alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### CULLINGWORTH v. WILSON et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 12, 1903.)

1. Appeal—Omission in Proof—Record.

An omission in proof of a matter of record may be supplied on appeal to sustain a judgment when the record cannot be answered or changed.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan.

Action by Alfred E. Cullingworth against Albert G. Wilson and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GILDERSLEEVE and MacLEAN, JJ.

C. D. Weaver, for appellants.

A. B. Kerr, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants were sureties on an undertaking on attachment in the case of Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co. The said attachment was vacated, and plaintiff, as assignee of the claim of the Jersey City Contracting Company, sues, for damages sustained by reason of the attachment. The damages are for lawyer’s fees in getting the attachment vacated. The limit of the undertaking was $250, and the value of the legal services is placed at that figure.

The plaintiff has received not only an assignment of the corporation, executed by its receiver, but also of the attorneys of the corporation who obtained the setting aside of the attachment. Some *969evidence was introduced to show the nature and value of the services.. The justice gave judgment for plaintiff for $250. The record shows that the case was submitted on November 24th, and the Judgment given on December 8th, which was within the 14-day limit. Defendants seek to contest this in an affidavit, which, however, is denied by plaintiff’s affidavit. In view of the record, it should be held that the justice had not lost jurisdiction. 21 Abb. N. C. 192. The defendants rely mainly on an alleged defect in plaintiff’s title on account of insufficient proof of the appointment of the receiver. The assignments to plaintiff from the receiver and the attorneys of the corporation are annexed to the record, as well as a certified copy of the appointment of the receiver; also a certified copy of the receiver’s bond handed up on this appeal, but not annexed to the record. An omission in proof of a matter of record may be supplied on appeal to sustain a judgment when the record cannot be answered or changed. Dunford v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 445.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.
#### In the Matter of S. Leto Construction Corp., Appellant, against Lyman B. Wentworth et al., Respondents.

Petitioner appeals from a denial of motion to punish respondents for contempt of court. The proceedings arose as the result of an auction sale, pursuant to an order of the court, where it was claimed respondents made a bid which they thereafter failed to complete, necessitating a new sale for a lesser amount. Section 753 of the Judiciary Law defines the power of the court to punish for civil contempt. Appellant claims that the conduct of the respondent bidders herein was such as to be in total disregard of an order of the court and contumacious. Special Term made a finding that the proof demonstrated that the respondents’ action was the result of a misunderstanding. We are satisfied that there is no clear showing of contumacious conduct on the part of the respondents sufficient to invoke the drastic remedy herein sought. Order unanimously affirmed, with $10 costs. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds,' JJ.
### §321h. Use of national private sector networks in emergency response

To the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary shall use national private sector networks and infrastructure for emergency response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive disasters, and other major disasters.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title V, §519, formerly §508, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2215; renumbered §519, Pub. L. 109–295, title VI, §611(6), Oct. 4, 2006, 120 Stat. 1395.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 318 of this title prior to renumbering by Pub. L. 109–295.
#### In the Matter of Fulton Bar & Grill, Inc., Respondent, against State Liquor Authority, Appellant.

In an article 78 proceeding, the State Liquor Authority appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered March 30, 1960, which annulled its determination revoking petitioner’s restaurant liquor license and which remitted the matter to the Authority for reconsideration and imposition of a lesser penalty in accordance with the opinion of said court. Order reversed on the law and the facts, with costs, and proceeding dismissed, with $10 costs and disbursements. Findings of fact insofar as they may be inconsistent herewith are reversed, and new findings are made as indicated herein. The State Liquor Authority, after a full hearing, revoked petitioner’s restaurant liquor license based upon a finding that on specified dates petitioner suffered and permitted its premises to become disorderly in violation of subdivision 6 of section 106 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. A consideration of the entire record discloses that the evidence is amply sufficient to warrant a finding by the Authority that petitioner and its principals knowingly permitted the licensed premises to be used as a gathering place for homosexuals and degenerates who conducted themselves in an offensive and indecent manner. The revocation of the restaurant liquor license was entirely justified. We cannot regard the fact that, as a result of the revocation, the petitioner’s principals were denied the renewal of a similar license on other premises (the conduct of which on the record before us may not be held to have been entirely above suspicion), as warranting a reversal of the Authority’s discretion in imposing the penalty it did. In any event, consideration of such collateral hardship is precluded by the mandatory statutory requirement that the Authority shall refuse another license to such licensee or *772to the principals of such a corporate licensee for any premises for a period of two years after the revocation (Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, § 126, suhd. 5). Petitioner, not having renewed in accordance with leave heretofore granted, its motion to dismiss the appeal, we have treated the order appealed from as being appealable within the meaning of sections 1300 and 1304 of the Civil Practice Act. Nolan, P. J., Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur. [21 Misc 2d 692.]
#### ROSENBLUM v. RILEY.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

November 18, 1903.)

1. Landlord and Tenant—Failure to Give Possession—Damages.

In an action for breach of a lessor’s agreement to give possession, the measure of the plaintiff’s general damage is the difference between the rent reserved and the rental value of the premises.

2. Same—Damages—Evidence.

In an action for breach of a lessor’s agreement to give possession, evidence of the rent paid by the lessee for other premises claimed to be of a similar character is incompetent.

¶ 1. See Landlord and Tenant, vol. 32, Cent. Dig. § 453.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.

Action by Michael Rosenblum against Edward Riley on agreement to lease property. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and BISCHOFF and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Nathaniel Cohen, for appellant.

Myer Greenberg, for respondent.

BISCHOFF, J.

The measure of the plaintiff’s general damage was the difference between the rent reserved and the rental value of the premises which were the subject of the lease. Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N. Y. 265, 21 N. E. 398.

The only indication of an excess of rental value over the agreed rent is sought to be afforded by proof of the rent paid by the lessee for other premises claimed to be of a similar character, and that the justice deemed this evidence to afford a basis of damages is apparent from the judgment rendered. It is the established rule in this state that damages founded upon real estate values cannot be proven by comparison between the premises in question and other premises, the policy of the rule being to avoid collateral issues, such as every such comparison would involve. Matter of Thompson, 127 N. Y. 463, 28 N. E. 389, 14 L. R. A. 52; Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 378, 23 N. E. 544; Jamieson v. Ry. Co., 147 N. Y. 322, 41 N. E. 693. The reception of this evidence was continuously resisted by the defendant, and the judgment founded upon it is well assailed.

Final order reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


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     See accompanying notes
     $ in thousands, except per share amounts
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                                <S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-28-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                 DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-28-1996
<CASH>                                         36104
<SECURITIES>                                       0
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<INVENTORY>                                    15365
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<DEPRECIATION>                                     0
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          18058
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              0
<PREFERRED>                                        1
<COMMON>                                         239
<OTHER-SE>                                         0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  136665
<SALES>                                       167155
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   0
<CGS>                                         115212
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (243)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              1996
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 6335
<INCOME-TAX>                                    2409
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                0
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                                    3926
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    .55
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</TABLE>
### §8113. Increase or decrease of basic compensation

(a) If an individual—

(1) was a minor or employed in a learner's capacity at the time of injury; and

(2) was not physically or mentally handicapped before the injury;

the Secretary of Labor, on review under section 8128 of this title after the time the wage-earning capacity of the individual would probably have increased but for the injury, shall recompute prospectively the monetary compensation payable for disability on the basis of an assumed monthly pay corresponding to the probable increased wage-earning capacity.

(b) If an individual without good cause fails to apply for and undergo vocational rehabilitation when so directed under section 8104 of this title, the Secretary, on review under section 8128 of this title and after finding that in the absence of the failure the wage-earning capacity of the individual would probably have substantially increased, may reduce prospectively the monetary compensation of the individual in accordance with what would probably have been his wage-earning capacity in the absence of the failure, until the individual in good faith complies with the direction of the Secretary.

(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 540; Pub. L. 90–83, §1(100), Sept. 11, 1967, 81 Stat. 220; Pub. L. 93–416, §8(a), Sept. 7, 1974, 88 Stat. 1145.)

| Derivation | U.S. Code | Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 5 U.S.C. 756(d). | Oct. 14, 1949, ch. 691, §105 "Sec. 6(d)", 63 Stat. 859. |

Statutes at Large

Administration of this subchapter was transferred to the Secretary of Labor by section 1 of 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 19, 64 Stat. 1271 (see section 8145).

Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface to the report.

#### 1967 Act

This section amends section 8113(b) of title 5, United States Code, to conform to the source statute (sec. 6(d)(1) of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, as amended (63 Stat. 859)).

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1974—Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 93–416 struck out subsec. (b) which authorized the Secretary to prospectively recompute compensation because of decreased wage earning power after age 70, aside from injury, and redesignated subsec. (c) as (b).

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1974 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–416 applicable to case where injury or death occurred prior to Sept. 7, 1974, but only to a period beginning on or after Sept. 7, 1974, see section 28(a) of Pub. L. 93–416, set out as a note under section 8101 of this title.

#### Effective Date of 1967 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 90–83 effective as of Sept. 6, 1966, for all purposes, see section 9(h) of Pub. L. 90–83, set out as a note under section 5102 of this title.
§ 219.115 IRB Records. ( a ) An institution, or when appropriate an IRB, shall prepare and maintain adequate documentation of IRB activities, including the following: ( 1 ) Copies of all research proposals reviewed, scientific evaluations, if any, that accompany the proposals, approved sample consent forms, progress reports submitted by investigators, and reports of injuries to subjects.
( 2 ) Minutes of IRB meetings, which shall be in sufficient detail to show attendance at the meetings; actions taken by the IRB; the vote on these actions including the number of members voting for, against, and abstaining; the basis for requiring changes in or disapproving research; and a written summary of the discussion of controverted issues and their resolution.
( 3 ) Records of continuing review activities, including the rationale for conducting continuing review of research that otherwise would not require continuing review as described in § 219.109(f)(1).
( 4 ) Copies of all correspondence between the IRB and the investigators.
( 5 ) A list of IRB members in the same detail as described in § 219.108(a)(2).
( 6 ) Written procedures for the IRB in the same detail as described in § 219.108(a)(3) and (4).
( 7 ) Statements of significant new findings provided to subjects, as required by § 219.116(c)(5).
( 8 ) The rationale for an expedited reviewer's determination under § 219.110(b)(1)(i) that research appearing on the expedited review list described in § 219.110(a) is more than minimal risk.
( 9 ) Documentation specifying the responsibilities that an institution and an organization operating an IRB each will undertake to ensure compliance with the requirements of this policy, as described in § 219.103(e).
( b ) The records required by this policy shall be retained for at least 3 years, and records relating to research that is conducted shall be retained for at least 3 years after completion of the research. The institution or IRB may maintain the records in printed form, or electronically. All records shall be accessible for inspection and copying by authorized representatives of the Federal department or agency at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner.
(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under Control Number 0990-0260)
### §124g. Information sharing incentives

#### (a) Awards

In making cash awards under chapter 45 of title 5, the President or the head of an agency, in consultation with the program manager designated under section 485 of this title, may consider the success of an employee in appropriately sharing information within the scope of the information sharing environment established under that section, including homeland security information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction information, or national intelligence (as defined in section 3003(5) of title 50 1, in a manner consistent with any policies, guidelines, procedures, instructions, or standards established by the President or, as appropriate, the program manager of that environment for the implementation and management of that environment.

#### (b) Other incentives

The head of each department or agency described in section 485(h) of this title, in consultation with the program manager designated under section 485 of this title, shall adopt best practices regarding effective ways to educate and motivate officers and employees of the Federal Government to participate fully in the information sharing environment, including—

(1) promotions and other nonmonetary awards; and

(2) publicizing information sharing accomplishments by individual employees and, where appropriate, the tangible end benefits that resulted.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title II, §210, as added Pub. L. 110–53, title V, §503(a), Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 313; amended Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXVIII, §6811(c)(2), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3601.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2022—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 117–263 substituted "section 485(h) of this title" for "section 485(i) of this title" in introductory provisions.

1 So in original. A closing parenthesis probably should precede the comma.
### §8345a. Embezzlement or conversion of payments

(a) Embezzling and Conversion Generally.—

(1) In general.—It shall be unlawful for a representative payee to embezzle or in any manner convert all or any part of the amounts received from payments received as a representative payee to a use other than for the use and benefit of the minor or individual on whose behalf such payments were received.

(2) Revocation.—If the Office determines that a representative payee has embezzled or converted payments as described in paragraph (1), the Office shall promptly—

(A) revoke the certification for payment of benefits to the representative payee; and

(B) certify payment—

(i) to another representative payee; or

(ii) if the interest of the individual under this title would be served thereby, to the individual.

(b) Penalty.—Any person who violates subsection (a)(1) shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.

(Added Pub. L. 116–126, §2(b)(1), Mar. 18, 2020, 134 Stat. 174.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective on Mar. 18, 2020, and applicable on and after the effective date of regulations promulgated under section 3(b)(1) of Pub. L. 116–126, see sections 4 and 3(b) of Pub. L. 116–126, set out respectively as an Effective Date of 2020 Amendment note and a Regulations note under section 8331 of this title.

#### Regulations

Regulations to carry out this section to be promulgated by Office of Personnel Management no later than 1 year after Mar. 18, 2020, with allowance for additional regulations relating to administration of representative payee program, see section 3(b) of Pub. L. 116–126, set out as a note under section 8331 of this title.
#### State of Minnesota *vs.*Mary Hammond.

January 14, 1889.

Minneapolis — Invalid Ordinance. — That part of section 4 of ordinance 5 of the city of Minneapolis, which imposes a penalty upon “any person who commits any act of lewdness or indecency within the limits of said city, ” is void, because it is in excess of the power vested in the city council by the city charter.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the municipal court of Minneapolis, after a conviction under the ordinance recited in the opinion.

*Albert*Knittle, for appellant.

*Moses E. Clapp,*Attorney General, for the State.

Gileillan, C. J.

The charter of the city of Minneapolis provides (Sp. Laws 1881, *c.*76, *sube.*4, § 5) that “the city council shall have full power and authority to make, ordain, publish, enforce, alter, amend, or repeal all such ordinances for the government and good order of the city, for the suppression of vice and intemperance, and for the prevention of crime, as it shall deem expedient; ** * **and for these purposes the said city council shall have authority, by such ordinances, * * ** sixteenth,*to prevent open or notorious drunkenness and obscenity in the streets or public places of said city.” The council passed an ordinance imposing a penalty upon any person who commits any act of lewdness or indecency within the limits of said city of Minneapolis. Section 4, ordinance 5. The precise and definite specifications of what the council may do to accomplish the general purposes mentioned in the beginning of section 5, as above quoted, (there are 42 heads of these specifications,) limit the power of the council to what is thus particularly specified j so that, if the general grant of power with which the section begins seems larger over a given subject than the subsequent specification treating of that particular subject would justify, the latter must prevail. In respect to preventing and punishing lewdness, indecency, or obscenity, the specification above quoted, — and it is the only one *44including that subject, — refers only to acts or conduct in the streets or public places of the city; only to such as may affect the public peace, decency, and good order; and does not authorize punishment for private conduct, however reprehensible it may be in the matter of mofáis. The ordinance exceeds the power, and is therefore void.

Judgment reversed.
Order entered November 13, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01421-CV

No. 05-14-01425-CV

IN RE DONALD GENE BLANTON, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 86th Judicial District Court

Kaufman County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 23078-86, 23592-86

ORDER

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DENY relator’s petition for writ of 

mandamus. We ORDER relator to bear the costs of this original proceeding.

/s/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE 

JUSTICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR PROFESSIONAL PAPER 1416-1
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PLATE 7

89°

BOUNDARY OF

BOUNDARY OF
.~ STUDY AREA

‘STUDY AREA

BOUNDARY OF
-— STUDY AREA

TENNESSEE,

Brownswille

Monroe 9

LOUISIANA

32h cra sel

ie

0 Baton Rouge

roy

50 MILES 25 50 MILES 50 MILES

0 25 50 KILOMETERS GULF OF MEXICO 0 25 50 KILOMETERS GULF OF MEXICO © 25 50 KILOMETERS

GULF OF MEXICO

UPPER CLAIBORNE AQUIFER MIDDLE CLAIBORNE AQUIFER LOWER CLAIBORNE-UPPER WILCOX AQUIFER

/ __ BOUNDARY OF

/|__ BOUNDARY OF
STUDY AREA

‘STUDY AREA

EXPLANATION

——200— Potentiometric contour—Shows altitude
at which water level would stand in tightly
cased wells. Hachures indicate depression.
Contour interval 20 feet. Datum is sea
level

33°

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6
Lake Charles

° 25 50 MILES

GULF OF MEXICO GULF OF MEXICO 0 25 50 KILOMETERS

MIDDLE WILCOX AQUIFER LOWER WILCOX AQUIFER

MAPS SHOWING SIMULATED 1987 POTENTIOMETRIC SURFACES OF THE UPPER CLAIBORNE, MIDDLE CLAIBORNE,
LOWER CLAIBORNE-UPPER WILCOX, MIDDLE WILCOX, AND LOWER WILCOX AQUIFERS,
MISSISSIPPI EMBAYMENT AQUIFER SYSTEM, SOUTH-CENTRAL UNITED STATES
#### § 2700.34 Downgrading authority.

The Security Officer, OMSN is authorized to downgrade OMSN originated documents after consultation with the staff member who is charged with functional responsibility for the subject matter under question.
### §256. Sense of Congress regarding construction of fencing near San Diego, California

It is the sense of the Congress that completing the 14-mile border fence project required to be carried out under section 102(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1103 note) should be a priority for the Secretary.

(Pub. L. 107–296, title IV, §446, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2195.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 102(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, referred to in text, is section 102(b) of title I of div. C of Pub. L. 104–208, which is set out as a note under section 1103 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.