alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2*


Section 1350 Certification


        I, Steven G. Larson, the chief financial officer of LaserCard
Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), certify pursuant to section
1350 of chapter 63 of title 18 of the United States Code that, to my knowledge:

        (i) the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period
ending June 30, 2005 (the "Report"), fully complies with the requirements of
section 13(a) or 15(d), whichever is applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and

        (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date:    August 8, 2005


/s/ Steven G. Larson
--------------------
Steven G. Larson


-----------------------

*       The material contained in this Exhibit 32.2 is not deemed "filed" with
the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the
Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
whether made before or after the date hereof and irrespective of any general
incorporation language contained in such filing.


                                       38
Exhibit 10.7  


COMMON SECURITIES CERTIFICATE  


        THIS COMMON SECURITY HAS NOT BEEN REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, AS AMENDED, OR ANY STATE SECURITIES LAWS OR ANY OTHER
APPLICABLE SECURITIES LAWS AND MAY NOT BE OFFERED, SOLD, PLEDGED OR OTHERWISE TRANSFERRED EXCEPT PURSUANT TO AN EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION. THIS CERTIFICATE IS NOT TRANSFERABLE EXCEPT IN COMPLIANCE
WITH APPLICABLE LAW AND SECTION 5.11 OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT  



	Certificate Number	 	Number of Common Securities: 1,238
	C-1	 	 




Certificate Evidencing Common Securities  


 of  


 BRESLER & REINER STATUTORY TRUST I  


 Common Securities  


 (liquidation amount $1,000 per Common Security)  


        Bresler & Reiner Statutory Trust I, a statutory trust created under the laws of the State of Delaware (the
"Trust"), hereby certifies that Bresler & Reiner, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the
"Holder") is the registered owner of 1,238 common securities of the Trust representing undivided common beneficial interests in the assets of the Trust
and designated the Bresler & Reiner Statutory Trust I Common Securities (liquidation amount $1,000 per Common Security) (the "Common
Securities"). Except in accordance with Section 5.11 of the Trust Agreement (as defined below), the Common Securities are
not transferable and, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any attempted transfer hereof other than in accordance therewith shall be void. The designations, rights, privileges, restrictions,
preferences and other terms and provisions of the Common Securities are set forth in, and this certificate and the Common Securities represented hereby are issued and shall in all respects be subject
to the terms and provisions of, the Amended and Restated Trust Agreement of the Trust, dated as of November 29, 2005 as the same may be amended from time to time (the
"Trust Agreement"), among Bresler & Reiner, Inc., as Depositor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Property Trustee, Chase Bank
USA, National Association, as Delaware Trustee, the Administrative Trustees named therein and the Holders, from time to time, of Trust Securities. The Trust will furnish a copy of the Trust Agreement
to the Holder without charge upon written request to the Trust at its principal place of business or registered office. 


        Upon
receipt of this certificate, the Holder is bound by the Trust Agreement and is entitled to the benefits thereunder. 


        This
Common Securities Certificate shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware. 


        Terms
used but not defined herein have the meanings set forth in the Trust Agreement. 


        IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, one of the Administrative Trustees of the Trust has executed on behalf of the Trust this certificate this 29th day of November, 2005. 



	 	BRESLER & REINER STATUTORY TRUST I
	
 	

By:	

/s/  SIDNEY M. BRESLER      

	 	 	Name:  Sidney M. Bresler
 Administrative Trustee
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2710

BARRY K. MCCLAMROCK,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

CARLTON M. DEVORE,

Plaintiff,

versus

CONCORD, NORTH CAROLINA CITY, a North Carolina

Municipal Corporation; WILLIAM MORRISON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Russell A. Eliason, Magistrate Judge. (CA-95-223-4)

Submitted: April 20, 1999 Decided: June 7, 1999

Before NIEMEYER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.
2

Barry K. McClamrock, Appellant Pro Se. Anne E. Essaye, KILPATRICK

STOCKTON, L.L.P, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).

3

PER CURIAM:

Barry McClamrock appeals the magistrate judge’s orders* denying him an extension of time to appeal and denying reconsideration.

The magistrate judge denied an extension of time by order dated

September 1, 1998. McClamrock had thirty days to appeal from this

order under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1). This time

period is mandatory and jurisdictional. See Browder v. Director,

Dep’t of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978).

McClamrock filed his notice of appeal on October 20, 1998.

Because he failed to timely appeal, or obtain an extension of the

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or (6), we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal to the extent he seeks review of the

magistrate judge’s September order. While McClamrock’s appeal is

timely as to the magistrate judge’s order denying reconsideration,

we find that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by

denying the motion. See NOW v. Operation Rescue, 47 F.3d 667, 669

(4th Cir. 1995) (discussing standard for reviewing motions filed

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)). Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s order denying reconsideration. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
4

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
#### Stuart G. Ballin, Appellant, v. Margaret S. Ballin, Respondent.

Order, entered on February 19, 1963, denying plaintiff's motion to modify judgment of separation with respect to custody, unanimously affirmed, without costs and without prejudice to an application by defendant at Special Term for counsel fees. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Eager and Steuer, JJ,
### §2952. Time of making annual reports

Except when a different time is specifically prescribed by statute, the head of each Executive department or military department shall make the annual reports, required to be submitted to Congress, at the beginning of each regular session of Congress. The reports shall cover the transactions of the preceding year.

(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 413.)

| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5 U.S.C. 106. | R.S. §195. |

Statutes at Large

The words "Executive department" are substituted for "department" as the definition of "department" applicable to this section is coextensive with the definition of "Executive department" in section 101.

The words "or military department" are inserted to preserve the application of the source law. Before enactment of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 578), the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force were Executive departments. The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 established the Department of Defense as an Executive Department including the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force as military departments, not as Executive departments. However, the source law for this section, which was in effect in 1949, remained applicable to the Secretaries of the military departments by virtue of section 12(g) of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 591), which is set out in the reviser's note for section 301.

This section was part of title IV of the Revised Statutes. The Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 201(d), as added Aug. 10, 1949, ch. 412, §4, 63 Stat. 579 (former 5 U.S.C. 171–1), which provides "Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [National Security Act of 1947], the provisions of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended shall be applicable to the Department of Defense" is omitted from this title but is not repealed.

Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 123 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 123

 Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on Education and 
         the Workforce in the One Hundred Eighteenth Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 10, 2023

    Ms. Foxx (for herself and Mr. Scott of Virginia) submitted the 
  following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House 
                             Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on Education and 
         the Workforce in the One Hundred Eighteenth Congress.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. AMOUNTS FOR COMMITTEE EXPENSES.

    For the expenses of the Committee on Education and the Workforce 
(hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Committee''), 
including the expenses of all staff salaries, there shall be paid, out 
of the applicable accounts of the House of Representatives for 
committee salaries and expenses, not more than $19,066,789 for the One 
Hundred Eighteenth Congress.

SEC. 2. SESSION LIMITATIONS.

    Of the amount specified in section 1--
            (1) not more than $9,255,723 shall be available for 
        expenses incurred during the period beginning at noon on 
        January 3, 2023, and ending immediately before noon on January 
        3, 2024; and
            (2) not more than $9,811,066 shall be available for 
        expenses incurred during the period beginning at noon on 
        January 3, 2024, and ending immediately before noon on January 
        3, 2025.

SEC. 3. VOUCHERS.

    Payments under this resolution shall be made on vouchers authorized 
by the Committee, signed by the Chairman of the Committee, and approved 
in the manner directed by the Committee on House Administration.

SEC. 4. REGULATIONS.

    Amounts made available under this resolution shall be expended in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House 
Administration.
                                 <all>
```
#### Freda Wincon, appellant, v. Dennis J. Egan et al., appellees.

Gen. No. 29,857.

Motion to vacate order quashing writ of replevin and ordering return of replevied property. Motion denied. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. John H. Marshall, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1924.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed April 13, 1925.

Novak & Novak, for appellant; Frank H. Novak, of counsel.

Harold 0. Mulks, for appellees.

Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.
### §203. Functions transferred

In accordance with subchapter XII (relating to transition provisions), there shall be transferred to the Secretary the functions, personnel, assets, and liabilities of—

(1) the United States Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, including the functions of the Secretary of the Treasury relating thereto;

(2) the Transportation Security Administration of the Department of Transportation, including the functions of the Secretary of Transportation, and of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, relating thereto;

(3) the Federal Protective Service of the General Services Administration, including the functions of the Administrator of General Services relating thereto;

(4) the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center of the Department of the Treasury; and

(5) the Office for Domestic Preparedness of the Office of Justice Programs, including the functions of the Attorney General relating thereto.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title IV, §403, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2178.)
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Thelma Lohaus, Appellant, v. Adam Lohaus, Respondent.

In a habeas corpus proceeding between parents to determine the custody of their eight-year-old son, the mother (the petitioner) appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated June 22, 1960, made after a hearing, which dismissed her writ of habeas corpus and directed that custody of the son be continued in the father “for the time being,” subject to stated rights of visitation by the mother. Order reversed on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, writ sustained, and custody awarded to the mother, subject to rights of visitation by the father on Tuesday and Thursday of each week from 3:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. ; on alternate Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.; on alternate Sundays from 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.; for two weeks during July or August, at a time, selected by the father, when the mother is not on vacation; for the second half of the school Christmas vacation; and at such other times as may be agreed upon between the parents. Findings of fact which may be inconsistent herewith are reversed, and new findings are made as indicated herein. In our opinion, the interests of the child will be best served by an award of custody to the mother, with liberal visitation rights to the father (cf. *People ex rel. Pritchett*v. *Pritchett,*1 A D 2d 1009, affd. 2 N Y 2d 947, 949). There is nothing in this record to indicate that the mother has not been a good mother, or that she cannot furnish a normal, decent home for the child. The father, though apparently a decent, industrious man, has a temperament and characteristics which, in our opinion, unsuit him for full-time custody and care of this young child. Nor, on this record, are we prepared to say that the mother lacked justification for her removal from the family home. In any event, the child’s tender age, coupled with the other factors here present, require an award of custody to the mother (cf. *People ex rel. Pritchett*v. *Pritchett, supra).*While we believe that the father is unsuited for full-time custody, we believe that he is suited for and entitled to liberal visitation rights. Beldock, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COUNTY OF BEAVER, BY AND

THROUGH THE BEAVER COUNTY

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS AND

THE BEAVER COUNTY

CONTROLLERS OFFICE,

 Respondents

 v.

MYRON R. SAINOVICH, AN INDIVIDUAL

AND SAINOVICH, SANTICOLA &

STEELE, A PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN

AS SAINOVICH & SANTICOLA, P.C.),

 Petitioners

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No. 366 WAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Tara A. McCarthy, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[835 NYS2d 462]—

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed November 8, 2005, which ruled that claimant’s request for a hearing was untimely.

After an initial determination found claimant to be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, the employer requested a hearing. When the employer failed to appear at the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a default decision sustaining the initial determination. The employer applied to reopen the default and a telephone conference hearing was conducted. Claimant did not answer her phone in order to participate in the hearing, following which the Administrative Law Judge granted the employer’s application to reopen and ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because she had voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Based upon the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, a new determination was issued on November 25, 2003, which claimant admittedly received, holding claimant ineligible to receive benefits, charging her with a recoverable overpayment and reducing her right to future benefits by eight effective days. Claimant subsequently sent a letter, received by the Department of Labor on July 25, 2005, requesting an opportunity to present arguments as to why the new determination was erroneous. Following a hearing on claimant’s letter request, the Administrative Law Judge found that claimant’s request for a hearing was not timely *(see*Labor Law § 620 [1] [a]) and sustained the Commissioner of Labor’s timeliness objection. The Administrative Law Judge likewise found that the case should not be reopened pursuant to 12 NYCRR 461.8. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board affirmed, prompting this appeal.

We affirm. Claimant neither requested a hearing within 30 days of the mailing of the determination by which she was aggrieved nor established a reasonable excuse for the delay in doing so *(see*Labor Law § 620 [1] [a]). Thus, we find no reason to disturb the Board’s decision that the request was untimely *(see Matter of Ronn [Commissioner of Labor],*34 AD3d 900, 901 [2006]; *Matter of Alkovic [Gold Shield Sec. & Investigation, Inc.—Commissioner of Labor],*32 AD3d 1062, 1063 [2006]). *994Further, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the denial of the application to reopen the case *(see 12*NYCRR 461.8; *Matter of Johnson [Commissioner of Labor],*298 AD2d 756 [2002]). Finally, despite claimant’s attempts to argue the merits of her case upon this appeal, we note that the merits of her disqualification for benefits are not properly before this Court *(see Matter of Wood [Commissioner of Labor],*24 AD3d 854, 855 [2005]).

Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Mugglin, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
EXHIBIT 32.2

EAGLE EXPLORATION COMPANY AND SUBSIDIARIES

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted

Pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Paul M. Joeckel, the Secretary/Vice President Operations of Eagle Exploration Company, (the Company), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the best of my knowledge:



|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated February 14, 2007



/s/ Paul M. JoeckelName:

Paul M. JoeckelTitle:

Secretary/Vice President Operations
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-7213

SAMUEL HAYWOOD MYLES,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

CHAPLAIN WALLACE, In his individual capacity and his 

official capacity; CHAPLAIN KOWALEZYK, In his individual 

capacity and his official capacity; CHAPLAIN ELLIOTT, In 

his individual capacity and his official capacity,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior

District Judge. (2:07-cv-00043-REM-JES)

Submitted: January 13, 2011 Decided: January 19, 2011

Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Samuel Haywood Myles, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Samuel Haywood Myles seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order adopting the report and recommendation of the 

magistrate judge. We dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. 

When the United States or its officer or agency is a 

party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty 

days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or 

order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court 

extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or 

reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he 

timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 

jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 

214 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket 

on April 8, 2010. The notice of appeal was filed on June 14, 

2010.*

 *

For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date 

appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could 

have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to 

the court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 

(1988). 

 Because Myles failed to file a timely notice of appeal or 

to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we 

dismiss the appeal. We deny Myles’ motion for inquiry and 

classification as moot. We dispense with oral argument because 
3

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

NO. CAAP-21-0000717

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

STATE OF HAWAI I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. YOUNGHUN BAIK, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

HONOLULU DIVISION (CASE NO. 1DTA-19-01614)

ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION TO DISMISS (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Leonard and Wadsworth, JJ.) Upon consideration of the Stipulation for Dismissal of Appeal, filed April 14, 2022, by Defendant-Appellant Younghun Baik (Baik), the papers in support, and the record, it appears that the parties stipulate to dismiss this docketed appeal, under Hawai i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 42(b), attached to the stipulation is Baik's declaration showing he understands the consequences of voluntary dismissal, consistent with HRAP Rule 42(c), and there are no outstanding fees or costs due.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Stipulation for Dismissal of Appeal is approved and the appeal is dismissed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, April 22, 2022. /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Chief Judge /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Associate Judge /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth Associate Judge

Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-21-0000717 22-APR-2022 08:08 AM Dkt. 14 OAWST
May 26, 1977.

M. P. No. 76-241.

#### Donald A. Demers, Jr. *v.*James W. Mullen, *Warden.*

*Robert B. Mann,*for petitioner.

*Julius C. Michael-son,*Attorney General, *John R. McDermott,*Special Asst. Attorney General, for respondent.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied as moot.