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AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Weather Operations

in the Transformation Era

JOHN M. LANICCI

Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 29

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

March 2003
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within a

solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air U

versity, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U

government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.
Foreword

In Weather Operations in the Transformation Era, C

John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at futur

weather operations. His hypothesis is that a consolidate

battlespace picture integrates both natural and man-mad

elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transfo

mation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easie

said than done and offers several cogent reasons why th

weather operations portion of information-in-warfare ha

not caught up with current USAF doctrine. One such ex

ample is our historical tendency to look at weather as 

somewhat isolated, tactical problem.

Significant advances in information technology and ad

vent of effects-based operations are propelling the USA

weather community away from traditional, single-injec

stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice t

war fighters at every step of campaign/mission plannin

and execution. This technological momentum will make 

necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analy

sis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outline

these changes in a concept called weather, intelligenc

surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first use

by the Air Staff to describe the total integration of natura

and man-made environments for predictive battlespac

awareness (PBA). The WISR concept is based on substan

tially increasing the volume of weather data collected in

theater by using the same airborne assets being propose

for PBA, persistent ISR, and time-critical targeting. It pro

poses the creation of a four-dimensional database that ca

be used to integrate the natural environment into the com

mon operating picture. The WISR concept also advocate

transmitting real-time weather information to the cockp

as a means to optimize the “kill chain” by allowing rapi

redirecting of sorties based on continuously update

weather information.

The author introduces a long-range planning model fo

examining national-level strategy and joint/service doc

trine, and identifying emerging natural environmental is

sues. The model identifies operational deficiencies, techno

logical needs, and research and development opportunitie

iii
in a number of areas and points out potential force

structuring issues associated with meeting the stated re

quirements of future US military strategy. The author’s i

lustration from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review repo

identifies a need for regional weather and climate monito

ing, impacts analysis, and prediction to support environ

mental security programs operated by combatant com

mands. These services would help combatant comman

staffs recognize environmentally vulnerable regions an

anticipate geopolitical instability that may require involve

ment of US forces. Colonel Lanicci’s extensive backgroun

in weather operations and research and his Air War Colleg

(AWC) faculty experience afforded him a unique perspectiv

to gather necessary background information, conduct re

search and interviews, and synthesize these concepts int

the thought piece presented here.

This is the twenty-ninth AWC Maxwell Paper. The serie

began in 1996. As with all Maxwell Papers, we encourage dis

cussion and debate on Colonel Lanicci’s proposals for guid

ing USAF weather operations into the transformation era.

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War Colleg

iv
About the Author

Col John M. Lanicci (BS, Manhattan College and Penn

sylvania State University; MS and PhD, Pennsylvania Stat

University) is a professor in the Department of Warfightin

the chief information officer, and the Education Technolog

Integration Group chair at Air War College (AWC), Maxwe

AFB, Alabama. Previous assignments include commande

88th Weather Squadron, Wright–Patterson AFB, Ohio; chie

Data Management and Environment Branch, Headquarter

USAF Directorate of Command and Control in Washington

D.C.; commander, Detachment 3, 11th Weather Squadron

Eareckson AFB, Alaska; chief, Meteorological Models, A

Force Global Weather Central. Colonel Lanicci is a gradu

ate of Squadron Officer School in-residence and the A

Command and Staff College and AWC seminar programs

v
Weather Operations

in the Transformation Era

“Listen, S-2,” the colonel said, “I don’t care about how many

inches of rainfall to expect. I don’t care about the percentage of

lunar illumination. I don’t want lots of facts and figures. Number one, I don’t have time, and number two, they don’t do me

any good. What I need is to know what it all means.” 

—USMC Doctrinal Publication 6

Command and Control

According to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary

the term transform “implies a major change in form, na

ture, or function.”1 There is considerable debate through

out the Department of Defense (DOD) as to whether we ar

witnessing a revolution in military affairs, multiple revolu

tions in military affairs, or merely a rapid evolution in mu

tiple military fields.2 No matter which position one takes o

the issue, it is generally agreed that emerging technologie

are already changing the ways that US, allied, and coal

tion forces fight, with the future promising even more dra

matic changes. In November 2001, Secretary of Defens

Donald H. Rumsfeld named retired Vice Adm Arthur Ce

browski to head a new Pentagon Office of Force Transfo

mation as a means of increasing the momentum to trans

form the US military to better face new challenges of th

twenty-first century.3

Introduction

The US Air Force Weather (AFW) service is no strange

to transformation. Since the end of the Cold War, AFW ha

undergone two major structural reorganizations: a func

tional realignment “divestiture” coincident with the USA

reorganization in 1991–92; and a reengineering of the en

tire career field from 1997 to 2002 to retool services at th

operational and tactical levels.4 These reorganizations—

combined with significant advances in information tech

nology and communications bandwidth—are fundamen

tally changing the types of weather services provided to th

Air Force, Army, and other important organizations withi

the US government. 

1
As we look towards the future, it is important to unde

stand how AFW will operate in a transformed DOD. A

weapons and the means to deliver them become increas

ingly more sophisticated and the combat decision cycle 

sped up significantly by near-instantaneous communica

tions and data delivery at multiple levels of command, th

question of relevancy of weather and climate informatio

to the battle becomes more important. Are we more vu

nerable to the natural environment (to include “spac

weather”) today because of our technological sophistica

tion? Or has the age of the truly “all-weather” force final

arrived?5 In order to address these questions, we mus

take a comprehensive look at the entire process of provid

ing weather and climate information to important user

from decision makers at the very highest levels of govern

ment (e.g., president, secretary of defense) to the individ

ual soldier, sailor, airman, or marine executing a tactica

mission in support of national objectives.

Purpose

This approach looks at weather and climate operation

at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfar

These operations cover the needs of war fighters from cu

rent conditions to long-range forecasts, spanning from th

surface of the earth to the near-space environment. Th

overarching hypothesis is that a truly consolidated “sigh

picture” of the battlespace totally integrates all elements o

the battle environment, man-made as well as natural. Fu

integration of these factors at tactical and operational lev

els can best be described as weather, intelligence, survei

lance, and reconnaissance (WISR). The WISR concept ha

two important implications for air forces: it optimizes th

target “kill cycle” find, fix, track, target, engage, and asses

(F2T2EA) by including natural environmental informatio

in every step of the cycle; and it enhances predictive battle

space awareness and persistent ISR by adding the natura

environment to the equation.6 When natural environmen

tal effects and impacts are fully integrated into all aspect

of the operator’s decision cycle, it becomes easier to in

clude natural environmental considerations throughou
the spectrum of military planning and execution, whethe

it is flying an individual sortie, building the Master Air A

tack Plan, or formulating the combatant command’s env

ronmental security program. Although the focus of th

paper is primarily on AFW services, the concepts coul

easily be related to joint meteorological or oceanograph

(METOC) services provided by the Air Force and Navy.7

To facilitate the discussions in this paper, two concep

models are introduced to better understand weather an

climate integration at various levels of warfare. The firs

model describes the weather decision cycle at the opera

tional and tactical levels and is used to illustrate how im

provements in data gathering and communication will im

prove air forces’ F2T2EA cycle and allow for bette

integration of weather and climate effects information i

the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC

The second model is a long-range planning construct fo

analyzing strategy, concepts, and doctrine. This model—

geared towards the strategic level—examines national-lev

strategy, joint and service doctrine, and analyzes the stra

egy’s feasibility from the natural environmental point o

view. The model’s analytical processes identify operationa

deficiencies, technological needs, and research and deve

opment opportunities in a number of areas and point ou

potential force structuring issues involved in meeting th

stated requirements of future US military strategy. Whi

both models are applied to an examination of AFW, neithe

produces a “stovepiped” view of the world. In fact, th

strategic planning model is general enough that it can b

applied to other functional areas. 

“WISR”: Environmental Situational

Awareness in the CAOC and Cockpit

When considering the impacts of natural environmen

on military operations, there is a tendency to become en

meshed either in an examination of natural environmenta

effects on individual platforms or missions or the accurac

of individual weather forecasts. In either case, the resultin

analysis loses grasp of the greater picture. This presents 

problem for officers as they progress from compan
through flag grades. For example, the flying communit

has good training manuals that document some natura

environmental effects at the tactical level (e.g., Air Forc

Handbook 11-203, vol. 1, Weather for Aircrews), but ther

is no “capstone” document that discusses natural environ

mental considerations at the operational and strategic lev

els. By the time an officer makes flag grade, he or she ma

no longer have the appropriate frame of reference in whic

to integrate the potential impacts of weather, terrain, an

climate properly with information about man-made threat

rules of engagement, campaign objectives, and so fort

during planning and execution. The result is a cultural re

gard of the natural environment as a hindrance that wi

eventually be engineered out of relevance (i.e., emergenc

of the all-weather force, a misnomer). This dilemma 

compounded by myriad operations that today’s militar

forces must be prepared to execute—from peacekeeping o

peace enforcement through major theater war—in man

inhospitable regions, and with the potential participation 

nations whose forces, equipment, and doctrine are likely t

be less weather tolerant than US forces.

In particular, problems with integrating weather and cl

mate information into air and space operations can be bes

summarized by the three statements below:

1. Senior officers tend to look at weather as being tact

cal because it is not a subject that is taught above a

introductory level (related to number three below

Additionally, the requirements of forecast precisio

often drive the solution to specifics of time and loca

tion (i.e., towards a tactical view).

2. Weather is considered information-in-warfare (IIW

per USAF doctrine, but not in practice.8 

—Weather data collection and utilization have no

been considered priorities on unmanned aerial ve

hicles (UAV) sensor packages.

—Real-time weather information delivery to the cock

pit has not been considered a priority despite it

potential to reduce weather-related aborts an

speed up the F2T2EA cycle.

—Weather information is not fully integrated into th

common operating picture (COP) in the CAOC.
—Considered a crosscutting function, weather tech

nological needs do not typically get advocacy from

major commands in the planning, programmin

and budgeting process unless there is a serious de

ficiency affecting one or more of them. 

3. Weather is not taught as a strategic-level considera

tion in senior officer professional military educatio

courses.

What Is Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance?

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5.2, Intelligenc

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, defines IS

as having “integrated capabilities to collect, process, ex

ploit, and disseminate accurate and timely informatio

that provides the battlespace awareness necessary to suc

cessfully plan and conduct operations.”9 The document als

describes ISR as a synergistic process that converts info

mation derived from surveillance and reconnaissance int

intelligence used “to formulate strategy, policy, and mil

tary plans, to develop and conduct campaigns, and t

carry out military operations.”10

The Air Force has taken a keen interest in ISR as a cri

ical component of information operations. The renaming o

the Aerospace Command and Control, Intelligence, Su

veillance, and Reconnaissance Center in 1999 was an im

portant corporate step in this evolution.11

What Is the Weather

Information Processing Cycle?

Natural environmental data are collected from a numbe

of locations and platforms such as airfields, satellite

radars, aircraft, and field observers. This raw data must b

compiled and go through a processing cycle—described i

figure 1—before it is transformed into useful knowledge fo

the operational decision maker.12 The first two steps ar

purely meteorological in nature and have always relie

upon high-performance computers to execute. This is es

pecially true in step two, where sophisticated atmospher
prediction models have been a staple of the profession fo

more than 30 years. Although humans are involve

throughout the process, it is not until the third step tha

forecasters begin to consider potential effects on militar

operations. Historically, the entire production cycle oc

curred on a 12-hour rotation centered around 1200 an

0000 Greenwich mean time (worldwide data collectio

times), with the first and second steps and communicatio

process (depicted by the arrows) greatly limited by compu

tational power and bandwidth. These limitations trans

lated into long preparation times for steps one and two

limited production of tailored applications in step thre

and limited opportunities for operators to employ the in

formation in their decision cycles in step four. This proces

has historically been largely linear, with little opportunit

for feedback from operators to modify the procedure. 

similar processing cycle existed for intelligence information—

and along with the weather—was presented as a singl

separate input to the operational commander, usually at 

stand-up briefing.

The end of the Cold War and Operation Desert Storm re

sulted in a changed mind-set about deployment and use o

ISR assets. Once the domain of national strategic decisio

makers, these assets are routinely used by the Joint Forc

Commander (JFC), and there is a groundswell to mak

more of these programs’ products available to a large

community of users. Organizationally, the last 10 year

have seen declassification of the National Reconnaissanc

Office, a major reorganization of the Intelligence functio

at Air Staff, and a shift of the Air Intelligence Agency to A

Combat Command.13 Assets such as Rivet Joint, airborn

warning and control system, and joint surveillance, targe

attack radar system are considered high demand/lo

density due to the extremely high operations tempos the

have sustained in the years since Operation Desert Storm

Figure 1. Traditional Weather Information Processing Cycl

Data

Collection

Analysis and

Prediction

BACKBONE

COMM

BACKBONE

COMM

BACKBONE

COMM

Tailored

Applications

for Operator

Operator

Decision

Cycle
Concurrent with the changes in ISR asset deploymen

and use is an emphasis shift towards weather or climat

effects products tailored for the end users. This shift 

consistent with effects-based planning and operation

Consider the following charts in figure 2 that illustrate th

evolution of a meteorological prediction from traditiona

“fronts on a weather chart” to sophisticated visualization

that could be used for mission planning and rehearsa

(right to left top row and left bottom row). These chart

characterize several important changes that have take

place in the weather business during the last 10 years: (

the ability of sophisticated visualization technology t

translate meteorological information that once required ex

perienced forecaster interpretation into impacts informa

tion directly useable by the operator; (2) the increasin

trend towards weather effects and impacts informatio

versus pure meteorological terminology; and (3) the oppo

tunity for the staff weather officer to move from deliverin

a purely meteorological briefing as a single inject in the de

cision process to a consultant who is able to provide con

tinuous support to the operation at every step of cam

paign/mission planning and execution.

Traditionally, the operator has not had technology avai

able to integrate weather and other types of information

Traditional application of weather information in the ope

ator’s decision cycle has largely been done using exper

ence and intuition, without involvement of the sta

weather officer except to answer questions about conf

dence in the forecast’s accuracy. “We don’t tell the opera

tor how to do his job” has been the standard motto fo

many years in this business. But situational awarenes

information volume, and flow have become so intensiv

with the advent of sophisticated computers and visualiza

tions that commanders have become frustrated that the

cannot take full advantage of all this new information

They want to be able to see the big or “fused” picture o

what is taking place, and it is no longer a matter of th

weather or intelligence officer delivering a briefing an

then dropping off. With ability to reroute attack sorties i

real time and call in close air support from horseback i

austere locations such as Afghanistan, weather and inte

ligence can no longer be treated as single injects at 
stand-up briefing but part of a continuously update

stream of information along with other real-time battle

space information. 

Putting It All Together: WISR

The central question: How do we integrate all this info

mation? It is important to begin by improving our knowledg

Courtesy of the Weather Channel: http://www.weather.com/maps/

Sources: Louis Hembree, Sam Brand, William C. Mayse, Maureen Cianciolo, and Bri

Soderberg, “Incorporation of a Cloud Simulation into a Flight Mission Rehearsal System: P

totype Demonstration,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, May 1997, 815–2

and Paul Tattelman, “The AFRL Weather Impact Decision Aids Program Progress Updat

Battlespace Atmospheric and Cloud Impacts on Military Operations (BACIMO) Conferenc

24–27 April 2000, Fort Collins, Colo. Available from http://www.cira.colostate.edu/GeoS

Bacimo2000/paper/paper/tattelman.pdf.

Figure 2. Examples of Different Types of Weather Informa

tion. Top (left to right) shows a basic meteorological cha

and an Air Force Weather Agency prediction model depictio

of cloud tops. Bottom (left to right) is an Air Force Researc

Laboratory target scene simulation using the cloud scen

simulation model and infrared target-scene simulation sof

ware and a cockpit video shot.
base of natural environmental effects on weapons, pla

forms, and missions. One way to accomplish this 

through building environmental effects databases and de

cision aids such as the Integrated Weather Effects Decisio

Aid.14 But this is only part of the answer. Unless there 

improvement in quality and quantity of observational dat

in the denied battlespace, we will suffer from the age-ol

problem of “garbage in/garbage out.” When one consider

the numbers of airborne platforms in the battlespace a

any one time, including UAVs with long loitering times, a

answer to this data problem begins to emerge. With th

advent of ideas such as the Smart Tanker and the growin

presence of UAVs, an order-of-magnitude increase in th

number of weather observations can be accomplished i

some of the most data-sparse regions of the world.15 In

jecting this large amount of data into step one of th

weather information processing cycle will have the greates

influence on improving the quality of the products comin

out of steps two and three. An additional enhancement i

step four would be the introduction of real-time weathe

information to the cockpit.16 This information could tak

the form of “pure” weather (e.g., a step two product suc

as satellite or radar imagery) or a step three-type of impac

product (e.g., “target area weather changing from yellow t

red for your weapons load; reroute to alternate target”

Such real-time weather information would save weapon

from being expended needlessly and would optimize ou

abilities to perform time-critical targeting in a fast-pace

battle rhythm situation.

Another way to reach WISR is to improve the integratio

of weather and climate information with other types of in

formation in the COP in the CAOC. Creating a continu

ously updating, four-dimensional METOC database woul

allow the weather information processing cycle to becom

nested with other functional decision cycles and that of th

operator (fig. 3).

Full implementation of the ideas being advocated her

will alter the weather information processing cycle from

the traditional process—noted previously in figure 1—to 

continuously updating information flow back and fort

from the theater. In such an operating environment, dec

sion assistance tools would translate weather data int
decision-quality information for use by mission plannin

rehearsals and simulations. Additionally, much of the im

pacts information could flow seamlessly through the exe

cution process using machine-to-machine interface

which is envisioned to look similar to figure 4.

The term WISR denotes integration of accurate, timely

relevant information about the man-made threats and na

ural portion of the battlespace environment. It is realize

that integration of relevant information into a common pic

ture of battlespace awareness is an evolutionary one—

defined by technology, history, and organizational struc

tures. Technological limitations historically made th

timely analysis, transmission, and display of relevant info

mation problematic. As computational capabilities in

creased, it became possible to perform accurate dat

Operator

Decision

Cycle /

Common

Operating

Picture

Logistics:

Transport

and Delivery

Cycle

ISR:

Collection

and Analysis

Cycle

Weather

Information

Processing

Cycle

Time

Critical

Targeting

Cycle

Figure 3. Weather information processing cycle nested wit

other decision or product cycles and tied to operator dec

sion cycle or common operating picture.
analyses and put them into an easily viewable form fo

consideration by decision makers. Satellite communica

tions today make it possible to move very large amounts o

information into and out of theater. The publication o

Cornerstones of Information Operations in 1997 marke

recognition by the Air Force of this evolution. Comman

and control, IIW, and information warfare or operation

have since become key components of US military strategy

Evolution is still being carried through by organization

that trace their lineage to the Cold War. Ideas presente

here are a means to use instruments of transformation t

integrate all needed information about components of th

operating environment into a single sight picture for th

JFC and his staff.

Strategic Weather in

the Transformation Era

Throughout history, there are numerous examples o

military operations whose planning and execution wer

significantly affected by the natural environment. Perhap

the most famous of these is the D-day invasion of th

European continent during World War II.17 All majo

US/allied/coalition operations in the last 10–12 year

(e.g., Southwest Asia, the Balkans, and now Afghanistan

have been impacted to varying degrees by the natura

environment.18 While everyone knows that the natura

Continuous:

Data Collection, Assimilation,

and Prediction

(steps one and two)

Wx obs from acft;

real-time wx

to cockpit

Tailored applications,

updated based on

current conditions and

operator needs (step three)

Integrate

in CAOC,

COP,

F2T2EA

Cycle

Figure 4. Notional weather information processing cyc

supports full integration into CAOC, common operating pic

ture, and F2T2EA cycle.
environment can impact operations, the nature and degre

of those impacts and implications for subsequent mil

tary actions are not well documented. A notable exceptio

to most publications is the book Battling the Element

Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War by Harold Win

ters and others. This book points out historical cases wher

weather, climate, and terrain had strategic-level impact

on the outcome of conflicts.

For the purposes of this paper, the term strateg

weather is defined as the significant influence of weathe

and/or climate on a nation’s (or coalition’s) ability to attai

its objectives while employing its military and other in

struments of national power. A strategic weather impac

can result from a long-term, cumulative effect (e.g., Russia

winter during Napoléon’s and Hitler’s invasions), or a singl

causative “strategic event” that suddenly changes th

course and outcome of events (e.g., Operation Eagle Claw i

1980). A strategic weather effect should not be somethin

that only historians can recognize in the gaze of 20–20 hind

sight; it is something that ought to be considered in bot

short-term as well as long-term military planning.

Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Weather

Organizations, Roles and Missions

It is important to examine the implications of the abov

definition, since it is the foundation for the discussion tha

follows. Note that strategic weather is not constrained b

spatial or temporal considerations. This is significant be

cause it suggests that a single event at a specific locatio

and time can produce a strategic effect. While this is no

an earth-shattering revelation in the study of military his

tory, it has significance when one considers the futur

missions of a strategic weather center. Such an analysis 

currently under way in AFW, which as a result of the 199

reengineering has defined its production centers as strate

gic, operational, and tactical, with the accordant assump

tion that these centers are tied to primary support at thos

levels of warfare (see Terms and Definitions section). Fig

ure 5 is a schematic representation of the types of product

developed at the three types of centers, using a concep

called the forecast funnel.19
According to the forecast funnel, the strategic-level cen

ter is associated with large spatial and temporal-sca

analysis and forecast products. At the operational leve

the operational weather squadron (OWS)—a regional fore

casting “hub” aligned with numbered air force or forc

supplier to the combatant command—adds more fidelit

through development of its specific, theater-scale prod

ucts. At the tactical level, small-scale forecasts are pro

duced at the combat weather team (CWT), especially ta

lored for individual missions, platforms, and weapon

being employed. As a result of the 1997 reengineerin

considerable staff effort has gone into delineating the task

of the OWS and CWT. However, for reasons that will b

elaborated upon below, there has been little comparativ

effort into defining the roles of the strategic center in th

reengineered AFW organization. The remainder of th

paper shows how employing a long-range planning mod

to today’s changing environment can allow us to make rec

ommendations for strategic weather center roles as th

DOD moves into the transformation era.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

SAME IN PEACE AND WAR

WAR FIGHTER

Strategic Weather Center (1)

Operational Weather

Squadrons (8)

Combat Weather

Teams (132)

Global

Products

Fine-Scale

Theater

Products

Mission-Sca

Two-Way

Information

Figure 5. Forecast Funnel Concept
Strategic Weather Focus:

Now and in the Future

The strategic center, known as the AF Weather Agenc

(AFWA), was formed in 1996 by the merger of AF Glob

Weather Central (AFGWC) and Headquarters Air Weathe

Service. According to its strategic plan, AFWA has two pr

mary missions: accurate, relevant, and timely air and spac

weather information to DOD, coalition, and national user

and standardized training and equipment to Air Forc

Weather.20 A close examination of AFWA reveals an organ

zation with a combination of production center and sta

agency responsibilities. First, as a production center, AFW

provides worldwide large-scale and fine-scale analyses an

forecasts that are used as “starting-point” guidance fo

units at the operational and tactical levels. But, as sug

gested in the mission statement, the strategic center als

provides direct operational and tactical-level products t

DOD, coalition, and certain national users (this last grou

is a legacy of Cold War strategic program support). Second

as a staff agency function, AFWA includes strategic plan

ning and management of technology programs for improv

ing the accuracy and reliability of weather observation

analyses and forecasts, and standardization of training an

equipment used throughout all of the AFW community. 

While there is not much dispute concerning AFWA

staff agency functions, there is, however, considerable de

bate about AFWA’s production side. Should it continue it

myriad product lines geared towards users at the strategi

operational, and even tactical levels or become strictly 

data production facility for large-scale, basic meteorolog

cal fields? Using the strategic weather definition provide

justification for AFWA’s traditional production roles, sinc

both longer-scale trends (e.g., climate anomalies) and sin

gular events can have strategic significance.21 The discus

sion of the traditional weather production cycle and his

torical limitations on computing power and communication

bandwidth also justified the necessity to centralize man

high-visibility functions at the old AFGWC.22 Given today

resource-constrained environment and the aforemen

tioned advances in computing power, visualization, an

satellite communications, this historical analogue can n
longer be maintained, even if it is consistent with th

strategic weather definition outlined in this paper. A loo

at both the modified weather production cycle from figur

4 and the forecast funnel concept of figure 5 suggest tha

AFWA should continue with long-term, large-scale prod

ucts and services, and leave the shorter temporal and spa

tial scales to the OWS and CWT. The question here is 

these constructs are adequate to frame the debate. I

other words, are there new, “wide open markets” fo

weather or climate services that will be particularly rele

vant in the transformation era that we might be missing

In order to explore this question, it is necessary to emplo

another approach, one that recognizes the need to addres

the long view of today’s military planners, some of whom

are looking ahead as far as 25–30 years. This paper posit

the need for a strategic planning model that can be used t

analyze long-range documents such as the Quadrennia

Defense Review (QDR), National Military Strategy (NMS

Joint Vision (JV) 2020, and service strategic plans and doc

trine for emergent weather or climate vulnerability issue

Such an analysis will allow the future roles of the strateg

center to be defined within the context of DOD transforma

tion. It is beyond the scope of this paper to perform a com

prehensive analysis for all the planning documents men

tioned above. Instead this paper’s planning model looks a

the 30 September 2001 QDR report to describe an illustra

tive weather or climate issue from it and then outlines th

necessary analysis that would need to be done to develo

recommendations for future strategic center roles and mis

sions over the next 10 years.

Planning Model and Its Application

As illustrated in figure 6, the proposed strategic plannin

model has three main stages: (1) an inputs stage in whic

strategic guidance, concepts, and doctrine are reviewed fo

possible weather and climatic considerations and implica

tions; (2) an analysis and planning stage containing thre

substages, in which significant natural environmental im

pacts are analyzed, technology needs are identified, an

force structures are proposed to integrate and apply th
Strategic Planning Model

Input

National-level Policy

Strategic Guidance

(National Security Strategy, 

National Military Strategy, 

Contingency Planning 

Guidance, Defense Planning 

Guidance, Quadrennial 

Defense Review, Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan)

Concepts and Doctrine

(Joint Vision 2020, Joint 

Pubs, AF CONOPS, AFDDs)

Functional Analysis and Planning

Phenomenology

Environmental interaction 

with impacts on strategic 

guidance, concepts, and 

doctrine

Technology

Technology needed to 

describe impacts 

accurately and exploit 

environment

Force Structure

Force structure needed 

to apply technology, 

execute strategy using 

appropriate concepts 

and doctrine

Operations

Execution of strategy 

using appropriate 

concepts and doctrine

 Execution

Fi

6

St

t

i

Pl

i

M

d

l
technology and accomplish the mission; (3) an operation

stage in which the appropriate force structure applies th

technology in order to execute the strategic concepts an

doctrine.

Inputs

The planning model actually begins outside the field 

consideration, by examining national-level policy an

strategic concept documents such as the National Securit

Strategy, NMS, QDR, and JV 2020. The approach is to ex

amine the broad concepts discussed in these planning doc

uments while asking the following pertinent questions re

garding potential problems with the interface between th

natural environment and strategic-level planning concept

• What roles (if any) do weather and climate play in plan

ning and executing this strategy? 

• Are any portions of the national strategies potential

unrealistic in light of known weather and climatic lim

itations?

An Illustrative example can be drawn from the QDR re

port, which highlights forward deterrence as part of a pa

adigm shift in force planning. Specifically, the report state

“Security cooperation will serve as an important means fo

linking DOD’s strategic direction with those of its allies an

friends. DOD will focus its peacetime overseas activities o

security cooperation to help create favorable balances 

military power in critical areas of the world and to deter ag

gression and coercion. A particular aim of DOD’s securit

cooperation efforts will be to ensure access, interoperabi

ity, and intelligence cooperation, while expanding the rang

of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threat

deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on US terms.”

In this passage and throughout the report, there is a proac

tive approach to national defense that emphasizes interna

tional security and regional actions to ensure that security

This is embodied by the stated US defense strategy of as

suring friends and allies, dissuading adversaries, deterrin

aggression, and decisively defeating any adversary. Give

today’s uncertain world and the many potential causes 

instability, combatant commands have many military an
nonmilitary issues in the area of responsibility (AOR) wit

which to concern themselves. One approach that comba

ant commands have used to address these security con

cerns is the theater security cooperation plan (former

known as theater engagement plan), which is an importan

component of peacetime strategy. An important componen

of this theater security cooperation involves environment

security, which can be described as an application of trad

tional definitions of security (i.e., safety from violence an

military threats) to environmental concerns such as env

ronmental degradation, lack of access to natural resource

et cetera.24

Analysis and Planning

A cursory examination of US Central Command, US Eu

ropean Command, and US Pacific Command environmen

tal security programs reveals activities in each AOR ad

dressing a broad range of issues from environment

remediation and pollution control to natural resourc

usage. But how applicable is this mission to AFW and th

definition of strategic weather? This paper proposes that a

emerging area of strategic weather support is those activ

ties in the environmental security arena that address re

gional vulnerabilities and resource issues caused or influ

enced by single weather events or climatic anomalies. Th

proposal suggests that part of US “preventive” strategy i

key regions should address those environmental issue

that, if ignored, could become a contributing factor to or 

catalyst for geopolitical destabilization and eventual mil

tary involvement (e.g., humanitarian relief, peace enforce

ment, and small-scale contingency). Developing such a ca

pability would fill a large void that is not being addresse

completely by any agency of the US government at presen

and would serve to support peacetime security cooperatio

strategies of combatant commands, agencies outside 

DOD, and high-level decision makers such as the pres

dent, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. Given th

void and the opportunity to fill it, what are AFW’s techno

logical and force structure capabilities in this area?

Phenomenology. The first analysis substage is phe

nomenology, where those potential weather or climat
considerations are identified from the national-level guid

ance and analyzed in terms of verifiable weather or cl

matic impacts. It is important to describe not only weathe

and climate conditions accurately in the theater but also t

understand potential impacts on friendly and enemy sys

tems, people, tactics, operations, and doctrine. Ultimately

we want to be able to predict the effects of the weather an

climate just as accurately as the weather itself or, as 

minimum, give decision makers some “robust scenarios” t

consider. By using this application to environmental secu

rity, the analyst’s next step would be to compile a list o

known weather and climatic phenomena (e.g., drough

anomalies due to El Niño/La Niña, hurricanes or typhoon

and persistent flooding rains) that could potentially im

pact environmental security concerns in the differen

AORs. At this point, we need to assess our ability to mon

itor regional weather and climate properly given th

amount of available data in different areas.25 We may dis

cover that abilities are very limited in certain regions, driv

ing the analyst to identify a technological deficiency for th

next substage of analysis and planning. While we may b

able to analyze the current weather or climate in a region

we also need information about the infrastructure in orde

to make an accurate assessment of potential effects due t

existing or impending weather phenomena. This assess

ment may reveal deficiencies in either understanding o

how different phenomena affect the region of interest or in

adequate knowledge of the region’s infrastructure, agai

leading our analyst to move towards the next substage o

analysis and planning to identify technology needs. Th

output of this substage ought to be a well-thought-out ex

amination of potential new requirements—not propose

solutions. This is an important point because require

ments are often mixed together with potential solutions i

the same investigation—an ill-conceived approach that fre

quently produces disaster for future planners and pro

grammers who might have to implement one or more in

complete solutions.

Technology. Once the requirements from strateg

planning guidance analysis are evaluated, our present ca

pabilities to satisfy those needs using present technology wi

be articulated. This is the substage where we identif
technological deficiencies and areas for DOD science an

technology (S&T) investment.26 Technological deficiencie

can fall into four areas: (1) needs for improving our unde

standing of the phenomenon; (2) needs for improving ou

understanding of the phenomenon’s impact on the pro

jected strategy; (3) needs for improving our prediction o

the phenomenon; and (4) needs for improving our predic

tion of the phenomenon’s impact on the projected strategy

Suppose that in the environmental security example, long

term drought and the influence of deforestation on re

gional climate are identified as needing further study. Th

next logical step would be to break down these phenomen

to provide guidance for where the greatest S&T needs exis

as illustrated in figure 7.

If we have identified a requirement to improve our un

derstanding of drought and deforestation’s influence on re

gional climate, it follows logically that we would also nee

to improve our ability to predict these. In case of drough

the simulations used to model these entities encompas

multiple physical domains (atmosphere, soil, and vegeta

tion), suggesting investment in diverse S&T programs t

address them. Deforestation and regional climate predic

tion are two areas that are very challenging to the scien

tific community. The deforestation problem also has th

anthropogenic dimension to it, requiring a combination o

interdisciplinary approaches to understanding it (e.g., re

mote sensing for monitoring change; multidomain physica

simulations to model its effects on the atmosphere an

biosphere; and economic, political, and sociological studie

Figure 7. Science and Technology Requirements Matr

Applied to Drought and Deforestation

Phenomena Effects

Can we analyze Can we analyze

Analysis regional drought and regional drought and

deforestation? deforestation effects?

Can we predict Can we predict

Prediction regional drought and regional drought and

deforestation? deforestation effects?
to understand its causes). The requirements analysis ca

quickly take us into areas outside of our functiona

purview. This action illustrates the planning model’s flex

bility and adaptability to other functional areas; it does no

produce a weather-centric view with stovepiped solution

Continuing the investigation, the need to understand th

phenomena’s effects on the region of interest could poten

tially lead to S&T requirements for developing interlinke

cause-and-effect models (environmental, political, an

economic) and geographic information systems that can b

used to examine the region’s infrastructure and identi

vulnerabilities. Once the technology deficiencies have bee

identified, the S&T community will need to inform us of th

resource requirements in terms of time, talent, and fund

ing to produce potential solutions to our identified need

This dialogue among the scientists, academicians, an

military planners leads to the next substage of the analy

sis in which force structure requirements are examined.

Force Structure. In the force structure substage, we loo

at our present and projected resources (personnel and ma

teriel) and evaluate our posture in terms of strengths an

deficiencies identified in the previous two substages. As 

development template, the planning model allows us to pro

ject integration of new analysis and prediction technologie

into our operations and build the objective AFW force struc

ture and operations concepts needed to apply the new tech

nology and execute tomorrow’s operations. The importanc

of saving the organizational considerations for the last pa

of the analysis cannot be understated. Many failed reorgan

ization attempts were a result of putting the reorganizatio

at the front of the analysis instead of looking at the curren

mission and process and future requirements and deficien

cies first. We must build a force structure that optimizes ou

strengths and minimizes our vulnerabilities. Going back t

the environmental security illustration, we must examin

our organizational structure and personnel qualifications t

see if AFW is postured to perform any of the tasks we iden

tified in the previous substages. For example, in order t

provide regional climatic monitoring, effects analysis, an

prediction, it is likely that AFW would need to send selecte

personnel to the appropriate academic institutions to re

ceive the graduate education and training necessary to wor
in this arena. It would also be necessary to examine th

AFWA’s ability to take on this new strategic weather mis

sion. The AF Combat Climatology Center (a part of AFWA

located in Asheville, North Carolina, could be a likely organ

ization in which to house this function, especially given the

collocation with the National Climatic Data Center of the Na

tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and th

Navy’s Fleet Numerical METOC Detachment. All of these re

source considerations would have to be investigated an

fleshed out in order to determine the feasibility of taking o

such a new and challenging mission area. 

Operations

It is only after completing the analysis and plannin

stage do we enter the operations stage where we actual

employ the technology and resources identified and deve

oped in the previous stages. It is also in this stage that an

lessons learned during routine and contingency operation

are identified for evaluation in the analysis and plannin

stage, showing that the model is not a linear progressio

but a continuous process that is always being refined an

updated.27 The importance of this stage cannot be ove

looked, because it provides a critical link between the op

erational community, and the acquisition and S&T com

munities that must be two-way. Importantly, the strateg

planning model can be employed by any functional com

munity to do long-range analysis and planning, since 

takes an “outside in” approach to requirements analysis b

starting with strategic guidance outside the functiona

specialty. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper examined AF weather and climate services a

the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. 

introduced a working definition for strategic weather an

two conceptual models: the first model described weathe

product preparation at the operational and tactical level

and the second model was used for long-term plannin

This paper showed that in order to attain a truly consol

dated “sight picture” of the battlespace, it is necessary t
totally integrate the man-made and natural elements o

the battle environment. Full integration of these factors a

the tactical and operational levels was described as WISR

Implementation of WISR will optimize the target kill cyc

F2T2EA by integrating robust natural environmental in

formation from ISR platforms into the weather analys

and prediction database and providing real-time, relevan

weather information to the cockpit during mission execu

tion. WISR will enhance air forces’ ability to execute pre

dictive battlespace awareness and persistent ISR over th

battlespace.

The strategic planning model was used to illustrate ho

national-level policy documents such as the QDR can b

analyzed for emerging natural environmental issues at th

strategic level. Using the preventive strategy outlined i

the QDR 2001 report, we considered the importance of the

ater security cooperation plans to the combatant com

mands and how environmental security supports thos

plans. We discussed the need to develop regional weathe

or climate monitoring and prediction capabilities to sup

port the combatant commands’ environmental securit

programs and other high-level government decision mak

ers. These services would help facilitate regional securit

and peacetime engagement by identifying fragile infra

structures vulnerable to prolonged climatic abnormalitie

such as persistent drought or singular natural disaster

especially hurricanes and typhoons. The importance o

identifying such vulnerabilities lies in the potential fo

geopolitical instability given the right set of circumstance

and events.28 The model was then used to show how suc

an emerging mission requirement would necessitate sc

ence and technology investments, specific education an

training requirements for personnel, and appropriate orga

nizational changes at the strategic center in order to buil

the capabilities needed to support this emerging strateg

weather mission area. The importance of saving the forc

structure decisions for the last step was emphasized, a

well as the need for the operational and acquisition or lab

oratory communities to establish dialogue with one an

other during the operational stage. 
There were several proposals developed as a result of th

analysis in this paper. At the operational and tactical lev

els, the following recommendations are made.

• Develop and implement the ability to collect and trans

mit in-situ weather observations from any manned an

unmanned platforms in the theater of operations. 

• Develop and implement the ability to continuously as

similate the increased observational data stream int

predictive models to build a four-dimensional METO

database from which tailored applications and decisio

aids can be developed and to provide environmenta

situational awareness through integration into th

COP in the CAOC.

• Develop and implement the ability to deliver fine-scal

accurate, real-time weather impacts information to th

cockpit in order to shorten the decision cycle for time

critical targeting actions.

At the strategic level, the following recommendations ar

made.

• AFW to implement the strategic planning model.

• Develop a capability to perform regional climatic mon

toring and short-term (on the order of months) climat

prediction.

• Develop the capability to perform regional climatic im

pacts analysis and facilitate the integration of that in

formation along with other types of demographic info

mation for use by combatant command staffs, U

government agencies, and high-level decision maker

such as the president, secretary of state, and secretar

of defense.

As DOD moves into the transformation era, it is time t

look at old missions in new ways, develop capabilities fo

challenging new missions, and find ways to keep the peac

in many troubled parts of the world. The new reality is tha

considerations of the combatant commands in their re

spective AORs include many nonmilitary as well as militar

concerns. Among these concerns are environmentally re

lated issues such as water resources and threats to fragi

infrastructures from natural disasters and climat
anomalies. This should be seen as part of an overall stra

egy to prevent wars so that we do not have to fight them

The challenges to AFW in this transformation are not un

like those encountered by our predecessors at the begin

ning of the Cold War and during the infancy of the US spac

program. AFW is no stranger to transformation. The mis

sion ahead is to rise to the occasion with a combination 

technology and those old-fashioned ethics that have alway

gotten the job done—ingenuity, flexibility, and persistence

Notes

1. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary,1990, s.v. “transform.”

2. For a thorough discussion of the different points of view concernin

transformation, see Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the F

ture of Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 7–3

3. Colin Robinson, Fact Sheet: DOD Office of Force Transformatio

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 14 June 2002), n.p

on-line, Internet, available from http://www.cdi.org/mrp/oft.cfm.

4. Headquarters US Air Force Directorate of Weather, Air For

Weather Reengineering, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from https:/

www.xo.hq.af.mil/xow/XOW%20page.html. 

5. See John M. Lanicci, “Integrating Weather Exploitation into Ai

power and Space Power Doctrine,” Airpower Journal, summer 199

54–56, for a discussion of how a combination of recent policy trends an

challenging weather can put an increased strain on the ability of air an

space power assets to execute its missions, n.p., on-line, Internet, ava

able from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98

sum98/lanicci.pdf. 

6. For brief descriptions of the F2T2EA, predictive battlespace awar

ness, and persistent ISR concepts, see US Air Force Posture Stateme

2002 (Washington, D.C., 2002), 12–13, 56–57, on-line, Internet, availab

from http://www.af.mil/lib/posture2002.pdf. 

7. See, for example, Bruce R. Kitchen, “Meteorological and Ocean

graphic Conditions,” Joint Force Quarterly, spring 1998, 38–43; and Joi

Publication 3-59, Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures f

Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations, 23 March 1999, n.p., o

line, Internet, available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs

jp3_59.pdf. 

8. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operation

4 January 2002, 35–36, on-line, Internet, available from https:/

www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp.

9. AFDD 2-5.2, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Oper

tions, 21 April 1999, 1, on-line, Internet, available from https://www

doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp.

10. Ibid., 2.
11. A brief history of the Air Force Command and Control and Intel

gence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Center (AFC2ISRC) can be found 

http://www2.acc.af.mil/ac2isrc/History.asp. 

12. Lt Col H. L. Massie Jr., Col D. C. Pearson, Maj K. S. Smith, an

R. Szymber, “Knowing the Weather” (paper presented at the Battlespa

Atmospherics Conference, US Army Research Lab, White Sands, N. Mex

1995), 56.

13. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The NRO Declassified (Washington, D.C.: N

tional Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 35, 27 Septemb

2000), n.p., on-line, Internet, available from http://www.gwu.edu

~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/; and David A. Fulghum and Robert Wa

“U.S. Shifts Cyberwar to Combat Commands,” Aviation Week & Space Tec

nology, 26 February 2001, n.p., on-line, Internet, available from http:/

www.aviationnow.com/content/publication/awst/20010226/avi_stor.htm

14. David Sauter, Mario A. Torres, Steve McGee, and Richard Okrasi

ski, “Leveraging Command and Control Technology to Provide Advance

Environmental Effects Decision Aids on the Battlefield,” 5th Internation

Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, 24–26 Oct

ber 2000, Canberra, Australia, n.p., on-line, Internet, available fro

http://www.dodccrp.org/2000ICCRTS/cd/papers/Track5/066.pdf. 

15. According to the Air Force Handbook for the 107th Congress, Se

ond Session, p. 62, Smart Tankers are intended to “extend the Multi-Se

sor Command and Control constellation while performing their prima

air refueling mission; they are not a stand-alone C2ISR platforms (sic

The idea being proposed in the present paper is to piggyback on the

C2ISR initiatives by adding the capabilities to collect and transmit rea

time weather observations from these and other aircraft operating in th

region. Many commercial airliners today collect and transmit in-si

weather observations from on-board sensors.

16. Real-time information to the cockpit is a concept that has bee

around a long time. There are many different “flavors” of this program d

pending on the type of aircraft and its primary mission. There are a num

ber of real-time weather-to-the-cockpit initiatives, primarily within th

civilian community. The best starting point to learn about these program

is the NASA Aviation Weather Information (AWIN) homepage, 

http://awin.larc.nasa.gov/overview.htm. 

17. James Martin Stagg, Forecast for Overlord, 6 June 1944 (New Yor

W. W. Norton & Co., 1971); Roger H. Shaw and William Innes, eds., Som

Meteorological Aspects of the D-Day Invasion of Europe, 6 June 1944: Pr

ceedings of a Symposium, 19 May 1984, Fort Ord, California (Bosto

Mass.: American Meteorological Society, 1986); John F. Fuller, Thor’s L

gion’s: Weather Support to the US Air Force and Army 1937–1987 (Bosto

Mass.: American Meteorological Society, 1990), 85–100; Harold A. Wi

ters, Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Ba

timore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 23–32; and Charl

C. Bates and John F. Fuller, America’s Weather Warriors: 1814–1985 (Co

lege Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1986), 88–95.

18. General Accounting Office (GAO), Operation Desert Storm: Evaluatio

of the Air Campaign: Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee o

Commerce, House of Representatives/United States General Accountin
Office (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1997); and Department of Defens

Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report to Congress (Washingto

D.C.: DOD, 2000).

19. L. W. Snellman, 9th Conference Weather Forecasting and Analysi

28 June–1 July 1982 (Seattle, Wash.: American Meteorological Societ

1982), 13–16.

20. Air Force Weather Agency, 2001/2002 Strategic Plan (Offutt AF

Nebr.: 8 May 2002).

21. See Fuller, 223. The author provides an interesting account 

how several high-visibility missions were eventually consolidated at A

Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC).

22. Fuller, 375, 378–79. Fuller gives a good historical account of ho

computational costs influenced the centralization of computer forecastin

functions at AFGWC. 

23. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, 20. 

24. Heather A. Smith, “Defining Environmental Security,” Journal 

Military and Strategic Studies, winter 2000/spring 2001, n.p., on-line, I

ternet, available from http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/journal/art

cle3.html.

25. There is a great amount of interest in the scientific community 

climate monitoring and prediction, although much of this stems from i

sues such as global warming. See Richard Goody et al., “Why Monitor th

Climate?” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, June 200

873–78.

26. It should be noted that there might exist S&T programs in oth

sectors of the government, academia, or private industry that can addre

our technology needs, in which case it would be those DOD-specific r

quirements that may require S&T investment. 

27. One of the more spectacular lessons learned came from Wor

War II, when persistent operational problems encountered during strat

gic bombing campaigns in Europe and the Pacific led to the “discovery” 

the jet stream. For more on this topic, see Fuller, 201–2; and Norman 

Phillips, “Carl-Gustaf Rossby: His Times, Personality, and Actions,” Bu

letin of the American Meteorological Society, June 1998, 1097–1112.

28. A seminal reference in this area is Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, E

vironment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universi

Press, 1999).
Terms and Definitions

climate. The composite or generally prevailing weather con

ditions of a region, throughout the year, averaged over 

series of years. (C. David Whiteman, Meteorology Glo

sary, 1999). Available from http://www.geog.ubc.ca

courses/geog102/Resources/G102Glossary.html.)

operational level of war. The level of war at which cam

paigns and major operations are planned, conducted

and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives withi

theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this lev

link tactics and strategy by establishing operational ob

jectives needed to accomplish the strategic objective

sequencing events to achieve the operational objective

initiating actions, and applying resources to bring abou

and sustain these events. These activities imply 

broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; the

ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactic

forces, and provide the means by which tactical suc

cesses are exploited to achieve strategic objective

(Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Di

tionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 200

as amended through 14 August 2002.)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation

often as a member of a group of nations, determine

national or multinational (alliance or coalition) securit

objectives and guidance, and develops and uses na

tional resources to accomplish these objectives. Activ

ties at this level establish national and multinationa

military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limit

and assess risks for the use of military and other in

struments of national power; develop global plans o

theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and pro

vide military forces and other capabilities in acco

dance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles an

engagements are planned and executed to accomplis

military objectives assigned to tactical units or tas

forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordere

arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in re

lation to each other and to the enemy to achieve com

bat objectives. (JP 1-02)

29
weather. The state of the atmosphere with respect to wind

temperature, cloudiness, moisture, pressure, et cetera

It should be noted that in the context of this paper, th

atmosphere is defined to include the region extendin

into the near-space environment, thus allowing fo

consideration of space weather in our analyses. (White

man)

30