India’s Emerging Security Strategy, 

Missile Defense, and Arms Control 

Stephen F. Burgess 

INSS Occasional Paper 54 

June 2004 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The 

paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 

Stephen F. Burgess is Deputy Chair and Professor in the Department 

of Strategy and International Security, US Air War College and an 

Associate of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC). 

His three books are Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe;

The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-97; and South 

Africa’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (forthcoming with Helen 

Purkitt from Indiana University Press). Dr. Burgess collaborated with 

Dr. Purkitt on a monograph for the USAFA INSS and the USAF CPC, 

The Rollback of the South African Chemical and Biological Warfare 

Program, that has been featured on 60 Minutes, in The New York 

Times, and in The Washington Post. He has recently conducted 

research on India’s role in the US missile defense posture; India and 

Pakistan in the arms control process; and India’s Emerging Security 

Strategy and Defense Capabilities. In November 2002, Dr. Burgess 

contributed a chapter, “Struggle for Control of Pakistan: Musharraf 

Takes On the Islamist Radicals” to Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of 

Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Culture, edited by Barry 

Schneider and Jerrold Post. Previously Dr. Burgess was a faculty 

member at Vanderbilt University, the University of Zambia, and 

Hofstra University. He completed his Ph.D. at Michigan State 

University and was a Fulbright-Hays fellow at the University of 

Zimbabwe. 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
iv
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

 Security Strategy and Defense Capabilities 2 

 US Security Strategies and Defense Capabilities 4 

 Missile Defense and Arms Control 6 

 Definition of Arms Control 9 

Background 10 

 Early Regional Security Issues 10 

 India Moves to Exercise Regional Hegemony 12 

 Impediments to Arms Control Negotiations 13 

 Clinton Administration Arms Control Efforts 16 

The BJP, the 1998 Nuclear test, and the Quest for Strategy 18 

 Nuclear Tests and the Emergence of Security 

 Strategy, Doctrine, and Structures 19 

 A New National Security Architecture: 

 The NSC and NSAB 21 

 The NSAB’s Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine 23 

 Kargil, the Need for Strategy, and “Limited 

 Conventional War” (LCW) 25 

 The War on Terrorism, Defensive Nuclear 

 Weapons Strategy, and the United States 27 

 Pakistan’s Reaction to India’s Emerging 

 Security Strategy 29 

 China’s Security Strategy and Defense 

 Capabilities in Relation to India 31 

 India’s Expanding Interests and Emerging 

 Security Strategy 32 

India’s Defense Capabilities 34 

 US-India Defense Cooperation 37 

India Explores Theater Missile Defense 38 

Arms Control 40 
vi

 The 1999 Lahore Declaration and Confidence- 

 Building Measures 43 

 US Mediation Efforts and the New 

 Relationships with India and Pakistan 46 

 The Pentagon and State Department Positions 

 on Arms Control and Missile Defense 49 

 China’s Position on Arms Control and Missile 

 Defense 50 

 Pakistan’s Position on Arms Control and Missile 

 Defense 50 

 Indian Government Position on Arms Control 

 and Missile Defense 56 

 Non-governmental Experts on Arms Control 

 and Missile Defense 62 

 US Embassy Observations on South Asia, 

 Arms Control, and Missile Defense 64 

Conclusion 69 

Notes 74 
vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fifty-fourth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). The focus of this paper is on the 

strategic context of South Asia, a region that increasingly sits at the 

center of United States security concerns. India is the world’s 

largest democracy (in terms of population), a regional power with 

both realized and additional potential relevance to United States 

security interests, and a nuclear power still struggling to formalize 

its national strategy, doctrine, and structure. Stephen Burgess 

develops the background, progress, and status of these efforts into 

2004. He discusses the dynamic interactions across this process 

with India’s regional rivals—Pakistan and China—and with the 

United States. This stands as one of the few serious studies of 

India’s evolving nuclear doctrine that also incorporates arms control 

and missile defense into the strategic calculus. Therefore, even 

though India’s electoral process has recently mandated a change in 

ruling party, the trend lines in strategy and force structure, in 

strategic thinking that incorporates roles for missile defense, and in 

careful analysis of the promise and problems of arms control drawn 

here are valuable baselines for assessing strategic continuity and 

change as the political leadership shifts. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division of the Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP), and the Dean of 

the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency; the Air Force Information Warfare 

Center; the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the United States 

Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense 

Command; and the United States Military Academy Combating 

Terrorism Center. The research leading to the papers in this volume 

was sponsored by XONP and OSD/Net Assessment. The mission 

of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, to 

foster the development of strategic perspective within the United 

States Armed Forces, and to support national security discourse 

through outreach and education.” Its research focuses on the areas 

of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control and 
viii

strategic security; counterproliferation and force protection; 

homeland defense, military assistance to civil authorities, and 

combating terrorism; air and space issues and planning; information 

operations and warfare; and regional and emerging national security 

issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners 

with education and research organizations across and beyond the 

military academic community to bring broad focus to issues of 

national security interest. And it hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. In these ways, INSS 

facilitates valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our 

sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our 

research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

India remains the only country to have released a nuclear 

doctrine without a security strategy. Domestic politics and internal 

differences, a lack of vision, and a fixation on its neighboring 

adversary, Pakistan, have prevented the promulgation of a clear 

security strategy. 

However, since the 1998 nuclear weapons tests and the 

formation of a National Security Council, India’s security strategy 

has been emerging. The 1999 National Security Advisory Board’s 

Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine, the 2000 enunciation of a 

“limited conventional war” concept, and the 2001 endorsement of 

missile defenses have touched off debates over strategy within the 

Indian security establishment and point to the emergence of a 

security strategy. In the coming years, India may develop a clear 

and coherent national security strategy in an evolutionary manner, 

as Indian leaders think through the various issues and act on them 

and especially if the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) remains in 

power for most of the next decade. 

It is not certain that a security strategy would lead to 

transparency and confidence-building, and even if it does, 

transparency and confidence-building measures may not lessen the 

chances of war with Pakistan. At the same time, transparency is 

problematic for India as it demonstrates its vulnerabilities to China. 

There will be areas where India is voluntarily transparent to the 

United States in order to curry favor and other areas where it will 

not be in India’s interests to do so. 

Transparency and confidence-building measures may be 

essential building blocks to prevent unwanted conflict with 

Pakistan, but the Bush administration does not see these measures 

as crucial in India-US relations. Since September 11, the US-India 

strategic relationship has accelerated and seems to be developing 

toward partnership, especially in the global war on terrorism, and 

the United States may find it desirable and necessary to eventually 

form an alliance with India to confront China. 

India’s efforts to develop world-class defense capabilities and 

implement an ambitious security strategy have been hampered by 

an inefficient bureaucracy and an economy that is still emerging 

from state control. Over the past decade, India has been investing 

more in developing nuclear weapons and missiles than in 

conventional capabilities. However, India’s conventional 

capabilities need to be improved substantially if the country ever 
x

hopes to move into the ranks of world powers. Assuming that India 

develops and publishes a coherent security strategy, a number of 

issues remain. 

Since 2001, the Bush administration has promoted 

counterproliferation and missile defense in South Asia. India has 

noted the links between missile defense, arms reduction, and India’s 

defensive “no-first-use” policy. It continues to explore the 

acquisition of theater missile defense (TMD) with the United States 

and Israel, and may have a system in place by 2010. If India is 

permitted to acquire TMD, it may join the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR) as a supplier. Pakistan finds missile 

defense too expensive and suspects that Indian TMD might 

neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, which could open the door 

to an arms race. Pakistan’s ally, China, suspects that missile 

defenses are meant to minimize its deterrent. 

In 2004, arms control in South Asia remains possible but 

problematic. India remains committed to a moratorium on nuclear 

testing and a “no-first-use” policy. Pakistan pledges not to test and 

continues to offer nuclear disarmament if India does the same. 

However, India wants to keep its nuclear weapons as a counter to 

China. 

While the Bush administration has moved away from the 

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has not been negotiated, the United States is 

active in South Asia. Efforts include facilitating regional stability 

as well as encouraging India and Pakistan to implement confidencebuilding measures (CBM), cooperative threat reduction (CTR), and 

nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRM). India and Pakistan both 

remain open to the CTBT (and India to the FMCT), but not the 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). An April 2003 overture by India 

created the opportunity for negotiations that include the disputed 

territory of Kashmir, arms control, and implementation of the 1999 

“Lahore CBMs.” The United States can assist the process from 

behind the scenes and help increase stability without changing the 

balance of power or encroaching on sovereignty. 
INDIA’S EMERGING SECURITY STRATEGY, 

MISSILE DEFENSE, AND ARMS CONTROL 

INTRODUCTION 

India is in the midst of the lengthy process of moving from the 

status of a defensive sub-regional, middle power, without a clear 

security strategy, to that of a more offensive-minded major power, 

with nuclear weapons, with interests to defend in Southeast Asia 

and the Middle East, and with China as a competitor.1

 During this 

process, Indian leaders and foreign and defense policymakers have 

been accused of lacking strategic vision.2

 

In recent years, Indian leaders, policymakers, and analysts have 

turned their attention to the issue of how best to project power and 

the means to do so. Discussions and deliberations about strategy 

also include weighing the acquisition of new defense capabilities. 

Among the possible new capabilities is theater missile defense 

(TMD), which is being explored in cooperation with the United 

States and Israel. Also, the Indian government is promoting greater 

interagency coordination and planning for developing and changing 

its defense capabilities. 

India’s emerging security strategy, changing defense 

capabilities, and exploration of TMD have been affecting relations 

with Pakistan and prospects for stability and arms control in South 

Asia. India’s testing and maintenance of a minimum nuclear 

deterrent and pursuit of a TMD program contributed to Pakistan’s 

development of a similar deterrent and reinforced its rejection of a 

“no first use” nuclear weapons policy and other arms control 

measures. 

US involvement in South Asia since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and its role as mediator in defusing the May-
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

2

June 2002 India-Pakistan crisis, have paved the way for 

negotiations to settle the six decades-old Kashmir conflict and 

perhaps for arms control measures. Recent revelations of Pakistan’s 

role as a nuclear proliferator should provide the impetus for the 

negotiation of arms control agreements, especially fissile materials 

controls. 

This study will address and analyze these issues in depth. First, 

issues and problems relating to security strategies, defense 

capabilities, TMD, and arms control will be presented. Second, 

relevant Indian and South Asian historical background will be 

provided. Third, India’s emerging security strategy and changing 

defense capabilities, including TMD, will be considered. Lastly, the 

exploration of missile defense by India and its impact on arms 

control in South Asia will be examined. 

Security Strategy and Defense Capabilities 

India remains the only country to have tested nuclear weapons 

and released a nuclear doctrine without first having a security 

strategy.3

 Domestic politics and internal differences, a lack of 

vision, and a fixation on its neighboring adversary, Pakistan, have 

prevented the promulgation of a clear security strategy. However, 

since the 1998 nuclear weapons tests and the formation of a 

National Security Council, India’s security strategy appears to be 

emerging. 

The lack of a published security strategy can be a source of 

confusion within a government and misleading to adversaries and 

great powers. Unclear signals nested among noise have been a 

major source of conflict.4

 In India’s case, unclear signals have been 

transmitted to its adversaries, Pakistan and China, on several 

occasions in the past and have contributed to the outbreak or near 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

3

outbreak of war. Over the last decade and a half, unclear signals in 

South Asia could have contributed to the outbreak of nuclear war, 

particularly in 1987, 1990, 1999, and 2002.5 At issue is the extent 

to which unclear signals can be overcome by a published security 

strategy. A second problem is that, without a clear security strategy 

to follow, inappropriate defense capabilities can be developed. 

The issue of India’s emerging security strategy and defense 

capabilities has become especially significant for the United States 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The attacks on the 

United States were organized in the South Asian region and drew 

the US closer to India than ever before, as the two powers consulted 

on strategies for combating terrorism.6

 India offered basing and 

overflight rights to the United States as US forces faced the real 

possibility that Pakistan would reject overtures for basing and 

overflight rights and that Operation Enduring Freedom in 

Afghanistan might have been mounted partly from Indian bases. 

The Indian basing offer helped to improve US-Indian relations. 

Furthermore, India’s broader security strategy and defense 

capabilities became of greater interest to the United States as 

conditions were evolving for an India-US partnership and perhaps 

for a future India-US alliance. A US-India partnership raises issues 

of future weapons purchases, technology transfers, and basing and 

overflight rights. In this study, the possibility is examined that India 

may become a major purchaser of US weapons. Currently, the 

United States is constrained by the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 

and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions from 

certain weapons sales and technology transfers but still can sell an 

array of weapons to India. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

4

US Security Strategies and Defense Capabilities 

A security strategy is a statement of a nation’s interests and 

goals and the ways and means to fulfill them. One example of a 

relatively coherent security strategy is the National Security 

Strategy of the United States (NSS).

7

 The NSS is produced in a 

painstaking inter-agency process, and it has been providing 

guidance to government agencies, especially the Department of 

Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS), for more than a 

decade. The NSS categorizes American interests at various levels 

and details ways and means for securing and furthering those 

interests. 

Well-established powers like the United States, and especially 

those with nuclear weapons, have found that having a published 

security strategy is useful and necessary. Most states do not have a 

formally published security strategy, but statements and documents 

cumulatively can constitute an informal security strategy. However, 

rising powers, like India, might learn from the US example and 

benefit from a published security strategy, thereby lessening the 

chances of strategic misperception and misunderstanding, failure, 

and defeat. 

On the one hand, a security strategy can provide coordination 

and coherence among government agencies. It can also transmit 

consistent signals to adversaries. On the other hand, rising powers 

may not be ready for a published security strategy. Leaders may not 

clearly perceive or agree upon what the national interests are, how 

to achieve them, and what the future may hold. Foreign policy and 

defense bureaucracies tend to rely on tried and true methods, may 

not be able to agree on a published strategy, and may not be able to 

adhere over time to a strategy. Rising states and even established 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

5

powers may have problems of internal contention and instability 

that may prevent agencies and related actors from agreeing on a 

security strategy. Some government agencies may not adhere to an 

overall national strategy. Another issue is whether or not a 

published security strategy can overcome the problem of unclear 

signals. Furthermore, some states find that opacity in their strategic 

approach is better than clarity. 

Even though the US Congress mandated an annual national 

security strategy in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense 

Reorganization Act, US administrations have not always been able 

to produce a strategy on time. For example, the Bush 

administration produced its first National Security Strategy in 

September 2002, more than a year behind schedule. New 

administrations have particular difficulty in coordinating actors, 

agencies, and interests in order to produce a NSS. The September 

11, 2001 attacks and the Bush administration’s determination to 

transform the Department of Defense made the task even more 

daunting. 

In the case of the United States, security setbacks provided 

impetus for the adoption of published security strategies. US 

strategic and operational failures in Iran (1980), Lebanon (1983), 

and Grenada (1983) led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and to the 

requirement that a national security strategy be published annually 

in order to provide a clear idea of the resources that the national 

security establishment required.8

 Given the US experience, it would 

be expected that security setbacks would create incentives for other 

powers, including India, to adopt security strategies. As will be 

demonstrated in this study, the setbacks that led India toward a 

security strategy included Pakistan’s 1998 decision to test a nuclear 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

6

device after India’s test and Pakistan’s incursion into Indian-held 

territory during the 1999 Kargil crisis. Of special concern was the 

failure of deterrence against Pakistan as well as India’s inability to 

counterattack into Pakistani-held territory to retaliate for the 

incursion. 

A security strategy guides and informs plans for the 

development of defense capabilities to achieve national goals. In 

the United States’ case, the NSS guides and informs the National 

Military Strategy (NMS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

that outline the military ways and means to attain national goals. In 

turn, the NSS and NMS influence the development and change of 

defense capabilities. For example, the Clinton administration’s 

NSS espoused “engagement,” and for the military, this led to a 

strategy of “shape, prepare, and respond.”9

 The NSS and NMS 

helped lead to the development of expeditionary defense 

capabilities, such as Air Expeditionary Forces and Marine 

Expeditionary Units.10 The Bush administration’s 2002 NSS 

focused on “preemption,” a major departure from previous 

strategies.11

Missile Defense and Arms Control

Since January 2001, the Bush administration has moved the 

United States away from a forty-year commitment to arms control 

and treaties that helped to keep the bipolar confrontation of the Cold 

War from erupting into a nuclear holocaust. In de-emphasizing 

arms control, Bush officials have cited the inability of the 

international arms control regime to deal with the danger posed by 

“rogue nations” that possess or seek weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) and that cannot be trusted to abide by arms control 

agreements, cooperate with international inspectors, and keep 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

7

WMD out of the hands of terrorists.12 According to the latest NSS, 

the alternative to arms control measures is to subject rogue nations 

to preventive action or, in the case of a pending attack, preemption. 

In the case of Iraq, non-compliance with demands to disarm helped 

precipitate a US-led invasion, while in the cases of North Korea and 

Iran, rogue behavior brought intensified US-led multilateral 

pressures. WMD “counterproliferation,” including missile defenses, 

has superseded nonproliferation and other arms control measures in 

the National Security Strategy as the principal strategy.13 

Three major indicators of the Bush administration’s shift away 

from traditional arms control follow: US withdrawal from the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; rejection of the Comprehensive 

Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and withdrawal from efforts to craft a 

tougher Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).14 

The administration asserted that the ABM Treaty inhibited the 

development of missile defenses, and Bush officials are now 

promoting missile defenses internationally as one of the best ways 

to prevent WMD blackmail by rogue states. The administration 

rejected the CTBT because it inhibited the development of new US 

mini-nuclear weapons that could destroy deeply buried targets. The 

administration asserted that the BWC was difficult to enforce, if not 

impossible to do so, without highly intrusive verification measures. 

Also, the administration proposed in 2001 to scale back the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that had been used to 

stabilize and dismantle Russian WMD programs.15 These and other 

Bush administration measures have led many to question the longterm viability of arms control.16

One of the best cases that can be made for continuing to 

emphasize the arms control approach is the need to manage the 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

8

ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan that could 

escalate into a nuclear war killing tens of millions. The two 

countries have been confronting each other for more than half a 

century and, especially since their May-June 1998 nuclear weapons 

tests, have been engaged in two dangerous confrontations and a 

nuclear arms race. The May-June 1999 Kargil war and the MayJune 2002 confrontation that followed the December 2001 terrorist 

attack on the Indian parliament were serious crises that could have 

spiraled towards nuclear war. 

Arms control agreements could prevent future crises from 

escalating into nuclear war and might slow the arms race. They 

could be used to fortify command-and-control and prevent 

accidental missile launches, control the production of fissile 

material and other WMD agents, and stop WMD and missile 

proliferation, which has been a problem with Pakistan. Arms 

control could lessen the chances of conflagration in the short and 

medium term, until the longer-term underlying problems in the 

India-Pakistan relationship, especially the status of the disputed 

territory of Kashmir, are resolved. 

Since January 2001, the Bush administration has made efforts 

to build relations in South Asia, especially with India as a rising 

power.

17 After September 11, 2001, the imperative of building 

good relations with Pakistan increased dramatically with the need to 

gain access to bases and overflight rights to conduct Operation 

Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.18 During the 2002 IndiaPakistan crisis, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Under 

Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Secretary of State Colin 

Powell visited South Asia on peacemaking efforts. These and other 

US officials impressed on Indian and Pakistani officials the dangers 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

9

of nuclear escalation and the horrible consequences of nuclear war, 

and they advocated nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs) that 

would keep India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons under better 

command-and-control. These diplomatic efforts demonstrated the 

Bush administration’s interest in a limited form of arms control as 

part of an overall campaign to reduce tensions in one of the most 

dangerous regions of the world. 

The US approach towards arms control with India and Pakistan 

is examined before and after January 2001. First, the extent to 

which the Clinton administration and India and Pakistan were 

genuinely committed and making real progress in arms control 

efforts in the 1990s is determined. Second, an assessment is made of 

the Bush administration’s approach, based upon interviews and 

secondary sources, to see if the US commitment to arms control has 

diminished in the sub-continent and to assess the impact that US 

promotion of missile defense has made. Third, a determination is 

made, based upon interviews and other sources, if Indian and 

Pakistani approaches towards arms control have changed as a result 

of the transition to the Bush administration with new ways of 

thinking. For instance, US rejection of the CTBT may have 

contributed to Indian and Pakistani reluctance to commit more fully 

to the CTBT and other arms control measures.19 

Definition of Arms Control 

Arms control emerged as a concept after World War I and was 

manifested in treaties limiting naval power and chemical and 

biological warfare. During the Cold War, the term applied to 

nuclear weapons treaties, including the ABM, Atmospheric Test 

Ban, and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) treaties, which 

slowed the nuclear arms race between the United States and the 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

10

Soviet Union. Arms control is often perceived as a short-term 

measure, while the underlying roots of conflict are addressed, and 

disarmament is achieved. The two best examples of disarmament 

treaties are the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). In this study, a broad 

definition of arms control is used and includes 

• limits on WMD use (e.g., the 1925 Geneva Protocol against 

chemical and biological weapons), development and 

production (e.g., the BWC, CWC, and the Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty [FMCT]), and testing (e.g., the CTBT); 

• cooperative threat reduction; 

• the implementation of nuclear risk reduction measures, 

including “hot lines,” systems for transparency, and 

agreement compliance verification, all of which also serve 

as confidence-building measures (CBMs); 

• nonproliferation, and particularly export controls, such as 

the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).20

BACKGROUND 

From 1947 through the 1998 nuclear weapons tests, security 

and arms control efforts in South Asia were largely defined by the 

adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan. The 1947 

partition of British India created India and Pakistan as instant 

enemies and produced a security dilemma, which made arms 

control efforts difficult, if not impossible.21 

Early Regional Security Issues

Before 1947, the British imperial strategy for India entailed the 

protection of sea-lanes from the United Kingdom to Hong Kong and 

the maintenance of buffer states in Central Asia.

22 Once it was 

independent, however, India could not maintain such a strategy, 

given the country’s partition and its vulnerability to further 

secession. At the same time, Pakistan constantly had to think of 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

11

survival, and its claim to Kashmir became a rallying cry that created 

a sense of Pakistani nationalism. 

Following the partition, the most important imperative for India 

for more than 40 years was to ensure that there was no further 

secession and that the country was consolidated. Successive Indian 

governments focused on maintaining internal security. India 

practiced a self-reliant economic policy, which reduced the 

importance of trade and the protection of sea-lanes. Instead of 

maintaining buffer states, India sought to counter Pakistan and its 

close relations with China and the United States by forging a 

relationship with the Soviet Union. 

For most of India’s history, the principles of founders Mahatma 

Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru—in particular, peaceful resolution of 

conflicts and nonalignment—helped to guide security, defense, and 

foreign policies.23 Given India’s weakness and Prime Minister 

Nehru’s moral authority, diplomacy and nonalignment provided 

means to maintain security and project the country’s image abroad. 

India maintained its distance from the West and promoted 

disarmament. India, in 1965, was one of the first states to propose 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, though it later abandoned its 

support due to efforts by the United States and Soviet Union to 

designate “nuclear weapons states” that created, in India’s 

perception, “nuclear apartheid.”24 

Due to India’s emphasis on diplomacy and its postindependence domestic turbulence, the country acquired the 

reputation of being a weak state. This reputation was enhanced in 

1962, when China handily defeated India in a border war that was 

started by the latter. Subsequent investigations determined that 

India’s security apparatus was plagued by poor strategy, 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

12

organization, and military equipment. Decisions about defense 

capabilities had been based more on domestic factors than any 

strategic considerations or planning.25 

India Moves to Exercise Regional Hegemony 

In response to the 1962 debacle, India moved towards the 

Soviet Union, which began to supply warplanes and other military 

hardware and helped build Indian defense capabilities in both 

conventional and nuclear areas.26 In August 1971, India signed a 

twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the 

Soviet Union. In December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan and 

created Bangladesh, dealing a devastating blow to Pakistan. India 

and Pakistan subsequently negotiated the 1972 Simla Agreement 

that stabilized relations until the late 1980s.27

In the wake of China’s 1962 victory and 1964 nuclear test, 

India developed a nuclear weapons program. In 1974, India 

conducted a “peaceful” nuclear test of a crude fission device. The 

nuclear test and the victory over Pakistan began to change India’s 

reputation from that of a weak state to that of a regional power. 

In the 1970s and 1980s, India continued its nuclear and 

conventional military build-ups. Evidence emerged that Pakistan 

was developing a nuclear weapons program, which touched off a 

South Asian arms race. In 1983, India began a ballistic missile 

program, which led to an India-Pakistan missile race in the late 

1980s. In 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to forge 

ahead with a thermonuclear weapons program. In 1989, the 

launching of a Pakistan-supported insurgency in Jammu and 

Kashmir led to a worsening of relations. India’s military exercises 

in the Rajasthan Desert in 1990 appeared to Pakistan’s leaders to be 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

13

the precursor to an Indian invasion of Pakistan and risked the 

possibility of nuclear war.28 

With the end of the Cold War, India shifted away from its 

alliance with Russia, though relations remained close. India’s 

military began to cooperate with the West. After establishing 

relations with Israel in 1992, military cooperation increased.29 

More than forty years after independence, India engaged with the 

global economy, as the government enacted neo-liberal economic 

reforms and as the computer software sector of the economy 

developed. Consequently, trade and sea-lanes appeared more 

important to Indian leaders, as did the development of a “blue water 

navy.”30

In the mid-1990s, the nuclear weapons program was in place 

and ready to be tested, and the short-range Prithvi missiles that 

could deliver warheads against Pakistan were also operational. All 

that was needed was a political decision to test nuclear weapons. In 

1995, the Indian government planned but then aborted a nuclear test 

after the United States discovered Indian preparations and applied 

pressure not to test. Further, that year’s indefinite extension of the 

NPT was criticized by India for preserving “nuclear apartheid.” 

While the nuclear weapons program remained largely in civilian 

hands, the military continued to adjust to the imperative of having 

to deliver nuclear weapons.31

Impediments to Arms Control Negotiations 

Why has there been little or no arms control in South Asia? 

One reason is that, unlike the bipolar balance of power that 

produced mutual assured destruction (MAD) and arms control 

efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 

confrontation between India and Pakistan is asymmetrical and 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

14

pathological, as epitomized by the decades-old struggle over 

Kashmir. It has also involved meddling powers, particularly China, 

the United States, the Soviet Union and, later, Russia. Inevitably, 

negotiated agreements between India and Pakistan, such as the 1972 

Simla Agreement, have been rare and have not been well 

implemented. 

India has attempted to exercise regional leadership or 

hegemony, which befits a nation of more than one billion people. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan has resisted with outside assistance, especially 

from China, and has declared its intention to use nuclear weapons in 

case of an Indian invasion. For more than a decade, Pakistan has 

offered to give up its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT, if India 

does the same. India has rejected this proposal, with an eye on 

nuclear deterrence against China, and has countered with a “no first 

use” proposal. Pakistan has found that its threat of first use has 

deterred India and guaranteed survival. 

In the late 1980s, India and Pakistan agreed to confidencebuilding measures and a joint commission, and promised to fully 

divulge information about their nuclear facilities, but the two sides 

never followed through satisfactorily. India’s and Pakistan’s 

rejection of the NPT and coolness towards other multilateral 

agreements and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

inspections also inhibited the development of transparency between 

the two antagonists. India and Pakistan’s continuing opacity about 

their WMD programs has forestalled the establishment of 

deterrence and arms control. The 1998 nuclear weapons tests and 

ongoing missile tests have provided additional information but not 

enough to firmly establish the concept of mutual assured destruction 

inside the heads of the two countries’ leaders. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

15

Efforts to achieve arms control between India and Pakistan 

have been complicated by Indian leaders’ perception that they must 

also seek strategic balance with Pakistan’s erstwhile ally, China, 

which has hundreds of nuclear warheads and dozens of mediumand long-range missiles that can strike anywhere in South Asia.32 

Consequently, India has responded to China’s strategic profile and 

has strived to produce intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 

considerable amounts of fissile material that could be used to 

produce hundreds of nuclear weapons.33 Because of competition 

with China, India has rejected Pakistan’s call for mutual 

disarmament, even though such a move would provide India with an 

overwhelming conventional advantage over Pakistan. While China 

and India have made recent strides in overcoming disputes that are 

over four decades old, they have not moved towards a treaty and 

have not entered into arms control negotiations. Part of the 

explanation lies in China’s superiority in WMD programs and 

missiles and its long-standing position as a nuclear weapons state 

(NWS) under the NPT. 

US arms control efforts in South Asia started with attempts in 

the 1960s and 1970s to pressure India and Pakistan to sign the NPT. 

India’s “peaceful” nuclear test of May 1974 and Pakistan’s 

determination to build a nuclear weapons program brought US 

sanctions, authorized by Congress’ 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation 

Act, as the Carter administration attempted to stop a South Asian 

arms race. However, with the Afghanistan war in the 1980s, US 

support for Pakistan against the Soviet Union led to the easing of 

sanctions and an unchecked India-Pakistan arms race. 

The winding down of the Cold War, Soviet withdrawal from 

Afghanistan, two Indo-Pakistani confrontations in 1987 and 1990, 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

16

and economic crises and vulnerability in the early 1990s opened the 

way for reinvigorated arms control efforts in South Asia. In 1990, 

the United States acknowledged that Pakistan had acquired nuclear 

weapons capability, and the US Senate passed the 1990 Pressler 

Amendment, imposing stiff sanctions on Pakistan. 

There have been two primary problems with the US approach 

of sanctions and negotiations. First, India wants to be treated like a 

great power and potential nuclear weapons state and not on the 

same level as Pakistan. This has made trilateral talks impossible to 

conduct. US sanctions and pressures to sign the NPT have caused 

resentment and led to Indian moves towards strategic self-reliance. 

Second, Pakistan has advocated multilateral negotiations where it 

believes that it will have US support on Kashmir and nuclear 

disarmament in South Asia. 

Clinton Administration Arms Control Efforts 

When the Clinton administration came to office in 1993, 

officials were determined to intensify arms control efforts. Among 

their early successes were the 1993 CWC and the 1995 NPT 

indefinite extension. Also of significance was the UN General 

Assembly’s launching of CTBT negotiations in the UN Conference 

on Disarmament in Geneva in 1993, as well as FMCT negotiations 

that same year.34 

Clinton administration officials were particularly concerned 

about the rapidly escalating arms race in South Asia. US concerns 

about proliferation increased, especially on the part of Pakistan. In 

1994, India proposed that Pakistan and India jointly undertake not 

to be the first to use their nuclear capability against each other. 

However, Pakistan refused and remained prepared to use nuclear 

weapons first in order to stop any Indian invasion.35 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

17

The Clinton administration was a major promoter of the CTBT, 

which arose in response to pressures to end the arms race in the 

post-Cold War era, build on the 1963 atmospheric Partial Test Ban 

Treaty, and protect the environment. Protests against France’s 

nuclear testing in the South Pacific in the early 1990s brought 

additional pressures for the CTBT. The negotiations over the CTBT 

coincided with a de facto global test ban that has now lasted a 

decade.36

The primary form of arms control negotiations in South Asia 

involving the United States was the effort to bring India and 

Pakistan into the CTBT. US pressure was especially intense on 

India, which was the lone holdout against the CTBT among the 44 

member countries in the UN Conference on Disarmament that had 

the potential to develop and test nuclear weapons. Pakistan 

expressed its willingness to sign the CTBT as long as India would 

do so. Multilateral pressures on India came in tandem with US 

bilateral pressures on India and Pakistan not to test. The pressures 

led to intense debates within India and Pakistan about the CTBT 

and nuclear testing. India’s objections were that, as long as the 

NPT’s distinctions between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” were 

in place, the CTBT would reinforce privileges enjoyed by the 

nuclear weapons states. Thus, the indefinite extension of the NPT 

in 1995 without any disarmament concessions by the NWS was 

strongly criticized by India for undermining CTBT negotiations. In 

1996, CTBT negotiations concluded in the Conference on 

Disarmament, and the draft was presented to the UN General 

Assembly and overwhelmingly approved, over the objections of 

India, Pakistan, China, and Russia.37 Subsequently, India and 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

18

Pakistan dropped out of arms control negotiations and raced to test 

nuclear weapons. 

THE BJP, THE 1998 NUCLEAR TEST, AND THE QUEST 

FOR STRATEGY 

In the mid-1990s, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rose in 

prominence and replaced the Congress Party as India’s major party. 

The BJP’s political philosophy of Hindu nationalism contrasted 

with the Congress Party’s secularism and inclusiveness. The BJP’s 

political platform promoted the interests of the Hindu majority at 

the expense of the Muslim minority and rejected external Islamic 

pressures on India. The BJP’s realpolitik and furtherance of India’s 

national interests outweighed principles of non-alignment and 

peaceful conflict resolution.38 The party was determined to move 

India toward becoming a morally superior “hard” state with a 

security strategy and defense capabilities that would enable India to 

compete with China.39 The BJP’s concern with strategic thinking 

was demonstrated with the 1996 publication of the future foreign 

minister Jaswant Singh’s National Security: An Outline of Our 

Concerns, which critiqued the lack of strategic thinking in previous 

regimes and offered his own outline of strategic considerations for 

the future.40 

In March 1998, the BJP became the major party after 

parliamentary elections and took power. Soon afterwards, Prime 

Minister Bihari Vajpayee gave orders to prepare for a nuclear 

weapons test. The BJP-led government decided to conduct a 

nuclear test primarily due to domestic politics and secondarily 

because of the BJP’s new strategic vision that included competition 

with China.41

The week before the test, Minister of Defense George 

Fernandes called China “potential enemy number one.”42 Since 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

19

India’s defeat by China in 1962 and China’s 1964 nuclear weapons 

test, India’s strategic thinkers had been focusing on competition 

with China and the prospect of catching it. In May 1998, they 

concurred with Fernandes and rationalized the nuclear test decision 

by referring to the need for a nuclear balance with their potential 

adversary. China had tested from 1964 to 1995, and India wanted 

to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities to its strategic competitor. 

After the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter to President 

Clinton in which he named China as India’s principal security 

concern.

43

India’s May 1998 test ended the country’s three-decades-old 

stance of nuclear opacity. In a statement to the Lok Sabha, the 

lower house of parliament, after the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee 

announced that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, 

and he promised to avoid an arms race, which would mean that 

India would produce just enough weapons for minimum 

deterrence.44 This nuclear doctrine statement was the first 

component of a security strategy. 

Nuclear Tests and the Emergence of Security Strategy, 

Doctrine, and Structures 

The May 11, 1998 test led Pakistan’s government to order a 

nuclear test, which was conducted on May 28, 1998. On June 6, 

1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 

1172, which urged nuclear restraint by India and Pakistan.45 The 

Pakistani test and subsequent US sanctions and pressures further 

influenced Indian leaders to formulate a nuclear doctrine and 

contemplate a security strategy. 

Starting in July 1998, a series of negotiations between Foreign 

Minister Jaswant Singh and US envoy Strobe Talbott dealt with 

nuclear weapons command-and-control and a transparent nuclear 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

20

doctrine, as well as arms control.46 The Singh-Talbott discussions 

eventually led to the reaffirmation of civilian command-and-control 

and a doctrine of “minimum deterrent and no-first-use.”47

Minimum deterrence meant that India would build enough 

nuclear weapons to deter Pakistan, and perhaps China, from 

attacking India. In order to guarantee no-first-use and avoid nuclear 

accidents due to faulty command-and-control, India would keep the 

components and the delivery systems for the nuclear weapons 

recessed and separate, and civilian control would continue.48

On December 15, 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee spoke before 

the Rajya Sabha, India’s upper house of parliament, and outlined 

the following main features of nuclear weapons doctrine and policy: 

(a) India will deploy its nuclear deterrent; 

(b) India’s nuclear doctrine includes a policy of “No-FirstUse” and “Non-use against non-nuclear weapons states;” 

(c) a policy of “No-First-Use” with a minimum nuclear 

deterrent implies deployment of assets in a manner that 

ensures survivability and capacity of an adequate response, 

in other words the development and deployment of a 

deterrent with a second-strike capability; 

(d) by way of meeting the concerns of the United States and its 

allies, India was willing to join the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty-to-come 

and to make its export control laws relating to “sensitive 

technologies” more stringent; and 

(e) India will continue its missile development program and 

not accept any restraints on the development of India’s 

research and development capabilities.49

In spite of Vajpayee’s statement, a contradiction remained between 

the concepts of “deployment, survivability, and second-strike 

capability” and the government’s commitment to “minimum 

recessed deterrence.” The open possession and testing of nuclear 

weapons, India’s relations with Pakistan and China, and US 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

21

concerns about escalation, command and control, and other issues 

led the Indian government in November 1998 to charge the National 

Security Advisory Board (NSAB) with weighing various options in 

regard to nuclear weapons doctrine and a national security 

strategy.50 

A New National Security Architecture: The NSC and NSAB 

On November 19, 1998, the BJP government formed a sixmember National Security Council (NSC), including Prime Minister 

Vajpayee, Minister of Foreign Affairs Singh, and Minister of 

Defense Fernandes, and appointed a National Security Advisor, 

Brajesh Mishra, who was already Parliamentary Secretary. The 

government also formed a Secretariat, whose nucleus would be 

provided by the existing Joint Intelligence Committee, to administer 

the inter-agency process, and a Strategic Policy Group (SPG), 

consisting mainly of foreign and defense policy bureaucrats to 

advise on security strategy. 

The government also created the National Security Advisory 

Board. The NSAB was partly composed of India’s foremost 

strategic thinkers, including journalists, academics, and former 

officials, and was charged with assessing nuclear doctrine and 

security strategy.51 The BJP government’s creation of a national 

security architecture was aimed at diverging from traditional policymaking processes in New Delhi and developing a more strategicoriented culture.52 The NSC created an inter-agency process, and 

the NSC, SPG, and NSAB paved the way for the development and 

emergence of a security strategy. In particular, the NSAB helped 

bring issues of national security into the open for parliamentary 

debate and public scrutiny and comment.53
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

22

A second goal was to bring the military into the national 

security decision-making process.54 In response, the government 

created a Chief of the Defense Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, 

and a joint staff structure to integrate arms acquisition, logistics, 

intelligence, and military strategy.55 

In the fifty years prior to the creation of the national security 

architecture, elite groups of bureaucratic “mandarins” in the Indian 

Foreign Service and the Indian Administrative Service had run 

foreign and defense policy. Working primarily through the Cabinet 

Committee on Defense and National Security, they were largely 

divorced from politics and from strategic thinking.56 There was no 

inter-agency process nor was there an open parliamentary process. 

Instead, the decision-making process took place largely behind 

closed doors in the respective ministries and in the cabinet. The 

armed forces were excluded from the decision-making process due 

to distrust of the military by Nehru and other political leaders. 

Traditionally, the minister of defense and other ministers were only 

asked for clarification on technical matters in parliament, and they 

were not subjected to probing questions, particularly from 

parliamentary committees.57 

The new national security architecture was aimed at 

transforming the archaic decision-making process. However, the 

new architecture and a more assertive media struggled to overcome 

the influence of bureaucrats.58 The Cabinet Committee on Defense 

and National Security continues to serve as adviser to government 

for long-range threat assessments, and the NSC has not fulfilled its 

potential.59 Other problems remain, including the continuing 

marginalization of military leaders and the lack of legislative 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

23

oversight of national security and foreign policy matters and 

processes.

60

The NSAB’s Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

On August 17, 1999, the NSAB released the Draft Nuclear 

Weapons Doctrine (Draft Doctrine).

61 The Draft Doctrine called 

for no first use of nuclear weapons, a “credible minimum deterrent,” 

survivability against a first nuclear strike, and second-strike 

capability. The Draft Doctrine recommended a nuclear triad of 

missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs) to deliver nuclear weapons. In the document the NSAB 

advocated moving away from a “recessed deterrent” toward one that 

would “shift to fully employable forces in the shortest possible 

time.”62 It called for an integrated operational plan or a sequential 

plan, in which generals would play a greater and more independent 

role and in which civilian command and control would be tempered. 

The Draft Doctrine made no mention of tactical nuclear weapons 

and flexible response command and control. While a triad was 

mentioned, there was little elaboration regarding nuclear 

submarines and SLBM capabilities. There was no assessment 

whether or not the triad could be achieved without further nuclear 

testing.63

After the Draft Doctrine was issued, the government was split, 

with some cabinet members finding it too ambitious.64 It caused a 

debate between “hawks” and “doves” concerning nuclear doctrine 

and security strategy.65 Ultimately, the Draft Doctrine was not 

adopted as official government policy, and some of the more 

hawkish NSAB members were not retained after 2000.66 However, 

according to one of India’s leading strategic thinkers, K. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

24

Subramanyan, elements of the document pointed to the future of 

Indian government policy.67 

Pakistan and China believed that the Draft Doctrine reflected 

Indian government policy and constituted a plan for a sustained 

nuclear buildup.68 Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Shamshed Ahmed, 

said that an international response was needed to arrest India’s 

“dangerous plan for nuclear and conventional arms escalation.”69 

China’s response to the Draft Doctrine was that India should abide 

by UN Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted in June 1998, 

which urged nuclear restraint on India and Pakistan.70

To a large extent, the Draft Doctrine was intended as a device 

to placate US demands for nuclear doctrine, greater transparency, 

and command and control. However, the Clinton administration 

criticized it, commenting that contrary to the drafters’ belief that it 

would enhance India’s security, it would instead unleash an arms 

race in the region and further escalate tensions.71 The Clinton 

administration also demanded that India indicate how many nuclear 

warheads it planned to build.72

After the Draft Doctrine appeared, the nonproliferation 

dialogue between Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and 

Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh continued. In a November 29, 

1999 interview in The Hindu Times, Singh clarified the 

government’s position regarding nuclear weapons.73 He stated 

India’s willingness to consider signing the CTBT and negotiating a 

FMCT. He further indicated in the interview that the NSAB was a 

group of non-official strategic experts and analysts and that the 

Draft Doctrine was not government policy. He reiterated previous 

statements about a minimum credible deterrent, which would 

remain recessed, no first use of nuclear weapons, and civilian 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

25

control. The foreign minister did not see SLBMs as feasible in the 

foreseeable future and warned against the development of tactical 

nuclear weapons. The statements by Singh, Vajpayee, and other 

government officials came closest to constituting a nuclear weapons 

doctrine. The relationship between nuclear weapons doctrine and 

an emerging security strategy seemed less clear and remained in a 

state of formation.74

In a January 2000 interview, Talbott indicated that he was fairly 

satisfied with India’s nuclear stance and that he was not asking 

India to roll back its nuclear weapons programs. However, he also 

commented that the United States continued to be concerned about 

command-and-control issues, particularly given the level of tension 

and the rise in terrorism in the South Asian region.75

Kargil, the Need for Strategy, and “Limited Conventional War” 

(LCW) 

In the winter of 1998-1999, Pakistan mounted an operation 

combining regular and guerrilla forces that crossed the Kashmir 

Line of Control (LoC) in a mountainous area, thereby starting what 

became known as the Kargil War. The Pakistani forces were only 

discovered by India’s intelligence services in the spring of 1999, 

which led to considerable criticism from the BJP government.76 

Subsequently, the Indian army mounted a counter-offensive, 

defeated the Pakistani forces, and drove them back across the LoC 

into Pakistan-controlled territory. Although India won the battle for 

Kargil, it lost the war of deterrence. Indian nuclear weapons had 

not deterred Pakistani forces from crossing the LoC.77 At the same 

time, Indian forces did not cross the LoC in any substantial way to 

punish Pakistan. Thus, it appeared that India had been deterred 

from counterattacking across the LoC by Pakistan’s nuclear 

weapons.

78
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

26

The Christmas 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to 

Kandahar, Afghanistan, and subsequent submission of the BJP 

government to hijacker demands brought protests, particularly from 

Hindu right wing politicians, against the irresolution of the Indian 

government. In response to such protests and to the strategic 

impasse in dealing with Pakistan, Minister of Defense George 

Fernandes introduced on January 5, 2000 the strategic concept of 

“limited conventional war” (LCW) at a leading think-tank, the 

Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Subsequently, 

the Army Chief of Staff and the powerful Minister of Home Affairs, 

L.K. Advani, backed Fernandes. The LCW concept posited that 

India could stage a limited retaliatory action against Pakistan, 

without risking nuclear retaliation. LCW supporters pointed out 

that China and the Soviet Union had engaged in border skirmishes 

in 1969 without a nuclear incident.79 The BJP government was split 

on the LCW proposal, and no move was made to adopt or 

implement the concept.80 However, Pakistani officials believed 

India’s seriousness about LCW and maintained their posture of 

nuclear ambiguity, refusing to indicate what their armed forces 

would do if India engaged in LCW actions.81

After Fernandes’ announcement, IDSA conducted research on 

LCW and came to identify three main options: (1) a low risk 

operation, one that would be over as soon as it started; (2) hitting 

guerrilla training camps and larger military installations in Pakistan, 

resulting in revenge attacks and reciprocation in a “tit-for-tat game;” 

and (3) a default position to go up the escalation ladder to war. A 

likely scenario would be for an Indian division to cross the LoC in 

the south of Jammu and Kashmir and advance on guerrilla bases 

around Muzzafarabad. After engaging the Pakistan army, the 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

27

Indian division would have to be reinforced, which would result in a 

spiral to nuclear war.82

 After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 

December 13, 2001, India mobilized 700,000 troops against 

Pakistan and sent them to the LoC and to the international border. 

Once again, India threatened but did not engage in LCW actions for 

three reasons. First, US pressure against an Indian intervention was 

significant, especially since US wargaming analysis indicated that 

any Indian LCW action would spiral into nuclear war.83 Second, 

the Indian government was uncertain of the threshold that would set 

off a nuclear war. Third, India also did not possess the capabilities 

(especially attack helicopters) to undertake low-risk LCW actions, 

such as raiding terrorist/guerrilla bases and quickly returning to 

base.84 As an alternative, India maintained a military strategy of 

attrition, hoping that Pakistan would be unable to sustain a large 

military presence along the LoC. 

The War on Terrorism, Defensive Nuclear Weapons Strategy, 

and the United States 

In December 1998, Russia proposed a partnership, including 

India and China, which would balance the power of the United 

States, particularly the US defensive strategy that included ballistic 

missile defense (BMD). India was initially receptive to Russian 

overtures, and Minister of Defense Fernandes criticized American 

BMD plans and supported nuclear deterrence. However, President 

Clinton’s March 2000 trip to India and the easing of sanctions 

helped improve India-US relations. Consequently, India became 

less receptive to Russian insistence on deterrence and opposition to 

missile defense and became more open to US strategic arguments.85

In January 2001, the Bush administration came to office 

determined to dramatically reduce the number of US nuclear 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

28

weapons without long, formal treaties with Russia, adopt a 

defensive nuclear weapons strategy, build a national missile defense 

(NMD), and promote missile defense systems abroad. Another goal 

was to improve relations with India as a rising power in Asia that 

could assist in balancing a rising China. In May 2001, President 

Bush proposed his missile defense initiative coupled with deep 

nuclear missile reductions. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee 

responded positively to Bush’s proposal, indirectly endorsing the 

concept of a defensive nuclear weapons strategy.86 On May 2, 

2001, the Indian government released the following statement: 

“There is a strategic and technological inevitability in stepping 

away from a world that is held hostage by the doctrine of MAD to a 

cooperative, defensive transition that is underpinned by further cuts 

and a de-alert of nuclear forces.”87

After September 11, 2001, India joined the US coalition against 

terrorism, provided overflight and port rights, and offered basing 

rights. One reason India offered basing rights was because the 

United States was fighting many of India’s adversaries in Operation 

Enduring Freedom.88 

On November 9, 2001 in Washington, DC, Prime Minister 

Vajpayee spoke of the United States and India as “natural allies” 

and reiterated his support for Bush’s proposal. Also, in November 

2001, the United States announced that it would leave the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and Russia did not protest. Instead, 

the United States and Russia agreed to cooperate on deep reductions 

in nuclear warheads and developing missile defenses. Suddenly, a 

defensive nuclear weapons strategy seemed more acceptable to the 

international community. In December 2001, May 2002, and 

August 2003, the US-India Defense Policy Group (DPG) met in 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

29

Washington, DC and discussed defense cooperation and a defensive 

nuclear weapons strategy. However, issues remained concerning 

the effect of such as strategy on Asian security and the acceleration 

of arms races, especially among India, China, and Pakistan.89

Indian strategists studied the probable impact of theater missile 

defense (TMD) and concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would 

be largely neutralized but that China’s arsenal would not be 

affected.90 US experts assess that China would probably believe 

that an Indian missile defense system would be intended to defend 

against China, and the latter would be able to keep well ahead of 

India in any subsequent arms race.91 

According to some experts, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s support 

for a defensive nuclear weapons strategy was intended to avoid a 

much more expensive strategy of developing intercontinental 

ballistics missiles (ICBMs), as China felt compelled to do in 

developing a minimum deterrent against the United States and 

Russia.92 Therefore, it seems likely that India will continue to 

explore a defensive nuclear weapons strategy as part of its overall 

security strategy but that it will be cautious in carrying out such a 

strategy. 

Pakistan’s Reaction to India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

Pakistan’s security stance and defense capabilities continue to 

be geared first and foremost toward survival against India’s rising 

power and its emerging security strategy. Pakistani leaders know 

that their country is less powerful on paper than India, with fewer 

nuclear weapons, conventional arms, and troops. They feel they 

have been forced by this asymmetry to develop all means available 

to ensure survival, including the building and testing of nuclear 

weapons and the maintenance of close relations with China.93 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

30

Pakistan has developed its nuclear deterrent in the face of sanctions, 

especially the Pressler Amendment, passed by the US Senate in 

1990. In spite of the asymmetry, Pakistani leaders believe that their 

conventional military is prepared to defeat any Indian attacks. 

Pakistan has created a streamlined and militarized nuclear force, as 

opposed to India’s decentralized and civilian-controlled force, 

which adds to the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent but also raises 

command-and-control issues.94

Before September 11, 2001, Pakistan was in danger of facing 

an Indian-US partnership and marginalization. After September 11, 

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf provided the United States 

with basing and overflight rights for Operation Enduring Freedom 

and prevented India from marginalizing Pakistan in its relations 

with the only remaining superpower. It is likely that both Pakistan 

and India will continue to draw closer to the United States, which 

could contribute to a lessening of tensions and lead to a new 

strategic configuration in South Asia.95

Pakistan takes India’s efforts to launch LCW seriously, 

especially since Minister of Defense Fernandes, Minister of Home 

Affairs Advani, and the Chief of Army Staff articulated it. In spite 

of the LCW threat, Pakistan resorted to asymmetrical warfare 

against India in the Kargil War and is prepared to do so again. If 

Pakistan and India are unable to resolve the status of Jammu and 

Kashmir, Pakistan will continue to explore ways to destabilize the 

territory in order to try to draw in the United States and resolve the 

issue in Pakistan’s favor. On a more positive note, Pakistan seems 

to be stepping away from its previous strategy of maximizing its 

threat to use nuclear weapons.96 Now, the scenario is more one of 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

31

using nuclear weapons as a last resort and, instead, using 

conventional options first.97

Pakistan has proposed to India a strategic restraint regime 

against weaponization and deployment of nuclear weapons. 

However, Pakistan believes that India is not interested in strategic 

restraint, particularly as evidenced by India’s embrace of missile 

defense. Given Pakistan’s strategic posture, India remains 

confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter 

Pakistan’s first-strike, defensive, and insurgency advantages.98 

Some have suggested that the way out of the strategic impasse is for 

India to renounce its “no-first-use” policy and develop a first-strike 

capability, which would present strategic problems for Pakistan.99

Even if India were to develop a published and seemingly 

transparent security strategy, there is a good chance that it will have 

little effect on improving the India-Pakistan relationship. However, 

the relationship between India and Pakistan is so pathological that 

having a national security strategy or doctrine really does not shed 

any transparency because of distrust.100

China’s Security Strategy and Defense Capabilities in Relation 

to India

China’s security strategy from 1949 to 1989, which was geared 

toward survival against the United States and the Soviet Union, 

included developing nuclear weapons and playing one superpower 

off the other. China’s victory over India in 1962 established the 

former as one of the foremost powers in Asia. India’s support for 

Tibet’s right to self-determination became a principal sore point in 

relations from the 1960s onwards. After 1989, China’s security 

strategy focused on contention with the United States over Taiwan, 

weapons proliferation, illegal trading practices, and other issues, 

and China has been steadily modernizing its defense capabilities. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

32

The relationship between China and Pakistan is not a solid 

alliance, and China has a history of not coming through for 

Pakistan. However, Indian officials still believe there is an alliance 

intended to encircle their country. Currently, China is backing off 

from missile cooperation with Pakistan. In regard to the border 

dispute on India’s northeast border, China is willing to negotiate 

with India, as it is not a serious issue or challenge for the 

Chinese.101

China’s overtures to India in recent years can be seen as an 

effort to prevent the latter from falling into the US camp. As China 

expands into Southeast and Central Asia, India will have to develop 

a strategy to contend with the possibility of Chinese dominance. 

China will also want to become more involved in South Asian 

affairs, while India would like to exclude China.102

Regarding nuclear arms and doctrine, China will continue to 

upgrade its second-strike capability, which may lead India into an 

arms race. Once China has full confidence in the capabilities of its 

missile systems, the situation in the Asian region may develop 

toward one of Chinese hegemony.103

India will continue to be inspired to compete with China. 

However, India may not have the will or the capability to persevere 

in an arms race with China. In order to avoid an expensive arms 

race, India instead may try to form alliances with the United States, 

Japan, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

members against China.104

India’s Expanding Interests and Emerging Security Strategy 

India’s interests will feature an increasing need to protect trade 

routes as trade continues to grow, and to guarantee access to rising 

supplies of oil and gas as the economy and population expand.105 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

33

India will be receiving increasing amounts of oil and gas from 

Central Asia and will have to maintain its partnership with Russia, 

possibly forming alliances with Russia, Kazakhstan, and other states 

in order to protect energy flows. India is participating in protecting 

commercial traffic in the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean in 

cooperation with the United States and other powers. India needs a 

significant naval presence in order to (1) protect against sea piracy 

and fisheries poaching; (2) ensure the rights to disputed islands; and 

(3) provide security against infiltration into the Indian Ocean by 

Malaysia and other states.106 

In the future, India will probably participate in protection of the 

Gulf, the Red Sea, and the South China Sea. Eventually, India and 

China could clash over the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, 

or the Indian Ocean. India may form partnerships and alliances with 

Iran, ASEAN, Korea, and Japan.107 Its memberships in multi-lateral 

organizations provide a framework for furthering its interests. India 

is already a leading member of the South Asian Association for 

Regional Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim-Association for 

Regional Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 

Governance and poverty constraints could prevent India from 

becoming one of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized 

countries.108 However, by 2015, Indian economic expansion will 

create interests throughout the world. The issue will be how to 

protect those emerging interests. For example, large numbers of 

Indian expatriates living in the Persian/Arabian Gulf region could 

be victimized at some stage and would need protection. In order to 

defend its interests, India could forge a partnership or alliance with 

the United States. This is a likely scenario, given rising trade and 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

34

improving relations with the United States.109 It is also likely that 

India will forge close relations with Iran.110

On the other side of the argument, there are those Indian 

strategic thinkers who argue in favor of self-reliance and free 

agency. Some hawks even advocate targeting ICBMs at 

Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to enhance India’s great power 

stature.111

INDIA’S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES 

India has been following the path of other world powers by 

trying to develop a nuclear weapons doctrine and a security 

strategy. An even more difficult task is to develop defense 

capabilities in order to execute that doctrine and strategy, while 

meeting the threats posed by Pakistan and non-state actors, and 

perhaps China. 

In terms of conventional capability, India has a large military 

that is characteristic of a regional power rather than a world power. 

India has 1.1 million soldiers, Pakistan half that number. India has 

738 combat aircraft, Pakistan 353. Indian tanks outnumber those of 

Pakistan by 3,400 to 2,300.112 However, there is a qualitative 

difference in favor of Pakistan because, for example, India’s 400 

MiG-21s are barely airworthy and its T-72 tanks have not been 

properly overhauled for years.113 

At current growth rates, India can only afford a defense budget 

that constitutes 3% of their gross domestic product, which will not 

allow for sweeping modernization.114 Therefore, India is faced with 

the issue of where to invest its defense rupees—in nuclear or 

conventional forces—and has a long way to go to become a world 

military power.
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

35

When it comes to nuclear weapons, India is moving ahead 

fastest in the area of fissionable material available for nuclear 

weapons development. The 1998 tests deepened India and 

Pakistan’s security dilemma and touched off a fissile materials arms 

race. In October 2001, India’s nuclear material was estimated at 

more than 400 nuclear weapons equivalents versus Pakistan, which 

had only 20-30. The fissionable material race is causing 

considerable concern in South Asia and among nonproliferation 

experts.115 On the other hand, India’s nuclear weapons program 

remains “recessed” and further tests seem unlikely.116 Also, doubts 

arose during the 1998 test about the ability of India’s scientists to 

build and test reliable fusion devices for thermonuclear weapons. 

Doubts about the reliability of India’s deterrent will continue if 

India does not test regularly.117 

For nuclear deterrence, India will continue to rely on bombers 

and missiles, especially the short-range Prithvi missile, against 

Pakistan. The intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Agni II, has 

been tested but is not yet operational.118 The nuclear “triad” with 

SLBMs is still a decade away, as India perfects the short-range 

Danush or Sagarika SLBMs. However, the issue will remain as to 

how to operate a submarine close enough to Pakistan’s coast to use 

short-range missiles while surviving anti-submarine attacks.119

In regard to India’s space program and the possible 

development of ICBMs, the Polar Space Launch Vehicle is the most 

likely candidate. In March 2002, the head of the Indian space 

program visited Washington, DC and consulted US officials on 

space and missile defense technology. India looks to such 

technology as a means to enter the “most-developed club” with 

Europe and China. Also, space launch vehicles provide a means for 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

36

economic growth. However, the Indian government is debating 

whether or not it should develop ICBMs. Given the support for 

worldwide nuclear disarmament within a large section of the Indian 

leadership and bureaucracy, there is more support for missile 

defense over developing ICBMs and nuclear technology. For BJP 

leaders, India’s development of space vehicles with ICBM 

capability is part of a wider plan for India to leapfrog over levels of 

development and to possess a symbol of world power in the 21st

century.120

The process of development and transformation of conventional 

forces is slower. In order to fight a limited conventional war against 

Pakistan, India needs advanced airborne assault capabilities. In 

protecting Central Asian oil and gas, India will need air mobility 

assets. India needs a larger navy to patrol the South China Sea, the 

Gulf, and Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region is a matter of 

legitimate interest, and the country is vulnerable by sea. In order to 

protect access to Southeast Asia and Gulf oil and gas, the 

development of a “blue water navy” has been a priority. By 2010, 

India should have three aircraft carriers, including one they built 

themselves.121

In case of a confrontation with Pakistan, the civilian nuclear 

authorities are supposed to transport the weapons to the Indian 

Army and to their missiles, and the Army then is supposed to hand 

weapons over to the Air Force for their bombers. In the 1990s, the 

Air Force was the slow element in the nuclear delivery equation, 

and it is only now learning how it can be more deeply involved. 

Until recently, the Air Force was not clear on how to deliver nuclear 

bombs. Now, it has focused its nuclear capability around the 

Mirage 2000.122 In April 2002 India set up a strategic command, 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

37

with the Air Force in charge, which is developing nuclear and 

limited war concepts.123

US-India Defense Cooperation 

In 2002, American arms sales to India resumed, as India 

purchased US radar, helicopters, and aircraft engines. US-Indian 

defense cooperation accelerated, and India increasingly looked to 

the United States as a partner. India’s Chief of Integrated Defense 

Staff has been engaging in a trilateral dialogue with US Pacific 

Command and Central Command, overriding lines of control within 

the US military structure.124 It is significant that top Pentagon 

planner Andrew Marshall made a stop in New Delhi in 2000 and 

provided US methodology and views on issues of jointness.125 With 

the development of joint concepts, there is greater inter-service and 

inter-agency coordination within the Indian government.126 

The United States and India are moving toward extended naval 

cooperation. India has already been escorting high value ships 

through the Straits of Malacca and protecting the freedom of sealanes. They are helping to ensure the free flow of the energy supply 

to Japan and the rest of Asia. However, the Indian navy is not yet 

prepared to escort ships through the Straits of Hormuz. Since 

September 11, India has opened its ports and repair facilities to the 

US Navy. They also would have provided the United States with 

basing rights, including access to air bases, had the need arisen.127

India has bought most of its aircraft from Russia, in addition to 

Mirages from France. They are also developing their own “light 

combat aircraft,” which will not be a predominant part of the Indian 

Air Force but will be an important symbolic aspect. While Russian 

aircraft are cheaper than American aircraft, Pakistani F-16s can 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

38

exercise air superiority. It is still uncertain whether or not India will 

buy American fighters to counter Pakistan’s advantage. 

Adapting defense capabilities to fulfill an emerging security 

strategy is challenging. It is often easier to develop new capabilities 

than to revamp old ones. Finally, the Indian case confirms that the 

development of security strategy and defense capabilities is 

intertwined with shifts in partnerships, alliances, and arms suppliers. 

INDIA EXPLORES THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE 

In May 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee responded positively to 

President Bush’s arms reduction and counterproliferation proposals 

and launched India’s exploration of the acquisition of theater 

missile defense.128 On November 9, 2001, in Washington, DC, the 

prime minister spoke of the United States and India as “natural 

allies” and reiterated his support for Bush’s arms reduction and 

missile defense proposals. By then, missile defenses seemed 

acceptable to other countries. Subsequently, the Bush 

administration began promoting missile defenses abroad, and India 

had already accepted the concept and was ready to begin pursuing a 

TMD system. Indian officials expressed interest in acquiring a 

TMD system and continued to note links with arms reductions. The 

Bush administration began to explore ways of providing missile 

defenses to India and perhaps Pakistan, which some Bush officials 

hoped might provide incentives for the easing of tensions and arms 

control. However, Pakistan remained concerned about the prospect 

of the United States providing missile defenses to India alone and 

possibly nullifying Pakistan’s first-strike nuclear deterrent. 

In December 2001 and May 2002, the US-India Defense Policy 

Group (DPG) had their first meetings in several years and discussed 

cooperation on TMD. Indian strategists studied the probable impact 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

39

of TMD and concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would be 

largely neutralized but that China’s arsenal would not be affected.129 

India examined the feasibility of developing a homegrown 

theater missile defense system, by converting its Akash surface-toair missile system. India also inquired about the purchase of the 

Israeli Arrow TMD system and the Russian S300-V TMD surfaceto-air missile. However, questions remained about the expense and 

transfer of technology, especially from Israel, which is constrained 

by the United States from selling certain technologies.130 Questions 

also remained about the Russian S300-V TMD system’s 

convertibility to TMD. 

India began to explore various TMD systems, including the 

Israeli-US Arrow 2, the Russian S-300 system, and the US Patriot 3. 

They eventually settled on the Arrow 2 and Patriot 3, which were 

cheaper than the S-300. However, the sale of the Arrow 2 system to 

India was slowed by questions raised in the State Department and 

elsewhere, including issues about the power of the Arrow’s booster 

phase rocket, which exceeded MTCR Category I limits.131 

India is open to cooperation with the United States regarding 

missile defense technology. If India decides to build a theater 

missile defense, it will attempt to import US, Israeli, and Russian 

technology. However, the United States and Israel are constrained 

by the NPT and the MTCR from exporting certain technologies to 

India. In regard to a joint missile defense development program 

with the United States, the limits to technology transfer have largely 

been determined, and India will proceed as far as the United States 

allows.132 The United States is providing some support for India’s 

space program, but there are still restrictions on some high tech 

defense and space exports.133
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

40

In August 2003, the US-India DPG met in Washington, DC. 

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith hosted the 

meeting, and Defense Secretary Ajay Prasad led the Indian 

delegation. By this time, the Bush administration had given its 

approval for Israel to sell India three Phalcon Airborne Warning and 

Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft. The press release mentioned 

that approval for the sale of the Israeli Arrow-2 anti-missile system, 

jointly developed by Israel and the United States, would soon 

follow.134 The two sides reaffirmed the shared view that missile 

defense enhances cooperative security and stability. They decided 

to hold a missile defense workshop in India as follow-on to an 

international workshop attended by US and Indian delegations at the 

June 2003 Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference held 

in Kyoto, Japan. The Indian delegation also accepted invitations to 

the July 2004 Multinational Ballistic Missile Defense Conference in 

Berlin and the 2005 Roving Sands Missile Defense Exercise.135

ARMS CONTROL

In the March 1998 general election campaign, the Bharatiya 

Janata Party campaigned on a platform that included a promise to 

test nuclear weapons in defiance of US CTBT pressures. The BJP’s 

realpolitik and furtherance of India’s national interests as a rising 

great power outweighed the country’s longstanding pacifist and 

anti-WMD principles and arms control articulated by Nehru and 

Gandhi.136 The 1998 nuclear tests on May 11 and 13 ended the 

country’s three-decades-old stance of nuclear opacity. In a 

statement to the Lok Sabha after the test, Prime Minister Vajpayee 

announced that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, 

and he promised to avoid an arms race, which would mean that 

India would produce just enough nuclear weapons to support a 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

41

strategy of minimum deterrence. Soon afterwards, he announced a 

unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.137 

The Indian tests led to intense pressure on Pakistani Prime 

Minister Nawaz Sharif from the military and radical Islamists for a 

reciprocal test. The United States sent a team, led by Deputy 

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Central Command 

commander-in-chief, General Anthony Zinni, to offer an aid 

package and the easing of sanctions if Pakistan would not test. 

However, Prime Minister Sharif and the Pakistan government 

ordered a nuclear test, which was conducted on May 28, 1998. 

On June 6, 1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted 

Resolution 1172, which urged nuclear restraint on India and 

Pakistan.138 Condemnation came from the five NPT nuclear 

weapon countries, the G-8, the European Union, the Organization of 

American States, the ASEAN regional forum, and also from a 

number of especially concerned states, including several that had 

recently given up nuclear weapon aspirations, such as Argentina, 

Brazil, South Africa, and Ukraine. 

The May 1998 tests proved India and Pakistan’s nuclear 

capabilities and eligibility for admission into the “club” of nuclear 

weapon states. Once they had tested, both India and Pakistan 

expressed a willingness to renegotiate the CTBT and continue to 

negotiate the FMCT, particularly if they were recognized as NWS. 

If the other NWS accepted India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 

programs, it might pave the way for their inclusion within the NPT 

as nuclear weapons states. 

The nuclear tests and India and Pakistan’s security dilemma 

accelerated the ongoing arms race, especially in missiles and 

fissionable material available for nuclear weapons development. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

42

The fissionable material has caused considerable concern among 

nonproliferation experts, with India moved ahead fastest, possessing 

today more than 50 nuclear weapons while Pakistan has just over 

20.139 

On the other hand, India’s nuclear weapons have continued to 

be recessed and undeployed, and further tests have not occurred in 

more than five years.140 In addition, doubts arose during the 1998 

test about the ability of India’s scientists to build and test reliable 

fusion devices for thermonuclear weapons. Doubts about the 

reliability of India and Pakistan’s deterrents will persist, if both 

continue to observe moratoria on nuclear testing.141

After the tests, the Clinton administration intensified sanctions 

against India and Pakistan. However, at the same time, the 

administration dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, along 

with other US diplomats, to negotiate a lessening of tensions and to 

prevent nuclear war in South Asia through diplomacy and the 

promotion of confidence-building measures and nuclear risk 

reduction measures that ensured sound command-and-control over 

nuclear weapons. The series of negotiations between Talbott and 

Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and also with Pakistani 

officials dealt with arms control (including export controls), as well 

as with command-and-control and a transparent nuclear doctrine.142 

Singh expressed India’s interest in joining the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.143 Pakistani 

officials expressed similar interest. In contrast, US efforts to 

convince India and Pakistan to adopt the NPT as non-nuclear states 

continued to be rejected. Pakistan continued to offer to disarm if 

India did, and India pledged not to strike first with nuclear weapons. 

However, Pakistan continued to keep its first-strike option open. A 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

43

positive consequence of the tests was that India and Pakistan held 

several bilateral meetings on Kashmir and other security issues. 

The most notable progress was made at a February 1999 summit 

meeting in Lahore, Pakistan. 

The 1999 Lahore Declaration and Confidence-Building 

Measures144

US negotiations and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “bus 

diplomacy” led to the February 1999 Lahore summit between Prime 

Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif, who discussed Kashmir, nuclear 

weapons, and other security issues. In the meeting, they agreed to 

CBMs that could be invoked to stabilize the India-Pakistan 

relationship. At the end of the meeting, the two prime ministers 

issued the “Lahore Declaration” that, with its accompanying 

documents, contained nuclear risk reduction measures to reduce the 

risks of a nuclear exchange prompted by an accident or 

misinterpretation of a nuclear or ballistic missile test and to improve 

nuclear security. 

The two states agreed to resolve remaining “technical details” 

in bilateral agreements by mid-1999 and to take several steps to 

reduce the nuclear danger on the subcontinent. First, the two sides 

agreed to exchange information on their nuclear doctrines and 

security strategies, as well as data on numbers of nuclear warheads 

and ballistic missiles and deployment information. However, with 

both sides still developing their nuclear arsenals and doctrines, the 

data exchanges could not provide much in terms of the level of 

detail and the scope of the nuclear weapons programs. 

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreed to at Lahore 

called for advance notification of ballistic missile test flights and 

prompt notification of “any accidental, unauthorized, or 

unexplained incident” regarding nuclear weapons. It also called for 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

44

work on measures to improve control over their nuclear weapons. 

Finally, the MOU recommended reviews of existing CBMs and 

emergency communications arrangements such as hotlines “with a 

view to upgrading and improving these links.”145 

The Kargil War of May-June 1999 and General Pervez 

Musharraf’s military coup of October 1999 stymied the progress 

that was made at Lahore and ended the promise of the Lahore 

Declaration and the CBMs and NRRMs. At issue is whether or not 

India and Pakistan can return to the agreements reached at Lahore 

and implement the CBMs and NRRMs. 

On October 13, 1999, Republicans in the US Senate led a 

majority in voting down the CTBT. Suddenly, the Clinton 

administration had lost a major leg of its arms control policy and 

found it more difficult to pressure India and Pakistan to sign. Even 

so, US officials appealed to India and Pakistan to sign the treaty as a 

way of putting the Senate under pressure to reverse its decision. For 

the next 15 months, the Clinton administration continued its efforts 

to persuade India and Pakistan to agree to the CTBT. 

In spite of the Pakistan coup and the CTBT setback, the 

nonproliferation dialogue between Deputy Secretary Talbott and 

Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh continued. In a November 1999 

interview in The Hindu Times, Jaswant Singh clarified the 

government’s position regarding nuclear weapons.146 He stated 

India’s willingness to consider signing the CTBT and negotiate a 

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. He reiterated previous statements 

about a minimum credible deterrent that would remain recessed, 

maintaining a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and 

ensuring civilian control over the weapons. The foreign minister 

did not see submarine launched ballistic missiles—which would 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

45

create a nuclear “triad”—as feasible in the foreseeable future and 

warned against the development of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a January 2000 interview, Deputy Secretary Talbott indicated 

that he was fairly satisfied with India’s nuclear stance and that he 

was not asking India to roll back its nuclear weapons programs. 

However, he also commented that the United States continued to be 

concerned about command-and-control issues, particularly given the 

level of tension and the rise of terrorist groups in the region, 

especially Al-Qaeda, that sought weapons of mass destruction.147 

President Clinton’s March 2000 trip to South Asia confirmed de 

facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapons state and emerging 

great power. His one-day visit to Pakistan demonstrated 

disapproval for General Musharraf’s October 1999 military coup 

and alleged proliferation activities. 

In sum, the Clinton administration’s arms control efforts in 

South Asia helped India and Pakistan agree to CBMs and NRRMs, 

which would lead to greater transparency and improved nuclear 

weapons command-and-control and safety. However, the 

administration’s failure to keep India and Pakistan from testing in 

May 1998 was a major setback. In the mid-1990s, the 

administration miscalculated by pushing India and Pakistan toward 

the CTBT and NPT. In regard to treaties, the Senate defeat of the 

CTBT was disappointing, while the FMCT remained stalled in the 

UN Conference on Disarmament as the administration left office. 

In spite of the setbacks, arms control prospects in South Asia were 

still reasonable when the Bush administration came to power in 

January 2001. 

While the proposal to cut nuclear weapons was significant, the 

Bush administration rejected the CTBT and the ABM Treaty and 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

46

initially backed away from cooperative threat reduction with Russia, 

which resulted in mixed signals in the area of arms control. The 

one notable exception was the administration’s support for the 

FMCT. However, FMCT negotiations in the UN Conference on 

Disarmament remained suspended, because of disagreement 

between countries, including the United States and India, which had 

substantial fissile material and wanted the FMCT to merely cap 

each nation’s supply. In opposition, countries like Pakistan, with 

less fissile material, wanted reductions that would bring greater 

strategic balance. In addition, China demanded consideration of a 

treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) before it 

agreed to negotiations on the FMCT, and Pakistan supported 

China’s position. The Bush administration has been cool towards 

PAROS, which might restrict the development of its missile defense 

and satellite defense programs.148

US Mediation Efforts and New Relationships with India and 

Pakistan 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the launching 

of Operation Enduring Freedom against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 

in Afghanistan led the Bush administration to intensify bilateral 

relations with both Pakistan and India and to ease sanctions against 

both countries. As a result, the United States was compelled to 

abandon its paternalistic approach to arms control and start working 

on a more equal footing with both governments. 

On December 13, 2001, Islamist terrorists, who had enjoyed the 

backing of Pakistan, attacked the Indian Parliament. In the next five 

months, India mobilized 700,000 troops against Pakistan and sent 

them to the Line of Control in Kashmir and to the international 

border. As during the 1999 Kargil war, India threatened but did not 

attack into Pakistan-controlled territory for two reasons. First, 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

47

Pakistan threatened to use nuclear weapons. Second, US pressure 

was significant. Any large-scale Indian cross-border action would 

probably have wrecked Operation Enduring Freedom and spiraled 

into nuclear war, according to US simulation analysis.149

At the height of the crisis, in late May and early June 2002, the 

Bush administration sent Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, 

followed by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, to South Asia as 

peacemakers. Russian President Vladimir Putin and British Foreign 

Secretary Jack Straw also made visits. They stressed the gravity of 

the confrontation and Pakistan’s obligation to stop cross-border 

terrorism. Some top Pakistani and Indian leaders, including Indian 

Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani and Defense Minister George 

Fernandes, continued to engage in rhetoric about their countries’ 

ability to fight, prevail in, and survive a nuclear war.150 

US officials emphasized the cataclysmic consequences of a 

nuclear exchange in which millions could be killed. However, 

some US officials, including Robert Blackwill, US Ambassador to 

India from 2001 to 2003, cautioned that India, for one, could no 

longer be lectured to paternalistically about its nuclear weapons 

program and that working as partners rather was a better 

approach.151

By October 2002 the confrontation had deescalated as Indian 

troops withdrew and Pakistan made efforts to stop cross-border 

terrorist activities. Also that same month, India managed to hold 

successful elections in its part of Kashmir that legitimized its 

presence. The United States continued its diplomatic campaign to 

bring the two countries together. By May 2003, relations had 

improved to the point where Prime Minister Vajpayee made an 

overture to President Musharraf of Pakistan. The thrust of the new 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

48

overture centered on restoring diplomatic relations and travel and 

then striving to negotiate a final settlement regarding larger issues, 

including the status of Jammu and Kashmir. It appeared that 

nuclear stability and a revival of the CBMs agreed in the Lahore 

Declaration were of secondary importance. 

In August 2002, British intelligence agents inside the Pakistan 

High Commission in London found incriminating documents 

showing that Pakistan was still helping North Korea develop a 

highly enriched uranium (HEU) program in exchange for assistance 

with missile technology.152 This report and others came after 

President Musharraf had assured Secretary Powell that cooperation 

with North Korea had ended after the 1999 coup. This led to a 

vigorous inter-agency debate over the next six months, with antiproliferation experts in the State Department pressing for 

punishment while top officials in the White House and Pentagon 

argued that admonishment of Musharraf, one of the key US allies in 

the war on terrorism, was sufficient. The White House and 

Pentagon prevailed, and no sanctions were applied against Pakistan. 

However, symbolic sanctions were levied on a North Korean stateowned company that was supplying missile technology to Pakistan. 

Public revelations of the case led to calls for greater control over 

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, including the employment of 

US monitoring technologies in, and on-site US inspections of, 

Pakistani nuclear facilities as part of a US cooperative threat 

reduction program with Pakistan (and India) as well as tighter 

Pakistani (and Indian) government export controls.153 

In January 2004, President Musharraf revealed that the “father 

of the Pakistan bomb,” A.Q. Khan had headed a ring of scientists, 

entrepreneurs, and security personnel who had been selling nuclear 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

49

secrets, including HEU centrifuges, to North Korea, Iran, Libya and 

perhaps other countries.154 These revelations reopened the issue of 

how to control Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. However, US 

requirements in Operation Enduring Freedom prevented actions 

against Pakistan. 

The Pentagon and State Department Positions on Arms Control 

and Missile Defense 

Organizational politics play a major role in explaining the Bush 

administration’s strategy towards arms control and missile defense, 

including efforts in South Asia.155 Most Bush administration 

national security political appointees, especially those in the 

Department of Defense, remain skeptical about arms control and 

deterrence and have been promoting counterproliferation and 

missile defenses, especially for India, as an alternative to arms 

control.156 This perspective was reinforced after September 11 by 

the specter of terrorists with WMD attacking the United States and 

its allies. Over the last two years, the Defense Department has been 

building relations with both India and Pakistan, using military aid 

and joint training and exercises. Defense agencies, the Central 

Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation are 

leading the way in tracking down suspected proliferators and 

terrorists in Pakistan to prevent nuclear materials from falling into 

the wrong hands. 

For many decades, the State Department took the lead in South 

Asia and now is competing with the Defense Department for control 

over policy and cooperation. State Department personnel, 

particularly those in the Bureau of Arms Control and the 

Nonproliferation Bureau, continue to promote arms control efforts, 

especially between India and Pakistan. However, the 

Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, John 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

50

R. Bolton—a political appointee—does not share the bureaus’ 

enthusiasm for arms control. Many in the State Department would 

like to see the revival of efforts to influence India and Pakistan to 

sign the FMCT and the CTBT, and eventually the NPT. There are 

many who insist that missile defense is destabilizing, and that arms 

control is the only way forward. Some State Department officials 

have employed war gaming and simulation analyses and generated 

findings that missile defense is “destabilizing” in South Asia.157 

China’s Position on Arms Control and Missile Defense 

Pakistan’s ally, China, believes that an Indian missile defense 

system would be intended partly to defend against Chinese 

intermediate-range missiles and that China would be able to keep 

well ahead of India in any subsequent arms race.158 At the same 

time, China knows that it must prepare for an eventual US-Indian 

alliance, which would put China at a strategic disadvantage. China 

believes that US missile defenses will force China to upgrade its 

nuclear deterrent and lead to an arms race and perhaps preemptive 

action.159 In regard to arms control, China’s main efforts take place 

in the UN Conference on Disarmament, where it has been especially 

interested in the PAROS treaty, which would slow the development 

of US space-based missile defense.

Pakistan’s Position on Arms Control and Missile Defense 

Pakistan remains committed to using nuclear weapons first in 

case of an Indian attack. However, Pakistan is also committed to 

arms control and arms reduction and is willing to disarm if India 

committed itself to do so. While Pakistan has rejected India’s 

proposal that both sides commit to a “no-first-use” policy, it has 

stepped away from its previous strategy of maximizing its threat to 

use nuclear weapons given any provocation.160 Now, the scenario is 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

51

more one of using nuclear weapons as a last resort and, instead, 

exhausting conventional options first.161 

In regard to missile defense, Pakistan believes that India is not 

interested in strategic restraint, as evidenced by India’s embrace of 

the Bush administration’s overtures. A Pakistani strategic expert 

sees India’s interest in missile defense “as an indicator of Indian 

designs and ambitions to acquire absolute regional superiority in the 

nuclear domain.” He warns, “Pakistan would be compelled to 

respond to Indian ambitions by increasing military cooperation with 

China and keeping its nuclear option open as the last resort in a war 

against India.”162 Pakistani officials think that the United States and 

Israel are supplying radar—including the “Pine Tree” fire-finder 

radar and AWACS that can detect cruise missiles—to India in order 

to help develop missile defenses.163

Pakistan’s Deputy High Commissioner (DHC) at its mission in 

India, Munawar Saeed, commented in a September 2003 interview 

about prospects for arms control in South Asia, including Pakistan’s 

acceptance of the CTBT and other arms control arrangements.164 

After the 1998 nuclear tests, he said, South Asia had moved beyond 

the reach of the nonproliferation treaty. However, both Pakistani 

and Indian prime ministers made statements that both countries 

would not proliferate. Pakistan has continued to say that it would 

accept the NPT if India did. He suggested that, unlike India, 

Pakistan developed nuclear weapons only for its national security 

and not to increase its national power. 

DHC Saeed continued by recounting the history of the South 

Asian arms race and what Pakistan sees as India’s leading role. 

India started working on nuclear power by the late 1950s and 

exploded a nuclear device in 1974. After the 1971 “national 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

52

trauma” of losing East Pakistan, Prime Minister Zulifkar Bhutto felt 

that Pakistan needed nuclear weapons and called a December 1972 

meeting of 25 nuclear scientists. While the meeting was historic, no 

action really started until after the Indian nuclear test of 1974. 

Pakistan did not sign the NPT “by default,” though it had no 

intention of developing nuclear weapons. However, since India did 

not sign the NPT and did develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan did not 

accede to the NPT. After the 1970s, a nuclear rollback was not 

possible, and the nuclear genie could not be put back into the bottle. 

In sum, he said, Pakistan is not averse to the idea of the NPT, but it 

is now involved in an arms race with India. 

DHC Saeed went on to discuss Pakistan’s proposal of a nuclear 

restraint regime against weaponization and deployment of nuclear 

weapons. He also reviewed a June 1997 meeting in Islamabad 

between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan, in which they 

discussed peace and security and Jammu and Kashmir. Besides a 

nuclear restraint regime in South Asia, Pakistan proposed controls 

on conventional as well as non-conventional arms. Pakistan’s 

proposal consisted of three elements: first, peaceful settlement of 

disputes; second, reinforcing confidence building measures at the 

regional level involving not just nuclear weapons but also ballistic 

missiles; and finally, a regime controlling ABM systems in the 

region. 

As early as 1992, Pakistan proposed a zero missile regime for 

South Asia. Pakistan also suggested to India that neither side 

develop ballistic missiles or ABM systems. Pakistan also stressed 

the need for structural negotiations to reduce conventional forces 

and weapons. However, he said, India has not been agreeable to an 

arms control regime with Pakistan, because of the need to strike a 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

53

military balance with China. India’s draft nuclear weapons doctrine 

of August 1999 demonstrated that force projection was a higher 

priority, discussing as it did submarine launched ballistic missiles 

and a “shopping list” that included aircraft carriers. India, he noted, 

has also stepped up defense cooperation with Israel. 

DHC Saeed referred to Pakistan’s refusal to accept the “nofirst-use” nuclear weapons doctrine and contended that India’s 

second-strike capability provided an excuse for larger nuclear 

forces. In contrast, a first-strike policy requires only minimum 

nuclear forces. He referred to the progress towards reduction of 

tensions and arms control embodied in the 1999 Memo of 

Understanding and the Lahore Declaration. At that time, the two 

sides agreed to enter into dialogue and consultation regarding 

security and nuclear doctrine and ballistic missile testing and to 

formalize relations on a bilateral level. Pakistan hopes that, 

whenever dialogue is able to resume, these issues can be pursued. 

Nuclear realities in South Asia, he suggested, deserve special 

consideration in regard to the Lahore MOU. At present, there is a 

limited possibility to restart talks and to establish a limited strategic 

regime and to address outstanding issues. The only major issue in 

South Asia is Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has suggested that, for 

the pacific settlement of disputes, there be an identification of issues 

and negotiations later. However, India would not accept even the 

identification of issues on a regional priority basis. 

DHC Saeed asserted Pakistan’s support for the FMCT, as long 

as India reduces its fissile material, and that Pakistan has voluntarily 

stopped producing fissile material. The problem is that India 

continues to produce fissile material and that Pakistan has limited 

trust in India. In 1992, under a declaration of understanding 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

54

regarding chemical weapons, the two countries agreed to finalize 

the Chemical Weapons Convention and their commitment to not 

possess chemical weapons. Later, India declared they had chemical 

weapons and were in the process of chemical weapons destruction. 

This was a breach of trust. Five years prior, India had given 

assurances that it had no chemical weapons. 

The Deputy High Commissioner reported that Pakistan was 

already implementing the MTCR without being party to it. 

Pakistan’s record on the export of nuclear-related materials and 

technology is good, but somehow interesting stories have appeared 

in the press. There have been stories about Pakistan acquiring 

nuclear materials from China and North Korea; and now the stories 

have been reversed and contend that Pakistan is supplying HEU to 

North Korea. 

DHC Saeed claimed that Pakistan had no intentions of 

proliferating and that the Americans would have acted much earlier 

if it had been true. He wondered why there were no similar stories 

about Indian proliferation. India allegedly stole HEU during the 

Kennedy administration. The HEU allegedly found in Iran recently 

would probably be of Indian origin. For the past 10 years, India has 

had good relations with Iran and has been working to establish a 

coalition or alliance with Iran, China, and Russia to isolate Pakistan. 

Pakistan, according to the DHC, looks at missile defense from a 

regional perspective and believes that it will feed the arms race in 

South Asia and will start a vicious cycle of escalating conflict 

potential in the region. However, nuclear weapons have brought 

strategic parity, and conflict will be a difficult proposition as long as 

both countries have nuclear weapons that they threaten to use, even 

if do not actually use them. When India starts cooperating on 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

55

missile defense, it is all right with the West. However, when 

Pakistan would start to do so, he feels it would be blamed for 

engaging in proliferation. Pakistan’s foreign office is dealing with 

issues of missile defense involving Germany, Japan, and other 

countries, but there have been no negotiations. Pumping money 

into missile defense on a regional basis might be all right, but it is 

too expensive on a state-by-state basis. 

DHC Saeed discussed the new overtures by Indian Prime 

Minister Vajpayee and stressed the need for structured negotiations 

on Jammu and Kashmir. If India showed willingness to 

compromise, he said, the dispute could be resolved in two years. 

However, India fails to recognize it as an issue. The Line of 

Control is subject to negotiations, but Pakistan does not want any 

territory. Pakistan wants the UN resolutions to be implemented and 

to satisfy the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. This must be a 

priority and be addressed. Whatever Kashmiris decide is all right 

with Pakistan. The LoC is a dagger in the heart of Kashmir. Under 

Indian occupation, Kashmiris have never been given a voice. There 

must be a referendum in which Kashmiris are consulted. Everyone 

agrees that has India failed to deliver on promises made to the UN 

over past 50 years. Neither government in Islamabad or Delhi can 

make the decisions. Instead, they need to find the courage within 

the leadership to allow Kashmiris to decide for themselves. First, 

he suggested, India has to recognize that a problem exists, but it is 

in a state of denial. Pakistan always has been willing to discuss this 

issue, as evidenced by Pakistan’s position on UN resolutions. 

Pakistan views any international state or group of states that can 

help bring India to at least start working towards finding a solution 

as having a crucial role to play. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

56

DHC Saeed counteracted the impression that Pakistan has been 

a failed or failing state and that the State Department had placed 

Pakistan on a list of terrorist states before September 11, 2001. 

Saudi Arabians established madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan 

in the 1980s and 1990s that have been a source of extremism. After 

the Russians left Afghanistan, the Americans left the country “high 

and dry,” with weapons everywhere, with no funding, and no 

government. No one cared that Afghans killed each other. Pakistan 

was concerned about Afghanistan due to the instability on its 

border. Since 2001, the costs now for the United States in 

Afghanistan are $1 billion per month. If the United States had spent 

one to two million dollars per year in the late 1980s, Saeed 

suggests, this could have been prevented. Perceptions have changed 

but realities on the ground have not changed. The madrassas are a 

gift of the West, he claims, so the West needs to resolve the 

education crisis. Pakistan has suffered more than its fair share as a 

result of others’ mistakes, says Saeed, and if the United States 

decides to leave Afghanistan today, then Pakistan will suffer huge 

consequences. 

Indian Government Position on Arms Control and Missile 

Defense 

India maintains that it is committed to arms control and 

disarmament and continues its efforts to gain recognition as a great 

power and a nuclear weapons state.165 The partnership with the 

United States since 2001 has led India to believe that it has been 

recognized as a power and NWS. Indian leaders remain committed 

to developing its nuclear deterrent, because leaders are convinced 

that a conflict with China is possible in the long run. This includes 

the development of unified command and control over its nuclear 

weapons and the production of long-range missiles. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

57

Civilian Government Perspectives. Current Indian views on arms 

control are reflected in a statement from Foreign Secretary, Kanwal 

Sibal, to the UN Conference on Disarmament in January 2003: 

Our doctrine also reaffirms India's readiness to join 

multilateral negotiations for reduction and elimination of 

nuclear weapons, for an FMCT and for effective export 

controls. As has been stated before, India is ready to 

multilateralise its no-first-use commitment so as to reduce 

the salience of nuclear weapons in the strategic realm. The 

residual threats of their accidental and unauthorized use can 

be addressed by moving towards a progressive de-alert of 

nuclear forces. These measures should be within our grasp 

given the non-adversarial relations among major powers.166

The statement indicates that India is prepared to proceed with the 

FMCT and the strengthening of export controls and perhaps other 

cooperative threat reduction measures. CBMs and NRRMs are part 

of security policy.167 In regard to the NPT, India remains 

uninterested in joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and 

would only contemplate doing so as part of multilateral 

disarmament by the nuclear weapons states, which remains most 

unlikely. India emphasizes that it has abided by the nonproliferation 

norms of the NPT since its inception.168

The Additional Secretary for Arms Control and Disarmament in 

the Ministry of External Affairs Sheel Kant Sharma, discussed in a 

September 2003 interview the prospects for bilateral cooperative 

threat reduction with the US to reduce the danger of theft of 

plutonium or HEU.169 In February 2003, Richard Meserve, 

Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, had visited to 

discuss issues of nuclear reactor safety. However, there were no 

discussions regarding fissile material. In regard to nuclear safety 

and nuclear technology, India has developed it independently in 

accordance with IAEA regulations. India, says Sharma, is not a 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

58

problem state like Russia or other former Soviet states. There is no 

possibility of stealing Indian nuclear/fissile material. India has 

highly developed systems with very strong physical security, so the 

situation is well under control. In regard to the production of fissile 

material, it has continued steadily over the last five years, because 

India needs fissile material for its breeder reactor, nuclear power 

plants, and nuclear weapons. However, India meets all the physical 

security conditions of the IAEA. 

Secretary Sharma referred to the issue of proliferation by using 

a diagram, with which he demonstrated that India was well beyond 

the “nuclear threshold stage” and was largely self-sufficient, while 

Pakistan was still in the stage of development and liable to 

proliferate. Pakistan was strengthening its nuclear deterrent, which 

was largely of nuisance value for India. He suggests that Pakistan, 

as “keeper of the Islamic bomb,” is more likely to contribute to the 

proliferation of HEU to Iran. The issue of suspected Pakistani 

proliferation to North Korea and Iran has not been discussed with 

India, he says, because the United States does not want to hear 

anything negative about Pakistan. 

The Additional Secretary mentioned that India, the United 

States, and Israel have had exploratory discussions regarding India’s 

acquisition of a missile defense system. India is a status quo power 

and a stable democracy without dictatorial rule and does not want to 

create any instability in South Asia. Therefore, missile defense 

makes a lot of sense. If one sees India solely through the 

India/Pakistan prism, he says, then one might conclude that India 

should not be interested in missile defense. However, India has a 

larger perspective. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

59

Secretary Sharma referred to multilateral arms control 

agreements and commented that India does not need to be validated 

as a nuclear power and does not seek any status in relation to the 

NPT. He contended that India is interested in being involved in 

FMCT discussions, but China is holding it up, and Pakistan is 

fronting for China. With regard to China’s insistence on a space 

weapons treaty, he wonders why China wants it. It is a substitute 

for the now-defunct ABM Treaty, which prevented the US from 

developing space-based weapons for missile defense. Finally, in 

regard to the possibility that India could acquire missile defense and 

then be encouraged to join the MTCR, he suggested that if the 

MTCR would accept India as an equal member, like Russia and 

France, that would be acceptable to India. 

India, he says, is open to overtures regarding to the Lahore 

Declaration and confidence-building measures. However, 

everything depends on Pakistan’s response—the continuation of 

cross-border terrorism is part of a composite dialogue. When 

terrorism stops, India and Pakistan can pick up the thread. 

Secretary Sharma commented that India neither feels threatened 

by American missile defense nor sees it as disadvantageous for 

India. The pattern of development regarding missile defense is 

reassuring, so India feels it is a good thing. This was a result of the 

Kyoto multilateral missile defense meeting, and the US briefing to 

India, Japan, and other countries. 

Secretary Sharma also discussed US State Department tactics 

and the perception that it keeps worrying unnecessarily about Indian 

tactics and motivations. India has tried to disabuse thinkers in the 

United States in regard to linking India to the situation in Pakistan. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

60

There is no comparison in terms of GDP, exports, and population, 

and India, he says, has never started a war. 

The Bush administration’s more relaxed approach to the CTBT 

and NPT is seen as a welcome change, but he notes that India does 

not particularity appreciate US unilateralism. India’s attitude 

towards CTBT already demonstrates that they recognize its validity 

and will not block its entry into force. With regard to the NPT, 

India will neither roll back its nuclear weapons programs nor go 

back on being a nuclear weapons state but instead can help by being 

a role model for how a nuclear power should behave. India, he 

says, has never provided any assistance on nuclear technology to 

anyone outside India. They will not join the NPT as a special status 

country and believe that the NPT club rules are unfair, leading them 

to not accept the treaty. India, he contends, cannot be a non-nuclear 

weapons state. 

The Indian Ministry of Defense. Joint Secretary for Planning in the 

Ministry of Defense, Gautam Mukhopadhya, commented that India has 

no interest in proliferation and no security interest in exporting nuclear 

weapons or missiles.170 Nuclear weapons are entirely for India’s own 

defense in a dangerous neighborhood, he said. They believe in arms 

control agreements; indeed, India helped negotiate the CWC and BWC. 

India is willing to consider becoming part of the MTCR under certain 

conditions. However, India did not negotiate the NPT, finds it unfair, 

and will not sign. India is willing to work with the United States and 

others on technological and nuclear security, and is not opposed to 

export controls and “dual use” dialogue. 

Secretary Mukhopadhya said further that India will resist 

intrusive conditions regarding theater missile defense and other 

weapons sales. At present, the Bush administration is working out 

its differences on missile defense and other arms sales. In addition, 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

61

Congress will have to remove residual sanctions, and the United 

States must prove its reliability in terms of consistently providing 

spare parts and not periodically resorting to sanctions. A stable, 

long-term security pact with the United States might be in India’s 

interest. 

India, he says, is still developing its approach to missile 

defense, which it views as an interesting force multiplier. From the 

United States’ side, the US-India DPG relationship is incremental. 

“No first-strike” and missile defense are complementary. India 

participated in the Kyoto Multilateral Missile Defense Workshop 

Dialogue on Science and Technology regarding Arrow 2 and Patriot 

3. India, he suggests, is the likely victim of first use of nuclear 

weapons and needs missile defense against more than just Pakistan. 

The September 2003 visit of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon was 

significant, and a discussion on the Arrow 2 system may take place. 

China is not perturbed by the prospect of Indian missile defense, but 

the question is how much can Pakistan build up. Also, the prospect 

of a Pakistani fundamentalist with a quick trigger finger trigger may 

be implausible but not impossible and is a good argument for 

missile defense. 

There is a convergence, Secretary Mukhopadhya points out, of 

security concerns between the United States and India, such as the 

war on terror, WMD proliferation, protecting sea lanes, and 

preventing instability. In terms of military equipment, India will 

continue to purchase primarily from Russia, Israel, and France. 

India will look to the United States for training, doctrine, logistics, 

and communications assistance and collaboration on research and 

development and modernization; there is much in the US arsenal 

that is dependable. The new US approach to India expects 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

62

cooperation but not exact convergence on Iraq, Afghan, North 

Korea, Iran, and other issues. 

The Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defense Staff (IDS), 

Ministry of Defense, Lt Gen B.M. Kapur, is in charge of defense 

planning.171 He reports that India has already done planning for 

missile defense and has purchased the Pine Tree fire-finder radar 

and Phalcon AWACS radar to detect missile attacks. Therefore, 

India will be prepared to utilize the Arrow 2 or Patriot 3 system 

once a system is acquired. He also discussed the new National 

Command Authority (NCA) and IDS’ role; the NCA has already 

enhanced India’s command and control over its nuclear arsenal and 

will provide greater reliability and safety. 

Non-governmental Experts on Arms Control and Missile 

Defense 

Indian non-governmental experts in think tanks and on the 

editorial boards of newspapers have varying views on arms control 

and missile defense.172 The major think tanks, including the 

Institute for Defence and Security Analysis (IDSA), the Institute of 

Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), the Delhi Policy Group (DPG), 

and the United Services Institution (USI), articulate mainstream 

views that reflect current BJP-led government thinking on security 

strategy, defense capabilities, limited support for arms control, and 

embrace of missile defense. A few journalistic experts, such as C. 

Raja Mohan,173 also share these views. More dovish and traditional 

views that oppose great power aspirations and missile defense and 

that support arms control and nonalignment are reflected in the 

Congress Party, the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary 

Studies, and the editorial boards of several newspapers. 

The hawkish view is best-articulated by Dr. Bharat Karnad of 

the Center for Policy Research.174 He contends that there is a gap 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

63

between India as an eventual great power and where it is at the 

moment. In regard to strategic weaponization, India proceeds by 

“auto pilot,” not by any direction from government. Issues are seen 

as technological challenges to be overcome, not as national security 

objectives. This tendency is inherent in the development of ICBMs 

and high-yield megaton nuclear weapons. For example, India has 

been technologically challenged to produce its own ICBM within 

one year, according to US intelligence estimates. Dr Karnad says 

Indian scientists see it as a challenge technologically to be able to 

do it themselves, but the government does not direct them. India 

cannot leave these matters to scientists and researchers, he suggests, 

as they may not meet national security needs. 

India’s computer simulation and development of software 

packages compensates for much of the need for nuclear testing. 

However, Dr Karnad says India needs more thermo-nuclear testing 

for accuracy purposes. Therefore, India should not sign the CTBT 

or continue the moratorium on testing. However, there are 

diplomatic implications behind further testing. The government, he 

says, does not have the will to resume testing. However, the United 

States needs India more than in the past. India needs to look at the 

mutual comparative advantage of cooperation. India, China, and 

Russia are all waiting for the United States to continue nuclear 

testing a low-yield device in 2005, and then testing will resume. 

According to Dr. Karnad, missile defense is an immature and 

expensive technology and does not firm up India’s deterrence. It is 

more a political gesture on India’s part towards the United States. 

In a democracy like India, either the entire country should be 

vulnerable or the entire country protected. It is an anti-democratic 

principle to only protect Delhi and not the rest of the country. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

64

Another issue of theater missile defense is whose hand is on the 

trigger. With the Aegis system’s coverage, control is still in the US 

hands. Patriot 3 or Arrow 2 would provide India with greater 

control. Also, missile defense technology is still unproven, 

especially the Israeli Arrow 2 system. Patriot 3 also has limitations. 

Ultimately missile defense is credible, but it is an immature 

technology and there are more immediate national priorities for 

India. 

Cooperative threat reduction, he suggests, may work with India 

and Pakistan. In theory, it is not a bad idea, but, in practice, 

Pakistan is not a threat to India. When it comes to the fissile 

material produced in India and Pakistan over the past five years, 

there is concern about Pakistan but not about India. However, notes 

Dr Karnad, Pakistani weapons are reportedly under American 

control since September 11 anyway. The United States is 

concerned with the “mad mullah” and “stray general” theories and 

an accidental nuclear launch in Pakistan. So, while the Pakistani 

corps commander becomes the “trigger” man for a nuclear launch, 

command and control functions have now been spread to lots of 

different people. In terms of the control of fissile material and the 

FMCT, there should be a nuclear cap on size for all states at some 

stage. In terms of the MTCR, it penalizes India, but the United 

States expects India to support it. In the end, Dr Karnad asks, who 

are greater proliferators? His answer: the United States and 

Pakistan. 

US Embassy Observations on South Asia, Arms Control, and 

Missile Defense 

The Political-Military Specialist in the US Embassy in New 

Delhi, Jonathan Wallis,175 has been closely observing India and 

Pakistan’s positions on arms control and missile defense. He 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

65

suggests that India has undertaken a post-Cold War shift away from 

its polarized anti-NPT position towards a more self-interested 

stance on arms control and missile defense. India does not like the 

MTCR, he says, but might join under certain conditions, possibly 

with defense trade-offs. Though Pakistan routinely turns down the 

FMCT, India considers it from time to time. 

However, when it gets down to the specifics of negotiation, it 

might be another story. India perceives a fait accompli regarding 

arms control treaties; they are a western predetermined product with 

no negotiation wiggle room. India needs flexibility and respect for 

it to take its place at the bargaining table with the major powers. 

India has flip-flopped several times on the issue of the CTBT. A de 

facto test ban is in effect, but if national security dictates, India will 

test if necessary. 

The perception in India, reports Mr Wallis, is that there can be 

no future arguments regarding India as a nuclear weapons state. 

There must be accommodation in the long run with India regarding 

its nuclear status, and the United States should not engage India in 

nonproliferation debates. India will be too big a power to ignore. 

India views Pakistan as a terrorist state and proliferator, where the 

military has overthrown a democratic regime, a position bolstered 

by allegations of Pakistan shipping HEU to North Korea. 

When it comes to bilateral US-India agreements, nuclear and 

missile safety issues may see some movement. The US Department 

of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission have visited India, 

and there could be cooperative threat reduction efforts. India cannot 

agree to anything that hampers its nuclear weapons and missile 

programs and has not signed any treaties prohibiting such. 

However, India is willing to work on nuclear safety and mutual 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

66

cooperation and collaboration regarding safety as a precursor to 

more cooperation in the future. The IAEA it is not forceful—it is 

present but not too visible in India. India helped to moderate the 

Nonaligned Movement statement on the IAEA, which was very 

helpful, but there was no forceful statement regarding Iraq. The 

IAEA has come to India for nuclear safety collaboration, and India 

has offered to expand IAEA access to nuclear facilities. 

In terms of missile testing and confidence building measures, 

he suggests it would be desirable for India and Pakistan to publish 

an entire year’s testing schedule in advance. As it stands, India and 

Pakistan notify each other 48 hours in advance by mutual 

agreement. On one occasion India did not notify Pakistan as a 

result of bureaucratic fumbling, as the person in charge was out of 

town. On another, a test that was scrubbed in December was 

rescheduled for March without notification. The US position is that 

the two countries need to announce testing in advance with a 

published schedule, which would make it possible to have advance 

warning. Each country should also publish a Notice to Airmen with 

coordinates and provide more formal notification to embassies or 

high commissions. There is a hotline system established that 

provides military-to-military contact, but not leader-to-leader, 

which is more essential. India has better command-and-control of 

its nuclear forces with the recent establishment of the National 

Command Authority. 

In terms of missile defense, the issue of India purchasing the 

Arrow 2 system or Patriot 3 system has not been decided and is still 

a matter of debate. India takes its time in terms of acquiring 

weapons systems, and it could take until 2010 before they buy a 

missile defense system. The Phalcon AWACS radar system was 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

67

approved in August, and India should move uncharacteristically 

quickly to acquire it from Israel. On the other hand, India has been 

negotiating to buy the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for more 

than a decade. Another question is whether missile defense a 

genuine military requirement or simply a means for India to draw 

closer to the United States. Indian think tanks, Mr Wallis says, see 

it as a means to take the war to Pakistan. 

India is very supportive of missile defense, but is the United 

States willing to go along? Arrow 2 falls under Category I MTCR 

restrictions, while Patriot 3 under Category II, which is less 

problematic. The State Department decides what fall into 

Categories I and II. However, the sale of missile defense to India 

will be a political decision and not a technical one. India has 

indicated a willingness to engage in quid pro quo and join the 

MTCR in exchange for missile defense. 

Colonel John Albert Hill, the US Air Attaché and Captain Eric 

Nelson, the Naval Attaché, commented on the Indian perspective on 

missile defense.176 India views missile defense within the context 

of its “no-first-use” nuclear weapons stance and believes that it 

benefits nonproliferation in South Asia. Missile defense will 

support India’s no-first-use strategy and guarantee that its secondstrike capability is secure. They report that India wants the United 

States to tell them more and has sent teams to the United States on 

missile defense. 

What might be Pakistan’s and China’s responses to missile 

defense? Given Pakistan’s resources and outside help, the attaches 

feel that Pakistan may still not have enough to be able to overwhelm 

an Indian missile defense, as Pakistan has only a limited numbers of 

weapons. The Indian response to Pakistan’s acquisition of missile 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

68

defense would be positive and might lead to nuclear and short-range 

missile reductions. In terms of longer-range missiles, China is the 

reason for India’s nuclear weapons program as a deterrent. India 

wants to have a ballistic missile submarine to threaten China from 

anywhere, not just limited range. India will never have enough 

strategic capability to gain advantage over China. 

Many questions remain in the US regarding the future of 

missile defense in the region. The debate continues in Washington 

over whether missile defense will stabilize or destabilize South 

Asia. There is also ongoing discussion in regard to giving approval 

for Israel to sell India missile defense via the backdoor. In regard to 

the debate between the Defense Department and State Department, 

the Bush administration has thrown India tidbits to maintain the 

dialogue until analysts can determine real the impact of missile 

defense in South Asia. Meanwhile, the price tag may not be 

affordable to India’s government. 

India needs to be clearer in defining what should be defended—

nuclear weapons sites or cities. The definition of the protected area 

determines what India would need in terms of missile defense. 

India has nothing to lose by defining targets, doing studies, and 

calculating costs. Why, they ask, has India not done this? The 

officers suggest that India wants a classified briefing on missile 

defense so that it can join Japan and other US allies. 

A science advisor at the US Embassy, Lori Dando, reported on 

US cooperation with India on nuclear power plants.177 She reports 

that US officials are slowly getting clearance to work with the 

Indians. According to Ms Dando, there was an IAEA meeting in 

Washington, DC with Indian scientists regarding safety issues and 

standards. Indian acquisition of missile defense may bring a quid 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

69

pro quo of cooperative threat reduction, especially in safeguarding 

nuclear plants. What will happen? The first step at this moment 

will be guarding nuclear fuel and plant safety. A Chernobyl-style 

meltdown possibility must be prevented. The plants are old and of 

Russian construction, with no spare parts and with intermittent 

repairs. 

Rodney Jones of the United States’ Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency surmises that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s support for US 

missile defense and the Indian government’s subsequent exploration 

of various systems was most likely intended to avoid an expensive 

strategy of developing ICBMs like China had to do in trying to 

develop a minimum credible deterrent in relation to the United 

States and Russia.178 Therefore, it seems likely that India will 

continue to explore acquiring missile defenses as part of its largely 

defensive security strategy but less likely that it will develop or 

deploy them in the coming five years or so. 

CONCLUSION 

India has lagged behind other major powers in developing a 

security strategy and remains the only country to have released a 

nuclear doctrine without such a strategy. However, since the 1998 

nuclear tests and formation of national security architecture, India’s 

security strategy has been emerging. The NSAB’s Draft Nuclear 

Weapons Doctrine, the “limited conventional war” concept, and 

Vajpayee’s endorsement of missile defenses have touched off 

debates within the Indian security establishment that have 

engendered strategic thinking and point to the emergence of a 

strategy. 

For more than fifty years, a lack of strategic thinking, 

bureaucracy, and domestic political configurations prevented the 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

70

promulgation of a clear security strategy. The 1998 nuclear tests 

underlined the importance of a developing a coherent security 

strategy. Even so, according to Stephen Cohen, India should not be 

rushed to develop a clear and coherent national security strategy. It 

will come in time in a slow evolution, as Indians think through the 

various issues and act on them. Indian political stability would lead 

to greater clarity in strategic pronouncements.179

India needs both strategic consensus and capabilities. An 

inefficient bureaucracy and an economy that is still emerging from 

state control have hampered India in the process of trying to 

develop world-class defense capabilities that would allow 

implementation of any ambitious security strategy. Thus far, it 

seems that India is investing in nuclear weapons and delivery 

systems over upgrading conventional capabilities. However, both 

nuclear and conventional weapons systems need to be improved 

substantially if India hopes to move into the ranks of world 

powers.

180

Assuming that India develops and publishes a coherent security 

strategy, a number of issues remain. First, it is uncertain if a 

security strategy would lead to transparency and confidencebuilding.181 Second, transparency and confidence-building 

measures may not lessen the chances of war with Pakistan. Thus 

far, India has been selectively transparent and will probably 

continue to be so. India has not been transparent in its agreements 

with Pakistan and China. Often, when India signals, Pakistan and 

China see the worst possible intentions. Also transparency is 

problematic to India as it indicates its vulnerability to China. As for 

Pakistan, it cannot be transparent; to be so would only provide 

confirmation of vulnerability. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

71

Concerning relations with the United States, there will be areas 

where India is voluntarily transparent in order to curry favor and 

other areas where it will not be in India’s interests to be so. 

Transparency and confidence-building measures may be essential 

building blocks to prevent unwanted conflict, but the Bush 

administration does not see these measures as crucial in India-US 

relations. 

Since September 11, the US-India strategic relationship has 

accelerated and developed toward partnership and perhaps an 

eventual alliance. India has assisted the United States through 

skillful diplomacy, and India’s major contributions to the UN and 

peacekeeping have led the United States to give tacit support to 

India’s campaign for a permanent UN Security Council seat. India 

has been very accommodating with the United States in not 

attacking Pakistan and is reaping rewards, especially in the defense 

capabilities realm. Meanwhile, debate in India continues over 

partnership and alliance with the United States. In the longer term, 

the United States may find it desirable and necessary to form an 

alliance eventually with India to confront China.182 

The broader conclusion from the Indian case is that rising 

powers, especially those that develop nuclear weapons and power 

projection capabilities, need a coherent security strategy. Leaders 

need to send clear signals to military and civilian agencies. 

Governments need to send clear signals to adversaries. However, 

the Indian case demonstrates the difficulties of formulating security 

strategy in a democracy and where bureaucratic resistance is strong. 

Developing defense capabilities to fulfill a security strategy is even 

more difficult. Often, it is easier to develop new capabilities than to 

revamp old ones. Finally, the Indian case confirms that the 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

72

development of security strategy and defense capabilities is 

intertwined with shifts in partnerships, alliances, and arms suppliers. 

US peacemaking efforts in South Asia continue. US rejection 

of the CTBT and coolness toward a treaty to prevent an arms race in 

outer space, thereby stalling the FMCT, have left little in the way of 

multilateral arms control to negotiate. Furthermore, after the United 

States drew closer to India and Pakistan in the wake of September 

11, sanctions for violating the NPT, the MTCR, and the non-ratified 

CTBT were eased. The easing of sanctions sent a message to both 

countries that it was acceptable for them to remain as de facto 

nuclear weapons states. Therefore, there is no probability that India 

and Pakistan can be coaxed as non-nuclear states towards accepting 

the CTBT and NPT. India will not give up its nuclear deterrent 

because leaders are convinced that a long-term conflict with China 

is possible, and Pakistan will keep its deterrent as long as India has 

nuclear weapons. 

What is intriguing is the prospect of the United States and the 

other nuclear weapons states accepting India and Pakistan as NWS, 

which they have already done in a de facto sense. While such a 

move may provide an incentive for other states, even North Korea 

and Iran, to test nuclear weapons and demand acceptance into the 

NWS club, it seems to be compelling India and, particularly, 

Pakistan to adhere more closely to NWS standards and has opened 

the door to more intensive and regular on-site inspections by the 

IAEA and the United States. 

Closer US relations with India and Pakistan over the last two 

years have opened the door to US-assisted bilateral arms control 

agreements; to a possible resolution of the Kashmir issue that drives 

the South Asian conflict; and, to Indian theater missile defense that 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

73

will not provoke Pakistan to launch a preemptive strike. The United 

States can achieve progress in arms control through CBMs, such as 

cooperative aerial monitoring, assisting with a more rigorous “hot 

line,” and a cooperative threat reduction program.183 In regard to 

other CBMs to stabilize the India-Pakistan relationship, the two 

countries could do a better job of providing data and strategies 

concerning their nuclear weapons programs and advance 

notification of ballistic missile test flights. In regard to CTR, US 

monitoring technologies and US systems for transparency and 

agreement compliance verification could be used. Thus, it is 

possible that India and Pakistan will be brought into a bilateral arms 

control process and will move toward resolving the Kashmir 

conflict through US influence. 

In regard to South Asia’s role in the US missile defense 

posture, India—along with Japan, Israel, and NATO states—will 

provide a test case to see if missile defense can be globalized. 

Pakistan might be persuaded to join a multilateral missile defense 

community; otherwise, Pakistan will have to be reassured and 

perhaps provided with better air defenses and other security 

guarantees. It is likely that India will successfully adapt the Arrow 

2 or Patriot 3 system to South Asia, which would validate the 

prospects for cooperative missile defense systems among the United 

States, Israel, India, and other states. 

Pakistan will remain a problematic case for some time to come, 

as demonstrated by HEU proliferation to North Korea, Iran, and 

Libya; China’s exports of missile and nuclear technology to 

Pakistan; and, the presence of Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups 

in the country. However, closer US relations with Pakistan allow 

for greater monitoring of possible WMD proliferation activities. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

74

The US presence has diminished the chances of Pakistan’s 

disintegration but has not lessened Pakistan’s alliance with China. 

In the last five years, the United States has helped India and 

Pakistan come to recognize the devastating security implications of 

war and has demonstrated that it can help increase stability in South 

Asia without dramatically changing the balance of power or 

encroaching on Indian or Pakistani sovereignty. 

What explains the stabilization of South Asia? Neo-realists 

would posit that unipolarity and a US administration that has been 

prepared to aggressively exploit it, especially after September 11th, 

in order to forge new relations (in this case with India and Pakistan) 

provides the best explanation. Also, the bilateral approach to 

resolving crises and negotiating arms control agreements is easier to 

implement than the multilateral approach. What is intriguing is the 

long-range US plan for South Asia. The US-India partnership will 

lead to greater regional cooperation and arms control in South Asia 

to efforts to contain a rising China as the twenty-first century 

develops. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Nayar and T.V. Paul, Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul, India in the 

World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2003). 

2

 George Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 

Corp., 1992). 

3

 National Security Advisory Board, Draft Nuclear Weapons Doctrine 

(DNWD), New Delhi, August 17, 1999. 

4

 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); Ike Skelton, “Military 

Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans,” Strategic Forum, No. 174, 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 

October 2000. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

75

 

5

 Seymour M. Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 

29, 1993, 56-73; George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The 

Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California 

Press, 1999), 300-302. Hersh provides an alarming account of the 

spring 1990 confrontation between India and Pakistan, while Perkovich 

does not. 

6

 K.P.S. Gill, ed., Terror and Containment: Perspectives of India’s 

Internal Security (New Delhi: Gyan Pub. House, 2001); Jatin Desai, 

India and US on Terrorism (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 

2000). 

7

 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States,

September 2002. The NSS has been issued annually, with exceptions, 

from 1987 through 2002. 

8

 Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy: Documenting 

Strategic Vision, Second Edition (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College 

Strategic Studies Institute, March 15, 1995). Snider writes: “the 

problem with such documents is that they often create the false 

impression that strategy formulation is a rational and systemic process. 

In fact, strategy formulation both within the executive branch and 

between the executive branch and Congress is an intensely political 

process from which national strategy emerges after protracted 

bargaining and compromise.” 

9

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy,

1995. 

10 Stephen Wolborsky, The Battle between Hedgers and Transformers 

for the Soul of DoD, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 

Harvard University, July 2000. AEFs and MEUs were devised in the 

1990s with the decline of US bases overseas and the need for access to 

a wider range of locations after the end of the Cold War. 

11 National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002. The basic 

outline of the Bush administration’s NSS emerged in the course of 

2002. The outline of a national military strategy and changes in 

defense capabilities were contained in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report, which includes plans for missile defense deployment. 

12 The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, 13. Also, 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 

2002, 1. 

13 National Security Strategy, 2002, 14. In the NSS and National 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, nonproliferation and 

arms control are mentioned after counter-proliferation as part of the 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

76

 

anti-WMD strategy. In the national security establishment, the State 

Department remains the repository of support for traditional arms 

control and multilateral treaty negotiations. 

14 The Bush administration has asserted its commitment to a Fissile 

Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). 

15 Rose Gottemoeller, with Rebecca Longsworth, Enhancing Nuclear 

Security in the Counter-Terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a 

New Region for Cooperation, Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, Non-Proliferation Project, August 2002. After September 11, 

the threat of terrorists obtaining Russian WMD led to a revival of CTR 

and the need to protect nuclear facilities. 

16 Representative John M. Spratt, Jr. “Stopping a Dangerous Drift in 

US Arms Control Policy,” Arms Control Today (March 2003) 

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/ spratt_mar03.asp. Also, 

James M. Smith, “Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 

Counterproliferation: In Search of Synergy and Policy Coherence,” 

International Studies Association-South conference paper, October 18-

19, 2002. 

17 See Stephen F. Burgess, “India’s Emerging Security Strategy and 

Defense Capabilities,” American Political Science Association (APSA) 

conference paper, August 2002. 

18 Lewis A. Dunn, “Balancing Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation in 

South Asia,” in Lee Feinstein, ed., A New Equation: US Policy Toward 

India and Pakistan After September 11, Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace Working Paper No. 27, May 2002. 

19 Harsh V. Pant, “India and Nuclear Arms Control: A Study of the 

CTBT,” Comparative Strategy, 21 (2002): 91-105. Also, Mario 

Carranza, “At the Crossroads: US Non-proliferation Policy Toward 

South Asia after the Indian and Pakistani Tests,” Contemporary 

Security Policy, Vol.23, No.2 (April 2002): 93-128. 

20 Spratt, “Stopping a Dangerous Drift.” Also, J. Smith, “Disarmament, 

Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterproliferation,” 12. 

21 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 

1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 

22 Stephen P Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution Press, 2001); Chris Smith, India’s ad hoc 

Arsenal, Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1994); Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb. 

23 Cohen, India, 195-197. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

77

 

24 Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

77, No. 4 (September/October 1998): “Challenging Nuclear 

Hegemony,” South Asian Voice, June 2000. 

25 C. Smith, India’s ad hoc Arsenal.

26 Santosh K. Mehrotra, India and the Soviet Union: Trade and 

Technology Transfer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 

27 Mehrotra, India and the Soviet Union. 

28 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 300-302; Hersh, “On the Nuclear 

Edge,” 56-73. 

29 Cohen, India, 247-248. 

30 Anthony S. Cordesman, The India-Pakistan Military Balance 

(Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 

2002); G.M. Jain, India’s Defence and Security: Intra-regional 

Dimension (Jaipur: INA Shree Publications, 1998). 

31 Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and 

Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International 

Security Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999): 148-177. 

32 “China's Nuclear Weapons,” Proliferation Brief, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, Volume 5, Number 8, Wednesday, 

May 1, 2002, <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates.asp?p=8& 

PublicationID=971.

33 Rodney Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: 

An Overview (Fort Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency Report, October 1, 2001). 

34 A brief history of the FMCT, Oxford Research Group, United 

Kingdom, 2003, 12. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/ 

publications/books/handbook/ch2.pdf 

35 Savita Pande, “Chinese Nuclear Doctrine,” New Delhi: IDSA 

Strategic Analysis Vol. XXIII, No. 12, March 2000. China was the 

first nuclear weapons state to declare a “no-first-use” doctrine. 

36 Pant, “India and Nuclear Arms Control,” 91-105. 

37 Pant, “India and Nuclear Arms Control,” 95. 

38 Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: The Realist 

Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2002). Karnad articulates 

a realpolitik strategy for India, which the BJP moved toward in the 

1990s and which would include the development of a nuclear force to 

rival China and other competitors. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

78

 

39 Narendra Gupta, “India’s Days of Nuclear Ambivalence are Over,” 

The Times of India, July 16, 1997. 

40 Jaswant Singh, National Security: An Outline of Our Concerns 

(New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1996). 

41 BJP Election Manifesto ’98, <http://www.bjp.org/manifes/ 

manifes.htm> Rodney W. Jones and Sumit Ganguly, “Debating New 

Delhi’s Nuclear Decision,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 

(Winter 2001): 181-189. In campaigning for election in 1998, the BJP 

promised in its manifesto to test nuclear weapons. When the BJP came 

to office, it soon became apparent that it would not be able to enact any 

of its election manifesto proposals and that the government would be 

short-lived. The promise to carry out a nuclear test was the only 

proposal that was attainable at the time. The fulfillment of the promise 

helped the BJP in the next round of elections in September-October 

1999. 

42 John F. Burns, “India Carries Out Nuclear Tests in Defiance of 

International Treaty,” New York Times, May 12, 1998, 1. 

43 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 

Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 

275-342. 

44 Statement by Prime Minister Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian 

Parliament, May 27, 1998. 

45 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, June 6, 1998. 

46 Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia” Foreign 

Affairs, Volume 78, No, 2 (March/April 1999). 

47 Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between 

Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 

2001), 392-398. In this massive work, Tellis lays out a number of 

scenarios involving India’s nuclear weapons program and concludes 

that a “minimum recessed deterrent” and a “force in being” will be the 

most likely outcome for the foreseeable future. 

48 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 392-398. 

49 N. Ram, “Dreaming India’s Nuclear Future,” Frontline, Volume 16, 

Issue 18, August 28-September 10, 1999. Also, India’s offer to join the 

CTBT and the FMCT was dependent upon Pakistan’s acceptance of the 

treaties, which was unlikely. 

50 Shaun Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia,” in 

Deepa M. Ollapally, ed., Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

79

 

Findings from USIP-sponsored Projects (Washington, DC: US 

Institute of Peace, September 2001), 32-36. 

51 Subash Kapila, India’s National Security Council—A Critical 

Review, South Asia Analysis Group Papers, May 10, 2000. 

52 See Kuldip S. Ludra, National Security Papers (Chandigarh: Thakur 

Strategic Research Centre, 1999). 

53 Gurmeet Kanwal, India’s National Security Strategy in a Nuclear 

Environment, IDSA, New Delhi, December 2000; V.R. Raghavan, ed. 

National Security Management: Proceedings of a Seminar Organized 

by the Delhi Policy Group (New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 1998); 

Interview with Ted Andrews, India Desk Officer, State Department, 

April 19, 2002. 

54 Lt Gen B M Kapur, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defense Staff, 

Ministry of Defense, interviewed in New Delhi, India, September 2003. 

55 Sreeram S. Chaulia, “BJP, India’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Realist 

Alternative’ to the Nehruvian Tradition,” International Politics Volume 

39 (June 2002): 233. 

56 Cohen, India, 72-76; Chaulia, “BJP,” 233. 

57 Kanwal, India’s National Security Strategy; Raghavan, ed. National 

Security Management; Interview with Ted Andrews. 

58 Cohen, India, 82-83. 

59 Chaulia, “BJP,” 233. 

60 Kapila, India’s National Security Council. Also, C. Raja Mohan, 

Strategic Affairs editor, The Hindu newspaper, Dr. Manoj Joshi, 

Political Editor and Chief of News Bureau, and Siddharth Varadarajan, 

Foreign Policy Editor, The Times of India interviewed in New Delhi, 

India, September 2003. 

61 National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Draft Nuclear Weapons 

Doctrine, New Delhi, August 17, 1999. 

62 NSAB, Draft. 

63 NSAB, Draft. 

64 Bidwai, Praful, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine Ups the Ante,” Asia Times, 

August 20, 1999. 

65 Gurmeet Kanwal, India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Policy, IDSA, New 

Delhi, February 2001. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

80

 

66 Interview with Francis Vaz, Minister for Political Affairs, Embassy 

of India, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2002. According to Minister Vaz, 

the NSAB was an “outlier” in relation to Indian strategic thinking and 

that the “triad” notion was “far-fetched.” 

67 Interview with Eric Arnett, Non-Proliferation Expert, State 

Department, April 29, 2002. 

68 Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, political 

counselors at the Pakistan Embassy to the United States, Washington, 

D.C., May 1, 2002. Pakistan believed that the DNWD signaled Indian 

intentions. 

69 BBC World News, September 7, 1999. 

70 BBC World News, September 7, 1999. 

71 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002. 

72 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 444-445. 

73 Interview with Jaswant Singh, The Hindu Times, November 29, 

1999. 

74 Interview with Jaswant Singh, The Hindu Times, November 29, 

1999. 

75 Interview with Strobe Talbott, The Hindu Times January 15, 2000. 

76 Cohen, India, 76-77. 

77 Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim, Amitabh Mattoo, eds. Kargil and After: 

Challenges for Indian Policy (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 

2001). 

78 Bajpai, Kargil and After. 

79 Jasjit Singh, “Dynamics of Limited War,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 

24, No. 7 (October 2000). 

80 Arpit Rajain, “The Nuclear Priority,” Institute of Peace and Conflict 

Studies, Article No. 370, June 23, 2000. 

81 Irfan Husain, “War or Peace,” Dawn, March 11, 2000. 

82 Singh, “Dynamics of Limited War;” Interview with Ambassador 

Teresita Schaeffer, Director, South Asia Program, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, April 29, 2002; Teresita Schaffer, Rising 

India (Washington, DC: CSIS Report, January 2002); Martin J. 

Wojtysiak, Preventing Catastrophe: US Policy Options for 

Management of Nuclear Weapons, Air War College Maxwell Paper 

No. 25, August 2001. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

81

 

83 Subhash Kapila, United States War-Gaming on South Asia Nuclear 

Conflict: An Analysis, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 476, June 

14, 2002. 

84 Anthony S. Cordesman, The India-Pakistan Military Balance 

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 

2002). India lacks attack helicopters and other airborne assault 

capabilities. 

85 Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, eds. Engaged Democracies: 

India-US Relations in the 21st Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand 

Publications, 2000); Baldev Raj Nayar, India and the Major Powers 

after Pokhran II (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001). 

86 Interview with Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, April 29, 2002. 

Schaffer points out that Prime Minister Vajpayee did not initially 

endorse National Missile Defense (NMD) in May 2001, but in May 

2002, India supports NMD coupled with counterproliferation. 

Counterproliferation is consistent with India’s views to scale down and 

eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. India also has endorsed the 

process of consultation, which helped lead Russia to live with NMD. 

87 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 19. 

88 However, Pakistan President Musharraf came forward in October 

2001 and offered the United States basing rights, so the United States 

did not require Indian bases. 

89 Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Impact of US Ballistic 

Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, DC: Henry L. 

Stimson Center, Report 46, July 2002). Krepon and Gagne find that, in 

the short term, US NMD and TMD might spark an arms race with 

China that would trickle down to cause an arms race between India and 

Pakistan. See also, Gregory Koblentz, “Viewpoint: Theater Missile 

Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix,” Non-proliferation Review, 

Vol. 4, No. 43 (Spring-Summer 1997): 54-62. 

90 Rajesh Basrur, “Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian 

Perspective,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Impact of 

US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, D.C.: 

Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 46, July 2002). Basrur writes that the 

Russian TMD systems cost between $55 million and $150 million 

depending on type. 

91 Interview with Col. Jack Gill, National Defense University, Near 

East and South Asia Center, May 1, 2002. 

92 Interview with Rodney Jones, April 30, 2002. In an arms race with 

China, India’s technological shortcomings and economic weakness 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

82

 

would be apparent. The BJP government is not committed to economic 

reform, which leads to economic backsliding. 

93 Shireen M. Mazari, Pakistan’s Security and the Nuclear Option

(Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Policy Studies, 1995). 

94 Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning 

Points and Nuclear Choices,“ International Security. 23, 4 (Spring 

1999): 178-204. 

95 Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, Pakistan 

embassy, May 2, 2002. 

96 Wojtysiak, Preventing Catastrophe. 

97 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002. 

98 Rajpal Budania, India’s National Security Dilemma: The Pakistan 

Factor and India’s Policy Response (New Delhi: Indus Publishing 

Company, 2001). 

99 Interview with Polly Nayak, Brookings Institution, April 29, 2002. 

100 Interview with Stephen Cohen, Brookings Institution, April 30, 

2002. Another reason for the limited potential of a security strategy 

and transparency is that Pakistan lacks good information systems; they 

are easy to break down and could contribute to escalation and war, 

especially since India places heavy reliance on information systems. 

Interview with Col. Jack Gill, National Defense University, Near East 

and South Asia Center, May 1, 2002. 

101 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002. 

102 Garver, Protracted Contest, 384-389; Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 

480-483. Karnad echoes calls for a “Monroe Doctrine” for South Asia 

that would keep out China and other foreign powers. 

103 Interview with Eric Arnett. 

104 Amit Gupta, “India’s Third-Tier Nuclear State Dilemma: N Plus 

20?” Asian Survey, Vol. XLI, No. 6 (November/December 2001): 

1044-1063. 

105 Dilip H. Mohite and Amit Dholakia, India and the Emerging World 

Order: Foreign Policy and Security Perspectives (Delhi: Kalinga 

Publications, 2001). 

106 Kuldip S. Ludra, The Defence of Andaman and Nicobar Islands

(Chandigarh: Thakur Strategic Research Centre, 1999). 

107 K.V. Kesavan and Lalima Varma, eds. Japan-South Asia: Security 

and Economic Perspectives (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 2000); Yoichi 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

83

 

Funabashi, “Tokyo’s Depression Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 78, 

No. 6 (November/December 1998). 

108 Verghese Koithara, Society, State and Security: The Indian 

Experience (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999). 

109 Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava, eds., 

Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest 

Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999); Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh 

Mattoo, eds., Engaged Democracies: India-US Relations in the 21st 

Century (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2000). 

110 Mohammed Ayoob, “South-West Asia after the Taliban,” Survival, 

vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 51-68. 

111 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 554-555. See also Mohite, India and the 

Emerging World Order. 

112 BBC World News, August 24, 2002. 

113 BBC World News, August 24, 2002. 

114 BBC World News, August 24, 2002. 

115 Rodney Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South 

Asia: n Overview (ort Belvoir, VA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Report, October 1, 2001) 

116 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 211-225. 

117 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 405-408. 

118 Gupta, “India’s Third-Tier Nuclear State Dilemma, 1049-1050. 

119 Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia. 

Eventually, India could build nuclear submarines with longer-range 

missiles. 

120 Gupta, “India’s Third-Tier Nuclear State Dilemma.” 

121 Interview with Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, Director, South Asia 

Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 29, 2002. 

Teresita Schaffer, Rising India (Washington, DC: CSIS Report, 

January 2002). 

122 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002. 

123 Interview with Eric Arnett. 

124 Interview with Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, April 29, 2002. 

125 Interview with Ted Andrews, India Desk Officer, State Department, 

April 29, 2002. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

84

 

126 Interview with Polly Nayak, Brookings Institution, April 29, 2002. 

127 G.V.C. Naidu, The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia (New Delhi: 

Knowledge World, in association with Institute for Defence Studies 

and Analyses, 2000). 

128 Ambassador Teresita Schaeffer, interviewed by the author, April 29, 

2002. Schaffer points out that Prime Minister Vajpayee did not 

initially endorse missile defense (NMD) in May 2001, but soon came to 

support it within the framework of counterproliferation. Counterproliferation is consistent with India’s views that all powers should 

scale down and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. India also has 

endorsed the process of consultation, which helped lead Russia to live 

with missile defense. 

129 Rajesh Basrur, “Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian 

Perspective,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Impact of 

US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, DC: 

Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 46, July 2002). Basrur writes that the 

Russian TMD systems cost between $55 million and $150 million 

depending on type. 

130 Interview with Rodney Jones, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA), Fort Belvoir, VA, April 30, 2002; P.R. Kumaraswamy, “India 

and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership,” Mideast Security and 

Policy Studies, No. 40, (September 1998, Begin-Sadat Center for 

Strategic Studies Bar-Ilan University). The “wild card” is how much 

will Israel invest in India and its military? 

131 Kerry Kartchner, Peter Almquist, Charles D. Frizzelle, Jr., Tom 

McIlvain, Jerome Bracken, Robert Batcher, US State Department, 

interviewed by the author May 12, 2003. 

132 Interview with Alexander Lennon, Editor-in-Chief, The Washington 

Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 

30, 2002. 

133 Interview with Ted Andrews, India Desk Officer, State Department, 

April 29, 2002. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

85

 

134 “Joint Statement Following US-India Defense Policy Group 

Meeting: Defense Officials of Two Countries Met in Washington Aug. 

6-7,” United States Department of Defense News Release, August 8, 

2003. 

135 “Joint Statement Following US-India Defense Policy Group 

Meeting,” August 8, 2003. 

136 Narendra Gupta, “India’s Days of Nuclear Ambivalence are Over,” 

The Times of India, July 16, 1997. The BJP was determined to make 

India a great power and nuclear weapons state with a security strategy 

and defense capabilities that would enable India to eventually compete 

with China. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: 

The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan, 2002). 

Karnad articulates a realpolitik strategy for India, which the BJP moved 

toward in the 1990s and which would include the development of a 

nuclear force to rival and target China and other competitors. 

137 Statement by Prime Minister Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian 

Parliament, May 27, 1998. 

138 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, June 6, 1998. 

139 Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, 2002), 191. Jones, Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in 

South Asia, 3, estimates as more than 100 Indian nuclear weapons 

equivalents (NWEs) and 50 Pakistani NWEs by the latter half of 2001. 

However, India has the potential to produce more than 400 NWEs and 

catch up with China’s 450 NWEs. Pakistan has the potential to produce 

more than 100 NWEs. 

140 Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture, 211-225.

141 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, 405-408. 

142 Strobe Talbott, “Dealing with the Bomb in South Asia” Foreign 

Affairs, Volume 78, No, 2 (March/April 1999): 110-122. 

143 A brief history of the FMCT, 12. 

144 “India, Pakistan Agree on Security, Confidence-Building 

Measures,” Arms Control Today (January-February 1999): 21.

145 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_01-02/ipjf99.asp 

146 Interview with Jaswant Singh, The Hindu Times, November 29, 

1999. 

147 Interview with Strobe Talbott, The Hindu Times, January 15, 2000. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

86

 

148 A brief history of the FMCT, 15-16. 

149 Subhash Kapila, United States War-Gaming on South Asia Nuclear 

Conflict: An Analysis, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 476, June 

14, 2002. 

150 Lee Feinstein, “Avoiding Another Close Call in South Asia,” Arms 

Control Today (July/August 2002), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/ 

2002_07-08/feinsteinjul_aug02.asp

151 Former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, “The Future of 

US-Indian Relations,” speech, Confederation of Indian Industry, New 

Delhi, July 17, 2003. Ambassador Blackwill mentioned the visit in 

February 2003 of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman 

Richard Meserve, who toured the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and 

the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, as one example of the new 

partnership with India. 

152 Selig Harrison, “Nuclear Proliferation: North Korea and Pakistan,” 

International Herald Tribune, April 21, 2003, http://www.iht.com/ 

articles/93839.html. Also, Bill Keller, “The Thinkable,” The New York 

Times Magazine, May 4, 2003, 48-53. 

153 Gottemoeller, Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism 

Struggle. Also, Harrison, “Nuclear Proliferation: North Korea and 

Pakistan;” Keller, “The Thinkable.” 

154 William J. Broad, David E. Sanger, and Raymond Bonner, “How 

Pakistani Built His Network A Tale Of Nuclear Proliferation,” New 

York Times February 12, 2004, 1. 

155 If a Democrat administration comes to power after the 2004 

elections, the US position could swing back towards an acceptance of 

arms control, including the CTBT, and missile defense programs may 

not proceed as quickly. 

156 Keith Payne and Mark Schneider, Office of Force Planning, 

Department of Defense, interviewed by the author, May 2003. 

157 Kerry Kartchner, Peter Almquist, Charles D. Frizzelle, Jr., Tom 

McIlvain, Jerome Bracken, Robert Batcher, US State Department 

interviewed by the author May 12, 2003. Also, Eric Arnett, South 

Asian Specialist, State Department, interviewed by the author April 29, 

2002. 

158 Interview with Col. Jack Gill, National Defense University, Near 

East and South Asia Center, May 1, 2002. 

159 Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Impact of US Ballistic 

Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, DC: Henry L. 
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy 

87

 

Stimson Center, Report 46, July 2002). Krepon and Gagne find that, in 

the short term, US NMD and TMD might spark an arms race with 

China that would trickle down to accelerate the arms race between 

India and Pakistan. Also, Gregory Koblentz, “Viewpoint: Theater 

Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix,” Non-proliferation 

Review, Vol. 4, No. 43 (Spring-Summer 1997), 54-62. 

160 Wojtysiak, Preventing Catastrophe. 

161 Interview with Eric Arnett, State Department, April 29, 2002. 

162 Mutahir Ahmed, “Missile Defense and South Asia: A Pakistani 

Perspective,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., The Impact of 

US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia (Washington, DC: 

Henry L. Stimson Center, Report 46, July 2002). 

163 Interview with Sohail Mahmood and Masood Khan, Pakistan 

embassy, May 2, 2002. 

164 Munawar Saeed, Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan in India, 

interviewed by the author on September 11, 2003, New Delhi, India. 

165The principal government expert on arms control is Sheel Kant 

Sharma, Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs. 

166 Indian Foreign Secretary HE Mr. Kanwal Sibal to the Conference on 

Disarmament 23 January 2003 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/cd/ 

speeches03/sibal23jan.html 

167 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New 

Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Penguin/Viking, 2003), 19. 

168 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 19. 

169 The Additional Secretary for Arms Control and Disarmament in the 

Ministry of External Affairs, Sheel Kant Sharma, interviewed by the 

author, September 9, 2003, New Delhi, India. 

170 Joint Secretary for Planning in the Ministry of Defense, Gautam 

Mukhopadhya, interviewed by the author, September 5, 2003, New 

Delhi, India. 

171 The Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defense Staff, Ministry of 

Defense, Lt Gen B M Kapur interviewed by the author, September 5, 

2003, New Delhi, India. 

172 Series of interviews by the author, September 2-12, 2003, New 

Delhi, India. 

173 C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor, The Hindu, interviewed by 

the author, September 6, 2003. See also Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon.
Burgess—India’s Emerging Security Strategy

88

 

174 Dr. Bharat Karnad, Center for Policy Research, interviewed by the 

author, September 5, 2003. See also Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and 

Nuclear Security.

175 Jonathan Wallis, Political-Military Specialist in the US Embassy, 

interviewed by the author on September 3, 2003 in New Delhi, India. 

176 Col John Albert Hill, the US Air Attaché and Capt. Eric Nelson, the 

Naval Attaché, US Embassy, interviewed by the author on September 

9, 2003 in New Delhi, India. 

177 Science Advisor at the US Embassy, Lori Dando, interviewed by the 

author on September 8, 2003 in New Delhi, India. 

178 Rodney Jones, interviewed by the author, April 30, 2002. In an 

arms race with China, India’s technological shortcomings and 

economic weakness would be apparent. The BJP government is not 

committed to economic reform, which leads to economic backsliding. 

179 Interview with Stephen Cohen, Brookings Institution, April 30, 

2002. 

180 Gupta, “India’s Third Tier Nuclear State Dilemma,” 1048-1055. 

181 Swati Pandey and Teresita C. Schaffer, “Building Confidence in 

India and Pakistan” South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Number 49, August 01, 2002. 

182 Venu Rajamony, India-China-US Triangle: A “Soft” Balance of 

Power System in the Making (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, March 15, 2002). 

183 Gottemoeller, Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism 

Struggle.