JOINT

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ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

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LLEGE

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John W. Bodnar
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Rethinking the Intelligence Process

by John W. Bodnar

WASHINGTON, DC

December 2003

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author 

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

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Strategic Intelligenc

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Joint Military Joint Military

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Intelligence College Intelligence College
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The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and encourage

on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves supp

policy-level and operational consumers

Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligence Process, by John W

This book bequeaths to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to the Intelligence Communi

substantiated vision, with examples, of how analysts can exploit already-available, massiv

to tackle many of the most vexing problems that we face. Dr. Bodnar builds on the earli

insight of Cynthia Grabo, whose book Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic W

recently published by the Joint Military Intelligence College’s Center for Strategic 

Research. The author also usefully integrates into this book the often-cited but rarely-s

work of the USAF’s strategic and operational philosopher Colonel John Boyd. Togeth

accompanying, classified case studies that are available to the Community on Intelin

reaches farther than any other toward the objective of bringing together substantive expe

accessible, methodologically sound analytical strategy in the service of the U.S. Intelligen

nity. Those who go on to apply this method will not only derive fresh understanding fr

data, but will also be able to guide future intelligence collection in an appropriately frugal 

 Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, 

Library of Congress Control Number 2

ISBN 0-9
iii

The author gratefully acknowledges the following individuals, who 

and commented on early drafts of this book.

Jim Murphy and Kelcy Allwein of the Defense Intelligence Age

McVaney of the National Security Agency, Mike Maskelaris of MITR

ration, and Frank Hughes, faculty member at the Joint Military In

College.

In addition, several individuals provided invaluable assistance or adv

classified case studies.

From the Defense Intelligence Agency: Dr. Eric Hehl, CW3 Dav

Mary Highsmith, and CDR James van der Velde. 

From the Joint Military Intelligence College: LTC Jeffrey Johnson, 

dent; Dr. William Williamson, faculty member; and Research Fellow 

Rebecca Katz.
iv
v

Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Commentaries on the Book. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter

1. Strategic Warning in a World of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. From Current Intelligence to Warning Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. From Newtonian Thinking to Quantum Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. Paradigm Shifts — When the Future Ain’t What It Used To Be . . . . 

5. From Newtonian Analog Models to Quantum Digital Models. . . . . . 

6. Toward Novel Intelligence from Massive Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. From Current Intelligence to Strategic Warning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. Modeling the Decision Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9. Modeling the Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10. Modeling How We Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11. Modeling Ourselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

12. Getting There from Here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

13. Toward an Information-Age IC: How Long Will It Take? . . . . . . . . . 

14. Can We Shift A Paradigm in a Single Generation?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Selected Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

vii

Warning Analysis For The Information Age:

Rethinking The Intelligence Process 

JEFFREY R. COOPER*

Looking toward the challenges posed to the Intelligence Commun

changed strategic circumstances of the Information Age, Dr. Bodnar, 

enced intelligence analyst with a deep technical background, weave

four themes in addressing the emerging demands of warning intellig

important core theme is the utility of his Multidimensional Analys

methodology in confronting the complexity of Information-Age war

lenges, an analytic approach he developed while working on a variet

lems posed by foreign development of weapons of mass destruction. T

theme builds on Cynthia Grabo’s recently republished classic Handboo

ing Intelligence and tunes those lessons for Information-Age rather th

trial-Age conditions. Bodnar’s third theme is to highlight the utility of 

Boyd’s theory of the OODA-loop decision cycle and integrate it into th

analysis framework. Finally, from his perspective as a working analy

provides, in a series of suggestions on fixing analytical and resource co

strategy to improve intelligence analysis. To this interesting and usef

would offer several thoughts for additional emphases. 

OVERALL COMMENTS

Properly in my view, Bodnar, in concert with many observers,1 sees 

mation Age as signifying a fundamental shift away from a determinist

ear Newtonian paradigm to a complex adaptive systems perspective gr

non-linearity and modern, quantum physics. Bodnar integrates this 

shift” theme throughout his paper; however, perhaps in keeping with hi

background and in focusing narrowly on the analytical issues, he fai

1

1

See, for example, David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity, Gl

and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, June 19

*Corporate Vice-President for Technology and Chief Scientist, Science Applications 

Corporation Strategies Group.
viii

deterministic Newtonian linearity, that are now also changing and co

our emerging warning problems. 

Industrial-Age powers drew their strength from three underlying 

lated roots: political, economic, and technological. First, building u

Westphalian emergence of nationalism, these nation-states drew le

political strength from large cohesive publics, which could also pr

military forces. Second, industrialization and mass production fuele

nomic growth that together allowed these nation-states to field and 

large military forces. Third, new technologies provided large-scale 

immensely lethal firepower for these forces, enabling offensive m

tions at a distance. The potency of scale dominated the sources of na

but the Industrial Age required efficient organizations and process

and exploit this power. Thus, the importance of Weber’s hierarchic

cies that brought professionalization, specialization and routinizatio

ment. Also, Taylor’s application of standardized and systematized 

manufacturing cannot be overemphasized as key elements of the In

paradigm that demanded the ability to predict and control these ma

ties. 

Throughout the Industrial Age, these same factors—mass, standar

predictability—also underwrote the sources of military strength and 

egies and operational approaches to warfare. But those very qualities 

us to adopt and exploit a warning paradigm based on assumptions (

and linearity) that danger would come from large-scale activities. T

almost by definition, would be visible—and deterministically predic

could access their signatures. The Information Age has changed th

able assumptions about the tractability of providing warning based o

activities and predictable processes; new threats may come in very 

ages that are difficult to detect, or subtle activities with non-linear c

that are hard to observe. While I might disagree with Bodnar as to th

of the threat posed by many of these new challenges (especially as co

tens of thousands of nuclear weapons wielded with deadly malice

agree that this new environment is more challenging, with respect to 

(in the formal sense), observability, and predictability if we contin

our inherited tools and practices. Exactly for this reason, I would stre

nar’s implicit call to re-examine issues of analytic process. This 

returning to first-order issues of both phenomenology and epistemol

A second area that I would emphasize is the diversity of the new w

lenges. First, I would emend Bodnar’s definitions of warning. All 
ix

intended to trigger action by the decisionmaker. Strategic warning in

especially must concern itself not just that a nation (or other group) 

hostile intentions and be acquiring appropriate capabilities to serve them

that other changes—such as new technologies, political institutions or 

economic dislocations, or challenges to human security such as diseas

ronmental catastrophe, could pose fundamental challenges to U.S. in

policies. I would also add Operational Warning to his categorization.

Tactical Warning (TW) is an alert; it should denote that the activity o

(such as a surprise attack) is immediately imminent or unfortunately un

should be specific with respect to at least where and when, even it cann

who and how. As Bodnar correctly notes, response to TW is immediate 

be with resources and plans at hand. Strategic Warning (SW) should id

existence of a potential threat, either in terms of intention or capability

vide sufficient time for policymakers to assimilate, plan, and provide 

for offsetting responses, as Bodnar recognizes. Operational Warning is 

tial link between these two; it both alerts that the adversary is pre

embark upon his inimical activity and identifies its particular charact

vides the necessary time to mobilize and activate the response, as well 

ger close monitoring of the indicators for TW. As an example, a

Strategic Warning in the mid-1990s would have alerted that Islamic F

talism was becoming a strategic threat to U.S. global interests. Operatio

ing would have cued that both Al-Qaeda and “airplanes as bom

instrumentalities of particular concern. Tactical Warning would have 

notice of imminent attack. The warning failure of 9/11 was not merely 

Tactical Warning, but Operational and Strategic as well. 

In the MDA, Bodnar provides a six-dimensional methodology th

structured, but inherently flexible in terms of the particular analytic 

models that can be incorporated. It is gratifying that he also appreciate

ited the evidence-driven “connect the dots” model is in its applicabilit

employing other models that rely more on hypothesis generation and 

essential. Moreover, although Bodnar lives within an “evidence-based 

he stresses the need to provide context as the only way to ensure that th

can be interpreted correctly; “the facts” don’t speak for themselves. In 

he highlights the need to adopt recursive hypothesis generation and test

cols to ensure that anomalous information is not simply ignored or dr

masses of confirmatory evidence fed in streams enriched as an inadv

product of a filtering process based on “a priori relevance” determinati
x

Bodnar is particularly strong in making useful suggestions on imp

analytic processes in intelligence by adopting similarly structured pr

akin to scientific research than to the humanities. 

Other Specific Comments

By highlighting MDA only within the context of warning intellig

significantly shortchanges its potential utility to address other seriou

analysis shortfalls. As one element of his fourth theme, he recogniz

sive adverse impacts of emphasizing current intelligence over asse

estimative intelligence—including in-depth warning analysis—bu

suggest explicitly that such structured, multi-element analytic proc

also improve many other types of intelligence efforts as a corrective 

torial character of current intelligence. 

Although focused on improving warning intelligence, Bodnar to

on a number of other existing problems that impede good intellige

overall. He usefully suggests that a multi-step analytic process inclu

atic examination of how we model the adversary and conduct the en

process. The frequent and advised references to “tradecraft” in com

ings recognize the continuing craft character of the intelligenc

despite the trappings of advanced technologies. One little-under

quence of the craft culture, however, is the evolutionary and accre

analytic practices and habits—especially those that proved successfu

a second is the relative lack of systematic examination of these analy

and the epistemology that underlies them. In an era of rapid an

change, a craft culture may not be able to adapt sufficiently quickly 

new challenges. Moreover, in a craft culture, much critical domain 

process information (as well as standards, values, and élan) often 

and embodied in human expertise—or in individual analyst’s “s

rather than instantiated in structured, catalogued and retrievable for

to others. He highlights the importance of addressing this issue befo

tise is lost forever. 

Bodnar recognizes that waiting on customer requests to build the 

lytic base necessary to MDA, as well as to other intelligence efforts, 

vide sufficient time to do the job properly when the need for g

becomes pressing. In doing so, he implicitly raises the key issue o

can be more proactive and go beyond the formal customer-driven 

process. Bodnar also recognizes that despite the customer’s usual in

answer,” not all “stories” are linear; he recognizes that telling the co
xi

also exposes the serious issue that while very substantial resources 

invested in the IC’s information infrastructure, relatively little has bee

tools to enhance the individual analyst’s cognitive performance—

among all-source analysts, or to effectively support endemic work prac

as “shoeboxes.” 

xiii

Warning Analysis For The Information Age:

Rethinking The Intelligence Process 

Dr. Norman Kahn*

Dr. Bodnar’s work identifies and integrates a number of elements cri

Intelligence Community’s understanding of efforts on the part of both 

non-state actors to develop weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, 

fies human sources, signals intelligence, and open-source exploitation a

tors; and he develops a potent argument for integrating information o

places and programs and making this information available to the in

analyst in the form of automated relational databases. This approach, 

defines as “multidimensional analysis,” is already in use by savvy an

widespread acceptance clearly will enhance the Community’s ability 

deeper and more sophisticated input to policymakers who bear th

responsibility of responding to national security threats.

F. J. Hughes**

We are indeed at the threshold of a paradigm shift in intelligence ana

research work of the Advanced Research Development Activity (A

Intelligence-Community-wide effort, is seeking to define how we shoul

our strategies, operational concepts, and organizations in a fashion corr

to Dr. Bodnar’s vision. ARDA brings a potent dynamic into play that f

Discovery, Exploitation, and Analysis of intelligence information. B

harbinger of a powerful shift in thinking that can shape the future of in

in a world that has changed dramatically. His work represents a signi

forward in intelligence studies and serves as an invaluable reference 

row’s intelligence analysts who confront the task of implementing com

mental analysis.

*Program Manager, Bio-Defense Programs, Intelligence Technology Innovation Cente

**Faculty Member, Joint Military Intelligence College.

1

Chapter 1

STRATEGIC WARNING IN A WORLD OF WEAPONS 

DESTRUCTION (WMD) AND TERRORISM

John W. Bodnar, PhD

Changes in technology in the past half century have destroyed th

to provide warning intelligence by traditional means. How can n

nologies facilitate new methodologies to provide warning intelli

the Information Age?

Sputnik, 9/11, and the End of Warning Intelligenc

The 9/11 attacks made very clear that the concept of warning int

totally changed. I suggest that the ability to provide warning intellig

very different up to the beginning of World War II from what it was 

times, but the changes in technology during that war began a new a

gence. To understand these changes and their effects, to start with, w

inition of warning; I suggest:

■ Tactical Warning — warning of potential actions by an adversar

response can be mounted with current resources.

■ Strategic Warning — warning of potential actions by an adversa

a response will require a significant reallocation of resources.

The aim of warning intelligence is to be able to provide warfighter

makers with specific indicators of the potential actions of the adver

need to realize that most of the intelligence we do is not warning b

rent intelligence. Current Intelligence is matching recently collected 

against warning indicators to be able to predict the next actions of th

Every society has a need to provide resources both for its defens

and for its sustaining infrastructure or economy—“butter.” A best-c

for a society would be an environment where it did not have to 

defense so it could allocate all its resources toward its economy, 

possible exception of some remote Pacific islands, societies have a

reallocate at least some of their resources toward a military. The n

nario is for a society to allocate virtually all its resources to “butt

build “guns” when attack from without is imminent. A society t
2

an imminent attack will be, in the long run, stronger than a society th

standing military.

A “butter-now-guns-later” strategy depends on strategic warning. A 

change from a peacetime economy to a wartime economy requires ti

intelligence is not available and used for a national-level policy ch

nation will find itself with only “butter” and some half-built “guns” in 

a fully armed opponent.

The Roman Empire survived for centuries in part because it cou

effective strategic warning. Since Roman-era intelligence could travel o

as military forces that might be on the move, it was not unheard-of that 

a hundred thousand Persians could come over the hill toward a villa

frontiers of the Roman Empire without any prior warning. This lack 

warning meant that the forces immediately at hand would be overrun, 

that occurred, warning could be passed throughout the Empire. Thi

warning would then allow a reallocation of assets to meet the threa

massing of legions from far-flung areas along the well-maintained road

up or arming of troops from the populace of the neighboring regions. T

to reallocate standing forces or change from “butter” to “guns” mean

price paid in taxes across the Empire was considered small in contrast to 

rity afforded by the Empire.

In contrast, the nations of nineteenth century Europe could not empl

ter-now-guns-later” strategy because an invading army could go th

entire nation before there was any hope of raising a military force fro

In that era, warning intelligence required collection inside other nation

their military buildup. This led to the presence of standing arm

Europe—a “both guns and butter” strategy—by which every nation att

have a tactical warning capability to spark the call up of a large eno

instantly, to repel the attacks.

The Information Age and the End of Warning Intelligen

Up through World War II the United States had the ability to provid

warning in a way similar to that of the Roman Empire. In the absen

national threats in the Americas, the navy on the oceans surrounding the 

vided a “tripwire” in much the same way as the Roman legions on the f

the Empire. Once in place, this system then only needed to use curre

gence to mobilize the proper response to a threat. This provided the U.S

ability to employ a “butter-now-guns-later” strategy where it could m
3

sense, Pearl Harbor was a tactical surprise but not a strategic surpris

caused massive local damage and destruction to the Pacific fleet, b

size of the Pacific Ocean the attack itself served as strategic warn

gave the U.S. a “wakeup call” to change from “butter” to “guns” w

time to meet the expanding Japanese and Axis threat. 

In spite of a huge tactical surprise at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. ho

never in significant danger because the U.S. has the ability to change 

from an inward-looking civilian economy to an outward-looking mi

naut. The vast expanse of oceans surrounding the U.S. meant that st

ing was not very hard. Strategic warning always implied threa

distant—either in space or time. But that changed markedly twice in 

of those who remember Pearl Harbor—as space and time “shrank” 

entered the Information Age. For the U.S., not only strategic warn

tactical warning virtually disappeared.

The first blow to the U.S.’s ability to provide warning intelligenc

the launch of Sputnik. As soon as the Soviet Union had the technical 

build and employ targetable, nuclear-tipped ICBM’s, the world ins

to the functional equivalent of eighteenth-century Europe. The U

threatened by a military force that could be built virtually unsee

Soviet Union and employed with only minutes’ worth of warning

that the U.S. could no longer think “butter-now-guns-later” and le

race reminiscent of those involving England, France, Prussia, and A

1800s, where standing armies were the order of the day. Even thoug

Union was half-a-world away, it was only twenty minutes away a

flies over the North Pole. The coupling of WMD with long-range 

tems, in the form of missiles tipped with nuclear warheads, changed 

warning intelligence forever. 

In the world of WMD, our “strategic weapons” and “Strategi

really only could have tactical warning—the ability to respon

resources currently available. This was a wakeup call for the U.S. be

gic warning, as we had previously known it, was gone. In the Cold 

warning was possible by monitoring missile silos and military move

ellite. But true strategic warning was gone. The U.S. now needed t

large, standing military for the first time in its history—a shift fro

now-guns-later” strategy to a much costlier “both-guns-and-butter” s

The second blow to the U.S. ability to provide warning intellige

11 September 2001. Terrorist attacks from within the U.S. itself dir
4

space had shrunk after Sputnik. In this case the wakeup call was the 

that tactical warning, as it has always been defined, was also gone. Tact

ing always depended on monitoring the movements of opposing milit

and deploying current assets to meet the threat. But what if the threat 

persons using U.S. assets within the continental U.S.? The very fou

even tactical warning was shattered in a world where an attack ordered 

in the world could come virtually anywhere, anytime, with assets that w

selves peaceful only minutes before. 

Additionally, in the Information Age the concept of a nation-state h

to where multi-national corporations and agencies sometimes are as p

the nations in which they operate. Therefore, in a world of non-nation

organizations and alliances that can shift between religious and politica

collecting intelligence on a state may often be misleading or irrelevant 

integrated with intelligence on that state’s interactions not only with o

tries but multi-national corporations and organizations as well.

For the U.S., the post-9/11 world in the dawn of the Information Ag

different from the Industrial-Age world of Pearl Harbor than world of 

bor was different from the world of the Roman Empire.

In the Information Age, the Intelligence Community (IC) in the U.

with unprecedented challenges:

■ How can it provide strategic warning in a world of WMD where 

attack from half-a-world away can occur minutes from now?

■ How can it provide tactical warning in a world of terrorism where a

who looked peaceful minutes ago can attack inside the U.S. min

now?

This requires a total rethinking about what we mean by warning inte

Warning Intelligence for the Information Age

In 1972 the Defense Intelligence Agency published Cynthia Grab

book of Warning Intelligence, re-published by the Joint Military Intellig

lege in an updated and declassified version in 2002 as Anticipating 

Analysis for Strategic Warning. Ms. Grabo laid the groundwork to codi

on warning intelligence and strategic warning. I aim to build on her th

indicate that warning intelligence at the dawn of the Information Age is 

tant—or even more important—as it was when she wrote her first man

the height of the Cold War. However, the technological changes that ha
5

Therefore, I will draw heavily on Ms. Grabos thoughts—sometime

timeless lessons on warning intelligence and sometimes to indicate 

an Information-Age addition to her Industrial-Age argument.

Warning intelligence at the strategic level, or as it is sometimes c

“indications intelligence,” is largely a post-World War II develop

More specifically, it was a product of the early days of the Cold 

when we began to perceive that the Soviet Union and other com

countries were embarked on courses inimical to the interests of t

World and which could lead to surprise actions or open aggressi

Enemy actions in World War II, such as the Japanese attack on P

bor in 1941, had dispelled many of the conventional or historica

cepts about how wars begin. The fear that America’s enemies on

might undertake devastating, surprise military action—and witho

declaration of war or other conventional warning—had become v

The advent of modern weapons and long-range delivery systems 

increased the need for warning to avoid surprise attack.1

Cynthia Grabo

Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning

As indicated by Ms. Grabo above, “warning intelligence” go

response to the shattering of the old paradigm for strategic warnin

oceans could no longer serve as a tripwire. In the past we could aff

While Pearl Harbor was tactically devastating, it was not strategica

ing. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese 

Harbor was believed to have realized the strategic mistake in that atta

“We have just roused a sleeping giant.” In an age of WMD even tac

is not an allowable option because a single attack with a single 

nuclear weapon can potentially be worse than multiple Pearl Harbor

In an era of asymmetric warfare in which our national security a

being can be seriously threatened by hostile groups as well as na

is imperative that lessons from the past not be forgotten but broug

date and the discipline of warning reinvigorated. Warning intelli

differs significantly from current intelligence and the preparation 

range estimates. It accepts the presumption of surprise and incom

1

Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, ed

(Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College’s Center for Strategic Intellig

2002), 1. Cited hereafter as Grabo. 
6

case for specific warning.2

LTG James Williams (Ret.), USAF

Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The new Directorate for Analysis will be charged with transform

our analysis from descriptive assessments to complex judgm

analysis required to identify vulnerabilities and provide option

policymakers and warfighters.3

VADM Lowell E. Jacoby

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Warning-oriented intelligence reflects a compelling need—unpr

prior to the development of WMD—not to be surprised. By not being s

mean that analysts must be able to provide detailed enough judgme

supporting reporting—so that both the warfighter and the policymaker 

pate the actions of potential adversaries and take timely action to sup

interests. In short, it is incumbent on the Information-Age analyst to pr

the warfighter and policymaker with options: On the basis of what the 

has the capability to do, how will he likely act? What actions can we ta

change, or respond to those actions, and what are the probable conseq

those actions? 

To do this, the Information-Age warning analyst must be able to pe

future with a level of granularity many times more detailed than eve

before. Rather than providing targeting to the warfighter at the level of 

or military base contains the threat, the Information-age analyst must 

tell the warfighter which building half-a-world-away contains the nucl

or BW fermenter so that he can interdict that facility with a single smar

cruise missile with minimal collateral damage. Rather than giving t

maker broad-brush descriptions of a country’s WMD capabilities, the 

tion-Age analyst must be able to tell the policymaker exactly where th

procuring the materials to build that nuclear or biological weapon so t

demarche the shipment of supplies before the weapon can be assemb

2

LTG James Williams (Ret.), USA, Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agenc

Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, ed. Ja

(Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College’s Center for Strategic Intelligen

2002), iii. 3

VADM Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, DIA, as posted on the Director’s Intelink hom

ruary 2003.
7

not affect the course of the war very much or the policy to reduce th

war; but if the Information-Age analyst assesses that a nation has 

weapons when they really have one or two, the results could be deva

9

FROM CURRENT INTELLIGENCE TO WARNING AN

A new kind of strategic warning is required for WMD and terror

can we rethink our assumptions on intelligence to redefine metho

for providing strategic warning?

As the ability to collect intelligence and project power has increa

massive technological breakthroughs of the past half-century, the 

intelligence cycle has increased. This has put a premium on collectin

ing current intelligence. Cynthia Grabo has argued that current intell

ferent from warning intelligence.

As intelligence collection becomes more sophisticated, volumin

expensive, and devices multiply for the rapid reporting and com

wide exchange and display of the latest information, we must tak

that we do not lose sight of what warning really is: the considere

ment of the finest analytic minds available, based on an exhausti

objective review of all available indications, which is conveyed t

policy official in sufficiently convincing language that he is persu

its validity and takes appropriate action to protect the national in

She further notes that the requirements for current intelligence 

intelligence are very different in their pace and approach.

It is possible that the single most prevalent misconception about 

is that the latest information is necessarily the most important, o

warning will be insured (or at least made much more likely) if o

lection can be speeded up and information communicated more 

to more alert centers. The effects of this type of preoccupation w

rency of information are likely to be twofold: long-term, basic in

gence and in-depth analysis tend to suffer both in the allocation 

personnel and in prestige; and the cumulative analysis of indicat

tends to be forgotten in favor of portraying the latest information 

charts or display boards in situation rooms. From this, it is but a 

accepting the view that what the adversary is doing this minute i

most important indication of his intentions, or that information w

more than 24 hours old is valueless or at least of minor value to w

4

 Grabo, 169.
10

information tends to obscure the significance of strategic, long-term 

actions by a potential adversary.5

Ms. Grabo’s message is clear. By building our organizations to provi

intelligence, we are hampering our ability to provide warning. To se

ahead, we must force ourselves to think totally opposite from our custo

see how fast we can produce intelligence but rather how well we ca

intelligence. That message was clear for the bipolar world of the Cold 

need to rethink how we think about intelligence is even more accentua

multi-polar world of WMD and terrorism.

Warning is cumulative, not merely current. Intelligence reporting a

times must take care to insure that the consumer knows the cumula

background and understands that the latest indication is but one of 

which in their totality give us insight into what may occur... The be

warning analysis is the product of a detailed and continuing review 

information, going back weeks and months, which may be relevant 

current situation, and a solid basic understanding of the potential 

enemy’s objectives, doctrines, practices, and organizations... Most 

have roots going deep into the past, much farther than we usually r

until after they erupt. Preparation for war or possible war often can 

traced back for months once it becomes clear that a real threat exist

pieces of information which appeared questionable, unreliable or e

ridiculous when received will suddenly have great relevance to the 

present situation, provided that the analyst has saved them and can 

them into the current pattern. Further, information which is months 

when received (and therefore scarcely current intelligence) may be 

immensely valuable. An indication is not useless or invalid because 

occurred months ago but you just found out about it today; it may d

onstrate that the preparations for conflict have been far more extens

and significant than you had believed.6

In the Cold War warning intelligence required “going back w

months.” In the world of WMD and terrorism warning intelligenc

going back “years and decades.” In the case of WMD “preparation fo

often has started decades before the conflict—at the time a state decide

building WMD. In terrorism “preparation for conflict” may have al

5

Grabo, 164.

6

Grabo, 164, 5-6.
11

that power perceived that it must have turned its enmity toward anot

The term strategic warning somewhat regrettably has no single, 

definition. To those in the world of warning intelligence, strategi

ing is generally viewed as relatively long-term, or synonymous w

“earliest possible warning” which the warning system is suppose

vide. Thus, strategic warning can be issued weeks or even month

advance... Tactical warning is much more easily defined, althoug

is some shading in meaning. Strictly defined, tactical warning is 

function of intelligence (at least at the national level) but it is an 

tional concern. It is warning that that would be available to the c

mander on the front line...”7

But now everywhere is the front line. Therefore, I suggest that 

terms. “Strategic” reflects the need to mobilize and/or realloc

assets between guns and butter. “Tactical” reflects the response 

made with the assets currently in hand. “Warning is an intangible

tion, a theory, a deduction, a perception, a belief. It is the product 

or of logic, a hypothesis whose validity can be neither confirmed 

until it is too late.”8

 

Warning is a prediction of the future that matches past and curre

with a model of the future. Therefore, warning depends very heavily 

mental images of what the world is and how it works. Building mo

analysis. I contend that we must go one level beyond Ms. Grabo’s p

that warning intelligence is really warning analysis. And the main 

warning analyst is to build a model of the world—ourselves, our a

adversaries—through giving current intelligence analysts a context i

may analyze new reports and observations.

When we navigate, we compare our observations against a map 

best direction to take. The high-speed “smart” weapons we use are 

out a highly accurate map with which to guide them, and making a

is a slow, laborious process. Similarly, the high-speed intelligence w

useless without a highly accurate “map” of the adversary. Current 

analysts need an accurate “map,” but warning analysts are required 

maintain it.

7

 Grabo, 4.

8

 Grabo, 4.
12

Col John R. Boyd, USAF, whose thoughts on warfighting are changin

we operate. Col Boyd is most famous for his collected briefings, A Dis

Winning and Losing, in which he presents and develops the “observatio

tion-decision-action cycle.”9

//

■ Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should op

faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet, get 

adversary’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action time cycle or 

■ Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictabl

generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries—since our a

will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with 

acing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are 

against.10

//

Col Boyd recognizes that operations (Decide and Act) are importan

emphasizes the need for intelligence (Observe and Orient). I su

Ms.Grabo’s “warning analysis” and Col Boyd’s “orientation” are merel

ways of addressing the need for strategic warning by building conceptu

or models. Accordingly, I will also draw heavily on Col Boyd’s exposi

Decision Cycle or OODA Cycle in indicating a path ahead.

... it has been deemed prudent and desirable to have indications o

warning specialists who, hopefully, will not be burdened or distra

by the competing demands placed on current analysts and will be 

to focus their attention solely on potential indications and their an

in depth. 

It is imperative to the process that the facts, including potential or p

ble facts, and other indications be most diligently and meticulously 

piled and analyzed. It is impossible to overemphasize the importan

exhaustive research for warning. It is in the history of every great w

ing crisis that the post-mortems have turned up numerous relevant 

9

Col John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Collection of un-numb

slides, August 1987. Cited hereafter as Col Boyd. 10 Col Boyd. Boyd used briefing slides in which what was presented (or left out) and 

of the text on the slide is as important as the text content. Therefore, whenever a whole 

Boyd’s is used, it will be indicated by “// Slide //.”
13

or another, were not considered in making assessments at the tim

A current intelligence analyst is a news reporter. A warning ana

more like a historian or scientist. When a reporter finds a story on 

highly technical issue, he or she finds a historian or scientist to pro

The intelligence community needs dedicated warning analysts to 

context.

How can the great machinery of U.S. intelligence, which is capa

spectacular collection and analysis on many subjects, fail to carry 

necessary research in a warning situation? ...there are two obvio

culties which arise and which may impede the research effort and 

facing of the relevant facts...

The intelligence research system is set up primarily to analyze c

types of information known as intelligence “disciplines” and on 

there is a more or less continuing flow of material... In a crisis si

great volumes of new material may suddenly be poured into the 

In order to cope, agencies often set up special task forces, and an

work overtime in an attempt to cover every aspect of the problem

When it is most needed, communication may break down for sheer l

time. 

Even more insidious may be the less obvious impending crisis, w

interrelationship of developments is not readily apparent, and par

where two or more geographic areas may be involved. In such c

difficulties of conducting research are greatly compounded when 

from two different areas, particularly if they seem relatively obs

questionable at the time, may not be brought together at all.

The greatest single justification for the existence of separate indi

offices or the employment of warning analysts is that they are de

their full time to research in depth without the distraction of hav

fulfill a number of other duties. The warning analyst should neve

sight of the fact that this is his raison d’etre. It is difficult enough 

to a sound warning judgment when all the facts have been consi

may be impossible without it.12 

11 Grabo, 7, 9.

12 Grabo, 10-11, 12.
14

adversary but also detailed knowledge of how the adversary interacts 

nations—both allies and adversaries. In short, the warning analyst’s fir

sibility is Orientation. Such detailed knowledge does not come from 

money or assets on a single problem then moving on to another but 

continual attention to interactions and trends—even when there is no 

Intelligence Community will always be in a “crisis management” mod

pays attention to problems after they have become crises.

A time-honored military precept, still quoted with some frequency, 

that intelligence should not estimate the intentions of the adversary

only his capabilities. Sometimes this has been extended to mean th

can judge his capabilities but that we cannot judge his intentions.13

In the world of WMD and terrorism, analyzing capabilities but not 

is not an option. In WMD the only difference between a non-threat dual

ity and a threatening dual-use facility is intent. In some cases the only 

between a vaccine plant and a BW-agent production plant is that a vac

uses a vaccine strain microorganism and packages it in tiny vials while 

duction plant uses a virulent strain of the same microorganism and pac

large warheads. Uranium enrichment plants can provide slightly enr

nium required to fuel a reactor or highly enriched uranium to build 

Chemical plants can provide deadly insecticides to kill insects or dead

cals to kill humans. And terrorist groups can potentially exploit benign b

chemical, or nuclear facilities to obtain deadly materials for WMD. In 

WMD and terrorism, we must “judge his intentions... Unlike current in

files, good warning files improve with age.”14

The more history we know, the more future we can project. The more 

and understand how an adversary acted in the past in response to many 

problems, the better we are able to “Orient” so that we can judge his cu

intentions and his future actions. Not only must we be able to train and 

warning analysts for the long haul, but we also must be able to leverage 

historical data in the many different IC databases to capture not only th

tors they contain but also the models and judgments the warning analys

made based on that data. “The ability to perceive connections, or at leas

connections, between events and reports which on the surface may not s

related is a very important ingredient in the warning process, and one w

13 Grabo, 17.

14Grabo, 32.
15

wisdom that we need to connect the dots. Ms. Grabo made that cl

years ago.

However, in the world of WMD and terrorism, we need to do be

models that merely connect the dots tells us what the connections ar

real world, the connections are not lines but rather vectors—arrows 

the future.

Therefore, I suggest that we need to reflect on Cynthia Grabo’s 

ments on the need for warning intelligence and realize that her arg

become more critical as the world moved out of the Cold War into 

tion Age. We also need to reflect on Col Boyd’s OODA Cycle and un

the input required for rational decisionmaking—the Orientation 

responsibility of the warning analyst. We need to find new ways to 

warning analyst to be able to both “connect the dots” and “orient th

provide a well-thought-out worldview on which the current intellig

can base his or her assessments. BUT, those warning analyses have 

before the crisis... For if nations or terrorists use WMD to start the c

it is already too late.

Rarely does the policymaker or the congressional committee c

intelligence failed to make an adequate assessment of enemy capa

when this in fact may have been the case. The criticism almost i

“You did not tell me this was going to happen. We were not led t

and were surprised.” Or, “You mean for all the millions that were 

lection, you were not able to tell us that this was likely to occur? 

gence Community’s competence often will be judged in the end by 

of its forecasts of what is likely to happen. And indeed this is what 

business is all about.’’16

15 Grabo, 38.

16Grabo, 18.

If we want to assess an adversary’s capabilities, we can d

“connecting the dots.” If we want to assess an adversary’s int

we need to “orient the arrows.”

17

New methodologies for warning intelligence can be developed b

quantum thinking rather than Newtonian thinking.

Chapter 3

FROM NEWTONIAN THINKING TO QUANTUM TH

Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) are precipitated by new d

ments in technology that ultimately change not only strategies an

tions but organizations as well. Our current strategies and organ

are based on Industrial-age technologies built by Newtonian thin

Strategies and organizations for the Information-Age must be bu

quantum thinking.

The object of science—just like the object of intelligence—is t

future.

Newton’s discovery of physical laws and development of calculu

matical system to describe physical systems led to the technologic

that defined the Industrial Age. Our ability to build engineering mar

automobiles, nuclear weapons, or intercontinental ballistic missiles

our ability to model physical systems quantitatively to predict what 

when we start them up and send them on their way. 

The Newtonian revolution in the physical sciences has led to RM

the new engineering prowess that became possible through our k

physics and chemistry. An Agricultural-Age army equipped wit

muskets that could shoot accurately for fifty yards could line up 

just outside that effective musket range then fix bayonets, charg

positions, and decimate an immobile opponent before that opp

reload and kill or wound enough attackers to repel the charge. A

Age army was equipped with mass-produced rifled muskets that 

accurately for several hundred yards, and this new technology re

land warfare. As Robert E. Lee found out by ordering Pickett’s Ch

tysburg, an attacking army faced with the massive longer range fire

entrenched Industrial-Age opponent would be decimated long be

reached the fixed position. Ulysses Grant revolutionized land w

Peninsula Campaign by understanding that a larger better-armed 

prevail by throwing assets into the breach so that in the meat grin
18

would prevail. 

This paradigm in land warfare prevailed through World War I and w

by the Nazi blitzkrieg that integrated tanks, aircraft, and better comm

into a new paradigm of maneuver warfare. In those revolutions and in t

of the current RMA driven by the development of missiles, WMD, 

bombs, changes in technology that have allowed an army to shoot fast

or more accurately have dominated the physical battlefield.

Industrial-Age RMAs were based on Newtonian thinking and the 

harness the physical world by being able to model physical systems tha

dictable characteristics. Industrial-Age intelligence developed along sim

Since an opponent’s ability to defeat an army depended mainly on th

and types of weapons the opponent could build and field, the most 

information an Industrial-age analyst could provide was the numbers, 

locations of the opponent’s weaponry. Industrial-Age intelligence ana

more concerned with an adversary’s capabilities than with his intent.

Industrial-Age battlefield dominance was based on physical domina

in the ability to field more and better technology than the opponent 

ability to know where his technology was.

The Newtonian paradigm in science began to unravel at the beginn

twentieth century with the discovery that energy is discrete or quantal—

tinuous. Over the next century several areas of science went through r

that occurred almost independently of Newtonian physics:

■ Revolutions in quantum physics led to the building of nuclear re

nuclear weapons.

■ Revolutions in organic chemistry led to the plastics and pharmaceut

tries and the building of chemical weapons.

■ Revolutions in biology led to genetic engineering and the buildin

kinds of biological weapons.

■ Revolutions in silicon chemistry led to the microchip and the 

revolution.

While knowledge of Newtonian physics was critical to all the engine

olutions of the Industrial Age, not one of these new revolutions was pr

by Newtonian physics or Newtonian modeling methods based on calcul

because all are based on quantum concepts—the fact that the world is b

crete countable objects such as atoms, molecules, organisms, or electro

than being continuous as Newton assumed when he invented calculus.
19

as Newtonian science changed society in the Industrial Age. Every p

in warfare has gone through three stages: (1) a Military Technica

(MTR) where new technologies give advantage over old ones; (2) a R

Military Affairs (RMA) where new strategies and operational co

exploit the new technology; and (3) a Revolution in Military Cu

where the operational concepts and technologies are integrated into 

organizations. The MTR precipitated by the mass-produced rifled re

ket led to the RMA of trench warfare which led to an RMC in which 

totally reorganized to fight that way. 

A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step

Chinese Proverb

We are at the threshold of a paradigm shift for the Information 

tated by quantum thinking that is potentially even larger than the pa

for the Industrial Age precipitated by Newtonian thinking. One 

which way to take the first step on a thousand-mile journey unles

where that thousand-mile-distant goal is. Similarly, we cannot reall

we should change our strategies, operational concepts, and organiza

exploit Information-Age technology unless we can see beyond the p

to what the world might look like in the next two generations. That 

(1) understanding what a paradigm shift is and how a culture gets b

(2) understanding the fundamental differences between Newtonian 

quantum thinking that make Newtonian physics and calculus virtua

in quantum physics, organic chemistry, biology, and computer s

therefore, virtually irrelevant in the analysis of the nuclear, chemical

ical weapons and computers produced by the new paradigm.

21

PARADIGM SHIFTS — WHEN THE FUTURE AI

WHAT IT USED TO BE

In a paradigm shift, one asks the same question and gets a differ

answer. The difference depends on the underlying assumptions on

about the world. Therefore, we must re-examine the assumptions 

paradigm to know when it can be used accurately.

The future ain’t what it used to be.

Yogi Berra

One perceptive historian, viewing a classical case of a science’s 

tation by paradigm shift, recently described it as “picking up the 

end of the stick,” a process that involves “handling the same bun

data as before, but placing them in a new set of relations with one 

by giving them a different framework.” Others who have noted 

aspect of scientific advance have emphasized its similarity to a c

visual gestalt: the marks on paper that were first seen as a bird a

seen as an antelope, or vice versa. That parallel can be misleadin

tists do not see something else: instead they simply see it.17

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

In a true paradigm shift the world is turned on its head. A propone

paradigm asks the same question as a proponent of the old paradig

different answer. An argument then ensues between the dueling para

no resolution because ultimately paradigms rest on belief systems th

be proved or disproved, only believed or disbelieved.

Therefore, bridging the gap across a paradigm shift requires ch

beliefs about how the world works—a difficult task at best. This 

rampant when, in the early twentieth century, quantum physics be

turn Newtonian physics. Werner Heisenberg suggested that th

between Newtonian thinking and quantum thinking could be sp

Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity. But Bohr’s principle w

to reconcile Newtonian mechanics with relativity and quantum 

which most of us find rather strange if not totally incomprehensibl

17Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: Univer

Press, 1996), 85. Cited hereafter as Kuhn.
22

on more familiar paradigms.

Let me explain what a paradigm shift is and how the complemen

ple can help us understand it by a more familiar example.

Fill in the blank.

The shortest distance between two points is a ________________

Now on the diagram below, draw the path that describes the shor

between point N and M.

Unless you read ahead, I can virtually guarantee that you filled 

with straight line and your drawing looked like this.

N M

N M
23

Now on the map below, draw the direction that during the Cold 

Force aimed their missiles to take the shortest distance between a 

Dakota and a target near Moscow.

Your answer probably looks something like this.

How was it that by merely re-labeling N and M to North Dakota 

that the direction of the path went from directly East to directly Nort

Of course the answer is simple. On the earth the shortest distance 

points is a great circle—not a straight line. 

North

Dakota

Mosc

North

Dakota

Mosc
24

question was a trick question. How

was it a trick question? We have just 

been so used to doing geometry on a 

plane—the Euclidian paradigm—

that we virtually never think to do 

geometry on a sphere—a nonEuclidian paradigm.

On the other hand, you can get to 

Moscow from North Dakota by 

going directly east. It is a pathway 

and it does get you there—only it is 

not the shortest path. So i

was as flat as our usual M

map depiction of it, the E

answer is the correct one

Both the great ci

straight-line paradigms 

rect answer in their own 

frames. So to a propon

straight-line paradigm, 

path is wrong. And whe

ponent of the great circle 

aims his missile north, th

line proponent shakes hi

wonders why the other 

just aimed his missile in the wrong direction.

On the other hand the great-circle proponent sees the most direct rou

he sees the world in a different way.

Also, there is no compromise position. Either the East or the North 

in fact, get to Moscow, but any compromise direction will miss. 

Furthermore, if the straight-line proponent offered to compare the 

using a much more controlled experiment, such as the direction from 

ton to Baltimore or New York to Boston, both paradigms get virtually 

answer. (This is why mariners and pilots use the flat earth Mercator 

for all but the longest sea voyages or intercontinental flights). So, th

N straig

pa

great circle

path

The direction you

take depends on

your assumptions

about the world.
25

circle paradigm, when, in the cases that matter, I cannot tell th

between the two?”

In fact, we use a straight-line flat earth paradigm most of the t

even though we know the earth is round. Have you ever put a globe 

compartment of your car? 

In paradigm shifts: (1) one asks the same questions but gets differ

(2) the differences depend on basic fundamental beliefs that cannot 

disproved in either paradigm; (3) there are no compromise answers 

where the assumptions of the two paradigms are at odds; and (4), t

digms give the same answers in situations where the assumptions of 

digm approximate those of the new.

Heisenberg indicated that there can

be no grounds for reconciliation

between paradigms until both paradigms are developed enough to get to

step (4), which is the complementarity

principle. More simply stated, the

complementarity principle is the idea

that models in two different paradigms

give the same answer only under conditions where the assumptions of both

paradigms are comparable. When one

goes from New York to Boston, the

shape of the earthly sphere in that

small region is almost a plane so that a

globe and a flat map are almost indistinguishable. It is only when we know enough about geometry on bo

spheres to be able to see that plane geometry is a limiting case con

non-planar geometry that we can be comfortable living with both pa

can look at the chart on the right and believe that the great circle rou

shorter than the loxodrome (course of constant direction) only beca

that plane geometry (the Mercator projection) works well only for 

where the surface of the sphere is approximately the same as a plan

we are comfortable using maps, and we don’t try fitting a globe in ou

partment and leave great circles for the Air Force, pilots on int

flights, and mariners.

In a paradigm shift, ideas we held dear—sometimes even ideas th

ered “facts”—all of a sudden are either wrong or only work under pa
26

asked the same question but sometimes we get a different answer. Thi

necessarily totally overturn the old paradigm but limits its applicability. 

plementarity principle allows us to see how the limiting old paradig

tained within and complementary to the new paradigm. It is only by 

complementarity principle that we can comfortably use both the old an

paradigm.

Old: The earth is flat.

New: The earth is round.

Complementarity Condition: When the area represented on 

small enough to approximate the portion of the sphere as a pla

is almost as accurate as a globe.

Old: The sun revolves around the earth.

New: The earth revolves around the sun.

Complementarity Condition: When observing the heavens b

epicycles of Ptolemy provide calculations that are almost th

those using the methods of Copernicus and Keppler.

Old: Atoms are indivisible.

New: Atoms are divisible.

Complementarity Condition: See Bohr and Heisenberg...

Therefore, in understanding any paradigm shift, one must go ba

underlying assumptions of both the old and new paradigms to understan

new paradigm can provide useful answers where the old one is limi

assumptions. And we can only be comfortable when we can see where 

complementarity. As Kuhn indicated, “The decision to reject one pa

always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgme

to that decision involves the comparison of the paradigms with nature 

each other.”18

In science our knowledge of the world depends on our ability to m

terms of a paradigm that supports observations and allows testable ex

from them. In intelligence our knowledge of the world—or our ori

depends on our ability to understand it in a way that can support observ

reports and allow actionable decisions from them. 

18Kuhn, 77.
27

indirectly because of what we learned in school—on Newtonian sci

ods. If Newtonian science is irrelevant for modeling nuclear phy

chemistry, biology, and computer science, then the answers we get b

methods to questions in those fields will also be irrelevant. More 

human organizations and cultures are biological, and if we are go

them in an actionable way, we need to forget Newton and build a 

based on quantum principles.

//

ILLUMINATION

■ The previous discussion assumes interaction with both the extern

nal environment. Now, let us assume, for whatever reason or co

circumstances, that we design a command and control system 

interaction with the external environment. This implies a focus in

than outward.

■ Picking up from this idea, we observe from Darwin that:

❏ The environment selects.

❏ Ability or inability to interact and adapt to exigencies of 

select one in or out.

■ Furthermore, according to the Godel Proof, the Heisenberg Uncer

ple, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics:

❏ One cannot determine the character or nature of a system wi

❏ Moreover, attempts to do so lead to confusion and dis

Because in the “real world” the environment intrudes (my vi

■ Now, by applying the ideas of Darwin, the Second Law, Hei

Godel to Clausewitz one can see that:

He who can generate many non-cooperative centers of grav

fies friction. Why? Many non-cooperative centers of gravity 

system restrict interaction and adaptability of a system with 

roundings, thereby leading to a focus inward (i.e., within its

which in turn generates confusion and disorder, which impe

ous or directed activity, hence, by definition, magnifies frict

entropy.19

//

19Col Boyd.

29

FROM NEWTONIAN ANALOG MODELS TO 

QUANTUM DIGITAL MODELS

The core assumption of Newtonian calculus is that the world is c

ous and single-valued. The real world is, however, demonstrably 

and multi-state. Any kind of model we use to describe the world 

answers that are directly dependent on its underlying core assum

An examination of the mismatch of Newtonian models with real-

systems—especially biological systems that include human orga

tions, cultures, and tools—indicates that several Newtonian assu

we currently use to analyze those systems’ functions provide mis

and/or incomplete assessments. This analysis also points toward 

basis of a New Science based on quantum methods, which assum

the world is digital and multi-state.

Integral and differential calculus is based totally on the assumptio

ematical functions can be described by lines that can be subdivided 

and smaller pieces ad infinitum (that is, continuous or analog) and 

one and only one value of y for every x (that is, single-valued). I

functions when one subdivides the line far enough it becomes a ser

nected dots (digital) and there can be multiple values of y for each x 

This seemingly small distinction in our mathematical formalism u

the world has enormous implications for how our models work an

become irrelevant. To model the world for the Information-Age we m

New Science that reflects the digital and multi-state nature of the wo
30

digm for the New Science using conditions in which the two show com

rity. This complementarity is very important here because using the N

paradigm outside these limited complementarity conditions will give i

or misleading answers.

Although this is a discussion of the scientific basis by which we m

analyze the world, I will use examples where possible from description

gation or familiar technologies directly applicable to intelligence analy

able to understand and model navigation is crucial to accommodating 

Science and extending it to a new logical and computational method 

gence analysis and assessment because: (1) the targets we model—be t

ons of mass destruction or the organizations that build and employ them

use navigational methods to function, and (2) we also are navigating w

such an analysis.

//

ILLUMINATION

■ Orientation is the schwerpunkt. It shapes the way we interact with th

ment—hence orientation shapes the way we observe, the way we d

way we act.

In this sense

■ Orientation shapes the character of present observation-orienta

sion-action loops—while these present loops shape the character 

orientation.

IMPLICATION

■ We need to create mental images, views, or impressions, hence pa

match the activity of the world.

■ We need to deny our adversary the possibility of uncovering or disce

terns that match our activity, or other aspects of the reality of the wo

//

20Col Boyd.
31

Smarter Thinking: History Matters I

Newtonian Assumption: A continuous function describing tw

objects can predict the future on the basis of a single observation.

New Science Assumption: A digital model of real objects with de

ture can predict the future on the basis of a history of observation

dimensions.

Complementarity Condition: When enough data points have be

one can build a model or function that can predict the future with 

data points.

Example: Given the object observed on the radarscope, predi

course and speed relative to the object in the center.

Newtonian thinking says that if I have a mathematical function t

the interaction of two point-like objects, I can use that function to 

future position and momentum. Unfortunately, if you don’t alrea

function, things can be rather difficult. The Newtonian model work

movements of planets, so that the blips on the “radarscope” could 

earth and moon. In that case the plot would look something lik

already know the exact position and momentum (course and speed) 

plus the masses of both the earth and the moon we can predict th

moon very far into the future. 

However, if we 

a bit deeper, we 

many years worth 

tions were require

Brahe) of planet

before Johannes 

fit them to a 

described the orbi

Newton’s Law’s o

gravitational interaction. But in real-world situations, the warfight

gence analyst does not have the luxury of collecting all that data 

“Now I can predict the future without any more observations merely 

of my mathematical functions.” What we forget is that the degree of 

that went into the initial conditions accounts for multiple observation

Let’s return to our real-world radarscope and define all the thing

observe before we can predict the future motion of our radar blip. O

. . . .
32

for our own ship in the center and a position for the target (in the form of a bearing and range). We have four

data bits on two point-like objects but not enough data

to determine a course and speed. Of course, Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics stated

that one cannot determine the position plus the momentum (the scientist’s way of saying position plus course

and speed) in a single experiment. And every sailor,

pilot, or artillery spotter who has ever tried to track a

target by radar knows that the real world follows

Heisenberg not Newton.

So let’s wait a bit and get another look at our radarscope. After three minutes the scope looks like this.

What is the course and speed of the target? There’s still

not enough data by the Newtonian method because we

don’t have a function to calculate.

Of course, any sailor, pilot, or artillery spotter can tell

that you do have enough data to solve for the target’s

course and speed—but of course you’ve got to be smart

enough to save the historical data. And the savvy operator had already marked the first position on the radarscope with a grease pencil so his scope looks like this.

The two points define two positions and simple math

will tell us that velocity = [(position 2)-(position 1)] /

[(time 2)-(time 1)] or v = ∆ (position)/∆ (time).

By now another three minutes have passed and

there’s another blip to add on the scope. By lining up the

three dots—one from the present and two historical ones

plotted in grease pencil—the operator can read off a

course. Then by measuring the distance the blip moved

in the six minutes using the range scale of his scope and dividing by th

(= six minutes) he can compute the speed. 

But what is the target’s position? In the time that it took to do the 

ments and calculations, the target moved. But by using the simple fun

determined graphically with the grease pencil, the operator can e

arrow forward and predict where the target will be in three more min

how confident is the operator of his assessment? It depends on how 

tory he has available. 

0807
33

left and decide whic

you the best estimate 

target will be three m

your last observation

world plot with data 

larger period of histo

the more accurate the 

the target has not decided to change course and/or speed.

In Newtonian thinking all functions are equally useful because the

culated forward and backward in time with equal accuracy. Note th

take the entire history, you can get a very accurate estimate of th

speed but you can only equate that computation in conjunction wit

position that is somewhere spread over the entire track you have mea

From this simple difference in assumptions, we operate

very differently.

Cold War Targeting: The key player on the battlefield

is the guy with his finger on the ICBM launch button. The

Newtonian Revolution enabled the physical sciences. Technological superiority based on the physical sciences meant

weapons that could go farther or faster or carry a bigger

boom. Therefore, the missile officer in the North Dakota

silo or the B-52 pilot was the key player on the battlefield.

History did not matter; solving the course and speed did

not matter. If you can deliver nuclear ordnance on target

anywhere in the world in fifteen minutes, all you need to

know is what the opponent is doing now. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) are the keys to Industrial-Age targeting.

Afghan War Targeting: The key player on the battlefield is the guy on horseback with the binoculars, GPS, and laser-p

Information Age the more accurately one can determine where the 

and what he will do, the more precisely one can target the opponent

showed that a person on the ground is far superior in determining th

an opponent and tracking his intentions than all the high-tech rem

devices—mainly for his ability to loiter and maintain a history of the 

and determining his location and intentions. A smart bomb is only as 

spotter or analyst who determines target PIM (position and intended 

HUMINT is the key to Information-age targeting.

0801.5

0802

0801

0804

0807

080
34

that can tell you everything you need to know about the future of eve

point-like object based on a single observation is a classroom dream b

Newtonian model of the world. In the real world—History Matters! 

tum reality of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle applies and:

■ You need a historical record of observations to be able to assess 

motion. You cannot tell where something is going unless you know 

came from.

■ If it moves faster or goes farther, you will be able to assess its course 

more accurately but you will be able to assess its position less accur

as Heisenberg said).

In the Industrial Age, IMINT and MASINT were critical for targ

analysis did not really matter—only how fast you can turn your obse

what is happening now into action. In the Information-Age HUM

selected Industrial-Age legacy weapons, will be critical for targeting, 

sis of the historical record is crucial to understand the opponent’s inte

future actions.

//

SAMPLES FROM HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT

■ Sun Tzu (around 400 BC)

Probe enemy to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns or mov

intentions. Shape enemy’s perception of world to manipulate/unde

plans and actions. Employ Cheng/Ch’I maneuvers to quickly and 

edly hurl strength against weakness.

■ Napoleon (early 1800s)

“Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less chary 

ter than the former. Space we can recover, time never. ...I may lose a 

I shall never lose a minute. The whole art of war consists in a wel

and circumspect defensive, followed by an audacious attack.”

■ N.B. Forrest (1860s)

“Git thar the fustest with the mostest.”

■ Blumetritt (1947)

“The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged up

concise assessment of situations,...quick decisions and quick executi

principle: ‘each minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage.’”

■ Balck (1980)

Emphasis on creation of implicit connections or bonds based upon 
35

and initiative—yet, harmonize within intent of superior command

internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.

■ Yours Truly

Operate inside the adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-ac

enmesh adversary in a world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, conf

der, fear, panic chaos, ...and/or fold adversary back inside himse

cannot cope with events/efforts as they unfold.21

//

Thinking in time is as important as thinking in space. Col Boyd m

sage very clear on three levels: (1) history matters—we can learn fro

gic thinking of analysts all the way back to Sun Tzu; (2) the best mil

talked processes over objects; and (2) the OODA Cycle exists in tim

From Fighting against Technologies to Out-Thinking Decisi

History Matters II

Newtonian Assumption: The world is single-valued.

New Science Assumption: The world is multi-state.

Complementarity Condition: Where the system being modeled is 

a decision (bifurcation) point, one can use the Newtonian single-valu

Example: An air conditioner thermostat is set at 70 degrees. For s

and to ensure it is not

constantly cycling ON

and OFF, the thermostat will turn the air

conditioner ON when

the temperature rises to

71 degrees and turn it

off when it has cooled

the room to 69 degrees.

I have two photographs of the thermostat: one that I just took

that shows a temperature reading of 70

21Col Boyd.

ON

OFF

A/C

State

Temperature

69o 71o

A

sys

w

wi

OFF 

dow

A
36

Is the air conditioner ON or OFF? 

This is a problem that is totally unsolvable in the Newtonian paradi

depends on instantaneous information to calculate its functions—

degrees the air conditioner can be either ON or OFF dependent on its hi

Newtonian paradigm will give a proper answer if the temperature is 

degrees (always ON) or below 69 degrees (always OFF) because at tho

atures there is only one solution. However, within the controlling “d

between 69 and 71 degrees, no answer is possible by Newtonian method

there are two correct answers: the air conditioner is ON if it was above 7

a few minutes ago and it’s cooling the room, or the air conditioner is 

was below 69 degrees a few minutes age and the room is warming up fo

cooling cycle. In the New Science the answer is ON because it appear

the cooling cycle based on the historical observation. Therefore, to 

multi-state system—one that is capable of making decisions—Newton

ods work only when the decision already has been irreversibly made. A

the New Science, one will require a history of events to determine wh

multiple states the system is in now. 

Unfortunately, it’s even more complicated than that. The two photos 

the air conditioner is ON because it appears to be on the cooling cycle. 

that assumes that the length of the cooling cycle is more than six minu

cooling cycle is only three minutes the first picture could have been tak

the beginning of a cooling cycle and the second could have been take

air conditioner was OFF and the temperature drifted back up to 70 degr

a correct answer, even in the New Science, one will need enough pict

over at least three cycles to be confident in knowing what the cooling cy

is...which will also will be different if the temperature outdoors is 85 

110 degrees. History matters even more.

Cold War Targeting: Shoot them all, and you’ll get the one you w

weaponry that could shoot faster and farther and with a bigger boom, 

tage was always with the side that shot first. In the Industrial-Age, pr

strike was always the best answer. Therefore, intelligence was set t

generic because fast reaction was key, and the old saying goes “nukes m

having to say you’ve missed.” Therefore, the missile officer did not nee

anything more than, “If I get the order, I push the button, and a city dis

Afghan War Targeting: Only shoot the ones who have decided to 

In the Information Age, one needs to know more about an opponent. I

istan it was not a viable strategy to shoot anyone carrying a gun beca

one in Afghanistan carries a gun, or even to shoot at anyone who’s 
37

rules are possible when party goers at a wedding will shoot guns i

appear at first glance like Taliban gunfire. One needs to model the d

ers to know which state they’re in before firing: the “shooting in the 

ding” state, or the “shooting at incoming aircraft” state—and 

knowledge requires history. In the Information Age, proportional 

response must be the norm.

Intelligence analysts are expected to predict future events and tre

observations of the world. Biological systems—be they individual or

bacteria or humans or collections of organisms like countries or e

constructed by human organisms—make decisions and control their 

ior in response to their environment. In our simple example, we re

three control cycles worth of data (dependent on today’s outdoor 

plus two additional photographs to confidently assess whether the ai

is ON or OFF. And that is for a single thermostat, which can only tur

in response to a single-input temperature sensor.

The take-home message here is that decisionmaking systems—

thermostats or as complex as states building WMD—are multi-stat

be calculated in the Newtonian paradigm unless they are far enoug

the particular set of conditions that will trigger the decision. The N

must, therefore, account for systems that can exist in different states 

ent conditions. One cannot predict what a system will do unless one 

it did in the past. And once again—History Matters! The New Sci

able to model the decisionmaking process.

Industrial-Age intelligence was based on Newtonian models 

ignored decisionmaking. Therefore, there was only one best st

emptive strike—for any adversary because the adversary’s decision

cess was not even considered in defining policy, and winning was 

dent on our own decisions and actions.

Information-Age intelligence must be based on quantum mod

account for the adversary’s decisionmaking process. Since an adver

depends not only on what he is trying to accomplish but also where 

decision loop; the Information-Age analyst must be able to prov

options that depend on the adversary’s different “states” as well as a

which “state” he is currently in—and hopefully an estimate of wh

would like to push him into.
38

MESSAGE

■ Suppress tendency to build-up explicit internal arrangements that hin

action with the external world.

Instead

■ Arrange settings and circumstances so that leaders and subordinate

given opportunity to continuously interact with external world, and e

in order to more quickly make many-sided implicit cross-referenci

tions, empathies, correlations, and rejections as well as create t

images or impressions, hence a similar implicit orientation, needed 

organic whole.

Why?

■ A similar implicit orientation for commanders and subordinates 

allow them to: 

❏ Diminish their friction and reduce time, thereby permit them to

❏ Exploit variety/rapidity while maintaining harmony/initiativ

permit them to:

❏ Get inside the adversary’s O-O-D-A loops, thereby:

❏ Magnify adversary’s friction, and stretch-out his time (for a favo

match in friction and time), thereby:

❏ Deny the adversary the opportunity to cope with events/effor

unfold.22

//

The Newtonian paradigm only deals with the physical world. The 

ence must deal with the conceptual world. Even as simple a control sy

thermostat uses an OODA Cycle to Observe the world, Orient agains

nal model whether that world is too hot or cold enough, Decide whet

conditioner should be ON or OFF, and Act to ensure that it is in t

state. Therefore, we need not only to understand the adversary’s OO

but our own as well before we can provide the proper orientation to 

best decision.

22Col Boyd.
39

Newtonian Assumption: The world is continuous.

New Science Assumption: The world is digital.

Complementarity Condition: When the world is viewed at a leve

ity that is too large to detect individuals, the strategy will reflect o

age” response that neglects differences among individuals.

Example 1: If one thousand honeybees can collect one thousand g

len in one hour, in the same time how many grams can half-a-hone

In the Newtonian world, the answer is calculated to be half-a-gram; i

ical world the answer is zero grams because half-a-honeybee is dea

Newtonian thinking only works under conditions where individuals 

Example 2: If two percent of the female population is pregn

select twenty-five females from that population, how many of t

pregnant? In the Newtonian world you will find half a pregnant fe

biological world all you can say is each individual has a two perce

being pregnant, but in each case the answer is either yes or no—o

half-pregnant. Newtonian thinking ignores individuals and can, th

describe an “average” individual or theoretically, one individual in 

where all are identical.

The take-home message here is that in biological—and human—

whole is not just the sum or the average of the parts. Individuals m

are properties and behaviors that are characteristic of an individual th

subdivided any further. The New Science must, therefore, be able to 

individuality within populations.

From a Two-Player Zero-Sum-Game to a Multi-Player Non

Game

Newtonian Assumption: All organizations are identical.

New Science Assumption: All organizations are individuals in th

with differing characteristics dependent on the individuals that comp

Complementarity Condition: When organizations are so simple 

viduals who comprise them can be ignored (either because they are 

or because only a single individual speaks for the entire organizati

organization will have only a single “center of gravity” which d

actions and vulnerabilities.
40

nian answer is that its large and anything large must be a threat. Th

cal-quantum-answer is “It all depends.” If it’s a lion and I have no 

threat; if it’s a lion, and I have a gun, it’s game, but it might be a threa

my gun; if it’s an antelope and I have no gun, it’s not a threat; if it’s a

and I have a gun, it’s not a threat even if I drop my gun. Newtonian m

two-player zero-sum games; answers are always “yes” or “no” in th

nian world. Once I know enough information to determine the most 

single factor in making the model, then there’s only a “yes” or “no

The quantum or biological model needs to collect enough data to dis

acteristics of the organism or organization. This is based on the assum

there are individual characteristics of an organization since it is bui

identical individuals, be it an organism built of individual cells or an 

tion built of individual organisms. A pride of lions is very different fr

of antelopes or a herd of cattle when estimating whether it is a threat 

vidual human or to group of cowboys.

Biological organisms are organizations made of different kinds of i

and organizational thinking depends on very subtle differences in the m

those organisms. This makes biological models multiple player non

games. Each individual organization will have its own goals for survi

own definition of winning. Put a lion and a deer together and for the lio

is dinner while for the deer a “win” is survival. Add a hyena and the 

have two choices for dinner while the hyena is rooting for the lion b

dinner is leftovers; and in any case the antelope just wants to survive.

The New Science must account for differences in organizations 

be able to account for non-zero-sum games. In any biological sy

best answer is the win-win scenario. Newtonian models don’t even 

that option.

Cold War Intelligence: It is “Us” versus “Them,” and the World is 

the Cold War the only decisionmakers who mattered were the Politburo

else was just following orders. Since the Cold War was built on the a

that “Communism” was a monolithic entity, the level of granularity in 

making needed only to assume Us vs. Them. Therefore, we needed onl

dictators who were on “Our Side” or “Their Side;” by that definitio

Hussein was a “Good Guy.” We also only needed to consider who w

on “Our Side,” not why they were; in the Cold War world we could 

reasons that Islamic nations might choose to fight Communism because 

“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” was all the rationale we nee

method of intelligence analysis also resulted in an emphasis on assessin
41

either with us or against us, we dont need to know their intent to 

granularity more than that; but we do need to know what their capab

we can assess how large a threat they are if they are “against us.” In

the Newtonian zero-sum game world was easy: (1) pick the bigge

divert all your intelligence assets in a huge task force to find its cent

(3) defeat its center of gravity and it will crumble. When you are d

next biggest threat and repeat the process.

Afghan War Intelligence: It is a multi-polar world where ev

organization, and individual has distinct goals and decisionmaking 

reach those goals. Finding allies with common goals could work 

win scenarios. Not only were the Taliban, Northern Alliance, and A

tinct organizations, but also one could expect both the leaders an

citizens in each of the organizations to make decisions different

found correctly that the multiple factions within Afghanistan had th

tures and goals. This meant that by encouraging the Northern 

found our “eyes” on the ground to provide the valuable HUMINT 

needed to distinguish between Taliban, Al Qaeda, and just your ave

truck, or wedding celebration. However, this also required a realiza

Northern Alliance would then become a player in the new gov

would rebuild Afghanistan according to an Afghan “win” scen

meant that once the war was headed toward victory, the Taliban 

became a political problem rather than a military one; since to t

Alliance the Taliban were also fellow Afghans, Taliban rank-and-

assimilated within the Afghan populace while the Taliban leade

peared because their power base was gone. On the other hand, Al 

ers—who were mainly non-Afghans anyway—disappeared 

elsewhere and remain a significant threat.

Industrial-Age intelligence ignored both the quantum nature of o

and the fact that individuals even exist. Therefore, intelligence a

needed to estimate if they were on “Our Side” or “Their Side”—bein

of my enemy” was a sufficient estimate for decisionmaking. It also 

plistic model of the world where a “center of gravity” was all that o

find to solve the intelligence problem once and for all.

Information-Age intelligence analysis must account for individua

the organizational level and the individual level. The Information

gence analyst must be knowledgeable of not only the overall organi

infrastructure, its leadership, and its culture as well. The Information

must assess intent at least as well as he or she assesses capability.
42

sesses WMD is a potential threat. Certainly, the most important questi

policymaker needs to know about a country that possesses WMD ar

threat? What should I do about that threat? How do I respond when t

leader goes against U.S. interests?” 

In the Newtonian bi-polar world the answers were easy because in t

nian world “one size fits all” and every organization is the same. Intelli

done by assessing capabilities and WMD capability, which, once asses

the intelligence problem with no further analysis. “Yes, any nation that 

WMD is a threat. We should preemptively end that threat by causing th

disarm or cause a regime change to make that happen. Who the other 

leader is does not even matter; WMD is a threat and must be ended and 

who thinks his country should possess WMD should be ‘taken out’ a

regime put in place.”

In the Information-Age world the answer is “it all depends.” Just as 

mammals” are different, all “nations possessing WMD” are different 

different kinds of leadership and different national goals. Where do w

line on “regime change” as the only way to end the WMD problem—

dam Hussein and Iraq? Kim Chong-Il and North Korea? Ayatollah Kh

Iran? President Musharraf and Pakistan? Vladimir Putin and Russ

Sharon and Israel? Jaques Chirac and France? Tony Blair and Great B

Surely WMD proliferation is the most important intelligence prob

twenty-first century. But analysts cannot hope to provide policym

options other than “find all their WMD facilities and take them ou

tively” until the IC has analytical tools that account for individuality—

tries, the organizations, and cultures that they are built on, and the pe

that lead them.

Information-Age intelligence must be able to assess both capability 

Intelligence analysts need new methodologies and tools that can transc

tonian Industrial-Age thinking to be able to provide cogent assessment

vide policymakers options that are individual-specific; not “one siz

Saddam Hussein, Kim Chong-Il, Perez Musharraf, Ariel Sharon, Jaqu

and Tony Blair can all employ WMD should it come to be in their nati

ests to do so—which is only in the U.S. national interest when thei

interests coincide with that of the U.S. Clearly, there are differing optio

with these individual leaders and their individual nations. The New S

Intelligence for the Information Age needs to be able to define tho

clearly and distinctly.
43

for the Industrial Age using Newtonian thinking and replace them w

for the Information Age built using quantum thinking. The core of In

intelligence was assessment of capabilities. The core of Information

gence must be assessment of intent.

//

MESSAGE

Referring back to our previous discussion, we can say: orientatio

interactive process of many-sided implicit cross-referencing proj

empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and sha

interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experie

and unfolding circumstances.

23

//

Assessment of capabilities was built on understanding and 

things—weapons and the facilities that make them. Assessment of in

built on understanding people as individuals and the organizations, c

cultures they build—for it is people who build WMD.

23 Col Boyd.

45

TOWARD NOVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM MASSIV

Data can be “massive” both in quantity and type. A major probl

exploiting the massive quantities of data available to the Intellig

Community is the lack of a historical baseline and a lack of libra

and curators to organize and tag the data for easy retrieval. Thi

that we must develop methods for rapid writing of classified hist

for systematic data archiving. Data can also be “massive” in its 

sionality. Collecting and analyzing massive amounts of data will 

vide valid assessments unless the dimensionality of the data refle

dimensionality of the problem.

We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the Community is un

human librarians and curators to support analysts in the way that ot

tion-dependent organizations support their researchers. This means 

develop methods to bypass the need for librarians and curators by 

those functions, that is, developing computer tools for data ar

retrieval.

Data can also be “massive” in their dimensionality. Collecting a

massive amounts of data will not provide valid assessments if the di

of the data does not reflect the dimensionality of the problem. More

cal methods are required to assess both current position and projecte

Methodologies that hope to project target intentions into the future m

on data collection for a longer time period into the past; current inte

cannot be used to build warning intelligence.

The analyst is swamped with data on a day-to-day basis. There 

information out there that too little time exists to be able to use it t

questions that need to be answered. We need to find ways to be 

through the massive amount of data “out there” and use it to find t

we need to answer those questions. A current project funded by t

Research Development Activity to address that issue is call NIMD

Intelligence from Massive Data.”

The NIMD charter suggests that “massive” data are those that a

large in quantity or in too heterogeneous a format for us to be able 

tively. I suggest that this well-intentioned answer and the methodo

pursue it is in fact a straight line, flat-earth approach using Newt

trial-Age thinking, whereas we need a great circle spherical-ear
46

approach that is inherently a 2-D method to model continuous sing

systems, so any methodology we build using a Newtonian model mu

inherently 2-D, continuous, and single-valued. Therefore, before we 

find “novel” intelligence from “massive” data, we must re-define wha

by “novel” and “massive” for an Information-Age model that is N-dim

digital, and multistate.

What is “Novel” Intelligence?

“Novel” is defined as “new and unusual, especially being the first o

Current efforts such as NIMD concentrate on the first part of the defini

and unusual.” However, as I will shortly show, finding “new and unusu

gence data in enormous quantities is not a problem—so long as it is n

of its kind. The challenge for the Information Age is to be able to find in

that is “the first of its kind” within an enormous dataset where the req

has not been structured by conventional techniques.

The Industrial-Age definition of “novel” is—new and unusual with

rent model but not the first of its kind. 

The Information-Age definition of “novel” must be—new and unusu

first of a totally new kind of data requiring a new model to understand.

What is “Massive” Data?

The Industrial-Age definition of “massive” data is—data whose sh

mous quantity is too great for our methodologies to exploit.

I suggest that the Information-Age definition of “massive” data mus

whose dimensionality is too great for our methodologies to exploit. I ca

this by two examples:

■ A simple research project that shows that sheer quantity of data is n

for even a neophyte trained in Information-Age methodologies as l

data are of a kind that has already been modeled. 

■ A simple data-reduction problem that shows that dimensionality o

require a total rethink of how we exploit that data even when the da

tains only four data points and four observations associated with 

points.
47

Just recently my younger daughter, who is an 8th grader, came 

science project to find out about an “American inventor who invente

that is smaller than 6 inches” and no further instructions. On firs

would think that her problem is equivalent to the intelligence analys

find out about an “Iraqi scientist capable of inventing a new BW a

cannot be because she could finish her inventor project in about six 

tiny amount of parental guidance and no research budget while the IC 

millions of dollars and employing teams of highly trained analysts a

on the Iraqi scientist problem. Besides, the IC team has access to ma

data in many relational databases but my daughter has only her Inte

and a library card. Surely my daughter has a NIMD problem becaus

of data she needs to sort through on the Internet and library is truly 

the Industrial-Age definition of “very large.” Why is her problem so 

than that of the Iraqi WMD analysts?

I suggest that there are four major differences in the American in

lem and the Iraqi scientist problem that make my daughter’s project 

day afternoon’s work and the Iraqi WMD analyst’s a daunting ch

note that none of these differences have anything to do with the shee

erogeneity of the respective datasets:

(1) Historians have already collected, parsed, and modeled inven

inventions using very old, tried and true research techniques 

IC has yet to do the in-depth historical research required for t

tist and BW agent problem.

(2) The librarians have already cataloged all the current material 

inventors and inventions using very old, tried and true library 

techniques, but the IC has yet to build the kind of library requ

the scientist and BW agent problem.

(3) My daughter can easily search the enormous quantity of data 

Internet using the Google search engine because she already 

model for her inventor but the IC is hampered by its lack of a 

model for their scientist.

(4) Although my daughter’s project is “novel” for her because it 

and unusual” it is not truly “novel” because it is not the “first 

kind” in that many other people and students have asked the 

question. The Iraqi WMD analyst’s project is “novel” in both 

of the word because no one has ever considered how Iraq’s B

gram has grown historically—certainly not at the classified le
48

smaller than six inches my daughter asked me to take her to the library 

“Dad, please help me. I don’t even know where to start.” So I went to 

catalog, searched for “inventor” and “invention” and by scanning t

titles noticed that virtually all were tied to Library of Congress (LC) Ca

“609.” I told her we would look for the books with “609,” we then re

numbers on the shelves until we found them, and I started handing her b

that number that had to do with inventors and inventions...and she did th

in an afternoon’s work.

What call number does the Iraqi analyst need to retrieve the data on 

ogists and microbiologists? Or even more fundamentally—if there is a 

ber for Iraqi biologists, are there any books on the topic? And once w

names of the inventor or scientist, how do we learn more?

In today’s world that is easy for finding American inventors but imp

finding Iraqi BW scientists for several reasons:

New Knowledge is Built on a Baseline of Old Knowledge 

by Historians

The IC dataset is “massive” because there are no historians to provid

tive on what it means.

There are no classified historical baselines because there are no 

in the IC. Most of the intelligence data are currently in the form of text 

residing in multiple databases. The Iraqi analysts could get off to a goo

their project by finding classified books such as “The History of Iraqi S

“A Decade of Evading the UN Weapons Inspectors.” But such books do 

Historians can provide an excellent baseline on many issues of inter

intelligence analyst, but only from unclassified records. They don’t hav

the billions of text messages in IC databases, but the IC does not emp

its own historians to build such a baseline. And analysts do not have the 

don’t stay on one project long enough—to build the historical baseline 

context for their current analysis. My daughter can rapidly find infor

American inventors and their inventions because there are historian

books about them; the Iraqi analysts cannot do the same because there 

torians writing classified books on WMD programs anywhere.

IC Challenge: How can we build the historical baseline with no h

How can we automate the function of those absent classified histo

smart computer programs?
49

The IC classified datasets are virtually impossible to use because 

librarians to catalog and meta-tag them.

There is no catalog of classified documents because is n

Library of the IC. One can very rapidly find books on any imagin

a library catalog because a librarian somewhere took the time 

Library of Congress number. Think of how hard it would be to us

there were no librarians—only computer engineers to maintain 

ers—and all the books were placed randomly on the shelves wit

assigning Library of Congress codes. My daughter could easily 

half-dozen books on American inventors and then use the Tables 

and Indices to choose one who invented something “smaller than s

having quickly found the inventors of the paper clip, the computer 

many others. The intelligence analysts have no such ability to 

because in the IC, libraries only have unclassified source material

fied documents are stored online in databases compiled by compu

without librarians to oversee the cataloging and indexing that th

world uses to make data retrieval easy.

IC Challenge: How do we catalog and index the IC products bo

and online on Intelink for easy retrieval of relevant documents? 

replace the missing librarians by smart computer programs?

There is no meta-tagging for easy document retrieval because 

librarians to maintain IC databases. One can also find records ver

huge database like the National Institutes of Health’s online PubMe

biological research because the National Library of Medicine (NLM

ians to meta-tag every journal article in a standard format for author

iations and to select a list of keywords on that article on the basis 

NLM ontogeny. PubMed is easy to use because every scientific 

abstracted in that database is read individually and meta-tagged by 

at the NLM, usually called a curator. The IC has hired many differen

tors to develop ontologies for IC records—reinventing the Library 

codes and specialized ontologies of the NLM and other specialize

Ontologies do not work until they are assigned to each individual 

there are no curators in the IC who do so.

IC Challenge: How can we meta-tag existing documents in IC d

provide policies for easily meta-tagging new ones? How do we re

missing data curators with smart computer programs?
50

Historical Baselines are not Available for IC Analysts

Once my daughter found an “invention less than six inches” and th

the inventor from the general studies in the library books, finding addi

on the Internet was very simple using the Google search engine and lo

records that contain that inventor’s name and/or the name of the inventi

data-mining search of heterogeneous data on the Internet, the key is find

cific starting point such as a person’s name plus an associated fact (su

invention or where they work or what their expertise is). Potentially

analysts could search for all the “anthrax” experts who work at univ

“Baghdad,” but there are so many possible pairs of keywords that coul

“an Iraqi scientist capable of producing a BW agent” that pairing the

one is prohibitive. One needs the clues from the more generic search of 

ical baseline.

IC Challenge: How can we provide data-mining profiles for data ret

can work independently of a historical baseline? Again, how do we r

missing historians with smart computer programs?

Discovery of “Novel” Intelligence Requires Re-searching th

Using New Models

Data-mining is easy for tracking known entities with known interac

virtually impossible for identifying new kinds of interactions with 

entities—even if the data are contained in the dataset.

My daughter’s project was not “novel” because ultimately she w

retrieving and assembling research done by historians. But for the Iraq

there is no historical baseline (that is, there is no classified historica

Iraqi scientists). Or, if the project may be addressing a totally new issue 

the scientist we are looking for is actually a Russian scientist recruited 

qis). In this case, the project is truly “novel”—in the sense that they mu

unexpected relationships. It may be that the data were never collected

data were contained in the dataset, it may not be amenable to straig

analysis. 

Data-mining is easy for known “bad guys” but not very good for 

ing new ones—without a source somehow saying “this new guy is s

and you should examine him.” This is the true challenge that “mas

presents—“How can we data-mine an existing dataset for new rel

between unknown entities?” But if the dataset does not even have 
51

interactions between them, this is impossible. 

A simple way of organizing data used by historians and other r

and indeed sometimes 8th graders—to solve this problem is the tried

by 5” index card (3x5 card). After the relevant documents are c

researcher uses the Table of Contents or Index to find and read the 

tions—or sometimes just reads the entire document if the interacti

been well defined—and writes down individual interactions as sing

on 3x5 note cards (along with bibliographic reference data). Once a

relevant documents are parsed this way, all the 3x5 cards are re-orga

low threads of interactions that tell a story. Different cards arran

ways could tell many stories off the same 3x5 card deck. The histo

tell the story for the project at hand and save all the cards for late

Often by following threads through the 3x5 card deck, “novel” relat

emerge that allow telling unexpected stories.

In essence, relational databases are merely electronic 3x5 card 

tional databases have the advantage that once the individual int

entered, the electronic 3x5 cards can be arranged and re-arranged in 

But, both relational databases and 3x5 card decks are limited; it do

how elaborate the electronic interfaces and tools or how big and or

card box, the ability to mine new data depends on the quality an

“cards” that comprise the dataset.

IC Challenge: How can we rapidly build the huge relational data

for the wide range of problems needed to be analyzed by the IC? H

historian or researcher be replaced by an electronic tool that ca

read and understand language well enough to build an effective ele

card” file?

The major problem in using the massive quantities available to the 

has less to do with the sheer magnitude of the data than the lack of 

build a baseline of knowledge and the lack of librarians and curator

and tag the data for easy retrieval. We must reconcile ourselves to the 

Intelligence Community is unlikely to hire human historians, libraria

tors to support analysts in the way that other information-depende

tions support their researchers. This means that we must develop 

bypass the need for historians, librarians and curators by automatin

tions, that is, developing computer tools for data archiving and retrie
52

“Massive” data can also be data that contain more dimensions than c

dled by the available data collection, analysis, or representation tools.

Submariners deal with the problem of data dimensionality on a d

basis. We can use a simple submarine bearings-only Time-Motion 

(TMA) to demonstrate that a dataset of only four data points can be 

sive” for the analyst to draw a meaningful answer if the methods by 

data were collected and analyzed did not account for the dimensiona

problem.

In sub vs. sub encounters, the submariner usually uses passive son

can only collect bearings to the target. Obtaining direct ranges requ

active sonar, which the submariner is loath to use because it gives awa

ence. The passive sonar bearings are then plotted and used to analyze f

get’s course, speed and range.

The submariner needs to know both where the target is now and als

intentions are to be able to intercept it. Every submariner knows that a 

description contains four distinct parameters: (1) bearing, (2) range, (

and (4) speed. Therefore, at least four observations are required to defin

Using only bearings (as shown on the right), possible target tracks are 

of vectors between the observed bearings that define a straight line

nately, it can be shown mathematically that determination of the rang

indirectly on not only the target course vector but also the “own ship

vector. Accordingly, there are an infinite number of possible target de

using a set of plotted bearing lines if “own ship” remains on the sam

.

.

.

. 0000

0005

0010

0015

Own

Ship

Bearings

to the

target

.

.

.

.0000

0005

0010

00

P

ta

ar

of 

le

fo

st
53

the dimensionality of the solution is greater than the dimensionalit

and a target description solution is impossible!

Therefore, the submariner knows that the dataset required to so

ings-only TMA problem requires at least two observations on two d

ship” courses. It is only after own-ship collects two bearings, maneu

lects two more bearings that a solution can be attempted (as shown 

drives both the submariner’s thinking toward data collection as 

patience in knowing when a solution is possible.

Like the submariner, the

intelligence analyst needs to

know a target’s current location

and its intentions—but the analyst’s targets are much more

complex. The simple submarine TMA problem indicates

that in determining location and

intentions a minimum amount

of data of the appropriate

dimensionality is required. Collection of the required data

requires planning to ensure that

the dimensionality of the data

can support the dimensionality

of the problem. Furthermore,

data collection and analysis will require a certain amount of time. 

History matters in determining intentions! One cannot know whe

going unless we know where it has been. And the more complex the 

more history that must be collected and analyzed to construct a 

reflects both target current position and projected intentions.

Analytical methods depend on data that reflect the dimensionality 

lem. Collecting and analyzing massive amounts of data will not p

assessments if the dimensionality of the data does not reflect the di

of the problem. Moreover, analytical methods are required to assess 

position and projected intentions. 

Methodologies that hope to project target intentions into the fu

based on data collection for a longer time period into the past. In the 

ligence world, data cannot be used to build warning intelligence. T

. . .

.0000

0005

0010

0015

Pos

targ

are 

of s

leng

form 

stra
54

begin to rebuild the Intelligence Community by:

■ Moving beyond Newtonian thinking to use new analytical m

built on quantum thinking.

■ Finding ways past our lack of historians, librarians, and cur

build new ways to assemble, catalog, and retrieve data.

■ Moving beyond the 2-dimensional Newtonian world to bui

methodologies built on quantum thinking that will allow us to 

multiple dimensions.

Only then can we move beyond Industrial-Age, Newtonian intelligence 

siders only capability, to Information-Age intelligence that can con

capability and intent.
55

FROM CURRENT INTELLIGENCE TO STRATEGIC W

Information-Age organizations needed to combat WMD and terr

proliferation networks must be able to process intelligence and m

decisions differently from Industrial-Age organizations in the Co

Using the Decision Cycle (or OODA Cycle) as a model for how 

zations work suggests that the nature of the organization (netwo

hierarchy) is dependent on its goals and its environment. The ab

provide strategic warning requires that information flow within I

gence Community must change by changing the way the organiz

processes information.

More could be less if commanders cannot make sense of it. E

when far less information streamed into Schwarzkopf’s headquarters

cult to separate out the best information, says former Marine lieute

Bernard Trainor. “It was like a fire hose coming out, and people 

information of no interest or value to them, and information that w

didn’t get to them,” says Trainor, co-author of The General’s War

Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. “I don’t think that has been solved.”

The top worries in the minds of the men who will run the war w

reflect the new face of warfare-information overload and a temp

micromanage battles from their high-tech command center in Q

Information Overload is a new reality to the Intelligence Comm

to be that intelligence reporting was very scarce and very dear. Ima

War II intelligence analyst ever saying, “I don’t have time to read ev

comes across my desk.” Yet, that is not unusual today as a massiv

data is deposited in databases around the IC, much of which is never 

On the afternoon of May 7, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

tried desperately to contact intelligence officials in Europe to ale

to the fact that the Yugoslavian military facility they had targeted 

fact, located one block away from where NATO pilots were abou

bombs. By the time his concerns could be registered, planes taki

24Andrea Stone, “Battlefield Clearly Visible Far Behind the Lines,” USA Today, 

9A.25Paul Martin, “Glut Of Data From Battlefield A New Command Problem,” Wa

19 March 2003, A12.
56

When the smoke cleared the next morning, NATO awoke to the har

reality that it had just bombed the Chinese embassy and killed thre

ple. In his official explanation of the factors that contributed to the d

mistake, CIA director George Tenet described a “severely flawed” 

identification process made worse by the use of outdated maps and 

bases filled with erroneous information.26

After Sputnik and 9/11, the Intelligence Community has been frustr

inability to provide strategic or even tactical warning. And yet it has 

databases full of massive quantities of data.

Today, the Defense Intelligence Agency is moving forward with a p

gram that promises within the next five years to eliminate minor ye

potentially deadly errors from proliferating throughout the intellige

community. Known as the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (J

the goal of the program is to help analysts overcome information o

load by transforming the once ad hoc process of sharing critical int

gence data into a fully digitized, dynamic environment.27

The Intelligence Community has been building and rebuilding an

massive resources into solving “the database problem.” Yet there ap

very few signs of real progress. The databases do not seem to be su

being converted into more valuable intelligence. Why not? Cynthia G

vides a clue...

Intelligence is made up of many facets and types of information, so

simple, and some complex. Some readily understood by non-expert

some that require detailed research and analysis before they have m

ing to users. If the sole function of intelligence was to compile “fac

there would be little need for analysts of any type. The intelligence 

cess would consist almost entirely of collection of raw data which w

be evaluated for accuracy but then passed on without further comm

analysis to the policy official.28

Current intelligence is different from tactical warning and strategic 

As Ms. Grabo notes, the key to warning intelligence is not collection 

26Daniel Verton, Federal Computer Week, 18 October 1999. URL: www. fcw. com. C

ter as Verton. 27Verton. 28Grabo, 133.
57

better warning. Only better analysis and the ability to provide contex

better warning. 

We can only design better analysis by first understanding how w

analyze. The problem is not how any one of us thinks but rather h

lize all the brainpower in the IC to be able to think as one. Before 

databases that work, we must first understand the interplay of inte

operations in current organizations to understand what those data

and cannot—do.

Tradeoffs between Intelligence and Operations

Col John Boyd defined military decisionmaking by a “decisio

“OODA Cycle,” where decisionmakers Observe, Orient, Decide, an

basic visualization of any military or political system is a timeline.

Each OODA Cycle can in itself be broken down into its comp

each one of which is also an OODA cycle. For example, the D-Da

Normandy hinged on the ability to launch the invasion force betw

Atlantic storms. To do so required: observing weather in Icelan

Atlantic, orienting all the data on a weather map, deciding that it 

go, and acting by launching the invasion force. But each one of tho

itself an OODA cycle:

■ The meteorologist “observing” in Iceland measured wind 

barometric pressure with his instruments, oriented the ma

instruments to numbers they represented, decided to send th

to England, and acted by radioing the readings.

■ The meteorologist “orienting” in England observed all the 

radio messages with readings, oriented them on a wea

decided what they meant, and acted by briefing General E

that the time was right.

OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT
58

oriented the information to his internal timeline and exp

decided that the time was right, and acted by saying, “Let’s go.

■ All the “actors” and forces in the invasion force observed th

from Eisenhower, oriented it against their Op-order, decided 

time, and acted in unison to invade.

In each of these nested OODA Cycles there is a plan—a systemati

steps from conception (of what needs to be done) through maturity (o

getting it done).

As organizations evolve from loose confederations to integrated s

systems, the components of the organization redefine their roles: g

working in parallel to working as an integrated team. The increasing d

the Information Age for quality intelligence and warning analysis requi

Intelligence Community clearly define the roles of its component agen

the most with its most scarce asset—its analysts.

The Evolution of Organizations through Integration o

Decision Cycles

The evolution of complex systems goes through a definable series o

new levels of complexity emerge. The first step is the formation of a 

where before there was only a set of unlinked individuals. 

The resulting loosely linked organization, which we will call a n

linked by common interests. All the individuals (be they organisms, 

organisms, or organizations) share their observations and orientation

ments of those observations) but reserve the right to decide and act on 

A biological example is a colony of bacteria, and a social example is a 

Even though decisions are made individually, if all the members of 

reach a consensus, the combination of all the individual actions wil

OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT

OODA OODA OODA OODA

Conception

Intelligence:

Building the Plan

Operations:

Implementing the Plan

M
59

kill an infected person by all secreting toxin where only one or a fe

sharing a common well in a commune benefits all—even if everyone 

vidual bucket. A coalition of states that fights a common foe—even 

fronts are totally unlinked—can provide for a common defense much 

tively than the individual countries acting on their own.

Often organizations continue to evolve beyond networks to provid

mechanism to insure coordinated action.

All biological systems are defined by four characteristic proc

include the ability to: (1) extract and store energy from the environm

and respond to the environment, (3) reproduce, and (4) evolve. T

Cycle or OODA Cycle is just another way of defining the second 

cesses—the ability to sense and respond to the environment.

In the OODA or Decision Cycle, the first two steps—observation 

tion—are what we commonly call intelligence. An individual’s or o

ability to make the best possible decision is directly dependent on bo

of its observations of the world and its assessments of what those 

mean. The orientation step is a comparison of the input observatio

internal map or model of the world whereby the “orienter” or analy

its own position in the world and define possible actions by displayin

the internal map and projecting whether they will lead to “rocks and 

a “safe harbor.” 

In the OODA or Decision Cycle, the second two steps—decision 

are what we commonly called operations. Once all the possible op

out on the internal map and assessments of their strengths and we

made, a decision is made to take the best possible action. The more 

the parts of the organism or organization are in carrying out that acti

effective that action will be.

Networks have an advantage over groups of unlinked individua

individuals in the network can share their observations and asses

makes the network much more informed because the individuals c

only observations of others who might be able to see farther or he

also assessments of dangers or possible actions from those who m

more refined map or model.

The inability for networks to be able to provide mechanisms for c

sionmaking or coordinated operations usually means that networks e

a second kind of organization which we will call a hierarchy. In a hi
60

hierarchy much more efficient because the individuals can work coo

toward the same goals based on the decisions of the leader.

Networks and hierarchies have inherent advantages over each 

which is best? Just as chemists use ideal compounds—the ideal gas an

fect crystal—we can compare a perfect network and perfect hierarchy 

stand how they work. Whenever we cannot imagine a “perfect” n

hierarchy, we can consider the closest real-world examples: a co

almost a pure network while Stalin’s USSR or the Saddam Huss

approached pure hierarchies.

Networks versus Hierarchies—Informed Inaction vers

Uninformed Action

The network has the advantage over the hierarchy in that the obse

orienting process is distributed over the entire organization—which me

can bring all the observational and assessment skills of every individu

on any problem. The wide-open lines of communication in the network 

effectiveness in sensing the world and orienting its place in that env

However, since organizational operations must be accomplished by c

the network is inefficient in decisionmaking or acting. The network is 

and effective but slow and inefficient. In short, a network is charac

informed inaction.

The hierarchy has the advantage over the network in that the decision

concentrated in a single individual, which means that there will alway

nimity in actions because all individuals are following orders of the l

restricted lines of communication in the hierarchy make for efficiency 

tions. However, since all the orienting processes are also concentrated 

individual, the hierarchy is only as smart as its leader. The hierarchy 

efficient but superficial and often ineffective. In short, a hierarchy is cha

by uninformed action.

But which is better—a network or a hierarchy? It all depends..

organisms and organizations, the “better” solution is the one that leads t

mal or organizational survival. The alternative is extinction or regime c

The key to any Decision Cycle is the ability to formulate and implem

of action that will be the best response to the environment on the b

available observed data. And there will always be three kinds of 

required for any organism or organization: (1) the today or tomorrow tr

the guns or butter tradeoff, and (3) the intelligence or operations tradeo
61

The present versus future tradeoff comes from the dichotomy 

need of the organism or organization to extract and store energy fr

ronment and the need to reproduce. The more resources put away 

day the better the organism or organization can exploit tomorrow’s e

whatever that may be. However, the more resources that can be us

act or to reproduce—the better the organism can most efficiently ex

Individual 1

O O D A

Individual 4

O O D A

Hierarchy Individuals follow leader’s

orders for common action us

intelligence.

TIME LINE

ORGANIZATION CHART

.

.

. Individ

O O 

 Individ

O O 

Network

Network

Individuals share intelligence and

actions but retain individual decisionmaking authority.

 Individ

O O 

Individual 1

O O D A

Organization

O O D A

Organization

O O D A

Hierarchy

1 2

3 4

1

2 3 4

Network Hierarchy

Informed Inaction Uninformed Activs.
62

always faced with the choice, Do I use my resources today or save 

tomorrow?”

The guns or butter tradeoff comes from the dichotomy between the n

organism or organization to sense and respond to the environment and t

reproduce. The more resources put into systems that allow efficient 

maintain today’s organism or organization—the guns that allow def

environmental threats—the better the existing organism or organizatio

vive today. However, the more resources put into systems that allow 

ability to build tomorrow’s progeny organism or organization—the “

build new infrastructure—the better the progeny of the organism or or

will be able to survive tomorrow. In a world of limited resources, an or

organization is always faced with the choice, “Do I use my resource

guns or butter?”

The intelligence or operations tradeoff comes from the dichotomy be

need of the organism or organization to be able to effectively sense (ob

orient) and to efficiently respond (decide and act). The more resources 

ism or organization can use to observe the world in fine detail in many 

integrate those observations into contingency plans for a wide variety o

ments, the better it can make informed decisions. However, the more re

organism or organization can use to make rapid decisions and confor

nated actions, the better it can exploit the environment. In a world 

resources, an organism or organization is always faced with the choice, 

my resources for better intelligence or for more efficient operations?” 

mately translates into “Do I organize myself into a network or into a hi

The best kind of organization in any case is the one that can best 

Decision Cycles that address the three tradeoffs... Today or tomorrow? 

butter? Intelligence or operations? 

As we will see shortly, the critical point in any Decision Cycle is the 

from orienting to decisionmaking. This depends on both an accurate 

plete internal map/model of the world and the ability to provide 

options for all foreseeable futures. An organization that can build and i

the most effective and efficient plan will be the one that will prevail.

And we will see that the choices made by the organism or organi

only determine how much of its resources to allocate to intelligence but 

kind of intelligence to value most... current intelligence, tactical warnin

tegic warning.
63

when tomorrows world will be the

same as today’s—the hierarchy is better. And in times of stasis or equilibrium only current intelligence is

needed.

The first possibility is that the world

can be modeled as continuous and single-valued; that is, changes will happen

only incrementally and there is only one

possible output for any given input. As

we have seen, these are the conditions

under which Newtonian models apply,

which are inherently two-player zerosum-games. If an organism or organization can approximate its world as a twoplayer zero-sum-game and can assume

that the other player will not change the

way it is playing the game, the complementarity conditions for Newtonian

thinking apply, and a hierarchy will provide the best solution to the three

tradeoffs.

Guns or butter? In a world where

threats are well defined and are not

expected to change markedly in capability or intent, a simple Newtonian model

can be made for the threats, especially

when there is only a single major threat.

Once that model is made, it is a twoplayer zero-sum-game which can—after enough historical data poin

collected to validate it—be converted into a “function” at which po

can be predicted rather well. Once an answer is obtained, be it “

“guns now,” or “some mixture of guns and butter now,” a single plan 

for the organization. At that point, the decision is easy and all possi

should concentrate on implementing the plan. Since hierarchies are b

tions, a hierarchy is the best choice.

Today or tomorrow? If a Newtonian model applies today, since 

ous and single-valued, it will change only incrementally tomorrow. If 

Individual 1

O O D A

Individual 3

O O D A

Information Flo

in a Network

Network

Organization

O O D A

Individual 2

O O D A

Individual 4

O O D A
64

arms race, the model will not change nor must the plan. Since tomorr

will then look much like today’s, the plan should be made to optimize 

of guns or butter for today—neglecting tomorrow because tomorrow 

change enough to change the plan. Once the plan has been made, the 

will implement it best. 

Intelligence or operations? Once the plan is made in a static wor

Newtonian model, intelligence is only needed to check the plan to look 

deviations that need to be corrected. Therefore, under such conditions, t

an organism’s or organization’s resources should be dedicated to opera

static world, current intelligence is most critical to provide constant 

easily assessed feedback to ensure that things are going according to th

In summary:

■ When the world is not changing and a plan has already been ma

best to maximize resources used for operations to implement th

A hierarchy is best to do so.

■ The organization in a static world only needs enough intel

resources to monitor that the plan is being implemented proper

■ Current intelligence provides data to assess that the current pla

isfactory for current operations.

■ In a static world, current intelligence is all that is needed.

In times of change— when tomorrow’s world will be incrementally 

from today’s—a command network, an organization that balances 

and a hierarchy, is best. And in times of incremental change tactica

becomes most important.

The second possibility is that of a two player model, quantum and m

Here there are only two players in the game but the other player will m

sions during the course of the game. Since Newtonian models cannot a

decisionmaking, these are conditions that transcend Newtonian mode

they are two-player zero-sum-games. In a world where the adversary 

decisions, as in changing its plans, but those decisions are predictable, t

zation can include contingency plans within its overall plan. For exa

organization has assessed that the adversary will begin hostilities and 

tured itself to defeat the adversary when the attack does come. Thus a 

constructed that accounts for operations prior to hostile action and 

during hostile action. A hybrid organization, which we will call a com

work, provides the best solution to the three tradeoffs under these cond
65

adversarys overall plan—hostile action—is assessed, the

plan has already accounted for

a current mix of guns and butter. Therefore, resources are

best allocated toward implementing the plan; this is best

done by a hierarchy. However,

during the time period prior to

the commencement of hostilities, tactical warning is

needed to provide decisionmakers options on how best to

react to the commencement of

hostilities. Therefore, a large

enough intelligence network

must be built into the organization to provide good prospects for tactical warning.

Today or tomorrow? In this context, today or tomorrow is rel

to the moment that hostilities begin. Therefore, the plan needs to c

tiple contingencies that include alternative actions dependent o

where hostilities commence as well as the possibility of pre-emp

an option within the plan. However, under these conditions, 

becomes tactical because plans are made for allocation of curre

decided in the overall plan.

Intelligence or operations? Under these conditions, the organiza

flexible. Since a war is imminent, the organization must be set up a

which is most effective once the war starts—at which point the situ

to a two-player-zero-sum game with no change in opponent plans (a

war is on) as described above. However, until hostilities begin (or if 

makes significant tactical changes in plan during the war), the organ

have the ability to provide tactical warning. During this pre-war pha

intelligence infrastructure must be fielded to at least answer the tacti

of when and where the opponent will attack. Thus, an intelligence n

be built which functions as closely as possible to a pure network to 

best intelligence, but within a hierarchical framework to be able to 

sions and actions in support of the plan.

Individ

O O 

Individ

O O 

Individ

O O 

Individual 1

O O D A

Organization

O O D A

Hierarchy

Information Flow in a Hiera
66

■ When the world will change in a predictable way, i.e., beginni

tilities, and a plan has already been made, it is best to m

resources for operations to implement that plan but still pr

enough intelligence assets to be able to implement the contin

of the plan most effectively. The best organization is a comma

work which is set up as a hierarchy but which can operate lik

work prior to decision-points in the plan.

■ Tactical warning provides data to assess when contingencies 

the current plan must be accounted for to support current and 

operations.

■ In a predictably changing world, tactical warning is needed.

In paradigm shifts, when the assumptions in tomorrow’s thinkin

backward from today’s, a network is better. And in paradigm shifts 

warning becomes most important.

The third possibility is that the world can be modeled as a quantum 

non that is multi-state and multi-player; that is, changes will happen 

there is more than one possible output for any given input, and one mu

for the actions of multiple players. These are conditions that transcend 

tonian models and two-player zero-sum-games. Here the organism or 

tion needs to model the world as a multi-player non-zero-sum-game 

assume that the other players will make decisions during the course of 

being played. In the worst-case scenario, all the multiple players m

independently based on their own guns-or-butter, today-or-tomorrow, a

gence-or-operations tradeoffs, and the organization must build plans fr

gence and implement them knowing that all the other players are doing 

simultaneously.

Guns or butter? In a world of constant, quantum change, the orga

only as strong as its infrastructure, and an infrastructure which can re

wide variety of conditions will be best. Since war is only one of man

futures in such a world, the organization that can maximize its ability 

diverse infrastructure will be most effective. Thus under these cond

more “butter” of the most possible kinds the better, and the closer the 

tion can be to a network of autonomous diverse parts, the better.

Today or tomorrow? In a world of constant, quantum change, tom

be different from today. Therefore, any plans for today will becom
67

sible contingencies.

Intelligence or operations? In a world of constant, quantum cha

work is the key, and the better intelligence the organization has, the 

react to the constantly changing world. Besides, a large and costly i

required to implement a long-range plan will likely become obsolet

ever used. Thus, the best intelligence in such an environment is one 

rectly predict far enough into the future to provide decisionmakers 

plan that accounts for not only changes in adversary plans but also t

the organization to be able to reallocate its resources before the wo

When there are multiple kinds of butter and guns—any one of which 

most effective tomorrow—the organization that can best reallocate 

will be most effective. Under these conditions, strategic warning b

important.

In summary:

■ When the world will change constantly in a complex way, w

players constantly building and implementing plans, it is bes

mize resources for intelligence to be able to effectively 

plans to reallocate resources. The best organization is a netw

■ Strategic warning provides data to assess when new plan

built in support of current and future operations.

■ In a constantly changing, complex world, strategic warning 

variety needed.

Is a network or hierarchy better? It all depends. Networks are be

plans. Networks provide the best intelligence but cannot act in a co

ner. Hierarchies are best at implementing plans. Hierarchies can act 

efficiently but are flying blind most of the time.

In a static world, a hierarchy is better because making plans 

ronment is simple, and the organization can marshal its resourc

ment the plan.

In a changing world, a network is better because making plans in 

ment is difficult, and the organization needs to expend resources ma

gency plans... the more complex the changing world, the more comp

need to be.

If change is small and can be neglected, the organization can m

plan and stick with it. Only current intelligence is required to 
68

make a plan with contingencies and look for indicators of that change 

which contingencies to implement. Tactical warning is needed to pro

indicators. BUT...

If change is constant and too great to account for all possible contin

a single plan, no matter how complex the plan is, the organization must 

build a new plan even while it is executing the old. That is what strategi

is all about.

Current U.S. military and IC organizations were built to fight Indu

wars. In the Industrial Age only current intelligence and tactical war

required because strategic warning could be done by the decisionmak

selves without any additional help from the IC:

■ The Japanese bombing Pearl Harbor signaled a beginning of 

ties. FDR could come up with a strategic plan immediately to 

cate U.S. resources from butter to guns.

■ The launching of Sputnik signaled the beginning of a new era

hower and the nation could immediately come up with a new s

plan to reallocate U.S. resources from just butter to guns plus b

and a standing “strategic” force to be on call for instant reaction 

Soviet attack. But once the new strategic plan was in place and 

contingencies of the plan fleshed out, the U.S. only needed 

warning thereafter to assess and provide guidance at the de

points in the plan.

But 9/11 changed all that. In a world where multiple players ar

WMD and terrorists can attack anywhere at any time, how do we build 

counter WMD and terrorism? That requires strategic warning, and it ap

strategic warning is impossible in a constantly changing multi-player w

Therefore, we must begin to do the impossible... Build an IC organi

can provide strategic warning in a world of WMD and terrorism.

From the Industrial Age to the Information Age–A New Ba

between Intelligence and Operations

The Decision Cycle is curious in that it is advantageous to remain in 

ligence half (Observe and Orient) for as long as possible but implemen

ations half (Decide and Act) as quickly as possible. Building a plan is 

with the maximum amount of information possible, so when an organiz

the intelligence half of an OODA Cycle it tends to stay there as long a
69

complete the plan as fast as possible because during the operation

cycle the organization is essentially flying blind.

One of the basic lessons of Decision Cycles is that the organiza

get “inside the adversary’s decision loop” will prevail. In essence, if 

tion can build a plan based on current assessments of the adversary a

and complete that plan faster than the adversary, it will get the advan

ing to the next Decision Cycle ahead of the adversary and be able co

and better plan that accounts for everything that has occurred durin

cycle. Feedback is possible during a Decision Cycle to allow monit

the plan on track or to provide for contingency decisions program

plan, but it is only by going to the next Decision Cycle that the organ

clean slate to build a new plan from scratch—one that can account f

that happened during the current cycle.

Both current intelligence and tactical warning are reactive. The

organizational plan that is in place and being executed and looks f

that the plan is still on track or that contingencies—decision-points

Information Flow in a Real-world Organization

Operations

O O D A

Logistics

O O D A

Intelligence

O O D A

Decision-maker

O O D A

Organization

O O D A

E

N

V

I

R

O

N

M

E

N

T

A

D

V

E

R

S

A

R

Y

or

O 

O 

Dec

Current

Intelligence

Tactical

Warning
70

Z. In either of these modes, the decisionmakers drive intelligence. Th

have a plan, and intelligence provides a feedback loop to monitor 

Therefore, decisionmakers drive current intelligence and tactical w

defining the requirements of their current plan. 

Strategic warning is proactive. It assumes that when the current orga

plan runs its course, the world will be different and that the new plan m

cate current resources to implement it. Any complex plan takes time to i

and complete, and once a decision is made to implement a plan, it is usu

effective to complete that plan than stop and redraw another. Strategi

provides inputs to plan for the next Decision Cycle. Therefore, strategi

must ultimately be driven by analysts.

But it’s even more difficult than that... True strategic warning nee

ahead not only into the next Decision Cycle but the Decision Cycle bey

In general—if it is possible to generalize on this—the policy o

is probably most receptive to early, albeit tenuous, warning in 

where he can take some preliminary action, such as some diplo

initiative, without incurring any significant risk or major comm

of resources. He is not likely to be so responsive if he has to u

take a redeployment of military forces or a call-up of reservist

ticularly if he believes that the threat is not imminent or that ac

our part could lead to military reaction by the adversary and an 

lation of the situation. And he probably will not wish to be “w

about potential dangers which still appear remote and which m

require a major change of recently established national policy.

Providing adequate strategic warning requires first recognizing that t

organization has not allocated its resources properly to react to the en

or threat and then requires formulating a plan to rebuild the organizatio

erly react to that environment or threat. It’s not good enough for the stra

lyst to say, “We cannot meet the threat with our current organiz

resources.” The strategic analyst must also provide a plan for the next 

sion Cycles: the first plan is for an infrastructure OODA cycle that 

reallocation of resources and new organizations to manage what mus

and the second plan is an operational OODA cycle that details the acti

new organization using its new resources to respond to the environmen

that will exist after new infrastructure is in place.

29 Grabo, 143.
71

adversary and how his decisions will affect changes that cannot 

countered by today’s infrastructure, but also an understanding of 

own organization and the possible decisions it can make to reorga

infrastructure. Current intelligence provides feedback on how the 

is going. Tactical intelligence provides feedback on how to implem

gency plan within the current plan to account for new intelligence o

sary or environment. Strategic intelligence must provide “feed-

how to build a new plan: first a plan on how to reallocate current re

a new infrastructure, then a plan on how to use that new infr

responding to the adversary and environment. “Warning does not 

has been conveyed to the policymaker, and he must know that 

warned.”30

To rebuild the IC from its Industrial-age organization to a new Inf

organization we must begin with a new set of assumptions:

■ In the Industrial-age action was the key to success. In the In

Age orienting will be the key to success.

■ Action depended on the soldier. Orienting depends on the an

■ Action is best implemented by a hierarchy. Orienting is b

mented by a network.

■ Action is served by current intelligence and tactical warning 

the success of the current Decision Cycle. Orienting is best 

strategic warning to insure the success of the next Decisio

and the one beyond that.

Current intelligence and tactical warning tells the decisionma

wants to know. Strategic warning tells the decisionmaker what he ne

30Grabo, 14.

73

MODELING THE DECISION CYCLE

Biological Systems are defined by what they do rather than 

are. Dynamic models for biological systems including organ

organizations can be built using the Decision Cycle or OOD

developed by Col John Boyd.

Amateurs talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.

Old Military Aphorism

How do we get there from here? With all the talk about “the da

lem” or “systems of systems,” is the world becoming too complex f

brain to comprehend? I suggest that the world only seems that com

we are basing our worldview and thought processes on what w

school...based on Newtonian Science. 

Newtonian Science is based on the notion of understanding the 

verse. There has been much thought and discussion to step beyon

build what is been termed “chaos theory” or “complexity theory.” B

the current notions of complexity science have failed because they 

Newtonian assumptions...half-a-honeybee...functions with no histo

importantly no decisionmaking. Therein lies the problem.

Decisions are most usefully depicted as quantal and multi-state. O

with A and get either B or C, dependent on the environment. Theref

eling of a decisionmaking system based on the Newtonian assump

world is continuous and single-valued is inherently flawed and misle

To model a world based on the Decision Cycle one needs to start 

assumptions that recognizes decisions.

Therefore, we need to look more closely at the Decision Cycle a

the complementarity principle applies; that is, where our Industria

tonian assumptions approximate the real world and where they 

inadequate.

If we redraw the Decision Cycle the way it works in an organiza

see not only why Newtonian thinking is limited for modeling the c

why current technology-based methods to improve the intellige

have failed.
74

tive or organizational world and therefore transcends Newtonian think

Observation step of the cycle, the observer interacts directly with th

world, performs measurements or senses physical entities, then co

physical reality into a symbolic representation of that reality. The met

in Iceland in support of D-Day measured wind direction and speed, and 

ric pressure but passed the data he collected in symbolic format (30

28.5”Hg). The symbolic data was then passed to the meteorologist i

who plotted all the symbols on a map, which is itself a symbolic represe

the physical world. He then oriented and presented all the data on th

map to General Eisenhower who decided on the best plan based on the 

worldview. Eisenhower then passed the decision in symbolic form, “

and finally the operational part of the organization took actions in th

world which affected physical entities (the German Army or the env

The input Observation and the output Action relate the organizationa

the physical world, but the Orienting and Decisionmaking steps exist to

organizational cognitive world based on totally non-Newtonian symb

maps, plans, decisions, and orders.

Actor 2

O O D A

Actor 3

O O D A

Actor 1

O O D A

Decision-maker

O O D A

Operations

Act

Observer 2

O O D A

Observer 3

O O D A

Observer 1

O O D A

Orienteer

(Analyst)

O O D A

Intelligence

Sense Data

Data Plan

Plan

Orders

Orders Orient Decide

Sense 1

Sense 2

Sense 3

Observe

The Organizational World

The Physical World

Observations are

made on the

physical world

 to i mplement 

in the physical 

which are converted into symbolic data

that is compared against a symbolic

map to synthesize alternative plans.

A plan is decided on

and operational

orders are given
75

Newtonian fringes of the Decision Cycle; that is, the parts of the Ob

Action steps that occur in the physical world. Thus we built physic

answer questions about physical systems. How do we build bigger an

sors to load more data into databases? How can we speed up our a

orders to allow our operating forces to target faster? But Newton ca

with orienting and decisionmaking because both only exist in the co

nizational world. 

Both the Observer and Actor do things, and technology based 

models can help them do things faster or farther or stronger. Industr

nology provided machine-aided methods for the Observation and Ac

the Decision Cycle in which the organization interacts with the phys

Both the Orienter and Decisionmaker think things, and technolo

biological or cognitive models can help them think more effectively. 

Age technology will ultimately allow computer-aided methods for t

and Decisionmaking steps of the Decision Cycle in which the organ

acts within itself cognitively.

Orienting compares symbolic representations of the physical wo

symbolic representation of the world—usually called a map—and 

plans.

Decisionmaking selects which plan to implement.

The key to Information-Age Intelligence and strategic warning 

standing how both our organization and an adversary’s organization 

and in how we can make our plans better than their plans.

■ Better operations required more efficient machines.

■ Better plans require more effective thinking.

In a rapidly changing world the key is to be able to build an orga

can respond most effectively to the new environment. This entails a 

that must span two Decision Cycles: in a Logistics Cycle a plan is fo

implemented to reallocate resources to build a new infrastructure, t

to change from “butter to guns” by building a wartime economy; i

tional Cycle a plan is formulated to employ the new infrastructure t

the environment in a new way, that is, to actually fight the war.

The core of the Decision Cycle is making and implementing 
76

Chinese Proverb

The single step I hope to accomplish is to be able to build a plan o

can build better plans through better strategic intelligence using Inform

technology. 

Lessons Learned are Better than Any Plan

A problem with evaluating plans is that one cannot truly tell how go

plan is until it is actually implemented. It did not matter how complex or e

all the turn-of-the-century plans were for flying machines, the proof of the 

brothers’ plan was that their aircraft actually got off the ground and flew. I

age of “vaporware” where PowerPoint slides of systems on the drawing bo

touted as the wave of the future, the proof is in the product. If a plan for be

intelligence is really a better plan, then one should be able to demonstrate

intelligence products based on that plan.

Accordingly, I will demonstrate by “lessons learned” from a concep

prototype that I have been building in DIA’s Biological Warfare Assessme

Divisions along with much help from many members of the IC. There are 

sections to my strategic plan for Information-age intelligence: (1) The Met

Section details a conceptual model for computer-aided multidimensional st

analysis both of target nations and terrorist groups and of the IC itself to us

basis for reorienting current thinking and current organizational dynamics t

produce better intelligence—especially strategic warning; (2) The Case Stu

detail several implementations of that plan to demonstrate how the new

methodology can provide better intelligence, not only to understand the adv

capabilities but intent as well.

If you think systematically and logically, read on directly... But if 

thinking “Show me,” please read the case studies first, and if you feel you k

more about WMD programs and how to deal with them than you have befo

come back and read about how that was done.
77

Information-Age Thinking

The methodology to model organizational decisionmaking canno

Newtonian world and must be built on quantum assumptions. Accord

I begin to describe the methodology, let me briefly reiterate my cha

Industrial-Age assumptions I am discarding to the Information-Age 

I will use.

From

Bigger Faster Technology — The key player on the battlefield is 

his finger on the ICBM launch button. IMINT and MASINT are 

Industrial-Age targeting

To

Smarter Thinking — The key player on the battlefield is the guy 

with the binoculars, GPS, and laser-pointer. HUMINT is the key to 

Age targeting. History Matters.

From

Fighting against Technologies — Shoot them all, and you’ll get 

want.

To

Out-Thinking Decisionmakers — Only shoot the ones who hav

shoot you.

From

I can project the future from today’s function. Instantaneous data 

taneous decisions.

To

I can project the future only by knowing the past. History Matters

From

Targeting Objects — It is “Us” versus “Them,” and the World is 

analysis, one size fits all. 
78

Targeting Individuals — It’s a multi-polar world where every nation

tion, and individual has distinct goals and decisionmaking processe

those goals. For analysis, it all depends; context is critical. 

From

Assessment of capabilities built on understanding and identifying 

weapons and the facilities that make them.

To 

Assessment of intent built on understanding people and the orga

nations, and cultures they build—for it is people who build WMD.

From

Intelligence that is reactive built on current intelligence and tactical 

To 

Intelligence that is proactive built on strategic warning. 

And finally

True strategic warning needs to plan ahead not only into the nex

Cycle but the Decision Cycle beyond that!
79

To transcend Newtonian models of the world, we need to begin 

models for the world that encompass not only the physical world b

tive organizational world as well.

The Intelligence Cycle — Now31

Current thinking in the IC is linear—both in modeling the adversa

model by which the IC collects, collates, analyzes, and presents fin

gence to the customer. As indicated by Robert Clark,32 we need to 

thinking to account for the non-linear network aspects of the entire 

includes three parts: modeling the target or adversary, modeling o

modeling how we model. Any new methodology for the Informati

31 Robert M. Clark, Model-Based Predictive Techniques, Lecture at the N

Agency, 2001. 32 Clark.

Customers In

Target

Needs,

New Information

Actionable Intelligence

Gaps,

Requirements

New Information

Intelligence – the Industrial-a
80

ent whole.

The Intelligence Cycle — Future33

Modeling the Target: How Do We Find Out the Adversar

Strategic Plan?

It is the history of warfare, and of warning, that the extraordin

buildup of military force or capability is often the single most 

tant and valid indication of intent.34

After 9/11, “extraordinary” is a single WMD or terrorist act. This c

single fermenter and crop duster or could be a single hijacked airliner

nately, the IC now must be able to understand and model both the capa

intent prior to a single “extraordinary” event...in essence to predict the “

nary” by only being able to know the “ordinary.”

The precept that intelligence properly deals only with, or shou

assess, capabilities derives, of course, from the requirements o

field commander. Confronted with military forces which may 

him or which he is preparing to attack, it is essential that the c

mander have the most accurate possible assessment of the capa

33 Clark.

34 Grabo, 22.

Your network:

Customers

Collectors

Processors

Analysts

The opposing netwo

People

Places

Things

Organizations

Network versus Network

Intelligence – a Model for the Informat
81

against what the enemy is capable of doing rather than attem

guess what he might do.35

The primary concern of the warfighter is the capabilities of the ad

is tactical intelligence.

The validity of this concept, however, does not mean that in

at the national and strategic level should be confined to the 

ment of capabilities. For the fact is that intelligence at all le

particularly that which is prepared for the guidance of policy 

is expected to deal with the question of intentions.36

The primary concern of the policymaker is the “question of inten

is the realm of strategic intelligence. 

When dealing with current intelligence, tactical intelligence, 

intelligence, the IC is currently the weakest in providing strategic 

But in the world of WMD and terrorism, that must become our str

gest the first step in that process is to mirror-image the adversar

aspect of modeling that we can exploit to turn a major weakness 

strength. As indicated above, strategic planning is very difficult fo

requires two Decision Cycles—a Logistics Cycle to reallocate reso

new programs and an Operational Cycle to implement that plan u

infrastructure.

I suggest that any strategic program, be it ours or that of a

requires two cycles to implement. A WMD program is a “program” 

any weapons of mass destruction actually exist. Every WMD prog

through a Logistics Cycle to build the weapons before it goes throu

tional Cycle to employ them. Surely to build a WMD program or t

terrorist network is strategic and requires first building an infrastruc

the WMD a nation might employ or the CBRNE (chemical, biologic

ical, nuclear or high-explosive) that terrorists might employ. 

LOGISTICS IS THE QUEEN OF BATTLES. The extent an

of logistics preparations for modern war are reflected in the n

logistics and transportation items carried on indicator lists, 

equal or exceed the number for any other topic. If we could 

35 Grabo, 17.

36 Grabo, 18.
82

time, we would not only have a very accurate grasp of the adve

capabilities, we would probably also have very precise insight i

intent.37

The key to providing strategic warning on an adversary nation’s W

gram or terrorist network’s CBRNE program is to understand not 

Operations Decision Cycle but the Logistics Decision Cycle that pr

The logistics of research, development, production, and testing of W

years, sometimes decades, and can be exploited to provide strategic 

Logistics for any terrorist operations are identical but smaller scale a

dent on a host nation.

Step 1 in building Warning Analysis for the Information Age is 

methodology to model the target that accounts for his strategic planni

need for a two-cycle planning process to build WMD or CBRNE.

Modeling How We Model—How Can We Provide Strategic A

to Build Our Own Strategic Plan?

Having a computer is like having a clerk who can add one plus 

subtract one from one, and open a drawer and tell you if there 

something in it. BUT he can do it VERY VERY fast.38

Once we have developed such a methodology, we need to develo

automate that method as much as possible. BUT, we need to remember 

puters are tools that only do exactly what we program them to do. 

understand how we think and build strategic intelligence before we can 

it. I contend that efforts to date to “solve the database problem” have be

in that they are concerned with how to get data into the databases, 

information out.

Step 2 in building Warning Analysis for the Information Age is to m

we think—build and test hypotheses—to provide strategic warning so th

then develop tools to help automate the process.

37 Grabo, 62.

38 Dr. William Tolles, U.S Naval Postgraduate School, personal communication, 19
83

to Empower the Warning Analyst to Think Strategic

“Network-centric warfare is not about technology. It is an e

theory of war,” said U.S. Navy Vice Adm. (ret.) Arthur K. C

director of the Pentagon’s force transformation office. “Pow

shifted to the network,” he said, and away from the Industri

view that power is derived from mass. Information, access t

how fast it is delivered now determines combat power... “Ne

warfare is not about the technology,” an industry expert reaf

“People would like to make it about technology, because it’s 

get their hands around it. This is about the network itself—d

organizations and cultures—things that make operations dif

about process—how to get people to share information, and 

change cultures.39

Once we have a methodology for strategic analysis and the comp

help automate it, we need to reorient our organizations to think coo

provide strategic warning. Much has been said about the shift to “net

fare” and how it can potentially revolutionize the way we fight. Th

another way of verbalizing what we saw above: that in times of mas

network is more effective than a hierarchy. But the current IC is bas

trial-Age hierarchical models for information flow and leadership.

In the Industrial Age, organizations developed to get things done 

using technology based on Newtonian models. The Newtonian parad

trated on the operations part of the Decision Cycle (Decide and Act)

rent national infrastructure can act efficiently and almost instantan

decisions are made.

In the Information Age, organizations must be developed to m

plans aided by information technologies, but based on new models. 

adigm must concentrate on the intelligence part of the Decisions Cy

and Orient), so that the future national infrastructure can think ef

cooperatively to provide the plans for making those decisions.

Step 3 in building Warning Analysis for the Information Age is to 

arrows” within the IC—both the information flow and leadership inte

39 William B. Scott and David Hughes, “Nascent Net-Centric War Gains Pentag

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 Jan 2003, 50, 53.
84

work as possible, when in the intelligence (Observe and Orient) p

national Decision Cycle, to provide strategic intelligence and strategic 
85

MODELING THE TARGET

How do we find out the adversary’s strategic plan? Step 1 in build

Analysis for the Information Age is to build a methodology to mod

that accounts for his strategic planning and his need for a two d

planning process to build WMD or CBRNE.

Modeling WMD Networks—The Problem

If the final objective of warning analysis is the understanding of wh

adversary is going to do, then the knowledge or recognition that he 

decided to do something is the ultimate achievement... What should 

highest priority in the analytic process—the attempt to decide what 

sary has decided—is often shunted aside in favor of mere factual re

what is going on, which is obviously much easier and less controve

[Multilayer Chart drawn by Michael Maskaleris]

Human networks are distinct from electronic ones. They are 

Internet. They are political and emotional connections amon

who must trust each other in order to function, like Colomb

cartels and Basque separatists and the Irish Republican Arm

mention high-seas pirates, smugglers of illegal immigrants, 

brokers of weapons of mass destruction.41

WMD programs are networks built on multiple kinds of interacti

and organizational relationships, technical processes and flows, t

and financial networks, and electronic connectivity networks. These 

are often plotted as networks on a chart. Multilayer network diagra

idly become unwieldy and incomprehensible because they contain in

multiple types which is plotted with no quantitative relationship

nodes and distance or sequencing information in the links.

Visualizing Networks—the Dimensionality and Complexity 

Visualization: The Problem of High Dimensionality

■ Humans can visualize very effectively in 2 dimensions; ca

patterns with difficulty in at most 5 or 6 dimensions

40 Grabo, 103.

41 Joel Garreau, “Disconnect the Dots,” Washington Post, 17 Sep 2001, C1.
86

Gaussian, and therefore not very interesting

Solution: find low-dimensional views or projections that a

Gaussian.

42

The world is 6-dimensional (6-D): 3 dimensions in space (x, y, z or 

and altitude), 1 dimension in time (t), and 2 dimensions in energy (ent

entropy or H, S). Current network models do very well in spatial rela

less well in temporal relationships, but very rarely consider energy 

ships. Additionally, complex systems are composed of boxes-in-boxe

tems-of-systems, so that networks are also hierarchical. This ad

problem of “drill-down,” where an individual node at one level of c

can be expanded to a network of its own by “looking inside” the node

ingly, a real-world network is really at least 18-dimensional, being 6-D 

els of complexity (strategic, theater, and tactical). To plot an entire ne

can, at best, hope to capture 2-D or 3-D “cross sections” that are m

and comprehensible and which are related in defined ways. 

Visualizing and Understanding N-Dimensional Network

2-D Computer Screens

I suggest a series of axioms that will allow systematic construction o

series of network plots that account for the planning required to org

build a WMD program or terrorist network. This formalization of dime

and complexity is designed to provide comprehensible ways to accou

interrelationships between the plots and to identify that a single even

dimensional. Most importantly, these plots capture the planning and or

required for the overall program—and by showing the relationships 

personalities they implicitly show doctrine.

All biological systems are defined by what they do, not what they 

includes military-political systems. The essence that defines them as 

42 Dean W. Abbott, Abbott Consulting, Data Mining: Level II, Class Handout, 2001

after as Abbott. Gaussian models are inherently Newtonian and suffer from all the li

Newtonian models described above.

Axiom: The key to understanding the operation of networks is 

“orienting the arrows” rather than “connecting the dots”
87

processes define the structures. By concentrating on the structures—

siles or buildings or CBW agents—and neglecting the processes they 

the intelligence community has lost a massive amount of very usefu

contained in the reporting.

Processes inherently have a direction and, therefore, need to b

arrows or vectors on a sequence chart (timeline) or as directed supe

nate relationships on an organization chart. Therefore, to understand 

zations can perform the processes required to build and employ WM

orient the arrows rather than connect the dots.

The laws of physics and chemistry indicate that the basic units of 

are space, time, and energy. Therefore, visualization tools must refl

The six units they represent (x, y, z, t, H, S) are independent varia

therefore orthogonal or perpendicular. Accordingly, each represents 

dent axis on any visualization plot.

■ Maps define spatial relationships of entities. A plot of x vs. 

or z vs. x is a map. In the IC we usually use Latitude (Lat), 

(Lon), and altitude, and for most purposes altitude can be 

For most IC purposes, one of the “cross-sections” of the 

sional (n-D) network will be a map with x and y axes of Lat 

■ Timelines define temporal relationships or sequential eve

interactions of entities. A plot of “something” vs. t is a timel

actual time units may not be important for analysis in some 

time sequence of events is always important. For most IC 

the second “cross-section” of the n-D network will be a tim

“something” on the vertical axis and time sequence—or 

events—plotted conventionally left to right.

■ Organization charts define energy relationships among en

energy organization of ideal gases is conventionally visua

Maxwell-Boltzmann plot (see tonebox) which relates ent

entropy. For biological and social organizations enthal

sponds to power and entropy corresponds to “degree of 

(see tonebox). For most IC purposes, the third required “

tion” of the n-D network will be an organization chart wit

Axiom: Plotting space, time, and energy requires maps, time

and organization charts.
88

Defining Energy Relationships for Military-Political Organizations

Energy Plots for Chemists. Chemists define energy in terms of enthalpy and entropy. Enthalp

measure of bonds holding atoms together or of kinetic energy of moving molecules; entropy is 

measure of the “disorder” of the system. For the simplest possible chemical system – the ideal 

one can visualize the energy distribution of its molecules using the Maxwell-Boltzmann (M-B) 

As shown, this plots the energy of any one molecule on the x axis versus the number of molecu

having that energy on the y axis. Similar to the more recognizable “normal distribution” seen f

visualization of grade distribution on a test, the M-B p lot shows that there are a few gas molecu

very low energy or with very high energy and many with intermediate energies. Additionally, 

define “activatio n energy” as an energy required for a molecule to undergo a chemical reaction

this plot only those molecules that are to the right of the “activ ation energy” line have enough e

to react.

Energy of a Given Molecule 

Number of Molecules with a 

Given Energy 

Enthalpy 

Entropy 

Activation 

Energy 

Maxwell-Boltzmann Plot 

Number if Persons with a Given Status 

Degree of Assembly ( Entropy ) 

Decision 

Energy 

Organization Chart 

By convention 

rotate 90o. 

Energy Plots for Analysts. An organization chart is conceptually the same as a Maxwell-Boltz

(M-B) plot – although by conventio n is rotated counter-clockwise ninety degrees from the M-B 

In this case the vertical axis measures the relativ e power of a given person – much like the rela

energy of a given molecule on the M-B plot. The horizontal axis represents “degree of assemb

terms of the number of individuals (persons or organizational units) of an equivalent status or r

There are implicit quantitative characteristics in an organization chart that can be defined expli

analogy with the chemical M-B plot:

- A “decision energy” (that corresponds to the chemist’s activation energy) is defined 

vertical/power axis such that individuals above the line have the ability to make decisions that 

belo w do not. For example, the person at the top can make decisio ns for the entire organization

mid-level persons can make decisions for only their in dividual units. In chemistry, enthalpy is 

measure of the ability of an individual to make or break chemical bonds; in analysis, power is a

measure of the ability of an individual to make decisions and have them carried out.

- The number of individuals at any given level on the vertical/power axis represents th

complexity of the organization and the difficulty in assembling and maintaining the organizatio

structure. For example, an organization with only two mid-level managers will be able to perfo

fewer different kinds of tasks than one with ten mid-level managers but will have an easier tim

coordinating those tasks. In chemistry, entropy is a measure of the number of possible ways a 

can be arranged; in analysis, entropy or “degree of assembly” is a measure of th e number of po

interactions required to perform a task.
89

horizontally.

Neglecting the third spatial dimension (altitude), 6-D networks can 

at a single level of complexity with a single set of three plots: a map, a 

and an organization chart.

Biological systems are defined by what they do rather than what th

introduced above biology texts define “life” as the ability to: (1) extrac

energy from the environment; (2) sense and respond to the environ

reproduce; and (4) evolve. Col John Boyd defined military units by a 

cycle,” or “OODA Cycle,” where they: Observe, Orient, Decide, an

defines the military unit by what it does, which is totally consistent wi

cess definition of life. Also, note that each of the abilities in the biologi

tion of life is individually an OODA cycle. Thus a basic visualizati

biological or military-political system is a timeline.

In each of these nested OODA Cycles there is a plan—a systemati

steps from conception (of what needs to be done) through maturity (o

getting it done).

One can capture the decisionmaking of a biological organism or mili

ical organization by a timeline that captures the nested Decision Cycles 

ception to maturity.

The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that the entropy of the u

always increasing; that is, the world as a whole is always disassembling 

apart. For example, if one takes a glass full of water and drops it on t

Axiom: Biological and military-political systems can be modeled 

series of nested Decision Cycles (OODA Cycles)

OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT

OODA OODA OODA OODA

Conception

Axiom: The steps from planning to completion of a task can b

visualized on a timeline with “degree of assembly” plotted agai

the time sequence of the steps in assembly.
90

where. But it is highly unlikely that those pieces would, on their own

and fly back into your hand. Thus, if one plotted the “degree of assemb

world versus time, one would see an increasing number of possible state

timeline. Biological systems appear to “beat” the Second Law by extr

using energy and matter from the environment to build new compone

tems. Similarly, WMD programs collect energy and materials to asse

use those weapons. Therefore, one can visualize a WMD program by tr

assembly of the weapon. 

In the Program Timeline:

■ Time in terms of sequence of steps is plotted left to right.

■ Each step in the program is plotted as a component process in the ov

Note that each step is implicitly an OODA cycle.

■ The vertical axis is “degree of assembly” where the objects at each 

represent the number of objects being manipulated in that part of the 

Note that many different research projects are often required for a 

opment projects in one overall program and that “degree of 

increases to the right.

■ Each program step can be subdivided into its own component progra

■ The program timeline follows the program from conception to ma

includes the planning and Research and Development (R&D) phase

This means that the object of the program may not exist for most o

gram; for example, in a SCUD missile program, a SCUD missile doe

until the “missile assembly” step.

Conception M

Warhead

Research

Warhead

Development

Warhead

Production

Engine

Research

Engine

Development

Engine

Production

MISSILE PROG

Missile

Testing

Missile

Employm

Missile

Assembly

Axiom: In a Program Timeline each program step can be 

expanded to include the input materials, energy, and personne

required for its completion.
91

them to build new components or systems. Tracking the inputs into 

step on the Program Timeline is important because:

■ The status of the entire process as well as the characteris

process can often be deduced through knowledge of the i

example, much can be known about a missile warhead f

knowing: how much electrical power it consumes, whether 

nium or plutonium is among the raw materials, the qualifica

engineers, or the types of equipment ordered and when 

ordered.

■ Knowing the location of the process allows linking the Tim

the Map.

■ Knowing the personnel and their organizations allows li

Timeline with the Organization Chart.

All non-routine or unusual actions emanating from the natio

result from some kind of decisions. They don’t just happen. 

true of both military and political actions. When something 

occurs, particularly something that increases the adversary’

ity to take military action or is otherwise potentially ominou

Warhead

Production Warhead

design

C

W

Warhead

Development

Warhead

Factory

Utilities (water, electrical power)

Raw materials

Personnel (Engineers, production workers)

Equipment

Axiom: Each visualization plot requires a “drill-down” capab

reflect the hierarchical nature of biological and military-pol

organizations.
92

adversarys plans? What prompted him to do this? What kind 

sion has been taken which would account for this action?43

Biological systems require an infrastructure to accomplish the Decis

required to extract energy from the environment, sense and respond to 

ronment, reproduce, and evolve. Military-political systems have 

requirements since they are biological systems. The nested nature of th

Cycles that describe such systems will also be reflected in hierarchi

maps, timelines, and organization charts needed to describe them. For 

the timeline for warhead production above could be further subdivided 

how the design, utilities, equipment, and raw materials come together 

warhead. Similarly, the Organization Chart for the production factory 

inside an organization chart for the military-industrial complex and cou

divided into departments and divisions and even individual leaders, en

workers.

Another simplistic approach to the decisionmaking question, w

also occurs surprisingly frequently, is to assume that political a

itary decisions are taken by different groups and are somehow 

related to each other... This is highly erroneous, at least in cou

where the national leadership exerts effective command and co

over the military forces, and it is particularly erroneous where 

political leadership maintains a monopoly on the decisionmaki

cess and the military undertakes virtually nothing on its own.4

43 Grabo, 104-105

44 Grabo, 107.

Axiom: Program Timelines and Organization Charts represen

orthogonal visualizations.
93

Program timelines indicate a “degree of assembly” of the weapo

program while organization charts indicate a “degree of assembly” o

organizations. These are directly related in that organizations are 

accomplish specific goals. For example, for a missile program the tw

lay as shown above.

The Program Timeline and Organization Chart are related in that:

■ The individual steps in the Program Timeline require a spec

organization to plan and accomplish them.

■ The individual organizations on the Organization Chart are 

to reflect the planning and coordination necessary to accom

specific tasks.

■ Overall coordination of any program requires coordinati

organizations needed to accomplish its goals; therefore, an

will require a person who is the overall leader/coordinator fo

O

Command

Authority

Basic

Research

Organization

Military

Research

Organization

Military

Missile

Corps

Military

Production

Organization

Civilian

Sector

Agencies

MilitaryIndustri al

Complex

Military

Decision Energy

for Missile Progra

Degree of

Weapon

Assembly

Conception 

Warhead

Research

Warhead

Development

Warhead

Production

Engine

Research

Engine

Development

Engine

Production

Missile

Testing

Mi

Empl

Missile

Assembly
94

required for the task.

In analysis of any program, the Program Timeline and Organization 

vide complementary (orthogonal) visualizations:

■ The Organization Chart indicates the personal and organiz

interactions required for planning and executing the program.

■ The Program Timeline indicates the actual sequence of ev

accomplishment of the program.

Additionally, there are two general guidelines that will assist t

lyst in perceiving the enemy’s most likely course of action thro

fog of deception:

Separate the wheat from the chaff. Weed out from the mass of 

ing material all information of doubtful reliability or origin an

assemble that information which is either known to be true (th

“facts”) or which has come from reliable sources which have n

sonal axes to grind or reasons to deceive...

Keep your eyes on the hardware. In the end, the adversary mus

launch operations with his military forces and what they do wi

the ultimate determinant of his intent.45

The objects and processes required for the operation of a network ex

D world. Biological systems and organizations are different from phy

tems in that they control energy for tasks and programs that require both 

and coordination to accomplish, and a network of interacting parts is re

this. Thus, visualization of biological and military-political networks 

concerted effort to capture this.

Enthalpy is a measure of the power stored in chemical bonds. Thus

requires marshaling energy, and WMD programs are basically building 

Therefore:

■ Timelines must reflect the “building” that goes on in the program by

❏ Identifying the energy and materials required to build the com

each step of the program.

45 Grabo, 131.

Axiom: Organization Charts, Program Timelines, and National M

must be used in an integrated manner to track the organization 

operation of networks.
95

(This is customarily done using maps.)

■ Organization charts must reflect how an organization accomplish

by:

❏ Identifying and tracking the person with the “decision energy

coordinate each step in the process.

❏ Remembering that organizations work from a plan. The o

infrastructure and the timeline will be consistent with that pl

Entropy is a measure of “degree of assembly.” Biological system

defy the Second Law of Thermodynamics in that they organize a

rather than disorganize and disassemble. Therefore:

■ Timelines must reflect assembly over time as the program mature

■ Organization Charts must reflect the assembly of people into th

teams required for the assembly steps in the program

Complex systems are hierarchical in that they can be described 

nested boxes-in-boxes or systems-of-systems. Every system can be 

an individual with system parameters to describe its behavior or as 

posed of smaller systems operating cooperatively. 

Axiom: Analysis must integrate top-down and bottom-up mod
96

Emergent Properties—Characteristics of Individuals not Un

When viewed as a unit, the system is united but unitary; that is, it 

described as e pluribus unum, “one made of many.”

When viewed as an individual, the system is indivisible; it can

broken down into smaller pieces without losing it identity. The con

“half-a-fruit-fly” or “half-a-carbon-atom” or “half a missile as

plant” is meaningless.

Emergent properties are those which apply to the system as an i

ual. Smaller systems comprise the unit, but it is only when they a

unitary and can be treated as an individual that a new emergent p

can be defined. For example, the property of life “emerges” at the 

level; even though the cell is composed of a defined structure of mac

ecules, DNA and proteins cannot be described as alive, only a ce

Similarly, evolution “emerges” at the species level; even though spe

composed of populations of individual organisms, organisms indiv

cannot evolve, only species can. Accordingly, there are characterist

“baseball team,” or a “Marine Corps company,” or a “missile as

plant” that can apply only as long as the unit can continue to functio

individual entity.

Thus when describing a system, an emergent property can o

applied at a given level of complexity thus requiring that the sys

described as an individual. Theoretically, one could also describe t

tem as a unit and by applying an appropriate non-linear model descr

cooperative interactions of the smaller individuals that provide 

emergent property. In practice it is usually only feasible to model t

tem as a unit (an integrated system comprising individuals) to und

why the property emerges, then measure that property by describ

system as an individual. For example, one could model a warship 

the individual components—turbines, pumps, compressors—and ca

its top speed, turning radius, and other tactical characteristics. But i

tice, it is much more straightforward to take the approach of Jane’s 

ing Ships and tabulate the top speed and tactical characteristics and 

table to describe the ships as individuals.
97

■ Bottom-up models describe systems as units composed of smal

systems. One catalogs all the different kinds of subsystem

describes their interactions, then uses the characteristics of thos

actions to describe the behavior of the system.

■ Top-down models describe systems as individuals that are indi

One measures the behavior of the system as a whole in multiple 

iments, then tabulates the properties that describe the system. O

system function is described it can be subdivided into compon

tems performing component processes.

Bottom-Up Models

See networks as objects connected by

lines.

“Connect the dots.’’

The process of model-building begins

with two objects that interact.

One builds a bottom-up model by adding new objects that interact with those

objects.

One continues to assemble objects

until the unit is complete (and implicitly is functional). 

Top-Down Models

See networks as arrows conn

objects.

Orient the arrows.”

The process of model-buildin

with a single object that reacts 

put process to perform an outpu

One builds a top-down mode

rowing within the object to bre

the initial process into smaller p

One continues to subdivi

cesses until the process ca

subdivided further or the ob

indivisible.
98

tion is done on given types of objects but also because the way we reas

English syntax is also inherently Bottom-Up.

Most models are Bottom-Up models where we observe the individu

that must be assembled to form a unit. There are only a few models we 

that are Top-Down models.

For example:

Bottom-Up Models

Nouns separated by verbs.

A syntax where objects act on other

objects. 

THE FOX ATE

THE MOUSE DIED

Top-Down Models

Verbs separated by nouns.

A syntax of cause and eff

input process causes an 

process.

THE EATEN MOUSE DIED

Bottom-Up Models

X-ray crystallography.

Experimental data are used to model

structure.

Can demonstrate structure directly, but

can only infer function.

X-ray crystallography can show

directly what an enzyme’s active site

is, but not what is does.

Alpha-Helix

Top-Down Models

Michaelis-Menten Enzyme K

Experimental data are 

model function.

Can demonstrate function 

but can only infer structure.

Enzyme kinetics can show 

what an enzyme’s active site 

not what it is.

Km ES Complex Vmax

E + S ES E + 
99

gle type of experiment you can build only one kind of model. If you 

tom-Up experiment, you can determine structure and then use the c

of that structure to deduce what that structure does. If you design 

experiment, you can determine function and then use the character

function to deduce what the structure must be.

For Bottom-Up thinking—Structure determines Function.

For Top-Down thinking—Function determines Structure.

To fully characterize a system’s structure and function you mu

least two experiments—at least one bottom-up and one top-down.

For the intelligence process, there are advantages and disadvant

kind of model:

■ A top-down model provides a notional network. This is goo

lection planning but provides no hard intelligence by itself.

■ A bottom-up model provides a real-world network. This pro

intelligence but is consistent with haphazard collection plan

■ A top-down model tells you where to look and what to lo

cannot provide intelligence until you actually look.

■ A bottom-up model keeps track of what you’ve found but c

vide guidance on where to look next.

What is needed is an integrated approach that combines top-down 

up modeling. Using a top-down model of nested processes on a timel

organizations on an organization chart, one can begin to fill in the 

gence by function on the timeline or by association on the organi

This sorts the “puzzle pieces” by type. The pieces of hard intelligenc

assembled bottom-up in each category. This kind of integrated app

used to build real-world networks and is both good for collection 

for assembling hard intelligence into a coherent picture.

Multidimensional Analysis—Visualizing WMD Networ

Kathleen Carley, director of the Center for Computational A

Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon Univ

says: “One of the things that leads to the ability to adapt is w

who and who knows what. The higher that is, the better the 

flexibility. But you can reduce the number of times the grou

communicate or congregate.”46

46 Joel Garreau, “Disconnect the Dots,” Washington Post, 17 Sep 2001, C1, C2.
100

sional Analysis (MDA), combines top-down and bottom-up models 

sents those models in 6-D using maps, timelines, and organization ch

an approach has been applied to strategic analysis of the North Korean 

gram, Russian biotechnology program, and the Al Qaeda CBRNE 

Results of those analyses are presented as classified case studies, an

learned from those studies indicate the good prospects for a straig

application of Multidimensional Analysis to WMD and CBRNE progra

The lessons learned reiterate the non-Newtonian quantum assum

strategic modeling of biological and organizational systems: History m

people make decisions, so you need to follow the people to learn intent

The methodology is based on knowing where to look and what to l

detail based on top-down modeling and also knowing how to build a 6

by directed bottom-up assembly of the collected data. What do we 

Where do we look for it? How do we assemble it into a multidimension

Strategic Analysis of a WMD program—What Do We Loo

Multidimensional analysis assumes that a WMD program is built 

and that they interact within organizations as they gather and assembl

and equipment to build WMD. Therefore, we need to look for interactio

eral types of entities—people, places, things, and organizations—in sp

and energy (both power and organization). Therefore, whether we thin

up and connect the dots or top-down and orient the arrows, the model w

of nested entities and the processes they perform.

A simple way to relate the 6-D approach to more familiar modeling m

to think of the questions one asks when writing a complete story: Wh

When? Where? Why? and How? Maps tell us where the program is an

entities move to assemble the WMD. Timelines tell us what is needed 

ble the WMD and when those assembly steps occurred (or likely w

Organization charts tell us who is building the WMD and—through a

how they are organized—why they are doing things in a particular way

The Maps, Timelines, and Organization Charts we will draw for a 

CBRNE program show all the component entities and processes perf

those entities to assemble the WMD. Each plot is built of nodes 

between those nodes, but note that on Maps and Organization Charts 

are entities and the links are processes but on Timelines the nodes are 

and the links are entities. Once the data are plotted in those formats, we 

actionable intelligence by straightforward analysis of the individual plo
101

MAPS: Where? How?

Nodes = geographical entities — facilities and the position of tho

Links = transportation processes — transportation routes. Her

define the routes by the entities that do the transporting, e.g., truck

ships, and the terminal facilities for that transportation, e.g. facilit

ports. 

Maps identify interdiction points — Entity = facility to target; Li

interdict.

Transaction

Gen A calls his agent Mr. B .

Mr. B then releases fun ds to Mr. C .

Mr. C ships the warhead to Gen A .

$

City S

$

Port Q

City R Por t X

Target

$

Target

Port Q

Warehouse

Company Y

Strategic

Country

Tactical

H

M WhereAP
102

TIMELINES: What? When? 

Nodes = critical processes in WMD fabrication — research, develop

duction, testing, and employment of both the payload and the delivery 

Links = component entities in WMD fabrication — research provi

cols for development, development provides blueprints for productio

tion provides the payload or delivery device to the assembly plan

assembly plant provides the completed munitions to the forces in the fi

Timelines identify progress toward fielding a WMD system. If we 

most complete component produced to date, we can estimate progre

weaponization. By identifying the total number of additional process

weaponization, we can estimate the time needed to field a WMD.

Transaction

Gen A calls his agent Mr. B .

Mr. B then releases fun ds to M

Mr. C ships the warhead to G

$

Facilities

Engine

R&D

Missile

Assembly

Missile

St orage

Engine

Production

Engine

Blueprint

Port Q T arget Nation

Warhead

R&D

Warhead

Production

Warhead

Blueprint

Warhead Port X

Personnel $

Rocket

Engine

Equipment

& Supplies

Wh

TIMELINE What?
103

ORGANIZATION CHARTS: Who? Why?

Nodes = critical organizations in WMD program

Links = tasking or funding or information exchange 

Organization Charts identify interrelationships of the organizations 

ple in the program. The node that is highest in organization is the one 

The node with most links is critical for procurement, funding, or opera

The key to multidimensional analysis is in building both bottom-up 

models and top-down process models for all the entities. A photograp

or CAT scan of a person is a structural model and tells you who or wh

son is. However, a résumé, which is a process model of the same perso

more valuable in assessing a person’s plans and intentions because i

what a person can do. 

The core of multidimensional analysis is to combine the conventio

tural models with process models, résumés if you wish. For a person t

obviously be a résumé (or a scientific résumé—a curriculum vitae or C

organization that would be an organizational history. For a place or thin

a facility or factory, or nuclear warhead or missile, that would be a proje

 TARGET NATION

Army

MGEN X

Atomic Energy

Commission

COL Q

Mr. A

Mr. B

Mr. C

Tank Corp s

GEN D

Missile Corps

GEN A

Infantry Corps

GEN B Relative

Importance

W

Who? ORGANIZATION CHART

Transaction

Gen A calls his agent Mr. B 

Mr. B then releases funds to 

Mr. C ships the warhead to 

$
104

weapon itself actually exists and that the project history begins with 

to begin research on the feasibility of building the weapon.

Building a Curriculum Vitae or Technical Résu

With the goal of building as complete a résumé as possible on the 

nel within the WMD program, we can exploit many kinds of sou

Examples here are directed toward analysis of a state-run BW progr

similar reasoning can be applied to state-run chemical weapons, nuc

sile programs.

■ Department Rosters — These can sometimes indicate links 

programs.

■ Company Brochures — These may also indicate links to mi

■ Résumés — Sometimes these can be obtained directly.

■ Curricula Vitae (CVs) — Academic scientist résumés are of

online.

■ Business cards (can provide addresses, phone numbers, E-m

■ Catalogs

■ Publications

FOLLOW THE PEOPLE... They will lead you to the projects.

 Smart people are needed to build WMD.

 Informal networks (Party, family, teachers) can be more imp

traditional chain-of-command.

 S cientists and Engineers are specialists. A WMD program re

appropriate mix of expertise.

 S cientists gain prestige by publications and presentations.

Parsing a Scientific Publication

Varshavsky, A. J., Nedospasov, S. A., Bakayev, V. V., Bakayeva, T. G., and Georgiev, G. P. * Histone-like proteins in the purified Escherichia coli deoxyribonucleoprotein, Nucleic Acids Res, 4, 272

FIRST Author OTHER Author LAST Author

FIRST Author = Did most of the experimental work .

OTHER Author = Did supporting work or provided technology expertise.

* = CORRESPONDING author = “Expert” on the project.

In order of importance

IF the lab head did most 

work, then he/she b ecom

first auth or, and last aut

lowest importance.

CORRESPONDING autho

usually the lab head.

MOST important

LEAST important

SECOND Author

LAST Author = The lab head and/or person with the funding.

A biologist’s personal contribution to a project can usually be determined by his/her place in the list 

authors on a scientific publication.
105

pieced together by anal

publications, conferenc

tions and interviews of s

their career. Scientists c

cious when collaborati

CW or nuclear dual-use 

or when linked to militar

■Construct CVs by “Me

■Expertise — What 

know? 

■Links — Where did the

■Who do they know?

■Publication record

■ Did they disappear from the literature? 

■ What did they publish when they re-emerged?

A prolonged lack of publications (especially when later publicati

of-the-art) can indicate that a scientist has worked on classified proje

g

(slang term used by US biologists). to

reconstruct a curriculum vitae or

résumé for a biologist using the

online PubMed web site from the

National Institute of Health (NIH).

The entire career of a biologist can

often be reconstructed by tracing all

his or her publications online on

Pubmed and following: projects

worked on, institutional affiliations

including years of first and last pubs

at an institution, and coauthors.

Tracking a Biologist’s Career by Publications

Biologists’ careers can be tracked by their publication records. 

- A PhD student will usually publish for 3 to 8 years with his/her mentor or adv

author.

- A Postdoctoral Fellow will also usually include his/her advisor as senior (las

- A Bench Scientist will usually have FIRST/SECOND author publications w

LAST for PhD and Postdoc then move to primarily LAST author papers when e

his/her own lab.

- A “Gene Jockey” (Biotechnologist) will usually have FIRST/SECOND auth

tions with advisor LAST for PhD and Postdoc. Afterwards he/she will have ma

author publications with many different LAST (senior) authors indicating that he

viding biotechnology expertise on many different projects.

- A Biologist with many OTHER author publications with the same LAS

author is usually a bench scientist working as a senior research scientist in the 

senior biologist. 

- A talented biologist will have FIRST or SECOND author publications when 

dent and Postdoc. Scientists with mostly OTHER publications either don’t las

doing bench work for someone else throughout their careers.
106

Any WMD program depends on R&D and production facilities, bo

BW, CW, or nuclear payload and the delivery system. One can track th

that occurs inside a technical facility by following the inputs and outp

facility. Again a BW facility will be profiled as an example.

Facilities associated with BW or involved in dual-use biological R&

identified by the biologists they employ and the biotechnology equip

acquire. Biotechnology projects usually require three different kinds of 

expertise: classical biologists who are experts on the microorganism, b

ogists who are bioengineering experts, and production specialists who a

on growing large-scale amounts of microorganisms. The biotechnology 

and biotech equipment can be significant when linked to projects on m

isms that can be used as BW agents or bioengineered into BW agents

the “Babool Microbiology Institute in Karjakistan” can refer to either 

zation or facility—or both—dependent on the context.

Biotechnology equipment used in BW or dual-use projects includes:

■ Genetic Engineering R&D

■ DNA Synthesizers 

■ PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction) 

Thermal Cyclers 

Taq (Thermus Aquaticus) DNA Polymerase

■ Large-Scale Production/Processing Of Microorganisms 

■ Fermenters

■ Bioreactors

■ Freeze-Dryers

Assessing whether a facility or institution is dual-use or actually inv

BW program can be problematic. There are clues to determine if a 

merely biomedical or biological R&D or dual-use or BW-associated:

■ DUAL-USE FACILITIES

Declared under Biological Warfare Convention (BWC)

Brochures, catalogs, products can point to dual-use projects

Biohazard Containment for infectious microorganisms 

BL-4 (maximum containment) or BL-3 facilities

Special air handling systems 

■ BW FACILITIES are usually associated with the military

Special security measures, bunkers, underground sites

Military chain of command, telephone books
107

Strategic Analysis of a WMD Program: Where Do We Loo

Multidimensional Analysis is aimed at integrating top-down mod

programs to provide the framework for the kinds of data that need to 

and bottom-up models that take reporting and build assessments. 

The top-down model provides a convenient tool for sorting data 

for more related data. For example, if a report indicates that the “Bab

ology Institute of Karjakistan” is involved in BW research, the anal

to ask a series of questions:

■ Who works at the Institute? Who do Institute workers vis

to? Which agency runs the Institute? Which agency is 

agency subordinate to? 

■ What projects are going on at the Institute? What equipmen

plies do they order? What kinds of technical resources an

tainment are required to support those projects? 

■ Where is the Institute located? Where are the component str

the facility? Where do the supplies and equipment come fro

■ When was the Institute formed? When was the facility bui

were people hired? When were the projects started?

■ Why? (The toughest question...which will be addressed late

■ How are supplies brought into the facility? How are prod

from the facility?

Agent S&T

Concept

Agent

R&D

Agent

Production Bio

Ag

Pathogen

or

Virulence/ Toxin

Gene + Nonpathogen

Classical

Bio-Production

Specialist

Expert on fermentation or

large-scale reactions

Pub

g gy g

A Top-Down Process Model

Biotechnology

Equipment

Biotechnology

Supplies

A Facility involved in a BW or dual-use biomedical program can be characterized by pr

scientists, and equipment and supplies.

Classical Biologist

Microbiologist, Virologist,

Epidemiologist

Biotechnology

Expert

“Gene Jockey”
108

the same kinds. If we find out that Dr. Boris Borisovich works for the M

ogy Institute, we can proceed as above, asking the same kinds of quest

him as an individual. The same applies if we find out that the Microbio

tute is housed in two buildings, one in downtown Babool and one insid

area in the nearby army base or if we learn that the Microbiology Instit

ordinate to the Karjakistan Ministry of Health. We aim to collect data to 

resumes for all key persons, histories for all nested organizations, de

and histories of all related facilities (places), and histories of all project

Multidimensional Analysis is built on the assumptions that conte

important for navigating. If I can build a detailed “maps” in 6-D, an

entity on those maps, I can deduce where it came from and where 

History matters.

By applying Multidimensional Analysis (MDA) methods to severa

(see Case Studies), in the author’s experience there were several unexp

sons learned about how the different intelligence collection methods—

support MDA and how MDA can in turn support the individual INTs in 

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting is by far the most impo

source for MDA. All the questions of who, what, when, where, why, an

be asked to any HUMINT source, but we have found that many of th

data bits have already been collected but remain in the databases bec

were either not valued or considered “too hard” to search for and use. In 

the kinds of questions asked through MDA also tend to mitigate the m

lem in WMD analysis of finding technically competent sources. 

For example, a janitor from the Babool Microbiology Institute has 

By previous standards he would be discounted as a source because the 

cal BW-related questions such as “What kinds of microorganisms do th

would obviously be well beyond his expertise. But for MDA there are m

tions for which he could provide very valuable and reliable answers. W

Director of the Institute? Who is your superior, and who does he work 

any Party dignitaries or military officers visited the Institute? Who 

meet? Which labs did they visit? Whose name is on the door to th

When you collect trash, are there any rooms off-limits for collection

any special handling you do of any trash or is any put in special kinds 

bags or sealed containers? Are there any animal or plant facilities that 

cleaned? By thinking of building WMD as a process mediated by p

organizations, a multitude of questions can be asked that a janitor—or a

kind of source—can answer.
109

MDA also provides an excellent reliability check; both on the dat

sources. In the example plots in the Figures above, General A order

through his intermediary Mr. B. That transaction could be validated 

ety of sources:

■ Phone intercepts could provide names and items of discussio

■ Recovery of phone numbers from either General A’s or Mr. B

book could indicate a link.

■ Information from a variety of sources that General A was th

of the Missile Corp and Mr. B. was associated with the Atom

Commission would provide additional context.

■ The location of both their offices as well as the area cod

phones would cross-correlate to provide information on the

zations and facilities.

■ Another phone conversation between Mr. B. and Mr. C w

been followed by an invoice sent or faxed, a transfer of 

receipt for the money, a receipt for the delivered item, an

round on interactions confirming completion of the order. In

any one of those, in the appropriate time frame, would valid

the other data.

Note that the reporting at this level soon begins to cross-validate 

ability. If the janitor in General A’s building came forward, one 

pieces of the story against his recollections of what office the Gener

during what time period and if he was even in the country at the appr

In short, MDA aims to collect data at multiple levels of granularit

ultimately cross-validate and also, as a spin-off, usually can encount

that any source with access—with any kind of expertise—can pro

For an MDA analyst, having access to the supply clerk (like Rada

the MASH TV show) may as valuable as having access to the Gener

MDA also can overcome the usual reaction that it’s “too hard” to t

ual people. A report on a North Korean microbiologist named Kim C

at first glance, impossible to track any further since querying for “K

Chong” or “Dr. Kim” in a database will return thousands of hits—mo

ous. This is compounded by the translation problem in that his nam

be reported as “Kim Jong-Ho” or even “Kim Jong-O.” In MDA

would likely note that name when first encountered, and wait for an

make tracking easier. For example, if Dr. Kim was linked to th

Anthrax Institute,” all the reporting available on that institute could 
110

re-searching databases for the correct person becomes easier, even tho

means having to read through irrelevant articles to separate “Dr. Kim C

the microbiologist from the Yang-Ho Anthrax Institute” from “Dr. Kim 

the Army Colonel from the Yang-Ho Army Base.” The same reasonin

separating or correlating institutions that have multiple possible nam

tions such as the “Microbiology Institute” vs “Germ Research Center” v

biological Research Academy.”

HUMINT-directed HUMINT targeting is aided by using MDA b

top-down approach provides a framework for asking relevant que

knowing not only where a source is from but also when he was there a

was in the organizational structure, questions can be worded to confir

already known about his location in the 6-D model for the program with 

is associated. For example, if a source came from the “Yang-Ho Anth

tute,” he could then be asked very specific questions about “Dr. Kim C

Furthermore, by having arrows already oriented with nothing on the 

specific new questions can be formed to probe for his links in space, 

organization.

All leaders need some popular support for their program, particular

programs that ultimately lead to war. History shows that most leade

even those bent on a course of aggression, rarely have made much 

to conceal their intentions, and some leaders (for example, Hitler in 

Kampf) have provided us with virtual blueprints of what they plann

accomplish.47

Open-source Intelligence (OSINT) reporting is, surprisingly, t

most valuable INT in support of MDA. The interdisciplinary nature 

means that it requires a massive amount of context directly or indirectly 

the target program. OSINT can provide much related background data 

text when building the 6-D model.

47 Grabo, 84.
111

directly from the

intelligence

“bathtub curve”

which states that

the amount of

available intelligence is large

very early in the

development of a

weapon and

almost as large

once it is employed, but that during the development stages done in classifie

intelligence collection virtually dries up. For example, if an 

officer attended the 5th International Congress of Theoretical 

Washington, DC in 1938, he could have had the opportunity to i

virtually every atomic scientist worldwide—from the U.S.’s Enric

Albert Einstein to Germany’s Werner Heisenberg—and could 

them anything imaginable about nuclear fission. Of course, the

peared into classified atomic bomb programs shortly thereafter 

intelligence would become available until the bomb was 

Hiroshima.

As in this legendary case, the early stages of any WMD program 

collect against and even at the “bottom of the bathtub” the key perso

to live their lives. Thus, if an analyst can identify the key players in 

gram, much intelligence can be gleaned by following the open-so

the most prominent leadership likely associated with the program

eclipse phase, a lack of specific data—if it is taken in a proper con

just as valuable as positive data. Also, if a name is reported in the e

much valuable context can be gleaned by checking the historica

example, a report in 1942 that Werner Heisenberg was in charge of 

program could become much clearer by reading his presentation 

physics conference.

Building WMD requires a specific mix of personnel: strategic s

ship to oversee the program; technical personnel to research, develo

the CW, BW, or nuclear payload; and technically competent logistics 

provide the infrastructure, order all the equipment and supplies, and p

Research Development Production Em

Open-source

Information

The Intelligence

“Bathtub Curve”
112

research scientists. In a small nation, there are few competent micro

chemists, or nuclear physicists so that those that are available are eit

dual lives; that is, working in both academic and classified programs, o

ing a track in the open literature during their training and then subsequ

appearing from open sources. Even then, they may be absent from pro

open or “gray” literature but remain visible in their new role perform

able service”—of an unspecified kind—to the nation. Similarly, senior 

is always seen in open sources, especially in Communist or totalitari

where the “privileged” leaders are fodder for all the propaganda journa

Propaganda is a very useful barometer of how concerned the c

try’s leadership is about certain issues... Most propaganda is “t

Here we are using “truth” in a relative, not absolute sense. We 

that states cannot continually distort their objectives and polici

particularly not to their own people. To put out totally false stat

or misleading guidance is self-defeating and will not evoke the 

desired response.48

Used creatively, there are many ways that OSINT can provide meani

text to model a WMD program using MDA.

■ Coauthorship on scientific publications or presentations can be 

link scientists. Informal scientific collaborations are very impo

publication by Dr. Borisovich with a Russian coauthor or an ac

edgement in the paper for the Russian scientist sending a DNA 

is useful in defining not only who he knows but also what th

know. For tracking biologists, the Pubmed online database 

valuable because it archives titles, authors, and usually abstrac

virtually every reputable biomedical journal—including many 

sian and Chinese—from the 1960s to the present.

■ Visits to meetings and conferences can be used to deduce 

information and sometimes more if a U.S. scientist has talked w

foreign scientist at the meeting. 

■ Visits to foreign countries often show up in the open literatur

visited nations. For example, a visit by Karjakistan’s Dr. Boriso

learn bioengineering in Italy, India, or other Western nation is l

show up on an Italian website with meeting abstracts or an 

website reporting research done at the Indian institute.

48 Grabo, 91.
113

relationships. For example, if the Premier of Karjakistan v

Microbiology Institute to present Dr. Borisovich a medal for 

service” to the nation, one would very likely see that rep

local journal listing all the Party dignitaries and important sc

attendance, often with a picture of all concerned lined up 

the building. Occasions to watch include: visits from impo

ers; ground breaking or openings of new facilities; funera

tions or trade shows; and party or holiday ceremonies. Atten

scientist at a Party or military ceremony can be very revealin

OSINT-directed HUMINT collection has the potential to be ver

the IC becomes more integrated. For example, analysis of biomed

technology open literature can:

■ Identify individuals suspect in biotechnology proliferation 

HUMINT targeting.

■ Identify potential HUMINT sources in the U.S. who were s

collaborators of suspect scientists who could provide impor

ground on those scientist’s expertise, travels, and other assoc

■ Provide unclassified evidence of proliferation links fo

demarches. Sometimes scientific publications or news re

indicate suspect links between nations, such as Russian 

working in Iran, which is consistent with classified intellig

the unclassified source could then be used to call the attent

foreign government to the potential proliferation issue witho

to divulge classified sources.

■ Provide quick screening of visa applications for suspect back

BW. “Medlining” a biologist can be done in less than a ha

most cases. Therefore, a quick check on open-source data c

indicate whether a foreign scientist is suspect and requires 

checking before granting a visa.

HUMINT- and OSINT-driven IMINT and Signals Intelligenc

collection is likely the most valuable byproduct of the MDA approa

the context required for building the multidimensional model ends up 

ting room floor” and never is included in finished intelligence. How

context can provide very valuable clues for all the INTs. For examp

limited for WMD collection—especially BW—by the dual-use nat

facilities. BW facilities are most often indistinguishable from other 

biomedical facilities, which are in turn virtually identical to schoo

houses. Therefore, a sketch drawn by a defector on how he walked 
114

train from his house to visit or work at a suspect facility or a propag

photo of dignitaries lined up in front of a suspect facility could allow a

analyst to find that facility. Similarly, as mentioned above, identific

General “Joe” A heads the Missile Corps in City S and Mr. “Bob” B wo

Atomic Energy Commission in City A through HUMINT and/or OSINT 

very valuable to a SIGINT analyst who intercepts conversations betw

and “Bob” about “special shipments” where the phones at each end are 

rect cities for the two offices.

Strategic Analysis of a WMD Program—How do we assembl

data into a multi-dimensional model?

The kinds and amount of data that can potentially be used in a m

sional analysis of a WMD program is enormous. At first glance it ap

enormous computing power plus new kinds of “data-mining” tools are 

because of the NIMD challenge, “How do we extract Novel Intellig

Surprisingly OSINT can provide valuable background and context for

understanding terrorist CBRNE programs. Valuable open sources on the Glob

on Terrorism (GWOT) include:

News stories from reporters in-country. With the high interest level on 

GWOT, many newspapers, wire services, and TV networks have sent reporter

to the action who have found unique data. Example – A Wall Street Journal re

recovered a computer in Kabul safehouse likely used by Al Qaeda’s Dr. Ayma

Zawahiri which contained documents on building a chemical and biological w

program.

Local press reports. With worldwide interest in the GWOT, press cov

regions in which the U.S. has few collection resources can help fill in the blan

Example – in trials in Malaysia and Indonesia, including the recent one for the

suspect Bali bombers, the suspects have testified about links between Jemaah

Islamiah (JI) and Al Qaeda, named the leaders involved, and identified person

trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Such news reports are posted on th

Lexis/Nexis database and often can be found online on the newspapers’ websi

Official Government statements or leaked official reports. When perso

detained for questioning in the GWOT, local officials usually will release info

on those detentions and sometimes other officials will talk off-the-record to lo

reporters. Again, these will appear in local press. Example – Pakistani governm

officials released statements on captured Al Qaeda members and on questionin

suspect Al Qaeda-linked nuclear scientists and physicians; Malaysian and Indo

police released reports on suspect JI terrorists.
115

erPoint as data-management tools, have indicated that MDA can su

NIMD challenges, massive quantities of data and too much dimensi

data, mainly due to the top-down approach.

The top-down modeling inherent in MDA is a way to tur

weaknesses of the NIMD challenge into strengths—mainly by t

Newtonian assumptions.

WMD or CBRNE programs are strategic programs and, as desc

require the nation or terrorist organization to formulate and impleme

projects ahead two OODA Cycles—a Logistics Cycle to build the 

an Operations Cycle to field and potentially employ them. In the Log

the order required to build organizations to assemble WMD or CB

that the plan must be implemented and remain valid for the years 

takes to go from conception of the plan to maturation of the infrastru

the WMD or CBRNE weapons, to the implementation of the plan an

the weapons using that new infrastructure. Therefore, the long-ran

required in any WMD program is its greatest vulnerability to intelli

sis. Hence the more “massive” the historical data set, the better.

Additionally, whi

lem of dual-use 

programs complic

ysis problem for W

conventional pro

dual-use nature 

grams means that 

more data are 

those programs th

expected. Much 

program may be 

plain sight” either 

dual-use really do

uses—that the m

is making both th

legitimate health 

as the BW agent—

of denial and d

either case, data 

even if it is hard 

BW Program Vulnerabilities to

Multidimensional Analysis

• Building biological weapons requires

planning that spans the entire

organizational infrastructure. Leadership

must coordinate people and organizations

that normally do not interact.

• Key personnel include: strategic

leadership, operational leadership,

technical support, and logistics support.

• Materials and supplies need to be

transported among facilities.

• Key persons in a BW program are

professionals and usually travel.

• BW technology is virtually all dual-use.

• Research phase of weapon life cycle is

open-source.
116

given more data.

On the other hand, the dimensionality of the data makes its interpreta

lematic. But if the methodology for building the 6-D hierarchical 

straightforward, no matter how tedious it is, it will with persistence pro

assessments.

Reconstructing a Proliferation Network

The first step in using MDA to develop a 6-D model for a WMD pro

construct a rough flow chart or timeline for the process to accou

required steps in assembling the weapon. For example, any nuclear 

program depends on the acquisition of fissionable materials, so any 

for a nuclear weapons program must include either uranium enrichme

tonium recycling from spent reactor fuel or alternative methods to bu

the purified elements.

Once the basic timeline is roughed out, a postulated organization

constructed to account for all the technical, logistics, and operatio

required to assemble the weapon. Again, the organization may d

research on WMD payloads or attempt to buy or steal components; 

chart must account for all possibilities. Any intelligence that is currently 

is then assessed and a very rough analysis is begun by ascribing indivi

toids” to a specific process on the timeline and/or the organization that 

sible for that process on the organization chart. The aim at this point is 

to link key personnel or key organizations with steps on the WMD tim

timeline will certainly have many gaps at this point. However, if only 

events on the timeline and the associated personnel and organizatio

identified, these few entities can be used as seeds to begin to build the 6

Once a few personnel and organizations have been identified, resumes 

zational histories are constructed on them. Hopefully the timelines pro

identify a few links in the overall timeline and organizational chart. 

maps are not very helpful at this stage because the interactions found ar

be separated widely in both time and space.
117

When the first pass at the known entities is complete, a systemat

build the overall 6-D model is employed—based on the intelligen

curve. Since it is very likely that most data can be obtained about the 

steps in the overall process and about the most visible leadership, t

are targeted and the organizational infrastructure is investigated in 

out much regard to whether the data are directly linked to WMD. Fo

■ If it was determined that the Babool Microbiology Institute w

tially involved in BW, its history would be built to includ

personnel and projects as could be determined from all sour

■ If it was learned that the Institute was subordinate to the K

Ministry of Health, a history would be built on the Ministry, 

its subordination, leadership, and its subordinate organizatio
118

(which have been reported to be CW- or BW-capable in oth

a rough history of the Karjakistani SCUD program would 

determine when the program started, if the missiles are hom

bought, and any indications of which military units employ 

The aim of the MDA at this point is to begin to fill in the overa

provide context for the national organization. One begins by stud

top-down by looking for the processes they are involved in, such 

research or procurement of missile systems. As reports are found and 

entity history is built, one can begin bottom-up modeling to assemb

dinate entities into a unit, where the focus is on scientists, equipme

and processes occurring inside a particular facility. Every time any e

acterized, its 6-D model will provide clues on where to look next s

either drill down to its subordinate entities and processes or build 

general process and organization of which it is a part.

The major lesson learned from using MDA on several BW and 

grams is that Multidimensional Analysis techniques are not difficul

not require extensive computing power. BUT they are tedious becau

to build an entire overview of the target nation’s infrastructure and 

pick out the parts that are involved in WMD or CBRNE. AND they 

mous amount of time and reading. For example, the MDA proje

Korean BW has been in place for almost three years and a first pass 

tinent reporting has not yet been completed. However, the benefit

great. From the detailed 6-D model the warning analyst using MDA 

eral things that conventional methodologies have difficulty doing.

Multidimensional Analysis of WMD Programs – Lessons Lea

¥ FOLLOW THE PEOPLE... They will lead you to the project

¥ Resumes of key people are critical.

¥ HISTORY IS IMPORTANT... You cannot know where they’

until you know where they’ve been.

¥ Relationship of organizational chart to timeline is critical.

¥ Facilities are processes on a timeline as well as boxes that enclo

organizations.
119

World of WMD and Terrorism

MDA can provide strategic warning in a world of WMD an

Since a timeline is the core plot of MDA, by building knowledge 

WMD program came from and when key events happened in the pa

ing analyst can provide critical assessments of where it might go i

Most importantly, MDA can provide warning on a WMD program 

weapons are actually built; that is, it can provide intelligence 

adversary’s new strategic infrastructure will look like before it is b

using MDA, a warning analyst can give strategic warning—even i

WMD and terrorism.

MDA can provide very specific information for targeting co

described above, feedback to collectors is critical for building a c

model, and the detailed model of every entity in the model provide

new collection.

MDA can provide specific assessments on intelligence gaps. In M

gence gaps become very clear. Entities that are virtually unfilled—l

on the 6-D models are cause for concern. However, as the model fi

them, the analyst can construct a rather detailed model of what nee

lected. For example, if the Babool Microbiology Institute was built 

research began there on anthrax in collaboration with Dr. Borisov

year, one can project that somewhere in the late 1980s one can look 

build production fermenters—either by the military or for biopest

vaccines. Projecting forward or back in time—either for projects alo

line or for key personnel up or down the organizational ladder—can 

ful in determining where to look next to fill the gaps.

... it is usually more important to understand the strategic im

of the particular issue to the nation than it is to place undue 

traditional behavior and priorities.49

MDA can also provide a mechanism to help screen out mirro

assessments or relying on remembered thoughts on a nation’s prior

doing so, it gives some indication of whether gaps are really gaps 

else. For example, we might assess that a nation would be stupid to 

aircraft to deliver BW agents over a battlefield and that covert em

Special Forces might be a better way to attack U.S. troops in the fie

49Grabo, 86.
120

Special Forces delivery process, it could be assessed as (1) a gap in in

(2) excellent denial and deception by the adversary, or (3) a true lack 

Forces delivery. In MDA the analyst can begin to assess which is true 

organizational or personal data such as aircraft unit training in suicide o

vaccinations for some units but not others, visits by biologists to certai

subordination of either unit to strategic commands rather than the norm

channels. Given the multiple linkages in time and organization of any 

WMD program to another, some kind of linkage should become avai

given denial and deception.

Power talks. Realistic descriptions of the buildup of military p

often convey a better sense of the likelihood of action than wi

series of estimative judgments which fail to include the milita

details or reasons on which the assessment is based. To under

the capability, and to be able to view it objectively, is a prerequ

the understanding of intent.50

MDA can help assess “Why?” “Who?” “What?” “When?” 

“Why?” and “How?” Conventional methods of intelligence analysis th

trate on weaponry and facilities can address “What” and “Where,” but 

culty in assessing the rest. We have shown MDA can directly addre

remaining questions required to write a good story except “Why?” 

Assessing “Why” is clearly the most difficult question for any warni

because it requires “getting inside the adversary’s head” to deduce 

intentions. The major difficulty lies in that currently any assessmen

must be built totally on others’ assessments of intent. Usually asses

intent come from a source stating that he heard the target leader say s

Even if the statement was, “I plan to build a BW program,” the statemen

provide a true assessment: the source may have heard a statement that w

ent and interpreted to be the one given; or the leader could have uttered 

ment but not meant what he said; or the leader could have meant what h

may not have been able to make good on the plan for many reasons. 

While MDA does account for such statements in building assessme

can provide independent assessment of the intent. If the leader really 

to build a BW program, those words would produce many more word

different venues involving planning conferences followed by orga

meetings...straight through all the steps in the timeline. Was the statem

50Grabo, 24.
121

ers in the organization which would carry out the order? Most im

the infrastructure provide the capability assessed and is that capabili

with a plan and the historical record of how the program was built?

MDA can assess intent by actions rather than words. By building a 

a potential WMD program one can project dual-use agent or paylo

with parallel munitions programs and later compare production and 

reporting with previous knowledge on how the project did the R

assessed weapons and with present knowledge of how the project 

R&D for the next generation of weapons. 

All those processes require planning. Planning shows inten

intent—“why” someone is doing something—is crucial to strategic w

123

MODELING HOW WE MODEL

How can we provide strategic analysis to build our own strategic 

in building Warning Analysis for the Information Age is to model h

—build and test hypotheses—to provide strategic warning so that 

develop tools to help automate the process.

From Responding Faster to Thinking Smarter—Strategic 

for the Information Age

Our U.S. defense strategy seeks new levels of effectiveness by ha

the power of advanced technologies. A central premise to future 

strategy is the formation of a system of systems (SOS) to attain d

battlespace knowledge. By coalescing data from collection and p

ing systems, the resulting information can be integrated with sys

weaponry and warriors for a seamless sensor-to-shooter flow. Li

these with the capabilities of maneuver, strike, logistics, and pro

will allow decisionmakers at every level to respond significantly 

than any adversary and in any operational situation.51

Virtually every discussion of “harnessing the power of advanced t

ultimately comes down to defining the most critical thing that new 

will ultimately allow us to do. And the answer is invariably that we w

“respond faster.” That answer is certainly correct, but it can be very 

we are still thinking tactically in the Newtonian, Industrial-Age para

//

■ Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we shou

at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, bett

inside the adversary’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-A

cycle or loop.

■ Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpr

thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adv

since our adversaries will be unable to generate mental ima

tures that agree with the menacing as well as faster transient 

patterns they are competing against.52

//

51 Annette J. Krygiel, Behind the Wizard’s Curtain: An Integration Environment 

Systems (Washington D.C., National Defense University, 1999), 1. 52 Col Boyd.
124

tional planning, he was defining how to integrate thinking and acting f

unit performance. One of the major implications of his model is the 

thinking “inside the adversary’s Decision Cycle,” that is, if you can 

your Decision Cycle faster than your opponent can complete his, you 

the advantage. 

Inherent in this concept are two points: (1) the better one can obser

and make a plan, the more effective his cycle will become, and (2) the 

can execute that plan, the more efficient his cycle will become. Howev

cated before, the most effective organization for intelligence (observin

enting) is a network that provides informed inaction whereas the mo

organization for operations (deciding and acting) is a hierarchy tha

uninformed action. 

Therefore, every organization has to negotiate a tradeoff. Do I want 

smart and very slow or do I want to be very powerful, very fast, and ve

If I take the time to understand all the intelligence and come up with the 

sible plan I will never accomplish anything, but if I build only a single 

can execute seamlessly and rapidly I may accomplish the wrong thing.

The Cold War could be approximated by a two-player-zero-sum ga

linear Newtonian, Industrial-Age thinking would suffice. As we have 

result was a single integrated “strategic” plan that could be instantl

motion...and organizational thinking channeled to the “very powerfu

fast” option.

But in a Post-Cold War multi-player non-zero-sum-game, Newtonia

is obsolete. “Very powerful and very fast” also is likely to be very stu

Information Age, one wins principally by being smarter than the adver

how can one be smart and still be fast? After all, the object is still to 

“think inside” the adversary’s Decision Cycle.

Fast is a relative thing. If one is thinking tactically, fast is a matter 

the coming attack and responding faster than the adversary. If one i

strategically, fast is a matter of sensing the world, the adversary, and o

coming up with a new plan for a new infrastructure that is more effectiv

opponent’s, then building and employing that new infrastructure faste

adversary can counter.

Strategic thinking and strategic planning go out to the next Decision C

most effective organization is one that can execute the current plan as ra

efficiently as possible while simultaneously rebuilding itself for a new p
125

any WMD from scratch takes years. On a strategic time scale, 

watching a glacier move. Therefore, a strategic plan must be “smart

generation organization and tools are smarter and more effective th

sary’s, they will prevail.

In tactical thinking, faster is better. In strategic thinking, sm

better.

Therefore, to provide strategic warning for strategic thinking 

rebuild ourselves for a strategic war on terrorism and WMD prolife

as we fight a tactical war against terrorist acts and WMD proliferatio

we must both build new tools to be able to think more effectively and 

organizational thinking to provide for strategic warning and planning

Hypothesis Testing as an OODA Cycle—Thinking a

How We Think

It is readily apparent that a determination of the order-of-ba

of foreign forces is of decisive importance for warning inte

Indeed, insofar as warning rests on a determination of the f

opposed to the more complex problem of determining what 

mean and issuing some interpretive judgment—the order-o

facts will often be the single most important element in wa

Determining the order-of-battle of foreign forces is a part of thin

cally. By determining what forces an adversary is building, one can 

kind of force structure he is planning. Plans define logistics, but 

reflect the plans. Multidimensional Analysis (MDA) provides a syste

define an adversary’s WMD order-of-battle. What WMD does he 

WMD is he trying to build? From that knowledge one can project w

is planning to build. The major difference from a standard OB is that 

includes dual-use industries, organizations, leaders, scientists, and en

The best judgments do not necessarily result from bringing 

people into the assessment process, and particularly those w

familiar with all the available information. The most accura

ing judgments often are made by a minority of individuals. 

ing of most conflicts is much longer term than most people 

and the first indications of the approaching crisis are often 

(if not discerned) months before the conflict erupts. As a re

53 Grabo, 55.
126

analysis of these trends and developments rather than an exce

concentration on the latest or most current information, which 

highly misleading.54

MDA follows directly from Cynthia Grabo’s assessment on warni

gence. History matters. Knowing the history of what weapons of mas

tion are being researched, developed, and built provides the baseline fo

analysis and is the basis for strategic warning. But unless we can mode

thought processes in building Multidimensional Analysis (MDA) o

warning, we cannot hope to write a computer algorithm to automate th

How do we do that? Again, Grabo provides the critical clue.

As a research problem, warning involves an in-depth, cumula

compiling and analysis of these trends and developments...55

MDA or strategic warning is a research problem. First and forem

intelligence analyst is a researcher.

As indicated before, the problem of Iraq’s WMD is not different 

eighth-grade daughter’s inventions project, or any research for that m

the core of all critical research is hypothesis testing. Of course, hypothe

is done in response to asking a question. Who? What? When? Whe

How? Subsequently, research is built on its own Decision Cycle:

■ Hypothesis — Build a possible mechanism for how the world 

and define an experiment to test the hypothesis.

■ Experiment — Perform a series of interactions with the wo

collect data.

■ Observation — Observe the data.

■ Hypothesis — Correlate the data with that predicted by the h

sis; keep hypotheses that are supported by the data, and 

hypotheses that are inconsistent with the data.

■ Repeat above.

■ Theory — After enough experiments are performed to give 

degree of credence to a given hypothesis, it moves up to b

“theory.”

54 Grabo, 162.

55 Grabo, 162.
127

Cycle, and the OODA Cycle is the ordering of events.

Research

[Hypothesis Define Experiment Experiment Observation 

Military

[Orientation Decision Action] [Observation O

For the military officer, the most important step is the action take

adversary and, therefore, the OODA cycle culminates in that ac

researcher, the most important step is the Theory, and, therefore, th

Testing cycle culminates with a better hypothesis and ultimately a th

For the military officer, taking the action is paramount. For th

building a plan for future action is paramount.

For the military officer, actions are collection-driven. For th

actions are hypothesis-driven.

The crucial step in answering the original question is the ori

where the hypothesis is compared against observed data. The resear

task is to build a hypothesis that answers the question in a way that 

with all the data. For the military officer, this is not an issue because 

maker has already determined which hypothesis answers the questio

plan can implement that hypothesis; current intelligence is compar

with the plan to ensure that it is still on course and/or any conting

plan are addressed.

The current intelligence analyst’s Decision Cycle is a classical 

because actionable assessments for implementing current plan a

Therefore, current intelligence is collection-driven.
128

■ Orient the reporting to the current plan and assess its implicat

action according to that plan.

■ Decide what is most important to report for current action.

■ Act by reporting an assessment to the decisionmaker.

However, the warning analyst’s Decision Cycle must be more 

researcher’s because the goal of the warning analyst is to providing 

assessments for building a new plan. Therefore, warning analysis is h

driven.

■ Orient (Hypothesize) using all the current data built into a 6-D 

layer model of the adversary.

■ Decide (Build an experiment) on what needs to be collected to 

hypothesis.

■ Act (Experiment) by retrieving reporting from available databa

libraries or, if necessary, directing new collection.

■ Observe the collected data.

■ Orient (Assess) the newly examined data against the hypothesi

■ Orient (Assess) whether the hypothesis is a theory.

If not Repeat above.

If so,

■ Act by reporting the assessment and potential new plan to the 

policymaker.

Strategic analysis and warning is hypothesis-driven. MDA is h

driven. Therefore, to model how the strategic analyst should model th

and therefore to decide what kinds of tools he or she might need—w

investigate the steps in hypothesis testing.

Good strategic analysis ultimately addresses the fundamental que

began the research. Who is building a WMD program? What weap

building? Where is he building them? When and where does he p

them? How will they be employed? Why has he taken this particular 

As indicated before, by linking entities in space, time, and organizat

builds charts that show the history of the WMD program in such term

vide strategic warning, the MDA analyst needs to chart the WMD pro

D, then interpret the results to address the customers’ questions.

What is fascinating in this respect is that the questions and their an

virtually always linear and the customers want to hear the linear ans
129

out a particular thread from the 6-D map to communicate to the cust

very similar to the role of the navigator on board ship. The naviga

ship on a map versus all the rocks and shoals and picks out the best c

the goal. This is because the customer, like the ship’s Captain, nee

the same set of questions about his own ship. Who am I going to m

my mission? When do I start? Where to I plot my course? How do 

the plan? Why is that important?

Whether taking observations and comparing them with the curren

or map or taking the hypothesis or map and deciding the plan, the ori

cess is not complete until the 6-D analysis becomes a linear story tha

guess trajectory or vector for both ourselves and our adversaries 

hypothesis or worldview.

From Hypothesis to Theory—

Building a Theory on Building a Theory

There are several steps a researcher performs in going from observ

world or from collected data to knowledge of the world and the abili

that knowledge to build an actionable plan.

The core of scientific research has always been hypothesis testing

ues to be true in the Information Age, but the way scientists build and 

eses is changing markedly with our ability to generate, store, and re

quantities of data.

From Paper-World Research to Cyber-World Resea

The scientist builds a hypothesis and tests that hypothesis by anal

data and coming up with a theory of how the world works that is 

that data. He or she formulates experiments to test that hypothe

those experiments, and then compares the results of the experimen

expected according to the hypothesis. If the experimental results a

with the hypothesis, the hypothesis can then be refined and tested 

new and different experiments. This series of hypothesis testing ste

to refine the hypothesis, and when enough experimental tests ha

formed, and the data support the hypothesis sufficiently well, the 

consider the hypothesis to be a theory.
130

sequentially:

Hypothesis 

Formulate Experiment

Perform Experiment

Compare Experiment and Hypothesis

Refine Hypothesis

In the Information Age, the scientific method remains the same wit

modification—the timing of the cycle. The enormous rate at which data 

collected and archived in databases means that hypothesis testing ca

uncoupled from laboratory experimentation or intelligence collection. 

ally, previously collected scientific and intelligence data are also arc

format in which it can now easily be accessed and recalled. Therefore

matics is based on a new twist on the scientific method. A scientist can 

mulate a hypothesis, formulate an experiment to test that hypothesis, 

going into the lab ask, “Has anyone already done that experiment?” 

can then check all available databases and, if the experiment has alr

done, use those experimental results to test the hypothesis. An intellig

lyst should be able to do the same; using MDA to understand intelligen

parallels the use of bioinformatics to understand biological data.

Information-Age biology has changed the scientific method slightly 

pling hypothesis testing and experimentation. A biologist can now do h

testing based on data archived in the many available databases. Theref

Information Age, the experimental and hypothesis-testing components 

entific method can be separate:

Experimental Cycle

Formulate Experimental Protocol

Perform Experiment on one genome/ organism

Archive data in database

Check database for completeness

Move to new genome/organism

Information Cycle

Hypothesis

Formulate Experiment

Recall Experimental Results from Database

Compare Experiment and Hypothesis

Refine Hypothesis 
131

archived in the many available databases. In the Information Age t

and hypothesis-testing components of the analytical method can be s

Collection Cycle

Formulate Collection Requirements Protocol

Collect intelligence on a given target

Archive data in database 

Check database for completeness

Move to new target 

Information Cycle

Hypothesis

Formulate Evidence Needed to Test Hypothesis

Recall Reports from Database

Compare Reports and Hypothesis

Refine Hypothesis

It is only when there is no experimental result or intelligence 

able in any database that the Information-age biologist or anal

actually go into the lab to perform an experiment or go into the fie

new intelligence.

Bioinformatics, Multidimensional Analysis and Hypothes

for the Information Age

In any kind of research project there is a series of steps the res

from the formulation of a research problem to the publication of a 

supporting experimental results. An intelligence analyst performs 

series of steps from the identification of an intelligence question to 

tion of an assessment with supporting intelligence reports. And bo

gists and analysts are splitting their hypothesis testing the way hi

done for decades.

Historians perform two kinds of research: (1) collection and do

of historical artifacts and records, and (2) analysis based on the co

mentation. For example, a historian studying the American Civi

choose to go to a historic battlefield site and dig for new artifacts 

new evidence in the personal effects saved by descendants of histo

Sometimes, if the era being investigated is recent such as World W

torian could interview participants themselves. This type of historic
132

in many ways similar to the biologists’ experimental method of hypot

ing or to the classical intelligence collection cycle. However, some 

never collect artifacts themselves but rather use libraries to dig thro

mentation and records to develop new insights into historical events. S

the records are primary evidence, such as court records or archives o

ment agencies, but often the records are books published by other auth

With the advent of automated data collection, biological researche

Intelligence Community are both amassing archives in databases simi

torical archives stored in libraries. Therefore, the methodologies of bio

ics and intelligence analysis will ultimately have more in commo

DATA

REPOSITORY

Library

Data Base

DATA

COLLECTION

Book/Record Pile

Relevant Record

Set

DATA RETRIEVAL

Retrieve

relevant books,

articles, or records

EVIDENCE FILE

Unsorted 3x5 Card

Deck

Relational

Database

EVIDENCE EXTRACTION

Extract relevant facts

and relationships.

ASSESSMENT

OUTLINE

Sorted 3x5 Card

De ck

Hypertext

Document

EVIDENCE MARSHALLING

Sort evidence to support,

discredit, or modify

ASSESSM

EXPOSIT

Manuscr

Webpag

ASSESSMEN

FORMALIZA

Present arg

support ass

DATA

KNOWLEDG

Rough

Hypothesis

Refined

Hypothesis

Theory

START HERE

FROM HYPOTHESIS TO ASSESSMENT

Using Industrial-age tools and the printed word

Using Information-age tools and the electronic word

A Scientist builds a THEORY.

An warning analyst builds an ASSESSME

RESEARCH

QUESTION?

NEXT CYCLE QUESTION

Assessment
133

approach.

At some time in school, we learned to do historical library r

methodology used in that kind of research can serve as a model fo

thinking and methods that can prove fruitful in both bioinformatic

gence analysis. We only need to update the approach from usi

printed documents, and 3”x5” index cards to using database

records, and data manipulation tools. The strategies and hypot

methods we learned in library research are very applicable to bioinf

Information-Age intelligence.

hypothesis. n. ... 2. A proposition or principle put forth or s

(without any reference to its correspondence with fact) mer

basis for reasoning or argument, or as a premise from whic

a conclusion; a supposition.

The Oxford English Dictionary

Data Retrieval. When a research question is asked or a researc

addressed, the first step is to form a preliminary hypothesis that ca

answer to that question. Then, using that preliminary hypothesis, th

goes to the data repository to retrieve records relevant to the questio

build a data collection. 

The purpose of this step is to collect records relevant to the hypoth

lem. The researcher now has a data collection—or “shoebox”—

records for further evaluation, some directly and some which may n

at until this step is repeated for a new or modified hypothesis afte

original one. 

■ Industrial-Age Methodology. The researcher went to the li

by using catalogs and indices, retrieved books and documen

to the problem. These were taken home or set aside for futur

■ Information-Age Methodology. The researcher logs onto th

online library, or database and using Boolean search tools 

and retrieves records relevant to the problem. These are th

loaded and set aside for future use.

The value-added in building the data collection is that the rese

local dataset that contains records relevant to the question or probl

she extracts evidence and builds cases for various hypotheses, th

“shoebox” full of valuable “stuff”—is a very important resource t

new evidence as hypotheses are discarded, modified, or built.
134

prove or disprove any conclusion.

The Oxford English Dictionary

Evidence Extraction. When a sufficient data collection is am

researcher reads the relevant records and extracts bits of evidence56 p

the problem at hand. At this point, if it becomes clear that the first pa

retrieval did not collect all the necessary relevant records, the research

new keywords obtained to do another round of data retrieval. The extr

dence then is stored in an evidence file.

The purpose of this step is to find all the bits of data—often called 

or “nuggets”—that can serve as evidence to test, support, discredit, or m

hypothesis at hand. The hypotheses can be very general, “All Nor

microbiologists are potentially involved in a BW program,” or very spe

Kim Chong-Ho is producing anthrax starter cultures for weaponizati

important to remember that evidence is a collection of “testimony or 

support or discredit a hypothesis. Therefore, evidence extraction is high

dent on the hypothesis at hand and will produce a differing result when 

respect to a new or modified hypothesis.

■ Industrial-Age Methodology. The researcher read the relevan

and documents in the “shoebox” and looked for individual fa

ideas that could be used as evidence to support, reject, or mod

hypothesis. These were copied on 3x5 cards—one to a card 

with referencing information. The cards were then set as

future analysis.

■ Information-Age Methodology. The researcher reads the r

records in the electronic “shoebox” and does a “cut and paste” 

vidual facts and data that can be tied to the hypothesis. If t

dataset is expected to be small, these evidence “nuggets” can 

ied into a word-processing file—along with referencing infor

56As indicated here, I define “evidence” as data that is pertinent to the problem at ha

“evidence” is always linked with a hypothesis. For example, for GEN Eisenhower on 

the barometric pressure in England or California was just data, but the barometric pre

land was evidence to be weighed in support of the hypothesis that a low barometric re

land on 5 June argues bad weather in the English Channel on 6 June. And of course, th

pressure/bad weather hypothesis was only valid for GEN Eisenhower in addressing 

“Do I invade tomorrow or not?” The implication here is that not all data in a data repos

dence.” It only becomes “evidence” after it is collected and judged relevant then sorte

pertinent to the hypothesis at hand. 
135

relational database and store the evidence nuggets as 

entries in the relational database.

The value-added in building the evidence file or unsorted 3x5 car

evidence “nuggets” relevant to the hypotheses at hand are availabl

those hypotheses directly and also any future modified or new hyp

example, a report that “Dr. Kim Chong-Ho is an expert on botulinum 

be used to discredit the hypothesis that he is producing anthrax cul

port the hypothesis that he is overseeing a botulinum toxin BW 

merely to back up a hypothesis that he is a well-versed microbiolog

keeping this “nugget” in the evidence file allows the researcher to go 

these or new hypotheses without having to start from the data co

every time. In MDA, evidence can link entities in 6-D and at multiple 

levels; evidence that may lead to a dead end for one hypothesis may 

ful to test another.

theory. n. ... 4.a. A scheme or system of ideas or statemen

an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenome

hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by obs

or experiment, and is propounded or accepted accountin

known facts; a statement of what are held to be general l

ciples, or causes of something known or observed.

The Oxford English Dictionary

Evidence Marshalling. When enough evidence has been extracte

in an evidence file, the researcher builds a case to argue for a hypothe

individual pieces of evidence in the file.

If not enough evidence is in the file on a particular topic, the re

use new keywords or Boolean combinations of keywords to perf

round of data retrieval and evidence extraction to build the evide

important point to remember here is that the evidence file is unsorte

the evidence marshalling procedure sorts and re-orders that eviden

coherent logical story in support of a hypothesis. At this point t

assessment exposition will have ideas, facts, experimental data, or 

reports to support it.

Further, for the sake of expediency and based on academic princ

ferred method of performing analysis is grounded in the principles 

the curriculum of the Joint Military Intellligence College and enco
136

Hughes.

These models of critical thinking move beyond the simplistic 

intuitive, representing higher-order cognitive function and the 

to replicate and illustrate the analytical process. They include 

sis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) methods, the use of evid

and inference, argumentation, and other techniques employing 

“imaginative and critical reasoning.”58

The second O, orientation—as the repository of our genetic he

cultural tradition, and previous experiences—is the most impo

part of the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we observe, 

way, we decide, the way we act.59

Col Boyd

Orientation is built on hypothesis testing. How we can integrate ou

heritage, cultural tradition, and previous experience” into models that sy

that worldview for Decisionmaking is the key challenge for the IC o

Century. Therefore, research into analyzing how we analyze is critica

puter-assisted implementation of strategic analysis. We cannot progra

puter to help us think until we know how we think—in detail. The 

toward that goal is the understanding that analysis is research, that h

testing is the OODA Cycle, and that going into the Information Age, it 

entation step of the national OODA Cycle that is broken.

Theory Formulation. When the hypothesis has been examined and 

marshaled to test the hypothesis, the researcher can now propose a new 

based on facts and experimental evidence or intelligence reporting. 

The purpose of this step is to provide a “published” version of the t

story that presents a hypothesis and the evidence that supports (or qu

At this point, dependent on the completeness of the evidence supportin

57 These refer to proponents of new methodologies analytical reasoning through 

analytical process: Douglas J. MacEachin, Richards J. Heuer, Stephen E. Toulmin, D

Schum, and Francis J. Hughes. I should note that the concept of Bottom-Up data-driv

versus Top-Down hypothesis-driven modeling is virtually identical to Heuer’s distinc

data-driven analysis and concept-driven analysis. A reading list of their works can be f

(ref below). 58 GYSGT Steven S. Rue, USMC, The Breakdown of the PC Paradigm: Informa

Technology As as Analysis Inhibitor, MSSI Thesis (Washington, D.C: Joint Military 

College, August 2003), 12. 59 Col Boyd.
137

the data repository for additional evidence to build the case. If the e

incomplete at that point, the researcher would be required to propose 

new experiments or collect additional intelligence for further test of 

a new evidence “nugget” is found that apparently discredits the curr

sis or theory, the scientist or analyst can return to the evidence file 

fied or totally new hypothesis which can then be rapidly tested 

evidence already available, albeit in an unsorted fashion with respe

hypothesis. The ability of being able to re-sort evidence file or “3x5 

or re-test a hypothesis more than overweighs the time and energy 

building and maintaining the evidence file.60

The value-added in theory formulation is that the researcher has 

tematic methodology to collect data and extract evidence that directl

discredits hypotheses. A scientist will usually wait until enough iter

Hypothesis Testing Cycle have been completed to support the th

unequivocally before publishing. An intelligence analyst often will 

luxury, but a systematic hypothesis testing approach, especially w

competing hypotheses are tested simultaneously with the same evid

provide the analyst the ability to publish his or her assessment at alm

either as a brief or paper. However, with fewer iterations of the cycl

ment may need to provide more than one hypothesis with both su

discrediting evidence for each.

I suggest that the basic methodology of data retrieval and evidence 

in support of hypothesis testing has not changed and will not chang

logical and intelligence communities go from the Industrial Age wit

word and library to the Information Age with the electronic word an

only that the methodology will get much more powerful as more 

available along with tools to identify, retrieve, and order evidence.

60 The concept of the “evidence file” or “electronic 3x5 card deck” can be direct

lytical methodologies such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) or other m

evidence and inference. The “evidence file” is the analyst’s unsorted “3x5 card deck

or she has collected because it appears to be pertinent to the question at hand. Acco

ACH as an analytical tool, the analyst can sort the “3x5 cards” once for each o

hypotheses to support, discredit, or modify each in turn for further comparison. The 

in this process is that a massive amount of evidence is compiled on the basis of very 

such as the basic WMD timeline and organization chart which then can be used di

dence file for systematic hypothesis testing tools such as ACH.
138

In the biological sciences another kind of powerful tool for eviden

tion is called homology comparison or homology searching. It has the 

for use in Information-Age strategic analysis. Homology searching is 

the theory that organisms grow and develop through gene networks 

gram all the biochemical steps in that process and that the genes in th

are inherited directly or with slight changes (or mutations) from their 

and parents. MDA of several WMD programs suggests that WMD 

grow and develop on the basis of organizational networks that defi

scientific, technical, and leadership steps in that process and that the 

the program acquire the knowledge and skills directly from their sc

leadership mentors.

Gene networks program development of biological organisms. P

works develop WMD programs.

Gene traits are inherited from ancestors and parents. Scientific, tech

leadership traits are learned from mentors.

Once again, history matters.

Following gene pedigrees can help geneticists and molecular bio

understand organismal development and disease. Following mentor

grees can help warning analysts to understand organizational develop

WMD programs.

MDA builds a top-down graphical hypothesis of the steps and org

required for a WMD program. When MDA has been done on several W

grams, comparison among the related WMD models can provide impo

for further analysis and collection in the same way that homology se

genetics and molecular biology is becoming a very powerful bioinform

in the study of organismal development and disease. Biologists use 

organisms, such as yeast, fruit flies, mice, and worms, to study human 

ment and disease because the gene networks in all those organisms are r

only in function but also in pedigree—common genes from common 

Such a methodology can also be very powerful in studying WMD de

because the people networks in WMD programs worldwide are relate

in function but often in pedigree—common technologies from common 

tors and mentors.

Identification of homology between genes can be used as eviden

guide for further experimentation. The search for homology between W
139

This is done in four major ways.

■ Comparison of disease genes with normal genes in the same 

By comparing the gene sequences and structures of a mutat

a disease patient and the same gene in a normal person, 

biologists can deduce the molecular differences in the DNA 

teins that cause the malfunction in the disease. Example: 

human beta-hemoglobin vs. normal human beta-hemoglo

larly, by comparing the resumes of WMD-associated lead

tists, and engineers with those of “normal” personnel w

legitimate dual-use programs in the same country, warnin

can begin to build profiles and indicators for the difference

in going from legitimate dual-use programs to WMD progra

■ Comparison of related genes in the same organism. Often 

gene families in an organism that encode homologous but no

protein sequences. Example: human alpha-hemoglobin 

hemoglobin expressed in adults vs. delta-hemoglobin an

hemoglobin expressed in infants and fetuses. The homolo

dence that those proteins have similar functions, but biol

then deduce fine differences in the differing genes that funct

ferent places in the body or at different times in developme

tially, comparison of WMD personnel resumes and orga

histories with resumes and histories in legitimate dual-use 

can point to places or times where the two diverge.

■ Comparison of the same gene in related organisms. Highl

gous proteins in different organisms often have the same 

Example: human beta-globin vs. mouse beta-globin. Com

WMD personnel resumes and organizational histories in one 

those in other WMD-developing countries to indicate emerg

programs. This can be even more powerful in cases where t

nel of one nation have been actively proliferating WMD to t

nation, because knowledge of the first nation’s WMD pro

provide very specific I&W on the second nation’s WMD pro

■ Comparison of related genes in related organisms. Homolo

teins in different organisms often have similar functions. 

human beta-globin vs. plant leghemoglobin. Analysts can 

build a common profile for all the personalities and org

required for WMD development by comparing the timelines 

nizational charts built by MDA for many different WMD 

Critical skills sets, organizational relationships, and prolifera
140

ent WMD or CBRNE program will become easier as a common 

MDA model is built for each type of WMD and a range of d

strategies within that model emerges by analysis of multiple pro

Biologists now exploit the power of homology searching by using a 

ple bioinformatics tools to deduce the function and mechanisms of new

ered genes by comparison with evidence in DNA, protein, genetic, 

databases—without having to perform any additional laboratory or fie

ments! Once MDA has been used to profile a few WMD programs, usi

homology searching methods can recall more evidence from the cur

bases without having to perform new field collection. If analysts conc

using systematic MDA-assisted hypothesis testing to build better the

assessments against a worldwide baseline of WMD programs, not onl

understanding of individual programs greatly improve, but an unders

WMD proliferation mechanisms will inevitably emerge.

Computers Don’t Think, People Think—New Thinking T

for the Information Age

A system is defined as a set of different elements so connected 

related as to perform a unique function not performable by the 

ments alone.61

Annette Krygiel

Systems, like their biological counterparts, are defined by what the

what they ARE. The “database problem” is not a problem with databa

Rather, the problem is to build a new system of people and informatio

ogy (IT) systems by which the analysts can, in fact, find Novel Intel

Massive Data and can, in fact, provide strategic warning. The new syst

composed of people and computers whereby the computers and the 

they contain will be tools for the analysts to use to become smarter.

The problem with the “database” problem is in first realizing that th

least four different kinds of databases. Each corresponds to the da

researchers already use in hypothesis testing (data repository, data colle

dence file, and assessment outline) and each is distinct in its format a

And it is very important to keep clear the distinction between databas

datasets they contain. Lessons learned from MDA projects on WMD 

61 Krygiel, 32.
141

database, BUT there is different analytical worth and value-added d

where the “nugget” is found.

Getting the Proper Tools to Do the Job: 

What New Computing Tools Do We Need?

Although the individual kinds of databases and database tool

around for many years, a major impediment to strategic analysis and 

current IT systems are not set up for hypothesis testing mainly becau

uses the word “system,” by current paradigms, one immediately th

tem” rather than “Human/IT system,” which does not account for 

human-computer and computer-human interactions required to comp

lytical task of building a strategic assessment.

What Data Mining is Not:

■ A particular software product or mathematical program

■ Just for statisticians

■ Turn-key

DATASETS TASKS TOOLS

Global Input

Datasets

Analyst

S hoebox

Entity Datasets

Data Repository

Data Collection

Evidence File

Search Global Data

Scan Shoebox

Analyze Shoebox

Reformat Traffic

Document R

Text Document 

Text to Table Re

Table Data

Convert TE

METATE

TEXT docu

TEXT Docu

Collector Input Dataset

Customer

Scan Traffic

Datamine Entity Set

METATE

Presentation

Website

Website Bu

HYPERTE

Search Shoebox

Build Website

Too

matche

Assessment

[IT|Human] Interface

3x5 Card Deck

Book/Record Pile

LIbrary
142

sense?

❏ Multiple iterations to find good models

■ A silver bullet

❏ Data are not informative in and of themselves62

We can illustrate the difficulties in the current IC data-handling syste

lowing the steps an all-source analyst performs in converting data to a

using the Hypothesis Testing Cycle. At each database (DB) step, there 

of data which then comprise the particular dataset in that DB, a process

which the DB tools perform specific tasks as specified by the analyst, a

put step in which new processed data is presented to the analyst. At e

step, the analyst performs the research tasks in hypothesis testing a

above and inputs the processed data into the next DB in much the same 

she formerly used the library, books, and 3x5 card files. [Several MD

have been accomplished using MS Word and PowerPoint as data-ma

tools because current IC IT systems are unsatisfactory for MDA, mai

limitations in IT-human interfaces and data movement among datab

Specific comments on current IC limitations are noted below in bracket

Data input to the analytical process is by way of GLOBAL databa

which are the libraries of the IC: SIGINT from NSA, HUMINT from C

Source from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and sum

IMINT data from NIMA. These data represent published messages fro

lection agencies and are loaded in a standard TEXT format with a few 

for identification (but not analysis).

(1) GLOBAL DB (Library) = TEXT storage of published records.

Input = Published records from Collectors at CIA, NSA, FBIS, NIMA 

(text not images).

Processing = Filtering of DBs according to analyst-written Profile.

Output = Presentation of filtered records to the analyst.

As was done with the books in the library, the analyst then scans the 

records from the GLOBAL DB and decides whether records are relevan

vant to task.

The analyst then RETRIEVES relevant records and redirects them t

TEXT storage. In the past, every analyst had a “shoebox” that contain

62 Abbott.
143

paper copies of intelligence reports. Hypothesis testing is built o

experiments based on assumptions of the hypothesis; as alternativ

are tested, discarded, and reconsidered, the researcher needs a place 

recall the experimental result—the “lab notebook.” Since the all-so

works with experiments done by others, that is with data input by co

“shoebox” represents the analyst notebook of relevant documents for 

ence. This “shoebox” has huge value-added in that the analyst has 

document and assessed that the material contained within the docu

vant to the assessments he or she needs to make. [One of the major 

IC analysts are prone to stay with their paper copies or MS Word ele

boxes is that no current IT systems have any reasonable methods 

electronic shoeboxes from heterogeneous data. This kind of DB cu

not exist in useable format; Pathfinder on JIVA at DIA is slated to s

pose, but available options for data-entry of relevant records by ana

too cumbersome to be of any use. A major goal in any IT system use

esis testing or MDA is to be able to build an electronic “shoebox” 

easily.]

(2) DATA COLLECTION/SHOEBOX DB = TEXT storage of 

records.

Input = (1) First-pass analyst input of relevant records.

(2) Feedback input through direct analyst query of or setup t

mining tool.

Processing = TEXT data mining (such as Pathfinder and text-mini

tools).

Output = Presentation of filtered or data-mined records to all-source 

Analysts read the presented records from the SHOEBOX DB and

■ Analyze: Analyst evaluates data recalled from SHOEBO

QUERY or by SHOEBOX DB TEXT data mining tool.

■ Reformat: Analyst reformats important records into META

entry into ENTITY DB. These are used in build facility, org

and project profiles, and personnel biographies.

The data prep is most difficult to characterize.63

(3) ENTITY DB (Evidence File) = METATEXT storage of filte

records.

63 Abbott.
144

BOX DB by analyst, or (b) input from already METATAGGED DBs (s

PubMed online biomedical DB).

(2) Analyst feedback to adjust visual or network displays.

Processing = (1) METATEXT data mining (with data mining tools f

data).

(2) MDA Chart presentation (such as by Analyst Notebook)

Output = Presentation of: (1) text or visual displays of data mining

(2) MDA chart displays (with hyperlinks to DATA 

COLLECTION DB for original report with highlighted markups).

Analysts view the presented graphs, networks, and the like from the 

DB and:

■ Analyze: Analyst evaluates data outputs provided by (1) META

data mining tools or (2) MDA chart presentations or (3) link a

directly from documents in the shoebox.

■ Marshal Evidence: Analyst builds MDA models using maps

lines, and organization charts, and builds HYPERTEXT doc

for input to PRESENTATION DB.

[Note that since this is all-source analysis at this point, collection a

NSA, NIMA, and FBIS should ideally not be expected to do this leve

sis; however, since current collaboration tools are not adequate, the 

analysts must do this to be able to perform the SIGINT, IMINT, or OSIN

tion task properly].

[The ENTITY DB will potentially prove to be the most valuable ana

in the future, but currently constitutes a huge gap in the IC’s repert

tools. A shared ENTITY DB would be the equivalent of a shared elec

card deck. Imagine if a historian were writing a new book on the Civi

instead of having just the library for references, could have access to an 

version of the 3x5 card note decks of Bruce Catton and a dozen other 

historians, complete with original references on each. The value added 

immense, not only in tracing hypotheses supported by Catton’s books 

testing hypotheses he may have had and discarded (but kept the cards 

reference) and in testing completely new hypotheses not covered in 

threads reported in the narratives of his books. However, as Catton’s 

deck might have actually been a pile of highlighted copies of docum

handwritten records, the cost of transferring these documents to electro
145

who are the Bruce Cattons of the IC. Building an ENTITY DB 

“shoeboxes” of all the retiring IC analysts will certainly be a huge ex

it is not done, all the assembled knowledge accumulated by thos

using their “shoeboxes” as datasets for hypothesis testing will be los

it could take a “curator” several months to transcribe the “shoebox

retiring analyst into a new electronic SHOEBOX DB and ENTITY D

considering that “smart” bombs are only as smart as the analyst prov

geting, if the shoebox reformatting of a single analyst cost about $75

only account for improving the analysis of the next generation 

enough to turn a single smart bomb miss into a hit to pay for itself.]

(4) PRESENTATION DB = HYPERTEXT storage of analyzed re

Input = Analyst input of:

(1) HYPERTEXT maps, timelines, and organization charts (which 

to ENTITY DB “3x5 cards” and highlighted reports in DATA CO

DB) and;

(2) associated facility, organization, and project profiles, and perso

phies.

Processing = Website setup for viewing on Intelink (such as the A

site)

Output = Presentation to policymakers and warfighters either as brie

sites in the PRESENTATION DB.

The challenge for IC analysis and for community resource man

21st Century is to be able to build IT tools that can support hypothes

multidimensional analysis and to make this multidimensional, multi

cess work in a collaborative environment.

147

MODELING OURSELVES

How can we reorient our intelligence process to empower anal

strategically? Step 3 in building Warning Analysis for the Informat

“reorient the arrows” within the IC—both the information flow an

interactions—to provide mechanisms built on Information-Age 

thereby be as close to a network as possible. The key to doing th

empower the analyst to build a new Orientation based on the hyperw

From Looking Outward to Looking Inward

//

ILLUMINATION

■ The previous discussion assumes interaction with both the extern

nal environment. Now, let us assume, for whatever reason or co

circumstances, that we design a command and control system 

interaction with the external environment. This implies a focus in

than outward.

■ Picking up from this idea, we observe from Darwin that:

❏ The environment selects.

❏ Ability or inability to interact and adapt to exigencies of 

select one in or out.

■ Furthermore, according to the Godel Proof, the Heisenberg Uncer

ple, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics:

❏ One cannot determine the character or nature of a system wit

❏ Moreover, attempts to do so lead to confusion and dis

Because in the “real world” the environment intrudes (my vi

■ Now, by applying the ideas of Darwin, the Second Law, Hei

Godel to Clausewitz one can see that:

He who can generate many non-cooperative centers of grav

fies friction. Why? Many non-cooperative centers of gravity 

system restrict interaction and adaptability of system with it

roundings, thereby leading to a focus inward (i.e., within its

64 The advent of HTML and the ability to hyperlink related ideas and story thre

to change the way we write. I will refer to this new method of writing, which transc

word, as the hyperword.
148

ous or directed activity, hence, by definition, magnifies friction 

entropy.65

//

Modeling Ourselves

Even with Information-Age methods to model the adversary an

implement those models, we still cannot truly put all the pieces toget

we have built an organization to integrate those methods and tools in 

manner. But how? Again Col Boyd provides guidance both in what h

in what he implies. His model for the adversary indicates that our aim 

to “generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity” in the advers

will foster our ability to be able to think inside his OODA Cycle. Impl

message is that we must be able to generate many cooperative centers 

within our own organization. Therefore, we need not only to look o

build better ways to understand the adversary but also to look inward 

stand ourselves to build a better IC.

As organizations evolve from loose confederations to integrated s

systems, the components of the organization redefine their roles—g

working in parallel to working as an integrated team. The increasing d

the Information Age for quality intelligence and warning analysis req

the Intelligence Community clearly reorient the roles of its componen

to do the most with its most scarce asset—its analysts.

...various alternative hypotheses may not be given adequate co

ation, or even sometimes considered at all, and no systematic e

made to insure that some group really goes through all the evi

and considers the various alternative explanations in exhaustiv

detail.

One reason for this, which we have noted before, is that in cri

budding crisis situations, there is likely to be an overwhelmin

tity of information, the mere scanning and preliminary proces

which is consuming most of the analyst’s time. There are simp

insufficient resources to cope with all the information in any m

let alone go through a time-consuming process of evaluating e

item of information against several hypotheses.66

65 Col Boyd.

66 Grabo, 49.
149

ally all the players are in a tight group trying to kick the ball and onl

and a few stray players picking flowers are found elsewhere. As the 

Information Age and data come in at an enormous rate, the IC also 

constantly playing “clusterball.” The IC is sized to handle a single c

gle nation. When there is no apparent crisis, the assets are spread eve

level to handle the pace of current intelligence and maybe a bit of wa

a crisis comes, most of the assets move to the crisis, and: (1) since th

warning intelligence being done on the crisis area, the team attempts 

up on the warning that should have been ongoing in that area, and (2

outside the crisis situation is then so understaffed that partial curren

is being done and no warning at all. Should a crisis arise in a new ar

repeats but with less warning and context than before because the 

plement of analysts on the new crisis area is less by having been pul

old crisis area. As the IC moves from crisis to crisis, the ability to 

becomes less and less. But somehow we must be able to get past t

ever going to provide strategic warning.

Furthermore, analysts have virtually no time to analyze informati

involving other than war or terrorist attack. Threats such as econom

or political infrastructure remain unassessed. As we have seen, strat

requires integration of knowledge about the adversary’s infrastructu

logistics, politics, and technical issues.

It is almost impossible to give too much stress to the impor

the most meticulous and exhaustive examination of all avai

information prior to reaching warning judgments. It is erron

presume that all research will automatically be accomplishe

sis or budding crisis situations, or that the organization and 

tion of work within the office or offices involved is necessa

adequate for the purpose... The inadequate examination of 

evidence has been a contributing cause to nearly every war

ure and in some cases should probably be considered the ma

of failure.67

Strategic warning must be proactive, actively building, testing, di

rebuilding hypotheses. The ultimate goal of strategic analysis is to b

vide actionable guidance early enough so that the situation can be ch

it becomes a crisis. 

67 Grabo, 163.
150

of the failure of strategic warning. For if there were prior indicati

impending “crisis,” it would have been evident that such a team w

prior to the crisis. 

As a former submariner, I must contend that the true indicator tha

warning and deterrence is working properly goes even a step further..

indicator of an IC that is providing satisfactory strategic warning is th

happens. Every submariner knows that the only way a submariner will 

the news or show up on CNN is if he fails at his job. In peacetime, su

are invisible unless they collide with someone or run aground. Even in 

submarine successes are proactive—behind enemy lines where only 

may be important, and with few or no BDA photos. In fact, every s

(especially those responsible for nuclear weapons) understands that the 

that a war starts means that he has failed in his primary mission—deter

Similarly, I contend that in the Age of WMD and terrorism, the st

the Intelligence Community must be to provide strategic warning 

NOTHING HAPPENS. From the standpoint of the IC:

■ The only acceptable WMD attack is one that never happens.

■ The only acceptable Weapon of Mass Destruction is one that 

built.

■ The only acceptable terrorist attack is one that never happens.

■ The only acceptable terrorist WMD program is one that is neve

MDA can provide a tool for strategic warning only if there are eno

and time to build the 6-D MDA model of the adversary and to use that 

actionable intelligence production.

It is possible to examine all available information and still not to 

stand its significance in relation to intentions... Some relevant in

tion is likely to come from highly classified sources—such as co

acquired military documents—and therefore has been extremely 

restricted in distribution. Some developments are likely to be hi

technical and understood by very few persons, but their interpre

and integration with other information can be critical to an unde

ing of what is really happening... In warning episodes, the need 

the community for expert assistance in a whole range of military 

subjects—and to a lesser extent, political—skyrockets.68

68 Grabo, 164.
151

uninterpretable if the data are outside the analysts area of expertise. 

work at all, MDA must be done by a team of analysts.

A system of systems is a set of different systems so connec

related as to produce results unachievable by the individual 

alone.69

Cooperation is the answer, but how can we build cooperation in th

Another major stumbling block to Information-Age analysis is t

of analytical methods and organizations with IT tools. The most pre

mode has been the introduction of next-generation tools into curre

tions using current intelligence methods. This “drive-by” dumping 

nologies onto analysts with no thought about how they interface w

methods and organizations results in frustrated analysts who now 

tools that they are expected to use that do not work and frustrated m

invested in new tools that they cannot sell to their subordinates. A 

examples of this kind mismanagement:

■ Buying “one-size-fits-all” business applications under the C

gram and implementing them with no thought to how they ap

IC. For example, in MS Word when an analyst types “(C)” t

Confidential paragraph, the computer changes that “(C)” int

copyright; when the analyst then hits “Enter” at the end of 

graph, the computer may also put a “(D)” to “help” the 

expected to continue in the new paragraph. Very few pro

ever customized to fit analysts’ needs prior to appearing on 

puter desktops.

■ No thoughts of consolidating individual proprietary softw

single system. Analysts cannot understand why there is comp

nology to identify terrorists by TV in airports, but that the 

system they are using requires as many as 14 separate pass

to do their job. Why cannot a system be implemented that r

only a single password for a single analyst?

■ No thoughts of interfaces between software on the system. C

DIA the “Global Database” is called WebSafe and the bes

analysts could use for a “Shoebox” is Pathfinder; however

way to transfer “relevant” items identified in WebSafe to 

for further analysis is for the analyst to E-mail the individual 

69 Krygiel, 33.
152

Without an easy-to-use interface between the agencys retriev

and its “analysis” tool, very few analysts use Pathfinder, but the

management chain to require the two independent contractors 

their tools.

Unless new methodologies are already in place and the organizations 

ented to use them, tools development will be as useful to an analyst 

DVD player would be to a music lover who owns several hundred re

cassettes. Music lovers don’t care what the format is, so long as they ca

the music. Analysts don’t care what the format is, so long as they can 

read the relevant documents in their shoebox. However, to implement s

tem requires cooperation between analytical organizations and the IT 

tions and contractors that support them.

The Digital Production System (DPS) was a 10-year developm

the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to deliver an end-to-end 

processing pipeline for production of mapping, charting, and g

products. [p. 50]... For the DPS program management, full rea

tion of the level of resources required and the extent of expert

needed to make a SOS [System of Systems] out of a set of ind

systems did not come until the beginning of the IOC integratio

activities. [p. 110]... “We had some idea of how many (people

needed and did in fact program for them, but what was unknow

the amount of information people had to absorb and understan

Again, cooperation is the answer, but how can we build cooperation 

Orienting Is More Important Than Deciding

//

COMMENT

Up to this point we have shown orientation as being a critical eleme

mand and control—implying that without orientation there is no com

control worthy of the name.

70 Krygiel, 111.
153

But, simply stated, what does this comment and everything els

cussed so far tell us about command and control?

//

ILLUMINATION

❏ The process of observation-orientation-decision-action rep

takes place during the command and control process—whic

the O-O-D-A loop can be thought of as being the C&C loop

❏ The second O, orientation—as the repository of our genetic 

tural tradition, and previous experiences—is the most impo

the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we observe, 

decide, the way we act.

IMPLICATION

❏ Operating inside adversary’s O-O-D-A loop means the sa

operating inside adversary’s C&C loop.71

//

I suggest that we can build organizations for the Information Age 

Boyd’s assessment, but we must remember that Col Boyd was mode

tary and that the military is only a part of the national organization

consider that what are strategic decisions from the standpoint of the 

tactical decisions from the national standpoint. Therefore, one mus

the national OODA loop transcends just military organizations and d

includes civilian ones as well. And in the national OODA loop, the IC 

with the intelligence half (observing and orienting) while the IC co

entrusted with the operations half (deciding and acting).

Therefore, to build a national OODA Cycle for the Information A

to remember:

■ The intelligence (OO) half of the national OODA Cycle is t

sibility of the IC.

■ The IC spends billions of dollars on researching and imp

Observe-Orient part of the cycle but virtually all the dollars g

“Observe” category on new collection methods and new da

which to store the collected data.

71Col Boyd.
154

only the same Industrial-Age knowledge is coming out of tho

bases.

Therefore:

■ It is the Orientation step in the national OODA Cycle that is br

■ As Col Boyd has stated, “the second O, orientation—as the rep

of our shared hypotheses and models of the world—is the most 

tant part of the OODA loop since it shapes the way we obse

way, we decide, the way we act.”

■ The only way to “orient the arrows” rather than merely connec

the dots, is to reorient the way the components of the IC int

Orient—build hypotheses, theories, and knowledge from thos

bases.

Toward an IC that Can Orient as a Team

Orienting is analysis. Strategic analysis orients the national organ

make plans not only for the current OODA Cycle but also to provide ne

to be able plan two OODA Cycles ahead—one logistics cycle and the 

operational cycle.

Strategic analysis requires methods, tools, and organizations. From 

on a variety of successful and unsuccessful attempts by DIA and the I

intelligence on Information Technology, I have noted that the interdepe

methods, tools, and organizations has led to a vicious cycle that has de

tually every effort to move intelligence analysis into the Information 

analytical methods require new computer tools that require new orga

interrelationships that require new analytical methods...

The single most important insight into making MDA a reality (as dem

by the accompanying case studies) was the realization that a new me

can be implemented with current tools and organizations if the analyst

desire (or are allowed) to take the time to build new methods by reorien

collection-driven analysis to hypothesis-driven analysis using MDA; 

ware-driven tools usage to methodology-driven tools usage; and from 

tion-driven teamwork to hypothesis-driven teamwork.

From Collection-Driven Analysis to Hypothesis-Driven An

Step 1 toward warning analysis for the Information Age is metho

modeling the adversary. Multidimensional analysis is a first step in that 
155

Methodology-Driven Tools Usage

Step 2 toward warning analysis for the Information Age is tool

how we model. Given a methodology, one can build tools to suppo

ingly, current tools available on almost any computer such a MS Wo

erPoint can support hypothesis testing and MDA—as long as 

involved know what they desire to do. While most IT experts do

either one “state-of-the-art,” when compared with Newtonian data 

tools—pencil and paper and real paper 3x5 cards—MS Word and Po

amazing tools. Hypothesis testing requires building a “shoebox” and 

deck,” which depend only on having the capability to cut-and-paste 

link. MDA requires drawing charts (maps, timelines, and organizat

which depend only on having capability to cut-and-paste and to dra

grams and annotate imported maps. Therefore, implementing MDA 

sis testing is doable with current tools. Certainly it will becom

methodology-driven tools become available, but we need not wait 

start the process.

The collector in the field who elects to forward, or not to fo

some fragment of information to his home office is making 

ment. The current analyst, who decides to write up a given 

information, or not to do so, is making a judgment about it. 

ner in which he writes up, the emphasis he gives to this or th

of it, constitutes another judgment. The items that his imme

supervisor selects to include in a briefing for the senior offi

his agency or department are the result of another judgmen

From Organization-Driven Teamwork to 

Hypothesis-Driven Teamwork

Step 3 in building Warning Analysis for the Information Age is to 

arrows” within the IC—modeling ourselves. Lessons learned from 

BW analysis projects have indicated how the IC-organizations need 

ented—but not necessarily reorganized—to implement MDA on an I

thereby preventing the “confusion and disorder” foreseen by Col B

IC is collection-driven; collectors provide raw data which are analyz

tion analysts (DO, NSA, FBIS, and NIMA) and those data enter t

intelligence reporting. The repository for reporting (each individual 

sion of a “Global Database”) is then exploited individually by the 

72 Grabo, 133.
156

essence the collection agencies (DO, NSA, FBIS, and NIMA) perform 

vation step in the national OODA cycle, the IC customers perform the 

step, but the Orientation step is done catch-as-catch-can independently 

one across the community from collectors to analysts to decisionmaker

The Next RMA will be a Revolution in Orientation

A re-examination of the OODA Cycle itself indicates that the curren

version of the cycle is built on Newtonian thinking. The Newtonian para

a revolution in the physical sciences—that is, in the way we can m

understand the physical world. Accordingly, the Industrial Age revoluti

way we can observe and measure the physical world, beginning with 

scope and microscope and moving onward to their lineal descendants s

satellite camera and signal interception receivers, and also the way we 

control the physical world beginning with the steam engine to propel a 

cotton gin for mass production and moving onward to their lineal de

the mass-produced cruise missile and smart bomb. 

The Newtonian revolution enabled the Observation and Action 

the OODA Cycle. Therefore, current projections that the next-g

military will be based on significantly improved Observation throu

How is it that Orientation—the most important step 

the OODA cycle—is the one with the least support?
157

technology and Action through more advanced delivery devices 

Newtonian thinking.

The major paradigm shift from Agricultural-Age to Industrial-Ag

land warfare came during the Civil War. Early in the war, when Lee 

Hancock and Meade, he was able to prevail due to their Agricultura

ing. Ulysses Grant brought land warfare into the Industrial Age wi

based on the railroad, steamship, and telegraph plus “shock and aw

mass-produced firepower in a drafted citizen army. While current 

faster and more powerful with longer ranges, the doctrine for their em

not very different from Grant’s strategy. For example, Sherman ma

Sea for much the same reason as Rumsfeld marched to Baghdad, an

using “precision” munitions was very much the same at the Peter

(where a tunnel was used to place explosives under Confederate pos

the precision attacks on Saddam Hussein’s bunkers. This continuity 

Age warfare is mainly due to the lack of changes in the Orientation 

steps in the national OODA cycle. The use of intelligence reporting 

is not very different in today’s Pentagon than it was in Grant’s tent; t

should not expect today’s Decisionmaking to be any more comple

than Grant’s was.

Act

O O 

Act

O O 

Act

O O 

Decision-maker

O O D A

Operations

A

Observer 2

O O D A

Observer 3

O O D A

Observer 1

O O D A

Orienteer

(Analyst)

O O D A

Intelligence

Sense Data

Data Plan

Plan

Orders

Orders Orient Decide

Sense 1

Sense 2

Sense 3

Observe

The Organizational World

Observations are

made on the

physical world

to imple

in the ph

which are converted into symbolic data

that is compared against a symbolic

map to synthesize alternative plans.

A plan is decided

on and operational

orders are given
158

because they occur in the organizational world—not the physical wor

why they will require Quantum thinking—not Newtonian thinking—to 

Common wisdom suggests that Revolutions in Military Affairs (R

intertwined with technological advances. However, the current RMA 

ferent, especially when one reflects on the trend that all the RMAs tha

our ability to Observe and to Act, since U.S. Grant brought land warfa

Industrial Age, appear to be sensor and/or weapons-related. I suggest th

rent revolution is a different kind that is more akin to the revolution

about by the invention of the written word and of the printed word. R

expecting this revolution to change the way we Observe and Act, w

instead look to its changing the way we Orient and Decide.

Communities are built on communication, and one can parallel the 

revolutions that follow the evolution of technology—which change the 

tion and Action steps in the OODA Cycle—with another kind of revo

follows the evolution of communication—which changes the Orien

Decision steps. Humankind evolved organizations using language, 

with the spoken word. A society based on the spoken word could beg

organizations as large as tribes because the Decisionmaker, the king 

could pass orders as far as he could yell or one of his followers cou

remembered order and also he could observe as far as his followers co

retell a remembered observation. 

The second O, orientation—as the repository of our genetic he

cultural tradition, and previous experiences—is the most impo

part of the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we observe, 

way, we decide, the way we act.73

But the tribe would flourish only if the Orienter could pass rememb

riences on to the next generation—where the best hunting grounds were

could tell by the stars or length of day when to start moving south for 

even how to tell which way South is. Societies began to have two kind

ers—a Soldier or Strongman who was responsible for organizational 

and a Teacher or Wiseman who was responsible for organizational O

Advances that empowered control over the physical world also empo

Strongman—fire, tools, domesticated animals, and crop cultivation. 

grew larger but were still limited by the oral tradition; the cultural tr

organizational world model was limited by what could be remembe

73 Col Boyd.
159

protégés to the next generation.

With the invention of the written word—again a technological adv

could become Empires as the Babylonians, Egyptians, Chinese, and 

showed. The Strongman could receive observations written in remot

empire and send orders to the ends of the empire written as royal dec

written word diffused the power of the Wiseman to a class of priests 

who would maintain the organizational Orientation as written text

and libraries. But empires could flourish because societies could rem

orient—over generations through the written word.

With the invention of the printed word, the role of the Strong

change very much but the power of the Wiseman was markedly affe

the financial backers of Gutenberg’s project to build a printing press 

nal who believed that when everyone could read from an identic

power of the Pope would increase. But instead, the power of the W

again diffused down another level—to the bourgeoisie—and to th

kinds of Wisemen who were the Orienteers for society. Clergy like M

and Calvin could print their own version of the Bible and begin t

revolution; scientists like Newton and Leibnitz could trade ideas by w

that all could read and begin a scientific revolution; and political 

Thomas Paine and John Adams could spread new ideas by printin

and newspapers. It was this orientation revolution that provided a 

tradition shared by the printed word that then served as the basis fo

Industrial Age.

I suggest that the invention of electronic communications and 

development of the hyperword is the technology that portends to star

lution as large as those brought about by the spoken word, writte

printed word. And as was seen in those revolutions, I expect that the 

revolution will center on Orientation—how we will build a new ki

cultural tradition built on the hyperword.

Therefore, the key to improving the all-important Orientation ste

enting current organizations. And based on the previous orientation 

expect that the effect of the hyperword will be to empower the Wi

than the Strongman and diffuse that power down yet another level. In 

gest that the key to the Information Age will be to empower the anal

necting or networking him or her with evidence to test hypothese

analysts to test hypotheses cooperatively, with collectors to bring 

support or refute those hypotheses, and with customers to provide 

well as tactical warning.
160

As shown above, information flow in the current IC is streamlined fr

tor to customer, from observer to decisionmaker. Its hierarchical nature 

what one would expect for an organization in an unchanging environme

Cold War where all agreed on a common world model (orientation) 

player-zero-sum-game. But in a time of change, a network is much 

building a new world model (orientation). In a new orientation revolut

being built on the hyperword, one would also expect that a new kind of 

would be critical and a new kind of medium of communication will 

much like the written manuscript or printed book. Lessons learned 

recent team experiments in BW analysis suggest the first steps towar

way of national Orientation will depend on empowering analysts to bu

based “hyperbook.” And I suggest that the first “hyperbooks’ will be 

that can present a 6-D hierarchical MDA model of the world.
161

tion is different and, therefore, lines of communication that enable 

tions to work as an “orientation team” are also different.

Again, it is important to note that the Orientation step is the one th

ing and that Cynthia Grabo’s “strategic warning,” Col Boyd’s “orie

my “models” are different views on the same important concept—an 

can only make decisions that are as smart as the common world

shared by the “Wisemen” of that organization.

How will this new kind of Orientation for the national OODA Cy

In the reoriented IC, intelligence will be hypothesis-driven (em

Down models) rather than collection-driven (employing Bottom-U

will also be proactive (building a worldview by modeling wherever 

sis testing Research Cycle leads) rather than reactive (building a w

response to customer tasking).

The key is providing the all-source analysts the time and tools 

build an MDA model of the target nations or organizations. This com

is then shared upward and downward in the old information flow pat

added links. The common MDA model is posted as a website on In

on the 6-D hierarchical MDA model. 

Experiments in posting an MDA WMD model on Intelink empo

one across the IC who was part of the project. But this depended on t

analysts to provide guidance and orientation:

■ Since DIA took responsibility for posting the common model o

site, CIA and DIA analysts needed to work more closely. DI

ensure that the model posted represented community consensus (o

munity disagreements where needed), and CIA needed to monit

again ensure that the site reflected common assessments but also t

they reflected reporting above the classification of the site (since s

reporting is usually in the realm of the CIA analyst).

■ The first level of intelligence posted was strategic analysis that pr

and easy availability of key assessments to both civilian and mi

makers.

■ The second level of intelligence posted contained detailed descr

MDA that included organizational histories and resumes of key W

nel including those that were assessed to be only dual-use and no

part of the WMD program. This level of information sharing he
162

collection targeting.

■ The most surprising result was that after about a year into the exper

all-source analysts began getting fewer questions and fewer taskers 

tomers even though MDA concentrates on building models rather th

addressing customer concerns. The proactive history and context of 

program is so much more detailed using MDA that new informatio

easier to orient within that larger context. Thus, questions from 

could usually be answered by providing the URL to the appropria

posting. Thereafter, the number of questions dropped dramaticall

ones that came in were much more informed because those custome

had a broader context from what was posted on Intelink.

The two-year IC-wide MDA effort has led to the identification of fou

technology facilities and localization of four known BW facilities in 

country as well as facilitating building an organizational chart and l

players in that country’s BW program.

I suggest that the current IC organization is adequate to bring intelli

the Information Age. By reorienting the lines of communication from 

cal (taskers flowing down and reporting flowing up) to network-like, t

provide strategic warning in a world of WMD and terrorism. The key 

concentrating on fixing the Orientation Step in the national OODA C

the key to that is empowering the collection analyst to become the “Wis

Observing and empowering the all-source analyst to become the “Wis

Orienting.
163

GETTING THERE FROM HERE

We have the methods, tools, and organizations to reorient the IC 

mation-Age intelligence that can build strategic warning. Can we fin

ship to get there?

How can we reorient our intelligence process to think strategical

we have organizations that are designed to act tactically?

From Industrial-Age Reacting to Information-Age Thin

As intelligence collection becomes more sophisticated, volu

expensive, and devices multiply for the rapid reporting and com

exchange and display of the latest information, we must take care th

lose sight of what warning really is: the considered judgment of the fi

minds available, based on an exhaustive and objective review of all a

cations, which is conveyed to the policy official in sufficiently con

guage that he is persuaded of its validity and takes appropriate acti

the national interest.74

//

NOW WE CAN SEE BY

GOING BACK TO THE BEGINNING

The Strategic Game

is one of

Interaction and Isolation

A game in which we must be able to diminish adversary’s ability 

cate or interact with his environment while sustaining or improving 

//

In the new age of WMD and terrorism, the IC is faced with an un

challenge: How can it provide strategic warning in a world of W

massive attack from half-a-world away can occur minutes from now

provide tactical warning in a world of terrorism where adversaries 

74 Grabo, 169.

75 Col Boyd.
164

to meeting this challenge comes from understanding the difference bet

rent intelligence, tactical warning, and strategic warning:

■ Current Intelligence — matching recently collected intel

against warning indicators to predict the next actions of the adv

■ Tactical Warning — warning of potential actions by an adve

which a response can be mounted with current resources.

■ Strategic Warning — warning of potential actions by an adve

which a response will require significant reallocations of resou

Tactical warning is possible from knowledge of what the adversar

now—if one can build knowledge of not only the weapons he has av

also the people and organizations that will employ them. If we can k

they currently have, we can decide what we can do in response with wh

rently have. But for strategic warning, we need first to get inside his hea

ondly to get inside our own heads. The strategic OODA Cycle begins w

to reallocate resources to build a new infrastructure then moves on to a p

that new infrastructure. 

Strategic warning requires understanding the adversary’s strategic 

that plan must begin with a decision to build a new infrastructure. T

WMD one first needs to build them. To employ CBRNE (chemica

cial, radiological, nuclear and explosive) weapons in a terrorist attac

needs to build them. Therefore, the warning analyst needs not only 

the adversary’s capabilities, what he can do now, but also his intenti

he is planning to do.

BUT, those warning analyses have to be ready before the crisis. For 

or terrorists use WMD to start the crisis, we are already too late.

New Assumptions for Information-Age Intelligence

I have indicated a path toward a reoriented IC that can provide strat

ing in a world of WMD and terrorism. The good news is that getting th

sible within a decade given leadership that can transcend Newtonian, 

Age thinking and move to Quantum, Information-Age thinking.

If we want to assess an adversary’s capabilities, we can do s

“connecting the dots.”

If we want to assess an adversary’s intentions, we need to “o

the arrows.”
165

True strategic warning needs to plan ahead not only into the n

Cycle but the Decision Cycle beyond that. The object of intelligen

the object of science—is to predict the future.

Using those quantum assumptions, I have outlined ways to mod

sary, model how we model, and model ourselves that indicate the 

take in our thousand-mile-journey toward an Information-Age IC. 

required methods and the required tools and technologies. We ev

Bigger Faster Technology, 

Fighting against Technologies, and

Instantaneous data leading to 

instantaneous decisions. 

From...

Targeting Objects.

It’s a bipolar world.

It’s “Us” versus “Them.”

From...

One size fits all.

Assessment of capabilities built on

 understanding and identifying

 things—weapons and the

 facilities that make them.

From...

Intelligence that is reactive,

 collection-driven, and

 built on current intelligence

 and tactical warning.

In tactical thinking, faster is better.

Smarter Thinking, 

Out-Thinking Decisionma

Projecting the future only 

knowing the past. 

History Matters!

To...

Targeting Individuals.

It’s a multi-polar world w

nation, organizatio

individual has d

and decisionmakin

processes to reach 

 It’s “Our team” working 

To...

 It all depends.

 Context is critical. 

Assessment of intent built 

standing people an

zations, nations, and 

they built—for it is 

who build WMD an

terrorists.

To...

Intelligence that is proacti

 hypothesis-drivien, a

 built on strategic war

In strategic thinking, smar
166

qgg

based on lessons learned from experiments in MDA of WMD progra

news is that such a process is possible within a decade should we 

apply ourselves to do so.
167

TOWARD AN INFORMATION-AGE IC: 

HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?

Changing cultures usually requires generations. Can we reorient 

from the Newtonian paradigm to a Quantum paradigm in a shorter tim

four generations it took the Navy to go from sail to steam or to go fr

gated to integrated?

From Observations Driving Actions to 

Orientation Driving Decisions

Warning is an intangible, an abstraction, a theory, a deduction, a pe

tion, a belief. It is the product of reasoning or of logic, a hypothesis 

whose validity can be neither confirmed nor refuted until it is too la

The second O, orientation—as the repository of our genetic heritag

tural tradition, and previous experiences—is the most important pa

the O-O-D-A loop since it shapes the way we observe, the way, we 

decide, the way we act.77

The bad news is that reorienting ourselves will not be easy. Our org

are set up on an Industrial-Age model that emphasizes Action driven d

Observation. This is not surprising because thinking logically within t

nian paradigm centered on our command of the physical world. But thi

ically in the emerging quantum paradigm centers on our comma

conceptual world. This means that we need an Information-Age m

emphasizes Decisionmaking driven by timely Orientation. The lead

Industrial-Age RMAs were “Strongmen” or “Soldiers” who made dec

acted. The current RMA portends to be an orientation revolution lik

based on the invention of the printed word that predated and drove the 

Age. The leaders in that kind of revolution were “Wisemen” or “Teac

Martin Luther, Isaac Newton, and Thomas Paine. 

76 Grabo, 4.

77 Col Boyd.
168

the physical world—Observation drives Action. In a rapidly changing 

works work best and the “Teacher” leads by emphasis on the cognitiv

Observation drives Orientation. By examining two RMAs of the secon

can see that such reorientations of organizational thinking usually ta

generations.

We have met the enemy and they are us.

 Pogo

Military Technical Revolutions (MTRs), which change the world by 

technologies, can happen rapidly. The early Civil War battles were b

due to Industrial-age technologies even though the generals were still u

cultural-Age tactics. RMAs, which change the world by changing how 

tions work, happen more slowly. Grant needed to reorganize the way ar

to bring in Industrial-Age strategies. Revolutions in Military Culture 

which change the way organizations think by changing the way that i

that comprise them think, by comparison, happen at a glacial pace.

How Long Does It Take to Change a Culture?

... a naval captain who fought in the Invincible Armada [1588] wou

have been more at home in the typical warship of 1840, than the av

captain of 1840 would have been in the advanced types of the Ame

Civil War [1861-1865].78

 CAPT Alfred Thayer Mahan

 From Sail to Steam

A problem with paradigm shifts is that those who grew up in the old 

have a very difficult time reorienting their own thinking to the new tec

and organizations built on them. This usually means that an MTR can b

RMA in just a few years but an RMC usually takes generations. The rev

the U.S. Navy going from sail to steam provides an example.

78 Alfred Thayer Mahan, From Sail to Steam (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907)
169

Clermont on the Hudson River in 1807.

The ironclads USS Monitor and CSS

Virginia fought in 1862. However, even

after successful use of other ironclad

steam Monitors throughout the remainder of the war, the U.S. Navy was still

very reluctant to give up its sails. The

ability to sail on any point of the compass at will—even into the wind or

when becalmed—changed the tactical

picture, but the technology outstripped

the tactics and organizational thinking.

This period of history was marked by

the days of the “steam sloop”—a true oxymoron. The Navy even 

four-bladed screws on many ships with less efficient two-bladed sc

could be lined up vertically with the keel to increase speed when 

under sail.79

In the Age of Sail officer candidates were trained on-the-job aboar

they were not either enlisted (who bunked in the foc’sle-forecastle-o

ship) or truly officers (who were berthed in the stern), they were b

ships—hence Midshipmen, a name that persists today. Their trainin

informal, usually by the ship’s chaplain, and they learned the ropes q

by climbing masts and furling sails. However, technology and scan

that. With steamships becoming more prevalent throughout the fle

concern about how to train officers on boilers and screws and all the 

principles involved, with the debate focusing in the 1830s on wheth

school to do so. The final blow to shipboard education, however, wa

on board the USS Somers in 1842 in which a Midshipman and two 

spirators were hanged for mutiny. The ship’s Captain was cleared of 

the incident, but since the Midshipman was the son of the Secretar

nephew of a Navy Captain, the ensuing furor led to the foundation 

Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD in 1845. Even though the Naval A

founded in response to the advent of steamships, the paradigm shif

steam was incomplete until the first Midshipman summer cruise wa

steam vessel in 1910.80

79 Sea Power: A Naval History, E. B. Potter, ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institu

117-120, 128, 155-161. 80 Sea Power: A Naval History, 112, 163.

Steam Sloop USS Gale

(built 1871-1879; wrecked 

(Norfolk Naval Shipya
170

Navys sail-to-steam MTR did not begin for another generation with th

sioning of the first steamships in the 1830s, the foundation of the Naval 

in 1845, and the Monitor-Virginia clash in 1862. Even then, the sai

RMC did not truly begin until CAPT Mahan’s book, The Influence of 

on History, began to reorient the Navy in the 1880s, leading to the t

Navy with President Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet and the first Naval 

steamship summer cruise after the turn of the century. Thus it took 

technology almost a century before it became an integral part of Navy 

A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its oppo

and making them see the light, but rather because its opponen

tually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with 

Max Planck

Why the resistance to change? Why does it take generations for a t

It appears that most people solidify their worldview and way of think

they leave school. Whatever they learned in growing up and in form

they later put into practice for the remainder of their careers. 

Example two is the segregation-to-integration revolution in the U.

President Roosevelt moved to integrate the Navy in 1942, but even the

tion only started at the Naval Academy under duress in 1945 with the 

of the first Black Midshipman, Wesley Brown, who graduated from 

Naval Academy in 1948. Even though the color-barrier was supposedly 

wasn’t until 1969 that the fiftieth Black Midshipman graduated. And 

by 1999, the Naval Academy could only boast of four Black graduate

been promoted to Admiral. 

Again it took several generations to go from RMA, with Roosevelt

integrate, to RMC with a totally integrated Navy. President Truman rei

integration goal with an executive order in 1948, establishing a polic

treatment and opportunity in the armed forces, but integration at the Ac

not really occur until the 1970s where the number of Black graduates 

only three in 1971 to over sixty in 1977. Academy graduates from th

paper integrated classes in the late 1940s finally became the Navy’s sen

ship—the Admirals with about thirty years service—in the mid 1970s. 

the first Naval Officers to spend an entire career with an official policy 

81 Sea Power: A Naval History, 162, 174, 192-193. 82 John W. Bodnar, “How Long Does It Take to Change a Culture? Integration at th

Academy,’’ Armed Forces and Society 25, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 286. Cited hereafter as 
171

implement that policy. Also, demographics dictated that until 197

virtually no Black officers in the pool of Admiral candidates. The 

Black graduates made Admiral by 1999—drawing off the classes of 

which graduated only 178 Blacks total—is actually a credit for integ

the probability of an individual Black making Admiral was not v

from that of a white classmate.83

One need only do the addition to track the progression of an RM

brought by an MTR in reference year zero will not have proponents 

with them in senior leadership until almost year thirty at which poi

expect a change in policy and organization to begin an RMA. But 

tion will not “think” in the new paradigm until the students of year 

selves become senior leadership.

The sail-to-steam revolution in the Navy took over half-a-centur

went from sail to steam in the 1840s; the first Midshipman “born an

steamships did not make Admiral until the 1870s, including Mahan

reorient the Navy to “thinking” steamships, but it was not until the 

that everyone in the Navy was trained by the first-generation steamsh

The progression of the 1845 founding of the Naval Academy to th

shipman steamship cruise follows the same pattern: it took Mah

Academy graduate, to reorient his generation before they assumed le

became decisionmakers based on a steamship orientation.

The segregation-to-integration revolution in the Navy is also takin

tury. Naval Academy graduates who were classmates of Wesley Br

“grew up” in a Navy that was always integrated—on paper at leas

became Admirals in the late 1960s, going from “on paper” integr

integration was not an issue because the Navy they knew was alway

The first truly integrated Academy classes of the mid-1970s are fina

senior leadership roles as Admirals as we turn into the new century

the number of Black Admirals increasing dramatically because of th

didate pool of the 1970s but also everyone in today’s Navy never 

when the Navy wasn’t integrated. Thus the reorientation process of s

thinking to integrationist thinking is finally reaching maturity over h

after Roosevelt’s order.

83 Bodnar.
172

to Quantum Thinking?

Just as Multidisciplinary Analysis predicts a lengthy process for an 

to change its strategic thinking, examining our own reorientations to n

gic paradigms indicates that we are subject to the same cultural and in

limitations on change. To predict when the RMC will emerge in the w

change from Industrial-Age thinking to Information-Age thinking, 

need only do the addition and demography.

The MTR for the Information Age began in the 1960s with the 

computers and television and the rise of institutional science in the 

defining chasm in Newtonian versus Quantum thinking is between t

graduated from college prior to and after the 1970s. Those who gradu

to 1970 can no more think in terms of Information-Age technologie

sailing-ship Admirals who learned the ropes as Midshipmen on boa

the 1840s could build pure steamships in the 1870s or the segre

Admirals who built their friendships in a totally white Navy of the 19

think integration in the 1950s. The class of 1975 is now just past fifty 

which means that virtually all our senior leadership in the military an

IF

You graduated from college

Before 1965... 

You’re more comfortable calculating

 than computing.

In the last science class you took, 

 you used a slide rule.

In biology class you 

 cut up dead cats.

You live in the world of 

 the printed word.

Your main source of news is 

 a newspaper or possibly 

 network TV

You are most comfortable writing 

 using a paper and pen 

 and the written word.

After 1980...

You’re more comfortable 

 computing than calculat

In the last science class you 

 you used a calculator.

In biology class you 

 analyzed DNA.

You live in the world of 

 the hyperword.

Your main source of news is 

 CNN or possibly 

 the Web.

You are most comfortable w

 using a computer 

 and the hyperword.
173

biology is about cutting up dead cats.

Projecting the process of the Information-Age reorientation in the 

predict that RMA has not yet begun—mainly due to a lack of leaders

able in the Information-Age paradigm. One can project that the “M

coming orientation revolution has not yet “written his book” (or 

posted his website) because such a “Teacher” needs to be someon

observe and reorient in a world dominated by Newtonian thinking bu

up” in the era of TV and computers. Cynthia Grabo and Col Boyd 

there; they both observed and oriented in an Information-Age worl

by Industrial-Age thinking; but neither were children of the Informa

Projecting from the sail-to-steam and segregation-to-integration r

the Navy leads to a rather gloomy picture. The Information-Age M

the 1960s, but the RMA is just beginning as young leadership—cla

later—who are younger than fifty, begin to build on the questionin

forward-leaning analysts like Grabo and Boyd to orient and build a p

enting the IC. Unfortunately, current attempts at integrating the IC 

the database problem” and building better analysis by building bigg

satellites” bring to mind the era of the steam sloop or the era of an 

Naval Academy that only graduates one or two Black Midshipman a 

The completion of RMC for the Information-Age orientation revo

the advent of an equivalent indicator such as the “Great White Flee

Black Chief of Naval Operations—likely will not come for another 

decades. That will require the rise of an Information-Age generati

ship (currently still in college) who will be taught quantum thinkin

dents of the Cynthia Grabo, Col Boyd, and other forward-leaning t

we afford to wait that long?

175

CAN WE SHIFT A PARADIGM IN A SINGLE GENER

Potentially we can short-circuit the slow pace of the MTR-R

progression to begin to build an Information-Age IC by beg

program to capture the knowledge of senior analysts and to 

the rising analytical leadership to reorient the IC. But we m

step to do so now or the opportunity will be lost for at least 

decade.

Potentially there exist things we can do now to short-circuit the 

MTR-RMA-RMC progression. In my hypothesis for reorienting th

cated that it is much more important for the IC to build a pool o

librarians, and curators than to continue spending its budget on bette

such as new satellites and next-generation computers. Given that the 

eration of leadership still thinks in the old Industrial-Age, “sailing 

digm, it is unlikely that they will place an over-riding emphasis o

broken Orientation step in the national OODA Cycle. Since they a

with an over-riding emphasis on Action driven directly by Observa

we can hope for in at least the next decade is the equivalent of a “ste

where we will acknowledge the new paradigm without letting go of 

RMA will not come from the top down, but perhaps it can be haste

bottom up.

Lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way!

Old Navy Saying

The key to reorienting the IC is building a cadre of WMD and te

lysts who are subject-matter-experts on the history of their particul

terrorist group as well as their particular WMD program, who routin

(or a more-developed successor) and who are comfortable doing 

production based on the hyperword. For convenience, I’ll call the

Generation Reorienters. At this point in history, such analysts are vir

sible to find. If we leave the process of training new ones to the natur

IC-wide leadership, it will take at least two generations. However, gi

demographic distribution of analysts in the IC, there may be a 

remember that history matters and to reorient to Information-Age th

act very soon.

Demography is an historical discipline used by both biologists 

scientists to study populations and to predict the future characteristi
176

have not yet directly incorporated demography into MDA, it is easy 

because the standard demography chart looks like a chemist’s Maxw

mann curve and, therefore, like an organizational chart turned on its 

plotted on a demographic chart is a reflection of experience and skills 

right-to-left demographic axis for a population approximates the bott

power axis on an organizational chart.

Over the next 10 years approximately 50 percent of the techni

experts in the Intelligence Community will retire. The junior a

filling these positions (assuming the positions are filled, and no

inated) may have the technical skills, but certainly will lack th

rience and the issue-based knowledge of their predecessors. T

mature Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) analyst is 

dwindling species. Mastering the implications and subtle poin

S&TI—and its significance for country and regional intelligen

analysis—requires years of study and experience. Our lost S&

lytical capability cannot be purchased quickly, nor for a limite

period, and will literally take years to replace. While CW S&T 

a modest increase over the [1991-2001] period, biological war

(BW) S&T resources decline—a surprising finding, consideri

growing importance. 84

 Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee

We can get a glimpse of the future of the IC by charting its demogra

key for the next decade is the curious bimodal distribution of analy

which follows from hiring practices over the last generation. During th

administration military buildup, the IC expanded and hired many youn

Over the course of their careers, the career path was optimistic, leadi

retention. These are the IC’s Senior Analysts, now in their 50s and earl

they represent a significant portion of the IC’s analytical assets. During 

of their careers, IC-wide hiring was low until the oldest analysts bega

Accordingly, today’s IC has a bimodal distribution of analysts by a

Analysts in their 50s and 60s and Junior Analysts in their late 20s and 

very few analysts in the 35- to 50-year-old range.

The Senior Analysts embody the IC’s corporate knowledge with tw

decades’ worth of experience as subject matter experts in their various 

84Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee, “The Health of Scientific an

Intelligence: A Study Conducted by the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Comm

1998).
177

nations as well as on traditional S&T knowledge acquired prior to 

IC. As such, they cannot be First-Generation Reorienters becaus

likely have amassed their “shoeboxes” in paper, or at best MS Word 

not likely to be actively involved in database usage, open-source ex

MDA. However, their knowledge, both what they know and wh

stored in their “shoeboxes,” represents the historical baseline neede

MDA process.

On the other hand, the young analysts are children of the Informa

very computer and database savvy. From anecdotal observations o

analysts, I have noted that they can very rapidly use both classifie

source databases to build a “shoebox” and electronic “3x5 card” d

senior analytical guidance, and are very interested in the IC’s imple

computer analytical tools for their use. As such they can become Firs

Reorienters if they can be educated in the analytical art and can get 

historical baseline required for MDA.

A First Step to Get There from Here

If the IC can change its emphasis from turning outward to han

taskers to turning inward to rebuild itself for the Information Age, th

sible path to address the two major personnel challenges it faces—b

sizing “teachers” rather than “soldiers” to provide the leadership. 

The first major challenge to reorient the IC in our lifetime is to 

knowledge of the Senior Analysts. This requires two parts:

■ Senior Analysts need to mentor young analysts to transition 

knowledge to the next generation. This will likely require h

analysts since many WMD accounts have only a sing

assigned, and a Senior Analyst cannot mentor a young anal

WMD account unless the young analyst is available and no

on another account (where he or she has no senior analy

ance), or is assigned to a “crisis support team.”

Strategic thinking and strategic planning go out to the next Decis

The most effective organization is one that can execute the curre

rapidly and efficiently as possible while simultaneously rebuildin

a new plan. 
178

■ The IC needs to hire enough IT and analytical support contra

preserve the Senior Analysts’ “shoeboxes” and extract the e

from them into a standardized “entity database.” Experienc

several MDA experiments has indicated that tools to perform 

day WMD analysis of a target country are in place or can 

shortly in the pipeline, BUT turning the historical record fr

printed word (or the printed word merely saved in electronic 

to hyperword is a daunting task that requires additional sho

help. A decade after the advent of the Internet in our current re

tion revolution, we are at the equivalent of a decade after Gu

printed his first Bible: printing any new books is straightforw

they are written; but it is only after we have gone back and prin

sions of all the written books in the libraries that enough copies 

available to empower the “analysts” like Luther, and Newt

Paine.

The preservation of the historical record represented by the Senior A

“shoeboxes” must be addressed now because any time a Senior Analy

and the young analyst who replaces him or her shreds all those do

(because they are merely on paper), a piece of our corporate knowled

forever.
179

ing the Rising Analytical Leadership. By following the demographi

we can see that a decade in the future virtually all of today’s Senior 

have retired. Given the gap in longevity today, that means that o

decade the mantle of “senior analyst” will rapidly move from analys

their 50s today to analysts who in their 30s today, meaning that the IC

knowledge is in for a huge drop—one that is already starting. Furthe

is nothing that we can do about it now because the gap in hiring ove

decades cannot be repaired in any way. There is no academic or indu

“analysts” like there is of lawyers or doctors that can be tapped to bri

enced analysts; analysts must be trained from scratch by the IC. Th

ever, a very small cadre of young analysts at the front edge of the 

age curve who are the Rising Analytical Leadership for the Informat

The Rising Analytical Leadership is a very small and very precio

IC: very small because there are few analysts who have entered t

1990s and have stayed for five to ten years to become leaders, and v

because these are the only candidates to become First-Generatio

These analysts are mature enough to understand the analytical proc

amassed a personal knowledge base both in their heads and in their 

yet young enough to be computer- and database-literate. These ar

who will lead the IC into the Information Age.

Unfortunately, this is the very group that is being squeezed out 

Industrial-Age personnel policies. There is no career pattern for the 

lytical Leadership. On one hand, they have hit a dead-end waiting f

Analysts to retire because all the senior billets are already encumb

other hand, they have begun to assume responsibilities well beyond 

ence level due to the huge gap in leadership ahead of them. In additio

there is a “database” problem to be addressed, it is those analysts wh

to solve it, not the Senior Analysts—who are considered database ill

How Long Does it Take to Change a Culture? It Is Up t

A multidimensional analysis of the IC suggests both good news a

Every member of the Rising Analytical Leadership—the GS-1

late 30s who are now the subject matter experts on WMD an

accounts IC-wide—who leaves the IC due to lack of career ad

opportunities is a potential First-Generation Orienter who cannot 

for almost two more decades.
180

build methods and tools and reorient ourselves to provide strategic war

age of WMD and terrorism. Multidisciplinary Analysis (MDA) is a fir

tion, Information-Age method that can serve as a basis for building be

ods, and MS Word and PowerPoint are powerful tools that can serve as 

building better tools as long as we keep in mind that analysis is bas

research OODA Cycle which is commonly called hypothesis testin

ments in employing MDA on state-run WMD programs and terroris

programs have shown that the methods, tools, and organizations are in 

Information-Age strategic analysis.

On the other hand, the major hurdle to an Information-Age IC is the 

that it is the Orientation step in the national OODA Cycle that is broke

to implement Information-Age strategic analysis the IC needs to reo

from an emphasis on Observation-driven Action to an emphasis on O

driven Decisionmaking. That reorientation requires quantum thinking a

IC leadership still operates on Newtonian thinking. This means that a 

reorientation of the IC cannot begin for another generation when the cu

ership retires and a new generation of senior leadership grows up that i

able with quantum models as outlined by Grabo and Boyd.

However, there is a possibility for bottom-up reorientation of the IC 

cadre of Rising Analytical Leadership old enough to know that histor

yet young enough to be comfortable with computers and databases. 

empower that cadre to lead the reorientation of the IC, we can potenti

generation and start the process now. But if that cadre is lost, the IC w

rebuild itself virtually from scratch, and will not have the expertise to d

least a decade.
181

Bodnar, John W. “How Long Does It Take to Change a Culture? I

the U.S. Naval Academy.” Armed Forces and Society 25, no. 2 (W

289-306.

Boyd, Col John R. A Discourse on Winning and Losing. Collectio

bered briefing slides. August 1987. 

Clark, Robert M. “Model Based Predictive Techniques.” Le

National Security Agency in 2001. (Available in: Robert M. Clark

Analysis. CQ Press, 2003).

Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic 

Jan Goldman. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College

Strategic Intelligence Research, 2002.

Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago

sity of Chicago Press, 3rd edition, 1996.

Krygiel, Annette J. Behind the Wizard’s Curtain: An Integration 

for a System of Systems. Washington, DC: National Defense Univers

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. From Sail to Steam: Recollections of Nav

York: Harper & Brothers, 1907.

Rue, GySgt Steven S., USMC. The Breakdown of the PC Paradig

tion Display Technology As Analysis Inhibitor. MSSI Thesis. Wash

Joint Military Intelligence College, August 2003.

Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee. “The Health of S

Technical Intelligence: A Study Conducted by the Scientific and Tec

ligence Committee.” April 1998.

183

3x5 card deck 51,134,137,142,145,155

6-D charts 86-88, 94, 100

energy considerations 88, 90, 94

maps 87, 101

organization charts 93, 100, 117

timelines 87, 102

9/11 1, 4, 56, 80

A

Afghan War 33, 36-37, 41

Agricultural Age 17, 157, 168

Analysis, capability vs intent 14, 81, 121, 164

Jacoby, VADM Lowell 6

Asymmetric warfare, Williams, LTG James, USAF 5-6

B

Bohr Neils, complementarity principle 21, 25-26

Boyd, COL John 12

Clausewitz 27, 147

command and control 152-153

Darwin 27, 147

Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle 27, 147

history 34

Napoleon 34

OODA Cycle 12, 30, 35, 38, 123, 136, 153

orientation 30, 38 43, 152-153, 156, 167

Second Law of Thermodynamics 30, 147

Sun Tzu 34

Strategic Game 163

C

CBRNE - see WMD

Chinese embassy 55-56

Clark, Robert, intelligence cycle 79-80

Clausewitz 27

Cognitive (organizational) 74, 167

Cold War 33, 36, 40, 124

Complementarity Principle 21, 25-26
184

Data, dimensionality 46, 52, 86

massive 45

retrieval 133, 141, 151

 “shoebox” 133, 141, 151, 155, 177

Databases 49, 56, 133, 141, 142

entity 141-142

Data-mining 50-51, 141

Decision Cycle - see OODA Cycle

Digital Production System (DPS) 152

Dimensionality - see data, dimensionality

E

Emergent properties 96

Evidence 132-149

extraction 134, 144

homology searching 138

marshalling 135

Evidence and theory formulation 136

F

First-Generation Reorienters 175, 179

G

Grabo, Cynthia 5

analysis vs facts 56, 94, 149, 163

analyzing capability vs analyzing intent 14, 18, 120

current intelligence 9

evidence 148-149

judgments 155, 163

intent 81

logistics 81-82

order-of-battle (OB) 125

OSINT 111-112

strategic warning 9-10, 70, 120

tactical warning 9

warning analysis 14, 85, 125, 149, 167

warning intelligence 4-5, 9-15
185

Heisenberg, Werner 21, 111

Heisenberg, Uncertainty Principle 21, 25-26, 32, 147

Historians/History 14, 48-51, 132, 175

History,organizational 103

Homology searching 138

HUMINT 33-34, 41, 108, 111, 113, 142, 156, 160

Hyperbook 160

Hyperword 160, 172, 175, 179

Hypothesis testing - see Models, hypothesis testing

I

IMINT 33-34, 113, 142, 156, 160

Industrial Age 17-18, 71, 77, 157, 167

Information Age 17-18, 71, 77

Information flow 63-71, 156, 160

Information Overload 55

Intelink 160

Intelligence Community (IC) 48, 151, 154

age distribution 178

corporate knowledge 177-179

need for mentoring 179

need for training new analytical leadership 180

teamwork 154

Intelligence, Current 1, 9-12, 69, 164

Intelligence Cycle 80

Intelligence, assumptions for Information Age 164-165

Intelligence, warning - see warning

Intelligence, Warning, Williams, LTG James, USAF, 5-6

J

Jacoby, VADM Lowell, analysis 6

K

Krygiel, Annette, systems of systems 123, 140, 151-152

Krygiel, Annette, Digital Production System (DPS) 152

Kuhn Thomas, paradigm shifts 21, 26
186

Library 47-48, 133-145

Librarians 45-49

M

Mahan, Alfred Thayer 168

MASINT 33-34

Maxwell-Boltzmann Plot 88

Military Technical Revolution (MTR) 19, 167, 175

Models, analog 29

analog vs digital 30-34

bottom-up vs top-down 97, 136-137

complementarity principle 31, 35, 39

digital 29

hypothesis-testing 125-145

Newtonian 29

structure vs function 98

two-player zero-sum vs multiplayer no-zero-sum 39

requirement for new 50, 53, 77-78

Multidimensional Analysis (MDA) 99, 104-116, 154

assessing intent 120-121

assessment building 132.

building resumes 104

building institutional profile 106

BW vulnerability 115

use of HUMINT 107-110

hypothesis-testing 128-129

use of Intelink 161

use of OSINT 111-114

strategic analysis 107-110, 114-116, 149-150

targeting collection 108-114, 119

WMD and terrorism 118-119, 150

N

Newton, Isaac 17

Newtonian science 17-18, 27, 29, 73, 157

Novel Intelligence from Massive Data (NIMD) 45-46
187

OODA Cycle 12, 38, 167

Actor 62,102

and hypothesis testing 125-126

Logistics Cycle 75

modeling 17

national 153, 161, 179-180

Observer 75, 127

orientation 15, 38, 180

Orienter 75, 127, 158

intelligence vs operations 58-59, 64-65, 67-69, 81

need to plan two cycles ahead 70, 81-82, 165

Operations Cycle 75

Organization charts 61

Organizations 58-60

biological 58-59

hierarchies and networks compared 60-62

hierarchies 58-59

networks 58, 80

 “Orient the arrows,” 15, 86-95, 154, 164

Orientation 15, 30, 43, 70-71, 127, 152-154, 157

OSINT 111, 113, 156, 160

P

Paradigm shift 21, 66, 169, 175

Pearl Harbor 3, 5, 68

Physical world 74

Planck, Max 170

Printed word 172

R

Reorienting the IC 175

Reorienters, First-Generation 175, 179

Resource allocation

“guns” vs “butter” 1-2, 60, 63-64

intelligence vs operations 60, 63-64

today vs tomorrow 60, 63-64

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 17-18, 157-158, 167, 172-1

RMA, definition 19
188

RMC, definition 19

RMC, emergence of new 172-173

Rue, GYSGT Steven, hypothesis-testing 136

S

Science

bioinformatics 131, 138

biology 18, 175-176

chemistry 18

physics 18, 170

political 175-176

Science vs intelligence 17

SIGINT 113, 156, 160

Spoken word 159

Sputnik 1, 68

Strategic warning 11, 149-150

Strongman and Wiseman 159, 167

Submariners, time-motion-analysis (TMA) 52-53

systems of systems 123, 151-152

T

Tactical warning 11, 69, 164

Terrorism 80-81

Terrorism, OSINT collection 114

Theory 132, 136-137

Thermodynamics, Second Law of 30

Timelines 57, 61

U

US Naval Academy 169-170

W

Warning 1, 6, 10

Warning analysis 11-13, 83-85

Warning, Strategic, Definition 1, 164

Warning Tactical, Definition 1, 164

Williams, LTG James, USAF, asymmetric warfare & warning intelli

Wiseman and Strongman 159, 167
189

CBRNE 81, 114

dual use 14, 18

Written word 159
190

John Bodnar has recently completed a year as a Research Fellow a

Military Intelligence College on sabbatical from his position as a biolo

fare analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He served twenty-thre

the Navy in the submarine force and Naval Reserves. As a technology 

the Naval Reserves, CAPT Bodnar was associated with the Office 

Research and the Naval War College where he published several pap

Revolution in Military Affairs. He completed a doctorate in biochemis

gon State University and postdoctoral training in virology at Yale Unive

research biologist, Dr. Bodnar was a faculty member at Northeastern 

and the U.S. Naval Academy and is currently an adjunct professor at 

College where he teaches bioinformatics. Dr Bodnar’s biological res

included laboratory studies on viral growth and cellular structures as we

retical studies and computer simulations on the dynamics of gene ne

embryogenesis and organismal development. As a defense analyst, D

has applied his network modeling approaches to several national and ter

logical warfare programs and has provided analytical guidance to severa

programs aimed at integrating computer technologies with analysis. T

may be contacted at JWBodnar70@hotmail.com or Bodnars@comcast

xiv

Bodnar, John W. Warning Analysis for the Information Age: R

Intelligence Process, 2003.

Intelligence Professionalism in the Americas. Russell G. Swenso

C. Lemozy, eds., 2003.

Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Pract

G. Swenson, ed., 2003.

Grabo, Cynthia M. Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic 

Goldman, ed., 2002.

Clift, A. Denis. Clift Notes, 2nd Ed. James S. Major, ed., 2002.

Ensign, Eric S., LT, USCG. Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea

2001. 

Clift, A. Denis. Clift Notes. James S. Major, ed., 2000.

Pickert, Perry L. Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action