[Cite as State v. Bush, 2011-Ohio-5954.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GREENE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 10CA82 

vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 06CRB1895 

ENOCH BUSH, JR. : (Criminal Appeal from 

 Municipal Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 18th day of November, 2011. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

Betsy A. Deeds, Atty. Reg. No. 0076747, Asst. Fairborn Pros., 510 

West Main Street, Fairborn, OH 45324 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Daniel J. O’Brien, Atty. Reg. No. 0031461, 1210 Talbott Tower, 

131 N. Ludlow Street, Dayton, OH 45402 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant, Enoch Bush, appeals from a final judgment 

that denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

{¶ 2} On or about September 7, 2006, Defendant was charged 

by complaint in Fairborn Municipal Court with one count of sexual 

imposition, the victim between thirteen and sixteen years of age, 
2

in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(4), which is a misdemeanor of the 

third degree. On March 6, 2007, Defendant entered a plea of guilty 

as charged and was sentenced to sixty days in jail and fined two 

hundred and fifty dollars. At the time of sentencing, the State 

took the position that Defendant had a duty to register as a sexually 

oriented offender because the victim in this case was thirteen 

years of age. The trial court took the matter of the registration 

requirement under advisement and indicated that the court would 

issue a written decision. 

{¶ 3} On June 4, 2007, the trial court issued its written 

decision requiring Defendant to register as a sexually oriented 

offender for period of ten years pursuant to R.C. 2950.04. The 

court sent copies of that decision to Defendant’s trial counsel 

and to Defendant at his last known address. By that time, Defendant 

had already completed his sentence, including serving the jail 

term and paying the fine. Over three years later, August 2, 2010, 

Defendant sent a letter to the trial court asking to withdraw his 

guilty plea and requesting relief from the sex offender 

registration requirement. 

{¶ 4} After retaining new counsel, on August 24, 2010, 

Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he 

was never advised at the time he entered his plea that as result 

of his guilty plea he would be required to register as a sex 
3

offender. A hearing was held on August 24, 2010. On November 

12, 2010, the trial court overruled Defendant’s post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In concluding that Defendant 

failed to demonstrate any manifest injustice, the trial court noted 

that Defendant had some knowledge about a possible sex offender 

reporting requirement because that matter was discussed in his 

presence at the time he entered his guilty plea, that Defendant 

waited over three years, without explanation, after the court 

ordered him to register as a sex offender before seeking relief, 

and that a trial court is not required to advise a defendant about 

sex offender reporting requirements when accepting a guilty or 

no contest plea. See: State v. Cupp, Montgomery App. Nos. 21176, 

21348, 2006-Ohio-1808. 

{¶ 5} Defendant appealed to this court. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 6} “THIS INDIGENT DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW 

AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW AND WAS INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED 

BY APPOINTED DEFENSE COUNSEL, WHICH FAILURE WAS CONJOINED IN BY 

THE TRIAL JUDGE, IN EACH OR BOTH FAILING TO WARN THE DEFENDANT 

OF ANY OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER RULE 11C (b), (c) AND 

(D); IN FAILING TO FULLY INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE EFFECTS OF 

HIS PLEA OF GUILTY, IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT THE DEFENDANT 

WAS MAKING HIS PLEA KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY; IN 
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FAILING TO SET ASIDE AND VACATE THE PLEA AFTER THE DEFENDANT’S 

STATEMENT, WITH 60 SECONDS OF THE PLEA, THAT HE (THE DEFENDANT) 

DIDN’T DO ANYTHING, THE ALLEGED VICTIM TRIED TO KISS HIM AND HE 

SENT HER HOME, AND APPOINTED DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT ONLY FAILING TO 

TELL THE DEFENDANT THAT ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF HIS PLEA WAS MANDATORY 

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, WHICH ON THIS RECORD, DEFENSE COUNSEL 

OBVIOUSLY DID NOT KNOW, AND WHICH OBVIOUSLY THE COURT ITSELF ALSO 

DID NOT KNOW, LEADING TO EXTREME PREJUDICE AND MANIFEST INJUSTICE 

VISITED UPON THIS DEFENDANT.” 

{¶ 7} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea because the failure to advise Defendant at the 

time he entered his plea about the effect of his plea, specifically 

that he would be subject to sex offender registration and reporting 

requirements, constitutes a manifest injustice. 

{¶ 8} In State v. Minkner, Champaign App. No. 2009CA16, 

2009-Ohio-5625, we stated: 

{¶ 9} “{¶ 24} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that ‘[a] motion to 

withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before 

sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court 

after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit 

the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.’ 

{¶ 10} “{¶ 25} A defendant who files a post-sentence motion 
5

to withdraw his guilty plea thus bears the burden of establishing 

a ‘manifest injustice.’ State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 

paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Milbrandt, Champaign App. 

No.2007-CA-3, 2008-Ohio-61, at ¶8. A manifest injustice has been 

defined as ‘a clear or openly unjust act’ that involves 

‘extraordinary circumstances.’ State v. Stewart, Greene App. No. 

2003-CA-28,2004-Ohio-574, at ¶6. ‘[A] “manifest injustice” 

comprehends a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so 

extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress 

from the resulting prejudice through another form of application 

reasonably available to him or her.’ State v. Hartzell (Aug. 20, 

1999), Montgomery App. No. 17499. ‘Crim.R. 32.1 requires a 

defendant making a postsentence motion to withdraw a plea to 

demonstrate manifest injustice because it is designed “to 

discourage a defendant from pleading guilty to test the weight 

of potential reprisal, and later withdraw the plea if the sentence 

was unexpectedly severe.”’ State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 

2009-Ohio-1577, at ¶9, quoting State v. Caraballo (1985), 17 Ohio 

St.3d 66, 67. 

{¶ 11} “{¶ 26} We review a trial court’s decision on a motion 

to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Whitmore, Clark App. No. 06-CA-50, 2008-Ohio-2226, at ¶38.” 

{¶ 12} “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude 
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that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. 

Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87. It is to be 

expected that most instances of abuse of discretion will result 

in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions 

that are unconscionable or arbitrary. 

{¶ 13} “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound 

reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not 

enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de 

novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, 

perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would 

support a contrary result.” AAAA Enterprises, Inc v. River Place 

Community Redevelopment (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161. 

{¶ 14} Defendant argues that the failure of the court or his 

counsel to advise him at the time he entered his guilty plea about 

the effects of that plea, specifically that he would be subject 

to sex offender registration and reporting requirements, 

constitutes a manifest injustice and therefore he should be 

permitted to withdraw his plea. We disagree. 

{¶ 15} This court has repeatedly held that a trial court need 

not inform a defendant about the registration and notification 

requirements in Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2950 before accepting 

a plea. In re C.A., Montgomery App. No. 23022, 2009-Ohio-3303, 

at ¶56; State v. Cupp, Montgomery App. Nos. 21176, 21348, 
7

2006-Ohio-1808; State v. Abrams (Aug. 20, 1999), Montgomery App. 

No. 17459. A trial court’s failure to do so does not render the 

plea invalid. Abrams. In addition, we have also held that a trial 

court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) when taking a plea 

is not an extraordinary circumstance demonstrating a form of 

manifest injustice required for Crim.R. 32.1 relief. Minker, at 

¶29-31. Accordingly, no manifest injustice supporting withdrawal 

of Defendant’s plea has been demonstrated. Thus, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his plea. 

{¶ 16} Defendant relies upon our decision in State v. Powell, 

188 Ohio App.3d 232, 2010-Ohio-3247. Defendant’s reliance is 

misplaced, however, because that case is distinguishable. 

{¶ 17} In Powell, the defendant pled guilty to voyeurism in 

violation of R.C. 2907.08(A). The victim of that offense was not 

a minor child under age eighteen. In accordance with the law in 

effect at that time, that offense was a presumptively 

registration-exempt sexually oriented offense, unless the trial 

court issued a separate order specifically removing the presumptive 

exemption pursuant to R.C. 2950.021. The trial court did not do 

that in designating Powell a Tier I sex offender at the time sentence 

was imposed. Under those circumstances, we found a manifest 

injustice and ordered the plea vacated. 
8

{¶ 18} Here, unlike in Powell, Defendant did not enter a guilty 

plea to a presumptively registration-exempt sexually oriented 

offense. The victim of this offense was not eighteen years of 

age or older. R.C. 2950.01(D)(1)(e), (P)(1)(a). When the victim 

is under the age of eighteen, no presumption arises that the offense 

is exempt from registration. Under those circumstances, the trial 

court is not required to issue an order specifically removing the 

presumptive exemption before requiring Defendant to register as 

a sexually oriented offender. 

{¶ 19} Defendant’s assignment of error is overruled. The 

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

HALL, J., concurs. 

FAIN, J., concurring: 

{¶ 20} I agree with everything stated in Judge Grady’s opinion 

for the court. In that opinion, it is noted that we have repeatedly 

held that a trial court need not inform a defendant about the 

registration and notification requirements in R.C. Chapter 2950 

before accepting a plea. I write separately merely to note that 

this may change for defendants sentenced after the Adam Walsh Act 

amendments to R.C. Chapter 2950 (2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10). As 

a result of State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 324, 2011-Ohio-3374, 

the registration, notification and verification requirements for 
9

persons classified as sexual offenders under the Adam Walsh Act 

are not regarded as remedial; they are punitive. Id., ¶ 16, 21. 

 If those requirements are now punitive under R.C. Chapter 2950, 

then they are part of the penalty for the offense. Consequently, 

the defendant must be informed of them before his plea of guilty 

or no contest may be accepted. Crim. R. 11(C)(2)(a). 

{¶ 21} But Bush is not subject to the Adam Walsh Act amendments. 

 His registration and notification requirements arise from the 

previous version of R.C. Chapter 2950 (Megan’s Law), and those 

requirements, being merely remedial, are not part of the penalty 

for his offense. Accordingly, as a long line of our cases have 

held, the trial court was not required to inform him of them before 

accepting his plea.