Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Domestic Approach to National Intelligence 
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 2

UNITED TO PROTECT
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

3

Table of Contents

4 Preface 

5 Introduction

7 Purpose

8 Challenge

10 Integrating National Intelligence

23 Other Key Considerations

24 Way-Ahead

25 Abbreviations
Preface

This publication comprises inputs from a broad array of 

participants representing elements of the U.S. Intelligence 

Community (IC) and its partners in the domestic field. We thank 

everyone involved for their time and valuable contributions. 

The process began with meetings and resulted in many 

conversations, drafts, revisions, and rounds of coordination 

with subject matter experts, lawyers, privacy and civil liberties 

officials, and senior leadership. Over time, we realized the topic 

is very complex and often characterized differently by the various 

participants and stakeholders, depending upon their vantage point 

and mission. Segments explaining the role of specific IC agencies 

and departments were written and provided by the entity itself. 

The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence describes the 

“as is,” or current picture, of the operating environment for the 

IC’s key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 

and private sector partners inside the United States. The next 

step—one that may be even more complex and challenging—is 

to move beyond the “as is” descriptions and work toward a vision 

of the “should be.” Challenges aside, we owe it to the American 

people to strengthen the national security apparatus to best 

protect our citizens and their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

5

Introduction

highest 

Since 

priorities 

my appointment as the Director of National Intelligence in 2010, one of my 

has been strengthening intelligence partnerships to help preserve 

country's nationa

the 

l security. Partnerships have long been a foundation of our work overseas. 

In light of 9/11 and the rapidly evolving nature of foreign threats 

must renew our 

to the homeland, we also 

focus on how the Intelligence Community (IC) collaborates with partner 

agencies inside the United States 

security mission

to ensure that we carry out our national and homeland 

s as effectively as possible

citizens 

. Protecting the privacy and civil liberties of our 

is fundamental to this endeavor. 

practices, 

Significant progress has been made since 9/11 in building capacity, standardizing 

respond 

and sharing information with partners in the United States to defend against and 

to foreign and foreign-inspired threats to our homeland. As vital as that progress 

has been, I believe that we still have work to do to ensure that all those 

—

involved in this effort

including the American people—share a common understanding of how this mosaic fits 

together. Thus, I directed my staff to work with our partners to describe in a single document 

the "as-is" operating environment for the IC’s key engagements with federal, state, local, 

tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside 

is 

the United States. The result of my request 

the paper, Domestic Approach to National Intelligence. 

This paper was prepared in consultation with the ODNI's Office of Civil Liberties, 

Privacy and Transparency 

partners. Appropriately, 

and Office of General Counsel and coordinated with mission 

the paper's description of the "as-is" operating environment 

each age

reflects 

ncy's limitations imposed by law, policy, and mission, and highlights the 

importance of protecting privacy and civil 

this committed effort. The 

liberties, an imperative for all partners engaged in 

paper does not purport to describe the specific laws, policies, 

safeguards, or operations relating to each agency's activities, nor does it make 

recommendations for change. 

I believe the Domestic Approach to National Intelligence 

mann

provides, in a transparent 

er, a common general understanding of the current state of intelligence exchange 

between the IC and its domestic mission partners, and serves to further our collaborative 

efforts. We trust that it will serve as a useful 

on homeland security that 

foundation for the ongoing, productive dialogue 

the American people rightfully expect.

James R. Clapper 

Director
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 6

“ We need to deal with the realities of globalization – the blurring 

these days of foreign and domestic matters. Because when threats 

like terrorism and international organized crime transcend borders, 

it’s critical that we think holistically about intelligence. But we’re 

also a people who – Constitutionally and culturally – attach a high 

premium to our personal freedoms and our personal privacy.”

James R. Clapper
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

7

Purpose

This paper, the Domestic Approach to National 

Intelligence, describes certain key roles and 

relationships that characterize efforts by members 

of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, 

state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government 

organizations to engage with one another to carry 

out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. 

These partners work with one another, and through 

established channels with the private sector (e.g., 

critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part 

of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, 

regardless of level, plays an important role in 

protecting the homeland with respect to warning, 

interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. 

The importance of partnerships and collaboration is 

emphasized in this paper, as is the IC’s responsibility 

to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil 

liberties. Descriptions related to organizational 

responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by 

the respective agencies. The Domestic Approach to 

National Intelligence is consistent with the framework 

and recommendations outlined in the Criminal 

Intelligence Coordinating Council’s (CICC) National 

Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies 

in support of the National Network of Fusion 

Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding 

standards outlined by the Program Manager for 

the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). 

By describing these roles and relationships in one 

place, this paper strives to foster an important national 

dialogue that will promote a better understanding of 

how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic 

enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated 

by the Director of National intelligence (DNI).

PROTECTING PRIVACY, CIVIL 

RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

To prevent and deter acts of terrorism and other threats 

on American soil, we must continue to develop lines of 

coordination and appropriately align intelligence, law 

enforcement, and homeland security efforts. However, 

this must be accomplished only in accordance with the 

Constitution, laws, Executive Order 12333, and core 

values of our nation. Protecting fundamental rights 

and liberties is an important national security end 

in and of itself. The Domestic Approach to National 

Intelligence is fully committed to exemplifying America’s 

values: operating under the rule of law, consistent 

with Americans’ expectations for the protection of 

privacy and civil liberties, respectful of human rights, 

and preserving the trust of the American people. As 

President Obama stated at the National Archives in 

May 2009, “We uphold our fundamental principles and 

values not just because we choose to, but because 

we swear to. Not because they feel good, but because 

they help keep us safe. They keep us true to who we 

are... So as Americans, we reject the false choice 

between our security and our ideals. We can and we 

must and we will protect both.” Thus, it is essential 

that we comply with all applicable legal and policy 

authorities including, but not limited to, the Privacy 

Act, Executive Order 12333, and the Information 

Sharing Privacy Guidelines. Similarly, IC elements 

and FSLTT organizations must continue to operate 

within their defined mission roles and responsibilities. 

President Obama, photo provided by the White House

“We uphold our fundamental 

principles and values not just because 

we choose to, but because we swear 

to. Not because they feel good, but 

because they help keep us safe. They 

keep us true to who we are... So as 

Americans, we reject the false choice 

between our security and our ideals. 

We can and we must and we will 

protect both.” 

President Obama

National Archives in May 2009

(Opposite) Director Clapper briefing the President, photo provided by the White House
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 8

Challenge

Our nation must deal with a wide range of complex 

threats to our people and interests both overseas 

and within the nation’s borders. These threats include 

foreign-based and foreign-inspired terrorism, foreign 

intelligence activities, homegrown violent extremism, 

transnational organized crime, cyber-attacks by 

foreign actors or their agents, and more. Shrinking 

budgets and growing mission requirements demand 

effective, interoperable, and non-duplicative–that is, 

“smart”–government operations. This new dynamic 

also demands greater teamwork and responsible 

information sharing between members of the IC 

and FSLTT partners—as well as appropriate and 

responsible information sharing with the private 

sector—that is consistent with law, policy, and 

regulation and protects privacy, civil rights, and civil 

liberties. Such partnerships provide access to the 

expertise and unique capabilities and authorities 

held by each partner, resulting in benefits not only to 

those involved but also to the nation as a whole. 

As the nature of threats to the homeland changes, 

so too does the nature of the challenges the nation 

must address. Transnational organized crime poses 

a significant and growing threat to national and 

international security and bears dire implications for 

public safety, public health, the security of democratic 

institutions, and economic stability across the globe. 

For example, transnational drug traffickers and 

human smugglers operating across U.S. borders and 

within the U.S. reap enormous profits that enable 

them to undermine legitimate governance in their 

countries of origin. At the same time, international 

criminal organizations, terrorists, and state-sponsored 

cyber attackers have demonstrated their ability to 

compromise information systems. Many of these 

threats have low-level signatures. Detecting them 

and determining their attribution can be difficult. 

Washington DC, photo provided by ODNI

The U.S. is considered a high-priority intelligence 

target by many foreign intelligence entities. While 

traditionally the threat has been to our political, military, 

and diplomatic interests at home and abroad, the loss 

of sensitive economic information and technology is a 

growing threat to our national security. In recent years, 

economic espionage conducted by foreign intelligence 

entities, corrupt insiders, and corporate competitors 

has exploited vulnerabilities in cyberspace that may 

weaken our economic advantage. Cyber espionage 

has not replaced traditional espionage as a way to steal 

secrets, but the ability to focus technology on lesser 

protected information is a significant and growing threat. 

Even before the 9/11 attacks, the IC elements 

and FSLTT organizations started developing 

relationships to identify and address particular 

threats and national intelligence challenges in 

the homeland. There was, however, no integrated 

national approach. Since 9/11, significant progress 

has been made in building capacity, standardizing 

9/11 Museum and One World Trade Center, photo 

provided by ODNI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

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practices, and sharing information, both 

horizontally and vertically, to support foreign 

operations, perimeter protection, and homeland 

security and law enforcement (HS&LE) requirements. 

Nonetheless, inconsistent practices, absence of 

doctrine, and a lack of unity of effort across levels 

of government still characterize the domestic 

landscape. This domestic enterprise is more ad hoc 

and independent than organized and enterpriseoriented, and often depends more on personal or 

preexisting relationships than defined engagement 

protocols. Many potential stakeholders and 

contributors are left out of the equation as well, 

particularly on issues other than counterterrorism. 

In navigating this enterprise, it is important for 

individual IC elements and FSLTT organizations to 

continue to work within their respective missions and 

authorities, even as they seek to enhance responsible 

collaboration and information sharing. In particular, 

the sharing activities and relationships between IC 

elements and FSLTT organizations are undertaken 

through established channels and in accordance with 

legal and policy requirements that are designed to 

ensure agencies are acting within their authorities 

and missions and are protecting privacy, civil rights 

and civil liberties. Sharing with the private sector is 

undertaken with special care so that applicable legal 

and policy requirements are identified and followed. 

CBP helicopter flying over New York City, photo provided by CBP
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

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Integrating National Intelligence

The effective integration of national intelligence 

with relevant information from FSLTT partners is 

essential to protecting the nation. This integration 

requires agile, robust, and responsible processes 

that leverage existing partnerships and encourage 

new ones. These partnerships enable appropriate 

information sharing and build trust, consistent with 

the missions and authorities of each agency and 

the need to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil 

liberties. As trust and partnerships mature, efficient 

integration across stakeholders is also increased, 

resulting in an enhanced understanding of respective 

capabilities, information, and requirements (including 

how customers use products and services). 

IC ELEMENT 

INTELLIGENCE

FSLTT PARTNER 

INFORMATION

• National 

Intelligence

• Foreign 

Intelligence

• Counterintelligence

• Criminal Intelligence 

• Homeland Security Information 

• Investigative Information 

• Cyber Threat Information 

• Suspicious Activity Reporting 

• Critical Infrastructure Security

and Resilience Information 

• Other Information

This graphic depicts some types of FSLTT information and intelligence shared in the domestic environment. In some cases, information can be categorized as both FSLTT information and intelligence.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

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ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES 

The IC interacts with and serves a wide range of 

customers and partners, both within and outside the 

U.S. Government (USG), with intelligence support 

designed to meet the customers’ and partners’ 

responsibilities and specific mission requirements. 

Customers are those who have requirements for 

intelligence products or support, and use it to carry 

out their official responsibilities. Within the domestic 

enterprise, federal customers directly receive unique 

support from the IC based on their mission needs, 

often through a Federal Intelligence Coordination 

Office (FICO). With regard to state, local, tribal, and 

territorial (SLTT) customers, information categorized 

or derived from national intelligence is generally 

disseminated by the Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Intelligence & Analysis (DHS/I&A), the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG). Dissemination occurs directly or via a “hub & 

spoke” approach through entities like fusion centers, 

and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The widearray of customers for intelligence support include 

departmental secretaries and senior policymakers, 

threat coordinators, governors, state homeland security 

advisors, mayors, police chiefs, sheriffs, first responders, 

federal officials, and others who are directly engaged 

in making decisions related to public safety. In addition, 

appropriate threat and warning information is provided 

to the private sector (e.g., owners and operators of 

critical infrastructures), through established channels. 

New York City Police Department patrol cars, photo provided 

by NYPD

FSLTT partners include HS&LE organizations operating 

across our country to protect our borders, points-of-entry, 

infrastructure, and communities. These professionals are 

on the front line of ensuring public safety and protecting 

the nation from all threats. Partner preparedness is 

crucial to our national security, as they have the greatest 

visibility on local criminal activity relevant to national 

intelligence and will be the first responders on the scene 

during threat situations and incidents. Information 

sharing at this level supports law enforcement and public 

safety offices best equipped to understand current 

threats and the risks associated with them, inform 

resource allocation, and interdict or investigate criminal 

actors. Crucial to their efforts is the timely and efficient 

sharing of criminal intelligence, public safety, and open 

source information via communication networks 

designed to store and transmit Sensitive But Unclassified 

(SBU) information. These partners also play a critical 

role in identifying suspicious activities and reporting this 

information following protocols established by the 

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, photo 

provided by ODNI

Additionally, appropriate and responsible information 

sharing with private sector entities, particularly the 

owners and operators of infrastructure critical to national 

security whose businesses may be exploited by 

nefarious actors, is fundamental to the protection and 

resilience of the nation. Such sharing takes place 

through established channels and in accordance with 

applicable law and policies. Private sector organizations 

undertake security and threat mitigation measures to 

protect lives and property and have unique information 

and expertise that can help the IC and FSLTT better 

understand existing threats. 

Thus, the domestic enterprise is characterized by an 

extraordinarily complex set of customer and partner 

relationships, composed of both informational and 

organizational architectures that are involved in 

the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination of 

information and intelligence. Relationships are described 

in general terms, recognizing that there is no national 

standard or doctrine for these interactions. It is also 

important to note that the descriptions on the following 

page do not include the multiple layers of legal and 

policy requirements that govern these relationships.
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 12

1 FSLTT Organizations 

Organizations operating on the front lines across the country to protect border points-of-entry, infrastructure, and 

communications, such as federal departments and agencies, DHS component agencies, local police departments, first responders, and other entities involved directly in infrastructure security and resilience.

2 Customers 

Individuals that maintain a ‘customer’ relationship with the IC, such as governors, homeland security advisors, 

mayors, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and HS&LE leaders.

3 Partners

Organizations that carry out the intelligence cycle under their respective authorities and may maintain formal 

partnerships with the IC, such as fusion centers, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs), Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Centers, Criminal Intelligence Units (CIUs), and federal departments and agencies with FICOs.

4 IC Elements with Domestic Emphasis 

Federal departments and agencies with both Title 50 and Non-Title 50 components, such as DEA, DHS, FBI (to 

include Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), JTTFs, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)), and USCG. DHS/I&A and 

FBI are primarily responsible for the IC’s domestic analysis and information sharing efforts with HS&LE partners.

5 IC Elements with Global Emphasis 

Federal departments and agencies that provide support to FSLTT partners, through appropriate channels, in the 

form of current intelligence, alerts, warnings, and notifications, such as CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, etc.

A SAR/NSI, Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), Criminal Intelligence, and Investigative Information 

FSLTT-initiated processes for documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing national intelligence with the IC.

B Alerts, Warnings, Notifications, Bulletins, TTPs, and other intelligence reporting

IC-initiated processes for documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing national intelligence with 

FSLTT partners. 

The Domestic Enterprise

This graphic broadly illustrates the relationships between FSLTT and U.S. IC partners.

FSLTT Organizations

Customers

Partners

1

2

3

U.S. IC

Global Emphasis

Domestic 

Emphasis

4

5

A

B
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

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KEY FSLTT SHARING 

ORGANIZATIONS/FUNCTIONS 

Certain FSLTT entities have formed specialized 

sharing organizations, or include specific sharing 

functions, that serve as points of intersection 

between FSLTT elements and the IC. 

State and Major Urban 

Area Fusion Centers 

The 78 federally-recognized fusion centers in the 

country form the National Network of Fusion Centers 

and operate to assist HS&LE partners in preventing 

and responding to crime, including terrorism. Fusion 

centers serve as focal points for the gathering, receipt, 

analysis, and sharing of threat-related information 

between partners. They are owned and operated by 

state and local entities with support from federal partners 

in the form of deployed personnel, training, technical 

assistance, exercise support, security clearances, 

connectivity to federal systems, technology, and grant 

funding. Located in states and major urban areas 

throughout the country, fusion centers are uniquely 

situated to empower front-line law enforcement, public 

safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, 

critical infrastructure owners and operators, and private 

sector security personnel with an understanding of the 

local implications of national intelligence. Additionally, 

fusion centers are optimally positioned to identify local, 

regional, and statewide trends regarding criminal or 

suspicious activity that relate to national security threats. 

Fusion centers provide interdisciplinary expertise and 

situational awareness to support decision making at 

all levels of government. Most fusion centers have 

access to SECRET-level systems, to include systems 

operated by DHS, FBI, and/or the Department of 

Defense (DOD). This connectivity enables fusion centers 

to obtain and review classified reports disseminated 

in accordance with applicable laws and policies. 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Areas (HIDTAs) 

The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 

provides assistance via the HIDTA program to federal, 

state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies 

operating in 28 areas determined to be the nation’s 

critical drug trafficking regions. The program’s goal 

is to reduce drug availability by assisting agencies 

participating in HIDTAs with federal support to dismantle 

and disrupt drug trafficking organizations, which includes 

analytic support to tactical counterdrug operations. 

Although many of the participating officers are cleared 

at the SECRET-level, the majority of their work is done 

at the UNCLASSIFIED and LAW ENFORCEMENTSENSITIVE-levels. The HIDTA program is built on 

the premise that participating agencies should have 

an equal voice in addressing regional drug threats. 

NCTC 017657d [0097cs] AI 1-15

UNCLASSIFIED

Domestic Approach to National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED

State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

Also located in:

Anchorage, Alaska,

San Juan, Puerto Rico,

Honolulu, Hawaii, and

St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands

Madison

Phoenix

Dover Indianapolis

Olympia

Frankfort

Trenton

Salt Lake

City Washington, D.C.

Hartford

Denver

Salem

Saint

Paul

Helena

Columbus

Boise

Cheyenne

Pierre

Des

Moines

Springfield

Lansing

Oklahoma

City

Carson City

Tallahassee

Santa Fe

Charleston

Jefferson

City

Little Rock

Raleigh

Bismarck

Austin

Richmond Topeka

Baton

Rouge

Lincoln

Jackson

Sacramento

Harrisburg

Concord

Montgomery

Albany

Augusta

Columbia

Providence

Montpelier

Nashville

Boston

Atlanta

Annapolis
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 14

High Intensity Financial 

Crime Areas (HIFCAs) 

The Department of the Treasury’s HIFCA program is 

intended to concentrate law enforcement efforts at 

the federal, state, and local levels to combat money 

laundering in designated high-intensity money laundering 

zones. In order to implement this goal, a moneylaundering action team was created or identified within 

each HIFCA to spearhead a coordinated anti-money 

laundering effort. Each action team is composed 

of all relevant federal, state, and local enforcement 

authorities, prosecutors, and financial regulators. 

Participating agencies leverage their respective 

authorities and resources to meet mission requirements. 

The seven HIFCA areas are California Northern 

District, California Southern District, Southwest Border, 

Chicago, New York, Puerto Rico, and South Florida. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agent, photo provided 

by ODNI

Regional Information Sharing System 

(RISS) Centers

The RISS network, funded by the DOJ’s Bureau of 

Justice Assistance, consists of six centers across the 

country that provide tailored analytic, technical, and 

research support, database access, equipment loans, 

event deconfliction, and training to local law enforcement 

agencies. RISS centers operate at the UNCLASSIFIED 

and LAW ENFORCEMENT-SENSITIVE-levels. 

Criminal Intelligence Units (CIUs)

CIUs serve as the principal collectors of criminal 

intelligence at the state and local law enforcement 

levels. Independently owned and operated by major 

city, major county, and state police law enforcement 

agencies, these intelligence units conduct strategic 

law enforcement intelligence operations on organized 

criminal activity, transnational threats, and terrorism 

within their jurisdictions. While separate and distinct 

from federal task forces and the IC, these units 

help support the analytic efforts of fusion centers 

and HIDTAs, contribute to federal task force 

investigations, and support other decision makers. 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives (ATF) 

ATF strives to enhance public safety by protecting 

Americans from gun violence, the criminal misuse of 

explosives, and acts of arson. In support of these key 

missions, ATF also regulates the explosives and firearms 

industries. ATF’s investigative and regulatory expertise is 

especially helpful due to its jurisdiction over firearms and 

explosives – two “commodities” that can possibly relate 

to terrorism and national security. At the headquarterslevel, ATF maintains contact with several IC agencies 

through direct liaison positions within ATF’s Office of 

Strategic Intelligence and Information. Additionally, ATF’s 

intelligence analysts and supervisors maintain working 

relationships with such entities as the National Network 

of Fusion Centers, and JTTFs. Finally, ATF publishes 

Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) for the community 

at large, both at the classified and unclassified levels, 

and is in the process of posting formally published 

criminal intelligence reporting on various IC platforms. 

Civil Applications Committee (CAC) 

The CAC is an interagency committee led by the 

Department of the Interior that coordinates and oversees 

the federal civil use of classified and unclassified 

collections. Chartered by the President in 1975, the 

CAC provides federal civil agencies access to national 

systems data in support of their mission responsibilities. 

Specifically, it provides a forum through which the 

federal civil agencies coordinate data requirements, 

develop tasking strategies, certify the proper use of data, 

and track and plan for the progress and evolution of 

national systems. CAC activities have expanded beyond 

traditional mapping applications to a broad range of 

environmental and remote-sensing applications central 

to federal agency civil missions, such as monitoring 

recovery from natural disasters and related hazards. The 

CAC also coordinates the use of imagery exploitation 

and application resources and supports remote-sensing 

research and development activities at special facilities, 

such as the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 

Advanced Systems Center. Examples of CAC facilitated 

activity include monitoring volcanoes, detecting wildland 

fires, coordinating emergency response to natural 

disasters (such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods), 

monitoring ecosystems, and mapping wetlands. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

15

Federal Intelligence Coordination 

Offices (FICOs) 

Outside of the IC, numerous federal departments 

or agencies have staff charged with intelligence-like 

functions. Cleared to the TOP SECRET levels, many 

with access to classified networks, FICOs serve 

as an interface between the IC and federal partner 

communities. FICOs provide varying levels of support 

to senior policymakers and consumers of intelligence/

information within their organization. Examples of 

departments with a FICO include the Federal Reserve 

Board of Governors, Department of Transportation, and 

Department of Commerce. Federal Senior Intelligence 

Coordinators (FSICs), designated by their Secretary 

or agency head, are the highest ranking individuals 

within a federal department or agency that serve as the 

primary liaisons between the respective departments 

or agencies and the IC. Designation of FSICs at 

Executive Branch departments and agencies, which 

began in 2012, assists in defining responsibilities 

and moving toward true intelligence integration.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The IC consists of 17 Executive Branch agencies 

and organizations that conduct intelligence and 

counterintelligence activities in support of U.S. foreign 

policy and the protection of our national security. 

Intelligence informs policy decisions, military actions, 

international negotiations, and interactions with foreign 

countries. IC elements that have a global emphasis 

make significant contributions to our homeland security 

and defense. Intelligence from these organizations in 

the form of alerts, warnings, notifications, and other 

reporting is shared in accordance with appropriate 

safeguards primarily through DHS/I&A and the FBI 

to domestic enterprise customers and partners.

The organizations described below serve as primary 

gateways for appropriate IC engagements with FSLTT 

partners (e.g., serving as integration points for sharing 

through the FSLTT intersection points described above, 

task force participation, and the exchange of staff 

officers and analysts with HS&LE organizations). 

DHS

DHS is responsible for the unified national effort to 

secure the U.S. by preventing and deterring terrorist 

attacks and responding to other threats and hazards. It 

also has statutory responsibilities to provide threat 

information to the owners and operators of critical 

infrastructure and key resources. DHS/I&A provides 

intelligence support across the full range of homeland 

security missions. DHS/I&A ensures that information 

related to homeland security threats is collected, 

analyzed, and disseminated to all relevant customers 

across the domestic enterprise. The DHS Under 

Secretary for I&A also serves as their Chief 

See Something Say Something campaign, provided by DHS

Intelligence Officer and reports to both the Secretary 

of DHS and the DNI. 

DHS/I&A has a unique mandate within the IC for 

sharing information and serving as an information 

conduit and intelligence advocate for state, local, 

tribal, and territorial governments. DHS/I&A supports 

fusion centers with deployed personnel and SECRETlevel systems, security clearances, training, technical 

assistance, exercise support, and collaboration.

This National Network of Fusion Centers is the hub of 

much of the two-way intelligence and information flow 

among the FSLTT partners. Fusion centers represent 

a shared commitment between the federal government 

and the state and local governments who own and 

operate them. DHS/I&A officers report and disseminate 

information of intelligence value from DHS components, 

FSLTT partners, and open source collection to the IC 

and the DHS Intelligence Enterprise. DHS/I&A also 

supports statutory responsibilities to provide terrorism, 

cyber, and other threat information to the owners and 

operators of critical infrastructures and key resources. 

Several other DHS component agencies have 

regular interaction with the IC, including Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 16

FBI

The FBI’s ability to leverage law enforcement and 

intelligence capabilities is critical to protecting the 

homeland. The FBI has the lead domestic role in 

investigating international terrorist threats to, and 

in conducting counterintelligence activities to meet 

foreign entities’ espionage and intelligence efforts 

directed against, the U.S. The FBI is also responsible 

for coordinating collection of foreign intelligence and 

counterintelligence activities with other IC elements 

inside the U.S., and leads the IC effort to integrate 

intelligence support in the domestic field through the 

DNI Representative (DNI Rep) program. The FBI is 

able to execute these roles because, under applicable 

statutes and Executive Order 12333, it can exercise 

a broader range of domestic activities than other 

intelligence agencies. The FBI can also leverage 

the capacities of its 56 field offices, supporting FIGs, 

JTTFs, cyber teams, and criminal authorities to support 

its efforts. A critical force multiplier for the FBI is its 

engagement in over 400 national security and criminal 

task forces with FSLTT partners and its participation in 

the National Network of Fusion Centers. The JTTF is 

an example of active partnership. The 104 JTTFs 

are multi-jurisdictional task forces established to 

conduct terrorism-related investigations. JTTF 

investigations are focused on known threat actors or 

identified individuals who meet the thresholds under 

the Attorney General Guidelines for domestic FBI 

operations. Using the information derived from FBI 

FIGs, JTTFs, and fusion centers, the FBI develops 

intelligence products on significant developments 

or trends related to terrorism. These intelligence 

products may be used by partners to support their law 

enforcement and homeland security activities, such as 

intelligence-led policing efforts, implementing protective 

measures, or other target-hardening initiatives. 

FIGs are located in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices 

and are staffed with FBI intelligence analysts, language 

analysts, and special agents who provide domain 

awareness for their areas of responsibility (AOR) 

and complement the overall FBI analytic effort. FIGs 

are the primary mechanism through which FBI field 

offices develop human intelligence, identify emerging 

trends, and identify, evaluate, and prioritize threats 

within their AORs. They support domain awareness 

and investigative efforts through the use of strategic 

and tactical analysis, linguists, subject matter experts, 

special operations groups, and specialized surveillance 

groups. FIGs have established processes for collecting, 

analyzing, and producing intelligence information. 

These processes enhance the nation’s ability to 

successfully penetrate national and transnational 

criminal networks, terrorist organizations, foreign 

intelligence services, and other entities that seek to 

harm the U.S. FIGs may also disseminate information 

to the IC and other federal, state, local, and tribal 

agencies, as well as foreign counterparts. Utilizing 

dissemination protocols, FIGs contribute to local and 

regional perspectives on all threats, and serve as the 

FBI’s primary intelligence link with fusion centers. 

The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) serves as the 

USG’s consolidation point for known and suspected 

foreign and domestic terrorist watch list information. 

The consolidated watch list contains thousands 

of records that are updated daily and shared with 

FSLTT law enforcement, IC members, and select 

international partners to ensure that individuals with 

links to terrorism are appropriately screened. The 

TSC, which is administered by the FBI and supported 

by federal departments and agencies, including DOJ, 

DHS, the Department of State (DoS), the ODNI, 

and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 

ensures that information provided to and consolidated 

by TSC is thorough, current, and accurate.

FBI agents arresting a suspect, photo provided by FBI
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

17

DEA

DEA is the lead federal agency for the enforcement 

of controlled substances laws and regulations of 

the U.S. It brings to the criminal and civil justice 

system those organizations and principal members 

of organizations involved in the cultivation, 

manufacturing, or distribution of controlled substances 

appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the U.S., 

and supports non-enforcement programs aimed at 

reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances 

on the domestic and international markets. 

DEA has 226 domestic offices and its workforce is 

supplemented with nearly 2,500 domestic police 

officers that are deputized as DEA task force agents. 

These agents, working under DEA supervision, 

are authorized to enforce federal laws and are the 

cornerstone of DEA’s interaction with state and local 

law enforcement. DEA coordinates drug intelligence 

worldwide to assist in disrupting or dismantling 

international drug trafficking organizations. DEA 

maintains both a global and domestic presence, and 

ensures that a clear bridge exists between the two. 

The DEA intelligence program works to provide predictive 

intelligence to identify trends and vulnerabilities in 

order to guide and prioritize the application of limited 

enforcement resources. The Office of National Security 

Intelligence (ONSI) was designated a member of 

the IC in February 2006. The objective of ONSI is to 

maximize DEA’s contribution to national security, while 

protecting the primacy of its law enforcement mission. 

Domestically, DEA shares intelligence with appropriate 

FSLTT agencies at multiple stages and at multiple 

points. Initial sharing of information occurs through direct 

contact with the partners. Each DEA field division and 

district office maintains a presence on the local JTTF, 

providing a direct conduit for sharing. Outside of the 

JTTF, information is shared directly with the responsible 

agency and/or through the HIDTAs and fusion centers. 

Additionally, DEA task force officers offer a direct link to 

their parent departments and agencies. Concurrently, 

relevant information is shared at the national level via 

the ONSI and the Special Operations Division, ensuring 

that information obtained by DEA is shared across 

multiple tracks with all relevant customers and partners. 

Department of the Treasury

Treasury is the department responsible for promoting 

economic prosperity and ensuring the financial security 

of the U.S. Treasury. It is responsible for a wide 

range of activities, such as advising the President 

on economic and financial issues, encouraging 

sustainable economic growth, and fostering improved 

governance in financial institutions. Treasury works

with other federal agencies, foreign governments, 

and international financial institutions to encourage 

global economic growth, raise standards of living, 

and, to the extent possible, predict and prevent 

economic and financial crises. Treasury also performs 

a critical and far-reaching role in enhancing national 

security by implementing economic sanctions against 

foreign threats to the U.S., identifying and targeting 

the financial support networks of national security 

threats, and improving the safeguards of the country’s 

financial systems. Created under the Intelligence 

Authorization Act of 2004, the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis (OIA) is Treasury’s IC component. OIA 

officers help draft Treasury policy and support the 

execution of Treasury’s regulatory and enforcement 

authorities by providing all-source intelligence analysis. 

Often, traditional intelligence is integrated with 

financial intelligence generated by administrative, law 

enforcement, and private sector partners. OIA also 

supplements intelligence support provided by DHS to 

the Treasury Department in its role as the financialsector agency for critical infrastructure protection. 

Seizure by the Drug Enforcement Administration, photo 

provided by DEA
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 18

USCG

As the principal federal agency responsible for maritime 

safety, security, and stewardship, the USCG protects 

vital economic and security interests of the U.S. 

and has strong partnerships with FSLTT entities. In 

addition to its responsibility for the safety and security 

of the maritime public, the maritime transportation 

system, and the integrity of maritime borders, the 

USCG fills a unique niche in the IC. USCG intelligence 

provides timely and actionable intelligence and 

criminal investigative expertise to support tactical 

and operational commanders, strategic planners and 

leaders, and to meet national and homeland security 

intelligence requirements. As a result of its diverse 

authorities and mission areas, the USCG maintains 

broad awareness of the maritime environment. 

SUPPORTING DOMESTIC 

INTEGRATION

The following ODNI components are tasked 

with supporting and improving intelligence 

integration in the domestic field:

NCTC

NCTC has primary responsibility within the USG for 

analysis and integration of all intelligence possessed 

or acquired by the USG pertaining to terrorism and 

counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining 

exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic 

counterterrorism. NCTC executes these duties through 

efforts in intelligence analysis, information sharing, 

counterterrorism strategic operational planning, and 

maintaining the USG’s central repository of identities 

information for known or suspected terrorists in 

support of the USG’s terrorist screening process.

Supporting the counterterrorism mission is the NCTCled Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT), 

which replaced the Interagency Threat Assessment and 

Coordination Group (ITACG) in April 2013. Its mission 

is to improve information sharing and enhance public 

safety. In coordination with the FBI and DHS, JCAT 

collaborates with other members of the IC to research, 

NCTC Operations Center, provided by NCTC

USCG vessel, photo provided by USCG 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

19

produce, and disseminate counterterrorism intelligence products for FSLTT partners, and advocates 

for the counterterrorism intelligence requirements and 

needs of these partners throughout the IC. JCAT aims 

to improve the quantity and quality of intelligence 

products for FSLTT partners. Like ITACG, 

JCAT is located within NCTC and is composed 

of fully cleared state, local, and tribal HS&LE 

partners, as well as representatives from NCTC 

and its federal partners, DHS and FBI. 

NCTC maintains the Terrorist Identities Datamart 

Environment (TIDE), which is the USG’s central and 

shared knowledge bank on known or suspected 

international terrorist identities. NCTC also has the 

unique mission to be the two-way interface between 

domestic law enforcement and homeland security 

apparatus and the IC for terrorist identity and 

encounter information. NCTC is the single point 

of national integration for information sharing 

regarding terrorist identity data through the 

TIDE database. It provides selected exports of 

terrorist identity information to U.S. domestic 

screening and border entities through the TSC. 

Additionally, NCTC’s domestic representatives are 

uniquely equipped to facilitate the flow of both strategic 

and regional counterterrorism information to and from 

NCTC. They are primarily co-located with DNI Reps 

and strive to share counterterrorism-related intelligence 

with federal, state, local, and tribal personnel, always 

working via their FBI and DHS counterparts. 

NCSC

The National Counterintelligence and Security Center 

(NCSC), previously known as the Office of the National 

Counterintelligence Executive, was established to help 

counter threats from foreign adversaries who seek to 

acquire national defense information, undermine the 

country’s economic and technological advantage, and 

influence governmental processes. NCSC facilitates 

the enhancement of U.S. counterintelligence activities 

by: 1) enabling the counterintelligence community to 

fulfill its mission of identifying, assessing, prioritizing, 

and countering the intelligence threats to the U.S.; 2) 

ensuring that the counterintelligence community acts 

in an efficient and effective manner; and 3) providing 

for the integration of all counterintelligence activities. 

Cyber Threat Intelligence 

Integration Center (CTIIC)

In February 2015, the President directed the 

DNI to establish the CTIIC to support the federal 

government’s efforts to anticipate, mitigate, and 

counter foreign cyber threats to the U.S. and our 

national interests. CTIIC supports the federal cyber 

community—including cybersecurity centers, the IC, 

other relevant departments and agencies, and senior 

policymakers. It facilitates the timely information 

sharing of threat intelligence and related indicators, 

integrates analysis of threat trends and events, identifies 

gaps in knowledge, and helps the community identify 

opportunities to degrade or mitigate threat capabilities.

NCTC 017657g [0097cs] AI 4-15

New York

Chicago

Washington, D.C.

Miami

Atlanta

San

Francisco

Pittsburgh

DNI Reps in the U.S.

Houston

Boston

Los

Angeles

Denver

Seattle

UNCLASSIFIED

Domestic Approach to National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 20

U.S.-Mexico Border, photo provided by CBP

DNI Representatives in the U.S.

Leveraging 12 senior FBI officials across the U.S., 

the primary mission of the DNI Rep is to lead IC 

efforts within his or her AOR by creating an IC 

enterprise that is coordinated, integrated, agile, 

and effective. The role of a DNI Rep is to engage 

and periodically convene U.S. senior field 

representatives of each IC element in their respective 

AOR. DNI Reps conduct coordinated outreach to 

ensure that appropriate entities are aware of the 

IC’s capabilities, analytic products, and resources 

while facilitating and monitoring implementation 

of DNI direction, policies, and procedures. This 

single-enterprise approach integrates intelligence 

in defense of the homeland and supports U.S. 

national security interests at home and abroad. 

National Intelligence Manager 

(NIM) for the Western Hemisphere 

and the Homeland (NIM-WHH)

The NIM for the Western Hemisphere and the Homeland 

is responsible for partnering closely with other functional 

and regional NIM teams, ODNI/Partner Engagement, 

and DNI Reps to ensure FSLTT equities (e.g. homeland 

security information, criminal intelligence, etc.) are 

identified and considered at the national intelligence level. 

The Unifying Intelligence Strategy (UIS) for the Western 

Hemisphere serves as a key instrument for integrating the 

efforts of the IC in support of the Western Hemisphere, 

which includes the U.S. homeland. The UIS identifies 

opportunities and priorities for intelligence integration 

in support of IC and FSLTT partners where foreign 

intelligence affects FSLTT information, and vice versa. 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

21

National Maritime IntelligenceIntegration Office (NMIO)

NMIO’s mission is to advance maritime intelligence 

integration, information sharing, and domain awareness 

to foster unity of effort for decision advantage that 

protects the United States, its allies and partners 

against threats in or emanating from the global 

maritime domain. NMIO serves as the nexus for the 

Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) to 

improve collaboration and facilitate integration, while 

keeping the highest levels of the U.S. Government 

informed on maritime information issues.

Program Manager for the Information 

Sharing Environment

PM-ISE is designed with one key goal in mind: to 

combat terrorism more effectively. The Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004) established 

an Information Sharing Environment (ISE), which is 

managed by the Program Manager for the ISE and 

comprises policies, procedures, and technologies 

linking the resources (people, systems, databases, 

and information) of FSLTT entities to facilitate terrorism 

information sharing, access, and collaboration.

PM-ISE has a government-wide mandate to facilitate 

the sharing of information with regard to terrorism, 

weapons of mass destruction, and homeland security 

in a manner consistent with national security and 

applicable legal standards relating to privacy and 

civil liberties. PM-ISE is working to achieve discrete, 

coordinated, and focused efforts leading to the delivery 

of interoperable, reused, and in some cases shared 

agency capabilities to accelerate mission impact. 

DOD 

DoD’s role can be summarized as follows: 1) homeland 

defense - the protection of U.S. territory, its domestic 

population, and critical defense infrastructure against 

external threats and aggression; and 2) civil support - 

providing military support to civil authorities at the federal, 

state, and local levels across a range of conditions. The 

Secretary of Defense describes the three circumstances 

under which DoD assets could be involved in homeland 

defense and civil support missions as follows: 

In extraordinary circumstances, DoD would conduct 

military missions such as combat air patrols or 

maritime defense operations. DoD would take the 

lead in defending the people and the territory of 

our country, supported by other agencies. Included 

in this category are cases in which the President, 

exercising constitutional authority as Commanderin-Chief and Chief Executive, authorizes military 

action to counter threats within the U.S. 

In emergency circumstances, such as managing the 

consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, 

or other catastrophe in support of civil authorities, 

DoD could be asked to act quickly to provide 

capabilities that other agencies do not possess or 

that have been exhausted or overwhelmed. 

In non-emergency circumstances of limited scope 

or planned duration, DoD would support civil 

authorities where other agencies have the lead— 

for example, providing security at a special event 

such as the Olympics, or assisting other federal 

agencies to develop capabilities to detect chemical, 

biological, nuclear, and radiological threats. 

DoD cannot provide for all aspects of homeland 

security. The homeland security mission requires the 

use of the full range of political, economic, diplomatic, 

and military tools, including enhanced intelligence to 

improve potential detection of future attacks. Domestic 

law enforcement agencies will bear a heavier burden 

in meeting domestic security needs. In addition, 

emergency preparedness planning and capabilities, 

which integrate the strengths of federal, state, and 

local authorities, are the first lines of response and 

defense in the homeland. Much of homeland security 

will entail localized responses, supported by planning 

and coordination with other levels of government. 

U.S. Northern Command 

(USNORTHCOM)

USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct homeland 

defense (protection against external threats and 

aggression), civil support, and security cooperation 

to defend and secure the U.S. and its interests. Its 

primary area of operation includes air, land, and 

sea approaches and encompasses the continental 

U.S., Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding 

water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also 

includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, 

and portions of the Caribbean region to include the 

Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 

The Commander of USNORTHCOM also commands 

North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) 

Command, a combined U.S.-Canadian team responsible 

for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime 

warning for Canada, Alaska, and the continental U.S. In 

conjunction with its other missions, NORAD assists in 

the detection and monitoring of merchant vessels and 

aircraft suspected of illicit trafficking. This information 

is passed to civilian law enforcement agencies to help 

combat the flow of contraband into North America. 
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 22

Military jet conducting a patrol exercise, photo provided by DoD 

Joint Task Force North (JTF North), a subcomponent of 

USNORTHCOM, is the DoD organization tasked to 

support our nation’s federal law enforcement agencies in 

the interdiction of suspected transnational threats within 

and along the approaches to the continental U.S. 

Transnational threats comprise activities conducted by 

individuals or groups that involve international terrorism, 

cyber threats, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, 

weapons of mass destruction, and the delivery systems 

for such weapons that threaten the national security of 

the U.S. JTF North support to federal law enforcement 

agencies is organized into the following six categories: 

intelligence, operational, engineering, general, 

interagency synchronization, and technology integration. 

Within the intelligence support category, JTF North 

provides the following: agency case-sensitive intelligence 

support, collaborative threat assessments, geospatial 

intelligence support, modified threat vulnerability 

assessments, and threat link analysis products.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

23

Other Key Considerations

SECURITY CLEARANCE REFORM

The ability to share classified information across the 

domestic enterprise at the SECRET-level, between the 

IC and FSLTT partners, is critical for effective intelligence 

integration. A key enabler to support this requirement 

is a streamlined process for nominating, investigating, 

adjudicating, granting, and tracking security clearances 

for partner agencies. Security clearance reform set the 

conditions for great progress over the last five years. 

In August 2010, Executive Order 13549, “Classified 

National Security Information Program for FSLTT 

entities”, designated the Secretary of Homeland Security 

as the Executive Agent for this effort. Working with 

the FBI and other federal partners, DHS established 

governance and an oversight structure to promote the 

uniform application of SECRET-level security clearance 

standards. Additionally, security liaison officers were 

designated at state and major urban area fusion centers 

to assist with nominations and the processing of security 

clearance requests. In 2006, the average processing 

time for initial security clearances was 165 days. 

Presently interim SECRET clearance determinations 

are made based on preliminary checks within 14 

days of requests being received by the sponsoring 

agency. Final clearances are issued once the Office of 

Personnel Management completes its investigation and 

there is a favorable adjudication of the request. The 

average processing time in 2015 for a final SECRET 

clearance was 116 days. DHS and FBI currently hold 

over 10,000 SLTT and private sector clearances.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 

INFORMATION SHARING 

& SAFEGUARDING

Our national security depends on the ability to share the 

right information, with the right people, at the right time. 

This information sharing mandate requires sustained 

and responsible collaboration between the IC and 

FSLTT partners. Over the last few years, the IC and 

FSLTT partners have successfully streamlined policies 

and processes, overcome cultural barriers, and better 

integrated information systems to enable information 

sharing. Today’s dynamic environment, nonetheless, 

poses challenges to the continuing effort to improve 

information sharing and safeguarding processes and 

capabilities. While innovation has enhanced the ability 

to share, increased sharing has created the potential for 

vulnerabilities that require strengthened safeguarding 

practices. The 2012 National Strategy for Information 

Sharing and Safeguarding provides guidance for 

effective development, integration, and implementation 

of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to 

promote secure and responsible information sharing. 

The strategy does not define particular categories or 

types of information that must be shared. Rather, it 

shifts the focus of information sharing and safeguarding 

policy to defining information requirements that support 

effective decision making. The strategy outlines a vision 

with a national policy roadmap to guide information 

sharing and safeguarding within existing law and policy. 

This strategy does not replace the National Strategy 

for Information Sharing (2007 NSIS), as the 2007 NSIS 

continues to provide a policy framework and directs many 

core initiatives intended to improve information sharing.
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 24

Way-Ahead

This paper promotes a better understanding of 

the current operating environment of the domestic 

enterprise. Going forward, it will be important to move 

beyond the “as is” descriptions and work toward a 

vision of the “should be.” This vision must guide longterm investment strategies that align assets to better 

synchronize intelligence collaboration and interplay with 

FSLTT partners, while ensuring the privacy, civil rights, 

and civil liberties of our citizens are fully protected. It 

must also help to identify potential changes to policies, 

technologies, and organizational and informational 

frameworks to optimize both cost and effectiveness. 

Ultimately, the domestic enterprise must be postured to 

provide all-source intelligence and enhance responsible 

information sharing and collaboration across public 

safety, law enforcement, and intelligence activities. 

This will ensure that our customers and partners—

from first responders to our national leaders—have 

the most accurate and current intelligence.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

25

Abbreviations

AOR Area of Responsibility

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives

CAC Civil Applications Committee

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CI Counterintelligence

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CICC Criminal Intelligence 

Coordinating Council

CIU Criminal Intelligence Unit

CT Counter Terrorism

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DHS/I&A Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Intelligence & Analysis

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI Director of National Intelligence

DoD Department of Defense

DoJ Department of Justice

DoS Department of State

DOT Department of Transportation

EMS Emergency Medical Services

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FICO Federal Intelligence Coordination Office

FIG Field Intelligence Group

FSIC Federal Senior Intelligence Coordinator

FSLTT Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial

HHS Health and Human Services

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HIFCA High Intensity Financial Crime Area

HSA Homeland Security Advisor

HS&LE Homeland Security & Law Enforcement

IC Intelligence Community 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IIR Intelligence Information Report

INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research

ISC Investigative Support Center

ITACG Interagency Threat Assessment 

and Coordination Group

JCAT Joint Counterterrorism 

Assessment Team

JTF Joint Task Force

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

LE Law Enforcement

NCSC National Counterintelligence 

and Security Center

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NIM National Intelligence Manager

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense

NORTHCOM Northern Command

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

NSI Nationwide Suspicious Activity 

Reporting Initiative

NSIS National Strategy for 

Information Sharing

ODNI Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence

OIA Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

Treasury Department

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

ONSI Office of National Security Intelligence

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PM-ISE Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment

RISS Regional Information Sharing System

SAR Suspicious Activity Report

SBU Sensitive But Unclassified

TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart 

Environment

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSC Terrorist Screening Center

TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UIS Unifying Intelligence Strategy

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services

USG U.S. Government

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

USSS U.S. Secret Service
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

 26

0 300 Kilometers

0 300 Miles

Nashv

Memphis

Sacramento

Los Angeles

El Paso

Albuquerque

San Antonio

Houston

New Orle

Dallas

San Diego

Las

Vegas

San Francisco

Boise

Salem Helena

Seattle

Portland

Olympia

Phoenix

Jackson

Baton Rouge M

Austin

Little

Rock

Jefferson

City

Kansas City

Springfield

Oklahoma

City

Springfield

Saint

Louis

Chicago

Saint Paul

Minneapolis

Denver

Salt Lake

City

In

Madison

Milwaukee

Lincoln

Omaha

Topeka

Bismarck

Pierre

Sioux Falls

Cheyenne

Santa Fe

Carson City

Des

Moines 

pending

MO

MN

AZ

NM

NE

ND

SD

KS

OK

IA

NV

UT

OR

WA

CO

WY

ID

CA

IL 

WI 

TX

MT

AR

MS 

LA

DNI Representative

NCTC Representative

Drug Enforcement Administration Division Office

El Paso Intelligence Center

Federal Bureau of Investigations Field Office

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Headquarters Element

Regional Information Sharing System Center

State/Major Urban Area Fusion Center

US Coast Guard District Office

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Shaded areas represent the DNI Rep Regions.

This map was created in June 2013 to provide a general overview 

of the domestic enterprise. It is not meant to be all-inclusive.

Honolulu

HI 

Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

Domestic Enterprise

UNCLASSIFIED

GU

Hagatna
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

27

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Frankfort

London

Louisville

ville

Knoxville

eans

Atlanta Birmingham

Columbia

Montgomery 

Mobile 

ndianapolis

e

Montpelier

Augusta

Concord

Lansing

Detroit

Columbus

Cleveland

Cincinnati

Hartford

Trenton

Dover

Annapolis

Boston

Providence

Albany

Harrisburg

Buffalo

Pittsburgh

Richmond

Raleigh

Charlotte

Charleston

Tallahassee

Miami

Jacksonville

Orlando

Tampa

pending

IN

MI

VT NH

CT RI

DE MD

MA

NJ

AL

OH

PA

NY

ME

TN

KY

WV

SC

NC

GA

FL

VA

AK

Juneau

Anchorage

PR

San Juan

0 100 Kilometers

0 100 Miles

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Hartford

Newark

Trenton

Norfolk

Annapolis

Baltimore

Dover

Boston

pending

Providence

New Haven

New York City

Albany

Philadelphia

Harrisburg

Richmond

VT

MD

PA

CT

NH

MA

NY

RI

DE

NJ

VA

NCTC 017657 [0097s] AI 7-15

UNCLASSIFIED

Charlotte

Amalie

VI
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence

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NCTC 029197 | December 2016