Senturion 

A Predictive Political Simulation Model 

Mark Abdollahian, Michael Baranick, Brian Efird, and Jacek Kugler 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

July 2006 
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy 

or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

Mark Abdollahian, Ph.D. is a Research Professor at the School of Politics and Economics at 

Claremont Graduate University and Chief Operating Officer at Sentia Group, Inc.. Dr. 

Abdollahian can be contacted at MAA@sentiagroup.com.

Michael Baranick, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, National Defense University. Dr. Baranick can be contacted at 

BaranickM@ndu.edu. 

Brian Efird, Ph.D. is an Executive Vice President at Sentia Group, Inc.. Dr. Efird can be 

contacted at BAE@sentiagroup.com. 

Jacek Kugler, Ph.D. is the Elisabeth Helm Rosecrans Professor of International Relations and 

Political Economy in the Department of Politics and Policy, School of Politics and Economics at 

Claremont Graduate University. Dr. Kugler can be contacted at jacek.kugler@cgu.edu. 

Defense & Technology Papers are published by the National Defense University Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC. CTNSP publications are available online at 

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html. 
iii

Contents 

Introduction......................................................................................................................................1 

Case Study 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Aftermath..................................................................7 

Case Study 2: Iraqi Elections, January 2005 .................................................................................10 

Case Study 3: Palestinian Leadership Transition after Yasser Arafat’s Death..............................14 

Conclusions....................................................................................................................................19 

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................................21 
iv
Introduction 

The expanding complexity of sub-national and cross-national threats to national security strains 

the analytical capabilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Intelligence Community, 

highlighting the need for methods and tools that can make this emergent complexity manageable. 

With an ever-increasing spectrum of threats, more objective analytic capabilities that draw on 

all-source intelligence and advances in computational methods are needed to help provide insight 

and aid understanding of individual and group behavior. 

Computer-based predictive technologies have the maturity, track record, and capability to help 

meet this challenge. Just as DOD and the Intelligence Community apply computational modeling 

for knowledge discovery applications, so too can computational technologies be applied to 

improve the understanding of human behavior and decisionmaking. Moreover, the approach 

described in this paper relies not on the large volume of electronic data focused on by most 

computational methods, but rather provides a platform to facilitate and pool the knowledge of 

subject matter experts in the Federal Government and academia. Computational modeling based 

on reliable simulations of human behavior can then be applied to this information set to form the 

basis for unbiased predictions of potential threats. This combination of technologies can then 

form the basis for courses of action in response to a more systematic assessment of potential 

threats. 

This paper summarizes work utilizing the Senturion predictive analysis software at the National 

Defense University (NDU). The Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at 

NDU has been testing the Senturion capability since 2002, and has begun to support the 

application of this new technology in DOD. In this paper, we begin by describing the 

methodology underlying the software, and then provide an overview of three case studies that 

used the software: a predictive analysis of the stabilization and reconstruction phase of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the run-up to the Iraqi elections in January 2005, and the leadership 

transition in Palestine following the death of Yasser Arafat. 

 

Each of these projects tested the application of the software’s modeling technology to unfolding 

events. Each analysis was performed and briefed to senior government decisionmakers well in 

advance of events; the forecasts from each project tracked well with reality, often providing 

counterintuitive results. The approach provides policymakers and analysts with a tool for 

anticipating the outcome of complex political events that can also provide a detailed explanation 

of why events may not unfold as expected with traditional means of analysis. 

Senturion is a simulation capability that analyzes the political dynamics within local, domestic, 

and international contexts and predicts how the policy positions of competing interests will 

evolve over time. The underlying methodology relies on agent-based modeling—an approach 

that applies a set of mathematical algorithms against rules that structure a simulation of the 

behavior of “agents,” which in this case are the individuals and groups that influence political 

outcomes. The set of rules used by Senturion synthesize several classes of political science and 

microeconomic theories into a real-world decisionmaking tool for researchers and practitioners. 

Rather than a statistical or probabilistic approach to predictive modeling, Senturion employs a set 

of algorithms drawn from game theory, decision theory, spatial bargaining, and microeconomics. 
2

Each theory provides a functional component for modeling how agents interact in a political 

process. The Senturion methodology has been applied across diverse fields, including diplomacy, 

military campaigns, economic accords and business negotiations. The simulation software yields 

unique risk-mitigation benefits by anticipating and explaining outcomes and identifying courses 

of action to achieve beneficial change. 

Senturion helps analysts frame key political issues that either propel or impede policy objectives. 

Given a particular issue, the software facilitates subject matter expert identification of the 

positions of critical stakeholders on policy issues, weighs their potential influence, and assesses 

the strength of their commitment or advocacy of a policy position. This subject matter expertgenerated data input captures a snapshot of the current political landscape with a high degree of 

accuracy. However, the track record of analysts’ predictions is typically accurate 45 to 65 

percent of the time.1 The agent-based modeling approach allows for a consistent, systematic, 

significantly less-biased, and accurate analysis of the evolution of political dynamics given the 

subject matter expert-generated political landscape. Halal and Bojes (2005) conducted a survey 

of experts in the field of forecasting to determine which methodologies are more useful and 

accurate in applied forecasting. Among the algorithms Senturion relies on as rules for the 

behavior of its agents, the survey identified many to be valuable forecasting methodologies. In 

particular, the combination of expert interviews, simulation, and game theory draws upon some 

of the highest-evaluated approaches to predictive analysis. Precursors to the Senturion approach 

focused more on the calculation of coalitional support for different policy alternatives, as 

opposed to a dynamic model that simulates the interaction of individuals and groups over time.2 

Stakeholder Analyses 

Politics has often been called the “art of the possible.” If economics is the study of the 

distribution of scarce resources, then politics is the competition for the rules that govern the 

distribution of those scarce resources. Ultimately, these possibilities are created and constrained 

by individual, groups, nation-states and their interactions. In the 1960s, work in the field of 

business and management on understanding how individuals influence outcomes led to 

stakeholder analyses.3 Political issues at the policy level might encompass U.S. policy in a 

particular country or region, budgetary allocations in Congress, national autonomy, wars of 

liberation, troop deployments, or even pipeline placement—any question that is fundamentally 

determined by the interaction of people. 

Traditional stakeholder analysis has relied on qualitative assessments of stakeholder preferences 

as the basis for predictions of how stakeholders are likely to behave in forming coalitions in 

favor of or in opposition to political issues. Senturion relies on identifying primary, secondary, 

and tertiary stakeholders who have an interest in propelling or impeding various political 

outcomes. Once stakeholders are identified by subject matter experts, they are categorized by 

their ability to influence outcomes and the importance of political issues to them. This 

categorization characteristically translates into matrix mapping with four typologies: 

 

1 See Rieber (2004). 

2 For a review see Feder (1987) and Kugler and Feng (1997). 

3 Stakeholder refers to persons, institutions, agencies, private sector groups, governments, non-state actors, or other 

entities with a stake in the outcome, or more importantly, some potential to influence a particular outcome. 
3

• Large influencers with high importance who can either help or impede progress. 

Opponents should be isolated, while proponents should be empowered to form larger 

coalitions. 

• Large influencers with little importance who can be mobilized to assist the political 

process if they support it, or blocked if they oppose it. 

• Small influencers with high importance who can either help or impede progress. 

Opponents should be isolated, while proponents should be empowered in stronger 

coalitions. 

• Small influencers with little importance who could be motivated to assist the political 

process, if necessary, but would not be worth the effort to block. 

Other methodologies attempt to aggregate specific stakeholder interests or scale their influence 

or importance. But these approaches lack a dynamic, analytical component that allows observers 

to know what will happen over time. This traditional stakeholder analysis may enlighten, but it 

does not answer the key operational question, “what’s next?” 

Work in the 1970s resulted in a more formal specification of the stakeholder approach, deriving 

the particular political issue as a linear continuum that stakeholders fight on with a consistent set 

of data inputs in the Prince System.4 Thus, stakeholders were assigned particular influence, 

importance, and positional attributes that could be scaled to arrive at a relative ranking of 

political viability but not actual political outcomes. The reality of most political processes is that 

stakeholders exert influence to shape the dynamics of outcomes based on interactions with each 

other.5 Tracking these dynamics and capturing the knowledge to achieve a desired outcome is a 

complex process. One approach suggests employing vectors in static form to anticipate 

stakeholder bargaining dynamics.6 Such solutions are relatively straightforward in dyadic 

interactions but become less predictable in multiple-actor environments. Worse, analysts are 

forced to simplify and aggregate stakeholders into larger, coarser groups to reach any 

conclusions, often missing important details. This is further complicated when multiple political 

issues are present.7 Combining traditional stakeholder analysis with recent advances in agentbased modeling allows for the accurate and rich simulation of all stakeholders on a particular 

political issue. 

Methodology 

Over the last thirty years, a large, multidisciplinary literature on the simulation of individual and 

group behavior on political issues has emerged and, more recently, proliferated.8 Approaches in 

this field typically focus on agents at the micro level (individuals or small groups) as the unit of 

analysis. The simulation technology used by Senturion models the behavior and interaction of 

decisionmakers (such as individuals, families, and firms) within a larger system. This modeling 

 

4 For a review of the PRINCE System see Coplin and O’Leary (1972). 

5 For more detail see Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and (1985). 

6 For more detail an initial notion of applying vectors to stakeholder analysis see Lalman (1988). 

7 This notion is explored in more technical detail in Morrow (1986), Morgan (1994), and Abdollahian and 

Alsharabati (1995) and (2003). 

8 The literature here is rather broad. A sample can be found in Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, and Cohen (1996); Epstein 

and Axtel (1996); Chwe (1999); and Axlerod and Tesfatsion (2005). 
4

strategy uses data on representative samples of decisionmakers, along with equations and 

algorithms representing behavioral processes, to simulate the evolution through time of each 

decisionmaker, hence, of the entire population of decisionmakers.9

Whereas the computational capacity of thirty years ago allowed the simulation of only very 

limited numbers of agents, or stakeholders, today’s computational power allows for sophisticated 

rule sets to be applied to thousands of agents simultaneously. The stakeholder model embedded 

in Senturion—which is technically an agent-based model, because agents are interacting within a 

system of rules—transcends traditional stakeholder approaches by providing a consistent and 

systematic modeled framework for the exponentially increasing network of interactions without 

reduction or simplification in problem fidelity. For a given political issue, Senturion simulates 

the iterative political decisionmaking calculus among stakeholders with different interests in and 

varying influence on the political process. With considerable accuracy, it can predict how these 

bargaining dynamics play out across a network of political relations over time. The result is an 

analytical assessment of the likely extent of reform and of the degree of stakeholder support for 

this outcome a priori without reliance on an ad hoc assessment. 

Beginning with a rigorous subject matter expert-led data collection process, one can obtain a 

detailed depiction of the current political landscape. In the data-collection process, stakeholders 

are assigned multiple attributes of their political position and potential influence. This is 

followed by an assessment of the amount of political, economic, social, and military capital they 

are willing to expend on the issue. Thus, all agents are not created equal de novo. They possess 

unique and individual capabilities that help determine their interactions with other agents. All 

agents are subject to the same push and pull of the political process, trying to maximize their 

available resources to support or oppose a particular outcome. Senturion views all agents as 

attempting to maximize their interests and seeking to create coalitions to support those interests. 

Senturion’s rule- and equation-based algorithms model the intuition behind each stakeholder’s 

political calculus by breaking the process into sub-elements that can be modeled. Each element 

models a particular part of the decision process; by combining the elements sequentially, the 

approach can provide an assessment and explanation of how stakeholders arrive at a particular 

decision or political outcome. Each sub-element of the modeling process is designed to help 

predict a part of how stakeholder positions will change and thus predict the evolution of the 

policy process in toto. From an analytical perspective, dynamic and recursive estimation of 

stakeholder interactions allows Senturion to anticipate compromises and coalitions that will form 

in response to political pressures. The end result is a simulation capability that provides both a 

forecast and a detailed explanation and justification for its predictions. (See figure 1 for a 

conceptual overview of Senturion’s sub-element rules). 

 

9 See Caldwell (1997). 
5

1. Initial Stakeholder Data 2. Agent Based Rules & Modeling Elements

1. What is winning coalition or Median 

position?

2. Given the winning coalition position, 

which groups are risk taking?

3. How does each stakeholder view every 

other stakeholder on assisting or 

opposing the issue?

4. Which stakeholders will make what 

proposals to other stakeholders, 

strengthening or weakening coalitions?

5. Which stakeholders will revise their 

position on the issue resulting in 

anticipating the political dynamics?

Effective Power

(Influence*Importance) Low

High

Effective Power

(Influence*Importance) Low

High

3. Anticipated Dynamics 4. Modeling Iteration 2

1. How did Median position change?

2. How did risk profiles change given the 

change in the median position?

3. How do stakeholder perceptions 

change?

4. Which stakeholders will make what 

proposals to other stakeholders given 

these changes?

5. Which stakeholders will revise their 

position on the reform issue resulting in 

anticipating the political dynamics?

Effective Power

(Influence*Importance) Low

High

5. Anticipated Outcome 6. Interpreting Outcomes

1. Iterations stop when stakeholders see 

no further gains in discussions. 

2. Where key stakeholders end up on the 

issue determines the anticipated issue 

outcome.

3. If a majority of stakeholders coalesce 

around a position, there is a large 

degree of consensus, if not conflict will 

occur.

Figure 1. Six Steps of the Senturion Modeling Process 
6

Senturion can provide a consistent framework for objective analysis of stakeholder politics, 

rather than relying solely on individual expert opinions about political outcomes. Of course, 

analytical transformations cannot compensate for poor data. The reliance on stakeholder data—

crucial to understanding human behavior and stakeholder motivations—limits the temporal 

forecast horizon to approximately two years, as certain data elasticities can propagate error over 

time. In other words, the likelihood of exogenous shocks over the stakeholder list increases over 

time, and after two years becomes quite high. That said, Senturion allows the analyst to examine 

political dynamics to, first, gauge whether the policy options are politically feasible as designed 

and, second, identify tactics to shape the political environment and achieve a more favorable 

outcome. Senturion can thus provide an assessment of multiple courses of action with a higher 

degree of confidence then previously available. 

Having described the methodology underlying Senturion, let us turn now to a description of three 

recent applications. 
7

Case Study 1: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Aftermath 

This section summarizes the findings of an analysis focused on stability and regime change in 

Iraq. The analysis for this case study began in November 2002, while the focus of the project 

was on the scenario that evolved several months later, following OIF, in 2003 and 2004. 

Senturion was used to simulate the interactions between all stakeholders who influence Iraq’s 

stability, forecasting the consequences for the survival of Saddam’s regime and the post-Saddam 

period. At each stage of the analysis, the software accurately forecasted, in detail, the outcome 

and consequences of policy decisions regarding the U.S. military campaign in Iraq and the 

subsequent efforts at Iraqi reconstruction. While Senturion did a good job of anticipating the 

behavior of stakeholders inside Iraq, it did a poor job of anticipating the behavior of stakeholders 

in Europe. In general, Senturion overestimated the willingness of European stakeholders to 

support U.S.-led operations. While the core of the study was on Iraqi behavior, this is an 

important lesson learned from the case study. These inaccuracies seem to be a reflection of the 

level of detail applied to the data for stakeholders in Europe. For example, France and Germany 

were both treated as single stakeholders. In reality, the leaderships of both countries were 

stakeholders operating subject to domestic political constraints and concerns that affected their 

ability and willingness to provide support for the U.S. Thus, if the intent was to more accurately 

model the behavior of different coalition partners, then the stakeholder data for those potential 

partners should be of sufficient depth and granularity to capture the constraints they face. 

All analysis was based on data provided by Iraqi subject matter experts from the Brookings 

Institution, RAND Corporation, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National 

Defense University. All forecasts were based on unclassified information. Updates were applied 

when stakeholders were captured or killed, for example, when Ali Hasan Al-Majid and Abid 

Hamid Hamud were captured,10 Uday and Qusay Hussein were killed,11 and Saddam Hussein 

was captured. Each new simulation, or forecast, relied on the predicted positions from the 

previous simulation to create a succession of simulations over a year and a half. 

Based on the aftermath of OIF in April 2003, we predicted that the situation in Iraq would 

worsen throughout 2003 and 2004 in terms of Iraqi attitudes toward U.S. presence as well as 

insurgent activity. While the Senturion simulation indicated that OIF would produce a quick 

regime change, Saddam’s well-trained former military core was expected to provide the basis for 

violent and persistent resistance. We anticipated that this resistance would receive broad and 

growing political support from numerous and otherwise opposing factions within Iraq. Initial 

Shiite neutrality to the United States was expected to evolve into active hostility for important 

factions, including al-Sadr. Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi dissident during the Saddam regime who 

was sponsored by the United States in post-war Iraq, was not expected to be a reliable ally for 

the United States over time. Continued U.S. military presence was expected to unify many 

 

10 Ali Hasan Al-Majid and Abid Hamid Hamud were two key leaders in Saddam’s regime. Thus, we wanted to 

ensure that their capture would not have an appreciable change on the simulation, as they were commonly perceived 

as key stakeholders. Their removal did not appear to make a significant difference. 

11 Uday and Qusay Hussein, Saddam’s sons, were similarly important stakeholders in his regime. Again, we wanted 

to update the simulation to reflect their death to ensure that the removal of such key stakeholders would not 

substantively impact the simulation. Their removal did not appear to make a significant difference. 
8

Sunnis and Shiites against a common foe, the U.S. military forces on the ground. While these 

findings have become a more generally accepted explanation of events after the fact, there was 

substantial disagreement about the likely course of events as predicted by the Senturion 

simulation prior to OIF. 

The former Iraqi regular army was expected to become an active opponent of the United States. 

The Kurds were expected to briefly oppose U.S. interests, but in the end renew their support for 

U.S. operations in Iraq. After the transfer of power on June 30, 2003, the model predicted that 

the French and Russians increasingly would oppose U.S. interests in Iraq. Finally, the overall 

level of violence in Iraq was not expected to diminish. Figure 2 shows the dates and content of 

the four Senturion forecasts. 

May 2003

May 2004

August 2003

November 20

January 2004

• Proposed 

government 

structures will not 

find consensus

• Implementation 

of new 

government will 

be thwarted by 

competing 

parties

• Disposition of 

Iraqis toward the 

US will 

deteriorate

• Al Sadr will 

become an active 

opponent of US 

interests

• Chalabi will 

cease to 

operate as a 

supporter of US 

activities

• Opposition to 

US from Iraqi 

civil society will 

increase

• Terrorist 

activities will 

increase with 

broadening 

support

• Shiite groups 

willing to 

coordinate with 

Sunnis in 

opposition to 

US interests

• Shiite religious 

leaders and 

Sunnis will 

increasingly 

oppose the 

US efforts 

• Terrorist 

activities will 

persist with 

support from 

Sunnis and 

Shiites

• Prospect for 

open internal 

war is high 

and imminent

• Saddam’s capture 

does not change 

the predictions

• Removal of 

Saddam will cause 

Shiite groups to 

oppose US 

interests more 

vigorously

• Removal of 

Saddam solidifies 

widespread violent 

opposition to the 

US

Operation

Iraqi

Freedom

April 2003

May 2003

May 2004

August 2003

November 20

January 2004

• Proposed 

government 

structures will not 

find consensus

• Implementation 

of new 

government will 

be thwarted by 

competing 

parties

• Disposition of 

Iraqis toward the 

US will 

deteriorate

• Al Sadr will 

become an active 

opponent of US 

interests

• Chalabi will 

cease to 

operate as a 

supporter of US 

activities

• Opposition to 

US from Iraqi 

civil society will 

increase

• Terrorist 

activities will 

increase with 

broadening 

support

• Shiite groups 

willing to 

coordinate with 

Sunnis in 

opposition to 

US interests

• Shiite religious 

leaders and 

Sunnis will 

increasingly 

oppose the 

US efforts 

• Terrorist 

activities will 

persist with 

support from 

Sunnis and 

Shiites

• Prospect for 

open internal 

war is high 

and imminent

• Saddam’s capture 

does not change 

the predictions

• Removal of 

Saddam will cause 

Shiite groups to 

oppose US 

interests more 

vigorously

• Removal of 

Saddam solidifies 

widespread violent 

opposition to the 

US

Operation

Iraqi

Freedom

April 2003

Figure 2. Track Record of Senturion Predictions on Iraq 

Based on Senturion results, Saddam’s inner circle was not expected to defect in the face of a U.S. 

military campaign or subsequent U.S. operations. The removal of Ali Hasan Al-Majid and Abid 

Hamid Hamud, two key leaders in Saddam’s regime, as well as Saddam’s sons, Qusay and Uday, 

was not expected to reduce the commitment of these stakeholders. Most importantly, the capture 

of Saddam was not expected to change these results. 

The Internal Security Services, Special Security Organization, Tikriti mafia, and Special 

Republican Guard were well-trained and well-armed military personnel known to be extremely 

loyal to Saddam. From the first prediction, these groups were expected to form the core of an 

armed and violent resistance to U.S. operations and efforts in Iraq. Subsequent predictions and 

adjustments have reinforced this initial finding. 
9

Sunni and Shiite factions were also examined to determine their likely response to the U.S. 

presence in Iraq. Sunni clan leaders always were expected to oppose the United States, providing 

support for the violent opposition to U.S. operations during and after OIF. The Sunni middle 

class, on the other hand, were expected to take more of a “wait and see” approach to the United 

States after formal military operations, and begin more vocal opposition to the U.S. activities in 

mid-2003. The Sunni masses were expected to remain neutral much longer, but would begin to 

voice mildly negative concerns in early 2004. After a brief period of support following the 

formal end of military operations, secular and urban Shiites were expected to oppose the United 

States by mid-2003. Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other southern Shiites were expected to remain 

neutral, while al-Sadr was expected to become a vocal opponent in early 2004. Most importantly, 

Sunni and Shiite opponents of U.S. military presence were expected to collaborate against U.S. 

forces. Note that this forecast was made months prior to the onset of military hostilities. 

Two additional stakeholders were added to the simulation in August 2003: the Iraqi Governing 

Council (IGC) and Ahmed Chalabi. Chalabi was forecasted to be only a temporary ally of the 

United States. The IGC, on the other hand, was expected to be a consistent advocate of U.S. 

activities based on its close ties to the United States. 

Senturion simulations provided detailed forecasts regarding how stability and regime change in 

Iraq would unfold as a consequence of OIF and subsequent actions. The model produced very 

specific predictions about the behavior of individual stakeholders and accurately captured the 

timing of unexpected defections as well as the potential support from unexpected allies.12 As an 

experiment in applying Senturion to an unfolding political situation, our test was a success, as 

judged by assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Office of Secretary of 

Defense (OSD).13 With only limited access to subject matter experts, robust analytic results were 

produced. 

 

12 For example, the specific behavior of al Sistani, al Sadr, and other Shia stakeholders following the collapse of the 

regime of Saddam was anticipated—to the point of even accurate sequencing of defections among different factions. 

Similarly, the reaction of Sunnis to the aftermath of OIF in the simulation tracked very closely to observed behavior. 

13 These assessments were documented in detail in Predictive Analysis Pre-Select Business Case produced by the 

Research and Requirements unit of the DIA on February 7, 2005. 
10

Case Study 2: Iraqi Elections, January 2005 

This section details the findings from a second analysis on Iraq, using only open-source data 

from subject matter experts from the Intelligence Community and Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy. This project focused on support for the January 2005 elections in Iraq. Once again, 

all findings and predictions in this briefing were generated using Senturion only. The largely 

pessimistic forecast for the elections held up well when compared to the actual flow of events. 

Table 1 summarizes all of the predictions based on data collected by the end of December 2004 

and compares them to actual events that unfolded over the following two months. 

Focusing on the various social factions within Iraq, Senturion provided insights into the likely 

behavior of Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds. The largely Sunni insurgents were expected to continue the 

scope and pace of attacks against supporters of the January 30, 2005 election. On the other hand, 

Iraqi supporters of the election, including secular Shia and Sistani’s followers, would maintain 

their support for and participation in the election. The Sadrists were likely to lean in favor of the 

election over the next few weeks, but ultimately be indecisive about their support for the process. 

Groups neutral toward the election at the end of December 2004, including secular Sunni, the 

Tribal Elders, and Turkomans, were expected to remain neutral. The Kurds were in general 

expected to continue to support the election strongly; the PUK would be much more supportive 

and cooperative with Interim Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi and the interim government than the 

KDP.14 Despite their mutual support for the 30 January election, tension between the Kurds and 

Shia was expected to remain high. Indeed, this tension is more pronounced than between Kurds 

and Sunnis. Finally, Senturion predicted that a change of approach that made neutral Iraqis feel 

safer, by either coalition forces or the insurgency, would have allowed either the U.S. or 

insurgents to gain the support of neutral Iraqis. 

Another major question facing analysts and decisionmakers before the election was the role that 

other nations in the region might play. Senturion was also able to calculate both the desires and 

effectiveness of those stakeholders in driving the election. According to the Senturion software, 

Iran would attempt to drive the election, but have very little success in shaping the electoral 

outcome. Syrian stakeholders would have very little influence on the election. However, the U.S. 

(with a direct approach) was in a position to persuade the Syrian regime, Old Guard, and 

intelligence services to support the election with a direct request for their backing—but Syrian 

President Bashar al-Asad would not cooperate with such a request. Saudi Arabian and Jordanian 

stakeholders were expected to have very little influence on Iraqi attitudes. Finally, while 

Jordanian stakeholders would have little direct influence on the election, its support for the 

election would indirectly solidify the support of Shia tribal elements. 

 

14 The two leading Kurdish groups in Iraq are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabani, and the 

Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), led by Massoud Barzani. 
11

Predictions 

(Based on 12/30/2004 Data) Actual Events Date of Actual Event 

Insurgents will continue scope and pace of 

attacks. 

Repeated attacks by insurgents continued 

through the elections. 1/31/200515

Strong supporters of the elections, 

particularly Sistani’s followers and secular 

Shia, will participate in the election. 

Sistani’s supporters and secular Shia voted in 

large numbers in the election. 2/1/200516

Sadrists will be indecisive about supporting 

the election despite positive signs during 

January. 

Sadrists straddle both sides of the election 

issue, neither boycotting nor actively 

opposing the election, but also not endorsing 

the process. 

1/31/200517

Secular Sunnis and Sunni tribal elders will 

remain neutral toward the election. 

Sunnis disproportionately stayed home during 

the election, while not actively opposing the 

process. 

2/1/200518

Kurds will strongly support the election. Kurds turned out for the election in large 

numbers. 2/1/200519

Tension will remain high between Kurds and 

Shia. 

Tension between Kurds and Shia on future of 

Iraq appears to remain high despite the 

election. 

1/31/200520

Zarqawi and foreign insurgents will have 

little success in undermining support for 

election in January. 

Election went forward with high Shia 

participation, despite attacks by insurgents. 2/1/200521

World Bank and IMF will pull back support 

of the election. 

Timing and willingness of World Bank and 

IMF reconstruction efforts in Iraq unclear. 1/28/200522

France, Russia, and Germany will 

increasingly support the election. 

France and Germany praise the Iraqi election. 

Russian response ambiguous. 2/2/200523

Table 1. Track Record of Iraqi Election Predictions 

 

15 Washington Times, Jan 31, 2005. 

16 Washington Post, Feb 1, 2005. 

17 New York Times, Jan 31, 2005. 

18 Washington Times, Feb 1, 2005. 

19 Washington Times, Feb 1, 2005. 

20 Christian Science Monitor, Jan 31, 2005. 

21 Washington Post, Feb 1, 2005. 

22 Washington Post, Jan 28, 2005. 

23 International Herald Tribune, Feb 2, 2005.
12

Senturion also was used to assess the reactions to the election of major players in the 

international community. France, Russia, and Germany were expected to coalesce and 

increasingly support the election, but their impact would be minimal on Iraqi attitudes. Poland, 

South Korea, and Australia would continue to strongly support the election with limited impact 

on Iraqi attitudes. Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, and Japan would also remain supportive of the 

election. Finally, the World Bank and IMF were expected to quickly pull back their explicit 

support for the election. 

In assessing the insurgency in Iraq, Senturion provided two startling conclusions. As for foreign 

insurgents, Senturion forecasted that Zarqawi and other foreign insurgents had very little 

leverage to undermine support for the election at this point. On the other hand, domestic 

insurgents, composed mainly of former regime elements, had most of the leverage in this 

situation in the months before the election. However, they did not recognize the extent of their 

potential influence. As long as the highly-trained factions of the former regime elements focused 

indiscriminately on targets in Iraq, they missed out on an opportunity to capture the support of 

neutral Iraqis. Were the former regime elements to shift their tactics and focus solely on coalition 

forces and their closest allies, they would maximize their leverage and better achieve their goal 

of minimizing support for the election. Such a shift by the insurgents would have undermined the 

resolve of the coalition to push forward on the elections and solidified the support of neutral 

Iraqis for the insurgency by making them feel safer. We cannot assess the accuracy of this 

finding because the former regime elements did not exploit this opportunity. 

 

Senturion also can be used to test alternative courses of action. The assumptions, policies, and 

tactics of U.S. stakeholders can be simulated to identify first- and second-order consequences, 

then adjusted to find the optimal approach to a particular situation. Moreover, because Senturion 

calculates the perceptions of stakeholders, it can also identify circumstances when perceptions of 

key stakeholders are inaccurate. At times, such knowledge may form the basis for a course of 

action to exploit the limits of perception. Several courses of action to improve the situation in 

Iraq prior to the election were identified using Senturion, as described below. 

First, Senturion identified a way to persuade Sunni tribal elements to moderate their opposition 

to the election. Initially, Interim Prime Minister Allawi and the interim government would have 

needed to alter their approach to the Sunni tribes and focus on persuading the youth element in 

the Sunni tribes. The youths could have been offered a modest monetary incentive to take a 

neutral stance toward the elections. After this accomplishment, the Sunni tribal elders could have 

been approached to actively support the elections (as the tribes would not have been split if the 

elders had accepted such an offer at that point). In a truly tribal structure, the elders decide on the 

course of the tribe and the youth will follow. However, no individuals make decisions without 

observing the sentiment and preferences of those around them. In this case, the model indicated 

that the elders were weakly committed to their initial course of action and could have been 

persuaded by the opinions of tribal youths, which in turn could have been influenced by U.S. 

strategic messaging or an information operation campaign. 

Second, we identified a way to obtain support from some former regime elements. Specifically, 

Senturion analysis suggested that rank and file former regime elements could have been 

persuaded to participate in the election if directly approached by Interim Prime Minister Allawi 
13

with U.S. backing. More senior and better trained former regime elements were not expected to 

respond to such an approach. These two measures would not have lessened the insurgency, but 

according to the Senturion simulation, they could have increased Sunni participation in the 

election. 

Finally, Senturion was used to assess the implication of adjusting the force structure in Iraq 

before the election. A reduced coalition military presence in Iraq would not have appreciably 

affected the attitudes of Iraqi stakeholders. However, increased coalition military strength in Iraq 

would have improved the attitudes of Iraqi stakeholders toward the election by making them feel 

more secure. We tested a variety of different options for the composition of military forces, as 

well as the level of percentage increase in forces on the ground necessary to impose the peace. 

The scenarios tested included the following, with the associated impact of each increase in boots 

on the ground: 

• 25% increase in coalition military strength would have captured the support of neutral 

Iraqis. 

• 50% increase in coalition military strength would have captured the support of neutral 

and some opposing Iraqis. 

• 75-100% increase in coalition military strength would have captured the support of 

neutral Iraqis, but with less gain in support than with a 50% increase. 

After testing the impact of greater numbers of troops, we also tested whether the population 

would be sensitive to the composition of enhanced deployments, that is, would it make a 

different if the troops were composed of strictly U.S. forces or a combination with other allied 

forces. The Senturion analysis indicated that the composition of U.S. versus other coalition 

troops did not make a difference in perceptions of the Iraqi population. However, there was a 

difference when testing the perception of using United Nations peacekeepers in place of U.S. 

troops, in that they could play a similar peacekeeping and policing role to that of U.S. or 

coalition military forces, but because of the perceptions of Iraqis, could accomplish the same 

results with fewer troops. 

The final set of Senturion simulations focused on scenarios that might have disrupted progress 

toward elections. In particular, we found that the assassination of al Sistani, al Sadr, or Allawi 

would not have disrupted support for or opposition to the election. The finding on al Sistani was 

a dramatic change from earlier findings on his role in Iraq. Over the course of the analyses in 

2003 and 2004 as described above, al Sistani played a major stabilizing role, and his death would 

have caused even greater instability. However, during the final run-up to the election, he had 

clearly declared his support for the U.S.-led elections. By no longer occupying a neutral role, the 

important stabilizing role previously played by al Sistani was diminished. Similarly, removal of 

Zarqawi was unlikely to disrupt the insurgents or affect support for the election. Finally, a 

targeted reduction of former regime element capability would have had little or no impact on 

support for the election. 
14

Case Study 3: Palestinian Leadership Transition after 

Yasser Arafat’s Death 

These results are drawn from a study analysis for the DIA on the leadership transition in 

Palestine following the death of Arafat and its impact on the Palestinian-Israeli peace 

negotiations. Unclassified data were collected from subject matter experts in the Intelligence 

Community on November 2, 2004, immediately following Arafat’s death and prior to the 

consolidation of power in Palestine. Table 2 summarizes the track record of these predictions. 

Predictions 

(Based on 11/2/2004 Data) Actual Events Date of Actual Event 

Fatah old guard will quickly support Mazen. 15-member Central Committee endorses 

Mazen. 11/23/200424

Mazen will quickly persuade Qaddumi and 

Dahlan to lend their support. 

Both Qaddumi and Dahlan endorse Mazen as 

President of the Palestinian Authority. 11/22/200425

Mazen expected to work with Dahlan and 

Musa Arafat, arranging power sharing 

accommodations with each. 

Dahlan and Musa Arafat reconcile their 

violent differences under the guidance of 

Mazen and lend their support. 

11/21/200426

Israel and Europe expected to accept Mazen’s 

leadership role. 

Mazen is the favored choice of Israel and 

Europe for Palestinian leadership. 11/24/200427

After most have declared support for Mazen, 

the AAMB will lend its support. 

AAMB factions issued a joint statement 

calling for Palestinians to support Mazen. 11/28/200428

Barghouti endorses Mazen. 11/26/200429

Barghouti enters presidential race. 12/1/2004 Barghouti not expected to oppose Mazen— 30

risk of opposition alliance with Hamas or 

AAMB. Barghouti withdraws from presidential race. 12/12/200431

Table 2. Track Record of Palestinian Leadership Transition Predictions 

 

24 Washington Post, Nov 23, 2004. 

25 Arabic Media Network, Nov 22, 2004. 

26 Jerusalem Post, Nov 21, 2004. 

27 The Guardian, Nov 24, 2004. 

28 BBC News, Nov 28, 2004. 

29 United Press International, Nov 26, 2004. 

30 Jerusalem Post, Dec 2, 2004. 

31 BBC News, Dec 12, 2004. 
15

Senturion accurately anticipated that Abu Mazen (a name applied to Mahmoud Abbas as a sign 

of respect) would be accepted as a political leader by the Presidential election in January 2005. 

Despite initial wide variance in the level of support from Palestinian stakeholders, as well as 

initial opposition by several militant groups within Palestine, all opposition to his leadership role 

was expected to erode. 

Senturion predicted a consolidation of Palestinian support for Mazen through leadership powersharing arrangements. Of those supporting Mazen, most were expected to support his leadership 

around the position of Abu Ala (also known as Ahmed Ali Mohammed Qurei, a member of the 

Fatah Central Committee). Mazen was expected to soften his claims to leadership first in 

response to Mohammed Dahlan (member of the Palestinian Legislative Council), and then in 

response to Musa Arafat (nephew of Yasser Arafat), implying some sort of power-sharing 

accommodation with each. 

Protracted opposition by armed groups was not expected. Mazen was expected to quickly 

persuade the Fatah hardliners, Faruq al-Qaddumi (interim chairman of the Fatah32), and Musa 

Arafat to support him. A year later, in September 2005, Musa Arafat was murdered, but during 

the course of the Palestinian election, Senturion correctly anticipated relative calm among these 

political figures. Hamas and the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB)33 were anticipated to 

respond to this consolidation by softening their level of opposition. Over time, the Senturion 

analysis indicated that both the AAMB and Hamas would realize they must support Mazen or 

risk being isolated from all other stakeholders. 

The major risk to this consolidation of power was the formation of an alliance between Marwan 

Barghouti (a leader of the Fatah movement imprisoned in Israel) and more extreme opponents of 

Mazen. In the early stages of Mazen’s consolidation of support, immediately after Arafat’s death, 

Senturion found that either AAMB or Hamas had the potential to bring Barghouti into an 

opposition coalition. Such a coalition would have posed the risk of a violent transition, as some 

of its members had previously relied on violence to express their opposition. However, this 

coalition was considered unlikely to form, as the AAMB and others were not expected to 

consider it workable. 

Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of effective power (influence weighted by importance) in 

support of particular positions, so that the strength of various coalitions can be easily identified. 

Figure 3 shows the distribution of power as of 2 November, 2004, and indicates a wide variety of 

positions supported by stakeholders. This indicated very little consensus regarding the choice of 

Mazen as the next Palestinian leader. 

 

32 At the time of this study, and even today to a lesser extent, Fatah was the major political party in Palestine. Fatah 

is the reverse acronym from the Arabic name Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (literally: "Palestinian National 

Liberation Movement"), and it is the largest organization within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a 

multi-party confederation. Thus, it was important for Abu Mazen to obtain the support of Fatah. 

33 The Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades are a Palestinian armed terrorist group closely linked to the Fatah party. It is often 

considered the radical militant arm of Fatah, although the ties between the organizations are not entirely clear. This 

militia was originally named after the Al Aqsa Mosque, one of Islam's holiest sites and an icon for the Palestinian 

movement.
16

AAMB

Hezbollah

Musa Arafat

Israeli Right

Fatah Hardliners

Qaddumi

PFLP

Hamas US (Pro-Israeli Right)

Egypt

Israeli Left

Barghouti

US (Pro-Israeli Right)

Fatah Reformers

Abu Ala

Jordan

Europeans

Dahlan

Abu Mazen

Figure 3. Current Situation - Distribution of Stakeholder Advocated Positions in Support of or in 

Opposition to Abu Mazen 

Figure 4, on the other, hand, reflects the distribution of effective power after the passage of 

several political interactions. This figure indicates that, over time, Mazen will consolidate 

support of all stakeholders. However, since all stakeholders have coalesced around a position 

less extreme than complete support of Mazen as Palestinian leader, we infer that he will 

accommodate others within the leadership and has agreed to some sort of power-sharing 

arrangement—while still taking the lead role in his coalition. 

AAMB

Fatah Hardliners

Qaddumi

Israeli Right

Abu Mazen

Abu Ala

Dahlan

Barghouti

Qaddumi

Fatah Reformers

Hezbollah

PFLP

Foreign Stakeholders

Figure 4. Predicted Situation (Round 8 of simulation, approximately 10-14 weeks) 

Distribution of Stakeholder Advocated Positions in Support of or in Opposition to Abu Mazen 

Figures 5 and 6 provide a round-by-round view of the position shifts of stakeholders, based on 

the Senturion calculations. According to a tracking of actual events, as documented in Table 2, 

these predictions proved to be uniformly accurate. While the software takes into consideration 

the influence of all stakeholders to more clearly identify changes in stakeholder positions over 

time, figure 5 depicts only Palestinian positions and figure 6 depicts only the positions of foreign 

stakeholders. 
17

Figure 5 indicated that, of those supporting Mazen, most would consolidate their position around 

Abu Ala, Barghouti, and the Fatah Reformers. Mazen is persuaded to soften his claims to 

leadership first in response to Dahlan, and then in response to Musa Arafat, suggesting some sort 

of accommodation with each. 

Full Opposition

toward Abu Mazen

as Leader

Full Support

for Abu Mazen

as Leader

Neutral

toward Abu Mazen

as Leader

Dahlan Abu Mazen

Fatah Reformers

Abu Ala

Barghouti

PFLP Hamas Fatah Hardliners

Qaddumi

Musa Arafat

AAMB

Figure 5. Prediction of 8 Rounds of Stakeholder Position Shifts 

Position Shifts of Palestinian Stakeholders’ Support of or Opposition to Abu Mazen 

At the other end of the spectrum, stakeholders opposed to Mazen were persuaded to lend their 

support to his leadership. Mazen was able to persuade the Fatah Hardliners, Qaddumi, and Musa 

Arafat to support him in the second round of the simulation. Hamas and the AAMB responded to 

this consolidation by increasing their level of support for him. In the third round, Hamas was 

persuaded by the new Palestinian leadership coalition to back Mazen. The AAMB, initially the 

most ardent opponent of Mazen, then had to make concessions or risk being isolated from all 

other stakeholders. Thus, even the AAMB was persuaded by Mazen and then Musa Arafat to 

support the coalition. 

Figure 6 provides a summary of expected position shifts for international stakeholders. 

Barghouti’s support for Mazen appeared to be important for validating the Mazen coalition in the 

eyes of foreign opponents, including such disparate stakeholders as the Israeli Right, Hezbollah, 

Iran, and Syria. As with the Palestinian stakeholders, all stakeholders came to support the Mazen 

coalition after several rounds of the simulation exercise. 

AAMB, according to Senturion, was a critical stakeholder in the evolution of support for Mazen. 

In the early stages of Mazen’s consolidation of support, the AAMB and other opponents had the 

potential to bring Barghouti into a prospective opposition coalition. Such a coalition would have 

raised the risk of a violent transition, as some of its members had previously expressed their 

opposition through violence. 

However, Senturion indicated that AAMB was unlikely to realize the potential success of such 

an initiative. If they, or other more extreme opponents of Mazen, realized the viability of such a 

coalition, the result was likely to be entrenched and potentially violent opposition to his 
18

leadership coalition—preventing the consolidation of support from any of his more extreme 

opponents. 

Full Opposition

toward Abu Mazen

as Leader

Full Support

for Abu Mazen

as Leader

Neutral

toward Abu Mazen

as Leader

Europeans/UN

Jordan

US Pro-Isareali Left

Israeli Left

Egypt US Pro-Israeli Right

Israeli Right Hezbollah

Iran/Syria

Figure 6. Prediction of 8 Rounds of Stakeholder Position Shifts 

Position Shifts of International Stakeholders’ Support of or Opposition to Abu Mazen 
19

Conclusions 

The three case studies described above demonstrate a portion of the track record of predictions 

that were produced by the Senturion software. This approach could compliment traditional 

analysis by allowing for the exploration of multiple permutations and iterations of analyst 

assumptions within a consistent framework. Moreover, systematic and rigorous tools such as 

Senturion enable analysts to generate courses of action to obtain improved outcomes and 

mitigate the risk associated with uncertain approaches. 

A predictive political simulation technology such as Senturion can be applied to an array of 

political-military problems in near-real-time. Approaches such as Senturion are useful in the 

complex field of predictive analysis because they facilitate a systematic account of stakeholder 

interactions, with a reliable predictive tool to support the decisionmaking and analytic processes. 

As shown in these case studies (and in all document DOD and Intelligence Community studies), 

Senturion has been uncannily accurate at anticipating stakeholder behavior. However, the greater 

aid that the tool offers is in providing analysts and decisionmakers with an alternative and 

systematic view of the decisionmaking process. By keeping track of and simulating stakeholder 

behavior in a systematic fashion, Senturion is able to identify subtle dynamics between 

stakeholders that might not otherwise be apparent. The combination of these subtle behaviors 

produces a rich, detailed view of stakeholder dynamics that in turn provides a capability that can 

be used to help test hypotheses and often produce counter intuitive results. Combined with 

subject matter expert input, Senturion provides a visualization and forecast of evolving political 

environments that can be adjusted in real time to see varying results and implications for 

differing courses of action. While analytical tools will never replace the human analyst, 

Senturion can help leverage analysts’ time to produce more accurate and actionable assessments 

of complex political-military situations. 
20
21

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