ISBN 1-932946-16-0
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Strategic Intelligenc

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OUT OF BOUNDS

Innovation and Change in

Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis

Deborah Osborne, Research Fellow

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of the Buffalo, NY Police Department, 

the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Joint Military Intelligence College

Washington, DC

March 2006

i

iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Commentaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Chapter

1. Untapped Capacities to Analyze Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. The Research Approach: Appreciative Inquiry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3. What Works: Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4. What Works: Relationships and Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5. What Works: Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

6. What Works: Information and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

7. What Works: Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

8. What Works: Training, Education, and Partnership with Academia. . . . . . . . . . . . 111

9. An Organizational and Institutional View of What Works. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

10. The Real and the Imagined Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

11. Harnessing the Power of Story to Effect Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

12. Are We There Yet? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Appendix: Some Participants in This Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
iv

Acknowledgments

This book owes its existence to the many analysts and experts who were willing to share

their stories with me. I recognize and appreciate that some participants were uncertain

about the need to bridge the distance between analytical fields and missions in law

enforcement, but nevertheless were willing to go along with my theory that this requirement is real by participating in the interview process. I thank them for their confidence in

my work and their gracious gift of time and ideas.

The command staff of the City of Buffalo Police Department was also supportive of this

work. I especially thank my immediate supervisor in the chain of command, Captain

Mark Makowski, whose leadership has offered me the freedom to explore and create

beyond the usual municipal civil service position. The training I have received as an analyst and the networking I have been encouraged to do in my position has made this book

possible. 

A special note of thanks to my father, Kenneth Patten, who encouraged me to look for the

answers to my questions and always had faith in my abilities to do so.

Above and beyond them, this book exists because of the generous invitation and continual

support of Dr. Russell Swenson, whose proposal to engage in this research project led to a

most interesting year of inquiry and discovery. 

Deborah Osborne

November 2005
v

Foreword

In the novel and on the movie screen, the suave detective and the hard-bitten-but-sensitive

street cop get the glory. But behind the scenes in the real world, a crucial foundation of good

police work is the collection, assimilation, analysis, and communication of information about

events, places and people. Crime and intelligence analysis is the back-office process that

frequently underlies the solved crime, the ameliorated problem, and the effective prevention

strategy.

Deborah Osborne’s Out of Bounds: Innovation and Change in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis addresses the changing nature and role of analysis in policing. Osborne’s

examination, though, focuses not only on the analytical process, but on the analysts —

critical actors who function with relative anonymity.

Osborne employs a provocative method of study: appreciative inquiry. In essence, analysts tell their stories: what motivates them, what successes they have enjoyed, what processes have worked well for them, how they see the future. A picture emerges of women

and men who have great passion for their work, and who make tremendous contributions

to solving crimes, interrupting crime patterns, apprehending criminals, and even preventing crime. By studying what works, the appreciative inquiry process draws out the themes

that characterize these successes: innovative thinking; creative problem solving; intraagency teamwork; collaboration and information sharing among agencies.

One of the more significant traits uncovered among state and local agency crime and

intelligence analysts is an overwhelming agility. These people are quick on their intellectual feet. They constantly adapt, try multiple approaches, quickly adopt technologies or

methodologies they find helpful, cultivate allies and complementary partners across organizational boundaries, and find ways to overcome impediments. They can describe specific

results achieved with great clarity, and can define their own contribution to the successes.

This stands in bold contrast to the fuzzy goals and bureaucratic doublespeak that seem to

characterize federal intelligence agencies. The locals appear not only to have their act

together, but to be quite adept at leveraging information, technology, and people to achieve

results. Of particular note, local analysts who function in a patchwork of jurisdictional

overlaps and adjacencies, with divergent governing bodies and widely varying information

systems, have found remarkably effective ways of bridging these potential divides and collaborating effectively. The Feds could learn a lot from the locals in this regard.

The description of the appreciative inquiry process itself is an intriguing aspect of the

book. Although appreciative inquiry has rarely if ever been applied to the criminal justice

process, Osborne carefully explains its purpose and demonstrates its value in this area. The

strength of this approach becomes evident in the book as the themes unfold in the words of

a diverse group of analysts working in vastly different circumstances. One can easily see

appreciative inquiry’s potential for other applications in law enforcement and beyond.

Tom Casady, Chief of Police, Lincoln, Nebraska

vii

Commentaries

Deborah Osborne asserts the following truisms about the state of intelligence analysis

in U.S. Law enforcement: that the information infrastructure and data quality found in

most agencies does not support analysis; that a lack of understanding of what analysis can

provide continues to hold us back; and that civilian analysts still have difficulty being

accepted as professionals. This is all common knowledge among law enforcement analysts as well as police officers in a position to know, but still needs to be continuously

hammered home. Although her informants offer useful insights, a broader array of participants would have provided even more depth in her analysis of the environment.

One of the most valuable conclusions reached by Ms. Osborne is that law enforcement

analysts are motivated by the same intangibles regardless of what level of government

they serve: they want to feel useful, challenged, appreciated for their skills and recognized

as part of a team.

Our tendency in this country to continuously collect information for the sake of collecting it, and disregarding any criminal information which does not support arrest or

criminal charges is a terrible waste of resources, and will continue to compromise our

ability to keep this country and our communities safe. I am happy to see that the author

highlights examples from outside the U.S., illustrating that there are more successful

models of police intelligence (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Northern Ireland’s Analysis Centre) to which we can aspire.

Lisa Palmieri, President, International Association

of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts

Ms. Osborne’s book offers a fresh assessment of what ails the Intelligence Community.

While the powers that be — that is, federal intelligence agencies and the Department of

Homeland Security — continue to struggle with intelligence sharing and an intelligence

model that fails to recognize the value of local intelligence, this book offers a number of

insightful observations that, if seriously considered, could make significant improvements

in fighting terrorism. Her methodological approach; namely, Appreciative Inquiry, lends

itself to creative ideas about improving the business of intelligence and crime analysis.

This book focuses on a number of fresh ideas about “what works”— See Chapters 3-8.

This book demonstrates the power of being open-minded and thinking critically about

how we go about intelligence gathering, analyzing crime and criminals; and how we

might collaborate better to counter terrorism and crime alike. This book brings together a

plethora of ideas and viewpoints, and is a must read for analysts and analysis unit managers, as well as public safety CEOs.

Noah Fritz, President, International Association of Crime Analysts

ix

Acronyms

AI Appreciative Inquiry

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics

CA Crime Analysis

CALEA Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies

CDX Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat

CICC Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council

CLEAR Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (Chicago)

COP Community-Oriented Policing

COPS Community-Oriented Policing Services

COPPS Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving

CPTED Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

DEA U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DOJ U.S. Department of Justice

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDLE Florida Department of Law Enforcement

GIS Geographic Information Systems

GISWG Global Infrastructure/Standards Working Group

GIWG Global Intelligence Working Group

GSWG Global Security Working Group

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

IACA International Association of Crime Analysts

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

IALEIA International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts

IC Intelligence Community

ICAM Information Collection for Automated Mapping

IJIS Integrated Justice Information Systems

ILP Intelligence-Led Policing

IRS Internal Revenue Service

IT Information Technology

JXDM Justice (Extensible Markup Language) Data Model

LE Law Enforcement

LEAA Law Enforcement Alliance of America

LEADS Law Enforcement Agency Data System

LEIN Law Enforcement Intelligence Network

LEIU Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit

LEO Law Enforcement Online

MO Modus Operandi

NCISP National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan

NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center
x

NIBRS National Incident-Based Reporting System

NIM National Intelligence Model

NLECTC National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center

NSA National Sheriffs’ Association

NTL National Training Laboratory

NW3C National White Collar Crime Center

OJP Office of Justice Programs

OLAP Online Analytic Processing

PD Police Department

POP Problem-Oriented Policing

PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems

SARA Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment

SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

UCR Uniform Crime Reporting

ViCap Violent Criminal Apprehension Program

XML Extensible Markup Language
1

Chapter 1

UNTAPPED CAPACITIES TO 

ANALYZE INTELLIGENCE

Since 9/11, national security agencies and law enforcement agencies are seeking to

build unprecedented partnerships. The urgent need to identify and prevent potentially

destructive actions by those who threaten to harm us as a nation on our own territory

demands new alliances. The challenge of combining the “eyes and ears” on our streets, or

local level law enforcement, with the resources of federal law enforcement agencies and

national security entities is great. The London suicide bombings in July 2005 emphasize

the need for local-level knowledge to address future threats of terrorism. New ways of

thinking to achieve a more secure homeland are not only desirable, but also essential to

our continued survival.

This book explores analytical capabilities in law enforcement, with a focus on local

applications. Along with those in the political and media arenas, the 9/11 Commission has

not recognized that intelligence analytical capacities exist in state and local law enforcement, and little mention of this emerging resource exists in the literature of the war on terrorism, or the Long War.

The purpose of this book is to inform the larger community of federal government agencies, including law enforcement, national security, and other interested entities, as well as

the citizens of this country and beyond, about the intelligence analytical capabilities existing in local and state levels of law enforcement. 

This work challenges the thinking of the national Intelligence Community and its analysts, as well as the law enforcement community, by using an organizational change management process called “Appreciative Inquiry.” Appreciative Inquiry focuses on using

imagination, the very thing found lacking in the U.S. Intelligence Community in evaluations of intelligence failures. The first stage of this process, the “discovery stage,” is incorporated into this work through success stories revealed in the author’s interviews with

analysts and experts who have contributed to real-world analytical work in law enforcement. Those success stories illustrate local law enforcement analytical capabilities.
2

State and local law enforcement officers, given their number, collect an enormous

amount of information. Untold, untapped quantities of information exist within their

reports that, if analyzed, could help solve many crimes, help direct efforts to prevent

crime, and, possibly, help find and/or connect some of the dots to help prevent terrorist

acts in the United States. 

The collectors are producing — but who is available to analyze the information? The

detailed reports of state and local law enforcers stay within their respective agencies. Federal agencies do not obtain the data contained in such reports. State law enforcement

agencies are likely to have analysts to support investigations, but many local law enforcement agencies have no personnel dedicated to information analysis. Analysts do exist at

the local level to carry out this task and some of their work is excellent — but an understanding of their role and support to develop their profession is absent.

Former CIA intelligence methodologist Richards J. Heuer noted, “Major intelligence

failures are usually caused by failures of analysis, not failures of collection.”1

 It is hardly

a stretch of the imagination to consider that crime prevention and criminal apprehension

efforts fall short in part because of lack of analysis in law enforcement. 

Untapped Information

Type of agency Number of agencies

Number of full-time

sworn officers

Total 796,518

All State and local 17,784 708,022

Local police 12,666 440,920

Sheriff 3,070 164,711

Primary State 49 56,348

Special jurisdiction 1,376 43,413

Texas constable 623 2,630

Federal* 88,496

Note: Special jurisdiction category includes both state-level and local-level agencies. Consolidated 

police-sheriffs are included under local police category. Agency counts exclude those operating on a parttime basis.

*Non-military federal officers authorized to carry firearms and make arrests.

In 2000, nearly 800,000 full-time, sworn law enforcement officers worked in the U.S.

Source: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm.

1

 Richards J. Heuer, Jr. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the

Study of Intelligence, 1999), Chapter Six. URL http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/art9.html.
3

With the effective application of law enforcement intelligence analysis, terrorists resident

in the U.S. who have had documented contact with terrorist networks can be apprehended

by state and local level law enforcement. For example, on 9 September 2001, Ziad Jarrah,

one of the 9/11 hijackers, was stopped by a veteran Maryland state trooper who did not

know Jarrah was an individual of concern to the U.S intelligence community.2 Similarly, a

command officer from the Washington State Patrol believes, in retrospect, that he unwittingly saw terrorist Mohammed Atta check out of a motel in Portland, Maine on the morning of 11 September 2001.3

 Non-federal law enforcement is much more likely to see

potential terrorists as they go on with their day-to-day business. State- and local-level analysts are likely to have data related to such contacts in the form of field interview reports or

911 calls that might, on the surface, appear innocuous. With unimpeded access to federal

databases, local law enforcement intelligence analysts can support offices in the field with

the available, but often missing, linkages for effective law enforcement.

Conversely, detailed data on calls for service and crime data maintained in police

departments belong to the individual agency and are typically not accessible to the FBI

and other law enforcement agencies. This means that when an offender commits a crime

or if there is unusual activity in one jurisdiction, it is not possible for anyone to correlate it

with another jurisdiction, unless there is regional data sharing and/or analysts working to

share this type of information. Regional data sharing is emerging in some parts of the

country, but without proactive analysis of the data, series and patterns will not be discovered. For the most part, law enforcement analysis is applied to current investigations and

identified crime problems, the things we already know about. Anticipatory discovery, or

the application of intelligence principles to law enforcement analysis, only occurs in

agencies where analysts have the freedom and the ability to initiate inquiries and to recognize new problems.

Although most law enforcement agencies report crime statistics to the FBI, the data

they send are aggregated and do not give specifics. Even National Incident-Based

Reporting System (NIBRS) data,4

 with more detail than the FBI's Uniform Crime

Report,5 provide little qualitative information of sufficient specificity for effective analysis. Good qualitative data provide the specifics needed to identify serial criminals or suspicious activities or anomalies. Few serial crime patterns or serial criminals can be

identified in the absence of such data. In practice, no terrorist can be identified without

sound and extensive qualitative data.

Statistical information, as indicated in the pyramid above, is not scarce. However, as

one analyst told the author, “The 1980s was supposed to be the Information Age, yet,

2

 Jonathan R. White, Defending the Homeland (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004), 2.

3

 White, 3.

4

 For a description of NIBRS data see http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD-STUDY/

03449.xml.

5

 See Summary of Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/

00crime1.pdf.
4

although we collected tons of data we did not analyze it. We were constantly collecting

data to count crimes but we did not have systems set up to search information to solve

crimes.” This trend continues in many law enforcement agencies to this day.

The 9/11 Commission noted that, in looking at individual cases, no one looked at the

bigger picture to see the blinking lights prior to the 11 September terrorist attacks.6 Likewise, no one proactively looks now at the bigger picture by analyzing the qualitative data

from law enforcement to look for connections. Many data already exist and have been

collected for decades, but they are collected for the purpose of counting. The data are not

used to identify on a broad scale, for example, chronic low-level crime offenders, situations that foster crime, or changing modus operandi that might be indicators of organized

crime. Since we can expect that terrorism is often funded by criminal activities, doing all

possible to examine the information we already possess becomes even more important

than its obvious usefulness in combating and potentially reducing the domestic crime that

plagues our nation.

The FBI employs over 28,0007

 — but its staffing is the equivalent of only five per cent

of local-level law enforcement numbers. How do we maximize use of our numerous

national law enforcement personnel? It is time to tap the resources we have through

exploring the possibilities of analysis at the state and local level of law enforcement.

Developing the role of the analyst of criminal activity can be a significant force multiplier

in improving public safety, both for crime reduction and for homeland security.

History

Law enforcement in the United States, unlike the military, has not been intelligencedriven, until recently, and even now most often is not. Although crime analysis and intelligence analysis have existed in various state and local law enforcement agencies since the

1970s, intelligence processes are not institutionalized nor widely understood by law

enforcement managers and officers. 

A pyramid of crime analysis data

Source: Author

6 9/11 Commission Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 254.

7 http://www.fbi.gov/fbihistory.htm. 
5

Intelligence analysis developed in law enforcement in the 1940s and 1950s to tackle

organized crime, and in the 1960s intelligence units appeared in some large local law

enforcement agencies.8 Passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

(RICO) legislation in 1970 influenced the development of intelligence analysis in law

enforcement.9 RICO's focus on organized crime has influenced the development of what

is commonly referred to as “intelligence analysis” in law enforcement. This type of analysis tends to look for networks of criminal activity with the ultimate goal of prosecuting

high-level operators in organized crime networks.

The term “crime analysis” was first offered in the second edition (1963) of Orlando

Winfield Wilson's book, Police Administration:

10

Crime Analysis. The crime-analysis section studies daily reports of serious crimes

in order to determine the location, time, special characteristics, similarities to other

criminal attacks, and various significant facts that might help to identify either a

criminal or a pattern of criminal activity. Such information is helpful in planning the

operations of a division or district.

Funding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the 1970s also contributed to the development of crime analysis; crime analysis was a key pillar of the Law

Enforcement Alliance of America (LEAA's) Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program.11 

8 Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements, Marilyn B. Peterson, ed., (n.p.: a joint publication of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (L.E.I.U.) and International Association of Law

Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALIA), 2000), 3-4.

9 Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements, 4.

10 International Association of Crime Analysts, Exploring Crime Analysis (Overland Park, KS:

IACA Press, 2004), 14.

11 Exploring Crime Analysis, 14.
6

The Two Pathways to Analysis

Thus, in the United Sates, law enforcement intelligence analysis at the state and local

levels has developed on two distinct pathways. The first pathway is more familiar to those

at the federal level. It consists of the intelligence analysis traditions that exist in the FBI

and most other federal law enforcement agencies, namely, to support investigative operations. The other pathway is that found mostly at the local level of law enforcement —

crime analysis. Crime analysis in local level-law enforcement assists decisionmakers tactically and strategically. It exists at the state level to study larger crime trends and measure

changes in crime levels. Crime analysis is similar to some aspects of national-security

analytical work. The crime analyst may look at a whole city to see where problems are,

just as a national security analyst may look at a whole country to try to understand emerging or existing problems that might affect U.S. security interests. 

Marilyn B. Peterson, past president of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, writes in Applications in Criminal Analysis:

Intelligence or investigative analysis has generally been held separate from “crime analysis,” which, in its simplest form, is done within police departments to determine patterns

of burglaries, auto thefts, and so on. Crime analysis has been a patrol-oriented form of

analysis: that is, its conclusions are often used to support decision making on the deployment of patrol officers. That deployment is often done as a measure to attempt to prevent

further crimes of the type that was the subject of the crime analysis. Investigative [intelligence] analysis, on the other hand, has been used to support the major crimes or organized crime functions within law enforcement, to help solve a particular case.12

As one subject interviewed for the present project put it, “Crime analysts are much more

involved in analyzing crimes, and intelligence analysts are much more involved in analyzing criminals.”

The distinctions between these types of analysis are peculiar to the structure of law

enforcement in the U.S. In this study, in professional debates and in the literature, law

enforcement analysts from other countries state that they do not understand why two

tracks have developed as separate approaches in the U.S. There are a number of possible

reasons for this development. However, the main reason is likely to be the number of law

enforcement agencies in the United States and the “silo” effect of having so many separate agencies with different missions specializing in particular crimes and investigations.

The type of analysis done in law enforcement is related to the mission and needs of the

agency. This separation of analytical roles between crime analysts and investigative analysts

is similar to the segregation or specialization among agencies in different locations and at

differing levels, which leads to withholding information, and to the enduring sense that each

agency takes a unique approach to work. Virtually all of the skills used in crime analysis can

12 Marilyn B. Peterson, Applications in Criminal Analysis: A Sourcebook (n.p.: Praeger/Greenwood, 1998), 2. 
7

be applied to intelligence analysis. The intelligence analyst may have to learn new ways of

looking at crime in order to cross over to the crime analysis field, but the critical thinking

skills used to analyze organized crime and support investigators are applicable as well to the

analysis of street crimes. The technical requirements of criminal analysis and intelligence

analysis vary, but in any case, specific software and analytical products also vary from

agency to agency. The requirements that analysts have the ability to learn software applications and create customer-based analytical products are the same for both positions.13

In November 2004 the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc. (IALEIA), through

funding provided by the U.S. Department of Justice's OJP (Office of Justice Programs),

published the booklet Law Enforcement Analytical Standards.14 This publication points

out the resource-conserving role of intelligence analysis:

In general, the role of law enforcement intelligence is to help agencies reduce crime

patterns and trends. The intended result of law enforcement is to lower crime rates,

whether through apprehension, suppression, deterrence, or reduced opportunity.

Analysis supports good resource management and is directly involved in creating

situational awareness, in assisting decision making, and providing knowledge bases

for law enforcement action.15

In March 2005, a focus group consisting of experts in crime analysis convened in Ashburn, VA, tasked with developing standard functional specifications for law enforcement

records management systems. The host group, the Law Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council (LEITSC) comprises representatives from the International

Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs’ Association, Police Executive

Research Forum and the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives.

The focus group recommended that the term crime analysis be changed to analytical support and that analysts be given the authority to access and export all data in such systems

for whatever types of analyses needed. Thus, specifications for records management systems would reflect the recognition that all types of information analyses may be potentially useful in supporting the missions of law enforcement.16

Although some law enforcement analysts are sworn officers or agents, the trend is to deploy

civilians as analysts. Due to the increasing need for advanced skill levels in analytical work,

and the aspect of sworn officers' work that allows them to frequently transfer positions, using

13 Also see California Occupational Guide 557 (1999) with the title “Crime and Intelligence

Analysts” at http://www.calmis.cahwnet.gov/file/occguide/CRIMANLT.HTM. California was the

first state to set standards for crime and intelligence analysts in law enforcement. Although the definitions may not be up-to-date nor comprehensive, they do differentiate between the two roles of the

analyst in law enforcement. 

14 Available at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf.

15 Please see http://it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf, 3.

16 Meeting of the Law Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council focus group on

crime analysis standards for RMS in Ashburn, VA, March 23-25, 2005.
8

civilians as analysts helps establish a consistent, experienced cadre of professional workers.

Training individuals who will stay in this field is cost-effective. Improving analysts' wages

and developing career paths will encourage growth of the profession. 

Civilian analysts free up sworn personnel to patrol, investigate, and do the work needed

in the field. This does not mean that sworn personnel should not know how to analyze

information; rather, it means that dedicated personnel should be consistently deployed in

the increasingly sophisticated and specialized work of law enforcement analysis.

It is very important that our first line of defense against terrorism — the seven hundred thousand officers on the street — be given adequate training and background

information on terrorism, the methods and techniques of the terrorists, and the likelihood of an imminent attack. The reason this information should be shared, or

available, is not so that state and local police can be involved in the investigation of

terrorist cells, or individual terrorists, or collecting raw intelligence information.

Rather it is simply that these officers know their territory and are on the street 24

hours a day. Considering that the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center

were stopped on several occasions by the local police prior to the attack for minor

traffic violations, it is logical to assume that this pattern of random interception

would continue in the future. If and when similar situations occur, our local and

state officers should have background knowledge by which to arrive at a reasonable

suspicion. Thereafter, the officers should have the ability to access national data

banks to assist in the further resolution of the matter at hand. This is a largely

ignored but critical asset in our struggle to contain terrorism.17

Let us consider a missing element in the scenario above — trained and educated people

to analyze the information collected by the 700,000 officers. 

Inadequacies of Law Enforcement Analysts Federally and Locally

Prior to 9/11, federal law enforcement agencies were moving toward legitimizing the

role of the analyst. In 2000, the FBI was in the process of developing competencies for

analysts in order to ensure a minimal level of effectiveness and quality in performance.18

The DEA, as part of its counterdrug initiatives, had developed new training modules for

analysts and was creating a career track similar to that of special agents in order to retain

quality staff.19 Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission identified common, serious problems

in the field of law enforcement intelligence analysis: lack of proactive analysis, hiring

unqualified persons, and inadequate information technology.

17 Major Cities Chiefs Association Intelligence Commanders Conference Report, “Terrorism:

The Role of Local and State Police Agencies” in Terrorism: The Impact on State and Local Law

Enforcement, (June 2002), 5. http://www.neiassociates.org/mccintelligencereport.pdf.

18 Gary Burton, Presentation on FBI Analyst Competencies on 7 June 2000 at Mercyhurst 

College, Erie, PA.

19 Jill Webb, Presentation on DEA Analysts Training on 7 June 2000 at Mercyhurst College,

Erie, PA.
9

However, the FBI had little appreciation for the role of analysis. Analysts continued to

be used primarily in a tactical fashion — providing support for existing cases. Compounding the problem was the FBI's tradition of hiring analysts from within instead of

recruiting individuals with the relevant educational background and expertise. Moreover, analysts had difficulty getting access to the FBI and intelligence community

information they were expected to analyze. The poor state of the FBI's information

systems meant that such access depended in large part on an analyst's personal relationships with individuals in the operational units or squads where the information

resided. For all of these reasons, prior to 9/11 relatively few strategic analytic reports

about counterterrorism had been completed. Indeed, the FBI had never completed an

assessment of the overall terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland.20

Systematic information analysis itself in all law enforcement is in its infancy. It is seldom proactive. Intelligence analysis in most federal agencies revolves around existing

investigations rather than uncovering new threats. This is changing in the post-9/11 world,

but a great obstacle to change is a lack of skilled staff to analyze information and systems

that support the growth of intelligent intelligence analysis.

Captain William S. Brei touches on this concept in Getting Intelligence Right: The

Power of Logical Procedure.

Although all intelligence activities are conducted to answer documented requirements, analysts who understand a customer's circumstances may find it possible to

increase the product's relevancy by answering unstated — or unforeseen — questions

that present themselves in the data and in the analysis.21

Looking for the unknown threats that are hidden in the data requires the proactive and

effective analysis of data — people with a proclivity to answer the unstated and unforeseen questions. There may be unknown elements existing in the data — hidden threats

that we could uncover, if we had adequate resources dedicated to the task.

Developing systematic crime and intelligence analysis at the local level of law enforcement remains a challenge due to the sheer number of local law enforcement agencies in

our nation. Each agency is separate and has a mission to protect and serve within its own

boundaries. Each agency is beholden to its taxpayers to make their concerns the highest

priority — priorities that often exclude information sharing across jurisdictions, as well as

information sharing for federal priorities. Many local law enforcement agencies are very

small and do not have the resources nor crime volume to justify development of their own

analytical units, nor the urgency to share their information with a larger pool of governmental agencies.

20 9-11 Commission Report, 77. 21 Captain William S. Brei (USAF), Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure,

Occasional Paper Number Two (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, January

1996), 22.
10

The March 2003 report Crime Analysis in America: Findings and Recommendations22

by primary investigator Timothy O’Shea, funded by the Office of Community-Oriented

Policing Services (COPS), U.S. Department of Justice, describes the vague work situation

of the crime analyst in America:

We found that only one of the departments that we visited or spoke with had a formal job manual for the crime analyst position. Several were in the process of drafting one. Nearly every analyst that we spoke with believed that a manual was

necessary, but they also pointed out that drafting one was a complex and difficult

task that required a collaborative effort between analysts and managers. The general

absence of a formal manual further illustrates the ad hoc nature of crime analysis in

American law enforcement and is a further indication that the function has not been

given the careful, deliberate consideration that it should.23

The Challenge of Conceptualizing “Intelligence” in Law Enforcement

In the National Intelligence Community, “intelligence” refers to information affecting

national security decisionmaking. In the military, “intelligence” often refers to information that is helpful in understanding how to combat enemy forces. “Intelligence” in law

enforcement generally has referred to information gathered from police officers or law

enforcement agents noting suspicious activities, information provided by police informants, and information gleaned by investigators through investigations. It is not necessarily obtained secretly or covertly, although it may be. Of course, in all environments,

intelligence is more than mere information.

If you don't know the difference between information and intelligence then you

don't see the value of analysis.24

More than 40 years after Sherman Kent, the CIA's father of intelligence analysis,

persuasively argued that intelligence is knowledge, some still confuse the method

with the product. Sadly, such confusion is widespread.25

22 See http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=855.

23 See http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=855,17.

24 Quote from author’s interview with a subject who prefers to remain anonymous.

25 Stephen C. Mercado, “Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age,” Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004), 51 at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3/article05.html.
11

Intelligence analytical products in law enforcement are usually considered “intelligence”

if they are about specific individuals or groups. Tactical crime analysis products, a crime

series bulletin for example, are generally not called “intelligence” in local law enforcement

agencies. There is no consensus regarding how and when to call information intelligence.

Some experts say unprocessed information differs from true “intelligence,” and that intelligence is the value added by analysis and interpretation within specific contexts.

New York City's Police Department has instituted a process called COMPSTAT26 that is

dependent on four components, the first being timely and accurate intelligence. In this

context, “intelligence” means all information that might be useful, whether raw data or

information processed by analysis. Perhaps, to the recipient, it is the utility of information

that defines it as intelligence. Thus, all information that supports decisionmaking in the

intelligence cycle, whether it be simply a wiretap providing a crucial name or a comprehensive study of human smuggling across international borders with detailed recommendations to prevent this activity, would be “intelligence.”

Diluting Intelligence by Calling Everything Intelligence

Clarity in understanding the meaning of intelligence is needed if the role of the analyst

is to remain healthy and to grow. This applies to national security as well as to law

enforcement. In a society in which information access and production are growing exponentially, Wilhelm Agrell's concern that intelligence be rigorously defined applies:

The problem is not in law enforcement but in the application of intelligence analysis in fields where its specific virtues are not adequate, not actually needed, or even

might become counter-productive. Intelligence analysis can, employed in the right

context, considerably enhance over-all performance. But in the wrong context

“intelligence” could be just another dead weight — wasting resources, complicating

procedures, or creating unrealistic expectations of gains or results. What I am referring to could be described as the application of the concept or perhaps the illusion

of intelligence analysis to various information-processing activities that are not

really intelligence in the professional sense of the word. Broadening the concept is

one thing — to flatten it out is something quite different.27

This research project, by virtue of interviewing and capturing the values of experienced

analysts and related experts, aims to expand the concept of intelligence in law enforcement and add to its understanding in the larger public safety and security community.

26 “CompStat (short for COMPuter STATistics or COMParitive STATistics) is the name given to

the New York City Police Department's management accountability process. CompStat is a multi

layered, dynamic approach to crime reduction, quality of life improvement and, personnel and

resource management.” 

27 Wilhelm Agrell, University of Lund, Sweden, When everything is intelligence — nothing 

is intelligence, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis Occasional Papers: 1, No. 4

(October 2002), 3.
12

Defining Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis in the IC

Even though it has a longer history, defining intelligence analysis in the Intelligence Community is also a challenge, according to Stephen Gale:

Just what is this intelligence business anyway? What is it that these “intelligence

professionals” (the “intelligence communities” of the world) do to earn their keep?

What are their professional standards, their backgrounds, training, risks and

rewards? And, short of having worked in the intelligence field, how can we, as

engaged citizens, decide whether to be shocked or awed by accounts that point to

failures in political decisions that are based on intelligence analysis?

Hard and fast rules are difficult to find in the world of intelligence analysis. More

often than not, intelligence analysts are faced with highly complex circumstances,

imperfect information, obscure motivations, conflicting interpretations, and deep

ideological and political differences. Simple answers are not only in short supply

but, when invoked, have the downside consequence of being misleading or worse.28

The crime and intelligence analyst in law enforcement is at an advantage in that the

world of law enforcement is information-rich, even though some of the information is

inaccessible due to technological failures, lack of computer-literate staff, jurisdictional

rivalries, and plain old lack of understanding by management (and sometimes analysts) as

to what tools and information are needed to succeed.

Intelligence: The Reality of Context

It may be helpful, in the course of dialogue, discussion, and debate regarding “intelligence analysis,” to consider that the arguments and positions we have and take are limited

by our own experience and areas of responsibility. 

In the course of argument, people frequently complain about words meaning different things to different people. Instead of complaining, they should accept it as a

matter of course. It would be startling indeed if the word “justice,” for example,

were to have the same meaning to each of the nine justices of the United States

Supreme Court; then we should get nothing but unanimous decisions. It would be

even more startling if “justice” meant the same thing to the robber as to the robbed.

If we can get deeply into our consciousness the principle that no word ever has the

same meaning twice, we will develop the habit of automatically examining contexts, and this enables us to understand better what others are saying. As it is, however, we are all too likely to have automatic, or signal, reactions to certain words

and read into people’s remarks meanings that were never intended. Then we waste

energy in angrily accusing people of intellectual dishonesty or abuse of words,

28 Stephen Gale, Standards of Intelligence Reasoning, in Foreign Policy Research Institute: 

A Catalyst for Ideas,14 November 2004, http://www.fpri.org. 
13

when their only sin is that they use words in ways unlike our own, as they can

hardly help doing, especially if their background has been widely different from

ours.29

Thus, intelligence has its context for each of us. To understand how our views vary yet

reach a consensus is the challenge. In the judgment of the present author, after study and

exposure to analysts in various venues, intelligence analysis is not fundamentally different in the military, national security, or law enforcement. Unless the reader has had similar exposure, he or she may disagree. Critical thinking requires that one suspend judgment

until all the available facts are presented and their applicability to alternative definitions is

ascertained. Perhaps, at the end of this book, those readers who disagree now will have

changed their minds. 

The New Emphasis on Intelligence in Law Enforcement

Although the core concept of intelligence analysis may not be different within the various entities that conduct it, law enforcement has only recently begun to emphasize its utility. This emphasis most notably began with the unveiling of the United Kingdom's

“National Intelligence Model” in 2000.30

This work is the outcome of a desire to professionalize the intelligence discipline

within law enforcement. Intelligence has lagged behind investigation in the codification of best practices, professional knowledge and in the identification of selection and training requirements of staff. It is also recognition of the changing

requirements of law enforcement managers which highlights three particular needs:

■ To plan and work in co-operation with partners to secure community safety

■ To manage performance and risk

■ To account for budgets31

The model addresses three levels: local, cross-border (which refers to multiple

agencies working together), as well as serious and organized crime.32 It focuses on

intelligence as a business with measurable outcomes.

Similar developments in the United States are more recent. In August 2002, The International Association of Chiefs of Police worked with other entities to publish Criminal

29 S.I. Hayakawa and Alan R. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (Orlando, FL: 

Harcourt, Inc., 1990), 40.

30 The National Intelligence Model: Providing a Model for Policing. URL http://www.policereform.gov.uk/implementation/natintellmodeldocument.html.

31 The National Intelligence Model: Providing a Model for Policing, 7.

32 The National Intelligence Model: Providing a Model for Policing, 8.
14

Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing.33 The concept of

intelligence-led policing as a medium for agency integration is encapsulated in the diagram below. Later, the Office of Community-Oriented Policing contracted research resulting in the November 2004 publication of Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for

State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies.34 The concept of Intelligence-Led

Policing is discussed later in the present work.

Source: URL http://www.theiacp.org/research/CriminalIntelligenceSharingReport.pdf, between pages 4 

and 5. 

33 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Community-Oriented Policing Services, and International

Association of Chiefs of Police, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence

Led Policing (n.p., 2002). URL http://www.theiacp.org/research/CriminalIntelligenceSharingReport.pdf.

34 U.S. DOJ, Community-oriented Policing Services (COPS), Law Enforcement Intelligence: 

A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencis, published at http://

www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=1404.
15

The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council

The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) was established in May 2004.

It is in the very early stages of providing direction for state and local law enforcement to

improve understanding of information and intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing.

Establishment of the CICC reflected the complex interaction of local and national concerns as illustrated in the text box below.

Developing and sharing criminal intelligence will be a challenge in the United States due

to the fragmented, many-layered structure of its law enforcement system. 

Why Change is Mandated

Terrorists commit “crimes ranging from: immigration violations, sale of contraband cigarettes, money-laundering, mail fraud, credit card fraud, insurance fraud, racketeering and

Bold Beginnings35

In order to address past inadequacies in our nation’s intelligence process, the U.S.

Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP), at the request of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), authorized the formation of the

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) Intelligence Working Group

(GIWG), one of several issue-focused subgroups of the Global Advisory Committee, to develop a collaborative intelligence sharing plan.

The GIWG supported the development of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) as a blueprint to assist law enforcement personnel in their crimefighting, public safety, and counterterrorism efforts. The plan acknowledged that

officers, investigators, and analysts working throughout the United States are the

first line of prevention and defense against terrorism and crime. The NCISP recognized the importance of local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies as a key

ingredient in the nation’s intelligence process and called for the creation of the

CICC to establish the linkage needed to improve intelligence and information sharing among all levels of government. Made up of members from law enforcement

agencies at all levels of government, the CICC was created to provide advice in connection with the implementation and refinement of the NCISP. Members of the

CICC serve as advocates for local law enforcement and support their efforts to

develop and share criminal intelligence for the purpose of promoting public safety

and securing our nation. These goals are attainable and necessary for the continued

safety of U.S. citizens and visitors.

35 Police Chief Magazine 72, no. 2 (February 2005). URL http://policechiefmagazine.org/

magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=print_display&article_id=512&issue_id=22005.
16

arson.”36 If we are to be effective in preventing terrorism, analyzing all crime is necessary.

The linkage of crime, even street crime, to terrorism is widely documented. 

Many transnational terrorist groups engage in low-level criminal activity to fund

operations, facilitate movement of personnel and procure weapons and explosives.

Their activities include robbery, credit card fraud, passport and identity forgery,

drug trafficking and immigration violations.

Worldwide, much of this activity centres on localised groups of disaffected young

men, often from diaspora communities, who become ensnared in militancy via their

criminal activities or while in prison.37

The emerging changes in society also call us to change. Individuals commit crimes and

individuals commit acts of terror.

The power of the individual: new technology will allow ever smaller, more anonymous groups or individuals to commit crimes previously beyond their means. We

are entering the age of asymmetric attacks, where individuals can take advantage of

their relative anonymity to strike quickly and without trace against targets at both a

national and international level. The more systems are networked, the greater the

danger from a single attack. New technology allows people to group together more

easily, overcoming geographical limitations. There is also the concern that organised crime will steer or fund these individuals into pursuing its goals.38

The growing need to understand the nature of low-level crime in relationship to terrorist

activities calls us to think and act in new ways. The growing need to create a new network

that acts intelligently and proactively to interfere in and disrupt the activities of criminal

and extremist groups is obvious. 

Disrupting Terrorists: A Systems Approach

It is time we use our law enforcement resources in a new manner. In the last fifteen

years, new law enforcement strategies, with a foundation in analysis of information, have

emerged to change the focus in law enforcement work to prevention of crime rather than

the traditional focus on apprehension and prosecution, which often do not result in a

reduction of crime. Crime, like terrorism, can be prevented. The strategies now being

developed to prevent crime may be adapted to prevent terrorism and vice versa. New concepts will emerge as we learn to think of the problem in a broad, system-based manner,

possibly in terms of the concept of “safety.” For, after all, whether a military mission, a

36 Christopher Jasparro, “Low-level Criminality linked to Transnational Terrorism,” Jane's 

Intelligence Review 17, no. 5 (May 2005), 19. 37 Jasparro, “Low-level criminality Linked to transnational terrorism,” 18.

38 UK Crime Prevention Panel, Department of Trade and Industry, Turning the Corner

(December 2000), 11 URL http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Previous_Rounds/Foresight_1999_2002/

Crime_Prevention/Reports/Summary_of_Action/index.htm.
17

national security mission, or a law enforcement mission, the bottom line is this: the mission is safety. Physical, economic, political, social and personal safety lie at the core. Our

systems to ensure the safety of citizens are often working at cross-purposes because the

overarching mission is lost in the course of our giving attention to the differences in the

ways we work and think. This study expects to bridge some of those differences.

At times, law enforcement and intelligence have competing interests. The former head

of the FBI's international terrorism division notes that Attorney General Reno leaned

toward closing down FISA surveillance if they hindered criminal cases. White, however,

notes that the need for intelligence was balanced with the effort to arrest and prosecute

terrorists. In addition, as noted earlier, convictions that help disrupt terrorists are often

on minor charges (such as immigration violations), which do not always convince Field

Office personnel that the effort is worthwhile compared with putting criminals in jail for

many years. As former FBI Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and

Counterintelligence Dale Watson explains, Special Agents in Charge of FBI Field

Offices focused more on convicting than on disrupting.39

The Bottom Line

The U.S. Homeland Security Strategy expects law enforcement professionals to exhibit

a capacity to analyze information. The present study builds on the four assumptions and

preliminary findings listed below to address the issue of how law enforcement professionals in the U.S. are adapting and adopting tools of analysis and synthesis to improve personal and homeland security.

■ Law enforcement crime and intelligence analysis play important roles in maintaining

and improving public safety and homeland security.

■ Crime and intelligence analysts at every level can learn and adapt best practices from

one another and collectively. 

■ The roles of law enforcement crime and intelligence analysts are not widely understood nor documented — this study aims to improve upon this situation.

■ In some cases, law enforcement crime and intelligence analysts operate with fewer restrictions and bureaucratic obstacles than those in federal agencies; thus in most cases, analysts

at the local level have more freedom to be creative and develop innovative analytical techniques/approaches that may help the wider public safety/national security community.

This book builds on law enforcement crime and intelligence analysis — combining

material gleaned from what is already written about the subject, and information gathered

through interviews with working analysts and experts who have directly contributed to

law enforcement analysis as a field. The next chapter explains the research methods and

the concept of Appreciative Inquiry as a process to engage imagination and accelerate

positive change in the field. 

39 Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Hearing on the

Intelligence Community’s Response to Past Terrorist Attacks against the United States from February 1993 to September 2000, 8 October 2002, 18.

19

Chapter 2

RESEARCH THROUGH APPRECIATIVE INQUIRY

Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a paradigm for organizational development through “action

research,” conceptualized in 1980 by Dr. David Cooperider and Suresh Srivastva at Case

Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. AI has been used by the U.S. Navy to

develop leadership skills, by the Roadway Express Company to study best practices and

accelerate change, and by the city of Chicago in a project called “Vision Chicago.” Examples of other companies/entities that have used AI include McDonald's, John Deere, GTE,

Texas Insurance, the Catholic Church, Habitat for Humanity, the United Nations, and the

Environmental Protection Agency.40

In the comprehensive Handbook for Qualitative Research, AI is grouped with emerging

research methods representing significant paradigm shifts from traditional research methods. Appreciative inquiry as described in that text is a relational process, rather than a

research methodology, one that “wholly transforms relationships among otherwise hostile

members of an organization or community.”41 A medium of human communication familiar to all those who inhabit organizations, whether large or small, is storytelling. Storytelling is a core element of the relational process that binds humans together. For this

research project, appreciative inquiry was extended to the law enforcement workplace by

asking interview subjects to tell stories that relate their work experiences to the development, acceptance and use of concepts and tools that accompany the professional evolution

of the field of crime analysis, or law enforcement intelligence. The appreciative inquiry

approach to organizational change and improvement allowed the author to capture a sense

of the strengths, successes, values, hopes and dreams of individuals who are charged with

promoting homeland security through law enforcement activities.

AI is used in this research to challenge the mindset of analysts and readers, in response

to retired CIA “philosopher” Heuer's call for intelligence analysts in the Intelligence

Community to explore different mental models.

Today, there is greatly increased understanding that intelligence analysts do not

approach their tasks with empty minds. They start with a set of assumptions about

how events normally transpire in the area for which they are responsible. Although

this changed view is becoming conventional wisdom, the Intelligence Community

has only begun to scratch the surface of its implications. 

40See Appreciative Inquiry Commons at http://appreciativeinquiry.cwru.edu/. Also see Jane

Magruder Watkins & Bernard Mohr, Appreciative Inquiry: Change at the Speed of Imagination

(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass/Pfeiffer, 2001).

41Norman K. Denzin, and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2d ed.

(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), 1039.
20

If analysts' understanding of events is greatly influenced by the mind-set or mental

model through which they perceive those events, should there not be more research

to explore and document the impact of different mental models? 42

AI is designed to influence mental models and change processes by radically altering

the way we normally perceive and “solve” problems. The process seeks to uncover what

is already working in a system and allows participants to hear what others value in the

system. It has shown itself effective as a change agent across many disciplines.

Appreciative Inquiry is about the coevolutionary search for the best in people, their

organizations, and the relevant world around them. In its broadest focus, it involves

systematic discovery of what gives “life” to a living system when it is most alive,

most effective, and most constructively capable in economic, ecological, and

human terms. AI involves, in a central way, the art and practice of asking questions

that strengthen a system's capacity to apprehend, anticipate, and heighten positive

potential. It centrally involves the mobilization of inquiry through the crafting of

the “unconditional positive question” often involving hundreds or sometimes thousands of people. In AI the arduous task of intervention gives way to the speed of

imagination and innovation; instead of negation, criticism, and spiraling diagnosis,

there is discovery, dream, and design. AI seeks, fundamentally, to build a constructive union between a whole people and the massive entirety of what people talk

about as past and present capacities: achievements, assets, unexplored potentials,

innovations, strengths, elevated thoughts, opportunities, benchmarks, high-point

moments, lived values, traditions, strategic competencies, stories, expressions of

wisdom, insights into the deeper corporate spirit or soul — and visions of valued

and possible futures. Taking all of these together as a gestalt, AI deliberately, in

everything it does, seeks to work from accounts of this “positive change core” —

and it assumes that every living system has many untapped and rich and inspiring

accounts of the positive. Link the energy of this core directly to any change agenda

and changes never thought possible are suddenly and democratically mobilized.43

Critics of the appreciative inquiry process may believe that the final judgment about

“what to do” with recommendations should be in the hands of senior managers. However,

the guidance for change that comes from the combined wisdom of diverse people who are

close to the problems effectively represents the “wisdom of the crowd.” 44 AI maximizes

the involvement of individuals to harness this wisdom. 

Training in Appreciative Inquiry 

The present project was facilitated by the author’s attendance at the Foundations Workshop in Appreciative Inquiry in Toronto, Ontario, 18-21 October 2004. The workshop

42 Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Chapter One. 

43 David L. Cooperrider and Diana Whitney, A Positive Revolution in Change: Appreciative

Inquiry, http://appreciativeinquiry.cwru.edu/intro/whatisai.cfm. 44 James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (New York: Anchor Books, 2005), 274.
21

addressed both theory and practice in AI. Jane Magruder Watkins, co-author of Appreciative Inquiry: Change at the Speed of Imagination, was the primary presenter. She has

worked closely with David Cooperider, the pioneer of AI, and continues to do so. Ms.

Magruder has been an integral member of the National Training Lab (NTL) for many

years. “Founded in 1947, NTL Institute, headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia, with a

facility in Bethel, Maine, is a not-for-profit educational company of members and staff

whose purpose is to advance the field of applied behavioral sciences and to develop

change agents for effective leadership for organizations of all variety.”45

The instructors engaged attendees in the AI process during the course of the four-day

workshop. On day one, each participant interviewed another person and then participants

broke into two groups to share the interviews and begin to uncover themes. By day three

participants were able to formulate a vision of what our learning community would be

from the workshop, along with an action plan to stay in contact. Participants collectively

produced enactments of “provocative propositions” to arrive at a collective understanding

of what was valued. The learning experience was also entertaining. A video showed how

the U.S. Navy has implemented AI to develop leadership skills46; another illustrated the

AI process as used by Canadian National Defence civilian workers.

The goal of group exercises was for each participant to experience the process so that

each could become an effective facilitator of AI.

At the workshop, the first phase of Appreciative Inquiry, the “Discovery” phase, was devoted

to developing the interview questions. The scope of the present research project was too large

for the process to be carried out in all its stages; however, AI proved to be an effective tool for

gathering new information and perspectives to continue the relational process. 

AI Is Rooted in New Science Paradigms

AI views organizations as living, complex systems and as such, is rooted in the study of

complexity and chaos in physics and biology, theories built on the inter-connectedness of

the universe. The prevailing scientific paradigm has kept such inter-connectedness beyond

our ready comprehension. The following chart captures some of the language or thought

processes that characterize old and new visions.

45 See http://www.ntl.org/about.html.

46 See an explanation of this project at www.nps.navy.mil/cpc.
22

Why AI?

AI helps identify the positive core of an organization, whether it be a business, a country, or a discipline, such as intelligence analysis. Inquiry into the positive core is “where

the whole organization has an opportunity to value its history, and embrace novelty in

transitioning into positive possibilities.”47

The positive core is identified by inquiry and may be expressed in numerous ways.

Some of these expressions were uncovered during the interviews for this project. 

Current and Emerging Paradigms

Current Scientific Paradigm Emerging Paradigm

Newtonian mechanics; reductionism 

and dichotomous thinking.

Quantum physics and new sciences: self-organizing 

systems; chaos theory; complexity theory.

We search for a model or method of objectively 

perceiving the world.

We accept the complexity and subjectivity of the 

world.

We engage in complex planning for a world 

we expect to be predictable.

Planning is understood to be a constant process of reevaluation.

We understand language as the descriptor of 

reality: “I'll believe it when I see it.”

We understand language as the creator of reality: “I'll 

see it when I believe it.”

We see information as power. We see information as a primal creative force.

We believe in reductionism, i.e., things can be 

best understood when they are broken into 

parts.

We seek to understand wholeness and the 

inter-connectedness of all things.

We engage in dichotomous thinking. We search for harmony and the common threads of 

our dialogue.

We believe that there is only one truth for which 

we must search.

We understand truth to be dependent on the context 

and current reality.

We believe that influence occurs as a direct 

result of force exerted from one person to 

another, i.e., cause and effect.

We understand that influence occurs as a natural part 

of human interaction.

We live in a linear and hierarchical world. We live in a circular world of relationships and 

cooperation.

Source: Watkins and Mohr, Appreciative Inquiry: Change at the Speed of Imagination, 8.

47 David L.Cooperider, Diana Whitney, and Jacqueline M. Stravros, Appreciative Inquiry Handbook: The First in a Series of AI Workbooks for Leaders of Change (Bedford heights, OH: Lakeshore

Publishers, 2003), 30.
23

Source: Author’s interviews and Appreciative Inquiry Handbook, 31.

Identifying such expressions yields energy for change. This is one significant aspect of

AI that sets it apart from traditional inquiry approaches.

Principles of Appreciative Inquiry

Whitney and Trosten-Bloom outline eight principles of appreciative inquiry.48 These principles were applied and their outcomes manifested in the present research, as indicated

below.

1. The Constructionist Principle — this principle states that reality is socially created

through language and conversations, that the words we use create our worlds. A language shift such as changing the “war on terrorism” to a “struggle against violent

extremism” and then to the “Long War” illustrates how leaders can consciously try to

influence perceptions by their choice of words.49 We do it every day. By collecting and

using the interview subject’s words in this project to explain and describe phenomena,

the scope of this work is enhanced and transcends the limits of the researcher's perspective. The interview subjects’ responses determined the format of this manuscript.

2. The Simultaneity Principle — this principle asserts that the act of questioning by

itself influences change, or even causes change and is thus an intervention. The present

author can attest to this — in the course of the interviews she learned different

approaches that have influenced her own work as an analyst. For example, she added

Expressions Connoting the Positive Core

Best business practices Positive macro strengths

Core and distinctive competencies Product strengths

Elevated thoughts Relational resources

Embedded knowledge Social capital

Innovations Technical assets

Organizational achievement Values

Organizational wisdom Visions of possibility

Positive emotions Vital traditions

Strengths of partners

48 Diana Whitney and Amanda Trosten-Bloom, The Power of Appreciative Inquiry: 

A Practical Guide to Positive Change (San Francisco, CA: Berret-Koehler Publishers, Inc, 2003),

54-55.

49 George Packer, “Comment: Name Calling,” The New Yorker, 8 and 15 August 2005, 33; 

Bradley Graham and Josh White, “Abizaid Credited with Popularizing the Term ‘Long War’,”
24

more information about known criminals to her analytical products in a way she had

not done earlier.

3. The Poetic Principle — this principle asserts that organizations are an endless source

of study and what we choose to study both describes and creates the world as we know

it.The present author hopes that by choosing to study intelligence analysis by focusing

on law enforcement practitioners' values, she will influence the way others conduct

future studies. By finding “what works” using positive inquiry, the objective of this

project is to create change in unanticipated and unexpected ways. Perhaps the introduction of a new concept may influence one reader to work better or smarter. 

4. The Anticipatory Principle — human systems move in the direction of their visions

for the future; the more positive and hopeful the image of the future, the more positive

the present-day action. This research project deliberately focused on what interview

subjects hoped would continue in the field of crime and intelligence analysis as well as

what their deepest wishes were for the future. Theoretically, based on AI research, just

by getting the participants to think of these things, the research may help participants

to move in the direction of their positive images.

5. The Positive Principle — momentum for large-scale change requires large amounts of

positive affect and social bonding; positive questions lead to positive change and

amplify the positive core. This principle applies to group AI activities, which were

beyond the scope of this project; however, the “positive core” identified in this text

may help energize the field to expand.

6. The Wholeness Principle — wholeness brings out the best in people and organizations; bringing all stakeholders together stimulates creativity and builds capacity.

Although this project was limited to questioning individuals one-on-one, the production of this manuscript for the larger audience of analysts, managers, and policymakers

from various, often unconnected realms, is in itself an attempt to create wholeness out

of what has been traditionally viewed as parts. 

7. The Enactment Principle — acting “as if” is self-fulfilling; to make the change we

want, we must be the change we want. By creating this project conceptually and carrying it out, the author enacted the changes she wanted to see. She believed it was possible; she did it. Enactment can be implemented on a wider scale by any reader

interested in influencing change.

8. The Free Choice Principle — free choice liberates power; it stimulates organizational

excellence and positive change. It appears that analysts who have freedom enjoy it and

say it contributes to their growth as professionals. With respect to this specific research

project, it was the author who chose what she would do. The freedom she had to design

and carry out this project provided the energy and excitement necessary to carry it out

from beginning to end. The participants all volunteered to be interviewed and thus this

was all a free-will effort. AI processes are not coercive.
25

The Interview Process

Fifty-two people were formally interviewed in order to learn more about the context of success in law enforcement analysis. A large number of analysts/experts agreed to be interviewed

but many were so busy that interviews could not be coordinated in the time frame allotted for

this project. A number of the participants, but not all, were acquainted professionally with the

researcher prior to the research. (Thirteen out of fifty-two had never met the researcher.) The

participants were chosen based on their contribution to the field or on the dimension of expertise and/or diversity they offered to the study. A few individuals asked to participate and were

included if their position was appropriate for the study. Since no definitive count of the number

of law enforcement analysts exists, there is no way to compare the size of the sample of persons interviewed to the total population of analysts/experts.

Subjects signed a consent form prior to each interview. Although many analysts have

agreed to be identified in this project, some have chosen to remain anonymous. Therefore,

throughout this manuscript, some quotes are attributed to an anonymous source. 

Most interviews were conducted by telephone and typically lasted about forty-five minutes. Nine interviews took place in person.

The Participants

At least fifteen of those interviewed had analytical experience or expertise in analysis at

the federal or national level of law enforcement, and seven of those interviewed had

analytical experience or expertise in analysis at the state or regional levels. Twenty-three

had analytical experience focused on analysis at the municipal level of law enforcement.

Four were Canadian analysts, and two had previously worked in analytical positions in

Australia. Three individuals had military intelligence analysis experience. Nine of the

participants were analysts who held a supervisory position specific to criminal analysis or

intelligence analysis at the time of the interview. At least thirteen of those interviewed

were actively involved in training analysts. Ten were teaching college-level courses in

analysis. Eight of those interviewed had written books related to law enforcement

Participants by Category

16 Crime Analysts 11 Intelligence Analysts

 8 Both Crime and Intelligence Analysts 8 Crime Analysis Academic Researchers/

 Developers

 3 Intelligence Analysis Academic 

 Researchers/Developers

 2 Command Staff with Analysis Experience

 4 Others Relevant to the Study 52 Total Number of Subjects
26

analysis; they and eight others interviewed had contributed to the literature in the field.

Their formal education was in very diverse fields, as shown below. 

Educational Background of Interview Subjects

Accounting Human Resources

Anthropology Journalism

Biology Law Enforcement

Business Administration Library Science

Chemistry Management

Computer Science Marketing

Criminal Justice Mass Communications

Criminology Mathematics

Economics Political Science

Education Psychology

Engineering Public Administration

English Public Policy

Geographic Information Systems Sociology

Geography Theology

Government Administration Urban Planning

History Vocational Education
27

The Interview Schedule

The participants were asked the following set of questions.50

■ To start, I’d like to learn how you came to work in the field of law enforcement

intelligence analysis. When did you start working in the field and what attracted

you to this field? What keeps you working in the field, or, if you have left it,

what kept you working in it as long as you did? What about law enforcement

intelligence analysis makes a difference to you?

■ Tell me a story about a time that stands out to you as a high point in your work

as an analyst — a time when you felt energized, passionate about your work and

most effective — a time when you were able to accomplish more than you

imagined. 

■ What do you value most — specifically about yourself and LE intelligence 

analysis as a field?

❏ Without being humble, what do you value most about yourself —

as a human being? What are the most important qualities or

strengths you bring to this field? 

❏ What is it about the nature of the work you do that you value the

most? What is most interesting or meaningful? 

■ To grow as a field, law enforcement intelligence analysis must learn to “preserve

the core” and be able to let go of things that are no longer needed. In transforming this field, what are three things — core strengths, values, qualities, ways of

working — you want to see preserved and leveraged as we move into the future?

■

the field of law enforcement intelligence analysis? If you had a magic wand,

what would you do to change the field of law enforcement intelligence analysis?

50 Note that law enforcement intelligence analysis also refers to crime analysis in this interview.

Fast forward ... it is 10 to 20 years from now. What would you envision for
28

Rationale for the Questions

The first question, asking the participants how they came to this work and what it is that

keeps them working in it, helped set the stage for the subsequent questions by focusing on

attraction, a positive emotion. A number of individuals came to this work by chance: they

saw a posting, applied, and got the job. Some were already in law enforcement and

desired a change. Almost all have stayed in the work because they felt they could contribute to society in one way or another — they felt there was meaning in this work on a personal level. No one indicated that they did this work for the money. Since this first

question was open-ended, the information elicited from each participant varied more than

in the other questions.

The second question, asking participants to tell a story about a high point in their work,

one in which they felt they could accomplish more than they had imagined, reflects a core

process in AI. The story, in AI theory, provides energy and uncovers those themes that contain common threads upon which we can build relationships and become energized. In this

project, the AI process was diluted because the author was the story's only listener. As AI is

usually carried out, a group collectively locates the themes in the stories. It is in the group

sharing of stories that the AI process moves forward. Nevertheless, some of the subjects' stories became the success stories of this book. The high point stories were most often the

things that work. In that regard, using AI as an interview format was very effective.

The next questions, asking analysts what they value about themselves and what they

value in the actual work they do, helped direct the participants' attention to their own participation in the work process. What positives they bring to their work and what actual

aspects are most enjoyable were concepts that a significant number of those interviewed

had never thought of before. The qualities they valued in themselves are the things that

work on an individual level. The aspects of the work they like most help clarify what the

work actually is — our understanding of this detail is still evolving as the field grows. The

answers helped the author articulate these concepts with a greater clarity later in this text.

The next question, what are three things — core strengths, values, qualities, ways of

working — you want to see preserved and leveraged as we move into the future, is the

most important question in that it uncovers “what works” in law enforcement intelligence

analysis. What was most surprising to the author was the number of analysts who could

not think of three things that work. One said nothing works but then qualified his answer

by indicating that nothing works the way he would like it to work.

The things that work as perceived by the people who do this work are very important to

know for several reasons. First, we know what to build upon if collectively we agree on

the articulated value. Second, we do not discard or mistakenly modify something that is

currently effective. Third, we better understand what it is we do right and try to take those

lessons to other areas of need. 

The last question, about the future, is designed to help create the vision we would hopefully move toward as we seek to grow a profession, and as a nation committed to developing
29

new measures to ensure public safety. “The heliotropic hypothesis suggests that people and

organizations, like plants, will move in the direction that is most life-giving.”51 Just as plants

turn and move toward the sun, so do people turn and move to images that inspire them.

For the author, the interviews were a highlight of her professional life. They were energizing, pleasant, very informative, and she learned something in every encounter. When a

participant would go off onto a negative tangent, the questions themselves provided a

return to considering the positive. A number of the participants seemed to enjoy the interviews as well. 

Data collected were shared with participants and others through an online “blog.” It was

hoped that this would provide an interactive forum for participants, but since they were not

as committed nor invested to the process as the author herself, it received minimal attention.

It did open doors to the researcher, nevertheless, as she was subsequently invited to join the

Police Futurists International after a member of that association visited the blog site.

Limitations of This Project

The scope of this project does not address the many concerns our nation faces as we move

toward using intelligence to inform law enforcement strategies. Civil liberties, constitutional

rights, and privacy concerns are fundamental aspects of the law enforcement context that are

discussed in other resources. They are too complex for this project to address. Such major

concerns related to the development of intelligence analysis in law enforcement should not

be forgotten nor dismissed in the dialogue and debate on this subject. 

Although this book covers many elements of the law enforcement intelligence analysis

field, it is selective in that it used only those things that fell under the umbrella of phenomena expressed by the interview participants. The interview data were supplemented

with research into what is known about success in the categories defined by the participants. This work is limited by the boundaries provided through the interview process and

outcomes. At the same time, however, interview subjects often demonstrated that their

innovations exceeded the boundaries established by precedent in law enforcement intelligence analysis. Finally, this document gains strength, in AI terms, by focusing on themes

of value to those with experience and expertise. 

A possible shortfall of this product is the minimal participation by analysts at the federal/national level of law enforcement. Out of fifty-two persons interviewed, only nine

had that level of analytical experience. Several more had worked at the federal level in

related capacities but were not working analysts. Only seven had regional or state level

experience. Although more analysts as these levels were invited to participate and some

replied that they were eager to do so, they did not carry through by scheduling an interview. This outcome tended to move the focus of this project to that of the local level of

law enforcement.

51 Watkins and Mohr, 135.
30

One explanation of this bias toward local efforts has to do with the restrictions placed on

sharing at the higher levels of government. For the most part, local-level law enforcement

analysts are directed by their job descriptions to network and share information outside of

their respective jurisdictions, and many have the authority to do so without restriction,

except to use sound judgment regarding what can be shared with whom. This is not the

case with many analysts at other levels of law enforcement. Much of their work is casespecific and sharing is restricted by stricter regulatory guidelines. Outcomes of investigations and prosecutions depend on their maintaining secrecy. Thus, they could not as easily

obtain organizational permission to participate in a study about analysis.

Another limitation of this project is that some complicated concepts and topics were, by

necessity of time and space, reduced to a paragraph or two. In such cases, one or more

links to additional information are provided to assist readers in learning more. 

Next

The next seven chapters are organized around the general categories of the “things that

work” as identified in the interview process. Therefore, the participants formed the structure of this text, limiting the author's task to describing in greater depth the things that

already work. Chapter Ten discusses analysts' wishes for the future. By the Anticipatory

Principle of AI, it is expected that, by capturing the collective vision of over 830 years of

law enforcement research/analytical experience, we will move into the direction of a

future desired by active and influential workers in the field.
31

Chapter 3

WHAT WORKS: INDIVIDUALS

My job is to turn information into knowledge.

I think I was a bloodhound in another life. 52

Systems-thinking business expert Peter Senge writes in The Fifth Discipline: The Art and

Practice of the Learning Organization that by seeing information in both broad and

detailed patterns we can respond to the challenge of complexity and change.53 In order to

develop the analytical capacity of law enforcement, we need to look in detail at how it

works at the ground level as well as in broader theoretical, conceptual terms. We begin by

looking at the analysts and field experts as individuals.

Why Study the Individual Intelligence Analyst?

To best understand something, one must have real-life experience with it. Too often in

law enforcement intelligence analysis, no one thinks to ask the analysts what it is they do,

how they do it, what they need, and what they think matters. Most often, their supervisors

have never been analysts. Staff is sent away for distant training to become analysts, but

managers are not sent away to understand what the analysis requires, what it is supposed

to be nor how to do it. The analyst often has to beg for the tools he or she needs, as well as

for even the most basic information necessary to do quality analysis. 

Dictionary definitions frequently offer verbal substitutes for an unknown term

which only conceals a lack of real understanding. Thus a person might look up a

foreign word and be quite satisfied with the meaning “bullfinch” without the slightest ability to identify or describe the bird. Understanding does not come through

dealing with words alone, but with the things for which they stand. Dictionary definitions permit us to hide from ourselves and others the extent of our ignorance. 54

This chapter introduces readers to law enforcement analysts through some of their “high

point” stories, and through the qualities and abilities they value as individuals. We start

with an overview of the analyst’s role in law enforcement, including the skill sets and

characteristics needed by individual workers. The chapter concludes with “what works”

in the context of the individual analyst.

52 Quotes from interviews.

53 Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of The Learning Organization (New

York: Currency Doubleday, 1990), 135.

54 Language in Thought and Action, 33, quoting H.R. Huse.
32

The Stories

Because narratives provide context for understanding, the stories of analysts’ “high

points” may give readers a sense of what analytical work “looks like” when it works. The

stories as reproduced here are no substitute for actually hearing the stories and the energy

behind them; however, the basic work stories and “archetypal stories” delineate some of

the aspects of analytical work that impart energy to participants. 

The Basic Types of Work Stories

Many analysts had high points that involved four main categories:

■ The Identification of a Crime Series Story: A crime analyst is the first one to notice

an existing pattern of crimes in which the same perpetrator(s) seems to be responsible

— a crime series — and the series does, in fact, exist.

■ The Pieces of Information Turning into a Big Case Story: An intelligence analyst

gets boxes of information, sometimes CDs full of information, and sorts through all of

it (analyzes it) to uncover information that leads to an even bigger investigation.

■ The Prediction Leading to Arrest Story: A crime analyst makes a prediction regarding the next likely time and place a serial criminal will offend and the offender is

apprehended based on the analyst’s accurate prediction.

■ The Successful Investigation Leading to Prosecution Story: An intelligence analyst

supports an investigation through appropriate analysis and visualization of data, creating relevant reports and graphics; the analyst’s work is used in court to help successfully prosecute the targets of the investigation.

The “Archetypal” Stories

Within the analysts’ “high point” stories certain common themes emerged that transcended the details of their work. In the present author’s view, the story types are: collaboration, support, discovery, creation, invention, influence, achievement, recognition and

impact. These themes are intertwined multiple times in a majority of the individual stories.

The Collaboration Story

Aspects of collaboration came up in many high point stories. Collaboration can mean

working in teams with clear but ordinary procedures and routines in place that repeatedly

result in extraordinary results. It can mean working on diverse teams where brainstorming

ideas with a variety of perspectives energizes participants. Linking cases with physical

evidence across jurisdictions is another form of collaboration. Task forces are a form of

collaboration often found to be effective. Managers who carefully select the analysts on

their teams tend to be enjoy collaborating with them.

For analysts, collaboration with enforcement officers can take several forms. Associating with the 20% of the officers that do the work, “the elite,” is a form of collaboration

that helps an analyst. Attending officer training with officers is another activity that helps
33

build relationships for future collaboration. Inclusion in briefings and meetings with officers and investigators, going out into the field with them, and conversely being able to train

them to gather the data needed for crime analysis is a form of collaboration that works. In

sum, building upon analysis in iterative fashion by getting feedback from officers and

investigators, and thereby changing one’s analytical perspective, is an approach that

works. 

Here are some more specific examples:

■ Multi-agency collaboration is exciting to a number of analysts. Teamwork between

many analysts and agencies, such as the local law enforcement agency, the IRS (Internal Revenue Service), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (for behavior analysis), and RISS (Regional Information Sharing Systems) analysts to complete a detailed

picture and to prove a suspect’s motive for murder in Kansas City, MO, is an example

of such a multi-agency collaboration provided by Sergeant Gregory Volker.

■ Cooperation between law enforcement agencies outside their own jurisdictions in tackling problems can help put pieces of a puzzle together. An example comes from a

remote location in Canada where empty boxes of stolen goods had been found for

years by railroad personnel; François Dubec, railroad intelligence analyst, along with a

number of law enforcement agencies from Canada, collaborated and ultimately identified a Hell’s Angels fencing ring.

■ The cooperative and collaborative effort of working on the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan was a high point for Lisa Palmieri, president of IALEIA.

■ In the mid-1990s Greg Saville collaborated with the Sydney Olympics Foundation

over a number of weeks, planning with designers and architects to help them think

about crime risks and successfully apply Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design (CPTED) theories in the real world.

The Supported Story

Another theme in the high point stories involved being supported by others. This is a

less common theme, yet it is important. Noah Fritz says he was able to build a true infrastructure for crime analysis in Tempe, Arizona because the police department had supportive chiefs. Having support means you have access to information, that you become

integrated into the agency, and that you get the training and equipment necessary to be

successful. The Tempe PD subsequently has produced a number of analysts who went on

to high-level jobs influencing the growth of crime analysis.

Others said they were supported when trying to implement new ideas, such as geographic profiling or environmental scanning. Shelagh Dorn indicated that her management team consists of progressive thinkers who are extremely supportive of analysts in

the relatively new Upstate NewYork Regional Intelligence Center.
34

The Discovery Story

Discovery involves noticing something that one has not noticed before. It is especially

prized when one is the first to notice something that is valuable to know. Discovery in

analytical work may consist of getting information that initiates new investigations, noticing how situations impact on crime rather than people, and learning how to focus on the

“important stuff” in the midst of an information glut. Discovery is the core of much of

analytical work and was part of a number of high point stories that mainly focused on

“impact.”

Here are some examples:

■ Toronto sworn officer/analyst Tyrone Skanes discovered the identity of two people

who got away at a murder scene based on data analysis. Peel Regional Police had

already arrested two persons and needed to know the identity of the two outstanding

suspects. He was able to give them two names plus two lists of people to talk to —

those who would and those who would not cooperate. It took Peel officers three

months to develop information leading to arrest, but he was correct. He knew who to

look for, where to go in the data banks, and in using field contact cards (called 208s in

Toronto), he assessed a wealth of information.

■ NW3C Training Director Mark Gage experienced high points in discovering new areas

for training in computer crime, white collar crime and terrorism, and economic crime

in households.

■ Mesa, Arizona analyst Peter Garza discovered a link between an auto theft case and a

burglary case; subsequently the burglary suspect admitted to stealing the automobile.

Discovering a link between two different crimes does not happen unless one looks for

it.

The Creation Story

Creativity in analysis often involves the synthesis of a lot of information to create a useful analytical product. Analytical work is creative — the outcome of analysis in the form

of analytical reports requires that an analyst make many decisions along the way as to

what should go in the product and what should not. Creativity extends to developing programs that help “grow” the field of analysis.

Some examples:

■ After two weeks on the job working for the U.S. Attorney, Western District of New

York, intelligence analyst Ronald Wheeler participated in the litigation of the Lackawanna Six; he created presentations for court.

■ Karin Schmerler designed a program at the COPS office called “Problem Solving Partnerships” which offered “funding only for analysis” to four hundred projects — some

people won POP awards. She liked helping “grow” projects.

■ Lois Higgins developed the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Analyst

Academy and hand-picked the first class to tweak the curriculum, which was based on
35

the Community Model from the Counterdrug Secretariat. She adapted it to fit Florida,

in order to get counterterrorism funding from the federal government; she adapted the

model because it was “blessed by the Feds.” 

■ Paul Wormeli was the originator of the Integrated Career Apprehension Program

which identified career criminals and put more attention on prosecution. This program

in turn funded agencies to create crime analysts.

The following story, from Crime Analyst Peggy Call, Salt Lake City Police Department,

illustrates how creative an analyst can be in her thinking, and how persistence pays off in

following the information trail to wherever it leads.

In the spring of 2003, we had a recurring (myth or truth) series of what the public

and some in animal organizations deemed to be “cat mutilations.” Some people

believed that these cat mutilations were “human caused” as the cats were “cut with

precision.” After much research, involving drought/rainfall variables, media stories,

a 10-year search for similar incidents — which asked our partners with animal and

humane societies to go back through their files to try and provide further details of

these incidents — and with the general public claiming that this was all due to a

serial killer in our midst, we took the novel approach of looking into every type of

scenario possible that could lead us to the cause of these “cat mutilations.” Police

don't normally get involved in animal matters, unless, of course, there is animal cruelty involved, but our department felt it was in the best interest of the public to

address their fears and perceptions on this issue.

After duly searching all reports of disturbances, of animal cruelty, and identifying

sex offenders in the target area, we determined that there was nothing that was

pointing us in the direction of any “escalating behavior”; nor was there anything

that indicated cats were being trapped and abused/killed; nor were there any neighborhood complaints of “screaming cats.” We started adding some other scenarios to

the investigation; we kept everything on the table until proven or discounted.

I used GIS (Geographic Information Systems) to pinpoint the area where these

occurred. Year after year, they occurred in the same area. At the same time, Aurora,

CO was experiencing similar incidents and we found, through GIS, that Denver's

drought pattern was the same as ours. I also did some research on coyotes, foxes

and Great Horned Owls as perpetrators (much to everyone's dismay and claims that

“there were no Great Horned Owls in Utah”). I was able to illustrate and examine

possibly relevant aspects of migration, breeding, drought, pattern of incidents, rainfall, and more for the entire area of Aurora and Salt Lake City.

My question every day was “Why in both of these locations?” What is similar about

them? Is it possible to have a serial killer operating in both cities? As we looked at

the time of year, rainfall, and physical geographical features of those specific areas,

the similarities were so strikingly similar, we knew we had to keep looking at the

“Why.”
36

Armed with this information, we contacted the Division of Wildlife Resources.

They were extremely helpful in showing us about animal life, scat patterns, and the

like, and actually took us up on horseback to the key area and pointed out where

coyotes had marked their area. They also located a fox den close to the key area and

removed the foxes. They then, through labs, determined that the foxes there had cat

hair/skin in their claws and at that point, we had one cat carcass (portion) left in a

neighborhood and it was determined, through labs, that the cat had fox hair in its

claws!

The fox den was removed. I've not had another incident since.

Bottom line? Think out of the box. Keep digging. Be persistent. You don't know

until you know.

Examples of Analytic Graphics for the Mutilated Cat Case

Between February of 2002 and July of 2003 Utah and Colorado experienced a move from 

abnormally dry weather conditions to extreme drought even during winter months. The pattern is 

also observed to move from east to west from Colorado to Utah, which may account for the large 

number of cat deaths in Colorado. This may be a good barometer for things to come for Utah, 

associated with animal predation and the competition for resources. 

Source: U.S. Geological Survey.
37

The Invention Story

Analysts are often inventive in figuring how to do their work despite numerous obstacles to success. Several of those interviewed are true “inventors.” Here are two of them.

■ John Eck was selected to head the problem-oriented policing (POP) project in Newport

News, Virginia, which ran from 1984 to 1987. He thought POP was “crap” at first. Bill

Spellman was hired as an assistant. Because this was a grant-funded project, they went to

Newport News weekly. Chief Darryl Stevens put together a team of every rank/unit, about

12 people in all, to work with them. The project could be summed up at first with the question, “What is POP and how are we going to implement it?” To address this question, Bill

and John created the “SARA” (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) process that is

central to POP (see Chapter Five); it was crafted and conceptualized for this project. Three

important case studies grew from this work: a downtown prostitution/john problem, a theft

Portion of Salt Lake City, showing location of mutilated cat carcasses. The geography of the Salt Lake 

City area is similar to that of Aurora. In Colorado, there is a ravine/creek dividing two areas of land, 

much like Capitol Hills and the Avenues in Salt Lake. The area encroaches on wildlife areas. As well, 

the Colorado area is experiencing extreme drought. The Avenues has a large area of wilderness to the 

north and east as well as open parks and large cemeteries. This type of development provides easy 

cover for wild animals that have become accustomed to a human presence and are accustomed to 

easy food sources when other traditional means of feeding are threatened. 

Source: Peggy Call.
38

from unsecured parking lots problem, and a suburban chronic burglary rate problem. U.S.

News and World Report did a three-page spread on their work in Newport News as an

example of good Police Department work. 

■ Vancouver, Canada detective and Ph.D. student (at the time) Kim Rossmo had an idea

for an algorithm while riding on a train in Japan in 2001. The project required developing a computer program — ultimately resulting in what is now called “geographic profiling.” Nine months after the idea in the train, he got the program working. At 2AM

one morning he ran the program on the very first crime series — and it worked. It gave

him a huge feeling of satisfaction when the time investment and the gamble paid off.

The Influence Story

Influencing others was another theme that appeared in analyst high point stories.

Here are some examples.

■ Bryan Hill influenced decisionmakers in the Phoenix PD to use ArcView GIS software

and to hire civilian analysts (even though he was a uniformed (sworn) officer).

■ Dr. Ron Clarke’s 1976 research work “Crime as Opportunity”55 was published and

went against conventional views — no one else had argued the point that crime is situational. He likes to persuade people to his point of view and works on the fringes of

criminology studying the situational determinants of crime. 

■ One analyst influenced change when he asserted himself and broke away from the perceived ways of doing things, after agents started coming to him directly rather than

going to the de facto gatekeeper — the more senior person who was not his supervisor

but who was perceived as such. This analyst makes “house calls” and believes that to

support agents we should go to them rather than vice versa.

■ Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe values reaching someone who works in the field through his presentations, by inspiring them and influencing them to improve.

■ Dr. Rachel Boba values when people “get it” during training, when she shows examples of what crime analysis does and people can see new ways of looking at crime. She

asks, “how to bring analysis to entire organizations” — and sees the answer as a participatory evolutionary process.

■ In 1989, for several weeks, RCMP analyst Angus Smith interviewed a downed pilot

who had landed in Canada and who worked for the Cali (Colombia) Cartel. He subsequently wrote a report about changes in the cocaine trade based on the debriefing. His

strategic report seemed to “light a fire” under people and he was taken seriously. Holes

in radar were detected and North American law enforcement organizations responded

to the report by altering the way they were addressing the Cali Cartel drug trade.

55 Ron Clarke and others, “Crime as Opportunity,” Home Office Research Studies No. 34 

(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office — HMSO, 1976). 
39

The Achievement Story

For some analysts, the high point is achievement. Achievement comes in different

guises: being a leader in the field, earning the respect of others, being viewed as an

authority via one’s achievements, and being hired in a competitive job because of one’s

achievements. Writing and getting published, being offered teaching jobs, the ability to do

all sorts of work well — these also are part of achievement. 

■ Crime Analyst Metre Lewis says that now that she has become a Florida Department

of Law Enforcement-certified Crime Analyst, she feels that, with 300 hours of training,

she is now a professional with the authority behind her to make recommendations,

instead of giving her end-users a minimum (what they ask for). Her ability to do indepth assessments is an achievement that is quite rewarding.

■ One of Retired NYPD Captain Joseph Concannon’s high points was a NarcStat meeting wherein he was quizzed on the successes in his precinct. It was noted that his regular officers executed more search warrants for narcotics than the narcotics unit. This

was because the approach they took to minor/small crime arrestees, who were treated

like human beings — given snacks or meals — as they were debriefed by precinct

officers, worked better than the narcotics unit’s approaches.

■ A high point for (former Australian) intelligence analyst Howard Clarke occurred

while he was working with the British Columbia provincial police in Vancouver, in

1996-1997. During a one-year-long investigation of Asian organized crime with ties to

Los Angeles and Seattle, as well as FBI involvement, he valued the experience of taking an ambiguous assignment of analyzing two boxes of material and turning the result

into a fruitful investigation through the interpretation and identification of new leads

and targets.

The Recognition Story

Recognition takes the form of awards, interagency recognition of the value of one’s

work, peer recognition, and media attention. Being recognized by peers is most important

since public recognition is seldom possible in a closed community like that of law

enforcement intelligence professionals.

Here are some examples.

■ Robert Heibel’s high point was recognition for his Research and Intelligence Analyst

Program at Mercyhurst College. In 1996 NSA sent out a team to evaluate the program

for its eligibility for an equipment grant, appraised the program and decided to support

it — the program had “crossed the threshold” and gained acceptance by the national

Intelligence Community.

■ One of David Jimenez’s high points was his IALEIA award in 1998 for Border Patrol/

INS work, a recognition by the profession for his analytical work on a major smuggling operation investigation. 
40

■ One of Steve Gottlieb’s high points was national coverage on NPR and NBC evening

news of a bank-robbery series arrest made by officers who had used his forecasting

methods after attending his analysis course. The resulting acclaim for crime analysis

and increased public awareness was very rewarding to him. 

■ Mary Garrand created an intranet Crime Analysis (CA) page, which officers could

access in their patrol cars. An officer on the midnight shift “out of the blue” sent her a

message about how great the CA Unit was because the information on the page was

very helpful. (See box below.56)

The Impact Story

Making a difference in the real world, having some impact, is a consistently mentioned

high point. Preventing a potential victim from victimization is a primary motivator for

several analysts. Predicting where and when an offender might crop up, tying various

events into a single pattern, helping officers find offenders, and connecting crimes and

criminals all have impact for analysts. 

To the Alexandria, Virginia Crime Analysis Unit:

This is a notice of commendation and appreciation for Officers P. Alvarez,

R. Enslen, G. Hillard, and the Crime Analysis Unit. 

In the beginning of March, I put together an investigative package on a

wanted sex offender residing in my group's assigned sector. The information on the subject was discovered from the newly developed Crime Analysis Unit's Sex Offender Information page located on the Mobile Data

Terminals. This package was copied and distributed to officers in my group

for follow-up investigation that would lead to an arrest. One of these copies

was forwarded to Sgt. W. Mayfield and a request was made for the mentioned officers to check on the case. These officers had been working a

repeat offender’s detail, initiated by Lieutenant D. Gaunt. The suspect in

this case was wanted for failing to register as a sex offender, a felony warrant issued on 12/4/2004.

After several attempts and a surveillance operation, on April 1 these officers were able to locate and arrest the fugitive at one of the addresses

included in the investigation package. 

I wanted to thank these officers for taking the extra time and effort in locating this felon. I also wanted to pass along a note regarding the effectiveness

of the Crime Analysis Unit’s MDT page and to let them know that their

information gathering and distributions do get noticed and often lead to

taking criminals off the street. 

56 Courtesy of Mary Garrand, Crime Analyst Supervisor.
41

Here are some examples:

■ For Shelagh Dorn, analyst and analyst supervisor in the Upstate New York Regional

Intelligence Center, impact includes opportunity to set up an analytical unit, being able

to build it with advanced technology and producing results rapidly.

■ For Sergeant Mark Stallo of the Dallas, TX PD, developing the concept of the crime

analyst for civil service, including how to advertise and interview for such positions,

had impact. He was able to use what he had seen to be effective in his experience, his

knowledge of software requirements, and his awareness of what qualities had led to

success for analysts he had supervised, to help determine the qualifications of future

analysts in his agency.

■ For Chief Tom Casady of the Lincoln, NE PD, the November 2002 arrest of Richard

Eugene Merritt for indecent exposure was a high point centered around impact. Taking

a pedophile off the street with the help of a young boy who had suspicions, and a

license plate number, and taking the boy seriously, was part of the process that led to

further investigation and arrest.

■ Joseph Regali, who works in the New England RISS, found out that six to eight of the

persons targeted for a case he worked on for a year (100-150 hours) were now in jail,

that his work made a difference, that his product format was used for the purpose it

was intended — prosecution — and that he was able to provide more than investigators

could do on their own.

■ Mary Garrand worked on a series of robberies of banks at strip malls and made a successful prediction. She used CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design) techniques and crime prevention techniques in forays out into the field to

assess environments herself. The robber was caught with the robbery note in his pocket

where and when predicted.

■ Lorie Velarde also likes to do environmental surveys to find the unconscious environmental clues that criminals react to when choosing places/victims, and feels rewarded

when good arrests result from her work.

■ Chris Delaney enjoys the ability to link what he is doing to results, and seeing the significant drop in homicide rates in Rochester, NY was a high point in the process of

working on Operation Cease Fire.

Several analysts found teaching others very rewarding. One said that providing crime

analysis training on an in-service basis to officers was a high point; the training focused

on improving data collection or analysis and data integrity.
42

What Analysts Value in Themselves

Characteristics

accessible finds meaning in the work persuasive

articulate future-oriented practical

committed good listener responsible

convincing good memory risk-taker

cooperative helpful self-aware

creative humility self-confidence

data-hungry independent self-motivation

dedicated intelligent sense of justice

desire to contribute intrinsically motivated sincere

desire to learn intuitive strategic thinker

detail-oriented knows territory strong work ethic

disciplined learns from mistakes tenacious

enjoys diverse viewpoints love of people truthful

enjoys novelty loyal unafraid of criticism

enjoys variety open to ideas unorthodox thinker

enjoys work passionate willingness to work extra time

fair patient work experience

faith in God perpetual student

Abilities

to direct to engineer to provide structure to concepts

to distinguish concepts to finish worthy projects to see potential

to adapt to follow through to share

to adapt products to audiences to follow trail to simplify the complex

to ask questions to help group reach consensus to solve problems

to assert to identify needs to synthesize

to break things down to juggle conflicting concepts to understand limitations 

of technology

to build to keep to a timetable to visualize

to challenge to know when enough is 

enough

to work in teams

to deliver to consumer to make connections to work with others

to dig deeper to prioritize
43

DEFINING THE INDIVIDUAL ANALYST 

Affiliation with Associations of Law Enforcement Analysts

Law enforcement analysts have formed two associations, IALEIA and IACA. These

associations have become the de facto authorities that define job performance standards

for law enforcement analysts, as we have neither national standards nor alternative mechanisms of oversight. Individual analysts in both the IALEIA and the IACA have developed standards for certification processes for their respective associations, and to apply

those standards, a peer group of analysts defines desirable individual characteristics for

the population of analysts.57

Certification is always at the individual level. Individuals demonstrate their abilities and

achievements through a defined process. Thus, a standard is set for the individual analyst

who chooses to go through the process. As of 2005, over 200 individuals worldwide have

met IALEIA’s Society of Certified Criminal Analysts (C.C.A.) standards and are certified

as criminal analysts. 

The IACA expects to administer its first certification in 2005 and the title of those certified will be Certified Law Enforcement Analysts (CLEA). 58

The IACA Certification Program is a result of the desire to reach the following six

goals:

1. To recognize the professional abilities and accomplishments of individual law enforcement analysts. 

2. To promote and encourage professional development by individuals in the field of law

enforcement analysis. 

3. To provide the employers of law enforcement analysts a reliable measure of professional competence. 

4. To provide employers of law enforcement analysts with a basis on which to establish

position descriptions. 

5. To promote the profession of law enforcement analysis to police chiefs, administrators

and the entire criminal justice community. 

6. To better define law enforcement analysis as a legitimate and unique career. 59

57 Courtesy of Mary Garrand, Crime Analyst Supervisor.

58 See http://www.iaca.net/Certification.asp. 59 See http://www.iaca.net/Certification.asp.
44

The Individual Analyst in the IC

We can infer that the analyst in the national Intelligence Community faces some of the

same challenges as an analyst in law enforcement and requires the same attributes, if we

examine the perspectives of the leading IC experts. Mr. Adrian (Zeke) Wolfberg of the

Defense Intelligence Agency describes the overriding importance of how an analyst

thinks over and above what an analyst knows in the passage below.

When we think about the all-source analyst, it is usually in terms of things they do

and the knowledge they possess. Analysts identify a problem, find information

about it, think about the information, reach a conclusion and then write a report

addressing the problem for a policy-maker or decision-maker. And there are training and educational programs that target these tasks and improve their knowledge

of facts. However, if we think about the analyst in terms of how they think — which

is the fundamental “crown jewel” of analytical work — then we immediately must

acknowledge its importance over what they know. 60

These analytical attributes include: innovation, synthesis, learning, questioning,

pattern recognition, adaptation to uncertainty, visual thinking, experimentation,

metaphors, nonlinear systemic thinking, focus on what is unknown or unknowable,

asking “What If?,” and building and working with multiple frameworks. 61

Next, Mark Lowenthal, then of the CIA, describes desirable analytical qualities.

We do not train analysts well. Their early training is good and then they are forgotten. No one looks out for careers (career management). Many analysts become disaffected and leave. There is a continuing need to know everything about everything

on a moment’s notice and there are no analytical reserves regarding human

resources.

There are not enough mid-level analysts and we have to deal with collaboration vs.

competitive analysis. Why do people become analysts? They become analysts

because of an intellectual curiosity, they like to share knowledge with other people,

they tend to like to write even if it’s painful, and they are attracted to public service. 62

The findings of this study echo these passages. Law Enforcement (LE) Analysts are

intellectually curious, desirous of sharing what they know, and of making a difference for

the public by their service. They are curious innovators who explore many questions

down paths that take them in unexpected directions. They adapt, experiment, and learn

60 Adrian (Zeke) Wolfberg, “To Transform Into a More Capable Intelligence Community: A Paradigm Shift in the Analyst Selection Strategy,” National Defense University, National War College

paper, 4. URL http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n03AWolfbergParadigm.pdf.

61 Wolfberg, 20-21.

62 Mark Lowenthal, “The Future of Analysis,” Keynote Speech, Findings: Fifth Annual International Colloquium On Intelligence, Mercyhurst College, Erie, PA, 9-11 June 2003, 16.
45

continually. Writing and visualization of information are central to their work. They synthesize information from a variety of sources, limited only by their imaginations,

resources and agency hierarchies, to develop deeper understandings of problems. What

the analyst knows is less important than how he or she thinks — no one in this study

emphasized knowledge alone as valuable. Experience, yes. Those interviewed affirmed

that they valued their ability to think.

Still other elements of LE analysis mirror what we know about analysts in the national

Intelligence Community. Pattern recognition is another core aspect of LE analysts’ work,

for example, especially in local law enforcement wherein many analysts are sifting

through large data sets to uncover patterns on a daily basis. LE analysts also experience

the same frustrations as analysts in the national Intelligence Community. Managers do not

nurture them and their career paths are very limited. Training is often only provided at the

beginning of their careers. They often have too much to do and no backups to cover them

or supplement them — some operate alone and all of the analytical work of their agency

is up to them. 

One difference in comparing LE analysts to those in the national Intelligence Community is that no LE analysts spoke of competition as a problem. Collaboration is the rule in

LE analysis. Perhaps because analysts are scattered (very rarely are there more than a few

analysts working together), competition is less likely and collaboration is necessary to

build any sort of LE analytical community. 

WHAT WORKS AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

Interview subjects identified individual aspects of analytical work that contribute to success. This chapter concludes with “what works” on an individual level as reported by

those interviewed.

What Works: Desire to “Catch the Bad Guys”

The ability to help “catch the bad guys” keeps analysts in this work. One analyst said,

quoting Ernest Hemingway, “Certainly there is no hunting like the hunting of man and

those who have hunted armed men long enough and liked it, never really care for anything

else thereafter.” 63

63 The quote appeared in the April 1936 issue of Esquire. It was the first line of an article titled

“On The Blue Water: A Gulf Stream Letter.” URL http://www.lostgeneration.com/hemfaq.htm#hunting.
46

What Works: Freedom to Analyze

The individual analyst benefits from freedom to be imaginative, to be free to pursue a trail,

to explore, to dig deeper, to follow a path that only he or she might sense — one that may

not even be articulated yet. One successful, experienced analyst avoids producing numerous

standardized reports in order to have “down time,” time where he can pursue the questions

that have come about in the course of his work. He finds that it is in pursuing his questions

that he discovers value — new information that can help his agency in unexpected ways.

Just as patrol officers have free time to patrol proactively so should the analyst have free

analytical patrol time to be proactive and able to respond to the unexpected.

What Works: The Generalist

Several subjects expressed concern about the development of training models and standardization of skills in the field of LE analysis They emphasized the need for a broad and

diverse background to ensure a role for a variety of perspectives in the field. Being a generalist — someone who can do many things, like a “renaissance man” — was viewed as

useful by some. Some felt that the artisan nature of analysis might be lost if the field were

to be rigidly standardized.

Measuring “Catching the Bad Guys”

Source: Courtesy of John Gottschalk, Pierce County Sheriff’s Dept., Washington.
47

One very experienced and accomplished analyst stated that forcing analysts into a narrow role would eliminate their power to make connections. He said that theories and

methodologies risked circumscribing the analyst’s view. Since “all intelligence analysis

does is help us understand the world,” limiting the scope of intellectual pursuits would

hurt the profession. He encourages analysts to “take those intellectual flights of fancy,”

and that, despite the need for specific skill sets and knowledge in the post-9/11 world, the

specific must be balanced by depth and breadth of knowledge and curiosity. He asserts

that what we do “is magic.”

What Works: The Specialist

Conversely, several individuals indicated that the need for specialists has emerged as

technology advances. As the technical tools become more sophisticated, the demand for

specialists with expertise grows. 

What Works: The Artisan and the Engineer

Being able to visualize information to tell a story for others requires a special talent,

according to some analysts. Writing gracefully is another talent. Some analysts emphasized the “art” aspect of the work. One expert, an engineer by training, indicated how

important it is to think like an engineer. Rather than taking one’s tools and applying them

to a problem, he says it is much better to design tools especially suited to the problem at

hand. Multi-disciplinary approaches are desirable – one individual pointed out that quality analysis depends on a “synthesis of disciplines.”

What Works: Experience

A number of analysts assigned high value to their breadth of experience, especially

those who had worked in a number of agencies and thought that “diverse multi-agency

experience” made them better analysts. For them, this significant body of experience

acted as a “good bank of ideas” and made the work process flow more intuitively. Experience provides a skill level that cannot be acquired by education or training.

Experts can detect differences that novices cannot see, cannot even force themselves to see. Wine tasters can tell one grape from another and even one year of

wine from another. To novices, wines are generic: they all taste the same. If you are

just starting to drink wines, no matter how much attention you pay, how much you

swirl the fluid around in your mouth, you don’t get it. That’s because “it” is not a

fact (the Civil War began in 1861) or an insight (dividing one number into another is

like subtracting it several times). You cannot learn just by being told or learn it all of

a sudden. It takes lots of experience, and lots of variety in that experience, to notice

differences. 64

64 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: The MIT

Press, 2001), 157.
48

What Works: Persistence

A successful analyst will have a drive to understand what is going on, to provide a clear

picture to others, and will find the best way to pursue the best problem-solving mode.

Analysts are forced to be creative, to get the needed information, to gain credibility, to

overcome organizational impediments. Along with persistence, the ability to discern

“when enough is enough” is crucial. “Overdoing it is like NOT doing it at all.”

What Works: People Skills

Developing an “inter-human connection” with everyone she meets was valued highly by one

analyst and repeated, in other words, by a number of analysts. Developing personal relationships with officers was cited as extremely important. Gaining the trust of others so that one

may eventually be able to benefit from their tacit knowledge is especially important. 

Operating “as a value-added retail center,” “becoming an “information brokerage,”

“training the consumer,” all come under the umbrella of service orientation requiring

higher order people skills. Talking to people in person, respecting them, knowing their

names, task force physical co-location — all can contribute to improving people skills.

Certain analysts highly value that they “like people,” describing this trait as conducive

to making people comfortable with them, making others feel appreciated, which in turn

helps them work on teams and get help in areas where they need help as well as earn

appreciation themselves: “Relationships foster getting more of what you need: data sharing, technical support, and development.”

WHAT WAS DISCOVERED

This is a Calling

In the project interviews many individuals expressed a desire to contribute to society;

some analysts said they would even work for free because they found their work so meaningful. Some do, putting in extra unpaid hours to pursue an idea or complete an urgent

project. A number of analysts called every day their high point, reporting that this work

remains continuously attractive:

“Every day is different.”

“This is a challenge every day.”

“I learn new things every day.”
49

Choosing Good Analysts

Napoleon reportedly asked new officers on his staff one question: “Are you lucky?”

Napoleon understood that luck in battle, although intangible, was a useful attribute. 

A senior intelligence official used to ask his subordinates two questions about new analysts they wished to hire: “Do they think interesting thoughts? Do they write well?” This

official believed that, with these two talents in hand, all else would follow with training

and experience.65 Law enforcement analysts at the local level do both very well, and much

more.66

Next

Building upon individual strengths, the next level of success depends on relationships.

Sharing of information and intelligence comes out of good personal relationships and thus

these two topics — sharing and relationships — are grouped together in Chapter Four.

65 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003),

91.

66 The skills and abilities of individual analysts differ significantly; this text is referring to the

analysts who are effective.

51

Chapter 4

WHAT WORKS: RELATIONSHIPS AND SHARING

At present, there are no standards related to information sharing and analysis.

—A Resource Guide to Law Enforcement, Corrections, and Forensic

Technologies67(U.S. DOJ, Office Of Justice Programs and Office Of Community

Oriented Policing Services, May 2001), 54.

It's not what you know — it is all the people you know and the resources and assets 

they have that can help you.

—Anonymous interview subject.

In the terrible days following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the entire nation became

more conscious of the critical importance of sharing criminal justice and public

safety information and intelligence among all branches and levels of government.

—Building Exchange Content Using the Global Justice XML Data Model:

A User Guide for Practitioners and Developers68 (U.S. DOJ, Office of

Justice Programs: 17 June 2005), Introduction.

Source: Chart concept adapted from William Glasser, Choice Theory: A New Psychology of Personal 

Freedom (New York: Harper Perennial, 1998), 9.

Paths of Technical and Human Relationships

67 Available online at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/186822.pdf.

68 Available online at http://it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=201.
52

RELATIONSHIPS AND INFORMATION SHARING

The success of the intelligence cycle, however it is specifically defined and wherever it

is applied, depends on the quality of relationships of those involved and their abilities to

share information appropriately and effectively. The theme of relationships and sharing

was emphasized in many of the interviews conducted for this project. Good relationships

and the ability to share may seem like common sense topics that do not need articulation,

but the gravity of failures to share and the infighting among those even now involved in

homeland security, as well as within the law enforcement community, require examination and in-depth research beyond this project.

The preceding chart is adapted to illustrate this concept. It may over-dramatize the problem, but the problem itself is very real. Technology has progressed exponentially over the

last century. Applied knowledge of how to improve human relationships (and thus facilitate sharing) has not. We may pour billions of dollars into systems that allow us to share

information better. We may link everyone by the most innovative technological means

such as hand-held instantaneous communication devices that can do myriad, unimagined

things. All this can happen and is on the road to happening — but if we do not learn how

to communicate better, how to relate better, how to share — none of the technology can

affect some of our basic problems. Intelligence failures are often relationship failures.

What applied knowledge works to improve this situation? This chapter highlights some of

“what works” in relationships and sharing in law enforcement intelligence analysis.

A Very Brief History of Information Sharing 

Sharing is foreign to national and criminal intelligence communities because of the

classified nature of the work. Strict security is a doctrine. Even information regarding

police 911 calls for service is restricted in some jurisdictions. Thus, new and urgent mandates to share involve real risk and, in many instances, changes in policies and ingrained

practices.

Generations of intelligence professionals have been trained in this distinction, the

doctrine of disclosing information only to those who have a demonstrable “need to

know,” and the rigidities of the national security classification system. On the law

enforcement side, it has long been recognized that confidentiality, protection of witnesses, and secrecy of grand jury information are essential to the successful investigation and prosecution of crimes. Thus, to both the law enforcement and foreign

intelligence professions, proper security practices and strict limits on the sharing of

information are second nature.69

69 Statement by Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff, Hearing on the Intelligence 

Community’s Response to Past Terrorist Attacks against the United States from February 1993 to 

September 2001, 8 October 2002, 22.
53

The Risks of Sharing

Information may not equate to power in all situations, but information can be used in an

unethical manner, and has been within law enforcement agencies and among them. There

is a history of distrust and real reasons for it. Federal agencies that take the credit for

investigations, when local law enforcement agency officers do the grunt work, add greater

complexity to the mistrust between the levels of law enforcement. The risk of computer

security problems adds to the concerns of many in law enforcement.

Police agencies have already experienced problems with low-level employees and

even police officers selling information, from the janitor who funneled discarded

drafts of the Jeffery Dahmer investigation to the news media to corrupt detectives

providing case files to organized crime. Emerging technologies both exacerbate that

age-old problem and add the new possibilities of direct interception and intervention without relying upon a human inside confederate.70

Sharing is facilitated by personal, face-to face relationships, even among rivals. Associating a face with a name, or being acquainted with someone who knows a face and can

associate it with a name you know, makes a world of difference to many in law enforcement. Trust is a first-name-basis issue. Computers take away that relationship factor. Conversely, many people who never met in person are now connected through email and other

computer-facilitated methods. They develop new types of relationships that facilitate

unprecedented levels of information exchange.

ViCAP: An Example of a Systemic Failure in Information Sharing

The Violent Criminal Apprehension Program began in the FBI Academy in July 1985

with the goal of identifying possible violent serial criminals across the United States,

based on crime pattern analysis through a voluntary computerized data collection system.71 Since 1996, after discovering that at most eight percent of such crimes were

entered into the database, with voluntary participation only by a few large urban areas,

efforts have been made to modify the system to make it more user-friendly and increase

participation. Even the name changed to “The New ViCAP.”72

The concept is excellent — capture the data on unsolved homicides across the country

and analyze it to uncover crime patterns that could conceivably result in early identification of serial killer behaviors and lead to earlier arrests. Old cases could be solved and

investigators could pool resources. But because entry into the system is voluntary, the FBI

must rely on the goodwill of each and every police agency to enter the data. This is inefficient and ineffective in uncovering threats. Considering all the movies and television

70 Thomas J. Cowper and Michael E. Buerger, Improving Our View of the World: Police and

Augmented Reality Technology (Washington, DC: Police Futures International/FBI, 2003), 55.

71 Eric W. Witzig, “The New ViCAP,” in The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 72, 

no. 6 (June 2003), 2.

72 “The New ViCAP,” 2-4.
54

shows about serial killers, the glamorous nature of CSI shows and other shows like it, and

the public fascination with this topic — how could it be that we as compatriots cannot

collect data on unsolved homicides in one place? There is no proactive way to analyze

this heinous crime in our country. Agencies express concern that their information is out

of their direct control if entered into this type of system.73 At what cost do they exercise a

freedom not to share?

The FBI has made distinct efforts to improve the situation by offering instructional and

technological support along with the software. The software is free and ViCAP crime analysts are available to help agencies use the software for case management and case matching.74 The failure in sharing is not the FBI's failure. It is a failure in the larger law

enforcement system of our country, where for many civil-liberty and division-of-power

reasons, we protect the privacy of serial killers and local priorities over national and even

international concerns.

Why the Resistance?

Often, local law enforcement officials feel neglected by federal law enforcement agencies that have differing missions. Charles H. Ramsey, chief of the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police, said the federal agencies and local police departments had different

missions and different needs after terrorists struck. “The F.B.I. is worrying about who

might have done it, but what I care about is that there was an attack on a transit system

and I have rush hour coming up,” he said. “I don't need a threat analysis. I need to know

what I can do proactively to strengthen the security of our transit system. Terrorism

always starts as a local event,” Chief Ramsey said. “We're the first responders.”75

The police chiefs of up to fifteen cities have begun working together to create their own

system of sharing terrorism-related information beyond the federal system. Frustrated by

what they say is the slow and sometimes grudging way that federal officials share information about terrorist incidents, police chiefs from around the country are creating an

informal network of more rapid communication. 

Among the leaders is William J. Bratton, the Los Angeles police chief, who said in

interviews Wednesday and Thursday that while the quality of information from the

F.B.I. and the Department of Homeland Security was generally good, it often

arrived far too late to be of any immediate value to local police departments. “The

frustration is that intelligence gathering and sharing networks at the federal level are

not working for local chiefs of police,” Chief Bratton said. “We're used to things

breaking very quickly and have to respond quickly. We don't have the luxury of

waiting.”76

73 “The New ViCAP,”7.

74 “The New ViCAP,”7.

75 John M. Broder, “Police Chiefs Moving to Share Terror Data,” The New York Times, 29 July

2005, online edition.

76 “Police Chiefs Moving to Share Terror Data.”
55

Recognition of the differing mission of local law enforcement and the federal ability to

support it are necessary to build relationships. After all, each citizen is dependent on the

local level of law enforcement for his or her primary safety needs. It is the local level of

law enforcement we call when we have a crime problem or see suspicious behavior. Local

law enforcement cannot wait for federal help. At the same time, federal recognition that

local law enforcement generates data useful at the national level is overdue.

Systems/Initiatives for Intelligence Information Sharing

A number of systems exist for sharing intelligence. Although interview subjects place

high value on relationships and sharing of information, very few mentioned these systems as

things they currently value or see these systems as contributing to their successes. 

Interstate information-sharing systems/initiatives in place or being 

developed at local, state, federal, and regional levels.77

CDU-Houston: 

Community Defense Unit — Houston, Texas, Police Department

CISAnet:

Criminal Information Sharing Alliance Network 

(Southwest Border States Anti-Drug Information System) 

CLEAR-Chicago:

Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting — Chicago area 

COPLINK: various states

CriMNet-MN:

CriMNet — Minnesota

EFSIAC:

Emergency Fire Services Information and Analysis Center

EPIC:

El Paso Intelligence Center

ERN-Dallas: 

Emergency Response Network — Dallas, Texas, FBI

HIDTA:

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

77Read about most of these systems/initiatives at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/

intell_sharing_system_survey.pdf.
56

Source: Compiled by author.

An Example of Success in Sharing: CLEAR

The Chicago Police Department stands out as a center of innovation in law enforcement

information sharing, not only among officers, but also with citizens.

JNET-PA:

Pennsylvania Justice Network

LEIU:

Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit

LEO:

Law Enforcement Online

LETS-AL:

Law Enforcement Tactical System — Alabama

MATRIX:

Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange

NCISP:

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan

NLETS:

National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System

Project North Star:

Multi-agency law enforcement coordination coalition

RAID:

Real-time Analytical Intelligence Database

riss.net:

Regional Information Sharing Systems secure intranet

SIN-OK:

State Intelligence Network — Oklahoma

SPIN-CT:

Statewide Police Intelligence Network — Connecticut

TEW Group-Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group — Los Angeles, 

California, area 

ThreatNet-FL: web monitoring service
57

CLEAR is an enterprise-wide vision of how anytime, anywhere access to centralized,

relational data can empower intelligence-driven crime-fighting. While other police

departments are struggling to integrate legacy data and applications, Chicago decided

in the late 1990s that to have maximum impact, all policing intelligence should be

accessible in one spot, with all tools leveraging and feeding that repository. 

The CLEAR database, deployed in April 2000 and now topping 200GB, is the foundation for a growing set of integrated CLEAR applications used by all of the department's 13,600 officers and most of its 3,000 civilians, plus an exponentially

expanding base of users outside the city limits. In fact, the Illinois state crime data

system will be replaced by CLEAR, which will serve as the State Police's data

repository. Typically, 1,200 concurrent users run more than 7,000 queries daily

against data that include: 

■ Arrest reports 

■ Live cases' statuses 

■ Criminal activity by district, beat, street and address 

■ Rap sheets with aliases, nicknames and distinguishing physical marks 

■ Digital mug shots and fingerprints 

■ Seized property and evidence tracking 

■ Forensics reports 

■ Personnel data — number of arrests by each officer and many other performance 

 metrics 78

One of the individuals interviewed for this project, Dr. Michael Maltz, worked in Chicago when it originally started using ICAM (Information Collection for Automated Mapping), a crime mapping and analysis application, and was a lead developer of the ICAM

project, the forerunner of CLEAR.79 Maltz says that the improved, realistic visualization

of data, such as the use of ortho photography and animation, will facilitate “knowing the

whole of ... everything that has occurred.” The map becomes the collective memory of the

department, since it captures the information from every shift and every officer. Animation allows officers and analysts to look over various time intervals, daily, weekly, seasonally — whatever criteria are set, and, by factoring in other information, such as how much

light or precipitation there was at a given time, it can help everyone become a crime analyst and conduct analysis in near-real-time. This is a futuristic, but realistic, hope.

78 Richard Pastore, “Taking IT to the Street: How the Chicago Police Department Used 

Technology to Fight Crime and Become the First Grand CIO Enterprise Value Award Winner,” CIO

Magazine, 15 February 2004. URL http://www.cio.com/archive/021504/grand.html.

79 The city of Chicago uses Appreciative Inquiry on a wide-scale; Imagine Chicago was

launched in 1992 and is an ongoing project — see www.imaginechicago.org.; http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/icamprog.pdf. 
58

An Example of Success in Sharing: The Sniper Investigation

A Police Executive Research Forum report highlights what worked in the sniper investigation, the efforts to end the killing spree in the Washington, DC area, in October 2002:

Law enforcement needs systems that allow multiple agencies in complex investigations to exchange and analyze information. In the sniper case, talented and dedicated information systems specialists and crime analysts were forced to patch

together portions of different systems to create an information analysis system that

eventually provided the investigation with robust intelligence capabilities.80

Of all the keys to success during this investigation, the one mentioned — indeed,

strongly emphasized — by every executive was the importance of pre-existing 

relationships.81

The Importance of “Weak” Social Ties

The concept of the power of “weak” social ties applies to the success of LE intelligence

analysis. The more people you know outside of your agency, the more access you have to

information. The weak ties concept is described in this passage:

Weak ties play a crucial role in our ability to communicate with the outside world.

Often our close friends can offer us little help in getting a job. They move in the

same circles we do and are inevitably exposed to the same information. To get new

information, we have to activate our weak ties. Indeed, managerial workers are

more likely to hear about a job opening through weak ties (27.8 percent of the

cases) than through strong ties (16.7 percent). The weak ties, or acquaintances, are

our bridge to the outside world, since by frequenting different places they obtain

their information from sources other than our immediate friends.82

In brief, it is not only who you know, but as important, and maybe even more important, it

is who they know. This concept echoes the message in Surowiecki’s, The Wisdom of

Crowds.

A Working Model for “Weak” Social Ties 

The importance of human relationships was emphasized over and over again in the

interviews conducted for this study. A model of effective relationship is that of the

National Drug Intelligence Center's Field Program Specialist. In New York Sate, Eddie

Beach holds this title and as part of his networking job tasks has face-to-face contact with

80 See Managing a Multijurisdictional Case: Indentifying the Lessons Learned from The Sniper

Investigation, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pubs/SniperRpt.pdf.

81 Managing a Multijurisdictional Case, 25.

82 A.L. Barabasi, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means

for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), 43.
59

officers, analysts, and health care agencies. If there is an issue, problem or question

related to drugs, Eddie is always there to help or inform. For example, when there was a

rash of heroin deaths in western New York, he was able to keep everyone informed and

help investigators link suspected overdose deaths to a particularly dangerous batch of heroin. He can bring information to Washington or vice versa. Real people interfacing with

real people is a highly effective practice, according to many of the subjects interviewed.

Developing creative ways to leverage this concept may help improve intelligence analysis

and sharing capacities.

Individuals acting as information “hubs” in a network could link many people, effectively overcoming the challenge of sharing. To design such a system proactively and

wisely may be a step toward facilitating information sharing. Analysts, being effective

“knowledge brokers” in law enforcement, could be effective hubs.

U.S. Coast Guard Operations Specialist Robert Ziehm also emphasized the importance

of face-to-face relationships. As an experienced law enforcement investigator, now retired

from that work, he says that people are more apt to open up in person and provide information beyond shared written reports.

A Second Working Model of “Weak Tie” Social Relationships 

One of the most significant contributions to the development of law enforcement analyst

relationships comes from the listserv LEAnalyst,83 a clear example of the benefit of weaktie social relationships. LEAnalyst links over 1,500 law enforcement analysts, experts,

and curious bystanders in an open network of sharing. Post a question on LEAnalyst and

a leading world expert may help you with an answer. You probably don't know these people personally, but they “know” you because you belong to LEAnalyst. They recognize

your name, or know you are an analyst. 

Other informal, but restricted, listservs created by field officers in intelligence are

emerging in ad hoc fashion, connecting voluntary members in the military, national security, and federal, state, and local law enforcement. This trend may be an indicator that,

although these structures at times experience difficulties in blending resources and missions, the ground-level workers have found ways around the obstacles of bureaucracy and

power struggles to do the work they value.

83 See http://www.leanalyst.info/. “The primary purpose of the LEAnalyst mailing list is to provide a place where law enforcement employees (sworn and non-sworn), academia (instructors and

students), and businesses providing products or services to the law enforcement community can

meet and exchange information, methods, and ideas regarding the analysis of crime. We allow other

law enforcement-related postings in order to encourage a free flow of information regarding all

manner of law enforcement concerns.” The listserv is maintained by Ray Sanford and Sal Perri as a

free service.
60

WHAT WORKS

Global Justice XML Data Model

Several subjects said that the Global Justice XML (Extensible Markup Language) Data

Model (Global JXDM) was an important milestone toward more effective informationsharing systems.

Developed by the U.S. Department of Justice's Global Justice Information Sharing

Initiative, the Global JXDM is a common vocabulary that is understood system to

system, enabling access from multiple sources and reuse in multiple applications,

allowing justice and public safety communities to effectively exchange information

at all levels.84

Paul Wormeli, a participant in this research project, gives an example of how the Global

Justice XML Data Model “works”:

The whole idea of the GJXDM is to make it very easy to share information between

law enforcement agencies... also to expedite judicial processing by sending incident

and arrest data easily to prosecutors and courts in near real time so that the prosecution and judicial proceedings are expedited. Information sharing in the dynamic and

highly mobile world of crystal meth is a big key to law enforcement success

through collaboration in cases involving multiple people, locations, and tactics,

irrespective of city boundaries. The more they share, the greater the likelihood of

successful case clearance and effective prosecution.

As states implement prescription drug monitoring programs and develop the system

for exchanging information across state lines, drug dealers specializing in the illicit

traffic of controlled substances will have a hard time hiding from law enforcement

agencies.85

Broad Networking

In LE analysis, success depends upon a high degree of networking, and crime analysis

itself has helped the growth of law enforcement networking. “Nobody seems to network

like analysts do. We ask each other for help in unprecedented ways.” One analyst points

out that officers do not seem to ask one another how to do their jobs, which runs counter

to the common activity of most analysts in LE — asking peers instead for help, [and for]

guidance in improving one's skills, techniques, or access to resources. 

One national-level analyst said that the interview (in the context of his work in a

national policing agency and the author’s work as a local-level law enforcement analyst)

84 See URL http://it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=201.

85 “Catching Drug Dealers: GJXDM To The Rescue,” The Rockley Bulletin at

http://www.rockleybulletin.com/technologycorner_comments.php?id=99_0_6_0_C. 
61

demonstrated the valued ability to reach across communities and disciplines and find that

the work we do is fundamentally the same trade. 

Cooperative Internal Relationships

Several analysts emphasized the importance of nurturing and maintaining cooperative

relationships among patrol personnel, investigators, and administrators. Learning about

the type of work done by others can help analysts in a number of ways. They may discover information they did not know existed, they may discover an analytical product

needed, and they will gain respect and trust.

Relationships with IT Staff

Developing relationships with IT (Information Technology) people is an approach that

works; the relationship benefits from any opportunity analysts have to show the IT personnel what analysts do, thus making clear how IT specialists can contribute to the team

effort. Often, the tools the analysts need and use put stress on the IT office and the

agency's IT system itself — the specialist's responsibility is to make sure the system performs and the analyst's work does not unduly slow the operation of systems. Without a

personal relationship between the two specialties, the likelihood of system overload can

cause conflict unanticipated by an isolated analyst. Developing good relationships with IT

support staff by showing them why their help is needed can facilitate improvement in getting analytical tools to work optimally in an agency.

Interview subjects made it clear that IT people often do not understand the greater

importance of interpreting data — being able to engage in intensive manipulation of data

— compared to the lesser value inherent in information-storage capabilities: “It is a specific name that solves a case, not just data.”

Teamwork

Law enforcement intelligence analysts were more likely than traditional crime analysts

to emphasize the importance of teamwork, probably because they work more often on

investigative teams. One senior analyst saw the intelligence analyst's role as complementary to the investigator's role, reporting that investigations without intelligence-oriented

analytical support are “deficient.” Intelligence analysts, according to him, provide intangible but valuable insights. Several law enforcement intelligence analysts reported in interviews that they enjoyed the camaraderie of law enforcement teamwork, the sense of

working together toward the common goal of public safety.

Developing intelligence in a team setting, face-to-face, is recommended by Coast Guard

intelligence analyst Robert Ziehm. Using charts to visualize who/what/when/where in

time and space, to pool resources to find better opportunities to detect illegal border activity, and to design operations around analytical findings are cost-effective keys to greater

success.
62

Relationships with the Community86

Local-level law enforcement intelligence analysts are in a different position from most

other analysts in that they can and do, in some jurisdictions, attend community meetings

and other types of problem-solving efforts where the stakeholders are working together.

Some of the analysts are involved with providing citizens with data, surveying citizens,

and working on task forces consisting of agencies outside of law enforcement. They may

attend block club meetings, recommend responses that include warning citizens of a current crime series, or help local government assess specific issues related to police data.

Our interest is in solving real world problems with research and analytical techniques. As such our position is that research must be directed in practical ways. As

good ethnographic researchers (and good street cops) will tell you, some of the very

best ideas for problem-solving and research can come from those being researched!

It can come from kids in the schoolyard, local taxi drivers, street hookers, beat cops

and residents in the apartment.87

INFORMATION SHARING AND HOMELAND SECURITY

It should be clear by now that there is not one law enforcement community, but many.

The tragedy of 9/11 forced the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to

reevaluate their information sharing practices. The nature of the threat today is such

that there cannot be a dichotomy between the two communities with regard to information; all available relevant intelligence information from one community must be

shared with the other in order to generate the most comprehensive analysis of the

potential threat to our homeland.88

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan89

Developed by the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) and endorsed by U.S.

Attorney General John Ashcroft, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) is a formal intelligence sharing initiative that

addresses the security and intelligence needs recognized after the tragic events of 11 September 2001. It describes a nationwide communications capability that will link together

all levels of law enforcement personnel, including officers on the streets, intelligence analysts, unit commanders, and police executives for the purpose of sharing critical data.90

86 See Thomas Rich, Crime Analysis and Mapping by Community Organizations in Hartford,

Connecticut at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/185333.pdf for an example of empowering neighborhoods to utilize crime mapping for problem solving.

87Greg Saville and Chuck Genre, draft manuscript Understanding Neighborhood Problems,

University of New Haven.

88 Christopher C. Thornlow, Fusing Intelligence with Law Enforcement Information: An Analytic Imperative (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, March 2005), 49. 

89 See document at http://it.ojp.gov/documents/200507_ncisp.pdf.

90 See NCISP home page at http://it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=93.
63

The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan was developed to address:

1. Lack of communication and information sharing — specifically, lack of a centralized analysis and dissemination function, either at the state or federal level; lack

of intelligence from federal agencies; and state statutory requirements that present

hurdles to sharing information.

2. Technology issues — specifically, lack of equipment to facilitate a national intelligence data system, lack of interconnectibility of law enforcement and other databases (that is, immigration services), limited fiscal resources, lack of technological

infrastructure throughout the state, and lack of uniformity between computer systems.

3. Lack of intelligence standards and policies — specifically, lack of common standards for collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence data; a need for

increased local training on legal standards for collection, storage, and purging of

data; access to classified data; and lack of standards for determining when to disseminate intelligence to federal agencies.

4. Lack of intelligence analysis — specifically, lack of compatible analytical software

and lack of analytical support, personnel, equipment, and training.

5. Poor working relationships — specifically, unwillingness of law enforcement agencies to provide information due to parochial interests and a culture within the federal

system that does not foster sharing of information or trust between agencies.91

An irony of the NCISP is that neither the International Association of Crime Analysts,

nor active crime analysts at the local level of LE, were involved in its conception or development. Good relationships must be fostered between the analyst associations as well.

Law enforcement leaders must also recognize that what crime analysts contribute is also

intelligence.

Next

Law enforcement has partnered with academia to develop several processes that significantly change the way police work is done compared with traditional policing —

processes in which intelligence analysis is a core component. Other innovative policing

processes have emerged due to change in police management priorities. Many subjects

cited these processes as important in their work, in bringing success and in preparing for

the future. The processes build upon individual analytical strengths, relationships, and

sharing. Chapter Five highlights the processes.

91 NCISP home page, 3.

65

Chapter 5

WHAT WORKS: PROCESSES

Traditional policing has a narrow focus, wanting to latch onto a guy rather than ask,

What are the possibilities? Where can you get the best bang for your buck? 92

In the Intelligence Community, the intelligence cycle is the process central to intelligence analysis. In law enforcement intelligence circles, the emergence of several different

approaches to policing, rooted in multi-disciplinary academic research, has resulted in the

institutionalization of numerous processes that have analysis as a central feature. Analysts

and expert observers value these processes. For law enforcement intelligence analysts, the

processes provide an avenue for increasing the value of their role. For contributing

experts, the processes provide a venue for innovative research and analysis methods to

bear additional fruit in the real world.

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING

As noted in Chapter One, the United Kingdom and the United States, along with Australia, Canada, and several other countries, are moving toward a new form of policing called

intelligence-led policing.

Intelligence-led policing is more than just a catchy phrase. We are at a critical

time when we should be collaborating to jointly develop a clear definition of

what it means. Based on current literature, I believe intelligence-led policing

is about being able to: 

describe, understand and map criminality and the criminal business process; 

make informed choices and decisions; 

engage the most appropriate tactics; 

allow the targeting of resources; 

disrupt prolific criminals; and 

articulate a case to the public and in court. 

To retool, to implement intelligence-led policing, a strategically directed

police effort must be based on analysis. It is only by focusing on intelligence

work performed by a specialized workforce that we can be released from the

predominately reactive cycle of policing.

92 Quote from interview.

Source: R. Ban, “The Dynamics of Retooling and Staffing: Excellence and Innovation in Police Management,”

Unpublished Candian Police College manuscript, 2003, 3.
66

Intelligence-led policing represents a paradigm shift. In the United Kingdom, its implementation rests on a formal business model of policing, or corporacy. 

The Concept of Corporacy 

Looking at the business of policing as one might look at a corporation is radically different from the way policing has been done in the past.

Good corporacy occurs when the leaders in a sector have a common understanding

of the activities, behaviours and results that create value for the customers of the

sector; it is tied to the concept of “best value.” Increasingly, the funding of public

sector services such as policing and health care is contingent upon demonstrating to

government funding and oversight agencies that the service performed with public

funds fulfills government objectives and meets standards set. Thus it is no longer

good enough just to patrol neighbourhoods and catch criminals; a police service

must show that its efforts are, for example, reducing crime levels and making the

community feel safer, and furthermore that we are doing so in the most efficient and

effective possible way. Many police services have started the challenging process of

retooling to make performance measurement an integral part of operations.93

In the corporacy view of intelligence-led policing, it is not enough for officers to be successful by arresting people, by investigations that close down major drug suppliers, or by

answering 911 calls within minutes. The new measurement of success will examine the

impact of the work. Does crime go down? Did the drug supply dry up? Did we eliminate

demands for service (911 calls) by solving underlying chronic problems instead of simply

93 “The Dynamics of Retooling and Staffing,” 7.
67

reacting to them individually? If not, can we think of other ways to do business that will

get the results our customers, the citizens, want? 

A number of interview subjects are excited about intelligence-led policing, but no one

had examples of success that they attributed specifically to this process. Their excitement

revolves around the fact that analysis is the driver of intelligence-led policing. Intelligence-led policing cannot exist without analysis.

COMPSTAT

The COMPSTAT process has been adapted by numerous law enforcement agencies.

One of the author’s sources, Joseph Concannon, calls himself “one of the babies of

COMPSTAT.” A retired captain of the NYPD, where COMPSTAT originated, he notes

that “the beauty of COMPSTAT is communication.” The maps and statistics provide visualization of crime and other policing problems to a whole group, facilitating discussion so

that decisions can be made, and workers held accountable. “Every aspect of COMPSTAT

involves measurement,” according to Concannon.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, a new engine of police progressivism may have

arisen. Characterized as a new crime-control program, COMPSTAT combines all of

the major prescriptions offered by contemporary organizational development experts

with the latest geographic information systems technology. It also re-engineers police

management by holding command staff directly accountable for crime levels in their

What does this chart mean for the community?

Source: John Gottschalk, crime analyst, Pierce County Sheriff's Office, 

Washington State.
68

beats. Furthermore, it uses sophisticated computer maps and crime statistics to facilitate timely and targeted responses to crime problems.94

Crime analysts value the concept of COMPSTAT because it has created a demand for and

thereby elevated the value of their work. Agencies that measure their crimes, look for

emerging and chronic problems, and seek to develop strategies to address them, need crime

analysis. However, crime analysis should NOT be confused with COMPSTAT. The technical ability to make maps and generate statistics is not analysis. Often agencies confuse the

two — generating charts and maps rather than analyzing the data to see what they mean.

COMMUNITY POLICING

The Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS)95 offers a definition of

Community Policing:

Community policing focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of

police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. The community policing model balances reactive responses to calls for service with proactive

problem-solving centered on the causes of crime and disorder. Community policing

requires police and citizens to join together as partners in the course of both identifying and effectively addressing these issues. 96

The COPS Office funded the project that resulted in the publication of Law Enforcement

Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies.97 The principal investigator was David L. Carter, from the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan

State University. Chapter Four of the book is called “Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP): The

Integration of Community Policing and Law Enforcement Intelligence.” Carter asserts in

this chapter that community policing and intelligence-led policing bear similarities:

94The Police Foundation report, Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities at

http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/compstatinpractice.pdf. 

95 “The COPS Office was created as a result of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement

Act of 1994. As a component of the Justice Department, the mission of the COPS Office is to

advance community policing in jurisdictions of all sizes across the country. Community policing

represents a shift from more traditional law enforcement in that it focuses on prevention of crime

and the fear of crime on a very local basis. Community policing puts law enforcement professionals

on the streets and assigns them a beat, so they can build mutually beneficial relationships with the

people they serve. By earning the trust of the members of their communities and making those individuals stakeholders in their own safety, community policing makes law enforcement safer and

more efficient, and makes America safer.” from http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=35

retrieved 7/21/05.

96 See URL http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=36.

97 U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and

Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services, 2004).
69

Both community policing and ILP rely on:

■ Information Management

❏ Community policing — Information gained from citizens helps define the

parameters of community problems.

❏ ILP — Information input is the essential ingredient for intelligence analysis.

■ Two-way Communications with the Public

❏ Community policing — Information is sought from the public about

offenders. Communicating critical information to the public aids in crime

prevention and fear reduction.

❏ ILP — Communications from the public can provide valuable information

for the intelligence cycle. When threats are defined with specific information, communicating critical information to citizens may help prevent a

terrorist attack and, like community policing, will reduce fear.

■ Scientific Data Analysis

❏ Community policing — Crime analysis is a critical ingredient in the

COMPSTAT process.

❏ ILP — Intelligence analysis is the critical ingredient for threat 

management. 

■ Problem Solving

❏ Community policing — Problem solving is used to reconcile community

conditions that are precursors to crime and disorder.

❏ ILP — The same process is used for intelligence to reconcile factors

related to vulnerable targets and trafficking of illegal commodities.98

Several analysts stressed the importance of the community in the work of analysis: “If

you want to solve crimes, your connection with the community is invaluable.” Participant

Greg Saville takes this concept even further. He believes that unless the stakeholders of

the community are involved in the problem-solving process, it is doomed to failure

because it is irrelevant. Unless the people with the problems are involved in the process,

he is pessimistic that real change can occur. “Crime analysis is a tool to be used to do

something else; it can help build capacities in neighborhoods to prevent crime.” 

Community policing has been implemented in many law enforcement agencies in varying degrees, depending on the interpretation of the concept and available resources. As of

30 June 2000, 

■ Two-thirds of all local police departments and 62% of sheriffs' offices had full-time

sworn personnel engaged in community policing activities. 

98 Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Agencies, 41-42.
70

■ Local police departments had an estimated 102,598 full-time sworn personnel serving

as community policing officers or otherwise regularly engaged in community policing

activities, and sheriffs' offices had 16,545 full-time sworn so assigned. 99

PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

The concept of problem-oriented policing (POP) was articulated by Herman Goldstein in

his seminal Problem-Oriented Policing in 1990.100 It is a central strategy advocated by the

COPS Office.

Problem-oriented policing is an approach to policing in which discrete pieces of

police business (each consisting of a cluster of similar incidents, whether crime or

acts of disorder, that the police are expected to handle) are subject to microscopic

examination (drawing on the especially honed skills of crime analysts and the accumulated experience of operating field personnel) in hopes that what is freshly

learned about each problem will lead to discovering a new and more effective strategy for dealing with it. Problem-oriented policing places a high value on new

responses that are preventive in nature, that are not dependent on the use of the

criminal justice system, and that engage other public agencies, the community and

the private sector when their involvement has the potential for significantly contributing to the reduction of the problem. Problem-oriented policing carries a commitment to implementing the new strategy, rigorously evaluating its effectiveness, and,

subsequently, reporting the results in ways that will benefit other police agencies

and that will ultimately contribute to building a body of know-ledge that supports

the further professionalization of the police. 101

POP is a process residing within other processes. ILP and Community Policing both

stress its importance. It is well-documented through numerous case studies that exemplify

how to implement the process. 

99 See http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sandlle.htm.

100 Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990).

101 From the COPS Center for Problem Oriented Policing at URL http://www.popcenter.org/

about-whatisPOP.htm.
71

Some Comparisons between Problem-Oriented Policing 

and Community Policing Principles102 

Source: Michael S. Scott.

Principle Problem-Oriented Policing Community Policing

Primary emphasis Substantive social problems within 

police mandate

Engaging the community in the 

policing process

When police and community 

collaborate

Determined on a problem-byproblem basisAlways or nearly always 

encouraged, but less important 

than community collaboration 

Emphasis on problem analysis Highest priority given to thorough 

analysis

Preference for collaborative 

responses with community

Preference for responses Strong preference that 

alternatives to criminal law 

enforcement be explored

Emphasizes strong role for 

police

Role for police in organizing 

and mobilizing community

Advocated only if warranted within 

the context of the specific problem 

being addressed

Essential

Importance of geographic 

decentralization of police and 

continuity of officer assignment 

to community

Preferred, but not essential. 

Strongly encourages input from 

community while preserving 

ultimate decision-making authority 

for police

Emphasizes sharing decisionmaking authority with community

Degree to which police share 

decisionmaking authority with 

community

Emphasizes intellectual and 

analytical skills

Emphasizes interpersonal skills

Emphasis on officers' skills; 

view of the role or mandate 

of police

Encourages broad, but not 

unlimited role for police, stresses 

limited capacities of police and 

guards against creating unrealistic 

expectations of police

Encourages expansive role for 

police to achieve ambitious 

social objectives

102 Michael S. Scott, “Relating Problem-Oriented Policing to Other Movements in Police

Reform and Crime Prevention,” Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years

(USDOJ:COPS, 2000), 99. Available online at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=311.

“This monograph assesses the current state of problem-oriented policing, revisits the fundamental

principles of Herman Goldstein’s POP framework, and reports on the successes and distortions in

implementing POP over the last 20 years. It is an invaluable resource for those seeking to better

understand this fundamental element of policing.”
72

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESS: DOCUMENTED 

PROCESSES THAT WORK

The book, Become a Problem-Solving Crime Analyst in 55 Small Steps,

103 by Ron V.

Clarke and John Eck, both of whom participated in this project, leads readers through the

problem-solving process as experienced by working analysts. The emphasis is on problem solving, rather than just apprehending “the bad guys.” A U.S. version, Crime Analysis

for Problem Solvers in 60 Small Steps, funded by the COPS Office, is also available.104

The book emphasizes social science research skills to address crime problems.

Problem-Oriented Policing Guides105 at the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services are also available online. They cover interesting topics

that affect a wide swath of people in any community. 

■ Gun Violence among Serious Offenders

■ Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places

■ Identity Theft

■ Loud Car Stereos

■ Misuse and Abuse of 911

■ Panhandling

■ Prescription Fraud

■ Rave Parties

103Available online at http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/publications/manual/crime_manual_content.php.

104See http://www.popcenter.org/Library/Recommended Readings/60Steps.pdf. 

105 http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=248.
73

The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing 106 endorses the steps outlined in the following

chart. 

Source: Modified from D.B Cornish and R.V Clarke, “Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal Decisions: 

Reply to Wortley's Critique of Situational Crime Prevention,” in M. Smith and D.B. Cornish, eds., Theory for 

Situational Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 16. (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2003), 

90. See URL: http://www.popcenter.org/25techniques.htm.

25 Techniques for Problem-Oriented Policing

Increase efforts Increase risks Reduce rewards Reduce 

provocations

Remove excuses

1. Harden targets

Immobilizers in 

cars; Anti-robbery 

screens

6. Extend 

guardianship

Cocooning; 

Neighborhood 

watch

11. Conceal 

targets

Gender-neutral 

phone lists; Offstreet parking

16. Reduce 

frustration and 

stress Efficient 

queuing; Soothing 

lighting

21. Set rules

Rental 

agreements; Hotel 

registration

2. Control access 

to facilities Alleygating; Entry 

phones

7. Assist natural 

surveillance

Improved street 

lighting; 

Neighborhood 

watch hotlines

12. Remove 

targets

Removable car 

parts; Pre-paid 

public phone 

cards

17. Avoid 

disputes Fixed 

cab fares; Reduce 

crowding in bars

22. Post 

instructions

“No parking”;

“Private property”

3. Screen exits

Tickets needed; 

Electronic tags for 

libraries

8. Reduce 

Anonymity Taxidriver IDs; “How’s 

my driving?” signs

13. Identify 

property Property 

marking; Vehicle 

licensing

18.Reduce 

emotional 

arousal

Controls on violent 

porn; Prohibit 

pedophiles 

working with 

children

23. Alert 

conscience

Roadside speed 

display signs; 

“Shoplifting is 

stealing”

4. Deflect 

offenders Street 

closures; 

Separate toilets 

for women

9.Use place 

managers Train 

employees to 

prevent crime; 

Support whistleblowers

14. disrupt 

markets Check 

pawn brokers; 

License street 

vendors

19. Neutralize 

peer pressure

“Idiots drink and 

drive”; “It’s ok to 

say no”

24. Assist 

compliance

Litter bans; Public 

lavatories

5. Control tools/

weapons

Toughened beer 

glasses; Photos 

on credit cards

10.Strengthen 

formal 

surveillance

Speed cameras; 

Closed-circuit TV 

in town centers

15. Deny benefits

Ink merchandise 

tags; Graffiti 

cleaning

20. Discourage 

imitation

Rapid vandalism 

repair; V-chips in 

TVs

25. Control 

drugs/alcohol

Breathalyzers in 

bars; Alcohol-free 

events

106 The Center also offers innovative interactive learning modules such as this example: Interactive Learning Module: Street Prostitution at http://www.popcenter.org/learning.htm.
74

Problem Analysis Triangle

The Problem Analysis Triangle was derived from the routine activity approach to

explaining how and why crime occurs. This theory argues that when a crime occurs, three

things happen at the same time and in the same space:

■ a suitable target is available; 

■ there is the lack of a suitable guardian to prevent the crime from happening at that time

and place; 

■ a motivated offender is present.

As an example of how this paradigm generates tools and approaches in crime prevention,

the UK’s Home Office has a number of “Crime Reduction Toolkits” available

online.107The Introduction to the Toolkit “Using Intelligence and Information” follows.

The use of sound, quality information and intelligence processes are essential to

identifying and limiting the activities of those committing crime and disorder and

tackling the problems which adversely affect community safety and quality of life. 

Problem-Analysis Triangle

Source: Graphic and text modified from the Community-Oriented 

Policing Center for Problem-Oriented Policing at http://

www.popcenter.org/about-triangle.htm.

107http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/.
75

Information gathering and intelligence lies at the heart of business planning by taking

into account local and national government objectives, required levels of performance

and value-for-money principles. The core ingredient in successful business planning

is information and understanding on five key issues:

■ An accurate picture of the business; 

■ What is actually happening on the “ground”; 

■ The nature and extent of the problems;

■ The trends; 

■ Where the main threats lie. 

Confident and effective information exchange is the key to multi-agency cooperation. It

relies on good relations between partners, and on mutual trust. The effectiveness of information exchange arrangements is a reflection of the effectiveness of the partnership as a

whole. 

There are many good reasons for exchanging information: 

■ Combining information resources creates a more accurate picture of what

is going on in the local area.

■ Better problem analysis and sound decision-making flow from the possession of good intelligence and accurate data.

■ Key decisions on how to invest and allocate resources will be more effective and easily justified, if they are information-based.

■ A combination of sound intelligence and effective interventions targeting

crime and disorder in an area reduces victimization, removes fear and benefits all sectors of a community, except the criminal. 

The case for sharing information to achieve these objectives is indisputable. This toolkit

must be considered in conjunction with the other crime reduction toolkits before developing particular strategies and action plans. In the words of the UK’s Home Office:

This Toolkit covers two main areas: analytical techniques and products for effective

intelligence/information; and processes for effective information sharing. Work will

be carried out to improve the content and ensure focus on the needs of crime and

disorder reduction partnerships. The effectiveness of the toolkits relies on your

help. We very much welcome contributions and advice on how to improve the content and approach. We also particularly welcome examples of good local practice

which has been shown to work. 108

108See http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/ui01.htm.
76

THE GROWTH OF CRIME ANALYSIS BASED ON 

NEW PROCESSES

Noah Fritz, current president of the International Association of Crime Analysts,

describes how the growth of crime analysis is based on a number of factors, including

new processes.

The profession of crime analysis has grown exponentially over the past 15 years. One

of the most interesting questions regarding crime mapping and analysis remains: Why

has this current growth and interest in crime analysis occurred at this point in time? The

modern popularity of Crime Analysis can be largely explained by five primary reasons:

(1) cost and popularity of computers have dramatically dropped and increased, respectively, both in society and within law enforcement since 1990; (2) the conceptualization

of community and problem-oriented policing and subsequent publications by academicians has legitimized the role of research and analysis in policing; (3) the federal government has financially backed this initiative with personnel and technology grants; (4)

chiefs of police and sheriffs have embraced the concept and practice of community

policing, culminating in the success of COMPSTAT and ICAM (Information Collection for Automated Mapping) and the claims associated with this effort have pointed to

crime rate reductions within jurisdictions utilizing this new style of policing; finally, (5)

professional standards have been identified and established within law enforcement;

specifically, the Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies

(CALEA) has provided support of crime analysis. 109

The processes of Intelligence-Led Policing, COMPSTAT, Community Policing, and Problem-Oriented Policing have led to the growth of analysis and the movement toward developing a small but growing cadre of very skilled analysts in law enforcement at the local-level.

The impact of these processes on the state or federal levels of law enforcement is unclear.

The intelligence analysts at state and federal levels, along with a few local-level analysts,

cited the ILP process as very important even though it is in its early stages. Many of the

local law enforcement analysts cited the other processes as valuable, especially ProblemOriented Policing. Both ILP and POP place emphasis on and rely on analysis — it is central

to each approach.

The Limitations of the Processes

Despite the emergence of the processes explained in this chapter and the new recognition of the importance of analysis, the growth of professional intelligence analysis in law

enforcement is inadequate to meet the demands for analysis implicit in achieving widespread success with any of the policing approaches.

109 Noah Fritz, “The Growth of a Profession: A Research Means to a Public Safety End,”

Advanced Crime Mapping Topics, National Law Enforcement & Corrections Technology Center,

2002, 3. This list builds on ideas set forth in John E. Eck and David Weisburd, eds., Crime and

Place (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1995), and David Weisburd and Tom MeEwen, Crime

Mapping and Crime Prevention (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1997), Introduction.
77

Too often, law enforcement agencies and policymakers praise the new ways of doing

business yet do not provide the resources to engage in the processes, including resources

for analysis and analysts. Without a redirection of resources there will be no change. Law

enforcement systems themselves resist change, sometimes employing one of the processes in name only, and going on about business as usual. Individual analysts and officers do have some ability to implement the processes on their own, but unless the whole

organization changes its mental model of what law enforcement is and what it is supposed

to do — the philosophy of agencies themselves — the value of these processes is limited.

Their successful application requires a commitment to broad change.

Intelligence-led policing is in its very early stages. Obstacles to its implementation are

the same as obstacles to the integration of the many agencies involved in homeland security. The need for classification of materials, the need for trust and relationships, the need

for a common definition of “intelligence” — these are but a few of the things that stand in

the way of a system of law enforcement that bases its decisions and deployment of

resources on timely, accurate, relevant, analyzed information. 

COMPSTAT has its critics. It lacks a strategic focus in its admirable mission to deal

with immediate problems as swiftly as possible. Accountability for police managers is

both its strength and its weakness. Having measurable goals, being rewarded with recognition for success and being helped with one’s own professional area by receiving additional resources when needed are positive outcomes for those managers working in a

COMPSTAT model. Conversely, problems with morale are the result of employing

accountability meetings that humiliate individuals and instill excess fear and unreasonable blame.

Community Policing, at its best, empowers all stakeholders with information to address

crime and disorder problems. Ideally, the formal role of the intelligence analyst supplements analysis conducted by officers for and by other citizens. Analysis at this level is

successful even if an entire agency is not engaged since it depends most on individual initiative and situation-dependent measurements of success.

The implementation of problem-oriented policing is not as widespread as it could be.

Herman Goldstein, the author of Problem-Oriented Policing, lamented its slow growth in

his keynote speech at the International Association of Crime Analysts Conference in Seattle in 2005. The strategic thinking and analysis required to engage in true problem-oriented policing requires a shift in the core of traditional policing. Reflection on problems,

rather than immediate action, suspending assumptions in order to examine facts from new

perspectives, and the capacity to work on issues without obvious solutions over long periods of time — these qualities are needed to engage in problem-oriented policing. 

The Police Foundation’s “Problem Analysis in Policing” stresses the federal role in

funding publication of problem analysis activities, including both what works and what

does not:

If one is really committed to reforming police in this country, then acquiring and

synthesizing the type of knowledge we are seeking and disseminating it to police
78

departments are a high priority. Doing so would enable the police to act more intelligently with regard to specific problems. It would enable the police to be in a better

position to describe to the public what they can and cannot do. That would equip

both the police and the public to redefine the whole police operation in a way that

makes what now often seems impossible possible. Being able to act honestly and

intelligently, based on carefully developed knowledge, could help attract more people into the field that are challenged by the fact that this is a very complicated business; that policies and practices are based upon a broad body of knowledge and

information that drives decisions.110

There are signs of new ways of addressing the changes needed to facilitate system-wide

innovations in policing. The emergent position of “strategic manager” in law enforcement

can facilitate such changes.

Strategic management is a systems management approach that uses active leaders in

the organization to move change across organizational boundaries. A small team of

personnel is assembled to analyze operational functions, identify inefficiencies,

review systems integration, and detect gaps in management communications that

hinder performance. In identifying organizational barriers, whether they are operational or caused by human dynamics, strategic managers are able to recommend

strategies to the police executive to improve operations and quicken transitions,

while working with managers to soften human resistance to change. 

Although the police executive has the vision, the role of guiding the agency toward

organizational renewal and change is the responsibility of all managers. Major

transformation in an organization cannot rest with one individual but should be

guided by teams under the direction of strategic managers. Police executives should

scan their talent pools for command and support staff members who have the expertise, credibility, and competence to get the job done. Working with the chief executive and top managers, strategic managers assist in expediting change by educating,

training, and marketing the reasons for change to management staff to make the

vision a reality. 111

110 Herman Goldstein of The Police Foundation, “Problem Analysis in Policing,” 

COPS-USDOJ, 37 at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=847. 111 Kim Charrier, Strategic Manager, Phoenix Police Department, Arizona, in “Strategic Management in Policing: The Role of the Strategic Manager,” The Police Chief 71, no. 6 (June 2004) at

http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=

324&issue_id=62004.
79

Despite the imperfections and inadequacies in the processes mentioned in this chapter,

analysts and experts value the focus on analysis implicit in each process, and there is general consensus that these processes are valuable and will evolve.

Next

The advent of the personal computer and software advancements have made the intelligence analyst’s job more central to law enforcement. The following chapter explains how

information and technology combine to promote an analyst’s capabilities.

81

Chapter 6

WHAT WORKS: INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY112

Technology can't be the master — we should be the master. We utilize the technology to answer OUR questions. The technology should not replace what we do — it

should supplement, enable, and speed our work.

It is a lot better to do good analysis on incomplete data than bad analysis on complete data.

The janitorial work of crime analysis is cleaning up the data.

The integrity of your personnel and their reporting is a core value to keep; we must

have honest, sincere civil servants filling out reports to the best of their ability and

duty.

Telephones were technology that changed our work — the capacity for crime

reporting via 911 as well and a change in the types of crimes that occur, such as

telemarketing fraud and facilitating communications between criminals.113

It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist

facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.

— Arthur Conan Doyle

Technology allows analysts to do in hours many things that previously took weeks.

Armed with various software programs, the average analyst, with the right data and computer equipment, can map crimes, create an association chart, write a report and distribute

it to every member of the force, create a wanted bulletin, and contact a colleague across

the country, all in a matter of hours. 

Computers and Information Systems 

According to the U. S. Bureau of Justice statistics:

■ Twenty-eight percent of local police departments in 2000, and 33% of

sheriffs’ offices, used computers for inter-agency information sharing.

This includes three-quarters of all local departments serving 250,000 or

more residents, and more than half of all sheriffs' offices serving 100,000

or more residents.

112 A Resource Guide to Law Enforcement, Corrections, and Forensic Technologies, published by

the Office of Justice Programs and Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services in May 2001,

provides in-depth resource information. It is available online at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/

186822.pdf.

113 This and quotes above from interviews.
82

■ In 2000, 75% of local police officers and 61% of sheriffs' officers worked

for an agency that used in-field computers or terminals, compared to 30%

and 28% in 1990.

■ In 2000, 75% of local police departments and 80% of sheriffs' offices used

paper reports as the primary means to transmit criminal incident field data

to a central information system, down from 86% and 87% in 1997. During

the same time period, use of computer and data devices for this purpose

increased from 7% to 14% in local police departments and from 9% to

19% in sheriffs' offices.

■ The percentage of local police departments using computers for Internet

access increased from 24% in 1997 to 56% in 2000. Among sheriffs'

offices, 31% used computers for Internet access in 1997, increasing to

67% in 2000.114

Even with the progress since 2000, it is likely that interdepartmental information sharing

has not yet come to all local law enforcement agencies. Paper reports continue to be the

main mode of data collection in the field. Without basic equipment and technology at the

ground level of law enforcement, as well as the training to use the technology, how can

we expect law enforcement data to be analyzed in an efficient and timely manner?

The Role of Planning in Technology 

Effective planning for the integration of technology into policing, not only for crime mapping but for other analytical processes, requires insight into the information and intelligence

needs of law enforcement. What is important to know? What new things can we see with all

the data that was never possible to see before? Like designing a building, designing a technological infrastructure means that one must have a foundation to build upon, know the purpose of the building, and create an environment that supports the inhabitants’ needs. Often

technology is purchased and implemented without such foresight. 

Implementing and integrating mapping technology with standard departmental procedures is not a simple or automatic process. Just purchasing the necessary software

and computer equipment is not enough to ensure the implementation of a successful

mapping strategy in a department; there needs to be a push to successfully implement a GIS plan. This suggests the importance of technical assistance and training

in the development of successful mapping programs. Without such support and

assistance, local departments are not likely to be able to successfully integrate computer mapping into problem solving and community policing.115

114 http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sandlle.htm.

115The Police Foundation, Crime Mapping Laboratory, Integrating Community Policing and

Computer Mapping: Assessing Issues and Needs among COPS Office Grantees, February 2000. See

http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/CD9.pdf.
83

Rather than having purchased technology forcing an agency to adapt to its structure, the

technology should be designed to meet the needs of its users and be flexible to adapt as

needs change and as new needs are identified. 

Example of a Common Information and Technology Problem

Even though the NYPD is more advanced than most LE agencies in numerous ways,

information and technology obstacles common to too many other U.S. police departments

also linger at this key agency. The passage below describes the senseless situation of too

little accessible information on outdated technological tools experienced not only in New

York City, but also by many law enforcement entities in our country. 

Dispatchers — each responsible for patrols in at least two precincts — often possess

information that they're just too busy to share, information that could save a life; clues

about what lies ahead, such as the name of the person who called for help, a description of

an attacker, and whether guns or knives have been reported at the scene. Police officers in

other cities get all this information, and more, from in-car laptops tied to sophisticated

computerized dispatch systems. Police officers in New York, on the other hand, are thankful if their car has a terminal that can just spit out information about who owns a particular vehicle, and whether there are warrants outstanding on that person. 116

Because the media now often portray law enforcement agencies as being armed with a

multitude of high-tech tools providing them with instant information, policymakers are

not pressured by the public to fund what is needed: the comprehensive overhaul of a technically outdated police world.

Issues in the Development of Technology

The reality is that the criminal world is outdistancing the law enforcement world in its

adaptation to potentials of technology.

This trend has several aspects. (1) Law enforcement agencies are not able to afford

to keep pace with the rapid change in technology, thus always leaving it behind the

curve. Government agencies were built on the predicate that pieces of equipment

(computers and their corresponding software are considered equipment) last as long

as an employee. Computers are [inventoried like] desks, and until a realistic

approach regarding keeping up-to-date with the change in technology is taken, law

enforcement and its intelligence component will be inferior (technologically) to the

criminal organization. (2) Although the explosion in technology generally allows

the intelligence units to do their duties more efficiently and faster, there is a danger

in believing it replaces analytical thought, investigative intuition, or genuine hard

work.117 (3) This technology explosion will allow criminal organizations, since they

116Deborah Gage and John McCormick, “The Disconnected Cop,” Baseline Magazine (online),

10 September 2002, http://www.baselinemag.com/print_article2/0,2533,a=30779,00.asp.
84

are unrestricted by bureaucracy and funding, to outdistance law enforcement’s ability to investigate or unearth specifics about their criminal acts. (4) Computers, the

Internet, and public information sources all contribute to making the unsophisticated criminal more sophisticated.118

The Data Themselves

Data are the basis for all analysis. 

Data integrity is universally critical, because every part of the analytical process that

follows depends on the data on which it is based.119

Criminal and intelligence analysis are more likely to be effective when the information

(data) is available and when it is of the highest quality. Not only must data be accurate

and reliable, they also must be properly formatted. The well-worn saying “garbage-in,

garbage-out” does apply to law enforcement analysis. Many analysts interviewed

expressed a desire for better information in terms of improved collection, improved data

entry, and improved accessibility of data. Analysts who have information systems that

worked well were certainly the happiest in their role as analysts.

Crime and disorder data contain many errors. Much crime is not reported, so the

biggest data error is not having known about events that occurred. Other events are

not accurately described. One might not know about important characteristics of the

event — what it is, when it occurred, or where it happened. These errors can confound analysis and preclude effective action. And the confusion arising from errors

in crime and disorder data becomes compounded when we compare across jurisdictional borders. As important as data quality is for normal crime analysis work, it is

even more critical when examining data from different jurisdictions that may suffer

from different rates of error. Consequently, they require serious attention.120

Collection of information by police officers for analysis is in a dismal state, according to

a number of participants. Local-level policing, unlike investigations at state and federal

levels (where analysts may work several years on a case), is a high-volume business with

a high volume of data. Huge amounts of data are collected every day in large agencies.

117 If a person leaves his or her job and takes the computer home, the agency will file charges for

stealing the computer, all the while not realizing that the most valuable information is located in the

person’s head. 

118 Martin A. Ryan, “The Future Role of a State Intelligence Program,” in IALEIA Journal 12,

No. 1 (February 1999), 28.

119 IACA, Exploring Crime Analysis, 144.

120 John Eck, “Crossing the Borders of Crime: Factors Influencing the Utility and Practicality of

Interjurisdictional Crime Mapping,” Overcoming the Barriers: Crime Mapping in the 21st Century

(National Institute of Justice, Police Foundation, 2002), 8-9. See URL http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/barriers-eck-2002.pdf. 
85

Beyond collection problems, once the information is entered into computerized systems,

data problems often arise.

Examples of Data Problems121

These errors occur in many automated information systems and interfere in the analysis

process. Searching data with such mistakes is an analyst’s nightmare — it makes the work

so much more difficult because errors must be corrected before analysis can be done.

Temple University professor, former Australian detective, and participant in the present

study Jerry Ratcliffe, presents examples of these and other related problems and their

ramifications in a forthcoming journal article.122 The lack of trained data entry personnel

affects the quality and consistency of data. Lack of audit procedures and capacities contribute to data disasters; in Ratcliffe’s study, an officer who had done an internal audit

found a fifty percent error rate in data recording.123 Selective data entry can also be a

problem. Certain crime types may be recorded in greater detail, a factor that aids analytical efforts, while others may capture minimal information.124

Obviously, if we do not have audit practices in law enforcement agencies, we have little

idea of whether the information is correct, complete, and entered in a fashion that facilitates analysis. We often make inferences based on data that are incorrect, without the ability to ascertain their accuracy. Aggregate crime statistics reported on the national level are

affected by this problem. Auditing and audit standards are not universal.

Without quality crime data, we cannot measure changes in the criminal environment.125

Nor can we measure the effectiveness of police work. Thus, several analysts interviewed

for this study expressed a desire for better data. 

Empty Fields Aliases

Typographical Errors Malapropisms

Punctuation Generalizations

Abbreviation Invalid Entries

Omissions Extraneous Errors

121 Exploring Crime Analysis, 146.

122 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management: A New Zealand

Case Study,” forthcoming in Police Practice and Research, and available at http://www.jratcliffe.net/

conf/Ratcliffe%20(in%20press)%20NZ%20case%20study.pdf.

123 “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management.”

124 “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management.”

125 “The Effectiveness of Police Intelligence Management.”
86

Collection Priorities and Analysis 

Mark Lowenthal, an authoritative observer of intelligence practices observes that:

analysts should have a key role in helping determine collection priorities. Although

the United States has instituted a series of offices and programs to improve the relationship between analysts and the collection systems on which they are dependent,

the connection between the two has never been particularly strong or responsive.126

Similarly, analysts in local-level law enforcement are faced with a variety of discontinuities between collected data and their analysis of it. Traditionally, the data collected by

officers was filed in drawers and not easily searchable. Officers with good memories and

an interest in linking crimes could uncover patterns. Some series and patterns are obvious

without resort to examining computerized data. However, officers work different shifts

and it is next to impossible to have a global view of the incoming information in a large

agency unless data are digitized.

Unless police reports have drop-down boxes to force standardization of electronic data

entry, officers enter qualitative variables in their own language. Was “red” actually: burgundy, rust, or maroon? Data in reports also rely on the reporting accuracy of the person

filing the complaint and the time allotted to the officer to write up the details, as he may

get another urgent call for his attention. Some reports have detail; some do not, due to the

fluid nature of police work and gray standards in data collection.

This is a real problem affecting the ability to spot and assess a potential crime series.

There may be a serial rapist who rapes only once a month in various jurisdictions. Let’s

say that he always approaches victims in an elevator. Even if these data are shared across

jurisdictions, if the MO does not mention the elevator as significant, it may not be possible to see a serial rape pattern unless there is physical evidence to link the crimes.

Example of Success: Automation to Streamline Work

Automating traditional analytical tasks is effective in freeing analysts to do more relevant work than making standard statistical charts and graphs. In Washington State, Pierce

County Sheriff’s Department Crime Analyst John Gottschalk and other analysts on his

team had the technical skills needed to create an automated monthly COMPSTAT-type

Microsoft PowerPoint presentation (example on the next page). 

126Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003), 47.
87

Source: Courtesy of John Gottschalk.

Analysts need technical support to automate their work if they themselves do not have such

skills. An analytical team whose members have different strengths can exploit those differences to find the most effective methods to streamline work. Automation is technically possible in a number of analytical tasks that formerly required days to accomplish. 

Automation of routine work is not the cause of success; rather, it frees analysts to do

more exploring of data. Most crime analysts prefer to read crime reports and automation

helps them find those reports in a records system much more easily than in hard copy,

especially as they can be queried by a number of variables, such as crime type or locations. Another type of automation is the use of templates. The Police Foundations Crime

Mapping Laboratory offers “Crime Analysis and Mapping Product Templates” in an electronic version.127 Although such templates have limited utility in terms of originality and

creativity, they serve as a guide for standardizing products within an agency and within

the profession of law enforcement analysis.

127Available at http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/mapping_templates.html.
88

Examples of Success: Analysis Information to Officers in Their Cars

Bringing information down to the workspace of officers on the street is another form of

technology that works. Intranet web pages that allow officers to access analytical information from a crime analysis unit, mapping applications that allow officers to analyze

data in their cars, and the ability to send bulletins to officers on the street directly from the

analyst to the officers are examples of effective use of technology.

WHAT WORKS

Field Reporting

The ability to transmit data directly from the field to automated systems represents an

effective advancement in the field of data collection. Agencies that have officers reporting

from police car to computer systems help analysts obtain timely information and increase

the likelihood of their producing relevant analytical products. For example, officers who

have field contact with a suspicious person, and who enter the contact information into a

system, make it available for the analyst who is trying to find potential suspects for investigators of a crime series. 

Data Mining

We are getting better at exploring data through formulating questions but we are just

touching the tip of the iceberg. The concept of data mining is growing — and not only

Crime Analysis Unit Web Page Available in Police cars in Alexandria, VA.

Source: Courtesy of Mary Garrand, analyst with the Alexandria Department.

Note: Contact information removed by editor.
89

automated data mining.128 The analyst can become skilled at developing and implementing ad hoc queries. Knowing what kinds of questions to ask of the data tends to maximize

their utility and demonstrates the skills of an experienced analyst. 

Ad hoc queries based on the analyst’s familiarity with common problems specific to the

jurisdiction increase the efficacy of data mining. For example, certain types of commodities may be particular to an area, such as antique house fixtures which are stolen in parts

of the U.S. Northeast for resale to home builders in other parts of the country. Rapes by

unknown assailants are more likely to be serial in nature than those with known assailants, so a query based on the relationship of the victim to the offender can be valuable. A

certain type of gun may be queried for its relationship with a known cache of stolen guns

in order to see patterns of the weapons’ distribution. Information about elderly victims

might be queried if there has been a pattern of victimization related to traveling criminals

who prey on the elderly. Ad hoc queries on a particular phrase used by a suspect in a

crime, if captured in the crime report, may lead to identification of a series of crimes. The

wide possibilities for ad hoc querying stand to help investigations by developing leads and

exposing relationships in data that help achieve a more comprehensive understanding of a

crime problem.

Technology an Analyst “Can’t Live Without”

Mary Garrand, Crime Analyst Supervisor for the Alexandra PD, reports that crime analysts cannot live without the following technology:

■ Database software to track crimes and offenders

■ GIS (Geographic Information System) software

■ SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) or other statistical 

software

■ Excel

■ Word or other publishing software

■ The Internet

Ms. Garrand notes that existing technology on many desktops often has a number of

application extensions that users do not know about or do not know how to use. She adds

that the software in the list above provides all the basic tools to do the work of a crime

analyst.

Lois Higgins of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement provides the following software to attendees of the FDLE Analysts Academy:

■ RFFLow charting software (an inexpensive flow-charting software)

128 Interview subject Paul Wormeli of the IJIS (Integrated Justice Information Systems) Institute

recommends that every analyst learn OLAP (Online Analytic Processing) to facilitate data 

mining.
90

■ MapPoint mapping software (an inexpensive but limited mapping 

software — primarily valuable for pin mapping)

Law enforcement analysts also should have training in the use of mapping software,

spreadsheet software, desktop publishing software, statistical software, database software,

flow-charting software, and the Internet.

Access to Information

Often, access to information is assumed. Just because information exists does not mean

it is accessible to the people who need it. In one story, officers had to go to the newspaper

reporter they knew for access to commercial databases to find out more information on

suspects they were investigating because their agency did not pay for such services. Public sector workers often do not have the same access to data resources as private sector

workers. Subscriptions to these services remain costly, and often those in law enforcement who would benefit from them do not know the resources exist or cannot adequately

articulate their benefit to superiors when they have the opportunity to request tools. If

their agency has access to commercial databases, such as Lexis/Nexis or Choice Point, it

is often limited — only one person in an agency may be able to use it.

Analysts in many law enforcement agencies have trouble getting access to information

within their own departments, not to mention from outside of their agencies. Investigative

files that could improve the depth and quality of analyses are kept locked away. Data on

parolees, probationers, and even the roll of individuals arrested in their own jurisdictions

may be a challenge to obtain. Data on truant students, juveniles, court dispositions of

cases — and many other such data — may not be obtainable.

Analysts would like more and easier access to other types of government data. Land

use, property owner information, and licensing data are just a few examples of government data that could be used to help understand crime problems in a more comprehensive

fashion if correlated to crime data. If the local government owns the data, analysts ask,

why not share it in a purposeful manner to help provide better services to citizens?

Correlating various data sets can be used in ways limited only by the imagination of the

analyst. Sometimes the value can only be discovered through experimentation. For example, ortho-photographic overlays on pin maps may reveal that a serial pattern of arsons is

occurring primarily at the end of streets next to boarded-up buildings. (An ortho photograph has consistent scale throughout and can be used as an accurate overlay of a map.)

Such details may only be seen through ortho photography or by site visits to each crime

location. Similarly, a detailed analysis of property ownership may indicate that vacant

properties that are used as drug houses have the same owner.

Intimacy with Data

Knowledge of the data past and present in one’s agency is a key to success. Having a

deep understanding of the data and its evolution, a kind of corporate knowledge, is very

useful. This type of familiarity is necessary for an individual to note anomalies and see
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analogies. For example, a new analyst may study a month’s worth of robberies, create a

report indicating that there were ten truck drivers robbed, and not know that this is abnormal for the jurisdiction unless he or she is familiar with the “norm.” The same analyst in

that month may note one robbery of a fast food restaurant and not see that it is exactly like

a robbery that occurred a year ago, because he or she has no historical frame of reference.

Familiarity with norms and having knowledge of past instances helps one recognize the

unusual as well as the similar.

One expert said he likes to “smell the data — get on the ground level and see where it is

coming from.”

Next

The next chapter explores the concept of “analysis.”

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Chapter 7

WHAT WORKS: ANALYSIS

Investigating one individual responsible for 15 robberies is cheaper than 15 separate robbery investigations.

You have to be that nine or ten year old and ask a lot of questions.

Automation will make us obsolete unless we do analysis. 129

Most importantly, plan to spend the bulk of your time on the analysis phase, which

will give a much more detailed picture of the problem. Many times, a thorough

analysis will yield surprising findings about the underlying causes of the problem.

Often, preconceived ideas about appropriate responses will thus be changed or

even abandoned for better ones.

 — Chula Vista Police Department,

PERF Response/Assessment Survey, 1999:12 130

Strangely, each time we ask prevention practitioners, field researchers, or our students what analysis actually means we find a curious mix of answers. Some — the

more academic — believe analysis is a form of research on some theoretical question regarding the causes of, or response to, crime. Others — the more practical —

feel analysis is not a theoretical exercise in research but rather that it must solve a

specific problem. They echo a twisted version of a Star Trek refrain: “Dammit Jim,

I’m a problem-solver not a number cruncher!” Why then, we wondered, do so many

think these two views are mutually exclusive? 131

The individuals interviewed for this project stress that analysis that works is imperative,

but there was not a great deal of elaboration about what good analysis is nor how to do it. 

“Analyst” as Title and as Word: “Analysis” as a Limitation

Analysts and experts interviewed for this study did not stress the technique of analysis

in its classic definition — breaking things apart to study them — as the central activity of

their work. Technically, analysis is only a minor aspect of their work. Analysts supporting

a major investigation are actually doing the opposite — organizing and synthesizing snippets of information to form a larger picture. Analysts looking for serial crimes are identifying patterns in large data sets — linking information through analogy and spotting

anomalies.

129 Quotes from interviews.

130 Debra Cohen, Problem-Solving Partnerships: Including the Community for a Change

(USDOJ:COPS, June 2001), 4.

131 Greg Saville and Chuck Genre, draft manuscript Understanding Neighborhood Problems,

University of New Haven.
94

The Synthesis Behind Analysis.

Source: Chart courtesy of David Jimenez, U.S. Border Patrol analyst

Gary Klein studied naturalistic decisionmaking by chronicling the strengths useful in

making difficult decisions.132 His chapter on “The Power to See the Invisible” was

reflected in the accounts of several analysts who value their ability to “see what others do

not see.” This is an important strength, and Klein’s insights on this ability may be useful

in understanding the characteristics of this possibly crucial analytical capability. Among

132 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: The MIT

Press, 2001), 1.
95

the many things that experts, with their tacit knowledge, can see, but that are invisible to

everyone else:

■ Patterns that novices do not notice.

■ Anomalies — events that did not happen and other violations of 

expectancies.

■ The big picture (situational awareness).

■ The “way things work.”

■ Opportunities and improvisations.

■ Events that either already happened (the past) or are going to happen (the

future).

■ Differences that are too small for novices to detect.

■ Their own limitations.133

The Human Factor, Technology, and Artificial Intelligence

Although technology offers a gateway to analyzing enormous amounts of data in ways

previously unimaginable, many analysts emphasized the importance of human beings

who read reports and connect different sorts of data to uncover patterns and solve problems. The following passage explains why this observation remains valid.

[On] the question of whether expert system, neural net, or artificial intelligence

approaches would provide a better means of inferring patterns from such spatial

data. We doubt it; these approaches may be very useful when trying to look for patterns of, for example, a disease, where the essential aspects of the disease manifest

themselves in different cases in similar ways. This is not the case in crime analysis,

unfortunately, because each burglar may have a radically different modus operandi

(MO). Training a computer algorithm to recognize burglary patterns from the MOs

of burglars 1 through 99 will probably not be of much benefit in having it recognize

burglar 100. In other words, to a computer analyst a “pattern” is a condition to be

diagnosed (like jaundice) while to a burglary detective a “pattern” is not so much a

condition (like burglary) but an MO that relates to a specific offender. 134

Understanding aggregate crime problems, which may be uncovered by automated data

mining, leads to the development of new strategies to prevent specific types of crime, but

in order to identify a specific individual who is committing serial crimes, or a particular

crime, one must factor in many variables, including changing contexts. The robber who

only strikes in dry weather because he does not have a car, who says different words to his

victims but always in a polite tone of voice, who wears a bandana or a scarf or a muffler,

133 Klein, 148-149.

134 Marc Buslik, Chicago Police Department, and Michael D. Maltz, University of Illinois at

Chicago, Power to the People: Mapping and Information Sharing in the Chicago Police Department, n.d.,129, http://tigger.uic.edu/~modem/Pwr2Ppl.PDF. 
96

depending on one’s interpretation — these nuances require human perception to discern

possible significance.

Analysis Tasks: A Description from a Centre for Analysis

The Police Service of Northern Ireland offers a description of key analytical tasks found

useful for law enforcement analysts:

Traditionally key tasks for crime analysts have included examining information on

“hotspots” and identifying patterns that might indicate crimes are linked. Some

crime is seasonal or occurs at particular times of the day or week. By examining

information properly it is often possible to provide advice on how, and where, to

best deploy operational personnel.

“Live time” plotting of hotspot trends in the recovery of stolen vehicles, for example, allows police to immediately target areas where problems are most likely to

occur. Intelligence analysts help in tackling prolific criminals by drawing together

lots of information to identify networks and opportunities for police action. Police

analysts can also provide the detailed information necessary to support multiagency crime prevention/reduction initiatives — for example a detailed analysis of

all alcohol related assaults in a particular area can provide the essential catalyst to

concerted action by hospitals, health/education boards, licensed premises and others working with the police. 

Skilled analysts also play a role in assisting major crime investigations. Often they

are used to sift through large amounts of information. Charts and accompanying

reports — which depict visually “what happened” — are routinely produced in

murder and other serious cases. They can be very useful, particularly in complex

investigations, where statements need to be checked and corroborated. And they can

assist busy detectives to identify new lines of enquiry. In court they can provide

invaluable help to prosecution and defence council and ultimately to the judge and

members of the jury. 135

TYPES OF ANALYSIS

Law enforcement analysts are dependent on the vision of their agency, their access to

information, skills and training received, the objectives set for them and, in instances

where managers do not understand their role, on objectives set by the analysts themselves.

Law enforcement analysts engage in some or all of the following analytical tasks,

depending on the mission of their organization, their assignment, the availability of

resources, and their skill levels and the specific training they have received.

135See http://www.psni.police.uk/index/departments/analysis_centre/pg_why_analyse.htm.
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■ Frequency Analysis — the quantity of disorderly behavior and criminal

variables

Frequency analysis is the most common task of crime analysis. Counting crime, comparing counts, and analyzing crime trends are examples of frequency analysis. Besides

crimes, 911 calls for service may be counted, and frequencies of other variables such as

types of vehicles, color of suspects’ clothing, and the like may be recorded in order to find

patterns in data. Some agencies have software that allows users to set thresholds of crime

or calls so that, if the frequency exceeds the threshold, the analyst or officer is alerted to

direct attention to the specified area.

■ Spatial Analysis — the “where” of crime/disorder

Spatial analysis is another common task of crime analysis. Crime mapping, whether using

pin maps or sophisticated Geographic Information System (GIS) applications, aids in

crime analysis to identify patterns of location. Spatial analysis can include refinement to

specific locations in buildings, such as hallways, certain rooms, elevators, and parks if

data are collected to that level. Spatial analysis also includes examining the spatial relationships between variables, such as ATMs to robbery, vandalism to schools, etc. Innovators in spatial analysis have adopted ideas from other disciplines, such as animal

movement, to study the predatory behavior patterns that sometimes seem to apply to certain types of criminal behavior.

■ Temporal Analysis — the “when” of crime/disorder

Some crimes occur in distinct patterns of time. The more difficult challenge is to see patterns that occur over years even in the same jurisdiction. Humans, even analysts, tend to

think in short-term time frames. A rapist who strikes every other year is less likely to be

detected as a serial offender through traditional temporal analysis, compared to one who

strikes every month. Temporal analysis identifies patterns of crime/disorder by time of

day, day of week, time of month, time of year, season, special events (holidays, sporting

events) as well as the tempo of crime.

■ Modus Operandi Analysis — the “how” of crime/disorder

Modus operandi (M.O.) analyses is especially helpful in highlighting whether crimes are

related. Capturing MO data in standardized, digital format is a most difficult challenge.

Modus operandi analysis consists of analyzing the qualitative aspects of a crime or disorder incident or collection of incidents by examining the method used in committing the

offense. Data include approach method, phrases spoken, entry method, degree of force,

specific types of items taken, weapons used, and types of graffiti, which are then analyzed

to uncover relationships between specific crime and/or disorder events. Qualitative data

can be coded to aid the efficient exploitation of data. Within this analysis, in some

instances, the “why” of crime may also be inferred.

■ Suspect/Victim Analysis — the “who” of crime/disorder

Suspect description information is analyzed to identify crime series (crimes perpetrated

by same individual(s)) or trends (such as emerging gangs). Victim information is analyzed
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to uncover series (such as those targeting the elderly) and trends (such as an increase in

juvenile victims).

■ Property Analysis — the “what” of crime/disorder

Property taken in a crime can be analyzed to uncover trends or to link related crimes. For

example, pawn shop data can be analyzed to uncover criminal activity; types of stolen

vehicles can be studied to find which cars need theft prevention modifications.

■ Problem Analysis — the depth of crime/disorder

Problem analysis constitutes a multi-faceted approach to analyzing a crime or disorder

problem, and may require site visits and interviews with members of the community.

Crime analysts may also contribute to the study of individual problems such as automobile traffic, automobile accidents or domestic violence.

■ Demographic Analysis — the population and crime/disorder

Demographic analysis focuses on demographic variables and their possible influence on

crime and disorder in the community.

■ Market Analysis — the commerce of crime

Market analysis addresses recovered guns, stolen goods, and illegal narcotics activity, for

the purpose of uncovering markets and developing strategies to disrupt the markets.

■ Network/Association Analysis — the organization of crime

Network analysis discovers and displays the relationships in a criminal group and the

activities of specific criminals.

■ Communication Analysis — uncovering the relationships among suspects

Communication Analysis explores the relationships of suspect individuals/organizations

as exhibited through telephone/computer records.

■ Financial Analysis — transactions of suspect individuals/organizations

Financial analysis scrutinizes the records of suspect individuals and businesses (or other

entities) to uncover relationships and possible illegal activity.

APPLYING ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

Describing law enforcement analytical techniques in any depth is beyond the scope of

this book. Some of the resources cited in the book can assist readers who wish to explore

this topic in greater depth. To help in understanding how analysis is applied, general

examples of the application of analytical approaches follow, using the analysts’ story

types from Chapter Two and the processes from Chapter Five as a framework.

■ The Identification of a Crime Series Story: A crime analyst is the first one to notice an

existing pattern of crimes in which the same perpetrator(s) seems to be responsible —

a crime series — and the series does, in fact, exist.
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In this type of success, an analyst will note that more than one crime (frequency) has similarities in MO. MO is the most important variable in determining if a crime is part of a

series. How a crime is committed is the indicator of individual behavior, and because a

series involves the same individual or group of individuals, MO analysis is most important

in this scenario. Serial crimes often have a spatial relationship, and may be found through

analysis of crime hot spots, but they also may occur across large areas and may not be discovered through spatial analysis. The time (hour of occurrence) of a crime plays an important role in predictive analysis. Some (but not even most) serial criminals commit crimes in

very distinct patterns of time, increasing the likelihood of accurate predictions. Analysis of

suspect information, including a physical description, often is the key to discerning a series,

but witness descriptions of offenders are often poor. Victimology is also a key in linking

some serial crimes — this means analyzing similarities in victims. This approach may also

include the question of what type of business is targeted in property crime. 

■ The Pieces of Information Turning Into a Big Case Story: An intelligence analyst

gets boxes of information, sometimes CDs full of information, and sorts through all of

it (analyzes it) to uncover information that leads to an even bigger investigation.

In this type of success, the analyst compiles a picture of a problem using information on

associates of a suspect (which may be a person, a business, and/or a group of people),

possibly through communications such as correspondence, telephone records, email, as

well as through surveillance and informants’ reports. Financial analysis to find possibilities of money laundering or other illegal income indicators is conducted through analysis

of bank records, charge receipts, assets and liabilities information, and other relevant evidence. Market analysis of the flow of commodities (such as guns, drugs, legitimate or

counterfeit goods) may indicate relationships involving illegal activity. The analyst pulls

clues from available information to find the important leads and help direct the activities

of investigators in their search to find more puzzle pieces for the case.

■ The Prediction Leading to Arrest Story: A crime analyst makes a prediction regarding

the likely time and place a serial criminal will next offend and the offender is apprehended based on the analyst’s accurate prediction.

This type of analytical work is highly dependent on frequency, temporal and spatial

analysis. Although, for statistical accuracy, a number of crimes must have occurred to

make a prediction that meets scientific standards, analysts make predictions on fewer

crimes in their effort to prevent another crime. They do not wait for a crime to occur if

there is enough information to make an informed forecast. Analysts use temporal analysis

to predict the most likely time the next crime will occur. There is no standard formula to

do this — analysts are like artisans in their forecasting techniques — they use a variety of

approaches. The same principle applies to spatial analysis. The location on a map is part

of the forecasting, and this is enhanced if the analyst is very familiar with the territory and

potential targets. Using environmental survey techniques by going into the field to assess

the similarities of targets, or of places crimes have occurred, helps the analyst decide the

potential of a future target being hit.
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■ The Successful Investigation Leading to Prosecution Story: An intelligence analyst

supports an investigation through appropriate analysis and visualization of data, creating relevant reports and graphics; the analyst’s work is used in court to help successfully prosecute the targets of the investigation.

This type of success often involves network analysis, event flow analysis and timelines.

It involves ongoing organization of information for investigators. It may involve maps to

visualize criminal activity and/or the flow of commodities. The analyst works as part of a

team and helps during the investigation and through prosecution with documents appropriate for the courts.

■ Intelligence-Led Policing

The Intelligence-Led Policing model employs all types of analysis at every level of

policing. Implementation of this model has occurred chiefly in the United Kingdom and

has been proposed for the United States, but it is not yet applied in a systematic way in

this country.

■ COMPSTAT

COMPSTAT employs the technical products used by analysts, such as frequency charts,

crime mapping, and other types of statistical and graphical data, but by itself, it is not

analysis. It is primarily used as a management accountability tool. Too often, COMPSTAT is confused with crime analysis. The NYPD has a separate crime analysis section as

well as a COMPSTAT process in place. 

■ Community Policing

Community policing employs a number of analytical approaches. If there is a crime

trend identified through frequency analysis, citizens may be warned in order for them to

engage in crime prevention measures. In some jurisdictions, crime maps and statistical

data are available on the Internet so that community groups and individual citizens may

be fully informed of local crime problems. Addresses are usually rounded to the hundredblock number to protect citizen privacy in the tabular data. Community police officers

may work with citizens on chronic crime problems using analytical support to identify the

extent of the problem. Demographic analysis, analysis of land use and property owner

information, crime and 911 call data, environmental surveys, and interviews of stakeholders may be part of community policing analytical support.

■ Problem-Oriented Policing

Problem-oriented policing analysis depends on the nature of the problem selected for

study. Background analysis of area demographics, crime hot spots, the baseline of past

and current policing strategies, interviews with stakeholders, as well as frequency, spatial,

and temporal analysis are all important in this approach to analysis. It generally requires a

higher level of research skills and long-term, dedicated resources to carry out adequately

and effectively.
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VIGNETTES OF SUCCESSFUL CRIME ANALYSIS

The following examples of analysis “success” illustrate the application of a variety of

analytical techniques specific to crime analysis.

1. (From analyst Anne Gunther, Hampton, VA) The analyst took a Crime Line call regarding the identity of a subject who had committed a “robbery” of a commercial establishment. It was known that the robbery was actually a burglary (citizens often use the

incorrect terminology). There had been several with the same MO. The name was queried and it was learned that the subject had a girlfriend who lived in the vicinity of the

burglary locations, and he had previously committed the same type of act. The subject

rode a bicycle and the items stolen were easy-to-carry entertainment items. After the

bulletin was disseminated, the subject was field interviewed. He was arrested.136

2. (From analyst Doug Rain, Aurora, CO) Over a period of a few weeks, I identified what

appeared to be an emerging crime pattern involving car break-ins in apartment complexes. The pattern was occurring within a four-hour period on only Sunday and Monday

nights at apartment complex parking lots which backed up to greenbelt areas. I wrote a

pattern report, which included an action plan, and gave it to the patrol commander. The

commander took action by assigning a team of two uniformed officers to “stake out” the

parking lot, which I had projected to be the next target. On the first night out, the team

observed a young man climb over the privacy fence separating the apartment parking lot

from the adjacent greenbelt. The subject looked around, approached a parked vehicle and

pulled a screwdriver from his pocket. He then pried the driver side wing vent and stuck

his arm through the opening in order to unlock the door. While his arm was still inside

the victim’s vehicle, the officers came up behind him and arrested him. He nearly fainted

with surprise. After the arrest, the break-in pattern ended.... We were having a rash of

robberies at dry cleaner establishments. The suspect description was the same in each

one — he wore a Halloween mask. Additionally, the suspect seemed to be getting bolder

with each robbery. No solid pattern existed for day of week or geographic location but all

the robberies occurred within a one-hour period of the day. I did a projection (forecast) as

to where and when the next likely robberies would occur. The projection was based on

the suspect’s tendencies rather than a tight pattern. The SWAT team and robbery unit

supervisors were given the projection report. They took action by conducting surveillance on the two most likely dry cleaner locations identified in the report. The first day

produced no results. However, on the second day the SWAT team observed an individual

matching the general physical description of the suspect approach the cleaners at the projected time. Just as he reached for the door to enter, he pulled a Halloween mask from

under his coat, put it on and entered the business. From their surveillance point, the

SWAT team had the business covered in a matter of seconds. When the suspect exited the

136 Deborah Osborne and Susan Wernicke, Introduction to Crime Analysis: Basic Resources for

Criminal Justice Practice (Bingingham, NY: The Haworth Press, 2003), 108-109.
102

cleaners, he was arrested immediately outside on the sidewalk without incident. With his

arrest, the pattern ceased.137

3. (From Lt. Tom Evans, Pinellas County, FL) Our Robbery — Crimes Against Property

— Unit used analysis reports in several significant cases. One case involved a series of

regional armed robberies involving restaurants. In this case, the analysis aided in

obtaining complete confessions from the robbery suspects who previously denied

involvement in the crimes. In this case the detective invited the analyst to sit in the

debriefing interview after the suspect confessed. The analyst was able to refresh the

suspect’s memory on a number of cases. The second case involved armed robberies of

local pizza delivery shops. In this instance, the analyst produced a forecast of the day,

date, time, and location of the next robbery. I am pleased to say the detectives' surveillance of the business, based on the forecast, resulted in the suspect's arrest. In a third

case, an analysis of a residential burglary series suggested that the perpetrator was

using the public bus system for transportation. Based on the analyst’s suggestion,

detectives conducted a surveillance of bus stops in the forecast target area. Although

another lead led to the suspect’s arrest, during his confession to the crimes, he admitted to using the county bus system for transportation and on his last bus trips to commit a burglary he spotted detectives’ surveillance and got back on the bus. We have

many more like these...138

4. (From Brian Cummings, Richmond, VA) One Richmond Crime Analyst identified a

pattern of commercial robberies in the downtown area of the city of Richmond in

1996. The robberies started with one in January 1996, followed by one in February

and two in March and none in April. Between May 5th and May 7th, there was one

each day. The robberies continued to occur with greater frequency through the month

of May. The analyst had issued several reports during this time. The analyst identified

physical descriptions along with various MOs. The analyst also included information

obtained from a sergeant at Third Precinct concerning a possible suspect with a similar

physical description. One of the MOs that was identified was that one location was targeted only on the weekends (Friday-Sunday) on the evening/midnight shift. This

location was near a major hotel and conference center. The analyst noted that the robberies were in an area that would allow the suspect an easy get-away route and that

some of the locations had been targeted more than once. It was also noted that the

suspect would leave the scene in a northern direction. Investigation subsequent to the

capture of the suspect revealed that the suspect lived to the northwest of the Downtown area. The detectives used the information provided by the analyst to set up surveillance and an apprehension was made. The subject was arrested and was the same

individual about whom the Sergeant from Third Precinct had provided information

during the investigation.139

137 Osborne and Wernicke, 109.

138 Osborne and Wernicke, 111.

139 Osborne and Werncike, 111.
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5. (From Crime Analysis Manager Gerald Tallman, Overland Park, KS) Overland Park

was hit with a marked increase of residential burglaries through open garage doors.

These “Garage Shopping” incidents were primarily centered in the southern half of our

city. In a unified effort of Crime Analysis, Crime Mapping, Patrol, Investigations, and

COPPS (Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving), we were able to successfully educate our citizens to keep their garage doors closed and locked, and within

a short time frame, were able to almost eliminate these incidents. In a speech on crime

mapping and technology, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno publicly praised our use of

technology and cooperative policing efforts in combating this problem.140

The law enforcement analyst is generally expected to analyze data and information in a

variety of ways to support the following law enforcement activities:

WHAT WORKS

Crime Mapping

Federal funding to promote crime mapping in local law enforcement has resulted in a

broad spectrum of agencies having crime mapping capabilities.141 Sometimes agencies

confuse having a crime mapping capability with analyzing information. Simply producing maps becomes the analyst’s job, rather than interpreting the meaning of the information on the maps.

■ Management Decision Making

■ Patrol Deployment

■ Community Policing

■ Problem-Oriented Policing/Problem-Solving Policing

■ Intelligence-Led Policing

■ Allocation of Resources/Request for Resources

■ Investigations

■ Apprehension/Arrest

■ Prosecution

■ Grants

■ Crime Prevention

■ Problem Solving

■ Evaluation

140 Osborne and Wernicke, 111-112.

141 This type of federal funding may have exaggerated the role of mapping in analysis — agencies acquired the ability to map crime but not the knowledge of other types of analytical tools, skills,

and strategies. Funding to develop the profession (or vocation) of analysis itself, within law enforcement agencies, is not available.
104

It is easy to underestimate or overestimate the rate of change and the long-term

impact of technological changes in policing — including crime mapping. While

current and future advances promise to lend substantial support to law enforcement,

we should remember that technologies such as crime mapping are only tools and,

like other tools, their benefits to society depend on the humans who wield them.142

The author’s interview subjects described analysis using Geographic Information Systems as effective when used in conjunction with other types of analysis, including temporal and MO analysis. Many online resources exist to provide a broader understanding of

crime mapping issues in law enforcement. 

Online Resources for Crime Mapping

Source: Author.

Geographic Profiling 

Geographic profiling is a tool used by some analysts and is highlighted here because it

represents an analytical tool developed within a law enforcement context that may also be

adapted for use in Homeland Security at the national level.

These online resources will allow readers to investigate crime mapping more 

thoroughly: 

Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety (MAPS)

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/

The Police Foundation: Crime Mapping News

http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/library.html#news

Advanced Crime Mapping Topics 

http://www.nlectc.org/cmap/cmap_adv_topics_symposium.pdf 

Mapping Crime: Principles and Practice by Keith Harries

http://www.ncjrs.org/html/nij/mapping/pdf.html

Law Enforcement Agencies with Crime Mapping

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/related.html

Overcoming the Barriers: Crime Mapping in the 21st Century — an occasional

series on the human and technological barriers that police agencies face in the

implementation and integration of crime mapping

http://www.policefoundation.org/docs/library.html#barriers

142 Keith Harries, Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice (Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Crime Mapping Research Center, 1999), 168
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Geographic profiling is an investigative methodology that uses the locations of a

connected series of crimes to determine the most probable area of offender residence. It is generally applied in cases of serial murder, rape, arson, and robbery,

though it can be used in single crimes (auto theft, burglary, bombing) that involve

multiple scenes or other significant geographic characteristics.

The basis of geographic profiling is the link between geographic crime site information

and the known propensities of serial criminals in their selection of a target victim and

location. The system produces a map of the most probable location of the criminal’s

centre of activity, which in most cases is the offender’s residence. When linked with

additional information relating to the crime incidents, and with additional data sources,

such as motor vehicles databases and suspect databases, geographic profiling has been

proven to have a profound impact on the effectiveness of a police investigation.

Geographic profiling can be used as the basis for several investigative strategies,

including suspect and tip prioritization, address-based searches of police record

systems, patrol saturation and surveillance, neighbourhood canvasses and searches,

DNA screening prioritization, Department of Motor Vehicle searches, postal/zip

code prioritization and information request mail-outs. It is important to stress that

geographic profiling does not solve cases, but rather provides a method for managing the large volume of information typically generated in major crime investigations. It should be regarded as one of several tools available to detectives, and is

best employed in conjunction with other police methods. Geographic crime patterns

A geographic profile for the Abbotsford (British Columbia) 

Killer case 

Source: Courtesy of D. Kim Rossmo.
106

are clues that, when properly decoded, can be used to point in the direction of the

offender. 143

Geographic profiling is a relatively new analytical tool that is best used by analysts

trained in its methodology. Lorie Velarde, a crime analyst in Irvine, California (formerly

in Garden Grove), has successfully used this tool in a number of situations, including burglary investigations. Pinellas County, Florida Sheriff’s Department crime analysts also

use geographic profiling as part of their repertoire of analytic techniques.

Geographic profiling has potential applications to homeland security, according to its

originator, D. Kim Rossmo:

Geographic profiling has a significant role to play in Homeland Security. Currently,

a project by Texas State University with the U.S. Border Patrol is being completed

on the “Geographic Patterns and Profiling of Illegal Crossings of the Southern U.S.

Border,” using environmental criminology principles to determine those physical

and human geography factors associated with where the Texas/Mexico border is

most porous. The goal of this project is to help the Border Patrol identify previously

unknown areas where criminal border crossings may be occurring. 

Geographic profiling can also help focus investigative efforts on the planning operations of foreign terrorist cells within the United States, and on terrorist and insurgent activity directed against U.S. interests and coalition troops outside the United

States. Finally, geographic profiling likely has a role to play in forensic epidemiology, including certain methods of bioterrorism.144

143 From “What is geographic profiling?” (2001), at http://www.geographicprofiling.com/

geopro/index.html.

144 E-mail to the author from D. Kim Rossmo, 12 August 2005.
107

The SARA Model

The SARA model originates from problem-oriented policing’s focus on scanning, analysis, response, and assessment as described on the chart below. Several analysts interviewed

for this study emphasized the promise of building on this model of “what works” in law

enforcement analysis.

The Problem-Solving Process and Evaluation

Source: John E. Eck, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers,

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. Chart modified from URL: http://www.popcenter.org/Tools/toolassessing.htm.

Problem Analysis

Problem analysis, discussed further in Chapter Ten, requires studying a crime problem

in depth. Senior Public Safety Analyst Karin Schmerler, of the Chula Vista, California

Police Department, has worked extensively in this area. The two charts that follow illustrate a few of the concepts behind problem analysis. The motel chart shows that budget

motels, of all motels in Chula Vista, had disproportionate numbers of calls-for-service

compared to other motels. Subsequently, Schmerler has been engaged in an in-depth

study of the problem and, along with numerous other stakeholders, is working on strategies to reduce the cause of the problem at budget motels. The “top calls for service chart”

ASSESSMENT

Did the response occur as planned?

Did the problem decline?

What should be done next?

What is the problem?

RESPONSE

What should be done about the problem?

Who should do it, and how?

Is it being done?

ANALYSIS

How big is the problem?

Who is involved, and how?

Where is the problem, and why?

SCANNING

What is the problem?

Problem-Solving Stages

and Major Questions

Did the response occur as planned (process

evaluation)?

Did the problem decline?

If the problem declined, can alternative

explanations be ruled out?

How will accountability be determined?

How will problem reduction be measured?

How will displacement and diffusion be

measured?

How will alternative causes for reduction be

examined?

How big is the problem?

Who is involved, and how?

Where is the problem, and why?

How should the problem be measured?

Critical Evaluation Questions
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below shows that many calls for police service are not crime related and implies that

police resources might be more effectively used if those calls could be reduced in number

by developing strategies specific to the problems.

Crime Series Identification and Predictive Modeling

A number of analysts indicate that Crime Series Identification and Predictive Modeling

are valuable elements of their analytical work that should be carried forward to the future.

Bryan Hill, of the Glendale, AZ Police Department, has developed techniques toward this

end. He, like many other analysts, is adapting different methodologies to study and to

solve the kinds of problems he faces in his daily work.

Source: Both charts courtesy of Karin Schmerler, Chula Vista PD.
109

In my introductory stages of becoming a crime analyst, I was often confronted with

the fact that probability ellipses and Gottlieb’s rectangular probability areas were

too large for practical use in many instances. Detectives and officers in our department often endow crime analysts with the mythical powers of the soothsayer of old.

They are disappointed when you give them a 35-square mile area to patrol for the

“next hit” by a robbery suspect. This is more often the case when a specific store

type cannot be identified in the suspect’s targets. By combining the efforts of several data sources and experience of the investigators and the crime analyst, a probability grid can easily be developed that will narrow the focus of the investigation. It

can also assist the analyst in providing the investigating units a smaller group of

businesses to put on their intensive patrol and stake-out lists. This is nothing new to

geographers who often plan on where a new business would be built based on multiple layers of data being combined to come to the most logical location. In the

Probability Grid Method, we use several different statistical methods to predict the

next hit location, and do analysis within and between these layers to come to a final

product that provides the best opportunities for the offender’s next crime. 145

Finding suspects in possible serial crimes is aided by mapping offender data, such as the

next example, a map that shows incidents of violent crime in Knoxville, TN. In this case,

as often happens, a clear pattern does not immediately emerge. Layering different sorts of

data helps analysts examine possible relationships and the interpretation of such a map is

only limited by the data available and the analyst’s imagination.

145 E-mail to author from Bryan Hill, 12 August 2005.
110

Next

Training, education, and partnerships with academia are elements of “things that work”

for analysts and experts. Chapter Eight explores this subject.

Mapping Crime — Knoxville, TN

Source: Lt. Robert Hubbs, Knoxville, TN, Police Department.
111

Chapter 8

WHAT WORKS: TRAINING, EDUCATION, 

AND PARTNERSHIP WITH ACADEMIA

To those interviewed for this project, there is a distinct difference between training and

education. Training is for the working analyst and involves learning how to use the tools

and how to employ the techniques of the trade. It is vocational in nature. Training is frequently offered by private vendors, as well as by law enforcement associations and agencies. Education is a much broader class of learning, and several of the interview subjects

have found that education in realms beyond the field of crime and intelligence analysis

pays great dividends.

Training by Vendors

Anacapa Sciences, Inc., a company that innovated analytical training for law enforcement

in 1971, remains a source of concepts for analytical techniques in law enforcement.146 The

Alpha Group Center is another company that has trained a number of law enforcement analysts.147 Most law enforcement analysts had to rely on such private vendors148 for training

until recently. Now, with the growing recognition of the value of training for analysts, and

the increasing number of analysts, a variety of programs has been developed. 

Training by Associations

Both IALEIA and the IACA offer on-site training at their periodic conferences. IALEIA

has contributed significantly to the development of the Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT) course. FIAT training provided by IALEIA149 is analyst-instructed —

many professionals hold that analysts should train analysts. “FIAT training was developed

by a consortium of IALEIA, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Directors, the

Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) and the National White Collar Crime Center

(NWC3).”150 The IACA has published Exploring Crime Analysis,

151 a textbook authored

by analysts and academics. Chapters cover the twenty skill sets identified by IACA membership as essential to effective crime analysis. 

146 See http://www.anacapasciences.com/company/overview.html.

147See http://www.alphagroupcenter.com/About_AGC.html.

148 Information on scheduled training can be found at www.ialeia.org and www.iaca.net. 

149 Further information on IALEIA FIAT training information can be found at 

http://www.ialeia.org/training.html.

150 See http://www.ialeia.org/protocol.html.

151 Exploring Crime Analysis: Readings on Essential Skills (North Charleston, South Carolina:

Booksurge, LLC, 2004). URL http://www.iaca.net/ExploringCA.asp.
112

WHAT WORKS

FLEAA

The Florida Law Enforcement Analyst Academy (FLEAA) is the first of its kind. The

Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) recognized the critical need for analyst

training at the local level of law enforcement and invested Homeland Security funds into

its creation and continuation. As of June 2005, four classes have graduated ninety-seven

analysts from over fifty municipalities, sheriff’s offices and state agencies.

The new war on terrorism has placed a premium on a higher level of analysis,

with the primary function of predicting and preventing criminal activity. Funded

through the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to advance the capabilities of law enforcement agencies throughout the state, FLEAA is a highly specialized training program for crime intelligence analysts assigned to anti-terror

investigations. Available to the entire Florida law enforcement community,

FLEAA is a standardized advanced training curriculum in intelligence analysis,

data management, and crime pattern analysis.152

FDLE offers a definition of “law enforcement analyst”:

“Law Enforcement Analyst” means any person who is employed or contracted by

any municipality or the state or any political subdivision thereof; whose primary

responsibility is to collect, analyze and disseminate data to support, enhance, and

direct law enforcement missions. Their efforts are directed at identifying criminal

subjects, organizations, activities, events and/or forecasting future crime occurrences utilizing analytical techniques. This definition includes all law enforcement

analysts who provide strategic, operational, investigative, intelligence and crime

analysis.153

FLEEA has improved the capabilities of law enforcement analysts and other emergency

responders to develop and use information and intelligence to prevent crime and conduct

complex investigations. The establishment of this academy also puts in place a career path

in investigations for non-sworn law enforcement personnel. “The curriculum for the academy covers a wide range of topics inclusive of the many analyst functions in the law

enforcement agencies, including crime analysis, intelligence analysis, investigative analysis, and management/statistical analysis.”154

Strategic Assessment: An Example from an Analyst Academy Graduate

The Analyst Academy requires analysts to complete a strategic assessment as a condition of graduation. The analyst and decisionmaker in a given agency determine the subject

152 See http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/20050615_FDLE_FLEAA_graduates.pdf.

153 Courtesy of Lois Higgins, program administrator.

154 From MS PowerPoint slides provided by Lois Higgins.
113

of the strategic assessment. A real need is identified and addressed through the assessment, and, in this way, the command staff of the respective agency is introduced to the

concept of using analysts to understand problems in greater depth as well as to identify

solutions or other types of recommendations. An example:

The purpose of this assessment was to review several pieces of data to determine if

there is any correlation between the “cycles” associated with heroin abuse and the

number of burglaries committed. The goal is to explore the possibility of developing strategies that will reduce the number of burglaries committed in the City of

Kissimmee by focusing on the heroin abuser. 

Peak times in which burglaries are being committed citywide as well as those in and

around documented “open air drug markets” were analyzed. Information from narcotics investigators in relation to heroin abuse was also analyzed. Drug and burglary

arrests data, peak times for narcotics related calls, and geographic information with

respect to where known heroin abusers are living was collected and analyzed. 

The results of this assessment will be a better understanding of the burglary problem in the City of Kissimmee, heroin abuse, and the possible connection between

the two.155

Few analysts in local law enforcement work in the capacity of investigative support. Analysts at this organizational level have traditionally focused on administrative reporting and

tactical support. The training provided in Florida will help standardize the work of analysts

across that state’s agencies, enabling specialists in various areas to speak the same language

when they think of the word “analyst.” The FDLE does recognize the transcendent value

that professional analysts can bring to cognate fields of law enforcement.

The value of competent and professional law enforcement analysts in support of

investigations continues to become even more evident. The anticipated impact of

intelligence-certified analysts is enhanced investigative outcomes and professionalism in this critical investigative support position. 156

155Strategic assessment overview provided by Crime Analyst Metre L. Lewis, Kissimmee Police

Department.

156See URL http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/20050615_FDLE_FLEAA_graduates.pdf.
114

Source: Lois Higgins, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, FLEAA.

The Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat

The Counterdrug Intelligence Secretariat of the Office of National Drug Control Policy

published a Basic Training Curriculum for Law Enforcement Analysts in March 2003. It

is not widely available; however; it was used in the development of the FDLEAA. One of

the attention-getting assertions by the Secretariat:

Analysts’ Job Focus: Professionalizing the intelligence analytic cadre at Federal

law enforcement agencies ... requires that intelligence analysts will no longer perform data-entry tasks and other nonanalytic-related tasks such as technical or

graphics support, but rather focus on the job for which they were hired — research

and analysis.157

 The International Association of Law Enforcement Analysts and other state,

regional and federal law-enforcement agency representatives did have input into

developing this training curriculum. Since the FLEAA addresses all law enforcement

157See http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/gcip/sectione.html, 2002, 

paragraph E-19.
115

enterprises in Florida, and many academy graduates function as municipal crime analysts, the adapted curriculum had to include their training needs as well as those proposed by the Counterdrug Intelligence Secretariat for this curriculum. Ms. Higgins

emphasized to the author the direct linkage that appears to exist between the analytical techniques that were adopted into this curriculum and the prospects for receiving

approval for funding. As a state-level analyst, she recognizes the value of the curriculum, but she also contends that the mission of local-level law enforcement requires an

emphasis on different methods of analysis.

A Model for Training: Police Service of Northern Ireland’s Analysis 

Centre

 Reforms in policing in Northern Ireland have led to the development of one of the most

progressive analytical capacities existing in law enforcement today.

The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland was set up as part of

the Agreement reached in Belfast on 10 April 1998. The task of the Commission

was to provide “a new beginning to policing” in Northern Ireland. In its report published in 1999 [commonly referred to as the Patten Report], the Commission made

175 recommendations about policing in Northern Ireland. Amongst the recommendations were proposals regarding the composition, size and structure of the Police

Service. It also recommended the creation of new accountability structures, and

said that Human Rights and community policing should underline all of the work

carried out by the Police Service.158

The PSNI has developed a comprehensive training program for law enforcement analysts in an Analysis Centre. With the advent of Northern Ireland’s policing reforms late in

the 1990s, funding and political will grew sufficient to restructure the business of policing

with a focus on the intelligent use of analytical support. Created in December 1999 by the

Chief Constables Policy Group, the Analysis Centre strives to be “a Centre of Excellence

in the professional development and delivery of analytical services and products. Police

analysts in Northern Ireland work to national standards.” 159

The PSNI was involved with representatives from European Union Member states

experienced in the fields of intelligence and analysis in the production of a booklet

entitled Intelligence Management Model for Europe (phase 1) — Guidelines and

standards and best practice within the analysis function.160

Mark Evans, Director of the Centre, indicates that in late 2005, details about the “Analysis

Centre Model” will be incorporated into one or more reference manuals. 161

158See http://www.psni.police.uk/index/about_psni.htm.

159See http://www.psni.police.uk/index/departments/analysis_centre.htm.

160See http://www.psni.police.uk/index/departments/analysis_centre/

pg_intelligence_management_model.htm.

161E-mail from Mark Evans to author, 24 July 2005.
116

Analysts from the PSNI have come to North America “to exchange best practices ideas

and techniques.”162 Participant Lt. Robert Hubbs of the Knoxville Police Department

reports that hosting a PSNI analyst was one of the high points in his work as an officer.

More detailed information regarding the PSNI Analysis Centre may be found at http://

www.psni.police.uk/index/departments/analysis_centre.htm. This Center, in the view of

the present author, is the most effective example now available for developing the analytical capacity of local law enforcement and integrating it with other levels of law enforcement, government, and the community. 

Analysts’ Training in the U.S. National Intelligence Community (IC)

Training for analysts remains a contentious issue in the IC.

Until very recently, the intelligence community did not spend a significant amount

of time on analyst training. This training is most useful in giving in-coming analysts

a sense of how the larger community works, what is expected of them, and the ethos

and rules of the community. No amount of training, however, can obviate the fact

that much of what an analyst learns comes through on-the-job training.163

Yet, in many law enforcement agencies, there is no one even to provide on-the-job training for analysts. They depend instead on outside resources to learn their work — a situation that has distinct limitations. 

Education

Some new academic programs focus on crime and intelligence analysis, but they are

slow to develop, when we consider how important analysis is to the intelligence process.

This observation suggests that validation is lacking for the concept. If there are few texts

and little university study of an otherwise important concept, then for important sectors in

our society, the concept has little basis in “reality.”

Several subjects interviewed for the present study are teaching college courses on crime

and/or intelligence analysis. The Research and Intelligence Analyst Program (RIAP) at

Mercyhurst College focuses on teaching analytical skills for federal and national levels of

government, as well as on business intelligence. Tiffin University is offering an online

Master’s program with a concentration in crime analysis. The California Department of

Justice sponsors a credentialing program in four California universities that is focused on

law enforcement crime and intelligence analysis; all students who successfully complete

the credential program become “Certified Crime Analysts.” 164

162 See URL http://www.psni.police.uk/index/departments/analysis_centre/

pg_international_analyst_exchange_programme.htm.

163Lowenthal, Intelligence, 90.

164 California State University, Fullerton; California State University, Northridge; California

State University, Sacramento; and the University of California, Riverside are the California universities offering this program of study, which is also affiliated with the Alpha Group Center. See http://

www.alphagroupcenter.com/Certification_Info.html. 
117

Still, in exchanges with the author, experts most often suggested that a broad education

in the social sciences and the humanities, with an emphasis on research, is preferred for

budding law enforcement intelligence analysts. A broadly educated and strongly motivated individual with an ability to learn is more likely to be a good analyst than someone

who does not have these intrinsic traits.

Law Enforcement Partnerships with Academia

Many of the participants in this study have worked with academic professionals. Some

are themselves academics who have been influential in shaping the face of policing today.

Several started as police officers who went on to be significant contributors to innovation

in law enforcement analysis through their grounded research.

From conversations with the experts, the author found that academics tend to partner

more frequently with local law enforcement officials in active, practical research than

with other levels of law enforcement. This observation may not withstand more systematic inquiry into the phenomenon, but it seems that large-scale, regional or interstate

investigations are usually so restricted to those with the “need to know” that they would

not be open to having “outside” eyes and ears examining potential areas of improvement

and innovation.

A spotlight can also be shone on other challenges to potential partnerships between law

enforcement officials and academics in the conduct of applied research:

The reality of law enforcement agencies and research departments is that their institutional cultures and requirements may, and do, lead them towards different

research agendas. Law enforcement agencies are typically interested in research

focused on local, daily policing practices. They must pursue research that responds

to external political realities. This need to address political pressures similarly dictates that law enforcement agencies require qualitative as well as quantitative

research in relatively compressed time frames. Law enforcement leaders work in a

world where public opinion matters and must be understood and addressed.

The interests of university-based research departments tend to [diverge] systematically from those of law enforcement agencies, and researchers shape their desired

research agendas accordingly. Frequently, faculty in pursuit of tenure or students in

pursuit of faculty positions value research that addresses national concerns [and]

that may ultimately change the face of policing, but [such] broad-brush efforts ...

are of only limited interest to local law enforcement agencies. Similarly, researchers

may not view the political pressures that influence police chiefs as being as important as those political pressures that shape the interests of university departments.

They may also value quantitative research over qualitative research.

While institutional priorities differ, and may frequently result in different research

priorities, the importance of research results dictates that neither law enforcement

agencies nor research departments can afford to allow such differences to hinder the

establishment of research partnerships. While a basic familiarity with each other’s
118

institutional priorities will always be important, a specific awareness of each other’s

research interests is vital to the establishment of productive partnerships.165

This IACP report goes on to encourage greater mutual understanding between the participants in research partnerships:

Law enforcement agencies and research departments should recognize that the best

research will be characterized both by its relevance to policing practices and its theoretical sophistication. Research departments, in particular, should work to validate

action research vital to improving policing practices.166

A number of analysts in law enforcement are “real” researchers. However, the IACP

report does not recognize the potential benefit of networking analysts with outside

researchers to develop more relevant knowledge and tools. This linkage is very common

in other fields, and is a valuable strategy. Analysts tend to be better educated than many of

their agency counterparts. “I am a blue-collar academic demonstrating the utility of theory, techniques, and statistics,” claims one analyst. They understand the needs of their

agencies and the needs of academics. They can and do, in fact, “translate” and facilitate

between the two camps.

The dichotomy between the roles of analyst and academic is, nonetheless, an artificial

one. We need academics to be employed and integrated into law enforcement to develop a

cadre of knowledge workers. The paradigm of having outside experts who allegedly

“know better” can be changed by changing hiring practices within law enforcement, as a

means of championing the professionalization of this applied field. 

An Example of Partnership with Academia: Operation CEASE 

FIRE 

On 31 March and 1 April 2005, the author attended an Operation CEASE FIRE conference in Rochester, New York. Subsequently, Chris Delaney, a research student affiliated

with the Rochester Institute of Technology, who worked in Rochester on its CEASE FIRE

intervention, was interviewed for this project. The operation involves gathering a great

deal of intelligence about violent gang and street criminal groups. A target group is identified and all its known members fully prosecuted after a violent incident, usually a homicide. They, in turn, are used as an example for other gangs, or for those already serving

time in the criminal justice system, or on parole or probation. The gang/group members

are warned that if there is another homicide and the police have identified who was

165National Institute of Justice (NIJ)/International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Unresolved Problems and Powerful Potentials: Improving Partnerships Between Law Enforcement Leaders and University Based Researchers: Recommendations from the IACP 2003 Roundtable, August

2004, 14-15. Read the full report at http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/LawEnforcement%2DUniversityPartnership%2Epdf.

166Unresolved Problems and Powerful Potentials, 16.
119

involved, they and every member of their group will be targeted for full enforcement/

prosecution. 

The Boston Strategy to Reduce Youth Violence,167of which Operation CEASE FIRE

was a main component, involved the collaboration of many stakeholders. Within the strategy, academia played a role in intelligence gathering and analysis in a way seldom seen.

This strategy proved effective in Boston. David Kennedy, the Harvard researcher (now at

John Jay College in New York) presently is at work in New York State to implement this

strategy with multiple law enforcement agencies. The collection of intelligence from

street-level officers drives the strategy employed in these operations. Academics help

organize the gathering, collection, and updating of intelligence, including the production

of gang territory maps, as described here:

We looked at the criminal histories of five years of youth victims and offenders and

found very high rates of prior arrests and court involvement. We looked at where

gangs identified turf. We built gang maps and network maps of gang relationships

based on the professional knowledge of practitioners. This was not available from

old documents and paper records, but when you put these very skilled, experienced

front-line folks around a table and a flip chart and got systematic about what they

knew, they knew all this. And we ended up digitizing these maps and playing all

kinds of fancy games with them, but it was all built on what they knew and the work

they had done.168

167 Read details about this program at http://www.bostonstrategy.com/programs/

11_OpCeaseFire.html.

168 David Kennedy at http://www.bostonstrategy.com/players/04_academia/01_academia.html.
120

The chart above demonstrates the effectiveness of the strategy in Rochester. Partnerships with academia can result in real-world progress and are valuable to the professional

education and experience of many analysts.

Next

The nature of each particular organization itself plays an important role in the success of

a law enforcement analyst. Institutional policing practices also impact on success, or lack

of success. The following chapter explores what works in law enforcement organizations

and institutions from the analyst’s perspective.

Effect of operation cease fire in Rochester, NY

Source: Chris Delaney, Rochester, New York Police Department.
121

Chapter 9

AN ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VIEW 

OF WHAT WORKS

Agencies have to empower analysts to be analysts.169

Analysts are often those who develop a lead, identify a connection between affiliates, or

determine the location of a suspect. The role of analysis in a law enforcement agency is to

support the investigative, intelligence, and planning activities of the agency. 170

We wander around until someone calls us for help. 171

Tradition versus Progress

Limited resources and fragmentation of services impair the movement of law enforcement from reactive modes to proactive modes. For law enforcement analysis to “work,” to

help law enforcement be proactive in using information, law enforcement agencies must

understand the role of the analysts and their work must be valued.

The nation’s police departments, the majority of which have fewer than 50 sworn

officers, continue traditional operations despite a rapidly changing social and scientific landscape. Working in small communities with limited and overlapping jurisdictions and dependent upon austere local budgets, most police departments

struggle to provide even the most basic traditional investigative and uniformedresponse services. Computer technology for a large percentage of the nation’s

smaller police departments is extremely limited. 172

Analysts have no clear sense of what products are useful to the target [consumer].

They produce, deliver, and through anecdotal evidence draw conclusions about the

value of their work. Neither the analysts nor the analysts’ managers are clear about

how and how well the targets use their products. Individual quantitative and qualitative measures cannot be established until managers know what products crime analysis units should be producing. This must come from a systematic assessment of

crime analysis output. 173

Interview subjects expressed widespread frustration over organizational and developmental obstacles to the application of crime and intelligence analysis in law enforcement.

One of their fondest wishes for the future is that law enforcement managers understand

169 Quote from interview.

170 FDLE press release. URL http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents 20050615_FDLE_FLEAA_

graduates.pdf.

171Quote from interview.

172 Cowper and Buerger, 10.

173O’Shea, Crime Analysis in America, 16.
122

the role of information analysis, its value, and its limitations. Some analysts believe it is

necessary for them to rise through the ranks and become supervisors and policymakers in

order to change the status quo and increase analytical effectiveness.

Crime Patterns and Organizational Responses

Perhaps the most important foundation for success in law enforcement intelligence

analysis, as seen by the subjects involved in this study, is embodied by an organization

that acts on analytical information, especially in relation to crime pattern identification

and predictive crime series reports. More than one analyst reported making accurate predictions regarding when and where a crime will occur, but resources and/or organizational

responses were not provided to stop the crime and/or apprehend the criminal. In the

author’s experience as well, organizations that are structured to act on various sorts of

information — to respond and problem-solve — are the sine qua non of analytical success. In British terms:

Incidents may be patterned in numerous ways, giving clues to potential problemsolving interventions at levels below the individual incident. There is now ample

evidence that incidents are good predictors of future incidents, especially in the

short term. This provides a focus for problem-solving at the level of service delivery. Incidents are also patterned at wider levels, providing further opportunities for

problem-solving. They can be patterned by time (of day, day of the week, time of

year, time of moving house etc); by place (nearness to junction, street, street side,

part of town etc); by victim attribute (sex, age, ethnicity, organisation type, income,

type of residence, household type, security levels etc); by modus operandi (victim

route to offence, escape from offence, mode of and direction of entry, type of attack,

goods stolen, means of disposal etc); or by offender attribute (education, sex, age,

co-offending practices, network of associates, form of organisation, lifestyle, drug

and alcohol taking habits etc). They can also, of course, be patterned by mixes of

these sorts of attributes. Different crimes will show different patterns in different

places. Informed and imaginative analysts, supplied with good data from a range of

sources, will be needed to tease out patterns identifying problem-solving needs and

opportunities. Preventive problem-solving opportunities emerge from identifying,

analysing, and anticipating patterns. Differing levels and types of organisation can

problem-solve at differing levels.174

174 Tim Read and Nick Tilley, Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime Reduction.

Crime Reduction Research Series Paper 6 (London, Home Office: Policing and Reducing Crime

Unit Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2000), 3-398. At URL http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/crrs06.pdf.
123

WHAT WORKS

Leadership 

Supportive, responsive, and understanding leadership are necessary for analysts to be

most effective. The leadership of an organization determines its priorities. To become

intelligence-led, a law enforcement agency’s leadership must be dedicated to analysis

not only in word, but in action — this means adequate resources for analysis, including

ongoing training for staff and relevant and effective responses to analytical output.

Together, dedicated leadership and analyst professionalism make an organization able to

live up to the ideal described here:

There is nothing more important to an individual committed to his or her personal

growth than a supportive environment. An organization committed to personal mastery can provide that environment by continually encouraging personal vision, commitment to the truth, and a willingness to face honestly the gaps between the two.175

A Leadership Example from Lincoln, Nebraska

Chief Tom Casady of the Lincoln, Nebraska PD empowers his officers to do analytical work

and find the information they need by providing IT systems that are easy to navigate, and training officers in their efficient use. Chief Casady goes a step beyond this by testing officers for

analytical skills as a requirement for promotion. Twenty percent of the areas tested for promotion involve analytical skills. Examples of test questions are in the text boxes below.

175Senge, 173.
124

Lincoln, Nebraska Police Department: Example of Promotion Test

Information Retrieval Exercises:

There are seven exercises, some with multiple questions. You must work independently and without assistance from others. You may use the Alpha terminal and PC

at your workstation. Write your responses in the space provided. If you wish, you

may print any material and attach it as part of your response.

You have a total of 30 minutes.

Exercise 1

A caller is displeased with the police response to repeated disturbance complaints at

what he asserts is a “party house” at 3243 N. 49th. 

■ How many complaints of this type have we handled in the previous 12 months?

■ Who has been complaining?

■ Who owns the property?

■ Who has been cited, for what, and what has been the outcome of any citations? 

Exercise 2

List the names and addresses of the Juvenile Drug Court defendants who reside on

the Southwest Team area.

Exercise 3

List the date, case number, and violation type for each of the tavern violations

reported at The Downtown during the previous 12 months.

Exercise 4

This morning, a purse snatch occurred in which the victim was attacked just south of

the Capitol while walking to work around 0700 hours. Two citizens chased down the

suspect, and an arrest has been made. This case sounds vaguely familiar to you, and

you recall another purse snatching in the area directly south of the downtown area

within the past few weeks. It stood out in your mind because of the early hour. Find

the case number of that case. What is the description of the suspect in that case?

Exercise 5

The president of the Forecaster Elementary School PTA has asked you to attend their

meeting tonight. He wants you to provide him with some information about police

calls or incidents in the general area of the school so far this month. You are unable to

attend due to a prior commitment, but intend to send your second shift sergeant.

Provide a synopsis of this activity for your sergeant to take along. 
125

Source: Courtesy of Chief Tom Casady, Lincoln, Nebraska Police Department.

All employees at all levels are empowered to use information in his organization. He

has removed the proprietary nature of intelligence information to make it more available

rather than less available. He states, “The protection of intelligence information will

restrict it so that it will lose its value.” 176 He would rather risk sharing it to obtain its

value than not.

In Lincoln, crime analysts and intelligence analysts are co-located and work on higher

levels of analytical tasks than those expected of sworn officers. Officers in Lincoln can on

their own volition get lists of crimes or bar charts showing crime trends, using the interface screen shown on the next page. The crime analysts are thus freed up to do special

projects, such as completing detailed dossiers on people who have committed gun crimes

in the last thirty days. They would do this in collaboration with the regional U.S. Attorney’s office.

Exercise 6

The clerk of the City Council has notified the chief’s office that a citizen intends to

come to the City Council meeting this afternoon during the open microphone session to complain about the lack of traffic enforcement at Cotner and Sumner. She

lives on the corner, and says that there have been several bad accidents at the intersection because people are always running the stop signs. The chief needs the accident history of this intersection since January 1, 2003. Since the chief will not be

back at the office prior to the meeting, he wants you to send the information to him

at his personal email address, so he can retrieve it on his cellphone. Write the information down in the space below, but also email your response.

Exercise 7

During the investigation of some vandalism cases, a golf club was recovered that

was used to smash car windows. The suspect in the vandalism claims he found the

golf club lying on the ground near Eastridge swimming pool. The club is a wedge

inscribed with “Greg Wilson” on the shaft. You think it’s probably stolen. Where did

it come from? 

176 Interview, 6 January 2005.
126

Source: Courtesy of Chief Tom Casady, Lincoln, NE Police Department.

Elevation of the Analysts’ Role

Analysts working on the same bureaucratic level with command staff serve to facilitate

integration of intelligence work into a law enforcement agency. This approach remains

uncommon at this time, but it is a direction that analysts sampled in this study would propose to help in the development of analysis in law enforcement. The following vignette

describes an example of such a process underway in the RCMP (Royal Canadian

Mounted Police):

The RCMP has recognized that the effectiveness of its intelligence programme is

completely dependent on its personnel and has taken a number of innovative steps

related to analysts’ positions within the organization. Civilian member analysts are

now paid a salary comparable to that earned by their regular member counterparts.

Beyond this, their value to the organization is reflected in their rank. The civilian

manager of the overall analytical programme is a Superintendent-equivalent, the

supervisors of the various analytical sections are Inspector-equivalents, while the

analysts themselves occupy a range of NCO (Corporal/Sergeant/Staff Sergeant)-

equivalent positions. 
127

Focusing on Repeat Offenders

If, as D. Kim Rossmo asserts in Geographic Profiling, 10 percent of offenders commit

50 percent of crime, an effective strategy is for agencies to focus on identifying and more

closely monitoring those 10 percent in their jurisdictions (and in surrounding areas) who

consistently re-offend. Analytical effectiveness is enhanced if analysts are used to help

identify those among the 10 percent, analyze and report on the qualitative aspects of their

behavior, and recommend strategies to either apprehend them the next time they re-offend

or prevent their crimes. This type of information must be continually updated. Analysts

also engage in comparative case analysis to help officers demonstrate to prosecutors that

the offender is responsible for more than one crime.

Much of the crime we fear most is committed by repeat offenders. Many of the

nation’s investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and criminal trials are devoted to

chronic offenders who are out on bail, on felony probation, on parole, or on early

release into the community because of prison overcrowding. These relatively few

offenders impose an immense burden on the criminal justice system. To prevail in

its mission, the system must work “smarter, not necessarily harder,” by removing

repeat offenders from the community. 177

Focusing on repeat offenders must be an organizational priority if it is to be effective. It

requires sharing intelligence with the entire organization. This threatens some officers

who would prefer to keep information to use for their own arrests. This may also threaten

the advent of investigations by an outside agency. Yet, if we have a chronic offender who

is unknown to most officers but known to a few, the prospective intelligence failure is

clearly inane — and preventable.

Modernity

Organizations that embrace technology and adapt to changes in technology facilitate the

success of analysis. One such example is illustrated below. 

For over four years the Knoxville, Tennessee, Police Department has been using GIS

software for problem-oriented policing, crime mapping, and deployment analysis. The

Knoxville Police Department serves over 175,000 people and is staffed with over 380

police officers. The Arc Explorer interface displays 15 data layers and a color digital

photo for pattern/trend detection, for directed patrol, and for strategic and tactical planning. This includes violent, property and sex crimes, calls for service, and traffic collision

locations. Data specific to the incident are displayed, and using the map tips feature

177Susan E. Martin and Lawrence W. Sherman, Catching Career Criminals: The Washington,

DC Repeat Offender Project, Police Foundation Report (Washington, DC: U.S. DOJ, National Institute of Justice, 1986), 5.
128

allows officers to pass the map pointer over each point and see date, time, location, and

other details in a pop-up label. 

Map data are distributed daily throughout the city using a wide-area wireless network.

There are over 20 wireless sites throughout the 100 square miles of Knoxville city limits.

Officers, using the 250 field laptops, can go to any of these areas and quickly download

the latest map data. Seven- and 28-day trend maps are displayed along with the mapped

addresses of parolees, probationers, and sex offenders. The school system supplies bus

stop locations that are compared to the work and home addresses of sex offenders for risk

assessments. 

Officers can see 90 days of shots-fired calls, and related gun crimes, allowing officers to

develop strategies of interdiction and tactical deployment. The field mapping initiative

assists Project Safe Neighborhoods, a nationwide commitment to reduce gun crime in

America that is led by the United States Attorney in all of the 94 federal judicial districts

across the country. The system networks existing local programs that target gun crime and

provides those programs with additional tools necessary to be successful. The goal is to

create safer neighborhoods by reducing gun violence and sustaining the reduction.178

Educated Managers and Coworkers

Educated law enforcement managers and educated law enforcement officers are a key to

the success of analysis in law enforcement. Few training resources exist to educate law

Mapping in Patrol Cars: Knoxville, Tennessee

Source: Courtesy of Lt. Robert Hubbs, Knoxville, TN, Police Department.

178 Lt. Robert Hubbs, Knoxville, TN PD.
129

enforcement managers on crime analysis and intelligence analysis and their effective

applications. One innovative example of training for managers is offered by The Intelligence Centre, an Australian-based vendor. One of the interview subjects, Howard Clarke,

teaches this course.

The focus of the training is centred on the following three elements: 

■ the intelligence process, role and functions of the analyst;

■ the intelligence supervisor — including managing the intelligence activity; 

■ the client — including tasking, monitoring and assessing performance of

intelligence services. 

The workshops discuss the concepts and practice of intelligence and provide

several opportunities for participants to practice and role-play in the three

roles of analyst, supervisor and client. 

Workshops may be conducted separately for supervisors or managers or clients. However, mixed groups generally provide better opportunities for more

effective understanding of different needs and perspectives.179

This type of training is critical to the development of analysis in law enforcement. Most

subjects expressed frustration at the lack of understanding law enforcement managers

have about their role, and the difficulty in obtaining the information and tools to do their

jobs effectively. One analyst said that this resulted in a positive: “forced creativity,” or the

need to find ways to work around the obstacles presented by being tasked to do this job

without easy assess to the resources needed. Another analyst stressed the need for a better-educated intelligence consumer, one who knows what intelligence can and cannot do.

He referred to a pronouncement thought to be associated with Henry Kissinger: “I don’t

know what kind of intelligence I need,” which suggests that he was open to learning about

intelligence capabilities.

Bioterrorism, identity theft, cyberstalking, and crimes not yet defined will require more

intelligent, better educated and trained, and more tech-savvy officers and leaders than are

now available in policing. Today a large majority of agencies require only a high school

diploma or equivalent to begin a career in policing. Training usually consists of 12 to 16

weeks of academy work and a six-month probationary period, during which superiors

evaluate the new officer. A few departments have specialists coping with Internet crime,

179 See http://www.intstudycen.com/Training_Programs/Manager_W_Shop/

manager_w_shop.html. Interview subject Howard Clarke, contract analyst for the RCMP, teaches 

for the Intelligence Centre. A key textbook from the Intelligence Study Centre is Don McDowell, 

Strategic Intelligence: A Handbook for Practitioners, Managers and Users (Cooma, NSW, Australia: Istana Enterprises Pty, Ltd, 1998).
130

but most do not. Leadership and management courses are offered for some, but coping

with technology and transnational crime has just begun to be part of the training.180

Educated officers also enhance the utility of analytical products.

Advances in information processing, and hopefully advances in data analysis methods, will provide the police with unprecedented opportunities to broaden their mission and mandate in a manner that may well impact the nature and extent of crime,

not merely react to its occurrence. This will require police policymakers to critically

assess their current operations and management paradigm. They will have to permit

themselves to be open to new ideas, methods, and practices and provide employees

within the department with the necessary skills, resources, and time to conduct such

problem analytic tasks. It will not be enough for the academics, or anyone for that

matter to provide the tools and techniques; police managers will have to understand

and appreciate the value of these new tools and techniques and demand the products

that they imply.181

Academia and Police Managers

Research dollars spent helping academics develop partnerships with police have

brought excellent results. Yet, until police managers invest in a more scientific approach

to analysis and problem solving, their efforts will bear fruit only in places fortunate

enough to have insightful, progressive police managers who will take ownership of the

possible applications. A recent, federally funded study notes that:

For the past fifteen years academics have been given unprecedented access to police

data. Partnerships have flourished between police and academics. Yet, when it

comes to practical applications of data analysis to inform problem analysis, academics have not been up to the challenge. It is one thing to say that the police

should focus their attention on understanding the factors behind patterns and relationships in the police data to better explain the complexities of the criminal and

disorder. It is quite another thing to show how.

We would hope that contemporary police managers can bring themselves to think

outside the box. Advances in information processing, and hopefully advances in

data analysis methods, will provide the police with unprecedented opportunities to

broaden their mission and mandate in a manner that may well impact the nature and

extent of crime, not merely react to its occurrence. This will require police policymakers to critically assess their current operations and management paradigm. They

will have to permit themselves to be open to new ideas, methods, and practices and

180 Gene Stephens, “Policing the Future: Law Enforcement’s New Challenges,” The Futurist 39,

no. 2 (March-April 2005), 57.

181 Timothy C. O’Shea, Crime Analysis in America: Findings and Recommendations (U.S. DOJ,

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2003), 26. URL http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/

open.pdf?Item=855.
131

provide employees within the department with the necessary skills, resources and

time to conduct such problem analytic tasks. It will not be enough for the academics, or anyone for that matter, to provide the tools and techniques; police managers

will have to understand and appreciate the value of these new tools and techniques

and demand the products that they imply.182

Next

The next chapter explores the future of law enforcement analysis.

182 O’Shea, 26. 

133

Chapter 10

THE REAL AND THE IMAGINED FUTURE

Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies.183

Use intellect, information, and technology to enable and empower preventable

measures that make our community safer.184

Since the number of participants who can join a partnership is infinite, so are the

options we can devise to prevent crime.185

...computer chips, sensors, software and actuators can now turn any kind of passive

product into an active preventer, and possibly even an intelligent one. The day is

here when we can make a reality of the magic harp in Jack in the Beanstalk — one

that doesn’t only cry “Master, Master, he’s stealing me!” but also sends the Giant a

warning by email on his WAP capable phone, and shuts down, refusing to play until

he’s back in the Giant’s castle or there’s been a formal transfer of ownership.186

Paradigm Shifts

Some ideas suggested by the interview subjects reflect wishes for the future. Some of

these ideas are already realities in the field of law enforcement, even though they are not

widespread in application. The next sections introduce a few such concepts: a new intelligence cycle, problem policing, crime science, and neighborhood involvement.

A New Intelligence Cycle: Interpret, Influence, Impact

Jerry Ratcliffe articulated an alternative view of the purpose of intelligence and crime

analysis in a world that is evolving toward intelligence-led policing. His vision is more

holistic than the standard intelligence cycle model; it includes the desired consequence of

law enforcement analysis — to make an impact on crime. Although getting specific criminals off the street has great virtue, if there is no reduction in crime, we must ask ourselves: How effective is our work? Where is the meaning if our work does not effect the

changes we say constitute the core of our mission to protect and to serve?

A few years ago, I was looking for a simple model to explain to intelligence and

crime analysts what their job should be in an intelligence-led policing environment.

183 9/11 Commission Report, Foresight-Hindsight, 6, online version at URL http://www.9-

11commission.gov/. 

184 Quote from interview.

185 Debra Cohen, Problem-Solving Partnerships: Including the Community for a Change

(USDOJ: COPS. June 2001), from Moscow [Idaho] Police Department PERF Response/Assessment

Survey, 1999:12.

186 Paul Ekblomb, “Less crime by design,” RSA Lectures, 10 November 2000. URL http://

www.rsa.org.uk/acrobat/Ekblomb.pdf. 
134

The problem was that many analysts spent their whole time analysing crime and not

thinking about the broader picture: why they were doing the analysis, and what they

should do with the results. The 3-I model grew from discussions with an Australian

federal agent and aims to show the purpose of crime analysis in the modern policing

world. The 3-I model revolves around three law enforcement activities:

■ Interpret

■ Influence

■ Impact 187

The 3-I Model for Police Intelligence

Source: Jerry H. Ratcliffe, URL http://jratcliffe.net/research/three_i_model.htm.

For the future of policing as well as homeland security, creating intelligence products

that contribute to the goals of our agencies is mandatory. Creating nice-to-know but useless work is a waste of tax dollars and self-sabotage. How will we be able to influence

managers with our products? Will we be able to do systematically what many analysts

value individually: impact on crime?

THE FUTURE

Problem Analysis188

Problem analysis in policing moves beyond traditional crime analysis in that it not only

supports policing actions but also drives them. It moves beyond mapping crimes, trend

187Jerry H. Ratcliffe. See URL http://jratcliffe.net/research/three_i_model.htm.

188See Using Analysis for Problem Solving: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement, http://

www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=342.
135

analyses, and pattern identification to using formalized methods of study to arrive at practical solutions.

It is interpretive, creative, and innovative as well as open-ended and inclusive. That

is, it does not presuppose the answers to questions or use solely conventional methods and data to examine problems.189

Because high-level problem analysis is not being routinely practiced by most police

agencies, there are not many examples to demonstrate its relevance and worth or to

use as models of integration. Most police agencies do not yet view problem analysis

as a necessity to police business and they need to be convinced.190

Advancing problem analysis in policing is challenged by the reactive nature of

policing and the difficulty of convincing practitioners that problem analysis is a

worthwhile effort. However, with a possible increase of crime rates on the horizon,

the shift of focus to homeland security, and the fierce competition for resources, it

may be an opportune time to assert and adopt the notion of policing “smarter”

instead of policing “more.”191

The conceptualization of problem analysis encompasses a move toward a different sort

of policing based on comprehensive analyses, which has not yet manifested itself in reality except in isolated instances. It is not yet integrated into policing. 

The first and most obvious reason that problem analysis has lagged behind responding to problems is that, historically, catching the bad guys has been the primary

focus of the police, rather than analyzing crime and disorder problems. Police officers and detectives are trained to respond to one call at a time or to investigate one

crime at a time. A good detective may link a number of crimes together through a

similar perpetrator and/or modus operandi, but this is still examining the crime on

an individual level. Thus, policing accumulates and values a different kind of

knowledge, that is, experiential knowledge. Research knowledge has not been accumulated or valued as highly. The key is to blend these two types of knowledge as

each improves the value of the other.192

Problem-Solving Policing is research-based policing. The research is best accomplished

internally within the policing agency in order to appreciate the ground-level perspective,

and to include all stakeholders. It is reflective rather than reactive, aggregate-based rather

than incident-based, and seeks to understand crime as a phenomenon to be addressed in

whatever ways may work, with a focus on prevention rather than punishment.

189 COPS, Problem Analysis in Policing (Washington, DC: The Police Foundation, 

March 2003), 3.

190Problem Analysis in Policing, 34.

191Problem Analysis in Policing, 45. 192 Rachel Boba, “Problem Analysis in Policing: An Executive Summary,” Crime Mapping 

News: Special Issue, 5, no. 1 (Winter 2003), 2. URL http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/

vol5issue1_color.pdf. 
136

Crime Science and Evidence-Based Policing

“Crime science” and “evidence-based policing” undertake a scientific approach to crime

much like a doctor applies medical science to his or her patient. 

Malcolm Gladwell, in The Tipping Point, points out that our notion of criminals as people with evil dispositions who need to be locked up or somehow fixed renders us helpless

in preventing crime. We feel that all we can do is defend against such people by locking

things up more securely or moving out of high-crime areas. But the reality is, context

matters — crimes occur in contexts.193 Environmental cues, as described in the Broken

Windows Theory,194 contribute to crime — litter, vacant buildings, graffiti — they are the

tipping points that affect neighborhoods by encouraging low-level crime. 

Professor Gloria Laycock, Director of the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, challenges

traditional criminology’s focus on the deviant criminal and conditions such as poverty and

poor parenting that “make” criminals. According to her, evidence in one large study suggests

that half of all male offenders are convicted of only one crime in their lifetime, and slightly

over half engage in criminal behavior for less than a year.195 The implications of this concept

are enormous. It challenges our assumption that crime is committed only by chronically “bad”

people. It lends us to accept that a portion of crime is situational and can be prevented — people offend when there is opportunity to do so.196 Crime science is a practical approach to

investigating such contentious concepts, and applying suitable preventive measures.

The UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science is the first in the world devoted specifically to reducing crime. It does this through teaching, research, public policy analysis

and by the dissemination of evidence-based information on crime reduction. 

Our mission is to change crime policy and practice. The Institute plays a pivotal

role in bringing together politicians, scientists, designers and those in the front line

of fighting crime to examine patterns in crime, and to find practical methods to disrupt these patterns.197

Evidence-based policing requires documentation of outcomes in order to see what

“treatments” are effective. Very little assessment of effectiveness of police work in relation to crime prevention is now carried out across the law enforcement system.

The new paradigm of “evidence-based medicine” holds important implications for

policing. It suggests that just doing research is not enough and that proactive efforts

193Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference 

(New York: Little Brown and Company, 2002), 166-167.

194http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broken_Windows.

195Gloria Laycock, Launching Crime Science, November 2003, 3-4. http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/

downloads/crime_science_series/pdf/LAUNCHING_CS_FINAL.pdf.

196This does not run counter to the theory that 5% of criminals commit 50% of the crime — it

refers to the other 50% of the crime, much of which is likely to be preventable.

197http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/.
137

are required to push accumulated research evidence into practice through national

and community guidelines. These guidelines can then focus in-house evaluations of

what works best across agencies, units, victims, and officers. Statistical adjustments

for the risk factors shaping crime can provide fair comparisons across police units,

including national rankings of police agencies by their crime prevention effectiveness. The example of domestic violence, for which accumulated National Institute

of Justice research could lead to evidence-based guidelines, illustrates the way in

which agency-based outcomes research could further reduce violence against victims. National pressure to adopt this paradigm could come from agency-ranking

studies, but police agency capacity to adopt it will require new data systems creating “medical charts” for crime victims, annual audits of crime reporting systems,

and in-house “evidence cops” who document the ongoing patterns and effects of

police practices in light of published and in-house research. These analyses can

then be integrated into the NYPD COMPSTAT feedback model for management

accountability and continuous quality improvement.198

The medical concept of diagnosis also applies to understanding neighborhood crime. If

we do not ask the neighbors about their condition, how can we assume we have a full

understanding of the nature of a neighborhood problem and the best possible “treatment?”

The method we promote to understand neighborhood crime is the method of diagnosis. We are using the term diagnosis here in its broadest sense. To diagnose is to

detect, analyze and formulate a prescription for a problem. Research that merely

formulates a hypothesis and tests it does not, therefore, fit into this definition. Neither does research that is formulated to prove, or disprove, a theoretical perspective

on crime. However, it is quite another matter when those types of research collaborate with those being researched, including decision-makers and practitioners, in

order to formulate a practical solution to the crime being studied. That is the

method of diagnosis to which we refer.199

Crime science, evidence-based policing, and the concept of diagnosis all are rooted in

applied science, rather than theory.

Stephen Marrin, formerly an analyst at the CIA, also compares medicine with intelligence analysis:

Intelligence agencies should assess medical practices for possible use in improving

the accuracy of intelligence analysis and its incorporation into policymaking. In particular, the processes that the medical profession uses to ensure diagnostic accuracy

may provide specific models that the intelligence community could use to improve

the accuracy of its intelligence analysis. In addition, the medical profession’s accumu198Abstract from Evidence Based Policing, by Lawrence W. Sherman, in Ideas in American

Policing (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, July 1998). 

199Greg Saville and Chuck Genre, draft manuscript, Understanding Neighborhood Problems

(New Haven, CT: University of New Haven, forthcoming).
138

lation, organization, and use of information for purposes of decision-making could

provide a model for the national security field to adapt in its quest for more effective

means of information transfer. While there are some limitations to the analogy due to

intrinsic differences between the fields, the study of medicine could provide intelligence practitioners with a valuable source of insight into various reforms that would

have the potential to improve the craft of intelligence.200

Integration of Neighborhoods into Homeland Security Strategies

Analysis and analysts will likely play a central role in the fuller integration of neighborhoods and other community services into crime intelligence analysis, and — through

database development initiatives and liaison with regional, state and appropriate national

offices — into homeland security.

Effective homeland security, as well as the provision of public safety services, now

and in the future, requires close and continuous coordination and cooperation

across the spectrum of social resources and organizations, both geographically and

electronically. To be effective this coordination and cooperation must occur at all

levels of government (federal, state, and local), among all governmental sectors

(police, fire, EMS, transportation, social services, military), between the public and

private sectors (corporate security, business, not for profit), and between public servants and public citizens, within the neighborhood and otherwise.201

A notable effort toward building a foundation for making this vision a reality comes from

Gregory Saville, who proposes a new type of analytical work focused on developing “a

cohesive community.” His vision is captured in the text box on the following pages.

200Stephen Marrin and Jonathan D. Clemente, MD, draft manuscript, “Tumors Don’t Read Textbooks: Looking to the Medical Profession for Ideas to Improve Intelligence Analysis,” e-mail to the

author, 13 June 2004. Subsequently published as “Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to

the Medical Profession,” in International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 18, no. 4

(Winter 2005): 707-729.

201Thomas J. Cowper, “Network Centric Policing: Alternative or Augmentation to the Neighborhood-Driven Policing (NDP) Model?” in Carl Jensen III and Bernard H. Levin, Neighborhood

Driven Policing, Police Futurists International: Proceedings from the Futures Working Group

(USDOJ, FBI, Futures Working Group, January 2005), 23. See URL http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/fwg/

neighborhood/neighborhood-driven-policing.pdf. 
139

A Vision for Crime Prevention Through Ties That Bind202

In recent years following 9/11 there has been great attention focused on security

across the country. Most of that has emerged from fears of foreign terrorist

attack, fears that for the most part are not founded on real events. With a few

tragic exceptions, and one spectacular event in New York, foreign terrorist

attacks have been virtually non-existent across the country (even domestic terror events have been relatively rare). Nonetheless, new legislation, a new

Department of Homeland Security, and numerous conferences and media

reports keep the public eye on terror attack risks.

This public attention has led to wide-ranging policy decisions, most of which

focus on the actual event of terror attack (such as target hardening strategies,

closed-circuit TVs, and probable-maximum-loss analysis). It has also focused

on response procedures in the aftermath (such as catastrophe risk modeling).

Unfortunately, planning and analysis for prevention prior to such events has

been limited to intelligence gathering by enforcement agencies. For the analyst,

these are two unfortunate circumstances: the public demand that the government do something and the obsession with event and post-event planning.

These circumstances have created two unique challenges for the crime and

intelligence analyst.

First, sound analysis depends on correlative or deductive patterns, and those

patterns are inferred by data from previous events. A lack of events means a

lack of data, and that is the analyst's nightmare. Second, and linked to the first,

there is an enormous dearth in creative strategies for anti-terror protection for

pre-event prevention.

In such circumstances it is therefore reasonable to draw knowledge from similar

fields of inquiry where we can test and apply lessons for homeland security.

Intelligence analysts are only now beginning to see this potential. For example,

one of the first areas of exploration is probabilistic risk assessment modeling

used in disaster planning and insurance risk mitigation. Though in the early

stages of development, quantitative risk modeling provides a lens — albeit a

blurred one — through which analysts can develop simulations.

202 E-mail to author from Greg Saville, 11 August 2005. For further information on Saville and 

others involved in problem-oriented policing, see http://www.popcenter.org/aboutCPOP.html. 
140

Mr. Saville’s vision of the future resonates with the findings of this research project.

More research and more development in the areas of understanding, improving and fostering relationships apply to homeland security, law enforcement, and public safety in

general. Safety may be the foundation of strong relationships, rather than the outcome.

Community policing rests on the premise that the community is the source of our collective strength and the beneficiary of all levels of government, but it is often not practiced in

this spirit. 

Signage alerting citizens to report suspicious behavior is one way of including the citizens in the process of homeland security, but Mr. Saville’s premise is much broader than

mere inclusion of citizens — that strengthening social ties is a greater need to prevent

crime and terrorism. This approach appears to remain unrecognized by the evidence of

current efforts in homeland security. Using appreciative inquiry as a basis of such an

effort herself, the author recognized that focusing on the creation of a vision of safety and

A much more detailed lens exists in the new field of Second-Generation Crime

Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). For many years 1stGeneration CPTED has been applied to minimizing crime opportunities in the

built environment: improving lighting to improve natural sightlines; enhancing

territorial control over properties by legitimate users of that space, and the like.

Making it difficult for potential terrorists to drive a car bomb in front of a

vulnerable school can be a matter of road design, jersey barriers, and redirecting

traffic flows. However, those are short-term security responses.

Analytical strategies for 1st-Generation CPTED can be as simple as conducting

CPTED surveys at a particular place. However, 2nd-Generation CPTED deals

with the social conditions that encourage positive social interaction, conditions

that can empower local residents or employees to surveil a particular locale or

identify suspicious activities.

In the 2nd-Generation response arena, the analyst is more interested in identifying the social factors that create a cohesive neighborhood or organization. How

can we build the social ties that bind people together, rather than simply rely on

what they fear? What factors create positive connections between groups, and

what are the correlates influencing and detracting from that cohesiveness? For

example, this is the kind of modeling under development by Greg Saville and

Nick Bereza of the TRM Group consultants. It is the first of its kind to employ

both traditional security and 2nd-generation CPTED. It is these social correlates

that lead to more sustainable long-term preventive strategies. A cohesive community mobilized against violent radicals inside, and outside, its realm is much

more likely to work together with governments to prevent terror attacks and create safe places.
141

the possibility of building new ways of working and thinking, rather than a vision that

focuses energy against crime and terror, represents a new paradigm that may not be visible yet except to those who are able to integrate the qualitative into what has been a quantified world. 

A VISION OF THE FUTURE FROM THE EXPERTS

If the analysts and experts interviewed for this project could change the field of law

enforcement intelligence analysis in any way they could in the next ten or twenty years,

this is what they would change:

■ Better-Educated Analysts

Analysts need to be better educated and to have continued educational opportunities:

“Learning as a process parallels the analytical process at its best.”

■ Real-Time, Quality Data and Quality Analysis

Analysts want timely, quality data so that they can do quality analyses. Better collection,

better auditing, better documenting is desirable to reduce turnaround time. “Real-Time

Crime Analysis” has appeared in the Ventura County, California, Sheriff's Office: Analysts are listening to police radios while they work and have helped officers make arrests

by doing so. In a specific example, an analyst listening in gave patrol officers vehicle plate

numbers and a physical description based on knowledge of a neighboring jurisdiction's

crime analysis reports; subsequently a serial robber was arrested as he was going back to

his vehicle which was left in the lot of the premises he had robbed.

■ Focus on Prevention

Analysts and experts universally desire to see a focus on root causes and proactive analysis to prevent crime rather than react to it.

■ Recognition and Integration of the Analyst into LE

Analysts want recognition, understanding and respect. They want analysis to be integrated into the policing world. Integrating analysis would involve analysts working on

every major case. Integration requires training every street cop, every investigator, every

agent, and every law enforcement manager to appreciate the value of all information,

however minute or obscure, for the purposes of analysis. 

■ Standards and Professionalism

Analysts want career paths, education and training developed specifically to enhance the

understanding and capacities of crime and intelligence analysis and are eager to see much

more literature directly applicable to the field.

■ Technology, Tools, Training

Analysts want automation, powerful computers and broadband technology to support

transmissions of data to and from the field. In the future, ortho photography, 3-D imaging,

biometrics, collected and applied system-wide for analysis, are desired. The possibilities
142

of exploiting nanotechnology in the future were mentioned by participants — its applications are at this point subject only to the limits of professional imagination.

Police officers carry guns and handcuffs — the things they need least often. They

need timely, accurate information at their immediate disposal to make sound decisions. The future of policing involves a number of technological tools. Police could

have a high-tech Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) to help them work. A guy urinating in the street could put his thumb on the screen for his print, be identified, the

incident recorded, a determination made of whether he is on parole or probation

made, all right on the spot.203

Some see the analyst as the moderator and interpreter of technological systems as they

advance. For example, the computer declares that there might be a crime series underway,

as inferred through the application of Artificial Intelligence, and the analyst decides the

next step — the analyst prioritizes — using a greater cache of information than those

observations already in the system.

Fully integrated data-sharing capabilities and fully linked data-sharing capabilities

among local, state and federal agencies are seen as the future of analysis and policing.

Experts contributing to this study would like real life to be like “Crime Scene Investigation” (CSI), presently a very popular television program. A number of analysts mentioned

CSI in one context or another. Nonetheless, they feel that the media portrayal of law

enforcement creates a false picture that interferes with new resource allocation. CSI is

very different from law enforcement realities.

■ Intelligence-Led Policing

A number of analysts and experts mentioned ILP as a certainty in the future and yet felt

the change would not come to pass soon enough to achieve the greatest good.

■ Working Together 

Data sharing, teamwork, and empowering others to analyze are forms of working together

desired by analysts. Analysts supporting every major investigation with timelines, maps,

and other types of synthesized information are in the actionable future. Analysis taking

place before officers engage in a major operation — as well as after — is often not the

reality of law enforcement. 

Having one security clearance process recognized by all agencies from federal to local

level would facilitate working together in the future.

■ Systematic Approaches to Capturing Knowledge

Debriefing criminals, making field assessments, capturing tacit/institutional knowledge,

and building dossiers or portfolios on known offenders are widely voiced wishes for the

203 Interview.
143

future. Already, some observers have identified appropriate questions to guide the systematic development of knowledge:

Source: Timothy S. Bynum, Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement (USDOJ, 

COPS, 14 September 2001), 37.

■ Nurturing the Analyst

Finally, there is the question of how far training (or experience) can take a given analyst.

Any reasonably intelligent individual with the right skills and education can be taught to

be an effective analyst. But the truly gifted analyst — the truly gifted athlete, musician, or

scientist — is inherently better at his or her job by virtue of inborn talents. In all fields,

such individuals are rare. They must be nurtured.204

Analysts confided that they would like supportive environments where they can use their

individual talents effectively.

■ Predictive Analysis

“For higher-level intelligence analysis, there must be science with accuracy to be predictive. For example, The Internet Crime Complaint Center has 20,000 crime complaints —

shouldn’t we be able to predict what the 20,001st crime complaint will be with all that

data at our disposal?” Improved predictive analysis is anticipated in the future, according

to a variety of analysts and experts.

■ The Present in the Future

Clearly, many wishes for the future are already being realized in some small way in the

present. This is an interesting result of the research. It corroborates a core assumption of

appreciative inquiry — that solutions to central problems already exist within the system. 

Next

The next chapter returns to the concept of AI, and addresses the power of story. It proposes a model to carry the present type of inquiry to a higher level.

Sample Offender Interview Questions:

1. Why were specific houses chosen for burglary?

2. Why were particular cars stolen?

3. What did the offender find desirable about the physical condition of the

offense location?

4. Why was the offender in a neighborhood other than his or her own?

5. Was the offense planned?

204 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 91.

145

Chapter 11

HARNESSING THE POWER OF STORY 

TO EFFECT CHANGE

Although this project did not apply appreciative inquiry to the fullest dimensions of a

group participation approach, in theory, by the interview design and by sharing the findings in this text, the AI process has already begun. Discovery in the high-point stories

uncovered these themes: collaboration, support, discovery, creation, invention, influence,

achievement, recognition and impact. These themes can be taken to the “dream” phase of

AI to create new metaphors and to inspire accelerated change.

Once you understand the concept of social construction, you realize that action happens in the dialogue. The first question you ask is fateful, and the whole system will

turn in that direction. Furthermore, given the heliotropic effect (remember that the

sunflower always turns its face to the sun), the system will turn toward its most positive images of itself. Those first interviews are the action! Add to that the principle

of simultaneity which posits that change is simultaneous with the first questions we

ask, and you have a process that recognizes the power of human language to create

a reality. We create what we imagine.205

Nodes of the Appreciative Inquiry Process

Source: The AI Cycle. See http://www.change-management-toolbook.com/tools/AI.html.

205 Watkins and Mohr, 199.
146

A number of possible methods exist to use AI on a greater scale if we decide to use this

process to address our larger need to collaborate and create change — change in how we

collect, share, analyze and use information — what we call intelligence.

An AI Summit

If the broad Intelligence Community, including all stakeholders, were to implement an

AI process, it might look like this:

■ Stakeholders from all agencies would conduct interviews of staff, customers

and societal representatives, at all levels of involvement (analysts, officers,

agents, commanders, consumers, community, IT staff, academia, policymakers), keeping interviews tuned as closely to the realities of the work (the

data) as possible. The focus of the interviews would be on the experiential:

“When we are at our best at intelligence analysis and sharing, what makes

work exciting, interesting, invigorating, motivating, and productive?”

■ The interviewers, clustered in “synthesis meetings,” would then look for

the implications, possibilities and inspiration in the data — not necessarily

the common ground.

■ Meeting outcomes would be shared in small teams which would then create a final report/presentation of all the data.

■ A three-day (more or less) AI Summit would be held with as many of the stakeholders in attendance as possible. Attendees would determine a variety of

organizing possibilities from the findings and agree to a set of design principles to improve the way we analyze and share intelligence, and then determine

ways to organize the next steps suggested by the design phase.206

What is an “AI” Organizational Summit?

The WHOLE SYSTEM participates — a cross-section of as many interested

parties as is practical. That means more diversity and less hierarchy than is usual

in a working meeting, and a chance for each person to be heard and to learn other

ways of looking at the task at hand.

Future scenarios — for an organization, community or issue — are put into HISTORICAL and GLOBAL perspective. That means thinking globally together

before acting locally. This enhances shared understanding and greater commitment to act. It also increases the range of potential actions.

People SELF-MANAGE their work, and use DIALOGUE — not “problemsolving” — as the main tool. That means helping each other do the tasks and taking responsibility for our perceptions and actions.

206 Cooperider and others, Appreciative Inquiry Handbook, 65-66.
147

Source: Sarah Patterson and David Cooperrider, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, AI Growth Summit 

Workbook, http://appreciativeinquiry.cwru.edu/ practice/toolsSummitDetail. cfm?coid=5320.

In Support of Choosing New Stories

AI taps into the power of our personal stories focused on what we value (which is

always grounded in emotion), and helps us recognize that the possibilities for changes

that we need in fact already exist in our work and in the work of others. We can change

our stories and define new values in the AI process. We can decide to believe it is possible

to create the kind of systems we need to in turn address the threats we perceive to our

notions of safety. 

People are not rational. Fact lovers hate this. They want to believe that the “facts are

the facts.” The story they tell themselves interprets people who aren’t rational as an

exception rather than a rule. A storyteller embraces, as a central theme, that people

aren’t rational and uses what she knows about feelings and emotions. She knows

that our choices are primarily driven by our feelings. She uses that “fact” to find stories that influence how people feel before she gives them data. Recent studies of

how the brain works demonstrate that emotions guide and direct our thoughts and

our interpretation of rational facts.

There is ample research to document that decisions are based more on feelings than

rational, logical thinking. People decide they like a piece of art because someone

they like likes it. They will attribute trustworthiness to an individual they have never

met because they have seen his or her picture enough for that person to feel familiar.

COMMON GROUND and NARRATIVE-RICH INTERACTION rather than

“conflict management,” or negotiation as the frame of reference. That means honoring

our differences rather than having to reconcile them, and searching for meanings and

direction in stories that honor and connect us to our “history as positive possibility.”

APPRECIATIVE INQUIRY (AI) — To appreciate means to value — to understand those things of value that are worth valuing. To inquire means to study, to ask

questions, to search. AI is, therefore, a collaborative search to identify and understand the organization’s strengths, its potentials, the greatest opportunities, and people’s hopes for the future.

INSPIRED ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE WHOLE — Because the “whole

system” is involved, it is easier to make more rapid decisions, and to make commitments to action in a public way — in an open way that everyone can support and

help make happen. The movement to action is guided by internal inspiration, shared

leadership, and voluntary initiative. People work on what they share a passion

about, what they most care about and believe will make the difference. Real change

begins with the simple act of people acting on what they care about, in the context

of a shared vision that matters.
148

They will select one item out of ten identical items and give a list of rational-sounding reasons why it is superior to the other nine — even though the item is exactly

the same as the other nine. For each of these feeling-based decisions (they had no

facts) research subjects always make up rational-sounding reasons and believe the

reasons they make up. People irrationally believe they are rational.207

Fear may energize, but the flight or fight energy is from adrenaline, and that adrenaline

rush, if continuous, eventually wears out the body. The information overload, the panic,

the constant threats we face all take energy and leave us in a state of continual crisis. We

need to be able to perceive that it is possible to arrive at new solutions and design our

future proactively, in an approach rooted in hope, rather than constantly reacting to threats

and danger, however real they may be. This does not mean we deny truth, but that we

expand our vision of the truth and employ all the power we have to create a better future.

We can give energy to one another by the power of our stories to motivate, invigorate, and

inspire. We can choose new stories.

In The Springboad: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era Organizations,

Stephen Denning, former Program Director of Knowledge Management at the World

Bank, describes how narrative changed the focus of the World Bank.208 By using true stories as examples that illustrated the knowledge-management direction he desired for his

agency, and helping people add their own visions to possibilities of new stories for the

World Bank, Mr. Denning was able to facilitate major change in the information infrastructure and practices at the World Bank. 

He found that stories worked better for him than traditional analysis and supporting data

and charts in helping people to understand the reason change was needed.209 As Denning

says, “The story does not replace rational analysis, but rather opens up new mental horizons and perspectives, which can then become the subject for analysis and testing.” 210

We Need the Big-Picture Story: Purpose

Change requires that leadership join together to create a bigger vision of what we have

yet to achieve — a story of what we are trying to become. AI can help inform leadership

in a powerful way and bind stakeholders together in a collective and co-created story.

Systematic structure is the domain of systems thinking and mental models. At this

level, leaders are continually helping people see the big picture: how different parts

of the organization interact, how different situations parallel one another because of

common underlying structures, how local actions have longer-term and broader

207Annette Simons, The Story Factor: Inspiration, Influence, and Persuasion through the Art of

Storytelling (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishing, 2001), 55-56. 

208 Stephen Denning, The Springboard: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era 

Organizations (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2001).

209 Denning, 14.

210 Denning, 177.
149

impacts than local actors often realize, and why certain operating policies are

needed for the system as a whole. But, despite its importance, the level of systematic structure is not enough. By itself, it lacks a sense of purpose. It deals with the

how, not the why.

By focusing on the “purpose story” — the larger explanation of why the organization exists and where it is trying to head — leaders add an additional dimension of

meaning. They provide what philosophy calls a “teleological explanation” (from

the Greek telos, meaning “end” or “purpose”) — an understanding of what we are

trying to become. When people throughout an organization come to share in a

larger sense of purpose, they are united in a common destiny. They have a sense of

continuity and identity not achievable in any other way.

Leaders talented at integrating story and systematic structure are rare in my experience. Undoubtedly, this is one of the main reasons that learning organizations are

still rare.211

Taking Qualitative Inquiry a Step Further...

Is intelligence analysis itself fundamentally qualitative inquiry?212 If the answer is yes,

then would it not be possible to take what is best in AI and apply it to the intelligence

analysis process? What might that look like?

Those who collect and analyze information would have their stories (intelligence) gathered as close to the data (all intelligence sources) as possible in the AI model. The resulting summarized intelligence would be clustered in hubs as close to the ground level as

possible but highly interconnected in a network. This network could have actual personto-person relationships to facilitate sharing the intelligence. This type of system would

enhance our ability to determine relevancy and exploit our current decentralized information systems. We would not necessarily need all machines (technology) connected, but we

would need connections among people. The analysts/hubs could be activated for special

needs and have expert access to the information resources, because they would be both

intimate with their own data and intelligence and would be highly connected to all the

players in their respective regions.

[I]t is from within this matrix of uncertainty, where we are unceasingly crossing the

boundaries of established enclaves — appropriating, reflecting, creating — that the

vitality of qualitative inquiry is drawn. It is here that we locate the innovative power

that is transforming the face of the social sciences. If we can avoid impulses toward

elimination, the rage to order, and the desire for unity and singularity, we can anticipate the continued flourishing of qualitative inquiry, full of serendipitous incidents

211 Senge, 354.

212 Intelligence analysis is fundamentally qualitative because it is looking for specific answers to

specific challenges. In many cases, quantitative analysis supports intelligence, but the final intelligence product has no utility if it cannot be acted upon in a qualitative manner.
150

and generative expressions. In particular, if we bear out the implications of the

increasing centrality of relationship over individuals — and realize these implications practically within the emerging spheres of technology — we may effectively

participate in the reconstruction of the social sciences and alternation of the trajectories of the cultures in which we participate.213

213 Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 1042-1043.
151

Chapter 12

ARE WE THERE YET?

All intelligence can do is paint a context.214

One of the lessons of war is that institutions, while powerful and long-lasting, are

often not insuperably rigid if the emergency is great enough.215

Crime will evolve and we will evolve.

The CSI Syndrome — the public and therefore Congress thinks we have this stuff.

In the United States we do not look internally with a critical eye at what is or is not

working.216

When public policing was first formally instituted in London in 1829, the emphasis

was on preventing crime: the public and officers themselves regarded successful

policing as the “absence of crime.”217

Analysis as a Responsibility

The 9/11 Commission Report discusses (in the context of the presence of Mihdhar,

Hazmi, and Moussaoui in the U.S.), the failure of “the intelligence community to assemble enough of the puzzle pieces gathered by different agencies to make some sense of

them and then develop a fully informed joint plan.”218 A very important point follows

regarding who was responsible for getting all the pieces together — everyone was responsible.219 That same concept points to a key failure in the development of systematic analysis in law enforcement: If law enforcement analysis is the responsibility of all officers,

then, in reality, no one is responsible. Analysis is a duty. Yet, if few responsible, professional-level analysts are at work in law enforcement (whether dedicated civilian staff or

sworn officers detailed to this work), then there may not be enough resources dedicated to

carrying out this important duty.

We Are Not Machines

Although analysts must strive to be objective and use technology to “drive” their work,

there is a danger in thinking too much in terms of formalizing and facts.

During the past two thousand years the importance of objectivity; the belief that

actions are governed by fixed values; the notion that skills can be formalized; and in

214 Quote from interview.

215 Hayawaka, 175.

216 Quotes from interviews.

217Gene Stephens, “Policing the Future: Law Enforcement’s New Challenges,” in The Futurist

39, no. 2 (March-April 2005): 51.

218 The 9/11 Commission Report, 355.

219 The 9/11 Commission Report, 355.
152

general that one can have a theory of practical activity, have gradually exerted their

influence in psychology and social science. People have begun to think of themselves

as objects able to fit into the inflexible calculations of disembodied machines:

machines for which the human form-of-life must be analyzed into meaningless facts,

rather than a field of concern organized by sensory-motor skills. Our risk is not the

advent of superintelligent computers, but of subintelligent human beings.220

Intelligence analysis, at its basic level, is a very human, practical activity. Existing technology facilitates it. An observer of the national intelligence scene puts it this way:

Change is a constant in the intelligence analysis profession. Technologies change,

organizational structures change, and procedures change. Yet the importance of personal relationships is a constant in the production of finished intelligence. In order

to access informal knowledge from collectors throughout the Intelligence Community, benefit from the comments of analytic counterparts, and produce analysis relevant to policymakers, personal relationships are crucial.221

Risk versus Threat

Police working “smarter,” together with federal law enforcers and those whose authorities and responsibilities are to assist — all of us — must work smarter and together. We

must realize that the technology on television shows does not exist in most of the real

world of policing, that modernity is uneven, technology outdated and/or irrelevant to the

work, and that the law enforcement system is fragmented. Nevertheless, our shared mission — to provide safety for the citizens we serve — irrevocably connects us. We are service workers. Networking our resources, developing an educated and trained cadre of

team players, being open to innovation and the power of information — these are necessary if we are to maximize our ability to prevent crime and terrorism. If we are to move

toward a more secure homeland, analysis, and particularly what we call law enforcement

intelligence analysis, will be central to success.

The media tell us that security is “beefed up” when the number of police officers

deployed to a given location is increased. But contrary to conventional wisdom,

numbers are not a good way to provide security. Rather, it's the ability of law

enforcement to recognize suspicious activities and people, their skill at assessing

the seriousness of the threat, and the ability to deploy strategies to stop the threat,

that minimizes the threat from terrorists who seek to do us serious harm.

The biggest weakness of the current American security approach is the general focus

on risk, as opposed to threat. Risk is a calculated assumption made based on past

220 Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason, 

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 280. 

221 Stephen Marrin, Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence, Markle 

Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, 15 July 2002, 15. See 

http://markletaskforce.org/documents/marrin_071502.pdf.
153

occurrences, Threat, on the other hand, is constant. It doesn't matter how many people

want to kill you as long as there is one person who wants to kill you. Assuming threat

means making it clear to law enforcement that a terrorist attack can happen any day and

any time. Having that assumption made translates to a different mode of operations

where engagement with a suspect is done immediately and without hesitation.222

Capturing timely, accurate data in the field, assessing chronic and emerging problems,

being able to note anomalies immediately, and having the ability to link crimes and suspicious activities across jurisdictions require new thinking, not more people.

Police in this war on terrorism will have to be creative, fast thinking, empowered with

the ability to make decisions and act decisively in the face of threat and at the same time

be defenders of the Constitution and protectors of civil liberties. Achieving this balance

involves using these acquired skills that must be constantly tested to insure competence.

We need to position ourselves ahead of the enemy, not behind and trying to catch up. In

short, we must think like the enemy and act like the defender. 223

The current law enforcement systems or agencies in this country are generally reactive

rather than proactive. They function extremely well in coordinated fashion when faced

with obvious threats, such as a sniper case or other murder sprees, but have become numb

to many other criminal threats in the constant barrage of “lower”-level, “normal” crime. 

The concept of intelligence as used in the military to strategize and maximize forces is

only now becoming valued in law enforcement, and, even so, not universally.

Understanding “Common” Intelligence Analysis and Common 

Threats

Law enforcement intelligence analysis, with its dependence on geographically dispersed

eyes and ears, seems to be a logical springboard for the coordination of national, regional

and local security resources. It is in light of this understanding that Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff urges us to work in a unified manner.

On the most basic level, we need to take a step back and focus on the fundamental

question: Why was the Department of Homeland Security created? It was not created merely to bring together different agencies under a single tent. It was created to

enable these agencies to secure the homeland through joint, coordinated action. Our

challenge is to realize that goal to the greatest extent possible.

Let me tell you about three areas where I plan to focus our efforts to achieve that goal.

First, we need to operate under a common picture of the threats that we are facing.

222 Edward J. Tully and E.L. (Bud) Willoughby, “Terrorism: The Role of Local and State Police

Agencies,” National Executive Institute Associates, Major Cities Chiefs Association, Major County

Sheriff’s Association, May 2002. URL http://www.neiassociates.org/state-local.htm.

223 Tully and Willowby.
154

Second, we need to respond actively to these threats with the appropriate policies.

Third, we need to execute our various component operations in a unified manner so

that when we assess the intelligence and we have decided upon the proper policies,

we can carry out our mission in a way that is coordinated across the board.224

The Need for Law Enforcement to Change with Changes in Crime

The need for a process-oriented understanding of law enforcement intelligence and its analysis is crucial, as crime will change in the future in ways that we may or may not be able to

imagine. A British panel of experts, sponsored by the UK government’s Foresight program,

considered the theme of crime prevention at the turn of the 21st century. Some results of their

thinking about how science and technology can be harnessed for criminal activity as well as by

governments for future crime prevention are summarized in the tables below.225

We believe new technology now and in the future might also create more

opportunity for crime by:

■ providing easier access to systems, premises, goods and information;

■ removing geographical obstacles to crime;

■ increasing the scale of potential rewards; and

■ increasing anonymity in committing crime or consuming its proceeds.

The speed and globalisation of criminal innovation versus institutional

responses:

Crime thrives in the margins, the gaps where different jurisdictions and regulatory

systems meet and conflict — this is likely to allow more opportunity for crime as

globalisation increases. Unlike business, it is hard for national law enforcement

bodies to have a strong presence elsewhere in the world. Equally the nature of

criminal intelligence and the concerns about sharing or losing it do not encourage

the breakdown of these divides. The future will be one of crime without boundaries, where more crimes can be committed without the perpetrator ever entering

the jurisdiction where the offence impacts. Co-ordinated and concerted proactive

steps must be taken with a speed which will match or outpace the criminal.

224 Statement of Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the

United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 13 April 2005, 

Washington, DC. See URL http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4460.

225 Department of Trade and Industry, UK Crime Prevention Panel, Turning the Corner, 

1 December 2000, 9, 11. See URL http://www.foresight.gov.uk/. Responses to the original report 

are at http://www.foresight.gov.uk/Previous_Rounds/Foresight_1999__2002/Crime_Prevention/

Reports/Turning%20the%20Corner/INDEX.HTM. 
155

Terrorist Threats and Organized Crime Threats

Assessing the threat of organized crime, especially in light of its links to terrorism, also

requires a comprehensive, integrated law enforcement effort grounded in intelligence

analysis. 

Both Enron and YBM Magnex, among other similar cases, illustrate some of the

potential vulnerabilities of North American business. Greed, coupled with failures

in audit and accountability, can combine to form an environment in which organized crime can establish itself and in turn exert real economic influence. And as

was the case with Enron, the victim pool may not consist simply of individuals, but

could potentially extend to entire financial sectors and their components.

Invariably, incidents like the collapse of Enron and YBM Magnex take us by surprise. They exact a profound toll, not only in terms of their victims, but also with

regard to our sense of selves as a civil and transparent society. They also suggest

that we do not have a clear sense of the vulnerabilities of our basic economic and

financial institutions, particularly with regard to organized crime.

Until we do, meaningful preventative strategies will not be forthcoming and the

risks to individuals, groups, and critical sectors will remain acute.226

Interview subject Mark R. Gage, Deputy Director for Training and Research for the

National White Collar Crime Center, believes that as business is now global, law enforcement must also find ways to globalize. In the past, most business was local. Now, almost

no business is local. This has changed the context of crime in ways that law enforcement

is ill-equipped to handle. The parochial nature of local law enforcement is outdated. 

We need a broader cultural awareness, a sense of the interconnections bigger than our

current landscapes, to address the new world with smarter policing. Besides technology

and equipment, our policing system itself has not changed much in the last one hundred

years.

Homeland Security Strategies Can Incorporate State, Tribal, and 

Local Public Safety

In November 2004 a project entitled the Taking Command Initiative was launched by

the IACP to ascertain what areas of homeland security were working, which were not, and

what obstacles stood in the way.227

226 Angus Smith, “Crime Victims in a Changing World,” in The Royal Canadian Mounted Police 

Gazette 66, no. 3 (2004) online at http://www.gazette.rcmp.gc.ca/articleen.html?&lang_id=1&article_id=18. 

227International Association of Chiefs of Police, From Hometown Security to Homeland 

Security: IACP’s Principles for a Locally Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security

Strategy, at http://www.theiacp.org/leg_policy/HomelandSecurityWP.PDF.
156

These law enforcement executives came to the conclusion that our nation’s current

homeland security strategy is handicapped by a fundamental flaw: It was developed

without sufficiently seeking or incorporating the advice, expertise or consent of

public safety organizations at the state, tribal, or local level.

Further consensus developed over the belief that there was a critical need to develop

a new homeland security strategy, one that fully embraces the valuable and central

role that must be played by the state, tribal, and local public safety community.228

This report goes on to stress five key strategies in the following categories:

■ All terrorism is local;

■ Prevention is paramount;

■ Hometown security is homeland security;

■ Homeland security strategies must be coordinated nationally, not 

federally;

■ The importance of bottom-up engineering, incorporating the diversity of

state, tribal, and local public safety in noncompetitive collaboration.229

A national, rather than a federal, response “ensures that all levels of government, local,

tribal, state, and federal are participating in the policy design and development process as

full and equal partners.”230 The policies that come from federal agencies are often viewed

as overly prescriptive, burdensome, and sometimes impractical.

In fact, the approach taken in the present research, to study those actually doing the kind

of work we say we want more of, is the opposite of a federal approach. Treating all participants’ input as equally valuable is central to Appreciative Inquiry. Prescribing strategies

before assessing capacities does not make sense. We need to first understand what is happening on the ground before we “prepare for battle.”

Climates of Trust

Building trust within agencies is difficult in law enforcement — building trust with different types of agencies with diverse priorities will be an even greater challenge, one that

we cannot hide from. This change will require leadership to develop climates that support

the growth of trust.

Law enforcement leadership has an important role in the management of intergroup

conflict, as change agents. Management must work toward the development of a

culture that is open, willing to share, and trusting. Leadership’s inability to achieve

such a culture means more and much more of existing problems.

228 From Hometown Security to Homeland Security, 2.

229 From Hometown Security to Homeland Security, 3-6.

230 From Hometown Security to Homeland Security, 6.
157

Diversity accomplished without understanding and vision is similar to red and

black ants being thrown together into the same Tupperware container by a grade

school child. The accomplishment is remarkable for its ease of implementation and

also for its disastrous effect. The change program to diversify the ant colony was

quick and easy and short-lived. Change in organizations requires a better plan.

Assumptions should not be made on what people think and feel. 

Law enforcement must look to better understand and prepare for the change diversity creates in organizations and to develop proactive strategies to manage the

resultant conflict. It will, of course, be necessary to establish processes that allow

for change implementation, analysis, feedback, and subsequent adjustments. Apart

from process will be the necessity of creating a climate or environment that allows

for successful change by promoting trust.231

As we work toward developing homeland security strategies, it is essential, as an

extremely diverse community of law enforcement, national security, and military, that we

find new methods to build trust. Trust cannot simply be prescribed.

Changing This Story

Quality analysis is dependent upon quality data, data that can be shared among the

stakeholders. We depend on people to analyze the data. Users of intelligence depend on

intelligent planning of information systems applied by analysts. Effective exploitation of

information can bring us toward the objective of crime reduction and homeland security.

In that light, for how long can the following news story remain true?

U.S. info sharing effort off to slow start

By Shaun Waterman

UPI Homeland and National Security Editor

Published 7/28/2005 3:38 PM

WASHINGTON, July 28 (UPI) — The man in charge of the Bush administration’s

plan to create a permanently connected network of databases to “join the dots” of

intelligence against terror threats told lawmakers this week that he had only three

people working for him, despite having been in the post more than three months.

John Russack, the program manager for the administration’s counter-terrorism Information Sharing Environment, appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee

Wednesday, his first testimony since his appointment by President Bush in April.

231 Lt. Pat Sprecco, “The Importance of Trust in the Management of Bias,” Police Futurist 11,

No. 2 (Fall 2003): 11, 16. See URL http://www.policefuturists.org/newsletter/pdf/Fall_2003.pdf
158

He warned that panel that there were important legal and policy impediments to information sharing that would have to be confronted by Congress and the administration

as they moved towards a vision of real-time, seamless data exchange between intelligence, law enforcement, emergency response and other agencies of federal, state,

local and other governments.

“Most of the low-hanging fruit has been plucked,” he said. “What is left to be done is

really hard.”

Russack told the panel in his opening statement that he had already begun work. “I

will be assisted,” he added, “by a very small staff of approximately 25 people,” 20 of

whom would be “detailees from other parts of our government.”

“I’m advised by counsel that you don’t have any employees,” the committee’s Chairman Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Penn., told him.

“Well, I have one,” Russack replied, “I have one, and I have two contractors... So

we’re making progress, Mr. Chairman.”

Specter seemed unconvinced. “Sufficient progress?” he asked Lee Hamilton, the

former congressman and Sept. 11 commissioner also giving evidence Wednesday. 

“It’s not even close,” replied Hamilton.

Russack earlier said his appointment would run out after two years, but that the law

which created the office — last year’s intelligence reform legislation — contained “a

caveat that says it could actually expire sooner if I don’t do a good job.”

“Is that sufficient progress, inspector general?” Specter asked the Justice Department's internal watchdog, Glenn Fine, of Russack’s hiring record. 

“We’re going to take a vote here, Mr. Russack,” the senator added. You may lose your

office sooner.”

The exchange came at the end of a marathon four-hour oversight hearing which began

focused on the FBI, and hearing testimony from Director Robert Mueller. But with

Russack's participation on a second panel, the topic broadened to encompass the challenges facing information sharing across the federal government.

A visibly frustrated Specter asked the other panelists how to instill “a sense of

urgency” in the work being done by Mueller and Russack.

“We went to help you,” he told Russack. “If I were to write a scathing letter, whom

would I address it to, to give you some help?” He asked.
159

Russack replied that “we have been working hard on this, even though we have a

very small staff.” He said that he had just sent out a letter to federal agencies and

departments outlining the positions he needed filled by detailees.

“I can assure you that there is a sense of urgency to get those positions filled,” he

said, adding that Specter should write to the Director of National Intelligence John

Negroponte. 

Hamilton soliloquized about the importance of Russack’s job.

“The place where it all comes together is in Mr. Russack’s position,” he said. “He’s

the fellow that has to see that we get all this information shared.” 

Hamilton said the position of the program manager had to be “empowered. He has to

have the resources. He’s got to have the people. He’s got to have the political support

in order to get the job done.” 

Russack said that he had already completed his first legislatively mandated report,

delivered to Congress and the president June 15.

His prepared testimony said the report identified five broad issues that would “define

the agenda for the program manager’s office over its two-year life.”

They were — in the order he listed them — “ambiguous and conflicting” policies

and authorities governing access to information; a lack of trust between different

parts of the federal government, and more generally between the feds and state and

local agencies, or between intelligence and law enforcement professionals; the persistence of the need-to-know principle in the application of “controls (on classified

data) imposed by the originating organization;” the need to improve information

sharing “in parallel with the protection of the information privacy and other rights of

Americans;” and, finally, technology.

Russack said that technology was not a barrier to or a restraint on information sharing. “The impediments are not the flow of electrons,” he said, calling technology “an

enabler of information sharing.”

The problem, his prepared testimony explains, is that “disagreements over roles and

responsibilities coupled with inadequate or outdated policies, procedures and standards often impede our ability to use existing technology effectively,” and resulted in

a “vast and confusing array of systems, databases, networks and tools that users must

deal with.”

Russack's June 15 report is classified For Official Use Only, the level below Secret,

he told United Press International after the hearing.
160

We can change this story. The effort will require a development of human, professional

relationships, collaboration, and vision. With inquiry and dialogue, and perhaps with the

articulation of stories rooted in knowledge and an appreciation of what works, change in

this direction is a real possibility — among those for whom the desire for change is real.

This study has explored “what works” in law enforcement analysis and what may work

in the future. The author applied only the first, Discovery, stage of Appreciative Inquiry.

If AI were fully applied to the problems noted in this study, solutions would be designed

by the participants and delivered in the Delivery stage. However, the treatment of all partners as equals in the Discovery stage does not apply to the Design and Delivery stages of

the process, where more traditional “command and control” would be applied by managers and political appointees. The goal of this book — to introduce the “outside” world to

the work of the analyst in law enforcement — has been achieved through the discovery of

valuable truths that frame the world view of active law enforcement analysts.

“We’ll see what we can do,” he responded when asked whether copies might be provided to the media. “A lot of other people have been asking that, too.”

Russack told UPI that his office was “going to be staffing up very quickly.”

“As you see, I have a lot of oversight to ensure that that happens,” he said, but

declined to put a timeline on the effort. 

Russack was not asked to elaborate on any of the policy or turf conflicts that he

alluded to in his prepared testimony. But one such issue identified by the presidential

commission on intelligence was the existence of conflicting and inconsistent rules

about what intelligence can be collected and shared if it relates to U.S. persons —

American citizens and corporations and other people living legally in the United

States.

At his confirmation hearing last week, the man nominated to be the general counsel in

the office of the director of national intelligence told lawmakers he would work

closely with Russack, noting that President Bush had chosen to place him under the

new director.

Benjamin Powell said that if confirmed, he “would supply necessary legal support to

(Russack) that would involve working with the chief legal officers of the components

of the intelligence community to identify legal impediments to information sharing.”

Powell said that he was considering setting up “some type of think tank” in the general

counsel’s office — “people whose job it is to look at these kinds of disputes” and who

were “wall(ed)... off from the day-to-day types of tasks that take everyone’s time.” 

Copyright © 2001-2005 United Press International — used by permission of the Copyright 

Clearance Center.
161

SOME PARTICIPANTS IN THIS STUDY

Subject Subject’s Title(s) E-mail

Thomas Algoe Retired Customs Intelligence 

Research Specialist, Buffalo, NY

talgoe@hilbert.edu

Eddie Beach Field Program Specialist — National Edward.beach@usdoj.gov

Rachel Boba Professor, Port St Lucie, FL, Former 

Crime Analyst

rboba@fau.edu

Lynn Brewer Crime Analyst in Newport News, VA lbrewer@nngov.com

Christopher 

Bruce

Public Safety Analyst in Danvers, 

MA

Cbruce@mail.danvers-ma.org

Peggy Call Crime Analyst in Salt Lake City, UT Peggy.Call@slcgov.com

Tom Casady Chief of Police in Lincoln, NE tcasady@lincoln.ne.gov

Howard Clarke Contract Analyst for RCMP in 

Vancouver, BC

Howard.clarke@cablelan.net

Ronald V. G. 

Clarke

Professor, Rutgers — former head 

of research Home Office, UK

rvgclarke@aol.com

Joseph 

Concannon

President of InfraGard, Bellerose, 

NY

Jconcannon@nym-infragard.us

Elise Dekoschak Intelligence Analyst in the High 

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, 

Tuscon, AZ

edekoschak@dps.state.az.us

Chris Delaney Research Analyst at RIT and in 

Rochester, NY

CD6709@cityofrochester.gov

Shelagh Dorn Senior Supervisor Program 

Research Analyst in the Upstate 

New York Regional Intelligence 

Center, Latham, NY

sdorn@troopers.state.ny.us

Francois Dubec Analyst in the Canadian Pacific 

Railroad, Montreal, Quebec

Francois_Dubec@cpr.ca

John Eck Professor, Cincinnati, OH John.eck@uc.edu

Appendix

Drug Intelligence Center, NY State
162

Participant Position E-mail

Noah Fritz President of the International 

Association of Crime Analysts 

nfritz@du.edu

Mark Gage National White Collar Crime 

Center Training 

mgage@nw3c.org

Mary Garrand Crime Analysis Supervisor in 

Alexandria, VA 

mary.garrand@alexandriava.gov

Peter Garza Criminal Intelligence Analyst in 

Mesa, AZ

Peter.garza@cityofmesa.org

Steve Gottlieb Alpha Group Crime Analysis 

Expert

crimecrush@aol.com

John Gottschalk Crime Analyst in Pierce County 

Sheriff’s Office, Puyallup, WA

jgottsc@co.pierce.wa.us

Samantha Gwinn Former Crime Analystin 

San Diego, CA

iaca_treasurer@mail.com

Robert Heibel Program Director of the 

Research/Intelligence Analyst 

Program at Mercyhurst College

rheibel@mercyhurst.edu

Bryan Hill Crime Analyst in Glendale AZ 

PD

bhill@glendaleaz.com

Lois Higgins Program Administrator of the 

Florida Department if Law 

Enforcement Analyst Academy 

in Tallahasse, FL

loishiggins@fdle.state.fl.us

Robert Hubbs Crime Analyst in Knoxville, TN rhubbs@cityofknoxville.org

David Jimenez Intelligence Analyst for the US 

Border Patrol in El Paso, TX

swnmia@juno.com

david.jimenez@dhs.gov

Metre Lewis Crime Analyst, in Kissimmee, FL mlewis@kissimmee.org

Michael Maltz Professor at Ohio Sate University 

in Columbus, OH

maltz4@osu.edu

Lisa Palmieri President of the International 

Association of Law Enforcement 

Intelligence Analysts 

Lisa.palmieri@pol.state.ma.us
163

Participant Position E-mail

Jerry Ratcliffe Research Professor at Temple 

University , Philadelphia, PA

jhr@temple.edu

Joseph Regali Manager of New England State 

Information Network Unit, 

Regional Intelligence Sharing 

jregali@nespin.riss.net

Dr. D. Kim Rossmo Research Professor at Texas 

State University in San Marcos, 

TX 

krossmo@aaustin.rr.com

Greg Saville Adjunct Professor in New Haven, 

CT

gregsaville@hotmail.com

Karin Schmerler Public Safety Analyst in Chula 

Vista, CA

kschmerler@chulavistapd.org

Tess Sherman Crime Analyst/Investigative 

Analyst inAustin, TX

Tess.sherman@ci.austin.tx.us

Tyrone Skanes Sworn Divisional Crime Analyst 

in Toronto, ON

tyskanes@hotmail.com

Angus Smith Senior Policy/Strategic Analyst in 

the RCMP in Ottawa, ON

Ac.smith@rcmp-grc.gc.ca

Sgt. Mark Stallo Supervisor of Crime Analysis in 

Dallas, TX

mstallo@hotmail.com

Steve Sullivan Supervisor of Crime Analysis in 

Ventura County Sheriff's Office in 

Thousand Oaks, CA

steve.sullivan@ventura.org

Warren Sweeney Alpha Group Intelligence 

Analysis Expert

Warren.sweeney@sympatico.ca

Lorie Velarde Crime Analyst in Irving, CA lvelarde@ci.irvine.ca.us

Gregory Volker Supervisor of Investigations, 

Kansas City, MO 

gvolker@kcpd.org

Susan Wernicke Crime Analyst in Shawnee, KS swernicke@ci.shawnee.ks.us

Ronald Wheeler Intelligence Research Specialist 

in the US Attorney’s Office, 

Western NY

Ronald.Wheeler@usdoj.gov
164

Participant Position E-mail

Kathleen Woodby Supervisor of Crime Analysis in 

Austin, TX

Kathleen.woodby@ci.austin.tx.us

Paul Wormeli Executive Director of the 

Integrated Justice Information 

Systems Institute in Alexandria, 

VA

Paul.wormeli@ijis.org

Robert Ziehm Operations Intelligence 

Specialist, US Coast Guard, 

Buffalo, NY

rziehm@grubuffalo.uscg.mil
165

Participants Were from These 18 States and 3 Canadian Provinces

City State/Province

Glendale Arizona

Mesa Arizona

Tucson Arizona

Chula Vista California

Garden Grove California

Montclair California

San Diego California

Thousand Oaks California

Denver Colorado

Hartford Connecticut

Kissimmee Florida

Port Lucie Florida

Tallahassee Florida

Shawnee Kansas

Boston Massachusetts

Danvers Massachusetts

Franklin Massachusetts

Kansas City Missouri

Newark New Jersey

Bellerose New York

Buffalo New York

Latham New York

Rochester New York

Cincinnati Ohio
166

Participants Were from These 18 States and 3 Canadian Provinces

City State/Province

Columbus Ohio

Erie Pennsylvania

Philadelphia Pennsylvania

Knoxville Tennessee

Austin Texas

Dallas Texas

El Paso Texas

San Marcos Texas

Salt Lake City Utah

Alexandria Virginia

Newport News Virginia

Puyallup Washington

Fairmont West Virginia

Vancouver British Columbia

Burlington Ontario

Ottawa Ontario

Toronto Ontario

Montreal Quebec
167

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International Association of Chiefs of Police. Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National

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168

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Press, 2001.

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2003.

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171

Index

A

abilities, 31, 43, 45, 52

academia, 59, 63, 110, 119, 146

access, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 33, 40, 57, 58, 60, 63, 72, 82, 88, 90, 96, 129, 149, 152

achievement, 20, 32, 39, 145

analysis, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,

30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62,

63, 65, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76

appreciative inquiry, 19, 23, 140, 143, 145, 156

artificial intelligence, 95

artisan, 46, 99

auditing, 141

automation, 87, 141

C

certification, 43

change, 1, 6, 7, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 38, 63, 69, 75, 77, 83, 104, 117, 121,

136, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152, 154, 156, 157, 160

characteristics, 5, 31, 43, 84, 94, 104

collaboration, 32, 33, 44, 45, 60, 70, 119, 125, 145, 156, 160

community policing, 67, 68, 69, 75, 82, 100, 115

complexity, 21, 31, 53

COMPSTAT, 67, 68, 75, 76, 86, 100, 137

computer, 34, 38, 53, 63, 67, 77, 81, 82, 83, 88, 95, 98, 133, 142

context, 11, 22, 25, 29, 31, 32, 60, 70, 104, 136, 142, 147, 151, 155

corporacy, 65, 66

creativity 24, 87, 130

crime, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40,

41, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 84,

85- 90, 93, 95, 96- 101, 103, 104-109, 111, 112, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122, 125-131, 134-

143,152, 154, 155, 165 
172

crime analysis, 133, 134, 141

crime patterns, 7, 53, 105

crime statistics, 3, 67, 85

crime trends, 8, 97, 125

D

data, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 32, 33, 34, 41, 42, 45, 48, 53, 54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 74,

81, 82, 84-91, 93, 95, 97-100, 103, 105, 109, 112, 113, 114, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142, 143,

146, 147, 148, 149, 153, 157

data mining, 88, 89

definitions, 7, 13, 31

discovery, 1, 3, 20, 32, 34, 145

E

education, 47, 96, 110, 111, 117, 119, 122, 141, 143

energy, 12, 20, 23, 25, 28, 32, 141, 148

engineer, 42, 47

equipment, 33, 39, 63, 81, 82, 83, 155

experience, 12, 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 39, 41, 42, 45, 47, 49, 59, 69, 109, 119, 122, 143

F

federal law enforcement, 1, 3, 6, 8, 54

freedom, 3, 17, 24, 25, 46, 54

future, 1, 8, 24, 27, 28, 30, 33, 41, 42, 63, 95, 98, 104, 108, 112, 121, 122, 130, 133, 134,

138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 147, 148, 154

G

generalist, 46

Geographic Information Systems, 35, 103

geography, 37, 106

I

imagination, 1, 2, 17, 20, 90, 109, 142

impact, 20, 32, 34, 40, 41, 57, 66, 75, 104, 105, 113, 120, 129, 130, 133, 134, 145, 149

inadequacies, 15, 77
173

individual, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 19, 24

influence, 5, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 32, 38, 98, 117, 134, 145, 147, 152, 155

information sharing, 9, 15, 51, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 74, 81, 82

intelligence, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 22, 28, 141

intelligence analysis, 84, 111, 112, 116, 117, 121, 122, 137, 138, 141, 143, 146, 149, 152,

153, 155

Intelligence Community, 11, 13, 17, 19, 39, 44, 45, 65, 86, 116, 146, 152

Intelligence Led Policing, 14, 165

International, 6, 7

International Association of Crime Analysts, 63, 74, 76, 85, 115, 165

International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, 5, 166

interpretation, 10, 12, 39, 69, 95, 109, 147

interviews, 17, 21, 22, 23, 25, 29, 48, 52, 54, 58, 61, 81, 93, 98, 100, 103, 145, 146

invention, 32, 145

investigation, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 30, 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 52, 53, 58, 61, 66, 84, 89, 93,

96, 99, 100, 102, 105, 106, 109, 112, 113, 117, 124, 126, 142

L

leadership, 19, 20, 21, 122, 123, 147, 148, 156

local law enforcement, 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 15, 33, 45, 53, 54, 55, 59, 75, 82, 103, 113, 117

M

management, 1, 7, 11, 12, 33, 44, 54, 63, 67, 68, 77, 100, 112, 115, 129, 130, 137, 145,

147, 148, 156

mapping, 57, 62, 75, 82, 87, 88, 90, 97, 100, 103, 104, 109, 127, 134

mental models, 19, 20, 148

military, 2, 5, 10, 13, 16, 26, 59, 138, 153, 157

mindset, 19

mission, 6, 7, 16, 17, 54, 55, 59, 67, 76, 96, 112, 115, 126, 129, 130, 133, 134, 152, 154

modernity, 152

modus operandi, 4, 95, 122, 135
174

N

National Intelligence Model, 13, 14

national security, 1, 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 52, 59, 138, 157

networking, 58, 60, 118

networks, 3, 5, 16, 54, 96, 128

O

organization, 1, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 35, 38, 48, 67, 76, 77, 84, 96, 98, 100, 112, 113,

120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 138, 140, 146, 147, 148, 149, 156, 157

organized crime, 4, 5, 6, 14, 53, 155

P

paradigms, 21, 22

patterns, 3, 4, 6, 7, 31, 35, 53, 86, 89, 93, 97, 105, 106, 122, 129, 136, 137, 139, 

people skills, 48

persistence, 35, 48

planning, 5, 21, 33, 73, 74, 82, 106, 121, 127, 139, 157

positive core, 22, 24

prediction, 32, 41, 99, 122

prevention, 2, 15, 16, 41, 67, 68, 73, 93, 96, 98, 100, 125, 136, 137, 139, 154

principles, 3, 23, 74, 106, 146

proactive, 3, 4, 8, 9, 46, 54, 68, 121, 137, 141, 153, 157

problem analysis, 70, 107, 129, 135

Problem-Oriented Policing, 69, 75

progress, 82, 119, 121

Q

qualitative data, 4

qualitative research, 19, 117

questions, 9, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 29, 42, 44, 46, 49, 75, 81, 88, 89, 93, 123, 135, 143, 145,

147

R

recognition, 7, 13, 32, 39, 44, 45, 55, 75, 76, 111, 141, 145
175

Records Management Systems, 7

regional data sharing, 3

relationships, 9, 19, 22, 28, 33, 48, 49, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 61, 63, 67, 76, 89, 97, 98, 99,

109, 119, 129, 140, 149, 152, 160

research, 11, 14, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 35, 38, 52, 60, 62, 65, 71, 75

resistance, 77

risk, 11, 13, 33, 42, 52, 72, 125, 127, 137, 139, 152, 155

S

safety, 1, 5, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 29, 51, 55, 60, 61, 138, 140, 147, 152, 156

serial criminals, 4, 53

sharing, 3, 9, 15, 28, 30, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 70, 74, 79, 80, 123,

126, 142, 145, 146, 149, 165

social ties, 58, 140

software, 7, 38, 41, 54, 63, 77, 81, 82, 83, 89, 90, 97, 127, 133

specialist, 61, 113, 129

standards, 7, 11, 13, 43, 51, 63, 66, 75, 85, 86, 99, 115

story, 27, 28, 32, 35, 47, 90, 98, 143, 147, 148, 149, 157, 160

success, 1, 25, 28, 29, 37, 41, 45, 49, 52, 58, 60, 61, 63, 66, 67, 75, 76, 87, 90, 98, 99, 100,

120, 122, 127, 128, 152

support, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 15, 32, 33, 38, 39, 48, 54, 55, 61, 63, 69, 75, 77, 82, 87, 96,

100, 103, 104, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 121, 141, 145, 147, 149, 156

Systematic information analysis, 9

systems thinking, 148

T

technology, 8, 16, 41, 42, 47, 52, 60, 67, 75, 77, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 89, 95, 103, 121, 127,

129, 133, 141, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155

terrorist(s), terrorism, 2, 3, 4, 8, 15, 16, 17, 51, 52, 54, 68, 106, 139, 140, 152, 153, 155

threat, 1, 9, 53, 54, 62, 68, 74, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 155

tradition, 6, 8, 20

training, 8, 11, 13, 26, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 63, 77, 82, 90, 96, 111,

112-116, 122, 123, 128, 129, 141, 143
176

U

understanding, 2, 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 28, 31, 32, 45, 66, 74, 89, 90, 94, 98, 103,

113, 118, 122, 128, 129, 137, 140, 141, 146, 149, 153, 154, 157

V

vendors, 3, 72, 111
177

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Deborah Osborne has been a crime analyst with the Buffalo Police Department for

over eight years. She holds a BA in Psychology and an MA in Social Policy with a

criminal justice emphasis from Empire State College, SUNY, where she has been an

adjunct instructor in Crime and Intelligence Analysis online at the Center for Distance

Learning. She has taught this subject at Mercyhurst College Northeast in Pennsylvania and online for Tiffin University in Ohio. Ms. Osborne has been the co-chair of the

certification committee of the International Association of Crime Analysts and

worked to set standards for a recently offered certification exam. She is also a member

of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts. Ms.

Osborne has co-authored a book on crime analysis for practitioners. She has presented at conferences and other venues on the topic of critical thinking skills, including a presentation on “Old and New Thinking Skills to Tackle Organized Crime” at

Criminal Intelligence Services Canada National Organized Crime Workshop. Ms.

Osborne also has served as an independent consultant to the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s Analysis Centre and facilitated short-term placements of PSNI police

analysts in law enforcement agencies in North America to promote cross-fertilization

of ideas and work methodologies. She is also a member of the International Association for Intelligence Education and Police Futurists International.