CTNSP Special Report

INSS

 Transatlantic Homeland Defense

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

www.ndu.edu

Context

T

his paper proposes an initiative to 

enhance transatlantic homeland 

defense at the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) November 2006 Riga 

Summit and beyond. As NATO develops its 

capabilities for expeditionary operations, 

it needs to revitalize plans and capabilities essential to realize its core mission: 

protecting Alliance territory as outlined in 

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This 

back-to-basics approach is designed to 

ensure that Allies can protect the transatlantic homeland against an array of new 

threats and challenges. This initiative 

would unfold in the context of broader 

efforts to protect the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO is but one of many institutions—national and international, governmental and nongovernmental—involved in 

societal security.

Key Points

Homeland defense—that is, the military’s 

role in preventing and defending against terrorist attacks on the territory of Alliance members—is an increasingly important imperative 

for the United States, Canada and Europe. NATO 

has the opportunity to articulate a strategic 

direction and planning process for homeland 

defense to ensure that relevant Alliance activities 

and capabilities are adapted and integrated to 

deal with these new threats. NATO’s activities 

in many areas—for example, its protection of 

Mediterranean sealanes against weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and terrorists—provide 

multiple elements that can be united to form a 

homeland defense initiative at Riga. Such an 

initiative would be intended to complement, 

not detract from, national and European Union 

(EU) capabilities and institutions that bear the 

major responsibility for ensuring homeland 

security. This initiative would offer NATO both 

a 21st-century approach to Article 5 and new 

meaning and credibility in the eyes of NATO 

publics who are concerned about threats to 

their homelands.1

This report proposes that enhanced transatlantic homeland defense be a major initiative 

for adoption at the 2006 Riga Summit and 

completion at the 2008 summit. Accompanying 

this initiative would be parallel proposals on 

strengthening partnerships with nonmembers 

and further improving NATO’s military forces 

and capabilities for new-era missions. The 

initiative would include four categories of 

homeland defense, none of which would address 

expeditionary, counterterrorism, natural disaster, 

and humanitarian missions outside the NATO 

area. In some cases, capabilities created for 

homeland defense purposes could be used 

within and outside the NATO area for such 

civil-military missions. The four categories are:

n guarding the approaches and achieving 

border security for the NATO region

n pursuing enhanced/integrated 

and linked continental early warning and 

air/missile defense capabilities

n preventing and managing terrorist 

incidents

n strengthening transatlantic capabilities 

for consequence management, ranging from 

terrorist use of WMD to large-scale natural 

disasters.

NATO and its members already possess 

noteworthy capabilities in some respects in 

these areas, but their capacity to act as a fully 

organized and capable alliance is not well 

developed. NATO will need improvements in 

physical assets and strengthened strategic 

planning and operating capacities. It also will 

require close coordination and harmonization 

with national governments, many of which 

view control of homeland security resources as 

vital manifestations of their sovereignty. The 

ultimate outcome of decisive action in these 

areas would be enhanced NATO capabilities to 

protect member airports, seaports, maritime 

approaches, and critical infrastructure; defend 

against future missile threats; prevent and 

manage terrorist incidents; and react promptly 

to WMD use.

NATO–EU Cooperation

The rationale for a NATO homeland 

defense initiative is that the vital interests of

all member nations are involved; hence, 

their cooperation will be critical to achieving 

improved capabilities. NATO’s political and 

practical collaboration with the European 

Union will also be crucial. Many Europeans 

view the EU as the main institution for promoting European integration across a spectrum of 

economic, political, and—increasingly—foreign policy and security activities. To be successful, a NATO initiative on homeland defense 

would have to complement existing national 

and EU programs. It also would have to provide 

an important collaborative role for the EU, 

Special Report 

This report is a joint project of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at 

the National Defense University. It was prepared by Neyla Arnas, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen J. Flanagan, Stuart E. Johnson, Richard L. Kugler, 

Leo G. Michel, Anne M. Moisan, Jeffrey Simon, and Kimberley L. Thachuk.

May 2006
which is seeking to develop a value-added role

to complement and integrate national capabilities 

for civilian and civil-military crisis management. 

As a consequence, many common European 

capabilities related to societal/homeland security 

and emergency response (such as customs, 

police cooperation, environmental security, and 

information-sharing) are likely to be housed 

within the EU in the future.2 Since 19 of the 25 

EU member states are members of NATO, and 

4 of the remaining 6 are Partnership for Peace 

(PFP) members, they are unlikely to be inclined 

to duplicate activities in NATO and/or the 

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to 

which they already are committed in an EU 

context. An initiative linking NATO and the 

EU in a common cause could have a positive 

impact on their cooperation in other areas as 

well, such as civil-military operations outside 

the Euro-Atlantic space. In short, the proposed 

approach would create a win-win outcome 

rather than a zero-sum game.

Of the four categories surveyed here, the 

first two (guarding approaches and air/missile 

defense) are mainly military and thus are largely 

NATO’s business when they require U.S.-European military integration. The third category, 

preventing and managing terrorist incidents 

within the NATO region, will require Alliance 

participation only when EU or national capabilities are overwhelmed. Because NATO involvement 

would come as a last resort, it must be prepared 

and able to respond if asked to do so. The fourth 

category, consequence management, requires 

a mixture of military and civilian assets and 

therefore will require national or EU cooperation.

Thus far, the European Union has undertaken a range of activities and initiatives aimed 

at improving its military and civilian capabilities and structures to respond to crises spanning 

both homeland defense and homeland security, 

including cross-border cooperation on consequence management for natural and manmade 

disasters (such as terrorist attacks, port security, 

and protection of critical infrastructure). For the 

most part, these activities were either spawned or 

accelerated by the Madrid (2004) and London 

(2005) bombings. The European Union has 

developed a European Security Strategy and a 

Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and has a situation center 

in Brussels that provides valuable EU-wide 

threat assessments to national governments. An 

example of an EU response to a disaster was the 

Prestige accident in November 2002, in which a 

tanker sank off the west coast of Galicia, Spain, 

releasing 44,000 tons of fuel. In response to a 

Spanish government request, EU member states 

made available floating barriers, ships, and 

surveillance planes. This action was carried out 

under EU agreements by the EU Commission’s 

Monitoring and Information Center.

EU officials and documents acknowledge 

that EU activities and initiatives are at various 

stages of development, with some in their early 

stage. For example, the European Council 

agreed in 2005 (during the British presidency) 

to examine a Commission proposal for an 

integrated “rapid response and preparedness 

instrument” to react to all types of disasters 

(including terrorism) inside or outside the EU 

while setting a goal to finalize crisis coordination operational procedures by June 2006. This 

examination includes work on possible support 

that member state military assets and capabilities could give to consequence management 

within an EU context.

Broad political support exists for these crisis 

response and management efforts within the 

EU. For example, during the British presidency, 

senior UK officials, including Secretary 

of State for Defence John Reid, noted that 

development of EU civil-military coordination—covering analysis, planning, and management of capabilities and operations—was 

a top priority. Finnish officials have expressed 

similar sentiments (Finland will assume the 

EU presidency during July-December 2006, 

overlapping the Riga Summit).

Given U.S. interests and equities in 

improved cooperation with the EU, bilaterally 

and through NATO—a goal shared by almost 

all EU members—any new initiative on 

homeland defense at the Riga Summit should 

be couched as one aspect of improved 

overall cooperation. This will require careful 

advance scrutiny to determine what the 

European Union already has in place or is 

developing, and where NATO can offer real 

value added. Creating a joint clearinghouse of 

capabilities would allow the EU and NATO to 

determine how best to meet the requirement 

of a specific crisis.

Moreover, Europeans have diverse constitutional approaches to domestic uses/authorities of their own militaries in crisis situations, 

and these are sensitive issues.3 (For example, 

Germany’s Constitutional Court recently found 

that the Ministry of Defense does not have legal 

authority to shoot down a terrorist-controlled 

aircraft if it would kill innocent civilians 

aboard.) Any suggestion that a “NATO commander” would somehow have authority over 

foreign forces or capabilities deployed within a 

member state will be viewed skeptically. Thus, 

a demonstrated U.S. willingness to initiate 

a discussion within NATO on transatlantic 

homeland defense that is cast in the context of 

NATO–EU cooperation and offers a mutually 

beneficial solution stands a plausible chance 

of gaining widespread consensus.

Guarding the Approaches

A Riga initiative in this category could 

have widespread appeal because this is a natural 

ongoing mission for NATO as well as an important, growing strategic priority in the current era. 

Simply stated, NATO’s approaches, especially its 

maritime approaches, need greater security from 

terrorists and other threats than they currently 

have. With a modest commitment of military 

and other resources, coupled with improved 

strategic planning and coordination by NATO 

civilian and military staffs, regional security 

could be enhanced. Building upon programs 

already being pursued, additional progress in 

this category could be made quickly in the years 

after the Riga Summit, thus showing success 

and commitment at the summit in 2008.

Existing Capabilities. NATO has been 

active in new arenas in recent years. For 

example, NATO airborne warning and control 

system (AWACS) aircraft were used to provide 

air surveillance at the recent Athens and Turin 

Olympic games and the 2004 European football 

championships. Existing Alliance capabilities in 

the area of guarding the maritime approaches 

to the transatlantic homeland are especially 

noteworthy. In October 2001, Allies implemented 

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an initiative linking NATO 

and the EU in a common 

cause could have a positive 

impact on their cooperation 

in other areas as well
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and agreed 

to deploy NATO forces to protect the approaches 

to Alliance territory from terrorist threats. Allied 

ships and aircraft soon began patrols in the 

eastern Mediterranean in what became Operation Active Endeavor. These patrols now help 

detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity 

in this vital and crowded sealane, through which 

flows 65 percent of Europe’s energy and a large 

percentage of other seaborne trade.

In February 2003, the operation was 

expanded to include escort of merchant vessels 

from Allied states passing through the narrow Straits of Gibraltar, where they might be 

vulnerable to terrorist targets. In April 2003, 

NATO expanded Active Endeavor’s scope to 

include boarding operations in compliance with 

international law. In 2004, the Alliance extended 

Active Endeavor’s area of operations to include 

the entire Mediterranean. It also welcomed 

participation by EAPC/PFP Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and put into place 

a new operational pattern focused on gathering 

and processing information and intelligence 

to target specific vessels of interest. As of March 

2006, Active Endeavor had completed its 100th

compliant boarding of a suspect vessel, while 

monitoring 75,000 vessels and providing escort 

to 480 ships.

NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic support 

this mission. Several NATO members—mainly 

Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey—contribute 

naval assets directly; Mediterranean Allies 

provide substantial logistic support; and several 

northern European Allies provide fast patrol 

boats for escort operations. Three PFP countries 

(Croatia, Georgia, and Sweden) and three 

Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Algeria, 

Israel, and Morocco), as well as Russia and 

Ukraine, have indicated a desire to participate 

in the operation.

Potential Improvements. This mutual 

interest of Allies and Partners to ensure the 

safety of maritime transit provides NATO an 

opportunity to enhance defense of its homeland 

approaches, including container security on 

the high seas, support to civil authorities, and 

the security of Partners. Active Endeavor has 

expanded the sharing of data collected at sea 

by Allies and Mediterranean rim countries. 

The Commander, Allied Maritime Component 

Command Naples, has developed the Joint 

Information and Analysis Center ( JIAC), an 

experimental networking system that provides 

analysis and warning, as well as information 

on deployment of assets, in order to ensure 

timely action by appropriate authorities.

Fuller development of the JIAC could help 

galvanize NATO member and Partner efforts to 

provide a two-way flow of usable information 

for countering terrorism, illegal trafficking, and 

WMD proliferation in the maritime domain. 

This information could be shared with coast 

guards and appropriate national and EU 

law enforcement and civilian authorities to 

enhance port and border security.

NATO member states could also take additional steps to integrate and selectively deploy 

with Active Endeavor and other operations their 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) detection capabilities to diminish 

further the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks 

before they reach their shores. Capabilities in 

ground, air, and coastal surveillance, port security, airport security, and CBRN detection could 

be improved to bolster support of civil homeland 

security authorities. Finally, establishment of 

a NATO Training Center in the Mediterranean 

Dialogue region that focuses on port security 

could deepen mutual security in that area.

The Black Sea region is increasingly 

important to Europe and the United States as 

a major East-West energy supply bridge and 

as a barrier to many transnational threats. 

Littoral states, led by Turkey, have initiated steps 

to enhance regional economic and security 

cooperation. In March 2004, the Turkish navy 

launched Black Sea Harmony to monitor 

traffic on the southern sections of the Black Sea 

and invited other littoral states to join. However, 

Turkey and Russia have both rejected NATO’s 

proposal to extend Active Endeavor into the 

Black Sea. This stance, driven by objections 

to a permanent presence by nonlittoral states, 

does not need to impede realization of NATO’s 

goals of enhancing security of the maritime 

approaches to the homeland. NATO might 

express its support for Black Sea Harmony,

encourage Allied littoral states (Bulgaria and 

Romania) to join, and develop an exchange of 

information through the JIAC.

Air/Missile Defense

The United States is beginning deployment 

of national missile defenses against intercontinental ballistic missile threats posed by new-era 

adversaries such as North Korea and Iran. A 

small defense shield of 100 to 150 midcourse 

interceptor missiles (employing hit-to-kill 

technology) is being contemplated, and other 

systems, including boost-phase missiles and 

high-energy lasers, are being developed. Yet such 

threats might not be confined to the United 

States. Iran’s development of nuclear weapons 

with missile delivery systems in the next few 

years would provide a direct threat to Europe of 

the sort that could build support for deployment 

of a NATO missile defense force.

Existing Capabilities. NATO recently 

has been studying options for missile defense. 

Its Theatre Missile Defence Programme seeks to 

field an active layered theater ballistic missile 

defense with the capability to protect deployed 

troops against short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles by 2010. Defense ministers 

approved a technical blueprint in 2004, and 

Allies have subsequently agreed to commit 

resources to develop a command and control 

and planning capability. At the Prague Summit, 

Allies agreed to study options for protecting 

populations against ballistic missile threats of 

all ranges and will evaluate these options on 

the basis of contractor studies. Thus, NATO is 

not yet seeking a missile defense of population 

centers in continental Europe comparable to 

that being deployed by the United States. Some 

members are pursuing research and development programs for missile defense, and major 

studies on European missile defense options are 

now under way.

Today, NATO air defense is focused on 

traditional threats to European airspace. The 

NATO Air Command and Control System 

Management Organization provides the structure 

for the planning and implementation of the 

command and control system supporting NATO 

air defense operations. Simply stated, NATO has 

a large traditional air defense system composed 

Special Report 

fuller development of the 

JIAC could help galvanize 

NATO member and Partner 

efforts to provide a two-way 

flow of usable information
Investigation and the Department of Homeland 

Security in the United States) and of multilateral 

police and law-enforcement organizations.

Increasingly, the Europeans are trying to 

use the European Union to coordinate counterterrorism activities. The organization has 

established a counterterrorism action plan, and 

its situation center continuously provides threat 

assessments to all EU members. Throughout 

Europe, NATO is mainly viewed as a helpful 

adjunct to counterterrorist missions within the 

NATO region, not a lead agency. Even so, NATO 

will continue to play a role in preventing and 

managing terrorist incidents, especially when 

indigenous capabilities require reinforcement.

Current Capabilities. NATO’s main role 

in counterterrorism has been to help provide 

continental early warning and air/missile 

defense as well as protection of vital sealanes 

through Operation Active Endeavor. It also 

provides protection of its own military assets. 

In the event of terrorist strikes, especially 

involving WMD use, NATO military forces could 

be mobilized to back up first responders for 

disaster relief. NATO has established a Terrorist 

Threat Intelligence Unit to analyze threats 

against Europe. Member states of the EAPC 

established a Partnership Action Plan Against 

Terrorism to promote and facilitate cooperation among its members in the fight against 

terrorism. NATO’s largest role in the war on 

terror, of course, has been its involvement in 

operations outside its territory and that of its 

Partners—for example, its participation in 

the International Security Assistance Force 

in Afghanistan since August 2003, its role in 

training Iraqi security forces, and its contributions to stability in the Balkans. But these are 

missions outside its territory, not homeland 

defense missions within its territory.

Potential Improvements. NATO nations 

are developing new, cutting-edge technologies 

to protect troops and civilians against terrorist 

attacks, including technology for the early 

detection, protection, and destruction of 

improvised explosive devices. Measures that 

protect critical infrastructure (ports, platforms, 

and energy pipelines) should be emphasized 

in cooperation with EU efforts in this area. In

addition, further measures to strengthen NATO 

intelligence collection and sharing capabilities 

would contribute to counterterrorism efforts 

within the NATO region.

Flexible response to countering terrorism 

requires a special operations force (SOF) 

capability. Such forces are expensive to 

organize, train, and equip, and are in great 

demand and short supply. NATO could explore 

a mechanism for nations to pool their SOF 

assets in order to respond promptly to a major 

challenge that would require NATO to assist 

overwhelmed individual nations.

The reinforced North Atlantic Council 

at Defense Ministers Level (NAC–D) could 

hold meetings with interior ministers on 

counterterrorism issues. A NATO exchange 

with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul 

Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries could 

be created by holding an annual conference 

focusing on the challenges of transnational 

threats, terrorism, and countermeasures. NATO 

also could explore how securing pipelines, 

offshore platforms, and ports to assure 

energy supplies in wartime defense could be 

applied to antiterrorist protection of critical 

infrastructure. Finally, NATO should establish 

mechanisms for cooperation with national 

police forces and other local first responders.

Consequence 

Management

Consequence management requirements 

could arise in response to challenges ranging 

from terrorist WMD use, to pandemics, to largescale natural disasters in the NATO region. 

NATO planning, logistical, and operational 

capabilities could provide unique support to the 

responsible national and EU authorities in the 

face of such catastrophic incidents. Improving 

NATO’s capabilities for consequence management support could be part of a Riga Summit 

agenda on homeland defense.

Existing Capabilities. For defense 

against WMD, NATO countries are jointly developing five nuclear, biological, and chemical

defense initiatives: a deployable analytical 

laboratory, an event response team, a virtual 

center of excellence for nuclear, biological, and 

chemical weapons defense, a defense stockpile, 

of AWACS, fighter interceptors, and surface-to-air 

missiles, but it has no near-term prospects 

for deploying a missile defense system for the 

European continent.

Potential Improvements. Should a NATO 

homeland defense initiative include heightened 

emphasis on continental missile defense? This 

controversial question is likely to generate a 

wide spectrum of answers, but as matters now 

stand, Europe is not prepared to deploy missile 

defenses in the foreseeable future.

Requirements studies establishing the 

framework for an active layered theater ballistic 

missile defense are mature enough that advance 

engineering work can be done to refine the 

concepts that would set the stage for the integration of NATO–EU air/missile defense processes. 

Based on earlier studies, Allies could establish a 

Missile Defense Technical Center to focus further 

research and development.

The Riga Summit plausibly could call 

upon NATO to accelerate its assessment of an 

architecture for protecting Alliance territory and 

populations against the full range of missile 

threats. This could include a call for greater 

research and development efforts on promising 

technologies by participating countries, as well 

as intensified studies and analyses of potential 

deployment options. To respond to the threat 

of attacks on Europe by cruise missiles from 

southern locations, the Riga Summit could call 

for enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities.

Counterterrorism

Article 5 was invoked for the first time in 

NATO history in a counterterrorism context on 

September 12, 2001, following the terrorist attacks 

on the United States. As a result, NATO’s Article 5 

focus has shifted from the traditional territorial 

defense of the Cold War era to emphasize counterterrorism. From October 2001 to May 2002, Operation Eagle Assist resulted in NATO AWACS aircraft 

being sent to help patrol skies over the United 

States. The need to consider terrorist threats has 

been a regular theme of NATO summits since 

then; for example, the Istanbul Summit of 2004 

called for NATO to develop improved intelligence, 

rapid response assistance after attacks, and 

assistance in protecting high-visibility events. 

Nonetheless, counterterrorism within the NATO 

region has remained mostly the responsibility of 

national ministries (such as the Federal Bureau of 

Special Report 

Allies could establish a 

Missile Defense Technical 

Center to focus further 

research and development
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and a disease surveillance system. In addition, 

a multinational NATO chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear defense battalion 

achieved full operational capability in 2004. 

Many of the key capabilities for responding to a 

CBRN event are resident in European and U.S. 

military forces, which could be called upon to 

assist first responders. NATO’s Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee has developed a Civil 

Emergency Planning Action Plan, which calls for 

the development of nonbinding guidelines and 

minimum standards for the protection of the 

civil population against CBRN risks. In addition, 

countries have prepared inventories of national 

civil and military capabilities that could be made 

available in the event of CBRN attacks.

There is precedent for NATO’s involvement 

in disaster relief in its own region and beyond. 

NATO assisted victims of Hurricane Katrina 

in autumn 2005 and aided Pakistanis in the 

aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake. 

It also has provided assistance to the Czech 

Republic, Bulgaria, and other countries 

in response to flooding and to Portugal in 

response to forest fires. NATO’s Euro-Atlantic 

Disaster Response Coordination Center is the 

focal point for coordinating disaster relief 

efforts of the 46 EAPC nations—in case 

of natural or technological disasters. The 

small staff is headed by NATO’s Director of 

Civil Emergency Planning. In the case of the 

Pakistan earthquake, NATO sent engineers, 

medical units, helicopters and crews, and a 

field hospital from its Response Force.

Potential Improvements. Experiences 

from natural disasters to high-end terrorist attacks 

indicate that a nation might need to supplement 

its indigenous capabilities in eight categories:

n decontamination teams to respond to 

CBRN attack

n local airlift assets (primarily transport 

helicopters)

n logistic support assets (primarily trucks 

and forklifts)

n communications and intelligence assets

n emergency medical teams

n constabulary forces and military police

n engineers, including explosive 

ordnance disposal

n Civil-Military Coordination Group 

capabilities.

Units with these capabilities exist in NATO 

member forces. The Alliance’s capacity would 

be strengthened by deliberate planning and 

force execution for consequence management 

in the event of a catastrophic incident.

NATO should undertake a homeland 

defense requirements and capabilities study. It 

should strengthen its structure and capacity for 

deliberate planning in order to identify requirements, develop force goals, and help guide 

national plans and programs to fruition. The 

formation of military disaster assistance response 

teams with a chemical-biological decontamination capability should be considered. In addition, 

NATO needs to ensure that its military forces for 

consequence management missions are properly 

trained and prepared. The acquisition of larger 

stocks of supplies and materials that might be 

needed in catastrophic terrorist attacks, especially WMD situations, should be investigated.

NATO could develop planning exchanges 

with subregional organizations such as Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial/Southeastern Europe Brigade or various Black Sea 

groupings to enhance subregional planning 

and cooperation with Partners.

NATO’s new Comprehensive Political 

Guidance has highlighted the need to plan for 

stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. As the force planning process focuses on 

S&R requirements, member countries likely 

will respond to some degree. Most S&R forces 

and capabilities will be useful in a variety of 

consequence management missions.

NATO’s military requirements for consequence management are proving to be larger 

than appeared to be the case only a few years 

ago. In addition to strengthening its military 

capabilities in this arena, NATO could pursue 

other improvements:

n develop NATO standards for cybersecurity, particularly those essential to energy, 

communications, and transportation

n conduct NAC–D meetings with interior 

ministers and, as appropriate, health ministers 

to review NATO’s capacity to respond to consequence management challenges4

n create a Civil Emergency Planning 

Action Plan tailored for Mediterranean 

Dialogue/ICI countries and Black/Caspian Sea 

Partners

n conduct exercises, involving NATO, the 

EU, and other multinational institutions that 

involve serious incidents of various sorts, 

including cyberattacks on governments, power 

grids, and air traffic systems

n strengthen multinational information-sharing on threat assessments, incident 

reporting, and early warning.

Command and Force 

Posture

Important command and force posture 

issues arise in determining how NATO’s role in 

homeland defense can best be strengthened. 

How can NATO headquarters best organize 

for these new challenges? Should NATO have 

a command equivalent to the U.S. Northern 

Command (USNORTHCOM) to plan and 

implement homeland defense missions? Can 

existing NATO military capabilities be used to 

perform homeland defense missions, or should 

new capabilities be created?

NATO headquarters would no doubt need 

additional assets focused on homeland defense 

missions. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning 

Committee and its Euro-Atlantic Disaster 

Response Coordination Center might need 

larger staffs. Beyond this, it may be necessary 

to create an Assistant Secretary General for 

Homeland Defense with appropriate staff to 

chart NATO’s future in this arena. This planning in NATO could also be linked to similar 

efforts in other regional organizations, such as 

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Creation 

of a Homeland Defense Committee to advise the 

NAC might also be a good idea.

With regard to military staffs, the United 

States needed USNORTHCOM because it had 

no other command for homeland defense. By 

contrast, NATO’s military commands were organized primarily to manage territorial defense of 

Europe. Thus, a NATO NORTHCOM equivalent 

does not appear necessary. However, some 

improvements to the existing military command 

structure may make sense. Allied Command 

Operations (ACO) is the logical headquarters 

for planning the use of NATO military forces 

for homeland defense missions. Below ACO, a 

proven command concept is to designate one of 

formation of military 

disaster assistance teams 

with a chemical-biological 

decontamination capability 

should be considered
Action Agenda/

Recommendations

At the Riga Summit, NATO should focus 

on homeland defense as a key part of its deliberations. The overall goal should be to point 

NATO in the direction of developing better 

capabilities for performing future homeland 

defense missions in concert with European 

countries and the EU. Specifically:

n The Riga Summit Declaration should 

include a statement of principles on a “Homeland Defense Initiative,” underscoring that 

NATO will undertake this initiative in cooperation with ongoing national and EU efforts, 

with a view to develop a capacity that can be 

used to complement national capacities and 

be available when these are overwhelmed.

n The Riga Summit should announce 

new homeland defense activities for PFP, 

designed to enhance Partner capabilities for 

homeland defense missions.

n In appropriate areas, the Riga Summit 

should announce a few specific force and 

organizational changes aimed at producing 

improved homeland defense capabilities in the 

near term.

n NATO headquarters and military staffs 

should conduct a study of future homeland 

defense requirements, capabilities, costs, and 

improvement priorities, and report the results 

in the near future.

Notes

1 Former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, and his 

Fundación para el Análysis y los Estudios Sociales (FAES) colleagues Rafael Bardají and Florentino Portero, made a compelling 

case for renewed Alliance attention to homeland defense efforts 

in their report NATO: An Alliance for Freedom (Madrid: FAES, 

2005), 22–29. We have included and expanded upon several of 

their proposals in framing this initiative.

2 For an overview of the European Union’s approach to 

homeland security, see Gustav E. Gustenau, “The Concept of 

Homeland Security in the European Union and in Austria: A 

Challenge for the Austrian EU Presidency,” in Transforming 

Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches, ed. Esther 

Brimmer (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 

Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International 

Studies, 2006), 59–80.

3 For a review of European national approaches to 

“societal” or homeland security, see Protecting the Homeland: 

European Approaches to Societal Security—Implications for the 

United States, ed. Daniel Hamilton, Bengt Sundelius, and Jesper 

Gronvall (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 

Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International 

Studies, 2006). 4 For a discussion on forging new health security alliances, 

see Daniel S. Hamilton and Bradley T. Smith, “Atlantic Storm,” 

in European Molecular Biology Organization Report, 7, no. 1 

(2006), 4–9.

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the principal subordinate operational headquarters as the deployable headquarters for handling 

homeland security missions. This would involve 

converting an existing principal subordinate 

command to handle homeland defense issues 

rather than creating a new one.

NATO authorities will need to analyze the 

issue of how new homeland defense missions 

should affect the force posture. A new small but 

highly ready force may need to be created for 

this purpose. Forces of lesser readiness are the 

equivalent of U.S. Reserve Component forces 

but can be mobilized over a period of weeks. 

These units will provide sufficient manpower 

and equipment in aggregate to handle the 

biggest homeland defense missions: incident 

management of WMD use or, as a lesser 

included case, natural disasters that clearly 

overload national and EU response capabilities. 

Yet close inspection may show that existing 

forces lack necessary capabilities in specific 

areas: for example, medical support, engineers, 

military police, and transport units. To the 

extent such deficiencies arise, NATO force planners will need to seek the necessary changes in 

forces, equipment, training, and readiness.

The alternative to relying upon existing 

forces is to convert forces to provide new capabilities oriented to homeland defense missions, 

especially consequence management. Because 

NATO’s members have active-duty forces that 

significantly exceed potential requirements for 

warfighting and related crisis response, some 

of the forces could be converted to homeland 

defense missions.

The tradeoff among three options will 

have to be analyzed carefully:

n rely upon existing forces and capabilities for homeland defense missions

n rely upon existing forces, but approve a 

contingency headquarters and organizational 

design that provide additional capabilities as 

warranted by homeland defense requirements

n create a new command and assign 

forces that are sized, equipped, and trained 

exclusively for the homeland defense mission.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, its

components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and 

gaming events and supports NDU educational programs in 

the areas of international security affairs and defense studies. 

Through an active outreach program, including conferences and 

publications, INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging 

strategic challenges and policy options.

N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E U N I V E R S I T Y

Hans Binnendijk Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF Stephen J. Flanagan

Director, CTNSP Director, NDU Press Director, INSS

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department 

of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces 

Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

(CTNSP) examines the implications of technological 

innovation for U.S. national security policy and military 

planning. CTNSP combines scientific and technical 

assessments with analyses of current strategic and defense 

policy issues, taking on topics to bridge the gap. The Center

has produced studies on proliferation and homeland 

security, military transformation, international science 

and technology, information technology, life sciences, and 

social science modeling.