STRATEGIES FOR DEFEATING COMMERCIAL 

IMAGERY SYSTEMS 

by 

Stephen Latchford, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

December 2005 

Occasional Paper No. 39 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 

i
STRATEGIES FOR DEFEATING COMMERCIAL 

IMAGERY SYSTEMS 

Stephen Latchford, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

December 2005 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy and Technology 

as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term strategic thinking about technology 

and its implications for U.S. national security. Copies of No. 39 in this series are available 

from the Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the CSAT web site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm. The fax number is (334) 953-6158; 

phone (334) 953-6460. 

Occasional Paper No. 39 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 

 

ii
Contents 

 

 Page 

DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................... iv 

ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES.....................................................................................v 

AUTHOR........................................................................................................................... vi 

ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................... vii 

I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................1 

II. COMMERCIAL IMAGING SYSTEMS AND THE THREAT TO NATIONAL 

SECURITY....................................................................................................................3 

Imaging Systems............................................................................................................3 

Nodal Description..........................................................................................................6 

III. IMPLICATIONS OF A SPACE CONTROL STRATEGY ..........................................7 

International Law..................................................................................................... 8 

Weaponization Without Destabilization......................................................................11 

Deterrence....................................................................................................................12 

Dissuading Vendors of Commercial Imagery .............................................................12 

Business Impact and Policy.........................................................................................13 

IV. STRATEGY RECOMMENDATION.........................................................................14 

Policy Statement ..........................................................................................................14 

Elements of a Decision to Use Force Against a Commercial Imagery Satellite .........15 

Deployment Strategy ...................................................................................................15 

V. COUNTERMEASURES .............................................................................................17 

Cooperative Measures .................................................................................................18 

Passive and Active Countermeasures..........................................................................18 

Technique-Node Scoring.............................................................................................20 

Description of Selected Techniques ............................................................................21 

Required Development ................................................................................................25 

VI. STRATEGY TO TASK ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS............................................25 

International Negotiation.............................................................................................26 

Military Strategy In Space...........................................................................................27 

Policy...........................................................................................................................28 

Acquisition Funding ....................................................................................................29 

Conclusion...................................................................................................................29 

APPENDIX A: SAMPLE OF EARTH-IMAGING SYSTEMS ......................................30 

APPENDIX B: DEFINITIONS OF DESIRED EFFECTS, WEIGHTS, 

COUNTERMEASURE TECHNIQUES, AND NODES ............................................32 

APPENDIX C: TECHNIQUES VERSUS NODE SCORING TABLE...........................37 

iii
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect 

the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the 

United States government. 

iv
Illustrations 

 

Figure 1. Example of 1-meter Resolution Imagery................................................4 

Figure 2. Nodes Common To Commercial Imaging Systems...................................19 

Figure 3. WorldView Satellite Receive Antenna Pattern (402 MHz)..................................22

Figure 4. Ground Station Visibility.................................................................22 

Tables 

Table 1. Countermeasure Techniques..............................................................20 

Table 2. Technique Score Summary...............................................................21

v
Author 

Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Latchford is currently the Command Electronic Warfare 

Officer and Chief of Special Technical Operations for Air Force Space Command, Peterson 

AFB CO. He is responsible for all aspects of Integrated Joint Special Technical Operations 

special-access capabilities related to Air Force Space Command. Colonel Latchford began 

his Air Force career as a navigator and electronic warfare officer on the KC-135 Rivet Joint. 

His previous assignments include Offutt AFB NE, the National Security Agency, and United 

States Central Command. He is a graduate of the Air Force’s Air War College and holds a 

M.S. in aeronautical science management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a 

B.S. in political science from the U.S. Air Force Academy. In 2004 Colonel Latchford 

received the Air War College Commandant’s Award for his paper entitled “Strategies for 

Defeating Commercial Imagery Systems.” 

vi
Abstract 

 High-quality space-based imagery, once among America' s most closely held secrets for 

force enhancement, is now openly available through commercial providers. The United 

States faces questions of how to keep this source of valuable intelligence information from its 

adversaries, and whether it is even possible or desirable to do so. This paper addresses 

strategies for countering the threat to military operations posed by commercial earth-sensing 

satellites. The paper emphasizes technical countermeasures, using a combination of nodal 

and value analysis to arrive at possible solutions. It also considers strategies necessary to 

make those countermeasures militarily useful and politically acceptable. The result of the 

research is a recommendation for long-term pursuit of co-orbital weapons with reversible 

effects, while in the short term, integrating current technology into ground-based and airborne 

radio-frequency jammers and low-power lasers for point defense. In the process it highlights 

the need for surge capacity in space lift, so the United States can have a defensive spacecontrol capability without accelerating the arms race in space. 

vii
I. Introduction 

The unique spaceborne advantage that the US has enjoyed over the past few 

decades is eroding as more countries—including China and India—field 

increasingly sophisticated reconnaissance satellites. Today there are three 

commercial satellites collecting high-resolution imagery, much of it openly 

marketed. Foreign military, intelligence, and terrorist organizations are 

exploiting this—along with commercially available navigation and 

communications services—to enhance the planning and conduct of their 

operations. 

 -- CIA Director George Tenet to the U.S. Senate Armed 

Services Committee, 19 March 20021

The 1991 Persian Gulf War provided the first evidence of the growing danger 

commercial earth-imaging satellite systems posed to United States military operations. For 

the first time in history, military commanders recognized commercially available satellite 

images could deny their forces the element of surprise because images had become sharp 

enough to detect force deployments and movements. Since 1995 more than sixteen countries 

and multi-national consortia have put commercial satellite-imagery systems into service, half 

with image-quality better than eight meters, further raising the threat posed to American and 

allied forces.2

 

In the United States, military strategy has not consistently served as the medium for 

encouraging technological innovation. Typically, strategy evolves slowly, taking advantage 

of new technologies developed by defense laboratories and industry. Practitioners adapt the 

capabilities to new uses, which subsequently results in improved tactics. The Wright 

brothers, for example, did not develop the airplane to meet stated needs of the United States. 

In fact, the Wrights could not generate government interest in their technology until after it 

found success in Europe. 

Likewise, it is reasonable to expect space capabilities and space strategy will evolve in a 

similar manner. New strategies for space warfighting sometimes run counter to currently 

held international norms, and because it can be difficult to create new strategies if the 

enabling capabilities to achieve them are not yet envisioned, existing strategies may be 

unnecessarily narrow, resulting in little popular support. Typically, when research scientists 

develop new technologies, users often request improvements to make it more suitable to their 

applications. While technology breakthroughs occasionally result in a new capability, the 

iterative approach is just as valid, but it takes resources to keep that process going. 

The problem with the iterative process is that in the time it takes for strategy and 

technology to evolve, a surprise may occur, one for which the country is not prepared to 

respond. As the nation’s dependency on space increases, civilian and military leadership will 

levy requirements for protection against hostile attacks upon space-based systems. Finally, as 

adversaries challenge U.S. space power through capabilities of their own, or worse if they can 

deny U.S. access to space, requirements will likely appear for offensive weapons to fight for, 

in, and from space. A proactive policy will lessen the likelihood of a strategic surprise. 

To prevent strategic surprise and to push technological capabilities and operational 

concepts forward more quickly, today’s leaders should analyze current and future space 

threats and generate a clear, unambiguous strategy for hedging against them. Such a strategy 

would generate validated requirements, which are the primary source for procurement actions 

taken within the military and supporting government agencies. 

1
Commercial imagery poses a real, if indirect threat to U.S. interests, yet the U.S. is slow 

to move ahead without a clear policy and strategy to do so. In March 2002 the Director of 

Central Intelligence told the Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. enemies are 

exploiting commercially available imagery to plan attacks.3 The threat is compounded by a 

complex set of problems that must be addressed. Prioritization of funding within the Defense 

Department is difficult when there is a lack of documented requirements. Formal 

requirements are difficult to produce because the legal considerations and financial 

obligations are significant. If the threat is as the director describes, however, the military 

needs to have a strategy for countering it. And that strategy should be built on a coherent 

policy from which all the branches of government and industry can act. Such a policy will 

ensure diplomatic and economic instruments of power are working to shape the environment 

to permit military employment, should it become necessary. 

The purpose of this paper is to advocate for an overarching policy on countering a single 

space-based threat, specifically commercial earth-imaging satellite systems delivering 

militarily useful imagery products to an enemy. Additionally, it will advocate a strategy, 

along with corresponding weapons technology for development. The paper focuses on 

countering dissemination of updated or new imagery, since imagery that has been sold and 

disseminated to the public is irretrievable. While old imagery can provide extremely valuable 

targeting information on fixed targets, such as buildings, updated imagery is arguably the 

main threat since it provides up-to-date information for attacks against military deployments 

and post-strike battle damage assessments against all types of targets. Though some ideas 

presented in this paper may be applicable to other threats, this analysis is limited to the 

problem of commercial imagery systems. 

Information about commercial imaging systems is plentiful. Many technical operating 

parameters are a matter of record, reported to the Radio Regulations Board of the 

International Telecommunications Union.4 The Joint Spectrum Center in Annapolis, 

Maryland, maintains updated files on every internationally registered communication system. 

Trade publications, company brochures, and various Internet sites provide imaging-system 

resolution, capabilities, system architectures, and sample images.5 Conversely, detailed 

technical information on counter-surveillance technology is sparse. During the literature 

search, a number of documents by service scientific and technical intelligence centers had 

titles that appeared to be on topic. However, in order to avoid compromise of classified 

information, they were not used in this study. 

After reviewing the threat and advocating a need for a policy that will generate strategybased requirements, this paper will review some countermeasure techniques worthy of further 

development and fielding. The first step is a nodal analysis on several representative satellite 

systems in an effort to identify typical sub-systems for targeting. Next, a set of desired 

effects will be developed to provide a standard for comparing countermeasure techniques and 

for ranking their suitability. The resulting scores will then be used to identify the most 

promising countermeasure techniques and discusses weapon-specific advantages and 

limitations of each countermeasure. The top-scored countermeasure techniques will be 

assessed to determine if they meet the strategy requirements and whether they should be 

considered for research, development, and fielding. 

2
II. Commercial Imaging Systems and the Threat to National Security 

Commercial imagery systems provide legitimate products essential to scientific and 

economic growth, yet they have the potential to be used as a military force-multiplier. 

Today, corporations and quasi-governmental consortia operate sophisticated imaging 

satellites and sell their images to the public for purposes such as earth mapping and 

cartography, agricultural monitoring, environmental studies, oil and gas exploration, weather 

prediction, treaty monitoring, news gathering, and disaster response. Imagery systems 

designed for non-military purposes can still have significant military value. In fact, the 

Director of Central Intelligence last year ordered use of commercial satellite imagery to 

augment military reconnaissance-satellite products. Under the new “Clearview” agreements, 

the government will pay up to one billion dollars to two companies over a five-year period.6

If the U.S. government, which has its own high-quality imagery systems, is buying imagery 

on the open market, there is every reason to suspect countries without such indigenous 

capability will find an advantage in doing so. 

The threat comes from the particular way imagery products might be used by an enemy 

to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess U.S. interests.7

 Archived imagery is readily 

available through a number of open sources, including the Internet; so military commanders 

should assume the adversary has precise knowledge of strategic targets such as ports, 

airports, military installations, power plants, government buildings, commercial centers, and 

sports venues. As this paper will show, however, once friendly forces begin to mobilize for 

combat, access to new imagery depicting updated force concentrations and movements, 

supply stations, deployment progress, and battle-damage imagery intelligence can be 

especially helpful to enemy planning. 

Imaging Systems 

The first step in being able to understand the potential harm to the nation’s forces is to 

understand the capabilities of commercial imaging systems. For the purpose of this paper, 

“commercial imaging systems” includes all the components of systems that use earth-orbiting 

satellites to make and distribute images of the earth. Such systems use electro-optical, 

infrared, multi- or hyper-spectral, or radar sensors. Government-operated and governmentsubsidized systems are included here, but only those that distribute images to the public for a 

fee, not those operated strictly by governments for their own use, such as military 

reconnaissance satellites. 

One of the key quality-measurements of imagery systems is the resolution of the image. 

“Resolution is dramatically increasing—10m in 1999, 1m in 2000, 62cm in 2002, and 

licenses for 50cm have been granted by the U.S. government.”8

 Depending on the specific 

sensor, different image resolutions are achievable. Gray-scale panchromatic images are 

available with resolutions down to 0.5 meters. SpaceImaging Corporation advertises 

IKONOS satellites can provide color images down to 1-meter resolution. Infoterra’s 

QuickBird multi-spectral resolution can achieve resolutions accurate to 2.4 meters, and 

Radarsat’s radar images are accurate to 8 meters.9 

Another measure of a satellite's capability is how often it can revisit a target. Some 

orbiting systems can revisit a site every two or three days, but with mirror steering, they can 

look at the site for several consecutive orbits before losing sight of it. Systems with multisatellite constellations can claim even more frequent looks. The value of frequent revisits is 

militarily significant for indications and warning and battle damage assessments. 

 

3
Figure 1. Example of color image at 1-meter resolution--Manhattan 12 Sep 01 taken by 

commercial Ikonos satellite. Used with permission, SpaceImaging.com 

The French consortium Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales, which runs the SPOT Image 

Corporation system, is an excellent example of the improvements in earth-imaging 

capabilities over the last twelve years. SPOT provided frequent high-fidelity commercial 

images to coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War, while denying them to Iraq.10 Its 

formidable capabilities at that time included four spectral bands—a stereo-vision 

panchromatic band with 10-meter resolution and three multi-spectral bands in the green, red, 

and near-infrared bands with 20-meter resolution. An image area of 60 kilometers x 950 

kilometers could be revisited every three days using steerable mirrors.11 This level of fidelity 

was sufficient to detect large armor concentrations and movements and could have given Iraq 

advance notice of U.S. attack plans.12 Today, SPOT advertises 2.5-meter panchromatic 

resolution, 10 to 20-meter multi-spectral resolution, and the ability to provide daily coverage 

of desired targets.13 

4
Orbits 

Geosynchronous earth orbiting satellites typically trade resolution for the ability to 

maintain constant coverage of a specific area. This is done by putting the satellite in an 

equatorial orbit at approximately 22,500 miles in altitude—the latitude and altitude necessary 

for the satellite to circle the planet once daily, thereby keeping its relative position with the 

ground. Weather satellites are an example. With resolutions of one kilometer or more, 

weather satellites are not normally considered to be sufficient for observing militarily 

significant targets on the ground. They can, however, be used to look for large, environmentinfluencing indicators such as aircraft contrails, smoke, and clouds of dust. The usefulness of 

Meteosat for indications and warning during Operation DESERT STORM was limited by its 

8-kilometer resolution and its downlink rate of one full picture every thirty minutes, yet it 

demonstrated an important military contribution: 

Meteosat satellites provided visible and infrared images of Iraq and Kuwait 

during the Persian Gulf War, including the first images of the smoke plume 

from the oil terminal off the Kuwaiti coast of Mina Al-Ahmadi. Every half 

hour, 24-hours a day, the Meteosat system provided visible evidence from 

space of Iraq's systematic destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells. The satellites also 

sent back information on wind direction during the early phases of the allied 

ground assault, considered critical if Iraq had resorted to using chemical 

weapons. Although the satellites provided images with resolutions of only 

about eight kilometers, they did so in minutes rather than hours or days, and 

were considered an important asset during the conflict. 14

Today, Meteosat advertises 1-kilometer resolutions and the ability to download a picture 

every fifteen minutes.15

Most imaging satellites use lower orbits designed to maximize the effectiveness of their 

payloads and to access specific geography for imaging and for communication with the 

ground site. For example, polar orbits are better than equatorial orbits for imaging polar 

icecaps. Because low-orbit satellites operate at lower altitudes than geosynchronous 

satellites, typically about 400-1000 kilometers, they are in constant motion in relation to fixed 

points on the earth. The addition of infrared or radar sensors improves the utility of low 

orbits because they make the nighttime portions of the orbit useable. The additional benefit 

of radar sensors is that they can see through clouds and some camouflage coverings. Higher 

image-resolution and better target access are achievable in low orbits, but since 

communication with the satellite requires line-of-sight to a ground station, geography may 

limit the orbit or require additional ground stations. For example, Landsat, the United States 

government’s low-orbiting system, sells 15-meter earth imagery to users worldwide and has 

ground stations in eighteen foreign countries, including China.16 

Sensor Technology 

Earth imaging satellites may carry more than one type of sensor, each designed for a 

specific purpose, and each using different sensing materials and covering different frequency 

ranges, expanding their utility. For example, Landsat-7, launched in 1999, features an 

enhanced thematic mapper in addition to its multi-spectral scanner. The enhanced thematic 

mapper uses eight spectral bands. The first four cover portions of visible light spectrum from 

0.45 to 0.9 micrometers using silicon photodiodes. Sixteen indium antimonide detectors 

serve the bands from 1.55 to 1.75 micrometers and 2.08 to 2.35 micrometers, and four 

mercury-cadmium-telluride detectors are added for the 10.4 to 12.5 micrometer band.17 Not 

5
all bands in a system have a need for high resolution, however. Multiple discrete bands are 

used together to produce multi-spectral images. Though multi-spectral images are lower 

resolution than panchromatic images, they can provide information such as foliage types, 

operating status of heat-generating infrastructure and equipment, and aircraft contrails. As 

the previous METEOSAT example showed, depending on the intended target and the spectral 

bands available to image it, low-resolution multi-spectral systems can have useful military 

applications. The number, type, and frequencies of the sensor bands vary from system to 

system, frustrating the concept of a simple, universally applicable countermeasure. 

Processing and Distribution 

Future enemies may already have an archive full of useful imagery, but they must rely on 

the satellite operator’s processing and distribution system to get up-to-date imagery. It can 

take from minutes to weeks for desired images to be received depending on the tasking—the 

desired angle, resolution, sensor type, the number of satellites in the constellation, their 

orbits, and the number and locations of suitable ground sites. SPOT’s system is typical.18 

The satellite operator passes instructions to the sensor, such as where, when, and how to look 

at a target, which sensors or bands to use when looking, which ground sites should receive 

the downlink and which customers should receive the product.19 Depending on the system, 

the image downlink may be processed where it is received, or it may have to be retransmitted 

to a processing facility somewhere else in the world. The processing center then creates the 

products from the image data and licensed distributors can provide them to customers. 

Potential enemies may get imagery from a licensed distributor, another customer, or through 

surreptitious acquisition such as unlicensed reception. 

Nodal Description 

A quick survey of space systems leads to the conclusion that all imaging systems are 

comprised of both space and ground components. The space component consists generally of 

the spacecraft platform, also called the bus, the sensor payload, and the communication and 

control system. A complex ground component can be distributed across several countries and 

consist of multiple ground receive-stations, an imagery-processing station, terrestrial 

communications between nodes, and a product distribution system. As described earlier with 

Landsat, some systems use direct-receiving stations, which support licensees in different 

countries or collect data for specific geographic areas. In those cases the reception and 

processing nodes may be co-located and have reduced need for specialized communication 

nodes beyond what is needed for product distribution. 

The capabilities described in this section form a threat to the homeland and to U.S. 

military operations worldwide, a threat that requires attention today if timely responses are 

expected in a crisis. If an enemy today were using updated imagery to plan attacks capable of 

significant damage to U.S. interests, the short list of available responses would be 

unappealing. For example, turning off or disrupting the space-based nodes, i.e. the satellites 

themselves, would effectively deny new information to legitimate users and friendly forces 

that are dependent upon it. Voluntary interruption of METEOSAT or Landsat data might be 

unacceptable in a time of crisis management, such as following a chemical attack where such 

data is used in managing the response. Disruption of selected terrestrial nodes, such as a 

direct-receiving station or the portion of the product distribution channel within the 

adversary’s borders, might limit the effects of the service denial to a subset of users and 

customers, but again, the impact on non-belligerent users might be substantial. 

6
III. Implications of a Space Control Strategy 

It is almost certain that sometime early in the 21st Century, the fielding of 

space-based weapons will occur under the auspices of defense, in much the 

same manner as the nuclear weapon buildup that occurred within the latter 

half of the 20th. And, like nuclear weapons, once fielded, there will be no 

reversing course. This too is an historical lesson of warfare. 

 --James Oberg, Space Power Theory20

 

The current U.S. strategy for operations against space threats is unclear. Part of the 

problem is that discussions on space threats are often focused on land-based threats to U.S. 

space-based infrastructure. Public strategy documents pay little attention to threats posed by 

enemy capabilities from space, or the threat from commercial imagery specifically. The 

President’s 2002 National Security Strategy focuses on protection of U.S. infrastructure and 

assets in outer space but is silent on threats from other countries’ space resources.21 The 

subordinate 1997 National Military Strategy, now superseded by the 2004 version, guardedly 

advocated controlling an adversary’s use of space: 

We will also endeavor to maintain our current technological lead in space as 

more users develop their commercial and military capabilities. It is becoming 

increasingly important to guarantee access to and use of space as part of joint 

operations and to protect US interests. Space control capabilities will ensure 

freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to 

adversaries.22 

The important caveat to denying freedom of action to the enemy is, “if directed.” Defense 

officials are essentially stating there is no policy permitting the military to deny freedom of 

action to adversaries. If the Defense Department wanted to encourage development of 

capabilities in that area, the document should have been more directive, saying “we will 

develop and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space, and to 

deny such freedom to adversaries.” 

From a review of public policy documents, U.S. space control strategy appears to be 

limited, and that is likely to have direct impact on funding for research and development. 

Looking at the Defense Department’s definition of “space control,” it is easy to see why the 

administration needs to have a carefully considered concept before declaring a strategy that 

will no-doubt have international repercussions. According to joint doctrine: 

Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly 

forces...and negation of enemy adversary space systems. Space control 

operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and include 

offensive and defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and maintain 

space superiority and situational awareness if events impact space 

operations.23 

The United States Strategic Command inherited the former United States Space 

Command’s mission to be prepared to apply force from space. It is currently limited to 

theorizing since a policy change is necessary to permit an attack. Strategic Command states, 

“In the future, being able to attack terrestrial targets from space may be critical to national 

defense....USSTRATCOM currently does not have an operational anti-satellite 

7
weapon....Research and development into anti-satellite technology is continuing.”24 The 

lack of a declarative U.S. policy on conducting space control operations leaves little room for 

the military to declare a space-control strategy. Without a policy or a strategy, support for 

building capabilities is likely to get vague, inconsistent, and cautious support from Congress 

and the public. 

Suggesting a strategy in response to the commercial imagery threat will likely generate 

resistance at home and abroad if it implies any form of space weaponization. It is still a goal 

of the world, including the United States, to preserve the use of space for peaceful purposes. 

The United Nations Conference on Disarmament has been working on the details of an 

agreement entitled, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” since 1981. It has not 

progressed since 1995 for a number of political reasons, including a U.S. assertion that it is 

unnecessary because there is no arms race in space.25 Despite slow progress, support for 

such a measure in the 2002 General Assembly remained nearly unanimous, with only the 

U.S. and Israel abstaining.26 Even if the U.S. generally supported the premise of space used 

for peaceful purposes, precipitous agreement on binding treaty language could severely limit 

options for countering or preventing hostile space activities by others in the future. 

International law, destabilization, deterrence, and business impacts of commercial 

satellite countermeasures are current concerns in the development of ground and space-based 

weapons for space control. They are considered here, in the context of the current threat from 

commercial imagery, to avoid assumptions related to other applications of space control. 

International Law 

International law is among the first considerations when establishing a policy permitting 

a space control strategy against commercial imagery systems. The first question is whether 

international law allows the U.S. to interfere with a commercial imagery system, what 

components of the system may be attacked, and under what conditions and restrictions, and 

the level of force that is permissible. Another deals with the permissible methods for doing 

so, in particular whether defensive countermeasures may be space-based. 

International law comes not from a single international code but from conclusions that 

may be drawn from the totality of international norms. “International law is a body of 

principles, rules, and norms, generally observed by the members of the international society 

in their international relations or when they are dealing with international organizations or 

citizens of other states.”27 

Legality of Attacking a Commercial Imagery Operator 

The question of whether to interfere with, obstruct, or otherwise attack a commercial 

imagery-satellite operator must first address whether the system is a legitimate target. 

International law is so complex that decisions on the legality and methods of attacking 

commercial operators should not be left until a crisis is at hand. To begin, maritime and land 

warfare law have addressed the problem of dealing with non-combatants providing tangible 

war materiel to parties of a conflict, but the guidance is not clear. With certain exceptions, 

such as humanitarian assistance, maritime law recognizes the right of combatants to halt trade 

by persons who abrogate their neutral status by supporting a belligerent with military aid. 

Since space law attempts to take advantage of existing maritime and air law, it was maritime 

law that established “a nation’s jurisdiction extends to any spacecraft under its flag.”28

Therefore, familiar mechanisms for dealing with suppliers of our enemies may have direct 

application in thinking about space control. 

8
Using the parallel between maritime and space law, trade in imagery products is 

permissible during peacetime. If, in a crisis, the United Nations subsequently imposes 

sanctions, the licensing state may, under its sovereign authority, demand its commercial 

enterprises abide by the resolutions. It is important to note that until hostilities begin, the 

U.S. may not be able to unilaterally enforce the sanctions. For example, during Operation 

Desert Storm, if Iraq owned a space-based imagery system, the United States could have 

attacked the ground components as part of Iraq’s intelligence infrastructure, in accordance 

with the laws of armed conflict. If instead Iraq had purchased its imagery, the question 

remains: Could the U.S. legally attack a commercial entity’s ground components as part of 

that same intelligence infrastructure? 

If a neutral country permits its citizens to export imagery data, U.S. commanders may be 

unable to forcibly interrupt the data unless the President or Secretary of Defense declares the 

country to be hostile, or the commander determines a need to act in self-defense. The Hague 

Convention V of 1907 says neutral states have no responsibility to prevent the export of 

anything that might be useful to a belligerent.29 Despite that, commanders in the field have a 

great deal of latitude to act in self-defense, and they may use any legal weapon available to 

attack a commercial imagery system, in space or on the ground. Self-defense against a 

camera may be difficult to justify if the operator is powerless to stop the imagery from going 

to the enemy. In that case, only the enemy’s forces, not the civilian imagery system, would 

be the legal targets. 

The complexity of the problem is made worse by an exception for communications 

systems. The Air Force advises its commanders: 

If a neutral nation permits its information systems to be used by the military 

forces of one belligerent, the other belligerent generally has a right to demand 

that it stop doing so. If the neutral refuses, or if for some reason it is unable to 

prevent such use by a belligerent, the other belligerent may have a limited 

right of self-defense to prevent such use by its enemy. There appears to be a 

limited exception to this principle for communications relay systems. This 

exception only applies to systems that merely relay communications, not to 

systems that generate information.30 

This exception for relay systems may have been derived from Article 8 of the Hague 

Convention V (1907), which says, “A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict 

the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy 

apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.”31 

 

Adding still more complexity are the agreements under The Helsinki Principles on the 

Law of Maritime Neutrality, part of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 

1982. These principles state, “Merchant ships flying the flag of a neutral State may be 

attacked if they (a) engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy; (b) act as auxiliaries to 

the enemy’s armed forces; or (c) are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s intelligence 

system ...”32 Recalling that imagery satellites are flagged by the states that license them, 

these elements seem to imply commercial systems would be legitimate targets in some cases. 

While the Air Force Judge Advocate has provided guidance to commanders on the subject of 

neutral information systems, it would be helpful for the Defense Department to make a 

declaration on the legality of attacking commercial imagery systems. A full analysis of a 

question of this complexity should not be postponed until a time-critical crisis is at hand. 

9
Considering Methods of Attack 

If the rules of engagement permit self-defense against neutral systems, or if commercial 

system operators are declared hostile, leaders will still have to consider which weapons are 

appropriate to attack the systems. With weapons for use against space-based nodes, 

commanders will have more options for conducting attacks while avoiding heat, blast, and 

fragmentation that put lives at risk unnecessarily. Space-based targets might also be more 

accessible than terrestrial targets, but the determining factor for alternatives is the weapons 

that are available. 

When weapons capable of attacking space systems are available, they will probably be 

controlled at very high echelons of command, at least initially, because of their political 

sensitivity. Any decision to target an imagery system of an otherwise neutral party will 

require direct evidence the imagery is giving a military intelligence to the adversary. Proof 

acceptable to U.S. military commanders may not be sufficient to sway public and 

international opinion, and may keep civilian leaders looking for options less controversial 

than an overt attack against the system. The question of whether an attack on a commercial 

system can be politically justified gives a commercial satellite operator a measure of 

protection. Accordingly, by buying third-party commercial imagery, the adversary gets a 

source of high-quality imagery without the expense of building it himself, plus a degree of 

built-in survivability, owed to the potential political dilemma. The adversary does run the 

risk, however, that the provider can decide to suspend service. 

Once the legitimacy of the target is established, the question becomes one of necessity, 

proportionality, and political acceptability. Currently, operators of commercial satellites may 

expect a level of protection as neutral parties participating in legal commerce. A statement in 

a USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies paper by Major James G. Lee reinforces that 

attitude, making a key assumption that the United States will not attack a third party's 

commercial satellite, even if that party is providing intelligence to the enemy. "In no case is 

attacking [a satellite owned by another nation but supporting a belligerent] with hard- and 

soft-kill mechanisms viewed as being politically acceptable."33 The real question is whether 

the assistance provided by the imagery system operator is so damaging that it warrants a 

military response, in spite of the international acrimony that is likely to follow. A counter to 

Lee’s argument would take the position that when American lives are lost as a result of 

material aid given to the enemy, the commercial enterprise may be declared a legal target out 

of necessity. It may then be put out of business in a proportional manner. The means of 

stopping commercial imagery will be evaluated in the context of international law and 

diplomacy, but the range of options is constrained by the weapons and tactics available. 

Space-based Weapons for Defensive Countermeasures 

Three important treaties to consider when discussing weaponization of space are the 

Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the now-obsolete Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty. The Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) banned nuclear weapons test explosions, and 

any other nuclear explosion, in and beyond the atmosphere, specifically outer space. Its main 

purpose was to prevent environmental and physical damage from radiation and 

electromagnetic pulse.34 The Outer Space Treaty (1967) developed at the height of the Cold 

War, proscribes, among other things, putting nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 

destruction in orbit around the earth. It prohibits certain activities on the moon, specifically 

testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, and establishing military 

installations. The Outer Space Treaty also established the universal right to orbit over 

sovereign countries by denying territorial rights in space, a clear departure from maritime and 

10
aeronautical law with respect to national sovereignty.35 The obsolete Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Treaty (1972), which grew out of the 1969 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I, prohibited 

developing an anti-ballistic missile and specifically prohibited space-based missile defense 

systems. Its purpose was to ensure that no country felt impervious to an intercontinental 

ballistic missile attack—a sense that could lead to undeterred bellicosity.36 

Though the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is no longer in force, its stabilizing philosophy 

will no doubt continue to be a goal of most members of the United Nations, as the 

Disarmament Committee continues its work to secure the use of space for peaceful purposes. 

Although literalists argue weaponization is permissible as long as the weapons are nonnuclear, such weapons may still violate the tenet of “customary use” of space. Cicero 

described customary use. “Justice has emanated from nature. Therefore, certain matters have 

passed into custom by reason of their utility. Finally the fear of law, even religion, gives 

sanction to those rules which have both emanated from nature and have been approved by 

custom.”37 Still, customary use is evolutionary and open to argument. In 1959, United 

Nations Resolution 1721 established that other international laws, such as those for air and 

the sea may have applicability in space.38 This is important, because it supports the view that 

when a treaty is silent on a matter, there may be relevant rules that apply from other treaties 

or custom. Because of that, the language on the purpose of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 

might remain a sticking point during weaponization discussions, even though the U.S. has 

withdrawn from this treaty. If U.S. legal advisors agree certain types of space weapons are 

consistent with international law and customary use, the first to put weapons in orbit is likely 

to draw international condemnation for their destabilizing effects. For the U.S., a decision to 

deploy defensive weapons is likely to be criticized as a momentous stride down the slippery 

slope toward martial space. 

Weaponization Without Destabilization 

Beyond the din generated by the international community, the United States will need to 

consider the actual destabilizing effects of deploying a space weapon, even if nominally 

defensive. As the world's superpower, a rush to weaponize in absence of an impending threat 

to its military superiority will be regarded with suspicion. American politicians must be 

prepared to respond to the question, “What threat is so grave that it cannot be handled by 

America’s prodigious terrestrial capability?” Although competitors may not respond 

militarily to U.S. weaponization, some will see it as a dangerous move by a hegemon and will 

shift to create a counterbalance. Coalitions are likely to form, particularly in diplomatic 

circles, in resistance to any effort to capitalize on weaponization, and adversaries will look to 

field asymmetric countermeasures against those weapons. Even a U.S. policy to build space 

weapons to be held in reserve until needed is certain to draw fire from those who perceive 

little difference between a quick-reaction defensive capability and an offensive capability. 

If a decision were made to put a defensive counter-imagery capability in space, the 

details of its deployment are as important as its technical abilities as a weapon. A number of 

reasons have been raised supporting the general idea of weapons in orbit.39 The most 

compelling among them would give the United States the ability to 

• Deter others from attacking critical information infrastructure 

• Disrupt enemy use of its indigenous or commercial information sources 

• Project power around the globe quickly and precisely 

• Defend the United States and its allies from ballistic missile attacks 

The wording alone in the first three bullets implies an offensive capability, while the last 

bullet looks to be more defensive. However, it is a type of defense that generated the 

11
concerns resulting in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The point being that even defensive 

measures can be seen as destabilizing. 

It stands to reason that orbiting weapons could have a stabilizing effect if they only 

counter the existing threat, are not able to punish, and do not comprise an impenetrable 

national defense. Defensive countermeasures against imaging satellites can meet that 

standard. It is a well-established rule of international law, established in the United Nations 

Charter, that “peaceful purposes,” key wording in the Outer Space Treaty, include the right of 

self-defense.40 It may be argued weapons targeted against a specific satellite before they are 

launched, in response to an ongoing attack, are contributing to the peaceful use of space. In 

anticipation of a threat, weapons could be deployed or launched against a general type of 

target, such as imaging satellites, and then receive specific target information later if the U.S. 

declared such a satellite “hostile.” The use of space stations, shuttles, or other satellites that 

wait in orbit for contingency tasking meets these criteria. However, their ability to go after 

non-belligerent satellites, if so ordered, may appear offensive and inconsistent with the 

peaceful use of space. 

Deterrence 

The U.S. currently has no credible, proportional military option that would deter 

commercial imagery operators from providing products to enemies. Military commanders 

will not use disproportionate force against an imagery provider or the country that licenses its 

operations. The challenge for the U.S. is to create a weapon that can be used in a counterimagery role while meeting proportionality standards by reducing the chance of unnecessary 

human casualties. 

Weapons that can be employed quickly have higher deterrent value than those with long 

deployment timelines. A satellite capable of interfering with a commercial imagery satellite 

does not have to be in orbit to be credible, but it loses credibility if it cannot be employed 

quickly, because the provider may use the deployment timeline to his benefit. The deterrent 

effect of a space-based system can be achieved by having systems on the ground that can be 

put into service rapidly. It requires an assumption of risk directly related to the time it takes 

to get the weapons deployed, which includes the commitment to ensure the response 

capabilities exist when they are needed. 

Dissuading Vendors of Commercial Imagery 

Foreign states are responsible for the activities of their citizens in space, and U.S. 

attempts to control foreign imagery will likely begin with the foreign government. Of all the 

options for persuading a company not to sell imagery, the use of force is a last resort. If the 

vendor is a United States corporation, the government can instruct it not to provide 

imagery.41 For foreign companies subject to the laws of a friendly government, a diplomatic 

request should be sufficient, since states maintain responsibility for all objects in space. The 

Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1976) requires states 

to register their spacecraft with the United Nations. In the case where more than one country 

is party to the mission, it requires those countries to decide which shall register it. According 

to Reynolds and Merges, “the state on whose registry the object is carried retains full 

jurisdiction and control over the object under Article 8 of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.”42 

With such agreements in place, the use of force can then be reserved for non-cooperative 

states, companies, or individuals, regardless of whether the satellite system is operated by a 

person, government, or international consortium. 

12
It is important to point out that an entity cannot generally be declared hostile unless it is 

cooperating with the belligerent. The U.S. would not be able to attack an imagery system 

being exploited by an enemy without the system operator’s knowledge or permission.43

In the past the United States has used exclusive marketing agreements in and attempt prevent 

the enemy from getting any support.44 This can come in especially handy when dealing with 

companies subject to the laws of a licensing state that is neutral or sympathetic to the enemy, 

and therefore unwilling to intervene on behalf of the United States. Should a more aggressive 

response be required, the United States will first warn the offender to desist, and if the 

warning failed to achieve the desired result, the next step could be a direct attack against the 

system. For the warning to be effective the decision maker, whether at the state or company 

level, must perceive an ability and willingness of the United States to follow through. 

Foreign companies may be unwilling to support the decisions made by their political 

leaders. During Operation Desert Storm, France was a coalition member, and SPOT Image 

Corporation allowed imagery access to the coalition while denying it to Iraq. By contrast, in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom there is evidence in news reports that Russian companies were 

providing Iraq with jammers to counter the Global Positioning Service, even though Russia 

supported the United Nations sanctions against Iraq.45 The Russians contended the vendors 

were not operating with government consent. The U.S. used the political instrument of 

power to persuade the Russians to stop the activity. Diplomacy can be most effective in 

denying imagery access to an adversary while maintaining it for friendly use. In those 

situations where diplomacy is ineffective, the field commander will need other 

countermeasures to deal with the enemy’s imagery providers. 

Many commercial systems are owned and operated by a consortium of private 

companies or governments, but spacecraft and ground sites are under the jurisdiction of 

states. The multi-national nature of some companies makes it difficult to assign 

responsibility for policing a company’s activities. Such is not the case with spacecraft and 

ground stations, which are under the jurisdiction of sovereign states. It is important that 

multinational corporations be made aware of United States policy so they have the ability to 

react appropriately when approached with a demand to desist. Even if the U.S. cannot 

directly influence decisions by a multinational company, it can take the matter up with the 

state of registration bilaterally. A corporate decision maker, regardless of nationality, will be 

at a disadvantage for negotiating a favorable outcome if the state of registry cooperates in 

response to political pressure. 

Business Impact and Policy 

The business impacts associated with a space-control policy could have unintended 

consequences. Supporting the policy is the deterrent effect of fear that a company could lose 

its satellite for failing to cooperate, or that it could lose business from some countries that 

prefer not to risk service interruptions. An announcement by the U.S. of a policy to attack 

satellites in orbit will likely generate a response from insurance companies trying to rate the 

risk of attacks on satellites. This could affect not only imagery companies, but also the entire 

space industry if the announcement generates an overall perception of an arms race in space 

increasing risk to every space-system operator. It would be ironic if a policy to control the 

dissemination of militarily significant imagery indirectly caused unrelated businesses to go 

out of business because of increased costs to operate. Once again, the types of weapons and 

tactics can have a major impact. For example, a kinetic anti-satellite weapon that impacts the 

target, destroys it, and leaves space debris in its wake is more problematic than a co-orbital 

screen that temporarily blocks the sensors’ view of earth and de-orbits after the mission ends. 

13
The value of a clearly stated policy to permit the development of a space control strategy 

is that it focuses everyone’s attention. Such a policy may also influence the actions of 

enemies against whom the strategy is to be directed. The United States, by openly stating its 

intent to protect its forces if they are threatened by commercial satellite systems, will keep 

planners and visionaries from assuming away potential military responses as Lee did in his 

paper. In addition, commercial satellite operators and the governments that regulate their 

activities will be more likely to put safeguards in place so they may choose to cooperate 

during hostilities rather than contemplate the loss of their system. An ambiguous policy 

invites the proliferation of imaging systems technically unable to respond appropriately in a 

crisis, and the most effective and inexpensive option for protecting U.S. interests is lost. 

IV. Strategy Recommendation 

Unless you plan your strategy and tactics far ahead, unless you implement 

them in terms of the weapons of tomorrow, you find yourself in the field of 

battle with weapons of yesterday. 

 --Alexander De Seversky, Air University, 28 May 194846

The United States strategy for weaponizing space is best served by endeavoring to be the 

second to engage in warfare from space. Since the high-altitude nuclear testing of the 1960s, 

the world has resisted the weaponization of space in order to preserve it for peaceful uses by 

all mankind. Changes in the post Cold War geopolitical environment, combined with 

advances in technology, suggest the world's few space powers should consider anew the 

benefits and implications of weaponizing space to find agreement on defensive space 

weapons. For instance, space-based capabilities against commercial imaging threats need not 

be placed in orbit ahead of a demonstrated peril. The desired deterrent effects can be 

achieved with capable systems stored on the ground until needed. A response-based 

weaponization strategy requires space lift to be available in sufficient quantities and 

timeliness to launch the weapons necessary to counter the threat and to launch replacements 

for any satellites that might have been damaged by an attack. Such a strategy will require the 

technology and the budget priorities be made available to make it possible.47

Policy Statement 

The United States needs a clearly stated policy so that a solid supporting strategy, and 

commercial coping strategies, may be developed. The current policy, described previously, is 

vague. It does not go into enough detail on how space superiority will be achieved when U.S. 

interests are threatened. American strategies and policies need not be overly specific, they 

simply need to support the coherent message that U.S. will take the actions necessary to 

protect its interests from attacks enabled by space-based commercial imagery systems. Such 

a policy, combined with overt research, development, test, evaluation, and deployment of 

space-control weapons, will provide adequate notice of national intent and will serve to 

motivate commercial imagery operators to consider ways to avoid confrontation. 

Threats can be neutralized in a way that mitigates legal and political fall-out, if the 

proper weapons are available. Today's atmosphere of international scrutiny and political 

sensitivities is best handled in advance with a clear, systematic approach to dealing with 

commercial imagery operators aiding the enemy during hostilities. If the attack is conducted 

in response to aggression, while minimizing the chances of physical harm to equipment or 

14
personnel and aiming to make the results reversible, the legal requirement of proportionality 

can be met and the political price for protecting friendly operations minimized. 

Elements of a Decision to Use Force Against a 

Commercial Imagery Satellite 

A strategy for space-control should be more detailed than the public policy and should 

first define the criteria under which the United States would take action against a commercial 

system, describing the desired post conflict end state in terms of whether the commercial 

imaging satellites are expected to resume operating. The decision to use force would be 

based on a set of criteria to ensure the attack is necessary and proportional, given the existing 

mix of weapons and tactics. Therefore, the strategy must address the response criteria and 

timeliness necessary for employing ground based countermeasures and launching spacebased countermeasure. A threat-based analysis suggesting parameters for system 

requirements will normally generate short-term and long-term goals for capabilities. Because 

a situation requiring a counter-space response is a present threat that can occur at any time, 

defense officials should waste no time in pursuing long and short-term systems and the 

capacity to quickly employ them. These systems will be reliant on solid technical 

intelligence for their development and properly trained personnel for their employment. 

A space control strategy would most likely make use of non-military instruments of 

power first, to lay the groundwork for cooperative denial of products to the enemy. It would 

use demarches to encourage non-combatant/neutral imagery providers not to aid the 

adversaries of the U.S. and its allies. It would also use military tactics such as operational 

security and deception to mitigate the usefulness of commercial images, which could reduce 

the need to resort to an attack. All of these steps could be taken prior to actual hostilities. 

If the threatening activity could not be stopped through peaceful means, national decision 

makers would consider declaring the imagery provider, or its host nation, “hostile.” 

Commanders could then consider any currently available non-destructive or reversible-effect 

weapon such as jammers, lasers, obscurants, or cyber weapons. If those were unavailable or 

ineffective, they could consider using more lethal means such as conventional munitions 

against terrestrial nodes, or destructive high-power directed energy against ground or spacebased nodes. These weapons would only be used if the U.S. were engaged in hostilities, 

because the imagery provider is conducting legal trade as a non-combatant up until the time it 

provides products to an enemy engaged in hostilities with the United States. 

If at any time friendly intelligence sources conclude U.S. forces are being targeted using 

such systems, commanders could use any available weapons in self-defense. It is possible 

that national decision makers will not make all space-control weapons available to field 

commanders, just as field commanders do not have access to nuclear weapons for unit self 

defense. These steps demonstrate the scope of options available when a clear policy has been 

articulated and the military-industrial complex has been permitted to establish capable 

weapons systems, ready to respond when national security is threatened. This paper will later 

discuss the types of techniques that might be most desirable for weaponization in order to 

achieve the goals of a stated policy. 

Deployment Strategy 

For a nation as great as the United States, a more realpolitik approach might be to 

prepare for combat in space, but to leave the capabilities earth-bound until they are needed. 

The effects of space weapons can be achieved by having the necessary space lift and weapons 

available for rapid response to a developing threat. By waiting for another country to be the 

15
first to weaponize space, the United States could avoid the political fallout of being the first 

to do so while garnering international support for defenses against the interloper. 

The long-term value of a second-to-weaponize approach is that it enhances America's 

“soft power.” Harvard Dean Joseph Nye says soft power “arises from the attractiveness of 

the country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When U.S. policies appear legitimate in 

the eyes of others, American soft power is enhanced. Hard power will always remain crucial 

in a world of nation-states guarding their independence, but soft power will become 

increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that require multilateral 

cooperation for the resolution.”48 Soft power is helpful in getting cooperation from the 

international community in the fight against terrorism and other trans-national threats. 

American interests are better served when the U.S. protects its interests in space, without 

being regarded internationally as a menace whose power must be counterbalanced. 

While space-based weapons are held in reserve, surface and airborne countermeasures 

can be deployed as the first-echelon defense. Once an imagery system is identified as a 

target, surface and airborne countermeasures such as jammers and lasers can be used to 

defend against it. If those systems are unable to counter the threat, commanders can decide 

whether to move to lethal force, such as conventional precision-guided munitions, or 

destructive directed energy against the ground-site with precision-guided high-power 

microwave munitions. If commanders need a temporary effect, they may then look to 

launching space-based defensive systems such as co-orbital jammers to go against terrestrial 

and space nodes, or on-orbit disabling techniques such as micro-satellite delivered 

mechanical devices or a screen that obscures the imagery satellite’s view of the earth. This 

option requires readily available space lift to be a tenable option. 

If the United State pursues a responsive second-to-weaponize strategy, it needs to 

dedicate the resources to launch capacity, weapon systems, and infrastructure replacements. 

It appears the Defense Department needs to determine a requirement for space-lift surge 

capacity, in terms of launch rate by class, if this strategy is to be credible. The Air Force 

Research Laboratory recently addressed the advantages of on-demand surge capacity saying: 

If we could quickly launch platforms that provide joint force commanders 

with whatever space assets are required, then we could strategically respond to 

situations in ways that eliminate the need for ultrahigh-resolution worldwide 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in predictable orbits. We 

want to arm our joint force commanders with the ability to respond rapidly in 

any given situation by supplying space assets in near real time. We can 

accomplish this by launching or moving space platforms or weapons to 

wherever they are required within several hours.49

This statement clearly shows how responsive, on-demand launches will improve warfighting 

capability. It supports the 1994 SPACECAST 2020 study recommending development of a 

standardized, reusable launch vehicle to reduce cost of launches. The requirement to develop 

surge capacity was more implied than stated in the study, which put the typical timeline for 

vehicle integration and checkout at sixteen weeks and quoted a cost to commercial users of 

$50 million per launch.50 Sixteen weeks will not be an acceptable timeline to joint force 

commanders, and the number of launches required remains undefined. 

A recent study funded by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

addresses the future need for launches and indicates almost no growth in demand for launches 

over the next twenty years. Counting government and commercial launches worldwide, 

“aggregate global launch vehicle demand remains relatively flat at between about 70 and 80 

launches a year....The forecast also indicates a gradual switch from medium to intermediate 

16
class launches and a steady increase of commercial market share from a quarter to half of 

launches, and the continued erosion of U.S. market share of all launches from the 40 percent 

down to the 25 percent level.”51 A major flaw in this study is its failure to indicate a 

requirement for a surge capacity during war, even though the study claims to be 

comprehensive in its accounting for Defense Department launch requirements. 

Surge capacity estimates for commercial and Defense Department launches should 

anticipate critical space-based infrastructure replacement, not just wartime weapon launches. 

The problem of replacing critical information infrastructure damaged by an attack could be 

lift-intensive, especially in heavy-class launches. Replacement systems, if available, would 

have to be mated to system-compatible lift. While new space-based systems may be 

designed to meet constrained lift specifications, many satellites currently in orbit used large, 

customized lift that could overwhelm the availability of the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle—heavy lift vehicles projected in the NASA study at twenty per year.52 The 

challenge comes in making surge capacity a priority for available funding, especially when 

launches currently cost about $190 million each.53 

A strategy of being second to weaponize space allows the United States to be one of the 

governments negotiating to keep other states’ weapons out of space. National leadership 

must decide whether the terrestrial responses are sufficient against current and foreseen 

threats. A ballistic missile attack against the homeland may be so dangerous that space 

weaponization will occur to counter that threat, despite the political cost of breaking the 

weaponization threshold. President Bush’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic 

Missile Treaty does not necessarily mean the U.S. will deploy a space-based system. It could 

instead end up deploying surface or airborne systems, or nothing at all. If a space-based antiballistic missile system is deployed, that deployment will probably clear the path for 

defensive space weapons against imagery satellites as well. 

The United States should prepare now for an uncertain future by adopting the second-toweaponize strategy. By keeping weapons on the ground until needed, the nation can continue 

to reap the benefits of space used for peaceful purposes. It can simultaneously pursue 

technological innovations, modernize and maintain the space-weapons inventory, and build 

sufficient launch vehicles for use in space combat. This approach creates deterrent effects 

without weaponizing space. If the U.S. does not take the opportunity to prepare now, it will 

still be able to fight, but victory will come more slowly and at higher cost.54 

V. Countermeasures 

A key objective for transformation, therefore, is not only to capitalize on the 

manifold advantages that space offers the United States but also to close off 

U.S. space vulnerabilities that might otherwise provoke new forms of 

competition. U.S. forces must ensure space control and thereby guarantee 

U.S. freedom of action in space in time of conflict.

 --Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, 

200355

When the U.S. needs to stop the flow of commercial imagery to adversaries, it is more 

effective to ask the system operator to suspend service than to forcibly prevent the service 

from being delivered. Companies providing imagery services are logically in the best 

position to install effective controls on their own collection and dissemination systems to 

interrupt subscribers’ ability to receive products. However, the United States must be 

prepared for situations where the company has either inadequate controls or does not desire to 

17
control product availability. Since attacking a system in any effective way would likely 

restrict the flow of imagery to all customers, companies may be motivated to provide their 

own high-grade security to protect their technology investment and their customer base. For 

example, SPOT and Landsat imaging satellites cost roughly $350 million each to build and 

launch.56 During Operation Desert Storm, SPOT demonstrated the ability to deny products to 

Iraq while permitting other customers to receive them. That is a much better solution 

financially, compared to having the system forcibly shut down. This is not to say the U.S. 

would attack a commercial imagery provider just because it was unable to stop unauthorized 

reception, but it might go after nodes owned or controlled by hostile entities, which might 

affect the operator’s on-site equipment, or service to other customers. Companies in business 

to make money are likely to have controls to protect their property rights from unauthorized 

exploitation. If nothing else, they will adhere to state’s licensing requirements, which may or 

may not require the company to deny imagery to enemies. In either case, the U.S. should be 

interested in the specific techniques the companies use to prevent unauthorized exploitation 

to ensure they are effective. 

Cooperative Measures 

Foreign governments and multinational corporations should be encouraged to voluntarily 

abide by a minimum data-denial standard. Companies should be warned that their data is 

militarily valuable, and a determined adversary may exploit it, resulting in loss of economic 

opportunity for the company, and a security risk to others. Once a satisfactory standard is 

developed, foreign companies will know whether their systems are technically capable of 

denying new imagery to unauthorized recipients. Foreign cooperation is a more efficient 

countermeasure for the U.S. and provides a measure of protection to companies that 

participate. In the event a company is unwilling or unable to take steps deny the data, the 

U.S. may have to use more forceful methods to prevent the enemy from obtaining imagery. 

Government encryption is one obvious method for denying data to unauthorized 

recipients, but commercial providers are reluctant to use it. In 2001 the U.S. government 

made encryption mandatory for some U.S. operators. The National Information Assurance 

Policy for U.S. Space Systems, National Security Telecommunications and Information 

Systems Security Policy Number 12 requires American companies to use National Security 

Agency-approved cryptography on commercial imaging satellites that might be used for 

national security requirements. Its goal is to ensure these capabilities are designed into future 

systems.57 A U.S. Senate report the following year quoted industry officials who expressed 

deep concerns with establishing encryption requirements because of the complexity of 

managing cryptographic materials, particularly overseas. Additionally, they said encryption 

does not provide much greater security than other techniques that protect data links.58 The 

specific techniques were not mentioned, but it is possible that they include commercial 

encryption or proprietary coding. Without a detailed technical review, defense officials are 

not likely to accept claims that techniques not involving government encryption are good 

enough to deny data access to an adversary—especially those who were once legitimate 

customers, or licensees, with direct-receive equipment and software. 

Passive and Active Countermeasures 

Passive countermeasures are actions taken to minimize the effectiveness of the system 

without taking the initiative against the targeted system.59 Passive countermeasures are 

useful not only during hostilities but throughout the range of military operations, including 

pre- and post-conflict phases. Operations security, one of the elements of today's integrated 

18
warfighting strategy, is an example. The goal is to “select and execute measures that 

eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary 

exploitation.”60 The ability to deny an adversary information for his operations requires 

some knowledge about how he gets that information. Intelligence support is essential for 

determining the degree to which friendly forces are vulnerable to space surveillance. 

Similarly, when the operations can be disguised by denial or deception so that the enemy is 

unable to use the imagery intelligence in a timely manner, then the commander is not at risk, 

and he may be able to avoid active countermeasures like attacking or jamming the systems. 

When commanders in the field foresee a need for active countermeasures, and few are 

available, a key task will be to determine what capabilities are needed and which techniques 

have the most promise for development. If voluntary cooperation and passive 

countermeasures are ineffective, commanders today have little ability to act directly against 

hostile commercial imaging systems, except to attack the ground sites. Value analysis is a 

technique by which a variety of other countermeasure techniques can be compared 

objectively, based on how they contribute to set criteria. Changing the criteria or the 

assumptions will change the overall ranking of compared countermeasure techniques. In the 

appendices of this paper, readers will find sufficient detail on how the criteria were selected, 

valuations defined, and overall scores calculated, so the results can be changed to meet new 

entering assumptions. When it comes to future requirements for countermeasures systems, 

the objective is not to determine what can be done, but what should be done. These analyses 

can push research and development in a direction to satisfy the most reasonable requirements. 

The list of countermeasure techniques selected for evaluation (see Table 1) was derived 

from techniques discussed by Major William Spacy in his 1999 paper on space-based 

weapons.61 It is important to differentiate between weapons and techniques. Techniques are 

ideal applications, unconstrained by the fact that the technology may not be available or 

efficient. Weapons, on the other hand, are systems capable of employing the techniques. 

Weapons are equipment that have actual mass, interfaces, and must be used within operating 

limits. The listed techniques are intended to be theoretical and are not concerned with the 

challenges of how they can be weaponized. A weakness of this evaluation is that techniques 

other than those listed were not considered. However, alternative techniques can be 

evaluated using the comparison tables in appendix C. Figure 2 shows nodes common to all 

commercial imaging systems. 

 

Platform Sensor 

Solar Array 

Control Product 

Downlink

Ground Site or 

Direct-Receiving 

Station

Sensor Array 

Comm

Processing 

Center 

Customer 

19
Figure 2. Simple Depiction Of Nodes Common To Commercial Imaging Systems 

The countermeasure techniques were evaluated on their ability to impact the previously 

identified nodes with the following desired effects: 

• End state—the potential to return the system to its pre-attack condition 

• Sustainability—of effects over the duration of hostilities 

• Vulnerability—of the weapon, or it effects, to negation by the enemy 

• Covert—whether the weapon must be covert to be effective 

• Target accessibility—likelihood the technique can access the targeted node 

• Collateral damage 

• Space debris—caused by effects of the technique 

• Political will—to employ the technique as a weapon 

The definitions and the weighting of each of the effects are listed in appendix B. Each 

evaluated technique received a standardized score for each node of a typical imagery system. 

Definitions of the techniques and the examples are in appendix B. 

Technique Example 

Conventional Attack Precision Guided Munitions 

Kinetic Destruction Anti-satellite missile 

Space Mines 

Disabling electronic attack Radio-frequency jamming 

Low-power laser dazzling 

On-orbit disabling Micro-mechanical robots 

Micro-satellite options 

Cyber attack Sensor commands 

Image Alterations 

Destructive directed energy High-power microwave 

High-power laser 

Particle beams 

Table 1. Countermeasure Techniques 

Technique-Node Scoring 

Table 2 shows a summary of the standardized scores by node. It is useful in drawing 

general conclusions about the best technique-node pair for achieving most of the desired 

effects, but the expanded scoring table in appendix C is more detailed and can give greater 

depth to understanding a particular technique for weaponization. Blanks in the table indicate 

the technique-node pair is not applicable. A critical contextual assumption in this scoring is 

that the conflict is open, not covert. The scoring and the standards change considerably if the 

commander wants to deny not only the use of the imagery, but also the fact that an operation 

is occurring or that a countermeasure is being employed. Covert countermeasures may be 

used in overt operations, but overt countermeasures may expose a covert operation. 

20
Space 

Platform 

Sensor 

Optics 

Command 

uplinks 

Ground 

Receive 

stations 

Ground 

processing 

stations 

Terrestrial 

Communications 

Conventional 

attack 27 17 23 

Kinetic satellite 

destruction 12 10 12 

Destructive 

directed energy 22 20 23 28 18 27 

Disabling electronic 

attack 28 32 34 24 

On-orbit disabling 29 28 28 

Cyber attack 21 23 16 22 

Table 2. Technique Score Summary 

The summary table points to two techniques, disabling electronic attack and on-orbit 

disabling, as potentially the most lucrative areas for further analysis since they have 

consistently high scores across several nodes. The score in each cell of the table is the sum of 

the effect-scores for each node, detailed in appendix C. The highest scoring pair, disabling 

electronic attack against the adversary's ground receive station, received a sum of 34, but the 

specific weapon indicated in this case would be an orbiting jammer in close proximity to the 

imagery satellite. It has outstanding promise for meeting the eight effects considered, but the 

political-will score for a jammer on stand-by orbit is probably zero, which in the value 

analysis is a multiplier against the overall score. If the political will is zero, the technique 

will not likely be supported for weaponization. The political-will score could become a one, 

if the jammer is kept on the ground, and is only launched in response to a specific action by 

an enemy. The table shows a sum of 34, as at this point political will is not prejudged. The 

purpose of the analysis is to determine effectiveness; acceptability will be determined later. 

Description of Selected Techniques 

The techniques are described in appendix B in sufficient detail to permit the value 

analysis. The scores in Table 2 identified disabling electronic attack and on-orbit disabling 

for more detailed consideration. Destructive directed-energy scored well against ground sites 

but not against other nodes. The weaponization envisioned in that case was a conventional 

precision-guided munition containing a high-power microwave warhead. As the application 

was more limited than the other two techniques, it was not selected for further analysis here. 

Disabling Electronic Attack 

According to doctrine, electronic attack is “employment of weapons that use either 

electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio 

frequency weapons, particle beams).”62 Electronic attacks powerful enough to cause physical 

damage to the target were categorized as destructive directed-energy weapons, while those 

intended to have a temporary or transient effect are disabling, but not necessarily destructive. 

21
Jamming may be conducted is several ways. As mentioned above, jamming a ground 

site from co-orbit with the satellite scored the highest of all countermeasure techniques, 

providing it can be made politically acceptable. Another method, low-power co-orbital 

jamming of the sensor’s command-and-control receiver aboard the satellite, is assessed to be 

effective. While it would be space-based, it may be more politically acceptable when 

targeted against a specific satellite, since it is low power, defensive, does not attack a ground 

site from space, does not threaten the environment, does not generate a feeling of military 

invulnerability, and can be designed to prevent collateral damage to other orbiting systems. 

+3 dBic

-2 dBic

-7 dBic

-12 dBic

210

180

150

120

90

60

30

0

240

270

300

330

Figure 3. WorldView Satellite Receive Antenna Pattern (402MHz)63

800 kilometer orbit, visible for 637 seconds 

400 kilometer orbit, visible for 373 seconds 

Earth 

Min elevation –10 deg 

Figure 4. Ground Station Visibility 64

22

22 
 A look at the design of a typical imagery system shows why co-orbital jammers are 

better than terrestrially-based jammers. Government information obtained from the Joint 

Spectrum Center indicates the large, six to twelve meter antennae used for downlink 

reception on the ground, have highly directional beam patterns for receiving signals. In order 

to jam the ground-station’s receiver, a jammer on the surface of the earth would have to be 

very close to the receive-antenna boresight with enough power to exceed the gain of the 

satellite’s signal. At any appreciable distance from the ground site, the task is nearly 

impossible. At ranges close enough to make this technique effective, a weapon such as an 

expendable jammer near a ground site risks detection and negation by the adversary. 

The antennae features that make jamming ground sites so difficult are not duplicated 

aboard spacecraft. The receive antennae on satellites are isotropic, making them much easier 

to jam from the ground or from space (Figure 3). Co-orbital jammers need far less power 

than ground-based jammers, which means the jamming might be difficult for the commercial 

system operator to detect, recognize, and troubleshoot. The receive antenna on satellites are 

designed this way to allow ground sites to maintain contact with a satellite as it transitions 

from horizon to horizon. It is this design that makes the satellite receivers more vulnerable 

than ground sites to jamming. The shaded area in Figure 3 shows the direction of the receiveantenna sensitivity, in this case a high-gain sensitivity from 90 to 270 degrees, which more 

than covers the portion of the earth’s surface in view from orbit. Land, sea, and air-based 

jammers can exploit that design. The area of the figure from 270 back to 90 degrees is the 

backside of the antennae, facing away from the earth. There is no need for it to be sensitive 

in that direction, so space-based jammers that are behind the satellite will need a stronger 

signal to get into the receiver from that direction, as indicated by the –12 decibel ring. 

 The disadvantage of sea- and land-based jammers is that while they can jam the 

satellite receivers within line-of-sight, they may not be able to get close enough to the ground 

site to prevent the satellite from having some effective line-of-sight time. Airborne jammers 

can substantially increase the area of coverage, but depending on geopolitical borders, the 

rules of engagement, the ability of an aircraft to be on-station for each pass of the satellite, 

and the enemy’s defenses, this airborne weaponization may also be inadequate as a sole 

attack method. The best solution for keeping jamming on the targeted system, while 

permitting access by friendly ground stations and not hostile ones, is to have the jammer in 

co-orbit with the satellite. Low-power space-based radio frequency jammers can be built so 

they are difficult to detect and locate, yet produce effects that are verifiable by friendly 

intelligence systems. These characteristics complicate the enemy’s ability to respond while 

providing a level of battle damage assessment. While space-based jammers earned the 

highest score for effectiveness, ground-based point defense using lasers against the sensor 

scored almost as high. Ground-, air-, or sea-based lasers can be used to prevent an area from 

being imaged during hostilities. A laser located in proximity to the friendly activity to be 

protected can saturate the receiver(s) so no clear image can be discerned. By knowing the 

orbit of the satellite, a laser can be aimed directly at it. The “blooming” of the image will last 

only as long as the sensor is looking in the direction of the properly tuned laser. The satellite 

operator might then choose to redirect the sensor to collect usable data of other areas, limiting 

the effects of this particular technique. Disadvantages of this weapon are that its use is highly 

detectable, it requires precise aiming throughout the visible window, and the laser power and 

frequency must be highly accurate. A laser that is too powerful may cause undesired 

permanent damage to the sensor, while one that is too weak or not properly tuned might not 

be effective. 

Temporary disabling of satellites by lasers can be a technically challenging problem. 

Separate lasers may be necessary to handle multiple bands of multi-spectral sensors. Earth 

imaging satellites often carry more than one sensor, each designed for a specific purpose, and 

23
each using different sensing materials and covering different frequency ranges. For example, 

Landsat-D has a thematic mapper in addition to its multi-spectral scanner. The thematic 

mapper uses seven spectral bands—the first four cover portions of the visible light range 

using silicon photodiodes. Sixteen indium-antimonide sensors serve bands from 1.55 to 1.75, 

and 2.08 to 2.35 micrometers, and four mercury-cadmium- telluride detectors are added for 

the 10.4 to 12.5 micrometer band.65 Landsat-7, the most advanced of the Landsat series, 

launched in 1999, is even more diverse.66 The difficulty in simultaneously jamming all the 

applicable sensors on the same satellite is difficult enough, but to ensure that the laser 

targeted against one sensor type does not permanently damage an adjacent sensor of different 

construction will require in-depth system analysis. According to Anderberg and Wolbarsht, 

“If the wavelength is one which the sensor system is designed to accept, the laser energy will 

be transmitted through the system itself, destroying or jamming vulnerable detectors. Sensors 

are normally designed to handle very small amounts of radiation and cannot accept the high 

intensities of radiation achieved by even very-low-energy lasers.”67 They go on to say dye 

lasers can be narrowly tuned within the visible to near-infrared part of the spectrum. Each 

dye is limited to about 50 to 100 nanometers. “For example, one dye may allow tuning of the 

laser within the orange part of the spectrum, but obtaining a wavelength in another part of the 

spectrum requires changing the dye.”68 They describe a technique called “Raman shifting” 

that marginally changes the wavelength of lasers by adding energy to the pump. The 

capabilities of targeted imagery systems are important when trying to design capabilities that 

are effective, while economizing on weight, space, and the number of lasers to make the 

techniques feasible as effective weapons. An imagery system carrying electro-optical, multispectral, and radar sensors would require an even more sophisticated ground based system for 

point defense. The Russian Resurs-021 earth-imaging system uses an active radar sensor in 

addition multi-spectral bands.69 An array of both low-power lasers and radar jammers might 

be necessary to adequately protect against this system. 

On-orbit Disabling 

New technologies promise to provide capabilities not even possible with manned 

spaceflight. For example, microsatellites are expected to permit close inspection of low-earth 

orbiting satellites, while making on-the-spot corrections for execution problems. Dr. Donald 

C. Daniel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, testified before Congress that current 

research and development programs will “provide the technology base for 10-100 kilogram 

microsatellites that will offer new options in many areas of space applications. Applications 

previously considered not cost-effective due to size and weight limitations, such as satellite 

servicing or launch on demand, become possible.”70 The transition from satellite servicing to 

satellite attack does not appear to be much of a stretch. Attacks might be carried out by 

remote robotics, including micro-mechanical robots. Radio controlled relays incorporated 

into an attack could be used to command re-connection of interrupted circuits, permitting a 

system to be returned to service without making a second rendezvous for the subsequent 

repair. A disadvantage with this approach is that any physical contact with the satellite could 

cause irrecoverable damage. 

An associated technique would be to erect a screen designed to permit the satellite 

operator to keep the platform operating properly, while blocking the desired sensor(s), 

effectively putting a lens cap on it. This would avoid the hazards of actual contact with the 

satellite, the risks associated with blocking vital communication, and risks associated with 

unintended laser damage to the sensor. A disadvantage of this application is similar to sensor 

lasing, in that eclipsing the sensor denies the product to all subscribers for the duration of the 

24
attack, not just to the adversary. A clear advantage is the potential for the effects to be 

completely reversible once the crisis subsides. 

Required Development 

The scores shown in the tables assumed 100 percent effectiveness, without compensation 

for physical or technical limitations imposed by actual weaponization of the techniques. 

Weapon development supported by detailed intelligence will be necessary for some of the 

techniques to achieve the results suggested in this analysis. For example, intelligence may 

suggest a command-and-control uplink can be successfully jammed, but the satellite will still 

image the territory and downlink image to the ground, based on previous instructions. This 

would be different from SPOT, where the downlink is commanded from the ground.71 

Detailed intelligence on the actual target is required to know the full effect of the techniques. 

As the foregoing suggests, different techniques will require unequal levels of effort to be 

used as weapons. Jammers have been weaponized for self-protection on small fighter 

aircraft, and subsequently need only be adapted to weaponization against commercial 

imagery nodes. Others, such as laser weapons, need further development if they are to be 

deployed aboard aircraft for access and aspect-angle advantages in point defense. Finally, 

some concepts require new discoveries in the basic sciences. Micro-mechanical robots may 

have a role when employed using microsatellites, but will need sufficient power-supplies, 

sensors, processors, mobility, and task-adaptable actuators for autonomous operation on 

satellites in space. Other systems, such as neutral particle beam weapons, are currently large, 

weigh hundreds of tons, and suffer from considerable atmospheric attenuation.72 

VI. Strategy to Task Ends, Ways, and Means 

Where the strategist is empowered to seek a military decision, his 

responsibility is to seek it under the most advantageous circumstances in 

order to produce the most profitable result. Hence his true aim is not so much 

to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does 

not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve 

this. 

--B.H. Liddell Hart 73

 

While countermeasure policy, strategy, and techniques have been the focus of this paper, 

it is helpful to step back and examine how commercial imagery countermeasures can be a 

part of broader U.S. space power. This section considers the role of strategy, policy, and 

acquisition funding to enhance U.S. space power. 

For the United States to be successful in its ability to counter its enemies in space, it 

must maintain its space power through international engagement. The interrelationship 

between the government, industry, and the military is inseparable in attaining, using, and 

keeping space power. American space objectives may be in conflict with other countries, or 

the international community as a whole, and while “space power” implies a focus on military 

advantage, it goes beyond the desire for military prowess. American military, diplomatic, 

information, and economic power are interdependent instruments for achieving the wide 

range of goals described in the National Security Strategy, including opportunities for 

economic growth. A good policy on space control would be more than a blueprint for future 

development, it would provide guidelines to practitioners, strategists, politicians, and the 

public as they debate the future of space power, and consider precedent-setting decisions in 

the international community that can either support or stifle freedom of action. 

25
International Negotiation 

The U.S. should never lose sight of the ability of the international community to 

collectively weaken American military options indirectly. Responding to the suggestion that 

the U.S. is the only world superpower, Joseph Nye writes, “On interstate economic issues, the 

distribution of power is already multipolar. United States cannot obtain outcomes it wants on 

trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of European Union, 

Japan, and others.”74 Accepting his position, and the position that military power is a tool of 

last resort for achieving objectives, the obvious conclusion is non-military space power—that 

which comes from humanitarian, economic, scientific, and other nonmilitary prominence—

must be maintained through leadership in the international community. While America 

moves ahead to use space for military operations, it must not jeopardize its broader interests 

abroad by trying to do so without a level of international acquiescence. 

According to a paper by Hamilton DeSausser, the United States took the lead in 

civilianizing space for commerce by passing the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization 

Act of 1984, and in so doing set an international precedent for commercial imagery systems. 

Describing the years that followed the launch of the first American imaging satellite in 1960, 

DeSausser says the United Nations Conference on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space considered 

claims by Argentina, Brazil, and other Latin American countries that imaging systems violate 

national sovereignty and property rights. After years of debate, the General Assembly, in 

1987, approved a weak resolution related to remote imaging from space. DeSausser 

described the result, “Since none of the multilateral space treaties cover remote sensing as a 

distinct regime, it is left to the practice of states to define the law in this area. The U.N. 

Resolution on Remote Sensing is simply too weak. Even if it were not, one state after 

another has declared that U.N. resolutions do not constitute binding obligations upon 

states.”75 According to Reynolds and Merges, the resulting resolution was decided by the 

existence of America’s precedent-setting law on the subject. Since then, the French and 

others have capitalized on the permissive rules made possible by U.S. leadership. A history 

such as that demonstrates nicely the advantage of international engagement and negotiation in 

building and preserving U.S. leadership in space. 

Just as clear is the benefit of carefully crafted bilateral agreements. Every aspect of the 

international space business, including launch facilities, boosters, payloads, communications 

bandwidth, liability insurance, and more, contains examples of government support leading to 

international bickering over trade practices. In a 1990 case cited by Reynolds and Merges, 

Arianespace accused the Chinese of agreeing to an Arabsat launch for $25 million, half the 

price of American and European competitors. Because approximately sixty percent of the 

payload was built in the United States, Arianespace asked the U.S. to disallow the export 

license. In the end, Arabsat canceled its contract with the Chinese and signed with 

Arianespace for the launch.76 Reynolds and Merges could not prove America's licensing 

power led to Arabsat’s decision, but the Chinese defended their practices saying they had not 

violated the 1974 Trade Act signed with U.S., while asserting the agreement they signed was 

unfair. “China is a sovereign country. There should not be any limits imposed by outside 

governments like this. For a sovereign nation, this is not a good thing”77 

The key lesson from these example cases is that the United States can and must continue 

to accrue space power through multinational organizations and bilateral agreements but must 

also exercise space power. Lost opportunities in international diplomacy lead to lost power 

in a real sense. Newcomers to space can find the environment hostile if the government has 

been ineffective in creating favorable conditions. Industry leadership in the development and 

use of space technology provides the opportunity for government to create policies that 

become the precedent for international law. Similarly, the careful crafting of bilateral 

26
agreements, and the aggressive enforcement of their elements, can produce advantages for the 

space industry. Favorable international agreements will permit the U.S. more latitude in 

dealing with commercial imagery threats, while hedging against foreign companies resorting 

to political retaliation when the U.S. demands they limit imagery distribution. When 

government is successful in producing a favorable environment, it is important that industry 

be ready to exploit the resulting opportunities. This is the advantage of a national space 

control policy that paves the way for an effective control of space-based imagery systems. 

Military Strategy in Space 

In accordance with doctrine “the employment of American military power adheres to 

constitutional and other legal imperatives, the highest societal values, and the concepts of 

proportionality, decisiveness, and accountability to the American people.” That doctrine is 

directive as well as descriptive. The Defense Department must develop technical weapons 

that minimize damage to existing infrastructure.78 Shortfalls in that ability need to be 

identified, and considered by the combatant commanders for appropriate action within the 

Joint Strategic Planning System. According to joint doctrine, “Senior US military leaders are 

responsible for providing advice .... to the President and the Congress on military aspects of 

national security including the development of forces, implications of the use of force, and 

integration of military planning and actions with the other instruments of national power.”79 

The value of a clearly stated policy is that it focuses the efforts of planners on both sides 

of a potential conflict, but it can also have consequences. The United States, by openly 

stating its intent to protect its forces if threatened by hostile commercial satellite systems, will 

keep planners and visionaries from assuming away their military responsibilities. 

Commercial satellite operators, and the governments that regulate their activities, will be 

more likely to put safeguards in place so they may choose to cooperate during hostilities 

rather than contemplate sanctions that could include the destruction of the system. An 

ambiguous policy invites the proliferation of commercial systems technically unable to 

respond appropriately in a crisis. Potential adversaries are likely to react on two levels. First, 

they will look for sources of imagery that are less likely to be interrupted, i.e. commercial 

systems controlled by their allies, commercial systems that cannot control who receives their 

data, and developing indigenous capability. The second reaction may be to follow the U.S. 

lead and threaten to target any system providing imagery to the U.S. 

While detractors might see either reaction as the genesis of a new arms race in space, the 

enemies of the United States are already preparing to negate U.S. space power. The Hong 

Kong newspaper, Sing Tao Jih Pao, indicates the arms race in space is already underway: 

According to the well-informed sources, to ensure winning in a future hightech war, China's military has been quietly working hard to develop 

asymmetrical combat capability so that it will become capable of completely 

paralyzing the enemy's fighting system when necessary by 'attacking selected 

vital points' in the enemy's key areas. The development of the reliable antisatellite 'parasitic satellite' is an important part of the efforts in this regard.80 

Strategy must stay ahead of system development, or the weapon capability may be traded 

away during normal budget challenges to the programs. The political sensitivity of space 

warfare makes a public strategy debate difficult enough to undertake, but when the requisite 

technologies are not yet ready for weaponization, it becomes easy to trade controversial 

capabilities for cost savings unless there is a strategy in place that demands specific 

27
capabilities. By establishing requirements early in the technology development phase, a 

coherent development effort can be achieved. 

The two shortfalls most likely to make the proposed “second-to-weaponize” strategy 

untenable are failing to commit to weapon development and failing to provide surge capacity 

for space lift sufficient to handle competing launch priorities during a crisis. Air Force Space 

Command’s Strategic Master Plan for Fiscal Year 2004 and Beyond explains how the 

organization will focus on transitioning from older Atlas, Delta, and Titan lift vehicles to the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle to provide routine, responsive launch capability.81 

However, it appears the strategy focuses on reduced cost for lift rather than developing surge 

capacity. While capitalization analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the cost for surge 

capacity would likely be in the tens of billions of dollars and take ten years to complete, 

depending on anticipated requirements and program decisions. 

Policy 

The United States’ overt policy on space superiority does not tell adversaries how 

superiority will be achieved when U.S. interests are threatened. Policy documents, such as 

the President’s 2002 National Security Strategy, the President’s National Strategy for 

Homeland Defense, and the Defense Department’s Transformation Strategy, explicitly call 

for protection of American infrastructure and assets in outer space but are less clear on the 

requirement to defend American interests from foreign space-based threats. The policy needs 

to affirm the U.S. will protect itself from surveillance systems supporting hostile forces, 

whether hosted on government or private platforms. Such a policy combined with overt 

research, development, test, evaluation, and deployment of space-control weapons will 

provide adequate notice of intent, and serve to encourage system operators worldwide to 

consider their own control measures in current and future systems. 

Counter-imagery weapons programs must be openly acknowledged. While the details 

are often cloaked in secrecy, there is no advantage hiding the programs if doing so widens the 

credibility gap and reduces the deterrent effect. Based on this research, the Defense 

Department should advocate unclassified intra-governmental guidance with this message: 

Given: Commercial imagery satellites pose a potential threat to national security. It is 

the goal of the United States to prevent our adversaries from getting unfettered access to 

commercial imagery when such access puts national security interests at risk. The United 

States Government will work to ensure U.S. and foreign commercial imagery providers 

have the ability to deny their data to unauthorized recipients. The Department of Defense 

will field systems to forcibly prevent the nation’s enemies from receiving commercial 

imagery products. 

System Requirements: The United States will use ground-based and space-based systems 

to prevent the flow of unauthorized imagery products and data. The systems will be 

designed for effectiveness and efficiency so as to minimize the impact on the 

international community, the environment, and the commercial imagery provider. 

Current Recommendations: While the following systems are recommended for 

development, this list is not intended to curtail current efforts or impede innovation. 

1. Space-lift capacity is needed to respond to a crisis whereby attacked systems can 

be rapidly replaced, and space-based weapons can be launched. The goal is to 

minimize negative impacts on economic and military activities while responding 

to hostile actions. 

28
2. Countermeasure systems should be built for launched into orbit locations when 

necessary to interrupt the flow of imagery. Specifically, look at low-power coorbital jammers and co-orbital systems capable of applying physical effects. 

3. Mobile low-power lasers and jamming systems are needed to deny commercial 

imagery sensors a usable source of electro-optical, infrared, multi-spectral, and 

radar imagery. 

Acquisition Funding 

Some of the most effective technical countermeasures against commercial imaging 

satellites, such as co-orbital jammers, are not currently available. In the meantime, surface 

and air-based weapons can be developed. When political support for space-based weapons is 

achieved, those high-scoring systems should become a high-priority for consideration. 

According to a Rand study, decision makers are most likely to pursue funding for spacebased weapons to:82 

• respond to a threat posed by an adversary who is undeterred by other capabilities 

• respond in kind to another nation’s acquisition of space weapons 

• forestall, control, or influence another nation’s independent acquisition of space 

weapons 

• demonstrate global leadership, protect U.S. and allied economic investments, and 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of military capability unilaterally in the absence 

of a compelling threat

Interestingly, the fiscal year 2004 budget requested nearly $3 billion for classified and 

unclassified programs to conduct strategic war fighting from space, and more than $30 billion 

through 2009. The money is allocated for ground-based systems for disabling satellites, 

microsatellites able to rendezvous with other satellites, directed energy weapons, and keeping 

the cancelled space-based laser program on life support ($50 million).83 Space-control 

advocates should be encouraged by this effort, but the budget is not detailed enough to glean 

whether any of those systems are capable of countering the commercial imagery threat. 

Conclusion 

The study conclusions, if accepted, provide foundational arguments for future decisions 

on developing systems to counter commercial imagery systems. Commercial imagery 

satellites pose a distinct threat to U.S. interests, but unfortunately this research did not 

uncover a single technical countermeasure capable of meeting all potential scenarios. It did 

identify three countermeasure techniques—co-orbital jamming, on-orbit disabling, and lowpower lasers from surface and air—as the best candidates for research, development, and 

fielding. International law requires careful consideration, as it specifically prohibits only a 

few types of weapons in orbit around the earth. However, the international community is 

likely to resist almost any U.S. space weaponization. It is possible the U.S. can reduce 

military risk and international concerns by developing space weapons and keeping them on 

the ground until needed, provided space lift is plentiful and rapid. Most importantly, U.S. 

policy documents need to plainly state U.S. intent to defend against space-based threats, 

thereby encouraging commercial imagery providers to develop the means to deny new 

imagery to adversaries. Such a policy statement would guide strategists, research scientists, 

industry, diplomats, and negotiators responsible for maintaining U.S. interests and 

developing U.S. advantages in space power. 

29
Appendix A 

Sample of Earth Imaging Systems 

The following table contains a subset of the earth-imaging satellite constellation. 

Analytical Graphics, Inc. web-based Spacecraft Digest contains 2303 records, 214 of which 

are classified as Earth-imaging entries. Jane's Space Directory, 18th ed., contained fewer 

systems, but previous editions are required to build a composite picture. DMS Market 

Intelligence’s “Space Systems Forecasts” report on imagery systems at irregular intervals, 

and provide technical data on many systems. Issued reports are kept in a three-ring binder at 

the Air University Library reference desk. Analytic Graphic’s website, http://www.stk.com, 

was particularly useful as a single source of up-to-date technical data on a wide range of 

systems. Facts were derived from multiple unclassified sources. When sources disagreed, 

the most capable assessment was used. It is presented for rough capability overview only. 

Definitions84

Electro-optical: Sensors that input energy from visible-light portion of the electromagnetic 

spectrum into electronics. A digital sensor. 

Hyperspectral: Measures many, possibly hundreds, of narrow, individual bands to detect 

very subtle differences among surface features such as vegetation, soil, and rocks. 

Infrared: Images acquired by sensors measuring energy in one or more bands above 1000 

nanometers. 

Multispectral: Color images acquired by a digital sensors measuring energy in three to seven 

discrete bands at once. One set of detectors may measure visible red energy, while 

another set measures near infrared. The data are combined to create color images. 

Panchromatic: Black and white images acquired by a digital sensor measuring energy over 

a single, wide portion of the electromagnetic spectrum simultaneously, typically 400 to 

1000 nanometers. The image usually spans the visible to near-infrared part of the 

spectrum. 

30
Worldwide Sampling of Earth Imaging Systems 

Country System Launch Type Resolution 

Australia ARIES-1 (Polar 

Orbit) 

2002 Panchromatic 

Hyperspectral 

10-Meter 

30-Meter 

Canada Radarsat-1 1995 Radar-C Band 8-Meter 

China Feng Yun 2B 

(Weather) 

2000 Electro optical 

Multispectral 

1.5 Kilometer 

5.5 Kilometer 

China, Brazil CBERS-2 2003 Panchromatic 

IR 

5-Meter 

80-Meter 

France CNES 

SPOT-5 

4 May 02 Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

IR 

2.5-Meter 

10-Meter 

20-Meter 

Europe (Italy 

and France) 

Cosmos Pliades 2005 

(planned) 

Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

.7 Meter 

2 Meter 

India IRS-P6 2003 Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

2.5-Meter 

23-Meter 

Israel ImageSat 

EROS 1A 

5 Dec 00 Panchromatic .67-Meter 

Malaysia TiungSat-1 2000 Panchromatic 

Infrared 

80-Meter 

Russia METEOR-3M-NI 

(Polar Weather) 

2001 Multispectral 1-2 Mile 

South Korea KOMPSAT-1 

(Arirang-1) 

1999 Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

6.6-Meter 

1 Kilometer 

United Kingdom

Algeria, 

China, 

Nigeria, 

Turkey, 

Thailand, 

Vietnam 

Disaster Monitoring 

Constellation 

UK DMC SAT 

AlSat-1 

China Tba4 

Nigera Sat-1 

BILSAT-1 

Thai Paht 2 

Vietnam Tba 2 

2003 

2002 

Planned 

2003 

2003 

Planned 

Planned 

Panchromatic 

Panchromatic 

Panchromatic 

Panchromatic 

Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

Panchromatic 

Panchromatic 

12-Meter 

32-Meter 

4-Meter 

30-Meter 

12-Meter 

18-Meter 

30-Meter 

30-Meter 

United States LANDSAT 7 1999 Panchromatic 

Multispectral 

15 Meter 

30 Meter 

United States Digital Globe 

QuickBird 2 

18 Oct 01 Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

.6-Meter 

2.4- Meter 

United States Space Imaging 

Ikonos-2 

24 Sep 99 Panchromatic 

Multi-spectral 

.5-Meter 

1-Meter 

31
Appendix B 

Definitions of Desired Effects, Weights, 

Countermeasure Techniques, and Nodes 

Desired Effects and Weights 

The definitions and the weights used in the technique-node analysis are listed below in 

the order in which they appear in the technique-node evaluation table in appendix C. Readers 

will find sufficient detail on how the criteria were selected, the valuation definitions, and how 

values were calculated, so the scores can be evaluated and changed, if desired, to meet new 

entering assumptions. The author invented the definitions and the weighting scale ranging 

from +5, meaning 100 percent effective in meeting the desired condition, to –5, meaning the 

technique would be ineffective or counter to the desired effect. A mid-point of zero indicates 

a questionable or doubtful impact, and therefore does not add or subtract from the value of 

the technique. All the criteria were scored on the same linear scale, except for political will, 

which was scored 1 or 0, and was weighted as a multiplier against the sum of all the scores. 

If the author judged the technique to be politically unacceptable, it the score would put it at 

the bottom for development consideration. Readers who find it necessary to weight other 

criteria should have no problem adapting their changes to this analysis. When evaluating 

criteria against specific nodes, scores across the entire +5 to –5 range were used, but all were 

simple estimates by the author, not backed by experimental data. The probability of each 

technique working as designed is assumed to be 100 percent. 

end state. Relates to whether the attacked system can be returned to the operator in its preconflict condition. The risk of permanent damage or orbital decay from application of 

the technique reduces the score. Satellites and main processing ground sites have a high 

probability of unique, difficult-to-replace equipment. A score of –5 is appropriate if a 

satellite will be destroyed, where as 0 is appropriate when main processing ground sites 

are attacked since the downtime may or may not be significantly longer than the duration 

of the conflict. A score of +5 is appropriate if the system should operate as it did 

previously upon discontinuation of a temporary effect such as jamming or obstructing 

the sensors line of sight. 

Condition 100 percent functional Questionable Destroyed/heavy 

damage 

Score +5 0 -5 

sustainability. Relates to expectation that a technique's effects could be sustained 

continuously over several days, either with the reapplication of the technique over the 

period, or through continuous application. It assumes enemy forces cannot deny access 

to the target. A score of +5 is appropriate if the effect should be easily sustained. A 

score of 0 is appropriate if a single technique or a single weapon would be expected to 

lose coverage of the target from time to time during the attack. Sustainability of 

jamming against ground targets from other than space was scored 0. Since all techniques 

are expected to have some effect when applied, negative sustainability was undefined. 

32
Condition Very Sustainable Unknown N/A 

Score +5 0 

vulnerability. Relates to vulnerability of the weapon or its effects to countermeasures by the 

enemy over the duration of the mission. A score of +5 is appropriate if there is no 

reasonable enemy countermeasure to the applied technique. A score of –5 is appropriate 

if the enemy would normally be expected to counter the technique before a mission of 

undefined duration could be completed. A score of 0 is appropriate when there is 

insufficient information to make a decision. 

Condition Not Vulnerable Questionable Very Vulnerable 

Score +5 0 -5 

covert. Relates to limitations of employing the weapon. Use of a covert weapon implies 

risks that detract from its usefulness in a deterrent role. Covert weapons may have 

limited usefulness once the technique is used if use compromises its existence. The 

score for covert techniques assumes first-time application, and therefore does not reduce 

the sustainability or vulnerability scores. Also, since the negative affect during first use 

is only if the technique is compromised, the permissible scoring range is limited 

compared to the others. 

Condition Overt Covert 

Score +5 +3 

target access. Relates to whether a technique can be weaponized so as to access the targeted 

node. The geometry of electronic warfare weapons and their targets is important. The 

use of co-orbital jammers would improve target access scores against nearby systems in 

the same orbit, but reduce access to ground sites, unless deployed in sufficient numbers 

of orbits to ensure global access. Likewise, ground-based jammers may never achieve 

line-of-sight with orbiting satellites. Depending on system design, mission, orbits and 

geometry, target access may or may not be achievable when necessary. No pair was 

scored less than zero in this evaluation. 

Condition Accessible Tenuous/Unknown No Access 

Score +5 0 -5 

collateral damage. Relates to the possible weapon effects on property and personnel, as well 

as the expectation of maintaining friendly use of the imagery product. Creation of space 

debris and creation of long-term problems for spacecraft operation are considered in 

other categories. Collateral damage scores may directly affect political-will score. 

33
Scores were determined by subtracting the following from 5: 

Subtract 

Is the technique likely to deny imagery to the US and others? 3 

 If not, is image quality or timeliness likely to be degraded? 2 

Weapon effects on or near the ground capable of causing indiscriminate 

damage or injury near target: 

2 

Weapon effects in space capable of damaging other satellites: 

considerable or unknown 

some 

minor 

6 

4 

2 

Reduced data quality to other users: 1 

Create space debris—considered separately under “space debris” 0 

Induce irrecoverable problems to spacecraft health and safety (uncontrolled 

flight)—considered separately under “endstate” 

0 

Condition No Collateral Damage See Above Table High Risk to Neutral 

Personnel and 

Equipment 

Score +5 0 -5 

space debris. Relates to the possibility that employment of the weapon will result in creation 

of orbiting debris. The problem of fratricide against friendly or neutral systems demands 

consideration of debris problems. This area was weighted equal to the others not only 

for military purposes, but also for political ones. If two options exist, and one does not 

create debris, it is assumed to be a better choice. On orbit disabling weapons and directattack munitions are not themselves space debris. It is assumed they would be designed 

to deorbit after mission completion. Likewise, a weapon that causes the target satellite to 

move intact to a useless orbit, or causes it to deorbit, would not be considered to have 

created space debris. Space debris may directly effect the political will score. 

Condition No Debris N/A Debris 

Score +5 -5 

political will. Relates to likelihood the President or Secretary of Defense would agree to 

weaponize and use a technique-node pair. This is the most heavily weighted condition. 

It is a multiplier of l or 0, applied to the total score. If a technique is politically 

untenable, the total score is irrelevant. The fact that the political will score was also 

added to the total was mostly for formatting purposes, and only marginally contributes to 

the overall score. 

Condition Acceptable N/A Unacceptable 

Score +1 0 

34
Countermeasure Techniques 

conventional attack. Those attacks using conventional fire weapons, against a terrestrial 

target. Only conventional attacks comprised of precision-guided munitions (PGM) were 

evaluated since they are the state of the art for stand-off engagement. The specific 

weapon was not assumed. Special operations attacks involving troops taking physical 

control of a facility were not evaluated under conventional attack. Conventional attacks 

against satellites were considered impossible. 

cyber attack. Those attacks of electronic systems intended to affect acquisition, processing, 

or display of information through commands recognized by the system. Cyber attacks 

differ from electronic attack (EA) in that they use available channels to get to their 

intended target, rather than using over-the-air transmissions to deny system access to the 

adversary. Examples include commands to the satellite sensor, through the TT &C link, 

directing observation of areas other than where friendly operations are taking place; or 

injecting an image into the system in place of the one created by the satellite processor. 

The types and scope of cyber attacks are limited by access to, and security of, the 

channels and the system itself. These types of attack can be quickly denied once the 

methods are compromised, so they are assumed to be covert. 

destructive directed-energy weapons. Those attacks that use various forms of energy to 

destroy electronic/optical components. For many years, nuclear explosions have been 

known to emit electromagnetic pulses capable of destroying circuits. New weapons such 

as high-power microwaves (HPM), also known as high-energy radio frequencies (HERF) 

are attempting to do the same thing without the associated blast, heat, overpressure, and 

nuclear fallout. High-power lasers (HPL) are being developed to turn matter into 

plasma. They can destroy components of systems, or become a source of heat that will 

deform optics or throw satellite environmental systems out of systemic equilibrium. 

Particle beam (PB) weapons are similar, except instead of light, they bombard the target 

with atomic particles. These examples share the goal of destroying the target with 

directed energy, but they differ in their means. 

disabling electronic attack. Those attacks intended to temporarily disable electronic/optical 

components through application of electromagnetic energy to the receive channel of a 

system. Examples include brute force radio frequency jamming that denies or degrades 

the system's receiver by saturating it with a stronger signal; smart jamming that subtly 

interrupts essential portions of a signal; and low-power lasers (LPL) designed to dazzle 

optics without permanently damaging them. The effects of disabling electronic attacks 

dissipate as soon as the weapon disengages the target. 

kinetic destruction. Those attacks designed to destroy a satellite by hitting it with a 

projectile. The anti-satellite (ASAT) missile program was one example. Another 

example would be space mines designed to orbit the earth while closing in on their 

target. The force of the projectiles' impact will destroy the target satellite. 

on-orbit disabling. Those attacks designed to temporarily disable a satellite by physically 

closing in on it to perform a procedure. Examples include manned rendezvous to install 

a lens cap and the unmanned placement of micro-mechanical robots on the satellite to 

install or disconnect a designated circuit. The technique is intended to be reversible, so 

that full functionality can be restored after a conflict. 

35
Nodes Selected for Analysis 

ground data communications (located in a country aiding the adversary). This node 

represents the ability to distribute data, processed or unprocessed, to customers or 

processing centers. Specifically it is the receiver equipment within that country, and may 

include intermediate communication steps through satellites, fiber optic cable, or the 

public telephone network. 

main ground processing center (located in a country aiding the adversary). This node 

represents the full ability to process images from data, and distribute the images. If the 

main ground processing center were located in the adversary's country , it would be 

treated similar to any other military support target. If it were in a country not supporting 

the adversary, there would be no need to attack it. Therefore this node represents the 

case of the remaining case and its political constraints. 

main ground receive station (located in a country aiding the adversary). The main 

ground receive station for data going to the satellite operator. This is typically the station 

that receives the data that is sent to customers and it may be the only receive station in 

the system. In contrast, remote direct receive stations are common among imagery 

providers. They often give their hosts direct access to some data and processing 

capability. 

sensor command uplink. Includes all radio receive equipment on the satellite connected to 

those processors specifically controlling the sensor. 

sensor optics. The actual optical arrays aboard the spacecraft sensor, including mirrors, 

lenses, microchip sensors, and transparent covers. Definition does not include sensor 

support items such as servo motors, and environmental controls. 

spacecraft command uplink. Includes all radio receive equipment on the satellite that 

controls satellite functions. It may or may not control the sensor depending on whether 

the particular design has separate radio command channels for the sensor and the 

platform. 

space platform. The actual spacecraft itself, including communications and payload. 

remote ground receive station (located in the adversary's territory). A direct-receive 

station licensed by the satellite operator to directly receive data from the satellite. 

Depending on the contract, data may be forwarded to the company via terrestrial 

communications, and/or used by the host. The existence of a remote ground receive 

station does not necessarily imply the ability to process the data into usable images. 

remote ground receive station (non-combatant party passing data to collaborating 

company, not directly to adversary). This node illustrates the scenario where a directreceive station in a neutral country is conducting normal, legal commerce. The fact that 

the parent company receiving the data from that site is assisting the adversary, puts the 

non-combatant party at risk of being declared a de facto collaborator. 

36
Appendix C 

Techniques versus Node Scoring Table 

This table shows the value analysis done on the technique-node pairs. The nodes are 

generally taken from the nodal analysis described in the paper, however they were expanded 

to account for how function and physical location might affect political will. A weakness of 

the evaluation is that it is easier to assume a political-will score of zero when there are other 

options without similarly negative political consequences. It is possible the chart indicates 

incorrect political-will scores, biased by surrounding options that are more appealing, and by 

the fact that political will is dependent on the actual situation at hand, and is therefore 

difficult to pre-judge. The definitions and the scoring criteria are detailed in Appendix B. 

The results are tabulated in section V, Table 2. 

37
Conventional 

(PGM) 

Kinetic Satellite Destruction 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Microwave) 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Laser or Particle Beams) 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Jamming) Air/Surface 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Coorbital Jammer) 

Spacecraft Sensor Optics Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total: 

N/A 

-5 

5 4 5 3 2 

-5 

1 

10 (1)=10 

Not 

Scored. 

There may 

be an 

effect but 

HPMs are 

more 

likely to 

be used 

against the 

Platform 

than the 

optics 

-5 

4 5 5 3 2 5 1 

20 (1) =20 

N/A N/A 

Sensor Command Up-link Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total:

N/A 

-5 

5 4 5 5 2 

-5 

1 

12 (1)=12 

-5 

5 5 5 5 

-2 

5 1 

19 (1)=19 

-5 

5 5 5 5 2 5 1 

23 (1)=23 

5 0 3 5 0 2 5 1 

21 (1)=21 

5 5 4 5 5 2 5 1 

32 (1)=32 

38
Conventional 

(PGM) 

Kinetic Satellite Destruction 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Microwave) 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Laser or Particle Beams) 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Jamming) Air/Surface 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Coorbital Jammer) 

Space Platform Command Up-link Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total: 

N/A 

-5 

5 4 5 3 2 

-5 

1 

10 (1)=10 

-5 

5 5 5 5 

-2 

5 1 

19 (1)=19 

-5 

5 5 5 5 5 2 1 

23 (1)=23 

2 0 3 5 0 5 5 1 

21 (1)=21 

5 5 4 5 5 3 5 1 

32 (1)=32 

Space Platform Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total:

N/A 

-5 

5 4 5 5 2 

-5 

1 

12 (1)=12 

-5 

5 5 5 5 

-2 

5 1 

19 (1)=19 

-5 

5 4 5 5 2 5 1 

22 (1) =22 

N/A N/\A 

39
Conventional 

(PGM) 

Kinetic Satellite Destruction 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Microwave) 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Laser or Particle Beams) 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Jamming) Air/Surface 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Coorbital Jammer) 

Main Ground Receive Station (located in a country aiding the adversary) Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total: 

5 3 0 5 5 0 5 1 

24 (1)=24 

N/A 

5 3 0 5 5 0 5 1 

24 (1)=24 

N/A 

5 0 2 5 5 2 5 1 

25 (1)=25 

5 5 4 5 5 2 5 0 

31 (0)=0 

Remote Ground Receive Station (located in adversary’s country) Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total:

5 2 0 5 5 3 5 1 

27 (1)=27 

N/A 

5 3 0 5 5 4 5 1 

28 (1)=28 

N/A 

5 0 2 3 5 3 5 1 

24 (1)=24 

5 5 4 5 5 5 5 0 

34 (0)=0 

40
Conventional 

(PGM) 

Kinetic Satellite Destruction 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Microwave) 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Laser or Particle Beams) 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Jamming) Air/Surface 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Coorbital Jammer) 

Remote Ground Receive Station (located in a non-hostile country) Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total: 

0 3 0 5 4 0 5 0 

17 (0)=0 

N/A 

3 3 0 5 4 

-3 

5 1 

18 (0)=0 

N/A 

5 0 0 5 4 2 5 1 

22 (0)=0 

5 5 4 5 5 2 5 0 

31 (0)=0 

Main Ground Processing Station (located in a country aiding adversary) Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total: 

0 3 0 5 4 0 5 0 

17 (0)=0 

N/A 

0 3 0 5 4 0 5 1 

18 (1)=18 

N/A N/A 

See 

Ground 

data 

communications

below 

N/A 

41
Conventional 

(PGM) 

Kinetic Satellite Destruction 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Microwave) 

Destructive Directed Energy (Highpower Laser or Particle Beams) 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Jamming) Air/Surface 

Disabling Electronic Attack (Coorbital Jammer) 

Ground data communications (located in a country aiding adversary) Desirable characteristics End-state effects: Sustainability: Vulnerability to detection & negation: Technique requires covert operation: Target Access: Collateral Damage Score: notional Space Debris: Political Will: Total: 

5 3 0 5 4 0 5 1 

23 (1)=23 

N/A 

5 3 0 5 5 3 5 1 

27 (1)=27 

N/A 

5 0 0 5 4 4 5 1 

24 (1)=24 

N/A 

42
Notes 

 1

 George J. Tenet, Statement before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, 19 March 2002, 

15, on-line, Internet, 14 Feb 2004, available from 

Hhttp://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/testimony.cfm?wit_id=193&id=192H. 2

 See appendix A. 

3

 Tenet, 15. 

4

 International Telecommunications Union, n.p., on-line, Internet, 14 February 2004, available from 

Hhttp://www.itu.int/members/index.htmlH. 5

 Analytic Graphics, AGI Space Digest, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from Hhttp://www.stk.comH, 

This site was particularly useful as a single source of technical data on a wide range of systems. 

6 Frank Morring, Jr., “Industry Could Gain $1 Billion From NIMA,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 

158, no. 4 (27 January 2003), 32. 7

 “Find, fix, assess, track, target and engage” are the elements of the Air Force Vision, describing the 

capabilities American Forces would like to preserve for itself and deny to an adversary. “Global Vigilance 

Reach & Power, America’s Air Force Vision 2020,” undated (but released in June 2000), 6, on-line, Internet, 

available at Hwww.af.mil/visionH. 

8 John Douglas, “A New Paradigm for Remote Sensing,” a paper presented at the 11th Australasian 

Remote Sensing and Photogrammetric Conference, Brisbane, 6 Sep 2002, 3, on-line, Internet, 9 December 

2003, available from Hhttp://www.apogee.com.au/pdf/11arspc_paper.pdfH. 9

 Multiple websites, on-line, Internet, 9 Dec 03. Ikonos accuracy is published on the SpaceImaging 

website, Hwww.spaceimaging.comH. QuickBird accuracy was found on Infoterra.com found at 

Hwww.infoterra-global.com/quickbird.htmH, and Radarsat resolution was found on the Radarsat website at 

Hwww.radarsat.comH,. 

10 Major James G. Lee, Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance, Thesis Paper (Maxwell 

AFB AL: School of Advance Airpower Studies, October 1994), 10. 

11 Major Edwin C. Swedberg, The Effect on Operational and Tactical Surprise by US. Military Forces 

Due to the Proliferation of Unclassified Satellite Imaging Systems, (Ft. Leavenworth KS: Command and 

General Staff College, 1995), 6. 

12 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Future of Remote Sensing From 

Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and Applications, OTA-ISC-558, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, July 1993), 160. 13 SPOT Image Corporation, n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 Dec 03, available from 

Hhttp://www.spotimage.fr/html/_167_171_172_.phpH 

14 “Space Systems Forecast-Meteosat,” International Forecast/DMS Market Intelligence Report, 

February 1995, 3. 15 AGI Space Digest, n.p. 

16 National Aeronautical and Space Administration, “Landsat-7,” n.p., on-line, Internet, 9 Dec 2003, 

available from Hhttp://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/groundstations/Igslist.htmlH. 

17 “Landsat-D” (an undated brochure produced by General Electric), 4-5. 

18 “Toulouse Facilities, SPOT Technical Information,” SPOT Image Corporation, 1-6, on-line, Internet, 

21 February 2004, available on line from Hhttp://www.spotimage.fr/html/_167_224_230.phpH. 

19 “SPOT Satellite Programming, a Custom Service,” SPOT Image Corporation, 1, on-line, Internet, 21 

February 2004, available on line from Hhttp://www.spotimage.fr/html/_167_224_230.phpH. 20 James Oberg, Space Power Theory, (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1999), 149. 21 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, 15, on-line, 

Internet, 9 December 2003, available on line from Hhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.htmlH. 22 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States, 1997, on-line, 

Internet, 9 December 2003, available on line from: 

Hhttp://www.apc.maxwell.af.mil/pubs/nms/joint.htm#CharacteristicsH 23 Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, 9 Aug 2002, x, CD-ROM, Joint Staff J7, 

June 2003. 24 Fact File, United States Strategic Command, undated, n.p., on-line, Internet 9 December 2003, 

available from Hhttp://www.stratcom.af.mil/factsheetshtml/spacemissions.htmH. 25 Sarah Estabrooks, “Positive Steps At The Conference On Disarmament,” Ploughshares Briefing, 

Autumn 2003, on-line, Internet 10 Jan 2004, available from 

Hhttp://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/mons03b.htmlH. 

43
 26 Sarah Estabrooks, “Preventing the Weaponization of Space,” Ploughshares Breifing, 03/3, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, available from Hhttp://www.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITORH. 27 Quoted in Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations, An Introduction to Public International Law, 6th

ed. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company) 4. 28 Glenn H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer Space, Problems of Law and Policy, 2d ed. (Boulder: 

Westview Press, 1997), 27. 

29 “Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on 

Land,” Hague Convention V, 18 October 1907, articles 7 and 8, on-line, Internet, 28 January 2004, available 

from: Hhttp://library.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/hague/hague6.htmlH. Article. 7. “A neutral Power is not called upon to 

prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in 

general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet.” Article. 8. “A neutral Power is not called upon to 

forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy 

apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals.” 30 Walter S. Kind, ed., Military Commander and the Law, 6th ed. (Maxwell AFB AL: Air Force Judge 

Advocate General School Press, 2002), Chapter 15, on-line, Internet, 12 December 2003, available from 

Hhttp://milcom.jag.af.mil/ch15/info.htmH. 31 “Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on 

Land,” Article 8. 32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, Articles 9 and 50, on-line Internet, 9 January 

2004, available from Hhttp://www.vilp.de/Enpdf/e025.pdfH. “The Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime 

Neutrality provide that Merchant ships flying the flag of a neutral State may be attacked if they (a) engage in 

belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy; (b) act as auxiliaries to the enemy’s armed forces; (c) are incorporated 

into or assist the enemy’s intelligence system; (d) sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; or 

(e) otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action, e.g., by carrying military materials, 

and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first place passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless 

circumstances do not permit, they are to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other 

precautions.” The United States is not a signatory of the Law of the Sea Treaty, but may abide by principles 

such as the Helsinki Principles. 33 Lee, 1. 

34 Reynolds, 51-54. The formal name of the treaty is, “Multilateral Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 

in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.” 35 Reynolds, 62. The formal name of the treaty is, “Multilateral Treaty on Principles Governing the 

Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” 36 Reynolds, 96. The formal name of the treaty is, “Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Systems, May 26, 1972.” 37 Captain Michael G. Gallagher, “Legal Aspects Of The Strategic Defense Initiative,” Military Law 

Review, Department of The Army Pamphlet 27-100-111, volume 111 (Winter 1986), 36. 

38 Ibid. 

39 William L. Spacy II, “Does the United States Need Space Weapons?” Cadre Paper (Maxwell AFB AL: 

Air University Press, September 1999), 10. 40 Ibid., 96. 

41 Land Remote Sensing Policy, Section 5621, United States Code Title 15, Chapter 82 - 1992. “No license 

shall be granted by the Secretary unless the Secretary determines in writing that the applicant will comply with 

the requirements of this chapter, any regulations issued pursuant to this chapter, and any applicable international 

obligations and national security concerns of the United States.” 42 Reynolds, 204-205. 

43 Major Thomas Rogers, Professor of Space Law, United States Air Force Judge Advocate General 

School, Maxwell AFB AL, interviewed by author, 15 Jan 2003. 44 Morring, 32. 

45 Mike Wendling, “Russian GPS Jammers Pose Little Threat In Iraq,” CNS News.com, March 31, 2003, 

n.p., on-line, Internet, 26 October 2003, available from Hhttp://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/7125-16.cfmH. 46 Quoted in Col (Sel) Bruce W. Carmichael, et. al, “Strikestar 2025,” Research Paper Presented To Air 

Force 2025, August 1996, 2. 47 Jeffery Lewis, “Lift-off for Space Weapons: Spending on War Fighting from Space in the FY2004 

Budget Request,” Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), School of Public Affairs, 

University of Maryland, n.p., on-line Internet, available from 

Hwww.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Publications/AMCS/H. Estimates of the unclassified budget request for the 

FYDP 04-09 are in the range of $30 billion. Half is for Command Control and Intelligence, $13 billion is for 

44
 space-based missile defense, leaving $2.8 billion for various programs under space control and power 

projection. 48 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (July/August 2003), 

66. 

49 Alan Garscadden and Michael Kelly, “Rapid Aerospace Response—Technological Capabilities Can 

Provide a Roadmap for Warfighter Operations,” Horizons, June 2003, n.p., on-line, Internet, 30 January 2004, 

available from Hwww.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/Dec03/PR0305.htmlH. 50 SPACECAST 2020, (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 22 June 1994), 64. 51 “Analysis of Space Concepts Enabled by New Technology,” NASA funded study by Futron 

Corporation, 2003, 2-3. The four classes of launch, according to NASA are “small, medium, intermediate, and 

heavy,” with intermediate class launches projected to make up roughly half of all launches through the end of 

the projection in 2021. 52 Ibid, 3. 

53 “CDI Space Security Update #10,” Center for Defense Information, 19 December 2003, n.p., on-line, 

Internet, 30 January 2004, available from 

Hhttp://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1962H. 54 The Institute for National Strategic Studies created a consensus view of future wars out to 2025 based 

on a review of thirty-six existing studies of the strategic environment. It concluded that the United States enjoys 

overwhelming advantages in conventional air and sea-based capabilities. Sam J. Tangredi, “Consensus Views,” 

The Emerging Strategic Environment, Unit 1, INSS, January 2004, 15-16. 55 Department of Defense, Military Transformation Strategy: A Strategic Approach (Washington D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, Fall 2003), 19. 56 Marco Caceras, “Industry Insights,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 

September 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from 

Hhttp://www.aiaa.org/market/index.hfm?mar=61&issuetocid=8H. 57 Senate, “Critical Infrastructure Protection, Commercial Satellite Security Should Be More Fully 

Addressed,” United States General Accounting Office Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate GAO-02-781, Aug 2002, 

18, on-line, Internet, 30 January 2004, available from Hhttp://www.fas.org/spp/military/gao/gao02781.pdfH. 58 Ibid., 32. 

59 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 5 June 2003, 399, CD-ROM, 

Joint Staff J7, June 2003. Definition derived from Department of Defense definition for “Passive Defense.” 60 Ibid., 389. 

61 Major William L. Spacy II, Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? CADRE Paper 

(Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, September 1999), 66, Tables 1 and 2. This source contained a useful, 

unclassified list of counterspace weapons. 62 Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, Joint Publication 3-51, 7 April 2000, I-2, CD-ROM, Joint Staff 

J7, June 2003. “Electronic Attack is the subdivision of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic 

energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of 

degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires (see Joint 

Publication [JP] 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support). Electronic attack includes actions taken to prevent or 

reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic 

deception; and employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary 

destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, or particle beams).” 63 “Weekly Circular 2207/12/12/1995,” Special Section no. AR11/A/1386, International 

Telecommunication Union, 12 December 1995. 64 Worldview Imaging Corporation to the Federal Communications Commission,” Application of 

Worldview Imaging Corporation for a Remote Sensing Satellite System Before the Federal Communications 

Commission,” Figure A-6, December 1992. 65 Landsat-D, General Electric brochure, undated, 4-5. 66 David Baker, ed., Jane’s Space Directory, 18th ed. (London: Jane’s Information Group, 2002). 67 Major General Bengt Anderberg and Dr. Myron L. Wolbarsht, Laser Weapons: The Dawn of a New 

Military Age (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 148. 68 Anderberg, 23. 

69 Baker. 

70 Jeffrey Lewis, “Lift-Off For Space Weapons? Implications of the Department of Defense’s 2004 

Budget Request for Space Weaponization,” by Center for International And Security Studies at Maryland 

(CISSM), 21 July 2003, 15. 

45
 71 “The SPOT Satellites Image Acquisition," n.p., on-line, Internet, 16 February 1997, available from 

http://www.spotimage.fr/anglaise/system/satel/ss-acquis.htm. 72 Major Thomas A. Summers, “How Is U.S. Space Power Jeopardized by an Adversary’s Exploitation, 

Technological Developments, Employment and Engagement of Laser Antisatellite Weapons?” (Maxwell AFB 

AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2000), 40-41. 73 Lt Colonel Charles M. Westenhoff, ed., Military Air Power—The CADRE Digest of Air Power 

Opinions and Thoughts (Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, October 1990). 74 Nye, 60-73. 

75 Quoted in Reynolds, 199-200. Hamilton DeSaussure, “The Interaction of Domestic and International 

Law,” a paper presented at the 38th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Brighton, United 

Kingdom, 10-17 October 1987. 76 Ibid, 259-260. 

77 Ibid., 260. 

78 Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, 14 November 2000, v, CDROM, Joint Staff J7, June 2003. 79 Ibid., vi. 

80 Quoted in Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., “Wake-up Call on Space,” CNSNews.com, 9 January 2001, n.p., online, Internet, 27 August 2003, available from Hhttp://www.cnsnews.comH. Quote originally appeared in 

newspaper Sing Tao Jih Pao, Hong Kong, 5 January 2001. 81 Air Force Space Command, “Strategic Master Plan FY04 and Beyond,” 5 November 2002, 16, on-line, 

Internet, available from Hhttp://www.nukewatch.org/importantdocs/resources/Final004SMP.pdfH 82 Bob Preston et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, (Santa Monica CA: Rand, 2002). Rand Corporation 

study sponsored by Lt Gen Roger DeKok, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs (AF/XP), xxii. 83 Lewis, “Lift-off for Space Weapons: Spending on War Fighting from Space in the FY2004 Budget 

Request,” 1-3. 

46