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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.A., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: T.J.A., FATHER : No. 948 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree, February 28, 2018,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000101-2018,

FID#51-FN-000992-2011

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2018

T.J.A. (“Father”) appeals from the February 28, 2018 decree granting 

the petition of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) to involuntarily

terminate his parental rights to his minor1female child, J.A. a/k/a J.A.S. 

(“Child”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).2 After 

careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history

of this case as follows:

On January 31, 2017, [DHS] received a General 

Protective Services (“GPS”) report alleging that the 

mother of Child was incorrectly mixing Child’s infant 

formula. The report further alleged that Child was 

underweight as result of the improper feeding. The 

 

1 Child was born in April 2016.

2 The record reflects that the trial court’s February 28, 2018 decree also 

terminated the parental rights of M.E. (“Mother”) to Child. Mother is not a 

party to this appeal.
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report also alleged that Mother had been diagnosed 

with mental health issues and that she exhibited

aggressive behavior. DHS met Mother, Father and 

Child, on February 3, 2017 to discuss the allegations 

but thereafter the family failed to maintain contact 

with DHS. Thereafter, DHS reestablished contact 

and met with the family on April 10, 2017. It was 

determined on that date that Child remained 

underweight. On the same day, DHS obtained an

Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) and Child was 

placed in foster care. On April 19, 2017, the Child, 

following a hearing, was adjudicated dependent. 

On December 11, 2017, a revised Single Case Plan 

(“SCP”) was created for Mother and Father. The 

objectives for Father were (1) to participate in all 

bi-weekly supervised visits of the Child; (2) to attend 

parenting classes; (3) to participate in a parenting 

capacity evaluation; (4) to engage in housing and 

employment classes; and (5) Father would comply 

with the court ordered recommendations of the

Clinical Evaluation Unit’s (“CEU”) evaluation and 

assessment for drug and alcohol treatment. The 

underlying Petition to Terminate Father’s Parental 

Rights was filed on February 5, 2018 after Father 

and Mother failed to meet their SCP objectives.

Trial court opinion, 5/11/18 at 2-3 (citations and footnote omitted).

On February 28, 2018, the trial court conducted a termination hearing; 

Father was present for said hearing and was represented by counsel. 

Following the hearing, the trial court entered a decree involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), and changed the goal to adoption. 

(See notes of testimony, 2/28/18 at 53-55.) In reaching this decision, the 

trial court noted during the hearing that “aggravated circumstances” existed 

as to Father given that his parental rights to another one of his children had 
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been involuntarily terminated in November 2017. (See id. at 30.) On 

March 22, 2018, Father filed a timely notice of appeal to this court, together

with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(2)(i). On May 11, 2018, the trial court filed its 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Father raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible 

error, when it involuntarily terminated

[F]ather’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence under the adoption act, 

23 P[a].C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) (2) and (5)[?]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible 

error when it involuntarily terminated 

[F]ather’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the 

termination would have on the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs of [C]hild as 

required by the adoption act, 23 P[a].C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b)[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred because the 

evidence was overwhelming and undisputed 

that [F]ather demonstrated a genuine interest 

and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort 

to maintain a parent-child relationship with 

[C]hild[?]

Father’s brief at 8.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 
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trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to 

trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations 

and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the 

trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the 

opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 

2003) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 
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delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined “clear and convincing evidence” as that which is so “clear, 

direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a 

clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing 

for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.
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(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(5) The child has been removed from 

the care of the parent by the court 

or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at 

least six months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to 

exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a 

reasonable period of time, the 

services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not 

likely to remedy the conditions 

which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights 

would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 
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medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b). We need only agree with the 

trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), in addition to 

Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental rights. In re M.M., 

106 A.3d 114, 117 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Instantly, we analyze the trial court’s decision to terminate under 

Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

The grounds for termination due to parental 

incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as 

incapacity to perform parental duties. 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(citations, internal quotation marks, and indentation omitted).

Upon review, we find that there was clear and convincing evidence to 

support the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights to Child, 
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pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). The record establishes that “incapacity” 

under Section 2511(a)(2) exists given that Father has demonstrated a 

repeated and continual inability to remedy the problems that led to Child’s 

placement by failing to satisfy any of his SCP objectives. As noted, DHS 

became involved in this matter after concerns arose regarding Child’s being 

significantly underweight. (Notes of testimony, 2/28/18 at 5.) At the time 

of the February 28, 2018 termination hearing, Child was 22 months old and 

had been in a pre-adoptive foster home for nearly 11 months. (Id. at 5-6.) 

Jessica Law, the Community Umbrella Agency case manager assigned to this 

matter, testified that Father’s SCP objectives for reunification with Child 

included: (1) housing education classes; (2) parenting classes; 

(3) participation in supervised visitation with Child; (4) participation in a CEU 

evaluation to determine drug and alcohol abuse; and (5) participation in a 

parenting capacity evaluation. (Id. at 14-15.) 

Law testified that as of the date of the termination hearing, Father had

yet to participate in a parenting capacity evaluation with Forensic Mental 

Health Services, LLC. (Id. at 15-16.) Specifically, Father failed to show up 

for his first scheduled evaluation on September 19, 2017, and arrived late to 

his January 3, 2018 evaluation, resulting in the appointment being 

rescheduled. (Id.) Law also testified that Father had failed to participate in 

a drug or alcohol evaluation with CEU or complete court-ordered random 

drug screening. (Id. at 16.) 
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Law next testified that Father had failed, in large part, to take 

advantage of the housing, financial counseling, and parenting services 

offered by the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”). Specifically, Father 

was twice referred to ARC on April 19 and December 15, 2017, but as of the 

date of the termination hearing, had attended one housing class, no financial 

counseling classes, and four parenting classes. (Id. at 17-18.) Law also 

testified that Father failed to establish any stability in his life with regard to 

housing, had recently moved into a boarding house with Child’s Mother that 

the trial court deemed inappropriate for reunification, and did not provide 

Law a mailing address until January 2018, three weeks before the 

termination hearing. (Id. at 16, 53-54.)

Additionally, the record reveals that Father has only sporadically 

visited Child. At the initial April 19, 2017 adjudicatory hearing, the trial 

court granted Father bi-weekly supervised visitation, but by the July 19, 

2017 permanency review hearing, Father’s visitation had been reduced to 

weekly due to his inconsistent attendance. (Id. at 18-19.) Thereafter, the 

trial court further reduced Father’s visitation with Child to bi-weekly in 

November 2017. (Id.) Law testified that even after these changes, Father 

had only attended five of the seven scheduled bi-weekly visitation

appointments with Child since the last court date. (Id.)

Father, in turn, testified on his own behalf at the termination hearing 

and stated that he missed supervised visitation with Child because the trial 
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court had precluded him from taking his drug tests; Father, however, was 

unable to explain exactly how the trial court had denied him his drug 

screenings. (Notes of testimony, 2/28/18 at 43-45.) Father also indicated 

that he was “somewhat” in a position to provide financial support for Child, 

but could not explain why he had failed to satisfy his SCP objectives thus far, 

and that he was “not making no [sic] excuses” and felt he had “done [his] 

part.” (Id. at 46-47.) 

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that there exists 

clear and convincing evidence of record to justify the termination of Father’s 

parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1216.

Next, we consider whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has 

stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). 

The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include [i]ntangibles 

such as love, comfort, security, and stability. . . . 

[T]his Court held that the determination of the 

child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of 

the emotional bonds between the parent and child. 

The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning 

the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. However, as discussed below, 

evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy 

task.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (internal case citations omitted). 

“[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and 

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of 

the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 

2010) (citations omitted). Additionally, when evaluating a parental bond, 

“the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) 

does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

Upon review, we find that the record supports the trial court’s 

determination that the termination of Father’s parental rights was clearly in 

the best interests of Child, pursuant to Section 2511(b). At the termination 

hearing, Law testified that Child had developed a strong “parental” bond

with her foster parents, whom she has resided with since August 2017, and 

that they provide for her medical, emotional, and daily needs. (Notes of

testimony, 2/28/18 at 12-13.) On the contrary, Law indicated that Father 

had failed to provide for any of Child’s daily needs since she was placed into 

DHS custody, and had never attended Child’s medical appointments nor 

provided her with any financial support. (Id. at 19-20.) Law opined that 

Child would not suffer any irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were 

terminated and that adoption would clearly be in her best interests. (Id. at 
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20.) The trial court found the testimony of Law to “be credible and accorded 

[it] great weight.” (Trial court opinion, 5/11/18 at 6.)

This court has long recognized that “[a] child’s life, happiness and 

vitality simply cannot be put on hold until the parent finds it convenient to 

perform parental duties.” In the Matter of the Adoption of A.M.B., 812 

A.2d 659, 675 (Pa.Super. 2002). Our standard of review requires us to 

accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations where, 

as here, they are supported by the record. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 

267. Accordingly, we decline to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness 

credibility.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Child

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). Accordingly, we affirm the 

February 28, 2018 decree of the trial court.

Decree affirmed. 

Nichols, J. joins this Memorandum.

Dubow, J. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this 

case.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/7/18