DEPA

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TMENT F THE ARMY •

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THI S W E' L L D E F E N D

Joint Publication 3-41

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Response

09 September 2016

i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides joint doctrine for military domestic or international response 

to minimize the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance 

of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations, and it provides considerations for 

military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, 

and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of 

authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes 

joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed 

Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this 

publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the 

mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the 

accomplishment of objectives. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, the Services, combat support agencies, and the National Guard. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in 

coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current 

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance 

or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified 

by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, 

commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and 

procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

 KEVIN D. SCOTT

 Vice Admiral, USN 

 Director, Joint Force Development 
Preface 

ii JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-41 

DATED 21 JUNE 2012 

• Incorporates a new title highlighting the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) 

integrated chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response 

enterprise capabilities and joint force matrix. 

• Characterizes CBRN response (previously consequence management), as a unique 

DOD response capability and responsibility. 

• Updates CBRN response construct. 

• Clarifies DOD’s supporting roles during an international chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear response (previously foreign consequence management) 

on foreign territory, regardless of who is designated the United States Government 

lead. 

• Clarifies the relationships of “unity of command” and “unity of effort” for a dualstatus commander (DSC). 

• Highlights the DSC will execute command and control separately over both federal 

and state military forces, through their respective chains of command. 

• Highlights the importance of the CBRN response force to minimize the effects of a 

CBRN incident. 

• Updates to Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise Assets,” to reflect the overall joint 

force CBRN response construct. 

• Adds or revises two definitions and deletes two CBRN-related definitions in Joint 

Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terminology. 

• Reduces redundancies and improves doctrinal guidance relationships between JP 

3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; 

JP 3-27, Homeland Defense; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; JP 3-29, 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance; and JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction.
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ vii 

CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

 General ..................................................................................................................... I-1 

 Domestic, International, and Department of Defense-Led Situations ...................... I-3 

 Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response .................................................................................................................. I-4 

 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response .................................... I-4 

 General Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response ................................................................................................... I-10 

 Limitation and Mitigation Strategies ...................................................................... I-29 

CHAPTER II 

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR 

RESPONSE 

 General .................................................................................................................... II-1 

 Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets .................................................... II-3 

 Command Relationships ........................................................................................ II-12 

 Considerations ....................................................................................................... II-17 

 Unique Planning Considerations in the Domestic Operational Environment ....... II-27 

 Applicable Laws and Agreements in the Domestic Operational Environment ..... II-28 

CHAPTER III 

INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, 

AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE 

 General .................................................................................................................. III-1 

 Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets .................................................. III-6 

 Command Relationships ..................................................................................... III-11 

 Affected Nation Considerations ......................................................................... III-14 

 Joint and Multinational Force Considerations ..................................................... III-16 

 Unique Planning Considerations for Operations Outside of the United States ... III-17 

 Applicable International Laws and Agreements .................................................. III-19 

CHAPTER IV 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-LED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE 

 General .................................................................................................................. IV-1 

 Roles and Responsibilities .................................................................................... IV-3 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-41 

 Command Relationships ....................................................................................... IV-4 

 Joint Force Considerations ................................................................................... IV-4 

 Planning Considerations During Military Operations .......................................... IV-4 

 General Planning Considerations .......................................................................... IV-6 

APPENDIX 

A Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols ..... A-1 

B Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets ................................... B-1 

C Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Enterprise ........................................................................................ C-1 

D References ....................................................................................................... D-1 

E Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. E-1 

GLOSSARY 

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................ GL-1 

Part II Terms and Definitions ........................................................................... GL-7 

FIGURE 

I-1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Responses ................... I-2 

I-2 Control Zones .......................................................................................... I-26 

II-1 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response .... II-2 

II-2 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

Command Relationships ......................................................................... II-13 

II-3 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Activities 

by Operational Phase .............................................................................. II-21 

III-1 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response ................................................................................................. III-2 

III-2 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Affected State 

 Coordination Process ............................................................................... III-4 

C-1 Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise .................................................................... C-2 
vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

• Provides Overview of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Response 

• Discusses Domestic CBRN Response 

• Covers International CBRN Response 

• Explains Department of Defense-Led CBRN Response 

Overview of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

General This publication focuses on the US military 

response to minimize the effects of a chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 

incident, regardless of who is designated the 

United States Government (USG) lead. This 

includes the response to both deliberate and 

inadvertent CBRN hazards. As preparation is a 

requirement for effective response efforts, 

emergency preparedness activities are discussed as 

well. A US military response is not automatically 

triggered by a CBRN incident. 

Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear 

(CBRN) Incident 

A CBRN incident is any occurrence resulting from 

the use of CBRN weapons and devices; the 

emergence of secondary hazards arising from 

counterforce targeting; or the release of toxic 

industrial materials (TIMs) into the environment, 

involving the emergence of CBRN hazards. A 

USG response would normally only be required 

when local, territorial, tribal, or state authorities 

are overwhelmed by the incident; if there are 

shortfalls in local, territorial, tribal, state, or federal 

response capabilities, other USG departments and 

agencies may require a defense support of civil 

authorities (DSCA) request for Department of 

Defense (DOD) assistance. For CBRN incidents 

occurring on foreign soil, either a host nation (HN) 

or international organization could request a USG 

response. An incident likely to create a harmful 

domestic effect, such as the spread of infectious 

disease or radioactive material across borders into 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-41 

the US, may require the President to declare an 

emergency under the National Emergencies Act. 

Domestic, International, and 

Department of Defense-Led 

Situations 

The geographic scope of the domestic CBRN 

response is associated with the US homeland. The 

homeland is the physical region that includes the 

continental US, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, and 

surrounding territorial waters and airspace. 

Generally, DOD, when tasked, supports 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) within 

the guidelines of the National Response 

Framework (NRF) and National Incident 

Management System. DOD normally supports the 

Department of State (DOS) as the lead agency in 

USG international chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear response (ICBRN-R) 

efforts. In cases where the HN lacks the capability 

to request assistance or DOS lacks an established 

diplomatic presence, the President may direct 

DOD to lead an ICBRN-R mission. DOD may 

lead USG domestic and ICBRN-R efforts when 

directed to do so by the President. In these cases, 

DOD is the supported agency for response until 

they are able to transition lead agency 

responsibilities to another interagency CBRN lead: 

DHS in the case of a domestic response and DOS 

in the case of an international response. DOD will 

always be the lead agency for a CBRN response on 

military installations, in cases where the CBRN 

hazard emerges from DOD property and where 

required by law. DOD will also lead CBRN 

responses during combat operations, military 

transportation mishaps, storage and/or weapon 

handling mishaps, and other CBRN incidents in 

which DOD is deemed responsible.

Emergency Preparedness for 

CBRN Response 

CBRN response provides the operational 

framework for authorized measures DOD 

undertakes in preparation for anticipated CBRN 

incidents to minimize the loss of life and property 

and to assist with the response and any required 

short-term recovery. This includes having plans, 

policies, procedures, training, and equipment 

necessary to effectively respond to CBRN 

incidents. 
 Executive Summary 

ix 

CBRN Response CBRN response considers the total capabilities and 

limitations of affected civil authorities, from the 

local first responders, up through the state 

response, to the federal response level. When civil 

authorities, up to, and including the federal level, 

lack necessary CBRN capabilities to effectively 

respond to the situation, military CBRN support is 

requested. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(CJCS) issuances frame US military support of a 

USG response for domestic and international 

CBRN incidents. 

General Planning Considerations 

for CBRN Response 

Planning considerations for responding to CBRN 

incidents are influenced by a variety of factors, 

including USG policy decisions, lessons learned 

from responses to previous incidents, capability 

limitations, time, current military operations, 

studies and analyses, modeling and simulation, 

live-agent tests and experiments, as well as 

analysis and exercise of national planning 

scenarios. Military planners need to be able to 

translate a military analysis of available 

capabilities for use in a CBRN response. 

Limitation and Mitigation 

Strategies 

The risk management process plays an integral role 

assisting commanders in making decisions where to 

apply scarce or limited resources, minimizing the 

effects of threats and hazards in order to accomplish 

the mission. Risk management entails developing 

controls and making risk decisions, implementing 

those controls, and then supervising and evaluating. 

Any CBRN response must be rapid in order to save 

lives and minimize the overall impact of the incident. 

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

General Domestic CBRN response is a type of support 

provided within the DSCA mission, conducted by 

DOD forces in order to save lives, protect property 

and the environment, and meet basic human needs. 

As a DSCA activity, domestic CBRN response 

focuses on providing DOD support directly to the 

civil authorities leading the CBRN response at the 

incident. State and local governments are closest 

to those affected by incidents, and have a lead role 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-41 

in response and recovery. A joint task force (JTF) 

typically leads DOD forces supporting domestic 

CBRN response, providing command and control 

(C2) of forces trained and equipped for this 

mission, as well as contingency sourced 

conventional forces. 

Roles and Responsibilities Domestic CBRN response is managed at the 

lowest possible level, with DOD providing support 

as directed. When the Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) approves a request for DSCA during a 

CBRN incident, Commander, United States 

Northern Command, and Commander, United 

States Pacific Command, are the supported 

geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) for 

CBRN responses within their respective areas of 

responsibility (AORs) as designated in the Unified 

Command Plan for a federal response. DOD 

supports the NRF primary and coordinating 

agencies during domestic CBRN response 

operations. The operational chain of command for 

federal forces remains with the GCC; the 

operational chain of command for state controlled 

National Guard forces remains with the governor.

Command Relationships Military forces always remain under the assigned 

C2 as established by either Title 10, United States 

Code (USC); Title 14, USC; Title 32, USC; or in 

state active duty. A dual-status commander may 

be utilized in a domestic CBRN response in order 

to facilitate unity of command for participating 

federal forces and also, unity of effort between 

federal and state military forces operating within a 

single state. Based on the magnitude, type of 

incident, and anticipated level of resource 

involvement, the supported combatant commander 

(CCDR) may utilize a JTF to command federal 

(Title 10, USC) military activities in support of the 

incident. If a JTF is established, consistent with 

operational requirements, its C2 element is 

colocated at the joint field office and included 

within the unified coordination group to ensure 

coordination and unity of effort. 

Considerations Planning considerations are significantly different 

for the joint force conducting CBRN response as 
 Executive Summary 

xi 

the primary mission than for the joint force 

conducting other missions. Requirements for 

protecting joint forces remain a constant priority 

for the joint force commander (JFC), especially 

when operating in a contaminated environment. 

DSCA may also entail unique legal implications 

that need to be considered through all phases of 

CBRN response planning and operations. To be 

effective in such a response, key personnel need to 

fully understand both interagency and CBRN 

response techniques and procedures. JTF-Civil 

Support can function as the core JTF headquarters 

element. 

Unique Planning Considerations 

in the Domestic Operational 

Environment 

Unique planning considerations include: resources 

provided by a designated base support installation, 

United States Army Corps of Engineers services, 

mortuary affairs assistance, decontamination 

planning, and control zones. 

International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

General ICBRN-R is assistance provided by the USG to an 

impacted nation to respond to the effects of a 

deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident on 

foreign territory. DOD’s CBRN response includes 

immediate life saving measures for the affected 

HN population, as well as efforts to protect US 

citizens and Armed Forces abroad, as well as those 

of its friends and allies, in order to minimize 

human casualties and to provide temporary 

associated essential services. Primary 

responsibility for responding to an international 

CBRN incident resides with the impacted nation, 

unless otherwise stipulated under relevant 

international agreements. ICBRN-R applies to 

international incidents involving the deliberate or 

inadvertent release of CBRN materials, including 

toxic industrial chemicals and TIMs. It does not 

apply to the following activities: 

 Acts of nature or acts of man which do not 

involve CBRN materials. Response to such 

incidents is conducted as foreign disaster relief 

operations in accordance with Department of 

Defense Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster 

Relief (FDR). 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-41 

 CBRN incidents that are the direct result of US 

military operations in a foreign country where 

DOS does not have an established presence. 

Roles and Responsibilities Primary responsibility for responding to, 

managing, and mitigating the consequences of an 

international CBRN incident resides with the 

affected nation’s government. When 

overwhelmed, the impacted nation is responsible 

for requesting international assistance and sharing 

all relevant information about the CBRN incident 

with international partners. Normally, all USG 

support to the affected nation will be coordinated 

by the responsible chief of mission (COM) and 

country team. All matters requiring DOS review 

or approval should be submitted to the COM. The 

CJCS reviews all requests for ICBRN-R. CJCS 

assesses whether US forces are able and available 

to support ICBRN-R operations concurrent with 

any on-going military operations. CJCS develops 

US military strategy, policy, and positions to 

support GCC operational planning and provides 

recommendations for DOD support to USG 

ICBRN-R operations. Each GCC identifies a 

headquarters element to provide the initial incident 

response and serve as the initial C2 element of 

DOD for ICBRN-R operations within their 

respective AOR. When in a supporting role, 

CCDRs provide requested forces and assets to the 

supported GCCs. As directed by SecDef, 

Commander, United States Transportation 

Command, plans and prepares to move selected 

DOD forces and identified elements, equipment, 

supplies, and other commodities and those of other 

USG departments and agencies, the impacted 

nation, and international partners in support of a 

President-directed ICBRN-R and/or other military 

CBRN response assistance operations. Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) provides 

operational and technical advice and support to 

DOD components and other USG departments and 

agencies, as requested and approved regarding 

ICBRN-R operations. As in the US, if a CBRN 

incident occurs, US commanders on foreign 

territory may, when requested by the impacted 

nation, exercise their immediate response authority 
 Executive Summary 

xiii 

to assist. However, their response is more 

restrictive (i.e., limited to only saving lives) than 

within the US homeland. 

Assets Assets that could respond to an ICBRN-R incident 

include: foreign emergency support team, 

consequence management support team; DTRA 

CBRN military advisory team; the US Armed 

Forces Radiobiology Research Institute; Air Force 

Radiation Assessment Team; the US Marine Corps 

Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force; and 

the United States Army 20th Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command. 

Command Relationships The DOD supports the lead federal agency (LFA) 

during USG ICBRN-R operations, unless 

otherwise directed by the President. DOD forces 

remain under the C2 of the supported CCDR. 

DOS retains responsibility for coordination among 

USG entities. 

Affected Nation Considerations A major part of any ICBRN-R operation is 

augmenting affected nation operations, not 

replacing them. The US embassy within the 

country should identify HN CBRN response 

capabilities in order to maximize the effectiveness 

and efficiency of the USG response. ICBRN-R 

may require specialized equipment such as 

decontamination systems, mobile laboratories, 

field hospitals, medical equipment, and emergency 

shelter. However, the affected nation may have 

safety, interoperability, or other issues with the 

importation and use of such equipment in a CBRN 

response. The affected nation will likely have its 

own guidelines for decontamination. However, 

international standards may also apply to an 

international CBRN incident. 

Joint and Multinational Force 

Considerations 

In general, when conducting ICBRN-R, standing 

rules of engagement (SROE) should be applied. 

However, CCDRs may augment SROE with 

supplemental measures or by submitting 

supplemental measures to SecDef for approval. 

During ICBRN-R operations, the ability of the JTF 

to work with all organizations and groups is 

essential to mission accomplishment. The civil–
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-41 

military operations center is a focal point as the 

primary meeting place of these elements, 

represented by US Service liaisons, military liaisons 

from participating countries, US Office of Foreign 

Disaster Assistance representatives, DOS personnel, 

affected nation representatives, and representatives 

from the United Nations, nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and international 

organizations. 

Applicable International Laws 

and Agreements 

The complexity of ICBRN-R policies, treaties, and 

agreements requires continuous involvement of the 

staff judge advocate or appropriate legal advisor 

with the planning, control, and assessment of 

operations. International law, policies, treaties, 

and agreements to which the US is a signatory 

identify certain rights and obligations that may 

affect joint operations. These legal requirements 

may pose constraints and restraints. 

Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response 

General DOD-led CBRN response operations are generally 

conducted in one of two situations. DOD may be 

directed to coordinate the USG CBRN response in 

a permissive or uncertain environment where the 

DOS has no established diplomatic presence in the 

joint operations area to facilitate LFA activities, or 

there is no functioning HN government to meet 

ICBRN-R requirements. The US military will lead 

CBRN response operations conducted concurrently 

with military operations in hostile environments 

consistent with strategic planning guidance. 

Roles and Responsibilities OSD coordinates JFC requests for support and 

forces with other USG departments and agencies. 

OSD coordinates with other USG departments and 

agencies for the transition or transfer of 

responsibility of CBRN response operations to 

other USG departments and agencies, international 

agencies, or other countries, as appropriate. CJCS, 

through the Joint Staff, coordinates with combatant 

commands and Services to make sure that DODled CBRN response operations are executed
 Executive Summary 

xv 

incompliance with domestic, international, and 

foreign laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. 

Joint Force Considerations One major objective is to conduct DOD-led CBRN 

response operations without jeopardizing critical 

military operations and objectives. However, 

commanders should plan for the diversion of 

combat forces and possible changes to overall end 

states and objectives due to the significance of a 

CBRN incident. 

Planning Considerations During 

Military Operations 

DOD-led CBRN response operations may be 

required to facilitate combat operations, and 

depending on the nature and purpose of the 

activities, may require coordination with response 

operations of domestic civilian authorities, 

multiple countries, partners, and a wide variety of 

international organizations and other NGOs. 

Regardless of the status of an impacted nation 

government or partner nations, international 

organizations, and NGOs will have significant 

equities in the operation. Therefore, JFCs should 

anticipate considerable interagency and 

intergovernmental coordination requirements. 

DOD-led CBRN response operations can occur at 

any point in a campaign. Therefore, these 

operations should be considered as a branch to 

contingency operations. 

General Planning Considerations Many shaping activities take place to support DOD 

efforts to lead CBRN response. These activities 

include joint, interagency, bilateral, and 

multinational CBRN response exercises and 

training; efforts to build partner CBRN response 

capacity; and consultation with partner nations and 

civil authorities. US law, international law, 

policies, treaties, and agreements to which the US 

is a signatory, identify certain rights and 

obligations that may affect DOD-led CBRN 

response operations. These legal requirements 

may pose constraints and restraints and shape the 

planning and execution of operations. 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-41 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides joint doctrine for 

military domestic or international response to 

minimize the effects of a CBRN incident. 
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

OVERVIEW 

1. General 

a. This publication focuses on the US military response to minimize the effects of a 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident, regardless of who is 

designated the United States Government (USG) lead. This includes the response to both 

deliberate and inadvertent CBRN hazards. As preparation is a requirement for effective 

response efforts, emergency preparedness (EP) activities are discussed as well. A US 

military response is not automatically triggered by a CBRN incident. 

(1) CBRN Incidents. A CBRN incident is any occurrence, resulting from the use 

of CBRN weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from 

counterforce targeting; or the release of toxic industrial materials (TIMs) into the 

environment, involving the emergence of CBRN hazards. Domestically, a CBRN incident 

may result in a USG response under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 

Contingency Plan; the President declaring an emergency or a major disaster under the Robert 

T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act or National Emergency Act; and 

response by USG departments and agencies under their own legal and regulatory authorities. 

A USG response would normally only be required when local, territorial, tribal, or state 

authorities are overwhelmed by the incident; if there are shortfalls in local, territorial, tribal, 

state, or federal response capabilities; or other USG departments and agencies may require a 

defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) request for Department of Defense (DOD) 

assistance. For CBRN incidents occurring on foreign soil, either a host nation (HN) or 

international organization could request a USG response. An incident likely to create a 

harmful domestic effect, such as the spread of infectious disease or radioactive material 

across borders into the US, may require the President to declare an emergency under the 

National Emergencies Act. Outside of certain response requirements discussed in DOD 

issuances, an order from the President/Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is typically required for 

DOD CBRN response. 

(2) International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

(ICBRN-R). USG activity that assists foreign governments in responding to the effects from 

an intentional or accidental CBRN incident on foreign territory in order to save and sustain 

lives, stabilize the situation, protect property and the environment, and/or meet basic human 

needs. 

“DOD [Department of Defense] forces will prepare for and, when directed by the 

President of the United States or SecDef [Secretary of Defense], conduct CBRN 

[chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] response operations in defense 

support of civil authorities in the homeland to save lives, protect property and the 

environment, and meet basic human needs in order to reduce the effects of a 

CBRN incident.” 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3125.01, Defense Response to 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the 

Homeland
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-41 

b. USG Approach in Responding to a CBRN Incident. The USG approach when 

responding to and managing the effects of a CBRN incident is vested in CBRN response. 

CBRN response can be described generally as the overarching USG’s capability to prepare for, 

respond to, and recover from the effects of a man-made or natural CBRN incident. When 

required, the USG will coordinate its response to a CBRN incident in one of three ways, based 

on geopolitical situations: normally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the USG 

lead agency for domestic CBRN response. However, other federal agencies, such as the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), may serve as the lead agency depending on the 

location and size of the incident and authorities under which the response is conducted; for an 

incident overseas, excluding homeland areas, the Department of State (DOS) is the USG lead 

agency for ICBRN-R. In either of those situations, and when directed, DOD typically provides 

support to the appropriate USG lead; lastly, a scenario could require DOD to lead CBRN 

response when a HN is unable to respond effectively or DOS is unable to lead the USG 

response. This scenario occurs during ongoing military operations, when a nation is unable to 

provide an official request for support, or where DOS does not have an established presence. 

c. DOD Perspectives of CBRN Response. DOD CBRN response falls under one of 

three distinct constructs (see Figure I-1). 

Figure I-1. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Responses 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Response Environments

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Responses

Ends: CBRN effects are neutralized, contained, and minimized.

Means: Fully integrated US and partner nation capabilities linked across components and 

echelons of command. 

Ways: Simultaneous and synchronized operations focused to contain and then minimize hazard 

effects through security operations, reconnaissance, decontamination, provision of 

essential services, and rapid transition to appropriate authority where necessary. Key 

elements include: coordination of response with partners; rapid response and hazard 

reduction; short-term remediation and restoration of essential services and facilities; and 

effective communications to sustain assurance and dissuasion.

Domestic

CBRN Response

Department of 

Defense 

CBRN Response

International 

CBRN Response

Lead Federal Agency:

Department of Homeland 

Security or Department 

of Defense

Lead Federal Agency:

Department of Defense

Lead Federal Agency:

Department of State or 

Department of Defense
 Overview 

I-3 

(1) DOD conducts domestic CBRN response in order to save lives, protect property 

and the environment, and meet basic human needs. 

(a) Domestic CBRN response is a component of the DSCA mission when DHS 

leads the USG domestic CBRN response effort. See Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, Defense 

Support of Civil Authorities, for more information. 

(b) Domestic CBRN response is a component of the homeland defense (HD) 

mission when DOD leads the USG domestic CBRN response effort. See JP 3-27, Homeland 

Defense, for more information. 

(2) DOD conducts ICBRN-R in order to provide immediate, lifesaving assistance, 

including emergency provision of food, water, shelter, and medical aid to affected 

populations overseas. Additionally, DOD conducts ICBRN-R to protect US citizens and US 

Armed Forces abroad in order to minimize human casualties and provide temporary 

associated essential services. ICBRN-R is conducted concurrently with foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA) mission whether DOS or DOD leads the USG response effort. See JP 3-

29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for more information. 

(3) When directed, DOD can lead USG domestic CBRN response and ICBRN-R 

efforts and will always lead CBRN response on military installations, and in cases with 

CBRN hazards emerging during military operations (including combat, transportation, and 

storage) to protect personnel, property, and the environment in accordance with (IAW) 

existing laws and regulations.

2. Domestic, International, and Department of Defense-Led Situations 

a. Joint forces may respond to CBRN incidents under several different situations 

characterized as domestic, international, and DOD-led. Both the geographic location and the 

political or diplomatic context factor into the selection of the USG lead for a CBRN incident 

response. 

(1) Domestic Response. The geographic scope of the domestic CBRN response is 

associated with the US homeland. The homeland is the physical region that includes the 

continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, and surrounding 

territorial waters and airspace. For most domestic CBRN incidents, when requested by the 

affected state, tribe, or territory, DHS normally leads and coordinates the federal 

government’s incident management efforts to include the resources utilized in responding to, 

or recovering from, terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. Generally, DOD, 

when tasked, supports DHS within the guidelines of the National Response Framework 

(NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS). The complex and unique 

aspects of domestic CBRN response are detailed in Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.” 

(2) International Response. DOD normally supports DOS as the lead agency in 

USG ICBRN-R efforts. A CBRN response that takes place in a permissive international 

operational environment requires a request for ICBRN-R to originate from an affected nation 

through DOS. In cases where the HN lacks the capability to request assistance or DOS lacks 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-41 

an established diplomatic presence, the President may direct DOD to lead an ICBRN-R 

mission. 

(3) DOD-Led Response. DOD may lead USG domestic and ICBRN-R efforts 

when directed to do so by the President. In these cases, DOD is the supported agency for 

response until they are able to transition lead agency responsibilities to another interagency 

CBRN lead: DHS in the case of a domestic response and DOS in the case of an international 

response. DOD will always be the lead agency for a CBRN response on military 

installations, in cases where the CBRN hazard emerges from DOD property and where 

required by law. DOD will also lead CBRN responses during combat operations, military 

transportation mishaps, storage and/or weapon handling mishaps, and other CBRN incidents 

in which DOD is deemed responsible. In each of these cases, DOD coordinates its CBRN 

response with interagency partners, local civilian authorities, and nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) as appropriate to operate effectively within the operational area. 

b. DOD has an associated preparation and CBRN response framework for specific 

employment of military forces in the overall USG effort in each of the three designated 

CBRN response situations. 

3. Emergency Preparedness for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response 

CBRN response provides the operational framework for authorized measures DOD 

undertakes in preparation for anticipated CBRN incidents to minimize the loss of life and 

property and to assist with the response and any required short-term recovery. This includes 

having plans, policies, procedures, training, and equipment necessary to effectively respond 

to CBRN incidents. 

a. Planning and Policies. All geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) plan and 

execute coordinated responses to CBRN incidents in their areas of responsibility (AORs) 

IAW DOD policies and law. Guidance documents are listed in Appendix A, “Key Legal, 

Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols.” 

b. Training and Equipment. Responding to a CBRN incident requires specialized 

training and equipment, especially in warm (decontamination) and hot (contamination) 

zones. However, DOD CBRN response forces receive required training and equipment to 

minimize CBRN effects under a variety of environmental conditions. Procedures for 

employing DOD forces to effectively respond to the CBRN incidents are detailed in 

subsequent chapters. 

4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

a. CBRN response considers the total capabilities and limitations of affected civil 

authorities, from the local first responders, up through the state response, to the federal 

response level. When civil authorities, up to and including the federal level, lack necessary 

CBRN capabilities to effectively respond to the situation, military CBRN support is 

requested. For all domestic incidents (including a CBRN incident), the NRF and the

National Disaster Recovery Framework provide national guidance for incident management 
 Overview 

I-5 

and acknowledges the DOD as a full partner in the federal response when tasked. The Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 

issuances frame US military support of a USG response for domestic and international 

CBRN incidents. 

b. Domestic CBRN response is the USG’s overall multiple department and agency 

effort to prepare for and respond to a CBRN incident within the US and its territories IAW 

the NRF. Domestic DOD CBRN response (with DOD and/or National Guard [NG] in Title 

10 or Title 32, United States Code [USC], status or in state active duty status) is a form of 

DSCA (with DHS as the lead for coordinating the USG response). A domestic DOD CBRN 

response leverages the total force capabilities of the Active Component (AC) and Reserve 

Component (RC) in the homeland. The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise entails an 

integrated AC and RC approach for DOD to provide a CBRN response. As such, different 

AC and RC elements of the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise may be in direct support of 

different civil entities, at any given time. For example, during a CBRN incident, NG forces 

may remain under the command and control (C2) of a state governor, while Title 10, USC, 

active duty forces may remain under the separate C2 of Commander, United States Northern 

Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) in support of the lead federal agency (LFA). Also, an 

appointment of a dual-status commander (DSC) may be used for C2, when agreed upon by 

SecDef and the state governor. In this case, the DSC would have C2 separately over both 

federal and state military forces, through their respective chains of command. 

c. CBRN Response on DOD Installations. DOD installation commanders develop 

CBRN responses for the installation as part of their installation emergency action plan IAW 

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards; DODI 

6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program; and DODI 6200.03,

Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department of Defense. Note: “CBRN 

response” is captured in the NRF and in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8, National 

Preparedness. Domestically, DOD conducts CBRN response in support of broader USG 

CBRN activities to prepare for, respond to, and provide a foundation to recover from CBRN 

effects, as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The term ICBRN-R applies to USG 

support, through DOS, to an HN and is a valid term, when used accordingly. 

d. In a DOD-led CBRN response, DOD serves as the lead USG agency. However, 

DOD may be supported by other USG organizations. A DOD-led CBRN response would 

typically occur during military operations, a CBRN hazard is involved, or in other situations 

in which DOS lacks sufficient local authority, or presence to lead the USG’s response. 

e. The Joint Force in CBRN Response

(1) Due to the potentially catastrophic nature of a CBRN incident, a DOD joint 

force may be called upon to assist with a domestic CBRN incident prior to civilian resources 

being overwhelmed or depleted. Even prior to being formally tasked to assist, the joint force 

commander (JFC) should strive to develop full situational awareness with respect to the 

incident’s cause to better understand the impact and to prevent further injury or harm to the 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-41 

civilian populace or the responding joint force. Situational awareness is especially important 

in suspected or known adversary attacks for force protection considerations. 

(2) A SecDef-designated JFC is responsible for leading the DOD-led CBRN 

response and its role to manage resources effectively so as to minimize the impact of the 

CBRN incident. 

(3) Many DOD strategies, activities, and programs support preparation for a CBRN 

response. Examples include training, planning, and exercises in both the domestic and 

international environments. 

(4) Security cooperation activities (e.g., multinational exercises, exchanges, 

experimentation, and counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities), while not a part of 

ICBRN-R, still serve to foster positive working relationships and build partner capacity to 

prepare for and respond to CBRN incidents, which may reduce the need for US forces in 

ICBRN-R operations. 

(5) Notional Joint Task Force (JTF) Structure. A JTF may be established, or an 

existing one tasked, to provide or facilitate the provision of a variety of CBRN response 

capabilities to minimize the effects of the CBRN incident. These capabilities may be located 

within the current force, or they may be requested from other DOD sources and attached to 

the JTF. The capabilities may be CBRN specific (e.g., CBRN reconnaissance, 

decontamination) or general (e.g., security, transportation), capable of functioning in CBRN 

environment. The composition of each CBRN response element will be based on incident 

type and severity. Possible capabilities the JTF might be tasked to provide or facilitate are 

included in Appendix C, “Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise.” The exact composition of each CBRN response element will 

be based on incident type and severity. 

(a) Command and Control Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Element (C2CRE). This JTF organizational element focuses on the 

overall C2 and management of the CBRN incident, as well as the intra-team 

communications, interagency communications, and ability to provide situational awareness 

to adjacent agencies and supported higher headquarters. The C2CRE is tasked to provide: 

1. Secure, encrypted digital voice and data communications via Nonsecure 

Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)/SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

(SIPRNET)/Global C2 System. 

2. High-speed, secure multimedia communications with reachback 

capability. 

3. Warning reporting services. 

4. Functionality to conduct incident simulation and projection exercises. 

5. Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians (civil affairs). 
 Overview 

I-7 

6. Assistance in transitioning support to civilian authority. 

(b) CBRN Response Reconnaissance and Surveillance Elements. These 

elements provide capabilities to locate, detect, identify, quantify, collect samples, survey, 

observe, monitor, report, and mark contaminated areas. 

(c) CBRN Response Decontamination Elements. These elements support 

methods and technologies required to neutralize or remove hazmat, including chemical 

warfare (CW) agents, TIMs, biological warfare agents, and radiological contamination. The 

capabilities needed for decontamination include: 

1. Rapid assembly and dissemination of the decontamination capability at 

multiple sites. 

2. Decontamination of personnel (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) and 

certain individual equipment. 

(d) CBRN Response Medical Element. These elements support force health 

protection and provides capabilities required for the triage, treatment, initial tracking, and 

transport of casualties involved in a CBRN incident. 

(e) CBRN Response Force Protection Element. These elements support the 

protection of DOD personnel responding to a CBRN incident. Separate security elements 

may be required to provide convoy, airport, military aircraft, seaport, and ship security, as 

appropriate to the mission being performed. Additionally, coordination with USG crime 

scene investigators may be necessary. The force protection element may be called upon for: 

1. Implementing appropriate antiterrorism (AT) measures. 

2. Establishing early warning systems within the JTF operational area. 

3. Providing convoy and patient transport security. 

4. Incident site control, to include entry and exit management. 

(f) Search and Rescue (SAR) Elements. These elements support all 

capabilities necessary to search for and rescue casualties from a contaminated or hazardous 

environment. Casualties are usually decontaminated prior to transit from the incident site. A 

SAR element requires specialized technical rescue training to support the rescue of personnel 

and equipment from a CBRN environment using unique SAR equipment for an urban and 

structural collapse environment 

(g) General Support Element. These elements support all capabilities 

necessary to provide the general support to all the other mission areas and maintain force 

readiness. This includes providing the transportation, maintenance, engineering, and 

personnel support services to enable the effective employment of the other mission areas. 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-41 

Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF headquarters can be found in JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters. Guidelines for obtaining operational contract support 

(OCS) can be found in JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

f. Doctrinal Publication Relationships. Several joint doctrine publications relate to 

DOD CBRN response and provide critical information on employment of forces in a CBRN 

environment. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, shares a 

relationship with several publications within the joint doctrine hierarchy, specifically JP 3-

11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; JP 3-27,

Homeland Defense; JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities; JP 3-29, Foreign 

Humanitarian Assistance; JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; and JP 4-02, 

Joint Health Services. The Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of 

Mass Destruction outlines three end states: no-new weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 

possession, no-WMD use, and minimization of WMD effects. As such, the strategy outlines 

key capabilities that DOD must have to perform effective CBRN response. As for DOD, 

countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) is its efforts against actors of concern to 

curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of 

WMD, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery (see JP 3-40, 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction). 

g. Global Considerations. Whether in WMD form or occurring due to natural events, 

disasters, or accidents, CBRN threats, and any resulting incidents and accidents,may require 

Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Environments, focuses on maintaining the joint forces’ ability to 

continue military operations in a chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) environment. This is done by describing the CBRN 

environment in a strategic context, providing a CBRN defense framework, 

discussing planning and operational considerations, and highlighting the 

complexities of sustainment. Furthermore, this publication carefully 

considers how logistics, personnel services, and health services are critical 

components of military operations in a CBRN environment. 

JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, establishes the Department of Defense (DOD) as 

the lead for response in the homeland defense (HD) mission with support from 

international partners and United States Government (USG) departments and 

agencies. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, details the necessity for DOD to 

simultaneously coordinate its efforts to meet HD and defense support of civil 

authorities mission requirements. 

JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, shares a close relationship with 

JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, as the 

DOD response activities to minimize the effects of a CBRN incident within a 

domestic scenario are provided as defense support of civil authorities 

operations. Both publications address emergency preparedness and 

response, rely on the National Response Framework, and refer the user to the 

associated National Incident Management System for additional guidance on 

incident management. 
 Overview 

I-9 

a coordinated ICBRN-R. The USG partners with other likeminded nations to encourage 

countering of WMD, to promote increased security for storage of all hazardous CBRN 

materials, and also to build an international capacity to respond to global CBRN incidents. 

h. Pandemic Influenza (PI) and Other Infectious Diseases. A pandemic is an 

outbreak of an infectious disease that may be of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin 

occurring over a wide geographic area. A pandemic is unique in that it is not a discrete 

event; rather, it is a prolonged infectious disease environment where military operations, 

including any CBRN response, may continue. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 

uses a three-pillar construct for preparation and response, and can be extended to other 

pandemics, as well. These three pillars are: EP, surveillance and detection, and response 

and containment. DOD plays a major role in the USG effort to contain, mitigate, and reduce 

the spread of PI or infectious diseases. Such actions also help preserve US combat 

capabilities and readiness, support USG efforts to save lives, reduce human suffering, and 

minimize the spread of infection. Additionally, biosurveillance, which relies heavily on 

surveillance and detection, is the process of gathering, integrating, interpreting, and 

communicating essential information related to all-hazards threats or disease activity 

affecting human, animal, or plant health to achieve early detection and warning, contribute to 

overall situational awareness of the health aspects of an incident, and to enable better 

decision making at all levels. 

JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, provides joint doctrine for foreign 

humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. It characterizes foreign 

consequence management as a mission that is common with FHA operations. 

Foreign consequence management operations, now international chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear response (ICBRN-R), may be conducted 

concurrently with foreign disaster relief and humanitarian assistance 

operations. DOD supports USG ICBRN-R operations as part of the USG 

response to CBRN incidents abroad to relieve suffering and avoid further loss 

of life. 

JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, forms the foundation for 

all other joint and Service doctrine for addressing weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) and provides overarching guidelines and principles to 

assist in planning and conducting operations to counter WMD. Countering 

weapons of mass destruction is a continuous campaign and requires a 

coordinated, whole-of-government effort to curtail the conceptualization, 

development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-related 

expertise, materials, and technologies. 

JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, accepts that the joint force commander (JFC), 

at all levels, is faced with the possibility that any operation may have to be 

conducted in a CBRN environment. Therefore, the component command 

surgeons, working with the appointed joint force surgeon/joint task force 

surgeon, have a critical role in guiding and integrating all health services 

capabilities available to the JFC toward mission accomplishment in a CBRN 

environment. 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-41 

(1) EP Within DOD for PI and Infectious Diseases. Throughout a PI or 

infectious disease outbreak, US military forces strive to preserve combat capabilities, 

accomplish assigned missions, and achieve strategic objectives. Implementation of force 

health protection measures is the primary focus throughout the entire spectrum of PI and 

infectious disease preparation, planning, and operations regardless of whether the biological 

hazard is natural, accidental, or of deliberate origin. 

(2) Health Surveillance. Detecting and tracking the spread of an infectious 

disease is key to its containment. Biosurveillance tools are used to detect and track 

biological threats and hazards and monitor any PI or infectious disease outbreaks that arise 

from them. Health threats generate health surveillance requirements in order to document 

and summarize occupational and environmental health (OEH)/CBRN health risk exposures. 

Documentation of relevant OEH/CBRN health risk assessment data is maintained in the 

Defense Occupational and Environmental Health Readiness System. Additional instructions 

regarding health surveillance requirements and developing occupational and environmental 

exposure summaries are found in JP 4-02, Joint Health Services; Navy Tactical Reference 

Publication (NTRP) 4-02.9/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.82-

IP/Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-02.82, Occupational and Environmental Health 

Site Assessment; DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health; Department of Defense Directive 

(DODD) 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance; and the Military Committee 

Memorandum (memorandum issued in the name of the Chairman) (MCM) 0028-07, 

Procedures for Deployment Health Surveillance. 

(3) Response and Containment. DOD CBRN forces should be prepared to 

respond to CBRN incidents during a pandemic. While a pandemic is a medical event and 

not a CBRN event, CBRN capabilities may be called upon to assist in a variety of means 

including but not limited to sampling and decontamination. 

5. General Planning Considerations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response 

a. Planning Considerations Regarding Hazard Effects. Planning considerations for 

responding to CBRN incidents are influenced by a variety of factors, including USG policy 

decisions, lessons learned from responses to previous incidents, capability limitations, time, 

current military operations, studies and analyses, modeling and simulation, live-agent tests 

and experiments, as well as analysis and exercise of national planning scenarios. Military 

planners need to be able to translate a military analysis of available capabilities for use in a 

CBRN response. For more information on possible scenarios, see the National Preparedness 

Guidelines.

(1) The planning process begins with determining and assessing potential CBRN 

responses with respect to the end state the supported combatant commander (CCDR) plans to 

attain. The developed response includes standing contingency plans and procedures to 

determine what forces and capabilities are required in support of requests for assistance 

(RFAs). Accidents may occur at chemical plants, nuclear power plants, or other facilities (to 

include those on DOD installations) that have the potential for release of CBRN material, or 

they may occur during the transportation of TIMs. Intentional acts include use of CBRN 
 Overview 

I-11 

materials by adversaries, sabotage, and acts of terrorism. CBRN materials present hazards 

that can be both immediate and delayed. In some instances, the delayed effects can cause 

significant problems for joint forces and may alter planned operations. In all cases, the 

setting and managing of operational exposure guidance (OEG) by the operational 

commander is a key requirement in protecting forces. 

(2) Chemical Agents, Industrial Chemicals, and Their Effects

(a) The JFC may be required to manage the consequences of a deliberate or 

accidental release of chemical agents (chemical substances intended for use in military 

operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate mainly through their physiological effects) 

or toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) (chemicals developed or manufactured for use in 

industrial operations or research). 

(b) The hazards associated with chemical agent and TIC release vary. Such 

hazards include inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of a lethal or incapacitating dose, as well 

as secondary complications such as asphyxiation, smoke inhalation, and fire. The use of 

appropriately certified personal protective equipment (PPE) is important during responses to 

CBRN incidents involving chemical agents and TICs. 

(c) The scope of CBRN hazards may be quite extensive in an industrialized 

area. Any site that stores or uses TICs may pose a threat to personnel even if the site is 

operating under normal conditions. Industrial accidents or sabotage, such as destruction of a 

large industrial complex, may release these potentially toxic substances. For information on 

TIC hazards, see the current edition of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 

Health Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg, and the US 

Department of Transportation’s Emergency Response Guidebook, 

http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/library/erg. 

For further doctrinal guidance on chemical agents and TICs, their effects, operational 

considerations, and force protection, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; Field Manual (FM) 3-11.9/Marine Corps 

Reference Publication (MCRP) 10-10E.4 [MCRP 3-37.1B]/NTRP 3-11.32/Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.55, Potential Military 

Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds; and ATP 4-02.85/MCRP 3-40A.1 [MCRP 4-

11.1A]/NTRP 4-02.22/AFTTP(I) 3-2.69, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Treatment of Chemical Warfare Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical 

Injuries. 

(3) Biological Hazards and Their Effects

(a) Biological agents are microorganisms and/or biologically derived 

compounds or molecules that cause disease in personnel, plants, or animals; and/or cause the 

deterioration of material. Biological agents are divided into two broad categories: pathogens 

and toxins. Biological hazards from industrial, medical, or commercial toxic industrial 

biologicals can also cause a potential infectious or toxic threat. 
Chapter I 

I-12 JP 3-41 

(b) Infectious diseases represent one of the greatest potential threats due to 

their reproductive ability and incubation period, the time delay from infection to the onset of 

symptom(s). An infectious biological incident anywhere in the world may remain 

undetected for several days to weeks after release due to the incubation periods. Diagnosis 

may be slow as many infectious agents have a slow onset and nonspecific symptoms that 

rapidly escalate in severity. Another compounding problem is that infectious casualties may 

be contagious without showing symptoms specific to the disease as they move from one 

geographic location to another, spreading the range of infection. Additionally, doctors often 

find difficulty in differentiating biological diagnoses as many initial symptoms often 

resemble those of the common cold. Depending on the biological agent, preventive 

measures and treatment are difficult to implement due to factors such as large numbers of 

casualties, ease of travel, and challenges of quarantining. Finally, first responders may be 

among the first casualties, rapidly overwhelming local and government support systems. 

(c) When people are infected, medical facilities may be the first source to 

notice an increase in specific symptoms. Alternatively, the first signs of an attack may be 

unusually high and widespread purchase of over-the-counter medicines by civilians within a 

region. Domestically, hospitals report to their state departments of health and to the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC and National Institutes of Health can 

then recommend steps for containment and treatment. GCCs encounter similar reporting 

processes that serve as warning and information sources. 

(d) Terrorists and other enemy elements may also attempt to use biological 

agents to infect agricultural plants and animals or to contaminate infrastructure, industry, and 

the environment. 

1. Agriculture can be attacked through animals or crops. This type of 

attack can affect a nation’s food supply, economics, and international trade. 

2. Bacteria, fungi, and viruses can be genetically engineered for specific 

functions. An example is an oil-eating bacterium. This technology could be used to 

deteriorate or contaminate industrial supplies or materials. A bacterial pathogen can be 

modified to be resistant to a variety of antibiotics and, thus, could be difficult to treat. 

For further guidance on biological agents, their effects, operational considerations, and 

force protection against biological hazards, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; and ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 

3-40A.3 [4-11.1C]/NTRP 4.02.23/Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 44-156_IP, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties. 

(4) Sources of Radiation and Their Effects

(a) Radiological Sources. Radioactive materials cause damage by ionizing 

effects of neutron, gamma, x-ray, beta, and/or alpha radiation. A population may be exposed 

to radiation intentionally through two primary methods (other than a nuclear detonation): 

radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) and radiological exposure devices (REDs). RDDs and 

REDs require less technical knowledge to build and deploy as compared with a nuclear 
 Overview 

I-13 

device. Also, the radioactive materials used in RDDs and REDs are widely used in 

medicine, agriculture, industry, and research, and thus are far easier to obtain than weaponsgrade uranium or plutonium. Personnel with access to nuclear materials and technical 

knowledge may be able to create an improvised nuclear device. Alternatively, any 

population can be unintentionally exposed to radiation released during an industrial accident 

or a natural disaster involving a nuclear facility, such as a nuclear power plant. 

1. An RDD is an improvised assembly or process, other than a nuclear 

explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, 

damage, or injury. Adversary use of an RDD often called “dirty bomb” and is considered far 

more likely than employment of a nuclear explosive device. A dirty bomb typically 

combines a conventional explosive device (such as a bomb) with radioactive material. Dirty 

bombs are not designed to produce a nuclear detonation. Rather, they produce a small blast 

area, an immediate hazard, and larger areas of residual radiological hazards. The immediate 

blast dispersion incident produces airborne radioactive material. Airborne radioactive 

material contains particles that can be inhaled into the lungs, embedded in open cuts/sores or 

incorporated into food products growing in nearby agricultural areas. 

2. REDs are radioactive sources placed to cause injury or death. 

Constructed from partially or fully unshielded radioactive material, a RED could be hidden 

from sight in a public place, exposing those who pass by. A RED does not distribute 

physical contamination. However, if the seal around the source is broken, radiological 

contamination may occur. The ability of a RED to cause injuries depends on several factors: 

the amount of radioactive material, radionuclide, distance and shielding materials between 

the source and personnel, and the duration and/or frequency of exposure. Unless an 

installation routinely employs radiation detection devices and/or dosimeters, patients 

presenting to a medical facility with acute radiation syndrome (ARS) or radiation sickness 

will likely be the first indication of a RED’s employment. 

(b) When responding to a radiological incident, the commander’s priorities are 

to keep critical missions operating while keeping exposure of all personnel as low as 

reasonably achievable (ALARA). ALARA guidance or parameters should be utilized to 

establish acceptable levels of contamination as prescribed by policy or the appropriate 

authority based on the CBRN incident. Unique post-radiological-incident challenges include 

determining personnel doses, decontamination challenges, hazard duration that measures in 

months to years, and lifelong health concerns for personnel with even low-level radiological 

exposure. The setting and managing of OEG by the operational commander is a key 

requirement in protecting forces. 

For further guidance on the sources of radiation, their effects, and force protection against 

radiological hazards (to include setting and managing OEG), refer to JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; ATP 3-11.32/MCRP 

10-10E.5 [Marine Corps Warfighting Publication {MCWP} 3-37.2]/Navy Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-11.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense; and ATP 

4-02.83/MCRP 3-40A.2 [MCRP 4-11.1B]/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-161(1), Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. 
Chapter I 

I-14 JP 3-41 

For additional information on radiation injuries and ARS, see Medical Management of 

Radiological Casualties Handbook, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, 

https://www.usuhs.edu/sites/default/files/media/afrri/pdf/4edmmrchandbook.pdf, and ATP 

4-02.83/MCRP 3-40A.2 [MCRP 4-11.1B]/NTRP 4-02.21/AFMAN 44-161(I), Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. 

The latter document is the Services’ consensus reference for medically qualified personnel 

on the recognition and treatment of nuclear and radiological casualties. 

(5) Nuclear Environment, Nuclear Detonations, and Their Effects. Nuclear 

detonations cause three types of injuries: blast, thermal, and radiation; as well as additional 

electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects. The type and distribution of casualties depends on the 

weapon (e.g., yield, height of burst), environmental conditions (e.g., weather conditions), 

physical environment (e.g., structure types), and personnel conditions (e.g., age, health, skin 

tone, clothing). 

(a) Blast (pressure) injuries are caused by the overpressure wave traveling 

outwards from the center of the nuclear detonation. The types of injuries are much the same 

as those which occur with conventional explosives. The human body is remarkably resistant 

to overpressure, particularly when compared with rigid structures such as buildings. 

Although many would survive the blast overpressure itself, they will not easily survive the 

crushing injuries incurred during the collapse of buildings from the blast overpressure or the 

impact effects of unintentional projectiles (e.g., flying debris and glass). The majority of 

casualties from blast effects result from the wind generated as the result of the blast 

overpressure. For a 10 kiloton (kt) yield, the velocity of the wind within 1.0–1.6 kilometers 

of ground zero will lift and throw people, causing serious injuries. It will also turn lighter 

objects into projectiles, resulting in impalement injuries (probability of injury increases with 

velocity). Heavier objects may present crushing hazards. 

(b) Thermal (heat) injuries present as flash burns (burns from direct exposure 

to the thermal radiation pulse, typically ultraviolet, visible, and infrared waves) or flame 

burns (burns from materials set afire by the infrared energy wave igniting flammable 

materials). Close to the fireball, the thermal energy is so intense that infrastructure and 

humans are incinerated. Immediate lethality would be 100 percent in close proximity. The 

distance of lethality will vary with nuclear yield, position of the burst relative to the Earth’s 

surface, weather, environment, and how soon casualties can receive medical care. People 

within line of sight of the burst may be subject to burn injuries up to two miles away for a 10 

kt device. The farther away from ground zero a person is, the less severe the burn injury will 

be. Early treatment can reduce mortality rates among the severely burned victims. 

(c) Radiation (electromagnetic waves and/or radioactive particles) injuries 

from a nuclear blast occur from two sources: initial and residual. Initial radiation effects 

occur due to the neutrons and high-energy gamma rays emitted within the first minute after 

detonation of the weapon. Severity of exposure depends on the weapon’s yield, emissions, 

shielding, and distance from the explosion. Residual radiation effects result from either 

fallout or neutron-induced activity. The amount of residual radiation will depend on whether 

the detonation is an air or surface burst (air burst, the fireball does not touch the ground; 

surface burst, the fireball does). A surface burst will cause a tremendous amount of residual 
 Overview 

I-15 

radiation. The fallout hazards from surface bursts are more prevalent due to the presence of 

emissions (typically alphas, betas, and low-energy gammas) generated when unused-fissile 

material mixes with vaporized dirt, debris, and other materials, drawn back into the fireball 

and subsequently deposited downwind. In contrast, neutron-induced activity (when specific 

materials are bombarded by neutrons and become radioactive themselves) occurs more 

prevalently as a result of airbursts. Collectively, these sources are called fallout. The extent 

of fallout depends on the weapon’s yield, type, and height of burst, while the area affected 

depends heavily on the wind. The hazard to personnel depends on the level of radiation 

present in the area, the duration of exposure, the distance of the personnel from the radiation 

area, and any unintended or intended shielding from the contaminated area. 

(d) EMP. An EMP is unlikely to have a direct health threat on individuals. 

However, personnel with pacemakers or other implanted devices may be negatively affected. 

An EMP can also damage electronic equipment, rendering it inoperable, if it is strong enough. 

For further information on EMP effects with graphical representation, refer to the 2008, 

Critical National Infrastructures, Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the 

United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,

www.empcommission.org/docs/A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB.pdf. For further guidance on 

the nuclear weapon effects and hazard considerations, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.

(6) Impacts of CBRN Incidents on Infrastructure 

(a) A CBRN incident can disrupt production and delivery of essential goods 

and services. Water supplies may be contaminated or unable to flow to incident area 

populace. Public health and emergency services will likely be affected by the CBRN 

incident either directly by their proximity to the incident or indirectly by the overwhelming 

need for the emergency response. EMP can destroy or cause transitory disruption of the 

power grid and damage or destroy portable/mobile electronic devices or equipment. EMP 

may further complicate immediate response operations by damaging/destroying the 

electronics in equipment first responders require. The transportation and communication 

infrastructure may be stressed through evacuations, providing relief supplies, or as a direct 

result of the CBRN incident. The response required by a joint force could potentially span 

the range of these effects. 

(b) Support to civilian authorities may also include specific public health 

support to government health departments, hospitals, health clinics, mortuaries, and 

pharmacies, to include distribution of pharmaceutical stockpiles. Joint forces supporting 

civilian authorities may assist in responding to the needs of affected communities. A 

primary concern to all response efforts is restoration of government functions to the affected 

area. Effects to public safety and security may result directly from CBRN attacks on 

government institutions or indirectly from cascading disruption of the institutions. Indirect 

effects include cascading disruption and financial consequences to government, society, and 

the economy through public and private sector reactions to an incident. Joint forces have the 

capability to assist in this area by supporting civilian authorities in restoration of essential 

goods and services. 
Chapter I 

I-16 JP 3-41 

(c) Another consequence of CBRN incidents is contamination of infrastructure 

and terrain. Contamination can be concentrated or be spread over a significant area 

depending on the means of delivery and the agent used. These areas are of operational 

concern during the recovery phase of the incident. For larger areas of contamination, 

specialized forces may be requested to assist governmental authorities logistically by 

providing transportation for the affected population, assisting with decontamination efforts, 

assisting with infrastructure restoration, and monitoring operations. 

b. General Planning Strategy for Decontamination

(1) Considering the scope of the emergency and determining proper 

decontamination procedures for different scenarios can help this process run more 

efficiently. Different forms of decontamination can be worked into response plans for 

different scenarios. 

(2) The warm zone (contamination reduction zone) is the transition area between 

the hot zone (exclusion zone) and cold zone (support zone). This area is where responders 

enter and exit the hot zone and where decontamination activities take place. 

(3) If the decontamination line or area is established outdoors, it should be in an 

area that is upwind of the hazard. 

(4) Locate decontamination lines in areas easily accessible to ambulances or other 

emergency transport vehicles if at all possible. 

(5) Determining the number of decontamination lines necessary is also a factor to 

consider. For a small incident, one line may be sufficient. If casualties are being taken from 

the area by one group of responders while another group of responders stops or cleans up a 

spill, it might be advantageous to have multiple lines: one for ambulatory casualties, a 

second for responders and equipment or non-ambulatory casualties. 

(6) The hot zone (exclusion zone) is the area with actual or potential contamination 

and the highest potential for exposure to hazardous substances. Everyone and everything 

that comes out of the hot zone must be checked for contamination and decontaminated as 

necessary. While decontamination personnel should practice contamination control 

measures for radiologically contaminated casualties, they should give lifesaving medical care 

priority over thorough decontamination. However, contaminated clothing from the casualty 

should be removed, and initial skin decontamination should be completed, if possible. 

Precautions should be taken to prevent a contaminated individual from passing 

contamination on to emergency medical personnel, ambulances or response vehicles, and 

hospital emergency rooms—potentially putting these resources out of service until they can 

be properly decontaminated. In a large-scale emergency, this can be very problematic. 

See ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 10-10E.5 [MCWP 3-37.2]/NTTP 3-11.37, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive 

Defense.
 Overview 

I-17 

c. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Response Planning 

Considerations

(1) Assessment. A thorough assessment of the employed CBRN material and/or 

its effects provides feedback such as protection requirements, hazard levels, areas of 

contamination, expected duration of hazards, etc. This information contributes to the 

commander’s situational awareness and technical assessment capability throughout any 

response. Objectives may include providing temporary critical life support; protecting 

critical infrastructure, preventing great property damage, protecting the environment; 

containing the incident; and enabling community recovery. In addition, it is advantageous to 

respond in such a manner that the effects of the incident are minimal and serve as a deterrent 

for future domestic and international terrorist attacks. Every incident will be different, but 

the underlying concepts remain constant. 

(a) Immediately after a CBRN incident, initial assessments determine the 

scope and magnitude of the incident and ultimately determine the need for DOD and joint 

force participation. Assessments should be done as quickly as possible to avoid additional 

lives being lost. 

(b) The CCDR, at the request of federal and state/territory or supported nation 

authorities, sends a site assessment team to conduct assessments to gain early situational 

awareness in response to a CBRN incident. Common assessment requirements are provided 

below: 

1. Damage and Injury Reports. Examine initial damage and injury 

reports for information on specific CBRN effects. Reports should be scanned for details 

including contamination control measures initiated and the number of contaminated 

casualties. Each CBRN incident has unique characteristics requiring appropriate follow-on 

response measures. 

2. Nature of the Incident. Examine the effect on the population and 

infrastructure to identify response capabilities required to address the incident. This includes 

assessing risk to responders in order to determine force protection requirements. 

3. Force Protection. Plan for and implement force protection measures. 

Force protection considerations are a top priority during any CBRN response operation and 

include providing proper protective equipment to personnel, planning for site safety, 

security, individual awareness of hazards and dangers, protection from contamination 

through proper marking and avoidance of contaminated areas, air monitoring, and health 

services. Force protection efforts must include consideration of secondary incidents/devices 

that may target first responders or be designed to intentionally spread contamination. While 

these factors are primarily CBRN-oriented, the force may also be vulnerable to multiple 

types of opportunistic threats by adversaries, so the threat assessment must not be focused 

solely on CBRN. 
Chapter I 

I-18 JP 3-41 

4. Duration and Geographical Extent of the Incident. Assess the 

number of jurisdictions affected by the incident and the likelihood of the scope expanding 

significantly due to population migration and weather/terrain. 

5. Weather and Terrain. Examine the effects weather and terrain may 

have on the CBRN material to include dispersion of chemical, biological, or radiological 

agents or toxic material by wind or water (e.g., stream/river flows). 

6. Public Reaction. Gauge public reaction to the incident as it can affect 

response requirements, particularly if the level of fear is high or likely to grow, or if massive 

population movement is under way or expected. 

7. Mission Duration. Assess mission duration, as it drives sustainment 

requirements. Extenuating circumstances may prolong CBRN response in the event civilian 

capability is lacking or inadequate. However, transition back to local responders should 

occur as soon as practical. 

8. CBRN Reconnaissance and Surveillance Tasks. Plan for the conduct 

of locating, detecting, identifying, quantifying, sample collecting, surveying, observing, 

monitoring, reporting, and marking contaminated areas. Military forces generally have only 

basic sampling and detection capabilities, so specialized military units may be required. 

9. Identification of Supporting DOD Forces. Local civil authorities 

may have NG and DOD forces assisting within their area under immediate response 

authority. The GCC should coordinate through the Services who will coordinate their 

support under immediate response authority prior to the execute order (EXORD) and JTF 

establishment. Understanding the capabilities of forces currently operating within the joint 

operations area (JOA), and leveraging their communications and logistics capabilities will 

accelerate JTF force arrival and employment. CCDRs should also coordinate with OSD and 

the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to determine future mission support requirements to the 

local authorities. Locally available forces may be able to continue response operations or be 

committed to emerging requirements, thereby eliminating duplication of capabilities required 

for the CBRN response. 

(2) Coordination Planning 

(a) Interorganizational Coordination. DOD will liaise and coordinate with 

other agencies and civilian authorities. Interorganizational coordination is a continuous 

process that should be established and emphasized prior to an incident, as well as during and 

after an incident. Coordination takes place at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

Whether coordination is conducted through the CCDR’s joint interagency coordination 

group or other means such as an interagency planning cell or group at the combatant 

command (CCMD) or JTF levels, the importance of interorganizational coordination in the 

planning process cannot be overstated. Of particular concern is information management 

and public affairs (PA). These activities are done in concert with DHS or the chief of 

mission (COM) and impacted nation, depending upon the operational environment. The 

NRF provides additional guidance for domestic situations. JFCs should be prepared to 
 Overview 

I-19 

coordinate operational activities with the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Ground 

Collection Task Force in the event of a response to a radiological or nuclear incident. The 

CCDR and staff will coordinate with the collection task force (TF) through DHS to the 

Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for national incidents and via 

DOS in response to an international RFA. 

Refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for a detailed discussion on interagency, 

international organization, and NGO coordination during joint operations. 

(b) State and Local Coordination. Determine if specialized national, 

international, or local assets are responding to the incident. Commanders at all levels must 

ensure that all DOD forces, whether under Title 10, USC; Title 32, USC; or state active duty 

status, synchronize their CBRN response activities with all DOD CBRN responders, as well 

as, state and local responders. Attempt to determine response capability gaps and seams that 

will require filling by DOD resources or capabilities, i.e., equipment, material, or personnel. 

These processes should be practiced during training events and exercises. 

(c) Federal Coordination. The CCDR and staff coordinate through DHS for 

domestic incidents and DOS for incidents involving an international response. These 

contacts should be verified during routine training events. 

(d) Communications. Determine if communications infrastructure is intact. 

If not, or if it is overwhelmed, joint forces may need to augment or replace the 

communications infrastructure in the affected areas using organic equipment. This is 

particularly important in a nuclear incident with resulting EMP. It should be anticipated that 

normal civilian communications means (i.e., land-line, cell phone, Internet) will be greatly 

affected and should not be considered as primary means of communications during a 

catastrophic incident. 

(e) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Technical Support. EOD 

personnel should be part of any CBRN response. They can provide the capability to 

detect/locate, access, identify, triage, diagnose, stabilize, render safe/neutralize, recover, 

exploit, and dispose of any weapons and explosives. This includes conventional munitions, 

CBRN munitions, unexploded explosive ordnance, WMD, homemade explosives, and 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to include those enhanced with chemical, biological, 

and radiological material. They also provide a reach back capability to the Joint EOD 

Technical Support Center who provides single point access to a corporate knowledge base of 

explosives, explosives ordnance, IEDs, and WMDs through the use of multiple databases, 

the technical information library and subject matter expert resources. 

(f) Public Health. A DOD public health lead should be identified for all units 

and installations. Typically the public health emergency officer will serve this function. The 

public health emergency officer, or equivalent, should provide recommendations regarding 

occupational, environmental, and public health threats in the event of a CBRN incident or 

response. The public health lead should serve as primary liaison to the local public health 

officials, the CDC, the National Institutes of Health, the EPA, and the Occupational Safety 
Chapter I 

I-20 JP 3-41 

and Health Administration, and any other pertinent agencies before and during a CBRN 

incident. 

(g) Biometric and Forensic Requirements. Where exclusive federal 

jurisdiction applies, coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to determine 

evidence collection procedures in case the incident is a criminal or terrorist act. Ensure that 

biometric evidence is vetted with the Biometrics Identity Management Agency and queried 

against authoritative federal biometrics databases: DOD Automated Biometric Identification 

System, DHS Automated Biometric Identification System, and the FBI Integrated 

Automated Fingerprint Identification System. 

(h) Transition and Termination. Commanders need to plan for the 

termination of military CBRN support. This is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed 

planning. DOD typically transitions from CBRN operations when the local authorities are 

capable of assuming the responsibility for the response operations. This is normally when 

the immediate danger from the CBRN incident has been eliminated, the capabilities to save 

lives are in place, and critical services are restored. DOD does not conduct site remediation 

or recovery operations as part of CBRN response or ICBRN-R. 

(i) Legal Requirements. In both domestic and ICBRN-R, unique legal 

requirements may exist. Legal review by the assigned staff judge advocate (SJA) should 

occur as the incident unfolds to ensure compliance with any such requirements. 

For further guidance on applicable laws and agreements refer to the operational 

environment chapters and Appendix A, “Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and 

International Protocols.” 

(j) Commander’s Communication Synchronization. Accurate and timely 

communication with the public is crucial. Themes, messages, images, and actions should be 

synchronized across jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations. Planning must include 

anticipated outages of civilian mass media capabilities for communicating evacuation and 

restriction of movement information. 

For more information, see ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 3-40A.6 [MCRP 4-11.1F]/NTTP 

4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service 

Support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment. 

(3) Logistics Planning

(a) Conduct Logistic Support. Providing logistic support for a CBRN 

response produces numerous challenges. The force may need to deploy with unique assets 

and specialized equipment depending upon the mission, situation, and the designated 

response force. Examples of such equipment include decontamination systems, mobile 

laboratories, field hospitals, medical equipment, and facilities for temporary accommodation 

of persons. Forces may also be required to operate and/or maintain unfamiliar equipment 

that will impact training, maintenance, and sustainment. It is also likely that much of the 

most critical equipment must operate in a CBRN environment. These additional 

requirements illustrate that the nature of such deployments require unique planning and 
 Overview 

I-21 

significant joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) support. 

Plans should allow forces to rapidly deploy, conduct JRSOI, and successfully execute their 

mission immediately after a CBRN incident. Contamination mitigation needs to be inherent 

in all CBRN logistics response planning in order to contain the spread of CBRN 

contamination and to prevent the unnecessary loss of valuable US assets. The 

responsiveness of support forces influences the success of the mission and the trust of the 

population affected by the CBRN incident. Logistics planning should address the integration 

of support for Title 10 and Title 32, USC, and state active duty forces. Logistics planning 

should also address support to United States Coast Guard (USCG) forces if they are to be a 

part of the support operations. While the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise contains 

significant tactical-level logistics/support forces, it requires a responsive theater opening and 

a theater sustainment capability to support operations. 

See Appendix B, “Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic 

Base Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets.” 

(b) Deployment and JRSOI. Commanders of CBRN response forces are 

responsible for coordinating and executing predeployment activities, deployment movements 

to and activities at ports of embarkation, and arrival at ports of debarkation (PODs). The 

designated JTF, in coordination with the designated base support installation (BSI) commander 

and joint field office (JFO), coordinate activities for JRSOI activities. Depending on the 

situation, JRSOI of incoming Title 10, USC, forces may not be tied to a designated installation. 

It may have to be conducted through an abbreviated method of capturing personnel and 

equipment status without requiring the traditional deliberate JRSOI model. 

For other deployment and redeployment operations, see JP 3-35, Deployment and 

Redeployment Operations.

(c) Transportation. Planners must anticipate that critical transportation routes 

and infrastructure may be disrupted by the incident itself or by secondary effects such as 

populace movement and emergency response efforts. Both primary and alternate 

transportation routes and staging areas need to be identified. Federal and/or state joint force 

headquarters staff coordinates movement restrictions and transportation safety and 

determines accessibility and status of rail and road networks, aerial ports of embarkation, 

aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), seaports of embarkation, and seaports of debarkation 

(SPODs) within the operational area. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of 

the President or SecDef, issues a deployment order (DEPORD) to deploy US forces 

supporting any CBRN response. 

1. All transportation modes should be considered for providing support to 

the CBRN response including organic assets. The deployment of unit personnel, supplies, 

and equipment should be phased so as to not overwhelm throughput of ports of 

embarkation/PODs, rail and road networks, and on-site reception and support capabilities. 

For those units that cannot deploy with organic assets, United States Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM) can provide common-user air, land, and sea transportation for 

deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces and equipment conducting domestic 

CBRN response operations. Due to the detrimental effects of aircraft contamination and the 
Chapter I 

I-22 JP 3-41 

difficulties of decontaminating aircraft, operational commanders should consider all measures 

consistent with mission priorities and operational risks to debark uncontaminated or packaged 

decontaminated cargo, equipment, and personnel at clean (uncontaminated) airfields. 

For more information on air mobility operations in a CBRN-contaminated environment, 

refer to MCM 0026-02, Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance, and 

JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

2. USTRANSCOM also provides aeromedical evacuation, air refueling, 

and aerial port services to support CBRN response. However, in a contaminated 

environment, USTRANSCOM will not transport contagious and contaminated casualties 

within the aeromedical patient movement system. In extreme circumstances, there may be a 

requirement to move contagious index cases (approximately two) for evaluation or critical 

medical care. If patient movement is required, the involved air evacuation of patients with 

potentially lethal, contagious infections poses unique challenges and risks to air crews and 

medical personnel. The decision to move contagious casualties will be directed through 

USTRANSCOM and the GCC. CCDRs; Commander, United States Transportation 

Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM); and SecDef, in consultation with medical authorities, 

provide necessary prior approval. Logistic planners need to be cognizant of the potential 

issues pertaining to requirements for the staging, reuse, transportation of, and/or disposition 

of decontaminated or residually contaminated equipment used during the CBRN response. 

These issues could significantly slow the normal redeployment process. Planners also need 

to consider the impact of cleanliness policy initiatives involving the transport of 

contaminated patients/cargo. 

For more information on current cleanliness policy and air evacuation of 

contaminated/contagious policy, refer to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 41-307 (Attachment 

12), Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations and Standards of Care; and 

USTRANSCOM policy documents titled, Policy on Patient Movement of Contaminated 

Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties. 

(d) Contracting Support. Effective OCS is critical to expedite the 

procurement of material and services in support of a CBRN response. The operational 

contract support integration cells (OCSICs) are the instruments that coordinate OCS. There 

is a permanent OCSIC at the CCMD and Service component levels. An OCSIC may be 

activated at the JTF level, this cell with the assistance of the CCMD and Service component 

OCSICs is vital to the successful coordination and execution of OCS. The OCSICs 

coordinate OCS requirements with personnel at the Service components, the BSIs, the NGB 

(US property and fiscal offices), combat support agencies (CSAs), and other federal agencies 

(Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], etc.). When contracting for supply, 

transportation, and services, OCS is used to identify existing contracts already supporting 

military installations and other USG departments and agencies in the operational area. 

Contracting support will be provided via the Services’ contracting organizations, CSAs, state 

NG (US property and fiscal offices). Logisticians should be familiar with the contracting 

support services provided by all of the identified organizations. 
 Overview 

I-23 

(e) Mortuary Affairs. When authorized by SecDef, DOD mortuary affairs 

assets can help minimize the potential health risks posed by mass fatalities and assist in 

incident response and recovery operations. The primary mortuary affairs missions in a 

CBRN environment are mortuary affairs identification tasks and contamination mitigation. 

When responding to a domestic incident the mortuary affairs assets perform mission 

assignments in support of the lead agency. 

For more information on joint mortuary affairs operations, refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary 

Affairs, and Technical Guide 195, Safety and Health Guidance for Mortuary Affairs 

Operations: Infectious Materials and CBRN Handling. 

(f) Resupply. Ensure that critical resupply items are identified and addressed 

(e.g., self-contained breathing apparatus refills and other CBRN related consumables). 

(g) Response Times. Time sensitivity for DOD response may vary depending 

upon the severity and type of incident and may determine the need for a particular mode of 

transportation. Another factor that may influence response time is whether other high 

priority operational missions (e.g., technical nuclear forensics) are occurring simultaneously 

and compete for limited transportation. Some logistics assets may be pre-positioned forward 

into theater to facilitate a more effective response. 

For more information on general logistic planning and support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint 

Logistics.

(4) Health Services Planning. Civil authorities require assistance in Emergency 

Support Function (ESF) #8 (Public Health and Medical Services) of the NRF. Providing 

initial essential stabilizing medical care and forward resuscitative/surgical care are the two 

essential capabilities that are required in the first hours following any CBRN incident. DOD 

may also be required to provide medical augmentation to local hospitals, community health 

(vaccinations, disease investigation, prophylaxis dispensing, preventive medicine, and 

veterinary support), and patient movement. It may also be asked to assist with 

distribution/redistribution of patients, medical logistics distribution, and behavioral health, as 

well as direct medical treatment and patient decontamination. DOD coordinates health 

services with the state health officer through the state’s office of emergency 

management/homeland security (HS). 

(a) Health Facilities. DOD health facilities have important roles in the 

National Disaster Medical System, local medical response organizations, DOD Laboratory 

Network, and the Laboratory Response Network. Local health facilities should identify their 

capabilities to support and sustain patient movement, patient treatment, ancillary services, 

and medical sheltering. DOD health facilities should plan to work in concert with 

operational medical units in CBRN responses. 

(b) At-Risk Population. Identify the demographics of population at-risk 

(elderly, young, pregnant, etc.). 

(c) Medical. Augment the analysis of available information on 

epidemiological and diagnostic patterns resulting from the incident to address preventive 
Chapter I 

I-24 JP 3-41 

medicine requirements, laboratory services, and casualty evacuation and treatment conducted 

by local, state, and federal public health authorities. If international or local medical support 

is provided, ensure that operating procedures are provided. Recognize that there are unique 

issues relating to military medical support to include personnel and supplies. 

(5) Populace Care Planning. During a catastrophic CBRN incident, large 

numbers of people may be left temporarily or permanently homeless and may require 

prolonged temporary housing. The JFC may provide immediate life-saving measures such 

as emergency food, water, shelter, hygiene, and medical care. DOD may also provide 

emergency shelter. At the earliest opportunity, DOD will transfer populace care 

responsibilities to civilian authorities for long-term recovery activities. DOD forces maintain 

property accountability so that transfers/disposals are properly documented for eventual 

reimbursement when it is authorized. 

(6) Decontamination Planning. Tasks may include decontamination of civilian 

and military personnel as well as civilian and military equipment and property. Additionally, 

contamination mitigation of human remains require planning. Planners must understand the 

decontamination procedures at local hospitals. Contaminated waste disposal is a key 

requirement, and important in the context of interagency coordination. A DOD 

medical/health representative, with appropriate technical expertise, should support civilian 

authorities to provide health-based recommendations concerning worker health and safety as 

well as environmental cleanup aspects related to military unique hazards (i.e., CW agents). 

If expertise is not available within the operational area, a number of technical reachback 

agencies/capabilities that can be contacted (i.e., the United States Army Medical Research 

Institute of Chemical Defense [USAMRICD]) and US Army Public Health Center to assist 

the JFC can advise responders. 

For the most current clearance criteria and policy guidance for materiel returning to the US, 

refer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) Revised Radiological Clearance 

Criteria Guidelines for Platforms and Materiel, and Chemical Clearance Guidelines for 

Platforms and Materiel. For more guidance on decontamination operations, refer to ATP 3-

11.32/MCWP 10-10E.5 [MCWP 3-37.2]/NTTP 3-11.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense. 

(7) Site Management Support Planning 

(a) Detection/Identification. DOD CBRN response forces may be tasked to 

detect and identify the specific hazard(s) and set hazard boundaries. Military CBRN 

surveillance and reconnaissance units may also be tasked to survey the contaminated area to 

determine extent and level/degree of contamination. Survey elements might need to consider 

the incident site as a crime scene by setting boundaries and cordoning the site to safeguard 

responders and onlookers and prevent further contamination or environmental damage. 

Hazard areas may need to be marked and isolated to warn and protect the response personnel 

working in the area. Setting boundaries facilitates strict control into and out of the incident 

site. 
 Overview 

I-25 

(b) Evidence. Evidence collected for forensic analysis on-site, or at a different 

location and time. 

(c) Containment. Joint force CBRN response forces can provide the 

capability to minimize further risk or damage to persons, materiel, facilities, and the 

environment. Contamination-control measures include leaving equipment in a potentially 

contaminated area until it is tested for contamination by qualified personnel. Other measures 

include encapsulating contaminated items by covering the equipment with plastic bags or 

tarps. 

(d) Zone Control. In a CBRN response role, joint forces may assist with 

verification and management of containment boundaries set by civilian (or affected nation) 

authorities. Control zones are operational areas established by civilian authorities at an 

incident site within which only specific types of operations are conducted. Figure I-2 depicts 

these control zones. The three zones established at a chemical, radiological, nuclear, and 

some biological incident sites (where there is a contaminated area such as may be the case 

with anthrax) are often referred to as the hot zone, the warm zone, and the cold zone. 

Control zones are established to ensure the safety of all responders and control access into 

and out of a contaminated area. Personnel working in these areas must adhere to strict 

procedures to ensure the safety of those working in the zones. In nearly all cases, the control 

zones will decrease in size with time as CBRN hazards naturally decrease. Once the 

characteristics of the hazard are understood, the control zones and responder PPE can be 

effectively altered to allow more mission flexibility. 

1. Hot Zone. The hot zone is an area immediately surrounding a 

hazardous material incident which extends far enough to prevent adverse effects from 

released contamination to personnel outside the zone. The level of risk, and thus the 

included area is determined by the incident commander (IC), accounting for characteristics 

of the hazards. The hot zone can also be referred to as the exclusion zone, red zone, or 

restricted zone and is the primary area of contamination. The hot zone is the area the IC 

judges to be the most affected by the incident. This includes any area to which the 

contaminant has spread or is likely to spread. Primary contamination can occur when 

individuals enter this zone. Usually, no decontamination or patient care except evacuation is 

carried out in this zone. Access is only permitted to personnel who are properly trained and 

protected. The IC sets the perimeters of this zone after giving consideration to the type of 

agent, the volume released, the means of dissemination, the prevailing meteorological 

conditions, and the potential of local topographic characteristics to channel agent dispersal. 

The perimeters of this zone may change as the hazardous agent is carried with the wind. 

Priorities within the hot zone may include conducting SAR, performing hazard mitigation, 

and identifying CBRN hazards or other physical obstacles to the entry point. 

2. Warm Zone. The warm zone is the area between the hot and cold 

zones where personnel and equipment decontamination and hot zone support take place. The 

warm zone includes control points for the access corridor and thus assists in reducing the 

spread of contamination. The warm zone can also be referred to as the decontamination 

zone, contamination-reduction zone, contamination-reduction corridor, yellow zone, or 

limited access zone. Since this zone is potentially less hazardous than the hot zone, the IC 
Chapter I 

I-26 JP 3-41 

may authorize personnel to wear reduced levels of PPE based on the suspected hazard 

characteristics and the environment. Management of the warm zone includes 

decontamination corridors where casualties, emergency responders, and equipment are 

decontaminated and where there is a risk of secondary contamination from objects or 

individuals brought from the hot zone. Maintaining access control points connecting the 

warm zone to the hot and cold zones and for the decontamination corridor assists in reducing 

the spread of contamination. Warm zone operation should be established in an area that is 

safe from downwind exposure and should include the bulk of the decontamination assets 

where survey teams are positioned and equipment decontamination is accomplished. 

3. Cold Zone. The cold zone is the area where the incident command 

post, staging areas for equipment, and other support functions that are necessary to control 

the incident are located upwind and uphill of the warm zone. Contaminated casualties and 

emergency response personnel must be decontaminated before entering this zone. The same 

basic considerations that are used for the hot and warm zones influence the extent of the cold 

zone. The cold zone must be readily accessible and provide the means for safety and rest. It 

must also be large enough to accommodate local, state, and federal CBRN response forces (if 

Figure I-2. Control Zones

Control Zones

Wind

Staging 

Area

Staging 

Area

Decontamination

Corridor

Access 

Control 

Points

Command 

Post

Crowd Control Line

Hot 

Zone Warm

Zone

Cold

Zone
 Overview 

I-27 

required) and to serve as the staging area for personnel and equipment. The operational 

priorities of the cold zone include providing C2 for operations being conducted in the warm 

and hot zones and ensuring that there is an area of security for emergency personnel and 

response forces conducting operations. Access to the different zones should be tightly 

controlled and limited to as few people as possible. Communication between work areas 

should be face-to-face whenever possible, particularly if the use of radios or other electronic 

devices (e.g., megaphones) is restricted because of the hazards involved. 

4. Zone Control in Nuclear Detonations. DHS has worked with partner 

agencies and emergency response partners to establish standard response guidance for 

emergency planners when dealing with a nuclear detonation. These recommendations are 

designed to maximize the preservation of life in the event of an urban nuclear detonation. 

The planning guidance summarizes recommendations based on the effects of a 10 kt nuclear 

detonation in an urban environment. There are two types of zones associated with a nuclear 

detonation: physical damage and radioactive fallout. Although these two zones overlap they 

are distinct and should not cannot add to the complexity of responding to a nuclear 

detonation is the inconsistent overlapping of these two zones. It is possible that responders 

may be able to access a higher damage zone that has little or no radioactive contamination or 

exposure and it is just as possible for responders to operate in a zone with little to no damage 

yet have to deal with radioactive fallout. 

a. Damage Zones. The nuclear explosion’s observable phenomena, 

in the area around ground zero, are linked to an accumulation of the hazards from pressure 

(blast), heat (thermal), and radiation as discussed in subparagraph 5a(5), “Nuclear 

Environment, Nuclear Detonations, and Their Effects.” These cumulative hazards make it 

more dangerous for rescue workers and less likely to find survivors the closer one moves 

toward the point of detonation. The observable phenomenon of damage to infrastructure and 

other objects provides a way to describe zones with rough approximation delineations that 

can assist planners and the initial emergency responders in managing risk. There are no clear 

boundaries between damage zones resulting from a nuclear detonation, but generally, the 

light damage (LD) zone is characterized by broken windows and easily managed injuries; the 

moderate damage (MD) zone by significant building damage, rubble, downed utility poles, 

overturned automobiles, fires, and serious injuries; and the severe damage (SD) zone by 

nearly complete destruction of buildings and infrastructure. 

b. Radioactive Fallout Zones. The area covered by fallout that 

impacts responder life-saving operations and/or has acute radiation injury potential to the 

population is known as the dangerous fallout (DF) zone. Unlike the LD, MD, and SD zones, 

the DF zone is distinguished not by structural damage, but by radiation levels. 

For further guidance on the nuclear weapon effects, planning considerations, and zone 

control, refer to https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/24879, for DHS 

Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, and JP 3-11, Operations in 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments. 

(e) Security. The JFC may provide Title 10, USC, forces in support of 

nonmilitary law enforcement agencies. This support may include, but is not limited to, 
Chapter I 

I-28 JP 3-41 

providing information concerning a violation of state or federal laws, loaning military 

equipment and facilities, providing personnel to operate and/or maintain the loaned 

equipment, and providing basic training or expert advice. 

(f) Monitoring. The requirements to monitor personnel, vehicles, and 

equipment entering or exiting a contaminated zone must be considered in order to prevent 

the spread of contamination. 

(g) Movement. Consider requirements to decontaminate personnel, vehicles, 

and equipment in support of evacuation, redeployment, or any movement from a 

contaminated site. The intent to retrograde residually contaminated equipment/cargo will 

require special approval through CJCS due to potential risks and political and environmental 

sensitivities. 

(h) Disposal. Consider requirements to dispose of unsalvageable equipment 

and vehicles. Also, commanders should plan for disposal/disposition of contaminated 

materials that cannot be feasibly decontaminated. Commanders for CONUS operations must 

coordinate waste disposal efforts with other federal, state, and local agencies. For outside 

CONUS, the commander must coordinate with the HN. 

(8) Safety Planning. An emphasis should be placed on operations safety during 

any CBRN response, as CBRN response forces may be requested and deployed with little 

warning and/or preparation time. Forces may move immediately into employment with little 

rest and under extremely stressful conditions. Military issue protective equipment may not 

protect against all CBRN hazards. While Service safety programs are generally run by 

Service components, additional safety guidelines, standards, and instructions should be 

established by the JFC. Tracking of exposure and force health protection compliance should 

be captured, analyzed, and acted upon as a joint safety effort. 

(9) Religious Affairs 

(a) Guidance in this section pertains to domestic, foreign, and DOD-led CBRN 

response operations. The primary role for DOD chaplains during CBRN incidents will be to 

support authorized DOD personnel. Only during rare and exceptional emergencies may 

DOD chaplains provide religious support (RS) to non-DOD civilians or first responders, and 

then only strictly in compliance with command direction, legal guidance, and supervisory 

chaplain oversight. 

For more information and legal considerations, see JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint 

Operations. 

1. As part of the DOD CBRN response, religious support teams (RSTs) 

deliver RS and advisement to the commander and authorized recipients according to applicable 

policies and standard operating procedures. They can work cooperatively and collaboratively to 

build partnerships with faith-based organizations and civilian clergy in order to facilitate the 

delivery of humanitarian care to the affected population. Emergency spiritual care, traumatic 

incident management, respecting and honoring the dead, and other religious activities are critical 

to sustaining DOD personnel and supporting the restoration of a stable society. Additionally, 
 Overview 

I-29 

military chaplains are trained in counseling and, as such, may be able to augment medical forces 

in the provision of some level of psychological care, when necessary. 

2. Many DOD CBRN units do not contain an embedded RST. Affected 

states will likely establish a NG JTF for C2 of NG forces, or a DSC-led JTF may be 

established utilizing Title 10, USC, RST personnel. RST augmentation will likely be 

needed, through an emergency management assistance compact (EMAC) or a request for 

forces (RFF) for Title 10, USC, RSTs. The NGB Office of the Chaplain can provide 

additional qualified RSTs as needed to support the NG JTF. 

(b) RST roles differ according to control zones. Most RST activities including 

those pertaining to casualty care, counseling, worship opportunities, memorial services, and 

stress management occur in the cold zone. Selected RSTs with proper training and 

certification, equipment, and command direction may also be tasked to provide limited RS in 

the warm zone. RST warm zone activities could include hot zone casualty reception and 

support to medical triage, mass casualty decontamination, and mortuary affairs operations. It 

is not recommended that RSTs enter the hot zone, but be prepared to provide RS to those 

personnel operating within the hot zone. 

(c) The following specific key locations at the incident site normally require 

the presence of properly trained, equipped, and authorized RSTs: the decontamination line, 

casualty collection point, medical treatment facilities, mortuary affairs collection points, and 

evacuation centers/emergency family assistance centers. At these locations, RSTs normally 

focus on RS to casualties and care givers. They also ensure honor and respect for the 

deceased. 

For more information on legal guidance and supervisory chaplain oversight, see JP 1-05, 

Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

(10) Biometrics and Identity Activities. When the US conducts CBRN response 

operations overseas, the employment of DOD’s biometric capabilities will be a mission 

enabler. Working with the partner nations, employment of biometric capabilities can assist 

in the management of local populations, force protection, initial accountability, access to 

relief sites, and casualty management (including food and medicine). 

6. Limitation and Mitigation Strategies 

a. Risk Management

(1) Risk Assessment Process. The risk management process plays an integral role 

assisting commanders in making decisions where to apply scarce or limited resources, 

minimizing the effects of threats and hazards in order to accomplish the mission. The 

process includes the identification of threats/hazards, critical capabilities and vulnerabilities 

to mission assets/resources. A risk assessment involves the collection and evaluation of data 

concerning the criticality of the resource based on mission impacts, probable threats and 

hazards, and degrees of vulnerability determining the overall risk posture of the resource. 

Matrixes and tables are often used to assist in this process. The joint force may have an 

established standard operating procedure for risk assessment. 
Chapter I 

I-30 JP 3-41 

For further doctrinal guidance on force employment risk management during a CBRN 

incident, refer to JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Environments. For further guidance on the risk management process and useful examples of 

matrixes and tables, refer to ATP 5-19, Risk Management.

For further guidance on force protection posture vulnerability analysis and risk reduction, 

refer to ATP 3-11.36/MCRP 10-10E.1 [MCRP 3-37B]/NTTP 3-11.34/AFTTP 3-2.70, MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Aspects of Command and Control.

(2) Risk Control. Risk management entails developing controls and making risk 

decisions, implementing those controls, and then supervising and evaluating. Maintaining 

safety discipline is extremely important during CBRN response operations. The heightened 

sense of urgency in working to help parents, children, and the elderly who have been 

contaminated may impact on decisions and cause Service members to want to take more 

personal risk. Other examples of long-term hazards requiring leaders to establish controls 

that consider the reason for the hazard and not just the hazard itself include climatic 

extremes, CBRN and hazardous waste contamination, or disease threats within the particular 

operational area or indigenous population. 

For more information, see ATP 5-19, Risk Management. 

b. Operational and Strategic Risk. Any CBRN response must be rapid in order to 

save lives and minimize the overall impact of the incident. JFCs providing CBRN response 

need to have viable plans and be prepared to make rapid decisions with minimal knowledge 

of the scope and magnitude of the incident. Self-confidence and high competency are 

necessary to execute effectively in a hazardous environment. Those forces committed by 

DOD to this mission as part of national preparedness need to be trained and ready when the 

nation calls. When these conditions are met, the risk of strategic and operational failure has 

been minimized. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

DOMESTIC CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR 

RESPONSE 

1. General 

a. Overview. Domestic CBRN response is a type of support provided within the DSCA 

mission (see Figure II-1), conducted by DOD forces in order to save lives, protect property 

and the environment, and meet basic human needs. See JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities, for a complete discussion of DSCA operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland, establishes DOD roles and responsibilities 

for domestic CBRN response activities. Domestic CBRN response requires unified effort 

among local, state, tribal, federal, and DOD organizations. DOD support for domestic 

CBRN response can include active duty forces and NG forces serving under both Title 32, 

USC, and state active duty status. As a DSCA activity, domestic CBRN response focuses on 

providing DOD support directly to the civil authorities leading the CBRN response at the 

incident. State and local governments are closest to those affected by incidents and have a 

lead role in response and recovery. DOD tailors its support to the scope and magnitude of 

the incident. Specifically, DOD employs forces with a focus on specific response 

requirements beyond the resources of state and federal civil authorities. A JTF typically 

leads DOD forces supporting domestic CBRN response, providing C2 of forces trained and 

equipped for this mission, as well as contingency sourced conventional forces. Using a 

phased approach, the JFC leads DOD forces through all phases of domestic CBRN response. 

b. DSCA. DSCA policy and procedures guide DOD support provided by all DOD 

personnel conducting domestic CBRN response. It includes immediate response and followon CBRN operations executing approved RFAs (see Figure II-1). This DSCA response 

includes support to federal departments and agencies that assist local, state, and tribal 

authorities within the US territories. Figure II-1 illustrates the basic relationships among 

elements conducting domestic CBRN response. It includes support provided by NG forces 

in Title 10 and Title 32, USC, or in state active duty status. SecDef policy and Joint Staff 

instructions provide guidance for the operational framework for a joint force’s relationship 

with local, state, tribal, other federal or nongovernmental entities. 

“The essential services that underpin American society must remain secure and 

functioning in the face of diverse threats and hazards. Therefore, we take a Whole 

of Community approach, bringing together all elements of our society—individuals, 

local communities, the private and non-profit sectors, faith-based organizations, 

and all levels of government—to make sure America is resilient in the face of 

adversity... . We will also continue to enhance pandemic preparedness at home 

and address the threat arising from new drug-resistant microbes and biological 

agents.” 

National Security Strategy 2015 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-41 

c. DOD and the NRF. DOD provides assistance, upon SecDef approval, of an RFA 

from an appropriate civil authority. DOD conducts CBRN response IAW the NRF, ESFs, 

and incident annexes. DOD generally identifies DHS/FEMA as the primary agency in its 

EXORD, operation plan (OPLAN), or operation order (OPORD) authorizing federal military 

assistance. 

For more information on ESFs, see the NRF and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities. 

(1) The domestic environment for DSCA presents many challenges to the JFC and 

more so when responding to a CBRN incident. It is imperative commanders and staffs at all 

Figure II-1. Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response 

CBRN

CONUS continental United States

DOD Department of Defense

OCONUS outside the continental United States

chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

request for assistance/coordination

provision of assistance

response to incident

Legend

CBRN

Incident

Incident Area

DOD Installation

Nongovermental 

Organizations

DOD Support

(Incident Area 

Only)

Department of 

Homeland Security

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response

Federal*

Local* Local First 

Responders*

State*

DOD First 

Responders and 

Additional 

Support





DOD support is 

organic

Assistance is 

requested through 

coordination with 

authorities at each 

echelon, CONUS 

and OCONUS

 DOD support 

is part of 

federal 

assistance

DOD Installation

Domestic 

CBRN 

Response

Base Support 

Installation

*Tribal response may require special consideration during coordination.
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-3 

levels understand the statutory and operational relationships among all federal departments 

and agencies involved in the operation. NIMS provides a consistent nationwide template to 

enable federal, state, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, and NGOs to work 

together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of 

incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity. NIMS is designed to apply to all 

incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated federal 

response. 

(2) Commanders at all levels should be knowledgeable about the NRF and NIMS 

and how their commands fit in to the overall architecture. The NRF is a guide to how the US 

conducts all-hazard responses. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating 

structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation. It describes specific 

authorities and best practices for managing domestic incidents that range from the serious 

but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF 

contains a number of incident annexes that apply to CBRN incidents. Each annex lists the 

ESF coordinator and the primary and support agencies involved in the response, and 

provides information on applicable policies, authorities, planning assumptions, concept of 

operations, actions, and responsibilities of cooperating agencies for the particular incident 

described. 

For more information on the NRF and NIMS, refer to the NRF Resource Center: 

http://www.fema.gov/NRF and the NIMS Resource Center: www.fema.gov/NIMS. These 

online resources are routinely updated and evolving. 

(3) All domestic CBRN responses are managed at the lowest possible level, with 

DOD providing support as directed. When SecDef approves a request for DSCA during a 

CBRN incident, CDRUSNORTHCOM and Commander, United States Pacific Command 

(CDRUSPACOM) are the supported GCCs for CBRN responses within their respective 

AORs as designated in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for a federal response. DOD 

supports the Secretary of Homeland Security (and subsequently the USG department, 

agency, or component of DHS that has the responsibility for directing or managing the 

response per the NRF during domestic CBRN response. The operational chain of command 

for federal forces remains with the GCC; the operational chain of command for state 

controlled NG forces remains with the governor. 

2. Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets 

Domestic CBRN response is managed at the lowest possible level, with DOD providing 

support as directed. When SecDef approves a request for DSCA during a CBRN incident, 

CDRUSNORTHCOM and CDRUSPACOM are the supported GCCs for CBRN responses 

within their respective AORs as designated in the UCP for a federal response. DOD 

supports the NRF primary and coordinating agencies during domestic CBRN response 

operations. The operational chain of command for federal forces remains with the GCC; the 

operational chain of command for state controlled NG forces remains with the governor. A 

brief synopsis of specific DOD roles and responsibilities for CBRN response in the domestic 

operational environment is provided below: 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-41 

a. SecDef. SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and 

equipment for DSCA, to include support to any CBRN response. SecDef has the primary 

responsibility to provide the overall policy and oversight for DOD in the event of a domestic 

incident. 

(1) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) 

(ASD[HD&GS]). The Office of ASD(HD&GS) is within the office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy (USD[P]). ASD(HD&GS) serves as the DOD Domestic Crisis 

Manager and provides policy oversight for all domestic CBRN incident support. 

ASD(HD&GS) coordinates with the heads of the DOD components; the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics on matters regarding the readiness posture of forces, to include 

critical infrastructure protection and CBRN response enterprise assets. See Appendix C, 

“Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Enterprise,” for a description of these assets. 

(2) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD[HA]). ASD(HA) is 

within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The 

ASD(HA) serves as the principal advisor to SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for clinical health care and health 

surveillance aspects of CBRN medical defense programs. The office also advises on 

deployment matters as they pertain to force health protection and readiness for DOD support 

to USG CBRN response IAW DODD 5136.01, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health 

Affairs (ASD[HA]). It also oversees the assigned responsibilities of the Director, Defense 

Health Agency. This office is responsible for interactions with the Department of Health and 

Human Services in the National Disaster Medical System. Each Service maintains federal 

coordinating centers, which are medical facilities responsible for locating all civilian beds in 

their geographic location, arranging the transport of patients from arriving aircraft, and all 

logistics in support of receiving mass casualties from a disaster area.

(3) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for CWMD supports the 

USD(P) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs by developing 

strategies and policies and overseeing the execution of approved policies and programs 

regarding CBRN defense, WMD missile proliferation, and global threats. 

(4) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD[RA]). ASD(RA) 

monitors RC CBRN personnel readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the 

appropriate integration of RC forces into CBRN response efforts. 

b. CJCS. CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef and the President in 

preparing for and responding to CBRN incidents, ensures that military planning is 

accomplished to support the lead or other primary agency during all CBRN responses, and 

provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of operations. On behalf of CJCS, 

the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], works closely with ASD(HD&GS) and the 

Services, CCDRs, and the NGB to produce military orders pertaining to domestic 

emergencies. CJCS forwards these orders to SecDef for approval, and then to the 

appropriate military commander(s) for execution. The initial request enters through the 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-5 

DOD Executive Secretary and is forwarded to the Office of ASD(HD&GS), who evaluates 

the request against six criteria: legality (compliance with laws), lethality (potential use of 

lethal force by or against DOD forces), risk (safety of DOD forces), readiness (impact on the 

DOD ability to perform its primary mission), appropriateness (whether the requested mission 

is in the interest of DOD to conduct), and cost (who pays, impact on DOD budget). 

c. CCMDs 

(1) CDRUSNORTHCOM. When directed by the President or SecDef, 

CDRUSNORTHCOM provides Title 10, USC, DSCA support to domestic CBRN response. 

CDRUSNORTHCOM, as DOD’s operational CBRN response synchronizer, provides CBRN 

response and assistance to US and allied authorities, as directed, within the United States 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, to include US territories and protectorates in 

that AOR. Other CCMDs can be tasked to provide DSCA in support of 

CDRUSNORTHCOM during CBRN response. USNORTHCOM has four subordinate 

commands to provide C2 for DOD Title 10, USC, CBRN response efforts within the AOR. 

(a) United States Army North (USARNORTH). When approved by SecDef 

and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, Commander, United States Army, North 

(CDRUSARNORTH) deploys a mission-specific TF or JTF, and conducts CBRN response 

operations to support federal, state, local, and tribal authorities. CDRUSARNORTH serves 

as the USNORTHCOM standing joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and has 

operational control (OPCON) of Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). It is also 

prepared to deploy additional JTF-level, mission-specific headquarters for multiple CBRN 

incidents to provide appropriate C2 based on the magnitude of the response. USARNORTH 

can be augmented by other Services to establish a JFC over subordinate JTFs and/or 

functional components when required by the scope and magnitude of the incident. It 

supports single or multiple incidents with communication zone coordination and logistics 

operations. 

(b) JTF-CS. JTF-CS is a standing joint operational headquarters dedicated to 

DOD planning and response to domestic CBRN and other high explosives incidents in 

support of civil authorities. CDRUSNORTHCOM has CCMD (command authority) over 

JTF-CS, and the JFLCC has OPCON of the unit. JTF-CS forms the command headquarters 

of the defense chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response force (DCRF). 

Routine day-to-day functions include providing advice in doctrine development, 

requirements identification, training and exercise management, and the promotion of 

domestic interoperability for DOD CBRN response-capable assets in the AC and RC. When 

approved by SecDef, and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys to assume C2 

of Title 10, USC, resources and forces, and conducts DSCA to assist civil authorities in 

responding to a CBRN incident within the homeland. When CBRN incidents occur in the 

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) AOR, CDRUSPACOM is the supported 

commander, and JTF-CS may deploy in their support. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise,” for unit descriptions and additional information on CBRN 

response forces. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-41 

(c) United States Alaskan Command (ALCOM). ALCOM is a subunified 

command responsible to CDRUSNORTHCOM for the conduct of HD and DSCA, to include 

CBRN response, within its assigned JOA. 

(d) Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR). As 

a standing subordinate organization of USNORTHCOM, JFHQ-NCR plans, coordinates, and 

maintains situational awareness within its assigned JOA to accomplish assigned HD and 

DSCA missions. When approved by SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM, Joint 

Task Force-National Capital Region is established and provides C2 of military support 

operations to help federal, state, and local authorities respond to a CBRN incident within the 

National Capital Region. 

(e) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), USARNORTH. 

CDRUSARNORTH appoints a DCO to each of the 10 FEMA regions to serve as DOD’s 

single point of contact at a JFO. A DCO may be the first DOD representative on-site and 

acts as the single DOD point of contact. The DCO is the designated DOD on-scene member 

of the FEMA-led JFO, the multiagency coordination center established locally for federal 

response related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions. The DCO, 

supported by a defense coordinating element (DCE), coordinates all RFAs and approved 

mission assignments with the principal federal official (PFO), federal coordinating officer 

(FCO), or designated representative from the NRF primary and coordinating agencies. If a 

JTF is established and colocated with the PFO at the JFO, this colocation does not replace 

the requirement for a DCO and DCE as part of the JFO coordination staff. The DCO 

continues to exercise the JFO staff function of mission assignment coordination and 

validation and acts as a liaison between the JFO staff and the JTF staff. 

(2) CDRUSPACOM. When directed by the President or SecDef, 

CDRUSPACOM provides Title 10, USC, DSCA support to domestic CBRN response. 

CDRUSPACOM, as DOD’s operational CBRN response synchronizer, provides CBRN 

response and assistance to US and allied authorities, as directed, within the USPACOM 

AOR, to include US territories and protectorates in that AOR. Other CCMDs can be tasked 

to provide DSCA in support of CDRUSPACOM during CBRN response. 

(3) Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

(CDRUSSOCOM). When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM conducts 

special operations in support of national CBRN response activities. CDRUSSOCOM may 

provide liaison officers (LNOs) and other assistance to the supported CCDR, as required. 

(4) CDRUSTRANSCOM. CDRUSTRANSCOM serves as the mobility joint 

force provider for the deployment, distribution, sustainment, and redeployment of DOD 

forces using common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation in support of 

CBRN response and provides patient movement aeromedical evacuation as required, IAW 

current guidance. 

(5) Commander, United States Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM). 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for synchronizing DOD planning for CWMD efforts in 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-7 

coordination with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed, appropriate USG departments 

and agencies. 

d. Services within DOD 

(1) DODD 2060.02, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Policy, directs the Services to organize, train, and equip to support the 

CWMD mission areas. Each Service has varied CBRN capability (based on its available 

doctrine) to conduct and/or support CBRN response operations. These capabilities may be 

called upon, when approved by SecDef, to provide forces, facilities, and assets to the 

supported CCDR as part of the DOD response to a CBRN incident. Specifically, the Service 

Chief responsibilities are as follows: 

(a) Provide the Joint Staff J-3 with information on assigned CBRN response 

capabilities, assets, units, and research or support facilities that are capable of providing 

reachback or on-scene support to CBRN response operations. 

(b) Identify units available to the supported CCDR consistent with Title 10, 

USC. 

(c) Provide designated forces, to include Service RC forces, in order to prepare 

for and to respond to a CBRN incident. CBRN response support will be provided to the 

supported CCDR through the appropriate Service component commanders. 

(2) United States Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force 

(CBIRF). CBIRF is a unit that was created to deploy on short notice in response to CBRN 

incidents. CBIRF consists of specially trained personnel and specialized equipment suited 

for operations in a wide range of contingencies. CBIRF is designed to minimize the effects 

of a CBRN incident through detection, identification, extraction, mass decontamination, 

medical triage, and emergency medical support. 

e. RC Forces. Reserve and NG forces are known collectively as RC forces. RC forces 

consist of the Air Force Reserve, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, 

United States Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR), Army National Guard (ARNG) of the United 

States, and the Air National Guard (ANG) of the United States. Guidelines for utilization of 

RC forces can be found in Title 10, USC, and Title 32, USC, and Title 14, USC, for USCG. 

Guidelines for utilization of NG forces under state active duty will be found in their 

respective state codes. 

For more information on USCG, Title 14, USC, authorities, see Commandant of the Coast 

Guard Publication P5850.2C, Coast Guard Legal Authorities. 

(1) Reserve Forces. The RC forces are structured and operated to mirror their 

respective AC counterparts. Unlike the ANG and ARNG, the United States Army Reserve 

(USAR), United States Navy Reserve (USNR), United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR), 

United States Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), and USCGR C2 relationships remain intact 

in both peacetime and wartime. These RC forces do not have state-specific relationships. 

When called to active duty, RC forces conduct DSCA missions under Title 10, USC, 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-41 

guidelines exactly as AC forces; USCGR is recalled pursuant to Title 14, USC. While on 

federal active duty, members of the ARNG, ANG, USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR, and 

USCGR are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. RC forces are 

called to active duty through the mobilization and demobilization processes. 

For more information on the RC mobilization and demobilization processes, see JP 4-05, 

Joint Mobilization Planning. 

(2) NG. The NG primarily operates under one of two separate chains of C2, state 

or federal. However, NG forces may be operationally employed under three different legal 

duty statuses: Title 10, USC (federalized and federally funded); Title 32, USC (nonfederalized and federally funded); and state active duty (non-federalized and state funded). 

Unless federalized, NG forces operate under the C2 of the governor and the adjutant general 

(TAG) in either state active duty or Title 32, USC, duty status. 

For more information, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 

(a) The NG of one state can assist other states responding to a disaster through 

formal state-to-state agreements, such as the EMAC. Typically, this occurs in state active 

duty (non-federalized and state funded). When requested by the supported state’s governor 

and authorized by the supporting state’s governor under a separate memorandum of 

agreement (MOA), NG elements deploy to the supported state. The supporting NG forces 

operate under operational command of the supported state’s TAG as granted by the 

supporting state’s governor. Typically, deployments under a state-to-state MOA are limited 

to a specific period, such as 30 days. 

(b) Under certain circumstances, a governor may request that the USG pay for 

the costs associated with a state call up of the NG for emergency response. The Chief, 

National Guard Bureau (CNGB) facilitates and resources ANG and ARNG forces and assets 

through the states adjutants general to conduct CBRN response operations to assist federal, 

state, local, and tribal authorities in responding to a domestic CBRN incident. When directed 

by SecDef, the CNGB supports transition of state active duty or Title 32, USC, NG forces to 

Title 10, USC, status for DSCA in coordination with the GCCs, through the appropriate 

Service Chief, the individual states, and the ANG and ARNG. Even though the NG forces are 

funded by the USG, in Title 32, USC, status, the governor retains C2 of their NG forces. 

Although the distinction between funding lines is important to the respective state and federal 

treasuries, tactical employment of forces remains the same. For the JFC, the important 

distinction is NG units in Title 32, USC, duty status remain under state control; and, as a result, 

have authority for some missions Title 10, USC units do not. Because NG forces in Title 32, 

USC, duty status remain under the C2 of the governor, NG units may support law enforcement 

missions and are not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). 

(c) NG Capabilities and Contribution. The National Guard Coordination 

Center (NGCC); NG joint operations centers (JOCs); National Guard joint force 

headquarters-state (NG JFHQs-State); joint task forces-state (JTFs-State); weapons of mass 

destruction-civil support teams (WMD-CSTs); chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and high-yield explosives enhanced response force packages (CERFPs); homeland response 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-9 

forces (HRFs); and the deployable direct incident response emergency communications 

terminal form the key elements of the NG’s CBRN response capabilities. 

1. NGCC. The NGCC provides mutual, shared situational awareness 

among each NG JFHQs-State and USNORTHCOM during a CBRN incident or other major 

or catastrophic incidents. The NGCC synchronizes alert notification and deployment of 

designated WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs and synchronizes notification of deployment of 

other NG capabilities when requested by a state or agency. The Joint Continental United 

States Communications Support Environment enables the NGCC to maintain situational 

awareness and share information with NG commanders at all levels throughout the 50 states 

and four territories. Additionally, it provides a deployable, interoperable communications 

capability to the JTF-State commander. 

2. NG JFHQ-State. The NG JFHQ-State provides the governor C2 

capability for all NG forces in their state or territory. In the case of the District of Columbia, 

the C2 of NG forces assigned in the District of Columbia has been delegated to the Secretary 

of the Army by SecDef. Therefore, the Joint Force Headquarters-District of Columbia 

currently operates on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. During a CBRN or bulk high 

explosives (HE) incident, the NG JFHQ-State assumes C2 of additional WMD-CSTs and 

CERFPs deployed into the supported state and provides JRSOI and logistical support. 

3. JTF-State. The JTF-State controls all subordinate state NG assets 

deployed in support of a CBRN or bulk HE incident. The JTF-State commander works 

closely with the IC to verify that NG resources are conducting CBRN operations effectively, 

safely, and legally. 

4. WMD-CSTs. WMD-CSTs are NG units designed to support civil 

authorities at a domestic incident site during specified events, which include use or 

threatened use of a WMD; terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack; intentional or 

unintentional release of nuclear, biological, radiological, or toxic or poisonous chemicals; 

natural or manmade disasters in the US that result, or could result, in the catastrophic loss of 

life or property by identifying hazards, assessing current and projected consequences, 

advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional 

support. The WMD-CST units execute their mission normally in a Title 32, USC, duty 

status within the US and its territories, as prescribed by Title 10, USC, Section 12310. 

For more information on WMD-CSTs, see ATP 3-11.46, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil 

Support Team Operations.

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

5. CERFPs. CERFPs are designed and trained to provide search and 

extraction, medical triage, emergency medical treatment, decontamination of casualties, C2, 

and recovery of remains during CBRN and non-CBRN incidents, as well as advice and 

assistance to the IC, state emergency management, the NG JFHQ-State, TAG, the governor, 

other key officials, and representatives of federal agencies. There are 27 NG CERFPs, 17 of 
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-41 

those are considered stand-alone CERFPs, and 10 are embedded with HRFs to enhance lifesaving capability. 

For more information on CERFPs, see ATP 3-11.47, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland 

Response Force (HRF) Operations.

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

6. NG HRF. The HRF is an NG element of the comprehensive DOD 

CBRN Response Enterprise designed to simultaneously manage multiple NG CBRN 

response elements at an incident site. The HRF is designed to be employed primarily with 

forces in state active duty or Title 32, USC, duty status. The HRF leverages the WMD-CST 

and CERFP force structure and capabilities with augmentation by force packages, to include 

a brigade level C2 element, a company-sized CBRN response security element, and an 

ANG-DIRECT within each of the 10 FEMA regions. Designated NG JFHQs-State will 

assign manning to the HRFs and maintain current NG HRFs with essential CBRN response 

capabilities. The operational elements include a security element, a CERFP C2 element, a 

search and extraction element, a medical element, a fatality search and recovery team, and a 

decontamination element. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise,” for additional information on CBRN response forces. 

f. USCG. The USCG is a Service and a branch of the Armed Forces at all times, and a 

law enforcement agency under DHS at all times. When directed by the President, or by a 

congressional declaration of war, the USCG may be transferred from DHS to the Department 

of the Navy. The USCG is not constrained by the PCA and has jurisdiction on US waters, 

the high seas, and at selected land-based maritime transportation and industrial facilities. As 

part of the Armed Forces with Title 10, USC, authorities, a member of the US intelligence 

community, and a regulatory and law enforcement agency using Title 14, USC, authorities, 

the USCG is uniquely positioned to contribute to a layered, integrated, national CBRN 

detection, identification, classification, triage, and protection effort. 

(1) USCG’s HS mission is to protect the US maritime domain and the US marine 

transportation system and deny their use and exploitation as a means for attacks on US 

territory, population, and critical infrastructure. Additionally, USCG prepares for and, in the 

event of attack, conducts hazard response operations. 

(2) The USCG is the LFA for maritime security. CCDRs may assign forces to USCG 

area commanders under tactical control (TACON) to support short notice HS operations without 

a formal RFF for up to 48 hours. Longer duration operations require an RFF. 

(3) USCG CBRN Capabilities. The USCG provides unique authorities, surge 

capacities, and capabilities for CBRN response. As an Armed Force and federal maritime 

law enforcement agency, the USCG authorities reside in a variety of statutory and regulatory 

titles. Those relevant to CBRN response include Titles 10, 14, 33, and 50 of USC. During 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-11 

CBRN response operations, the USCG may be employed in either a supporting or supported 

role with DOD forces. 

(a) USCG general forces include Coast Guard small boat stations, sectors, 

cutters, deployable specialized forces (DSFs), and emergency relocation group personnel are 

equipped with CBRN capabilities to conduct initial response operations in a known or 

suspected CBRN contaminated environment. 

(b) USCG expeditionary forces include USCG ships, aircraft, port security 

units, and law enforcement detachments operating in the GCCs’ AORs. These forces are 

trained and equipped to DOD CBRN defense standards and may support limited ICBRN-R 

operations and unique domestic military operations under the USCG defense readiness 

mission. 

For more information on USCG expeditionary force capabilities, see Commandant of the 

Coast Guard Instruction (COMDTINST) 3400.4, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Policy for Coast Guard Expeditionary Forces. 

(c) USCG DSFs have CBRN response capabilities that include armed maritime 

security response teams (MSRTs), and unarmed national strike force (NSF) teams that are 

capable of performing technical response functions inside a known or suspected CBRN 

contaminated environment. DSFs are equipped to detect, identify, and respond to CBRN 

incidents in a CBRN contaminated environment, and are capable of performing its statutory 

missions, and primary mission essential functions. DSFs support domestic response and may 

deploy detachments to support overseas (expeditionary) military operations and ICBRN-R 

operations. 

1. MSRTs consist of advanced tactical teams with specialized capabilities 

for conducting law enforcement and counterterrorism operations. MSRTs conduct maritime 

security and response, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives (CBRNE) detection and response. 

2. USCG NSF strike teams facilitate preparedness for and response to oil 

and hazardous substance pollution incidents in order to protect public health and the 

environment. NSF provides rapid response support in incident management through various 

specialized capabilities, to include maritime environmental response, WMD, and CBRN. A 

NSF strike team operates in all operational areas and deploys specialized capabilities and 

incident command expertise to support lead agency IC, and federal on-scene coordinator 

preparation and response to CBRN incidents. NSF organizations are based in several 

CONUS locations and strike teams can be pre-staged where a threat of CBRN release exists. 

The NSF supports domestic response and requests of international assistance and may deploy 

detachments to support overseas military environmental response operations. 

For more information on USCG specialized forces, see COMDTINST M16601.12, Special 

Missions Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) 

Operations Manual. 
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-41 

g. CSAs. CSAs provide direct support to CCDRs during emergency situations and are 

subject to evaluation by CJCS. The CSAs are the Defense Information Systems Agency, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Health Agency, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 

National Security Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, National GeospatialIntelligence Agency, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Each plays a critical 

role in supporting CBRN response operations by ensuring the supported commander has the 

technical CBRN information, situational awareness, technical support, 24/7 reachback 

capability, logistics, and contracting support necessary to carry out the mission. DTRA 

provides operational and technical advice and support to DOD components and other USG 

departments and agencies, as requested and approved, regarding CBRN response operations. 

This is accomplished through training and exercises, the deployment of CBRN military 

advisory teams, and operational planning assistance. DTRA also provides modeling, 

predictions, assessments, publications, lessons learned, analysis, and other support as 

required. DTRA provides technical reachback support through the DTRA National Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Technical Reachback Enterprise, a 24/7 WMD and CBRN national 

reachback and situational awareness facility, for all technical analysis support. During 

CBRN response, DTRA liaises with other technical support providers and the intelligence 

community to meet support requests. 

3. Command Relationships 

a. Domestic CBRN Response C2. Domestic CBRN response operations may involve 

the full spectrum of government, NGOs, and the private sector. The efficient coordination of 

military and civil capabilities and activities within a stricken operating environment requires 

a unifying command structure to achieve unity of effort. Military forces always remain 

under the assigned C2 as established by either Title 10, USC; Title 14, USC; Title 32, USC; 

or in state active duty. 

b. As previously discussed, NG Soldiers and Airmen may serve either in a Title 10, 

USC, duty status in a state active duty, or Title 32, USC, duty status, under the C2 of the 

governor. The state governors, through TAGs, control NG forces when those forces are 

performing operations in state active duty and when in Title 32, USC, duty status. Figure II2 depicts these command relationships. Two crucial principles clarify the duty status of NG 

personnel: 

(1) Unless ordered into federal service, NG Soldiers and Airmen serve in state 

active duty or Title 32, USC, status under a state C2 chain under the governor. 

(2) The duty status of these NG Soldiers or Airmen is not determined by who funds 

an operation; rather, it depends upon their legal status and associated chain of authority. 

c. DSC. Legislation allows for a DSC to have command authority over both federal and 

state NG forces. A DSC provides a means for providing unity of effort for military forces 

operating in Title 32, USC, or state active duty status, and Title 10, USC duty status. A DSC 

must be duly appointed and can be an active duty officer who accepts an additional state 

commission or can be a federalized state NG officer. By design, a DSC can leverage 

military leadership that has local situational awareness and existing relationships with local 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-13 

civil agencies, provide continuity as federal forces are integrated into the response effort, and 

provide for continuity in response (same JTF C2 prior to and after federal response). Of 

note, DSC authority is vested in an individual commander, not the organization. Therefore, a 

DSC should have a Title 10, USC, and state active duty/Title 32, USC, deputy, as well as a 

joint staff manned by Title 10, USC, personnel. This augmented staff is particularly 

important should a dual-status JTF-state have to control naval forces since few states have 

naval militias from which to draw maritime expertise. The primary shared DOD and state 

interests are unity of effort and effective execution. 

For more information on DSC responsibilities and authority under Title 10, USC, and Title 

32, USC, see JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 

Figure II-2. Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Command Relationships

Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Command Relationships

civilian authority

federal command

state command

coordination

advisory role

Legend

Coast Guard

Joint

Task Force

Functional

and/or

Service

Components

Joint Task 

Force – State

National

Guard

Bureau

Combatant

Commander

Secretary

of the

Army

Secretary

of the

Air Force

Joint Force

Commander

Joint Force

Headquarters – 

State

Federalized

National Guard 

Forces

Secretary of 

Homeland 

Security

President

Secretary of 

Defense

Chairman of 

the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff

Director, State 

Emergency 

Management 

Agency

Governor

State

Adjutant

General
Chapter II 

II-14 JP 3-41 

d. Achieving Unity of Effort Without Unity of Command. When the US undertakes 

military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a 

national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. A DSC may be utilized in a 

domestic CBRN response in order to facilitate unity of command for participating federal 

forces and also, unity of effort between federal and state military forces operating within a 

single state. Unity of effort does not depend on “what” capabilities are employed; rather, it 

depends on “how” they are integrated and utilized effectively for employment. Therefore, 

unity of effort can be achieved without unity of command and is the predominant solution in 

domestic CBRN response operations. 

(1) Joint doctrine focuses on multinational and interagency coordination employing 

the broad term of “unified action” in referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or 

integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military 

operations to achieve unity of effort. Establishing unity of effort at the national level is, of 

necessity, a cooperative endeavor involving a number of federal departments and agencies. 

A similar unity of effort will be necessary at the state and local levels during a CBRN 

response operation. 

For more information on interagency coordination and unity of effort, see JP 3-08, 

Interorganizational Cooperation.

(2) National response doctrine in the NRF identifies unity of effort through unified 

command as one of its five key principles for the federal/state/local/tribal/ territorial/insular 

area response. The NRF and the incident command system (ICS) “unified command” 

concept is distinctly different from the military chain of command construct of “unity of 

command” and, as such, military forces do not operate under the authority of the IC, or under 

the ICS. From a NRF perspective, effective unified command is indispensable to response 

activities and requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each 

participating organization. Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of 

command of each participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across 

jurisdictions in support of common objectives. Use of the ICS is an important element 

across multi-jurisdictional or multiagency incident management activities. The ICS provides 

a structure to enable agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, and functional 

responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively on scene. In a team effort, the 

ICS allows all agencies with jurisdictional authority and/or functional responsibility for the 

incident to provide joint support through mutually developed incident objectives and 

strategies established at the command level. Each participating agency maintains its own 

authority, responsibility, and accountability. NIMS supports response through the following 

actions: developing a single set of objectives; using a collective, strategic approach; 

improving information flow and coordination; creating common understanding of joint 

priorities and restrictions; ensuring that no agency’s legal authorities are compromised or 

neglected; and optimizing the combined efforts of all agencies under a single plan. 

For more information on unified command and unity of effort in the NRF, NIMS, and ICS, 

refer to the NRF Resource Center: www.fema.gov/NRF and the NIMS Resource Center: 

www.fema.gov/NIMS. These online resources are routinely updated and evolving. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-15 

(3) At the operational level, the JFO ensures unity of effort by identifying agencies 

that have the requisite capabilities to reach the common objectives or the ability to adapt 

their wide-area operations in light of the response by bringing their core competencies to the 

interagency forum. When all participants in the interagency process understand what needs 

to be done, agree upon the means to accomplish it, and identify who will accomplish specific 

activities through coordination, a common sense of ownership and commitment toward 

resolution helps achieve unity of effort. 

(a) The unified coordination group functions as a multiagency coordination 

entity (as defined by the NIMS) and works to establish coordinated priorities (single or 

multiple incidents) and allocate resources, resolve agency policy issues, and provide strategic 

guidance to support federal incident management activities. The unified coordination group 

coordinates field operations from a JFO and typically consists of the FCO, state coordinating 

officer, and senior officials from other entities with primary statutory or jurisdictional 

responsibility and significant operational responsibility for an aspect of an incident. Because 

the principles of unified command apply to the unified coordination group, the objectives are 

a reflection of the agencies’ collective approach rather than “tasking” from a senior 

commander. JFO standard operating procedures ensure consideration to 

departmental/agency timelines and requirements to ensure a coordinated federal response. 

(b) Based on the magnitude, type of incident, and anticipated level of resource 

involvement, the supported CCDR may utilize a JTF to command federal (Title 10, USC) 

military activities in support of the incident. If a JTF is established, consistent with 

operational requirements, its C2 element is collocated at the JFO and included within the 

unified coordination group to ensure coordination and unity of effort. NIMS standardized 

structures and tools enable a unified approach to be effective both on scene and at the 

emergency operations centers (EOCs). 

(4) Unity of effort is expected at the tactical level. This is because the designated 

IC develops the incident objectives on which subsequent incident action planning is based 

and integrates all available capabilities into the response. The IC approves the incident 

action plan (IAP) pertaining to ordering and releasing of incident resources. 

(a) Almost all tasks given to DOD are tasks that someone in a civil position 

normally does, but the disaster conditions have overwhelmed their capacity. The technical 

knowledge and expertise is still resident with the activity or organization that needs the 

support (initial state requestor) but they are limited in their ability to cover the sheer 

magnitude of requirements on their own. 

(b) The JFC shapes tactical unity of effort by having a common operational 

picture with all levels of the local, state, tribal, and federal response where DOD capabilities 

are being employed. Unity of effort in CBRN response is improved by interoperability with 

common methods of operation and common training using compatible or comparable 

equipment. Finally, common control measures reflected in shared and common plans, 

concepts of execution, and IAPs can provide for civil authority oversight and direction in 

incident management, coordination of actions, and supervision of tactical effort without 

requiring a unity of command construct to get unity of effort. The JFC tasked with 
Chapter II 

II-16 JP 3-41 

integrating DOD capabilities at the tactical level into domestic operations improves unity of 

effort when there is clarity at the tactical level in these four areas: 

1. Certainty as to Requirement(s). DSCA policy imposes strict controls 

for staying within the scope of the FEMA mission assignment process, leaving little latitude 

for tactical nimbleness in adjusting to quickly changing situations. The JFC should put 

controls into place to ensure actual requirements are being met to the satisfaction of the 

entities closest to the situation. 

2. Clarification of Expectations. Ground truth at the work site can often 

change from the initial situation described in the federal response IAP and mission 

assignment. Thereafter, adjustments are made by first line leaders during execution to 

achieve the IC’s objectives. Direct coordination with the initial in-state requestor closest to 

the point of execution facilitates measured and reasonable adjustments while staying within 

the operational and fiscal constraints of the mission assignment. 

3. Efficient Resolution of Performance Issues. Even with the best 

intentions, support efforts sometimes don’t satisfy the expectations of the requestor who 

initially articulated the requirement. During a catastrophic incident, lost productivity or 

additional rework because of incomplete or improper performance can have a devastating 

impact on meeting goals and objectives. The JFC should encourage subordinate leaders to 

request routine checks and oversight by the initial state requestor to permit quick and 

efficient resolution of issues among requestors and responders closest to the point of 

performance. 

4. Risk Management. Management of performance risk is allocated by 

the control measures agreed to by the contributing agencies, with the drafter (in this case the 

state requestor) initially setting the standards. The JFC should ensure that the initial 

requestor is part of the controls that are in place to identify and manage performance risk and 

not rely completely on the ESF coordinator in the JFO. Safety risks can many times be 

reduced by the initial requester, who routinely does the task, providing oversight over the 

DOD forces, perhaps even conducting on-site training for nontechnical forces. 

e. Achieving Unity of Effort Between Initial DOD Response Forces. Effective 

employment of federal and NG forces requires common doctrine and organizational design. 

Presidential directives and DOD regulatory guidance mandate that DOD civilian personnel 

and Service members meet minimum federal compliance standards for emergency 

responders and command and staff personnel. Law and circumstance enable unity of 

command and unity of effort; leaders at every level depend on their experience, flexible 

initiative, and understanding of DSCA operations to ensure integrated and synchronized 

military CBRN response. Initial DOD response forces, consisting of both NG in Title 32, 

USC, status and federal forces in Title 10, USC, status, consult, coordinate with, and respond 

to state authorities or federal civil authorities in the tactical-level execution of assigned tasks, 

pursuant to an order by SecDef or the President to provide support to those authorities. The 

DOD CBRN Response Enterprise is structured to achieve an early unity of effort and 

integration of capabilities for responding to CBRN incidents. Key to achieving unity of 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-17 

effort is the integration of the enterprise through sourcing, training, exercising, readiness 

reporting, planning, and coordination prior to an incident. 

See Appendix C, “Department of Defense Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Response Enterprise,” for additional information on response forces. 

4. Considerations 

a. The Joint Force in a CBRN Response Environment. Overarching requirements 

for a joint force in a CBRN environment are two-fold: the joint force shapes the composition 

of the response through proactive planning and interagency, intergovernmental, and 

nongovernmental coordination. The joint force is also responsible for protecting each DOD 

member conducting DSCA. The CBRN environment causes joint forces to plan in a unique 

way and recognize the primary reason for employment of the joint force is to support civil 

authorities and minimize the impacts of a CBRN incident. Planning considerations are 

significantly different for the joint force conducting CBRN response as the primary mission 

than for the joint force conducting other missions. Requirements for protecting joint forces 

remain a constant priority for the JFC, especially when operating in a contaminated 

environment. DSCA may also entail unique legal implications that need to be considered 

through all phases of CBRN response planning and operations. 

b. Tiered CBRN Response. The NRF describes a tiered response and emphasizes that 

response to incidents should be handled at the lowest jurisdictional level capable of handling 

the work. The response to a CBRN incident requires the integration and synchronization of 

capabilities from the local, state, tribal, and federal level. Federal agency teams respond on 

their agency’s authority, if the problem exceeds the capabilities of lower tiers. From the 

DOD perspective, the response will likely begin within hours with employment of NG 

WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs in Title 32, USC, or state active duty status in addition to 

local Title 10, USC, commanders providing assistance under immediate response authority. 

When directed by SecDef, USNORTHCOM responds within hours with JTF-CS and the first 

echelons. 

c. Integrated CBRN Response Framework 

(1) Strategic. During a CBRN incident, DHS coordinates the federal 

government’s incident management efforts in support of the civil authorities. However, it is 

likely that the major elements of operational framework will have already been established 

IAW strategic decisions made by state and local responders in the initial hours of the 

response effort. A major decision is the determination of controls for the employment of 

first responders (police, fire, and emergency medical services) into the incident area to 

ensure that significant portions of the first responder community do not themselves become 

casualties. Another major decision concerns the ability of local civil government to control 

the evacuation out of the incident area. If the local government can control the evacuation 

through public information and rapid establishment of traffic control points, then operational 

conditions are favorable for the deliberate application of local, state, and federal resources at 

designated evacuee processing centers and urban SAR, decontamination, and medical triage 

and emergency medical sites at points upwind or crosswind from the incident area. If the 
Chapter II 

II-18 JP 3-41 

local civil government is unable to control the evacuation of the civil population, then 

evacuation centers are established at resulting choke points either on major roads or near 

hospitals and will result in a less deliberate approach to application of local, state, and federal 

resources. Both these decisions have significant impact on the operational environment that 

CBRN response forces will find when they are employed into the incident area. Therefore, 

the initial assessments conducted by NG WMD-CSTs or other federal assessment teams are 

critical in providing DHS and other federal departments and agencies the necessary 

situational awareness to make quick decisions regarding resource sharing and coordination. 

(2) Operational. The WMD-CST deploys within three hours of notification. The 

WMD-CST is able to provide the initial assessment to the NG JFHQ-State, JTF-State, and 

the IC, which forward the assessment to the NGCC and to USNORTHCOM. It is important 

the NGCC and USNORTHCOM JOC forward the initial assessment and characterization of 

the threat to follow-on deploying NG WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, HRFs, and DCRF and C2CRE 

units, respectively, so these units can be better prepared for conditions they will face in the 

incident area. However, as discussed previously, much of the operational environment for 

CBRN response will be set based on early strategic decisions of the local authorities. If the 

evacuation of the population is controlled, CBRN response forces deploy to staging areas 

where they link up with local responders and are integrated into an existing network of 

evacuation processing centers. If the evacuation is uncontrolled, CBRN response forces may 

be required to establish evacuation centers at designated choke points or vicinity hospitals. 

For CBRN response forces, the most critical operational decision in the first 24 hours will be 

determination of how and where to employ life-saving (search and extraction, 

decontamination, and medical triage and emergency medical) capabilities. The most likely 

employment of forces is at the upwind or crosswind points either reinforcing local 

responders or establishing additional search and extraction, decontamination, and medical 

triage and emergency medical sites at upwind and crosswind points that local responders do 

not have the capability to cover. 

(3) Tactical. At the tactical level, the critical effort is a rapid, and effective 

employment of reconnaissance capabilities to provide assessments on the effects in terms of 

casualties and medical treatment (detect and monitor). These assessments provide the 

necessary information to assist the IC in determining upwind and crosswind points and best 

locations for search and extraction, decontamination, medical triage and emergency medical 

services, and other sites. The next major effort is to increase the capability and capacity of 

local responders to perform search and extraction, decontamination, and medical triage and 

emergency medical care of casualties. DOD forces can reinforce evacuation centers to 

increase capacity and throughput or establish search and extraction, decontamination, 

medical triage and emergency medical—expanding the geographic distribution of response 

capability. An important force multiplier is DOD’s ability to assist with decontamination of 

local fire, police, and emergency medical services personnel and equipment, enabling first 

responders to participate safely in the CBRN response. 

d. Organizing Considerations

(1) A JTF established in support of CBRN response is organized in a manner 

similar to a conventional JTF. The CCDR normally establishes a JTF to plan and conduct 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-19 

CBRN response. However, a JTF may be established subordinate to a CCMD or subunified 

command. For example, a GCC may elect to form a JTF to conduct CBRN response in a 

specific region of the theater. In establishing a JTF for CBRN response, the CCDR 

experiences significant organizational, operational, and training challenges as he fuses a 

diverse group of key personnel, with varying degrees of understanding and experience in 

joint operations, CBRN response, and interagency cooperation, into a functioning JTF that 

can conduct a CBRN response. To be effective in such a response, key personnel need to 

fully understand both interagency and CBRN response techniques and procedures. JTF-CS 

can function as the core JTF headquarters element. Guidelines for establishing a JTF can be 

found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

(2) Augmentation. The JTF staff conducts crisis action planning (CAP) and 

determines whether mission requirements will exceed the JTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., 

qualified personnel, facilities, or equipment). The commander, joint task force (CJTF), 

requests assistance from the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR prepares in advance to 

identify or request possible resources from both AC and RC forces to meet critical needs. 

Additionally, these augmentees train regularly with the JTF if it is organized on a standing 

basis. 

(3) Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC). The JPAC is a tailored group of 

CBRN response joint planners. The cell is manned, equipped, and trained by JTF-CS to 

assist other JTF staffs or the DCE. JPAC members maintain currency in CBRN areas 

through professional education, participation in joint and multiagency exercises, and through 

planning for national special security event contingencies. The JPAC is able to focus an ad 

hoc JTF staff on how to employ joint forces in conducting CBRN response. The JPAC also 

assists the JTF with obtaining technical augmentation or dedicated reachback capability from 

DTRA, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 

USAMRICD, Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), United States Army 

Forces Command’s (FORSCOM’s) 20th CBRNE Command, and the CDC. These experts 

maintain liaison and reachback capability for the JTF and JPAC to national-level expertise, 

while providing on-staff subject matter expertise. The JTF command surgeon, in particular, 

should consult with these technical experts, as they are able to provide information critical to 

medical planning considerations. 

(4) Technical Augmentation and Liaison. CBRN incidents entail operational and 

force health protection risks. The affected community and federal partners in the response 

may need technical advice and situational awareness in effects mitigation. 

(a) DTRA. DTRA provides planning support through deployable teams and 

real-time technical reachback. This includes expertise in CBRN incident modeling and 

potential consequences of CBRN incidents, as well as CBRN military advisory teams to 

assist in all phases of CBRN incidents. 

(b) USAMRIID. The USAMRIID representative provides expertise in 

epidemiology and biological warfare defense. 
Chapter II 

II-20 JP 3-41 

(c) CDC. The CDC expert serves as the on-staff augmentation for national 

level EP and response, the Laboratory Response Network, and Public Health emergency 

response, and has expertise on the Strategic National Stockpile. 

(d) 20th CBRNE Command. The 20th CBRNE Command is subordinate to 

FORSCOM. Its representatives are CBRNE subject matter experts, can serve as liaison to 

the CJTF, and are knowledgeable of the command’s capabilities and units. 

(e) USAMRICD. The USAMRICD representative provides an expert in the 

medical management of chemical casualties. 

(f) Air Force Technical Applications Center. This center operates and 

maintains a global network of sensors called the United States Atomic Energy Detection 

System (USAEDS). Once the USAEDS senses a disturbance underground, underwater, in 

the atmosphere, or in space, the incident is analyzed for nuclear identification, and findings 

are reported to SecDef and the President through Headquarters US Air Force. 

(g) AFRRI. The AFRRI representative provides an expertise in radiological 

and nuclear warfare defense, response, and treatment for radiological/nuclear casualties. For 

more discussion on the AFRRI, see Chapter III, “International Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Response.” 

(5) Boards, Centers, and Cells. The CJTF may elect to organize boards, centers, 

and cells to facilitate a number of functions required of the JTF. To assist in this decision, 

the staff should determine what organizational structures have been formed within the JTF, 

and what organizational structures have been delegated to the CJTF by the supported CCDR. 

The CJTF then decides what boards, centers, and cells would be best suited to support the 

JTF mission and functions. The DCO is closely associated with the JTF and resides within 

the JFO as the DOD single point of contact under the NRF. JTFs typically will require 

planning, logistics, movement, medical fusion, current operations, future operations, 

communication, mortuary affairs, effects assessment, and intelligence coordination centers 

and boards. Larger incidents may also require joint mortuary affairs, movement control, 

contracting, PA, visitor control, and a standing personnel reception center. 

e. CBRN Response Operations. The JP 3-0, Joint Operations, phasing model is 

adapted for domestic CBRN response operations as described below and depicted in Figure 

II-3. 

(1) Phase 0—Shape (Shape). Phase 0 is continuous situational awareness and 

preparedness. Actions in this phase include interagency coordination, planning, 

identification of gaps, exercises, and PA outreach. 

(a) This phase sets conditions for increased CBRN response interoperability 

and cooperation with interagency partners, through active participation in planning, 

conferences, and exercises. These strategic- and theater-level objective activities continue 

through all phases. Preparedness of the designated units is the operational and tactical focus 

during this phase in order to ensure readiness conditions are sustained for execution of 

CBRN response operations and building command relationships. Units with designated C2 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-21 

headquarters and the CCMD’s Army Service component prepare to assume their mission. 

TF commanders focus on training and rehearsals for CBRN response, based on the joint 

mission-essential task list provided through the Army Service component command (ASCC) 

and as directed by the CCDR. Individuals and detachments receive training from experts on 

operations in a contaminated environment. 

Figure II-3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Activities by 

Operational Phase 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Activities by Operational Phase

Situational 

Awareness 

and 

Preparedness 

Phase 0 

includes 

planning, 

coordination, 

training, and 

exercises

CCDR identify 

CBRN response 

mission or 

directed by 

SecDef

Deploy CBRN response 

begins

Force units 

redeploy and 

OPCON reverts to 

Phase 0 

commander

DOD scales 

down response 

responsibilities

Forces receive 

DEPORD

Forces ready 

to conduct 

mission 

assignments 

in the JOA

DOD Title 10, 

United States 

Code, 

utilization 

diminishes

Force steady 

state Phase 0 

Redeployment preparedness

criteria met

BEGIN

BEGIN/

END

BEGIN BEGIN BEGIN BEGIN

END

END END

END

END

Phase 0

Shape

Phase 0

Shape

Phase I

Anticipate

Phase II

Respond

Phase III

Operate

Phase IV

Stabilize

Phase V

Transition

Phase 0

Shape

Phase I

Anticipate

Phase II

Respond

Phase III

Operate

Phase IV

Stabilize

Phase V

Transition

Phases are discrete but many activities overlap.

Operate Activities Transition Activities

Stabilize 

Activities

Respond 

Activities

Anticipate Activities

Shaping Activities Shaping Activities

Level of Military Effort

Incident

DOD Department of Defense

JOA joint operations area

OPCON operational control

SecDef Secretary of Defense

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear

CCDR combatant commander

DEPORD deployment order

Legend
Chapter II 

II-22 JP 3-41 

(b) Further, subordinate staffs, DCRF and C2CRE TF commanders, DCRF and 

C2CRE TFs, or others identify shortfalls and submit requests for additional capabilities 

through their parent headquarters. Inevitably, some shortfalls will result in a requirement for 

contracted support. Known shortfalls should be analyzed and prepared for expedited 

contract execution, to include comprehensive performance work statements and other 

necessary contractual documents. These staffs modify existing plans to fit their particular 

organization and capabilities and review the plans with the CJTF. This includes updating 

and submitting time-phased force and deployment data through the ASCC and their parent 

headquarters to USTRANSCOM. The TF commander pays particular attention to 

interoperability between elements from the other Services, and includes LNOs and other 

requirements. 

(c) CBRN response units should conduct force health protection measures 

including mask fit testing and immunizations to prevent delays in response posture. CBRN 

response tasked units are to adhere to the CJCS CBRN EXORD medical 

readiness/immunization requirements, identified by their force provider, before assuming a 

CBRN response mission role. Units must meet force health protection standards established 

in the operation or DEPORD prior to deployment into an operational area. For units 

stationed in an operational area, force health protection standards are met prior to 

employment. The CJTF should consider all these factors and recommend a viable force 

health protection course of action (COA) to the supported CCDR at the earliest available 

opportunity. 

(d) Finally, the shaping phase includes a mission rehearsal exercise designed 

by USNORTHCOM/USPACOM and supported by USARNORTH/US Army Pacific, 

respectively. The phase ends with the identification of a potential CBRN response mission 

through warning, SecDef direction, or the occurrence of a no-notice event. 

(2) Phase I—Deter (Anticipate). Continued situational awareness is vital to 

understanding the CBRN response operation parameters. The situation may warrant, due to 

warnings, the CAP process to begin before a CBRN incident occurs. Determination of joint 

force command structure, the DOD anticipated response, and early and thorough 

collaboration with federal departments and agencies, state governments (including respective 

NG TAGs, commanders), and localities is paramount. Alerting and preparing the joint force 

may be directed through a CJCS warning order, planning order, or alert order. However, 

CBRN incidents may also occur without warning, resulting in accelerated procedures and the 

first notification being an EXORD. This EXORD guidance may possibly even be verbal. In 

this case, the operations would move directly into phase II, with relevant phase I tasks still 

requiring to be performed. During this phase, the DCOs and situational awareness teams are 

employed post incident to provide assessments to USNORTHCOM and situational 

awareness to the JFLCC. 

(a) The assessment will determine the scope and magnitude of the incident, 

identify potential theater response forces, identify DCRF and C2CRE requirements to 

expedite response, and identify potential C2 node requirements. The senior individual of the 

assessment element serves as the CCDR’s LNO to gain on-scene situational awareness and 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-23 

provide recommendations on the appropriate level of C2 and initial resources required for the 

CBRN response. 

(b) The assessment element may include SJA, CBRN, medical, PA, mortuary 

affairs, operations, intelligence, plans, logistics, law enforcement, and communications 

officers and selected subject matter experts to assist in developing the assessment and 

recommending an appropriate response. Other CCDRs have standing site assessment teams 

or survey and assessment teams prepared for this mission. 

(c) Because the vast majority of Title 10, USC, capabilities for DSCA falls 

under USNORTHCOM, the CCMD situational awareness team procedures are included here 

as an example of assessment processes and actions. Following coordination with state civil 

and military officials (typically the state TAG or the NG JFHQ-State) and federal officials 

(to include the FCO, incident management assistance team, the DCO and other on-scene 

technical advisors), the situational awareness team makes an evaluation of potential 

shortfalls in federal and state capabilities, which may become requests for DOD assistance. 

The situational awareness team prepares its report shaped by its knowledge of CBRN effects 

and how to minimize and manage the harm or damage the effects may cause. The report 

identifies proposed methods of response, anticipated actions, and potentially required forces. 

Information gathered is developed, either independently or through the support of an 

appropriate joint planning group for CAP, into a commander’s assessment using the 

Adaptive Planning and Execution format for a commander’s estimate and forwarded to the 

CCDR. This document provides specific recommendations to the CCDR relative to the 

CBRN response effort, to include tailoring and supplementing the CBRN response force 

structure required to employ. 

(d) The situational awareness assessment helps the CCDR conduct the mission 

analysis and prepare the commander’s estimate with a recommended DOD COA to be taken 

in support of the incident and recommended DOD resources and capabilities for anticipated 

mission assignments. The commander’s estimate identifies force to task capabilities required 

to accomplish anticipated DOD mission assignments. With SecDef approval and through 

CJCS direction, these capabilities are identified by the Services, CCDRs, and the DOD 

agencies. The CJCS EXORD identifies the designated forces allocated to the CCDR and 

specifies the type of command authority (normally OPCON) for exercises and mission 

execution. Additionally, it provides approval of purpose, desired effect, and COA to be 

taken in support of USG departments and agencies for the CBRN response. 

(e) This phase ends when forces receive prepare-to-deploy orders and are 

staged and ready to deploy. Once a unit receives a DEPORD through its parent headquarters 

specifying OPCON by the receiving CCDR, the TF deploys LNOs to a location designated 

by the CJTF for establishing the JTF deployable headquarters. These LNOs provide C2 

connectivity for dissimilar systems and pass situational assessments back to their TF as the 

situation develops. Simultaneously, each TF deploys an advance party to the BSI identified 

by the JFLCC or JFC for JRSOI and base support. JRSOI is the essential process that 

transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving in 

theater, into forces capable of meeting the CCDR’s operational requirements. The TF 

commanders should coordinate with the CJTF on rules for the use of force (RUF), arming 
Chapter II 

II-24 JP 3-41 

status, law enforcement missions, intelligence support and restrictions, PA guidance, 

deployment priorities, and mission assignments (if known). Because of the nature of the 

most likely CBRN response operations, forces will likely deploy into and remain in the JOA 

for the entire length of the CBRN response. Catastrophic incidents may require force 

rotation. 

(3) Phase II—Seize the Initiative (Respond). The key to success during the 

respond phase is sequencing the required JTF resources at the appropriate time and place. 

Phase II executes deployment of forces to key theater nodes and to the JOA to save lives, 

minimize human suffering, and maintain public confidence. Speed and decisiveness are 

essential. The JFC establishes C2 of designated DOD Title 10, USC, forces, establishes a 

common operational picture, continues JRSOI, and validates and establishes a BSI. (See 

Appendix B, “Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base 

Support Installations and Foreign Theater Assets.”) Participation in the JRSOI is essential 

for mission accomplishment and protection of the joint force. 

(a) Forces are prioritized to deploy for mission tasks that are directly involved 

in life saving and preventing further injury. These forces have the highest movement priority 

for CBRN response force deployment. Next in movement priority are forces that assess and 

establish operations or provide temporary critical life support. These forces subsequently 

become the forces necessary to establish and sustain operations. Biological incidents may or 

may not provide a clear point of origin. In this case, TF-medical may be the primary effort 

and have priority in movement. Elements of TF-operations normally have priority for 

movement in the force flow because they contain those capabilities needed to relieve and/or 

augment the efforts of first responders (i.e., monitoring, marking, decontamination, hot-zone 

extraction, security). TF-operations are normally employed closest to the actual incident 

site. 

(b) Forces for the JTF are transferred using a DEPORD to the CCDR, and 

command relationships are established as designated in the EXORD and/or OPORD. After 

coordinating with the BSI, the JTF commences JRSOI operations. Commanders should 

appoint a capable officer and staff to continue to manage unit arrival and JRSOI. As units 

complete JRSOI, they occupy their assigned operating bases and prepare for mission 

assignments. Leaders take every available opportunity to reinforce soldier skills they will 

need when operating in their operational areas, stressing protective measures, RUF, and 

situation awareness and reporting. TF commanders receive and integrate additional forces 

identified during phase II. They provide updates to the CJTF and keep the supporting 

installations informed. 

(c) Phase II completion is generally marked by having forces deployed with 

enough C2 and unit-capability to safely and effectively begin operations. Depending on the 

situation, the CJTF may decide to move into phase III operations before all phase II 

objectives are complete and continue to work on phase II objectives while in phase III. 

(4) Phase III—Dominate (Operate). In phase III, planning and execution efforts 

are synchronized and integrated with the efforts of the supported civil authorities, as well as 

other military operations that may be occurring simultaneously (e.g., technical nuclear 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-25 

forensics sample collection for attribution) within the same operational area. Phase III 

begins when DOD and/or NG forces begin executing mission assignments within the 

operational area. The coordinating agency typically assigns mission assignments to 

supporting or cooperating agencies for action. DOD accepts mission assignments as RFAs, 

which become mission assignments only after being received by Office of the Executive 

Secretary of DOD, then forwarded to the ASD(HD&GS) and the Joint Staff J-3 for 

validation and order processing, and approved by SecDef. Once SecDef approves the 

request, an order is issued to CCMDs, Services, and/or agencies to accomplish the mission. 

In the case of the DCRF and C2CRE, SecDef has authorized CDRUSNORTHCOM to 

approve the mission assignments as long as they are within the scope and capabilities of the 

DCRF and C2CRE. During this phase, the primary focus is on mission assignments that 

involve incident site lifesaving and injury prevention. Key tasks during this phase are hazard 

assessment, casualty search and extraction/rescue, ambulatory and non-ambulatory 

decontamination, emergency medical services, air and ground medical/casualty evacuation, 

and logistical support. 

(a) The CJTF exercises OPCON over all designated DOD forces as directed by 

the CCDR’s EXORD. The commander of a JTF-State exercises OPCON over all designated 

NG forces as directed by the approved EXORD or EMAC agreement. The JTF may task 

organize functionally, by Service components, or a combination of both, depending on the 

situation. The JTF executes mission assignments using the allocated DOD forces within the 

designated operational area. The JTF-State executes mission assignments using NG forces 

within the designated operational area and requesting additional forces from the supported 

CCDR if those within the designated operational area are not adequate. The JTF receives 

mission assignments from the DCO/DCE after they have been validated. The JTF maintains 

force readiness and sustainment requirements for assigned forces in the designated 

operational area. 

(b) The CJTF begins to assign missions to the JTF component commanders, 

who in turn task their units as they become available within the JOA. In some cases, mission 

assignments will be awaiting specialized units as they arrive. Each TF can expect to receive 

multiple missions together with a priority of effort. Commanders should inform residents 

and responders working near their forces of ongoing activities. 

(c) Certain units may work closely with highly specialized personnel from 

other agencies as part of their mission assignment. The TF commander may be required to 

support these agencies and should coordinate with them to assess the progress of operations. 

(d) Normally joint tactics, techniques, and procedures and mission-essential 

task list conditions and standards derived from the Universal Joint Task List are adequate to 

meet the tactical expectation of civil authorities; however, in some circumstances, additional 

requirements may be established. Joint forces should expect some local authority 

coordination and periodic work oversight to confirm that projects are progressing on time 

and confirm that performance is to acceptable civil standards. Phase III ends when deployed 

Title 10, USC; Title 32, USC; and/or state active duty NG forces have completed the 

preponderance of incident site lifesaving mission assignments and the effort shifts to other 

state and/or federal mission assignments that have broader application to the JOA. 
Chapter II 

II-26 JP 3-41 

(5) Phase IV—Stabilize (Stabilize). Stability is marked by a scaling down of 

operations as DOD Title 10, USC, forces; Title 32, USC, NG; and/or state active duty 

utilization diminishes with the associated completion of a majority of incident site mission 

assignments. 

(a) Great loss of property or life is no longer the state’s major concern; rather, 

the priority shifts to support life sustaining operations. Key tasks during this phase are 

patient redistribution, logistical support, and ESF activities to minimize human suffering and 

enable community recovery. During this operational phase, all RFFs have been identified 

and filled such that a smaller DOD C2 or a state-based NG C2 headquarters may be 

warranted. The JTF may reposition capabilities to locations throughout the operations area 

that support the primary agency requests. Determining whether DOD has met transition 

criteria requires close coordination and day-to-day interaction with the lead agency. TF 

commanders continue to exercise C2 while reviewing subordinate operations for ability to 

transition. Redeployment of selected uncontaminated DOD force capabilities no longer 

required for operations may begin; however, selected contaminated assets such as aircraft 

require GCC and International Civil Aviation Organization approval before transition begins. 

Success equals civil authorities ready to respond effectively to continuing requirements and 

assuming full response without degradation of operations. 

(b) The phase ends when civil authorities are postured to transition to recovery 

operations and have the ability to accommodate surge requirements for treatment of 

casualties and critical life support. DCRF and C2CRE units redeploy and reconstitute. 

(6) Phase V—Enable Civil Authorities (Transition). Transition functions begin 

when the effects of the CBRN incident have been minimized and adequate support of civil 

authorities has been provided such that further support is no longer required. 

(a) Civil authorities and the JTF, as well as the supported CCDR or supporting 

or supported JTF-State, agree to implement a seamless transition of operational 

responsibilities to a designated civil authority or a designated command. Civil authorities are 

postured for full responsibility for NRF recovery operations and have the ability to 

accommodate surge requirements. Well before this phase begins, TF and JTF planners 

develop transition criteria with specific measures of effectiveness for each mission 

assignment. As required, they modify reporting requirements to indicate readiness for 

transition. Resource managers should pay particular attention to accountability for 

nonexpendable items that are to be turned over to a civilian agency as part of transition. Site 

clean-up is coordinated with federal, state, and local authorities, and hazmat is turned over 

for disposition. Lessons learned and after action reports are completed. Commanders 

review redeployment schedules and mode of transport details with their subordinates and 

ensure that leaders understand the schedule and requirements for a safe and efficient 

redeployment. Redeploying forces may require decontamination, and medical observation 

and evaluation based on the pathogen or hazard involved. Forces safely redeploy to home 

station to reset and reconstitute. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-27 

(b) The phase ends when all response forces are moved out of the JOA and 

when DOD Title 10, USC; Title 32, USC; or state active duty NG forces have transitioned all 

operations back to civil authorities and redeployed to home stations. 

5. Unique Planning Considerations in the Domestic Operational Environment 

a. BSI. A BSI is a military installation within the US or its territories controlled by any 

Service or agency, in or near an actual or projected domestic emergency operational area, 

designated by DOD to provide military support for DOD and federal agency disaster 

response operation efforts. 

(1) Resources provided by a designated BSI may include, but are not limited to, 

marshalling and lay down areas, security forces, personnel and equipment reception and 

staging areas and facilities, personnel support, billeting, transportation, material handling 

equipment, maintenance, general supply and subsistence support, contracting support, 

communications support, and medical services. 

(2) Logistic planners should consider appropriate Service and RC installations as 

potential BSIs that will facilitate JRSOI and sustainment of CBRN response units. Although 

the Services, when directed by SecDef, designate the appropriate BSI, locations for potential 

BSI should be based on previous site surveys, assessments, and mission analysis. 

For more information on BSI planning considerations, see Appendix B, “Planning 

Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support Installations 

and Foreign Theater Assets.” 

b. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Services. USACE is the 

designated ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering) coordinator and the primary agency for 

providing ESF #3 technical assistance, engineering, and construction management resources 

and support during response activities as directed by the NRF. USACE shares ESF #3 

primary agency with DHS/FEMA. When activated under ESF #6 (Mass Care, Emergency 

Assistance, Housing, and Human Services), USACE is a supporting agency and fulfills 

commodities distribution, emergency power, debris removal, temporary roofing, temporary 

housing, and infrastructure assessment. If ESF#3 or ESF#6 have not been activated, the JTF 

or DCO may request engineering capabilities through the CCDR to the components. 

c. Mortuary Affairs. The joint force may aid federal and state agencies by providing 

mortuary affairs assistance. Any assistance provided will be IAW the NRF and existing 

civilian plans and local civilian direction. 

(1) The primary responsibility for responding to mortuary affairs issues rests with 

state and local authorities. A local or state medical examiner and/or coroner (ME/C) will 

have the responsibility for leading the response effort. DOD mortuary affairs assets are 

usually employed in support of the ME/C. Other important state and local stakeholders who 

may have significant operational involvement include office of emergency management, 

department of public health, NG, state law enforcement, EPA, and fire department and 

hazmat units. 
Chapter II 

II-28 JP 3-41 

(2) Several conditions affect the ability of local and state officials to respond to 

mass fatality operations. Some of these factors include number of fatalities, quality and state 

of remains, the agent or agents (contaminated versus uncontaminated) present, location and 

size of the search and recovery area, conditions (weather, daylight, terrain), city and state 

resources available, and most important, public expectations. Within the construct of the 

civilian operation there are a number of different missions where joint forces may be asked 

to provide mortuary affairs assistance. 

(3) A phased mortuary affairs plan may be required to assist civil authorities in 

augmenting ME/C. Not all mortuary affairs assets are deployed for each mass fatality 

incident; the mortuary affairs response will be tailored to meet the needs of the local 

jurisdiction. 

For additional information on mortuary affairs, see JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.

d. Decontamination Planning. The EPA is the ESF coordinator and primary agency 

responsible for hazardous waste. The USCG may also play a significant role as a primary 

agency for hazmat as defined by the NRF and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 

Pollution Contingency Plan. 

e. Control Zones. In CBRN response, control zones are established to ensure the 

safety of all responders and control access into and out of a contaminated area. The three 

zones established at a chemical, radiological, nuclear, and some biological incident sites 

(where there is a contaminated area such as may be the case with anthrax) are often referred 

to as the hot zone, the warm zone, and the cold zone. See Chapter I, “Overview,” 

subparagraph 5c(7)(e), “Zone Control,” for detailed discussion of control zones. In nearly all 

cases, the control zones will decrease in size with time as CBRN hazards naturally decrease. 

Once the characteristics of the hazard are understood, the control zones can be effectively 

altered to allow more mission flexibility. 

6. Applicable Laws and Agreements in the Domestic Operational Environment 

a. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. PPDs, Presidential study directives, 

Presidential decision directives, national security Presidential directives (NSPDs), homeland 

security Presidential directives (HSPDs), and executive orders (EOs) are the primary means 

by which the President issues national security policy guidance. These Presidential 

documents, national-level strategy documents, and laws provide the basis for the 

development of subordinate and implementing guidance by DOD agencies. A list of 

documents that provide guidance for CBRN response is contained in Appendix A, “Key 

Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols.” The following 

documents deserve special note due to their direct applicability to a domestic CBRN 

response: 

(1) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. HSPD-5 enhances the ability of 

the US to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive NIMS. The 

NRF was developed as a result of HSPD-5 to integrate the family of federal domestic 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-29 

hazards plan to unify the domestic incident management process. When the NRF is used, 

national interagency plans, such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 

Contingency Plan, Mass Migration Emergency Plan, National Search and Rescue Plan, 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and National Maritime Transportation Security Plan, 

are incorporated as supporting and/or operational plans. In addition to consolidating federal 

plans, the NRF establishes a National Operations Center, and the creation of a PFO, who 

may be appointed to represent the Secretary of Homeland Security at the incident site and the 

JFO. HSPD-5 also created NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, 

state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, 

respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. 

(2) PPD-8, National Preparedness. This directive establishes policies to develop a 

national preparedness goal that identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness and 

a national preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the nation to achieve the 

goal. The national preparedness system will allow the nation to track progress of our ability 

to build and improve the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, minimize the 

effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the 

security of the nation. 

(3) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The 

Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for federal participation in domestic disaster relief 

(DR). When incidents of national significance that are declared disasters or emergencies by 

the President occur, federal support to states is delivered IAW relevant provisions of the 

Stafford Act. Based upon the overwhelming nature of a no-notice catastrophic CBRN 

incident, the approval process will be expedited through federal levels. Under the NRF 

construct, DOD is designated a supporting agency for all ESFs and a cooperating agency for 

a number of NRF support and incident annexes. DOD approved support under the Stafford 

Act is generally provided on a reimbursable basis. The ESF coordinators, located in the JFO, 

serve as the primary operational-level functional mechanisms to provide assistance to state, 

local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of 

primary federal responsibility. 

(4) The Economy Act of 1932 (Title 31, USC, Section 1535). IAW the Economy 

Act or other applicable authorities, federal agencies participating in the NRF may provide 

federal-to-federal support by executing interagency or intra-agency reimbursable agreements. 

Federal agencies providing mutual aid support may request reimbursement from the 

requesting agency for eligible expenditures. 

(5) The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy to 

Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the National Strategy for Countering 

Biological Threats. The National Strategy for Homeland Security complements the National 

Security Strategy (NSS) of the US by providing a road map to mobilize and organize the 

nation to secure the US homeland from terrorist attacks. This includes objectives around 

which society can mobilize, align, and focus on HS functions, align budgetary resources to 

the task of securing the homeland, and account for performance on HS efforts. The National 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction provides guidance to integrate USG 

and/or partner nation CBRN response efforts at home or abroad. The National Strategy for 
Chapter II 

II-30 JP 3-41 

Countering Biological Threats provides a framework for future USG planning efforts that 

supports the overall HSPD-10/NSPD-33, Biodefense for the 21st Century, and complements 

existing White House strategies related to biological threat preparedness and response. 

(6) PCA, Title 18, USC, Section 1385. Under the PCA, federal military personnel 

in a Title 10, USC, duty status may not participate in law enforcement activities, except as 

otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. For example, Congress specifically 

authorized military forces to conduct law enforcement activities as an exception to PCA 

when dealing with criminal investigations involving nuclear materials. See Title 18, USC, 

Section 831, and DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

(7) The EMAC. The EMAC is a congressionally approved interstate mutual aid 

compact that provides a legal structure by which states affected by an emergency may 

request assistance from other states. Signatories to the compact resolve potential legal and 

financial obstacles that states might otherwise encounter as they provide assistance to the 

stricken state or states. The compact sets out the responsibilities of the signatory states, 

provides authority to officials responding from other states (except that of arrest unless 

specifically authorized by the receiving state) equal to that held by residents of the affected 

state, ensures reciprocity in recognizing professional licenses or permits for professional 

skills, and provides liability protection (in certain areas) to responders from other states. The 

National Emergency Management Association, a professional association of state emergency 

managers, administers the compact. Since being ratified by Congress and signed into law in 

1996 (Public Law 104-321), 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US 

Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become members of EMAC. The compact 

establishes immunities, authorities, and liabilities for missions executed under its authority. 

It allows the states to rely upon each other in responding to, among other things, emergencies 

such as man-made or natural disasters, insurgencies, or enemy attack. 

b. Key DOD Guidance 

(1) Implications. DOD guidelines are promulgated in a variety of documents that 

include strategy documents, planning guidance, DOD, and the CJCS policy documents. 

These documents are consistent with and complementary to the federal statutes and national 

security policy discussed earlier. DOD issuances specifically address missions for HD and 

DSCA operations to include CBRN response. The following documents, further discussed in 

Appendix A, “Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols,” are 

of special note: 

(a) The Strategy for HD and DSCA that builds on the concept of an active, 

layered defense outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). 

(b) DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), provides 

policy on and responsibilities for DSCA activities. 

(c) The DOD Strategy for CWMD seeks to ensure that the US and its allies 

and partners are neither attacked nor coerced by hostile actors with the threat of WMD. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-31 

(d) CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland, provides operational and policy guidance 

for US military forces supporting domestic CBRN response operations to prepare for and 

respond to the effects of a threatened or actual CBRN situation. 

(2) Special Considerations. The following discussion provides general guidelines 

for functional areas that are associated with CBRN response. Commanders should be aware 

of the specific legal implications of special considerations. 

(a) Intelligence Oversight, Information Collection, Sharing, and Handling.

1. In light of today’s changing environment, commanders and their staffs 

should carefully consider the different rules when planning domestic operations. 

2. The SJA role is especially important during domestic operations as the 

parameters under which DOD operates are different in the US than they are overseas. The 

military commander’s need for information and intelligence within the homeland is on the 

rise—force protection information and counterintelligence integrated into domestic 

operations are expected due to a heightened awareness of potential terrorist threats. These 

needs and expectations pose unique issues in the information and intelligence gathering 

arena. DOD intelligence components are restricted by a set of rules referred to as 

intelligence oversight, governed and regulated by DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence 

Activities, and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components that Affect United States Persons. Everyone else in DOD is subject to a 

different set of rules governed by DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning 

Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. Therefore, the 

commander must direct his need for information or intelligence to the right component—the 

component with the capability and authority to achieve the commander’s intent. 

Determining the nature of the data and the right unit to gather it are areas that often require 

SJA input. 

(b) Military Information Support Operations. US law and DOD policy 

prohibit DOD from using military information support units to conduct operations against 

US persons. However, assets can be used to help disseminate critical information to the 

civilian population. DOD PA units may use military information support personnel and 

equipment to support activities such as information dissemination, printing, reproduction, 

distribution, and broadcasting. 

(c) Use of Weapons and RUF 

1. CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in The Homeland, establishes a presumption 

that units deployed to CBRN incident sites will not carry arms. Units may deploy to CBRN 

incident sites with their weapons in storage in the event that the unit is subsequently 

authorized to carry arms by SecDef or is deployed from the CBRN site to an assignment 

where weapons are authorized. 
Chapter II 

II-32 JP 3-41 

2. JFCs should be thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the standing rules 

for the use of force (SRUF) IAW CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing 

Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (U). National and local decisions about force 

protection conditions (FPCONs) may affect decisions regarding the arming policy. The 

decision to implement a particular FPCON is a CJTF command decision. The CJTF may 

request a higher FPCON from the CCDR if warranted by threat level assessments for the 

JOA. FPCON is based on an assessment of the vulnerability of JTF personnel or facilities, 

criticality of personnel or facilities, availability of security resources, impact on operations 

and morale, damage control considerations, and other international or US actions. Deterrent 

measures may include requesting SecDef authorization to arm the response forces along with 

taking other additional security measures based on local FPCON. 

(d) Immediate Response Authority. The DOD’s immediate response 

authority policy addresses the specific authority delegated to DOD component or military 

commanders to provide immediate DSCA to save lives, prevent human suffering, or 

minimize great property damage in the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from 

any civil emergency or attack. 

1. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be 

associated with a declared or undeclared disaster. The potentially catastrophic nature of 

CBRN incidents would most likely lead to DOD forces conducting some CBRN response 

activities under immediate response authority, but there are no policy exceptions or special 

authorities for CBRN response. A JFC, responding to a SecDef-approved DSCA mission 

and/or EXORD, is like any other DOD military commander and may find the need to 

exercise his/her immediate response authority with available forces. This is particularly 

relevant in the event of a second terrorist attack or TIM release within the JOA, since trained 

medical and specialized CBRN assessment/response teams are on the scene and able to 

rapidly respond to time-sensitive requests from the civil sector. 

2. It is important for commanders to understand immediate response 

authority is limited, restrictive, and conditional. The situation must be a bona fide 

emergency that overwhelms the ability of civilians to respond and meets the restrictions 

criteria within DOD and Service directives. As soon as practical, the military commander, or 

responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance, reports the 

request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of 

command to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The GCC should also be 

notified when the NMCC is notified. IAW state law and DOD/NGB policies, state officials 

may also direct immediate response assistance by NG personnel under state C2, including 

Title 32, USC. However, NG personnel will not be placed in or extended in Title 32, USC, 

status to conduct state immediate response activities. Immediate response requests in the 

event of a CBRN incident may include, but are not limited to: 

a. Rescue, evacuation, and emergency medical treatment of casualties, 

maintenance or restoration of emergency medical capabilities, and safeguarding the public 

health. 
 Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

II-33 

b. Emergency clearance of debris, rubble, and explosive ordnance 

from public facilities and other areas to permit rescue or movement of people and restoration 

of essential services. 

c. Detection, assessment, and containment (initial steps taken to 

facilitate emergency evacuation and public awareness warnings). 

d. Roadway movement control and planning. 

e. Emergency Response. An action that commanders or individuals 

may take in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization is impossible, 

and where the delay or absence of a quick response to save lives, prevent human suffering, 

protect property and the environment, or meet basic human needs may contribute to greater 

danger, tragedy, or misfortune. 

f. Emergency restoration of essential public services (including firefighting, water, communications, transportation, power, and fuel). 

For more information on immediate response authority, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense; JP 

3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo 

OSD011873-13, Utilization of Immediate Response Authority for Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities in Complex Catastrophes, and DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities (DSCA).

(e) Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) for mutual assistance are often 

established between military installations and local communities. If an installation 

commander receives an RFA directly from local civil authorities prior to the President 

declaring a major disaster or emergency, the requesting agency should be referred to the 

local/state emergency management channels, unless an immediate response condition exists 

or a mutual assistance agreement is in effect. Installations may have entered into earlier 

mutual assistance agreements with the local community in the areas of fire-fighting, hazmat, 

medical evacuation and/or other areas, as appropriate. Dependent upon circumstances, this 

type of support may not be considered immediate response. Accordingly, RFAs under 

mutual assistance MOUs must be considered IAW applicable DOD and Service directives. 

c. NRF Guidance. The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards 

response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to 

align key roles and responsibilities across the nation. It describes specific authorities and 

best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to largescale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. 

(1) The NRF explains the common discipline and structures that have been 

exercised and matured at the local, tribal, territorial, insular area, state, and national levels 

over time. It describes key lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, focusing 

particularly on how the USG is organized to support communities and states in catastrophic 

incidents. Most important, it builds upon NIMS, which provides a consistent template for 

managing incidents. 
Chapter II 

II-34 JP 3-41 

(2) The term “response,” as used in the NRF, includes immediate actions to save 

lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. Response also 

includes the execution of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery. The 

NRF is always in effect, and elements can be implemented as needed on a flexible, scalable 

basis to improve response. 

(3) The NRF is comprised of the core document, the ESF, Support, and Incident 

Annexes, and the partner guides. 

(a) Core Document. The core document describes the doctrine that guides the 

national response, roles and responsibilities, response actions, response organizations, and 

planning requirements to achieve an effective national response to any incident that occurs. 

(b) ESF Annexes. Appendix B of the NRF groups federal resources and 

capabilities into 15 functional areas that are most frequently needed in a national response. 

(c) Support Annexes. The support annexes describe essential supporting 

aspects that are common to all incidents (e.g., financial management, volunteer and 

donations management). 

(d) Incident Annexes. The incident annexes address the unique aspects of 

how agencies respond to seven broad incident categories (e.g., biological, nuclear, 

radiological). 

(e) Partner guides provide ready references describing key roles and actions 

for local, tribal, territorial, insular area, state, federal, and private-sector response partners. 

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The SPP is a US 

Presidential initiative with DOD equities. The SPP agreement, designed to reduce barriers 

on trade and facilitate economic growth while improving the security of the continent, was 

signed on 23 March 2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of 

Canada, and the President of Mexico. DHS and the HS Council are the lead agencies for the 

agreement’s security components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The SPP Action Plan 

addresses goals and objectives associated with HS to include “protection, prevention, and 

response.” One of the goals of the agreement is to “develop and implement a common 

approach to critical infrastructure protection, response to cross-border terrorist incidents, and 

as applicable, natural disasters.” This includes a dual-binational (US/Canada and 

US/Mexico) objective on emergency management cooperation to develop and implement 

joint plans for cooperation in incident response, as well as conduct joint training and 

exercises in hazard response. This drives the development of plans to build and strengthen 

mechanisms, protocols, and agreements for communicating and coordinating hazard 

response for mutual assistance and cooperation in the event of natural and 

technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts involving CBRN devices and hazards. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 

NUCLEAR RESPONSE 

1. General 

a. ICBRN-R is assistance provided by the USG to an impacted nation to respond to the 

effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRN incident on foreign territory. ICBRN-R 

encompasses coordinated USG efforts to assist a partner nation responding to CBRN 

incidents. DOD’s CBRN response includes immediate life saving measures for the affected 

HN population as well as efforts to protect US citizens and Armed Forces abroad, as well as 

those of its friends and allies, in order to minimize human casualties and to provide 

temporary associated essential services. Primary responsibility for responding to an 

international CBRN incident resides with the impacted nation, unless otherwise stipulated 

under relevant international agreements. Unless otherwise directed by the President, DOS 

leads and executes the overall USG ICBRN-R. When requested by DOS and directed by 

SecDef, DOD supports ICBRN-R operations by performing CBRN response activities to the 

extent allowed by law and subject to the availability of DOD forces. 

b. Any ICBRN-R response typically includes a number of USG departments and 

agencies in addition to DOD. In the case of a CBRN incident, the ability of the USG to 

assist an impacted nation government and its affected population is determined by the nature 

of the CBRN incident, the resources available to provide assistance, and the time required to 

deploy to the vicinity of the incident. ICBRN-R operations will generally be conducted 

concurrently with FHA, noncombatant evacuation operations, and other USG response 

activities. ICBRN-R operations generally occur in a permissive environment, but the 

relevant GCC is responsible for force protection requirements for US military personnel. 

Figure III-1 depicts the basic ICBRN-R relationships. 

c. A nation that endures a significant CBRN incident requiring international assistance 

may first request assistance from neighboring states, regional allies, and regional or 

international organizations that have the capacity to deliver that assistance in a timely 

manner. The USG may be asked to provide assistance, or the USG may offer assistance, as 

part of a bilateral or international response to the CBRN incident. It is unlikely that the USG 

would be the only international entity providing assistance. 

For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

“A CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] incident that occurs on 

foreign territory may also present direct hazards to the homeland.” 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01, Defense Support for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-41 

d. Limits on the Scope of ICBRN-R Operations. ICBRN-R applies to international 

incidents involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRN materials, including TICs 

and TIMs. It does not apply to the following activities: 

(1) Acts of nature or acts of man which do not involve CBRN materials. Response 

to such incidents is conducted as foreign DR operations IAW DODD 5100.46, Foreign 

Disaster Relief (FDR). 

(2) CBRN incidents that are the direct result of US military operations in a foreign 

country where DOS does not have an established presence. See Chapter IV, “Department of 

Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response,” for additional 

information. 

Figure III-1. International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

request for assistance/coordination

provision of assistance

response to incident

Legend

Incident Area

CBRN

Incident

Department of State

(Principal Agency)

Foreign 

Government

Nongovernmental

Organizations

Foreign First 

Responders

 DOD support is requested 

through the Department 

of State

International Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Response

Base Support 

Installation

Defense 

Support for 

CBRN Incidents 

on Foreign 

Territory

International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear

DOD Department of Defense
 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

III-3 

(3) CBRN incidents that occur and are contained on DOD installations and 

facilities overseas for which DOD retains primary responsibility under relevant international 

agreements or arrangements IAW DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards; DODI 

6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program; and CJCSI 3214.01, 

Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign 

Territory.

e. USG Offer of Assistance Process. The impacted nation’s CBRN response may or 

may not be sufficient to minimize the hazards from a CBRN incident. Support requests for 

international assistance may begin immediately after an incident. During this period, the US 

embassy in the country, the applicable GCC, and other USG entities must gain situational 

awareness related to the nature and magnitude of effects from the CBRN incident, in order to 

decide whether to offer assistance to the impacted nation. 

f. RFA Process. Figure III-2 depicts both the ICBRN-R RFA and ICBRN-R processes. 

Once the impacted nation determines additional capabilities are required, the impacted nation 

notifies the US embassy with an RFA and provides known information about the incident. 

(1) The COM, usually the US ambassador, notifies DOS in Washington, DC. DOS 

conducts internal DOS and National Security Staff notifications and dispatches a foreign 

emergency support team (FEST) and/or a consequence management support team (CMST) 

to the US embassy. Additionally, DOS begins logistics, transportation, and other support 

coordination with the country team. It is expected the embassy country team will inform the 

appropriate GCC, who will dispatch a liaison element to work with the country team to 

assess the situation, identify potential support requirements, and begin the flow of 

information through the CCMD to the NMCC. 

(2) The National Security Staff coordinates interagency deliberations to assess the 

request and determine whether the US will honor it, identify what specific support will be 

provided and which agencies will provide that support, and develop initial guidance for 

responding organizations. During this period it is expected that response elements from 

other nations and international organizations will also start deployment to the country 

stricken by the CBRN incident. 

(3) Following interagency coordination, the National Security Staff provides 

guidance to executive departments and other organizations to initiate the formal USG 

response under ICBRN-R. The US embassy country team increases coordination with the 

impacted nation regarding the specific support the US will provide and finalizes logistics, 

transportation, and legal negotiations. 

(4) Specific requests for DOD support are submitted to the OSD Executive 

Secretary or verbally through the NMCC with a follow-on formal request to the OSD 

Executive Secretary. Upon receipt of a request, DOD assesses it against specific request 

criteria, issues appropriate orders, and coordinates for the movement of tasked resources. 

DOD identifies command relationships, and the supporting commands coordinate the 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-41 

provision of identified resources. The supported CCMD identifies a TF organization, 

develops C2 guidance, and coordinates resource deployment with the country team. 

g. RFA/Offer of Assistance Assessment Criteria. OSD and Joint Staff offices, in 

coordination with the supported GCC, will use the criteria outlined below to assess potential 

offers of, and requests for, assistance and provide a coordinated recommendation to SecDef. 

(1) Legality—compliance with US and international laws and bilateral and 

multilateral agreements. 

Figure III-2. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Affected State Coordination Process 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Affected State Coordination Process

notifications

requests

coordination

taskings

assistance provided

Legend

National Security 

Staff

Notification

Notification

Notification

Coordination

Request for 

assistance 

sent

Request for 

assistance 

sent

Liaison element dispatched by 

supported combatant commander

Foreign 

emergency 

support team and/or 

consequence 

management support 

team dispatched by 

Department of State

Supporting 

Department 

of Defense 

organizations 

tasked

Required 

resources 

provided

Assistance 

provided

Department of 

State

Department of 

Defense

International 

Support

Chief of 

Mission

Supporting 

Organizations

Department of 

Defense

Affected 

State

Supported 

Combatant 

Command
 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

III-5 

(2) Lethality—potential use of force by or against DOD assets. 

(3) Risk—to national security (if the USG does or does not provide the requested 

assistance), the potential to affect US interests across national instruments of power, and to 

the health and safety of forces supporting ICBRN-R operations. 

INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND 

NUCLEAR–RESPONSE DURING OPERATION TOMODACHI 

The disaster from a 9.0 magnitude earthquake, 46-foot tsunami, and 

catastrophic damage to the Fukushima Dai’ichi Nuclear Power Plant on 

Honshu Island, Japan, in March 2011 required the first international chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear response (ICBRN-R) (formerly foreign 

consequence management) by US forces. This incident ultimately resulted in 

the voluntary departure of US citizens from Japan, significant loss of life, and 

displacement of Japanese citizens, and a Level 7 Major Accident–the highest 

level on the International Nuclear Event Scale. 

Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) established 

Joint Support Force–Japan (JSF-J) to plan and execute several different 

missions concurrently including; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 

(HA/DR) ICBRN-R; departure of Department of Defense (DOD) dependents and 

force protection of US military bases. Adding to the complexity, HA/DR and 

ICBRN-R operations were conducted bilaterally with the government of Japan 

and the Japanese Ministry of Defense. 

In order to support ICRBN-R operations, JSF-J employed a combination of 

CDRUSPACOM forces and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

assets resourced from outside the joint operations area including staff 

augmentation from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Joint Task 

Force-Civil Support, the Air Force Radiological Assessment Team, the Army 

Area Medical Laboratory, and one Initial Response Force from the Marine 

Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force. In addition, unilateral 

response operations were required of JSF-J forces in addition to ICBRN-R. 

The radiological contamination from the nuclear power plant required unique 

and complex analysis of the potential radiation hazard areas and short- and 

long-term radiation hazard to US forces and citizens. Differing national and 

international standards of radiation exposure, hazard modeling, exclusion 

zones, response procedures, and units of radiation measurement were issues 

faced by the response community. Those issues coupled with the lack of 

reliable information of the state of the damaged reactors demonstrate that 

there can be uncertainty in situational awareness in ICBRN-R operations. 

The concurrent execution of various mission areas demonstrates that joint 

force commanders should be prepared to adapt to any dynamic situations that 

arise during response. 

Various Sources 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-41 

(4) Cost and Reimbursement—availability of funds, potential for reimbursement, 

and impact on DOD budget. 

(5) Readiness—impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission and 

availability of appropriate forces. 

(6) Appropriateness—whether or not DOD can and should perform the mission. 

Factors to be considered include the contributions provided by other USG departments or 

agencies, other nations, and international and private organizations. 

(7) CCDR input—GCC issues regarding mission execution and impact of the 

mission on country-specific and regional policies, plans, and initiatives, and other current or 

planned military operations. 

(8) Timeliness—ability to deliver the requested capabilities where needed in a 

timeframe that can achieve USG CBRN incident-specific policy objectives. 

2. Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Assets 

a. Roles and Responsibilities

(1) Impacted Nation. Primary responsibility for responding to, managing, and 

mitigating the consequences of an international CBRN incident resides with the affected 

nation’s government. When overwhelmed, the impacted nation is responsible for requesting 

international assistance and sharing all relevant information about the CBRN incident with 

international partners. 

(2) DOS. Unless otherwise directed by the President, DOS coordinates all USG 

support to an affected nation. DOS typically serves as the LFA for ICBRN-R; however, 

DOS frequently coordinates support through the US Agency for International Development. 

After such an ICBRN-R support request by DOS is approved by SecDef, DOD commences 

its support to the affected nation as part of the overall USG response. This support may 

include negotiation of landing and/or overflight diplomatic clearances for contaminated or 

formerly contaminated aircraft. 

(3) The US Embassy/COM. The US COM (normally the ambassador) is the 

President’s top representative in the affected nation. Normally, all USG support to the 

affected nation will be coordinated by the responsible COM and country team. All matters 

requiring DOS review or approval should be submitted to the COM. 

(4) The National Security Council/Staff. The National Security Council, through 

the National Security Staff, coordinates interagency deliberations during any ICBRN-R 

response to determine whether the US will honor a potential affected nation request, 

identifies what specific support will be provided and which agencies will provide that 

support, and develops initial guidance for responding organizations. 

(5) ASD(HD&GS). The ASD(HD&GS) serves as the principal advisor to SecDef 

and the USD(P) on matters concerning any portion of the DOD response within an ICBRN-R 
 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

III-7 

operation. As such, the ASD(HD&GS) develops, coordinates, and oversees all aspects of 

associated policy. The ASD(HD&GS) also serves as the OSD office of primary 

responsibility for the review of all CJCS plans, instructions, and manuals related to ICBRNR operations, exercises, and plans. The ASD(HD&GS) represents SecDef on all ICBRN-R 

policy matters outside of DOD; provides policy oversight for the planning and prepositioning of DOD ICBRN-R assets for international incidents, including but not limited to, 

foreign events, summits, and conferences; and finally serves as the principal coordinator of 

DOD ICBRN-R exercises within the USG. 

(6) CJCS. The CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef and the 

President in preparing for and responding to an international CBRN incident. The CJCS 

reviews all requests for ICBRN-R. CJCS assesses whether US forces are able and available 

to support ICBRN-R operations concurrent with any on-going military operations. CJCS 

develops US military strategy, policy, and positions to support GCC operational planning 

and provides recommendations for DOD support to USG ICBRN-R operations. 

(7) GCCs. Each GCC has the inherent responsibility to provide support to DOS as 

approved by SecDef. Each GCC develops plans for ICBRN-R within their assigned AOR 

and is prepared to deploy a liaison element to the vicinity of the incident site to liaise with 

the US embassy and to provide situational awareness to the supported CCDR. Each GCC 

identifies a headquarters element to provide the initial incident response and serve as the 

initial C2 element of DOD for ICBRN-R operations within their respective AOR. When in a 

supporting role, CCDRs provide requested forces and assets to the supported GCCs. The 

GCCs develop interface procedures for exchanging CBRN response-related operational 

support requests between the COM, Joint Staff, their subordinate commanders, and higher 

headquarters. The interface procedures should include affected nation to DOS, DOS to 

DOD, DOD to supported CCDRs, and supported to supporting CCDRs’ protocols, and reside 

in theater plans or standard operating procedures. 

For more information, see CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory.

(8) CDRUSSTRATCOM. Consistent with USSTRATCOM’s role to integrate 

and synchronize DOD’s efforts in CWMD, advises the CCDRs and Joint Staff on the 

capabilities available to assist in ICBRN-R operations. 

(9) CDRUSTRANSCOM. As directed by SecDef, CDRUSTRANSCOM plans 

and prepares to move selected DOD forces and identified elements, equipment, supplies, and 

other commodities and those of other USG departments and agencies, the impacted nation, 

and international partners in support of a President-directed ICBRN-R and/or other military 

CBRN response assistance operations. 

(10) Commander, US Special Operations Command. Prepares to deploy 

selected forces to support the GCC during Presidential-directed ICBRN-R and/or other 

military CBRN response operations. Provides special operations assets to the supported 

CCMD as requested and approved by SecDef. 
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III-8 JP 3-41 

(11) Service Chiefs. When directed by SecDef, provide trained and equipped 

forces (to include forces from the RC) as part of the supported GCC’s response during a 

CBRN incident. Service forces may consist of, but are not limited to, specialized CBRN 

personnel, teams, or units that have been trained and equipped to provide support in the 

warm and hot zone and conventional forces for operations in the cold zone; and force 

protection elements, transportation units, logistics activities, air assets, and research and 

medical capabilities. See Chapter I, “Overview,” subparagraph 5c(7)(e), “Zone Control,” for 

detailed discussion of control zones. 

(12) CNGB. CNGB coordinates with states and territories to provide capabilities 

as part of the supported GCC’s response during a CBRN incident, to assist the LFA. These 

forces may consist of, but are not limited to, specialized chemical and biological units with 

CBRN detection, identification, warning, reporting, protection, and decontamination 

capabilities, chemical detachments; EOD units; specialized medical units; force protection 

elements; transportation units; logistics activities; air assets; and research capabilities. 

(13) DTRA. DTRA provides operational and technical advice and support to DOD 

components and other USG departments and agencies, as requested and approved regarding 

ICBRN-R operations. This is accomplished through training and exercises, the deployment 

of a CBRN military advisory team, and operational planning assistance. DTRA also 

provides modeling, predictions, assessments, publications, lessons learned, analysis, and 

other support as required. DTRA provides technical reachback through the DTRA 

Operations Center, a 24/7 WMD and CBRN national reachback and situational awareness 

facility, for all technical support. During ICBRN-R, DTRA liaises with other technical 

support providers and the intelligence community to meet support requests. 

(14) Installation Commanders. As in the US, if a CBRN incident occurs, US 

commanders on foreign territory may, when requested by the impacted nation, exercise their 

immediate response authority to assist. However, their response is more restrictive (i.e., 

limited to only saving lives) than within the US homeland (see CJCSI 3214.01, Defense 

Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Incidents on Foreign 

Territory). DOD has independent statutory authority (Title 10, USC, Section 404) to 

respond to overseas man-made or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of life. 

Under EO 12966, Foreign Disaster Assistance, SecDef provides such assistance at the 

direction of the President, or in consultation with the Secretary of State. However, in 

emergency situations to save human lives, when there is not sufficient time to seek prior 

concurrence from the Secretary of State, DOD may provide assistance, and advise and seek 

the concurrence of the Secretary of State, as soon as practicable, thereafter (see also DODD 

5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief [FDR], and DODI 2000.21, DOD Support to International 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear [CBRN] Incidents). 

(15) NGOs and the Private Sector. NGOs are private, self-governing, not-forprofit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, 

health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict 

resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. 

Private sector is an umbrella term that may be applied in the US and in foreign countries to 

any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit 
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organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected NGOs. While 

many of these organizations are very capable of performing humanitarian assistance (HA) 

tasks, there is a great diversity of capabilities between the various NGOs and private sector 

entities. For planning purposes, it should be assumed that these various agencies and entities 

will desire to participate in HA aspects of ICBRN-R operations. It should also be expected 

that various organizations will interact with the responsible CCMD military elements in 

differing degrees and manners, from cooperative to indifferent. These organizations often 

need to work separate from the USG to maintain the ability to be neutral in conflicts. 

b. Authorities. In the event of a CBRN incident affecting foreign territory, various 

authorities exist to govern the response. The two major laws which govern US responses to 

international CBRN incidents are the International Disaster Assistance section of the Foreign 

Assistance Act (FAA) (Title 22, USC) and the military humanitarian response authorities set 

forth in Title 10, USC. In addition to a review of these authorizing laws, various restrictions 

on US international aid should be considered before any response or assistance is provided. 

(1) The FAA of 1961 provides authorization for USG foreign aid programs. The 

FAA authorizes the President “to furnish assistance to any foreign country, international 

organization, or private voluntary organization, on such terms as he may determine, for 

international DR and rehabilitation, including assistance relating to disaster preparedness, 

and to the prediction of, and contingency planning for, natural disasters abroad.” 

Additionally it states, “In carrying out the provisions of this section the President shall insure 

that the assistance provided by the US shall, to the greatest extent possible, reach those most 

in need of relief and rehabilitation as a result of natural and man-made disasters.” The types 

of assistance that may be provided under this section are not enumerated. However, 

assistance relating to disaster preparedness is expressly approved. 

(2) EO 12966 authorizes DOD to provide disaster assistance outside of the US 

either at the direction of the President, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, or on 

its own initiative to save human lives in emergency situations where there is insufficient time 

to consult with the Secretary of State. The immediate response authority is similar to but 

more constrained than the military’s immediate response authority for domestic disasters in 

that immediate response authority is only to save lives. When such compelling conditions 

exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, commanders or 

officials acting under immediate response authority may take necessary and prudent action to 

respond to requests from local affected nation authorities or the US COM. Following their 

immediate response authority actions, commanders report to their higher headquarters of 

assistance being provided by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or 

additional authorizations as needed. The GCC notifies the affected US COM at the time of 

higher headquarters notification. 

c. Assets. The following paragraphs identify organizations that could respond to an 

ICBRN-R incident: 

(1) FEST. The FEST is a DOS-led interagency support team that can be deployed 

immediately in support of the US embassy in response to actual or suspected terrorist 

incidents. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism exercises responsibility for 
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III-10 JP 3-41 

the management of the FEST. The FEST is task-organized depending on the incident and 

may include DOD elements that provide support to the US embassy, consulate, or mission 

for foreign emergency operations. The appropriate GCC provides liaison, and as required 

technical support to the FEST. A small ICBRN-R advisory component should be on the 

FEST whenever CBRN materials are involved. DOD provides additional support as required 

through the supported CCMD. 

(2) CMST. The CMST is a DOS-led interagency support team that can be 

deployed pre- or post-incident. The CMST provides CBRN response advice, assistance, and 

support to a US embassy, consulate, or mission in country. It can be deployed in lieu of or as 

a subordinate element to the FEST. It is comprised of subject matter experts from DOS and 

other USG departments and agencies as required. The CMST provides ICBRN-R situation 

assessments to the USG and affected nation, as appropriate, and with the COM, coordinates 

the USG response for DOS. Upon approval by SecDef, DOD provides support to the CMST 

through the appropriate GCC as requested by DOS. 

(3) DTRA CBRN Military Advisory Team. The CBRN military advisory team 

deploys to provide joint technical support to the supported commander with expertise in 

CBRN response procedures, requirements, resources, C2, health physics, PA, legal affairs, 

and specialized technical information. The CBRN military advisory team is able to taskorganize and deploy to support commanders in the technical aspects of CBRN accidents or 

incidents. The incident tailored force has secure communications, trained technical experts, 

hazard prediction modeling capability, and rapid reachback capability. 

(4) The US AFRRI can provide DOD technical support capability for nuclear and 

radiological incidents or accidents. An AFRRI medical radiobiology advisory team (MRAT) 

responds as part of the DTRA CBRN military advisory team and is available at all times. 

The MRAT can provide on-site training to health professionals on the management of 

nuclear or radiological casualties. The team provides state-of-the-art expertise and advice to 

commanders and primary care providers following a nuclear or radiological incident. The 

MRAT provides access to biodosimetry and bioassay support to incident responders and 

local health authorities. 

(5) The Air Force Radiation Assessment Team is a globally responsive force 

support package that provides personnel and equipment for expert technical assistance and 

field response to radiological/nuclear accidents, incidents, or threats. Capabilities include 

direct radiation measurements, collection of environmental samples, dosimetry and bioassay, 

field radioanalytical laboratory, quantitative hazard analysis, risk assessment and 

communication, and operational planning and commander decision support. 

(6) US Marine Corps CBIRF. CBIRF deploys on short notice in response to an 

international CBRN incident to minimize the effects through detection, identification, search 

and extraction, technical rescue, mass casualty decontamination, medical triage, and 

emergency medical support. 

(7) The United States Army 20th CBRNE Command is the operational 

headquarters for Army CBRN specialized units. The 20th CBRNE Command is the primary 
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Army force provider of specialized CBRNE capabilities. It conducts CBRNE operations in 

support of the CCDR, JFC, and Army; provides support to the LFA as required; provides C2 

of assigned CBRN forces; provides CBRNE technical advice and assistance; and maintains a 

technical reachback assistance capability. 

A more comprehensive listing of military capabilities, assets, and units for support to CBRN 

response operations can be found in ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 10-10E.6 [MCRP 3-37.2C]/NTTP 

3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations.

3. Command Relationships 

a. SecDef designates the supported and supporting CCMD relationships, and the 

supported CCDR establishes the command relationships of assigned forces for each specific 

CBRN response. The DOD supports the LFA during USG ICBRN-R operations unless 

otherwise directed by the President. DOD forces remain under the C2 of the supported 

CCDR. DOS retains responsibility for coordination among USG entities. 

b. C2 Element Considerations. Important considerations for commanders of C2 

elements include: 

(1) Assessment and Response. JTF assessment and response requirements may 

include: 

(a) Incident site surveillance and initial assessments. 

(b) Incident site control, to include entry and exit management. 

(c) Assistance with decontamination of personnel, equipment, facilities and/or 

terrain. The JTF assessment and response element may provide initial assistance to the 

affected nation in decontamination services. The JTF assessment and response element 

should scope planning for potential decontamination services providing protection for public 

health and safety, keeping in mind that protracted clean-up efforts will be performed by the 

affected nation. 

(d) Analysis and recommendations to the COM, USG departments and 

agencies, and affected nation for near-term management of the incident. 

(e) Temporary provision of essential service support. This support may 

include providing assistance in critical infrastructure restoration or assistance in initial site 

clean-up and debris removal. Note, however, that long-term recovery efforts are the 

responsibility of the affected country. 

(f) In the event of a radiological incident, a radiological control team may be 

needed to provide health physicists and/or other technical assistance (radiation control and 

safety). 
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III-12 JP 3-41 

(g) Risk communications coordination to include developing strategy, 

addressing operational issues, and ensuring consistent messaging across the JTF. Assistance 

with this task can be sought through the US Army Public Health Center (Provisional) or 

Service equivalents. 

(h) Coordination of information sharing protocols among data producers and 

data users in order to maintain a common operational picture among participating agencies. 

Provision of a share point or similar unique information clearinghouse that is access 

controlled and available to all participating agencies is recommended. 

(2) Transportation and Logistics. Transportation and logistics may include the 

following: 

(a) Pre-positioning materials and supplies for use by the JTF. 

(b) Providing transport support, to include aviation, ground, and, if necessary, 

waterborne assets. Assisting the affected nation in the coordination of transportation. 

1. Depending upon the condition of the remaining transportation 

infrastructure including roads and railroads, rotary-wing aviation and ground units may be 

able to assist in the movement of personnel, supplies, debris, and equipment in and around 

the incident area. The CCDR and CJTF should anticipate such assistance requests. 

2. The use of maritime forces is dependent upon waterway and 

helicopter/aerial access of incident site and JTF transportation requirements. 

(c) Providing contract support to the JTF. 

(d) Coordinating logistic support for the other components of the JTF. 

(e) Providing medical evacuation transportation support. 

1. Rotary-wing assets may be able to provide the most efficient means to 

move non-contaminated casualties within the vicinity of the incident site. 

2. Both fixed-wing and high speed waterborne assets can be used to 

quickly move casualties intertheater and/or intratheater depending upon the locations of the 

affected areas and the condition of surviving transportation infrastructure (e.g., airfields, 

ports, railroads). 

(f) Establish policy for the disposition of contaminated or formerly 

contaminated US materiel and equipment including aircraft, vehicles, and other major end 

items. Note that this may apply in the HN, a third-party nation, or CONUS. 

(g) Establish policy for the maintenance of contaminated or formerly 

contaminated US materiel and equipment including aircraft, vehicles, and other major end 

items. Supporting elements should be notified that although the item may have been 

decontaminated to standard, there may be remaining contamination in internal areas and 
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III-13 

components not normally accessible during routine operations. Note that this may apply in 

the HN, a third-party nation, or CONUS. 

(3) Health Services. Assess health risk of CBRN hazards and provide 

recommendations to minimize risk. Health services tasks may include the following: 

(a) Triage of casualties. 

(b) Treatment for casualties and responders. 

(c) Augmentation to existing medical treatment facilities IAW status-of-forces 

agreements (SOFAs). 

(d) Assistance in medical administration and management during an incident. 

(e) Collection of medical specimens as required for laboratory analysis and 

identification. 

(f) Patient tracking/patient movement/evacuation teams for coordination 

purposes. 

(g) Distribution of medical supplies. 

(h) Administration of medical countermeasures, to include immunizations and 

prophylaxes, as required. Medical countermeasure administration may require the 

establishment of a point of dispensing for mass operations. 

(i) Stress management. 

(j) Patient decontamination. 

(k) Detection. 

(l) For radiological incidents, a radiological advisory medical team specifically 

trained in radiological health matters may be needed to provide on-site assistance and 

guidance to the CJTF and local medical authorities. 

(m) For chemical and biological incidents, consider the following specific 

consultation: 

1. The USAMRICD and USAMRIID provide telephonic consultation in 

cases of potential exposure. Specialized response teams can deploy upon validated request 

by appropriate military or federal authorities to provide clinical event analysis and bedside 

clinical consultation (not direct patient care) in response to a chemical or biological event of 

national or international significance. 

2. For infectious diseases, US Air Force’s Critical Care Transport Team is 

responsible for the transport of a highly contagious patient that has been exposed to a 

biological contaminant and to prevent further contamination to the medical staff and the 
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III-14 JP 3-41 

environment. The patient isolation unit (PIU) provides a capability to move a small number 

of highly contagious patients through the aeromedical evacuation system. However, in most 

situations, it is recommended that the necessary medical resources be moved to the event 

location (treat in place) rather than moving the contagious patient. The PIU enhances force 

protection by providing medical personnel the capability to transport contagious patients 

without fear of contamination to caregivers, other patients, passengers, and transport 

vehicles. 

(n) Develop policy and guidance on health monitoring of exposed and/or 

contaminated Service members or other impacted US citizens. This may encompass short-, 

intermediate-, and/or long-term monitoring and follow-up. 

(o) Ensure coordination of force health protection measures with DOS and 

other USG and HN departments and agencies. 

(4) Civil-Military Operations. Civil-military operations tasks may include the 

following: 

(a) Assistance in supporting the interface between the affected nation 

government and outside assets. 

(b) Assistance in dealing with displaced civilians. 

(c) Interorganizational coordination. 

(5) Security. Security tasks may be to: 

(a) Provide force protection and security for JTF, as required. 

(b) Protect US citizens and casualties. 

(c) Implement appropriate AT measures. 

(d) Establish early warning systems within the JTF operational area. 

(e) Provide convoy and patient transport security. 

Guidelines for establishing a JTF and standing JTF headquarters can be found in JP 3-33, 

Joint Task Force Headquarters.

4. Affected Nation Considerations 

a. An affected nation is one that has requested CBRN support in order to minimize the 

hazardous effects of the incident. The affected nation has primary responsibility to respond 

to, manage, and coordinate other nations’ augmenting CBRN support. Ultimately affected 

nation is responsible for minimizing the effects and concluding the CBRN incident within its 

borders. A major part of any ICBRN-R operation is augmenting affected nation operations, 

not replacing them. The US embassy within the country should identify HN CBRN response 
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III-15 

capabilities in order to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the USG response. To 

assist in the clarification of duties, a list of typical government ministries follows, although 

exact names will vary in each country. 

(1) Ministry of interior in many countries performs the national crisis response 

mission. 

(2) Ministry of agriculture typically has the responsibility for rural development 

and water conservation, as well as land resources. 

(3) Ministry of defense is typically responsible for ensuring the defense of the 

country by coordinating defense-related matters with the Services, as well as the applicable 

branches of government. 

(4) Ministry of finance is typically responsible for the administration of the 

finances of the affected nation government, regulation of expenditures of the government and 

is concerned with all economic and financial matters affecting the country as a whole. 

(5) Ministry of foreign affairs typically prepares the affected nation foreign affairs 

policy and represents the interests of the affected nation government outside of its borders. 

(6) Ministry of health is typically the health authority in the affected nation 

responsible for the coordination of the affected nation health care policy (if applicable) and 

sanitation. 

(7) Ministry of trade and industry is typically responsible for providing safe 

working conditions, administrating laws and regulations related to trade and industry, and 

dialogues with enterprises, organizations, and other authorities. 

(8) Ministry of justice is typically concerned with the creation and implementation 

of the affected nation laws, as well as advising the other ministries regarding these laws. 

(9) Ministry of labor is typically responsible for the affected nation employment 

policy, administration and personnel policy, competition and income policy, and matters 

concerning living standards. 

(10) Ministry of the environment typically handles issues such as pollution control, 

nature conservation, and waste management and minimization. 

(11) Ministry of public works and housing is typically responsible for affected 

nation programs that address housing needs; improves and develops communities; and 

enforcement of applicable housing and other public welfare laws. 

(12) Ministry of social development is typically entrusted with the welfare, social 

justice, and empowerment of the disadvantaged and marginalized section of the society. 

(13) Ministry of transportation typically ensures a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, 

and convenient transportation system that meets affected nation interests. 
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III-16 JP 3-41 

(14) Ministry of education typically oversees the quality of education in the 

affected nation and prepares students for employment in the affected nation environment. 

b. Negotiations Regarding Use of Specialized Equipment and Facilities. ICBRN-R 

may require specialized equipment such as decontamination systems, mobile laboratories, 

field hospitals, medical equipment, and emergency shelter. However, the affected nation 

may have safety, interoperability, or other issues with the importation and use of such 

equipment in a CBRN response. For instance, US responders may have difficulty importing 

specialized CBRN detection equipment into foreign countries. In the absence of agreements, 

responders may have to rely on such ad hoc negotiations to import and/or use equipment 

necessary for an effective response. Ideally, relevant multinational CBRN response training 

exercises can identify special requirements and establish the necessary agreements prior to 

an incident. 

c. The affected nation will likely have its own guidelines for decontamination. For 

instance, within the US, the EPA provides guidance on cleanup levels for radioactive sites 

and trains other US departments and agencies to prepare for such emergencies. However, 

international standards may also apply to an international CBRN incident. 

5. Joint and Multinational Force Considerations 

a. RUF/Rules of Engagement (ROE). CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of 

Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (U), outlines the DOD 

standing rules of engagement (SROE) and SRUF for US forces. In general, when 

conducting ICBRN-R, SROE should be applied. However, CCDRs may augment SROE 

with supplemental measures or by submitting supplemental measures to SecDef for approval. 

Commanders also notify SecDef of restrictions placed on approved ROE/RUF. 

b. During ICBRN-R, commanders at all levels have the inherent right and obligation to 

defend their units and other US forces at all times against a “hostile act or demonstrated 

hostile intent.” 

c. US forces under the OPCON or TACON of a multinational force will follow the 

ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by SecDef. Any 

inconsistencies between the multinational ROE and US ROE will be submitted through the 

chain of command for resolution. Prior to resolution, US forces will follow US ROE. 

Additionally, US forces will remain bound by international agreements to which the US is a 

party regardless of whether the other members of the multinational force are party to the 

agreements. However, international agreements, e.g., SOFAs, “may never be interpreted to 

limit US forces right of self-defense.” Self-defense, specifically unit self-defense, can be 

extended to, and includes, persons, vessels, or aircraft receiving emergency assistance from 

US aircraft or vessels. 

Enclosure A of CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force for US Forces (U), details SROE policy and provides implementation guidance for the 

application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of self-defense. It also 

addresses SROE for US forces operating with multinational forces. 
 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

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d. Multinational Operations. The US has standing agreements with some foreign 

governments that allow for the sharing of high-level intelligence (e.g., special category), but 

in all cases, the release of classified information to multinational partners is made IAW the 

national disclosure policy (NDP). Detailed guidance is provided to the senior US 

commander by the chain of command IAW National Security Decision Memorandum 119, 

Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and 

International Organizations, and NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure 

of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. 

JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 3-16, 

Multinational Operations, contain detailed discussions of sanitization and foreign disclosure 

procedures. 

e. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). During ICBRN-R operations, the 

ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission 

accomplishment. A good working relationship between military forces, USG departments 

and agencies, civilian authorities, involved international and regional organizations, and the 

population is critical. The CMOC is a focal point as the primary meeting place of these 

elements, represented by US Service liaisons; military liaisons from participating countries; 

US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance representatives; DOS personnel; affected nation 

representatives; and representatives from the United Nations (UN), NGOs, and international 

organizations. More than one CMOC may be established in a JOA, and each is taskorganized based on the mission. The organization of the CMOC is theater and mission 

dependent—flexible in size and composition. During large-scale hazards assessment 

operations, if a headquarters operations center is formed by the affected nation or UN, the 

CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between participating military and civilian 

agencies. The CMOC for ICBRN-R operations should include representatives from all 

agencies and organizations involved in the response. 

For further guidance on the interagency process, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 

and JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation. Additional guidance on multinational 

operations is found in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

6. Unique Planning Considerations for Operations Outside of the United States 

CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Incidents on Foreign Territory, establishes the phases of ICBRN-R operations. As in the 

domestic operational environment, CBRN response is based on a six-phase construct. 

However, phase names and associated activities differ from the JP 3-0, Joint Operations,

model. It is unlikely that all forces will shift from each of these phases to the next phase 

simultaneously. It is more likely that some forces will be still working the last issues 

associated with one phase as other components are commencing activities within the next 

phase. The six phases follow: 

a. Phase 0 (Shape). This is a continuous phase. The intent of this phase is to ensure 

DOD is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to support USG efforts to minimize the 

effects of CBRN incidents on foreign soil. Key tasks of this phase include military 
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III-18 JP 3-41 

engagement, interagency coordination, plans development, training, exercise, and constant 

monitoring for a developing crisis. DOD will assist DOS in shaping the environment 

through security cooperation, information operations, partner capacity building and other 

military engagement activities on both a country and regional basis in an effort to prevent or 

avert a CBRN incident and to enhance partner capabilities to effectively manage the effects 

of a CBRN incident if such an incident cannot be prevented. Additionally, CCMDs should 

coordinate response, support, and situational awareness processes, procedures, and 

requirements with US embassies within their AOR. 

b. Phase I, Deter (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Transition to phase I 

occurs on reliable warnings of a CBRN incident or upon notification that an incident has 

occurred. Phase I includes those actions required to conduct situation assessment and 

preparation, including the timely and accurate assessment of the CBRN situation, preparation 

for deployment, and deployment of selected advance elements. This may include, but is not 

limited to, the CCMD LNO or team. Phase I ends when the nature and scope of the CBRN 

situation and initial response force requirements are defined. Additionally, any limited initial 

response to a CBRN incident conducted by DOD commanders operating under immediate 

response authority would likely occur during phase I. 

c. Phase II, Seize the Initiative (Deployment). Phase II begins with SecDef-approved 

CJCS deployment and/or EXORD designating the intermediate and/or forward staging bases 

and establishing formal command relationships (i.e., supported and supporting commanders). 

The order serves as the formal authority for the deployment of forces. Phase II completion is 

generally marked by having forces deployed with enough C2 and unit capability to safely 

and effectively begin operations. Depending on the situation, the CJTF may decide to move 

into phase III operations before all phase II objectives are complete and continue to work on 

phase II objectives while in phase III. 

d. Phase III, Dominate (Assistance to Affected Nation Authorities). Phase III begins 

with the arrival of required military assistance at the incident location and supporting 

locations and ends with the determination that DOD support is no longer required or 

appropriate. Commanders begin planning immediately for transition to affected nation and 

civilian agencies, including USG, other international governments, donors, and NGOs, and 

should identify the necessary or minimum conditions to initiate transition to other agencies. 

e. Phase IV, Stabilize (Transition to Affected Nation and/or Other Agencies). 

Although planning for transition of CBRN response activities begins as soon as practical 

following the initial response, phase IV begins with the formal implementation of the 

transition plan for those tasks and responsibilities being accomplished by DOD and ends 

when directed by SecDef or the affected nation has assumed full responsibility for response 

activities. 

f. Phase V, Enable Civilian Authorities (Redeployment). Phase V begins with the 

redeployment of US military forces involved in CBRN response operations or the formal 

transition of those forces to a purely DR or HA mission. Phase V is complete when all 

forces have returned to their previous military posture or completed transition to other 

missions. 
 International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

III-19 

7. Applicable International Laws and Agreements 

a. Legal Guidance. The complexity of ICBRN-R policies, treaties, and agreements 

requires continuous involvement of the SJA or appropriate legal advisor with the planning, 

control, and assessment of operations. Because of the international nature of ICBRN-R 

efforts, this will also include continuous interorganizational coordination to establish the 

legal authorities, capabilities, and limitations associated with participating organizations. 

(1) The SJA should be involved throughout the planning process, including mission 

analysis and COA development, to ensure that the relevant GCC is aware of potential 

ICBRN-R related legal issues. For instance, multinational partners, allies, and affected 

nations will have their own treaty obligations and laws that may significantly differ from our 

own and restrict or prohibit their participation in ICBRN-R operations. The SJA can advise 

of potential associated issues, such as consequences of execution and harmful environmental 

impacts, collateral damage, or other ICBRN-R-related legal issues that should be considered 

during the response effort. 

(2) The SJA should address ICBRN-R-related legal issues associated with joint 

operations during both the mission analysis and the planning processes. ICBRN-R-related 

legal issues should be outlined in appendix 4 (Legal) to annex E (Personnel) in plans and 

orders, and should reflect the description of legal support required to sustain the mission as 

developed during the planning process. Protecting enemy prisoners of war and third country 

nationals from CBRN hazards are examples of two such issues. 

b. International Law and Agreements. International law, policies, treaties, and 

agreements to which the US is a signatory identify certain rights and obligations that may 

affect joint operations. These legal requirements may pose constraints and restraints. They 

shape the design of operations and campaigns that deal with support to an ICBRN-R 

mission. 

For further guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military 

Operations. For additional background on legal issues unique to ICBRN-R operations, refer 

to the DTRA Foreign Consequence Management Legal Deskbook. 
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IV-1 

CHAPTER IV 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-LED CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 

RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE 

1. General 

a. DOD conducts CBRN response operations to minimize the effects of CBRN 

incidents on operations. Although DOD CBRN response capabilities are primarily designed 

for use in support of military operations, like any other DOD response capability, these 

military assets may also be used in support of civilian operations or joint or multinational 

forces, when directed. Minimizing the hazard reduces the threat to personnel, facilitates 

freedom of action, and supports mission completion. In the majority of cases, DOD CBRN 

response capabilities are applied in support of DOS in the conduct of ICBRN-R and DHS for 

domestic CBRN response. However, during combat operations or in specific instances 

where DOS or DHS is unable or incapable of leading the USG effort, DOD could be given 

primary mission responsibility. DOD-led CBRN response can occur in either domestic 

CBRN response or ICBRN-R. DOD may be delegated or tasked with leading a USG CBRN 

response effort. 

b. For DOD, the CBRN environment is hazard-focused and may involve deliberate, 

prolonged actions in and around the hazard area to support response and recovery efforts. 

While some hazard mitigation can be conducted by conventional forces, specialized CBRN 

response operations to address the source of the hazard often require specialized training and 

equipment. 

c. DOD-led CBRN response operations are generally conducted in one of two 

situations. DOD may be directed to coordinate the USG CBRN response in a permissive or 

uncertain environment where the DOS has no established diplomatic presence in the JOA to 

facilitate LFA activities, or there is no functioning HN government, to meet ICBRN-R 

requirements. The US military will lead CBRN response operations conducted concurrently 

with military operations in hostile environments consistent with strategic planning guidance. 

d. These unique conditions require the JFC to assume primary responsibility for 

planning and conducting the incident responsible until conditions permit transfer of 

responsibility to DHS, DOS, or another authority. In these cases, the JFC becomes the de 

facto USG lead for the initial response using available assets. The JFC requests additional 

support from the USG and other nations through DHS or DOS for follow-on operations. The 

conditions within the operational environment may range from active combat operations to 

“Where DOS [Department of State] has no established diplomatic presence, 

POTUS [President of the United States] may direct the Department of Defense 

to coordinate the USG [United States Government] response.” 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3214.01, 

Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Incidents on Foreign Territory
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-41 

crisis response in limited contingency in responding to or in minimizing effects of, such an 

incident. DOD transitions CBRN response activities as soon as feasible to an appropriate 

civilian governmental authority. 

e. Strategic and operational objectives drive the priority of DOD-led CBRN response 

operations in relation to other ongoing military operations. JFC’s should plan DOD-led 

CBRN response operations as a complex contingency or branch operation executed in any 

environment to: 

(1) Facilitate accomplishment of overall military objectives. 

(2) Minimize the effects of a CBRN incident on combat operations. 

(3) Provide assistance to civilian populace affected by a CBRN incident. 

(4) Facilitate transfer to stability operations. 

f. In general, DOD-led CBRN response operations occur in one of the following 

operational contexts: 

(1) In response to CBRN incidents on foreign territory where DOS does not have 

an established diplomatic presence or there is no functioning HN government DOD may be 

required to act as the LFA for ICBRN-R requests to coordinate the USG response, including 

in-country activities and actions to minimize the effects of WMD use/CBRN hazards. 

Requested activities and actions will be assessed based on the following criteria: legality, 

lethality, risk, cost and reimbursement, readiness, appropriateness, GCC input, and 

timeliness to provide recommendations to SecDef and facilitate coordination of the USG 

response through DOS and interagency partners. 

(2) DOD-led CBRN response operations conducted concurrently with military 

operations include: 

(a) CBRN response assistance to the local populace within the operational 

area. 

(b) CBRN response at APODs/SPODs to maintain force projection capacity. 

(c) Activities to minimize potential collateral effects from targeting adversary 

WMD capabilities. 

(d) CBRN response as a result of US, allied, or adversary military operations 

that result in the release of CBRN or TIMs. 

(e) CBRN response to incidents on DOD installations. 

(3) DOD-led CBRN response for: 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

IV-3 

(a) CBRN response to incidents involving DOD property located on or off a 

DOD installation at the time of the incident. 

(b) CBRN response as directed by the President. 

2. Roles and Responsibilities 

Roles, responsibilities, and relationships for DOD-led CBRN response differ from those 

listed in Chapter II, “Domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response.” 

The following information applies only to DOD-led CBRN response operations: 

a. OSD. OSD coordinates JFC requests for support and forces with other USG 

departments and agencies. OSD coordinates with other USG departments and agencies for 

the transition or transfer of responsibility of CBRN response operations to other USG 

departments and agencies, international agencies, or other countries, as appropriate. OSD 

coordinates with either DHS or DOS and the Joint Staff to obtain legal authorities, protocols, 

standards, and agreements. Additionally, OSD coordinates with DOS to notify the 

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of discoveries or destruction of 

chemical weapons materials and former production facilities. 

b. CJCS. CJCS, through the Joint Staff, coordinates with CCMDs and Services to 

make sure that DOD-led CBRN response operations are executed in compliance with 

domestic, international, and foreign laws, policies, treaties, and agreements. They assist with 

interagency support for operations and assist in planning and exercising activities within the 

interagency process. They also coordinate and provide intelligence support to the CCDRs 

for threat identification and prioritization. When required after SecDef’s approval, CJCS 

publishes appropriate EXORDs for DOD-led CBRN response operations. 

c. GCCs. GCCs plan and execute DOD-led CBRN response operations within their 

AORs. They incorporate DOD-led CBRN response operations into their operational plans. 

GCCs also provide for intratheater movement of specialized personnel and equipment and 

coordinate transportation of suspect or confirmed CBRN-related material, to include 

weapons, agents, delivery systems, and infrastructure for short- to long-term storage, 

protection, dismantlement, destruction, or disposal. This includes tracking, documenting, 

accounting, and reporting WMD material, facilities, and personnel discovered, stored, or 

destroyed in the AOR. GCCs coordinate with OSD and the Joint Staff to plan for transition, 

or the transfer of responsibility of DOD-led CBRN response with other multinational forces 

or nation-states. Finally, they coordinate with OSD and the Joint Staff to ensure operations 

are in compliance with US obligations under international laws, policies, treaties, and 

agreements. 

d. DTRA. DTRA provides operational and technical advice and support to DOD 

components and other USG departments and agencies, as requested and approved regarding 

DOD CBRN response operations. This is accomplished through training and exercises, the 

deployment of CBRN military advisory teams, and operational planning assistance. DTRA 

also provides modeling, predictions, assessments, publications, lessons learned, analysis, and 

other support as required. DTRA provides technical reachback through the DTRA 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-41 

Operations Center, a 24/7 WMD and CBRN national reachback and situational awareness 

facility for all technical support. During a CBRN response, DTRA liaises with other 

technical support providers and the intelligence community to meet support requests. 

3. Command Relationships 

The JFC coordinates the response to a CBRN incident in the assigned JOA. The JFC 

requests additional support through the appropriate GCC. For large incidents, a JTF as 

described in Chapter III, “International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response,” should be considered for the response. The GCC coordinates with DOS for 

support from other USG departments and agencies or foreign countries. For DOD-led 

CBRN response operations the JFC is the supported commander. JFCs should take into 

consideration that other USG departments and agencies may not be accustomed to working 

in a supporting capacity to DOD. 

4. Joint Force Considerations 

In the context of DOD-led CBRN response operations, the appropriate JFC assumes 

responsibility for the execution of operations within the JOA when a CBRN incident 

requiring a response occurs. The GCC approves end states for these operations by phase 

within the JOA. One major objective is to conduct DOD-led CBRN response operations 

without jeopardizing critical military operations and objectives; however, commanders 

should plan for the diversion of combat forces and possible changes to overall end states and 

objectives due to the significance of a CBRN incident. 

5. Planning Considerations During Military Operations 

a. GCC security cooperation activities (phase 0) support DOD-led CBRN response 

operations by facilitating interaction with partners to identify partner capabilities, build 

partner capacity, and increase interoperability. Planning for DOD-led CBRN response 

should build on these activities and incorporate the experience gained in working with 

partner nations in operations. 

b. DOD-led CBRN response operations may be required to facilitate combat operations, 

and depending on the nature and purpose of the activities, may require coordination with 

response operations of domestic civilian authorities, multiple countries, partners, and a wide 

variety of international organizations and other NGOs. JFCs should be aware of the 

following planning considerations: 

(1) Integration of US military forces, USG departments and agencies, civilian 

authorities, and contractors. 

(2) Integration of partner nation support and forces. 

(3) Support and integration of NGOs. 

(4) Development of a strategic communication plan. 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

IV-5 

c. Coordination between DOD and other USG departments and agencies, NGOs, and 

international organizations will also be important aspects of any DOD-led CBRN response 

operation. Regardless of the status of an impacted nation government or partner nations, 

international organizations, and NGOs will have significant equities in the operation; 

therefore, JFCs should anticipate considerable interagency and intergovernmental 

coordination requirements. 

(1) Operations will likely be subject to monitoring by various government agencies 

or international organizations; therefore, planners should anticipate receiving specific US 

national level guidance. As DOD-led CBRN response operations may involve significant 

interactions with civilian authorities and international organizations that do not normally 

operate in a supporting role to DOD, the JFC should strongly consider forming a CMOC or 

supplementing an existing CMOC with appropriate ICBRN-R expertise. In addition to 

international organization participation, the CMOC often involves multinational partners that 

possess unique capabilities. 

For further guidance on CMOCs, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. Additional 

guidance on multinational operations is found in JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

(2) As with USG departments and agencies, NGOs and international organizations 

may have significant equities and capabilities: planning for their participation in a hostile or 

uncertain environment is challenging. Some of these agencies may demand to participate 

regardless of the risk, and others may not be willing to participate until a permissive 

environment exists. 

d. DOD-led CBRN response operations can occur at any point in a campaign; therefore, 

these operations should be considered as a branch to contingency operations. DOD-led 

CBRN response-related activities are conducted in the following phases, which differ from 

traditional operational phases as found in JP 3-0, Joint Operations:

(1) Phase 0 (Shape). This is a continuous phase. The intent of this phase is to 

ensure DOD is organized, trained, equipped, and prepared to minimize the effects of CBRN 

incidents on foreign soil. Key tasks of this phase include planning response capabilities 

within the joint force, identifying possible partner nation ICBRN-R capabilities, 

incorporating DOD-led CBRN response scenarios into training and exercises, and 

developing intelligence on friendly, neutral, and enemy CBRN threats in the operational 

area. 

(2) Phase I, Deter (Situation Assessment and Preparation). Transition to phase 

I occurs upon receipt of a warning of a CBRN incident or upon notification that an incident 

has occurred. Phase I includes those actions required to conduct a timely and accurate 

assessment of the CBRN situation, preparation for deployment, and deployment of selected 

advance elements. Phase I ends when the nature and scope of the CBRN situation and initial 

response requirements are defined. The response spectrum may include technical expertise, 

specialized teams, or entire units. Military forces will also be needed to carry out nonCBRN tasks (medical, transportation, security, etc.). Any limited initial response to a CBRN 

incident conducted by DOD commanders operating under immediate response authority 
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-41 

would likely occur during phase I. Plans should also include FHA considerations for those 

affected by the CBRN incident or its cause. 

(3) Phase II, Seize the Initiative (Deployment). Phase II begins with the 

deployment of designated forces and the establishment of formal command relationships 

between supported and supporting commanders. Depending on the nature and scope of the 

hazard, forces may continue to flow for some time (days, weeks, or even months). 

Commanders begin planning immediately for redeployment and transition to civilian 

agencies, including USG, other national governments, donors, and NGOs, and should 

identify the necessary or minimum conditions needed to effect the transition. Phase II ends 

when the first capability arrives and is operational. 

(4) Phase III, Dominate (Minimize Hazard Effects). Phase III begins with the 

initialization of efforts to minimize hazard effects. These efforts may include lifesaving 

operations, personnel and equipment decontamination, actions to stop or reduce the source of 

contamination, and actions to support associated FHA efforts as a result of the CBRN 

incident. Remediation (return to a pre-contaminated state) is usually not possible by DOD 

forces. Rather, the control of the hazard site and reduction of the threat to forces and any 

nearby civilians is the goal. When (due to operations) transition is not possible, the area will 

be marked to protect forces and any civilians in the area. Phase III ends when the on-scene 

commander determines that the incident site is under positive control. 

(5) Phase IV, Stabilize (Transition to Close the Incident Site). Phase IV begins 

initiation of the redeployment plan. The situation contained, the effort is now made to 

reduce the personnel needed to continue mitigation efforts. When possible, HN, NGO, or 

USG personnel may replace functions performed by DOD personnel. Otherwise, efforts will 

be made to mark the area to reduce any residual threat to personnel or civilians in the area. 

Phase IV ends when the mitigation of the incident is at such a point where it is determined 

that no or minimal personnel are needed to maintain security of the site. 

(6) Phase V, Enable Civilian Authorities (Redeployment). Phase V begins with 

the redeployment of the bulk of US military forces involved in civilian-led-CBRN response 

operations or the formal transition of those forces to a purely FHA mission. Phase V is 

complete when all forces have returned to their previous military posture or completed 

transition to other missions. 

6. General Planning Considerations 

a. Overall Planning Considerations

(1) Many shaping activities take place to support DOD efforts to lead CBRN 

response. These activities include joint, interagency, bilateral, and multinational CBRN 

response exercises and training; efforts to build partner CBRN response capacity; and 

consultation with partner nations and civil authorities. 

(2) US law, international law, policies, treaties, and agreements to which the US is 

a signatory identify certain rights and obligations that may affect DOD-led CBRN response 

operations. These legal requirements may pose constraints and restraints and shape the 
 Department of Defense-Led Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 

IV-7 

planning and execution of operations. The complexity of US laws, international laws, US 

policies, treaties, and agreements requires the involvement of the SJA or appropriate legal 

advisor with planning and execution. This will also include consultation with civil 

authorities, other USG departments and agencies, multinational partners, impacted nation 

governments (if applicable), and international organizations to establish the legal authorities, 

capabilities, and limitations associated with their organizations. 

b. Additional Planning Guidance

(1) Flexibility. Geographic CCMD and JTF commanders should be given 

maximum flexibility to both render assistance and continue to execute their command’s 

primary mission. Assistance that allows mission flexibility during conduct of DOD-led 

CBRN response includes: 

(2) Hostile or Uncertain Environment Factors. Due to the nature of the 

environment in which DOD-led CBRN response operations occur, the following specific 

details need to be covered during JFC planning: 

(a) Additional force protection is provided for elements in direct support of the 

DOD-led CBRN response operation. 

(b) Medical evacuation resources are available for both the CBRN response 

force and for possible civilian CBRN casualties. 

(c) Communications are adequate for CBRN response operations during 

simultaneous combat operations and have as little priority competition as possible. 

(d) Intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are focused on the CBRN 

incident to reduce its impact or eliminate future incidents. 

(e) PA, civil-military operations, and military information support operations 

that reduce the civilian population panic, support the early return of civilian authority to the 

management of the CBRN-related incident, and facilitate the release of US and partner 

nation forces to the conduct of the primary combat operation. 

 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
A-1 

APPENDIX A

KEY LEGAL, STRATEGY, AND POLICY DOCUMENTS AND 

INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOLS 

1. Legal, National Strategy, and National Policy Guidance 

a. Key Executive and Legislative Guidance. The following documents are key 

references when addressing the DSCA mission area, to include CBRN response. 

(1) The White House Notice, Continuation of Emergency with Respect to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reissued every year since 1994, the notice concerns EO 

12938, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and as amended, that a national 

emergency exists because of the worldwide threat posed by the proliferation and potential 

use of WMD. 

(2) PPD-1, Organization of the National Security Council System, establishes the 

process and structure for the national security council system. 

(3) HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council, 

established the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all HS-related activities 

among the executive departments and agencies and promote the effective development and 

implementation of all HS policies. 

(4) HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System, provides the guidelines for 

a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding the risk of 

terrorist acts to federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities and the American people. 

In 2011, DHS replaced the color-coded alerts of the HS Advisory System with the National 

Terrorism Advisory System, designed to more effectively communicate information about 

terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the American public. This 

document establishes the five threat conditions and their respective protective measures. 

(5) DOD Strategy for CWMD states that DOD seeks to ensure that the US and its 

allies and partners are neither attacked nor coerced by actors with WMD. It outlines three 

end states: no-new WMD possession, no-WMD use, and minimization of WMD effects. The 

strategy also establishes countering WMD priority objectives for the DOD, defines an 

approach for achieving them, and identifies essential activities and tasks. 

(6) HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, assigns the Secretary of the DHS 

as the PFO for domestic incident management to coordinate the USG’s resources utilized in 

response to, or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. 

Additionally, HSPD-5 established the NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for 

federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare 

for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. 

(7) PPD-8, National Preparedness, is aimed at strengthening the security and 

resilience of the US through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-41 

to the security of the nation, including acts of terrorism, cyberspace attacks, pandemics, and 

catastrophic natural disasters. 

(8) Federal Strategic Guidance Statement for Chemical Attacks in the United 

States. The strategic guidance statement, issued pursuant to HSPD-8, Annex 1 (National 

Preparedness), guides USG efforts in addressing chemical attacks based on the applicable 

National Planning Scenarios along with threats of attacks using other possible chemical 

weapons. 

(9) HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food, establishes a national 

policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies. 

(10) HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century, outlines the essential pillars of our 

biodefense program and provides specific directives to further strengthen the significant 

gains put in place during the past three years. These pillars include threat awareness, 

prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery, which 

include response planning, mass casualty care, risk communication, medical 

countermeasures, and decontamination. 

(11) HSPD-14, Domestic Nuclear Detection, seeks to protect against the 

unauthorized importation, possession, storage, transportation, development, or use of a 

nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological material in the US, and to protect 

against attack using such devices or materials against the people, territory, or interests of the 

US. 

(12) HSPD-15, US Strategy and Policy on the War on Terror[ism] (U), discusses 

the coordination of all instruments of national power to meet six US goals for the war on 

terrorism: deny terrorists resources, enable partner nations to counter terrorism, combat 

WMD, defeat terrorists and their organizations, counter support for terrorism in coordination 

with partner nations, and establish conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism. 

(13) HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction,

describes the principles from which national guidance is derived for addressing the 

challenges presented by the diverse CBRN threat spectrum, optimizing the investments 

necessary for medical countermeasures development, and ensuring that USG activities 

significantly enhance domestic and international response and recovery capabilities. 

Mitigating illness and preventing death from CBRN threats are the principal goals of the 

USG medical countermeasure efforts. 

(14) PPD-17, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices, establishes and 

implements measures to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate 

attacks using IEDs and their consequences at home and abroad. 

(15) HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy, establishes a comprehensive national 

policy on the continuity of USG structures and operations and a single national continuity 

coordinator responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of federal 

continuity policies. The policy establishes “national essential functions,” prescribes 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-3 

continuity requirements for all executive departments and agencies, and provides guidance 

for state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and private sector organizations in order to 

ensure a comprehensive and integrated national continuity program that will enhance the 

credibility of the USG national security posture and enable a more rapid and effective 

response to and recovery from a national emergency. 

(16) HSPD-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness, establishes a national 

strategy for public health and a medical preparedness strategy which builds upon principles 

set forth in HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century. The directive sets forth policy 

enabling the provision of public health and medical needs of the American people in the case 

of a catastrophic health incident through continual and timely flow of information and rapid 

public health and medical response that marshals all available nation capabilities and 

capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner. 

(17) HSPD-22, Domestic Chemical Defense (U), establishes a national policy and 

directs actions to strengthen the ability of the US to prevent, protect from, and respond to, 

and recover from terrorist attacks employing toxic chemicals and other chemical incidents. 

(18) The NSS and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS establishes 

broad strategic guidance for advancing US interests in the global environment through the 

instruments of national power. The NMS describes how the USG will employ military 

forces to protect and advance US interests. 

(19) The National Strategy for HS. Prepared for the President by the Office of 

Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, organization, and critical 

areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on preventing terrorist attacks, 

reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage and recovering from said 

attacks. 

(20) National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. Issued by the 

National Security Council, this strategy guides efforts to prevent acts of bioterrorism or other 

significant outbreaks of infectious disease by reducing the risk of misuse of the life sciences 

or derivative materials, techniques, or expertise that will result in the use or intent to use 

biological agents to cause harm. It also complements existing policies, plans, and 

preparations to advance the USG’s ability to respond to public health crises of natural, 

accidental, or deliberate origin. 

(21) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Expands on the National 

Strategy for HS and the NSS by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, 

win the war of ideas, and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. While the 

national strategy focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the US, this strategy is more 

proactive and focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they reach our borders. The 

direct and continuous action against terrorist groups can disrupt, degrade, and destroy their 

capability to attack the US. 

(22) National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. Issued by the Homeland 

Security Council, this strategy presents the USG approach to address the threat of PI. It 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-41 

outlines how the nation prepares, detects, and responds to a pandemic by documenting the 

responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments; private industry; international 

partners; and American citizens. 

(23) Strategy for HD and DSCA. This strategy establishes strategic guidance for 

securing the US from direct attack by using an active, layered defense construct. Expands on 

the DSG by establishing a lead, support, and enable construct in organizing DOD objectives. 

Provides specific objectives to support managing the consequences of CBRN and bulk HE 

use resulting in mass casualties. 

(24) FAA of 1961. Establishes DOS as the LFA for USG assistance to a foreign 

country during a disaster and describes the procedures for conducting that relief as well as 

the congressionally authorized funding. 

(25) Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 

Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 [as 

amended]). This act enhances domestic security against terrorism. It eases some of the 

restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the US and affords the US intelligence 

community greater access to information discovered during a criminal investigation. 

(26) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 

(Title 42, USC, Sections 5121–5207). The Stafford Act provides for assistance by the USG 

to the states in the event of natural and other disasters and emergencies. It is the primary 

legal authority for federal participation in domestic DR. Under the Stafford Act, the 

President may direct federal agencies, including DOD, to support DR. DOD may be directed 

to provide assistance in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major 

disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and 

property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency. 

(27) The Economy Act of 1932 (Title 31, USC, Section 1535). The Economy Act 

authorizes federal agencies to provide goods or services on a reimbursable basis to other 

federal agencies, when more specific statutory authority to do so does not exist. 

(28) PCA (Title 18, USC, Section 1385). This statute limits the use of federal 

military personnel to perform civilian law enforcement activities. The PCA generally 

prohibits the use of US Army and US Air Force active duty (Title 10, USC) personnel for 

civilian law enforcement activities, except as authorized by the US Constitution or by statute. 

Additionally, DOD policy extends the prohibitions of the PCA to US Navy and US Marine 

Corps active duty (Title 10, USC) personnel. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian 

Law Enforcement Agencies, details express statutory exceptions to the PCA, such as the 

Insurrection Act and emergency assistance involving WMD, which, upon appropriate 

notifications and approval, allow for the otherwise prohibited use of federal military 

personnel to support civilian law enforcement activities during civilian led-CBRN response 

operations. 

(29) Title 10, USC (Armed Forces). Title 10, USC, provides guidance on the 

Armed Forces. Guidance is divided into five subtitles. One covers general military law and 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-5 

one each for the US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps, the US Air Force, and the RC. 

Chapter 18 (Sections 371–382) of Title 10, USC, is entitled and governs Military Support for 

Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. Title 10, USC, Section 375, directs SecDef to 

promulgate regulations that prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, 

Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless 

participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” 

(30) Title 14, USC (Coast Guard). Sections 1, 2, 19, 88, 89, 99, 141, and 143, 

define the statutory authority of the USCG during HS missions. 

(31) Title 32, USC (National Guard). Specifically, Title 32, USC, authorizes the 

use of US federal funds to train NG members, while they remain under the C2 of their 

respective state governors. In certain limited instances, specific statutory or Presidential 

authority allows for NG forces to perform DOD operational missions funded by the USG 

under Title 32, USC, authority, while they remain under the C2 of the governor. Examples 

of those exceptions include the employment of WMD-CSTs, HD activities, and the President 

of the United States-directed airport security mission. 

(32) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence Community, 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the DHS Concerning Information Sharing, 4 

March 2003. This agreement provides a framework and guidance to govern information 

sharing, use, and handling among the following individuals and their agencies: Secretary of 

Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and any other 

organization having federal law enforcement responsibilities (other than those that are part of 

the DHS). The agreement mandates minimum requirements for information sharing, use, 

and handling and for coordination and deconfliction of analytic judgments. 

(33) Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and 

Department of Homeland Security on the Use of US Coast Guard Capabilities and 

Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy, 23 May 2008. This agreement 

provides for the identification of certain national defense capabilities of the USCG and 

improves the process by which the USCG serves as a force provider for DOD missions. 

(34) NRF. The NRF focuses on response and short-term recovery, and articulates 

doctrine, principles, and architectures by which the US prepares for and responds to allhazard disasters across all levels of government. The NRF and supporting annexes are 

available at www.fema.gov/nrf. 

(35) Inter-Departmental Memorandum of Understanding for Foreign 

Consequence Management Preparedness and Response. The purpose of this MOU is to 

synchronize and integrate USG foreign consequence management (now ICBRN-R) efforts. 

The MOU details the USG’s goals and objectives relating to foreign consequence 

management (now ICBRN-R) and provides policy relating to roles and responsibilities of 

departments and agencies to prepare for and respond to a CBRN incident on foreign soil. 

(36) National Strategy for Biosurveillance. This strategy articulates an 

overarching goal supported by core functions. Through a deliberate emphasis on the 
Appendix A 

A-6 JP 3-41 

identified core functions and enabling focus areas, the aim is to enhance the Nation’s ability 

to detect, track, investigate, and navigate incidents affecting human, animal, and plant health, 

thereby better protecting the safety, well-being, and security of the American people. 

b. Key DOD Guidance. The following discussion identifies a number of key 

documents to make commanders and planners more aware of material that may assist in the 

planning and execution of the CBRN mission areas. 

(1) UCP. The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified CCDRs, establishes their 

missions and responsibilities, delineates the general geographical AORs for GCCs, and 

specifies functional responsibilities for functional CCDRs. 

(2) DSG. DSG establishes and directs how to accomplish broad strategic 

objectives. Provides HD implementation guidelines. 

(3) DOD Strategy for CWMD. The pursuit of WMD and potential use by actors 

of concern pose a threat to US national security and peace and stability around the world. 

The 2014 DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction represents the DOD’s 

response to this global WMD threat. It specifies desired end states, prescribes priority 

objectives, delineates a strategic approach for achieving those objectives, and outlines the 

CWMD activities and tasks necessary for success. 

(4) National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. This plan 

constitutes the comprehensive military plan to prosecute the global war on terrorism for the 

Armed Forces of the United States. It is the plan that guides the contributions of the CCMDs 

the Military Departments, combat support agencies, and field support activities of the US to 

protect and defend the homeland, attack terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at 

home and abroad, and support mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism. 

(5) DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program. This instruction updates 

policies and assigns responsibilities for implementing the procedures for the DOD AT 

program. It establishes CJCS as the principal advisor and focal point responsible to SecDef 

for DOD AT issues. It also defines the AT responsibilities of the Military Departments, 

commanders of CCMDs, DOD agencies, and DOD field activities. Its guidelines are 

applicable for the physical security of all DOD activities both overseas and in the homeland. 

(6) DODI 3025.20, Defense Support of Special Events. This instruction provides 

definitions for a special event and support and outlines policy guidelines and responsibilities 

for DOD support of special events. It allows for the DOD component to designate a special 

events coordinator who is charged with providing timely information and technical support 

to the ASD (HD&GS). 

(7) DODD 2060.02, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Policy. This directive recognizes the need for the Services to be 

prepared to support CWMD operations and directs Services to organize, train, and equip 

their forces to support them. 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-7 

 (8) DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). This directive

provides guidance for the execution and oversight of DSCA when requested by civil 

authorities approved by the appropriate DOD official or as directed by the President. It 

authorizes immediate response authority for providing DSCA when requested and authorizes 

emergency authority for the use of military force under dire situations. 

(9) DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. This 

instruction provides guidance on DSCA activities for civil disturbances and civil disturbance 

operations, including response to terrorist incidents, and covers the policy and procedures 

whereby the President is authorized by the Constitution and laws of the US to employ the 

Armed Forces to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence under various 

conditions and circumstances. Planning and preparedness by the USG and the DOD for civil 

disturbances are important due to the potential severity of the consequences of such incidents 

for the nation and the population. 

(10) DODD 3150.08, DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents. This 

directive promulgates policy and assigns responsibilities for DOD CBRN response to US 

nuclear weapon incidents and other nuclear or radiological incidents involving materials in 

DOD custody IAW the guidance in NSPD-28, US Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, 

Safety, and Security; the NRF; and the NIMS. 

(11) DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR), details DOD policy for 

conducting DR operations which covers the scenarios of foreign consequence management 

(now ICBRN-R) and DOD-led CBRN response on foreign soil. 

(12) DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and 

Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. This directive establishes the 

Defense Investigative Program general policy, limitations, procedures, and operational 

guidance pertaining to the collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating of information 

concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD. 

(13) DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities. This directive is the primary 

authority used as guidance by DOD intelligence personnel and those performing an 

intelligence or counterintelligence function to collect, process, retain, or disseminate 

information concerning US persons. 

(14) DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components That Affect United States Persons. This regulation sets forth procedures 

governing the activities of DOD intelligence components that affect US persons, to include 

the collection, retention, processing, and dissemination of US persons’ information. 

 (15) Department of Defense Manual (DODM) 3150.08-M, Nuclear Weapon 

Accident Response Procedures (NARP). This manual is issued under the authority of DODD 

3150.08, DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents. It provides a concept of 

operations as well as functional information necessary to execute a comprehensive and 

unified response to a nuclear weapon accident. It provides information for planners and 
Appendix A 

A-8 JP 3-41 

response elements to understand the overall response concept and roles of DOD and the 

Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration. 

(16) DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards. This instruction 

implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures to establish and 

implement a program for a worldwide DOD installation hazard response to manage the 

consequences of a CBRN and bulk HE incident. It provides guidance for the establishment 

of a CBRN and bulk HE preparedness program for emergency responders at all DOD 

installations. It also prescribes that DOD installation emergency responders must be 

prepared to respond to the effects of a CBRN or bulk HE incident to preserve life, prevent 

human suffering, minimize the effects of incident hazards, and protect critical assets and 

infrastructure. 

(17) DODI 2000.21, DOD Support to International Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents. This instruction establishes policy and assigns 

responsibilities for DOD support to the United States Government response to international 

CBRN incidents. 

(18) DODI 3001.02, Personnel Accountability in Conjunction with Natural or 

Manmade Disasters. This instruction establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for 

accounting and reporting of specified DOD-affiliated personnel, within CONUS and outside 

CONUS, following a natural or man-made disaster. 

(19) DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program. 

This instruction is a reference for response of a DOD installation to a CBRN incident. 

(a) Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for 

developing, implementing, and sustaining installation emergency management (IEM) 

programs at DOD installations worldwide for “all hazards” as defined in the glossary. 

Establishes the goals of the DOD IEM Program as follows: 

1. Prepare DOD installations for emergencies. 

2. Respond appropriately to protect personnel and save lives. 

3. Recover and restore operations after an emergency. 

(b) Aligns DOD emergency management activities with NIMS, the National 

Preparedness Guidelines, and the NRF. 

(c) Establishes the DOD Emergency Management Steering Group. 

(20) DODI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management within the 

Department of Defense. Establishes DOD guidance IAW applicable law and ensures 

mission assurance and readiness by protecting installations, facilities, personnel, and other 

assets in managing the impact of public health emergencies caused by all-hazards incidents. 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-9 

(21) CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force for 

US Forces (Classified). This instruction provides the SRUF to be employed by US forces in 

a Title 10, USC, status performing DSCA missions. 

(22) CJCSI 3125.01, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland. This instruction provides operational and 

policy guidance and instructions for US military forces responding to domestic CBRN and 

bulk HE incidents. This instruction applies only to domestic operations. This instruction is 

of specific importance to the geographic CCMDs with domestic CBRN and bulk HE 

responsibilities. It identifies that domestic support encompasses both deliberate and 

inadvertent CBRN and bulk HE situations including terrorism, acts of aggression, industrial 

accidents, and acts of nature. It recognizes that these operations may be conducted by US 

military forces under immediate response authority and in support of the designated LFA. 

(23) CJCSI 3214.01, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory. This instruction provides guidance for US military 

forces supporting USG-led foreign consequence management (now ICBRN-R) operations 

and DOD-led CBRN response operations in response to a CBRN incident. 

(24) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF and the Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) inform DOD how to employ, and in part manage, the 

force in the near term. The GEF provides strategic planning guidance and identifies security 

cooperation focus areas for campaign planning—both foreign language for US forces and 

English skills for allies. 

(25) JSCP. The JSCP provides guidance to the CCDRs and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. It apportions 

limited forces and resources to CCDRs, based on military capabilities resulting from 

completed program and budget actions and intelligence assessments. The JSCP provides a 

coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the President and 

SecDef. 

2. Key International Legal Documents 

a. Canada-United States (CANUS) Agreements

(1) Integrated Line of Communications (ILOC) Agreements. The CANUS 

ILOC agreements facilitate cooperation in training and operations and provides for reciprocal 

logistical support, supplies, and/or services in non-routine situations. 

(2) Canada-US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation. Under this 

agreement, both countries work together on contingency plans for defending against and 

responding to possible threats in Canada and the US including natural disasters and potential 

terrorist attacks. 

(3) Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United 

States and Canada Agreement. This agreement provides principles and procedures for 

temporary cross-border movement of land forces between the two nations. 
Appendix A 

A-10 JP 3-41 

(4) Canadian–United States Regional Emergency Management Agreements. 

Emergency management officials in Canada and the US have regional mutual assistance 

agreements to manage emergencies or disasters when the affected jurisdiction(s) requests 

assistance in response to natural disasters, technological hazards, man-made disasters, and 

civil emergencies. These agreements are compliant with the Agreement between the 

Government of the United States and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in 

Comprehensive Emergency Planning and Management. These agreements promote unity of 

effort with civil authorities in planning and executing military support to civilian authorities. 

Three regional agreements implement regional emergency management mutual assistance 

covering specific states and provinces: 

(a) Pacific Northwest Emergency Management Agreement. 

(b) Prairie Region EMAC. 

(c) International Emergency Management Assistance Memorandum of 

Understanding. 

(5) Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan (JRERP). The CANUS 

JRERP establishes the basis for cooperative measures to deal effectively with a potential or 

actual peacetime radiological incident involving Canada, the US, or both countries. The 

JRERP will apply whenever a potential or actual radiological incident occurs that can affect 

both countries or, although affecting one country, is of a magnitude that the affected country 

may need to request assistance from the other. The JRERP is designed to: 

(a) Alert the appropriate federal authorities within each country of the 

existence of a threat from a potential or actual radiological incident. 

(b) Establish a framework of cooperative measures to reduce, to the extent 

possible, the threat posed to public health and safety, property, and the environment. 

(c) Facilitate coordination between organizations of the federal government of 

each country in providing support to states and provinces affected by a potential or actual 

radiological incident. 

(6) Inland Pollution Contingency Plan, June 1998. The US EPA and 

Environment Canada recognize that there is a high probability that there will be a spill or 

other release of oil or hazmat along the common border between Canada and the US. The 

CANUS Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan provides for cooperative measures for 

dealing with accidental and unauthorized releases of pollutants that cause or may cause 

damage to the environment along the shared inland boundary and that may constitute a threat 

to the public health, property, or welfare. The Inland Plan is made up of five regional 

annexes or regional plans. 

b. Military Agreements
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-11 

(1) CANUS Civil Assistance Plan. The CANUS Civil Assistance Plan provides a 

framework for the military of one nation to provide support to the military of the other nation 

in the performance of DSCA operations. 

(2) Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs). The military forces 

of the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have agreed to adopt 

certain standard operational concepts in various QSTAGs. The military forces further agreed 

to consult and wherever possible, reach mutual agreement, before introducing changes to 

these agreements. 

(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Agreements 

(STANAGs). STANAGs are promulgated by the Director, NATO Standardization Agency. 

No departure may be made from these agreements without informing the tasking authority in 

the form of a reservation at the time of ratification. Ratifying nations have agreed that 

national orders, manuals, and instructions implementing these STANAGs will be developed. 

The aim of these agreements is to provide guidelines to commanders about operational 

issues. Participating nations agree that NATO armed forces will adopt the standards outlined 

in each agreement. 

c. SPP. The SPP agreement, designed to reduce barriers to trade and facilitate 

economic growth while improving the security of the continent, was signed on 23 March 

2005 by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Canada, and the President 

of Mexico. DHS and the HS Council are the lead agencies for the agreement’s security 

components, with DOD as a supporting agency. The SPP Action Plan addresses goals and 

objectives associated with HS to include “protection, prevention, and response.” This 

includes a dual-binational (US/Canada and US/Mexico) objective on emergency 

management cooperation to develop and implement joint plans for cooperation in incident 

response, as well as conduct joint training and exercises in hazard response. This includes 

the development of a plan to build and strengthen mechanisms, protocols, and agreements 

for communicating and coordinating hazard response for mutual assistance and cooperation 

in the event of natural and technological/industrial disasters or malicious acts involving 

CBRN and bulk HE devices and hazards. 

d. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

(1) FM 3-11/MCRP 10-10E.3 [MCWP 3-37.1]/Navy Warfare Publication 

(NWP) 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Operations. This publication provides tactical-level commanders and staffs 

with keystone doctrine for operations to prevent, counter, defend, and mitigate the entire 

range of CBRN threats, hazards, and incidents. 

(2) ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 10-10E.5 [MCWP 3-37.2]/NTTP 3-11.37, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Passive Defense. DOD personnel responding to a CBRN incident may be responsible for 

CBRN response and/or crisis planning and may be required to execute plans across the 

conflict spectrum. This publication presents principles and tactical-level tactics, techniques, 

and procedures related to CBRN passive defense utilizing the operations process. It 
Appendix A 

A-12 JP 3-41 

summarizes existing policy and details responsibilities and procedures for CBRN 

contamination avoidance, protection, hazard awareness and understanding, contamination 

mitigation, decontamination, and installation CBRN passive defense. 

(3) ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 10-10E.6 [MCRP 3-37.2C]/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-

2.37, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations, provides commanders, 

staffs, key agencies, and military members with a key reference for planning and conducting 

CBRN consequence management. It provides the tools for CBRN responders to effectively 

manage the consequences of a CBRN incident. 

e. International Agreements that Affect US CBRN Activities with Mexico

(1) Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 

Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. The Basel Convention on the Control of 

Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is the most 

comprehensive global environmental agreement on hazardous and other wastes. While the 

US is not a party to the agreement, it is a signatory and conducts activities with many of the 

convention’s 178 parties to help protect human health and the environment against the 

adverse effects resulting from the generation, management, transboundary movements, and 

disposal of hazardous and other wastes. 

(2) Convention on the Transboundary Effect of Industrial Accidents. This 

convention applies to the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to industrial 

accidents capable of causing transboundary effects, including the effects of such accidents 

caused by natural disasters, and to international cooperation concerning mutual assistance, 

research and development, exchange of information, and exchange of technology in the area 

of prevention of, preparedness for, and response to industrial accidents. 

(3) International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness provides 

emergency response planning for oil pollution incidents. 

(4) The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Guiding 

Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness, and Response. A 

comprehensive document to help public authorities, industry, and communities worldwide 

prevent and prepare for accidents involving hazardous substances resulting from 

technological and natural disasters, as well as sabotage. 

(5) Mexico-US Joint Contingency Plan Preparedness for and Response to 

Emergencies and Contingencies Associated with Chemical Hazardous Substances in the 

Inland Border. Also referred to as the Inland Border Plan, its purpose is to protect the 

health, human safety and the environment, providing joint and coordinated responses to 

significant chemical hazardous substances contingencies or emergencies that affect the 

inland border area between Mexico and the US. It provides a mechanism for cooperation 

between Mexico and the US to provide response to a chemical hazardous substances 

contingency or emergency that may resent a significant threat for both participants or that 
Key Legal, Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols 

A-13 

affects one of them in such a way that justifies the notification of the other participant or 

RFA. 
Appendix A 

A-14 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR LOGISTICS AND OTHER SERVICES 

FROM DOMESTIC BASE SUPPORT INSTALLATIONS AND FOREIGN 

THEATER ASSETS 

1. Purpose 

a. The planning considerations contained in this appendix will assist commanders and 

their staff in conducting mission analysis, preparing to meet logistics and other service 

support requirements, and coordinating the potential use of a military installation for support 

of DOD forces during CBRN response operations. These are considerations and not 

requirements. They are not unique to CBRN response, but the difficult nature of responding 

to the catastrophic no-notice incidents described in this publication make it appropriate that 

they be contained here. Managing the consequences of a CBRN incident often means that 

lifesaving forces deploy and are employed before the JFCs logistics structure is established. 

b. Depending on the physical location of the APOD and/or SPOD, the questions 

concerning airfield or port suitability may be analyzed separately or in conjunction with base 

support planning. Some requirements may be adequately met or even better suited to the 

operation when obtained from impacted nation or local community capabilities rather than 

from a US controlled installation. 

c. Serving as a BSI is a uniquely domestic function of DOD Service and defense agency 

installations because the GCC has limited or no control over resources on installations within 

the US and its territories. This is particularly true for CDRUSNORTHCOM who, by special 

SecDef restriction, does not have the authority to assume OPCON of forces within the US 

during an emergency. SecDef establishes the supported/supporting relationship through an 

EXORD at the time of incident (or anticipation thereof) to task the specific installation to 

serve as a base for military forces conducting either HD or DSCA operation. These planning 

considerations are helpful in selecting a BSI and arranging for necessary support. 

d. CBRN response operations in the foreign- or DOD-led military operational 

environments will find these planning considerations of value even when the affected 

country has unique relationships with the US in terms of access and support. 

e. Planning. All GCCs have the responsibility to plan coordinated responses to the 

possible use of WMD in their AORs. A GCC’s plan(s) for CWMD are developed IAW 

DOD policies and law. These guidance documents are listed in Appendix A, “Key Legal, 

Strategy, and Policy Documents and International Protocols.” 

(1) Plan. The JFC plans CBRN response actions to isolate and contain the physical 

effects, assure security, promote freedom of action, save lives, and provide essential services 

to continue operations. One of the most important aspects of planning is anticipating the 

need to coordinate and integrate joint, multinational, interagency, and HN actions. Planning 

should include the transition efforts to civil authority as soon as possible when supporting 

another agency or department other than DOD. 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-41 

(2) Prepare. Preparing and posturing actions set the conditions for successful 

execution of response operations. Preparation activities happen both before and after the 

incident. 

(a) Phase 0 mission analysis is critical to support the JFC’s response 

operation. Pre-incident activities are designed to collect and analyze militarily significant 

information on the operational environment such as industrial hazards (friendly, neutral, and 

enemy) in the operational area and any WMD actors’ intent. Mission analysis includes 

warnings focused on attack preparation and detection to provide early warning for response 

asset preparation and facilitating a rapid response to any intentional use of WMD or 

accidental release of any CBRN material. Advance situational assessment teams should 

be developed to facilitate JTF entry through communication with the COMs. 

Additional preparation tasks may include directing intelligence activities to include provision 

of warning of any WMD attack on a non-domestic operational areas collaboratively 

assessing and monitoring the operational situation; developing and exercising C2 structures 

to integrate components (medical, logistics, engineering, security, communications), as well 

as any other partners and interagency support; integrating partner capabilities (first responder 

equipment, training, personal decontamination supplies, health care facilities, etc.) to 

maximize effectiveness; conducting exercises; providing passive defense capabilities that 

will allow all the interactive forces to maintain the necessary operational tempo; and 

identifying specialized individuals, teams, and forces needed to provide CBRN response 

support. 

(b) Plan for post-incident activities to allow sensor and intelligence assets to 

begin surveillance of the affected area for the detection, identification, characterization, 

support to attribution forensics activities, and analysis of the CBRN hazards. Once the 

hazard and contaminated hot zones are established, the joint force concentrates upon hazard 

prediction and attribution analysis. See Chapter I, “Overview,” subparagraph 5c(7)(e), 

“Zone Control,” for detailed discussion of control zones. The JFC also focuses upon the 

prevention of further injury, death, or illness. Post-incident operations are designed to 

establish the extent and composition of a CBRN incident. This effort increases the 

commander’s awareness and his understanding of the incident and its effect on the force. 

(3) Execute. The JFC may provide politico-military support to establish a secure 

environment that allows for the delivery of assistance and introduction of civilian relief 

resources. A secure environment could include protection from the effects of contaminants 

and other external threats. Execution also includes supporting efforts to concurrent 

operations brought about by the CBRN incident. 

(4) Assess. The JFC assesses progress along each response line of operation that 

may be part of the plan. The assessment facilitates the transition of response, remediation, 

and restoration efforts to civil authorities as desired conditions are met. Collected forensic 

information assists in establishing attribution for the incident to support appropriate followon action. 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support 

Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-3 

2. Checklists 

Planning considerations should take into account, at a minimum, the following areas 

related to the key functions of logistics, service support, and other enabling requirements of 

the JFC in a CBRN response. Those items that are solely domestic or foreign are annotated 

appropriately. 

a. General 

(1) Is there a concise concept of the purpose of the supporting installation? Is there 

a description of the functions that the installation is to support? 

(2) What forces have been identified to support the operation? Has the deployment 

flow been analyzed to determine time phasing for induction of logistic elements? 

(3) What are the key assumptions the supporting installation operates under? 

(4) Is the installation a RC base? If so, what will be required to activate personnel 

to provide required support (e.g., mobilization and man-days)? Is funding available for 

activation? 

(5) Where is the incident response coordination center? For domestic response, 

where is the established JFO in the affected area? For ICBRN-R or DOD-led military 

operations, where is the impacted nation emergency operation center? 

(6) Where are non-DOD equipment, personnel, and materials arrival and staging 

areas? For domestic CBRN incidents, where is the location(s) of the nearest FEMA incident 

support base(s)? For ICBRN-R, where are the nearest APOD, SPOD, and JRSOI points? 

(7) How long will the supporting installation be expected to provide support to the 

JFC? 

(8) Where will the BSI headquarters be established? (Domestic only) 

(9) Where is the support installation location relative to incident or venue? 

(10) Is the installation identified to support other agencies or organizations 

simultaneously? What is the current or projected utilization? 

(11) What are the proper coordination procedures to arrange for support? 

(12) What CBRN response capabilities are resident in the state and local 

jurisdictions? (Domestic only)

(13) Where are FEMA, state, and local staging areas? What is their capacity? 

(Domestic only) 

(14) What CBRN response capabilities are resident in the impacted nation? Will 

the impacted nation offer use of military/civilian facilities? (Foreign only)
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-41 

(15) What mutual support agreements are in place for state/local support? 

(Domestic only)

(16) What mutual support agreements are in place for impacted nation support? 

(Foreign only)

(17) Develop the annex T (Consequence Management), for OPLANs consistent 

with the Adaptive Planning and Execution format. 

b. Airfield/Airspace Suitability

(1) Is the APOD contaminated or is the APOD in danger of becoming 

contaminated (weather, high threat)? If contaminated, can airlift operations be accomplished 

without contaminating the aircraft? Has an exchange zone (EZ) been established to continue 

operations despite airlift asset contamination? 

(2) Is the APOD capable of handling the flow of forces and material moving in/out 

and around the operational area? 

(3) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the airfield 

capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, 

Deployment and Redeployment Operations.) 

(4) Is a contingency response element needed to manage air mobility activities? 

(5) What is the current condition of the airfield? What are the runway lengths? 

What is the current usage/throughput of the airfield? What is the working and parking 

maximum (aircraft) on ground? 

(6) Can the airfield support medical evacuation and utility helicopter operations? 

(7) Is the weight bearing capacity of the airfield sufficient to handle the type of 

aircraft that will be used for movement? 

(8) What impact does weather have on airfield operations? Night operations? 

(9) Are adequate personnel and equipment assets available to assist in 

arrival/departure airfield control group operations? 

(10) What materials handling equipment (MHE) and patient movement equipment 

(e.g. litters) are available? Where can additional equipment be acquired (via contract and/or 

closest military installations)? 

(11) Is support available for mobile aeromedical staging facilities? 

(12) Is sufficient refueling capability/bulk fuel available? What is the resupply 

turn-around time? Has a stand-by bulk fuel vendor been requested? 

(13) Is direct support aircraft maintenance available? 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support 

Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-5 

(14) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the main supply routes (MSRs) 

that access the airfield? Can the MSRs support over/out-sized vehicles? Have over/outsized vehicles been identified? Who handles Department of Defense Form 1266 (Request 

for Special Hauling Permit)? Forms for hazardous cargo movement? 

(15) Are other nearby military or civilian airfields available? 

(16) What is the threat level? 

(17) What type of physical security is available at the airport? 

(18) Are security personnel available? 

(19) After review of threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments, what force 

protection measures are needed? 

(20) Coordinate with the appropriate military legal advisor to ensure that the 

operative RUF (domestic only) or ROE (foreign only) are properly tailored for the situation. 

(21) Are fire/crash/rescue available? 

(22) What type of aircraft does the airfield support? 

(23) What types of navigational aids are available? 

(24) Can the airfield support aircraft decontamination operations if required? 

(25) Has an airspace control plan been put in place? Are civil authorities still 

capable of controlling air traffic in and around APOD airspace? Are airspace control 

elements in place to manage air operations for both civil and military air traffic? 

c. Supply

(1) Does the site have adequate supply support capabilities in place to sustain the 

forces in the operational area? 

(2) What supply capabilities are available? Will military augmentation be 

required? 

(3) What is the process to establish requisition flow? What type of automated or 

non-automated requisition system is used? How will the forces tie into that system? 

(4) What supply support is available for common-user items in relation to the 

standard categories of supply? What type of storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety 

measures and procedures are in place? Is cold storage available? 

(5) What distribution capability is available? What MHE is available? Can it be 

moved to support multiple locations to include potential forward operating bases (FOBs)? 
Appendix B 

B-6 JP 3-41 

(6) Is fuel storage and distribution available to support the rolling stock and 

potential FOBs? 

(7) What type of local support is available for FOBs or intermediate staging bases? 

(8) Are other DOD assets available (for instance DLA) that can assist the 

supporting installation? 

d. Maintenance Support

(1) Does the site have adequate maintenance capabilities in place to sustain the 

units in the operational area? 

(2) What maintenance capability is available to support primarily automotive, 

communications, and medical equipment? Will military augmentation be required? 

(3) What are the procedures for disposal of contaminated fuel, oils, antifreezes, and 

other hazmat? Is there an environmental office available? 

(4) Is local support available for repair parts? 

e. Transportation

(1) Can the site accommodate deployment, sustainment, and redeployment flow 

and facilitate movement of units in/out and around the operational area? 

(2) What transportation capability is available? 

(3) What other transportation capabilities (rail lines or marine ports) are available 

to support military operations? 

(4) What transportation tracking systems are in place? What automation is 

available for in-transit visibility/total asset visibility? 

(5) Are loading ramps available? If so, what are their capabilities (i.e., weight, 

width restrictions)? Are the ramps fixed or portable? 

(6) What are the characteristics and capabilities of the MSRs that access the base? 

What are the primary and secondary routes? What are the dimensions and classifications of 

bridges/tunnels along the routes? Are there any restrictions or chokepoints? What routes are 

identified for evacuation? What are the grades of the primary and secondary routes? 

(7) What is the availability of installation transportation motor pool assets (truck, 

bus, passenger vehicles)? Are drivers available for these assets? Are rental vehicles 

available? 

(8) Does the installation transportation officer (ITO) have contract capability with 

local vendors (truck, bus, passenger vehicles) to support a surge? 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support 

Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-7 

(9) Are the personnel and cargo reception and staging capabilities of the installation 

capable of handling the deployment flow for onward movement? (Refer to JP 3-35, 

Deployment and Redeployment Operations.) 

(10) Will the ITO be able to support redeployment operations of DOD forces? 

(11) What are the procedures for and availability of ground refueling? 

(12) Who will provide transportation management services to coordinate personnel 

and material movements into, within, and out of the JOA? 

(13) Who will provide daily operations briefings? 

(14) Who will provide technical guidance to subordinate units and civilian 

agencies? 

(15) Who will coordinate and deconflict transportation movement mission 

assignments? 

(16) Who will monitor freight and passenger movement by all modes in the JOA? 

(17) Who will coordinate transit clearances for highway movement? 

(18) Will there be a joint movement center (JMC) in the JOA? 

(19) What tracking systems will the JMC have access to? 

(20) Who will monitor flow and velocity in the supply distribution system? 

(21) Will an individual responsible for special assignment airlift mission validation 

be located in the JMC? 

(22) Will unit movement officers back brief the ITO on the deployment plan? 

(23) Has the unit created load plans for air movement/rail movement/sea 

movement? 

(24) Has the unit completed appropriate hazmat declarations? 

(25) Has the unit completed appropriate country clearances? (Foreign only)

f. Engineering, Environmental, and Public Works

(1) What engineering assets are in place and available to support forces in the 

operational area? 

(2) What are the water planning factors in use on the installation? Will sufficient 

water support be available to support the DOD forces? What procedures are used to ensure 

the water is potable? 
Appendix B 

B-8 JP 3-41 

(3) What are the procedures for trash collection and disposal? 

(4) What are the procedures for hazardous waste collection and disposal? 

(5) What environmental rules and procedures are in place? 

(6) Will the installation be able to handle the additional energy usage requirements 

or will supplemental generators be required? 

(7) What force protection considerations will require engineer support to 

implement? 

(8) What electrical power sources are available that may require voltage converters 

for DOD use? (Foreign only) 

g. Health Services

(1) Does the site have adequate health service (medical, preventive medicine, 

dental, mental health, medical logistics, ground and aeromedical evacuation) support 

capabilities in place to sustain the forces in the operational area? 

(2) What medical assets are available and what capabilities do they have? 

(3) Is there a primary and secondary hospital available? What number of medical 

field units, operating rooms, and hospital beds are available? What type and how many 

medical specialists are available? 

(4) Are there ground and air ambulances available? Has an air ambulance helipad 

been identified? What are the grid coordinates and physical location? 

(5) Is medical supply available? 

(6) Is there a pharmacy available? What types of medicine are in short supply/not 

generally available? 

(7) What are the availability and power requirements of mobile drug/blood 

registration storage units? 

(8) What medical capabilities exist in the local community? 

(9) Are patient decontamination capabilities available? 

(10) Are expanded medical/billeting facilities identified to support quarantine or 

isolation operations? 

(11) What are the diseases endemic in the local population and vectors present in 

the area? 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support 

Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-9 

(12) Is there adequate electrical, water, drainage, and space to accommodate up to 

an expeditionary medical support +25 (25-bed rapid response medical package)? 

(13) Do medical practitioners require licensing and credentialing to practice on the 

supporting installation? (Foreign only)

h. Communications

(1) Does the support installation have look angles (latitude, azimuth, elevation, and 

longitude) to access required satellites? 

(2) What are the building specifics that may affect the communications at the 

command post? Considerations: 

(a) Detailed description of proposed site (include drawings and photos). 

(b) Building composition. 

(c) Roof composition. 

(d) Roof shape. 

(e) Roof access. 

(f) Window description. 

(g) Power. 

(h) Phone and data lines. 

(i) Location of trees surrounding buildings. 

(j) Location of antennas surrounding buildings. 

(k) Telephone lines and numbers. 

(l) Can a communication room be secured? 

(3) What are the antenna placement factors that may affect the communications at 

the command post? Considerations: 

(a) Selected location of tactical radios from antenna location (distance will 

depend on type and capabilities of available radios). 

(b) Location of radio antennas of other units within area without interfering 

with each other. 

(c) Recommended radio room set up and location. 
Appendix B 

B-10 JP 3-41 

(d) Recommended coax cable runs. 

(e) Recommended antenna grounds. 

(f) Placement (use roof as last resort). 

(g) Location of power lines which may affect signal strength. 

(4) Power planning considerations: 

(a) Communications room/closet number/location. 

(b) Type of power available (110 volts/60 hertz or 220 volts/50 hertz). 

(c) Type of outlets available (two-prong or three-prong). 

(d) Location of circuit breaker boxes. 

(e) Access available to breakers. 

(f) Circuit breaker numbers. 

(g) Backup power. 

(h) Type of power (generator, auto switching) and how long it will last. 

(i) Power test plan. 

(5) JFC communication requirement considerations: 

(a) Defense Switch Network or commercial voice (prefix, number, extension). 

Commercial will be required if DOD communications are required to support commercial or 

government civilian agencies. 

(b) Commercial Internet, NIPRNET, or SIPRNET requirements. (Commercial 

will be required if DOD communications are required to support commercial or government 

civilian agencies). 

(c) Tactical single channel radios (primarily used for DOD-to-DOD 

communications). 

(d) Radio bridging capability; used to bridge disparate communication 

capabilities such as single channel tactical radios into commercial cell phones, etc. 

(e) Satellite phone requirements. 

(f) Communications on-the-move (enables communications while en route to 

the incident area or other locations). 
Planning Considerations for Logistics and Other Services from Domestic Base Support 

Installations and Foreign Theater Assets 

B-11 

i. PA

(1) What type of PA assistance is available in the incident area or, if using a 

military facility, what military support is available? What PA personnel are already there? 

(2) Is there an appropriate non-classified facility for use by PA as well as members 

of the media? Is it separate from the main JOC area? 

(3) Is there a facility large enough to host a news conference that could include 

hundreds of media representatives? 

(4) Does this facility offer Internet and cable/satellite television access? Does it 

have the capacity for multiple Internet connections so that all PA staff and supporting 

personnel have access? Is there enough capacity to allow media to use workstations if 

necessary? 

(5) Does the facility have adequate electrical plugs and wiring to support PA 

equipment? 

(6) What kinds of major media outlets (television, radio, print) are in the area? 

j. Other Services

(1) Is there a contracting office on the installation? What local contracting 

procedures are in place? What existing contracts are in place to support the major items 

previously listed? Is the support adequate? Does the contracting office need augmentation 

from its higher HQ? 

(2) Is financial management support available? Who is tracking costs associated 

with contracting and installation support? 

(3) Is there adequate infrastructure to support billeting and food service? If not, 

what contract lodging and food service options are available? How many can be handled per 

day at the current capacity? 

(4) Is there an adequate location to locate a JOC? 

(5) Are hardstand facilities available to support several large command operations 

centers? 

(6) What is the availability of laundry, shower, and latrine facilities? Will the 

installation provide portable facilities as required? 

(7) Are exchange facilities available? 

(8) Is there adequate infrastructure in place to support C2 communications 

requirements? 
Appendix B 

B-12 JP 3-41 

(9) Are there adequate force protection and security procedures in place? Will this 

require military augmentation? 

(10) What are the procedures for receiving mail? 

(11) What type of RS is available? 

(12) Are adequate security forces and trained security augmentation forces 

available to: 

(a) Secure the site and mark areas around the site clearly? 

(b) Provide convoy security on to the installation or from one area of the 

installation to another for containment of the crisis? If convoys are required to travel outside 

of the installation, are there additional security requirements to protect from looting, 

vandalism, etc.? 

(c) Implement force protection tasks as assigned? 

(d) Provide weapons and ammunition storage facilities? 

(13) Is there a CBRN response capability resident on the installation? 

(14) Is there a firefighting capability resident on the installation? 

(15) What intelligence support/infrastructure is available? 

(16) Is there an emergency 911 system in place? (Domestic only) 

(17) Can the support installation coordinate off-installation law enforcement 

support/escort? 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, 

AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE ENTERPRISE 

1. General 

a. The CBRN Response Enterprise is a national multi-component military organization 

designed to save lives and minimize human suffering in the aftermath of a CBRN event. It is 

geographically dispersed, incorporating NG capabilities in every state, to enable the most 

rapid state-directed initial response. The CBRN Response Enterprise, composed of 

organizations ranging from platoon size through two-star commands, responds in a building 

approach from state to regional to federal response based on the size of the CBRN incident. 

The response is orchestrated through a combination of state authorities, multi-state 

agreements, and federal authorities. Response times vary, dependent on the mission and 

scale of the force, from the state WMD-CSTs advance elements’ 1.5 hours to 96 hours for 

some federal elements. CBRN Response Enterprise capabilities include highly technical 

skills necessary to operate in a contaminated environment, SAR, medical, transportation, and 

logistical functions and the command elements necessary to direct response in support of an 

IC. The CBRN Response Enterprise functions everyday through WMD-CST responses to 

local events, such as a chemical industrial accident, but stands ready to respond to multiple 

large CBRN incidents or a catastrophic incident that could cause mass casualties on a 

national scale. Figure C-1 identifies these units. 

b. As shown in Figure C-1, the NG forces under state C2 consist of the WMD-CSTs, 

CERFPs, and HRFs. The federal military forces consist of the DCRF, and C2CRE A & B. 

The DCRF, C2CRE A, and C2CRE B are allocated to USNORTHCOM in the Global Force 

Management Allocation Plan JTF-CS is the division level C2 element of the DCRF. JTF-CS 

conducts training and readiness oversight (TRO) authorities for allocated units of the DCRF. 

CDRUSNORTHCOM exercises OPCON of allocated federal CBRN Response Enterprise 

forces upon arrival in the affected area for CBRN response operations and relinquishes 

OPCON back to the force providers upon the forces’ departure from the affected area. 

c. DOD CBRN Response Enterprise Mission. When directed (by SecDef for federal 

military forces and by the governor[s] concerned for NG forces under state C2), the DOD 

CBRN Response Enterprise conducts CBRN response operations within the US and its 

territories to support civil authorities in response to CBRN incidents in order to save lives 

and minimize human suffering. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-41 

Figure C-1. Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Enterprise 

C2 command and control

C2CRE command and control chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear response element

CASEVAC casualty evacuation

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear

CERFP 

and high-yield explosives enhanced 

response force package

CRPL CBRN Response Posture Level

DCRF defense chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear response force

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

FP 1 force package 1

FP 2 force package 2

HRF homeland response force

JS Joint Staff

MEDEVAC medical evacuation

N+ notification +

NLT not later than

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

RFF request for forces 

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction–civil 

support team

Legend

Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Response Enterprise

HRF

DCRF

C2CREA C2CREB

Assigned to 

National Guard of 

Individual States

Allocated 

Forces

WMD-CST

CERFP

Federal Response

Total Federal Response 

Force: 8,200

State Response

Total State Response 

Force: 10,595









Designed to address . . . one catastrophic or three near simultaneous significant CBRN incidents

Provides integrated State and Federal multi-component response

Focused on the provision of key life-saving capabilities: search and rescue, decontamination, 

medical care and MEDEVAC

Integrated through significant phase 0 training/coordination and managed by OSD and JS co-led 

Senior Steering Group

WMD-Civil 

Support Team

(57 Teams) 

22/1,254 

Personnel

CBRN Enhanced 

Response Force 

Package

(17 Units) 203/ 

3,451 Personnel

Homeland 

Response Force

(10 Units) 589/ 

5,890 Personnel

Defense CBRN Response Force

5,200 Personnel

FP 1 (2,100)

FP 2 (3,100)

C2 CBRN 

Response 

Element A

1,500 Personnel

C2 CBRN 

Response 

Element B

1,500 Personnel

Prepared to 

Deploy NLT N+3 

Hours

Prepared to 

Deploy NLT N+6 

Hours

Prepared to 

Deploy NLT 

N+6-12 Hours

Prepared to Deploy 

FP 1 NLT N+24 Hours

FP 2 NLT N+48 Hours

CRPL 1

CRPL 2

CRPL 4 CRPL 4

Prepared to Deploy 

NLT N+96 Hours Prepared to Deploy 

NLT N+96 Hours

+ Additional RFF 

Forces

+ Additional RFF 

Forces

Capabilities

Detection/ 

Identification

Rapid 

Assessment 

of Hazardous 

Material





Capabilities

Search/Recovery

Decontamination

Emergency 

Medical

Fatality Search 

Recovery Team

Command and 

Control











Capabilities

Command and 

Control

Search/Extraction

Decontamination

Emergency 

Medical

Fatality Search 

Recovery Team

Casualty 

Assistance 

Support Element













Capabilities

C2

CBRN Assessment

Search and Rescue

Decontamination

Emergency Medical

Level 2 and 3 Medical with 

Surgical Capability

Security

Engineering

Logistics

Transportation

Ground MEDEVAC and CASEVAC

Aviation Lift

Aviation MEDEVAC and CASEVAC



























Capabilities

C2

CBRN Assessment

Search and Rescue

Decontamination

Emergency Medical

Level 2 Medical

Security

Engineering

Logistics

Transportation





















Capabilities

C2

CBRN Assessment

Search and Rescue

Decontamination

Emergency Medical

Level 2 Medical

Security

Engineering

Logistics

Transportation




















Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise 

C-3 

2. Response Forces 

a. NG WMD-CSTs. WMD-CSTs respond to a CBRN incident by providing a rapid 

response capability in the event of an intentional or unintentional release of CBRN threats 

and hazards. These high priority and rapid response units are comprised of 22 full-time 

Army and Air Force NG and Army Reserve personnel. These units were established by 

Congress and are certified by SecDef after they meet DOD certification guidelines. By 

statute, each WMD-CST operates under the C2 of the governor, in Title 32, USC, duty 

status, and can be employed as a state asset. TAG will direct employment of the WMD-CST 

to support either a state’s response or to provide support to another state’s response, if 

requested. Further, under Presidential mobilization, WMD-CSTs can be employed as part of 

the Title 10, USC, and CBRN response package. Per direction of OSD, the NGB has 

established a national level response plan which provides a designated number of WMDCSTs for a rapid response to WMD incidents and national disasters. On site, a WMD-CST is 

prepared to conduct continuous operations for 72 hours using organic assets. 

(1) The WMD-CST mission is to support civil authorities at a domestic incident 

site by identifying CBRN hazards/substances, assessing current or projected consequences, 

advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state support to 

facilitate additional resources. This includes the intentional or unintentional release of 

CBRN and natural or man-made disasters in the US that result, or could result, in the 

catastrophic loss of life or property. 

(2) WMD-CSTs in CONUS and Alaska are assigned to USNORTHCOM for TRO 

which is provided by the GCC component, USARNORTH. For WMD-CSTs in Hawaii and 

Guam, USPACOM has TRO, which is executed by US Army Pacific. 

b. NG CERFPs. The CERFP mission is to alert, assemble, and deploy within 6-12 

hours of notification in response to a CBRN incident to save lives, minimize human 

suffering, and prepare for follow-on forces in support of civil authorities. The CERFP 

provides a C2 capability to assist local authorities with search and extraction, 

decontamination, medical services, on-site communications, and fatality search and recovery. 

There are 17 stand-alone CERFPs and 10 HRFs (with CERFP capability) to enhance lifesaving capability. They can be used as a state and federal CBRN capability. They are a state 

and federal NG capability. Personnel who augment the CERFPs are not in a Title 32, USC, 

“operational status,” which means they cannot assemble and deploy until the governor orders 

the unit members into state active duty. Units and personnel assigned to each of the CERFPs 

remain under the control of the governor of the state in which they reside. Governors 

exercise their executive authority through TAGs. Out-of-state CERFP support is requested 

from the state EOC IAW interstate agreements or EMACs. The NG JFHQ-State JOC may 

enter the governor’s request into the Joint Information Exchange Environment (JIEE) for 

coordination with the several states and NGB. Requests are coordinated with other states 

and NGB based on a supporting/supported relationship and operational or TACON provided 

by the gaining supported state IAW established MOAs or other agreements. In some 

circumstances, the President may federalize NG assets, to include HRFs, CERFPs, and 

WMD-CSTs. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-41 

c. NG HRFs. The HRF mission is, on order, to alert, assemble, and deploy within 6-12 

hours of notification in response to a CBRN incident to save lives, minimize human 

suffering, and prepare for follow-on forces in support of civil authorities. Capabilities 

include search and extraction, casualty decontamination, emergency medical triage and 

treatment, security element, and C2. There are 10 HRFs, one existing within each FEMA 

region, consisting of 583 personnel in each HRF with 25 percent full-time manning in each, 

for a total of 5,780 personnel. The HRFs will be sourced from the existing ARNG and ANG 

force. NG units that are selected as part of the HRF remain under the direction and control 

of the governor of the state in which they reside. Governors exercise their command, 

operational authority, or TACON of military forces through TAGs. Requests for out-of-state 

HRF support are requested from the state IAW interstate agreements or EMAC (via a 

Requisition A) of which all states are signatories. The NG JFHQ-State JOC may enter the 

governor’s request into the JIEE for coordination with other states and NGB. Requests are 

coordinated with other states and NGB based on a supporting/supported relationship and 

OPCON or TACON provided by the gaining/supported state IAW established MOAs or 

other agreements. The authority to notify, deploy, and employ an HRF, in almost all cases, 

is vested in the independent, sovereign state governors who control the NG capabilities with 

the understanding that HRFs are designed to be regional and national assets that support 

CBRN response nationwide. In some circumstances, the President may federalize NG 

assets, to include HRFs, CERFPs, and WMD-CSTs. Each HRF has a medical treatment area 

with no holding capacity. In addition, HRFs provide C2 and planning for all organic and 

attached units (WMD-CSTs and CERFPs) and provide security for CBRN site locations. 

They also coordinate and synchronize CBRN operations for designated areas and 

decontamination sites. The HRF is responsible for integrating CBRN Response Enterprise 

planning (state and federal) with the assigned FEMA region. 

d. JTF-CS. JTF-CS serves as the CBRN response headquarters for the DCRF. JTF-CS 

provides planning, training, and coordination for CBRN response operations. It serves as 

lead planning authority for development of operational JTF and tactical TF level CBRN 

response OPLANs and develops projected CBRN response and DSCA force requirements 

and structures to support mission requirements for all CBRN national planning scenarios. 

JTF-CS is the C2 element responsible for executing domestic CBRN response by responding 

to federal RFA IAW the NRF and DOD policy to provide immediate actions to save lives, 

protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. The domestic CBRN 

response focuses on the operational to tactical levels in order to rapidly integrate and 

synchronize DOD capabilities in support of civil authorities. 

e. DCRF. The DCRF includes approximately 5,200 personnel sourced primarily from 

the AC (multi-Service). DCRF capabilities include CBRN incident assessment, SAR, 

decontamination of DOD personnel and equipment, evacuee and casualty decontamination, 

emergency medical, Role 2 medical care (advanced trauma management and emergency 

medical treatment including continuation of resuscitation), patient holding, ground and 

rotary-wing air patient movement, Role 3 medical care (surgical and intensive care), force 

health protection measures, military personnel and equipment operational security, site 

accessibility horizontal engineering, logistics, general support to enhance lifesaving and 

reduce human suffering, C2 aviation lift, mortuary affairs, and transportation. The DCRF is 

designed to employ these capabilities in multi-function packages in order to provide critical 
Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise 

C-5 

lifesaving capabilities in a synchronized manner. There are two force packages, Force 

Package 1 (2,100 personnel) and Force Package 2 (3,100 personnel). Commander, JTF-CS, 

has the flexibility to task organize the DCRF based on the CBRN situation and mission in 

order to provide the most effective support to a CBRN response. To better meet internal and 

external support of civil authorities during an incident, JTF-CS established CBRN battalion 

TFs, which are nested within the DCRF TF operations. All other DCRF TFs and enablers 

(TF Aviation, TF Medical, TF Logistics, and TF Signal) will be primarily used in direct 

support of DCRF TF operations. Battalion TFs are organized to be scalable, self-contained, 

semi-autonomous units (requiring limited C2 and support). Battalion TFs are composed of 

mission command, communications, SAR, decontamination, medical, and logistic 

capabilities maneuvered into and employed in an operational area. Battalion TFs are manned 

and equipped sufficiently to conduct six core lifesaving capabilities: mission command, 

hazard identification and detection, technical and nontechnical SAR, mass casualty and noncasualty decontamination, medical triage and stabilization, and support air and ground 

evacuation (medical and nonmedical). The flexibility, versatility, and scalability of the 

battalion TF construct permit the JTF-CS commander to properly tailor the response package 

to the CBRN situation. 

f. C2CRE A and B. The two C2CREs will include approximately 1,500 personnel 

each and be sourced from the AC and RC. C2CRE A and C2CRE B will contain much 

smaller elements of many of the capabilities contained in the DCRF. When directed, the 

C2CREs will begin initial operations, but must be quickly augmented with additional 

capabilities to sustain operations. These additional capabilities may include federalized NG 

assets (including WMD-CSTs, CERFPs, and HRFs) or forces from the AC and RC. 

Dedicated C2CRE capabilities include CBRN assessment, SAR, decontamination, 

emergency medical, Role 2 medical, engineering, C2, logistics, and transportation. 

3. Unity of Effort in the Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Response Enterprise 

The DOD CBRN Response Enterprise is one of many parts of the overall national 

CBRN response. An effective, unified national response requires layered, mutually 

supporting capabilities. The NRF systematically coordinates private sector and NGO 

capabilities with those of local, tribal, state, and federal for commitment in response to a 

CBRN incident. If requested, SecDef is responsible for assisting DHS and the ESF primary 

and coordinator agencies in CBRN response operations for a domestic CBRN incident. The 

synergistic construct of the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise supports unity of effort by 

facilitating a rapid and echeloned response providing redundancy of critical lifesaving 

capabilities and a layered integration of NG resources reinforced by federal capabilities. 
Appendix C 

C-6 JP 3-41 

Intentionally Blank 
D-1 

APPENDIX D 

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-41 is based upon the following references: 

1. General 

a. The Constitution of the United States.

b. Title 10, USC. 

c. Title 14 USC. 

d. Title 18, USC. 

e. Title 22, USC. 

f. Title 31, USC. 

g. Title 32, USC. 

h. Title 42, USC. 

i. Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act.

j. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.

k. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.

l. Homeland Security Act of 2002.

m. EO-12966, Foreign Disaster Assistance.

n. HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council. 

o. HSPD-3, The Homeland Security Advisory System. 

p. HSPD-4/NSPD-17, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

q. HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents. 

r. PPD-8, National Preparedness. 

s. HSPD-9, Defense of United States Agriculture and Food. 

t. HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century. 

u. HSPD-14, Domestic Nuclear Detection. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-41 

v. HSPD-15, US Strategy and Policy on the War on Terrorism (U). 

w. HSPD-18, Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

x. PPD-17, Countering Improvised Explosive Devices. 

y. HSPD-20, National Continuity Policy. 

z. HSPD-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness. 

aa. HSPD-22, Domestic Chemical Defense (U). 

bb. NDP-1, National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military 

Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations. 

cc. NSPD-28, United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and 

Security. 

dd. National Security Decision Memorandum 119, Disclosure of Classified United 

States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

ee. National Security Strategy.

ff. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Glasstone and Dolan, DOD.

gg. National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

hh. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

ii. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

jj. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.

kk. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.

ll. Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

mm. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan. 

nn. National Strategy for Biosurveillance.

oo. NRF Resource Center: http://www.fema.gov/NRF. 

pp. NRF: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 

qq. NRF, Catastrophic Incident Annex.
 References 

D-3 

rr. 4 March 2003, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Intelligence 

Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the DHS Concerning Information 

Sharing.

ss. Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation.

tt. JFO Standard Operating Procedures and JFO Field Operations Guide:

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/jobaids.htm. 

uu. NIMS Resource Center: www.fema.gov/NIMS. 

vv. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Pocket Guide to Chemical 

Hazards: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pdfs/2005-149.pdf. 

ww. US Department of Transportation’s Emergency Response Guidebook:

http://hazmat.dot.gov/pubs/erg/guidebook.htm. 

xx. Are You Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness, FEMA “Are You 

Ready Guides”: http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/terrorism.shtm. 

yy. National Disaster Recovery Framework:

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf. 

2. Department of Defense Publications 

a. Unified Command Plan.

b. Guidance for Employment of the Force.

c. 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.

d. National Defense Strategy. 

e. National Military Strategy.

f. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

g. The National Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

h. DOD Global Concept Plan.

i. DTRA Foreign Consequence Management Legal Deskbook. 

j. DODD 2060.02, Department of Defense (DOD) Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) Policy. 

k. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 

l. DODD 3150.08, DOD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents. 
Appendix D 

D-4 JP 3-41 

m. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR). 

n. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations 

not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. 

o. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.

p. DODD 6490.02E, Comprehensive Health Surveillance. 

q. DODI 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Activities.

r. DODI 2000.21, DOD Support to International Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents.

s. DODI 3020.52, DOD Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Preparedness Standards. 

t. DODI 3025.20, Defense Support of Special Events. 

u. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. 

v. DODI 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities.

w. DODI 3150.09, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

Survivability Policy.

x. DODI 3150.10, DOD Response to US Nuclear Weapon Incidents.

y. DODI 6055.17, DOD Installation Emergency Management (IEM) Program. 

z. DODI 6200.03, Public Health Emergency Management Within the Department of 

Defense. 

aa. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health. 

bb. DODM 3150.08, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP). 

cc. DODM 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, 

Classification, and Declassification. 

dd. DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence 

Components that Affect United States Persons. 

ee. Medical Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook, Armed Forces 

Radiobiology Research Institute: http://www.afrri.usuhs.mil. 

ff. USTRANSCOM policy document: Policy for Patient Movement of Contaminated 

Contagious or Potentially Exposed Casualties.
 References 

D-5 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

a. CJCSI 3110.01J, 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (U). 

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force 

for US Forces (U).

c. CJCSI 3125.01D, Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland. 

d. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Formats and Guidance.

e. CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program. 

f. CJCSI 3214.01E, Defense Support for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear Incidents on Foreign Territory. 

g. CJCSM 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). 

h. CJCSM 3150.13C, Joint Reporting Structure–Personnel Manual. 

i. CJCSM 3500.03E, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States,. 

j. MCM 0028-07, Procedures for Deployment Health Surveillance. 

k. CJCS CBRN Response EXORD 24 March 2016.

4. Joint Publications 

a. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

b. JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

c. JP 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations.

d. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

e. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.

f. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation. 

g. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Environments. 

h. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. 

i. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

j. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
Appendix D 

D-6 JP 3-41 

k. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

l. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

m. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. 

n. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 

o. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

p. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

q. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

r. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

s. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

t. JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning. 

u. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs. 

v. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. 

w. JP 5-0, Joint Planning. 

x. Universal Joint Task List.

5. Multi-Service Publications 

a. FM 3-11/MCRP 10-10E.3 [MCWP 3-37.1]/NWP 3-11/AFTTP 3-2.42, Multi-Service 

Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations.

b. FM 3-11.9/MCRP 10-10E.4 [MCRP 3-37.1B]/NTRP 3-11.32/AFTTP(I) 

3-2.55, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds. 

c. ATP 3-11.32/MCWP 10-10E.5 [MCWP 3-37.2]/NTTP 3-11.37, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Passive Defense.

d. ATP 3-11.41/MCRP 10-10E.6 [MCRP 3-37.2C]/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP 3-2.37, 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations. 

e. ATP 3-28.1/MCRP 3-30.6 [MCWP 3-36.2]/NTTP 3-57.2/AFTTP 3-2.67, MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and 

Procedures For Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 
 References 

D-7 

f. ATP 4-02.7/MCRP 3-40A.6 [MCRP 4-11.1F]/NTTP 4-02.7/AFTTP 3-42.3, MultiService Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Support in a Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environment. 

g. ATP 4-02.83/ MCRP 3-40A.2 [MCRP 4-11.1B]/ NTRP 4.02.21/AFMAN 44-161(I), 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Nuclear and 

Radiological Casualties. 

h. ATP 4-02.84/MCRP 3-40A.3 [MCRP 4-11.1C]/NTRP 4-02.23/AFMAN 44-156_IP, 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Biological Warfare 

Agent Casualties. 

i. ATP 4-02.85/MCRP 3-40A.1 [MCRP 4-11.1A]/NTRP 4-02.22/AFTTP(I) 3-2.69, 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical Warfare 

Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries. 

j. NTRP 4-02.9/AFTTP 3-2.82_IP/ATP 4-02.82, Occupational and Environmental 

Health Site Assessment. 

6. Army Publication 

ATP 5-19, Risk Management. 

7. Air Force Publications 

a. AFMAN 10-2608, Disease Containment. 

b. AFI 41-307 (Attachment 12), Aeromedical Evacuation Patient Considerations and 

Standards of Care. 

8. Coast Guard Publications 

a. COMDINST M16601.12, Special Missions Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Operations Manual. 

b. COMDTINST 3400.4A, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear High-Yield 

Explosives (CBRN) Policy for Cost Guard Expeditionary Forces. 

c. COMDINST 3400.3B, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Catastrophic Hazardous 

Material Releases. 

d. COMDTINST M3010.11D, Contingency Preparedness Planning Manual, Volume I: 

Contingency Planning Policy. 

e. Commandant Publication P5850.2C, Coast Guard Legal Authorities. 

f. Coast Guard Publication 3-0, Operations. 
Appendix D 

D-8 JP 3-41 

8. International Documents 

a. Canadian Legislation

(1) Emergencies Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.22 4th Supplement). 

(2) EP Act (Revised Statutes of Canada: 1985 c.6 4th Supplement). 

b. CANUS Agreements 

(1) Canada–United States ILOCs Agreement. 

(2) Canada–US Agreement for Enhanced Military Cooperation. 

(3) Temporary Cross-Border Movement of Land Forces Between the United States 

and Canada Agreement. 

(4) Canadian–United States Regional Emergency Management Agreements. 

(5) Canadian–United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan. 

(6) Inland Pollution Contingency Plan. 

c. Canada Command and United States Northern Command, 25 January 2012, Canada 

and US Civil Assistance Plan (JOINT UNCLASSIFIED CAN USA/FOR OFFICIAL USE 

ONLY). 

d. Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. 

e. NATO Article 5. 

f. Chemical Weapons Convention Article X. 
E-1 

APPENDIX E 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint 

Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis 

Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should 

address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and 

appearance. 

2. Authorship 

The lead agent for this publication is the US Northern Command Director, Strategy 

Policy and Plans (J5). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director, 

Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

This publication supersedes JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Consequence Management, 21 June 2012. 

4. Change Recommendations 

Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine (DD JED), Attn: Joint Doctrine 

Division, 7000 Joint Staff (J-7), Washington, DC, 20318-7000 or 

email:js.pentagon.j7.list.dd-je-d-jdd-all@mail.mil. 

a. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint 

Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, 

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force 

Development, J-7/JED. 

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other 

organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents 

reflected in this publication are initiated. 

5. Lessons Learned 

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force 

readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, 

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint 

Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons 

learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-41 

resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness 

of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine 

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, 

events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become 

institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are 

routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the 

development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil or 

http://www.jllis.smil.mil. 

6. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. 

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD 

Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, 

and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security 

Program: Protection of Classified Information. 

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp 

(NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and 

Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, 

Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, 

the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally 

reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY 

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AC Active Component 

AFI Air Force instruction 

AFMAN Air Force manual 

AFRRI Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures (instruction) 

ALARA as low as reasonably achievable 

ALCOM United States Alaskan Command 

ANG Air National Guard 

AOR area of responsibility 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

ARNG Army National Guard 

ARS acute radiation syndrome 

ASCC Army Service component command 

ASD(HA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) 

ASD(HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and 

 Global Security) 

ASD(RA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 

AT antiterrorism 

ATP Army techniques publication 

BSI base support installation 

C2 command and control 

C2CRE command and control chemical, biological, radiological, 

 and nuclear response element 

CANUS Canada-United States 

CAP crisis action planning 

CBIRF Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

 and high-yield explosives 

CCDR combatant commander 

CCMD combatant command 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (DHHS) 

CDRUSARNORTH Commander, United States Army, North 

CDRUSNORTHCOM Commander, United States Northern Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-41 

CERFP chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

 and high-yield explosives enhanced response force package 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJTF commander, joint task force 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CMST consequence management support team 

CNGB Chief, National Guard Bureau 

COA course of action 

COM chief of mission 

COMDTINST Commandant of the Coast Guard instruction 

CONUS continental United States 

CSA combat support agency 

CW chemical warfare 

CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction 

DCE defense coordinating element 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DCRF defense chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

 response force 

DEPORD deployment order 

DF dangerous fallout 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DODM Department of Defense manual 

DOS Department of State 

DR disaster relief 

DSC dual-status commander 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

DSF deployable specialized force 

DSG Defense Strategic Guidance 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EMAC emergency management assistance compact 

EMP electromagnetic pulse 

EO executive order 

EOC emergency operations center 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EP emergency preparedness 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

ESF emergency support function 

EXORD execute order 
Glossary 

GL-3 

FAA Foreign Assistance Act 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ) 

FCO federal coordinating officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS) 

FEST foreign emergency support team 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FM field manual (Army) 

FOB forward operating base 

FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command 

FPCON force protection condition 

GCC geographic combatant commander 

GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force 

HA humanitarian assistance 

HD homeland defense 

HE high explosives 

HN host nation 

HRF homeland response force 

HS homeland security 

HSPD homeland security Presidential directive 

IAP incident action plan 

IAW in accordance with 

IC incident commander 

ICBRN-R international chemical, biological, radiological, and 

 nuclear response 

ICS incident command system 

IED improvised explosive device 

IEM installation emergency management 

ILOC integrated line of communications 

ITO installation transportation officer 

JFC joint force commander 

JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters-National Capital Region 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFO joint field office 

JIEE Joint Information Exchange Environment 

JMC joint movement center 

JOA joint operations area 

JOC joint operations center 

JP joint publication 

JPAC joint planning augmentation cell 

JRERP Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
Glossary 

GL-4 JP 3-41 

JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and 

 integration 

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

JTF joint task force 

JTF-CS Joint Task Force-Civil Support 

JTF-State joint task force-state 

kt kiloton(s) 

LD light damage 

LFA lead federal agency 

LNO liaison officer 

MCM military committee memorandum (memorandum issued 

 in the name of the Chairman) 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication 

MD moderate damage 

ME/C medical examiner and/or coroner 

MHE materials handling equipment 

MOA memorandum of agreement 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MRAT medical radiobiology advisory team 

MSR main supply route 

MSRT Maritime Security Response Team (USCG) 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NDP national disclosure policy 

NG National Guard 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NGCC National Guard Coordination Center 

NG JFHQ-State National Guard joint force headquarters-state 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NIMS National Incident Management System 

NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network 

NMCC National Military Command Center 

NMS national military strategy 

NRF National Response Framework 

NSF National Strike Force (USCG) 

NSPD national security Presidential directive 

NSS national security strategy 

NTRP Navy tactical reference publication 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NWP Navy warfare publication 

OCS operational contract support 
Glossary 

GL-5 

OCSIC operational contract support integration cell 

OEG operational exposure guidance 

OEH occupational and environmental health 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PA public affairs 

PCA Posse Comitatus Act 

PFO principal federal official 

PI pandemic influenza 

PIU patient isolation unit 

POD port of debarkation 

PPD Presidential policy directive 

PPE personal protective equipment 

QSTAG quadripartite standardization agreement 

RC Reserve Component 

RDD radiological dispersal device 

RED radiological exposure device 

RFA request for assistance 

RFF request for forces 

ROE rules of engagement 

RS religious support 

RST religious support team 

RUF rules for the use of force 

SAR search and rescue 

SD severe damage 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network 

SJA staff judge advocate 

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SPOD seaport of debarkation 

SPP Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

SRUF standing rules for the use of force 

STANAG standardization agreement (NATO) 

TACON tactical control 

TAG the adjutant general 

TF task force 

TIC toxic industrial chemical 

TIM toxic industrial material 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-41 

TRO training and readiness oversight 

UCP Unified Command Plan 

UN United Nations 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USAEDS United States Atomic Energy Detection System 

USAFR United States Air Force Reserve 

USAMRICD United States Army Medical Research Institute of 

 Chemical Defense 

USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of 

 Infectious Diseases 

USAR United States Army Reserve 

USARNORTH United States Army, North 

USC United States Code 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USCGR United States Coast Guard Reserve 

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

USG United States Government 

USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USNR United States Navy Reserve 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

WMD-CST weapons of mass destruction-civil support team 
GL-7 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management. None. 

(Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

dispersion. 1. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities, 

which are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. (JP 5-0) 2. In 

chemical and biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol 

form. (JP 3-41) 3. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel and/or cargo on the 

drop zone. (JP 3-17) 4. In naval control of shipping, the reberthing of a ship in the 

periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own protection in order to 

minimize the risk of damage from attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2) 

emergency operations center. A temporary or permanent facility where the coordination of 

information and resources to support domestic incident management activities normally 

takes place. Also called EOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

exposure dose. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

flash burn. A burn caused by excessive exposure (of bare skin) to thermal radiation. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

foreign consequence management. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

height of burst. The vertical distance from the Earth’s surface or target to the point of burst. 

Also called HOB. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

international chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. United States 

Government activity that assists foreign governments in responding to the effects from 

an intentional or accidental chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident on 

foreign territory. Also called ICBRN-R. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint operations center. A jointly manned facility of a joint force commander’s 

headquarters established to plan, monitor, and guide the execution of the commander’s 

decisions. Also called JOC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

Joint Task Force-Civil Support. A standing joint task force established to plan and 

integrate Department of Defense support to the designated lead federal agency for 

domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives 

consequence management operations. Also called JTF-CS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-41) 

lead federal agency. The federal agency that leads and coordinates the overall federal 

response to an emergency. Also called LFA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

National Disaster Medical System. A federally coordinated medical system, augmenting 

the United States’ medical response capability to assist state, local, and tribal authorities 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-41 

in dealing with medical impacts during major peacetime disasters. Also called NDMS. 

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

National Incident Management System. A national crisis response system that provides a 

consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the 

private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently 

together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 

cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

nuclear incident. An unexpected incident involving a nuclear weapon, facility, or 

component, but not constituting a nuclear weapon(s) accident, resulting in any of the 

following: a. an increase in the possibility of explosion or radioactive contamination; b. 

errors committed in the assembly, testing, loading, or transportation of equipment, 

and/or the malfunctioning of equipment and materiel which could lead to an 

unintentional operation of all or part of the weapon arming and/or firing sequence, or 

which could lead to a substantial change in yield, or increased dud probability; and c. 

any act of God, unfavorable environment, or condition resulting in damage to the 

weapon, facility, or component. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

nuclear weapon(s) accident. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

principal federal official. The federal official designated by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to act as his/her representative locally to oversee, coordinate, and execute the 

Secretary’s incident management responsibilities under Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 5. Also called PFO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

technical nuclear forensics. The collection, analysis and evaluation of pre-detonation 

(intact) and post-detonation (exploded) radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and 

debris, as well as the immediate effects created by a nuclear detonation. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-41) 

thermal radiation. 1. The heat and light produced by a nuclear explosion. 2. 

Electromagnetic radiations emitted from a heat or light source as a consequence of its 

temperature. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-41) 
Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

 JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

 JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

 JSDS prepares JS staffing package

 JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for 

signature 

 LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first 

draft (FD)

 PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

 FD comment matrix adjudication

 JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to 

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

 Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment 

matrix

 FC joint working group 

STEP #4 - Maintenance

 JP published and continuously 

assessed by users 

 Formal assessment begins 

24-27 months following 

publication

 Revision begins 3.5 years 

after publication

 Each JP revision is completed 

no later than 5 years after 

signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

 Joint doctrine development 

community (JDDC) submission to fill 

extant operational void

 Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis

 Joint Doctrine Planning Conference 

validation

 Program directive (PD) development 

and staffing/joint working group

 PD includes scope, references, 

outline, milestones, and draft 

authorship

 JS J-7 approves and releases PD to 

lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant 

command, JS directorate) 

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE PLANS SYSTEM

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-41 Operations is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below 

illustrates an overview of the development process: