Speci f i cal l y , we mus t cons i der a) whe t her eac h s t at ut ory provi s i on un der whi ch t he D ef endan t was conv i ct ed 1

r equi r es proof of a f a c t t h a t t h e ot h e r do e s n ot ; b) w h e t h e r t h e s a me e v i de n c e i s n e c e s s a r y t o pr ov e bo t h of fe n s es ; c) whe t he r the t wo offens es i nv ol ved mul t i pl e v i ct i ms or di s cr et e a ct s ; an d d) wh et her t he t wo offens es ar e a i med at di f fer en t g oal s

. 938 S. W

. 2d a t 381. “ N o s i n g l e a s pec t of t h i s an al y s i s i s gi v en con t r ol l i n g wei g h t ; e ac h f ac t or mu s t be weighed and co nsi d ered i n rel at i o n t o t he o t hers

. ” St at e v. G o o d wi n, 14 3 S.W

. 3 d 77 1
, 7 8 1 ( T e n n

. 20 0 4 ). H o wever,

“ [ t ] h e k ey i s s u e i n m u l t i pl e pu n i s h men t ca s es i s l eg i s l at i v e i n t en t , ” a n d we ar e t o pre s u me t h at “ t h e l eg i s l at u r e does n ot

or di n ar i l y i n t en d t o pu n i s h t h e s ame of fen s e u n der t wo di f

fer en t s t at u t es

. ” D en t on , 938 S. W

. 2d a t 379. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 26, 200 5

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . GREGO RY MULLINS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty No. S48,296-297 Jon K. Blackwood , Judge

No. E2004-02314-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Augu st 25, 2005

CO NC UR RI NGAN D D ISSEN TIN G OP IN ION

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J

. , d i s s en t i n g.

I concur in the majority ’s decision finding the evidenc e suff icient to support the Def

endant’ s convictions for violating the vehicle reg istration la w, speeding
, driving on a suspended license, and felony evading arr est. I

respe ctfully

disag ree that principles of double jeopar dy under Te nnessee ’s

c on sti tut ionre qu ir e theme rg e r of the De fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n f or mis de me a no r e va din g arr e st w ith his felony evading arr est conviction.
The majority

relies on the Ca l l oway

decision as de terminative of this issue. See State v. Prentice C. Calloway , No. M2004-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 130 7800 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na sh vil le , Jun e 2, 20 05 ). I n th a t c a se , a pa ne l of thi s Co urt ut ili zedthefo ur -p ro ng te st s e t f orth i n State v. Dent o n , 938 S.W .2d 373 (Tenn. 1996)
, and conc luded initiallythat the two offe nses 1 contained dif

fer ent statutory

elements. See Calloway , 2005 WL 1307800, at *7. Thus, t he Calloway pa nel determin e d th a t th e of fe ns e s o f m isd e me a no r e va din g arr e st andfe lon y e va din g arr e st p a ss Bloc kburg er sc rutiny

. See id. I ag ree with that aspec t of the dec ision. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16- 603(a) (1)( A) provides that “it is unla wful for any person to intentionally

flee by any means of locomotion from any one the person knows to be a law e nforc ement off icer if the per son

. . . [k]n ow s th e of

fi c e r i s atte mpt ing to a

rr e st the pe rs on [.]” Th is o ff e ns e is d e sig nate d a

Cla ss A misdemeanor. See id. § 39-16-603(a )(1) (3). Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 39-16-603( b)(1)-2-

provides that “[i]t is unlawful for any person, while ope rating a motor vehic le on any street, r oad, alley or hig hway

in this state, to intentionally flee or attempt to e lude any law enf orce ment office r,
a ft e r h a vin g re c e ive d a ny sig nal fro m suchof

fi c e r t o b ri ng theve hic le to a sto p. ” Th is o ff

e ns e is desig nated a

felony . See id. § 39-16-603( b)(3)

. Thus, misdemeanor e vading arr est may be committed “by

any me an s of locomotion.” Fe lony evading arr est, on the other hand, require s that the suspect be flee ing “ while operating a motor vehicle on any

street, r oad, alley

or hig hway .” Misdemeanor evading arr est also re quires that the police off icer be at tempting to ar

rest the suspec t and that the suspec t rea liz e this. Fe lony evading

arr est require s only that the offic er be attempting to stop the ve hicle. Ac cording ly , as re cog nized by the ma jo r ity a n d th e p a n e l o f th is Co u rt th a t d e c id e d th e Ca ll o w a y c a s e , th e s e tw o statutory provisions have diff

ere nt elements. Diff

ering elements indicate that the two off enses a re not the

sa me fo r d ou bleje op ard y pu rp os e s.

The Callowa y p anel ne x t determined that the two offe nses re quired diff ere nt proof, ag ain,

a fa c tor in f a vo r o f f ind ing tw o se pa

rate of fe ns e s. Se e Ca llo way , 20 05 WL 13 07 80 0, a t *7 . I a lso ag ree with that as p ec t o f the de cision. This prong of the a naly sis involves a consideration of the evidenc e re quired to prove eac h offe nse, as g uided by the ca se of Duc hac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tenn. 1973) . See De nton, 938 S.W .2d at 381. Ducha c provide s that,

I f the sa me e vid e nc e is n ot re qu ir e d [to pr ov e bo th o ff e ns e s], the n th e fa c t th a t bo th

c ha rg es re late to, a ndg ro w o ut o f, on e tr a ns a c tio n, do e s n ot m ake a sin g le of fe ns e wher e two ar e def

ined by the statutes. . . . [T] here is no identity of off enses if on the trial of one of

fense proof of some fa ct is require d that is not necessa ry to be prove d in the trial of the other , al t h o u gh some of the sa me ac ts may nece ssarily

be prove d in the trial of ea ch.

505 S.W .2d at 239 (quoting 21 Am. J ur. 2d Crim. L aw § 82). The Def endant c ontends in his brief that “his ac t of flee ing f

rom Off icer Hy att by vehicle and subsequently on foot was a

single act, that his sole intent and choice was to attempt to elude a rre st.” Ho weve r, we must look t o the proof require d by

eac h offe nse. Misdemea nor eva ding a rre st require s that the State prove that the suspect fled a n office r, by

any means, while know ing that the o fficer wa s attempting to a rre st him or her. The De fendant admits his commi ssion of this crime. I n order to prove fe lony

eva d ing a

rre st, the State had to prove that Offic er H y att attempted to stop the Def endant while t h e De fendant was driving a vehicle, and that the Def endant there afte r intentionally fled or attempted to elude Of fice r Hy att by continuing to drive the vehicle. The proof require d was there fore differ ent, and the pr oof actua lly adduce d at trial wa s differ ent. I ndeed, the Def endant c ontends that he did not commit felony evading arr est bec ause he was not driving the pickup at the time. T hat is, the Def endant a dmits t he

acc urac y of some of the State’s proof, but c ontests the differ ent proof ne cessa ry to prove fe lony evading arr est. Off

icer Hy att’s testimony

established the c rime of f elony eva d ing a

rre st when he de sc ri be d th e De fe nd a nt’ s a c c e le ration to si x ty mil e s p e r h ou r a ft e r O ff ic e r H y a tt s ig na le d h im t o pull over by

turning on his lights. The Defendant subsequently committed the crime of misdemeanor

e va din g arr e st a s d e sc ri be d b y Of fi c e r H y a tt’ s te sti mon y

wh e n, a ft e r the br ow n pic ku p c a me to a ha lt,W e n ot e t h at f el on y e v adi n g a r r es t i s a C l as s E f el on y un l es s t h e mot or i s t ’ s f l i g h t “ cr ea t es a r i s k of

de at h or 2 inj u ry to inn o c e n t b ysta n d e rs o r o the r th ird p a rtie s,” in w h ic h c a se the o ff e n se is a C la ss D felo n y. T e n n

. C o d e A n n . § 3 9

- 1 6

- 6 0 3 (b)(3).

-3- the Def endant e x ited the vehicle and ran off, try ing to pr event Of fice r Hy att from ar

resting him. The proof r equire d by the offenses is differ ent, and the proof a dduced by the State at trial in support of

eac h offe nse wa s differ ent. Acc ording ly , this aspect of the analy sis supports a finding that the two of fe ns e s a reno t th e sa me fo r d ou bleje op ard y pu rp os e s.

I n addre ssing the third pr ong of t he Denton inquiry , the Calloway panel c oncluded that the offe nses “did not involve multiple victims or mult i p l e ep isodes.” 2005 WL 1307800, at *7. I

re sp e c tf ull y dis a g re e wi th this po rt ionof theCa llo way

de c isi on and would th e re fo reno t f oll ow it in the instant case. T he majori t y d o es , howeve r, and a ccor dingly conclude s that the Def

endant’ s fl ig ht f ro m O ff ic e r H y a tt w a s a

sin g le c on tin uo us c rimi na l e pis od e rathe r tha n tw o d isc re te a c ts capa ble of supporting multip le c o n v ic tions. To the contrary , as desc ribed in the pre ceding para g raph, theDe fe nd a nt e ng a g e d indis c re te a c ts i n c omm itt ing bo th f orms o f e va din g arr e st. Mo re ov e r, wh ile the crimes of misdemeanor evading arr est and felony evading arr est do not contemplate vic tims per

s e (ot her tha n the State at lar g e), the re is a ve ry rea l differ encein the risks cre ated by these two crimes. F elony

evading arr est exposes the motoring and pedestrian public, as we ll as the pursuing office r(s), to the dang ers inher ent i n a vehicle being drive n at hig h speeds. Misdemeanor eva ding

arr est under the circ umstances of case s like this one, in which the suspect st ops flee ing in his or he r vehicle and beg ins fleeing on foot, exposes the pursuing office r(s) to a differ ent type of threat. I f the pu rs uin g of

fi c e r i s u na

bleto c on tin ue c ha sin g thesu sp e c t i n hi s or her c ru ise r, a ndde c ide s to continue the pur suit on foot, the office r must leave the relative safe ty of his or her

vehicle. If the suspect is arme d, the offic er

-- as we ll as any unfortunate by stander - - has just bec ome more vulnera ble to attack. T he diffe ring types of dang er involved w ith the differ ent forms of e vading

arr e st s up po rt s, in m y

op ini on , a

fi nd ing of

tw o d isc re te a c ts, a ndthe re fo retw o s e pa rate of fe ns e s.
Finally , I respe ctfully

disag ree with the C alloway panel’ s conclusion t hat t he leg islature wa s addre ssing the same conce rn with both misdemeanor and felony evading arr est. The Calloway panel determined that “[t] he evil at whic h the statute is dire cted is the same whether one flee s on foot or [by ] motor vehicle, that is, to discourag e flig ht from a police office r performing his or her of ficial dutie s

. ” 2 0 0 5 WL

1 3 0 7 8 0 0
, a t * 8

. H o w e v e r , mi s d e me a n o r e v a d in g arr e s t i s a im e d a t p u n is h ing those who attempt t o ev ad e t h eir actual ar rest, ther eby

thwarting the State’s ef

forts to prosec ute a criminal suspec t. The fe lony evading arr est provision is aimed at all of those who are driving motor
ve hic le s a ndaresim

ply or de re d b y

a po lic e of fi c e r t o s top the ir

ve hic le
, bu t r e fu se to d o s o. Th us , the conce rn addre ssed by the felony evading arr est statute is the protec tion of other drive rs (including the pursuing law enfor ceme nt of fice rs) and pedestrians from the potential and ac tual dang ers c reated by a drive r eng ag ing in r eckle ss maneuver s while try ing to e lude a pol ice c ruiser. There fore , I 2

c on c lud e that th e pu rp os es of thetw o s tatut ory

pr ov isi on s a

resu ff ic ie ntl y dis tin c t a s to su pp ort a fi nd ing that th e tw o o ff

e ns e s a reno t th e sa me fo r d ou bleje op ard y pu rp os e s.-4-

I n s umm ary , my

a na ly sis of

theDe fe n d an t ’ s c o n v i c ti o n s f or bo th m isd e me a no r e va din g arr e st and fe lony

evading arr est convince s me that the De fendant’s dual co n v i ctions do not offend Te nn e sse e ’s pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t do ub le je op ard y , e ve n th ou g h b oth c on vic tio ns aro se ou t of a sin g le

c ha se . Ac c or din g ly , I wo uld no t mer g e the De fe nd a nt’ s con vic tio n for mis de me a no r e va din g arr e st into his conviction for felony evading arr est. I

would aff

irm both convictions.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE