1

RUSSIAN ELECTRONIC, INFORMATION, 

NAVIGATION, AND RECONNAISSANCE-STRIKE 

AND -FIRE OPERATIONS: DEFINITIONS AND 

USE 

Author: Timothy Thomas

November 2020

Sponsor: US Army Futures and 

Concepts Center

Dept. No.: N213

Contract No.: W56KGU-19-F0004

Project No.: 0720A150-MD

The views expressed in this 

document are those of the 

author and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of 

MITRE, the Department of 

Defense, or the US 

government.

Approved for Public Release; 

Distribution Unlimited; Case 

Number 20-3186

©2021 The MITRE Corporation. 

All rights reserved.

McLean, VA
2

Military security is turning into an intellectual-reconnaissance-informational-navigational-strike 

system, which demands a special relationship regarding the control of its actions. 

Major General V. D. Ryabchuk (deceased), 20080 F

1

Introduction

Russia has been investigating a host of strike and fire concepts for at least a few decades, 

with one of the first reconnaissance-strike discussions documented in 1984. The quotation above 

indicates that reconnaissance-strike is not the only strike means under consideration in Russia, and 

that the number has increased over the years. In terms of terminology and context, Russia’s strike 

and fire forms are different from those of other nations. The forms under discussion in Russia are 

radio-electronic-strikes (REU) and radio-electronic-fire strikes (REOU), information-strike and -

fire operations (IUO for strike operations, no abbreviation offered for -fire operations), remotely 

controlled cyber operations (RCW, which appear to be part of information-strikes), navigation 

strikes, and reconnaissance-strike1 F

2 and -fire complexes (RUK and ROK, respectively). 

Most of these points were further emphasized during General Staff Chief Valeriy 

Gerasimov’s 2018 presentation to the Academy of Military Science. He stated the following:

Recce-strike and recce-fire profiles are being created with the aim of ensuring the 

efficiency and continuity of fire effects against the enemy. Reconnaissanceinformation and information-control systems are being integrated with weapons 

systems of services and branches. Work is being done on the creation of an 

automated interservice recce-strike system.

Considering the steady broadening of the scope of employment of different types 

of radio-electronic means, forces and means of struggle against them are being 

developed. Forces are being outfitted with equipment for radio-electronic warfare 

against aerospace resources, navigation systems, and digital radio communications 

systems.2 F

3

RUK and ROK operations have been the center of most strike and fire discussions over the 

years. IUO and information-fire operations have been discussed more intermittently in military 

periodicals (2007, 2009, 2011, and 2020). In 2009 information-strike systems (IUS) were added 

to the discussion. The REU and REOU were introduced in 2017 (perhaps earlier, just 

undocumented) and they work to disorganize an opponent’s command and control capability (C2). 

 1 V. D. Ryabchuk, “Problems of Military Science and Military Forecasting in Conditions of an IntellectualInformation Confrontation,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 5 2008, p. 73. 2 General definitions of strike and fire are: Udar (strike): strategic, operational, or tactical in scale and can be nuclear 

or conventional. Ogon (fire): artillery, tanks, small arms, etc. use of weapons to damage or destroy targets in 

combat. See pages 762 and 508, respectively, of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow Military Publishers, 

1986, main editor was S. F. Akhromeev.

3 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Influence of the Contemporary Nature of Armed Struggle on the Focus of the Construction 

and Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Priority Tasks of Military Science in Safeguarding 

the Country’s Defense,” Vestnik Akademiy Voennyh Nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science), 2018, No. 

2, p. 19. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation of this presentation.
3

The 2017 article discussed below used the term “disorganization” 18 times. Remote-controlled 

cyber operations first appeared in 2015 and then again in 2020, both times authored by the same 

individual. Navigation strikes were apparently exercised against the NATO Trident Juncture 

exercise in 2018. The inclusion of the term in Gerasimov’s presentation indicates the issue is more 

important than previously viewed.

The following summary of these four fire and strike operation classifications covers the 

period from 1984 to the present. Due to their shorter length, the examination first looks at the REU 

and REOU concepts and how they assist in the attainment of superiority over opponents during 

operations and create favorable conditions for seizing and keeping the operational (tactical) 

initiative.3F

4 Second, the discussion examines Russian information-strike operations, to include the 

use of remote-cybernetic operations and, to some authors, the use of radio-electronic means as 

well. The remote-cybernetic weapons have been described as smart weapons and thus are included 

in the information-strike section. Third is a very short discussion of a Russian navigation strikes 

against NATO forces during exercise Trident Juncture. Finally, there is a long and extended 

discussion of RUK and ROK operations. 

Based on this detailed analysis, Russia is clearly continuing to look for new ways to utilize 

strike and fire means. Artificial intelligence and robotics are part of current ways to update and 

improve reconnaissance-strike and -fire complexes. There are two appendixes. The first one is on 

definitions and the second one is a diagram of a ROK from a Russian publication. 

The Radio-Electronic Strike Concept in 2017

In 2017, an important article on radio-electronic warfare (REB) appeared in the journal 

Military Thought. It stated that there were two important Russian REB developments in the initial 

decade of the 21st century, first the creation of REB troops and second the documented guidance

for REU and REOU operations, whose theoretical components had been discussed as early as the 

1990s.4F

5

The authors listed the following fundamental principles as the template to follow when 

using REU or REOU (to stress the apparent importance of the disorganization concept in this 

article, each time the term is addressed it is placed in bold below).:

• The object of the strike: practically the entire range of resources of an 

opponent’s information-control systems (ICS) are potential targets of 

suppression. For example, communications centers may be an object of REU to 

cause “radio-information blocking” of the unit and its entire C2 subunits 

(forward and rear command posts, etc.).5F

6

 4 D. V. Kholuenko, V. A. Anokhin, A. S. Korobeynikov, and L. A. Lakhin, “Radio-Electronic and Radio-ElectronicFire Strikes—Basic Forms of Employing REB Unites and Subunits,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 11 

2017, pp. 21, 27. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article. 5 For example, one of the articles authors, V. A. Anokhin, had written an article in Nauchnyi Sbornik (Scientific 

Journal) in 1993 titled “New Forms and Methods for the Disorganization of Enemy Command and Control of 

Troops and Weapons in Operations and Combat Operations.” See page 21 for the entire site. 6 Kholuenko, Anokhin, Korobeynikov, and Lakhin, p. 22.
4

• The target of the strike: the disruption of the functioning of an ICS or line of 

enemy leadership, with a “given degree of effectiveness for the 

disorganization of C2” or “the functioning of information systems.”6 F

7

• The strike’s effectiveness: the REOU goal is to disorganize the functioning of 

enemy C2 with a concentrated main effort. If capacity is limited, then 

disorganize the C2 of first-echelon brigades. If capacity is adequate, then 

disorganize C2 subsystems, such as field artillery and tactical or army 

aviation.7F

8

• The force requirements to deliver REU and REOU: the range of resources for 

interference must span all types of communications. The absence of even one 

interference type results in a 2-3-fold reduction in the effectiveness of 

disorganizing C2.8F

9

• The place to insert the REU (REOU) in an operation: at the beginning of an 

operation, an REOU is delivered to disorganize C2 of first-echelon troops and 

an REU is delivered to disorganize the C2 of field artillery. As the operation 

develops, strikes aim to disorganize the C2 of an opponent’s second echelon 

and reserves. Disorganizing C2 ensures the seizure of the operational 

initiative.9F

10

• The procedure for employing forces and means: it is necessary to preempt an 

opponent’s use of C2 and REB systems; jamming stations should leave a 

position after 5-15 minutes; and strikes should be comprehensive. 10F

11

Based on these distinctions, the following REU and REOU definitions were offered:

Radio-electronic strike – the comprehensive and mass employment of radio-electronic warfare 

forces and means, coordinated with troops tasks, for the purpose of ensuring the required 

effectiveness for the disorganization of the enemy’s information-control systems (control 

systems) or the lines of enemy leadership.

Radio-electronic-fire strike – the totality of specially organized radio-electronic and fire strikes, 

coordinated and interconnected with respect to goals, tasks, place, and time, conducted by the 

forces and means of various services and special forces, according to a single concept and plan to 

execute tasks for the disorganization of enemy command and control of troops and weapons on 

given axes, in an established period and with the assigned effectiveness.11 F

12

The following table shows units and subunits needed to deliver an operational REU or REOU. The 

table was listed under the bullet “force requirements” above:

Table 1: Participation of REB Units and Subunits in Delivering REU or REOU at Different Levels12F

13

 7 Ibid., p. 23.

8 Ibid., p. 24.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., p. 25. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 26. 13 Ibid., p. 24.
5

Level of REU or REOU

Participation of REB Units and Subunits

MRB Army Military District Central Subordination

Strategic + +

Operational-strategic + + +

Operational + + + +

Tactical + + +

The following comment ended the discussion on force requirements:

The accumulated experience of assessing the effectiveness of disorganizing 

command and control at the tactical and operational-tactical levels of an opposing 

side confirms that to achieve a tangible effect of disorganizing command and 

control without the fire destruction of the enemy’s radio electronic resources 

requires a capacity of REB resources that exceeds the existing capacity in large 

formations (formations) by 2.5-3 times.13 F

14

Thus, an increase in Russian REB systems is expected. To close out the article, the authors listed 

the parameters of REU and REOU for an army operation and division battle as follows:

Table 2: General Characteristics of Army and Division (Brigade) REUs and REOUs14F

15

Number Characteristics Forms of REB Employing Units and Subunits

Army operation Division (brigade) battle

REU REOU REU REOU

1 Object of effects

Line of leadership of the 

type army corps (AK)-

first-echelon motorized 

division (md), AKreserve md, etc. 

AK’s informationcontrol system (ICS), 

AK’s functional 

systems

Line of leadership of 

the type first echelon 

md-motorized brigade 

(mbr)-motorized 

battalion (mb), md-fire 

control center, etc.

Md, mbr ICS, md 

functional systems

2 Goal

Disorganization of 

command and control of 

first-echelon divisions 

for the time for 

executing operational 

task

Gaining superiority in 

command and control 

at the operational 

level for the time for 

executing operational 

task

Disorganization of 

command and control 

of first-echelon 

formations (units) for 

the time for executing 

operational task

Gaining superiority in 

command and 

control at the tactical 

level for the time for 

executing 

operational task

3

Anticipated 

effectiveness 

(degree of 

disorganization)

Breakdown of command 

and control of firstechelon formations 

(units)

1. Breakdown of 

command and control 

while executing an 

operational task

2. Gaining 

(maintaining)

superiority in 

command and control

Breakdown of 

command and control 

of first-echelon 

formations (units)

1. Breakdown of 

command and 

control at the mdmbr-mb levels while 

executing an 

operational task

2. Gaining 

(maintaining) 

superiority in 

command and 

control

4

Place in the 

operation (battle)

Component of army 

operation or REOU army

Component of army 

operation

Component of Division 

(brigade) battle or 

division (brigade) 

REOU

Component of battle

 14 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 15 Ibid., p. 26-27.
6

5

Decision-making 

level

Army chief of staff on 

recommendation of REB 

chief

Army commander on 

recommendation of 

REB chef

Formation chief of staff 

on recommendation of 

REB chief

Formation 

commander on 

recommendation of 

REB Chief

6

Scope

One line of corps 

leadership

AK ICS, 1-2 AK 

functional systems

One line of division 

leadership or 1-2 lines 

of brigade leadership

MD ICS, 1-2 MD 

and/or MBR 

functional systems

Frequency 1-2 times per day of operation (battle)

Duration, hours 1-2 1.5-3 0.5-1.5 1-1.5

Depth and width

In the zone of army defense to a depth of the 

enemy’s operational structure

To the entire depth of the enemy’s combat 

formation in the brigade’s area of responsibility

7

Make-up of forces 

being used

Forces and means of special operations, rocket forces and artillery, army aviation, operationaltactical aviation, and REB of the military district, army, division (brigade)

The article’s final thoughts recommended finding new forms for disorganizing enemy C2 as a 

priority trend for military researchers.15 F

16 While a 2017 article, the content remains important today. 

Information-Strike/Remote-Controlled Cyber Weapons in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2015, and 2020

By 2007, the information age’s impact on operations was in full display in Russia and 

elsewhere. Instead of the reconnaissance-strike operation (ROO) concept, I. N. Vorobyev, a 

specialist in tactical issues, discussed the evolving field of information-strike operations (IUO) in 

the journal Military Thought. The informatization of the Russian Armed Forces had created 

opportunities for information attacks on command-and-control targets. Of interest is that 

Vorobyev underscored how C2 can be “disorganized” in both physical and electronic ways, with 

the latter becoming an “active offensive weapon as effective as firepower.”16F

17 An IUO was defined 

as 

The sum total of interconnected information-fire engagements, information-fire 

battles, and information strikes, coordinated in terms of target, objectives, place, 

time, and methods, and conducted to disorganize an adversary’s troop and weapon 

command and control and inflict a blow to its information resources.17 F

18

It was suggested to use the IUO in combination with firepower.

An information-strike, Vorobyev added, is a short and powerful attack by an information 

weapon on an opponent’s information resource. Types include information and psychological 

strikes to disinform and mislead an adversary; psychotropic strikes, which affects people’s minds 

with special tools; electronic, which includes jamming (and calls into question whether 

information and electronic strikes are in the same category—he makes a case that they are); and 

software, which includes attacks on an opponent’s C2 computers. IUO’s make it possible to seize 

the initiative and gain information superiority, to reflexively control an opponent, and to be carried 

out independently or in combination with other operations.18 F

19 IUOs are global, varied in form and 

method, continuous, and covert, allowing for fast-moving and precise operations. While the scope 

of an IUO has not been yet determined, to Vorobyev it could extend along an operational axis 

 16 Ibid., p. 27. 17 I. N. Vorobyev, “Information-Strike Operations,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2007, p. 15. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.
7

exceeding 300-400 kilometers laterally and up to 450-500 kilometers in depth. An entire theater 

of operations would be covered on the strategic level.19F

20

The IUO consists of three stages, the disorganization of an opponent’s intelligence 

capability to increase surprise; under cover of jamming, deliver strikes to kill assets; and the 

disorganization of information support of all combat operations. Blocking the gathering, 

processing, and sharing of information, and the planting of disinformation at all stages of 

information support, is required.20F

21 Full use of precision weapons is made to disorganize adversary 

information management systems of artillery and aircraft. It is possible that future wars will 

involve electronic-fire battles and electronic-fire engagements used by different types of EW 

units.21F

22 The latter appeared to have evolved as he predicted, based on the 2017 REB discussion 

above on the electronic-fire concept.

Finally, coordination is required to accomplish the following objectives, all designed to 

protect Russian assets:

1. Counter adversary reconnaissance

2. Conduct jamming, wage information and fire battles, and deliver concentrated 

and massive information strikes

3. Launch an information-psychological attack to disinform and mislead the 

adversary

4. Attack adversary command and control computers with special destructive or 

corruptive software

5. Seize (destroy) adversary intelligence forces and assets, command posts, radars, 

and communication centers

6. Conduct camouflage, simulation, disinformation, and feints to create a false 

electronic environment

7. Disorganize adversary information management systems, information support 

of reconnaissance, combat zone air and missile defense, tactical and army 

aircraft, and field artillery

8. Disrupt information support of fire forces and assets.22F

23

Vorobyev added that it will be necessary to maneuver EW forces and covertly shift electronic 

strikes from one site to another. It will be necessary to simultaneously carry out electronic attacks 

against EW sites or blockade them both electronically and with fire. These are offensive 

operations.23 F

24

In 2009, the information-strike system (IUS) was introduced, although the IUO 

continued to be defined and discussed as well. The IUS was the result of the 

reconnaissance-strike complex acquiring a “new quality.” The information-strike system 

(IUS, range over 500 kilometers, in the strategic zone) is an automated weapon system 

designed for the highly effective destruction of one, several, or many facilities/targets using 

 20 Ibid., p. 17. 21 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 22 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 23 Ibid., p. 21. 24 Ibid.
8

precision-guided strike weapons at great distances in accordance with the operations plan 

or its concept of operations.24F

25

These changes in range and accuracy were made possible by the availability of satellites 

and other means of information-space support. This support allows for accurate target acquisition 

while Russian units remain outside of the kill zone of the enemy’s traditional weapons. It also 

minimizes the importance of the old concept of theaters of military operations that were carved 

out under geographic considerations. Further, the interface between missiles and space-based 

systems that improves range and accuracy is not restricted in any manner by existing treaties. Past 

arms control treaties have only addressed the number of missiles, their flight range, and speed.25 F

26

The sequence of operations in future wars, the authors noted, will start with a preemptive 

information war to gain supremacy in political, legal, psychological, and other non-military 

measures. Space operations will then precede air, naval, and land offensive operations directed at 

gaining supremacy in near-Earth space to ensure the functioning of Russia’s orbital constellations. 

The main missions of space operations will be to destroy an enemy’s space infrastructure and to 

disrupt their command and control. Once the supremacy of space information systems and 

independent military operations is assured in strategic space (meaning offensive missions will 

predominate to gain the initiative in war), it is then possible to consider defensive operations to 

defend information resources.26 F

27

These missions will be accomplished through the information-strike operation (IUO). The 

IUO is:

The sum of interrelated and coordinated operations based upon goals, missions, 

location, time, and techniques for the conduct of information-strike battles, 

information-weapon engagements, and information-strikes which are being 

conducted with the goal of disrupting the enemy troops command and control and 

weapon control systems and the destruction of his information resource. This is a 

new form of armed combat, the characteristic elements of which are informationstrikes which transition in combination with fire impact into information-weapon 

engagements and information-strike battles.27F

28

The IUO will be important in helping Russian forces gain the initiative in the information 

sphere. This ensures troop and weapon complex command and control as well as reflexive 

command and control of the enemy. The latter concept enables the management and control of 

adversary battlefield perceptions. The striking importance of this concept should not be overlooked

since Russia’s military is considering operational-strategic strike operations against the 

information infrastructure and resources of potential adversaries. Russia’s desire to use the IUO as 

a reflexive control mechanism that manages the perceptions of enemy forces is an issue worthy of 

future study.

 25 Igor Morozov, Sergey Baushev, and Oleg Kaminskiy, “Space and the Character of Modern Military Activities,” 

Vozdushno-kosmicheskaya i Oborona (Air and Space Defense), No. 4, 2009, pp. 48-56, downloaded from the 

Eastview web site. 

26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
9

In 2011, two Russian military specialists wrote on information-strike operations in the 

journal Armeyskii Sbornik (Army Journal). They viewed the classic triad of fire, strike, and 

maneuver as no longer capturing the essence of a battle or operation. Radio-electronic, electronicfire, and information-strike operations were the new forms of armed struggle, they noted. The latter 

is defined below:

The information-strike operation (IUO) is the totality of mutually associated 

information strike engagements (srazhenie), information-strike battles (boi), and 

information strikes (udar), coordinated with respect to goal, missions, place, time, 

and method of conduct, carried out with the aim of disorganizing an adversary’s 

troop and weapons command and control system and destroying his information 

resources.28 F

29

The definition is almost identical to the first part of the IUO definition offered above in the 2009 

discussion. The types of strikes include information-psychological (which disinform or mislead an 

adversary), information-psychotropic (to disrupt a person’s psyche), radio-electronic, and 

program-computer. IUO’s help gain the initiative and superiority in the information sphere, 

including command and control of troops and the reflexive control of opponents. IUO’s have no 

spatial limitations, a variety of forms and methods of use, no weather or seasonal constraints, can 

often be used covertly, and can target command posts and communication nodes.29F

30

IUOs can be conducted in three stages. First, information support systems of command and 

control for intelligence, air defense, and rocket defense are disorganized. Second, under the cover 

of jamming, destructive strikes are made—operational-tactical and tactical rockets. Third, 

information support of tactical and army aviation and field artillery is disorganized.30F

31 To prepare 

an IUO, an adversary’s command and control system must be studied and exposed, and objectives 

for fire and radio-electronic destruction determined in advance. Disorganizing the enemy’s 

command and control system is critical to planning and coordinating friendly fire destruction 

elements.31F

32

The authors appear to have combined the two articles above, Vorobyev’s 2007 discussion 

in Military Thought and Morozov, Baushev, and Kaminskiy’s 2009 article in Air and Space Defense. 

They note that there are various types of information-psychological weapons that will enhance an 

IUO. This involves energy-information-psychological weapons under study that look for ways to

modulate super high frequency ultrasonic infrared waves that affect the human nervous system. S. 

G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov mentioned the use of infrasonic weapons in their 2015 article on

forecasting in Military Thought. There have been several authors who discussed Russia’s use of 

nonlethal weaponry. Psychotropic-information weapons use narcotics and chemicals to produce 

information-control effects on biological processes and the nervous system. Technical means (e.g., 

 29 I. N. Chibisov and V. A. Vodkin, “The Information-Strike Operation,” Armeyskii Sbornik (Army Journal), March 

2011, p. 46. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article. 30 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 31 Ibid., p. 47. 32 Ibid., p. 48.
10

generators) of virtual information-psychological and other types of weaponry offer different 

potential capabilities to affect the human psyche (author’s note: no actual results were offered, just 

these theories). Information-psychological weapons are to be integrated with fire, radio-electronic, 

and energy effects to broaden the operational-strategic methods for achieving IUO goals. Radio 

disinformation, active and passive jamming, false radar targets, and fake communication centers 

facilitate misleading an opponent. The IUO is basically an offensive action, but it can acquire a 

defensive character if needed.32 F

33

In a 2015 Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal) article, titled “Remote-Controlled Cyber 

Weapons: Construction Principles and Functional Possibilities,” author G. Vokin discussed this 

new type weapons military-technical capabilities, organizational composition, and expected 

effects.33F

34 Interestingly, the August 2020 issue of Russia’s Military Thought included another 

Vokin article on the same topic, but coauthored this time with M. I. Makarov. It was titled “The 

Conceptual Foundations of the Creation of a New Class of Weapon—Remote Cybernetic 

Weapons.”34F

35 While not directly using the terms strike and fire, the implication was clear: this is 

how cyber weapons would be used in operations, to include in reconnaissance-diversionary 

operations.

In the 2020 article, remote-cybernetic weapons (RCW) were discussed and appeared to be 

another way of discussing smart weaponry (use of lasers, etc. for precision targeting). RCW are 

composed of a series of new capabilities. Due to the speed (to include hypersonic) and precision 

of these weapons, they can overcome counter-systems. RCW are non-nuclear “smart weapons,” 

the authors noted, based on robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and information resources which 

guarantee high strike accuracy on critically important elements of targets. It is combat robotfighters that deliver RCW to the target area, not classical missiles, and bombs.35F

36

The authors called it wise to remotely destroy an opponent’s strategic weapons and the 

most important military and civilian structures. However, ballistic-type warheads are in the field 

of vision of air defense systems for their entire flight and thus have a more limited chance to 

destroy an opponent’s nuclear sites. This is due to the difficulty of hitting an enemy’s nuclear 

potential that is often hidden on reverse slopes of mountains or in canyons. Thus, hitting large 

cities and important stationary structures (military bases, arsenals, large hydroelectric stations etc.) 

become main targets. Cruise warheads offer a way out of this dilemma, as they are highly accurate 

and can fly at low altitudes, behaving differently than ballistic warheads. A cruise warhead 

(krylatyy boevoy blok) consists of a “heat shield, within which is a cruise subblock (krylatyy boevoy 

 33 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 34 G. Vokin, “Remote-Controlled Cyber Weapons: Construction Principles and Functional Possibilities,” Armeyskiy 

Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 8 2015, pp. 9-11. 35 G. G. Vokin and M. I. Makarov, “Conceptual Foundations of the Creation of a New Class of Weapon—Remote 

Cybernetic Weapons,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 8 2020, pp. 117-125. The author would like to thank 

Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article.

36 Ibid., pp. 118-119.
11

subblock).”3 6F

37 Depending on the composition of the latter, the functional purposes of the subblock 

may be:

• Reconnaissance-information (cameras, radar, target sensors, surveillance 

sensors, radio beacons, information transmitters)

• Strike (warheads of increased power with homing systems or increased fuel 

reserve for patrolling)

• Reconnaissance-sabotage (maps of dangerous areas, mines, coordinates for 

mines, mine-release devices)

• Additional reconnaissance (sensors for reconnaissance of targes, radio beacons, 

surveillance sensors)

• Reconnaissance-strikes (sensors for additional reconnaissance of targets, 

warheads, and mines)

• Rescue-support (munitions, weapons, medicines, food, rescue resources, etc.)37F

38

RCW can be delivered to targets individually or a few at a time by a single carrier. The authors 

pointed out that there remain many problems to work out, such as the development of 

neurocomputer algorithms for target recognition; developing military-scientific scenarios for 

employing RCW and their expected combat effectiveness; and developing and designing variants 

of RCW means of destruction, among others.38 F

39 In conclusion, it was stated that RCW “are an 

effective, non-nuclear means of warning, preemption, containment, and retaliation that our country 

needs now, and even more in the future.”39 F

40 Such weapons will make “an attack on our Motherland 

impossible.”40F

41

Navigation

Russia writes that practically every US weapon is hooked to satellite communications, GPS 

navigation, and the Internet, and REB operators claim to be able to shut these channels down with 

ease. Recent DARPA contracts, the Russian analysis noted, appear to focus on upgrading weak 

systems as DARPA is directing companies to design new systems able to function against 

electronic interference. Another Western concern is that Russia is not limited to just jamming 

NATO systems but can also intercept and manipulate US military targeting data. One US analyst, 

according to the same Russian publication, stated “If the enemy can get into command-and-control

computers to provide wrong data, you could potentially call in airstrikes against your own 

positions. If troops can no longer communicate, close air support becomes more time-consuming 

or impossible.”41F

42

There have been only a few publicized events of Russian attempts to block GPS signals. 

One of the most glaring, and perhaps a trial run at Russia’s ability to destroy or block such signals, 

 37 Ibid., p. 120. 38 Ibid., p. 123. 39 Ibid., p. 124. 40 Ibid., p. 125. 41 Ibid. 42 Aleksandr Sitnikov, “US for the First Time ‘Shuts Down’ Russian Electronic Warfare in Syria. Account 

Published in America of New Method to Counter the ‘Putin Threat,’” Svobodnaya Pressa, 18 October 2018.
12

was during the 2018 NATO exercise Trident Juncture. The Norwegian Defense Ministry blamed 

Russia for GPS malfunctions during the exercise and Finnish Prime Minister Juha Sipila stated 

that jamming from the Kola Peninsula had knocked out some of his nation’s navigation systems. 

Israel implied that the Krasukha-4 REB system was to blame for the recent inadequate 

performance of its Iron Dome air defense system. With an operating range of 300 kilometers, the 

Krasukha system could reach Israel if deployed in Syria. Zhitel, Divnomorye, or Borisoglebsk-2 

systems may also be at fault, according to Israeli experts cited in the Russian report. None of these 

nations claim to have potential counters to these Russian systems.42 F

43

Early References to Reconnaissance-Strike and -Fire Operations, 1987 and 1996

In past wars, human reconnaissance “spotters” were used to find and report targets for 

artillery units. Soon new technologies were introduced, such as laser devices, that helped to 

precisely determine a target’s coordinates. These devices were supplemented with navigation 

resources and other communication means. The military’s Strelets system is one such development 

that combines all these assets. The result for Russia has been the quick development of RUK and 

ROK that can quickly fix and destroy targets of a strategic, operational, or tactical nature. Strike 

and fire measures include artillery, missiles, and aircraft that employ a noncontact (that is, other 

than between fighters on the ground) mode. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other 

reconnaissance assets (helicopters, etc.) have been introduced and are able to find and fix an 

opponent’s precise location for destruction, since many are now armed as well. 

Modern war’s “victory triad,” according to one discussion, includes reconnaissance, 

command and control, and fire engagement.43F

44 Command and control (C2) issues, electronic 

warfare, geoinformation systems, reconnaissance-information support, and weaponry must be tied 

together to form a unified system that shortens target detection and destruction. Engagement 

superiority goes to the side able to collect, process, and analyze information fastest.44 F

45 Western 

audiences focus on different concepts, such as kill chains and other concepts that have similar but 

perhaps not identical ingredients. The military cultures and weaponry of the US and Russia are 

different, and this results in the use of different terminology and applications of weaponry. 

The Russian topics of reconnaissance-fire and reconnaissance-strike forms and methods 

have acquired various and distinctive subsets. Just the number of associated abbreviations can be 

confusing. ROS, RUK, ROK, OROS, OKRUD, REOS, RPS, ROD, VROK, and ROO are 

abbreviations used either specifically or in relation to the reconnaissance-fire and -strike 

complexes. Each of the abbreviations (in the same order) is defined in Appendix One for reference 

purposes. As discussed above, there are also radio-electronic-strike operations, information-strike 

operations, and navigation under consideration.

In 1987, one of the first early references to ROK and RUK appeared in that year’s edition 

of Taktika (Tactics), published under the authorship of General-Lieutenant V. G. Reznichenko, a 

 43 Sergey Ishchenko, “Krasukha with Lysukha Have Struck Terror into NATO and Israel. A Norwegian Frigate on 

the Shoals, and the Iron Dome—Holes. Is this EW?” Svobodnaya Pressa, 13 November 2018. 44 V. Kiselev, “Precision Engagements in Future War,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 2 2017, p. 26. 45 Ibid., pp. 31 and 27.
13

Russian professor at the Frunze Military Academy and an expert on the subject. The book noted 

that reconnaissance-strike (fire) (RUK [ROK], as written) complexes were the most effective form 

of high precision weapons. Reconnaissance and destruction could now be carried out practically 

in real time (the book noted that this was the view of foreign specialists). Such systems usually 

have four components: an automated reconnaissance and guidance system; a mobile ground 

control center; high precision weapons; and a system for the precise determination of the location 

of system components.45 F

46 Reconnaissance-fire complexes (ROK) are usually positioned with 

division and brigade control posts.46F

47 However, it was unclear if the explanations offered were 

about the application of Russian terminology to advancements made in foreign nations or to 

Russia. What was clear was the use of RUK and ROK.

In 1996, the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff at the 

time, Colonel General Viktor Mikhaylovich Barynkin, explained RUK and ROK. In the military 

journal Armament, Politics, Conversion, he discussed precision weapon effects on combat 

operations and military art. Most importantly, he discussed RUK and ROK operations, noting how 

new forms of combat operations and fire engagement using precision weaponry (VTO) would be 

needed. He stated that a transition to a multifunctional “reconnaissance-strike complex (RUK) 

(reconnaissance-fire delivery complex, ROK [as written])” would be required. When enough 

operational-strategic and operational-tactical RUKs and ROKs employing VTO become available, 

a massive fire strike concept for use in the initial period of war and before first operations must be 

developed. 47 F

48 No further distinction between RUK and ROK was offered. 

Barynkin noted that a reconnaissance-fire delivery system (ROS) will include 

reconnaissance, fire engagement, and electronic warfare and will be supported by automated 

command and control. These assets are integrated “hierarchically, organizationally, technically, 

informationally, and functionally,” which will become the basic form of integration. The ROS will 

allow for reconnaissance-strike-maneuver, fire and destroy, and other forms of fire engagement. 

The “fire and destroy” principle could lead to the gradual elimination of harassment, fire 

suppression, and even neutralization methods, since a one-time “critical mass of enemy losses” 

should be planned before friendly combined-arms groups are committed. Barynkin added that fire 

engagements may even acquire strategic significance, where war results are determined not by a 

quantitative but by a qualitative correlation of weapon systems during first operations. Area point 

engagements would be conducted by ROSs of each troop echelon in their zone of responsibility. 

Looking into the future, Barynkin stated that in the 21st century, “automated command and control 

systems using element of artificial intelligence” will do planning and fire control.48F

49

The goal of ROS will be to crush the enemy with fire and weaken forces posed for combat. 

Strategic and operational-tactical means of long-range fire engagement will play the predominant 

role in determining an operations outcome, with tactical actions occurring as a secondary or 

concluding action. As a result, there may be a shift from successive methods of fire engagement 

 46 V. G. Reznichenko, Tactics, Moscow Military Publishing House, 1987, p. 24. 47 Ibid., p. 25. 48 V. M. Barynkin, “The Effect of Precision Weapons on the Character of Combat Operations and the Development 

of Military Art,” VOORUZHENIYE, POLITICA, KONVERSIYA (ARMAMENTS, POLITICS, CONVERSION), No. 3 

1996, p. 19.

49 Ibid., pp. 19-20.
14

to simultaneous and continuous engagement methods to the depth of an opponent.49F

50 With an 

increase in combat potential, a material basis will be created for the introduction of the 

reconnaissance-fire delivery operation (ROO), defined as follows:

The aggregate of simultaneous and successive air, air defense and fire battles, 

engagements and strikes coordinated and interrelated in terms of goals, missions, 

place, and time and conducted jointly under a common concept and plan by 

groupings of reconnaissance, fire engagement, and EW personnel and assets on one 

or several strategic axes for purposes of crushing the enemy by fire.50 F

51

Barynkin concluded that operational massing will be achieved through “overwhelming 

fire-delivery and electronic preponderance” on decisive axes with VTO and other new weapons. 

This will be a one-two punch in future conflicts that will include the use of preemption and 

maneuver forms of warfare. The overriding goal in defensive operations will be to first crush the 

enemy by fire with VTO and then to conclude with forces and assets of troops. This means that 

fire-delivery and maneuver in the defense will lead to the exclusion of linear, positional forms of 

warfare, and to classic close combat.51 F

52

Reconnaissance-Strike Discussions: 2005, 2008, and 2009

In 2005, Colonel S. I. Matveyev discussed the transformation from the RUK/ROK 

organization to the RUS/ROS. Reconnaissance-fire systems (ROS), the author noted, will have 

high mobility and will be capable of attacking targets three to seven minutes after detection with 

a fifty percent destruction potential. In future operations, a combined-arms reconnaissance-fire 

system or OROS (obshchevoyskovoy razvedyvatel’no-ognevoy sisteme) will be developed. The 

delivery of fires will be simultaneous and not sequential, Matveyev stated, and planning and target 

engagement will be continuous,52F

53 which was in line with Barynkin’s prediction in 1996. 

In early 2008, due to the proposed use of the armed forces in a future war, new concepts 

and terminology were under development. The preemptive acquisition and possession of 

information through better intelligence devices helped planning and real-time control. For 

example, four military officers wrote about a concept known as the operating contours of 

reconnaissance-strike activities (operativnyy kontur razvedyvatel’no-udarnykh deystviy) or 

OKRUD. OKRUD is defined as 

The integrated totality of various reconnaissance, software, strike, and 

countermeasure forces and hardware that are covered by a common, uninterrupted, 

automated control in close-to-real time. Integration creates continuity between the 

processes of reconnaissance of important enemy facilities; the transmission, 

processing, and presentation of intelligence data; and the identification, target 

 50 Ibid., p. 21. 51 Ibid., p. 20. 52 Ibid. 53 S. Matveyev, “Precision Systems of the Missile Forces and Artillery: Perspectives and Basic Direction of Work 

for the Creation of Reconnaissance-Strike and Reconnaissance-Fire Complexes,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 2, 2005, pp. 22-23.
15

indication, precision, and autonomous homing of guided weapons to top-priority 

targets.53 F

54

In 2009, there was an explanation of how to categorize ROK, RUK, RUS, IUS, and other 

terms as specific spheres of military art in Russia (strategic, operational, tactical) in an article in 

the journal Air and Space Defense.54 F

55 It noted the following designations of categories:

• The reconnaissance-weapon complex (range up to 30-40 kilometers, in the 

tactical zone) is a fast reaction, standalone, artillery complex where 

reconnaissance, weapons, automated fire control, and fire support complexes 

are integrated (for example, they are integrated with the unmanned aerial 

vehicle Pchela-1 and the Smerch multiple rocket launcher system). 

• The reconnaissance-strike complex (RUK, range up to 200 kilometers, in the 

“operational zone”) is an automated weapons complex designed for the timely 

detection and fire destruction of important enemy ground-based targets that use 

strike systems. An SU-27 with strike weapons and support equipment is such a 

complex.

• The reconnaissance-strike system (RUS, range up to 500 kilometers [sometimes 

greater], in the operational-strategic zone) is the aggregate of strike and support 

automated weapons and military equipment complexes. 

• The information-strike system (IUS, range over 500 kilometers, in the strategic 

zone) is an automated weapon system designed for the highly effective

destruction of one, several, or many facilities/targets using precision-guided 

strike weapons at great distances in accordance with the operations plan or its 

concept of operations.55 F

56

It is not known if or how these categories have changed under contemporary developments. 

However, in 2017 Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov noted that reconnaissance-strike 

loops include not only the Rocket Troops and Artillery but also Army Aviation and Su-24M 

bombers.56F

57 This implies that the RUK still maintains strategic missions. 

Reconnaissance-Strike and Fire Discussions: 2015-2019

The journal Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal) and other military journals published many 

works written by artillery and other branch officers. The following summary of a few of these 

articles is listed in accordance with their publication dates from 2015 through 2019. 

 54 Ye. Gribov, V. Kazaryan, D. Karimov, and V. Khlopyak, “Using Precision Weapons in the Operating Contours of 

Reconnaissance-Strike Activities,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), 

No. 3 (24), 2008, p. 46.

55 Igor Morozov, Sergey Baushev, and Oleg Kaminskiy, “Space and the Character of Modern Military Activities,” 

Vozdushno-kosmicheskaya i Oborona (Air and Space Defense), No. 4, 2009, pp. 48-56, downloaded from the 

Eastview web site.

56 Ibid.. 57 Sergey Obukhov, “EMD Rocket Troops and Artillery Training Intensively to Function as ReconnaissanceFire/Strike Circuits,” Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 17 November 2017.
16

In 2015, V. Litvinenko wrote on the integration of reconnaissance, control, and destruction 

systems under 21st century conditions, which reflected a change from platform-centric warfare to 

network-centric warfare. The main idea of the latter is “the comprehensive integration of weapons 

systems and resources within the framework of a unified system of command and control (C2) of 

troops.”57F

58 Information technologies allow combat systems to interact better and reduce the C2 

time cycle. Information and networks working together help achieve information superiority over 

an opponent through their collection, processing, modeling, decision-making support, and data 

transmission capabilities nearly in real time. The network-centric model consists of sensors, 

information, and combat, where reconnaissance and destruction means are united by C2. When 

“creating such a C2 system, fire destruction resources are essentially a global reconnaissance-strike 

complex (RUK). Precision-weapons and those based on new physical principles destroy, disorient, 

and disorganize enemy systems.”5 8F

59

The network-centric principle of C2 changes how reconnaissance is conducted, creates a 

single information field in the battlespace, and simplifies planning and coordinating fire damage 

and other types of effects, which help ensure reconnaissance-fire systems function well during 

armed confrontations.59 F

60 The US Armed Forces “Shock and Awe” operations used in Iraq were 

deemed to be an integrated single spatially distributed reconnaissance-destruction system 

(razvedyvatel’no-porazhaiushchaia sistema or RPS). Litvinenko stated that information-control 

systems in a single information domain changed the nature of military conflicts.60F

61 There are still, 

however, several shortcomings to overcome. The main problems for systems developing 

reconnaissance and information transmission destruction means are the lack of interaction with 

other analogous systems, their inability to receive and transmit information in real time, the failure 

of software to transmit data, and other technical facts.61F

62

Finally, Litvinenko recommended that Russia borrow some Chinese concepts, especially 

the use of asymmetric effects against an opponent, namely “fire and electronic damage of the 

elements of the information grid (command posts, communications centers, orbital grouping of 

reconnaissance and control satellites, etc.).”62 F

63

In a February 2017 article in Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), Litvinenko and coauthor S. Voronkov discussed artillery fire and maneuver. They wrote that fire and maneuver were 

the new approaches to fire engagement, with the most important roles belonging to battalion and 

brigade artillery subunits. Artillery must be capable of the following missions:

• Conducting highly maneuverable operations

 58 V. Litvinenko, “The Comprehensive Integration of Reconnaissance, Control, and Destruction Systems under 

Conditions of 21st Century Military Concepts,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 8 2015, p. 33. The author 

would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article.

59 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 60 Ibid., p. 36. 61 Ibid., p. 35. 62 Ibid., p. 36. 63 Ibid.
17

• Delivering fire for effect to the full depth of an opponent’s battle formation

• Engaging the enemy with direct and indirect fire

• Destroying enemy tactical precision-guided munitions

• Suppressing and destroying command and control and fire control posts, radars, 

EW, and air defense assets

• Conducting engagements of enemy personnel and weapons during preparation 

for attacks, battles in the depth of enemy defense, repelling counterattacks, and 

conducting defensive operations

• Conducting counterbattery fire

• Destroying enemy antitank weapons and other armored vehicles

• Conducting battle against reserves and irregular elements

• Dispersing formations while preserving fires massed in time and space. 63F

64

The authors added that “For future fire engagements of the enemy, weapons can be integrated in a 

unified reconnaissance-fire system (ROS), which implements a zonal-installation principle of 

organizing reconnaissance and engaging the enemy.”6 4F

65 A diagram (see Appendix Two for the 

diagram and key) of the ROS followed this description, with the subtitle as follows: “Functional 

ties among elements in a tactical (battalion) module of a first-order missile troops and artillery 

reconnaissance-fire system.”65F

66 This would strengthen the argument that ROS is a tactical system. 

Artillery recommended for the combined-arms brigade included two self-propelled artillery 

battalions of 152-mm howitzers and a rocket artillery battalion of 122-mm multiple-launch rocket 

systems, as well as a 120-mm artillery battery for each motorized rifle battalion. These components 

should guarantee the capability to conduct maneuverable reconnaissance-fire combat operations.66F

67

Long-range fire destruction, to include rocket forces, artillery, and aviation, is determining combat 

potential. 

In March 2017, authors Savapin, Tikhanychev, and Chernov recommended to develop a 

cross-service strike and fire-capable reconnaissance system (CSSFCRS) to raise the efficiency of 

the fire destruction of an opponent. The concept was described as a prototype in 2017, one that 

can offer an integrated combat environment. The CSSFCRS concept will make it possible to 

increase the fire destruction of an adversary more efficiently through the implementation of actions 

that forestall an adversary’s plans and thereby help maintain friendly force initiatives. There are 

hurdles to cross, naturally, such as the systems requirements for specialized mathematical and 

information-linguistic support along with a need for a suite of special software. Some of the 

important demands on CSSFCRS components will be the need to adapt reconnaissance, control, 

and fire component integration and to aim at solving the tasks of fire destruction. These demands 

must be supplemented with the installation of security measures in both the physical sphere against 

 64 V. Litvinenko and S. Voronkov, “Artillery Fire and Maneuver: The Role of Artillery of a New Type for Tactical 

Force Elements in Armed Conflicts of the Late 20th and Early 21st Centuries,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), 

No. 2 2017, p. 35. 65 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 66 Ibid., p. 35. 67 Ibid., p. 38.
18

adversary reconnaissance and strike assets and in the information environment, among other 

demands.67F

68

In an interesting interview in April 2017, Missile and Artillery Chief Lieutenant General 

Mikhail Matveyevsky offered his thoughts on the emerging forms and methods of the tactical 

employment of artillery. Forms, he noted, remain operations, battles, systematic combat 

operations, strikes, and maneuvers. These will remain so until 2030. Methods are the procedures 

for employing force and equipment to achieve a form or war’s goals. This may require an 

organizational realignment of specific structures to ensure a rapid response to various 

contingencies. Maneuver will remain a focus of improvement as will achievements in intelligence 

and information superiority over an opponent.68 F

69

Matveyevsky noted that improvements were needed in the speed of response and accuracy 

of RUKs of all services, and in the level of integration and speed of weapon, reconnaissance, 

command and control, and support systems that create ROKs efficiency and accuracy. There will 

be a focus on improving maneuver and fire operations as well. To boost the ability to conduct 

maneuver strikes and fires, it “is envisaged to increase the size of firing and starting position areas.” 

Operating autonomously at large intervals, combat groups, each possessing one self-propelled 

artillery gun and ammunition delivery transport, are envisaged along with the following maneuver 

and fire cycle: artillery attack—maneuver—preparing the self-propelled artillery gun for the next 

attack—loading the ammunition compartment. Autonomous groups carry out missions in tactical 

zones of action along prepared maneuver routes with ammunition resupply locations and seven to 

eight prepared firing positions. This should reduce losses of artillery by 23-37 percent. In offensive 

operations artillery can conduct fire for effect with attacks of 6-10 rounds per minute in a short 

duration span of 1-4 minutes.69F

70

Matveyevsky listed several modern principles of artillery use. These included the 

following:

• The principle of a rational combination of the dispersed employment of 

maneuver-and-fire operations by RViA, to help achieve operational and tactical 

effects of fires impact on an opponent

• The principle of the asymmetric pre-emption of the enemy while conducting 

systematic fire, and the destruction of critical assets using mainly highprecision weapons, which require a response time faster than an opponent’s

 68 O. V. Sayapin, O. V. Tikhanychev, and N. A. Chernov, “The Creation of an Interservice ReconnaissanceDestruction System as a Base for Increasing the Effectiveness of Fire Efficiency,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military 

Thought), No. 3 2017, pp. 32, 36-37. 69 Mikhail Matveyevsky, “The Missile Troops and Artillery: The Development of Forms and Methods of Combat 

Employment,” Armeysky Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 4 2017, pp. 21-22. 70 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
19

• The principle of the resource-oriented distribution of RViA’s efforts, which

involves the distribution of assets based on reach, resource intensity, and size 

of the resource allocated in the joint use of the enemy’s fire forces.70 F

71

Modes of “fire for effect” include structural, asset-oriented, barrier, and fire blocking, that is the 

spatial-temporal sequence for destroying the enemy’s task forces, combat and support systems, 

and critical assets.71 F

72 Fire for effect against combat and support systems should be simultaneous 

and based on penetrating an opponent’s task force (locations, etc.) with ROS. Artillery assets on 

the move will be dispersed with weapons in a stand-by mode. When a target is detected it will be 

destroyed with a short fire attack followed by a quick maneuver out of the area and the occupation 

of a new firing position.72F

73

Also in April 2017, in an article in Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), V. Litvinenko and 

co-author S. Tolochko noted that the contemporary state of military art’s development has become 

characterized by a “substantial increase in the role and place of fire destruction of the enemy.”73 F

74

A new generation of conventional weapons indicates that arithmetical superiority (the quantitative 

correlation of forces) no longer creates “decisive prerequisites for defeating an enemy,” since the 

qualitative component now dominates the quantitative component. There has been a shift from the 

targeted destruction of an area to the destruction of a specific target.74 F

75 The planning and 

implementation of fire destruction will most likely be a zonal-targeting method, and the main form 

of employing forces will be according to a maneuver-fire design. One of the new forms of fire 

destruction is reconnaissance-fire methods and operations. The reconnaissance-fire method of 

operations for artillery formations is defined as follows:

Operations of forces and means of reconnaissance, automated command and 

control, and fire destruction, coordinated with respect to targets, tasks, place, and 

time, for effects against the most important and high-mobility enemy targets, 

including direct laying fire. These operations are to be implemented in real time, 

according to the principle of ‘reconnaissance-hit...’75F

76

These capabilities will enable forces to strike where and when they need to create effects.

A short statement about fire destruction ended the article, but it was significant. The authors noted

that “The need to create artillery groupings (army artillery groups, division artillery groups, 

 71 Ibid., p. 26. 72 Ibid., p. 27. 73 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 74 S. Tolochko and V. Litvinenko, “Forms and Methods of the Selective Destruction of the Enemy,” Armeyskiy 

Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 4 2017, pp. 32-33. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the 

translation of this article.

75 Ibid., p. 33. 76 Ibid., p. 35.
20

brigade artillery groups, etc.) will disappear, because the reconnaissance-fire resource itself 

envisions the effective selection for the means of destruction.”76 F

77

Litvinenko and a different co-author, this time S. Yastrebov, defined a reconnaissancefire system (ROS) in August 2017 as follows:

The reconnaissance-fire system (ROS) is an organizationally, technically, 

informationally, and functionally integrated aggregate of fire engagement forces 

and assets and of operational, combat, and technical support joined by unified, 

automated command and control and supporting the discovery and engagement of 

enemy groupings and targets to the full depth of his operational alignment.77F

78

Other authors utilized a nearly identical replication of this definition, so it appears widespread and 

well accepted.

The objective of precision-guided munitions (PGM), the authors note, is the selective 

destruction of key (critically important) targets [indicating to U.S. planners that key targets need 

to be defended or decentralized so that one node’s destruction does not destroy one’s overall 

capability], which lower an opponent’s combat potential and disorganizes the command and 

control of combat operations.78F

79 Missile, rocket artillery, and artillery subunits of the ROS are 

“used in the form of reconnaissance-strike (fire) loops” to reduce the acquisition, engagement, 

and destruction time of targets. PGM’s integration into ROS result in new forms of combat 

employment and new methods of executing fire missions, with the reconnaissance-fire method 

still the primary one:

It should be expected that massive and concentrated fire strikes will be the main 

forms of fire pressure on the enemy with the employment of PGMs, and that 

systematic fire actions will take the form of the targeted execution of fire missions 

by highly organized complexes (mobile combat platforms) during the execution of 

specific tactical missions by combined-arms force elements of the new type.79F

80

It is unclear if the word “massive” envisions firing many weapons at one target or just 

firing at a lot of specific targets using fewer weapons due to PGMs.

The focus will be reconnaissance-fire actions and the radio-electronic suppression of 

enemy targets presenting the greatest threat to brigade activities.80F

81 Surprise is developed from 

using PGMs when opponents are first detected. Fire missions include maneuver-fire arrangements 

 77 Ibid., p. 36. 78 V. Litvinenko and S. Yastrebov, “Precision-Guided Munitions: A Look at the Future: Directions for the

Development of State-of-the-Art Precision-Guided Munitions,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 8 2027, p. 

15.

79 Ibid., p. 12. 80 Ibid., p. 14. 81 Ibid.
21

in the following order: deployment to firing positions; on acquiring targets, immediate engagement 

with a salvo lasting no more than 1-3 minutes; safe exit from a zone of retaliation (1-1.5 minutes); 

and occupation of a new firing position for the next fire mission (1-2 minutes).81F

82 First, the 

robotization of missile troops and artillery will increase survivability. Second, PGM improvements 

will result in the “intellectualization” of weapons, offering the ability to identify a target and 

choose its most vulnerable spot. This “highly-intelligent” phase of PGM development includes 

lasers, beams, radio-frequency weapons, and other weapon types. 82F

83

In October 2017, this time in conjunction with a co-author, Mayveyevsky and M. A. 

Safronov discussed the need to develop more precise, real time reconnaissance activities to better 

support ROS. They are needed to inflict damage against both relatively immobile and highly 

maneuverable opponents. Naturally, there is more lag time allowed between acquisition and 

destruction for the former and less for the latter. The main enemy targets to be hit include the 

following: operational-tactical missile launch pads at their start positions (even if on the march); 

artillery batteries, multiple rocket launcher systems, mortar platoons at firing positions; AN/TPQ36 and AN-TPQ-37 radar stations [strange that these two systems would be singled out]; artillery 

division fire control enters; and artillery battery fire control posts.83 F

84 It is unknown if the reference 

extends to the TPQ-50 and TPQ-53. 

In 2018, Litvinenko stated that noncontact or reconnaissance-fire forms were playing a 

greater role in operations. To effectively use artillery’s fire and maneuver capabilities provisional 

reconnaissance-fire complexes (VROK) were established. The latter was defined as follows:

The provisional reconnaissance-fire complex, abbreviated VROK, should be 

understood to mean an integrated system of forces and assets of reconnaissance, 

weapons, and automated command and control and support equipment dynamically 

formed in planning and organizing coordination and used in the subsequent course 

of combat operations.84F

85

He noted that preemption in fire engagements determines modern battles, based on artillery 

experiences in the Syrian Arab Republic. Combat productivity of the VROK will depend on 

variables that can be depicted by the following mathematical relationship: 

W= (Tp; At; Moz), where W is the overall time cycle of the rate of fire; Tp is the 

time cycle for reconnaissance assets to acquire and transmit information; At is 

response time of automated C2 equipment, including decision-making, will be 

 82 Ibid., p. 16. 83 Ibid., p. 17. 84 M. M. Matveyevsky and M. A. Safronov, “The Organization and Conduct of Reconnaissance in the Interest of the 

Combat Use of Missile Forces and Artillery in Present Day Operations,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10 

2017, pp. 7-8. 85 V. Litvinenko, “Organization of Coordination: Provisional Reconnaissance-Fire Complex (VROK), Mission, 

Composition, Combat Capabilities,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 8 2018, pp. 23-24.
22

constant in performing one’s functional tasks; and Moz is the time cycle for 

receiving the fire mission and its execution.85F

86

Without a clearer explanation of the equation, it can only be assumed that W is just a function of 

the three variables.

A reconnaissance-fire action/operation (razvedyvatel’no-ognevye deistviya), or ROD was 

defined as the simplest form of the systematic delivery of fire or (sistematecheskoe-ognevye 

vozdeistviya) (SOV). The SOV is conducted by specially assigned fire means of a combined-arms 

formation (subunit) for engaging (disrupting the functioning of) newly detected important enemy 

targets in the zone (area) of responsibility of a combined-arms formation (subunit). The essence 

of ROD is the joint employment of reconnaissance assets (subunits) and destruction means in the 

form of a unified, continuous process aimed at engaging enemy targets with requisite effectiveness 

in a minimum of time, which is the essence of reconnaissance-fire actions/operations.

VROK’s structure depends on the type of target to be engaged, the level of reconnaissance 

assets employed, and the level of C2 assets used. Mission execution can be influenced by, first, 

the time of preparing and laying an artillery grouping, the range of fire, and the power of the 

munitions employed. Second, the accuracy in determining coordinates and time of target 

acquisition. Third, the range of communications, their stability, security, jam resistance, and data 

processing time. And finally, the volume and rate of supply movement. To evaluate the effect of 

the VROK, two principal items are used: the kill probability (degree of damage) of the target that 

took place in the required time; and the number of targets engaged that took place without 

consideration of ammunition replenishment. Other parameters (meteorological, ballistic, topogeodetic support, UAVs, radar complexes, fire control complexes, etc.) can also affect outcomes 

and precision.86 F

87

Litvinenko then expressed “in seconds” the amount of time it takes to launch a mission and 

where gaps might develop. In the latter case the following were offered:

• Generation of the report by the chief of the formation’s artillery and its 

transmission to the missile battalion commander (20-30-40 seconds)

• Work of the missile battalion command in organizing coordination with 

reconnaissance assets (17-22-28 seconds)

• Process of laying and loading (30-40-60 seconds)87 F

88

Experiences in Syria demonstrated that employing one Smerch MLRS fighting vehicle along with 

an Orlan UAV permitted the fastest-response mode. For that reason, the most promising 

 86 Ibid., p 24. 87 Ibid., p. 24. 88 Ibid., p. 26.
23

reconnaissance assets for integration with a missile battalion were the following, most likely 

indicating the response speed or time from detection to fire:

• SNAR-10 (102-151-205 seconds)

• Orlan UAV (87-128-190 seconds, against enemy columns and other target 

types, thus the most promising)88 F

89

The term “VROK zone of reconnaissance and engagement” will be used for fire 

engagement responsibility. Zones could be a “formation zone of reconnaissance and engagement 

(2S19 Msta-S 152-mm, Grad 122-mm),” a “battalion zone of reconnaissance and engagement 

(120-mm mortar, Vena 120-mm or Khosta 120-mm self-propelled gun),” or an “operational 

command zone of reconnaissance and engagement (Uragan Reap [rocket artillery regiment], 

Smerch Redn [rocket artillery battalion]).” Frontage, depth, and productivity (targets to hit) 

capabilities were included in a table. Automated control systems in the VROK were said to 

increase effectiveness by 20-30 percent.89F

90 It was noted that the staff must determine the objectives 

of the operation, that VROK missions are determined in the operation order, and that the VROK 

commander organizes coordination among commanders in terms of time, missions, and methods.90F

91

In March 2019 Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov noted in a speech at the 

Academy of Military Science that the West’s policies have forced Russia to “answer a threat with 

a threat,” that being a Russian plan for strikes against Western decision-making centers and 

launchers of cruise missiles aimed at objectives on Russian territory. This also requires the

development of a unified system of integrated intelligence, destruction, and command and control forces 

and means based on contemporary information and telecommunications technologies. This system includes 

strategic and operational-tactical nonnuclear weapons.91F

92 So, Gerasimov envisions strikes, not fires, against 

Western systems.

In April 2019, the maneuver and fire option for the use of artillery was restated in relation 

to lessons learned during fighting in Syria. At a training range near Chelyabinsk, in the Southern 

Urals, the “artillery carousel” was under test conditions as a new method for using artillery within 

a reconnaissance-loop (contour). After a fire mission is executed, the crew withdraws to a specially 

prepared reloading region, after which “they continue to fire, but now from a new, prepared 

position.”92F

93 Colonel-General Aleksandr Lapin, commander of the Central Military District at the 

time, noted that the creation of a ROK permits follow-up reconnaissance and fire damage 

 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 91 Ibid., p. 27. 92 V. V. Gerasimov, “The Development of Military Strategy under Contemporary Conditions. Tasks for Military 

Science,” Vestnik Akademii voennykh nauk (Journal of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2 2019, pp. 6-11. The 

author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article. 93 No author provided, “New Method of Using Artillery Tested at Central Military District Range Near 

Chelyabinsk,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 11 April 2019.
24

assessment after each mission and allows the next fire mission to be from different firing positions 

and over a short period of time.93F

94

In December 2019, Litvinenko and Yastrebov wrote an article titled “Our Answer to 

Multi-Sphere Operations,” the latter being the Russian language version, apparently, of multidomain operations. They wrote that when defending against a strong, technically equipped enemy 

capable of highly maneuver operations, systematic fire effects will be chosen as the “principal 

form of fire effects,” while planned fire strikes will be made against infrastructure targets 

supporting maneuver operations and “the operations of cyberspace structures.” Reconnaissancefire operations along with radio-electronic warfare resources are the basic forms of tactical 

operations against such enemy forces.94F

95

The reconnaissance-fire module will include conventional and rocket artillery subunits, 

radar artillery, radio-engineering artillery, instrumental intelligence artillery, and a UAV 

detachment. It was then stated that “the decisive place will most likely be given to reconnaissancefire complexes, which have demonstrated high quality during the struggle against terrorists in 

Syria.”95F

96 The authors added that due to the US’s new tactics, Russian theorists will need to 

reexamine operational art and tactics individual tenets and the quality of equipment and weapons 

“for intelligence resources, automated command and control, and fire and strike means of 

destruction.”96 F

97

The authors then changed from discussing complexes to systems. For a reconnaissancefire system, the need was stated:

• To create a complex of existing resources for intelligence, destruction, and 

all-round support based on developing automated means of command and control, 

which will make it possible to create a technical foundation for RViA 

reconnaissance-fire systems

• To modernize the most effective existing models (complexes) of weapons 

and military equipment, which will make it possible to maintain and improve their 

fire (combat) capabilities

• To create precision and high-mobility models (complexes) of weapons with 

means of individual (group) protection against the enemy’s precision weapons, 

which will make it possible to effectively destroy enemy targets to the entire depth 

of his operational structure.97 F

98

Munitions will be improved with the addition of artificial intelligence that increase their 

power and capabilities for detecting targets.98F

99

 94 Ibid. 95 V. Litvinenko and S. Yastrebov, “Our Answer to Multi-Sphere Operations,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), 

No. 12 2019, p. 38. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for the translation of this article. 96 Ibid., p. 39. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., p. 40. 99 Ibid., p. 41.
25

A study of the U.S.’s “multi-sphere battle” (which appears to be a reference to the U.S. 

multi-domain operation concept) focus, according to the authors, offer the following trends for 

Russian artillery specialists who are focused on developing the theory and practice of employing 

artillery in battle:

• Further assimilation of the new concept of enemy fire destruction in an 

operation (battle)

• Theoretical development and validation of the basic tents of a 

reconnaissance-fire operation (battle)

• Development of the basic tenets and practice of the employment of RViA 

in a reconnaissance-fire battle

• Introduction of a combined arms methodology for planning fire and nuclear 

destruction of an enemy and a methodology for planning the fire and nuclear 

destruction of an enemy by RViA staffs

• Development of new principles of the combat employment of RViA 

(principle of “active artillery”)

• Adoption of new guiding documents on the combat employment of 

branches of forces in an operation (battle).99F

100

In summation, the authors noted that it is necessary to integrate all forces and means, to 

include C2, communications, navigation, and intelligence systems into a single information space. 

There must be a simultaneous synchronization of these operations. The operations of brigades must 

be of an adaptive nature to ensure they can react to sudden changes in the situation. Finally, 

decentralized operations of all types of brigades based on a single plan must be realized along with 

the achievement of intelligence and information superiority over an opponent so that timely 

command decisions can be made.100 F

101

Conclusions

The 7 November 2020 issue of The Economist noted the following about Russian President 

Vladimir Putin’s new army:

Russia’s ultimate aim is to create a ‘reconnaissance-strike complex’—originally a 

Soviet idea—in which data from vehicles on the ground, drones in the air, satellites 

in space, and radio signals emitted by enemy units are collected, processed, and fed 

into the weapons in real time. Any ‘sensor’ (for instance, a ‘drone’) can feed a target 

to any ‘shooter’ (like a faraway ship), with targets prioritized centrally and struck, 

ideally, within minutes.101 F

102

Russia’s development of tactical, operational, and strategic strike and fire complexes are 

widespread. The nation’s military has assembled a series of strike and fire forms that include RUK, 

ROK, IUO, REU, and REOU. RUK and ROK utilize UAVs and Strelets systems, among other 

 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 No author provided, “Putin’s New Model Army,” The Economist, 7 November 2020, p. 45.
26

measures, to spot targets and deliver precise targeting. IUO utilizes information channels to 

penetrate systems and conduct strikes, and REU/REOU utilize frequency intercepts to conduct the 

business of disorganizing opponents. At times complexes are involved, at other times systems or 

loops/circuits (in Russian, contours). 

New to many Western analysts in this discussion of reconnaissance-strike and -fire issues 

were the additions of the information, electronic, and navigation aspects of strike and fire missions. 

Some are aimed at destroying or damaging equipment or facilities while others aim to disorganize 

communications or command and control links. Ryabchuk, in the opening quote to this paper, also 

mentioned intellectual strikes. Thus, there are other strike and fire issues about which the West 

should be concerned and on the lookout. The important aspects of such missions were summed up 

in the VROK discussion:

VROK’s structure depends on the type of target to be engaged, the level of 

reconnaissance assets employed, and the level of C2 assets used. Mission execution 

can be influenced by, first, the time of preparing and laying an artillery grouping, 

the range of fire, and the power of the munitions employed. Second, the accuracy 

in determining coordinates and time of target acquisition. Third, the range of 

communications, their stability, security, jam resistance, and data processing time. 

And finally, the volume and rate of supply movement. 

To evaluate the effect of the VROK, two principal items are used: the kill 

probability (degree of damage) of the target that took place in the required time; 

and the number of targets engaged that took place without consideration of 

ammunition replenishment. Other parameters (meteorological, ballistic, topogeodetic support, UAVs, radar complexes, fire control complexes, etc.) can also 

affect outcomes and precision.102F

103

Russia was prompted, some Russian authors note, to develop these strike and fire forms 

due to the U.S.’s Prompt Global Strike (PGS) system, which one article noted could become a 

possible orbital reconnaissance-strike system, employing advanced warheads for a number of 

systems.103 F

104 To answer such a U.S. capability Russia has invested heavily in a number of high-tech 

developments. One, according to The Economist, is a nuclear-powered cruise missile that can 

circle the earth indefinitely.104 F

105 Such developments appear to follow the advice of General Staff 

Chief Gerasimov, who noted it was time to “answer a threat with a threat.”

 103 Ibid., p. 24. 104 Ilya Kramnik, “The Army: Promptly and Globally. Will the United States Be Able to Depreciate Russia’s 

Nuclear Arsenal?” Izvestiya Online, 13 October 2017. 105 “Putin’s New Model Army,” p. 46.
27

The Russian systems to confront PGS and other Western strike capabilities were described 

above. They have been tested in major exercises, such as Zapad-2017.105F

106 UAV and other 

reconnaissance vehicles are under development, to include the following:

The Russian military department has developed a special computer program that 

will teach unmanned air vehicles to independently identify targets on the battlefield 

in any condition, during the day, at night, in bad weather, and even when the 

adversary is jamming and creating decoy targets.106 F

107

Other Russian equipment also can conduct strike and fire actions, such as the 

reconnaissance-strike Ka-52 Alligator helicopter107 F

108 or mobile reconnaissance-strike robot 

complexes. Vikhr combat robots, for example, can be installed not just on ground vehicles but also 

on Su-25 ground-attack aircraft.1 08F

109 Another report noted that, before 2030, Russia hopes to have 

a reconnaissance-strike capable hypersonic aircraft,109F

110 and plans are underway to construct space 

systems that can neutralize Western systems in that domain. Work is being done on an inter-service 

automated RUS, which reportedly can increase the accuracy for target strikes.110F

111

Thus, a series of developments are underway in Russia on strike and fire means. It is very 

important for Western audiences to take note of these changes and how Russia intends to use them, 

whether it be as a preemptive (take out Western kill chains) or defensive weapon. Now is the time 

to consider not only how Russia might employ them but also how to counter them. 

 106 No author provided, “The Zapad-2017 Exercise Will Demonstrate the Integrated Employment of Automated 

Troop Command and Control Systems and Reconnaissance-Strike (-Weapon) Loops,” Ministry of Defense of the 

Russian Federation, 15 September 2017. 107 Aleksandr Ramm and Vasilisa Belokopytova, “Defense Ministry to Teach Drones to Accurately Identify 

Targets,” Izvestiya Online, 22 March 2017. 108 Anton Valagin, “Russia Has Doubled ‘Alligator’ Production,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, 5 June 2017. 109 Ruslan Melnikov, “Video Has Appeared Showing Tests of the Heaviest Russian Combat Robot,” Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta Online, 23 April 2017. 110 V. V. Selivanov and Yu. D. Ilyin, “On Selecting Priorities in the Development of Kinetic Weapons for Solving 

Tasks in Military Conflicts,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 7 2017, pp. 29-40. 111 Interfax, 24 March 2018.
28

APPENDIX ONE: DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are listed in order according to these abbreviations: RUG, ROS, RFS, 

RUK/ ROK, RUK, REOS, RPS, ROD, VROK, ROO, “kontur,” and RLA.

Reconnaissance-strike group [razvedyvatel’no-udarnaia gruppa/RUG]: in the Air force – the 

main element of the combat formation of an aviation subunit (unit), intended for reconnaissance 

of enemy targets and their destruction. The appearance of RUGs is associated with the 

development of the theory of air reconnaissance-strike operations that assume the use of air 

reconnaissance forces and means with strike forces and means in a single complex (system). The 

RUG can consist of aircraft of the same type (helicopters) that have reconnaissance-strike (search 

and strike) properties, whose crews carry out the search, detection, and employment of means of 

destruction against enemy targets they have discovered in real time. In a different variant, the RUG 

can consist of different aircraft that have only reconnaissance and only strike properties. Some 

crews carry out the search, detection, and determination of coordinates of enemy targets, and 

transmit target designation (guidance), while other crews employ means of destruction, using the 

information from the scouts. The RUG can be employed to hit both enemy land (maritime) and air 

targets. Similar RUGs have been created in naval aviation.111F

112

Reconnaissance-fire system (ROS) (разведывательно-огневая система (РОС)) –

hierarchically, organizationally, technically, informationally, and functionally integrated totality 

of forces and means of fire and other types of destruction, supporting the disclosure of enemy 

groupings and targets and their effective destruction in real time.112 F

113

Reconnaissance-fire system (ROS) (разведывательно-огневая система (РОС)) – a system of 

the missile troops and artillery (RViA) of a large formation into which enter the recce-strike and 

recce-fire complexes of large formations, formations, and units having a single automated 

command and control system.113F

114 

Reconnaissance-strike (reconnaissance-fire) complex (RUK [ROK]) (разведывательноударный [разведывательный-огневой] комплекс) (РУК [РОК]) – a formation of rocket 

(artillery) units (subunits) that organizationally, technically, and functionally links reconnaissance, 

guidance, command and control, and fire destruction resources into a circuit capable of carrying 

out detection, target indication, guidance, and reliable destruction of enemy targets with a high 

 112 Military Encyclopedia, Moscow Military Publishing House, 2003, Volume 7, p. 145. 113 V. L. Komol’tsev and P. I. Mikheev, “On Ensuring Information Compatibility When Creating Automated 

Command and Control of the RViA,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 2004, pp. 19-22. [Found on page 

541 of Vol 2, terminology book]. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation of this 

definition.

114 S. I. Matveev, “High-Precision Systems of RViA: Perspectives and the Basic Direction of Work in the Creation 

of Reconnaissance-Strike and Reconnaissance-Fire Complexes,” Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 2 2005, 

pp. 22-27. [Found on page 545 of Vol 2, terminology book]. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for 

his translation of this definition.
29

degree of precision in an automated regime and in the shortest time. Each RUK (ROK) should 

include subsystems that ensure its autonomous functioning: reconnaissance and guidance, 

controlled means of destruction, navigational and time support, command and control, and special 

technical and rear area support.

The principal structure of the interaction among these subsystems in the process of the combat 

employment of RUKs (ROKs) is as follows: Reconnaissance resources search, detect, identify, 

and measure the necessary parameters of the targets in the complex’s zone of control. Information 

about the detected targets is transmitted in an automated regime to the center for collecting and 

processing information and controlling the complex. At the center it is analyzed and compared 

with information from other sources. A decision is made about destruction, after which information 

necessary for its organization is transmitted to resources for fire effects, target accompaniment, 

and weapons guidance. On command from then center for control of the complex, precision fire 

effects resources deliver strikes against the indicated targets. Munitions guidance is implemented 

at remote distances from the targets with the help of the reconnaissance subsystem’s resources for 

target accompaniment and weapons guidance as the target is approached – with the help of selfguiding warheads set up on the munitions.

Considering the importance of the fire destruction tasks being carried out, the complexes, with 

respect to their qualitative parameters, should be mobile, highly maneuverable, and fast-acting 

RViA structures, employing precision munitions, and have the ability to deliver strikes (raids) 

against newly reconnoitered targets no more than 3-7 minutes from the time they are detected, 

destroying these targets with a probability of no less than 50%. The delivery of short fire strikes 

(fire raids), with a duration of no more than one minute, will make it possible to leave the initial 

(fire) position in 2-4 minutes, thereby getting out from under enemy strikes and maintaining 

survivability.114 F

115

Reconnaissance-fire complex [razvedyvatel’no-ognevoi kompleks/ROK] – a rapidly-acting

autonomous artillery complex, which is assumed to combine means of artillery reconnaissance, 

destruction (based on precision munitions), automated control of fire, and fire support. The term 

was first introduced to designate formations in which means of reconnaissance and destruction 

were integrated for the purpose of executing fire tasks in real time. Subsequently, variants were 

developed in which only self-propelled gun and multiple rocket launchers with precision munitions 

with different principles of guidance were the means of destruction. However, in connection with 

the narrowly specialized designation, which made it possible to resolve only a limited number of 

fire tasks (destruction of tank columns, firing guns, and radio-emitting resources), the practical 

implementation of ROKs was not obtained. As highly effective fire resources and supporting 

resources improved, a shift to a general, multilevel (from battalion to front) reconnaissance-fire 

system for the rocket forces and artillery of the Ground Forces was possible.115 F

116

 115 Ibid. 116 Military Encyclopedia, Moscow Military Publishing House, 2003, Volume 7, p. 145.
30

Reconnaissance-strike complex [razvedyvatel’no-udarnyi kompleks/RUK, 2003 definition] – an 

automated weapons complex intended for the timely detection and highly-effective fire destruction 

of the most important enemy land (water surface) targets by strike resources (rocket, aviation) 

quickly, as they are found. The following tasks can be assigned to RUKs:

• destruction of resources for delivering tactical and operational-tactical nuclear 

weapons

• destruction of a first echelon attacking or defending enemy

• interdiction and destruction of second-echelon reserves (in the defense – for the 

purpose of thwarting the enemy’s build-up efforts; in the offense – for the 

purpose of thwarting enemy counterattacks and counterstrikes)

• struggle against groups of surface ships

• disruption of command and control of troops, aviation, and means of destruction 

by incapacitating command posts

• destruction of radio-electronic warfare resources

• isolation of areas of combat operations by striking and incapacitating airfields, 

railroad transport centers, ports, bridges, crossings, and other infrastructure in 

a theater of military operations.

RUKs are subdivided into operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical, and tactical with 

respect to their organizational structure and the nature of the tasks they are carrying out and they 

operate in areas of responsibility of the corresponding combined arms formations. RUKs consist 

of means of reconnaissance and guidance; automated command and control; destruction (precision 

weapons); radio-electronic suppression; navigation and timing support; special technical and rear 

support.

RUKs are created in practically all states that have precision weapons and effective reconnaissance 

resources. In the USSR, for example, in the mid-1950s RUKs were created to destroy groupings 

of surface ships, in which were combined the information technology communications of 

submarines with long-range anti-submarine missiles and the reconnaissance aircraft with a radar 

detection and targeting system. The complex successfully resolves the task of transmitting radar 

images of the search area from the reconnaissance aircraft to submarines and coastal command 

posts in real time. Subsequent generations of this type of RUK made the information technology 

coupling of carriers of means of destruction (submarines and surface ships) with a system of 

maritime and space reconnaissance and targeting, which continuously conducts reconnaissance of 

the situation on the water surface in the World’s Oceans.11 6F

117

Operating contours of reconnaissance-strike activities (operativnyy kontur razvedyvatel’noudarnykh deystviy or OKRUD)—defined as the integrated totality of various reconnaissance, 

software, strike, and countermeasure forces and hardware that are covered by a common, 

uninterrupted, automated control in close-to-real time. Integration creates continuity between the 

processes of reconnaissance of important enemy facilities; the transmission, processing, and 

 117 Ibid., pp. 145-146.
31

presentation of intelligence data; and the identification, target indication, precision, and 

autonomous homing of guided weapons to top-priority targets.117 F

118

Reconnaissance-electronic-fire (strike) system (REOS) of a combined arms formation 

(разведывательно-электронно-огневая (ударная) система (РЭОС) общевойского 

формирования) – organizationally, informationally, and technically integrated totality of forces 

and means of reconnaissance, fire destruction, and radio-electronic warfare (when the latter is 

present in the structure of the combined arms formation), linked by overall command and control 

and supporting reconnaissance of enemy targets, their radio-electronic suppression, and precision 

guidance of guided weapons to them in real time. The following may be considered functional 

elements (subsystems) of a combined arms formation’s REOS: recce-fire (recce strike) complexes 

(ROK, RUK), recce-electronic complexes (REK), or recce-electronic-fire (strike) complexes 

(REOK, REUK), operationally established for the period in which combat operations are being 

conducted, with the specific tasks of fire destruction of the enemy and radio-electronic 

suppression. Each REUK (REOK) can be designated for reconnoitering and destroying one or 

several groups of important enemy targets.118F

119

The US armed forces “shock and awe” system was said to be an integrated single spatially 

distributed reconnaissance-destruction system (razvedyvatel’no-porazhaiushchaia sistema or

RPS). The author stated that information-control, reconnaissance-destruction, and reconnaissancestrike systems of high-precision weaponry have been created in some developed countries of the 

world, and it was the implementation of information-control systems in a single information 

domain that changed the nature of military conflicts.119F

120

Reconnaissance-fire operations (разведывательно-огневые действия) (ROD) – operations 

carried out from the commencement of battle (combat operations), begun, as a rule, with part of 

the reconnaissance and fire destruction forces and means in the interests of destroying 

(suppressing) the most important newly identified enemy targets when he is structuring his order 

of battle for an attack. Fire destruction, in the recommended form of brigade artillery, is delivered 

by short fire raids with maximum density, using conventional munitions, with a subsequent 

change of fire positions (completion of antifire maneuver).120 F

121

Provisional reconnaissance-fire complex (VROK)—The provisional reconnaissancefire complex, abbreviated VROK, should be understood to mean an integrated system of 

forces and assets of reconnaissance, weapons, and automated command and control and 

 118 Ye. Gribov, V. Kazaryan, D. Karimov, and V. Khlopyak, “Using Precision Weapons in the Operating Contours 

of Reconnaissance Strike Activities,” Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military 

Science), No. 3 (24), 2008, p. 46. 119 M. I. Karatuev, “Coordinating the Forces and Means of Reconnaissance and Fire Destruction in Operations,” 

Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 6 1998, pp. 37-41. [Found on page 539 of Vol 2, terminology book]. The 

author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation of this definition. 120 V. Litvinenko, “The Comprehensive Integration of Reconnaissance, Control, and Destruction Systems under 

Conditions of 21st Century Military Concepts,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 8 2015, p. 35. 121 S. N. Petrunkh, “On the Forms and Methods of Fire Destruction of an Opponent by Motorized Rifle Brigade 

Artillery in a Maneuver Defense,” Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No 1 2013, pp. 29-32. [Found on page 548 

of Vol 2]. The author would like to thank Dr. Harold Orenstein for his translation of this definition.
32

support equipment dynamically formed in planning and organizing coordination and used 

in the subsequent course of combat operations.121F

122

Reconnaissance-fire delivery operation (ROO)—The aggregate of simultaneous and successive 

air, air defense and fire battles, engagements and strikes coordinated and interrelated in terms of 

goals, missions, place, and time and conducted jointly under a common concept and plan by 

groupings of reconnaissance, fire engagement, and EW personnel and assets on one or several 

strategic axes for purposes of crushing the enemy by fire.122 F

123

The word “kontur”—Russia’s use of RUK, ROK, and ROS issues can also involve two other 

terms, loop and circuit, both understood to be translations of the Russian word kontur. The acting 

chief of the Eastern Military District’s Rocket Troops and Artillery, Colonel Sergey Obukhov, 

discussed the meaning of kontur (he used “circuit” in this case) in a 2017 interview:

The reconnaissance-fire circuity is based on artillery and mortar units and employs 

artillery reconnaissance/targeting assets, UAVs, and kinetic artillery assets, while 

the reconnaissance-strike circuit consists of artillery reconnaissance assets, UAVs, 

atmospheric measurements and fire control, as well as ‘Uragan’ multiple launch 

rocket system (MLRS) units.123F

124

It is not possible to define reconnaissance-strike and -fire circuitry as RUK and ROK, as the “K” 

is for complex, not circuit (kontur), so no abbreviation is provided. Of interest is that the “circuit” 

functions, first, with a commander tasking a fire mission and, second, then assigning a mission to 

reconnaissance assets (UAVs, etc.) to get targeting intelligence that, third, is transmitted to artillery 

assets. Obukhov noted that automated command systems decrease command time by 80 percent 

and ammunition consumption by 15 percent while increasing target intelligence by a factor of four 

and damage to targets by a factor of two.124 F

125

Reconnaissance aircraft [razvedyvatel’nye letatel’nye apparaty/RLA] – technical apparatus for 

conducting air and space reconnaissance. These include piloted and unmanned reconnaissance 

airplanes, helicopters, drifting balloons, and spaceships. Depending on the nature of the tasks being 

resolved and conditions of the combat operations, RLA are equipped with the following technical 

means of reconnaissance: day and night aerial cameras; infrared, laser, and television 

reconnaissance systems; on-board stations for reconnoitering the parameters of ground, ship, and 

air radar stations; panorama radar stations and side-scan radar stations; a system for reconnoitering 

all types of radio communications, the ground and air radiation situation, et al. Some RLAs have 

means of destruction and are able to destroy important targets that have been detected (see 

reconnaissance-strike complex).

 122 V. Litvinenko, “Organization of Coordination: Provisional Reconnaissance-Fire Complex (VROK), Mission, 

Composition, Combat Capabilities,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 8 2018, pp. 23-24. 123 V. M. Barynkin, “The Effect of Precision Weapons on the Character of Combat Operations and the Development 

of Military Art,” VOORUZHENIYE, POLITICA, KONVERSIYA (ARMAMENTS, POLITICS, CONVERSION), No. 3 

1996, p. 20.

124 Obukhov. 125 Ibid.
33

The following are the principal advantages of piloted reconnaissance airplanes:

• capability of flexible maneuver (actively search for targets; change altitude, 

speed, and direction of flight; can used various types of reconnaissance systems, 

depending on conditions);

• rapid assessment of obtained information

• rapid transmission to their command.

Their shortcoming is their vulnerability to air defense resources. 

In comparison with piloted airplanes, unmanned reconnaissance airplanes have a number of 

advantages:

• no danger of losing the crew

• comparatively low cost

• relatively simple to use

• no need for airfields

• ability to fly in areas with high levels of radioactive contamination.

Helicopters can also be used to conduct radar and radiation reconnaissance. Free-flight balloons 

are employed for aerial photography and radio-technical and meteorological reconnaissance. 

Streaming air currents are used for their flight at stratospheric and mesospheric altitudes, which 

have seasonal steady trajectories. The high flight altitude and weak radar contrast of drifting 

balloons make it difficult to fight against them.

Characteristic for space RLAs are the globality of their operations, ability to monitor enormous 

areas of the earth in a short time, the high precision in determining the coordinates of military and 

industrial targets, etc. Unmanned reconnaissance spaceships (see artificial satellites) are employed 

to conduct reconnaissance with the help of optical-electronic and radio-electronic resources, 

including aerial photography and meteorological reconnaissance. They can detect ICBM launches, 

monitor nuclear explosions, et al. Piloted spaceships can make long flights in space, and they have 

integrated reconnaissance equipment. The range of altitudes for their flight is 200-400 

kilometers.125F

126

 126 Military Encyclopedia, Moscow Military Publishing House, 2003, Volume 7, p. 146.
34

APPENDIX TWO: ROK DIAGRAM WITH KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
35

Key (as of 2017): 

ARM—automated workstation ARM

VR—aerial reconnaissance automated workstation

ASU—automated control system

Br (P)—brigade (regimental)

DPLA—remotely piloted aerial vehicle

K—commander

KNM—command-observation vehicle

KNP B—battalion command-observation post

KP Br (P)—brigade (regimental) CP

KSA TZU—tactical control echelon automation equipment complex

KShM—command and staff vehicle

msb—motorized rifle battalion

MPDU—not further expanded, possibly ground remote control post

NPOI—not further expanded, possible ground data processing post

NPPI—not further expanded, possibly ground data reception post

NR msb—motorized rifle battalion chief of intelligence

PPO—not further expanded, possibly initial processing post

PRP—mobile reconnaissance post

PU—command and control facility

PU NA—not further expanded, possibly ground artillery command and control facility

PUR—reconnaissance command and control facility

RLS RNDT’s—moving ground target reconnaissance radar

RLS ROP—firing position reconnaissance radar

SAO—self-propelled artillery piece

ShM puAR—staff vehicle of artillery reconnaissance command and control facility

TsBU—battle management center

TsU ROS—reconnaissance-fire system command and control center

VK RRNTs—ground target radar reconnaissance airborne complex126F

127

 127 V. Litvenko and S. Voronkov, “Artillery Fire and Maneuver,” Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Journal), No. 2 2017, p. 

36.