The Art of Peace: 

Dissuading China from Developing 

Counter-Space Weapons 

David O. Meteyer 

INSS Occasional Paper 60 

August 2005 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The 

paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 

David O. Meteyer, Major, USAF, is currently assigned to 

Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces in Hawaii where he works space 

operations. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree from 

Oregon State University, and he holds an MBA from the University of 

Montana. Maj Meteyer recently completed a second graduate degree 

in Security Studies/Defense Decision-Making and Planning from the 

Naval Postgraduate School. This paper is adapted from the thesis he 

completed as part of that degree. 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

 Background 1 

 US Military Dependence on Space 2 

 Designing Defense Policies 4 

 Roadmap 7 

Dissuasion 9 

 Background 9 

 Why Dissuasion? 10 

 The Targets of Dissuasion 13 

 Defining Dissuasion 17 

 US Defense Policies and the China-Taiwan Issue 27 

 Summary 33 

Space Operations in a Sino-American Conflict 34 

 Background 34 

 An Introduction to Space Operations 36 

 Space Functions 41 

 Space System Elements 42 

 Complications of Dissuading Space Systems 46 

 Counter-Space Systems 47 

 Summary 53 

Conditions for Success 55 

 Background 55 

 Military Condition 57 

 Economic Condition 65 

 Diplomatic Conditions 69 

 Summary 74 

Conclusion 75 

 Summary of Findings 75 

 Policy Assessments and Recommendations 82 

 Final Thoughts 87 

Notes 91 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this sixtieth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). The value of David Meteyer’s 

paper is twofold. First, it presents a systematic discussion of the 

defense policy construct dissuasion, differentiating and relating it to 

more traditional constructs such as defense, deterrence, and 

assurance. This is a discussion that has not been presented in 

writing except in very rare instances such as the October 2004 issue 

of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Contemporary 

Conflict journal Strategic Insights. Second, this paper goes on to 

extend that discussion with a logical application to possible US 

dissuasion of China’s military space initiatives and development. 

Meteyer concludes that there is only a narrow arena of potential 

application—dissuasion of space-based offensive counter-space 

systems—and that this effort best lends itself to diplomatic rather 

than military implementation. The paper lends itself particularly to 

use in the military classroom to spur further examination of 

dissuasion as a policy tool, and to project US defense requirements 

into the strategic future that lies beyond today’s conflicts. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the Strategic Security 

Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XOS), and the 

Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors include the 

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Studies Office (FMSO); the Army Environmental Policy Institute 

(AEPI); the United States Northern Command/North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORTHCOM/NORAD); and the 

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(CTC). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security 

research for the Department of Defense within the military 

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national security discourse through outreach and education.” Its 

research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our sponsors: 

arms control and strategic security, counterproliferation and force 

protection, homeland defense and combating terrorism, regional and 
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emerging national security issues, air and space issues and 

planning, and information operations and warfare. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

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 Director 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This paper assesses the viability of applying dissuasion towards 

the development of offensive counter-space (OCS) systems by 

China. As a relatively new defense policy and certainly one that 

has never been explicitly applied previously, the paper delves into 

the characteristics prescribed by recent US planning documents to 

develop a strategy that more appropriately addresses current 

security concerns. Implicitly, dissuasion is intended to prevent 

future arms races with China through well-placed US actions that 

channel adversarial efforts in a direction desired by Washington. 

Several things become clear during this investigation. First, 

very little scholarly work exists discussing the concept of 

dissuasion and the mechanisms used to formulate, implement, and 

execute it as a defense policy. Second, while an admirable attempt 

to lessen the need for more costly policy options such as deterrence 

and defeat, dissuasion will not prevent China from developing 

counter-space weapons, especially since ground-based jammers that 

target satellite links have already proven effective. Third, the best 

chance of dissuading China’s efforts to acquire space-based OCS 

systems is through international treaties and laws 
x
THE ART OF PEACE: DISSUADING CHINA FROM 

DEVELOPING COUNTER-SPACE WEAPONS 

INTRODUCTION 

Background 

Recently, several key US planning documents have explicitly 

spelled out a defense strategy that “actively” pursues American 

security. While the traditional challenges of previous eras are not 

entirely gone, other challenges have sprouted that threaten US interests. 

New strategies are necessary to counter these new challenges. In 

addition, new strategies incorporate lessons learned from the failures of 

past policies. The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) advocates 

one such new strategy: “We will work to dissuade potential adversaries 

from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, 

particularly by developing our own key military advantages.”1

 

Furthermore, current US leadership has explicitly identified one 

particular area of concern. 

In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region 

susceptible to large-scale military competition.... Maintaining 

a stable balance in Asia will be a complex task. The 

possibility exists that a military competitor with a formidable 

resource base will emerge in this region.2

The clear implication of these two statements is that the United 

States must dissuade China, the only possible “military competitor” 

with a “formidable resource base,” from developing systems that could 

target US military strengths, above all in a Taiwan conflict, the issue on 

which United States and Chinese interests conflict most directly. 

This paper is concerned with the problem of dissuasion as it applies 

to Chinese space systems. Since 1979, the People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) leadership has undertaken serious efforts to modernize the Red 

Army, although recent US military operations starting with Desert 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

2

Storm in 1991 and concluding in 2003 with Iraqi Freedom “stunned” 

the Chinese High Command with just how far behind they remain from 

achieving the level of military might enjoyed by America. 

Consequently, the PRC modified its primary objective for the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA) from being prepared to execute a “people’s 

war under modern conditions” to “winning a limited war under hightech conditions.”3

 A key component of this effort is the modernization 

of PRC space capabilities, which encompasses the ability to harness the 

advantages of space operations as well as deny those advantages to 

adversaries. Counterspace weapons such as ground-based satellite 

jammers constitute an especially fruitful area where China may seek to 

exploit US weaknesses. These modernization efforts present an 

emerging threat to space systems upon which American military power 

is heavily dependent. 

US Military’s Dependence on Space 

The evolution of space systems from unfunded pet projects of the 

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to WWII terror devices to 

Cold War nuclear war stabilizers caused space systems to take on 

specific missions. In fact, space systems such as the CORONA 

photoreconnaissance satellites and the Defense Support Program (DSP) 

missile warning spacecraft proved instrumental in supporting Cold War 

decision making and stability. Subsequently, these Cold War devices 

merged into US conventional force operations, and ultimately a strong 

dependency developed for the services provided by space systems. 

Yet, the fact that these devices were still relatively unknown and based 

on Cold War requirements caused many US civilian and military 

leaders to recognize the potential for even greater improvements in air, 

land, and sea force effectiveness once newer space systems were 

acquired through a modern requirements process. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

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Therefore, remote sensing and other intelligence platforms, the 

global positioning system (GPS), weather satellites, and satellite 

communications (SATCOM) all found their niche further embedded in 

the US conventional force doctrine. Today multiple US military 

documents, both joint and service specific, spell out the criticality of 

space in combat operations. 

This publication provides guidelines for planning and 

conducting joint space operations. It provides space doctrine 

fundamentals for all warfighters — air, land, sea, space, and 

special operations forces; describes the military operational 

principles associated with support from and through space, and 

operating in space; explains U.S. Space Command 

relationships and responsibilities; and establishes a framework 

for the employment of space forces and space capabilities.4

A number of data points underscore US dependency on space as 

well as its integration into operations across the entire spectrum of US 

forces. The GPS precision-guided munitions (PGM) used in both 

Desert Strom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates this point. In Desert 

Strom 8% of munitions were PGM5

, as compared to 68% in Iraqi 

freedom.6

 In addition to supporting PGM, GPS also aides in the 

prevention of fratricide, enhances close air support (CAS) employment, 

and fosters economy of force through successful blue force tracking 

(BFT) capabilities, among other benefits.7

Satellite communications (SATCOM) usage levels also emphasizes 

the significant US dependence on space operations. US reliance on 

satellite communications during Desert Strom was paltry: one Mbps per 

every 5,000 troops deployed. For Iraqi Freedom that number swelled 

to 51.1 Mbps.8

 The massive SATCOM bandwidth requirement 

supported such activities as Iraqi target imagery dissemination, 

Combined and Joint C2, Predator UAV data feeds, and Combatant 

Commander video-teleconferences. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

4

Another data point to consider when discussing US dependency on 

space is people. US space requirements have grown at such a rate that 

several large and costly organizations have developed to handle these 

programs. For example, the lead agent for US military space is Air 

Force Space Command, which is based out of Colorado Springs 

Colorado and consists of nearly 40,000 personnel.9

 These forces are 

responsible for a number of space operations that includes missile 

warning, satellite communications (SATCOM), and GPS operations. 

In addition, the entire functional combatant command of Strategic 

Command is dedicated to nuclear and space warfare. Lastly, the money 

trail for space acquisition implies that this realm of operations is every 

bit as important as air, land, and sea. 

Consider that of the $60+ billion in major 2006 defense acquisition 

programs, from the F/A-22 to Patriot missiles to AEGIS destroyers, 

space programs account for over 10% of this budget. Or, consider that 

at $6.3 billion, space program procurement is more than twice that of 

the carrier replacement program, DD(X) destroyer, AEGIS destroyer, 

and littoral combat ship’s combined expenses. And, the outlays for 

improved SATCOM systems will more than double that spent on the 

B-2, F-15E, and F-16 aircraft.10 Opponents to increased space program 

funding can present logical arguments as to why limited defense dollars 

should concentrate elsewhere. However, at a minimum, the substantial 

amount of Department of Defense (DoD) funds earmarked for space 

programs represents a commitment by senior leadership that American 

forces will depend on these systems in future operations. 

Designing Defense Policies 

Figure 1 shows one possible approach to the cause-effect 

relationship between defense policies and strategic challenges facing 

the United States. Since the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

5

(SALT), the two superpowers recognized the futility of the nuclear 

arms race.

11 In essence, a limited number of nuclear weapons were 

agreeable between the two sides. As depicted in the top line of Figure 

1, deterrence’s affect is sufficient when directed towards other nucleararmed states. The fact that no nuclear war has occurred supports this 

position. However, the consequence of nuclear arms control treaties 

like SALT and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is that 

more money is available for conventional or traditional types of 

forces.12 Fortunately, from an American perspective, defense policies 

against these types of challenges are extremely effective since the US 

conventional military possesses such overwhelming strength. Yet, this 

causes another cascade of adversary money, although this time it is 

from traditional weapons to irregular or disruptive challenges such as 

insurgency or cyber warfare. Unfortunately, the United States has 

proven to be ill equipped to handle these types of challenges. It is for 

this reason that US policy makers created the strategy of dissuasion in 

hopes that it can counter challenges not normally considered US 

strengths. 

These factors are partially responsible for the policies outlined in 

recent US documents such as the 2002 National Security Strategy 

(NSS), 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 2005 National 

Defense Strategy (NDS), and 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS). 

In the end, these documents provide a framework for the various 

activities that support US security like service budgets, military war 

planning, and foreign diplomacy. Dissuasion represents one specific 

defense policy prescribed by these documents. The next section 

analyzes this policy and highlights its key traits, but one issue is worth 

mentioning now. The amount of literature and understanding on 

exactly what dissuasion entails or seeks to accomplish is extremely 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

6 

Figure 1: Relative Strength of Traditional US Defense Policies versus Relative Strength of S

Catastrophic Challenges 

Traditional Challenges 

Irregular or Disruptive 

Challenges 

$$$ 

Deterrence/ 

Defeat 

Deterrence 

Deterrence/Defeat 

$$$ 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

7

limited. Of equal concern is the fact that none of the aforementioned 

US policy documents provides any semblance of an executable strategy 

for this new concept. While not a conclusion that addresses the main 

question of this thesis, it is worth noting that as a policy prescription 

dissuasion requires much more discussion, analysis, and most 

importantly guidance from US senior administrators in the DoD, State 

Department, and White House. 

Nonetheless, it seems logical that the genesis of dissuasion reaches 

back to the Cold War and that one of this policy’s targets is China’s 

counter space technologies. Mindful of the large costs associated with 

the superpower stare downs of the twentieth century, the United States 

sought to develop a policy that avoids arms races before they have a 

chance to begin. Since the other mediums of operation already nurture 

on-going battles for improved air, land, and sea-based weapon systems, 

its application in those domains seems less apparent. In addition, many 

individuals, nations, and international groups are against the 

weaponization of space. Conversely, the international community does 

not view the buildup of improved tanks, airplanes, and ships as illegal. 

Moreover, no known destructive weapons exist in space. Speculation 

as well as research and development programs are looking at weapons 

that could orbit the earth and actually destroy other satellites or fire 

lasers back onto earth. However, when compared to its more mature 

counterparts, space is relatively free of weapons. This sanctity appeals 

to some and provides impetus to keep space free from destructive 

systems. 

Roadmap 

This main divisions of this paper fall into three distinct sections. 

The second section discusses in more detail why dissuasion is a defense 

policy option and its objective as a military strategy. This chapter 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

8

relies heavily on deterrence literature and logic in establishing the 

foundation of dissuasion. At times the line between deterrence and 

dissuasion may seem unclear, and while this paper may not necessarily 

clear up this confusion, it will at a minimum analyze and identify the 

similar traits of these two defense policies. Furthermore, this section 

traces the roots of dissuasion through recent historical security issues 

confronting the United States and its allies to provide a sense as to why 

US policy makers are promoting this new policy. The conclusion of 

the section summarizes why dissuasion is not just a US defense policy 

in a broad sense, but why US policy makers considered it the ideal 

choice to tackle the potential threat of Chinese counter space systems. 

The third section analyzes China’s space program. To accomplish 

this objective, this chapter introduces some basic concepts of space 

operations, such as the primary elements that comprise a space system. 

Understanding the basic elements of a space system is necessary for 

any policy that seeks to protect space systems. Simply protecting one 

element may not be enough to guarantee access to the space capabilities 

the United States has come to enjoy. Next, this section explores the 

difficulty of dissuading space systems and more specifically, why the 

dissuasion of counter space weapons represents the most probable 

chance for success. Finally, it examines the current space weapons 

China is likely to possess or seek to develop in the future. 

Section four uses past strategic cases as well as current defense 

policy theories to propose conditions necessary for dissuasion to 

succeed. In essence, these conditions for success are broken down into 

military, economic, and diplomatic conditions with each one containing 

multiple sub-conditions or criterion. Aside from the conditions 

presented, this section emphasizes that the prospects for dissuasion to 

succeed cannot be easily computed like a linear equation. Even though 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

9

this paper develops logical situations where dissuasion may work, it is 

much more difficult to account for the actual decision-making and 

reaction to decisions made by state’s leaders. In essence, judgment and 

risk are crucial components of any policy. 

The paper concludes with an assessment of the prospects for 

success in dissuading China’s counter space systems. Unfortunately, 

the answer to this dilemma is that dissuasion will not succeed in 

stopping the Chinese from producing these types of systems. However, 

the concluding section as well as the entire paper takes the reader 

through an in-depth and honest analysis that ultimately produces this 

result. 

DISSUASION 

Background 

Like other political options, defense policies represent one set of 

tools to advance and protect US interests. Reflection and analysis of 

the past contributes to the policy process by allowing leaders to revise 

policies to better address current and future security requirements. One 

way to communicate these updates is through formal strategic policy 

documents, such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). For example, the 2002 NSS 

issued by President Bush set a new course for US policy makers. 

Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled 

military strength and great economic and political influence. 

In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our 

strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to 

create a balance of power that favors human freedom; 

conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for 

themselves the rewards and challenges of political and 

economic liberty. 

Portions of this recent guidance call upon older policies that have 

proven successful in the past while simultaneously advocating the 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

10

implementation of a new policy to address the changing dynamics of 

the twenty-first century. Consequently, the next statement made by 

President Bush in the NSS provided clear direction for future US 

defense policies. 

We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. 

We will preserve the peace by building good relations among 

great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free 

and open societies on every continent.14

While these three statements do not explicitly refer to the concepts 

of assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat, they do make a strong 

case for them. The United States will “defend...by fighting,” 

“preserve...by building,” and “extend...by encouraging.” These ideas 

provide a departure point for subsequent and more specific defense 

planning guidance. Clearly, the more traditional defense policies of 

assurance, deterrence, and defeat resonate in the terms “defend” and 

“preserve.” However, the notion of “extend[ing]” the peace through 

“encouraging” friendly atmospheres is a pillar of the relatively new 

defense policy called dissuasion. 

Why Dissuasion? 

Recognizing the risk of provocation that comes with policies such 

as deterrence is one factor that caused US leaders to re-examine past 

policies in search of something that better achieves a more productive 

relationship between states. Security studies expert Patrick Morgan 

summarizes the common distractions and unintended consequences of 

deterrence. 

We do not want deterrence to work in such a way that it is 

provocative and produces, rather than prevents, disastrous 

conflicts—which are the stability problem in its various 

forms.... We do not want deterrence to shape the endless 

security dilemma.... We do not want deterrence to drive out 

the alternatives that are available for the better management of 

global, regional, and national security.15
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

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Unfortunately, at times, other less aggressive policies have also 

proven counterproductive, the most notable being the appeasement 

policies of pre-WWII. Designed to quell the aggressive interests of 

Hitler and his Nazi regime, appeasement simply provided Germany 

unfettered opportunities to deepen its pre-war buildup. Historian 

Gordon Craig analyzes the negative consequences of appeasement 

Germany truly intended on being naughty and she would go on 

being so as long as there was no compelling reason to change 

her ways.... In September 1938 Hitler was well on his way to 

realizing the program laid down on 5 November 1937; and 

there seemed no possibility after Munich that anyone would 

object seriously to future depredations.16

The disaster of WWII serves as a frightful reminder that even nonaggressive approaches can also contribute to unsatisfactory policy 

results. Placing these two policies on a spectrum as shown in Figure 2 

illustrates that room exists for a policy that lies somewhere between the 

two. A policy in this area could possibly better address some of the 

indeterminate security requirements currently facing the United States. 

Dissuasion may represent the most appropriate tool for dealing with 

states that fall between outright adversary and close ally. In addition, 

dissuasion affords leaders a more viable option for an exit strategy, a 

classic criticism of deterrence-based policies, should the intended target 

state respond favorably with peaceful assurances. 

In light of these reasons, among others, the 2002 NSS dictates the 

use of dissuasion.17 Moreover, the 2001 QDR, 2004 National Military 

Strategy (NMS), and 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) echo the 

same strategic methods as the NSS and identify dissuasion as a defense 

policy.18 As such, US civilian and military leaders are directed to 

implement dissuasion when and where necessary. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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Figure 2: Defense Policy Spectrum 

Foe Friend 

Deterrence DissuasionNew Defeat Assurance 

Historically this area has lacked a specific US defense policy 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

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The Targets of Dissuasion 

The targets of US defense policies can be broken into three types 

of threats: emerging, existing, and engaged. Ideally, as depicted in 

Figure 3, a specific defense policy counters each of these threats. 

However, a distinguishing characteristic is that policies other than 

dissuasion all represent strategies aimed at current security situations. 

The United States assures its allies that it will support them against 

“existing” aggressive regimes, the United States deters “existing” 

adversaries from attempting coercion or harmful influence, and when 

necessary the United States defeats “existing” enemies on the 

battlefield. Conversely, according to the 2005 NDS, the United States 

“Seeks to limit would-be opponent’s strategic options and dissuade 

them from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and 

ambitions.”19

This explains a unique quality of dissuasion, that as a defense 

policy it seeks to reduce the likelihood that new adversaries will 

“emerge” or if they do “emerge” that they will be equipped with less 

capability. This is consistent with the overall guidance put forth by 

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld: “This strategy emphasizes the 

importance of influencing events before challenges become more 

dangerous and less manageable.”20

This is a clear reflection on the difficulties associated with past US 

defense policies and the common security dilemmas that transpired 

from previous deterrence-focused strategies whose foundations were 

based on waiting for threats to develop first, then engage second. 

Robert Kaplan describes this situation as “deterring China without 

needlessly provoking it.”21 Moreover, the current commander of 

Pacific Command, Admiral Fallon, recently appeared before the House 

Armed Services Committee and discussed the delicate nature of China- 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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Figure 3: US Defense Policies and Respective Targets 

Threat 

Defeat Engages 

Threat Exists 

US

Defense

Policies

Deter 

Threat 

Dissuade Emerges

Assurance 
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Table 1: US Defense Policy Breakdown 

 Objective Target Measure of 

Effectiveness

Assurance Convince Allies US 

Will Deal With Threat 

Allies and Enemy Allies Avoid Arm

Race 

Deterrence Stop Threat Existing Threats Threat Held in Ch

Defeat Eliminate Threat Engaged Threats Threat Surrende

Dissuasion Reduce Threat Emerging Threats Threat Never Deve
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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Taiwan relations and the role that US influence may play in “diffusing 

the tension and moving forward.”22

Until dissuasion, no policy goal explicitly sought to reduce the 

number of threats, whether the threats exist at the strategic, operational, 

or tactical levels. Instead, policies were designed to simply deal with 

threats at hand. Assurance, deterrence, and defeat assume that the 

United States will always have dangerously armed belligerents to 

manage. On the other hand, successful dissuasion may reduce the need 

for the other defense policy goals. Furthermore, policies often work 

best when integrated into a cohesive strategy that taps into the unique 

attributes of each specific policy. It is hard to imagine dissuasion 

working properly without the support of deterrence, assurance, and 

defeat, especially given the highly complex nature of the global 

environment. In fact, a broad strategic plan that uses the wide-ranging 

utility of multiple defense policies is more likely to meet the diverse 

challenges of current security situations. 

For example, the US conventional and nuclear capabilities 

immediately following WWII served notice to any aggressor that 

America possessed the means to defeat even the most well-armed 

nation. Combined with the assurance policies of the United States to 

its NATO partners, the collective power of these two policies 

(assurance and defeat) created a more favorable environment for 

deterrence. However, this logic also bolstered the Soviet’s deterrence 

policies. The USSR demonstrated credible defeat-type qualities during 

WWII and the subsequent force build-up in Eastern Block countries 

assured the United States and others that the USSR was committed to 

the region. Consequently, these policy attributes afforded the Soviets 

certain degrees of credibility from which their deterrence policies could 

more effectively operate. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

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Defining Dissuasion 

To understand the benefits of dissuasion better it is useful to 

compare it with other defense policy goals to highlight its unique 

attributes. Some of this comparison already took place in the 

introduction to this chapter. However, in addition to the nature of the 

relationship and the intended policy set, additional discussion will help 

to differentiate between dissuasion and its older counterparts. 

Defeat. On one extreme of the US defense policy spectrum is 

defeat (reference Figure 2), which represents the least desirable and 

most costly option. Yet, to uphold treaty obligations and prevent the 

efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its 

allies, or friends, defeat may be the only option left that will preserve 

national security.23 WWII, Korea, and the first Gulf War all represent 

examples of the United States carrying out defeat-based defense 

policies, some more successfully than others. In addition, US policy 

towards each of these conflicts carried with it specific policy 

objectives. WWII represented unlimited warfare with only the 

unconditional surrender of the Axis powers (i.e., “traditional” strategic 

challenges) satisfying US objectives. The first Gulf War had more 

limited objectives, which arose primarily from the diverse interests of 

states that comprised the fragile coalition. Nonetheless, the Gulf War 

still sought the defeat of a “traditional” type of strategic threat. 

More recently, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was conducted as 

part of a broader defense policy to defeat a “traditional” threat, 

although a primary objective of OIF was to reduce the number of 

“catastrophic” threats (i.e., WMD) in the Middle East. Unfortunately, 

one unintended consequence of OIF is the increase in the number of 

“irregular” (i.e., insurgency and terrorism) threats in the region.24 This 

highlights a consequence of US military superiority in that it drives 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

18

allies and adversaries to pursue means of warfare that avoid this 

strength by targeting a weakness (i.e., asymmetric warfare). 

Assurance. On the opposite end of the defense policy spectrum 

(reference Figure 2) is assurance. According to the 2002 NSS and 2001 

QDR, the United States will “assure our allies and friends” that they do 

not stand alone in the face of aggression or other potential threats.25 

Specifically, “The U.S. military plays a critical role in assuring allies 

and friends that the Nation will honor its obligations and will be a 

reliable security partner.”26

The US position within NATO during the early years of the nuclear 

arms race provides a good example of this type of defense policy goal. 

By providing economic aid, conventional forces, as well as nuclear 

weapons, the United States demonstrated its commitment to stand by 

its NATO allies who were facing Soviet conventional and strategic 

forces. Consequently, the strong assurances provided to these Western 

European states allowed them to feel more protected, allocate sparse 

resources towards other programs, and bolster the US position as a 

provider of global security. 

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 represents another US assurance 

policy aimed at reducing the likelihood of a regional security dilemma. 

In response to the ebbs and flows of the historic China and Taiwan 

reunification conflict, the United States enacted a policy that assured 

Taiwan that they did not stand alone in the face of forceful attempts to 

reunify.27 Furthermore, the policy provided “reassurance through 

restraint” that the United States would support peaceful resolutions 

with respect to China–Taiwan relations, but would act defensively if 

deemed necessary. Combined with the power projection capabilities of 

the Pentagon, and the most recent defeat of aggressive regimes (i.e., 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

19

Milosevic and Hussein) by US-led forces, American policies with 

respect to the China – Taiwan issue carry a great deal of credibility. 

Assurance is about building and fostering productive relationships 

in an effort to bolster economic, diplomatic, and other non-military 

type activities. In addition, even though there is a military aspect to 

assurance policies, it is not an “in your face” type of involvement. 

Instead, it lurks behind the scenes while other strategic actions take 

front stage. One only needs to examine the highly productive 

relationship that exists between the United States and its closest allies 

to see the potential of assurance. Interestingly, the US-Japan and USGerman assurance policies since the end of WWII have allowed both 

Japan and Germany to grow into modern industrial and intellectual 

giants. Of course, prior to WWII both of these states were strong 

geopolitical powers, but the aggressive nature of each state put it at 

odds with the United States. Therefore, assurance sees competing 

interests much more like a win-win situation and not a zero-sum 

equation. 

Deterrence. Unlike defeat and assurance, which lay on the outer 

edges of the defense policy spectrum, deterrence is closer to the middle, 

although it leans more towards defeat than assurance (reference Figure 

2). In addition, when states start to consider deterrence-type policies, 

then the win-win potential of assurance quickly dissolves into a loselose scenario. Granted deterrence can prevent wars of monumental 

costs from taking place, but it simply does not allow for the productive 

type of relationships that exist under assurance. Nonetheless, 

deterrence served as the US military’s primary objective during much 

of the Cold War. With both superpowers arraying vast arsenals of 

nuclear weapons at each other neither one was prepared to accept the 

consequences of atomic warfare: in effect, the weapon systems and 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

20

political policies of each nation deterred nuclear war as well as WWIII. 

The 2001 QDR defines deterrence as “A multifaceted approach...that 

requires forces and capabilities that provide the President with a wider 

range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of 

coercion.”28 Using terminology from the 2005 NDS, the design of 

Cold War defense policies primarily deterred the “catastrophic” 

challenges presented by nuclear weapons.29 

Lawrence Freedman stated in his 2004 book titled Deterrence that 

in the past, “Deterrence anticipated aggression, and therefore guarded 

against being caught by surprise, but it could still be presented as 

essentially reactive.”30 One only needs to look at the action words of 

this description to get a sense of when and against whom to apply 

deterrence. “Aggression” implies an adversarial state while “guarded,” 

“surprise,” and “reactive” detail a situation of insecurity where states 

mass forces along the border because of the distrusting or competing 

nature of the environment. 

This highlights two key assumptions when constructing deterrence 

policies. First, that the target of deterrence is hostile or aggressive 

towards US interests. Second, that the aggressive behavior is known 

and consists of military forces arrayed within striking distance from 

those interests. If hostilities have already commenced the value of 

deterrence lessens. If two states are close allies then this policy seems 

to have minimal utility. 

According to Freedman there are two approaches that deterrence 

can take which will influence behavior. It can either prevent adversary 

action through denial or punishment. This is similar to the carrot and 

stick analogy where a state will either be denied the carrot or punished 

with the stick, although neither seems very appealing which 

underscores the objective of deterrence. Efforts by states to not 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

21

recognize or negotiate with terrorists are examples of a denial-based 

deterrence approach. The idea is that a state withholds from the 

aggressor something they want in order to prevent or deter the 

aggressor from taking undesirable actions. In the case of terrorism, the 

US hopes that terrorists will avoid carrying out certain actions because 

the international community will prevent them from joining its 

organizations if they do. Conversely, deterrence by punishment is 

based on the notion that the costs of action outweigh any potential 

benefits (i.e., you’ll suffer more than its worth).31 This is the more 

common application of deterrence and embodies the main precept of 

nuclear deterrence. Neither superpower was willing to risk nuclear war 

because the economic, political, and domestic costs far outweighed any 

conceivable gains made by destroying the other side. This also serves 

to illuminate the confrontational nature of this policy, which Patrick 

Morgan summarizes in the following statement: “Yet deterrence 

remains an important tool for failed relationships and communities—it 

is not ideally our first choice, but more like a recourse.”32 The 

numerous instances of deterrence and not just nuclear deterrence 

provide more of the same confrontational brinksmanship. 

In the historical application of deterrence, three common criteria 

are evident: an effective military capability, the capability to impose 

unacceptable costs, and the willingness to use these capabilities if 

attacked.33 These criteria re-enforce the hostile nature of deterrence, 

the security dilemma that it usually creates, and ultimately the 

unproductive diplomatic environment fostered by such a strategy. 

Security expert Robert Jervis explains a key component of deterrence is 

the ability to recognize the enemy’s intentions because “The central 

argument that great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status 

quo powers are weak in capability or resolve and that the state must 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

22

display the ability and willingness to wage war.”34 Jervis’ point and a 

key factor in any deterrence policy is that certain states respond to the 

threat of force. Therefore, deterrence can be used to achieve national 

strategy if it is used against the correct type of enemy. A thorough 

understanding of intentions puts leaders in better position to determine 

if a given state is a candidate for deterrence or if some other type of 

policy, such as engagement, may be more appropriate. 

Another security expert, John Ikenberry introduces the concept of 

“strategic restraint” in an effort to lessen the need for deterrence 

policies. His concept proposes that states seek to bind their own limits 

through international institutions.35 In addition, Janice Stein and 

Lawrence Freedman in separate writings underscore the logic of 

deterrence by asserting common deterrence assumptions primarily 

based on a cost-benefit model.36 Looking back at these experts’ 

opinions on deterrence reveals that it is a highly complex policy 

requiring a clear understanding of the opposing state. Furthermore, 

they all emphasize the fact that deterrence takes place between 

belligerents with existing threatening capabilities and intentions that 

usually consist of traditional and/or catastrophic weapon systems. 

Dissuasion. In retrospect, the policies of assurance, deterrence, 

and defeat feel familiar to US strategists because they achieved success 

in the past. Threats exist in the world and will arguably always exist. 

Therefore, these policies will have a place at the bargaining table when 

deciding on national security strategies. However, these policy options 

are often expensive, destabilizing, and deadly. Dissuasion, on the other 

hand, is an attempt to curb the number of strategic, operational, and 

tactical threats future policy makers will face, and in turn lessen the 

overall need for assurance, deterrence, and defeat. The United States 

has more friends than enemies, but even so, most states do not fall 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

23

consistently into either of these categories (reference Figure 4). 

Traditional US defense policies do not seem to afford an effective 

means for dealing with these types of states. Become too friendly with 

assurances and an aggressive state can simply act unfettered, but 

become too hostile with deterrence and then little room is available to 

back out of a security dilemma. To better address the current 

environment and avoid some of the problems with other defense 

policies, US leaders coined the notion of dissuasion. Professor Richard 

Kugler of the National Defense University (NDU) summarizes the 

rationale for dissuasion: “It offers a potent concept for handling 

geopolitical situations in which US relationships with key countries fall 

short of overt rivalry but can deteriorate if strategic and military 

competition takes hold.”37

A review of current US strategic guidance (e.g., 2001 QDR, 2002 

NSS, 2004 NMS, and 2005 NDS) provides a very brief and broad 

overview as to how policy makers view the implementation and 

execution of dissuasion. The 2002 NSS states that “our military must 

dissuade future military competition,” the 2001 QDR states that 

dissuasion “influences the nature of military competition, channels 

threats in certain directions, and complicates military planning for 

potential adversaries.” Furthermore, the 2005 NDS dictates that the US 

military “Will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting 

threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by 

developing our own key military advantages.”38 However, dissuasion is 

a relatively new term and its actual use in existing or previous policies 

is unknown. Some analysts point to ballistic missile defense (BMD), 

while still others point to the US Navy as forms of dissuasion.39 In 

theory, a functional BMD system would drive aggressors away from 

procuring and producing WMD-tipped ICBMs targeting the United 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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Figure 4: Defense Policy Gray Area (Friend or Foe?) 

Foe Friend 

Deterrence DissuasionNew Defeat Assurance 

Proximity of deterrence and dissuasion means these policies share common traits 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

25

States. In fact, this is one of the primary reasons that President Reagan 

pursued the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983. Additionally, 

not only would SDI render adversary nuclear missiles irrelevant, it 

would provide the ultimate protection to America’s population.40 

Nevertheless, once faced with SDI, aggressors are likely to put the 

WMD device on a boat, or an airplane, or develop it within America’s 

borders. 

US maritime capability represents another possible example of 

dissuasion, and in theory, the American naval fleet is so strong that it 

has in essence dissuaded other nations from developing comparable 

fleets. Undoubtedly, the United States is the only nation on earth 

capable of projecting multiple large carrier strike groups in all major 

waterways. However, one result of this dissuasion has been an increase 

in the number of states that have mini-subs and anti-ship missiles. In 

addition, while not necessarily a direct result of the US Navy, the PLA 

Navy (PLAN) is pursuing a blue water capability, although it would 

take decades to achieve the quality of US naval operations. Still, these 

actions seem to go against the desired end state of dissuasion. 

These two cases underscore the likelihood that dissuasion will spur 

the growth of asymmetric warfare much the same way that US 

conventional force dominance has spurred a rise in terrorism and 

insurgency, two means of warfare that the United States handles 

poorly. In either case, no policy maker or strategist has previously 

stated that US involvement or policies in these defense programs are 

part of a much broader dissuasive campaign. Dissuasion is still a 

relatively new policy, and its record of accomplishment in strategy 

employment and policy results is difficult to measure. Examining past 

cases in which the concept can be observed to have operated, even if 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

26

the term itself did not exist, may provide insight into possible benefits 

and consequences of this policy. 

While past events can help explain dissuasion’s objective, it is 

future threats that truly comprise this policy’s intended target set. 

According to the 2001 QDR, dissuasion targets “future military 

competition.” Moreover, the 2001 QDR states that to “Have a 

dissuasive effect, this combination of technical, experimental, and 

operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus.”41 In addition, 

the 2001 QDR describes dissuasion as having a “channeling” effect due 

to superior US technological strengths.42 The downside of a policy that 

advocates the bolstering of an existing strength is that it drives 

adversaries to find US weaknesses. It is not feasible to consider 

dissuasion in relation to every conceivable military threat. While the 

US economy remains robust, it does have limits, and US leaders must 

chose judiciously where defense dollars are spent. Designers of US 

defense policy must provide a “clear strategic focus” by identifying 

those emerging systems that present the greatest threat to US security.43 

In addition, they need to weigh these future threats against the 

probability of dissuasion being a successful policy. While dissuasion 

may cause an adversary to avoid certain types of weapons, US policy 

makers must address critical questions: “What will the adversary 

pursue instead” and “Is it possible that the asymmetrical choices they 

make are worse for the United States than if dissuasion had not been 

implemented?” The Chinese military space program is an example of 

an emerging threat toward which a strategy of dissuasion may offer 

some promise of success. 

Dissuasion represents a different approach to achieving strategic 

objectives in a rivalry-based global environment. According to the 

2005 NDS dissuasion targets potential adversaries in an effort to 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

27

discourage them “from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and 

ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military 

advantages.”44 In his book Astropolitik, Everett Dolman advocates an 

elaborate space-based dissuasive strategy where the United States 

dominates satellite orbits so thoroughly with space weapons capable of 

shooting down adversarial space systems that no aggressor or enemy of 

the United States is capable of fielding a space platform, regardless of 

its proposed intentions, without America’s consent.45 A key difference 

between the two policies is that dissuasion tries to pre-empt the 

production of weapon systems whereas deterrence assumes the weapon 

system already exists or will exist shortly. Moreover, dissuasion 

applies to US allies who might wish to acquire weapon systems 

perceived as detrimental to US policies (i.e., regional arms race). In 

certain situations, older, more traditional defense policies are the 

appropriate policy solution to achieve national security. However, in 

other situations, dissuasion may afford the best chance at maintaining 

US interests as well as gaining a potential ally. 

US Defense Policies and the China-Taiwan Issue 

Some security experts believe that dissuasion was devised 

specifically to deal with China, a state that at times acts like an 

adversary to US interests, but still at other times acts like a friend.46 

Therefore, the current China-Taiwan reunification issue serves as a 

good test case to demonstrate the application of US defense policies as 

well as further illustrate the potential of dissuasion. In addition to the 

definitions provided above as well as the defense policy targets shown 

in Figure 3, this section breaks down the application of defense policies 

across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. One caveat is that this 

analysis does not exhaust all the possible applications of US defense 

policies with respect to the China-Taiwan scenario. Instead, it 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

28

demonstrates one logical albeit simple application of an integrated 

defense strategy that comprises these policies, with particular emphasis 

on the less mature concept of dissuasion. 

Figure 5 illustrates the strategic-level application of the US defense 

policies towards China and Taiwan. The United States actively assures 

Taiwan of its diplomatic, economic, and military support in the face of 

aggressive attempts by China to reunify. In addition, the United States 

assures Taiwan that it should avoid making controversial statements 

and legal actions that serve to antagonize the PRC. Moreover, the 

United States dissuades China from pursuing aggressive approaches to 

reunification through a collage of military, foreign, and trade policies. 

Simultaneously, the United States also maintains a well-armed regional 

force under Pacific Command (PACOM) that serves as a deterrent to 

hostile PLA actions. 

At the operational level, the United States takes similar steps to 

manage this situation as shown in Figure 6. PACOM, DoD, and the 

State Department establish a variety of personal and professional 

networks with Taiwanese counterparts to strengthen the US assurance 

policy. In addition, the DoD takes selective steps to dissuade the PLA 

from fielding specific weapon systems. As shown in Figure 7, one 

possible list of dissuasive targets is the space weapons mentioned in the 

2005 NDS. Therefore, US leaders can attempt to take steps (e.g., 

enhance current technology, establish treaty forbidding specific space 

platforms, etc) to carry out a dissuasive policy. Next, PACOM 

develops regional war plans and conducts frequent exercises and 

training missions to demonstrate the lethality of US forces. This serves 

notice to Beijing and the PLA that Washington and the Pentagon 

possess the capability to follow through with combat operations if 
29 

Figure 5: US Defense Policies (at the Strategic Level) with Respect to China-Taiwan Relatio

PLA should China 

Defeat Attack Taiwan 

China from Attacking Taiwan 

US

Defense

Policies

Deter 

China from Hard-line Stance on Reunification

Dissuade

Assurance Taiwan 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

30 

Figure 6: US Defense Policies (at the Operational level) with Respect to China-Taiwan Rela

PLA in Cross Strait Conflict 

PACOM Defeats 

PLA from Crossing Taiwan Straits 

US

Defense

Policies PACOM 

Deters 

PLA DevelopmenCertain Weapon Systems DoD Dissuades

PACOM Assurance 

TaiwaDefenForce
31 

Figure 7: US Dissuasion Policy and its Sub-Components47

US 

Emerging Threatenin

Capabiliti

Dissuades

Emerging Threate

Met

Emerging Threaten

Ambiti

(e.g., Disruptive Challenges

- Bio-technology - Cyber Ops - Space Weapons

DissuadesDissuades
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

32 

Figure 8: US Defense Policies (at the Tactical level using Space Systems) with Respect to Ch

PLA Loses Access to 

Space Systems

JFACC 

Defeats with OCS

PLA Recognizes 

Fragile Nature of 

Space Support

US

Defense

Policies JFACC 

Deters with OCS/DCS 

PLA Develop

of Disrup

Space Sys

JFAC

 Dissuades

JFACC Assures 

Taiwan D

Forces A
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

33

necessary. In other words, PACOM efforts at dissuasion are designed 

to show capability without being provocative.

Since a host of tactical-level operations take place for a given 

scenario, this discussion will use space systems to clarify the tactical 

level defense strategy depicted in Figure 8. In the US military, 

normally the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) will 

control US space forces during conflicts since this individual owns the 

preponderance of space assets and the means to control them. Lacking 

a conflict, a combination of other US military organizations will control 

space forces. Nonetheless, the JFACC (as depicted in Figure 8) or 

some other US leader will assure the Taiwanese of access to space. In 

addition, the JFACC will attempt to dissuade the PLA from developing 

counter-space systems that could undermine or negate US space 

superiority. In concert, the JFACC will also provide the necessary 

offensive and defensive counterspace (OCS/DCS) forces to deter the 

PLA from using space. Finally, if appropriate, the JFACC will execute 

his OCS systems and deny the PLA access to space. 

Summary 

Several factors contributed to the creation of dissuasion as a US 

defense policy. Failed policies of past regimes and the misapplication 

of these policies each contributed to the realization that something 

different may be warranted. In addition, there is a general recognition 

that some states currently lay within a gray area, where it is difficult to 

discern friend from foe. In these cases, the misapplication of 

deterrence or assurance might lead to catastrophic results. Therefore, 

US strategists crafted a new defense policy to better account for these 

situations and re-enforce the overall integrated US defense strategy 

with a policy that seeks to reduce the number of emerging threats, 

whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

34

A brief examination of the more mature defense policies (i.e., 

assurance, deterrence, and defeat) helped to put the new concept of 

dissuasion into context. The characteristics that make up dissuasion 

represent some of the same ones that factor into deterrence and 

assurance. Consequently, dissuasion provides a tool that capitalizes on 

common interests by encouraging would-be adversaries to work with 

the United States in harmony and not slip towards an aggressive 

relationship. Unfortunately, current US planning documents do not 

provide much explanation of how to implement a dissuasive strategy. 

This section has sought to develop a simple and logical case to 

demonstrate the possibility of a US defense strategy targeting the 

China-Taiwan reunification issue. At the strategic, operational, and 

tactical levels, each defense policy has a clear objective that targets a 

specific threat. Assurance policies target allies, dissuasion targets 

emerging threats, deterrence targets existing threats, and defeat targets 

engaged threats. Digging deeper into dissuasion reveals that it seeks to 

target threats predicated upon emerging capabilities, methods, or 

ambitions. Depending on the level of analysis, this could either be a 

state, a non-state organization, or a potential weapon system. For a 

possible China-Taiwan conflict, it is likely that the PLA will attempt to 

employ counter-space technologies in an effort to degrade US space 

superiority. Since space weapon platforms are still an emerging threat, 

it makes sense to counter them with a dissuasive strategy. The next 

section discusses China’s space program and the potential threat it 

presents to US forces. 

SPACE OPERATIONS IN A SINO-AMERICAN CONFLICT 

Background 

On October 15, 2003, China became only the third nation to send a 

man into space. Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel Lang Liwei’s 21-hour 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

35

orbit made him an instant hero in China and reaffirmed Beijing’s 

commitment to modernize the PLA. Observant during the Cold War, 

Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, 

Chinese leaders saw the effect of space support to air, land, and sea 

operations. They witnessed the value of space enhancement across 

everything from basic command and control to intelligence gathering to 

weapon accuracy. In a few instances, they have even begun to 

capitalize on this recognition. Recent employment of advanced Feng 

Huo space command and control (C2) systems,48 new Fanhui Shi 

Weixing (FSW) space-based intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance 

(ISR) capabilities,49 and most importantly, covert efforts to develop 

counter-space systems and tactics aimed at negating an adversary’s 

space capability loom large on US defense strategists’ minds.50 To 

create these counter-space threats, China is developing, at its restricted 

space facility located in the Gobi desert,51 space weapons such as antisatellite lasers and parasitic micro-satellites.52 Using lexicon from the 

current US defense establishment, these types of space systems can 

constitute a “disruptive” technology that represents an “emerging” 

threat to US space superiority.53 

Phillip Saunders recognizes the potential that space can provide 

Beijing: “Chinese space capabilities will improve in the coming 

decades, producing significant boosts in PLA military capabilities.”54 

In addition, China may also attempt to disrupt US space superiority, 

“For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using 

the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be 

an irresistible and most tempting choice.”55 The convergence of the 

threat posed by China’s space modernization with the already high but 

still increasing dependence on space by the Pentagon creates a 

potentially useful target for dissuasion.56 This section first introduces 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

36

the reader to space operations, to include the advantages and limitations 

afforded by this medium, common space system functions, and the 

primary elements comprising a space system. Then, it explores the 

complications of defense policies that target space systems. Finally, 

this section presents a discussion of various counter-space means by 

which China might choose to attack American space systems. 

An Introduction to Space Operations 

“Gain the high ground,” an old concept that has served militaries 

well. Whether it was Civil War commanders using balloons to spot 

enemy movements or the Cold War superpowers using satellites to 

survey opposing ICBM fields, the high ground affords capabilities not 

easily replaced by land or sea modes of operation. As the highest 

ground, space has several advantages over other mediums of operation. 

Advantages. First, space has persistent global access. This means 

that borders, terrain, and in some cases weather that limit the access of 

air, land, and sea-based platforms to desired areas do not normally 

affect space access. The ease by which satellites can move across 

territorial borders is especially significant since that is the primary 

limitation of traditional intelligence-gathering platforms. International 

law specifically describes territorial borders as not extending into 

space.

57 Consequently, satellites can provide daily and global coverage 

to almost anywhere on the surface of the earth. Second, space provides 

capabilities and services with very limited or essentially no forward 

basing, movement of troops and resources, and force protection. In 

essence, a satellite launched from the United States can repeatedly see 

the world and transmit its findings without any personnel moving 

outside of US borders. Third, once placed in orbit, space systems are 

relatively inexpensive to maintain when compared to other mediums of 

operation. Granted the costs to launch satellites can reach over $1 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

37

billion, but once in orbit a handful of sparsely populated ground 

stations can keep these systems operating for as long as 10-15 years. 

When one compares this to what it would cost to continuously sustain 

enough U-2s capable of imaging the entire globe every day of every 

year the costs of sustaining space operations is considerably less. 

If a Taiwan Straits conflict erupted, these advantages would 

become vital to American military success. With persistent and 

immediate global access, American forces would presumably have 

instantaneous C2, ISR, and missile warning services available to them 

before the conflict even begins. The fact that the PLA could launch an 

extremely short-notice barrage across the straits drives home the utility 

of this advantage. Furthermore, the fact that space systems provide 

services with little or no forward movement of troops or equipment 

bodes well in this scenario since few US land bases exist within the 

Taiwan area of operations (AOR). US naval and air forces only need to 

turn on their systems to be able to utilize a number of many space 

services. Lastly, the cost-effectiveness of space systems means that 

limited defense dollars can be used in other areas. Moreover, many 

space systems can support multiple operations at the same time. For 

example, America’s Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) 

has satellites in geostationary orbits (GEO) that can serve PACOM and 

CENTCOM requirements simultaneously.58 

Disadvantages. However, like air, land, and sea operations, space 

also has inherent limitations. First, the location of space systems is 

rigid, and movement from the original position in space is difficult. 

The laws of orbital mechanics govern satellites and consequently they 

influence the location of space systems as well as the space systems 

loiter time over a given area. For example, satellites in GEO remain 

relatively fixed over a given point on the earth, and from this location, 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

38

most satellites can see one-third of the earth, or in space vernacular the 

satellite’s “foot print” covers about one-third of the earth. This 

phenomenon is what allows individuals to always point their satellite 

TV dishes in the same direction. However, outside of very small 

adjustments to the geostationary position, orbital locations for these 

satellites do not move. Figure 9 provides a snapshot of the various 

satellite orbits and the most common systems that populate those orbits. 

Imagine if the media corporation DirectTV moved a satellite that 

was providing coverage to the central United States further east along 

the geosynchronous belt to provide more coverage of the eastern 

seaboard. The results may benefit those on the East coast, but at the 

same time, this movement probably means that fewer subscribers on 

the West coast can continue to receive the satellite signal. The 

consequences are the same for dedicated military systems. If a 

commander in one theater, say EUCOM, needs more satellite 

communications (SATCOM) bandwidth, the movement of one DSCS 

satellite may satisfy his needs, but it will likely have a reciprocal effect 

that reduces the bandwidth in a neighboring theater, like CENTCOM. 

Granted these kinds of tradeoffs appear in all military conflicts, but it is 

still helpful for strategists to understand the cost of such decisions. 

Another factor affecting the feasibility of moving satellites is the 

extremely limited on-board fuel storage. The introduction of the more 

efficient Hall-effect thrusters (HET) will help to mitigate this problem, 

but not on a sufficiently large scale to change the management 

principles of on-orbit space systems.59 Movement usually involves a 

tradeoff between meeting the demands of a crisis outside the intended 

purpose of the space system and the overall life expectancy of the space 

system within its original design (since life expectancy directly relates 

to the amount of on-board fuel available for orbital station keeping). 
39 

Figure 9: Satellite Orbits and Common Functions60
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

40

Similarly, designated orbital paths for satellites in low earth orbits 

(LEO) do not radically change. Moreover, even though LEO orbits do 

not remain fixed over a given point but instead circle the earth 

approximately every 90 minutes, the feasibility of altering the original 

orbits is constrained.61 In addition to the fuel concerns that limit the 

movement of GEO satellites, another reason for lack of flexibility is 

that any movement of the satellite reduces the original coverage. It is a 

give-and-take relationship and at times it may be advantageous to move 

a satellite, but that is the exception and not the norm. 

Second, space systems are not as durable as other air, land, or sea 

platforms. U-2 aircraft took their first images 50 years ago, and many 

of these same aircraft are still flying missions today. By contrast, space 

systems usually only last for 10 to 15 years. It is true that some 

satellites have been known to exceed their specified life expectancy, 

but not by 40 years. In addition, the ability to repair space systems is 

negligible. Ground station operators can resolve some anomalies, but 

essentially nothing can be done when problems require physical contact 

with the satellite. Other air, land, and sea platforms have maintainers 

readily available to fix problems, or worst case the systems transition to 

a depot for extensive repairs. Conversely, it is cost prohibitive to 

physically repair satellites. Whether through use of the space shuttle or 

some type of retrieval and re-launch process, space systems are not 

easily repaired. Yet, even in light of these limitations, space systems 

still provide a wealth of functionality to numerous types of users. 

Many of these limitations would ultimately affect the manner in 

which the Pentagon might execute a conflict with the PRC. First, the 

space systems of operational value at the start of a conflict are most 

likely going to be the ones servicing American forces at the end of the 

conflict. While other space systems may potentially offer additional 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

41

services, the cost and time required to move them into a useful orbit is 

too high. Second, the fragility of space systems, and the very limited 

number of spares, means that the functions these systems provide can 

be quickly and in some cases easily cut off. 

Space Functions 

Space provides a number of useful functions to a variety of users. 

In addition, it is not uncommon for a single space system such as 

satellite communication (SATCOM) systems to support multiple users. 

SATCOM can be used by civilians to make phone calls, surf the 

internet, or watch television, or it can be used by the military to do 

those same things plus track logistical movements, issue orders up and 

down the chain of command, send electronic documents between units, 

or conduct a video teleconference (VTC) between combatant 

commander staffs. Take for example the International 

Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IntelSat), an 

internationally owned consortium that leases SATCOM services across 

the globe to individuals, organizations, and states.62 The US military 

uses IntelSat to broadcast its Armed Forces Radio and TV Services 

network, but IntelSat can chose to lease services simultaneously to 

China, Iran, and Russia for use by their respective militaries. 

Therefore, several space functions are considered dual use. However, 

SATCOM is only one of many functions provided by space. 

A commonly accepted grouping of space system functions 

(reference Table 2) is communications (SATCOM), navigation, remote 

sensing (i.e., imagery), weather, scientific, missile warning, and 

reconnaissance. However, the specificity, sensitivity, and economic 

pay back of space-based reconnaissance-surveillance and missile 

warning mean that only the military community fields these systems. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

42

Table 2: Space Functions 

Non-Military Military

Communication X X 

Navigation X X 

Remote Sensing X X 

Weather X X 

Scientific X X 

Missile Warning X 

Reconnaissance and 

Surveillance 

 X 

There are some additional functions required for the employment 

of space systems, but they do not necessarily interact with space 

systems on a daily basis, nor are they required for day-to-day 

operations. Nonetheless, space launch and space surveillance63 are two 

functions critical to the employment of space systems.64 Without these 

two capabilities, it would be impossible for space systems to exist. 

Space launch is analogous to when a new ship gets underway for the 

first time. Until the ship actually departs from the dock, it is not 

carrying out its mission. Similarly, satellites cannot provide services 

while stuck on the ground. In addition, space launch cannot take place 

until space surveillance uncovers the optimal trajectory to reach the 

designated orbit. Lack of space surveillance would be the same as 

aircraft flying around without air traffic controllers de-conflicting flight 

paths. With nearly 10,000 “softball size or bigger”65 objects orbiting 

the globe, and when very small particles can cause substantial damage 

(e.g., in 1983 a paint flake less than 1/100th of an inch in diameter put a 

crater in the shuttle Challenger’s windshield)66, it is vital to mission 

success that the paths satellites traverse remain clear of debris. 

Space System Elements 

Space launch and space surveillance underscore the fact that space 

is much more than just satellites. Most people can point to a tank, 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

43

bomber, or submarine and understand the basic components of these 

older military systems as well as appreciate the traditional function 

these weapons fulfill. Yet, in a number of ways space systems are 

different from other military platforms. They are relatively unknown 

and indistinguishable when compared to more familiar weapon 

systems. These differences and the unfamiliarity of space systems can 

cause problems when trying to develop a strategy that seeks to prevent 

a space arms race. Therefore, understanding the elements of a space 

system can help US leaders craft a more effective defense policy. DoD 

Joint Publications 3-14, Space Operations, states that 

Space capabilities are based on complex systems that include 

the following: ground stations; launch facilities; satellite 

production, checkout, and storage facilities; communications 

links; user terminals; and spacecraft (both manned and 

unmanned).67 

The definition reveals that space systems consist of more than just 

satellites (i.e., space nodes), but also include the associated ground 

stations (i.e., terrestrial nodes) and communication signals (i.e., links) 

transiting between space and earth (reference Figure 10). 

Understanding the elements of space systems is important because 

most threats to space systems are capable of targeting only one 

element. Based on current technology, traditional weapons such as 

cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions (PGM) released from 

aircraft represent the most likely choice to strike terrestrial nodes. This 

type of attack, also known as an offensive counter-space (OCS) 

mission,68 took place during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when 

coalition forces PGM pounded the Iraqi Ministry of Information in an 

effort to take down Iraq’s satellite broadcast capability. Saddam’s use 

of GPS jammers against coalition forces in an attempt to degrade the 

PGM accuracy of coalition forces represents another type of OCS 

system, albeit one that targets the space links element.69 Cuba’s July 
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Figure 10: Space System Elements 

Space Node

Link Link

Terrestrial Nodes 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

45

2003 satellite jamming of the Voice of America broadcast to Iran is 

another type of ground-based system that targets the satellite links.70 

Aside from the efforts of the United States and USSR during the Cold 

War, few states pursued counter-space systems that targeted the space 

nodes. However, in the wake of American military dominance, due in 

large part to enhanced lethality of other weapon systems arising from 

space operations, adversaries may undertake new efforts to develop 

counter-space devices that do in fact target space nodes. The recently 

released 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) considers this family 

of counter-space systems to be an emerging threat to US space 

superiority.71 Furthermore, potential foes like China are frantically 

pursuing space systems that support conventional military operations 

across the entire spectrum of known space functionality as depicted in 

Table 2.With an understanding of the functionality provided by space 

systems as well as the elements necessary to manage these services, it 

is easier to identify those areas more susceptible to enemy action and in 

turn, help US decision makers target weapon systems for a dissuasive 

campaign. In addition, some functions may prove more useful than 

others in specific operations. For example, US forces operating in 

Afghanistan are highly dependent on SATCOM to execute C2 and 

carry out assigned missions. However, missile warning functions are 

not required against the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda networks. In 

the Taiwan Straits AOR, many space functions, and most certainly 

missile warning, will prove equally critical to the success of US 

operations. In addition, the ongoing modernization efforts by the PLA 

mean that they too are becoming dependent on key space functions, 

albeit on a much lower scale than US dependency. 
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Complications of Dissuading Space Systems 

Several factors will complicate a US defense policy of dissuasion 

that aims to reduce the threat of space systems. First, China’s space 

program already has operational systems providing a wide range of 

military and commercial capabilities.72 China’s space capabilities give 

it more than just a foot-in-the-door. In fact, China is already reaping 

the numerous benefits afforded by the highest frontier. In addition, 

even though China’s space programs are relatively immature when 

compared to the United States, the learning curve for improving upon 

these technologies is steep. Finally, it is one thing to dissuade someone 

from doing something they cannot already do and hence cannot 

appreciate its advantages; it is an entirely different thing to dissuade 

someone from doing something they already do, especially when it has 

clear benefits. 

Second, there is an extremely close relationship between military 

and commercial entities in the space industry. Some systems are dual 

use such as navigational or weather satellites. Therefore, targeting 

programs that provide many services enjoyed by the public is 

challenging to carry out. For example, it would be difficult to justify 

the denial of satellite produced weather information used to aid civilian 

populations. A properly networked space-based weather information 

structure may have reduced the devastation caused by the recent Indian 

Ocean tsunamis as well as other types of catastrophic events. 

Third, states frequently buy space capabilities from other states or 

commercial businesses. For example, France and Russia both operate 

military space systems and it is widely believed that both of these states 

offer their military space systems for use by other countries.73 In 

addition, several commercial companies sell space services to include 

imaging and satellite communications.74 This limits the prospect of a 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

47

dissuasion policy because even if China abandons certain space 

programs, they may still acquire similar information through these 

third-party connections. 

In light of these reasons, it seems unlikely that dissuasion will 

succeed in stopping China from pursuing many types of military space 

systems. In addition, many of these space systems (e.g., commercial 

communications satellites) simply do not pose a significant enough 

threat to US security interests to justify a dissuasion campaign. 

However, space weapon systems that can destroy other satellites (e.g., 

space mines) or from space can destroy things on earth (e.g., spacebased laser) do in fact present a significant threat to not only US space 

supremacy, but to US security as well. It is for these reasons that a 

dissuasion campaign should only target counter-space systems. 

Counter-Space Systems 

Counter-space systems can be broken down into two categories: 

offensive counter space (OCS) and defensive counter space (DCS). 

OCS operations preclude an adversary from exploiting space 

to their advantage. OCS operations may target an adversary’s 

space capability (space systems, terrestrial systems, links, or 

third party space capability), using a variety of permanent 

and/or reversible means. The “Five Ds” —deception, 

disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction—describe the 

range of desired effects when targeting an adversary’s space 

systems.75

The 1997 Iranian jamming of Western satellite broadcasts and the 1999 

Russian disruption of Chechen satellite phone calls and are two 

examples of OCS activities.76 Conversely, DCS tactics and devices 

protect space systems from hostile or damaging activities. 

DCS operations preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to 

its advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly 

space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference. 

Friendly space-related capabilities include space systems such 

as satellites, terrestrial systems such as ground stations, and 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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communication links. DCS operations are key to enabling 

continued exploitation of space by the US and its allies by 

protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting friendly 

space-related capabilities before, during, and after an adversary 

attack.77

In certain instances, a single action can take on OCS and DCS 

characteristics simultaneously. For example, a well-placed Tomahawk 

missile on a SATCOM jammer located in Cuba is both an OCS and 

DCS mission. From an OCS perspective, the attack destroys an 

adversary’s space system. However, from a DCS perspective the attack 

protects US space operations from the hostile actions of the jammer. 

Similar to a fighter aircraft’s ability to dispense chaff and flares 

and produce threat reaction maneuvers in response to surface-to-air 

missiles (SAM), space systems must also be able to defend against 

hostile acts. DCS consists of various measures aimed at defeating an 

adversary’s attack. These measures consist of such tactics as system 

hardening, dispersal, maneuvering, system configuration changes, and 

suppression of adversary counterspace capabilities (SACC).78 

Unfortunately, these current measures provide no realistic defense 

against anti-satellite lasers, parasitic micro satellites, and advanced 

computer network attacks. While some satellites, like an imaging 

system, may be able to automatically place a protective cap over the 

system’s lenses, it cannot stop an anti-satellite weapon from physically 

destroying the entire satellite bus. In addition, while satellite 

movement is theoretically feasible, this movement in relation to the 

potential threats is too slow to prevent an attack.79 Therefore, the 

United States is attempting to take meaningful steps to improve DCS 

capabilities. 

Improving DCS system capability may allow for the shielding of 

critical components from potentially destructive forces. For example, 

the newest GPS Block III satellites in production house more robust 
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49

DCS capabilities than previous versions. These capabilities enable the 

satellite to withstand multiple levels of denial, disruption, and 

degradation attacks.80 The Air Force’s Military Strategic and Tactical 

Relay (MILSTAR) satellite constellation represents another example of 

improved DCS capabilities. This system is designed to reduce the 

impacts of nuclear explosions on SATCOM signals as well as on the 

satellite itself. Moreover, MILSTAR utilizes cross-links between 

satellites thereby reducing, although not eliminating, the requirement 

for terrestrial ground station support.81 However, since US territory is 

no longer considered unassailable ground, station physical security is 

also being strengthened through improved force protection measures. 

Moreover, new space systems will have abilities to threat react in a 

more tactical nature. Again, similar to air operations where pilots use 

on-board sensors such as radar warning receivers (RWR) gear to make 

real-time defensive maneuvering decisions, so too will space operators 

for the systems they command. Nonetheless, while the United States 

has taken some steps to upgrade its DCS capability, space systems 

remain highly vulnerable to attack. 

In addition to OCS and DCS categories, counter-space systems can 

also be separated into space-based and ground-based. Space-based 

OCS systems include mines, lasers, and any other types of space-based 

platforms designed to deny, degrade, disrupt, deceive, or destroy. 

Interestingly, no state employs or has ever employed space-based OCS 

systems. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) put forth by President 

Regan in 1983 had the capacity to disrupt other space systems, 

although that was not the primary mission of this program. 

Furthermore, this system never progressed beyond the initial stages of 

research. Conversely, the Soviets and Americans did develop and test 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

50

ground-based OCS systems. Specifically, each country explored the 

utility of an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile. 

The Soviets’ first ASAT used an ICBM fitted with an explosive 

device that released 1,000s of small pellets once it approached its 

intended satellite target. In addition, the Soviet nuclear-armed Galosh

ABM interceptor could fulfill the role of ASAT weapon against 

satellites in specific low earth orbits (LEO). The Americans also 

investigated a crude ASAT system in the late 1960s but eventually 

abandoned it in favor of an F-15 launched ASAT system that lingered 

in existence until the mid-1980s.82 During this time, the development 

of ASAT systems may have seemed like simply a natural evolution of 

space operations. Much like other mediums of operation, it was only a 

matter of time before the necessity arose to destroy and therefore 

protect space-based systems. Interestingly though, space systems did 

not follow this path, and ASAT technology never did produce a true 

military arms race in space. In fact, to this day space has remained 

relatively free of weapons. 

One reason why ASAT development did not endear itself to 

superpower leadership was the potential destabilizing affect it would 

cause on the tenuous nuclear arms race. ASAT systems that destroyed 

the adversary’s missile warning or communications systems may mean 

that the aggressor is considering a first strike. ASAT systems that 

target remote sensing platforms may imply that one side is trying to 

covertly change its nuclear order of battle, by moving systems around 

or fueling up new systems. In either case, ASAT systems constituted a 

precursor to a first strike, which might cause a destabilizing influence 

on the already tricky Cold War. Therefore, the presence and effect of 

ASAT systems during the Cold War was short lived and of small 

impact. In addition, the demise of the ASAT re-enforced the notion 
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51

that space systems best served a critical but nonetheless supporting role 

to other means of warfare and security. President Johnson highlighted 

the capability and value of the supporting role played by these early 

space programs. 

I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this but we’ve spent 35 or 40 

billion dollars on the space program. And if nothing else had 

come out of it except the knowledge we’ve gained from space 

photography, it would be worth 10 times what the whole 

program cost. Because tonight we know how many missiles 

the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off. 

We were doing things we didn’t need to do. We were building 

things we didn’t need to build. We were harboring fears we 

didn’t need to harbor. Because of satellites, I know how many 

missiles the enemy has.83

Johnson’s comments re-enforce the notion that the United States is 

highly dependent upon space capabilities. Therefore, it makes sense 

that current as well as potential adversaries would seek to develop 

other, more acceptable counter-space technologies. The GPS jammers 

used by Saddam’s forces during Iraqi Freedom and the SATCOM 

jammer used by Cuba to negate the Voice of America broadcast (i.e., 

both are OCS systems that target the links element of space systems) 

represent a lucrative area for growth in counter-space systems. First, 

they are cheap and relatively easy to build. Second, they have proven 

capabilities, especially the SATCOM jammer used against Voice of 

America. Third, they avoid the current dilemma of weaponizing space, 

although it offers a slippery slope in that direction. Fourth, while it is 

possible that these systems could target missile-warning systems, they 

are unlikely to foster the levels of instability created by the Cold War 

ASAT systems. Finally, they offer the potential of disrupting a key 

area of US military dominance and subsequently reducing the overall 

combat effectiveness of American forces. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

52

Another potential counter-space system that offers equally 

appealing effects is lasers that could target space nodes, links, and 

possibly even terrestrial nodes. However, several differences exist 

between lasers and jammers. One difference is that jammers are a more 

proven commodity and in some cases have worked remarkably well in 

actual employment. In addition, various forms of electronic jamming 

have been taking place for decades. For example, the US military used 

a variety of airborne jammers during the initial stages of Desert Storm 

to help confuse the enemy. Conversely, laser technology as a space 

weapon is still confined to research and development, and it seems to 

be a long way from actual operational status, not to mention doctrinally 

proven and integrated into other operations. For many of these same 

reasons, space mines are unlikely to reach operational status in the near 

future. In sum, with respect to space-based counter-space systems, 

many problems exist. 

Table 3: Offensive Counter-Space (OCS) Systems 

Research and 

Development

Tested Operational

Ground-Based

Jammers X 

ASAT X 

Laser X 

Space-Based

Micro-Satellites X 

Mines X 

Laser X 
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53

Since there is considerable momentum to keep space free of weapons, 

the most likely course available to China to attack US space superiority 

is through ground-based counter-space technologies. These systems 

offer sufficient capability to successfully target and engage US space 

platforms. 

Summary 

Deng Xiaoping’s harsh criticism of the PLA in 1979 sparked 

numerous efforts by the PRC to modernize its military to meet the 

demands of national security. In the decades that have followed, new 

Chinese leadership pressed for continued steps to update a severely 

archaic military, especially in light of the amazing successes of US 

forces during this time. Today, PLA modernization efforts continue 

with modest results in various areas to include space operations. As 

one of three states to send a man into space and one of seven states 

capable of launching satellites, China is making progress to harness the 

power of this new medium. 

And why not? Space provides a wealth of capabilities across a 

number of important functions which would prove beneficial to either 

Beijing or Washington in a Taiwan Straits conflict. However, the 

multiple elements necessary to operate space systems make them more 

vulnerable than other, more traditional weapon systems. Of immediate 

concern is the fact that the links element of space systems is 

particularly susceptible to jamming. Therefore, while space operations 

are critical, they are also vulnerable, and while US forces are highly 

dependent upon these systems, they are not well protected nor easily 

replaced. Nonetheless, space systems are a key component to any plan 

the United States as well as the PRC might execute in the Taiwan 

Straits. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

54

However, numerous factors constrain the applicability of a 

dissuasion policy that seeks to reduce the emergence of Chinese space 

capabilities. Many space systems are dual-use in nature and therefore 

difficult to target with this policy. Furthermore, some space systems 

simply do not pose a threat to US space superiority, or the type of 

information provided by them can be obtained through another state or 

via commercial industries. Consequently, the area most likely to offer 

a useful target for dissuasion is counter-space systems. 

Counter-space systems, primarily OCS, are still an emerging threat 

that do not support civilian needs or currently exist in an established 

role in PLA operations. Therefore, these types of space systems 

provide US policy makers with an ideal target for a dissuasive strategy. 

In all conflicts, opposing sides strive to find a weak spot to exploit. 

One weak spot in the US military arsenal is space systems. These 

platforms provide a host of capabilities not easily replaced. 

Compounding this problem is the fact that most of these systems have 

essentially no defensive mechanisms to fend off possible attacks. 

Furthermore, the communication links, the means by which space 

systems receive and deliver information, have proven to be especially 

easy prey using relatively primitive techniques, as recently 

demonstrated by Russia, Iran, and Cuba. Ground-based space jammers 

represent one of several possible counter-space systems likely to be 

developed by the PLA and ultimately employed against the US military 

in a future conflict. It behooves US strategists to ponder the dynamics 

of space operations and the manner by which US forces as well as 

Chinese forces utilize these systems. The proper analysis of the PLA 

and its use of counter-space systems will enable American leaders to 

ascertain if a dissuasion strategy can effectively reduce the threat 

presented by these emerging systems. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

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CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 

Background 

All other things being equal, it is usually safe to assume that 

decision makers look at situations and make decisions based on a costbenefit analysis. “Will this decision and the resultant course of action it 

sets us on as well as the counter actions taken by others garner me more 

than it costs?” However, in some cases, the decisions are less about 

achieving success than about avoiding failure. In other words, some 

instances require decision makers to accept a limited amount of loss to 

avoid even greater losses in the future. For example, it may be costly 

to leave US space systems defenseless, especially given the 

enhancements space endows upon the greater American military 

machine. However, the costs may be even higher if US leaders choose 

to truly weaponize space since other states might be compelled to 

produce comparable space weapons to keep pace with Washington’s 

military build up. Nonetheless, the conditions for success usually exist 

when the benefits of a specific course of action outweigh the costs. 

This section focuses on establishing the conditions necessary for 

success in a policy of dissuasion that targets Chinese OCS systems. 

Defining the conditions for successful dissuasion is challenging 

because no historical record exists that describes its application and 

subsequent consequences. Nonetheless, the 1983 proposal for the 

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) may offer a snapshot into the types of 

conditions necessary for dissuasion. The theoretical utility of SDI was 

formidable, and if proven capable of actual operations it may have 

seriously jolted the nuclear stability of its time. In addition, the nature 

of this system would have profoundly affected the manner by which the 

United States could execute future conventional missions. With 

assured access to space for the United States and its allies combined 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

56

with assured denial of space to the USSR and its allies, the potential 

capabilities and political ramifications of this system were powerful. 

Therefore, SDI represented to its proponents a system that would 

diminish a key foundation of the USSR military forces, the ICBM. 

Furthermore, the economic costs for the USSR to match SDI were 

simply insurmountable, although the costs to defeat the system were 

likely to be much less. Already in a tailspin from the apparent 

economic boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the USSR could not 

afford to proceed step-for-step with the US SDI efforts. Moreover, the 

diplomatic conditions present during this time supported the US 

decision to pursue SDI. Even though the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 

(ABM) Treaty was still in effect and numerous groups opposed 

weaponizing space, the idea that SDI could topple the USSR and 

therefore help bring about an end to the Cold War overwhelmed these 

other issues and convinced President Reagan among others that this 

system housed strong utility. 

As mentioned earlier, the concept of dissuasion as a US defense 

policy arose from several factors, one of which was the necessity for a 

policy that offsets the limitations and dangerous consequences of 

deterrence and assurance. Unfortunately, merely transposing the 

conditions for deterrence or assurance success does not do justice to the 

fact that dissuasion is an entirely new strategy with its own 

characteristics. Therefore, any attempt to define the conditions 

necessary for this defense policy to succeed will involve a great deal of 

speculation. In addition, while US strategists can analyze data in an 

attempt to predict the future course of military procurement (i.e., 

dissuasion seeks to avoid arms races), no one is entirely sure how it 

will actually unfold. Furthermore, while several types of counter-space 

systems were discussed, these were all based on journalistic references. 
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The secretive nature of military weapons procurement leads to a lessthan-exact accounting of actual OCS systems. Nonetheless, even given 

these constraints, theorists can make certain logical arguments that 

define conditions when dissuasion is most likely to be successful. 

This paper proposes that dissuasion’s best chance for success is 

when China confronts the following conditions: 

• Militarily it cannot employ effective offensive counter-space 

weapons 

• Economically the cost of developing these systems is simply too 

high 

• Diplomatically the instability caused by developing such devices 

outweighs the benefits enjoyed by stable diplomatic relations with 

the United States and others. 

The discussion that follows explores each of these conditions 

individually, although establishing the military conditions is the 

primary endeavor given the tactical nature of this specific dissuasion 

policy. More strategic-level dissuasion policies will involve 

correspondingly more emphasis on the diplomatic conditions. 

Regardless, no conditions can be discounted, but must be analyzed 

within the overall context of the intended objective. 

Military Condition 

Criterion #1: Only Target Non-Operational or Emerging 

Systems. China already possesses the capability to build, launch, and 

operate space systems. In fact, recent modernization efforts have 

sought to propel China’s space program into a more Western-style 

infrastructure. The Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry 

directs the civil and military space programs, which is akin to the 

Office of Science and Technology in the US White House. In addition, 

portions of the civil space programs fall under the China Aerospace 

Corporation and the China National Space Administration, which 
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loosely corresponds to the National Aeronautical and Space 

Administration (NASA) in the United States.84 

From a space launch perspective, China has a solid history of 

successes. Currently, only a handful of states or organizations (United 

States, Russia, China, European Space Agency (ESA), India, Israel, and 

Japan) possess space launch capacity. China’s inventory of space 

launch systems is substantial, and as of 2003, they had launched 73 

satellites.85 China’s Long March series of rockets (12 different 

versions) possesses the capability to place satellites into low-earth orbit 

(LEO) and geostationary orbits (GEO). China is looking to increase its 

heavy lift capacity to a gaudy 25 tons for LEO and 14 tons for GEO. 

These numbers compare favorably to the European Space Agency 

(ESA) and the US space lift fleet.86 As a reference point, consider that 

the Long March rockets could easily lift two of the larger US defense 

satellites on orbit (e.g., Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites 

weigh less than 3 tons at 5,250 lbs and the Military Strategic and 

Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) satellites weigh 5 tons at 10,000 lbs). 

Furthermore, the ability to carry more weight may indicate that China 

seeks to place multiple satellites in orbit with one launcher. This is a 

modern space launch tactic and was used regularly during the 

implementation of the launching of the Iridium constellation in the late 

1990s. 

China carries out its space launch activities at three locations. 

Jiuquan serves as the manned space flight launch site, Taiyuan is used 

for LEO launches, and Xichang is the primary launch pad for GEO 

satellites.87 Collectively, the ability to launch into the two most 

popular and meaningful orbits (LEO and GEO) and the high success 

rate of Chinese space launches has contributed to making China’s space 

launch industry not only highly regarded and prestigious within China, 
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59

but also attractive to state governments and foreign commercial 

vendors. Consequently, China has successfully launched 27 foreignowned satellites.88 China is also actively engaged in multilateral space 

system development. For example, China developed a new SATCOM 

system, the DFH-3 series, in a joint venture with Germany,89 and on 

October 21, 2003, China launched an “advanced multi-spectral remote 

sensing spacecraft developed in conjunction with Brazil.”90 In 2006, 

China will launch a Nigerian satellite that it was also contracted to 

build.91 However, even though China has made significant progress in 

its efforts to modernize, including its achievements in space, according 

to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) it is still decades behind the 

United States. China is far from becoming a global military power and 

it remains at least two decades behind the United States in military 

technology and ability.92

In sum, the PRC already possesses the ability to build, launch, and 

operate space systems. Moreover, they not only recognize the benefits 

that space provides, they actively harness these benefits and integrate 

them into normal operations. In addition, even though China’s overall 

space program is “decades behind” US space capabilities, it is 

nonetheless an existing threat and not merely a non-operational 

emerging industry. 

Criterion #2: Only Target OCS Systems. Another aspect to 

consider concerning China’s current space program is that as each year 

passes the services provided by these systems become further 

embedded within normalized Beijing operations. Consequently, the 

Chinese have developed a dependency on these systems that would be 

difficult to replace. To try to dissuade Chinese leaders to abandon 

existing commercial and military space programs does not seem 

realistic. In addition, the often times dual commercial–military nature 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

60

of space systems makes them appear hazy in any strategy’s targeting 

scope. This situation forces US strategists to narrow the dissuasive 

strategy to space systems serving only military functions as well as 

systems that are non-operational (i.e., emerging). The emerging 

systems that most closely resemble these criteria are anti-satellite 

missiles, lasers, directed energy, and satellite links jammers type 

weapons platforms (reference Table 4). Many of these OCS systems 

are in the research and development phase and seek to provide 

traditional military destructive capability. Also, they are still relatively 

unknown or not in use. Consequently, China does not operate these 

systems or currently enjoy their benefits. Therefore, dissuasion, a 

strategy specifically designed to deal with emerging threats, is the most 

appropriate policy tool to counter PRC OCS systems. 

In addition, by targeting weaponized systems the US can 

potentially tap into the large “no weapons in space” bandwagon that 

currently exists. Since a number of international treaties currently ban 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space, which by itself is a very 

elusive definition and since the US military greatly fears the possibility 

of space weapons increasing the already debris-riddled atmosphere, a 

dissuasive campaign against these types of systems already has the 

momentum and leverage of existing policies and interests.93 However, 

the impetus to keep space “weapons free” really only applies to spacebased OCS systems such as space-based lasers or a space-based ABM 

system and to destructive OCS systems like a kinetic ASAT or space 

mines that would create a debris cloud in space. Other OCS systems 

that execute their missions through temporary or reversible means lay 

within a gray area that so far seems to be more acceptable to the 

international community. If the Russian attack on Chechen cell phones 

or the Cuban attack on the Voice of America were carried out through a 
61 

Table 4: Offensive Counter-Space (OCS) Threats94

 Terrestrial 

Node 

Attack

Links 

Jamming

Lasers Electromagnetic 

Pulse (EMP)

Kinetic 

ASAT95

Informa

Operat

Emerging 

or Existing

Existing Emerging/ 

Existing 

Emerging Emerging96 Emerging97 Emerg

Space or 

Ground Based

Ground Ground Both Space Both Grou
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

62

destructive OCS platform like a kinetic ASAT that permanently 

eliminated a space-based SATCOM system, then these events would 

not have been as easily forgotten. 

Unfortunately, by targeting these types of systems it would be 

difficult for the Pentagon to justify the pursuit of similar OCS systems 

for its own use. If Washington does choose to pursue these systems but 

still engage in dissuasion against them for others such as Beijing, then 

it becomes problematic to use public support and international law as a 

strategy springboard. Furthermore, international law and concerns over 

space debris do not apply to the OCS ground-based satellite links 

jammers that have emerged in recent years. 

Another characteristic of this criterion is that it re-enforces the 

notion that dissuasion aims to target emerging threats, not existing or 

engaging threats. Of course, there is a hazy line between emerging and 

existing threats. It is likely that American policy makers might still 

consider jammers to be an emerging threat due to the relatively crude 

and experimental nature of the few existing devices, the less than 

sophisticated employment tactics, the rudimentary doctrine, and the 

lack of integration into other military operations. Subsequently, this 

criterion then avoids depriving China of a system that they currently 

depend upon as well as targeting something used by civilians. Another 

advantage is that this criterion aims to reduce the same military space 

weapons that many international and state organizations seek to 

abolish. Finally, the probability that China is already developing OCS 

weapons means that US policy makers have an actual emerging threat 

to dissuade. 

Criterion #3: US Systems Are Unassailable, Easily Replenished, 

or Substitute Sources of Similar Capability Exist. The last criterion of 

the military condition is that the US possesses better defensive space 
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63

measures than China’s offensive space weapons. This criterion is 

slightly different in format from the previous ones. It is comprised of 

three alternatives, but only one needs to be present for the criterion to 

function. One option of this criterion is that the unassailable nature of 

US systems would present such an insurmountable dilemma to the 

Chinese that they would have no logical alternatives but to abandon any 

attempts to develop offensive space weapons. However, this option 

requires the ability to completely protect all the elements of a given 

space system (terrestrial nodes, links, and space nodes) through 

defensive counter-space (DCS) tactics. Highly effective defensive 

measures could possibly consist of on-board mechanisms that could 

either maneuver the satellite away from the threat, destroy the threat as 

it approaches, or harden key components and sensors on-board the 

spacecraft. 98 

Table 5: Defensive Counter-Space (DCS) Capabilities99

Passive 

Measures

Camouflage, 

Concealment, 

and Deception 

(CCD) 

System 

Hardening 

Dispersal of Space 

Systems 

Active 

Measures

Maneuver and 

Mobility 

System 

Configuration 

Changes 

Suppression of 

Adversary 

Counterspace 

Capabilities 

(SACC) 

Satellite ground stations that provide satellite command and 

control, filter and interpret satellite-derived information, and use 

satellite-based knowledge to support the efforts of other entities would 

also need to be unassailable since their destruction produces the same 

effect of rendering the space system unusable. Even with the on-going 

efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to include the 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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establishment of US Northern Command, many terrestrial nodes inside 

and outside the US are not protected well enough to stop a debilitating 

attack. Finally, and possibly most importantly, the links connecting 

terrestrial ground stations with orbiting space nodes would need to be 

secure from jamming, interference, and spoofing. 

The concept of replenishment is another option for this criterion. 

This option entails the US replenishing space systems faster than the 

destruction caused by Chinese space weapons. China would have to 

ask itself, “Why attack US space systems if the systems will in effect 

be rapidly replaced in such a way that US capabilities remain intact?” 

Unfortunately, this option requires two nearly unachievable capabilities 

for the United States. One is the ability to rapidly launch multiple 

spare satellites within minutes of destruction and quickly make them 

operational, and the other is having the necessary spare satellites ready 

and loaded on spacelift vehicles. Even with the advent of the newest 

launch vehicles, spacelift processing times will still take months, not 

the minutes required for unassailability.100 Moreover, the high cost of 

satellites, sometimes as much as $1 billion, makes spare satellite 

inventory financially unacceptable. 

However, the availability of substitute sources to space systems 

may provide another avenue to achieving this criterion. If the United 

States can produce sufficient air, land, and sea-based platforms to 

compensate for attacks on space-based platforms then that would 

contribute to dissuading a potential adversary. For example, sufficient 

air-based ISR platforms may allow US planners to compensate for the 

loss of space-based ISR systems. Unfortunately, there are certain 

inaccessible regions that air, land, or sea-based ISR sensors simply 

cannot reach such as Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing. These deeply landlocked and highly important cities offer no viewable access to US air, 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

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land, and sea-based sensors. In sum, the requirements for military 

criterion #3 are unlikely to be achieved since the United States does not 

have the capability to make space systems immune from destruction, 

easily and quickly replenished, or able to be compensated for by other 

air, land, and sea systems. 

Economic Condition 

From an economic standpoint, dissuasion is most likely to be 

successful if China’s financial resources are extremely limited whereas 

US resources are relatively abundant. The concept behind this 

condition is that if China cannot afford to keep pace with American 

weapons procurement, and more specifically with respect to OCS and 

DCS space technologies, then they will be unable to field systems 

capable of defeating US weapon systems and hence will consciously 

decide not to engage in an arms race. This condition requires a highly 

robust US economy that could afford to take full advantage of the 

technological space capabilities that exist. Simultaneously, China 

would need to be mired in a sluggish and extremely limited economy 

that is forced to manage very constrained defense spending options 

even more than they currently do. Consequently, the large gap in 

finances creates an economic condition where the US is able to invest 

in the superior defensive space capabilities that would ward off any 

conceivable OCS system introduced by the Chinese. 

Criterion #1: Basic Economic Strength. At $10.5 trillion, the US 

economy is nearly twice that of China, which boasts the second highest 

GDP at almost $6 trillion.101 However, is it strong enough that China is 

dissuaded from developing space weapon systems? Does this gap in 

revenue cause PRC leaders to pause at every decision and analyze the 

cost-benefit relationship? Surely, all leaders make such assessments 

regardless of the economic gap. However, what the economic 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

66

condition is trying to define is whether the financial gap is large enough 

that PRC leaders not only pause, but also recognize the impossibility of 

overcoming the gap. Unfortunately, every year China closes the 

financial gap that exists between them and the United States China’s 

real rate of growth has outpaced the US growth by nearly a 4-to-1 

margin over the last few years.102 Moreover, with the Pentagon 

scrambling to make ends meet due to the incredible drain on military 

budgets stemming from ongoing operations in Afghanistan and more 

significantly Iraq, its seems unlikely that US decision makers will see a 

windfall of funds to dole out to DCS systems when the threat from 

OCS systems is arguably weak. 

Comparing China’s budget with respect to its regional interests 

sheds some light on not only its position compared to the United States, 

but also compared to its regional competitors. China’s $56 billion 

defense bill in 2002 is 40% more than Japan and 800% more than 

Taiwan’s. This is due in large part to the 300% increase in defense 

spending that occurred between 1996 and 2004.103 However, military 

spending per capita flips this relationship upside down (Taiwan at 

$335.08 per person to China’s $43.44 per person). 104 As the most 

populous country in the world, this data seems logical. Additional 

statistical computations exist that support the notion that China’s forces 

are getting increasingly more money each year. However, other 

statistics support the notion that from a relative standpoint of per capita 

or as a percentage of GDP, Chinese defense spending is low. 

Unlike during the climactic years of the Cold War where US 

strategists could spend at will and in turn support the collapse of the 

Soviet economy, the Sino-American economic relationship is much 

different. During the 1980s, Moscow’s command-driven economy was 

plummeting while Washington’s market economy was soaring. Today, 
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Beijing’s market-based economy is soaring faster than the US 

economy, and it is highly unlikely that US strategists in this era have 

the freedom to spend at will. 

Criterion #2: Modern Military Industrial Complex. Current US 

naval capabilities offer an example of this criterion. The substantial 

industrial tail that goes along with the sizable US naval fleet would be 

difficult for another country to imitate. The amount of finances 

required to build 12 aircraft carriers, associated support vessels, 

docking facilities, logistical supplies, capable seamen, as well as 

executable doctrine and training is well beyond anything that China or 

any other country in the world could afford. In essence, the gap 

between the US navy and other navies is so wide that states are 

dissuaded from pursuing a large capital fleet because of the economic 

costs associated with such a venture is just too high, relative to the 

strategic advantages it would afford. Japan and Germany both 

attempted to pursue navies that were beyond their means in the late 

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and both failed at sustaining 

them. A host of arguments can be made that explain this failure and 

some even argue that it had less to do with economics and more to do 

with the long-standing interests of these states. Regardless of exactly 

how much economics was a factor, whether it was the most important 

or simply one of many, it was nonetheless a factor in these failures. 

In certain instances, US policy makers actually construct 

international relationships that encourage states NOT to pursue naval 

build-up. These policy makers offer up US naval services with specific 

caveats that compel states not to undertake a military buildup in 

exchange for US protection. In these cases, the arrangement benefits 

both states. The US may garner basing rights while the smaller state 

saves money and gains protection. While not as demanding as 
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sustaining a modern navy, nurturing a modern space program carries 

many of the same requirements. 

However, one needs look no further than China’s national defense 

infrastructure (i.e., military-industrial complex) to witness repeated 

failures to establish modern industries and practices. David 

Shambaugh notes this problem in his book Modernizing China’s 

Military. 

China’s persistent search abroad for military technology and 

hardware has been born of necessity and is a clear indication of 

indigenous failure: China’s own industries, scientists, and technicians 

have consistently failed to keep pace with either their nation’s 

defensive needs or global standards.105

So, does China possess the type of military-industrial complex 

necessary to sustain its security endeavors? Specifically, does it at least 

possess enough of an industry to sustain capable OCS systems? The 

former is more difficult to answer, but certainly, the answer to the latter 

is “Yes.” As discussed earlier, OCS systems need not consist of spacebased platforms with highly sophisticated capabilities. Crude groundbased jammers have already proved sufficient to negate advanced 

command and control systems. Conversely, it is less apparent that 

China could develop a space-based OCS capability. 

Criterion #3: Diversification of Interests. Another key 

component of an economic analysis between China and the United 

States is a comparison of each state’s security interests. Compared 

against the US global designation of military regions, it is evident that 

the Chinese only need to expend resources to defend their existing 

continental territory. The only exception, although a significant one 

nonetheless, to this situation is Taiwan, where the PLA is investing 

resources to develop a legitimate amphibious assault force. In contrast, 
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US regions spread across every square inch of the globe and includes 

bases, ports, and liaisons in many countries and on every continent. 

The economic consequences of this vast military diversification are the 

necessity to spread out defense dollars across these regions. 

Furthermore, the United States must develop and sustain the capability 

to transport forces rapidly to and from each region. Conversely, the 

logistical cost to Beijing is considerably less than it is for Washington. 

This translates into a similar relationship for space system 

expenditures, where China only needs to support enough space systems 

to enhance regional operations whereas the United States must maintain 

enough systems to simultaneously support multiple regions for a 

continuous global presence. 

In sum, it does not seem evident that the economic conditions exist 

to support dissuasion. Even if one was to consider that China must 

spread its wealth across four times as many people and that the PRC 

military-industrial complex is riddled with problems, there just is not 

enough of a gap that the US can spend unlimited amounts of money to 

counter any OCS procurements made by China. This situation is 

especially difficult given the number and scope of global commitments 

supported with US defense dollars. 

Diplomatic Conditions 

Criterion #1: OCS Systems Violate International Laws and 

Norms. Putting China in a position where the employment of the OCS 

capabilities they are currently developing is in violation of international 

law is one aspect of the diplomatic condition necessary for dissuasion 

success. Strong and enforceable international laws or at minimum 

norms prohibiting the development of weaponized space platforms 

makes a formidable road block to their development. Currently, the 

1967 Outer Space Treaty encourages the use of space for “peaceful 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

70

purposes,” and prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or WMD in 

space.

106 However, this treaty was designed and intended to serve the 

Cold War, and it is clearly targeting a specific sub-set of space 

weaponry. In fact, this treaty does leave the door open for space-based 

weapons as long as they do not contain nuclear or WMD material. Of 

course, the term WMD can be interpreted loosely, but few would 

consider a space-based laser or space mine to fit into this category. 

Consequently, some states have attempted to expand the laws of outer 

space and make more specific constraints on the placement of weapons 

in space. The Chinese and Russian delegations to the Prevention of an 

Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) strongly supported the notion of 

forbidding weapons in space.107

However, this condition losses strength if the United States does 

not adhere to the same set of laws. If the United States does indeed 

weaponize space with lasers or kinetic ASAT systems, whether as 

primary OCS systems or indirectly as part of a more elaborate ABM 

system, then it becomes extremely problematic for the diplomatic 

condition to support dissuasion. Once the race for space-based 

weapons begins, then any attempt at dissuading OCS systems from 

space is over. Space hawks like Everett Dolman actively argue that this 

is the best time for the Pentagon to field an armada of space-based 

weaponry. Since no other state can today match US space superiority, 

then why wait until they can to field these types of weapon systems. 

Furthermore, Dolman believes that Beijing’s space capability is much 

closer to US standards, more like ten to fifteen years behind, than one 

might be led to believe considering that the PRC uses first-generation 

imaging systems, technology used by the United States during the 

1960s.108 There is nothing wrong with this position as long as it aligns 

with the rest of the US defense strategies.109 Unfortunately, if the 
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United States wishes to dissuade China from entering into a space arms 

race, then this aggressive Astropolitik position just does not mesh with 

the broader security concerns. 

Another problem with this criterion is that certain space weapons 

such as links jammers are not viewed as illegal within the confines of 

the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or even within some viewpoints of 

PAROS and therefore provide China a viable option to sidestep this 

criterion. In addition, with the introduction by the US Air Force of the 

Counter Communications System (CCS), the space arms race has 

already taken a significant step that will be difficult to dissuade other 

states from taking. As mentioned, several other states already possess 

these types of OCS systems, at least one of which is a UN Security 

Council member, thus the likelihood of links jammers becoming 

subject to a UN treaty is low. Moreover, with US territory vulnerable 

to attack, terrestrial nodes long deemed secure just by their location 

within the United States are more susceptible to attack. 

Criterion #2: OCS Systems Unnecessary Due to Strong SinoAmerican Ties. Diplomatically, the US must build ties with China to 

convince them that space weapons are unnecessary in tomorrow’s 

world because the US - China connection is so strong that future 

conflict is unrealistic or at least that the strategic gains of future conflict 

are less than the costs. Of any of the conditions and their criterion, this 

one is the easiest to accomplish because many of its foundational 

elements already exist: the United States and China are important 

trading partners; they actively cooperate on a range of international 

issues, and so on. However, there are actions that may mitigate this 

criterion’s chance of success. 

First, with the European Union (EU) removing its military arms 

embargo that was enacted after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 
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72

1989 while the United States keeps its in force, China may have less 

need to maintain as strong of a relationship with the United States as 

previously undertaken. Second, strong ties do not guarantee peace. 

Prior to WWI, Germany and Britain both prospered as each other’s 

largest trading partner. Therefore, while strong diplomatic and 

economic relationships may guide state strategy, it is the security of 

state interests that predominantly drive state actions. One approach that 

could reinforce this criterion from eroding is stronger ties between US 

and Chinese space industries. 

Denny Roy of the Asia-Pacific Center believes that the Chinese 

position with respect to nuclear weapons is analogous to their position 

on space weapons, that if the United States reduces or eliminates its 

stockpile or ambitions in those respective areas then the PRC will 

reciprocate.110 The fact that China and Russia both have tried to push a 

weapons free space agenda in the UN supports this belief. The 

implication of this is that an opportunity exists to strengthen this 

criterion if US leadership chooses to support more aggressive antispace weapons treaties and policies. Unfortunately, from this 

perspective, it seems likely that President Bush will advocate a space 

policy that strongly hedges against the need to develop and 

operationalize space-based weaponry in order to protect US 

dependency.111 Therefore, it is very unlikely that any country will react 

to this policy by giving up its own space weapon developments and 

instead states are more likely to continue pursuing such devices. 

Criterion #3: OCS Systems Would Target China’s Own Space 

Information. Diplomacy can create a space dependency between the 

two states such that China’s space weapons development would only 

end up damaging systems they use themselves. By providing military 

information to China, the United States becomes an ally and not a foe. 
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Stronger ties between Washington and Beijing, and the exertion of 

influence through the UN and other international organizations, can 

create a diplomatic condition that does not allow China to develop OCS 

systems. 

One inroad to satisfying this criterion is the development of 

Chinese space systems by US manufacturers. Indeed, several PRC 

space systems have been built by American firms, such as AsiaSat-1, -

3, and -3SA, which were built by Hughes and AsiaSat-2 which was 

built by Lockheed Martin.112 In fact, many experts, such as Elizabeth 

Van Wie Davis of the Asia-Pacific Center, believe that Beijing is much 

more likely to procure rather than produce its space program.113 

Another noted space expert, James Oberg, recently testified to 

Congress with an assessment of China’s space program. One highlight 

of the testimony was his comparison of the PRC and USSR space 

programs. Using two nearly identical images, one of Yuri Gagarin’s 

space flight in 1961 and one of Lang Liwei’s in 2003, Oberg effectively 

underscored the fact that China is using old Soviet systems to build up 

its own space program.114 Besides the obvious implication that China 

lacks the ability to produce many of its own systems, another 

implication is that China is ripe for space collaboration, and it may be 

in Washington’s best interest to spearhead these efforts rather than the 

European Union. 

In sum, combining the facts that certain international laws and 

norms discourage the weaponization of space, that a strong 

interdependence exists between the United States and China, and that 

potentially Chinese and American forces may well be using the same 

space systems (e.g., IntelSat) simultaneously makes for an overall 

favorable diplomatic condition. However, much more needs to be done 

in this area to sustain this momentum. China actively engages with the 
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EU and ESA to advance its space capabilities. Furthermore, the United 

States seems reluctant to sign on to proposed treaties that call for more 

strict weapons-free space criteria. 

Summary 

This section presented three conditions that must be present for 

dissuasion to succeed. Militarily, a dissuasion policy must target 

emerging OCS systems not currently providing services to the PRC or 

integrated into existing PLA doctrine. In addition, US space systems 

must become unassailable to eliminate the enticement afforded by OCS 

capabilities. In essence, why would China pursue counter-space 

technologies if the US system were impervious to such devices? While 

portions of this condition are executable, the last criterion (i.e., 

unassailability) is far from becoming a reality. 

Economically, dissuasion has a better chance to succeed when the 

US economy is vastly superior to the PRC. However, while this 

superiority at first appears impressive, it will soon give way to the 

burgeoning Chinese economy, which is rising dramatically. In 

addition, the PLA does not need to spread its resources as thinly as 

does the United States since its interests are constrained to its own 

territory and region, to include Taiwan. Diplomatically, the possibility 

exists that this condition can be more easily fulfilled compared to other 

conditions. International treaties and norms exist that support a 

weapons-free space environment. Furthermore, Sino-American ties are 

reaching new heights, and although more could be done, both countries 

rely heavily on each other. Moreover, as space assets become 

increasingly international and commercialized, they become less and 

less desirable for military targeting. 

Assessing the environment is an important step for any US defense 

policy. Just as one dips a toe or finger into the pool before taking the 
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plunge, so too should US strategists dip a “toe” into the military, 

economic, and diplomatic “pools” before embarking on a strategy of 

dissuasion. However, in the case of dissuading China’s OCS 

procurement, the conditions are not present to support a strategy of 

dissuasion. This assessment will be discussed in more detail in the 

conclusion. 

CONCLUSION 

Summary of Findings 

Analyzing defense policies is important because it supports 

refinement of current strategies and helps leaders design objectives that 

are more effective in the future. Unfortunately, the very nature of 

international relations makes collective agreement on policy attributes 

rare. A successful piece of one policy may in fact mean that another 

piece of that same policy failed. Even within the same state, theorists 

spend countless pages in debate over classifying a policy as success or 

failure. Furthermore, a policy can produce multiple outcomes as the 

Cold War exemplifies. Touted as a success, the global stability caused 

by the deterrence policies of the twentieth century cost the United 

States and others irrelevant weapon systems, counterproductive 

budgets, and regional instability. Yet, the process of analyzing these 

policies provides valuable information to proponents and opponents 

alike. In addition, understanding the outcomes of past policies helps to 

frame the conditions for successful policy in the future. 

For example, President Wilson’s decision to enter WWI in the 

spring of 1917 was necessary to prevent a victory by the Germans. In 

addition, this policy was effective in contributing to a substantial rise in 

US power. Granted, the costs of this policy in terms of lives and 

taxpayer money were enormous, but earning a place at the peace table 

was a key step in increasing the global position of the United States. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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Conversely, many theorists and world leaders point to the US policy of 

pre-emption in Iraq as counterproductive because even though it was 

believed necessary to stabilize the region and reduce the threat of 

WMD and terrorism, the implementation of this policy arguably has 

had the opposite effect. Opponents point to the substantial increase in 

insurgency and terrorism that has sprung up in Iraq since the end of 

official hostilities in May 2003. 

Nonetheless, discussing these policies and their impact is important 

to future strategists. The lessons learned from the failed appeasement 

policies prior to WWII were directly responsible for the deterrence 

policies of the Cold War. Fearing a similar crisis as the one sparked by 

Nazi Germany, the international community embraced deterrence 

because it meant that the rising power of the Soviets would be equaled 

by that of the Americans. Consequently, Stalin could not simply roll 

over Europe as Hitler had done in 1941. However, as experts began to 

analyze the nuclear arms race, many people realized that deterrence 

carried its own bag of counterproductive and failed policy results. 

Today, policy makers in Washington are counting on dissuasion to 

avoid some of the pitfalls of deterrence as well as bolster other defense 

policies by preventing specific arms races. China’s space weapon 

programs offer one such target for dissuasion. 

Unfortunately, assessing the utility of such a dissuasion policy is 

challenging. First, China already has operational space systems 

providing them with numerous services. Second, it is difficult at times 

to distinguish between military and commercial space systems. Third, 

even if a state does not actively launch its own space systems, other 

states or commercial systems can provide the desired space-based 

information. Due to these challenges, it is imperative that any 

dissuasion strategy aimed at China’s space program target offensive 
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77

counter-space (OCS) systems such as space-based ASAT platforms and 

ground-based jammers. 

The military only system criterion represents one portion of the 

overall military, economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the 

successful dissuasion of China’s space weapons. Other conditions and 

their respective criteria, summarized in Table 6, are necessary. 

Conditions include the unassailability of US systems, the 

overwhelming US economy, and the strong interdependence of US–

PRC relations. Unfortunately, it is neither possible nor highly likely 

that many of the conditions necessary for successful dissuasion exist 

now or will in the future. For example, it is nearly impossible for the 

Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through 

advanced defensive mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source 

capabilities. The economic condition looks similarly unattainable since 

the China–US economic gap is rapidly closing. In the future, China 

may surpass the United States as the biggest economy in the world and 

would place itself in a position to develop more and better space 

systems. 

Organizing these conditions into Table 6 aids in the discussion of 

dissuasion, but it should not be seen as a linear equation. These 

conditions represent the logical analysis of US defense strategies in 

today’s environment. However, they do not account for or replace 

judgment and risk. US leaders must weigh these conditions against 

other issues and judge if the risk of attempting dissuasion is worth the 

consequences. The reason these policies make up larger defense 

strategies is exactly because nothing is certain, and a proper blend of 

strategies is usually the best choice as well as insurance against one 

specific policy’s failure. If US assurances to Taiwan fail to prevent 

them from openly declaring independence, then hopefully America’s 
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Table 6: Summary of Dissuasive Conditions with Estimate115

Categories

(with estimate)

Conditions Required for Dissuasion Success

(with estimate)

China 

YES

US 

NO

Criterion #1

Non-Operational (Emerging) 

(Yes) 

Criterion #3

Unassailable 

(No) 

Criterion #1

Military Only 

(Yes) 

Criterion #3

Easily Replenished 

(No) 

Military

NO

(+) China OCS 

systems present a 

viable target 

(-) US unable to 

satisfy 

unassailability, etc. Criterion #2

OCS 

(Yes) 

Criterion #3

Alternative Sources E

(Sometimes) 

China 

NO

US 

NO

Economic

NO

(+) China lacks 

modern MilIndustrial Complex 

Criterion #1

Overall Strength - Limited

(Yes) 

Criterion #1

Overall Strength - Unlim

(No) 
79 

Criterion #2

Aged Mil-Industrial Complex 

(Yes) 

Criterion #2

Modern Mil-Industrial Co

(Yes) 

(-) US economy not 

strong enough 

(-) US interests 

spread widely Criterion #3

Diversification of Interests 

(No) 

Criterion #3

Consolidation of Inter

(No) 

China 

YES

US 

YES

Criterion #1

OCS Systems Violate International Law 

and Norms 

(Depends) 

Criterion #1

OCS Systems Violate Interna

and Norms 

(Depends) 

Criterion #2

OCS Systems Unnecessary Due to Strong 

Sino-American Ties 

(Yes) 

Criterion #2

OCS Systems Unnecessary Du

Sino-American Tie

(Yes) 

Diplomatic

YES

(+) Considerable 

impetus to NOT 

develop OCS 

systems 

Criterion #3

OCS Systems Affect China’s Own 

Information 

(Possibly) 

Criterion #3

OCS Systems Affect US’

Information 

(Possibly) 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

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deterrence policies will still keep China from attacking across the 

straits. All a policy maker can do is analyze the best information 

available and then make an educated decision about how to proceed. In 

essence, this is the art or skill required for most decision-making 

processes. 

Examining the utility of dissuasion is a worthwhile exercise. The 

United States and others have invested heavily in traditional defense 

policies. While the placement of US service members, conventional 

forces, and nuclear weapons in Europe assured NATO that Soviet 

forces would remain behind the Iron Curtain, it nonetheless came at a 

substantial cost. The policy of deterrence proved worthwhile during 

the Cold War; although, like assurance, it extracted a cost from the 

United States and the rest of the world. The tradeoffs for nuclear 

stability were regional instability and the diversion of the global 

economy away from other areas such as education and health care. In 

addition, the policy of defeat, played out in the numerous wars of the 

past century, was needed in situations like WWII, but again the costs 

were high. 

In today’s security environment, American leaders must make 

countless decisions with respect to the interests of the state. One of 

these decisions is determining the tradeoff between dissuading other 

states from pursuing certain weapon systems and the potential 

consequences of what these countries do in response to this policy. The 

response to US superiority on the seas is mini-subs and the response to 

US superiority in the air is surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Figure 1 

expanded this type of cause-effect relationship on a much broader scale 

by depicting how the unmanageable nuclear stand-off and 

overwhelming might of Washington’s conventional forces have caused 

other states and non-state actors to pursue weapon systems and tactics 
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that avoid these strengths entirely. Unfortunately, whether this was the 

intended “channel” envisioned by the drafters of the 2001 QDR or not, 

the dissuasive consequences of the overwhelming US military power 

have been largely detrimental since the Pentagon is ill-prepared to 

handle the irregular or disruptive challenges that flow from this type of 

policy. The notion of “channeling” threats is admirable, but if the 

channeler is not prepared to catch those channeled, then the concept 

does not work (e.g., insurgency in Iraq or Cubans jamming US satellite 

broadcasts). 

If dissuasion is pursued with respect to illegal space weapons, it 

may simply cause US adversaries to produce more and better types of 

links-based OCS systems that fall outside of international law. Even 

though some space weapons have proven ineffective, like the GPS 

jammer used against coalition forces in Iraqi Freedom, others like 

Cuba’s satellite jammers that targeted the Voice of America broadcast 

have been remarkably capable at affecting US space systems. 

Furthermore, these types of disruptive technologies provide a glimpse 

as to how future adversaries will attempt to deny the US access to 

space.

116 It seems that a combination of other policy tools may present 

the most viable option to preventing a space arms race. By leveraging 

existing space law, advocating space arms control, increasing economic 

interdependence, and using skillful diplomacy, the United States may 

prevent a space race as well as avoid the counterproductive results 

likely to arise from a dissuasive strategy. Table 6 reveals that 

dissuasion’s success is in fact most likely to occur when a combination 

of several policy tools are employed simultaneously. However, the 

2002 NSS and 2001 QDR do not describe dissuasion in this manner. 

Instead, both documents focus on increasing military superiority to 

such a high level that the enemy or allies give up weapons 
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development. Unfortunately, the conditions are not present for this 

policy as currently defined to succeed. 

Nevertheless, the concept of dissuasion offers the possibility that 

other more costly defense policy goals may not be required as often in 

the future or that they may become stronger when considered as a 

packaged strategic plan. The strategy of dissuading other states from 

entering into an arms race has the potential benefit of reducing the need 

to deter or defeat an adversary in the future, and anything that saves 

money and lives is worth investigating. The need for this type of 

policy is compelling, but its use to prevent a space arms race is likely to 

fail and inevitably create a whole range of offensive counter-space 

(OCS) systems that seek to disrupt the enormous advantage of space 

operations enjoyed by America. Consequently, any potential conflict 

with China would see US ships forced to elude subs, US air forces 

dodging SAMs, and US space systems interrupted by jammers 

targeting their links. 

Policy Assessments and Recommendations 

Still, opportunities exist to reduce the threat to US space systems. 

This paper has highlighted several areas where dissuasion seems 

promising, and after reviewing the necessary conditions (reference 

Table 6), the United States can take steps to slow the development of 

Chinese counter-space systems, increase the protection of American 

space systems, and “manage the rise of China.” 

Strategy. As a strategy, dissuasion may not provide the same level 

of clarity in application as other defense policies. In addition, it is 

highly unlikely that American technological superiority can be 

harnessed in such a manner that potential adversaries give up pursuing 

their own security interests. No state has done this. Nonetheless, this 

is exactly what the 2005 NDS proposes. The US fighter aircraft fleet is 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

83

far superior to any other air force in the world. However, this does not 

stop other states from developing fighters, nor does it prevent them 

from developing systems to counter this superiority. SAMs 

proliferating around the globe demonstrate the inevitable pushback 

approaches undertaken by states confronted with an adversary who 

possesses superior air power. Similarly, the US Navy enjoys 

dominance on the seas, but this does not dissuade other states from 

pursuing naval buildup. In fact, it increases the likelihood that others 

will follow suit. Look no further than the buildup of the PLA Navy 

(PLAN). Beijing is pursuing a blue-water force capable of protecting 

and maybe even projecting Chinese influence ostensibly within the 

Asia-Pacific and possible beyond. 

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) put forth by President 

Reagan in 1983 is poor evidence that a policy of dissuasion can work. 

It is debatable at best that SDI caused the USSR to do anything, let 

alone to concede the arms race or bow out of the Cold War. First, SDI 

in 1983 was far from being technologically feasible. In fact, even 

given current technology, ground-based ABM systems have proven less 

than reliable. Moreover, as ABM technologies proceed upwards, costs 

and challenges soar. The Airborne Laser (ABL) under development at 

Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California is considerably further 

behind in research and development than the ground-based concepts 

frequently tested over the Pacific Ocean.117 To go one step further and 

try to mount an ABM system aboard a satellite would require vast sums 

of money and technological breakthroughs. Therefore, any belief that 

SDI caused the USSR to pause and reconsider its interests is doubtful. 

Second, even if SDI could have been developed and tested to some 

degree of reliability, it is also argumentative that it necessarily caused 

the Soviets to “give up.”118
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

84

China and space weaponry are no different today than the USSR 

and SDI relationship was in 1983. China will pursue whatever is in its 

best interests, and it will not back down or give up simply because the 

United States fields its own arsenal of space weapons. Therefore, as a 

strategy, dissuasion’s success is more about diplomatic and economic 

partnerships and less about military superiority.

China’s Rise. Specific to the rise of China, dissuasion has already 

proved of little utility. The United States has attempted to dissuade 

China from solving the Taiwan issue militarily. However, the Chinese 

continue to pursue a military capable of overrunning Taiwan, 

amphibious assault forces, a blue water navy, advanced SAM, and 

counter-space weaponry. Beijing also continues to make strong and 

even provocative statements about Taiwanese independence. In light 

of these actions, it appears that dissuasion is failing. 

The opportunities for dissuasion to succeed with respect to China 

are similar to those stated in the previous section. Efforts by 

Washington to dissuade PLA actions and instead channel its efforts in 

directions more favorable to America are not realistic. This is 

especially true given China’s growing economy, military 

modernization, and increasing partnerships with other states. However, 

US strategists are compelled to do something to protect American 

influence abroad. Britain faced a similar dilemma when it began to fall 

from its position as global hegemon during the first half of the 

twentieth century. Unfortunately, Washington is slowly realizing, 

much like Britain’s leadership, that only so much can be done to protect 

these high levels of power. 

Britain’s fall from power was a direct result of the changing 

international system. The demise of mercantilism, the slow erosion of 

colonialism, and the industrial revolution combined to create an 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

85

environment where British naval mastery simply could no longer 

control the international order in the same manner as it enjoyed 

previously. Today, American dominance of the international system 

sits upon a precipice and many theorists argue over if or when China 

will assume the position of global hegemon. Others debate whether US 

policies can do anything about the changing dynamics of the world 

order. 

The designers of dissuasion are attempting to delay or possibly 

even secure indefinitely America’s position on top of the world. 

However, dissuasion will not slow down China’s economic growth, 

derail its global influence, or channel its security interests somewhere 

considered more favorable to the United States. Therefore, it is in 

Washington’s best interest to promote institutions (e.g., United Nations, 

World Trade Organization, etc.) that will sustain significant levels of 

influence even if the PRC should become a greater power. 

Chinese Space Weapons. The United States has the most to lose 

in a conflict that physically destroys space-based platforms. The 

release of President Bush’s space policy shed a little light on this 

subject, but some conclude that this policy, like his predecessor’s, 

leaves the door open for space-based weapons.119 By itself, this is not 

cause for alarm from this perspective, but in conjunction with the preemptive nature that the administration approaches international 

relations, it is less than certain that the United States will leave space 

free of destructive devices. 

American forces have the most to lose should space systems be 

subject to destruction or negation. Moreover, the cost relative to 

strategic value gained by weaponizing space to insure these systems is 

significantly more than can be justified. Furthermore, the technology 

required to field space weapons is theoretical at best. Granted, the fact 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

86

that US forces do rely on space so much is a compelling argument to 

field OCS systems in an effort to protect this reliance. In addition, if it 

were affordable and doable, then weaponizing space would be a 

plausible option. 

Despite US economic and technological advantages, an 

unrestrained space race would impose significant costs and 

produce few lasting strategic advantages unless the US can 

dominate both offensively, by destroying an adversary’s space 

assets, and defensively, by protecting U.S. space assets.120

However, this is not the case, and when combined with the selfinduced strains placed on US persona within the international 

community, it seems that any diplomatic weight that the United States 

may have at one time possessed has been eroding over the last few 

years. In essence, if Washington would stop breaking the China in the 

China Shop, then it may have an opportunity to cash in on its 

diplomatic influence and convince others that its space policy is in 

everyone’s best interests. 

From a strategic perspective, collaboration may reduce the chance 

of a future conflict, although this has not always been the case. 

Nonetheless, open communication, shared interests, and a better 

understanding of each other can go a long way toward reducing 

tensions. Furthermore, from the tactical perspective, joint space 

ventures would complicate any attempts by the PLA to target US-only 

space systems. Granted, it would be impossible to make all space 

systems a Sino-American venture, but SATCOM, navigation, and 

weather systems could serve as a springboard for such an undertaking 

and would limit the number of targets available to the PLA should they 

consider embarking on firing a space weapon. 

The European Union, Brazil, and others are already working with 

Beijing on developing new space systems. Washington has allowed 

some limited US involvement in China’s space program, but may need 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

87

to reconsider its position and make the Chinese market even more 

accessible. Therefore, Washington should avoid a space policy that 

encourages weapons in space and discourages Sino-American space 

collaboration as a means to dissuade Chinese space programs and 

protect American systems. 

Final Thoughts 

As a master of warfare, Sun Tzu sought to describe the difficulties 

of conflict in a simplistic manner. The outcome was his writings The 

Art of War, a list of principles or rules to guide the application of force. 

The rationale follows that by simplifying the complexities of war, 

warriors can more easily recall and apply time-tested truths in the heat 

of battle. The challenge though of embarking on this process is that 

when one whittles down these complexities into a few short statements, 

important characteristics that do not readily or easily simplify are often 

lost. Furthermore, even if one has uncovered the optimal list of guiding 

truths, he must be able to translate, merge, and employ these truths in a 

coherent manner. This then represents the art of The Art of War, the 

ability to meld the appropriate principles of war into an effective 

strategy. 

One of Sun Tzu’s beliefs was that avoiding battle should be 

considered of great importance: “Thus, those skilled in war subdue the 

enemy’s army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting 

them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.”121 This is 

consistent with many of his other beliefs, such as taking the state 

“intact,” “captur[ing] the enemy is better than destroy[ing] it,” and to 

“subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”122 

Furthermore, these beliefs highlight a common theme that prescribes 

the use of a strong military to force enemy capitulation. The possession 

of equally matched adversaries only serves to invoke combat. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

88

This belief is similar to the policy of dissuasion espoused by US 

strategists in recent high-level documents and discussed within this 

paper. It is apparent in the statements and policies of the current US 

administration that it should and will utilize its relative strength to 

sustain its own security. In the words of Brad Roberts, “Dissuasion 

must work for the best, even as it helps to hedge against the worst in 

future major power relations.”123

Andrew Scobell describes China’s strategic thought as being dual 

natured. On one hand, it is “conflict averse” and undertakes defensiveminded approaches to international relations. On the other hand, PRC 

leaders seem to enjoy using the PLA to deal with conflicts or 

disturbances in the system.124 Another PRC expert, David Lai, uses the 

Chinese game of ‘Go’ to describe the nuances of Beijing’s stratagems. 

Instead of approaching China with an American football approach that 

emphasizes force on force, or a chess mindset which encourages power 

plays, it would be wise to consider the manner by which Chinese tend 

to construct strategy. The game of “Go” emphasizes winning strategies 

that rarely achieve annihilation of the enemy but rather see tactics that 

lead to relatively small differences between the winner and loser.125 

Lai recognizes the troublesome nature of trying to label China with 

some sort of exacting degree of confidence. Nonetheless, his estimate 

is that Beijing is seeking to re-establish China’s role as a great power. 

In addition, PRC leaders are adamant that Taiwan reunify.126 Scobell’s 

assessment is that Chinese strategy is simply the means by which 

China’s leaders will attempt to accomplish these objectives. However, 

it seems likely that these objectives will inevitably conflict with those 

of the United States. Regardless, based on recent statements from 

Washington, America will continue to use more force-on-force type 

strategies to achieve its own objectives. “America has, and intends to 
89 

Figure 11: Modified Defense Policy Spectrum 

Foe Friend 

Deter DissuasionNew Defeat Assurance 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

90

keep, military strengths beyond challenge thereby, making the 

destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to 

trade and other pursuits of peace.”127

However, no matter the depth of analysis one thing is clear with 

respect to dissuasion. It is going to be difficult policy to implement and 

even more difficult to classify as a success or failure. While this paper 

attempted to clarify the meaning of dissuasion, it also reaffirmed the 

notion that this concept is difficult to grasp. This is due in no small 

part to the lack of literature on the subject to include sparse guidance 

from its designers. Another factor contributing to its elusiveness is that 

it tries to straddle the fence in the same manner as the détente policies 

instituted by President Nixon during the early 1970s. 

Détente as a state of existence that combined both conflict and 

cooperation was more difficult to understand than the Cold 

War. It was easier to explain a relationship that was 

essentially one of confrontation or cooperation.128

As discussed and depicted earlier, dissuasion addresses issues in 

the middle of the spectrum where the classification of friend or foe 

becomes difficult to ascertain. In fact, in retrospect it may be more 

appropriate to illustrate a defense policy spectrum where deterrence and 

defeat occupy one end of the spectrum and assurance the other, while 

dissuasion wanders in the middle, much like Nixon and Kissinger’s 

version of détente. 

In sum, this paper prescribed a simplified set of conditions 

necessary to attain dissuasion, although it does not imply that they are 

sufficient for this policy to succeed. Instead, dissuasion, which is really 

the ability to avoid war, must also account for the nuances of defense 

policies. Therefore, the art of dissuasion and its viability as a strategy 

to stem the tide of space weapons procurement is tough to discern. 

Indeed, US policy makers will likely hedge one way or the other, either 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

91

towards a more deterrence-oriented policy through the advocating of 

US space weapons and the protection these systems may provide or 

through an assurance-focused strategy that fosters international norms 

against the weaponizing of space and the inherent protection that this 

policy affords US systems. 

NOTES 

 

1

 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington DC, Mar 05, iv. 

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf (accessed 

19 May 05). 

2 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD), Washington DC. 30 Sep 01, 4. 

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed 19 May 05). 

3

 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, 

and Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004), 2-3. 

4

 Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 Space Operations. The Joint Staff, 

Washington DC, 9 Aug 02, I, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/

jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf (accessed 19 May 05). 

5

 “Operation DESERT STORM: Evaluation of the Air Campaign.” Letter 

Report, Government Accounting Office (GAO)/NSIAD-97-134, 12 Jun 97. 

6

 Michael Mosley, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—By the Numbers.” 

Assessment and Analysis Division, US Central Command Air Forces 

(USCENTAF), Shaw AFB, SC, 30 Apr 03. 

7

 Matthew French, “General Points way to Better Blue Force,” Federal 

Computer Week (FCW), 21 Oct 03. http://www.fcw.com/fcw/

articles/2003/1020/web-oif-10-21-03.asp (accessed 19 May 05). 

8

 Patrick Rayermann, “Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better Way,” 

Parameters, Vol 33, No. 4 (Winter 2003-04), pp. 54-66. http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/rayerman.pdf (accessed 19 

May 05). 

9

 USAF Space Command Commander’s Biography, Peterson AFB, CO, 

Jan 05. http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6232 (accessed 19 May 

05). 

10 Department of Defense (DoD) Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon 

System, DoD Budget for Fiscal Year 2006. Comptroller for the Office of 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

92

 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington DC, Feb 05, 1-3. 

http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_weabook.pdf

(accessed 19 May 05). 

11 The following US State Department links contain information on SALT: 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html (SALT I), 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html (SALT II), 

and http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html (SALT II) 

(accessed 29 May 05). 

12 The following US State Department link contains the complete START 

documentation: http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18535.htm (accessed 29 May 

05). 

13 The 2005 NDS describes the four “strategic challenges” in more detail. 

14 The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America, 

The White House, Washington DC, 17 Sep 2002, iv, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed 8 May 05). 

15 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2003), 286-287. 

16 Gordon Craig, “High Tide to Appeasement: The Road to Munich 1937-

1938,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 65 No. 1 (March 1950): 20, 37. 

17 2002 NSS, 29. 

18 2001 QDR, pp. 11-12; 2004 National Military Strategy, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, DoD, Washington DC, 2, 9, 1, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed 19 May 05); 2005 NDS, iv, 7. 

19 2005 NDS, 7. 

20 Ibid, iii. 

21 Robert Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly, 

Vol 295, Issue 5, June 05, 54. 

22 “Counterterrorism, Military Readiness Among Top US Priorities,” US 

Federal News, Washington, 4 Apr 05. 

23 2001 QDR, 13. 

24 2005 NDS, 8. 

25 2002 NSS, 29 and 2001 QDR, 11. 

26 2001 QDR, 11. 

27 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th US Congress, 10 Apr 79, 

http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html 

(accessed 8 May 05). 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

93

 

28 2001 QDR, 12. 

29 2005 NDS. 

30 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004), 11. 

31 Freedman, Deterrence, 15. 

32 Morgan, Deterrence Now, xix. 

33 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 4. 

34 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the 

Adversary,” Perception and Misperception in International Politics. 

(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Ch. 3. 

35 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Restraint, and the 

Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2001). 

36 Janice Stein “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., 

eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. II (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1991), and Freedman, Deterrence.

37 Richard Kugler, “Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept,” Strategic Forum, 

No. 196, Dec 02. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF196/SF196.pdf (accessed 

19 May 05). 

38 2005 NDS, iv. 

39 Pete Lavoy, Barry Zellen, and Chris Clary, “Dissuasion in US Defense 

Strategy,” Dissuasion in US Defense Strategy Conference Report, 

Strategic Insights, Vol III, Issue 10 (Oct 04), Center for Contemporary 

Conflict (CCC), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), 22 Sep 04. 

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/dissOct04_rpt.asp (accessed 8 

May 05). 

40 Steven Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World 

War II, Sixteenth Edition (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2004), 193-194. 

41 2001 QDR, 11. 

42 2001 QDR, 12. 

43 2001 QDR, 12. 

44 2005 NDS, iv. 

45 Everett Dolman, Astropolitik: Classic Geopolitics in the Space Age

(London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishing, 2001), specifically 156-

158, although the entire book embodies this strategy. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

94

 

46 Brad Roberts, “Dissuasion and China,” Strategic Insights, Vol III, Issue 

10 (Oct 04), Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Naval Postgraduate 

School. http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/oct/robertsOct04.asp

(accessed 29 May 05). 

47 2005 NDS, 7. 

48 Phillip Clark, “Civil and Commercial Satellite Communications—

China,” Jane’s Space Directory, Jane’s Information Group, 8 Dec 04, 

http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jsd/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/

janesdata/yb/jsd/jsd_0154.htm@current&Prod_Name=JSD&QueryText= 

(accessed 8 May 05). 

49 White Paper: Full Text of China’s Space Activities, 22 Nov 00, FBIS 

CPP20001122000046. 

50 Fiscal Year 2004 Report To Congress On People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) Military Power, Department of Defense (DoD) Publications, 

Washington DC, 28 May 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/

d20040528PRC.pdf (accessed 8 May 05). 

51 “China's Secret Cape Canaveral A Sprawling City Of 15,000,” Space 

Daily, 2 Sep 04, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-04zze.html

(accessed 19 May 05). 

52 Leonard David, “Pentagon Report: China’s Space Warfare Tactics 

Aimed at US Supremacy,” Space News, 1 Aug 03, http://www.space.com/

news/china_dod_030801.html (accessed 8 May 05); For more discussion 

on Chinese ASAT development read Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, 

Stephanie Lieggi, and Angela Deters, “China's Space Capabilities and the 

Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Center for Non-Proliferation 

Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), 

Monterey, CA, 22 Jul 02. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm

(accessed 29 May 05).

53 2005 NDS, 2-3.

54 Phillip Saunders, “China’s Future in Space: Implications for US 

Security,” ad Astra, The Magazine of the National Space Society. 

http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html (accessed 30 

May 05). 

55 Wang Hucheng, "The US Military's 'Soft Ribs' and Strategic 

Weaknesses," Liaowang, Vol. 27, reprinted in Xinhua Hong Kong Service, 

July 5, 2000, FBIS CPP20000705000081. 

56 The following three references provide a snapshot of the growth in US 

military space dependence: “Operation DESERT STORM: Evaluation of 

the Air Campaign,” Letter Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, 12 Jun 97; 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

95

 

Michael Mosley, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—By the Numbers,” 

USCENTAF Assessment and Analysis Division, 30 Apr 03; Patrick 

Rayermann, “Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better Way,” 

Parameters vol 33, no 4 (Winter 2003-04), 54-66.

57 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other 

Celestial Bodies,” Office of Outer Space Affairs, United Nations, 

Originally signed in Jan 67 and ratified as recently as Jan 03, 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html (accessed 8 May 

05). This treaty is commonly referred to as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 

58 “Survey of Space Weapons System Employment by the 50th Space 

Wing in Support of operation Iraqi Freedom,” 50th OSS/OSK, Schreiver 

AFB CO, 8 Oct 03, Section 5. 

59 Barry Watts, “The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,” 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Feb 01, p. 6. 

Copies can be obtained through http://www.csbaonline.org/ (accessed on 8 

May 05). 

60 Ashton Carter, “Satellites and Anti-satellites: The Limits of the 

Possible,” International Security Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), 49. 

61 JP 3-14 Space Operations, F-4. 

62 2004 Space Almanac, Air Force Magazine, Aug 04, p. 45, 

http://www.afa.org/magazine/Aug2004/0804space_alm.pdf (accessed 8 

May 05). 

63 This space surveillance refers to the ground-based systems that track 

space objects (i.e., Earth systems tracking objects in space), which is 

different from the space-based surveillance systems in Table 2 that track 

objects below the earth’s atmosphere (i.e., space systems tracking objects 

on or near earth). 

64 Michael Muolo, Space Handbook: A Warfighter’s Guide to Space, Vol I, 

AU-18, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, Dec 93), 22, 33, 39, 78, 

85, 97-102, all of Ch. 4, and 142. 

65 Watts, “The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,” 78. 

66 Jerry Sellers, Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, 

Second Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 70. 

67 JP 3-14 Space Operations, I-1. 

68 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-2.1 Counterspace Operations, 

Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC), Maxwell AFB, AL, 2 Aug 04, 3, 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

96

 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_2_1.pdf (accessed on 

8 May 05). 

69 Roald Sagdeev, “Space Weapons and Space Navigation,” US Space 

Operations in the International Context, Dwight D. Eisenhower National 

Security Series, The Eisenhower Institute, 24 Feb 04, 

http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/final_04/US%20Space%20Operati

ons%20-%20EI-%20ENSS%20Final.pdf (accessed 8 May 05). 

70 “US Accuses Cuba of Jamming Broadcasts to Iran,” Public Broadcasting 

Service (PBS), PBS On-Line News Hour, 17 Jul 03, http://www.pbs.org/

newshour/media/media_watch/july-dec03/jamming_07-17.html (accessed 

on 8 May 05) and Stephan Johnson, “Cuban Jamming Demands a Firm 

Response,” The Heritage Foundation Web Memo #319, 22 Jul 03, 

http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm319.cfm (accessed 6 

Jun 05). 

71 2005 NDS. 

72 Fiscal Year 2004 Report to Congress on the Military Power of the PRC. 

73 Country Capabilities, Current and Future Space Security, Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International 

Studies (MIIS), Monterey CA, 28 Sep 04, http://cns.miis.edu/research/

space/spfrnat.htm (accessed 8 May 05), and Air Force Doctrine Document 

(AFDD) 2-2 Space Operations, Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, 

AL, 27 Nov 01, 33-34. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/

service_pubs/afdd2_2.pdf (accessed on 29 May 05). 

74 Space Imaging, 2005, http://www.spaceimaging.com/ (accessed 8 May 

05), and AFDD 2-2, 33-34. 

75 AFDD 2.2-1 Counterspace Operations, 3. 

76 “Ministry Spokesman Admits Phone Jamming in N. Caucasus,” Paris 

AFP (North European Service), 24 Nov 99, FBIS AU2411101599; 

“Mullah’s Terrorism Targets Satellite Communication,” National Council 

of Resistance of Iran–Paris, 12 Aug 97, http://www.iran-e-azad.org/

english/ncr/970812.html (accessed 8 May 05). 

77 “Ministry Spokesman Admits Phone Jamming in N. Caucasus,” Paris 

AFP (North European Service), 24 Nov 99, FBIS AU2411101599; 

“Mullah’s Terrorism Targets Satellite Communication,” National Council 

of Resistance of Iran–Paris, 12 Aug 97, http://www.iran-e-azad.org/

english/ncr/970812.html (accessed 8 May 05). 

78 AFDD 2-2.1 Counterspace Operations, 26-27. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace

97

 

79 Jeremy Singer, “STRATCOM Chief says need for Space Control is 

Now,” Space News, 30 Mar 04, http://www.space.com/news/

nss_stratcom_040330.html (accessed 8 May 05). 

80 NAVSTAR GPS Block III Specs, Andrews Technical Service, 14 Apr 

03, http://www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/constellations/navstar-gpsblock3_conspecs.shtml (accessed 8 May 05). 

81 Boeing Satellite Systems Fact Sheets, MILSTAR II, 2004, 

http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/space/bss/factsheets/

government/milstar_ii/milstar_ii.html (accessed 8 May 05). 

82 Joseph Nye and James Schear, Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite 

Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime (Lanham, Maryland: University 

Press, Inc., 1987), 7-8. 

83 Dwayne Day, John Logsdon, Brian Latell, Eye in the Sky: The Story of 

the CORONA Spy Satellites. (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute 

Press, 1998), 1. 

84 David Baker, “Government and Non-Government Space Programs, 

China,” Space Directory, Jane’s, 14 Oct 04, http://www4.janes.com/

subscribe/jsd/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/yb/jsd/jsd_05

28.htm@current&Prod_Name=JSD&QueryText= (accessed 15 May 05). 

85 2004 Space Almanac, 47. 

86 Philip Clark, China Country Information, Space Directory, Jane’s, 1 Sep 

04, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jsd/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/

content1/janesdata/yb/jsd/jsd_0334.htm@current&Prod_Name=JSD&Quer

yText=#img (accessed on 11 May 05). 

87 “China’s Three Major Space Launch Bases,” China Daily Online 

Edition, 15 Oct 03, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/home/

index.html (accessed 11 May 05) and “Satellite Launch Centers,” 

China.org website, 18 Oct 04, http://www.china.org.cn/english/SPORTc/77178.htm (accessed 11 May 05). 

88 White Paper: Full Text of China’s Space Activities, 22 Nov 00, FBIS 

CPP20001122000046. 

89 Baker, “Government and Non-Government Space Programs, China.” 

90 Craig Covault, Aviation Week and Space Technology, New York: 27 Oct 

03, Vol 159, Iss 17, 30. 

91 “Nigeria to Launch Chinese-Assisted Communications Satellite in 

2006,” Paris Agence France Presse News Release, 9 Feb 05, FBIS 

AFP20050209000185. 
Meteyer—The Art of Peace 

98

 

92 Adam Segal, “Chinese Military Power,” Report of an Independent Task 

Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Maurice R. 

Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies,” Council on Foreign 

Relations (CFR), 2003, p. 2, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/China_TF.pdf

(accessed 11 May 05). 

93 “United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law,” Office for 

Outerspace Affairs, United Nations Office at Vienna, 10 May 04, 

http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/treaties.html (accessed 8 May 

05). 

94 AFDD 2.2-1, Counterspace Operations, 4, 33, list the six OCS threats in 

Table 1. The remaining information in the table is based on data contained 

in this paper. 

95 Kinetic ASAT systems could consist of ASAT missiles like those 

produced by the US and USSR during the Cold War or space mines and 

parasitic micro-satellites which are not currently employed but certainly 

discussed in some “space weapon” forums and articles. 

96 Existing atomic weapons have the inherent capability to produce an 

EMP type affect (if detonated in space) and some theorists speculate that in 

certain cases states may consider employing nuclear weapons as a means to 

target space systems. However, this seems extremely risky and only 

plausible if the aggressor accepts the risk of nuclear retaliation. Therefore, 

this category of OCS weapons implies non-nuclear EMP weapons 

designed specifically to target space-based platforms. 

97 Both the Soviets and United States tested kinetic ASAT systems, 

although these system were shelved shortly after initial development (late 

1970s and early 1980s). Therefore, the ASAT systems still fall into the 

“emerging” threat category. 

98 AFDD 2-2.1 Counterspace Operations, 3. 

99 AFDD 2.2-1 Counterspace Operations, 25-27. 

100 AFDD 2-2 Space Operations, 34. 

101 World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1 Jan 04, 

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (accessed 8 May 05), and 

GDP, Nation Master, Dec 03, http://www.nationmaster.com/graphT/eco_gdp (accessed 8 May 05). 

102 World Fact Book. 

103 Nation Master, Military Expenditures. 

104 Nation Master, Military Expenditures. 
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99

 

105 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and 

Prospects, 225. 

106 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 

107 UN General Assembly, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 

(PAROS), UN GAOR, 58th Session, UN Doc. A/RES/58/36, 8 Jan 04. 

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/455/07/PDF/N0345507.p

df?OpenElement (accessed 29 May 05). For a more thorough discussion 

of the legal ramifications of weapons in space read Elizabeth Waldrop, 

“Weaponization of Outer Space: US National policy,” High Frontier, Vol 

1, No. 3 (Winter 2005), USAF Space Command, 

http://www.peterson.af.mil/hqafspc/news/images/JournalWinter05Web.pdf

(accessed 19 May 05). 

108 Personal interview with the author, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies (SAASS), Air University, Maxwell AFB AL, 18 Mar 05. 

109 Everett Dolman, Astropolitik and Everett Dolman, “Strategy Lost: 

Taking the Middle Road to Wherever,” High Frontier, Vol 1, No. 3 

(Winter 2005), USAF Space Command, 32-34 http://www.peterson.af.mil/

hqafspc/news/images/JournalWinter05Web.pdf (accessed 19 May 05). 

110 Personal interview with the author. Asia-Pacific Center for Security 

Studies (APCSS), Honolulu HI, 24 May 05. 

111 Tim Weiner, “Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons 

Programs.” New York Times, 18 May 05. 

112 Phillip Clark, China Country Information. 

113 Personal interview with the author, APCSS, Honolulu, HI, 24 May 05. 

114 Testimony of James Oberg: US Senate Science, Technology, and Space 

Hearing: International Space Exploration Program, 27 Apr 04. 

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12687 (accessed 29 May 

05). 

115 Within each criterion, a “Yes” implies that the conditions are ripe for 

dissuasion and “No” answers imply the opposite. A “+” means that the 

stated criteria is favorable for a dissuasive policy and a “-“ means that 

these criteria detract from dissuasion. The more “Yes” and “+” 

assessments means the more likely dissuasion will succeed. 

116 “Survey of Space Weapons System Employment by the 50th Space 

Wing in Support of OIF,” para. 4.6. 

117 Airborne Laser, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, 2 Apr 05. 

http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/abl/flash.html (accessed 30 

May 05). 
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100

 

118 For an in-depth look at the political environment surrounding the 

development of SDI read Strobe Talbot, The Master of the Game: Paul 

Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1988). 

119 Sean Kay and Theresa Hitchens, “Bush Policy would Start Arms Race 

in Space,” Center for Defense Information (CDI) Space Security, 25 May 

05. http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID

=3022&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLast

Updated&ProgramID=68&from_page=index.cfm (accessed 29 May 05). 

120 Saunders, “China’s Future in Space.” 

121 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Samuel Griffith (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1963). 79. 

122 Ibid, 77. 

123 Roberts, “Dissuasion and China.” 

124 Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture,” Strategic Studies 

Institute (SSI), Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 02. http://www.carlisle.army.

mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=60 (accessed 29 May 05). 

125 David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering 

China’s Strategic Concept, Shi,” Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, May 04. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/

display.cfm?PubID=378 (accessed 29 May 05). 

126 Personal interview with the author. Air War College, Air University, 

Maxwell AFB AL, 16 Mar 05. 

127 President Bush, Remarks at 2002 West Point Graduation, Whitehouse 

Press Releases, 1 Jun 02, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, (accessed 21 May 05). 

128 Hook and Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since WWII, 159.