13 February 2006

Information Operations

Joint Publication 3-13
PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for information operations planning, preparation,

execution, and assessment in support of joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces

of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination

and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for

the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs)

and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use

by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication

to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a

manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the

overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant

commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands,

and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed

except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,

this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally

in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current

and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or

coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by

the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders

should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where

applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP

Lieutenant General, USA

Director, Joint Staff
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Preface

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13

DATED 9 OCTOBER 1998

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Aligns joint information operations (IO) doctrine with the transformational

planning guidance as specified by the 30 October 2003 Department of Defense

Information Operations Roadmap

Discontinues use of the terms “offensive IO” and “defensive IO” but retains

the recognition that IO is applied to achieve both offensive and defensive

objectives

Removes information warfare as a term from joint IO doctrine

Updates the descriptions and interrelationship of the five core IO capabilities

(electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations,

operations security, and military deception) and their associated supporting

and related capabilities

Establishes the core capability of computer network operations, consisting of

computer network attack, computer network defense, and computer network

exploitation

Adds combat camera and realigns physical attack, information assurance, and

counterintelligence under supporting IO capabilities

Adds defense support to public diplomacy and realigns public affairs and civil

military operations under related IO capabilities

Adds a description of the information environment and discusses its

relationship to IO and other military operations

Adds a discussion of the relationship of IO to strategic communication

Adds a separate chapter on intelligence and communications system support to

IO

Expands the chapter on IO planning to address IO considerations in joint

planning, situational aspects of IO planning, IO measures of performance and

effectiveness, and the importance of interagency coordination in IO planning

Adds a discussion on the planning aspects of IO and theater security

cooperation planning

Adds a separate chapter on multinational considerations in IO
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Summary of Changes

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................ ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

• Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1

• The Information Environment .................................................................................... I-1

• Military Operations and the Information Environment ............................................... I-3

• Principles of Information Operations.......................................................................... I-6

• Strategic Communication ......................................................................................... I-10

• Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations .................................. I-10

CHAPTER II

CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION

OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1

• Core Information Operations Capabilities ................................................................ II-1

• Information Operations Supporting Capabilities....................................................... II-5

• Information Operations Related Capabilities ............................................................ II-8

CHAPTER III

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1

• Intelligence Support to Information Operations ....................................................... III-1

CHAPTER IV

RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ IV-1

• Authorities and Responsibilities .............................................................................. IV-1

• Joint Information Operations Organizational Roles and Responsibilities.................. IV-2

• Organizing for Joint Information Operations ........................................................... IV-3

CHAPTER V

PLANNING AND COORDINATION

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. V-1

• Information Operations Planning .............................................................................. V-1

• Information Operations Planning Considerations ........................................................... V-2
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• Commander’s Intent and Information Operations .......................................................... V-7

• The Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of

 Effectiveness ........................................................................................................... V-7

CHAPTER VI

MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

• Introduction ............................................................................................................ VI-1

• Other Nations and Information Operations .............................................................. VI-1

• Multinational Information Operations Considerations ............................................. VI-2

• Planning, Integration, and Command and Control of Information

 Operations in Multinational Operations................................................................. VI-3

• Multinational Organization for Information Operations Planning ............................ VI-3

• Multinational Policy Coordination .......................................................................... VI-3

CHAPTER VII

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN JOINT EDUCATION, TRAINING,

EXERCISES, AND EXPERIMENTS

• Introduction ............................................................................................................VII-1

• Information Operations Education ..........................................................................VII-1

• Information Operations Training .............................................................................VII-2

• Planning Information Operations in Joint Exercises.................................................VII-3

• Information Operations Exercise Preparation, Execution, and Post-Exercise

 Evaluation ........................................................................................................... VII-7

• Information Operations in Joint Experimentation ................................................... VII-8

APPENDIX

A Supplemental Guidance (published separately) ................................................... A-1

B Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities ................... B-1

C Communications System Support to Information Operations .............................. C-1

D References ......................................................................................................... D-1

E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 The Information Environment ......................................................................... I-2

I-2 Information Quality Criteria ............................................................................ I-3

I-3 Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional)................ I-7
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Table of Contents

II-1 Principles of Public Information ......................................................................... II-9

IV-1 Information Operations Cell Chief Functions..................................................... IV-4

IV-2 Notional Information Operations Cell ............................................................... IV-5

V-1 Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of

Joint Planning .............................................................................................. V-4

V-2 Example of the Relationship Between Measures of Performance and

 Measures of Effectiveness............................................................................ V-8

B-1 Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities.......................... B-1

B-2 Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations............ B-5

B-3 Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public

Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera ........... B-8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Discusses the Information Environment and Its Relationship to Military

Operations

Discusses the Information Operations (IO) Core Capabilities Necessary to

Successfully Plan and Execute IO to include Supporting and Related

Capabilities in a Joint/Multinational Environment

Aligns Joint IO Doctrine with the Transformational Planning Guidance as

Specified by the Department of Defense IO Roadmap for Achieving

Information Superiority on the Battlefield

Provides an Organizational Framework for Integrating, Deconflicting, and

Synchronizing IO Planning and Execution Activities for Supporting and

Supported Combatant Command Staffs, National Intelligence Agencies, and

Other Federal Agencies as Applicable

Outlines Planning Considerations for Developing an IO Career Force

through Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experimentation

Military Operations and the Information Environment

To succeed, it is necessary

for US forces to gain and

maintain information

superiority.

Information is a strategic resource, vital to national security, and

military operations depend on information and information

systems for many simultaneous and integrated activities.

Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated

employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network

operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military

deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in

concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to

influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and

automated decision making while protecting our own.

The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint force commanders

(JFCs) and their staffs guidance to help prepare, plan, execute,

and assess IO in support of joint operations. The principal goal

is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and

its allies.
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Executive Summary

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The information environment is the aggregate of individuals,

organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or

act on information. The information environment is made up of

three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and

cognitive.

IO consists of five core capabilities which are: PSYOP,

MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. Of the five, PSYOP, OPSEC,

and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for

many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first

by EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five

capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting and related

capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of

influencing an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by

enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information

environment.

Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA),

physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat

camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the

information environment and contribute to effective IO. They

should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities,

but can also serve other wider purposes.

There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civilmilitary operations (CMO), and defense support to public

diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO. These

capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always

be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO

capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under

which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires

additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of

IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must

work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.

Core capabilities.

Supporting capabilities.

Related capabilities.

Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities
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Executive Summary

Intelligence and Communications System

Support to Information Operations

Successful planning,

preparation, execution,

and assessment of

information operations

(IO) demand detailed and

timely intelligence.

Nature of IO intelligence

requirements.

Intelligence

considerations in

planning IO.

Before military activities in the information environment can be

planned, the current “state” of the dynamic information

environment must be collected, analyzed, and provided to

commanders and their staffs. This requires intelligence on relevant

portions of the physical, informational, and cognitive properties

of the information environment, which necessitates collection and

analysis of a wide variety of information and the production of a

wide variety of intelligence products.

In order to understand the adversary or other TA decision-making

process and determine the appropriate capabilities necessary to

achieve operational objectives, commanders and their staffs must

have current data. This includes relevant physical, informational,

and cognitive properties of the information environment as well

as assessment of ongoing IO activities.

Intelligence Resources are Limited. Commanders and their

intelligence and operations directorates must work together to

identify IO intelligence requirements and ensure that they are

given high enough priority in the commander’s requests to the

intelligence community (IC).

Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The IC must

implement technical and procedural methods to ensure

compliance with the law. Additionally, intelligence may be

supplemented with information legally provided by law

enforcement or other sources.

Intelligence Support to IO Often Requires Long Lead Times.

The intelligence necessary to affect adversary or other TA

decisions often requires that specific sources and methods be

positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary

information and conduct the required analyses.

Information Environment is Dynamic. Commanders and their

staffs must understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they

receive and the differing potentials for change in the dimensions

of the information environment.
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Executive Summary

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Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence.

Collection of physical and electronic information is objectively

measurable by location and quantity. Commanders and their staffs

must have an appreciation for the subjective nature of psychological

profiles and human nature.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCS's)

responsibilities for IO are both general (such as those to establish

doctrine, provide advice, and make recommendations) and specific

(such as those assigned in the Department of Defense [DOD] IO

policy). The Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3) serves as

the CJCS’s focal point for IO and coordinates with the other

organizations within the Joint Staff that have direct or supporting IO

responsibilities. The IO divisions of the Joint Staff J-3 provide IO

specific advice and advocate Joint Staff and combatant commands’

IO interests and concerns within DOD and interact with other

organizations and individuals on behalf of the CJCS.

Commander, United States Strategic Command’s

(USSTRATCOM’s) specific authority and responsibility to

coordinate IO across area of responsibility (AOR) and functional

boundaries does not diminish the imperative for other

combatant commanders to employ IO. These efforts may be

directed at achieving national or military objectives incorporated

in theater security cooperation plans, shaping the operational

environment for potential employment during periods of

heightened tensions, or in support of specific military operations.

It is entirely possible that in a given theater, the combatant

commander will be supported for select IO while concurrently

supporting USSTRATCOM IO activities across multiple theater

boundaries.

Components are normally responsible for detailed planning and

execution of IO. IO planned and conducted by functional

components must be conducted within the parameters established

by the JFC. At the same time, component commanders and their

subordinates must be provided sufficient flexibility and authority

to respond to local variations in the information environment.

Component commanders determine how their staffs are organized

for IO, and normally designate personnel to liaise between the

JFC’s headquarters and component headquarter staffs.

Responsibilities and Command Relationships

Joint Staff.

Combatant commands.

Components.
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Executive Summary

Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of joint

operations. Subordinate staffs normally share the same type of

relationship with the parent joint force IO staff as the Service and

functional components. Subordinate JFC staffs may become

involved in IO planning and execution to a significant degree,

to include making recommendations for employment of specific

capabilities, particularly if most of the capability needed for a certain

operation resides in that subordinate joint task force.

Combatant commanders normally assign responsibility for IO

to the J-3. When authorized, the director of the J-3 has primary

staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and

assessing joint force IO. The J-3 normally designates an IO

cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The

primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are

integrated and synchronized in all planning processes of the

combatant command staff and that IO aspects of such processes

are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and

multinational staffs. To integrate and synchronize the core

capabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and

appropriate staff functions, the IO cell chief normally leads an

“IO cell” or similarly named group as an integrated part of the

staff’s operational planning group or equivalent. The

organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the

organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance.

The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish

JFC objectives. Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate,

negate, or harm other JFC military operations, as well as other US

Government (USG) information activities. JFCs must ensure IO

planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process,

assigning them to the joint targeting coordination board in order to

ensure full integration with all other planning and execution efforts.

Other USG and/or coalition/allied information activities, when

uncoordinated, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective.

Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early

detailed JFC IO staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction with

USG interagency efforts in the AOR to effectively synergize and integrate

IO capabilities.

IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC’s campaign or

operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to,

the overall planning effort. IO are used in all phases of a campaign or

Planning and Coordination

Subordinate joint force

commanders.

Organizing for joint IO.

IO planning follows the

same principles and

processes established for

joint operation planning.

Planning considerations.
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Executive Summary

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Commander’s intent and

information operations.

operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence

the amount of effort required for the remaining phases.

The use of IO in peacetime to achieve JFC objectives and to

preclude other conflicts, requires an ability to integrate IO

capabilities into a comprehensive and coherent strategy through

the establishment of information objectives that in turn are

integrated into and support the JFC’s overall mission objectives.

The combatant commander’s theater security cooperation plan

serves as an excellent platform to embed specific long-term

information objectives

IO planning requires early and detailed preparation. Many IO

capabilities require long lead-time intelligence preparation of the

battlespace (IPB). IO support for IPB development differs from

traditional requirements in that it may require greater lead time

and may have expanded collection, production, and dissemination

requirements. Consequently, combatant commanders must ensure

that IO objectives are appropriately prioritized in their priority

intelligence requirements (PIRs) and requests for information

(RFIs).

As part of the planning process, designation of release and

execution authority is required. Release authority provides the

approval for IO employment and normally specifies the allocation

of specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the

execution authority. Execution authority is described as the

authority to employ IO capabilities at a designated time and/or

place. Normally, the JFC is the one execution authority designated

in the execute order for an operation.

IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful

review and national-level coordination and approval.

The commander’s vision of IO’s role in an operation should begin

before the specific planning is initiated. A commander that expects

to rely on IO capabilities must ensure that IO related PIRs and

RFIs are given high enough priority prior to a crisis, in order for

the intelligence products to be ready in time to support operations.

At a minimum, the commander’s vision for IO should be included

in the initial guidance. Ideally, commanders give guidance on IO

as part of their overall concept, but may elect to provide it

separately.
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Executive Summary

Multinational Considerations in Information Operations

Measures of performance (MOPs) gauge accomplishment of IO

tasks and actions. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) determine

whether IO actions being executed are having the desired effect toward

mission accomplishment: the attainment of end states and objectives.

MOPs measure friendly IO effort and MOEs measure battlespace

results. IO MOPs and MOEs are crafted and refined throughout the

planning process.

Allies and coalition partners recognize various IO concepts and

some have thorough and sophisticated doctrine, procedures, and

capabilities for planning and conducting IO. The multinational

force commander is responsible to resolve potential conflicts

between each nation’s IO programs and the IO objectives and

programs of the coalition. It is vital to integrate allies and coalition

partners into IO planning as early as possible so that an integrated

and achievable IO strategy can be developed early in the planning

process.

Integration requirements include clarification of allied and

coalition partner’s IO objectives; understanding of other nations’

information operations and how they intend to conduct IO;

establishment of liaison/deconfliction procedures to ensure

coherence; and early identification of multinational force

vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures to adversary attempts

to exploit them.

The development of IO as a core military competency and critical

component to joint operations requires specific expertise and

capabilities at all levels of DOD. At the highest professional

levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies

that are the capstone to American military power. The Services,

United States Special Operations Command, and other agencies

develop capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied

in law, policy, and lessons learned. At each level of command, a

solid foundation of education and training is essential to the

development of a core competency. Professional education and

training, in turn, are dependent on the accumulation,

documentation, and validation of experience gained in operations,

exercises, and experimentation.

Measures of performance

and measures of

effectiveness.

Every ally/coalition

member can contribute to

IO by providing regional

expertise to assist in

planning and conducting

IO.

A solid foundation of

education and training is

essential to the

development of IO core

competencies.

Information Operations in Joint Education, Training,

Exercises, and Experiments
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Executive Summary

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The IO career force should consist of both capability specialists

(EW, PSYOP, CNO, MILDEC, and OPSEC) and IO planners.

Both groups require an understanding of the information environment,

the role of IO in military affairs, how IO differs from other information

functions that contribute to information superiority, and specific

knowledge of each of the core capabilities to ensure integration of IO

into joint operations.

IO planners are required at both the component and the joint

level.

Senior military and civilian DOD leaders require an executive

level knowledge of the information environment and the role of

IO in supporting DOD missions.

Joint military training is based on joint policies and doctrine to

prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to strategic and

operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant

commanders to execute their assigned missions.

IO training must support the IO career force and be consistent

with the joint assignment process. Joint IO training focuses on

joint planning-specific skills, methodologies and tools, and

assumes a solid foundation of Service-level IO training.

The Services determine applicable career training

requirements for both their IO career personnel and general

military populations, based on identified joint force mission

requirements.

This document provides the doctrinal principles for DOD

employment of IO. It has been designed to provide overarching

guidance in the planning and execution of IO in today’s joint/

multinational security environment. It’s primary purpose is to

ensure all of the capabilities comprising IO are effectively

coordinated and integrated into our nation’s warfighting capability

against current and future threats.

CONCLUSION

IO education

considerations.

IO training

considerations.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I-1

“The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion

is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is

new, so we must think anew and act anew.”

Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress 1 December 1862

1. Introduction

Information operations (IO) are integral to the successful execution of military operations.

A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies.

Information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when it is effectively

translated into superior decisions. IO are described as the integrated employment of electronic

warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military

deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting

and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated

decision making while protecting our own. The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint force

commanders (JFCs) and their staffs guidance to help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO in

support of joint operations. To apply IO across the range of military operations, the JFC integrates

his military actions, forces, and capabilities throughout the domains (air, land, sea, and space) of

the operating environment in order to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects on

adversary leaders, forces (regular or irregular), information, information systems, and other

audiences; while protecting and defending the JFC’s own forces actions, information, and

information systems. The commander assesses the nature of the mission and develops the intent

for IO in all phases of an operation or campaign.

2. The Information Environment

a. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems

that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors include leaders, decision makers,

individuals, and organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect,

analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is where humans and

automated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principal

environment of decision making. Even though the information environment is considered distinct,

it resides within each of the four domains. The information environment is made up of three

interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive (see Figure I-1).

(1) The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of the command

and control (C2) systems, and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations

to conduct operations across the air, land, sea, and space domains. It is also the dimension where

physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includes

the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively,

the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power has

traditionally been measured primarily in this dimension.
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(2) The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is where information is

collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2

of modern military forces is communicated, and where commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists of

the content and flow of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must be

protected.

(3) The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of

the decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think,

perceive, visualize, and decide. It is the most important of the three dimensions. This dimension

is also affected by a commander’s orders, training, and other personal motivations. Battles and

campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unit

cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well as

public opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension.

b. Advancements in technology have enabled information to be collected, processed,

stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected outside the cognitive process in quantities

and at speeds that were previously incomprehensible. While technology makes great quantities

of information available to audiences worldwide, perception-affecting factors provide the context

which individuals use to translate data into information and knowledge.

Figure I-1. The Information Environment

THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Where human decision making takes place

Dimension of intangibles such as morale, unit

cohesion, public opinion, situational awareness

Key characteristics: perceptions, emotions,

awareness, and understanding

Where information is collected, processed,

stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected

Dual nature - information itself and the medium

Links physical and cognitive dimensions

Key characteristics: information content and

flow, information quality

Where automated decision making takes place

Where the information environment overlaps

with the physical world

Information systems and networks

Key characteristics: computers and

communications systems, and supporting

infrastructures

Cognitive

Dimension

Informational

Dimension

Physical

Dimension
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Introduction

c. There are criteria that define the quality of information relative to its purpose. Information

quality criteria are shown in Figure I-2. The varying purposes of information require different applications

of these criteria to qualify it as valuable. Additionally, each decision relies on a different weighting of the

information quality criteria to make the best decision.

d. The finite amount of time and resources available to obtain information must be

considered. Whether decisions are made cognitively or pre-programmed in automated systems,

the limited time and resources to improve the quality of available information leaves decision

making subject to manipulation. Additionally, there are real costs associated with obtaining

quality information — that is, information well-suited to its purpose —such as those to acquire,

process, store, transport, and distribute information. The overall impact of successful IO improves

the quality of friendly information while degrading the quality of adversary information, thus,

providing friendly forces the ability to make faster, more accurate decisions. Quality criteria are

shown in Figure I-2.

3. Military Operations and the Information Environment

a. Information is a strategic resource vital to national security. Dominance of the

information environment is a reality that extends to the Armed Forces of the US at all levels.

Military operations, in particular, are dependent on many simultaneous and integrated activities

that, in turn, depend on information, and information systems, which must be protected.

Figure I-2. Information Quality Criteria

INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA

ACCURACY

Information that conveys the true situation

RELEVANCE

Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand

TIMELINESS

Information that is available in time to make decisions

USABILITY

Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays

COMPLETENESS

Information that provides the decision maker with all necessary data

BREVITY

Information that has only the level of detail required

SECURITY

Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required
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b. In modern military operations, commanders face a variety of information challenges.

Technical challenges include establishing and maintaining connectivity, particularly in austere and distributed

locations. Operational challenges include the complexities of modern combat against adversaries with

growing information capabilities. For example, regardless of their size, adversaries, including terrorist

groups, can counter US efforts through propaganda campaigns, or develop, purchase, or download

from the Internet tools and techniques enabling them to attack US information and information systems

which may result in tangible impacts on US diplomatic, economic, or military efforts. The global information

environment and its associated technologies is potentially available to everyone and as a result, US

military commanders face another challenge. Our adversaries now have the capability to pass information,

coordinate, exchange ideas, and synchronize their actions instantaneously.

c. The commander visualizes, plans, and directs operations — IO are a part of those

operations. The commander’s intent should specify a visualization of the desired effects to be

achieved with IO and other operations for the staff to develop IO objectives. The commander

must not only be able to visualize the desired effects to be achieved with IO but also understand

the adversary’s capabilities to limit the impact of US operations while the adversary strives to

acquire information superiority from the US. These effects can vary based on the objectives of

the mission, ranging from disrupting an enemy commander in combat to assuring friendly nations

through combined/multinational military training/exercises during peacetime. The role of the

military and the desired end state or effect, is dependent on the nature of the conflict. If conducting

a humanitarian assistance mission, then generating goodwill for the services rendered and

departing with a favorable impression of US activities becomes a primary objective. The

commander’s intent must include the concept of how these effects will help achieve force

objectives.

d. Military forces operate in an information environment of constantly changing

content and tempo. This evolution adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of planning

and executing military operations at a specific time and in a specific location. A continuum of

long-, medium-, and short-term factors shape the information environment for which military

operations are planned and in which such operations are executed. Commanders and IO cell

chiefs must be prepared to adapt or modify IO plans to meet their desired IO effects.

(1) Long-term factors which may shape the information environment include the

various ways by which humans:

(a) Organize (nation states, tribes, families, etc.).

(b) Govern.

(c) Interact as groups (culture, sociology, religion, etc.).

(d) Are regionally influenced (stability, alliances, economic relationships, etc.).

(e) Are technologically advanced.
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Introduction

(2) Medium-term factors may include the rise and fall of leaders, competition between groups

over resources or goals, incorporation of specific technologies into information infrastructure; and the

employment of resources by organizations to take advantage of information technology and infrastructure.

(3) Short-term factors may include weather; availability of finite resources to support

or employ specific information technologies (ITs); and ability to extend/maintain sensors and

portable information infrastructure to the specific location of distant military operations.

e. The pervasiveness of the information environment in human activity combined with the

speed and processing power of modern IT enhances and complicates military efforts to organize,

train, equip, plan, and operate. Today, technology has opened the way to an ever-increasing

span of control.

f. US forces perform their missions in an increasingly complex information

environment. To succeed, it is necessary for US forces to gain and maintain information

superiority. In Department of Defense (DOD) policy, information superiority is described as the

operational advantage gained by the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted

flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.

(1) The forces possessing better information and using that information to more

effectively gain understanding have a major advantage over their adversaries. A commander

who gains this advantage can use it to accomplish missions by affecting perceptions, attitudes,

decisions, and actions. However, information superiority is not static; during operations, all

sides continually attempt to secure their own advantages and deny useful information to

adversaries. The operational advantages of information superiority can take several forms,

ranging from the ability to create a common operational picture to the ability to delay an adversary’s

decision to commit reinforcements.

(2) Recognizing information superiority can be difficult to attain over certain adversaries, but

its advantages are significant. When it exists, the information available to commanders allows them to

accurately visualize the situation, anticipate events, and make appropriate, timely decisions more effectively

than adversary decision makers. In essence, information superiority enhances commanders’ freedom of

action and allows them to execute decisions, and maintain the initiative, while remaining inside the

adversary’s decision cycle. However, commanders recognize that without continuous IO designed to

achieve and maintain information superiority, adversaries may counter those advantages and possibly

attain information superiority themselves. Commanders can achieve information superiority by maintaining

accurate situational understanding while controlling or affecting the adversaries’ or TAs’ perceptions.

The more a commander can shape this disparity, the greater the friendly advantage.

g. Potential information adversaries come in many shapes: traditionally hostile countries who wish

to gain information on US military capabilities and intentions; malicious hackers who wish to steal from

or harm the US Government (USG) or military; terrorists; and economic competitors, just to name a

few. Potential adversarial information attack techniques are numerous. Some, particularly electronic

means, can be prevented by the consistent application of encryption, firewalls, and other network

security techniques. Others are considerably more difficult to counter. Possible threat information
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techniques include, but are not limited to, deception, electronic attack (EA), computer network attack

(CNA), propaganda and psychological operations, and supporting signals intelligence (SIGINT)

operations.

h. With the free flow of information present in all theaters, such as television, phone, and Internet,

conflicting messages can quickly emerge to defeat the intended effects. As a result, continuous

synchronization and coordination between IO, public affairs (PA), public diplomacy (PD), and our allies

is imperative, and will help ensure that information themes employed during operations involving neutral

or friendly populations remain consistent.

i. Legal Considerations in IO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring

careful review. Beyond strict compliance with legalities, US military activities in the information

environment as in the physical domains, are conducted as a matter of policy and societal values

on a basis of respect for fundamental human rights. US forces, whether operating physically

from bases or locations overseas or from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, are

required by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the law of armed conflict

(LOAC).

4. Principles of Information Operations

a. Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating essential information

while denying it to the adversary and other TAs. IO encompass planning, coordination, and

synchronization of the employment of current capabilities to deliberately affect or defend the

information environment to achieve the commander’s objectives. Figure I-3 describes how IO

is integrated into joint operations.

(1) Core capabilities (EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC) are integrated

into the planning and execution of operations in the information environment.

(2) Supporting IO capabilities (information assurance [IA], physical security, physical

attack, counterintelligence [CI], and combat camera [COMCAM]) have military purposes other

than IO but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the information

environment.

(3) Related IO capabilities (PA, civil-military operations [CMO], and defense support

to public diplomacy [DSPD]) may be constrained by US policy or legal considerations. While

these capabilities have common interfaces with IO, their primary purposes and rules make them

separate and distinct. As a result, it is essential that commanders and their staffs coordinate their

efforts when exercising their functions within the information environment.

b. IO are primarily concerned with affecting decisions and decision-making processes,

while at the same time defending friendly decision-making processes. Primary mechanisms

used to affect the information environment include: influence, disruption, corruption, or usurpation.
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Introduction Figure I-3. Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTO JOINT OPERATIONS (NOTIONAL)

Core, Supporting,

Related Information

Activities

Electronic Warfare Electronic Attack

Electronic Protection

Electronic Warfare

Support

Computer Network

Attack

Physical,

Informational

Usability Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES)/

Targeting Process

Individuals, Governments,

Militaries

Individuals, Governments,

Militaries

Individuals, Businesses,

Governments, Militaries

Individuals, Businesses,

Governments, Militaries

Businesses, Governments,

Militaries

Businesses, Governments,

Militaries

Businesses, Governments,

Militaries

Businesses, Governments,

Militaries

Businesses, Governments,

Militaries

Governments

Governments, MilitariesGovernments, MilitariesGovernments, Militaries

MilitariesMilitaries

JOPES/Defense Planning

Joint Intelligence Preparation of

the Battlespace(JIPB)/SIGINT

Collection

JIPB/JOPES/Targeting Process

JOPES/J-6 Vulnerability AnalysisJOPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis

JOPES/Defense Planning

JOPES/Joint Operation PlanningJOPES/Joint Operation PlanningJOPES/Joint Operation PlanningJOPES/Joint Operation PlanningJOPES/Joint Operation PlanningJOPES/Joint Operation Planning

Interagency Coordination

JIPB/Human Intelligence Collection

Destroy, Disrupt, DelayDestroy, Disrupt, Delay

Destroy, Disrupt

Protect Computer

Networks

Influence

MisleadMislead

Influence

Deny

InformInform

Protect Information and

Informatin Systems

Secure Information and

Protect the Use of ElectroInformation Infrastructure magnetic Spectrum Identify and Locate Threats Physical Security Security Security Security Security Usability

Usability

Relevance

AccuracyAccuracyAccuracyAccuracyAccuracy

Physical Usability

CognitiveCognitiveCognitiveCognitiveCognitiveCognitive

Informational

PhysicalPhysical

Cognitive

Computer Network

Defense

Psychological

Operations

Military Deception

Operations Security

Information

Assurance

Physical Security

Physical Attack

Counterintelligence

Civil Military

Operations

Public Affairs

Public Diplomacy

Computer Network

Operations

Psychological

Operations

Military Deception

Operations Security

Supporting

Capabilities

Related

Capabilities

Activities Audience/ Target Objective Information Quality Primary Planning/ Integration Process Who does it?

Physical,

Informational

Physical,

Informational

Individuals, Governments,

Militaries

JIPB/Targeting Process Gain Information From and About Computers

and Computer Networks

Security Computer Network

Exploitation

Informational

Governments, Militaries JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Inform/Document Usability,

Accuracy

Physical Combat Camera
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c. IO’s ability to affect and defend decision making is based on five fundamental

assumptions. Although each of these assumptions is an important enabling factor for IO, they

will not all necessarily be true for every operation. For any specific operation where one or more of

these assumptions are not met, the risk assessment provided to the commander would be adjusted

accordingly.

(1) Generally, the quality of information that is considered valuable to human and

automated decision makers is universal. However, the relative importance of each quality criterion

of information (Figure I-2) may vary based on the influences of geography, language, culture,

religion, organization, experience, or personality.

(2) Decisions are made based on the information available at the time.

(3) It is possible, with finite resources, to understand the relevant aspects of the information

environment to include the processes decision makers use to make decisions.

(4) It is possible to affect the information environment in which specific decision

makers act through psychological, electronic, or physical means.

(5) It is possible to measure the effectiveness of IO actions in relation to an operational

objective.

d. Since human activity takes place in the information environment, it is potentially subject

to IO. However, only mission-related critical psychological, electronic, and physical points

in the information environment should be targeted, directly or indirectly, by IO. The

planning methodologies used to identify and prioritize such points in planning IO are discussed

in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”

e. IO capabilities can produce effects and achieve objectives at all levels of war and

across the range of military operations. The nature of the modern information environment

complicates the identification of the boundaries between these levels. Therefore, at all levels,

information activities, including IO must be consistent with broader national security

policy and strategic objectives.

f. Because IO are conducted across the range of military operations, and can make significant

contributions before major operations commence, the IO environment should be prepared and assessed

through a variety of engagement and intelligence activities, all designed to make IO more effective. In

addition to impacting the environment prior to the onset of military operations, IO are essential to postcombat operations. Therefore, integration, planning, employment, and assessment of core, supporting,

and related IO are vital to ensuring a rapid transition to a peaceful environment.

g. The ultimate strategic objective of IO is to deter a potential or actual adversary or

other TA from taking actions that threaten US national interests. Additionally, IO actions

executed through civilian controlled portions of the global information environment, or which

may cause unintended reactions from US or foreign populaces, must account for US policy and
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Introduction

legal issues, as well as potentially disruptive infrastructure issues, through civil-military coordination at all

levels.

(1) IO may target human decision making or automated decision support systems

with specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to be targeted with

increasing precision and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. However, targeting

automated decision making, at any level, is only as effective as the human adversary’s

reliance on such decisions.

(2) The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in order

to affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and understanding of the situation.

IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways:

(a) By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add,

modify, or remove information from the environment of various individuals or groups of decision

makers.

(b) By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates,

processes, and/or stores information in support of targeted decision makers.

(c) By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data,

information, and knowledge.

h. All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive operations.

Commanders use IO capabilities in both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously to

accomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations and

systems. Fully integrating IO capabilities for offensive and defensive operations requires planners

to treat IO as a single function. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following:

(1) Destroy. To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function

or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.

(2) Disrupt. To break or interrupt the flow of information.

(3) Degrade. To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 or

communications systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the

morale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisions

and actions.

(4) Deny. To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information,

systems, and services.

(5) Deceive. To cause a person to believe what is not true. MILDEC seeks to mislead

adversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality.
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(6) Exploit. To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant false

or misleading information.

(7) Influence. To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to US forces.

(8) Protect. To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment

and information.

(9) Detect. To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into

information systems.

(10) Restore. To bring information and information systems back to their original

state.

(11) Respond. To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack or intrusion.

5. Strategic Communication

a. Strategic Communication constitutes focused USG efforts to understand and engage key

audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG

interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages,

and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power.

b. DOD efforts must be part of a government-wide approach to develop and implement a more

robust strategic communication capability. DOD must also support and participate in USG strategic

communication activities to understand, inform, and influence relevant foreign audiences to include:

DOD’s transition to and from hostilities, security, military forward presence, and stability operations.

This is primarily accomplished through its PA, DSPD, and IO capabilities.

c. DOD PA, DSPD, and IO are distinct functions that can support strategic communication.

Synchronization of strategic communication-related PA, IO, and DSPD activities is essential for

effective strategic communication.

d. Combatant commanders should ensure planning for IO, PA, and DSPD are consistent

with overall USG strategic communication objectives and are approved by the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD). Combatant commanders should integrate an information strategy

into planning for peacetime and contingency situations. Combatant commanders plan, execute,

and assess PA, DSPD, and IO activities to implement theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs),

to support US embassies’ information programs, and to support other agencies’ public diplomacy

and PA programs directly supporting DOD missions.

6. Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations

a. History indicates that the speed and accuracy of information available to military

commanders is the significant factor in determining the outcome on the battlefield. IO enables
I-11

Introduction

the accuracy and timeliness of information required by US military commanders by defending our

systems from exploitation by adversaries. IO are used to deny adversaries access to their C2 information

and other supporting automated infrastructures.

b. Adversaries are increasingly exploring and testing IO actions as asymmetric warfare that can be

used to thwart US military objectives that are heavily reliant on information systems. This requires the

US military to employ defensive technologies and utilize leading-edge tactics and procedures to prevent

our forces and systems from being successfully attacked.
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II

CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION

OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

II-1

“The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.”

Charles Ardant du Picq 1821 - 1870

1. Introduction

IO coordinates and synchronizes the employment of the five core capabilities in support of the

combatant commander’s objectives or to prevent the adversary from achieving his desired objectives.

The core capabilities are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. There are five supporting

capabilities: IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, and COMCAM, and three related capabilities:

PA, CMO, and DSPD. Together these capabilities enable the commander to affect and influence a

situation. However, the potential for conflict between interrelated capabilities requires their employment

be coordinated, integrated, and synchronized.

2. Core Information Operations Capabilities

a. Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major

part in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first by

EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction with

supporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an

adversary and other TAs by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information

environment.

b. Psychological Operations

(1) PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to

foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior

of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or

reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital part

of the broad range of US activities to influence foreign audiences and are the only DOD operations

authorized to influence foreign TAs directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. PSYOP

personnel advise the supported commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts of

every aspect of force employment, and how to develop a strategy for developing and planning the

dissemination of specific PSYOP programs, to achieve the overall campaign objectives. During a crisis,

a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) deploys at the request of the supported commander. A POAT is

a small, tailored team of PSYOP planners, product distribution/dissemination, and logistics specialists.

The POAT assesses the situation, develops PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate level

of support to accomplish the mission. A POAT can augment a unified command or joint task force

(JTF) staff and provide PSYOP planning support. The senior PSYOP officer in the operational area,

normally the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) commander, may also serve as the de

facto joint force PSYOP officer. Working through the various component operations staffs, the joint
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JP 3-13

force PSYOP officer ensures continuity of psychological objectives and identifies themes to stress and

avoid.

(2) PSYOP as an IO Core Capability. PSYOP has a central role in the achievement of IO

objectives in support of the JFC. In today’s information environment even PSYOP conducted at the

tactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must be

understood and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This is

particularly important in the early stages of an operation given the time it takes to develop, design,

produce, distribute, disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. All PSYOP are conducted

under the authority of interagency-coordinated and OSD approved PSYOP programs. The PSYOP

program approval process at the national level requires time for sufficient coordination and resolution of

issues; hence, JFCs should begin PSYOP planning as early as possible to ensure the execution of

PSYOP in support of operations. A JFC must have an approved PSYOP program, execution authority,

and delegation of product approval authority before PSYOP execution can begin. JFCs should request

PSYOP planners immediately during the initial crisis stages to ensure the JFC has plenty of lead time to

obtain the proper authority to execute PSYOP. PSYOP assets may be of particular value to the JFC in

pre-/post-combat operations when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. PSYOP

must be coordinated with CI, MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure deconfliction and control, CI operations

are not compromised, and that all capabilities within IO are coordinated to achieve the objectives

established in planning. There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PA

staffs in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences, which is the purpose of the IO cell.

PSYOP efforts are most effective when personnel with a thorough understanding of the language and

culture of the TA are included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. As the information

environment evolves, the dissemination of PSYOP products is expanding from traditional print and

broadcast to more sophisticated use of the Internet, facsimile messaging, text messaging, and other

emerging media. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination of

the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO, and EW.

For more discussion on PSYOP, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological

Operations.

c. Military Deception

(1) MILDEC is described as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary

decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary

to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’

mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities — MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect

analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny real

information to an adversary, and prevent correct deduction of friendly plans. To be effective, a MILDEC

operation must be susceptible to adversary collection systems and “seen” as credible to the enemy

commander and staff. A plausible approach to MILDEC planning is to employ a friendly course of

action (COA) that can be executed by friendly forces and that adversary intelligence can verify. However,

MILDEC planners must not fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values,

and reactions that “mirror image” likely friendly actions in the same situation, i.e., assuming that the

adversary will respond or act in a particular manner based on how we would respond. There are
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Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities

always competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the resources required for the

real operation. For this reason, the deception plan should be developed concurrently with the real plan,

starting with the commander’s and staff’s initial estimate, to ensure proper resourcing of both. To

encourage incorrect analysis by the adversary, it is usually more efficient and effective to provide a false

purpose for real activity than to create false activity. OPSEC of the deception plan is at least as

important as OPSEC of the real plan, since compromise of the deception may expose the real plan.

This requirement for close hold planning while ensuring detailed coordination is the greatest challenge to

MILDEC planners. On joint staffs, MILDEC planning and oversight responsibility is normally organized

as a staff deception element in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3).

(2) MILDEC as an IO Core Capability. MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. It

exploits the adversary’s information systems, processes, and capabilities. MILDEC relies upon

understanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and plan and how both use

information management to support their efforts. This requires a high degree of coordination with all

elements of friendly forces’ activities in the information environment as well as with physical activities.

Each of the core, supporting, and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of successful

MILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time. While PA should not be involved in the provision

of false information, it must be aware of the intent and purpose of MILDEC in order not to inadvertently

compromise it.

For more discussion on MILDEC, see JP 3-58, Military Deception.

d. Operations Security

(1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing

friendly actions and other activities to: identify what friendly information is necessary for the

adversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversary

decision makers critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversary

decision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information because other

information about friendly forces and intentions remain secure. On joint staffs, responsibilities

for OPSEC are normally delegated to the J-3. A designated OPSEC program manager supervises

other members of the command-assigned OPSEC duties and oversees the coordination,

development, and implementation of OPSEC as an integrated part of IO in the operational area.

(2) OPSEC as an IO Core Capability. OPSEC denies the adversary the information

needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. In particular, OPSEC complements

MILDEC by denying an adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove

a deception plan. For those IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and vulnerabilities,

such as EW and CNO, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly capabilities are not compromised.

The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking measures to

mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach to

securing friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. Examples

of other types of security include physical security, IA programs, computer network defense (CND),

and personnel programs that screen personnel and limit authorized access.
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For more discussion on OPSEC, see JP 3-54, Operations Security.

e. Electronic Warfare

(1) EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) and

directed energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the adversary. EW includes three major

subdivisions: EA, electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). EA involves

the use of EM energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weaponsto attack personnel, facilities, or

equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability.

EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists of actions tasked by, or under direct

control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize

sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat

recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. ES provides information

required for decisions involving EW operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance,

targeting, and homing. ES data can be used to produce SIGINT, provide targeting for electronic

or other forms of attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). SIGINT

and MASINT can also provide battle damage assessment (BDA) and feedback on the effectiveness

of the overall operational plan.

(2) EW as an IO Core Capability. EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensive

and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarial

use of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom of action in that spectrum. Expanding reliance

on the EM spectrum for informational purposes increases both the potential and the challenges of EW

in IO. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends both the utility and

threat of EW, offering opportunities to exploit an adversary’s electronic vulnerabilities and a requirement

to identify and protect our own from similar exploitation. As the use of the EM spectrum has become

universal in military operations, so has EW become involved in all aspects of IO. All of the core,

supporting, and related IO capabilities either directly use EW or indirectly benefit from EW. In order to

coordinate and deconflict EW, and more broadly all military usage of the EM spectrum, an electronic

warfare coordination cell (EWCC) should be established by the JFC to reside with the component

commander most appropriate to the operation. In addition, all joint operations require a joint restricted

frequency list (JRFL). This list specifies protected, guarded, and taboo frequencies that should not

normally be disrupted without prior coordination and planning, either because of friendly use or friendly

exploitation. This is maintained and promulgated by the communications system directorate of a joint

staff (J-6) in coordination with J-3 and the joint commander’s electronic warfare staff (or EWCC, if

delegated).

For more discussion on EW, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

f. Computer Network Operations

(1) CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military operations. CNO

stems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems by

military and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt,
II-5

Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities

deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. For the purpose of military operations,

CNO are divided into CNA, CND, and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling

operations. CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny,

degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and

networks themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect,

monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and

computer networks. CND actions not only protect DOD systems from an external adversary but also

from exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE is

enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks

to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Note that due to

the continued expansion of wireless networking and the integration of computers and radio frequency

communications, there will be operations and capabilities that blur the line between CNO and EW and

that may require case-by-case determination when EW and CNO are assigned separate release authorities.

(2) CNO as an IO Core Capability. The increasing reliance of unsophisticated

militaries and terrorist groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2

forces reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability of computers

and the range of their employment broadens, new vulnerabilities and opportunities will continue

to develop. This offers both opportunities to attack and exploit an adversary’s computer system

weaknesses and a requirement to identify and protect our own from similar attack or exploitation.

The doctrinal use of CNO capabilities in support of IO is discussed further in Appendix A,

“Supplemental Guidance,” to this publication.

g. Mutual Support Among IO Capabilities. A more detailed description of how the IO

core capabilities mutually support one another is illustrated in the table at Appendix B, “Mutual

Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities.” This shows some of the positive

interrelationships between the contributors to IO effects. For each positive contribution, there is

also the possibility of negative effects if these capabilities, which all operate in the information

environment, are not fully coordinated. The development of effective IO across the range of

military operations depends upon a full understanding of this interrelationship among capabilities.

Only then can they be properly and effectively integrated through the processes discussed in

Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”

3. Information Operations Supporting Capabilities

a. Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, and

COMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and

contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but

also serve other wider purposes.

b. Information Assurance

(1) IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systems

by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes
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providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction

capabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority. IA requires a defense-in-depth

approach that integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayer

and multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must assume

that access can be gained to information and information systems from inside and outside DOD-controlled

networks. In joint organizations, IA is a responsibility of the J-6.

(2) IA as a Supporting Capability for IO. IO depends on IA to protect information

and information systems, thereby assuring continuous capability. IA and IO have an operational

relationship in which IO are concerned with the coordination of military activities in the

information environment, while IA protects the electronic and automated portions of the

information environment. IA and all aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other to

be effective. IO relies on IA to protect infrastructure to ensure its availability to position

information for influence purposes and for the delivery of information to the adversary.

Conversely, IA relies on IO to provide operational protection with coordinated OPSEC, EP,

CND, and CI against adversary IO or intelligence efforts directed against friendly electronic

information or information systems.

For detailed policy guidance, see DOD Directive (DODD) 8500.1, Information Assurance (IA),

DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation. Joint policy is

established in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.03, Information

Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND) Joint Quarterly Readiness Review

(JQRR) Metrics, and CJCSI 6510.01 Series, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network

Defense (CND).

c. Physical Security

(1) Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed

to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and

documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical

security process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats, applying appropriate

deterrent, control and denial safeguarding techniques and measures, and responding to changing

conditions.

(2) Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO. Just as IA protects friendly

electronic information and information systems, physical security protects physical facilities

containing information and information systems worldwide. Physical security often contributes

to OPSEC, particularly in the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity could

compromise the real plan. IO plans may require significant physical security resources and this requirement

should be made clear to the J-3 as early as possible in the planning process.

For more discussion on physical security, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for

Civil-Military Operations, and in general, JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.
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Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities

d. Physical Attack

(1) The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. Physical attack disrupts,

damages, or destroys adversary targets through destructive power. Physical attack can also be

used to create or alter adversary perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable information

systems.

(2) Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO. Physical attack can be

employed in support of IO as a means of attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy ability to exercise

C2 and of influencing TAs. IO capabilities, for example PSYOP, can be employed in support of

physical attack to maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary. The integration

and synchronization of fires with IO through the targeting process is fundamental to creating the

necessary synergy between IO and more traditional maneuver and strike operations. In order to

achieve this integration, commanders must be able to define the effects they seek to achieve and

staffs will incorporate these capabilities into the commander’s plan. Specifically, due to the fastpaced conduct of air operations, it is crucial that the planning and execution of both IO and air

operations be conducted concurrently to produce the most effective targeting plan. Considerations

of targeting are discussed in more detail in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”

e. Counterintelligence

(1) CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect against

espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of

foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international

terrorist activities. The CI programs in joint staffs are a responsibility of the CI and human

intelligence staff element of the intelligence directorate.

(2) CI as a Supporting Capability for IO. CI procedures are a critical part of guarding

friendly information and information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA,

physical security, CI, and OPSEC with risk management procedures offers the best chance to

protect friendly information and information systems from adversary actions. CNO provide

some of the tools needed to conduct CI operations. For the IO planner, CI analysis offers a view

of the adversary’s information-gathering methodology. From this, CI can develop the initial

intelligence target opportunities that provide access to the adversary for MILDEC information,

PSYOP products, and CNA/CNE actions.

For more discussion on CI, see classified JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence

Support to Operations.

f. Combat Camera

(1) The COMCAM mission is to provide the OSD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(CJCS), the Military Departments, the combatant commands, and the JTF with an imagery capability in

support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations. COMCAM

is responsible for rapid development and dissemination of products that support strategic and operational
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IO objectives. The COMCAM program belongs to the Defense Visual Information Directorate, which

falls under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. When deployed, operational control of

COMCAM forces can be delegated to any echelon of command at the discretion of the JFC and

subordinate commanders. COMCAM may be coordinated by the IO staff at the JFC, component,

and subordinate unit levels. Most large JTF organizations will have a joint COMCAM management

team assigned to manage COMCAM, and to assist in the movement of imagery. Additionally, there are

usually one or more joint or component specific COMCAM teams assigned to the theater. These

component teams may be assigned to special operations forces (SOF) or other specific units.

(2) Combat Camera as a Supporting Capability for IO. COMCAM supports all

of the capabilities of IO that use images of US or friendly force operations, whether to influence

an adversary or other TAs or support US forces or allies. They provide images for PSYOP,

MILDEC, PA, and CMO use, but can also be used for BDA/measures of effectiveness (MOEs)

analysis. COMCAM can also provide records of IO actions for subsequent rebuttal proceedings.

However, COMCAM imagery must be controlled in order to ensure that OPSEC is maintained

and valuable information is not released to the adversary. The quality and format, including

digital video/still photography, night and thermal imagery, means that COMCAM products can

be provided to professional news organizations by PA when they are unable to provide their own

imagery.

For more discussion on COMCAM, see Field Manual (FM) 3-55.12 / Marine Corps Reference

Publication (MCRP) 3-33.7A / Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(NTTP) 3-13.12 /Air Force

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP [1]) 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations.

4. Information Operations Related Capabilities

a. There are three military functions, PA, CMO, and DSPD, specified as related capabilities

for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated

and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose

and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional

care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO

staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.

b. Public Affairs

(1) PA are those public information, command information, and community relations

activities directed toward both external and internal audiences with interest in DOD. PA is

essential for joint forces information superiority, and credible PA operations are necessary to

support the commander’s mission and maintain essential public liaisons. PA’s principal focus is

to inform domestic and international audiences of joint operations to support combatant command

public information needs (see Figure II-1).

(2) PA as a Related Capability to IO. PA and IO must be coordinated and synchronized

to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses. As with other
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Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities

related IO capabilities, PA has a role in all aspects of DOD’s missions and functions. Communication of

operational matters to internal and external audiences is just one part of PA’s function. In performing

duties as one of the primary spokesmen, the public affairs officer’s interaction with the IO staff enables

PA activities to be integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted with IO. While intents differ, PA and IO

ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences.

PA contributes to the achievement of military objectives, for instance, by countering adversary

misinformation and disinformation through the publication of accurate information. PA also assists

OPSEC by ensuring that the media are aware of the implications of premature release of information.

The embedding of media in combat units offers new opportunities, as well as risks, for the media and the

military; the PA staff has a key role in establishing embedding ground rules. Many adversaries rely on

limiting their population’s knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint

forces’ messages to these populations.

For more discussion on PA, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

c. Civil-Military Operations

(1) CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit

relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations

and authorities, and the civilian populace. They are conducted across the range of military operations to

address root causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted

Figure II-1. Principles of Public Information

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory

requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints

or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The “Freedom of Information Act”

shall be supported in both letter and spirit.

Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect

national security, or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of

the Armed Forces.

The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) obligation to provide the public with

information on DOD major programs may require detailed public affairs

planning and coordination in the DOD and with other Government Agencies.

Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public.

A free flow of general and military information shall be made available,

without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed

Forces and their dependents.

Information shall not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the

Government from criticism or embarrassment.
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independent of other military operations to support US national security objectives. CMO can occur in

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas to facilitate military operations and achieve US objectives.

CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the

responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or

subsequent to other military actions. CMO may be performed by designated civil affairs (CA), by other

military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. Certain types of organizations are particularly

suited to this mission and form the nucleus of CMO. These units are typically CA and PSYOP units.

Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF, engineers, health service support, transportation, military

police and security forces, may act as enablers. Personnel skilled in the language and culture of the

population are essential to CMO.

(2) CMO as a Related Capability to IO. CMO can be particularly effective in

peacetime and pre-/post-combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be

constrained. Early consideration of the civil-military environment in which operations will take

place is important. As with PA, the CMO staff also has an important role to play in the development

of broader IO plans and objectives. As the accessibility of information to the widest public

audiences increases and as military operations increasingly are conducted in open environments,

the importance of CMO to the achievement of IO objectives will increase. At the same time the

direct involvement of CMO with core, supporting and related IO capabilities (for instance PSYOP,

CNO, and CI) will also increase. CMO, by their nature, usually affect public perceptions in their

immediate locale. Distribution of information about CMO efforts and results through PA and

PSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or

individuals.

For more discussion on CMO, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

d. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy

(1) DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by DOD components, not solely

in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG.

(2) DSPD, PD, and IO. DOD contributes to PD, which includes those overt international

information activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking to

understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialogue

between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. When approved, PSYOP

assets may be employed in support of DSPD as part of security cooperation initiatives or in support of

US embassy PD programs. Much of the operational level IO activity conducted in any theater will be

directly linked to PD objectives. DSPD requires coordination with both the interagency and among

DOD components.

For more discussion on DSPD, see DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO).
CHAPTER III

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

III-1

“To understand human decisions and human behavior requires something more

than an appreciation of immediate stimuli. It requires, too, a consideration of the

totality of forces, material and spiritual, which condition, influence or direct human

responses. And because we are dealing with human beings, the forces which

helped shape their actions must be recognized as multiple, subtle, and infinitely

complex.”

David Herlihy, The History of Feudalism

1. Introduction

Like all other aspects of joint operations, IO requires effective intelligence support. IO is

intelligence intensive in particular and therefore successful planning, preparation, execution,

and assessment of IO demand detailed and timely intelligence. This chapter briefly discusses

how intelligence supports the planning and execution of IO.

2. Intelligence Support to Information Operations

Before military activities in the information environment can be planned, the current “state”

of the dynamic information environment must be collected, analyzed, and provided to commanders

and their staffs. This requires intelligence on relevant portions of the physical, informational,

and cognitive properties of the information environment, which necessitates collection and analysis

of a wide variety of information and the production of a wide variety of intelligence products as

discussed below.

a. Nature of IO Intelligence Requirements. In order to understand the adversary or

other TA decision-making process and determine the appropriate capabilities necessary to achieve

operational objectives, commanders and their staffs must have current data. This includes relevant

physical, informational, and cognitive properties of the information environment as well as

assessment of ongoing IO activities.

(1) Physical Properties of the Information Environment. Physical properties of

the information environment include people, places, things, and capabilities of information

infrastructure and adversary information capabilities. Examples include:

(a) Geographic coordinates of adversary information infrastructure and

capabilities.

(b) Organization of infrastructure and capabilities as well as identification of critical

links, nodes, and redundant communication infrastructure.

(c) Types, quantity, and configuration of information infrastructure and capabilities

(with specific makes, models, and numbers).
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(d) Organizational planning, decision, and execution processes.

(e) Enemy intelligence/feedback mechanism for gaining battlespace awareness,

information, and knowledge.

(f) Enemy computer attack, defense, and exploitation capabilities.

(2) Informational Properties of the Information Environment. Informational properties

of the information environment include those systems and networks where information is created,

processed, manipulated, transmitted, and shared. It includes those properties relevant to the electronic

collection, transmission, processing, storage, and display of information. These properties may be

electronic or human-to-human or a combination of both. They describe the formal and informal

communications infrastructure and networks, kinship and descent relationships, licit and illicit commercial

relationships and social affiliations and contacts that collectively create, process, manipulate, transmit,

and share information in an operational area and among TAs. Examples of informational properties

include:

(a) Specification, capacity, configuration, and usage of information infrastructure

and capabilities.

(b) Technical design of information infrastructure.

(c) Networks of human-to-human contact used for the transmission of information

(couriers, rat-lines, dead-drops, etc.).

(d) Social and commercial networks that process and share information and

influence (kinship and descent linkages, formal and informal social contacts, licit and illicit

commercial affiliations and records of ownership and transactions, etc.).

(e) Content and context.

(3) Cognitive Properties of the Information Environment. Cognitive properties

of the information environment are the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human

attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of

information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization. Cognitive properties

may include:

(a) Cultural and societal factors affecting attitudes and perceptions such as

language, education, history, religion, myths, personal experience, and family structure.

(b) Identity of key individuals and groups affecting attitudes and perceptions,

whether in the same or a different country as those they influence.

(c) Identity and psychological profile of key decision makers, their advisors, key

associates, and/or family members who influence them.
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Intelligence Support to Information Operations

(d) Credibility of key individuals or groups and specification of their sphere of influence.

(e) Laws, regulations, and procedures relevant to information and decision making,

decision-making processes, capability employment doctrine, timeliness, and information content.

(f) How leaders think, perceive, plan, execute, and assess outcomes of their results

and actions from their perspectives.

(g) Identify key historical events between the target country and the US, which

may affect an individual or group’s attitudes and perceptions of the US, whether in the same or

different country as those they influence.

(4) While these broad types of properties of the information environment illustrate the diversity

of IO intelligence requirements, it is important to note that multiple sources and methods may be required

to collect physical, informational, and cognitive properties of specific collection targets in order to fuse

and analyze different properties in support of IO planning. For instance, if operational planning requires

intelligence on radio stations within an adversary country, that requirement may include the number and

location of broadcast and transmission facilities (physical), the technical specifications of each station

(informational), the identity of owners and key personnel, and the credibility or popularity of each station

(cognitive).

b. Intelligence Support to IO Planning. Intelligence support is an integral part of IO

planning. In particular, the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process provides

a valuable methodology for identifying capabilities, vulnerabilities, and critical nodes within the

information environment. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, discusses JIPB support to IO. A sequential overview

of intelligence support to IO planning includes actions to:

(1) Identify adversary information value, use, flow, and vulnerabilities relevant to

specific types of decision making.

(2) Identify individual systems and target sets relevant to specified adversary or other

TA decision making.

(3) Identify desired effects appropriate to individual systems and target sets.

(4) Predict the consequences (non-objective related outcomes) of identified actions.

(5) Coordinate with planning personnel to establish priority of intelligence requirements.

(6) Assist in developing IO assessment criteria during planning and then assist in

monitoring and assessing IO during execution (which may extend before and after execution of

conventional operations).

(7) Tailor assessment/feedback methodologies to specific operations.
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(8) Evaluate the outcome of executed IO activities/tasks.

(9) Provide assessment for IO actions relative to JFC objectives and mission.

c. Intelligence Considerations in Planning Information Operations

(1) Information Environment Impact on Intelligence Support. The nature of the

information environment has profound implications for intelligence support to IO. Members of

the operational community and the intelligence community must understand these implications

in order to efficiently request and provide quality intelligence support to IO. These implications

are listed below.

(a) Intelligence Resources are Limited. Information collection requirements

are almost limitless, especially for many types of IO. Commanders and their intelligence and

operations directorates must work together to identify IO intelligence requirements and ensure

that they are given high enough priority in the commander’s requests to the intelligence community

(IC).

(b) Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The nature of the information

environment complicates compliance with legal constraints and restraints. Thus the IC must

implement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally,

intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or

other sources. Especially in the area of CNO, where the application of different domestic and

international laws may be unclear, close coordination among the operational, legal, and law

enforcement communities is essential.

(c) IO Intelligence Often Requires Long Lead Times. The intelligence

necessary to affect adversary or other TA decisions often requires that specific sources and

methods be positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conduct

analyses required for IO planning. Commanders and their staffs, including IO planners, must be

aware of the relative lead times required to develop different types of intelligence both for initial

planning and for feedback during operations. To deal with these long lead times, the commander

must provide detailed initial guidance to the staff during the mission analysis and estimate

processes.

(d) The Information Environment is Dynamic. The information environment

changes over time according to different factors. Physical changes may occur more slowly and

may be easier to detect than informational or cognitive changes. Commanders and their staffs

must understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentials

for change in the dimensions of the information environment. The implication is that we must

have agile intellects, intelligence systems, and organizational processes to exploit this dynamic

environment.
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Intelligence Support to Information Operations

(e) Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence. Collection of

physical and electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity. While identification

of key individuals and groups of interest may be a relatively straightforward challenge, the relative

importance of various individuals and groups, their psychological profiles, and how they interact is not

easily agreed upon nor quantified. Commanders and their staffs must have an appreciation for the

subjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature. They must also continue to pursue effective

means of trying to measure subjective elements using MOEs and other applicable techniques.

(2) Coordination of Planned IO with Intelligence. Coordination should occur among

intelligence, targeting, IO, and collection management personnel. The requirement for accurate

intelligence gain/loss and political/military assessments, when determining targets to attack and

means of employment, is central to the integration of IO.

(3) Foreign Perceptions and Human Factors Analysis. Assessing foreign

perceptions is necessary for successful IO activities. Preparing the modern battlespace for

successful joint operations relies on a thorough understanding of the information environment,

including foreign perceptions, TA analysis, and cultural analysis. Geographic combatant

commanders require IC support to continually assess foreign perceptions of support for the

areas of responsibility (AORs) TSCP efforts, along with Joint Operation Planning and Execution

System (JOPES) planning activities. Human factors analysis in conjunction with an understanding

of the cultural environment are also important in avoiding projection of US cultural bias on TAs

(mirror imaging). Intelligence resources contribute to assessing of foreign populations through

human factors analysis, influence net modeling, foreign media analysis, media mapping, polling/

focus group analysis, and key communicators/sources of influence analysis. This is, for the

most part, open source intelligence and must be interpreted and synthesized by country/cultural

intelligence subject matter experts (SMEs).

(4) Priority of Effort. The requirement to collect, analyze, and produce detailed

intelligence of the granularity required for IO currently exceeds the resources of the IC. Assigning

intelligence resources to IO as with all operations is regulated based on established requirements

and processes within the IC. It is imperative that intelligence requirements be coordinated and

prioritized at each level of command.

d. Sources of Intelligence Support

(1) Through the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), IO planners and supporting

joint organizations have access to intelligence from the national and combatant command-level

intelligence producers and collectors. At the combatant command level, the theater joint intelligence

center supports IO planning and execution and provides support to JTFs through established joint

intelligence support elements. In multinational operations, when appropriate, the J-2 should share

information and assessments with allies and coalition partners.

(2) The J-2 on each joint staff normally assigns specific J-2 personnel to coordinate with IO

planners and capability specialties through the IO cell or other IO staff organizations established by the

JFC.
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Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

IV-1

“Good will can make any organization work; conversely the best organization in

the world is unsound if the men who have to make it work don’t believe in it.”

James Forrestal

1. Introduction

This chapter describes the JFC’s authority for IO, specific responsibilities established in

DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), and the Unified Command Plan, command

relationships between the DOD components responsible for IO, the organization of combatant

command and JTF staffs for IO, and joint boards, processes, and products related to IO.

2. Authorities and Responsibilities

a. Authorities. IO in one combatant command AOR may affect other AORs directly or

indirectly. To address this complication, the President has given Commander, United States

Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) specific responsibility to coordinate IO (core

capabilities) across combatant command AOR boundaries.

b. Responsibilities

(1) Responsibilities for IO are established in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations

(IO). The commanders of the combatant commands shall integrate, plan, execute, and assess IO

when conducting campaigns across the range of military operations and shall identify and prioritize

IO requirements. IO shall be integrated into appropriate security cooperation plans and activities.

(2) In accordance with change 2 to Unified Command Plan for Fiscal Year ’04

CDRUSSTRATCOM integrates and coordinates DOD IO that cross AOR boundaries including:

(a) Supporting other combatant commanders for planning.

(b) Planning and coordinating capabilities that have trans-regional effects or that

directly support national objectives.

(c) Exercising C2 of selected missions if directed to do so by the President or the

Secretary of Defense (SecDef).

(d) Planning, directing, and identifying desired characteristics and capabilities

for DOD-wide CND.

(e) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities of CNA, conducting CNA

in support of assigned missions, and integrating CNA capabilities in support of other combatant

commanders, as directed.
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(f) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for joint EW and planning

for and conducting EW in support of assigned missions.

(g) Supporting other combatant commanders for the planning and integration of

joint OPSEC and MILDEC.

3. Joint Information Operations Organizational Roles and Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS’s) responsibilities for IO are both

general (such as those to establish doctrine, provide advice, and make recommendations) and specific

(such as those assigned in DOD IO policy). The J-3 serves as the CJCS’s focal point for IO and

coordinates with the other organizations within the Joint Staff that have direct or supporting IO

responsibilities. The IO divisions of the Joint Staff J-3 provide IO specific advice and advocate Joint

Staff and combatant commands’ IO interests and concerns within DOD and interact with other

organizations and individuals on behalf of the CJCS. CJCSI 3210.01 Series, Joint Information

Operations Policy, provides specific policy guidance on IO responsibilities and functions of the Joint

Staff.

b. Combatant Commands

(1) CDRUSSTRATCOM’s specific authority and responsibility to coordinate IO across

AOR and functional boundaries does not diminish the imperative for the other combatant

commanders to coordinate, integrate, plan, execute, and employ IO. These efforts may be directed

at achieving national or military objectives incorporated in TSCPs, shaping the operational

environment for potential employment during periods of heightened tensions, or in support of

specific military operations. It is entirely possible that in a given theater, the combatant commander

will be supported for select IO while concurrently supporting United States Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM) IO activities across multiple theater boundaries. As with other aspects of

joint operations, joint IO should be accomplished through centralized planning and direction

and decentralized execution. Joint-level planners should resist the temptation to plan in too

great a level of detail. Plans that focus on objectives and end states rather than specific actions

improve flexibility during execution and allow component staffs to develop plan details based

on resource availability, constraints, and other factors. The specifics of planning IO as an integral

part of joint plans are discussed in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”

(2) The Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) shall, in addition

to the responsibilities in section 2.b.(1) above, integrate and coordinate DOD PSYOP capabilities

to enhance interoperability and support USSTRATCOM’s IO responsibilities and other combatant

commanders’ PSYOP planning and execution. USSOCOM shall also employ other SOF IO

capabilities as directed.

c. Components. Components are normally responsible for detailed planning and execution of

IO. IO planned and conducted by the components must be conducted within the parameters established

by the JFC. At the same time, component commanders and their subordinates must be provided

sufficient flexibility and authority to respond to local variations in the information environment. Component
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Responsibilities and Command Relationships

commanders determine how their staffs are organized for IO, and normally designate personnel to liaise

between the JFC’s headquarters and component headquarter staffs.

d. Subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of joint

operations. Subordinate staffs normally share the same type of relationship with the parent joint

force IO staff as the Service and functional components. Subordinate JFC staffs may become

involved in IO planning and execution to a significant degree, to include making

recommendations for employment of specific capabilities, particularly if most of the capability

needed for a certain operation resides in that subordinate JTF.

4. Organizing for Joint Information Operations

The principal staffs that may be involved in IO planning are the combatant command,

subordinate joint force command(s), and component staffs.

a. Combatant Command Organization. Combatant command staffs, supported by

the IC and other DOD combat support agencies and Department of State (DOS) representatives,

can call on the expertise of personnel assigned to their component commands to assist in the

planning process. These staffs use the planning process specified by JOPES to carry out planning

responsibilities. The command which is designated the supported command receives guidance

and support from the President and SecDef and can call on the expertise and technical support of

all other designated supporting commands.

(1) Combatant commanders normally assign responsibility for IO to the J-3. When

authorized, the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating,

integrating, and assessing joint force IO.

(2) IO Cell Chief. The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executing

joint IO responsibilities. The IO cell chief is the central point of contact on the combatant

command staff for IO. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integrated

and synchronized in all planning processes of the combatant command staff and that IO aspects

of such processes are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs.

In operational planning, the IO cell chief ensures that the IO portions of JOPES and TSCP

products reflect the combatant commander’s guidance and are consistent with the operational

principles and elements of operational design discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and Chapter

V, “Planning and Coordination,” in this publication. The IO cell chief is normally responsible

for functions shown in Figure IV-1.

(3) IO Staff. The IO cell chief is normally assigned responsibility for supervision of IO

activities for that portion of the J-3 staff designated as IO planners and for coordination with SMEs

within the joint force. The portion of the staff under the cognizance of the IO cell chief is normally given

a specific numerical designation such as “J-39.” This staff section assists the IO cell chief and provides

IO planning and core capability expertise within the staff and coordinates with other staffs and supporting

agencies and organizations. During the execution of an operation, IO planners shall be available to the

joint operations center (JOC) or its equivalent to assist in integration, deconfliction, support, or adjustment
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of IO activities as necessary. If IO manning permits and the J-3 or IO cell chief designates, IO staff

personnel may be part of the JOC watch team or stand a separate watch. Due to the sensitive

nature of some aspects of IO, all members of the IO staff should have the appropriate security clearance

and access necessary to fulfill their IO responsibilities.

(4) IO Cell or Planning Organization. To integrate and synchronize the core

capabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and appropriate staff functions, the

IO cell chief normally leads an “IO cell” or similarly named group as an integrated part of the

staff’s operational planning group or equivalent. The organizational relationships between the

joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance. These supporting

organizations provide guidance on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities.

The specific duties and responsibilities of representatives from these supporting organizations

should be established between the IO cell chief and the senior representative of each supporting

organization. Authorized staffing levels, mission, and location of JFC staff vis-à-vis each

capability-level organization are among the considerations in determining how organizations

are represented in the cell. Figure IV-2 is intended as a guide in determining which members of

a joint staff should coordinate with IO planners. The JFC should tailor the composition of

the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. Capability, staff function and organizational representation

on the IO cell may include the following personnel listed and described below.

Figure IV-1. Information Operations Cell Chief Functions

INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL CHIEF FUNCTIONS

Coordinating the overall information operations (IO) portion of the plan for

the joint force commander (JFC).

Coordinating IO issues within the joint staff and with counterpart IO planners

on the component staffs.

Coordinating IO activities to support the JFC concept of operations.

Recommending IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives.

Determining the availability of IO resources to carry out IO plans.

Recommending tasking to the operations directorate (J-3) for joint

organizations, staff, and elements (e.g., electronic warfare planners, military

deception planners) that plan and supervise the various capabilities and

related activities to be utilized. Consolidated J-3 tasking ensures efficiency

in planning and executing integrated IO.

Serving as the primary “advocate” for IO targets nominated for attack

throughout the target nomination and review process established by the JFC.

Coordinating the planning and execution of IO between the joint

organizations (including components) responsible for each element of IO.

Coordinating intelligence and assessment support to IO.

Coordinating IO inputs from joint centers and agencies.

Coordinating liaison with the Joint Information Operations Center, Joint

Warfare Analysis Center, and other joint centers.
IV-5

Responsibilities and Command Relationships

(a) EW Representative. Coordinates EW activities and acts as liaison between

the IO cell and the EWCC when formed (at the direction of the JFC). Serves as Joint

Spectrum Center (JSC) liaison officer and provides oversight of input and changes to the

JRFL in the absence of an EWCC. When directed by the JFC, the EWCC will stand up and

reside at the JFC component most appropriate to the ongoing operation, and will be directly

responsible to the JFC, through the EW representative in the IO cell, for the coordination and

deconfliction of all EW activities and all military usage of the EM spectrum within the combatant

commander’s AOR. When an EWCC is active, the EWCC chief or his designated representative

should be the EW representative at the IO cell. Coordinates closely with J-6 planners to deconflict

friendly IO in the EM spectrum.

(b) CNO Representative. Coordinates integration and synchronization of CNO

with other IO capabilities and deconflicts CNO with other staff directorates and organizations represented

Figure IV-2. Notional Information Operations Cell

NOTIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL

JCMOTF

CI STAFF

SECTION (J2X)

STATE DEPARTMENT

LIAISON

ALLIES AND

SUPPORT REPS

TARGETING

CELL (J2T)

JSOTF

STO

CELL

PHYSICAL

SECURITY STAFF

SECTION

JPOTF

EWCC

MILDEC

PLANNERS

OPSEC

PLANNERS

CI

CMO

CND

CNO

EW

EWCC

IA

IO

JCMOTF

JPOTF

Counterintelligence

Civil-military Operations

Computer Network Defense

Computer Network Operations

Electronic Warfare

Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell

Information Assurance

Information Operations

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

Joint Special Operations Task

Force

Military Deception

Operations Security

Public Affairs Office

Psychological Operations

Representative

Special Operations Forces

Special Technical Operations

United States Strategic Command

JSOTF

MILDEC

OPSEC

PAO

PSYOP

Rep

SOF

STO

USSTRATCOM

J-3

IO CELL

J-2 REP

J-5 REP

RESIDENT

NONRESIDENT

J-6 REP

(IA & CND)

USSTRATCOM REPS (CNO,

SPACE CONTROL & GLOBAL STRIKE)

J-7 REP

PAO REP

LEGAL REP

J2X REP (CI)

CMO STAFF/CIVIL

AFFAIRS REP

COMPONENT

LIAISONS

STATE DEPARTMENT

REP

J2T REP

OTHER

REPS

SOF REP

STO REP

PHYSICAL

SECURITY REP

PSYOP REP

EW REP

MILDEC REP

OPSEC REP

CHAPLAIN

J-2 J-4 J-5

J-6

J-7

PAO

JUDGE

ADVOCATE

USSTRATCOM

LIAISON(S)

SERVICE/FUNCTIONAL

COMPONENTS

IO CELL

IO CELL CHIEF

JOINT FIRES

ELEMENT (JFE)

JOINT FIRES

OFFICER
IV-6

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JP 3-13

in the IO cell.

(c) PSYOP Representative. Coordinates to provide DSPD. Integrates,

coordinates, and synchronizes the use of PSYOP with other IO capabilities, functions, agencies,

and organizations represented in the IO cell. Serves as entry point for liaison from the JPOTF,

the in-theater multinational PSYOP cells, and Joint PSYOP support element as appropriate.

(d) OPSEC Representative. With assistance from each directorate, identifies

existing threats and vulnerabilities, develops the critical information list, and implements OPSEC

countermeasures. Serves as the joint communications security (COMSEC) monitoring activity

(JCMA) point of entry into the staff.

(e) MILDEC Representative. Coordinates combatant command or subordinate

joint force command MILDEC planning.

(f) Special Technical Operations (STO) Representative. The STO representative

should be an integral member of the IO cell to ensure STO planning is fully integrated and coordinated.

STO read-ins are conducted throughout the IO staff based on mission requirements and governing

security directives.

(g) USSTRATCOM Representative(s). Participates via collaborative systems

or in person when available. Acts as liaison to USSTRATCOM across AOR or functional

boundaries to support IO planning and execution.

(h) J-6 Communication Systems and IA Representative. Facilitates IA and

coordination between information system planners and managers and members of the IO cell.

Coordinates with the J-3 to minimize IO operations impact on friendly forces C2. Principal

liaison with the joint network operations control center (JNCC). Identifies critical information

systems and vulnerabilities of these systems and networks (non-secure internet protocol router

network, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET], Joint Worldwide Intelligence

Communications System, voice, video, data, satellite, and tactical communications). May assist

coordination between the J-3 and OPSEC planners with JCMA.

(i) J-2 Representative. Coordinates collection requirements and analytical

support for compartmented and noncompartmented IO. May serve as liaison to the IO cell for

other DOD intelligence agencies. Provides baseline assessment of the information environment.

(j) Targeting Cell Representative. Represents the targeting cell(s) and

coordinates IO targets with the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), if designated.

(k) CI Representative. Coordinates IO inputs to CI activities which have

significant roles in IO. Provides input on adversary collection capabilities for OPSEC planning.

(l) Physical Security Representative. Provides physical security expertise and

advocates interests and concerns within the joint command, the host base, and the joint rear area as
IV-7

Responsibilities and Command Relationships

appropriate, during IO cell planning deliberations. May liaise between the IO cell and both the joint rear

tactical operations center and the base defense operations centerwhen appropriate.

(m) Logistics Directorate (J-4) Representative. Coordinates and integrates

IO logistic considerations into the contingency planning process. Represents IO cell concerns

to the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) process and assists IO cell members in

getting IO capabilities properly entered and synchronized on the time-phased force and

deployment list (TPFDL). During deployment, execution, and redeployment phases of an

operation, the J-4 representative can assist IO cell members in tracking movement of IO activities

and their logistic support to and from the supported AOR. The J-4 representative relays IO

planning guidance for OPSEC to other J-4 staff personnel and provides logistic policy guidance

as appropriate.

(n) Plans Directorate Representative. Coordinates integration and

synchronization of IO cell procedures and products into staff operational and theater planning

processes.

(o) Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate (J-7)

Representative. Provides exercise planning, modeling and simulation (M&S), and lessons

learned process expertise and advocates exercise planning, M&S, and lessons learned

interests and concerns. Serves as primary integrator of IO into exercises and M&S, especially

at the JTF level. Ensures resulting lessons learned are incorporated into the Joint Lessons

Learned Program, as appropriate.

(p) PA Representative. Coordinates and deconflicts PA activities with planned IO.

(q) CMO Representative. Ensures consistency of CMO activities within the

combatant commander’s AOR that may support IO. Provides IO cell cultural advice and analysis

of IO impact on civilian targets. Coordinates IO support to CMO as required. Provides interagency

coordination, intergovernmental coordination, and coordination with nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs), and host nations. Provides feedback on IO MOEs.

(r) Judge Advocate (JA) Representative. Advises planners to ensure IO complies

with domestic and international law and assists with interagency coordination and negotiation.

(s) Special Operations Representative. Coordinates use of SOF within an AOR

or joint operations area in support of IO.

(t) Service and Functional Component Representatives. These officers interface

with the combatant command IO cell to provide component expertise and act as a liaison for IO matters

between the combatant command and the component. These representatives also may serve as

members of one or more of the supporting organizations of IO (e.g., the STO cell). For most

effective coordination between the combatant command IO cell and the component IO cells, the liaisons

must be pre-designated, thoroughly familiar with the component’s IO plan, and of the appropriate rank

to speak for the component when the component is at a separate location.
IV-8

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JP 3-13

(u) Chaplain Representative. Chaplains, as noncombatants, should not

participate in combatant activities that might compromise their noncombatant status; however,

they may provide relevant information on the religious, cultural, and ideological issues at the

strategic and operational levels.

(v) DOS Representative. DOS will coordinate with foreign and international

organizations that could be or are affected by the implementation of IO activities. Provides PD

expertise and advocates PD and DOS interests and concerns during IO cell planning

deliberations. The DOS representative provides a view of the PD capabilities that can be brought

to bear to achieve USG objectives within the military operational area, and makes

recommendations for interacting with civilian (and military) leaders, which can influence the outcome of

military operations.

(w) Support Organization Representatives. Representatives from various

organizations providing support to IO, discussed in paragraph 4.c. below and not mentioned

specifically above, may participate in IO cell planning deliberations as directed in individual

joint staff procedures and standing operating procedures (SOPs).

See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,” (published separately), for additional organization

guidance and responsibilities.

b. Joint Task Force Command Organization

(1) The size of the IO staff, at the JTF level, is determined by the JTF commander

based on a variety of factors including assigned mission and available resources. The standing

joint force headquarters core element (SJFHQ CE) is a part of each geographic combatant

commander’s staff that provides a trained and equipped standing, joint C2 element specifically

organized to conduct joint operations. It facilitates JTF headquarters (HQ) formation either as

an integrated part of the JTF commander’s HQ or from its location at the combatant commander’s

HQ. If elements of the SJFHQ CE deploy, they become an integral part of the JTF HQ, not a

separate organization within the JTF HQ. SJFHQ CEs have IO sections that benefit from the

SJFHQ CE’s cross-functional organization and planning methodology.

(2) The primary purpose of a JTF IO staff is to focus IO planning and support within

the JTF HQ. The JTF IO staff provides expertise to the other JTF HQ staff directorates and is the

focal point for coordinating and deconflicting individual core, supporting and related IO

capabilities with other staff functions, component and higher HQ staff, and supporting agencies

and organizations. JTF IO staff’s responsibilities include:

(a) Participation in JTF planning.

(b) Integration and synchronization of IO core, supporting, and related capabilities within

the JTF. Processes are discussed in paragraph 5 below and in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”
IV-9

Responsibilities and Command Relationships

(c) Oversight of the IO aspects of the JTF commander’s assigned missions.

c. Organization of Support for IO. As discussed above, IO planners use other joint

organizations to plan and integrate joint IO. Support for IO comes primarily from within

DOD, but other government agencies and organizations, as well as some allied agencies and

organizations, may support IO.

(1) Support from within DOD includes, but is not limited to, personnel augmentation

from the Service IO organizations, USSTRATCOM’s Joint Information Operations Center,

USSOCOM, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfare Analysis Center

(JWAC), Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC), JSC,

and JCMA. Additionally, through the various joint organizations that plan and direct core,

supporting, and related IO capabilities, commanders and planners have access to the

component expertise necessary to plan the employment or protection of component systems or

units.

(a) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA support for IO may

be coordinated through the J-2 representative of the IO cell or directly with a NGA representative

and can include:

1. Determination of the availability of the various types of existing geospatial

reference data covering the area of interest.

2. Deconfliction of national and lower-level geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)

collection activities.

3. GEOINT data and products describing the physical environment and the

adversary’s locations, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.

4. Geospatial data quality information (accuracy, currency, completeness,

consistency) and appropriateness of the data for the intended use.

5. Visualization and spatial/spectral analysis of imagery and geospatial

information in support of mission planning, rehearsal, execution, and post-mission assessment.

6. Disclosure and release of GEOINT to allies and coalition partners.

(b) National Security Agency (NSA). NSA support for IO may be coordinated

through the J-2 representative of the IO cell or directly with a NSA representative and can include:

1. Information security technology, products, and services.
IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 3-13

2. Vulnerability and threat analyses to support IA and the defense of US and

friendly information systems.

3. Determining exploitation risk for telecommunications systems.

4. Determining releasability of COMSEC materials to allies or coalition

partners.

5. Providing technical expertise for CNO.

6. Conducting intelligence gain/loss assessments.

7. Collecting C2 targeting-related information.

(c) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA support for IO may be coordinated

through the J-2 representative of the IO cell or directly with the DIA representative to include:

1. Intelligence for IO target selection and post-strike analysis.

2. Identifying friendly vulnerabilities and the most probable friendly targets

within the adversary’s capabilities and concept of operations.

3. Developing all-source intelligence gain/loss and/or risk assessment of IO

targets.

4. Conducting political, military, and human factors assessments.

(d) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA support for IO may

be coordinated through the J-6 representative of the IO cell or directly with the DISA representative

and includes:

1. Coordinating with DIA, NSA, and the Services to ensure sufficient database

support for planning, analysis, and execution of IO.

2. Assisting in disseminating adversarial CNA warnings.

3. Assisting in establishing a security architecture and standards for protecting

and defending selected portions of the Global Information Grid.

4. Developing IA education, training, and awareness program guidelines, including

minimum training standards, for use by the JTF HQ, components, and subordinate JTFs.

(e) JWAC. The JWAC assists the combatant commanders in their preparation and

analysis of joint operation plans (OPLANs) and the Service Chiefs’ analysis of weapon effectiveness.

The JWAC provides analysis of engineering and scientific data and integrates operational
IV-11

Responsibilities and Command Relationships

analysis with intelligence. The JWAC normally supports a JTF through the supported combatant

commander. See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,” (published separately).

(f) JPO-STC. The JPO-STC provides the combatant commanders, Service

Chiefs, and operating forces with the ability to assess their critical infrastructure protection

dependencies and the potential impact on military operations resulting from disruptions to

key infrastructure components (e.g., electric power, natural gas, liquid petroleum, transportation,

and telecommunications). JPO-STC also conducts technical assessments of emerging special

technologies to determine their potential impacts on military and civilian systems and proposes

countermeasure solutions and/or response options. See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,”

(published separately).

(g) JSC. The JSC can provide the following direct support to the JFC through

the EWCC or the EW representative to the IO cell.

1. Locational and technical characteristics about friendly force C2 systems.

2. Augmentation teams trained to prepare a JRFL or provide training and

assistance in how to prepare a JRFL.

3. Augmentation teams trained to prepare a JRFL to locate and identify

interference sources and recommend technical and operational fixes to resolve identified

interference sources or to provide training and assistance.

4. Assistance in the resolution of operational interference and jamming

incidents.

5. Data about foreign communications systems frequency and location.

6. Unclassified communications systems area studies about the regional

communications systems infrastructure, to include physical and cultural characteristics, overview

of telecommunications systems, and EM frequencies registered for use within the geographic

boundaries of each country in the region.

(h) JCMA. The JCMA can provide the following direct support to the JFC through

the IO cell:

1. COMSEC monitoring and analysis support.

2. A joint COMSEC monitoring and analysis team to provide direct,

deployable joint COMSEC monitoring support. If tasked, the JCMA may manage all COMSEC

monitoring.

3. Cryptographic or plain language system monitoring.
IV-12

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JP 3-13

4. Timely, tailored reporting to supported commanders, to include near real time

reporting of inadvertent disclosure of friendly critical information identified in the OPSEC process.

(i) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). JCSE is a rapidly deployable,

joint tactical communications unit under the operational control of USJFCOM that provides contingency

and crisis communications to joint forces. JCSE is composed of Active and Reserve Component forces

and is equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment. JCSE supports

time-sensitive operations.

(2) Interagency Support. Non-DOD USG departments and agencies may have a role in

planning and executing IO. The expertise, programs, and activities of a wide variety of non-DOD USG

agencies should be considered as part of the IO plan when appropriate. Combatant commanders

establish staff procedures specific to their AOR for requesting interagency support and coordination of

various aspects of joint operations. For more discussion on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08,

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

During Joint Operations, Volume I. Normally combatant commanders work through designated

liaison representatives attached to their command. USSTRATCOM can assist joint commanders in

requesting interagency IO support when liaison representatives from specific organizations are not attached.

Planning coordination of IO as an integral part of planning joint operations is discussed in Chapter V,

“Planning and Coordination.” The following departments, agencies, and organizations are not all inclusive

but representative of possible interagency support and coordination required for IO.

(a) DOS. DOS will coordinate with foreign and intergovernmental organizations

that could be or are affected by the implementation of an IO plan. See Volume II of JP 3-08,

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

During Joint Operations.

(b) Other Representatives and Liaison Officers. The JFC should tailor the

composition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. Other representatives could

include, for example, the non-DOD intelligence community. See Volume II of JP 3-08,

Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

During Joint Operations.

(3) Multinational Support. Chapter VI, “Multinational Considerations in Information

Operations,” discusses multinational support of IO.
IV-13

Responsibilities and Command Relationships
IV-14

Chapter IV

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER V

PLANNING AND COORDINATION

V-1

“Master the mechanics and techniques; understand the art and profession; and

be smart enough to know when to deviate from it.”

Gen Anthony Zinni, CDRUSCENTCOM

1997-2000

1. Introduction

IO planning follows the principles and processes established for joint operation planning.

The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish JFC objectives.

Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JFC military operations,

as well as other USG information activities. JFCs must ensure IO planners are fully integrated

into the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the JTCB in order to ensure full

integration with all other planning and execution efforts. Other USG and/or coalition/allied

information activities, when uncoordinated, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective.

Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early detailed JFC IO staff planning,

coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts in the AOR to effectively synergize

and integrate IO capabilities.

2. Information Operations Planning

a. IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC’s campaign or operation planning

and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IO are used in all

phases of a campaign or operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence

the amount of effort required for the remaining phases.

b. The use of IO in peacetime to achieve JFC objectives and to preclude other conflicts,

requires an ability to integrate IO capabilities into a comprehensive and coherent strategy through

the establishment of information objectives that in turn are integrated into and support the JFC’s

overall mission objectives. The combatant commander’s TSCP serves as an excellent platform

to embed specific long-term information objectives

c. IO planning requires early and detailed preparation. Many IO capabilities require long

lead-time intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IO support for IPB development

differs from traditional requirements in that it may require greater lead time and may have

expanded collection, production, and dissemination requirements. Consequently, combatant

commanders must ensure that IO objectives are appropriately prioritized in their priority

intelligence requirements (PIRs) and requests for information (RFIs). In addition, the intelligence

gain/loss from the application of an IO capability and the status of the target as a viable element

of the target system must be evaluated by the IC prior to execution.

d. As part of the planning process, designation of release and execution authority is required.

Release authority provides the approval for IO employment and normally specifies the allocation
V-2

Chapter V

JP 3-13

of specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the execution authority. Execution authority is

described as the authority to employ IO capabilities at a designated time and/or place. Normally, the

JFC is the one execution authority designated in the execute order for an operation.

See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,” (published separately), for additional guidance.

e. Legal Considerations in IO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring

careful review and national-level coordination and approval. The United States constitution, US

laws, and international law set boundaries and establish precedence for military activity in the information

environment. Another country’s legal basis and limitations for military activity in the information environment

may differ. US military activities in the information environment, as in the physical domains, are conducted

as a matter of law and policy. US forces, whether operating physically from bases or locations overseas

or virtually in the information environment from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, are

required by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the LOAC.

(1) Legal limitations may be placed on IO. All military activities in the information

environment are subject to the LOAC. In order to determine whether there are any questions of

the legality of particular IO tasks, such tasks must be reviewed by the appropriate JA and approved

by appropriate levels of the chain of command. Bilateral agreements to which the US is a

signatory may have provisions concerning the conduct of IO and its supporting, or related

capabilities and should be consulted prior to action. A current list of treaties and other international

agreements in force is found in Department of State Publication 9434, Treaties In Force.

(2) IO planning at all levels should consider the following broad areas and consult the

appropriate personnel for input:

(a) Whether a particular use of IO may be considered a hostile act by other

countries.

(b) Domestic, international, criminal, and civil law, affecting national security,

privacy, and information exchange.

(c) International treaties, agreements, and customary international law, as applied

to IO.

(d) Structure and relationships among US intelligence organizations and the overall

interagency environment, including NGOs.

3. Information Operations Planning Considerations

This section is an overview of IO as a part of the joint operation planning processes and products,

with a focus on common planning activities. The joint planning process steps are: planning initiation;

mission analysis; COA development; COA analysis and wargaming; COA comparison; COA approval;

and plan or order development. A more detailed discussion of the planning process can be found in JP
V-3

Planning and Coordination

5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Figure V-1 shows the IO cell actions and outcomes aligned with the

joint operation planning process and steps.

a. Planning Initiation. Integration of IO into joint operations should begin at the initiation

of planning. Key IO staff actions during this phase are:

(1) Monitor the situation and receive initial planning guidance, review staff estimates

from applicable OPLANs and/or operation plans in concept format.

(2) Convene the IO cell. The cell should use this opportunity to alert subordinate

commands/units of potential tasking with regard to IO planning support. For crisis action planning,

regularly convene to review the situation and determine what preliminary planning actions should

be accomplished. For contingency planning, convene a meeting of the full IO cell or consult

informally with other members as needed.

(3) Gauge initial scope of the IO role in the operation.

(4) Identify location, SOP, and routine of other staff organizations that require IO

interaction and divide coordination responsibilities among IO staff.

(5) Begin identifying information needed for mission analysis and COA development

and availability of required information. (Continues through plan development.)

(6) Identify IO planning support requirements (including staff augmentation and support

products and services) and issue requests for support according to procedures established locally

and by various supporting organizations.

(7) Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs and RFIs, keeping in mind the long lead times

associated with satisfying IO requirements. (Continues throughout contingency planning process.)

(8) Provide input and recommendations on IO strategies and resolutions to conflicts

with other plans.

(9) Submit IO target nominations to JFC or component JTCB for IC review of intelligence

gain/loss, and for JFC deconfliction and validation.

(10) Ensure IO planners participate in all JFC or component planning and targeting sessions

and JTCBs.

b. Mission Analysis. The purpose of mission analysis is to assess the assigned mission in order

to determine the commander’s objectives and tasks, and to prepare guidance for subordinate elements.

Key IO staff actions during this phase are:

(1) Identify specified, implied, and essential IO tasks.
V-4

Chapter V

JP 3-13

Figure V-1. Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of Joint Planning

INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL ACTIONS

AND OUTCOMES AS PART OF JOINT PLANNING

PLANNING

PROCESS STEPS IO CELL PLANNING ACTION IO CELL PLANNING

OUTCOME

Planning

Initiation

Request taskings to

collect required

information.

Monitor situation.

Review guidance and estimates.

Convene IO cell.

Gauge initial scope of the IO role.

Identify organizational coordination requirements.

Initiate identification of information required for mission

analysis and COA development.

Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs/RFIs.

Recommend IO strategies and conflict resolution.

Mission

Analysis

List of IO tasks.

List of assumptions,

constraints, and

restraints.

Planning guidance

for IO.

IO augmentation

request.

IO portion of the

commander's

restated mission

statement.

Identify specified, implied, and essential IO tasks.

Identify assumptions, constraints, and restraints relevant

to IO.

Identify IO planning support requirements (including

augmentation) and issue requests for support.

Initiate development of MOEs and MOPs.

Analyze IO capabilities available and identify authority for

deployment and employment.

Identify relevant physical, informational and cognitive

properties of the information environment.

Refine proposed PIRs/RFIs.

Provide IO perspective in the development of restated

mission for commander's approval.

Tailor augmentation requests to missions and tasks.

COA

Development

List of objectives to

effects to IO tasks to

IO capabilities for

each COA.

Select IO core, supporting, and related capabilities to

accomplish IO tasks for each COA.

Revise IO portion of COA to develop staff estimate.

Provide results of risk analysis for each COA.

COA Analysis

& Wargaming

IO data for overall

synchronization

matrix.

IO portion of

branches and

sequels.

List of high-value

targets related to IO.

Analyze each COA from an IO functional perspective.

Identify key IO decision points.

Recommend IO task organization adjustments.

Provide IO data for synchronization matrix.

Identify IO portions of branches and sequels.

Identify possible high-value targets related to IO.

Recommend IO CCIRs.

COA

Comparison

Prioiritized COAs

from an IO

perspective with Pros

and Cons for each

COA.

Compare each COA based on mission and IO tasks.

Compare each COA in relation to IO requirements versus

available IO resources.

Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective.

COA Approval N/A No significant IO staff actions during COA approval.
V-5

Planning and Coordination

(2) Identify assumptions, constraints, and restraints relevant to IO.

(3) Initiate development of MOEs and measures of performance (MOPs).

(4) Analyze IO capabilities available for the mission and identify level of approval

authority for deployment and employment.

(5) Identify relevant physical, informational, and cognitive properties (whether friendly,

adversarial or neutral/third party) of the information environment that may impact the operation.

Commanders and their staffs must avoid projecting US value sets on opponents (mirror imaging).

Therefore, incorporating specific cultural, regional, and country experts into the IO planning

process can help prevent developing plans based on inaccurate cultural assumptions.

(6) Refine proposed PIRs and RFIs.

(7) Provide IO perspective in development of restated mission for the commander’s approval.

(8) Tailor the quantity and skill sets in augmentation requests to the specifics of mission and

tasks as they are developed.

(9) Based on intelligence and mission analysis, identify potential IO targets, compile an IO

target development list, and nominate developed IO targets to the JFC’s standing joint target list.

Figure V-1. Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of

Joint Planning (cont’d)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL ACTIONS AND

OUTCOMES AS PART OF JOINT PLANNING (cont’d)

PLANNING

PROCESS STEPS IO CELL PLANNING ACTION IO CELL PLANNING

OUTCOME

Plan or Order

Development

Updated IO estimates

based on selected

COA.

Draft IO appendices

and tabs, supporting

plans.

IO requirements to

TPFDD development.

Synchronized and

integrated IO portion

of operation plan.

Refine IO tasks from the approved COA.

Identify IO capability shortfalls and recommend solutions.

Update continually, all supporting organizations

regarding details of the IO portion of plan details (access

permitting).

Advise supported combatant commander on IO issues

and concerns during supporting plan review and

approval.

Participate in TPFDD refinement to ensure the IO force

flow supports the CONOPS.

Plan

Refinement

No specific IO staff actions during plan refinement. N/A

CCIR

COA

CONOPS

IO

Commander's Critical Information

Requirement

Course of Action

Concept of Operations

Information Operations

MOE

MOP

PIR

RFI

TPFDD

Measure of Effectiveness

Measure of Performance

Priority Intelligence Requirement

Request for Information

Time Phased Force Deployment Data
V-6

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JP 3-13

(10) Compile and maintain a target folder for each IO target nomination incorporating at

least the minimum data fields. Target folders will facilitate IC review and JFC deconfliction and commander

approval for action.

c. COA Development. The staff takes the output from mission analysis as key inputs to

COA development: initial staff estimates; mission and tasks; and JFC planning guidance. Key

IO staff actions during this phase are:

(1) Select IO core capabilities that may be used individually or integrated with other

options to accomplish IO supporting tasks for each COA.

(2) Revise the IO portion of COAs as required to develop the staff estimate.

(3) Brief portions of each COA and include the results of risk analysis for each COA.

d. COA Analysis and Wargaming. Based upon time available, the commander should

wargame each tentative COA against adversary COAs identified through the JIPB process. Key

IO staff actions during this phase are:

(1) Analyze each COA from an IO functional perspective.

(2) Reveal key IO decision points.

(3) Recommend IO task organization adjustments.

(4) Provide IO data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decision-making tool.

(5) Identify IO portions of branches and sequels.

(6) Identify possible high-value targets related to IO.

(7) Recommend commander’s critical information requirement for IO.

e. COA Comparison. COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluating

the advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Key IO staff actions during

this phase are:

(1) Compare each COA based on mission and IO tasks.

(2) Compare each COA in relation to IO requirements versus available IO resources.

(3) Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective.
V-7

Planning and Coordination

f. COA Approval. There are no significant IO staff actions during COA approval.

g. Plan or Order Development. During plan or order development, the IO staff develops

the IO portion of the plan or order. Key IO staff actions during this phase are:

(1) Refine IO tasks from the approved COA.

(2) Identify IO capability shortfalls and recommend solutions.

(3) Facilitate development of supporting plans by keeping organizations responsible

for development of supporting plans informed of IO plan development details (as access

restrictions allow) throughout the planning process.

(4) Advise the supported combatant commander on IO issues and concerns during the

supporting plan review and approval process.

(5) Participate in TPFDD refinement to ensure the IO force flow supports the OPLAN.

h. Plan Refinement. There are no IO specific staff actions during plan refinement.

4. Commander’s Intent and Information Operations

The commander’s vision of IO’s role in an operation should begin before the specific planning

is initiated. A commander that expects to rely on IO capabilities must ensure that IO related

PIRs and RFIs are given high enough priority prior to a crisis, in order for the intelligence

products to be ready in time to support operations. At a minimum, the commander’s vision for

IO should be included in the initial guidance. Ideally, commanders give guidance on IO as part

of their overall concept, but may elect to provide it separately. The commander may elect to

provide separate guidance on IO when a more focused and direct discussion about IO is

appropriate. Commanders may find providing separate guidance on IO during exercises is a

valuable tool for training their staffs to view IO as an integral part of their overall operations

concept.

5. The Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of

Effectiveness

a. MOPs gauge accomplishment of IO tasks and actions. MOEs determine whether IO actions

being executed are having the desired effect toward mission accomplishment: the attainment of end

states and objectives. MOPs measure friendly IO effort and MOEs measure battlespace results. The

relationship between these two measures is illustrated by examples in Figure V-2. IO MOPs and

MOEs are crafted and refined throughout the planning process.

b. In developing IO MOPs and/or MOEs, the following general criteria should be considered:
V-8

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JP 3-13

(1) Ends Related. They should directly relate to desired effects required to accomplish

objectives.

(2) Measurable. Effectiveness or performance is measured either quantitatively or

qualitatively. In order to measure effectiveness, a baseline measurement must be established prior to

the execution, against which to measure system changes.

(3) Timely. The required feedback time should be clearly stated for each MOE and/or

MOP and a plan made to report within specified time periods.

(4) Properly Resourced. The collection, collation, analysis, and reporting of MOE

or MOP data requires personnel, budgetary, and materiel resources. IO staffs should ensure that

these resource requirements are built into the IO plan during its development.

Figure V-2. Example of the Relationship Between Measures of Performance and

Measures of Effectiveness

EXAMPLE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEASURES

OF PERFORMANCE AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Percentage of PSYOP

products disseminated

Percentage of adversary

command and control

(C2) facilities attacked

Days between updates

on effectiveness of

deception plans

Percentage of tasked

network attacks

conducted

Specific

actions taken based on

friendly deception

activities

adversary

Effect of network attacks

on target systems

MOE requires access

to a measurable

output or to the

’s own

reporting of the attack

adversary

MOE requires an

estimate of how the

is expected

to react if they do and if

they do not believe the

deception

adversary

Observed adversary

actions indicating lack of

foreknowledge of

friendly operations

Effect of attacks on

adversary C2 facilities’

ability to pass critical

information

MOE requires a

change in a detectable

and measurable

activity

MOE requires

collation of all leaked

information and

comparison with

adversary actions

Often necessitates

further intelligence

requirements

Extent that PSYOP

changed the

demonstrated behavior

of the target audience

Psychological

Operations

(PSYOP)

Operations

Security

(OPSEC)

Military

Deception

(MILDEC)

*MOPs are derived from CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). Most MOP are

answered by internal statistic generation.

**MOEs vary and are based on IO objectives and individual planned tasks.

Computer

Network

Operations

(CNO)

Electronic

Warfare

(EW)

Capability Measures of

Performance (MOPs)*

Measures of

Effectiveness (MOEs)** Remarks

Percentage of identified

compromises of critical

information or indicators

with OPSEC measures

applied
V-9

Planning and Coordination

c. Examples of IO MOPs:

(1) Number of PSYOP products disseminated (weekly, monthly).

(2) Percentage of adversary command and control facilities attacked.

(3) Percentage of tasked CNAs conducted.

(4) Number of CMO projects initiated.

(5) Increased adversary radio transmissions within a desired frequency, due to EA.

(6) Human intelligence reports of PSYOP broadcasts during Commando Solo missions.

d. Examples of IO MOEs:

(1) Quantitative MOEs

(a) Percentage of degradation of a radar system over time as measured by an

appropriate sensor.

(b) Number and size of civil disturbances over time as reported by own forces.

(c) Number of computer intrusions over time as measured by software.

(d) Trends in target population position on a specific issue as gauged by public

opinion polls.

(e) Number of troops surrendering as instructed by a PSYOP leaflet operation.

(2) Qualitative MOEs

(a) Target population position on a specific issue as gauged by a focus group or

series of focus groups.

(b) Assessment of changes in supportiveness (or non-supportiveness) of public

statements made by key leaders as measured against IO objectives and/or effects.

(c) Assessment of changes in bias of foreign media outlets.

(d) Instances of defections, surrenders, non-support of authorities attributed to

impact and/or credibility of loudspeaker broadcasts or leaflets.
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e. Challenges and Considerations. It can be difficult to isolate variables and establish a direct

cause and effect relationship, especially when assessing foreign public opinion or human behavior.

Unforeseen factors lead to erroneous interpretations. For example, a traffic accident in a foreign country

involving a US Service member and a local civilian may bias an audience against US policies irrespective

of otherwise successful IO. Lack of leadership, equipment, weapons, or sustenance may have as great

an influence on surrendering enemy soldiers as a PSYOP leaflet urging surrender. In contrast, a visit by

a popular US official to a region may cause a positive spike in public opinion that cannot be credited to

executed IO actions.
CHAPTER VI

MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

VI-1

“We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.”

George C. Marshall

22 January 1948

1. Introduction

Joint doctrine for multinational operations, including command and operations in a

multinational environment, is described in JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight IO-specific issues that are not covered in JP 3-16,

Chapter IV, Section F “Information Operations.” IO in a multinational environment are also

covered in the US sponsored America, Britain, Canada, and Australia Interoperability Program

Coalition Operations Handbook, Chapter 10. This document includes IO checklists for staff

and commanders assigned to a multinational IO operational environment.

2. Other Nations and Information Operations

a. Allies and coalition partners recognize various IO concepts and some have thorough

and sophisticated doctrine, procedures, and capabilities for planning and conducting IO. The

multinational force commander (MNFC) is responsible to resolve potential conflicts between

each nation’s IO programs and the IO objectives and programs of the multinational force (MNF).

It is vital to integrate allies and coalition partners into IO planning as early as possible so that an

integrated and achievable IO strategy can be developed early in the planning process. Initial

requirements for integration of other nations into the IO plan include:

(1) Clarification of allied and coalition partners’ IO objectives.

(2) Understanding of other nations’ IO and how they intend to conduct these activities.

(3) Establishment of liaison/deconfliction procedures to ensure coherence.

(4) Early identification of MNF vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures to

adversary attempts to exploit them.

b. Regardless of the maturity of each nation’s IO capabilities, doctrine, tactics, techniques, or

procedures, every ally and/or coalition member can contribute to IO by providing regional expertise

to assist in planning and conducting IO. If allies and coalition partners have developed specific IO

capabilities, such capabilities may be tailored to specific targets and threats in ways that are not utilized

by the US. Such contributions complement US IO expertise and capabilities, and potentially

enhance the quality of both the planning and execution of multinational operations.
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3. Multinational Information Operations Considerations

a. Considerations in military operational planning processes, particularly for IO, whether JOPESbased or based on established foreign or alliance planning processes, should include:

(1) Recognizing allied/coalition partner cultural values and institutions.

(2) Recognizing allied/coalition partner interests and concerns.

(3) Recognizing differences between the US and foreign moral or ethical values.

(4) Understanding allied/coalition partners’ rules of engagement and legal constraints

concerning military activities in the information environment.

(5) Awareness of the complications of planning and execution in multiple languages

and their effect on the time taken to develop and execute plans.

(6) Familiarity with allied/coalition partner IO doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

b. Sharing of information with allies and coalition partners.

(1) Each nation has various resources to provide both classified and unclassified information

to a particular IO activity. In order to plan properly, all nations must be willing to share appropriate

information to accomplish the assigned mission, but each nation is obliged to protect information that it

cannot share with other nations.

(2) Information sharing arrangements in formal alliances, to include US participation in United

Nations missions, are worked out as part of alliance protocols. Information sharing arrangements in ad

hoc multinational operations where coalitions are working together on a short-notice mission, must be

created during the establishment of the coalition.

(3) Using National Disclosure Policy (NDP) 1, National Policy and Procedures for

the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International

Organizations, and DODI O-3600.2, Information Operations (IO) Security Classification

Guidance (U), as guidance, the senior US commander in a multinational operation must provide

guidelines to the US-designated disclosure representative on information sharing and the release

of classified information or capabilities to allied/coalition forces. NDP 1 provides policy and

procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms, release

arrangements, and other guidance. The disclosure of classified information is never automatic.

It is not necessary for allied/coalition forces to be made aware of all US intelligence, capabilities,

or procedures that are required for planning and execution of IO. The JFC should request

approval from higher command authorities to release IO-related information that has not been

previously cleared for allied/coalition partners.
VI-3

Multinational Considerations in Information Operations

(4) Information concerning US persons may only be collected, retained, or disseminated in

accordance with law and regulation. Applicable provisions include: the Privacy Act, Title 5 US Code

Section 552a; DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations

not Affiliated with the Department of Defense;Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence

Activities; and DODD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence

Components that Affect United States Persons.

4. Planning, Integration, and Command and Control of Information Operations

in Multinational Operations

a. The role of IO in multinational operations is the prerogative of the MNFC. The mission

of the MNF determines the role of IO in each specific operation.

b. Representation of key allies/coalition partners in the MNF IO staff ensures multinational

IO expertise and capabilities are effectively used, and the IO portion of the plan is coordinated

with all other aspects of the multinational plan.

c. MNF members may not have IO capabilities, and it may be necessary for the MNF HQ

to assist the subordinate MNFCs and their staffs in planning and conducting IO.

5. Multinational Organization for Information Operations Planning

a. When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by planners

and SMEs from allied/coalition forces. Allied IO capability specialists should be trained on US

and allied/coalition IO doctrine, requirements, resources, and how allied/coalition forces are

structured to conduct IO. IO planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of each

allied/multinational force, within given constraints, with the goal of using all the available IO

expertise and capabilities of the multinational force.

b. In the case where the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC J-3 to brief

the MNFC and staff on the advantages of using US IO capabilities and procedures to

achieve MNF goals. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO staff using

organizational criteria discussed earlier. If this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should

assume responsibility for implementing IO within the joint force as a part of the multinational

operations to support multinational mission objectives.

6. Multinational Policy Coordination

The development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, plans, intelligence, and

communications support applicable to IO requires coordination with the responsible DOD components

and allied/coalition nations. Coordination with allies above the JFC/MNFC level is normally effected

within existing defense arrangements, including bilateral arrangements. The Joint Staff coordinates
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JP 3-13

US positions on IO matters delegated to them as a matter of law or policy, and discusses them

bilaterally, or in multinational organizations, to achieve interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common

requirements. Direct discussions regarding multinational IO operations in specific theaters are the

responsibility of the geographic combatant commander.
CHAPTER VII

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN JOINT EDUCATION, TRAINING,

EXERCISES, AND EXPERIMENTS

VII-1

“The Romans are sure of victory . . . for their exercises are battles without

bloodshed, and their battles bloody exercises.”

Flavius Josephus

Historian, 37-100 AD

1. Introduction

The development of IO as a core military competency and critical component to joint

operations requires specific expertise and capabilities at all levels of DOD. At the highest

professional levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies that are the

capstone to American military power. The Services, USSOCOM, and other agencies develop

capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in law, policy, and lessons learned.

At each level of command, a solid foundation of education and training is essential to the

development of a core competency. Professional education and training, in turn, are dependent

on the accumulation, documentation, and validation of experience gained in operations, exercises,

and experimentation. This chapter discusses the education, training, joint exercise, and

experimentation necessary to achieve and maintain the goal of establishing IO as a core

competency.

2. Information Operations Education

As DOD conceptualization of the information environment and the role of IO in military

affairs has evolved, the necessity of an IO career force has been realized. The basic tenets of

education and training necessary for this force are:

a. The IO career force should consist of both core capability specialists (EW, PSYOP,

CNO, MILDEC, and OPSEC) and IO planners. Both groups require an understanding of

the information environment, the role of IO in military affairs, how IO differs from other

information functions that contribute to information superiority, and specific knowledge of each

of the core capabilities to ensure integration of IO into joint operations.

b. Initial capability specialist training and education requirements are Service and

capability specific. Capability specialists may be officers or enlisted. As Service-trained

specialists become more experienced and senior, their training and education must be broadened

to prepare them for responsibilities to plan and supervise the employment of other capabilities

that are employed in IO, and to synchronize IO with other aspects of joint operations and USG

policy.

c. IO planners are required at both the component and the joint level. Personnel

assigned to IO planning must have a working knowledge of the various capabilities potentially
VII-2

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JP 3-13

employed in IO as well as appropriate planning processes, procedures, tools, and the legal and

policy basis for the conduct of IO.

d. Senior military and civilian DOD leaders require an executive-level knowledge of the

information environment and the role of IO in supporting DOD missions.

3. Information Operations Training

a. Joint military training is based on joint policies and doctrine to prepare joint forces and/

or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant

commanders to execute their assigned missions. The basic joint IO training task is to educate

those personnel and organizations responsible for planning and conducting joint IO in the

doctrine found in this and other joint publications.

b. IO training must support the IO career force and be consistent with the joint

assignment process. Joint IO training focuses on joint planning-specific skills, methodologies

and tools, and assumes a solid foundation of Service-level IO training.

c. The Services determine applicable career training requirements for both their IO

career personnel and general military populations, based on identified joint force mission

requirements. Joint training requirements related to IO include both those recommended by

the nature of the information environment and those specific to the planning and execution of

IO.

(1) Service-wide training of military personnel should account for the nature of

the information environment and the fact that the actions of individual personnel can affect

the perceptions of foreign populations. The Services are responsible for sensitizing the entire

military population to the potential impact of their individual and collective actions on the

perceptions of foreign populations, particularly when visiting or assigned to overseas locations,

where cultural values and institutions differ substantially from the US norm. Prior to deployment

to locations outside the US, military personnel should receive cultural-specific

indoctrination. The objective of such indoctrination should be to prevent inadvertent

misperceptions of US forces’ actions and conduct by foreign populations at the deployed

location. Personnel expected to operate at length or covertly among foreign populations must

receive more extensive cultural training.

(2) Language and cultural skills are critical to IO. Language training in the past

has focused on intelligence requirements. Additionally, the requirement for cultural training is

increasing. IO requires not only that appropriate messages and themes be translated accurately,

but that joint forces have the language and cultural skills to understand how their actions and

messages, intended and unintended, are being perceived by the populations among which they

operate. Misperception and misunderstanding are complicated and reinforced when joint

forces do not have sufficient language and cultural skills to communicate effectively among

the populations where they operate. The burden of acquiring proficiency in a foreign language

and culture cannot be placed primarily on the foreign population’s ability to learn English and
VII-3

Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experiments

Western culture. Lack of sufficient language expertise and cultural understanding makes the

joint force dependent on foreign translators. Language training must provide sufficient numbers of

personnel fluent in those languages and conversant in those cultures where joint forces expect to operate.

Language and cultural skills are required for those forces to interact effectively with foreign populations

and maintain awareness of foreign population perceptions during the course of any joint operation.

(3) Specific IO capabilities, such as CND and OPSEC, also have training

requirements that are applicable to the general military population on a continuing basis.

Such capabilities require an “all hands” effort and are dependent on individuals knowing the

consequences of their mistakes or inactions in following “proper procedures.”

(4) Beyond these basic military-wide training requirements, the training of IO capability

specialists is a Service responsibility. The development of specific capability expertise should

be complemented by increasingly in-depth instruction appropriate to the student’s seniority

level. More in-depth training should broaden the student’s perspective of the role of specific

IO capabilities and their impact on the conduct of joint operations. Such training requires

reinforcement and enhancement throughout their careers. Only this continuity of Service training

can provide the foundation necessary to build joint IO planners and indoctrinate future senior

military leaders in the complexities and subtleties of military activity in the information

environment.

(5) IO practitioners need education to help them learn how to think about IO. IO

requires very detailed analysis and skilled synthesis, fueled by specific subject matter expertise

and knowledge. IO requires its practitioners to synthesize and view problems/challenges as

holistic and related instead of isolated. Hence, each part of IO relates to other parts, with actions

in one part of the world affecting other geographical areas and dimensions. IO education must

give people a broad appreciation of how different cultures affect how people think, plan, and

interpret outcomes. IO planners also need education sufficient for conducting sophisticated

wargaming going back and forth from the mind of the friendly commander to the minds of other

participants in the conflict who have influence on friendly COAs.

4. Planning Information Operations in Joint Exercises

Effective employment of IO in joint operations depends on the ability of US forces to train

as they intend to fight. Joint exercises provide a unique opportunity to rehearse and evaluate

component IO capabilities in mutually supportive operations. The complexity of integrating

IO into joint operations, and the impact that IO potentially has on other aspects of joint

operations, recommend the inclusion of IO in most joint exercises.

a. Exercise planning is a separate process from JOPES planning which is used to develop OPLANs.

While the development of an OPLAN using the JOPES planning process is usually part of the training

that takes place during joint exercises, exercise planning involves all thenecessary preparations

to structure the exercise and facilitate training. Most joint exercises are scheduled at an annual

exercise planning conference. The results of this conference are promulgated in a CJCS notice. CJCS-
VII-4

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JP 3-13

sponsored exercises may be accessed through the Joint Training Information Management Systems via

the SIPRNET.

(1) More information about the joint training program can be obtained from Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed

Forces of the United States. The tasks that must be accomplished during the planning stage for

each joint exercise are normally divided between those tasks that must be accomplished prior to

the initial planning conference (IPC) and those tasks that should be accomplished prior to the

mid-planning conference (MPC), which concludes the planning stage.

(2) IO aspects of an exercise must be concerned with:

(a) Identifying IO exercise objectives that are consistent with the overall

objectives in scope, purpose, and level of effort.

(b) Integrating IO tasks and objectives into the JFC’s concept of operations.

(c) Coordinating IO personnel and assets to participate as “Blue,” “Green,”

and “Red” forces (if specific force participation has not already been designated by higher

authority).

(d) Identifying personnel with IO expertise to participate as joint exercise control

group and “White Cell” members.

(e) Determining IO M&S requirements and systems for the exercise and

coordinating their availability and funding.

(f) Drafting the IO sections of the exercise directive and supporting plans (to

include the exercise control plan).

b. Exercise Planning Considerations. When employing IO in exercises, fundamental

planning considerations include:

(1) The exercise objectives and how they relate to IO. Planning IO objectives should

include a review of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the Joint Mission Essential Task List,

and the CJCS’ Recommended Training Issues for applicable objectives.

(2) The type, location, and size of exercise, as well as the duration.

(3) Accurate representation of operational target delivery environment.

(4) Lessons learned from previous exercises and operations. The review of lessons

learned is an important and cost-effective way to avoid the documented mistakes of previous

exercises and operations.
VII-5

Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experiments

(5) The number and type of IO capabilities and personnel appropriate for the type of exercise

and its objectives.

(6) The type of control (free-play, semi-controlled, controlled, or scripted) for IO

capabilities necessary to most effectively accomplish the training objectives.

(7) Defining exercise “play” area(s) in the information environment. The

information environment creates opportunities for remote participation of capabilities and

personnel, but also requires concern for inadvertent collateral “damage” or other unintended

consequences of exercise information actions not properly “confined.” IO capabilities that

affect the information environment from CNA or EA exercise activity have the potential to

affect or “interact” with the information environment outside the designated exercise area.

Exercise planners must evaluate the potential for unintended effects throughout the exercise.

Avoiding exercise conflicts with third party Internet or EM spectrum use, involves adherence to

guidance provided in training area SOPs, as well as applicable local regulations, laws, treaties,

and conventions.

(8) Need to balance integrated IO training with other training. The potential for

capabilities such as EA and CNA to disrupt exercise play requires that participation of those

capabilities be well planned. However, strictly isolated exercise of potentially disruptive

capabilities on test ranges and isolated computer networks can lead to false confidence in readiness

and inaccurate exercise lessons.

(9) The type of M&S systems to be used as part of the exercise.

(10) The number of experienced IO evaluators required to properly monitor the exercise

and assist in developing lessons learned through the after action report (AAR) process.

(11) Evaluation of possible adverse effects of compromising friendly operations,

intelligence capabilities, and methods. “Real world” OPSEC and other security considerations

must be taken into account when planning IO activities. Foreign intelligence organizations

often monitor joint exercises to gather information about US capabilities, tactics, techniques, and

procedures. IO capabilities and support, participating virtually or from remote locations, should guard

against the foreign intelligence collection that targets their communications links with other exercise

participants.

c. Planning Tasks. The following tasks should be undertaken to ensure that IO is properly

integrated into joint exercises when appropriate:

(1) Developing specific, attainable IO exercise objectives. The identification and

accomplishment of these objectives increase the capability of effectively employing the IO

resources and provide the vehicle to evaluate the training of IO personnel. Objectives must be

measurable and compatible with overall exercise constraints. IO objectives should provide

specific direction and should be derived from the UJTL or appropriate OPLAN tasks. General

statements of policy and rephrased definitions should be avoided in the development of objectives.
VII-6

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JP 3-13

(2) Providing sufficient opportunity to test the abilities of IO planners to coordinate

military information activity, accomplish exercise objectives, and satisfy training requirements.

IO within an exercise must be stimulated through scenario design, asset participation, and scripting

of specific events in the master scenario events list (MSEL).

(3) Designing the IO portion of an exercise scenario in such a way that appropriate

assumptions are made about friendly and adversary IO capabilities, baseline perceptions of

appropriate individuals and groups, as well as how perceptions may change over the course of

the exercise in reaction to all scripted events and exercise play. Baseline perception and IOrelated intelligence must be provided in documentation that both Blue and Red forces receive at

the start of the exercise (STARTEX). Technical and safety requirements must be coordinated

with appropriate range and/or J-6 personnel. IO requirements for M&S must be coordinated.

IO experiments during the exercise must be coordinated. MOEs for IO must be identified and

documented for exercise evaluators and lessons learned personnel.

(4) Obtaining sufficient IO assets to support training objectives during exercise play.

Specific asset availability may be difficult to firmly schedule months before an exercise. Scenario

designers should assess the probability of key asset participation and, if necessary, draft backup

training objectives and scenario specifics to allow for the loss of exercise assets because of

higher priority operational requirements.

(5) Scripting appropriate IO-related events to support training objectives during exercise

play. Events scripted to stimulate IO play must be developed as an integrated part of the MSEL.

Sufficient IO-related events must be provided to keep participating personnel challenged and

achieve training objectives. Where necessary, branch and sequel MSELs must be developed to

account for alternative exercise outcomes.

(6) Creating as realistic an exercise environment as possible. Realism can be achieved

by using friendly IO capabilities or by employing IO models and simulations, and incorporating

robust IO response cells into the exercise environment. Response cells are especially useful for providing

interaction with national-level agencies or departments when conducting strategic influence campaign

planning or DSPD. In this regard, there must be an opposing force well-schooled in adversary information

techniques in both a conventional and unconventional sense. When US IO planners plan IO actions,

they must take into account the presence of realistic opposition forces that will be attempting to anticipate

US actions and set conditions for their own effects to work. This interplay also stimulates IO wargaming

for information superiority.

(7) Ensuring adequate manning for IO staff functions and IO evaluation. IO

planners should nominate IO staff billets through the process being used to develop the exercise

billet documentation. In addition to the appropriate number of IO billets on the exercise joint

staff, IO observer/training billets and IO “white cell” billets may be appropriate, depending on

the scale and purpose of the exercise. If IO-related technology or tactics evaluations are to be

accomplished during the exercise, additional IO evaluation billets may be necessary.
VII-7

Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experiments

(8) Ensuring “real world” OPSEC is considered in the exercise planning. Coordinate

with appropriate authorities to ensure that adequate protection is applied for both simulators and real

world systems. These systems should be used at locations and in ways that minimize the success of

collection by hostile intelligence systems.

(9) Coordinating use of simulation to fulfill training objectives. Force-on-force

simulations provide a capability to train battle staffs in the planning, execution, and evaluation

of IO employment for any range of scenarios, from a small single-Service counterdrug exercise

to a multinational theater campaign.

d. IO Exercise Planning Flow. The planning tasks discussed in the previous paragraph

must be accomplished within the framework of the three phases of exercise planning culminating

in the IPC, MPC, and final planning conference (FPC), respectively. Normally, the IPC occurs

approximately eight months prior to the commencement of the exercise. The MPC follows the

IPC by about four months. The FPC normally occurs about two months before the exercise.

5. Information Operations Exercise Preparation, Execution, and Post-Exercise

Evaluation

The planning stage is only the first of four stages in the life cycle of each joint exercise. The

other three stages; preparation, execution, and post-exercise evaluation, also involve tasks and

coordination on the part of IO exercise staff personnel.

a. Preparation Stage. During the preparation stage, the approved exercise directive and

supporting plans are distributed; pre-exercise training is developed and conducted; any exercise

specific databases are finalized and tested; and the exercise TPFDD is validated. During this

stage, milestones receive a final review and update; operation plans and orders are finalized;

simulation gamer augmentees and AAR observer staffing is completed; and the AAR collection

management plan is approved. The FPC is conducted to finalize actions required prior to

STARTEX. Key actions of the FPC include TPFDL refinement, and the concept of operations

and MSEL review as applicable. IO preparations during this period include obtaining necessary

clearances and notifications for IO activity (particularly EA and CNA), coordinating

implementation of the exercise directive, and accommodating changes in personnel and assets.

b. Execution Stage. During the actual conduct of the exercise, personnel responsible for

IO should focus on ensuring the IO events in the MSEL occur as planned, the actual IO exercise

activities remain focused on the training objectives, and that data/observations supporting the

AAR process are properly collected and processed. Prior to the actual STARTEX, it may be

necessary or useful to provide structured training on some aspect of IO as a means to achieve

one or more of the training objectives. The specifics of such training (who instructs, who attends,

where, etc.) should be worked out during the planning and preparation stages of the exercise.

c. Post-Exercise Evaluation Stage. This period actually begins prior to the conclusion of

the exercise. IO activity associated with this stage includes capturing and documenting lessons learned,

participating in “hot wash” meetings, and coordinating the redeployment of participants and assets to
VII-8

Chapter VII

JP 3-13

parent commands. The form and format for documenting lessons learned can be found in CJCSI

3150.25 Series, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

6. Information Operations in Joint Experimentation

a. Conceptualization of the information environment and military activity in it continue to evolve.

The joint experimentation (JE) process provides the means to conduct structured analysis of specific IO

concepts, concept of operations, doctrine, and capabilities in a controlled environment. This process is

crucial to establishing, gauging, and validating proposed IO tactics, techniques, procedures, and capabilities

in order to allocate resources efficiently.

b. CJCSI 3180.01, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processes

for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations, is the policy document

that guides JE. USJFCOM develops the JE campaign plan and coordinates it through Joint Staff

J-7, with inputs from the combatant commanders, Services, Joint Staff, OSD, and defense agencies.

USJFCOM submits the JE campaign plan for CJCS approval through the JROC process (to include

providing briefings to the JROC Joint Review Board).

c. Recommendations resulting from joint IO experiments and other assessments are

submitted to the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate, in accordance

with CJCSI 3180.01 Series, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic

Processes for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations, and other

DOD guidance, as required.
APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE (PUBLISHED SEPARATELY)

A-1

This appendix is a classified supplement provided under separate cover. The classified

appendix expands on information contained in this publication.
A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

MUTUAL SUPPORT BETWEEN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

CORE CAPABILITIES

B-1

Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities

MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

OPSEC PSYOP EW

OPERATIONS

SECURITY

(OPSEC)

SUPPORTS BY

Concealingcompetingobservables.Degrading generalsituation informationto enhance effect ofobservables.Limiting informationand indicators thatcould compromiseMILDEC operations.

Concealingcontradictingindicators whileconveying selectedinformation andindicators.

PHYSICAL

DESTRUCTION

PHYSICALSECURITY MILDEC

Concealing friendlydelivery systemsfrom enemy offensiveinformationoperations (IO) until itis too late for theadversary to react.Denying informationto the enemy on thesuccess of offensiveIO.

Concealing EW unitsand systems to denyinformation on extentof electronic attackand electronicwarfare support(EA/ES) capabilities.

Concealing essentialelements of friendlyinformation (EEFI).Reducing theactivities requiringphysical security.Hiding tools ofphysical security thuspreventing adversaryfrom gaining access.Information hasadequate protection.

MILITARY

DECEPTION

(MILDEC)

SUPPORTS BY

Influencing adversarynot to collect againstprotected units/activities.Causing adversary tounderestimatefriendly OPSECcapabilities.

Providing informationcompatible withPSYOP theme.

Influencing adversaryto underestimatefriendly physicaldestructioncapabilities.Influencing adversaryto defend commandand control (C2)elements/systemsthat friendly forcesdo not plan todestroy.

Influencing adversaryto underestimatefriendly EA/EScapabilities.

Masking troopactivities requiringsafeguards.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS

(PSYOP)

SUPPORTS BY

Disseminating rulesof engagement.Counteringpropaganda andmisinformation.Minimizing resistanceand interference bylocal population.

Creating perceptionsand attitudes thatMILDEC can exploit.Integrating PSYOPactions with MILDEC.Reinforcing thedeception story withinformation fromother sources.

Causing populace toleave targeted areasto reduce collateraldamage.

Broadcasting PSYOPproducts onadversaryfrequencies.Developingmessages forbroadcast on otherservice EW assets.

Targeting adversaryaudiences to reducethe need for physicalsecurity.
B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-13 Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities (cont’d)

MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES (cont’d)

OPSEC PSYOP EW

PHYSICAL ATTACK

SUPPORTS BY

Conducting physicalattacks as deceptionevents.Degrading adversarycapabilities to see,report, and processobservables.

Degrading adversaryability to see, report,and processinformation.Degrading adversaryability to jam PSYOPbroadcasts.

PHYSICAL

DESTRUCTION

PHYSICALSECURITY MILDEC

Destroying adversaryC2 targets.Destroying electronicsystems adversaryuse.

Reducing physicalsecurity needs byattacking adversarysystems able topenetrate informationsystem (INFOSYS).

ELECTRONIC

WARFARE (EW)

SUPPORTS BY

Degrading adversaryelectromagneticintelligence,surveillance, andreconnaissance (ISR)operations. againstprotected units andactivitiesCreating barrier ofwhite noise to maskunit maneuvers.

Degradingadversary's ability tosee, report, andprocess information.Isolating targetaudience frominformation.

Providing targetacquisition throughES.Destroying orupsetting susceptibleassets with EA.

Using electronicprotection (EP) tosafeguardcommunications usedin protectingfacilities.

INFORMATION

ASSURANCE (IA)

SUPPORTS BY

Ensuring INFOSYSconfidentiality.

Providing INFOSYSassets for conductingMILDEC operations.

Ensuring INFOSYSare available forphysical destructiontasks.

Ensuring EW assetsare available.

Providing forINFOSYSauthentication.

Preventing ordegrading adversaryreconnaissance andsurveillance.

Using EA/ES asdeception measures.Degrading adversarycapabilities to see,report, and processcompetingobservables. Causingenemy to misinterpretinformation receivedby his electronicmeans.

Ensuring availabilityof INFOSYS forPSYOP.

COMPUTER

NETWORK ATTACK

(CNA)

SUPPORTS BY

Attacking enemycomputers beforethey can detect ourEEFI.

Providing thedeception storythrough computers.

Nonlethal attack ofselected targets,which allows lethalattacks on othertargets.

Used with EA. Conducting risk

assessment todetermineconsequence of 2dand 3d order CNAeffects.

Another means ofproviding the PSYOPtheme.

COMPUTER

NETWORK

DEFENSE

(CND)

SUPPORTS BY

Detecting enemyattempts to acquireinformation.

Protecting theMILDEC plan residentinside computers.

Protecting firesupport C2 systems.

Used in conjunctionwith EP.

Erect firewalls toprotect intrusion intonetworks.

Preventing thecompromise ofPSYOP messagebefore release.
B-3

Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities (cont’d)

MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES (cont’d)

OPSEC PSYOP EW

PHYSICALSECURITY

SUPPORTS BY

Restricting access bylevel of security andnumber of personnel.

Ensuring products donot contain classifiedinformation

PHYSICAL

DESTRUCTION

PHYSICALSECURITY MILDEC

Safeguardingequipment used inEW.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)

SUPPORTS BY

Countering foreignhuman intelligence(HUMINT) operations.

Conductingcountersignaloperations to allowbroadcast of PSYOPmessages

None Countering foreign

HUMINT operations.

OPSEC

SUPPORTS BY

Concealing physical andelectronic INFOSYS locations.

Ensuring EEFI are concealedfrom enemy collection assets.

Concealing CNA capabilities. Denying enemy knowledge

about CND capabilities.

Protecting operationplans and operationorders.

Countering foreignHUMINT operations.Identifying threat ISRcapabilities.

PSYOP

SUPPORTS BY

Safeguardingavailablity ofINFOSYS to use inphysical destruction.

Providing electroniccountermeasures.

CNA CND CI IA

MILDEC

SUPPORTS BY

Overloading adversaryintelligence and analysiscapabilities.Protecting and defendingfriendly INFOSYS.

Giving the adversary a coverstory so his intelligence systemcollects irrelevant information.

Providing MILDEC targets anddeception stories to enhanceCNA.

Causing enemy to believe ourCND is greater than it actuallyis.Causing enemy to believe allCND tools are in place.

Enhancing the ability of IA in theminds of the enemy.

Providing messages in enemydecision maker's mind that canbe revealed by CI to determineenemy true intentions.

Convincing enemy not to dosomething by describing effectsof a CNA if they takeundesirable actions.

Providing information aboutnon-military threat to computersin the area of operations.

PHYSICAL ATTACK

SUPPORTS BY

Attacking adversary systemscapable of influencing friendlyINFOSYS availability andintegrity.

Destroying appropriatelynominated adversary collectionassets.

Supplementing CNA bydestroying or degrading hardtargets.

Destroying or degrading enemyCNA facilities before they attackfriendly computers.

EW

SUPPORTS BY

Using EP to protect equipment. None Supplementing CNA with EA. Using EP to protect personnel,

facilities, and equipment.
B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-13

Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities (cont’d)

MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES (cont’d)

IA

SUPPORTS BY

Ensuring INFOSYS are availableto conduct CI.

Ensuring links with higherheadquarters to pass CNArequests.

Taking actions to ensureavailability, integrity,authentication, confidentiality,and nonrepudiation ofcomputers.

CND

SUPPORTS BY

CNA CND CI IA

CNA

SUPPORTS BY

Attacking enemy computersbefore enemy attacks friendlycomputers.

Exploiting enemy intelligencecollection.

Attacking enemy ability toattack friendly computers.

Supporting IA of informationpassed via computer networks.

Detecting, identifying, andassessing enemy collectionefforts against computers.

Protecting CNA weapons fromenemy detection.

PHYSICAL

SECURITY

SUPPORTS BY

Safeguarding INFOSYS byimplementing securityprocedures.

Safeguarding personnel, andpreventing unauthorized accessto equipment, installations,materiel, and documents.

Safeguarding INFOSYS fromsabotage, espionage, damage,or theft.

Determining applicable risk andthreat levels.

CI

SUPPORTS BY

At certain echelons, helpingensure information integrity.

Confirming results of CNA. Detecting, identifying,

assessing, countering, andneutralizing enemy intelligencecollection.
B-5

Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS

OPSEC PSYOP EW

OPERATIONS

SECURITY

(OPSEC) CAN

CONFLICT BY

Limiting informationthat can be revealedto enhance deceptionstory credibility.

Limiting informationthat can be revealedto develop PSYOPthemes.

PHYSICAL

DESTRUCTION

PHYSICALSECURITY MILDEC

Limiting informationthat can be revealedto enemy to developtargets.

Electronic protection(EP) and OPSEC mayhave different goals.

Should be no conflict.

MILITARY

DECEPTION

(MILDEC) CAN

CONFLICT BY

Revealing informationOPSEC normallyseeks to conceal.

Limiting PSYOPtheme selection.Limiting informationthat can be revealedto develop PSYOPthemes.

Limiting targeting toallow survival andconduct of criticaladversary commandand control (C2)functions.

Limiting electronicattack (EA) targetingof adversaryinformation systems(INFOSYS) to allowsurvival and conductof critical adversaryC2 functions.

Negating thedeception story byphysical securitypreventing ourtransmitting arealistic deceptionstory.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS

(PSYOP) CAN

CONFLICT BY

Revealing informationOPSEC normallyseeks to conceal.

Limiting deceptionstory selection ifdeception storycontains untruths.

Limiting targeting ofadversary C2infrastructure toallow conveying ofPSYOP themes.

Limiting EA againstadversarycommunicationsfrequencies to allowPSYOP themes to beconveyed.

Should be no conflict.

PHYSICAL ATTACK

CAN CONFLICT BY

Limiting selection ofdeception means bydenying or degradingelements of adversaryC2 infrastructurenecessary to processdeception story.

Limiting meansavailable to conveyPSYOP themes bydenying or degradingadversary C2systems.

Limiting opportunitiesfor communicationsintrusion by denyingor degradingelements of adversaryINFOSYS.

If need-to-knowconsiderations limitaccess to targetingdata.

ELECTRONIC

WARFARE (EW)

CAN CONFLICT BY

Revealing EW assetsprematurely.

Reducing frequenciesavailable to conveyPSYOP themes.

Limiting targeting ofadversary C2systems.

Revealing whatphysical security istrying to protect (EA).EP should notconflict.

Causing firingsystems to revealtheir locations.

Limiting selection ofdeception measuresby denying ordegrading use ofadversary C2 systems.
B-6

Appendix B

JP 3-13 Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations (cont’d)

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (cont’d)

OPSEC PSYOP EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION PHYSICAL SECURITY MILDEC

INFORMATION

ASSURANCE (IA)

CAN CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Reinforcing the

deception story

Should be no conflict. EP and IA must be

deconflicted.

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

COMPUTER

NETWORK ATTACK

(CNA) CAN

CONFLICT BY

Attack selected onenemy targets mayprovide informationon friendly activities.

May result inattacking wrong targetif coordination notmade with MILDEC

Attacking same targetwith nonlethal andlethal weaponswastes both time andammunition.

Need to deconflictwhich systems attackwhich targets.

Revealing CNAsource that should beprotected.

Preventing the enemyfrom receiving thePSYOP message.

COMPUTER

NETWORK

DEFENSE (CND)

CAN CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Reinforcing the

deception story

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (CI)

CAN CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Killing sources. Should be no conflict.

OPSEC CAN

CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

Should be no conflict

PSYOP CAN

CONFLICT BY

Electronic warfaresupport may beneeded for otheractivities.

CNA CND CI IA

MILDEC

CAN CONFLICT BY

Presenting data the enemy willbelieve versus assuring data isnot revealing to enemy.

Giving the adversary a coverstory that inadvertently supportshis collection plan.

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.
B-7

Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations (cont’d)

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (cont’d)

IA CAN

CONFLICT BY

Having insufficient INFOSYSavailable to conduct CI.

Not having available links withhigher headquarters to passCNA requests.

Should be no conflict.

CND CAN

CONFLICT BY

CNA CND CI IA

CNA

CAN CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Attacking enemy computers

before exploiting hostileintelligence collection efforts.

Should be no conflict.

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

PHYSICAL

SECURITY CAN

CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

CI CAN

CONFLICT BY

Ineffective CI can negateinformation integrity.

Should be no conflict. CI revealing how networks are

protected.

PHYSICAL ATTACK

CAN CONFLICT BY

Attacking incorrect adversarysystems capable of influencingfriendly INFOSYS availablity andintegrity.

Destroying insufficient numberof adversary collection assets.

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.

EW CAN

CONFLICT BY

Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict.
B-8

Appendix B

JP 3-13 Figure B-3. Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera

SUPPORT ROLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC

AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND COMBAT CAMERA

INFORMATION

OPERATIONS PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMBAT CAMERA

INFORMATION

OPERATIONS

(IO)

SUPPORTED BY

Influencing/informingpopulace of CMO activitiesand support.Neutralizingmisinformation and hostilepropaganda directedagainst civil authorities.Controllingelectromagnetic spectrumfor legitimate purposes.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

CIVIL MILITARY

OPERATIONS

CIVIL MILITARY

OPERATIONS

(CMO)

SUPPORTS BY

Conducting counterpropaganda and protectionfromDeveloping essentialelements of friendlyinformation (EEFI) topreclude inadvertent publicdisclosure.Synchronizing psychological operations (PSYOP)and operations security(OPSEC) with PA strategy.

misinformation/rumor.

Ensuring accuracy ofinformation.Maintaining relevance ofinformation.Timeliness of information.Usability of information.Completeness ofinformation.Security of information.

Coordinating guidance toCOMCAM teams withcommander'sinformation/objectives.Assisting in expeditioustransmission of criticalCOMCAM images.

Providing information oncivil-military operationscenter activities to supportpublic affairs (PA) strategy.Synchronizing informationcommunications mediaand message.Identifying, coordinating,and integrating media,public information, andhost-nation support.

Providing information toinform interagencyelements on localinformation environment.Synchronizingcommunications mediaand messages with otherIO capabilities.Establishing andmaintaining liaison ordialogue with indigenouspersonnel and NGOs.Supporting DPSD withfeedback on strategiccommunications themes.

Using COMCAMcapabilities to recordpriority civic actionprojects.Synchronizing imageryassignments withCOMCAM team leader.

Providing information tosupport friendly knowledgeof informationSynchronizingcommunications media andassets and message withother IO capabilities.Coordinating commandand control target sets withtargeting cell.Establishing andmaintaining liaison ordialogue with indigenouspersonnel andnongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs).Supporting PSYOP withfeedback onProviding news andinformation to the localpeople.

environment.

PSYOP themes.
B-9

Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities Figure B-3. Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera (cont’d)

SUPPORT ROLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC

AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND COMBAT CAMERA (cont’d)

INFORMATION

OPERATIONS PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMBAT CAMERA

PUBLIC

AFFAIRS (PA)

SUPPORTED BY

Producing accurate,timely, and balancedinformation for the public.Coordinating with civilaffairs specialists to verifyfacts and validity ofinformation.

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

CIVIL MILITARY

OPERATIONS

DEFENSE

SUPPORT TO

PUBLIC

DIPLOMACY

(DSPD)

SUPPORTS BY

Developing informationproducts to protect USactions consistent withstrategic communicationsthemes and objectives.Coordinating withinteragency planners toensure a consistentmessage.Providing assessment ofmedia coverage.

Managing release of keyimages through PAchannels.Coordinating for COMCAMcoverage and access tokey events andoperations.

Providing a link tointeragency forcoordination and guidanceon strategiccommunications themesand activities.

Providing a link tointeragency forcoordination and guidanceon strategiccommunications themesand activities.

Developing informationproducts to protectsoldiers against the effectsof misinformation ordisinformation.Coordinating with IOplanners to ensure aconsistent message andmaintain OPSEC.Supportingcounterpropaganda bycounteringmisinformation.Providing assessment ofeffects of media coverageto OPSEC planners.Providing assessment ofessential nonmediacoverage of deceptionstory.Providing a link tointeragency forcoordination and guidanceon strategiccommunications themesand activities.

Providing a link tointeragency forcoordination and guidanceon strategiccommunications themesand activities.

COMBAT

CAMERA

(COMCAM)

SUPPORTS BY

Providing responsiveimagery coverage ofevents in the operationalarea.

Providing responsiveimagery coverage ofevents in the operationalarea.

Providing responsiveimagery coverage ofevents in the operationalarea.

Providing responsiveimagery coverage ofevents in the operationalarea.
B-10

Appendix B

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX C

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

C-1

1. Introduction

Joint communications systems support the warfighting commander across the range of

military operations. DOD communications systems are designed, acquired, and linked according

to principles that provide for flexible, adaptable use in a wide variety of applications. Normally,

IO is planned, directed, and supported on the resident command or organizational communications

systems which support other communications requirements. Personnel responsible for IO or IO

support at each DOD component use communications systems available to other command

personnel in compliance with appropriate IA, information management, and administrative

policies. The IO cell chief, or other designated person, provides communications system support

requirements through staff procedures established locally. Whether core capability staff sections

submit their communications support requirements through the IO cell chief is command specific.

At each command, IO communications requirements are prioritized with other unit or

organizational communications requirements. During operational planning, IO and capabilityspecific frequency and bandwidth requirements are negotiated as part of the JOPES or other

designated planning process.

For more discussion on communications system support, see JP 6-0, Communications System

Support.

2. Joint Force Communications System Directorate

a. The J-6 is responsible to the JFC for providing the communications system to support

reliable, timely information flow in support of unified action. The operational arm of the J-6 is

the JNCC. JNCCs play a vital role in IO, particularly in the IA process, where they provide

communications and network connectivity throughout the chain of command. The J-6 establishes

a JNCC to manage all communications systems deployed in the operational area. The JNCC

requires timely support from subordinate command’s communications control centers to direct

network operations (NETOPS) and retain situational awareness of force networks.

b. The JNCC serves as the single control agency for the management of the joint

communications system in an operational area. The JFC may task subordinate Service or

component commanders to provide personnel augmentation to the J-6 to ensure the appropriate

subject matter expertise exists within the JNCC. Combatant commanders and component

commanders should designate a single office within their communications staffs to coordinate

with the J-6.

c. The JNCC may incorporate the use of a joint network management system, which may

include the joint defense infrastructure control system. These systems play a high-level role in

the network planning, monitoring, and control of the system, illustrating the network common

operational picture used in combat operations.
C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-13

3. Communications System Directorate Responsibilities

a. Exercises staff supervision of all communications system assets. Publishes

communications system plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission,

furnishing direction to subordinate commands regarding provision of communications system

assets required to support the JFC. This may include assigning primary responsibility for

communications to a subordinate or component command. The J-6 also assigns responsibility

for lateral communications between subordinate commands.

b. Provide overall management of the communications system supporting the JFC.

c. Review and coordinate communications system plans prepared by subordinate commands.

d. Upon requesting CJCS-controlled transportable assets, including JCSE assets, in

accordance with CJCSI 6110.01A, CJCS-Controlled Communications Assets, and other

established procedures, exercises staff supervision when deployed to the operational area.

e. Ensure interoperability of the joint communications system.

4. Joint Network Operations Control Center Responsibilities

a. Exercise technical management over communications control centers belonging to

deployed components and subordinate commands.

b. Serves as the single control agency for management of the joint communications networks

and infrastructure.

c. Perform planning, execution, technical, and management functions.

d. Develop/disseminate standards/procedures and collect/present communications system

management statistical data.

For more discussion on NETOPS and JNCC see JP 6-0, Communications System Support.
APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

D-1

The development of JP 3-13 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Executive Branch Documents

a. National Security Strategy.

b. Unified Command Plan FY 04 (through Chg 2).

c. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.

2. Department of State Documents

Department of State Publication 9434, Treaties In Force.

3. Department of Defense Documents

a. IO Roadmap.

b. DODD 3222.4, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W)

Countermeasures.

c. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services

in Peacetime in Contingencies Short of Declared War.

d. DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO) (SD 106 Formal Coordination Draft).

e. DODD 5122.5, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)).

f. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not

Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

g. DODD 5205.2, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program.

h. DODD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components

that Affect United States Persons.

i. DODD 5240.2, DOD Counterintelligence (CI).

j. DODD 8500.1, Information Assurance (IA).

k. DODD O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense (CND).
D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-13

l. DODI O-3600.02, Information Operations (IO) Security Classification Guidance (U).

m. DODI 3608.11, Information Operations Career Force.

n. DODI 5240.4, Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal Violations.

o. DODI 5240.6, Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness, Briefing, and Reporting Programs.

p. DODI 5240.10, Counterintelligence Support to the Combatant Commands and the

Defense Agencies.

q. DODI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation.

r. DODI O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense (CND).

s. National Military Strategy (2004).

4. Joint Policy, Doctrine, and Other Publications

a. CJCSI 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy.

b. CJCSI 3110.05C, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan FY 2002.

c. CJCSI 3113.01, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement

Plans.

d. CJCSI 3141.01B, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Operation Plans.

e. CJCSI 3150.25B, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

f. CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.

g. CJCSI 3180.01, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processes

for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations.

h. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy.

i. CJCSI 3210.03, Joint Electronic Warfare Policy.

j. CJCSI 3211.01C, Joint Policy for Military Deception.

k. CJCSI 3213.01B, Joint Operations Security.
D-3

References

l. CJCSI 3401.03A, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND)

Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR) Metrics.

m. CJCSI 6510.01D, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND).

n. CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning.

o. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I

(Planning Policies and Procedures).

p. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II

(Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment

Execution).

q. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, Planning

Formats and Guidance.

r. CJCSM 3122.04A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II –

Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance.

s. CJCSM 3141.01A, Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans.

t. CJCSM 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.

u. CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).

v. CJCSM 3500.04C, Series 01, Classified Supplement To The Universal Joint Task List

(UJTL).

w. CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-In-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network

Defense (CND).

x. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

y. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military

Operations.

z. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

aa. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

bb. JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

cc. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation

of the Battlespace.
D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-13

dd. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support to Joint Operations.

ee. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

ff. JP 3-01.4, JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD).

gg. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.

hh. JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting

and Mission Planning.

ii. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I.

jj. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. II.

kk. JP 3-09, Joint Fires.

ll. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in the Theater.

mm. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

nn. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

oo. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

pp. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

qq. JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations.

rr. JP 3-54, Operations Security.

ss. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

tt. JP 3-58, Military Deception.

uu. JP 3-60, Targeting.

vv. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

ww. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

xx. JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Headquarters.
D-5

References

yy. JP 6-0, Communications System Support.

zz. Joint Forces Staff College IO Planning Handbook (2003).

aaa. Standing Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures (Draft).

bbb. USJFCOM Standard Operation Procedure & Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

for the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element), 14 July 2004.

ccc. USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3: Doctrinal Implications of the

Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), 16 June 2004.

ddd. The Privacy Act, Title 5 US Code Section 552a.

5. Multi-Service and Service Publications

a. FM 3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

b. Naval Warfare Publication 3-13, Navy Information Operations.

c. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations.

d. United States Air Force Concept of Operations for Information Operations.

e. A Concept for Information Operations (USMC document).

f. FM 3-55.12 / MCRP 3-33.7A / NTTP 3-13.12 / AFTTP(I) 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations.
D-6

Appendix D

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine

and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments

should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and

appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for

Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-13, 9 October 1998, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations

and JP 3-13.1, 7 February 1996, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-DDGO//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//

CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP//

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center,

Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans

and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate

will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military

Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to

source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-13

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Distribution of Printed Publications

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through the Service publication

centers listed below (initial contact) or USJFCOM in the event that the joint publication is not

available from the Service.

b. Individuals and agencies outside the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and

combat support agencies are authorized to receive only approved joint publications and joint test

publications. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign

nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign

Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative

support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquarters

of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

1655 Woodson Road

Attn: Joint Publications

St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

700 Robbins Avenue

Bldg 1, Customer Service

Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)

814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321

Albany, GA 31704-0321
E-3

Administrative Instructions

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD)

US Coast Guard

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander

USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

Doctrine and Education Group (Publication Distribution)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in

accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. The Joint Staff will not print copies of electronic joint publications for distribution.

Electronic versions are available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET), or http://

nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/ (SIPRNET).

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to

foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense

Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon,

Washington, DC 20301-7400.
E-4

Appendix E

JP 3-13

Intentionally Blank
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AAR after action report

AOR area of responsibility

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command

CE core element

CI counterintelligence

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CMO civil-military operations

CNA computer network attack

CND computer network defense

CNE computer network exploitation

CNO computer network operations

COA course of action

COMCAM combat camera

COMSEC communications security

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

DODI Department of Defense instruction

DOS Department of State

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy

EA electronic attack

EM electromagnetic

EP electronic protection

ES electronic warfare support

EW electronic warfare

EWCC electronic warfare coordination cell

FPC final planning conference

GEOINT geospatial intelligence

HQ headquarters
GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-13

IA information assurance

IC intelligence community

IO information operations

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IPC initial planning conference

IT information technology

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff

J-7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate,

Joint Staff

JA judge advocate

JCMA joint communications security (COMSEC) monitoring activity

JCSE joint communications support element

JE joint experimentation

JFC joint force commander

JIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace

JNCC joint network operations control center

JOC joint operations center

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JPO-STC Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force

JRFL joint restricted frequency list

JROC Joint Requirement Oversight Council

JSC Joint Spectrum Center

JTCB joint targeting coordination board

JTF joint task force

JWAC joint warfare analysis center

LOAC law of armed conflict

M&S modeling and simulation

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence

MILDEC military deception

MNF multinational force

MNFC multinational force commander

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOP measure of performance

MPC mid-planning conference

MSEL master scenario events list
GL-3

Glossary

NDP national disclosure policy

NETOPS network operations

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NGO nongovernmental organization

NSA National Security Agency

OPLAN operation plan

OPSEC operations security

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA public affairs

PD public diplomacy

PIR priority intelligence requirement

POAT psychological operations assessment team

PSYOP psychological operations

RFI request for information

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SIGINT signals intelligence

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network

SJFHQ standing joint force headquarters

SME subject matter expert

SOF special operations forces

SOP standing operating procedure

STARTEX start of the exercise

STO special technical operations

TA target audience

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list

TSCP theater security cooperation plan

UJTL Universal Joint Task List

USG United States Government

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and

command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific

missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies,

etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP 1-02)

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully

apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land,

sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the

electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas

and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a

strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or

exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve

operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military

forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military

actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civilmilitary operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces,

or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under

a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary

of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established

by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders

of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or

the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated

and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military

operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to

the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ

GL-4 JP 3-13

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned

missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also

called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat camera. The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of

combat, information, humanitarian, special force, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering,

legal, public affairs, and other operations involving the Military Services. Also called

COMCAM. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,

equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in

planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

command and control warfare. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP

1-02.)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the

operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further

as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support.

(JP 1-02)

communications security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny

unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and

study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of

the results of such possession and study. Communications security includes: cryptosecurity,

transmission security, emission security, and physical security. Also called COMSEC. (This

term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the

next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)

computer intrusion. An incident of unauthorized access to data or an automated information

system. (JP 1-02)

computer network attack. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt,

deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the

computers and networks themselves. Also called CNA. (This term and its definition modify

the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)

computer network defense. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect,

monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense

information systems and computer networks. Also called CND. (This term and its definition

GL-5

Glossary
GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-13

modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-

02.)

computer network exploitation. Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities

conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary

automated information systems or networks. Also called CNE. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of JP 1-02.)

computer network operations. Comprised of computer network attack, computer network

defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. Also called CNO.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s

assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of

operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case,

particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out

simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the

operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s

concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating

specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two

or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander

or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but

does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement

cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating

authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be

exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than

to operations. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage,

other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign

governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international

terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

cryptosecurity. The component of communications security that results from the provision of

technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. (This term and its definition are

provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP

6-0.)

cyberspace. The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over

computer networks. (JP 1-02)

data. Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for

communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic means. Any
GL-7

Glossary

representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned.

(JP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or

falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s

interests. (JP 1-02)

defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the Department

of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United

States Government. Also called DSPD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)

defensive information operations. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP

1-02.)

directed energy. An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a

beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. Also called

DE. (JP 1-02)

electromagnetic spectrum. The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to

infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. See also electronic warfare.

(JP 1-02)

electromagnetic spectrum management. Planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of

the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative

procedures. The objective of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to

perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable

interference. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed

energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW.

The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic

protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic

warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons

to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or

destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA

includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic

spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons

that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism

(lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division

of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities,

and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare

that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic

warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under
GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-13

direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize

sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate

threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare

support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and

other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic

warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or

destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. See also directed energy;

electromagnetic spectrum. (JP 1-02)

emission security. The component of communications security that results from all measures

taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept

and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto-equipment and telecommunications

systems. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)

fires. Actions using lethal and nonlethal weapons to produce a specific effect on a target. (This

term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the

next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)

fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations

forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and

operational objectives. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately

covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02)

geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to

describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically reference activities

on the Earth. Also called GEOINT. (This term and its definition are provided for information

and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)

Global Information Grid. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information

capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing,

disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and

support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications

and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services

and other associated services and National Security Systems. Also called GIG. (This term

and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next

edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)

human factors. In information operations, the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other

human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the

interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-9

Glossary

information. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human

assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems

by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.

This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection,

detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (This term and its definition modify

the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP

1-02.)

information environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect,

process, disseminate, or act on information. (This term and its definition modify the existing

term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and

operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,

disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting

our own. Also called IO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its

definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information security. The protection of information and information systems against

unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit,

and against denial of service to authorized users. Also called INFOSEC. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the

next edition of JP 1-02.)

information superiority. The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process,

and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an

adversary’s ability to do the same. (This term and its definition modify the existing term

and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information system. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components for

the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and disposition of

information. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and

are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information warfare. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

integration. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that

operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce

uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential
GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-13

area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine

the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. The coordination that occurs between agencies of the US

Government, including the Department of Defense, for the purpose of accomplishing an

objective. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-08.)

joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in

coordinated action toward a common objective. See also fires. (JP 1-02)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations

forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. See

also fire support; joint fires. (JP 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish

broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating

targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint

integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from

the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also

called JTCB. (JP 1-02)

leveraging. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers

as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary

to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the

friendly forces mission. Also called MILDEC. See also deception. (This term and its

definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of

JP 1-02 by JP 3-58.)

offensive information operations. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP

1-02.)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service,

training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including

movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any

battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational

objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns,

major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy

into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all

levels of war. (JP 1-02)
GL-11

Glossary

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing

friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those

actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that

hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to

derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute

measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions

to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

physical security. 1. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard

personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and

documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. 2. In

communications security, the component that results from all physical measures necessary

to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation

thereof by unauthorized persons. See also communications security. (This term and its

definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of

JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to

foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately

the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose

of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable

to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations

activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department

of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

public diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States

Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to

understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening

the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (JP

1-02)

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment,

or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02)

space. A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted

to achieve US national security objectives. (JP 1-02)

space control. Combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure freedom

of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary

freedom of action in space. The space control mission area includes: surveillance of space;

protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use

space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; negation
GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-13

of space systems and services used for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and

directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications, and intelligence. (JP

1-02)

strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and

engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the

advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs,

plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national

power. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce

maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 1-02)

target audience. An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA. (This term and

its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in

the next edition of JP 1-02.)

transmission security. The component of communications security that results from all measures

designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than

cryptanalysis. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)

vulnerability analysis. None. (Approval for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and combatant

commands

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones, and

who will develop drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be Service,

combatant command or

Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

The combatant commands receive

the JP and begin to assess it during

use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality of

each JP and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or

Joint Staff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

combatant commands

J-7 initiates Program Directive

STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine is organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview

of the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-13 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMS PLANS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes

required changes and prepares pub for

coordination with Services and combatant

commands

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval

as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority

(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with combatant

commands, Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3

Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINT

WARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF