U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

29–447 PDF 2018

S. HRG. 114–769 

WAR IN SYRIA: NEXT STEPS 

TO MITIGATE THE CRISIS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 17, 2016 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee ................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator From Maryland ................................... 2 

Ford, Hon. Robert S., Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Lindborg, Hon. Nancy, President, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Wittes, Dr. Tamara Cofman, Director and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle 

East Policy, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ................................. 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 14 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Statement Submitted by Human Rights First ...................................................... 40 

A New Normal—Ongoing Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria, February 2016 

Submitted by the Syrian American Medical Society ......................................... 45 

Text of ‘‘An Open Letter From Syrians Working With U.S. and European 

Funded Organizations’’ ........................................................................................ 107 

(III)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(1) 

WAR IN SYRIA: NEXT STEPS 

TO MITIGATE THE CRISIS 

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:00 a.m. in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Johnson, 

Flake, Gardner, Perdue, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, 

Murphy, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to 

order. 

I want to thank each of you for being here. Ambassador Ford, I 

know we are starting a little bit later than normal to accommodate 

your travel, but we thank all three of you for being here. 

We probably will probably limit questions to 5 minutes today because of the timing of this hearing and what comes afterwards. 

But, again, thank you. 

As many know, this committee has spent a lot of time on the 

Syrian war. 5 years into the war, I think we can draw a few general conclusions. 

Without leverage on the Assad regime, we have little ability to 

influence a diplomatic solution to the war. The longer this war goes 

on, the more complicated it gets and the more people suffer. 

Today we are at a meeting in the latest round of peace talks in 

Vienna. In April, I talked to Dr. Hijab, the leader of the opposition, 

and I understand why they withdrew from the talks. As violence 

picked up, humanitarian aid was stopped and civilians were targeted. So they almost had no choice, and we supported his decision. 

I would be interested to hear your thoughts on what could bring 

the opposition back to the table at this point. More importantly, I’d 

like to hear your expectations for the talks. 

This is a time when civilians continue to be targeted, aid convoys 

continue to be stopped, and in some areas elements of the opposition are acting against their own interest. I am not sure exactly 

what can come out of Vienna, but we look forward to hearing your 

thoughts in that regard. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
2 

I know Secretary Kerry has repeatedly mentioned a plan B. I 

have never sensed that was realistic. It seems to me very rhetorical. I do not even know if it is aiding in getting to an end. 

I would also appreciate your thoughts on some of the longer-term 

ramifications of the war. Issues like the refugee crisis, a generation 

without education, an independent Kurdish region, and threats to 

Turkey will have impact for generations to come. 

Finally, we spend a lot of time talking about Syria and not 

enough time listening to what Syrians are saying. 

Without objection, Mr. Ranking Member, I would like to insert 

two documents into the record. The first is a report on chemical attacks from the Syrian American Medical Society, and the second is 

a letter from 150 Syrians working to provide governance in Syria. 

Without objection, I will enter those into the record. 

[The report and the letter referred to above are located on pages 

45 and 107, respectively.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And with that, again I want to thank you all for 

being here and look forward to our comments from our distinguished ranking member, Senator Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for 

convening this hearing on the War in Syria: Next Steps to Mitigate 

the Crisis, the ongoing civil war in Syria. 

And we have a very distinguished panel, and I thank all three 

for being here and sharing their views as we try to figure out how 

to move forward, recognizing the current situation. We cannot rewrite history. We are where we are. How do we move forward? 

Suffering of the Syrian people has continued because Bashar al 

Assad and his inner circle cling to power. An internationally brokered transition government seems further away today than ever 

with Assad’s deputy foreign minister recently saying this will not 

happen, not now, not tomorrow, not ever. Assad’s contempt for his 

own people, enabled by Iran and Russia, is destroying his country 

and has created a regional crisis, including an internally displaced 

persons and refugee crisis of historic proportions that grows more 

dangerous every day. 

I remember that almost 2 months ago Russian President Putin 

announced that he would start withdrawing troops from Syria. We 

all remember that. And we thought, well, it looks President Putin 

might be exerting his leverage over Assad to get a negotiated settlement. 

And yet, here we are again. The cessation of hostilities has collapsed. Putin’s supposed pressure has receded, and Russia’s jets 

have resumed their bombing in violation of the very ceasefire that 

Mr. Putin helped broker. 

As this conflict continues to escalate, the number of combatants 

grow and chances for grave mistakes rise. Just a few weeks ago, 

Russia and Israeli fighter jets nearly confronted each other, and reports suggest that Russian jets have fired at least twice at Israeli 

aircraft. And let us not forget that in late 2015, Turkey shot down 

a Russian jet. Misunderstandings will and can happen. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
3 

Now, the stakes are higher for our own special forces who have 

been deployed to counter ISIL. And while their mission is to train 

and support local forces to fight ISIL, I am concerned that they 

have been deployed to a complex battlefield. 

I hear the term ‘‘deconfliction’’ bandied about. But in the fog of 

war, it is just a term. What we should not lose sight of in the fog 

is the human dimensions of this conflict. The Syrian people are suffering. 

Just look at the numbers here, Mr. Chairman. This is incredible, 

the crisis that has taken place. Since March 2011, 400,000 Syrians 

have been killed and over 1 million have been injured. More than 

4.8 million Syrians have been forced to leave the country. 6.5 million are internally displaced, making Syria the largest displacement crisis globally. 

This humanitarian crisis has been fueled in part by the atrocities 

committed by the Assad regime and violent extremist groups 

against Syrian civilians. Any party responsible for these crimes 

must be brought to justice for the abuses which defy international 

law. We cannot allow impunity. We must hold accountable those 

who are responsible. 

I have repeatedly raised this issue and I am proud the Senate 

passed a bill that I authored, the Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act. And I hope the House will do the same. The only way 

forward is to expend every effort to achieve a broad political solution and to resolve this conflict through negotiations that lead to 

a stable Syrian government representing all of its citizens. 

The combatants and their outside enablers must understand that 

there is no possibility of a military victory for any party to this conflict. The Russians cannot bomb their way to peace. The Iranians 

cannot prop up Assad forever. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand this issue has been subject to much 

debate within Congress and between the Congress and the administration over the past several years. And I have been clear in my 

view where I think we have opportunities. But I am not interested 

today in reliving or relitigating what might have been. I am interested in developing a bipartisan approach that allows Congress and 

the administration to work together today to seek to bring peace 

and stability to Syria and to bring an end to the suffering of the 

Syrian people. 

I look forward to our exchange and hope that we can move forward in a positive way to resolve this civil war. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

We will now move to our witnesses. Our first witness is the Honorable Robert S. Ford, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute. 

Our second witness is the Honorable Nancy Lindborg, President of 

the United States Institute of Peace. Finally, our third witness is 

Dr. Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings Institution. 

If you would just speak in order, it will save time versus me reintroducing. And we look forward to your comments. I think you 

know you can summarize. Without objection, your written testimony will be entered into the record. With that, thank you. Ambassador Ford? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
4 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. FORD, SENIOR FELLOW, 

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ambassador FORD. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to speak to you today about Syria and what new steps the 

United States can take to mitigate the Syrian crisis. 

In short, there is nothing the United States can do by itself to 

solve the Syrian crisis now. There is no quick fix. This is in part 

because the Syrian war is, first and foremost, a conflict between 

Syrians. Yes, foreign states are involved, some quite, quite deeply. 

Some have sent their own forces to fight in Syria, and one regional 

state is organizing foreign militias to fight in Syria. But these foreign countries do not control the Syrians completely. We must remember that most of the combatants in Syria are Syrians, and the 

top leaders of the two opposing sides, the Syrian Government and 

the Syrian opposition—they are Syrian. So Syrians ultimately have 

to negotiate an end to this war if they can. 

Neither side, government or opposition, has reached the breaking 

point, although both sides are tired. And I would add here the Syrian economy, the Syrian currency is plunging in value over recent 

weeks. 

Both sides, however, still seek military advantage. That military 

advantage is often measured in just a few miles of ground. The foreign states helping them are either not willing or not able to compel their Syrian allies to stop fighting or even allow humanitarian 

access. And so with this willingness on the part of the Syrians to 

keep fighting and in the absence of a widely agreed mechanism to 

monitor a new cessation of hostilities, I doubt—I strongly doubt 

there will be any penalties imposed on any group that violates a 

renewed cessation of hostilities deal. 

Thinking long-term, it makes little sense for foreigners to sketch 

out designs of how a partition of Syria would work one day. No 

Syrian now is seeking partition. They may want partition in the future, but they are not there now and it is up to them to decide. 

Likewise, it makes little sense to sketch out ideas about a future 

constitution for Syria when the existing state has never respected 

the rule of law and elements of the armed opposition do not either. 

Senator Corker, as you just mentioned, it seems unlikely the Syrian Government will negotiate a compromise deal for a new transition government without more military pressure put upon it. We 

can talk about how we could do that military pressure, if you wish. 

But let me just say that I am firmly against introduction of more 

American military forces into combat situations in Syria. I spent 5 

years of my life trying to stand up an Iraqi Government so we 

could get our forces out of Iraq, and I do not want to see more 

American forces injected into Syria. I am, frankly, not happy that 

we have American forces there now. 

What I would like to see is that the United States do more to 

help Syrian civilians. We should be pressing much harder on humanitarian access issues. If the United Nations can airdrop supplies to the Syrian Government-held city of Deir ez-Zur in the east, 

which is under siege by the Islamic State, then why can it not drop 

air supplies to Daraya in the Damascus suburbs? We should urge 

the United Nations and we should urge the International ComVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
5 

mittee of the Red Cross to speak more directly and to speak more 

publicly about who exactly is blocking aid convoys. No more passive 

tense. 

I have to say here Jan Eglund’s remarks—Jan Eglund from the 

United Nations—about the Daraya aid convoys and the Syrian 

Government blockage—his remarks were a welcomed departure in 

terms of directly fingering who is responsible on the ground. 

Senator Corker, you asked what would bring the opposition back 

to the table. Getting humanitarian aid into communities that have 

been besieged for years would be a huge step in that direction. 

Let me just say a few things about the refugees. Jordan and Turkey, countries that have done a very great deal, are blocking access. There are 50,000 people stranded on the Jordanian-Syrian 

border right now. Those two countries, Jordan and Turkey, need to 

open up their borders as international humanitarian or law requires of them. 

But we cannot demand more without doing more ourselves. The 

United States should accept more Syrian refugees. The administration is at great risk of not meeting even its relatively small target 

of 10,000 Syrian refugees to be admitted this year, and we should 

be aiming much, much higher. The screening processes for Syrian 

refugees are very thorough. They are very labor-intensive. And we 

need more resources to be devoted to that task. 

Let me conclude my remarks there, Senator. Thank you again for 

the invitation this morning. 

[Ambassador Ford’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. FORD

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Cardin, other distinguished members of 

the Committee, 

Thank you for the invitation to speak before the committee today about what new 

steps can be taken to mitigate the crisis in Syria. It is an honor to appear before 

you again. 

There is not much we the United States can do now to mitigate the crisis in Syria 

quickly. The fighting is too entrenched and bitterly sectarian; both the Syrian government and the armed opposition seek military victory instead of preparing their 

own ranks for tough, mutual compromises. Foreign nations are deeply involved—far 

more deeply than the United States—and they are committed to winning the conflict militarily. There is no magic American bullet. 

This is not to say there are not useful things the United States can and should 

do, but we are well past the point of a clearly identifiable path out of the conflict. 

Today in Vienna there was another meeting of the International Syria Support 

Group and renewed calls for a cessation of hostilities. Last January and February 

I was highly skeptical that efforts to broker a cessation of fighting would achieve 

much. In fact, the February 27 brought a significant reduction in violence for some 

weeks—longer than many observers, myself included, thought possible. 

But it did break down, badly. Aleppo, the Damascus surburbs, Lattakia province, 

Idlib province, Homs province, Hama province all are witness to that. The structural 

problem undermining an enduring cessation is the lack of agreed mechanisms to (1) 

monitor violations and (2) impose penalities on those determined responsible for violations. Indeed, it is not clear that American officials have a very clear understanding of which groups are operating in specific locations as they shift regularly 

in the course of the fighting. 

I will add here that without greater military pressure on the Syrian government 

it will not negotiate a compromise political settlement. The difference in tone between President Assad’s public remarks of late last July, when he was sober about 

defeats, and his upbeat tone in public remarks this spring after the Russian intervention are striking. The Russian intervention thus hindered prospects of a negotiated deal. The United States, meanwhile, lacks leverage with the armed opposition 

because it—and its regional backers—view us as inconsistent at best. I don’t know 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
6 

if our policy on the armed opposition in the remaining time of the Obama administration will change. I only know the result the policy has had on the ground. 

There are steps the administration might be convinced to take now to mitigate 

some parts of the Syrian tragedy. They would help us from the national security 

standpoint—especially in terms of undermining extremist recruiting in Syria—and 

they would address the horrible humanitarian situation. 

These steps include: 

• Taking more Syrian refugees. The screening process is thorough but labor intensive. It needs greater resources. So far, the U.S. has admitted only about 

1,800 this fiscal year when the administration’s goal is 10,000 by the end of 

September. As fantastic as it sounds, we should be aiming to take 100,000 but 

without far more resources this will not be possible. 

• Pressing regional states such as Turkey and Jordan to keep borders open to refugees, as international humanitarian law requires. 

Both countries of course do much to help Syrian refugees, but there are reportedly 50,000 people trapped on the Syrian-Jordanian border now in the 

harsh conditions of early summer. Turkish border guards have shot at refugees 

attempting to cross into Turkey on occasion. We should urge such actions to 

stop. 

Likewise there are modest steps we could do to better press for access by humanitarian aid providers to civilians in communities under siege by both government and 

opposition in Syria. 

These steps include: 

• Raising specific instances of aid access denial—whether by the Syrian government or opposition fighters—in the Security Council with a view to discussing 

the possibility of Chapter VII action. 

The Russians have voted for UN resolutions such as 2254 that call for humanitarian access, and when the Syrian government blocks aid convoys, as it 

did in Daraya last week, the Russians should not be given a pass. 

• Pressing Russia and Iran, and through them the Syrian government, to allow 

air drops to besieged communities in suburban Damascus just as there have 

been UN air drops to Deir Zour, an eastern Syrian city controlled by the Syrian 

Government and besieged by Islamic State forces. 

• Press the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross to be explicit, 

publicly, about which groups are responsible for blocking aid convoys. 

Only when combatants sense they will suffer retaliation of some sort will they 

change their behaviors. The absence of agreed monitors that I mentioned before 

makes the role of the UN and ICRC all the more important. In the past, they 

have preferred discretion, but clearly that discretion is paying marginal returns 

at best. The more forthright comments from Jan Egeland of the UN last week 

after the convoy to Daraya was stopped was a good step in this direction. 

Looking longer term, Syria’s unity may be impossible to restore. Especially if 

there is a durable cessation of hostilities but no progress on a compromise political 

deal, Syria could end up de facto partitioned even if no Syrian of any political stripe 

is now demanding this. 

Partition is not a particularly good outcome for the United States. 

In such a scenario: 

• It is doubtful that large numbers of fighters from either the government or the 

Syrian opposition would reach across lines and cooperate against the Islamic 

State. It will thus make our efforts against ISIS harder; 

• Reconstruction of Syria will certainly be far harder and that in turn means that 

while refugee flows might subside, relatively few of the 4.8 million outside the 

country will be able to go home. 

• Polling of young people in the region suggests that unemployment is a big driver in extremist recruitment which again suggests that moribund reconstruction 

will pose a national security problem for us and our allies. 

There are Syrian efforts to reach across bitter ethnic and religious divides and 

they merit our support; they are modest in size and won’t fix Syria’s crisis quickly 

but they may lay groundwork that formal negotiations might utilize later. It is a 

small investment and includes: 

• Encouraging more off-line, informal meetings between Syrians in track two formats and direct discussions under the auspices of international NGOs or senior 

world statesmen; 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
7 

It would be especially useful to encourage conversations between Syrian 

women from opposing camps, although it may be hard to find empowered 

women from among the ranks of government supporters. 

• Encouraging greater participation from ethnic and religious minorities in offline discussions with opposition and pro-government persons. 

• Supporting efforts to build stronger civil society organizations in Syria so that 

they are stronger if the day after fighting ends ever comes. 

The White Helmets, for example, have done great work even if some members of 

that group are far from perfect. There are legal groups struggling to maintain elements of fair rule of law in areas outside government control that need support and 

health and organizations operating under horrendous circumstances struggling to 

keep the health care sector afloat. They need recognition and support. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Lindborg, before you start, our friends in pink—we have 

been incredibly courteous to you in every encounter in the hallway. 

And you are really disrespecting everyone here by making noises 

and clapping. And we all feel that disrespect. So I would just say 

please act like adults. Otherwise, you will leave the room. Okay? 

Ms. Lindborg? 

STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin 

and distinguished members of the committee, I also thank you for 

the opportunity to testify today on the current situation in Syria 

and steps that could be taken now to mitigate the impact of the 

crisis. 

And I will not repeat the grim litany of statistics. Senator 

Cardin, you mentioned some of them, the statistics that really underscore the immensity of the human suffering that has accompanied this conflict, including displacement, death, and widespread 

crimes against humanity. We have seen use of starvation as a 

weapon. We have seen deliberate targeting of religious and ethnic 

groups and deliberate targeting of medical personnel. 

I have full testimony in the record. Let me focus today on a few 

key points. 

The first is that it is imperative to continue the lifesaving humanitarian assistance that has saved countless lives since the beginning of this crisis. The international humanitarian community 

has mobilized to provide this assistance, and with your important 

support, Senators, the U.S. Government has led the way, led the 

way with the provision of $5.1 billion over the course of the crisis. 

At the same time, inside Syria, provision of critical assistance is 

persistently hampered by complexities, by great danger, by operating while a regime continues to conduct a ruthless bombing campaign, including the deliberate targeting of civilians. 

We have also had the rise of ISIS, which has led to a capture 

of large swaths of territory where access is completely denied, and 

the many different armed factions, including the government, that 

have made crossing of multiple lines of control a daily arduous and 

dangerous undertaking by very heroic aid workers. Access to those 

in need has consistently been difficult or denied despite repeated 

passage unanimously of U.N. Security Council resolutions going 

back to 2014 that demand all parties allow delivery of assistance 

and respect the neutrality of medical assistance. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
8 

So even though this is critically important, the international mobilization and continuing heroic aid efforts, humanitarian action is 

at best a stop gap. So secondly, the most important is that we stop 

the bloodshed, that we prioritize a cessation of hostilities or, better 

yet, a full-on ceasefire. In February, we saw the cessation of hostilities that was negotiated by the international Syrian support 

group almost miraculously hold for nearly 7 weeks. From late February through early March, we saw the humanitarian community 

able to make important progress. They were able to reach 10 of 18 

communities under siege both through convoys and airdrops. Compared with October to December of last year where only 3 percent 

of the population was reached, during this 7 weeks cessation of 

hostilities, the humanitarian community reached 52 percent of besieged communities. There are some estimates that violence decreased up to 90 percent during this period, which shows you the 

importance that these kinds of cessations can make to suffering 

and war-torn communities. 

We know that by mid-April, this tenuous agreement began to fall 

apart. Access is now again severely reduced. Negotiations for access 

are again difficult and uncertain with all sides of the conflict. 

We also know that the regime bombing campaign never really 

ceased. In April, Syrian regime forces rapidly escalated attacks in 

and around Aleppo and Homs. 

Third, we have to recognize that this is a generational crisis and 

sharply shift our assistance away from a short-term model, especially to the refugees to one that emphasizes long-term resilience 

and development. The 4.8 million refugees who fled Syria have 

overwhelmed the financial, social, and economic systems of the 

whole region. They have threatened stability in Europe. We have 

already seen significant progress with efforts to shift from shortterm emergency assistance to addressing the long-term reality of 

the crisis, including new host country resilience strategies, new 

World Bank financing mechanisms, and admirable efforts within 

the U.S. Government to combine relief and development. And, Senators, your support on this forward movement is critical into the 

future to ensure longer-term, more flexible funding that enables us 

to address the developmental issues and the roots of this crisis in 

Syria and regionally. 

Fourth, we must relentlessly focus on the youth of Syria. This is 

the future of the country and of the region. They are growing up 

in conflict ripped from their families, from communities, and any 

dream of a future. We must relentlessly focus on providing the 

kinds of jobs, education, and opportunities for their voice to be 

heard so that they can be a part of a peaceful future. We must 

keep them from being a lost generation or, even worse, a dangerous 

generation. 

Finally, we have to invest now in peace and reconciliation at the 

community level and in civil society. After 5 years of war, we are 

seeing Syrian communities splintered into a multitude of factions. 

Even if peace is negotiated in Vienna tomorrow, the wounds of the 

Syrians will take generations to heal. So we need to help now the 

Syrians begin to rebuild the social cohesion that has been ripped 

apart by the conflict both within the refugee communities and, 

where possible, on the ground inside Syria. Peace will have to be 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
9 

1The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and not the U.S. Institute 

of Peace. 2The Syrian Center for Policy Research published a report that estimated deaths at 470,000 

through 2015. UN Special Envoy de Mistura made a personal estimate of 400,000 killed on April 

28, 2016. 3 UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service: https://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emergemergencyDetails&appealID=1133 

built from the ground up with continuous and reliable support to 

civil society, to women, and minorities. 

Thank you, Senators, for your continued focus and attention to 

this issue. I look forward to your questions. 

[Ms. Lindborg’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG1

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the current situation 

in Syria and steps that can be taken to help mitigate the crisis. 

I testify before you today as the president of the United States Institute of Peace 

(USIP), although the views expressed here are my own. USIP was established by 

Congress over 30 years ago as an independent, national institute dedicated to the 

proposition that peace is possible, practical and essential to our national and global 

security. It engages directly in conflict zones and provides tools, analysis, training, 

education and resources to those working for peace. 

UNABATED HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SYRIA

The numbers associated with the Syrian crisis have become a grim litany of steadily increasing statistics throughout the past five years. Currently, the UN estimates 

11.3 million Syrians are displaced, which is roughly equivalent to all the residents 

of Ohio being forced from their homes. Of those, 6.5 million are displaced within 

Syria and another 4.8 million have fled the country as refugees. Overall, 13.5 million Syrians are in need of humanitarian assistance and of those, 4.6 million live 

in areas that are hard to reach. Grimmest of all is the climbing death figure, now 

believed by some to be between 400,000 and 470,000 deaths.2

For more than five years the Syrian conflict has crossed the threshold of mass 

atrocities, featuring widespread crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 

by the state security forces, affiliated groups, and opposition movements, including 

the use of chemical weapons and the intentional targeting of religious groups. The 

Syrian-American Medical Society has documented 161 chemical weapon attacks 

leading to the deaths of 1,491 people and more than 14,000 injuries. Additionally, 

an estimated 488,000 people live in besieged areas where they are unable to receive 

food or basic medical care, leading the UN Secretary-General to accuse all parties 

of using starvation as a weapon of war. 

THE GLOBAL RESPONSE

Since the beginning of this crisis, the global community has mobilized to provide 

critical humanitarian assistance. With your important support, Senators, the U.S. 

government has led the way by providing $5.1 billion over the course of this crisis. 

However, inside Syria, provision of critical assistance has been persistently hampered by the complexities and extreme danger of responding to needs in this crisis. 

The regime has conducted a ruthless bombing campaign, including the deliberate 

targeting of civilians and specifically medical personnel and facilities. The rise of 

ISIS has led to its capture of large swaths of territory where humanitarian access 

is extremely limited, and the many different armed actors have made the crossing 

of multiple lines of control an arduous, dangerous and uncertain undertaking by heroic aid workers. 

The Syrian crisis has helped drive a steep increase in global humanitarian need 

that has overwhelmed the international system and led to significant funding shortfalls globally, despite historic levels of funds raised. For 2016, the UN reports only 

23% coverage of the $4.55 billion requested for humanitarian and regional response 

needs.3

In February, 2014, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2139, which demanded that ‘‘all parties allow delivery of humanitarian asVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
10 

4 ISSG Humanitarian Task Force briefing April 28, 2016. 

sistance, cease depriving civilians of food and medicine indispensable to their survival, and enable the rapid, safe and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who wish 

to leave.’’ It demanded that ‘‘all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality 

and facilitate free passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment and transport.’’ However, despite repeatedly reaffirming these convictions in subsequent 

unanimously passed UN resolutions, access to hard-to-reach and besieged populations remained difficult or impossible, with terrible reports of malnourishment and 

outright starvation. 

Finally, in February of this year, the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), 

co-chaired by the U.S. and Russia, managed to negotiate a Cessation of Hostilities 

(COS) that miraculously managed to hold for nearly seven weeks. From late February through early March, the humanitarian community was able to make important progress in reaching ten of the 18 communities under siege, both through 63 

convoys bringing life-saving food, medical supplies and treatment and 22 airdrops 

by the World Food Program. Humanitarian assistance reached just 3% (10,500 of 

393,700) besieged between October and December 2015, but with the Cessation of 

Hostilities in place, humanitarian aid reached 52% (255,250 of 486,700) of those in 

besieged communities between January and April 2016.4 Some estimates indicate 

that violence decreased by 90 percent during the cessation, bringing a much needed 

respite to war-torn communities. 

However, by mid-April, the tenuous Cessation of Hostilities began to fall apart. 

Humanitarian access has once again been severely reduced, with negotiations for access again difficult and uncertain. The regime bombing campaign never fully ceased, 

and in April, Syrian regime forces rapidly escalated attacks in and around Aleppo 

and Homs, including the destruction of two of the few remaining hospitals in Aleppo. The Syrian Network for Human Rights reports that in March and April, Syrian 

government forces killed 1,100 civilians, ISIS killed 165 and opposition forces killed 

170. 

As the ISSG ministerial reconvenes today in Vienna, most urgent is the recommitment of all parties to pressure each of the warring parties to respect the Cessation 

of Hostilities in an effort to stop the killing and enable critical assistance to reach 

those most in need. 

REGIONAL SPILLOVER

Syrians fleeing the war have helped push global displacement to the historic high 

of 60 million people worldwide who have been forced from their homes by violence. 

An estimated 4.8 million Syrian refugees have fled their country, overwhelmed 

neighboring countries and now spilling onto Europeans shores, triggering a secondary crisis within Europe. 

The impact of this outflow on the region is enormous. Basic infrastructure—water, 

electricity, schools, hospitals—have been stressed to the breaking point. Economic 

and social pressures are mounting as countries cope with the influx of Syrians. 

In Lebanon, which is hosting an estimated 1.07 million Syrian refugees, nearly 

one in four people is now Syrian. (If one in four Americans were a refugee, the 

United States would face the unimaginable equivalent of hosting the populations of 

California, Texas and Illinois combined.) This influx has increased tensions among 

Lebanon’s own communal groups. Since 2011, it has reduced the country’s economic 

growth to the 1-2% range. Syrian refugees have increased the labor supply but also 

have pushed more Lebanese into the ranks of the unemployed. This crisis, along 

with Lebanon’s chronic debt crisis, political paralysis, and declining revenue, has 

drastically limited the government’s ability to invest in infrastructure improvements, such as water, electricity, and transportation. 

Similarly, Jordan struggles to cope with more than 628,000 Syrian refugees. Jordan already suffers from an insufficient supply of natural resources, especially 

water and energy. Coupled with chronic high rates of poverty, unemployment and 

underemployment, this influx of refugees places immense stress on one of the region’s poorest countries. The World Bank estimates that Jordan has lost more than 

$2.5 billion a year since the beginning of the Syria conflict. This amounts to 6% of 

its GDP, and one-fourth of the government’s annual revenues. 

Even amid its own war, Iraq also is receiving Syrian refugees. The United Nations estimates that more than 246,000 Syrian refugees have entered Iraq to escape 

the Syrian civil war. These refugees join nearly four million internally displaced 

Iraqis, adding to the enormous stress on the social infrastructure of a state already 

suffering from its own war. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
11 

Five years ago, there were hopes that changes in the region would lead to more 

equitable, inclusive growth, with an emphasis on creating more jobs for MENA’s legions of young unemployed. Instead, the reverse has happened, with the first four 

years of the Syrian war costing the region as much as $35 billion (measured in 2007 

prices) in lost output or foregone growth. 

The conflict in Syria has had a profound impact on the lives of average citizens 

throughout the region. In many cases, towns have doubled or tripled in size; housing 

prices have increased, schools are operating at double shift, and communities—already poor themselves—are stretched to accommodate a refugee population that 

continues to expand. Estimates are that per capita incomes for many Turks, Egyptians, and Jordanians are 1.5% lower now than they would have been without the 

Syrian conflict, and by 1.1% for many Lebanese. 

RETHINKING REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Importantly, the refugee crisis has accelerated a rethinking of how assistance is 

provided, with increased focus and action on responding to the protracted reality of 

this crisis instead of treating it as a short term conflict. Given the utter enormity 

of the social, physical and economic destruction inside Syria, it will be decades before people are fully able to return home even once a peace agreement is reached. 

While there is still much to do better and differently, there are useful if still nascent 

changes in how the international community provides assistance. For example, the 

UN has worked with Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt to develop a regional 

refugee and resilience plan as well as individual country strategies with the goal 

of forging a much closer link between relief and development efforts. Additionally, 

efforts have included an increased focus on: 

• Building resilience, with greater attention to education, jobs, psychosocial and 

social cohesion within both refugee and host communities; 

• Addressing potential conflict between refugee and host communities through 

dialogue, mediation and targeted initiatives, including a recognition of the importance of including host communities, often poor themselves, in any assistance programs; 

• Enabling local initiatives and local government and civil society actors to have 

a greater role and voice in assistance programs; 

• Financing to support host countries, including a new World Bank-led MENA financing initiative that provide new concessional loans to Lebanon and Jordan 

at rates not previously available to them as Middle Income Countries. New 

funding just announced provides $100 million for Jordan to create 100,000 jobs 

for Jordanians and Syrians, while another $100 million for Lebanon focuses on 

education for both Lebanese and Syrians. 

• Providing education and livelihoods: Jordan has announced temporary work 

permits for Syrians; many schools in Jordan have gone to double shifts, and 

there is progress in enabling Syrians to attend school in Jordan. 

FOCUS ON YOUTH

Addressing the youth of Syria may be the most important challenge as an entire 

generation is now growing up torn from families, homes and dreams. UNICEF reports that the conflict is affecting 8.4 million children more than 80 percent of all 

Syrian children either within the country or as refugees. Approximately 3.7 million 

Syrian children have been born since the conflict began in 2011, including over 

300,000 children who have been born as refugees. Without a birth certificate, one 

of the main means of determining citizenship, these children risk becoming stateless 

in the future, adding to their risk. Children are left without protection, especially 

the more than 15,000 unaccompanied or separated children who have left Syria. 

Most of all, there is tremendous urgency to ensure education is available, with reports noting more than 2.8 million Syrian children are not attending school. Young 

people who languish in refugee camps or live on the margins in the slums of host 

countries risk growing up untrained, unskilled, and uneducated. These children and 

youth, many of them unmoored from family, culture and community, are vulnerable 

to predatory employers, the allure of violent extremists groups, transnational criminal organizations, or potential victims of human trafficking. 

Despite significant efforts to mobilize action to ensure ‘‘No Lost Generation’’ of 

Syrians, persistent funding shortfalls and tremendous challenges remain. In the absence of concerted action, we risk a new generation of youth without hope and potentially poised to continue cycles of conflict. Instead it is imperative to focus on proVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
12 

grams that enable youth to have opportunities, be heard and have a chance to contribute to a more hopeful future. This includes: 

• Engaging youth from refugee communities in efforts that enable them to resist 

the lure of radical ideology, including consistent but discreet support to moderate religious leaders in the region who may engage youth as part of interfaith 

dialogues and counter radicalization efforts. 

• Establish mechanisms to issue children born while displaced or as refugees 

some form of birth certification and documentation. 

• Despite some progress on enabling refugee children to attend school, a full scale 

concerted effort is needed to ensure that Syrian children can attend school, and 

importantly, that high-school and college students can complete studies that 

have been interrupted by war. 

• Increase the focus on enabling youth to find livelihoods and jobs, with complementary help for youth of host countries. 

WORLD HUMANITARIAN SUMMIT

Next week, the first World Humanitarian Summit will convene in Istanbul, with 

governments and civil society working to map out a new approach for humanitarian 

action at a time of unprecedented need. Global humanitarian assistance has shifted 

over the last decade from primarily serving those affected by natural disaster. Now 

80% of assistance is going to those affected by violent conflict. Conflict has been 

identified by the UN as the ‘‘greatest global threat to development.’’ The Syrian humanitarian crisis has dramatically sharpened the urgency to reconsider some of the 

fundamental approaches to humanitarian assistance. 

The World Humanitarian Summit will aim to expand the number of donors helping to meet the global burden of humanitarian need. It will seek to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian delivery; will focus on building resilience 

and closing the gap with development; and most importantly, will deliver an urgent 

call to action on shrinking the need. 

As the Syrian crisis illustrates, all too often, humanitarian action becomes the 

focus in the absence of real solutions moving forward. At the Summit, there will be 

a call to rally the missing political will to end these protracted conflicts that wreak 

generational havoc. 

CONCLUSION

Today the ISSG reconvenes in Vienna, with the hopes of reinvigorating the cessation of hostilities. In the absence of a longer term solution, an agreement to 

staunch the violence is paramount. In the meantime, critical policies for the U.S. 

government include: 

Continued life-saving support: The U.S. government leadership and support has been critical; it is imperative that humanitarian support continues 

to ensure life-saving assistance is available for those most in need. 

Focus on Resilience: The U.S. government leadership and support is vital 

for a wide range of changes that could enable smarter, more effective and 

more efficient assistance. This effort includes more flexible funding that enables greater support for local actors, greater ability to tailor response to 

needs on the ground and an increased ability to address relief and development needs as part of one response. It also includes support for the new 

World Bank initiatives that support middle income countries struggling to 

support an overwhelming refugee burden. 

Focus on building peace and reconciliation at the community level: Finally, we know that even if peace is negotiated in Vienna tomorrow, the 

wounds of Syrians will take generations to heal. We need to focus now on 

investing in ways to rebuild social cohesion both within refugee communities and where access is possible, inside Syria. My own institution, USIP, 

has piloted some of this work inside Syria by gathering religious and tribal 

leaders, ethnic Arabs and Kurds from a rural northeastern district last year 

for talks that halted a rise in local communal tensions, let displaced families return home and re-opened a local road critical to normal commerce. 

This work helps lay the foundation for moderate local leadership and cooperation that are essential for building Syria’s future stability. It need not, 

indeed should not, wait for an end to hostilities. 

Thank you, Senators, for your continued focus and attention to this critical issue. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
13 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Wittes? 

STATEMENT OF DR. TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, DIRECTOR 

AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, 

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Dr. WITTES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, 

committee members. I appreciate the invitation to appear before 

you. 

And let me begin by emphasizing, as I always do, that I represent only myself before you today. The Brookings Institution does 

not take institutional positions on policy issues. 

When I last testified before this committee regarding Syria, it 

was April 2012, and I expressed then a concern that American reticence to act to shape the emergent civil war risked enabling an unbridled escalation of the conflict. 

The administration’s initial read of the Syrian conflict as holding 

only narrow implications for American interests was a failure to 

learn the lessons of the post-Cold War period by recognizing the 

risk that Syria’s civil war could spill over in ways that directly implicated American interests. 

Unfortunately, the realistic policy options available to the United 

States have narrowed considerably since 2012, and yet, the Syrian 

civil war has direct and dire consequences today not just for regional order but for international security. This reality, combined 

with the tremendous human suffering this war generates every 

day, drives two clear imperatives for U.S. policy: to intensify efforts 

to contain the destabilizing spillover and to seek an end to the conflict as soon as possible. 

But we must be realistic about what steps will and will not end 

the Syrian conflict. I believe that absent a change in the balance 

of power on the ground, diplomacy alone is unlikely to end the war. 

But I certainly agree with diplomatic efforts to advance a countrywide cessation of hostilities and advance a vision for a political settlement. A full-scale ceasefire could create more space for political 

bargaining and in the meantime reduce human suffering. 

Right now, however, the Assad government and its patrons in 

Tehran and Moscow have no interest in a sustained ceasefire because the battleground dynamics continue to shift in their favor. 

They have used the partial ceasefires of the past weeks to consolidate territorial gains from opposition forces and to further weaken 

those forces through continued air attacks. Without agreement 

amongst the various governments around the table in Vienna as to 

which fighting groups constitute terrorists, a ceasefire will inevitably disadvantage opposition factions as the Assad regime targets 

them in the name of counterterrorism. This will likewise advantage 

the most extreme among the rebel factions, as well as jihadi groups 

like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. 

In the ongoing diplomacy over how the conflict ends and what 

political settlement results, there are two issues on which the parties involved in the Vienna takes demonstrate sharp disagreement 

and about which the United States needs to advance clear views. 

The first is a disagreement over the primacy of preserving the 

central Syrian Government, even if it remains headed by Bashar 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
14 

al-Assad. It is understandable to desire the preservation of Syrian 

Government institutions, to want a central government to work 

with on counterterrorism and postwar reconstruction. But there is 

an embedded assumption here that any Syrian Government based 

in Damascus will exercise meaningful control over most or all of 

Syria’s territory when the war ends. I think that assumption is 

faulty. 

The degree of displacement, the extent of destruction, the hardening of sectarian and ethnic divisions mean that local communities will end up being the primary providers of order, and it is 

local order, more than a central government, that will enable communities to resist ISIS infiltration. So countries concerned with effective governance in Syria as a bulwark against extremism need 

to recognize and value the importance of local governance. 

The second major issue under contention is the role that Iran 

will play in a post-conflict Syria. Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in Syria and the region as a whole are a concern that unites 

all of America’s partners in the region and a major concern for 

Washington as well. Any political settlement that institutionalizes 

that role will increase Iran’s ability to threaten American allies and 

American interests. 

A second major priority for American policy is stepped-up efforts 

to mitigate the destabilizing consequences of the war and, while we 

work on a diplomatic solution, to prepare for the long-term, widescale effort needed for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. 

Let me make just one point on this issue. 

I think too often in discussing Syria we posit a choice between 

working with the central government and working with unsavory 

non-state actors. And there is an obvious additional option which 

is already in play that deserves greater emphasis. That is empowering and engaging local municipalities, local business sectors, local 

civil society, other actors who exist in territory not under either extremist or regime control and who have an obvious stake in the 

success of their communities. These are the ones who will manage 

differences, who will mitigate the reemergence of conflict, who will 

deal with the consequences of transitional justice, who will resist 

terrorist infiltration. USAID and its implementing partners I think 

have been very creative in developing programs to engage these 

local communities and this work deserves robust support from Congress. 

One final note on the refugee crisis. In addition to associating 

myself with the comments of my colleagues, I wanted to let you 

know that The Brookings Institution in the middle of next month 

will convene a high-level gathering of regional, European, and 

American leaders to develop new responses, more robust forms of 

cooperation to meet this global challenge. And I look forward to reporting to you on our findings. 

Thank you. 

[Dr. Wittes’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cardin, for the invitation to appear before 

you today. I’d like to request that my full statement be entered into the record, and 

I’ll give you the highlight reel. And let me begin by emphasizing, as always, that 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
15 

I represent only myself before you today—the Brookings Institution does not take 

institutional positions on policy issues. 

Opportunities Lost 

When I last testified before this committee regarding Syria, in April 2012, I expressed my concern that American reticence to act to shape the emergent civil war 

and the involvement of regional powers in it risked enabling an unbridled escalation 

of the conflict. I suggested then that uncontrolled escalation could entrench sectarian violence, empower radicals, destabilize the neighborhood, and generate wide 

human suffering. While the Obama Administration has taken incremental steps 

over the last four years to try and shape both the battlefield and the context for 

diplomacy, those steps have proved too little and too late to alter the conflict’s fundamental dynamics. 

President Obama’s initial read of the Syrian conflict as holding only narrow implications for American interests was a signal failure to learn the lessons of the postCold War period, and the civil wars of the 1990s, by recognizing the risk that Syria’s 

civil war could spill over in ways that directly implicated U.S. interests. The experience of the 1990s clearly suggested how a neglected civil war offered easy opportunities for a violent jihadist movement—just as the Afghanistan war did for the 

Taliban in the mid-1990s—and how large-scale refugee flows would destabilize Syria’s neighbors, including key U.S. security partners like Jordan and Turkey. And as 

we now know, ISIS used the security and governance vacuums created by the Syrian civil war to consolidate a territorial and financial base that the United States 

has been seeking since late 2014, with limited success, to undermine. 

Unfortunately, the realistic policy options available to the United States have narrowed considerably since 2012, the violence is entrenched, the spillover is creating 

serious challenges for the neighborhood and for Europe, and the number of actors 

engaged directly in the Syrian conflict has proliferated. All of this means that the 

continuation of the Syrian civil war has direct and dire consequences today, not just 

for regional order, but for international security. This reality, combined with the tremendous human suffering this war generates every day, drives two clear imperatives for U.S. policy: to intensify efforts to contain the spillover and misery, and to 

seek an end to the conflict as soon as possible. 

Ending the War 

We must be realistic, however, about what steps will, and will not, end the Syrian 

conflict. Recently, some policy experts have suggested that, in the name of advancing great-power concord to end the war, the United States should relax its view that 

Bashar al-Assad’s departure from power is a requisite for any political settlement. 

This view rests on the assumption that Russia will not bend in its insistence on 

Assad’s remaining in place, and on the assumption that a U.S.-Russian agreement 

on leaving Assad in place would override the preferences of those fighting on the 

ground to remove him. Both of these premises, in my view, are incorrect. 

We must therefore understand clearly the interests and imperatives driving the 

major players in this conflict, and we must understand, too, that the battlefield dynamics will heavily condition the prospects of any political settlement. Ending the 

bloody war in Bosnia in the 1990s involved getting the major external powers with 

stakes in the outcome—the United States, the Europeans, and Russia—to agree on 

basic outlines of a settlement and impose it on the parties. But imposing it on the 

parties required a shift in the balance of power on the battlefield, brought about 

by Croat military victories and ultimately a NATO bombing campaign. Bosnia also 

required a large-scale, long-term United Nations presence to separate the factions 

and to enforce and implement the agreement. 

So I believe that, absent a change on the ground, diplomacy alone is unlikely to 

end the Syrian war—but I certainly agree with diplomatic efforts to advance a country-wide cessation of hostilities and advance a vision for a political settlement. A 

full-scale cease-fire could create more space for political bargaining, and in the 

meantime reduce human suffering and mitigate the spillover effects of the ongoing 

violence. Right now, however, the Assad government and its patrons in Tehran and 

Moscow have no interest in a sustained cease-fire, because the battleground dynamics continue to shift in their favor. They used the partial cease-fires of the past 

weeks to consolidate territorial gains from opposition forces and to further weaken 

those forces through continued air attacks. Without agreement amongst the various 

governments around the table as to which fighting groups constitute terrorist organizations, a ceasefire will inevitably disadvantage opposition factions as the Assad 

regime targets them in the name of counterterrorism. That will likewise advantage 

the most extreme among the rebel factions as well as jihadi groups like ISIS and 

Al Qaeda’s affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, who will all continue to use force to acquire 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
16 

and hold territory and to force their political opponents and inconvenient civilians 

off the field. 

Likewise, some suggest that the sectarian nature of the conflict, and the deep investment of regional powers in backing their preferred sides, mean that it is not 

possible to hasten an end to the war at all, and that it must be allowed to ‘‘burn 

itself out.’’ This policy option is infeasible for the United States, from moral, political, and security standpoints. The scale of death and destruction already, over nearly five years of war, should shame the conscience of the world. Those seeking to escape this misery deserve our succor, and those seeking to end the carnage deserve 

our support. And it is beyond question that Bashar al-Assad and his allies are the 

ones responsible for the vast majority of this death, destruction, and displacement. 

In political and security terms, the war’s spillover into neighboring countries and 

now into Europe can still get worse. Key states like Lebanon and Jordan are at risk 

of destabilization and/or extremist terrorism the longer the conflict goes on and the 

more of its consequences they must absorb. Turkey, as we know, has already suffered attacks by extremist groups. And the war has continued to be a powerful 

source of recruitment for extremists, drawing fighters and fellow travelers from 

around the world. ISIS and Al Qaeda feed on the civil conflict and the chaos on the 

ground is what gives them room to operate. It is indeed imperative that the United 

States remain engaged, and intensify its engagement as needed, to secure an end 

to the conflict as soon as possible. 

Understanding the Geopolitical Context 

In the ongoing diplomacy over how the conflict ends and what political settlement 

results, there are two issues on which the parties involved in the Vienna talks demonstrate sharp disagreement, and about which the United States needs to advance 

clear views. The first is a disagreement over the primacy of preserving the central 

Syrian government, currently headed by Assad. Russia, along with some regional 

actors (even some opponents of Assad), believe that the most important determinant 

structuring a political settlement must be the preservation of the Syrian central 

government, even if that means preserving Bashar al Assad in office. If Assad is 

ousted without an agreed-upon successor in place, they argue, then Syria will become a failed state like Libya, in which ISIS will have even more space to consolidate and operate, with dire consequences for regional and international security. It 

is this concern over state collapse and the desire for strong central authority that 

keeps Russia united with Iran behind Assad. 

It’s understandable to desire the preservation of Syrian government institutions 

as a bulwark against anarchy, and to want a central government in Syria with 

which to work on counterterrorism and postwar reconstruction. The problem with 

elevating this concern to a primary objective in negotiations is its embedded assumption that any Syrian government based in Damascus will be able to exercise 

meaningful control over most or all of Syria’s territory after rebels and government 

forces stop fighting one another. That’s a faulty assumption, for several reasons. 

First, it is extremely unlikely that we’ll see swift or effective demobilization and 

disarmament of sub-state fighting factions in favor of a unified Syrian military 

force. If the central government remains largely in the form and structure of Assad’s 

government, and even more so if Assad himself remains in power, it is hard to imagine rebel groups agreeing to put down their weapons and rely on security provided 

by the central government. Thus, local militias will remain important providers of 

local order and also important players in either defeating or enabling extremist 

groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda. 

Second, effective governance from Damascus is extremely difficult to imagine, 

much less implement. The degree of displacement, the extent of physical destruction, and the hardening of sectarian and ethnic divisions due to five years of brutal 

conflict (and decades of coercive rule before that) all present steep challenges to centralized rule. Those with resources and capacity within local communities will end 

up being the primary providers of order at the local level—and it is local order, more 

than a central government, that will enable communities to resist ISIS infiltration. 

Thus, countries concerned with having effective governance in Syria as a bulwark 

against extremists need to recognize the value and importance of local governance 

in any post-war scenario. 

Finally, there is the unalterable fact that Bashar al-Assad and his allies have 

slaughtered perhaps as many as 400,000 of Syria’s citizens; have used chemical 

weapons against civilians; have imprisoned and tortured thousands and displaced 

millions; and, through Assad’s own horrific decisions, have broken Syria’s government, the Syrian state, and the Syrian nation to bits. Those who demand his ouster 

as a prerequisite for ending the war are justified in their view that Assad does not 

have and will not have legitimacy to govern from a majority of Syrians, that his 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
17 

continued rule would be divisive and destructive of Syrian unity and security, and 

that he should instead face justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity. As 

a practical matter, and because of all this, many Syrian fighting factions on the 

ground and their supporters, are committed to Assad’s ouster. U.S.-Russian concurrence on setting that goal aside will not induce them to end their fight. The only 

way that might occur is if Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—who are committed 

to Assad’s ouster—relent on their demands and agree to curtail support to rebel factions who continue to fight. This is hard to imagine in the current circumstances. 

In other words, while preserving the Syrian state is a laudable goal, it will not 

alone achieve the objectives set by those who hold it out as the primary imperative 

in the political negotiations over the future of Syria. I would suggest that, while the 

fate of Bashar al Assad is not perhaps of primary concern from the perspective of 

U.S. interests, the United States should be pressing Russia and others involved in 

the talks to relax their fixation on Syria’s central government (and who runs it) as 

a counterterrorism goal, and to recognize that a significant degree of decentralization and international engagement with local actors inside Syria will be necessary 

to preserve the peace, to carry out reconstruction, and to defeat ISIS. Likewise, the 

Syrian opposition and those states demanding Assad’s ouster as a precondition for 

peace must recognize that they have even more to gain from insisting on decentralization and local autonomy than they do from Assad’s departure from power. 

They might even be able to trade their current demand for Assad’s immediate departure against robust assurances for empowerment of local authority, release of detainees and internationally guaranteed transitional justice. 

The second major issue under contention regarding a negotiated end to the Syrian 

war is the role that Iran will play in post-conflict Syria. Iran’s efforts to expand its 

infuence—in Syria and in the region as a whole—present a concern that unites all 

of the United States’s partners in the region, and should be a major concern for 

Washington as well. The gains made by the Assad regime (with Russian and Iranian help) over the past eight months enhance the disturbing prospect of a Syrian 

government remaining in power in Damascus that is dependent on Iranian funding, 

Iranian military support, and the importation of Iranian-backed militias. While the 

Russians are perhaps concerned more about the Syrian state as a bulwark against 

extremism, Iran is deeply committed to the survival of its Alawi client and the 

maintenance of Syria as a channel for Iranian support to Hizballah. And while some 

Sunni Arab states embrace the goal of preserving Syrian territorial integrity and 

the central government, all are troubled at the prospect that this government would 

be under the thumb of Tehran. Any political settlement that institutionalizes Iran’s 

overwhelming role in Syria will likewise increase Iran’s ability to impact to threaten 

Israel’s northern border, to destabilize Lebanese and perhaps also Jordanian politics, and to interfere with ongoing efforts to assuage the anxieties of Iraqi Sunnis 

and bring them back into alignment with the government in Baghdad. 

The rising likelihood of an Iranian-dominated Syria emerging from the war has 

induced a change in attitude toward the Syrian conflict by America’s closest regional 

partner, Israel. Israeli officials took a fairly ambivalent stance toward the civil war 

for several years, although they were always wary of the Syrian-Iranian alliance. 

But today, they judge Assad’s survival as possible only through effective Iranian suzerainty, putting their most powerful enemy right on their border. Iranian domination of post-conflict Syria would also likely spell an escalation in Iranian weapons 

transfers to Hizballah—and Israel cannot expect to have 100% success in preventing 

the provision of increasingly sophisticated rocket and missile technology to 

Hizballah. These and other types of support from Iran through Damascus could increase Hizballah’s capacity to wage asymmetric war against Israel, at great cost to 

Israel’s civilian population. Israeli observers are increasingly alarmed at this scenario, and Israeli officials now state clearly that, if faced with a choice, they’d prefer 

to confront ISIS than Iran across the Israeli-Syrian frontier. 

American diplomacy in Vienna must take greater account of the destabilizing implications of an Iranian-dominated Syrian government, even a rump government 

that does not control all of Syrian territory. A U.S. focus on constructing a political 

settlement that limits Iran’s influence in postwar Syria could induce greater coherence among American partners in Vienna currently divided over the fate of Assad; 

and it could prevent a situation in which the United States trades the threat of ISIS 

in Syria for the threat of Iranian-sponsored terrorism and subversion emanating 

from Syria. 

Al Qaeda and the Syrian conflict 

Al Qaeda’s affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra has particularly benefited from the war’s continuation, from the weakness and partiality of the ceasefires negotiated earlier this 

year, and from the inability of the U.S.-Russian diplomatic process to generate any 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
18 

progress toward a political transition. Shrewdly, Nusra has focused on building its 

reputation as the most consistent, and most effective, military opponent of the 

Assad regime, and on its readiness to cooperate with anti-Assad factions with whom 

it has other, ideological and political, disagreements. The failures of diplomacy feed 

Nusra’s strength and win it allies amongst more nationalist rebel factions. And 

while it’s tempting for American efforts to focus on rallying forces to defeat ISIS, 

our diplomats and decision makers must beware that leaning too far back on the 

issue of political transition for the sake of building an anti-ISIS coalition might just 

end up pushing more hardline opposition elements into the arms of a different extremist movement, one with demonstrated intent and capability to attack the 

United States. 

To summarize, it’s imperative that American diplomacy to produce a political settlement of the Syrian war be firmly focused achieving two goals crucial to the interests of the United States and its regional partners: first, enabling and institutionalizing local governance as a bulwark against ISIS (more than central government institutions), and second, establishing hard limits on Iran’s role in a post-conflict Syria 

and on its ability to use Syria as a conduit for support to Hizballah. 

Managing Spillover and Restoring Stability 

A second major priority for U.S. policy, in addition to this refocused diplomacy, 

must be stepped-up efforts to mitigate the destabilizing consequences of the Syrian 

war, no matter how long it goes on. And, while the United States continues to work 

through diplomacy and pressure to produce an end to the war, work must also begin 

now to prepare for the long-term and wide-scale effort needed for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. 

The scope of death, displacement and destruction threatens to rob Syria of the 

basic ingredients for social stability, regardless of what lines might be drawn at a 

negotiating table in Vienna. Without concerted effort to ameliorate the effects of this 

conflict for people on the ground, to rebuild social trust, and to nurture resilience 

within these battered communities against conflict and division, any peace settlement could quickly unravel the face of local security dilemmas and intercommunal 

tensions, as well as in light of the unaddressed scars and grievances of Assad’s brutality against the Syrian people. 

Meeting this challenge requires at least four lines of effort: 

• doing more to engage Syrians in building local governance and community resilience, especially skills and platforms for conflict resolution; 

• doing more to stabilize and secure frontline states, including support for integrating refugees into the economy and society; 

• helping more refugees create new lives far from the conflict zone, including 

much more resettlement in the United States; and 

• working diligently with regional partners to tamp down the sectarianism that 

both drives and is driven by the war, and that feeds extremist recruitment and 

violence. 

As we have seen, ISIS markets itself partly on the order it provides to local communities—a brutal order to be sure, but still a contrast with the chaos and insecurity of civil war. To counter ISIS effectively, we must help local communities with 

governance and service delivery. More can be done even now to put into place the 

ingredients for successful and sustainable conflict resolution for Syrians. These 

steps include enabling and encouraging Syrians displaced by the fighting, whether 

in neighboring countries or in areas of Syria not under ISIS or regime control, to 

engage in dialogue over, and planning for, their own communal future. Neighboring 

states accepting refugees have understandably sought to tamp down political discussion and debate within refugee camps, for example. But these refugee populations 

need to engage in dialogue to build the basis, in social trust, that will enable them 

to manage daily governance and resolve differences peacefully if and when they are 

no longer living under refugee agencies and host-government security services. 

These processes can also connect, over time, to negotiating efforts on a political 

transition in which the Syrian opposition is represented, yielding greater legitimacy 

and efficacy to that more formal political process. 

Too often, in discussing Syria, we posit a choice between working with the central 

government and working with unsavory non-state actors. There is an obvious additional option, already in play, that deserves greater emphasis: empowering and engaging local municipalities, local business sectors, local civil society, and other actors who exist in territory not under extremist or regime control and who have an 

obvious stake in the success of their own communities and their defense against coercion either from ISIS or from the Assad government. It is these local actors who 

will make or break the implementation of any political settlement, because they are 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
19 

the ones who will give it life and legitimacy. They are the ones who will help manage differences within their own communities and with their neighbors to avoid outbreaks of violence, and they are the ones who will lead the establishment of a new 

social compact to enable long-term stability in Syria. USAID and its implementing 

partners have been creative in developing programs to engage local communities 

and local governing institutions, and this work deserves robust, sustained support 

from Congress. 

The United States continues to lead in international support for refugee relief— 

but it lags woefully in refugee resettlement. Only about 1300 of the 10,000 Syrian 

refugees the Obama Administration promised to admit into the United States have 

been resettled here so far; and the United States can and should accept more. 

In addition, American policy efforts to address the refugee crisis must go beyond 

humanitarian relief and expanded resettlement. Working with European partners, 

the United States government can work to save lives along the transit routes for 

refugees fleeing the region, can support successful integration of refugees into European cities (again, working at the municipal level), and can do more to support social stabilization, livelihoods, and development for the large refugee communities in 

Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey and for the societies hosting them. 

On June 14 and 15th, the Brookings Institution will convene a high-level gathering of regional, European, and American leaders to develop new responses and 

more robust forms of cooperation to meet this global humanitarian crisis. I look forward to reporting back to you on our results. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Because of the topic and our outstanding witnesses, we have a 

full house, and I know we have other things that are going to be 

starting a little bit later. So I am going to ask Bertie to put 5 minutes on the clock instead of 7. 

And I would just ask the witnesses if you can get your point 

across concisely, I know everyone will appreciate it. But, again, 

thank you for being here and for your outstanding service to our 

country. 

I am going to reserve my time. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, I thank 

the witnesses. 

You all three said basically we have to find a negotiated way for 

Syria to move forward as a unified country with leaders that will 

respect all the communities, have the confidence of all the communities, that this is a civil war being waged by Syrians, and the only 

way to resolve it is for the Syrians to have confidence that a process moving forward can bring their country together. 

So what are the lessons learned from the ceasefire that did not 

hold? 

When Russia said they were going to leave, I do not think many 

of us believed that they would be leaving, and clearly they did not. 

We are not sure what Russia’s intents are, although we know that 

they want to be relevant in the Middle East and they see Syria as 

a country where they can exercise continuing influence. 

Iran is clearly involved here. And their motivations are much 

less understood from the point of view of a way that we can work 

with them and find a common ground to move forward in Syria. 

So what are the lessons that we have learned from the failed 

ceasefire that can help us in planning a strategy for peace talks 

that can really lead to a ceasefire and, as you point out, the urgency of delivering humanitarian assistance, which will also help 

reconciliation in the country? 

So what would you suggest, moving forward, we should do differently than we did in the last efforts in Vienna? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
20 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I would suggest one big lesson 

learned and then a couple of suggestions. 

The big lesson learned is that Russia either cannot or will not 

deliver major Syrian concessions even on something as simple as 

humanitarian aid access. 

Going forward, what I am looking for out of the discussions in 

Vienna today is whether or not there is, number one, an agreement 

among all of the people at that table in Vienna about a monitoring 

mechanism. Otherwise there is a lot of finger-pointing about who 

violated what cessation of hostilities detail. 

And the second I am looking for is an agreement among the 

countries at that table that whoever is determined to have violated 

the cessation of hostilities—there will be penalties for doing that. 

There were no penalties imposed at all. 

Senator CARDIN. What kind of penalties, sir? 

Ambassador FORD. It could be anything from allied states who 

are pumping in weapons to say we will stop if you continue to violate the ceasefire. It could be diplomatic pressure in terms of booting out an embassy or demanding publicly that that behavior must 

stop, and if not, there will be consequences. I imagine it would be 

graded over time if the violations continue. The group on the 

ground who has foreign friends would come under greater and 

greater pressure. But there are no penalties at all now. None. 

And so those would be the lessons I would take. 

Senator CARDIN. Iran. Do you want to comment as to whether 

Iran needs to be part of these discussions and how do we handle 

that participation by Iran in these peace talks when, at least to 

many of us, we think their major interest is to keep conflict brewing? 

Dr. WITTES. Thank you. Well, let me try to address that. 

I think that Iran, as I said, is the one issue that unites the 

United States and all of its partners around the table in Vienna. 

There are other issues on which they disagree. So I think that we 

need to keep that coalition strong. 

Iran’s primary objective in my view is not necessarily to keep the 

war going but to keep the Assad regime in power, to keep this 

Alawi regime in power. 

Senator CARDIN. That keeps the war going. 

Dr. WITTES. Yes, I agree. 

But they would, I think, settle for, if forced, even a rump Assad 

regime that did not maintain control over all of Syria because they 

need it as a conduit to Hezbollah and a strategic depth for 

Hezbollah. 

Senator CARDIN. My conversation with a lot of the players is that 

that will not bring peace to Syria. 

Dr. WITTES. I would certainly agree and it might not bring peace 

anywhere else in the region either. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Senator, I would just add that what also unites 

the parties at the table is the fact that chaos and conflict continues 

to benefit some of the armed extremist groups who are no positive 

benefit to any of the actors. So there is a united desire to take action in such a way that those groups are curtailed, number one. 

And number two is the longer this conflict rages on, the longer 

there is a shared terrible impact from the outflow of refugees and 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
21 

the destruction of the economies and the infrastructure regionally. 

So there is a shared interest in coming to some conclusion. 

Senator CARDIN. There is no question there are shared interests. 

The question is how do you overcome the individual issues that 

have blown up the process in the past. We recognize it is challenging. And I think you have offered—particularly having some 

degree of accountability, Mr. Ambassador, I thought was a good 

suggestion. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Perdue? 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. I have two brief questions. 

Dr. Wittes, you had mentioned earlier—and I want to come back 

to this. Merkle has asked that safe zones be discussed again with 

a potential of no-fly zone support and so forth. That did not seem 

to be very viable earlier when they were discussed. What would 

make that more workable today? 

I visited with refugees personally in Jordan, also in the Nizip 

camp near Gaziantep in Turkey, and also have seen them in the 

refugee pipeline up in Serbia. In my opinion, these people do not 

want to leave their country. They want to stay there, but obviously 

the conditions there are so bad, they have been forced to. 

I have one question about that in terms of—quickly, if you can 

respond to. Is it now possible, given the failure of this first attempt 

at cessation of hostilities—is it now not an opportunity to go back 

and revisit the safe zone opportunity? 

Dr. WITTES. If we see a cessation of hostilities as not only a way 

to reduce human suffering but also a way to work toward the end 

of conflict, then it is clearly preferable as a first step than safe 

zones. And I think that they are taking another go at it. I do not 

think they have given up yet. 

But if in fact those parties in Vienna cannot agree to a meaningful ceasefire, then I think pressure for safe zones will grow. And 

we have seen what the Europeans have done. Trying to restrict the 

flow through Turkey is only having limited impact. We see Syrians 

now going into north Africa to try and cross the Mediterranean and 

get into Europe that way. So they are searching for a solution to 

this problem. 

Senator PERDUE. The second question on Russia. You mentioned 

Russia earlier. It sure seems to me that they have a long-term interest in Syria, not Bashar al Assad. With what they have done in 

the airbase at Latakia and in the naval base at Tartus, they look 

like they are there permanently. This fits in very well with their 

strategy in Crimea as well. 

So what is the long-term role that they play? They certainly have 

not come to the realization and agreement that Bashar al Assad 

has to go. How do they play into where we go from here honestly? 

Dr. WITTES. You know, I think the administration has spent the 

last 4 years trying to persuade the Russians to shift their position 

in Syria without success. And that leads me to a similar conclusion 

to the one that Ambassador Ford gave in his testimony, which is 

that they are either unable or unwilling. And I am honestly not 

sure. It could be a bit of both because the Syrians also have very 

robust Iranian backing that is directed at saving Bashar al Assad. 

Now, for the Russians, it is about a place at the table. It is about 

having a state rather than state collapse because they believe that 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
22 

is what will enable Sunni extremism to migrate in their direction, 

as well as about preserving those assets that you described. So in 

theory, it is possible to arrive at a solution that meets their needs. 

I just do not see a lot of willingness on their part to move there 

in practice. 

Senator PERDUE. Ambassador, you mentioned several things you 

would have us do in terms of dealing with the refugees. What 

would have us do politically to encourage a ceasefire and really to 

move toward removal of Bashar al Assad, which is our position 

right now? And are we ever going to be willing to give up on that? 

I hope we will not. But what is our position now relative to the failure of the cessation of hostilities? What would be your recommendation right now in terms of our position vis-a-vis a renewed 

round of negotiations relative to a ceasefire? Or you mentioned the 

military side as well. But would you respond to that? 

Ambassador FORD. Very briefly, Senator. 

With respect to a cessation of hostilities, obviously the United 

States wants it. There are modalities I mentioned about accountability and penalizing people who are determined responsible for 

violations. 

The broader goal of solving the Syrian crisis—the American 

strategy has always been to get to a negotiated solution between 

Syrians. I think that makes sense, but we have never had tactics 

to achieve that strategy. And it is very clear to me that unless 

there is a great deal more military pressure on Bashar al Assad, 

he will not make substantial compromises. 

Senator PERDUE. And where would that pressure come from? 

Ambassador FORD. Well, the pressure needs to come from armed 

opposition groups on the ground. 

Let me give you an example of what I am talking about, Senator. 

In July of 2015, President Assad in a national speech in Syria said 

our forces are tired. We are having to withdraw from towns and 

cities that we do not want to withdraw from, but we have to because we do not have enough soldiers. People are not signing up 

for the army. They are running away from national service. They 

need to stay. His entire demeanor was very downbeat. 

Senator PERDUE. I am sorry to interrupt, but you know, you got 

the Kurdish YPG and the SOC have terrible relationships. I mean, 

where is this opposition going to really come from? 

Ambassador FORD. As I was saying, Senator, last July Assad 

himself was admitting that his forces were losing on the battlefield. 

Senator PERDUE. That was a year ago and they are still—— 

Ambassador FORD. Well, that was 9 months ago before the Russians intervened. 

After the Russian intervention, to me the logical thing—we were 

talking a moment ago about Iran, which has ground forces in 

Syria. In order to get them to negotiate, they will have to feel more 

pain. But I do not want American forces to do that. I think there 

are fighters on the ground that can do that. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey? 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Thank you all for your testimony. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
23 

I agree that 1,800 refugees being taken in by the United States 

this year from Syria is unacceptably low. We have a far greater responsibility to deal with the human suffering that has been created 

in that region. We are part of the creation of the problem. We have 

to be part of the relief valve to help these families. And so we 

thank you for that. 1,800 is just too low. 

So what I’d like to do is just follow up on what Senator Perdue 

was talking about and that is looking at this interaction between 

Russia and the United States, especially in light of these reports 

where Al Qaeda now is intending to move in more deeply into Syria 

to partner with Al Nusra and to declare a caliphate. No small moment in Syrian history if that does happen, creating a tension not 

only against Assad but simultaneously against ISIS, a really complicating problem. 

So if I could come back to you again, Ambassador Ford—and 

thank you for your service. Could we go to, again, this issue of Russia and the United States agreeing on a chapter 7 enforcement action so that we can create the space for humanitarian aid to go in, 

we could create some space where additional weaponry is not being 

introduced into that region, and that the United States and Russia 

can agree at the U.N. in Geneva—that that would be a pathway 

forward? What would it take for that kind of an agreement to be 

reached? 

Ambassador FORD. During my time in government, Senator Markey, the Russians were extremely averse to any kind of Chapter 7 

action against the Syrian Government. I would add that Iran is 

now sending in fighters directly, as well as weaponry. They are 

even organizing Shia to come from places like Iraq and Afghanistan to fight in Syria. And so it would have to be Chapter 7 not 

only against the Syrian Government but potentially against Iran. 

And I can imagine that that is going to be not easy for people in 

Moscow to swallow. 

Senator MARKEY. So in your opinion then that whole process just 

cannot come to anything because the Russians would be unwilling 

at any time to stand up and say that the Iranians as well must 

be bound by any restrictions that are placed on the transfer of humanitarian aid into these troubled areas and the maintenance of 

a ceasefire so that these people are not caught in the crossfire? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I am not aware of any American efforts in the past year to take humanitarian assistance issues to the 

United Nations Security Council and try to get an action under 

Chapter 7. And I think it would be useful to pin the Russians on 

that frankly. I think it would be very useful. I do not think we have 

tried it, but I would just caution you that I do not think the Russians are likely to cave very easily. 

Senator MARKEY. Even on humanitarian aid. 

Ambassador FORD. Even on humanitarian assistance. 

Senator MARKEY. Ms. Lindborg? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Senator, if I could just comment on that. Beginning in February 2014, there was the first of, I think, about four 

different resolutions passed on this issue, all but the Chapter 7 

provision. They have all had no teeth in them whatsoever. It has 

been a hard-fought but unanimous vote. You would not get it 

passed based on that experience if you tried to put any teeth into 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
24 

it. I think they walked it as far and as hard as they could and got 

repeated blocks. What we are seeing now is a possible alternative 

in the Vienna process that hopefully will take us further than what 

we have been able to do in the Security Council. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, I think that if the Iranians seem to feel 

that they are exempt from this process and they are a continuing 

and increasing problem in Syria, then unless the United States 

raises this issue in a formal way that puts Russia on the spot, then 

I am just afraid we are going to see again a repetition syndrome 

that escalates inside of Syria. 

So, Ambassador Ford, coming back to you again, would you recommend that the United States bring this in a much more focused 

way to the Russians as an issue that we force them to vote upon? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I would, and I say that with great 

respect to former colleagues because the amount of work that goes 

into taking an issue to the Security Council and pushing on a resolution with Chapter 7 sanctions—the amount of work is enormous. 

But I do think it is useful to force the Russians to publicly—publicly—either defend the Assad government’s actions blocking humanitarian access or to accept that there should be some Chapter 

7 measure against the Syrian Government and against any other 

group—— 

Senator MARKEY. So if it applied to Assad and the opposition 

groups, could Russia support it? 

Ambassador FORD. I do not think they would, Senator. 

Senator MARKEY. We have to press that question. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. I am going to let Senator Johnson go. 

The CHAIRMAN. He kind of came in first, but I will let you guys 

arm wrestle. 

Senator RUBIO. No, I am not going to arm wrestle. [Laughter.] 

Senator RUBIO. I think he has got to be somewhere. I do not have 

to be somewhere for a few more minutes. So go ahead. 

Senator JOHNSON. Sorry about that. 

How long have we been talking about a negotiated settlement? 

Ambassador Ford. 

Ambassador FORD. Since 2011. 

Senator JOHNSON. Is it not true that diplomacy follows facts on 

the ground? 

Ambassador FORD. Sometimes it can get out in front of facts on 

the ground, but facts on the ground will definitely influence diplomacy. 

Senator JOHNSON. So the fact on the ground is that Iran has 

gained strength. Correct? We do not know exactly how many billions have been injected into their economy and military, but they 

are gaining strength. Correct? 

Ambassador FORD. I would put it this way, Senator. There are 

more Iranians and Iranian-backed militias in Syria now than a 

year ago or 2 years ago. 

Senator JOHNSON. So Iran is gaining strength in Syria. 

Russia has, obviously, entered the war and certainly the opposition is weakening. Correct? 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
25 

Ambassador FORD. It is a stalemate for the most part, Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. The opposition certainly is not gaining 

strength. 

Ambassador FORD. Yes and no. But it is basically a stalemate, 

Senator. 

Senator JOHNSON. So how do you create any kind of pressure on 

either the Assad regime or Iran or Russia to make any concessions 

whatsoever in a negotiation? 

Ambassador FORD. As I said before, Assad himself was admitting 

defeats last July, and that is what brought the Russians in. So my 

question then would be is there no way to facilitate additional supplies to the armed opposition to get us back to where we were last 

July. 

Senator JOHNSON. Are we not deluding ourselves thinking that 

we can achieve some kind of negotiated settlement and some kind 

of ceasefire in Syria before Russia, Assad and Iran have achieved 

their aims? Why would they stop? 

Ambassador FORD. I think the Iranians in particular are a bit 

sensitive about their casualties. They try to keep the number of 

their direct forces down. That is why they are sending in Afghans 

and Iraqis. But they have taken a lot of losses among their officers 

in Syria, which is interesting. 

And I do not think the Russians are particularly attached to 

Assad. The question is are they willing to use any leverage to get 

a replacement, and I have not seen that willingness. 

Senator JOHNSON. I remember in testimony before this committee, the administration making the point that Russia is going 

to regret going into Syria. They are going to enter a quagmire 

there. This is going to be terrible for Russia. Has it turned out that 

way? Do you think they are regretting their involvement right 

now? 

Ambassador FORD. No, I do not think they regret it, but they 

have not won either. 

Senator JOHNSON. Dr. Wittes, do you have anything to add to 

this? 

Dr. WITTES. I guess I would just say that the Russians had modest goals for their intervention, which was resetting the balance in 

Assad’s favor. They achieved those goals. If they can sustain that 

at modest cost, I think they will be happy. So Ambassador Ford is 

suggesting that we find ways to increase the cost, and I think that 

is an appropriate avenue. 

Senator JOHNSON. So, again, short of something pretty dramatic 

happening to change that equation, change that balance of power, 

the facts on the ground continue to favor Assad, Russia, and Iran. 

Dr. WITTES. If I may make one more point. You know, I think 

there have been some suggestions made recently in the commentary that perhaps the United States should not be so stuck on 

the idea of Assad’s departure as part of a peace settlement and 

that letting go of that demand might allow some kind of U.S.-Russian condominium. I actually think that rests on some faulty assumptions. 

First, as we have seen, it is not clear the Russians have the will 

or ability to exercise leverage over Assad. But more than that, if 

you look at other cases of civil wars settled with the help of outside 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
26 

powers, you can get that international agreement, but you still 

have to impose it on the parties on the ground. And in the Bosnian 

case, for example, doing that required a set of Croat military victories, and then it required a NATO air campaign. So I do not 

think we can look to diplomacy alone to settle this. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Senator Rubio and Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons? 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking 

Member Cardin, for convening this important hearing and to all 

three of you for your lengthy and important public service and for 

your testimony here today. 

The grinding, brutal nature of the humanitarian crisis in Syria 

is something that has, I know, occupied you and many on this committee for years and is one of our greatest unaddressed, unresolved 

tragedies of the modern era. So let me try to ask briefly three different questions across three different topics and then leave you in 

turn to answer them. 

First, about Iran’s role and the distinctions between Iran’s role 

and Russia’s role and their intentions. You have all at different 

points talked about we need to find ways to increase the cost on 

the ground. There are slight differences in priority between Russia 

and Iran, but Iran has doubled down, has sent in forces, has sent 

in militias. And that is really the only thing that has shifted the 

balance on the ground and the momentum in Assad’s favor and has 

significantly complicated the path forward towards any kind of 

lasting cessation in restoration of humanitarian aid. 

Why not now move to plan B, to significantly increasing our 

train and equip mission and investing in finding forces on the 

ground that will oppose Assad in a meaningful and sustained way? 

I can imagine the critiques of that, but I would be interested in 

hearing yours rather than mine. 

And then second, if I might, there is an upcoming conference, 

Ms. Lindborg, in Istanbul. I strongly agree with your view that we 

need to recalibrate humanitarian assistance from being emergency 

and temporary to recognizing that a whole generation of Syrians 

will likely grow up in the midst of conflict and outside their native 

country, and we have to begin investing in human development in 

order to have any hope for a next generation of Syrians capable of 

carrying out a peace in that country once restored. 

Kenya is currently making, I think, really unfortunate and 

threatening gestures about the tens of thousands—hundreds of 

thousands of Somali refugees in northeastern Kenya. The reality is 

they have lived there more than 20 years. And so we have to accept 

that many who are currently refugees may well be refugees for decades. 

How do you expect the model of development to change at the 

Istanbul conference, and what, frankly, could we in the Senate do 

to provide support whether for some new strategy on the ground 

in Syria that might change the balance on the battlefield? And how 

do you imagine that we could peal Iran and Russia apart in their 

views? And then how do you imagine we might be more effective 

in supporting a change in the humanitarian delivery and the longVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
27 

term prioritization of humanitarian assistance? I would be interested in your response to those questions, any of the panel. 

Dr. WITTES. Thank you. Let me kick it off with Iran and Russia. 

First, I would say that what shifted the dynamic on the battlefield is the Russian intervention, not primarily these Iranian militias and IRGC commanders. The militia presence I think is an indication that Iran is sensitive to the costs of this intervention, just 

as Russia’s announcement of its withdrawal, although it did not in 

fact withdraw much, is evidence of its sensitivity to cost. Hezbollah, 

for its part, has lost 1,000 people fighting in Syria, and it has to 

answer to its Lebanese constituency for that. So none of these parties are insensitive to the price they pay for supporting Assad, and 

some of them are more cost-sensitive than others. So if you want 

to peal them apart and you can increase the cost, some of them will 

start to step away, probably the Russians first as we have been discussing. 

Now, on the train and equip question, the first thing I would say 

is that even in the best case scenario, that is a very long-term 

strategy. That is a multiyear strategy. And the administration’s 

early efforts here were too little and, some would argue, too late 

as well to make much impact. So if we are going to kick that off 

again, we should expect that to operate over a 3- to 5-year time 

frame minimum. 

And then, of course, the other barrier so far has been the American priority on fighting ISIS in Syria. And so the administration 

would have to be willing to shift its priority set. It would be much 

more in line with our regional partners who are dealing with the 

Syrian conflict. They would like to see us turn our attention to 

Assad first and ISIS later. But I think that that is something the 

American people might not feel the same way about. We have seen 

in public opinion a strong shift that creates a better environment 

for the United States to invest in fighting ISIS because of the fear 

of ISIS. But I am not sure that there is sufficient consensus here 

that the broader Syrian conflict or removing Bashar al Assad is 

something that we want to invest in. 

Senator COONS. I am almost out of time. Ms. Lindborg, if you 

could just answer the humanitarian question, please. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

You know, despite the urgency of the situation, for 2016 we are 

still only seeing 23 percent of the humanitarian appeal being funded globally, 23 percent of $4.5 billion. So at a time where people 

urgently need assistance and we have refugees overwhelming country systems, it is severely underfunded. 

The World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul next week, which 

is the first of its kind, is really seeking to look at a global system 

that is crushingly overburdened, driven by Syria but also by protracted crises like Kenya that have persisted for decades. We are 

seeing 80 percent of global humanitarian funding now going to conflict-affected crises. A decade ago, it was 80 percent to natural disasters. 

So we need to rethink how we provide both development and relief assistance so that we tackle the roots-of-conflict earlier—before 

we are forced to rely on gigantic needs for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. There is a big effort to increase both effecVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
28 

tiveness and efficiency. We need to have more donors who are in 

the system, but we really need a different kind of approach that 

blends the emergency response with the longer-term support; support for youth, for education, for livelihoods, for psychosocial impacts, and for the kind of rebuilding of social cohesion at the community level when it has been torn apart by these conflicts. These 

factors will lead to repeated cycles of conflict if we do not invest 

as much in them. 

So this is an opportunity for a gigantic reset. I think it will probably be the opening of a door instead of the end of a conversation. 

It will require ultimately support from you, Senators, to enable the 

U.S. to be a leader in rethinking the kind of flexibility that we need 

to work at the community level in very complex environments. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Ambassador Ford, you have heard this today and some of the 

questions kind of allude to the fact that there is no one to work 

with. Is it not true that until the Russians began airstrikes in September, non-ISIS, non-jihadist, Arab local forces were making significant military gains and that in fact that was the reason why 

Russia began to conduct airstrikes last September? 

Ambassador FORD. Precisely. That is what Bashar al Assad admitted in his speech to the Syrian nation at the end of July 2015. 

Senator RUBIO. And in fact, the Russian airstrikes have been 

largely targeted at the non-ISIS fighters for much of the conflict because Assad is trying to create a binary choice for the world between the Islamists and himself. 

Ambassador FORD. I think that is accurate. 

Senator RUBIO. And as long as Assad is in power, will there ever 

be peace in Syria? I will give you an example. I watched recently 

a program on Frontline called ‘‘The Children of Syria.’’ It followed 

some children for 3 years. And one of the children, a very young 

child, 8 or 9 years old said into the camera if I ever get my hands 

on Bashar al Assad—I forgot the exact term—I am going to torture 

him, kill him, strangle him, the point being you now literally have 

millions of people who have seen loved ones killed, cities entirely 

wiped out. The bottom line is as long as Bashar al Assad is in 

power, there will be some other group that will rise up and resist 

his rule. As long as Assad is there, there is not going to be peace 

in Syria. 

Ambassador FORD. I think that is accurate, Senator. I would just 

say it is not only Assad, it is an entire security apparatus that has 

terrorized Syrians for decades. 

Senator RUBIO. My question to you and to Wittes is, is it time 

to start thinking about the reality that perhaps Syria, as we have 

known it, its existing borders as a unitary nation, that the fact is 

it may never again be possible to bring all of these communities to 

share a common nation given what has transpired over the last few 

years? I am sure that is not the ideal outcome, but is that where 

we are headed? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, it may be that in the end Syrians decide that partition is better. It may be. I do not know. No Syrian 

now is calling for it, and I do not think it can be imposed—a partiVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
29 

tion can be imposed. It is different that way from Bosnia, say, and 

the Balkan experience. 

I think in the meantime what needs to be done is to try to help 

Syrians build bridges across very bitter divides. And I would like 

to see much more effort complementing whatever the United States 

is doing through formal diplomatic efforts. I would like to see more 

effort on informal efforts, offline meetings between Syrians, civil society organizations because that is the only way to lay a foundation 

to get past the bitter fighting we have—— 

Senator RUBIO. And I do not know the answer to the questions. 

That is why I asked. Is there enough a Syrian identity, separate 

from sectarianism, separate from tribalism? Is there enough of a 

Syrian identity to unify a nation around? 

Ms. LINDBORG. If I could just chime in. There is certainly a long 

history of communities living and working with one another. And 

we see in both Syria and Iraq that tensions have been exacerbated 

and inflamed because of the respective conflicts. But my institution, the U.S. Institute of Peace, has experience helping to broker 

negotiations between Sunnis and Shias, for example, in Tikrit that 

enabled hundreds of thousands of people to return. You can build 

peace from the ground up, but it has to be within a framework for 

a larger pathway forward. 

Dr. WITTES. Let me perhaps make a broader point which is I do 

not think the problem here is about borders. I think the problem 

is about politics. This is how people settle their differences peacefully. If they cannot settle their differences peacefully, they are 

going to do it violently. And when politics does not work, when 

your government betrays you and turns its guns on you, then you 

revert to other ways of telling friend from foe and you look for 

other people with guns who can protect you. That is what is going 

on. That is not an irreversible process. 

And I would say too that I do not see any place you can draw 

lines that will automatically end the fighting because people are 

not fighting over square inches of land. 

Senator RUBIO. Let me ask this. This is relevant to the last point 

I wanted to raise before I run out of time. We are about to go 

through a pretty significant conundrum between Turkey and the 

Kurds up north in the Manbij Pocket that there is going to be an 

effort to close. The Kurds say—and they are important in this effort and they are a NATO ally—that the YPG elements in the 

north of the country that are trying to unify the cantons are basically the PKK, their moral enemy, and that once they unify the 

cantons, the next step is to come across the border. 

On the other hand, others like the United States would argue 

that the YPG and others are the only group up north that can be 

worked with that have proven effective. 

Is it in fact the goal of the YPG to not just engage in this closing 

of the Manbij Pocket but to establish across the northern part of 

Syria, unify the cantons from Afrin all the way to the east, and create their own state? Is that not what they are calling for now, is 

the creation of their own state? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, they have not publicly said they 

want to create a state, but they have already announced an autonoVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
30 

mous zone. Their model is something like what the Iraqi Kurds 

have in northern Iraq. 

Senator RUBIO. The Iraqi Kurds want their own state now. So 

that would be the next step I guess. 

Ambassador FORD. It might very well be. 

Absolutely they want to take that pocket and create a contiguous 

region. There is no question about that. And that is why the Turks 

have reacted badly. 

May I just say one thing? The YPG, that militia that the United 

States has been supporting, is absolutely affiliated with the PKK. 

Second, there are other groups that are operating up there that 

have been fighting the Islamic State but also fighting the Bashar 

al Assad regime. They have never gotten the kind of support that 

the YPG has received. They have never gotten the kind of close 

combat air support that that Kurdish militia has received. You can 

ask the administration why that is. 

I do not believe that the YPG is an irreplaceable element of an 

American strategy against the Islamic State. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. Thank you all very much for being 

here today. 

Ambassador Ford, I certainly agree with you that I would like to 

see more focus on humanitarian aid, that we should do a much better job. I think all three of you have said that. I think the United 

States should do much more to accept Syrian refugees, and I think 

it is disappointing that we have an election cycle that seems to be 

inhibiting that in the way that it is. 

But one of the things I also heard I think all three of you agree 

on is that until we remove Assad, the fighting is going to continue 

and that the only way we are going to get Assad to consider negotiations and all of the parties to consider that is by putting greater 

military pressure on him. And what I do not understand, Ambassador Ford, is how we are going to be able to do that if the train 

and equip mission has not worked, the opposition groups have not 

been successful. I mean, I am not in favor of putting U.S. troops 

on the ground there, but how do we accomplish that end of putting 

greater military pressure on Assad if we are not willing to do anything that is actually going to do that? I mean, I throw that out 

to all three of you. How does that happen? 

Ambassador FORD. Frankly, Senator, it does not happen unless 

the United States, working with regional partners, provides greater 

material assistance to the armed opposition. I would not do that 

without making it part of a broader strategy, a political strategy. 

But it has to be one element, an important element, of that broader 

political strategy, otherwise frankly I see no positive outcome from 

a Geneva peace process even if it does restart. 

Senator SHAHEEN. But let me explore that just a little bit further 

because it seems to me that we are now more willing to provide 

arms and equipment to opposition fighters, but it does not seem to 

be having the kind of positive impact that we would like. So I 

guess I am not sure how that gets us where we want to go. And 

maybe somebody else would like to respond. 

Dr. WITTES. Well, I will make one more note about the nature 

of the support that has been provided to those fighting Assad in 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
31 

Syria. The U.S. support, of course, is being provided to groups that 

are fighting ISIS, and that is because the U.S. priority is the defeat 

of ISIS. Our partners in the region are divided. Some of them have 

a priority of defeating ISIS. Some of them have a priority of defeating Assad. Now, I think we all agree that both those things are important. It is a question of which is primary. 

But in the absence of sufficient coherence within our friends and 

partners on that set of priorities, the assistance is not being directed in a unified manner, and it is not being directed against a 

political strategy. And you see instead the different regional actors 

are backing their favorite factions in a way that is inefficient and 

ultimately ineffective on the battlefield. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. That is helpful. 

Because my time is short, I want to also explore the comments 

about supporting local civil society groups and local communities 

because I certainly agree that that makes a lot of sense as an alternative to a central government that can be stable. But I think one 

of the challenges has been how to do that in a way that is consistent, that actually gets support to those communities when they 

are in the middle of a civil war. So I wonder if you could elaborate 

on that a little more, Ms. Lindborg and then perhaps Dr. Wittes 

as well. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Sure. Thank you. 

There has been, actually, considerable effort by the U.S. Government and a number of USAID partners to provide support to local 

provincial councils, to local civil society groups, as well as to a really courageous group of first responders called the White Helmets. 

Underneath what we see and what we hear about, there is still a 

remarkable amount of activity and action and leadership on the 

ground by Syrians. It is critically important to support that to help 

it expand. That will be the foundation of a future Syria. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Okay. Well, excuse me for interrupting. So 

what are you suggesting that would be more effective than what 

we are doing? Increasing the amount of assistance that is going to 

those groups? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Supporting its continuation, expanding it when 

possible because it varies depending on who is controlling territory 

at a given time. But this will be part of a longer-term strategy that 

extends into a future for Syria. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, that is what I was going to ask, and I 

am out of time. I know that. But how long into the future? Because 

what you are talking about is a decades-long strategy. Is it not? 

Ms. LINDBORG. It is both immediate because the local structures 

are providing some stability in certain parts of Syria for their community members, and they will provide the nucleus for a future of 

Syria into the future, however long that becomes necessary. This 

is a very important part of the strategy, though, because Syrians— 

and it has been alluded to by all three of us—Syrians beyond the 

armed groups have to be a party to negotiations, to local conversations, and opportunities to envision a peace. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Murphy? 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
32 

Ambassador Ford, I wanted you to maybe touch a little bit more 

deeply on your skepticism about the effectiveness of U.S. combat 

troop deployments into Syria. You know, our deployment in the region certainly is not as deep as it was during the Iraq War but it 

is frankly broader and wider than ever before. We now have troops 

in Iraq, in Syria, in Yemen. Of course, the history of our engagement in places does not tell you that thin deployments get thinner. 

It tells you that they get thicker over time. 

So you had some strong words in your opening statement about 

your unwillingness to endorse broader deployments but your discomfort with the existing deployments. Can you just talk a little bit 

about your fears in this respect? 

Ambassador FORD. Three comments. 

Number one, we have gained—our side, our allies in Syria and 

in Iraq, have gained a lot of ground against the Islamic State. And 

that is a good thing. That is a good thing. 

But, number two, as we saw in Iraq, Senator, what do you do on 

the day after? I was just speaking a little while ago with Senator 

Rubio about the Kurdish militia that we have relied upon. That 

Kurdish militia has been accused of war crimes by groups like Amnesty International. In some cases, Syrian refugees flee it and do 

not go towards the Kurdish areas. They run away from them. They 

go into Islamic State territory, which tells me that governance is 

an issue. The Kurds cannot provide that governance. Who is going 

to provide it? It cannot be American special ops. So there is a lot 

more to this than just sending in special forces. 

And number three, there is a price for sending in American 

forces which is it does play right into the recruitment videos of the 

so-called caliph and others who say this is a jihad against the 

hated Americans. It is harder for them to say that when they are 

only fighting Syrian Muslims, whether they be Kurds or Arabs. 

Senator MURPHY. Dr. Wittes, I wanted to sort of give you a 

chance to respond in part to what Senator Shaheen was raising 

and maybe in this context. So that sounds wonderful, a future 

Syria in which local communities are empowered to work for themselves and protect themselves. The recent history of the Middle 

East would not suggest that that is a paradigm that can last. What 

we have mostly is either strongmen or chaos. And even a place like 

Lebanon which certainly has more local community empowerment 

than others, it is still required there to have a very complicated 

Rube Goldberg scheme of national governance that provides cover 

underneath. 

So answer Senator Shaheen’s question about why this matters, 

empowering local communities, but then also address my skepticism that that is a sustainable solution in a region that does not 

have a lot of evidence that there is a middle ground between strong 

central governance or chaos. 

Dr. WITTES. Thank you, Senator. I think that is a fantastically 

important question not only for Syria but for the region as a whole. 

And it is an important question because that is precisely what the 

Arab world is struggling with right now, the collapse of an 

unsustainable political model of authoritarianism. These strong 

central governments failed their people, and everybody knows it. 

And the result is that there is intense skepticism among Arab citiVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
33 

zens, particularly young Arabs, not just about central governments 

or strongmen, but about political parties, about politics in general, 

about religious institutions or other people who stand up and claim 

to tell them what to do and what to believe. And in an environment 

where citizens have that much frustration and that much skepticism, what they really want is their own voice and their own 

choice, and I think that means local empowerment. 

You see that in other countries around the region. Morocco, for 

example, has committed to a path of decentralization that is pushing budgets and decision-making down to the local level. So I think 

that governments are already recognizing—— 

Senator MURPHY. Let me sneak in one last question. But are you 

going to get to that place by the United States picking and choosing what local communities get funding and support and what do 

not? 

Dr. WITTES. Okay. Thank you. And that does give me an opportunity to link up to Senator Shaheen’s very good question. 

I think there are some specific things that the United States can 

do, although most of this has to be done in and by the region. In 

the Syrian context, I would point to a couple of things. 

One is that right now the support that is being provided to these 

local councils in northern Syria is being provided across the Turkish border. And as you know, we are working very hard to close 

that border to prevent jihadis from going back and forth. So the 

United States needs to work with the Turkish Government to ensure that the civilian aid and the civilian workers, the Syrians who 

are getting trained and going back into work with their own communities can get back and forth across that border. That is one 

very specific thing the United States can do. 

A second thing I do not think we are doing much of right now 

and I think we could do a lot more of is working with refugee populations who are outside of Syria, in some cases quite far away, to 

help them build the skills and platforms for dialogue, for conflict 

resolution so that they can plug into this stuff when and if they 

are able to go back. There is no reason not to start working on that 

now, and no one else is doing it. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Having used none of my time, I just want to ask one brief question. Ambassador Ford, this conflict has evolved. And we had a tremendous opportunity I felt in September of 2013 when the red line 

was crossed. We had a 10-hour operation planned off of the Mediterranean, no boots on the ground, at a time when the moderate 

opposition had tremendous momentum to really sort of recalibrate 

and push Assad back. 

I am struck by your comments, your consistent comments, of sort 

of lesser U.S. engagement. And I am just wondering has it always 

been that way or has it been because of the way the conflict has 

evolved and we let it get to a place where you now feel that greater 

U.S. engagement is not as useful. 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I have never been comfortable with 

having American combat forces in Syria. I have always thought 

this was, first and foremost, a Syrian fight. There is no perfect 

angel in this civil war, but there are some that are much worse 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
34 

than others. And I think the American policy should be aimed at 

helping those who accept that there needs to be a genuine political 

solution and a political process out of that solution that allows Syrians to choose their own form of government. I do not think special 

operations forces, as good as they are—and they are fabulous—they 

can govern the spaces that are going to be liberated from the Islamic State, and I do not think they should be choosing—I do not 

think they should be choosing who governs those spaces either. I 

worry that given the fragmentation among Sunni Arabs, they will 

just start killing each other, and if we do not insist on a process 

by which they choose, I fear that it is going to go very bad again, 

just as western Iraq did. 

With respect to material assistance to the armed opposition, Senator, I think I actually have been pretty consistent over the years. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think most of the committee has been too, as 

has Congress. It just has not happened—appropriately happened. 

Senator Flake? 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, and I apologize if some of this ground 

has been covered. 

The New York Times reported over the weekend that al Qaeda’s 

top leadership has decided that its future lies in Syria and that it 

has dispatched more than a dozen of its seasoned veterans there. 

Is this your understanding, Ambassador Ford? Is that happening, 

and if it is, how is that going to complicate the situation there? 

Talk about the interplay between al Qaeda and ISIS. 

Ambassador FORD. The Nusra Front, the al Qaeda affiliate in 

Syria, has been gaining ground for most of the last 2 years. I have 

seen these reports about them declaring a caliphate or intending 

to. I do not think they have reached a final decision on that, Senator. If they do, it will complicate greatly their relations with other 

Syrian opposition groups on the ground and their relationship with 

other Syrian opposition groups—I am not talking about the Islamic 

State, but in northwestern Syria where there is no Islamic State. 

It will greatly complicate their relations up there. 

Senator FLAKE. Is there, as The New York Times is claiming, a 

renewed emphasis on Syria by al Qaeda and injecting more of its 

forces there? 

Ambassador FORD. Absolutely. Zawahiri in Central Asia, wherever he is, South Asia, has been paying more attention to Syria. 

He has sent envoys to try to line up the leadership of the Nusra 

Front, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria. So they are absolutely paying 

attention. 

I do not think they have a finalized decision on what strategy to 

pursue. And so they are paying more attention to it. They are sending more people, as you said. But I think they are still in their own 

internal deliberative process. The key thing to watch for, Senator, 

is whether or not they declare a caliphate of their own. 

Senator FLAKE. Ms. Lindborg, did you have any thoughts on 

that? 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would simply reiterate and underscore something I said in my earlier comments: the importance of really paying attention to a generation of Syrian youth who have been dispossessed. They are without educational or job or future opportunities. That leaves them much more vulnerable to predatory employVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:13 May 16, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\2016 HEARINGS -- WORKING\05 17 2016 -- 29-447

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
35 

ers, human trafficking, and violent ideologies. We ahould be relentlessly focusing on assisting a generation of Syrians who are currently uprooted. 

Senator FLAKE. Ambassador Ford, if no one there really believes 

that we will put ground forces or a significant number of ground 

forces there, what leverage do we have in Syria? And is it more leverage than we had 2 years ago, or is it less? 

Ambassador FORD. I think we have less leverage than we did 2 

years ago, Senator. 

Senator FLAKE. How is that? 

Ambassador FORD. The Russians have combat forces in Syria. 

That has increased their leverage. The Iranians now have their 

own combat forces in Syria. That has increased their leverage. And 

I think frankly Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the 

region who have been fighting against Assad I think look at this 

administration and perceive that it is not consistent with respect 

to what is happening in Syria and the American response. And 

therefore, our credibility with those governments has diminished. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Menendez? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, last month, the U.N. Special Envoy Staffan de 

Mistura said that Syria—the conflict there has claimed nearly 

400,000 deaths. Some estimates place that closer to a half a million; 4.5 million have fled the country since the start of the conflict, 

most of them women and children. And 6.5 million people are internally displaced inside of Syria. That is 11 million people who 

have either fled or are internally displaced. 

I think we have become desensitized to that reality. The degree 

of carnage and butchery is unparalleled today, and it has bled over 

into Europe in a trail of death that traverses the Mediterranean 

and under dangerous roots where it threatens to destabilize an entire continent. 

So I listen. And I have great respect for all of you. You have 

come before the committee many times. And this is not an easy situation. But what I hear here is testimony that in essence amounts 

to recommendations for selective engagement on a scale that in my 

view will not lead to meaningful changes to stop the human catastrophe or relieve the human suffering that we in the Congress, as 

well as this administration, has done little to stop. I think we had 

an opportunity to affect that when several years ago this committee 

passed a bipartisan effort to arm and vet the moderate Syrian 

rebels at a time that it would have made a difference. Unfortunately, the administration was not ready to engage in that, and 

when it did, it was way too late and the conflict had already 

conflagrated in such a way that there were no clear sides so to 

speak. 

And I think while we are trying to figure out what we do now, 

I think there are lessons to be learned here for the future. We had 

a hearing here recently about America’s role in the world. Well, 

you know, I appreciate and fully have supported on Syrian refugees 

into the United States. I have supported the humanitarian assistance. But I want to stop the slaughter, not just simply feed those 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
36 

who survive the carnage. And in that respect, I do not get much 

of a sense that we have a lot of options. I think we have lost the 

opportunity and emboldened and strengthened our enemies whether those are Assad, Iran, Russia, the Islamic State, and I think history is not going to look too kindly on us in the years ahead. 

So with that as my own perspective on where we are at and how 

we got here, the question is how do you—specifically, if you could 

give me an A, B, or C—affect the calculus and the leverage with 

Russia who clearly has its interests? It has committed troops. It 

changed the paradigm. It gave Assad a new life at a time that 

Assad—look at the differences of Assad in July versus afterwards. 

A very dramatic difference. And we are even in the midst of some 

negotiations that say we accept him for a period of time. God 

knows how long that is going to be. 

The Iranians, as you have all testified—they have their interests, 

and their interests largely do not coincide with ours or for that fact, 

the Syrian people, most importantly. And we seem to be hesitant 

to do anything to push back on them because we are worried that 

anything we do affects the nuclear agreement. 

So at the end of the day, what are—and the Russians at the Security Council can veto anything. I agree with you that having consequences for not permitting humanitarian assistance and other 

elements of a ceasefire, that there should be consequences for those 

who violate it. But if it is going to be at the Security Council, you 

have got a Russia who is not going to vote for that. 

So at the end of the day, what are the things that we can do to 

leverage against or with Russia and Iran, the two big players here, 

as well as other regional players, but where do we start there that 

we can change the dynamics? Because otherwise, we are just going 

to keep having these hearings and talk about the carnage, but we 

are not going to do anything to end it. 

I hope silence is not just—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The one person who is most equipped please answer. 

Ms. LINDBORG. I am not the most equipped, but I would just say 

that I think everybody shares the utter sense of frustration. This 

is obviously one of those terribly complicated situations, especially 

right now, that does not yield to easy answers. 

I would say, however, one of the challenges among the many that 

we have already talked about here today is the lack of unity and 

focus among the purported allies we have in the region. You have 

Saudi Arabia, one of our strong allies, that is distracted by Yemen 

and is blocking negotiations with parts of the opposition. You have 

Turkey that is distracted now by its fight with the Kurds. So a terrible situation has been further complicated by a splintering of interests among a complex set of actors who have different stakes in 

the conflict. 

So that leaves no easy path forward. Whether it is a combination 

of what Ambassador Ford has talked about, or what is being addressed in Vienna with these talks, it does not appear as if there 

will be a fast, satisfactory conclusion to what is a soul-ripping set 

of humanitarian catastrophes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So there are no leverage points against the 

Russians, against the Iranians is basically what I am hearing. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
37 

Ambassador FORD. I am not an Iran expert, Senator Menendez. 

But I do think the Iranians are very sensitive about their domestic 

economy. I am a little puzzled that there seem to be efforts by the 

administration to promote business with Iran in Europe when Iran 

is causing us problems in regions such as Syria. 

And second, they are sensitive to casualties on the ground in 

Syria. And so if there is a way to increase that cost, I think that 

might be a way to get leverage. 

We need to be clear about what Iran is interested in in Syria, 

Senator, and that is, they want a government in Damascus that 

has good relations with Hezbollah and will give Hezbollah sustained strategic depth in its confrontation against Israel. That is 

the Iranian goal, and that goal is at great odds with American policy. 

The CHAIRMAN. So I am going to need to step out, and I appreciate Senator Cardin bringing this to a conclusion after Senator 

Udall. 

I just want to say I sat here for an hour and a half and listened, 

and we thank you so much for your testimony and service. But in 

essence, what we have allowed to occur is this is going to be settled 

in the manner that Russia and Iran decide it is going to be settled. 

And that pendulum swung when Russia stepped into the vacuum 

that we allowed to exist for so long. We did not, along the way, do 

the things that we said we were going to do. I mean, all of us have 

visited the refugee camps and talked to the people there telling 

them help was on the way, and this is what we are going to do to 

keep their sons and uncles and nephews from being slaughtered. 

And we never delivered. Not with any frustration towards each of 

you. You are doing your best to rationalize what is happening and 

to help directly in many ways. It is pretty unbelievable to me that 

this has gone on as long as it has gone on. We did not even do the 

things that we said we would do, and certainly missed huge opportunities along the way to keep 405,000 people from being slaughtered and half the country from being displaced. 

So we thank you for your efforts. 

I see no real solution that the United States is going to drive. 

Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime is going to drive whatever solution occurs, and we are going to be basically acquiescing to that. 

I think we all know that. And I say that with tremendous frustration. 

So with that, Senator Udall. 

Thank you each for being here. If you do not mind, there will be 

some questions, and if you would answer them fairly promptly, we 

would appreciate it. 

With that, Senator Cardin I know will adjourn. Thank you so 

much. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much, Chairman Corker and 

Senator Cardin. I really appreciate you calling the hearing and 

very much appreciate all of your service and hard work on many 

of these issues in the Middle East. 

Director of National Intelligence Clapper was pretty frank about 

the situation in Syria, and he said—and I quote—the U.S. cannot 

fix it. The fundamental issues they have, the large population 

bulge of disaffected young males, ungoverned spaces, economic 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
38 

challenges, and the availability of weapons won’t go away for a 

long time. 

So what can we do? Many Senators on this committee staunchly 

opposed arming the so-called moderate Syrians, and that program 

has been an abysmal failure, as you all know. We have to make 

some hard choices to end the killing in Syria and Iraq. Yet, another 

occupation by U.S. forces is not the answer. I know, Ambassador 

Ford, you said you did not think that was the case. I am sure others feel that way. 

We already are slowly, incrementally heading there in Iraq without congressional approval, which is something that I am very worried about. A limited presence may be justified, but I have deep 

concerns. I firmly believe that the lack of an AUMF has weakened 

the Congress and set a dangerous precedent. That is not in our Nation’s long-term interest, and it is not in line with the Constitution. 

So a question to Dr. Cofman Wittes. You wrote about this slippery slope. In just 2 years, the United States has moved from airstrikes to hundreds of military advisors in Iraq and 4,000 troops 

on the ground in both Iraq and Syria. And now the growth of ISIL 

in Libya and elsewhere is leading to more airstrikes in that country, all without congressional authorization. This is a generational 

struggle to contain ISIL and al Qaeda globally. 

Do you believe it is appropriate for Congress to place limits on 

our military footprint to prevent another full-scale war in the Middle East and without the approval of the American people? 

Dr. WITTES. Well, that is a very big question, Senator, and I am 

glad that I do not carry the burden that you carry in having to decide these issues up here. Let me do my best to give you an academic’s perspective. 

ISIS is a threat to the region. It is a threat to the United States. 

It is a threat to the world. And I think it appropriate that we are 

working in coalition to defeat them and to deal with that threat. 

I think DNI Clapper said we cannot do this. We cannot do it alone. 

That is for sure. And so I think the key ingredient to success is 

that we have a strong coalition. 

And we have talked a lot over the last hour and a half about the 

fractions within America’s coalition, whether it is competing priorities or concerns about the prospect of state failure in Syria, or 

other states like the issue of Kurdish autonomy or independence. 

These are issues that if the United States does not want to go it 

alone and wants to be successful in coalition it is going to have to 

address individually with some partners and collectively with others. It is not a small matter. 

And I think the conclusion that I draw not only from these last 

years of efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict, but more broadly 

looking across the arc of our policy in the Middle East over the last 

years is the importance of alliance relationships, the importance of 

partnerships, and the importance of dialogue because we are not 

always going to agree on interests or on priorities. But we can 

never stop talking and go on our own ways because we end up creating more problems for ourselves and for our friends. 

Senator UDALL. There was a lot of attention given to the fact 

that the Russians pulled back and they made public announcements and everything. What actually happened there? Are they 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
39 

still just as engaged and just as involved in Syria as they were before? What is your sense from everything you can tell, open sources 

and everything, the numbers of troops, the numbers of fighting 

forces, weaponry, all of that, to any member of the panel here? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, they are still deeply involved militarily. They continue to conduct combat operations. They did withdraw some kinds of aircraft, but they sent in ground attack helicopters instead. And so in a sense, they adjusted their force structure, adapted it to conditions on the ground. 

Senator UDALL. Any other panelist have a thought on that? No? 

Please go ahead. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Only that as we saw, the Syrian regime, with 

support from primarily the Russians but also the Iranians, has continued to do relentless bombardment of civilian populations, especially in and around Homs and Aleppo. And as Ambassador Ford 

has said, that is with the reinforcements that they received over 

the last 9 months. 

Senator UDALL. And once again, let me echo what everybody 

said. We really appreciate all your hard work, your focus on this, 

your thoughtfulness. And you can tell a lot of us are very frustrated like I think you are. 

Thank you very much, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Cardin [presiding]: And let me join the chairman in 

thanking our panel. 

The magnitude of the crisis here demands U.S. leadership and 

attention. Clearly the underlying solution is for the Syrians to have 

an opportunity to develop a country that they want and respect 

and have credibility. And that requires the United States, working 

with our coalition partners, to make it clear that those who interfere with that that there are consequences. I agree, Ambassador 

Ford, I do not want U.S. troops in Syria for the reasons that you 

just said. But there have got to be consequences to those who block 

humanitarian aid. There have got to be consequences to those who 

violate a ceasefire. And the United States, working with our coalition partners, need to be able to provide that type of a framework 

so that we can move forward for peace among the Syrian communities and isolate the terrorists and work to eliminate the terrorists. 

And I think this hearing has been helpful in that regard, and I 

thank you all for your comments. 

As the chairman said, the record will remain open until Thursday. If questions are asked, we would ask that you try to respond 

to that quickly. 

Without objection, the Human Rights First statement will be included in the committee record. 

Senator CARDIN. And with that, the committee stands adjourned. 

Thank you all very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
40 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST

We are pleased to submit this statement on behalf of Human Rights First. Human 

Rights First works in the United States and abroad to promote a secure and humane world by advancing justice, human dignity, and respect for the rule of law. 

Human Rights First is an independent advocacy organization that challenges America to live up to its ideals. We are a non- profit, nonpartisan international human 

rights organization with offices in New York City, Washington D.C., and Houston, 

Texas. 

For over 30 years, we’ve built bipartisan coalitions and teamed up with frontline 

activist and lawyers to tackle issues that demand American leadership, including 

refugee protection and the advancement of civil society. American leadership is 

needed now more than ever. Effectively addressing the war in Syria and the resulting refugee crisis will require the kind of strong global leadership that the United 

States is has a long history of providing. 

PROTECTING REFUGEES RIGHT TO FLEE

Drafted in the wake of World War II and in the context of the many border restrictions that denied refuge to those fleeing Nazi persecution, the 1951 Refugee 

Convention and its Protocol prohibit states from refoulement, or returning people 

to places where their lives or freedom would be at risk. Even states that are not 

party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol must comply with this prohibition as 

it constitutes a tenet of customary international law. At a time when thousands of 

families fleeing Russian bombs, Syrian government attacks, and ISIL terror have 

been blocked from escaping the violence raging within their country, compliance 

with these refugee protection tenets and international law is more important 

thanever. 

In the absence of adequate responsibility-sharing by other countries, front- line 

refugee hosting states have imposed an array of restrictions, escalating in 2015, 

blocking entry to many refugees trying to flee Syria. Jordan has restricted the entry 

of refugees since 2013 and largely closed its borders to Syrian refugees in 2014. As 

of May 2016, over 50,000 Syrian refugees were stranded on a berm in a remote 

desert area ‘‘no man’s land’’ along the Syrian-Jordan border. Likewise, in January 

2015 Lebanon imposed new border rules that generally bar Syrians from escaping 

to Lebanon, leading many to be turned away and forced to return to Syria in violation of customary international law protections against refoulement. 

Turkey has also closed its borders to Syrians seeking refuge, preventing thousands from escaping Syria. As Syrian government attacks on Aleppo and its surrounding countryside, supported by Russian aerial bombing, escalated in February 

2016, tens of thousands of Syrians fled to the Turkish border, only to be barred from 

crossing into Turkey. In April, human rights researchers reported that Turkish border guards shot at Syrian refugees trying to cross to safety in Turkey, and multiple 

reports indicated that refugee camps within Syria near the border have been attacked. 

While the countries that border Syria have legitimate security concerns, they can 

address these concerns through individualized exclusion assessments conducted in 

accordance with international law. Blanket or random denials of entry violate the 

Refugee Convention and international law prohibitions against return. Not only do 

border restrictions that improperly bar refugees violate international law, but they 

leave Syrians with no way out of a country ravaged by barrel bombs, conflict, and 

terror. These moves also make clear to many Syrians that they cannot secure effective protection in the region. 

ADVANCING REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

With respect to Syrian resettlement alone, Oxfam calculated in its 2016 Syria Crisis Fair Share Analysis that only 128,612 resettlement or other humanitarian admission spots had been pledged by the world’s richest governments—still 331,388 

below the overall Syrian resettlement need level (as of February 2016) of 460,000. 

The United States, long the global leader in resettlement, admitted only 105 Syrian 

refugees in fiscal year 2014 through resettlement, only 1,682 in fiscal year 2015, and 

only 1,736 so far this fiscal year. 

Resettlement is a tangible demonstration of responsibility-sharing by countries 

outside the region, providing critical support to front-line refugee hosting states as 

they struggle under the strain of hosting large numbers of refugees. Resettlement 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
41 

can also, most critically, be a life-saving solution for vulnerable refugees who are 

struggling to survive in front-line countries. In addition, it can also be a tool for protecting other refugees—particularly if effectively leveraged—by encouraging frontline countries to continue to host the bulk of refugees and to allow additional refugees to cross into their countries to escape conflict and persecution. 

The lack of effective resettlement or other orderly routes to protection has significant consequences. As detailed in Human Rights First’s February 2016 report The 

Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Need for U.S. Leadership, based on research in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, the lack of effective regional protection, exacerbated by 

the lack of assistance and insufficient orderly resettlement or visa routes for refugees, has driven many Syrian refugees to embark on dangerous trips to Europe. In 

Turkey primarily, and also in Jordan and Lebanon, Human Rights First researchers 

heard reports that refugees who had been struggling to survive for years in exile 

lost hope while waiting for potential resettlement and decided to instead take the 

dangerous trip to Europe. 

However, U.S. commitments to resettle Syria refugees have—so far—fallen far 

short of the necessary leadership, given the scale of the crisis and the impact of the 

crisis on U.S. allies, regional stability, and U.S. national security interests. With its 

pledge to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees this fiscal year, the United States has 

agreed to take in only about 2 percent of the Syrian refugees in need of resettlement, which amounts to less than 0.2 percent of the overall Syrian refugee population of 4.7 million. The lackluster U.S. response has been particularly detrimental 

given the traditional U.S. role as the global resettlement leader. 

Seven months into the fiscal year, the United States has resettled just 1,736 Syrian refugees. With five months left to meet the remaining 81% of its goal for the 

fiscal year, the United States has a long way to go to meet its modest goal. It is 

imperative that the United States meet this commitment, and significantly increase 

its resettlement commitment for the next fiscal year. The United States has the capacity and security systems to resettle far more than 10,000 Syrian refugees. A bipartisan group of former humanitarian and national security officials has recommended that the United States resettle 100,000 Syrian refugees, and the U.S. 

Commission on International Religious Freedom has also recommended that the 

United States resettle 100,000 vulnerable Syrian refugees. 

In a December 2015 letter to Congress, a bipartisan group of former national security advisors, CIA directors, secretaries of state, and Department of Homeland Security secretaries pointed out that the refugee ‘‘resettlement initiatives help advance 

U.S. national security interests by supporting the stability of our allies and partners 

that are struggling to host large numbers of refugees’’ and also stressed that refugees ‘‘are vetted more intensively than any other category of traveler.’’ The bipartisan group, cautioned that barring Syrian refugees ‘‘feeds the narrative of ISIS that 

there is a war between Islam and the West,’’ urging the U.S. government to reject 

‘‘this worldview by continuing to offer refuge to the world’s most vulnerable people, 

regardless of their religion or nationality.’’ Some of the signers on the letter included 

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Former CIA Director and Secretary 

of Defense Leon Panetta, Ret. General and former CIA Director David Petraeus, 

former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Secretary of 

Defense Chuck Hagel. 

TURKEY’S BORDER CLOSURES RESTRICTING CIVIL SOCIETY

In President’s Obama’s December 7, 2015 televised addressed, he billed Turkey’s 

border closure as an achievement in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL). 

In reality, the opposite is true. After consultations with Syrian civil society activists, including during fact-finding trips to the Turkish border in 2015 and 2016, it 

is clear that the closure does not deter ISIL from crossing in and out of Syria. Rather, it prevents civil society activists from doing their vital work in the fight against 

ISIL and against the repression of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. To the limited extent 

that international attention has been paid to the danger of Turkey’s border closure, 

it has focused on the very real harm to refugees trying to flee Syria. Even less discussed is the threat to Syrians trying to support civil society in their country. 

Activists working across the border are trying to prevent exactly the sort of grievances that ISIL feeds on. Activists can dissuade potential recruits from joining ISIL, 

but only if they can reach them. The effective closure of legal crossings since July 

2015 for all but humanitarian emergencies and a few other exceptions is strangling 

the work of these activists. 

If America’s ‘‘support for civil society is a matter of national security,’’ as President Obama declared in late 2014, Washington should be doing everything it can 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
42 

to empower Syria’s peaceful voices battling the Assad regime, ISIL and other extremist groups. Unsealing the border will let them do their lifesaving work. 

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SYRIA PEACE PROCESS

Currently, there is no formal role in the Geneva talks for Syrian civil society. Secretary Kerry has rightly said that the initiative’s goal should be creating ‘‘the basis 

for an inclusive, peaceful, and pluralistic Syria.’’ However, it will be difficult for parties to reach an informed political deal without the direct input of those who are 

battling to hold what’s left of Syrian society together. 

Syria’s problems are too big to be left to politicians alone. If the Geneva talks are 

to be the beginning of the end of the Syrian conflict, delivering a successful, longlasting peace deal will require the early involvement of the country’s medics, students, engineers, and other civil society representatives. The United States should 

push for their participation in these negotiations. 

SUPPORT FOR ARMED GROUPS IN SYRIA

Finally, Syria’s conflict has produced hundreds of local, regional and national 

fighting forces. While the regime’s Russian and Iranian backed military remains the 

most powerful force, the United States should not ignore the many smaller opposition groups, including Free Syrian Army, Kurdish groups, ISIS, Al Nusrah and 

many others whose allegiances can shift depending on what other forces are threatening their locality. 

The larger and smaller opposition groups generally rely on outside sponsorship to 

survive, although ISIS, which controls lucrative oil fields and major population centers like Mosul in Iraq, and has a vast arsenal of weaponry, is largely self-funding. 

Turkey, the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Counsel (GCC) states are the 

main political and military backers of these other groups, although the complicated 

internecine nature of the war means it is not always clear who is fighting whom 

at any particular time. 

At a meeting with GCC foreign ministers in Bahrain on April 7, 2016, Secretary 

Kerry urged Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Washington’s other regional partners to use 

their influence with these rebel groups to keep the truce and to support the negotiations in Geneva. This is a message President Obama should emphasize as talks continue. 

Just as countries should be pressed to control their proxies, President Obama 

should also push them to support enforcement of United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 2139, to have medical facilities and personnel protected during the conflict. 

In February 2014 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2139 (2014), demanding the safe passage of food and medical aid to civilians 

and that ‘‘all parties respect the principle of medical neutrality and facilitate free 

passage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment and transport.’’ However, it 

has not been enforced, and the United States should press its regional allies to support enforcement of the resolution by using their influence with the militias and by 

supporting greater enforcement mechanisms at an international level. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United State should lead a comprehensive global initiative to protect Syrian 

and other refugees. Such a comprehensive approach would enhance the stability of 

refugee-hosting states and the broader region surrounding Syria, and would advance 

the national security interests of the United States and its allies. Key elements: 

• Champion the protection of refugees.—The U.S. government should use its influence with its allies to protect refugee rights to cross borders to seek protection, 

to work and to access education, to move freely without living in fear of arbitrary detention or xenophobic violence. 

• Encourage Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and other states in the region surrounding Syria to stop blocking or preventing Syrian refugees from fleeing their 

country.—The United States and other donor states should increase their support to these states—through humanitarian aid, development investment and 

resettlement—and make clear that they expect these nations to comply with 

international law and allow Syrian refugees to cross their borders. 

• Lead by example and substantially increase the U.S. commitment to resettle Syrian refugees.—A bipartisan group of former U.S. government officials, including 

ones with national security and humanitarian expertise, have called on the 

United States to resettle 100,000 Syrian refugees, noting that such a commitment would ‘‘send a powerful signal to governments in Europe and the Middle 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
43 

East about their obligations to do more.’’ The Bipartisan U.S. Commission on 

International Religious Freedom, explaining that ‘‘[t]he United States must continue to live up to our nation’s core values,’’ has similarly recommended that 

the United States resettle 100,000 Syrian refugees. This commitment would be 

miniscule compared to that of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, and would amount 

to just over 2 percent of the overall Syrian population hosted by these and other 

states in the region and only about 21 percent of the overall resettlement need, 

estimated to exceed 460,000. This commitment would still fall far short of the 

U.S. ‘‘fair share’’ level of 163,392 Syrian resettlements. 

• Continue to address staffing and efficiency gaps to reduce backlogs, bottlenecks 

in resettlement and SIV processing.—The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of State and other agencies should continue efforts to increase 

staffing, efficiency, prioritization and resources to address the backlogs, delays 

and efficiency gaps that are hampering the U.S. resettlement process. The 

President and Congress should encourage and support increases in staff and resources. These backlogs undermine the reputation of these programs and the 

nation’s ability to meet its commitments to U.S. allies, other refugee-hosting 

countries, and vulnerable refugees, including those facing grave risks due to 

their work with the United States. Addressing delays, backlogs and efficiency 

gaps would not undermine security; rather it would strengthen the effectiveness 

of U.S. processing. It is certainly not in the security interest of the United 

States to have delays in security vetting, which would potentially put off the 

identification of a person who might actually pose a security threat. 

• Ensure that NATO actions, as well as any proposed ‘‘safe zone,’’ ‘‘no fly zone,’’ 

or similar endeavors, do not violate the human rights of refugees and migrants, 

including the right to flee persecution and seek asylum, and do not end up exposing civilians to dangers. UNHCR has cautioned that NATO’s mission in the 

Aegean Sea should not ‘‘undermine the institution of asylum for people in need 

of international protection.’’ Efforts to block people from crossing borders to secure protection often instead push them—and the smugglers who profit off migration barriers and human misery—to find other, sometimes riskier, routes. 

• Work with other donor states to meet humanitarian appeals and significantly increase U.S. humanitarian aid and development investments in frontline refugee 

hosting states.—In particular, with Congress’ support, the administration should 

substantially increase both U.S. humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees 

and displaced persons and U.S. development aid. The United States and other 

donors should expand and replicate initiatives that increase opportunities for 

refugees to work and access education, while also supporting refugee-hosting 

communities. 

To address the ongoing conflict in Syria and work to bring about its swift, peaceful resolution, Human Rights First urges the United States to: 

• Press Turkey to allow human rights activists to cross the border freely into 

Syria; 

• Ensure that Syrian civil society are included in peace negotiations; and 

• Urge its allies to use their power to improve the behavior of the armed groups 

they support, including respecting human rights in the areas they govern. 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
(45) 

A New Normal—Ongoing Chemical Weapons 

Attacks in Syria, February 2016 

SUBMITTED BY THE SYRIAN AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-01.eps
46 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-02.eps
47 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-03.eps
48 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-04.eps
49 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-05.eps
50 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-06.eps
51 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-07.eps
52 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-08.eps
53 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-09.eps
54 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-10.eps
55 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-11.eps
56 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-12.eps
57 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-13.eps
58 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-14.eps
59 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-15.eps
60 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-16.eps
61 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-17.eps
62 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-18.eps
63 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-19.eps
64 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-20.eps
65 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-21.eps
66 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-22.eps
67 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-23.eps
68 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-24.eps
69 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-25.eps
70 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-26.eps
71 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-27.eps
72 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-28.eps
73 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-29.eps
74 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-30.eps
75 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-31.eps
76 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-32.eps
77 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-33.eps
78 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-34.eps
79 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-35.eps
80 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-36.eps
81 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-37.eps
82 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-38.eps
83 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-39.eps
84 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-40.eps
85 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-41.eps
86 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-42.eps
87 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-43.eps
88 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-44.eps
89 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-45.eps
90 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-46.eps
91 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-47.eps
92 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-48.eps
93 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-49.eps
94 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-50.eps
95 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-51.eps
96 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-52.eps
97 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-53.eps
98 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-54.eps
99 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-55.eps
100 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-56.eps
101 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-57.eps
102 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-58.eps
103 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-59.eps
104 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-60.eps
105 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-61.eps
106 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLERsyrchem2-62.eps
TEXT OF ‘‘AN OPEN LETTER FROM SYRIANS WORKING 

WITH U.S. AND EUROPEAN FUNDED ORGANIZATIONS’’ 

Secretary of State of the United States John Kerry 

Foreign Ministers of all Member States of the European Union 

We write to you as Syrians working in USG and European-funded organizations 

on programs promoting local governance, civilian livelihood and grassroots organizing; programs meant to support democratic reform and the creation of an inclusive pluralistic nation. Recent events however have raised doubts whether our work 

has any meaning. 

As Russia and the Assad regime’s aggression continue to escalate in an unprecedented manner, it has become eminently clear that without immediate action by the 

U.S. and its allies, including a complete cessation of hostilities throughout Syria and 

a meaningful political process, our efforts may be lost as the situation on the ground 

becomes irreversible. With local governance and civil society activity wiped away, 

extremists on the ground will be decisively empowered and the refugee crisis will 

spiral out of control. 

In recent days, Russia and the Assad regime have targeted and destroyed Syrian 

civilian infrastructure including the Civil Defense base in Atarib, Aleppo, Al Quds 

hospital, the only hospital providing healthcare services for women and children in 

opposition-held Aleppo, two primary health care centers in opposition-held Aleppo, 

and a marketplace in Muarat Numan, among many other civilian localities. 

Five ‘‘White Helmets’’ along with the last remaining pediatrician in oppositionheld Aleppo were killed as a result. Indeed, between April 23 and 28, there have 

been 120 documented cases of regime/Russian shelling and barrel bombing, killing 

a total of 170 people including 36 children. These people are not only our program 

beneficiaries, but they are more importantly our families and friends. 

While Russia and the Assad regime point to Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS to justify 

these war crimes, the reality is that there are no legal or humanitarian justification 

for the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure. These claims are mere red 

herrings to hide the appalling truth that Syrian doctors, nurses, civil defense workers, and children are the real targets of Russia and the regime. 

As the co-chair of the Vienna Statement, Munich Agreement and the ISSG working group, the U.S. holds a dominant role in protecting Syrians and ensuring that 

the regime and Russia are complying with Security Council resolution 2254 which 

calls for a ceasefire, parallel political process and the immediate cessation of attacks 

against ‘‘civilians and civilian objects... including attacks against medical facilities 

and personnel, and any indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling 

and aerial bombardment.’’ 

By failing to take any real steps to enforce this agreement, the U.S. is failing in 

its legal and political responsibilities to stop the bloodshed of our Syrian brethren. 

Indeed, U.S. special Envoy Michael Ratney’s statement on April 29 made clear 

that Aleppo is left out of the current negotiated fighting freeze between the U.S. 

and Russia, which will grant Russia and the regime carte blanche to further scorch 

Aleppo to the ground and massacre its people ultimately. We find this utterly outrageous. 

(107)


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER
108 

While the U.S. and its allies have asked Syrians to be supportive of the Geneva 

peace process, how can we? At the time of this writing, Russia and the regime are 

bombing our hospitals and schools and leveling our towns. Minute by minute, we 

are losing our loved ones to Russian missiles and regime barrel bombs under the 

international community’s watch. Given such realities, the political process has lost 

any credibility. 

In Secretary John Kerry’s address to the Syrian people during the Geneva III 

talks he stated, ‘‘The world needs to push in one direction—toward stopping the oppression and suffering of the Syrian people and ending, not prolonging, this war.’’ 

If an end to Russian and regime aggression is not realized immediately, the conflict 

will burn on. As a result, the only winners in such a scenario are the Assad regime 

and extremist groups like ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra, as the real bodies that can 

create the ‘‘inclusive, peaceful, and pluralistic Syria’’ that our programs have worked 

so hard to support will have been brutally decimated. 

Sincerely, 

150 SYRIANS WORKING ON PROGRAMS FUNDED BY: U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, 

USAID, FCO, DFID, ECHO, EU, AID RESILIENCE AND STABILIZATION, DANISH

FOREIGN MINISTRY, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY, GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, 

SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTRY. 

Æ 


FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER