AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Tanker-Force Structure

Recapitalization of the KC-135

JUAN C. NARVID

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 32

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

August 2004
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

Aerial refueling is key to the nation’s global reach in response to operations in all parts of the world. As such, aerial

refueling provides the bridge for air, joint, and coalition

forces to deploy anywhere, any time around the world. It is

important in this era of transformation that the tanker

force and doctrine of aerial refueling also meet the challenges of the Air Force’s task force concept of operations

(CONOPS). The highly demanded tanker has the ability to

affect global strike; homeland security; global mobility;

space; and command, control, communications, computers,

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR);

global response; and nuclear response. The KC-135 aircraft has been an outstanding platform for aerial refueling,

and through some enhancements, it has been able to

leverage some of its capabilities in airlift and communication. However, the Air Force has the opportunity with its

next class of tankers to field a new tanker with capabilities

that can serve all services in more demanding joint and

coalition warfare of the future.

In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135,

Lt Col Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking

of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler

across the full spectrum of operations. This research is

very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In contrast to

some of the 767’s capabilities, he outlines a conceptual tanker

that combines airlift and aerial-refueling capabilities and

is able to survive in a combat environment, and he leverages

its ability to act as a platform to enhance network-centric

warfare. He points out that while the “Cadillac” of all tankers

may only be conceived in the minds of Airmen, the tanker of

the future cannot resemble the single-role tanker of the past.

In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of

the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old

capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on

iii
new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats. Joint warfare already capitalizes

on getting the right information to the decision makers and

the warrior executing the combat mission. Innovative ideas

within the mobility Air Force (MAF) are providing the link

for information between the two through roll-on beyond line

of sight (ROBE) systems. To employ these type capabilities

into a combat area, tankers may come up against asymmetric threats from an enemy willing to blunt any advantages

the MAF has to offer. Colonel Narvid believes the Boeing

767 improves on the capabilities of the KC-135 and that

the Air Force currently needs to replace some of the older

KC-135s. However, he argues, it will not fit the bill when it

comes to meeting the challenges of the future—instead, a

tanker designed from the ground up should recapitalize the

KC-135 fleet.

As with all Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in the

spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious consideration of the issues. We encourage your responses.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College

iv
About the Author

Lt Col Juan “Grande” Narvid is a graduate of the Air War

College, Class of 2004. His assignments include operations

officer of the 37th Flight Training Squadron, 14th Flying

Training Wing, Columbus AFB, Mississippi; and tours at

Laughlin AFB, Texas; McGuire AFB, New Jersey; and Scott

AFB, Illinois. Colonel Narvid entered the Air Force from the

University of Texas–San Antonio. He is a command pilot with

more than 5,300 hours in the KC-10, C-141, C-9, T-37, and

T-38. He qualified as an instructor pilot/flight examiner in

four separate weapon systems. He served as major command

regional operations director, Tanker Airlift Control Center,

and was hand selected as director, Air Mobility Operations

Inspections, Headquarters Air Mobility Command Inspector

General. He is a distinguished graduate from Squadron Officer School; holds a master of arts in National Security and

Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, Newport,

Rhode Island; and one in Human Resource Development

from Webster University, Missouri; and is a graduate of the

Naval Command and Staff College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Following graduation from Air War College, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama, Colonel Narvid took command of the 735th Air

Mobility Squadron, Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

v
Tanker-Force Structure

Recapitalization of the KC-135

“The Air Force recognizes the need to begin replacing its large,

aging fleet of KC-135s as soon as possible.”

—Lt Gen Stephen B. Plummer,

––10 January 2003

The United States Air Force KC-135 fleet is nearly 50 years

old; recent studies show that it is time for the recapitalization

of this tanker fleet. The present inventory of aircraft went

through many upgrades and modifications, but all are still

the basic A-model aircraft initially purchased by the Air

Force in the late 1950s. The Air Force needs to replace this

aged aircraft by designing a new tanker from the ground up,

capable of responding to the threat environment of today and

the future.

Bomber and fighter aircraft dominate Air Force history.

Despite the proven capabilities of aerial refueling during the

birth of the Air Force, technology was directed at improving

the reach of combat aircraft without regard to tankers. However, technology finally reached its limit and required aerial

refueling to propel combat aircraft beyond the shores of the

United States and the limits of forward bases.

Aerial refueling found its way into Air Force doctrine and

became an integral part of the national military strategy

(NMS). As the NMS reached into more regions of the world

and encompassed more missions of vital national interest,

tankers were required to expand the country’s capability into

a global strategy. Funding, importance, and old technology

limited the emerging tanker-force structure. However,

today’s Air Force concept of operations (CONOPS) challenges

Airmen to think differently about the threat of the future and

the force structure required to respond to these threats.

The tanker-force structure was built from old bomber systems and off-the-shelf airline technology. It required little research and development to build or buy an aircraft that only

needed to transfer gas to its receiver. While the mission of old

only required this simple capability, time quickly outpaced

the legacy systems. Future trends in war fighting require a

capabilities-based tanker able to survive in today’s combat

environment while responding across the full spectrum of

operations. The long-term reliance on old tanker weapon

1
systems patched with rebuilds, refurbishments, or replacements will not meet today’s Air Force mission.

The scope of research in this paper does not look into

budget issues associated with the recapitalization or procurement of force-structure platforms. It serves as a think

piece into the capabilities required for the future replacement of the KC-135 fleet. This research challenges the

reader to look beyond the platform of the tanker and the

upgrades that the Boeing 767 can deliver. The Air Force

needs a tanker able to deliver the capabilities that the joint

environment requires to operate across the full spectrum

that the future holds. The tanker can no longer serve only

the Air Force of the past but must meet the needs of the

forces of the future. The capabilities built into a newly designed tanker will make it a valuable national asset across

all services.

The Need for Aerial Refueling

US strategy has undergone massive changes since the

end of the Cold War. No longer do we face a single foe in a

given area of the world. Today, surgical strikes by combat

aircraft may be required to defend the US homeland or destroy a terrorist camp in the desert. 

National Security Strategy

The US National Security Strategy (NSS) requires the endurance and flexibility that aerial refueling gives to receiver

aircraft in order to operate across the entire spectrum of the

NSS operations. Aerial refueling gives the United States the

ability to respond across the full range of operations, from

combating global terrorism to humanitarian actions. Aerial

refueling spans the gap between the robust nature of the regional commitment of the NSS and the limited bases that are

available in the en route structure from which this strategy

may be executed. Aerial refueling allows the US vision to become possible by using distant bases coupled with the global

reach of tankers extending to all regions of the world.

Pres. George W. Bush outlined in the NSS a strategy

that required the United States to respond to the higher

end of the conflict spectrum, including conflicts stemming

from terrorism and attacks against the United States and

2 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
its allies.1 Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, has

proven to be a considerable challenge for US forces in the

fight against terrorism. The mountainous terrain surrounding the area of operations is a haven for fleeing terrorists, and without tanker support to keep fighter aircraft

loitering above the battle area, time-sensitive targets would

easily escape. Likewise, intercept aircraft defending the

shores of the United States from attacks by rogue nations

or terrorist groups would also be unable to maintain their

constant vigilance without the extension of fuel received

from orbiting tankers.

Additionally, the NSS must respond to the lower end of the

spectrum by addressing conflicts arising from infractions of

human dignity.2 Past US leaders have worried over the implications of committing US forces in response to humanitarian

actions, particularly in Bosnia and Somalia. Torn between

the atrocities being committed in these countries and the

possibility of US soldiers being wounded or killed to preserve

the peace, the administration looked to airpower to provide

the United States the force needed to maintain credibility in

the international arena while preventing public outrage due

to American casualties.3 Aerial refueling allowed the nation

to reach out to these regions by providing fuel for the airlifting of supplies and fighter protection.

Finally, the NSS pledges to work with other nations to

defuse regional conflicts.4 Each region of the world offers a

unique and volatile challenge requiring operations from

airlift to strategic attack. In the poverty-stricken continent

of Africa, aerial refueling will play a major role, linking the

European en route structure to the vast areas comprising

the southern countries in Africa. The two closest bases to

the en route structure are Lajes, Azores, and Rota, Spain,

which require an air bridge of tankers to respond to the region (fig. 1).5 Additionally, the United States already has

long-term commitments in Korea and Iraq requiring numerous aerial-refueling assets to support the operations.

The NSS also lays out a willingness to respond to challenges

in Israel, Palestine, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Western

Hemisphere, and Latin America. Again, with the concentration of the en route structure established along the west

coast of Europe and the east coast of Asia, aerial refueling

NARVID 3
will be a required resource to employ operations throughout the regions.

4 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 

Figure 1. En route structures. (Adapted from Col Scott Phillips,

“DIRMOBFOR,” lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 5

December 2002.)

Air Force Doctrine

The Air Force doctrine of aerial refueling is designed to

support the service’s power-projection capabilities, which

in turn support our national security interests. Air Force

Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-6.2, Aerial Refueling, points

out the numerous principles of airpower, such as time,

distance, and payload, affected by aerial refueling. AFDD

2-6.2 outlines aerial refueling and its ability to increase

mass, surprise, economy of force, flexibility, versatility,

and maneuverability.6 To execute this doctrine, tanker

operations rely heavily on established airfields with a robust logistical system.

During the past decade, the United States reduced the

number of overseas bases accessible by heavy aircraft

such as tankers. During Operation Desert Storm, two of

the six largest bases provided 58 percent of the airlift capability and access. This was due to their ramp space and

runway length, which were capable of handling the heavyweight aircraft of Air Mobility Command (AMC).7 The two

bases, Torrejon, Spain, and Frankfurt, Germany, have not
been used to their full capacity since Desert Storm. This

reduction limits the compatible runways for AMC’s large

aircraft and causes aircraft to compete for a smaller pool

of available forward operating bases. Reductions like

these, as well as the denial of airfields by host nations, make

aerial refueling vital to the Air Force mission. If reductions

and denials continue, the United States will come to rely

more on projecting power from its own shores or be forced

to choose less-than-optimum locations further away from

the fight than desired. While Central Europe and Central

Asia may grant access to additional airfields, current

tanker operations still require robust logistical support.

Logistical support impacts the ability of aerial refueling

to increase the payload carried by receiver aircraft. Due to

limitations in engine thrust, runway length, or aircraft

weight, some aircraft are unable to take off with the maximum amount of payload and carry enough fuel to accomplish the mission. The sacrifice in payload on supply aircraft means less cargo (supply items) to deployed troops or

kinetic weapons that are relied upon to “kill people and

break things” to win wars. Fighter aircraft may have to sacrifice fuel or payload, thus reducing either time or lethal impact over the target. However, the use of a tanker aircraft

can allow receiver aircraft to maintain high payloads and

to extend airtime by in-flight refueling.

Tankers can deliver capabilities beyond AFDD 2-6.2. Recently, Gen John P. Jumper, Air Force chief of staff, outlined how the Air Force will tailor forces and employ them

in response to a range of scenarios. In General Jumper’s

task force, CONOPS tankers must expand to become the

tankers of the future. The next tanker-force structure must

leverage its size and loiter time to enable all services a more

robust C4ISR while combining capabilities and doctrine to

help the airlift community to deliver global mobility and

global response. Additionally, future tankers need to leverage the lethality of combat air forces by increasing global

strike capabilities to linger over the battle area with larger

payloads. The next tanker cannot just be a replacement for

the KC-135. Airmen must think across doctrine, services,

platforms, and organizations in fielding the next tanker.

NARVID 5
History of Aerial Refueling

In 1921 the idea of aerial refueling was born in the minds

of daring men willing to brave dangerous aerial demonstrations to please watching crowds gathered below. One of the

first recorded aerial refuelings was such a stunt. A lone

man named Dougherty crept across the wings of a Lincoln

Standard biplane with a five-gallon gasoline can strapped to

his back.8 He stepped out onto the awaiting wing of a JN-4

Jenny aircraft and poured the contents of his can into the

Jenny’s tank; thus, the first historical recording of the first

aerial refueling of an airborne aircraft. During the next couple of years, aerial refueling quickly evolved through trial and

error. New methods of transfer were tested using hoses to

transfer fuel instead of wing walkers, and endurance records

were extended, fuel loads increased, and distance records

were broken. However, it all came to a halt with the death of

some Airmen in an aerial demonstration; the refueling hose

from the tanker wrapped around the prop of the receiving

aircraft.9 The idea of aerial refueling seemed to subside in the

chapters of airpower history. The fledgling airline industry

did not share the initial interest shown by the military. Commercial flights simply did not require the endurance aerial

refueling could provide to domestic flights. It was not until

1929 that the Army Air Corps brought back the revolution of

aerial refueling, grabbing the world’s attention. Two young

officers, Carl Spaatz and Ira Eaker, piloted their monoplane

named the Question Mark, smashing all air-endurance

records—the aircraft remained airborne for 150.8 hours.10

This famous demonstration of in-flight endurance made possible by aerial refueling caught the attention of proponents of

airpower throughout the world.

The Early Years

The United States pioneered aerial refueling. However, as

US involvement in World War II began in early 1940, aerial

refueling would take a backseat to the strategic bomber. The

strategic bomber had the endurance (fuel capacity) required

to execute its mission when deployed to the region where

bombing was required. However, fighter aircraft were still

without the required range to escort bombers or fly long6 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
range missions within the theater of operations. The United

States failed to build tankers and equip fighters and bombers

with transfer-receiver capability. Aerial refueling became important as World War II ended and the Soviet Union emerged

as a foe of the United States. In 1946, to meet the new global

mission to deter the Soviet Union, the Army Air Force converted B-29s into tankers. B-29 tankers off-loaded fuel to

B-29 bombers via a hose winched from the bomber onto the

tanker by a grappling line. By the time the first tanker was

born, bombers with higher engine thrust were being built,

and despite the invention of the more efficient flying boom,

the KB-29 was unable to keep up with the faster bombers.

The KC-97 tanker-transporter evolved from the KB-29,

which had a more efficient boom system and, more importantly, gave the United States a swing capability to carry

cargo. The propeller-driven KC-97 soon found itself outclassed by the more powerful bombers. The KC-97 had to

descend while refueling or “toboggan,” and the later version,

the KC-97L, included an extra engine under each wing to

provide the KC-97 enough thrust to stay ahead of the receiver aircraft. The older technology of the KC-97 was soon

replaced by the “jet”-powered KC-135.

Tankers of Today

In 1957 the first KC-135 was delivered to the Air Force

and became an important part of the Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) strategy. When paired with the B-52 under

the Joint Chief of Staff’s Single Integrated Operations Plan,

the team could deliver nuclear weapons to the Soviet

Union.11 The KC-135 was strictly tied to the strategic

bomber force and not used to refuel Tactical Air Command’s fighter force until the Vietnam War. The KC-135

could refuel at higher altitudes and easily keep up with the

B-52, enabling them to maintain 24-hour coverage of the

sky. The same boom-system design used on the KC-97 was

still in place on the KC-135. In changing from a strictly

SAC asset to refueling TAC aircraft, the KC-135’s missions

would undergo additional changes.

Although the Navy had its own small fleet of tactical

tankers and the KC-135 inventory was quickly increasing,

the Navy wanted access to the KC-135 as a viable refueler

NARVID 7
to increase the reach of their fighter force. To refuel Navy

and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft, a

drogue or “basket” was adapted to replace the boom tip for

Navy or NATO refueling missions.

During the next 25 years, the KC-135 dominated the

aerial-refueling arena while undergoing additional evolutions and transitions, such as new fuel-efficient and quieter

engines, partial wing replacements due to metal fatigue,

and engine-strut replacement. The KC-135 was already

becoming outdated before the first KC-10 reached the Air

Force inventory in 1981. The KC-10 was born under the

advance tanker/cargo aircraft idea.12 Not only would the KC10 be able to carry nearly twice as much fuel as the KC-135,

it could also alternate between boom and drogue refueling

while airborne. Moreover, the KC-10 provided the Military

Airlift Command (MAC) a tremendous boost in strategicairlift capability due to its large cargo capacity. One of the

biggest advantages the KC-10 has over the KC-135 is that

the KC-10 eventually evolved to a dual-drogue system capable of refueling two Navy or NATO fighter aircraft at the

same time from its wings. Eventually, the KC-135 was modified (in limited numbers), allowing it to trail two drogues from

its wing pods. The KC-10 is often used in the “reliability

tanker role” due to the massive amount of fuel it carries and

its ability to refuel different types of aircraft, regardless of the

refueling system installed.13 Presently, the Air Force has not

received a new tanker since the delivery of the KC-10 over 20

years ago and has a fleet of KC-135s nearly 50 years old.

Shortfalls

International tanker operations are required for modern

US air campaigns. However, many international areas do

not have infrastructure capable of supporting tanker

ground operations.

En Route Structure

The international “en route structure” in which tankers

are required to operate does not provide an endless number of options when it comes to selecting airfields to deploy

assets. Every country varies in the infrastructure they can

8 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
afford to build or maintain. In many cases, nations rely on

antiquated airfields designed for World War II–era aircraft.

The runway is unable to either handle the weight of largetanker and cargo aircraft or the length of the runway is insufficient. Likewise, countries that do have the capability

to support tankers may limit access due to disagreements over military use of airfields, or their top priority is

commerce-producing commercial aircraft. These limitations in the en route structure highlight limitations in the

US tanker force that must be addressed in the development of the future tanker-force structure.

The number of bases available within the en route structure is limited by runway requirements for tanker aircraft.

The weight of tankers due to mission requirements for fuel

often exceeds the weight capacities of many foreign runways.

Additionally, many foreign runways are not long enough to

allow a fully loaded tanker to take off. This limits access to

bases/airports by all but a few overpowered aircraft. As in

the case of the air operations in Kosovo, US forces had to rely

on an old NATO and former Warsaw Pact en route structure

designed for much lighter fighter aircraft and were unable to

use the numerous bases available in the area.14 Maj Gen

Roger Brady, Air Force deputy chief of staff, noted that “the

amount of bases close to combat operations and available

to tankers were [sic] not readily available.”15 Moreover, the

United States does not control the development or suitability

of other nation’s airfield infrastructure. The few bases the

United States does maintain and contribute to the high cost

of modernizing are not available in numbers large enough to

accommodate the large expeditionary packages dictated by

today’s Air Force mission requirements. Without a change in

foreign airbase operations or increased US funding for

modernization of foreign bases in the future, the only runways readily available may be in austere locations.

Civilian- versus Military-Designed Aircraft

Civilian airlines rarely operate in austere locations or rely

on airfields lacking support and required infrastructure.

When they do service these areas, they do so with smaller

aircraft capable of operating on limited-length runways.

The larger civilian aircraft enjoy the luxury of modern interNARVID 9
national airports fully equipped with all the amenities afforded the high-commerce demands of airborne transportation and have no incentives to operate on less-than-normal

runway lengths. However, US tankers designed on airline

prototypes or slightly modified versions, such as the KC135 and KC-10, must gain access to available airfields

closest to the fight. The NATO standard 8,000-foot runway

is not adequate for fully loaded KC-135s and KC-10s.

The tankers in the Air Force inventory today are built to airline standards, not to military requirements, which limits

the runways available. This is just one example where commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) aircraft design negates military

requirements. 

The development of the Boeing 767 seems to address the

disparity between civilian and military specifications on

runway-length capabilities and does allow the aircraft to

take off fully loaded on an 8,000-foot runway, which gives

access to 2,000 additional bases/airfields due to reduced

runway requirements.16 However, it has taken two generations of tankers to meet these requirements. While this

new capability may fit a strategy linked to NATO allies, it

may not suffice in the future for isolated areas away from

the mobility en route structure. Tanker operations in the

future may depend on less-developed runways with some

missions requiring the building of refueling infrastructure

(pipelines) to realize full capability.

Even with the new capability, the 767 will not match the

capability to land on austere runways, such as the militarydriven requirements of the C-17 or the heavier C-5.17 If given

these same capabilities, the 767 would have access to additional runways. However, to fully utilize a short-field capability, the tanker force will need to develop a new approach

to tanker operations. Tanker forces may require pipelines to

bring the fuel from large bases or offshore tankers to the

smaller airfields. The flexibility to operate globally and in lessdeveloped countries will be part of future tanker missions;

critical planning is needed now.

Boom-Cycle Time

Boom-cycle time is the rate a tanker can off-load fuel to

multiple receivers. Despite the amount of fuel that tankers

10 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
carry, with only one boom, tankers can off-load only a set

amount of fuel within a given time. This has been a problem with the tanker force from inception. Single-port refueling reduces the flexibility of the entire operational force. During multiple aircraft refueling, the single boom limits the

entire aerial-refueling process. The single boom does not present the same problem when refueling large deploying aircraft or requiring extra fuel to make long flights across the

oceans. However, it does affect small fighter aircraft flying

long distances or loitering for long periods. The limited

amount of fuel carried by smaller aircraft requires most to

refuel hourly. With only one boom available, each aircraft

must refuel in turn and burn onboard fuel while waiting its

turn. When combat aircraft operate in packages, the waiting

time is a limiting factor delaying the attack or restricting time

over target. The following excerpt sheds light on the problem

of refueling with a single boom.

Three flights of four fighters each are airborne and burning fuel at

an average rate of 8,000 pounds per hour (pph) or a total of 96,000

pph for the flights. One tanker can transfer fuel at a rate of 60,000

pph to these notional flights of fighters, allowing each aircraft to

cycle on and off the boom. In this typical example, only 60 percent

of the fighters can be refueled and will require an additional tanker

to refuel the strike package.18

In the above example, adding an additional boom to KC

aircraft allows a two-to-one reduction in tanker requirements and reduces required airspace. Currently, KC-10s

already employ this concept when refueling naval aircraft

by extending two hoses from the wings. Navy aircraft control their own refueling—closure to hose, connection to

aircraft, positioned on the hose in relation to the tanker,

and monitored by the boom operator on the tanker. Air

Force use of a duel-boom system would not require an additional boom operator. Currently, only single-boom operations are allowed because the boom operator flies the

boom into the receptacle of the awaiting aircraft. On the

older KC-135, the boom operator monitors the refueling

envelope and disconnects the refueling aircraft when or if

limits are reached. However, on the KC-10, the boom system can operate in an autonomous mode with a computer

monitoring the rate of closure and boom limits, even executing “disconnects.” Current technology still requires a

NARVID 11
boom operator to make the contact with receiver aircraft;

however, new technological advances in an automaticboom-operating system can make dual-boom operations a

possibility. Employment of the new technology will require new developments in breakaway procedures. The

Navy already uses dual refueling, and the Air Force could

easily adapt breakaway procedures from lessons learned

by the Navy.

Refueling from a single boom reduces the flexibility of

fighter aircraft. Current strike packages require the integration of many weapon systems spread among different

fighter aircraft. One strike package may have two or three

different types of aircraft providing defensive and offensive

capabilities. If these packages are responding to a set time

over target, the aircraft have a limited amount of time to

refuel with the precoordinated tanker support. The problem becomes more pronounced when fighters are reacting

to a time-sensitive target. Time-sensitive or pop-up targets

require minimal response time and can be negatively affected by single-boom operations. If refueling is required,

the time to cycle through refueling requirements is cut in

half with an additional boom. Until additional booms are

added, other tankers will need to deploy and will contribute to the already growing airspace issue.

The addition of a boom will most likely require extensive aircraft-design engineering, as the current aircraft

design does not allow a simple bolt-on boom. One of the

biggest unknowns in moving refueling operations from

the tail of the aircraft to two booms on the wings is with

heavy-receiver aircraft. What aerodynamic affect will a

heavy aircraft have on the tanker by refueling from the

wing? It is obvious that heavy aircraft will not have

enough clearance from the tail of the tanker to refuel

from the wing on commercial airline designs. It is most

likely that the body of a dual-boom tanker will have to resemble a B-2 or have a blended wing where the boom can

extend beyond the trailing edge of the aircraft. Designing

a dual-boom system into an aircraft during the design

phase will reduce drag, improve maintenance, and limit

interference between aircraft systems. This will not be

possible if the Air Force uses a COTS aircraft.

12 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
Getting Enough Gas to the Fight

Tankers are gas stations in the sky. As such, tankers must

carry as much fuel as possible. Mission requirements dictate

the amount of fuel needed, but having additional fuel increases mission flexibility and will cover contingencies, if

needed. To deliver the maximum amount of gas to the fight,

tankers leverage three capabilities. First, the more gas a

tanker departs home station with, the more it will have when

it reaches the planned aerial-refueling route. This is a simple

concept—the bigger the tanker is, the more fuel it can carry.

As mentioned earlier, the KC-135 can carry approximately

half of what a KC-10 can carry. Second, the less fuel a tanker

burns en route to the fight, the more it can deliver. The advantage of fuel-efficient engines is one the Air Force has continually pursued in the KC-135. Finally, the faster a tanker

can off-load fuel to a receiver, the less time the additional receivers spend burning fuel in the refueling track.

The KC-10 can take the place of about two KC-135s on the

ground and in the air. On the ground, a KC-10 has a smaller

footprint than two KC-135s. Additionally, one KC-10 requires

less maintenance and support while carrying more cargo

than two KC-135s. The disadvantage is when a single KC-10

has a maintenance problem; twice the aerial-refueling capability is lost. Additionally, there are penalties involved with

the KC-10 on the ground. Due to its weight and associated

runway requirements, the en route structure may not have

the required fields to accommodate heavy tankers. In the air,

a single heavy tanker burns less fuel than two smaller

tankers carrying the same amount of fuel as a heavy tanker.

Additionally, a single tanker requires less airspace to perform

aerial refueling and is more maneuverable. The standard

spacing for a tanker-refueling cell requires one mile between

each tanker. For every additional tanker added to a formation, the formation spreads out an additional mile. A formation of tankers avoiding thunderstorms or adjusting its turn

must take into consideration all tankers in the formation. A

single tanker or even a two-ship formation does not require

all the airspace and precoordination that a large cell of

tankers requires.

The less fuel a tanker burns, the more it delivers to the

fighters. One of the most prevalent ways to reduce fuel

NARVID 13
consumption is to develop more fuel-efficient engines. Due

to the limited en route structure, fighters are based closest

to the fight, while tankers are expected to make the long

haul to the aerial-refueling tracks. This positioning causes

tankers to burn additional fuel to reach the refueling

point. Technological advances in engine performance have

driven numerous modifications to the KC-135 to increase

the total fuel available for receiver aircraft. Commercial

technological advances have shown numerous ways to improve aircraft efficiency. One of the most ignored is the design of the wing or aircraft. Preliminary analysis of blendedwing bodies, like the B-2, has shown the ability to exceed

the capability of conventional aircraft of the same size.19 A

skin-friction reduction innovation, called micro-blowing

technique, reduces the friction around the nacelle of an

aircraft up to 70 percent.20 The reduction in drag reduces

the amount of engine thrust required and the total amount

of fuel burned.

The rate fuel is transferred between the tanker and receiver using the boom or drogue must improve to reduce

the time receiver aircraft spend awaiting and receiving

fuel. Refueling using a boom enables tankers to transfer

fuel at a maximum 1,100 gallons per minute.21 This capability is reduced on the hose and drogue systems installed

on the wings of some KC-10s and KC-135s. Though two

hoses would seem to double the capability, a hose is only

able to off-load fuel at a rate slightly more than half as fast

as a boom. Despite having the added hose, two receiver aircraft are still only able to transfer fuel at about the same

rate as one boom. The problem is even more prevalent

when only one drogue is available (usual case) because

there are not enough dual-hose kits to equip the entire

force. For example, during a KC-10 deployment to Al

Dhafra, United Arab Emirates, Operation Southern Watch,

only one KC-10 was equipped with wing pods. If new advances are made in the transfer rates of fuel from a tanker,

the receiver may become a limiting factor. The technology

must be upgraded on the receiver aircraft to handle the

higher transfer rates. With advances in technology to improve transfer rates on a drogue system, as well as the

boom system, engineering studies must be accomplished

14 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
to ensure center-of-gravity problems do not develop on the

tanker during rapid-transfer fueling.

Trends

Future US air operations will place tankers in harm’s way.

For the tanker to continue to be a force multiplier, it must be

able to evade or thwart enemy efforts to shoot it down.

Tankers Are Targets Too!

The United States, without disagreement, has the most

formidable Air Force in the world and the best protection for

its aircraft. Technological advances in stealth, early warning

detection, and systems that defeat surface-to-air missiles

(SAM) have been protecting the country’s combat air forces

with resounding success for the past decade. Additionally,

fighter aircraft can employ tactics such as high-speed, high

g-force turns, and steep approaches, which add to their

self-defense. However, tankers are very susceptible due to

their lack of aircraft defensive systems, slow speed, and vulnerability during takeoff and landings.

A threat definitely exists, and adversaries rely more and

more on asymmetric weapons and tactics to bring down

US airborne assets. First of all, shoulder-launched missiles are present in sizeable amounts and available to just

about anyone with a reason to hate the United States.

Stinger missiles were provided to the Mujahideen by the Central Intelligence Agency during Afghanistan’s resistance to

the occupation of their land by the Soviets.22 Of these missiles, it is estimated that at least 30 of them are still

available and in the hands of Osama bin Laden and his

terrorist group, al-Qaeda.23 If it is easy for terrorists to gain

access to US missiles, how much more access do they have

to Soviet-made missiles provided by nations such as Iran,

Syria, or North Korea?

Secondly, the tactics to employ these missiles are simple

to achieve and difficult to defeat. “You can’t protect against

somebody standing on a building or road and shooting off

a missile,” says Clair Brunavs, a spokeswoman for Jane’s

Historic Military Aircraft Recognition Guide.

24 Recent events

have proven the ability of rogue groups to effectively employ

NARVID 15
shoulder-launched missiles, such as the Russian SA-7.

Several strategic and tactical airlift aircraft were recently

fired upon during the landing phase into Baghdad International Airport, Iraq. Moreover, an international carrier,

comparable in size and weight to a KC-135, was struck by

an SA-7 during takeoff.25

Finally, the future does not hold a better outlook for

tankers. Smaller groups may not have the technology and infrastructure to research and develop weapons that can

counter US systems. However, nation states that understand

US capabilities and employment of air assets can develop the

means to defeat US weaknesses while avoiding US strengths.

Why should a foe be expected to face US strengths head-on?

China is just one example of such a state that may be a peer

competitor in the future and willing to invest funds to attack

one of the Achilles’ heels of the United States—a large, slow,

less-maneuverable tanker aircraft. Additionally, it is no secret to the United States and the world that China is currently developing a new use for its over-the-horizon cruise

missile to specifically attack air-to-air refueling capability.26

China recognizes how reliant the United States is on its

tanker force and aerial refueling to enable its bomber and

fighter force to reach out and apply deadly force. It is also

highly possible that other countries desiring protection

against the United States will also be willing to either develop

or purchase technology, allowing them to have an asymmetric advantage. Tanker aircraft are vulnerable in the low (takeoff) and high structure (in flight). Current technology limitations on the SAMs combined with US intelligence allows

tankers to avoid known threat areas while in the high structure of flight. However, in the low structure during takeoff

and landing, tankers need the capability to identify threats

with warning equipment and to counter them with technology such as chaff and flares that are already installed on

many airlift aircraft. Moreover, laser technology that deflects

the course of hostile missiles would make tankers an even

more difficult target to the enemy.

Network-Centric Warfare

With the advent of the Air Operations Center (AOC), the

need for correct information from the battlefield to the

16 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
decision maker and the war fighter has become a trend

that is highly dependent on sensor and communication

technology. The Committee on Appropriations submitted

to the 106th Congress a report explaining a shortage of required assets needed in establishing a network-centricwarfare capability. They reported deficiencies in low-density,

high-demand assets such as electronic warfare aircraft,

tactical collection and dissemination of assets, secure communications, and command and control.27

Tankers can provide the link between decision makers and

war fighters if they are afforded the technology and integrated in current doctrine. For years tanker aircraft have always been close to the fight. Tanker fighter-anchor patterns

are assigned by AFDD and require the tanker on station as

the gas station in the sky for as long as other aircraft are flying. The Air Force is currently taking advantage of the loitering tanker and integrating it into network-centric warfare.

ROBE enhancement is the relay in the smart tanker concept

receiving information from different locations and transmitting it beyond visual range to the right person, at the right

time.28 However, the tanker can go beyond ROBE and its

capability of integrating the joint tactical radio system

(JTRS). Recent shoot-downs of friendly helicopters and fratricide of friendly ground forces signal a need for identification

of friendly forces. The JTRS has a function allowing a vehicle

being targeted to transmit a specific signal.29 With ROBE

already onboard, the tanker can quickly transmit this information to the appropriate aircraft to prevent killing of

friendly forces. Tankers are capable of combining capabilities

of other battle-management aircraft.

Likewise, the decision loop, in the execution of combat

forces, relies intensely on information from numerous sensors in, on, and around the battlefield. Optical sensors on

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), air-to-air radar sensors

on E-3 airborne warning and control systems, and air-toground radar sensors on E-8C joint surveillance target

attack radar systems (JSTARS) provide battle-space

awareness to decision makers and targeting information to

war fighters in high fidelity. The capability of sensors and

the advent of new ways to employ them have created a

sensor race between services and major commands within

the services. Although the many sensors can be linked by

NARVID 17
systems and share the information, the information sent

or received is limited by the lack of equipment on ground

units or airborne aircraft. Additionally, because some of

these systems are service parochialisms, many services cannot receive the information simply because they were not

planned as a customer of the information (i.e., the Air Force

may not be able to receive Army information or the Army receive Air Force information). The outcome of the need for sensors and the lack of a centralized command for sensor production have created numerous platforms.

The tanker can provide the capability to act as the platform with the sensors needed to service the battle area. First,

tankers have the capability to loiter while serving as refueling points for fighter aircraft. Anytime a fighter is patrolling

the sky, the air tasking order contains an anchor point or a

reliability tanker for emergency refueling. Second, tankers

have ample space within the aircraft to house communication as well as sensor equipment. Finally, tankers have large

surface areas outside the aircraft and the capability to mount

aerodynamic components that can serve as sensor devices.

More Airlift

The National Military Strategy has moved away from fighting two major theater wars to a 1-4-2-1 defense strategy. The

four parts of the strategy are (1) defend the United States

(homeland defense), (2) deter aggression and coercion in

four critical regions, (3) swiftly defeat aggression in two

overlapping major conflicts, and (4) upon presidential direction, win decisively against one of the two major conflicts.

A new force structure to support the airlift of this strategy

would require 302 C-17s and 52 C-5s and the call-up of

the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, Stage III.30 AMC’s 2004 planning

factors uses a primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI) of

94 C-17s, 96 C-5s, and 42 C-141s strategic-airlift aircraft

in the active duty and reserve.31 According to Air Force fact

sheets, a C-17 can carry approximately 170,900 pounds of

cargo,32 a C-5 can carry approximately 270,000 pounds of

cargo,33 and a C-141 can carry 687,000 pounds of cargo.34

Given the requirements of the new strategy and the current inventory, it is obvious that the nation is unable to

meet the new requirements of a 1-4-2-1 defense strategy

18 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
when one considers the total amount of cargo that is required by the strategy versus the total amount of cargo

that is capable of being airlifted by military aircraft (fig. 2).

NARVID 19

70,000,000

60,000,000

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

0

Current

Capability

C-17 C-5 C-141 Total

1-4-2-1 Defense

Strategy

Figure 2. Current cargo capability versus required capabilities in 1-4-2-1 defense strategy.

Tankers, while limited in carrying outsized and oversized

cargo, have the capability to carry more cargo than a C-141

and as much cargo as a C-17. According to Air Force fact

sheet, KC-10 Extender, a KC-10 is capable of carrying

170,000 pounds of cargo, roughly equivalent to a C-17.35

Likewise, according to Air Force fact sheets, the KC-135 is

capable of carrying 83,000 pounds of cargo, which is more

than a C-141 and almost half of what a C-17 can carry.36

With 472 KC-135s and 54 KC-10s in AMC’s PMAI, this gives

the Air Force an additional 48-million pounds of cargo-lift capability. However, it is impossible to use the entire tankercargo airlift capability because of the tanker’s requirements

to fulfill aerial refueling for combat support and deployment

missions. One of the lessons learned from Kosovo was not

that the number of tankers was inappropriate but that planning and efficient use of tankers stretched aerial-refueling

operations.37 Tankers can be used more effectively to augment the strategic-airlift mission if planning is more efficient

or planning models are used more effectively. Additionally,

the total amount of cargo capability is somewhat different

when operationally using the capability of a tanker as an air-
lifter. Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 10-1403, Air Mobility Planning Factors, realistically states that a KC-135 can carry

36,000 pounds of cargo on a 3,200-nautical-mile leg because

it is limited by the smaller number of pallets it can carry.38

Tankers of the future must have better airlift capability to

provide more options to the supported commanders. Airlift

operations require access to shorter runways to deliver cargo

closer to the end user. C-17s are designed to land on shorter

runways, giving them access to thousands more runways

than tankers. Given the number of tankers in the Air Force

inventory and the need for airlift, a tanker capable of delivering cargo anywhere would enhance the airlift mission and

the flexibility of combatant commanders. However, tankers

would need the capability to survive the hostile threats facing airlift aircraft.

Tankers can also give the combatant commander the airlift capability normally received from AMC. Usually, the only

airlift the joint forces commander has control of is through

the joint forces air and space component commander

(JFACC) and the AOC is tactical airlift using the C-130 force.

On specific occasions, the tactical control of strategic-airlift

aircraft changed to the theater. A temporary change of control over C-17s was done in the Kosovo crisis to move Task

Force Hawk from Germany and was considered a “tremendous success story” according to Gen Charles T. “Tony”

Robertson Jr., former commander of AMC.39 It was such a

success that General Robertson said, “It’s something we’re

going to have to go back and write into the doctrine as to how

that’s done.”40 Tankers are assigned to an expeditionary airrefueling squadron and are under the control of JFACC,

through the Air Mobility Division (AMD), within the AOC.

Tankers are available in numbers to provide the theater

airlift the joint force commander requires. However, the

current tanker force is unable to act as a theater airlifter

due to the risk of threats and the short runways. To use

tanker assets to their fullest, JFACCs must develop the

same understanding as that of the director of mobility forces

(DIRMOBFOR), and the AMD must include in the planning of

aerial-fueling capabilities the airlift capability of tanker aircraft. Moreover, a tanker with the airlift capability of a C-17

would give the JFACC the ability to control his or her tanker

force in the role of an airlifter.

20 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
The recapitalization of the KC-135 is an issue of major importance for the Air Force, AMC, and the Air Force globalreach capability. One proposed solution has brought a lot of

discussion and controversy—the leasing of the Boeing KC767. Much of this controversy has been over the politics involved in the process of leasing the newly proposed tanker

with little discussion over its capability. While leasing or purchasing the KC-767 will add many needed capabilities in the

short term, a better solution is to design and build a new

tanker: KC-XX, capable of multiple roles across the full spectrum of operations, able to survive in the demanding environment of the future, and based on capabilities, not platforms.

A newly designed KC-XX is the better choice to fill the needs

of the Air Force. Though the KC-XX may not be appealing because of the price, it may stand as an innovation to challenge

the mind-set of Airmen.

An additional solution proposed by analysts and not considered a viable alternative in this paper was to again reengine the aging KC-135. Whereas this would provide additional capability for takeoff payloads and fuel-burning

efficiency, it would not address many problems with the age

of the aircraft. Corrosion is one of the most pressing issues

with the KC-135, and new engines will not fix it. The corrosion of the airframe remains one of the elusive problems

with the tanker. It is difficult to predict when and where

corrosion will appear and what impact it will have on the

aircraft. A catastrophic failure due to corrosion would result in fleetwide grounding, crippling the nation’s ability to

project airpower due to the reliance on the KC-135 to provide the majority of the aerial-refueling capability. Despite

a solution for the corrosion problem, the KC-135 is already

over 40 years old and suffers from structural fatigue that

cannot be overcome with modifications, short of a complete

aircraft rebuild. The problem of age will simply get worse

as time goes on, and to re-engine the aircraft will fail to address the sustainability of the aircraft as a future platform.

Full Spectrum of Operations

Future tankers must have the ability to operate across the

full spectrum of operations. Tankers must have full access to

airfields around the world and provide combat aircraft the

NARVID 21
fuel required in an expeditious manner. Future tankers cannot be tied to a Cold War strategy and an en route structure

limited by runway weight or length restrictions. Future

tankers must have the ability to respond to the mission dictates of fighter aircraft, such as quick response to targets or

loitering over war zones.

An 8,000-foot NATO-standard runway may no longer

suffice for conflicts in the future. The United States’ decision to “go it alone” during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

is evidence that the United States cannot expect access to

another country’s bases and runways. Even with former

Soviet bloc countries joining NATO, allowing former inaccessible airfields to now be available, the lessons of OIF

points to a world where tankers with the capability of

short-field takeoff and landing like the C-17 will be mission

critical. At the very least, the next tanker must be able to

take off with full loads on smaller runways to open up isolated areas of the world to tanker operations. The KC-767

will allow access to more runways than the current inventory of KC-135s and KC-10s and with full fuel loads. However, will new capabilities built on old standards meet future mission requirements?

The global war on terrorism requires combat aircraft to

be available at all times, defending the US homeland from

terrorist attracts, such as those launched on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and meeting mission requirements such

as the air war over Kosovo. Future tankers must deliver

more fuel at a faster rate to ensure mission success.

Today’s combat missions require information gathering,

early warning, and communication-laden aircraft in and

around the fight, limiting the availability of airspace. Large

tanker formations add to the problems of confined airspace. Confined airspace requires fewer tankers delivering

more fuel. A KC-10 currently delivers as much fuel as two

KC-135 tankers. The proposed replacement, the KC-767,

can carry roughly the same amount of fuel as a KC-135.

While Boeing touts better fuel efficiency and maximum

takeoff weight to deliver more fuel to the fight, it requires two

KC-767s to do the work of one KC-10. The use of the KC-767

will increase the number of tankers in critical airspace.

Additionally, there are no provisions to add a multiple-boom

capability to the KC-767. The concept tanker would employ

22 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
multiple booms providing fuel to multiple aircraft as the KC10 currently does.

There are COTS aircraft available in the civilian community that are able to deliver large amounts of fuel. However,

little has been done to increase the rate of transfer or boomcycle time. If chosen, a civilian aircraft would immediately

require modifications to add multiple booms. Engineering

studies have not been accomplished on a COTS aircraft;

therefore, it is unknown whether the aerodynamics of a

COTS aircraft would allow advances in boom-cycle time.

Design studies and engineering of a new tanker could build

the use of multiple booms or other modifications into the design of the aircraft. A large tanker with two booms equals two

KC-767s using current boom technology. The advantages

gained from new engineering would result not only in capability but also would limit the number of tankers and their

time exposed to enemy attacks.

Survivability

Tankers of the future must be able to survive in all environments. Of critical importance is the capability to identify

and protect the asset during the takeoff and landing phases

of flight. Of additional importance is the need to limit the

exposure of tankers to attacks by limiting the amount of

tankers in a formation. Large deployments to one base or

large tanker formations are two examples of putting too

many tankers together at one time. Extending the US global

reach by using tankers could become an Achilles’ heel, one

the enemy would be willing to attack to defeat US forces.

Developments in OIF show the enemy has the ability and

is willing to attack large susceptible AMC assets. A C-17 was

unable to defend itself against SAMs and was hit during

takeoff. Gen Richard Myers, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

recounted the “harrowing experience” at the Reserve Officers

Association, Mid-Winter Conference, Washington, D.C.41 In a

separate incident, a C-5 was forced to land after being struck

by a missile on takeoff.42 The current aircraft defensive systems (chaff/flares) used to protect airlift aircraft are designed

to defeat older enemy technology and do not actively engage

incoming missiles. Even though both aircraft were able to

land without incident and the attack did not deter further

NARVID 23
operations, valuable ramp space was required by the battledamaged jets, which limited ramp operations. Moreover,

had the jets been shot down, operations may have ceased

completely.

If COTS aircraft (KC-767) are used to replace the current

tanker fleet, a bolt-on defensive system of flares or chaff

should be added. This system would add weight, create

drag, and decrease fuel efficiencies while arguably allowing

the aircraft to be susceptible to enemy shoulder-launched

missiles. A KC-XX would be able to capitalize on stealth

technology and designs used in fighter and bomber aircraft

proven successful in limiting heat signatures. Moreover,

directed-energy technology that offensively takes action

and redirects missiles could be built into the aerodynamic

design of a KC-XX. Additionally, the KC-XX could incorporate fuel-cell technology used in AMC’s airlift aircraft to

increase survivability. Current COTS aircraft are not engineered to survive in combat and utilize wet-wing technology, making them a target for a lone rifleman on the

outskirts of an airbase. However, the Federal Aviation

Administration recently issued a requirement for “newly

manufactured” aircraft to have a system to prevent fueltank explosions.43 Without new technology, lone tankers

are a prime target and become a more inviting target for

enemy forces when bunched together.

The tanker’s large footprint is further amplified when

multiple aircraft cells are launched or when large packages

are deployed to areas of hostility. The KC-767 is more fuelefficient than a KC-135. However, the fuel savings are not

enough to reduce the number of tankers required in the air

or to reduce the ramp space required. The KC-767 promises a 20 percent increase in off-load fuel when compared

to the KC-135E.44 The KC-XX could be designed to carry

twice the fuel of a KC-767. Even though a larger aircraft

creates a larger footprint than a smaller tanker, a single

KC-XX that is able to do the work of two KC-767s would

make a smaller signature in the air and on the ground. A

large cell requiring six KC-767s would only require three

KC-XXs. The new KC-XX would result in savings by limiting the vulnerability to enemy attacks while reducing required airspace and ground requirements in and around

the area of operations.

24 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
Capabilities Based

The tanker’s primary mission is that of being a platform

to provide fuel to aircraft. However, a KC-XX designed from

the ground up to include joint war-fighting capabilities

could provide more than fuel to the battlespace. The KC767 is a better platform than its predecessor, the KC-135E,

but it adds little to the current capabilities needed by the

joint war fighter. Tankers can remain airborne on station

for long periods. Normally, this capability is used to position a tanker in an orbit to await receivers. The KC-767 can

depart with about the same amount of fuel as a KC-135,

and through greater fuel efficiency, the KC-767 can arrive

at the orbit with more fuel and thus remain on station

longer. However, the KC-767 does little beyond providing

power sources for add-on capability while in orbit. The KCXX could leverage the increased orbit time to provide capabilities to the joint war fighter. Due to the long loiter times a

tanker is able to sustain, there are capabilities in command

and control, sensor, and communication that would make

the KC-XX multimission capable. Instead of a modification to

add these capabilities to an existing system, the new requirements could be designed into the KC-XX and avoid potential

engineering problems. One example of a potential engineering problem was the KC-135’s global air traffic management

(GATM) upgrade. Newly modified aircraft experienced problems with interfering electrons from existing wiring and systems which caused a delay in fielding the upgraded aircraft.

Adding planned zones to the design of the KC-XX would

avoid compatibility problems. Additionally, planned zones

can optimize the design of the aircraft for field maintenance

and increase cargo handling and capacity.

The tanker’s primary mission is to get gas to the receiver

aircraft. In its new multimission role, the KC-XX would

have increased cargo handling and capacity. The COTS aircraft currently used as tankers are limited in the oversize and

outsize cargo carried and are not designed to speedily offload cargo in combat environments. They require specialized cargo-handling equipment to reach the high-deck

heights of their load. This extra equipment creates a longer

logistics tail and the possibility of increased maintenance

problems. A KC-XX designed with low-loading heights like

NARVID 25
the C-17 and combat off-loading through the aft end of the

aircraft would not require as much support equipment.

This capability would give theater commanders the ability

to operationally control the KC-XX strategic-lift-capable

tankers without having to work through the prioritization

process used to schedule airlift. Additionally, this new

strategic-airlift capability would offset the large requirements of a 1-4-2-1 strategy.

Build or Buy?

The final decision for the procurement of a tanker will

come down to whether the Air Force should build a tanker

from the ground up or buy a COTS aircraft and modify it

for military use. While it is natural to propose that the best

solution to the tanker recapitalization is to build one, the

tanker of the future must meet the current Air Force’s fiscal constraints. Additionally, it will take decades to design

and replace the current inventory of tankers.

Before considering any solution, Airmen should conceptually think through the capabilities required of a new

tanker. The next phase would be to design the tanker including the capabilities and future requirements for a multimission, state-of-the-art aircraft. The design would serve

as a baseline for a comparison between a COTS tanker and

the KC-XX. Additionally, the design would convey to aircraft

contractors the requirements and desires of the Air Force.

If operational needs and mission effectiveness is the criteria for building or buying the next tanker, it is more likely

that an extra robust tanker meeting all requirements can be

built rather than purchased. A COTS aircraft could be a good

platform while still not meeting all performance requirements of the Air Force. However, if the capabilities outlined

in this paper were to be included, a COTS aircraft would require major modifications and design changes to meet future

tanker requirements. While COTS aircraft may be required

as an immediate solution to the current tanker problem, the

future of tanker operations will require a different solution.

The airlift mission proposed in the KC-XX can serve as an example of how much more effective weapon systems can be

when designed from the ground up. Nearly every strategic

26 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
airlifter from the C-17 back into airlift history has been

fielded in this manner.

Conclusion

It is hardly fair to compare the KC-767 to a notional KCXX. The KC-XX is not constrained by a history and mindset of purchasing existing airline platforms to fulfill the

role of aerial refueler. Since the advent of refueling, the role

of the tanker has been to be present and off-load as much

fuel as possible. The KC-767 only looks to continue this

single role, whereas the KC-XX can be multimission while

completing its primary mission. When one thinks of an aircraft combat package, only fighters or bombers come to

mind. Yet, many times the tanker is called to fly into

enemy territory to rescue its receiver when a crisis has developed, and the receiver has burned more fuel than was

planned for the strike. This reliance on the tanker has made

it an easy target of opportunity in asymmetric warfare. So, is

it unfair to dream of a stealthy KC-XX equipped with offensive and defensive systems to combat a direct enemy attack?

The KC-767 just cannot compete with such lofty ideas. While

at it, why not invent a supertanker with short-field takeoff

capability, able to deliver hundreds of thousands of pounds

of cargo and carry a standoff-precision-attack capability

used to target the enemy using its own sensor-array system.

The idea of the supertanker encroaches on other platforms

and is unattainable or is it?

While the next tanker may not be the KC-XX described

in this paper, the future force structure must take advantage of a capabilities-designed tanker. The next tanker

should be a national asset that can correct some longstanding shortfalls. Strike aircraft need gas, a lot of it, and

they do not want to hover wasting time to get it. Strapping

a boom or drogue to a COTS aircraft will not provide this

capability. The next tanker must take advantage of future

trends of warfare and bring to the war fighter multimission

capabilities that use the orbit time and cargo hauling

space of the tanker.

The Air Force must take the first step and design the

tanker needed to provide the capabilities that the joint

NARVID 27
environment needs. While it may not seem feasible to build

the “Cadillac” of all tankers, can the United States weather

another 50 years of a single-role tanker, continually needing modifications to meet the requirements of the future?

The Air Force cannot afford the risks of not having a

tanker designed for the future.

The future holds a place for the tanker. The tanker of the

future will not look like the tanker of the past. AMC pioneers

need to take advantage of trends in warfare and look beyond

the gas customer of yesteryear. Decision makers across all

services can benefit from the capabilities a tanker can bring

to command and control, communication, and sensors,

thus linking the war fighter on the ground, in the air, and on

the sea to the decision makers in the theater of operations.

The next tanker will be a joint-force asset with a prominent

role in the battlespace. The future tanker will fill the role of

gas passer, but today’s air warriors will need to decide if this

much-unused enabler will take a multimission role in tomorrow’s battle space.

Notes

1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, sec. 3.

2. Ibid., sec. 2.

3. Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information,

and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia,” 112–42.

4. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, sec. 4.

5. Phillips, “DIRMOBFOR,” 5 December 2002.

6. AFDD 2-6.2, 5.

7. Narvid, “Strategic Airlift: A Force Structure for the Challenging Future,” 5.

8. Sunderman, Early Air Pioneers, 176–78.

9. Latner-Needham, Refueling in Flight, 3–4.

10. Smith, “Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refueling: Highlights, 1923–

1998,” 52.

11. Monday, The Official Pictorial History of the USAF, 23.

12. Tankers, Military Analysis Network.

13. Burnett, “Control of Mobility Air Forces: Should the Director of

Mobility Forces Command?” 65

14. Brady, “Building and Commanding Expeditionary Units: Lessons

from Kosovo,” 12–21.

15. Ibid.

16. “AMC Plans and Programs, KC-767A: The Aircraft to Begin Our

Tanker Recapitalization,” 3.

17. Polek, “Tanker Version of 767 Ready for Refit Program.”

18. Callens, Tankers—The Weak Link?, 43.

28 TANKER-FORCE STRUCTURE 
19. “Affordable Air Travel,” SAT Annual Progress Report.

20. Ibid.

21. Fact Sheet, KC-10 Extender, October 2003.

22. Isenson and Lindsey, “Kenya Rocket Attack: Is Europe Next?”

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. “DAHL Plane Hit by Missile in Iraq,” Airwise News, 22 November

2003.

26. Wortzel, “China’s Strategic Intentions and Goals.” 

27. House, 106-244 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2000.

28. KAL Gopaul, “Smart Tankers.”

29. Miller, Dominate Logistics: Extreme JTRS-A Combat Data Infrastructure, 4 April 2003.

30. “AMC Plans and Programs, Air Mobility Requirements for the Future.”

31. AFPAM10-1403, 15.

32. Fact Sheet, C-17 Globemaster, January 2004.

33. Fact Sheet, C-5 Galaxy, August 2003.

34. Fact Sheet, C-141 Starlifter, March 2004.

35. Fact Sheet, KC-10.

36. Fact Sheet, KC-135 Stratotanker, April 2004.

37. Garamone, “DoD Studies Kosovo Lessons Learned.”

38. AFPAM10-1403, 12.

39. Schatz, “Theater Airlift Lessons from Kosovo.”

40. Ibid.

41. Garamone, “Chairman Calls Reserves a National Treasure.” 

42. Mathews, “Robins Maintainers Team to Return C-5 to Airlift Rotation.”

43. Koch and Lewandowski, “FAA Orders Fuel Tank Safety Systems

on Jets.” 

44. Boeing Company, “Boeing’s 767 Tanker Aircraft Delivers More of

Everything,” news release, 23 April 2004.

NARVID 29
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33