NEATH THE SURFACE

M C M X L V I I

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

D

E

PARTMENT OF THE AIR FOR

C

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for

COUNTERTERRORISM

Major Troy S. Thomas

U.S. Air Force

JOINT

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CO

LLEGE

1962

JOINT

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ILITARY INTELLIGENCE C

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LLEGE

1962
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on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves Intell

Community capabiliies for policy-level and operational cons

Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism, by 

S. Thomas, U.S. Air Force

This book presents the deep subject-matter understanding gained by a mid-career U.

officer who as a Research Fellow engaged in a year-long quest for insight into asymm

analysis and synthesis. During the year, through innumerable exchanges with expert coun

practitioners inside and outside of government, he acquired a first-hand appreciation of 

gence can more systematically build and employ a capability to gain ground in this chall

ronment. His formulation, presented here in an accessible, systematic manner that make

as a handbook for practitioners at any level, goes well beyond any existing guidance yet a

one package.

This product has been reviewed by senior experts from academia and government, an

approved for unrestricted distribution by the Office of Freedom of Information and Secu

Washington Headquarters Services. It is available to the public through the National Tec

mation Service (www.ntis.gov). 

Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, Editor and Director

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

Library of Congress Control Number 2

ISBN 1-9

i

Intelligence Preparation of the Battles

for

Counterterrorism

Major Troy S. Thomas, U.S. Air Force

Research Fellow

WASHINGTON, DC

November 2004

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author 

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

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Intelligence College Intelligence College

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Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreword. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Commentaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

List of Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Preface: Off the Horn of Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter 

1. COUNTERING TERRORISTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Violent Theater. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Violent Intellectuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Terror’s Bad Name. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Innocence Lost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Fixing on Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Hybrid Adversary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Counterterrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Mission Analysis I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Big Picture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Campaigning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Face-to-Face. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Asymmetric Contests. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Preparing the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Four Phases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Three Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Linking Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
iv

2. TERROR’S SPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Lost in Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Mission Analysis II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Getting it Done.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Setting Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Going Three-Dimensional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

What we Know and Don’t Know . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Remodeling Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Mapping Stakeholders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dimensional Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Positioning Players.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Nested Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Urban Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Parting Shots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. BATTLESPACE EFFECTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Special Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Courses of Action.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Step-by-Step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Total Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Net Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Dimensional Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Cumulative Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Parting Shots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. EVALUATING CAPABILITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Adversary Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
v

Old Models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Real World. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Can Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Full Spectrum Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Agents of Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Supermodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Parting Shots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. ANTICIPATING ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bad Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

End States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Full Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Detailing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Collection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Good Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Fasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Hypothesis Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Hypothesis Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Parting Shots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6. BEYOND TERRORISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Pass and Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Define the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Determine Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Evaluate Capabilities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Anticipate Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Core Propositions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
vi

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
vii

The finer qualities of this work are due to the wisdom and assistan

The opportunity to study was afforded by the U.S. Air Force, an institu

able for its commitment to the professional and intellectual developme

The Defense Intelligence Agency, recognizing the value of hosting an 

independent research in support of the Intelligence Community under 

of the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), has since 2002 s

Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. I benefited from these arran

Research Fellow, with my research being backed by impressive organ

port and unconditional intellectual freedom as I pursued an intense ex

intelligence as it relates to counterterrorism. This research also enjoyed 

support, and more importantly, the astute guidance, of the Institute 

Security Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy and the Combating Te

ter at the U.S. Military Academy. 

Collaboration with several front-line organizations allowed real

new ideas and direct exposure to the complex challenges inherent to 

porary security landscape. Within the Directorate for Strategic Plan

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Deputy Director for the Global War on Te

the issues, shared their strategic thinking, and invited my particip

development of a seminal counterterrorism strategy document. My 

were motivated and shaped by their dedication and insight. The grou

and operationally focused work of professionals at the Joint Warf

Center opened the door to advanced analytical methods and cutti

grams for achieving effects against terrorist groups. Our cooperation 

cation of systems analysis to counterterrorism will continue as id

here are applied in the field. Collaboration with the Transformation 

mentation Center, Joint Forces Intelligence Command, offered an o

apply a systems approach to homeland defense and work with a talen

analysts. Additional organizations that provided practical knowledg

ties to apply methods, or simply championed my ideas include No

mand, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Council for Emerg

Security Affairs, the State of New Mexico Office of Homeland Secu

Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism, and the Joint Mi

gence Training Center.

Wise counsel and deep expertise came from four individuals who 

ners in the project. The Center for Strategic Intelligence Research 

led by its Director, Dr. Russell Swenson. His incisive guidance 

scholarship imbues every page. An able practitioner of “soft power,’’ 
viii

another of these individuals, Dr. Donald Hanle, now on the Faculty o

Military Intelligence College, since he was my Flight Commander at 

Force Base a decade ago. A published expert on terrorism, his penetrat

sis and intellectual clarity remain the standard against which all others a

Dr. James Smith has helped me and others transform intellectual cur

policy-relevant scholarship for years as the Director of the Air Force

for National Security Studies. Dr. Smith, with the talented support of 

Heerdt, shepherd an impressive research program that continues to fost

professional development. Among the many doors opened by Dr. S

leading to a new partnership with the Combating Terrorism Center at W

has been the most rewarding. Directed by Colonel Russell Howard, the 

breaking new ground at a critical juncture by producing widely 

research and publications. Colonel Howard not only championed and 

my work, but made possible my participation in the Partnership for Pe

bating Terrorism Working Group where I learned a great deal from 

counterterrorism officials as well as from its co-Chairs, Colonel Howa

Rohan Gunaratna.

One must have great allies in all scholarly endeavors if only to rem

thrive on the good humor, cutting intellect, selfless work, and adventu

of two long-standing colleagues and friends, Majors William Casebeer 

Kiser. Our collaboration and travels do not always unfold as expected

are always rewarding and entertaining. As we move forward on seve

collaboration with Captain Jason Bartolomei and Lieutenant Colonel F

chuk brings much-appreciated energy and perspective. Among ma

trusted friends and world travelers Captain Thomas Coakley and L

Colonel Joseph Derdzinksi continue to offer powerful insights and 

advice. I have also enjoyed the support and collegiality of the other Res

lows at the JMIC, Major Steve Lambert, Major Eva Jenkins, Dr. Linda 

Melanie Gutjahr. Within the Defense Intelligence Agency, I was ed

those in the forefront of counterterrorism analysis, including Dr. Mar

Director of Counterterrorism Analysis in the Joint Military Intelligenc

Center and Cal Temple, Chief of Transnational Threats in the Joint In

Task Force-Combating Terrorism.

The contributions of these individuals stand in the shadow of anot

Thomas shared her mind and time to ensure this project's success. Its fi

ties are truly a reflection of her worthy intellect and prized friendship.
ix

Cal Temple

Chief, Office of Intelligence Operations

Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terroris

Defense Intelligence Agency

Major Thomas’ Beneath the Surface comes at precisely the righ

War on Terrorism. Over the past three years the U.S. military and 

ments of national power have been able to attack and damage Usama 

al-Qaida network. We have exploited the known, reacted to resulta

ties, and organized a set of sustainable allies and partners to do the s

Now for the hard part.

The remainder of the War or Terrorism—which will continue 

requires that intelligence be on the front. The War has been, and wil

be, an intelligence war. In such a war intelligence and operations are 

staff components; they are instead a blend of activities that are mutu

ing. In this continuing war every soldier is a collector, and every coll

dier; operators glean intelligence directly from the field, and in

always operational.

Further, the war ahead will demand new strategies for long-term 

counterpunching phase is over. The rapid-fire operations-intelligenc

rorism-targeting cycle happening right now in Iraq and Afghanista

fix, finish, exploit, then find again” process—becomes less powerfu

paign continues. This cycle has to be underpinned by a strategic 

framework that ensures we are attacking a part of the enemy that 

just taking the near-term opportunity that inflicts little lasting damag

The U.S. requires new strategies to collect intelligence, to man

intelligence (using operations in doing so), and most importantly to 

in new, systemic and strategic ways to make the most of what we kno

shadowy, self-healing and determined asymmetric, worldwide adver

In my view Major Thomas’ work is one of the first coherent blue

way ahead. For persons seeking to understand the complexity of 

lence, Chapter One provides a broad and comprehensive overview 

about the problem. For the counterterrorism practitioner, Chapters 

Five are extraordinarily well-reasoned views on organizing data 

knowledge and potential power. Major Thomas also offers sound adv
x

focus operational activity for maximum effect.

We in the Department of Defense and those responsible for other U

ments of national power are re-learning old lessons and refining new 

lesson we all learned from the 9/11 terrorist attacks is to work smarter, 

systematically. Maj. Thomas’ work helps light the way toward that goa
xi

Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battle

Counterterrorism

Donald J. Hanle, Ph.D.

JMIC Faculty

Writing products related to terrorism has become a cottage indust

Intelligence Community. Few, however, have produced a work as s

as functional as has Major Troy Thomas in Beneath the Surface. Thi

sents not merely the careful and extremely useful adaptation of clas

of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) to the emerging 

rorism, but it offers a truly new and effective means by which intellig

sionals may approach this critical topic. 

If this was all that Major Thomas had achieved in this work, it wou

essential reference to be added to the libraries of all academicians as 

ligence and law enforcement professionals who focus upon terrorism 

tralization. Beneath the Surface represents something far more p

merely serving as an incredibly useful analytical “tool,” however. 

ingly melding classical IPB methodologies with open systems the

Thomas has achieved a means by which even the novice analyst ca

not merely the complexity of the terrorist threat, but its inevitable en

structural or sub-systemic strengths and weaknesses as well. 

Beneath the Surface constitutes, therefore, a truly effective repr

the paradigm shift in warfare that has been induced by our intense fo

ism. Major Thomas’ approach provides an entirely new means by w

about the problem of terrorism, compelling lines of inquiry th

extremely unlikely to emerge using previously existing methodolog

the Surface demands a full-spectrum examination of the threat n

physical and social perspectives, but in terms of information and co

fare. The assessment of factors ranging from geography and weath

and technology is essential to carrying out Major Thomas’ countert

process. Each of these factors is then subjected to a multifaceted 

from the environmental, systemic and sub-systemic dimensions to ide

of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements and, finally, crit

bilities on the physical, moral and cognitive planes of war. As he d

the results can be remarkable—whether applied to a local militia gro

snational terrorist group. Beneath the Surface promises to be much 

analytical handbook; it is, in itself, a manifestation of an entirely 

problem solving—a work that is destined to be reprinted countless ti
xii

Special Operations Command, Pacific

American strategy must look at how the U.S. government detects, d

defeats terrorists worldwide. The effectiveness of this strategy is, in part

the capacity of national and domestic agencies and the departments in

intelligence, defense and law enforcement to think like an adaptive 

anticipation of how the latter may act in a variety of situations, aided b

resources. This goal requires that departments and agencies organize t

for maximum efficiency, information sharing, and the ability to functio

and effectively under new operational definitions. New times make new 

necessary and demand the adoption of the advanced analytical methods 

by Troy Thomas. Organizations must do what they have been reluctan

the past: they must reach across bureaucratic territorial divides 

resources to counter insurgencies and other emerging threats. 

To develop this capacity, leaders must dedicate themselves to new

practices that are based on a value system, that involve the whole perso

are developed and guided by seasoned instructors versed in integrated t

addition to continuing to use the traditional “hard” skills, these leaders 

to apply “soft” skills that require an understanding of tactics and str

negotiations, as well as familiarity with the fields of psychology, socia

tural anthropology, somatics, emotional intelligence, complexity theory

tems management in a foreign-area context. As an object-lesson in how 

Troy’s work is both informed by and reflective of an integrated unders

the problem, and he, like few others, is able to provide a framework an

for moving forward.

The practices highlighted in this work will allow leaders to build the 

and skills necessary to assess situations and act on them effectively, r

helplessly succumbing to the pressure of the moment. Like the martial a

who deftly handles multiple attacks, the counterterrorist expert, in a fa

and fluid environment, with “holistic” leadership development and T

guide, can learn to adapt to any given situation in order to serve selfle

new attitude and behavior pattern is imperative. An integrated and comp

approach to counterterrorism requires a reorientation in the way the U.

ment plans, organizes, trains, and thinks about complex and unco

threats. Troy Thomas’ makes an important contribution to our achi

imperative.
xiii

Senior Engineer, RAND Corporation

This study provides a well-structured and comprehensive discu

intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, and of the major c

intelligence and warfighting communities face in counterterrorist op

an excellent primer on the doctrine, tactics, techniques and proced

with a comprehensive bibliography.

The publication clearly underscores the differences between con

for traditional warfare and for counterterrorist operations, and offer

on how to address those differences to ensure that the IPB process be

tive in asymmetrical operations generally. Carefully chosen real-wo

systematically highlight each phase of the IPB process and show its 

to intelligence, operations, and decisionmaking cycles. An in-depth 

ing of these relationships is essential as we try to address counterte

tions in an effective manner.

In discussing the IPB process, the author provides keen insights i

ing effects-based counterterrorist operations. His discussion of how 

adversary capabilities clearly illustrates the applicability of social ne

sis, and emphasizes the importance of an opponent’s operational co

nology choices, as well as the pertinent social dimensions of the 

environment.

xv

Figure 

1. Combat Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2. Ali Sabieh Hospital, Djibouti. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Fast Roping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. Khobar Towers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. Embassy Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6. Direct Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

7. Indirect Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

8. USS Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

9. Terrorist Group Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

10. Fighting al-Qaida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

11. Missile Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

12. Strategic Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

13. Filipino Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

14. Malian Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

15. Buried Foxbat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

16. IPB Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

17. IPB Support to Decisionmaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

18. Colombian Jungles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

19. Unified Command Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

20. Yemeni Special Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

21. Afghan Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

22. Dimensional Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

23. Positioning Players. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

24. Mapping Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
xvi

26. Urban Terrain Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

27. Urban Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

28. Peshawar, Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

29. Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

30. Afghanistan Village. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

31. Night Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

32. Direct and Indirect Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

33. Nigerian Officers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

34. Peru Airstrip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

35. Dimensional Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

36. Observation and Fields of Fire Overlay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

37. Kandahar, Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

38. Noble Eagle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

39. Statute of Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

40. Cyberspace Vulnerability Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

41. Destroyed Drug Lab, Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

42. Land MCOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

43. Infrastructure Overlay (Illegal Drugs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

44. Uncertainty Framework I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

45. Uncertainty Framework II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

46. Friday Mosque, Andijan, Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . 

47. Stakeholder Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

48. Urban Slums, Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

49. Toma Suburb, Casablanca, Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

50. Sector Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

51. Public Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
xvii

53. Sarajevo, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

54. Population Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

55. Perception Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

56. Khiva, Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

57. Afghan Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

58. Cessna Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

59. Osama bin Laden Poster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

60. Basque Nationalism Graffiti, Vitoria, Spain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

61. Center of Gravity Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

62. Humanitarian Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

63. Ground Doctrine Template. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

64. Time Event Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

65. Target Value Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

66. Five Ring Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

67. Poppy Field, Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

68. Bangladesh Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

69. IRA Suspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

70. Saddam Hussein. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

71. Network Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

72. Two Sheiks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

73. Iranian Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

74. Relationship Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

75. Activities Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

76. Pattern Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

77. Ricin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

78. Open System Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
xviii

80. Ahmed Omar Sheik. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

81. Life Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

82. ETA Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

83. Chechen Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

84. Bali Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

85. Intentions vs. Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

86. Georgian Commandos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

87. Aum Shinrikyo Headquarters, 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

88. Measures of Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

89. Ambush Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

90. Raid Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

91. Named Area of Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

92. Event Matrix Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

93. Mogadishu, Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

94. North Korean FAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

95. Triborder Meeting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

96. ICRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

97. Competing Hypotheses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

98. CT Airlift. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

99. Phase Breakout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

100. IPB Core Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

101. 3D Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

102. Afghan Child. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
xix

ACH Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

AIAI Al-Ittihad al-Islami

AIPB Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

AO Area of Operations

AOI Area of Interest

AP Associated Press

AT Anti-terrorism

AUC United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CENTCOM Central Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJTF Combined Joint Task Force

CNA Computer Network Attack

COA Course(s) of Action

COG Center(s) of Gravity

CONPLAN Concept Plan

CPA Coalition Provisional Authority

CT Counterterrorism

CTC Counterterrorism Center

CC Critical Capability

CR Critical Requirement

CV Critical Vulnerability

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD Department of Defense
xx

DSB Defense Science Board

EBO Effects-based Operations

ETA Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party

EU European Union

EW Electronic Warfare

EUCOM European Command

FARC National Liberation Army of Colombia

FAST Functional Analysis Systems Technique

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations

FID Foreign Internal Defense

FM Field Manual

FP Force Protection

FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization

GIA Armed Islamic Group

GPO Government Printing Office

GSPC Salafist Group for Call (Preaching) and Combat

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

HoA Horn of Africa

HUJI Harakat ul-Jihadi-Islami 

HUJI-B Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/ Bangladesh

HUM Harakat ul-Mujahidin

HM Hizb ul-Mujahidin

HPT High Payoff Target

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HVT High Value Target

IC Intelligence Community
xxi

IGO Intergovernmental Organizations

IHL International Humanitarian Law

IIPB Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade

IMINT Imagery Intelligence

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IO Information Operations

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IRA Irish Republican Army

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JFC Joint Force Commander

JI Jemaah Islamiya

JIPB Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

JITF-CT Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combatting Terrorism

JFIC Joint Forces Intelligence Center

JMIC Joint Military Intelligence College

JWAC Joint Warfare Analysis Center

KLF Kashmir Liberation Front

LAW Light Anti-tank Weapon

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MASINT Measures and Signatures Intelligence

MCOO Military Combined Obstacle Overlay

MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Pamphlet

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations

MOOTW Military Operations other than War

MOUT Military Operations on Urban Terrain
xxii

NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NORTHCOM Northern Command

NSA National Security Agency

OA Operational Area

OCOKA Observation and Fields of Fire, Concealment and Cov

Obstacles, Key Terrain, Avenues of Approach

ONA Organizational Network Analysis

OPFOR Opposing Force

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPORD Operations Order

PA Public Affairs

PACOM Pacific Command

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements

PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army

PSI Pan Sahel Initiative

PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization

POW Prisoners of War

PSYOPS Psychological Operations

PULO Pattani United Liberation Organization

RISTA Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Target Acquisition

ROK Republic of Korea

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SLOC Sea Lines of Communication

SOCOM Special Operations Command
xxiii

SOUTHCOM Southern Command

SNA Social Network Analysis

TAA Tactical Assembly Area

TCO Transnational Criminal Organization

TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UCP Unified Command Plan

UN United Nations

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USA United States Army

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USS United States Ship

VNSA Violent Non-State Actor

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

xxv

OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) in asymmetr

demanding for many reasons, including the complexity of the opera

ment and the elusiveness of the adversary. As the transcript below i

challenges for the intelligence professional engaged in combating te

are prime examples of asymmetric opponents, are immediate and 

abridged remarks by Major General John F. Sattler, United States M

(USMC), Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (

were made only 30 days after the CJTF was established. His expres

establish a useful context for this book’s exploration of how the IPB 

counterterrorism (CT) can be improved as we continue into this era 

ric conflict. General Sattler ascribes to intelligence a vital role in co

rorist operations: his is a real-world view of the many collection, 

operational difficulties associated with confronting transnational, 

opponents. He offers direct insight into the complex array of battlesp

teristics, enemy activities, coalition relationships, rules of engagem

issues certain to challenge the intelligence professional tasked w

“actionable” intelligence. 

Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa Briefin

10 January 2003, 1002 hours, EST

(Special briefing via telephone onboard the USS Mount Whitney in 

Aden. Also participating: Major Stephen Cox, public affairs officer, 
xxvi

public affairs officer for CJTF-HoA. Before we begin the question a

session with Major General Sattler, I’d like to provide you a brief open

ment. 

About 30 days ago, the headquarters for CJTF-HoA arrived on station 

operations in support of the global war on terrorism in the Horn of Afr

Our mission is to detect, disrupt and defeat terrorists who pose an immi

to coalition partners in the region. We’ll also work with host nations t

reemergence of terrorist cells and activities by supporting internationa

working to enhance long-term stability for the region. For this operati

defining the Horn of Africa region as the total airspace and land areas 

high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Dji

Yemen. The CJTF headquarters has about 400 members representin

armed services, civilian personnel, and coalition force representatives, 

the USS Mount Whitney, currently operating in the Gulf of Aden. Our 

includes about 900 personnel at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and a sma

of liaison personnel working in other parts of the region. Given organic 

the capabilities of U.S. Central Command, CJTF-HoA has the capabilit

act upon credible intelligence to attack, destroy and/or capture terrorist

port networks. Our actions in the last 30 days have set the stage for su

visited all sovereign nations in the region, meeting heads of state in 

Yemen, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Also, we met with coalition military le

recently completed the first in a planned series of exercises and 

between CJTF-HoA and Combined Task Force 150 maritime forces. 

A key to defeating terrorism lies in building trust with coalition partn

product of trust is the development of actionable intelligence, which 

host-nation ability to win the battle within their borders. The global war 

ism is not a war against any people or any religion. It is a long-term figh

the forces of freedom and those who seek to spread hatred and fear, b

Horn of Africa region and around the world. CJTF-HoA is prepar

extended war on terrorism. We will press the fight at every turn as long 

and with the help of our coalition partners, together we will win this fig

Ladies and gentlemen, at this point, I’d like to introduce the comman

bined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Major General John F. Sattler. 

Major General (Maj Gen) Sattler: Good morning, everyone. John Sa

and I believe I’m prepared to go ahead and answer your questions at th

Question (Q): General Sattler, this is Pam Hess with United Press Inte

Could you tell us if you all have actually done anything besides the e
xxvii

have you responded to it in any way? 

Maj Gen Sattler: We’ve had a quite a bit of intelligence that has com

been shared, not only among the agencies within the Department of 

also among our coalition partners and the other government agenc

the] inter-agency process. But to go into whether or not we have ac

on or pressed any targets or are closing with, I really don’t want to c

hold my comment on any possible future operations. But let’s just sa

developing the intelligence network, which is really critical in a figh

rorism, and it’s becoming more refined every day. 

Q: General, this is Matt Kelley with the Associated Press. I’d like to 

are any plans to expand the amount of personnel or materiel in yo

force and also, what areas are of specific interest in your area of resp

Maj Gen Satt

first question, 

eral Franks s

here, he made 

when he sent 

Central Comm

me his comma

ance that altho

force—the h

the number 

mately 400, a

close to 900 fo

which are und

cal control at a

as we start to d

ligence and re

rorist location

centers, et cet

have the abili

back, through General Franks, to come up with additional forces, i

So I’m very comfortable at this time that we have forces under our ta

that give us the ability to respond rapidly and quickly to actionable 

And if we need it or any target would exceed that capability, that’s wh

through the chain of command to General Franks and he has at his d

ously all the resources that are in his area of operations, plus he ca

through his chain of command to find additional or unique forces, if 

Figure 1. Combat Training

Soldiers from the 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment fight off a dust storm 

created by a CH-53E helicopter during a combat recovery training 

exercise in rural Djibouti. Soldiers are currently deployed in 

support of the Global War on Terrorism.

Source: CJTF-HoA, URL: http://www.cjtfhoa.centcom.mil/

default.asp, accessed on 14 April 2004.
xxviii

area of responsibility? Are you looking more specifically at places li

and Somalia? 

Maj Gen Sattler: Of course our mission was very broad, in that we we

transnational terrorism across the Horn of Africa, going from Yemen 

Gulf of Aden, and then, you know, the entire Horn. We do have some 

we’re concentrating on—a couple of the border areas, some of the coast

where intelligence—as we start to refine the intelligence and take the in

and turn information into intelligence, where we’re taking not a broad c

the-net approach, but we’re homing in on certain areas. You know, the p

ders with Somalia are one of the areas that we’re taking a very hard 

well as the coastlines coming across the Gulf of Aden. So without g

more specific than that, there are some areas that deserve watching m

than others across the entire Horn. 

Q: General, this is Mark Mazzetti with U.S. News and World Rep

wanted to clarify. When you met with the heads of state of those four 

were you given the authority to act freely at any time you gain actiona

gence against terrorists and to operate in those countries? And do you h

their permission before you go? And then, finally, do you expect t

authority in every country in your area of responsibility? 

Maj Gen Sattler: The authority to actually prosecute a target in any of 

ereign countries, as we start to—oh, first of all, we’re in the process o

the exchange of liaison officers, so that the countries that we are respo

across the Horn of Africa, those who have sovereign governments, th

take liaison officers on board that’ll be on board USS Mount Whitney w

will be able to have direct access back to their parent countries. But 

talked down through both the military leaders and the heads of state, an

U.S. ambassador and country teams in each one of those countries, 

about different types of targets and different types of action that we wou

coalition. Now, keeping in mind that this is not a U.S. [operation] alon

not a unilateral effort across the Horn of Africa, it’s a combined coaliti

of the countries that we have in our area of operations are, in fact

closely with us. We have not visited Somalia, but the other countrie

talked to and we have established a relationship. And there are certain 

we will follow, which I won’t go into, but we did discuss those exact p

you just brought out. 

But I would really like to stress that a lot of the information [and] in

sharing—many of these countries have very capable armed forces and 

capable internal security mechanisms that they can certainly prosec
xxix

role in that would be to assist them with intelligence, with inform

they so request, possibly training and even some equipment, all over 

time here. 

Q: General, this is Jim Mannion of AFP [l’Agence France-Presse]. I 

ing if you could describe the scope of the Al-Qaida presence in Yem

port area along Saudi Arabia; and also, whether Al-Qaida has been 

territory as a haven and whether the Saudis have been cooperative 

them? Thank you. 

Maj Gen Sattler: [Given] the countries that we have responsibilit

ously Yemen borders Saudi Arabia—our specific Combined Joint T

not working directly with the Saudi government. Now, we’ve recei

tion and intelligence across the entire inter-agency process so that we 

ligence from other parts of the world that we’re able to take and f

analysts on board the ship here to help build that jigsaw puzzle that n

who’s moving where and when. We are not just tracking Al-Qaida. O

for all transnational terrorism, regardless if it’s individual, if it’s spo

organization like Al-Qaida or even cells that we haven’t heard of. So 

honed in specifically on Al-Qaida, therefore, I can’t give you a no

head-count; I just do not have that information. 

Q: General, Tom Bowman with the Baltimore Sun. I know you said y

ated quite a bit of intelligence, and I know you can’t be too specific. B

dering if you can give us any general sense of the activity there. Are 

greater amount of terrorist activity? More training camps, greater n

maybe you anticipated? Anything that surprises you? Anything in 

you can give us. 

Maj Gen Sattler: You know, keeping in mind, Tom, we’ve just been h

days right now, I would tell you that there’s a lot of activity to be co

that it’s hard also to decipher what is just normal activity moving ac

at different points and moving across the Gulf of Aden, and what m

either the smuggling of weapons, munitions, explosives, or individua

of some of the countries. 

So I would tell you that I would think there is a lot to collect upo

where it becomes very tough, is trying to figure out what is informa

to be vetted through, and what becomes hard-core intelligence that 

towards an action, action somewhere down the road. So there are 

areas we’re looking very, very hard at. We have not hit that point of, 
xxx

actually conducted any attacks on any terrorist cells or training camps, 

But I would tell you that we’re getting more and more information t

intelligence every day. You know, it’s not a short-term battle over here

to be patient because we need to be correct, absolutely correct when 

come forward and identify a particular location as a training site or 

being full or harboring terrorists. 

So I would tell you there have really been no large surprises—no big 

But as you would know, and as anyone there can probably guess, it’

take time to sort down through this. But the good news is that, you kno

ing the terrorists is the ultimate goal, but en route to that, while coll

intelligence across all coalition partners and within our own interagenc

ondary goal is obviously to disrupt and keep off balance [the terrorists

feel very confident that by virtue of breathing down their neck, lookin

through multiple intelligence sources, and collecting on them throug

sources, that we are in fact disrupting—keeping them off balance until 

to that next phase which is defeat, that is, bring [them] to justice. 

Q: General, Nick Childs from the BBC. Your headquarters currently is 

Mount Whitney. Can you say if it is your plan to move the headquarte

ashore? And if so, when? 

Maj Gen Sattler: The USS Mount Whitney, which is, you know, a com

control ship, probably the most capable platform—naval platform in th

so right now we have access and reach-back to anything and anywher

can also command and control and speak with anyone that we can 

know, remotely think that we would utilize either in operations or to go 

help us either do, A, analysis, or to, B, pull down intelligence from 

spectrum. So therefore, there’s no hurry for us to push ashore. Right n

off the coast of Djibouti, and we have, you know, helicopter capability 

So I’m capable, as are others on board ship, to move into where we 

forces right now at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. We are looking at the 

go ahead and phase ashore. That decision has not been made. There’s a 

places we could do that, and obviously we’re already established fair

Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. [Comment Removed]

Q: General, Alex Belida from Voice of America. Earlier you were d

your relationships with the countries in your area of responsibility. I’

if you could discuss in perhaps more detail your relations with the go

of Sudan. Do you have a liaison individual in Sudan or a Sudane

with you? And secondly, have leaders in the region expressed conce
xxxi

madrassahs? Thanks. 

Maj Gen Sattler: Okay, on

the first question, which is a

good one, we’ve had one

trip—my number-one area

tour colonel, who is our—

he’s our geopolitical advisor,

who tripped the entire Horn.

He has been in Sudan twice.

And we have had another

team in Sudan, working with

the embassy. I have personally not gone to Sudan yet.

We’re still making the

rounds. We’ve been to

Yemen, we’ve been to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and obviously

Djibouti, and we still have

Kenya to pick up before we

actually go ahead and

attempt to go in and set up a

visit into Sudan. So to

answer your question, we have initial contact. We’re working w

embassy there in Sudan, but we have in fact not made a formal visit y

still out there.

On your second question, one of our goals, in addition to detecting

terrorists and disrupting and then defeating, the third portion of our 

enhance the long-term stability of the region. We’re also responsibl

Command, to General Franks, for taking a look at civil-military ope

building of schools, roads; enhancing the quality of life; humanitaria

which, if in fact there was a drought, a famine, across any of the 

across the entire horn, we would be looking to assist both governm

and non-government agencies, to go in and enhance the quality of 

shore-up, where we could and where we’re asked to, stability acros

[Comment Removed]

Q: General, Craig Gordon from Newsday. After the war in Afghan

down, there was a great deal of concern about Al-Qaida fleeing to

toward Somalia, places like that. I suspect that’s basically why you’

Figure 2. Ali Sabieh Hospital, Djibo

Army Brigadier General Willard C. Broadwater, dep

CJTF-HoA speaks during a dedication ceremony a

Hospital. This project promotes economic growth 

mission to detect, disrupt and defeat transnational 

Horn of Africa by denying terrorists a safe 

Source: CJTF-HoA, URL: http://www.cjtfhoa.c

default.asp, accessed on 14 April 200
xxxii

know, a few dozen, a few hundred—any sense of how much of that kind 

ment did occur. And secondly, I was interested in your comment, if I u

it correctly, that you’re not honing in on Al-Qaida; that you’re looking f

snational terrorists. Are there other groups in particular that you’re look

think the sense was Al-Qaida was your main focus there. 

Maj Gen Sattler: To answer the first question, as the war progress

Afghanistan, this is the exact reason, as you alluded to, why General 

consult with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, decided to go ahead and 

the CJTF-HoA to hone specifically on the region running from Yemen 

Gulf of Aden, and then, obviously, into the Horn of Africa. Once agai

can’t discuss, you know, any targeting—any terrorist groups that we ar

for intelligence collection, etcetera, whether those be Al-Qaida or any 

rorist group or faction of one of the other groups that occupies o

through that region, mainly in Somalia, as was already alluded to. So, 

Al-Qaida, obviously, we’re going to concentrate on it, collect on i

actionable intelligence and then prosecute, so I did not want to give, pl

one the idea that we were taking Al-Qaida or anybody from the Al-Qai

zation lightly. But I also want to stress that this is about all terr

transnational terrorism, that can either impact on us personally, that is

or our coalition partners. 

Q: Hi, sir. This is Kathy Rhem from the American Forces Press Service

describe what the camp that you have there in Djibouti is like, what are 

conditions like for the Marines and what kind of facilities are available 

Maj Gen Sattler: The camp in Djibouti—right now, we actually hav

sailors, airmen, and Marines and we have some civilians that are ther

also; approximates about 900. The camp has very, very strong anti

force protection security, which we provide ourselves. The individu

there—we are living in tents, sleeping on cots. There are environmen

units, there are environmental control units with each tent, and therefo

have some degree of air conditioning. There’s a mess hall, chow hall, t

also set up in tents with tables and chairs inside. It’s fairly—it’s very a

it’s only there to, you know, go ahead and support the global war on 

[Comment Removed]

Q: General, it’s Pam Hess from UPI again. I’m interested in the v

you’re using. You keep using the word “prosecute.” Is your mission t

you get actionable intelligence, to participate in or support snatch-and

then putting people into the legal system? Or, are you guys bringing, 

power to the question? 
xxxiii

inside the military, when you prosecute a target, that just means that 

and take that target—that is, it could be an artillery mission, could be 

on a conventional attack. So I do not mean to use it as our sole go

know, ensure that we have indictments on people and that those indiv

fact arrested and brought back to trial. That could be done, obviousl

terrorists or groups of terrorists that we do have an indictment out 

would be done mainly by civilian organizations—to go ahead and ar

In our particular case, it really doesn’t matter. If someone arrests 

them off the street based on intelligence information that we were ab

or in fact that it’s a clean target and we have to go ahead and take th

or group down, utilizing military action—I was using that term “p

both cases—I guess what I would say is one would be militarily t

destroy it, if in fact we couldn’t go ahead and, you know, arrest th

them to justice. 

Q: Hi, General. Bret Baier with Fox News Channel. You mentioned 

ing things moving on the waters there—perhaps smuggling, other t

are some reports indicating that Al-Qaida might have speedboats 

explosives and might be trying to hit targets, either U.S. or allied, i

on the water. Do you believe there’s credible evidence [for] that? And 

do you take that threat? Is there a higher state of alert because of tha

Maj Gen Sattler: Well, there have been, you know, two targets s

method in the last two years, one being the USS Cole, the tragedy th

the second one, much more recent, was the French oil tanker, the 

that tactic is out there for sure. We take it extremely seriously, as do 

partners. Each of the countries that we’ve worked with is very con

coastal security, to ensure that they have the capability to detect and, 

interdict. 

So a lot of our—without getting into it, a lot of our intelligence 

focused on areas where these type of boats could, A, be stored; B, 

launched from. And we also, through Combined Joint Task Force 1

time component—they’re constantly at sea, looking to interdict, stop 

necessary, you know, boats of this type, to make sure that they can’t 

in close. We’re also, especially on board our own ship—we have a 

anti-terrorism defense on board USS Mount Whitney, just to ensure 

of attack does not happen to us. Therefore, we drill, we practice. W

We have watch standers, etcetera. So we take that threat very, very s

as I’ve indicated, it’s been used twice and possibly foiled one other 

out there, and we are concerned. 
xxxiv

Q: General, Tom Infield from Knight Ridder Newspapers. Just to cl

described the assets at Camp Lemonier, and you obviously have the 

What other facilities or assets do you have as part of this task force? 

Maj Gen Sattler: We have on Camp Lemonier, without getting into 

detail; we have access to some Special Operations forces that are dire

our tactical control. And I don’t want to get into numbers or size. An

have elements of the Marine Expeditionary Unit that is over here curre

ating that are under our tactical control. So we are capable of massi

credible force on very short notice to go ahead and attack a target, once 

would have, you know, credible intelligence that was actionable. 

Q: General, I’m Carl Osgood. I write for the Executive Intelligence 

know that you have a specific area of responsibility that you’re operat

there are also conflicts and operations going on in adjacent areas, 

Israeli-Palestinian issue; you have operations in the Persian Gulf, on th

Sea in South Asia, and things like that. Can you say anything about t

that all of this—things going on in these adjacent areas—have in yo

responsibility? 

Maj Gen Sattler: I would say that General Franks, when he stood up 

bined Task Force, just like the one—you know, Combined Joint Task Fo

Afghanistan, he put Lieutenant General McNeill up there to focus on 

stan, not that General Franks wasn’t interested or divesting himself of 

wanted one individual to focus solely on that to make sure that he d

Figure 3. Fast Ro

A soldier with the 10th M

Division fast ropes out of a 

53E helicopter near Arta, D

unit also participated in 

Operations in Urban Terrai

order to better support CJ

its mission to defeat tran

terrorism in East Af

Source: CJTF-HoA, UR

www.cjtfhoa.centcom.mil/d

accessed on 14 April 
xxxv

Horn of Africa, made it very clear thats exactly what they wanted u

ahead and pull intelligence in from outside the Horn that might 

example], transnational terrorism starting outside the Horn and com

if something was leaving the Horn and moving into another area, w

tainly pass all that information back up the chain. But we are really

ing on those seven countries, and then the water that moves across, in 

with the Combined Joint Task Force 150. So the competition for res

be out there, as in the case of any operation at any time. But right now

that we have asked for, everything that—every type of intelligenc

platform that we’ve been looking for, we’ve had it made available t

have not wanted for anything at this time. So, I would tell you that 

concentrating on these seven countries and then picking up the terr

move through. 

Q: General, Otto Kreisher, Copley News Service. I want to follow 

the question earlier about your capabilities. You’re used to operating 

[Amphibious Readiness Group], with the helicopters, both troop car

ships. The Whitney is capable of about two helicopters. I’m intere

your mobility is. You know, if you have to prosecute a target, wher

your air assets, and what do you [do] about, you know, air cover—fi

cover, for what you have to do? 

Maj Gen Sattler: If an operation is distant—If we are to conduct an o

have [such things] at our disposal, going through General Franks, i

in our mission that we become the supported—the supported agen

area of operations. And obviously, what that would mean would be t

time component commander, the air component commander and th

component commander would then respond to General Franks’ di

ahead and provide us the assets you just spoke about. Without getti

bers, we also have—we have helicopters and other assets that are u

control, that we own 24-hours a day, every day. Therefore, we have a 

do the things you just spoke of day or night without having to reach 

for assistance. But if it became a larger operation, there’s no doubt 

that, you know, we can and we would go ahead and go back through 

command and ask the other commanders out here to go ahead and s

a particular operation for a particular period of time. 

Q: General, it’s Jim Mannion from AFP again. From the intelligenc

gathered, is there any indication that Osama bin Laden is in your are

Maj Gen Sattler: We have nothing at all that would indicate tha

Laden is operating in any of the countries I just talked about. I h
xxxvi

here. So, the answer to that is no. 

Q: General, it’s Mark Mazzetti with U.S. News again, and I think I’

question. I just wanted to follow up on my earlier question about acce

countries. I guess the nature of actionable intelligence is that there’s 

there’s a shrinking time window before it no longer becomes actionable

just wondering whether you feel that you’re confident that you have w

all of the bureaucracy now to allow you to act quickly in these countri

having to go through a lot of the red tape it might normally take. You 

other words, do you feel like you can—if you had to prosecute a target 

you didn’t have a lot of time, that you’d be able to do it successfully? 

Maj Gen Sattler: Boy, that’s a—I’m smiling because that is a great que

that’s the one that we constantly ask ourselves. If it’s a very fleeting ta

time-sensitive, you’re right, you need to have all those—that chain of 

the sequence of events that has to unfold to go in and prosecute that targ

be well defined so that phone numbers are known, individuals to be sp

are known to get that clearance. I will tell you that we are comfortab

have that now, but I will never be totally comfortable to the point that 

keep going back and reminding—traveling back through the countries 

already been to [, to] make second and tertiary appearances to make sur

know that we’re with them, we’re coalition partners, and anything that 

in fact be coordinated and orchestrated with them to make sure that 

exactly who has the authority and who we need to speak with, and in so

who on our side, with—inside the Combined Joint Task Force, within 

of command, needs to make the call for the final clearance. So we’re 

cerned about that, meaning that we have taken a look at it in a number o

situations, and we’re working to make sure that we have that in fact c

both our mind and in our coalition partners’ mind. 

Staff: Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate your time.1

IPB is the method for achieving the actionable intelligence expected 

General Sattler and required by CJTF-HoA to prosecute targets with U

lition military forces. The interview correctly highlights important i

concepts that are at the focus of this work, which seeks to be a primer

1

 Full text available from the U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript. Jo

Force Horn of Africa Briefing, 10 January 2003, 10:02 a.m. EST, URL: http://

defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/ t01102003_t0110hoa.html, accessed 12 Apri
xxxvii

detail in the pages ahead, General Sattler clearly outlines operation

(deter, disrupt, defeat), breaks down combating terrorism into its el

terrorism and counterterrorism), characterizes the nature of the thr

tional, shadowy, networked), highlights the varying aspects of the 

(neighboring conflicts, state failure, coalition partnerships), and 

tantly, drives home the central operational role of intelligence. In 

offers valuable boots-on-the-ground/deck testimony about the need 

quality intelligence. The following document develops and advoca

whereby the Intelligence Community can handle information on asy

flict in a manner that applies directly to operational requirements.

1

COUNTERING TERRORISTS

Donkey carts laden with rocket-propelled grenades, teenage girl

nails and explosives, and civilian airliners filled with fuel and trav

are the weapons found in the arsenal of today’s most insidious adv

terrorist. With few exceptions, terrorists play a prominent role in 

humanitarian and political crisis faced by the international commu

ple from across today’s geo-political landscape reveals a Ha

bomber haunting the streets of Jerusalem, Nepalese Maoists launc

round of bombings in Katmandu, and a Jemaah Islamiya (JI) milita

a car bomb to rival the 2002 attack in Bali. In addition to threatenin

ests and allies, terrorists pose a direct threat to the U.S. as evidenc

last decade by attacks on the World Trade Center (1993), Kh

(1996), embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998), the USS Cole (20

combined attacks of 11 September 2001. 

 As terrorists gain greater

access to resources through

globalized networks, they

secure footholds on the terrain

of illegal trade in drugs, guns

and humans. The broad spectrum of objectives and asymmetric methods of these

contemporary Assassins and

Barbary Pirates fractures traditional warfighting concepts

and challenges intelligence

capabilities. Countering terrorists demands the full spectrum of national power

instruments as well as a longterm perspective, particularly

given the dominant ideological context of the confrontation. Within this strategic

environment, the U.S. military mitigates underlying conditions that spawn terrorists and takes do

tions that commit terrorism. 

Figure 4. Khobar Towers

The explosion of a fuel truck set off by terr

p.m. EDT, Tuesday, 25 June 1996, outside 

fence of the Khobar Towers complex near Ki

Air Base, killed 19 and injured over 26

Source: U.S. Army, URL: http:www.army

fmsopubs/issues/terror/KHOBAR7.gif, acce

2004.
2

hinges on intelligence. The National Commission on Terrorism in its re

105th Congress, Countering the Changing Threat of International 

contends that

Good intelligence is the best weapon against international terr

Obtaining information about the identity, goals, plans, and vu

bilities of terrorists is extremely difficult. Yet, no other single 

effort is more important for preventing, preempting, and respo

to attacks.1

Intelligence contributes to policy decisions, informs military strateg

operational planning, enables tactical execution and assesses progress i

ing terrorism. Intelligence seeks profound insight into the adversary’s c

and intentions, and strives to do so inside the adversary’s decision-cycl

military forces develop and execute plans for combating terrorists, the 

to deliver actionable intelligence to affect targets now, while simu

crafting long-range, decision-quality threat estimates, has never bee

Remarking on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Secretary o

Donald Rumsfeld asserts that the Intelligence Community (IC) has a 

often thankless job with little margin for error. “If they fail, the world k

Important steps to enhance the intelligence contribution are und

several fronts, including improving inter-agency cooperation, establi

“fusion” organizations, expanding human intelligence (HUMINT) ca

and adapting innovative technologies. Military intelligence professio

to provide tailored support to operations in multiple theaters, includi

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Abu Sayyaf in 

ippines, and al-Qaida. Success occurs particularly where advances in 

tion technology (IT) and structured analytical techniques are appl

problem. Social network analysis, for example, is being successfully 

to determine high-value targets (HVT) associated with transnational g

widespread use has contributed to the killing or capture of a significa

of terrorist operatives across the globe, including about three-four

1

 National Commission on Terrorism, Report to the 105th Congress, Countering th

Threat of International Terrorism, 7 June 2000, URL: http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/, a

12 April 2004. 2

 Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, testimony before the Senate Armed Servi

Committee, 4 February 2004, URL: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/

n02042004_200402045.html, accessed on 12 April 2004.
3

way to understand the complex relationships between terrorist grou

environment.4

The concept and process that links these intelligence efforts to m

tions is intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB integ

gence analysis with operational planning and command decisionm

structured, continuous four-phase analytical approach to defining the 

describing battlespace effects, evaluating the adversary, and determi

of action (COA). It meets the operational requirements of military 

with combating all adversaries, including terrorists. Contemporary 

and techniques are primarily oriented toward the conventional, 

adversary, with counterterrorism (CT) considerations receiving o

attention, if any.5

 Moreover, the ideas enshrined in current IPB doc

limiting to accommodate the asymmetric character of the terrorist t

ing as it does on symmetric confrontations with nation-states.6

 T

understandable, given a law-enforcement approach to terrorism, th

legacy of superpower rivalry, and the attention given to rogue regime

Cold War period. In the context of GWOT, however, where the milita

3

 Written Statement for the Record of James L. Pavitt, Deputy Director for Oper

Intelligence Agency, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 

Washington, DC, 14 April 2004, URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speech

pavitt_testimony_04142004.html, accessed on 14 April 04. 4

 For a complete systems analysis of terrorist groups, see Troy S. Thomas and W

beer, Violent Systems: Defeating Terrorists, Insurgents and Other Non-State Advers

sional Paper #52 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Security Studies, Mar

5

 Joint and Service IPB doctrine offer supplemental guidance and checklists for 

asymmetric, unconventional and/or terrorist threats, which will be integrated with th

sequent sections. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techn

cedures for Joint IPB (JIPB) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 

viii, broadly asserts that “JIPB is a remarkably versatile process which can be adapt

wide range of joint activities applicable to countering an adversary’s use of asymme

Cited hereafter as Joint Pub 2-01.3. While the process is valid for the asymmetric th

the specific techniques recommended in JIPB can be improved and added to for CT

6

 A similar argument was made in a highly regarded 2002 RAND study for the U

Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, Street Smarts: Intelligence Preparation of 

for Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2002), xiv. The

with regard to the limitation of IPB in the urban environment apply equally well to t

They argue, for example, that IPB is limited “in part because of entrenched ideas ab

and locations of operations the US Army will conduct. Traditionally, IPB has focus

force operations against a known enemy on sparsely populated terrain.”
4

needed, but past due.

APPROACH

Mindful of these challenges and the evolving nature of the terrorist 

objectives of the present study are to:

1) Clarify the CT challenge and its intelligence demands;

2) Advance IPB tradecraft to meet CT requirements; 

3) Apply enhanced IPB concepts and methods to terrorist threats.

The intent is not to replace current IPB doctrine and its associated tac

niques and procedures (TTP), but to modify them where necessary and 

of best practices and emerging concepts as appropriate. The desired ou

core set of concepts and methods that reflect “state-of-the-art” think

government, business, and academia. 

7

 This conviction is consistent with a similar argument by Medby and Glenn, Street 

who claim “the tools traditionally used to conduct the IPB process have not kept pace w

ing types of operations and adversaries the Army encounters. Enemies, battlefields, and 

are different from what is traditionally envisioned.”

Note to Analysts

Regardless of rank or position, if you have a stake in delivering on-target intelligence fo

against terrorist groups, you may view this document as your guide. Although it is not a tre

rorism or a comprehensive rerun of IPB doctrine, it advances the latter to deal with the form

case studies of terrorist groups and tutorials on analytical techniques are not on offer; ho

are introduced and references to further detail in open-source literature are made thro

guide deals specifically with intelligence for military operations rather than being a prim

gence support to the full spectrum of CT efforts undertaken through the U.S. inter-agen

Moreover, the non-state terrorist group is the unit of analysis even though state-sponsor

remains deadly. This sub-state focus not only reflects the changing relationship between te

states, but complements the current body of IPB doctrine. It bears repeating — the world of 

than its military element. It includes diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments, m

which are more critical to the contest. Nonetheless, the military is certain to be engaged i

taking at all levels in conjunction with the other tools of state power.
5

technical issue; it involves both human and machine factors. T

enhanced mental skills and technology solutions are required to i

IT is a critical enabler, but long-lasting improvement requires 

thought take root in organizational culture, through individual initi

as training and education programs. Once we understand how to 

CT problem and develop the cognitive methods for working on 

brought to bear to improve horizontal intelligence sharing, battles

ization, data fusion and more. Since IPB in practice is often cond

field of battle, resources will be constrained, stakes will be high, 

friction will reign. IPB is an ally; it structures intelligence work 

tough conditions and when computers fail. Thus, the emphasis 

improving the “brain piece” as a first step toward a more comprehe

technical approach. In this sense, it embraces a common exhortati

USMC Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak, to “equip the m

the equipment.”8

This chapter introduces the core concepts of the book: terrorism, c

ism, and intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Given the diffic

ated with settling on a single definition for terrorism, the four core 

terrorism are examined in sufficient detail so as to understand th

posed by the asymmetric, hybrid adversary. For its part, CT is exam

of its three interrelated mission levels — strategic, operational, tacti

fundamentally asymmetric character. The four phases of IPB are in

connected to the three levels of analysis, the intelligence cycle, an

planning. As we move into the chapters, a consistent approach is use

rent IPB doctrine is introduced and critiqued with emphasis on its ob

concepts, and basic methods. Concepts and methods with enduring 

are highlighted for retention. Each chapter also modifies current d

new or improved methods for applying IPB to the terrorist threat and 

sion. The final chapter summarizes the key outcomes for each pha

ten propositions to guide all CT. 

VIOLENT THEATER

Terrorism is “violent theater.”9 “Tourists are terrorists with came

are tourists with guns.”10 While clever, and even accurate in a sense, 

8

 Although repeated on many occasions, one documented example can be found 

Magazine, May 1997, “Equipping the Man...Not Manning the Equipment,” URL: h

www.usmc.mil/ cmcarticles.nsf/0/b214bdebbc9df9f6852564d70070efd3?OpenDocu

on 14 April 2004.
6

already accumulated over one hundred official definitions two decades 

pointed out by Bruce Hoffman, terrorism expert and author of Inside Te

virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence that is perce

directed against society — whether it involves the activities of 

government dissidents or governments themselves, organized 

syndicates or common criminals, rioting mobs or persons enga

militant protest, individual psychotics or lone extortionists — i

labeled terrorism.12

No doubt, we can generally agree terrorism is bad. But we need some 

or at least recognition of terrorism’s core elements to know what w

against and how to avoid using it as a pejorative for any unwanted viol

out also offering insight into the morality of the behavior, the legality 

or the appropriateness of a response. 

The definitional problem exists in our own government. The FBI, fo

emphasizes the criminal aspect of terrorism as the “unlawful use of fo

lence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce.”13 The Sta

ment on the other hand draws attention to the political character of the 

the noncombatant status of the target. This Department’s definition has 

by the U.S. since 1983 to develop lists of Foreign Terrorist Organizati

and analyze terrorist attacks. It also enjoys a legal basis in Title 22 of 

States Code, Section 2656f(d), and is the most widely used:

9

 Brian Jenkins first introduced the idea of “terrorism is theater” in “International Te

New Mode of Conflict,” International Terrorism and World Security, eds. David Carlto

Schaerf (London, UK: Croom Helm, 1975), 16. 10 Anonymous.

11 Alex P. Schmind, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, D

and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), 119-152. 12 Bruce Hoffman offers an excellent, concise discussion of the difficulties surround

tion of terrorism in, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998

13 Hoffman, 38.
7

combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine age

ally intended to influence an audience.14

The Department of Defense (DOD) definition ignores the actor 

focuses on the act as

The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculc

intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies 

suit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideolog

With such divergence, it is no wonder the United Nations (U.N.) has 

to reach a global definition as the basis for a convention against terro

forms. Instead, the current body of international law proscribes certa

specific tactics, thus whittling away at terrorism, but never attacking 

Rather than attempting a new definition here, it is more important t

generally accepted key elements: political motivation, violence with 

cal impact, noncombatant target, and organized perpetrators.17

Violent Intellectuals

Terrorism is an intentional act resulting from the decision of an 

organization. It is not momentary rage, impulse or accident.18 Politic

describes the purpose of the act, not the reasons for joining a group

always directed at changing or fundamentally altering the political or

the last half of the 20th century, many terrorist groups pursued the m

14 This definition is taken from the State Department’s website and annual publi

in Global Terrorism 2003, URL: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt, accessed on 15 

hereafter as State Department, Patterns 2003. 15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and P

Antiterrorism (Washington, DC: GPO, 17 March 1998), I-1. Cited hereafter as Join

16 For a listing of the key terrorism conventions, see the United Nations website

untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp, accessed on 15 April 04. 17 The parsing of the key elements is drawn from Paul R. Pillar’s, Terrorism and 

Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 13. Pillar’s text is high

mended and reflects his extensive experience, culminating in service as the Deputy 

Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Counterterrorist Center (CTC). 18 Pillar, 13.

19 Hoffman, 42. The exception to this maxim, as appropriately argued by Donald 

repression terrorism, which seeks to reinforce an existing state order. Hanle cites th

vices of Hitler, Stalin, and Saddam Hussein, which engaged is systematic terrorism 

populations. Interview with author, 20 May 2004, Washington, DC. See his chapter 

rorism” in Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Bra
8

exemplified by the statehood am

ethnic separatist groups like th

Fatherland and Liberty Party (ETA

beginning of a new century, we m

the equation an adversary not just 

shift power in the system, but pu

overthrow of the entire system fro

the system. Osama bin Laden ma

prior U.S. military presence in Sa

or the U.S. stance on the Israeli-P

conflict as primary causes for glo

But in fact, a fatwa entitled “Dec

the World Islamic Front for Jihad 

Jews and the Crusaders,” released o

ruary 1998 in the Al-Quds al-’Arab

per (based in London), calls for 

against any non-Muslim coalition, d

to kill Americans and their 

both civil and military, is 

vidual duty of every Musli

is able, in any country whe

is possible, until the Aqsa 

mosque [in Jerusalem] an

Haram mosque [in Mecca

freed from their grip, and 

their armies, shattered and 

ken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, incapable of th

ing any Muslim.20

Going further, evidence suggests bin Laden and other members of t

jihadist cabal will not be satisfied with a U.S. retreat from the Middle E

November 2001, former Taliban ruler Mullah Mohammed Omar told 

that “the current situation in Afghanistan is related to a bigger c

destruction of America.”21 This is what Michael Ignatieff, Director o

Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard, calls “apocalyptic nih

20 The fatwa is reprinted in part and analyzed by Bernard Lewis, The Cris

Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York, NY: Modern Library, 20

xxvii.

Figure 5. Embassy Bombing

Terrorists associated with al Qaeda 

detonated a large truck bomb outside 

the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, 

Tanzania, on 7 August 1998, just as 

another truck bomb exploded outside 

the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. 

Source: FBI, URL: http://www.fbi.gov, 

accessed on 20 April 2004
9

making political demands at all. They are seeking the violent transfor

irremediably sinful and unjust world.”22 While not political in the 

realpolitick sense, these statements do reflect “macroconcerns abou

larger order” that can be considered “political” in a social, religious 

nomic sense.23

Political motivation distinguishes terrorist groups from common c

lunatics. Criminals rely on violence often similar to terrorism in for

material motive—money. Even when criminals threaten or use viol

of kidnapping, shooting or robbing is generally not intended to h

quences or create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself

in mind, terrorists regularly engage in criminal behavior and partner 

tional criminal organizations (TCO). In fact, the unholy alliance betw

ism and organized crime is at the crux of the emergent threat landsc

its own label of narco-terrorism. Terrorism is also set apart from lun

ics, like Charles Manson’s “Helter Skelter” group, are motivated 

behavior and individual values rather than a self-perceived pu

Whether we can see the “good” in terrorist ambitions is irrelevant; H

Irish Republican Army (IRA) and others are convinced their actions 

in terms of achieving “a greater good for a wider constituency.”26 In 

of Bruce Hoffman, “the terrorist is fundamentally a violent intellect

to use and indeed committed to using force in the attainment of his g

21 Transcript of interview with Mullah Omar conducted by BBC. Thursday, 15 N

10:31 GMT, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_16570

1657368.stm, accessed on 15 April 04. 22 Michael Ignatieff, “It’s War- But it Doesn’t Have to be Dirty,” The Guardian, 1 

URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4267406,00.html, accesse

2004. 23 Pillar, 14.

24 Hoffman, 41

25 Hoffman, 43.

26 Hoffman, 43.

27 Hoffman, 43.
10

Terrorism is a tactic—a

form of warfare—by which

violence or the threat of violence is intended to have a

psychological impact on an

audience. It is “violent theater,” but the audience is not

the victim of the attack. Terrorism earns its name when

the normative values, or

expectations, of the victim or

target audience are violated.28 Brian Jenkins,

renowned terrorism expert,

makes this point when he says

Terrorism is violence for effect; not only and sometimes not at 

the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact the vic

may be totally unrelated to the terrorists’ cause. Terrorism is vi

aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not 

byproduct of the [force employment].29

The classic relationship between terrorist, victim and target is shown in 

adopted from Hanle’s text, Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare. 

audiences of the 11 September 2001 attacks were not its victims—airli

gers and employees or workers in the World Trade Center and Pentagon

American public and government. The takeaway insight is that the “tru

of terrorism is not the “physical attack on the victim, but the psy

impact upon the target.”30 Thus, choosing “victims” is among the most 

decisions terrorists make. Misjudging the symbolic value of the victi

expected target audience response can discredit a group and set back 

Religiously motivated terrorism adds an additional twist whereby both 

28 Hanle, 52.

29 Quoted in Hanle, 112, from Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode 

(Los Angeles, CA: Crescent Publications, 1975), 1. 30 Hanle, 113.

Figure 6. Direct Targeting

Source: Alex P. Schmid and J. de Graaf, Viol

Communication (London: Sage Publications L

176, Hanle, Terrorism, 113.
11

theatrical qualities of the act itself.3

There is more. F

resents the class

form of terrori

terrorism, as e

Hanle, adds ano

the target of infl

is distinct from 

terror. The 

shown in Figur

display in Iraq o

2003. Terroris

foreign jihadist

cide car bombs 

cent Internationa

of the Red C

workers. The ta

ror were ICRC and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), b

of influence were not only NGO leadership, but the U.N., as well a

and international opinion. Again, an accounting of the unique char

gious terrorism is warranted. While the terrorist organization may h

ence in mind when it sends out a suicide bomber, the audience of rel

actual bomber may very well be his or her family, or more significan

is, we must keep in our understanding the prospect of “Allah as audie

31 According to Bruce Hoffman, for the religious extremists of Hamas, Islamic J

Qaida, violence is a “sacramental act or a divine duty executed in direct response to 

cal demand or imperative.” Thus, terrorism “assumes a transcendental dimension” a

becomes the “legitimizing force.” The religious sanction is essential as exemplified 

entitled, “Sacrificing Oneself for God,” by a Jewish rabbi from the West Bank, who 

during wartime is permissible for the sake of victory of Israel.” Hoffman, 94-95, 10

tive is reinforced, not only by the rhetoric of the terrorist’s themselves, but in other 

Among these, I recommend a seminal inquiry into violence as a function of fantasy 

longings” by James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolut

(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980). Recommended studies focused on the Islamic 

terrorism as a divine act, or fulfillment of a fantasy role, include Daniel Benjamin an

The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2003), M. J. Akbar, The Shad

Jihad and the Conflict Between Islam and Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2002

Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco Pu

Figure 7. Indirect Targeting

Source: Hanle, Terrorism, 113.
12

all phases of IPB, but particularly the development of COA in phase fo

Innocence Lost

 Noncombatants are the so-called “innocents” of war. The class is n

to children, the elderly or the weak, but to all individuals who cann

themselves with violence.32 We might also add those who choose not t

themselves, such as conscientious objectors, and those whose professio

it, such as doctors.33 In international humanitarian law (IHL), noncomb

not clearly defined. Rather, the burden of distinguishing them is place

batants, who must determine the application of four standards whereb

ants, by definition: (1) are commanded by a person responsibl

subordinates; (2) have a fixed, distinctive emblem recognizable at a di

carry arms openly; and (4) conduct their operations in accordance wit

and customs of war.34 Anyone, including mercenaries, not meeting 

requirements is technically a noncombatant, and thus does not enjoy 

rights and duties of war.”35 Of course, terrorists also fall short, and ma

internal wars involve belligerents who avoid these symbols of professi

gain an asymmetric advantage. This does not make them noncombata

does bring into question whether they should enjoy any of the rights o

ants when captured. The U.S. State Department adds further clarificatio

[T]he term “noncombatant” is interpreted to include, in additi

civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident ar

unarmed and/or not on duty...We also consider as acts of terro

attacks on military installations or on armed military personne

a state of military hostilities does not exist.”36

32 Pillar, 14.

33 Donald Hanle, interview with the author, 20 May 2004, Washington, DC.

34 Article 1, Hague Convention (IV), “Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on L

to the Convention,” 18 October 1907. Reprinted in, The Laws of War: A Comprehensiv

of Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflicts, eds. W. Mic

man and Christ T. Antoniou (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1994), 41. 35 The Laws of War, 43. 36 State Department, Patterns 2003. The following are examples of non-combatants 

State’s definition: Col. James Rowe, killed in Manila in April 1989; Capt. William Nor

defense attaché killed in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the Labelle 

bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and the four off-duty U.S. Embassy Marine gua

a cafe in El Salvador in June 1985.
13

commuter rail lines on 11

March 2004 in Madrid,

Spain, clearly targeted noncombatant victims, the attack

on the USS Cole in the port of

Aden on 12 October 2000 is

less clear. The USS Cole

attack highlights the gray

areas of the war-vs.-crime

and terrorist-vs.-guerilla

dilemma. Strategically

located near the mouth of the

Red Sea, Aden was undergoing a modest revival as a refueling stop when the USS Cole

made its visit while en route

to the Persian Gulf. Around

noon, the USS Cole was in

the middle of the harbor preparing to refuel at a floating station. Small rubber boats went about 

massive destroyer to the surrounding buoys with mooring lines. Tw

of the boats apparently smiled and waved as they returned to its sid

worked, a powerful explosion tore a 20-by-40 foot hole in the hull ne

room and adjacent to eating and living quarters. Throughout the ni

the next day, sailors fought to save their mates and boat. In the en

were killed and 39 injured. 

Were they combatants or noncombatants? From Osama bin Lade

tive, war had been declared in his fatwa, and the sailors of the US

instruments of the state engaged in military actions against the Mus

nity. Thus, they were combatants. On the other hand, the U.S. did 

itself at war, and the sailors of the USS Cole were not part of a lo

chain designed to harm someone as part of a conflict. Moreover

quarters and mess were attacked, removing them even further fro

Based on the State Department clarification, they were noncom

determining factor, which is beyond the scope of this book, is wh

exists with non-state groups at all. It was war in the sense that a po

an al-Qaida-affiliate, used lethal force for a political end; however

the U.S. had never declared war on terrorists, and it is still unclear 

international laws of war allow for it. If the bombing can be seen as 

Figure 8. USS Cole

Seventeen Sailors aboard the USS Cole (D

killed as a result of an explosion that left la

port side of the Norfolk, VA-based de

Source: U.S. Navy Office of Information, 

www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/news_

cole1.html, accessed on 

14 April 2004. 
14

sailors of the USS Cole, these distinctions are not relevant—the attac

sounded and killed like war. In a way, the question poses a false d

Terrorism is simultaneously an act of war and a crime by the very n

only of the actions against the target, but most importantly, the tactic

more directly, terrorism is criminal war.37

Fixing on Groups

Terrorism is collective violence carried out by organized perpetr

CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC) provides a specific definition for 

group as “any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups tha

international terrorism.” Even though the State Department’s definition 

the lone actor, IPB must include the solo terrorist as a CT target. For 

former CTC Deputy Director Paul Pillar argues that the four-year hunt 

Mir Aimal Kansi following his shooting spree outside CIA headqu

“always rightly regarded as a counterterrorist operation.”38 Several addi

tinctions help characterize our adversary and provide general insight int

ities and intentions.

First, terrorism is often state-sponsored. Examples of the latter incl

Korea’s 1987 in-flight bombing of a Korean Air Lines passenger jet, 

115 passengers, and Libya’s sponsorship of the 21 December 1988 

aboard Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. During the Cold War, a

rorism expert Martha Crenshaw, and particularly in the 1980s, the c

state-sponsorship gained popularity because 

it simplified the problem of how to combat terrorism by makin

act of international aggression, even an act of war. The real am

surrounding the causes of terrorism, which makes devising an 

priate remedy so hard, could be ignored by assuming that hos

states were the real cause.39

Since the end of the Cold War, state-sponsorship has declined and sta

ship, or even state-predation has increased. Hezbollah, for example, is 

dependent on Iran, although coordination continues. JI preys on the sta

37 Two types of terrorism are not necessarily forms of war: state repressive terrorism 

nal terrorism. The former, because the population is not resisting (war is a duel), and th

because the motivation is narrowly commercial, not political. 38 Pillar, Terrorism, 14. 39 Martha Crenshaw, “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts,” in Te

Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Pres
15

erodes state sovereignty, taking advantage of globalization cove

porous borders and of “failures in governance” to exploit territory, r

people. CT against states is certain to be part of our future; this is a r

IPB for military operations involving nation-states needs continuou

reflect the shifting security landscape.

Figure 9. Terrorist Group Types

Source: Heather S. Gregg, “Defining and Distinguishing Traditional a

Religious Terrorism,” paper presented at International Studies Association Co

March 2004, Montreal, Canada.

Defining Goals Exa

Left 

1) Anarchist—destroy the 

government 

2) Marxist—foment worker’s 

revolution 

3) Socialist—economic restructuring

Arg

Mon

German/

A

Shin

Right

1) Racist—racial supremacy

2) Fascist- militant nationalism/

racism 

3) Nationalistic

Ku K

Neo

Rumania

Ethnic Separatist 1) Dispel foreign occupier 

2) Create ethnically independent

state

IR

Single Issue 1) Advance cause 

2) Defend issue

A

Libera

Ear

Religious 1) Apocalyptic—cataclysmic 

destruction 

2) Government—create religious 

government 

3) Purity—purge heretical faiths 

Aum 

Hez

Hind
16

tinction. The terrorist label obscures a more fundamental identity

rooted in membership characteristics and shared motivations. Dist

groups in these terms leads to several simplified identity types: left, rig

separatist, single-issue and religious extremist. Goals and examples fo

shown in Figure 9. Left-wing groups pursue anarchist, Marxist or radic

agendas and generally claim to represent the impoverished or disenfra

Right-wing groups embrace racist, fascist, or fiercely nationalist agen

ethnic separatists pursue an autonomous or independent homeland. Si

groups have emerged in recent years as self-perceived champions 

focused causes—the term “eco-warriors” characterizes the many group

for environmental reasons. 

Religious extremism warrants further subdivision into three grou

forth by terrorism expert Heather Gregg: apocalyptic, religious govern

religiously pure state.41 Apocalyptic groups are motivated by their faith 

hasten the end of the world or cause some other form of cataclysmic d

while individual terrorists in these groups are often motivated by an 

audience” mind-set. Others seek the creation of a religious government

Islamic law or Reconstruction Theology for example, either within th

of a state’s borders, or transcending borders as in the pan-Islamic g

desired by the Muslim Brotherhood.42 Finally, several religious-base

groups seek to cleanse, or purify, the state of so-called infidels.43 By re

each of the types highlighted here, we gain immediate insight into gen

vations, membership characteristics and even likely targeting strategies

The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism offers a four

tion based on levels of operation by terrorist organizations, which s

basis for assessing the threat and structuring strategy. Groups on the 

operate primarily within a single state, such as the IRA (United K

ETA (Spain) or Abu Sayyaf (Philippines). By taking advantage of 

tion, single-country groups can grow to have an impact on a regional 

level. Regional groups, such as JI (Southeast Asia) or the Salafist 

Call and Combat (GSPC), in the Mahgreb region of North Africa, tra

40 Bruce Hoffman offers a useful historical and contemporary examination of these 

in Inside Terrorism, 45-129. 41 The figure and categories are adopted from a paper presented by Heather S. Greg

and Distinguishing Traditional and Religious Terrorism,” International Studies Associa

ence, Montreal, Canada, 17-20 March 2004. 42 According to Gregg, Reconstruction Theology is “one interpretation of Christian 

that calls for the creation of a Christian theocratic government in the U.S.” Gregg, 8. 43 Gregg, 11.
17

to share intelligence, resources and personnel, and (2) promoting 

logical agendas.45 The high degree of interconnectedness, argues 

Strategy, necessitates pursuing “them across the geographic spectr

that all linkages between the strong and weak organizations are bro

each of them isolated, exposed, and vulnerable to defeat.”46 These 

allow us to initially size up a group in terms of its relationship to th

identity, and operational reach. The most challenging groups will b

global reach, a religious extremist identity and state(s) support. Al-

mized this type of threat while the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, an

continues to reflect these characteristics. 

Hybrid Adversary

If terrorism is a form of warfare, we need to ascribe to the perpetra

tity separate from the terror tactic. While blowing up a mosque earn

ous title of “terrorist,” and a hit-and-run ambush by a small group 

earns the label of “guerrilla,” these terms mask the more complex 

cussed above. Going further, terrorists in Chechnya, Colombia, Ir

where use forms of violence other than terrorism—they are hybrid 

Like the FARC or al-Qaida, the most challenging groups are sim

criminals, terrorists, guerillas and soldiers. The forms of war—ter

rilla, conventional—are often confused with concepts like revolution

jihad, and preemptive war. These strategic concepts refer to politi

involving lethal force; they are politico-military constructs that will 

or more of the forms of warfare. To avoid underestimating the m

asymmetric capabilities of the terrorist group, the two additional dom

of warfare are succinctly addressed below. Of note, this discuss

address cyberwar, which emerges in discussions throughout this w

rants an independent IPB-oriented study.

44 U.S., National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003

hereafter as National Strategy.

45 National Strategy, 9.

46 National Strategy, 9.
18

Conventional wars involve mechanized forces that rely on maneuver,

mass and other principles to defeat

the adversary in force-on-force battles. In the 2001 war in Afghanistan,

Osama bin Laden fielded an “elite”

force of Arab fighters with mechanized equipment as the 55th Arab

Brigade. Other terrorist groups, such

as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, have

occasionally fielded small armies. A

conventional fight with terrorists is a

rarity for at least four reasons. First,

building and deploying it requires

geo-political space. The terrorist

must carve the territory from the

state. In the case of al-Qaida, the

Taliban provided the space. In the

case of the FARC, former Colombian President Andres Pastrana

ceded national territory as part of a

peace process, allowing the FARC

to consolidate its forces. In most

cases, the terrorist must wrestle the

space from the state, often as part of

an internal war. Even when space is

obtained, the terrorist group must be

sufficiently mature and well-organized to recruit, train, equip and feed a conventional force, and it mus

professional skills to plan and execute operations. Third, acquiring co

weapons and the infrastructure to support them is expensive and ille

there is access to resources resembling those of a state. States can buil

tain conventional forces the terrorist finds difficult to rival—a fact that 

larly true of industrialized states. Moreover, by building a conventional 

terrorist is actually playing to the state’s asymmetric operational advan

thus setting itself up for almost certain defeat. Against an advanced ind

foe, concentrating one’s forces is an invitation to summary destruction. 

Figure 10. Fighting al Qaeda

An Anti-Taliban Forces (ATF) fighter 

bandolier of ammunition around his bod

personnel help secure an al Qaeda co

against which the U.S. Marines ha

conducted a Cordon and Search Rai

Helmand Province of Afghanist

Source: U.S. Atlantic Fleet News, UR

www.atlanticfleet.navy.mil/ index.htm, 

on 20 April 2004.
19

 Guerrilla warfare pits the weak against the strong. Of course, this 

tinction related to the “will to fight” than it is of the ability to do so li

its core is avoidance of direct confrontation, making it very similar 

The guerrilla’s only chance of winning is to survive, preserving his s

while simultaneously wearing down the adversary. Small, persisten

intended to compel a weakening of the enemy’s will. It takes advant

metries by directing what lethal force is available against the state’

ties. In the words of one of guerrilla warfare’s primary architects, M

“the strategy of guerrilla war is to put one man against ten, but the t

ten men against one.”47

According to the DOD definition, guerrilla warfare involves “

paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory 

predominantly indigenous forces.”48 This approach correctly highlig

tary aspect of the operation, the obvious geo-political space (host

operations occur, and the irregular nature of the forces. However, wh

las were once principally indigenous forces, conflicts have witnessed 

increase in the participation of non-indigenous forces from the tim

Afghan mujahideen welcomed the participation of Arabs to their figh

Soviet Union. With victory against one of the world’s superpowers 

eign fighters were emboldened and unemployed. Like the roving m

the pre-Westphalia period, they embraced bin Laden’s call for a glo

fanned out across the globe to support a perceived defensive str

Islamic community, or umma, against infidels and apostate regime

kans, Chechnya, Afghanistan again, and now Iraq. On the eve of the 

2003, Syrians, Afghanis, Yemenis, Chechens, Saudis and others rush

join the fray. 

Where the DOD definition comes up short is in addressing the d

gets and tactics of guerrilla warfare. In terms of targets, guerrilla war

guished from terrorism by its focus on the government rath

noncombatants. Gray areas exist. Whereas most guerrilla operation

history have centered their targeting on the state’s military, it is not u

see guerrillas go after other government officials and related support 

47Quoted from Max Boot in his study of U.S. involvement in small wars during 

Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York, NY

2002), 112. 48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictiona

and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: GPO, 12 April 2001, As Amended Throug

2003), under “guerrilla war.” Cited hereafter as Joint Pub 1-02.
20

the states instruments of coercion; the further removed the target is 

causal chain of coercion, the more likely the attack is going to be percei

rorism. Of course, even when the targets are considered legitimate, t

likely to employ the rhetoric of terrorism in an effort to discredit the gu

The history of guerrilla warfare is replete with well-known theorists 

titioners, including Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, T.E. Lawrence, Charles Callw

of the influential Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice), Che Gu

Vo Nguyen Giap.49 All contributed to its development, but for the bes

tion of its overall strategy and tactics we return to Mao as quoted i

O’Neill:

What is the basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla strategy must be 

primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It must be adjusted 

adversary situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communic

the relative strengths, the weather, and the situation of the peop

guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from th

and attacking from west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; a

withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. 

guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he adva

harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursu

when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flank

other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he mu

harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated.50

The choice between terrorism, guerilla and conventional war is larg

capability and strategy, although issues of popular legitimacy also f

guerrilla seeks to preserve popular support by not intentionally killing 

The terrorist is often willing to kill civilians either to eradicate the adv

force a change in policy without regard to popular support. That said

targeted terrorism can serve to mobilize support; not just among its cor

ers, but among a sympathetic population.51 In addition to the core eleme

49 Among the many histories of guerrilla warfare, I recommend: Robert B. Asprey, 

Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 19

Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical & Critical Study (New Brunswick, N.J.: Tran

lishers, 1998). 50 Bard E. O’Neill is quoting from Mao’s On Guerrilla Warfare (New York, NY: Fr

Praeger, 1962) in, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (W

DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990), 25. 51 See Hanle’s chapter on Revolutionary Terrorism, 132-163.
21

in multiple forms at once. 

At this point, we should be able to size up a potential terrorist 

political motivation, targeting strategy, organizational characteristi

able forms of warfare. A quick look at the LTTE, for example, reveal

ethnic separatist group seeking autonomy by attacking noncombata

ize the Sri Lanka public and influence the Sri Lankan government

guerrilla war and has even fought pitched battles with convent

Although a single-country group, it has global reach in terms of its s

structure. These insights are not of the decision quality required by 

do serve as a point of entry for more nuanced analysis required by C

COUNTERTERRORISM

Combating terrorism entails all actions taken to oppose terroris

entire threat spectrum.52 These actions come in two forms: anti-te

and CT. AT “is defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability o

and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and con

local military forces.53 We know it at as Force Protection (FP), and 

involves hardening facilities, introducing layers of security, and i

random measures to create uncertainty. When expected targets, such 

and military bases, are hardened, terrorists look elsewhere for softe

targets, including housing complexes and commercial centers. W

defensive, CT aims to “prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.”5

terrorism is examined in this section with emphasis on the mission

metric character of CT. 

The U.S. strategy for combating terrorism underwent a sea chang

tember 2001. Prior to the attacks, the U.S. approach emphasized a 

fighting and warfighting, with the law enforcement approach domin

fighting relies on investigation, forensics, prosecution and incarcerat

ing criminals domestically is hard enough, where a robust law enfo

judicial system exist. The international system is even less potent, su

voluntary participation, a weak Interpol, and a newly established 

criminal court that does not yet enjoy universal participation. High-

like Carlos the Jackal or Ramsi Youssef notwithstanding, terrorists a

hard to arrest. And when arrested, convicting with proof beyond 

52 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-1.

53 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-1.

54 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-2.
22

doubt is difficult at best. Of the two Libyans tried in the Netherlands f

Am 103 bombing, one, Al-Amin Kalifa Fahima, was released becaus

dence failed to meet this standard. We also responded to the Khobar 

Cole bombings with criminal investigations, although military options 

sidered. As a result of this police work, approximately 17 people had 

victed for these bombings through September 2001.

With a crime-fighting approach in use, overt military operations we

sparingly in the last two decades of the 20th century. President Rona

used the military instrument in 1986 in the wake of the 5 April bomb

LaBelle Club in Berlin. On 14 April, U.S. Air Force F-111s joined Nav

in strikes in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya, destroying a range of terrori

and military targets. Just two years later, Pan AM 103 exploded in mi

DESTROYED

SEVERE DAMAGE

MODERATE DAMAGE

LIGHT DAMAGE

Figure 11. Missile Strikes

According to the former Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, the capability to 

terrorist operations from these facilities was significantly reduced. The anti-ter

strikes on the terrorist camps in Afghanistan took place on 20 August 199

Source: DOD News Photo, URL:

 http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/Jan1999/990113-O-0000X-001.html

accessed on 17 April 2004.
23

sons on the ground. The U.S. in 1993 responded to the attempted ass

Iraqi agents of former President George Bush in Kuwait with missi

Iraqi Intelligence Services headquarters. President Clinton replied 

embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania with cruise missile attack

camps in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical factory in the Sudan

ings by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U

Commission) in April 2004 substantiated U.S. planning of several c

tions, but also suggested a host of restraints, including an absence o

intelligence,” that precluded execution. By interviewing senior CT of

ard Shultz substantiated U.S. reluctance to employ Special Opera

(SOF) as a result of “nine mutually reinforcing, self-imposed constra

ing the criminalization of terrorism, not treating terrorism as a clea

danger, concerns over legal authorities, aversion to risk, and a lack 

intelligence.55

With the GWOT well underway by February 2003, the Taliba

Afghanistan deposed, and al-Qaida under assault, the U.S. rele

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. It enshrines a new appr

on the integration of crime-fighting and warfighting, but clearly elev

of the military. More directly, it declares

Ours is a strategy of direct and continuous action against 

groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, o

degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations. T

frequently and relentlessly we strike the terrorists across al

using all the tools of statecraft, the more effective we will be.5

The short history presented here highlights a substantive shift in 

icy, but we are reminded that the U.S. history of military-oriented 

back to the country’s founding. During the administration of Thom

for example, the Barbary States of North Africa employed pirates t

and scuttle trading ships. After languishing in prisons, crews were 

sold into slavery.57 Jefferson responded in his first State of the Unio

Congress, 

55 Richard H. Shultz, “Showstoppers: Nine reasons why we never sent our Speci

Forces after al-Qaida before 9/11,” The Weekly Standard,” 26 January 2004, URL: w

standard.com, accessed on 17 April 2004. 56 National Strategy, 2. 57 Gerard W. Gawalt, “America and the Barbary Pirates: An International Battle 

Unconventional Foe,” (Thomas Jefferson Papers), np, URL: http://memory.loc.gov/

mtjhtml/ mtjhome.html, accessed on 14 April 2004.
24

one exception exists. Tripoli, the least considerable of the Ba

States, had come forward with a demand unfounded either in ri

in compact, and had permitted itself to announce war on our fail

comply before a given day. The style of the demand admitted bu

answer. I sent a small squadron of frigates to the Mediterranean.

Mission Analysis I

Mission analysis guides and informs IPB at all times. It frames the 

reducing uncertainty and helping IPB zero in on the commander’s decis

needs—a problem well-defined is a problem half-solved. Framing begin

commander’s objectives and guidance, which helps us “understand the 

58 Gawalt, np.

Figure 12. Strategic G

Source: Testimon

Raymond J. Decker, D

Defense Capabiliti

Management, U.S. G

Accounting Offi

“Combating Terro

Observations on Na

Strategies Relate

Terrorism,” before t

Congress, Hous

Representatives, Com

on Government Re

Subcommittee on N

Security, Emerging T

and International Re

3 March 2003
25

trine and TTP include mission analysis as a sub-step in the first pha

the battlespace—its overriding importance to all phases argues for an 

ment. Given the tough conditions and time constraints under which 

ducted in the field, IPB should never be started without first figu

mission, and continual reflection on the mission must follow the proc

analysis stays on track.

Like IPB analysis, CT planning and execution is carried out on 

related levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. The operational 

mines WHAT we will attack, in WHAT order, and for WHAT dur

operational level links tactical engagements to strategic objecti

engagements deal with how we fight, while the strategic level addr

and WITH WHAT we will fight and WHY the enemy fights us.”61 

levels of CT planning and execution are treated separately, we m

terms of planning, operations and effects that transcend levels. That 

level action can have strategic effects and strategic-level planning w

tical behaviors. Essentially, the levels provide a theoretical scaffold

our work and understand the flow of action and effects across the bat

IPB process is consistent for each level; however, specifics may v

ably due to “obvious differences in missions, available resources,” s

tional areas and other factors developed in Chapters 2-5.62

The Big Picture

GWOT is a strategic construct; CT policy objectives are est

national resources are developed and used to accomplish them.63 F

DOD definition, actions at the strategic level “sequence initiatives, 

and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of na

develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives

military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic pla

gic-level CT integrates all the instruments of national power to ach

defined security objectives that are consistent with the nation’s Nati

59 Air Force Pamphlet 14-118, Intelligence, “Aerospace Intelligence Preparation 

tlespace (AFPAM 14-118),” 5 June 2001, 12. Cited hereafter as AFPAM 14-118. 60 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Organization and Employment of Ae

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center, 17 February 2000), 3. Cited hereaft

61 AFDD 2, 2.

62 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-7.

63 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Strategic Level of War.”

64 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Strategic Level of War.”
26

egy for Combating Terrorism although guidance can also be found in 

tional strategy documents shown in Figure 12. Among these are the 

Military Strategy and National Military Strategic Plan for the War on 

(classified). The former addresses a broad range of topics, including t

create a global anti-terrorism environment. Its specific guidance includ

To defeat terrorists we will support national and partner-nation e

to deny state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorist org

tion. We will work to deny terrorists safe haven in failed state

ungoverned regions. Working with other nations’ militaries and 

governmental agencies, the Armed Forces help to establish favo

security conditions and increase the capabilities of partners. The 

tionships developed in these interactions contribute to a global 

terrorism environment that further reduces threats to the United S

its allies and its interests. For example, intelligence partnership

other nations can take advantage of foreign expertise and are

focus and provide access to previously denied areas.65

For the purposes of setting up IPB, the unclassified National Strategy 

bating Terrorism provides greater detail and is more than sufficient to o

elements. While it is likely that policy will be refined in future years un

quent administrations, we can expect strategic intent to remain genera

tent to “stop terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its 

and our friends and allies around the world and ultimately to create a

tional environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support 

U.S. strategic intent highlights the three core dimensions of combat

ism: (1) causes, (2) capabilities and intentions, and (3) defenses. Ac

Pillar, these elements correspond to the life cycles of terrorism. Th

dimension focuses on root conditions and issues “that give rise to 

groups in the first place and motivate individuals to join them.67 T

dimension centers on the intention and ability of groups to conduct 

while the third focuses on defending against attacks. IPB for CT is fo

marily on the second dimension, although the joint force makes a signi

tribution to the others.

65 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2

2004, 10. Cited hereafter as NMS. 66 National Strategy, 11. 67 Pillar, 29.
27

ism policy: defeat, deny, diminish and defend (4Ds). Defeat and d

terrorist capabilities (second traditional dimension), while dimini

mitigating causes (first dimension), and defend (third dimensio

about AT. In reverse order, the defend front “encompasses our nat

tive efforts to defend U.S. sovereignty, territory, and its nationa

home and abroad.”68 Recognizing the adaptive, asymmetric char

adversary, it includes defending against attack with weapons of m

tion (WMD) and the “cyber threat” in its many forms. Defen

include efforts to implement a homeland security strategy, dev

awareness, or “effective knowledge” of the threat, protect physic

mation-based infrastructure, protect citizens abroad, and ensure a

incident-management capability.69 The diminish front works to mi

tions in the environment that give rise to and are exploited by terr

In addition to working on persistent, underlying problems, such as 

ease, and localized conflict, this front seeks to strengthen weak sta

governance, and win the “war of ideas.”70

On the deny front, the U.S. seeks to prevent terrorists from the “

support, and sanctuary that enable them to exist, gain strength, tra

execute their attacks.”71 Essentially, this front seeks to sever profita

ships between terrorists and their stakeholders. Its correspondin

include ending state-sponsorship, establishing international standard

ability, interdicting resources, eliminating sanctuaries, and strengthe

tional efforts by: working with willing and able states, enabling 

persuading reluctant states, and compelling unwilling states.72 The d

the most aggressive, seeking to defeat terrorists by isolating and lo

activities and then destroying the organization through intensiv

action.73 At the strategic level, all the instruments of national powe

to bear to find and fix terrorists in order to disrupt their operations an

to terminate their functioning.

68 National Strategy, 24. 69 National Strategy, 24-28. 70 National Strategy, 22-24 71 National Strategy, 17. 72 National Strategy, 17-21. 73 National Strategy, 15.
28

every front, and a

one front will affec

on the other. Alth

for CT tends to 

defeat and deny fro

military operatio

impact our ability t

conditions and defe

and resources. 

success in dimini

defending will hav

ing, positive effec

ability to defeat 

groups. Opening a 

Djibouti village im

ing conditions, w

enhance efforts 

hearts and minds,” 

shrink a potentia

recruiting pool, 

changes the capabilities of the adversary. Military forces may actually 

the hospital, or they may provide security to defend workers. A more l

tary CT mission is offensive action against a group seeking to disrupt 

tion. While tactical in nature, our ability to defeat the group and defend 

has strategic effects. The bottom line is that IPB for CT, while focused 

ing an adversary, must not be blind to the mutual exchange of effects ac

and levels.

Campaigning

CT at the operational level entails planning, conducting and sustai

paigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within 

other operational areas.74 Actions include “establishing operational 

needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to a

operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to b

and sustain these events.” Operational actions also suggest “a broader 

of time or space” than tactics, enable “logistic and administrative suppo

cal forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are ex

74 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Operational Level of War.”

Figure 13. Filipino Training

A U.S Special Forces soldier checks a Filipino scout 

ranger’s target during marksmanship training. About 660 

U.S. personnel deployed to the Philippines to assist Armed 

Forces of the Philippines forces during counter-terrorism 

training. 

Source: US PACOM, URL: http://www.pacom.mil/

philimagery/index3.shtml, accessed 14 April 2004
29

document that translates national security objectives into military st

specifically to CT, the National Military Strategic Plan for the War 

and its successor link military objectives to national strategy and set 

operational planning by combatant commanders. According to pre

this first military CT plan is “more of a general framework of p

objectives for military commanders than an attempt to define specifi

or tactical plans.”76 Although not detailed here due to its classifie

must be treated as mandatory reading. 

Objectives and missions at

the operational level are certain to contain 4D parallels to

be carried out by unified

commands, component commands and joint task forces.

Special Operations Command (SOCOM), for example, is charged to disrupt,

defeat and destroy networked

terrorist organizations. Their

global approach to the problem covers the seams created

by regional command boundaries, which is needed given

the transnational character of

modern terrorism. The

SOCOM Posture Statement

asserts that “SOF are specifically organized, trained, and

equipped to conduct covert,

clandestine, or discreet CT

missions in hostile, denied,

or politically sensitive environments.”77 Among the missions the IPB analyst might

75 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Operational Level of War.”

76 Bradley Graham, “Troops Could Stay for Months without Replacements,” Wa

23 January 2003, A12. 77 US Special Operations Command, Posture Statement 2003-2004, 35, URL: ht

www.socom.mil/Docs/2003_2004_SOF_Posture_Statement.pdf, accessed on 17 Ap

Figure 14. Malian Training

Soldiers from the 1/10th Special Forces Gro

teach mounted infantry tactics to soldiers fr

Army in Timbuktu. The Pan Sahel Initiative 

State Department-funded program in the no

countries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Ch

enhance border capabilities throughout the 

arms smuggling, drug trafficking, and the 

trans-national terrorists. U.S. Army Spec

assigned to Special Operations Command 

training selected military units in Mali and 

mobility, communications, land navi

and small unit tactics.

Source: EUCOM Photos, URL: http://www

Photo_Gallery/index.htm, accessed 14 A
30

cue, recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and n

activities aimed at the ideologies or motivations that spawn terrorism

missions include counter-proliferation, foreign internal defense (FID), 

itary affairs, counter-weapons of mass destruction, intelligence survei

reconnaissance (ISR), information operations (includes psychologic

tions), and direct action using unconventional forces. 

The missions performed by SOCOM are integrated with the pl

regional unified commanders: Central Command (CENTCOM), Europ

mand (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Southern Command 

COM), and Northern Command (NORTHCOM). All combatant c

including SOCOM, develop and execute CT-related concept plans (CO

and operational plans (OPLAN). These classified documents integrate o

forces and mission at the operational level.78 Likely missions include: 

the capabilities of allied governments to combat terrorism, disrupting 

cations, interdicting terrorist resource flows, capturing or killing terrori

denying safe havens and sanctuary, and conducting information ope

influence perceptions. As an example, intelligence analysts supporting 

Force-Horn of Africa (JTF-HoA) were credited in a 16 April 2004 D

release for “the capture of suspected terrorists and interdictions of drug 

off the Horn of Africa.”79 According to CENTCOM, “a ‘number’ of 

terrorists have been taken from dhows, traditional fishing vessels in t

and ‘pushed into the interrogation system because of their ties to al-

Like the maritime interdiction operations (MIO) example here, missio

at the operational level requires understanding linkages to strategic o

desired outcomes, the capabilities of available friendly forces, the rang

and factors capable of impacting the campaign, and “integrating tactica

ties at the decisive time and place.”81

Face-to-Face 

The engagement with terrorists is joined at the tactical level—engage

planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tac

or task forces.82 Forces are synchronized in time and space to achieve 

78 An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the combatant c

strategic concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operation

1-02, under “Operations Plan.” 79 Kathleen T. Rhem, “Coalition Achieving Success in Horn of Africa,” American F

Service, 16 April 2004, URL: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2004/

n04162004_200404168.html, accessed on 17 April 2004. 80 Rhem.

81 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-7.
31

Spirit bomber firing a precision weapon at a terrorist training camp, 

fare Combatant-craft Crewmen aboard a Mark Five boat interdictin

or Army Rangers capturing a key terrorist operative. CT at this lev

hand-to-hand, but face-to-face. In fact, humanitarian, civil-military 

tion operations missions are likely to dominate. Thus, the IPB anal

likely to support civil-affairs operations, humanitarian relief or p

operations as well as the more traditional combat missions. Even w

for highly specified engagements, we must keep in mind the poten

effects of tactical-level action.

Asymmetric Contests

Regardless of the mission level, CT is an asymmetric contest. In ter

type and the forms of violence employed, encounters between states 

lack “a common basis of comparison in respect to a quality, or in operat

capability.”83 Asymmetry does not equate to newness or something that 

but rather directs our attention to the often dramatic differences between 

terrorist in terms of a broad range of qualities. Among the many formal 

asymmetry, the most comprehensive comes from the U.S. Army War C

In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry 

organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to m

one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain t

tive, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strateg

tary-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail 

methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, 

combination of these. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be 

or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can h

psychological and physical dimensions.84

At its core, asymmetry is about difference. CT is most challenging w

dramatic dissimilarity between opponents in several key areas, particul

belligerents are fighting different types of wars. For example, the Iraq 

pitted the U.S. against the Iraqi conventional forces in a contest that w

82 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Tactical Level of War.”

83 Montgomery C. Meigs, “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare,” P

no. 2 (Summer 2003), 4. 

84 Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and US Military Strategy

Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

lege, January 2001), 5-6.
32

that at the same time also reflected war-defining asymmetries in training, t

and cohesion to name a few. For example, the asymmetric air superiority 

of the joint force not only kept the Iraqi Air Force on the ground, but led it 

bury its aircraft in the sands (Figure 15). The asymmetries played to the U

tage through the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003. As the war transitioned t

gency, the asymmetries grew, particularly in terms of strategy, weaponry, a

Among the variou

forming the basis fo

metry, terrorism r

asymmetric strateg

ists excel at “poor m

fare.” They rely 

military strategist L

calls the indirect 

attacking vulnerabil

simultaneously avoi

physical engageme

contest is further co

by mixing unco

weaponry with thei

in fact, the one infl

other. In many c

weapons are among 

out-dated and cheap

black market, including man-portable surface-to-air missiles and backp

sives. In one example of low-tech weaponry as part of an indirect approach

diers captured a donkey cart mounted with rocket-propelled grenades tha

used against the Iraqi Oil Ministry building and two hotels in Novemb

Many other examples of innovative and unconventional tactics and weap

including cyber attacks and WMD. 

Hanle breaks down wars into a classification scheme based on obje

methods, further qualifying the asymmetric contest. A total political obje

the complete destruction of the adversary as a political entity, while t

objective seeks only the abandonment of or a change in policy.87 Exam

85 The indirect approach is explained in B.H. Liddell Hart’s classic study, Strategy (

NY: Signet, 1967). 86 “Rocket strikes ‘militarily insignificant’,” CNN, 21 November 2003, URL: http:/

www.cnn.com /2003/WORLD/meast/11/21/sprj.irq.main/index.html, accessed on 10 A

Figure 15. Buried Foxbat

A U.S. military search team examines a Cold War-era MiG25R Foxbat B that lay buried beneath the sands in Iraq. 

Several MiG-25s and Su-25 ground attack jets have been 

found buried at al-Taqqadum air field west of Baghdad.

Source: DOD, URL: http://www.defendamerica.mil/

photoessays/aug2003/p080603b7.html, accessed 1 June 2004.
33

toward Israel, or more recently in the tapes of Osama bin Laden and fa

extremists toward the U.S. A total military objective of annihilation 

destruction of the adversary’s armed forces in decisive battle, and the l

tive of attrition leverages time to erode the adversary’s will to fight.88 

tary methods are either positional, using maneuver to seize or 

(conventional war), or evasive, using maneuver to avoid the adversa

(guerrilla war and terrorism).89

Applying this framework to the insurgency in Iraq through early 2

tants were fighting a limited war of attrition using evasion. That is, they 

the limited objective of causing the U.S. and its allies to leave the count

cohesion and will through a sustained series of knife cuts with c

ambushes, and seemingly random attacks. As the weaker political ent

gents “employ security and maneuver to evade the enemy’s [U.S.] st

forces, hitting only when and where local superiority can be assured.”9

ing that the Iraq War is informal and limited both in terms of politica

objectives provides insight to the key to insurgent victory—“making th

tory greater than the opponent is willing to bear.”91 On the other han

fighting a unique, total war of annihilation and attrition using evasion 

global jihadist insurgency strategy—the key to victory shifts. Drawing 

Clausewitz, Hanle argues correctly that “In total war you erode you

power base so that he becomes unable to fight, and in a limited war y

the cost(s) until he becomes unwilling to fight.”92 It is rare to find a terr

a total war of annihilation, given their limited ability to generate the 

force required to defeat a state’s armed forces in open battle. Regardle

tary strategy, positional or evasive, victory always hinges on “destroyin

will to resist.”93 In this asymmetric contest between the U.S. and terro

tions, Clausewitz’s “will to resist” retains its value where terrorist orga

concerned; however, CT adds the dimension of “will to support” as a 

of the environment.

87 Hanle, 62.

88 Hanle, 62.

89 Hanle, 62.

90 Hanle, 57.

91 Hanle, 59.

92 Hanle, 59.

93 Hanle, 61
34

The Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu offered one of the first do

expressions of IPB around 500 B.C., imploring commanders to: 

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, yo

never be defeated. When you are ignorant of the enemy but 

yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ign

both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defea

every battle.94

He directs attention to the value of not just estimating the threat, but u

ing the action-reaction dynamic between adversaries. Noting the relatio

of war, Carl von Clausewitz also argued, “war is nothing but a duel on 

sive scale.”95 As an example, it is not sufficient to know a terrorist lea

tected by thirty guards with automatic weapons before attempting a ca

Special Forces. Rather, we must also consider how the overall organiz

respond to an invasion of their sanctuary, which will feed back into j

operational planning. It is also possible, for example, that killing a spec

will open the door for a more ruthless operative or remove a lucrative 

contact. Similar thinking about delayed effects and adversary adaptabil

to operations for delivering relief aid or training allied security forces

for knowing the adversary, knowing ourselves, and winning the 

improved through IPB for all mission types.

IPB offers no magic solutions, nor does it eliminate the need for h

Instead, it serves as a mental model for structuring our thinking abou

complex problem. It enables decision superiority by improving our abil

inside the adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time cycl

(OODA Loop).96 IPB and the OODA Loop concept, developed by f

Force Colonel John Boyd, are both focused on connecting intelligence 

tions to provide “predictive intelligence to warfighters at the right time 

planning and executing operations.”97 Thus, the practice of IPB is driv

94 General Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu’s Art of War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation

Shibing (New York: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc., 1987), 100. 95 Carl von Clausewitz, On War: General Carl Von Clausewitz, trans. Colonel J. J. G

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 1. 96 Colonel John R. Boyd, A Discourse on Winning and Losing, collection of un-num

briefing slides from August 1987, URL: http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf, access

19 April 2004. 97 AFPAM 14-118, 6.
35

in the command decision-cycle.

 IPB conducted in isolation will 

rance of us and the adversary. 

CT IPB has joint and service doctrine as its pedigree. The grand

Field Manual (FM) 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefi

amended by the services and expanded in Joint Doctrine. While a

have doctrinal similarities, and even involve similar TTPs and pr

are tailored to deal with their unique mission and mediums. Th

however, asserts a more functional orientation as opposed to the 

focus of the other services.99 Whether this distinction remains acc

all IPB must now think in terms of effects. That is, IPB must be fo

effects joint forces can achieve, not just against the adversary dir

relation to the battlespace. This establishes an analytic envir

demands net assessment, which in turn invites serious thought abo

potential asymmetries and their effects. For example, in the case o

penetrating the organizational black box is difficult, accessible en

effects for the “blue force” should be pursued to generate uncertain

plexity, thus undermining terrorist group performance. As a furthe

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, (JIPB) differs from se

purpose, focus and level of detail.100 JIPB focuses on the overal

and adversary (terrorist organization) rather than on the mission or 

cific interests of the Services. 

Four Phases

IPB supports the decision cycle in four continuous phases: (1) defi

tlespace; (2) describing the battlespace’s effects; (3) evaluating the ad

(4) determining adversary COA. The phases restated as objectives 

Figure 16. Phases one and two look outside the organization to sal

mental dynamics, while phases three and four seek to pierce the o

black box of the adversary to uncover sources of strength and vulner

first phase bounds the problem by clarifying the “arena of operation

98 John W. Bodnar argues the critical role of the “orientation” stage of the OODA 

ing analysis in Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the Intelligen

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intellig

December 2003). 99 Quoting from AFDD 2, AFPAM 14-118, AFPAM 14-118, airmen “view the a

force more from a functional plan than geographic standpoint and classify targets by 

destruction/denial has on the enemy rather than where the targets are physically loc

100 Joint Pub 2-01.3, I-3.
36

ments.

 The output of phase one is analysis and collection foc

battlespace characteristics most likely to influence the planned mi

ples might include terrain, weather, demographics and culture. T

these influences is the purpose of phase two, where we are charged 

out the effects of the battlespace on friendly and adversary capabiliti

tions. These effects are either direct or indirect and constraining or e

erating a dynamic situation in which comparative advantages can be 

lost. Moreover, the degree of complexity and uncertainty in the 

impacts a range of organizational factors, particularly the orient an

ments of the adversary decision cycle. 

In the absence of a str

process, threat analy

begins and ends with p

evaluate the adversary

ability of terrorists to 

open societies or grow 

in geographic hinterl

mining strengths and w

be daunting. Noneth

analysis remains vital, 

equation of “capabiliti

threat” still applies. IPB 

to go beyond an 

approach to capabilit

we seek to uncover cen

ity (COG), or source

enabled by critical 

which may or may not 

requirements that equal vulnerabilities. This COG analysis transl

tion into prescription by pointing toward high-value and high pay

Finding terrorist COGs offer unique challenges; the present study 

uniquely suited tools in Chapter 4. An essential aspect of phase thr

IPB; assessing friendly COGs as a means to understand potential te

101 Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Intelligence (Washington, DC: Naval D

mand, no date), 31. Cited hereafter as NDP 2.

Figure 16. IPB Objectives

Source: Adapted from JIPB by author.
37

for probable adversary denial and deceptions activities.

Phase four brings it home with a forecast of adversary action based 

environment affords, capabilities allow, and intent desires. Terrori

racked and stacked to identify most likely, unlikely and wildcard sc

thermore, the full range of COAs is evaluated to determine if any can 

to our advantage or influenced by our own deception efforts. A crys

proffered; however, methods for envisioning a wide range of crea

COA options and assessing their probability are set forth. Phase four 

challenge of “predictive analysis” and seeks to help the commander 

adversary’s probable intent and most likely COA.”103

The phases and associated goals make up IPB doctrine, whereas 

tion to CT reflects tailored methods. The present work does not seek 

doctrine or discard relevant TTPs. Rather, doctrine is amended for 

lem, and methods are recommended for accomplishing goals. W

methods work, they are retained, and where new ones are needed, th

duced. As a final note of emphasis, mission analysis is part of ev

shown in Figure 16. We must keep asking, what are we trying to ach

Three Levels

Our three familiar levels—strategic, operational, and tactical

appropriate focus and detail for IPB and ensure time is not waste

apply to IPB as a whole and to each phase of the process. Focusing 

all IPB, the strategic level considers a “global theater” and must w

range of factors, including the character of the international system

culture, media, IT, space and many others. Analysis of the adversar

strategic capabilities and intentions such as motivation, ideology d

and appeal, resource dependencies, demographics, forms of warfare

strategy. Operational level IPB focuses on a battlespace limited by t

reach of friendly forces and the adversary, which may be cou

regional or transnational. It considers popular support, organizatio

102 Per Joint Pub 2-01.3, I-6, the IPB analysis “should analyze the probability th

may engage in ‘counter JIPB’ by deliberately avoiding the most operationally effici

fore most obvious) COA in order to achieve surprise. Additionally, an adversary ma

JIPB analyst regarding the timing of an otherwise ‘obvious’ COA, through asynchro

preparations and by psychologically conditioning the JIPB analyst to accept unusua

types of activity as normal.” 103 Joint Pub 2-01.3, I-1.
38

ing facilities, safe havens, communication assets, media roles, 

weather characteristics, and most importantly, COGs with any assoc

abilities. At the tactical level, IPB starts to focus on the location of t

anticipated short-term actions, available weapon systems, persona

vehicles, safe houses, local support, and highly specific strengths an

Although COG analysis can be performed at all levels, it is primar

tional-level function that informs tactical-level action. Even though m

ysis points to an operational level of planning and execution, keep

and tactical level factors in mind is good practice—the worthy adver

Linking Concepts

IPB is married to the intelligence cycle, operational planning, a

decisionmaking. In fact, this tight merging is leading to an evolutio

cept from IPB to what is being termed operational preparation 

tlespace. As an aside, all that is developed here remains relevant to 

focus, particularly our heavy operational emphasis. Sticking with I

to the first phase of the intelligence cycle, planning and direction, 

ing “facts and assumptions” about the environment and priority 

requirements (PIR).104 By determining PIR and likely COA, it sets 

tion plan—phase two—to close knowledge gaps and monitor indic

sible COA execution. IPB improves the processing and exploitati

providing a “disciplined yet dynamic” structure for managing vas

information and staying focused on relevant factors.105 In support 

sis and production phases, IPB fits with the more general goals o

gence analysis as outlined by Mark Kauppi, Director of the 

Program at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), in his primer, 

rorism Analysis 101: (1) improve threat awareness; (2) facilitate th

destruction of terrorist organizations and their activities; and (3) pr

warning and accurate forecasting.106 As a process and set of produ

ports dissemination and integration. Even when conditions do n

written intelligence estimates, IPB products can communicate jud

clear fashion. As a continuous process that constantly seeks to re

sions based on mission analysis and changing information, IPB ep

evaluation and feedback phase of the intelligence cycle.

104 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-9. 105 Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-10. 106 Counterterrorism Analysis 101, Counterterrorism Training Program, Joint M

gence Training Center, no date.
39

IPB support to operational planning and decisionmaking has be

throughout; however, a more direct vision of the linkages is provid

17. Though tailored for conventional IPB against a nation-state 

products, the general structure of the relations remain in place fo

both informed by and informs mission analysis by visualizing the 

distinguishing known from unknown, and establishing “working 

regarding how adversary and friendly forces will interact within th

of the battlespace environment.”107 Terrorist group COG and 

friendly COA development, force selection and disposition, and 

107 Joint Pub 3-07.2, III-2.

Figure 17. IPB Support to Decisionmaking

Source: US Army Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battle

Huachuca, AZ: US Army Intelligence Center, 8 July 1994), np, URL: ht

www.adtdl.army.mil/ cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-130/Ch1.htm, accessed 15 Apr
40

for fighting the COA to assess likely outcomes of engagements 

additional opportunities or constraints. It leverages the action-rea

assessment, approach of IPB to determine the optimal friendly CO

port to decisionmaking continues through the decide and act step

OODA Loop by continuing to evaluate the battlespace and terro

additional PIRs and a synchronized collection plan to monitor pro

changes in adversary COA, and support further planning. This basi

is also tailored to meet unique service and joint planning process

the Joint Air and Space Operations Plan.108

PARTING SHOTS

The terrorist threat is alive and killing. With the rise in religious ex

political motivations of terrorist groups are shifting to embrace m

shattering goals. Even as goals shift, terrorists continue to embrac

“propaganda by deed,” attacking symbolic targets to achieve a p

impact on an audience. Increasingly, the audience is not just a nat

popular opinion and even a supreme being. Innocents continue to b

choice, demonstrating the impotence of government while simultane

ing citizens for complicity. Even while states continue to sponsor t

era of globalization is witnessing the proliferation of non-state terro

tions that cross national borders and prey on states. Terrorist groups 

hybrid adversaries that pose a complex challenge to intelligence and 

By structuring this complex threat, IPB enables CT missions aga

groups and the environmental conditions in which they prosper. 

seeks to defeat, deny, diminish and defend. Framed at the strat

national security documents, CT is planned and executed at the op

tactical levels. Missions range widely, embracing operations typical

ized as Military Operations other than War (MOOTW) as well as d

Importantly, the military finds itself in a vital, non-violent supportin

ing regional security relationships, building competent foreign secu

ties, and performing civil-affairs missions. For all mission types, I

command decisionmaking by clarifying the operating environment

ing the constraints and opportunities presented by the battlespace, 

threat in terms of capabilities and vulnerabilities, and forecasting l

of action. At the end of the day, the real value of this effort to forge 

be determined in the streets of Baghdad, the air terminals of the U.S

of Indonesia, or the wadis of the Sahel.

108 For a thorough explanation of IPB integration with the Joint Air and Space O

and the Air Operations Center, see AFPAM 14-118, Chapter 6.
41

TERROR’S SPACE

A jihadist rap video titled

“Dirty Kaffir [Unbeliever]” is

posted to the Internet by a

London-based group, a thick

jungle canopy cloaks an

underground cocaine laboratory guarded by female guerrillas in southern Colombia,

and boys and girls as young as

twelve are abducted or sold

into the ranks of Tamil rebels

in Sri Lanka.109 These images

reflect characteristics of the

modern CT battlespace, which

is marked by an unprecedented degree of complexity

and diversity. On one hand, the

revolution in information technology enables a global

recruiting campaign by religious extremists, while on the

other, persistent socio-economic deprivation and failures in governance expand the recruiting 

country groups access transnational networks, and groups with globa

trate the dense physical terrain of mega-cities where governments fear 

109 I received a copy of the video via email on 4 February 2004, and I was able t

posting by the head of the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights in Saudi 

Arabian opposition group, Mohammed al-Massari. One of many articles on the vide

interview with al-Massari, is by Antony Barnett, “Islamic Rappers Message of Terr

ian, 8 February 2004, URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/saudi/story/ 0,11599,11436

accessed on 25 April 2004. According to BBC reporter Jeremy McDermott, up to 30

is female. See, “Colombia’s Female Fighting Force,” BBC News, 4 January 2002, U

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ americas/1742217.stm, accessed on 25 April 2004. For a short 

use of child soldiers by a the LTTE terrorist group, see Frances Harrison, “Analysis

Child Soldiers,” BBC News, 31 January 2003, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sout

2713035.stm, accessed on 25 April 2004.

Figure 18. Colombian Jungles

Colombia employs an ongoing aerial eradic

involving turbo-thrush aircraft a

ultra glyphosate (Roundup) herbicide to dest

Source: CIA, Coca Fact Paper, URL: http://

saynotodrugs/cocaine_o.html, accessed 24 
42

ism, that we perform IPB and execute CT missions. 

Observing the battlespace and orienting on its salient features is t

of the IPB process. The objective of phase one—define the battlesp

ple to state, but demanding to achieve. When successfully conducte

a bounded problem focused on environmental factors that are m

influence the CT mission, whether it is to eliminate drug productio

the Colombian jungles or extend governance into the remote ar

sprawl in Karachi. As in subsequent chapters, we begin by exam

IPB doctrine and outlining its objectives and core concepts, inclu

analysis, areas of operation and interest, battlespace dimensions, a

priorities. Attention is next turned to achieving the phase’s objective

ing enduring IPB concepts to the CT battlespace. The “CT are

unique challenges for delineating the battlespace and capturing its v

sions, necessitating the modification of current methods, introduc

ones, and a general shift in emphasis toward the social dimension. S

multi-level framework for figuring out the contested battlespace and 

relevant characteristics is provided. It links the mission levels—stra

tional and tactical—to nested battlespace levels, and stresses t

importance of clarifying stakeholders and analyzing non-traditiona

the environment. To the abiding question of, “What are we trying 

this chapter adds—“What out there matters most?”

LOST IN SPACE

The first phase of IPB—define the battlespace—scopes the prob

analysis, and shapes collection. It does this by looking out the win

the organization, to the world around. It seeks to identify what is o

can influence decisions and actions; what factors do we need to weig

make good choices. Once these factors, or characteristics, are spotte

seeks to explain how they will impact the performance of the joint f

rorist groups. By the end of phase one, for example, we will re

weather, terrain, soldiering skills, local attitudes, and other factors w

six-month foreign internal defense mission; however, it is not until 

phase two that we grasp how these factors impact mission success. 

mining constraints and opportunities afforded by the battlespace, w

scan the environment and inventory the array of consequential vari

so is an enduring IPB requirement.

In this section, steps for defining the battlespace are discussed 

and service doctrine is culled to determine the core concepts and 
43

are highlighted and a common approach is recommended. Where cur

proves valuable, it is championed and incorporated into the body of 

methods for CT. For example, the six general steps for phase one ar

full, and existing guidance for analyzing the mission, managin

resources, and closing knowledge gaps remains valid with only m

ments. The crux of phase one is mapping the battlespace and defin

features. Contemporary thinking gets us underway, but modification

emphasis, concepts, and methods are needed as addressed here.

At first, the dizzying array of variables in the environment may 

whelming. Theoretically, the environment is everything outside the 

the organization; in our case, the joint or coalition force. Clearly, w

capable of sizing up the world, nor is every flap of a butterfly’s win

our mission. IPB helps us avoid drowning in a flood of informati

multi-step process. When successfully applied, the result is an entire 

centered on the aspects of the battlespace most likely to influence co

sions and COA implementation. Though ordered differently with s

gent terminology in joint and service doctrine, there is general a

these fundamental steps:

1) Analyze the mission;

2) Determine detail required and feasible in time available;

3) Identity limits of the battlespace;

4) Identify significant characteristics of the battlespace;

5) Evaluate existing databases and identify knowledge gaps; and

6) Act on intelligence requirements.110

Mission Analysis II

Mission analysis kicks off phase one and sticks with us throug

phase four. Initial inquiry should seek to determine objectives and c

intent appropriate to the mission level. The mission is most often d

110 To highlight contrasts within existing doctrine, Joint Pub 2-01.3 starts with “

its of the joint force operational area,” II-3, while AFPAM 14-118 begins with “mis

12. Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Fort Huachuca

Intelligence Center, 8 July 1994), np, URL: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/ cgi-bin/atdl

toc.htm, accessed on 25 April 2004, hereafter cited as FM 34-130, begins with “ide

characteristics of the environment.”
44

thetical CT example might be to deter an emergent ethnic separatist g

nia Herzegovina from using violence, including terrorism. T

commander intends to support non-military efforts to influence the 

sionmaking by strengthening security forces, disrupting illegal s

explosives, and supporting psychological operations that offer an alte

to that preached by the group’s leadership. Further clarification of t

likely to depend on the initial results of IPB, necessitating on-going 

between intelligence and operations staff. As planning progresses, a

go beyond objectives and intent to gain increased mission fidelity, in

available, roles for joint and coalition partners, operational con

risks.111 As the Bosnia scenario unfolds, additional intelligence of sp

ism planning accelerates operational timelines, roles for North At

Organization (NATO) partners are incorporated, and higher-lev

authorities insist that operations involve Bosnian forces. As in this b

mission “adjustments” shape IPB, which in turn shapes the mission.

Getting it Done

Investing time and effort into mission analysis saves time and e

this vein, step two is more about leadership than it is about analy

strategic level IPB normally involves timelines extending into mont

operational IPB occurs over days and weeks, while tactical IPB co

hours or days. Thus, a critical adjunct to mission analysis is an a

what can and must be accomplished given the time and resources a

goal is quality, not quantity, and importantly, quality attached to the 

the process. Four general options exist when time and resources 

mium: command requirements, assumptions, pre-mission analysis

planning. When making trade-offs, the first and most important 

engage the commander and staff to find out their requirements. Inq

knowledge that is most lacking and what matters most to planni

inquiry zeroes IPB in on the most important phases and the le

required. As detail decreases, assumptions increase. Assumptions 

faced early and often—an axiom reinforced by Secretary of State 

when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Tell me what yo

me what don’t know...tell me what you think...always distingui

which.”112 An operational assumption might be that another terrori

stay on the sidelines, or that elements of the local population will we

111 JP 2-01.3, II-4. 112 Quotation cited in AFPAM 14-118, 13.
45

and strategic consequence, and they should be based on initial analys

tives that is not refuted by available evidence (see Chapter 5 for appl

alternative competing hypothesis method). A third option for saving 

ing early. Intelligence professionals can draw on existing plans (O

CONPLANs), foreign terrorist organization (FTO) lists, and comma

to start pre-mission IPB before an execute order is received.113 The 

recognized throughout doctrine is to “plan backwards from the tim

information is required to determine the amount of time available f

each step.”114 If all the steps cannot be completed in full, focus on the 

the fog and operational needs are greatest.

Setting Limits

Step three is tough in part because it presupposes we know where 

and will be. Unless we declare the world as our battlespace and judg

acteristic to be relevant, which would render IPB meaningless, we a

the need to place limits. IPB doctrine offers three limited “areas” w

tlespace: area of operations (AO), operational area (OA), and are

(AI). The definitions for these are neither totally clear nor consisten

Nonetheless, we can discern some general guidance from current 

will serve us well on the CT front.

The battlespace is not the same as the environment. The envir

sists of everything outside the boundary of the organization, but no

“out there” is relevant to our CT mission. The concept of battlesp

the field by focusing on “the environment, factors, and conditions 

understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, 

the mission.”115 Thus, the battlespace is what is important abou

determining “what is important” is the difficult task of IPB. It is 

cut at what needs to be weighed when analyzing and selecting 

action. It is a dynamic view, changing in relation to operational r

adversary actions, force availability, and other factors. It contracts 

“in relation to the commander’s ability to acquire and engage th

Given the complexity of CT, particularly in terms of diverse missio

113 The U.S. State Department maintains a current FTO list with listing criteria a

www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2003/12389.htm. 114 AFPAM 14-118, 13. 115 Joint Pub 1-02, under “Battlespace.” 116 Quoted from Field Manual 101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms and Gr

ington, DC: Department of the Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 30 September 1997) i
46

tinuous quality. This dynamism demands a rejection of the linear th

ciated with the outmoded “battlefield.” Think of the battlespace 

linear offspring of the battlefield, taking in areas of the operating 

beyond the physical surface of the planet to include air, space, cyb

recently, social dimensions. In turn, each of these dimensions mu

ered across the levels of analysis and action—strategic, operation

and over time. Constructing the battlespace without factoring in tim

or required, is done at great peril.

Whereas the battlespace is a mental construct of relevant factors o

area of operations (AO) is an assigned space. It is typically defined 

headquarters and specified in the unified command plan (UCP), OPL

PLANs, or operations orders (OPORD). The UCP, for example, carv

into regional areas of responsibility as shown in Figure 19, which a

ther broken down into AOs. The AO is a “geographical area, inclu

space above, usually defined by lateral, forward and rear boundaries

a commander...in which he has responsibility and the authority to c

tary operations.”117 An example is the assignment of responsibility 

for CT missions in the Horn of Africa area defined as “the total airsp

areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, and Eth

coastal waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean.”118 J

and Air Force doctrine, however, refer to an operational area 

includes the geographically constrained AO plus the air, space and 

areas through which coalition forces will operate.119 OA embrace

functional reach, or operational position of the joint force and th

Given increased reliance on reach-back capabilities physically lo

U.S., the global reach of air, space and Special Forces assets, and the 

cyber capabilities, CT IPB is better served by the OA concept. T

where we operate with authority. As a final note, assigning the AO 

the OA depends on IPB since they are a function of where the adv

will operate. Since terrorists are not normally assigned a geograp

117 FM 101-5-1, 1-10, in Medby, 14. 118 CJTF-HoA Fact Sheet, CJTF-HoA Background, 19 March 2004, URL: http:/

hoa.centcom.mil/factsheet.asp, accessed on 27 April 2004. 119 AFPAM 14-118, 13 and Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-3.
47

enemy might be and where we want to be.

Figure 19. Unified Command Plan

Assigned areas of responsibility for five regional unified commands

Source: DOD, URL: http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/ unifiedcommand

areaof_responsibility.jpg, accessed 22 April 2004.
48

ond arena within the battlespace. Unlike AO/OA, there

is generally concurrence in

joint and service doctrine that

the AOI is the “area of concern” to the commander, 

including the area of

influence, area adjacent

thereto, and extending

into adversary territory to

the objectives of current

or planned operations...

An AOI is usually larger

than an operational area,

and encompasses areas

from which the adversary or potential third

parties can affect current

or future friendly operations.120

Although referred to as a geographic area, it is more broadly th

which information and intelligence are required to permit planning 

conduct of the command’s operation.”121 It is limited by the adversa

project power, the influence of third parties, the time expected to 

operation, and other factors that can be expected to impact the missio

to the Horn of Africa, JTF-HoA’s AOI most likely includes the Arabi

and may extend geographically into Northern African or the Levan

long-term mission of combating terrorism in the area, the AOI should 

transnational trade networks extending into Asia, the cyberspace wh

exchange information, and the cultural space where attitudes are form

is where we achieve direct effects, but the AOI is where indirect e

mission originate. 

As highlighted in the AO vice OA discussion, the relationship b

constructs is not entirely clear in current doctrine. For example, Arm

suggests “a command’s battlespace generally includes all or most o

120 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-5. 121 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 6.

Figure 20. Yemeni Special Force

Yemeni Special Operations Forces practice m

CT techniques learned from 

U. S. Marines. 

Source: CJTF-HoA Official Photos, UR

www.cjtfhoa.centcom.mil/

gallery.asp?photoid=1950202162003, accessed 
49

operationally meaningful way is likely to cause brain lock. A RAND 

analysis seeks clarity based on cause and effect: the AOI influen

which influences the battlespace. That is, the AOI consists of a

beyond the AO that might influence the mission in it,” while the “b

composed of the areas (or personnel) that are affected by ongoin

within the AO.123 Posing it as questions, the AO asks, where will I 

AOI asks, what can impact me outside the AO?124 The battlespace as

be impacted by me?” While helpful, it is still linear thinking: AOI => 

tlespace. Successful CT demands non-linear thinking and an apprec

feedback relationships inherent in these artificial “limits.” 

Going Three-Dimensional

Once the space we are dealing with is limited by OA and AOI, th

to identify its salient characteristics. In phase one, we are developing 

of characteristics that are of possible “significance or relevance 

mander’s mission.”125 Each characteristic is evaluated in more detail 

two to determine its effect on the COA available to friendly forces 

adversaries. The importance of a characteristic is certain to vary o

function of mission, adversary behaviors, joint force capabilities, re

ability, and much more. Organizing the vast array of potential char

the primary challenge of phase one and the focus of modifications to 

made in the next section.

As it stands, joint and service doctrine implores us to begin by 

all possible threat forces followed by incorporating a host of other 

several dimensional buckets. Regarding threat forces, naming the 

easy when dealing with other nation-states (Soviet Union, North 

etcetera), but it is far more complicated when non-state actors, incl

ist groups and NGOs, are added to the equation. In the case of C

sary is most often a specified FTO, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, 

additional adversarial actors, attitudes and ideas are in the mix. 

enemy becomes more difficult as we move from tactical to strategic

of this writing, there remains considerable debate over the adve

GWOT; is it terrorism, religious extremism, al-Qaida as movement

corporation, al-Qaida as network, al-Qaida as pan-insurgency, 

122 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 5 123 Medby, 15, 48. 124 AFPAM 14-118, 19 125 AFPAM 14-118, 17.
50

through stakeholder analysis (introduced in the next section), but s

ity will always be present for CT.

The concept of dimension is used to carve up the battlespace into 

chunks. Where terrain and weather features once dominated, today

eted missions demand consideration of surface, air, space, informati

dimensions. Service doctrine carves these up differently; howev

dimensions of physical, information and social come across thro

physical dimension includes the geography of terrain, air, space, 

The information dimension consists of information, information 

information functions; it is “any medium adversary or friendly ele

use to transfer, defend or attack information.”126 The social dimensio

diverse and difficult to assess, and yet it is the most critical to CT. 

Force doctrine refer to it as the human dimension, but since we are r

about characteristics of groups of people and relationships among 

term “social” is more apt. Regardless of the label, this dimension in

tarily significant sociological, cultural, demographic and psychologic

istics of the friendly and adversary populace and leadership.”127

What we Know and Don’t Know

In these last two steps, we establish what we know and don’t know

requires mining existing databases, exploiting available sources (clas

ing and databases as well as open sources), and communicating wi

experts to determine the “state of our knowledge.”128 This can be a t

ing process, suggesting the need for pre-mission homework, a ready 

known resources, a short list of experts, and access to the appropriate 

systems. As a word of caution, we must avoid becoming bogged 

searching for a 100% solution when a workable, 80% solution is n

time is constrained, elevate assumptions and pursue collection again

gaps through the establishment of PIRs and collection operations. 

REMODELING SPACE

This first phase of IPB deals with the dynamic nature of the CT 

by framing it in a way that ensures we capture its mission-relev

126 AFPAM 14-118, 17. 127 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-37. 128 See forthcoming Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) book on exploitin

by Robert Steele.
51

cepts presented here, the six-step process remains valid. By proc

tion, we should have a solid grasp on our mission, time and resourc

for conducting IPB, a conceptual view of the battlespace with asso

tional and geographic limits, a rough take on characteristics within 

sional bucket that can influence the mission, and a plan for closin

gaps. Thus far, the concepts have been modified only slightly, incl

in terminology to deal with the social character of the battlespace

its applicability to CT, further modifications are necessary. Applyin

ment to CT suggests a need to view the battlespace as a field of 

where OA and AOI for joint and adversary organizations are relate

operational positions and effects across levels. Moreover, dimens

the start. The modest terminology modifications initiated above are 

further frame and structure the battlespace. Each dimension, for ex

sists of several sectors, and all dimensions are nested in our stra

tional and tactical hierarchy. Characteristics are also mapped ag

history matters and the future counts. Ideally, phase one provides th

with a comparative “situational awareness” advantage over the ter

which can be exploited to minimize our uncertainty and maximize 

on the enduring concepts and refinements made in the last section, 

ifications and new concepts are presented here. Specific recom

include mapping stakeholders, incorporating dimensional sectors

players, and nesting characteristics. 

Mapping Stakeholders

Nailing down the adversary is the necessary first step of IPB over

one specifically. As examined in Chapter 1 and discussed earlier in 

naming and correctly identifying the terrorist group, particularly w

with contemporary Islamist extremist groups, is complicated by rap

self-proclaimed group titles, multiple memberships by individual t

blurred connections between groups, movements and communities. 

tional nature of threat also requires cooperation across nation-sta

inter-governmental organizations like the U.N., European Union, A

South East Asian Nations, and others. To the mix we will also add 

vate individuals, NGOs, neighborhood associations, religious comm

vate security firms, and other violent non-state actors (VNSA). P

within a cultural or ideological context, fueled by the rapid diss

information, leaves a cauldron of complexity. IPB is charged with ge

this mess, and a good place to start is by mapping out the stakeholde
52

and organizatio

interest in the ou

contest. CT miss

in a multi-ce

where power and 

diffused across 

military affairs 

logical affairs m

example, are d

enced by the 

developmental 

NGOs like NetA

gees Internation

long-term influe

leaders, inclu

chiefs, mayor

priests, shamans

school teachers 

Even direct act

to take down a 

capture a leader 

occur in a social context, possibly an urban battlespace, where fa

nesses and entire communities become involved. As an example, Isr

assassinations of two Hamas leaders in February and April 2004 

street demonstrations, resulted in the deaths of civilians, and destroye

ture. Mapping these diverse stakeholders is a form of social network 

results in a picture of the interorganizational network.129

The resulting stakeholder picture is a useful reminder that CT m

gate a complicated terrain of multiple actors with shifting loyalties 

degrees of influence. It provides initial insight into the relationships 

may draw on to survive in the face of a concentrated CT effort. For e

widely held that the Revolutionary Guard of the Iranian armed force

stakeholder interest in the Hezbollah in Lebanon, providing a rang

services to include money, sanctuary and training. Strings are attach

their strength remains a matter of dispute. In its 16 February 1985 

letter, Hezbollah asserted

129 Mary Jo Hatch, Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic and Postmodern Pe

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 65.

Figure 21. Afghan Officials

A corporal assigned to the Parwan Provincial 

Reconstruction Team talks with school teachers about the 

repairs needed for some of their classrooms in Gulbahar, 

Afghanistan, 

4 May 2004. 

Source: DOD Multimedia, URL: http://

www.defenselink.mil/multimedia/, accessed 

24 April 2004.
53

victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the 

central Islamic state, abide the orders of a single wise and ju

mand currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruho

Musavi al-Khomeini, the rightly guided imam who combine

qualities of the total imam.130

With the death of al-Khomeini, the rise of more moderate political f

and Hezbollah’s growth into a dominant social, political, economic 

organization in Lebanon, it can be reasonably argued the Hezboll

takes orders from Tehran. Therefore, the character of this importan

relationship has changed.

In terms of methods for getting at these relationships, the task 

is to inventory all possible stakeholders, including, but not limi

highlighted earlier as well as state sponsors, sanctuary or safe have

individual financiers, charismatic leaders, weapons suppliers, dia

rupt officials or agencies, sympathetic communities, financial ins

other terrorist groups. As one example, the Tamil rebels in Sri Lan

eration Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), are supported by stakeho

the Tamil Diaspora, including migrant communities, charitable 

front companies.131 When feasible, specific stakeholders must b

such as in the case of Shun Sunder. Sunder is a medical practitione

nia who has provided an estimated $4 million to LTTE during t

Notably, not all stakeholder associations are defined in terms of fi

port. In many cases, such as celebrity support for an independent 

Beastie Boys, the association may provide more publicity than mo

stakeholders inventoried, the next step is to estimate their potent

on the mission—this is taken up in Chapters 3 and 4. This type 

analysis is revisited in future chapters as an important method for 

information and resource dependencies and critical capabilities an

abilities. Too often, social network analysis only looks at the adve

tionships, but when mapping the battlespace for CT missions

130 Cited in Amal and the Shi’a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, by Augustus R

(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987), 168-169. 131 The full extent of Diaspora support to the LTTE is superbly detailed in D

and others, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, 

Corporation, 2001), 42-55 132 Byman, 51.
54

the relational nature of the contest.

Dimensional Sectors

Stakeholders operate within and across the dimensions of the bat

position staked out in the three dimensions—information, physical, 

is the OA; an ecological niche in the ecosystem we call terror’s bat

dimensions are big buckets for organizing the mission-relevant char

the environment. Their relative importance and the uncertainty level 

tents shift depending on the CT mission. Civil-affairs missions wei

dimension as more important, but the information and physical 

ignored. Direct action to capture an operative in an urban setting r

attention to the physical characteristics of the battlespace, for examp

resents a good start, but dimensional buckets are too abstract for 

made by current IPB guidance, which declares:

A joint force’s battlespace must encompass all characteristic

environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood 

cessfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete 

sion. The friendly and adversary use of the electro-magnetic sp

the capabilities of both sides to use satellites for communicat

intelligence gathering, friendly and adversary information 

capabilities and vulnerabilities, and the perceptions and atti

the leadership and population both inside and outside the op

area are examples of non-geographic characteristics that must 

sidered when determining the full, multi-dimensional spectru

joint force’s battlespace.133

The three dimensions provide orientation and balance, but they fal

fidelity required to ensure we observe and orient on all the relevant 

greater precision and to help get organized, we add the idea of “se

within dimensions.134 Think of dimensions as a strategic-level const

tors as the operational equivalent. Dimensions frame our work. Secto

frame by grouping and relating characteristics in sub-categories that 

later to provide a more holistic picture. The reductionist process 

133 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-6. 134 Dimensions and sectors have enjoyed prominence in political and organizatio

many years. In organizational theory, the following sectors are identified: industry, r

human resources, financial resources, markets, technology, economic conditions, go

socio-cultural, and international. See Daft, 137. 
55

ing tactical facts to strategic theories.

Devising sectors and t

more art than science

the sectors identified 

are a guide, or rul

open to modification b

CT mission in questio

these sectors do captur

of characteristics 

throughout force prote

metric conflict, inform

tions, MOOTW, 

appendices found in jo

vice doctrine. For e

Force Protection (an 

not CT) attachment to 

suggests that the fo

ments, at a minimum, b

geography, terrain, we

graphics, religious beliefs, political belief, transportation, commu

works, rules of engagement, treaties, crime, environmental hazar

unrest.135 Moreover, they reflect an appreciation for the complexity 

lem, including the diversity of CT missions, terrorist groups, and en

dynamics. The intent is not to present the universe of relevant ch

but to ensure we are not neglecting any important galaxies. Time al

characteristic is further broken down into four core elements: ag

information, and resources. For example, the transshipment of an 

modity such as heroin involves specific people, occupying and mo

physical space, transferring information and resources. Getting sp

these four core elements is the real grunt work of IPB in phase one

The physical dimension is well-developed in current IPB g

includes geography, weather, and artifacts. Geography encompas

maritime, air, and space domains as well as hazards and diseases o

the natural world. The land domain “concentrates on terrain features 

face materials, ground water, natural obstacles such as bodies of wat

tains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the configuratio

drainage” to name a few.136 The maritime domain is the sea and litt

135 AFPAM 14-118, 166.

Figure 22. Dimensional Sectors

Source: Author. 
56

where space takes over. Rarely will terrorist groups have a space pr

ever, it is increasingly common for adversaries to rely on commer

and the telecommunications systems resident in space. Weather ref

tions in the atmosphere. Finally, artifacts are man-made feature

roads, bridges, harbors, tunnels, airfields. 

The information dimension is less developed than the physical, b

theless received considerable attention as cyberspace, cyber se

attack, information operations, computer network attack, informati

and other “informational” concepts have come to the fore in the nati

dialogue. In terms of IPB, Air Force doctrine is the most detailed, 

informational domain into the information itself, the technology us

exploit, assess, and disseminate it, and the cognitive style of ind

groups.137 “Information” serves as a generic label for a hierarchy o

beginning with measurements and observations known as data.138 W

placed in context, indexed, and organized, they become informatio

mation turns into knowledge when it is understood and explained. 

application of knowledge is wisdom.139 Technology includes the 

collect, exploit, and create information and knowledge. IT ranges fr

chips to satellite dishes to cellular phones. In the words of “informat

Bruce Berkowitz, “information technology has become so importan

military power that it overwhelms almost everything else.”140 The “

refers to the “OOD” of the OODA Loop. The ability of terrorist grou

(collect intelligence), orient (develop situational awareness and fix o

tures), and decide is so important to CT that it is discussed in more 

phase three—evaluate the adversary. For now, it is sufficient to no

one requires us to inventory the decisionmakers, which flows from 

analysis, for further psychological evaluation.

The social dimension consists of at least three primary sectors, 

collection, analysis, and operational demands on the joint force 

group. Demographics, as developed in Chapter 3, usefully cha

dimension overall. The political sector focuses on the distribution 

136 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-10. 137 AFPAM 14-118, Attachment 4, “Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of the B

Information Operations,”130-146. 138 Edward Waltz, Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise (Bosto

House, 2003), 62. 139 Waltz, 62. 140 Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War will be Fought in the 21st 

York: The Free Press, 2003), 2.
57

mission level, relevant characteristics might include the role of i

mental organizations (IGO), international laws and treaties, cr

jurisdiction, rules of engagement, and failures in governance due t

illegitimacy or excessive coercion.141 The form of government, de

authoritarianism, the extent of civil society, and on-going confli

measures are just a few additional considerations. The economi

include the availability of goods and services, market tendencies, r

ing trade, illegal commodities (drugs, guns, humans), unemplo

accounts, money laundering schemes, exchange rates, and many 

related to the trade in goods and services. 

The culture sector is the least understood and yet the most imp

deal with today’s terrorists. Cultural intelligence is gaining prom

intelligence professionals are increasingly called on to understand t

and psychology of their opponent. Attempts at “actionable” cultura

often fall short, resulting in interesting histories, customs and folkl

intelligence deserves more attention and increased study.142 As op

here, cultural intelligence looks at the norms and values that shape 

groups, and communities. Breaking it down, “norms make explicit 

behavior appropriate for members” of the group being evaluated.143 

if a norm is a property of the group or community in question, the fol

ria must be met: 1) there is evidence of beliefs by individual member

behaviors are expected; 2) a majority of group members share the b

there is general awareness that the norm is supported by most of 

members, not just the leadership.144

141 For a discussion of “failures in governance” as a key to the formation of viol

actors, see Troy S. Thomas and Stephen D. Kiser, Lords of the Silk Route: Violent N

in Central Asia, Occasional Paper 43 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National S

May 2002), 45-47. For further insight into state failure, see Chester Cocker, “Why F

Endanger America,” Foreign Affairs, September-October 2003, 32-45, Donald Snow

International Security and the New Internal Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 

1996), and reporting by the State Failure Task Force, University of Maryland, URL

www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail. 142 Of note, the USMC has engaged in an on-going cultural intelligence effort thr

for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. Mor

can be found at http://www.ceto.quantico.usmc.mil/projects.asp. 143 Troy S. Thomas and William D. Casebeer, Violent Systems: Defeating Terror

and Other Non-State Adversaries, Occasional Paper 52 (USAF Academy, CO: Instit

Security Studies, March 2004), 32, quoting from Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, 

chology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), 385. 144 Katz, 386.
58

rate and generalized justification both for appropriate behavior and f

ties and functions of the system.”145 Values become norms wh

operationalized by the group members in terms of specific behavio

broad range of terrorist group types introduced in Chapter 1, two v

tend to dominate: transcendental and transactional.146 Religious extr

issue, and ethnic separatist groups embrace a transcendental value sy

places emphasis on morality, sacred duty, the supernatural, and symb

scendental values are difficult to inculcate, but are more effective 

loyalty. Transnational criminal organizations (TCO) and warlords 

militias epitomize the transactional or pragmatic value system with 

sis on amassing wealth or power. The transactional value system ca

developed, but it is also more susceptible to disruption and defectio

of a superior threat or more lucrative alternatives for members. The m

groups foster a dual-value system, manipulating symbols and delive

value. Dual-value systems have the added advantage of offering 

sources of adaptability; faith can often be sustained even when cash 

Culture emerges from the evolution and propagation of norms 

Diagnosing culture is exceedingly difficult, but when success

insight provides answers to practical issues, including: who matter

boundaries, why and how does work get accomplished, what are p

what is most important to the community or terrorist group

strength, or the extent to which members share the norms and v

community’s glue. It is a strong and often overlooked source of c

survivability in social organizations. A terrorist group with a str

such as the IRA or Hezbollah, is more likely to enjoy greater mem

ment. An organization with an inflexible or weak culture will have 

culty dealing with environmental turbulence. 

As characteristics are dumped into sector buckets, three additi

must be weighed. First, each characteristic has a history and a futur

ters. Like my old, run-down Jeep, machines have histories that sugge

life-span. Cultures are the product of a history that can motivate in

well after a charismatic leader passes—today’s event is tomorrow’

Second, every sector serves as a source of information and/or res

stakeholders. In phases two and three, the information and resource d

145 Katz, 385. 146 Katz, 388. 147 Thomas G. Cummings and Christopher G. Worley, Organization Developmen

(Cincinnati, OH: South Western College Publishing, 1997), 480.
59

nerability or strength. Therefore, it is important to identify the salie

each sector and inventory the information and resources it provides. 

ets have holes, and it is not always clear where to put the info. At t

are less concerned with filling the right buckets than we are with ensu

ture most of the relevant characteristics. 

Positioning Players

Dimensions enable us to visualize and map the “terrain” of the 

ensuring we pay appropriate attention to all mission-relevant featur

return to limiting the space in a way that sharpens focus and identi

print of stakeholders on the terrain. Armed with an assessment of the 

all key players in the battlespace, the commander and staff can sta

terms of maneuvering in the battlespace to exploit dimensional ad

maximize adversary constraints. 

A theoretical relative 

of a terrorist group a

force is shown in Fig

“blobs” represent the 

The lines do not neces

sent a place on a map, 

resent the extent to w

characteristics affect 

sion and terrorist go

essentially an initial 

two of IPB. Returning 

HoA example, geo

weather have more of 

American forces than 

nous groups. Artifacts 

outside the sprawling 

reducing their impact t

In the social dimensi

factors, particularly failures in governance and the devolution of po

groups, has significant impact, where cultural factors seem to imp

more than the joint force. This last assessment invites debate, r

value of this basic positioning method for testing assumptions

assessments, and generating discussion.

Figure 23. Positioning Players

Source: Author.
60

through how the OA might change to improve advantage relative 

sary. From this perspective, the blobs provide insight to a functio

within the battlespace. The AO is assigned based on geography, b

where we choose to operate. The OA offers greater flexibility and 

re-position forces and actions relative to the terrorist group’s OA. I

based Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), for example, is directly impact

to information regarding future targets (NGOs, embassies, shippin

Internet, the joint force will want to increase its presence and infl

the information dimension. Given the limited IT infrastructure in 

such dependence may represent vulnerability. On the other hand, A

likely to rely on human agents rooted in kinship groups for inform

reinforces the need for JTF-HoA to persist in its efforts to build b

culture sector. Taking this tack, interaction exists where the two O

When we work in other players, a picture develops of what features 

to CT as a function of their impact on these other stakeholders. If a 

is critical to a humanitarian-centered CT mission, and if the NG

affected by infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, the joint f

served by working with the NGO to overcome this battlespace con

tioning players in the battlespace based on OA is an improvement 

IPB methods, which highlight the need to consider other stakeho

not expect us to map out their position in relation to ours. 

Following the positioning of players, we overlay the AOI and 

ize the entire battlespace. The AOI is what is “outside” the joint 

geographically and functionally—that can affect the mission indi

terrorist group’s OA exists outside the joint forces’, then those 

become part of our operating area as well. The AOI also include

acteristics of each sector that may be outside both the terrorist an

OA, but can still influence the engagement. Identifying these char

made easier by re-introducing time. For an operational mission l

days, changes in the technology sector are unlikely to fall wit

whereas a multi-year mission requires continuous evaluation of 

telecommunications, computing and sensors. There is utility in 

current doctrine in two additional ways. First, adding an ana

adversary’s AOI opens the door to creating additional uncertaint

tlespace for the terrorist and further assessing relative capabilit

our dynamic view of the environment means the AOI-OA interfa

mutual feedback and influence. The terrorist group, for example, a

to reinforce conditions that contribute to prosperity—this “system

approach tracks with the mutual influence experienced by the th
61

time-constrained AO (geography), OA (operational effects) and A

influence) for all relevant stakeholders.

Nested Characteristics

Mission analysis orients us to the appropriate level for performing 

argued in Chapter 1, IPB has value at every level. At the strategic le

us to broad global trends: the diffusion of power in a multi-centric 

advancement of technology; and patterns in terrorist group attribute

iors. Strategic-level characteristics shape operational-level considera

ing the infrastructure of the physical dimension, the web of social rel

which the terrorist group is embedded, and the role of information t

sharing information. In turn, the tactical level is focused on the spe

social groups, and technologies. The levels serve as mental scaffold

analysis on the right amount of detail and salient dynamics, while al

to think in terms of vertical effects. That is, the levels are nested, and 

action at one level will influence the same at another. When workin

cal level, for example, it is important to understand how (1) tactica

cascade at the operational and strategic levels and (2) strategic-lev

operational dynamics will shape tactical options. This modification to 

thinking helps us understand reinforcing influences across levels. W

sion of nested levels, the battlespace picture becomes more like a hol

painting. The joint force and terrorist group, along with other stak

positioned in relation to each other in the (1) dimensions, (2) over 

across levels. Another way to conceptualize nesting in relation to dim

player positions is shown in Figure 24. Ideally, the joint force will a

ence on all levels while isolating the adversary to the tactical level.

Urban Battlespace

The urban battlespace offers an important final example of nested lev

teristics as they relate to dimensions. Although terrorists inhabit the en

of the physical dimension, the urban space, and its associated features in 

tion and social dimensions, is certain to be dominant terrain for CT.148 T

148 The detailed example of the urban battlespace is adopted and updated from a 

that is particularly relevant to both the concept of nested levels and the dominant ter

abbreviated version of the article is available, Troy Thomas, “Slumlords: Aerospace 

Fights,” Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 2002), 57-68. See also The City’s Many 

sell W. Glenn (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), and Alan Vick, Aero

tions in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts (Arlington, VA: RAND Cor
62

strategic and 

level dynamics 

battlespace dim

example of how 

missions in u

might proceed. 

Strategic 

Urbaniza

Urbanizatio

vant strategic

In the industr

industrial era

become the ce

nomic growth

74.5% of the 

of advanced countries lived in urban areas.149 While developed count

dle urbanization, trends in developing countries are threatening 

capacities. According to the UN Population Division (UNPD):

Population growth will be particularly rapid in the urban area

developed regions, averaging 2.3 per cent per year during 200

Migration from rural to urban areas and the transformation 

settlements into urban places are important determinants of 

urban population growth anticipated in the less developed 

Almost all the growth of the world’s total population betwe

and 2030 is expected to be absorbed by the urban areas of 

developed regions. By 2017, the number of urban dwellers w

the number of rural dwellers in the less developed regions.150

The social impact is considerable. Unemployment in much of th

world exceeds 50 percent; subsistence activities or informal jobs 

percent of urban employment in sub-Saharan Africa and 30-50 per

America.151 While poverty traditionally exists principally in rural 

149 UN Population Division (UNPD), World Urbanization Prospects: the 2003 R

York: UNPD, 1999), 5. 150 UNPD, World, 5. 151 According to the 1999 UNPD World Urbanization Prospects, 3. Hereafter cit

World 1999.

Figure 24. Mapping Levels

Source: Author.
63

children and the elderly. According to World Bank estimates, 1.3 b

survive on less than $1 a day and women die during childbirth at ra

times that of the developed world.152 Rapid urban growth in exces

ment capacity results in civil strife, possibly conflict, and certainl

ian crises. As a contributor to a failing state, rapid urbanization i

causal factor for the dramatic increase in civil war over the past d

combined with increasingly nationalistic ethnic separatist groups, t

watershed change in the nature of armed conflict and a plentiful ha

ror’s sales force. 

Potentially mo

to CT is the w

tion is occurrin

dramatic growt

the “million cit

with population

and 10 million

there will be 5

cities compare

270 in 1990.

these cities are 

the handful of 

plus mega-citie

25), they are no

ting priority for 

resources. Mo

growth is not 

the city core, b

fringes, result

called “uninten

slums that are beyond the reach of government services and contro

the periphery of Baku, Casablanca, Aden, Istanbul, or Cairo, thi

sprawl constitutes its own highly complex battlespace.154

Urban areas also have strategic value to terrorists due to their location

and power.155 Cities exist in areas that sustain populations due to the 

152 Charles W. Kegley, Jr, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Tr

8th ed. (New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000), 126.

153 UNPD, World 1999, 2. 154 All visited by author in 1994, 1995, 2003 or 2004.

Figure 25. World’s Largest Cities

Source: Anne-Marie Lizin, “City-to-City Networking to 

Fight Poverty,” Choices Magazine (UNDP, September 

2002), 21.
64

straddles the Bosporus Strait, Tashkent bridges Asia along the ancie

Seoul hugs the Han River, Buenos Aires overlooks the Rio de la Plata, a

guards the Strait of Malacca.156 As hubs for air, land and sea travel, th

others are hard to avoid. Cities are symbols that transcend their socio-e

such symbolism is derived from the cultural, religious, political, and s

Given the link to identity, control often becomes the object of struggle e

costs are excessive; think of Jerusalem, Najaf, Fallujah, Kandahar, Gro

Hue, Vietnam. Insurgents, terrorists and criminals thrive in the symbo

rich urban environment. Some of the darkest days of the conflict in No

involved the Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaign in L

October 1981.157 As pointed out in a previous study, 

cities are centers of power. They are often the seat of governme

commercial epicenter, the industrial backbone, and the informa

for states, regions and even non-state actors. Their control brin

access to resources, technologies, information, and the populat

Operational Space

The trends in urbanization highlight the changing character of a prin

tlespace. Given the complexity and instability in many monster cities o

ing world, it also creates a highly uncertain battlespace. That said, ev

battlespace lends itself to operational-level analysis across dimensions. 

the physical dimension of an urban area consists of five spaces. First, th

space above the ground. Second, there is the super surface space, whi

structures above the ground that can be used for movement, maneuv

concealment and firing positions.159 Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah, for e

minarets to gather intelligence and target U.S. marines. Third, the surfa

sists of the exterior areas at the ground level to include streets, alleys, o

parks—the surface space is routinely shattered by car bombings.160 The 

is the subsurface, or subterranean level, consisting of those sub-sys

below ground to include subways, sewers, utility structures and others

155 Three reasons adapted from an assessment by the DOD Joint Staff, J-8, Dom

Assessment Division, “The Role of Urban Areas in Military History,” Handbook fo

Operations (Washington, DC: DOD, 17 May 2000), I-5. Cited hereafter as Joint Ur

156 Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Washington DC

tember 2002), I-4. Cited hereafter as Joint Pub 3-06. 157 Joint Urban, IV-39. 158 Joint Pub 3-06, I-4. 159 Joint Pub 3-06, I-4. 160 Joint Pub 3-06, I-4.
65

systems exist as part of a citys planned infrastructure; therefore, they 

ships that are knowable. A fifth type of space, which brings in the 

dimension, is the telecommunications infrastructure and other means fo

ing information, from sophisticated sensors or wide-eyed children u

phones or beating drums.162 In Mogadishu, communication between c

was often conducted by the pounding of make-shift drums.

The physical dimension of five spaces can be further modeled 

zones. As proffered by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)

artifacts. Humans design, build, maintain, and alter them—by and 

aspects of the urban terrain—the location, size, and materials m

physical components are recorded and archived... And that mak

most understandable and militarily exploitable...”163 While this 

urban areas under government control, it is not always the case 

tended and unregulated slums of the developing world. Although 

ships and nodes in these slums are harder to discern, they still exi

context of a terrain that can be sorted into rough categories that 

tional and tactical relevance. 

161 Los Angeles, for example, has over 200 miles of storm sewers, which could r

for movement. Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Marine Corps Warfight

(MCWP) 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (Washington, 

ters USMC, 1998), 1-3. 162 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information O

(Washington, DC: GPO, 9 October 1998), GL-7. 163 JWAC, Air Power in MOUT: A JWAC Experiment (Science Applications Inter

ration, CD-ROM, August 1998), Slide 4.

Figure 26. Urban Terrain Zones

Source: Alan and others, Aerospace Power in Urban Environments: Exploring N

(Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2000), 74-80.
66

for assessing the phys

and its operational i

method of distinguis

zones is by function, d

between administrativ

commercial and residen

But if we are to stick 

physical characterizat

point and how it mig

mission execution, it 

think in terms of heigh

The higher and m

packed the structures, 

ficult it is to conduct 

provide security, find 

and weapons caches, a

rorists. For example, 

implies suburban hous

ments to most Americans, which suggests a type of order and structu

that is inconsistent with much of the world. Residential in Seoul, 

means high-rise apartment buildings, while residential in Aden, Yem

and clapboard shantytowns.165 To our benefit, rigorous research on 

has already been initiated based on the study of fourteen diverse c

seven zone types shown in Figure 26.166

Each of the zones described here tends to be located in concentr

shown in the simplified graphic of Figure 27. The core is the heart of 

mally located at the center of the urban area and home to the most im

nomic, political and social structures—also where the government t

greatest control. The boundary links the core to the periphery, usual

of critical lines of communication (LOC) and a mix of industrial, com

164 Functional categorization is used by the USMC in MCWP 3-35.2 and the Ur

Information Requirements Handbook, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Decembe

165 Observations based on authors multiple visits to Seoul in 1998/1999 and thre

tour of Aden, Yemen, in 1995. 166 The research was conducted by Dr. Richard Ellefsen, a geography professor a

University who also worked as a consultant for the Naval Surface Warfare Center an

Proving Ground. The data were generated from detailed examination of maps, aeria

and visits. Dr Ellefsen picked his cities to reflect diversity in terms of population, ge

tion, climate, terrain, port services, political importance, and development process. 

effectively summarized and critiqued in Vick, 74-80.

Figure 27. Urban Space

Source: Troy Thomas, “Slumlords: Aerospace 

Power in Urban Fights,” Aerospace Power Journal 

(Spring 2002), 62.
67

the surrounding landscape. The periphery can be an orderly mix 

areas or an unruly sprawl that exceeds the capacity for governance. 

of operationally-relevant intelligence analysis resulting from a terrain 

down is that only 1-3 percent of urban areas are characterized by Z

terrain and that these zones dominate in the developed cities wher

likely.167 In fact, over 60 percent of urban areas consist of Zones V a

height and density are not as great, but where complexity and instabi

Linking this back to trends in urbanization, many cities in the deve

are dualistic, with small modern cores and unintended primitive peri

ing a recent walk through Casablanca, shanty towns nestled with new 

the urban core, suggesting an alternative, integrative trend.

The urban battlespace also

has cross-cutting functional

features that bring the city to

life and serve as social, information and physical networks

for terrorist activity. Among

other functions, IPB must

consider services, communication, transportation, and

utility networks that enable

resources to flow throughout

the city. The service network

consists of government buildings, universities, diplomatic

offices, medical facilities and

other activities that provide

for governance and basic human needs. Roads, subways, waterwa

and sea and airports are a few of the elements of the transportation n

U.S. and its adversaries rely on these links to move forces, weapons 

The Mogadishu International Airport was critical to airlifting and sta

and forces during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. In Se

River bridges serve as chokepoints, potentially channeling refugees a

The communication network controls the flow of information throu

mation dimension. It can be manipulated by the joint force, adversar

167 Vick, 77. 168 In June 1950, the destruction of the bridges substantially disrupted the mome

ing North Korean Army. Unfortunately, it also trapped an entire South Korean divis

core.

Figure 28. Peshawar, Pakistan

Source: Author.
68

utility network provides energy, water and sanitation. Each network 

cal to the noncombatants who are dependent on utilities for cooki

sanitation. 

There are formal and informal variations on each of the functiona

that have implications for how military forces are employed—anoth

at phase two. In the developed cities, functions are characterized b

administration, industrial or post-industrial technologies.169 The Wa

Metro, for example, is managed by a large bureaucracy, utilizes ad

puter technologies and consists of a defined network of rail lines and 

tions. Formal functions are easier to collect against given th

characteristics, the availability of documentation on their operatio

susceptibility to remote sensor surveillance and reconnaissance. In

tions are less “knowable” because they exist outside the reach of 

They are characterized by decentralization, often including the ab

central managing authority. Primitive or adaptive technology domin

network generally consists of patterns of individual or small group a

bly, informal functions are more survivable under conditions of tu

conflict. The periphery of Peshawar or Karachi, Pakistan, for examp

ingly endless sea of urban squalor. Public transportation, power a

infrequent, trash is piled high in the streets, and lawless sectarian gr

the streets.170 There are no blueprints. Given the subtlety of their i

tionships, direct surveillance and reconnaissance, such as human 

(HUMINT), are essential to understand and ultimately exploit the i

of the battlespace.

169 Thomas, 62. 170 Based on author’s driving and walking tour of Peshawar in 1994.
69

tion, the social 

of cities can be 

three rough type

clan and mu

Hierarchical cit

most familiar. T

acterized by a 

zenry that live 

agreed rules of in

The city consists 

command that op

an accepted l

work.173 Most of 

North American 

qualify, as do m

such as Singa

Lumpur and To

opposite end of the spectrum are clan cities that manifest from 

growth and associated impoverishment.174 Relationships are govern

and revenge. Restless young men fight over limited resources and c

government. Clans form and fight, while many citizens simply str

vive the crossfire. CT missions in a clan-based urban system will fi

to distinguish friend from foe and identify patterns of activity. The 

many: Kinshasa, Republic of Congo; Dushanbe, Tajikistan; and are

Nigeria. Multi-cultural systems exist between these extremes in 

tending systems of custom and belief, often aggravated by ethn

struggle for dominance. They are, by their nature, cockpits of strugg

type interactions can gain momentum and drag the city into bru

Jerusalem is a good example of a multi-cultural city that oscillates b

archal order and clan-oriented conflict. Sarajevo is an example 

descended into a factional hell and is still on the path to recovery.17

171 Adapted from the work of Ralph Peters, “The Human Terrain of Urban Opera

ters (Spring 2000), 4.

172 Peters, 5. 173 Peters, 4. 174 Peters, 8. 175 Peters, 5. 176 Visited by the author in February 2004.

Figure 29. Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Source: US Army, URL: 

http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/Units/Eagle/MWR/mwrweb/

tours/sarajevo/Photos/sarajevo9.jpg, accessed 2 June 2004
70

In an era of globalization, the linear approach to describing the bat

stuck in the era of disco and domino theory. In this chapter, the goa

one—define the battlespace—is achieved by building on existing IPB 

and methods. A six-step process is retained, beginning with mission an

ending with collecting against knowledge gaps. Important modification

methods are made for steps dealing with defining the limits of the battle

identifying its salient features. With regard to the former, the enduring 

of AO, OA, AOI and battlespace are modified to account for multiple p

missions, and the relative positioning of stakeholders in the battlespa

case of the latter, dimensions are sorted into three main categories of so

ical and information, and further broken down into three sectors eac

sions and sectors help organize our effort, ensure balance across dimen

provide a landscape on which to position players. Given the many rele

ers in CT, mapping stakeholders and characterizing their relationships i

requirement. Positioning stakeholders in relation to each other across d

and levels and in consideration of time horizons offers the most compl

ization of the battlespace possible. Though tough to accomplish in t

high levels of uncertainty, phase one handles the first “O” of the OOD

observe—and begins work on the second—orient. In doing so, it pr

commander with the best situational awareness possible and sets up 

challenging analysis of battlespace effects in phase two. When succes

formed phase one answers the question, “What out there matters most?
71

BATTLESPACE EFFECTS

The global diffusion of

information technology

allows a bin Laden speech to

shape terrorist targeting strategy in Iraq, reconstruction

efforts in an Afghanistan village enables access to fresh

intelligence on the location

of weapons stores, and heavy

February rains complicate the

monitoring airborne drug

trafficking in the Andean

region.177 These simple

examples are indicative of the

types of effects the battlespace can have on counterterrorism (CT). The joint

force and terrorist do not

operate in a vacuum, but

within an increasingly dynamic arena that affords constraints and o

When confronting transnational networks of terrorist cells, which p

shadows of sovereignty and are fueled by the digitally scattered rhe

ots, the traditional emphasis on geography and weather fails to cap

spectrum of mission-relevant effects originating from the environm

177 An audio-tape attributed to Osama bin Laden surfaced in February 2003 in w

speaker stated, “We have been following anxiously the preparations of the crusade

the former capital of Islam and steal their wealth and impose a puppet regime that 

ters in Washington ad Tel Aviv...We also want to clarify that whoever helps Americ

fight next to them or give them support in any form or shape, even by words, if the

kill the Muslims in Iraq, they have to know that they are outside the Islamic nation

ject to punishment. Transcript reprinted in Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The 

Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America (New York: Random House, 2003), 4

According to Lieutenant General David Barno in a February 2004 interview with t

“Where our units interact with the same elders, the same leaders on a regular basis

gence will improve dramatically, and we’ve seen indications of that in the last two 

including the seizure of weapons caches or stores. Andrew North, “Village Life Be

Troops,” BBC News On-line, 20 February 2004, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

3507141.stm, accessed on 16 May 2004.

Figure 30. Afghan Village

A soldier with the 450th Military Police co

boys during an Adopt-A-Village Program 

Afghanistan, 4 May 2004. 

Source: DOD, URL: http://www.defens

multimedia/, 

accessed 24 April 2004
72

effects that range across the battlespace dimensions. Where the in

dimension enables communication and forges perceptions, the social 

guides behaviors and determines attitudes. When integrated as par

assessment, all three dimensions shape the courses of action (COA) a

the joint force, terrorist group, and other stakeholders.

Building on our orientation to salient battlespace features in phase o

gence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) continues in phase two by 

the effects these features have on operations. Phase two is essentially a 

tion of the “Orient” step in the OODA Loop that bleeds over into the “

step; it clarifies command options. It answers a key question—how d

tures of the battlespace impact the ability of the joint force, the terro

and other stakeholders to accomplish their respective objectives? Phase 

not focus on how the adversary will impact the joint force; rather, the 

relational dynamics among stakeholder courses of action is central to p

That said, a net assessment of how the environment treats all players in 

each other is performed here. 

As before, we begin by examining current IPB doctrine to determine 

concepts and improve their application to CT. Analysis reveals a ric

doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) against a n

adversary for the physical dimension, a developing roadmap for the in

dimension, and spotty guidance for the increasingly vital social dimen

first section also fills a gap in current doctrine by fleshing out the c

“effects,” which is at the core of phase two and fundamental to CT 

whole. The second section builds on current doctrine by unveiling con

methods for evaluating effects across all sectors and for the battlespa

The newly introduced concepts of uncertainty, nesting, affordances, a

dencies are complemented with techniques for evaluating the under

social dimension. Recommendations and examples of the types of IPB 

likely to be useful for CT decisionmaking are sampled throughout. T

whole, this chapter offers the IPB analyst a set of tools whose specific 

vary by mission, decision requirements, and time available. To the qu

“What are we trying to achieve (mission analysis)?” and “What out the

most (define the battlespace),” we now add “How does it impact us?”

SPECIAL EFFECTS

The second phase of IPB—describe battlespace effects—molds C

by painting a clearer picture of what the environment allows. Armed 

understanding, the commander is able to exploit the battlespace to 
73

are integrated with insight into adversary vulnerabilities (phase three)

is an asymmetric knowledge and capability advantage. Absent goo

phase two, opportunities will be missed, constraints will be misjudge

terrorist will obtain unexpected advantages.178 In this section, joint a

doctrine are again harvested to determine the concepts and methods th

at the core of CT IPB. Specifically, the enduring concepts of effects 

are developed, and the basic steps of phase two are introduced: (1) a

mission-relevant effects of each dimension and (2) describe the effects 

sary and friendly capabilities and COA.179

Before tackling doc

TTPs, three points 

made. First, phase tw

poses some knowledg

sary capabilities and p

is a good reminder th

process is iterative. In 

we may only be able t

general battlespace 

first, requiring us to re

two after completing 

sis of COA in phase fo

point, we are dealing 

plans for all players. 

provide security for N

work (joint force); pu

test presence of U.S

trainers (activist); 

explosive materials to 

(terrorist). 

Second, the effects of the battlespace are dynamic, and they will rout

as terrorists seek new advantages to counter our latest CT move or due t

in battlespace conditions. For example, U.S. forces, particularly Spec

routinely leverage our lead in night operations, resulting from advantag

vision and infrared technology. Terrorists and insurgents such as those c

178 Per FM 34-130, Chapter 2, the consequences of failing to perform phase two inc

commander’s failing “to exploit the opportunities that the environment provides,” and t

nent’s finding and exploiting “opportunities in a manner the command did not anticipa

179 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-9. 

Figure 31. Night Vision

Combat Controllers from the 20th Special Forces 

Group use a variety of night vision devices to direct fire 

from an AC-130U Gunship at the Tonopah Test Range 

during an exercise.

Source: JFCOM, URL: 

http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/photolib/ 

mc02/af/0731/0731/0731af1_JPG.html/,

accessed 10 May 2004.
74

urban infrastructure to avoid exposure to U.S. surveillance. At the stra

Al-Qaida relied on the global financial network to rapidly move mone

wire transfers, credit transactions, and multiple bank accounts; 

increased international cooperation to disrupt terrorism financing—

increasing advantage in the informational domain—forced a shift i

emphasis by Al-Qaida financiers to an informal banking system 

hawala.180 By some estimates, the hawala system of unregulated, infor

tance transfers delivers $2.5 to $3 billion annually into Pakistan alone.1

180 According to terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna, as of 2003 Al-Qaida’s “banking 

operates feeder and operational accounts, transfers from the feeder accounts to the ope

accounts usually taking place through several bank accounts in order to disguise their t

pose...Al-Qaida also siphons funds from legitimate Islamic charities and NGOs that it i

while its extensive web of front, cover and sympathetic organizations include businesse

from diamond-trading, import-export, manufacturing and transport. Al-Qaida’s clandes

tion of legitimate public and private organizations included one charity that became the 

target of such activities and whose board at the time included President Pervais Musha

stan.” Inside Al-Qaida: Global Network of Terror (New York: Colombia University Pre

62-63; Gunaratna, Associate Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nan

nological University, interview by author, 24 February 2004, Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzego

March 2004, Montreal, Canada.

181Gunaratna, 63. According to E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Econom

ness Affairs, the “hawala is a system used extensively throughout the world to transfer v

banking channels and until 9/11, this system was in many jurisdictions completely unre

only minimally so in others. The quantity of funds that flows annually through hawala-l

internationally, though very hard to measure, is very large. Most such funds are believe

related to the legitimate remittance to families at home of earnings by expatriate worke

from South Asia, Latin America, and the Philippines, or to the conduct of legitimate tra

charities, however, this sector, since it is less transparent than the formal banking secto

quently been abused by terrorist financiers and other criminals to move funds in every c

world. Along with our Departments of Treasury and Justice partners in the USG, as wel

ners in the anti-terrorist coalition, we have worked to broaden foreign regulatory standa

native remittance systems such as hawala. Testimony to the House Committee on Inter

Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Righ

tional Dimension of Combating the Financing of Terrorism,” 26 March 2003, URL: htt

www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2003/19113.htm, accessed 16 May 2004
75

tion for the analytical pitfalls commonly associated with attempts t

any complex phenomena, including effects. Complex problems ar

with through simplification strategies known as heuristics, which ar

prone to error. Of these cognitive biases, mirror-imaging is our tend

gaps in our knowledge by “assuming that the other side is likely to ac

way because that is how the U.S. would act under similar circumstan

terrorist groups, mirror-imaging blinds us to unexpected strategies 

such as using commercial airlines as missiles or religious groups forg

with secular, criminal organizations. When evaluating COA and terr

tions of the environment, mirror-imaging can be minimized throug

and creative methods, including red teaming, alternative futures ge

old-school brainstorming. A second cognitive bias relevant to assess

known as the fundamental attribution error, which is a tendenc

behaviors in terms of individual traits rather than environmental co

example, to explain the absence of a major terrorist attack on the U

two years after 9/11 as the result of a deliberate choice by Al-Qaida 

probably an attribution error. Although we cannot know for certai

likely that changes in the international CT environment (invasion of 

international cooperation, new technologies) forced Al-Qaida to shif

ally-based strategy where softer targets exist. As argued by judgmen

Bazerman and others, 

182 In his seminal book, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richards J. He

that “mirror-imaging leads to dangerous assumptions, because people in other cultu

the way we do... Failure to understand that others perceive their national interests d

the way we perceive those interests is a constant source of problems in intelligence 

U.S. perspective on what is in another country’s [or terrorist groups] national [or sta

interest is usually irrelevant in intelligence analysis. Judgment must be based on ho

country perceives its national interest. If the analyst cannot gain insight into what th

is thinking, mirror-imaging may be the only alternative, but analysts should never ge

much confidence in that kind of judgment.” Center for the Study of Intelligence, Ce

gence Agency (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), 70. Also available at URL: http://ww

books/19104/art9.html, accessed on 17 May 2004.
76

and other professionals with a simple way of dealing with a com

world, producing correct or partially correct judgments more 

than not. In addition, it may be inevitable that humans will adopt 

way of simplifying decisions. The only drawback is that indiv

frequently adopt these heuristics without being aware of them

misapplication of heuristics to inappropriate situations, unfortun

leads people astray.183

Among the many cognitive biases to which analysts routinely fall vi

ror imaging and the fundamental attribution error are the most relevan

two of IPB. They rear their heads in subsequent phases, and thus deserv

tinued attention. 

Effects 

What is an effect? Although existing IPB doctrine asks us to describe 

offers no definition of the concept. Fortunately, effects-related thinking 

sufficient traction in operational doctrine to get us started. Per the DOD

is “the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or conseq

results from specific military or non-military actions.”184 This definit

sense when we think from the organization out. That is, the definit

when an effect, such as diminishing the roots causes of terrorism, is th

joint force actions; of course, this may also be a form of the fundamen

tion error. This line of thinking is the basis for effects-based operatio

which is the

process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or “effect” o

enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative 

cation of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels.185

183 Max H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (New York: John 

Sons, Inc., 1994), 7. See also Paul C. Nutt, Making Tough Decisions: Tactics for Impro

gerial Decision Making (San Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers, 1989), and Morgan D. 

Thinker’s Toolkit: Fourteen Skills for Making Smarter Decisions in Business and in Life 

Random House, 1995). 184 JFCOM Glossary, under “Effects,” URL: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/ glossary.h

accessed 14 May 2004. 185 JFCOM Glossary, under “Effects-based Operations.” For an analytical approac

K. Davis, Effects-based Operations: A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community 

ica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
77

with one important exception—IPB requires us to reverse the cause

tional arrow. In addition to thinking about how we impact the battles

asked to figure out how the battlespace affects us. In reality, the 

between the organization and the environment is open and dynamic

tems perspective, the organization is continually exchanging energy 

tion with the environment; organizational behaviors are shaped by e

conditions, and the environment is in turn shaped by the organization

for the IPB analyst is to think in both directions all the time. Later in 

several concepts and methods are introduced to characterize the c

tionship between the battlespace and relevant organization. 

Thinking in terms of effects begins with a seemingly simple quest

battlespace feature identified in phase one have an impact or not? W

sandstorms restrict operating windows, or will local opinion allow 

186 IPB is a form of systems analysis, which has its roots in the General Systems 

ogist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory (New York: George Brazille

explained by Francis Heylighen, editor of the Principia Cybernetica Project, Bertala

systems theorists emphasize all systems are “open to, and interact with, their environ

they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence, resulting in contin

Rather than reducing an entity (the human body) to the properties of its parts or elem

cells), systems theory focuses on the arrangement of and relations between the parts 

them into a whole (holism). This particular organization determines a system, which 

of the concrete substance of the elements (particles, cells, transistors, people). Syste

developed independently of systems theory, applies systems principles to aid a deci

problems of identifying, reconstructing, optimizing, and controlling a system (usua

nical organization), while taking into account multiple objectives, constraints and re

to specify possible courses of action, together with their risks, costs and benefits.” P

netica Project, URL: http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/SYSTHEOR.html, accessed 20 May 

tems approach informs much of my work and will be applied further as a way to ev

organizations in phase three of IPB. 
78

gathering? Yes or no? Such simplicity is an important start, but it is 

utility to a commander seeking to understand how the feature will imp

tions, whether the effect represents a constraint or opportunity, and h

effects interact to create comparative advantage or disadvantage rela

adversary. To get beyond binary answers to a laundry list of factors, w

distinguishing between direct and indirect effects. 

Direct effects have an immediate, usually recognizable impact in 

space with no intervening effect or mechanism between act and outcom

versely, indirect effects tend to be delayed in time and space, resultin

intermediate effect or mechanism to produce the final outcome; they 

more difficult to recognize (Figure 32).188 Indirect effects are less imp

tactical level action, but become increasingly important as we move th

operational to the strategic level. As an example of a direct effect that 

discarded during planning, consider the relationship between a group t

a psychological operations message and the behavior of an influentia

187 JFCOM Glossary, under “direct effects.” 188 T.W. Beagle, “Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise,” School of Adv

power Studies thesis (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, December 20

Figure 32. Di

Indirect Ef

Source: USAF 

Center briefing

and Indirect 

Defining and M

reprinted in T.W

“Effects-Based 

Another Empty 

(Maxwell Air F

AL: Air Univer

December 2
79

it would be foolish to ignore the relevance of Islamist firebran

Zakzaky, located farther north in Zaria, who declares, “If we want a 

ple out on the streets on any issue we can do that.”189

While Zakzaky may have a direct effect on operational planning

effect might emanate out of Al-Qaida’s support to a local extremist g

the Ja’amutu Tajidmul Islami (The Movement for Islamic Revival). 

two-way street, impacting friendly forces and the adversary. For exam

effect against a terrorist group, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation F

in the southern Philippines, is the disruption of training caused by 

their jungle camp. The indirect effect of disrupting training is li

decrease in attacks down the road, or even a longer training program 

throughput due to increased concealment requirements. According to 

commander, codenamed “Congressman,” the destruction of their mai

Bakr, in 2000 by the Philippine Army has forced them to break up 

more mobile guerilla units and confine leaders to secret locations, c

make training more difficult.190 Battlespace features in the operational 

more likely to have a direct effect than those in the area of interest; i

guishing between direct and indirect effects helps delineate the battles

tial cut at direct and indirect effects focuses IPB on what must be co

without blinding us to beyond-the-horizon forces. 

189 Dan Isaacs, “Nigeria’s Firebrand Muslim Leaders,” BBC News, 1 October 20

/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1573491.stm, accessed on 27 April 2004. 190 Orlando de Guzman, “The Philippines’ MILF Rebels,” BBC News, 6 May 20

/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3003809.stm, accessed on 27 April 2004.
80

Once an effect 

classified as dire

rect, the next t

determine its 

impact on CO

consideration by 

force, terrorist 

and other stakeh

COA is simply 

plan intended t

plish the CT mis

the joint force’s 

sion is to disrup

borne shipment 

in the Andean 

COA might inc

selectively dep

rity personnel t

fields used 

aircraft; or (2) use airborne command and control aircraft to monitor 

intercepts of suspect drug aircraft. If a feature of the environment ha

on the ability of the joint force or its allies to carry out the COA, then 

identified and assessed. The sheer volume of potential runway sur

example, has a direct effect on the ability of security services to sec

whereas a steep rise in the price of aviation fuel may have an indirec

the number of flights over time. Determining and describing the speci

or quality, of the direct or indirect effect on the COA is the yeoman

phase two. That is, answering the questions of WHY and HOW is tou

dealing with WHAT. Existing methods are highlighted below; how

191 DOD offers a more detailed definition: “1. A plan that would accomplish, or is re

accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. 

uct of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase

ported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander’s e

recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of sup

estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of comb

support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data ba

contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the 

action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order.” 

02, under “Course of Action.” 

Figure 33. Nigerian Officers

Nigerian Army officers participate in a Ministry of Defense 

workshop for Public Affairs Officers, learning the “better 

we are at keeping the public informed, the more support we 

can expect from them. Alternatively, the less information 

we provide, the less support we should expect.” 

Source: The Embassy of the United State, Nigeria, URL: 

http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria, accessed 24 April 2004.
81

concepts and methods are developed in the next section to get u

physical dimension to full-dimensional analysis.

Step-by-Step

Equipped with our new insight into effects and COA, we can 

work. Joint and service doctrine reflect general consistency on pha

steps: (1) analyze the mission-relevant effects of each dimension, and 

the effects on adversary and friendly capabilities and COA. The 

effort to each step and degree of detail required “will vary dependin

sion, the general capabilities of both friendly and adversary forces, 

tive significance or importance of each battlespace dimension to 

military operation being planning.”192 As a rule-of-thumb, mission

pate hostile action will require more detail than those occurring in 

192 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-9.

Figure 34. Peru Airstrip

Clandestine airstrips in Peru are usually located in the far eastern areas, 

aircraft can depart before the Peruvian air force can catch them. Here, the a

at Campanilla is being blocked and dismantled by Peruvian National Po

Source: William W. Mendel, “Colombia’s Threats to Regional Securi

Military Review, May-June 2001, 16.
82

(FID) training on a secure range. Missions in complex geography, su

suburbs of Manila, will require more detail than missions in unpopula

less densely vegetated terrain. The operational area demands more wor

area of interest, and a skilled, transnational adversary like Hezbolla

more effort than a localized, nascent group like the Pattani United 

Organization (PULO) of southern Thailand.193 This last rule-of-thumb 

word of caution. We bear the responsibility of avoiding overestimating 

estimating the adversary. While ground truth on adversary capabilities 

sible, success in phase two and for the CT mission overall depends on g

in phase three—evaluate the adversary. As with COA, phase two requ

preliminary work on adversary capabilities; therefore, we continually 

initial assessment of battlespace effects based on refined phase three 

work as well as changes in the battlespace itself. The IPB process is fee

ented, requiring circular systems thinking rather than habitual linear thi

193 Analysts have identified PULO as a possible behind-the-scenes instigator of atta

lim youth against security forces in the southern Thailand provinces of Songkhla, Yala, 

Over 100 of the attackers were killed in the fighting, which Thai Prime Minister Thaks

watra blames on local gangs involved in smuggling and drug trafficking. Analysts, howe

the arrest in Thailand of JI operations chief, Hambali, in 2003 and evidence that “many 

Thailand’s Islamic groups, especially PULO, were given training by militant organizat

Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Kate McGeown, “Who was behind the Thai attacks?” BBC 

line, 30 April 2004, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3670537.stm, accesse

2004.
83

Capitalizing on our inventory

of mission-relevant features

identified in phase one, we next

analyze them to determine

effects on operations. Joint and

service doctrine uses three

buckets—terrain, weather,

“other” factors—that we have

realigned into the dimensions

and sectors shown in Figure 35,

which elevates the importance

of social and information factors to better fit CT requirements. In the paragraphs that

follow, presently available

methods for analyzing effects

for these dimensions are introduced with initial commentary

on their fit with operations

against terrorists. As with all

recent IPB doctrine, the preponderance of guidance is for comb

nation-state, relying on conventional forces in non-urban terrain. Fin

repeating, IPB analysis is not an end in itself. Rather, “it is the me

mine which friendly COA can best exploit the opportunities” the bat

vides and how the battlespace affects the adversary’s available COA

The physical dimension includes geography (land, maritime, air 

weather, and artifacts. As developed in phase one, analysis is dire

features and their effects that are germane to the mission. The effect

time space are relevant, for example, to JTF-HoA’s mission to disru

shipment of weapons into Somalia, but they can be filtered 

unconventional operation against a Taureg supply route in the deserts 

buktu. Joint and service IPB doctrine are robust on this front, offerin

methods for the weather and land components of geography and re

but equally useful methods for dealing with the maritime, air and sp

Artifacts, or man-made structures and infrastructure, are generally 

these existing methods, which works equally well for CT; howev

194 FM 34-130, 11.

Figure 35. Dimensional Secto

Source: Author.
84

outweigh natural features, such as urban settings. 

The militarily relevant aspects of geography are analyzed using the 

methodology: observation and fields of fire (effects of lethal or non-le

ons); concealment and cover; obstacles; key terrain; and avenues of app

each is examined in turn, CT requires keeping a diverse array of mi

stakeholders in mind. The OCOKA method was developed by the U.S

deal specifically with the land component, but it has gained credence in 

time and air domains and has some limited applicability to space. Hig

weather analysis close out this section after additional consideratio

space, air, and maritime domains are addressed. 

Observation and fields of fire serve related purposes. Observation is “

to see (or be seen by) the adversary either visually or through the use 

lance devices.”195 A field of fire is “the area that a weapon or group o

may effectively cover with fire (effects of lethal or non-lethal weapon

given position.”196 Reflecting the combat orientation of current IPB, th

tion allows us to:

(1) Identify potential engagement areas, or “fire sacks” and “kill zon

(2) Identify defensible terrain and specific system or equipment posi

(3) Identify where maneuvering forces are most vulnerable to ob

and fires.197

For direct action CT missions to disrupt or destroy terrorist infrast

capture a high value target (HVT), these effects retain their full relevan

lels for non-combat CT missions at the tactical and operational level 

Observation in particular should be expanded to include the ability o

force to monitor activities of NGOs, community leaders, or coaliti

Where transparency of joint force activities is at a premium, possibly w

to build trust in a local community, reverse observation analysis is wa

ensure the desired psychological effect. Determining “engagement area

ably the most important for CT. This is where we expect to encounter th

or another key stakeholder. It might include planned distribution point

supplies, a front business in a suburb where money is laundered, or a 

expect the terrorist to attack. Both observation and fields of fire deal w

195 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-10. 196 FM 34-130, 11. 197 FM 34-130, 12.
85

in the battlespace; what we can see or affect without obstruction. W

tions to line-of-sight (LOS) observation or direct fires exist, vision i

vulnerabilities increase. When combined, the result is a graphic depi

the physical features of the OA/AOI restrict vision and fires, as show

ness terrain in Figure 36; similar examples for urban, jungle, des

complex terrains are needed.

Concealment and cover are the inverse of observation and field 

cealment refers to anything that offers protection from observation

is protection from direct and indirect effects from lethal and non-

ons.198 Typically, we think in terms of artifacts, such as buildings o

natural features like a jungle canopy or glacial crevice. For CT, w

think more broadly. Consider domestic laws that protect individ

from monitoring or arrest, or front business and charities that mask 

raising, or kinship communities that protect suspected operatives

examples abound for each, ranging from legal restrictions against 

to the Pashtun tribal code in western Waziristan that deters Pakistan

198 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-11.

Figure 36. Observation and Fields of Fire Overlay

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, 11.
86

only pose advantages to the terrorists, but they help the joint force ide

nues of approach, defensible positions, locations for surprise act

assembly, staging, or dispersal areas.199

Obstacles are at the core of the OCOKA model. Simply, obstacles ar

ural and/or manmade obstructions that disrupt, fix, turn, or otherw

mobility.200 Obstacles exist across every sector and dimension and are 

evant to all CT missions. Among many other examples, land obstacl

artifacts and natural terrain features; air obstacles include balloons, wir

smoke and other obscurants; space obstacles include satellites, mete

debris and other sun-related effects (solar winds, radiation); and marit

cles include flotsam, reefs, icebergs, harbors, and straits. Moving b

physical, the information dimension experiences firewalls, cognitiv

ments, and bandwidth obstacles among others, and the social dimen

fronts cultural norms, resource scarcities, and political alliances that 

much broader conception of mobility—our ability to navigate a particu

of the battlespace. Obstacles are classified as unrestricted, restricted, o

restricted in terms of their impact on mobility.201 Their respective con

are currently geared toward the movement of combat units; however, 

equal utility for movement related to CT missions.

199 FM 34-130, 15. 200 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-11, and FM 34-130, 15. 201 Unrestricted indicates terrain free of any restriction to movement. Nothing need

to enhance mobility. Restricted terrain hinders movement to some degree. Little effort 

enhance mobility but units may have difficulty maintaining preferred speeds, moving in 

mations, or transitioning from one formation to another. Severely restricted terrain seve

or slows movement in combat formations unless some effort is made to enhance mobil

could take the form of committing engineer assets to improving mobility or of deviatin

trinal tactics, such as moving in columns instead of line formations or at speeds much l

those preferred. FM 34-130, 17.
87

broadly across dimensions, is any

locality that “affords a marked

advantage” to stakeholders as a

result of its control.202 Critical at all

levels, key terrain is evaluated by

assessing the impact of its control

upon the results of the engagement.203 Due to its importance, key

terrain is often identified as an

objective; however, we are cautioned

against thinking of physical space as

an “end” itself, particularly in the

CT arena:

Key terrain is decisive terrain if

it has an extraordinary impact

on the mission. Decisive terrain is rare and will not be

present in every situation. To

designate terrain as decisive is

to recognize that the success of

the mission depends on seizing

or retaining it.204

Rather, the control of key terrain

facilitates mission accomplishment

by providing advantages in surveillance, reconnaissance, mobility,

defense, and influence. Key terrain

also exists at each of our levels of action and analysis—strategic, ope

tactical. 

By way of an example, the entire country of Afghanistan represen

key terrain in the physical dimension in the CT contest with Al-Q

202 FM 34-130, 18. 203 Joint and Army doctrine cast this in more conventional, combat-oriented term

is evaluated by assessing the impact of its seizure by either force upon the results of 

missions, particularly those geared toward mitigating conditions and influencing pe

more likely to control, influence or leverage key terrain than “seize” it. Joint Pub, 2

204 FM 34-130, 19-20.

Figure 37. Kandahar

Marines on patrol in Afghanistan 

way through the narrow streets of a 

of Kandahar.

Source: USMC, URL

www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn

accessed 21 May 2004
88

around Tora Bora. At the tactical level, key terrain included key inte

dominant buildings, and unobstructed fields of fire near tunnel openings

exist for the other dimensions, and more importantly, for integrated are

battlespace. Depending on the mission, CT actions directed toward the 

cleric, Sheikh Salman bin Fahd al-Awda, for example, might have to co

the key terrain of the mosque in his home city of Buraydah, Saudia Ara

ical dimension), linked to his actual rhetoric and chokepoints for the d

of his tapes (information dimension), and to the cultural norms of bot

supporters and the malleable masses (social dimension).205 The critic

grasp here is, we must not only think of key terrain for the non-physic

sions (Internet server, psyche of a specific operative, religious serm

resource), but we must also think in terms of mobile terrain such a

trains, ships or even nomadic communities. Key terrain is an endurin

when more generally applied for the other dimensions.

The final element of OCOKA, avenue of approach, is air, space, l

routes that lead any of the stakeholders to its objectives. They are mo

tant when the COA under consideration involves the maneuver of fo

nues are evaluated by first identifying mobility corridors, which a

relatively free of obstacles where a force can capitalize on the pri

mass and speed, but is canalized due to restrictive terrain.”206 Whethe

ity corridor exists, or is free of obstacles, depends on the type of force 

sion. For CT missions to seize suspected weapons or contraban

beneath the floor of a hut, for example, analysis of possible mobility 

will consider cover, concealment, and observation. Second, mobility 

are categorized like obstacles as unrestricted, restricted, or severely 

When two or more mobility corridors can be grouped together, an 

approach exists. In turn, the overall avenues should be prioritized base

ability to support the mission and in terms of access to key terrain, 

canalization, ease of movement, concealment and cover, observation 

for fire, and directness to the objective.207Anti-terrorism missions re

on avenues of approach analysis, particularly in an era when suicide 

205 Al-Awda and Sheikh Safar bin Abd al-Rahman al-Hawali are known as the dawa

awakening—sheikhs for their fiery rhetoric, which among other proclamations, has “in

the government [Saudi Arabia] undertake a broad program of reform to bring Saudi life 

dance with the requirements of sharia, which was violated by, among other things, ban

‘usurious’ policies, the unequal distribution of public resources, and a foreign policy th

advance Islamic concerns.” Benjamin, 107-108. 206 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-15. 207 FM 34-130, 22.
89

weapon. Likewise, CT

missions require the joint

force to evaluate avenues

for terrorist and stakeholder movement. Importantly, terrorist

movements are not limited to actual attacks, but

include surveillance,

recruiting, financing, and

service (medicine, food,

education) delivery operations. Finally, the concept of avenues has

parallels in cyberspace

and social networks.

We have gone into some detail explaining the OCOKA method

was developed for the land domain, but which applies to the othe

spaces and to CT missions directly. Still, OCOKA does not address a

originating from the maritime, air, and space environments; an evalu

“uniqueness” is required. The maritime space, for example, affects 

the open three-dimensional space of the sea and the more constricted 

littorals. Among sources of “maritime effects,” are chokepoints, nat

ports, sea lines of communication (SLOC), and the “hydrograph

graphic characteristics of the ocean floor and littoral land masses.”208 

the Red Sea passage between Eritrea and Yemen, for example, provid

ties for land-based observation or attack, constrain mobility, and sug

rain for interdicting the movement of terrorists and/or weapons into 

Africa. Closer to the shores of Somalia, characteristics like littoral 

composition, coastal infrastructure, levels and locations of comme

and tides all impact the ability of the terrorist to move secretly, o

force to interdict.

Military operations in the air space are even less constricted than 

Nonetheless, air operations are impacted by land and sea character

density, mountains, ocean currents). Air Force doctrine recommend

process for assessing air effects: (1) assess air-related operating l

facilities (targets, airfields, missile launch site, aircraft carriers, anti-

208 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-17.

Figure 38. Noble Eagle

An F-15C Eagle from Langley Air Force Base

over Washington during an early morning comb

mission in support of Operation NOBLE E

Source: USAF, URL: www.af.mil/photos, access

2004.
90

or operating altitudes; (3) incorporate analysis of other dimension

weather, air corridors, aviation rules); and (4) synthesize results in gr

plays (step two below).209 Since the 1950s, air space factored into CT 

as (1) a medium through which retaliatory strikes were executed (

ELDORADO CANYON against Libya in 1989 and the cruise missile 

response to the African embassy bombings in 1989), or (2) the result o

cial airline hijackings. Regarding the latter, Bruce Hoffman asserts that 

advent of what is considered modern, international terrorism occ

on 22 July 1968. On that day three armed Palestinian terr

belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P

one of the six groups then comprising the Palestine Liberation O

zation (PLO), hijacked an Israeli El Al commercial flight en 

from Rome to Tel Aviv.210

The attacks of 9/11, when civilian airliners were hijacked and convert

laden missiles, sparked a paradigm shift in both our understanding of 

and the nature of combating terrorism. Your author and many other in

professionals entered uncharted waters when we begin performing IPB 

missions to defend (AT) or intercept (CT) civilian aircraft posing a 

threat. As part of Operation NOBLE EAGLE, intelligence professional

the mix of battlespace considerations the effects of Federal Aviation A

tion rules, the locations and capacities of commercial airports, and th

civilian aircraft types. From the terrorist’s perspective, air space effec

critical, particularly given the heavy lifting performed by airborne su

and reconnaissance platforms to find, fix and track terrorists, and the 

strike capabilities of air-delivered weapons.

209 AFPAM 14-118,25-26. 210 Hoffman, 67.
91

Because few terrorist organizations control their own space ass

underappreciated by intelligence analysis for CT. And yet, not on

based systems integral to joint force capabilities, but they are accessi

rorist. For example, a well-financed terrorist organization can work t

imate front companies to purchase commercial satellite imagery 

Additionally, terrorists are known to use satellites for communicati

bin Laden stopped using satellite phones in 1997 on suspicion that 

Security Agency (NSA) could track his communications via satell

and detect his location based on a “voiceprint.”211 For CT IPB, spa

the lowest altitude at which a space object can maintain orbit arou

(approximately 93 miles) and extends upward to approximately 2

211 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of bin Laden (New Y

2001), 229. Also interviewed by the author, 16 January 2004, Washington, DC.

Figure 39. Statute of Liberty

A 60-centimeter natural color image of the Statue of Liberty collected by Qu

on 2 August 2002.

Source: DigitalGlobe, URL: www.digitalglobe.com, accessed 21 May 2
92

propagation of electromagnetic energy, orbit density and debris, and 

geomagnetic activity.213 Impacts are most likely to be felt on satellite 

cations, high-frequency operations, radar systems, satellite control and 

satellite anomalies, spacecraft charging, satellite disorientation, an

space flights.214 A more practical approach for the CT analyst in the 

assess the operational impact of space access by an adversary, gaps in j

space-based ISR, and a loss in access to space systems.

Weather’s relevance is intuitive and further “official” clarification ri

essary complication. At a minimum, it is worth knowing that weather is 

of the atmosphere regarding wind, temperature, precipitation, moisture

ric pressure and cloudiness.”215 Weather patterns expressed over many 

specific region constitute a climate. Weather affects military operatio

ways: (1) it interacts with and modifies the other dimensions of the b

and (2) it can have a “direct effect on military operations regardless o

tlespace dimension.”216 At a minimum, IPB should establish thresholds 

standing when deteriorating conditions in visibility, winds, pre

temperature, and cloud cover “can be expected to have favorable, m

unfavorable effects on specific types of operations and equipment.”2

mind that unfavorable effects for the joint force may prove profitab

adversary. Sandstorms can grind high-tech U.S. equipment to a halt a

ISR operations; however, these same conditions may afford a condition

such as the GSPC in Algeria, cover and concealment. Among other 

used by adversaries, back-lighting can undermine night-vision goggles 

pected heat sources can throw off infrared sensors.

Information Dimension

The effects of the information dimension cover a wide swath, from h

ception to data fusion. Rather than distinguishing between information

ogy, and cognition, joint and service doctrine focus on cybers

electromagnetic spectrum, and human factors.218 The terminology d

are less important than understanding how their interplay can affect mil

212 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-28. 213 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-29. 214 For the only thorough treatment of IPB for space, see AFPAM 14-118, Attachme

117-129. 215 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-39. 216 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-39. 217 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-41. 218 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-34.
93

ations. Not only is information superiority, and now decision domi

core of the joint force’s vision and capabilities, but terrorists are incr

ant on cyberspace. To date, terrorists have used information, par

media, as a force multiplier, extending the reach and impact of its me

get audiences. IT also serves organizational purposes, including 

information sharing, and recruiting. Rarer are actual informa

although as discussed in the next section, the threat of mass disrupt

space is real enough.

 Looking first at cyberspace, which links the three sectors, joint do

nizes the growing importance of integrated hardware, software, ne

procedures, and human operators to the joint force and the adversary

effects springs from an analysis of the information systems on wh

force, terrorist, and other stakeholders depend to determine how critic

Figure 40. Cyberspace Vulnerability Matrix

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-38
94

impact of system failure, data loss, or operator error is to capabilities 

execution. Crossing system prioritization against vulnerability results in 

shown using notional systems in Figure 40—that can be used to get an in

shot of the potential effects of system disruption.219 The Services contrib

this discussion in open sources than one might think. Rather than describ

mational effects, the Air Force focuses its IO appendix on the effects oth

sions will have on the IO activities of gain, exploit, attack, and defend

the information dimension is discussed, we are asked to assess effects b

ing the following questions: (1) How does information technology assis

ISR operations; (2) How dependent are they [adversaries] on inform

tems?221 These two questions represent the only attempts to get beyond i

what cyber-capabilities exist and into an analysis of how informatio

relate to performance. The absence of well-developed concepts and m

this aspect of the information dimension does not reflect a lack of p

effort, but rather the difficulty of figuring out these relationships.

The electromagnetic spectrum relies on technology (radio, radar, l

tro-optic, and infrared equipment) to emit information. It offers an “

medium for communications; electro-optic, radar, and infrared imagin

intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MAS

electronic warfare (EW) operations.222 These operations are not the 

view of the joint force; terrorists, IGOs, NGOs, and others rely on 

quency radios, radar, listening devices, and radio controls. In one of 

basic, yet ingenious examples of a contest within the electromagnetic 

the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) pioneered the use of 

trols from model aircraft to detonate bombs from a distance. Acc

Bruce Hoffman, the British Ministry of Defense developed sophistic

tronic countermeasures and jamming techniques, which the PIRA w

thwart with a sophisticated network of electronic switches after five y

own research and development.223 While evaluating its effects is ofte

the skills of most IPB analysts, communications experts can help figur

changes in the electromagnetic environment (interference, skip zo

219 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-38. 220 AFPAM 14-118, 130-146. 221 AFPAM 14-118, 135. 222 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-31. 223 Bruce Hoffman, “Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum,” 

Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, eds. John Arquilla and David Ro

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 354.
95

holder to utilize the medium. 

The human mind is at the core of the CT challenge. Not only d

render a psychological wound, but the cognitive abilities, predisp

perceptions of all players are critical within the contest of wills. Reco

current doctrine stresses the need to evaluate individual psycholog

little else with which to work. At minimum, the IPB analyst is encou

sue a psychological profile of leaders in terms of biographical data su

background, education, belief, values, character traits, and dec

style.224 Ideally, such analysis will yield rare insight into strategy, m

even the holy grail of intelligence work, intention. Organizational-l

is essentially ignored, but the importance of public opinions, belie

(which cross into the cultural sector) are not. As for group-wide ef

and regime loyalty are highlighted as key variables that can impact 

and susceptibility to psychological operations.225 Although relevant, 

part of the cognitive sector, which also includes considerations of na

nality, and perception.

Social Dimension

The social dimension serves as a catch-all for what current d

“other factors,” but which is developed only partially. Effects stemm

political sector span the levels, from alliances to rules of engageme

nomic sector shapes commerce, finances, land use patterns, industr

vices, employment and other characteristics that may provide opp

constrain options. Finally, culture affects behavioral norms and worl

lectively demographic analysis might reveal the role of ethnicity, a

income and other population qualities in shaping public opinion, soc

development, or the use of violence. From current doctrine we can 

“strong emphasis placed on demographic analysis” for MOOTW, wh

CT.226 Joint doctrine comes closest to giving CT-relevant guidance, p

following for effects-based evaluation as applied to special operat

military affairs missions:

224 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-37. 225 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-39. 226 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, V-I.
96

cal, economic, soci

itary behaviors of g

(2) Economic or s

grams that cou

desired changes i

tion behavior; 

(3) The goals and 

of political organiz

special interest gro

ble of influencing 

sion;

(4) The formal and 

political, econom

social power struct

(5) The history and 

political violence in the country; and

(6) The attitudes, values, and motivations of the civil populace.227

While each is a source of effects, this listing is more reflective of 

analysis than it is of phase two’s requirement to explain how attitudes, 

social conditions shape COA. Nonetheless, it provides a baseline for t

attempt at improvement later in the chapter.

227 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, IV-8, IV-15.

Figure 41. Destroyed Drug Lab, Colombia

Source: Department. of State, U.S. Embassy Colombia, 

URL: usembassy.state.gov/colombia/www.snasc.shtml, 

accessed 19 May 2004.
97

Step two relat

specific COA a

to communica

commanders in 

ble, graphic 

enables good d

ing. The curren

ogy is inducti

up from each 

and then integ

holistic picture 

battlespace allo

tested against 

grated battlespa

determine how 

tlespace will 

support their 

Since most 

afford both adv

disadvantages, 

lenge is to co

within each sec

for the OA and 

Certain COA s

own emphasis. 

find and destro

in the jungles c

the FARC, fo

will require an 

each dimensio

information and social effects are likely to take a back seat to phy

related to tactical execution. That said, an awareness of the dec

style and values of the adversary cannot be overlooked if combat i

ture possible, or political effects are likely to constrain the role of U

The trick for the IPB analysis is to describe the effects of each dim

if possible, the overall battlespace on the COA. Many formats are po

ever, graphic depictions are preferred. The most common graph

known as the military combined obstacle overlay (MCOO). Figure 

doctrine example of land MCCO, which captures the results of 

Figure 42. Land MCOO

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-18
98

assessment for a conventional fight against a nation-state. Figure 43 

alternative graphic for counter-drug operations, which is more akin to t

product suited for CT. Ideally, the infrastructure overlay of Figure 4

bined with a MCOO. Given the complexity of overlaying effects from 

sectors, it may be necessary to use sector-only graphics, allowing each 

an optimal COA, and reserving an integrated assessment for verbal 

communication. In addition to those shown here, joint doctrine recom

impressive list of graphics with applicability to CT, including associat

ces, event templates, legal status overlays, pattern analysis plot sheet

tion status overlays, and time-event charts.228 Rather than showing eac

here, these and others will be integrated with modifications in the ne

and subsequent chapters as appropriate. At the end of the day, the res

two is a preliminary prioritization of COA for the joint force, terroris

stakeholders based on how well each is supported by the battlespace.22

228 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, V-9-27. 229 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-44.

Figure 43. Infrastructure Overlay (Illegal Drugs)

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-18
99

As the last section makes clear, several concepts and methods f

doctrine are helpful for CT IPB, especially in application to the phy

sion. In this section, additional concepts for an improved methodo

sented to color in the white spaces of the social and information dim

transition from existing doctrine to the new concepts is approached 

the idea of net effects. All of the ideas presented here are not valua

time. Net effects of the battlespace, for example, may not be relevant 

lar tactical-level mission; more likely, only one or two of the ideas w

able for the task at hand. As elsewhere in this guide, the ideas pr

should be thought of as a set of tools we can use to solve specific CT 

Net Effects

The inverse of the inductive approach sketched above is a dedu

based on a more generalized portrayal of the battlespace. Rather 

from the organization out, we think from the environment in—Can 

the overall battlespace in a way that lends insight to probable impac

ticipants? How the joint force or adversary responds to these over

determines who derives the most advantage. Political and organiza

offer some useful concepts toward achieving this goal, and here the

to assess effects related to uncertainty, nesting, stakeholders, depen

affordances. All five concepts are of potential use; however, mission 

availability will drive what can be accomplished in the time allotte

mum, we should seek to get a general fix on how messy the situatio

major players are, and what constraints and/or opportunities are pres

Uncertainty Principle

The CT battlespace is turbulent, creating uncertainty for the jo

adversary.230 Uncertainty, commonly attributed to the environmen

experienced by decisionmakers. It is akin to the Clausewitzian “fog 

denser the fog, the greater the risk of mission failure to all particip

tainty is a more useful concept than its seeming ambiguity suggest

cific components, complexity and change, that are evaluated to cha

environment and suggest implications for the organizations in it. As 

an initial diagnosis of the degree of uncertainty helps gauge the chal

in terms of workload, information requirements, and extent of assum

230 The seminal work on the turbulent character of the contemporary internation

is James N. Rosenau’s, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ

1990).
100

44), which refers to the heterogeneity, or the number and dissimilarit

nal elements relevant to an organization’s properties.”231 More dire

cluttered are each of the sectors with things of concern to our COA? A

bers of relevant features and other organizations (friendly, neutral, or 

ial) in the battlespace increase, so does the complexity. For exa

battlespace in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom gai

plexity as relief NGOs, outside terrorist organizations, such as th

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and additional coalition forces p

Moreover, changes in weather, the influence of the heroin trade, refu

and attacks on cultural objects like the Buddhist statutes at Bamiyan, 

of other variables added to the complexity even before the operation b

231 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, (Mason, OH: South-Western

Figure 44. Uncertainty Framework I

Source: Adapted from Robert B. Duncan, “Characteristics of Perceived Environme

Perceived Environmental Uncertainty,” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972), 
101

whether elements in the environment are dynamic.

 Are things ch

stable battlespace, the mission-relevant features experience little 

time. At the other extreme, the unstable environment is characterized 

changing and shifting features. Instability in Afghanistan was incre

idly shifting alliances between tribes, a prison revolt in Mazar-i-

pected levels of resistance in the Tora Bora region, and other dyna

Figure 44 pulls these two axes together in a way that allows us to qu

the degree of uncertainty faced. CT missions gain uncertainty as ti

nerabilities, hostile interference, stakeholders, and other factors i

seeks to reduce our uncertainty relative to the terrorist, while CT mis

increase adversary uncertainty to undercut performance. 

The degree of uncertainty in the battlespace has general effects 

making, organization, and COA development. Change and compl

decisionmakers by altering their intelligence demands. Meeting shif

ments consumes resources and energy, and the resulting availabili

intelligence can enable or hinder decisionmaking. A complex-stable 

for example, can result in information overload. A complex-unstable 

generates an “overwhelming amount of information, but [decision

not know which information to attend to due to constantly chan

stances.”233 To get a clearer picture of whether uncertainty breeds 

poor judgment among blue, red or other decisionmakers, this ne

should be integrated with the psychological profiling of specific de

if possible. Some commanders and terrorist group leaders are cap

judgment under uncertainty, but many are not.

Uncertainty also drives organizational structure. Drawing again 

thinking, the law of requisite variety states that 

for one system to deal with another it must be of the same or grea

plexity. In organizational terms this means that organizations ma

ceived environmental complexity with their internal structures a

management systems. There is a theoretical limit to this, of cour

if the organization ever realized the full complexity of its environ

would be that environment.234

In CT terms, this means the battlespace will influence the command 

structure and functions of us and our adversaries. A failure to fit on

232 Daft, 142. 233 Hatch, 90. 234 Hatch, 90. 
102

and ultimately, decreased performance. Think of it this way: If the In

Community were to fail to build capacity to collect HUMINT or condu

analysis, it would not be adapting to the realities of CT. 

What structures result? A stable-simple battlespace fosters a m

organization, marked by formalized rules and procedures, clear hie

authority, rigidly defined tasks, centralized planning and decisionma

vertical communication.235 It is the epitome of the modern bureaucra

table Kafkaesque castle. The mechanistic organization improves effic

it also reduces the ability to adapt and pursue alternative strategies. M

organizations are generally rigid and rational, which makes them v

Where uncertainty reigns, organic organizations prove more success

munication is horizontal, knowledge is diffused, control is lessened, h

are flattened, tasks shift to reflect new demands, and decisionmaking 

tralized.236 Organic organizations are a better fit for terrorists, often re

an asymmetric command and control advantage until nation-states an

forces adapt. 

By way of an example, the al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade debuted as 

group on 12 October 2000 during a paramilitary parade in Nablus, P

Territories.237 According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, the brigades we

coalition of irregulars, hurriedly trained in basic individual combat and 

with privately owned small arms. Operatives wore plainclothes and lim

activities to roadside shootings...”238 During this early phase, their orga

structure was organic; however, efforts to create a formal military org

establish infrastructure, acquire arms, develop tactical leadership, a

recruits to their secular version of the Hamas suicide squads made the

ingly mechanistic. Ultimately, a cell-based structure emerged under 

command of Marwan Barghouti with an intelligence division, militar

division, special combat teams, suicide bomber volunteer forces, and c

at least six West Bank towns.239 This left the Brigades vulnerable to d

235 Daft, 149. 236 Daft, 149. See also Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, “Mechanistic and Organic Sy

Management of Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Reprinted in Clas

Organization Theory, eds. Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt 

Publishers, 2001), 201-205. 237 David Eshel, “The Rise and Fall of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” Jane’s Intelli

Review, 14, No 6 (June 2002): 20. 238 Eshel, 21. 239 Chapters included Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. E
103

capture of senior leaders during Israeli military operations in April 

case of the Brigades, the remaining organic aspects of the structure

decentralized organization, diffused supplies of arms, and ready acc

nal resources, including willing martyrs, enabled it to survive.240 O

tures can survive uncertainty, while mechanistic organizations find 

navigate such turbulent waters.

Uncertainty also impacts COA development. Planning and f

increasingly important as instability and complexity go up. In a pl

ment, organizations are free to focus on current problems and ope

day-to-day efficiency of garrison training. Turbulence, on the other 

the need for more detailed COA development, increased COA optio

forecasting of adversary COA (phase four), and the ability to resp

Response speed refers to the ability to execute a COA without de

240 Eshel, 22.

Figure 45. Uncertainty Framework II

Source: Adapted from Richard Daft, 152, and Mary Jo Hatch, 91.
104

requirements, organizational structure, and COA development are summ

rules-of-thumb in Figure 45.

 Nesting Effect

The idea o

effects was intr

Chapter 2 as a dis

nested battlespac

teristics using the 

tion example. 

effects cascade a

levels of anal

action—strategic

tional, and tacti

ventionally, effec

“when they ripp

an enemy targe

often influencing 

get systems as well. Typically this can influence nodes that are critical t

target systems.”241 These indirect effects do not just influence targets

influence all stakeholders and the battlespace itself, usually flowing 

higher to lower levels of conflict; however, tactical-level effects can hav

consequences—My Lai and Abu Graib. 

241FCOM Glossary, under “cascading effects.”

Figure 46. Friday Mosque, Andijan, Ferghana Valley, 

Uzbekistan

Source: Author.
105

lowing brief examples. Within the cultural sector of the social di

example, an operational consideration in targeting a training camp i

have insight into the school of Islamic thought embraced by the ca

tors, which has implications for how prisoners of war (POW) are tre

This operational-level analysis informs tactical-level evaluation of 

gious and tribal leaders who have a stake in protecting or supporti

The convictions of a specific Islamic school of thought, such as 

influence a global trend in the resurgence of a more fundamentalist, 

cal approach to Islam, which in turn forges a global movement of 

embolden and support the initial school of thought at the operati

Globalization is a strategic-level dynamic of the social and inform

sion that impacts communication infrastructures among belligerents 

tional level, which shapes the types of specific devices—cell ph

courier—used at the tactical level. Trends in developing world soc

development, such as increasing disparity between the poor and wea

infant mortality rates, translate into failures in governance at the oper

which enables terrorist groups and other criminals to operate with im

242 Once captured, the Muslim commander has several options, which differ ac

Islamic school of thought (madhab) followed by the commander. According to the 

madhab, the commander is allowed four options; execution, enslavement, or relea

out ransom. The Maliki madhab does not allow for gratuitous release; that is, with

while the Hanafi madhab forbids release under any condition until the war is termi

troversy surrounding the treatment of captives springs from contradictions among Q

and inconsistent practices by the prophet Mohammad, and points to the need to th

stand the prevailing madhab of any potential adversary to discern expected action

eral consensus, however, that the commander is not authorized to force the enemy 

Islam. Indeed, the POW must be kept alive and ultimately released, unless the Musl

follows the Maliki madhab. See Troy Thomas, “Prisoners of War in Islam: A Lega

Muslim World (January 1997), 47. 243 Islamic laws regarding international relations, known as siyar, have real impl

missions against Islamist extremists. There is urgency in understanding, for example

to say about a POW, given the frequency of conflicts in which participants invoke ji

continued likelihood of American and allied warriors becoming POWs. The need is 

ated by the reality of conflict involving groups like al-Qaida, the IMU, or Abu Sayy

non-state actors exists outside the body of contemporary international law—war is t

circumstance of states, and international law is the law of states. Even if we extende

war to non-state actors like Al-Qaida, they reject the system on which these very law

cated. These groups as well as hostile Islamic states, however, are bound by the lega

ciated with jihad, which entitles their adversaries, including the U.S., to certain exp

conduct. Armed with this understanding, individual warriors can assert rights even w

diction of international law ends, and policymakers are better positioned to leverage 

opinion against those who violate the same laws they claim to enforce.
106

effects must move vertically as well as horizontally.

Webs of Influence

Stakeholders were introduced in Chapter 2 as fundamental to CT 

They are inventoried in phase one and evaluated in phases three and f

they are related to one other in order to paint a picture of overall influe

“influences” are useful, particularly when we start to limit the battlespa

and AOI. First, is the stakeholder likely to have a direct or indirect in

the mission? A direct influence indicates the stakeholder impacts de

actions immediately—a religious leader can withhold divine sanction fo

ist act, or an ally can veto an operation. Indirect influence may degra

mance in the near-term, but is more likely to impact decisions or action

road. A regular weapons supplier who backs off the sale of black-mark

der-launched surface-to-air missiles will not stop tomorrow’s attack on 

airliner, but he may be able to undermine future planning. 

Second, is the influence likely to be adversarial, friendly or unk

course, these generic labels can mean many things, ranging from activ

with intelligence or combat force to passive support by acquiescenc

mission in neighboring territory—Russian tolerance of U.S.-supported 

ations in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia in 2002. More detailed methods f

Figure 47. Stakeholder Effects

Source: Author. 
107

is the influence likely to be exerted? How we label these characte

important than understanding who the relevant players are beyon

terrorist group and what impact they are likely to have on the missi

fied, conceptual example of stakeholder mapping to reveal the in

tional network of influences is shown in Figure 47. Of note, this ma

a few stakeholders and their relationship to the joint force or the ter

a more accurate map will also show relationships among the stake

thermore, mapping external relations is probably one of the most d

in the CT analysis business, so it is important to highlight degree of 

The result is a web of influence that provides insight into the effect

ers are likely to have on COA in terms of assistance, interference, 

Thus armed, the joint force can seek to exploit alliances, flip or di

parties, or persuade the uncommitted. Moreover, it suggests how th

another stakeholder might respond to one of these moves based on t

indirect relationships.

Dependencies 

A fourth optio

ing about net e

concept of 

Dependency mo

to an organizatio

tive, but still off

concept for ide

defining the influ

battlespace. The 

the battlespace 

of scarce resou

critical to surv

dramatically, C

tion. The conc

roots in resource 

theory, which argues in its simplest form that the environment is a p

straint on organizations. Thus, resource dependencies must be effe

aged to guarantee the organization’s survival and “to secure, if po

244 A RAND Corporation study stresses the difficulty of collecting intelligence 

tions. Bonnie Cordes, Brian M. Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, A Conceptual Framework f

Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, June 1985).

Figure 48. Urban slums, Ferghana,

Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan

Source: Author
108

independence and freedom from external constraints.”245 For the pu

CT, “resources” is a broad term, encompassing information, money, te

divine sanction, allies, skilled operatives, and others. 

Dependency is measured in terms of criticality and scarcity. Critical 

are vital to system function. Individuals committed to suicide bombing 

ical resource of Hamas and Islamic Jihad now and the LTTE (Sri Lan

past. Scarce resources are not widely available in the environmen

intense competition for them—diamonds and plutonium are scarce, 

are not.246 Unfortunately, willing suicide bombers are also abundant. 

that are critical and scarce demand the greatest organizational attention 

represent a critical vulnerability (more on this in phase three). Critical 

that are widely available, or scarce resource that are not critical, creat

nerability, while non-critical, abundant resources do not constrain CO

245 I.M. Jawahar and Gary L. McLaughlin, “Toward a Descriptive Stakeholder Theo

nizational Life Cycle Approach,” The Academy of Management Review 26, no. 3 (July 

ProQuest. 246 Hatch, 79-80.

Figure 49. Toma Suburb, Casablanca

Source: Driss Benjelloun, Urba-Systèmes, interview with the author, 

7 May 2004, Rabat, Morocco.
109

dent on any resources whose disruption could undermine COA imp

For civil-affairs missions, a dependent relationship is likely to exist w

nity leadership; whereas, the capture of a terrorist cell leader may b

on an unobstructed route in and out of the hideout in the labyrinthine 

of Toma, Casablanca.

Affordances

The final “net effect” option builds on our discussion of battlesp

ing in Chapter 2 by capturing an overall assessment of what the 

affords. In that discussion, we looked at how blobs can be used to g

the extent to which sector characteristics affect our CT mission and t

as shown in Figure 50. Regardless of how we choose to display rela

ing for each sector, the key is to size up whether each sector afford

(opportunities) or disadvantages (constraints). If, for example, ou

phase one suggests the attitudes of the local population will directly 

execution in the operating area, phase two assesses whether existing 

favorable (opportunity) or unfavorable (constraint). Figure 50 sugg

bag, with the joint force and the terrorist group enjoying some degree 

support with no clear advantage for either. Of course, the challeng

with collecting accurate intelligence about attitudes and intentions 

cult to have a high degree of confidence in the results; the goal is a g

of what each sector and dimension affords as the basis for more tar

gence collection and analysis. In this net assessment of opportunit

straints we must incorporate an appreciation for the inherent lim

perception. The argument that what we perceive about the battles

important than what it actually presents is rooted in affordance the

ception theorist James J. Gibson invented the word “affordances” to 

offerings of the environment, roughly the sets of threats (negative 

and promises (positive affordances) that characterize items in the 

relative to organisms.”247 That is, we see constraints where none exis

to recognize opportunity when it knocks. What we think we see is m

to the COA we choose than what is really out there. Essentially, it is 

tionary tale against mirror-imaging, reminding us that the terroris

holders may behave in unexpected ways and charging us to cr

obstacles into opportunities. 

247 Andrea Scarantino, “Affordances Explained,” Philosophy of Science 70, no. 5 

2003), 950.
110

In addition to adopting the five general concepts and methods for ana

effects, CT IPB should also tend to sector and dimension-specific effec

not adequately covered in current doctrine. As noted, the OCOKA 

robust and appropriate for CT when modified as discussed. On the in

and social fronts, additional work is needed. Therefore, the paragraphs t

focus on several effects particularly relevant to CT missions in the in

dimension, which are then linked to the demographic and cultural eff

social dimension. Additional effects from the physical dimension are no

but integrated throughout. 
111

Information Effects

Whether dependency and uncertainty exist is a result of the inte

information, technology, and cognition. In the CT context, inform

warranting further investigation relate to organization, publicity, 

decisionmaking. The information dimension affords opportunities an

as a result of the availability and quality of information, the sophi

reliability of technology, and the limitations of human cognition. 

aware of the information dependencies for the joint force, but there is 

consensus among terrorism experts that among the various trends 

over the last decade,

Figure 50. Sector Effects

Source: Author. 
112

of the profound impact of television and satellite communi

through the rapidly developing and expanding use of the Interne

the revolutionary change that characterizes all aspects of com

technology. The terrorists now have at their disposal the medi

disseminate information and increasingly coordinate attacks aga

wide range of targets from the relative safety of cyberspace. In 

tion they will increasingly be able to conduct terrorism against th

nerable technological infrastructure of industrial and post-indu

societies by targeting critical infrastructure, particularly in refe

to computer facilities and networks. Through their actions, the

have the potential to directly and indirectly place large numb

people in harm’s way by degrading an air traffic control network

lic health care system, or other complex systems that can profo

threaten both personal and societal security.248

The information dimension is having profound effects on the shape 

bilities of the joint force, and has enabled NGOs, IGOs, terrorists and o

holders to extend their reach and increase their effectiveness. Am

organizational effects, advances in IT combined with declining costs o

ing, are impacting command and control structures. Increasingly, the 

chical, cell-based terrorist group is giving way to IT-based 

organizations. According to RAND analysts, many of the newer Islami

ist groups, such as Hamas, have become more “loosely structured,” wit

using chat rooms and email to coordinate activities.249 IT, and the Inter

ticular, enable several other organizational functions, including colle

sharing information, recruiting, publicizing propaganda, debating agen

dinating action, and conducting attacks.250 Internet-based recruiting i

powerful example of how IT can dramatically change the nature of terro

rorist websites routinely post “be all you can be” videos, martyr testim

248 Stephen Sloan, “The Changing Nature of Terrorism,” The Terrorism Threat and 

ment’s Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, eds. James Smith and Willi

(US Air Force Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, March 200

249 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Info

Terrorism,” Countering the New Terrorism, eds. Ian O. Lesser and others (Santa Monic

RAND Corporation, 1999), 65. 250 For a full discussion of each, I recommend Dorthy E. Denning, “Activism, Hack

Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy,” Networks and N

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 239-

overall best discussion of information-age effects, see Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Wa

Cyberspace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
113

what capabilities it affords, what are its vulnerabilities, and what a

quences associated with its disruption or failure—and do this for th

terrorist group, and stakeholders having direct influence. If it soun

work replete with “unknowns,” it is. At the same time, we must not 

the role of IT for organizational purposes. Al-Qaida’s famed relianc

phones quickly gave way to an old-school courier service—a remin

nology is a double-edged sword. 

The media establishment is the landlord of the information space

central to the violent theater of terrorism, ensuring that media effects 

parcel of CT IPB. There is a natural symbiosis between the terr

media. Terrorist groups exploit media coverage to extend the p

impact of the act of violence on the target audience. Examples span t

terrorism, but just during the time of this writing, media coverage of 

in Madrid and Riyadh, suicide attacks in Israel and the Palestinian te

vated threat levels in U.S., and a video-taped beheading in Iraq hav

uted to increased public anxiety and ensured widest coverage of pr

deed. When press coverage is absent, terrorists generate their own th

newspapers, and increasingly, websites. Some of the more pop

www.hizbollah.org, www.palestine-info.net/hamas, and www.aln

main al-Qaida site).252 The idea that media coverage provides the 

tactical and operational advantages is supported by terrorism e

Laqueur, who argues that “media coverage has provided constant gr

rorist mill; it has magnified the political importance of many terrori

all proportion.”253 It is not clear, however, whether it always has strat

as set forth by Hoffman: 

251 “Examining the Cyber Capabilities of Islamic Terrorist Groups,” presentatio

cal Analysis Group, Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, N

slide 18. A good example of a bin Laden recruitment video can be found at the Colu

tional Affairs On-line website (ciao.net). Cited hereafter as “Cyber Capabilities.” 252 Michele Zanini and Sean J.A. Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Inf

Networks and Netwars, 43 253 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destr

York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 44.
114

crave the attention that the 

media eagerly provides, the 

publicity that they receive 

cuts both ways. On the one 

hand, terrorists are indeed 

assured of the notoriety that 

their actions are designed to 

achieve; but, on the other, the 

public attitudes and reaction 

that they hope to shape by 

their violent actions are both 

less predictable and less malleable than either the terrorists or the pundits believe.254

In addition to figuring out

the impact of the media on

terrorist COA, effects on the

joint force must also be factored. Key issues to determine overall media effects include reporter a

media outlet’s capacity to communicate locally, regionally or internatio

likely spin to be put on CT actions; the opportunity to shape the story; 

concerns that shade into public affairs or psychological operations. To b

psychological operations use specific techniques to influence fav

behavior or beliefs of non-U.S. audiences. In contrast, joint PA [p

affairs] operations should not focus on directing or manipulating p

actions or opinion. They provide a timely flow of accurate inform

to both external and internal publics. While they reinforce each 

and involve close cooperation and coordination, by law PA and PS

[psychological operations] must be separate and distinct.255

Strictly on the public affairs side, the media provide advantages for 

CT missions. A civil-affairs mission to the jungles of the southern Philip

example, might leverage media effects to advertise the public benefits o

sion, keep citizens informed of health concerns, and coordinate m

increase participation. On the flip side, media presence can undermin

254 Hoffman, 147. 255 Joints Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Join

(Washington, DC: GPO, 14 May 1997), III-18.

Figure 51. Public Affairs

A Combat Camera photographer allows a Somal

look through the view finder while documenting 

of food to the villagers during Operation Resto

Source: Joint Pub, 3-61. 
115

will depend on the CT mission, but as a general rule for the heart

emphasis of CT, the advantages outweigh the risks.

When sophisticated IT is combined with skilled computer technic

sibility exists for cyberterrorism. There are few pure examples, altho

email bombing against Sri Lankan embassies by the Internet Black T

closest; the psychological impact of email disruption or server meltd

comparison to the death of innocent people.256 Evidence suggests ter

do seek cyberterrorism skills, and there is a growing community of h

affiliated with terrorists. The Anti-India Crew, Unix Security Gua

Pakistan, and the World’s Fantabulous Defacers are Islamist ha

apparently trapped in a hip-hop identity crisis, but also committed 

Indian and Israeli sites.257 This may be just the beginning. Accordi

Omar Bakri Muhammad, a London-based Islamic cleric with kn

Osama bin Laden, “in a matter of time you will see attacks on the sto

would not be surprised if tomorrow I hear of a big economic collaps

somebody attacking the main technical systems in big companies.”25

nation of available technology, skills, and willingness raise the lik

cyberterrorism will increasingly be a weapon in the terrorist arsena

lary, information operations will gain significance within the CT 

with it, IPB applications will emerge. 

The stress thus far on IT is not meant to diminish the criticality 

piece. In fact, the cognitive styles of individuals and groups as we

tudes, beliefs and perceptions of other stakeholders, including t

probably the most important to CT. Why are people joining Hama

Why did she become a suicide bomber for Hamas? What are bi

Musab al-Zarqawi planning? Is this community sympathetic to us o

Islam? What are public attitudes toward our presence in Najaf? The

tant questions, but very, very difficult to answer. In terms of cognitiv

should seek answers using HUMINT as we can, but it is more lik

insight will come from the participants themselves, who give spe

martyrdom tapes, give interviews, and participate in public opin

Cognitive inquiry, particularly psychological profiling and opinion 

integral to the analysis of the adversary in phase three. At this poi

cient to note that cognitive effects spring from the individual min

256 Denning, 283. 257 “Cyber Capabilities,” slide 49. 258 Dan Verton, “Bin Laden Cohort Warns of Cyberattacks,” PCWorld On-line, 1

2002, URL: http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,107052,00.asp, access on 2
116

are several general influences, or factors, that will affect the decisionm

perceptions of all stakeholders—bounded rationality, the role of affec

importance of narrative. 

Cognitive biases have already been introduced as limitations on all 

making. Our COA must anticipate that other stakeholders will not o

from the same biases, but that we must be careful in assuming their a

the result of a rational calculus. An old idea remains salient here—boun

nality. Decisionmakers “often lack important information [uncertain

definition of the problem, the relevant criteria,” the range of possible 

and other factors.259 As a result, it is very difficult for us or our ad

always calculate the optimal choice; instead, we often forego the “best 

favor of the one that is acceptable or reasonable.”260 Even when we can

the terrorist’s calculus, we can appreciate that all stakeholders are a

limits on ability to choose the best COA. Organizational decisionmaki

from the same constraints. There is a lot of room for work on the cogn

particularly with regard to how the functioning of the brain affects dec

ing, and while this research unfolds, the IPB analyst must rely on histor

dent, public statements, and confidential communications to g

decisionmaking style of the adversary. Getting at public perception is e

ficult, but not impossible. Given its integral relationship with cultural fa

picked up in the next section. 

Social Effects

The links between terrorism and the sectors of the social dimensio

found. Modern terrorism reflects the cultural influence of religion, 

imbalances of the international system, and the socio-economic con

their purported constituents. U.S. counterterrorism, in turn, reflects W

ues, the state system, and economic strength among other qualities. Fo

tary operations, but particularly for CT, the range of available COA refl

this contest affords. The health standards in a local village affect the typ

that should be built. Various factors ranging from religious beliefs rega

ing to norms governing nocturnal habits drive mission timing. Prefe

local leaders impact rules of engagement. Kinship ties open doors to n

gence. Codes of honor prevent the surrender of a terror suspect. Sinc

possible to address every type of effect in this bucket, the following 

259 Bazerman, 5. 260 Bazerman, 5.
117

integrates the cultural, political, and economic features into an analy

graphic, cultural and perception effects.

Demographic analysis offers a picture of how the population lo

based on a host of defining societal characteristics, including religi

language, income levels, type of economic activity, or age. We are m

with this type of analysis, which gives us a static picture of populat

tion as exemplified in the 1993 depiction of ethnic groups in Cen

after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Figure 52). The utility of these 

that they offer a graphic representation of the positioning of mis

social features in relation to the physical dimension. Similar typ

dimensional mapping can be done in cyberspace. Among other b

highlight possible lines of contention, areas in greatest need of assi

first cut at religious preferences.261 Of course, this type of analysis 

able. Increasingly, precision operations require highly localized, o

graphic insight to specific cities, swamps, jungles, mountains and co

Figure 52. Central Asia Ethnicity, 1993

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library

Map Collection, University of Texas, on-line, URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/ma

accessed on 25 May 2004.
118

lyzing changes in population composition over time. Central Asia offe

example of how such changes can create demographic pressures on 

ties, ripening individuals for recruitment and fueling terrorist rhetoric. 

positional factor most often associated with demographic pressures 

Asia is the “youth bulges” (where the population is skewed toward 

demographic)—most of the developing world is experiencing a simi

Assuming net migration is zero, persistent fertility rates above the re

value of children per family cause the population to expand, while 

verse—fertility rates below the replace value—result in a shrinking p

A rapidly increasing population places demands that are beyond the c

the local government, reinforcing failures in governance. When hig

rates are combined with rapidly declining death rates, the result is a p

explosion that will persist until the demographic transition is comp

corresponding decline in fertility.264 This population explosion has b

stalled in Central Asia due primarily to acute underdevelopment and 

which has kept death rates relatively high. Nonetheless, the relatively h

ity rates and strong growth rates are creating demographic pressures th

destabilizing soon. These trends can be shown on an overlay that lin

employment to location. 

Another approach to understanding how the population looks in p

cultural intelligence, which “augments demographic analysis by descr

demographic traits and relationships between groups can act, or hav

acted, to stabilize or destablize conditions.”265 Cultural effects are a f

deep-seated norms and values. With good planning, the IPB analyst sh

261 Medby, 57. 262 “Irregular warfare exists in highly specific operational environments, “microclim

need to be understood by intelligence analysts, military commanders, and policymaker

sents several challenges. First, these operational environments consist of a number of e

including geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics. These are not top

the military intelligence community devotes much attention. Second, for irregular warf

have to be seen in a detailed and nuanced context. It is specific local geography, history, 

that are crucial. Arab history is one thing, the history of Christian-Druze conflict in Leb

another, and the role of specific families and family members yet another. Collecting, a

and assimilating information at this level of detail is a formidable challenge for intellig

lysts, policymakers, and warfighters alike.” Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Threat: Som

on Irregular Warfare,” Studies in Intelligence (Washington, DC: Center for the Study o

gence, 1996), 2. 263 Thomas and Kiser, 24. 264 Thomas, 24. 265 Medby, 59.
119

social studies. The USMCs on-going seminars and reports on cu

gence are useful in this regard. Open source literature is particular

gaining solid background information that goes beyond custom and 

we dig through these resources, keep an eye for norms—enacted 

are likely to characterize interaction with the adversary or another 

To illustrate, Margaret K. Nydell’s book, Understanding Arabs: 

Westerners, is a highly regarded study examining Arab values:

(1) A person’s dignity, honor, and reputation are of paramoun

tance and no effort should be spared to protect them, especia

honor;

(2) It is important to behave at all times in a way which will 

good impression on others;

(3) Loyalty to one’s family takes precedence over personal nee

(4) Social class and family background are the major dete

factors of personal status, followed by individual charac

achievement.

Simple, but useful. In four bullets, Nydell provides deep insight into 

likely interaction on the Arab street and with other stakeholders. 

leaders, for example, are unlikely to admit failure; they will lie t

compromising their family; and they are unlikely to challenge poo

high-ranking officials. When background research is not possible, b

street communication and observation should focus on patterns of 

suggest underlying norms. 

Graphically describing cultural effects follows from other types o

recent RAND study on urban warfare suggests several useful produc

lists and timelines of salient cultural and political events; cultural 

charts; line of confrontation overlay; culturally significant structu

power templates; and the so-called status quo ante bellum overlay. T

pares the status quo conditions before a significant event with th

afterward to understand how the population responds.266 On the rare 

such historical data are available, the resulting insights into changes 

shifts, resource movements, or increased violence will allow COAs t

266 Medby, 61.
120

a more accurate assessment of how the social dimension is likely to 

Figure 53 shows a commercially available example of a cultural struct

lay for Sarajevo with the additional feature of NGO and IGO locations

Culture drives perception, and perception effects determine the te

of the operational area. A sense of overall attitude proves useful in an

effects on a mission. Will there be protests? Will we be welcomed? 

presence be betrayed? Can we expect to gather street-level intelligen

our cultural homework enables current attitudes to be gauged in rel

historical benchmark. Getting at current conditions requires aggress

level interaction, and if possible, public opinion polling, either fo

informally. Not without precedent, the Coalition Provisional Authority 

Iraq commissioned a poll by the Gallup Organization in early 

revealed that “80 percent of the Iraqis questioned reported a lack of c

267 Medby, 61.

Figure 53. Sarajevo, 2004

Source: The Map Network (Used with Permission) 
121

in the Coalition Provisional Authority, and 82 percent said they d

the U.S. and allied militaries in Iraq.”268 No doubt, this affects plan

When attitudes are known, joint doctrine recommends an overlay 

disposition of the populace as shown in Figure 54. The RAND stu

perception assessment matrix as another useful tool. The intent of th

“measure the disparities between friendly force actions and wha

groups perceive.”269 Returning to the urban warfare example, the ma

Figure 55 integrates a social snapshot of the local population with an 

etrating look at the joint force.

268 Thomas E. Ricks, “80% in Iraq Distrust Occupation Authority,” Washington 

2004, URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A22403-2004May12?lan

accessed 25 May 2004. 269 Medby, 65.

Figure 54. Population Status

Source: Joint Pub, 2-01.3, V-21. 
122

Cumulative Effects

At the end of the day, we pull our analysis together into an integrate

enable COA evaluation and prioritization. Essentially, the commander’

expect an assessment of cumulative effects: the “aggregate of many dire

rect effects.”270 Given a specific COA—provide route and clinic co

security from 0800-1500 using a mix of helicopters and light vehicles

analyst must provide an assessment of what the battlespace affords. Ti

and resources permitting, the IPB team will assess each sector and 

using the highlighted concepts and methodologies to determine depend

affordances. Moreover, an overall assessment of uncertainty, stakehold

and nesting should be provided with specific implications for decisio

command and control, and COA planning. Stepping through each 

assessment is made as to whether the sector, dimension, and ultimatel

AOI and battlespace provide advantages or disadvantages. Once adver

are determined and prioritized, an assessment of comparative advantag

made, which may allow the joint force to actually shape the envir

improve COA options. 

270 JFCOM Glossary, under “Cumulative Effects.”

Figure 55. Perception Matrix

Source: Medby, Street Smarts, 67.
123

Not all the effects are important all of the

time, but effects are present every time. In

this chapter, the goal of phase two—describe

the battlespace—is achieved by leveraging

existing doctrine and TTP. The concept of

effects retains its fundamental role in IPB,

and it is peeled back here to get at differences between direct, indirect, cascading

and cumulative effects. Direct effects grab

our attention with their in-your-face immediacy and impact, while indirect effects are

often overlooked due to their subtle wearyou-down approach. Effects are only important insofar as they condition specific plans,

or COA, for achieving CT missions, terrorist

objectives, and stakeholder interests. Turning to our battlespace buckets, the OCOKA

methodology for evaluating effects in the

physical dimension stands the test of time

with the requisite CT adjustment. Joint and

service guidance for the information domain

has legs, particularly with regard to the

impact of information loss, but it does not

get us much further. The social dimension is even less developed for 

cepts and methods from MOOTW get us underway. Section two bri

with a pioneering inter-disciplinary approach to assessing tota

effects. Degrees of uncertainty, measured by change and complexity

sionmaking styles, organizational structures, and COA planning. N

lights the vertical and horizontal axes of effects—the strategic co

tactical general. Tactical effects, like rules of engagement, can have s

sequences when violated. The interrelationships among stakehold

web of influence that COA must navigate. Reversing directions, th

the unit’s window reveals dependencies on critical and scarce res

straining action and exposing vulnerabilities. The battlespace also 

advantages and disadvantages that may be misconstrued due to a lac

ity or flawed perception. Complementing these overall effects are n

and methods for the information and social dimensions. In a CT 

information front fosters organizational, media, attack, and cognitiv

the social front, demographics, culture, and perceptions work to 

Figure 56. Khiva, Uz

The author pursues cul

during three weeks in Ce

2001.
124

which COA are most likely to achieve objectives and what comparat

tages or disadvantages the joint force and terrorist can expect. It is an 

because effects are not static, and the results of phase three and four wi

tate a return trip. Phase two makes the transition from Orient to Dec

OODA Loop, and more importantly, enables the joint force’s OODA 

dominate that of the adversary. In the end, phase two answers the quest

does it impact us?”
125

EVALUATING CAPABILITIES

Hezbollah’s new game show, “The Mission,” reinforces their view 

by advancing winning contestants toward Jerusalem; bags of liquefi

are released in the Tokyo underground by the cult/terrorist group Au

and a warren of tunnels along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border pro

for elusive leftovers of the Taliban regime.271 These real-world exam

strate the critical capabilities enjoyed by our adversaries—attractive 

propaganda, an ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WM

tively free access to sanctuary, or safe haven. These capabilities also 

changing nature of our adversary, reflecting both the low-tech approa

day’s isolated cells and the high-tech techniques of today’s self-sus

destine networks. Modern terrorism has become a multi-faceted, glob

where violence is no longer the only product, and in fact, it may no

important to group survival. In addition to upholding the time-hono

of blowing things up, terrorists now run clinics and schools, prod

drugs, operate charities, and host game shows. 

Combining these commercial and social capabilities with the rele

of exotic weaponry and a persuasive mythology results in an adve

extremely tough to “know.” As argued by Bruce Hoffman and othe

lenge is to understand an “enigmatic enemy who fights unconven

operates in a highly amenable environment where he typically is i

able from the civilian populace.”272 The distinction between ally a

can be murky, and the diversity of counterterrorism missions require

quite a lot about a broad range of stakeholders and their capabiliti

service delivery by NGOs, the rhetorical appeal of religious leaders, 

influence of local politicians. Notwithstanding the very real limits of 

271 “In ‘The Mission’ contestants battle for points which enable them to step tow

on a virtual map. Questions range from the date of the French Revolution to names o

carried out suicide attacks...al-Manar spokesman Ibrahim Musawi told the newspap

show—which draws on contestants from across the Arab world—wanted to put its m

form that would appeal to a wider segment of the population.’ Contestants compete 

to $3,000, with each question they answer correctly they move one step closer on a 

toward Jerusalem. Should a contestant successfully reach Jerusalem the show plays 

Hezbollah song which declares ‘Jerusalem is ours and we are coming to it.’” BBC N

“Hezbollah’s unconventional quiz,” URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3

accessed on 2 June 2004. 272 Bruce Hoffman, “A Nasty Business,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds

Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 301
126

know about the full spectrum of players, phase three of CT IPB offe

tools for narrowing the knowledge gap.

Building on the battlespace insights gained in phases one and t

three pursues knowledge of adversary capabilities. In addition to r

this traditional focus on the enemy as addressed above, CT analysis 

thesis demands consideration of all actors (NGOs, IGOs, commun

businesses) with a capability to directly influence joint force COA. W

cessfully performed, the result is a realistic assessment of what the st

is and is not capable of given existing battlespace conditions. We p

before by looking at contemporary IPB doctrine to determine endu

cepts and methods. A four-step process for diagnosing the adversary i

in modified form as are several schoolhouse solutions for analyzing 

ties and activities. The core concept of center of gravity is preserv

more deeply examined in order to iron out doctrinal inconsistencies 

mize its utility for CT. The existing requirement to model stake

upheld, but is substantially reformed to deal with the complexity of t

zations as they relate to core ideological and environmental factors

Figure 57. Afghan Tunnels

Soldiers with the 10th Mountain Division secure the opening of a cave in th

mountains of Afghanistan after throwing a grenade inside to deny its use by Ta

or Al-Qaida terrorists. 

Source: DOD, URL: www.defendamerica.mil/photoessays/apr2004/p041504a6

accessed 2 June 2004.
127

practices for determining organizational strengths and weaknes

two also expands our stakeholder net to ensure we factor in all infl

ers based on a clearer definition of adversary. To the questions: W

trying to achieve? (mission analysis); What out there matters most

battlespace); How does it impact us? (describe battlespace effec

add “What can they do to us?”

ADVERSARY CAPABILITIES

In the third phase of IPB—evaluate the adversary—we diagnose 

to determine their sources of strength, range of capabilities, and pote

abilities. We do this for the adversary, other influential actors, and th

itself—reverse IPB. Phase three provides the commander with a rea

ment of whether the terrorists and others are able to interfere with the 

what form that interference might take. Can Abu Sayyaf fight off an 

training camp? Can Khalid Sheikh Mohammed elude capture in Kar

Can the Somalia-based Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) disrupt NGO activ

opia? Can the FARC shoot down our reconnaissance aircraft? Equi

answer to these questions, the joint force leverages our strengths an

allies against the weaknesses of the terrorist group. Knowing our adv

denying knowledge of us delivers an asymmetric OODA Loop ad

knowledge gained in phase three is one half of the traditional thr

threat = capabilities + intent. While intent does factor into a capab

ment, particularly in terms of motivation and strategy, phase four pro

explicit examination of intent to include COA.273 In this section, 

process recommended by joint and service doctrine is inspected to d

concepts and methods applicable to CT IPB:

273 An argument that doctrine should be revised to eliminate confusion regarding 

between “intent” and “COA” is made by Major Lawrence Brown, who notes “The E

Fighting was not what we had Predicted,” What is Wrong with IPB at the Dawn of th

monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army 

General Staff College, 2004), 29. He observes, “Today, confusion is caused when A

states “success requires identifying enemy capabilities (strengths and vulnerabilitie

and courses of action.” This statement still implies that the two are mutually exclusi

are not. Other Army doctrinal manuals differentiate the two actions as well. He asks 

that the specific task to “seek enemy intentions” was an imported concept into Arm

1976, while the task of “determining and prioritizing enemy courses of action” has 

part of Army doctrine. Instead of combining the two tasks into the same term, offici

both at large. No one has made the effort to restate the requirement as “seek enemy 

include enemy courses of action.”
128

(1) Identify adversary centers of gravity;

(2) Update or create adversary threat models;

(3) Determine the current adversary situation; and

(4) Identify adversary capabilities.274

This process presumes we have already garnered a basic understandi

the battlespace influences relevant players; however, it also acknow

need to refine phase two analyses based on a higher fidelity look at the

Failure to accurately size up our adversary can result in having joint for

abilities exposed, being surprised by adversary operations, wasting eff

capabilities that may not exist, and ultimately, mission failure.

274 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-46. 

Figure 58. Cessna Crash

A Cessna 208 plane shortly after it crashed in southern Colombia on 13 February 20

terrorists killed the plane’s American pilot and a Colombian national on board and kid

three remaining American survivors. 

Source: Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, URL: http://www.st

rls/pgtrpt/2003/31640.htm, accessed 2 June 2004.
129

What is the key to al-Qaida survival? Is it the narrative appeal of the

jihadist worldview, its careful personnel selection and intense socialization program, or the leadership of

Osama bin Laden? What enables the

Provisional IRA to resist over time?

Is it a decentralized cell structure,

persistent poverty, or political exclusion? What is the United SelfDefense Forces/Group of Colombia

(AUC’s) source of strength?275 Is it

the lucrative drug trade, well-trained

guerrillas, or failures in governance?

Or, are they all of the above? The

answers to these questions are likely

to reveal centers of gravity (COG),

which is central to achieving operational effects. According to joint

doctrine, “COG analysis is conducted after an understanding of the

broad operational environment has

been obtained [phases one and two]

and before a detailed study of the

adversary’s force occurs.”276 Essentially, we are expected to answer the

fundamental questions posed above

before we have analyzed actual

capabilities in any detail. While it

may not always make sense to start

275 “The AUC—commonly referred to as the paramilitaries—is a loose umbrel

formed in April 1997 to consolidate most local and regional self-defense groups e

mission to protect economic interests and combat FARC and ELN insurgents loca

supported by economic elites, drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effe

ment security, and claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from insu

elements under the AUC umbrella, and under the influence of its political leader C

have voluntarily agreed to a unilateral cease-fire, though violations of the ceasefire 

terns 2003, 136 276 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-45.

Figure 59. Osama bin Laden 

During a search and destroy m

Afghanistan, Navy SEALs found 

information, including this Osam

propaganda poster located in an 

classroom.

Source: US Navy, URL: http://www

archives/020222/terrorism_022202

2 June 2004.
130

requirement. 

Centers of gravity are fundamental to military theory and practice. 

that “characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force

alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to figh

the conceptual offspring of the work of Prussian military theorist 

Clausewitz, who articulated it in the context of an examination of the 

war in his seminal work, On War (von Krieg). Reflecting on the revo

citizen-based character of the Napoleonic wars of the late 18th centu

“skulking” tactics of the wild Cossacks of Russia, Clausewitz sta

must keep the dominant characteristic of both belligerents in mind. Ou

characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all p

movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at whi

energies should be directed.”278 The importance of determining COG 

in joint doctrine, 

The COG concept is useful as an analytical tool [in] designing camp

and major operations to assist JFCs [joint force commanders] and t

staffs in analyzing friendly and adversary sources of strength as we

weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Analysis of COG, both friendly an

adversary, is a continuous process throughout a major operation or 

paign. This process cannot be taken lightly, though; a faulty conclu

as to the adversary COG because of a poor or hasty analysis can ha

very serious consequences; specifically, the inability to achieve the 

tary objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expend

of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive s

gic or operational results. Accordingly, a great deal of thought and 

sis must take place before the combatant commander and staff can 

determine proper COG with any confidence.279

COG Ladder

COG are sources of power, not weakness. Although doctrinal incon

confused this issue in the past, more recent guidance has embraced th

ing work by Joe Strange.280 Strange’s approach retains the original C

277 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of th

States (Washington, DC: GPO, 14 November 2000), V-3. 278 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Pr

Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-596. 279 Joint Pub 5.00-1, II-6.
131

and resistance, and links it to the valuable doctrinal concept of crit

bilities (CV).281 Critical vulnerabilities are “those aspects or comp

adversary’s critical capabilities (or components thereof), which are 

vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner ach

sive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resource

Strange bridges the gap between COG and CVs by introducing the 

critical capabilities (CC) and critical requirements (CR), whic

embraced in joint and service doctrine as the “critical factors” of 

Critical capabilities are “those adversary capabilities that are consi

enablers for the adversary’s COG to function as such, and are ess

accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s).”283 Crit

ments are those “essential conditions, resources, and means for a 

bility to be fully operational.”284

280 Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the 

Foundation so that we can all Speak the Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighti

VA: Defense Automated Printing Service Center, 1996). 281 Strange, 2-3. 282 Joint Pub 5.00-1, II-7. 283 Joint Pub 5.00-1, II-7. 284 Joint Pub 5.00-1, II-7.

Figure 60. Basque Nationalism Graffiti, Vitoria, Spain

Source: William Casebeer (with permission), photo taken while traveling wi

December 2003.
132

stakeholders: COG-CC-CR-CV. For example, it is likely that our anal

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) party in the Basque region of 

reveal that a highly secretive cell structure is at least one COG at the o

level. This COG is enabled by their ability to find sanctuary in urban 

Bilbao and San Sebastian and the ability to maintain internal discipl

critical capabilities of securing sanctuary and ensuring security require 

thetic population, restraints on intrusive police action, a bountiful 

pool, and effective physical cover and concealment. Over its 45-ye

ETA has been generally able to secure each of these requirements, wh

dependent relationships between the organization and the battlespa

two). The post 9/11, and now 3/11 (2004 al-Qaida attack on trains 

environment has changed in ways to create vulnerabilities where they p

did not exist, or could at least be managed. After 9/11, Spain and Fran

tougher anti-terrorism laws along with many other countries, and impro

nomic conditions tempered separatist ambitions. Moreover, the 3/1

train bombings, which initially were blamed on ETA, created a popula

against terrorism in general. 

During the author’s visit to the Basque region in December 2003, ho

recruiting situation appeared to remain favorable. For example, hidde

narrow alley in the old quarter, or Parte Vieja, of San Sebastian was on

small bars crammed with young people wearing t-shirts championin

nationalism and chain-smoking under a large poster of Che Guevara. Th

probably most of the youth, were loosely associated with the banned H

suna (Popular Unity) political party, which was linked in its 1979 or

ETA. Several of these youths spent the early hours before daybreak sp

ing “ETA” and other nationalist slogans across the old city—a ritua

neously conducted in the region’s other major urban centers of V

Bilbao. From among these rebellious youth, several will one day be a

by ETA recruiters, and if selected, their participation in vandalism will 

their indoctrination in terrorism begins. According to officials of th

Nationalist Party, however, recruitment is becoming more difficult 

Improved economic conditions as well as the increased societal rejecti

lence have reduced the pool of potential recruits, forcing ETA to mak

fewer than the optimal number of new members. Given the arrests of 

leaders over the decades, and most recently in France in 2002 with th

ETA’s commando leader, Jon Ibon Fernandez, the rebellious youth o

alley bar may even rise to the rank of senior military leader in j

years.285A declining recruiting pool, waves of leadership purges, and 

member discipline are combining with other factors to weaken, or creat
133

structure as a COG. 

COG-CC-CR-CV are the targets of our phase three analysis and t

of operational planning. We work our way up and down the critical f

to determine whether our adversary has weakness that can be exploit

desired effects. Figuring this out requires rigorous analysis support

priate models and methods. As argued in joint doctrine, 

[t]he importance of identifying the proper COG cannot be overs

Determining the adversary’s strategic COG and critical vulnerab

absolutely essential to establish clarity of purpose, to focus effor

ultimately, to generate synergistic results in the employment of o

forces. In fact, detailed operational planning should not begin un

adversary’s COG have been identified. Identifying COG is an an

process that involves both art and science.286

COG Characteristics 

The art and science of COG analysis involves additional consider

although Clausewitz suggested that “the first principle is that the u

stance of enemy strength must be traced back to the fewest possible 

ideally to one alone,” he also recognized that there is no guarantee 

COG existing.287 In fact, there may be several COG at each of our le

ysis and action. For example, a strategic-level COG in the fight aga

terrorist groups is likely to be the jihadist ideology itself, while an 

level COG may be the network of individuals and technology that spr

sage, and a tactical-level COG may be a specific media source or mes

often the case, a CC of a higher-level COG (capability to disseminate 

a COG itself at the next level down.288 Second, as the above exam

COG often exist outside the organization, residing in the environ

function of a key relationship between stakeholders. Where terrorism 

with an insurgency, for example, the strategic COG are often popul

285 For a discussion of the Basque region, which includes insight into ETA’s dev

Mark Kurlansky, The Basque History of the World (New York: Penguin Books, 199

this vignette were also derived from the author’s visit to the Basque province in Dec

which involved informal discussions with members of the ruling Basque Nationalist 

leaders of several non-governmental social organizations pursuing non-violent solu

Basque conflict. 286 Joint Pub 5.00-1, II-8. 287 Strange, 14-15. 288 FPAM 14-118, 177.
134

grievances against the state. Third, COG can dictate courses of action

of strength suggest specific activities. For example, a well-trained urba

force is an operational COG for the AUC. Although the AUC will n

employ urban terrorism as part of a short-term strategy, the fact that it i

of strength argues for its continued use. Fourth, CV and CR may repre

value and high-payoff targets, or decisive points, which when targeted b

sions can have a decisive effect on the COG.289 Figure 61 highlights 

COG characteristics that apply to all missions, including CT, with tw

tions. First, in CT the adversary COG is more likely to exist in the info

social dimensions than the physical—weapons or training camps are les

be a COG than is divine sanction or communications technology. Seco

289 AFPAM 14-118, 176.

Figure 61. Center of Gravity Characteristics

Source: Joint Pub 5.00-1, II-7.
135

organic qualities of the organization, including decentralization a

operations, are sources of power. 

COG an

only rel

adversar

should b

the join

other 

In the 

former, 

offers 

what w

defend, 

rorist is 

get, 

capabili

draw on 

asymme

tage. Re

a usefu

for this 

larly for 

opment 

four; the

discussion of this method is reserved for the next chapter. NGOs, re

ers, businesses and other stakeholders can also be diagnosed using C

Take, for example, the Islamist cleric Abdessalam Yassine, who head

and Charity party and is under house arrest in Sale, Morocco.290 Y

vival is rooted in his popular appeal and status, which depend on sev

ditional critical capabilities, including religious credentials, effecti

style, and a party organization that can sustain grassroots appeal. T

only require individual skills, but depend on his ability to access an 

preaching at Friday prayers or disseminating audio tapes—and the fr

party to operate in the suburbs of Morocco’s major cities. Each of t

ments has proven vulnerable: the state controls access through hou

290 Sale sits across an estuary from Rabat, the capital, and was visited by the aut

May 2004.

Figure 62. Humanitarian Mission

A soldier from the 25th Infantry Division talks with Tora Ray village 

locals during a humanitarian assistance mission in Afghanistan

Source: DOD, URL: http://www.defendamerica.mil/photoessays/

apr2004/p041504a8.html, accessed 3 June 2004
136

fection elsewhere and generating new sources of support. 

Given the broad range of CT missions, the joint force’s goal will n

be to exploit weakness on the path to achieving the “paralysis” of an 

COG. In fact, CT missions to diminish underlying conditions or impro

capabilities will focus instead on strengthening an allied COG by build

bilities, creating more reliable and secure dependencies, and minimizi

ability. Using an NGO illustration, the delivery of medical aid (CC) to 

Afghan village requires a secure operating environment (CR). As rec

June 2004, Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres) 

operations in Afghanistan after five of its workers were killed in an 

reflecting their vulnerability to attack (CV).291 A likely CT mission is 

the NGO vulnerability, which in turn requires finding and exploiting Ta

nerabilities. The interrelationships among stakeholder COG are an 

part of the puzzle. 

Where to Start

The examples provided thus far reflect an initial cut at COG-CC-CR

out looking behind the scenes at the model and methods available fo

such key conclusions. According to existing joint doctrine, “a prope

must be based on a detailed knowledge of how opponents organize, fi

decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknes

requirement begs the question of whether phase three should begin o

COG analysis. Beginning with COG identification means theory leads 

risks a bias toward selecting evidence that confirms our first look, or i

“the basis for ignoring evidence that is truly indicative of future events” 

bilities.292 On the other hand, starting with theory has the advantage of 

ing thought and overcoming the inevitably anemic data. The other tack 

the results of step two to reveal COG-CC-CR-CV; however, this data i

or situational logic approach carries its own costs. In addition to the 

time cost of wading through vast amounts of data absent a theoretical fr

situational logic suffers from three weaknesses. First, the clandestine 

the adversary makes it unlikely that robust intelligence will be available

in only partially informed speculation on our part.293 Second, it fails t

291 According to press reporting, Taliban rulers claimed responsibility for the attack 

west of the country. BBC News on-line, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/37

accessed on 4 June 2004. 292 Heuer, Chapter 4, np. 293 Heuer, Chapter 4, np.
137

and in other time periods.

 Third, 

[t]o think of analysis in this way overlooks the fact that informat

not speak for itself. The significance of information is always a j

function of the nature of the information and the context in whic

interpreted. The context is provided by the analyst in the form of 

assumptions and expectations concerning human and organizatio

behavior. These preconceptions are critical determinants of whic

mation is considered relevant and how it is interpreted.295

In reality, we are obliged as elsewhere with CT IPB to go at our p

both directions. We cannot afford to neglect existing terrorism theory

allow theoretical constructs to become a self-fulfilling prophecy tha

changes in adversary capabilities and intentions. For example, re

tional wisdom that religious groups do not collaborate with drug sy

been shattered. When time is of the essence and evidence is unavai

reigns. Prior to the crisis, we should do our homework and test th

COG against the evidence. COG analysis, modified only slightly 

generates the “big picture” of stakeholder capabilities. Figuring ou

tors as well as the supporting details of operations requires the use o

methods introduced below and in the next section.

Old Models

Step two models the adversary, depicting preferred modes of ope

ideal conditions.296 Absent battlespace effects, what does the advers

how does he behave, and what targets will he attack? The models an

methods offered by current doctrine are a good start for CT, but do 

the optimal theoretical framework and tools for examining terrorist g

are suited to state actors relying on conventional forces. That said, s

concepts described below remain valid, setting up the introduction of 

priate models in section two of this chapter. Although current doctrin

indicate, we must remember that step two is a means to an end—

COG-CC-CR-CV either by substantiating our initial assessment o

based on the more detailed results of steps two through four.

294 Heuer, Chapter 4, np. 295 Heuer, Chapter 4, np. 296 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 34.
138

Standard Practice

Models consist of three elements: (1) doctrinal templates; (2) desc

preferred tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and options; and (3

cation of high-value targets (HVT).297 Taking each in turn, doctrinal 

“illustrate the employment patterns and dispositions preferred by an 

when not constrained by the effects of the battlespace environment.”298 

they offer a scaled, graphic depiction (Figure 63) for each compon

state’s military force—air, ground, sea, space. Templates are also pro

each broad type of COA, such as attack, defend, reinforce, and retrog

297 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-46. 298 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-46. 299 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-46.

Figure 63. Ground Doctrine Template

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-47.
139

doctrine recommends the following be incorporated for all threats: 

composition, tactics, training, logistics and command and contro

MOOTW to the mix, which includes CT, these factors are added

themes, agents of influence, personality types, ISR capabilities

deception, WMD capabilities, weather, local grievances, interna

groups, and motivation.301 It is an impressive list; however, little 

offered for how to integrate these diverse factors into one threat mo

graphically display them. 

Activities

Once our template is molded, our next task is to describe “the ty

ties and supporting operations that various adversary units portrayed 

trinal template are expected to perform.”302 Types of activities refer 

and their associated tactics. For example, the U.S. Air Force perfo

support operations using a range of combat platforms based on a pu

mand and control construct. Tactics depend on a host of variables, 

platform, commander, and skills of operators to name a few. For exa

will circle at high altitude using both precision-guided munitions 

bombs,” while an A-10 will close at low-to-medium altitude, using a 

of its 30mm cannon and precision weapons to rip up the enemy. S

downs are applied to adversary forces to determine preferred operati

phasing, timing, distances, weapons systems, tactics, and appr

OCOKA factors presented by the battlespace. Additionally, this sec

of our model describes the options (branches and sequels) available 

sary depending on the outcome of the operation. For example, the 

army chose to disband in the face of a superior U.S. adversary in Ma

2003 rather than regroup in defensive positions around Baghdad. 

capturing how the adversary prefers to sequence operations is th

matrix shown in Figure 64. If possible, we are also encouraged to 

list any decision criteria known to cause the adversary to prefer one 

another.”303

300 AFPAM 14-118, 40. 301 List derived from content analysis of joint and service IPB doctrine for MOO

302 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-46. 303 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-48.
140

High-Value Targets

High value targets are the third piece of the model and include asse

adversary requires to perform the desired operations (critical requ

HVT are evaluated by a four-step method: (1) identify HVT by men

gaming adversary operations to determine how assets are used; (2) 

the impact of losing any of the HVT; (3) evaluate and rank-order 

based on relative worth; and (4) construct a target-value matrix (Figu

grouping HVT according to function (FM 34-130 suggests thirteen: c

control and communications; fire support; maneuver; air defense; 

Figure 64. Time Event Matrix

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-50.
141

reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (R

electronic combat; bulk fuels; ammunition storage and distribut

nance and repair; lift; and lines of communication).304

Five Rings

Pulling these three ingredients—template, activities and HV

model is rare in joint and service doctrine with the exception of t

Five-Ring model based on the work of former Air Force Colonel J

The Five-Ring model is embraced in Air Force warfighting doct

served as a guiding construct for air campaigns against several 

including Iraq and Serbia. The model views the “adversary from th

with infrastructures linked as a “system of systems” with mutua

304 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 35-38.

Figure 65. Target Value Matrix

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-51.
142

it comes as no surprise to us that a terrorist group, the joint force, and o

holders might be best thought of as systems, consisting of interloc

systems, where the focus is on critical relationships rather than as isola

 According to Warden, the systems model offers a “comprehensible p

complex phenomenon so that we can do something with it.”306 Based o

ing of systems theory, all systems consist of five subsystems: leadershi

essentials, infrastructure, population, and fighting mechanism.

War is a contest of wills, reminding us that at the core of every s

human(s) who gives direction and meaning.307 The Five-Ring model h

ship at its center:

A strategic entity—a state, a business organization, a terrorist organ

tion—has elements of both the physical and the biological, but at th

ter of these whole systems and of every subsystem is a human being 

gives direction and meaning. The ones who provide this direction a

leaders, either of the whole country or some part of it. They are the 

305 AFPAM 14-118, 37. 306 John A. Warden III, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal 9, no 1 (Sprin

40-55, URL: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/warden.html, acces

10 April 2004. 307 Warden, 44.

Figure 66. Five-Ring Model

Source: John Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal 9, no 1 (Spring 

URL: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/warden.html

accessed 10 April 2004.
143

ones who decide when they want their strategic entity to adopt o

adopt a different set of objectives. They, the leaders, are at the st

center, and in strategic warfare must be the figurative, and somet

literal, target of our every action.308

From this perspective, the center ring of leadership is always the 

possible, we must attack it directly; however, if the COG lacks dis

nerabilities, we go at it indirectly by attacking the other rings. Figu

elements of each of these subsystems for four types of systems. O

tials are energy inputs (resource dependencies if you will) that are 

enable the system to function.309 Infrastructure is the skeleton, w

mobility, but is usually sufficiently redundant to allow workarounds w

it are disrupted or destroyed.310 The fourth ring directs our attention 

dimension and the web of relationships in which the organizatio

Finally, the forces that protect the system—fielded forces, police, 

cians—are its fighting mechanism. Each ring has capabilities that m

as well as key nodes (HVT) that represent systems-threatening vulne

Salvage Yard

What is salvageable for CT? First, the requirement to “model” st

an enduring concept. Models represent theories as a set of concepts 

ships, which serve to make abstract understanding more tangible.311 

vide a generalized abstraction of the phenomenon in question—org

the case of CT—that has descriptive attributes and properties.312 A 

framework for organizing and relating intelligence evidence based o

how the organization looks and works in practice. Figure 62 mode

tional ground force engaged in a linear battle. Not only is the mode

for today’s non-linear conventional battlespace, but it falls well sho

required for CT where non-linearity, adaptability, innovation, dy

asymmetry describe the players and battlespace. The Five-Ring Mod

step in the right direction; however, it suffers from three key shortco

applied to CT: (1) it assumes the primary COG to be the leadership

not be supported by evidence or is secondary to other candidates as 

ogy, network structure, sanctuary; (2) it is does not sufficiently acc

tlespace effects (it is a closed system, not allowing for feedback effe

308 Warden, 44. 309 Warden, 45. 310 Warden, 45. 311 Hatch, 14. 312 Waltz, 181.
144

dimensions of organizations. Therefore, better models are needed that 

on current doctrinal strengths while incorporating factors relating to 

and information dimensions. Doctrinal templates remain useful if adap

tray more fluid structures and operations. Moreover, the need to descr

ties and options remains valuable as a way of putting flesh on the 

skeleton and providing greater fidelity into CC, CR, and CV. Finally, H

retained if recast in terms of decisive points or key nodes associated wi

CV or CR—it is good to remember that a CR may have a decisive poin

that is not, for the moment, vulnerable. 

The Real World

Step two evaluates stakeholders as they would look and behave in 

strained, idealized world; step three brings us back to earth by balancin

against the reality of what the battlespace affords. The value of this sa

is echoed in Air Force doctrine:

The pressures and uncertainties imposed by the battlespace environ

will place constraints on adversary actions or provide opportunities 

exploit. An analysis of the current situation provides a link between 

the adversary believes he can accomplish according to his doctrine 

what he is actually capable of doing given the constraints imposed b

environment.313

313 AFPAM 14-118, 43.
145

unconstrained adversary capable of optimizing battlespace

advantages, we avoid overlooking and being surprised

by capabilities. Having

grounded this analysis as a

result of phase two—describe

battlespace effects—we place

previously performed analysis

into the current operational

context.314 This approach

remains equally valid for CT.

Our step one analysis of the

AUC, for example, notionally

reveals a doctrinal capability

for generating income that

depends on “sponsors” for 40 percent and obtains the other 60 perc

peasants and running drugs. In reality, AUC leaders, as Carlos Castaño 

televised interview in 2000, actually generate 70 percent of their funds 

trafficking and taxation.315 The reasons for this difference between “ide

are likely to be found in the environment (internal government crackdo

ing profit margins on drugs) and in the organization itself (strategy ch

shift related to demographics). In addition to evaluating how the ad

force, and other stakeholders look in the light of day, this step require

out how specific COA, developed in phase four, are impacted. A 

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) COA to disrupt the electrical grid in Singapore m

within the group’s capabilities; however, by passing “strict new legislat

the country’s computer systems” from attack in 2003, Singapore has 

battlespace and rendered the COA less attractive even if the capability r

314 AFPAM 14-118, 43. 315 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs 

and it’s Implications for Regional Stability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation

316 The Singapore government “has said the measures are necessary because of r

successful hacking—there were just 10 in 2000, but that had risen to 41 last year.” T

the monitoring of all computer activity and pre-emptive action. BBC News, “Singap

cyber terror,’” 11 November 2003, URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/325

accessed 4 June 2004.

Figure 67. Poppy Field, Colomb

Source: Department of State, URL: 

usembassy.state.gov/colombia/wwwsnasc.sh

on 17 May 2004.
146

With the ideal balanced against the real, step four closes out this third 

identifying the set of “broad COAs and supporting operations that the 

can take to interfere with the accomplishment of the friendly mission

simply, what are the stakeholders capable of doing? The capabilities 

mined by comparing the results of step three with the models of step t

the terrorist or NGO is capable of meeting or exceeding the doctrinal st

step two, the capability should be considered a strength.318 If the al-Q

plate calls for unobstructed access to an economic target, such as an o

in Saudi Arabia, with at least two trucks loaded with explosives, and it 

get three trucks to the desired engagement area, this COA (attack term

supporting capability (move and ignite explosives) is a strength. More 

stakeholder will fall short of the doctrinal ideal due to battlespace c

revealing a deficiency.319

The results of step four analysis can take the form of specific stat

capabilities tied to specific COA such as these apt examples from the A

Manual:

(1) The enemy has the capability to attack with up to 8 divisions 

supported by 170 daily sorties of fixed-wing aircraft.

(2) The enemy can establish a prepared defense by 14 May.

(3) The enemy has the ability to insert up to 2 battalions of infan

a single lift operation.

(4) The drug smugglers have the capability to detect the radars u

our observation posts. 

(5) The threat can conduct up to three separate smuggling oper

simultaneously. 

(6) The protesters can effectively block traffic at no more than 7 

different intersections.320

Similar statements can be made for other stakeholders, including the ab

NGO to deliver aid, an IGO to negotiate a settlement, an allied securi

317 Joint Pub, 2-01.3, II-52 318 Joint Pub, 2-10, II-52 319 Joint Pub, 2-10, II-52 320 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 40.
147

a religious cleric to recruit potential terrorists, or a terrorist group to 

get. An important, but often overlooked aspect of stating capabilitie

porate time. When possible, add a timing factor to each statem

“within three hours,” “continuously,” “every two or three days,” and 

FULL SPECTRUM CAPABILITIES

Intelligence is in service to the mission. Our responsibility in p

CT IPB is to provide an accurate and timely diagnosis of mission-r

bilities. The goal is not a static display of the adversary, rich in histo

and packed with organizational charts and tables of equipment. R

gence is charged with providing a motion picture of what the terrori

and other stakeholders are capable of over time. We must emphas

over inventories and relationships over hierarchies. We still want t

the adversary possesses, but such intelligence is subordinate to 

things, and information interact to carry out a particular course of 

are the capabilities of all the players in the CT battlespace? How d

up? Who has the advantage? What deficiencies can be exploited, ne

tected, or require healing? What dependencies are open to exploitat

doctrine and TTPs provide a foundation for answering these questi

only take us part way down the road to a fluid, operational capabi

ment. To this end, new ideas and methods are introduced here. 

We begin by returning to our familiar “stakeholders first” approa

clarifying and expanding the framework for characterizing and relat

ers for the CT mission. The intent is to make sure we are accurately 

range and priority of potential actors before embarking on a capab

ment. We want to be straight on who the threat is and what we can 

other players. Second, we build on the four-step process as modifi

section. Centers of gravity and the other critical factors of capabili

ments and vulnerabilities are enduring concepts that serve operati

ments. Figuring them out for CT missions requires a new approach i

model the adversary—based on more appropriate templates. Expres

plates must integrate (1) battlespace effects, (2) ideology and/or cu

organizational performance. Concepts and analytical methods are 

integrating these elements, including the introduction of network 

models as state-of-the-art practices. 
148

We previously addressed the difficulty of accurately identifying the 

a challenge compounded by the diversity of stakeholders to CT missio

mate NGOs turn out to be front organizations for terrorist financing, 

favored political leaders betray our capabilities to a hostile state. And a

the case in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, even the 

defining the enemy can be elusive. As argued by Bruce Hoffman in a Ju

2004 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, “the Iraqi insurgency today appea

no clear leader (or leadership), no ambition to seize and actually hol

(except ephemerally, as in the recent cases of Fallujah and Najaf), no 

ideology, and most importantly, no identifiable organization.”321 While 

tity swamp is not always so murky for modern terrorism, it often is. 

the issue of sorting out stakeholders is revived here as a precursor to 

capabilities. A summary of the general types of links, hard and soft, 

often exist between groups is also introduced.

In phase one, we developed an inventory of stakeholders—indivi

groups with an interest in the outcome of the CT mission. In phas

mapped the stakeholders as a web of influence to get a general sense of 

ity to affect CT missions directly or indirectly. In phase three, we se

fidelity as we assess their ability to impact COA by clarifying the very 

of adversary and by implementing a RAND concept, the continuum 

interests. The aim is to:

(1) Determine a stakeholder’s potential utility in meeting mission dem

(2) Determine a stakeholder’s potential for manipulation; and

(3) Provide a basis for detecting and monitoring shifts in relevan

relationships.322

The first, and most basic question to ask about the stakeholders inve

phase one is whether they are currently an adversary (stressing the pre

recognizes that today’s ally may be tomorrow’s enemy). In the abse

accepted DOD definition, the RAND study Street Smarts: Intelligence 

tion of the Battlespace for Urban Operations, offers one with CT 

adversary has some current capability and intention to negatively infl

mission accomplishment by exploiting a friendly vulnerability.323 This 

321 Bruce Hoffman, “Plan of Attack,” The Atlantic Monthly (July/August 2004), 42. 322 Medby, 96. 323 Medby, 97.
149

this work. Underlying the definition is a recognition that stakeholder 

underlying motivation for the pursuit of an activity) drive intention (

to fulfill the corresponding interest).324 This is a critical insight for 

First, intentions are notoriously hard to determine, particularly wh

holder actively works to keep its intentions secret. Interests, howe

mally more open to examination and are often stated explicitly. We 

clear on how the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Ch

Xinjiang Province intends to use terrorism, but we do know that 

include group survival and the establishment of an Islamic state.325 E

tions are elusive, knowing interests helps scope the range of likel

Second, interests are more durable than intentions. That is, interests a

to change, particularly when backed by a persuasive or coercive ide

ever, the mode chosen to secure the interest, or intention, is often op

This difference between interest and intention is a sound basis for 

manipulation, and influence.

324 Medby, 98. 325 ETIM “is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuin

dent “Eastern Turkistan,” an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgy

stan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Xinjiang. ETIM is linked to al-Qaida and the in

mujahidin movement. ETIM militants fought alongside al-Qaida and Taliban for

stan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. In October 2003, Pakistani sold

ETIM leader Hassan Makhsum during raids on al-Qaida–associated compounds 

Pakistan. U.S. and Chinese Government information suggests ETIM is responsib

terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May 2002, two ETIM members were d

China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as 

US interests abroad. Patterns 2003, 144.
150

guide, we can further nuance the categories of

stakeholders introduced in phase two (ally,

neutral, adversary) into the five types:

Adversary: A population element with

the capability, interest, and intent to

exploit a friendly vulnerability.

Hindrance: A population element with

an active capability to exploit a friendly

vulnerability. Current interests may or

may not be compatible with friendly

force goals, but there is no intention to

interfere with friendly force activities.

Neutral: A population element whose

interests do not conflict with either the

friendly or the adversarial force. Capability to affect the friendly force mission

may exist, but it is currently inert.

Accomplice: A population element with

the capability to capitalize on a friendly

or adversary vulnerability whose intentions are compatible with friendly force

objectives.

Ally: A population element whose interest and intent is to assist in accomplishing friendly force objectiv

To this list, we should retain the category of unknown to avoid forcing 

cation of a label that is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, we 

these categories are relative to not just the joint force, but to the terro

and other players. Depending on the time of day, our accomplice m

obstacle. The continuum of relative interests is a useful guide, which ha

efit of (1) taking us out of the “us” versus “them” mentality of tradition

providing a framework for recognizing, shaping and possibly anticipat

holder shifts along the continuum based on changing battlespace cond

326 Medby, 97. “Hindrance” replaces RAND’s “Obstacle” to avoid confusion with t

“Obstacle” for the OCOKA methodology.

Figure 68. Bangladesh B

A member of the Banglad

inspects a movie thea

Mymensingh after a bomb 

killed 15 persons on 7 D

2002 (AP).

Source: State, Patterns 20

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/

2002/html/19982.htm, acc

June 2004.
151

intentions and capabilities to joint force vulnerabilities. 

The web of terrorist influence is an important sub-set of the overa

ages among all stakeholders. As argued in the National Strategy fo

Terrorism, 

[t]errorist groups with objectives in one country or region can dr

strength and support from groups in other countries or regions. F

ple, in 2001, three members of the Irish Republican Army were 

in Colombia, suspected of training the FARC in how to conduct 

bombing campaign. The connections between al-Qaida and terro

groups throughout Southeast Asia further highlight this reality.32

Globalization has made transnational coordination easier for friend and foe alike.

In the 1970s and 1980s, our

focus was on the linkages

between secular and nationalist groups, such as the open

cooperation between ETA

and the IRA. Now we are

witnessing the diffusion of

religious extremist terrorists, consisting of regionallybased groups and globallynomadic operatives and

cells. The linkages between

groups take two general

forms. Hard links reflect

direct influence and involve

concrete transactions.328

Hard links include: financial

support, sharing intelligence, coordinating action,

327 National Strategy, 8. 328 The hard and soft links concepts are taken from Combating Terrorism in a G

World, Report by the National War College (NWC) Student Task Force on Combati

(Washington, DC: National War College, November 2002), np, URL: www.ndu.edu

AY02/ combating_terrorism/index.htm, accessed on 17 February 2004. Cited herea

Figure 69. IRA Suspects

Suspected IRA members captured in Bogota 

collaboration 

with the FARC in 2001 (AP).

Source: State, Patterns 2001, URL: http://ww

ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/, 

accessed 7 June 2004.
152

Soft links refer to indirect influence involving the exchange of intang

and information capital: sharing opportunities, sharing responsibili

diplomacy, sharing ideological values.330 Of the two, hard links are mo

tible to collection, analysis, and CT effects; however, soft links are mo

to groups pursuing a transcendent agenda.

At this point in our stakeholder analysis, we are equipped with (1) 

tory of stakeholders from phase one, (2) an initial cut at direct or indi

ence by each from phase two, (3) a typecasting of each based on relati

from phase three, and (4) an initial cut at the type of linkages. Thus equ

are able to prioritize stakeholders for collection, analysis and incorpo

COA development. In this light, information on an adversary stakeh

direct influence (such as Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami) on an foreign intern

mission to Bangladesh should be at the top of our “to do” list, while 

stakeholder with indirect influence is near the bottom, and only earns 

tion if time and resources are available or if a consequential shift is like

sion or interest.331 For example, the Bangladesh-based NGO, Proshika

the world’s largest NGOs and plays a major role in poverty reduction 

ladesh.332 Its neutral position and indirect influence on a short-term m

train Bangladesh soldiers in CT skills make it a low priority; howev

longer-term mission to diminish underlying conditions, Proshika has th

to move from accomplice to ally with direct influence. These stakehold

methods set up an evaluation of stakeholder-specific capabilities and co

COA forecasting in phase four. 

Supermodels

The complexity of terrorism requires a superhero model, able to org

relate the full spectrum of variables that animate the battlespace and its 

329 NWC, Chapter 2, np. 330 NWC, Chapter 2, np. 331 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/ Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Movement of Islamic Holy W

Shauqat Osman and has a mission “to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. HUJI-B has 

to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihadi-Islami (HUJI) and Harakat ul-Mujahi

who advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. Funding of the H

comes primarily from madrassahs in Bangladesh. The group also has ties to militants i

that may provide another funding source.” Patterns 2003, 146. 332 See the Proshika website at http://www.proshika.org/ for more information or re

ing on the arrest of Proshika’s president Qazi Faruque Ahmed and deputy, David Willia

by the BBC. “Calls for release of aid workers,” 25 May 2004, URL: http://news.bbc.co

south_asia/3746801.stm, accessed on 4 June 2004.
153

transition among levels of analysis and action while allowing for var

of magnification and detail, all without sacrificing utility. The absenc

sus over the “right” approach to the study of terrorism complicate

While the two complementary models presented here—networks an

do not save us entirely, they are a marked improvement over ex

focused models. Moreover, their value is gaining recognition in CT c

ing in their adaptation and use throughout the U.S. inter-agency sy

foreign governments and agencies.333

The network and systems models are able to capture the intric

because they reflect a multicausal approach that draws on the most pe

ments of existing theories. From the political approach, we take an 

for the importance of battlespace effects as both a cause and shaper 

Particularly at the strategic level, the political approach suggests 

causes of terrorism, and therefore the keys to diminishing terrorism, 

in the environment.334 In fact, strategic-level COG are often outside 

organization—socio-economic deprivation, systemic crime and 

resource scarcity, failures in governance, intractable conflict, identi

and demographic pressures.335 As analysts, we are responsible for u

the range of environmental causes even if their operational value is 

obvious. Until strategic-level COG in the battlespace are dealt w

against terrorist groups will be short-lived. From the physiological a

333 Both are directly incorporated into national CT strategy and planning docume

throughout the Intelligence Community, employed by operational joint forces, and 

rounds of foreign governments. The author has directly participated in several work

projects and operations that employ network and systems analysis methods, includi

ship for Peace CT Working Group, Joint Intelligence Task Force for CT (JITF-CT), 

and Analysis Center (JWAC), Joint Forces Intelligence Center (JFIC), Northern Com

Mexico Department of Homeland Security, Foreign Service Institute, and others. 334 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a 

Why? (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Septembe

335 Troy Thomas and Stephen Kiser examine the relationship between these envi

tors and prosperity of terrorist groups in Lords of the Silk Route: Violent Non-State A

tral Asia, Occasional Paper #43 (USAF Academy, CO: Institute for National Securi

2002), URL: http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/OCP43f.pdf, accessed on 7 June 20

to our analysis, “these system elements interact in a highly dynamic, causative mann

VNSAs of the developing world. This framework [open systems model] effectively 

parate actors that are too often examined in isolation, and draws needed attention to 

ships that enable the cycle of violent collective action to thrive. As an open system, 

allows for environmental factors, which is particularly important given the transnati

of many VNSAs. It allows us to consider the influence of such international dynami

tion and the role of external powers,” 5-6.
154

based response to acts of terrorism as transmitted through the media 

sources.336 From the psychological approach, we incorporate cognition 

vation at the individual and group level, which is shaped by ideology

personal needs, and in some cases, abnormal pathology.337 Finally, from 

nizational approach we understand terrorism to be either (1) an in

means to achieve a political goal as well as (2) the result of organizat

cesses concerned primarily with group survival.338 Religious extremis

an example of the latter, where “[v]iolence has a personal meaning fo

vidual. It is a path to individual salvation, regardless of the political ou

the collectivity in the real world. The motivation for terrorism may b

scend reality as much as to transform it.”339 Each of these approaches i

in our IPB work thus far, particularly as part of battlespace effects. 

In this section, the network and systems models bring it all togethe

that allows us to climb the COG ladder. Both focus our analysis on the 

vant capabilities, address the asymmetries among CT players, and allo

lyst to use a similar set of analytical methods: timelines, pattern 

association matrices, and link diagrams, for example.340 Bear in min

discussion presents only their key attributes, resulting in an operati

overview of how to structure our thinking. Getting beyond the basics fo

requires (1) homework, including training if possible, on methodolog

reachback to organizations and subject matter experts who develop an

these techniques regularly.341 Deciding which to use is a decision that 

ported by clear-cut criteria, leaving it up to the commander and staff to 

the most appropriate approach based on its operational utility. The netw

336 Hudson, 17. 337 Hudson, 18. Mark Kauppi highlights several personal needs met by participation 

ism: money, family ties, peer pressure, rebellion, and thrill. He continues by stating “th

with an inner sense of worthlessness, confusion or rage may seek refuge and validation 

rebirth within a charismatic mass movement. Young persons with few life prospects ma

join a terrorist organization for such a simple reason as the expected thrill of life in the u

organization or a way to enhance one’s self-esteem and status by becoming a “defende

munity.” On-line course material, Counterterrorism Analysis, Joint Military Intelligenc

Center. Author completed the course in April 2004. 338 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational App

Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 13

339 Crenshaw, 20. 340 Methods are introduced as part of the model explanation; they are not repeated f

model even though they can be used to analyze systems and networks. 341 Advanced analytical methods for systems and network analysis are being develo

employed by a host of organizations with which the author collaborated, including JWA

NSA, CTC, JFIC, and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) to nam
155

ing a key node. The systems model is appropriate if we seek to lever

cies in resource dependencies in order to disrupt a critical capa

absence of certainty, either will serve the joint force better than exist

Network Model

Of the two, the network model is the most widely embraced, rein

U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:

The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network s

enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose i

nectivity both within and between groups. In this environmen

ists work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, l

planning, and executing attacks... The terrorist threat today 

resilient and diffuse because of this mutually reinforcing, 

network structure.342

342 National Strategy, 8.
156

overview of guiding princ

concepts, fields of analysis

model’s connection to COG

CV. Its proponents are correc

ing that it remains in the early 

development for CT applicat

ever, its widespread adoption

larly by the joint force, ha

contributed to the capture o

leaders and operatives, and in 

public advertisement for its 

utility, Saddam Hussein. The 

finding Hussein began with f

that morphed into a networ

hundred names, and ultimate

gle “source” who led the Ar

famous spider hole.343 Acc

one of the intelligence 

involved, it was “like we are 

suddenly.”344 CT IPB is dete

with an operational imperativ

While more varied than the 

discussion suggests, the 

approach is unified in its em

the relationships between nod

inform organizational design

operational modes, technology use, decisionmaking, and other CT-rele

bilities. Like the systems approach described later, dynamic relationsh

the organization, with other stakeholders, and with the battlespace a

The network has properties that are more than the sum of its parts—

fluid, and resilient to name a few. The network as a whole is worthy of 

sis as are the specific actors and relational ties that make it up. In add

emphasis on hard and soft linkages, the network perspective embrace

guiding principles:

(1) Actors and their action are interdependent rather than independen

mous units;

343 Farnaz Fassihi, “Two Novice Gumshoes Charted the Capture of Saddam,” Wall St

18 December 2003, A1, A6. 

Figure 70. Saddam Hussein

Picture taken following his capture as part of 

Operation Red Dawn, 

14 December 2003.

Source: CENTCOM, URL: http://

www.centcom.mil/operations/iraqi_Freedom/

reddawn/OperationRedDawn_files/

frame.htm, 

accessed 7 June 2004.
157

resources;

(3) Network models view the environment as providing opportun

straints for action; and

(4) Network models conceptualize structures [battlespace dimens

ing patterns of relations.345

Embedded in these principles are several key concepts requiring u

nition. The nodes of a network can be most anything (people, organiz

puters, ideas) as long as they are hooked up in a meaningful way.3

network analysis tends to focus on social linkages among actors, o

ties.

347 As in our stakeholder analysis, nodes are linked by relation

344 Quote attributed to Lieutenant Angela Santana, Fassihi, A1. The story contin

September, after many sleepless nights spent sifting through tens of thousands of pa

tion” Lieutenant Angela Santana and Corporal Harold Engstrom narrowed a list of 

names. “The duo read through sheaves of interrogation reports from detainees and i

local Iraqis. They plumbed a huge database provided by central military intelligenc

they created what they nicknamed ‘Mongo Link,’ a four-page, 46-by-42-inch color-

with their 300 names on it. It was basically a family tree, with Mr. Hussein’s picture 

and lines connecting his tribal and blood ties to the six main tribes of the Sunni tria

seins, al-Douris, Hadouthis, Masliyats, Hassans and Harimyths. The military believ

these clans shielded Saddam for eight months, financed the resistance, and planned 

and attacks against Iraqis and coalition forces. Next to each of the names, Lt. Santan

strom scribbled down bits of information they were able to gather about individuals

home village, spouses and children, where the names came from, whether people on 

custody and how they got there... As the chart grew, the pair started to see patterns. 

the resistance was multilayered, as they pieced together who was related to whom am

The tribal leadership was tightly linked through a web of marriages and intensely lo

sein, the analysts concluded. Below that level were a number of other people clearly 

insurgency. These fighters were likely in it for the money. The two sleuths noticed h

resistance fighters who had been caught planting bombs or carrying out raids were r

tribal principals. They concluded that the bosses were distancing themselves from t

file...Next to every name on the chart is a physical description—hair and eye color, 

features that stand out—as well as details about where they were last seen or any ot

that might lead to their arrest. Several dozen of the names are already in custody of 

forces and color-coded with red ink. The main people around Hussein are then linke

others, many of whom the military believes to be ringleaders for resistance cells plo

against Americans in Tikrit, Samarra, Fallujah, Ramadi and Baghdad.” Fassihi, A1, 

345 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods 

tions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4. Another useful resource i

Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (London: Sage Publications, 2000). 346 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in John Arquilla and Dav

Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 66. 347 Wasserman, 17.
158

(resource exchanges); association (membership, attendance); behaviora

fighting); mobility (migration, transport); physical (road, bridge); form

ity, chain of command); and biological (kinship).348 A set of linkages of 

kind among actors is a relation—the hard and soft linkages of diplom

tions, intelligence sharing, financial transfers. Putting it all together, 

“consists of a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations d

them.”349 How we define the network depends on the mission and th

analysis and action. A disrupt-CT mission at the strategic level will dem

ysis of the global al-Qaida network, whereas the same mission at the tac

requires analysis of the specific, mission-relevant cell. Of course, eve

cells have links to strategic level players; Jamal Ahmidan, for example, 

to have been one of the 3/11 cell commanders in Spain with al-Qaida ti

Terrorist, joint force, and stakeholder capabilities are assessed throu

zational network analysis (ONA). ONA views networks as “a distinc

organization, one that is gaining strength as a result of advances in co

tions.”350 Network organizations are more organic than the mechanistic 

tions discussed in previous chapters: (1) organizational design reflects 

over vertical relationships; (2) communication and coordination emerg

task as opposed to being formalized by rules and procedures; (3) inte

connect to external nodes in the battlespace; and (4) “internal and extern

enabled not by bureaucratic fiat, but rather by shared norms and value

last quality is particularly important for transnational groups as it enab

bers to be ‘all of one mind’ even though these are dispersed and devoted 

ent tasks. It can provide a central ideational and operational coherence t

for tactical centralization.”352 There is no standard methodology for ana

organizational network, as stated by its RAND sponsors; however, t

state-of-the-art argues for directing efforts at five reinforcing “fields of 

organization; narrative; doctrine; technology; and social.353 Each field 

a set of capabilities and characteristics that lend themselves to COG an

348 Wasserman, 19. 349 Wasserman, 20. For an excellent summary in the changing forms of organization 

see David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAN

tion, 1996), URL: http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR789/, accessed on 8 June 2

350 David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “What Next for Networks and Netwars,” Arq

351 Michele Zanini and Sean J.A. Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Inform

Arquilla, 31-32. 352 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” Arquilla, 9 353 “Field” replaces “level” found in Ronfeldt and Arquilla to avoid confusion with 

analysis and action—strategic, operational, tactical. Ronfeldt, 324.
159

tion itself is a capability.

 Recalling our analysis of overall battle

tainty in phase two, the organizational structure, or design, can be o

the mission and environment. A network with a small number of c

(mechanistic), for example, is more susceptible to disruption and 

overload, while one that is highly decentralized is able to resist, ad

flows, and repair itself. On the other hand, communication and coo

more difficult in spider webs. Generally, the organization will at leas

capability if not a COG itself. To get a sense of whether the orga

strength or weakness, what its vulnerabilities are, and how it migh

directly or indirectly, we need to assess its design, the independenc

the location of leadership, and “how hierarchical dynamics may be 

the network dynamics.”355

The three basic forms of networks (Figure 71) are chain, hub, an

as described in Networks and Netwars:

The chain or line network, as in a smuggling chain where peop

information move along a line of separated contacts, and where end

munication must travel through the intermediate nodes.

The hub, star, or wheel network, as in a franchise or a cartel w

actors are tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, 

through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other.

 The all-channel or full-matrix network, as in a collaborative netw

tant peace groups where everybody is connected to everybody else.3

These pure forms are not resident in the real world. Rather, mos

organizations will consist of a combination of these and more tradi

chal forms. Hybrids are likely, such as a terrorist group with an 

council or directorate at its core,” but using hubs and chains for ta

tions.357 Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna describes al-Qaida’s de

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM along similar lines:

Al-Qaida’s structure enables it to wield direct and indirect 

over a potent, far-flung force. By issuing periodic pronounc

354 This recognition is reflected in the joint force’s structure as well. The Air Forc

treats the Air Operation Center as a weapon system—it represents a command and 

ity for employing air and space power. 355 Rondfeldt and Arquilla, 325 356 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 7. 357 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 9.
160

speeches and writings, Osama indoctrinates, trains and cont

core inner group as well as inspiring and supporting periphera

res...in 1998 al-Qaida was reorganized into four distinct but 

linked entities. The first was a pyramidal structure to fac

strategic and tactical direction; the second was a globalist ter

network; the third was a base force for guerilla warfare 

Afghanistan; and the fourth was a loose coalition of transnation

rorist and guerrilla groups.358

NGOs, the joint force, and commercial stakeholders are likely to 

greater hierarchy than crime syndicates, insurgencies and many of th

groups we face. Leadership may be at the end of the chain, the center o

or diffused across several channels. As these simple examples make 

chain is easier to disrupt than the all-channel, while exercising com

control is more demanding for the all-channel than the others. A simpl

can afford to be more reliant on a single charismatic leader and fewer 

cation channels, while a multi-link network demands a cohesion tha

come from a shared culture. We are only scratching the surface of desig

tions; however, the rules-of-thumb suggested here highlight the imp

deepening our knowledge of organizational theory and practices for C

over, the design implications have to be balanced against battlespace e

other stakeholder capabilities to determine whether vulnerabilities exis

All CT missions involve competitive story-telling. Whether seekin

perceptions, shrink the pool of recruits, entice defection, or discredit 

narrative is involved. The narrative is variously called public diploma

358 Gunaratna, 56-57.

Figure 71. Network Designs

Source: Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 8, URL: http://www.ran

publications/MR/MR1382/MR1382.ch1.pdf, accessed 7 June 2004.
161

of means, including speeches, sermons, fatwas, policy documen

Strategy), web postings, posters, graffiti and many others. The narra

function of rhetoric and actions, and in many cases, actions tell a d

than the public pronouncements suggest. The narrative answers imp

tions for CT participants: who we are (identity), where we are (locat

are (rules for living), when we are (sense of history), and why we are 

existence).359 A compelling story provides cohesion and works again

enables relations with other groups, and generates a “perception that 

has winning momentum.”360 The story is shaped by the battlespace, 

shapes attitudes in the social and information dimensions.

Al-Qaida has proven most adept at competitive story-telling, evid

highly influential fatwas issued on behalf of Osama bin Laden an

Zawahiri. One of the earliest appeared on 22 February 1996 where

announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad 

Jews and the Crusaders, delivering a story that remains a core eleme

bal jihadist insurgency:

[b]ased upon this and in order to obey the Almighty, we her

all Muslims the following judgment: The judgment to kill a

Americans and their allies, whether civilians or military, is an 

tion for every Muslim who is able to do so in any country.

name of Allah, we call upon every Muslim, who believed in A

ask for forgiveness, to abide by Allah’s order by killing Ameri

stealing their money anywhere, anytime, and whenever possib

William Casebeer provides further insight into myth creation in 

tems: Defeating Terrorists, Insurgents, and other Violent Non-State A

[t]he fanatical devotion shown by al-Qaida operatives stems 

part not from any rational deliberative process but rather from 

cess Osama bin Laden and others have had in fashioning a 

and appealing foundational myth. The events of 11 Septemb

can be thought of as the punch line of a chapter in an epic 

“the warriors of God” against an “infidel West.” This myth 

propagate itself via rational actor channels, but instead was 

359 Michael Vlahos, “Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within Islam,” Occasional Pape

Joint Warfare Analysis Department of the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopki

May 2002), 8 360 Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 328. 361Bergen, 95-96.
162

of Islam.362

According to Michael Vlahos, former Director of the State Departm

ter for the Study of Foreign Affairs, the al-Qaida narrative draws heav

symbolism of the Prophet Mohammed’s life. He points to four element

in the current jihadist story and strategy: (1) heroic journey of mythic 

history as an epic struggle; (3) commanding charge of renewal; and (

revealed through mystic literary form.363 The symbolic framework em

Salafist, Wahhabi, Ikhwani, Deobani and other Islamic subcultures 

fierce conviction of the cause’s righteousness, a willingness to embrac

and death, and a belief that “the act of the struggle itself is triumph.”364

 For IPB, our t

understand the nar

its role in the org

The former requ

basic knowledge o

as well as the elem

good story. Effect

ric involves 

(ethos), appeal t

(logos), and appea

tion, or affect (path

When CT-related 

are presented by 

who lacks credibil

message fails to 

emotional respon

likely to fall on de

actually generate 

or rage. This is n

clarion call for the joint force to gain allies through the investment of s

tal, but to guard against mirror-imaging by assuming that our penchan

362 Thomas and Casebeer, 65. 363 Vlahos, 8. 364 Vlahos, 10. 365 Based on the ideas of Thomas Coakley, “The Argument against Terror: Globaliz

Peruvian Experience, and the Necessity of US Military Transformation,” paper present

Institute for National Security Studies Annual Research Results Conference, USAF Ac

13 November 2003. Interview with author on 14 November 2003.

Figure 72. Two Sheiks

A Frame from an Osama bin Laden videotape released by 

the DOD on 

13 December 2001.

Source: DOD, URL: http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/

Dec2001/011213-D-0000X-003.html, accessed 7 June 2004.
163

dinner conversation with another sheikh shortly after 9/11 (Figure 

the rhetorical device of mystical revelation through dreams: 

He [Abd Rahman al-Ghamri] told me a year ago: “I saw a dre

playing a soccer game against the Americans. When our team show

field, there were all pilots!’ He didn’t know anything about the ope

he heard it on the radio. He said the game went on and we defeate

was a good omen for us.366

By dissecting the narrative, we gain insight into the questions ask

how the story shapes the organization and the battlespace. For CT, th

almost always a COG, and the ability to develop and disseminate i

capability. Whether the critical requirements of speaker, rhetoric, sto

and distribution means are vulnerable to CT missions depends on th

orientation, the availability of alternative storytellers, and the existen

compelling narrative. 

The principles and practices that guide organizational behavior ar

and TTPs, explaining why and how individual members and the orga

whole operate as they do. Principles and practices make clear how gro

strategically and tactically, without necessarily having to resort to a 

mand or leader.”367 In this sense, it not only explains role behaviors, 

insight into the types of behaviors we can expect—setting up COA 

phase four. The concept of operational code captures what we 

achieve in this field: (1) perception of the political world and 2) b

responses to the political world.368 The former reflects the philosop

discussed as narrative above, and the latter deals with instrumental iss

standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strateg

his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action”369 Oper

are not just about weapons and tactics, but rather focus on the more 

character of an organization’s modus operandi. Are certain targets of

certain types of weapons (WMD, cyber, explosives) preferred ov

deception acceptable, or is it considered dishonorable? Are attacks 

Does the terrorist take credit for attacks, or not, and why? What is th

366 Vlahos, 10. 367 Ronfeldt and Arquilla, 333. 368 Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Drawing policy implications from the ‘Operationa

‘new’ political actor: Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Policy Sciences 34, nos. 3-

2001), 330. 369 Dyson, 331.
164

require a level of analysis that goes beyond inventories of equipment an

preferred tactics—it requires analysis of the organization’s over-archin

relationships across all sectors, and existing and planned operational cap

As an example, Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation is among 

have broken-out the operational code for al-Qaida based in part on a re

project with the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency (DARP

ing in mind that operational codes change over time, this analysis re

following key elements of al-Qaida planning:

(1) Long planning horizons, patient;

(2) Persistence—a preferred target not easily abandoned (World 

Center);

(3) Al-Qaida learns, perfects (boat bombs [USS Cole]);

(4) Stick to familiar playbooks, core competencies, centers of 

excellence;

(5) Imaginative low-tech over challenging high-tech (boxcutters, ricin);

(6) Operations planning is de-centralized, and therefore 

entrepreneurial; and

(7) Proposals start big, then back off (can’t do the American em

can’t do the Brooklyn Bridge).370

One key take-away from this analysis is that al-Qaida is less conce

how it attacks than with sustaining attacks to maintain the momentum o

nization. In the same briefing to the Army Science Board, Jenkins 

sources of the operational code: Islam, patterns of pre-Islamic warfare, 

fare, selected history and myth, current circumstances, terrorist tactics 

and discussed, and their own playbook.371 In fact, al-Qaida produces 

magazine, Camp al-Battar, which trains and shapes behaviors with gu

everything from physical fitness to small arms tactics.372

370 Brian Jenkins, “The Operational Code of the Jihadists,” brief to the Army Scien

April 2004, Slide 32. 371 Jenkins, Slide 36. 372 One open source for translated copies of Camp al-Battar is the Intel Center, Alex

URL: www.intelcenter.com.
165

broad types of technology are most important to CT: information a

As discussed in phase two, information technology serves organi

operational purposes. Weapons technology sets limits to operations, 

essarily to destructive and disruptive potential. Crude car bombs, ex

assassination with a knife, and box cutters are often sufficient. Rathe

ing past discussion, our goal in phase three is to answer several basic 

related questions. Is the organization high-tech, low-tech, or more lik

nation of both? Does it have low-tech back-up to its high-tech capab

technology is possessed? What is sought? Do they have the know

and abilities to use the technology? Is there infrastructure to support 

used? Is it critical to other capabilities? Does it have any vulnerabili

used to attack or defend? These questions and others apply to all 

reverse IPB is vital in this field due to the joint force’s reliance on an 

technology advantage over our adversaries.

The final field of analysis views the relations among individuals 

ity with its own strengths and weaknesses—it is the agent-level co

stakeholder analysis. The study of social relations, known as soc

analysis (SNA), is the forerunner to ONA and remains a co

approach. SNA sees networks in all social exchanges ranging from 

families to international relations. SNA’s analytical focus is on un

mal and informal relational ties and the roles of actors in making t

tion work.373 Actor importance derives more from social capital (

or relational skills) than human capital (personal characteristics).

further qualified in terms of their centrality, access, and roles. This 

tions for CT missions; the actor with the most linkages of a highl

type is often a lucrative HVT for capture or influence. On the ot

actor with only a few linkages but extensive social capital (Ayman 

may represent cognitive leaders that either are COG or represent a 

bility supporting a COG.375

Figure 73 is an example of SNA performed on Iranian senior lead

open-source material. In his analysis, Robert Renfro is showing deg

closeness (1-3), direction of influence, and number of agents per grou

list of 384 individuals and openly available reporting on their role

ties.376 While more detailed than what is feasible on the front lines, i

373 Williams, 66. 374 Ronfeldt, 318. 375This line of argument runs counter to the conclusion of some that “networks ar

to lack a center of gravity as an organization.” Ronfeldt, 343. 
166

concept to the Saddam Hussein example. At operational and strate

intelligence agencies are able to draw on advanced modeling and simul

to build elaborate network models that can be tested to determine 

removing nodes, altering relations, and affecting overall performanc

battlespace effects.

In the field, SNA methods are more likely to involve basic associat

ces, link diagrams, time lines and pattern analysis. Each is well-develop

trine and expertly taught at several schools including the Join

Intelligence Training Center (JMITC). As a review, matrices show rel

between people and people, events, time, and locations (Figure 74). Th

tions identified in the matrix can be visually depicted using link diagram

376 Robert Renfro, “Modeling and Analysis of Social Networks,” Ph.D. Dissertation

School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology, Air Univers

cation and Training Command, December 2001, 142-143, URL: https://research.au.af.m

ay2002/afit/afit-ds-ens-01-03.pdf, accessed 7 June 2004. Renfro reminds his readers tha

of the names is an Iranian opposition group of questionable reliability.

Figure 73. Iranian Network, with degree of social closeness indicated.

Source: Renfro, 143.
167

and tailored to the CT mission. The activities matrix of Figure 75 re

uals to specific roles played in the network; it too can inform a l

Finally, time-pattern analysis is useful to determine the periods of 

lence, illegal activity, and movement. Pattern analysis builds capab

knowledge that shape COA, such as knowing when is the best time to 

plies, enter a neighborhood, or meet with key leadership. Figure 76 i

from joint doctrine that shows key activity in an urban area over a 24

during the course of a week.377

377 Joint Pub 2-01.3, V-13.
168

Figure 74. Relationship Mapping

Source: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, MOOTW Instructional Materials for the M

Officer Transition Course, Fort Huachuca, AZ: United States Army Intelligence Ce

Fort Huachuca, 1999. Reprinted in Medby, 110. 

Figure 75. Activities Matrix

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, V-26.
169

OPEN SYSTEMS MODEL

There is growing recognition of the value in treating organizations 

tems, interacting in a dynamic battlespace. In doctrinal terms, the U

the case to shift our thinking as far back as 1997:

The attempt to apply a scientific approach can result in some 

ing ideas. For example, some political scientists treat politica

as unitary rational actors, the social equivalents of Newton

bodies hurtling through space. Real political units, however

unitary. Rather, they are collections of intertwined but funda

distinct actors and systems. Their behavior derives from the 

interplay of both rational and irrational forces as well as f

peculiarities of their own histories and of chance. Strategi

Figure 76. Pattern Analysis

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, V-15.
170

at war will have difficulty understanding either sides motivatio

actual behavior. Such strategists ignore their own side’s gr

potential vulnerabilities and deny themselves potential levers an

gets—the fault lines that exist within any human political con

Fortunately, the physical sciences have begun to embrace the cl

problems posed by social interactions like politics and war. The a

priate imagery, however, is not that of Newtonian physics. Rath

need to think in terms of biology and particularly ecology.378

The open systems framework developed and applied here is guided b

organization theory, which is rooted in the interdisciplinary approa

mended by the USMC and others. As a way of thinking about organizat

types, organization theory has evolved beyond a rigid emphasis on scien

agement and bureaucratic structures, which characterize mechanistic 

tions, to an organic view based on natural and biological systems.3

structural theory does not reveal the inner workings of the organi

include the complex informal interactions that constitute the “real” g

analysis must go beyond formal structural theory to appreciate these co

as an aspect of the dynamic, even organic, character of CT players. Or

theory as intended for businesses, non-profits and legitimate political 

tions guides their diagnosis for the purpose of solving problems to im

formance. We turn this on its head for CT—solving threat assessment pr

order to decrease and deny performance. 

378 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1, Strategy (Washington, DC: De

the Navy, 1997), 16-18. Continuing, “[t]o survive over time, the various members of an

must adapt—not only to the external environment, but to each other. These agents comp

erate, consume and are consumed, join and divide, and so on. A system created by such 

is called a complex adaptive system. Such systems are inherently dynamic. Although th

sometimes appear stable for lengthy periods, their components constantly adapt or fail

evolves alone; rather, each species “co-evolves” with the other species that make up its 

ment. The mutation or extinction of one species in any ecosystem has a domino or ripp

throughout the system, threatening damage to some species and creating opportunities 

Slight changes are sometimes absorbed without unbalancing the system. Other slight c

alteration in the external environment or a local mutation—can send the system into co

growth or collapse. One of the most interesting things about complex systems is that th

ently unpredictable. It is impossible, for example, to know in advance which slight pert

an ecological system will settle out unnoticed and which will spark catastrophic chang

not because of any flaw in our understanding of such systems, but because the system’s 

generated according to rules the system itself develops and is able to alter. In other wor

tem’s behavior may be constrained by external factors or laws but is not determined by 

379 Daft, 25-27.
171

At its most basic, this model

shares the Five-Ring approach of

viewing all organizations as systems.

In the words of our old friend von

Bertalanffy, it conceptualizes a system as an “organized cohesive complex of elements standing in

interaction.”380 The interaction

refers to two main patterns of behavior: (1) the relationship between the

organization and the battlespace;

and (2) the relationships among

functions (capabilities). Regarding

the former, organizations are too

often analyzed in isolation from the

environment with excess emphasis

on internal structures, including

organization charts, leadership,

rules, and formal communications.

While a useful aspect of organizational diagnosis, this closed system

approach neglects the simple realities of IPB in general and our phase

two analysis specifically; an organization “must interact with the environment to survive; it both

consumes resources and exports

resources to the environment.”381

It is an understatement to say that systems are highly complex. As 

organization theorist and practitioner, Richard Daft, “the organizatio

and obtain needed resources, interpret and act on environmental chan

of outputs, and control and coordinate internal activities in the fac

mental disturbances and uncertainty.”382 To simplify, all organizatio

following basic components: (1) importation of resources; (2) conver

380 Thomas G. Cummings, quoting von Bertalanffy in Systems Theory for Organ

opment (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1980), 6. 381 Daft, 14. 382 Daft, 14.

Figure 77. Ricin

Castor beans can be processed by t

with crude equipment and basic k

produce the deadly toxin 

Source: CIA, “Terrorist CBRN: M

Methods,” URL: http://www.cia.go

terrorist_cbrn/terrorist_CBRN.htm

6 June 2004.
172

tern of activities. Organizational inputs are many, but generally include 

rials, money, people, equipment and information.383 Some of these i

represent the resource dependencies introduced in phase three, and a 

these resource dependencies will qualify as the critical requirements 

analysis seeks. Outputs can be objective and subjective, but general

products, services, ideas and in the case of terrorists, violence. The conv

the ways it transforms inputs into outputs—are often the most difficu

nose, particularly given the elusive character of terrorists—it is hard to 

the black box. Finally, all relationships inside and outside the s

dynamic; they involve feedback. As put by Daniel Katz and Robert Ka

seminal work on organizations, The Social Psychology of Organization

are also informative in character and furnish signals to the structure 

environment and about its own functioning in relation to the environme

383 Michael I. Harrison and Arie Shirom, Organizational Diagnosis and Assessment

Theory and Practice (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999), 44.

Figure 78. Open System Model

Source: Author.
173

activities and behaviors. The open systems model helps by struc

activities for us. Patterns of activity in all organizations are both form

mal, and they reflect the most basic level of analysis. By examining 

interact with information and tools to accomplish tasks, we disce

Functions are patterns of activity with a specific purpose that con

whole. Synching this up with COG analysis, functions that can be p

a capability. The function of a flashlight is to shine light. If the flashl

has the capability to shine light. In CT terms, the function of the su

is to die in an act of violent destruction. If Hamas can successfully d

bombers, it has this capability. All social organizations have a simila

bilities that fall into one of four general categories: support, mainten

tive, and conversion. The specific patterns of activities that cha

capability and its overall contribution to performance (strength or w

unique to each group. Figure 78 is a model of an organization as a 

sisting of capabilities embedded in the organization, which are 

resources and information with the battlespace. The following parag

these capabilities in turn with one or two specific examples each.

384 Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, “Organizations and the System Concept,” T

chology of Organizations (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). Reprinted i

Organization Theory, eds. Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott (Fort Worth, TX: Harco

Publishers, 2001), 262.
174

madrassahs, are identified and 

for jihad, money is collected 

dered through a front charity, s

are purchased on the black m

communiqués are faxed to me

around the world.385 These are 

of the routine activities that 

support capabilities, which 

resource dependencies, attend 

holder associations, and provid

(shelter, food, transport). Recru

important, if not critical suppo

ity that involves linking needs a

tations within a community to a

Terrorists, the joint force, and o

on a menu of incentives incl

tangible benefits of a salary, t

shelter (transactional) and the 

suasive intangible incentives of 

sense of belonging, power, g

possibly the promise of eternal 

scendental).386 Religious 

groups recruit through mos

madrassahs to support a radical 

warlords with private militias recruit through family and clan associatio

port predatory wealth accumulation; Maoist insurgents recruit studen

universities to support a proletariat revolution.387 And as evidenced on 

of Baghdad and Tikrit during 2003-2004, Sunni groups hired one-sho

using hard cash payments of over $2500.388 Selection is an important 

385 Thomas and Casebeer, 23, available at URL: http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/OCP/

or Thomas and Casebeer, “Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems, St

Insights, (March 2004), URL: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/casebeerMar0

accessed 6 June 2004. 386 Thomas and Casebeer, 25. 387 Thomas and Casebeer, 25. 388 According to NPR reporter Emily Harris, “Some 90 U.S. troops have been killed 

fire since May 1 (2003), when President Bush announced an end to major combat. Man

attacks on American forces appear to be coming from Iraqis loyal to Saddam Hussein’s 

From “US Troop Toll Mounts in Iraq,” NPR Morning Edition, 2 October 2003

Figure 79. Human Shields

Terrorists use Filipino hostages as human 

shields after seizing them in Zamboanga, 

Philippines, in late November 2001 

(Reuters).

Source: State, Patterns 2001, URL: http://

www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/, 

accessed 7 June 2004.
175

or those that might prove difficult to socialize—it is tailored to the 

and what the battlespace affords. 

Acquiring resources and attending to stakeholders are key suppor

that have been developed throughout, requiring only modest elaborat

resource acquisition capability involves manipulation of the battles

to obtain requirements for system performance (similar to organic e

Like organisms, the resources required to sustain a group or carry ou

bilities become increasingly elaborated as the group moves through 

(see below). As a reminder for phases one and two, resource depen

requires us to inventory resources of all types and assess their critica

city. Attending to stakeholders is an important capability for any orga

particularly terrorist groups trying to survive in a state system. A u

for evaluating this capability is to determine the actual and perceiv

given association by looking at the group’s strategy for dealing with 

tion involves extensive effort to maintain relations, address stakeho

and anticipate future requirements—Hezbollah’s relationship with 

1980s.390 Accommodation is a less active strategy that might enta

interface, or only partial efforts to satisfy interests-suggestive of Hez

tionship to Tehran in the 1990s.391 The defense strategy involves do

mum required to keep the relationship alive, while reaction typ

ignoring or rejecting the relationship—the “LTTE must be proactiv

with donor organizations in the Tamil Diaspora, whereas it takes a 

even reactive approach to dealing with moderates and scholars in T

who do not share their agenda.”392

Jihadists are groomed through training camps and battlefield e

Maoist insurgent is executed by a comrade for collaboration with the 

AUC assassin is promoted for successfully killing a justice minis

389 Katz and Kahn, 84. 390 Approaches for dealing with stakeholders are adopted from research by sev

tional theorists into understanding stakeholder value to a given company througho

ment. Stakeholder dependency theory is admirably discussed in I.M. Jawahar and 

McLaughlin, “Toward a Descriptive Stakeholder Theory: An Organizational Life 

Approach,” The Academy of Management Review 16, no. 3 (July 2001), np, ProQ

391 Thomas and Casebeer, 30. 392 Thomas and Casebeer, 30. During the 1990s, the LTTE assassinated leading 

scholars in Sri Lanka. Daniel Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support for Insu

ments (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND, 2001), 47. 393 Thomas and Casebeer, 30.
176

them to a set of values (culture) and enforcing role behaviors through 

of rewards and sanctions. Recruitment brings in members; socializa

them to a set of norms and values, which as discussed in phase two, c

culture. In phase two, it is the culture of the battlespace; here it is the 

the stakeholder that is of interest. For an organizational value to be op

ized as a norm, three criteria must be met: (1) there is evidence of belie

vidual members that certain behaviors are expected; (2) a majority 

members share the belief; and (3) there is general awareness that the no

ported by most of the group’s members, not just the leadership.394 Nor

tive of values, constitute the group’s ideology and provide a more “ela

generalized justification both for appropriate behavior and for the act

functions of the system.”395 Rewards and sanctions reinforce culture, 

the discipline required for groups to survive member defection. For CT

who “display cowardice, reveal operational secrets to the government

the organization in any way are often killed.”396 On the other hand, incr

promotion, prestige and even promises of a martyr’s paradise are used t

job well done.397 Tracking who gets what and for what reason provides 

this capability as well as specific individuals who are more highly val

gestive of HVT.

394Katz and Kahn, 386. 395 Katz and Kahn, 385. 396 Thomas and Casebeer, 33. 397 Thomas and Casebeer, 34.
177

leaders meet to plan 

urban bombings, a cell 

implemented to ensure 

directions are issued f

nuclear materials. Cog

bilities are responsible 

and strategy developme

making, learning, and 

control over the organ

development and disse

ideology, or the core 

among the most import

capabilities whether us

tem or network mod

shapes strategy devel

optimal strategy match

ties to the demands 

tlespace and ag

vulnerabilities, and ul

COG, of the opponen

“strategy is analytically 

because you cannot sim

the statements of le

members—strategy is e

directed.”398 Since orga

organic, it is more ap

think of strategy as the 

organization takes, re

whether it is intentional

ing strategy begins by comparing the publicly disclosed strategy as 

marily in leadership statements and communiqués with the obser

based on pattern analysis of past activities and operations.400 An ex

the difference between “stated” and “observed” most often lies in 

conditions, a critical vulnerability, rhetorical excess, or intentional 

398 Thomas and Casebeer, 38. 399 Hatch, 113. 400 Thomas and Casebeer, 38.

Figure 80. Ahmed Omar Sheik

Pakistani police escort Ahmed Omar Sheik from 

the police station to the high court in Karachi, 

Pakistan, on 25 February 2002. The British-born 

Islamic radical was accused of masterminding 

the kidnapping of murdered Wall Street Journal

reporter Daniel Pearl (Reuters).

Source: State, Patterns 2002, URL: http://

www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/, accessed 7 

June 2004.
178

viduals and capabilities with the strategy. Control is implemented throu

and informal social structures. If a formal organizational structure e

most often hierarchal, functional, matrix, or cellular. The informal s

more important to actual performance, but more difficult to figure out. S

work analysis provides the best method for figuring out the linkag

agents, resources, and information. Communication—”the exchange o

tion and the transmission of meaning”—is a core capability for diss

strategy and exercising control.401 As the terrorist group grows and 

communication becomes increasingly complex, necessitating restrictio

vent system “noise,” or information that distracts and misleads.402 As a

lier, even though terrorists continue to rely on couriers and fa

interaction to ensure security, sophisticated information technolo

improved communication in three ways: reduced transmission time

costs, and increased scope and complexity of information.403 To avoid 

al-Qaida and others have adapted common web-based communicatio

with increased cleverness. For example, Microsoft Network’s Hotmail 

tem is used to communicate, not by sending messages, but by preparing 

and saving them in the “draft” folder, where they sit until another ope

on using the same account name—the message is never actually sent a

less susceptible to interception. 

Terrorist associations, like all organizations, are cybernetic systems; 

a reflexive feedback capability that enables correction and in some c

awareness.404 CT players can survive without learning when the batt

simple and stable. Conversely, a high degree of uncertainty necessitat

simple learning for survival—reflecting back on the relationship betw

mation and battlespace uncertainty. Single-loop learning is the most bas

ing learning from the consequences of previous behavior, resulting in c

“strategies of action or assumptions underlying strategies in ways tha

values of a theory of action unchanged.”405 More simply, we adjust 

based on mistakes or new information, but do not question underlying 

values. The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) in Yemen offers an example o

adjustment without letting go of its jihadist values:

401Katz and Kahn, 428. 402 Katz and Kahn, 430. 403 Zanini, 35-36. 404 Hatch, 371. 405 Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method a

(Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1996), 20.
179

Britons, two Australians and two Americans. Led by Abu Ha

group’s purposes included protesting the 1998 US military o

in Iraq known as Desert Fox and seeking the release of th

leagues being held by the Yemeni government on bombing ch

rare attempt by Yemeni security forces to rescue the hostages 

a two-hour fire-fight, leaving four hostages and three kidnappe

No prisoners were released, and Abu Hassan went to prison w

henchmen. Having failed to secure their objectives through 

ping, the IAA changed tactics. In January 2000, an attempt to 

US warship failed when the explosive-laden raft sank imm

after being launched. This feedback did not cause a change in 

but a re-engineering of explosives on the raft. On 12 October 

second raft blew a massive hole in the USS Cole.

406

Single-loop learning is sufficient when operational and tactical 

that is necessary to achieve goals. As uncertainty increases, decision

question and possibly adjust underlying norms and values—d

change—or risk stagnation, irrelevancy, and defeat. The ability not o

behavior, but determine what behavior is correct, is essential for s

ses—this is double-loop learning.

407 We learn to learn. Back to our I

the value of attacking Westerners was never abandoned even th

changed; adopting non-violent protest or shifting strategy against a

lim regimes instead of against the U.S. are examples of double-loop l

tern analysis, status quo ante bellum overlays, timelines, and conten

strategy documents are methods for analyzing learning. Investig

mechanisms for collecting, analyzing and processing intelligence th

system is also required—all capabilities provide information throug

with the battlespace, and “every individual, whether trained to collec

or not, is a sensor.”408

Child soldiers learn to shoot an AK-47, health services are deliver

munity, a suicide bomber records a martyr’s video, underground 

built, a politician is kidnapped, or aircraft are used as missiles to 

marks.409 These examples of conversion capabilities prepare resou

into the organization for export back into the battlespace. The terroris

important capability that anti-terrorism focuses on defending again

406 Thomas and Casebeer, 36 based on Bergen’s reporting, 167-181. 407 Hatch, 372. 408 Thomas and Casebeer, 37. 409 Thomas and Casebeer, 43.
180

to sustaining the group or a particular COA. For example, training 

recruits into terrorists, criminals, logisticians, accountants, or prop

while production converts resources into useful materials, includ

(cocaine, heroin), weapons (vehicle-born improvised explosive device

vests), or social services.410 Although conversion capabilities are often 

focus of combating terrorism, it is important to note that terrorist group

vive an extended period of dormancy in their conversion capabilities 

other capabilities remain active. Hezbollah, for example, can restrict ki

and suicide bombings for a year as long as it continues to recruit, soci

tain stakeholder relations, and propagate its ideology.411

System Properties

In addition to decomposing t

zation into a core set of ca

systems analysis introduces t

nizational-level properties 

neglected in the study of 

groups—life cycle, negative 

and congruence. Terrorist gro

spontaneously appear as ratio

nizations with well-ordered 

and patterns of activities. Ra

pass through a distinct seri

cycle phases in form and func

ure 81). As one example, whe

ditions of violence meet a w

and a charismatic leader with 

incubation occurs and a terro

may be born—gestation. As t

zation takes initial form, it w

adapting to its environment and becoming increasingly complex and 

ated by adding layers, cells, and capabilities. If allowed to prosper un

or if highly adaptive even in an uncertain battlespace, the terrorist g

reach maturity where growth plateaus, but increased efficiencies and th

of terrorist progeny may occur—witness al-Qaida’s transformation int

ment and the emergence of regional offspring. The life cycle is not n

410 Thomas and Casebeer, 45. 411 Thomas and Casebeer, 47.

Figure 81. Life Cycle

Source: Author.
181

areas. Maybe as a result of conscious strategy, but more likely due t

conditions, organizations revert back to another phase. 

Knowing where an organization is within its life cycle has imp

COG analysis as certain capabilities tend to be more critical than 

various stages.412 As a general rule, support capabilities are the mos

ing gestation and early growth, whereas maintenance and cognitive 

are more important in late growth. Groups with transcendental goals

gious extremist groups, will value maintenance capabilities more 

tional groups like narco-terrorists who value conversion capabil

production and delivery of cocaine.

412 For a summary of life cycle vulnerabilities see Thomas and Casebeer, 47-52.
182

can live forever. Of course, their ability to do so is contingent on many

factors, not the least of which is an

ability to avert the natural entropic

process. The tendency toward disorder and decline—information is lost,

people fail to uphold role behaviors,

conditions worsen—is forestalled by

building negative entropy. Negative

entropy is the “stock of energy,” the

“store of fuel,” and the “winter fat”

on which the terrorist draws during

periods of crisis. It is common and

often appropriate to think of cash

reserves, abundant recruits and backup sanctuaries as the forms of negative entropy. Through application of

the systems approach, however, other

more potent and less appreciated

forms emerge, including culture,

socialization, social services, intelligence gathering, and command and

control structures. In particular,

adherence to designated roles due to

an emphasis on maintenance capabilities can ensure a group survives a

loss of a leader or sanctuary, financial interdiction, or seizure of weapons. Figuring out how to cause defection, or deviation from role behav

be the most powerful means of undermining performance. The source o

entropy is a COG—CT strategy must deplete the stores of negative 

order to keep the terrorist from reemerging down the road. 

The third property, congruence, deals with the “fit” or “alignmen

capabilities in the context of the battlespace. A terrorist organizatio

likely to prosper when it achieves reinforcing working relationships 

parts, and importantly, between it and the battlespace. Good “fit” or c

works against entropy, optimizes performance, and propels the group 

life cycle path. Al-Qaida demonstrated good fit with changing battlesp

tions by shifting to soft targets in Africa when the hardening of targets i

Figure 82. ETA Bombing

Spanish police officers inspect the re

passenger bus set ablaze after a car bom

on the ETA, exploded near Madrid on 

2000. The attack killed three persons, 

Spanish Supreme Court judge, injured 

60 others, and destroyed dozens o

Source: State, Patterns 2000, URL

www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2

2434.htm/, accessed 7 June 20
183

can disrupt organizational performance, ultimately leading to defeat—

poor congruence when it recruits undisciplined youth to carry out de

that demand strict adherence to operational secrecy.414 Congrue

requires us to determine the factors that contribute most to harmoniz

ties with the battlespace. 

A clarifying example comes from an examination of the 

FARC.415 The FARC imports recruits as well as guns, training (

training from outside groups, such as the urban tactics training pro

Provisional IRA since 1998) and drug monies (resource depend

FARC converts, or transforms the recruit input into a trained guerri

ganized input is exported to the battlespace; the FARC recruit join

conducts attacks on Colombian armed forces. This pattern of activ

the attacks generate new resource inputs—recruits, resources, g

responses. In a clear rejection of the closed-system approach, the 

to avoid inevitable disorganization and death by importing m

(recruits, guns, funds) than it expends. Indeed, it is this adaptive c

that has enabled the FARC to survive CT efforts—suggestive o

energy inputs are also informative, providing intelligence about the 

The quality of available recruits provides insight into changes 

dimension and a change in the payments schedule by the drug car

intelligence on the current profitability of the drug market. In m

feedback cases, the FARC conducts covert surveillance against a p

to determine vulnerabilities, which in turn impacts operational plan

in combat also provides the negative feedback required to drive a 

shift in tactics.

Universal Model

To summarize, the open systems approach asks us to analyze all o

including terrorists, on three levels: environment (battlespace), organ

tem), and internal elements (functions). In addition to stressing the i

conducting analysis on relationships within and across levels, syst

leaves us with these key ideas:

(1) An organization’s effectiveness and success depends heavily 

ability to adapt to its environment, shape the environment, or find 

413 Thomas and Casebeer, 16. 414 Thomas and Casebeer, 16. 415 Adapted from Thomas and Casebeer, 14-15.
184

(2) Organizations will use their products, services and ideas as inpu

organizational maintenance and growth;

(3) An organization’s effectiveness depends substantially on its abil

meet internal system needs—including tying people to their roles i

organization, conducting transformative processes and managing o

tions—as well as on adaptation to the environment; and

(4) Developments in and outside of organizations create pressures f

change as well as forces for inertia and stability.416

It also directs analysis at four generic and several specific capabiliti

candidate critical capabilities for COG in the environment, ideology or 

tion itself. Insight into life cycle, negative entropy and congruence also 

us in on the right steps in the COG ladder. Prioritization and focus i

USMC doctrine argues:

We should try to understand the enemy system in terms of a rela

few centers of gravity or critical vulnerabilities because this allo

to focus our own efforts. The more we can narrow it down, the 

easily we can focus. However, we should recognize that most e

systems will not have a single center of gravity on which every

else depends, or if they do, that center of gravity will be wel

tected. It will often be necessary to attack several lesser cent

gravity or critical vulnerabilities simultaneously or in sequen

have the desired effect... We should try to understand the unique 

acteristics that make the enemy system function so that we can 

trate the system, tear it apart, and, if necessary, destroy the is

components. We should seek to identify and attack critical vulner

ties and those centers of gravity without which the enemy cannot 

tion effectively. This means focusing outward on the part

characteristics of the enemy rather than inward on the mechanica

cution of predetermined procedures. 417

The open systems model is a universal framework for a global pro

As a transportable tool, it allows for structured analysis across regions

increasingly important given the transnational character of terrorism. 

ing the uniqueness of groups, it also provides common scaffolding on 

416 Harrison and Shirom, 47-48. 417 MCDP 1-1, 47, 76.
185

Earth First!

PARTING SHOTS

On its worst counterterrorism day, the joint force engages determi

cautious communities, stressed security forces, raging identity entrep

conflicted NGOs. These stakeholders and others form a web of influ

joint force and its allies must negotiate to accomplish the mission

standing of this web gains fidelity in phase three by incorporating th

of relative interest concept, which tags stakeholders based on intere

to the CT mission. Even when intentions are not known, a range of p

and the opportunity for influencing them can be gauged by a clear a

interest. The prospects for operational success are further imp

“actionable” evaluation of capabilities that enables us to (1) affe

gravity and (2) bound the set of potential COA. 

Phase three of joint IPB doctrine prescribes four steps for evaluat

ties that are retained for CT IPB with modifications. Step one is the 

omega of capabilities evaluation—COG analysis. Centers of gravity 

of power, the sources of strengths, and the ultimate focus of CT effo

mine or bolster stakeholder performance and mindset. Despite argu

contrary, there are no “magic lists” of COG for CT, although there ar

didates depending on the level. At the strategic level, battlespace con

erty, exclusion from power), ideology (extremist theology, r

Marxism), and global networks are prime candidates. Cutting across 

ership (Osama, Abimael Guzman) is a perennial favorite; however, 

tion against such optimism, particularly in networked forms of o

where leadership is decentralized.418 Other operational-level “A

include intelligence gathering, finances, sanctuary, command and con

skilled operatives with weapons, and alliances. 

COG are enabled by critical capabilities, which may themsel

lower on the ladder. The network and system models suggest sever

overlooked by traditional analysis, including: resource acquisitio

418 In an 18 August 2003 interview, four leading RAND CT experts (Brian Jenk

man, John Parachini, William Rosenau) agreed that the capture of bin Laden would 

Qaida organization, but would not bring it down. According to Rosenau, “Although 

important to the movement, bin Laden’s death or capture would not mean the end o

Qaida isn’t like Peru’s Shining Path, where the arrest of its leader, ‘Presidente Gonz

group’s virtual collapse.” Symposium: Diagnosing Al-Qaida, reprinted from Front P

18 August 2003, URL: www.rand.org/news/newslinks/fp.html, accessed on 7 April 
186

vice delivery. Good sense also suggests that our analysis look into the 

but equally important tactical-level capabilities of eating, sleeping

sheltering. CC have resource requirements (information, money

objects, space) that may reflect dependencies on the battlespace. To 

that these dependencies are critical and susceptible to disruption, man

or strengthening, they represent critical vulnerabilities. Key nodes

points, or HVT are most likely to be found in CC and CR, and wher

be accessed, they are CV. 

An initial cut at COG-CC-CR-CV gives focus to step two: update th

els. Traditional threat models are insufficient for CT, leading to the in

of network and systems models as cutting-edge approaches. Both req

evaluate the stakeholder in relationship to the battlespace and as a who

ing the organization down, analysis is directed at relationships and core 

Moreover, these models capture several capabilities that are often mor

to CT missions, including ideology dissemination, strategy developm

service delivery, and others mentioned above. Importantly, CT IPB do

miss the need to develop inventories of equipment, chart authority stru

analyze tactics. Instead, it subsumes these basics of conventional analy

overall operational code. Models display stakeholder capabilities u

conditions, necessitating the reality test of step three—what the b

affords. In step four, sanity-checked capabilities are translated into a se

tial COA stated as capabilities—Abu Sayyaf can kidnap three peopl

Hezbollah can fund twelve clinics a year; NetAid can open and sup

alternative madrassahs a year. Once the set of available COA and 

capabilities are identified, we update our COG analysis to (1) determ

represent critical capabilities and (2) how CC link up to COG. Wor

down the ladder, we figure out (3) what CR exist for each and (4) whet

the CR have critical vulnerabilities. Time and resources depending, this 

conducted for every stakeholder in prioritized order. At a minimum, it i

the terrorist and reversed against the joint force. We are cautioned agai

ing the enemy without first having figured out our own COG ladder. W

cessfully performed, phase three not only answers the question, What c

to us?, but What can we do to them?
187

ANTICIPATING ACTIONS

Forty-one armed Chechens, including several female suicide bo

the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow; the al-Jihad organization merges w

and begins operations outside of Egypt; and in Iraq and Afghan

increased targeting of non-governmental (NGO) and inter-governm

organizations.419 These real-world examples are indicative of te

courses of action (COA) in response to changing battlespace co

efforts to combat terrorism by the U.S. and others. The first represe

tactical action in October 2002 by a Chechen group, calling itself the 

cide Squad, to achieve strategic effects in the heart of Russia. The se

a major change in stakeholder association intended to leverage a sha

and operational code against their declared enemies, including the 

Arabia and Egypt. The third example suggests an operational-level 

geting with strategic and tactical consequences. Anticipating these a

rorist actions is not only difficult; it is often impossible. While our 

reveal interests, it can rarely penetrate the veil of secrecy, deception

tion and uncertainty that shrouds intentions. Mark Kauppi, director o

rorism analysis for the Joint Military Intelligence Training Cent

clarifies our challenge:

Trying to determine if a military conflict or invasion is about to 

challenging enough—the intelligence community has been given 

ing grade for not anticipating Pearl Harbor, the Korean War, Chi

entry into that war, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Iraqi inva

419 On 23 October 2002, 41 Chechen separatists took 800+ Moscow theatergoer

57-hour crisis ended in the death of 129 hostages and 41 terrorists due primarily to 

aerosol opiate, fentanyl by Moscow authorities. Before being knocked out by the gr

through the vents, one of the female bombers reported told a hostage, “We have com

we all want to go to Allah, and you will be going with us.” John Donahoe, “The Mo

Crisis: An Analysis of Chechen Terrorist Goals,” Strategic Insights, May 2003, URL

www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ rsepResources/si/may03/russia.asp, accessed 10 June 2004. 

tages speak of storming terror,” BBC News, 26 October 2002, URL: http://news.bb

europe/2363679.stm, accessed on 10 June 2004. Al-Jihad, or Egyptian Islamic Jihad

merged with Al-Qaida in 2001 after at least a decade of cooperation, and increased 

Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and possibly elsewh

Kurth Cronin, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Report to Congress (Washington, 

sional Research Service, 6 February 2004), 49. The United Nations, International Co

Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children were all bombed during 

2003, iii.
188

directed on such observables as tanks, ships, planes, and foreign 

tary and diplomatic facilities.

Anticipating terrorist action is an even more daunting task... The an

of putting together pieces of the puzzle is apt. But for the terrorism 

lyst there is no box cover to assess progress, no piece has a straight 

and hundreds of pieces from other puzzles are part of the mix.420

Despite the inherent difficulties, it remains our responsibility to asses

stakeholder actions in relation to CT missions. Wide-eyed to the rea

knowing what we do not know, phase four of CT IPB recommends m

reducing surprise and developing a plausible set of COA available to th

and other influential stakeholders.

Phase four ties together threads from previous phases, building on 

and methods introduced thus far to go beyond battlespace awarene

tlespace knowledge.421 It evaluates and anticipates the “Decide” and 

elements of the adversary’s OODA Loop, enabling the joint force to le

knowledge advantage to decide on optimum COA while preparing for 

420 Mark V. Kauppi, “Counterterrorism Analysis 101,” Defense Intelligence Journal 

(Winter 2002), 42, 44. 421 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-53.

Figure 83. Chechen Terrorists

Source: Donahoe, URL: http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/ rsepResources/

si/may03/russia.asp, accessed 10 June 2004.
189

consider COA for all stakeholders with direct, and time permitting, i

ence on mission accomplishment. Moreover, the emphasis of CT 

diminish, disrupt, and defeat as opposed to defending against te

(anti-terrorism) necessitates preparing for a larger menu of possibl

dicting the what, where, when, why and how of the next big attack i

important responsibility of the Intelligence Community; however, 

capabilities assessment indicates that stakeholders take a greater 

actions relevant to their agenda (achieve goals/survive) and the joint 

sion. Will the pro-independence Kashmir Liberation Front (KLF) 

extremist Islamist agenda of Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM) in an effort t

influence?422 Will Jemaah Islamiah (JI) try to establish training camp

ippines, or will it collaborate with pirates to move operatives and e

revenue streams? How will the Algerian Salafist Group for Preachin

Combat (GSPC) respond to the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and incre

security capabilities? These are just a handful of the types of quest

only be answered with insight into intentions and the specific plans t

out. Determining which questions to ask, identifying the set of pos

available, and evaluating each COA in sufficient detail to determine 

and associated risks is the manual labor of phase three. 

In this chapter, a multi-step process recommended by joint and 

trine is introduced and modified to serve CT. The process has en

because it reflects an awareness of our knowledge gaps (holes reall

account adversary perceptions, and scopes the set of possible CO

sound criteria. It begins by identifying stakeholder objectives, whic

generation of all possible COA in step two. Step three evaluates an

the COA based on what the battlespace affords, the stakeholder p

capabilities allow. Steps four and five increase fidelity and identify ta

lection, monitoring, and achieving effects. Rather than changing the 

concepts and methods introduced here focus on how to achieve ea

422 According to Patterns 2003, 147, “Hizb ul-Mujahidin, the largest Kashmiri m

was founded in 1989 and officially supports the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir a

to Pakistan, although some cadres are pro-independence. The group is the militant w

stan’s largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami. It currently is focused on I

forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir and has conducted operations jointly w

miri militants.” Further (136), “The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), an 

the GIA [Armed Islamic Group], appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approxima

currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the 

gained some popular support through its pledge to avoid civilian attacks inside Alge

ents abroad appear to have largely co-opted the external networks of the GIA and ar

active throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. 
190

tools that have applicability beyond CT. Stakeholder analysis, which 

integral to every phase, is advanced by the introduction of an effects-ba

odology for determining an adversary’s desired end-state. Time-tested

overlooked methods are introduced for use in identifying and evaluatin

COA, including analysis of competing hypotheses, scenario analysi

teaming. Overall, this chapter argues for the adoption of hypothesis as a

and useful concept and hypothesis generation and evaluation as more v

ods. Success in phase four depends on knowing what we are trying 

over what time period and at what level of focus. Are we interested in an

the movement of a specific shipment of weapons into Somalia, or ar

cerned with the changing role of communications technology in the al-

work? But even as we focus our analysis, we are reminded that these ac

nested effects—tactical developments have strategic consequences. To 

tions: What are we trying to achieve? (mission analysis); What out the

Figure 84. Bali Bombing

Flags of Australia, Indonesia, and the U.S. hang at the explosion site in Kuta, B

Indonesia, 17 October 2002. More than 180 people, most of them foreign tourist

killed and hundreds injured when a car bomb exploded at the nightclub. (AP

Source: Department of State, URL:

 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/pix/events/b/eap/id/events/14470.htm/, 

accessed 10 June 2004.
191

effects); What can they do to us? (evaluate capabilities); we now add

they do?”

BAD INTENTIONS

Phase four of IPB—determine adversary courses of action—attem

out what plans are being devised and which are most likely to be i

The universe of possible COA is limited by the effects of the battle

two), the extent of stakeholder capabilities (phase three), and percep

Importantly, the only plans worthy of our time and effort are those t

ence the mission. For example, the GSPC might publish a new anti-

with no direct impact on a short-term CT mission of training Ma

forces—we would ignore it based on the methods offered here. Bu

continuum of relative interests from phase three, a complementar

goal is to exploit adversary plans through disruption and manipulatio

the prospects for joint force success. Where other stakeholders ar

phase four guides us in influencing their actions to improve their 

persuade them with respect to key decisions, and influence their beh

reinforcing objectives are achieved through five steps:

(1) Identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired end-state

(2) Identify the full set of courses of action available to the advers

(3) Evaluate and prioritize each course of action;

(4) Develop each course of action in the amount of detail time all

(5) Identify initial collection requirements.423

Air Force doctrine offers the only divergence from this “standar

recommending steps to explicitly identify assumptions, conduct re

consider adversary perceptions, and identify targets valuable to 

tion.424 These recommendations appear to add value and are incorpo

five-step process. “Perceptions” and its sister concept of “affordanc

gral to steps one through three, while assessing high-value and payo

wrapped into step four. Before applying each step to CT, we pause t

definitions and address a persistent debate regarding the evaluation o

423 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-54, and FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 44. 424 AFPAM 14-118, 46.
192

the pursuit of an activity.

 Thus, the first step of phase four is focused 

mining interests as they relate to desired objectives and end-states. Inte

the mode for achieving an interest, and when translated into plans an

intentions become COA. For the joint force, a COA is a specific plan f

ing the mission. It details forces, time-phasing, schemes of maneuver, 

operational details, providing the basis for an operational order. For th

COA are plans to achieve a desired end-state, which can be conceived 

cal goal and/or group survival (organizational goal). For other stakehol

are the plans to deliver a service, achieve a political objective, or ear

Whether a potential plan is relevant to the mission is a function of dire

effects and the level of action—strategic, operational, and tactical. For e

joint force COA to seize and destroy a weapons cache in Afghanistan i

cerned with the indirect, strategic COA of the Taliban to re-establish a

regime than it is with a direct, operational plan by the militants to rei

position and defend the assets at all costs.426 The key to assessing rele

lies in addressing the question: Can it influence mission success?

 Second, determining intent is so difficult, so fraught with uncert

many argue we should not even try “predicting the future.” Rather, 

should be squarely on capabilities. Cynthia Grabo, in Anticipating 

Analysis for Strategic Warning, makes a case echoed by military co

throughout history: 

Confronted with military forces which may attack him or which 

preparing to attack, it is essential that the commander have the 

accurate possible assessment of the capabilities of enemy force

that he prepare his defense or plan his offense against what the e

is capable of doing rather than attempting to guess what he mig

There is no doubt that battles and probably even wars have bee

for failure to have followed this principle and that the commande

permits his judgment of what the adversary intends to do overri

assessment of what he can do is on a path to potential disaster.42

425 Medby, 98. 426 During Operation Anaconda in March 2002, al-Qaida and Taliban forces put up a 

to defend a cave complex despite the most likely COA identified by the joint force bein

Brown, “The Enemy We Were Fighting Was Not What We Had Predicted,” 21. Referen

after-action report, Brown states, “Slide #54 graphically portrays the most likely enem

action titled ‘ECOA 1 (Most Likely) Escape;’ and slide #55 graphically portrays the le

enemy course of action titled ‘ECOA 2 (Least Likely) Defend/Attack.” 427 Cynthia Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washingt

Joint Military Intelligence College, December 2002), 17.
193

derives a similar conclusion in his

assessment of the contribution of

intelligence to victory in war through

history: “[F]oreknowledge is no protection against disaster. Even realtime intelligence is never real

enough. Only force finally

counts.”428 The reality is that accurate assessments of capabilities and

intentions are both difficult—there is

an iceberg below the surface of our

knowledge that is even bigger when

terrorists are involved. Moreover,

there are cases in which estimating

capabilities has proven thornier than

intentions. Grabo highlights the case

of Vietnam, where “there was little

doubt that North Vietnam intended to

move supplies through the Laotian

panhandle” to units in the South, yet

it “proved very difficult to estimate

the actual so-called throughput to the

South, let alone the supplies which might reach any given unit.”4

forced to choose between making an assessment of capabilities and i

with capabilities. That said, judging both is inherent in all comma

making whether we are cognizant of it or not. A simplified model o

weighting based on the decision level is shown in Figure 85. Accordi

at the strategic level, insight into intentions has historically proven m

to avoiding surprise, while at the tactical level, the range of possible 

sufficiently narrowed to allow capabilities-based planning. 

End States

Step one begins with the rationalist assumption that plans flow fro

which seek to achieve a specific end-state. Objectives are either go

based. For the former, objectives are “clearly defined, decisive, and a

428 John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to 

(New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 2003), 349. 429 Grabo, 20. 430 DOD Dictionary, under “objective.”

Figure 85. Intentions vs. Cap

Source: Brown, 27 
194

feature or adversary capability.

 End-states are the set of required 

that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.”432 Under exi

trine, we determine these by analyzing the current “military and polit

tion, strategic and operational capabilities, and the country characte

Getting only slightly more specific than this requirement to “know ev

doctrine recommends starting by identifying the overall strategic-leve

of the adversary—defend borders—before working out objectives at 

tional and tactical levels. Objectives are further broken out for each of 

involved, and when dealing with military operations other than war (M

for political and economic goals.434 For all objectives, we are reminde

and service doctrine to state assumptions explicitly when the 

unknown.435

For CT, the first step is even more demanding because we must 

broader range of stakeholders, end-states, and objectives. Moreover, ou

view of the battlespace and organizations in it implies that objectives 

time and are not always the result of rational calculation. Although c

desired end-state may be the result of conscious decisionmaking, spurre

ble-loop learning, it is also the result of life-cycle phasing, battlespa

and joint force coercion—it is emergent. Consider, for example, th

Chechen rebel groups seeking sanctuary in the Pankisi Gorge of norther

where it borders the Russian Federation republic of Chechnya. Among 

using the area, the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), 

notorious Shamil Basayev, probably envisioned using the mountainou

side Tbilisi’s control for staging operations, storing weapons, and shiel

tants among local inhabitants. The IIPB’s departure from Pankisi in 

likely the result of multiple factors, including Russian pressure and U.

to the Georgian military through a Train and Equip Program, whi

momentum as reports of IIPB ties to al-Qaida surfaced.436 There may h

431 DOD Dictionary, under “objective.” 432 DOD Dictionary, under “end state.” 433 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-53. 434 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 45. 435 “There will often be gaps in what is known about the adversary. It may be ne

develop assumptions to fill the gap(s) between what is known and unknown. Assum

educated guesses made when facts are not known... It is important they are recorde

municated to planners and decisionmakers. At the same time, collection requiremen

[articulated and] submitted to confirm or deny the assumption. In all cases, be sure 

guish assumptions from facts since assumptions involve some form of risk for plann

AFPAM 14-118, 46.
195

conscious decision to relocate, but it is also possible that it just happ

much debate—migration often happens this way. As in this example

a shift in objectives and if possible, the underlying causes, is just as 

figuring out the objective itself. 

Several concepts and methods have been introduced to help o

including basic insight to group identity (ethnic separatist, religiou

and similar), all of which provides a fix on whether the group is purs

actional or transcendental agenda. The building-block approach ta

holder analysis delivers insight based on a continuum of interests 

relationships. We can learn much about a terrorist group by the crowd 

with. By using the models in chapter four we assess rhetoric, dec

and learn to figure out narratives, strategies, and operational codes. T

tern analysis are also available since many terrorist groups forecast s

436 According to Patterns 2002, 136, “The IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be 

duit for Islamic funding for the Chechen guerrillas, in part through links to al-Qaida

ciers on the Arabian Peninsula.” 

Figure 86. Georgian Commandos 

Members of a Georgian Commando Battalion perform a combat off 

load at a training range at Krtsanisi, Georgia. 10th Special Forces 

Group (Airborne) participated in the Train and Equip Program.

Source: EUCOM, URL: 

http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Operations/main.htm&2, 

accessed on 12 June 2004. 
196

communiqués, website posting, and other tip-offs. Friday sermons in m

sometimes a good way to harvest intentions for Islamist groups, while 

recruiting and group membership can suggest a new operational directi

over, our approach takes into account end-states that link together obj

each of the dimensions, going beyond terrain and forces to goals linked 

opinion, resource acquisition, and service delivery. In part two of this c

functional analysis systems technique (FAST) debuts as one more tool f

ing objectives when intentions are not advertised. 

Full Set

Step two places a premium on creativity matched with solid work 

phases to develop a complete, consolidated list of all available COA. 

mum, we must identify plans that: (1) the stakeholder’s doctrine (narra

ational code, charter, business model) considers appropriate for the situ

accomplishment of objectives; (2) could significantly influence the mi

if they are not optimal, according to doctrinal guidance; and (3) are in

recent activities or events.437 The full set of COA is then evaluated in 

perception, criteria, capabilities, and effects. 

Reflecting on affordance theory from phase two, we are reminded 

holder perceptions of what the battlespace allows and what the joint for

will do is often more important than what is really possible or will act

pen. Of course, knowledge of perceptions requires getting inside the a

head, which presents the same difficulties as analysis of intentions. A

strated later in the chapter, reverse IPB through the use of red teaming i

sible means of discerning what the terrorist thinks we will do so th

figure out what he will do—it is a causal loop of action, reaction, and 

tion that demands an iterative, circular thinking process. Even with 

structured methods, it remains unlikely that we can paint an entirely ac

ture of adversary perceptions, let alone our own.

By current doctrine, the list of COA is now to be tested against fiv

suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency. A CO

able if its execution can contribute to achieving the objective. A plan to 

a change in leadership, as Hamas did in 2004, is not suitable to ach

objective of keeping leadership alive when Israel conducts targeted 

tions. A COA is feasible if sufficient time, space, and resources are a

carry it out.438 Keep in mind that terrorist groups, including al-Qaid

437 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-53.
197

by the first (1993) and second (2001) World Trade Center attacks 

City. Acceptability refers to the amount of risk that is tolerable to 

tion. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the use of suicide bombers d

cate a willingness to accept greater risk. Rather, it is reflective of a w

sacrifice, and if a martyr’s death is believed to herald paradise, it ma

perceived as sacrifice. Moreover, the originality, or at least surpris

many terrorist acts suggests a risk-taking mentality when in fact it is 

ing quality that make them less risky. Terrorist groups perceive risk a

need their operations to succeed to publicize their cause, build supp

ner resources. The unique criterion is simply a filter to ensure each o

sufficiently distinct from the others to warrant independent analysi

unique if it has significant differences in terms of effects, resources, 

ticipants, or operational plans.439 The final criterion requires COA 

tent with doctrine, or in the case of CT, the operational code. We a

however, that an adversary may deviate from doctrine to achieve su

to other factors, including desperation, past failures, and changes in 

Criteria screening results in a consolidated list of COA that ar

against our analysis from phase three—can they do it? Since our 

stakeholder capabilities is certain to be only partially accurate, we 

eliminating COA that are just outside the assessed range of capabilit

anese cult and terrorist group, Aum Shinrikyo, for example, surpri

with the extent of its chemical (sarin) and biological (botulism toxin) 

well as efforts to acquire conventional munitions, develop laser w

possibly acquire a nuclear capability.440 The bottom line is that we 

high degree of confidence that the adversary truly lacks the means 

such COAs, and is incapable of innovation or change in TTP that ma

a COA feasible” before we drop it.441 Having narrowed the COA by 

438 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-54. 439 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-54. 440 “Documents recovered by Japanese police in the investigation of Aum Shinrik

in the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack reportedly indicated that the terrorists were co

mation on uranium enrichment and laser beam technologies. A spokesman for Russ

nuclear physics laboratory, [the] Kurchatov Institute, acknowledged that at least one 

follower was working at the institute.” Central Intelligence Agency, “The Continuin

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Appendix A: Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Inc

March 1996, URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/1996/

go_appendixa_032796.html, accessed on 10 June 2004. 441 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-55.
198

criteria, and capabilities, we are left with screening based on the result

two—Does the battlespace allow it? In this final test, look at the b

effects over the period of COA execution to determine whether cond

significantly shape, disrupt, support, or limit the plan.

With our consolidated list in hand, we are encouraged to review it 

time, looking for any opportunity to refine it with available intelligence 

phasing, sequencing, synchronizing, locations, participants, and any o

that might clarify the COA and hint at plausibility. In doing so, three ke

ments surface: (1) consider the possibility that the stakeholder may have 

and choose COA that do not interfere with the mission; (2) remember th

befalls those who predict only one COA, so be certain to have severa

incorporate consideration of wildcards.

442 Wildcard COA are less likely

theless have the potential to directly impede mission success if execut

pected and unorthodox COA may be the result of creative, adaptive th

stakeholders, but they are also likely to occur as a result of desperation, 

standing, misperception, immature decisionmaking, ignorance, uncertain

ity, or a superior understanding of the battlespace.443 It is worth noting t

all the potential adversaries the U.S. might face, terrorist groups are the m

442 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 48. 443 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 49.

Figure 87. Aum Shinrikyo Headquarters, 1993 

Source: Department of Health and Human Services, URL: http://

www.hhs.gov/asphep/presentation/diagnosticestacio.html, accessed on 12 

June 2004. 
199

affords, group capabilities permit, and stakeholder actions demand.

Current doctrine offers a solid, comprehensive approach to develo

and filtering COA that requires only modest refinement in principle

methodology, doctrine says little about how to generate a good list u

going any explanation of even the most basic brainstorming techn

shortcomings are less a function of the process than they are of ima

cognitive bias. Perception errors and mirror-imaging are persistent p

are more acute when trying to forecast another’s planned actions. O

tion front alone, Heuer points to these common biases.

(1) We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive;

(2) Mind-sets tend to be quick to form but resistant to change

(3) New information is assimilated to existing images; and

(4) Initial exposure to blurred or ambiguous stimuli interfe

accurate perception even after more and better information 

available.444

Even the criteria offered by doctrine reflect Western mindsets as t

and how something might be done. This does not mean we should d

but rather it is a clarion call to greater appreciation of the value of cu

gence and the analysis of non-traditional dimensions of social and 

transactions.445 Techniques for helping with creativity and reducing 

ing are introduced in the next section, and the pitfalls of bias must 

always and often through a combination of awareness, collaboration 

and the structured methods introduced in this book.

Priorities

The COA identified in step two are hypotheses (explanations und

tion) about what stakeholders will do—they are not facts.446 That is, 

444 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: 

Study of Intelligence, 1999), 8-13. 445 The concept of cultural intelligence naturally applies across several areas of h

tion in a globalizing world. A recent book about the concept as it applies to internat

transactions is P. Christopher Early and Soon Ang, Cultural Intelligence (Stanford, 

University Press, 2003). It seems clear that tactical and operational collection and u

intelligence will be in proportion to the openness and astuteness of our operational fo

of any forward-deployed intelligence professionals.
200

hypothesis can be refuted by evidence to the contrary. Hypotheses r

most informed impressions of what we can anticipate the adversary an

do in light of current conditions. Inherent in this process is the recog

these plans, like the results of all our analysis, are dynamic and will cha

on joint force actions, shifting positions of other players across the di

and organizational learning. To render the COA set more useful to o

planning and command decisionmaking, step three evaluates and priori

as follows:

(1) Analyze each COA to identify its strengths and weaknesses, 

and decisive points;

(2) Evaluate how well each meets the criteria of suitability, feasi

acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine;

(3) Evaluate how well each COA takes advantage of the battle

environment;

(4) Compare each COA and determine which one offers the gr

advantages while minimizing risk;

(5) Consider the possibility that the adversary may choose the s

or third most likely COA while attempting a deception operati

evidencing adoption of the best COA;

(6) Analyze the adversary’s current dispositions and recent activ

determine if there are indications that one COA has already 

adopted; and

(7) Guard against being “psychologically conditioned” to a

abnormal levels and types of adversary activity as normal.

These procedures leverage concepts and methods developed here, 

modification in terms of mindset only. For example, our developmen

analysis argues that decisive points are most likely to represent targe

ated with vulnerabilities of critical requirements. While working it 

incumbent upon us to situate each procedure and COA within the con

system of value and norms, or culture, of the stakeholder.447 We need 

446 Brown makes a similar argument, stating “a hypothesis is a universal scientific pr

to help explain possible enemy events based on analysis,” 43. 447 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-56.
201

action by religious and/or ideological extremists as opposed to the 

outcomes. Westerners tend to be goal-driven, while others are oft

by the symbolism of the act itself. We should not underestimate 

for deception, but at the same time be blind to the obvious—some

ists do what they say they will do. 

How the results of step three are presented should be the result o

with the commander and staff. A traditional, probability-based pres

be sufficient. This type of presentation rates each COA in terms of li

ative to the joint force’s plan. In its simplest form, we might state th

most likely and COA #5 is least likely. For example, COA #1 is: tha

can Islamist Combatant Group (GCIM) is most likely to use suicid

kill tourists in the Djemaa el-Fna square in Marrakech during t

August.448 Even when using verbal descriptors of likelihood, some 

be made to discuss these qualifying words to ensure standardized co

tion of their meaning. Returning to the work of Heuer, he argues tha

Verbal expressions of uncertainty—such as “possible,” “probabl

“unlikely,” “may,” and “could”—are a form of subjective probab

judgment, but they have long been recognized as sources of amb

and misunderstanding. To say that something could happen or is 

may refer to anything from a 1-percent to a 99-percent probabili

express themselves clearly, analysts must learn to routinely comm

uncertainty using the language of numerical probability or odds 

Figure 88 shows the result of one study involving NATO officers 

ifying words were assigned probabilities based on interpretation o

ing.450 Given the variance of perceived meaning, the need to form

is evident. Sherman Kent, the first director of CIA’s Office of N

mates, recognized this problem and proposed the assigned probab

by the gray bar in Figure 88.451 Probability estimates will not be 

448 Moroccans associated with the GICM are part of the support network of the 

tional jihadist movement. GICM is one of the groups believed to be involved in pla

blanca suicide bombings in May 2003. Members work with other North African ext

engaging in trafficking falsified documents and possibly arms smuggling. The group 

issued communiqués and statements against the Moroccan Government.” Patterns 2

449 Heuer, 154. 450 Heuer, 154. 451 Heuer, 154.
202

titative terms when they are really subjective creatures. Other option

identifying COA that are the most dangerous to joint force mission s

most promising to achieve adversary objectives, or highest risk, mos

tive, most complex, and any other qualifier that fits with the CT mis

horizon, and forces involved.

Figure 88. Measures of Probability 

Source: Heuer, 155, URL: 

http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/art15.html, 

accessed on 12 June 2004. 
203

Fleshing out and translating the consolidated list into a decision-q

tional format is next. Working in prioritized order, step four answe

questions about each COA:

What—the type of operation: bomb, kidnap, smuggle, hide

and train (capabilities-based).

When—the timing, usually stated in terms of the earliest 

stakeholder can adopt the COA and its expected duration. 

Where—the location (geography, cyberspace, cognitive) w

COA is carried out (positioning across sectors and dimension

How—the methods by which the stakeholder employs re

skills and other assets to execute the COA (informed by an op

code). 

Why—the objective or end-state that the COA intends to acc

(effects-based).452

Answers to these questions are related and presented in three parts: s

plate, narrative description, and targets. The answers also serve as in

can be employed to monitor COA selection and implementation.

The situation template is a graphic depiction, whenever possible, 

holder’s disposition and actions at key points in time for each COA

situation template captures the situation before the joint force pl

mented and at critical junctures during the execution of both joint f

rorist COA. These “snapshots” are strung together to provide a sens

situation will develop, including deviations (branches and sequels) 

COA as events unfold. Several templates are usually required to capt

plexity of the COA and the array of capabilities and/or assets involve

uation template relates the description of the battlespace from pha

stakeholder’s doctrinal template (operational code) from phase thre

it based on the reality check of battlespace effects. The examples i

452 Adopted from FM 34-130, Chapter 2, np. 453 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-57.
204

and 90 from Army Field Manual 34-130 are for insurgent COA; how

may be equally applicable to a terrorist group. When an operation or 

does not lend itself to a drawing, or schematic representation, a matrix 

crete cells is superior to words alone as a tool for referencing a set o

actions against locations, time, and agents. 

These examples are suggestive of the types of products that can be c

a host of terrorist actions, including smuggling operations, communic

works, target surveillance operations, and training activities. At the tac

a terrorist COA to conduct surveillance against a potential target migh

map of the urban area marked with options for terrorist transit in and 

area (foot, mass transit, bicycle), positions for unobstructed observatio

ing on the equipment used (telescope, camera, eyeball), and optimal tim

imize risk. A surveillance template can be combined with a sanctuary t

capture another COA centered on the cover and concealment activities o

ist cell. At the strategic level, there is value in mapping situation templa

Figure 89. Ambush Template

Source: FM 34-130, URL: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-1

Ch3.htm#s3, accessed on 12 June 2004. 
205

overall al-Qaida recruitment, training, and socialization plan. One 

envision a graphic involving physical locations, timelines, organizat

uals, and instrumental items or events (blood oath, completion of tr

bat) involved in the “processing” of names like Jose Padilla, John W

Abu Zubaida, and in the following example, Mohammad Rashed al’

He was born in 1977 in Liverpool, England....Al’Owhali was bro

in a religious manner, in his teens devouring magazines and boo

jihad, such as The Love and Hour of the Martyers and the Jihad m

published by bin Laden’s Services Office. He attended a religiou

sity in Riyadh and considered going to fight in Bosnia or Chechn

1996, finally opting for training in Afghanistan. When al’Owhali 

the Khaladan training camp in Afghanistan, he was told that he s

adopt an alias like everyone else. At a certain point he was grant

audience with bin Laden, who told him to train some more. He w

instructed in the black arts of hijacking and kidnappings, with pr

given to planning for attacks against American military bases an

sies and the kidnapping of ambassadors. He also learned how to 

security and gather intelligence. Al’Owhali then volunteered to fi

alongside the Taliban, who were at war with Afghanistan’s form

Figure 90. Raid Template

Source: FM 34-130, URL: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-130

accessed on 12 June 2004. 
206

then moved to a month of specialized instruction in the operation 

management of the cell.” The cell, he was taught, was divided into 

tions—intelligence, administration, planning, and finally execution

was also taught how to do a site survey of a target using stills and v

Al’Owhali was now judged ready for a big job.454

Al’Owhali’s “big job” turned out to be the Nairobi embassy bombing. 

massive bomb exploded on 7 August 1998, al’Owhali fled the scene 

plan to kill the gate guard failed—he had forgotten his gun. His c

insight into capabilities and COA at the strategic level, which shape o

and tactical level COA—nested effects exist for COA as well. Tha

development must include consideration of how higher- or lower-l

influence each other. 

The graphic situation template is supported by a clear, concise 

description. At a minimum, COA description should address the “earlie

COA can be executed, location of the main effort, supporting opera

time and phase lines.”455 CT parallels exist, requiring time, resources

tion, agents, and space (location) to be incorporated into a verbal desc

activating cells or specific linkages, transferring money, posting to 

indoctrinating a recruit, and conducting surveillance. The narrative also 

critical decision points (event, time, or location when a command d

required to engage the adversary), and if possible high-value targets (

high-payoff targets (HPT). As a reminder, a HVT is a resource, in

agent, or space that can disrupt or defeat a critical capability and thus 

affect the COG. A HVT is often a vulnerability associated with a critic

ment. Although not addressed as such in joint or service doctrine, tim

be a HVT when it can be controlled or manipulated in a way that und

terrorist plan. A HPT is a target that must be acquired and engaged (

defeated, or strengthened for allies) for the success of the joint force m

For example, a HPT for a COA to intercept an illegal sea-transfer 

might be the ship itself and/or the crew.

In most cases, the details connecting an initial point to the objecti

known, requiring us to mentally wargame, or play out the actions to 

how it is likely to unfold and what its critical junctures, or decisive p

Wargaming involves an action-reaction-counteraction sequence that 

454 Bergen, 107. 455 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-59. 456 AFPAM 14-118, 52.
207

tions, adversary assets and possible COA, and a specific battlesp

ment.”457 It is a structured process that brings to bear all the result

work to test out joint force plans against the most likely or dangero

other stakeholders. Each COA is played out on its own merits with 

ment of all COA being held off until the end.458 As the plans 

enacted, key decision points, high-value and -payoff targets, and na

interest are identified and recorded. Wargaming also helps identif

gaps for collection.

Collection

In the final step, intelligence requirements are derived from the de

opment of COA in steps one through four. Each COA, when suffic

fied, will suggest areas and activities that when observed will reveal 

the adversary has adopted.459 If a known terrorist operative is obser

ing reconnaissance of a housing complex for foreign nationals in R

Arabia, the activity serves as an indicator of a COA to target it for b

new jihadist website appears bearing rhetoric suggestive of JI, and it 

server in Saigon, the activity suggests the establishment of a cell in V

area where each of these activities is expected to take place is called a 

of interest (NAI). The word “area” is used loosely, not just in the tra

graphic sense, and can be a time, event, movement, statement, or any 

opment that indicates a specific capability is being performed, a p

implemented, or a decision has been reached. Importantly, NAI 

applied to the sectors of the battlespace, serving as markers to ass

conditions. NAI are only useful if they are sufficiently distinct to all

to be distinguished from another. If all COA under consideration in

transfer of funds as a precursor to any of several options, it should be 

indicate initiation of a plan, but not to determine a specific one—“co

the differences that will provide the most reliable indications of ado

unique COA.”460 Other clues to NAI include knowing the life cycle o

Named areas of interest are depicted on the event template and 

former is a graphic depiction of where or when the NAI comes int

added to the situation template as in the example for an insurgency 

457 Joint Pub 2-01.3, III-3. 458 Joint Pub 2-01.3, III-4. 459 Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-59. 460 FM 34-130, Chapter 2, 56.
208

The insurgency example uses physical locations; however, NAI ca

mapped against a cyber-network, social network, or even time. An ind

an NGO is preparing to move into the joint force operational area, for 

might be trigged by a phone call to a local activist, or a change in targe

by a terrorist cell might be evidenced by a coded email. The matrix of

for capturing the specific activity expected for each NAI and COA. Figu

a conventional example to demonstrate how the NAI on the event tem

referenced against time to build the matrix. Each NAI gets a full desc

the key indicators for collection and monitoring. The integration of ti

for the entire life cycle of a COA to be depicted and used to develop a 

plan. These tools are integrated with the alternative competing h

approach in the next section to maximize our chances of developing an

ing the COA that are most likely to influence the mission. 

Figure 91. Named Areas of Interest

Source: FM 34-130, URL: http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/34-130/Ch

accessed on 12 June 2004. 
209

GOOD PROSPECTS

We cannot allow the rigor of the five procedures developed thu

proliferation of the word “predictive” to seduce us into greater certa

analysis allows. The consolidated and prioritized list is at best a se

ses subject to continuous investigation. If we remain fully aware o

limitations, the five-step process is nonetheless practical for anticip

that can influence joint force plans—its prospects are improved w

introduced here. In the previous section, concepts and methods fro

phases were incorporated to improve the usefulness of each step 

one’s requirement to determine end-states and objectives, for exam

ported by prior stakeholder analysis (web of influence, continuum 

interests) and an evaluation of the narratives, operational codes, 

development capability of the group. In this section, the functional 

tems technique picks up the stakeholder analysis thread by adding 

Figure 92. Event Matrix Formation

Source: Joint Pub 2-01.3, II-64. 
210

assessing objectives when the adversary’s interests and intent are shrou

section adds new tools to improve our ability to generate a full set of C

out being limited by a lack of imagination or bias. Furthermore, they a

evaluate and monitor COA in a more effective, accountable manne

cally, hypothesis generation is improved through pre-mortems, red tea

scenario analysis. Each employs related concepts in a unique manne

thinking traps, such as mirror-imaging or satisficing, and generates a

set of COA. When it comes to hypothesis evaluation, ACH is alway

tool to use because it offers a simple, time-tested method for struct

dence and monitoring COA implementation. In the end, all these techn

only take us part way to understanding how the adversary thinks. In th

Cynthia Grabo,

Figure 93. Mogadishu, Somalia

Source: U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum, URL: http://www.qmmuseum.lee.arm

mout/somalia.html, accessed 7 June 2004.
211

ing processes of foreign powers clearly is fraught with peril. N

less it is important to try. The analyst, the Intelligence Commu

policymaker or military planner may have to make a conscient

imaginative effort to see the problem or the situation from t

side’s point of view. Fantastic errors in judgment, and the mos

itous misassessments of what the adversary was up to have bee

utable to such a lack of perception and understanding.461

We must try. In the end, we will not get it exactly right, but the joint f

off and our mission more likely to succeed if we at least know ou

have taken a decision to act and we have a sense of what actions 

Indeed, this may be enough. Once the adversary is met, on the stree

ishu or the Internet servers of cyberspace, all COA are certain to cha

Fasting

When rhetoric is vague or inconsistent, when terrorist leadership 

or when deception and misrepresentation characterize policy, how 

the objectives and desired end-state of the state or terrorist grou

cases, such as North Korea or Jemaah Islamiya, we can infer o

observing the behavior of the organization. Of course, even this 

intense collection difficulties. This approach, informed by sys

requires us to decompose the functions of the target organization. In 

for example, we used the systems model to identify a core set of ter

functions (verb noun pairs: climb mountain, recruit people, acqui

communicate guidance, produce weapons, and others.) These func

building blocks of a method known as Functional Analysis System

(FAST). Jason Bartolomei and William Casebeer, in their report to 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), argue that systems engineers ha

FAST to “clearly identify the functions of the parts of a physical sys

functions are then arranged in a hierarchal manner, which allows u

objectives of the system “even in the absence of specific knowled

intention of the designers.”463

461 Grabo, 47. 462 Jason Bartolomei and William Casebeer, “Using Systems Engineering Tools 

Policy on North Korea,” unpublished report to the Defense Threat Reduction Age

2004, 4. 463 Bartolomei, 4.
212

Bartolomei and Casebeer used this methodology to identify the obj

all the stakeholders involved in negotiations with North Korea (Democ

ples Republic of Korea (DPRK)): U.S., Japan, South Korea (Republic 

(ROK)), China, and Russia. By observing the actions of each stakeho

tions were defined. Their focus on North Korea, which shares some c

tics with terrorist groups in terms of secrecy and deception, offers a 

example that can be readily adapted to CT. The observed activity, for ex

increasing the density of artillery in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) is 

into a strengthen DMZ function.464 In another example, the U.S. decisio

duce Patriot missile batteries along the DMZ served multiple functions

threaten DPRK and protect ROK. Subject matter experts are brought o

help identify all the functions as shown in Figure 94. Once all the obse

tions are identified and consolidated, the FAST method organizes th

hierarchical structure of “How” and “Why.”465 The diagram is read fro

464 Bartolomei, 4. 465 Bartolomei, 4.

Figure 94. North Korean FAST 

Source: Bartolomei, 5. 
213

According to their analysis, the DPRK is strengthening its milita

itself, and 

[it] protects itself in order to preserve Korean Worker Party’s (KW

which in turn helps it achieve great power status. Conversely, ho

North Korea achieve great power status? By preserving KWP ru

does it do this? By focusing on maintaining internal stability. Int

bility is maintained via a police state apparatus.466

The “Why” functions define the desired end-state and supporting ob

the “How” functions reveal the means by which objectives are ac

analysis tags preserve regime and achieve great power status as h

objectives for the DPRK. From these, second order objectives to m

nal stability, build prestige, eliminate threats, and protect self are re

fied. Working across the diagram, the other functions support the

continues until all the observed functions are mapped. If we applied 

a terrorist group, we would likely find interesting higher-order exp

the observed functions, particularly if we factor in culturally or i

informed functions. For example, the function of detonate self lin

higher-order functions such as access paradise, preserve group, and 

merce. That terrorist functions can simultaneously serve several 

functions is what makes it particularly dangerous and difficult to 

application, FAST is most useful when complementing more direc

rhetoric, psychology, and trends in group behavior as part of phase t

Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis generation, or identifying the full set of possible COA

pin of phase four. Failure to identify the correct hypothesis as one 

options guarantees the right one is never evaluated. Canadian ho

Wayne Gretzky got it right when he said, “you miss 100% of the sho

take.” In a similar vein, we will miss 100% of the COA we fail t

front. A classic method for identifying options is brainstorming, wh

the freewheeling exchange of ideas without constraints of practica

ment until all the ideas are on the table. In practice, brainstorming 

turns into discussions over pre-conceived ideas. Brainstorming is in

ideas presented here—pre-mortems, red teaming, and scenario an

more structured methods champion creativity and adjust for the ha

466 Bartolomei, 5.
214

from a different perspective. Pre-mortems look first at joint force COA 

sons for mission failure. Red teaming starts with the adversary and 

options based on its goals and character. Scenario analysis, also known 

tive futures, begins with the battlespace, identifying underlying forces 

actors to certain outcomes.

Pre-mortems

The pre-mortem is the most elegant of the methods for its simplicity

suffer from limited expert participation and a less rigorous process. Pre

have gained traction among military planners as way to overcome p

much confidence in their own plans.468 The pre-mortem method seeks t

loose from pre-conceived notions, over-confidence, or personal attach

particular outcome by using mental simulation to find defects in a pl

planner is rewarded, not for defending a plan and arguing for its imper

but for finding fatal flaws. In practice, pre-mortems involve three 

assume the plan has failed at some future date; (2) actively seek out r

failure, probing for ill-advised assumptions, weaknesses, and complexi

develop strategies to account for possible causes of failure.470 Well e

breaks down the emotional attachment to the plan’s success, instead 

creativity and competence by identifying likely sources of breakdown.”

 Pre-mortems are useful for CT IPB if applied with some modifica

minimum, the pre-mortem should involve operations and intelligence 

familiar with the joint force mission and proposed COA. Using the exa

mission to defeat an al-Qaida-affiliated cell in the tri-border region 

America (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), a possible, and broadly stat

to use Special Forces to seize a high-ranking operative from his vill

Assuming the COA has failed, the first task is to identify all the possib

for its failure at any time prior to or during its execution. Likely resu

467 Heuer, 95. 468 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge: MIT 

2000), 71. 469 Klein, 71. 470 Pre-mortems are also recommended for use by leaders and teams in high intensi

environments. See, Jim Stratton, Sam Grable, and Troy Thomas, “Expeditionary Air Fo

Cognitive Skills for the Naturalistic Battlespace,” Air and Space Power Chronicles (Feb

URL: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/stratton.html, accessed on 

2004. Sam Grable and Troy Thomas, “Training the Mind to Deploy,” Air Force Comptr

zine (July 2001, October 2001).

471 Klein, 71.
215

breakdowns, compromise, relocation of target, strong resistance, an

second task is to select out all reasons for failure that can possibly be 

adversary and/or other stakeholder action, such as the last three ex

third task is to subject each of these reasons to the tests of step two: 

criteria, capabilities and effects. Keep in mind that several reas

related. For example, compromise by a Paraguayan official (COA

joint force plans and provide to cell leader) combines with the smu

operative out of the area (COA: continually relocate leader to avoi

undermine the joint force plan. From here, we simply continue wit

(prioritize), four (detail) and five (collect). The key difference betw

tems and red teaming is that pre-mortems start by questioning th

COA while red teaming starts with the adversary COA. Ideally, time 

to run both and compare results.

 Red Teaming

Red teaming has a distinguished record in the defense communit

challenge feasibility, vulnerability, risk, and operational value, part

regard to acquisition and concept development programs. It also has 

tory in military exercises, such as the Air Force’s Red Flag or 

National Training Center, where an opposing force (OPFOR) ser

team, emulating adversary tactics and equipment to train the joint fo

ing to a recent report from the Defense Science Board (DSB), “red te

ens understanding of options available to adaptive adversarie

complements and informs intelligence collection and analysis.”47

project themselves “imaginatively into the terrorists’ minds to devi

strategies, operations and tactics.”473 It is a structured way of si

actions-reaction-counteraction of stakeholders in the wargaming ph

tional planning. For COA generation, it offers a methodology fo

“valid scenarios consisting of detailed action to complete a terrorist 

Successful red teaming depends on a (1) supported, qualified team; 

perspective; and (3) structured approach.

472 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force, “The Role and Status of DOD Re

Activities,” Report to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, T

Logistics (September 2003), 1. 473 Joshua Sinai, “Red Teaming the Terrorist Threat to Preempt the Next Waves 

Terrorism,” briefing presented at the 14th Annual NDIA SO/LIC Symposium and E

February 2003, slide 6. 474 Judy Moore, John Whitley, and Rick Craft, “Red Gaming in Support of the W

ism: Sandia Red Game Report,” Summary of Red Game held 22-24 July 2003 (Feb
216

is the use of a tea

ing of individual

for their subj

expertise, profess

cultural perspectiv

nation, or even ski

cal analysis.475 In t

is rarely possible 

experts from releva

such as NGOs or c

leaders; therefor

effort must be mad

in experts from the 

may meet the abov

including talented 

als from the c

security police, 

public affairs, o

and intelligence. A

sider identifying p

who bring imagin

critical eye even if they lack experience or expertise. Teams often fai

lack of institutional support, particularly because they can become time

and through their introduction of uncertainty, they are perceived as di

programs or COA to which the staff is already wedded.476 But this disru

ries the value of mitigating surprise. Other typical causes of red te

involve not taking the assignment seriously, being captured by bureauc

ests, becoming too removed from the decisionmaking process, failing 

results in a timely manner, and leaking results prematurely.477

Getting an accurate perspective demands more than putting on terror

requires going deep into culture and drawing on all the well-grounded 

cultural intelligence recommendations available. It also requires atten

the pitfalls of perception. In the words of red teaming expert Mark Ma

view from a defense contractor’s office or an academician’s window 

same as the view from the proverbial ‘Arab street,’ nor can a lifetime’

475 DSB, 3. 476 John F. Sandoz, “Red Teaming: A Means to Military Transformation,” Report fo

Advanced Warfighting Program, Institute for Defense Analysis (January 2001), 4. 477 DSB, 5.

Figure 95. Triborder Meeting

In December 2002, delegates from the U.S., Paraguay, 

Argentina, and Brazil meet for the first Three Plus One 

Triborder Area Counterterrorism Meeting.

Source: State, Patterns 2002, URL:

 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/html/19987.htm,

accessed 7 June 2004.
217

effort must be expended up front to ensure all prospective members 

as a whole invest in analysis of the social and information dimensio

tlespace as well as the worldview, desired end-state, narrative, oper

and tactics of the terrorist group. This is equally valid for other 

What are the social norms of the Nigerian peacekeepers in Sierra 

does NetAid initiate and develop relations with community leader

will the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) be playin

ational area? Ideally, these stakeholders will be open about their pe

operational codes; this is not always the case. 

A qualified red team rooted in a well-developed social intelligenc

can employ a variety of structured methods—brainstorming, altern

ios, and an evolving “attack tree” approach-to develop a full set 

Regardless of the method, several ingredients should always be p

clearly define the objective of the red team. For example, the objecti

identify the full set of actions by which terrorist cells in the tribord

generate income, undermine governance, obtain sanctuary, or inte

joint force mission. Are we trying to predict the next big attack, or 

shift in safe haven or training locations? Thinking in terms of optio

actions intended to interfere with the joint force is important sinc

likely that the terrorist group or other stakeholder is (1) not aware 

and (2) will execute COA that interfere by accident rather than con

ning. For example, the relocation of an operative from a house in 

town of Ciudad Del Este may have less to do with the impending c

tion than it does with an invitation to dinner or a family emergency. 

478 Mark Mateski, “Red Teaming Terrorism, Part I,” Method Paper 1.03, Red Team 

2003), URL: http://www.redteamjournal.com/methods/redTeamingTerrorismPt1.htm

11 March 2004. 479 The “attack tree” method is recommended by Mateski and developed by secu

Bruce Schneier. According to Schneier, “Attack trees provide a formal, methodical 

ing the security of systems, based on varying attacks. Basically, you represent attac

tem in a tree structure, with the goal as the root node and different ways of achievin

leaf nodes.” For details and examples on the method, see “Attack Trees: Modeling s

Dr. Dobb’s Journal (December 1999), URL: http://www.schneier.com/paper-attack

ft.html#rf2, accessed 15 June 2004.
218

defined, brainstorm on all the possible options for achieving the objective. Do not rule anything out

initially; save filtering for the third

requirement—test the options

against pre-established constraints.

The constraints are most often going

to be our familiar perceptions, five

criteria, capabilities, and effects.

Additional constraints can be added

based on the red teaming objective,

which reflects constraints of the CT

mission. In the Sandia National Laboratories Red Gaming project, for

example, realistic constraints were

established for a terrorist event in the

Washington DC subway system

within a two year window:

People: Teams were allowed to

recruit others in country and

out of country—but if they

were going to assume the presence of resources from out of

country, they would have to

plan for getting them into the

country.

Risk: Their cell could be completely destroyed but leaving a

trail to other al-Qaida leaders was not acceptable. They would w

get credit for al-Qaida for the event but they didn’t want to be de

before completion.

Money: $100,000 was available from overseas to support the 

effort, but they would need to communicate to get it. Making m

was allowed. Charitable fund raising was also allowed.

Communications: Open source information was assumed, no s

means of communication was assumed.

Figure 96. ICRC

An Afghan woman waits for by her 

grain and oil from the ICRC

Source: EUCOM, URL: http://www.e

Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?h

www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/O

oef/oef.htm&2,

accessed 7 June 2004.
219

or skills the real players had. At the end of the game th

Masters would query the teams about how any specialized 

edge could have been gained—in particular what actions w

required.

Context for the Individuals: The team would assume that 

them had only been here for a few years and had tried to m

low profile. They were not citizens and were here on visas. A

extremely loyal and dedicated to the cause of al-Qaida.480

The fourth requirement is to detail each option, thinking three-t

ahead within the context of a single COA. Importantly, many opera

ods, such as wire transfers, entering a country, or detonating a bomb, 

across groups and scenarios. By developing a menu of “reusable” 

methods, team members can avoid reinventing the wheel for each 

focus instead on how operational methods link together in a uniqu

achieve the terrorist objective.481

The fifth and final requirement is to develop a robust list of in

observables. Returning to the Sandia project, several high-lev

emerged regarding their general nature that are consistent with 

answer who, what, when and where for each; (2) link indicators to 

life cycle of each COA; (3) attach additional qualities (visibility, lin

indicator); and (4) determine the likelihood that a particular indi

noticed.482 This last one is particularly important, as we tend to 

expect to see and gravitate toward familiar indicators—troop move

tion of a communication network, recalls, and others. For CT, we m

creative in our indicator lists—religious school enrollment, group 

charity events, web postings, coded emails, sermons, and many, man

true value of red teaming is its emphasis on getting in the adversar

employing a rigorous method for generating COA and preparing the

tion as hypotheses. 

480 Moore, 14-15. 481 Moore, 18. 482 Moore, 18.
220

Also known as scenario analysis, the alternative futures methodolog

to overcome two key shortcomings of traditional trend analysis: (1) fore

single outcomes with attached probabilities; and (2) failure to enco

examination of basic assumptions.483 These failures reflect our tendenc

tify a specific organization or capability and then to extend it forward 

without fully accounting for the effects of the battlespace. Scenario 

however, draws on our CT IPB phase two work by starting with the batt

identify the underlying forces that are likely to shape outcomes. R

focusing on what is known with confidence, this method embraces u

and makes no assumptions regarding historical continuity or change.484

to one of its expert practitioners, Alan Schwartz, the analytical goa

“forecast what a system will look like in the future. The goal is to es

range of behaviors the system can exhibit within a given time period.”4

Like the other methods, scenario analysis is best performed by inter

ary teams focused on a clear goal. What question(s) are we trying to an

example, will Islamist extremist groups increase their presence in the 

region in the next two years? Or, will Hezbollah obtain weapons of ma

tion (WMD) by 2015? With the goal defined, the first task is to identify 

of battlespace effects, or driving forces that can influence the outcome. 

of Hezbollah, what forces from across the battlespace dimensions will i

decision to pursue a WMD capability? A driving force is any factor, co

effect that might serve as a catalyst for the outcome, including the core 

for developing and acquiring weapons. In a study conducted for the DT

ers for weapons proliferation in the Middle East by a range of actors, 

Hezbollah, were identified as resource scarcity, socio-economic c

regime behavior, internal conflict, defense/deterrence incentives, offens

incentives, and stakeholder relations.486 The key is to consolidate the 

relevant drivers into the fewest categories possible while remembering 

are generally interrelated, thus reinforcing and modifying the others. 

483 Alan R. Schwartz, PolicyFutures, LLC, “Scenario Analysis for Understanding th

ment of Terrorism in Central Asia,” unpublished report of the first working group, 22 S

2002, 2-3. 484 Schwartz, 3. 485 Schwartz, 3. 486 Brent Talbot, Troy Thomas, Tim Uecker, “All Our Tomorrows: Proliferation Dri

Middle East,” unpublished research report conducted for the Defense Threat Reduction 

April 2001.
221

Forces have a direct or indirect effect on the outcome. The DTRA 

that Hezbollah’s incentives to acquire WMD, for example, are influe

by a defense motivation (against Israel and/or the U.S.), an offens

(against Israel), a stakeholder incentive (relationship with Iran), and 

tors (prestige).487 Next, each is sorted into those “that can be forec

tainty and those about which there is much uncertainty over the an

period.”488 In the DTRA analysis, all of these forces were assessed 

remain directly influential through 2015 with high certainty. Less c

rounded the possible influence of internal conflict within Hezbollah 

or the impact of changing socio-economic conditions. These driving 

effects on the strategic level; however, it is also appropriate to look 

behind the forces to deal with operational or tactical questions.

Our next task is to combine the drivers to generate a set of scenar

ative futures. The best place to start is with the extremes of each 

example, what if Iran dropped out of the WMD business and Israel 

treaties with all its neighbors? What if Hezbollah split into two or m

and Israel formally announced a nuclear capability? Continue by co

extremes of all the drivers, which will result in four scenarios for eac

this case of 7 drivers, 84 different outcomes with varying degrees 

The scenarios represent hypothetical future conditions that will sugg

or negative effect on the central question. Since there is rarely tim

every possible scenario, the “art” of this approach is prioritizing bas

and uncertainty, and then testing each scenario against our standard 

set of alternative futures can also be reduced by bundling the d

smaller set. Another benefit of this approach is that it provides insi

changing conditions can influence outcomes, which provides guid

missions focused on diminishing underlying conditions.

Next, flesh out the scenarios by creating a plausible plot or ster

cally, we must be able to tell a credible story that links current con

future outcome based on the influence of the drivers while accou

degree of uncertainty. Returning to our notional example, we migh

degree of certainty that Hezbollah will continue to confront Israel, 

remain a key sponsor, providing the incentive and means for WMD p

is sufficient to acquire a modest chemical arsenal, but not to develop 

487 Talbot, 4. 488 Schwartz, 4. 489 Schwartz, 4. 490 Schwartz, 4.
222

the availability of key resources. Finally, we identify leading indicato

scenario.

491 The indicators serve as the evidence against which we m

evaluate the alternative futures, or hypotheses.

Hypothesis Evaluation

Outfitted with our list of potential adversary COA, which has been fi

series of reality checks and prioritized based on potential mission impa

now positioned to compete them against each other. Evaluation is 

hypothesis generation; however, we can guard against the natural bia

favored or consensus COA through the analysis of competing hypothe

method. ACH protects us from the tendency to seek confirming eviden

COA. It turns the tables on traditional analysis by seeking evidence 

COA, thus embracing a more rigorous scientific method. When faithful

it helps organized evidence and arguments around a core set of COA

used to evaluate COA based on currently available evidence (intelligen

ing), and it can use future reporting to monitor several COA to determin

being enacted. ACH consists of the following eight steps, expertly dev

Heuer in Psychology of Intelligence Analysis:

 (1) Identify the possible hypotheses to be considered. Use a gro

analysts with different perspectives to brainstorm the possibilitie

491 Schwartz, 4. 492 Hypotheses or “claims” must be “testable.” That is, they must be imagined and p

itively, not as a question) in such a way as to be “refutable.” Further, to gain the most va

process of comparing and refuting alternative, competing hypotheses, each must be as 

independent or exclusive (not overlapping) as possible. The more exclusive each hypot

the others, the more authoritative will be its refutation, with a given weight of negative 

See Louise G. White, Political Analysis: Technique and Practice, 4th Ed. Ft Worth, TX

Brace College Publishers, 1999), 40-41 and Gary King and others, Designing Social In

tific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994)

4, and 6.
223

each hypothesis. 

(3) Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and 

down the side. Analyze the “diagnosticity” of the evidence a

ments--that is, identify which items are most helpful in jud

relative likelihood of the hypotheses. 

(4) Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete 

and arguments that have no diagnostic value. 

(5) Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood 

hypothesis. Proceed by trying to refute the hypotheses rather t

firming them. 

Figure 97. Competing Hypotheses

Source: Heuer, Chapter 8, URL: http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/art1

accessed 10 June 2004.
224

evidence. Consider the consequences for your analysis if that evi

were wrong, misleading, or subject to a different interpretation. 

(7) Report conclusions. Discuss the relative likelihood of a

hypotheses, not just the most likely one. 

(8) Identify milestones for future observation that may indicate e

are taking a different course than expected.493

Each of the eight steps bears some relationships to previously introdu

ods, and thus serves as a useful overall framework that can incorp

mortems, red teaming, scenario analysis, or any other hypothesis g

technique that proves useful. 

The first step is improved by applying any of the generation method

up with a full set of options. Before starting to weed out COA, keep in 

difference between an unconfirmed and a refuted hypothesis. An un

hypothesis should remain on the table until evidence emerges, or o

make clear, that it is not correct. When positive evidence does emerge 

hypothesis, it joins the trash bin of other discarded COA. Ideally, the 

hypotheses on which we settle will be between three and seven. Use t

level of battlespace uncertainty as a guide—high uncertainty, mor

Drawing on the indicators and observables developed earlier, we compi

evidence that is applicable to all COA as well as evidence that is uniqu

Simply ask, if this COA were true, what would we expect to see or n

Unlike previous methods, step two requires us to identify factors that 

and against the COA and consider the absence of evidence as evid

merging terrorist organizations, or not activating a communications no

issuing a statement is often evidence of COA selection. As argued by 

tend to focus on what is reported rather than what is not.495 Think crea

figure out what is missing.

According to Heuer, step three is the most important in part because 

terintuitive. Rather than evaluating one hypothesis at a time to see how 

evidence fits, we look at the evidence to see how consistent it is with eac

esis. To avoid being overwhelmed by the data, a matrix is used to or

hypotheses and evidence. Figure 97 is an example based on a historica

493 Heuer, 97. 494 Heuer, 98. 495 Heuer, 99.
225

the U.S. bombed the Iraqi Intelligence Services Headquarters in 

response to a failed attempt by Iraqi agents to assassinate form

George Bush while he was in Kuwait for a ceremony. Across the top

three hypotheses, and down the side there is a simplified list of evid

as key assumptions. For each item of evidence, work across the row 

whether it is consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant to each hypoth

type of shorthand that fits.496 While doing this, assess the evidence fo

ity. Does it tell us anything? The evidence is diagnostic when it in

judgment on the relative likelihood of the various hypotheses.

deemed to have the same relationship to all hypotheses has little dia

is like a high temperature, letting you know something is wrong, but 

ative of nothing specific. Rather, evidence that is unique and obs

given hypothesis should weigh heaviest in our judgment. In Heuer’

ple, E1 is the same to all, whereas E4 argues for H2 or H3, and E6

assumption instead of evidence, argues strongly against H1.498 In 

pause to review and refine; weed out useless evidence and disproved 

Step five takes the opposite tack from step three. Instead of worki

rows of evidence, the analyst works down the columns of hypothe

one at a time, our goal is to identify evidence or arguments that sugg

is unlikely. Heuer suggests: 

A fundamental precept of the scientific method is to proceed b

ing or eliminating hypotheses, while tentatively accepting on

hypotheses that cannot be refuted. The scientific method o

cannot be applied into intuitive judgment, but the principle of 

to disprove hypotheses, rather than confirm them, is useful.499

Since we can never “prove” a COA to be true, our goal is to find the 

the fewest strikes against it. If the end result does not pass any of ou

checks (capabilities, effects, five criteria), it is probably because o

overlooking important assumptions or evidence. In step six, we test t

of the evidence. That is, we must investigate the evidence or assumpt

our conclusion most heavily hangs. What is the reliability of the sour

tion possible? Do alternative explanations exist? According to Heuer

496 Heuer, 100. 497 Heuer, 101. 498 Heuer, 102. 499 Heuer, 103.
226

assumptions that went unchallenged and proved invalid. It is a t

that analysts should identify and question assumptions, but t

much easier said than done. The problem is to determine 

assumptions merit questioning. One advantage of the ACH proc

is that it tells you what needs to be rechecked.500

The final steps are familiar to us. Report the results with due consid

standardized language for portraying probability, and continue to u

monitor to determine if events are unfolding in an unexpected manner

successfully performed as part of IPB, ACH avoids common analytic

increases the odds of identifying the right COA, and leaves an “audit t

ing the evidence used” along the way.502 It can stand on its own, or in

the results of other hypothesis generation methods.

PARTING SHOTS

Anticipating the future, particularly when it involves humans, is a r

ness. But even when predictions misfire, the joint force is well-position

ate its own future through the rigorous application of the IPB process

four, our baseline goal is to identify all the options available to the 

Including in our initial list the one COA that is ultimately implemented 

way to avoid surprise. Imagination backed by solid work in the first 

phases is at a premium. Thus, step two of phase four—identify the 

COA available to the adversary—is the most important of the five-step 

requires structured methods to generate a complete, creative set of hypo

filtering, testing, prioritizing, and in the end, operational planning. 

To this end, brainstorming through pre-mortems, red teaming, an

analysis are suggested. Each steps off from a different perspective, re

our multi-level, systems-thinking approach. Pre-mortems cast us in t

critics, seeking to identify reasons for mission failure that are attributa

adversary. Red teaming make us the bad guy, thinking deviously abou

can disrupt the joint force’s plans and what actions will achieve our o

Scenario analysis turns us into ecologists, looking for conditions i

tlespace that will shape future outcomes. 

500 Heuer, 106. 501 Heuer, 107. 502 Heuer, 109.
227

adversarys likely objectives and end states. Building on our analy

holders, including webs of influence and the continuum of relative 

the insight gained from the network and systems models, FAST is d

additional tool for penetrating the black box that is the terrorist adv

two and three—evaluate and prioritize each COA—introduce a serie

reality checks, that are applied to the full set of COA. We can filter o

move lower on the priority list, COA that (1) the stakeholder does no

possible or likely to achieve its objectives (most difficult filter to a

not meet the criteria of suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniquen

sistency; (3) the stakeholder is not capable of implementing (limite

edge of capabilities and what the adversary perceives it can do); an

afforded by the battlespace. 

The ACH methodology is capable of integrating and structuring 

well as other evidence in a manner that mitigates cognitive bias and c

to refute a hypothesis before it is trashed. Like the other methods, A

completion of step four—develop each COA in the amount of 

allows—to improve the results of evaluation and establish initi

requirements (step four) for continual monitoring. When successfull

phase four enables us to answer with measured confidence, What w

The fourth and final phase does not close the door on the IPB proce

holds it open and invites us to return to previous phases, updating 

analysis until the mission is accomplished.
228

BEYOND TERRORISM

Terrorism is relentless. It is a scourge to history and a persistent asp

contemporary international landscape. Terrorism is more than a tactic: 

of warfare, it is violence wielded against non-combatants to achieve p

cal effects and influence target audiences. Its partisans are individuals

actors, and states that embrace a broad spectrum of political goals, ran

statehood for ethnic separatists to the establishment of a religious poli

by extremists. Terrorist groups leverage the dark dynamics of globa

move in the shadows of the nation-state, exploiting seams to transit the 

the physical, information and social dimensions. They embrace asymm

ues and methods to erode sovereignty, propagate an ideology, and in m

annihilate a perceived adversary. Countering the terrorist challenge de

the instruments of national power, robust international collaboratio

adroit intelligence capability. The joint military forces of the U.S. play 

tant supporting role in the global effort to diminish underlying causes, d

rorist activities, and defeat terrorist organizations. Given the prevaili

Figure 98. CT Airlift

A pallet of food and blankets slips off the back of a C-130 Hercules as the crew per

“combat offload” at Faya-Largeau Airport, Chad. The aid was delivered to Chadian 

after they engaged a group of transnational terrorists and sustained casualtie

Source: EUCOM, URL: http://www.eucom.mil/ Photo_Gallery/index.htm, 

accessed 18 June 2004.
229

extend beyond the application of physical force to shaping environm

tions, participating in the narrative of public diplomacy, and strength

capabilities of allies. Mission accomplishment is enabled by an 

knowledge and decision advantage derived from the skilled perform

ligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB builds situational aw

delivers a deep evaluation of stakeholder capabilities and cours

(COA). IPB is operational, geared to command decisionmaking and 

of CT missions as in this recent example out of the Pan-Sahel Initiat

A terrorist leader, Ammari Saifi [Salafist Group for Preach

Combat], took 32 European tourists hostage near the Libya

and transported some of them to northern Mali [2003]. To free 

tages, U.S. military officials say, Germany paid him a ra

nearly $6 million...making him instantly one of the most p

Islamic militants in North Africa....Earlier this year, Saifi w

shopping spree in northern Mali, gathering weapons, vehi

recruits, while American and Algerian intelligence monit

activities with growing alarm. In February [2004], Algeria

intercepted a convoy carrying weapons north from Mali. Alge

cials say the cargo contained mortar launchers, rocket-prope

nade launchers and surface-to-air missiles. The U.S. E

Command sent a Navy P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft to sw

area, relaying Saifi’s position to forces in the region. Mali pus

out of the country to Niger, which in turn chased him int

where, with U.S. Special Forces support of an airlift of fuel a

supplies, 43 of his men were killed or captured. Saifi him

away...503

The objective of the present study is to improve the intelligence co

IPB to the CT operations highlighted in this example and the countl

our horizon. Going beneath the surface of conventional wisdom an

approaches, it has explored and clarified the CT challenge and its 

demands, worked to advance IPB tradecraft to meet these requir

applied new learning to the terrorist problem. In this final chapter, 

ments of CT IPB are reviewed in consolidated form and core pro

outlined. 

503 Craig Smith, “U.S. looks to Sahara as front in terror war,” International Hera

May 2004, 4.
230

What are we trying to achieve?

The answer is derived from mission

analysis, which clarifies the desired

end state, supporting objectives, and

joint force involvement. It frames the

problem, focusing our efforts on the

appropriate level—strategic, operational, and tactical—and structures

the impending asymmetric contest.

While working through each IPB

phase in collaboration with the commander and staff, we continually

return to mission analysis to increase

fidelity on timing, phasing, force dispositions, operational constraints,

risk and other factors. Whereas mission analysis keeps us on target, systems thinking underlies our entire

approach. IPB reflects the tenets of

systems theory, directing our attention to multiple levels of analysis,

dynamic relationships, and recurring

feedback. Rather than centering our

efforts on the adversary’s organization, the systems-guided approach of

IPB has us examine the relationships

between the environment and the

organization as a whole and within

the organization among its functions.

Moreover, our analysis moves vertically through levels to assess nested

and cascading effects as well as horizontally across dimensions to determine relationships among stakehold

mation, and resources. IPB as modified and improved in this work pr

manual, scaffolding, and tools to organize and work through the high 

uncertainty inherent to CT missions. Figure 99 breaks out the steps for 

four objectives and phases.

IPB is performed by teams spanning staff functions and directorate

trating the process, clarifying the mission, and establishing commande

Define the Battlespace

1. Analyze the mission

2. Determine detail required and 

3. Limit the battlespace

4. Identify mission-relevant chara

5. Determine knowledge gaps

6. Act on collection requiremen

Describe Battlespace Effects

1. Analyze mission-relevant eff

2. Describe the effects on ca

and COA

Evaluate Stakeholder Capabi

1. Perform COG analysis

2. Update or build multi-level m

3. Test model against current si

4. Evaluate actual capabilities

Determine Course of Action

1. Identify desired end-state a

objectives

2. Generate the full set of availa

3. Evaluate and prioritize each 

4. Detail each COA to extent fe

5. Refine collection requiremen

Figure 99. Phase Breakout

Source: Adapted from JIPB by au
231

vision to integrate the IPB process with the joint force effort to obt

edge and decision advantage over the adversary. IPB leaders an

expected to size up what must and can be accomplished given t

resources available and act decisively and deliberately to deliver dec

results. We must recognize that it is only through capable leadersh

teams that IPB can provide the edge expected in our ability to ob

decide, and act (OODA Loop).

Define the Battlespace

In phase one, the battlespace is recast in non-linear terms. The o

define the battlespace in a manner that answers the question, What o

ters most? A six-step process guides us toward the phase’s deliverabl

tory of factors or features that can influence the mission. The steps 

to account for the wider range of CT missions, stakeholders, and adv

bilities. Rather than dealing with an overwhelming global operating 

the battlespace is limited by several enduring concepts: area of oper

operational area (OA), and area of interest (AOI) are modified to ac

relative positioning of stakeholders across multiple dimensions. Th

serves as an over-arching mental construct that encompasses the ge

based and assigned AO, the arena where operational effects are ac

and the arena of indirect influence (AOI). The multiple stakeholde

the joint force, terrorist group(s), and other state and non-state acto

an AO, OA, and AOI for which we must account. Where they ove

ment and possibly conflict occur, and in many cases, the joint force 

tion itself to bring it in line with other stakeholders in order to m

“points of contact.”

Whereas the physical dimension has been the traditional focus 

character of the threat and spectrum of CT missions necessitates 

attention to social intelligence and information dimensions. The dim

only aid intelligence work, but provide a conceptual basis for oper

ning. Specifically, the physical dimension consists of geography (l

and space), weather, and artifacts (man-made structures). The soci

relates culture to political and economic factors. The information 

bring together the information itself, enabling technology, and the 

cognitive or human piece. For each sector, our task is to identify the 

tics, activities, or factors that might have an impact on the mission. 

Dimensions and sectors organize our effort, balance analysis, a

landscape on which to position stakeholders either graphically usi
232

(IT). To this static picture of what factors are likely to affect the m

add time horizons and nested levels. For the former, it is important to 

the expected duration of the mission and its internal phasing to furt

the applicability of the inventoried battlespace characteristics. In 

nested levels, strategic-level features, such as trends in urbanizati

operational and tactical-level developments, and tactical-level events 

tegic consequences. The rapidity and impact of developments acros

accentuated in an era of globalization. For a short-term, operational-

sion, for example, sitting religious officials in key churches, te

mosques are more likely to be relevant than religious students expecte

plete their studies in a few years. Phase one builds situational awar

picks out for further analysis those features of the battlespace with the 

to influence mission accomplishment.

Determine Effects

In phase two, effects-based thinking guides us to an understanding o

tionship between the environment and stakeholder objectives and ca

The objective is to describe the effects of the battlespace in a manner th

the question, How does it impact us? Phase two orients us to the battle

delivers both a holistic and specific understanding of what the battlespa

all stakeholders. Even though the process involves only two steps, the d

each are substantial. The first step is the toughest, requiring innovativ

analysis clearly presented using graphics and precise descriptions.

The concept of effects is fundamental to IPB, and it is elaborated in 

to distinguish between direct, indirect, cascading and cumulative effe

effects have a nearly immediate impact on the mission. If delayed in 

space at all, it is only briefly. Therefore, all factors with the potential 

direct effect are part of the OA and must be analyzed up front in phase 

rect effects are also important, particularly given their subtle, time-de

spatially-removed influence. They are part of the AOI and are evaluat

and resources allow. Both have cascading influence across the levels a

cumulative impact on capabilities and COA. The cumulative impact 

effects is often overlooked, resulting in a surprisingly direct influence 

mission is underway.

Phase two involves sorting out and explaining how the mission-rele

acteristics identified in phase one impact mission accomplishment. In 

methodology, the time-tested OCOKA (Observation and Fields of F

and Concealment, Obstacles, Key Terrain, Avenues of Approach) is sa
233

On the other hand, the present study offers a significant improvem

information and social dimensions of existing doctrine. Organizati

cyberterrorism, and cognitive effects originate from the informatio

generating constraints and opportunities related to the availability a

information, the sophistication and reliability of technology, and th

of human cognition. If the information dimension is the oxygen of m

ism, the social dimension is its food. Effects from the social dimen

cultural influences such as religion, the politics of power, and soc

conditions of communities. Demographic analysis provides a pic

communities look on paper that becomes dynamic when integrated w

sis of cultural and perception effects. 

 Complementing the dimension-specific methods are methods for 

overall, or net effects. The CT battlespace is turbulent, reflecting var

of uncertainty related to change and complexity. Net levels of unce

information requirements, decisionmaking, organizational structure

planning. A return to the concept of nested effects stresses the verti

zontal axes of influence. When stakeholders are mapped in relation

other, the result is a web of influence that the joint force must ma

negotiate to be successful. The relationship between stakeholders 

tlespace is also co-dependent. As open systems, all organization

resources and information to enable capabilities. These dependenc

vulnerabilities when the resource or information is critical and scar

cept of affordance reminds us of the importance of perception—ac

cated on what we perceive the battlespace affords regardless of 

Figure 100. IPB Core Elements

Source: Author.
234

actions because it perceives advantages and disadvantages we do not. W

grated, net and dimensional effects offer a first look at what the b

allows. By comparing opportunities and constraints across dimension

each stakeholder, a picture emerges of comparative advantages. 

Evaluate Capabilities

In phase three, we evaluate stakeholder capabilities to determine 

strength, the array of capabilities, and potential vulnerabilities. The obje

determine capabilities in relation to the joint force mission and in lig

the battlespace affords to answer the question, What can they do to us? 

tinuum of relevant interests offers a sliding scale to gauge the orientati

stakeholder in relation to the joint force’s mission. In addition to sizi

players as ally, accomplice, neutral, hindrance, adversary, or unknown, 

tions are further qualified by a set of hard and soft linkages. Starting w

sary stakeholders, the four steps of this phase involve COG (Centers o

analysis, modeling, reality testing, and capabilities specification. 

Centers of gravity and their associated critical capabilities, requirem

vulnerabilities are the marrow of phase three. Capabilities enable COG

are dependent on resources for their execution. For example, training 

requires recruits, secure space, and equipment. The most importan

resources are critical requirements, and if any of these requirements ar

ble, they represent potential high-value targets. These “critical factor

guideposts of operational planning, and all subsequent work in phas

intended to figure them out with as high a degree of confidence and pr

our knowledge and skills allow. Importantly, all stakeholders have critic

varying to include the social contract or professional reputation of an 

business model or branding (product image) of a multinational corpo

ideology or network structure of a terrorist group, and the skilled profe

IT infrastructure of the joint force. In step one, we make an initial, 

assessment of COG, but allow our work in subsequent steps to challen

and ultimately identify the rungs on the COG ladder—COG-CC-CR-CV 

Capabilities, Critical Requirements, Critical Vulnerabilities).

Step two entails building models that accurately portray the org

capabilities, and characteristics of stakeholders. Where traditional m

short, network and system models take over. Both look at the organiz

whole, standing in dynamic relation to its environment, and break the 

tion down into core functions, or capabilities. The network model is bu

the idea of key nodes linked together to form a network of social relat
235

tive, doctrine, technology, and social ties. The first sees the organiz

ture, and in particular the network structure, mixed with the mor

hierarchy, as a capability itself. Narrative refers to the story linking 

tion and its members to a world view and historical thread, which g

and purpose. Doctrine gets at the principles and practices, or oper

while technology deals with the range of IT and weapon systems a

last, social ties, looks at the linkages among people; their organiz

derives more from social capital (interpersonal or relational skills) t

characteristics.

The systems model sees organizations as constantly exchanging r

information with the battlespace through a core set of boundary-sp

bilities. Support capabilities recruit people, collect intelligen

resources, transfer money and otherwise attend to the dependenci

earlier. Maintenance capabilities wed people to the group through 

and a schedule of rewards and sanctions to ensure role complianc

capabilities determine the innovation, adaptability, and strategic dir

organization through learning, strategy development, decisionmakin

mand and control. Finally, conversion capabilities craft people and r

something more valuable than the sum of their parts. The producti

creates cocaine for trafficking, the service delivery capability mainta

foster community support, and the operations capability conducts 

attack. Among others, one important contribution of the systems 

emphasis on capabilities other than the act of collective violence. 

capabilities may actually contribute more to the organization’s abili

crisis (negative entropy), hold together in the face of turbulence (

and prosper over the course of its life cycle. 

All models paint stakeholders under ideal conditions, which is 

form a sanity check. We adjust the models for the real world, or w

tlespace affords. Under ideal conditions, al Qaeda would train, hyp

thousand recruits every three months in basic techniques; however

tion of training camps disrupts training, resulting in a throughput 

hundred every six months. The reality-tested models are restated a

with a time dimension. The Provisional IRA, for example, is ca

radio-detonated bombing every six months, based on their operatio

limited by robust security. Working up the ladder, this analysis refi

COG or reveals new ones, and working down the ladder, it unco

requirements. If vulnerabilities can be identified, the joint force can 

to indirectly affect the COG. At a minimum, COG analysis is done f
236

is a formula for mission failure.

Anticipate Actions

In phase four, we anticipate future actions by the terrorist group 

stakeholders. The objective is to identify, evaluate, prioritize, and mon

available COA to answer the question, What will they do? Sometimes 

as preditive analysis, we forecast COA without a crystal ball, fully aw

intrinsic difficulties and the likelihood we will not get it quite right. No

phase four is necessary to avoid surprise and make sure the right m

force capabilities is part of operational planning. The balance between 

and capabilities is weighed toward intentions at the strategic level and c

at the tactical. 

Stakeholder analysis is the core method used in this phase, buildin

dimensional picture of CT players using the web of influence, continu

ative interests, functional analysis systems technique, and the networ

tems models. At a minimum, we must successfully accomplish th

step—generate all the options for future action open to the terror

appropriate, other stakeholders. The best way to avoid surprise is to 

that an approximation of the adversary’s ultimate COA is included in 

list. Even if we do not give it the right priority, or detail its branches an

precisely, we can avoid surprise. Coming up with a good list dema

tured methods that overcome cognitive bias and champion creativity

tems, red teaming, and scenario analysis each contributes a 

perspective for hypothesis generation. 

We evaluate and prioritize each COA through a series of tests in 

COA are filtered using five criteria: suitability, feasibility, acceptabilit

ness, and consistency. If the COA passes through these filters, we asse

the stakeholder is capable of implementing the plan. Recognizing that o

edge of capabilities may be flawed, we should retain COA that are on th

of assessed ability. The third test leverages the work of phase two and 

the battlespace allow it? Is the technology there? Can these skills be lea

culturally acceptable? Essentially, the five criteria are being applied 

dimensions of the battlespace. Analysis of competing hypotheses (AC

the optimal methodology for organizing and evaluating COA using 

and any other evidence that might have diagnostic value. ACH drives co

itive thinking, asking us to discount potential COA in a manner consi

the scientific method. Each of the methods involves detailing the C

extent time, resources, and information allow, which will improve our 
237

we revisit previous phases to refine and improve our analysis. We 

until the mission is achieved, and even then, we are encouraged to 

work to improve for the next go.

CORE PROPOSITIONS

Counterterrorism IPB owes much to the practiced methods of inte

port to conventional military operations and the rich corpus of tactics

and procedures embodied in joint and service doctrine. In this wo

embraced the four objectives and phases of traditional IPB because 

tical utility, backed by a potent theory about the relationships betwe

tions and their environment. By harvesting enduring concepts and 

adapting existing IPB steps to the CT mission, we also speed its tr

field. That is, we can stick with the overall process and leverage man

dardized terms and techniques for CT. The IPB punch can be 

strengthened for CT only if many of these concepts are modified, n

adopted, and our toolbox of analytical methods is expanded to tac

trum of missions, stakeholders, and asymmetric capabilities of th

core propositions result that shape and underlie all phases of CT IPB

1) Systems thinking offers a powerful approach to solving c

problems. Countering terrorists requires an approach that ca

tively deal with high levels of uncertainty (rapidly changing 

ment and complex array of ever-changing factors). Systems 

provides the intellectual scaffolding and tools for evaluating 

ing on two sets of linkages: (1) relations between the organiza

whole and the battlespace; and (2) relations among the intern

ings, or functions, of the organization. As an approach, it cap

adaptive, evolving character of all social organizations, p

insight to the exchange of information and resources with 

tlespace, the feedback loops that enable learning, and the 

points that allow us to achieve lasting effects.

2) Effects-based analysis and operations sharpen focus 

comes. IPB is an operational process focused on achieving 

mission outcomes, or effects. An effects-based approach v

adversary as a complex system and time an as essential ingre

analysis and operations. Direct and indirect effects cascade a

mulate to impact organizational capabilities and courses o

Thinking in terms of effects ensures we remain centered on o

while considering changing circumstances and actions ca
238

options, and shape capabilities. As opposed to a target or capabi

based approach, which measure success in terms of destroying 

or denying actions, effects-based operations incorporate them b

intermediary stops on the path to achieving a desired end-state.

3) Levels, dimensions, and time provide a three-dimensional 

eton for performing IPB and executing CT missions. Effec

achieved within levels and dimensions over time (Figure 101)

three levels of analysis and action—strategic, operational, and 

cal—are nested; effects, characteristics, and actions have a casc

impact on the adjoining level(s). Although IPB is primarily an o

tional-level process, it is shaped by strategic-level guidanc

trends. Tactical-level actions are molded by operational constr

but often have strategic consequences. Effects are also achieve

experienced across the physical, information, and social dimen

of the battlespace. Dimensions carve up the battlespace into mu

reinforcing, interrelated arenas, which are reassembled to 

Figure 101. 3D Framework

Source: Author.
239

turn a static snap-shot into a dynamic motion picture. Missio

sis directs work to the appropriate level, dimension, and tim

zon.

4) Counterterrorism missions are wide-ranging and multi-

The joint force has an important role to play in the four pilla

national strategy for combating terrorism: diminish, disrupt

and defend. The joint force is part of a coordinated interage

cess that emphasizes public diplomacy, conflict resolution, a

governance. It provides lethal and non-lethal options for shap

tlespace conditions, strengthening allied CT capabilities, di

militarily accessible terrorist activities, and defeating organ

when and where they can be directly engaged. The great div

missions, which span the spectrum of conflict from combat to 

tarian operations, requires intelligence to address a wider array 

ditions, threats, and stakeholders.

5) Counterterrorism involves non-traditional stakeholde

asymmetric capabilities and intentions. CT operations in

host of players. Religious leaders, local politicians, non-gover

organizations, international organizations, multi-national 

tions, allied forces, and John Q. Public are often part of the m

ting a fix on who matters and why demands persistent sta

analysis, resulting in a crowded web of influence that can b

aged, manipulated, isolated, and strengthened. IPB must acc

all the stakeholders with potential influence and evaluate their 

ities and intentions as time and resources allow. In many cases

foreign internal defense or civil affairs, other stakeholders 

more important to mission success than the terrorist grou

Moreover, contemporary terrorist organizations employ asy

tools and tactics and in some cases, values, to obtain sur

exploit perceived weaknesses in the joint force.

6) Social intelligence is vital to a decision-quality understa

the battlespace and adversary. Terrorism is generally root

ideology that reflects the human perceptions, socio-econo

political conditions, and culture of at least the group’s membe

the community from which it is spawned. Therefore, there is 

ing need to build the concepts and competencies that allow u

lyze social dynamics in a manner that gets beyond folklore

end, cultural intelligence as operationalized here provides for 
240

grating consideration of perception and demographic effects, 

dance theory (perception drives action), and the worldvie

adversaries as reflected in their prevailing narratives. 

7) Stories open the book on terrorist group identity and str

Stakeholder narratives are echoed in rhetoric, publications, recr

and socialization processes, and operational actions. Analyzing 

tives answers key IPB questions, including issues of identity, cu

roots, ideological influences, sense of history, and the meani

existence. The stories we tell connect our actions to a symbolic f

work and a narrative thread that arcs through history. The more 

pelling narrative often wins, particularly when the struggle is be

competing interpretations of contemporary events. By analyzin

stories told and enacted by our adversaries we answer key que

and gain insight into how it shapes the battlespace, other stakeho

and the terrorist group itself. The narrative and the ability to prop

it are usually critical factors.

8) Centers of gravity and the other critical factors are the g

posts for operational planning. All stakeholders have one or 

centers of gravity, which are nested at each level and serve as a s

of strength to the organization. Strategic centers of gravity allo

adversary to resist, while operational ones enable the accomplish

of tasks under tough conditions. When dealing with allies, cent

gravity are protected and reinforced. For terrorists, the joint force 

to achieve direct effects on the COG, undermining the group’s abi

operate and possibly rendering a crushing blow. More often, the C

in doubt or inaccessible by direct means, requiring us to analy

critical capabilities that permit it to function. The most lucrative w

disrupt a critical capability is to determine the resources on wh

depends to operate, such as weapons, conditions, or even an ide

look for deficiencies that may be vulnerable to joint-force targ

The evaluation of capabilities in phase three of IPB is a means to a

important end—pinpointing centers of gravity.
241

CT requires r

assessments. Co

tional. The cont

the joint force 

group is a serie

reactions, and c

tions that change 

pants over time

our analysis of t

can never be c

splendid isolatio

always take into 

disposition and c

the joint force as 

stakeholders. In 

is comparative a

the overall appra

everything stand

to everything is 

ment. In phase o

relevant factors 

pared. Effects ar

in phase two thro

tive positioning o

ers in the battles

assessment of 

advantages acros

phase three, cap

compared and 

analysis is broug

get a sense of 

player might 

strengths and w

the other. Finally, COA are wargamed in phase four to anticipate ho

sequence might play out. 

10) Recurring, critical self-evaluation, if ignored, risks 

accomplishment. It is a mistake to think of IPB as something 

do to understand the adversary. Understanding the decisio

process of the enemy is an enduring, yet highly elusive inte

Figure 102. Afghan Child

A young girl from the village of Tora Ray peeks at soldiers 

from her house doorway in Afghanistan, 6 April 2004.

Source: DOD, URL: http://www.defendamerica.mil/

photoessays/apr2004/p041504a9.html, accessed on 

18 June 2004.
242

own strengths and weaknesses; failing to do so ignores an ess

aspect of the adversary’s OODA Loop. Even when we are no

cerned with the perception of other stakeholders, our operational 

ning, force protection, and other joint force activities are improv

an understanding of our own critical factors and what the battle

affords. Therefore, reverse IPB is an element of every phase. In 

two, for example, we reverse it to assess the effects of the battele

on the mission, while in phase three we objectively seek out our 

and associated vulnerabilities. In phase four, we reverse it to 

likely adversary COA, which are based on their perception of wh

can and might do.

PARTING SHOTS

Like terrorists themselves, the counterterrorism effort must also be 

in diminishing conditions, disrupting activities, and defeating terrorist 

tions. Intelligence is at the nexus of the soft and hard instruments of p

are integral to moving beyond terrorism, or at least relegating it to an 

able practice constrained in effect. Our drive for decision-quality intell

as its destination a battlespace awareness and knowledge advantage 

adversary. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace offers the optimal 

cedures, concepts, and methods for achieving this goal Our confide

value, however, is tempered by recognition that beneath the surface lie 

unknowns, pushing us harder to penetrate the murky waters of modern 

Our toughest terrorist adversaries work in the shadows of nation-

embrace an all-consuming ideology that allows no quarter. Prevailin

such foes requires integrating intelligence with long-term strategies for 

conditions and countering their extremist, exclusionary narrative with a 

suasive vision of human security through tolerance. In modest fashion, 

seeks to improve prospects for the joint force to enable this vision. 
243

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York: Ecco Publishers, 2003.

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Clausewitzian Foundation so that we can all Speak the Same La

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251

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253

9/11 74

A

Actionable Intelligence 2

Adversary 1, 2, 3, 5, 8

Afghanistan 18, 22, 51, 71, 87, 126, 129, 135, 244

Air space 90

Ally 5

Al-Qaida 2, 74, 126

Arquilla, John 94, 112, 158-159, 252

Asymmetric 1, 3, 5, 12, 17, 18, 21, 27, 31-33, 54, 73, 102, 127, 

201, 231-233, 240, 242

Attrition 33

Aum Shinrikyo 15, 125, 199, 200

Avenues of Approach 84, 86, 88, 235

B

Basque Fatherland and Liberty Party 8

Battlespace 3, 5

Benjamin, Daniel 11, 71

Bergen, Peter L. 91

Bosnia Herzegovina 43, 74

Boyd, John 34

Brainstorming 75, 201, 215, 217, 219, 228

C

Capability 20, 22, 27, 31, 73, 126, 129, 131, 133, 145-14, 148, 

159, 164, 167-168, 174-180, 196, 199, 206, 208-209, 211, 222

238, 243

Cascading Effects 105, 233

Casebeer, William 131, 162, 213, 247

Center of Gravity 126, 130, 134, 167, 184

Central Command 30, 165

Central Intelligence Agency 3, 7, 75, 199

Chad 29, 231-232

Chechnya 17, 19, 196, 207

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
254

Climate 66, 92

Clausewitz, Carl von 33-34, 130, 248

Coakley, Thomas 163

Cognition 92, 111, 154, 236 

Cognitive Bias 75, 201, 229, 239

Cognitive Effects 115, 123, 236

Colombia 2, 17, 41, 74, 81, 96, 128-129, 145, 151

Communications 221

Concealment and Cover 84-85, 88

Congruence 181, 183-184, 238

Continuum of Relative Interests 148, 151, 193, 211, 229, 239

Conventional War 20, 33

Courses of Action 3, 40, 45, 72, 77, 80, 127, 133, 165, 189, 193, 232

Crenshaw, Martha 14, 155

Critical Capability 131, 155,159, 164, 167, 208, 243

Critical Requirement 208

Critical resources 108

Critical Vulnerability 108, 178

Cultural Intelligence 56-57, 118-119, 201, 219, 242

Culture 36, 37, 56, 57, 58, 59, 95, 119, 123, 147, 160, 177, 182, 18

219, 234, 242, I

Cumulative Effects 122-123, 235

Cyberspace 48, 55, 89, 92-93, 112, 117, 205, 213, 253

Cyberterrorism 112, 115, 236

D

Daft, Richard 103, 172

Decisionmaking 3, 24, 38-40, 44, 72, 96-97, 101-102, 111, 116, 1

157, 177, 195-196, 198, 201-202, 213, 219, 232, 236, 238, 244

Defeat 17-18, 26-29, 33,40, 180, 183-184, 191, 208, 215-216, 231, 2

Defend 12, 15, 26-28, 40, 49, 90, 94, 135, 138, 166, 194, 196, 242

Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency 165

Defense Intelligence Agency 38

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 214

Diagnosticity 225, 227

Dimension 11, 26, 28, 33, 49-50, 55-56, 61, 72-75, 81, 87, 97, 11

238, 242

Diminish 26-28, 40, 115, 136, 153, 191, 231, 242

Direct Effects 48, 78, 123, 235, 243
255

200, 208, 215, 228, 231, 242, 243

Doctrine 3-5, 24, v31, 37, 42-43, 43, 45, 47-49, 54-55, 60, 69, 72-

83, 87, 90, 92-99, 110, 114, 121, 123, 126-127, 129, 130-131, 133

139, 141, 133, 147, 159, 166, 168, 184-185, 191, 193, 196, 198

202, 208, 236, 238, 240, 251

Driving Force 222

Drug Trafficking 29, 71, 82, 145

E

Effects 3, 25, 28, 31,34-36, 48, 61, 69-79, 81-86, 89-90, 92-95, 9

104-120, 122-124, 127, 129, 138, 143, 145, 152, 154-155, 161, 

191-194, 196, 198-200, 205, 208, 217, 220, 222-223, 227, 231

240-241, 244-245

Effects-based Operations 35, 76, 241

End State 24, 196, 233

Enduring Freedom 100, 149, 160, 268

Environment 1, 3, 26-27, 33, 35-43, 45-46, 53, 55, 60, 63, 71-74, 

99, 101-103, 108, 110, 122, 125, 129, 132-133, 136, 138, 14-145

171-173, 181, 184, 202, 209, 233-235, 237, 240

Ethnic Separatist 8, 15-16, 21, 43, 57, 197

European Command 30, 232

F

Fatwa 8, 13

Federal Bureau of Investigations

Ferghana Valley 104, 108

Field Manual 35, 39, 43, 46, 146, 206, 249

Field of Analysis 167

Fields of Fire 84, 85, 88, 235

Force Protection 21, 54, 245

Foreign Internal Defense 30, 42, 81, 152, 242

Function 11, 35, 38, 47, 49, 59, 65, 108, 118, 131, 133, 137, 140, 

174, 181, 185, 194, 201, 214-215, 243

Functional Analysis Systems Technique 198, 211, 213, 239

Fundamental Attribution Error 75-76
256

Geography 234, 205, 118, 84-83, 81, 71, 66, 60, 59, 55-54, 49

Georgia 107, 196-197

Global War on Terrorism 2

Globalization 14, 16, 40-41, 69, 106, 151, 154, 163, 231, 235

Governance 15, 27, 41-42, 56, 59, 66-67, 106, 118, 129, 154, 220, 2

Gunaratna, Rohan 74, 160

H

Hamas 1, 11, 49, 51, 102, 108, 112-113, 115, 174, 199

Harakat ul-Jihadi-Islami 75-76

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/ Bangladesh

Harakat ul-Mujahidin 153

Hatch, Mary Jo 52, 103

Heuer, Richards J. Jr., 75

Heuristics 75-76, 251

Hezbollah 9, 14-15, 17, 4, 52, 58, 82, 125, 176, 181, 186, 222-224

Hindrance 150, 237

Hizb ul-Mujahidin 191

Hoffman, Bruce 6

Hypothesis 45, 192, 202, 210, 212, 215, 224-229, 239

I

Ideology 37, 57, 133, 143-144, 147-149, 154, 175, 177-178, 181, 1

189, 231, 237, 242, 245

India 115

Indirect Effects 48, 78-79, 85, 105, 122-123, 194, 235, 240

Indonesia 40, 192

Information 2, 80, 129

Information Dimension 49, 55, 59, 64, 67, 72, 88, 92, 94, 106, 1

154, 236

Information Technology 2, 41, 56, 60, 71, 94, 166, 235

Insurgency 17, 33-32, 49, 133, 146, 148, 157, 161-162, 209-210, 25

Intelligence 5, 129, 268

Intention 2

International Humanitarian Law 12

Iran 14, 52, 176, 223-224

Iraq 32

Iraqi Freedom 268
257

Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade 196

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 100

J

Japan 100, 214

Jenkins, Brian 6

Jemaah Islamiya 1

Jihad 8

Joint Chiefs of Staff 3, 7

K

Kahn, Robert L. 57, 173, 251

Kashmir Liberation Front 191

Katz, Daniel 57, 173

Key Terrain 84, 87-88, 90, 235

Kiser, Stephen 154

Klein, Gary 216

L

Laden, Osama bin 8, 13, 18, 33, 71, 115, 129, 161-162, 164, 247

Land Domain 55, 89

Laqueur, Walter 20, 113

Lebanon 52, 118, 189, 223, 252

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 18,52

Life Cycle 108, 178, 181-184, 209-210, 221, 238, 250

Limited War 33

Link Diagrams 155, 168 

M

Mali 29

Mauritania 29

Mechanistic Organization 102

Media Effects 113-114

Military Combined Obstacle Overlay 97

Military Operations other than War 40, 196

Mirror-imaging 75, 110, 163, 201

Moro Islamic Liberation Front 79

Morocco 109, 135
258

Narrative 95, 116, 129, 133, 159, 161-162, 164-165, 177, 186

National Strategy 2, 16-17, 23, 25-27, 29, 151, 156

Negative Entropy 181-184, 238

Nested Levels 61, 235

Network 2

Neutral 53, 61, 100, 150-153, 235, 237 

Niger 29 232

Noble Eagle 9-90, 267

Noncombatant 6-7, 12-13

Northern Command 30, 153

O

Objective 32-33, 42, 87-88, 129, 131, 173, 194, 196-197, 199, 20

217, 219-221, 232, 234-235, 237, 239

Open Systems 154, 170-171, 174, 184-185, 236 

Operational 2, 3, 5, 28, 37, 88

Operational Code 165-166, 249

Opposing Force 217 

Organizational Effects 112

P

Pacific Command 30

Pakistan 67-68, 74, 82, 86, 115, 125, 149, 153, 178, 189, 191

Palestinian Liberation Organization 90

Pan Sahel Initiative 29

Pattani United Liberation Organization 82

Pattern Analysis 98, 155, 168, 170, 178, 180, 198

Perception 92, 95, 110, 116, 120-123, 139, 161, 165, 198, 201, 21

236, 243-245

Peru 81, 186

Philippines 2, 16, 28, 74-75, 79, 114, 175, 191

Physical Dimension 49, 55, 60-61, 64-65, 72, 80, 83, 87-88, 99, 11

123, 234

Pillar, Paul 14

Political Motivation 7, 9, 21

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 90

Pre-mortem 216

Priority Intelligence Requirements 38

Provisional Irish Republican Army 94
259

Public Affairs 114, 218, 251

R

Recruiting 28, 41, 89, 93, 112, 132, 175, 198, 243

Red Teaming 75, 135, 165, 192, 198, 212, 215-220, 222, 226, 

249, 252, 253, 254

Relational Ties 157-158, 167

Resource Acquisition 176, 186, 198

Resource Dependency 108, 176

Reverse IPB 36-37, 127, 134, 151, 167, 193, 198, 245

Rewards and Sanctions 177, 238

Ronfeldt, David 112, 158-159, 247, 252

Russia 130, 189-190, 199, 214

S

Salafist Group for Call and Combat 16, 191

Satellites 53, 86, 91

Scenario Analysis 192, 212, 215-216, 222, 226, 228, 239

Sector 56, 58-60, 66, 74-75, 86, 95, 97-98, 105, 109, 110-111, 12

Sensitivity 227

Simon, Steve 11, 71, 247

Single-loop Learning 160, 179

Situation Template 205, 208-209

Social Dimension 42, 49, 53, 56, 59, 72, 86, 88, 95, 105, 110, 116

143, 183, 234, 236

Social Intelligence 219, 234, 242

Social Network Analysis 2, 52-53, 158, 167, 179, 253, 255

Socialization 129, 177, 182, 186, 206, 238, 243

Somalia 47, 67, 83, 90, 127, 192, 212

Southern Command 30

Space 18-19, 28, 30, 37, 40-42, 46-50, 55, 58, 61, 64-65, 78, 83-

95, 113, 138, 155, 159, 170, 186, 199, 208, 216, 234, 235, 237, 25

Spain 13, 16, 131-132, 158

Special Operations Command 29

Special Operations Forces 23, 47, 254

Sri Lanka 18, 21, 41, 52, 108, 176

Stakeholder 38, 49, 52-53, 56, 72, 84, 89, 95, 106-108, 119, 122

127, 136-137, 146, 148-149, 151-153, 158, 160-161, 167, 175
260

233, 235, 237, 239, 242-243, 250

State-sponsorship 14, 16, 27

Story 41, 44, 114, 157, 161-164, 224, 238

Strategic 1, 5, 17, 24-31, 35, 37-38, 40, 42-44, 46, 49-50, 54, 60-63, 

78, 87, 105-106, 112-113, 123, 130, 133, 142-143, 154, 158-161, 16

185, 189, 192, 194-196, 206, 208, 223, 233, 235, 238-239, 241, 24

249, 252-253, 268

System 8, 16, 21, 30, 37, 56-57, 60, 68, 74-75, 77, 80, 84, 94, 99, 10

106, 108, 112, 116, 141-143, 153-154, 159, 171-174, 176-181, 1

203, 213, 219-220, 222, 237, 240, 255

Systems Theory 77, 142, 172, 213, 233, 248

Systems Thinking 60, 82, 101, 142, 233, 240

T

Tactical 2, 5, 25, 28-31, 37-38, 40, 42, 44, 46, 49-50, 54, 60-61, 65, 

84, 87-88, 97, 99, 102, 105-106, 113, 123, 133, 158-160, 180, 186, 18

194-195, 196, 201, 206, 208, 223, 233, 235, 239, 241

Terrain Zones 65-66

Terrorism 1-7, 9-12, 14-17, 19-21, 23-26, 28-30, 32-33, 40, 43-44, 48

76, 88, 90, 94-95, 111-113, 116, 125, 128, 132-133, 137, 148-149, 15

155, 160, 180-181, 185, 189, 190-191, 217, 219, 222, 231, 236, 24

247-250, 252-255

Thailand 82

Thomas, Troy 61, 65, 105, 154, 216, 223, 249, 254

Time Lines 168

Total War 33

Transactional 57, 158, 175, 182, 197

Transcendental 11, 57, 175, 182, 197

Tzu, Sun 20, 34, 250

U

Uncertainty 99-104

Unconfirmed Hypothesis 226

Unified Command Plan 46

United Nations 7, 189

United Self-Defense Forces 129

United States 3, 6, 26, 129, 250-251, 255

United States Air Force 112, 254

United States Army 169, 255
261

United States Navy 13, 129

Urbanization 62-64, 66, 105, 235

Uzbekistan 100, 104, 108, 123, 149

V

Values 9-10, 31, 57-58, 95-97, 116, 119, 152, 159, 177, 179-180, 

W

Wargaming 40, 140, 208-209, 217

Weapons of Mass Destruction 27, 30, 125, 199, 222

Weather 20, 36, 38, 42, 49, 54-55, 59, 71, 83-84, 90, 92, 100, 139

Y

Yemen 47, 66, 89, 179, 189

263

Major Troy S. Thomas is an Air Force officer with leadership e

intelligence operations, defense policy, academia, and non-profit o

In addition to leading airmen in homeland defense (NOBLE EAGL

ditionary operations in the Middle East (IRAQI FREEDOM, ENDUR

DOM, SOUTHERN WATCH, and VIGILANT WARRIOR), Troy h

the Intelligence Flight Commander of the 1st Fighter Wing, a war 

7th Air Force in South Korea, an intelligence analyst with 9th Air F

gence chief for the 55th Fighter Squadron, a staff officer in the Penta

Air Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, a Fellow with th

Strategic Intelligence Research, and an Assistant Professor of Politic

the U.S. Air Force Academy. A distinguished graduate from the Air 

emy, he holds an MA in Government from the University of Texas, A

in Organizational Management from George Washington University, 

Operational Studies from the USMC School of Advanced Warfighti

term member with the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of th

Emerging National Security Affairs, and an Associate with The 

National Security Studies. Travel to over 35 countries has contribute

lications on leadership, conflict, intelligence, and Islam. Troy 

assigned to the Joint Staff.