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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

The Air Superiority Fighter

and Defense Transformation

Why DOD Requirements Demand

the F/A-22 Raptor

DEVIN L. CATE

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 30

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 2003
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within 

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air 

versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any othe

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are avail

able electronically at the Air University Research Web

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Pres

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question 

whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare 

the twenty-first century. Critics of the F/A-22, the US 

Force’s next generation air superiority fighter, have ide

fied it as a cold war relic—unjustifiably expensive and ou

step with the Department of Defense (DOD) transformati

Colonel Cate argues that the six operational goals of 

DOD transformation, as defined in the Quadrennial Defe

Review Report (QDR) of 2001, actually demand a highly 

pable air superiority fighter. He shows how achieving th

transformational operational goals requires performance 

the four offensive counterair functions of surface atta

fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defen

(SEAD), as well as defensive counterair. He demonstra

that only an air superiority fighter can efficiently and ef

tively satisfy all these functions.

Colonel Cate then identifies the operational requireme

for an air superiority fighter to adequately contribute to 

operational goals of the transformation. These requireme

are superlative air-to-air and air-to-ground performan

survivability against modern air defense systems, and a 

pable sensor suite that allows the fighter to be a sens

shooter and participate in the joint data network. Fina

Colonel Cate assesses the leading candidates for a twen

first century fighter—the F-15C/E, F/A-22, F-35A, uninh

ited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), and the common ae

space vehicle (CAV)—against these requirements. T

proliferation of advanced air defense capabilities during 

next few years will seriously challenge the suitability of 

aging F-15C/E as an air superiority fighter. He notes t

while the UCAV holds long-term promise an air superio

platform, we still have much to do in developing its capa

ity and the doctrine, tactics, and training to employ 

UCAV in the air-to-air mission, especially against mann

air-to-air threats in close engagements. Consequen

Colonel Cate concludes the F/A-22 is the only fighter t

will meet all the requirements for a transformational air 

periority fighter by 2007.

iii
This paper provides rich material for discussion not o

about the role of the air superiority fighter in the twenty-f

century but also concerning the nature of defense trans

mation itself. As with all Maxwell Papers, we encourage d

cussion and debate of Colonel Cate’s important paper.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War Colle

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Devin L. Cate is a student at the Air War Coll

located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He has ser

tours as a physicist, flight test engineer, and staff offi

on the Air Force Secretariat and the Office of the Secret

of Defense (OSD) staffs. He has participated in a dive

number of research, development, test, and engineering 

forts, including the ground-based laser space segmen

the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the F-11

Nighthawk. Colonel Cate led the Air Force’s Red Teams 

counter-precision-guided munitions and directed-ene

programs, including the airborne laser. At OSD, he ser

as the program director for the national low-observa

(LO) and counter low-observable (CLO) programs, auth

ing Department of Defense policy for management of 

LO and CLO programs, including export policy. Colo

Cate’s awards include the R. L. Jones Award for being 

top engineer graduate of the US Air Force Test Pilot Sch

He is a distinguished graduate of the Squadron Offi

School and Air Command and Staff College. Colonel C

holds a bachelor of science degree in physics from the 

Air Force Academy and, as a recipient of the Boeing F

lowship, he also earned a master of science degree in ae

nautics and astronautics from the University of Washi

ton. Additionally, Colonel Cate has published papers 

laser optics, adaptive control, and prototyping.

v
The Air Superiority Fighter

and Defense Transformation

Why DOD Requirements Demand

the F/A-22 Raptor

The end of the cold war and the beginnings of a trans

mation of this country’s national defense forces have 

some to question the need for a new air superiority figh

specifically challenging the continuation of the F/A-22 p

gram.1 The requirement for air superiority has been an 

cepted tenet of US doctrine since the War Department p

lished Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employm

of Air Power, in 1943.

2 Given the recent changes to the stra

gic environment that underpin the current transformation 

Department of Defense (DOD), is there still a need for the t

ditional air superiority fighter? A careful reading of the ope

tional goals of the transformation of DOD as codified in Q

drennial Defense Review (QDR)-01 demonstrates that t

transformation cannot be accomplished without a new 

superiority fighter. This new fighter must exhibit domina

in air-to-air engagements, have significant air-to-ground 

pability, survive against a sophisticated surface-to-air m

sile (SAM) threat, and serve as sensor and shooter in the jo

data network (JDN). The options for fielding a new air su

riority fighter include an upgraded F-15C/E, the F/A-22, 

F-35A, the uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), a

the common aerospace vehicle (CAV). Only the F/A-22 

meet the emerging needs of the air superiority task in 

coming decades. In the longer term, other options hold so

promise.

Air Superiority Defined

Air superiority and its enabling complement, counte

operations, are defined in joint doctrine. Joint Publicat

(JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military a

Associated Terms, defines air superiority as “that degree 

dominance in the air battle of one force over another wh

permits the conduct of operations by the former and its 

lated land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place w

out prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”3 Count

1
air “integrates offensive and defensive operations to att

and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counte

missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy airc

and missiles, both before and after launch.”4 Air superior

then, is the degree to which a force has attained freedom 

conduct joint operations by dominating the air. Counte

operations are the means of achieving air superiority.

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.1, Counte

Operations, describes air superiority as a core compete

of the United States Air Force (USAF) and asserts that it 

normally the first priority of US forces whenever the ene

possesses air and missile assets capable of threaten

friendly forces or inhibiting their ability to use the air a

space medium to apply force.”5 According to AFDD 2-1

“any action taken to achieve the effect of dominance ab

the Earth’s surface yet within the atmosphere fits i

counterair operations.”6 AFDD 2-1.1 maintains that count

air operations not only include air attack but also in

mation attack, surface attack, or space-based attack—

long as the effect is air superiority.7

There are two types of counterair operations: offens

and defensive. Offensive counterair (OCA) operations 

stroy, disrupt, or degrade enemy air and missile threa

with the goal of defeating these threats at their origin. O

reduces the enemy air threat and frees friendly forces 

use airspace for their own purposes, including other 

operations.8 Defensive counterair (DCA) is defense 

friendly forces from enemy air and missile attacks. T

spectrum of DCA ranges from active air defense design

to destroy incoming air and missile threats to pass

measures intended to reduce the effectiveness of th

threats.9 Because the focus here is the air superio

fighter, the discussion that follows concentrates on 

roles in OCA and DCA. The primary reference is to AF

2-1.1 for OCA and DCA discussions since it is more 

tailed and recent than JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Coun

ing Air and Missile Threats.

10

Offensive Counterair

Offensive counter has four elements: surface atta

fighter sweep, escort, and suppression of enemy air defen
(SEAD).11 Surface attack (called “Offensive Counterair 

tack Operations” in JP 3-01) destroys, disrupts, or degra

enemy air and missile threats and their associated supp

infrastructure.12 The goal of surface attack is to prevent e

ployment of enemy air and missile weapons by attack

them before they are launched.13 Fighter sweeps search 

and destroy enemy aircraft, airborne missile launch p

forms, and other airborne targets of opportunity.14 Esco

protect friendly aircraft from enemy air-to-air and surfa

to-air threats while over enemy territory. The escort miss

supports other air missions such as interdiction, reconna

sance, airlift, search and rescue, aerial refueling, airbo

command and control, and electronic warfare.15 Suppress

of enemy air defenses neutralizes, destroys, or tempora

degrades enemy surface-based air defenses by disruption 

destruction.16

Defensive Counterair

According to AFDD 2-1.1, “DCA missions for fighters 

clude high value airborne asset (HVAA) protection, po

defense, and area defense.”17 Protecting HVAA enco

passes the defense of “critical airborne theater assets su

as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), RIV

JOINT, and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Syst

(JSTARS).”18 Point defense protects a limited area—ty

cally vital elements of forces and installations.19 Area 

fense protects a broad area and is usually conducted in 

ordination with a combination of weapons system

Having established the definitions and missions relevan

the air superiority fighter, as found in joint and USAF d

trine, it is now appropriate to discuss the operational go

of DOD transformation.

Air Superiority and the Operational Goal

of DOD Transformation

QDR-01 identifies six operational goals that define 

focus of DOD transformation efforts:

1. Protecting critical bases of operations and defeat

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear high-yi
explosive (CBRNE) weapons and their means of 

livery

2. Assuring information systems in the face of att

and conducting effective information operations

3. Projecting and sustaining US forces in distant an

access or area-denial environments and defeat

anti-access and area denial threats

4. Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persist

surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement w

high-volume precision strike

5. Enhancing the capability and survivability of sp

systems and supporting infrastructure

6. Leveraging information technology and innova

concepts to develop an interoperable, joint co

mand, control, communications, computers, inte

gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

chitecture and capability that includes a tailora

joint operational picture.21

The air superiority fighter, as envisaged, will fulfill each 

these goals to varying degrees. These goals also provide 

sight into the capabilities that will be required of an air 

periority fighter by DOD transformation. Appendix A su

marizes how air superiority missions contribute to 

operational goals of transformation.

The protection of critical bases of operation offers ch

lenges that can be addressed in part by an air superio

fighter, especially those related to defense against CBR

delivery systems. Base protection against CBRNE deliv

systems is a task of DCA. The air superiority fighter m

be part of a layered defense against airborne threats su

as aircraft and cruise missiles. To be effective, this figh

requires advanced sensor systems with sufficient capa

ities to meet low-observable cruise missile threats, such 

the Apache and Storm Shadow/Scalp EG.22 It must h

significant air-to-air advantages over enemy airbo

threats. It also requires the ability to communicate w

ground-based air defense systems such as the Patr

other airborne air defense systems such as the joint la

attack missile elevated netted sensor system; and co

mand and control (C2) systems, such as AWACS. OCA a

plays a role in base protection. Surface attack destr
enemy CBRNE delivery systems and their support inf

structure on the ground. Sweep, escort, and SEAD supp

joint force attacks on CBRNE assets. To perform th

missions, the air superiority fighter must defeat threats 

closely as possible to their origins. For this, it will n

survivability. A new, highly capable air superiority figh

could make significant contributions to the joint effort 

meeting the demands of the first operational goal of tra

formation—base defense.

The air superiority fighter will contribute to the cond

of information operations (IO). The four OCA mission

surface attack, sweep, escort, and SEAD—can ensure 

air superiority required to conduct C4ISR operations a

airborne electronic attack and network attack over ene

airspace. In its DCA role, the air superiority fighter p

tects HVAA employed in IO and supports base protecti

which indirectly contributes to offensive and defensive 

The air superiority fighter’s most critical contribution 

to the third operational goal of DOD transformation—p

jecting and sustaining US forces in distant, anti-access 

area-denial environments and defeating anti-access a

area-denial threats. This goal requires highly surviva

platforms that not only can penetrate modern air defe

systems but also can conduct all four OCA missions. S

face attack directly defeats anti-access threats from 

enemy’s air assets and surface-based air defenses at th

origin. Sweep and escort allow friendly forces to m

freely about enemy airspace to conduct other types of 

erations. Power projection is impossible without such fr

dom of movement. SEAD directly suppresses air defe

systems such as antiaircraft artillery and SAMs. The pr

ence of modern SAMs in future enemy anti-acc

schemes will require the air superiority fighter to poss

significant survivability, including stealth capability, 

well as advanced electronic attack and electronic prot

tion measures. Projecting and sustaining US forces requ

a capable and survivable OCA air superiority fighter.

The US Air Force is developing a new concept of ope

tions (CONOPS) that addresses power projection and s

tainment in the modern anti-access environment. It is 

global strike task force (GSTF) CONOPS. The US Air Fo

Transformation Flight Plan explains that the purpose of 
GSTF is to overcome enemy anti-access systems to g

and maintain access for follow-on joint forces.23 “At 

start of a conflict, it will ‘kick down the door’ into den

battlespace by rapidly degrading, and then defeating, 

adversary’s C4ISR, anti-access weapons, CBRNE deliv

systems, and threats to ground and naval forces, th

clearing the way for joint persistent follow-on ope

tions.”24 The GSTF draft CONOPS describes the attack 

erations of the GSTF, highlighting the fundamental 

quirements for an air superiority fighter to participate 

the GSTF.

GSTF assets must have the capability to operate within anti-acces

environments and to . . . find, fix, track, target, engage, and asses

(F2T2EA) the full spectrum of an adversary’s anti-access capabili

ties to include: long-range air and missile defenses [and] mobil

ballistic and cruise missiles. . . . The GSTF CONOPS requires th

capability to independently locate, destroy, or suppress enemy in

terceptors and fixed or mobile air defenses using a mix of on or off

board sensors and weapons. . . . The GSTF CONOPS requires th

capability to accomplish Time Sensitive Targeting involving anti

access threats despite operating in conditions where there may b

extended distances between sensor, command/control, an

shooter constellations.25

Clearly, this CONOPS calls for, among other things, an 

superiority fighter to conduct the OCA surface attack, swe

escort, and SEAD missions against enemy anti-access s

tems (SAMs, ballistic and cruise missiles, and airborne 

terceptors). This air superiority fighter must survive in 

anti-access environment and be capable of engaging t

gets with or without the aid of off-board C2 assets. GS

envisions the air superiority fighter enabling the B-2 to 

erate freely, even in daylight conditions, creating a n

“24-hour stealth” capability.26

Additionally, the US Air Force Transformation Flight P

enumerates specific performance requirements for GS

assets, of which the following are relevant to an air su

riority fighter.

1. First look, first shot, first kill: Ability to detect, id

tify, shoot, and kill adversary air threats before t

have a similar opportunity.

2. Low observability for penetrating strike assets ver

radar, IR [infrared], acoustic and, to some extent, 

sual electro-optic sensors.
3. Survivability and countermeasures versus the air 

fense threat.

4. Onboard launch warning for enemy weapons e

ployment.

5. Location and targeting of active air defense system

6. Precision striker sensors to accomplish solo F2T2

and combat identification.

7. Precision attack against the GSTF target array.27

The requirements above may be summarized in three fu

damental characteristics. The air superiority fighter for 

GSTF must have superlative air superiority performa

(in both air-to-air and precision surface attack), surv

ability, and sensors. The role of the sensor suite in ful

ing the air superiority fighter’s role in the GSTF is criti

The GSTF CONOPS demands its strike assets have 

highly capable, interoperable, and robust sensor suite.

GSTF CONOPS assets will employ a wide range of sta

off and penetrating asset-based sensors and flexible co

mand systems to provide accurate, timely, target-qua

data to decision makers and cockpits. Using advan

data links, the GSTF CONOPS will leverage the sensors 

ready mounted on strike assets to feed data into the thea

picture. This use of GSTF CONOPS assets as sensors 

also enable these assets survivability and rapid att

upon fleeting or time sensitive targets [sic].28

The GSTF CONOPS requires the air superiority fighte

be a sensor for the joint force theater picture. GSTF—

Air Force’s CONOPS to meet the third operational goa

DOD transformation—requires an air superiority figh

with the capacity to strike heavily defended targets eff

tively and with the sensor and data link capabilities t

allow it to function both autonomously and in conjunct

with other systems.

In addition to OCA, the air superiority fighter has a D

role in sustaining US forces in anti-access and area den

environments. Protection of HVAA assets like Rivet Jo

AWACS, and JSTARS will require an air superiority figh

that can defeat air-to-air threats and suppress or dest

surface-to-air threats before they can threaten our HVAA 

sets. SAMs with extended range (greater than 250 miles) m

siles can threaten HVAAs in friendly airspace. 29 This thr
makes survivability and the capability to detect and eng

advanced SAMs key requirements for this air superio

fighter, even when originally tasked for the DCA role.

A new air superiority fighter is clearly demanded by 

DOD transformation operational goal of projecting and s

taining US forces in distant anti-access or area-denial en

ronments. GSTF is the USAF CONOPS created to meet t

goal. As conceived by the Air Force, GSTF calls for an air 

periority fighter to conduct air superiority operations w

leading-edge, air-to-air and air-to-ground performance; s

vivability in the presence of sophisticated air defense s

tems; and a sensor suite that enables it to search for mo

targets, conduct electronic attack and protection, and 

erate either autonomously or in cooperation with other GS

assets. This fighter also bears a corresponding DCA role 

supporting this transformational goal.

The fourth operational goal of DOD transformation is 

deny enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surv

lance, tracking, and rapid engagement with all-weat

precision strike against fixed and mobile targets. An air 

periority fighter contributes to this goal through all f

OCA missions. Surface attack provides highly survivab

rapid engagement of enemy air and missile assets, es

cially when coupled with a capable sensor suite. Sw

and escort allow airborne intelligence, surveillance, a

reconnaissance (ISR) assets and other strike assets 

move into enemy airspace and find critical targets. SE

protects these assets from SAM threats. DCA prote

HVAA intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance s

sors operating in friendly airspace. To satisfy this ope

tional goal, the air superiority fighter must have the air

air and air-to-ground performance, survivability, a

sensor suite capacity discussed above.

Enhancing the capability and survivability of space s

tems and supporting infrastructure is the next goal 

DOD transformation. The contributions of an air super

ity fighter to this goal are somewhat limited. The air su

riority fighter can be used for surface attack or air-to

engagements to defend joint tactical ground stations 

other deployed ground stations supporting friendly sp

assets. Again, there would be no unique performance 

quirement for defending space assets, as the requireme
would be a function of the threat environment as in 

previous discussions.

Leveraging information technology to develop a jo

C4ISR capability, including a tailorable joint operatio

picture, is an essential requirement for the transform

tional air superiority fighter. This air superiority figh

must be capable of autonomous and supported operatio

The air superiority fighter acts as a shooter-turned-sens

sharing data with the rest of the joint force. Because su

a fighter will be fielded in far greater numbers than hi

demand, low-density (HDLD) airborne sensors such 

AWACS and JSTARS, it has the potential of adding to 

joint air picture via sensor netting—a volume and qua

of data unattainable today. Moreover, a new air superio

fighter with a capable sensor suite is highly valuable si

it can survive in close proximity to targets of interest.

The Transformational

Air Superiority Fighter

To this point, the operating assumption has been t

only a fighter aircraft can satisfy OCA tasks (surface 

tack, escort, sweep, and SEAD). Other weapons syste

are often mentioned as alternatives to a dedicated air 

periority fighter such as the F/A-22.

Alternative Solutions

To determine whether an air superiority fighter is 

sential to the transformation of DOD, we must exam

the alternatives—ground-based, sea-based, and other 

borne alternatives such as cruise missiles, the airbo

laser (ABL), and airborne high-power microwave. Spa

based systems are a candidate for a future air superio

weapon, but discussion of them is deferred until later.

Ground-based systems such as artillery, the Army t

tical missile system (ATACMS), and SAMs have the ca

bility to conduct some OCA and DCA missions, but w

limitations. Artillery systems and ATACMS can cond

surface attack and SEAD missions. However, they can o

be used if friendly forces occupy ground within range 

the targets. Likewise, SAMs, such as Patriots, can cond
DCA missions but again only if the enemy threat is wit

the range of the system. Ground-based systems cannot f

sibly conduct sweep or escort missions. Sweep and esc

missions require the ability to engage throughout the en

theater airspace and respond to highly mobile threa

Ground-based assets can only do this in cases where ene

airspace is extremely limited, and the placement of grou

based assets is unusually advantageous. Refuelable 

borne systems overcome these limitations by virtue of th

ability to move freely and operate over a theater-wide ar

Special operations forces (SOF)—another type of grou

based asset—can perform surface attack and SEAD m

sions, but, once inserted, they are limited in mobility and 

sponsiveness to time-critical targeting contingencies.

Sea-based systems, such as AEGIS cruisers and 

stroyers and the Tomahawk cruise missile, have a deg

of flexibility to perform some air superiority missions 

are limited to operations within the range of their seabo

launch platforms. While the abilities of AEGIS systems 

engage air threats and the Tomahawk to conduct surf

attack across the littoral make them a critical elemen

the joint force, they cannot perform the full spectrum of 

superiority missions throughout the entire theater.

Other airborne alternatives to an air superiority figh

include cruise missiles such as the joint air-to-surf

standoff missile (JASSM), ABL, and airborne high pow

microwave. Cruise missiles such as JASSM are useful 

surface attack and SEAD against fixed sites. Because t

are bomb-on-coordinate weapons, cruise missiles are 

appropriate for moving targets such as airborne thre

and, therefore, cannot carry out sweep and escort m

sions. ABL presents an interesting alternative for the 

superiority fighter. Designed for the tactical ballistic m

sile (TBM) threat, the ABL can bring lethal energy to b

over long distances at the speed of light. However, the A

is a large aircraft and an HVAA. It is unlikely to be u

over enemy airspace. Therefore, the ABL is subject 

range limitations due to its lack of survivability. The f

that it is an HDLD asset limits its flexibility to addr

multiple air superiority demands. Ultimately, ABL technol

should progress to the point of being hosted on smaller, 

merous, flexible platforms—like the air superiority figh
Airborne high-power microwave, like airborne laser, ho

promise for satisfying each air superiority mission. L

the ABL, this technology likely will be advanced to 

state where it can be hosted, not on an HDLD platfo

but on a flexible, survivable air superiority fighter.

Although alternatives to the air superiority fighter m

be capable of executing the missions of surface atta

sweep, escort, and SEAD under certain conditions, no sin

class of weapon system currently has the capability a

freedom of movement to conduct all these operations 

fectively throughout the theater, except for the air sup

ority fighter. Therefore, the remainder of this paper focu

on an airborne fighter solution to the air superiority 

quirement.

Requirements for the Air Superiority Fighter

Having laid the foundation of what an air superio

fighter does and how it can contribute to the operatio

goals of the DOD transformation, it is now appropriate 

identify requirements such a fighter must meet to be r

vant in the twenty-first century. These requirements 

the capability to defeat advanced air-to-air and surface

air threats; to survive in an anti-access environment 

posed by a modern IADS; and to participate fully as s

sor and shooter within a modern warfare network.

Ability to Defeat Air-to-Air and Surface-to-A

Threats. The air superiority fighter must be able to def

air-to-air and surface-to-air threats as well as TBMs a

cruise missiles. In a 2001 Aerospace Power Journal arti

Air Force chief of staff Gen John P. Jumper identified 

Sukhoi Su-35 and Su-37 as air-to-air threats superior 

the F-15C, the current US air superiority fighter.30 M

alarming are the highly capable SA-10 and SA-12 surfa

to-air missile systems.31 QDR-01 identifies cruise miss

as a major concern, as these long-range systems—some 

which enjoy the benefits of low-observable technology3

may be used by the enemy to delay or deny US forces se

ing access to overseas bases, airfields, and ports.33 Defe

ing these threats requires several capabilities. To eng

fighters beyond visual range requires, as seen in the GS

requirement set, a first look, first shot, and first kill ca
bility. Additionally, to engage advanced air-to-air fight

within visual range requires superior maneuverability. F

look, first shot, and first kill require not only low obse

ability but also superior radar range performance, speed, 

titude capability, and air-to-air missile performance. L

observability works against the enemy’s capability 

achieve the first detection. Radar range performance wo

in concert with low observability to yield a first look. Sp

and altitude extend the kinematic range of air-to-air m

siles. Superior air-to-air missile performance works in c

junction with low observability, radar range performan

speed, and altitude to allow a first shot. Superior air-to

missile performance is a function of aircraft speed and a

tude at launch and missile aeronautical performance, 

board processing, and seeker and fusing performance. It 

sures the first look and first shot result in a first kill.

To defeat modern SAMs, the fighter must first be sur

able, meaning it must feature all-aspect low observabi

and have advanced electronic countermeasures (ECM). 

aspect low observability allows access in dense air defe

environments, where it is not always possible to keep thre

on the nose. Advanced ECM adds a margin of survivabil

To defeat modern SAMs, the air superiority fighter must a

have significant surface attack and SEAD capability. T

means it must be capable of carrying munitions (while ma

taining its low signature) and have the sensor suite requi

to find threats and carry out attacks on them.

Cruise missile threats drive many of the same requ

ments as air-to-air threats. To address cruise missiles, 

air superiority fighter must have radar performance ca

ble of detecting the incoming missile, which may be l

observable and operating at low altitudes, where grou

clutter and terrain can degrade conventional radar perf

mance. Additionally, the fighter’s weapon suite must h

the avionics and missile performance to support defea

the cruise missile in flight. In summary, to fulfill its rol

defeating air-to-air, surface-to-air, and cruise missile threa

the air superiority fighter requires superior aeronaut

performance, surface attack capability, all-aspect low 

servability, electronic countermeasures, and advanced a

to-air missile avionics support and performance.
Survivability. Survivability in the presence of mod

air defense systems is a major issue for the air superio

fighter in the twenty-first century. Requirements for s

vivability for the near future will be driven by the capa

ities of the SA-10, SA-12, and SA-20 SAMs. The SA-1

(the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] designat

for the Russian S-300PMU-1) is a highly capable surfa

to-air system with a missile, the 48N6, which has a ra

of roughly 90 miles.34 The S-300PMU-1 has been expor

to China and Cyprus.35 Russia is marketing an upgrad

version, the S-300PMU-2, with the 125-mile range 48N

missile, which is designed for TBM threats.36 Russian 

sign engineers are working on a further improvement 

the S-300 series, the S-400 (NATO designation SA-2

with a missile range of 250 miles.37 One Russian desig

claims this newest generation of technology includes 

capability to detect even stealth designs at 60 mile

Countries that have S-300 series SAMs include Bulga

India, Iran, and most of the former Soviet republics.39 

telligence sources reportedly claim Syria, Iraq, and Lib

are among the possible customers for these system

which cost more than $100 million.40

Sensor-Shooter Capability. A transformational air 

periority fighter must function as sensor and shoo

within a modern warfare network. The airborne figh

must operate effectively with other members of the jo

force within the JDN. It must communicate with other 

defense assets in the air, on the ground, and at sea to 

fend our bases effectively against enemy aircraft a

cruise missiles. It must receive data that will allow it to 

spond to mobile or emergent threats or targets of oppor

nity. Likewise, it must quickly pass threat data to ot

members of the joint force that are in a better position 

address the threat. Finally, it must have the capacity 

support and contribute to IO by acting as a capable a

survivable sensor-shooter. Beyond being compatible w

the JDN, the air superiority fighter must also have an 

ceptional onboard sensor capability.

The next generation air-to-air fighter must have a capa

active-electronically-scanned-array (AESA) radar. AE

radar offers the air superiority fighter revolutionary per

mance, flexibility, autonomy, enhancements to survivabil
and the ability to act as a network sensor. AESA radars 

already being exported on US fighters, and foreign intere

are now independently developing AESA radars.

AESA radar is a revolution in radar technology. It phy

cally manifests the doctrinal tenet of centralized con

and decentralized execution in that it distributes the fu

tion of the radar to hundreds or thousands of small in

pendent but centrally controlled radars. This leap in 

pacity makes its host platform a capable autonomo

sensor for the networked joint force. AESA radar is b

from hundreds or thousands of low-power individ

transmitter/receiver elements known as T/R module

These T/R modules are small, lightweight, and highly r

able. Each module combines highly miniaturized anten

and electronics assemblies. Advanced processors man

data from the hundreds to thousands of T/R modules 

present an integrated picture to the pilot.42

AESA radar is a technological leap beyond convention

mechanically scanned array (MSA) radar, which is co

prised of a single high-power dish that acts as its tra

mitter and receiver. AESA radar yields greater detect

range performance than MSA radar. Open source lite

ture estimates the range of the AESA radar on the F/A

against a target with a one-square-meter radar cross s

tion to be an astounding 125 nautical miles.43 AESA ra

is far more flexible than MSA radar since it can perform 

wide variety of functions nearly simultaneously. This fle

bility results from the fact that the beam is electronic

scanned through independently controlled transmiss

modules rather than mechanically scanned by a sin

dish. That means the revisit rate—how quickly the ra

can scan a particular part of the airspace scan volume—

not mechanically limited by a large gimbaled dish, but 

the processing speed of the controller. Because AESA ra

can scan and process data quickly, it can interleave s

eral different waveforms with the result that it can perfo

dissimilar functions nearly simultaneously. These fu

tions include the traditional air-to-air radar functions 

scanning and tracking targets and guiding missiles 

flight, along with more diverse tasks such as jammi

threat warning, surface attack,44 and ground mapping.
With its ability to support so many combat functions 

multaneously, AESA radar gives the air-to-air fighter 

ability to act without support of off-board electronic s

port (e.g., jamming) or off-board C2. This capability to 

autonomously in the opening engagements of an air ca

paign is an essential element of GSTF. AESA radar also 

hances the fighter’s survivability by controlling side-lo

and beam width as well as by transmitting radar pul

that are agile in frequency and exhibit different wavefor

from pulse to pulse.46 This manipulation reduces the a

ity of enemy observers to detect the aircraft from its ra

emissions.47 Finally, AESA radar gives the air superio

fighter an important contribution to the joint force by a

ing as a network sensor. The air superiority fighter will 

its AESA radar to collect and process electronic data 

provide threat location, target tracking, bomb damage 

sessment, and other critical reconnaissance data to 

joint force.48

Because AESA radars are configured on several exp

aircraft and because foreign interests are developing th

own AESA radars, the air superiority fighter must have 

AESA radar to establish air superiority in an environm

where this technology is proliferating. AESA radars are f

tured on several US exported vehicles. These aircraft 

clude the F-16 Block 60 (which is being exported to 

United Arab Emirates49 and is one of the aircraft be

considered by Singapore in its future fighter comp

tion50); the F-15K (which is being exported to So

Korea,51 and a version of which is also competing for 

Singapore fighter52); and the F/A-18E/F (which has w

approval for export and is a candidate in the Singap

competition53). Additionally, a European consortium (co

prised of EADS, Thales, and BAE Systems) is developing 

own AESA radar.54 Since US-built fighters with AE

radars will be exported within the next 10 years, and w

the development of a competing European system, AE

radars will become standard configuration items for air 

periority fighters worldwide. Given the extraordinary ca

bilities of AESA radar, the US air superiority fighter m

have an AESA radar that is not only survivable but a

dominant in its air superiority mission.
The Air Superiority Role:

A Comparison of the Competitors

There are several candidates to achieve the air superio

requirements driven by DOD transformation. The alter

tives examined here are the F-15C/E, F/A-22, F-3

UCAV, and an advanced space-based system called 

common aerospace vehicle. The requirements are super

air-to-air and air-to-ground performance, survivabi

against modern air defense threats, and a sensor su

that allows the fighter to act autonomously or as an ac

part of the JDN. Appendix B summarizes how each can

date measures against these requirements.

F-15C/E

The F-15C/E does not satisfy all the requirements fo

transformational air superiority fighter. It does not exh

the aeronautical performance required for air-to-air do

nance against threats like the MiG-29, Su-27, and S

35/37. The F-15C does not carry out surface attack O

missions. The F-15E is able to conduct surface attack m

sions, as well as other air superiority missions, but its 

creased weight over the F-15C reduces its aeronaut

performance. The F-15C/E does not have the low obse

ability required to make it survivable in the modern air 

fense environment. However, it does have the capability 

hosting an advanced sensor suite compatible with 

JDN. Still, the newest F-15Cs will be 20 years old in 20

and nearing the end of their current service life (8,0

hours), which is twice the original specification.55 On b

ance, the F-15 cannot continue to serve as America’s fro

line air superiority fighter after 2007.

The US Air Force and some defense observers judge t

the F-15C will not be able to compete against next-generat

fighters. In a 1998 interview with Aviation Week and Sp

Technology, Gen Richard Hawley, commander of Air Co

bat Command, said, “the F-15 will not be able to oper

effectively against upcoming threats such as four-and

half- and fifth-generation fighters like the Eurofighter a

Rafale and upgraded versions of the Sukhoi Su-27.”56 

cording to the Federation of American Scientists, “simu
tions conducted by British Aerospace and the British 

fense Research Agency compared the effectiveness of 

F-15C, Rafale, EF-2000, and F-22 against the Russian S

35. The Rafale achieved a 1:1 kill ratio. . . . The EF-20

kill ratio was 4.5:1 while the F-22 achieved a ratio of 10

In stark contrast was the F-15C, losing 1.3 Eagles for ea

Su-35 destroyed.”57 Some argue these deficiencies can 

addressed through radar and avionics upgrades. Howev

improvements in aeronautical performance (accelerati

maneuverability, engine thrust, and rate of climb) a

radar cross-section are more difficult to make without s

nificantly changing the airframe. The inefficiency of m

ing these kinds of upgrades to a platform that has been 

erational since 1979—and was last built in 198658—ma

fielding an entirely new and more capable fighter a m

viable option. The F-15E performs air-to-ground missi

like surface attack OCA and other air superiority missio

However, its increased weight over the F-15C compromi

its performance against other air-to-air fighters.59 Its s

vivability and sensor suite characteristics are sim

enough to the F-15C to merit no further separate disc

sion of the F-15E.

The Air Force does not believe the F-15 will be surviva

against modern air defense threats like the SA-10, SA-

and SA-20. In the same interview cited above, General H

ley noted F-15Cs will not be capable of handling SA-10 or 

12 threats.60 General Jumper, in a 1999 interview conduc

when he was commander, US Air Forces Europe, affirm

that the introduction of SA-10s and SA-12s into Kos

would have “changed the landscape of [Operation ALLI

FORCE] significantly,”61 dramatically increasing the threa

conventional platforms like the F-15C. Although actual ra

signature data and threat system performance are classif

its fielding predated the operational fielding of stealthy p

forms like the F117. Although conventional aircraft can 

modified to achieve some degree of stealth, they can

achieve the same low-observable signature performance 

an aircraft designed for stealth from the outset, like 

F-117. Once the basic physical configuration of the airfra

is determined, design trade-offs required for signature 

duction—such as platform alignment; materials selecti

and design of leading edges, nozzles, intakes, access pan
and myriad other critical details—are no longer feasibl

Thus, not only is the F-15C not survivable against mod

air defense threats but low observability treatments to it 

unlikely to give it the signature performance available t

new air superiority fighter designed for stealth from 

outset.

The F-15C can be upgraded to have the sensor p

formance required to be a transformational air superio

fighter. The Air Force has already upgraded 18 F-15Cs 

the 3d Fighter Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alas

with the APG-63(V)2 AESA radar.63 Additionally, it is c

sidering a fleetwide upgrade to the APG-63(V)3 AE

radar.64 Some critics of the F/A-22 assert that these ra

upgrades are sufficient to provide the air superiority ne

of the future.65 However, this judgment ignores the f

that more than radar detection performance is required 

attain first look, first shot, and first kill capability agai

enemy fighters. Without a stealthy signature, impro

ments to the F-15 radar are not enough to make it a s

vivable and dominant air superiority fighter. Given the 

of the F-15C airframes, the existence of non-US air su

riority fighters with better performance than the F-1

and the proliferation of modern SAMs, the F-15C/E c

not meet the requirements to be the US air superio

fighter after 2007.

F/A-22

The F/A-22 not only meets all the operational requ

ments for a transformational fighter, but its initial oper

ing capability (IOC) date of 2005 makes it the best ne

term solution for a twenty-first century fighter.66 

outstanding aeronautical performance, stealthy signat

performance, and advanced avionics, including an AE

radar, make it extremely capable in its role as an air su

riority fighter.

The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan summari

how the F/A-22 (called the F-22 at time of its publicati

meets Air Force transformational goals and the requ

ments outlined in this paper to meet operational goals 

the DOD.
The F-22 Raptor combines into one platform multiple capabilities—

such as air dominance, negation of enemy air defenses, precisio

attack, supercruise, advanced all-aspect stealth, and informatio

integration—that previously required many separate aircraft. . . . I

addition, when modified with an air-to-ground radar and arme

with the Small Diameter Bomb, the F-22 can . . . take out critica

highly defended targets at the outset of conflict, especially enem

air defenses armed with advanced SAMs. . . . Its ability to “super

cruise” without afterburner above Mach 1.5 makes it the ideal air

to-ground platform to dramatically shorten the time between find

ing a rapidly moving target and destroying it . . . This capability wi

also dramatically improve the ability to shoot down cruise missile

over a large area of airspace, contributing immensely to effectiv

theater missile defense . . . The F-22, with its stealth, extrem

lethality, first-look/first-kill capability, high mission capable rates

and low logistical requirements, will be critical to achieving air su

periority into the foreseeable future.67

The F/A-22 would also meet transformational requ

ments for sensor contributions to the JDN. With the AP

77 AESA radar, the F/A-22 will make an exceptional 

pact on joint force capabilities, especially with 

capability against elusive cruise missiles.68 The F/A

meets all operational requirements for a transformatio

air superiority fighter.

F-35A

The F-35A, the Air Force version of the joint str

fighter, is not an acceptable candidate for an air super

ity fighter.69 The F-35A is highly capable of fulfilling s

face attack and SEAD missions, but it is not designed 

fulfill the air-to-air sweep or escort missions. Additiona

its IOC date of 2011 creates a gap in air superiority p

formance as the F-15C exceeds its service life and becom

less capable of filling the air superiority role.70

The USAF does not consider the F-35A an air super

ity fighter. Within the construct of the GSTF, the F-35A 

part of the joint follow-on forces that are brought into 

fight only after the first wave of highly survivable GS

strike assets are brought to bear.71 The F-35A—design

for a range of missions such as close air support—can

achieve the F/A-22’s level of stealth and air-to-air p

formance.72 Although it can function in surface attack a

SEAD missions, it is not currently expected to fulfill sw

or escort missions.
Nevertheless, with regard to its ability to function as a s

sor in the JDN, the F-35A, with its next-generation AE

radar, will likely exceed the capability of the F/A-22 for so

while.73 The following excerpt from the US Air Force Tra

formation Flight Plan describes the F-35A’s capability.

The F-35A incorporates an advanced “Multi-Function Array,” whic

employs a number of multi-spectral sensors and transmitters t

provide high-resolution detection, recognition, and jamming of ai

and ground targets . . . The F-35A will provide persistent battlefiel

stealth, day and night, in adverse weather conditions, to attack an

destroy a broad range of mobile and heavily defended targets an

offer vastly increased close-air-support capability to ground forces

The F-35A will have a SEAD/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense

(DEAD) role in the 2015 timeframe. The combination of stealth, in

ternal weapons carriage, and sensor array, including airborne elec

tronic attack, will give it a robust capability in this role.74

Coupled with the fact that thousands of F-35As will 

fielded,75 this sensor suite will make the F-35A a vast a

highly capable sensor array for the JDN. Even though 

F-35A will have superior air-to-ground capability, sign

cant level of low observability, and exceptional sen

suite, it is not designed for OCA sweep and escort m

sions. As a result, it cannot be considered a transform

tional air superiority fighter.

Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicle

The uninhabited combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), like 

F-35A, has limited suitability as an air superiority fighter 

cause it is not designed for an air-to-air role. The UCAV 

developmental program to field airborne strike capability 

a stealthy unmanned aerial vehicle. It is programmed for 

IOC of 2008.76 The US Air Force Transformation Flight P

describes the purpose and benefits of the UCAV program

The Air Force UCAV program is intended to field a highly survivabl

light attack aircraft. . . . Current Air Force plans emphasize appli

cation for SEAD. . . . UCAVs will increasingly take over the comba

missions of manned vehicles today, especially those involving hig

risk, high-priority targets that are critical to defeating an adver

sary’s anti-access strategy. The advantages of UCAVs are obvious

They would put no aircrews in harm’s way, especially during ver

dangerous missions. They are not restricted by human physica

limitations. . . . They can loiter far longer over the battlefield an

operate at greatly increased ranges enabling time-critical targetin

of moving targets. Finally, more platforms with increased capabil

ity can be built with less money.77
The UCAV will satisfy many of the requirements for 

transformational air superiority fighter. It will have the 

pability to conduct surface attack and SEAD missions

will be survivable. It should make a significant contri

tion to the joint force as a sensor-shooter—it has grea

potential than manned aircraft because greater numb

of them may be fielded. In addition, the UCAV is envision

for electronic attack, with some speculation that it co

ultimately host a high-power microwave weapon.78 H

ever, currently there is no plan to make the UCAV an 

superiority fighter, capable not only of strike and SE

but also sweep and escort. Consequently, the UCAV, 

currently envisioned, is not a candidate for the trans

mational air superiority fighter. 

However, it is conceivable that a next-generation UC

(2025, assuming a 15-year procurement cycle starting 

2010) could be developed with air-to-air capability t

would satisfy all air superiority missions, including sw

and escort. This would be a major transformation 

UCAV operators. The addition of air-to-air missions wo

significantly complicate training. For beyond visual ra

engagements, the additional mission would be diffic

enough, but for close engagements requiring maneuver

tactics, the training required to produce the skill and 

centive to win against an enemy with more inherent 

centive to survive (a manned vehicle) will be truly ch

lenging. In summary, UCAV, as envisioned for IOC 

2008, does not meet requirements for a transformatio

air superiority fighter. With changes to the weapon syst

concept and the requisite change to operator traini

UCAV holds promise in the far term (2025) to provide a 

pable and prolific air superiority fighter.

Space-Based Systems

Space-based systems hold promise for some air sup

ority tasks but are unlikely to fulfill the requirements 

sweep and escort missions. Today’s space-based syste

are focused on the mission areas of space control, force 

hancement, and space support—none of which address 

rectly attacking terrestrial-based targets, a mission a

called space force application. According to Joint Publi
tion 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, “curren

there are no space force application assets operating 

space.”79 However, the Air Force has proposed a fut

system called the common aerospace vehicle in its Tra

formation Flight Plan.

The Common Aerospace Vehicle is an advanced space delivery ve

hicle capable of delivering and dispensing conventional payload

worldwide from and through space. The [CAV] is deployed as 

prompt response, precision accuracy weapon system to engage th

enemy anytime and anyplace without advanced deployment

Prompt response permits action in the initial phases of conflict t

strike high-value, time-critical, or heavily defended targets in ad

vance of or complementing expeditionary forces. . . . The [CAV]’

speed and maneuverability combine to make defense extremely dif

ficult. Planned payloads include the small diameter bomb, un

manned aerial vehicles, wide area search autonomous attac

miniature munition, and a unitary penetrator. . . . The commo

aerospace vehicle can also support area surveillance, SEAD, an

anti-personnel missions with appropriate payloads.80

Clearly, the CAV is designed for surface attack and SEA

but does not lend itself to air-to-air missions of sweep 

escort. However, CAVs could be used as a platform to d

pense a UCAV to perform these missions. Nevertheless

is unlikely that the common aerospace vehicle would 

used directly in air-to-air engagements. Finally, one c

conceive of a space platform to do all air superiority m

sions. This could be a space-based weapon that uses 

rected energy or kinetic kill devices against air and surf

targets. Many technological and legal hurdles stand in 

way of making this a reality.

Although future space-based systems may be able 

conduct surface attack and SEAD missions, they do 

lend themselves to the OCA missions of sweep and esc

The proposed common aerospace vehicle will be able 

conduct strike missions and may be able to carry UCA

to perform other air superiority missions. Neverthele

space systems are unlikely to fulfill the need for an air 

periority fighter.

Conclusions

The United States cannot meet its operational goals 

DOD transformation without a new air superiority figh

This fighter must have the capability to defeat advanced 
to-air and surface-to-air threats, survive in an anti-acc

environment imposed by a modern IADS, and function 

sensor and shooter within a modern JDN. The only weap

system able to meet all these requirements by 2007 is 

F/A-22 Raptor. The UCAV holds promise as the future g

eration air superiority fighter (2025)—given some ma

changes to the weapon system concept and training. Even 

this age of transformation, air superiority is still required 

bringing forces to bear successfully in theaters of confl

The operational goals of DOD transformation demand 

highly capable air superiority fighter with wide-ranging 

pabilities. The only system capable of fulfilling these 

mands within the next five years is the F/A-22 Raptor.

Notes

1. Elaine M. Grossman, “F/A-22 Fighter Unlikely to Meet Some Requ

Capabilities by Test Time,” Inside The Pentagon, 22 August 2002, 1.

2. War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and 

ployment of Air Power (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing O

[GPO], 1943), 1.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionar

Military and Associated Terms, 14 August 2002, 21.

4. Ibid., 100.

5. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.1, Counterair Operati

26 April 2002, 1.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 3.

9. Ibid.

10. JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats

October 1999, I–2.

11. AFDD 2-1.1, 17.

12. JP 3-01, IV–3.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 18.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 26.

18. Ibid., 23.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 22.

21. Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review 

port (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001)

(hereafter QDR-01).

22. Nick Cook, “Europe’s Cruise Missile Conundrum,” Interavia B

ness and Technology 53, no. 621 (June 1998): 40.
23. “The US Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,” FY03–FY07, 

USAF/XPXT, 14, on-line, Internet, 6 November 2002, available f

http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/xpx/xpxt/DOCS/The USAFTransformationF

PlanFY03-07.pdf.

24. Ibid.

25. ACC/XPS, “Global Strike Task Force CONOPS (Draft)”, Ver

2.0, 26 July 2002 (hereafter ACC GSTF), 25, on-line, Internet, 6 Nov

ber 2002, available from https://afconops.hq.af.mil/support/gstf.do

26. Gen John P. Jumper, “Global Strike Task Force: A Transform

Concept Forged By Experience,” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 20

n.p., on-line, Internet, 15 August 2002, available from http://w

airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/spr01/spr01.html.

27. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, 86.

28. ACC GTSF.

29. David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Russia’s Top Desig

Claim Antistealth Skills,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 155, 

15 (8 October 2001): 83.

30. Jumper.

31. Ibid.

32. Cook, 40.

33. QDR 01, 31.

34. John A. Tirpek, “The Double-Digit SAMs,” Air Force Magazine 

no. 6 (June 2001): 49.

35. Robert Wall, “Russia’s Premier SAMs Seen Proliferating Soon,” A

tion Week and Space Technology 151, no. 13 (27 September 1999): 36.

36. Ibid.

37. Fulghum and Wall, 83.

38. Ibid.

39. Tirpek, 48–49.

40. Ibid.

41. David A. Fulghum, “New Radar Design Uses Unique Buil

Blocks,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 153, no. 11 (11 Septem

2000): 60.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. David A. Fulghum, “New Sensors Grab Extra Combat Roles,” 

ation Week and Space Technology 153, no. 11 (11 September 2000): 

45. David A. Fulghum, “Advanced Sensors Expand JSF Role,” A

tion Week and Space Technology 154, no. 23 (11 September 2000): 5

46. David A. Fulghum, “Stealthy UAVs Snag Rumsfeld’s Attenti

Aviation Week and Space Technology 154, no. 23 (4 June 2001): 30.

47. David A. Fulghum, “New F-22 Radar Unveils Future,” Avia

Week and Space Technology 152, no. 6 (7 February 2000): 50.

48. Fulghum, “Advanced Sensors,” 58.

49. Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, “The F-16 Block 60: A High-Tech 

craft for a Volatile Region,” Aerospace Power Journal, 14, no. 3 (fall 20

n.p., on-line, Internet, 31 October 2002, available from http://w

airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/fal00/phifal00.htm

50. John Fricker, “Singapore Closest to Finalizing Future Fighter P

erence,” Aviation Week’s www.Aviation Now.com, n.p., on-line, Inter
31 October 2002, available from http://www.awgnet.com/showne

02asia1/airfrm08.htm.

51. “F-15K Advanced Avionics/Cockpit Systems,” Boeing Web 

n.p., on-line, Internet, 31 October 2002, available from http://w

boing.com/defense-space/military/f15/f-15k/f15kavionics.htm.

52. Fricker, “Singapore.”

53. Karl Schwarz, “Boeing Seeks F-18E/F Export Customers,” Flu

Review Online, September 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, 31 October 20

available from http://www.flug-revue.rotor.com/FRheft/FRH01

FR0109c.htm.

54. John Fricker, “Europe Expands Union Concept to Military Airc

Procurement,” Aviation Week’s www.Aviation Now.com, 18 June 20

n.p., on-line, Internet, 31 October 2002, available from http://w

awgnet.com/shownews/01paris2/topsto08.htm.

55. “F-15 Eagle,” Federation of American Scientists, n.p., on-line

ternet, 5 September 2002, available from http://www.fas.org/man/

101/sys/ac/f-15.htm.

56. Stanley W. Kandebo, “F-22 Will Set Standard for Next-Cen

Fighter,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 149, no. 5 (3 August 1998)

57. “F-15 Eagle.”

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Kandebo, 46.

61. Wall, “Russia’s SAMs,” 36.

62. The author has extensive experience in low-observable aircraft 

sign, test, and evaluation as program director, National Low Observ

and Counter Low Observable Programs (Office of the Under Secretar

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and as a flight test 

gineer.

63. Robert Wall, “F-15 Radar Upgrade Expands Target Set,” Avia

Week and Space Technology 151, no. 24 (13 December 1999): 40.

64. Robert Wall, “USAF Begins Upgrade of F-15 Radars,” Avia

Week and Space Technology 156, no. 6 (11 February 2002): 54.

65. Wall, “F-15 Radar,” 40.

66. Air Force Transformation, E-4.

67. Ibid., E-3–E-4.

68. Wall, “F-15 Radar,” 40.

69. Air Force Transformation, 23.

70. Ibid., E-4.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. David L. Rockwell, “AESA Fighter Radars: The Future is He

Aerospace America 41, no. 2 (February 2003): 22.

74. Air Force Transformation, E-4.

75. Fulghum, “Advanced Sensors,” 58.

76. Air Force Transformation, E-8.

77. Ibid.

78. David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “USAF Tags X-45 UCAV 

Penetrating Jammer,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 157, no. 

July 2002): 26.
79. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, 9 August 2002, 

80. Air Force Transformation E-8.
Appendix A

Air Superiority Missions versus Transformational Goal

27

Air

superiority

missions

Protect

Critical

Bases

Assure Information

Systems

Project

and

Sustain

US Forces

Deny

Enemies

Sanctuary

Protect

Space

Systems

Develo

Joint O

eration

Picture

OCA

Surface

attack

Defeats

airborne

threats to

bases at

source

Destroys

groundbased

threats to

ISR assets

Defeats

airborne

threats at

source

Direct

strike

capability

on enemy

forces

Destroys

groundbased

threats to

space

systems

Sensor

shoote

part of 

data ne

work

Fighter

sweep and

Escort

Defeats

airborne

threats to

bases at

source

and supports joint

attack on

these

threats

Defeats

airborne

threats to

ISR

assets

Protects

friendly

airborne

assets

operating

in enemy

airspace

Defeats

enemy

ISR

assets

and airborne

threats to

friendly

ISR

assets

Defeats

airborne

threats to

space

systems

and supports joint

attack on

these

threats

Same 

surface

attack

SEAD Defeats

SAM

threats to

forces

attacking

threats to

bases

Defeats

SAM

threats to

ISR

assets

Defeats

SAM

threats to

airborne

assets

Defeats

SAM

threats to

airborne

assets

Defeats

SAM

threats to

forces

attacking

enemy

threats to

space

systems

Same 

surface

attack

DCA Defeats

inbound

airborne

threats to

bases

Protects

HVAA ISR

assets in

friendly

airspace

Defeats

inbound

airborne

threats to

forces

Protects

HVAA

assets in

friendly

airspace

Protects

groundbased

support for

space

assets

Same 

surface

attack
Appendix B

Comparative Capabilities of Air Superiority

Fighter Candidates

29

Candidates Air-to-Air Air-toGroundSurvivability Sensor Suite IOC

F-15C Insufficient None Insufficient Insufficient

but can be

upgraded

Current

F-15E Insufficient

less than F15C

Excellent Insufficient Insufficient

but can be

upgraded

Current

F/A-22 Superb Superb Superb Superb Current

F-35A Insufficient Excellent Excellent but

less than

F/A-22

Superbbetter than

F/A-22

2011

UCAV None; can

be upgraded

to give

beyondvisual-range

capability;

Unlikely to

yield

maneuvering

air-to-air

capability

Adequate Excellent Adequate 2008

Common

Aerospace

Vehicle

None; can

conceivably

release

UCAVs with

air-to-air

capability

Adequate Adequate Adequate Unknown