HOMELAND DEFENSE:

ARE WE THERE YET?

by

Judith A. Ward

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 11

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Homeland Defense:

Are We There Yet?

Judith A. Ward

April 2001

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of

mass destruction. Copies of No. 11 and previous papers in this series are

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 11

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

.
Executive Summary

 Significant global events such as the 1995 Tokyo subway nerve gas

attack, the former Soviet Unionís bioweapons program, Iraqís efforts

to produce and weaponize biological agents highlight the greatly

increased probability of chemical or biological terrorism.

 The inclusion of homeland defense in U.S. national security strategy,

as well as recent executive and legislative responses to chemical and

biological terrorism, are improving our ability to respond to chemical

or biological terrorist incidents in the U.S.

 Lack of threat awareness, limited response capabilities and overall

organizational confusion hamper U.S. preparedness for chemical or

biological incident response.

 Organizational confusion, including responder training and incident

coordination, is, perhaps, the greatest roadblock in countering or

responding to a chemical or biological terrorist threat.

 The Department of Defense (DOD) is the lead agency providing

technical operations capabilities in responding to the threat,

establishing the Consequence Management Program Integration Office

(COMPIO) in March 1998 to include training, acquisition systems,

logistic support systems and program elements for consequence

management.

 The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici act tasked DOD to improve the

capabilities of 120 cities to respond to weapons of mass destruction

incidents, and mandated the program be turned over to the Department

of Justice (DOJ) by October 2000. The DOJ would continue where

DOD left off and pick up 37 new cities.

 In the event of a WMD incident, the U.S. military will support local

law enforcement agencies and many other federal, state, and local

entities, including the use of specific civil support teams and response

forces located throughout the U.S.

 DOJ is the lead agency for threats or acts of terrorism with U.S.

territory, providing a variety of responders ñ including the FBI ñ for a

domestic chemical or biological incident.

 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead

agency for consequence management, working closely with other

local, state, and national responders to possible chemical or biological

incidents.
ii

 A variety of other agencies including the Department of Energy,

Department of Health and Human Services, Environmental Protection

Agency, and Center for Disease Control provide technical operations

support.

 Municipal governments and non-governmental organizations are

largely unprepared to prevent or effectively manage the consequences

of a chemical or biological incident.

 Confusion exists as to who actually is in charge following a chemical

or biological incident, especially within a federal bureaucratic

structure so complex that it appears to be fragmented and

uncoordinated.

 Federal agencies, including DOD, DOJ, and FEMA are working

closely to solve the problems arising from incident response

coordination, including rapid internet communications, specialized

response databases, and online responder courses.

 Even the best possible preparation for a chemical or biological terrorist

attack will not necessarily stop the attacker.

 The U.S. government is not yet fully organized to conduct homeland

defense with respect to the current chemical and biological threat,

especially in area of incident management and response coordination.
Contents

Page

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i

The Author.................................................................................................. ii

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... iii

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1

II. Executive and Legislative Direction ......................................................3

III. When an Incident Occurs, Who's in Charge.........................................5

IV. Are We There Yet?.............................................................................11

V. Conclusion ...........................................................................................15

Notes..........................................................................................................17
i

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do

not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the

U.S. Government, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.
ii

The Author

Judith A. Ward has been an analyst for the Department of Defense for

over 30 years. She has held positions in collection, analysis, and reporting

of weapons and space systems and managed both reporting and data

production and dissemination branches. Mrs. Ward has a Paralegal degree

from Anne Arundel Community College and a Bachelor of Arts Degree in

area studies from the University of Maryland University College. She

received a Master of Strategic Studies Degree from the Air War College in

June 2000. She became interested in homeland defense and consequence

management issues through the counterproliferation electives she took

while a student at the Air War College.
iii

Acknowledgments

I am especially grateful to the Air War College for providing me the

opportunity to broaden my horizons in the area of counterproliferation. In

particular, I would like to thank Dr. Barry Schneider and Colonel (Dr.)

Jim Davis for their expertise and excellent instruction in

counterproliferation issues. They both created an environment that piqued

and allowed me to pursue my interest in homeland defense and

consequence management. My seminar mates in both electives also

contributed to my interest in various counterproliferation issues. I also

want to thank Jeff Knopf and Darcy Bender from the Monterey Institute of

International Studies for their patience in answering my questions.

Finally, to my wonderful husband, Jess, I am forever grateful for his

encouragement and support throughout this academic year. It was

difficult for us to be geographically apart, but I will always remember his

dedication in helping me achieve my goals.
Homeland Defense . . . 1

Homeland Defense: Are We There Yet?

Judith A. Ward

I. Introduction

ìOur potential enemies, whether nations or terrorists, may

be more likely in the future to resort to attacks against

vulnerable civilian targets in the United States.î1

The threat of a catastrophe from terrorist's use of a chemical or

biological weapon is increasing in probability in light of events such as the

1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway, disclosures regarding

the former Soviet Union's sophisticated bioweapons program, and

discoveries of Iraq's large-scale efforts to produce and weaponize

biological agents. Public awareness about terrorism was certainly

heightened during the Y2K alerts and the arrests of Algerians linked to

Osama bin Laden at the United States-Canadian border, but also may be a

result of increasing public awareness through books, such as The Cobra

Event and Biohazard; programs, such as ABCís ìBiowar;î and media

attention to non-state actors, such as Osama bin Laden.

Certainly, there are a number of terrorist groups that have not only

demonstrated their dislike for the U.S., but who have also shown some

interest in chemical and biological agents in the past few years. Among

them are Osama bin Laden, who has stated that it is his duty to try to

acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He has declared war on the

United States and its citizens and his allies have struck in the United States

before, at the World Trade Center. The chief counterterrorism

organization in the United States, the FBI, has suspended giving tours of

its headquarters, in part because of concern that bin Laden's supporters

could strike within the United States.2

 One documented use of a

bioterrorism event in the United States occurred in 1984 when the

Rajneeshee religious cult infected over 750 people with salmonella in

Wasco County, Oregon. More recently, officials seized anthrax from the

trunk of a car in Las Vegas. Larry Wayne Harris, arrested in the incident,
2 . . . Homeland Defense

once boasted of plans to place a ìglobeî of bubonic plague in a New York

City subway and cause thousands to die.

What is still needed is an awareness of the response and some of the

areas in which the government is working to avert an incident and, failing

that, to mitigate the consequences. Since the United States increasingly

faces the possibility that a chemical or biological attack could occur on

U.S. soil, how well organized is the United States government to conduct

homeland defense with regard to the chemical-biological threat? 
Homeland Defense . . . 3

II. Executive and Legislative Direction

ìWhen Congress received a request from the administration to address

 bioterrorism, we had only the vaguest idea what they wanted to do.î3

The United States has included homeland defense in its national

security strategy and there have been a number of executive and

legislative responses to the increased threat of a terrorist event using

chemical or biological weapons. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass

Destruction Act of 1996 directs the Secretary of Defense to enhance the

capability of the federal government to respond to terrorist incidents and

to support improvements in the capabilities of state and local emergency

response agencies. An amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1997, also referred to by the names of its legislative sponsors,

Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Domenici, authorized

funding to establish a military rapid response unit; to implement programs

providing advice, training, and loaning of equipment to state and local

emergency response units; and to provide assistance to major cities in

establishing medical strike teams. The Local Firefighter and Emergency

Services Training Act of 1996 authorized the Department of Justice

(DOJ), in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), to provide specialized training to state and local fire and

emergency personnel.

The responsibilities of federal agencies and their relationships to each

other in conducting crises and consequence management is provided in

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), United States Policy on

Counterterrorism, issued June 1995. PDD 62, Combating Terrorism, and

PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, were issued in May 1998 and

established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection,

and Counter-terrorism and authorized the FBI to develop a National

Infrastructure Protection Center (NICPAC). The two directives also

provide a four-part initiative focused on biological weapons. These

directives recognize the need for a coordinated approach to homeland

defense against chemical and biological (C/B) attacks.
4 . . . Homeland Defense

In spite of the focus placed on this problem at the highest levels, a

1999 National Guard Bureau WMD Study found,

With few exceptions, the United States is not prepared

today to adequately respond to a C/B WMD attack.

Although members of the emergency response community

throughout our nation are working diligently to be prepared

for a C/B WMD incident, the lack of resources, equipment,

and training significantly limit their readiness. There is a

widespread lack of understanding of the threat and of the

capabilities needed to prepare for and cope with WMD

incidents nationwide. This is especially true for biological

incidents.4

With so much attention focused on the chemical and biological threat,

what organizational problems hamper United States preparedness?
Homeland Defense . . . 5

III. When an Incident Occurs, Whoís in Charge?

ìThere must be a rapid and decisive capability to protect

U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond against

terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to victims.î5

According to a September 1997 study by the U. S. General

Accounting Office, there are over 40 different federal agencies, bureaus,

and offices for responding to terrorism.6 However, the list of agencies for

terrorism response on the Center for Nonproliferation Studies Chemical

and Biological Weapons Resource Page describes many more (see Figure

1).7

Figure 1: United States Domestic Preparedness Program Organizational Chart8

(Editors Note: This Chart was considered accurate as of January 2000, but is subject to change in

an evolving atmosphere. DOJ has not published anything more current since this chart was

assembled by the Monterey Institute for International Affairs.)
6 . . . Homeland Defense

This chart illustrates the vast coordination problem associated with a

terrorist event. ìTo the local and state provider, the lack of coordination

among federal agencies is confusing and ineffective.î9

The Domestic Terrorism Program, as prescribed in the 1997 Defense

Authorization Bill, required the Defense Department (DOD) to lead the

technical training of ìfirst respondersî to enable them to react to a nuclear,

chemical or biological attack. Five other agencies were named in

supporting roles: FEMA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),

and the Departments of Energy, Justice, and Health and Human Services

(see Figure 2.)
8 . . . Homeland Defense

Figure 2: Some Important Federal Actors Responding to a Domestic Chem/Bio

Terrorist Incident10

The DOD provides ìtechnical operations capabilities to support the

Federal response to threats or acts of WMD terrorism.î11 It also

coordinates military operations with the appropriate civilian lead agencies.

The 1996 Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act directed the

DOD to manage a training and equipment program in 120 cities over a

five-year period.12 Training and equipping local responders is critical in

responding to chemical and biological attacks. These people will be the

first to arrive on a scene, make initial assessments and manage the

casualties. Another stipulation of this act mandated the program be turned

over to DOJ by October 2000. The DOJ would become responsible for

continuing where DOD left off, as well as picking up 37 new cities.

In March 1998, the Consequence Management Program Integration

Office (COMPIO) within DOD was established to implement a plan for

improving DOD response to terrorist attacks using WMD and to ensure
Homeland Defense . . . 9

that reserve components are integrated into the response. COMPIO, in

conjunction with partners throughout DOD and other federal agencies,

established training, acquisition systems, logistic support systems and

program elements for consequence management. COMPIO was also

responsible for fielding 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection

(RAID) Teams. These teams, which were initially funded in 1999 to

provide rapid assessment of biological and chemical incidents and to

supply initial detection equipment, are now known as Weapons of Mass

Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMDCST). Plans for an additional 17

teams were announced on 13 January 2000.13 These WMDCS teams will

act in support of first responders when requested by state or federal

government. They will respond to a suspected or actual chemical or

biological attack, assess the situation, provide advice to the local incident

commander, and facilitate the arrival of additional military assets. These

22-member teams will be available for operational support to first

responder communities after formal validation. The GAO has questioned

whether creating these Guard units is a duplication of effort. However,

Guard units are ìstate resourcesî and could respond more quickly than

some other national assets. The National Guard is already familiar with

other demands that could result from a WMD event, such as arranging to

feed, shelter, and clothe displaced personnel. Should health officials order

a quarantine, the Guard could be asked to help implement the plan.14

The DOD also has highly trained units from which it can draw to

respond to a WMD incident. The Marine Corpsí Chemical Biological

Incident Response Force (CBIRF), which is currently based at Indian

Head, Maryland, can deploy to treat and evaluate casualties, and provide

local security, detection, and decontamination. The Joint Special

Operations Command also has units that are manned, equipped, and

trained to deal with WMD threats. The Explosive Ordnance Disposal

teams and the Armyís Technical Escort Unit also respond to emergencies

and have been involved in the development of response plans and

procedures.

In December 1999, Brigadier General Bruce M. Lawlor was

appointed the commander of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS).

This command has been given the mission to plan for the use of the
10 . . . Homeland Defense

military to support the civilian sector in response to a chemical, biological,

or nuclear attack. The JTF-CS is within the Joint Forces Command.

In the event of a WMD incident against the civilian population within

the United States, the military, for the most part, will be required to

support local law enforcement agencies and many other federal, state, and

local entities. If a WMD attack occurs, the response must be immediate in

order to mitigate casualties and/or damage. Emergency medical care must

be given. Protective gear, medication, and vaccines will have to be

distributed and areas will have to be evacuated and/or quarantined. The

military is trained and equipped to provide this logistical support and has

the unique ability to quickly mobilize resources. The military is also

capable of specialty support such as providing decontamination equipment

to an area or otherwise lending its expertise. For example, in a Las Vegas

anthrax seizure, a terrorist suspect's car was taken to Nellis Air Force Base

(AFB) where federal chemical and biological experts studied its

contents.15

The DOJ is ìthe lead agency for threats or acts of terrorism within

U.S. territory.î16 DOJ assigned the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

as the lead for all operational response to a WMD incident in the United

States. In that capacity, the FBI ìoperates as the on-scene manager for the

Federal Government.î17 The National Domestic Preparedness Office

(NDPO) of the FBI is the single program and policy office for WMD. The

NDPO is tasked to provide ìone-stop shoppingî to local authorities with

centralized access to financial assistance for the acquisition of special

equipment, training courses, and technical assistance for chemical and

biological incidents. The FBI also manages the Domestic Emergency

Support Team (DEST), an interagency team activated in 1995 to provide

expert advice and assistance to the FBI on-scene commander regarding the

capabilities of domestic agencies and to coordinate follow-on assets. The

DOJ is providing money for the training of local responders (also referred

to as ìfirst respondersî), such as the local police and fire officials and for

local responder equipment. DOD transferred control of the facilities at

Fort McClellan, Alabama, to the DOJís Center for Domestic Preparedness

for the training of local responders. This should help improve the

response process because DOJ has a natural relationship to first

responders, particularly law enforcement
Homeland Defense . . . 11

FEMA is the lead agency for consequence management and supports

the FBI by coordinating the consequence management of a WMD

incident. FEMAís responsibility includes ensuring that the Federal

Response Plan (FRP) is adequate for consequence management activities

regarding terrorist and WMD attacks. The FRP ìbrings together twentysix Federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross to

organize Federal disaster response and recovery efforts and coordinate

them with the affected State.î18 FEMA developed the Terrorism Incident

Annex to the FRP, which describes the coordination relationships between

the various federal agencies.

Other agencies providing technical operations support are the

Department of Energy in the area of radiological response; the Department

of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regarding medical support; and

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for hazardous materials

operations. The DHHS response may include agent identification,

epidemiological investigation, hazard detection and reduction,

decontamination, and public health support. The Center for Disease

Control (CDC) has been designated by DHHS to lead its public health

preparedness effort for chemical and biological terrorism. The CDC and

the Public Health Service Office of Emergency support state and local

governments by coordinating the health and medical response. The Public

Health Service is establishing 25 Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams

throughout the country.19

The immediate response to a chemical or biological attack is at the

local and municipal level. However, municipal governments and nongovernmental organizations are largely unprepared to prevent or

effectively manage the consequences of such an attack, especially

bioterrorism. The federal government is a source to assist state and local

authorities in responding to WMD incidents. The federal responders will

be available to supplement the resources of cities, counties, and states

across the United States, but specific guidelines should be in place for the

division of labor between the military and civilian sectors as well as

federal, state, local, and non-governmental agencies.
12 . . . Homeland Defense

IV. Are We There Yet?

ìThe FBI and our police officers, fire fighters, and

emergency medical services personnel have quietly

replaced our military forces as the first line of defense and

the primary instrument of national security against the

threat of terrorism.î20

While there is high-level guidance regarding the roles of federal

agencies, those roles are still being defined. So the answer to the question

of ìWhoís in charge?î currently is, ìIt depends.î Federal response to a

chemical or biological event will depend upon the nature and severity of

the incident. In a chemical or biological attack, the disaster site is also a

crime scene and the event is a national security problem. There may

be no clear point at which an incident moves from crisis management

to consequence management. ìIndeed these phases may occur

simultaneously or, in some cases, the consequence management phase

may actually precede the identification of a terrorist event.î21 A domestic

chemical or biological attack could be of such magnitude and complexity

that it would quickly draw on and require resources far beyond what any

one agency or service could handle. Medical treatment, distribution of

protective gear, medication and vaccines, and a possible evacuation or

area quarantine are but some of the demands following such an incident.

Many people believe that the federal government is ready and able to

respond to such an attack. While there are many assets from both military

and civilian agencies upon which the federal government can rely, the

major problem is that these resources probably will not be there in a

timely manner. The actual role of the federal response is to support state

and local governments. Local responders will be the first to arrive at the

scene and will have to handle the immediate consequences of an incident.

Additionally, a catastrophic chemical or biological event will present

medical response challenges. In the event of bioterrorism, the initial

major impact would probably be upon emergency medical personnel

rather than the traditional first responder community. No one may know

that anything has happened until people start showing up at doctorsí
Homeland Defense . . . 13

offices and hospitals. It will be extremely difficult to decide whether the

problem is a natural incident or a biological attack and to determine what

actually happened and why. While the worst effects of a chemical attack

are soon over, the devastation following a biological outbreak, such as

smallpox or anthrax, can continue as the disease begins to spread. While

the federal government has been funding programs to train emergency

responders for a chemical or biological incident, such WMD preparedness

programs have only minimally involved hospitals and the health care

professionals working in them.22 This points to a gap in preparedness to

deal with a biological weapons threat. Preparedness exercises for such a

catastrophe should also include hospital and public health personnel. The

U.S. Public Health Service is attempting to address this problem by

converting a closed hospital at Ft. McClellan into a center to train

emergency medical personnel in the treatment of victims of biological and

chemical attacks. They will also be taught how to protect themselves and

the hospital buildings.23

The federal bureaucratic structure is so complex that it appears to be

fragmented and uncoordinated. ìState and local officials consistently

express frustration in understanding where or how to enter this

bureaucratic maze to obtain information, assistance, funding, and

support.î24 However, U.S. government initiatives are addressing this

problem. DOD and DOJ have been coordinating improvement in the area

of domestic preparedness. The creation of the NDPO provides federal

coordination, integration, and interagency cooperation and has improved

support to state and local responders. The NDPO is coordinating a list of

standardized equipment for the local responder community and is working

with FEMA, OSHA, and the National Fire Protection Association to

support the acquisition of comparable equipment. FEMA and the DOJ

have been working together to better coordinate the interagency efforts for

ìdomestic preparedness in the areas of planning, training, exercises and

equipment to further assist the State and local response community.î25

FEMA has developed, delivered, and coordinated a number of courses

with the National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management

Training Institute using the National Emergency Training Center to

provide local responders with training and information. The FEMAdeveloped Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) is an on-line
14 . . . Homeland Defense

planning and training tool to assist federal, state, and local emergency

responders to prepare for and respond to WMD incidents. Among its

contents are a database of chemical and biological weapons materials

characteristics, effects, and indicators; hotlines and helplines; and an

inventory of federal capabilities available to support local response.
16 . . . Homeland Defense

V. Conclusion

ìWe must ensure that plans and procedures are developed,

fully coordinated across all level of government, to reduce

to a minimum the chaos and confusion that is inherent in

the response itself.î26

There is no absolute protection against terrorist attacks. Terrorist

incidents involving biological agents probably will be markedly different

than those involving chemical agents and require different preparation and

response. The various chemical/biological response teams being

developed at the local, state, and federal levels are almost entirely focused

on the detection, decontamination, and quick treatment of chemical

casualties. An attack with chemical agents is similar to a hazardous

materials incident that local responders contend with on a regular basis.

Although the federal government is better prepared for a chemical attack,

federal help will probably be of little use in a chemical attack because of

the rapidity with which chemical agents react. 

ìVulnerability and capability, two pre-requisites of bioterrorism, are

in place.î27 The task of preparing for a covert act of biological terrorism

is especially daunting since such an attack would not be recognized until a

substantial number of cases, and possibly fatalities, have been reported.

Preparing for such an attack will require organization, training, equipment,

therapies, procedures and adequate and sustaining resources. Public

health departments and the medical community must be included in the

planning and training for chemical and biological incidents. Strengthening

existing mechanisms for dealing with unintentional releases of chemical

hazards, monitoring food safety, and detecting and responding to

infectious disease outbreaks also should be included in our domestic

preparedness plans.

Military approaches to chemical and biological defense are applicable

to domestic civilian situations involving these agents, but some military

standard operating procedures, could be difficult to implement in the

civilian sector, such as vaccination requirements. Help from deployable

military teams will only be optimal if intelligence allows for predeployment or the attack occurs near the teamís home base. The creation
Homeland Defense . . . 17

of the JTF-CS should provide the planning and coordination necessary for

the civil and military to be effective in response to this threat.

Detection and identification of agents in both chemical and biological

attacks are often based on individual symptoms. Diagnosis problems and

limited detection capabilities eventually may be overcome by

technological solutions. Recognition of the need for local, regional, and

national preparedness, especially for bioterrorism, should provide the

impetus for civilian and military personnel to join together to address the

issues of planning, education, training and equipment, and applying

technology.

The United States government is not yet fully organized to conduct

homeland defense with regard to the chemical-biological threat.

According to a 1998 GAO report, ìthe many and increasing number of

participants, programs, and activities in the counterterrorism area across

federal departments, agencies, and offices pose a difficult management

and coordination challenge to avoid program duplication, fragmentation,

and gaps.î28 No single federal or local agency is capable of coping with

all of the consequences of a chemical or biological attack. It will take

coordination among law enforcement, emergency response, military and

medical personnel at all levels. Deterrence, defense, and preparation must

come through the efforts of both military and civilian resources. The U.S.

government, through the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure

Protection, and Counter-terrorism, should take the lead in organizing the

federal, state, and local governments for federal planning, programs,

training, equipment, and response to homeland defense with regard to

chemical-biological threats.
18 . . . Homeland Defense

Notes

1. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, Washington

DC, December 1999, p.16.

2. David Siegrist, ìNot So False Alarm,î The Washington Post, page A17, 28

August 1999, n.p. on-line, Internet, 18 September 1999, available from

http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/Wplate/1999-08/28/0021-082899-indx.html.

3. S. Anthony McCann, ìView from the Hill: Congressional Efforts to Address

Bioterrorism,î Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4, July-August 1999, 496.

4. National Guard Bureau Study ñ Report to National Guard Bureau Executive

Summary, 9 February 1999, n.p, on-line, Internet, 6 February 2000, available from

http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/wmd/volumeI/3_vol1_exec_summary.html

5. DOD Tiger Team, ìDepartment of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard

and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass

Destruction,î January 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 January 2000, available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/index.html

6. A list of the ìAgency Structures for Terrorism Responseî may be found on the

Chemical and Biological Resource page available from The Monterey Institute of

International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies webpage,

http://cns.miis.edu/research.cbw/response.html.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., on-line, Internet, 25 January 2000, available from http:/cns.miis.edu/

research/cbw/domest_p.htm

9. Joseph F. Waeckerle, MD, ìDomestic Preparedness for Events Involving

Weapons of Mass Destruction,î Journal of American Medical Association, Vol 283, No.

2, 12 January 2000; n.p., on-line, Internet, 13 January 2000, available from

http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v283n2/full/jed90095.html

10. The Henry L. Stimson Center Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, ìU.S. Bureaucracy Reorganizes to Grapple With Chem/Bio

Terrorism,î The CBW Chronicle, January 1999; n.p., on-line, Internet, 29 January 2000,

available from http://www.stimson.org/cwc/domprep.htm

11. Federal Response PlanTerrorism Incident Annex, April 1999, TI-11, on-line,

Internet, 29 January 2000, available from http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/frp/frp.terr.pdf.

12. Ibid.
Homeland Defense . . . 19

13. ìDOD Plans 17 New WMD Civil Support Teams,î Washington File, U.S. State

Department, 13 January 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 January 2000, available at

http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p/products/washfile/topic/iÖ/

newsitem.shtm

14. David Siegrist, ìBiologicial Agents: A Threat the Guard Can Handleî, National

Guard Magazine, May 1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 18 September 1999, available from

http://www.ngaus.org/ngma/fire599.htm.

15. David Phinney, ìPossible Anthrax Plot Busted,î 19 February 1999, n.p.; on-line,

Internet, 8 September 1999, available from http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/

DailyNews/ harris0219.html.

16. Federal Response Plan Terrorism Incident Annex, TI-3.

17. Federal Response Plan Terrorism Incident Annex, TI-11.

18. Catherine H. Light, Director, Office of National Security Affairs Federal

Emergency Management Agency, statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight,

Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure U.S. House of Representatives, June 9, 1999. On-line, Internet, 29 January

2000, available from http://www.fema.gov/library/light609.htm

19. Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and

International Affairs Division testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security,

International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and

Oversight, House of Representatives, GAO-NSIAD-98-164, 23 April 1998, on-line,

Internet, 7 February 2000, available from http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pdfs/

crosscut.pdf

20. Kay C. Goss, FEMAís Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and

Exercises, speech to Plenary Session on New Threats, New Players, and New

Approaches: Challenges to Emergency Management, 23rd Annual Workshop on Hazards

Research and Applications, Boulder Colorado, July 15, 1998. On-line, Internet, 29

January 2000, available from http://www.fema.gov/pte/gosspecch42.htm

21. ìFive-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Planî, p. 21 as

quoted in the First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory

Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of

Mass Destruction, 15 December 1999, on-line, Internet, 30 January 2000, available from

http://cryptome.org/tp-terr.htm

22. Waeckerle, op. cit.

23. Rose Livingston, ìNew center trains for chemical attacks,î The Birmingham

News, 28 January 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 1 February 2000, available from

http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/Jan2000/28-e368940b.html
20 . . . Homeland Defense

24. First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel to

Study the Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass

Destruction, 15 December 1999, on-line, Internet, 30 January 2000, available from

http://cryptome.org/tp-terr.htm

25. Light, op. cit.

26. Goss, op. cit.

27. David Siegrist. ìThe Threat of Biological Attack: Why Concern Now?î

Emerging Infectious Diseases, Volume 5, number 4, July-August 1999, 505; on-line,

Internet, 18 September 1999, available from http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/

siegrist htm.

28. Government Accounting Office, ìCombating Terrorism: Observations on the

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program,î T-NSIAD-99-16, 2 October

1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 23 January 2000, available from

http://www.access.gpo/gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= gao&docid=f:ns99016t.txt
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