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1. REPORT DATE

JAN 1983

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Short of War: Major USAF Contingency Operations, 1947-1997

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6. AUTHOR(S)

A. Timothy Warnock

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Air Univ, Maxwell AFB, AL

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SAR

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304

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
Major USAF Cont

194

A. TIMOTHY W

Air Force Histori

Air Force History 

in asso

Air Univ
Contents

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

INTRODUCTION: From Cold War

to Global Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

Berlin Airlift: Operation VITTLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Daniel L. Haulman

Lebanon Crisis: Operation BLUE BAT . . . . . . . . . . . 11

David A. Byrd

Crisis in the Congo: Operation NEW TAPE . . . . . . . . . 23

Daniel L. Haulman

Page

Cuban Missile Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Edward T. Russell

Indo-Chinese Conflict: Operation LONG SKIP . . . . . . . 43

William J. Allen

Rebellion in the Congo: Operation DRAGON ROUGE . . . . 53

Daniel L. Haulman

Dominican Crisis : Operation POWER PACK . . . . . . . . 63

A. Timothy Warnock

Military Airlift to Israel : Operation NICKEL GRASS . . . . . 75

Edward T. Russell

Vietnam Evacuation: Operation FREQUENT WIND . . . . 83

Daniel L. Haulman

Cambodian Airlift and Evacuation:

Operation EAGLE PULL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Daniel L. Haulman

Crisis in Southeast Asia: Mayaguez Rescue . . . . . . . . 105

Daniel L. Haulman

Crisis in Tropical Africa: Operations ZAIRE I and II . . . . 115

Daniel L. Haulman

Crisis in Iran : Operation EAGLE CLAW . . . . . . . . . . 125

Edward T. Russell
iv

Crisis in Grenada: Operation URGENT FURY . . . . . . . 135

Daniel L. Haulman

Raid on Libya: Operation ELDORADO CANYON . . . . . . 145

Judy G. Endicott

Persian Gulf Crisis : Operation EARNEST WILL . . . . . . 157

William J. Alien

Intervention in Panama : Operation JUST CAUSE . . . . . 167

William J. Allen

Crisis in Iraq: Operation PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . . . . 179

Daniel L. Haulman

Crisis in Southern Iraq:

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

William J. Alien

Crisis in Bosnia: Operation PROVIDE PROMISE . . . . . . 197

Frederick J. Shaw Jr.

Crisis in Somalia: Operations PROVIDE RELIEF

and RESTORE HOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Daniel L. Haulman

Resolution of Bosnian Crisis:

Operation DENY FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Daniel L. Haulman

Crisis in Haiti : Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY . . . . . 229

William J. Allen

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Maps

Germany during Berlin Airlift

Inset: Berlin during Operation VITTLES . . . . . . . . 3

BLUE BAT Area of USAF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Operation NEW TAPE Routes

Inset: Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . . . . . . 26

Area of USAF Operations in Cuban Missile Crisis . . . . . 35
Area of USAF Operations during URGENT FURY

Inset: Areas of Operational Responsibilities

on Grenada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

USAF Strike Force Route for ELDORADO CANYON

Inset: Operation ELDORADO CANYON Targets . . . .

.

.

137

147

Persian Gulf Region during Operation EARNEST WILL . . . 158

Panama Canal Zone during Operation JUST CAUSE . . . . 169

No-Fly Zones in Iraq during Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

No-Fly Zones in Iraq during Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Europe during Operation PROVIDE PROMISE

Inset: Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

USAF Area of Operations during the Crisis in Somalia . . . 211

USAF Area of Operations in DENY FLIGHT . . . . . . . . 221

Haiti, Site of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY . . . . . . 231

Photographs

Maj . Gen. William H. Tunner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Moving Coal to a C-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

USAF Troop Carrier C-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

First RB-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

KB-50 Tanker Refueling F-100, F-101, and RB-66 . . . . 18

Area of USAF Operations for LONG SKIP . . . . . . . . . . 46

Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Area of USAF Operations during Dominican Crisis . . . . . 64

USAF Flight Route during Operation NICKEL GRASS . . . . 76

Southeast Asia during the Vietnam Evacuation

Inset: Saigon during Operation FREQUENT WIND . . . 84

Area of USAF Operations during Cambodian

Airlift and Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Area of USAF Operations during Mayaguez Crisis . . . . . 106

Area of USAF Operations during ZAIRE I and II . . . . . . 116

Iran and Persian Gulf during Hostage

Rescue Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Vi

Page

C-130s at Wheelus AB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

USAF Crew Members Dine on a Congo Airstrip . . . . . . 29

Ground-to-Ground Missile Base in Cuba . . . . . . . . . 36

Missile Site in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Loading a C-124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

C-124 in Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

C-130 Lands at Paulis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Paratroopers Prepare to Board C-130 . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Tents at San Isidro AB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Members of 82d Airborne Division Return

to Pope AFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

C-5 Leaves Lajes Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

C-5 at Lod Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

USAF NCO Gives Food to Vietnamese

Refugee Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Operation BABYLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Deplaning from a C-130 after Evacuation

from Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Landing Zone "Hotel" in Phnom Penh . . . . . . . . . . . 100

HH-53 Crews Prepare for EAGLE PULL . . . . . . . . . . 101

Marines Board a CH-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Wreckage of U.S. Helicopters on Koh Tang . . . . . . . . . 110

Moroccan Troops Prepare to Board a C-141 . . . . . . . . 118

French Troops Observe a C-5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

MC-130 Flying Low . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

MC-130 of the Type Used in the Rescue Attempt . . . . . 131

C-130 Unloading at Point Salines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Army Rangers Board C-141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

F-111F Bomber Based at Lakenheath . . . . . . . . . . . 150

F-111F Takes on Fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker . . . . 152

E-3 AWACS Provides Airborne Surveillance . . . . . . . . 163

KC-135 Refueling an F-16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

U.S . Army Personnel Boarding C-5B . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Peacekeepers Patrolling Perimeter of Howard AFB . . . . . 173

Manuel Noriega in Custody of DEAAgents . . . . . . . . . 176
USAF Enlisted Men Prepare to Load

a C-130 . . . . . . . 182

F-16 at Incirlik AB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

F-16 Test Aircraft at Eglin AFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

437th Airlift Wing Globemaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

C-141 at Mogadishu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

C-5 Unloads Vehicles in Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

NATO AWACS Aircraft over the Adriatic Sea . . . . . . . . 222

F-15 Refuels from

a KC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

C-130s Staging at MacDill AFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Foreword

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, a series of geographically

localized crises caused by political, religious, or ethnic unrest;

outright military aggression; and natural disasters has re

placed the relative stability that characterized international

relations for more than fifty years of the Cold War. For the

United States Air Force (USAF), this has meant short-notice

deployments, airlifts, and other operational missions conducted in reaction to local crises . Such missions-once of

secondary importance to nuclear deterrence or preparations

for theater war-have come to dominate Air Force operations.

The result has been recognition that global aerospace power

and mobility are central to effective American crisis intervention in the post-Cold War world . This recognition has led the

U.S. Air Force to restructure itself as an Expeditionary Aerospace Force, exploiting diverse core competencies consisting of

global air and space superiority, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, global attack, information superiority, and

agile combat support. Via rapid-response air expeditionary

forces, the U.S . Air Force can furnish global power and presence for humanitarian or combat purposes-"bombs or bread

or both"-in hours to any spot on Earth . A traditional precept

of USAF doctrine has been that the service must always be

prepared to assess its roles and missions in light of new and

ever-changing national policy and strategy. Recognizing that

doctrine is largely a distillation of knowledge gained from historical experience, the Air Force Historical Research Agency

has compiled this record of USAF contingency operations covering the last half-century.

This book is an effort to meet the needs of Air Force commanders and other decision makers for a useful reference

work on contingencies . One of an ongoing series of reference

works, it is organized in the style of the recently published The

United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations,

1947-1994. It adds to the history of the Air Force by providing

statistics and narrative descriptions of the Air Force's most

significant contingency operations over the last fifty years .
Decision makers, planners, logisticians, and educators may

find in these pages examples of lessons learned or themes

worthy of further analyses . Scholars, educators, journalists,

and the general public may gain an understanding of how the

Air Force meets its obligations in a rapidly changing world.

RICHARD P. HALLION

Air Force Historian
Preface

Air Force Basic Doctrine 1, September 1997, states, " . . . military operations other than war may deter war, resolve conflict,

relieve suffering, promote peace, or support civil authorities."

Scope and Definition

Spanning the decades from the beginning of the Cold War to

today's strategy of global engagement, the twenty-three operational summaries in this book illustrate each of the objectives for

military operations other than war. The summaries deal with a

particular type of military operation; that is, contingency, which

is defined as an emergency caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other unexpected events and involving military forces . A contingency requires plans, rapid response, and

special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. Such operations are as old as

the U.S. Air Force, but professional interest in them has increased in direct proportion to their growing importance in the

spectrum of post-Cold War operations. This book provides a

reference resource that, hopefully, will also stimulate disciplined

and analytical investigation of the subject.

The U.S . Air Force conducted each of these contingencies in a

combat zone or area of serious civil disturbance. Armed raids,

major evacuations, major rescue operations, movement of troops

or equipment into foreign countries for peace operations or in

support of war, or enforcement of no-fly zones are typical. In

sum, the contingencies in this book represent the most significant Air Force flying campaigns undertaken in a hostile, potentially dangerous milieu short of war. The compilation is representative rather than comprehensive. Excluded are operations

involving small numbers of aircraft and personnel, strictly humanitarian airlift operations, shows of force, peace operations

not involving combat, and those contingencies in which the Air

Force played a minor role. Most of the twenty-three entries deal

with a single contingency, but several cover two, and occasionally even more, where the operations are closely related.
Arranged chronologically, each entry includes the dates

beginning with the first day of USAF involvement and ending

with the last day of USAF operations . Also listed are the location or theater of operations and overseas air bases used. The

list of USAF flying organizations involved includes from major

command level, where relevant, down to the squadrons and

flights, but the latter are recorded only if the parent wings did

not physically participate. Also listed are the types of USAF

aircraft used ; in the narrative, the writer may also identify

aircraft of other services and nations. A map of the area of

operations shows geographical and political features affecting

events . A brief narrative states the principal purposes of the

campaigns, a summary of activities, and lessons learned .

Political/Military Environment

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, most contingencies

were either directly or indirectly associated with the Cold War.

At least seven Cold War operations effectively countered Communist provocation. Breaking the Berlin Blockade by airlift

marked the first Western victory over post-World War Ii Soviet

expansionism. Thirteen years later, the Cuban Missile Crisis

ended in a humiliating defeat for the Soviet Union with the

forced withdrawal of its nuclear missiles from their bases in

Cuba . Several contingencies in Africa, such as Operation NEW

TAPE and Operations ZAIRE I and ZAIRE II served to prevent

the expansion of Soviet and Cuban influence across the

emerging nations of the continent. U.S. intervention in the

Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Grenada not only countered

Communist expansion but also introduced requisite political

and economic stability, allowing democratic processes to take

root. Eleven Cold War contingencies imposed political stability

on chaotic nations or supported peace operations .

Principal Missions

USAF airlift capabilities have always been the cornerstone

for U.S. global-projection missions. Twelve of the twenty-three

entries in this book involved principally military airlift; such

as transport of troops, their equipment, and other cargo to
cluded some humanitarian airlift; that is, transport of food,

clothing, tents, medical supplies, or other cargo for the relief

of a civilian population.

Although airlift played a significant supporting role, the basic

missions in seven summaries entailed reconnaissance, air-to-air

combat, air-to-ground attacks, or close air support of ground

forces . The Air Force amply demonstrated its abilities to maintain air superiority with aerial victories over enemy aircraft during Operations SOUTHERN WATCH and PROVIDE COMFORT

and by damaging or destroying enemy air defense systems during operations such as URGENT FURY and DENY FLIGHT. Operation DENY FLIGHT also saw the effective use of precisionguided munitions to force an end to violence and aggression. In

addition, Air Force personnel usually provided critical combatsupport elements such as reconnaissance, command and control of air traffic, logistics, and air refueling to other U.S . services

and allied forces during most military actions.

Role of the Reserve Component

One of the clearest changes, illustrated through the study of

contingencies, is the , steadily increasing importance of the Air

Reserve components-the Air National Guard (ANG) and Air

Force Reserve (AFRES) . For example, no ANG or AFRES unit

participated in Operation VPI'I'LES in 1948-49. During the Cuban

Missile Crisis in 1962, personnel and aircraft from AFRES units

supplemented active duty airlift capabilities within the United

States . A short three years later, AFRES members voluntarily

flew missions to the Dominican Republic, and an ANG unit

provided aircraft to enhance long-distance communications . In

the early 1970s, implementation of the Total Force Policy resulted in far greater Reserve participation, as was evident in

Operations ZAIRE I and II in 1978 . During those, at least three

AFRES associate airlift wings participated. By Operation UPHOLD

DEMOCRACY in 1994, the Air Reserve components were thoroughly integrated into the activities of the regular Air Force.

Not only had they become a vital, integral part of the Air

Force's airlift mission capability, but they also provided fighter,

Xili
reconnaissance, air refueling, and other functions amounting

to some 10 percent of deployed forces .

Joint and Combined Operations

In these twenty-three summaries, the U.S. Air Force operated alone in only three. The remainder were joint operations,

involving one or more of the other U.S . armed services . Until

enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986, few joint contingencies had a true

joint commander. Rather, the unified (i .e., joint) commander

coordinated operations, with each armed services component

commander retaining control of his forces . Prime examples

included the Dominican Crisis and Operation URGENT FURY.

But, every contingency since 1986 has benefited from a joint

commander who exercised full command of all military forces in

the area of operations, thus improving the integrated application

of force, including air power, towards successful operations .

Fourteen summaries describe combined operations ; that is,

military forces from other nations cooperated or worked

closely with U.S . armed services, and beginning with DESERT

SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1991, coalition force commanders have directed all contingencies. Ten entries involved multinational organizations, such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Organization of American

States . Virtually all required cooperation from other nations to

provide to the U.S . Air Force overflight rights, forward air

bases, and other logistical support.

A. TIMOTHY WARNOCK

Chief, Organizational History Branch

Air Force Historical Research Agency
Acknowledgements

Robert T. Cossaboom, Chief, History Office, Air Mobility

Command, and members of his staff, Daniel F. Harrington,

Historian, History Office, United States Air Forces in Europe ;

Jacob Neufeld, Chief, Projects and Production Division, Air

Force History Support Office (AFHSO) ; and Daniel R. Mortensen, Chief of Research, Airpower Research Division, College for

Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Air University,

carefully read the manuscript, offering constructive, critical

comments to improve it. Other readers at AFHSO were Richard Davis, Sheldon Goldberg, Perry Jamison, Priscilla Jones,

Edward Mark, Roger Miller, Diane Putney, Wayne Thompson,

George Watson, Herman Wolk, and Tom Y'Blood . Larry Benson, AFHSO, provided a copy of his background paper on "Historical Examples of USAF Operations Tempo," which proved

very useful. Tammy Rodriguez, editorial assistant, Air Force

Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) pulled the material into a

single document and edited it for format and consistency.

Frederick J. Shaw Jr., Chief, Research Division, AFHRA, arranged for editing and layout as well as provided expert advice

to the editor. SrA Susan Beasley, AFHRA, scanned the photographs . Air University Press accomplished the copy editing

and layout, including compilation of the illustrations . Specifically, Debbie Banker did an outstanding job of copy editing

and layout, Susan Fair and Daniel Armstrong did the photographs, maps, and cover, and Linda Colson typeset the manuscript-all under the expert guidance of Steve Garst, Design

Branch Division Chief, and Deputy Director, Tom Mackin. A

word of appreciation is due Col. William E. Mathis, Commander, AFHRA, for his support and to Dr. Richard P. Hallion,

Air Force Historian, as sponsor of the work. Errors of omission

and commission ultimately rest with the editor.

Introduction

From Cold War, to Global Engagement

On March 17, 1947, U.S. President Harry S Truman in a

message to Congress requesting foreign aid to assist Greece

and Turkey against Communist subversion established con

tainment as the national strategy to counter Soviet expansionism. To halt Soviet expansion, the United States had to rely on

a large professional military establishment and nuclear weapons, bolstered by international alliances to deter war. The explosion of the Soviet Union's first atomic device in August 1949

imparted greater urgency to U.S. efforts to develop and expand

its nuclear capabilities. In the forty-year period of international

tension that came to be known as the "Cold War," the containment of the Soviet Union and deterrence of nuclear war to a

great extent depended on the ability of the United States to

develop and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent force .

The potential for successful exploitation of nuclear weapons, the basis of deterrence, at first depended on bombers

stationed overseas that were capable of hitting targets within

the Soviet Union. Building a nuclear-capable fleet of strategic

bombers was the responsibility of the United States Air Force

(USAF), established as a separate armed service in September

1947. Considering strategic bombing its primary mission, the

new service focused its resources on expanding the Strategic

Air Command (SAC) . While SAC slowly built its nuclear deterrent, the USAF's conventional forces remained comparatively

weak, especially considering the massive conventional arsenals of the Soviet Union and its client states . Paradoxically,

the nuclear stalemate engendered by successful deterrence

increased the need for the conventional forces to resolve the

Cold War's numerous crises .

The first Cold War contingency was the Soviet blockade of

Berlin in June 1948, in a manner of speaking, the opening shot

of the Cold War. The U.S . government determined to break the

blockade by supplying the city by airlift. The effort began with

C-47s, but the U.S . Air Force quickly moved to the larger

Xvii
C-54s, stripping the Military Air Transport Service and other

major air commands to build a fleet of 225 large transports for

Operation VITTLES . The airlift broke the blockade, giving the

West (embodied in the newly founded North Atlantic Treaty

Organization [NATO]) its first victory of the Cold War. It also

dramatically demonstrated the need for specialized military

cargo aircraft capable of loading near ground level from the

front or rear. In the early 1950s, the U.S . Air Force put into

operation the four-engine C-124 aircraft to haul oversized

military cargo long distances, as well as the twin-engine

C-123 for intratheater airlift. In the latter part of the decade,

the versatile C-130, initially a short-haul carrier of oversized

cargo, entered service .

The invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans in June

1950 marked the beginning of another major Cold War crisis,

requiring the exclusive use of conventional forces . Early in the

war, the United States marshaled its diplomatic resources to

obtain a United Nations (UN) condemnation of the Communist

invasion and, under UN auspices, threw what forces it had in

the Far East into the fray. Throughout the conflict, the United

States and its Allies were unwilling to provoke a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union or risk adverse world reaction

by employing nuclear weapons against conventional Communist forces. Under the UN Command, the Far East Air Forces

(FEAF) employed its meager forces, although trained and

equipped for the air defense of Japan, in interdiction and

ground-support roles to help slow the enemy advance. Despite

handicaps imposed by post-World War II neglect of tactical air

support, the FEAF soon established and maintained air superiority over South Korea and most of North Korea . The USAF

experience in Korea would have important consequences for

addressing the requirements of the contingency mission.

In the aftermath of the Korean conflict, the Air Force, while

continuing to emphasize the buildup of its nuclear forces,

began improving its ability to deal with the crises and "brush

fire" wars that it now recognized as Cold War "facts of life." In

July 1955, it activated under Tactical Air Command (TAC) the

Nineteenth Air Force as a planning headquarters for the newly

established Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) . Designed as a

highly mobile tactical air force to be deployed to meet military
forces from TAC's other numbered air forces. In July-October

1958, during Operation BLUE BAT, the CASF in its first crisis

deployed to Lebanon. The C-124 and the newly operational

C-130 aircraft proved their capabilities by transporting the

CASF from bases in the United States to Incirlik, Turkey,

within three days . Tactical fighter aircraft made the quick

journey with the help of aerial refueling from KB-50 tankers .

Among other lessons, the deployment revealed inadequate aircrew training for non-nuclear operations, significant joint

command and control problems, and the inadequacy of forward air bases. The Air Force sought to alleviate the forwardair-base problem with the establishment of civil engineering

teams, who could survey forward bases and install facilities to

maintain and operate the deploying aircraft.

By the late 1950s, the dissolution of the European colonial

empires was well advanced . Wars of national liberation, civil

war, and political unrest clouded the twilight of imperialism.

In July 1960, civil war in the newly independent Republic of

the Congo, formerly a colony of Belgium, involved the U.S . Air

Force in Operation NEW TAPE . During NEW TAPE's four year

history, USAF transports airlifted refugees from the rebellionwracked Congo, delivered UN troops to keep the peace, and

flew humanitarian relief missions . Because of the inadequacies of the propeller-driven C- 124s and C-119s, the Air Force

instituted in October 1962 the use of the C-135, a civilian jet

airliner converted to military use. The experience of Operation

NEW TAPE added urgency to the procurement of a jet military

transport and underscored the need to expand the airlift forces .

While USAF transports accomplished their mission in the

Congo, a series of events unfolded that pushed the United

States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war, producing

the most serious crisis of the Cold War. By the early 1960s,

the dissolution of European colonial empires was exacerbating Cold War tensions . Guided by experience and MarxistLeninist doctrine, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in January 1961 announced Soviet support for "wars of national

liberation" to advance the triumph of world Communism in

emerging nations . To counter the Soviet strategy, U.S . President John F. Kennedy, who took office the same month,
directed that military response be made swiftly and in kind to

the aggression encountered. Known as "flexible response," this

defense posture acknowledged the importance of conventional

forces and, among other improvements, led to a program to

increase airlift capacity. The new policy also affected the employment of nuclear weapons. In June 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara refined massive retaliation to include a counterforce strategy based on a second-strike

capability, emphasizing the destruction of military forces . In

pursuit of this strategy, the administration planned to deploy

Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in hardened silos and Polaris nuclear-powered submarines equipped

with sea-launched ballistic missiles.

Under tremendous internal pressure from Soviet hard-liners

to balance U.S. initiatives, Premier Khrushchev saw opportunity when Cuba requested military aid to deter U.S .-sponsored

invasions . In October 1962, U.S . intelligence received word

that the Soviets were building sites for medium-range and

intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. USAF reconnaissance flights confirmed the construction of missile sites

and also discovered the presence of IL-28 medium-range

bombers, capable of carrying nuclear bombs. In reaction, the

United States brought its nuclear forces to full combat alert,

and a CASF led the deployment of TAC units to bases in the

Southeastern United States within range of Cuba. During

tense diplomatic negotiations, the United States enforced a

naval blockade of Cuba . Within a few days, facing a possible

U.S. invasion of Cuba or general nuclear war, the Soviet leaders ordered the removal of nuclear weapons, withdrawal of

ballistic missiles and bombers, and destruction of the missile

sites . This crisis revealed the inadequate capabilities and shortages of USAF tactical aircraft and the need for development of

modern tactical air reconnaissance systems capable of allweather and darkness surveillance .

Shortly after the termination of the Cuban missile crisis,

another emergency erupted; this one occurred on the border

separating India from China. In November 1962, the People's

Republic of China invaded the remote Himalaya region of India. The Indian government requested U.S . military support in

the form of munitions, other war materiel, and tactical airlift.
most urgently needed supplies by air from Europe and the

United States . It also provided a squadron, with aircrews and

maintainers, of C-130s that for over six months provided tactical airlift to the almost inaccessible disputed area. The

C-130 proved its capability to operate successfully on short,

primitive airfields at high altitudes . In less than a year, the

Chinese forces had pulled back to China, vindicating U.S .

containment policy.

The U.S . Air Force returned to the Congo in Operation

DRAGON ROUGE from November through December 1964.

C-130s transported Belgian soldiers from Belgium to the

Congo, air-dropping some and landing others, to secure key

towns and cities and rescue Europeans and Americans being

held hostage by rebel forces. Numerous aircraft came under

enemy fire that punctured fuel cells and tires but failed to

impair operations significantly. The C-130 aircrews developed

new landing and takeoff tactics that would be used later in

Southeast Asia. Like NEW TAPE, Operation DRAGON ROUGE

was a peace operations contingency.

As conventional U.S . responses to international crises became

routine events, the Kennedy administration turned its attention

to the growing conflict in Southeast Asia. At first, the U.S . government perceived it as a guerrilla war against South Vietnamese Communist rebels augmented by North Vietnamese troops .

The Kennedy administration determined that it could be met

through flexible response. However, it quickly evolved into a

conventional war of attrition against North Vietnam. Kennedy's

successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, prosecuted a war of

gradual escalation in Southeast Asia with little success. His

successor, President Richard M. Nixon, began withdrawal of

U.S. forces from Vietnam shortly after his inauguration in 1969.

Conducting bombing campaigns against North Vietnam in 1972,

the U.S. Air Force became the primary military instrument that

forced the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the war in

early 1973. Despite the formal cessation of hostilities, the Communists would attain most of their goals in Southeast Asia,

capturing Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam within three

years without opposition from the United States.
During the Vietnam War, U.S . forces deployed overseas to

the Dominican Republic in 1965-66 . In the Dominican Crisis,

the U.S . government undertook military intervention to deter

subversion of the Dominican government by Communist

Cuba. This operation began with USAF C-130s airlifting the

entire 82d Airborne Division from Pope Air Force Base, North

Carolina, to Santo Domingo . The Air Force also deployed a

tactical fighter squadron, a fighter-interceptor squadron, a reconnaissance squadron, and psychological-warfare elements

to support the U.S . Army and deter Cuban reaction to the

intervention. This could be considered the first nation-building

contingency of the Cold War and one of several peace operations in the 1960s . It highlighted shortcomings in USAF contingency planning and in joint command and control .

As the Communists overran Southeast Asia in 1975, the

U.S . Air Force became involved in three contingencies, marking the end of U.S . military intervention in that region. Two of

these involved evacuations of refugees fleeing Communist

forces . During the U.S . withdrawal from South Vietnam,

April-September 1975, the U.S . military evacuated over

130,000 refugees, about 50,000 by air, over a period of several

weeks . Carried out in mass confusion, panic, and fragmented

command and control with no single military commander, the

Vietnam evacuation resulted in the loss of a C-5 and a C-130 .

The Cambodian airlift and evacuation initially involved the

airlift of supplies to besieged friendly forces in the Cambodian

capital of Phnom Penh. The U.S . Air Force relied heavily on

civilian-contract airlift for this operation . When the fall of

Phnom Penh became imminent in April 1975, the U.S . ambassador implemented a plan with a USAF officer as commander

of the joint evacuation force. In this highly successful operation, nearly 300 people took advantage of the chance to leave

the country.

The third contingency in Southeast Asia during 1975 also

involved Cambodia . In the Mayaguez Crisis, Khmer Rouge soldiers seized an American civilian merchant ship, the SS Mayaguez, traveling off the Cambodian mainland . U.S . President

Gerald R. Ford decided to attempt a rescue of the crew. USAF

reconnaissance aircraft found the ship but could not determine the location of its crew. Reconnaissance also failed to
was mistakenly believed held . USAF helicopters inserted a

U.S . Marine force on the island, where they came under intense fire from an entrenched, powerful enemy. After a significant delay, the Air Force provided effective close air support,

enabling the helicopters to extract the marines. In this operation, the U.S. Air Force lost four helicopters, and U.S . forces lost

forty-one lives. The limitations of reconnaissance, weaknesses of

intelligence, and the tragic consequences that may result from

both marked the last major U.S . military operation in Southeast

Asia.

In the course of the Southeast Asian conflict, the U.S . Air

Force brought its airlift capability to maturity, introducing the

C-141 and C-5 transport aircraft into operational service . In

the ensuing years, the role of aerial transport in projecting

military power to contingency-conflict areas assumed critical

importance. In 1977, the Department of Defense recognized

the rising prominence of airlift by designating the U.S . Air

Force the single manager for all transport aircraft. To meet

this role, the USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC) became a

specified command; that is, it came under the strategic guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for air transport . Three contingencies of the 1970s illustrated the vital importance of strategic airlift to meet U.S . national policy objectives.

The first was Operation NICKEL GRASS, the aerial resupply

of Israel's arsenal in October 1973. Armed with Soviet-supplied

weaponry, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, which, rapidly

running short of munitions and equipment, appealed to the

United States for supply . In addition to flying fighter aircraft to

Israel, USAF C-141s and C-5s transported tons of cargo, including tanks, from the United States. Operation NICKEL

GRASS convinced USAF leaders of the need to modify the

C-141 for aerial refueling and to procure the KC-10, which

was capable of transferring twice as much fuel as the venerable KC-135 .

In the other two airlift contingencies of the decade, Operations ZAIRE I and II, May-June 1978, the U.S . Air Force returned to the Congo, now Zaire . In response to Zaire's request,

the United States cooperated with France and Belgium to

provide military aid against Marxist rebels . MAC set up an
infrastructure to support the airlifters, and C

130s airlifted

Belgian, French Foreign Legion, and later, African troops to

Zaire, while C-141 s transported needed supplies and equipment. This operation was noteworthy for the substantial numbers of USAF Reservists involved . It also exposed some recurrent

problems, such as poor communication infrastructure and inadequate support facilities at forward air bases, but it did

serve U.S . containment policy by helping thwart another Communist government in Africa .

A broad political consensus not to get involved in another

third world "quagmire" like Vietnam dissuaded the United

States from heavy involvement in contingencies during the

last half of the 1970s. But in 1979, the excesses of a fundamentalist Moslem regime in Iran forced a U.S. reaction. When

in November 1979 Iranians made U.S . diplomatic members in

Tehran hostage, U.S . President James (Jimmy) E. Carter approved a rescue attempt. The Department of Defense devised a

plan and assembled equipment and people to carry it out. In

April 1980, the rescue force rendezvoused in the Iranian Desert, but the team leader called off the attempt because of

helicopter failure . As the aircraft departed, an explosion destroyed a helicopter and an EC-130, killing eight people . This

experience provided the impetus for the United States to create a Special Operations Command and to strengthen special

operations forces in all armed services .

The next President, Ronald W. Reagan, announced a scant

ten months after taking office in 1981 the rejuvenation of U.S.

strategic forces . He sought the strengthening and modern

ization of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers,

the so-called strategic triad . For the U.S . Air Force, this meant

the procurement of the B-1 strategic bomber, which President

Carter had canceled several years previously. The missile force

would see the introduction by the end of the decade of the

Peacekeeper ICBM. President Reagan also instructed the services to equip and train for rapid response and flexible employment of conventional forces. The Department of Defense

established a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF),

whose commander had operational control of certain U.S.

Army and Air Force units, as well as planning responsibility

for operations in Southwest Asia . In January 1983, the U.S.
Three months later, the U.S . Air Force merged its special operations forces with its Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Services under a new MAC organization, the Twenty-Third Air

Force . This numbered air force had global responsibilities not

only for rescue and recovery and special operations but also

for weather reconnaissance, drone recovery, space-shuttle

support, and support for SAC missile sites . The amalgamation

of these missions proved fortuitous for the success of a major

contingency later in 1983.

Following an anti-American coup of the government in Grenada, President Reagan acted quickly to protect U.S . citizens

attending medical school on the island and to eliminate a grow

ing Cuban military presence there. In Operation URGENT FURY,

the U.S. Air Force on October 25 transported and air-dropped

U.S . Army troops, while its special operations gunships, the

AC-130s, provided close air support for the assault. The Air

Force also provided close air support for U.S . Army and U.S.

Marine operations over the next two days, while evacuating

U.S . citizens to safety in the United States . Operation URGENT FURY met political and military objectives by expelling

the Cuban military from the island, deposing an authoritarian

regime, and laying the groundwork for the reestablishment of

democratic rule. From the military perspective, it exposed recurrent problems with intelligence, flaws in joint command

structure, and the reluctance of USAF major commands to yield

operational control of aircraft. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 addressed these

discrepancies by reforming the Department of Defense and mandating a single commander in joint military operations .

Even as Congress debated this legislation, the United States

successfully completed yet another major military campaign.

In April, President Reagan ordered an air strike against Libya,

which had sponsored several terrorist attacks worldwide

against the United States and its allies. During Operation

ELDORADO CANYON, U.S . authorities assigned targets to

both the U.S. Navy and Air Force. The Air Force flew a force of

F-111 s, supported by KC-10 and KC-135 aerial tankers, from

England to strike assigned targets in or near Tripoli, Libya, in

close cooperation with the naval air strike as well as naval
units supporting both strike forces . In spite of the loss of an

aircraft and several aborted sorties, the USAF aircrews successfully destroyed their assigned targets with little collateral

damage. President Reagan had proven the validity of a prepared and trained force for flexible response against terrorism.

Another crisis ripened in Panama during 1989 when dictator Manuel Noriega's policies jeopardized the U.S. commitment

to transfer control of the Panama Canal to Panama. As U.S.-

Panamanian relations worsened, the dictator terrorized internal opposition and increasingly harassed U.S. military members and citizens . U.S. President George H. W. Bush decided

that U.S. interests required the ouster of Noriega, whom a

U.S . grand jury had indicted on drug-related charges . The

United States launched Operation JUST CAUSE in December.

The Air Force airlifted U.S. Army troops from the United

States, provided close air support, and transported supplies

for the U.S . military, as well as humanitarian aid for displaced

Panamanians. Another nation-building activity, JUST CAUSE

resulted in the establishment of a pro-American democratic

government in Panama.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989 spelled the

end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the United States began to

reduce its military forces, including its nuclear forces . The

retreat from nuclear confrontation reached a historic milestone in July 1990 when the Strategic Air Command ended

nearly thirty years of continuous airborne command-post operations known as Looking Glass . Then in September, President Bush ordered SAC to end its thirty-minute alert status ;

on September 28 the alert forces ceased operations . Henceforth, U.S . strategy would rely more heavily on tactical, conventional means of military operations. Ironically, the dissolution of the Soviet Union eliminated the stability imposed by

nuclear stalemate and superpower understandings, unleashing dangerously pent-up tensions . To meet the resulting crises

and those arising from other causes, the United States sent

military forces on extended operations overseas even as it

reduced its forces significantly.

The beginning of this new era was signaled as early as July

1987 with the commencement of Operation EARNEST WILL in

the Persian Gulf. Increasingly, Iran and Iraq in their war with
tankers, in the Persian Gulf. When the Kuwaiti government

asked for protection for its ships, the United States agreed to

register them as U.S . vessels and provide naval escort through

the gulf. The U.S . Air Force provided airborne warning and

control system surveillance support to other U.S. services, all

of which operated under a single joint commander . U.S . forces

successfully conducted sixty-six escort missions before Iran

and Iraq declared a cease-fire in 1988 .

Peace remained elusive in the Middle East. Within three

years, the United States once again used its military forces on

behalf of Kuwait against Iraqi aggression . In 1990, Iraq in

vaded Kuwait, declaring it an Iraqi province . The United

States formed a coalition in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM to defeat quickly and decisively Iraqi aggression

against Kuwait. Air power dealt precise blows against Iraqi infrastructure and armies to prepare the way for a short ground war

that forced Iraq in February 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait and

concede to terms for international weapons inspections .

Even in defeat, Iraq continued to threaten its neighbors and

brutally repressed internal opposition, particularly its Kurdish

minority. Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and SOUTHERN

WATCH addressed the United Nations' concerns with Iraqi

policies . PROVIDE COMFORT involved the enforcement of a

no-fly zone over northern Iraq to protect the minority Kurds

from Saddam Hussein's forces and discourage further Iraqi

moves against Kuwait. The U.S . Air Force airlifted extensive

humanitarian aid to the Kurds and transported some refugees

to Guam. SOUTHERN WATCH was the enforcement of a no-fly

zone over southern Iraq, which continued into 1998 . These two

exercises exacerbated USAF personnel problems with excessive

deployment time overseas and a growing maintenance crisis due

to much higher-than-planned use of equipment and aircraft.

Even as the United States sought to contain Iraq, in 1991-

92, internal conflict in Somalia created a starving, diseasedridden population . International agencies, including the

United Nations, attempted to provide humanitarian relief, but

thievery and violence among warlords often thwarted these

efforts . The U.S . Air Force airlifted U.S . and later UN troops to

keep the peace, as well as transporting humanitarian aid cargoes.
g pp

p

system to U.S . policy makers occurred in October 1993. The

U.S . President, given a choice between a twenty-one-day sea lift

and an eight-day airlift, chose the latter, proving the growing

reliance of the modern world on air power for rapid delivery of

humanitarian assistance and military forces.

In Southern Europe, the breakup of Yugoslavia generated

old ethnic hatreds and conflicts that eventually led to UN and

NATO intervention . The two contingencies involving USAF par

ticipation were Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DENY

FLIGHT. In the first, the U.S. Air Force airlifted humanitarian

relief supplies to the besieged population of Bosnia. During

the second operation, NATO and the United Nations enforced

a no-fly zone over Bosnia to check Serbian aggression and

protect PROVIDE PROMISE's humanitarian deliveries. Later,

USAF and other NATO aircraft conducted air strikes, known

as Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, to force the antagonists to

negotiate an end to the war.

During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, a nation-building

effort in Haiti, the United States used its military forces to

stabilize the country following a collapse of government. The

U.S. Air Force initially provided the airlift to transport Army

troops to Haiti and to provide humanitarian relief to the population of the capital city. This contingency ended with the

return of the exiled legitimate president to Haiti .

Given the contingency operation's respectable longevity, formal USAF doctrine has been slow to recognize its significance .

In 1953, the USAF's first published doctrine focused on the

delivery of weapons of mass destruction to an opponent's heartland to destroy the capacity to wage war. The resulting emphasis on building a nuclear deterrent diverted attention from

preparation for more conventional operations . The realities of

the Southeast Asian conflict forced attention on less traditional forms of air power. In 1964, USAF doctrine recognized

counterinsurgency-with its potential for contingency operations-as a legitimate application of air power. Air Force doctrine further expanded in 1971 by defining for the first time

support functions like psychological warfare, search and rescue, air refueling, and airborne command and control. Later

iterations of doctrine carefully elaborated the importance of

XXUiii
declined and new technologies came to prominence. It remained

for the September 1997 edition of Air Force Basic Doctrine to

acknowledge the importance of the contingency operations to

contemporary roles and missions. Devoting an entire section to

"Air and Space Power in Military Operations Other Than

War," it recognized that " . . . many strategic actions tend to be

non-nuclear, conventional or special operations against more limited war or contingency operations objectives. . . ." Recognizing

the primacy of the contingency operation in current world affairs, it identifies the Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force as

the most appropriate organization to meet this challenge . Recent

deployments to Southwest Asia tested prototypes of the expeditionary task force .

Once eclipsed by nuclear deterrence and theater conventional warfare, the contingency operation has gained during

the last decade of the Twentieth Century a conspicuous posi

tion in the overall mission of the Air Force. Spanning the universe of "operations short of war" from peacekeeping to humanitarian airlift, these operations are often conducted under

joint service command or in cooperation with other nations .

They are currently the USAF's primary means of protecting

and projecting U.S. interests in the period of readjustment

made necessary by the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

localized conflicts, and continuing natural disasters . Finally

assuming a prominence in formal USAF doctrine, the contingency operation is today driving the organization of the "Air

Expeditionary Force." The contingencies described in the following pages encapsulate much of the USAF historical experience with this extremely challenging application of air power.

Operation VITTLES

Daniel L. Haulman

DATES: June 26, 1948-September 30, 1949

LOCATION: Germany

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Burtonwood, England; Celle Royal Air

Force (RAF) Station, Fassberg RAF Station, Kaufbeuren Air Force

Base (AFB), Oberpfaffenhofen AFB, Rhein-Main AFB, Wiesbaden AFB,

Germany; Tegel Airfield, Tempelhof AFB, Gatow Airfield, Berlin .

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-47, C-54, C-74, C-82, YC-97

TASK FORCES/DIVISIONS GROUPS: (con't .)

Airlift Task Force (Provisional) 317th Troop Carrier

1 st Airlift Task Force 1420th Air Transport Group (Provisional)

Combined Airlift Task Force 1422d Air Transport Group (Provisional)

7499th Air Division

SQUADRONS:

WINGS: 1 st Air Transport (later, 1263d Air Transport)

Airlift Wing (Provisional) 3d Air Transport (later, 1273d Air Transport)

60th Troop Carrier 8th Air Transport (later, 1255th Air Transport)

61 st Troop Carrier 9th Air Transport (later, 1256th Air Transport)

313th Troop Carrier 11 th Air Transport (later, 1250th Air Transport)

317th Troop Carrier 12th Air Transport (later, 1251 st Air Transport)

525th Air Transport (later,

1602d Air Transport) 17th Air Transport (later, 1258th Air Transport)

7150th Air Force Composite 19th Troop Carrier

7497th Airlift Wing (Provisional) 20th Troop Carrier

21 st Air Transport (later, 1266th Air Transport)

GROUPS: 22d Air Transport (later, 1267th Air Transport)

Airlift . Group (Provisional) 23d Air Transport (later, 1268th Air Transport)

60th Troop Carrier 54th Troop Carrier

61 st Troop Carrier 7169th Weather Reconnaissance

313th Troop Carrier
At the end of World War II, the victorious Allies divided

Germany into four zones of occupation, one each for the

United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

They similarly divided Berlin. Unfortunately, the German capital lay in the center of the eastern Soviet zone . Highways,

canals, railroads, and three air corridors connected the western sectors of Berlin with the American, British, and French

zones that lay 110 miles to the west.

Following World War II, relations between the Soviet Union and

its former allies deteriorated into the Cold War. In 1947, Soviet

Premier Joseph Stalin denounced the American-sponsored

Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe . On June

18, 1948, the western powers announced currency reforms in

their zones of Germany. Six days later, the Soviet Union severed all land routes between western Berlin and western Germany, isolating more than two million people . Berlin became

an island in the Soviet zone .

The United States considered four options . Abandoning German currency reform would cripple European economic recovery. Abandoning Berlin to Soviet occupation would demonstrate appeasement and encourage further Communist

expansion. Forcing an armored column through the Soviet

zone of Germany would likely provoke a war in Europe against

Soviet ground forces with overwhelming numerical superiority.

President Harry S Truman approved a plan to airlift supplies

from western Germany to Berlin to neutralize the blockade

and buy time for a diplomatic solution.

The Berlin Airlift originated as an expedient. General Lucius D.

Clay, USA, military governor of the American zone, asked Lt.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, Commanding General, U.S. Air

Forces in Europe (USAFE), to arrange an emergency airlift of

coal and food to western Berlin. LeMay appointed Brig. Gen.

Joseph Smith, USAF, at Wiesbaden as temporary commander

of the operation. Americans called the airlift Operation VITTLES. The British conducted a parallel airlift, which they

called Operation PLAINFARE .

The first USAF transports airlifting cargo to Berlin supplied

only the U.S. garrison. Within days of the full blockade, the
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Germany during Berlin Airlift

Inset : Berlin during Operation VITTLES

60th and 61 st Troop Carrier Groups began ferrying tons of VITTLES cargo to the people of Berlin. At first, USAFE performed the

operation with C-47s, transporting coal and food from western

Germany to Tempelhof Airport in Berlin. Smith increased deliveries to the besieged city, but the C-47s available were too small

to transport the estimated forty-five tons of coal and food the
berg, USAF Chief of Staff, arranged to augment the C47s with

C-54 Skymasters, which could carry three times as much cargo

per flight. Within a few weeks, scores of Skymasters from the

Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and at least four other

commands joined the airlift from bases as far away as Alaska,

the Caribbean, Texas, and Hawaii. At the end of September

1948, the U.S. Air Force withdrew all USAFE C-47s from Operation VITTLES to make room for more C-54s. Eventually, the Air

Force employed more than 200 Skymasters on the airlift .

To command the expanded operation, Vandenberg chose the

most experienced airlift expert in the Air Force, Maj . Gen. William H. Tunner. He had directed the complex and successful

"Hump" operation during World War II, which in its last year

airlifted 550,000 tons of war materiel from India over the Himalayas to isolated China. In Europe, Tunner worked closely with

LeMay and later with Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, who replaced

LeMay as USAFE commander when the latter returned to the

United States to take over the Strategic Air Command (SAC) .

On October 15, 1948, the United States and Britain transformed the Berlin Airlift into a combined operation. The preponderance of U.S. resources assured that Tunner would

command the Combined Airlift Task Force. British Air Commodore John W. F. Merer served as deputy commander. Pilots

from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa flying

British transports eventually hauled most of the passengers,

salt, and petroleum products on the airlift.

General Tunner turned the Berlin Airlift into an efficient

machine. His system of schedules and routes allowed the

transport fleet to fly to and from Berlin as if they were on

conveyor belts. The general demanded a precise, rhythmic cadence . He replaced holding patterns and the stacking of aircraft preparing to land with straight-in approaches. He determined that Berlin flights would not be delayed if one airplane

failed to land on its first attempt. Instead of circling around for

another try, it would go back to its base of origin, allowing the

next plane to land on schedule . Tunner insisted that the direction, altitude, and speed of each and every VITTLES airplane

be strictly controlled, with pilots routinely following instrument

flight rules. Radio beacons at several locations in western
Maj. Gen. William H. Tunner, Commander of the Berlin Airlift

Germany and Berlin controlled the routes of the airplanes . Precision was important because the corridors over the Soviet zone

were only twenty miles wide. Eventually, an airplane landed in

Berlin every three minutes. Ninety seconds after each transport

landed, another took off. The transports flew at staggered altitudes to minimize the danger of collisions . At one point, pilots

followed one of five different altitude tracks. Transports at the

same altitude were spaced from six to fifteen minutes apart. As a

result, there was only one mid-air collision during the entire

operation. At the peak of the airlift, allied aircraft flew the northern and southern corridors from nine bases in the western zones

of Germany to three airfields in western Berlin. The middle corridor carried airplanes from Berlin back to western Germany.

The U.S . Air Force used seven major air bases for Operation

VITTLES: Rhein-Main, Wiesbaden, Fassberg, and Celle in

western Germany, and Tempelhof, Gatow, and Tegel in western

Berlin. Of these, only Rhein-Main, Wiesbaden, and Tempelhof

were located in American zones. The British maintained and

operated the airfields at Fassberg, Celle, and Gatow, and the
of Berlin. The Allies constructed two new bases, Celle and

Tegel, and built new runways at Tempelhof and Gatow. At

Tempelhof, where high apartment complexes surrounded the

airfield, airlift engineers constructed light towers in a nearby

cemetery to guide the aircraft in bad weather.

Once an airplane landed in Berlin, a "follow me" jeep or a

truck guided it to its unloading point. During unloading, aircrews remained near their aircraft so that they could take off

again as soon as possible. Tunner arranged for vehicles with

refreshments, briefing personnel, and maintenance men to

meet the crews at their aircraft. Careful management reduced

turnaround time in Berlin from an hour to only thirty minutes . A transport stayed on the ground only long enough for

unloading and emergency maintenance . By the summer of

1949, unloading at Tempelhof took only fifteen minutes .

General Tunner devoted much of his attention to maintenance. Never designed for heavy cargo shuttling, the C-54s

wore out quickly. After 200 flying hours, VITTLES aircraft flew

to Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, and later to Burtonwood, England, for inspection and repair. After 1,000 hours, the airlift

transports flew to the United States for inspection and overhaul

by civilian contractors . The largest USAF depot, Kelly AFB,

Texas, overhauled 500 C-54 engines monthly for Operation VITTLES . Huge C-74 Globemasters ferried the engines to and from

Germany. By increasing the utilization rate of his aircraft, Tunner was able to limit the number of aircraft needed .

General Tunner encouraged competition among units and

the setting of new tonnage records . He insisted that the figures be published, despite objections from nervous security

officers who wanted them classified. On the first anniversary

of the Air Force, September 18, 1948, American aircraft alone

transported 5,582 tons to Berlin. Ground teams also competed to see how quickly they could load the airplanes . On

April 16, 1949, the Berlin Airlift delivered an incredible 12,941

tons of coal and food, the equivalent of 12 50-car trainloads,

to Berlin in 24 hours. This "Easter Parade" involved almost

1,400 flights. Between May and August 1949, the airlift transported an average of 8,000 tons per day . Heavy loads departed

Berlin with manufactured products, allowing factories there to
ton-mile decreased consistently.

The Combined Airlift Task Force demanded thousands of

trained airmen, who were in short supply. Each airplane required three three-man crews and seven maintenance men. By

the end of 1948, MATS had furnished the operation with no less

than 457 aircrews. Temporary duty assignments, originally set

at forty-five days, eventually stretched to six months, challenging the family lives of pilots surprised by the emergency. Eventually, an aircrew replacement training unit at Great Falls AFB,

Montana, provided substitutes . Maintenance, engineering, logistics, transportation, communication, weather, and other support

personnel far exceeded in number the men in the aircrews . To

reinforce the maintenance work force, Tunner employed German

aircraft mechanics. In June 1949, almost 11,500 USAF personnel were assigned or attached to the operation.

Between August 1948 and August 1949, Operation VITTLES

recorded hundreds of harassment incidents by Soviet forces,

including buzzing by fighters, antiaircraft firing and air-to-air

target shooting in the vicinity of the corridors, balloons in the

corridors, and searchlights directed at aircraft taking off. Yet

the Communists never seriously challenged the airlift. Remembering the failed German airlift to Stalingrad, Soviet officials might have assumed the operation would fail anyway .

They were also aware that the United States had deployed

some ninety SAC B-29 bombers to Europe during the crisis .

VITTLES was not only a combined but also a joint operation. Two U.S . Navy squadrons, flying R5D airplanes that were

virtually identical to the USAF C-54s, participated in the airlift. The U.S . Army transported supplies by rail and truck to

the airlift bases, constructed or repaired airfields, and supervised the loading and unloading of the VITTLES airplanes. The

Airways and Air Communications System provided radio and

telephone links among the bases and between the airfields

and the aircraft.

Publicity focused the world's attention on the airlift. First

Lt. Gail S. Halvorsen, USAF, inadvertently contributed to the

propaganda value of the airlift with "Operation LITTLE VITTLES,"

in which he and his fellow pilots dropped candy attached to tiny

handkerchief parachutes to the children of Berlin .
y 

ade of Berlin was not working and was generating publicity

contrary to Soviet interests. Operation VITTLES was uniting

Germans in the western zones of Germany and Berlin against

the Communists and in support of the West in this opening

round of the Cold War. At the height of the airlift, in early April

1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born,

uniting the powers of North America and Western Europe. Frustrated, the Soviets reopened the land routes between western

Germany and Berlin on May 12, 1949 . Tunner continued the

airlift through September 30 to stockpile fuel, food, and medicine in the city in case the Soviets changed their minds. The

Combined Airlift Task Force airlifted over 2 .3 million tons of

cargo on more than 277,000 flights during the Berlin Airlift. The

United States delivered more than 1 .78 million tons .

Of all the lessons the Berlin Airlift taught, the most important

was the need for larger cargo airplanes designed specifically for

airlift . The C-54s were more efficient than the small C-47s that

USAFE used when the airlift began, but even the Skyrnasters

were too limited in capacity for such an operation to continue

indefinitely at acceptable cost, and they were difficult to load

and unload. Airlift demanded specialized aircraft, preferably

with a giant door in the back or front and with landing gear that

allowed it to sit close to the ground so that cargo could be rolled

in and out. Larger transports would mean fewer trips, fewer

crews, fewer bases, less maintenance and fuel, and fewer communications and traffic problems . Operation VITI'LES, which

tested the C-74 Globemaster, C-97 Stratofreighter, and C-82

Packet, stimulated the development and production of the

C-124 Globemaster II cargo airplane, which revolutionized air

mobility in the 1950s. During the Berlin Airlift, Tunner convinced Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington to support

the acquisition of this twenty-five-ton-capacity airplane, which

could carry two and a half times the cargo of a Skymaster.

Operation VITTLES demonstrated the value of cycled reconditioning of aircraft. The systematic and methodical maintenance methods used during the Berlin Airlift contributed to

future military airlift operations and even to commercial aviation. The operation proved the value of an efficient depot and

logistics network ready to respond to emergencies .
Moving coal from a truck to a C-54 destined for Berlin .

The demands of the Berlin Airlift produced shortages of aircraft and personnel in other theaters. MATS had to curtail

airlift in the Pacific, the Caribbean, and Alaska. In all three

areas, no more than 60 percent of airlift requests could be

fulfilled in 1948. One lesson of Operation VITTLES was that

the U.S. Air Force needed enough aircraft and crews to respond to contingencies without substantially degrading its normal operations elsewhere.

The Berlin Airlift experience taught its participants the

need for reorganization . Sensing the prerequisite of centralized operational control of supporting elements, such as

ground handling units, the U.S. European Command established an Airlift Support Command in April 1949 . General

Tunner struggled with shortages of manpower, materiel, supplies, and housing, partly because of friction with the USAFE

leadership, which discouraged his direct communications

with MATS or Air Materiel Command. He also recognized

USAFE favoritism to occupation troops over rotating airlift

personnel and noted inefficiency at depots beyond his control.

After Secretary Symington visited Tunner in December 1948,
Air-mobility specialists noted the need for a single manager for

airlift, but the designation of one command for both strategic

and tactical airlift did not occur until 1974 .

The transportation of coal to Berlin challenged the airlift

more than the delivery of other commodities . Coal dust eroded

equipment and demoralized crews . General Tunner oversaw

the improvement of coal bags and the modification of aircraft

to combat the problem, but it remained a persistent headache.

At one point, Tunner discovered that coal sacks were being

loaded beyond the one hundred pounds for which they were

designed, resulting in overloading of the airplanes .

Operation VITTLES provided opportunities for the Air Force

to improve air traffic control and ground-controlled approach

techniques that benefited not only future military operations

but also commercial airlines . It also demonstrated the need for

improved materials-handling equipment, such as forklifts .

The Berlin Airlift cost in lives and property. Of the 126 U.S .

accidents recorded, 70 were major. At least twenty-four USAF

and British airplanes crashed, and more than thirty Americans, including twenty-two USAF pilots, lost their lives during

the operation. Experts determined that Operation VITTLES

cost the United States as much as $300 million .

It was worth the cost. Operation VITTLES achieved all of its

purposes and more . It satisfied the needs of more than two

million people, proving the ability of airlift to sustain a large

isolated population . It was the first victory in a forty-year Cold

War, demonstrating the resolve of the West in the face of the

first major Communist challenge and encouraging the formation of NATO. It proved the continued ability of the United

States and Great Britain to perform combined operations in

the post-World War II era . It protected the economic recovery

of Germany and planted the seeds for future unification as a

noncommunist nation . The Berlin Airlift revolutionized the

technology and methods of air power, proved the effectiveness

of airlift as an instrument of national policy, and blazed the

trail for hundreds of humanitarian airlifts around the world. It

convinced many that the U.S. Air Force could move anything

anywhere anytime. In terms of tonnage and sorties, Operation

VITTLES remains the greatest airlift operation in history.

1 0
DATES: July 14-October 24, 1958

LOCATION: Lebanon

OVERSEAS BASES: Adana (Incirlik) Air Base (AB), Turkey; Beirut

International Airport, Lebanon; Furstenfeldbruck Field, Erding Field,

Ramstein-Landstuhl AB, Rhein-Main AB, Germany; EvreauxFauville AB, France; Royal Air Force Sculthorpe, United Kingdom

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

Operation BLUE BAT

David A. Byrd

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT : B-57, F-100, RF-101, RB-66, WB-66,

F-86, T-33, C-130, C-124, C-119, C-54, C-131

Operations

In today's U.S . Air Force (USAF), the USAF Air Expeditionary Force (AEF), a tailored mix of airlift, reconnaissance, and

attack aircraft with a myriad of responsibilities and capabili

ties, is central to the service's capacity to meet the combat

aspect of its mission-the ability to attack anywhere, anytime.

But, the concept of deploying significant U.S.-based air forces

quickly is not new. Over forty years ago, the Air Force deployed

its Composite Air Strike Force (CASF), a progenitor to the AEF,

in response to the Lebanon Crisis . Featuring a wide range of

NUMBERED AIR FORCE: WINGS: (con't.)

Nineteenth Air Force 363d Tactical Reconnaissance

463d Troop Carrier

WINGS: 4505th Air Refueling

60th Troop Carrier

63d Troop Carrier AIR DIVISION :

86th Fighter-Interceptor 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo)

314th Troop Carrier

317th Troop Carrier SQUADRONS:

345th Tactical Bomb 498th Bomb

354th Tactical Fighter 7167th Air Transport
MEDITERRANEAN SEA

TURKEY

INCIRLIKAIR BASE* ~ADANA

BLUE BAT Area of USAF Operations

1 2

aircraft from a number of different units, the CASF met the

challenge of "anywhere, anytime."

Immediately following the Korean War, the United States

adopted a military strategy acknowledging the ascendancy of

the Cold War with the Soviet Union but also recognizing the

threat posed by lesser conflicts. The U.S . Air Force developed

the CASF as a flexible, mobile force, capable of meeting limited

threats conventionally or with tactical nuclear arms. In the

four years following the Korean War, the CASF command element, Headquarters Nineteenth Air Force, developed, implemented, and refined BLUE BLADE, the blueprint for CASF

operations . The Air Force implemented the concept when

trouble began brewing in the Middle East.
rebellion. Well-equipped but politically divided Moslem rebels

seized control of much of the country and demanded the re

moval of Camille Chamoun, the Christian president. Chamoun

refused to resign, and the situation stalemated for several

weeks . The overthrow of the Iraqi government on July 14

prompted President Chamoun, who feared the coup would

spur renewed action by rebels in Lebanon, to immediately request military aid from the United States, France, and Britain.

Lebanese rebels stated that they had no hostile intentions

against the United States, but the possibility of losing a proWestern ally to an anti-Western regime was not palatable to

U.S . policy makers . Several months before the unrest, the

United States had announced its willingness to support any

Middle Eastern government who requested aid against armed

aggression. Besides, U.S. military preparations for assistance

had begun as early as mid-May; consequently, response to

Chamoun's request was swift. On July 14, U.S . President

Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the U.S . Navy's Sixth Fleet to

land U.S. Marines at 3:00 P.M. local time the following day, thus

implementing BLUE BAT, the operational plan for Middle East

operations . The Air Force's involvement was divided into three

distinct actions : Composite Air Strike Force "Bravo" deployed

into Adana (present-day Incirlik) AB, Turkey. At the same time,

the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) airlifted U.S . Army troops

and supplies to Lebanon. Finally, the Military Air Transport

Service (MATS) deployed numerous aircraft from the United

States to Europe to assist in the USAFE airlift .

The first of three U.S. Marine landing teams startled lounging, bikini-clad vacationers when it arrived on Lebanon

beaches in the mid-afternoon hours of July 15. Within hours,

they had assumed control of the Beirut International Airport

and moved into the city itself early the next day. The marines

encountered no resistance .

Before the marines waded ashore, the Air Force was ordering its units into action . C-124s from the MATS 63d Troop

Carrier Wing (TCW) at Donaldson AFB, South Carolina, began

flying out late on the evening of July 14 . Twenty-six were in

place at Rhein-Main AB, Germany, by July 16, and another

ten from Donaldson arrived the following day. In addition to

1 3
USAF Troop Carrier C-54, typical of the C-54s used during Operation BLUE BAT.

the thirty-six aircraft en route, USAFE used eight MATS C-124s

from the 63d TCW already on temporary duty to Europe. As

the aircraft arrived in Germany, they were integrated into the

322d Air Division (AD), USAFE's combat cargo unit responsible for airlift.

On July 15, some C-124s, along with thirty-two C-130s from

the 317th TCW, and nineteen C-1 19s from the 60th TCW-both

wings assigned to the 322d AD-converged on Furstenfeld

bruck and Erding Fields in Germany. The following day, the

aircraft began moving the U.S. Army's "Task Force Alpha,"

consisting of 1,749 paratroopers and associated equipment, from

there to Adana, Turkey. Although air sovereignty and landing

rights issues with Austria and Greece complicated the

seventy-two-sortie movement, Alpha was in Turkey ready

for deployment by July 17. After a daylong delay caused by

congestion at the airport in Beirut, Task Force Alpha arrived

in Lebanon on July 19 . While Task Force Bravo remained on

twenty-four-hour alert in Germany, Task Force Charliemade up primarily of support personnel-followed closely

1 4
this unit in Turkey, although some aircraft made it through

on July 19 . These transports flew from Turkey to Lebanon the

following day, and other 322d AD aircraft completed the movement of Charlie directly from Germany to Lebanon by July 26 .

All together in the 12-day period, aircraft under the control of

the 322d AD flew 418 accident-free sorties and airlifted over 8

million pounds of troops and cargo.

The diverse mix of aircraft and units, the logistical difficulties

associated with arranging and implementing airlift and aerial

refueling, and the last-minute nature of the situation combined

to make the, deployment of the CASF the most challenging aspect of USAF operations in the Lebanon Crisis. Despite pending

inactivation because of the ongoing phaseout of B-57Bs, the

345th Tactical Bombardment Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia,

deployed one of its twelve-aircraft squadrons to Adana on July

15. It was the first U.S.-based tactical unit to depart. The first

ten B-57s, assigned to the 498th Bomb Squadron, were in place

by July 17; the final two arrived the next day.

Although originally not part of the CASF plan, nor the first

aircraft to leave the United States, F-100s from the 354th

Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) were the first to arrive in Turkey.

Of the initial twelve-ship package launched in the mid-afternoon

of July 15, four arrived in Turkey around noon local time on

July 16, twelve and one-half hours after takeoff from Myrtle

Beach AFB, South Carolina . Air aborts and other logistical

problems prevented all but three of the initial package from

making it to Adana; aircraft from the second and third

launches brought the total number of F-100s in Turkey to

twenty-six. More would arrive in the weeks that followed .

The CASF also included RF-101s, RB-66s, and WB-66Ds

from the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Shaw

AFB, South Carolina. As with the 354th TFW, air aborts

proved a problem for this package . Twelve RF-101s launched

from Shaw, but five returned to base due to mechanical problems. The RB-66s had their problems as well, to include the loss

of one aircraft 325 miles southeast of Lajes . Rescuers subsequently picked up the pilot and navigator 'but could not find

the gunner. Despite the troubles, the whole reconnaissance

force was in place by July 20.

1 5
The first RB-66 aircraft made. An aircraft like this was lost 325 miles

southeast of Lajes where the pilot and navigator were rescued, but the gunner

was never found.

The 463d and 314th Troop Carrier Wings provided most of

the CASF airlift. Twenty-four C-130s from the 314th and

nineteen from the 463d transported material and personnel

ranging from the Nineteenth Air Force (command element for

CASF) to support equipment and troops from Shaw, Langley,

and Myrtle Beach AFBs . The short notice given the airlift

wings caused some problems for the 314th. Some aircraft,

positioned at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and Stewart AFB,

New York, to perform other missions, deployed from those

locations without all the required equipment . The C-130s returned to the United States after the initial airlift.

While airlift was generally satisfactory, problems during the

deployment phase of CASF Bravo included inadequate planning, experience, and supplies. Most significant, however, was

unsatisfactory air-to-air refueling availability and procedures. A

lack of spares to replace aborted 4505th Air Refueling Wing

KB-50s at the first refueling location left several of the 354th's

F-100s short of fuel, and three were forced to abort to Greenwood

1 6
fuel starvation compounded by inclement weather; the pilot

ejected safely. In addition to the aborts, the KB-50s carried

reduced loads because runway repair at Langley prevented

takeoff with full loads . Inclement weather, a refueling unit not

qualified for night air refueling procedures, and aborts all contributed to a shortage of tankers at the second air-to-air refueling area near Lajes Field, Azores, and at the final refueling

area over Europe .

Despite the difficulties, all CASF forces were in place at Adana

on July 20 . The fifty-five combat aircraft force included twentysix F-100s, twelve B-57s, seven RF-101s, seven RB-66s, and

three W13-66s . Nine F-86s from the 86th Fighter-Interceptor

Wing (Ramstein AB, Germany)-technically not part of the

CASF-provided air defense for the base . About 1,100 personnel also deployed . Four KB-50s of the 429th Air Reconnaissance Squadron deployed to Adana on July 21 as a last-minute

addition in case air-to-air refueling was needed . They remained on one-hour alert throughout much of the deployment

with aircrews initially sleeping under their airplanes .

Adm. James L. Holloway, USN, Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East, oversaw U.S . military operations

during the Lebanon Crisis. Elements of the Sixth Fleet, U.S.

Army and Marine units, and the CASF and associated air

units comprised American forces. Maj . Gen . Henry Viccellio,

USAF, Commander of Nineteenth Air Force and of the CASF,

also served as the Commander, U.S . Air Forces, and directed

all USAF air operations.

Thanks to diminishing tensions in the area after the arrival

of U.S . forces, the United States did not engage in combat

during the Lebanon Crisis . Air employment operations consisted of mass fly-overs of Lebanon, reconnaissance, air defense, and a leaflet drop. In addition, the Air Force supported

British troops in Jordan with an airlift.

The first CASF flights began on July 18 when six 354th TFW

F-100s flew their initial combat sorties . From then until their

departure on October 19, the F-100s flew a total of 874 sorties .

Missions included combat air patrols, scrambles, and training.

Operations were generally uneventful, although aircraft suffered

1 7
Composite Air Strike Force KB-50 tanker refueling F-100, F-101, and R13-66, all

accompanied by two C-1 30s.

from a chronic lack of supplies and experienced a pair of

landing accidents at Adana.

While the Super Sabres patrolled the skies during the day,

USAFE F-86s provided air defense for the base after sunset. Their

506 sorties also provided training opportunities for the aircrews .

Occasionally the F-86s augmented the F-100s during daytime

operations or stood in for them during inclement weather.

The B-57s also began operations on July 18. Through the

end of the deployment, they flew day and night visual reconnaissance, various training sorties, and other missions. Ten

B-57s participated in show-of-force formations on July 23, 26,

and 29. Maintenance crews of the often-balky aircraft maintained

a surprisingly high in-commission rate of 87 percent during the

deployment. One B-57 suffered small-arms fire damage, probably from a .30-caliber rifle .

The reconnaissance package of the 363d TRW bore the

heaviest load during the CASF Bravo deployment, primarily in

support of U.S. Army requests. Flights began July 21 and

1 8
sions . The package performed adequately, although the RB-66

aircraft, which had to be flown low and slow to perform its

mission adequately, received small-arms ground fire on numerous occasions. No one was hurt, and damage was minimal.

Seven Air Force C-124s and 13 C-130s airlifted 247 tons of

fuel to Jordan from Beirut during July 17-26 . The airlift supported thirty-five British troops in that country performing much

the same mission as U.S. forces in Lebanon. On July 24, more

transports began carrying supplies to the British contingent, an

airlift that lasted until August 10. Altogether, both airlift operations moved 2,277 tons of cargo into Jordan's capital.

In the last major deployment action of the crisis, 322d AD

aircraft transported Task Force Delta (4,411 support personnel,

including an Honest John missile battery) and Task Force Echo

(668-man artillery unit) during the first two weeks of August,

flying directly out of Germany to Beirut. When this phase of

airlift was completed, the 322d AD had flown 13,997 hours

without incident, airlifting over 8,200 tons .

Psychological warfare operations in Lebanon took the form of

a leaflet drop July 21 . Two escorted USAF C-130s dropped one

million leaflets over the populated areas of Lebanon explaining

the role of the United States in the country. In the end, the

Lebanese people generally approved of American presence . One

could argue that the pro-American leaflets helped; just as likely,

however, was the stability the U.S . forces provided and the improved business climate that resulted .

The arrival of the Americans prompted intense political activity by the various Lebanese factions to solve the country's internal problems without bloodshed. Gen . Fouad Chehab, head of

the Lebanese army, was elected to replace President Chamoun

on July 31 . Leading rebels as well as those in the government

found him acceptable. By mid-August, the situation warranted

the withdrawal of one Marine battalion. The WB-66s-generally

not needed thanks to mostly clear weather during the deployment-departed in late August, followed by eight F-100s on

September 4 and eight more on September 13 . Chehab assumed

governmental control on September 23, and remaining U.S.

forces left Lebanon and Turkey in various stages over the next

thirty days .

1 9
withdrawal of U.S . Army units on October 18 . Heavy equipment

went first, then personnel. C-130s and C-124s flew seventy-seven

sorties in this phase of the redeployment. Altogether, the division airlifted 2,579 passengers and over 1,100 tons of freight

without incident or accident. The operation ended October 28.

Operation SUNDANCE, the redeployment of the Composite Air

Strike Force, began the day after USAFE . started airlifting the

U.S. Army out of Lebanon. The bulk of CASF aircraft, to include

six F-100s and the remaining B-57s and RF-101s, departed

Adana on October 19 . USAFE F-86s followed them two days

later. Twelve F-100s of the 353d Fighter Squadron stayed behind as part of a temporary rotational squadron. The air, land,

and naval headquarters officially inactivated October 24, bringing BLUE BAT and USAF involvement in the Lebanon Crisis

officially to an end.

The U.S. military establishment learned a number of lessons

from its three-month action in Lebanon . In a February 1959

memo to the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (JCS) cited five lessons learned, two of which directly

reflected problems the Air Force experienced during its operations. First, the JCS wrote that the early determination of

overflight and staging rights hampered the USAF response .

During the crisis, Greece, Israel, and Austria imposed restrictions that negatively affected initial airlift of ground forces and

deployment of the CASF. During the airlift to Jordan, Saudi

Arabia's restrictions forced the Air Force to airlift fuel from

Beirut rather than Bahrain . Second, inadequate facilities seriously constrained operations, particularly during the early

days of the operation. Although Adana was the best base

available to meet the demands of the Lebanon Crisis, it was in

fact inadequate in terms of size and prepositioned supplies.

Additionally, the United States failed to notify Turkey of plans to

use Adana ; subsequently, the Turks began to apply strict controls on U.S . military activities in that country. Poor planning

also negatively impacted USAF reaction to the crisis. For example, MATS was originally cast to provide CASF airlift, not

Tactical Air Command's (TAC) own C-130 units . More significantly, the TAC F-100 unit that eventually deployed was not

scheduled to go-the 354th TFW, which had just received a

20
832d AD with only a few hours notice. Although CASF crews

were fully qualified for the delivery of nuclear weapons, the

F-100 pilots had not shot rockets nor dropped conventional

bombs. Only a few had strafing experience. Similarly, the B-57

crews lacked experience in conventional weapons delivery.

Despite the difficulties associated with Operation BLUE BAT,

a number of positive results came from the deployment .

Changes were made to later iterations of the CASF planning

document to answer shortcomings . In addition, the Lebanon

Crisis, as well as later emergency deployments of the late 1950s

and early 1960s, led to the establishment of PRIME BEEF (Base

Engineer Emergency Force) teams. PRIME BEEF's mission of

providing force beddown and other essential civil engineer services marked an evolution in Air Force support doctrine that

continues today.

In the end, the USAF response to the Lebanon Crisis proved to

be a victory on a number of fronts, and its consequences continue today. Air power played a predominant role in furthering

U.S. political aims, and the Lebanese government did not fall.

Just as significantly, the Air Force proved it could deploy a large

force quickly in response to a limited threat. Although the deployment revealed a number of flaws, the service implemented

corrective actions that resulted in a force more capable of reacting to similar situations in the future. The lessons learned have

been continually refined over the last forty years. The CASF and

its descendants have evolved into today's Air Expeditionary

Force. Like the CASF, the AEF draws its resources mostly from

units based in the United States and deploys them overseas to

meet current contingencies as quickly as possible.

Operation NEW TAPE

Daniel L. Haulman

DATES: July 8, 1960-June 30, 1964

LOCATION: Democratic Republic of the Congo

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Accra, Ghana; Addis Ababa (Harar Meda

Airport), Ethiopia; Albertville, Coquilhatville, Elizabethville, Goma,

Kamina, Kindu, Leopoldville (N'Djila Airport), Libenge, Luluabourg,

Pointe Noire, Stanleyville, the Congo ; Amman, Jordan ; Asmara,

Ethiopia; Bonn, Cologne, Rhein-Main AB, Stuttgart, Germany;

Bordeaux, Evreux-Fauville AB, Chateauroux Air Station (AS), France;

Brazzaville, Congo-Brazzaville; Brussels, Belgium; Cairo, Egypt (United

Arab Republic); Clark Air Base (AB), Philippines ; Conakry, Guinea;

Copenhagen (Vaerlose Airfield), Denmark; Dakar, Senegal (Mali

Federation) ; Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika; Dhahran, Saudi Arabia;

Diredawa, Ethiopia; Djakarta, Indonesia; Dublin, Ireland; Entebbe,

Uganda; Freetown, Sierra Leone; Garoua, Cameroon; Harmon, Malmo,

Stockholm (Arlana Airport), Sweden; Kano, Lagos, Nigeria; Karachi,

Pakistan; Khartoum, Sudan; Kuala Lumpur, Malaya; Lome, Togo;

Luanda, Angola; Mildenhall, Prestwick, United Kingdom; Monrovia

(Roberts Field), Liberia; Nairobi, Kenya; Bombay, New Delhi, Jamnager

AB, India; Oslo, Norway; Pisa, Italy; Salisbury, Rhodesia; Sidi Slimane

AB, Morocco; Tehran, Iran; Trenton, Ontario, Canada; Tunis (El Aouina

Airfield), Tunisia; Vienna, Austria; Wheelus AB, Libya

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

23

DIVISION: WINGS: (cont.)

322d Air (USAFE) (later, MATS) 1602d Air Transport

1607th Air Transport

AIR FORCES: 1608th Air Transport

Eastern Transport Air Force (MATS) 1611 th Air Transport

Western Transport Air Force (MATS) MATS Air Transport Wing, Provisional (Europe)

WINGS: SQUADRONS:

62d Troop Carrier MATS Air Transport Squadron, Provisional (Europe-1)

63d Troop Carrier MATS Air Transport Squadron, Provisional (Europe-2)

317th Troop Carrier MATS Air Transport Squadron, Provisional (Europe-3)

464th Troop Carrier MATS Air Transport Squadron, Provisional (Europe-4)

1501 st Air Transport
C121, C54

Operations

Independence brought chaos to the Congo. Within days after

Belgium granted the country independence on June 30, 1960,

various factions within the new nation began fighting among

themselves. As early as July 5, elements of the Congolese army

mutinied, demanding promotions, pay raises, and the removal

of Belgian officers . Various tribes across the country demanded

independence for their provinces. The breakdown of law and

order led to riots and looting in the cities . Mobs threatened

Europeans, who began a mass exodus from the country. To

protect those who remained, Belgium reinforced a 2,500-man

garrison it had left, by treaty, in the Congo.

On July 11, Moise Tshombe declared Katanga Province independent and asked for Belgian military support. The Congolese

government, headed by President Joseph Kasavubu and Premier

Patrice Lumumba, appealed to the United Nations (UN) to send

troops to replace those of Belgium. They threatened to turn to

the Soviet Union if the UN failed to do so . On July 14, two days

after the request, the UN Security Council resolved to airlift

peacekeeping troops to the Congo . None of these troops would

come from any of the five permanent members of the Security

Council, which included the United States and Soviet Union.

Since July 8, the U.S . Air Force (USAF) was already evacuating Americans and airlifting desperately needed food to the

Congo in an operation called SAFARI. U.S . President Dwight

D. Eisenhower agreed to airlift most of the UN troops as well,

and the operation was renamed NEW TAPE . The operation

would last four years, rotating troops between their countries

and the Congo, delivering food to where it was most needed,

and evacuating refugees.

The 322d Air Division of the U.S . Air Forces in Europe

(USAFE), then under command of Col. Tarleton H. Watkins,

USAF, operationally controlled military transports in Europe

and Africa . Three C-130 Hercules squadrons at Evreux-Fauville

AB in France and Military Air Transport Service (MATS) C-124

Globemaster Its at Chateauroux AS, France, were available for

the initial phases of Operation NEW TAPE. The division set up

24
the movements of C-130s south of the Sahara Desert. Lt. Col.

Francis E. Merritt, USAF, commanded the support unit at

Leopoldville, capital of the Congo. At the same time, MATS set

up Movement Control Teams at various bases around Africa to

coordinate the movements and maintain intratheater C-124s .

Col. Paul C. Steinle, USAF, commanded the most important team,

at Brazzaville, just across the Congo River from Leopoldville.

On July 18, MATS set up a provisional wing alongside the

1602d Air Transport Wing at Chateauroux to support Operation NEW TAPE . The provisional wing, which initially em

braced four C-124 air transport and two maintenance squadrons, served under Col. Marshall H. Strickler, USAF, until

July 25 . Then Col . William H. Schwartz Jr., USAF, Commander, 1602d Air Transport Wing, assumed command of the

provisional organization as well.

Some of the Operation NEW TAPE flights were especially

memorable . In one four-day operation in 1960, C-124s from

Chateauroux picked up Moroccan troops at Sidi Slimane in

North Africa, refueled at Dakar on the west African coast, and

stopped at Accra, Ghana. After twenty-seven hours of duty,

the crew rested for twelve hours. The Globemasters continued

on to Leopoldville, where they unloaded, refueled, and underwent routine maintenance checks . The crews stopped at Dakar

for rest on the way back. By the time the airplanes returned to

Chateauroux, they had covered 11,200 miles . Another mission

from Chateauroux landed in Egypt to load Swedish troops,

who had been patrolling the Gaza strip on the border with

Israel, and carried them via Wheelus AB, Libya, and Kano,

Nigeria, to Leopoldville . That round-trip covered 11,720 miles.

It compared in distance to forty-four Berlin Airlift flights, or

twenty-two World War II "Hump" missions .

Crews faced many dangers on these missions, not the least

of which was flying for hundreds of miles over the world's

largest desert. They were not necessarily safe when they

landed in the Congo. At Stanleyville on August 27, 1960, Congolese soldiers pulled a C-124 crew off their airplane and

severely beat them, apparently mistaking them for Belgians.

Despite these challenges, USAF aircraft airlifted 20,000 passengers, including refugees and more than 16,000 troops,

25
LEOPOLDVILLE

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

OFTHECONGO

Operation NEW TAPE Routes

Inset: Democratic Republic of the Congo

during the first 3 months of Operation NEW TAPE. They also

transported more than 3,300 tons of cargo, including UN military equipment and over 1,100 tons of food . After September

1960, the number of C-130 and C-124 airplanes needed in

Africa declined . The MATS provisional wing based at Chateauroux disappeared, and only one provisional air transport and

one provisional maintenance squadron remained alongside

the 1602d Air Transport Wing .

26
equipment to the Congo . In December, 5 C-130s and 6 C-124s

carried 112 Austrian medical personnel and 122 tons of medical

equipment and supplies from Vienna via Libya, Nigeria, and

Uganda to Goma in the Congo . The flights took sixteen hours .

Operation NEW TAPE fluctuated with events in the Congo .

In September 1960, President Kasavubu and Premier Lumumba fired each other, and Col. Joseph Mobutu, Congolese

army chief of staff, took over the government. Tshombe continued to fight for the independence of Katanga Province, and

Albert Kalonji led a new secession movement in Kasai Province . After the assassination of Lumumba in February 1961,

the UN Security Council voted to use force to end the Congolese civil war and prevent the secession of two valuable provinces . The United States airlifted more troops from around the

world to the Congo . In June, the United Nations convened a

new Congolese Parliament, and Kasavubu was renamed president, with Cyrille Adoula as new premier.

In September 1961, MATS gained operational control of the

C-124s that had served USAFE's 322d Air Division while in

Africa. After September 21, NEW TAPE missions became

MATS special assignment airlift missions. UN Secretary General

Dag Hammarskjold was killed in an aircraft crash, and his

successor, U Thant of Burma, pursued a UN war in the Congo,

attempting to establish stable political institutions while at the

same time suppressing secession in Katanga and Kasai. Assisted by a predominantly American airlift of UN forces from

countries around the world, he achieved some degree of success . Most of the troops came from Ethiopia, Ireland, Tunisia,

Sweden, Nigeria, Morocco, India, Liberia, and Ghana. In December, MATS discontinued its provisional air transport and

maintenance squadrons at Chateauroux, but the 1602d Air

Transport Wing remained there with C-124 squadrons .

On January 8, 1962, France withdrew its support of the UN

Congo operation; consequently, the Air Force could no longer

fly from Chateauroux and Evreux-Fauville to Africa. Portugal

followed France's example and also denied overflight clearances for aircraft on UN Congo missions . Thus, USAF flights

from Britain, Germany, or Scandinavia followed new routes

27
staging base on the way to the Congo .

In October 1962, the USAF used jet-powered C-135s for the

first time in the Congo operation. The faster Stratolifters were

more comfortable and required fewer stops than their propellerdriven predecessors . They carried Swedish troops from Stockholm to the Congo, stopping only for fuel at Wheelus AB and

flying over Kano, Nigeria, on the way.

During the second half of 1962, rotations of UN troops from

other nations to central Africa continued, but more and more

airlift missions were needed within the Congo, as UN forces drove

into secessionist Katanga Province . By 1963, MATS C-124 airplanes shuttled troops within the Congo, while C-135 Stratolifters moved them among the scores of nations from which

they came. Eventually, the C-135s carried more UN troops from

the Congo to their native lands than the other way around. By

1964, NEW TAPE was tapering off. The 322d Air Division transferred from USAFE to MATS and moved to Chateauroux, and

MATS officials discontinued the 1602d Air Transport Wing.

A crisis in Cyprus between Turks and Greeks demanded the

diversion of UN troops from central Africa to the Mediterranean, and by June 30, 1964, UN forces were out of the

Congo . MATS continued to serve Leopoldville with a channel

route from Charleston AFB, South Carolina .

C-130s at Wheelus AB, Libya, during Operation NEW TAPE.

28
from the NEW TAPE airlift experience . The Congo emergency

was a surprise, and the Air Force was not fully prepared for

the operation . In October 1960, MATS published a revised

mobility manual recommending Quick Reaction Forces with

equipment for rapid deployments. The forces would precede

the main airlift force. to a crisis area and arrange base support, schedule aircraft movements, and note suitability of airfields. NEWTAPE taught the Air Force to expect contingencies

in all parts of the world and to prepare for operations in

regions lacking modern facilities or equipment.

Operation NEW TAPE was the beginning of the end for the

C-124 Globemaster Ils, and the end of the beginning for new jet

cargo airplanes, such as the C-135 Stratolifter . Globemaster Its

were not suitable for many of the African airfields because they

needed long and strong runways that were not always available.

The piston engines of the C-124s operated poorly at airfields at

high elevation, such as those in Ethiopia, or with high temperatures, such as those in the Sahara Desert. Slower and more costly

to operate than the turboprop C-130s, the C-124s were also more

particular about the fuel they drank.

In many ways, NEW TAPE was a much more demanding

operation than the Berlin Airlift. For one thing, the distances

USAF crew members dine on a Congo airstrip .

29
Desert and the scarcity of adequate airfields in sub-Saharan

Africa made extremely long flights necessary. From Evreux to

Cairo, Egypt, was 1,765 miles. Tunis, Tunisia, to Kano, Nigeria, was 1,498 miles. The trip from Wheelus AB, Libya, to

Kano required seven flying hours . An aircrew took 6 hours to

fly the 1,200 miles between Kano and Brazzaville .

This operation was more demanding than the Berlin Airlift

in other ways, as well. Many of the African airfields lacked the

communication and navigational facilities that were common

in Europe. Runways were often short or weak, and there was

a shortage of ramp space, maintenance facilities, and materials-handling equipment such as forklifts . At some of the airfields, refueling equipment was nonexistent, and personnel

had to manually pump fuel from fifty-five-gallon drums. To

solve such problems, USAFE and MATS set up field maintenance teams at many locations in central Africa . Three

C-124s shuttled among airfields with spare engines, propellers, and other parts, and after about a month of operations,

there were thirteen repair kits in the theater. Quality maintenance contributed to a very low accident rate.

Shortages of personnel plagued Operation NEW TAPE . At

Leopoldville, there were only twenty-five aerial port men,

where almost four times as many were needed . During the

first phases of the operation, twelve-hour workdays and

seven-day workweeks were common. Resultant fatigue threatened morale and safety.

Hostile fire challenged some of the airlift flights over the

Congo . In December 1961, some transports were hit by smallarms fire . MATS responded by temporarily suspending flights

to the zone where the incidents occurred and by acquiring

fighter escorts for a time. Future airlifts into hostile zones

would face similar challenges .

Navigation and communication were problem areas . Air

Force personnel originally lacked the maps and charts they

needed to carry out flights to various sub-Saharan airfields .

Absence of radio signals and landmarks over much of the

African landscape forced crews to rely on celestial navigation,

and even that was difficult in areas of dust storms . Weather

information had to come from a Strategic Air Command base

30
necessary information. At first, the 322d Air Division and

MATS lost track of some aircraft after they crossed the Sahara

Desert because of the absence of radio communication facilities . The Air Force had to establish new radio and Teletype

stations in Africa to alleviate the problem.

Command and control for Operation NEW TAPE was initially confused. At Brazzaville, Colonel Steinle was at first

unaware that the airlift had expanded from food deliveries and

refugee evacuations to airlift of UN troops, that MATS was

augmenting the number of C-124s in Europe and Africa, and

that the 322d Air Division of USAFE had operational control of

his airplanes. Airplanes landing at Leopoldville or Brazzaville

were often diverted from their flight schedules to carry out

emergency refugee evacuations at the request of Clare H. Timberlake, U.S . ambassador to the Congo .

There was also a language problem, because air traffic controllers in the Congo initially could not communicate in both

French and English . Troops from more than thirty countries

eventually rode aboard USAF transports in Operation NEW

TAPE, and many of them could not talk with each other or

with the aircrews that were transporting them. Some of the

cargo was mislabeled or was labeled in metric quantities with

which all participants were not familiar.

Sanitation became a persistent problem with passengers

who had never flown before or who had never seen an aircraft

latrine . Ground personnel had to disinfect the planes rou

tinely. Because of insects, aircraft had to be fumigated on a

regular basis . Many nations required aircrews to show proof of

immunization against seven dangerous diseases common in

equatorial Africa and quarantined those who could not show

such proof. This led to some flight delays . Despite precautions, MATS crews suffered eleven cases of malaria .

Unlike the machine-like Berlin Airlift, Operation NEW TAPE

suffered irregularity because there were no steady cargo flows

to Chateauroux or Evreux-Fauville. Some staging bases ran

out of aircraft fuel, and rerouting was necessary. Field units in

Africa, such as the Combat Airlift Support Units and Movement

Control Teams, enjoyed the financial support of the U.S . Department of State but often lacked adequate billeting or messing

3 1
lenged people on the ground .

French and Portuguese denial of overflight clearances for

Congo airlift missions early in 1962 encouraged the United

States to develop longer-range and faster cargo airplanes and

to consider aerial refueling for large transports to accommodate longer flights . Congress pressed for development of the

C-141 Starlifter as a replacement for the C-124.

Operation NEW TAPE, the largest USAF airlift since the Berlin

Airlift of 1948-49, covered much greater distances and carried

more tons per aircraft. The monumental operation proceeded

under three American presidents: Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy,

and Lyndon B . Johnson . It supported the largest deployment of

UN troops since the Korean War. In duration and in ton-miles,

Operation NEW TAPE surpassed even the vaunted Berlin Airlift.

MATS alone moved 63,899 passengers and 18,806 tons of cargo

among at least 24 nations in the 4 years between July 1960 and

June 1964. By the end of 1962, USAFE's 322d Air Division and

MATS together had already moved more than 94,000 passengers

and over 21,000 tons of cargo on NEW TAPE missions . By 1964,

eight kinds of airplanes had taken part, including giant C-133s

and jet C-135s. No previous airlift had transported troops from

so many nations over such long distances . American transports

shuttled troops, refugees, and food among more than sixty different airfields .

Operation NEW TAPE allowed the United Nations to achieve

many goals in the Congo, including preserving the country's

unity, preventing a return to Belgian colonial rule, avoiding a

Cold War confrontation in central Africa by preventing a unilateral Soviet intervention, and bringing some law and order in

place of anarchy and chaos . The operation also prevented mass

starvation by delivering thousands of tons of food, prevented

genocide by evacuating thousands of refugees, and preserved

international access to key raw materials, such as uranium,

cobalt, and copper. The United States and other western nations depended on some of these for national defense . For both

strategic and humanitarian reasons, Operation NEW TAPE

succeeded, paving the way for other such operations in the future .

32
Missile Crisis

Edward T. Russell

DATES: October 13-November 15, 1962

LOCATION: Cuba

OVERSEAS BASE USED : Guantanamo Naval Air Station, Cuba

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS :

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-124, C-133, C-135, RB-47, RF-101, U-2

Operations

Early in 1962, the Premier of the Soviet Union, Nikita S .

Khrushchev, could not match the United States in nuclear

weapons or strategic delivery systems nor push the western

nations out of Berlin. In the east, the Chinese constantly harassed him concerning Soviet weakness. In his frustration and

frantic search for an opportunity to alter the strategic imbalance, he turned to Cuba . In 1959, Fidel Castro had overthrown the dictator, Fulgencio Batista, and assumed power.

Initially promising free elections, he soon instituted a socialist

dictatorship . Hundreds of thousands of Cubans fled their island, many coming to the United States . From his rhetoric

and actions, Castro proved he was a Communist. Consequently, in late 1960, the President of the United States,

Dwight D. Eisenhower, authorized the Central Intelligence

Agency to plan an invasion of Cuba using Cuban exiles as

troops . Ultimately, Eisenhower hoped that in conjunction with

the invasion, the Cuban people would overthrow Castro and

install a moderate, pro-U.S . government. Eisenhower's second

term ended before the plan could be implemented . The new

33

MAJOR COMMANDS: WINGS:

Strategic Air Command 55th Strategic Reconnaissance

Tactical Air Command 62d Troop Carrier

Military Air Transport Service 363d Tactical Reconnaissance

Continental Air Defense Command 1501 st Air Transport Wing (Heavy)

Air Force Reserve 4080th Strategic
p

aggressive than his predecessor, ordered the invasion to proceed . In mid-April 1961, the Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of

Pigs and suffered a crushing defeat. Not only did the Cuban

people not rise to help them, but Castro's forces killed some

200 and captured close to 1,200 invaders .

Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Khrushchev increased Soviet aid, including military supplies to Cuba. In August 1962,

the Soviet Union, with Cuban cooperation, began to build

intermediate-range (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missile

(MRBM) sites on the island . The American intelligence community, suspicious of the construction on the island, needed

tangible proof and called for photographic reconnaissance . On

October 11, 1962, Headquarters Strategic Air Command (SAC)

notified the 4080th Strategic Wing at Laughlin Air Force Base

(AFB), Texas, to "freeze" two officers, Maj . Richard S. Heyser

and Maj. Rudolf Anderson Jr., for a special project. They reported to Edwards AFB, California, where they received orders

to conduct strategic reconnaissance flights over Cuba. On October 13, Major Anderson deployed to McCoy AFB, Florida, to

join a U-2 aircraft ferried in for the special mission. Meantime,

Major Heyser launched from Edwards AFB in a U-2 equipped

to photograph suspect sites on the island . He arrived over the

island during daylight on October 14 . The next day, Major

Anderson made his flight from McCoy. Photographs obtained

on these flights confirmed that Soviet/Cuban crews had

launch pads under construction that, when completed, could

fire nuclear-armed IRBMs with a range of approximately 5,000

miles and MRBMs with a range of approximately 3,000 miles .

While the U-2s flew high-altitude reconnaissance missions,

the staff of the 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Shaw

AFB, South Carolina, made aware of the potential need for

low-level flights over Cuba, began planning such flights and

preparing target folders . On October 21, Tactical Air Command (TAC) ordered the 363d to deploy to MacDill AFB, Florida . The wing began immediately to move RF-101 and RB-66

aircraft, personnel, and photographic equipment to Florida.

By the next morning, the aircraft were at MacDill, cameras

cocked, ready to carry out any reconnaissance missions .

While aircrews went on alert, support personnel expanded the

34
GUANAJAY

IRBM SITES HAVANA SAGUA LA GRANDE

SAN CRISTOBAL " M~' _IMRBM'SITES

MR _t " REMEDIOS IRBM SITES

Area of USAF Operations in Cuban Missile Crisis

base photo-laboratory facilities and installed photo vans and

darkrooms . Because of a shortage of adequate facilities, aircrews and other airmen occupied temporary, inadequate,

wooden barracks that hampered crew rest . After trying offbase housing, the aircrews moved to permanent airmen's

quarters on the base for the remainder of the deployment.

On October 26, the wing launched the first flight of two

low-level reconnaissance aircraft. For the next three weeks, wing

aircraft, by photographic and visual reconnaissance, gathered

vital data, including prestrike intelligence, air-surveillance

verification of Cuban buildup, and subsequent dismantling

of the IRBM and MRBM sites and Soviet IL-28 aircraft. Because of the possibility of alternate sites and concealed storage facilities, the wing initiated intensive low-level aerial

search efforts . Other flights returned with highly significant

35
Photo taken by RF-101 of ground-to-ground missile base in Cuba, November 1962.

photographs of missiles and related equipment on docks at

Cuban ports, the loading of Soviet freighters, and the deck

cargo of Soviet ships entering and leaving Cuban ports. Consequently, the President of the United States was constantly

aware of Soviet actions regarding the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba.

Analysis of the 363d photographs provided a wide range of

essential intelligence concerning Cuba. Frequent sorties over

major Cuban airfields provided daily information on the

number, type, and specific location of Cuban aircraft. Photos

also revealed the number and location of assembled, partially

assembled, or unassembled IL-28 Soviet twin-engine tactical

bombers with a range of 1,500 miles. This information was vital

to establish immediate air superiority if strike forces went into

action . On one of these missions, the 363d discovered the first

evidence of the existence of infrared homing air-to-air missiles

(Soviet AA-2s) . Surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites proved to be

prime targets for low-level reconnaissance missions. The wing

36
equipment, military encampments, cruise-missile sites, and

possible landing beaches .

SAC ordered continual U-2 reconnaissance flights over

Cuba, and at the same time, in order to make room for fighter

aircraft, ordered the deployment of medium and heavy bombers and tanker aircraft from MacDill, McCoy, and Homestead

AFBs in Florida. Meanwhile, TAC began deploying F-84,

F-100, F-105, RB-66, and KB-50 aircraft to bases in Florida,

while Continental Air Defense Command (GONAD) began flying missions to protect bases in the southeastern United

States . SAC, alerted to the possibility of war with the Soviet

Union, dispersed nuclear-armed B-47 aircraft to approximately forty airfields in the United States and kept numerous

B-52 heavy bombers in the air and ready to strike . In addition, all available intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)

stood ready for a launch countdown. These included the first

ten solid-fueled Minuteman I ICBMs, which became operational on October 27 .

While TAC continued to deploy fighter aircraft to MacDill,

McCoy, and Homestead AFBs, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) not only flew bombs and ammunition into bases

in the southeast but also responded to airlift requests from

the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. On October 20, 1962, for

instance, the Joint Chiefs directed the Air Force to move

nearly 2,000 marines and 1,400 tons of equipment to the U. S.

Naval Air Station at Guantanamo, Cuba. Air Force C-124s,

C-133s, and C-135s completed this task in two days .

In the midst of these preparations, President Kennedy and

his advisors debated the sanest course of action. The President outlined the general goals : remove all Soviet missiles

from Cuba, avoid a nuclear war, prepare for Soviet countermoves in Berlin, and preserve national honor. He formed an

executive committee, which included the Attorney General

Robert F. Kennedy, to give him advice . The committee examined several options such as launching a nuclear attack

against the missile sites, launching a conventional strike

against the sites followed by an invasion of Cuba, or instituting a naval blockade to prevent Soviet supplies from reaching

the island . Fear of Soviet reaction soon eliminated talk of a

37
lowed by invasion continued to grow. While the invasion forces

gathered in Florida, Kennedy ordered the state department to

develop a plan for civil government in Cuba. Former Secretary

of State Dean Acheson and the Joint Chiefs favored an invasion, but Robert Kennedy vehemently opposed that plan and

instead advocated a blockade . The President listened to his

brother, and on October 22, 1962, appeared on television to

explain to America and the world that the United States was

imposing a strict quarantine on offensive military equipment

being shipped to Cuba. Kennedy also warned Khrushchev that

the United States would regard any missile attack from Cuba

as an attack from the Soviet Union and would retaliate against

the Soviet Union . SAC increased its alert posture by placing

more B-52s on airborne alert.

Khrushchev responded belligerently . In a letter received in

Washington on October 23, 1962, he accused the United

States of degenerate imperialism and declared that the Soviet

Union would not observe the illegal blockade. Nevertheless,

the quarantine began on October 24 . Tension mounted as the

Soviets continued to work on the missile sites and their ships

continued moving toward Cuba. Then on October 26, Khrushchev sent another message in which he offered to withdraw or

destroy the weapons in Cuba, provided the United States

would lift the blockade and promise not to invade the island.

Before the presidential advisors could decide on an answer,

another message arrived raising the price . Now the Soviets

wanted the United States to withdraw all missiles from Turkey.

On October 27, an RB-47 from the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing located the Soviet freighter Grozny and reported

its location. Meantime, Major Anderson failed to return from a

U-2 reconnaissance mission . The Joint Chiefs recommended

an immediate air, strike against Cuba, but the President

decided to wait .

The increasing tempo in the military, however, continued unabated. SAC ordered over sixty B-52 bombers to continue on

airborne alert. TAC forces in Florida assumed a one-hour alert

and prepared to go to a fifteen-minute alert, which involved

pilots waiting in aircraft for launch orders. The Army placed six

divisions on alert and called on MATS and the Air Force Reserve

38
known Soviet submarine in the Western Hemisphere, patrolled

the high seas waiting for the Soviet ships to arrive.

In Washington, the President's advisors examined the

Khrushchev letters and debated the appropriate action. The

launch pads in Cuba were almost finished, and there were

already missiles on the island. Furthermore, the Soviet ships

carrying additional missiles were fast approaching the island

and the quarantine cordon of the U.S . Fleet. Something had to

be done. Robert Kennedy proposed that the President ignore

Khrushchev's last message and instead answer the message

offering to exchange the removal of the missiles with an

American promise not to invade Cuba . After a heated debate,

the advisors recommended that the President follow this proposal while Robert Kennedy met with the Soviet Ambassador,

Anatoly Dobrynin, and in effect, promised to remove the

American missiles from Turkey. This promise was sufficient.

The next day the Soviet Union informed the United States that

the missiles in Cuba would be withdrawn . The Soviets began

turning their ships around, packing up the missiles in Cuba,

and dismantling the launch pads. As the work progressed, the

Air Force started to deploy aircraft back to home bases and

lower the alert status .

The Air Force response to the crisis must be rated as outstanding. On October 19, 1962, the Air Force followed its

normal peacetime posture . Within the following week, American airmen evacuated SAC bombers and tankers from Florida

to make room for tactical fighters and defense forces. They

placed B-52 forces on airborne alert, dispersed the B-47 fleet

to predetermined military bases and civil airports, and

brought the SAC airborne force (approximately 1,400 bombers

and 900 tankers) to full combat alert. In addition, SAC initiated

shipping surveillance assistance fifteen hours after receiving

the request from Commander in Chief Atlantic. Throughout

the crisis the Air Force flew daily high- and low-level reconnaissance flights to keep the U.S. leadership apprised of activities on the island of Cuba and on the high seas. Concurrently, TAC, which had 140 tactical fighters in Florida,

increased this number to 511 fighters, 72 reconnaissance aircraft, and 40 tankers . At the same time, Air Force leaders

39
Missile site in Cuba, November 1962.

formulated a plan to augment the European force with ten additional fighter squadrons. At the beginning of the crisis, CONAD

had 240 aircraft on normal air defense alert. Within 48 hours, it

increased the force in Florida to 82 aircraft (F-101 s, F-102s, and

F- 106s) and the total number on alert to 520 aircraft.

The airlifters of Military Air Transport Service, Tactical Air

Command, and the Air Force Reserve played a vital role during

the crisis. They airlifted several Marine battalions from points

in the United States to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, TAC support

units from bases all over the United States to bases in Florida,

and Army units from various locations to the southeastern

United States . In addition to moving personnel, the airlifters

carried bombs, rockets, ammunition, tanks, and other materiel . Some of this materiel came from as far as Turkey and the

Philippines . MATS estimated that it airlifted 6,738 tons of

cargo and 5,018 passengers in direct support of the Cuban

requirements .

40
McNamara noted deficiencies in the conventional forces . For

example, there were not enough aircraft available to locate

every Soviet ship moving toward the Western Hemisphere . In

addition, because of a shortage of transport aircraft, the government called up approximately 14,000 Reservists and utilized approximately 400 obsolete aircraft to accomplish the

airlift mission. Finally, McNamara noted the shortage of

fighter aircraft, pointing out that air defenses in other parts of

the United States had been stripped because of the need in

the southeastern part of the country.

The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world dangerously

close to nuclear war, and the world breathed a sigh of relief

when it ended . The strategic and tactical power of the U.S. Air

Force, coupled with the will and ability to use it, provided the

synergy to deter nuclear war with the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and convince the Soviet leaders to remove the nuclear weapons from Cuba .

LOCATION: India

Operation LONG SKIP

William J. Allen

DATES: November 2, 1962-August 31, 1963

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Dum Dum Air Base (AB), Calcutta; Palam

Airport, New Delhi; and Leh Airfield, Ladakh, India; Rhein-Main AB,

Germany

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS :

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: VC-47, C-124, C-130, C-135

Operations

In 1962, the subcontinent of Asia was a huge, but undeveloped, giant. Its population exceeded the combined populations

of Africa and South and Central America, and when compared

to the United States, it contained nearly three times as many

people! Its size alone made it an area of importance in the

Cold War's balance of power. Moreover, the region's strategic

importance increased with the economic expansion taking

place . The world's policy makers could not ignore the potential

that existed there.

Deeply entrenched in the Cold War, the United States constantly adjusted its foreign policy in the region in an attempt

to keep two neighbors, India and Pakistan, from warring

against each other and disrupting the balance of power. However, on October 20, 1962, India's and Pakistan's larger, more

dangerous neighbor, the People's Republic of China, threw the

43

AIR FORCES: WINGS: DETACHMENTS:

Eastern Transport 317th Troop Carrier U.S. Air Attache -Iran

Western Transport 1501 st Air Transport U.S. Air Attache - Turkey

1602d Air Transport U.S. Air Attache - Saudi Arabia

DIVISIONS: 1611th Air Transport

322d Airlift
India across long-disputed Himalaya borders each shared .

Only a small portion of the 2,400-mile India-China border

was officially or precisely defined, although the traditional

boundary stood uncontested with no serious problems until

1955 . At that time, the Chinese built a road across the Aksai

Chin Plateau in northeastern Ladakh effectively seizing control of about 10,000 square miles of territory in Kashmir

claimed by India. The Chinese exerted pressure with occasional light clashes along the disputed border between 1959

and 1962 . Chinese activities on the Indian border increased

after mid-1962, and heavy skirmishing broke out on August

20, when Chinese troops moved into India's Northeast Frontier Agency and the area around Ladakh. Here are some of the

highest and most inaccessible territories in the world . In these

areas, only airlift provided adequate supply lines into isolated

valley landing fields.

On October 26, after a series of military reverses suffered by

India during the first days of fighting, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to U.S. President John F. Kennedy

outlining India's position on the border dispute and asking

support in combating open Chinese aggression. President

Kennedy's reply on October 28 promised solidarity with India

and suggested talks between U.S. Ambassador J. Kenneth

Galbraith and Indian officials about practical assistance . In

conversations with Galbraith the following day, Nehru formally asked the United States for military assistance. By November 2, India had already received military assistance from

the United Kingdom and Canada. After Nehru's request, the

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) established a small advisory

team to refine and speed Indian military assistance requirements. The team reported directly to the Ambassador and the

Secretary of Defense and operated within the U.S. Embassy

since its chief was a member of the Country Team. The U.S. Air

Force (USAF) and Army Secretaries and the Director of Military

Assistance nominated one officer each to the team.

Arriving in New Delhi on November 1, the team reached

agreement with Indian defense officials that same day concerning a list of the highest priority items for initial air shipment to India . Based on their availability and Indian ability to

44
sonnel mines, machine guns, ammunition, mortars, and spare

parts for the weapons . The United States expedited delivery by

rounding out mine and ammunition quantities for aircraft

loading capacity and waiving combat serviceable, packing, and

preservation standards where necessary. The arms shipments

included essential manuals and nomenclature lists.

Beginning its first alljet cargo airlift on November 2, USAF

Military Air Transport Service (MATS) delivered over 1,000 tons

of required military items during the initial phase of LONG SKIP.

From Rhein-Main AB, Germany, the first 2 C-135s from the

1611th Air Transport Wing took off for Calcutta's Dum Dum

Airport, some 6,200 miles away. From Travis AFB, California, 3

C-135s from the 1501st Air Transport Wing flew to Calcutta

with a 22-man maintenance team, small arms, and equipment;

flying time was 22 hours, covering 10,600 miles. Deployed personnel from the 1602d Air Transport Wing at Chateaurox AS,

France, constituted the LONG SKIP operations staff, including

the airlift task force commander. Additionally, from Rhein-Main

AB, Germany, the 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo), a U.S. Air

Forces in Europe (USAFE) organization, launched two C-130s

from the 317th Troop Carrier Wing and two rotational C-124s

from the 15th Air Transport Squadron to Calcutta. These aircraft flew in support equipment needed for communications and

maintenance.

Although the C-135s delivered to India its initial requirements

(plus an additional fifty tons) by November 5, separate Indian

government agencies submitted additional requests to U.S. representatives . Each increased the tonnage of arms, ammunition,

and supplies to be flown in by the C-135 crews . On November 7,

the Indian government provided the U.S. Ambassador a formal

list of additional requirements that totaled approximately $65

million . By November 14, C-135 crews had airlifted major

military-assistance items to India valued at approximately $3.7

million. During the 14-day airlift, 48 C-135 missions arrived in

Calcutta carrying a total of 1,035 tons of arms, ammunition,

and equipment. C-124s, C-130s, and a C-135 also flew eight

additional support missions into Calcutta. The DOD team at

New Delhi recommended further shipments estimated at fiftyone million dollars to Bombay by sea lift .

45
46

Area of USAF Operations for LONG SKIP

After the initial airlift, Indian army and air force officers

briefing the DOD team on November 18 reported that use of

Indian military aircraft plus requisitioned civilian planes

could provide only 20 percent of the airlift urgently required

to supply Indian troops in the combat areas. On November

20, Ambassador Galbraith requested U.S . air-transport assistance within India. The following day, the U.S . Department of State advised that twelve C-130s would be provided

for this purpose.

On November 21, crews and support personnel for twelve

C-130s from the 317th Troop Carrier Wing received alert orders for deployment to India. Within six hours, the first air

craft was airborne from Evreux-Fauville AB, France . The Hercules transports flew via Athens, Greece, and Tehran, Iran,

reaching New Delhi's Palam Airport forty-eight hours after

takeoff from France .

The first mission aircraft carried a Combat Airlift Support

Unit (CALSU) package tailored to support the intra-India airlift

operations . Consolidation of 20 USAFE radio technicians at

Calcutta with 39 additional 2d Mobile Communications
CALSU strength to 166. Installed with the CALSU in a hangar

at Palam Airport, the communications team established a

double Teletype line via Wheelus AB in Libya to Evreux, a

single Teletype circuit to Headquarters USAFE at Wiesbaden,

and a radio link with the USAFE communications network.

Given very little advance notice of the departure for India,

the first crews had not known what support, if any, they could

expect . Accordingly, the 322d Airlift Division made use of its

mobility cells, designed to make aircraft independent of the

support normally furnished by USAF bases. Made up of supplies, equipment, and personnel, the cells provided all essentials : medical care, kitchen facilities, office supplies, and aircraft maintenance . Although the Indian government was

generous in its efforts to support the operation, the decision to

bring the mobility cells on the first aircraft proved to be a wise

one. The CALSU personnel rotated every thirty days, the aircraft every sixty days .

Palam's 10,000-foot runways and 400-mile Instrument

Landing System were suitable for commercial Boeing 707 operations . Ramp space was adequate for the twelve C-130s, but

no hangar was large enough for the C-130's wingspread .

When the aircraft was jacked up for maintenance, it had to be

done between buildings with an eye to the wind . The Indian

Air Force (IAF) was well trained and very cooperative . However,

apparently the Indian government had not expected the quick

arrival of the C-130s . No loads were available in the first three

days; therefore, the Task Force Commander surveyed the forward airfields in India .

Developed mostly during World War II, India's air facility

system comprised 176 airfields, most with permanently surfaced runways . Some forty-one of the fields north of 22° N

were primary fields, which might be used in the India-China

border dispute. Five of these, Agra, Ambala, Palam, Barrakpore, and Dum Dum, had permanently surfaced runways over

8,000 feet in length . The remaining 36 fields in this area had

3,000- to 8,000-foot runways.

In the first 14 days of operations in India, the USAFE

C-130s flew 211 sorties and logged 50 hours. These initial

C-130 intra-India airlift missions transported two 2,200-man

47
Loading a C-124

C-124s transported communications and maintenance equipment for

Operation LONG SKIP.

C-124 in flight

48
in the disputed northeast and Ladakh areas. By the end of

December, the C-130s had flown 1,927 hours, transporting

7,206 passengers and 3,407 tons of cargo . Among the passengers were Prime Minister Nehru, Defense Minister Y. B.

Chavan, Ambassador and Mrs. Galbraith, and U.S . Secretary

of Commerce Luther B. Hodges .

USAFE also provided VC-47s and crews to transport within

India a high-level U.S. group after their arrival on November

22. This group, headed by W. Averill Harriman, Assistant Sec

retary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, included Paul Nitze,

Assistant Secretary of Defense ; William Sullivan, UN Advisor,

Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; and General Paul D. Adams,

USA, Commander in Chief, Strike Command . The group

quickly learned that the original Indian army stocks in the

forward areas had been inadequate and were still marginal.

Supply efforts up to that time had provided only the minimum

essentials to troops in contact with Chinese forces. Indian

military authorities, principally army, directed the transporting of supplies during the urgent beefing up of defenses in the

North East Frontier area. Later, the Indian military devoted its

entire use of the C-130 airlift to strengthening the northwestern area of Ladakh, which was more difficult to reach. Almost

all supplies for Indian troops in contact with the Chinese

forces in the area had to be airlifted or air-dropped to them.

The Indian army estimated that supplies for the Ladakh area

could only be airlifted to the airfield at Leh (at 11,500-foot

elevation) and that it would take until June 1963 to accumulate what was needed .

The operation stabilized during the first few months of

1963. A liaison officer from the 322d Airlift Division worked

with the Indian army to prepare loads and plan sorties for the

following day. Indian army trucks brought the supplies and

troops to Palam, where the CALSU had been established .

Heavy tire use resulting from frequent landings at high-altitude

fields became a major C-130 operational problem. The estimated cost was an average of one and a half tires per landing.

The Task Force Commander suggested to the IAF that the

C-130s make five airdrops and five landings per day to reduce

tire damage . Thus, by the end of February, the C- 130s were

49
airdrops to two drop zones in the Indus River Valley .

Other problems encountered during this early period included keeping a sufficient number of crews trained at any

given time for the difficult landing techniques required at Leh.

Further, the daily airdrops quickly depleted the supply of

standard USAF cargo-extraction parachutes . With improvisation the order of the day, the use of Indian parachutes began

after a release system and bomb shackles were manufactured

for the C-130s . Operations and maintenance personnel wrote

plans to standardize rigging and dropping techniques, thus

ensuring that replacement crews learned quickly. Other plans

and information developed and made available to crews included routing and navigational procedures, emergency procedures for the Himalaya regions, operation schedules, and data

concerning drop and landing zones .

Another operational improvement was the reservation of

certain hours of the day for the IAF aircraft-C-47s, C-119s,

and Soviet-built AN-12s-to fly into Leh. The total IAF airlift

capability was about 100,000 pounds per day, far less than

the 322d Air Division's 12 C-130s . Comparatively, the 4-engine

turboprop AN-12 carried only 12,000 pounds into airfields at

11,000-feet while the 4-engine reversible turboprop C-130 airlifted 30,000 pounds . The deployed C-130s delivered about

260,000 pounds more per day than the entire AF's transport

fleet. Additionally, top echelons of the IAF had no clear picture

of Indian tactical air support and air defense capabilities . The

IAF made no realistic plans for airlift operations, apparently in

the belief that the United States would provide additional air

transport assistance, as well as combat and training aircraft.

Consequently, after several months of routine operations, the

main problem became one of finding a diplomatic way to end the

airlift . The task force had originally been sent for ninety days,

but at the request of the Indian government, the United States

extended this period several times. There were indications that

the Indian government wanted the airlift to continue indefinitely.

The road from Srinagar into the Ladakh area was open only

from July to October. The United States argued that it could

be put into proper shape, and the airstrip at Leh rebuilt to

take an increased number of Indian aircraft every day. Since

50
road, the U.S . government decided that before sending the

C-130s back to France the airlift would continue just long

enough to transport heavy equipment and supplies to Leh.

These would be used to build an airstrip big enough to handle

the highest-tonnage cargo planes that the IAF could field.

Cement and other supplies had been flown into Leh since

the first of 1963, along with the supplies for the Indian army .

By May, the planeloads consisted mostly of construction items

based on a fist of available U.S ., British, Japanese, and Indian equipment and supplies . In June, the number of C-130s

deployed in India progressively dropped to six. By the end of

August, after all items on the list had been transported, the

remaining aircraft, crews, and ground personnel returned

to France .

The 322d Air Division's nine-month-long portion of Operation LONG SKIP ended the last week in August 1963, when

the division commander flew the last C-130 out of Leh back to

New Delhi and from there to France. From November 1962

through August 1963, the 322d C-130 crews had flown over

1,800 sorties and 10,000 hours, transported over 20,000 passengers and troops, and delivered over 25,000 tons of supplies

and equipment.

In both phases of Operation LONG SKIP, emergency and

intratheater airlift, USAF forces deployed quickly with minimal

notice, successfully endured frequent changes in airlift re

quirements, and in the end, found a diplomatic way to cease

operations. In the face of foreign assistance to India, the Chinese had pulled back to their original positions on November

20, 1962, except in the Ladakh area where they continued to

occupy some small villages . The U.S . contribution ensured no

further Chinese aggression against India and was a major

factor in maintaining peace and order in the region.

g

Operation DRAGON ROUGE

Daniel L. Haulman

DATES: November 17-December 2, 1964

LOCATION : The Democratic Republic of the Congo

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Evreux-Fauville Air Base (AB), France;

Kleine Brogel AB, Belgium; Moron AB, Spain ; Ascension Island

(United Kingdom) ; Kamina AB, Stanleyville, Paulis, Leopoldville,

Congo

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

DIVISION : SQUADRON:

322d Air - ~52d Troop Carrier

WING:

464th Troop Carrier

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-130

Operations

After four years of attempting to prevent civil war from

tearing the Congo apart, the last United Nations (UN) troops

left the country on June 30, 1964 . They left an unstable

central government, headquartered at Leopoldville in the

western Congo, under President Joseph Kasavubu and

Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. Neither Kasavubu nor Adoula

was very popular. Late in 1963, Kasavubu had dissolved the

Congolese Parliament and granted Adoula full legislative

powers. Adoula attempted to redistrict the country into a

host of new provinces . Opposition members crossed the

Congo River to Brazzaville and revived the party of the late

socialist Patrice Lumumba. During the summer of 1964 under Gaston Soumialot and Nicholas Olenga, rebel warriors

who called themselves "Simbas" (lions) took over some towns

in the eastern Congo, including Albertville . Christophe Gbenye,

53
54

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC

OF THE CONGO

Democratic Republic of the Congo

leader of the Lumumbists at Brazzaville, named Soumialot

head of a provisional government in the eastern Congo.

The rebel soldiers wore primitive clothing, had little education, and regarded with disdain those who did. They looked

upon Europeans and Americans in the Congo, including

Christian missionaries, as enemies. Although the Simbas carried shields and spears, they were not averse to using bullets

and guns that they captured from the demoralized government forces they defeated . The Soviet Union and Communist

China also sent weapons and ammunition to the rebels

through Burundi and Uganda, located on the eastern border

of the Congo.

To quell the rebellion, President Kasavubu in early July replaced Prime Minister Adoula with Moise Tshombe, who had

just returned from exile in Europe. Tshombe had led a secession
as premier he could attract the support of that part of the

country for the central government at Leopoldville . Under

Kasavubu and Tshombe, Gen. Joseph Mobutu served as military leader of the Congolese army. On July 20, Tshombe flew

to Stanleyville, located in the northeast Congo, to negotiate

with the rebels, but they refused .

In early August, Olenga's Simbas captured Stanleyville .

They burned government records and began to execute Congolese loyalists in the province . Some of the executions were

particularly brutal. Intellectuals and the wealthy were favorite

rebel targets. On August 19, the rebels captured Paulis, another important town 225 miles northeast of Stanleyville . By

the end of the month, with much of the eastern Congo under

his control, Soumialot proclaimed a People's Republic of the

Congo, with Stanleyville as capital and Christophe Gbenye as

president. Soumialot was named defense minister and Olenga

commander of the army. Within three months, the rebels had

executed thousands of black Congolese in Stanleyville and

Paulis.

After years of civil and intertribal war and recent defeats at

the hands of the Simbas, the Congolese army was weak and

demoralized . Tshombe and Mobutu contracted with white

mercenaries from South Africa, Rhodesia, and Europe to help

reconquer lost territory. They hired Maj . Mike Hoare, a South

African, to lead the mercenaries . In response, Soumialot announced he could no longer guarantee the safety of whites in

his area of the Congo . The rebels took as hostages over 1,500

white foreigners from several different nations . Among the

hostages were about 60 Americans, 300 Britons, and over

1,000 Belgians . Many of these were Christian medical missionaries following in the footsteps of Dr. Albert Schweitzer.

Olenga met with Michael Hoyt, American consul at Stanleyville, about U.S. support of Tshombe, which could affect the

safety of Americans in rebel hands . Hoyt assured Olenga that

U.S. combat troops were not in the Congo . The United States

also encouraged Tshombe to replace white mercenaries in his

army with black African troops from neighboring countries .

Tshombe tried that, but neighboring countries refused to participate in the defense of his regime. He and Mobutu continued

55
in the east.

In September, UN Secretary General U Thant unsuccessfully urged the rebels to allow the hostages to leave the country, and Kenya's Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, head of the

Organization of African Unity, attempted peace negotiations

between representatives of Tshombe and Gbenye. He did not

have much success, either. During the same month, a diplomatic crisis strengthened Tshombe's support in Leopoldville,

the Congolese capital. When Tshombe attempted to attend a

conference of nonaligned nations in Cairo in the United Arab

Republic, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser put him

under house arrest. Tshombe's government immediately put

the United Arab Republic representatives in Leopoldville under

house arrest until Tshombe was released. Despite this diplomatic slap in the face from Egypt, Tshombe refused to sever

relations, because he knew Nasser was eager for an excuse to

recognize the rebel government instead .

During October, Congolese government troops and mercenaries won control of Bukavu, Beni, and Bumba, liberating

Belgian Roman Catholic priests and nuns and clearing the

way for an offensive against the rebel capital. At the end of

October, as more and more Congolese died at Stanleyville and

Paulis and as rebel threats against whites there intensified,

Hoare began to move against the rebel heartland.

Hoare's mercenaries reached Kindu on November 5, just in

time to save 220 European hostages whom Olenga had ordered exterminated. At the news of the rebel defeat at Kindu,

Gbenye announced that Belgian and American civilians would

be treated as "prisoners of war." The Belgian and American

consuls at Stanleyville, including Hoyt, were imprisoned and

beaten. The rebels refused to allow International Red Cross

representatives to examine the condition of the hostages . On

November 16, the rebels announced that Dr. Paul Carlson, an

American Protestant missionary who had been in the country

three years and whose wife and children had recently fled

the country, would be executed as a spy. When government

troops took the town of Kibombo, they found three dead European civilians.

56
that the overland advance of the Congolese army and its mercenaries would not be rapid enough to save the hostages. With

the approval of Premier Tshombe, they began preparing a contingency rescue mission called DRAGON ROUGE. U.S . President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara refused to commit combat troops, but they were

willing to airlift Belgian forces .

The United States provided aircraft and crews under the

command of Col . Burgess Gradwell, USAF, Commander, 322d

Air Division, Detachment 1 at Evreux-Fauville, France. At his

disposal were C-130 Hercules aircraft of the 776th and 777th

Troop Carrier Squadrons of the 464th Troop Carrier Wing,

which were serving on rotation to Europe. The C-130s were

excellent tools for the special mission. Each airplane could

carry more than 22 tons of payload more than 1,750 miles at

a cruising speed of 291 knots.

On November 17, 1964, fourteen 464th Troop Carrier Wing

aircrews flew their C-130Es from Evreux-Fauville AB in

France to Kleine Brogel AB in Belgium. After loading 550 Bel

gian soldiers of the First Paratroop Battalion under the command of Col. Charles Laurent, the airplanes flew to Britain's

Ascension Island in the Atlantic Ocean, refueling at Moron AB,

Spain, which was en route . Ascension was 7 hours, and

slightly more than 2,500 miles, by air to Stanleyville . The

move, designed to put more pressure on the rebels to release

the hostages, was no secret to the world press. Gbenye postponed the execution of Dr. Carlson.

When negotiations between the United States and rebel representatives in Nairobi, Kenya, proved fruitless, Operation

DRAGON ROUGE proceeded . The Belgian paratroops flew

from Ascension Island to Kamina, a strong loyalist base in the

southern Congo . On November 24, twelve of the C-130s,

loaded with hundreds of combat-ready Belgian troops, took off

from Kamina for the assault on Stanleyville . Five of the U.S .

airplanes air-dropped Belgian paratroops, who secured the

airport and cleared the runway, littered with gasoline barrels

standing on end and vehicles without wheels . Less than an

hour later, the other seven C-130s delivered the remaining

Belgian troops.

57
the airport to the center of Stanleyville . When the rebels

learned of the landings, they herded some of the white hos

tages from a hotel into the street in front of the Lumumba

monument . Gbenye and Soumialot fled, leaving the fate of the

prisoners in the hands of Soumialot's bodyguard, who killed

twenty-two men, women, and children and wounded forty others.

Among the dead was Dr. Paul Carlson. As the Belgians approached, the rebels retreated . In another section of the rebel

capital, the paratroopers discovered bodies of thirty more

white civilians who had been beaten or hacked to death .

With or without the rescue operation, hostages would have

died . Survivors agreed that the quick arrival of the Belgian

paratroopers in the center of Stanleyville saved many lives .

The Belgians took the liberated hostages to the airport for

aerial evacuation to Leopoldville, located about 750 miles to

the southwest . The rebels had wounded many of the hostages,

requiring twenty-eight of them to be carried . During the rescue, hostile gunfire hit several of the Hercules airplanes, but

none of the crew members was injured, and all of the airplanes- were able to take off. In addition to the twelve C-130s

that landed troops, two others arrived to help evacuate survivors to Leopoldville . The USAF crews transported more than

1,200 of the Stanleyville hostages to the Congolese capital.

Among the hostages were Consul Hoyt and his aides, along

with about thirty other Americans.

Later in the day, units of the Congolese army, including

Hoare's mercenaries, linked up with the Belgians. They fought

off rebel counterattacks and secured the city for the Tshombe

regime . The rebels retreated in the direction of Paulis, and the

Belgian paratroopers returned to Kamina to prepare for the

liberation of another town.

Two days later on November 26, about 250 Belgian commandos and paratroops struck again. This time they flew on 7

USAF C-130s to Paulis, where 270 whites, including 44 Roman

Catholic missionaries and 7 Americans, were being held hostage. Despite bad weather on the route and fog at the objective, the paratroops air-dropped successfully and secured the

4,100-foot airfield . They established a combat control team to

direct the C-130 landings, but heavy enemy gunfire at the

58
0-130 lands to evacuate rescued hostages and Belgian paratroops from Paulis.

approach end of the runway delayed landings about fifteen

minutes while the commandos cleared the area. As at Stanleyville, the C-130s sometimes landed and took off under hostile

fire, which damaged several airplanes, piercing fuel cells and

tires . But all returned safely to Kamina AB. Rebels massacred

eighteen hostages before the rescue mission was complete. At

Paulis, the Belgian paratroopers rescued about 250 people of

many nationalities .

On November 27, the American C-130s withdrew the Belgian

troops from both Stanleyville and Pauhs to Kamina AB, and,

under the protection of government troops, continued to evacu

ate refugees to Leopoldville. The next day, an advance party of

Americans and Belgians redeployed to Ascension Island to coordinate support for the requirements of the main force, which

began redeploying from the Congo on November 29 . By the end

of December 2, redeployment was complete. The 464th Troop

Carrier Wing C-130s returned to Evreux-Fauville AB in France,

after taking the Special Forces back to Belgium.

Reaction to the missions of November 24 and 26 was mixed.

Americans, Belgians, the former hostages, and countrymen of

the hostages interpreted Operation DRAGON ROUGE as a heroic rescue . Britain, having allowed the use of Ascension Island,

59
Belgian paratroopers prepare to board a C-130 on Ascension Island .

praised the operation as a humanitarian necessity. On the

other hand, Communist nations such as the Soviet Union and

China condemned the operation as "imperialist aggression."

They had hoped that the rebels would establish a new Communist state in central Africa, and they wanted to attract the loyalty

of nonaligned nations such as Egypt and Algeria, which opposed

the Tshombe regime. Remembering that Belgium had recently

ruled the Congo as a colony, many African states also condemned the rescue operation as a revival of Western imperialism. Even some black political activists in the United States,

such as Malcolm X, condemned the operation and blamed President Johnson for the deaths of some of the hostages.

Operation DRAGON ROUGE was significant politically . First

of all, it freed more than 1,400 hostages, including dozens of

Americans. Only three Americans died. The rescue attracted

the admiration of many people around the world . The operation

strengthened the central government of the Congo by helping

it crush a rival regime, forestalling secession and revolution .

At the same time, it demonstrated the solidarity of Belgium

and the United States and their ability to conduct successful

combined missions . It also revealed the crucial importance of

friendly support and staging areas ; for example, Britishcontrolled Ascension Island .

60
first example of American C-130 airlift operations in a tactical

combat situation under enemy fire. All of the Hercules aircraft, even those with damaged fuel cells or tires, survived .

With less than twenty-four hours of maintenance, they were

ready to fly again. For the first time, C-130 crews successfully

tested new formation procedures for landing and taking off in

combat. Such tactics would be used again in Southeast Asia,

when C-130s were committed there in 1965 .

During Operation DRAGON ROUGE, the 322d Air Division

did not augment aircrews, and there was minimal crew rest.

Had the operation lasted longer, personnel fatigue might have

become a problem. Operation FULL STRIKE, launched during

DRAGON ROUGE, deployed twenty more 464th Troop Carrier

Wing C-130 crews and sixteen C-130s from Pope Air Force

Base, North Carolina, to Moron AB, Spain . They supplemented

U.S . Air Forces in Europe resources while some C-130s were

in Africa and could have reinforced aircraft and aircrews of

Operation DRAGON ROUGE.

Dominican Crisis:

Operation POWER PACK

A. Timothy Warnock

DATES: April 29, 1965-September 21, 1966

LOCATION: Dominican Republic

OVERSEAS BASES USED: San Isidro Air Base (AB), Dominican Republic ; Ramey Air Force Base (AFB), Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station,

Puerto Rico

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-130, C-124, C-97, C-47, C-123, U-10,

F-100, F-104, RF-101, RB-66, KC-135, EC-135

63

MAJCOM : WINGS: (con't.) GROUPS:

USAF Southern Command 363d Tactical Reconnaissance 908th Troop Carrier Group,

Medium

433d Troop Carrier Wing, 910th Troop Carrier Group,

Medium Medium

CENTER :

442d Troop Carrier Wing,

Heavy

USAF Special Air Warfare 452d Troop Carrier Wing,

Medium SQUADRONS:

463d Troop Carrier Wing, 28th Air Transport Squadron,

Medium Heavy

WINGS:

464th Troop Carrier Wing,

Medium 331st Fighter-Interceptor

1st Air Commando 51

Heavy

Troop Carrier Wing, 353d Tactical Fighter

62d Air Transport Wing, 514th Troop Carrier Wing,

Heavy Medium

63d Troop Carrier Wing, 516th Troop Carrier Wing,

Heavy Medium

137th Air Transport 1607th Air Transport Wing,

Heavy

313th Troop Carrier Wing, 1608th Air Transport Wing,

Medium Heavy

314th Troop Carrier Wing, 1611 th Air Transport Wing,

Medium Heavy

317th Troop Carrier Wing,

Medium
p

The Dominican Republic shares with Haiti the island of Hispaniola, located about 700 miles southeast of Miami, Florida,

between Cuba and Puerto Rico. Not only is the island near the

United States, it occupies a strategic position as a gateway to

the Caribbean Sea and an approach to the Panama Canal. Consequently, the United States has historically been involved militarily and politically in the Dominican Republic. Thus, U.S.

President Lyndon B. Johnson decided on intervention when in

late April 1965 the country fell into anarchy following a military

overthrow of the existing government. He feared that Cuban

Communism would subvert the government, thereby enhancing

Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere .

DOMINICAN

REPUBLIC

SAN ISIDRO

SANTO AIRPORT

DOMINGOCL"

Area of USAF Operations during Dominican Crisis

On April 26, 1965, the U.S . Joint Chiefs of Staff, with presidential approval, moved a U.S . Navy task force off the Dominican coast and alerted the U.S. Army 82d Airborne Division for

possible deployment to the Dominican Republic under the

code name of POWER PACK. The next day, U.S . Marines from

the naval task force began evacuation of U.S. and other foreign nationals from the capital, Santo Domingo. On the 28th,

the current military junta requested U.S. military assistance

to maintain order. President Johnson immediately authorized

U.S . armed forces to protect American lives . Five hundred

Marines landed to protect the U.S. Embassy and continue the

evacuation. The President then decided to send the entire 82d

64
der and a friendly, non-Communist government.

The Nineteenth Air Force formed an Airlift Task Force

(ALTF) at Pope AFB, North Carolina, to manage the airlift of

the division, a force four times larger than conceived in contingency plans . After receiving approval from Maj . Gen . Robert

H. York, USA, Commander, 82d Airborne Division, the ALTF

staff coordinated activities with Brig. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw,

USAF, Vice Commander, Nineteenth Air Force, at Seymour

Johnson AFB, North Carolina . The ALTF staff had to locate

more aircraft and crews, schedule arrivals at Pope, devise a

parking plan for the overcrowded base, compute new loading

plans, find sufficient personnel to load the aircraft, billet the

hundreds of aircrews and other personnel arriving, and work

out flight plans . To meet these demands, the ALTF commander, Col. William L. Welch, USAF, Commander, 464th

Troop Carrier Wing (TCW), established a command post at the

Consolidated Airlift Support Unit, which ordinarily staged,

scheduled, and controlled airlift transport .

On April 28 and 29, Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Military Air Transport Service (MATS) deployed eighty-five C-130s

within twelve hours from their home bases to Pope AFB to join

the seventy aircraft already there. MATS also deployed C-124s

to Seymour Johnson AFB, where the 82d loaded its heaviest

equipment aboard six aircraft. The concentrated and sustained airlift operation at Pope overwhelmed support capabilities normally geared to supporting a single troop carrier wing.

Billeting facilities proved totally inadequate, forcing officials to

house transient personnel in unheated, open-bay barracks on

nearby Fort Bragg . In addition, an airdrop exercise at Pope

was not canceled until the day before, thus delaying the loading and reconfiguration for POWER PACK of several aircraft

that had been participating in the exercise . To accommodate

148 aircraft at the same time, Pope authorities resorted to

nose-to-tail parking, using all available ramp space and even

taxiways . The resulting congestion impeded the . refueling,

loading, and launching of aircraft; for example, crews had to

tow aborting aircraft clear before remaining aircraft could taxi.

Movement of Army equipment to be loaded on the aircraft

added to ramp congestion, and a lack of loading tables delayed

65
preparation of cargo and equipment for airlift and airdrop .

Cargo delivered out of sequence complicated the expeditious

loading of aircraft. Nevertheless, within 18 hours, Air Force

loaders put 1,754 paratroopers and their equipment and supplies aboard 144 C-130s .

General Delashaw, as commander of the Air Force Tactical

Force formed to control USAF participation in POWER PACK,

arranged for fighter escort, reconnaissance, and communica

tions support . He then flew from Seymour Johnson to Ramey

AFB, Puerto Rico, aboard the TAC Airborne Command Post

(EC-135) to set up a Tactical Air Control Center and Command Post.

Colonel Welch commanded POWER PACK's assault airlift

phase, code-named RED FOX. The first aircraft departed Pope

AFB on April 29 at 7 :54 P.M. Launched in a two and a halfhour period, the RED FOX force flew in four high-altitude

in-trail formations with a continuous stream of red running

lights visible for miles in the night sky. Within the formation,

pilots flew sometimes at 250 knots and other times at 100

knots in efforts to maintain aircraft separation. While RED

FOX was in mid-flight, the U.S . Embassy reported that friendly

forces controlled San Isidro Airport, fourteen miles east of

downtown Santo Domingo . Consequently, Colonel Welch diverted from the planned landing at Ramey to San Isidro. As the

RED FOX force changed its heading, General Delashaw took

the EC-135 from Ramey to a designated orbit near the Dominican Republic to control the landing of the assault force . Meanwhile, Vice Adm. Kleber S . Masterson, USN, the Joint Task

Force Commander aboard the USS Boxer off the Dominican

coast, learned from a Dominican leader friendly to the United

States that the San Isidro control tower was unmanned and

the runway unlighted. Admiral Masterson sent his aide and

two U.S. Marine officers to man the tower, turn on the lights,

and prepare for the arrival of the first C-130 landings . Because

of the changed destination, the ALTF traveled the 1,200 miles

to the Dominican Republic in about 7 hours, a good 2 hours

more than would have been normally required.

Colonel Welch touched down aboard the lead C-130 at 2 :00

A.M . on April 30, hitched a ride with a jeep-load of armed

Dominicans to the control tower, assumed command of the

66
carrying troops and forty-six others with equipment. Within

an hour, the airlifters had unloaded the 82d Airborne's soldiers, but unloading the equipment took longer. Since aerialport equipment and manpower were unavailable, U.S . Army

and Air Force personnel cut nylon webbing and honeycomb

packing with axes before rolling stock could be driven off the

aircraft and ramps . For lack of equipment, cargo clogged taxiways, impeding aircraft movement. Consequently, sixty-five

C-130s, unable to land on the crowded base, diverted to Ramey

AFB for refueling and rerigging. At Ramey, a Strategic Air

Command (SAC) base, 300 SAC personnel physically manhandled the cargo off the aircraft, derigged (removing parachutes,

nylon webbing, and honeycomb packing) it, and reloaded it for

shipment to San Isidro . Finally, some five and one-half hours

after the initial assault force had landed, San Isidro began

accepting cells of nine aircraft, each arriving at fifteen-minute

intervals from Ramey. Eighteen hours after the arrival of the

initial assault force at San Isidro, an Aerial Port Detachment and

a Consolidated Airlift Support Unit arrived with equipment and

people to handle cargo and passenger loading and unloading.

Taking off from San Isidro, most aircraft returned to Pope

AFB. In the first few days of the operation, Pope transit alert

operations had difficulties handling so many returning aircraft

in spite of the assistance of Enroute Support Teams from

participating airlift units. As aircraft landed at intervals of one

or two minutes, ground crews had to park, refuel, and prepare

them for new flights. Confusion ensued, with some C-130s

being loaded before receiving maintenance . As a result, crews

had to transfer those loads to other aircraft that were ready for

flight, thus raising the 464th Wing's turnaround time to excessive levels. Consequently, on the fourth, MATS began sending its POWER PACK aircraft to Charleston AFB, South Carolina, for maintenance prior to flying to Pope for loading.

In spite of these difficulties, the Air Force flew over 1,361

accident-free sorties and moved 12,000 passengers and

17,250 tons of cargo within 5 days from Pope to San Isidro .

From April 30 through May 3, USAF members at San Isidro

handled 651 C-130 sorties . Between May 4 and 6, they received 502 C-130 and 47 C-124 flights. The airlifters flew

67
Tents housed facilities at San Isidro AB, Dominican Republic. These included a

field-ration mess and medical unit to support actions in that area. Parked on

the ramp near the tents is a C-1 30E of the 464th Troop Carrier Wing .

forty-nine sorties on May 7, and then the 464th TCW flew

resupply missions at the rate of about nine each day until the

last week in May. They also transported to San Isidro a onehundred-bed field hospital, as well as tons of beans, condensed milk, and flour for relief of the embattled Santo Domingo population. After May 7, ships provided most of the

support for the military operation. In June, MATS established

a scheduled flight from Charleston AFB to San Isidro Airport.

On May 1, Maj. Gen. Marvin L. McNickel, USAF, Commander,

Ninth Air Force, assumed command of the Air Force Task Force

at Ramey AFB. On May 5, he established at San Isidro Airport

the Joint Air Control Coordination Center controlling all task

force activities under the direction of U.S. Forces, Dominican

Republic, the joint command headed by Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer

Jr., USA. Responsibility for providing forces, controlling movement to and from the Dominican Republic, and supporting them

remained with the component commands, coordinated by the

Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command.

Tactical air units, deployed to Ramey AFB for mission combat support, included a tactical fighter squadron, a fighterinterceptor squadron, and a composite reconnaissance squadron.

68
pilots, and support personnel totaling 400 people to Ramey

and San Isidro . As part of this deployment, the wing's 353d

Tactical Fighter Squadron sent its eighteen F-100s from Myrtle

Beach AFB, South Carolina, to Ramey AFB. SAC tankers refueled the fighters en route . At Ramey, ground crews configured

the aircraft for combat air patrol missions, intended primarily

to deter possible air support from Cuba for the leftist rebels .

On May 6, Air Defense Command sent twelve F-104s of the

331 st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron from Webb AFB, Texas, to

Ramey to augment the F-100s . Two fighter aircraft flew over

the Dominican Republic at all times through the month of

May. Between May 28 and June 3, the 354th Tactical Fighter

Wing and the 331st Fighter-Interceptor Squadron redeployed

their aircraft and personnel to the home stations .

The 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing deployed a composite squadron with six RF-101s, three RB-66s, an augmented

photo-processing cell, and maintenance elements to provide

reconnaissance support for POWER PACK. The aircraft deployed from James Connally AFB, Texas, to Ramey AFB and

began operations on May 2 . The wing had already sent 132

supporting personnel and 6 tons of equipment aboard C-124

transports . The first sorties targeted airfields throughout the

Dominican Republic . Reconnaissance missions over Santo

Domingo suffered because aircraft had to fly above 1,500 feet

to avoid small-caliber ground fire. To counter this problem, the

squadron obtained oblique photographs, a process that negated the necessity to fly over the city. It also photographed

and updated reconnaissance of the entire country, including

main lines of supply, rivers, and approach valleys, completing

the project on June 3. The RB-66s flew thirty-one and the

RF-101s ninety-six missions during the deployment.

At Ramey, excessive demand for aerial photography, primarily from the U.S . Army, overwhelmed the photo-processing

cell. It met requirements after May 7 only because General

McNickel ordered an arbitrary reduction by 50 percent of print

production and distribution . Time to deliver developed photography averaged better than five hours, an unacceptable delay

during a crisis . The photo-processing cell developed the photography at Ramey and delivered it by air to San Isidro, where

69
jeeps distributed it to military users. The 

wing

redeployed to Texas between May 21 and June 4 .

Besides the fighter and reconnaissance units, the U.S . Air

Force also deployed air control and communications elements.

TAC's airborne command post directed the initial assault airlanding at San Isidro in a seven-hour mission and then for the

next three days, coordinated air operations and relayed communications in twelve-hour missions . When the EC-135 was

not on station, a C-130E configured as an Airborne Battlefield

Command and Control Center or a similarly configured C-97

belonging to the Air National Guard (ANG) took over those

functions. The 507th Tactical Control Group, stationed at

Shaw AFB, South Carolina, deployed 264 airmen and 17 officers to San Isidro. By May 1, the group's long-range mobile

radars and communications equipment tracked and controlled

arriving and departing aircraft. Initially, flight patterns went

over Santo Domingo, but the controllers quickly changed these

to avoid the city after several aircraft received ground fire .

In the early phase of the Dominican Crisis, airborne communications proved absolutely essential, since ground-based

communications did not have the range to reach offshore,

much less provide links with U.S. national leaders . The 137th

Air Transport Wing, an Oklahoma ANG organization, deployed

C-97 "Talking Birds" to provide long-range communications

until an adequate ground-based communications station could

be installed. Also, the Air Force landed a specially equipped

C-130 at San Isidro to provide long-range communication.

These aircraft proved their usefulness to General Palmer and the

U.S . Embassy staff during the first week because no other direct

communications link to Washington existed .

The Special Air Warfare Center at Eglin AFB, Florida, played

a key role in psychological operations by furnishing speakerequipped C-47s, four C-123s, two U-10s, and a small photographic laboratory to support the U.S . Information Agency.

Personnel from the 1st Air Commando Wing operated the

C-47s from San Isidro, dropping leaflets and broadcasting

messages . They began on May 3 with 2-hour missions, 3

times a day, at no more than 1, 500 feet, at times receiving

small-arms fire that wounded 1 crewman.

70
Isidro to arrange aeromedical evacuation of patients from military medical facilities, principally the U.S . Army's 15th Field

Hospital at Santo Domingo. Meantime the 1st Aeromedical

Evacuation Group at Pope organized in-flight medical teams to

send to San Isidro and Ramey. From April 30 until August 25,

the group evacuated by C-130 some 500 patients, including

152 battle casualties, from Santo Domingo .

The 354th Tactical Fighter Wing at Myrtle Beach deployed a

combat support group who established operations at San

Isidro on May 1 . During the first few days, personnel slept in

tents, ate C rations, suffered from a lack of potable water, and

worked twelve- to eighteen-hour days. Later, living conditions

improved as civil engineers constructed shower and eating

facilities . The combat support group included police, supply,

transportation, and civil engineering members.

At the urging of the United States, the Organization of

American States on May 6 formed an Inter-American Peace

Force (IAPF) composed of U.S. and Latin American troops to

restore order in the Dominican Republic . This gave an aura of

legitimacy to U.S . military forces there and vindicated President Johnson's strong anti-Communist position. The U.S. Air

Force in Operation PRESS AHEAD airlifted IAPF troops from

Central and South America to Santo Domingo . On May 14-15,

USAF Southern Command and TAC transports airlifted Honduran, Nicaraguan, and Costa Rican troops along with almost

thirty tons of cargo to the Dominican Republic. Then on May

24-29, USAF and Brazilian airlifters carried 1,130 soldiers

and their equipment from Santa Cruz, Brazil, to San Isidro .

During this operation, USAF aircraft flew 65 missions, carrying 1,382 passengers and 734 tons of cargo . For over a year,

USAF airhfters subsequently resupplied the IAPF and transported people rotating into and out of the Dominican Republic. At its peak, the IAPF numbered over 25,000 soldiers, the

majority being U.S . troops.

With the arrival of Latin American troops, the United States

gradually reduced its military presence . Military and diplomatic efforts soon resulted in establishment of an interim

government under auspices of the Organization of American

States . On September 9, 1965, the U.S. Air Force provided a

7 1
C-130 to transport General Elias Wessin y Wessin, commander

of conservative Dominican forces and a major obstacle to the

interim government, from San Isidro to Howard AFB, Panama

Canal Zone . The next day, the general flew to exile in Miami,

Florida.

By October, only 8,500 U.S . military personnel remained in

the Dominican Republic . In June 1966, Dominican citizens

elected Joaquin Balaguer as their new president. The last U.S.

troops flew home on September 19, and the IAPF formally ended

its operation the next day. The 464th TCW flew its last mission

from San Isidro to Pope on September 21, 1966, thus ending

Operation POWER PACK.

In assessing POWER PACK, General Palmer cited the Air

Force for a successful airlift. Among lessons the Air Force learned

was the importance of Reserve forces in supplementing activeforce operations. Continental Air Command assigned about a

fourth of Air Force Reserves' airlift forces to TAC and MATS.

These aircraft and crews flew 1,844 missions, including as

Members of the 82d Airborne Division return to Pope AFB following service

during the crisis in the Domincan Republic. C-130E aircraft assigned to the

464th Troop Carrier Wing at Pope flew troops to and from the island .

72
tween May 1 and July 5, 1965 . Also, Continental Air Command and ANG airlift resources alleviated shortages within

the United States by assuming regular TAC and MATS routes

and flying them long after POWER PACK ended .

One of the most important lessons was that contingency

plans should be current and flexible enough to deal with fluctuating force levels and unexpected, changing situations. In

this crisis, existing contingency plans envisioned a mission

one-fourth the size of POWER PACK. Consequently, the Air

Force had to improvise, resulting in confusion and much

heavier workloads than expected . Plans must also be flexible

enough to incorporate restrictions on military actions, since

national leaders are likely to supervise closely any politicalmilitary operation such as the Dominican Crisis . For example,

political considerations prevented the use of the Santo Domingo International Airport, only ten miles from the city, even

though crowded and rather primitive conditions at San Isidro

imposed considerable difficulties on air operations. The operation also taught the need for a diversity of airpower assets .

The U.S . Air Force provided airlift, fighter, and reconnaissance

aircraft and support. It also aided in disaster relief, conducted

psychological operations, took part in civil affairs, and provided aeromedical and civilian evacuation .

U.S. activities during the Dominican Crisis illustrated the

Quick Reaction Concept. U.S . forces quickly deployed to a

critical area to stabilize a government and prevent unfriendly

elements from taking it over. The United States successfully

used joint military forces to achieve limited political objectives .

In a study of the Air Force's role a year later, the Air University's

Aerospace Studies Institute outlined the basic lesson of

POWER PACK: that in the future, a principal operational demand on military forces would be stability or peace operations

in disturbed areas of the world . Today's USAF Air Expeditionary Forces reflect the prophetic character of that statement.

y 

Operation NICKEL GRASS

Edward T. Russell

DATES: October 14-November 14, 1973

OPERATION: Israel

OVERSEAS BASES USED : Lajes Field, Azores; Lod Airport, Israel

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-5, C-141

Operations

Since 1967, when Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula and the

Golan Heights in a six-day war, Egypt and Syria had been

eagerly waiting to strike back at Israel to wipe out the humili

ation of the earlier defeat and regain their lost territories. In

January 1970, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser made a

secret journey to the Soviet Union, returning with a Soviet promise of equipment and advisors . Shortly thereafter the equipment

began to arrive: MiG-21 interceptors, battalions of surface-to-air

missiles (SAM), banks of electronic equipment designed to

counter enemy intruders, and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and the crews to man them. Nasser died in 1971 ; President

Anwar el-Sadat succeeded him. While Soviet armaments continued to flow into Egypt, Sadat grew increasingly unhappy with

the Soviet presence and soon expelled most Soviet advisors.

Meantime, he enlisted the Syrians, to whom the Soviets had

75

NUMBERED AIR FORCES: WINGS:

Twenty-First 60th Military Airlift

Twenty-Second 62d Military Airlift

63d Military Airlift

436th Military Airlift

437th Military Airlift

438th Military Airlift

443d Military Airlift
also provided 

qp, p

also persuaded other countries, including Iraq, Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia, to move token forces to the

Suez Canal area . At the time of the attack, Arab strength was

approximately 350,000 soldiers and 2,800 tanks, of which

250,000 men and 2,000 tanks belonged to Egypt.

t

MC, GUIRE AFB

DOVE E

CHARLESTON AFB

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

LAJES FIELD,

AZORES ELAVIV

USAF Flight Route during Operation NICKEL GRASS

On October 6, 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces made simultaneous attacks on Israel. Egyptian forces crossed the

Suez Canal and quickly overran the Israeli fortresses, which

were protecting the eastern bank . The Soviet-built antiaircraft

and wire-guided antitank missiles and rocket-propelled grenades effectively blunted initial Israeli air and armor counterattacks . To the northeast, Syrian forces overran the major

Israeli stations on Mount Hermon and then conducted a frontal assault against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights . Following a devastating artillery attack, the Syrians, manning

hundreds of Soviet-built T-55 and T-62 tanks, virtually annihilated the outnumbered Israeli defenders.

As the Israelis recovered, they were able to stop the Arab

attacks, but the attrition rate was enormous . Both sides began

to run out of ammunition within a week. The Israelis required

vast numbers of high-explosive antitank shells, sabot-discarding

antitank rounds, and above all, antitank missiles . In the air,

they needed replacement aircraft, parts, armament, and electronic equipment to detect and defeat the new Soviet antiaircraft batteries . Since many of their tanks, planes, and heavy

guns were American-made, the Israelis naturally turned to

the United States for resupply. At the same time, the Arab

76
gppy ppy 

which organized an airlift to Egypt and Syria.

After the Israeli government made the initial request, the

United States hesitated, primarily out of concern that Arab nations would retaliate by interrupting the region's oil exports, but

finally President Richard M. Nixon ordered the resupply to begin.

However, the intensity of the war meant that there would not be

enough time to manufacture and ship new weapons to Israel.

Supplies would have to come from American inventories .

In preparation for Operation NICKEL GRASS, as the airlift

was known, General Paul K. Carlton, USAF, Commander in

Chief, Military Airlift Command (MAC), immediately notified

his Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Air Force commanders to

plan airlifting over 4,000 tons of materiel to Israel. He also sent

Brig. Gen. Kelton M. Fan-is, USAF, to Lajes Field, Azores, in the

mid-Atlantic Ocean, to direct airlift operations there. Lajes, the

major en route station, would also prove to be a choke point.

General Carlton ordered a buildup of petroleum supplies at Lajes to enable the airlift to continue. MAC also increased security

A C-5 leaves Lajes Field in the Azores; the major en route station and the key

to the Israeli resupply operation.

77
fuel supplies. In rapid succession, Headquarters MAC activated

its Contingency Support Staff, canceled all but essential training, designated the Twenty-First Air Force as the controlling

organization, and placed all C-141 and C-5 aircrews on alert.

Together, the C-141 and C-5 aircraft could carry almost any

piece of equipment that the Israeli armed forces needed . The

C-141 could accommodate ammunition, supplies, aircraft parts,

and many vehicles, while the C-5 could carry tanks, aircraft

fuselages, helicopters, and large guns.

As the airlift began, politics and geography became major

factors . Most of the European nations, fearing a reduction in

their oil supplies, chose to be neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus West Germany, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Malta,

and Cyprus denied overflight approval and use of their airfields . In addition, MAC aircraft could not land and refuel in

Iceland, Greenland, Scotland, or England . Only Portugal

agreed to help by allowing the U.S . Air Force to use Lajes

Field, Azores. After entering Mediterranean airspace, U.S . pilots faced the hostility of Moslem states on the northern coast

of Africa, particularly Libya and Egypt, and had to avoid flying

over any country on either side of the sea . The final and

perhaps most dangerous leg, approaching Israel, required particular caution because of its proximity to Egypt and Syria.

Because of the distance from the United States to Israel, the

frequency of flights, the nature of the cargo, the necessity for

picking up material at over twenty pick-up points, and the

risks of the Mediterranean route, MAC had to use stage crews,

augmented crews, and navigator pools. The stage crew would

relieve the tired initial crew and fly on to the next destination.

MAC used stage crews primarily in the C-141 aircraft. The

C-5 aircraft flew, for the most part, with augmented crews .

They had a third pilot, a second engineer, a second navigator,

and an additional loadmaster. These crews flew as much as

twenty-eight hours without rest, going from the U.S. east coast,

or one of several other bases, to Lajes and then to Lod and

back through Lajes . Then, the crew would change.

The USAF airlift began on October 14. The giant aircraft

loaded their cargoes as close as possible to the source of

supply within the continental United States then proceeded to

78
The first MAC aircraft to land at Lod Airport was a C-5, tail no. 0461, assigned

to the 60th MAWat Travis AFB, California.

one of several major bases on the east coast, where they refueled and departed for the Azores . At Lajes Field, they refueled

again, and rested aircrews took over the controls. The aircraft

entered the Mediterranean over the Strait of Gibraltar and flew

south of Sicily and Malta, then north of Crete, and then along

the boundary that separated Greek and Libyan airspace to

dodge the majority of civilian traffic and reduce any Arab

threat. Avoiding Egypt by the greatest distance possible, the

American aircraft then proceeded to Lod Airport, Tel Aviv,

Israel. For the last 190 miles of the journey, Israel provided

fighter aircraft as armed escort. According to the MAC study

Flight to Israel by historian Kenneth L. Patchin,

The whole airlift from start to finish was fraught with potential

danger-danger at home due to the explosives carried and sometimes

lack of sufficient parking-danger from possible terrorist attacks when

security was questionable at Lajes-danger from hostile North African

Arabian aircraft-danger of being attacked by missiles supposedly poised

in Egypt for Israel's heartland-danger of conflict with Russian [sic]

aircraft which did not always follow Greek controller instructionsand the ever present danger of aircraft problems occurring over so

much open water.

79
comed the first C-5 Galaxy. Since another C-5, carrying the

special ground-handling equipment, had aborted to Lajes, the

Israelis manually unloaded the 194,000 pounds of cargo

themselves . Reflecting the urgency of the situation, they completed the job in three and one-half hours. Within three days,

Military Airlift Command was delivering, on a daily basis,

nearly 1,000 tons of critically needed ammunition, medical

supplies, missiles, aircraft parts, helicopters, F-4 fuselages,

175-millimeter cannons, 155-millimeter howitzers, and even

M-60 and M-48 tanks . As the Israelis stabilized the Syrian

front and turned their attention to the Sinai, the airlift requirement increased from four C-5s and twelve C-141s daily

to six C-5s and seventeen C-141s . From that point until the

end of the war, the airlift flow remained fairly stable .

During the crisis, two factors became apparent: first, the

"magic" weather, and second, the outstanding performance of

the C-5 . The only bad weather included excessive winds at Lajes

in the beginning and severe fog at Lod Airport midway through

the operation. The C-5 presented a few mechanical problems,

but its logistics reliability turned out to be 95 percent. The

C-141 had an even higher 98 percent reliability rate, but having

flown since the mid-1960s, this was a time-proven aircraft.

The airlift to Israel lasted thirty-two days. In that period,

567 MAC flights carried approximately 22,300 tons of cargo,

including numerous tanks. These shipments helped to reverse

the imbalance of military power created by the vast shipments

of Soviet war materiel to the Arab nations and led to a

cease-fire . USAF airlift capability had made a strong contribution to an American national objective-peace in the Middle

East. Perhaps the most meaningful assessment of the airlift

came from the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, who expressed the thought that for generations to come Israel would

remember the giant airplanes from America that brought the

materiel that meant life to the Israeli people .

On October 24, the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire and

silenced the guns . On January 18, 1974, they signed a disengagement agreement that called for Israeli forces to withdraw from the

west bank of the Suez Canal, while a limited number of Egyptian

80
April 1982, Israel returned control of the Sinai to Egypt.

In examining the airlift, American airmen quickly realized

the crucial need for complete air refueling capability. The refusal of NATO allies to allow U.S . aircraft use of their airfields

and airspace to deliver supplies to Israel could have been

disastrous . In fact, if Portugal had denied the use of Lajes

Field, NICKEL GRASS would have been virtually impossible .

Without forward bases, the only alternative was in-flight refueling. The C-5 aircraft were equipped for it ; however, in late

1973, MAC had only nineteen crews trained and proficient in

this dangerous task . MAC planners had considered sending

the C-5s directly to Tel Aviv from bases in the United States .

The aircraft had enough range to go the distance with only 20

tons of cargo, but this would have increased the necessary

number of sorties from 145 to over 500 . To make matters

worse, the C-5 could not return to the United States nonstop

because of headwinds on the westbound journey. Considering

the number of sorties needed to airlift the supplies that Israel

required and the number of C-5s in the U.S . Air Force at the

time, the airlift would not have succeeded if flown directly

from the United States .

The C-141 aircraft was not equipped, at the time, for inflight refueling and could not participate in the airlift without

a forward base . Shortly after Operation NICKEL GRASS, Air

Force leaders moved to modify the C-141 for in-flight refueling

and train the aircrews for the task. They also pushed ahead

with development of a new tanker aircraft, the KC-10. Known

as the Extender, the KC-10 could unload twice as much fuel

as the KC-135, fly longer distances, and receive fuel in flight.

By teaming the KC-10 and KC-135, the distance to which fuel

can be delivered is limited only by the number of supporting

tankers available and the endurance of the crews .

Evacuation:

Operation FREQUENT WIND

DATES: April 4-September 16, 1975

LOCATION: Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

OVERSEAS BASES USED : Tan Son Nhut Air Base (AB), Saigon,

Vung Tau, South Vietnam; U-Tapao Royal Thailand Air Base (RTAB),

Thailand; Clark AB, Philippines; Andersen Air Force Base (AFB),

Guam; Wake Island

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

Daniel L. Haulman

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: A-7, AC-130, EC-130, HC-130, C-130,

C-5, C-9, C-141, CH-53, HH-53, F-4

Operations

U.S . combat troops left the Republic of Vietnam in 1973 according to the terms of a peace agreement that temporarily

83

DIVISION: WINGS: (con't.)

3d Air 436th Military Airlift

437th Military Airlift

WINGS: 438th Military Airlift

3d Tactical Fighter 443d Military Airlift

18th Tactical Fighter 446th Military Airlift

22d Bombardment 514th Military Airlift

43d Strategic

56th Special Operations GROUPS:

60th Military Airlift 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

62d Military Airlift 9th Aeromedical Evacuation

63d Military Airlift

307th Strategic SQUADRONS:

314th Tactical Airlift 16th Special Operations

374th Tactical Airlift 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

388th Tactical Fighter 56th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

432d Tactical Fighter
American forces, but the North Vietnam Communist government re-equipped its army and escalated the ground war in

Vietnam. Meantime, the U.S. government continued aid to

South Vietnam at a greatly reduced level. Consequently, several

thousand U.S . citizens remained, many employees at the Defense Attache Office (DAO) complex at Tan Son Nhut Airport,

at the U.S. Embassy compound in downtown Saigon, or at

four consulates at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can

Southeast Asia during the Vietnam Evacuation

Inset: Saigon during Operation FREQUENT WIND

84
guards . In August 1974, Maj . Gen . Homer D . Smith, USA,

assumed command of the DAO. He reported to Graham A.

Martin, U.S . Ambassador to South Vietnam, and to Adm. Noel

A. M. Gaylor, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command.

Early in 1975, Communist military forces in Vietnam prepared for a major offensive . Such an offensive was not likely to

provoke a powerful American military response, such as the

one launched in 1972, because President Richard M. Nixon

had resigned in 1974 in the wake of the Watergate scandal.

The U.S. Congress showed little willingness to approve more

aid for South Vietnam, much less a reintroduction of American forces into the conflict. During the first week in March,

the North Vietnamese Army attacked key bases in the central

highlands of South Vietnam. Ban Me Thuot, on the highway

between Saigon and the north central highlands, fell on March

14, persuading South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van

Thieu to withdraw his forces from Pleiku and Kontum. A chaotic retreat followed . By the end of the month, enemy forces

had captured the strategic bases of Quang Tri, Hue, Tam Ky,

and Da Nang, the last three on the northern coast.

The evacuation of Da Nang was chaotic . Communist forces

had cut off land escape routes, leaving refugees and military

forces alike dependent on sea lift or airlift . Ships evacuated

thousands southward to other coastal bases . Commercial airlines under contract to evacuate American citizens were forced

to carry panic-stricken Vietnamese soldiers and their families .

The last airplane to depart, a World Airways 727, carried out

290 passengers, at least 7 in its wheel wells . The aircrew

could not even retract the airliner's landing gear.

During the first week in April, other key South Vietnamese

coastal bases, including Cam Ranh Bay and Nha Trang, fell to

the North Vietnamese. Sea lift carried thousands more refugees

to Vung Tau, on the coast just southeast of Saigon, and Phu

Quoc Island . Although some South Vietnamese fully expected

U.S. air strikes against the Communists, President Ford refused to order them. He did announce on April 3 that American military transports delivering military cargo to Saigon

would on return flights to the United States evacuate Vietnamese orphans.

85
AUSAF NCO gives food to a Vietnamese refugee family in Guam.

This operation, called BABYLIFT, began tragically. On April 4,

a giant C-5 Galaxy, then the largest airplane type in the world,

landed in Saigon with artillery for the South Vietnamese army. It

took off with more than 200 orphans, escorted by 37 female

DAO employees. Not long after taking off from Tan Son Nhut

Airport, about the time it crossed the coast near Vung Tau, the

C-5 suffered an explosive decompression in its rear cargo door

area . Deprived of controls to the massive airplane's tail, Capt.

Dennis Traynor, USAF, attempted to fly back to Saigon using

the ailerons alone. Despite his best efforts, the huge airplane

crash-landed in rice paddies short of Tan Son Nhut. Miraculously, 175 of the 330 aboard the C-5 survived the explosion

and crash. Thus began the airlift evacuation of American citizens and Vietnamese refugees from Saigon.

Although sabotage was never proven, fear of it slowed the

airlift from Saigon . The U.S . Air Force used no more C-5s and

tightened luggage inspections . BABYLIFT was not a total failure.

86
MAC crew members cradle South Vietnamese infants during Operation

BABYLIFT.

Other airplanes, including military transports and commercial

airliners under contract, eventually evacuated more than

2,600 Vietnamese orphans to Hawaii and on to the continental United States .

A number of factors contributed to declining South Vietnamese morale during April. North Vietnamese forces continued to advance all across the country. On April 9, they at

tacked Xuan Loc, only thirty-eight miles from Saigon. That

same week, Communist Khmer Rouge forces captured Phnom

Penh, capital of neighboring Cambodia, and U.S . Marine

Corps helicopters had to evacuate Americans there. If the

trend continued, Saigon would also fall .

Ambassador Martin wanted to preserve an atmosphere of

normality and calm in the South Vietnamese capital. He

feared that a sudden massive American evacuation would lead

to the kind of panic that had erupted in Da Nang, and he

87
ernment. During the first part of April, USAF C-141 Starlifters

landed in Saigon with increased frequency to deliver military

cargo to the South Vietnamese . Available to evacuate U.S .

citizens, third country nationals, and selected Vietnamese, at

first they carried only a small fraction of their passenger capacity. U.S. citizens with Vietnamese dependents refused to

leave without them, and Vietnamese dependents faced timeconsuming paperwork. They also wanted to take their extended families with them. Lines grew to a mile or more, and

some people waited for more than twenty-four hours. C-141s

often landed at Tan Son Nhut more frequently than they could

take off because of time-consuming passenger processing and

baggage checks . Consequently, at one time, four vulnerable

Starlifters sat on the ground at Tan Son Nhut. By April 19,

only about 6,000 evacuees had flown out of South Vietnam.

The fixed-wing evacuation went into high gear between April

20 and 28 . Admiral Gaylor and Ambassador Martin simplified

the paperwork that had delayed so many evacuees . President

Ford authorized the evacuation of tens of thousands of "at

risk" Vietnamese, even if they were not American dependents .

In addition to the C-141 s, USAF C- 130s from the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing at Clark AB in the Philippines began flying to

and from Saigon on April 21 . The air evacuation became an

around-the-clock operation, with about twenty C-141s taking

off every day and about twenty C-130s every night. Neither

airplane type was authorized to carry more than 100 passengers, but each one, in the later stages of the airlift, carried 180

or more .

There were other reasons for the accelerated aerial evacuation. By April 21, two-thirds of the country's land area and

twenty-one of forty-four South Vietnamese provincial capitals

were in enemy hands. The defenders of Xuan Loc began withdrawing to Saigon . The North Vietnamese Army cut the main

highway between Saigon and Vung Tau and took crucial

points along the Saigon River, precluding a massive sea lift .

On April 21, President Thieu resigned, hoping new South Vietnamese leadership would persuade the Communists to negotiate . But North Vietnam was not in a mood for compromise .

The Communists sensed total victory and hoped to occupy

88
May. The North Vietnamese publicly announced that they

would not oppose an American aerial evacuation of Saigon but

only if it took place immediately.

On April 22, more than 3,000 evacuees flew out of Saigon .

There were more each day. On April 26 and 27, about 12,000

departed Tan Son Nhut on 46 C-130 and 28 C-141 flights.

Two 374th Tactical Airlift Wing C-130s evacuated 250 dependents of South Vietnamese marines from Vung Tau on the

27th . Shortly afterwards, more C-130s entered the operation,

having deployed from the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing in Arkansas

to the Philippines . Maj . Robert S. Delligatti, USAF, and later

Col . Earl E . Michler, USAF, of the Seventh Air Force supervised the airlift at Tan Son Nhut, working in the Evacuation

Control Center at Tan Son Nhut. They collaborated with Col.

Garvin McCurdy, USAF, DAO Air Attache, and Brig. Gen.

Richard T. Drury, USAF, Pacific Theater Airlift Manager. By

the end of April, the DAO had processed over 40,000 people

for aerial evacuation.

Initially, most evacuees flew to Clark AB in the Philippines,

but on April 23, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos anAmericans and Vietnamese deplane from a 0-130 after evacuation from Vietnam .

89
refugees in his country at a time . There were already more

than 5,000 there . His new policy forced the U.S. Air Force to

airlift refugees to Andersen AFB, Guam, and to Wake Island in

the central Pacific, where the U.S . military services hastily

constructed huge camps .

On April 27, enemy rockets hit Saigon for the first time in

years . They set off a huge fire that left 5,000 people homeless.

The attack ended the C-141 airlift because the Starlifters were

more expensive and vulnerable than the C-130s and because

they were needed for shuttling passengers from the Philippines to Guam and Wake. The C-130 airlift continued, but

not for long . The next day, Communist pilots in captured

A-37s bombed Tan Son Nhut, temporarily halting the Hercules evacuation after only 18 flights had carried out 3,500

people . Ambassador Martin hoped to use sixty C-130 flights

to complete the aerial evacuation of Saigon on April 29, but

Communist rockets frustrated his plans . A predawn artillery

attack destroyed one C-130 and forced the last two to take

off immediately, one with refugees and one with the burning

C-130's crew. The runways also became full of evacuating

South Vietnamese military aircraft and mobs of people demanding to be taken away . By dawn on April 29, the fixedwing evacuation of Saigon was over.

Between April 1 and 29, the U.S . Air Force flew 201 C-141

and 174 C-130 sorties in the evacuation. Between April 5 and

29, these aircraft had airlifted more than 45,000 people from

Saigon, including more than 5,600 U.S. citizens. Thousands of

refugees and many U.S. citizens, including the ambassador,

his staff, and many DAO members, remained in Saigon when

the last C-130s departed. Fourteen North Vietnamese Army

divisions armed with antiaircraft weapons surrounded the city.

At this point, President Ford ordered the final aerial evacuation

of Saigon by helicopter, Operation FREQUENT WIND.

At dawn on April 29, a fleet of Air America UH-1 helicopters

began shuttling evacuees from preselected Saigon rooftops to

the DAD at Tan Son Nhut or to the American embassy. At the

same time, a fleet of buses moved selected evacuees from

predetermined Saigon assembly points to the DAO or to the

embassy. Large Marine Corps CH-53 and CH-46 helicopters

90
coast to transport Marine Corps security forces to protect the

DAO and embassy and to extract evacuees . Each CH-53 could

carry as many as sixty-five passengers .

The U.S. Air Force played a key role in Operation FREQUENT WIND. Ten USAF CH-53 and HH-53 helicopters from

the 56th Special Operations Wing and the 40th Aerospace

Rescue and Recovery Squadron in Thailand had deployed earlier in the month to the USS Midway in the South China Sea.

Operation FREQUENT WIND was the first major operation

involving the use of USAF helicopters from an aircraft carrier.

Nine flew with the Marine Corps helicopters to Saigon for the

final aerial evacuation . Col. Loyd J. Anders Jr . commanded

the USAF contingent. The U.S. Navy provided fighters from

aircraft carriers as air cover for the helicopters, and the U.S .

Air Force flew fighters and gunships, including F-4s, A-7s,

and AC-130s, from bases in Thailand . Some of the F-4s attacked enemy antiaircraft artillery sites near the encircled

capital. The Air Force also provided KC-135 tankers to refuel

the fighters and C-130 airborne command and control aircraft

to handle the air traffic.

Despite careful planning, Operation FREQUENT WIND did

not proceed on schedule. Crowds of panic-stricken Vietnamese

blocked bus routes in downtown Saigon and surrounded the

embassy and DAO complex. South Vietnamese military forces

at Tan Son Nhut demanded evacuation for themselves and

their families. Enemy raids on the airport had knocked out the

Air America helicopter refueling facility, forcing the UH-1 s to

fly all the way to the fleet to refuel. Many more refugees gathered at the U.S . Embassy than expected, and evacuation from

that site did not begin until almost dark . There was confusion

over scheduling with cover flights arriving in Saigon some

three hours before the large helicopters from the fleet. Bad

weather complicated an already confused operation.

During FREQUENT WIND, 71 American military helicopters

flew 662 sorties between Saigon and elements of the Seventh

Fleet. The operation succeeded in extracting more than 7,800

evacuees from the DAO and U.S . Embassy on April 29 and 30,

not counting the U.S . Marines that had landed that day. On 4

round trips between the Midway and Saigon, USAF helicop9 1
tanker, and command and control flights, the U.S . forces flew

a total of 1,422 sorties over Saigon the final day. The operation ended before 9 :00 A.M. on April 30 . Shortly after noon,

Communist flags were flying from Saigon's Presidential Palace.

Although FREQUENT WIND, the final air evacuation of Vietnam, was over, the airlift of Vietnamese refugees to islands in

the Pacific continued. Refugees congregated at Clark AB and

the naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, Andersen AFB

in Guam, and Wake Island . More than 400 Military Airlift

Command (MAC) flights transported 8,556 tons of cargo to the

refugee camps during the spring of 1975 . Starlifters carried

most of the supplies, including bedding, tents, and food. Of

the camps, Guam was by far the most significant. MAC

C-141 s and C-130s made 135 flights to move at least 31,000

refugees from the Philippines to Guam. By mid-May, the island sheltered more than 50,000 Indochinese refugees.

In an operation called NEW ARRIVALS, MAC transports and

commercial airliners transported tens of thousands of refugees

from the Pacific island camps to refugee reception centers in

the continental United States. The movement, which lasted

through the end of summer, took about 600 flights . Refugees

landed at one of several military bases that had been prepared

for them, including Fort Chaffee, Arkansas ; Camp Pendleton,

California; and Eglin AFB, Florida. To reduce the refugee

population on Guam, which became increasingly vulnerable

as typhoon season approached, the Department of Defense

opened a fourth reception center at Fort Indiantown Gap,

Pennsylvania. In Operations NEW LIFE and NEW ARRIVALS,

about 130,000 Indochinese refugees eventually settled in the

United States.

Members of the armed services drew several lessons from

the evacuation experience . Fragmented command and control

hindered the operation, especially during FREQUENT WIND. A

single military commander, and not the ambassador, should

have controlled all military forces involved in the final phases

of the evacuation. Not all participants in FREQUENT WIND

agreed on scheduling, leading to confusion over the launch

time of the large helicopters . A single agency should have

defined the reference hour for execution. The definition of who

92
qualified 

p

expanded the number of refugees to be evacuated . The Vietnamese evacuation demonstrated the value of a single theater

airlift manager, the effectiveness of integrating strategic and

tactical airlift resources, and the critical importance of adequate ground-support personnel to mission success .

The aerial evacuation of South Vietnam was the largest in

history. More than 50,000 people fled by air, the majority on

USAF aircraft. Almost all U.S . citizens left by air. Operation

FREQUENT WIND ended more than twenty years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Cambodian Airlift and Evacuation:

Operation EAGLE PULL

DATES: April 11, 1973-April 17, 1975

LOCATION: Cambodia (Khmer Republic)

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Korat, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon, Udorn,

and U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Bases (RTAFB), Thailand; Tan Son

Nhut Air Base (AB), South Vietnam; Clark AB, Philippines

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

Daniel L. Haulman

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-130, AC-130, EC-130, F-4, RF-4,

HH-53, CH-53, A-7, OV-10, KC-135, C-141

Operations

During the late 1960s, as the war in Vietnam intensified,

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops infiltrated neighboring

Cambodia to build Communist supply bases for attacks in

South Vietnam. Cambodian ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk

seemed unwilling or unable to stop the infiltration . In March

1970, while Sihanouk visited the People's Republic of China,

Lt . Gen. Lon Nol seized power in Phnom Penh, the Cambodian

capital . Nol depended on the United States for aid and announced his opposition to the Communists . In May, he allowed U.S . and South Vietnamese troops to enter Cambodia to

wipe out the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese supply bases.

When those troops left Cambodia later that year, Lon Nol still

faced a combination of antagonists, including Communist

95

WINGS: GROUP:

56th Special Operations 3d Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

60th Military Airlift

307th Strategic SQUADRONS:

374th Tactical Airlift 7th Airborne Command and Control

388th Tactical Fighter 21 st Special Operations

432d Tactical Fighter 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery
Khmer Rougeforces and supporters of Sihanouk, who re

mained in China.

During the early 1970s, the Cambodian Communists attempted to take Phnom Penh in a series of frontal attacks .

Failing in this, the Khmer Rouge embarked on a new strategy

of cutting all supply lines to the Cambodian capital. They

gained increasing amounts of Cambodian territory and threatened to cut all major highways between Phnom Penh and the

countryside . The Cambodian capital survived only with supplies shipped up the Mekong River from South Vietnam and

by a USAF airlift.

In April 1973, the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing began flying

C-130s carrying rice, ammunition, and fuel from U-Tapao

Royal Thai Naval Airfield, Thailand, into Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport. The wing also air-dropped weapons and

food to twenty-five major enclaves across Cambodia, including

Kampong Seila and Neak Luong. By October 1974, the U.S .

Air Force had airlifted about 100, 000 tons of cargo from Thailand to Cambodia on over 6,000 flights.

In 1974, U.S . President Gerald R. Ford and his advisors

grew increasingly cautious about the possibility that American

aircrews would be shot down over Communist-held territory.

The Cambodian (Khmer) air force could not take over the

airlift because its C-123 aircraft were not large or numerous

enough to carry the needed cargo. To continue the airlift and

yet reduce the presence of American military forces in Cambodia, the Military Airlift Command (MAC) contracted in September with a private company called Birdair to furnish aircrews .

In early October, Birdair civilians began to fly all the USAF

C-130s on the Cambodian airlift, continuing to deliver rice,

ammunition, and fuel from U-Tapao to Pochentong and dropping the same kinds of cargo to the enclaves . The Birdair

crews, some with USAF experience, learned to air-drop with

precision, despite high-altitude and high-velocity flights . The

374th Tactical Airlift Wing continued to furnish and maintain

the airplanes.

This arrangement worked well until early 1975, when Communist offensives in both South Vietnam and Cambodia closed

the Mekong River supply fine . The last Mekong River convoy

turned back to Saigon on February 5, when it encountered a

96
PHNOM

PENH

KAMPONG

SEILA NEAK

LUONa

Area of USAF Operations during Cambodian Airlift and Evacuation

barrage of enemy gunfire and mines. Airlift alone could sustain Phnom Penh, as it had Berlin, but only if it was vastly

expanded . Birdair had been flying about ten missions a day,

using five aircrews . Experts estimated that Cambodia would

need a daily minimum of 30 missions, because Phnom Penh

alone required more than 1,000 tons of supplies per day.

The United States reacted to the emergency by increasing the

number of C-130s available for the Cambodian airlift and expanding the Birdair contract. Birdair doubled the number of

97
aircrews and tripled the number of sorties by the end of Feb

ruary, moving impressive amounts of food, munitions, and

fuel from U-Tapao in Thailand to Phnom Penh and the enclaves . Still it was not enough. Phnom Penh had a population of

more than two million people, equivalent to that of Berlin in the

late 1940s, and only an airlift on the scale of the one for Berlin

in 1948-49 would allow it to survive . Moreover, Phnom Penh

needed additional supplies to fight off military attack.

More was needed, but President Ford, aware of growing opposition in Congress, refused to reintroduce USAF aircrews into

the Cambodian airlift . He had asked for about $220 million in

additional aid for Cambodia, but Congress refused to approve it .

Some congressmen, who expected Cambodia to fall in any case,

even demanded a June 30 cutoff for all aid to the country.

To augment the Birdair C-130 airlift, MAC contracted with

two airlines, Airlift International and World Airways, for DC-8

flights . On February 15, they began transporting war materiel

from Thailand to Phnom Penh. By the end of February, the

DC-8s were flying about 550 tons of rice daily on a new route

from Saigon to Pochentong Airport in the Cambodian capital.

In March, MAC contracted with three additional DC-8 airlines,

Trans International, Flying Tiger Line, and Seaboard World, to

carry more food from Saigon to Phnom Penh. At the same

time, Birdair C-130s continued to transport war materiel from

U-Tapao to Pochentong. MAC personnel supervised the double

airlift from South Vietnam and Thailand .

The expanded Cambodian airlift allowed the Lon Nol regime

to survive through March, but the Khmer Rouge continued to

tighten the ring around Phnom Penh, and more enclaves fell.

By April, the end was near. Lon Nol departed Cambodia for

Indonesia on April 1, turning the government over to acting

President Saukham Khoy . On April 4, the United States began

the aerial evacuation of Phnom Penh . The same C-130s and

DC-8s that delivered ammunition and rice from Thailand and

South Vietnam began to transport selected evacuees from Pochentong Airport. A few C-130s flown by USAF crews on routine administrative flights to Phnom Penh also participated in

the fixed-wing evacuation of the Cambodian capital. Between

April 4 and 11, about 875 Cambodians flew to Thailand on

USAF C-130s. Most of them found shelter at a large refugee

98
p pg 

were fifty

two orphans, whom the U.S . Air Force flew from Thailand to

the Philippines on a 60th Military Airlift Wing C-141 . They

flew on to the United States on a MAC contract flight .

Between January 1 and the middle of April 1975, an estimated 2,500 enemy artillery and rocket rounds hit in the

vicinity of Phnom Penh's airport . DC-8 pilots demanded

changes in ramp space to avoid areas most often hit. Increased Khmer Rouge shelling of Pochentong ended all C-130

and DC-8 air-land flights on April 11 . Since mid-February,

DC-8s had flown 770 missions from Saigon to Phnom Penh,

delivering over 36,000 tons of rice, ammunition, medical supplies, and other cargo . During the same period, Birdair flew

more than 1,000 missions to deliver over 20,000 tons of cargo,

mostly war materiel, from Thailand. Deprived of these lifelines,

the Lon Nol government had no hope of survival.

At the time U.S . airplanes stopped flying to Phnom Penh,

the Khmer Rouge appeared ready for the final assault on the

Cambodian capital. John Gunther Dean, U.S . Ambassador to

Cambodia, decided to implement Operation EAGLE PULL, the

final evacuation of U.S . citizens, Cambodian employees of the

U.S. government, and third-country nationals from Phnom

Penh. Eager to avoid a repetition of the chaotic aerial evacuation a couple of weeks earlier from Da Nang, South Vietnam,

Dean and military planners prepared to use helicopters to lift

the evacuees from a defensible soccer field just a few blocks

from the U.S . Embassy. Lt. Gen. John J . Burns, USAF, Commander, Seventh Air Force, served as commander of the joint

operation. He reported to Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler, USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command.

Around 9:00 A.M., April 12, a USAF HH-53 Super Jolly

Green Giant helicopter landed on the field, designated Landing

Zone Hotel, with a four-man combat control team. In the next

few minutes, U.S. Marine Corps CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters

from the USS Okinawa, an amphibious assault ship eight

miles off the Cambodian coast, began landing with a groundsecurity force under the command of Col . Sydney H .

Batchelder Jr., USMC. This force, from the 31 st Marine Amphibious Unit, quickly deployed around the soccer field to

protect the landing zone, but the Cambodians who gathered to

99
Landing Zone "Hotel" in Phnom Penh, Cambodia .

watch the helicopters posed no danger. There was no panic or

chaotic rush to escape . While the first helicopters were landing, ground vehicles carried Americans, selected Cambodians,

and others from the embassy to the soccer field .

As soon as each CH-53 helicopter discharged its marines, it

loaded evacuees and took off to make room for the next helicopter. The landing zone was big enough to accommodate

three of the big choppers simultaneously, if necessary. Ambassador Dean had expected as many as 780 evacuees. Less

than 300 actually showed up, and almost all of them departed

on the first wave of USMC helicopters. USAF CH-53s from the

56th Special Operations Wing that hovered over the area waiting their turn to load passengers were not needed . A pair of

USAF HH-53s from the 40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery

Squadron evacuated the last of the ground-security force,

seven late passengers, and the combat control team. As the

last helicopters took off, Khmer Rouge rockets and mortars

100
HH-53 crews prepare in Thailand for Operation EAGLE PULL.

began to zero in on the soccer field . A helicopter was hit by

ground fire and suffered minor damage . There were no U.S .

casualties and no aircraft lost . The whole operation took less

than two and a half hours .

The Air Force played a greater role in EAGLE PULL than

providing a few HH-53s and CH-53s. To cover the evacuation

and escort the helicopters, F-4s, A-7s, and AC-130s from the

388th and 432d Tactical Fighter Wings flew twenty-six sorties,

but they had to expend no ordnance . A pair of EC-130s from

the 7th Airborne Command and Control Squadron provided

General Burns with air traffic control and linked by radio the

U.S . Embassy with the Joint Rescue Coordination Center in

Thailand. KC-135s from the 307th Strategic Wing orbited for

aerial refueling and radio-relay missions . OV-10s flew sixteen

sorties, ready to provide forward air control if necessary, while

RF-4s flew weather reconnaissance missions.

A total of 287 people left Phnom Penh by USMC and USAF

helicopters on April 12. There were 173 Cambodians, 83 U.S .

citizens, 30 third country nationals, and 1 U.S . citizen dependent. A few reporters, desiring to cover the fall of Phnom

Penh, remained in the Cambodian capital. Most of the Cambodian evacuees had been U.S. government employees or their
family members. 

y 

USS Okinawa and later on to Thailand .

Phnom Penh did not fall for another five days. During that

time, Birdair C-130s continued airdrops over friendly enclaves

and Pochentong Airport. They delivered 457 tons of rice and

371 tons of ammunition between April 13 and 17 on 55

flights . The airdrops ceased on April 17 when the Khmer

Rouge took over Phnom Penh .

The Cambodian airlift was the largest sustained airlift operation between the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49 (Operation VITTLES)

and the airlift to Bosnia (Operation PROVIDE PROMISE) of

1992-96 . More than 5,400 missions to Pochentong delivered

over 123,000 tons of food, ammunition, fuel, and other cargo

in 2 years. In addition to that, more than 3,000 air-drop missions transported almost 39,000 tons of cargo to surrounded

enclaves around Cambodia during the same time . That was

better than three times the cargo air-dropped to Khe Sanh in

1968 . More than 8,400 air-land and air-drop missions delivered 162,000 tons of cargo to Cambodia. Civilian aircrews or

airlines delivered about 60,000 tons of this on some flights.

The Cambodian airlift taught several valuable lessons . Like

Operation VITTLES, it proved airlift can feed and supply a city

surrounded by enemy forces. Between early February and

mid-April 1975, Phnom Penh depended on airlift alone for food

and military supplies . The airlift ultimately failed, however,

because the United States refused to finance the increasing

level of supplies needed and because enemy ground forces

were able to close Pochentong. Operators of the C-130s and

DC-8s delivering supplies to Phnom Penh used the airport

long after it came under enemy artillery fire by altering flying

and taxiing patterns, moving off-load areas, and temporarily

suspending flights . No airlift aircraft were lost, and only eight

were damaged .

For the first time in USAF history, civilian-contract aircrews

flew airlift missions into an airfield under enemy fire . The

Cambodian airlift proved that contracting between the Military

Airlift Command and private airlines could work. The Birdair

flights represented a truly combined effort of civilian aircrews,

military aircraft, and military maintenance crews. USAF supervision of the DC-8 airlift flights revealed advantages and

102
gg 

money, but civilian airlines

did not offer the same flexibility and responsiveness of a

purely "blue suit" operation.

The final evacuation of Phnom Penh also taught some valuable lessons . Planning for Operation EAGLE PULL began years

in advance of its execution, and the preparations paid off.

Careful selection of the landing zone and provision for enough

resources, in combination with the element of surprise, enabled the operation to proceed without the panic and chaos

that attended the previous evacuation of Da Nang in neighboring South Vietnam. Both loyalist Cambodians and Khmer

Rouge expected the final evacuation to take place with fixedwing aircraft at Pochentong Airport, not by helicopters from a

soccer field .

If anything, Operation EAGLE PULL committed too many

resources to the evacuation. No one could tell in advance the

degree of opposition the aerial evacuation would encounter.

Fighters and gunships flew missions without expending any

ordnance . Embassy officials overestimated the number of

evacuees, forcing helicopters to return to their home bases or

ships without passengers. The helicopters flew holding patterns concentrated in a single area, risking damage from enemy antiaircraft weapons .

On the other hand, the evacuation of Phnom Penh demonstrated interservice cooperation. USMC and USAF helicopter

crews worked well with those of USN ships and USAF aircraft

under a single operational commander. Unfortunately, not all

of the operation participants agreed on the meaning of terms .

For example, to some "L-Hour" meant the time the USMC

hehcopters launched from the USS Okinawa, while to others

it meant the time they landed in Phnom Penh. The use of

ultrahigh-frequency radio networks would have improved

communication between the helicopters and the controlling

EC-130s. The HH-53 helicopters proved superior in some respects to the CH-53s in the operation. Unlike the CH-53s, the

HH-53s were air-refuelable by HC-130 aircraft, which allowed

them to have longer ranges and to hover and circle longer.

The aerial evacuation of Phnom Penh provided both the Air

Force and the Navy practice for the larger evacuation of Saigon

at the end of the month, but the earlier operation in fact went

103
much smoother. The final evacuation of Americans from South

Vietnam precipitated a rush of refugees desperately attempting

to flee the country, because they had seen what happened after

the fall of Cambodia. Not long after the Khmer Rouge took

Phnom Penh on April 17, the Communists forced all of the

city's residents to move into the countryside and began a series

of mass executions that eventually left as many as two million

people dead . The Khmer Rouge tortured and enslaved many of

the survivors. The Cambodian airlift and Operation EAGLE

PULL delayed the coming of this dark age and allowed some of

its potential victims to escape to freedom.
DATES: May 12-15, 1975

Crisis in Southeast Asia:

Mayaguez Rescue

LOCATIONS: Cambodia and Gulf of Thailand

OVERSEAS BASES USED: U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base

(RTAFB), Thailand ; Cubi Point and Clark Air Base (AB), Philippines;

Kadena AB, Okinawa

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS :

Daniel L. Haulman

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: CH-53, HH-53, A-7, F-4, F-111, AC-130,

C-130, HC-130, KC-135, OV-10, C-141, RF-4, U-2, C-9, C-5

Operations

On May 12, 1975, as the American civilian merchant ship SS

Mayaguez on a voyage from Hong Kong to Thailand passed

about sixty miles off the Cambodian mainland, a gunboat pulled

alongside, and armed Khmer Rouge soldiers climbed aboard.

They quickly seized the vessel and its forty-man crew, but not

before one of the crewmen sent a "mayday" distress message.

When U.S . President Gerald Ford learned that an American

ship had been seized in international waters, he responded

105

WINGS: SQUADRONS:

41st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 7th Airborne Command and Control

56th Special Operations 16th Special Operations

60th Military Airlift

62d Military Airlift

307th Strategic

314th Tactical Airlift

347th Tactical Fighter

374th Tactical Airlift

388th Tactical Fighter

432d Tactical Fighter

L 437th Military Airlift
MPONG

GULF OF b .-j S_OM

THAILAND

Area of USAF Operations during Mayaguez Crisis

immediately. He remembered that North Koreans had seized

the U.S . Navy ship Pueblo in 1968 and held its crew for a year,

not releasing them until the United States had issued an

apology. Just a month before the Mayaguez seizure, Cambodia and South Vietnam had fallen to Communist forces, suggesting that the United States was a "paper tiger." President

Ford sought a quick solution to the crisis through diplomacy,

but that option faded quickly. Since the collapse of the Phnom

Penh government a month earlier, the United States had no

formal diplomatic ties with Cambodia. Ford tried negotiating

through China and the United Nations, but neither produced

any immediate results . He turned from the state to the defense department .

106
Marines board a CH-53 helicopter bound for Koh Tang .

President Ford ordered military aircraft to search the Gulf of

Thailand for the Mayaguez. USAF F-111 s from Thailand located the ship near Koh Tang (Tang Island), about thirty-four

miles southwest of the mainland city of Kompong Som. Reconnaissance flights suggested that the Cambodians were holding

the Mayaguez crew on the tiny island . The President hoped to

rescue the American hostages before they were taken to the

Cambodian mainland .

At the time, the United States still maintained powerful

military forces in Thailand and the Philippines . Lt. Gen. John

J . Burns, USAF, Commander, Seventh Air Force, and the U.S .

Military Advisory Group in Thailand assumed local command

of the rescue operation, reporting to Adm. Noel A. M. Gayler,

USN, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command . USAF F-4s,

A-7s, F-l11s, and AC-130s from Thai bases kept watch over

the Mayaguez and Koh Tang, prevented the ship from being

taken elsewhere, and stopped virtually all shipping between

the island and the Cambodian mainland . They sank or damaged seven Cambodian gunboats, but they could not prevent a

fishing boat from voyaging from Koh Tang to Kompong Som on

the mainland, despite their use of rockets and riot control

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contain some of the Mayaguez crew. Actually, all of the captured Americans were aboard the fishing boat, but Burns believed that most of them remained either on the ship or on

Koh Tang.

U.S. air and ground forces concentrated at U-Tapao, the

nearest Thai base to the scene . Among them were USAF

CH-53 Knife helicopters from the 56th Special Operations

Wing and HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant choppers from the

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron . Both helicopter types bore armor plating and machine guns, and the

HH-53s could refuel in the air. One of the CH-53s, loaded

with air policemen, crashed on the way to U-Tapao, killing all

twenty-three men aboard . Meanwhile, 16 Military Airlift Command C-141s carried more than 1,100 U.S . Marines from

Kadena AB in Okinawa and Cubi Point in the Philippines to

the Thai base . The movement took twenty-two hours . At the

same time, a flotilla of U.S . Navy ships, including the aircraft

carrier USS Coral Sea and the destroyers USS Henry B. Wilson

and USS Harold E. Holt, voyaged toward the Gulf of Thailand.

General Burns and his staff planned to use about 230 marines to board the Mayaguez and assault Koh Tang simultaneously, hoping to find the Mayaguez crew members on either

the ship or the island . Pacific Command intelligence sources

estimated as few as 19 enemy soldiers on the island, although

the Defense Intelligence Agency warned that there could be

200 or more. Lt. Col. Randall W. Austin, USMC, Commander

of the Marines destined for Koh Tang, reconnoitered the island

in a USAF aircraft on May 14 and expected little opposition.

Normal amphibious procedure called for a three to one numerical superiority for an attack and a preliminary bombardment. Burns refused preparatory air strikes on Koh Tang because he did not want to hit the Mayaguez crewmen he

believed to be there .

Early on May 15, the rescue operation began. Three USAF

helicopters transported forty-eight Marines to the Holt. As the

Holt sailed toward the Mayaguez, USAF A-7s dropped tear gas

cartridges on the decks of the merchant ship to immobilize any

enemy who might be aboard. Shortly afterwards, the Holt pulled

alongside the Mayaguez, and Marines with gas masks boarded

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start the old merchant ship's engines, so the Holt attached a line

and began towing the ship away from the vicinity of Koh Tang.

At this point, the Cambodian government broadcast a message

that it was going to release the Mayaguez. The message contained no reference to the crew members, who were still in an

unknown location. Since General Burns reported that the Mayaguez crewmen were probably on Koh Tang, President Ford

directed that military operations continue .

Eight USAF helicopters loaded with about 180 Marines attempted to land on the northern side of Koh Tang. Disaster

followed . An entire entrenched enemy battalion heavily armed

with automatic weapons, rocket launchers, mortars, heavycaliber machine guns, and grenades opened fire on the big

helicopters as they approached . Three went down, including

one with most of the Marines' forward air control radio equipment. Four other helicopters suffered severe damage, one of

them returning to Thailand without unloading its men. Only

one escaped heavy damage. The helicopters delivered about

130 Marines to Koh Tang in the first assault wave .

The Cambodian soldiers outnumbered and outgunned the

U.S . Marines, who were fragmented into three groups. They

needed air support, but it was slow in coming. A USAF for

ward air control A-7 flew overhead to direct air strikes but had

difficulty communicating with the Marines on Koh Tang. Some

of the ground forces contacted the airplane with survival radios . Flying high and fast, the A-7 could not determine the

exact location of friendly or enemy forces on the island and

refused to direct heavy fire into areas that might contain

Americans. General Burns had ordered that supporting fire

from the air be limited to small-caliber gunfire or riot-control

gas to prevent casualties among possible Mayaguez crewmen.

While the fighting on Koh Tang continued, reconnaissance

aircraft spotted the Mayaguez crewmen in a fishing boat in

the Gulf of Thailand . The Wilson intercepted the boat and took

on the liberated Americans. Now both the Mayaguez and its

crew were free, but the fighting on Koh Tang continued.

Austin needed reinforcements to allow him to fight off the

enemy until he could unite his scattered troops and withdraw

safely. Burns' superiors debated the need for putting more

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Wreckage of U.S. helicopters on Koh Tang .

Marines on an island from which they were to withdraw but

eventually decided a second assault wave was necessary, even

with seven of the helicopters destroyed or severely damaged.

Four surviving helicopters landed Marine reinforcements on

Koh Tang around noon, bringing the number of Americans on

the island to about 220. A fifth helicopter was hit repeatedly

and had to turn back without unloading its troops .

Once General Burns learned that the Mayaguez crewmen

were not on Koh Tang, he directed heavier air bombardment of

the island . A series of F-4, A-7, and AC-130 air strikes reduced enemy fire . American strafing increased, first with 20-

and 40-millimeter ammunition and later with 105-millimeter

ordnance from the AC-130 gunships. In the late afternoon,

Maj. Robert W. Undorf, USAF, arrived in an OV-10 Bronco
could fly lower and slower than the A-7, allowed Undorf to

pinpoint the positions of the Marines and to direct more accurate gunfire from the USAF fighters and gunships. At about

the same time, the two groups of Marines on the western side

of the island established a combined perimeter, while a search

and rescue HH-53 helicopter evacuated twenty-five Marines

isolated on the eastern side of the island . KC-135s and

HC-130s orbiting over the Gulf of Thailand refueled the fighters and helicopters . To disrupt the enemy defenders psychologically, a C-130 dropped a huge 15,000-pound BLU-82

bomb, the largest non-nuclear explosive in the American arsenal, on the southern part of the island . It fell far enough away

not to injure any Marines, leaving a crater the size of a football

field . By then, the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea had arrived,

but it used its fighters to hit targets near Kompong Som on

the Cambodian mainland in order to prevent their intervention

in the island fighting . Other U.S. Navy ships bombarded Koh

Tang to support the Marines .

As darkness approached, Burns had very few USAF helicopters left for the extraction of the almost 200 troops remaining

on Koh Tang. During the insertions and search and rescue

attempts, eleven helicopters had been destroyed or damaged .

Only three USAF helicopters accomplished the final extractions, two of them making repeated trips. Picking up the last

of the Marines was extremely dangerous, not only because the

enemy continued to challenge the helicopters and soldiers

with heavy fire, but also because of almost total darkness . Air

Force fighters and gunships, directed by additional OV-10s,

provided air support for the final extractions. The helicopters

took the Marines to the Coral Sea and the Holt, each equipped

with a small helicopter deck. The troops had been on Koh

Tang a total of fourteen hours .

The Mayaguez rescue operation was a qualified success.

The primary purpose of the mission, the rescue of the fortyman Mayaguez crew and the return of their ship, had been

accomplished . The United States had demonstrated that it

would not tolerate the seizure of its ships in international

waters and discouraged Khmer Rouge piracy, which had

threatened other ships in the Gulf of Thailand . The action
willingness and ability of the administration to respond to

Communist challenges, a confidence that had fractured after

the fall of the Cambodian and South Vietnamese governments .

The Mayaguez operation, on the other hand, aroused a

great deal of negative criticism. Counting the helicopter that

crashed in preliminary movements in Thailand, the U.S. Air

Force lost four CH-53 helicopters. Enemy fire badly damaged

eight others. More important than the loss of aircraft was the

loss of life . In the assault on Koh Tang, the United States lost

eighteen lives, most of them in one destroyed helicopter. The

helicopter crash in Thailand took the lives of another twentythree USAF personnel. In the contingency as a whole, the

United States suffered ninety-one casualties, including fortyone dead and fifty wounded, to save the lives of forty men who

might have been released without military action. Viewed as a

whole, the operation cost more lives that it saved .

Of all the lessons learned in the Mayaguez incident, the first

was that inadequate intelligence leads to disastrous results .

American intelligence failed to locate the Mayaguez crewmen,

leading planners to think that they were either still on the ship

or on nearby Koh Tang, when in fact they were in neither place.

American intelligence also failed to predict accurately the

strength of the enemy on Koh Tang. Observers, including the

USMC commander, who had flown over the island the day before the assault, expected only token resistance . The USAF helicopter crews and Marines flew into an ambush. They should

have known better. The USAF and USN aircraft that kept watch

over the Mayaguez and Koh Tang on May 14 had attracted

considerable antiaircraft gunfire from the island . Given the short

suspense, the scanty intelligence is more understandable.

Should American aircraft have bombarded Koh Tang before

the Marines attempted to land there? After all, preliminary

bombardment was a traditional part of Marine Corps amphibious doctrine . But General Burns believed that Mayaguez

crewmen were on the tiny island and did not want to endanger

them. If he had thought the crew was not on Koh Tang, there

would have been no reason for the assault.

Air support for the Marines was initially poor. This was not

because the EC-130 airborne command and control center
was too far action, as some critics have

charged . Operation commanders did not want to endanger the

Mayaguez crewmen they believed to be on Koh Tang, the enemy destroyed a helicopter that contained most of the Marines' forward air control radio equipment, and the fast and

high-flying A-7 could not pinpoint the location of friendly or

enemy positions . The OV-10 proved to be a more effective

forward air control aircraft than the faster and higher-flying

A-7 . The poor selection of landing sites also contributed to the

inadequate initial air support, because it placed friendly and

enemy troops in such close proximity that heavy air strikes

would have resulted in fratricide .

The Cambodians abandoned the Mayaguez and released its

crew at the same time the costly assault on Koh Tang was

beginning, suggesting that military action was premature and

unnecessary . There was no previously prepared operational

plan to build on or consult . The crisis began on May 12, and

President Ford sent American men into battle three days later.

He could have allowed more time for diplomacy to work, but

he wanted to rescue the Mayaguez crewmen before they could

be taken to the mainland . Even if the United States had had

diplomatic relations with the new Cambodian regime, there

was no assurance that it exercised full control over the Khmer

Rouge forces on Koh Tang and at Kompong Som.

Riot-control gas, used extensively in the Mayaguez operation, was not very effective as a military instrument. It did not

prevent the fishing boat with the Mayaguez crew from leaving

Koh Tang and reaching the Cambodian mainland on May 14.

Gas played no useful part in the retaking of the Mayaguez,

because the ship was empty when it was boarded . A change in

the wind made the gas useless on Koh Tang during the fighting there, blowing it out to sea.

The BLU-82 "daisy-cutter" bomb had little effect on the

battle on Koh Tang. It was dropped far enough from the Marines

to avoid injuring them, but it was also far enough from the

battle line to make little difference there . It had been designed

to clear helicopter landing zones in the jungles of Southeast

Asia and had been very effective for that purpose, but that

was not how it was used on Koh Tang. Dropped late in the

fighting, the big bomb had little more than a psychological effect
during the operation, although the football-field size area it

cleared might have also contained some enemy troops and

weapons . More effective were the air strikes of A-7s, F-4s, and

AC-130s .

Although the initial U.S . air attacks from the Coral Sea on

the Cambodian mainland occurred just before President Ford

learned that the Mayaguez crew was free, they continued afterwards . Some critics have suggested that the subsequent air

strikes were useless bluster, because the purpose of the operation had already been achieved . The air raids were designed not to free the crew but to prevent hostile Cambodian

forces on the mainland from joining in the battle on Koh Tang,

which was not yet over.

The United States suffered strained relations with Thailand

as a result of the Mayaguez operation . Anxious to avoid confrontations with its new Communist neighbors, the Thai government officially protested the use of its territory to stage

U.S. attacks against Cambodia. For diplomatic reasons, one

C-5 and thirteen C-141s transported all remaining U.S. Marines in Thailand back to Okinawa and the Philippines within

twenty-four hours of the assault on Koh Tang . The Thai government expelled all U.S. military forces from Thailand within

a year, but that decision had been made in March of 1975.

The Mayaguez affair was the last major American military

operation in Southeast Asia.
Crisis in Tropical Africa:

Operations ZAIRE I and II

DATES: May 16-June 16, 1978

LOCATION: Zaire

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS :

WINGS:

60th Military Airlift

62d Military Airlift

63d Military Airlift

349th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)

436th Military Airlift

437th Military Airlift

438th Military Airlift

443d Military Airlift Wing, Training

445th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)

514th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)

Daniel L. Haulman

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Rhein-Main Air Base (AB), Bitburg AB,

Ramstein AB, Germany; Torrejon AB, Rota AB, Spain; Royal Air

Force (RAF) Mildenhall, United Kingdom; Brussels (Melsbroek),

Belgium; Solenzara (Corsica), Colmar, Avord, France ; Pisa (Camp

Darby), Italy; Geneva, Switzerland ; Ascension Island ; Roberts Field

(Monrovia), Liberia; Dakar, Senegal; Kinshasa, Kamina, Lubumbashi,

Zaire ; Agadir, Morocco; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; Libreville, Gabon ;

Lome, Togo

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-141, C-5

Operations

After Congo President Mobutu Sese Seko replaced Moise

Tshombe of Katanga in 1965, he developed a dictatorship that

was especially unpopular in Katanga, where rich copper mines

and cobalt resources attracted European and American miners

and engineers . Mobutu renamed the country Zaire and Katanga
Province, Shaba. Katangan rebels who had fled to neighboring

Angola invaded Shaba Province in May of 1978, hoping to drive

Mobutu from power, or at least liberate the province from his

control . The rebels captured the provincial capital of Kolwezi and

the city of Mutshatsa. The fighting and rebel-led mass executions trapped and endangered almost 3,000 Belgian, French,

and American mining and engineering workers .

Area of USAF Operations during ZAIRE I and II

Belgium, France, and the United States, all members of the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, considered intervention.

They had more to fear than the threat to the lives of their

citizens in Zaire. Cuba had some 43,000 troops in at least 14

African nations, including newly independent Angola, from

which the rebels had struck. Western nations relied more on

Zaire than any other nation for scarce cobalt, which came

primarily from Shaba Province . If Zaire became a Communist

state like Angola and Cuba, the Soviet Union might be able to

deprive the West of one of its most valuable resources in the

Cold War. There were other reasons for intervention. The

KOLWEZI

" LUBUMBASHI
United States had long supported operations in Zaire designed

to prevent the country's dissolution, and as dictatorial as

Mobutu was, he seemed to be a lesser evil than a divided or

Marxist Zaire. In 1978, Belgium still had thousands of citizens

and a billion-dollar investment in Zaire.

Western leaders considered launching a rescue operation

similar to DRAGON ROUGE in 1964 in which Belgian paratroopers dropping into the Congo from American transports

had saved the lives of many foreigners . A French airdrop of

Moroccan paratroops in 1977 had driven the Katangans back

into Angola . The USAF Military Airlift Command (MAC) prepared to airlift elements of the 82d Airborne Division from

North Carolina to central Africa, marshaling C-141 Starlifters

and C-130 Hercules aircraft for the operation.

When U.S. President James (Jimmy) E . Carter learned that

most U.S. citizens in Shaba had been able to leave, he refused

to commit ground troops after all. Just a few years earlier, he

had witnessed the collapse of South Vietnam after the loss of

tens of thousands of American lives. Carter decided instead to

support logistically a Belgian and French paratroop operation

in Shaba by airlifting fuel, ammunition, equipment, and supplies from Europe and the United States to Zaire . He scrupulously consulted Congress and followed the guidelines of the

International Security Assistance Act of 1977. The operation

might have involved newly trained female Air Force pilots, and

Congress had not yet approved their participation in combat.

President Carter decided that American cargo airplanes flying

to Zaire would avoid the combat zone in Shaba.

To coordinate the various routes for the complicated airlift,

MAC set up airlift control elements (ALCE) at various locations

in Europe and Africa. During the first phase of the operation,

ALOE personnel operated from Solenzara (Corsica), France ;

Dakar, Senegal; Brussels, Belgium; and Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, Zaire . Later, MAC set up other ALCEs at Agadir, Morocco ; Lome, Togo; Abidjan, Ivory Coast; and Libreville, Gabon .

Mission-support teams deployed at Roberts Field (Monrovia),

Liberia; Kamina, Zaire; Colmar, France ; and Geneva, Switzerland. Ground personnel to operate these ALCEs and missionsupport teams came from the U.S . Air Forces in Europe

(USAFE) and some of MAC's C-130 units .
Moroccan troops prepare to board a C-141 after service in Zaire.

In mid-May 1978, Belgium and France chartered airliners

and military airplanes, including C-130s and C-160s, to airlift

paratroops from Europe to central Africa . About 1,300 Belgian

paratroops took off from Brussels, while 600 members of the

French Foreign Legion flew from Corsica to Zaire . On the

morning of May 20, Belgian troops aboard C-130s landed at

Kolwezi's airport and began moving into the rebel-held city. At

the same time, French paratroops secured major sections of

the city, interrupting a mass execution. No major battle followed . The rebels retreated, allowing the Belgian and French

troops to gather the European workers who survived the rebel

invasion and executions. Flown to other parts of Zaire, the

refugees boarded commercial airliners to Europe. By May 21,

about 2,100 refugees had flown to Brussels or Paris. The next

day, as more European civilians headed from Africa to Europe,

Belgian and French troops began withdrawing from Kolwezi .

U.S. airlifters supported the Belgian and French combat

operation, providing crucial fuel, ammunition, vehicles, and

other equipment and supplies . Between May 16 and 27, MAC

cargo aircraft transported 931 tons of cargo and 124 passengers to Zaire on 42 C-141 and 1 C-5 missions . Twenty-eight of

the C-141 s in what was called ZAIRE I came from the 437th
Jersey, while the C-5 came from the 436th Military Airlift

Wing in Delaware . Loading at bases in Germany, Belgium,

France, Italy, and Spain, the cargo aircraft landed for replacement crews and refueling at Roberts Field in Liberia and at

Dakar in Senegal . Using these staging bases on the west coast

of Africa allowed the MAC airplanes to fly over the Atlantic

Ocean instead of over potentially hostile territory. In Zaire,

they landed at Kinshasa, the capital, and at Kamina and

Lubumbashi near the combat zone .

Ten C-141 missions from Brussels, capital of Belgium, to

Kamina transported more than one hundred tons of cargo . At

first, the Starlifters staged at Roberts Field, but a shortage

of fuel there forced them to switch to Dakar. Other C-141s

transported forty-two tons of aircraft bulk-fuel bladder systems

from Camp Darby near Pisa, Italy, to Kinshasa. Four bladderconfigured Starlifters then shuttled 352 tons of fuel from the

Zairian capital to Kamina in 12 missions . Belgian C-130s

flying troops and refugees between Kamina and Kolwezi were

thus able to refuel .

French troops who flew from Zaire to Corsica observe a C-5.
For the French, American C-141s and a C-5 transported

437 tons of military cargo and 120 passengers from Solenzara

to Lubumbashi, staging through Dakar. The C-5, then the

largest airplane in the world, carried a fuel truck that was too

large for the Starlifters or any of the French and Belgian airplanes . C-141s also shuttled between Dakar and Lubumbashi

carrying military vehicles, supplies, and fuel .

The second phase of the airlift was called ZAIRE II . Between

May 31 and June 16, 1978, American air transports helped

the Belgian and French soldiers to withdraw from Zaire to

Europe and replaced them with black African troops . Sixtyone C-141 Starlifter missions and 11 C-5 Galaxy missions

moved 1,619 tons of cargo and 1,225 passengers during this

phase . To improve inadequate communications between ALCEs

along the air routes, American C-141s transported satellite

equipment from Europe to Africa. Fourteen missions airlifted

809 French troops and 225 tons of cargo from Lubumbashi to

Corsica . Most of the Belgian troops and refugees flew from

Zaire to Europe on Belgian military and chartered aircraft, but

the United States devoted 6 Starlifter missions to move 129

tons of cargo in support of the Belgian withdrawal.

Fifty C-141 and C-5 missions moved 1,214 tons of cargo as

well as 416 troops from Morocco, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal,

and Togo to Zaire to replace the Belgian and French forces .

The aircraft carried jeeps, trucks, ammunition, communication

gear, small arms, mobile kitchens, and medical supplies. Replacement of white Europeans with black Africans during the

Zaire contingency stifled propaganda from Communist nations

that the operation was another example of white European

oppression of black Africa. The U.S Air Force airlifted supplies

and vehicles from Avord and Colmar to Lubumbashi for the

African troops. A relief airlift also contributed to favorable

world public opinion . Two C-141 missions transported fiftyone tons of International Red Cross food and medical supplies

from Geneva to Lubumbashi and Kinshasa to combat hunger

and disease in Zaire.

MAC aircrews and aircraft that took part in the Zaire contingency in 1978 came from seven wings of the Twenty-First

and Twenty-Second Air Forces. A third of USAF participants in

the operation were members of the Air Force Reserve assigned

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the active wings with which they were associated . Among the

participating Reservists was Lt. Kathleen R. Cosand, one of

the first female Air Force pilots who completed training in

September 1977 . Various tactical airlift wings provided

ground personnel for the ALCEs and mission-support teams,

but USAF C-130 aircraft did not participate in the contingency flights .

The experience of ZAIRE I and II in 1978 taught the Military

Airlift Command and the Air Force some valuable lessons .

Inadequate communications at first endangered the success of

the operation. If American combat troops had deployed by air

from the United States to central Africa, as originally planned,

very good but very bulky and heavy communication gear

would have accompanied them. When those flights were cancelled, MAC decided to scale back flights of communication

equipment. The gear subsequently deployed and set up at

Corsica, Kinshasa, Kamina, and Lubumbashi was not adequate, because it lacked sufficient power to span the enormous distances between some of the ALCEs. At the start of

ZAIRE II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the deployment

of satellite terminals to solve the problem. Terminals set up in

Corsica, Morocco, Senegal, Togo, and two bases in Zaire allowed almost simultaneous command and control communications . At the conclusion of the Zaire contingency in 1978,

MAC recommended that quick-reaction communication packages, including satellite terminals, be available to the Air

Force for similar operations . MAC also recommended other

communication improvements, such as equipment and software to allow encoding of transmitted weather data. The command further advised that every deployed ALCE should have

access to the Defense Communications System's voice telephone network.

As in previous operations to the Congo (Zaire) in the early

1960s, many airfields in Africa lacked adequate infrastructure

or supplies to support extensive or sustained airlift opera

tions . Shortages of fuel, support facilities, communication

equipment, potable water, food, shelter, and ground transportation complicated the airlift . For example, lack of aircraft fuel

at Roberts Field in Monrovia forced some flights to go to Dakar
to stay over twenty miles away, resulting in poor communications between the crew quarters and the airfield . The Military

Airlift Command had to send large amounts of equipment and

supplies to allow the African bases to support the deployment

of large numbers of U.S . military personnel, including rotating

aircrews, ground crews, ALCEs, refuelers, and communications technicians . Enough bases provided refueling support

for the C-141s on the ground, but ZAIRE I and II demonstrated the need to continue modification of the Starlifters for

in-flight fueling capability .

ZAIRE I demonstrated the necessity to deploy the ALCEs

before the arrival of the first cargo airplanes. Sometimes the

ALCEs did not arrive at an airfield until after aircrews, who

needed points of contact at each base to give them information

such as airfield fuel supplies, aircraft parking space, and personnel support facilities . They also required more information

on Africa, including current aeronautical charts on the area.

ZAIRE I and II also confirmed the need for more prepositioning

of equipment and supplies to allow a sequenced flow of aircraft

along the MAC worldwide routes and to reduce overconcentration of resources at any one base prior to the actual flights .

Some of the problems to surface were organizational. Various commands confused MAC with overlapping airlift requests . The command identified a need for one Joint Chiefs of

Staff agency to consolidate and validate airlift requirements

during a contingency . MAC also concluded that more staff,

support personnel, and time should be devoted to planning for

such a contingency and that staff functions had to be more

clearly defined. The redundant requests for information inundated the ALCEs. A central point of contact for data would

protect subordinate airlift agencies from extraneous requests

for information that would interfere with their ability to accomplish the missions .

Various computer systems were available for the Zaire airlift

in 1978, including the Joint Operational Planning System, the

World-Wide Military Communications Control System Intercomputer Network, and the Integrated Military Airlift Planning System, but users demanded more computer support. For example,

122
mation at short notice .

One important lesson from ZAIRE I and II was that, among

the nations of the Free World and possibly in the world at

large, only the United States had the capacity for massive

airlift operations involving the transportation of large quantities of fuel and bulk cargo. At the time, only the United States

had an aircraft like the C-5, able to handle oversized cargo .

MAC's large fleet of C-141 heavy-cargo airplanes was unmatched by any other nation. Using these tremendous capabilities, the United States provided the Belgian-French paratroop operation with its logistical foundation and replaced the

European troops with soldiers of sub-Saharan African nations .

Of all the U.S. military services, the Air Force proved to be

the most useful instrument for the ZAIRE contingency in

1978. The need for a quick response over a long distance to a

country in the interior of a continent called more for airlift

than sea lift . The U.S . Army would have played a larger role if

the President had decided to deploy American combat troops,

but he did not .

There were few diplomatic problems. Spanish officials denied

the use of Torrejon AB as a staging base when third country

nationals such as French or Belgians were aboard. Still, the

State Department was able to secure blanket clearances to

fly over and land in most countries, with waivers of requirements to list aircraft tail numbers, aircraft commanders, and

loads. The 1978 ZAIRE operation attracted far more international support than the similar 1964 DRAGON ROUGE operation to the same country. Many sub-Saharan nations had

grown suspicious of the large contingent of Soviet-supplied

Cuban troops in Africa and were more concerned about Soviet

imperialism than a return to European or American colonialism. French diplomacy in the French-speaking countries of

sub-Saharan Africa contributed to the suspicious attitude toward the Soviet Union.

ZAIRE I and II accomplished important foreign policy goals of

the United States. ZAIRE I saved the lives of thousands of people, most of whom were citizens of nations allied with the United

States. ZAIRE II transported black African troops to replace the

white soldiers from Europe, thus avoiding the perception of

123
preserve the unity of Zaire, which might have suffered the

secession of Shaba Province and a resultant civil war. The

operation also prevented a Marxist government from coming to

power in Zaire, which could have led to a larger number of

Soviet-supplied Cuban troops in Africa. Finally, ZAIRE I and II

demonstrated the ability of the United States and its Air Force

to transport by air extraordinary amounts of crucial cargo over

long distances in short periods of time, an ability that is crucial in a world of proliferating contingencies .
LOCATION : Iran

Crisis in Iran:

Operation EAGLE CLAW

DATES: December 8, 1978-April 25, 1980

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Hellenikon Air Base (AB), Athens,

Greece; Masirah Island, Oman ; Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

Edward T. Russell

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-5, C-141, EC-130, MC-130

Operations

In the mid-1970s, Islamic fundamentalists, urged on by the

exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, grew more and more dissatisfied with the leadership, reforms, and government of Iran,

under Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. In August, 1978, approximately 44,000 Americans, including 700 military members, 250 defense department employees, and 8,000 defenserelated contractor personnel lived in Iran. In early December,

when antigovernment demonstrations in Iran began to

threaten the well-being of U.S. military dependents in the

country, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the Military

Airlift Command (MAC) to fly out dependents wishing to leave

Iran . Consequently, on December 8-9, the Twenty-First Air

Force flew 2 C-5 and 9 C-141 special assignment airlift missions carrying 903 persons from Mehrabad Airport in Tehran,

the capital of Iran, to bases in the United States and Germany . Throughout the remainder of the month, violence and

disorder mounted, leading the U.S. Department of State to

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NUMBERED AIR FORCE: WINGS:

Twenty-First 1 st Special Operations

436th Military Airlift

DIVISION : 437th Military Airlift

322d Airlift 438th Military Airlift
By the end of December, the JCS, at the request of the Secretary of State, directed MAC to provide space-available seating

on scheduled MAC flights from Iran to dependents of American citizens . In response, MAC increased the number of regularly scheduled missions to Tehran to two a day. C-5s and

C-141s flew these missions equipped with the maximum

number of seats. The airlift continued throughout January 1979

amidst further demonstrations, strikes, and general turmoil.

The Shah fled the country on January 16 and Khomeini

triumphantly returned on February 1 . He appointed a government four days later and began to transform Iran into a

theocratically ruled Islamic state. In addition to draconian

domestic measures, he completely abandoned the Shah's proWestern orientation and adopted a foreign policy of absolute

hostility toward the United States and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics . In February, an estimated 1 million people

demonstrated in Tehran, and at least 500 died in a clash

between factions.

As a result of this turmoil, the U.S. Department of State

ordered increased efforts to evacuate all American dependents

and nonessential industrial and military personnel from Iran.

On February 8, MAC added more missions to the scheduled

flights from Tehran. On February 10, the Iranians closed Mehrabad Airport, forcing suspension of airlift operations. Altogether,

between December 9, 1978, and February 10, 1979, 34 C-5 and

87 C-141 flights airlifted 5,732 passengers, 687 tons of cargo,

and 169 pets from Tehran. On February 11, in anticipation of a

possible requirement to provide additional U.S. military support

for evacuation operations in Iran, the JCS ordered MAC's Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) to deploy six HH-53

helicopters and five HC-130 tankers from Royal Air Force Woodbridge, United Kingdom, to Incirlik AB, Turkey. The JCS also

tasked the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, to deploy to

Incirlik AB one combat-equipped Marine infantry detachment

that could reinforce the U.S . Embassy compound in Tehran

during an evacuation . Furthermore, in case an immediate

evacuation became necessary, MAC ordered six C-141 aircraft

at Athens, Greece, on alert.

12 6
On February 13, the JCS ordered the Marine detachment to

stay at Lajes AB, Azores, on alert, prepared for further deployment within three hours following notification . The JCS also

directed the ARKS task force to remain at Sigonella, Italy,

pending further guidance . The next morning, armed guerrillas

stormed the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran and seized

102 Americans hostage until Khomeini security forces, responding to U.S. requests for assistance, returned the embassy to U.S. control. After this action, the JCS directed the

ARKS task force to leave Italy and proceed to Incirlik. The

government of Turkey, however, stipulated that the aircraft

arrive with no weapons or military equipment aboard, that the

helicopters depart for Iran with the permission of the Iranian

government, and that the helicopters be used to evacuate only

U.S . personnel and their families . The JCS did not order the

emergency evacuation force to Iran. On February 17, the Iranian government reopened Mehrabad Airport, and MAC flew

its final evacuation mission-a C-141 that airlifted sixty-nine

passengers to Athens. Between February 17 and 26, 13 commercial Boeing 747 missions chartered by the state department airlifted 4,099 more passengers from Tehran -to cities in

Europe and the continental United States. By March 1, the

United States decided to airlift out of Tehran all but skeletal

staffs at the embassy and at some corporate headquarters.

The tension continued to mount. Hardly a day passed without some manifestation of anti-American sentiment. News

broadcasts, demonstrations, speeches in Parliament, and venomous pronunciations from the Ayatollah reflected this attitude. Khomeini blamed the United States and the "great Satan," U.S. President James E. Carter, for Iran's troubles. In

May 1979, a crowd of 150,000 gathered at the U.S. Embassy

chanting "death to Carter." Despite this activity, President

Carter, in an effort to maintain contact with Iran, did not

recall American Foreign Service personnel. Meanwhile, the

Shah, diagnosed with cancer, requested treatment in the

United States . Acting against the advice of almost all of his

advisors, President Carter allowed the Shah to enter the

United States for surgery and radiation treatment at the New

York-Cornell Medical Center. The deleterious effect of this decision became painfully clear on November 4, 1979, when the

127
U.S . diplomatic personnel hostage . For the remainder of his

presidency, Carter worked to free these citizens . The United

States tried diplomatic initiatives, the seizure of Iranian assets, economic sanctions, and passive military air and naval

deployments-all failed.

From the first day of the crisis, the National Security Council discussed military options such as the seizure of Iranian

oilfields, retaliatory bombing, mining of harbors, total blockade, various covert operations, and a rescue attempt. President Carter eventually decided to go with the rescue attempt.

This decision caught the JCS by surprise . The United States

lacked bases and other resources in the area . Intelligence

sources in Iran had disappeared after the revolution . Operationally, the United States did not have a force to conduct the

rescue or contingency plans for it. After five months of intensive preparation, a complicated operational rescue plan

emerged . It involved eleven groups of men drawn from the

U.S . Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) . The President and his military advisors

approved the plan and ordered its execution.

The operation, known as EAGLE CLAW, called for 3 MC-130s

to carry an assault force of 118 troops from the island of

MC-130 flying low over a desert.

128
Masirah, off the coast of Oman, to Iran, landing 200 miles

southeast of Tehran at a desolate, uninhabited location called

Desert One . Unfortunately, this site was very close to a highway. Accompanying the MC-130s would be three fuel-bearing

EC-130s. After landing in the desert, they would wait for the

eight RH-53D helicopters from the carrier USS Nimitz, located

in the Gulf of Oman. These ,would arrive approximately thirty

minutes after the last C-130 had landed . The commanders

and planners agreed that a minimum of six helicopters would

be required to carry out the mission. They sent eight helicopters so that if anything went wrong with two, they would still

have the minimum number. The helicopters would then refuel

from the EC-130s and load the assault force . The C-130s

would return to Masirah while the RH-53s proceeded to the

assault force's hiding site. The helicopters would unload the

troops, then proceed to a separate site fifteen miles to the

north in the hills, where they would hide during daylight.

Meanwhile, two agents, who would have been placed in Iran

several days before, would rendezvous with the assault force and

lead the troopers five miles overland to a remote wadi sixty-five

miles southeast of Tehran. There they would hide until dark.

The agents would then leave, obtain a pickup truck and a passenger van, return to the site, and transport six drivers and six

translators to a warehouse in Tehran where six enclosed Mercedes trucks were stored . The drivers and translators would pick

up the Mercedes trucks, return to the hiding site, pick up the

assault force, and enter Tehran. While the main assault force

drove through Tehran to the embassy compound, a thirteenman assault team, using the van, would rescue three hostages

being held in the Foreign Ministry Building. Upon arriving at the

embassy, the assault force, divided into three elements, would

neutralize the outside guards, scale the embassy wall, enter the

compound, neutralize the interior guards, locate and secure the

hostages, and determine if helicopters could land within the

embassy grounds . If no obstacles existed, one helicopter would

land, pick up the hostages, and fly them to Manzariyeh, an

airport approximately thirty-five miles south of Tehran. The rest

of the helicopters would then pick up the assault force . If

obstacles existed and could not be removed, the assault force

would blow a hole in the embassy wall, and lead the hostages

129
Iran and Persian Gulf during Hostage Rescue Attempt

to a nearby soccer stadium where the helicopters could accomplish the airlift.

While the assault force conducted the rescue operations in

Tehran, a U.S . Army Ranger contingent would fly in, take, and

secure the airfield at Manzariyeh. They would hold the field

until the helicopters arrived from Tehran. Once everyone arrived at Manzariyeh, all of the hostages, drivers, translators,

130
MC-130 of the type used in the rescue attempt.

helicopter crews, agents, Special Forces personnel, and the

assault force would be airlifted out of Iran on C-141 aircraft.

The Rangers would then destroy any American equipment left

on the field and fly out.

On April 24, 1979, the first MC-130 launched from the island

of Masirah . It carried the ground and air commanders, a team

tasked to block the highway, and one of the assault elements.

The other five C-130s would follow one hour later. As the first

MC-130 crossed the Iranian coast, it dropped to 400 feet to

avoid enemy radar. At approximately the halfway point, the air

commander received word that the eight helicopters had

launched from the Nimitz. After landing successfully at Desert

One, team members unloaded the equipment. Before they

could block the highway, a bus approached the landing zone.

The blocking force fired on the bus, stopped it, and detained

forty-five Iranians. Before this incident ended, an Iranian

gasoline-tanker truck came down the road. When it did not

stop, the troopers launched an M72 LAW (light antitank
truck approached, the driver evidently sensed the danger,

turned around, and fled . The U.S. ground commander decided

to continue the mission, and the first MC-130 took off to

return to Masirah.

The second MC-130 landed shortly afterward . The burning

tanker truck served to light the area, while the troopers unloaded this aircraft . It then taxied onto the rough airstrip and

took off for the return flight to Masirah. In short order, one more

MC-130 and the three EC-130s landed in the desert and took

their positions with engines idling to wait for the helicopters .

At first, the helicopter mission bordered on normal, but

approximately two hours after take-off, one crew received

cockpit indications of an impending rotor-blade failure . The

crew landed, verified the malfunction, and abandoned their

aircraft. A companion aircraft landed, picked up the crew, and

continued the mission. Approximately one hour later, the pilots saw what appeared to be a fog bank several miles ahead .

However, it turned out to be the first of several large layers of

desert dust and sand . When the RH-53s flew into this mess,

they encountered a cyclonic dust storm . Intense winds buffeted the aircraft, and visibility dropped so that the pilots

could not see the ground from as low as seventy-five feet, nor

could they see the other aircraft . The helicopters immediately

separated and proceeded individually to Desert One. The pilots described the experience as flying in a darkened milk

bowl . With no visual references, the pilots, wearing nightvision goggles, flew on instruments, at low-level, in the dark,

through the turbulent winds . Several experienced vertigo but

successfully kept their aircraft in the air. As the flight continued, another helicopter experiencing navigation and flightinstrument problems, decided to abort and return to the

Nimitz. This left six helicopters proceeding to Desert One . During the long flight across the desert, a third helicopter experienced hydraulic problems, continued the mission, hoping the

problem could be fixed on landing.

Meanwhile, at Desert One, the ground forces waited impatiently. They needed to refuel the helicopters, board them, and

fly to the hiding site before daylight, and time was running

out. Finally, an hour to an hour and a half late, the helicopters

132
began arriving. The ground commander realized that part of

the mission would have to be flown in daylight; still he decided to continue . He ordered the assault force to board the

helicopters. Simultaneously, the Americans began loading the

detained Iranians on board the MC-130 for evacuation to the

Manzariyeh Airport . While the assault force boarded the

RH-53s, the pilot of the helicopter with hydraulic problems

conferred with the helicopter commander. They concluded

that the aircraft could not be fixed at Desert One and would

have to be abandoned . This decision left five mission-ready

helicopters . These were not enough . When notified that he had

only five helicopters, the ground commander decided to cancel

the rescue mission . He notified his commander in Egypt, who

in turn forwarded the recommendation through the chain of

command to President Carter, who reluctantly approved.

At Desert One, noise, dust, and confusion prevailed. The

commanders decided to refuel the helicopters so that they could

return to the Nimitz and load the assault force on the C-130s

to return them to Masirah Island . The desert floor rocked from

the roaring engines of four C-130 and five RH-53 aircraft, and

dust and sand flew everywhere . While the burning tanker

truck cast an eerie glow, the assault force began loading onto

the C-130s for evacuation. The helicopters had moved near

the EC-130s to refuel when suddenly disaster struck. Evidently, a rotary blade on one of the helicopters struck an

EC-130. The resultant explosion destroyed both aircraft and

endangered the other nearby aircraft . Eight men died. The

commanders decided to load everyone on the remaining

C-130s and abandon the four functional helicopters . As

quickly as possible, the troopers and helicopter crews boarded

the Hercules, which took off for Masirah. The mission had

tragically failed . Although President Carter continued to work

to free the hostages, the Iranians held them captive until

January 20, 1981 .

When the news broke, critics attacked everything from the

plan to the maintenance of the helicopters, but the major

factors contributing to the failure were the unexpected dust

storm and the lack of backup helicopters . However, even in

those areas, there were extenuating circumstances . The

United States had no way to insert meteorologists into the

133
Nimitz could not carry any more helicopters in its hangar nor

could any be carried on the deck for fear that Soviet satellites

would detect them and the Iranians would be warned . Perhaps the most significant result of the Iranian operation was

the eventual formation of the U.S . Special Operations Command and its USAF component, the Air Force Special Operations Command. The military had learned that especially in

operations of this type, where personnel were drawn from the

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, joint planning and

joint training were crucial . The U.S . Special Operations Command provides the forum and structure for continuous planning and training.
Crisis in Grenada:

Operation URGENT FURY

Daniel L. Haulman

DATES: October 24-November 3, 1983

LOCATION: Grenada

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station,

Puerto Rico ; Grantley Adams International Airport, Barbados ; Point

Salines, Pearls, Grenada

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

135

DIVISION: WINGS: (con't .)

552d Airborne Warning and Control 380th Bombardment

384th Air Refueling

WINGS: 410th Bombardment

1 st Special Operations 412th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)

2d Bombardment 436th Military Airlift

7th Bombardment 437th Military Airlift

9th Strategic Reconnaissance 438th Military Airlift

19th Air Refueling 452d Air Refueling Wing, Heavy

22d Air Refueling 459th Tactical Airlift

23d Tactical Fighter 463d Tactical Airlift

33d Tactical Fighter 512th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)

55th Strategic Reconnaissance 514th Military Airlift Wing (Associate)

60th Military Airlift

62d Military Airlift GROUPS:

63d Military Airlift 68th Air Refueling

67th Tactical Reconnaissance 134th Air Refueling

97th Bombardment 159th Air Refueling

305th Air Refueling 193d Electronic Combat

314th Tactical Airlift 913th Tactical Airlift Group (Associate)

315th Military Airlift Wing (Associate) 932d Aeromedical Airlift I

317th Tactical Airlift

375th Aeromedical Airlift SQUADRON:

379th Bombardment 7th Airborne Command and Control
Q-9, C-5, KC-10, KC-135, E-3, F-15, A-10, SR-71, U-2, RF-4, RC-135

Operations

In October 1983, a military coup on the tiny Caribbean

island nation of Grenada aroused U.S . attention. Coup leaders

Bernard Coard and Gen . Hudson Austin arrested and then

assassinated Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, imposed a

twenty-four-hour shoot-on-sight curfew, and closed the airport at Pearls on the east coast, about twelve miles from the

capital, St. George's, located on the opposite side of the island .

U.S . President Ronald W. Reagan, who did not want a repetition of the Iranian hostage crisis a few years earlier, considered military intervention in order to rescue hundreds of U.S .

citizens attending medical school on the island. Adm. Wesley

L. McDonald, USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command,

began planning an evacuation.

After attaining independence from Great Britain in 1974,

Grenada belonged to both the British Commonwealth and the

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) . On October

21, Sir Paul Scoon, Grenada's governor-general, who represented the Commonwealth, asked the OECS for help in restoring order to the island . On October 22, the OECS requested

that Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States intervene militarily in Grenada.

Bishop, who had taken power in a 1979 coup, had allowed

hundreds of Cubans into Grenada to construct a new airfield

with a 9,000-foot runway at Point Salines on the island's

southwestern tip . The new air base could serve as a springboard for Cuban military operations in Africa and South

America or allow the Soviet Union to disrupt U.S . supply lines

that crossed the Caribbean Sea. Hence President Reagan decided to invade the island, not only to rescue U.S . citizens, but

also to restore democracy and eliminate a growing Cuban

military presence .

The Department of Defense called the invasion Operation

URGENT FURY. Vice Adm. Joseph Metcalf III, USN, Commander, Second Fleet, took command of the URGENT FURY

joint task force, which included elements of all the military services. The Pentagon assigned Maj . Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

136
USA, Commander, 24th Mechanized Infantry Division, to advise Metcalf on the employment of ground forces . Brig. Gen.

Richard L. Meyer, USAF, Vice Commander, Twelfth Air Force,

directed some of URGENT FURY's strategic and tactical airpower missions, while Maj . Gen. Robert B . Patterson, USAF,

Vice Commander, Twenty-First Air Force, supervised the operation's airlift forces . Admiral Metcalf divided Grenada into

two zones . His plan called for U.S . Marines from a naval task

force to assault Pearls and Grenville in the northeast, while

U.S . Army forces, airlifted by the Air Force, attacked Point

Salines some five miles southwest of St. George's .

Military movements began before the invasion, which was set

for October 25. U.S. Marine and Navy forces on the way to the

Mediterranean Sea diverted toward Grenada, while the U.S. Air

Force deployed E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System

ROOSEVELT ROADS->

U.S. NAVAL STATION

GRENADA

BRIDGETOWN

GRANTLEY

ADAMS

AIRPORT -

Area of USAF Operations during URGENT FURY

Inset: Areas of Operational Responsibilities on Grenada

137
(AWACS) 

g

Station in Puerto Rico. Refueled by Strategic Air Command

tankers, the airplanes patrolled the Caribbean Sea north and

west of Grenada to detect and deter any air or sea movements

from Cuba. At the same time, USAF strategic and tactical reconnaissance aircraft flew over Grenada to compile intelligence

about the location of U.S. citizens and enemy forces .

Those enemy forces were larger and better equipped than

the United States expected . Coup leader General Austin commanded the Grenadian army, recently equipped with a huge

stockpile of weapons and ammunition from Communist countries . The armaments included more than 9,000 rifles and

machine guns and over 5 .5 million rounds of ammunition.

The more than 600 Cuban construction workers at Point Salines and elsewhere on Grenada were military engineers who

also served as soldiers under the command of Cuban Col.

Pedro Tortola Comas.

The first U.S. troops on Grenada were Special Forces . One

team of U.S . Navy SEALs landed on the island during the night

of October 24 to reconnoiter Pearls Airport, while other teams

set out to secure Governor-General Scoon's residence and the

radio station near St. George's. A U.S . Army Delta Force reconnoitered Point Salines for the next day's invasion. Both the

SEALs and the Delta Force ran into stiff enemy opposition in

the St. George's area and at nearby Point Salines.

The U.S. Marines who assaulted Pearls Airport by helicopter

just before dawn on October 25 met little opposition. Arriving

with surprise, they secured the airport and Grenville in a

couple of hours without a casualty. The U.S. Army attack at

Point Salines was not as successful . Waves of USAF MC-130

and C-130 transports, which had departed Georgia with two

battalions of Army Rangers the night before, approached

southwestern Grenada in the predawn darkness. AC-130 gunships from Florida had arrived at Point Salines before them to

provide air cover for the landings . Using low-light sensors,

they discovered Cuban construction equipment and other

obstacles blocking the runway. Consequently, the first wave of

transports prepared to drop their troops instead of landing. At

this point, inertial navigation equipment on the two lead

MC-130s malfunctioned, forcing the crews to delay their

138
drops . As one MC-130 dropped the first Rangers, enemy

searchlights illuminated it, and antiaircraft batteries opened

up . Although the antiaircraft fire damaged the aircraft, its

pilot skillfully maneuvered out of range . The other transports

in the first wave diverted until an AC-130 could quell the

enemy fire . By the time the aircraft returned to complete the

drops, dawn had arrived . Attacking more than one-half hour

after the U.S. Marines, the Army troops met a completely

prepared enemy.

The AC-130s attacking the batteries noted the hilltop antiaircraft guns could not depress their barrels to fire low. To

avoid being hit, the MC-130s and C-130s dropped the first

battalion of Rangers with parachutes from an altitude of only

500 feet. Some of the 700 air-dropped Army troops hot-wired a

bulldozer to clear the runway so that transports could land a

second battalion at Point Salines. They liberated 138 American students at a campus near the airfield but soon learned

that hundreds more students remained behind enemy lines at

Grand Anse four miles to the north.

Heavily armed Cubans and Grenadians put up stiff resistance as the Rangers moved north toward Grand Anse and St.

George's . To reinforce the Rangers, USAF C-141 Starlifters

transported two battalions of the 82d Airborne Division from

North Carolina to Point Salines . The limited airfields on Grenada forced the U.S . Air Force to rely heavily on staging bases

between the United States and Grenada . USAF airplanes already crowded the ramps and runways at Roosevelt Roads,

forcing the United States to depend on Grantley Adams International Airport in Barbados . From there, C-130s shuttled

thousands of tons of war materiel to Grenada. Sniper fire at

Point Salines sometimes prevented use of the entire runway,

of which only 5,000 feet was complete anyway, and at first

there was room for only 1 C-141 on the ground at a time. The

Pearls runway was too short for Starlifters. Extremely large

C-5 Galaxies, which could not land on either of the Grenadian

airfields, unloaded their URGENT FURY passengers and cargo,

including some helicopters, in Barbados for later flights to

Point Salines and Pearls.

The heavy fighting just north of Point Salines convinced Metcalf and Schwarzkopf to send U.S . Marines on an amphibious

139
0-130 unloading at Point Salines with engines running.

assault at Grand Mal in western Grenada just north of St.

George's. Armed with tanks, the U.S . Marines drove into the

capital and rescued the Navy SEALs, who had been surrounded at the governor-general's residence and the radio station. Further south, Army Rangers used USMC helicopters to

rescue about 224 U.S. medical students trapped at Grand

Anse while naval bombardment, air strikes, and AC-130s kept

enemy troops at bay.

While the Marines captured St. George's and moved south,

the Army Rangers and airborne troops advanced methodically

to the north and east. They met heavy opposition at Fort

Rupert, Fort Frederick, Richmond Hill Prison, and Calivigny

Barracks but prevailed with the close air support of AC-130

gunships, carrier aircraft from the USS Independence, and

bombardment from U.S. Navy ships. At the end of October,

U.S. Marines, supported by USAF A-10 attack aircraft, assaulted the island of Carriacou just north of Grenada to capture a suspected guerrilla base . By early November, U.S .

forces on Grenada had achieved most military objectives . They

captured coup leaders Austin and Coard along with almost

700 Grenadian and Cuban troops . When the Marines deployed to their assigned destination in the Mediterranean, the

Military Airlift Command (MAC) transported additional battalions of U.S. Army airborne troops to Grenada. These troops

140
an interim government until a democratic government could

be established .

To transport about 164 wounded U.S . soldiers from Grenada

to Barbados, Puerto Rico, and the United States, the USAF

employed C-141 Starlifters, C-130 Hercules, and C-9 Nightingales . Some of the rescued U.S . medical students treated

wounded American soldiers. MAC moved the dead to a Department of Defense mortuary at Dover, Delaware. In Operation

URGENT FURY, the United States lost nineteen people. Enemy

casualties were at least 45 killed and almost 400 wounded.

A primary purpose of the invasion had been to evacuate

endangered citizens from Grenada. Between October 26 and

30, 1983, the U.S . Air Force transported about 700 noncom

batant passengers from Grenada. The evacuation took sixteen

C-141, one C-5, and two C-130 flights. Hundreds of medical

students flew to Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina.

MAC also evacuated about 200 third country nationals from

Grenada. Twenty C-130 missions transported 755 Cubans

from Grenada to Barbados for repatriation.

Reconnaissance, close air support, delivery of troops,

transportation of cargo, movement of casualties, evacuation

of citizens, and movement of prisoners were not all the U.S .

Air Force accomplished in URGENT FURY. KC-135s and

KC-10s provided air refueling for the transports, gunships,

and fighters . Air National Guard EC-130s flew psychological

warfare missions. Other EC-130s and E-3s provided communications and air control. When the island government became stable enough to allow U.S . Army occupation troops to

leave, MAC returned at least 6,000 to the United States on

C-141s and C-130s .

URGENT FURY was at once a combined and a joint operation. Troops of Barbados, Jamaica, and other Caribbean

states joined U.S . forces in a combined task force. A 300- to

400-man Caribbean Peacekeeping Force under Brigadier

Rudyard Lewis of Barbados deployed to Point Salines early in

the operation, first to guard Cuban prisoners and later to

support the establishment of an interim government. The

branches of 'the U.S . military interacted and cooperated, and
Army Rangers board a C-141 to return from Grenada to the United States.

Reserve and National Guard forces contributed significantly to

the successful invasion .

With overwhelming military power, the United States took

two full days to subdue an island only twenty-one miles long

and twelve miles wide. Despite the overall success of the operation, the U.S. Air Force and the other services learned

important lessons as a result of the Grenada invasion. Foremost among these was the need for adequate airfields and

staging bases. Pearls Airport on Grenada was too small for

either C-5s or C-141s, and Point Salines at first lacked

enough space for more than one C-141 on the ground at a

time. Ramp saturation prevented Roosevelt Roads Naval Air

Station from serving as the primary staging base, forcing the

United States to rely on the international airport at Barbados .

Only skillful management of aircraft flights prevented Barbados' airport from becoming saturated as well. The Grenada

invasion encouraged the U.S . Air Force to continue the development of the C-17, a transport aircraft that would combine

the capacity, range, and speed of a strategic airlifter with the

C-130's ability to land and take off on short runways . With

such an airplane, staging bases would be less necessary .

142
This operation revealed other inadequacies in the USAF

C-130 fleet. Most Hercules aircraft lacked precision navigation

equipment, forcing them to rely on lead aircraft for night operations. Malfunctions of lead aircraft systems caused costly

delays and upset the sequence of airdrops at Point Salines .

Each C-130 also required improved radio equipment so that

information could be transmitted securely. Finally, the C-130s

lacked upgraded defenses against antiaircraft weapons .

The operation confirmed the value of the AC-130 in the

close air support role. Maj . Gen. Edwin Trobaugh, USA, Commander, 82d Airborne Division, preferred the gunships to na

val bombardments, helicopters, and land artillery because of

their speed, accuracy, and versatility . The AC-130s repeatedly

silenced and destroyed enemy artillery batteries and armored

personnel carriers .

The invasion of Grenada revealed the shortcomings of intelligence . Without a political or military presence on the island, the

United States lacked tactical intelligence about the exact location of the U.S. medical students, the strength of Cuban forces,

the number of enemy antiaircraft artillery batteries at Point Salines, and runway obstructions . An extremely short planning

time contributed to the shortage of intelligence. More planning

time would have allowed U.S . Atlantic Command to incorporate

the advice of more ground, air, logistical, and public relations

experts . A decision to exclude the press from Grenada until the

third day antagonized U.S . news organizations and deprived the

operation of possibly positive publicity. The Pentagon decided to

include a pool of reporters in future operations .

URGENT FURY repeated the lesson that air superiority is a

prerequisite for airlift success. Lacking the element of surprise

that benefited the USMC helicopters at Pearls, the USAF transports that carried Army Rangers to Point Salines required

AC-130 gunships to suppress hostile enemy antiaircraft fire

before they could complete their drops . Fortunately, Grenada

lacked an air force that might have neutralized the AC-130s .

Only after the dropped Rangers cleared the airfield of obstacles were the other C-130s able to land with more troops.

The experience of URGENT FURY encouraged the Department of Defense to pay more attention to the routing of airlift

requests. Many of these did not go through proper channels

143
for validation. The Twenty

First Air Force and the Military

Airlift Command received some requests directly. Without going to the supported command, such requests caused delays

and confusion.

The various branches of the U.S . armed forces used incompatible radio equipment and procedures that resulted in poor

communication during the invasion . Ground, air, and sea

forces could have supported each other more effectively if their

communications had been more standard . URGENT FURY

convinced defense department planners to standardize communication equipment and procedures among the services so

that they could act symbiotically .

The operation uncovered flaws in joint command structures

that contributed to the failure of the various services to work

together as one team. Leaders of several commands acted

without clear concepts of the limits of their authority, and the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff often intervened in the

operation. The Military Airlift Command controlled airlift and

the Strategic Air Command retained operational control of the

URGENT FURY strategic reconnaissance and air refueling

missions. The experience of the Grenada invasion encouraged

Congress to reorganize the defense department with passage

of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which established a more "purple" or joint

Pentagon, with one command in charge of one operation.

Despite mistakes from which the defense department and

the Air Force learned valuable lessons, URGENT FURY was

unquestionably a success. The invasion of Grenada accomplished much more than its triple mission of rescuing U.S .

citizens, restoring democracy to the island, and eliminating a

hostile Cuban/Soviet base in the Caribbean. It was the first

clear U.S . military victory since the war in Southeast Asia,

restoring pride in the United States and its armed forces that

had declined in the wake of setbacks in Vietnam, Cambodia,

Iran, and Lebanon . URGENT FURY provided military leaders

such as General Schwarzkopf valuable experience in joint

combat operations that they were able to use in the far larger

Southwest Asia War. The many missions that air power performed in URGENT FURY proved its indispensability in a future of joint contingency operations .

144
Raid on Libya:

Operation ELDORADO CANYON

DATES: April 14-15, 1986

LOCATION: Libya

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Royal Air Force (RAF) Fairford, RAF

Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhali, RAF Upper Heyford, United Kingdom

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

Judy G. Endicott

WINGS: II GROUP:

306th Strategic

48th Tactical Fighter - -

11 1 1 th Strategic

SQUADRON:

42d Electronic Combat

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: F-111, EF-111, KC-10, KC-135

Operations

In 1969, a group of junior military officers led by Muammar

Qadhafi overthrew the pro-Western Libyan Arab monarchy.

Since then, Qadhafi's relations with the United States, and

most Western European nations, as well as moderate Arab

nations, have been confrontational. By the mid-1980s, Libya

was one of the leading sponsors of worldwide terrorism. In

addition to subversion or direct military intervention against

other African nations and global assassinations of anti-Qadhafi

Libyan exiles and other "state enemies," Qadhafi has sponsored terrorist training camps within Libya and supplied

funds, weapons, logistical support, and safe havens for numerous terrorist groups.

As a presidential candidate, Ronald W. Reagan criticized

President James (Jimmy) E. Carter's approach to the Iranian

hostage crisis, saying that, if elected, his policy would be one of

"swift and effective retribution" against international terrorists .

Between January 1981 when President Reagan took office and

145
April 1986, terrorists worldwide killed over 300 Americans and

injured hundreds more . With National Security Decision Directive 138 signed on April 3, 1984, President Reagan established in principle a U.S . policy of preemptive and retaliatory

strikes against terrorists. But the very nature of terrorism has

usually made impossible the assignment of certain guilt to

any one government. By the mid-1980s, Americans had grown

angry and frustrated with elected officials' inability to stem the

increasing tide of terrorism.

On December 27, 1985, terrorists attacked passengers in

the Rome and Vienna airport terminals, killing nineteen (including five Americans) and injuring over one hundred . The

terrorists possessed passports confiscated from Tunisian

guest workers in Libya and grenades from the stocks of the

Libyan Arab army. In addition, intelligence sources claimed

that Qadhafi had paid the terrorist Abu Nidal a bonus of five to

six million dollars for the operation . Despite the strong evidence

that connected Libya to the incident, the U.S . administration

officials determined that they did not have sufficient proof to

order retaliatory strikes against Libya at that time . President

Reagan imposed economic and other sanctions against Libya,

publicly denounced Qadhafi for sponsoring the operation, and

sent the Sixth Fleet to exercise off the coast of Libya.

Contrary to international law, Qadhafi had proclaimed 32°

30' N, including the entire Gulf of Sidra, to be the northern

boundary of Libya . To dispute this claim, the U. S . Navy periodically staged freedom of navigation exercises in or near the

Gulf of Sidra. During the 1986 exercises, a naval surface action group crossed on March 24 below the disputed latitude,

which Qadhafi dramatically called the "Line of Death." Soon

afterward, a Libyan missile battery near Sirte fired two SA-5

missiles at the F-14s flying combat air patrol. The F-14s,

aided by naval EA-6B electronic jammers, evaded the missiles, as they did on two other occasions that evening, but the

Navy's restraint had ceased . Before the exercise ended on

March 27, naval forces sank at least two Libyan antishipmissile vessels racing toward the surface action group and damaged another. In addition, carrier-based aircraft damaged the

radar at the Sirte air defense facility (one of Qadhafi's most

sophisticated) after it had again locked onto naval aircraft.

146
LAKENHEATH

FAIRFORD a,~~~NHALL

Z`WS "London

LIBYA

USAF Strike Force Route for ELDORADO CANYON

Inset: Operation ELDORADO CANYON Targets

However, if the Reagan administration thought that evidence

of Libya's military weakness and vulnerability might encourage

Qadhafi to give up his support for terrorist activities, it was

mistaken.

On April 2, plastic explosives detonated aboard a TWA flight

bound for Athens, killing four Americans . Although a caller in

Beirut claimed the bombing constituted a response to the

14 7
recent U.S . Navy

s 

gy, py

traces of the bombing pointed to involvement by Syria, not

Libya. However, Qadhafi praised the terrorists as freedom

fighters and vowed to escalate the violence against U.S . targets, civilian and noncivilian, throughout the world . Then, in

the early hours of April 5, in Berlin a large bomb gutted

LaBelle Club, a discotheque popular with U.S . servicemen.

The explosion immediately killed an American infantryman

and his girlfriend and injured over 200 others, including more

than 75 Americans . This time, electronic surveillance intercepted two messages to Qadhafi from the East Berlin Libyan

People's Bureau that definitely linked Qadhafi to the bombing .

A few hours prior to the detonation, the People's Bureau had

told Qadhafi that something being planned would make him

happy . Following the bombing, they sent notification in general terms, stating the precise time of the discotheque explosion. President Reagan now had the evidence he sought. On

April 9, he authorized an air strike against Libya and attempted to obtain support from European allies .

Armed with the evidence against Qadhafi, Vernon Walters,

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, pressed the governments of Italy, Germany, England, France, and Spain for more

severe sanctions against Libya . With the last three nations he

also discussed support for a raid against Libya. Margaret

Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain, gave permission for

the U.S . Air Force to launch its portion of the raid from British

bases . The governments of France and Spain denied permission

to fly over their countries, thereby increasing the Air Force's

round-trip to almost 6,000 miles .

Military planning for a possible operation against Libya had

begun shortly after the December attacks in Rome and Vienna.

The U.S . President ordered the joint U.S. European Command

(USEUCOM) to prepare contingency plans for possible targets in

Libya. U.S . Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) military planners

identified possible targets, along with planning on how those

targets could be attacked, assuming that the British government would allow the United States to stage operations from

British bases . General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, Commander,

USEUCOM, designated Vice Adm. Frank B. Kelso, USN, Commander, Sixth Fleet, to be overall commander of the joint

148
service operation, code-named Operation ELDORADO CANYON. Planners determined that a nighttime attack provided

the best chance of evading Libya's formidable air defense network . Considering the proximity of possible targets to civilian

population centers, use of aircraft that provided the most precise targeting available would afford the least possibility for

collateral damage in civilian areas .

USAF planners chose the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, based

at RAF Lakenheath, to perform the Air Force portion of the

attack . Col. Sam W. Westbrook III, USAF, a former Oxford

Rhodes scholar and Southeast Asia combat veteran, commanded the 48th, USAFE's only F-111 F wing. Its aircrews

regularly trained for nighttime-precision missions. While it

had its systems reliability problems, the F-111 F (nicknamed

Aardvark) provided the long-range, nighttime, all-weather, and

precision-strike capabilities required. Using terrain-following

radar, the F-111F could avoid enemy radar and ground obstacles, while flying as low as 200 feet above the ground ; its Pave

Tack laser-targeting system guided ordnance to the target.

Navy and Air Force liaison officers coordinated strike planning that incorporated President Reagan's desire to avoid

damage to Libya's economic infrastructure or the death of

innocent civilians . From the list of possible targets, the National Security Council, with President Reagan's approval, selected five; four were linked to Qadhafi's terrorist-training infrastructure and the fifth dealt with the enemy defensive

threat. The Bab al-Aziziyah barracks in Tripoli was the command center of the Libyan terrorist network. The complex

included a billeting area for Qadhafi's personal Jamahiriyah

guards and, at times, Qadhafi's own residential compound .

The Murat Sidi Bilal training camp, near Tripoli, trained naval

commandos and terrorist frogmen. The military side of the

Tripoli Airport held Soviet-built IL-76 Candid aircraft that had

been used in support of terrorist activities . The Benghazi

Jamahiriyah military barracks served as an alternate terrorist

command center and included a storage and assembly facility

for MiG aircraft. The fifth target, Benghazi's Benina fighter

base, housed night-capable MiG-23 Flogger E interceptors

that posed a threat to the attacking force .

149
A 48th TFW F-111 F bomber based at Lakenheath, England.

Admiral Kelso assigned the three targets in and around

Tripoli to the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, while assigning to

the Sixth Fleet the two targets at Benghazi, as well as responsibilities for combat air patrol and suppression of enemy air

defenses . EF-111A Ravens (also nicknamed Sparkvarks) from

the 42d Electronic Combat Squadron, based at RAF Upper

Heyford, would accompany the F-111Fs to help the Sixth

Fleet's Marine EA-6B Prowlers jam enemy radar systems . The

plan called for striking all targets simultaneously and limited

each aircraft to a single pass at its target to lessen the time

that Libyan air defenses could react to the attack. Admiral

Kelso imposed strict rules of engagement to avoid or reduce

the possibility of civilian casualties in the congested urban

area of Tripoli, while inflicting as much damage as possible on

the targets. He insisted that each airplane should have positive identification of its assigned target on multiple systems

and abort its attack if weapon-guidance or navigation systems

were not fully functional.

At nearly the last moment, the strike force increased from

six to eighteen F-11 Is, forcing the 48th to readjust the timing

and flow of aircraft against each target, as well as identifying

specific aiming points for the additional aircraft. Adding aircraft also necessitated gathering more Strategic Air Command

150
tankers from far-flung locations. The strike force could not hit

Libya and then return to its English base without aerial refueling en route . The European Tanker Task Force, a collection

of KC-135s and KC-10s and aircrews on temporary duty from

stateside wings, operated through the 306th Strategic Wing

and 1 lth Strategic Group, located at RAF Mildenhall and Fairford, respectively, to refuel U.S . forces . In the two days before

the Monday night strike, additional tankers streamed into the

English bases, many of the aircrews not knowing their mission until they arrived. Col. Lynn T. Berringer, USAF, Commander, 306th Strategic Wing, and his staff planned the crucial refueling. Using the "mother-tanker" concept, each F-111

aircraft would remain with the same tanker during the long

flight to Libya and rejoin that tanker following the attack.

By Monday, April 14th, all USAF forces were gathered and

ready. At 5 :13 P.M. Greenwich Mean Time, the tankers began

launching in radio silence, with the F-111 Fs and EF-111 s

beginning twenty-three minutes later, most of the force joining

together over southern England . The aircraft flew and refueled

entirely in radio silence to preserve tactical surprise . The

nighttime silent air refueling was difficult for the strike force

because few of the fighter crews had experience receiving fuel

from the KC-10 tankers, which were relatively new in the

European Theater. The F-111 s flew with their electronic identification equipment turned off, hoping that inquisitive radar

operators would see only a group of tankers on their screens .

After the first refueling, six F-111 and one EF-111A airborne

spares returned to their bases, leaving eighteen Aardvarks

and five Ravens whose targeting, weapons delivery, and terrain-following radar were all fully functional at that point.

From England, the aerial armada proceeded south, in flight

cells, past Portugal and turned east through the Strait of

Gibraltar into the Mediterranean Sea toward Libya, aiming for

a simultaneous strike at 2 :00 A.M . Libyan time. Those aboard

the lead airborne command KC-10 included Colonel Westbrook, Colonel Berringer, and Maj . Gen . David W. Forgan,

USAF, Headquarters USAFE Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, who was the airborne mission commander for Operation

ELDORADO CANYON.
A 48th TFW F-111 F takes on fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker .

At about the same time that the USAF task force took off

from bases in England, the Navy's Coral Sea and America

battle groups began a high-speed dash toward Libya in electronic silence, eluding Soviet surveillance . At 12:45 A.M., the

Navy began launching its strike, surface-to-air missile (SAM)

suppression, and support aircraft, also in electronic silence.

After the F-Ills finished their last refueling, they left their

mother tankers in three attack groups: nine for Bab al-Aziziyah

barracks; six for the Tripoli Airport; and three for Sidi Bilal.

At ten minutes before strike time, the EF-111As and the

Navy's EA-6Bs began their electronic jamming against Libyan

radar and communications, reputedly one of the most ad

vanced air defense systems in the world . As the Libyan radars

sprang into activity, trying to find and identify the airplanes,

152
the Navy's A-7s and F/A-18s began firing missiles that rode

the radar beams back to the sites, destroying more than a

dozen before the raid was finished . An official from the tiny

island of Malta notified Libya at least one-half hour before the

raid began that unidentified aircraft were heading south toward

Libya. Despite the warning, when the F-111 Fs reached Tripoli,

they found the streetlights on in the city below, cars driving with

their headlights on, floodlights illuminating principal buildings,

and airport runway lights shining. Libyan defenders launched

unguided SAMs and directed intense antiaircraft fire at the

Aardvarks, lighting up the night sky .

The Bab al-Aziziyah target, located in the densely populated

city, was the most difficult of the Tripoli targets, because it did

not show up well on radar. Mistakes and equipment failures

especially hampered this attack. Of the nine F-111 Fs (call signs

Remit, Elton, and Karma) assigned to strike this target, one had

flown the wrong direction after the final refueling, one aborted

while still over the water, three aborted their attacks in the

target area due to equipment malfunctions, and one (Karma 52)

crashed into the ocean before reaching the target. Only three

F-l l is remained to drop their one-ton laser-guided bombs . Two

of these attacks caused considerable damage to the compound,

but the third F-111 crew misidentified its "offset aim point" on

the radar screen, dropping the GBU-l 0s near the French embassy, one and one-half miles northeast of the intended target.

Three F-111 s (call sign Jewel), also armed with laser-guided

bombs, struck the Sidi Bilal naval commando training complex

about fifteen miles west of Tripoli. All three dropped their

bombs, despite the last being hampered by smoke from the

preceding Paveways. The attacks severely damaged several

buildings and destroyed a number of small training vessels at

the docks.

The objective of the last six Aardvarks (call signs Puffy and

Lujac) was the military side of the Tripoli Airport, with the

specific objective of hitting the Soviet-made IL-76 jets used to

transport terrorists and their weapons . Unlike the other two

groups, which approached their targets from the sea, this

group entered Libyan territory east of Tripoli and circled to

attack the airport from the south, thus avoiding the main body

of Libyan air defenses . One F-111 lost its terrain-following radar

153
and aborted before reaching the target. The remaining 5

dropped their 500-pound Snakeye retarded-delivery bombs,

which were equipped with parachutes to slow their descent so

that the aircraft would not suffer damage from their own ordnance . Poststrike reconnaissance showed that the Snakeyes

damaged several buildings, destroyed or severely damaged five

Its-76s parked on the flight line, and touched off a number of

fires and explosions .

Meanwhile, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Sidra, six

A-6E Intruders from the carrier America struck the Benghazi

Jamahiriyah military barracks, heavily damaging them and a

nearby MiG-23 assembly facility. Another six A-6Es from the

Coral Sea cratered the runway at Benghazi's Benina military

airfield and destroyed or damaged numerous aircraft on the

parking apron, including the MiGs that might have risen in

opposition to the American forces.

By 2:13 A.M., all strike aircraft, except Karma 52, had safely

crossed the Libyan coast, the A-6s heading toward the carriers and the F-111 s toward the tankers waiting for them over

the Mediterranean . Libyan antiaircraft guns and missile batteries continued to fire blindly into the sky for hours after the

American aircraft had departed . Rattled Libyan gunners lit the

skies for several nights following as well. All Navy aircraft had

recovered on their carriers by 2:53 A.M., while the Air Force

F-111 s and EF-111 s tried to locate their assigned tankers

near Sicily, a task made more difficult because the F-llls

were low on fuel. After the F-111 s refueled, the Air Force

armada remained in the area for an hour, hoping that the

missing airplane would join up. The Navy continued the

search for another twenty-four hours but found no trace of the

plane or its crew. The survivors, as they made the long journey back to their English bases, mourned their two comrades,

the pilot, Capt. Fernando Ribas-Dominicci, and the weapons

system officer, Capt. Paul Lorence .

Politically, the raid against the terrorist state was extremely

popular in the United States and almost universally condemned or "regretted" by our European allies, who feared that

the raid would spawn more violence. The operation spurred

Western European governments to increase their defenses

against terrorism, and their intelligence agencies began to

154
share information . Moderate Arab governments did not fall,

nor did they rally behind Qadhafi; in fact, some (especially

those who had suffered Qadhafi's interference) were quietly

pleased . If the Reagan administration hoped the raid would

create the internal conditions for Qadhafi's opponents to topple his reign, it was disappointed. However, Qadhafi's arrogance was shaken, and he retreated into the desert for many

months afterwards .

The Air Force was saddened by the loss of the one F-111 F

crew, but the loss of one out of over a hundred aircraft used in

the raid statistically was not a high toll. The high abort rate

was disappointing, but made understandable by the severe

rules of engagement under which the F-111 Fs operated, coupled with the extreme length of the mission and the known

fragility of some of the critical F-111 subsystems . Of the

eleven crews that dropped their bombs, only one made a critical error that caused significant collateral damage. The U.S .

government expressed regret for the loss of innocent lives but

pointed out that unguided Libyan missiles and antiaircraft

shells falling back to earth had caused much of the damage.

Reconnaissance flights after the raid showed that all the targets had been severely damaged . Despite the disappointments,

the Air Force could be proud that it successfully bombed three

targets seen beforehand only in photographs, after a flight of

over six hours, and in the face of strong enemy opposition.

Persian Gulf Crisis :

Operation EARNEST WILL

DATES: July 24, 1987-November 17, 1988

LOCATIONS: Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of

Oman

OVERSEAS BASES: Riyadh, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; Diego Garcia

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

William J. Allen

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: KC-10, KC-135, E-3, C-5, C-141

Operations

Until the late 1970s, American involvement in the Middle

East hinged upon foreign policy based on two primary objectives: contain Soviet expansion and support Israel's freedom

and territorial integrity. The Iran-Iraq War that started in 1980

threatened the peace and security of the region for nearly a

decade and required new U.S . foreign policy objectives . President James E. (Jimmy) Carter set forth three principles as

foreign policy for the Persian Gulf. These were to maintain the

157

NUMBERED AIR FORCES: WINGS: (con't .)

Third 374th Tactical Airlift

Ninth Air Force/USCENTAF (Forward) 436th Military Airlift

Twenty-First 433d Military Airlift

Twenty-Second 463d Tactical Airlift

552d Airborne Warning and Control

WINGS:

9th Strategic GROUP:

60th Military Airlift 11th Strategic

62d Military Airlift

63d Military Airlift DETACHMENT:

68th Air Refueling

Detachment 4, 4448th Mobility Support

Squadron/European Liaison Force-One

(ELF-ONE)

306th Strategic
DHAHRAN6

SAUDI ARABIA

Persian Gulf Region during Operation EARNEST WILL

free flow of oil, deny the Soviets an opportunity to gain control

of the region, and support the independence and stability of

the Gulf States. U.S. Presidents Ronald W. Reagan and George

H. W. Bush continued these objectives during their administrations.

By 1986, with the Iran-Iraq War still grinding on, the situation began to seriously threaten U.S. foreign interests in the

region. The expanding war especially threatened U.S . objectives in the waters of the Persian Gulf, where the majority of

the world's oil passed . Here, Iran, and to a lesser degree Iraq,

increased the number of attacks on neutral shipping in the

gulf. For example, in 1985 both countries attacked oil tankers

in the gulf a total of fifty-three times . The next year, over 106

158
attacks on shipping occurred. During the same period, the

Soviet Union increased its presence in the gulf diplomatically

and conducted relatively benign minesweeping operations .

The Kuwaiti government requested that the United States reflag eleven of their tankers under U.S . registry for protection,

because they were increasingly the targets of Iranian attacks .

Consequently, President Reagan ordered U.S . Central Command (USCENTCOM) to begin escorting American ships

through the gulf-Operation EARNEST WILL.

Although a relatively small deployment of Air Force manpower and equipment, Operation EARNEST WILL, significantly, was the first joint contingency conducted under the

guidelines of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Intended to integrate elements of all

four services under one operational commander, the act recognized that none of the services could win a war on its own,

but, through joint action, an enemy could be defeated . The

new law gave Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense, new authority to consolidate forces from all four services into a single operational entity under the commander of a

unified command.

Prior to Operation EARNEST WILL, each service had its

separate, but coordinating, operational chain of command in

the gulf. For naval forces, the operational chain of command

ran from Commander Middle East Forces to Commander Naval Forces, Central Command, to Commander in Chief, Central Command, to the Secretary of Defense . The operational

control of the Middle East Forces commander only included

the Persian Gulf waters to the Strait of Hormuz. The area

south into the Arabian Sea fell under the operational control

of the Commander, Pacific Fleet. The carrier group commander, steaming in the waters in or near the gulf, had an

operational chain of command that ran from the Fleet Commander to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to Commander

in Chief, Pacific Command, to the Secretary of Defense .

Operational control of USAF aircraft was also a mixed affair.

As early as 1980, the U.S . Air Force maintained a small presence in Saudi Arabia with the European Liaison Force-One

(ELF-ONE) at Riyadh Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) Base. The

detachment primarily provided air defense radar surveillance

159
of the Persian Gulf for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . Central

Command Air Forces (CENTAF) at Shaw Air Force Base (AFB),

South Carolina, maintained operational control of ELF-ONE,

which served as the linchpin of an air defense network that

included RSAF and USAF forces.

Strategic Air Command (SAC) provided KC-135 and KC-10

tankers while Tactical Air Command (TAC) provided E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) for ELF-ONE,

and both increased their presence during Operation EARNEST

WILL. The 11th Strategic Group in England provided the deployed tankers while TAC's 552d Airborne Warning and Control Wing at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma, augmented command and

control. Relying on the sophisticated sensors of the E-3A Sentry and other communications systems, deployed personnel

from the wing passed air defense information to the Saudi air

defense network. The RSAF employed its own F-15 and F-5

interceptors and surface-to-air missiles to defend the kingdom.

By 1987, the U.S. commitment to Operation EARNEST WILL

broadened ELF-ONE's mission.

As the Air Force agent to USCENTCOM, Headquarters Ninth

Air Force had a dual role as a TAC numbered air force and

CENTAF, which planned and directed aerial operations for the

Southwest Asia theater. CENTAF deployed a headquarters contingent to Saudi Arabia to conduct land-based aerial operations

for Operation EARNEST WILL. Known as CENTAF Forward,

command and control personnel, planners, intelligence specialists, and other support personnel needed to provide twenty-fourhour operations arrived in June 1987 . The ELF-ONE commander and staff provided CENTAF Forward in-country

logistical support and liaison with their Saudi Arabian hosts .

Unlike typical Air Force contingency operations with massive

airlift and movement of units to theaters, Operation EARNEST

WILL did not see any additional airlift requirements beyond the

weekly resupply flight levied upon Military Airlift Command

(MAC) . For the most part, the AWACS and tanker units at ELFONE deployed with their own people and equipment.

With operational control arrangements requiring massive

coordination, the commander of Middle East Forces could only

request naval air support through his carrier group commander, while his land-based air forces operated through

160
CENTAF. As a result of these command arrangements, forces

were controlled piecemeal by CENTCOM, Pacific Command

(USPACOM), and U.S. European Command. Secretary Weinberger was the first official in the chain of command with

authority over all forces inside and outside the gulf.

On July 24, 1987, approximately twenty miles west of Farsi

Island, the first of two reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, Bridgeton,

hit a World War I vintage contact mine . Immediately at risk

were the second tanker and a host of U.S. warships that

included four frigates, three cruisers, and a destroyer. Overhead, USAF E-3 and KC-10 and USN A-6, E-2, and F/A-18

aircraft protected the vulnerable convoy from Iranian Silkworm missiles or other air attacks.

This event highlighted inadequate planning and poor use of

intelligence information, leading Secretary Weinberger to

change command arrangements in the gulf as provided by the

Goldwater-Nichols Act. After consulting with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Weinberger passed all operational control of forces supporting operations in the Persian Gulf to USCENTCOM and

authorized the activation of Joint Task Force-Middle East, a

joint staff to plan for the continued employment of forces in the

gulf. A short, flexible chain of command that ran directly from

the Middle East Forces to USCENTCOM, the Secretary of Defense, and the President permitted rapid decision making and

allowed the theater commander to establish command arrangements based on his estimate of what the situation needed . The

benefits gained with . the new command arrangement would pay

off handsomely during the course of the operation.

Only after Bridgeton hit the mine in the gulf was MAC called

upon to fly special assignment airlift missions . The TwentySecond Air Force managed these, delivering USN minesweep

ing specialists and equipment to the theater. The 10 missions

flown by C-5 and C-141 aircraft carried approximately 380

passengers and 453 tons of equipment from the United States

to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. From there the equipment and people boarded USN vessels bound for the Persian

Gulf. MAC also supplied additional Airlift Control Elements

and Mission Support Teams at Clark Air Base, Philippines,

and Diego Garcia to assist in this deployment.
During EARNEST WILL, AWACS crews flew the same rou

tine mission profile as they did during normal ELF-ONE operations . The mission typically began with a premission briefing and aircraft checkout procedures lasting some forty-five

minutes. Next came the takeoff and northeasterly flight of

about twenty-five minutes to the prearranged orbit. After the

E-3 climbed to at least 18,000 feet, the minimum altitude

necessary for the outside air to cool the equipment, the radar

was turned on. With radar and communication checks complete, the aircraft and crew were fully operational in about

forty-five minutes after takeoff.

The E-3 could now relieve the AWACS aircraft already on

station. It would fly a racetrack-surveillance pattern at about

31,000 feet for 6 hours, after which, the crew would fly to

either a KC-135 or KC-10 tanker orbiting nearby for refueling .

During refueling, the crew would turn off the aircraft's radar

but maintain constant communications with controllers at Riyadh . An aerial refueling typically lasted fifteen to thirty minutes. With refueling complete, the AWACS needed approximately ten minutes to restore the radar to fully operational

status . Returning to the racetrack orbit, the crew would normally fly for another six hours until relieved. With the exception of takeoffs, refuelings, and landings, the typical mission

for AWACS flight crews was long and boring. However, during

periods of heavy activity in the gulf, the flights could become

extremely taxing for the mission crew members who manned

the radar consoles, communication gear, and computers in

the rear of the aircraft.

Flying the orbit was arduous duty for the five aircrews from

the 552d Airborne Warning and Control Wing on temporary

duty. Each crew remained in Saudi Arabia for approximately

three weeks, flying a fourteen-hour mission every day and a

half. Normally, crew members could expect to return to Saudi

Arabia once more during their squadron's ninety-day rotation.

That schedule was primarily driven by TAC's flying-hour restrictions limiting aircrews to 125 flying hours every 30 days

and no more than 330 hours every 90 days . Each of the wing's

three squadrons (963d, 964th, and 965th) spent two rotations

in Saudi Arabia during Operation EARNEST WILL.

162
E-3 AWACs aircraft provided airborne surveillance and command, control, and

communications functions during Operation EARNEST WILL.

The wing's maintenance specialists faced a schedule that

was even more grueling than the rotation imposed on the

aircrews. Some sixty to sixty-five people deployed with their

respective squadrons for thirty days. Normally working twelvehour shifts, most received one or two days off after two weeks.

Working conditions in the ramp area were extremely challenging

with temperatures reaching as high as 140 degrees Fahrenheit

in the summer. With the help of contractors from Boeing, they

provided a full range of flight-line maintenance services, including radar work, phased maintenance, and some engine

repairs.

Over the course of Operation EARNEST WILL, SAC KC-135

and KC-10 aircraft flew more than 200 sorties, refueling over

900 aircraft. They also supported other operations in the gulf.

For example, during Operation PRAYING MANTIS, a retaliation

raid against Iranian oil platforms, April 18-24, 1988, the tankers

delivered more than 2 million pounds of fuel to over 230 aircraft.

The usual deployment of tankers at ELF-ONE included four

KC-135 and two KC-10 aircraft and approximately fifty people .

163
At the height of operations, SAC deployed four KC

10 and four

KC-135 aircraft with an additional thirty-seven members to

maintain and fly them. An additional force of tankers deployed

for a short while, July-October 1987, to Diego Garcia to support

forces operating from the Arabian Sea .

Temporary duty periods for the SAC contingent varied . Each

tanker detachment commander, deploying from RAF Fairford in

the United Kingdom, spent about four weeks in the theater.

Aircrews and crew chiefs accompanied their own aircraft and

also spent four weeks. However, additional maintenance and

support technicians drawn from throughout SAC generally

spent only two or three weeks in the Persian Gulf area.

While providing AWACS and tanker support for Operation

EARNEST WILL missions, USAF members also participated in

retaliatory combat operations. For example, on September

21,1987, the Iranian ship Iran Ajr was captured in the act of

laying mines in international waters . USN P-3 and USAF E-3

aircraft tracked the ship, which had been observed loaded

with mines in port as it left Bandar Abbas, Iran, on September

18 . During the night of September 21, two USA helicopters of

KC-135 refueling an F-16. The KC-135 is typical of the tankers used during

Operation EARNEST WILL.

164
Task Force 160, U.S . Special Operations Command, 

the ship's crew laying six mines in the water. The Commander, Middle East Forces, decided to fire on the ship . After

two rocket and machine-gun attacks, the Iranians stopped

and abandoned ship. Navy SEALS boarded the ship and found

more mines on deck. The captured ship was sunk, and its

crew returned to Iran. The international press reported this

incident, and the United States received considerable international support for the operation. The incident was not a result

of chance, but a rather carefully timed and executed trap by

Adm. William J . Crowe Jr., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff. He personally briefed helicopter crews in the gulf one

week prior to the incident and provided them with clear rules

of engagement and freedom to act.

Another example of American retaliation against continued

Iranian mining came after the April 14, 1988 mine strike by

USS Samuel B. Roberts. President Reagan approved a planned

retaliation against three Iranian gas-oil-separating platforms

and the Iranian frigate Salaban by USN Surface-Action

Groups . These groups attacked and neutralized two of three

platforms and damaged Salaban, which had long terrorized

shipping in the gulf.

On April 19, during a day-long operation, Air Force E-3

AWACS assisted with the naval and air engagements against the

Iranians. They directed USN A-6E Intruders flying combat air

patrol to the Mubarek oil field where Iranian patrol boats were

attacking the SS Willi Tide, a U.S. vessel. The A-6s requested

permission to attack the patrol boats . The request to attack

the Iranians was relayed to the White House via satellite and

approved in only three minutes. The A-6s armed with Mark 20

Rockeye Cluster bombs made short work of the three patrol

boats .

Later, Sahand attacked Surface-Action Group D, whose

mission was to find and neutralize Salaban. After an hourlong surface action, the naval group sank Sahand. During

the engagement, USAF AWACS found and tracked Salaban.

After watching its sister ship receive the full force of the

group's attack, Salaban sailed to Bandar Abbas where it hid

behind larger, commercial tankers. At 6:00 P.M ., Salaban

sailed into the gulf and fired surface-to-air missiles at A-6Es

165
flying patrol and surface-to-surface missiles at USN vessels .

An A-6E responded with a 500-pound laser-guided bomb,

which reportedly went straight down the smoke funnel of the

ship and exploded in the engine room. The U.S . attack was

called off when the ship appeared to be sinking at the stern

from the bomb's effects .

Command arrangements or rules of engagements cannot

prevent accidents from occurring during any contingency,

such as the case of USS Vincennes shooting down an Iranian

civilian airliner on July 3, 1988. With the cease-fire between

Iran and Iraq in effect in August 1988, CENTCOM ordered

reduction of forces . The last of sixty-six escort missions during

Operation EARNEST WILL ended on November 17, 1988 .

As an integral part of the theater commander's combat forces,

the Air Force provided daily command and control of the air,

aerial refueling, and planning for joint air operations through

CENTAF Forward . Simultaneously, the ELF-ONE contingent

continued its mission of providing air defense early warning for

Saudi Arabia. The successful outcome of Operation EARNEST

WILL and subsequent retaliation operations could be directly

tied to the premise of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The theater

commander had under his span of control USA special operations helicopters aboard USN ships, naval air cover, and USAF

command and control and refueling aircraft. He also enjoyed a

short, direct chain of command that ensured the orders issued

and planning undertaken were not diluted by any competing

service interest. In short, he was truly "in command."
Intervention in Panama:

Operation JUST CAUSE

DATES: December 17, 1989-February 14, 1990

LOCATION: Panama

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Howard Air Force Base (AFB), Omar

Torrijos International Airport, Tocumen Airfield, Rio Hato Airfield,

Panama

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

William J. Allen

167

NUMBERED AIR FORCES: WINGS: (con't .)

Eighth 97th Bombardment

Ninth 118th Tactical Airlift

Fifteenth 136th Tactical Airlift

Twenty-First 137th Tactical Airlift

Twenty-Second 146th Tactical Airlift

305th Air Refueling

WINGS: 314th Tactical Airlift

1st Special Operations 315th Military Airlift

2d Bombardment 317th Tactical Airlift

9th Strategic Reconnaissance 319th Bombardment

19th Air Refueling 340th Air Refueling

22d Air Refueling 349th Military Airlift

24th Composite 380th Bombardment

28th Bombardment 433d Military Airlift

33d Tactical Fighter 436th Military Airlift

37th Tactical Fighter 437th Military Airlift

42d Bombardment 438th Military Airlift

55th Strategic Reconnaissance 439th Military Airlift

60th Military Airlift 445th Military Airlift

62d Military Airlift 446th Military Airlift

63d Military Airlift 459th Military Airlift

68th Air Refueling 463d Tactical Airlift

96th Bombardment 512th Military Airlift
AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS: (con

t.)

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT : C-130, AC-130, HC-130, MC-130,

EC-130, C-5, C-141, MH-53, MH-60, F-117, F-15, F-16, EF-111,

E-3, KC-135, OA-37, A-7

Operations

Since Panama's declaration of independence from Columbia

in 1904, the United States has maintained a special interest

in the small Central American country. The United States

controlled and occupied the Panama Canal Zone, through

which it built a forty-mile long canal over the next ten years to

connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. U.S . President Woodrow

Wilson formally opened the canal on July 12, 1915, by proclamation. Political and domestic conditions in Panama remained

fairly stable until 1968, when Brig. Gen. Omar Torrijos Herrera

deposed President Arnulfo Arias Madrid . Through the efforts of

U.S. President James (Jimmy) E. Carter and the U.S. Senate, a

new Panama Canal Treaty took effect on October 1, 1979 . The

new treaty granted Panama complete control of the canal and

withdrawal of U.S. military forces by January 1, 2000 .

One of General Torrijos' sublieutenants in the Panamanian

National Guard was Manuel Noriega. Noriega's rise to power

began with an appointment to head the Panamanian military

intelligence, where he became a key advisor and most trusted

friend of Torrijos . After Torrijos's death on July 31, 1981, a

struggle between leaders ensued, and in 1983, Noriega prevailed.

He promoted himself to general and consolidated his air force,

navy, and army into the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) . Noriega

maintained ties with the U.S. intelligence community, furnishing

168

WINGS: (con't.) GROUPS: (con't .)

552d Airborne Warning and Control 139th Tactical Airlift

1550th Combat Crew Training 180th Tactical Fighter

193d Special Operations

GROUPS: 916th Air Refueling

105th Military Airlift 919th Special Operations

109th Tactical Airlift 1720th Special Tactics

125th Fighter-Interceptor
CARIBBEAN SEA

1

PEDRO MIGUEL LOCKS

MIRAFLORES LOCK

TORRIJOS/TOCUMEN

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Panana Canal Zone during Operation JUST CAUSE

information on Latin American drug trafficking and money

laundering, while at the same time engaged in such activities

himself. By 1984, those opposing Noriega's regime openly

criticized him and accused him of being a drug trafficker. By

1987, brutal repression of his people was enough for the U.S .

Senate to issue a resolution calling for the Panamanians to

oust him. Noriega in turn ordered his supporters to attack the

U.S. Embassy, causing an end to U.S . military and economic

aid. In 1988, a Miami federal grand jury indicted Noriega on

drug-trafficking and money-laundering charges . However, he

intensified his ruthless campaign against his own people and

increased harassment of U.S . military personnel, their dependents, and other Americans.

169
U.S. Army personnel boarding C-5B in support of JUST CAUSE.

By 1989, U.S . President George H. W. Bush, concerned by

the Panamanian government's harassment of U.S. military

personnel and their dependents and the threat to U.S . national interests, decided to invade Panama. To oust the dictator, President Bush ordered the planning and execution of

several contingencies setting the stage for an invasion from

both within Panama and from the United States . During Operation NIMROD DANCER in May 1989, the Military Airlift

Command (MAC) airlifted elements of the U.S. Army's 5th and

7th Infantry Divisions and the U.S . Marines' 2d Expeditionary

Force to strengthen U.S . forces throughout Panama. By the

time the operation ended, 34 C-5, 39 C-141, and 2 commercial Ir 1011 missions had airlifted 2,679 soldiers and Marines

and over 2,950 tons of equipment into the country. Also in

May, President Bush ordered U.S. forces in Panama to relocate

dependents living off base to a secure military base . In most

cases, on-base residents opened their homes to friends and

coworkers until dependents could be airlifted back to the

170
United States . That airlift, Operation JEWEL, took

place from May 16 to June 29, 1989 . Commercial airlift, C-5s,

and C-141 s flew a total of 5,915 persons and 398 pets from

Howard AFB to Charleston AFB, South Carolina. However, not

all American citizens were evacuated from Panama during Operation BLADE JEWEL.

After Operation BLADE JEWEL, several key PDF officers

attempted a coup against Noriega on October 3, 1989 . They

tried to take over PDF headquarters, known as the Commandancia, in Panama City . The rebels captured Noriega

but, by chance, soldiers loyal to him were on a military

exercise just outside the city. They returned, defeated the

rebels, and freed Noriega. Shortly, the Panamanian government declared a "state of war" against the United States.

The Bush administration, seemingly indifferent to an opportunity to overthrow Noriega, caused great concern to Congress and the media . But, President Bush had long anticipated the need to capture Noriega, and the recent troop

buildup in Panama was part of a plan named PRAYER

BOOK. This plan envisioned deployment of approximately

five brigades and a corps headquarters within three weeks

to Panama. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the time needed to increase the U.S . military

presence of about 13,000 people to nearly 26,000 .

The U.S Southern Command oversaw what proved to be

the largest U.S . military operation since the Vietnam War.

Its commander, Lt. Gen . Maxwell R. Thurman, USA, delegated combat planning for the operation to the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina . The corps headquarters, designated as Joint Task Force-South, devised the

plans for Operation JUST CAUSE. Representatives from

MAC, Strategic Air Command (SAC), and Tactical Air Command (TAC) worked with Joint Task Force-South and other

headquarters to plan the aerial invasion and follow-on support. Meanwhile, General Thurman created the Joint Special

Operations Task Force with personnel from Headquarters,

Twenty-Third Air Force, who planned the special operations

support for the ground forces .

By design, all four services participated as parts of several task forces . The ground forces were divided into Atlantic,
Semper Fi, Bayonet, and Pacific Task Forces . Task Force Atlantic, built around two brigades of the 7th Infantry Division,

was to attack positions around the Caribbean end of the Panama Canal. Task Force Semper Fi would secure Howard AFB

and the Bridge of the Americas . Assigned to attack the PDF

headquarters and various installations in and around Panama

City was Task Force Bayonet's 193d Infantry Brigade . Task

Force Pacific's two brigades of the 82d Airborne Division

would air-drop into both Torrijos International Airport and

Tocumen Airfield, seizing these vital gateways for the arrival of

reinforcements . Airborne Ranger brigades would lead the initial assaults on the airfields and also attack the PDF facilities

at Rio Hato Airfield .

The units to invade Panama conducted numerous planning

sessions and exercises that refined the assigned missions of

USAF commands . MAC was responsible for the airlift of the

assault forces and follow-on reinforcements . SAC was responsible for providing air refueling to USAF aircraft during the

contingency. USAF special operations forces would fly special

operations aircraft in support of the assault airlift and combat

ground forces.

Continuing incidents between the PDF and off-duty U.S.

military personnel and their dependents finally resulted in the

death of a U.S. Marine and a sexual assault . President Bush's

order on December 17, 1989, was simply "Let's do it." President Bush's stated objectives were to protect American citizens, support the democratically elected officials whom Noriega

had ousted, keep the Panama Canal operational, and arrest

Noriega to face his indictment. Operation JUST CAUSE was

under way. Battle staffs and Crisis Action Teams all over the Air

Force began mustering their respective forces in preparation for

the pre-employment staging of airlift and air refueling forces. On

December 18 and 19, MAC airlifters prepositioned assault personnel and equipment at several staging bases in the southeastern United States and at Howard AFB in Panama itself.

MAC originally planned to support the Army's air-drop and

air-land missions with sixty-three C-141, twenty-one C-130,

and two C-5 aircraft staging from the United States. During

normal peacetime duty, these numbers would tax MAC's

ability to provide enough airplanes and crews . Fortunately,

172
Peacekeepers patrolling the perimeter of Howard AFB, Panama.

the order for the invasion came during the Christmas season,

when most aircrews and aircraft were at home . A disruption in

plans occurred because the XVII Airborne Corps waited until

the morning of the 19th to recall their troops . This late call

reduced the time to load the 82d Airborne Division and caused

many aircraft to descend on Pope AFB almost simultaneously,

instead of in an orderly manner. Pope aircraft marshals found

parking spaces for twelve more C-141s than the number planners believed the field could handle . In all, forty-five C-141 s

crowded Pope's ramps and taxiways. Twenty aircraft loaded

2,176 assault troops, and the others carried the division's

equipment. As planned, the equipment-loaded C-141s flew to

Charleston AFB, South Carolina, where they waited for the

start of the airlift to Panama .

Adding to overcrowded conditions at Pope, the next disruption hit cold and hard for the loaders, crews, and troopers.

Early on the 18th, weather forecasters warned that a severe

ice storm would hit the base that afternoon. Considering all

the planning that had gone into the operation, unforeseen ice

173
could have easily frozen the invasion in place . The storm arrived on schedule with ice forming on the aircraft, causing

serious delays . The normal climate being mild, Pope lacked

equipment to deice so many aircraft. Airlift units from as far

away as Dyess AFB, Texas, flew in deicing equipment and

fluid . The extra deicing trucks and thousands of gallons of

fluid arrived at Pope in time to limit further delays in launch

times, but the postponements had a rippling effect for planned

airflow and air refueling times .

As ground crews deiced the aircraft, loaders and paratroopers

waited in miserable conditions, aerial-port technicians quickened the pace of loading the big transports to get the aircraft

launched on time. But they needed help . Military retirees and

Reservists from the local area heard that "something big" was

up at Pope and Fort Bragg. Many volunteered to help in any way

they could ; some immediately went to work loading aircraft.

The combined efforts of those in and out of uniform enabled

the equipment-carrying C-141s to leave Pope for Charleston by

3 :30 P.M. on the 19th. Most of the transports took off close to

their scheduled departure times despite compressed loading

times and hazardous weather.

While MAC airlifters staged airborne forces and equipment,

SAC positioned KC-135 and KC-10 tanker crews at Seymour

Johnson AFB, North Carolina, and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana .

On the 19th, SAC tankers flew to their designated refueling

tracks to refuel the airlift to Panama . The tankers also refueled

TAC F-15s from Eglin flying a fighter cap near Cuba, E-3A

AWACS aircraft providing command and control, and EF-111

radar-jamming aircraft protecting the airlift force. The delays

due to deicing caused some tankers to remain in their refueling tracks near Panama too long. To remedy the situation,

some KC-135s transferred their fuel to the larger KC-10s,

which could stay longer to refuel aircraft. Overall, tankers

from 23 squadrons pumped over 12 million pounds of fuel

from December 20, 1989 to January 3, 1990 to aircraft supporting Operation JUST CAUSE.

The planned route of the air bridge to Panama required

aircraft to fly through the "gap" between Mexico's Yucatan

Peninsula and the western tip of Cuba. To avoid detection by

Cuban radar, airlifters descended to the lowest possible safe

174
altitudes . The C-141 s dropped to 5,000 and the C

130s to

3,000 feet, based on factors such as the distance from Cuban

radar and the curvature of the earth. To make matters more

difficult, the crews flew to Panama under radio silence.

Four C-130s of the 317th Tactical Airlift Wing with equipment and troops of the 75th Ranger Regiment began the airlift

from Hunter Army Airfield (AAF) at Savannah, Georgia, at 5 :56

P .M. on December 19 . Seven hours later, the Rangers made the

first jumps at Torrijos/Tocumen . The aircraft that carried

them were specially-equipped Special Operations Low-Level II

C-130s . At 6 :02 P.M., thirteen C-130s departed Lawson AAF at

Fort Stewart, Georgia, with assault troops for Rio Hato, followed by C-130s carrying heavy equipment and two additional

special operations Hercules aircraft.

Meanwhile, two C-5s loaded with forward area refueling

equipment and an airlift control element left Hunter bound for

Torrijos/Tocumen . Later, seven C-141s with troops of the

75th Rangers and five others carrying their equipment took

off. At 10 :30 P.M., thirty-one C-141s carrying heavy equipment

and containers launched from Charleston AFB bound for the

same destination . The C-141 aircraft carrying the 82d Airborne Division did not fly the planned single-wave, twentyship formation due to deicing delays . Instead, they departed

Pope between 9:30 P.M. on December 19 and just after midnight in four waves.

Special tactics teams were the first USAF people on the

ground at the Panamanian airfields prior to the designated

"H-hour." They installed navigational beacons that guided the

troop-laden aircraft to the drop zones . From the troop carriers,

additional special tactics teams parachuted to the landing

zones . Once on the ground, combat controllers hurriedly

cleared the runways of parachutes, debris, and Panamanianplaced obstructions in preparation for the following air-land

operations. Pararescuemen set up casualty collection points

for triage and combat first aid for the wounded. The special

tactics teams also provided air traffic control, command and

control communications, assistance to gunship operations, refueling and rearming point management, air evacuation support, and emergency medical treatment.

175
Manuel Noriega in custody of DEA agents.

At three minutes past midnight on December 20, the first

twelve C-141s dropped paratroopers and their equipment at

Torrijos/Tocumen . The aircrews completed the drop using

night-vision goggles to locate the darkened, blacked-out airfields. This marked the Air Force's first combat use of this

highly valuable equipment. A minute later at Rio Hato, thirteen C-130s made their drop just after the combat debut of

the F-117 Nighthawk, which dropped ordnance near the PDF

barracks . Of the initial 111 aircraft involved in the assault, 84

flying at 500 feet dropped close to 5,000 troops in the largest

nighttime airborne operation since World War 11 .

Providing a critical protective cover for assault troops, MAC's

special operations aircraft suppressed ground threats, such as

antiaircraft positions, and covered helicopters inserting Army

Rangers. AC-130s of the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW),

from Hurlburt Field, Florida, and of the 919th Special Operations Group from Duke Field, Florida, provided close air and

special sensor support . Other USAF special operations aircraft,

MC-130Es, MH-53Js, HC-130Ps, and MH-60s, flew mostly at

17 6
gpy and Navy Special

Forces . In Panama, Air Force members at Howard AFB supported prepositioned U.S . forces . The Marines of Task Force

Semper Fi launched their attack from Howard AFB. Under

difficult "blacked-out" conditions on an aircraft-saturated airfield, Howard's people supported Army helicopter and AC-130

gunship operations . The assault C-130s also landed there to

refuel, and several had to receive repairs for battle damage,

before returning to the United States. Howard AFB also supported many other operations, including the follow-on airlift of

reinforcements and the evacuation of the wounded to military

hospitals in the United States .

Operation JUST CAUSE saw the U.S. Air Force undertake

its largest and most complex air operation since the war in

Southeast Asia. Over 250 aircraft took part in the invasion . Air

Force special operations forces supported Army ground forces

that eliminated organized PDF resistance by Christmas day.

On January 3, 1990, Manuel Noriega surrendered to U.S .

forces. A 1st SOW MC-130 flew him to Miami, Florida, for

arraignment. By the end of hostilities, the PDF suffered casualties of over 300 killed, 124 wounded, and over 5,800 captured .

The experience gained by planners, crews, and ground personnel in building the air bridge to Panama during Operation

JUST CAUSE proved invaluable. From December 20, 1989 to

February 14, 1990, the Air Force flew almost 40,000 passengers and delivered over 20,650 tons of cargo. Included in the

airlift were over 1 .2 million pounds of food for displaced Panamanians. Air Force transports evacuated over 320 U.S . military casualties to hospitals in the United States and honorably

returned 23 soldiers who died during the operation.

JUST CAUSE was the culmination of several operations

during 1989 to fulfill President Bush's policy toward Panama.

The more prominent achievements by U.S . military forces during this operation included the successful airborne invasion of

Panama and capture of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega.

The prepositioning of U.S . forces within the country, evacuation of military dependents, and the airborne invasion all

contributed to a successful completion of Operation JUST

CAUSE. However, as successful as the operation was, not

everything went according to plan. For example, the North

177
Carolina ice storm delayed aircraft launches, causing tanker

crews to adjust their refueling on-station time and some airlift

crews to change flight plans while in-flight to arrive over the

drop zone on time .

Despite these and other problems, Operation JUST CAUSE

resulted in the return of democracy to Panama and secured

the Panama Canal. In a mere eight months to come, some of

these same airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines would build

and travel through another, larger air bridge during Operation

DESERT SHIELD.
Crisis in Iraq:

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Daniel L. Haulman

DATES: April 5, 1991-December 31, 1996

LOCATIONS: Southeastern Turkey and Northern Iraq

OVERSEAS BASES USED : Incirlik Air Base (AB), Adana, Antalya,

Diyarbakir, Silopi, Batman, Turkey; Sirsenk, Iraq; Rhein-Main AB,

Germany

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

179

DIVISION: WINGS: (con't.) WINGS: (con't .)

322d Airlift 81 st Tactical Fighter (later,

81 st Fighter) 419th Fighter

86th Tactical Fighter (later,

86th Wing, 86th Fighter) 435th Tactical Airlift

WINGS: 92d Air Refueling 436th Military Airlift

1 st Fighter 100th Air Refueling 437th Military Airlift

3d Wing 131st Fighter 463d Tactical Airlift

16th Special Operations 132d Fighter

552d Airborne Warning and

Control (later, 552d Air

Control)

19th Air Refueling 138th Fighter Composite Wing

(Provisional), 7440th

20th Tactical Fighter (later,

20th Fighter) 140th Fighter

22d Air Refueling 154th Composite GROUPS :

27th Fighter 174th Fighter 1 st Rescue

36th Tactical Fighter (later,

36th Fighter) 180th Fighter 10th Special Forces

39th Special Operations 192d Fighter 32d Fighter

39th Wing 302d Tactical Airlift 39th Tactical (later, 39th

Operations)

48th Fighter 306th Strategic 43d Air Refueling

52d Tactical Fighter (later,

52d Fighter)

314th Tactical Airlift (later,

314th Airlift 124th Fighter

57th Wing 317th Tactical Airlift 143d Tactical Airlift

60th Military Airlift 349th Military Airlift 154th Composite

66th Electronic Combat 366th Wing 159th Fighter
()

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: A-10, C-5, C-12, C-21, C-130, C-141,

D-3, EC-130, EF-111, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-111, HC-130, KC-10,

KC-135, MH-53, RC-135, RF-4

Operations

When an American-led international coalition bombed Iraq

and drove the forces of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991,

it weakened his power. Rebellious Kurds in northern Iraq,

whom Hussein had brutally suppressed with chemical weapons three years earlier, launched a new uprising in early

March. When Iraqi government troops defeated the rebellion a

month later, threatening to repeat the massacres of the past,

more than a million Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey. Hundreds

of thousands more gathered on cold mountain slopes on the

Iraqi-Turkish border. Lacking food, clean water, clothing,

blankets, medical supplies and shelter, the refugees suffered

enormous mortality rates .

On April 3, the United Nations Security Council authorized

a humanitarian relief effort for the Iraqi Kurds . During the

first week in April, the United States organized a combined

task force for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Maj . Gen.

James L. Jamerson, USAF, served as first commander. USAF

C-130 cargo airplanes, which had deployed mostly from bases

in Germany to Incirlik AB, Turkey, began air-dropping relief

supplies directly to Kurdish refugees in the mountainous Iraqi

border area on April 7. They delivered about 600 pallets of

relief supplies per day, staging at Diyarbakir and Batman in

southern and eastern Turkey. But airdrops alone proved to be

inadequate . The refugees needed different quantities and

180

GROUPS: (con't.) SQUADRONS: SQUADRONS: (con't.)

185th Fighter 21 st Special Operations 92d Air Refueling

187th Fighter 32d Fighter 93d Air Refueling

192d Fighter 43d Electronic Combat 114th Fighter

313th Tactical Airlilft 58th Military Airlift (later,

58th Airlift)

123d Tactical

Reconnaissance

352d Special Operations 67th Special Operations 911th Air Refueling

44th Fighter 91 st Air Refueling
types of cargo than those chosen for delivery, not enough

cargo reached the people who needed it most, and some items

actually landed on refugees, killing or injuring them. Moreover, the operation failed to address the root of the problem.

The refugees could not stay where they were, and Turkey,

faced with a restive Kurdish population of its own, refused to

admit them in large numbers . PROVIDE COMFORT, therefore,

evolved into a larger operation, with more than one phase, and

the use of American ground troops .

On April 17, 1991, Lt. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, USA,

took command of the PROVIDE COMFORT Combined Task

Force, and General Jamerson became commander of the air

component . With United Nation's (UN) approval, Shalikashvili

built temporary camps in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey so that the refugees could come out from the mountains.

He could better identify the needs of the refugees once they

were in the camps . General Shalikashvili's next step was to

enforce a security zone for the Kurds in northern Iraq so that

they would feel safe enough to return to their homes. Once

there, they would no longer need so many relief supplies . At

first, such a security zone required extensive coalition ground

and air forces . In a month, the Combined Task Force strength

grew beyond 20,000 members . Over half of these were Americans, but the forces of twelve other countries participated in

the operation.

Between mid-April and mid-July, General Shalikashvili and

his task force were able to accomplish their immediate goals

in the first phase of PROVIDE COMFORT. The Iraqi army

withdrew from a security zone that eventually embraced the

cities of Zakho, Al Amadiyah (Amadiya), Suri, and Dihok (Dahuk) and covered several thousand square miles. Shalikashvili

met periodically with Iraqi military officials to avoid misunderstandings. USN sea-lift ships transported cargo to ports in

Turkey for shipment by truck and helicopter to the Iraqi-Turkish

border area . USAF cargo aircraft, including C-5 Galaxies and

C-141 Starlifters, also moved thousands of tons of relief supplies from the United States to Turkey, flying via Germany to

Incirlik, Adana, and Diyarbakir. During the first twenty days

of PROVIDE COMFORT, C-5s and C-141s flew seventy-five

missions from the United States and Europe to Turkey. C-5s
USAF enlisted men prepare to load a C-130 for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

also transported allied troops from Italy to eastern Turkey,

and from there they moved overland to Zakho . The Air Force

used C-130s to deliver cargo from eastern Turkey to Sirsenk

Airfield in the security zone . By mid-July 1991, USAF airplanes had transported more than 7,000 tons of PROVIDE

COMFORT relief supplies.

U.S. and coalition fighter aircraft provided air cover for the

PROVIDE COMFORT ground forces in the security zone . The

combination of air cover and ground forces, along with a

promise of some degree of autonomy from Baghdad, persuaded most Kurdish refugees to return to their homes. By

the end of May, only about 41,000 refugees remained in the

camps . On June 7, the United Nations resolved to send forces

to replace those of the American-led coalition, and by the

middle of July, the PROVIDE COMFORT Combined Task Force

withdrew from northern Iraq. A six-nation coalition ground

force remained in southern Turkey, ready to enter Iraq again if

necessary. Thus ended PROVIDE COMFORT I .

The second phase of PROVIDE COMFORT, which began in

mid-July 1991, enforced the established security zone with

U.S ., British, French, and Turkish air power. All PROVIDE

COMFORT II commanders, beginning with General Jamerson,

were USAF generals . Coalition ground forces withdrew from

182
No-Fly Zones in Iraq during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

southern Turkey at the end of September, increasing the burden

on the remaining air units. By the end of the year, USAF

members assigned to PROVIDE COMFORT still numbered

more than a thousand, but the number of U.S. Army, Navy,

and Marine Corps declined to less than 200. The coalition

enforced a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, north of 36° N, from

which Iraqi aircraft were forbidden. This no-fly zone covered

more area than the UN security zone on the ground .

183
PROVIDE COMFORT relied increasingly on fighters as its

primary missions evolved to enforcement of the no-fly zone,

reconnaissance over the area, and readiness to retaliate if the

forces of Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurds again. Humanitarian airlift, however, did not completely disappear. USAF

C-5s, C-141s, C-130s, and KC-10s, supplemented with coalition aircraft and commercial airplanes, transported 119 tons

of food and water and more than 4,000 bundles of clothing to

the Iraqi Kurds during the winter of 1991-92 .

Concerned that U.S . and UN support for the Kurds in Iraq

might encourage Kurdish separatists in Turkey, Turkish military

authorities demanded and received co-command of Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT. With this arrangement, the Turks gained

operational control over their own PROVIDE COMFORT troops .

The Turkish government, which looked on the operation as a

mixed blessing, allowed it to continue only by approving shortterm extensions. The Turks wanted to discourage the Kurds of

northern Iraq from crossing the border into Turkey, but the

government also feared creation of a Kurdish state in Iraq that

might have encouraged the 10 million Kurds in Turkey to create

a state of their own. The PROVIDE COMFORT forces came to

Turkey's relief in February, March, and April 1992, after avalanches and an earthquake inspired USAF humanitarian airlifts .

In the long run, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT proved to be as

much in the interest of Turkey as of the Iraqi Kurds . The coalition persuaded the Iraqi Kurds to refuse to cooperate with Turkish Kurds in separatist activities or to allow their territory to be

used for cross-border raids.

In August 1992, the United States established another nofly zone, this time in southern Iraq south of 32° N, to discourage renewed Iraqi military activity near Kuwait (Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH). It complemented the PROVIDE COMFORT no-fly zone north of 36° N. Iraqi forces tested the no-fly

zones in both south and north by sending fighters into them

in December 1992 and January 1993 . On December 27, 1992,

F-16 pilot Lt. Col. Gary L. North, USAF, shot down an Iraqi

MiG-25 in the southern zone . Less than a month later, on

January 17, 1993, another F-16 pilot, Lt. Craig D. Stevenson,

USAF, shot down an Iraqi MIG-29 in the north. Those were

the only aerial victories of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

184
In January and June 1993, USN warships fired cruise missiles into Iraq to destroy a suspected nuclear facility and to

punish Saddam Hussein for an attempt to assassinate former

U.S . President George H. W. Bush. In January, April, June,

July, and August 1993, USAF aircraft attacked Iraqi antiaircraft and radar sites in both the northern and southern no-fly

zones after they fired at or locked onto coalition patrol aircraft.

In 1994, Iraqi troops massed near Kuwait, prompting the

United States to deploy more forces to Southwest Asia (Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR) .

After 1993, Saddam Hussein did not often challenge coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones, but U.S. units remained wary. On April 14, 1994, two American F-15s patrolling

the northern no-fly zone accidentally shot down two USA

UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, killing twenty-six people, including fifteen Americans. Misidentifying the helicopters as

hostile, the F-15 pilots failed to receive contrary information

from either the helicopters or an orbiting E-3 aircraft . The

"friendly fire" incident aroused negative public opinion and a

demand for changes to prevent such accidents in the future .

The Iraqi Kurds did not maintain a united front against

Saddam Hussein. One faction, eager to assert its power over

another, invited the Iraqi army to help it take control of the city

of Irbil in the American-protected no-fly zone. Iraqi tanks took

the city in August 1996. Anxious to discourage Saddam Hussein

from further military adventures, U.S . President William J.

Clinton responded by expanding the southern no-fly zone to

33° N and clearing the additional territory of crucial air defenses by firing forty-four cruise missiles from USN ships and

USAF B-52s (Operation DESERT STRIKE) . During the same

month, Iraqi forces fired a surface-to-air missile at a pair of

F-16s patrolling the northern no-fly zone but activated the

radar too briefly to score a hit or to reveal its location for an

effective counterstrike.

Kurds of the defeated faction fled to the Turkish border. In

Operations QUICK TRANSIT I, II, and III, the United States

helped them move to safe areas in Turkey. Almost 7,000 refu

gees flew on to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam to be processed for eventual settlement in the United States (Operation

PACIFIC HAVEN) .

185
At the beginning of 1997, Operation NORTHERN WATCH

replaced Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which had ceased to

be a predominantly humanitarian operation, to complement

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. The two security zones in

northern and southern Iraq discouraged Saddam Hussein not

only from acts of genocide against his people in those areas

but also from invading Kuwait again.

Foremost among the lessons PROVIDE COMFORT taught was

the need to avoid fratricide. The downing of the two USA helicopters generated a thorough investigation that led to changes in

organization, procedures, training, and the rules of engagement.

Maj . Gen. James Andrus, USAF, Commander, Third Air Force,

led the initial investigation. Air Force Chief of Staff General

Ronald R. Fogleman, who replaced General Merrill A. McPeak in

October 1994, personally reviewed the cases of those involved to

prevent such a situation from happening again.

The operation also revealed the limitations of airdrops

alone. At first, U.S. transports dropped some food and clothing

the Kurds refused to eat or wear, because planners did not

realize what cargo was appropriate for the culture. The Air

Force also had to reduce chances that air-dropped cargo

would land on the very people it was designed to assist. More

accurate intelligence assessments when the operation began

could have precluded the extensive operational modifications

that occurred later.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT exposed some host-country

problems. Distrustful of the Kurds in their own country, the

Turks were reluctant to support an operation to help Kurds in

Iraq. The Turkish government gave approval to the operation

for only up to six months at a time and limited the number of

coalition combat aircraft in the operation to forty-eight at a

time. Turkey also waged a war against its own Kurds during

PROVIDE COMFORT, which complicated the operation when

Kurdish separatists sometimes mistook American aircraft for

those of the Turks.

Friction among rival Kurdish factions in northern Iraq

threatened PROVIDE COMFORT by giving Saddam Hussein

an excuse to take the Kurdish city of Irbil in the no-fly zone .

In future contingencies, the United States and its coalition

partners should be more familiar with the divisions among the

186
A 52d Fighter Wing F-16 at Incirlik AB, Turkey, for Operation PROVIDE

COMFORT duty.

people they are trying to assist, especially if such divisions

could undermine the operation .

The need for alternative bases was another lesson to emerge

from the PROVIDE COMFORT experience . Although fighters

continued to operate from Incirlik throughout the operation,

runway construction there forced larger aircraft such as E-3s,

tankers, and strategic transports to use bases at Antalya,

Adana, and elsewhere .

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT challenged the readiness of

the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) . While USAFE personnel

and aircraft decreased because of the post-Cold War reduction

of forces, they were committed simultaneously in Turkey, Bosnia, and central Africa. The PROVIDE COMFORT patrols ate up

flying hours that USAFE. would have preferred to use for training. Command leaders, fearing that they were overextended,

persuaded the U.S. Air Force to rotate more people and aircraft

from other commands to serve in PROVIDE COMFORT.

The operation suffered from confusing definitions of territorial responsibility. The no-fly zone was larger than the security

zone on the ground, which Iraqi troops were forbidden to enter. This allowed Iraqi troops to move antiaircraft weapons and

radar into the territory below the no-fly zone, increasing the

risk to coalition aircraft. The line between the areas for which

the U.S . European Command and U.S . Central Command

187
were responsible ran along the border between Turkey and

Iraq . PROVIDE COMFORT bases were located in the U.S .

European Command's area of responsibility, but the PROVIDE

COMFORT no-fly zone was technically in the U.S . Central

Command's zone. To solve the problem, Central Command

allowed the European Command to patrol northern Iraq, while

it concentrated on the southern no-fly zone .

One other problem that emerged from PROVIDE COMFORT

was the absence of an exit policy. Strategists in Washington

did not define a desired end state that would justify termination of the operation . No one knew exactly how long the no-fly

zone over northern Iraq would have to be enforced, and PROVIDE COMFORT was eventually replaced by another operation

with a different name but the same basic mission.

Despite mistakes and serious problems, Operation PROVIDE

COMFORT succeeded in its purpose. It saved the lives of thousands of Kurdish refugees . By encouraging them to return to

their homes in northern Iraq, it reduced hostile ethnic pressure

on Turkey, a key North Atlantic Treaty Organization any . It

prevented Saddam Hussein from having a free hand in the

northern part of his country, discouraging him from repeating

genocidal incidents against the Kurdish minority. Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT set a precedent for no-fly zones elsewhere, serving as a model for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

in southern Iraq and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia. Finally, PROVIDE COMFORT, in conjunction with SOUTHERN

WATCH, discouraged Iraq from invading tiny Kuwait again.

Saddam Hussein learned that his northern flank was as exposed as his southern to readily available airpower resources.
Crisis in Southern Iraq:

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

DATES: August 2, 1992To Be Determined

LOCATIONS: Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Riyahd Air Base (AB), Dhahran AB, Al

Kharj AB, Saudi Arabia; Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

William J. Allen

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-21, C-130, E-3, EC-135, EF-111, F-4,

F-15, F-16, F-117, HC-130, HH-60, KC-10, KC-135, MC-130,

MH-53, RC-135, U-2

Operations

On August 26, 1992, U.S . President George H. W. Bush announced a no-fly zone over southern Iraq in support of United

Nations Security Council Resolution 688. Thus began Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH, one of the longest contingency/deployment

operations ever undertaken by the U.S . Air Force. The resolution

protected Shiite Muslims under aerial attack from the Iraqi

regime of Saddam Hussein in the aftermath of Operation

DESERT STORM and enforced other United Nations (UN)

sanctions against Iraq. Those sanctions included compliance

with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons inspection,

plus dismantling, destruction, and import/export restrictions .

189

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES: GROUPS:

4417th Air 4th Expeditionary Operations

4418th Air 49th Operations

552d Operations

WINGS: 1681 st Airlift

4th Air Expeditionary 1700th Operations

4401 st Wing 4401 st Operations

4404th Wing 4402d Operations

4404th Operations

4409th Operations (later, Air Base)
F1

EXPANDED NO-FLY ZONE

UN GROUND SECURITY ZONE

NO-FLY ZONE

190

No-Fly Zones in Iraq during Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

Later UN resolutions included war reparations and Iraqi acceptance of the sovereignty of Kuwait.

The original no-fly zone (called "The Box" by SOUTHERN

WATCH participants) encompassed all of southern Iraq south

of 32° N. The Box excluded all Iraqi fixed- and rotary-winged

aircraft. In the aftermath of an Iraqi massing of troops at the

Kuwaiti border in October 1994, the United States declared it
a no-fly, no-drive zone . Under the direction of U.S . Central

Command, Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as coalition

(Saudi Arabia, Great Britain, France, and later, Kuwait) forces,

combined to enforce the UN sanctions. The remaining U.S.

forces in the Persian Gulf after DESERT STORM provided the

forces for the newly organized Joint Task Force-Southwest

Asia, which provided tactical command and operational planning for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH forces . On August 27,

1992, less than twenty-four hours after President Bush's announcement, these forces flew the first operational sortie .

Flying activities included fighter sweeps and patrols conducted against would-be targets in southern Iraq, reconnaissance, suppression of enemy air defense, air-to-air refueling,

airborne warning and control system support, and other special missions . By February 1997, Operation SOUTHERN

WATCH aircrews had flown more than 133,000 operational

sorties, with over 86,000 being in The Box over southern Iraq.

The U.S. Air Force normally deployed personnel to Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH on a ninety-day rotational basis. Operational flying squadrons deployed the necessary aircraft, personnel, and equipment needed to meet force-structure requirements, while support squadrons filled their ranks through

individual tasking per occupational-specialty requirements .

Once deployed, personnel were assigned to provisional units.

From August 1992 to January 1997, Tactical Air Command,

later replaced by Air Combat Command, activated eighty-one

provisional flying squadrons, groups, and wings at various times

to meet the manpower and force structure requirements of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Also, these commands activated an

additional seventy-two provisional support units to support flying operations and meet changing requirements. At any given

time, they deployed over 5,000 USAF members to support the

operation. At times, such as the reinforcement of SOUTHERN

WATCH during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the ranks

could swell to nearly 15,000 USAF people, plus additional

Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel.

The Iraqi regime complied with the restrictions of the no-fly

zone until December 27, 1992 . Then the Iraqi air force sent

two aircraft south of 32° N, threatening USAF patrol aircraft. A

flight of F-16s attacked the intruders with missiles, shooting
This F-16 is still active at Eglin AFB, Fla., as a test aircraft . F-16s were used

against MiG-25 intruders of the no-fly zone.

down a MiG-25 "Foxbat" aircraft. The American delegate to

the UN delivered a demarche to the Iraqi delegate on January

6, 1993 over the violation of the southern no-fly zone and the

threatening deployment of Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems

to southern Iraq. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH forces subsequently met Iraq's refusal to remove the threatening missile

systems by attacking both missile sites and the Zaafaraniyah

Nuclear Fabrication Facility near Baghdad. On January

13-18, USAF aircraft struck missile sites in southern Iraq.

Later, four USN warships launched forty-five Tomahawk landattack missiles against the nuclear facility, followed by more

USAF and coalition attacks against several missile and command and control sites in southern Iraq.

Again, on April 18, 1993, a USAF F-4G "Wild Weasel" aircraft fired on an Iraqi radar site that had threatened the aircraft . Later, on June 27, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH forces

launched an attack on the Iraq Intelligence Service Headquarters in Baghdad in response to the April 1993 planned assassination attempt on former President Bush during his visit to

Kuwait . Two days later, a Wild Weasel struck another hostile

Iraqi radar site . On July 24, another Wild Weasel on a routine

patrol over southern Iraq fired an antiradiation missile at an

192
Iraqi radar. As members of the Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

team, two USN EA-6B "Prowler" aircraft fired missiles at another Iraqi radar site on July 29 .

For much of 1994, the Iraqis seemed to accept daily patrolling by Operation SOUTHERN WATCH forces, since little Iraqi

activity warranted retaliation or defensive protection by coali

tion aircraft. However, by October, Iraq had moved elements of

its elite Republican Guard and regular army through southern

Iraq to the border with Kuwait. This aggressive move led to the

rapid reinforcement of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH forces

during Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. Troop strength in the

theater swelled to over 25,000 U.S . personnel from all services. The number of available USAF aircraft grew temporarily

to over 270 to meet the crisis .

In late 1995, Operation VIGILANT SENTINEL was launched

to deter any Iraqi adventurism after several high-level Iraqis

defected with their families to Jordan. Although a smaller

reinforcement than Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, this operation proved to the Iraqi leader the resolve of the United

States and its coalition partners to keep Iraq out of Kuwait

and Saudi Arabia.

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH became the USAF test for

the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept in October 1995,

when a composite unit, designed to temporarily replace a USN

Carrier Air Wing leaving the gulf area, arrived to support flying

operations. The AEF provided forces with the same or greater

capability than the units that they replaced. The first, AEF I,

deployed with eighteen F-16 aircraft to Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain,

from October 28 to December 18 . The AEF arrived fully armed

and began flying within twelve hours of landing. The AEF

concept proved sound, and since the first AEF deployment,

several additional AEFs have deployed to support Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH.

Following a terrorist attack against Saudi Arabian and U.S .

forces in Riyadh in November 1995, Headquarters Joint Task

Force-Southwest Asia implemented antiterrorism measures to

deter further attacks against U.S. forces in the region. However, on June 25, 1996, a terrorist bombing killed nineteen

USAF members at Dhahran AB, Saudi Arabia. The blast

193
wounded another 547 people, including 250 Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH personnel.

On September 3-4, USAF and USN aircraft hit targets in

southern Iraq, a response to Iraqi military moves against

Kurds in northern Iraq. In Operation DESERT STRIKE, B-52s

and Navy ships launched forty-four cruise missiles against air

defense batteries in southern Iraq. Then, in response to Iraqi

aggression against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, U.S. President William J . Clinton expanded the no-fly zone to 33° N, just

south of Baghdad . The expanded zone, combined with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, covered most of

the airspace over Iraq.

In February 1998, President Clinton ordered U.S. forces to

the Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from

taking military action in the face of continued UN sanctions.

Hussein refused to allow UN inspectors (specifically American

inspectors) access to possible nuclear, biological, and chemical production sites located in or near his presidential palaces .

The U.S . Air Force deployed additional F-117 stealth fighters,

F-15s, and other aircraft and over 2,000 members. Although

Hussein quickly relented and allowed the inspections, the U.S .

forces did not redeploy until June 1998 .

Since the beginning of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in

1992, routine and emergency deployments have created several personnel and operational problems for the U.S. Air

Force . Because of SOUTHERN WATCH and other deployments

like Operations NORTHERN WATCH and DENY FLIGHT in

Bosnia, USAF members faced multiple temporary-duty assignments within a given year . In the case of crews flying E-3

AWACS or EC-135 aircraft, the number of days deployed each

year reached as high as 200 or more. While Operation

SOUTHERN WATCH tested USAF pilots, aircrews, and support

personnel in a near-combat situation, high deployment rates

for some squadrons and individual mission-essential specialists created proficiency training, quality of life, and pilot retention problems. Because of the high deployment rates, the Air

Force assessed its overall "Ops-Tempo" and took several

measures that enhanced training and the quality of life for

their members. These included limiting the number of days

members deployed from their home base and cutting back the

194
number of higher headquarters inspection visits, peacetime

training exercises, and competitions.

Perhaps one of the most important improvements in both

flying operations and the quality of life for USAF members

resulted directly from the 1996 bombing at Khobar Towers,

Dhahran AB. In the aftermath, the Air Force reviewed its entire security police, law enforcement, and force protection programs . The review resulted in a new security forces concept

that proved to be more than just a change in specialty name .

In 1998, the Air Force reorganized existing security police

units into new security forces groups and squadrons that

trained and specialized in all aspects of force protection, including terrorist activity and deployed force security.

By mid-1998, the Air Force continued routine deployments

of personnel and aircraft to the desert, fulfilling its mission of

patrolling the skies over southern Iraq and enforcing UN sanc

tions . General Ronald R. Fogleman, Air Force Chief of Staff,

pointed out the significance of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

in July 1995 . He stated, "What we have effectively done since

1992 is conduct an air occupation of a country. . . ."

Crisis in Bosnia:

Operation PROVIDE PROMISE

Frederick J. Shaw Jr.

DATES: July 2, 1992-January 9, 1996

LOCATION: Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Rhein-Main Air Base (AB), Ramstein AB,

Germany; Aviano AB, Falconara AB, Italy; Split Airport, Zagreb

Airport, Croatia

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS :

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-130, C-141, C-5, C-9, C-17

197

WINGS: GROUPS: SQUADRONS:

23d Wing 105th Airlift 2d Aeromedical Airlift

60th Airlift (later, Air Mobility) 123d Airlift 14th Airlift

62d Airlift 130th Airlift 16th Airlift

86th Airlift 135th Airlift 17th Airlift

94th Airlift 139th Airlift 37th Airlift

118th Airlift 143d Airlift 38th Airlift

123d Airlift 145th Airlift 40th Airlift

133d Airlift 153d Airlift 41 st Airlift

136th Airlift 165th Airlift 55th Aeromedical Airlift

137th Airlift 166th Airlift 312th Airlift

146th Airlift 167th Airlift

302d Airlift 176th Composite

314th Airlift 179th Airlift

315th Airlift 189th Airlift

317th Airlift 908th Airlift

349th Airlift 910th Airlift

403d Airlift 911th Airlift

435th Airlift 913th Airlift

437th Airlift 914th Airlift

440th Airlift 928th Airlift

934th Airlift
Operations

By 1991, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe

and the Soviet Union, coupled with the disintegration of the

Soviet Union itself, had dissolved the political cement that

bound ethnically diverse Yugoslavia into a single nation. Freed

from the threat of external domination, Roman Catholic

Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the

Yugoslav Federation dominated by Eastern Orthodox Serbia.

In early 1992, predominantly Moslem Bosnia-Herzegovina

(Bosnia) also severed its ties to the Federation . Fearing their

minority status, armed Serbs within Bosnia began forming

their own ethnic state by seizing territory and, in the spring,

besieging the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo .

In April 1992, the United States recognized Bosnia's independence and began airlifting relief supplies to Sarajevo. Early

in May, Bosnian Serbs took control of the capital's airport,

cutting off more than 300,000 people from food and other

necessities . After negotiations with the warring parties, the

United Nations (UN) organized an international relief effort,

starting first with overland truck convoys from Croatia to

Sarajevo . At the end of June, it took control of Sarajevo's

airport, reopening it to international relief flights. On July 3,

1992, the UN airlift began when a French C-130 landed at

Sarajevo with relief supplies . On the same day, U. S . Air

Forces in Europe (USAFE) C-130s began delivering food and

medical supplies.

The United States designated operations in support of the

UN airlift PROVIDE PROMISE. It established a joint task force

under U.S. European Command. Col . Patrick M. Henry, USAF,

Vice Commander, 435th Airlift Wing (AW) at Rhein-Main AB

in Germany, served as PROVIDE PROMISE's first mobility

commander. The 37th Airlift Squadron (AS), a subordinate

unit of the 435th AW, normally flew the PROVIDE PROMISE

missions .

Most USAF transports took off from Rhein-Main, staged at

Zagreb in Croatia or Aviano AB in Italy on the way to Sarajevo,

or flew directly to the Bosnian capital. During a normal duty

day, an aircraft might make several round-trips between Zagreb and Sarajevo before returning to Rhein-Main. The 435th

19 8
BOSNIA MAGLAJ

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Inset: Bosnia-Herzegovina

and 317th Airlift Wings provided the first C-130s, but Air

Force Reserve (AFRES), Air National Guard (ANG), and regular

USAF units began rotating aircraft to Europe for three-week

deployments . Before long, about three C-130s were unloading

at Sarajevo daily. Although the United States was only one of

at least fifteen countries airlifting relief supplies to Sarajevo,

by the end of 1992 its airplanes had delivered more than

5,400 tons of food and medical supplies. Despite gunfire

around Sarajevo that shot down an Italian cargo airplane in

September, U.S. airlifters avoided battle damage during 1992 .

Shortly after the inauguration of U.S . President William J .

Clinton in January 1993, PROVIDE PROMISE expanded dramatically. In February, Bosnian Serb mortars hit a market in

199
central Sarajevo, killing sixty-eight people . Two American

C-130s evacuated fifty wounded people from the Bosnian

capital to Ramstein AB, Germany. During the same month,

Bosnian Serbs blockaded Moslem enclaves in eastern Bosnia,

preventing the arrival of UN truck convoys . At the end of

February, President Clinton authorized American airdrops of

food and medicine to the enclaves, including Tuzla, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde . Maj . Gen . James E . Chambers,

USAF, Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, directed the effort,

which began on February 28 with C-130s of the 435th Airlift

Wing . Later, French and German aircraft would participate in

the airdrops .

Profiting from experience acquired in northern Iraq (PROVIDE COMFORT), C-130s dropped thousands of leaflets explaining the mission's humanitarian nature and warning people to beware of descending bundles . During the first airdrops,

regular USAF C-130s, equipped with the Global Positioning

System (GPS) to ensure precision delivery, avoided ground fire

by dropping their cargoes at night from altitudes in excess of

10,000 feet. Large parachutes and padded packages cushioned the fall of the first bundles, which sometimes weighed a

ton. Lacking the GPS required for accurate nighttime deliveries, AFRES and ANG C-130s did not participate in the first

airdrops. In later operations, they participated by flying in

formations led by GPS-equipped aircraft.

To make possible the safe delivery of food to closely besieged

population centers, members of the 352d Special Operations

Group at Royal Air Force Alconbury, United Kingdom, developed a new tri-wall aerial delivery system (TRIADS) . TRIADS's

containers ripped open as they left the aircraft, scattering

individual meals weighing only 2.2 pounds each. Deliveries by

this method reduced the danger of injury or damage on the

ground. By the middle of July 1993, PROVIDE PROMISE aircraft had dropped more than 7,000 packages of food and over

500 bundles of medical supplies .

The C-5, at that time the largest cargo aircraft in the Air

Force, also participated in PROVIDE PROMISE. In April 1993,

a C-5 from Travis Air Force Base (AFB) in California transported relief supplies from Massachusetts to Rhein-Main AB

in Germany. At Rhein-Main, ground crews loaded the cargo

200
aboard smaller airplanes for delivery to Bosnia . In August, a

C-5 assigned to the 312th Airlift Squadron, 349th Airlift Wing,

flew two water purification systems from Texas to Croatia.

Each of the systems weighed in excess of eighteen tons . From

Croatia, smaller C-130s ferried the water purification equipment to Sarajevo. During the same month, aircraft from the

ANG's 105th Airlift Group delivered three more water purification systems to Europe for service in Sarajevo . Once assembled, the five systems afforded Bosnia's capital a clean water

supply, reducing the chances of epidemics .

Aeromedical evacuation of Bosnian war casualties from

Sarajevo continued in the summer of 1993 with a twist. Supplementing C-130 and C-9 flights from Bosnia to Germany,

C-141 Starlifters began airlifting the wounded from Europe to

the United States for medical treatment. The project was

dubbed Operation SECOND CHANCE.

PROVIDE PROMISE passed a milestone on October 8, 1993

when it exceeded in duration the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift (Operation VITTLES) . By then, American aircraft had transported

more than 23,000 tons of relief cargo to Bosnia, with no major

injuries or accidents. Surpassing this historic marker, the

Bosnian airlift continued, as fighting waged on, claiming as

many as 200,000 lives and leaving more than 2 million people

homeless .

PROVIDE PROMISE airlifters embarked on a secondary operation in December 1993 called PROVIDE SANTA. Hercules

aircraft dropped about fifty tons of toys and children's clothes

and shoes over Bosnia . American military personnel stationed

in Germany and German civilians donated the cargo. By early

1994, USAF transports from Rhein-Main also dropped thirty

tons of mattresses, blankets, sleeping bags, candles, and

beans over eastern Bosnia to enable the people on the ground

to better cope with the winter.

The first damage to an USAF PROVIDE PROMISE aircraft

occurred in early January 1994, when an exploding shell from

artillery fire at the Sarajevo Airport hit a C-130. It was the

sixth UN relief aircraft to suffer damage since July 1992 .

Despite the fact that there were no injuries and the damage

was minor, the United Nations suspended PROVIDE PROMISE

flights for about a week. When flights resumed, the C-130s

20 1
employed proven tactics to reduce exposure to ground fire,

approaching and departing the airport at steep angles and

keeping their engines running during unloading. Fighting continued around Sarajevo with stray or deliberately aimed shots

still causing casualties within the city. On February 5, mortars hit an open Sarajevan market, killing 68 people and

wounding 200. The 2d Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron provided emergency treatment to the wounded, who were evacuated to Ramstein in four USAF C-130s and one International

Red Cross aircraft.

In May 1994, a cease-fire provided USAFE with an opportunity to begin relocation of the 37th AS to Ramstein . The lull

was also an opportunity to rebuild Sarajevo's food stocks by

using larger C-141 Starlifters from the 315th and 437th Airlift

Wings in place of the smaller, more maneuverable 435th Wing

C-130s. As inevitably happened during the Bosnian civil war,

the cease-fire broke down, and the approach to Sarajevo Airport once again became a shooting gallery. For protection from

snipers and antiaircraft fire, aircrews, which often included

female pilots technically banned from combat zones, wore helmets and flak vests . On July 21, one of the 437th Airlift Wing

Starlifters, flown by Capt. Craig A. Breker, USAF, 62d Airlift

Wing, drew ground fire in the vicinity of Sarajevo . Although

twenty-five bullets hit the fuselage and several more struck

both wings, damaging the hydraulic and fuel systems, Breker

returned the plane safely to Rhein-Main. The incident marked

the ninth time during PROVIDE PROMISE that USAF aircraft

had been hit. Reacting to this and other incidents, the United

Nations briefly suspended flights . At this time, the U.S. Air

Force transferred the PROVIDE PROMISE C-141s to the

Rwandan relief operations . During their three-month stint flying missions into Sarajevo, the large transports nearly tripled

the amount of cargo delivered daily, quickly restoring the city's

food supplies to adequate levels and building a surplus for distribution by ground convoy to surrounding Moslem enclaves .

PROVIDE PROMISE flights to Sarajevo resumed on August 9

with C-130s of the 37th AS employing steep angle approaches

and deliveries to evade danger and deliver supplies . Numerous

suspensions, prompted by fighting near the airport, harassing

ground fire, or fear of Bosnian Serb reactions, interrupted

202
deliveries. The final suspension of 1994 took place on Decem

ber 31 when a fuel-laden UN aircraft skidded off the runway,

creating a hazard that-"stopped flights until January 3, 1995 .

Air-drop missions, primarily to Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa,

Bjelimici, Tesanj, and Maglaj, continued through 1994 . At the

beginning of the year, the U.S . Air Force had expended more

than 21,000 G-12 parachutes designed to drop a single 2,200-

pound bundle from high altitudes at high velocities . Its inventory of G-12 parachutes nearly exhausted, the Air Force

turned to the G-12D parachute, capable of 4,500-pound loads

but designed for low-velocity deliveries at low altitude. Since

low-altitude deliveries exposed aircraft and crews to danger,

modifications were necessary. Working with Natick Laboratories, Rhein-Main parachute riggers adapted the G-12D parachutes for high altitudes primarily by reducing the area of the

parachute (reefing) and dividing the cargo into two containers .

Although early deliveries were not entirely on target, further

modification and accumulated experience eventually resulted

in accurate deliveries.

Seed for food and forage, which isolated Moslem communities needed to ensure their food supplies, continued to be

among the most important cargoes delivered by parachute.

Taking advantage of experience gained in 1993, PROVIDE

PROMISE aircraft began dropping seeds in early rather than

late spring to ensure adequate forage (red clover, alfalfa, bird

grass, English grass) and food (beans, tomatoes, barley, and

oats) in the encircled pockets. Except in the vicinity of

Bjelimici and Zepa, where local officials failed to adequately

secure the drop zones, the missions were largely successful,

delivering 380 metric tons of seeds by May 9.

In June, air-drop missions slowed considerably as good

weather and the cease-fire opened roads, allowing the distribution of food by convoy from Sarajevo . The respite ended in early

August, when fighting resumed in the Bihac area, and UN officials requested airdrops to support the local population. Despite

their vulnerability to surface-to-air missiles that ringed the area,

UN transports, preceded by DENY FLIGHT fighters, flew missions over Bihac from August 11-18 . These were the last PROVIDE PROMISE air-drop missions. Although Bosnian Serb

forces continued periodically to blockade surrounded enclaves,

203
they almost always permitted the entry of convoys before airdrops became necessary. In other situations the deteriorating

military situation rendered airdrops too dangerous or futile .

In 1994, the U.S . Air Force accomplished a number of important organizational changes associated with PROVIDE

PROMISE . On January 4, it activated the 38th Airlift Squadron to control deployed equipment, aircraft, and people assigned to the airlift . Squadron leadership rotated among Air

National Guard, Air Force Reserves, and 23d Wing officers at

ninety-day intervals . The May introduction of C-141 flights to

Sarajevo permitted the 37th AS to begin a protracted transfer

from Rhein-Main to Ramstein. In October 1994, the 86th Airlift Wing at Ramstein formally assumed operational control of

PROVIDE PROMISE missions from the 435th AW at RheinMain. On December 20, the 37th completed its transfer to

Ramstein and began flying missions from its new station .

A significant organizational change highlighted the beginning of 1995 . All North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

PROVIDE PROMISE missions other than those of the U.S . Air

Force flew from Falconara AB, Ancona, Italy . To reduce operational costs, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees requested that the U.S. Air Force move its operations to Falconara as well . Accordingly, on January 13-15, the U.S. Tanker

Airlift Control Element moved from Split, Croatia, to Falconara

AB. Three C-130s of the 37th AS and maintenance technicians followed on January 16 .

PROVIDE PROMISE flights into Sarajevo continued sporadically through March, disrupted by ground fire and other forms

of harassment. On April 8, gunfire hit a 37th AS C-130 as it

flared for a landing less than ten feet above Sarajevo's runway .

More rounds struck while the aircraft was on the ground and

as it took off. None of the six crew members, all of whom were

wearing the flak jackets and helmets, were hit. One bullet,

however, shattered the windscreen right in front of the pilot.

Another severed a hydraulic line . Others struck an engine and

a fuel tank. In all, twelve bullets penetrated the aircraft, which

returned safely to Ancona.

Responding to this incident, UN officials suspended flights

into Sarajevo indefinitely. Running from April 8 to September

15, this was the longest suspension of PROVIDE PROMISE

204
missions. While the suspension was in effect, UN forces experienced a major humiliation at the hands of the Bosnian

Serbs . In late May, NATO responded to the Bosnian Serb

shelling of civilian targets near Sarajevo and the seizure of

weapons from UN weapons-collection depots by bombing ammunition depots near Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital. In retaliation, the Bosnian Serb army seized more than 370 UN

peacekeepers as hostages, forcing a cessation of the bombing .

Resolving to conduct future military operations without fear

of reprisals, Britain, France, and the Netherlands formed a

heavily armed and mobile UN Rapid Reaction Force to protect

UN peacekeepers. Transportation of UN soldiers under PROVIDE PROMISE orders to Split, Croatia, designated Operation

QUICK LIFT, began on July 8 . By the end of the operation on

August 11, 23 USAF C-141 s and 35 C-5s had airlifted 4,500

British, Dutch, and German soldiers, 1,500 vehicles, and

1,500 trailers from bases in the United Kingdom, Germany,

and the Netherlands to Croatia. From Split, the UN combat

components traveled overland to Sarajevo, arriving in time to

participate in the Bosnian civil war's final crisis . Its resolution

would result in the termination of hostilities and the resumption of PROVIDE PROMISE missions to Sarajevo .

In July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces, emboldened by the

United Nations irresolution during May, assaulted and captured Moslem "safe areas" in the vicinity of Srebrenica and

Zepa. Atrocities against both combatants and noncombatants

accompanied the fall of the two sanctuaries . On August 28, a

mortar attack on a UN-designated safe area in Sarajevo killed

thirty-seven civilians. After UN commanders determined that

the attack came from a Serbian position, the United Nations

authorized air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets . Beginning

on August 29, the air strikes, in combination with a successful Croat ground offensive against Bosnian Serb forces in the

north, brought the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. On

September 14, NATO halted the strikes after Bosnian Serb

authorities promised unimpeded access to Sarajevo and the

cessation of attacks on Moslem safe areas .

With the cease-fire and promise of permanent peace, PROVIDE PROMISE flights into Sarajevo resumed on September

16. Escorted by fighter aircraft, C-130s from the United

205
In December 1995, the Globemaster, assigned to 437th Airlift Wing, Charleston,

South Carolina, began flights to Sarajevo in support of PROVIDE PROMISE.

States, Great Britain, and France and C-160 Transails from

Spain delivered over 137 tons of cargo by September 17 . Operations continued through October 9, when small-arms fire

directed at an USAF C-130 during takeoff resulted in a brief

suspension. The exhaustion of cargo stockpiled at Ancona,

however, suspended PROVIDE PROMISE flights for three

weeks, November 6-30.

PROVIDE PROMISE flights resumed on December 1 with

five USAF and one French C-130 delivering sixty-five and a

quarter metric tons of cargo, mostly peas, to the Bosnian

capital . On December 8, the U.S . Air Force dramatically expanded its capacity to deliver cargo, introducing the C-17

Globemaster III on PROVIDE PROMISE missions. The C-17

was the largest USAF transport, and its sixty-four-metric-ton

payload was four times that of the C-130 and over double that

of the C-141 . On December 8-11, 1995, five C-17s assigned to

the Air Mobility Command's 437th AW at Charleston AFB,

South Carolina, delivered 321 metric tons of gas heaters,

pressed logs, flour, sugar, and chicken feed.

While the giant transports were making their last deliveries,

a UN decision shortened the airlift. On December 10, the

United Nations reduced the total tonnage of cargo to be delivered to Sarajevo by January 31, 1996, from 5,000 metric tons

to 1,861 metric tons, exactly the size of the stockpile remaining

206
at Ancona . In making this decision, the United Nations reasoned that the imminence of a permanent peace made unnecessary the accumulation of a larger reserve. On December 14,

Bosnia's warring factions signed peace accords at WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio . The formal cessation of hostilities, however, did not end the danger to USAF aircraft. On December

23, small-arms fire struck a 37th AS C-130 over Sarajevo.

Only the Kevlar armor added as a precaution to squadron

C-130s kept one round from reaching the flight deck. This

was the last hostile fire incident affecting PROVIDE PROMISE

airlifters . The last humanitarian air-land delivery into Sarajevo took place on January 4 .

At its conclusion, the UN humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo

was one of the longest airlifts in history. Flying into a besieged

city, aircrews accomplished their missions at considerable

risk. The approaches to Sarajevo Airport and isolated enclaves

were war zones ringed by antiaircraft weaponry and often the

location of bitterly fought battles . Ground fire, whether intentional or not, threatened allied aircraft 279 times during the

entire airlift . In the worst incident, antiaircraft fire downed an

Italian cargo aircraft in September 1992, killing four crewmen.

Despite the dangers, allied airmen accomplished their mission. Between July 2, 1992 and January 4, 1996, aircraft from

21 nations flew 12,886 sorties, delivering 159,622 metric tons

of food, medicine, and supplies and evacuating 1,300 wounded .

Responsible for approximately 95 percent of the humanitarian

aid delivered to the city of 380,000 people, the airlift kept

Sarajevo alive during its 3 .5-year ordeal .

Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United

States were the principal participants, with the United States

designating its portion of the airlift PROVIDE PROMISE. Dur

ing PROVIDE PROMISE, the Air Force flew 4,553 C-130,

C-141, and C-17 sorties, delivering 62,802 metric tons of

cargo . The 37th AS was the main span of the allied air bridge,

at times flying as many as six C-130 missions daily from

Rhein-Main to Sarajevo . Later, at Ancona, the normal rate was

three sorties per day . Additionally, USAF C-130s flew 2,222

sorties, dropping 28,748 Container Delivery System bundles

and 1,185 TRIADS bundles .

207
On January 9, a formal ceremony marking the end of the

airlift took place at Sarajevo . Ten minutes after the arrival of a

USAF C-130 carrying visiting dignitaries, a French C-130

landed with a symbolic sack of flour. American, British, and

French commanders then reported to UN officials that the airlift was officially over. The ceremony accurately captured the

significance of the Sarajevan airlift . A large-scale multinational

operation conducted under the auspices of the United Nations,

the airlift owed its success to the military and diplomatic cooperation of many nations. For the United States and its NATO

partners, the airlift was a tangible demonstration of their commitment to stability and peace in post-Cold War Europe .
Crisis in Somalia: Operations

PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE

Daniel L. Haulman

DATES: August 14, 1992-March 25, 1994

LOCATION: Somalia

OVERSEAS BASES USED : Mogadishu, Kismayu, Baledogle, Belen

Huen, Baidoa, Bardera, Oddur, Beledweyne, Somalia; Mombasa,

Wajir, Kenya; Cairo West, Egypt; Jeddah New, Taif, Saudi Arabia;

Djibouti, Djibouti; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Aden, Yemen; Lajes Field,

Azores ; Moron, Spain; Souda Bay, Greece; Royal Air Force Mildenhall,

United Kingdom

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

209

WINGS: WINGS: (con't .) GROUPS:

4th Wing 319th Air Refueling 98th Air Refueling

12th Airlift 349th Airlift 105th Airlift

16th Special Operations 380th Air Refueling 118th Airlift

19th Air Refueling 403d Wing 133d Airlift

22d Air Refueling 433d Airlift 135th Airlift

23d Wing 434th Wing 143d Airlift

43d Air Refueling 435th Airlift 145th Airlift

60th Airlift 436th Airlift 151st Air Refueling

62d Airlift 437th Airlift 157th Air Refueling

63d Airlift 438th Airlift 164th Airlift

100th Air Refueling 439th Airlift 170th Air Refueling

101 st Air Refueling 445th Airlift 172d Airlift

108th Air Refueling 446th Airlift 176th Group

123d Tactical Airlilft 452d Air Refueling 179th Airlift

141 st Air Refueling 459th Airlift 190th Air Refueling

146th Airlift 463d Airlift 352d Special Operations

171 st Air Refueling 512th Airlift 453d Operations

302d Airlift 514th Airlift 457th Operations

305th Air Refueling 910th Airlift 906th Air Refueling

314th Airlift 914th Airlift 907th Airlift

315th Airlift 913th Airlift

317th Airlift 916th Air Refueling
AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS: (con

t.)

GROUPS: (con't.)

940th Air Refueling

943d Airlift

SQUADRON :

16th Special Operations

AIRCRAFT: C-5, C-141, C-130, KC-10, KC-135, AC-130

Operations

Civil unrest in the wake of a 2-year civil war contributed to

a famine in Somalia that killed up to 350,000 people in 1992 .

As many as 800,000 refugees fled to neighboring countries,

including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. Central and

southern Somalia suffered most, because of the collapse of

political and economic institutions there .

News broadcasts showing mass starvation stimulated an international relief effort. In July 1992, United Nations (UN)

troops from Pakistan arrived to monitor a tenuous cease-fire

that feuding factions had agreed to in March. In August, the

United States launched Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, flying

food on C-141 Starlifters from the United States and Europe to

Kenya. Within Kenya, the Starlifters moved the relief cargo

from Mombasa to Wajir, near the border with Somalia, where

thousands of refugees camped. Workers cut trees at Wajir to

make room for the large jet transports. The United States withdrew the Starlifters after initial deliveries but continued shuttling food in C-130s from Kenya to various locations in Somalia, where the airfields were too small to accommodate the

C-141s . The airfields included Belen Huen, Baidoa, Bardera,

Oddur, and Beledweyne . Unpaved and poorly maintained runways at some of these airfields forced USAF crews to replace

tires frequently, and snipers occasionally interrupted deliveries . Despite these obstacles, PROVIDE RELIEF flights delivered

more than 38 million pounds of food to Somalia and Kenya

between August and December 1992 . During the same period,

ships from many nations delivered even more food to ports

such as Mogadishu and Kismayu on the Somali coast.

Despite the large quantities of food that arrived, many people continued to starve because armed members of rival clans

21 0
USAF Area of Operations during the Crisis in Somalia

intimidated relief workers and stole supplies from the warehouses and trucks of international relief agencies . In September 1992, the United States airlifted hundreds more UN troops

from Pakistan to Somalia in Operation IMPRESSIVE LIFT.

These soldiers escorted humanitarian supplies but were unable to stop the thefts and threats. In September and October,
some of the PROVIDE RELIEF C

130s were hit by bullets as

they delivered relief supplies, and the shelling of a cargo ship

in Mogadishu harbor forced the United Nations to temporarily

suspend food shipments in November.

To remedy the crisis in Somalia, the United States offered to

send up to 40,000 troops as part of a multinational coalition.

The United Nations accepted the offer, authorizing member

states to establish a safe environment for humanitarian relief

operations in Somalia. On December 4, President George H.W.

Bush launched RESTORE HOPE, an operation to establish

order in central and southern Somalia so that food could be

distributed fairly. The RESTORE HOPE plan contained a clear

mission statement with limited and measurable objectives so

that the United States would not be drawn into a quagmire .

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, USMC, who had served as chief

of staff for General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, during Operation DESERT STORM the previous year, served as RESTORE

HOPE commander. General Johnston led an international military coalition representing twenty-three nations, including Canada, France, Belgium, Sweden, Botswana, Nigeria, Tunisia, and

Zimbabwe. He also commanded a joint task force consisting of

elements of the U.S . Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marines .

U.S . Navy commandos and Marines coming ashore at

Mogadishu from ships before dawn on December 9 achieved

no surprise. The press had learned of the landings, and the

invaders encountered the lights of television cameras . Fortunately, they encountered no military opposition. Robert B.

Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Somalia, and a U.S . Liaison Office

in Mogadishu had paved the way for a peaceful invasion by

working with local political factions. Once the ground forces

had secured the capital city's airport, the airlift portion of the

operation began.

The U.S. Air Force played a leading role in the first weeks of

RESTORE HOPE, because the operation called for the rapid

projection of U.S . forces at very long range. General Ronald R.

Fogleman, USAF, dual-hatted commander of both Air Mobility

Command (AMC) and U.S . Transportation Command, supported

General Johnston with a new centralized organization of airlift

and air refueling units . This organization was crucial given the

post-Cold War scarcity of adequate staging bases. Brig. Gen.

21 2
A C-141 at Mogadishu, Somalia, in December 1992 participated in the strategic

airlift phase of Operation RESTORE HOPE.

John W. Handy, USAF, commanded the AMC Tanker Airlift

Control Center, which scheduled refuelings and flights for the

complicated deployment.

Strategic airlift flights proceeded between the United States

and Somalia through intermediate staging bases in Egypt (Cairo

West), Saudi Arabia (Jeddah New and Taif), Ethiopia (Addis

Ababa), Yemen (Aden), and Djibouti. Cargo airplanes such as C-5

Galaxies and C-141 Starlifters refueled over the Atlantic Ocean

and Mediterranean Sea from KC-135 tankers based in the northeastern United States, at Lajes Field in the Azores, and at Moron

Air Base, Spain. Saudi Arabia allowed a refueling track over the

Red Sea supported by tankers from Operation SOUTHERN

WATCH. On December 16, 1992, KC-135s from Souda Bay,

Greece, began flying refueling missions for RESTORE HOPE. In

addition to C-5 Galaxies and C-141 Starlifters, the Air Force

eventually used KC-10 tankers as cargo planes for the long-range

airlift. Commercial airliners also took part in the operation, as

they had in the previous year's DESERT STORM. The airliners

21 3
and cargo planes unloaded at Mogadishu, Baledogle, and Kismayu, with the vast majority going to the capital.

U.S. C-130s continued flying food from Kenya into Somalia

as part of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, and the two operations

proceeded simultaneously until the end of February 1993 . After the initial surge phase of RESTORE HOPE, Air Mobility

Command connected its Pacific and Indian Oceans channel

mission routes with Mombasa, Kenya, so that cargo could be

delivered from there to Mogadishu . By mid-December 1992,

RESTORE HOPE absorbed PROVIDE RELIEF administratively.

When PROVIDE RELIEF ended on February 28, C-130s continued flying supply missions from Mombasa to Mogadishu.

RESTORE HOPE airlifted more than 32,000 U.S. and foreign

troops to Somalia. Commercial airliners carried most of these,

but U.S . military aircraft moved most of the 32,000 tons of

cargo . KC-135 tankers flew more than 1,100 refueling missions, transferring more than 82 million pounds of fuel. The

initial cargo went by air until ships could arrive. Once they did,

sea lift quickly surpassed airlift in terms of tonnage delivered .

General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, urged the United States to turn over the mission of

safeguarding the distribution of food in Somalia to the United

Nations as soon as order was established and the food was

flowing again. On March 26, the United Nations passed Security Resolution 814, which provided for a UN force to assume

control of the operation. At the end of April, U.S. Secretary of

State Warren M. Christopher notified UN Secretary-General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the U.S .-led coalition had secured

the area of operations and reversed the humanitarian crisis in

southern and central Somalia. Operation RESTORE HOPE

ended on May 4,1993, when the United States turned over the

mission to the UN organization in Somalia.

Redeployment airlift missions continued through the end of the

month as U.S. forces began to leave Somalia. The subsequent

Operation CONTINUE HOPE, that began on May 5, supported

the United Nations with reduced U.S . forces, who served under Maj . Gen. Thomas Montgomery, USA. Less than 5,000 of

the more than 25,000 U.S. troops who deployed in RESTORE

HOPE remained in Somalia.

21 4
A C-5 unloads vehicles in Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The UN operation went beyond RESTORE HOPE's clear mission of securing a safe environment for the distribution of

humanitarian supplies . It attempted "nation building," or the

construction of centralized political institutions in Somalia.

This brought the United Nations into conflict with warlords,

such as Mohammed Farah Aidid. On June 5, 1993, a battle

between Aidid's forces and UN troops left two dozen Pakistani

soldiers dead. The United Nations requested more U.S. troops,

and General Montgomery appealed for more armor.

On October 3, a battle in Mogadishu between U.S. troops

and Aidid's forces left eighteen Americans killed and eightyfour wounded. On October 7, U.S . President William J. Clinton

announced that he was sending more troops and armored

vehicles to Somalia. Their mission would be only to protect U.S.

troops and bases; keep roads, ports, and communication lines

open; and keep the warlords in check. He refused to commit the

United States to nation building in Somalia and promised that

the troops would be home by the end of March 1994. To send

the reinforcements, the President had two options: twenty-one

days by sea or eight days by air. He chose airlift.

21 5
There followed Operation RESTORE HOPE 11, which between October 5 and 13, 1993 rapidly airlifted more U.S .

troops, armor, and other military cargo from the United States

to Somalia. Air Force C-5s transported most of the 1,700

deploying troops and 3,100 tons of cargo directly from Hunter

Army Airfield near Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Griffiss Air

Force Base near Fort Drum, New York, to Mogadishu . Only

the C-5s could carry the eighteen heavy tanks and forty-four

Bradley armored vehicles because of their weight and bulk.

The nonstop flights from Georgia to Somalia took eighteen

hours. After delivering the tanks, the C-5s staged at Cairo

West,, which took another four to five hours of flying. A crew

could be together for as many as thirty hours (twenty-three

hours of flying time) . To cover the exhausting flights, operation

leaders augmented crews with extra pilots and expanded the

maximum number of hours allowed in a crew-duty day. As in

the previous RESTORE HOPE operation, C-141 Starlifters also

carried troops and their equipment from the United States to

Mogadishu. Most of the Starlifters were grounded in mid-1993

because of wing cracks, and commercial airliners helped take

up the slack during subsequent flights to sustain the troops.

By October 1993, Brig. Gen. John B. Sams Jr ., USAF, had

replaced General Handy as commander of the AMC Tanker

Airlift Control Center. The Galaxies and Starlifters refueled

from KC-10 Extenders and KC-135 Stratotankers 4 times on

direct flights of 8,000 miles from the United States to Somaliaover the western Atlantic Ocean, the eastern Atlantic, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and the Red Sea. The tankers came

from bases in England, Spain, and Greece . During Operation

RESTORE HOPE II, Stratotankers and Extenders transferred

17 .2 million pounds of fuel. American AC-130 gunships also

deployed from Europe and Florida to Africa. They operated over

Somalia from Mombasa, Kenya. To support them, some C-5

flights carried gunship and support gear from three bases in

the United States to Mombasa . At least eighteen airlift and air

refueling wings from the Air Mobility Command, U.S . Air

Forces in Europe, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard

participated in RESTORE HOPE II . It was an echo of RESTORE HOPE and a reminder that such operations would be

needed in the future. The last C-5 carrying American forces

21 6
departed Mogadishu on March 25, 1994, and Joint Task ForceSomalia inactivated two days later . RESTORE HOPE II enabled U.S. forces to pull out of Somalia without more casualties, but the country was still left with anarchy and the threat

of famine.

Ambassador Oakley, in a speech at the Federal Bureau of

Investigation Academy on December 14, 1993, offered advice

for future peacemaking operations . Echoing former Defense

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and General Powell, Oakley

recommended that such operations have an exit strategy, that

forces move in quickly, that the efforts have the support of

Congress and the American people, and that the position be

modified for changing circumstances . The original Operation

RESTORE HOPE, between December 1992 and May 1993,

exhibited these qualities . Overwhelming force was deployed ;

there was nonconfrontational and constant dialogue among

the factions and agencies involved ; there was coordination

among military, political, and relief agency leadership; and

little question arose about command and control. After the

United Nations took control of coalition military forces in Somalia on May 4, 1993, the Somalia effort began to slide toward

a nation-building quagmire . RESTORE HOPE was unquestionably a successful operation. It was only after the conclusion of that operation that serious hostilities broke out.

RESTORE HOPE II was also a successful operation. It accomplished President Clinton's goal of rapidly projecting U.S .

reinforcements to Somalia to prevent more U.S . deaths and to

allow the United States to withdraw honorably from what began as a humanitarian operation. What failed were the poorly

defined UN operations between the end of RESTORE HOPE in

May 1993 and the beginning of RESTORE HOPE II in October.

The Somalia operations were milestones in USAF history

that taught many lessons. They were AMC's first major airlifts

and the most significant military operations since DESERT

STORM. They tested the coordination of airlift and air refueling

aircraft to compensate for a shortage of staging bases and

proved the practicality of using strict flight scheduling in the

post-Cold War environment of limited forward presence. The

large C-5 Galaxies and C-141 Starlifters could not land at

most of the airfields in Somalia, and at Mogadishu, they

21 7
crowded runways and ramps . This experience demonstrated

the need for either a network of better air bases or more

aircraft such as the C-17 . Shortages of C-5 and C-141 aircrews trained in aerial refueling threatened the efficiency of

the operation, and shortages of spares reduced reliability rates

for Galaxies and Starlifters to well below peacetime figures .

While age sharply limited the use of C-141s, KC-10 aircraft

proved to be good cargo-hauling substitutes . RESTORE HOPE

also demonstrated the danger of extending crew-duty days,

which inevitably led to personnel fatigue on long missions .

The operation proved the practicality of new equipment, such

as portable Global Positioning Systems for C-130 aircraft,

which allowed them to determine their positions from satellite

communications in a desert environment. Finally, the operations in Somalia revealed much about the probabilities of future humanitarian and contingency operations . Crises would

continue to erupt in underdeveloped areas, and responses

would be increasingly international in character, requiring communication and consensus among many coalition partners .
Resolution of Bosnian Crisis:

Operation DENY FLIGHT

DATES: April 12, 1993-December 20, 1995

LOCATION: Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia)

OVERSEAS BASES USED : Aviano Air Base (AB), Brindisi, Pisa,

Sigonella Naval Air Station, Malpensa, Genoa, Capodichino, Italy; Istres

AB, France; Royal Air Force (RAF) Mildenhall, RAF Alconbury, RAF

Fairford, Brize Norton, England; Hannover, Ramstein AB, Germany;

Soesterberg, the Netherlands; Souda Bay, Greece; Split, Croatia

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

Daniel L. Haulman

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: F-16, F-15, A-10, OA-10, RC-135,

KC-135, KC-10, C-130, AC-130, MC-130, HC-130, EC-130,

EF-111, MH-52, MH-53, U-2, C-21

Operations

When the Communist Party relaxed its political control over

Yugoslavia in 1990, the country began to fracture along ethnic

21 9

WINGS: WINGS: (con't .) GROUPS :

1st Special Operations 100th Air Refueling 43d Air Refueling

3d Fighter 301 st Fighter 103d Fighter

4th Wing 305th Air Mobility 104th Fighter

9th Reconnaissance 355th Wing 110th Fighter

16th Special Operations 401st Fighter 157th Air Refueling

19th Air Refueling 434th Fighter 175th Fighter

27th Fighter 442d Fighter 190th Air Refueling

31 st Fighter 463d Airlift 930th Operations

36th Fighter 917th Fighter 944th Fighter

43d Air Refueling 924th Fighter

48th Fighter 926th Fighter SQUADRONS:

52d Fighter 7490th Wing (Provisional) 7th Airborne Command and

Control

55th Wing 76th Airlift

60th Air Mobility 429th Electronic Combat

86th Wing (later, 86th Airlift) 555th Fighter
and religious lines . In 1991 and 1992, the provinces of

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia, which was dominated by Serbs under

the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic . The large Serb minority

in Croatia and Bosnia resisted the independence of those republics, hoping to forge a "greater Serbia" with the remainder

of Yugoslavia. A devastating civil war resulted .

In early 1992, the United Nations (UN) sent a protection

force to supervise a truce in Croatia, but a greater conflict

within Bosnia-Herzegovina soon demanded the world body's

attention. A plurality of Bosnia's population was Moslem, but

large portions were Serbian or Croatian. Serbs under Radovan

Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic rejected the leadership of

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and seized large parts of

the country. With huge quantities of arms from Yugoslavia,

the Bosnian Serbs threatened to crush the infant republic and

spread the war into other parts of the Balkans . The United

Nations reacted by extending its forces to Bosnia and authorizing an international airlift of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo, Bosnia's capital. Operation PROVIDE PROMISE began in

July 1992 and continued for three and one-half years .

In September and October, the UN Security Council imposed a regional arms embargo and economic sanctions

against Yugoslavia. European nations enforced the embargo

and sanctions in an operation called SHARP GUARD. At about

the same time, in an attempt to limit the war, the United

Nations passed a resolution to ban military flights over Bosnia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) monitored

the flights in Operation SKY WATCH but had no authority to

enforce the ban. Aircraft from various factions in the war

violated the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia routinely by the spring

of 1993 . On March 31, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 816, which authorized NATO to enforce the ban on

military flights by shooting down violators. Another resolution

set up six urban "safe areas" in Bosnia-Sarajevo, Bihac,

Gorazde, Tuzla, Srebrenica, and Zepa . A third Security Council resolution demanded an end to hostilities in the safe areas .

NATO's Operation DENY FLIGHT attempted to enforce UN

Security Council Resolution 816 . The UN and NATO approached

the operation with a "dual key" concept. Both international

220
+ BIHAC

MAGLAJ

BOSNIA

AND

HERZEGOVINA

SARAJEVO

TUZLA'

INTER-ENTITY

BOUNDARY LINE

SREBRF,NICA

ZEPA

GORAZDE

UDBINA

SPLIT

CROATIA

HUNGARY

SERBIA

v

YUGQSLAVIA

ALBANIA

USAF Area of Operations in DENY FLIGHT

organizations had to approve attacks before they could proceed . Adm. Jeremy M. Boorda, USN, replaced later by Adm.

Leighton W. Smith, USN, served as commander of NATO's

Allied Forces Southern Europe during the operation. Lt. Gen.

Joseph W. Ashy, USAF, served as commander of Allied Air

Forces Southern Europe until Lt. Gen. Michael E. Ryan, USAF,

replaced him in late 1994 . The only non-American in the NATO

DENY FLIGHT command chain was the Italian commander of

the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, collocated at Vicenza, Italy,

22 1
A NATO AWACS aircraft over the Adriatic Sea during Operation DENY FLIGHT.

with a new Combined Air Operations Center, also under command of an American. Other nations that participated in

DENY FLIGHT included the United Kingdom, France, the

Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and eventually, Germany and Italy .

While France was not a military member of NATO, it willingly

participated in the air operation because so many of the UN

troops in Bosnia were French.

The 36th Wing at Bitburg AB in Germany flew initial DENY

FLIGHT missions out of Aviano AB in Italy, which became the

most important of the operation's bases . U.S. search and rescue

aircraft operated from Brindisi, Italy, while USAF tankers flew

from bases in other parts of Italy and from France . USAF

reconnaissance aircraft operated from England . A USN carrier

task force in the Mediterranean provided more fighters and

electronic warfare aircraft, some of which refueled from USAF

tankers orbiting over the Adriatic Sea.

DENY FLIGHT began on April 12, 1993, but at first there

was little action . Most of the aircraft over Bosnia were either

helicopters or PROVIDE PROMISE transports . NATO commanders could not easily determine whether the helicopters in

222
A USAF F-15 refuels from a KC-135 over the Adriatic Sea during Operation

DENY FLIGHT.

the no-fly zone were flying humanitarian missions, especially

since many of them, hostile or not, carried civilians or wore

Red Cross symbols. Not wishing to cause an international

incident, DENY FLIGHT ignored the helicopters.

In the summer of 1993, DENY FLIGHT assumed new roles .

The UN Security Council authorized NATO close air support

missions and offensive air strikes to protect UN forces. UN

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave his representative for the former Yugoslavia, Ambassador Yasushi

Akashi, authority to veto NATO close air support missions.

Boutros-Ghali himself retained the authority to veto retaliatory air strikes .

DENY FLIGHT enjoyed initial success . A Bosnian Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo's central market on February 5, 1994

killed or wounded more than 260 people. A few days later,

NATO demanded removal of heavy weapons from around

223
Sarajevo, or they would be targeted . The mere threat of air

strikes persuaded the Serbs to curtail their shelling and move

their artillery back from the exclusion zone . On February 28,

NATO aircraft scored their first aerial victories in the alliance's

forty-five-year history. Two flights of F-16s from the 526th

Fighter Squadron intercepted six Bosnian Serb jet aircraft

over the no-fly zone and shot down four of them. One American F-16 pilot, Capt. Robert L. Wright, USAF, downed three of

the violators . Ground strikes also demonstrated NATO's determination to enforce the UN resolutions . On April 10, 1994, two

512th Fighter Squadron F-16s struck a Bosnian Serb artillery

command post involved in the shelling of Gorazde . This raid

was the first NATO close air support mission. On August 5,

two A-10s destroyed a Bosnian Serb armored vehicle after

Serbs stole weapons from a UN-guarded collection point. The

Serbs returned the weapons . In September, NATO launched

other air strikes on Serbs who had attacked a French tank.

Despite these successes, Operation DENY FLIGHT was

largely ineffective in quelling the war or stopping the advance

of the Bosnian Serbs before August of 1995. Attacks on

C-130s and C-141s flying humanitarian relief missions to

Sarajevo sometimes forced temporary suspensions of PROVIDE PROMISE. Akashi was reluctant to approve NATO close

air support missions because he feared the UN would appear

to be taking sides against the Bosnian Serbs, who might retaliate against UN peacekeepers on the ground . He repeatedly

refused to consent to requested air strikes or approved them

too late to be effective .

The Bosnian Serbs regularly took UN hostages to stop NATO

air strikes. After an air raid on a Bosnian Serb artillery position

that was shelling Gorazde in April 1994, the Serbs took 200

UN hostages . As they expected, the UN suspended NATO air

strikes. In November, NATO leaders convinced Boutros-Ghali

to approve the largest alliance air raid yet against an airfield

at Udbina, Croatia, from which Serb aircraft raided Bosnia .

The Secretary-General sharply limited the targets that could

be hit . Even so, the Serbs again seized UN hostages, and

again the United Nations halted NATO air raids. In May 1995,

the United Nations allowed NATO to strike a Serb ammunition

depot at Pale near Sarajevo, but the Serbs took 370 UN hostages

224
strikes . To NATO's predominantly U.S . air commanders, such

action apparently rewarded the Serbs for taking hostages, but

then the United States had no troops on the ground in Bosnia

to be taken hostage .

The next month, the emboldened Serbs shot down a USAF

fighter, an F-16 flown by Capt . Scott O'Grady. He and Capt.

Wright, who had shot down three Serb aircraft the previous

year, were patrolling the skies near Udbina when the Serbs

fired surface-to-air missiles at them. O'Grady was rescued a

week later, but the Serbs had demonstrated their ability to

down American fighter aircraft, which encouraged their further aggression.

In July, the Bosnian Serbs attacked the two UN safe areas of

Srebrenica and Zepa. NATO requested air strikes, but UN approval came too late to prevent the fall of the cities . The conquerors killed thousands of Moslem men and expelled tens of thousands of refugees in an "ethnic cleansing" campaign to clear the

area for Serb domination. The loss of one-third of the safe areas,

and the genocide that followed, embarrassed both the United

Nations and NATO. They appeared to be powerless in the face of

Serb aggression, and participants in DENY FLIGHT realized it

was time to either pull out or intensify the operation.

At meetings in July, NATO members decided to draw the

line at Goradze, the most threatened of the four remaining

safe areas . They warned that a Bosnian Serb attack on the

city would result in the most severe retaliatory air strikes the

war had yet known. NATO leaders persuaded Boutros-Ghali to

let the UN Protection Force military commander, French Gen .

Bernard Janvier, have the United Nations veto on NATO air

strikes . In early August, the North Atlantic Council extended

the Goradze ultimatum to the other safe areas, including

Sarajevo . By mid-month, General Ryan briefed Admiral Smith

and General Javier on a bold new air campaign plan, and

before the end of the month, NATO was ready to launch an

accelerated phase of DENY FLIGHT called Operation DELIBERATE FORCE.

To prevent the Serbs from taking hostages again and shortcircuiting the air campaign, the UN force moved its personnel

from vulnerable areas and accepted reinforcement from a new

225
Rapid Reaction Force composed of thousands of fresh combat

troops from Britain, France, and the Netherlands . In an operation called QUICK LIFT in July and August, American cargo

airplanes transported most of these troops from northwestern

Europe to Split, Croatia, from which they moved overland into

Bosnia's surviving safe areas .

Operation DELIBERATE FORCE began on August 30, 1995

shortly after a Bosnian Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo that

killed thirty-seven and wounded eighty. As promised, the air

campaign came swiftly and decisively, targeting Serb positions

not just around Sarajevo and Gorazde but also all across

Bosnia. According to General Ryan's plan, enemy air defenses

were destroyed so that NATO aircraft could roam across the

country at will. For the first time in airpower history, precisionguided munitions outweighed conventional bombs and missiles in a campaign. The air strikes ceased for a few days in

early September to allow negotiations, but when the talks did

not produce immediate Serb compliance with UN and NATO

conditions, the remarkably accurate raids resumed until the

Serbs signaled agreement on September 14 . DELIBERATE

FORCE participants stood ready to resume the intense air

raids, but the Serbs showed evidence of compliance, and the

operation officially ended on September 21 .

Air power was only one reason for the Serb change of heart .

In early August, a Croatian offensive lifted the siege of Bihac

and drove as many as 200,000 Serbs from Croatia. In Septem

ber, a combined Bosnian-Croatian offensive wrested huge regions of Bosnia from the Serbs . No doubt the DELIBERATE

FORCE air strikes had helped cripple Mladic's military machine . By the time the operation ended, the Serbs were more

willing to discuss a peace plan that gave them only 49 percent

of Bosnia, because that was about all they had left. The Serbs

also realized that they could no longer count on support from

Belgrade . Milosevic encouraged Karadzic to come to terms so

that UN sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia) would be lifted.

In November, peace talks among the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio produced an

agreement to end the war in Bosnia. In December, as the peace

accords were formally signed in Paris, Operation DENY FLIGHT

ended, replaced by a new operation called JOINT ENDEAVOR to

226
implement the agreements . The 

p

received code

name Operation DECISIVE ENDEAVOR.

Several strategic lessons emerged from the DENY FLIGHT

experience . There was no precedent for a peace enforcement

operation that demanded the cooperation of two international

organizations, the United Nations and NATO. The lack of doctrine created inevitable friction, as the United States and

NATO pressured the United Nations for permission to retaliate

against the Bosnian Serbs while the United Nations sought to

preserve impartiality in the Bosnian civil war and to protect its

peacekeepers on the ground . The fall of Srebrenica and Zepa

in July 1995 largely eliminated this conflict in goals and persuaded the United Nations to approve a more aggressive air

campaign. The DELIBERATE FORCE phase of DENY FLIGHT

worked better than earlier phases partly because restrictions

were eased but also because the tide was turning on the ground.

Conversely, Bosnian/Croatian ground offensives succeeded in

part because air strikes crippled Serbian military forces .

The loss of Captain O'Grady's aircraft to enemy fire also

taught some valuable tactical lessons . The U.S . Air Force

learned to devote more attention to the suppression of enemy

air defenses and react more sensitively to possible surface-toair missile threats . It worked to improve communication between surveillance and combat aircrews and to reduce the

vulnerability of combat air patrols by decreasing the predictability of flight patterns.

DENY FLIGHT taught some coalition and interservice lessons . Both the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force and the Combined

Air Operations Center at first lacked enough high-level officers

for this size operation, and NATO countries were reluctant to

provide them. The objective wing concept produced personnel

shortages, especially at the planning level . Internationally,

France moved closer to resuming the full association with

NATO she had rejected three decades earlier, and Germany

deployed troops beyond its borders for the first time since

World War II . Italy refused to allow the basing of F-117 stealth

fighters at Aviano, and both Italy and France prohibited security police to carry weapons on their bases .

There were also technological lessons. The Combined Air

Operations Center, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force headquarters,

227
and the Allied Air Forces Southern Europe headquarters at

first lacked the electronic and communications equipment

needed for an intense air campaign across the Adriatic. The

United States solved this problem by sending computer equipment, software, and skilled temporary-duty people for the successful DELIBERATE FORCE phase . The U.S . Air Force deployed a Contingency Theater Air Planning System at Vicenza

and a new computer simulation system at Aviano that allowed

aircrews to view the routes of future missions in three dimensions. DELIBERATE FORCE also demonstrated that precisionguided munitions produced enormous savings in lives, property, money, sorties, and aircraft. The Air Force successfully

married the precision weapons with fighter-aircraft types that

had never used them before in combat.

DENY FLIGHT taught air campaign planners to prepare

bases large enough to accept contingency surges . NATO based

as many as 140 aircraft at a time at Aviano, which normally

accommodated 42 . There was not enough ramp space . Living

space was also a problem at Aviano, where as many as 2,400

personnel deployed at a time . The building of a tent city and

the use of distant lodging provided a temporary solution. Fortunately, enough war materiel could be mustered from leftover

Cold War stocks in Europe to furnish most of the needs of the

primary DENY FLIGHT bases . Future contingency operations

may not be as fortunate . DENY FLIGHT not only limited the

Bosnian civil war, but also contributed, as much as any other

factor, to its conclusion. It demonstrated the enormous potential of air power as a diplomatic instrument for the United

Nations, NATO, and the United States.
Crisis in Haiti:

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

OPERATION DATES: September 9-October 12, 1994

LOCATION : Haiti

OVERSEAS BASES USED: Port-au-Prince International Airport, Cap

Haitien Airport, Haiti ; Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station (NAS),

Puerto Rico; Guantanamo Bay NAS, Cuba

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS:

William J. Allen

AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT: C-130, AC-130, A/OA-10, E-3, EC-130,

RC-135, EC-135, U-2, F-15, C-141, C-5, KC-135, KC-10

Operations

On September 18, 1994, U.S . President William J . Clinton

signed the order that launched U.S . sea and air forces to the

island nation of Haiti . Under the name Operation UPHOLD

DEMOCRACY, the United States used its military forces to

return democracy and the Haitian exiled president to a country whose people suffered under military dictatorship and corrupt government. USAF participation effectively ended October

12, when resupply of U.S. forces became routinely scheduled

airlift missions and deployed aircraft and crews returned

home . Three days later, Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his entourage went back to Haiti in triumph, flying

229

WINGS: WINGS: (con't.)

4th Wing 314th Airlift

6th Air Base 355th Wing

7th Wing 436th Airlift

9th Reconnaissance 438th Airlift

16th Special Operations 552d Air Control

20th Fighter

23d Wing GROUPS:

33d Fighter 193d Special Operations

55th Wing 145th Airlift
from Andrews Air Force Base (AFB), Maryland, aboard a USAF

C-137 and a C-9 .

Aristide, a leftist Roman Catholic priest, had been elected in

December 1990 in a landslide victory as president of Haiti. He

took office on February 7, 1991 . He appointed as commander

in chief of the Haitian armed forces Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras,

who on September 30, 1991 engineered a military coup that

forced Aristide from power. With Cedras' regime came social

and economic despair for most Haitians . Many attempted to

find a better life in the United States by crossing the Atlantic

Ocean by boat some 700 miles to Florida .

By January 1992, the number of Haitians the U.S. Coast

Guard picked up at sea reached 14,000. The increasing flood of

Haitians forced U.S. President George H. W. Bush to order those

not eligible for political asylum returned directly to their home

country. By May 1992, he had ordered the U.S . Coast Guard to

repatriate all Haitian boat people without allowing them to apply

for asylum. The flow of refugees slowed to a trickle .

On July 3, 1993, General Cedras and exiled President Aristide signed the Governor's Island Accord, which provided for

Aristide's return by October 30, 1993 . This agreement also

called for the retirement of Cedras and other military leaders

and the lifting of sanctions imposed by the United Nations and

Organization of American States against Haiti. However, General Cedras ignored the agreement, and the flood of refugees

began anew. By July 1994, thousands of refugees overwhelmed U.S . ability to send them back to Haiti. The United

States detained the refugees at Guantanamo U.S. Naval Base,

Cuba, and in other Caribbean countries . However, the situation in Haiti rapidly deteriorated until on September 8, 1994,

when U.S. national leaders determined to intervene militarily.

The U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) developed Operation

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in two different plans, one a forcible

entry and the other a passive entry plan. The first optioned for

an airdrop of the U.S. Army's 82d Airborne Division, marshaled at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and special operations

forces into Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, and other strategic

drop zones . Initially, it called for sixty C-130 aircraft for the

airdrop of heavy equipment and paratroopers at the International Airport in Port-au-Prince. Near the cities of Mirebalais,

230
Haiti, Site of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

thirty miles northeast of Port-au-Prince, and Miragoane, fifty

miles west of Port-au-Prince, forty-five C-141 aircraft would

air-drop heavy equipment and paratroopers . Eight more

C-141 s would land troops at the International Airport in the

capital city. Special operations teams required an additional

seven C-141 s to air-drop them into Port-au-Prince.

In the permissive-entry plan, if the Cedras government

agreed to relinquish power peacefully, the U.S . Army's 10th

Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, would land in

Haiti by sea and airlift . The U.S . Air Force planned to airlift

members of the 10th to Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, on

the northern coast of Haiti. Further, armed forces from Jamaica,

Trinidad, Tobago, Barbados, Antigua/Barbuda, Guyana, and

Belize would also be airlifted into Haiti as part of the U.S .-led

multinational force. USAF planners worked through evolving

variations not knowing which of the two plans would be chosen at the last moment. USACOM planners looked to September

23 1
20 as the possible invasion date, and USAF planners worked

under this assumption.

On September 8, 1994, the Joint Staff alert order authorized prepositioning of mobility forces. The next day, aircraft,

crews, and support technicians from Air Mobility Command,

Air Combat Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and other USAF organizations started deploying to

staging bases in the United States and the Caribbean. Nine

days later, the Joint Staff directed execution of the forcible-entry

plan. For the invasion, the Air Force gathered an aerial armada

of over 200 aircraft that included 121 transports, 73 tankers,

and several command and control and special operations aircraft like E-3 AWACS and AC-130 gunships . From Pope AFB,

North Carolina, and MacDill AFB, Florida, sixty C-130 aircraft

of the 314th Airlift Wing at Little Rock AFB, Arkansas, 7th

Wing at Dyess AFB, Texas, and 23d Wing at Pope, departed on

the initial wave on September 19 . At Charleston AFB, South

Carolina, and McGuire AFB, New Jersey, sixty-one strategic

airlift C-141 aircraft remained awaiting their launch times

with cargoes of heavy equipment and troops . Aerial refueling

aircraft to support the armada came from Robins AFB, Georgia

(twenty-eight KC-135s) ; Homestead AFB, Florida (eleven

KC-135s) ; Roosevelt Roads Naval Air Station, Puerto Rico

(nine KC-135s) ; Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina

(twelve KC-10s) ; and Barksdale AFB, Louisiana (thirteen

KC-IOs) .

From the start, the plan proceeded as scheduled, up to and

including the launch of the second formation of troop-carrying

C-130s. The lead assault wave, forty-six C-130s, consisted of

eighteen aircraft loaded with paratroopers and twenty-eight

carrying heavy equipment. The second wave of fourteen

C-130s only carried paratroopers. All the heavy equipment

aircraft left MacDill while the paratroop aircraft departed from

Pope . As aircraft of the first wave flew to form up over the

Atlantic Ocean, significant problems developed.

Flying from MacDill, the twenty-eight C-130s had good

weather, took off as scheduled, formed up, and prepared to link

up with the thirty-two aircraft from Pope . However, the C-130s

from Pope experienced problems from the start. First, planners

only allowed forty-five seconds between aircraft launches. Second,

232
C-130s staging at MacDIII AFB during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY,

September 1994.

because of unusually heavy loads, they decided to use 700 feet of

flight line, requiring aircraft to taxi to the far end of the runway,

turn around, and then take off. This maneuver actually, required

between seventy and ninety seconds, resulting in excessive time

between the first and last takeoffs . Additionally, the first aircraft

launched was equipped with the master station-keeping equipment that allowed safe formation flying. With aircraft strung out

over more than ten miles, the station-keeping aircraft became

completely ineffective . To complicate matters more, Pope

launched their aircraft during rain showers, and thunderstorms awaited the crews all along their flight to the south .

These problems created a stressful and uncertain situation

for the Pope C-130 crews as they flew toward a rendezvous

with the MacDill C-130s. Pope aircrews used speed adjustments to catch up with the lead C-130, an acceptable practice

in small formations with minimum spacing but impractical for

large formations spread over long distances. After all the C-130s

233
from Pope were airborne and heading south, it was a formation only in name.

With the C-130s on their way to planned objectives, and the

C-141s yet to launch, the Joint Staff ordered the invasion

halted and the airborne forces to return to their respective

launch bases for a twenty-four-hour period . At nearly the last

minute, a diplomatic proposal that former U.S . President

James (Jimmy) E. Carter offered General Cedras persuaded

the junta leader to relinquish his control over Haiti. The unexpected decision caused a mission change from a military invasion to the insertion of a multinational peacekeeping force.

When President Clinton and the Joint Staff thought that

Cedras intended to cooperate fully, USACOM ordered on September 19 the cancellation of the forcible-entry plan. At the

same time, the Joint Chiefs issued the execution order for the

permissive-entry plan.

Transition between plans required a twenty-four-hour pause

to reposition some aircraft now supporting the new plan . Those

already in place for the deployment of the permissive-entry

forces took off, carrying several U.S . Army units, and landed

at Haitian airports as planned . These U.S . Army units delivered by the air and sea forces functioned as a military police

force maintaining the peace . They also assisted in training a

new police force for Haiti during the political transition period

between the Cedras and Aristide governments.

On September 19, a C-5 carried members of the 436th

Airlift Wing's Tactical Airlift Control Element from Dover AFB,

Delaware, to Port-au-Prince to establish airlift control, aerial

port, and other airfield support for aircraft bringing equipment

and troops . Shortly thereafter, ground forces began arriving

at Port-au-Prince on commercial and military aircraft. The

permissive-entry plan required the deployed strategic airlift

forces, C-5s and C-141s, waiting at Dover, McGuire AFB, New

Jersey, and Griffiss AFB, New York, to fly to various locations

for loading and then to Haiti before returning to their respective deployment bases . These large aircraft flew only to the

capital city since no other airfields in Haiti could handle them.

By September 26, USACOM had established requirements for

twenty-five C-141 and ten C-5 daily inbound flights .

234
Although over 20,000 troops eventually arrived in Haiti, the

initial execution of some portions of the permissive-entry plan

was anything but smooth. For example, to move the 10th

Mountain Division from its home at Fort Drum to Griffiss AFB,

action officers coordinated ground and air transportation

times . For its part, the division contracted with local school

bus companies to move its troops . However, the troops did not

always arrive at Griffiss on time to meet the scheduled aircraft

launch . Thus, launch times slipped, resulting in the Tactical

Airlift Control Element at Port-au-Prince sometimes not knowing exactly when or what type of aircraft would show up . This

created problems when scheduling, unloading, and notifying

Army soldiers when to expect arrival of equipment and troops

at Port-au-Prince . Further, C-130s and USA helicopters distributing equipment and troops to airfields around the country

had no firm scheduling times to pick up loads .

The C-141s, C-5s, and commercial aircraft delivered U.S .

and foreign forces to Port-au-Prince, Roosevelt Roads NAS,

Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Base, Cuba. At

these locations, the C-130s from MacDill AFB that originally

supported the forcible-entry plan loaded troops and cargo and

airlifted them to various airfields throughout Haiti. Later, on

September 26, ten aircraft and crews from the 7th Wing redeployed from MacDill to Roosevelt Roads to conduct airlift operations to Haiti. USACOM also released the remaining MacDill C-130s and crews from participation in the crisis.

By September 30, USAF operations in Haiti became more

or less routine as Air Mobility Command added supply airlift

missions to point-to-point, or channel, mission scheduling.

The airlifters of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY helped deliver the peak military strength of the multinational forces of

20,931 by October 2 . On October 10, General Cedras resigned and two days later left the country. After completing

the movement of multinational forces from Roosevelt Roads,

the remaining C-130s redeployed to their home station by

October 12, ending USAF contingency flying operations for

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

On October 15, 1994, Aristide returned to his country, the

benefactor of a strong U.S . response to an oppressive dictator.

General Cedras only agreed to leave after tough negotiations

235
and perhaps the realization that he faced an approaching

force similar to that of the airborne invasion of Panama in

1989 . As in Panama, the Air Force brought to bear an overwhelming force of fighters, command and control aircraft,

gunships and other special operations aircraft, reconnaissance airplanes, aerial refueling tankers, and thousands of

troops aboard the airlift fleet of strategic and tactical aircraft.

The successful adaptation to the last-minute change in mission, from military invasion force to airlifting peacekeeping

troops, was a major indicator of the flexibility air power offers

U.S . military and political leaders in fulfilling national foreign

policy objectives .
Glossary

AAF. Army Airfield

AB. Air Base

AD. Air Division

AEF. Air Expeditionary Force

aeromedical evacuation. The sending of injured or ill patients by specially equipped aircraft from the contingency

area to medical facilities, usually stateside, for further treatment. Trained medical personnel accompany patients on

such flights .

AFB. Air Force Base

airborne. The capability to accomplish missions by airlift.

airborne alert. Having aircraft in the air, ready to undertake

its mission .

Air Component Commander. The commander under the

Joint Commander with responsibility for command and

control of air assets in the theater of operations .

air-drop . To drop troops or materiel by parachute from aircraft in flight.

airland. To land troops or materiel by aircraft, as distinguished

from air drop.

airlift. To transport personnel or cargo by aircraft.

alert . A state of readiness against impending danger or for

immediate action.

ALCE. airlift control elements

ALTF. Airlift Task Force

AMC. Air Mobility Command

ANG. Air National Guard

ARRS. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service

AS. Airlift Squadron

AW. Air Wing

AWACS. airborne warning and control system

beddown. To survey and install at a base the facilities and

other resources necessary to maintain and operate an aircraft system.

237
CALSU. Combat Airlift Support Unit

CASF. Composite Air Strike Force

CENTAF. Central Command Air Force. Air Force component

of the U.S . Central Command.

CIA. Central Intelligence Agency

CINCCENT. Commander in Chief, Central Command

CINCPAC. Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

CINCPACFLT . Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Cold War. The forty-year confrontation between the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) and the

United States and its allies .

COMMIDEASTFOR. Commander, Middle East Forces

COMNAVCENT. Commander, Naval Forces, Central Command

Component Commander. In a joint force, the commander of

a particular service component (e .g., the Air Component

Commander) . The Component Commander is subject to the

commanding authority of the Joint Commander.

CONAD. Continental Air Defense Command

DAO. Defense Attache Office

deploy. To send personnel, units, and aircraft to another location to accomplish a mission.

DOD. Department of Defense

FIS. Fighter-Interceptor Squadron

Group. The lowest headquarters organization of the U.S . Air

Force, with squadrons and flights usually assigned to the

headquarters .

GPS. Global Positioning System

IAF. Indian Air Force

IAPF. Inter-American Peace Force

ICBM. intercontinental ballistic missile

IRBM. intermediate-range ballistic missile

Joint Commander. The single conunander authorized to exercise

command authority or operational control over ajoint force.

238
joint force. A military force made up of elements from two or

more U.S . armed services and usually operating under a

single Joint Commander.

joint operations. Military activities by a joint force.

Khmer Rouge . Communist rebel forces fighting against the

legitimate government of Cambodia.

LAW. light antitank weapon

MAC. Military Airlift Command, predecessor of AMC

MATS. Military Air Transport Service, predecessor of MAC

MRBM. medium-range ballistic missile

NAS. Naval Air Station

NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization

no-fly zone . An area in which aircraft, usually military, are

forbidden to fly. It is a type of exclusion zone, defined in

doctrine as a zone established by a sanctioning body to

prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. The

purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify

behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body. The

sanctioning body may grant permission for specific flights

(e .g., by aircraft of nations belonging to it) .

OAS. Organization of American States

OECS. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

239

PDF. Panamanian Defense Force

peace enforcement . Application of military force, or the

threat of its use, normally pursuant to international

authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or

sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order

(Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms) .

peacekeeping. Military operations undertaken with the consent

of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and

facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or
other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to

reach a long-term political settlement (Joint Publication 1-02).

peacemaking. Military operations intended to ameliorate suffering and facilitate a cease-fire and political settlement.

peace operations. A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted

in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain

peace (Joint Publication 1-02) .

PRIME BEEF. Base Engineer Emergency Force. A unit capable

of deploying immediately to provide essential civil engineering

support to a forward base and forces using that base .

rig. To prepare an aircraft's cargo for transport.

RAF. Royal Air Force

RSAF. Royal Saudi Air Force

RTAFB. Royal Thai Air Force Base

SAM. surface-to-air missile

SAC. Strategic Air Command

SEALS. sea, air, land . U.S . Navy special operations unit.

SECDEF. Secretary of Defense

sortie . Asingle flight by a single aircraft to accomplish a given

mission.

SOW. Special Operations Wing

stage. Refers to use of an intermediate base between the origin and destination of the aircraft in order to refuel, perform

maintenance, or rearm.

Squadron. A constituted and organized unit of the U.S. Air

Force with no subordinate units assigned.

TAC. Tactical Air Command

TCW. Troop Carrier Wing

TFW. Tactical Fighter Wing

TRIADS. Tri-Wall Aerial Delivery System

TRW. Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

UHF. ultra-high frequency

UK. United Kingdom

UN. United Nations

240
unified command. A joint command made up of components

of each armed service and responsible for command and

control of military operations in a specific geographical area ;

for example, USEUCOM.

UNPROFOR. United Nations Protection Force

USA. United States Army

USACOM. United States Atlantic Command . The unified command responsible for contingency operations in the Atlantic

Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, and the Gulf of Mexico. (USACOM lost responsibility for the Caribbean and the Gulf to

USSOUTHCOM in June 1997.)

USAF. United States Air Force

USAFE. United States Air Forces in Europe

USCENTCOM. United States Central Command. The unified

command responsible for contingency operations in East

Africa and Southwest Asia.

USEUCOM. United States European Command. The unified

command responsible for contingency operations in Europe

and most of Africa.

USMC. United States Marine Corps

USN. United States Navy

USPACOM. United States Pacific Command. The unified command responsible for contingency operations in the Pacific

Ocean, Far East, South Asia, and Indian Ocean regions .

USS. United States ship. A prefix to the name of a Navy vessel.

USSOUTHCOM. United States Southern Command. The unified command responsible for contingency operations in

Central and South America. (Since June 1997, USSOUTHCOM has included the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico,

formerly part of USACOM. )

Viet Cong. Communist rebel forces fighting against the legitimate government of South Vietnam.

Wing. A headquarters organization of the U.S . Air Force : subordinate units, mostly groups but sometimes squadrons

and flights, are assigned to the wing headquarters .

24 1

Bibliography

The USAF organizational histories on file at the Air Force

Historical Research Agency provided much of the information

summarized in the contingencies of this book. Often, these

histories included supporting documents that contained primary sources . These unclassified histories, not cited here, are

voluminous but may be easily retrieved by a search of the

agency's computerized database .

Many recent documents are classified, and the writers could

not use this information. They turned instead to current news

sources, particularly, Air Force Times and the Air Force News

Service E-mail bulletins as well as commercial newspapers

and newsmagazines . These are readily available to the reader,

as well, and database searches will yield the relevant articles.

The following citations should provide ample sources for

students, scholars, and others interested in reading in greater

depth concerning the contingencies . For most operations,

these selections of published government documents, books,

and articles provide significant information. All should be

readily available from local libraries .

Government Documents

Acree, Cliff M. The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission: What Went

Wrong? Norfolk, Va. : Armed Forces Staff College, 1984.

American Force Information Service. U.S. Forces in Haiti. CDROM. Washington, D.C . : DOD Joint Combat Camera Center, 1995 .

Balati, Frank E., Jr. Military Intervention in Latin America. Fort

Leavenworth, Kans . : U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, 1983 .

The Berlin Airlift: A Brief Chronology. Scott AFB, Ill . : Air Mobility Command History Office, May 1997 .

Cole, Ronald H. Operation Urgent Fury. Washington, D.C . :

Joint History Office, 1997 .

Des Brisay, Thomas. Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang. Washington, D.C . : Office of Air Force History, 1985.

243
Dolle, Dennis B . Operation Nickel Grass. Maxwell AFB, Ala. :

Air Command and Staff College, 1987 .

The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965: The Air Force Role.

Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Aerospace Studies Institute, December

1966 .

Harrington, Daniel F . "The Air Force Can Deliver Anything!" A

History of the Berlin Airlift. Ramstein AB, Germany: U. S . Air

Forces in Europe Office of History, May 1998 .

Haulman, Daniel L. The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift Operations, 1947-1994. Washington, D.C . : Air

Force History and Museums Program, 1998.

Historical Handbook, 1941-1984. Scott AFB, Ill . : Military Airlift Command History Office, 1984.

Joint Military Operations Historical Collection. Washington,

D.C. : Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997 .

Koura, Tony. The Cambodia Airlift, 1974-1975. Hickam AFB,

Hawaii: Office of Pacific Air Forces History, 1976.

Launius, Roger D., and Coy F . Cross II. MAC and the Legacy of

the Berlin Airlift. Scott AFB, Ill . : Military Airlift Command

History Office, April 1989 .

Little, Robert D. Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis-1958.

Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Historical Liaison Office,

1960.

Mets, David R., ed. Last Flightfrom Saigon. Washington, D.C . :

Office of Air Force History, 1985 .

Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, vol. 1 . Fort

Leavenworth, Kans . : Center for Army Lessons Learned, July

1995.

Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After-Action Report (JAAR).

Norfolk, Va. : U.S. Atlantic Command, June 1995.

Patchin, Kenneth L. Flight To Israel: A Historical Documentary

of Strategic Airlift to Israel. Revised . Scott AFB, Ill . : Military

Airlift Command Office of History, 1976 .

Peterson, Wayne G., et al. The Fall and Evacuation of Vietnam.

Hickam AFB, Hawaii : Office of Pacific Air Forces History,

April 1978 .

Rivard, David T. An Analysis of Operation Urgent Fury. M

well AFB, Ala . : Air Command and Staff College, 1985 .

244
Steele, William M. The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission. Fort

McNair, Washington, D.C. : National War College, 1984.

Thomas, Charles S . The Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt. Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : U.S . Army War College, 1987 .

Tustin, Joseph P. USAFE Humanitarian Missions, 1945-1962.

Ramstein AFB, Germany: U.S . Air Forces in Europe History

Office, 1963.

Vien, Cao Van. The Final Collapse. Washington, D.C. : U.S.

Army Center of Military History, 1983 .

Willeford, Hugh B. Airlift in Grenada. Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

Command and Staff College, 1988 .

Yates, Lawrence A. Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966. Fort Leavenworth, Kans . : Combat

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, 1988.

Books

Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globalism, American Foreign Policy Since 1938. New York: Penguin Books, 1991 .

Beckwith, Charlie A. Delta Force. New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, 1983 .

Bolger, Daniel P . Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of

Violent Peace. Novato, Calif : Presidio Press, 1988 .

Bowers, Ray L. Tactical Airlift. Washington, D.C . : Office of Air

Force History, 1983 .

Cantwell, Gerald T. Citizen Airmen. Washington, D.C . : Air

Force History and Museums Program, 1997.

Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. New York: Doubleday,

1950.

Colvin, Ian. The Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe . London:

Leslie Frewin, 1968 .

Davis, Brian L. Qaddaft, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S.

Attack on Libya. New York: Praeger, 1990.

Dougan, Clark, et al . The Fall of the South. Boston, Mass . :

Boston Publishing Co ., 1985 .

Futrell, Robert Frank. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking

in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1907-1960, and vol. 2,

1961-1984. Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1989 .

245
Guilmartin, John F. A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the

Battle of Koh Tang. College Station, Tex. : Texas A&M Press,

1995 . Miller, Roger G. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949.

Washington, D.C . : Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998 .

Natty, Bernard C., ed. Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History

of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, 1950-1997 . Washington,

D.C . : Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997 .

Palmer, Bruce, Jr. Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965. Lexington, Ky. : The University Press of

Kentucky, 1989.

Perusse, Roland I . Haitian Democracy Restored, 1991-1995 . New York: University Press of America, 1995.

Powell, Colin L. My American Journey. New York: Random

House, 1995.

Rowan, Roy. The Four Days of the Mayaguez. New York: W. W.

Norton and Co., 1975 .

el-Sadat, Anwar. In Search of Identity. New York: Harper &

Row, 1977 .

Schoonmaker, Herbert G. Military Crisis Management: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965. New York :

Greenwood Press, 1990.

Stanik, Joseph T. "Swift and Effective Retribution": The U.S.

Sixth Fleet and the Confrontation with Qaddai. Washington,

D.C . : Naval Historical Center, 1996.

Tunner, William H. Over the Hump. Washington, D.C . : Office

of Air Force History, 1985 .

Venkus, Robert E. Raid on Qaddaft: The Untold Story of History's Longest Fighter Mission by the Pilot Who Directed It.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992 .

Wragg, David W. Airlift: A History of Military Air Transport.

Novato, Calif. : Presidio Press, 1986 .

Articles

"Africa: The Congo Massacre ." Time 84 (December 4, 1964):

28-31.

Barela, Timothy P. "Calm Before the Storm." Airman 39 (October 1995) : 2-9 .

246
The Congo : Killing Ground.

Newsweek 64 (December 7,

1964) : 47-48 .

"Countering the Communists ." Time 111 (June 5, 1978) :

26-30 .

Covello, Art . "Destination Zaire ." The Air Reservist 30 (July

1978) : 23 .

"Curbing Saddam's Military Adventures ." Defense Issues 11

(1996) : 1-4.

Dare, James A. "Dominican Diary." US Naval Institute Proceedings 91 (December 1965) : 36-45 .

Davis, James L. "Building a Bridge for Hope ." Mobility Forum 2

(May-,June 1993) : 38-39.

Freeman, Waldo D., et al . "Operation Restore Hope : A

USCENTCOM Perspective ." Military Review 73 (September

1993) : 61-72 .

Fulghum, David A. "Massed Airborne Forces Aimed at Heart of

Haiti." Aviation Week & Space Technology 141 (October 10,

1994) : 71-72 .

Fursdon, Edward . "Operation Deny Flight." Army Quarterly

and Defence Journal 125 (January 1995) : 15-19 .

"Germany to Zaire with a `Fair Force' Reserve Pilot." The Ofcer 54 (August 1978) : 12 .

"Inside Kolwezi : Toll of Terror." Time 111 (June 5, 1978) :

32-34,36 .

Kitfield, James. "Restoring Hope ." Government Executive 25

(February 1993) : 20-33 .

Launius, Roger D. 'The Berlin Airlift : Constructive Air Power."

Air Power History 36 (Spring 1989) : 9-22 .

. "The Berlin Airlift : Refining the Air Transport Function,

1948-1949 ." Airlift 10 (Summer 1988) : 10-17.

. "Lessons Learned, Berlin Airlift ." Air Power History 36

(Spring 1989) : 23.

"Massacre in the Congo : Story of a Rescue Attempt." U.S.

News and World Report 57 (December 7, 1964) : 41-43.

"NATO Aircraft Strike Targets in Bosnia ." Airman 39 (October

1995) : 10 .

"NATO Airlift Deficiencies Seen in Zaire Evacuation." Aviation

Week 108 (May 29, 1978) : 22.

247
New Threat to Bosnia Talks.Janes Defence Weekly 24 (Sep

tember 23,1995): 3.

Ofcansky, Thomas. "Chaos in the Congo." Airman 27 (August

1983): 13-16.

. "Congo Airlift, 1960-1964." Airlift 5 (Summer 1983):

22-25.

Owen, Robert C. "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1 ."

Airpower Journal 11 (Summer 1997) : 4-24 .

Ramos, Francisco J. "The United Nations and the Congo Crisis ." Military Review 45 (November 1965): 50-57.

Rogers, Marc. "NATO Begins to Assess Air Strike Damage As

Peace in Bosnia Nears." Jane's Defence Weekly 24 (November 11, 1995): 19 .

"Reservists in Crises ." Air Reservist 17 (July 1995): 4--7.

"The Shaba Tigers Return ." Time 111 (May 29, 1978): 28-30.

"Special Study of Operation VITTLES." Aviation Operations

Magazine 11 (April 1949).

"United States Cooperates with Belgium in Rescue of Hostages

from the Congo." Department of State Bulletin 51 (December

14, 1964): 838-48.

Viccellio, Henry. "The Composite Air Strike Force, 1958 ." Air

University Quarterly Review 11 (Summer 1959): 3-17 .

Watkins, Tarleton H. "Operation New Tape: The Congo Airlift."

Air University Quarterly Review 13 (Summer 1961): 18-33.

Wyllie, James. "Saddam's Prospects." Jane's Intelligence Review 8 (November 1996): 504-505.

Yuen-Gi Yee. "Bridge to Berlin." Airman 28 (May 1984) : 43-48.
Contributors

William J . Allen, presently Chief Historian, 37th Training

Wing, Lackland AFB, Texas, was a historian at the Air Force

Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, from

1996 through 1998 . He earned a Bachelor of Science degree in

history from Troy State University at Montgomery, Alabama,

in 1998 . Mr. Allen joined the Air Force in 1975 and worked as

an administrative specialist until retraining as a historian in

April 1987. As a wing historian, in 1991-92 he served in

Operation DESERT STORM at Masirah Island, Oman, and

Kuwait City. Subsequently, he deployed to Haiti for Operation

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in 1994 and to Southwest Asia for

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in 1995. During eleven years

as an enlisted historian, Sergeant Allen wrote twenty-seven

unit histories and six special studies, earning awards for

Twenty-Second Air Force Historian of the Year in 1988 and

1989 ; Air Force Historical Program of the Year in 1992 ; Air

Force Special Study of the Year in 1992 ; Pacific Air Forces

Special Study of the Year in 1993 ; Air Combat Command

Historical Publication of the Year in 1995 ; and the Air Force

Historian's Special Achievement Award in 1996 . He retired in

June 1996 from active duty after over twenty-one years of

service .

MSgt . David A. Byrd is assigned to the Archives Branch of

the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB,

Alabama. He also has served as historian for the Ballistic

Missile Office, Rome Laboratory, and the 354th Fighter Wing .

In 1995, he deployed in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Sergeant Byrd holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in history from Utica College of Syracuse University . He has

authored numerous studies and papers since joining the Air

Force history program, including Rail Based Missiles from Atlas to Peacekeeper and Forty Years of Research and Development at Gri firs AFB, plus an award-winning study of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT Combined Task Force actions

following the 1994 Blackhawk helicopter shootdown .

249
Judy G. Endicott is a historian in the Research Division of

the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. She holds a bachelor's and a master's degree in history

from Pittsburg State University, Pittsburg, Kansas. Ms. Endicott initially began working at AFHRA as an archivist in 1969,

six years later becoming the Chief of Circulation and Deputy

Archives Division Chief. She was promoted in 1984, becoming

a historian and Deputy Chief of the Organizational History

Branch. The USAF expert in Lineage and Honors History, Ms.

Endicott is the editor of two recent on-line publications on

lineage of Air Force organizations and units. The publications

are Active Air Force Wings as of 1 October 1995 and USAF

Active Flying, Space, and Missile Squadrons as of 1 October

1995.

Daniel L. Haulman is a historian in the Research Division

at the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama. He holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of

Southwestern Louisiana and a master's degree from the University of New Orleans. After teaching high school social studies for five years, he earned his PhD in history from Auburn

University, Alabama, in 1983. Dr. Haulman first began working at AFHRA as an archivist in 1982. The next year, he

became a technical information specialist, then in 1985, he

was promoted to a historian position. He is the author of two

books, The United States Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift

Operations, 1947-1994 and Air Force Aerial Victory Credits:

World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. His other

publications include three USAF pamphlets: The High Road to

Tokyo Bay; Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan; and

Wings of Hope: The U.S. Air Force and Humanitarian Airlift

Operations. He has written six articles and presented papers

at seven historical conferences .

Edward T. Russell is a historian in the Research Division

of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama. He holds a bachelor's degree from Huntingdon College, Montgomery, Alabama, and a master's degree from Troy

State University, Troy, Alabama. He has done postgraduate

work at Auburn University of Montgomery and the University of

250
Alabama. 

gpy

as an

adjunct at local universities . In 1972, he began working at

AFHRA as a technical information specialist ; ten years later he

moved to the Research Division as a historian. He coauthored

a textbook entitled Minorities in American History, compiled

the Research Guide to the Published Project CHECO Reports,

and revised The Organization and Lineage of the United States

Air Force. He also is the author of Leaping the Atlantic Wall:

Army Air Forces Campaigns in Western Europe, 1942-1945

and coauthor of Africa to the Alps: The Army Air Forces in the

Mediterranean Theater, both commemorative pamphlets published by the Air Force History and Museum Program.

Frederick J. Shaw Jr. is currently Chief of the Research

Division, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama. After receiving a PhD in history from the University

of Florida in 1976, Dr. Shaw worked as historian at the Strategic Air Command Office of History, specializing in ballistic

missiles and budgeting. He moved to AFHRA in 1986 and

assumed his present position two years later. He has authored

monographs on the development of the mobile and

Peacekeeper ICBMs and also coedited The Cold War and Beyond: Chronology of the United States Air Force, 1947-1997.

A. Timothy Warnock is Chief, Organizational History

Branch, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB,

Alabama. He holds three degrees-a bachelor's, a master's,

and a PhD-from the University of Georgia. He taught at Georgia Southern College, Statesboro ; the Air War College, Maxwell

AFB, Alabama; and Auburn University's Maxwell Graduate

Program prior to joining the AFHRA as a historian in 1980. In

1991, he was appointed to his present position. Dr. Warnock

is the author of the book, USAF Combat Medals, Streamers,

and Campaigns and two World War II commemorative pamphlets: The Battle Against the U-Boat in the American Theater

and Air Power versus U-boats: Confronting Hitler's Submarine

Menace in the European Theater. He has written several articles and professional papers. He is also coeditor of The Cold

War and Beyond: Chronology of the United States Air Force,

1947-1997.

25 1

Index

Accra, Ghana: 25

Acheson,Dean: 38

Adams, Paul D. : 49

Adana, Turkey: 13-15, 17-18, 20, 181, 187. See also Incirlik

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: 213

Adoula, Grille : 27, 53-54

Adriatic Sea: 222, 228

Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS): xxv, 126-27

Africa : 24-32, 43, 60-61, 78, 117-24, 136, 187, 216

African: 116, 120, 122, 145

troops : xxiv, 55, 120, 123

Agadir, Morocco: 117

Agidjan, Ivory Coast: 117

Agra, India: 47

Aidid, Mohammed Farah: 215

Air America: 90-91

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS): xxvii, 138, 160, 162, 164-65, 174,

194,232

Air Combat Command: 191, 232

Aircraft

Commercial

Boeing 707: 47

Boeing 747: 127

DC-8: 98-99, 102

Ir1011 : 170

UH-1 : 90-91

World Airways 727 : 85

Foreign

AN-12: 50

C-160'fransail : 118, 206

F-5: 160

11,28: xx, 35-36

IL-76 Candid: 149, 153-54

MiG-21 : 75

MiG-23: 149, 154

MiG-25 Foxbat: 184, 192

MIG-29: 184

U.S . Air Force

Airlifters

C-5 Galaxy : xxii-xxiii, 78, 80-81, 86, 114, 118-20, 123, 125-26, 139,

141-42, 161, 170-72, 175, 181, 184, 200-201, 205, 213, 216-18, 234-35

C-9 Nightingale: 141, 201, 230

C-17 Globemaster III: 142, 206-7, 218

C-47: xvii, 3-4, 8, 50, 70

VC-47: 49

C-54 Skymaster: xviii, 4, 6-8

C-74 Globemaster: 6, 8

C-82 Packet : 8

253
C97 

g, 

C-119 : xix, 14, 50

C-123: xviii, 70, 96

C-124 Globemaster II : xviii-xix, 8, 13-14, 19-20, 24-32, 37, 45, 65, 67, 69

C-130 Hercules: xviii-xix, xxi-xxii, xxiv, 14, 16, 19-20, 24-27, 29, 45-47,

49-51, 57-59, 61, 65-67, 70-72, 88-92, 96-99, 102, 111, 117-19, 121,

129, 131, 133, 138-39, 141-43, 172, 175-77, 180, 182, 184, 198-202,

204-8, 210, 212, 214, 218, 224, 232-35

AC-130: xxv, 91, 101, 107, 110, 114, 138-40, 143, 176-77, 216, 232

EC-130: xxiv, 101, 103, 112, 129, 132-33, 141

HC-130: 103, 111, 126, 176

MC-130: 128-29, 131-33, 138-39, 176-77

C-133: 32, 37

C-135 Stratolifter : xix, 28-29, 32, 37, 45

EC-135: 66, 70,194

C-141 Starlifter: xviii-xxiv, 32, 78, 80-81, 88-90, 92, 99, 108, 114, 117-20,

122-23, 125-27, 131, 139, 141-42, 161, 170-76, 181, 184, 201-2,

204-7, 210, 213, 216-18, 224, 231-32, 234-35

U-10: 70

Bombers

B-1: xxiv

B-29: 7

B-47: 37, 39

B-52: 37-39, 185, 194

B-57 : 15, 17-18, 20-21

Fighters

F-4: 80, 91, 101, 107, 110, 114

F-4G Wild Weasel: 192

F-15: 138, 160, 174, 185, 194

F-16: 184-85, 191, 193, 224-25

F-84: 37

F-86: 17-18, 20

F-100 Super Sabre: 15-21, 37, 69

F-101 : 40

F-102: 40

F-104: 69

F-105: 37

F-106: 40

F-111 Aardvark: xxv, 107, 149-55

EF-111 Raven: 150-52, 154, 174

F-117 Nighthawk: 176, 194, 227

Helicopters

CH-53 Knife: 91, 100-101, 103, 108, 112

HH-53 Super Jolly Green Giant: 91, 99-101, 103, 108, 111, 126

MH-53J: 176

MH-60: 176

Reconnaissance

RB-47: 38

RB-66: 15, 17, 19, 34, 37, 69

RF-4: 101

RF-101 : 15, 17, 20, 34, 69

254
U

2: 34, 37

38

WB-66: 15, 17, 19

Tankers

KB-50: xix, 16-17,37

KC-10 Extender: xxiii, xxv, 81, 141, 151, 160-64, 174, 184, 213, 216, 218, 232

KC-135 Stratotanker: xxiii, xxv, 81, 91, 101, 111, 141, 151, 160, 162-64,

174, 213-14, 216, 232

Other

A-7: 91, 101, 107-111, 113-14

A-10: 140, 224

A-37 : 90

E-2: 161

E-3: 137, 141, 160-62, 164-65, 174, 185, 187, 194, 232

OV-10 Bronco: 101, 110-11, 113

U.S. Army

UH-60 Black Hawk: 185

U .S. Navy

A-6 Intruder: 154, 161, 165-66

A-7: 153

EA-6B Prowler: 146, 150, 253, 193

F/A-18: 153, 161

F-14: 146

P-3: 164

R5D: 7

RH-53: 129, 132-33

U.S. Marine Corps

CH-46: 90

CH-53 Sea Stallion: 90, 99-100

Air Defense Command: 69

Air Expeditionary Force (AEF): xxix, 11, 21, 73, 193

Air Force (numbered)

Third: 186

Seventh: 89, 99, 107

Ninth: 68

Twelfth: 137

Seventeenth : 200

Nineteenth: xvii-xxiii, 12, 16, 65

Twenty-First: 77-78, 120, 125, 137, 144

Twenty-Second: 77, 120, 161

Twenty-Third: xxv, 171

Air Force Reserve (AFRES): xxiv, 39-40, 72, 120, 142, 199-200, 204, 216

Reservists: 41, 121, 174

Air Force Special Operations Command: 134, 232

Airlift control element (ALOE) : 117, 120-22, 161, 175, 204, 234-35

Airlift Support Unit: 25, 31, 46-47, 49, 65, 67

Airlift Task Force (ALTF): 65-66

Air Materiel Command: 9

Air Mobility Command (AMC) : 206, 212, 214, 216-17, 232, 235

Air National Guard (ANG) : 70, 73, 141-42, 199-201, 204, 216

Airways and Air Communications System: 7

Akashi, Yasushi : 223-24

Albertville, Democratic Republic of the Congo: 53

255
Algeria: 60

Allied Air Forces Southern Europe: 221, 228

Ambala, India: 47

American: xxixxii, 54-56, 58-61, 64, 77, 79-81, 85-89, 91, 96, 100, 104-5, 107-17,

120, 123, 125-27, 131, 133, 139, 141, 146-48, 154, 157, 159, 165, 172, 180-82,

185-86, 192, 194, 200-201, 208, 215-17, 221-22, 224-26

forces: 17, 84-85, 96, 154, 217

Foreign Service : 127

intelligence : 34, 112

troops: 121, 123, 181

Ancona, Italy: 204, 206-7

Anders Jr., Loyd J. : 91

Andersen AFB, Guam: 90, 92, 185

Anderson Jr., Rudolf. 34, 38

Andrews AFB, Maryland: 230

Andrus, James : 186

Antalya, Turkey: 187

Arab: 76--77, 79-80, 145

Arab-Israeli conflict: 78

Arabian Sea: 159, 164

Aristide, Jean-Bertrand : 229-30, 234-35

Arkansas: 89, 92, 232

Ascension Island: 57, 59-60

Ashy, Joseph W. : 221

Athens, Greece : 46, 126-27, 147

Atlantic Ocean: 57, 77, 119, 168, 213, 216, 230, 232

Austin, Hudson: 136, 138, 140

Austin, Randall W. : 108-9

Austria : 14, 20, 27

Aviano AB, Italy: 198, 222, 227-28

Avord, France: 120

Azores: 17, 77-79, 127, 213

Bab al-Aziziyah, Tripoli, Libya: 149, 152-53

Baghdad, Iraq: 182, 192, 194

Bahrain: 20, 193

Baidoa, Somalia: 210

Baledogle, Somalia: 214

Bandar Abbas, Iran: 164-65

Barbados: 136, 139, 141-42, 231

Bardera, Somalia: 210

Beledweyne, Somalia: 210

Belen Huen, Somalia: 210

Belgian: 25, 31-32, 55-56, 58-59, 116-20, 123

commandos: 58

forces: 57, 120

paratroops: 57-58

soldiers: xxi, 57, 120

troops: xxiv, 57, 59, 118, 120

256

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana: 174, 232

Barrakpore, India: 47

Batman, Turkey: 180

Beirut, Lebanon: 13-14, 19-20, 147
Belgium: xix, xxi, xxiii

xxiv, 57, 5960, 

, , 

Belgrade, Yugoslavia: 226

Benghazi, Libya: 149-50, 154

Berlin, Germany: xvii, 2-8, 10, 33, 37, 97-98, 148

Berlin Airlift : 2, 4, 6, 8-10, 25, 29-32, 102, 201

Berringer, Lynn T. : 151

Bihac, Bosnia: 203, 220, 226

Birdair: 96-99, 102

Bitburg AB, Germany: 222

Bjelimici, Bosnia: 203

Boeing: 47, 127, 163

Bomb

BLU-82: 111, 113

GBU-10: 153

Mark 20 Rockeye Cluster: 165

Paveways: 153

Snakeye: 154

Bosnia: xxviii, 102, 187-88, 194, 198, 200-201, 206-7, 220, 222, 224-27

Bosnian civil war: 202, 205, 227-28

Bosnian Serb: 198-200, 202, 205, 220, 223-27. See also Serbs

forces: 203, 205

Bosnian-Croatian : 226

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 214, 223-25

Bradley armored vehicles : 216

Brazil: 71

Brazzaville, Congo: 25, 30-31, 53-54

Breker, Craig A. : 202

Bridge of the Americas, Panama: 172

Bridgeton, SS: 161

Brindisi, Italy : 222

British: 5, 17, 19, 51, 55, 60, 148, 182, 208

Commonwealth: 136

soldiers: 205

Brussels, Belgium: 117-19

Burns, John J. : 99, 101, 107-12

Burtonwood, England: 6

Bush, George H. W. : xxvi, 158, 170-72, 177, 185, 189, 191-92, 212, 230

Cairo West, Egypt: 213, 216

Cairo, Egypt: 30, 56

Calcutta, India: 45-46

California: 34, 45, 92, 200

Cambodia: 87, 95-99, 102, 104, 106, 114, 144

Cambodian: xxii, 96-107, 111, 113-14

(Khmer) air force: 96

Communists : 96

forces : 114

government : 109, 112

soldiers: 109

Canada: 44,207, 212

Cannon, John K. : 4

Cap Haitien, Haiti: 231

Caribbean : 4, 9, 136, 141, 144, 172, 232

countries : 230

257
forces: 141

states: 141

Caribbean Sea: 64, 136, 138

Carlton, Paul K. : 56-58, 77

Carriacou Island, Grenada: 140

Carter, James (Jimmy) E. : xxiv, 117, 127-28, 133, 145, 157, 168, 234

Castro, Fidel: 33-34

Cedras, Raoul: 230-35

Celle, West Germany: 5-6

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) : 33, 128

Chambers, James E. : 200

Chamoun, Camille: 13, 19

Charleston AFB, South Carolina : 28, 67, 141, 171, 173-75, 206, 232

ChateaurouxAS, France: 24-28, 31, 45

Chehab, Fouad: 19

China: xx-xxi, 4, 43, 60, 95-96, 106

Chinese: 33, 44, 51

forces: xxi, 49

troops: 44

Christopher, Warren M. : 214

civilian airlines : 103, 166

civilian-contract aircrews : 102

civilian-contract airlift: xxii

Clark AB, Philippines: 88-89, 92, 161

Clay, Lucius D. : 2

Clinton, William J. : 185, 194, 199-200, 215, 217, 229, 234

Coard, Bernard: 136, 140

Cold War: xvii-xix, xxii, xxvi, xxix, 2, 8, 10, 12, 32, 43, 116, 187, 208, 212, 217,

228

Colmar, France: 117, 120

Commander in ChiefAtlantic : 39

Communism: )ix, 198

Communist: xxii, 2, 7-8, 10, 33, 44, 60, 85, 88, 90, 92, 95-96, 104, 112, 114, 116,

120, 138

China: 54

Cuba: xxii

forces : xviii, xxii, 85, 106

government: xxiv

invasion: xviii

Khmer Rouge : xxii, 87, 96, 98-100, 102-5, 111, 113

military forces: 85

Party: 219

rebels : xxi

Composite Air Strike Force (CASF): xviiixxi, 11-12, 15, 20

Bravo : 13, 18

Congo: xix, xxi, xviii-xxv, 24-25, 27-32, 53-55, 57, 59-60, 115, 117, 121

Congo River: 25, 53

Congolese: 55-56, 58

army: 24, 27, 55, 57-58

civil war: 27

government: 24

loyalists: 55

Parliament: 27, 53

258
soldiers : 25

troops : 56

Congress : xxv, 32, 98, 117, 144, 171, 217. See also United States Congress

Continental Air Command : 72-73

Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD): 37, 40

Corsica, France: 117-18, 120-21

Cosand, Kathleen R. : 121

Crete: 79

Croatia: 198, 201, 204-5, 220, 226-27

Crowe Jr., William J. : 165

Cuba: xx, 33-34, 36-39, 41, 64, 69, 116, 136-39, 141, 174, 230, 235

Cuban: xx, xxii, 33-37, 40, 136, 138, 141, 144, 174-75

Communism: 64

forces: 143

military: xxv

troops : 123-24, 140

Cubi Point, Philippines : 108

Cyprus: 28, 78

Da Nang, South Vietnam: 84-85, 87, 99, 103

Dakar, Senegal: 25, 117, 119-20, 122

Dean, John Gunther: 99-100

Defense Attachd Office (DAO) : 84-86, 89-91

Defense Intelligence Agency: 108

Delashaw, Robert L. : 65-66

Delaware: 119, 141, 234

Delligatti, Robert S. : 89

Department of Defense (DOD): xxiii-xxv, 44-46, 92, 125, 136, 141, 143

Desert One: 129, 131-33

Dhahran AB, Saudi Arabia: 193, 195

Diego Garcia : 161, 164

Dihok (Dahuk), Iraq: 181

Diyarbakir, Turkey: 180-81

Djibouti : 210, 213

Dobrynin, Anatoly : 39

Dominican: xxii, 64, 66, 70, 72-73

forces: 72

government: xxii

Dominican Republic: xxii, 64-66, 68-69, 71-72

Donaldson AFB, South Carolina: 13

Dover AFB, Delaware : 141, 234

Drury, Richard T. : 89

Duke Field, Florida : 176

Dum Dum, Calcutta, India: 45, 47

Dyess AFB, Texas: 174, 232

Edwards AFB, California: 34

Eglin AFB, Florida : 70, 92, 174

Egypt: xxiii, 25, 56, 60, 75-79, 81, 133, 213

Egyptian forces : 76, 81

Eisenhower, Dwight D. : 13, 24, 32-33

England: xxv, 78, 148, 151-52, 160, 216, 222. See also Great Britain and United

Kingdom

259
g, , 

Erding, Germany: 14

Ethiopia: 27, 29, 210, 213

Europe: xxi, 2, 4, 7, 13-14, 17, 24, 30-31, 54--55, 57, 117-18, 120, 123, 127, 181,

199, 201, 208, 210, 216, 226, 228

European: xix, xxi, 24, 54, 56, 78, 115, 118, 120, 123, 148, 151, 220

Allies : 154

force: 40

troops: 123

Evreux-Fauville AB, France : 24, 27, 34-31, 46-47, 57, 59

Falconara AB, Ancona, Italy: 204

Farris, Kelton M. : 77

Fassberg, West Germany: 5

5th Allied Tactical Air Force: 221, 227

Florida: 34, 37-40, 138, 176, 216, 230, 232

Fogleman, Ronald R. : 186, 195, 212

105-7, 109, 113-14

France : xxiii-xxiv, 2, 13, 24, 27, 45-46, 51, 57, 59, 116-17, 119-20, 148, 205-7,

212, 222, 226-27

French: 6, 31-32, 116-18, 120, 123, 182, 198, 200, 206, 208, 222, 224-25

embassy: 153

forces : 120, 191

Foreign Legion: 118

soldiers: 120

troops : xxiv, 118, 120

Furstenfeldbruck, West Germany: 14

Gabon: 120

Galbraith, J. Kenneth: 44, 46, 49

Gatow, West Berlin, Germany: 5-6

Gaylor, Noel A. M. : 85, 88, 99, 107

Gbenye, Christophe: 53, 55-58

Geneva, Switzerland : 117

Georgia: 138, 175, 216, 232

German: 7, 204-201

soldiers: 205

Germany: 2-3, 5-6, 8, 10, 14-15, 19, 78, 119, 125, 148, 180-81, 201, 205, 207,

222,227

Ghana: 27

Global Positioning System (GPS): 200, 218

Golan Heights: 75-76

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: xxv, 144, 159,

161, 166

Gorazde, Bosnia: 200, 203, 220, 224-26

Gradwell, Burgess : 57

Grand Anse, Grenada: 139-40

Grantley Adams International Airport, Barbados: 139

260

Ford, Gerald R. : xxii, 85, 88, 90, 96, 98,

Forgan, David W. : 151

Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 65, 171, 174

Fort Drum, New York: 216, 231, 235

Fort Stewart, Georgia: 216
Great Britain: 2, 4, 10, 13, 

, , , , , , , g

and United Kingdom

Great Falls AFB, Montana: 7

Greece: 14, 20, 46, 78, 126, 216

Greek: 28, 79

Greenland: 78

Grenada: 136-44

army: 138

government: xxv

troops: 140

Grenville, Grenada: 137-38

Griffiss AFB, New York: 216, 234-35

Grozny: 38

Guam: xxvii, 90, 92, 185

Guantanamo U.S . Naval Base, Cuba: 37, 38, 230, 235

Gulf of Oman: 129

Gulf of Sidra: 146, 154

Gulf of Thailand : 107-9, 111

Haiti: xxviii, 64, 229-31, 234-35

Haitian : 229-30

airports: 234

armed forces: 230

Halvorsen, Gail S. : 7

Hammarskjold, Dag: 27

Handy, John W. : 213, 216

Harriman, W. Averill : 49

Hawaii : 4,87

Henry, Patrick M. : 198

Heyser, Richard S. : 34

Himalayas: 4, 44

region: xx, 50

Hispaniola: 64

Holloway, James L. : 17

Homestead AFB, Florida: 37, 232

Hong Kong, China: 105

Howard AFB, Panama: 72, 171-72, 177

Hoyt, Michael: 55-56, 58

Hunter AAF, Savannah, Georgia: 175, 216

Hurlburt Field, Florida: 176

Hussein, Saddam: xxvii, 180, 184-86, 188-89, 194

Incirlik AB, Turkey: Nix, 13, 126-27, 180, 181 . See also Adana

India: xx, 4, 27, 43-47, 49, 51

India-China border: 44, 47

Indian: 44-47, 49-51

army: 46, 49, 51

brigades: 49

border: 44

government: xx, 45, 47, 50

officials: 44

troops: 46, 49

Indian Air Force (IAF): 46-47, 49-51

26 1
Indian Ocean: 161, 214

Indonesia: 98

Indus River Valley: 50

Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF): 71-72

International Red Cross: 56, 120, 202, 223

Iran: xxiv, xxvi-xxvii, 46, 125-29, 144, 158, 165-66, 180

Iran Ajr. 164

Iran-Iraq War: 157-58

Iranian: xxiv, 126, 128, 131, 133-34, 136, 145, 159, 161, 165-66

government: 127

Iraq: xxvi-xxvii, 76, 166, 180-86, 188-95

Iraqi: xxvii, 180-81, 183-85, 190-94

air force: 191

army: 181, 185

forces: 184-85

government: 13, 180

troops : 180, 185, 187

Irbil, Iraq: 185-86

Israel: xxiii, 20, 25, 75-81, 157

Israeli : 76, 80

armed forces : 78

government: 77

Italy: 78, 119, 127, 148, 182, 222, 227

Ivory Coast: 120

Izetbegovic, Alija: 220

Jamaica: 136, 141, 231

Jamerson, James L. : 180-82

James Connally AFB, Texas: 69

Johnson, Lyndon B. : 32, 57, 60, 64, 71

Johnston, Robert B. : 212

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): xxiii, 20, 37-38, 64, 121-22, 125-28, 144, 161, 165, 171,

214,234

Jordan: 17, 19-20, 193

Kadena AB, Okinawa: 108

Kamina, Zaire: 57-59, 117, 119, 121

Kampong Seila, Cambodia: 96

Kano, Nigeria : 25, 28, 30

Karadzic, Radovan: 220, 226

Kasavubu, Joseph: 24, 27, 53-55

Kashmir, India: 44

Katanga Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo: 27-28, 55, 115-17. See also

Shaba Province

Kelly AFB, Texas: 6

Kelso, Frank B. : 148, 150

Kennedy, John F. : xix, 32, 34, 37-38, 44

administration: xxi

Kennedy, Robert F. : 37-39

Kenya: 56, 210, 214

Khobar Towers, Dhahran AB, Saudi Arabia: 195

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah: 125-27

Khrushchev, Nikita: xix, xx, 33-34, 38-39

262
Kinshasa, Zaire : 119-22. See also Leopoldville

Kismayu, Somalia: 210, 214

Kleine Brogel AB, Belgium: 57

Koh Tang, Cambodia: 107-14

Kolwezi, Zaire: 116, 118-19

Kompong Som, Cambodia: 107, 111, 113

Kurdish: xxvii, 180-82, 184, 186, 188, 194

Kurds: xxvii, 180-81, 184-86, 194

Kuwait: xxvii, 76, 180, 184-86, 188, 190, 192-93

Kuwaiti: 161, 190

forces: 191

government: xxvii, 159

Ladakh, India: 44, 49-51

Lajes, Azores: 15, 17, 77-81, 127, 213

Langley AFB, Virginia : 15-17

Laughlin AFB, Texas: 34

Lawson AAF, Fort Stewart, Georgia: 175

Lebanon: xlx-xx, 11, 13-15, 17, 20-21, 144

Leh, India: 49-51

LeMay, Curtis E. : 2, 4

Leopoldville, Democratic Republic of the Congo: 25, 28, 30-31, 53, 55-56, 58-59.

See also Kinshasa

Liberia: 27, 117, 119

Libreville, Gabon: 117

Libya: xxv, 27, 78, 145-49, 151-53

Libyan: 146, 148-50, 152-55

airspace: 79

Arab army: 146

Arab monarchy: 145

Little Rock AFB, Arkansas: 232

Lod Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel : 78-80

Lome, Togo: 117

Lorence, Paul: 154

Lubumbashi, Zaire: 117, 119-21

Lumumba, Patrice: 24, 27, 53-58

MacDill AFB, Florida: 34, 37, 232-35

Macedonia: 220

Maglaj, Bosnia: 203

Malta: 78-79, 153

Manzariyeh, Iran: 129-30, 133

Marcos, Ferdinand: 89

Martin, Graham A. : 85, 87-88, 90

Maryland: 230

Marxist: xix, 117

government: 124

rebels: xxiii

Masirah, Oman: 129, 131-33

Massachusetts: 200

Masterson, Kleber S. : 66

Mayaguez, SS: xxii, 105-14

McCoyAFB, Florida: 34, 37

263
McCurdy, Garvin: 89

McDonald, Wesley L. : 136

McGuire AFB, New Jersey: 232, 234

McNamara, Robert S. : xx, 41, 57

McNickel, Marvin L. : 68-69

McPeak, Merrill A. : 186

Mediterranean: 28, 78, 140

Mediterranean Sea : 30, 79, 137, 151 ; 154, 213, 216, 222

Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran: 125--27

Meir, Golda: 80

Mekong River: 96

Merritt, Francis E. : 25

Metcalf III, Joseph: 136-37, 139

Meyer, Richard L. : 137

Miami, Florida: 64, 72, 169, 177

Michler, Earl E. : 89

Middle East: xxvii, 12-13, 17, 80, 157

Middle East Forces : 159-61, 165

Military Air Transport Service (MATS) : xviii, 4, 7, 9, 13-14, 20, 24-32, 37-38, 40, 45,

65, 67-68,72-73

Military Airlift Command (MAC): xxiii, xxv, 77-81, 92, 96, 98-99, 102, 108, 117-23,

121-22, 125-27, 140-41, 144, 160-61, 170-72, 174,176

Milosevic, Slobodan: 220, 226

Missiles: 36-39, 76, 79-80, 146, 153-54, 191, 193, 226

air-to-air: 36

antiradiation : 192

antitank: 76, 131

attack: 38

cruise : 185, 194

intercontinental ballistic (ICBM): xx, x)iv, 37

intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM): xx, 34-35

M72 LAW (light antitank weapon): 131

medium-range ballistic (MRBM): xx, 34-35

Peacekeeper ICBM: xxiv

SA-5: 146

Silkworm: 161

sites: xx, 37-38, 192

surface-to-air (SAM): 36, 75, 153, 160, 185, 203, 225, 227

surface-to-surface : 165-66

Tomahawk: 192

Mladic, Ratko: 220, 226

Mobutu, Joseph: 27, 55

Mogadishu, Somalia: 210, 212, 214-17

Mombasa, Kenya: 210, 214, 216

Montana: 7

Montgomery, Thomas: 214-15

Morocco: 27, 76, 120-21

Moron AB, Spain: 57, 61, 213

Moslem: 78, 198, 200, 202-3, 205, 220, 225

rebels: 13

regime: xxiv

Murat Sidi Bilal Training Camp, Tripoli, Libya: 149

264
Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina: 15-16, 69, 71

Nairobi, Kenya: 57

Nasser, Gamal Abdel: 56, 75

nation building: xxii, xxvi, xxviii, 215, 217

National Security Council : 20, 128, 149

National Security Decision Directive 138: 146

Neak Luong, Cambodia: 96

Nehru, Jawaharlal : 44, 49

Netherlands, The : 205, 226

New Delhi, India: 44-45, 51

New Jersey : 119, 232, 234

New York: 16, 127, 216, 231, 234

Nidal, Abu: 146

Nigeria: 27, 212

Nixon, Richard M. : 77, 85

Nol, Lon: 95, 98-99

Noriega, Manuel: xxvi, 168-69, 171-72, 177

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): xviii, xxviii, 8, 10, 81, 116, 118, 204-8,

220-28

forces: 151

North Carolina: xxii, 16, 61, 65, 117, 139, 171, 174, 177-78, 232

Northeast Frontier Agency, India: 44

North Vietnam: xxi, 88. See also Vietnam and South Vietnam

Communist government: 84

North Vietnamese: 85, 89, 95

Army: 85, 88, 90

forces: 87

troops: xxi, 95

North, Gary L. : 184

Nuclear : 34, 37, 189, 194

confrontation : xxvi

deterrent: xvii-xxix

facility : 185, 192

forces: xviii, xx, xxvi

stalemate : xxvi

strike : 38

war: xvii, xix-xx, 37, 41

weapons: xvii, xx, 33, 41

O'Grady, Scott: 225, 227

Oakley, Robert B. : 212, 217

Oberpfaffenhofen, West Germany: 6

Oddur, Somalia : 210

Okinawa: 108, 114

Oklahoma: 70, 160

Olenga, Nicholas: 53, 55-56

Operation

BABYLIFT: 86

BLADE JEWEL: 171

BLUE BAT: xix, 13, 20-21

BLUE BLADE: 12

DECISIVE ENDEAVOR: 227

265
DELIBERATE FORCE: xxviii, 225

28

DENY FLIGHT: xxviii, 188, 194, 203, 220-28

DESERT SHIELD: xxvii, 178

DESERT STORM: xxvii, 189, 191, 212-13, 217

DESERT STRIKE: 185, 194

DRAGON ROUGE: xxi, 57, 59-61, 117, 123

EAGLE CLAW: 128

EAGLE PULL: 99, 101, 103-4

EARNEST WILL: xxvi, 159-60, 162-64, 166

ELDORADO CANYON: xxv, 149, 151

FREQUENT WIND : 90-93

FULL STRIKE: 61

HATRACK: 20

IMPRESSIVE LIFT: 211

JOINT ENDEAVOR: 226

JUST CAUSE: xxvi, 171-72, 174, 177-78

LONG SKIP: xxi, 43, 45, 51

NEWARRIVALS: 92

NEW LIFE: 92

NEWTAPE: xix, xxi, 24-32

NICKEL GRASS: xxiii, 77, 81

NIMROD DANCER: 170

NORTHERN WATCH: 186,194

PACIFIC HAVEN: 185

PLAINFARE: 2

POWER PACK: 64-67, 69, 72-73

PRAYING MANTIS: 163

PRAYER BOOK: 171

PRESS AHEAD: 71

PROVIDE COMFORT: xxvii, 180-82, 184, 186-88, 194, 200

PROVIDE PROMISE: xxviii, 102, 198-207, 220, 222, 224

PROVIDE RELIEF: 210, 212, 214

PROVIDE SANTA: 201

QUICK LIFT: 205, 226

QUICK TRANSIT: 185

RED FOX: 66

RESTORE HOPE: 212-18

SAFARI: 24

SECOND CHANCE: 201

SHARP GUARD: 220

SKY WATCH: 220

SOUTHERN WATCH: xxvii, 184, 186, 188-95, 213

SUNDANCE: 20

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: xxviii, 229-30, 235

URGENT FURY: xxv, 136-37, 139, 141, 143-44

VIGILANT SENTINEL: 193

VIGILANT WARRIOR: 185, 191, 193

VITTLES: xviii, 2-10, 102, 201

ZAIRE I : xxiii, 118,121-24

ZAIRE II : xxiii, 120-24

Organization of American States (OAS) : 71, 230

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) : 136

Pacific Ocean: 9, 90, 92, 168, 214

266
Pacific

Command: 85, 99, 107-8, 159

Fleet: 159

Theater Airlift: 89

Pakistan : 43, 210-11

soldiers: 215

Palam Airport, New Dehli, India: 46-47, 49

Pale, Bosnia: 205, 224

Palmer Jr., Bruce: 68, 70, 72

Panama: xxvi, 72, 168, 170-75, 177-78, 236

Canal: xxvi, 64, 172, 178

Treaty : 168

Zone: 168

City: 171-72

Panamanian: xxvi, 169, 177

Defense Force (PDF): 168, 172, 176-77

government: 170-71

National Guard: 168

Paris, France : 118, 226

Patterson, Robert B. : 137

Paulis, Democratic Republic of the Congo: 55-56, 58-59

Pearls, Grenada: 136-39, 142-43

Persian Gulf: xxvi-xxvii, 157-61, 164, 191, 194

Philippines: 40, 89-90, 92, 99, 107, 114

Phnom Penh, Cambodia: xxii, 87, 95-99, 101-4, 106

Pochentong Airport: 96, 98-99, 102-3

Point Salines, Grenada: 136-39, 141-43

Pope AFB, North Carolina: xxii, 16, 61, 65-67, 71-72, 173-75, 232-34

Port-au-Prince, Haiti: 230-31, 234-35

International Airport: 230-31

Portugal : 27, 78, 81, 151

Portuguese: 32

Powell, Colin L. : 214, 217

PRIME BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Force) : 21

Puerto Rico: 64, 66, 138, 141, 232, 235

Qadhafi, Muammar: 145-49, 155

RameyAFB, Puerto Rico: 66-69, 71

Ramstein AB, Germany: 17, 200, 202, 204

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) : xxiv-xxv. See also United States

Central Command

Rapid Reaction Force: 29, 205, 226

Reagan, Ronald W. : xxiv-xxvi, 136, 145-49, 155, 158-59, 165

Red Sea: 213, 216

Rhein-Main AB, Germany: 5, 13, 45, 198, 200-204, 207

Ribas-Dominicci, Fernando: 154

Rio Hato Airfield, Panama: 172, 175-76

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: 162, 193

Riyadh Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) Base: 159-60

Roberts Field, Monrovia, Liberia: 117, 119, 121

Robins AFB, Georgia: 232

Rogers, Bernard W. : 148

267
Rome : 146, 148

Roosevelt Roads NAS, Puerto Rico: 138-39, 232, 235

Royal Air Force

Alconbury, UK: 200

Fairford, UK: 151, 164

Lakenheath, UK: 149

Mildenhall, UK: 151

Upper Heyford, UK: 150

Woodbridge, UK: 126

Ryan, Michael E. : 221, 225-26

Sadat, Anwar: 75-76

Sahand: 165

Sahara Desert: 25, 29-31

Saigon, South Vietnam: 84-92, 96, 98-99, 103

Saigon River: 88

Salaban: 165

Sams Jr., John B. : 216

San Isidro Airport, Dominican Republic: 66-73

Santa Cruz, Brazil: 71

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: xxii, 64, 66, 68-71, 73

Sarajevo: 198-208, 220, 223-26

Airport: 201-2, 207

Saudi Arabia: 20, 76, 159-60, 162, 166, 193, 213

Saudi Arabian forces : 191, 193

Scandinavia: 27

Schwartz Jr., William H. : 25

Schwarzkopf, H. Norman: 137, 139, 144, 212

Scoon, Paul: 136, 138, 141

Scotland : 78

Seko, Mobutu Sese: 115-17

Senegal: 120-21

Serbia: 198, 226

Serbian: xxviii, 205, 220

military forces : 227

Serbs: 198, 220, 224--26. See also Bosnian Serb

SeymourJohnson AFB, North Carolina: 65-66, 174, 232

Shaba Province, Zaire: 116-17, 124. See also Katanga Province

Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain: 193

Shalikashvili, John M. : 181

Shaw AFB, South Carolina : 15-16, 34, 70, 160

Sicily : 79

Sidi Bilal, Libya: 152-53

Sidi Slimane, Morocco: 25

Sihanouk, Norodom: 95-96

Sinai : 75, 80-81

Sirsenk Airfield, Iraq: 182

Slovenia: 198, 220

Smith, Joseph : 2-3

Smith, Leighton W. : 221, 225

Solenzara, France: 117

Somalia: xxvii, 210-18

Souda Bay, Greece : 213

268
Soumialot, Gaston: 53-55, 58

South Carolina : 15, 34, 67, 69-70, 119, 141, 160, 171, 173, 206, 232

South China Sea: 91

South Vietnam: xxii, 84-85, 88, 93, 95-96, 98, 103--4, 106, 117. See also North

Vietnam and Vietnam

South Vietnamese: xxi, 85, 87-88, 90

army: 86

government: 88, 112

marines: 89

military forces : 91

troops : 95

Southeast Asia: xxi-xxiii, 61, 113-14, 144, 149, 177

Southwest Asia: xxiv, xxix, 160, 185

Soviet : xix-xx, 8, 32-39, 41, 50, 64, 75-76, 80, 123, 134, 144, 149, 152-53, 157-58

ambassador : 39

blockade : xvii

expansionism: xvii

forces : 2, 7

strategy: xix

Soviet Union: xvii-xix, xxvi, xxix, 2, 12, 24, 33-34, 37-39, 54, 60, 75, 77, 116, 123,

136, 159, 198. See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Spain: 31, 57, 61, 78, 119, 148, 206, 213, 216

Special Air Warfare Center : 70

Split, Croatia: 204-5, 226

Srebrenica, Bosnia: 200, 203, 205, 220, 225, 227

St. George's, Grenada: 136-40

Stalin, Joseph : 2, 8

Stanleyville, Democratic Republic of the Congo: 25, 55-59

Steinle, Paul C. : 25, 31

Stevenson, Craig D. : 184

Stewart AFB, NewYork: 16

Stockholm, Sweden: 28

Strait of Gibraltar: 79, 151

Strait of Hormuz: 159

171, 174, 191

Tan Son Nhut, South Vietnam: 84, 86, 88-91

Tanks: 216

M-48: 80

M-60: 80

269

Strategic Air Command (SAC) : xxv-xxvii, 4, 7, 30, 37-39, 67, 69, 138, 144, 151, 160,

163-64, 171-72, 174

Strickler, Marshall H. : 25

Subic Bay, Philippines: 92

Suez Canal: 76, 80

Sweden: 27, 212

Swedish troops : 25, 28

Symington, Stuart : 8-9

Syria: =ii, 75, 77-78, 148

Syrian

forces : 76

front: 80

Tactical Air Command (TAC) : xviii, xix-xx, 20, 34, 37-40, 65-66, 70-73, 160, 162,
T-55 : 76

T-62 : 76

Tanker Airlift Control Center: 213, 216

Task Force

Alpha: 14-15

Atlantic: 171-72

Bayonet: 172

Bravo: 14

Charlie: 14-15

Delta: 19

Echo : 19

160: 165

Pacific : 172

Semper Fi: 172, 177

Tegel, West Berlin, Germany: 5-6

Tehran, Iran: xxiv, 46, 126-27, 129-30

Tel Aviv, Israel: 81

Tempelhof Airport, West Berlin, Germany: 3, 5-6

Tesanj, Bosnia: 203

Texas: 4, 34, 69-70, 174, 201, 232

Thailand: 91, 96, 98-99, 101-2, 105, 107, 109, 112, 114

Thatcher, Margaret: 148

Thurman, Maxwell R. : 171

Timberlake, Clare H. : 31

Tinker AFB, Oklahoma: 160

Tocumen Military Airfield, Panama: 172, 175-76

Togo: 120-21

Torrejon AB, Spain: 123

Torrijos International Airport, Panama: 168, 172, 175-76

Travis AFB, California: 45, 200

Traynor, Dennis: 86

Tri-wall aerial delivery system (TRIADS) : 200, 207

Tripoli, Libya: xxv, 149-50, 153

Airport: 149, 152-53

Truman, Harry S: xvii, 2

Tshombe, Moise : 24, 27, 54-58, 60, 115

Tunis, Tunisia: 30

Tunisia : 27, 30, 76, 146, 212

Tunner, William H. : 4, 6-10

Turkey: xix, 13-15, 19-20, 38-40, 78, 126, 180-88, 222

Turkish: 182

government: 127, 184, 186

Turks: 28, 184, 186

Tuzla, Bosnia: 200, 220

Udbina, Croatia: 224-25

Uganda: 27, 54

Undorf, Robert W. : 110-11

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 41, 126. See also Soviet Union

United Kingdom: 44, 205, 222. See also England and Great Britain

United Nations (UN) : xxvii-xxviii, 24, 26-28, 32, 53, 106, 148, 181-84, 189-92,

194-95, 198, 200-208, 210, 212, 214-15, 217, 220, 224-28, 230

force : 27-28, 205, 214, 223, 225

270
soldiers: 205

troops: xix, xxvii-xxviii, 31-32, 53, 210-11, 215, 222

United Nations Security Council: 24, 27, 180, 220, 223

Resolution 688: 189

Resolution 814: 214

Resolution 816: 220

United States: xvii-xxvii, 2, 4, 6-8, 10, 12-13, 15, 32-33, 36-41, 43-46, 49, 50-51,

55, 57, 60, 64, 66, 71-73, 76-78, 81, 84-85, 87-88, 90, 92-93, 95, 97-99, 101-2,

106-7, 111-14, 116-18, 120-21, 123-28, 132-33, 136, 138-46, 148, 154, 159-61,

164-66, 168-72, 177, 180-82, 184-86, 190, 193, 198-99, 201, 206-8, 210,

212-17,222, 225, 227-31, 235-36

ambassador: xxii, 31, 85, 99, 148, 212

forces: xxii-xxii, xxvii, 17, 19, 64, 68, 71, 73, 92, 108, 114, 140-41, 144, 168,

170, 177, 191, 193-94, 212, 214, 217, 229, 235

government: xvii, xxi-=i, 84, 99, 101, 155

military: xxii-xxiii, xxvi

servicemen: 148

troops: xxvii, 71-72, 83, 95, 138, 214-16

United States Air Force (USAF): xvii-xxvii, xxv-xxix, 4-6, 10-13, 15, 17, 24, 31-32,

37, 39, 41, 44-45, 47, 50, 58, 66-67, 70-73, 78, 80-81, 86, 88, 90-91, 93, 96,

98-103, 107-9, 111-12, 117, 120-21, 123-24, 128, 134, 137-44, 148-49, 154-55,

159-61, 164-66, 172, 175-77, 180, 182, 186-87, 189, 191-95, 198-208, 210,

212, 217, 222, 225, 227-32, 235-36

ELF-ONE: 160, 162-63, 166

forces: 51, 151, 160

37th Airlift : 198, 202, 204, 207

38th Airlift : 204

312th Airlift : 201

429th Air Reconnaissance: 17

15th Air Transport: 45

498th Bomb: 15

42d Electronic Warfare: 150

353d Fighter: 20

512th Fighter: 224

526th Fighter: 224

331st Fighter-Interceptor: 69

2d Mobile Communications: 47

353d Tactical Fighter: 69

776th Troop Carrier: 57

777th Troop Carrier: 57

Group

1 st Aeromedical Evacuation: 71

105th Airlift : 201

352d Special Operations: 200

919th Special Operations: 176

27 1

Squadron

2d Aeromedical Evacuation: 202

40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery: 91, 100, 108

7th Airborne Command and Control: 101

963d Airborne Warning and Control: 162

964th Airborne Warning and Control: 162

965th Airborne Warning and Control: 162
g

507th Tactical Control: 70

60th Troop Carrier: 3

61st Troop Carrier: 3

Wing

7th: 232, 235

23d: 204, 232

1 st Air Commando: 70

552d Airborne Warning and Control: 160, 162

62d Airlift: 202

86th Airlift : 204

314th Airlift: 16, 89, 232

315th Airlift: 202

317th Airlift: 199

349th Airlift : 201

435th Airlift : 198, 200, 202, 204

436th Airlift : 234

437th Airlift : 202,206

4505th Air Refueling: 16

137th Air Transport: 70

1501st Air Transport: 45

1602d Air Transport: 25-28, 45

1611th Air Transport: 45

36th Fighter : 222

86th Fighter-Interceptor : 17

60th Military Airlift : 99

436th Military Airlift : 119

437th Military Airlift : 118

438th Military Airlift : 119

1st Special Operations: 176-77

56th Special Operations: 91, 100, 108

306th Strategic: 151

307th Strategic: 101

4080th Strategic: 34

55th Strategic Reconnaissance : 38

317th Tactical Airlift : 175

374th Tactical Airlift : 88-89, 96

345th Tactical Bombardment: 15

48th Tactical Fighter: 149-50

354th Tactical Fighter: 15-17, 20, 69, 71

388th Tactical Fighter: 101

432d Tactical Fighter: 101

363d Tactical Reconnaissance: 15, 18, 36, 34, 69

60th Troop Carrier: 14

63d Troop Carrier: 13-14

312th Troop Carrier : 16

317th Troop Carrier: 14, 45-46

463d Troop Carrier: 16, 57, 59, 61, 65, 68, 72

464th Troop Carrier: 67

Division

832d: 21

272
Detachment 1 : 57

United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) : 2-4, 8-9, 13, 18, 20, 24, 27-32, 45-47,

49, 61, 117, 149, 187, 198, 202, 216

United States Army (USA): xxii, xxiv-xxv, 7, 14, 17-18, 20, 37-38, 40, 44, 64-65, 67,

69, 71, 123, 128, 134, 138, 170, 172, 177, 183, 191, 212, 230-31, 234

airborne troops: 140

forces : 137, 191

Rangers: 130-31, 138-40, 143, 172, 175-76

soldiers: 235

Special Forces: 177

troops: xxv-xxvi, xxviii, 13, 139, 141

units : 234

XVII Airborne Corps : 173

XVIII Airborne Corps: 171

82d Airborne Division : xxii, 64-65, 67, 117, 139, 143, 172-73, 175, 230

832d Airborne Division : 21

15th Field Hospital: 71

193d Infantry Brigade: 172

5th Infantry Division : 170

7th Infantry Division : 170, 172

24th Mechanized Infantry Division : 137

10th Mountain Division : 231, 235

75th Ranger Regiment: 175

United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) : 68, 126, 136, 143, 230-31, 234-35

United States Central Command (CENTCOM): xxv, 159-61, 166, 187-88, 191

United States Congress: 85. See also Congress

United States Department of State: 31, 38, 46, 123, 125-27

United States European Command (USEUCOM): 9, 148, 161, 187-88, 198

United States Marine Corps (USMC): xxvii, xxv, 13, 17, 19, 37, 40, 64, 66, 85, 87,

90-91, 99, 100-101, 103, 108-10, 112, 114, 126-27, 134, 137-40, 143, 150, 170,

172, 183, 191, 212

forces: 137

Marines: 13, 37, 64, 100, 108-9, 111-13, 139-40, 170, 177-78, 212

2d Expeditionary: 170

31st Marine Amphibious: 99

United States Navy (USN) : xxv, 7, 39, 64, 91, 103, 106, 108-9, 111-12, 128, 134,

140, 146, 148-49, 152-54, 161, 164-66, 181, 183, 185, 191-94, 212, 222

SEALS: 138, 140, 165

Special Forces: 177

Naval

air strike : xxv

blockade: xx

escort: xxvii

forces : 137, 146, 159

units: xxvi

154

273

Second Fleet: 136

Sixth Fleet: 13, 17, 146, 148, 150

Seventh Fleet: 91

USS

America: 152, 154

Boxer. 66

Coral Sea: 108, 111, 114, 152,
Harold E. Holt: 108

Henry B. Wilson: 108

Independence: 140

Midway: 91

Nimitz: 129, 131-34

Okinawa: 99, 102-3

Pueblo: 106

Samuel B. Roberts: 165

Vincennes: 166

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM): 71, 171

United States Special Operations Command: xxiv, 134, 165

U Thant: 27, 56

U-Tapao Royal Thai Naval Airfield, Thailand : 96, 98-99, 108

Vandenberg, Hoyt S. : 4

Viccellio, Henry: 17, 47

Vicenza, Italy: 221, 228

Vienna, Austria: 27, 146, 148

Vietnam: xxii, xxiv, 84-85, 92-93, 95, 144. See also North Vietnam and South

Vietnam

Vietnam War: xxii, 171

Vietnamese: 85-88, 90-93

Virginia : 15

Vung Tau, South Vietnam: 85-86, 88-89

Wajir, Kenya: 210

Wake Island : 90, 92

Walters, Vernon: 148

Washington, D.C. : 38-39, 70, 188

Watkins, Tarleton H . : 24

Webb AFB, Texas: 69

Weinberger, Caspar W. : 159, 161, 217

Welch, William L. : 65-66

Wessin y Wessin, Elias: 72

Westbrook III, Sam W. : 149, 151

227

Wright, Robert L. : 224-25

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: 207, 226

Yemen: 210,213

York, Robert H. : 65

Yugoslavia: xxviii, 198, 219-20, 223, 226

Zaafaraniyah Nuclear Fabrication Facility, Iraq: 192

Zagreb, Croatia: 198

Zaire: xviii-xxiv, 115-24

Zepa, Bosnia: 200, 203, 205, 220, 225, 227

274 * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 2000 367-980

Wheelus AB, Libya: 25, 28, 30, 47

Wiesbaden, Germany: 2, 5, 47

Willi Tide, SS: 165

Wilson, Woodrow: 109, 168

World War II : xviii, 2, 4, 10, 25, 47, 176,