DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ROY A. DANFORTH, DIANE MARIE DANFORTH, 

and RYAN DANFORTH,

Appellants,

v.

JAMAICA BAY EAST MANAGEMENT CO., INC., a Florida corporation

d/b/a PARADISE VILLAGE,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-1440

[September 30, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Nicholas Richard Lopane, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

CACE16008814.

Matthew W. Dietz of Disability Independence Group, Inc., Miami, for 

appellants.

Jeffrey M. Hearne of Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., Miami, 

Michelle Trunkett of Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc., Fort Myers, 

Katherine Hanson of Disability Rights Florida, Tallahassee, and Angel 

Eason of Legal Services of North Florida, Tallahassee, for Amicus Curiae 

The Housing Umbrella Group of Florida Legal Services, Inc.

Paul B. Ranis and Caran Rothchild of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Fort 

Lauderdale, for appellee.

CURLEY, G. JOSEPH, Associate Judge.

Appellants Roy, Diane, and Ryan Danforth (collectively, “the 

Danforths”) appeal from the trial court’s final order granting summary 

judgment as to Counts I and II of their counterclaim in favor of Jamaica 

Bay East Management Co., Inc. (“Jamaica Bay”). We reverse and remand 

for further proceedings.

Facts
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Roy and Diane Danforth lived in a residential manufactured home 

park called Paradise Village, owned and operated by Jamaica Bay East 

Management Co., Inc. Their son, Ryan Danforth (“Ryan”), 27 years old, 

lived with them. Ryan was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder in 

2014. The Danforths proffered that Ryan’s psychological evaluation 

indicates that “[a]utistic individuals often do not experience their 

emotions until they are already erupting . . . [where] emotions such as 

anger, sadness and even joy are not experienced until they are 

escalated.”

On October 9, 2015, Ryan was involved in an incident with the 

management office. Ryan parked his car along a fence on the north side 

of the office, clubhouse, and pool area. A note left on Ryan’s car 

informed him that if his car was not moved due to tree trimming, it

would be towed at his expense. Ryan moved the car to another spot but 

along the same row, so a tow truck came to remove the car. Ryan could 

not understand why the car was being towed after he had moved the car 

as instructed by the note. Seeking an explanation, he banged loudly on 

the office door, which was locked for the lunch hour, swore, and allegedly 

threatened the people inside the office. Both Ryan and the people in the 

office called the police. 

On October 21, 2015, the Danforths received a lease termination 

notice, notifying them that their lease was terminated because Ryan’s 

incident resulted in a violation of the lease. At this time, Jamaica Bay 

claimed not to know which of the Danforth sons was involved in the 

incident. 

The Danforths retained an attorney who spoke with Jamaica Bay’s 

attorney on October 29, 2015, to discuss possibilities of resolving the 

matter. Their discussion included potential removal of Ryan Danforth

and reimbursement for legal fees and costs. They also discussed that it 

was standard practice for Jamaica Bay, and in its policies and 

procedures, to file a written stipulated settlement agreement with the 

court. Jamaica Bay proposed to file, but not serve, a complaint for 

eviction and thereafter file the settlement stipulation with the court. 

Although the Danforths’ attorney did not raise any issue with these 

methods, he also did not agree to them. 

On October 30, 2015, Jamaica Bay’s attorney sent a draft stipulation 

of settlement, which included the permanent removal of Ryan Danforth. 

Also on October 30, the Danforths delivered a letter to Jamaica Bay’s 

attorney which stated that Ryan had been diagnosed with autism 
3

spectrum disorder and requested reasonable accommodations for him to 

continue living in Paradise Village. 

On November 6, 2015, Jamaica Bay’s attorney sent to the Danforths’ 

attorney a revised settlement offer which would have allowed Ryan to 

stay, but with automatic and immediate eviction should any future 

violations occur from any Danforth family member. The email sent with

the settlement offer stated that the offer would remain open until the end 

of the week.

Three days later, on November 9, 2015, Jamaica Bay filed a complaint 

for tenant eviction. The Danforths filed an answer, affirmative defense 

and counterclaim under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3504, 

asserting Count I for intentional disability discrimination and Count II 

for refusal to make reasonable accommodations for a disability.

Jamaica Bay filed motions for summary judgment on the Danforths’

counterclaims, believing the Danforths had not sufficiently established 

either claim. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary 

judgment on Count I, but denied summary judgment on Count II. In a 

later hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment on Count II, 

finding that the Danforths failed to prove that they timely and properly

requested a reasonable accommodation.

Analysis

On appeal, the granting of a motion for summary judgment is 

reviewed de novo. Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 

So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only 

where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 

1.510(c); MacClatchey v. HCA Health Serv. of Fla., Inc., 139 So. 3d 970 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Moreover, we have further explained:

When a defendant moves for summary judgment, the court 

is not called upon to determine whether the plaintiff can 

actually prove his cause of action. See Publix Super Mkts., 

Inc. v. Schmidt, 509 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Rather, 

the court’s function is solely to determine whether the record 

conclusively shows that the moving party proved a negative, 

that is, “the nonexistence of a genuine issue of a material 

fact.” Besco USA Int’l Corp. v. Home Sav. of Am. FSB, 675 So. 

2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). If the record reflects even 

the possibility of a material issue of fact, or if different 
4

inferences can reasonably be drawn from the facts, the 

doubt must be resolved against the moving party. See id.

Winston Park, Ltd. v. City of Coconut Creek, 872 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2004) (emphasis added).

“The law is well settled in Florida that a party moving for summary 

judgment must show conclusively the absence of any genuine issue of 

material fact and the court must draw every possible inference in favor of 

the party against whom a summary judgment is sought.” Moore v. 

Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1985). If the evidence is conflicting or 

could permit different reasonable inferences, it should be submitted to 

the jury as a question of fact. See id.

The learned trial court perceived no genuine issue of material fact and 

granted summary judgment as a matter of law. In this case, questions of 

fact as to the reasonableness of the association’s actions and

accommodations remain. The Danforths asked for an accommodation

for Ryan, which was met with a provision that all family members could 

be evicted for any violation. Jamaica Bay asserted that it was reasonable 

for them to evict the entire family because the Danforths refused to agree 

that they would be subject to being immediately and summarily evicted 

for any violation in the future. It is uniquely a fact issue to determine 

whether this proposal offered a reasonable accommodation free of 

discriminatory animus in these circumstances.

Jamaica Bay also argued it did not know that Ryan suffered from a

disability until after it acted to evict, which it asserts prevents any ability 

to claim that its actions were motivated at the material times by a 

discriminatory animus. The Danforths countered that Jamaica Bay was 

provided written notice requesting accommodation on October 30, 2015, 

before any potential court eviction, and that Jamaica Bay responded by 

offering an unreasonable proposal adverse to all of the Danforths. In 

addition to the factual determination of whether a reasonable 

accommodation was offered, the circumstances here also present fact 

issues as to whether notice of a disability and a request for 

accommodation were given before the adverse actions were taken by 

Jamaica Bay.

Conclusion

The issues here present questions of fact, the inferences from which 

must be drawn in favor of the Danforths, as the counterclaim plaintiffs,

on Jamaica Bay’s motion for summary judgment. Because material 
5

questions of fact remain, we reverse the summary final judgment on 

Counts I and II of the Danforths’ counterclaim, and remand this cause 

for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Reversed and remanded.

GROSS and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.