree of social cohesiveness of a society: class cleavages and cultural identity. Generally, societies with less divisive class cleavages and strong cultural identity (Japan and Germany

being such societies) enjoy a higher degree of social

cohesiveness. Although social cohesiveness per se may

not have a direct impact on political stability, it is an

important environmental factor that increases (or

lowers) the overall risks of political turmoil. In countries where deep class divisions (manifested chiefly in

high inequality) and conflicts of cultural identity

(mainly ethnic cleavages) exist, the likelihood of political instability is significantly higher than in countries

where similar cleavages are less pronounced.

There is mounting evidence showing rising

inequality in China in the last twenty years. Many factors contributed to this trend. The abandonment of

egalitarian policies that imposed an artificial level of

equality (mainly by preventing the accumulation of

wealth by the talented and entrepreneurial segments

of society) during the Maoist era obviously played a

role. Economic liberalization that freed up market

activities and created new business opportunities

allowed the entrepreneurial elements to take greater

risks and seek higher returns. Freer labor mobility,

while benefiting some, has left immobile labor elements behind economically. As in the West, rapid

technological progress has favored the younger and

more educated in the labor force. The restructuring of

loss-making state-owned enterprises removed the

rents previously collected by their workers. To be sure,

these market forces were not solely responsible for rising inequality in China. Government policy or inaction exacerbated this trend. For instance, lack of public investment in rural infrastructure, research and

development, and primary education was a major

cause of stagnant rural income. Continual discrimination against private firms (especially in terms of

their access to bank credits and financial markets)

inhibits the growth of the private sector, which could

have helped alleviate the rising unemployment problem (a major cause of inequality in urban areas). The

CCP prohibition against independent labor unions

has further denied Chinese workers their collective

bargaining power and left them poorly protected in a

rapidly changing labor market with few rules.

Measured by inequality, China’s social cohesiveness has evidently declined. But it is difficult to determine, on the basis of available evidence, the political

effects of this decline. Inequality in China has two

salient characteristics: interregional (or interprovincial) and urban-rural inequality. In the past, the political effects of inequality could be contained geographically because of these two characteristics. In

post-reform China, labor mobility has effectively broken down the geographical barriers. The consequence

of this breakdown is rather mixed: it both reduces

inequality and increases it at the same time. On an

individual level, mobile laborers who migrate to more

affluent areas have increased their income, while those

immobile ones remain mired in poverty. On a

regional level, provinces with a large outflow of laborers seem to have benefited greatly from the remittances those laborers have sent back.

The novel—and potentially destabilizing—phenomenon is the emergence of the urban poor (mainly

victims of reforms in state-owned enterprises). Unlike

the vast masses of the rural poor (hidden and dispersed in inaccessible interiors), China’s urban poor

are concentrated, visible, and easily organized. Moreover, as a relatively privileged group (state employees), they are more aware of their relative deprivation,

more assertive of their rights, and more skillful in

confronting the government.

The other aspect of social cohesiveness—cultural

identity—changes much more slowly than class cleavages. In China’s case, there are two contradictory

trends—one enhancing such identity and the other

reducing it. The trend of rising Chinese national identity has evidently coincided with the resurgence of

Chinese nationalism. This trend has received enormous impetus from the decline of the official Communist ideology (which used to subordinate Chinese

nationalism to a universal doctrine), from government-inspired and spontaneous efforts to restore Chinese cultural and historical symbols, from China’s
56 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

recent economic success, from the country’s growing

confidence in its international standing (such confidence, it should be noted, owes a great deal to the

remarkable success of Chinese athletes in international sporting events), and from the ironic effects of

globalization (in curious ways, increasing contact

with the rest of the world may only increase the Chinese people’s self-cultural awareness).

But the rising Chinese cultural identity is accompanied by a contradictory and centrifugal trend—the

rise of ethnic cultural identity in outlying regions with

high concentrations of minority groups (such as in

Tibet and Xinjiang). This resurgence of separatism,

which emphasizes cultural distinctiveness, rather than

identity, coincided with the breakup of the Soviet

Union, a historic development which inspired China’s

minority groups to re-kindle their own nationalist

dreams. It is worth noting that, ironically, the growth

of ethnic separatism occurred despite (perhaps

because of) the relatively liberal ethnic policies

adopted by the post-Mao leadership. The best example

was Tibet, where liberal reforms introduced by Hu

Yaobang in the early 1980s failed fully to address

Tibetans’ nationalist needs. Consequently, the failure

of liberal policies has caused Beijing policymakers to

re-adopt harsh, repressive measures in these areas. If

the record of the last decade is any indication, repressive measures have not worked. Ethnic separatism will

remain a major source of instability for the foreseeable

future, despite the low probability of success (defined

in achieving the political goals of independence).

Conclusion: Focusing on the Big

Picture

This discussion of political and social cohesiveness in present-day China does not, unfortunately,

yield an unambiguous assessment of the country’s

stability. The rapidity of change and fluidity of conditions make it almost impossible to offer such an

assessment. However, this analysis demonstrates that,

on balance, there has been an overall decline of social

and political cohesiveness (see table 2). Strictly speaking, one need not be alarmed about declining political

and social cohesiveness in transition societies—rapid

changes inevitably produce forces tearing at the political and social fabrics of these societies. Generally,

what has kept most transition societies from falling

apart under such pressures is a set of countervailing

trends that generate new forces of social and political

cohesion. In China’s case, such trends are emerging

and visible. The main cause of concern is, however,

that these stabilizing trends are weak and tentative. At

the moment, they do not appear to be capable of

countering the centrifugal forces working within the

Chinese society and polity.

Table 2. Overall Assessment of Political and Social

Cohesiveness

Type of Cohesiveness Increase () or Decline ()

Elite 

Ideological 

Institutional 

Social 

Obviously, not all forces of disunity and instability

have the same political effects. For example, declining

social and ideological cohesiveness has mostly an indirect, background effect on political stability. Analysts

must focus their attention on elite and institutional

cohesiveness, because these two factors more directly

and powerfully determine political stability. Moreover,

given the slow pace of institutional change and adaptability, elite cohesiveness will remain for a long time

the principal cause of China’s political stability.
57

A rapid worsening of Sino-Australian relations in

1996 provided the new Coalition government in Canberra—elected that March—with a clear practical

demonstration of the importance of China. China’s

irritation with Australia, already roused by the awarding of the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney rather than

to Beijing, had increased in March when an Australian

government statement expressed support for the U.S.

intervention in the Taiwan Strait crisis.1 In June 1996,

Chinese Minister for Trade Wu Yi expressed “strong

concern” over Australia’s sudden decision to discontinue its Development Import Finance Facility (DIFF)

aid program. China was one of several Asian nations

with joint projects that were jeopardized by the DIFF

cancellation.2

China’s annoyance with Australia increased in

July 1996 after Australia voiced concerns over the fate

of democracy and human rights in a post-handover

Hong Kong3 and over China’s July nuclear test on the

eve of a testing moratorium.4 Annoyance became

anger in August, when an editorial in the People’s

Daily denounced the “strengthening” of the AustraliaU.S. alliance as part of a coordinated campaign to

contain China that included the earlier renegotiation

of the U.S.-Japan alliance: “From this we can see that

the United States is really thinking about using these

two ‘anchors’ as the claws of a crab.”5 Simultaneously,

a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement accused Australia of breaching the “one China policy” in approving an unofficial visit by Primary Industries Minister

John Anderson to Taiwan.6

Later in August, Australian Defense Minister Ian

McLachlan suggested that China’s actions during the

Taiwan Strait crisis, its claims in the South China Sea,

and its “newly assertive international posture” were

destabilizing to the region.7 In September, Australian

Prime Minister John Howard met with the visiting

Dalai Lama, despite Chinese threats that such a meeting would jeopardize bilateral relations.8

Although none of these incidents in isolation

would ordinarily have upset bilateral relations, their

occurrences in the space of several months plunged

Sino-Australian relations to the lowest point since the

Tiananmen incident in 1989.9 China canceled official

visits to Australia, and verbal attacks on Australia

became common in the official Chinese media, bringing Australian leaders face-to-face with the consequences of soured relations. The business community

raised concerns over the future of the flourishing

bilateral trade. The Chinese-Australian community

and Asianist scholars questioned the government’s

commitment to the Asian region. Foreign policy makers pondered the added difficulties that an openly

hostile China would add to the country’s already delicate regional diplomacy. The strategic community

considered the additional defense measures that

would be required if China became an enemy. Michael Wesley is Professor of Political Science at the University

of New South Wales, in Sydney, Australia.

The Challenges of China: Australian

Perceptions and Reactions

by Michael Wesley
58 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Concerns were expressed outside Australia as

well. Countries in Southeast Asia questioned whether

the worsening of Australia’s relations with China represented a shift in its regional policy, which could alter

their relations as well. United States President Bill

Clinton, embroiled in his own bilateral friction with

China, urged the Australian government to mend

relations with China during his November 1996 visit

to Australia.

The lessons of 1996 for Australian foreign policy

makers were profound. The Foreign and Trade Policy

White Paper, released in September 1997, listed China

as one of Australia’s “foremost” bilateral relationships,

alongside the United States, Japan, and Indonesia. It

noted that the Sino-Australian relationship would be

based on hardheaded pragmatism:

China will remain one of Australia’s key relationships.

The Government’s approach to China will be based on

shared interests and mutual respect. These principles

provide the basis for a realistic framework for the conduct of the relationship, and offer the best prospects to

maximize shared economic interests, advance Australia’s

political and strategic interests, and manage differences

in a sensible and practical way.10

The Australian Strategic Policy White Paper of

December 1997 continued this theme:

Clearly, the development of policies which serve our

national interests while acknowledging China’s political,

economic, and military growth will continue to be a

major priority for Australia. Our policies and actions

will seek to show China that the strategic outcomes we

seek are consistent with China developing a key role on

regional political, economic, and security issues commensurate with its legitimate claims as an emerging

major power. The best way we can do that is to encourage more high-level dialogue and contact between

China’s policy makers and our own to build better

mutual understanding of each other’s positions.11

These observations, providing a policy framework

for the bilateral relationship, are ubiquitous in the

foreign policy establishment’s statements on SinoAustralian relations, from Department of Foreign

Affairs and Trade (DFAT) briefings to speeches by the

Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.12 According

to both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister,

the bilateral policy framework has delivered to Australia “a more productive, realistic, and sustainable

relationship with China than at any time since the

resumption of diplomatic relations in the seventies.”13

This policy framework gives the impression that

there is a unified view among Australian policymakers

on the future of China, how this will affect the AsiaPacific region, and how Australia should respond.

Closer analysis reveals, however, that no such unified

view exists. The following discussion outlines the three

different visions of China’s future role in the region

that are held by Australian policymakers and academics: (1) as a player in an “accelerating status quo” in the

Asia-Pacific; (2) as a crucial participant in an increasingly integrated Asia-Pacific community; and (3) as a

great power in an imminent balance of power.

While these visions all tend to agree on China’s

objectives—the need to become a unified, internally

stable, great power—they differ on China’s ability to

achieve these objectives and how its development will

affect the region, and they differ on their prescriptions

for how Australia should manage bilateral relations

with China and the United States. The different visions

are not always mutually exclusive, nor do individual

policymakers and academics always subscribe to the

same one. Each vision tends to rise to prominence

when called forth by different events in the region.

Three Visions of China’s Future 

in the Region

Vision 1: An “Accelerating Status Quo”

This vision of the future for China in the region, a

view held by many Australian policymakers and academics, is like the others in that it expects China and

other states of the Western Pacific to seek greater

wealth, power, and internal stability. However, it disagrees with the other views on China’s ability to

achieve equal status with other great powers.

This skepticism is expressed in two ways. One cluster of opinion suspects that China’s rise to great power

status will be interrupted by serious internal problems:

corruption, unemployment, political instability.14 The

other cluster argues that even if China does become

wealthy, internally stable, and powerful, the nature of

power has changed in such a way that China will not be

able to assail the lead in power that the United States

possesses. The United States will continue to lengthen

its lead over China due to revolutions in information

and technology, which place American power in a different strategic league and complement the “revolution

in military affairs” (RMA).15
Australian Perceptions and Reactions 59

The common conclusion reached by both of these

schools of thought is that the continuing predominance of American power, and its estimated 25-year

lead in military technology over its closest Western

Pacific competitors, will see the present security structure in the Asia-Pacific region persist for the majority

of the 21st century. That all of the states of the

region—China, the United States, Japan, and the

ASEAN states—will continue to advance in wealth

and power will mean the situation will “accelerate,”

but not in any way alter the status quo in the current

hierarchy of power. Neither will these advances

change the basic hub-and-spokes structure of bilateral

security relationships between Asia-Pacific states and

the United States.

Vision 2: The Emerging Asia-Pacific Community

Agreeing with the first view that China and other

Western Pacific states want wealth, power, and internal stability, this vision argues that pursuit of these

goals will alter the nature of their societies and order

in the region. Analysts point to the growing interdependence and continued economic dynamism of the

Asia-Pacific, despite the recent Asian financial crisis,

as the most direct route to attaining wealth and

power. The incentives are for these states to foster

these interdependent links—through regimes promoting trade liberalization, regional stability, and

greater understanding.16

Asia-Pacific institutions—the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN

Regional Forum, and the ASEAN Post Ministerial

Conference—will all make gains in their strength,

resources, and effectiveness. These interdependencies

and the regimes that foster them are judged to be ultimately more important than the occasional tensions

and conflicts that flare up in the region. In fact,

broader and more regular contacts will breed a sense

of common regional feelings and mutual identification that will make such disputes less and less common.17 Furthermore, greater openness and contact

will eventually alter the Asia-Pacific states’ domestic

structures, bringing greater liberalism and democracy.

Newly democratic “Asian tiger economies,” such as

South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and perhaps

Indonesia, provide evidence that economic liberalism

brings political liberalism.

From this point of view, then, China will integrate

further into a strengthening set of Asia-Pacific

regimes as it pursues wealth, power, and stability, and

in the process become more open, liberal, and less

inclined to pursue interests that oppose other countries in the region.

Vision 3: A Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific

According to Defense Minister John Moore,

China will be “probably the second-biggest power” in

the world.18 China, Japan, Russia, and India are particularly bent on gaining on the United States in

power. Such is the imperative in balancing the predominant American power in the region that they are

likely to single-mindedly devote themselves to this

goal and achieve it. The regional power race is also

likely to be provided by the rivalry between China,

India, and a Japan that is increasingly unsure about

the U.S. security commitment.

The Asia-Pacific region is likely to see a full economic recovery from the effects of the Asian financial

crisis, but plagued by both old and new tensions,

rivalries, and instability. A five-power balance may not

emerge initially. Analysts see moves such as the

December 1999 signing of the Sino-Russian communiqué urging all nations to join a “balanced, multipolar world order” as evidence of an increasing willingness of former rivals to join together in balancing U.S.

power.19 New regional institutions will form around

this new imperative to balance power.20 There will be

little prospect of reconciling the competing powers;

permanent friendships will be superseded by permanent interests. The imperative of all states in the AsiaPacific will be to ensure that open conflict does not

break out between them, four of which have nuclear

arsenals. In this vision, China will be one of the great

powers in an Asia-Pacific “Balance of Power.”21

How China Will Affect the 

Asia-Pacific Region

Each vision of China’s future entails a specific

prediction about how China will affect the AsiaPacific region in the future. The “Accelerating Status

Quo” vision is essentially one of a frustrated, and perhaps increasingly desperate, China using regional

diplomacy to try to leverage its power in relation to

that of the United States. The region will continue to

be plagued by the Sino-U.S. rivalry, as well as other

rivalries, comprising an unresolved “uni-multipolar”

structure of both attraction to and competition with

the United States.22
60 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Under an “Accelerating Status Quo,” the issue of

Taiwan reunification is unlikely to be resolved, despite

China’s persistent efforts to seek unification. Taiwan,

on the other hand, is likely to act with increasing confidence if it sees the relative U.S. lead undiminished

and if the U.S. commitment to Taiwan security continues.23 The more pessimistic opinion of China’s

potential foresees domestic problems in China creating further instability in the region, possibly through

massive refugee flows.24 Regional instability will be

increased if recovery from the Asian financial crisis is

not complete. Continuing economic fluctuations will

create domestic turmoil, particularly in ethnically

mixed Asian states with governments that have weak

legitimacy. There is a potential for an “arc of instability” to form to the north and east of Australia, stretching from Burma and Cambodia through Indonesia

and Papua New Guinea, with New Zealand becoming

ever less significant as a strategic force in the region.25

The “Asia-Pacific Community” vision has a much

more benign prediction for how China will affect the

region. China’s decision during the Asian crisis not to

devalue its currency demonstrated its commitment to

the return of economic stability and growth to the

region.26 Figures already show that the region is well

on its way to a full recovery, and before long will be

leading the world in economic growth.27 In this context, regional institutions will be strengthened and

made more effective; institutional innovations are

already being mooted with this purpose in mind.28

China’s growing interest in and commitment to

regional institutions will continue.29

Interdependence and regime membership will

increasingly define China’s relationship with the AsiaPacific region. These forces will also begin to transform China and the Asia-Pacific. Economic openness

will be followed by political liberalization and the

“demand for new institutions, social welfare structures, and a more predictable legal framework.”30

Generational change in leaderships will bring new

political values into the governments of China and

others.31 As interdependence breeds a sense of

regional community, structures of sovereignty and

rivalry will begin to be mitigated. This may eventually

contribute to the resolution of the region’s most serious ongoing tensions—between China and Taiwan,

on the Korean Peninsula, and in the South China Sea.

The “Balance of Power” vision sees China’s rise to

power exerting a profound influence on the region.

Security calculations of the region’s states, until now

determined by U.S. strategic predominance, will need

to be reviewed in relation to a new center of power

emerging.32 Thailand and Malaysia have already dabbled in developing closer relations with China as they

become uncertain about their ties to the United

States.33 For its part, China will seek allies to balance

the coalition of U.S. allies in the region: This has been

the motive of its refusal to devalue its currency during

the crisis, and its campaign to improve relations with

Southeast Asian states.34

For the most part, China’s regional strategy will be

driven by its overriding rivalry with the United States,

leading it to seek accommodation with former great

power rivals Russia, India, and possibly Japan. AsiaPacific states will have more options if their relations

with the United States become strained. On the other

hand, the new imperative for the smaller states of the

region will be to avoid being trampled in the course of

great power competition. They will need to manage

their relations with the great powers in such a way as

to avoid being “chain-ganged” by a larger ally into a

conflict not of their making. They will also have an

interest in maintaining stability and peace between the

great powers in order to escape the devastating effect

of what may possibly be a nuclear conflict. Regional

tension spots such as Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, will become possible conflict detonators and are

likely to attract great attention within the region.

Australia’s Regional Policy

The different visions of China in the region also

call forth different imperatives for how Australia will

relate to the Asia-Pacific region. If an Accelerating

Status Quo develops, Australia’s overriding objective

will be to maintain its security alliance and close relations with the United States. To these ends, the Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper states that:

A key objective of the Government will be to strengthen

further the relationship between Australia and the

United States by expanding the already close links that

exist at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels.

The Government will be looking, in particular, to

broaden its dialogue with the United States on AsiaPacific issues, and to encourage it to accord sustained

high-level policy attention to the region.35

The East Timor crisis—for which Australia

appealed to the United States to lead the international
Australian Perceptions and Reactions 61

peacekeeping force into the devastated province but

was politely rebuffed—introduced another element

into these calculations. Echoes of the Nixon doctrine

were audible in the U.S. commitment to provide

logistical support but not troops, urging Australia to

take the lead. This led to the now-infamous interview

given by the Australian Prime Minister and its characterization as the “Howard doctrine”—Prime Minister

John Howard suggested that Australia could take the

lead in stabilizing regional turmoil while U.S. forces

played the role of a “lender of last resort” in security

terms. In an “Accelerating Status Quo” vision, Australia could be an agent of U.S. security policy in lowlevel security situations:

[The East Timor operation, led by Australia] has done a

lot to cement Australia’s place in the region. We have

been seen by countries, not only in the region but around

the world, as being able to do something that probably

no other country could do; because of the special characteristics we have; because we occupy that special place—

we are a European, Western civilization with strong links

to North America, but here we are in Asia.36

The Prime Minister has since retracted support

for this so-called Howard doctrine in the face of political ridicule and media criticism.37 Elements of the

intent behind the Howard doctrine can, however, still

be heard in statements of the military and foreign

policy establishments.38

A vision of an “Asia-Pacific Community” requires

Australian policy to focus on participating in and the

strengthening of regional multilateral institutions:

Active participation in APEC and other regional institutions demonstrates Australia’s recognition that its

future is inextricably linked to the future of the AsiaPacific region. It reflects the Government’s commitment

to being closely involved—from the inside—in shaping

the region’s future.39

Regional states that are not yet members of these

institutions and important global institutions should

be included as soon as possible. Furthermore, it is

important that the great powers abide by the rules

and norms of these institutions, thereby protecting

the interests of smaller regional players like Australia.

The current government is wary of placing all of

Australia’s interests in “grand constructs,” and much

more skeptical of multilateralism than its predecessor

had been:

Australia must be realistic about what the multilateral

system can achieve. The twentieth century has been

both the incubator and the graveyard of a long list of

initiatives for international cooperation. In most cases

their failure reflected an inability to recognize that

international organizations can only accomplish what

their members states are prepared to enable them to

accomplish. All too often international initiatives have

failed to match aspirations with capability.40

At the same time as the government has elevated

“practical bilateralism” to the core of Australia’s foreign policy, the current Australian government has

remained committed to and interested in multilateral

structures, from the United Nations and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to forging a link between its

own free trade agreement with New Zealand and the

ASEAN Free Trade Area.

A “Balance of Power” vision requires Australian

diplomacy to be flexible, able to respond quickly to

shifts in power balances. It also needs to be pragmatic

and dedicated to developing working relationships

with all states in the region, which it can subsequently

call on in the context of the evolving balance. “Special

relationships” are to be shunned, as is “emotionalism”

in foreign policy. This has been emphasized by the

Australian government, particularly in relation to

China: “[A]ffirming that we have a special relationship with China does not improve our policy choices,

it constrains them. It sets up unreal expectations both

here and in China which cannot always be met. In the

end, it only sets us up for a fall.”41

Many see Australia’s unthreatening nature and its

creativity in foreign policy as conferring the advantages

of playing the role of a middle power,42 helping to mitigate tensions between great powers: “For Australia, it is

adherence to fundamental values wrapped around a

creative and nimble diplomacy that helps to show the

bigger powers the imperative of reaching solutions.”43

At the same time, the new instability in the region has

led many to question Australia’s military preparedness,

comparing defense spending of less than 2 percent of

GDP in 1998 unfavorably with Australia’s more than 5

percent of GDP defense budget in 1951.44

Another view within the balance of power school

is that Australia should prepare for the coming bipolar

or multipolar regional system by prioritizing relations

not with the United States or China, but with the

smaller states of the region, which are similarly torn

between the two and endangered by the prospect of

the Sino-American rivalry spilling into open conflict:
62 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

Our best guarantee against being forced to choose

[between the United States and China] is to give much

greater emphasis to our relations with other countries in

East Asia and to make common cause with them—in

our separate bilateral relations and in larger, multilateral formations. This gives us options and flexibility and

some possibility of working together with other East

Asians to help ameliorate the tensions between Washington and Beijing.45

Australia’s China Policy

Examining Australian policies toward China in

the context of these three different visions helps

explain some of the complexities in Australia’s larger

foreign policy. Each vision prompts a distinctive set of

Australian policies towards China.

The vision of an “Accelerating Status Quo” in the

Asia-Pacific, and Australia’s imperative to maintain a

close relationship with the culturally similar American superpower, is comforting to those who are convinced that “there will continue to be major differences between our societies and political structures,”46

and that these differences have a major influence on

the ability of states to associate. China policy therefore

depends heavily on the state of Sino-American relations at any given point in time. Australia’s alliance

imperative to support the United States in the AsiaPacific, both rhetorically and materially, will sometimes entail tension in the Sino-Australian relationship. However, Australia will continue to have

important interests that require a workable relationship with China; the imperative therefore will be to

try to mitigate conflicts between Australia’s interests

with China and its commitment to the U.S. alliance.47

The structures underlying the “Accelerating Status

Quo” vision are likely to be the RMA and the proposal

for theater missile defense (TMD) in North Asia. Australia will probably need to subscribe to or support

these programs in the future,48 while its forces will

need to remain interoperable with those of the United

States and its Asia-Pacific allies.

Those with visions of an “Asia-Pacific Community” believe Australian policy toward China should

focus on a number of different imperatives:

First, China’s participation in, and commitment

and adherence to, regional and multilateral institutions should be encouraged: “China must have a place

in international institutions and a say in setting the

rules it is expected to abide by. But China’s participation must be on a basis that will strengthen those

institutions.”49

Australia has strongly backed China’s bid to

become a member of the World Trade Organization

(WTO), and was an early advocate of including the

“three Chinas”—China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—

in APEC.50 Institutions and norms are the best way

to accommodate China’s unsettling regional aspirations: Australia actively promoted the adoption of a

code of conduct to regulate the actions of China and

its rival claimants to the South China Sea,51 and

reacted with disappointment when China rejected

the proposed code.52

Second, Australia should build a stronger and

more varied bilateral relationship with China. This

has prompted innovations such as the “One and a

Half Track” security talks and the establishment of

exchanges with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as

an extra line of access into the Chinese government.53

Such regular contact and socialization is important in

fostering empathy between the two countries:

“[T]here is absolutely no substitute for face-to-face

contact in gaining a better understanding of how

another country sees the world.”54

Third, Australia’s policy should be dedicated to

working with China on issues where their interests

converge:

Australia has worked to build a relationship which

maximizes our mutual economic interests, promotes

cooperation on the many issues of common concern;

protects our strategic interests, and is direct about the

differences in values while managing them as productively as possible.55

Fourth, positive domestic change within China in

a non-confrontational way should be promoted. Current Australian policy includes an annual bilateral

human rights dialogue and a human rights technical

assistance program designed to promote civil society

and the rule of law.

An Asia-Pacific “Balance of Power” vision entails

a number of benefits as well as imperatives for Australia’s China policy. In fact, a number of benefits in

finding common cause with China have emerged in

recent years. China intervened on Australia’s behalf in

its attempts to free jailed aid workers Peter Wallace

and Steve Pratt from a Belgrade jail.56 In September

1999, imprisoned Chinese-Australian businessman

James Peng was released from a Shanghai prison. As a
Australian Perceptions and Reactions 63

permanent member of the Security Council, China is

important to various initiatives Australia may want to

pursue in the United Nations.57

Australia has also proved useful to China. A furious China relied partly on Australia to pressure Papua

New Guinea to reverse its decision in July 1999 to

establish full diplomatic relations with Taiwan in

exchange for an estimated $3.8 billion in aid.58 Australia has already been able to use its strengthened ties

with China to apply pressure to the United States over

the troubled issue of Australia-U.S. trade. Visiting Beijing in July 1999, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer

unfavorably contrasted the U.S. announcement of its

imposition of quotas on lamb imports—a major Australian export market—with a recent Sino-Australian

understanding on trade: “So, on the one hand [the

United States is] closing off an important export market to Australia and on the other hand, on the other

side of the Pacific, through our World Trade Organization negotiations with China, we are getting better

access to a whole range of markets.”59

The relationship with China must at all times be

pragmatic, and interest-based, however: “[I]n the

past, Australia’s relations with China have assumed an

overly emotional character, with a tendency to succumb to the excesses of opprobrium or enthusiasm.”60

A realistic view of Australia’s relative importance

to China can have real advantages in a Balance of

Power. As Foreign Minister Downer noted:

Australia will rarely dominate China’s foreign policy

considerations.... But this does have advantages for us.

We do not come to the Chinese with the same complicated political baggage that others have. We do not challenge Beijing in the same way. We are also not directly

embroiled in regional issues like the South China Sea,

where Beijing believes it has core national interests at

stake. We can talk to China about such matters without

having our own vested interest called into challenge and,

as a result, are now seen as valuable interlocutors on a

whole series of regional issues.61

This advantage also means that Australia should

not adopt a confrontational stand on human rights.

Here, Australian policymakers are less constrained

than their American counterparts because of the lack

of a large and organized lobby concerned with China’s

human rights record. Australian public concern tends

to peak around issues such as the Tiananmen incident

or the forced abortion—under the one-child policy—

of a pregnant woman deported from Australia to

China.62 Australian leaders have adopted the stance

that, “Shouting at the Chinese about human rights in

public forums is counter-productive,”63 which allays

some of the media and public criticism of their stance

of not confronting China on human rights abuses.64

They have also argued that not only does confrontation with China risk Australia’s trade ties and diplomatic influence, it is pointless, given Australia’s lack of

diplomatic weight with China. Moreover, it is less

effective than private representations and dialogue.

Australian Policies toward the United

States

Each vision also prescribes different ways to handle Australian relations with the United States. The

“Accelerating Status Quo” view places Australia-U.S.

relations at the center of Australian foreign policy;

thus, all policy decisions should follow from the prerogatives of the alliance with the United States. The

U.S. presence in the region is vital for Asia-Pacific

security: “Australia—along with others in the

region—regards [American] strategic engagement as

vital for the stability of Asia. We are committed to

providing the political and practical support to make

that possible.”65

There are two main policy prescriptions involved

in this task. The first is to ensure that the United

States remains interested in and engaged in the AsiaPacific region. Great nervousness is caused by isolationist elements in the U.S. Congress, which would see

the U.S. reduce its security forces in the Western

Pacific and perhaps close its markets to Asian

exports.66 The maintenance of the bilateral alliance, of

“highest strategic priority” for Australia, is crucial for

maintaining U.S. engagement: “[T]he US-Australia

alliance has come to be seen by both sides as an

important element in the post-Cold War strategic

architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, helping to sustain US strategic engagement in the Western Pacific.”67

The second policy requirement is to make sure

that the United States never loses interest in its

alliance with Australia. Australia, long dependent on

alliances with “great and powerful friends,” also has a

visceral fear that its allies will not come to its assistance when it is attacked.68 For this reason, Australia

must continually demonstrate its usefulness to the

United States, in intelligence sharing, in regional
64 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

diplomacy, and in maintaining a significant enough

strategic presence to be useful as a coalition partner

with U.S. forces in regional operations.69 Australia

must also restrain itself from pushing issues of conflict with the United States, such as agricultural trade,

which could damage the core security relationship.

The “Asia-Pacific Community” vision dictates

that the United States must be kept committed to and

engaged in regional institutions. For the most part,

this is consistent with policies seeking continued U.S.

engagement in the region. It leads Australian policymakers to stress the achievements of regional organizations such as APEC, in order to maintain U.S.

interest in the organization.70 On the other hand, it

entails harsh criticisms of American policy when this

is seen to be damaging to, or ignoring its obligations

under regional institutions.71 It also has brought criticism when U.S. policy toward China and Asia more

generally is characterized as “confused,” to the detriment of the institutions and norms emerging in the

Asia-Pacific.72

A sub-stream of opinion within this vision suggests that it may be easier to construct more viable

regional institutions if the United States is left out of

them. Citing ongoing bilateral tensions between the

United States and both China and Japan, such opinion proposes a regional organization in the Western

Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand with the

ASEAN states, China, South Korea, and Japan, but not

the United States or Canada.73 This arrangement

would not be in order to balance against U.S. power

and influence; rather, the United States would still be

tied into the Asia-Pacific region through other bilateral and institutional structures, as it is with the European Union.

The “Balance of Power” vision creates greater

freedom to maneuver Australian policy toward the

United States. The evolution of different centers of

power means that Australian policy would no longer

be tied to the maintenance of one key bilateral relationship, but could balance it differently as its interests were affected by different issues. This would

resolve a central tension in Australian foreign policy:

its current overwhelming reliance on the bilateral

security alliance with the U.S., but a growing frequency of disagreements with the United States on a

variety of regional issues, from trade to human rights

and environmental standards. 74 If the balance

remained loose, the prospect for Australia may be to

gravitate toward states with more complementary

interests and views on particular issues. On the other

hand, threatening to gravitate elsewhere could present

Australia with some additional leverage over the

United States:

We in fact have more powerful weapons in our hands

than we know. Since the end of the Cold War the strategic alliance with the US has become less important and

less central to our affairs. . . . Would we be brave enough

to say to the US: we want your friendship, we want the

strategic alliance to remain but, if you want it to

remain, you also have to treat us as an economic ally

rather than as an economic enemy?75

The danger of the balance of power, however,

would be the added risk of being drawn into a major

great power conflict. Such concerns were raised as

recently as July 1999, as China reacted angrily when

Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui described theirs as

“state to state” relations: “If China attacked Taiwan,

the United States would probably support Taiwan.

Australia and Japan could be drawn in under the

terms of their defense agreements with the US.”76

Conclusion

The purpose of this analysis has not been to suggest that the Australian foreign policy establishment,

academics, and the media are divided into three cohesive groups of opinion on China and the region’s

future, and its implications for Australian policy. The

analysis itself uses statements made by the same people on different issues and at different times to illustrate different visions. The central point of this analysis has been to argue that a close examination of

Australian foreign policy and the statements of leaders and academics show that in Australia there is no

consensus on the future of China in the region. The

three visions outlined above are simplifications of

current opinion in Australia; they do allow similar

views in the same rubric. They allow one to explore

the implications of each vision for Australian policy

toward China and the United States.

Each vision is based on a different prediction for

China and the region in the future. As events emerge

to support or call into question these predictions, different visions and their policy consequences will rise

to prominence. The Asian crisis, in calling into question the inevitability and sustainability of the “Asian

miracle,” has seen the Accelerating Status Quo vision
Australian Perceptions and Reactions 65

gain currency since 1997. At the same time, the weak

responses of regional institutions to the Asian crisis

called into question the Asia-Pacific Community

vision and its predictions of a more institutionalized,

norm-governed, stable region. Yet this vision has

gained strength from China’s decision against devaluing its currency, and the democratization of a number

of western Pacific states. The Balance of Power vision

has been given new prominence by the December

1999 Sino-Russian communiqué and the South Asian

nuclear tests.

None of these “standards of evidence” are decisive

enough to allow one vision to predominate. For this

reason, Australian pronouncements and policy frequently contain elements and consequences of all

three. Whether the weight of evidence accumulates in

favor of one vision or all three is likely to determine

the policy responses of Australia. However, at this

uncertain time, it is unquestionably better to have

several possible visions of the future than for Australia

to have invested all of its confidence, resources, and

interests in one, possibly mistaken, vision.

Notes

1 China’s military forces conducted live-fire air and naval

exercises in the Taiwan Strait between March 8 and March 25,

1996. Missiles were launched from China into the sea near Taiwan’s two major ports. The exercises were seen as intimidation of

Taiwan shortly after it held the presidential election in which Lee

Teng-hui became the first directly elected head of state in China’s

history. The United States responded by sending two carrier battlegroups to the area. 2 See Michael Dwyer, “Downer Forced into Backdown,” Australian Financial Review, June 25, 1996. 3 On July 1, 1997, Britain officially ceded sovereignty over

the territory of Hong Kong to the PRC. 4 Don Greenlees, “Downer Warns China on HK,” Australian,

July 26, 1996; Gabrielle Chan, “Downer Condemns Chinese

N–Test on Moratorium Eve,” The Australian, July 30, 1996. 5 Michael Dwyer, “Australia and Japan are the Claws US Will

Use to Entrap Us, Says China,” Australian Financial Review,

August 8, 1996. 6 Mark Baker, “China Launches Double Attack,” Sydney

Morning Herald, August 8, 1996. 7 Don Greenlees, “McLachlan Criticises China,” Australian,

August 24, 1996. 8 D. D. MacNicholl and Don Greenlees, “PM Defies China’s

Economic Threats to Greet Dalai Lama,” The Australian, September 27, 1996. 9 On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government used tanks and

military forces to suppress thousands of student demonstrators in

Tiananmen Square. 10 Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (Canberra: National

Capital Printing, 1997), 63.

11 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy

(Canberra: DPUBS, 1997), 24. 12 See, for example, the Department of Foreign Affairs and

Trade Website at http//www.dfat.gov.au/ geo/na/prc. 13 John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia, Address at a

Lunch Hosted by Georgetown University, Washington, DC, July

13, 1999. 14 See, for example, David Lague, “Dancing With the Dictators,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 8, 1999. 15 See, for example, Paul Dibb, “The Revolution in Military

Affairs and Asian Security,” IISS Annual Conference on Security

Challenges in the Rising Asia-Pacific, Singapore, September

11–14, 1997.

16 See, for example, Ross Garnaut, Open Regionalism and

Trade Liberalisation: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the World

Trade System (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997). 17 See Gareth Evans, “Australia in East Asia and the AsiaPacific: Beyond the Looking Glass,” speech to the Asia-Australia

Institute, Sydney, March 20, 1995. 18 Quoted in David Lague, “Dancing with the Dictators,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 8, 1999. 19 David Lague, “Russia, China in Pact Against West,” Sydney

Morning Herald, December 11, 1999. 20 For example, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung suggested in October 1999 that Southeast Asian nations and the three

Northeast Asian nations—South Korea, the People’s Republic of

China (PRC), and Japan—establish a new regional mechanism on

economic and security cooperation; see Chon Shi-yong, “Kim

Calls for Merger of East Asia, ASEAN,” The Korea Herald, October

23, 1999. 21 Paul Dibb, David D. Hale, and Peter Prince, in “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s Economic Crisis,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 2

(Summer 1998), suggest that both China and the United States

have emerged relatively strengthened by the Asian crisis, a factor

likely to lead to added competition and balancing urges. 22 This term was coined by Samuel P. Huntington, “The

Lonely Superpower” Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April 1999). 23 See Greg Austin, ed., “Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan’s

Future: Innovations in Politics and Military Power,” Canberra

Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 122 (Canberra: Australian

National University, 1997). 24 Australian concern over the effects of refugee flows has

been heightened in recent months by the rising tide of illegal

immigrants and people-smuggling operations that have been

detected by the Australian customs and immigration service; see

Bernard Lagan, “The People Smugglers,” Sydney Morning Herald,

May 22, 1999. 25 Dibb et al., “The Strategic Implications of Asia’s Economic

Crisis.”

26 Ben Dolven and Lorien Holland, “Softly, Softly,” Far Eastern Economic Review 62, No. 23 (June 10, 1999). 27 “ASEAN Looks to the New Year,” The Economist, December

19, 1998. 28 Michael Wesley, “The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of

Regional Institutions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1

(April 1999). 29 Patrick Walters, “China to Play Key Role in ASEAN

Forum,” The Australian, July 23, 1996.
66 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

30 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown University, July 13, 1999. 31 Recently, Foreign Minister Downer cited the introduction

of elections at the village level in China as evidence of the progress

of liberalization, but warned that much still remained to be done;

see Alexander Downer, “The 1999 China Oration,” AustraliaChina Business Council, Sydney, November 25, 1999. 32 Greg Austin, “Apocalypse Next? Will Asia Become the Next

Arena For Great Power Conflict?” Asia-Australia Papers, September 2, 1999. 33 Michael Vatikiotis, Murray Hiebert, and S. Jayasankaran,

“Imperial Intrigue,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 160 (September 11, 1997). 34 “East Asia’s New Faultlines,” The Economist, March 14,

1998.35 Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, 58. 36 Fred Brenchley, “The Howard Defence Doctrine,” The Bulletin, September 28, 1999, 24.

37 Paul Kelly, “Delusions of Grandeur,” The Australian,

December 11, 1999. 38 Howard, in a speech to the Millennium Forum in Sydney

at the end of November 1999, said, “I don’t think this country has

stood taller and stronger in the chanceries of the world than it

does at the present time”—a clear signal that the triumphalism

derived from the East Timor operation is still alive and well in the

thinking of the Prime Minister and foreign policymakers. 39 Commonwealth of Australia, In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper, 45. 40 Ibid., 47.

41 Downer, “The 1999 China Oration.” 42 Michael Wesley and Tony Warren, “Wild Colonial Ploys?

Currents of Thought in Australian Foreign Policy,” Australian

Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 2000), 19. 43 Bruce Wolpe, “Learning to Stand on Our Own Feet,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 30, 1999. 44 “Time to Take on Defence,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 17, 1999. 45 Stephen FitzGerald, “How (Not) to Deal With China,”

Quadrant, Vol. 41, No. 7–8 (July-August 1997), 19–20. 46 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown University. 47 Stuart Harris, Will China Divide Australia and the US?

(Sydney: Australian Centre for American Studies, 1998). 48 Stephen Lunn, “$10 bn for Defence to Catch Up,” The Australian, November 1–2, 1997, quotes remarks by Deputy Secretary

of Defence Hugh White predicting that this amount of investment

will have to be made over the next 10 years if it is to remain compatible with U.S. systems. He also stated that Australia’s failure to

do this would create a “strategic risk” in the region. 49 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown University. 50 Michelle Grattan, “PM Backs China’s Trade Bid,” Sydney

Morning Herald, September 9, 1999. 51 Craig Skehan, “Downer Push for Regional Code,” Sydney

Morning Herald, July 27, 1999. 52 Joseph Brady, “China Snubs Island Peace Code,” Sydney

Morning Herald, November 27, 1999.

53 David Lague, “Canberra Forges New Links with PLA,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 26, 1999. 54 Downer, “1999 China Oration.” 55 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown University. 56 David Lague, “China to Plead for Aid Pair,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 13, 1999. 57 A recent reminder of this was China’s refusal to endorse

the renewal of the U.N. mandate for the peacekeeping force in

Macedonia because of Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan; see

“China Pressed on Macedonia,” Sydney Morning Herald, February

27, 1999. 58 Australia’s representations to Papua New Guinea to cut ties

with Taiwan included its warnings that its neighbor’s move added

“unwelcome tension” to the region, and would have “negative economic implications” for Papua New Guinea; see David Lague,

“Ties with Taipei Infuriate Beijing,” Sydney Morning Herald, July

7, 1999. 59 Michelle Grattan, “Give Us Action, Not Talk: PM,” Sydney

Morning Herald, July 14, 1999. 60 Downer, “1999 China Oration.” 61 Ibid.

62 Damien Murphy, “China Forces Asylum Seeker to Abort

Baby,” Sydney Morning Herald, May 5, 1999. 63 Downer, “1999 China Oration.” 64 See David Lague, “Downer’s China Syndrome: What

Human Rights Abuses?” Sydney Morning Herald, July 17, 1999. 65 Howard, Address at a Lunch Hosted by Georgetown University. 66 Geoff Hiscock, “US View of Asia Dangerous, Says Hawke,”

Australian, August 7, 1996. 67 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy, 19. 68 Wesley and Warren, “Wild Colonial Ploys?”, 15. 69 Max Walsh, “The Dollars and Sense of Defence,” The Bulletin, September 28, 1999, 25.

70 Michael Wesley, “The Politics of Early Voluntary Sectoral

Liberalisation in Australia,” Research Paper for the Institute for

Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organisation, February 2000. 71 For example, Prime Minister Paul Keating referred to the

U.S. push to include the Russian Federation in APEC as “an act of

international vandalism.” 72 Michelle Grattan, “Stop the Violence, PM Tells Jakarta,”

Sydney Morning Herald, July 15, 1999. 73 See, for example, former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser,

“Great Power Relations and the Issue of Taiwan in the Asia

Pacific,” Asia-Australia Papers, No. 2, September 1999; a variant

may also be the original Australian concept for APEC, which

envisaged an organization without members from the eastern

Pacific. 74 Andrew MacIntyre, “Pacific Adrift: Southeast Asia and the

US-Australia Relationship,” Pacific Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1996). 75 Former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, “Memo US: We’re

an Ally, Not an Enemy,” The Australian, February 27, 1997. 76 David Lague, “Taiwan’s Swagger Provokes Outburst,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 14 , 1999.
67

As the world enters a new century and the new millennium, so too does the configuration of world powers. The multipolarization of the world and the globalization of the economy are introducing new

international factors. In the post-Cold War era, major

powers are readjusting and realigning their relationships. The developed countries, especially the United

States, are enjoying a relatively stable period of economic growth and making progress in science and

technology. The information revolution has made the

world a more integrated one. Along with these developments are changes in people’s mindsets—mentalities as well as ideas. Another prominent development

is the increase of the numbers of nonstate or superstate players, regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations. Finally, the disintegration of the former Soviet

Union is forcing the United States to redefine its

strategic defense and China policy.

Nonetheless, states are still the most important

actors in international affairs. In terms of state-tostate relations, the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the

most important bilateral relationships. In 1999, SinoU.S. relations experienced dramatic and drastic

events, ranging from the bombing of the Chinese

Embassy in Belgrade1 to the conclusion of a trade

agreement in Washington as a step toward China’s

accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The U.S. presidential election in 2000 makes the

future of the Sino-U.S. relationship even more complicated and difficult to predict.

Sino-U.S. relations have a strong international

context because of other regional and global factors.

The direction that the relationship takes will directly

affect peace and economic development around the

world and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular.

China and the United States, as two major powers,

bear special responsibility. Given the commonality of

some goals and differences between the two nations,

there exist both positive and negative possibilities for

their relationship in the years ahead.

The World, the Region, and China

World Environments

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed some fundamental changes. The bipolar environment has disappeared, but it is not yet clear what

kind of system is developing. Some observers suggest

a Pax Americana; others talk about a multipolar system. Still others advocate something in between. The

question of how to define the new world system has

caused some uncertainties and anxieties.

The transition from the Cold War international

order to the post-Cold War environment does not

resemble what has occurred in previous periods. The

Yang Jiemian is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Department

of American Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International

Studies, People’s Republic of China.

Challenges for Sino-U.S. Relations:

Issues and Problems

by Yang Jiemian
68 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

transition did not follow a major war and new

treaties; instead, it has been undergoing a long process

of evolution. The United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank

continue to be important parts of the current international order. But the WTO is definitely something

new. All countries, especially some big and middle

powers, want to obtain an advantageous position in

the NIPEO—the new international political and economic order.

Both the content and extension of international

affairs have expanded greatly. State-to-state relations

exceed traditional spheres, now extending into economic affairs, education, culture, environmental protection, and others. Nonstate actors are coming to

play more important and active roles than ever

before. International and regional intergovernmental

organizations act as part of a supranational government. Some multinational and transnational organizations have not only much more economic power

but also more political power than do some medium

and small countries. A state’s physical boundaries

have become less important for the flow of people,

capital, and technology.

A dichotomy of trends is appearing to gather

momentum. On the one hand, nations and peoples

are inclined to determine their priorities by practical

interests. Economic growth and the elevation of quality of life issues are more important than abstract

concepts. On the other hand, the United States and

some other Western powers are increasingly stressing

such notions as democracy, freedom, and human

rights. They emphasize the limitations of sovereignty,

advocate humanitarian intervention, and call for preventive diplomacy.

The information revolution has rapidly and profoundly changed the world, not only in the ways people communicate but also in the ways they live, work,

and think. The ease and swiftness of communications

enable nations and people to think in a much broader

sense. This is especially true in international affairs.

The developed countries are attempting to take

advantage of this to expand their political and economic interests in the world. The developing countries are obviously at a disadvantage.

The United States continues to gain advantages. It

is enjoying the longest period of economic growth

and rapid developments in science and technology.

Through NATO expansion and the U.S.-Japan Security Guideline, the United States has succeeded in

readjusting its relations with its major allies. With this

boost to its comprehensive national strength and selfconfidence, the United States is anxious to translate its

will into actions in certain international affairs. At the

same time, the United States has had to readjust its

relations with other major powers. It faces difficulties

in dealing with Russia, China, India and, to a certain

extent, France. The United States also has troubles

dealing with the developing countries.

Regional Environments

The perceptions and realities of the Asia-Pacific

region have greatly changed over the past decade. Ten

years ago, people were greatly optimistic about the

region’s politics, economy, and security. The AsiaPacific region did not suffer the European kind of

political and economic turmoil at the end of the Cold

War. People were thus encouraged to talk about the

possibility of a peaceful and prosperous transition.

The previous two decades of economic growth led

them to entertain such ideas as an “Asia-Pacific century.” Some people even doubted if there would ever

be a business cycle in the region. However, recent

developments proved these predictions wrong.

First, the major power relationships in the region

have seen frequent difficulties. Relations among the

United States, Japan, and China have become difficult.

Indeed, Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan relations have

soured. The strengthened U.S.-Japan military alliance

is being watched carefully by China, while closer military-to-military ties between China and Russia are

causing grave concerns in the United States and Japan.

Second, the Asian financial crisis that began several years ago ended a long period of high economic

growth in the region. Many economies have actually

regressed for many years. Asian countries realize now

that their economies are vulnerable to outside

impacts. As a result, the process of achieving regional

economic cooperation and integration has been

noticeably affected.

Third, in some countries political turbulence has

gone hand in hand with economic difficulties.

Indonesia finally discarded the Suharto regime. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula caused repeated concern. The U.S.-Japan Security Guideline and the proposed Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system are

highly controversial. The nuclear arms race between

India and Pakistan has been a severe setback to nonproliferation efforts.
Sino-U.S. Relations 69

Despite these adverse developments, the AsiaPacific region is still moving ahead. On the whole, the

Asian financial crisis is over. South Korea, Thailand,

Malaysia, and others have regained their momentum of

economic growth. Moreover, the Asia-Pacific countries

have learned a good lesson that will benefit their development in the future. Indonesia has displayed a great

capability to avert political disaster and adapt to the

new situation. The ASEAN countries are closing their

ranks and preparing for a new role in regional affairs.

Implications for China

After twenty years of reforming and opening up,

China has substantially improved its national

strength. Beijing hopes to transform backward China

into a moderately developed country by the middle of

the 21st century. To achieve its goals, China needs a

peaceful environment externally and stability internally. Thus, China pursues an independent and peaceful foreign policy.

China set out a very clear global and regional

strategy. At the global level, this strategy seeks to

ensure a more just and reasonable international order.

China, as an emerging power, does not demand an

overhaul of the existing international order. Actually,

China is already part of the existing one. For political

and security matters, China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. For economic matters, it is a member of both the IMF and

the World Bank. China is sparing no effort to join the

WTO. As a matter of fact, China’s policy of reform

and openness is a manifestation of how painstakingly

China is working to integrate itself into the international community.

In the meantime, China also works hard at

improving the existing order. China does not endorse

a monopolar world, nor is it satisfied with Western

dominance of world affairs. China calls for an

increased role for developing nations. China hopes

that, through negotiations and dialogue, the world

community will finally be able to establish a more just

and fair NIPEO.

At a regional level, China’s first priority is to

improve relations with its neighbors, and thanks to

past efforts, China enjoys good and stable relations

with most of them. China has settled almost all of its

border issues with Russia, the former Soviet republics,

Vietnam, and some others. China’s proposal for common development while shelving disputes in the

South China Sea has been widely appreciated by the

parties concerned. During the Asian financial crisis,

China kept its promise and did not devalue its currency, thus halting the “domino effect” and a new

round of Asian devaluation. China’s high sense of

responsibility has won great admiration from its

Asian neighbors.

In fact, many Asian countries have come to realize

that China is not a threat, but a helper. China also

plays an important role in maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and works hard on the

issue of nonproliferation. China is a positive and

active member of major regional organizations and

mechanisms, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), the 10+3 (10 ASEAN nations plus

China, South Korea, and Japan), the 10+1 (10 ASEAN

nations plus China), and the Asia-Europe dialogue.

Trends in Sino-U.S. Relations

New Challenges

There have been new challenges to the Sino-U.S.

relationship:

First, mutual frustration has reached a dangerous

point. In China’s view, the United States has created

one trouble after another. These include allegations of

Chinese political contributions to a U.S. presidential

campaign, plans for theater missile defenses, the

release of the congressionally commissioned Cox

Report on suspected espionage,2 a last-minute rejection of the package deal with visiting Chinese Premier

Zhu Rongji on China’s accession to the WTO, the

embassy bombing, and the proposed Taiwan Security

Enhancement Act (TSEA). The United States, on the

other hand, has criticized China for its human rights

record, its ties with such rogue nations as Iraq and

Iran, its rejection of renouncing the use of force to

solve the Taiwan issue, and its vehement reaction after

the embassy bombing. The United States also complained that, among other things, China does not

return America’s well-intentioned gestures.

Second, the strong mutual frustration has turned

into deep mutual suspicion. The worst scenario has

prevailed in some cases. Foreign policy depends substantially on perceptions. If people just think the

worst of each other, sensible and reasonable policies

will not be made and implemented. Some of the U.S.

media have often depicted China in a very negative

way. Some Americans both inside and outside the
70 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

government have suspected that China will become

an adversary. Some believe that a conflict between the

two sometime in the coming century is inevitable.

Third, domestic factors play an increasingly large

role. Many complicated and difficult factors are

affecting China policy in the United States. Political

and partisan fights often derail the President’s agenda.

The U.S. preference for unilateralism and the strange

alliance of the left and right exert great pressure on

any attempt to improve Sino-U.S. relations. The single-issue pressure groups, such as human rights and

environmental protection groups, trade unions, and

religious organizations, have all challenged the Clinton administration’s China policy. The 2000 presidential campaign has made the situation even more difficult to handle.

In China, increasing integration with the world

and with the United States has blurred the distinction

between foreign and domestic issues. The issues of

Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status

with the United States and WTO accession are two

cases in point. The Chinese people’s resentment and

dissatisfaction over U.S. pressure have been on the

quick rise. Patriotism and enhanced self-confidence

have become important factors to be reckoned with in

China’s foreign policy decisionmaking process. Of

course, not all the domestic factors are negative. Years

of interchanges in politics, economics, cultural affairs,

professions, and academics have created a large group

of people who want a normal and healthy relationship. The two business communities play an active

and effective role in this bilateral relationship.

Fourth, the Sino-U.S. relationship is closely tied to

cross-Strait relations. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in

1995–19963 and the summit visits in 1997 and 1998,

the United States has exercised some restraint and

caution on the Taiwan issue. The U.S. executive and

legislative branches and others in the mainstream

have reached a sort of consensus behind the view that

Taiwan should not take provocative moves. However,

two opposing forces are pulling the United States: the

desires to improve the Sino-U.S. relationship and to

strengthen U.S. ties with Taiwan. The United States

has increased arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S.-Japan

defense Guideline virtually includes Taiwan, and the

proposed TMD will give military, political, and psychological support to Taiwan’s separatist tendencies.

Some Positive Trends

The Sino-U.S. relationship is so important that

neither side can afford total confrontation. Even during the troubling and eventful year of 1999, the two

governments were able to control the damage and

continue their relationship. There is some encouraging news.

1. Both governments are working to put their

relationship back on a normal track.

Because the Sino-U.S. relationship is too important to let it get out of control, both countries are

working to repair the damage. They reached an agreement on compensation for the embassy bombing. It is

encouraging to see that the two presidents used their

“hotlines” after both that bombing and Taiwan’s Lee

Teng-hui’s “two-state” remarks.4 The Jiang-Clinton

summit at the APEC meeting in September 1999

greatly facilitated the completion of the WTO deal.

Finally, China and the United States have resumed

political and military consultations, which had been

suspended after the bombing incident.

2. The WTO trade package will exert a positive

influence on the Sino-U.S. relationship.

Although President Clinton turned down the best

possible offer from Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji during his April trip to the United States, the U.S. executive and legislative branches finally realize its importance. Only four months after the bombing incident,

the two presidents met at the APEC meeting in Auckland, New Zealand, and agreed to reopen the WTO

trade negotiations. Two months later, the two governments concluded the package agreement. As an

important step in fulfilling the U.S. obligations, the

U.S. Congress will vote on whether to offer PNTR to

China some time in the middle of this year.5 In

essence, this is a vote on whether the United States

would like to continue its normal trading relations

with China and realize the hard-won benefits from its

trade negotiations with China. The conclusion of the

WTO deal will help narrow differences and expand

commonality in the relationship. Closer economic

and trade relations will also have positive ripple

effects in other fields.

3. China and the United States have reached a certain degree of understanding in order to stabilize the

situation in the Taiwan Strait.

China and the United States realize that healthy

and normal relations facilitate stable cross-Strait relations, which are in the interests of all the parties concerned. Shortly after Mr. Lee Teng-hui put forward
Sino-U.S. Relations 71

his “two-state” theory last July, the U.S. executive

branch clarified its position on adhering to a “One

China” policy and criticized Mr. Lee for his intention

to “rock the boat” and “change the status quo.” Even

some pro-Taiwan elements within the U.S. Congress

showed their dissatisfaction. Some credit should be

given to the Clinton administration for helping to

defuse the tension.

4. The two sides have resumed political and security dialogues.

While the proposed constructive strategic partnership is controversial, both governments continue consultations on strategic and security matters. Starting

from December 1999, China and the United States

resumed political and military dialogues. It has been

reported that more high-level visits will take place. The

Chinese side has again agreed to allow U.S. ships to

call at Hong Kong ports. The two sides will also hold

joint maritime humanitarian exercises. Such mutual

visits and military-to-military exchanges are obviously

beneficial for increasing mutual understanding.

5. Realistic expectations reduce the chances of

disillusion in future relations.

The two sides have become pragmatic and realistic

in setting their goals this year, an election year in the

United States. On the American side, the Clinton

administration understands that the best course of

action is to avoid controversy during the presidential

campaign. It is focusing on winning support for PNTR.

On the Chinese side, Beijing also realizes that under the

current circumstances it is not likely to reach any significant breakthroughs in Sino-U.S. relations. Therefore, promoting the trade and economic relationship

has become the major theme, and possibly the only feasible target. Perhaps this is what both sides have learned

in the past few years: it is better to resist tempting

catchwords and to adopt realistic attitudes.

How Sino-U.S. Relations Impact the

Region

China and the United States are two important

members of the world and the Asia-Pacific region.

Their bilateral relationship has great significance for

the foreign and domestic policies of the Asian-Pacific

countries. For the past three decades, though with ups

and downs, the general trend of the Sino-U.S. relationship has been positive and forward-looking. An

improved relationship has greatly contributed to

peace and development in the region.

In order to maintain this trend, we must understand some of the conceptual and actual differences

between the two countries. In evaluating the global

and regional situation, China does not see eye to eye

with the United States. China believes that the world

is heading for a multipolar arrangement. Since the

end of the Cold War, the configuration of world powers is changing. The original bipolar confrontation

has been replaced by the coexistence of one superpower and several major powers. Although this pattern basically remains stable, U.S. superiority is on the

rise. Moreover, the United States is trying hard to

translate its superiority into the advancement of its

own interests in politics, diplomacy, security, and

economy. China calls for the establishment of a more

just and fairer NIPEO. It appeals for respect for the

territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries; it

opposes interference in others’ internal affairs; and it

rejects the use or threat of use of force.

The United States maintains that it should continue its leadership role in world affairs well into the

21st century. On the basis of its enhanced international standing and increased national strength, the

United States tries hard to project its powers, promote

its values, expand its economic interests, and spread

its culture. U.S. superiority has been further strengthened vis-à-vis a weakened Russia, an economically

injured Japan, and a Europe that is not yet a peer. In

handling world affairs, the United States is often hegemonic, hotheaded, inclined to interfere with others’

internal affairs, and solve some regional conflicts by

force. The United States has even gone so far as to

bypass the UN to use military force. Just since August

1998, the United States has used force, either individually or multilaterally, against Afghanistan, Sudan,

Iraq, and Yugoslavia.

The United States has not moved beyond the

Cold War thinking in security matters. At the end of

the Cold War, some Americans seriously thought of

restricting NATO’s role, withdrawing some overseas

troops, and calling for peace dividends. In the AsiaPacific region, the Clinton administration once put

forward the concept of a “New Pacific Community.”

American academic circles explored possible collective models, ranging from the Northeast Asian Security Cooperation Conference to the ARF. However, in

recent years, Cold War thinking is picking up in the

United States. According to the U.S. Government

strategy stated in 1997, the United States takes as
72 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

guiding principles molding a conducive international

environment, maintaining the capacity to win two

theater wars at the same time, and preparing for

unforeseeable crises. It is stepping up a security system in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening bilateral military alliances under its leadership.

The United States has clear-cut targets in these

two strategic regions. First and foremost, the United

States tries to maintain its global and regional leadership role. It wants to continue to weaken Russia so

that there will be no way for Russian to challenge the

United States once again in the future. In the AsiaPacific region, the United States has a hedging policy

to prevent China from becoming its peer sometime in

the next century.

In order to realize its security strategy, the United

States needs to cooperate and coordinate with its

allies. The United States has worked out a security

network in Europe by strengthening and enlarging

NATO. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States

has made the U.S.-Japan alliance a cornerstone of its

system of bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea,

Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia.

China has always advocated the casting away of

Cold War thinking. It has called for common and

cooperative security, and it opposes obtaining one

nation’s security at the expense of others. China

opposes the so-called NATO expansion, the U.S.-led

NATO action in Kosovo, and U.S. military actions

against some countries. China firmly opposes U.S.

arms sales to Taiwan, the inclusion of Taiwan under

the U.S.-Japan Security Guideline, the TMD covers

for Taiwan, and the proposed TSEA. All these not only

seriously violate three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués,

but in China’s eyes, they gravely encroach upon

China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Small wonder that China and the United States

differ on a number of international issues, such as

China’s relationship with Iran and Iraq, post-nuclear

test relations with India and Pakistan, the international trial of former Khmer Rouge leaders, and particularly the Kosovo crisis. Therefore, some Americans even claim that there is no basis of cooperation

for the proposed strategic partnership between the

two countries.

A Better Future

Working Toward a Better Sino-U.S. Relationship

As a ranking U.S. Pentagon official said, among

the Sino-U.S. problems, the most important and

imminent danger lies not with concerns over human

rights, trade deficits, or the Falun Gong, but with the

Taiwan issue. Indeed, the Taiwan issue has always

been the most important and sensitive issue at the

core of the relationship. Therefore, the United States

should play a positive role in handling the Taiwan

issue. Fundamentally speaking, the Taiwan issue is an

internal affair between the Chinese across the Taiwan

Strait, and the United States should not interfere with

China’s internal affairs. However, the Chinese side can

discuss the Taiwan issue with the Americans because

the United States created the Taiwan issue half a century ago6 and still possesses great influence over Taiwan. The Taiwan issue remains the most important

and sensitive issue at the core of the Sino relations.

The U.S. executive branch and the U.S. Congress

should not play a negative role in the process of China

reunification. The United States should abide by the

three joint communiqués and keep to its commitment

to the “One China” principle; the U.S. Congress

should encourage cross-strait dialogue instead of Taiwanese independence.

In the near term, both countries should strive to

stabilize their relationship. Like it or not, the U.S. election culture has created a four-year cycle of first

attacking and then dealing with China. Campaign

rhetoric fuels fiery debates in both countries. Political

and opinion leaders have a great responsibility to stabilize the bilateral relationship. The gradual resumption of political, strategic, and military exchanges is

important for mutual communication. The so-called

second tracks are indispensable in promoting mutual

understanding. The economic interaction is a stabilizer in the relationship. Allowing each other to speak

candidly and refraining from overreaction to words

benefits efforts to maintain a stable relationship.

Doing something of common interest and deferring

something controversial facilitates a constructive relationship. The reverse will result not only in a competitive but also a confrontational relationship.

In the medium term, both countries should

improve their mechanisms and work towards more

confidence-building measures (CBMs). They should

also create a favorable regional environment. Given

the importance of the two countries, their bilateral
Sino-U.S. Relations 73

relationship has far exceeded their physical boundaries. It is in their common interest to create a politically friendly, strategically cooperative environment in

the region. China and the United States should adopt

a down-to-earth attitude to discuss important

regional issues, such as the China-U.S.-Russia relationship, the China-U.S.-Japan relationship, the

Korean Peninsula, economic and financial cooperation, and so forth.

In the long term, both countries should take a

strategic and long-term view when they deal with each

other. They should take concrete steps to enhance

understanding, dispel misunderstandings, remove suspicions, reduce troubles, and increase cooperation.

First and foremost, they should work out a strategy for

making friendlier relations and not making enemies of

each other. They must have more official and unofficial contacts, greater economic and trade interactions,

better coordination on global and regional issues,

closer consultation in international organizations, and

joint efforts in building up a NIPEO.

Working Toward a Better Asia-Pacific Region

As the Sino-U.S. relationship directly affects

regional stability and prosperity, the two countries

have special responsibilities and hold the keys to building regional security and an economic framework.

China and the United States should display more sincerity and trust in conducting dialogues on regional

security matters. Together with other countries in the

region, they should work out a formula to enhance

mutual trust, reduce mutual suspicions, alleviate the

danger of an arms race, and avoid unintentional accidents. Through these CBMs, they could contribute to

a stable and secure regional environment.

On some existing and potential hot spots in the

region, both China and the United States should

expand cooperation where such cooperation exists,

such as concerning the issues of the Korean Peninsula,

Cambodia, and the matter of non-proliferation on the

South Asia sub-continent. They should work hard to

facilitate cooperation where such possibilities can be

sought, such as in Southeast Asia. They should also do

a better job of damage control where they have fundamental differences. Neither side should take unilateral

actions that will aggravate the situation.

Security far exceeds traditional boundaries. Economic security has become an important component

of national security considerations. China and the

United States worked together at the APEC forum and

cooperated to a certain extent on financial and monetary matters during the Asian financial crisis. However, further cooperation needs more frequent communication, understanding, and trust. China, the

United States, and other concerned countries should

work together toward this end. Here, region-wide

cooperation must be a precondition for building up

the regional mechanism to promote trade liberalization, cooperation in science and technology, and stability in finance and monetary matters.

Working Toward a Better World

China and the United States are major world

powers. They are both permanent members of the

UN Security Council, and both possess nuclear

weapons. China is the largest developing country,

whereas the United States is the strongest developed

one. Moreover, China is emerging and the United

States is not declining. To a large extent the two countries will be critical to the establishment of the NIPEO

on a more just and fairer basis.

Both countries should work together with major

countries and/or country groups to reach a consensus

on the principles for establishing the new international

order. They should determine the codes of conduct as

well. While it is useful to explore such concepts as

human rights and humanitarian concerns, no country

has the right to monopolize their interpretation, let

alone to enforce their views onto other nations. In the

meantime, the two should fully implement China’s

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence7 as a prerequisite to establishing the NIPEO. Of course, they should

also take into consideration other proper principles.

To realize these goals, China and the United States

should work with other countries to reach agreements. China does call for an immediate realization of

the NIPEO, but through negotiation and in a gradual

way. It advocates strengthening rather than weakening

the role of the UN It firmly opposes unilateral alteration of existing arrangements, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). It positively participates

in new negotiations, such as the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty (CTBT). And China makes relentless

efforts to join new organizations such as WTO.

Both countries should work hard, with a view to

the era of the “earth village.” China and the United

Sates are major nations that both have vast territories,

big populations, and considerable powers. Therefore,
74 Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China

it is relatively easier for them to adopt the earth village

concept, but still difficult to translate it into policies.

They should stress the welfare of the entire human

race rather than their own. They have the responsibilities and obligations to eliminate poverty both at

home and abroad. Broad-mindedness is the basis for

harmony, instead of conflict, between nations.

Both the United States and China should think

far in advance for ways to promote the peace and

prosperity of the world. At this time of invention, creativity, and advancement, new progress in science and

technology takes place every day. China, the United

States, and other countries are confronted with the

issue of how to make these developments work for

world peace and prosperity. All countries should concentrate their wisdom and resources on lifting up

people’s living standards. All countries should use

these new achievements to promote healthy state-tostate relations, instead of interfering with other countries internal affairs. No country should be allowed to

start a new round of arms race by taking advantage of

its strength.

The above-mentioned principles may seem to be

too idealistic and moral-driven. However, for a better

and more secure world in the new century and millennium, we need inspiration, principles, value, and

truth. China is one of the birthplaces of great

thoughts. The United States is typical in generating

new thinking. Asia is proud of its unique value. The

Asia-Pacific region has immensely contributed to

development strategy and philosophy. There is no reason why China and the United States should hesitate

to talk about ideas and ideals.

In the United States, especially in the military circle, it is generally believed that strong and sufficient

military preparation can stop war. In Chinese characters, two parts make up the word “military”: meaning

say NO to weapons. We have something in common

despite of all our differences. Therefore, let us make

joint efforts at the two ends of the world to say NO to

wars and YES to peace and prosperity.

Notes

1 On May 8, 1999, NATO bombs hit the Chinese embassy,

killing four. NATO said its planes were attacking a Yugoslav arms

procurement office in Belgrade and fired on the wrong building. 2 The Cox Committee, formally titled the Select Committee

on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial concerns with

the People’s Republic of China, issued its report in June 1999. 3 China conducted military exercises that included missile

tests in the Taiwan Strait, to which the United States dispatched

two carrier battlegroups and other ships. 4 Lee made these remarks to a German radio station reporter

on July 9, 1999. 5 The United States House of Representatives voted to

approve PNTR on May 24, 2000; the Senate approved the measure

on September 19, 2000. 6 In 1949, when Mao Zedong declared Beijing the capital of

the new People’s Republic of China, millions of Kuomintang

(KMT) supporters fled to Taiwan. The United States did not officially recognize the People’s Republic of China until December 15,

1978.7 These principles for fostering friendly relations with other

countries were formally presented by Premier Zhou Enlai in April

1955 at the first Asian-African conference (the Bandung Conference). In 1982, these principles were written into China’s Constitution.