Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Andrea L. Ciobanu

Alex Beeman

Ciobanu Law, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Marcia E. Avery-Hanley

Law Office of Marcia E. AveryHanley

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kulwinder Kaur,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Hardev S. Bal,

Appellee-Petitioner.

February 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1409-DR-658

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Theodore M. 

Sosin, Judge

The Honorable Caryl F. Dill, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D02-1112-DR-46524

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 2 of 10

[1] Appellant-Respondent Kulwinder Kaur (“Wife”) appeals the trial court’s 

distribution of the marital estate in her divorce from Appellee-Petitioner Hardev 

S. Bal (“Husband”). Specifically, Wife contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion in valuing the marital residence, in including some property in the 

marital estate, in excluding other property from the marital estate, and in 

ordering an unequal distribution of the marital estate. Because we conclude 

that the trial court acted within its discretion in some regards but abused its 

discretion in others, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum decision. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Husband and Wife were married on April 15, 1993. During the course of their 

marriage, Husband and Wife moved to Indiana with their two children. Upon 

moving to Indiana, the parties purchased a home in Indianapolis and Husband 

purchased a Star Mart “gas station and mini-mart” business located in Wingate. 

Appellant’s App. p. 8. Husband and Wife separated on January 2, 2010. At 

the time of separation, Husband was employed at the Star Mart and Wife was 

employed by the United States Postal Service.

[3] On December 7, 2011, Husband filed a petition seeking a dissolution of the 

parties’ marriage. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 17 

and 18, 2014. On August 22, 2014, the trial court issued an order dissolving the 

parties’ marriage and distributing the marital estate. The trial court’s order also 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 3 of 10

included a determination relating to child custody, support, and visitation.1 

This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Wife contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital 

estate. Specifically, Wife asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

valuing the marital residence, including the 2013 Nissan Altima in the marital 

estate, and failing to include Husband’s $56,107 interest in corporate stock in 

the marital estate. Wife further asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 

in ordering an unequal distribution of the marital estate.

I. Standard of Review

[5] The division of marital assets lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. DeSalle v. Gentry, 818 

N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Elkins v. Elkins, 763 N.E.2d 482, 484 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2002). “‘An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court’s decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.’” Dillard v. Dillard, 889 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 

Poppe v. Jabaay, 804 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). 

 

1

 The parties do not challenge the portions of the trial court’s dissolution order relating to child 

custody, support, or visitation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 4 of 10

When a party challenges the trial court’s division of marital 

property, [s]he must overcome a strong presumption that the 

court considered and complied with the applicable statute, and 

that presumption is one of the strongest presumptions applicable 

to our consideration on appeal. DeSalle, 818 N.E.2d at 44. We 

may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the 

witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable 

to the trial court’s disposition of the marital property. Id. 

Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a 

different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that 

of the trial court. Id.

Galloway v. Galloway, 855 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

II. Valuation of Marital Residence

[6] Wife asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the marital 

residence at $155,000. “[T]he burden of producing evidence as to the value of 

the marital property rests squarely on the shoulders of the parties and their 

attorneys.” Galloway, 855 N.E.2d at 306 (internal case quotation and citation 

omitted). 

[7] In the instant matter, neither party provided any evidence relating to the current 

market value of the marital residence. In fact, both parties explicitly testified 

that they did not know the current value of the marital residence. Review of the 

record reveals that the only evidence presented by the parties relating to the 

value of the marital residence was Husband’s testimony that the parties 

purchased the home in 2007 for $160,425 and that the remaining balance of the 

mortgage loan was approximately $150,000. Father did testify that the parties 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 5 of 10

had refinanced the marital residence on two occasions and modified their 

mortgage on one occasion, but did not present any specific information relating 

to the value of the marital residence at the time of these transactions.

[8] Given that neither party presented any evidence specifically relating to the 

value of the marital residence, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision to 

value the marital residence at $155,000, or approximately half the difference

between the purchase price of the marital residence and the remaining balance 

on the mortgage loan, is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom. We therefore conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in this regard.2

III. 2013 Nissan Altima

[9] Wife next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in including a 2013 

Nissan Altima into the marital estate because there was no evidence relating to 

it in the record. In claiming that the trial court acted within its discretion in 

including the 2013 Nissan Altima in the marital estate, Husband argues that it

was included in the Financial Declaration Form Wife submitted to the trial 

 

2

 In concluding that it was within the trial court’s discretion to value the home at half the 

difference between the purchase price of the marital residence and the remaining balance on 

the mortgage loan, we note the widely-known fact that the housing market took a dip in 2007 

and has yet to completely recover.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 6 of 10

court in accordance with Marion County Local Rule 49-FR00-504 (“Local Rule 

FR00-504”).

[10] Local Rule FR00-504(C) provides that “[s]ubject to specific evidentiary 

challenges, the Financial Declaration shall be admissible into evidence upon 

filing.” Despite Father’s claim to the contrary, the language of Local Rule 

FR00-504(C) does not state that the Financial Declaration is self-executing or 

automatically admitted into evidence, but only that the Financial Declaration is 

admissible. Neither party points to any exhibit or testimony indicating that 

Wife’s Financial Declaration Form was actually admitted into evidence. As 

such, the trial court abused its discretion in including the 2013 Nissan Altima in 

the marital estate.

[11] Furthermore, even if Wife’s Financial Declaration Form had been admitted 

into evidence, the parties’ legal date of separation was December 11, 2011, i.e., 

the date that Husband filed his petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage. The 

marital estate, i.e., the “marital pot,” incorporates “all of the property acquired 

by the joint effort of the parties before the marriage and up to the date of final 

separation.” Pitcavage v. Pitcavage, 11 N.E.3d 547, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 

(internal quotation omitted), reh’g denied. Thus, because Wife could not have 

acquired the 2013 Nissan Altima, a model that was not available for purchase 

until late 2012 or 2013, before the date that Husband filed his petition to 

dissolve the parties’ marriage, the 2013 Nissan Altima should not have been 

included in the parties’ marital estate. See generally, Moore v. Moore, 482 N.E.2d 

1176, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (providing that a vehicle that was acquired by a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 7 of 10

party to a divorce action after the parties’ final separation was not subject to 

distribution in the marital estate). For this additional reason, it was an abuse of 

the trial court’s discretion to include the 2013 Nissan Altima in the marital 

estate.

IV. Capital Stock

[12] Wife also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to include 

$56,107 in capital stock owned by Husband in the marital estate. Again, 

Husband owns and operates a Star Mart “gas station and mini-mart.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 8. It is undisputed that Husband’s ownership interest in 

this business was acquired during the course of the parties’ marriage and should 

be included in the marital estate. Husband argues that the trial court considered 

his interest in the capital stock in finding that Husband had no equity in the 

business. We disagree.

[13] The trial court’s order indicates that in finding that Husband had no equity in 

the business, the trial court considered an appraisal which valued the business 

and subject property, with all improvements, at $205,000 together with $30,450 

in inventory, as reported on the 2011 corporate tax return. The same corporate 

tax return also indicated that Husband held $56,107 in capital stock.3 The trial 

court’s order, however, makes no mention of Husband’s interest in the capital 

 

3

 Review of the appraisal of the value of the business and subject property with all improvements 

indicates that Husband’s interest in the capital stock was not included in the appraisal value. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 8 of 10

stock. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to include 

Husband’s interest in the corporate stock in the marital estate or to explain why 

such interest was excluded from the marital estate amounts to an abuse of the 

trial court’s discretion. As such, on remand, we instruct the trial court to 

include Husband’s $56,107 interest in corporate stock in the marital estate or to 

provide an explanation as to why the trial court excluded Husband’s interest in 

the corporate stock from the marital estate.

V. Unequal Distribution of the Marital Estate

[14] With respect to the division of marital property, Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 

provides as follows:

The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital 

property between the parties is just and reasonable. However, 

this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents 

relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following 

factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition 

of the property, regardless of whether the 

contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by 

each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the 

time the disposition of the property is to become 

effective, including the desirability of awarding the 

family residence or the right to dwell in the family 

residence for such periods as the court considers just 

to the spouse having custody of any children.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 9 of 10

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as 

related to the disposition or dissipation of their 

property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as 

related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property 

rights of the parties.

[15] In the instant matter, the trial court specifically found that “there should be an 

equal distribution of the marital debts and assets pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-

15-7-5.” Appellant’s App. p. 12. The parties do not present any argument or 

evidence on appeal that would convince us that an unequal distribution would 

be warranted. Thus, on remand, we instruct the trial court to distribute the 

marital debts and assets equally.

Conclusion

[16] In sum, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in valuing 

the marital residence. However, we conclude that the trial court abused its 

discretion in including the 2013 Nissan Altima in the marital estate and in 

excluding Husband’s interest in $56,107 in corporate stock from the marital 

estate without providing an explanation as to why Husband’s interest in the 

corporate stock was excluded. On remand, we instruct the trial court to recalculate the value of the marital estate in accordance with our above-stated 

conclusions and to order an equal division of the marital estate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1409-DR-658 | February 4, 2016 Page 10 of 10

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the 

matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum 

decision. 

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.