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Statistical Transparency Report Regarding use of National Security Authorities

April 22, 2015

Introduction.

In June 2013, President Obama directed the Intelligence Community to declassify and make 

public as much information as possible about certain sensitive U.S. government surveillance 

programs while protecting sensitive classified intelligence and national security information. 

Since then, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has declassified and authorized the public 

release of thousands of pages of documents relating to the use of critical national security 

authorities. In addition to declassifying and publicly releasing these documents, the DNI and 

the Intelligence Community have published several reports regarding these authorities, 

including a first-of-its-kind report on June 26, 2014, presenting statistics on how often the 

government used certain authorities during calendar year 2013.

Today, and consistent with the Intelligence Community’s Principles of Intelligence 

Transparency, we are releasing our second annual report presenting statistics on how often the 

government uses these important authorities. Accordingly, the DNI has declassified and 

directed the release of the following information covering calendar year 2014.

Annual Statistics for Calendar Year 2014 regarding Use of Certain National Security Legal 

Authorities.

Titles I, III, IV, and VII of FISA.

Legal Authority Annual Number 

of Orders

Estimated Number of Targets

Affected 

FISA Orders based on probable cause 

(Title I and III of FISA, Sections 703 

and 704 of FISA)

1519 orders 1562

Section 702 of FISA 1 order 92707

FISA Pen Register/Trap and Trace 

(Title IV of FISA)

135 orders 516
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It is important to provide some additional context to the above statistics. 

 Targets. Within the Intelligence Community, the term “target” has multiple meanings. 

For example, a “target” could be an individual person, a group, or an entity composed of 

multiple individuals or a foreign power that possesses or is likely to communicate 

foreign intelligence information that the U.S. government is authorized to acquire by the 

above-referenced laws. Some laws require that the government obtain a court order 

specifying the communications facilities (e.g., a telephone number, an email address)

used by a “target” to be subject to intelligence collection. Although the government 

may have legal authority to conduct intelligence collection against multiple 

communications facilities used by the target, the user of the facilities – the “target” – is 

only counted once in the above figures. 

 702 Targets. In addition to the explanation of target above, in the context of Section 

702 the term “target” is generally used to refer to the act of intentionally directing 

intelligence collection at a particular person, a group, or entity. For example, the 

statutory provisions of Section 702 state that the Government “may not intentionally 

target any person known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United 

States” (emphasis added), among other express limitations. Under Section 702, the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) approves Certifications as opposed to 

individualized orders. In the Section 702 context, the Intelligence Community targets a 

particular person, group, or entity by “tasking” selectors, pursuant to targeting 

procedures approved by the FISC. Selectors are specific communications facilities 

assessed to be used by a target (e.g., an email address or telephone number). Given the 

restrictions of Section 702, only selectors used by non-U.S. persons reasonably believed 

to be located outside the United States and who possess, or who are likely to 

communicate or receive, foreign intelligence information that is covered by an approved 

certification may be tasked. 

The number of 702 “targets” therefore reflects an estimate of the number of known 

users of particular selectors. This estimate is based on the information readily available 

to the Intelligence Community to identify unique targets – users whose identity may be 

unknown but who are reasonably believed to use the particular selector from outside 

the United States and who are reasonably believed to be non-United States 

persons. For example, foreign intelligence targets often communicate using several 

different email accounts. Each email account is a different selector, so unless the 

Intelligence Community has information that multiple email accounts are used by the 

same target, each of those accounts, i.e., selectors, would be counted separately in 

these figures. On the other hand, if the Intelligence Community is aware that multiple

accounts, i.e. selectors, are all used by the same target, as defined above, they would be 

counted as one target. This method of estimating helps ensure that the Intelligence 

Community does not inadvertently understate the number of discrete persons targeted 

pursuant to Section 702.
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 Relationship of Orders to Targets. In some cases, one order can by its terms affect 

multiple targets (as with Section 702). Alternatively, a target may be the subject of 

multiple orders, as noted below. 

 Amendments and Renewals. The FISC may amend an order one or more times after it 

has been issued. For example, an order may be amended to add a newly discovered 

account used by the target. To avoid redundant counting, these statistics do not count 

such amendments separately. Moreover, some orders may be renewed multiple times 

during the calendar year (for example, the FISA statute provides that a Section 704 FISA 

order against a U.S. person target may last no longer than 90 days but permits the order 

to be renewed). Unlike amendments, the statistics count each such renewal as a 

separate order. 

Title V of FISA (Business Records).

We are reporting information about the government’s use of the FISA Business Records 

provision (Title V) separately because this authority has been used in two distinct ways –

collection of business records to obtain information about a specific subject and collection of 

business records in bulk. Accordingly, in the interest of transparency, we have decided to 

clarify the extent to which individuals are affected by each use. In addition, instead of reporting 

on the number of Business Records orders, the government is reporting on the number of 

approved applications submitted to the FISC because the FISC may issue several orders to 

different recipients based upon a particular application. 
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Legal Authority

Annual Number of

Approved

Applications

Estimated Number Affected

FISA Business Records (Title V 

of FISA)

170 160: The number of 

individuals, entities, or foreign 

powers subject to a business 

records application to obtain 

information about a specific 

subject.

161: The number of selectors 

approved by the FISC to be 

queried under the NSA 

telephony metadata program.

227: The number of known or 

presumed U.S. persons who 

were the subject of queries of 

information collected in bulk or 

who were subject to a business 

records application. 

National Security Letters.

Finally, we are reporting information on the government’s use of National Security Letters 

(NSLs). On April 21, 2015, the Department of Justice released its Annual Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act Report to Congress. That report provides the number of requests made for 

certain information concerning different United States persons pursuant to NSL authorities 

during calendar year 2014. In addition to those figures, today we are reporting (1) the total

number of NSLs issued for all persons, and (2) the total number of requests for information 

contained within those NSLs. For example, one NSL seeking subscriber information from one 

provider may identify three e-mail addresses, all of which are relevant to the same pending 

investigation and each is considered a “request.” 

We are reporting the annual number of requests rather than “targets” for multiple reasons. 

First, the FBI’s systems are configured to comply with Congressional reporting requirements, 

which do not require the FBI to track the number of individuals or organizations that are the 

subject of an NSL. Second, even if the FBI systems were configured differently, it would still be 

difficult to identify the number of specific individuals or organizations that are the subjects of 

NSLs. One reason for this is that the subscriber information returned to the FBI in response to 

an NSL may identify, for example, one subscriber for three accounts or it may identify different 

subscribers for each account. In some cases this occurs because the identification information 

provided by the subscriber to the provider may not be true. For example, a subscriber may use 
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a fictitious name or alias when creating the account. Thus, in many instances, the FBI never 

identifies the actual subscriber of a facility. In other cases this occurs because individual 

subscribers may identify themselves differently for each account (e.g., by including a middle 

name or middle initial) when creating an account. 

We also note that the actual number of individuals or organizations that are the subject of an 

NSL is different than the number of NSL requests. The FBI often issues NSLs under different 

legal authorities, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, 

and 18 U.S.C. § 2709, for the same individual or organization. The FBI may also serve multiple 

NSLs for an individual for multiple facilities (e.g., multiple e-mail accounts, landline telephone 

numbers, or cellular phone numbers). The number of requests, consequently, is significantly 

larger than the number of individuals or organizations that are the subjects of the NSLs. 

Legal Authority Annual Number of 

NSLs Issued

Annual Number of 

Requests for 

Information

National Security Letters issued 

pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5),

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 

U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 U.S.C. § 2709

16,348 33,024

This information will be available at the website of the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI); and ODNI’s public website dedicated to fostering greater public visibility 

into the intelligence activities of the government, IContheRecord.tumblr.com.