Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle, 

Florida, 28 December 1835

A Study of Leadership in Irregular Conflict 

 

Captain Michael G. Anderson

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Cover painting by Ken Hughes “The Dade Massacre” History Miami, 

Archives and Research Center-101C West Flagler Street, Miami, FL 

33130 archives@historymiami.org

CGSC Copyright Registration #13-0799 c/e
Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle, Florida,

28 December 1835

A Study of Leadership in Irregular Conflict 

Captain Michael G. Anderson
ii

 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Anderson, Michael G., 1984-

 Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle, Florida, 28 December 1835: A 

Study of Leadership in Irregular Conflict / Captain Michael G. Anderson.

 1. Dade Massacre, Fla., 1835. 2. Staff Rides--Florida. 3. Command of 

troops--Case studies. 4. Irregular warfare--Case studies. I. Title. 

 E83.835.A54 2013

 975.9’38--dc23

 2013039018

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide 

variety of military history topics. The views expressed in 

this CSI Press publication are those of the author(s) and 

not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the 

Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications 

available for downloading can be found at:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on 

any republication without the express written permission of the Director 

of CSI.
iii

Foreword

The Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle, Florida, 28 December 

1835 is the eleventh volume in the Combat Studies Institute’s Staff Ride 

Handbook series. Michael G. Anderson’s well-researched handbook uses 

the opening conflict of the Second Seminole War as a vehicle to allow 

organizations at any echelon to study leadership at the tactical level. 

Although the battle was part of what is now called “irregular warfare,” 

today’s leaders—uniformed and civilian—will find ample opportunity to 

highlight the role of all warfighting functions with a particular emphasis on 

intelligence, fires and protection. In addition, the backdrop of two ethnocultural groups, each antagonistic to the other, provides a strong continuity 

of experience to the many current and potential future operations of the 

United States’ Armed Forces. Continuing the tradition of CSI Publications 

and the Staff Ride Handbook series in particular, readers will not be 

surprised that the insights gleaned from conducting the Dade’s Battle 

staff ride are as relevant today as they were over 175 years ago. Finally, 

commanders at all levels will find this handbook and the one-day staff 

ride on which it is based to be an excellent way to enhance subordinates’ 

understanding of their profession. CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Colonel Thomas E. Hanson

Director

Combat Studies Institute

v

Acknowledgements

No published work is done alone and I wish to thank the many whose 

efforts and assistance made this possible. The opportunity afforded me 

by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Staff Ride Team for the publication 

of this study cannot be appreciated enough. First and foremost I wish to 

thank the outstanding support and assistance provided me by Dr. Curtis S. 

King of the Staff Ride Team. Without his guidance through the creative 

and publication process, his insightful suggestions and early readings of 

the manuscript and invaluable support on the graphics this study would 

not be the same. Likewise, I wish to thank Dr. Christopher Stowe of the 

Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Department of Military 

History for his early reading of the manuscript and suggestions as well. 

Also, the assistance provided in technical and geographical aspects of the 

study provided by Mr. George Webb of the Dade’s Battlefield Historic 

State Park and Mr. Patrick Potts of the Hillsborough River State Park and 

Fort Foster Historic Site was extremely helpful. In addition, I would like 

to thank the University of Central Florida Army Reserve Officer Training 

Corps (ROTC) class of 2013 for being such willing and cooperative test 

subjects for the application of the staff ride handbook. Finally, I wish to 

thank my close friends and family who continually and without complaint 

provided encouragement and support throughout the entire process, this 

could not have been done without it.

vii

Contents

Page

Foreword..................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements................................................................................... v

Introduction............................................................................................... 1

Part I Second Seminole War Opponents

United States Army Organization....................................................... 5

Peacetime Army

Overview

Leadership

Major Dade’s Soldiers

Weapons

Firearms

Edged Weapons

Artillery

Tactics

Tactical Doctrine of 1835

Frontier Tactics 

Logistical Support

Engineer Support

Communications

Medical

Intelligence

 The Seminole Nation Organization

Pre-war

 Overview

 Leadership

 Micanopy’s Warriors 

Weapons

Projectile Weapons

Edged Weapons

Tactics

“Indian” Fighting

Seminole Combat Support and Service Support Capabilities

Overview

Logistical Support

Engineer Support

Communications
viii

Medical

Intelligence

Part II Campaign Overview .................................................................... 29

Introduction

The Drums of War

Orders to March

The March

The Ambush

The Soldiers Rally

Final Assault

The Aftermath

Part III. Suggested Stands (Sites) to Visit............................................... 43

 Introduction

 Stand One: Fort Brooke and Decision to March: Overview........ 44

 Stand Two: Hillsborough River Crossing and Fort Foster............ 49

 Stand Three: Fort King Road........................................................ 53

 Stand Four: Seminole Decision to Attack..................................... 57

 Stand Five: Ambush and Major Dade’s Death.............................. 60

 Stand Six: Soldiers Rally and Seminoles Retreat ......................... 64

 Stand Seven: The Breastworks and Last Stand............................. 66

 Stand Eight: Death of Captain Gardiner and the Fate of the 

 Survivors..................................................................................... 69

 Stand Nine: The Aftermath ........................................................... 73

Part IV Integration: Final Phase of the Staff Ride .................................. 77

Part V Support: Practical Information on Conducting a Staff Ride

in the Tampa and Dade Battlefield Area ................................................. 81

Appendix A Order of Battle for the Forces Involved.............................. 83

Appendix B Biographical Sketches of Key Participants ........................ 87

Francis Langhorne Dade

George Washington Gardiner

Upton Sinclair Fraser

Ransom Clark

Chief Micanopy

Jumper, or Ote Emathla

Alligator, or Halpatter Tustenuggee
ix

Appendix C Historical Maps .................................................................. 95

Area of Dade’s March

Map 1. Fort Brooke

Map 2. Area of Dade’s March

Map 3. Initial Assault

Map 4. Final Assault

Bibliography ........................................................................................... 99

Tables

Table 1: United States Army in 1835........................................................ 5

Table 2: Dade’s Battle Casualties ........................................................... 42

1

Introduction

As a vehicle for the education of the military professional, the 

staff ride has long proven its value. Analysis of a battle or a campaign 

through an examination of the actual terrain is a concept deeply rooted 

in military study. In Europe, after the Wars of German Unification, 

Helmuth von Moltke ingrained staff rides into the training of German 

general staff officers by posing challenging questions to his cadets during 

rides of battlefields on which he had achieved his greatest triumphs. In 

the United States, Captain Arthur L. Wagner made an initial proposal for 

a staff ride and Major Eben Swift brought the concept to fruition at the 

General Service and Staff School (the forerunner of the Command and 

General Staff College [CGSC]) in 1906. The essential elements of Wagner 

and Swift’s staff ride concept included a detailed preliminary study of a 

campaign followed by an in-depth visit to the sites associated with that 

campaign. Later pioneers of the staff ride added an integration phase in 

order to mesh the preliminary and field study phases for further insights 

into the military profession. Thus, the preliminary, field, and integration 

phases are the cornerstones of the modern staff ride.

Today, the US Army considers the staff ride an essential aspect of 

historical education for the modern military professional throughout its 

system of schools, as well as a crucial facet of the continuing professional 

development of its officers and noncommissioned officers in line units. 

The CGSC, the Army War College, and institutions throughout the Army’s 

school system conduct staff rides with the extensive resources necessary to 

fully execute the preliminary study, field study, and integration methodology. 

Units outside of the schoolhouse environment can also benefit extensively 

from staff rides but they often find resources, particularly time, to be more 

restricted. That is where the staff ride handbook comes in. The handbook 

is a tool that is particularly useful for the line unit in preparing for a staff 

ride. It provides background to the campaign, a suggested list of sites to 

visit (called “stands”), material for discussion at the stands, and advice 

for logistics support of the staff ride. The intent of this handbook is not to 

replace the detailed study needed for the ride but it does provide a starting 

point that should make any organization’s preparation easier.

This handbook is one in a series of works from the Combat Studies 

Institute (CSI) designed to facilitate the conduct of staff rides throughout 

the Armed Forces of the United States. The foundational document of this 

series is The Staff Ride by Dr. William Glenn Robertson (Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History Publication 70-21, 1987). The Staff Ride 

describes the staff ride methodology in detail and gives hints that will 

assist in building any staff ride. Other published handbooks focus on 

particular battles and campaigns and include works on Chickamauga, 

Cowpens, Shiloh, and Vicksburg among others. CSI staff ride handbooks 
2

can be obtained from the CSI website: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/

csipubs.asp. All of these publications are outstanding tools for the military 

professional, and anyone for that matter, interested in the detailed study of 

battles and campaigns. This work on Dade’s Battle has borrowed liberally 

from all of its predecessors, particularly in the organizational outline of 

the handbook as well as the Introduction and the Integration sections 

specifically. The author is appreciative of the excellent efforts of previous 

Staff Ride Handbook authors.

Although there is a considerable connection among all staff ride 

handbooks, the Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle, Florida, 28 

December 1835, has some significant differences from other handbooks. 

First, it is a struggle between a conventional-focused peacetime professional 

army and a budding irregular force. As such, a staff ride for Dade’s Battle 

is a highly relevant small-unit staff ride at the tactical level and thus is 

a departure from the more common conventional war staff ride studies. 

Secondly, this battle was a tactical defeat for the US forces as well as 

the opening battle in a long war with severely limited firsthand accounts. 

These factors create unique challenges and opportunities.

One of the aspects that sets Dade’s Battle apart from other staff rides 

is the small level of the action which was essentially a couple of hundred 

combatants on both sides. By necessity, this limits much of the operational 

analysis typical of many staff rides. Though there exists significant 

operational-level topics to be discussed in the events leading to the small 

unit action, it is essentially a study of company-level and lower leadership 

and tactics between a conventional force and an unconventional foe with 

the inherent lessons and observations of warfare in an insurgency. This 

case is the opening battle of such a conflict.

Another challenge is the paucity of firsthand accounts, limited to only 

one account from a US Army survivor, one from a Seminole chief, and 

one from a noncombatant translator. This demands that research include 

a broad analysis of a range of firsthand accounts of later actions in the 

Second Seminole War as well as reliance on reports from the Soldiers who 

first arrived on the scene of the battle’s aftermath to reconstruct the details 

of the engagement. Along with the few firsthand accounts, an analysis 

of the Soldiers’ reports on seeing the battlefield and later accounts of the 

fighting of the war itself, certain secondary sources are integral as well. In 

addition, as with all insurgency-involved studies, a study of anthropological 

sources concerning the insurgents is necessary to better understand their 

approach to the conflict, resources, and organization. This is a point to 

be emphasized throughout the study but certainly during the preliminary 

study and integration. Also, to study a defeat instead of focusing only on 

successes provides an important vehicle for both immediate edification 

but also a lesson in the art of learning. Of course, the needs and intentions 

of the staff ride leader will definitively shape the end result of this and any 

staff ride.
3

This handbook is structured for a single day’s ride with less than 

10 stands. Staff ride leaders may have to modify the stands to fit their 

schedules, and routes, but they should always attempt to keep a sense of 

connection between stands so that students do not lose the larger context of 

Major Dade’s march. However, due to time constraints, units may choose 

to execute a battlefield site only study. This handbook is designed to allow 

staff ride leaders to pick selected stands that perhaps focus on either the 

entire march or just the battlefield itself as time permits.

In addition, staff ride leaders must give the students a chance to conduct 

research and prepare before actually visiting the campaign locations. The 

extent of student preparation will depend on available time. At one end of the 

spectrum, students might have ample time to explore the secondary sources 

and even access certain available primary sources such as the passages 

regarding the battle in John Sprague’s Origin, Progress and Conclusion of 

the Florida War (Broadway, N.Y.: D. Appleton and Company, 1837) or 

John Bemrose’s Reminiscences of the Second Seminole War (Edited with 

an Introduction and Postscript by John K. Mahon, University of Tampa, 

FL, Tampa Press, 2001). On the other hand, if students have less time to 

devote to research, Frank Laumer’s Dade’s Last Command (Gainesville, 

FL, University Press of Florida, 1995) provides an excellent account of the 

entire march and background. The Staff Ride Handbook for Dade’s Battle 

provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this long overlooked 

battle.

Part I describes the organization of the United States Army of the 

Frontier and what little is known of the Seminole Nation, detailing their 

weapons, tactics, logistics, engineer, communications, medical support, 

and intelligence gathering.

Part II consists of a campaign overview which establishes the context 

for the individual actions to be studied in the field.

Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit in order to 

obtain a concrete view of the campaign in its critical moments. For each 

stand, there is a set of travel directions, an orientation to the battle site, a 

discussion of the action that occurred there, vignettes by participants in 

the campaign, and suggested analysis questions and topics for discussion.

Part IV discusses the final phase of the staff ride, the integration phase. 

In this phase, students integrate the classroom portion of the staff ride with 

the field phase and seek to provide relevant lessons for the modern military 

professional.

Part V provides practical information on conducting a staff ride in 

the Tampa and Dade Battlefield area, including sources of assistance and 

logistical considerations.
4

Appendix A outlines the order of battle for the forces involved on 

the day of battle. Appendix B provides biographical sketches of key 

participants, and appendix C provides historical maps of the area. A 

bibliography suggests sources for preliminary study.

In sum, the Dade’s Battle campaign is a magnificent example of 

small unit leadership and tactics between a conventional force and its 

unconventional foe and the price paid by the common soldier. The lessons 

that may be learned from this small but complex struggle can provide a 

superb tool for the education of the modern military professional.
5

Part I. Second Seminole War Opponents

United States Army Organization

Peacetime Army

Overview

The aversion of the United States to a standing army meant that there 

was only a limited cadre of professional Soldiers and officers during 

“peacetime.” This aversion stemmed in large part from a tradition rooted 

in English history--the puritanical reign of Oliver Cromwell’s New Model 

Army in England. The use of this professional standing army for the 

enforcement of a specific sect of society’s views on the rest of the country 

resulted in a deep-seated fear in English political thought of a permanent 

fulltime land force at the control of a few individuals. In the political 

tradition of their former colonial masters, the United States inherited this 

aversion. The new nation thus relied on a surge of volunteers or militia 

forces to fill out the ranks for any major conflict. This type of force would 

take time to enroll, organize, and train, leaving the meager professional 

army to bear the brunt of the conflict’s opening battles.

As of 9 December 1835, the US Army was composed of 6,595 enlisted 

Soldiers led by 603 commissioned officers. The regimental breakdown 

was one regiment of dragoons, four regiments of artillery, and seven 

regiments of foot infantry with non-regimental affiliated engineers and 

staff accounting for the rest of the Army (see Table 1). This army was 

scattered over 53 separate posts with no single gathering of more than 10 

companies in one place. 
6

The focus of the peacetime military was dominated by the diplomatic 

gamesmanship between President Andrew Jackson and France which 

ultimately placed an emphasis on the United States Navy and coastline 

fortifications of the United States. The quarrel was over a promise from 

France to pay recompense to the United States for damages done to United 

States ships during Napoleon Bonaparte’s rule of France. When France 

neglected to fulfill this pledge, President Jackson proceeded to seek 

Congressional approval to punish France for their lack of payment. In 

turn, France was offended by such an illicit threat to its interests bringing 

the two nations precipitously close to open naval warfare and thus putting 

military focus in the United States to the Navy and to the defense of the 

shores. This resulted in less of a focus on the defense of the territories 

and frontier, and more of a containment approach to the trouble with the 

“Indian Question”.

The US Army presence in Florida was significant in light of the relative 

size of the Army. There were 536 Soldiers serving in Florida, of which 26 

were commissioned officers. These were scattered over less than ten posts 

and mostly congregated in north-central Florida with the exception of the 

post at Key West. Leading up to Dade’s Battle there was growing concern 

over increasing violence. However, the US Government dismissed many 

of the fears and warnings from those in the Florida Territory itself and 

was slow to respond. Although nowhere else in the United States were 

more than ten companies co-located, the Secretary of War in 1835, Lewis 

Cass, ordered reinforcements of Regulars to be sent to Florida to bring 

Florida’s total up to 14 companies of Regulars. This reinforcement would 

not be completed before the outbreak of hostilities but it did manage to get 

the necessary movements started. By the end of the war, every US Army 

Regular regiment had rotated through and seen combat in the war in Florida 

even as the professional army saw extensive expansion as a result of the 

war. In addition, the Secretary of War authorized federal appropriations for 

raising local Florida Volunteer Militia in December. The initial call was for 

a month’s duty for 150 mounted Floridians to bolster the Army in Florida’s 

lack of mounted mobile forces and local knowledge of the area. 

Volunteers from across the United States as well as increased numbers 

of Florida militia volunteers would play a significant role alongside that of 

the Regulars in the coming Second Seminole War. However, there would 

be none present at Dade’s Battle, who all would be Regulars stationed in 

Florida. 
7

The Soldiers stationed in Florida, a prism of the entire Regular Army 

of the day, were mainly foreigners among the enlisted along with hard 

luck citizens and adventure-seekers. In this period, a skilled laborer was 

said to have been able to make a dollar a day for his labor whereas the 

average enlisted Soldiers received only five dollars a month for their duty, 

although for better or worse, the Soldiers were provided uniforms, food, 

and housing.

Leadership

The majority of leaders in this small professional army prior to the war 

came from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. 

The younger junior leaders came from the Academy while many of the 

older career officers came from other sources. Some officers had obtained 

battlefield commissions during the War of 1812 and risen from the ranks 

of the enlisted on merit or connection but few of these made a career of 

the Army and in peacetime moved to other professions, as did some West 

Point graduates. Of the 14 general officers in 1835, none were Academy 

graduates, though this may be due to the youthfulness of the Academy at 

the time, having only been teaching for 32 years.

The officer class was educated and from upstanding families although 

even they were paid poorly compared to their civilian peers with similar 

educations and upbringing. Especially true of the Academy graduates, 

most officers were not driven by wealth to the colors but rather by ideals 

and virtues associated with military service as an officer. One other wrote 

that it was to be “among the elite few, the brave, and honorable spirits” 

that he joined (John K. Mahon, 118-119). For many, including the author 

of the above words, this soon gave way to a bitter reality of a nation’s 

indifference and little respect for a professional military class and, of 

course, the very real effect of a small salary.

The education received at West Point was focused mainly on 

officership, engineering, and the tactics of a conventional, linear, 

European-style conflict. Many of the officers had prior experience in both 

the large-scale War of 1812 against the British and native allies as well as 

numerous “Indian” wars along the frontiers of the expanding nation. As a 

result, even though they were a small cadre, the leadership of the period 

possessed direct experience in many cases in both large-scale conventional 

warfare as well as “Indian” fighting along the frontier. However, even with 

this experience, the cultural influences of the period deeply affected the 

perceptions on and the opinion of these unconventional conflicts with the 
8

various tribes. These cultural influences strongly affected the devotion 

to and retention of lessons and knowledge concerning unconventional 

warfare.

Major Dade’s Soldiers

As they marched on, Dade’s command was composed of 100 enlisted 

men, mostly “red-legged infantry” (an acknowledgement of artillerytrained Soldiers performing infantry duties due to the lack of enough 

trained infantry to garrison the frontier), and seven combat arms officers 

with one medical officer attached. Virtually all the enlisted had direct ties 

to foreign soil, earning their way in America through military service, 

though some were multi-generation lower class native-born Americans. 

The young officers were from West Point while the two senior officers, 

Major Francis Langhorne Dade and Captain Upton Sinclair Fraser, were 

not. They had one wagon which carried the majority of their food stores 

and ammunition since artillerymen had no cartridge boxes but rather used 

improvised cartridge sacks tied to their webbing. In addition, they had the 

translator and one critical six-pound cannon and caisson. With this force, 

they entered the Seminole Nation during a growing escalation of hostility. 

The US Army Regulars wore sky blue uniforms with white crossbelts forming an X across their chest and back. They wore black leather 

caps and in winter time, a blue wool-like overcoat. In summer, they wore 

a white linen shirt. Occasionally, the Soldiers would darken the white 

cross-belts with charcoal or something similar but it is doubtful that that 

precaution would have been taken at the time as official hostilities had not 

been declared. Each carried with him his knapsack, rolled blanket, musket 

and cartridge box, and limited supply of rations, the excess for the ten-day 

excursion kept in the wagon.

Weapons

Firearms

The US Soldier carried the standard shoulder-carried weapon of 

his day, a non-rifled muzzle-loading musket. It was the 1816 model .69 

caliber weapon with an effective range between 100 and 200 yards, firing 

a rounded 120 grain powder musket ball. This model was roughly 58 

inches long (without bayonet) and weighed eight to 10 pounds (depending 

on size/weight of bayonet). The socket bayonets varied of the period for 

the Model 1816 between 16-21 inches in length, to include the three inch 

socket. 
9

The drill loading procedure was a six step process. 

1. The hammer would be half-cocked. 

2. The pan was primed by pouring powder into the pan and closing 

the frizzen. 

3. The remaining powder was poured down the muzzle. 

4. The musket ball and the paper wadding were then inserted. 

5. The ramrod was used to pack down the ball and wading down the 

muzzle. 

6. The rammer would be removed and the weapon ready to be fired. 

(George Webb, “Dade Battlefield Staff Ride Questions.” Message to 

Michael Anderson. 19 December 2012. E-mail).

The standard rate of fire for a skilled experienced soldier was one 

round every 20 seconds or three times a minute. The officers carried 

similar flintlock pistols. The common pistol model was an 1819 .54 caliber 

pistol with 40 grain powder ammunition. It weighed three pounds and was 

14 inches long. Effective range for the pistol was roughly 20 yards. Both 

loading procedure and standard rate of fire for the officers’ pistols was the 

same as that of the shoulder arm.

It must be considered that though there were more modern arms 

available for the time, just not with Dade’s command, they were not 

seen as the technological solution. The standard alternative to the musket 

was the model 1819 Hall’s breach loading rifle. However, Soldiers who 

used these in the field complained of the recoil breaking the stocks, of 

a faulty breechblock that seized up after only a few shots, and that the 

smaller caliber it fired was not damaging enough to bring a target down 

effectively. Some of these problems may in fact have been due to a lack 

of proper training as the breech-loading rifle naturally involved more 

technical training for proper use as it was a more intricate machine than 

the traditional muzzle-loader. Even with these complaints from the soldier, 

the rifle did have a reported four times faster rate of fire, if it did not seize 

up of course. In addition, it had four times further range and the smaller 

caliber allowed for more rounds to be carried due to the lighter weight and 

smaller size. This would allow the Soldiers with a Hall’s model rifle to fire 

four times as many rounds at target four times more distant and having 

more ammunition, thus allowing for a more prolonged intensity of fire. 

However, the propensity for prolonged intense fire with more rapid firing 
10

weapons would place a significant strain on an inherently weak logistical 

system. The demand for increased ammunition to supply rapid-firing 

individual Soldiers would be difficult for the industrial base of the early 

1830s to support. Even the rifles available to Dade’s men were not well 

received by the soldiery. At the time of Dade’s march, the US Army had 

roughly one of these breach loading rifles for every 20 muskets, however, 

there are no records indicating that any rifles were with Dade’s command. 

Edged Weapons

The officers were armed with straight artillery officer swords or the 

slightly curved infantry officer sword while the assigned cannon crew 

carried short swords. None carried the curved sabers of the mounted 

dragoon. The enlisted men were normally armed with bayonets, certainly 

if they were infantry, as this was a sign of distinction. However, the noninfantry enlisted, such as the “red-legged” infantry, were not always 

armed with this critical melee weapon. It was not standard practice to 

issue anyone, other than infantry, the fearsome bayonet for attachment 

to the muzzle of their muskets for close combat. Though there were a 

few true-blue infantrymen in Dade’s column, it is reasonable to assert 

that bayonets were present even among the red-legged infantry. However, 

the issue of the bayonet as a portion of the Soldiers’ weaponry is largely 

muted as the Seminole were known to avoid close combat, perhaps out 

of a sense of tactics but for many of the contemporary Soldiers it was 

sometimes attributed to their diminutive upper-body stature as compared 

to the physically larger US Soldiers. They were noted to be poor wrestlers 

in competitions at local forts against US Soldiers and throughout the later 

Second Seminole War, close combat with hatchets, tomahawks, and the 

like were extremely rare. An organized and coordinated bayonet charge 

would disperse gathered Seminoles without a contest as it did each time 

executed later in the war but the nature of the unconventional war made 

this occurrence rare.

Artillery

A true projectile weapon that separated the US Army Soldiers from 

the Seminole Warriors was the presence of the single six-pound cannon. 

The cannon, though solitary in this case, cannot be underappreciated as 

both a deadly physical weapon as well as a psychological weapon. It 

both demoralized the enemy and encouraged friendly forces. Though the 

majority of Soldiers marching with Dade were “part-time” infantry, they 

were trained and professional artillerymen, thus they knew how to handle 

the cannon properly. Even if the deadly impact could be minimized by 
11

lack of maneuverability and its solitary state, the cannon’s psychological 

aspects were substantial as the red-legs counted on. However, ammunition 

was finite for both the cannon and the muskets.

The standard six-pound cannon of the period was animal drawn 

and weighed approximately 750 pounds. Its range was determined by a 

combination of powder charge, ammunition type, and elevation. Due to 

the haste of reacting to an ambush without proper time to place the gun in 

standard operations, the artillerymen accompanying Major Dade would 

have fired a quicker loading 1 1/4 pound powder charge at zero elevation 

resulting in an average range of 318 yards. In ideal conditions, however, 

with more powder charges and differing elevation and terrain, light pieces 

such as the six-pounder could reach approximately 1,000 yards. 

The standard loading procedure for a six-pounder in action was a ninestep process. The cannon team would be divided into 10 roles with one 

non-commissioned officer, two gunners, and six junior enlisted loaders. 

1. The first command was “Parade!” to which the cannon team took 

takes their places. Two loaders on each side accompanied by one gunner 

with two other enlisted men forming a chain from the ammunition carriage 

to the gun with the non-commissioned officer and an officer standing 

behind the gun giving commands and assisting with aiming the weapon. 

At this time, if the gun was not already unhooked from the limbers, the 

command “Unlimber!” would be given and the team would unhook the 

cannon and maneuver it into its firing position. 

2. The second command was “To Action!” The crew at this time 

stepped forward preparing to execute the first action upon the cannon. 

3. The third command “Sponge Tend, Vent!” was issued and the 

cannon bore was sponged while the charge was passed from the crate to 

the gun. Meanwhile, a gunner stepped forward and reached to the breech 

of the gun and covered the vent. 

4. The fourth command was “Handle, Cartridge!” The prepared 

cartridge was passed from the ammunition bearer to the loader near the 

cannon. 

5. The fifth command was “Charge, Piece!” The cartridge was 

placed into the bore and the loader with the rammer readies his piece. 

6. The sixth command was “Ram down, Cartridge!” which was 

when the cartridge was rammed down one to two times. 

7. The seventh command was “Prime!” at which time the gunner 

removed his hand from the covering vent and inserted tube until it entered 
12

the cartridge. If not using tubing, the gunner could also insert priming wire 

to achieve same results as using the tube. 

8. The eighth command was “Take, Aim!” The gunner removed his 

hand from tubing or priming wire and using his fingers ranged the weapon 

and adjusted as needed the elevation and traverse of piece. 

9. The final command was “Fire!” at which time the crew cleared 

the wheels to avoid recoil and the cannon was lit. Upon firing, the gunner 

tended to the vent while the rest of the crew awaited instructions as to 

follow on duties. 

(Amos Stoddard, Exercise for Garrison and Field Ordnance Together 

with Maneuvers. New York: Pelsue & Gold, 1812. Section V).

The standard rate of fire for a well-trained crew was up to three rounds 

per minute or one every 20 seconds. However, for crew safety and to keep 

the gun from overheating, the normal rate was two rounds per minute or 

one every 30 seconds. When taking into account the effects of conducting 

these actions under intense direct fire as with the ambush of Dade’s men, 

it is more likely to err on the side of one round a minute. 

Ammunition for the six-pounder was composed of three types. These 

were canister, solid (or round shot), and grape. Both canister and grape 

were used for close quarters such as clustered infantry or mounted forces 

threatening the immediate friendly lines. Grape could be fired as far as 500 

yards but canister and grape were more commonly used at closer than 250 

yards. The only difference between these two types was what composed 

the rounds themselves. Canister was a random assortment of shrapnel 

placed into a container while grape was a collection of rounded musket 

ball-like projectiles. The third type of round was the solid shot. This was 

used primarily against fortifications or dense formations of troops at longer 

range or counterbattery fire. This type of round was more commonly used 

at ranges exceeding 600 yards. The precise breakdown of the ammunition 

accompanying Dade’s six-pounder is not known, however, it is recorded 

that they carried a total of 50 rounds for the cannon. In comparison, the 

standard load for this weapon during its use in the War of 1812 was 90 

solid shots and 30 canisters. The peace and logistics of the frontier had 

certainly curbed artillery ammunition supply for the US Army.

Tactics

Tactical Doctrine of 1835

The US Army’s standard drill for tactics was largely based on 

General Winfield Scott’s oversight of the 1824 tactical board along 
13

with Commandant of the Cadets William Worth’s light infantry drill 

implemented in West Point instruction. The 1824 tactical board was 

dominated by traditional, European linear, close-order warfare, the so 

called “line infantry” in contrast to the more independent “light infantry”. 

The light infantry drills that were included in the revised infantry tactics 

were largely based on Commandant Worth’s instruction at West Point 

and field tested by both cadets and Soldiers from the artillery school at 

Fort Monroe. Even with this deviation from a European focus on closeordered line infantry in contrast to the rare European light infantry, these 

US Army light infantry (skirmisher) drills were founded in traditional 

linear tactics and more of an addendum than a standalone concept. Just 

as in Europe, General Scott could not move himself to specialize a light 

infantry corps but rather proposed more extensive training of line infantry 

to have the secondary capabilities of light infantry but always remaining 

firmly rooted in their traditional duties as close-ordered line infantry. 

There would be more changes incorporated in the 1835 revision of the 

US Army Infantry regulations. These were not revolutionary changes but 

changes nevertheless providing more freedom of maneuver and range 

for the light infantry and codifying the open order lessons learned in the 

intermittent frontier conflicts of expanding US influence in North America. 

The concept of linear formation fighting was still the predominant tactic 

taught at the US Army’s Academy at West Point and from the experiences 

of the War of 1812, although the addition of an American battlefield 

influence of light infantry was acknowledged and trained as an addendum 

to the conventional line infantry instruction. The 1824 and subsequent 

1835 revision of the US Army infantry regulations would spark multiple 

professional debates in the early and mid-1800s, much of it predicated 

on the constant struggle between frontier fighting advocating a move 

towards more light infantry drill and the traditional approach to following 

European models, vacillating between British and French options. The end 

result would be a hybrid of European style line infantry drill influenced by 

American light infantry drill based on frontier conflict. 

Frontier Tactics 

At times necessity dictates tactics rather than institutional doctrine. No 

one knows more than the soldier on the ground, living in the immediate 

presence of the “fight” to know just how he needs to train in order to 

survive. After all, it is his natural survival instincts that are involved. 

The Florida territory US Army Regulars appeared to be an example of 

this. These Soldiers according to Private John Bemrose, stationed at 

Fort King, practiced “drilling in the woods at Indian fighting” as well as 
14

marksmanship training. (Bemrose, 25). There is no record of how often 

or how prolific this sort of training was but it does illuminate the fact that 

the Soldiers and officers on the frontier knew the necessity of being able 

to fight in the current terrain, not the terrain of the open Europe-based 

manuals. Though the institutional denigration of fighting unconventional 

wars was prominent, many recognized the importance of modified tactics 

to fit the frontier. Frontier tactics were dominated by the most common 

soldier at the time along the frontier, the foot soldier. “Frontier tactics” 

for the infantryman were essentially light infantry, or skirmisher, tactics. 

This meant more individuality in the soldier’s selection of cover, his rate 

of fire, and target selection. This was still conducted within the confines 

of officer and Non-Commissioned Officer command and control but in 

the looser model found in the period’s light infantry doctrine. When using 

these frontier tactics, Soldiers would no longer adhere to a tight linear 

formation but split into smaller groups and individuals to best use terrain. 

These frontier tactics, the woodland drills, would largely supplant the 

traditional linear tactics with rapidity in the Second Seminole War and 

indeed, the Soldiers under Major Dade would demonstrate the woodland 

drill for the majority of the battle before construction of the breastworks. 

Logistical Support

Logistics for the US Army of Florida Territory in the mid-1830s 

was haphazard. Most of the supplies that were not self-cultivated by 

the scattered posts and settlers were transported into the main posts that 

served as ports such as Fort Brooke at Tampa Bay, Key West in the south, 

and St. Augustine on the east coast. For ground logistical support for the 

more rural and interior posts such as Fort King, rudimentary roads were 

connected to crisscross the frontier both allowing for transport of goods as 

well as communication and military maneuver. On these roads the primary 

logistical mover was the ox or horse-drawn wagon. These supply columns 

transporting goods between military posts were always vulnerable, in times 

of war or peace, to marauding bands of Seminoles or criminal settlers. The 

artillery units were known for using wagons to transport their goods. Even 

though they were pressed into a more infantry-type role on the frontier, 

they still were logistically equipped for their more traditional role and thus 

were supported by more wagons. In contrast, the infantry, and later the 

dragoons when they were were deployed to Florida, were supported more 

by pack mules when operating apart from a column that included artillery.

The treaty stipulations that granted the Seminoles the interior of 

the peninsula as their Seminole Nation and gave the United States the 
15

coastlines and limited interior penetration, greatly hampered the logistical 

situation of the scattered military posts as did the extreme nature of the 

swampy interior of the peninsula itself. As operations progressed in 

the Second Seminole War, logistics would increasingly be borne by the 

growing riverine US Navy boats as they navigated swampy channels, 

rivers, and streams in support of the US Army. Food, medicine, and 

ammunition would always be an issue as logistical failures and inabilities 

crippled even the most experienced Army general’s campaign plans in the 

hitherto unknown terrain and climate of interior Florida.

As for Major Dade’s command, once they departed Fort Brooke, they 

lacked even moderate logistical support. The route of march along Fort King 

Road took the column deeper into the interior of both the territory and into 

the Seminole Nation denying them logistical resupply. They took a wagon 

with them to carry additional ammunition and food for a cumulative 10 

days supply. For this march, Dade’s command took 30 rounds per person 

for their personal weapons and 50 rounds for the cannon. This was half 

of what Dade had taken on a previous march through Seminole territory 

years earlier as a captain. At that time he took no cannon to account for 

speed and each of his infantrymen carried 60 rounds of ammunition per 

person. They made this previous march without contest along the same 

route from Fort Brooke to Fort King. For sustenance, Dade’s command in 

1835 took on their person 18 ounces of stale bread, and 3/4 of a pound of 

raw pork or 1/4 pound of salted or fresh beef. The additional rations for 

the march were stored on the supply wagon. There was no concerted plan 

for resupply during the march. The command took a 10-day supply which 

was to suffice to get them to Fort King where they would resupply and 

continue operations. For all intents this meant that the only thought for 

beyond the 10-day supply would be to live off the land as there would be 

no friendly settlements within the Seminole Territory with which to trade. 

A 10 day supply of sustenance was a regular occurrence during this period 

on the frontier in Florida. Generally, half would be carried by the Soldiers 

on their backs and half the ration in a supply wagon. When resupply was 

coordinated for during that march, it was generally acquired from locals 

or mostly from waterborne resupply from a riverine force. This lack of 

extensive logistical network in support of the march resulted in a critical 

dearth of ammunition in light of the intensive contact. 

Engineer Support

A primary purpose for the creation and sustainment of the military 

academy at West Point was to provide the nation with a corps of competent 

and trained engineers. These engineers were largely utilized in peacetime 
16

after the War of 1812 to build, restore, and improve on coastal fortifications 

and did not see much utilization or action in the frontier wars which in 

comparison to the coastal fortification mission, were a lesser priority. 

The major contribution of the engineers to the frontier in Florida was the 

construction of the few roads that did in fact exist such as the critical Fort 

King Road, although, even these roads were generally constructed by the 

posted infantry and artillery units.

In Dade’s command there were no engineer troops and he had no 

engineer support other than the academic training of the young West Point 

graduates. When the command was forced to ford rivers after Seminoles 

burned the log bridges and move their cannon and wagon through the 

terrain it was up to the infantrymen, artillerymen, and the officers to 

conceptualize and execute the mobility and counter-mobility issues.

Communications

Communication within the US Army was either from a verbal 

messenger or from an official courier delivering written communications. 

These could be either land-based, being either foot movement or mounted, 

or seaborne with the messenger or courier transported by ship. The 

majority of settlements at this time on the Florida frontier dotted the 

coastline as the previous treaties had provided the Seminoles with the 

interior portions of the peninsula as their “Seminole Nation” thus the 

majority of communication along the frontier was passed with merchant 

ships although land based road networks were beginning to be used but 

this involved more danger from marauding Seminoles or criminal settlers.

The Fort King Road on which Major Dade’s command marched was 

a major landline of communication from Fort Brooke on the west coast 

at Tampa Bay with the more eastern Fort King. This road cut through the 

heart of the Seminole Nation though it was the most direct route between 

the two forts and divided US Army Regulars in north-central Florida. At 

the time Major Dade’s contingent departed Fort Brooke for Fort King, 

the land-bound communication between the two forts had been cut off by 

growing Seminole depredations which included the murder of a US Army 

courier along the Fort King Road. Throughout the march, Major Dade 

would receive and send courier-born messages back to Fort Brooke but 

nothing would come from Fort King.

Within the command, the leaders relied on personal verbal commands. 

In the period, drums and bugles were utilized regularly in infantry 

organizations, however, Major Dade’s command, perhaps due to its 

smaller size, neglected this and relied on verbal communication.
17

Decisions had to be made by officers in the Second Seminole War 

based on the latest message delivered by ship or courier and both were 

unreliable in timeliness. 

Medical

The military frontier post normally had a serving surgeon from the 

Army Medical Department assigned to it. Although medical capabilities 

were limited in the 19th Century and even more so at austere frontier posts, 

minimal medical knowledge and care was available. The largest medical 

issue dealt with in peacetime and war was illnesses to include dysentery, 

measles, mumps, smallpox, rampant malaria, and simple malnutrition. 

The doctors and their assigned supporting medical orderlies spent much 

of their time combating pestilence and the rest of it servicing battlefield 

wounds and local needs. The medical services were not strictly military 

either. Though the medical personnel were commissioned officers and 

the orderlies were enlisted Soldiers from the ranks assigned to support 

the medical professionals, they served the local population as well. There 

was no progressive medical care in the territories beyond the local post’s 

infirmary. If it could not be handled at the infirmary level of the fort, there 

were limited options revolving around available transport on merchant 

vessels to more developed medical facilities.

The US Army Soldiers under Major Dade had Assistant Surgeon Dr. 

John S. Gatlin accompanying them. Dr. Gatlin was the assigned medical 

professional to Fort Brooke, and he accompanied the march with a 

limited supply of bandages and medicine along with his saws and knives 

contained in his medical bag. He had only just arrived at Fort Brooke from 

Fort Pickens, near Pensacola, Florida, and after handing off the supplies 

he had brought with him, he was ordered to accompany Major Dade’s 

column to deliver receipts and invoices to Fort King for medical supplies 

for Assistant Surgeon Dr. Henry Lee Heiskell. With the extreme lack of 

supplies and assistance, Dr. Gatlin could only provide rudimentary aid to 

the wounded in Dade’s Battle and, by nature of the fight, be a combatant 

as well.

Intelligence

US Army intelligence was markedly absent concerning the Seminoles 

and was not organized or considered in any manner. Through regular 

postings to the frontier and the First Seminole War, many of the officers 

and enlisted Soldiers had experience with the Seminoles. As with any 

garrison or occupational duties, these previous experiences for better and 

for worse affected judgments and would result in preconceived notions. 

At the time of the march, most of the information the US Army possessed 

came from reports from terrified settlers coming to the forts. These settlers 
18

were “terrified” from the depredations of the Seminole to include theft, 

burnings, and posturing of violence. In addition, the garrison forces could 

witness from their encampments acts of bravado by bands of Seminole in 

defiance of the agreements. Finally, the US Soldiers also relied heavily 

on warnings and reports of Seminoles themselves both from boastful 

antagonists as well as friendly informants. As for physical intelligence 

gathering, there was a distinct lack of reconnaissance patrolling prior to 

the hostilities.

Major Dade utilized an African-American slave named Louis Pacheo. 

Pacheo accompanied him on his march to run ahead as a scout each day 

for the Seminoles but Pacheo, with later questioned loyalties, never saw 

any Seminoles though reported there were certain signs such as burned 

bridges and slaughtered animals. Major Dade’s command had also been 

given the son of a loyal Seminole chief to accompany them but through 

fear, he had left days before the ambush of the column. The US Army 

attempted to use the supportive locals as much as possible. Later the 

regular Army would rely heavily on the untrained Florida Militia for 

terrain knowledge. Language barriers would consistently be an issue with 

intelligence gathering as virtually no Army Soldiers spoke the Seminole 

language and thus they had to rely on either slaves, such as Pacheo, or 

“loyal” Seminoles to serve as translators.
19

The Seminole Nation Organization

Pre-war

Overview

Estimates place the Seminole population in 1835 to be approximately 

4,000-5,000 with around 500-1,400 warriors among them (Mahon, 

121-122). Though commonly referred to as the “Seminole Nation”, the 

organization was more of a confederacy of many different, scattered, and 

independent tribes that themselves had broken off from the Lower Creek 

tribes of the Muskogee in Georgia and Alabama. The confederation was 

nominally ruled by a senior male chief of the oldest and most “original” 

Seminole tribe of northern Florida. Though there was a council of chiefs 

and a head chief, the Seminole Nation still was a loosely-based nation of 

tribes. These tribes did come together in times of need for a greater good 

but in no manner were they organized in a Western sense of socio-cultural 

organization. They were said to be proud of their valor and hardiness and 

to be haughty to outsiders but generally receptive and hospitable.

These Seminoles were offset by the presence of both free Africans, 

known as “Maroons” who were incorporated and lived peacefully in the 

Seminole territory, as well as African slaves. The Maroons were separate 

but included in the loose confederation that made up the Seminole 

community. They numbered only a few thousand at the time of the 

Second Seminole War but were well known for their bravery, courage, and 

violence. In addition, they provided the Seminoles with translators and a 

deeper understanding of the “white man.” The Seminoles were thought 

to have nearly 100 slaves among them. They embraced a perception of 

the importance and prestige that slavery provided, having learned this in 

lower Georgia before the Seminole migration to Florida. These slaves were 

generally results of military conquests although with more interaction with 

the Spanish, English, and then Americans, it began to reflect more of an 

economic idea as well.

By the nature of their society, the Seminoles did not have anything 

reflective of a standing or professional army. The tradition of the 

Seminoles when going to war was one of long deliberation and voluntary 

tribal commitments to the overall war effort. The main hereditary chiefs of 

the major clans or sub-tribes would come together and once deciding on 

war, would send envoys out to the smaller tribes with requests for support 

in supplies and manpower and would declare when the hostilities would 

commence. This would be done by depositing red sticks at the meeting 
20

lodges of each tribe with one stick representing a day. Each day, one 

stick would be removed in a countdown allowing the tribes to gather the 

volunteers and donations and deliver them to the hereditary chiefs before 

the day the war was to begin. Any excesses were stored or returned when 

the warriors left for war. The lack of a professional system and strong 

central disciplinary measures meant that Seminole campaigns were never 

intended to be ones of length and endurance. 

Leadership

Seminole leadership was both hereditary and merit-based. The tribal 

decision-making and the policy-makers were mainly hereditary based. 

The merit-based leaders were mostly the men of action in the tribes and 

they led through their influence on the hereditary leadership. The meritbased leaders were the more physical leaders and thus more prominent 

in military matters. However, even in this, the cultural significance and 

influence of the hereditary tribal leaders could not be discounted as their 

presence was integral to any tribal actions, military or not. Although the 

Seminoles certainly had no professional military education or promotion 

system they still contained natural and experienced leaders along with the 

less capable.

The Second Seminole War was not the first armed conflict between the 

United States and the Seminole Nation in Florida. The First Seminole War 

had been fought from 1816-1819. Many Seminoles, if they did not have 

direct experience from the previous conflicts or occasional depredations 

with the settlers, certainly had heard stories and lessons of previous fights 

with the Soldiers from their seniors. This allowed for Seminole leadership 

to have limited knowledge of previous fighting experience but they 

certainly all knew the land they lived on and what they were fighting to 

maintain.

The Seminole war chiefs lacked much authority over the tribe-provided 

warriors other than example and use of shame or glory to inspire. The 

harsh and stark goals the US Government was enforcing through violence 

did slightly alter the “traditional” approach to war. In this case the result of 

failure did inspire some more attempts at enforcing discipline by Seminole 

war chiefs, exemplified by the Seminole war chief Osceola’s threats to 

kill any warrior who left the fight without his permission. This was the 

exception and not the rule to Seminole military measures.
21

Micanopy’s Warriors 

The Seminole males were described by contemporary US Soldiers 

such as Private Bemrose as more often than not over six feet tall and having 

generally strong lower bodies but weaker upper body strength (Bemrose, 

17). This may be attributed to the limited manual labor of their culture 

undertaken by the males coupled with their propensity for roaming across 

the lands on the hunt while domestic labor was handled by the women and 

the younger children.

They wore animal skin moccasins and would paint their bodies red 

and black for war, some wore jewels and feathery finery as distinctions. 

Others would wear clothing, such as jackets, taken from killed Soldiers or 

settlers to add to their native clothing while many were known to go to war 

nude or with only a loin cloth. The age of combatants would run from the 

late teens to those still capable of fighting. They voted with their feet and 

were only loosely controlled by their chiefs, mostly through cajoling and 

example more than anything else.

The warriors who fought Dade were all dismounted. A mounted 

element of Seminoles were present but were not involved in the fighting. 

The Seminoles throughout the war did not utilize the limited number of 

horses they had in a traditional mounted combat cavalry role but rather as 

a means of transportation and for the traditional scouting role of mounted 

forces. There are a few possibilities explaining the Seminole lack of horses 

in direct mounted combat. The lack of numbers of horses could be one, 

a result of inability to logistically support multiple horses on a campaign 

or the terrain not being conducive to mounted operations. This was 

supported by the US Army’s relative light use of horses in direct combat 

action during the war. In addition, culturally, the Seminole livelihood did 

not place the same prominence on horses as did the Americans with their 

European background.

At the battle along Fort King Road, Micanopy’s subordinate war chiefs 

were a youthful but experienced and competent pair. Alligator and Jumper 

were Micanopy’s immediate subordinate leaders as Osceola would not 

be present due to his mission against the US Indian Affairs Agent Wiley 

Thompson. 
22

Weapons

Projectile Weapons

For projectile weapons, the Seminoles relied almost exclusively on 

rifles. Contemporary US military participants recorded that the Spanishmade and imported rifle largely used by the Seminoles was even superior 

to the available US Army models. The Spanish rifles were small-bored and 

came from Cuba (Potter, Woodburne. The War in Florida. Baltimore, MD: 

Lewis and Coleman. 1836, 147). These Spanish rifles fired even a smaller 

caliber round than the Hall’s model rifle which fired a .52 caliber round. 

As the war progressed, Soldiers’ accounts would note the Seminoles 

had difficulty at times making these smaller caliber rounds effective at 

distance. This in some part giving credence to the previously noted US 

Army Soldiers’ disparaging claims of the effectiveness of his available 

breech-loading Hall’s rifle round which was of an even larger caliber than 

the Seminole’s ammunition. Some US Army veterans of the war would 

later claim that the enemy fire was ineffective beyond 20 yards (Bemrose, 

52-53). There remain questions if this was from lack of marksmanship and 

fire discipline or from an inferior weapon system. Nearly all the Seminoles 

were armed with rifles, some with acquired US weapons. In addition, the 

Seminoles lacked any form of artillery.

The rifles were not the only projectile weapons at the disposal of the 

Seminoles. They also utilized bows and arrows as well. The arrows were 

made from sugar cane stalks and were four feet long with pointed fiber 

tips. These tips were hardened through fire or at times shards of metal were 

used for the tips. The Seminoles, however, as a culture did not possess the 

knowledge for metal working and thus they could not make or repair their 

own rifles when these malfunctioned or broke. They relied on traders and 

settlers for all their metalworking needs, which of course, ceased when 

hostilities broke out.

Edged Weapons

The Seminoles possessed a variety of traditional “Indian” closecombat weaponry. They carried hunting knives, or scalping knives, as 

well as hatchets and clubs. These were crude instruments due to the lack 

of metal-working development in the Seminole culture at the time. The 

resulting reliance on settlers’ metal-working abilities limited the quantity 

and quality of these sorts of weapons in comparison to those of the US 

Army’s bayonets, swords, and axes. This was not a significant detriment 

to the Seminole fighting effort, however, as their tactics notably avoided 

close contact with Army Soldiers and rarely did fighting devolve to close 
23

quarter combat. These weapons were largely ceremonial in importance 

being used most commonly for post-combat actions such as scalp-taking 

or execution of wounded or prisoners of the enemy.

Tactics

“Indian” Fighting

The Seminoles would gather the necessary warriors from their 

scattered and loosely aligned clans to a centralized meeting place, usually 

at the warrior chief’s camp. As the last red sticks signifying the countdown 

to the conflict were gathered up, the assembled warriors would be secluded 

for three days for purification ritual. Once this was complete the Seminole 

warriors would move out in single file, moving in the previous Seminole’s 

footprints with the last Seminole in the order of movement covering the 

trail with grass. Whenever they stopped, they would circle with weapons 

outwards and the warrior chief controlling the one opening of the circle. 

He would use hand and arm signals to signal the others when to sleep and 

when to rise before they would commence their attack.

The tactics of the Seminole were that after the coordinated first volley, 

the battle became more of an individual fight or small groups controlled 

by a close leader. The tactics most employed, as recalled by US Army 

veterans, was for the Seminole to fire from the ground or a low crouch. 

After firing, they would let out a Seminole war-whoop and then fall or roll 

to the left to free up the right side for reloading the rifle. Consequently, 

a standard practice later developed by the US infantry was to fire to 

the right of where they saw the muzzle blasts. If this tactic, which was 

recognized during the later battles of the Second Seminole War, was true 

and accurate and perhaps displayed in the fight with Dade’s men, then the 

relevant importance of the underbrush concealment and scattered trees of 

the battlefield take on more meaning.

Typically, once the initial fighting commenced, the Seminoles 

engaged in individual fights. However, the overall tendency in multiple 

engagements during the war was for the Seminoles to attempt to envelop 

the flanks of the US Soldiers. When the Seminoles were the defenders 

they tended to engage individually as they attempted to disengage from 

the contact.

Seminole marksmanship was brought into question by the US 

veterans. In many of the battles with the Seminoles, the first volley of the 

Seminoles was always said to be the most destructive. This is not unusual. 

In most militaries the opening salvo is the most accurate simply because it 

is loosed under the least pressure and with the most time and preparation. 
24

This was the case with the Seminoles as well. The first volley was said to 

be extremely accurate, some argued that they even targeted officers in this 

volley. The follow up volleys were too hurried many observers commented, 

as if they fought in an ill-disciplined passion. US veteran reports recounted 

that after the battle, branches as high as 20 to 30 feet overhead were cut 

and broken from the Seminoles’ wild rifle fire. Some reports even told of 

Seminoles missing their targets at four yards (Mahon, 120). It would not 

be unusual for these reports to be somewhat exaggerated as they mostly 

came from American sources but they may be grounded in a generalized 

truth. 

In the fight with Dade’s men, the Seminoles fought according to their 

standard methods. They fired a coordinated initial volley and then the fight 

devolved into many individual firefights among a dispersed Seminole 

formation against a scattered US force. As the battle developed, led in 

small groups, the Seminoles began to encroach on and then envelop the US 

position once the US Soldiers began to reconsolidate and reorganize into 

a static defensive position. Dade’s battle was in fact one of the Seminole’s 

most effective displays of this common tactic.

The effectiveness, if not professionalism, of the Seminoles should 

not be judged or questioned on this. Reference the skill sets supposedly 

possessed by the chief, Alligator, and the successfulness of the Seminoles 

at defying the US Army for so long and this cannot be disregarded easily.

Seminole Combat Support and Service Support Capabilities

Overview

Little is known regarding the combat support and service support 

capabilities of the Seminoles in regard to war-fighting. The Seminole 

support infrastructure was limited or nonexistent for protracted 

engagement, which explains their predilection towards smaller hit-and-run 

type engagements. Only if forced through US Army maneuver would they 

fight anything reflecting a set-piece battle. On only a few occasions did 

the US Army manage to maneuver into a place that forced the Seminoles 

to stand and fight in large numbers. When the Army managed to draw the 

Seminoles into a European-traditional battle it was always in vicinity of 

a major Seminole hamlet before the Seminoles had time to move their 

families and belongings and then it was only a delaying action until the 

families and provisions were either moved or destroyed. In any case, the 

lack of sustained infrastructure is the major factor influencing each of the 

following sections of Seminole support and service support categories.
25

Logistical Support

A military logistical system did not exist for the Seminole warriors. 

What they carried with them is what supported them. The Seminole logistical 

plan was only for the opening move and did not include contingencies for 

extended operations or re-supply. The Seminoles would declare intention 

for another fight by the distribution of red sticks, one stick equaling a 

day. The collection of sticks would be placed at the meeting lodges of the 

surrounding lesser tribes to signify the need for military provisions and 

volunteers for the coming fight with an appointed warrior chief’s hamlet 

being the final gathering point. With a daily countdown removal of a red 

stick, the Seminoles knew when they would need to gather all they could 

provide to include manpower, logistical support, and sustainment to the 

warrior chief at the appointed collection point. 

Though the Seminoles did not have a coordinated military strategy 

that envisioned or required prolonged support away from their tribal 

hamlets, this was not a detriment due to the cultural attitude from which the 

Seminoles approached warfare. The Seminoles were a mixed agricultural 

and hunting society. Their approach to a “war party” was an adaption to 

their hunting of deer and other animals to that of hunting man. They did 

not travel far from their hamlets to ambush or raid US Army patrols or 

settlements, usually returning home at the conclusion of the engagements. 

The few times they undertook a prolonged fight was in the vicinity of one 

of their larger hamlets where they lived and that was only long enough to 

get the women and children moved. This was only in the rare instances 

when the US Army surprised them. 

The Seminole warriors’ baggage train was their families’ belongings 

as they eluded US Army patrols or if stationary, the warriors simply used 

their hamlets as a base of operations. Seminole logistics were labor-based. 

Old men and boys would carry powder in bags to the gathering place prior 

to the fight. Likewise, the women would cook extra food and bring it and 

bags of bullets to the meeting place signified by the collection of red sticks.

A major source of Seminole logistical movement was their canoes 

which utilized the many meandering waterways through the swamplands 

of Florida. These canoes were made of cypress tree trunks and could hold 

an estimated 20-30 warriors. These canoes and the attendant waterways 

were certainly a major means of transport of supplies for the Seminole 

Nation especially once war broke out. Trade with Cuba and the Bahamas 

was even recorded by Seminoles in these large canoes. This canoe 

transportation system gained more importance as the war progressed 
26

beyond Dade’s Battle as the Seminoles began to embrace the necessary 

nomadic lifestyle required to avoid the US Army patrols and their attacks 

on Seminole hamlets. The Seminoles focused planting their agriculture, 

such as corn, on river banks to facilitate quiet and speedy gathering of 

these provisions by canoe. They would also began to bind the feet of their 

chickens and hogs to keep them from wandering too far in order to ease 

collection as well. 

In addition, the Seminoles relied heavily on scavenging the battlefield 

after a fight for weapons, ammunition, and clothing to sustain them. 

Immediately before the outbreak of hostilities, Indian Affairs Agent 

Wiley Thompson outlawed the sale of weapons, powder, or bullets to 

the Seminoles. The later influx of US Army and US Navy forces into 

the territory greatly hampered any trading with the Seminoles which 

were confined to the interior of the peninsula with the Spanish and 

with bloodshed, even illicit trading between settlers and Seminoles was 

terminated. The Seminoles would be forced to mix rifle and musket 

powders as the majority of their rifle stores were exhausted in the opening 

fights and most of the plunder from battlefields with the US Army only 

resulted in musket supplies. By the end of the war, the Seminoles were 

relegated to handcrafting bullets from sheets of lead. However, for the 

opening confrontation of Dade’s Battle, the Seminoles were at their peak 

of supplies due to ability for trading between settlers and Seminoles prior 

to hostilities. Exact numbers for the Seminole stores prior to and during the 

war are illusive due to the nature of Seminole historical record-keeping. 

They expected that by launching such a violent and stunning attack to 

terrorize the United States, that it would not be a long war.

By the illusive nature of the conflict and the terrain, the Seminoles 

operated on interior lines of communication as well as logistics. The 

inherent dispersed and defensive nature of their operations meant that they 

were not seriously hampered by their lack of organized combat support 

systems. They merely wanted to remain on their lands and it was up to 

the US Army to force them out. By necessity they lived and traveled light.

Engineer Support

The Seminoles had no training or professional understanding of 

engineer support for military operations. However, the Seminoles had 

an instinctual understanding of mobility and counter-mobility on the 

battlefield and in many cases applied this terrain analysis and understanding 

to tactical use. Though there was no Seminole engineer detachment or 

engineer branch, they still conducted operations that would be considered 
27

engineer-type operations in more organized and professional armies such 

as their counter-mobility operations against Dade’s men when they burned 

the bridges over the swollen rivers. This both delayed the Soldiers as well 

as tired them by forcing them to ford the rivers and bring the cannon with 

them through manual labor and wagon across the waters. In addition, they 

made use as a people of the hammocks, hill-like protrusions from the 

otherwise mucky swamp-land. They made their homes on these hammocks 

and set up many of their ambushes on the pursuing or patrolling US Army 

Soldiers throughout the war.

Communications

The Seminole communications were at an organizational disadvantage 

to even the limited measures available to the US Army in that few could 

read or write in any language and that the Seminole language itself did 

not have a recognized written form. They still could pass information 

through personal messenger and this was certainly their primary measure 

to communicate. Since they resided in the interior of the peninsula they 

did not require large merchant ships for logistics or for communication, 

though they did possess smaller canoe-type craft for river navigation and 

communication in the swamps.

Medical

There is a distinctly limited knowledge of military medicine as 

practiced by the Seminoles. In fact, the medical knowledge of the 

Seminoles as a whole is sparse and non-specific. What is recorded is prebattle purification ritual that lasted three days where the gathered warriors 

were secluded from the rest of the people and drank “war medicine” 

consisting of a brew of herbs and roots. The purpose of this was to purge 

the body and cleanse it before the fight but it also had the benefit to keep 

the warriors from drinking alcohol for three days before the fight. It is also 

thought that the Seminole disposition to fight in the near nude was a means 

to keep the clothing from causing infection by entering the wound if the 

Seminole was shot, though this is speculation.

Battlefield medicine for the Seminoles was basic as well. Each war 

party was to include a religious and medicinal participant, who refrained 

from entering the fight but stood away, praying for the warriors and 

providing rudimentary treatment to the wounded. This medicine man 

would carry a bag containing heads of parsley and when an injured 

Seminole was brought to him he would bite into the plant and apply it to 

the wound. 
28

Intelligence

The Seminole intelligence “network” was a simple collection of 

rumor and sympathetic reports and observations. The Seminoles would 

receive information on troop movements, disposition, and activities from 

inside forts through African-American slaves sympathetic to the Seminole 

defense and of runaways and freed African-Americans. By the nature of 

the war, the Seminoles lived around the forts and had regular interaction 

with the Soldiers and settlers, both friend and foe, and through this they 

gained critical intelligence and insight into the US Army and the citizens. 

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, a Seminole chief stated they had been 

planning the opening attack for nearly a year before it happened, just 

waiting for an opportunity to present itself, which it did with Dade’s march. 

Private Bemrose noted in his writings on seeing Seminoles watching 

closely the US Soldiers’ drilling and marksmanship training (Bemrose, 

25). Through a combination of sympathetic reporting from the slaves, 

direct observation through reconnaissance by Seminoles themselves, and 

an inherent knowledge of the land, the Seminoles gathered significant 

knowledge to greatly influence their chances for success in ambushes and 

raids or successfully evade if outmatched.
29

Part II. Dade’s Campaign Overview

Introduction

On the 28 December in 1835 deteriorating relations between the US 

Government and the Seminole Nation in the territory of Florida escalated 

into outright hostility. This was not the first time that violence had been 

undertaken to resolve disputes in Florida over expanding grasp on the 

continent nor would it be the last. On that day Seminole chieftain Osceola 

and his culturally superior Chief Micanopy executed a two-pronged 

aggressive operation meant to persuade and intimidate (through violence) 

Washington and the local settlers of Florida into simply leaving the 

Seminoles alone.

Osceola lay in wait to ambush the official government representative 

to the Seminoles, Indian Affairs Agent Wiley Thompson and his dinner 

guests. Meanwhile, Micanopy and a few hundred warriors lay in wait 

along the Fort King Road to engage a contingent of US Army Regulars 

under the command of Brevet Major Francis Dade. Dade’s command was 

marching through the declared Seminole Nation under direct orders to 

reinforce the commander of the US forces in Florida, Brevet Brigadier 

General Duncan Clinch, in preparation for military operations to persuade 

and intimidate the Seminole Nation into leaving their homes in accordance 

with a series of treaties.

Morning of the 29th December, 1835 would find the political power of 

Washington questioned with the murder of Agent Thompson by Osceola 

while likewise the military might of the young US Army was tested with 

the isolated and final stand of Dade’s command on a long and lonely road. 

With these twin attacks, the Seminole Nation ushered in the long and 

bloody Second Seminole War, also known at the time as “the Florida War”.

The Drums of War

There were two arguably intertwined political reasons for the aggressive 

posture that the United States was taking with the “Indian question” 

concerning the Seminoles of Florida. First it was an issue of slavery and 

second the expansion of American settlers across the peninsula. By 1835, 

the Seminole Nation had voluntarily confined themselves to a “nation” 

that encompassed the interior of the peninsula, providing the United States 

willingly with the Florida Panhandle and the coastlines. However, the 

Seminole practice of openly accepting runaway slaves into their society 

as equals coupled with the growing desire to connect the coastlines, for 

commercial reasons, set the Seminoles and the local white settlers on a 
30

collision course and thus pulled the United States into the contentious 

issue of further Seminole restrictions.

A series of three treaties in regard to the fate of the Seminole tribes, 

defined the political climate that initiated the series of events culminating 

in the fateful order for the march of a token US force through the heart of 

the Seminole Nation. These three treaties set the political and diplomatic 

climate for the outbreak of hostilities with each following Washington’s 

overall Indian removal policy. 

The first treaty, the Treaty of Moultrie Creek of 1823, established the 

reservation in the heart of Florida as the Seminole Nation. This reservation 

was 60 miles by 120 miles. This treaty further tasked the US government 

to control unwanted trespassing of whites into the Seminole Nation and 

likewise made the Seminole chiefs responsible for the monitoring and 

controlling of Seminole traffic outside of the reservation. 

The Treaty of Payne’s Landing of 1832 was the next diplomatic 

agreement following the Treaty of Moultrie Creek. The critical provision 

of this treaty was for the transportation of Seminole chiefs to see the 

proposed lands west of the Mississippi River to which they were to be 

transferred and where, upon approval, would be sent. Discrepancies in the 

text of this treaty would cloud this matter in history. A question of whose 

approval was binding–that of only the chiefs who would speak for the 

nation or the nation’s approval to what the chiefs would return to propose 

to them. The US Government saw the chiefs as the representatives of the 

people, thus their decision was binding. However, some Seminole chiefs, 

the later war leaders, said they could only propose to the nation and the 

nation itself would have to choose. In the end, a direct result of the Treaty 

of Payne’s Landing was the final treaty leading to the Second Seminole 

War, the Treaty of Gibson in 1833. This treaty came about after Seminole 

Chiefs travelled to the lands upon which they were to be relocated and 

gave their tacit approval for the movement of the tribe. However, the US 

Government never really understood that the Seminole Nation was not a 

unified political entity and thus many Seminoles rejected the treaty and 

refused to relocate. The treaty provided the US government with political 

capital to use military force to compel the resisting Seminoles to “honor” 

their agreement to transfer from Florida to the lands west of the Mississippi 

in the Arkansas and Oklahoma territories. 

As a result of the diplomatic pressure of the political treaties 

culminating in the Treaty of Gibson, the military climate of Florida led 

to a sharp divide among the Seminole tribes. This divide led to a growing 

violence among smaller groups of the Seminoles and both the encroaching 

settlers and their United States Army defenders.
31

There were a variety of depredations committed leading up to the battle 

of Major Dade’s command. There was a brief skirmish between settlers 

and a Seminole warrior party at Hog Town after the locals reportedly 

caught some Seminoles stealing. There was a brief exchange of small arms 

fire, and then the settlers tied up and flogged a captured “thief.” Due to 

the sensitive cultural nature of Seminole’s regard for personal honor and 

revenge for affronts, the second notable violent act occurred. Tacitly, in 

response to the humiliation and abuse of the flogging of the Seminole, 

a group of Seminoles vowed revenge. This revenge was executed on a 

solitary US Soldier serving as a courier between Fort Brooke on Tampa 

Bay and the main post of Fort King northeast along the Fort King Road. 

The unfortunate soldier was Private Kinsley Dalton. Private Dalton 

was found scalped and disemboweled on the side of the road with the 

dispatches he was carrying scattered about the road. As the escalation 

rose, it was not limited only to Seminole against United States but even 

amongst Seminoles themselves. A prominent Seminole chief, Omathla 

also known as “Charley,” was murdered in front of his family by Osceola, 

a growing dissenter championing war. Omathla was targeted after having 

sold his cattle in preparation to follow up with his pronounced position 

to relocate and leave Florida to the encroaching whites. This would serve 

to intimidate Seminoles, radicalize dissenters and advance the young 

Osceola’s standing among the warriors.

The final escalation toward war was a skirmish prior to the march of 

Dade’s command where a raid was conducted by a Seminole war party on 

a government supply train. This skirmish fought on 18 December 1835, 

known by some at the time as the “battle of Black Point,” resulted in six 

wounded and two dead US and a loss of two wagons burned but with 

Seminole losses unknown.

This developing whirlwind of increasing violence resulted in 

Brigadier General Clinch’s plan to use military force to influence 

Seminole cooperation. Under pressure from Washington to enforce the 

treaty stipulations and the local Floridians’ calls for an end to the violence, 

Clinch sought to gather his available forces together and then to move on 

the larger Seminole homesteads.

Orders to March

On the 16 December in 1835, General Clinch sent orders to the 

commandant of Fort Brooke to send two companies of Regulars to link 

up with his assembled forces at Fort King near the Withlacoochie River. 

It was Captain Francis S. Belton who, as acting commandant, received 
32

General Clinch’s orders. The guidance received was to send the available 

two companies, which were Captain George Washington Gardiner’s C 

Company, 2d Artillery Regiment and Captain Upton Fraser’s B Company, 

3d Artillery Regiment. After these two companies were sent, the other two 

inbound from Key West were to follow.

Captain Belton deferred as long as he could for the reinforcements 

from Key West to arrive. Belton struggled to comply with the orders from 

his superior. However, as fort commandant, he had to keep the safety of 

the fort in mind as well as that of the civilians who had flocked to the 

fort during the growing violence. Also, as any professional soldier would, 

Belton preferred to wait for the entire reinforcement contingent to arrive 

so that four companies could be sent together through “Indian country” 

as the road to Fort King and the Withlacoochie from Fort Brooke went 

right through the heart of the Seminole Nation. However, General Clinch 

ordered reinforcements, with all haste, as soon as they were readied. 

Belton, in the age of slow courier-driven communications, had no way 

of knowing the exact circumstances of Fort King, though he did know the 

circumstances of Fort Brooke intimately as acting commandant. Equally 

so, General Clinch couldn’t know of the exact circumstances of Fort 

Brooke. General Clinch’s entire command in Florida was of 700 Regulars 

with a recently added muster of 150 militia “horse” or mounted infantry. 

This was due to the “shallow opinion...of the Seminoles” held by those in 

command and distant from the immediate violence. Recently, it could be 

heard from one Captain Gustavus Drane that he could take his entire 60-

man command through the Seminole Nation unscathed. Some were aware 

of the dangers and abilities of the Seminole, others were not, but some 

would be vindicated while others humbled in the coming days (Bemrose, 

32).

As Captain Belton wrestled with the decision of when to commence 

Captains Gardiner and Fraser and their companies on the march, a ship 

from Key West arrived. On it was B Company from the 4th Infantry 

Regiment under Major Francis Dade. Using the infantrymen from Major 

Dade’s detachment to round out the Artillery companies, Captain Belton 

decided he must follow orders. Against his own judgment, he ordered the 

march to commence on the 23rd of December, at dawn.

Each company had been bolstered to 50 “bayonets” (referring to 

enlisted men), plus seven officers and an attached medical officer, Assistant 

Surgeon Dr. John Gatlin. Captain Belton had also contracted the service 

of both a Seminole and an African-American translator to accompany the 

march. Though Captain Fraser was senior in captaincy to Captain Gardiner 
33

by a number of years, he gave command to Gardiner in light of Gardiner’s 

West Point appointment whereas Fraser was promoted from the ranks. It 

was at this point as the contingent was preparing to depart that Major Dade 

spoke up on behalf of a troubled but dutiful Captain Gardiner. Captain 

Gardiner’s wife was extremely ill at Fort Brooke’s infirmary. Major Dade 

offered to Captain Belton to lead the march in place of Gardiner to allow 

Gardiner to stay with his wife. Captain Belton acquiesced and that morning, 

Major Dade led the column out the gates of Fort Brooke and onto the road 

to Fort King while Captain Gardiner returned to his ill wife’s side. It was a 

momentous decision for Major Dade. Under no obligation to take part on 

a certainly dangerous mission, Major Dade offered his services to allow a 

fellow officer to remain with his sick wife. Before they left, Major Dade 

made it of utmost importance to take a cannon with them. Belton was able 

to assist them with one 6-pounder field piece, drawn by four oxen. This 

would be of critical importance in the coming battle.

Even with Major Dade’s selfless act of taking charge from Captain 

Gardiner to allow Gardiner to tend to personal affairs, fate would not leave 

Gardiner alone. On the second day of the march, news came to Fort Brooke 

that the oxen with the cannon had fallen behind and Major Dade requested 

Belton to do all he could to supply them the necessary team of draft 

horses to help the cannon retake the marching column. Simultaneously, 

a merchant schooner bound for Key West arrived and Captain Gardiner 

was able to secure passage on it for his ill wife to travel to Key West 

was immediate family resided that could care for her. Having his wife’s 

affairs taken care of, Captain Gardiner stubbornly and devoutly loyal to 

his men would not see them through enemy territory and suffer privations 

that he did not as well. He requested, permission from Belton to rejoin the 

column. Belton granted it, and both Gardiner and the cannon retook the 

column that evening. Upon arrival, Gardiner explained securing his wife’s 

departure to Key West thereby allowing him, “his earnest desire to be with 

his men” (Bemrose, 63). Seeing the situation as it was, Captain Gardiner 

acquiesced to Major Dade to maintain command of the column. Captain 

Gardiner only wanted to be restored to command of his C Company, 2d 

Artillery.

The March

The contingent departed Fort Brooke on the 23d of December and 

began their 125 mile march along the Fort King Road. They marched in 

two man columns with an advance guard and main body accompanying the 

cannon and wagon and a rear guard. Dade had pushed out flankers to the 

sides each day along the march. Under orders, they established breastworks 
34

of timber and logs at night for their bivouacs along with sentries and camp 

fires. Private Clark recalled hearing Seminoles every night from departure 

of Fort Brooke trailing them. At night they would hear Seminoles calling 

out and moving around but never saw any. The cannon and wagon slowed 

the rate of march and when they came across the river crossings such as 

the Hillsborough River, and later the most dangerous portion the Soldiers 

thought the Withlacoochie swampland, the cannon was an abysmal 

accompaniment. The bridges had been burned. This was assumed by the 

Soldiers to be the work of Seminoles but never proven. The Soldiers did 

not really care, all they knew is in the frigid winter weather they had to 

attach harness and ropes and haul the cannon through the river and up the 

embankments each time which was exhausting work. In fact, one soldier 

was so injured by this work that he was sent back, alone, to Fort Brooke 

due to his injuries. He did not report any assaults by Seminoles on him, 

they let him go. They were focused on Dade and the main force moving 

down the road. Likewise, by this time, the Seminole guide and all other 

civilians were gone save one Louis Pacheo who was the lone remaining 

translator and African-American slave.

Dawn broke on the 28th of December. The troops were judged to be 

within one day’s movement from Fort King. The journey was almost over 

without Seminole assault and now the terrain was opening up, vegetation 

was thinning, and the Soldiers could see further. The air was damp from 

the previous evening’s light rain. Rain had been plaguing them all along 

the march adding to the coolness of the average 70s to 50s Fahrenheit. As 

they moved north along Fort King Road, Major Dade promised the men, 

“I’ll give you three days for Christmas! Have a good heart, difficulties 

and dangers now over.” (Laumer, 179). This brought a cheer from among 

the men. As they moved down, nearing their objective, perhaps a false 

sense of security set over them because Dade did not order out skirmishers 

even as the land opened up. The claim was that the mounted force or those 

on the wagon could see farther than a skirmisher in the underbrush and 

that the underbrush would slow down the skirmishers and thus the entire 

command when they were so close. Major Dade kept all his command 

close and in marching order along the road. This was not the only instance 

of a lackadaisical approach to forced marches during this period in Florida. 

There were similar records of march with no scouts, no pickets, and arms 

unloaded until 50 miles into the march. The weather being cold, the march 

having started at dawn and it now between 0800 and 0900, the Soldiers 

had marched for roughly four hours already that morning. Major Dade 

allowed the men to button their overcoats over their shouldered arms in 

addition to their cartridge boxes and ammunition sacks to keep warm and 

keep the dampness out.
35

When they approached the Seminole positions, the US Army was 

organized in an advance guard of six enlisted men under the command 

of Second Lieutenant Robert Mudge. He was joined by Captain Fraser, 

Major Dade, and the translator Pacheo. This detachment led the main 

column by 200 yards and walked in single file. The main force followed 

in two-man columns led by Captain Gardiner with the wagon and cannon 

trailing this formation and directly in front of the rear guard under the 

charge of Second Lieutenant William Bassinger.

The Ambush

The Seminoles waited in ambush ahead in moccasins and skins, some 

in feathers and finery and many painted in blacks and reds. As they lay in 

the tall grass spread out along the west and north of the approaching US 

Army Soldiers with a pond bordering the east of the road, they waited to 

implement a plan that was supposedly a year in the making. The plan was 

two-pronged to deliver both a political strike and a military intimidation. 

They were to kill the Indian Affairs Agent while simultaneously striking 

a military blow by knocking out a vulnerable military unit, Dade’s 

command. Osceola said that Agent Thompson was “his friend, he would 

see to him” (Sprague, 90). Earlier, Agent Thompson had placed Osceola 

in chains for an unrecorded outrage and had forever darkened Osceola’s 

relations towards him. Osceola did what was necessary to be released and 

seem Thompson’s friend but merely waited to exact his revenge for his 

tainted honor.

Private Bemrose commented that he had observed the Seminoles 

watching the Soldiers train at Fort King previously, including the Soldiers’ 

“woodland drill” to “fight like the Indians” as well as the Soldiers’ 

marksmanship (Bemrose, 25). The strained relationship between AfricanAmericans and the United States in Florida due to slavery and race relations 

concerning the Seminole assistance did not help matters as claims were 

made of treachery by African-Americans running ahead and telling the 

Seminoles of the number of Dade’s command and their departure. Some 

even claim that Pacheo was a traitor as well, who at this point was Dade’s 

only Seminole-speaker.

Even at the most modest accounts, the Seminoles had assembled a few 

hundred warriors to meet Dade’s command. There were even reports of 

upwards of one hundred mounted Seminoles present. The site chosen was 

not the first choice. The original intention had been to attack the Soldiers 

three days earlier, but the gathered Seminoles were without major tribal 

leadership at that time, neither Micanopy or Osceola were present. When 
36

Micanopy arrived, he had argued for delay until Osceola could join but 

Osceola would not, as he was intent to strike at Agent Thompson. Jumper, 

one of Micanopy’s junior assisting war chiefs with Alligator, chastised 

Micanopy’s lack of initiative and was worried the favorable time would 

pass. Jumper addressed those present and told those who were faint hearted 

to remain behind but he would go forward. He called Micanopy out in 

front of the assembled warriors and Micanopy agreed to go forward with 

the ambush of Dade’s men.

They chose the site as the last favorable location before the Soldiers 

would be too close to Fort King and also too far from the swampland. The 

swamps were the unchallenged territory of the Seminoles. They knew it 

well and they knew the Soldiers could not effectively operate in it. They 

lay in the tall grass no more than 30 yards from the edge of the road as the 

advance guard approached, followed by the rest of the column.

Up until the last possible moment, Micanopy is said to have hesitated 

until his two subordinate chiefs and known warriors, Jumper and Alligator, 

told him in no uncertain terms that he was either with them or against 

them. To this, Micanopy reportedly replied, “I will show you.” (George 

A. McCall, Letters from the Frontiers, Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott 

and Company, 1868, 303-304). Micanopy rose and as per the signal for 

the first volley, fired. He shot the mounted Major Dade. The postmortem 

wound would indicate that he was shot through the heart. Micanopy said 

he knew Dade from when he had befriended him in Tampa and it would be 

he who would kill him. Strikingly similar to what Osceola said concerning 

his personal targeting of Agent Thompson.

Accounts differ slightly on the time of the first volley but it is certainly 

between 0800 and 0900. Clark said he distinctly heard a single first shot 

and before he or anyone could react to it there came fire “as if from a 

thousand rifles” along the entire formation from forward (the north) and 

from the left (the west) (Account of Ransom Clark, as reprinted in Laumer, 

236). The first volley was highly destructive, taking out half of all the 

Soldiers. The entire advance guard was killed immediately as their bodies 

were found where they fell right in the road in marching order with the 

exception of Captain Fraser who had crawled a little ways to lean against 

a tree on the side of the road before dying and Second Lieutenant Mudge 

who would crawl back to the main force and die alongside them. Brevet 

Second Lieutenant John Keyes had both his arms broken in the first volley 

and unresponsively sat out the rest of the battle until he was killed where 

he leaned against a tree. Another lieutenant, Richard Henderson, was shot 

through the arm in the initial volley with the main body.
37

The Seminoles would have fired, let out a war-whoop starting as a 

guttural growl and ending in a high-pitched yell, adding to the din of the 

combat after each time they fired. As was described by one Seminole War 

veteran, “the crack of rifles was one incessant peal of sharp... bells to 

which the loud report of musketry and the booming of the artillery formed 

a fitting, though fearful accompaniment.” (McCall, 305). In addition, it 

was reported that over the woods ringing with war-whoops, could be heard 

Captain Gardiner’s boisterous commands.

Private Clark wrote that for the first seven or more volleys from the 

woods, he did not even see a Seminole. When he did start seeing them, he 

fired only at identified targets and these were merely heads and shoulders 

which was all he could see in the tall grass or around trees.

When the first assault turned into a regular engagement, the Seminoles 

fought in widely scattered groups in a semi-circle covering west to north. 

The pond was on the east and to the south was the road back to dense 

vegetation. The mounted Seminoles remained aloof from the fighting, 

arrayed to the north to cut off any fleeing Soldiers towards Fort King.

It can be imagined that the Soldiers were exhausted and sore from 

five days of marching and fording rivers with the cannon. They were 

cold and shivering from the drizzling rain and winter weather and had 

psychologically lowered their guard as well as physically and were 

stunned in the initial moments of the ambush. Half of their forces were 

knocked out with half of the officers, including their commander, killed 

immediately. Having come so far to Fort King to be attacked now with the 

entire advance guard wiped out and no word or sign from them and only 

200 yards away, must have been demoralizing. They must have struggled 

to unbutton overcoats in order to bring muskets to bear, rifling through 

cartridge sacks if a red-legged infantryman or a cartridge box if one of 

the few true-blue infantrymen. The immediate cacophony of Seminole 

whooping, the rifle and soon musket fire and the cries of wounded and 

bellowing commands of Captain Gardiner, made for a shocking departure 

from the seconds previous silence. Soon the cannon was unlimbered and 

added its booming to the fight under the command of Lieutenant Bassinger 

as directed by Captain Gardiner.

The Soldiers Rally

The Soldiers dispersed to fight as light infantry, each behind a 

tree returning individual fire. This would not be a linear rank-and-file 

coordinated volley battle by the seriously reduced US Army forces. The 

Seminoles were firing in the manner that later veterans of the Seminole 
38

War would recognize, at a crouch from behind a tree or on the ground. 

Lieutenant Bassinger placed the six-pounder into action, firing grapeshot 

in the general direction of the Seminole fire. The men who manned the 

cannon were shot down as soon as the smoke cleared from the last round 

fired. Seminole accounts mention their specific targeting of the artillerymen 

around the cannon as does the narrative of the surviving US soldier, Private 

Clark (Sprague, 91 and Account of Ransom Clark, as reprinted in Laumer, 

236). Mixed with the grapeshot were solid shots, however, these solid shot 

cannon balls soared over the heads of the Seminoles, most likely due to 

the immediacy of the cannon’s utilization, giving the artillerymen no time 

to lay aiming lines or judge distance but just immediately putting it to 

work. The booming certainly had an effect, even if the solid shot went 

over the Seminoles’ heads. The artillerymen were at their best manning the 

six-pounder while others along with the infantrymen kept up a musketry 

fire. As one artilleryman at the cannon fell, another took his place. The 

cannon’s position was the most exposed with Lieutenant Bassinger by its 

side directing its fire while Captain Gardiner rallied the scattered men. 

The grapeshot fire from the cannon, the small containers full of small 

balls meant to spread out like a shotgun blast, was certainly more effective 

against the scattered Seminoles. By the time the Seminoles began to fall 

back from the road, the cannon reportedly fired five to six rounds.

After about an hour of fighting the Seminoles had enough of the 

cannon and the stubborn fire of the remaining bluecoats and fell back about 

a half a mile, having fired 12 to 15 volleys from Private Clark’s account 

(Account of Ransom Clark, as reprinted in Laumer, 236). The cannon had 

bought the small band of Army Regulars a respite.

Captain Gardiner did not waste a minute of this respite. He ordered the 

scattered wounded to be brought to the cannon’s position where others were 

ordered to begin felling some young trees to make a hasty breastwork, a 

logged redoubt anchored by the cannon. Others began scrounging among 

the dead and wounded for more ammunition. The breastworks were formed 

into interlocking layers making a triangle. These breastworks were about 

two and a half feet tall. There were barely over 30 Soldiers left at this point 

as Captain Gardiner organized a last stand defense. His defense was based 

around the cannon, which anchored the north point of the redoubt. The 

Soldiers manned the west and north legs of the triangle works as the east 

faced the pond and they took no fire from Seminoles from that direction. 

The wounded were brought into the works and Dr. Gatlin did what he 

could, but the hard-won respite would not last long.
39

Gardiner decided he had no choice but to stay. The wounded had 

no transport, the cannon which was what was keeping the Seminoles at 

bay, was not maneuverable in the least and the only way back was a long 

multi-day retreat to Fort Brooke. He determined they could not break out 

towards Fort King and could not survive if they dispersed in the open area 

and in view of mounted Seminoles. No, they had to stay and fight with the 

wounded and the cannon. Maybe, Gardiner thought, the Seminoles would 

retreat and leave the survivors alone and Gardiner, without immediate 

pressure, could find away to transport the wounded or at least get a runner 

to Fort King or back to Fort Brooke. A professional like Gardiner knew 

what he had to do, knew his duty to his men, and knew what had brought 

him here from his ill wife’s side. They all would stay with the wounded 

and the cannon.

Final Assault

The Seminoles regrouped a half mile away from the Soldiers’ final 

stand. There the chiefs received reports of the breastwork going up. Chiefs 

Jumper and Alligator sought to return to finish off the remaining Soldiers. 

The others, not mentioned but certainly including Micanopy, refused. It 

took derision and insults from the two warrior chiefs to get the Seminoles 

to go back, “asking them if they were drunk, sick or women to be afraid of 

a few white men.” (M.M.Cohen, Notices of Florida and the Campaigns. 

Charleston, S.C.: Burges and Honour, 1836, 77).

In less than 45 minutes, the Soldiers saw the Seminoles begin advancing 

again. They were in open order until within range and once the cannon and 

the muskets began firing, the Seminoles scattered, moving and fighting 

from tree to tree to avoid the cannon fire. This diluted the deadly effect 

of the cannon fire but the cannon still roared. The Seminoles purposefully 

targeted the men manning the cannon in between the smoke from the 

firing. Bodies began to pile up alongside the gun as men worked over the 

fallen forms of their comrades to keep the cannon going. Alligator, in his 

sole Seminole account of the fighting, recalled that “The Soldiers shouted 

and whooped and the officers shook their swords and swore loudly.” He 

distinctly recalled, “There was a little man, a great brave, who shook his 

sword at the Soldiers and said, ‘god-dam!’ no rifle-ball could hit him.” 

(Sprague, 91). This likely was Captain Gardiner who stayed in the center 

of the works controlling the Soldiers while Second Lieutenant Bassinger 

manned the cannon. Wounded Second Lieutenant Henderson, with one 

good arm, fired from inside the works until it was felled by the Seminoles, 

firing a reported 30 to 40 rounds before dying.
40

The Seminoles began spreading out, forcing the few scattered Soldiers 

like Private Clark who had been skirmishing out behind trees into the 

breastworks. Clark claims to have shot three Seminoles alone, and fired 

40 to 50 rounds never failing to properly identify his target (Account of 

Ransom Clark, as reprinted in Laumer, 237). No matter the effort made by 

the Soldiers, the Seminoles were closing the noose. The Soldiers kept up 

a brisk fire punctuated by the cannon. However, the cannon only had 50 

rounds and fast expending them along with the growing casualties around, 

exposed its position. 

At least the breastworks provided some measure of protection. The 

Soldiers killed in the redoubt were from shots to the head and neck and 

countless rifle balls were found lodged in the breastworks. Then Captain 

Gardiner, the “great brave” that “no rifle-ball could hit” was struck mortally. 

He fell in the center of the redoubt he had commanded constructed to 

protect his wounded men. He cried out, “I can give you no more orders, 

my lads, do your best.” (Woodburne Potter, The War in Florida. Baltimore, 

MD: Lewis and Coleman, 1836, 105) Once Captain Gardiner died, the 

only remaining combat arms officer remaining was Lieutenant Bassinger 

and he was already wounded. He said, “I am the only officer left, boys. 

We must do the best we can.” (Account of Ransom Clark, as reprinted 

in Laumer, 239). The cannon had fired 49 of its fifty rounds, the final 

round was loaded but went unfired. The Soldiers were out of ammunition. 

Dr. Gatlin leaning on the works with his double-barreled shotguns where 

he would die said, “Well, I have got four barrels for them!” (Account of 

Ransom Clark, as reprinted in Laumer, 239). 

As the Seminoles approached for the final push with the now silent 

cannon and empty muskets, Lieutenant Bassinger, the only remaining 

officer, told Clark “to feign myself dead” (Sprague, 91) saving Clark’s life. 

Clark claims the firing lasted from 0800 to 1400 with the 45 minute lull 

after the first hour of fighting. Before the approaching Seminole’s entered, 

Clark recorded one short stout one give a short speech. This must have 

been Micanopy gloating over the dead Soldiers, as certainly the Seminoles 

upon their approach, figured there were no survivors. The Seminoles 

found no ammunition in any of the Soldiers’ packs. One wounded soldier 

seized a Seminole’s rifle, wrenched it from his hands and killed him with 

a blow to his head and then ran, only to be chased down by two mounted 

Seminoles, who perhaps afraid to face such a frenzied soldier, shot him 

from afar.

Clark recalled that the Seminoles did not desecrate the dead. They 

merely picked over the weapons and equipment and took scalps. However, 
41

once the Seminoles left a band of their African-American followers (about 

50) they began looting and killing the remaining wounded. As they came, 

a Soldier tried to run but was shot by a Seminole from behind a tree. With 

the killing going on Lieutenant Bassinger, still alive, rose and offered his 

sword and pleaded for a stop to the killing. He was struck down.

The battle was over. Three Soldiers survived to try and make their 

way back to Fort Brooke, even though closer, none wanted to follow the 

departing Seminoles and their African-American partners north towards 

Fort King. Private Clark was wounded five times: in the right shoulder, 

in the right thigh, in the right temple, his back, and in an arm. He could 

not walk and had to crawl his way back to Fort Brooke. He started off 

with another survivor but on the first day on the road back to Fort Brooke, 

they came across a mounted Seminole and split up. The Seminole pursued 

the other survivor and killed him. Failing to find Clark, he left and Clark 

continued on alone. Three days later, Clark arrived at Fort Brooke and 

when treated for his wounds, was “swearing most terribly and continually 

whilst under the surgeon’s hands... when any bones were removed... 

asking if they would make good soup.” (Bemrose, 65).

Clark would later write an account of the battle and his ordeal. The 

other survivor, Private Joseph Sprague, left no written record after making 

it back on 1 January, 1836 to Fort Brooke. On 29 December, Private John 

Thomas, the one with the injured back from moving the cannon across the 

river, made it back to the fort with no knowledge of the fighting. Together, 

these three would be the only soldier survivors of Dade’s command. 

The translator-slave Louis Pacheo survived the fight, was spared by the 

Seminoles and kept by them. It’s not known whether this was willingly or 

not. Years after the fact, Pacheo would leave a written account of the fight 

as well. Together with Alligator’s Seminole account, these three make up 

the only eye witness accounts of the battle.

Only three enlisted Soldiers survived of Major Dade’s “bayonets”, 

one of which was not even present at the fight. No officers lived but the 

one translator did, accounting for 105 US Army deaths. Of the Seminoles, 

Alligator’s account claimed only three Seminoles were killed and five 

wounded, this low estimate interestingly matches the exact same report 

given by the Seminoles as their record of losses at another large-scale 

battle, that of the Battle of Withlacoochie which would take place only a 

few days later. When Osceola first heard the report of the attack on Dade’s 

column he was informed that the Seminoles had killed 200 whites for a 

loss of 100 Seminoles and had captured “a big gun”, fought “all day”. 

(Cohen, 77). It had been a blood-red day (see Table Two).
42

The Aftermath

It would not be until 20 February 1836 that blue-clad Soldiers would 

see the site of Dade’s last stand. These Regulars were from New Orleans 

under the command of General Edmund Pendleton Gaines coming to 

aid General Clinch. Though it had been nearly 60 days, the battlefield 

remained untouched, the Soldiers remained where they fell, aligned to the 

north and west facing their enemy, many in the road where they fell after 

the first volley, including the advance party. The first signs of struggle were 

seen 100 yards to the east of the works as the column approached. When 

they neared the incomplete breastworks one officer said, “The picture of 

those brave men lying thus in their ‘sky-blue’ clothing... was such as can 

never be effaced from my memory.” (Sprague, 108). All the bodies in the 

breastworks were found kneeling or lying with their heads resting on the 

timbers. The fellow officers identified their fallen peers and friends. The 

fallen remained at right angles to the works, “as if they had been toySoldiers arranged by a child.” (McCall, Letters from the Frontiers, 306)

Graves were dug and the remains were separated by rank of officers, 

NCOs, and enlisted. The cannon, retrieved from where it had been dumped 

in the nearby pond, was placed upside down on top of the officers’ grave as 

what was seen to be a short-term memorial. The 4th Infantry Regimental 

Band of Major Dade’s former unit, led the procession followed by the 

officer who had known the deceased and then in a two-man column, was 

the rest of General Gaines’ command. They made three circuits around the 

small gravesite dug in the middle of where the interned had made their 

final stand and arms were reversed. Then it was over and the Army moved 

on to the dirty business of a new war.
43

Part III. Suggested Stands (Sites) to Visit

Introduction

The Dade Battle staff ride is composed of nine suggested stands to 

support a comprehensive study and analysis of the battle. However, to 

adjust for available time considerations and additional starting locations, 

a seven-stand option is available as well and is entirely contained at the 

site of the battlefield. The full nine suggested stands incorporate the entire 

march of Dade’s command from the site of Fort Brooke on Tampa Bay 

(current site of the Cotanchobee/Fort Brooke Park) along modern US 

301 (old Fort King Road), a stop addressing fording the Hillsborough 

River, and ending at the site of the battle. This involves additional driving 

compared to the seven-stand option but provides the most complete 

overview and experience of Dade’s Battle. The seven-stand option 

involves one vehicular movement to the site of the battle. Once here, a 

simple overview of the campaign should be added to Stand three (the 

first stand on the actual battle site) with no other additional changes. By 

necessity, the seven-stand option removes certain operational aspects of 

the staff ride and lessens terrain analysis, specifically the river crossings 

and their entailed vulnerabilities.
44

Stand One

Fort Brooke and Decision to March: Overview
45

Directions: Stand One is at the Fort Brooke Plaque in the Cotanchobee/

Fort Brooke Park located at 801 Old Water Street, Tampa FL, 33602 near 

the site of the current Tampa Bay History Center. Both the Tampa Bay 

History Center and the nearby Tampa Marriot Waterside Hotel have areas 

for bus drop off. In addition, there is parking available at the historic center 

as well as across the street at the Tampa Bay Times Forum. On the west 

side of the park near the hotel, is a Fort Brooke Plaque in the walkway. 

Conduct the stand near the plaque. 

Visual Aids: Historical Map 1: Fort Brooke, Historical Map 2: Area of 

Dade’s March.

Orientation: The Cotanchobee/Fort Brooke Park runs along the Tampa 

Bay riverfront and between the Tampa Bay History Center and the Tampa 

Marriot Waterside Hotel. To the south is the waterway and to the east is 

a bridge to Harbor Island. Directly west of the plaque there is the Tampa 

Marriot Waterside Hotel and another bridge crossing the waterway. There 

are no remains of the original Fort Brooke at the site. In the 1830s, Fort 

Brooke comprised what is now the park along with the Tampa Bay History 

Center and the Tampa Marriot Waterside Hotel along the waterfront. 

The fort was composed of barracks for officers and enlisted personnel, 

a set of storehouses, livestock stables, a small hospital, a kitchen, and a 

guardhouse. The fort did not possess a palisade or defensive walls until 
46

there was an immediate threat and then palisades were cut and placed. 

These were removed once the threat had passed and stored until the threat 

returned when they were placed again. Likewise, when threatened, ditches 

were dug around the perimeter and stakes were placed in the ditches to 

keep attackers from the edges of the palisades. The ditches were filled with 

hay or straw to hide the stakes. Similar to the palisades, these defensive 

trenches were filled in and re-dug based on the perceived threat to the fort.

Description: The entire struggle of Major Dade’s column with the 

Seminoles on the Fort King Road can be traced to Brigadier General 

Clinch’s order to Fort Brooke’s acting commandant, Captain Belton, to 

send to him four companies at Fort King. General Clinch’s insistence that 

it was to be done with all due haste—two companies at a time since Fort 

Brooke had not received its second pair of companies yet—emphasized 

this need for speed. Due to the nature of the communications of the period, 

Brigadier General Clinch was in the dark as to the current situation at Fort 

Brooke and equally so was Captain Belton to that of Clinch at Fort King. 

With the growing hostility, the two forts had not communicated via courier 

for crucial weeks in which time relations between the Seminoles and the 

United States were deteriorating exponentially.

Brigadier General Clinch wanted the reinforcements, essentially his 

entire US Army Regulars, together for his proposed pre-emptive offensive 

to end the growing Seminole violence and resistance to the enforcement 

of the movement treaties. It is always far clearer to look in retrospection 

on critical decisions. With the information on hand, General Clinch knew 

he had growing physical discontent with the Seminoles and he wanted 

to strike at a center of gravity of the Seminoles, a large hamlet near the 

Withlacoochie, and doing so demanded that he concentrate his available 

means.

According to General Clinch’s plan, with the reinforcements from 

Fort Brooke, his combined Regulars, and newly added short-term Florida 

militia volunteers would apply the necessary pressure through coercion 

on the Seminoles’ linchpin of their hamlets and force them to end the 

violence and abide by the accelerated treaty stipulations. Thus, General 

Clinch would have ended the Second Seminole War before it began, or so 

he desired and planned. The Seminoles had other plans in mind, plans that 

they had been refining, coordinating, and patiently waiting to execute for 

nearly a year. 

As an officer in the United States Army and a graduate of the military 

academy at West Point, Captain Belton did not truly have much of a 
47

choice professionally not to obey his superior’s lawful order. Captain 

Belton noted his own concerns with the order he received on 16 December 

1835 ordering him to strip his post of the Regulars and send them through 

enemy territory to reinforce the commander’s expedition. Balancing the 

immediate responsibility to the defense of his post as acting commandant 

of the fort with the responsibility and loyalty to his commanding officer, 

General Clinch, Captain Belton delayed. Captain Belton was faced with 

a “not if but when” question to dispatch Captain Gardiner and Captain 

Fraser’s companies on the road to Fort King. Knowing the dangers and 

the growing violence of the Seminoles, holding the security of the fort as 

preeminent, feeling the pressure as each day passed after 16 December, 

not knowing the security situation at Fort King, Captain Belton delayed 

for as long as he reasoned was ethically allowed. Reinforcements came 

from Key West, not the other two companies of which Captain Belton 

wanted but a portion, a detachment under Major Dade.

Captain Belton had wanted to send all four companies to General 

Clinch at once. Major Dade’s detachment’s arrival from Key West was the 

trigger point and with a filled-out roster of two companies, Captain Belton 

ordered the detachment to march in compliance with the orders of General 

Clinch on 23 December 1835. Captain Belton intimately faced one of the 

costs of command. In the end, it was his decision, watching those sky 

blue-clad Soldiers marching out the gates of Fort Brooke, which directly 

affected the lives of his Soldiers.

Vignette: A letter from Lieutenant George McCall describing Fort Brooke 

soon after its founding in 1824:

“My dear Father: We have now been established here, I may say, 

about a month. We are encamped on a point of elevated land lying 

between the mouth of Hillsborough River and the bay of that 

name—near its head. Our camp extends under a canopy of the 

most superb trees I ever beheld; and as the temperature is from 

75° to 80° Fahrenheit, you may readily conceive how delightful 

is the noontide shade they afford. These giant live-oaks throw out 

their huge limbs at a distance of six to ten feet from the ground; 

these enormous limbs, as large as the trunks of common trees, 

extend in an almost horizontal direction for ten or fifteen feet, 

then spreading and rising to the height of fifty or sixty feet, form 

a dense round head that is a perfect parasol. Their great limbs and 

their smaller branches are hung with long pendants of the Spanish 

moss, and with festoons of the yellow jasmine which has been 

in bloom, with clusters of bright yellow flowers, ever since we 
48

have been here. The progress of the work is quite satisfactory. The 

walls of the men’s barracks are already eight or nine feet high; 

they will be about twelve feet, to give the free circulation of air so 

essential in a hot climate. These buildings are of pine logs, and are 

raised by notching the logs down, one upon another. The quarters 

for the officers will not be commenced until the barracks for the 

men are roofed in and floored.” (McCall, 133).

Analysis: 

1. Having heard the threats and knowing of the growing violence and 

the dangers posed to traveling through the Seminole Nation; did General 

Clinch make a sound military decision with the information on hand? 

Why or why not?

2. Were Captain Belton’s actions appropriate to delay as long as he 

thought possible and in the end send two companies as ordered though he 

personally disagreed with the order?

3. What role, if any, did the US Army leaderships’ perception of the 

Seminoles’ influence the decision to send minimal force among a noted 

larger gathering of potentially hostile enemy? How is this similar to our 

modern military’s perceptions of other cultures and its influence on our 

military decision making?
49

Stand Two

Hillsborough River Crossing and Fort Foster
50

Directions: From Stand One, travel north on Old Water Street toward 

Channelside Drive (.1 miles) and turn slightly left on East Brorein Street 

(.1 miles). Continue veering slightly left to enter Selmon Expressway 

Toll East ramp towards Brandon. Continue on Selmon Expressway/State 

Route-618-TOLL-E (portions toll) for 3.2 miles to Exit 11 US-41 North. 

Then turn left on South 50th Street/US-41/State Route-599 for 1.2 miles. 

Merge onto Interstate-4 East toward Orlando for 2.6 miles. Take Exit 7 

towards US-301 North/ Zephyrhills/ US-92 East/ Vandenberg Airport 

for .9 miles then merge onto US-301 North towards Zephyrhills for 14.3 

miles. The Hillsborough River State Park Visitor Center will be on the 

left of US-301. The address is 15402 North US Highway 301. The visitor 

center is on the left (west) of Highway 301 but the actual stand site is to 

the right (east) of the highway. Make sure to coordinate with the staff at 

the visitor center prior to your staff ride to be able to go to the stand site. 

On the day of the ride, you will need to make a right off Highway 301 on 

Ranch Road and after only about 40 yards, make a left on to a dirt road. 

Follow the road to the end where it stops at Fort Foster (a reconstructed 

fort). The original fort was not built until after the Dade Campaign, thus 

the stand should focus on the river crossing just north of the fort. Although 

the fort is not part of this campaign, you can arrange for a tour with the 

park rangers if time permits. 
51

Visual Aid: Historical Map 2: Area of Dade’s March.

Orientation: The Hillsborough River is to the north, one of the major 

waterways forded by the march since the bridges had been destroyed. 

Fort Foster was constructed later in the Second Seminole War but marks 

an important crossing point on the Fort King Road. This was part of the 

Seminole Nation at the start of the war. In the winter months of the 1830s, 

the Hillsborough River depth was waist deep. The riverbank heights were 

gently sloping. Even so, to get the wagon and the gun across the ford due 

to the burned bridge required a system of ropes and pulleys with brute 

manpower hauling the equipment across the water and up the banks. 

(Laumer, 98-99).

Description: One of Major Dade’s security measures before he undertook 

the march to Fort King was the addition of a six-pound artillery piece to 

the two companies of Soldiers. A few years prior, Major Dade had chosen 

speed for security when he had made a similar march along a similar 

route to reinforce the forces to the north of Fort Brooke during a flare 

up of hostility. His command had made it safely without contest. This 

time he assessed a different situation and demand a cannon accompany 

his command, choosing firepower over speed as security for this march to 

Fort King.

The command was no more than a few hours from Fort Brooke 

when the cannon’s draft team of oxen stopped cold and refused to go on. 

Highlighting the importance Major Dade placed on the cannon, he only 

went a few hours march farther from the cannon to the river crossing and 

stopped, sending an imploring letter back via courier to Captain Belton at 

Fort Brooke asking for a new team of draft animals be bought to help bring 

the cannon back to the column. Belton would come through for Dade, 

his own concerns for the security of the column inspiring him to get the 

necessary animals and supplies together, resulting in the cannon’s return 

to the Dade’s command that night.

On Christmas of 1835, Dade’s command neared the crossing of 

Hillsborough River. The bridges had been burned and were only partially 

intact. There was not enough of the bridge left to get the wagon and the 

cannon across. They would have to ford the river. This was the moment 

the Soldiers thought most vulnerable, their forces split, some on one side, 

some crossing, and others waiting on the south bank. The cannon, wagon, 

and caisson had to be manually hauled across the cool river in winter and 

with ropes pulled up the bank on the other side back to the road. It was 

back-breaking work, literally, for one Private Thompson who injured his 
52

back would be sent back to Fort Brooke on foot alone after Dr. Gatlin 

determined there was nothing to do for him and he would be of no use in a 

fight in such pain. The burned bridge was a sure sign of Seminole activity 

and it, along with the draft animals for the addition of the cannon, added 

to the delays and cost the Army command time.

Vignette: None

Analysis: 

1. Was Major Dade’s decision sound to rely on firepower over speed 

for security and thus bring an artillery piece along though it significantly 

delayed his movements most notably at the fording of the Withlachoochie? 

These are perennial considerations for any movement conducted through 

enemy territory, speed or firepower.

2. Was the US Army correct in determining the river crossings along 

the Fort King Road were the most dangerous points on the march? If not, 

why would the Soldiers have come to such a conclusion? If so, were the 

Seminoles mistaken in not attacking until after the river crossings?

3. How are the route limitations that Major Dade incurred through 

bringing along a wagon and cannon similar to those faced by the US Army 

in modern conflicts with irregular opponents in difficult terrain? 
53

Stand Three

Fort King Road
54
55

Directions: To Stand Three from Stand Two, start north on US-301 for 

37 miles. Turn left on Seminole Avenue/CR 476 West, signs for Dade 

Battlefield Historic State Park will begin. Take a left on Battlefield Drive 

and continue until it turns into County Road 603. Address for the park is 

7200 County Road 603, Bushnell, FL 33513.

From Tampa directly to Stand Three, take 1-75 North towards Ocala 

for 40 miles. Take Exit 314 State Route-48, towards Bushnell. Keep right 

to take ramp towards Bushnell and slight right onto State Route-48. You 

will make a right onto Battlefield Drive/County Road-603 and continue to 

the park entrance approximately one mile.

Visual Aid: Historical Map 2: Area of Dade’s March.

Orientation: The first parking lot to the right is for large vehicles and 

another additional parking lot is next to the Visitor’s Center for smaller 

vehicles. Stand Three is just south of the recreated breastworks and the 

Visitor’s Center on the small path, which is the remains of the original Fort 

King Road. It is approximately 15 meters east of the paved trail in front of 

the Visitor’s Center. It is recommended to go to the Visitor’s Center after 

the staff ride to look at exhibits there. The main path through the park is the 

remains of the original Fort King Road. The road from Fort Brooke to Fort 

King was 125 miles long, built in early 1828. It was cut through the forest 

and swamps by a combination of Soldier manual labor as well as that of 

local Florida settlers’ slave labor. For most of the route, the underbrush 

came right up to the edges of the road and continually encroached on the 

road. With the road wide enough for one wagon or two mounted horses, 

about 20 feet, the Soldiers marched in columns of two. The ground was 

not even as the road had been cut through thick vegetation leaving many 

stumps and holes. The path itself was extremely sandy causing struggles 

for wagons and especially heavy items such as cannon and caisson. It has 

smoothed over with time and is more packed compared to the historical 

road. In addition, the surrounding grounds are more cleared out and open 

than before. A look to the natural preservation area to the east of the park/

road will reveal more of the natural terrain closer to what it would have 

been like at the time of the battle. Towards the northern end of the park and 

road are white pillars scattered along the road. These are markers erected 

in remembrance of the fallen officers of the advance party and the initial 

attack. They are approximately where the bodies fell.

Description: The road expedited movement through the thick vegetation 

that surrounded the area. With the wagon supplies and the cannon and 

caisson, the Soldiers had no choice but to take this one road through the 
56

Seminole Nation. The road connected the two primary US Army posts in 

north-central Florida and was well traveled by companies moving back 

and forth and courier travel in times of peace. During the march itself, the 

command was broken up into three distinct groups as they moved along 

the Fort King Road.

There was an advance guard made up of a squad of Soldiers, eight 

Soldiers on day of battle, marching in columns and this was generally 

led by two officers, a lieutenant and one of the captains. Normally, Major 

Dade also accompanied the advance guard on his horse along with the 

translator as he did on the morning of the attack. Also on the day of the 

fight, Captain Fraser was with the advance guard. 

The second element was the main body and this was composed of 

the majority of the command to include the cannon and supply wagon 

and medical officer. The other captain and most of the remaining officers 

marched in columns here. On the day of the attack, Captain Gardiner was 

with the main body.

The final element was the rear guard. It was led by a lieutenant. The 

entire column was also supported by flankers, small groups of Soldiers 

sent out to the sides of the main body. However, these were pulled in once 

the terrain started to open up the day of the ambush. The entire column at 

times spanned over 300 meters with the advance guard at times over 200 

meters in front of the main body.

Vignette: None

Analysis: There is no specific analysis for the Fort King Road but it may 

be worth mentioning the terrain and maneuverability aspects relevant to 

the road’s role in the fight. If conducting the seven-stand option, this is 

the first stand and should include the Decision to March as found in Stand 

One above. 
57

Stand Four

Seminole Decision to Attack

Directions: From Stand Three, walk north along the Fort King Road 

approximately 200 yards and then turn east and walk off the path another 

30 yards until you reach the wire fence of the park’s border. 

Visual Aid: Historical Map 3: Initial Assault.

Orientation: Facing west is the road on which the US Army Soldiers 

marched north, behind the stand to the east, was the large pond. To the 

east and south were the swampland and more dense growth with scattered 

ponds. Further south were the previously forded rivers. North about 40 

miles was Fort King, the Soldiers’ destination. This stand is not on the site 

of the Seminole camp where they made the decision to attack; rather this 

stand is on the general location of the Seminole battle lines. The decision 

to attack was made the night before the battle, several miles south of this 

location. 
58

Description: Having received the culturally required higher Seminole 

Nation leadership in the form of Micanopy, the Seminoles were ready to 

execute their ambush on the night of the 27 December, 1835. A portion 

of the Seminole forces had been trailing the marching Soldiers since they 

departed Fort Brooke on 23 December. The Seminoles had wished to 

strike at the Soldiers three days earlier and deeper into the tangled dense 

underbrush near one of the more dangerous crossing points over a river 

but they had needed a senior chief’s presence. With the arrival of Chief 

Micanopy, they decided they did not need to wait for Osceola’s presence 

as he was already involved in his strike against Agent Thompson at Fort 

King. Still, Micanopy hesitated and preached caution and inaction. The 

junior chiefs, Alligator and Jumper, upbraided him and challenged him 

to action. He characteristically succumbed to their manipulation and 

pressure. 

They chose an open dry portion of the Fort King Road just beyond 

the final river crossing for Major Dade’s column and just before the end 

of the swampland. The Seminoles, afraid that the chance would pass 

the closer the Soldiers came to Fort King and further from the swamp, 

chose land that benefited the maneuverability of the mounted Seminole 

force and gave the ambushed Soldiers limited cover to break contact. The 

presence of underbrush played to Seminole concealment for the ambush. 

The limited scattered pines gave the Seminoles the degree of cover they 

needed from the solitary cannon and musket fire of the Soldiers. They 

initiated the ambush at such a place as to pin one flank of the Soldiers 

against a large body of water in a pond, block further forward progress 

with an unengaged mounted force, leaving the Soldiers but two areas to 

maneuver, into the Seminole dismounted fire or retrograde back into the 

dense swampland. This same swampland on the edge of the engagement 

also provided the Seminoles with a sanctuary to retreat.

Ambushes and raids are not purely the purview of the small guerillaband type of soldiery. However, by necessity, they excel at it or else they 

would not survive against a stronger force.

Vignette: In the single Seminole record of the attack, one of the main 

chiefs recounts their decision making:

Here we thought it best to assail them and should we be defeated, 

the Swamp would be safe place of retreat. Our scouts were out 

from the time the Soldiers left the post and reported each night their 

place of encampment. It was our intention to attack them on the 

third night but the absence of Oseola [sic] and Micanopy presented 
59

it. On the arrival of the latter, it was agreed not to wait for Oseola, 

as the favorable moment would pass. Micanopy was timid and 

urged delay. Jumper earnestly opposed it and reproached the old 

chief for his indecision. He addressed the Indians and requested 

those who had faint hearts to remain behind he was going, when 

Micanopy said he was ready... we moved out of the swamp into 

the pine-barren... Upon approaching the road, each man chose his 

position on the west side; opposite, on the east side, there was a 

pond. Every warrior was protected by a tree or secreted in the high 

palmettos. (Account of Alligator as told to Captain John Sprague 

in Sprague, 90).

Analysis: 

1. Was the Seminoles’ site selection criteria sound for an ambush? 

Why or why not? 

2. How does the site selection for the actual compare to the potential 

ambush site at the Hillsborough River crossing?

3. Was this action a risk or a gamble for the Seminoles? In the course 

of this analysis, get the students to define risk and gamble. You can also 

discuss the concept of mitigation of risk. 

4. What are the modern principles of a successful ambush and did the 

Seminole ambush meet them?
60

Stand Five

Ambush and Major Dade’s Death

Directions: From Stand Four, return to the Fort King Road and move 

north 20 yards. Do the stand here on Fort King Road. 

Visual Aid: Historical Map 3: Initial Assault.

Orientation: From here to the south approximately 200 yards was the 

main body of Soldiers. Beyond that were the wagon and cannon followed 

by the rear guard. To the north and the west were scattered Seminoles with 

the large pond to the east. The markers are erected at the historical sites 

where the advance guard’s officers were shot.
61

Description: The US Army Regulars broke camp at about 0500 hours on 

28 December 1835 and began their march northward to Fort King in three 

groups: an advance party, main party with cannon and wagon, and a rear 

guard. They marched in columns of twos. Major Dade, Captain Fraser, 

and Lieutenant Mudge led the advance guard while Lieutenant Bassinger 

commanded the cannon team with Captain Gardiner in the main body. Dr. 

Gatlin was on the wagon, and the other lieutenants were scattered among 

the Soldiers of the main and rear guard. 

Each prior day, as they passed through the more dangerous grounds, 

the likely ambush sites, Major Dade posted flankers/skirmishers, and each 

night he took the extra precaution to order breastworks thrown up and 

sentries posted. After they passed the last of these suspected ambush sites 

at the river crossings and entered more open land, Major Dade recalled 

his flankers from moving in the underbrush of the open territory. He 

claimed the eye could see as well as the flankers could in the open lands 

and that the underbrush would slow the flankers’ movement and thus that 

of the column. With the cool, damp weather, Major Dade allowed his 

men to button their overcoats around their cartridge boxes and muskets, 

thus hindering any quick employment of these weapons. Premature 

announcements of coming celebration and enjoyments at the end of the 

march potentially distracted the vigilance of the column as they now had 

their mind’s eye on scenes of Christmas celebration and relaxation.

Only four hours march from the Soldiers’ last night’s camp, the 

Seminoles lay in wait 30 yards from the edge of the road, unseen by 

the Soldiers in the tall grass or behind the pine trees. With a war whoop 

from Jumper and the signal shot from Chief Micanopy, the ambush was 

initiated. Micanopy’s first shot rang out sometime between 0800 and 0900 

hours on the morning of 28 December. The Seminoles had waited until the 

entire US Army column had passed in front of them, between them and the 

pond. With the signal shot from Micanopy that struck down Major Dade, 

the entire Seminole line fired the initial deadly volley. The entire advance 

guard was killed where they were marching, as fire swept down the rest 

of the command, half of the Soldiers were out of the fight in the first 

volley fired by Seminoles extremely close to the close-ordered column 

marching Soldiers. All the officers were struck down, either wounded or 

killed, except for Captain Gardiner, Lieutenant Bassinger, and Dr. Gatlin. 

Both Lieutenant Keyes and Lieutenant Henderson would survive the first 

volley but of the two, only Henderson could continue fighting even with a 

severely wounded arm.
62

Vignette: Both of these vignettes – the two leading eyewitness accounts, 

one from Private Clark and the other from a Seminole chief Alligator – 

recount the critical opening volley and its destructive aftermath. Clark:

“Suddenly I heard a rifle shot in the direction of the advanced 

guard and this was immediately followed by a musket shot from 

that quarter. Captain Fraser had rode by me a moment before in 

that direction. I never saw him afterwards. I had not time to think 

of the meaning of these shots, before a volley, as if from a thousand 

rifles, poured in upon us from the front, and all along our left flank. 

I looked around me and it seemed as if I was the only one left 

standing in the right wing. Neither could I, until several vollies 

[sic] had been fired at us, see an enemy and when I did, I could 

only see their head and arms peering from the long grass, far and 

near, and from behind the pine trees. The ground seemed to me an 

open pine barren, no hammock near that I could see. On our right, 

and a little to our rear, was a large pond of water some distance 

off. All around us were heavy pine trees, very open, particularly 

towards the left, and abounding with long high grass. The first 

fire of the Indians was the most destructive, seemingly killing or 

disabling one half our men.” (Account of Private Ransom Clark as 

reproduced in Laumer, 236)

Alligator:

About nine o’clock in the morning the command approached. In 

advance some distance was an officer on a horse, who, Micanopy 

said, was the captain [Major Dade]; he knew him personally; had 

been his friend at Tampa. So soon all the Soldiers were opposite 

between us and the pond, perhaps 20 yards off, Jumper gave the 

whoop, Micanopy fired the first rifle, the signal agreed upon, 

when every Indian arose and fired, which laid upon the ground, 

dead, more than half the white men. (Account of Alligator as told 

to Cpt. John Sprague in Sprague, 90-91) 

Analysis: 

1. Historically, one of the most damning post facto judgments has 

been on Major Dade’s security the morning of the attack. Are these attacks 

justified? Could things have been different if flankers were employed 

or if the Soldiers had kept their muskets at the ready even in the damp 

conditions?

2. Could any options available to Major Dade at the time have averted 

this defeat or was the Seminole plan too much to overcome?
63

3. What were the effects, if any, were there to the loss of leadership for 

the US Army Regulars?

4. What were the effects, for both Seminoles and US Soldiers, of the 

first Seminole volley?
64

Stand Six

Soldiers Rally and Seminoles Retreat

Directions: From Stand Five, move south approximately 100 yards 

remaining on Fort King Road to arrive at Stand Six. 

Visual Aids: Historical Map 3: Initial Assault, Historical Map 4: Final 

Assault.

Orientation: To the north lies the fallen advance guard where they stood 

and to the south was the rear guard, wagon, and cannon. The Seminoles 

were all along the west and across the north with the pond closing off the 

east.

Description: The initial response to the ambush was surprise and chaos 

but quickly the Soldiers began to return fire and scatter to the trees to fight 

in “woodland drill.” The Seminoles were well concealed but their fire was 

less effective after the initial volley and speedily the artillerymen brought 

the lone six-pounder into action. The most exposed group of Soldiers were 
65

those manning the cannon and they suffered from concentrated Seminole 

fire each time the smoke from the cannon fire cleared. The artillerymen 

who fell were immediately replaced in order to keep the cannon, under 

the command of Lieutenant Bassinger, in operation. The cannon was 

unlimbered and when placed into the action, fired, sweeping from west to 

north to west from its place in the middle of the road.

The few remaining officers, notably Captain Gardiner and Lieutenant 

Bassinger, who survived the first volley, rallied the troops exhorting them 

and leading by example. The Soldiers kept up an increased musketry fire 

and though the cannon fired high over the heads of the Seminoles, it kept 

up a rapid fire, adding to the din and active US Army response to the 

ambush.

The heavy firing of the initial assault lasted from the opening shot 

between 0800 hours and 0900 hours until around 1400 hours when the 

Seminoles broke contact and moved northwest just under a mile away to 

reconsolidate and regroup. The Soldiers had survived the first assault but 

at terrific loss in both Soldiers and leadership.

Vignette: Seminole chief Alligator described the battle’s initial action and 

the determined leadership and rally of the US Army:

“...when every Indian arose and fired, which laid upon the ground, 

dead, more than half the white men. The cannon was discharged 

several times but the men who loaded it were shot down as soon 

as the smoke cleared away... The Soldiers shouted and whooped 

and the officers shook their swords and swore. There was a little 

man, a great brave, who shook his sword at the Soldiers and said, 

‘God-dam!’ no rifle-ball could hit him. As we were returning to 

the swamp, supposing all were dead an Indian came up and said 

the white men were building a fort of logs.” (Account of Alligator 

as told to Cpt. John Sprague in Sprague, 91)

Analysis: 

1. What factors accounted for the Soldiers’ rally after the devastating 

initial volley?

2. Why did he Seminoles’ retreat? Was it the cannon, the musketry of 

the scattered “Light Infantry” fighting, or something else?

3. What role, if any, did the remaining officers play in the rally?

4. What can be learned by junior leaders today from the initial reaction 

of the surviving US Army leaders of Dade’s fight?
66

Stand Seven

The Breastworks and Last Stand

Directions: From Stand Six, proceed south 35 yards just north of the 

recreated breastworks for Stand Seven, still on the Fort King Road. 

Visual Aid: Historical Map 4: Final Assault.

Orientation: Immediately southwest is the location where the breastworks 

were constructed. The northeast corner of the works was anchored by 

the cannon while the Seminoles were re-grouping, just under a mile to 

the northeast. The Seminoles returned while the breastworks were being 

constructed and they enveloped the Soldiers from the north, west, and 

south and cornered them in the breastworks.

Description: The command originally had been Captain Gardiner’s before 

the march and then devolved to Major Dade for personal reasons and then 

returned to Captain Gardiner when Dade was killed in the opening salvo 

of the ambush. Thus Captain Gardiner made the final decisions affecting 

the Soldiers on that day. With half the US Army force out of the fight in the 

first volley and the engagement of the cannon the only thing to deny the 
67

Seminoles complete victory in the first assault, Captain Gardiner made his 

decision to stay and fight, basing his defense around the cannon, gathering 

the wounded and throwing up impromptu breastworks.

This decision in effect determined the fate of the Soldiers. Captain 

Gardiner decided to leave no man behind. The wounded could not be 

left to the hands of the Seminoles and Fort Brooke and Fort King were 

far away for the transport of so many wounded by so few able-bodied 

survivors. Lastly, he could not utilize the cannon effectively in maneuver. 

These considerations led Captain Gardiner to make his quick decision to 

remain and fight until the end, keeping faith with the wounded and staying 

with the weapon that had kept them alive that long. The US forces were 

outnumbered. The closest friendly forces could only be reached by forcing 

through the enemy positions and into even more open land being watched 

by a horse-mounted enemy force. Retrograde movement returned to the 

more dense and restricted terrain in swampland, preferred and known by 

the enemy far better than the Soldiers, and indeed, the more conducive 

sites for ambush in the minds of the Soldiers.

Captain Gardiner took control and gave the orders. Some Soldiers 

began felling the young sapling trees to make the breastworks while others 

gathered the wounded and brought them back to the works and checked 

the dead and wounded for ammunition.

The Seminoles gathered less than a mile away over a small knoll and 

when they learned of the entrenching Soldiers, they debated a second 

assault. It was the exhortations of the two younger chiefs, Jumper and 

Alligator that shamed the others into finishing the Soldiers off at their 

breastworks. After less than an hour lull, around 1500 hours, the Seminoles 

approached the works. They spread out in the face of the booming cannon 

and the musket fire of the remaining 30 capable defenders. The cannon 

was placed along the north wall of the breastworks with the same field 

of fire as before, west to north. The limber and the chest were brought 

into the breastworks within the perimeter. The Seminoles enveloped the 

position, forcing those Soldiers who were fighting behind trees outside the 

fortification to move to it and trapping the remaining Soldiers. In time the 

rifle fire took its toll and the Soldiers expended the last of their ammunition 

and the Seminoles pressed in against the reduced resistance. 
68

Vignette: Private Clark’s account of the Dade’s command’s last stand 

is poignant in its subtle description of the Soldiers’ desperation and 

determination. By this time the Soldiers knew all was lost but still fought 

on as the Seminoles advanced again. In the surviving soldier’s words:

We had barely raised our breastworks knee high when we again 

saw the Indians advancing in great numbers over the hill to our 

left. They came on boldly till within a long musket shot when 

they spread themselves from tree to tree to surround us. We 

immediately extended as Light Infantry, covering ourselves by 

the trees, and opening a brisk fire from cannon and musketry. The 

former I don’t think could have done much mischief, the Indians 

were so scattered... Lieutenant Henderson had his left arm broken 

but he continued to load his musket and to fire it, resting on the 

stump, until he was finally shot down towards the close of the 

second attack, and during the day he kept up his spirits and cheered 

the men. Lieutenant Keyes had both his arms broken in the first 

attack; they were bound up and slung in a handkerchief and he sat 

for the remainder of the day until he was killed- reclining against 

the breastwork- his head often reposing upon it- regardless of 

everything that was passing around him. Our men were by degrees 

all cut down. We had maintained a steady fire from 8 until 2 P.M. 

or thereabout... had been pretty busily engaged for more than five 

hours. Lieutenant B [Bassinger] was the only officer left alive and 

he severely wounded. He told me as Indians approached, to lay 

down and feign myself dead. I looked through the logs and saw 

the savages approaching in great numbers. (Account of Private 

Ransom Clark as reproduced in Laumer, 237-238)

Analysis: 

1. Critique Captain Gardiner’s decision to build the breastworks and 

remain in place. What were his other options? Was he correct to remain?

2. What caused the culminating defeat, was it Seminole superiority 

in numbers, the Soldiers’ expenditure of ammunition, or something else?

3. How do the final defensive principles exhibited by Dade’s men 

compare to those used in modern missions?
69

Stand Eight

Death of Captain Gardiner and the Fate of the Survivors

Directions: From Stand Seven, move approximately 10 yards to the 

southwest at the nearest corner of the recreated Breastworks for Stand 

Eight. 

Visual Aid: Historical Map 4: Final Assault.

Orientation: The remaining Soldiers were contained within the 

breastworks or immediately outside it manning the cannon. They were 

arrayed along the north, east, and south portions of the triangle to confront 

the Seminoles. None faced the east, the pond, and no Seminoles attacked 

from that direction.

Description: Captain Gardiner fell in the center of the works, mortally 

wounded, passing command to the one remaining officer, Lieutenant 

Bassinger. The Seminoles kept up their rifle fire until there remained 

no more resistance. Bassinger commanded those left to play dead. The 

Soldiers had expended all their ammunition, the cannon had its final 50th 
70

round loaded but no one was left to fire it having all been wounded or 

confined to the works by the encroaching Seminoles tightening the noose. 

It was nearing late afternoon when the firing ceased.

Without resistance, the Seminoles approached the breastworks. First, 

Chief Micanopy gave a speech, gesturing to the works. No doubt he 

praised the Seminole victory over the perceived superiority of the “white 

man” and his professional army. The Seminoles were so confident in 

their victory that they entered the works without guard and ignored those 

wounded, taking what military equipment and supplies they could as well 

as weapons and the culturally obligatory scalps. Some US Army wounded 

gave struggle and struck at the Seminoles only to be killed themselves as 

they tried to escape the triangle wooden enclosure.

With their military victory over Major Dade’s command complete, 

the Seminoles took their military plunder and their scalps of the dead and 

moved north, towards Osceola and the Seminoles gathering from Fort 

King to celebrate their dual victories over Major Dade’s command and the 

murder of Indian Affairs Agent Thompson. As they left the enclosure and 

the wounded, the African-Americans who had accompanied the Seminoles 

came to the breastworks. These Africans were mounted and numbered 

around fifty and had refrained from the fighting, most likely because they 

had been part of the mounted blocking force to the north of the fighting.

These Seminole allies entered the wooden enclosure and took to 

executing the wounded Soldiers. After they executed all those who they 

noticed were still alive and took what few clothing and belongings they 

desired, though not much, they too followed the route of the departing 

Seminoles, killing the draft animals, lighting the wagon on fire and tossing 

the cannon into the nearby pond.

After they had left some of the few remaining Soldiers stirred from 

their false deaths. One would be shot attempting to run from the enclosure, 

motivating the others to wait until dark. The only other two who remained 

left together around 2100 hours, heading back south towards Fort Brooke 

and away from the direction the Seminoles had taken, even though Fort 

King was much closer. They moved south only to run into a mounted 

Seminole the following day. They split up, the Seminole rode down and 

killed one survivor, but Private Clark eluded capture and crawled, dragged, 

himself back to Fort Brooke over two days later. The only other survivor 

of the fight to return to Fort Brooke did so earlier but he had left wounded 

before the last stand, Private Joseph Sprague.
71

Vignette: Private Ransom Clark’s account of the battle imparts the 

excitement and terror involved in close quarters combat and survival of 

the defeated. He wrote of the enemy occupation of the Soldiers’ defenses 

and resulting actions of the belligerents:

A heavy made Indian, of middle stature, painted down to the 

waist, [Micanopy] seemed to be the Chief. He made them a 

speech, frequently pointing to the breastwork. At length they 

charged into the work; there was none to offer resistance, and 

they did not seem to suspect the wounded being alive- offering 

no indignity, but stepping about carefully quietly stripping off our 

accoutrements, and carrying away our arms. They then retired 

in a body in the direction from whence they came. Immediately 

upon their retreat, fort or fifty negroes on horseback galloped 

up... and commenced with horrid shouts and yells the butchery 

of the wounded... Lieutenant B [Bassinger] hearing the negroes 

butchering the wounded at length sprang up, and asked them to 

spare his life. They met him with the blows of their axes, and their 

fiendish laughter. Having been wounded in five different places 

myself, I was pretty well covered with blood, and two scratches 

that I had received on my head, gave to me the appearance of 

having been shot through the brain... After stripping all the dead 

in this manner, they trundled off the cannon in the direction the 

Indians had gone, and went away... Shortly after the negroes went 

away, one Wilson... crept from under some of the dead bodies... 

He asked me to go with him back to the Fort, and I was going to 

follow him, when, as he jumped over the breastwork, an Indian 

sprang from behind a tree and shot him down. I then lay quiet until 

9 o’clock that night, when D. Cony, the only living soul beside 

myself; and I started, upon our journey. We knew it was nearest 

to go to Fort King, but we did not know the way, and we had 

seen the enemies retreat in that direction. As I came out, I saw 

Dr. G. [Gatlin] lying stripped amongst the dead. The last I saw 

of him whilest living, was kneeling behind the breast-work, with 

two double barrel guns by him, and he said, ‘Well, I have got 

four barrels for them!’ Captain G. [Gardiner] after being severely 

wounded, cried out, ‘I can give you no more orders, my lads, 

do your best!’ I last saw a negro spurn his body, saying with an 

oath, ‘that’s one of their officers-‘... My comrade and myself 

got along quite well until the next day, when we met an Indian on 

horseback... coming up the road. I took the right, and he the left 
72

of the road. The Indian pursued him. Shortly afterwards I heard a 

rifle shot and a little after another... I made something of a circuit 

before I struck the beaten track again. That night I was a good deal 

annoyed by the wolves, who had scented my blood, and came very 

close to me; the next day, the 30th, I reached the Fort. (Account of 

Private Ransom Clark as reproduced in Laumer, 239)

Analysis: 

1. Why did the Seminoles act with restraint once they had taken 

the breastworks in contrast to the actions of the accompanying AfricanAmericans?

2. When faced with an alien culture (Seminoles, their slaves, or Al 

Qaeda for example in this day), what needs to be done to understand that 

culture and maintain discipline even if faced with enemies who employ 

techniques that we do not condone?
73

Stand Nine

The Aftermath

Directions: Move southwest from the recreated Breastworks less than five 

yards to the paved trail in front of the Visitor’s Center to arrive at Stand 

Nine, the final stop. 

Visual Aid: Historical Map 4: Final Assault.

Orientation: The Visitor’s Center is to the west, the parking lots to the 

northwest. Directly to the east are the breastworks, to the south along Fort 

King Road is the route the US Army survivors took after darkness fell 

back towards Fort Brooke.

Description: The site of Dade’s Battle would remain untouched after the 

last African allied with the Seminoles departed north toward Fort King 

and the two wounded Soldiers headed south to Fort Brooke. It was a larger 

contingent of Regulars and Louisiana volunteers under Brigadier General 

Gaines from New Orleans that first traced Major Dade’s route along the 

Fort King Road in response to the report of Private Clark. They would not 

arrive at the site of the battle until nearly two months later, in February 
74

1836. Since then the Second Seminole War was in full swing. In fact, 

one of the largest battles of the war was fought only a few days following 

Dade’s Battle by Brigadier General Clinch, ignorant of the fate of Major 

Dade’s contingent but impatiently having undertaken his campaign against 

the Seminole hamlets north of the Withlacoochie.

The columns under General Gaines came across the site of Dade’s 

last stand and after proper identification and accountability, interred the 

remains of the fallen Soldiers. Playing the Death March with friends of the 

officers and the regimental band of Major Dade’s own regiment, the 4th 

Infantry, leading the way, circled the hasty memorial and burial grounds 

before continuing on to war and more battles with the Seminole Nation. 

The United States Army went on to a frustrating Second Seminole 

War where thousands of volunteers flocked to avenge this “massacre” 

and many Florida militia came to defend their right to expansion while 

more and more Regulars cycled through service in hot, humid, frustrating 

Florida. The Army struggled to find the enemy and in time shifted course to 

targeting homesteads and livelihoods, persuading the shadowy Seminoles 

that living in fear was worse than living west of the Mississippi. The war 

officially ended on 14 August 1842 as declared by Colonel William Worth, 

the last in a long line of Army commanders sent to quell the Seminoles. 

By this time, after nearly seven years of fighting, the US military through 

military, and political methods had whittled the remaining stubborn 

Seminoles down to about six hundred. Colonel Worth said the remaining 

could be removed “by pacific and persuasive measure, or not at all.” Even 

with half the entire regular Army the US could not cover the entire 47,000 

square miles of Florida to hunt down the less than one thousand Seminoles 

remaining. 

By the end of 1843, 3,824 Seminoles had been successfully shipped 

west out of Florida. The US Army Regulars suffered 1,466 dead, of which 

only 328 were killed in battle. The militia numbers and those of the 

volunteers are unrecorded. In 1836 alone, 17 percent of the commissioned 

officers in the US Army resigned their commissions due in large part to 

the escalating war in Florida. Dade’s Battle Was the beginning of a long 

and bloody war.

Vignette: Acting Inspector General Captain Ethan Allen Hitchcock’s report 

upon reaching the site of Dade’s Battle would be a significant document in 

both the historical recreation of the event as well as the contemporary “call 

to arms” for more troops to fight the growing war. He wrote:
75

General- Agreeably to your directions, I observed the battle ground 

six or seven mile north of the Withlacoochee River, where Major 

Dade and his command were destroyed by the Seminole Indians... 

and have the honor to submit the following report... Our advance 

guard had passed the ground without halting, when the General 

and his Staff came upon one of the most appalling scenes that can 

be imagined. We first saw some broken and scattered bones; then 

a cart, the oxen of which were lying dead... a little to the right, 

one of two horses were seen. We then came to a small enclosure, 

made by felling trees in such a manner as to form a triangular 

breast-work for defense. Within the triangle, along the north and 

west faces of it, were about thirty bodies, mostly mere skeletons, 

although much of the clothing was left upon them. These were 

lying, ever one of them, in precisely the same position they must 

have occupied during the fight; their heads next to the logs over 

which they had delivered their fire, and their bodies stretched with 

striking regularity parallel to each other. They had evidently been 

shot dead at their posts, and the Indians had not disturbed them, 

except by taking the scalps of most of them. Passing this little 

breast-work, we found other bodies along the road, and by the 

side of the road, generally behind tees, which had been resorted 

to for cover from there enemies’ fire. Advancing about two 

hundred yards farther, we found a cluster of bodies in the middle 

of the road. They were evidently the advanced guard, in the lead 

of which was the body of Major Dade, and to the right that of 

Captain Fraser... we had with us many of the personal friends 

of the officers of Major Dade’s command, and it is gratifying 

to be able to state, that every officer as identified by undoubted 

evidence. They were buried, and the cannon... that the Indians 

had thrown into a swamp, was recovered and placed vertically at 

the head of the grave, where it is to be hoped it will long remain. 

The bodies of the non-commissioned officers and the privates 

were buried in two graves, and it was ground that ever man was 

accounted for. (Report of Captain Hitchcock, dated February 22, 

1836 as reproduced in Cohen, 74-75)

Analysis: 

1. Historians with hindsight claim Dade’s Battle was merely a Seminole 

“tactical” victory and never had the potential to be anything more? If this 

is a legitimate assessment, how is it so? If not, why?
76

2. How do the Seminole actions, tactics, plans, motivations reflect 

insurgencies the United States Army has fought in its history, or insurgency 

warfare in general?
77

Part IV. Integration

Final Phase of the Staff Ride

As this handbook has previously emphasized, a staff ride consists of 

three phases. The first phase is the “Preliminary Study Phase.” This phase 

is conducted before the visit to the battlefield and prepares the students 

for the visit. The second phase is the “Field Study Phase.” This phase is 

conducted on the battlefield and enables students to understand historical 

events through analysis of the actual terrain. The final phase of a staff ride 

is the “Integration Phase.” No staff ride is complete without an integration 

phase because it is critical for the students to understand what happened, 

why it happened, and most importantly, what can be learned from the 

study of the battle or campaign.

There are several factors that the staff ride leader should consider 

when planning for and conducting the integration phase. First, the leader 

must work with the organization that is participating in the ride and select 

a time and location for the integration session. Occasionally, units may 

have to depart shortly after the last stand of the field phase and the staff 

ride leader must conduct the integration phase on the battlefield immediately after completing the field study phase. However, when possible, 

students should have some time for personal reflection and thought before 

the integration phase. Thus, the integration phase is best if conducted the 

day after the field study phase ends. Even if you cannot wait an extra day, 

it is best to do the integration session at a location different from the last 

stand, a place comfortable and dry that will encourage open discussion 

from all the participants.

The staff ride leader should organize the integration phase based on 

the unit as well as time available and training objectives. The leader can 

conduct the integration phase in any format or may simply lead a discussion 

with participants on what they learned. Specific students can brief 

particular items or just have an open discussion with minimal structure. 

It is important to keep in mind that the integration phase is not an AAR 

(after action review) of the ride itself, i.e., ways to improve the ride. While 

it is useful to seek constructive criticism in order to continue to improve 

the ride, this should be done at another time or perhaps with written AAR 

comments. Instead, the integration phase is used for the students of the 

campaign to integrate their preliminary study with the fieldwork in order 

to gain insights that are relevant to their current duties and enhance their 

professional development. Whatever method the staff ride leader chooses 

to employ, the most important thing to remember is that the participants 

should do the majority of the talking. 
78

One method that often produces a fruitful integration phase is to conduct 

the session in three parts based on three broad questions. Sometimes the 

leader need only present one of these general questions and let others carry 

the conversation or the leader may have to ask more follow-up questions 

to prod the discussion. Each of the three questions is discussed below.

What aspects and impressions of the campaign had you developed in 

the preliminary study phase that changed or were strongly reinforced 

because of your study of the ground? 

This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to a staff 

ride, otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. Of 

course, students may develop a wide range of answers based on personal 

study and observations in the field. Some of the more popular aspects of the 

discussion of terrain for Dade’s Battle include Major Dade’s assessment 

on impact on security, the Seminoles’ site selection of the ambush, the 

restriction of the road on maneuver for the Soldiers, the availability of 

cover and concealment for the initial ambushers and the rallied Soldiers, 

and Captain Gardiner’s decision to make a stand. The staff ride leader can 

ask a related question which may also generate good discussion: Did seeing 

the terrain alter your opinion of any of the leaders and their decisions?

What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have 

remained the same since Dade’s Battle? 

The answers to the “changed” aspects will probably seem more obvious 

to the modern military professional and often will be related to technology. 

This may include changes in weapons, communications, and numerous 

other pieces of equipment. The aspects that have “remained the same” 

may not seem as numerous at first but the students will often build on some 

initial answers and find many good items. The role of key personalities, 

the importance of intelligence, the need for strong positive leadership and 

an ability to motivate Soldiers, the importance of maneuverability, warrior 

ethos, elements of surprise, courage, and fear are just some of the items 

of warfare that seem to have changed little since 1835. Depending on the 

group, you may want to ask a few more focused questions. For example, 

if you have an infantry unit, you can ask the following: What aspects of an 

ambush have changed and what aspects have remained the same? 

What insight(s) can the modern military professional gain from 

Dade’s Battle that is relevant today? 

Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast number 

of arenas. Once again, the type of unit participating in the staff ride might 

help to guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit 
79

might focus the commander’s situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and the importance of reconnaissance.

These concepts are suggestions. The staff ride leader may use some of 

them, use another framework, or simply let the students take the discussion in whichever direction they want.

The three suggested integration phase questions are to aid in sparking 

discussion, not to provide hard and fast “rules” of warfare. Note that the 

handbook provides examples of possible answers to the questions but it 

does not attempt to provide a list of “right” answers. The staff ride leader 

should take time before the session to write down his or her answers to 

these questions in order to have some potential ideas to generate student 

discussion. At the same time, the staff ride leader should strive for the 

participants to develop their own answers and thus be prepared to let the 

discussion roam many different paths.

81

Part V. Support

Practical Information on Conducting a Staff Ride in the Tampa 

and Dade Battlefield Area

1. Information and assistance. 

a. The Staff Ride Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, can provide advice and assistance on every aspect of the staff 

ride. The Staff Ride Team can also recommend facilitators to lead a 

Dade’s Battle Staff Ride. Visit the Combat Studies Institute website for 

information on obtaining staff ride assistance and/or leadership. Staff Ride 

Team support includes background information, knowledge of the battle 

and battlefield, and familiarity with the Dade’s Battle area. 

Address: Combat Studies Institute 

290 Stimson, Unit 1 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027 

Telephone: DSN: 552-2078 

Commercial: (913) 684-2082 

Website: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/csi/SRTeam.asp

b. The Dade Battle Staff Ride takes place at two Florida Historic State 

Parks. It is important to contact the staff of both parks and let them know 

you are conducting a staff ride. Dade Battlefield Historic State Park has a 

visitor’s center on the premises. However, the Fort Foster Historic State 

Park on the Hillsborough River does not have its own dedicated Visitor’s 

Center as it is part of the larger Hillsborough River State Park and its 

exhibit is shared in the 1930s Ranger Station.Fort Foster itself is still 

preserved as a historic site.

Dade Battlefield

Address: 7200 County Road 603

Bushnell, FL, 33513

Telephone: Dade Battlefield Visitor Center 

(352) 793 4781 

Website: http://www.floridastateparks.org/dadebattlefield/

Fort Foster

Address: 15402 US 301 N.

Thonotasassa, FL 33592

Telephone: Hillsborough River State Park Visitor Center

(813) 987 6771

Website: http://www.floridastateparks.org/fortfoster/

2. Logistics.

a. Meals. There are many restaurants in Tampa that are convenient 

to hotel locations, and should take care of breakfast and dinner. Lunch 
82

can either be a box lunch carried on the vehicles or you can eat at nearby 

restaurants, although options can be scarce along portions of US 301 

between Tampa and Bushnell. Depending on time, there are picnic areas 

at the primary staff ride location, the Dade Battlefield Historic State Park.

b. Lodging. Groups can find many hotels in the Tampa Bay area if 

travel time requires they remain over night. If the group wants to cut down 

on lodging costs, there are many military bases in Florida but most are not 

as conveniently located as the hotels.

c. Travel. If the group is flying to the area, the Tampa airport is the 

most convenient to use. Once on the ground, larger groups will need to 

contract for a bus—make sure it has a microphone and public address 

system as well as a restroom. Smaller groups (less than 20) might find it 

easier for parking and maneuvering to use rental vans.

3. Other considerations.

a. A reconnaissance of the stands and route just prior to execution of 

the ride is imperative for a successful staff ride.

b. Ensure that every member of the group has water. Additionally, 

Dade Battlefield Historic State Park has public restrooms, however, there 

are none available at Stand One or Stand Two at Fort Foster which requires 

additional planning. Make a plan for adequate use of these facilities.

c. Ensure that your group has proper clothing for inclement weather. 

Thunderstorms can occur in any season. Some walking is required at both 

the Hillsborough River crossing at Fort Foster and at the battlefield site 

along the remains of Fort King Road. Comfortable boots or hiking shoes 

are recommended. We recommend that you do not wear sandals or running 

shoes.

d. Mosquitoes, ants, chiggers, ticks, and other insects are prevalent 

from March to October so insect repellent is advised. Poison ivy is also 

present in some of the more remote areas off the preserved site.

e. Road traffic in downtown Tampa can be heavy along normal urban 

schedules. Once outside of the city center further north on US 301 North, 

traffic lightens during the approach to Fort Foster and then to Dade 

Battlefield Historic State Parks.
83

Appendix A

Order of Battle for the Forces Involved

1. United States Army (100 enlisted, eight officers and one interpreter at 

time of ambush)

Major Francis Dade, Commanding

Captain Gardiner’s C Company, 2d Artillery

Captain Fraser’s B Company, 3d Artillery

Major Dade’s Detachment B Company, 4th Infantry

Attached Soldiers from B and H Company, 2d Artillery to fill the 

understrength companies

Dade’s Command Roll Call

Rank and Name Place of Birth

Enlisted

Private John Barnes Ireland

Private Donald Campbell Scotland

Private Enoch Gates North Carolina

Private Martin Cunningham Pennsylvania

Private John Doughty New York

Private Cornelius Donovan Ireland

Private William Downs Maryland

Private Samuel Hall Ireland

Private Wiley Jones North Carolina

Private John Markham Virginia

Private Edwin Decourcey England

Private Edward Boston Scotland

Private Michael Kenney Ireland

Private Anthony Laughlin Ireland

Private John McWiggin Ireland

Private James McDonald Ireland

Private John McCartney Ireland

Private Hugh Peery Ireland

Private Patrick Rooney Ireland

Private Richard R. Bowen New York

Private Henry Brondan Prussia

Private John Craig Ireland

Private John Kerins Ireland

Private Hugh McMee Ireland

Private John A. Patton Dist. Of Col.

Private Reuben Phillips Pennsylvania
84

Private Thomas Thornton Canada

Private Hiram Taylor Pennsylvania

Private William Wright Massachusetts

Private John Stafford England

Private William Black Maryland

Private Richard Burke Ireland

Private Rufus Barton New York

Private Owen Boyen Ireland

Private Thomas Davis Pennsylvania

Private Robert Green Maryland

Private Isaac C. Grant New York

Private Alpheus Gillert New York

Private John Halter Pennsylvania

Private John Hurley Ireland

Private William Holmes Ireland

Private Cornelius Hill Ireland

Private Aaron Jewell Vermont

Private Thomas Knarr Pennsylvania

Private Robert Mulvahal Ireland

Private William Neely Ireland

Private Patrick Rotterty Ireland

Private William Robertson Scotland

Private John Riley Scotland

Private Casper Schneder Germany

Private William Taylor Vermont

Private Isaac Taylor Maryland

Private Joseph Wilson New York

Private Orville Worcester Vermont

Private George Bertran Scotland

Private Ben C. Carpenter New York

Private Patrick Cumusky Ireland

Private Samuel E. Dodge New York

Private William Flannagan Ireland

Private John C. Folk Germany

Private George Herlyhigh Rhode Island

Private Jorden Hall New York

Private Samuel Kinkerly Pennsylvania

Private Jacob Kneeland Maryland

Private Samuel Lemon Pennsylvania

Private William Minton New Jersey

Private Donal Monroe New York

Private John Mulcuhy Ireland

Private William D. Randall New York
85

Private John Schaeffer Germany

Private Henry Senram Germany

Private Washington Tuck Maine

Private Richard Vreeland New Jersey

Private Samuel S. Wright Ireland

Private John Williams Ireland

Private Sylvester Welsh Pennsylvania

Private Daniel Wechsong Germany

Private George York England

Fifer William Carney Ireland

Drummer Charles T. Heck Pennsylvania

Artificer George Howard New Jersey

Artificer Henry Wagner Pennsylvania

Noncommissioned Officers

Sergeant Peter Thomas Pennsylvania

Sergeant John Hood Scotland

Sergeant Philip Cooper Saxony

Sergeant John Louis New Jersey

Sergeant Thomas Sarin Ireland

Sergeant Benjamin Chapman Rhode Island

Sergeant John Valing Germany

Sergeant Anstin W.C. Farley Virginia

Corporal Michael Ryan Ireland

Corporal George G. Young Rhode Island

Corporal Philander Wells New York

Corporal Alexander Jones New Jersey

Corporal Nicholas Clark New York

Corporal James Dunlap Maine

Officers

Brevet Major Francis Dade 4th IN Regt.

Captain Upton S. Fraser B Co., 3d Artillery

Captain George W. Gardiner C Co., 2dArtillery

First Lieutenant William F. 

Basinger C Co., 2dArtillery

Second Lieutenant Robert R. 

Mudge B Co., 3d Artillery

Brevet Second Lieutenant R. 

Henderson C Co., 2dArtillery

Brevet Second Lieutenant J.L. 

Keais B Co., 3d Artillery

Assistant Surgeon John Gatlin Medical Staff

Survivors

Private Joseph Sprague B Co., 3d Artillery
86

Private Ransom Clark B Co., 2d Artillery

Private John Thomas B Co., 2dArtillery

2. Seminole Forces (200-500 warriors including 50-100 mounted, and 

approximately 50 Africans)

Chief Micanopy, Commanding

Loosely organized Forces under Chiefs Jumper and Alligator (to include 

mounted element)
87

Appendix B

Biographical Sketches of Key Participants

Francis Langhorne Dade was born in February, 1792 in Virginia. He 

served in the War of 1812, always in the infantry from his first commission 

in the 12th Infantry Regiment but would soon find his long-lasting home 

under the colors of the 4th Infantry Regiment. He was serving with the 

4th in Florida when he volunteered to take Captain Gardiner’s command 

to allow the latter to have time with his ill wife. He was not a West Point 

educated officer.

He had extensive service in the southern garrisons and was embroiled 

in Florida’s military adventures with the United States from the early 

conflicts all the way to his final battle. Dade had even served with Seminoles 

under his command in the vicinity of Tallahassee. He had lauded them, 

granting them medals for service. In 1825, Dade had undertaken a similar 

mission as the one he found himself on for General Clinch, to reinforce 

a threatened agency outpost near what would later become Fort King. At 

that time it had only been “Indian trails” to move on, not a developed road, 

but the contingent then had moved fast as they were not being slowed with 

a cannon. 

Dade was an experienced officer. He had served extensively in 

Florida with Seminoles. Perhaps, though, this gave him a false sense of 

understanding their ways. He had also served in the War of 1812, the last 

“big” war of his time period that Soldiers talked about and revered. A 

career infantryman, he still understood the importance of a cannon on a 

battlefield as he demanded one accompany this march.

Perhaps too dedicated to “traditional” warfare that made careers for 

the professionals, Dade fell among the category of those who deeply 

underestimated or misjudged the Seminoles. He held a hubris that was 

not uncommon among the upper ranks of the US Army when it came to 

considering the effectiveness of “Indians” in fighting.

Regardless, Major Dade lived a life of duty to his country and never 

shirked from danger or risk, as clearly shown in his act of taking over for 

Captain Gardiner. His demand for the cannon can be judged as either a 

positive or a negative thing. It played a critical part in the battle, however, 

in reference to then-Captain Dade’s previous execution of a similar 

mission, the absence of a cannon at that point allowed his detachment to 

cover the distance far faster by moving lighter and less conspicuously. 

Other decisions made by Dade leading up to the immediate fight itself 

may have been less pardonable but the students can judge for themselves. 
88

George Washington Gardiner grew up in Kingston, New York from an 

affluent family. He was a lawyer’s son. Gardiner was a short stocky man, 

said to be barely over five feet tall. He enrolled in West Point, graduating 

at the top of his class of 1814 in March, just in time to serve in the final 

months of the War of 1812. 

He was an artilleryman by trade, however, Brevet Major Sylvanus 

Thayer, noted reformer of the Academy, recognized Gardiner’s 

professionalism even as a young lieutenant and recommended Gardiner as 

temporary instructor on infantry tactics in August of 1817. In September, 

Gardiner found his true calling at West Point and was appointed as 

instructor of artillery and commandant of the cadets, known as the “God 

of War” by his pupils. From there, he served in various garrison posts in 

the northeast before temporarily leaving the military to pursue a law career 

as had his father. 

The colors, however, would not let Captain Gardiner go and, at 42 

years old, he soon found himself back in the Army doing garrison duties 

along both coasts of a Florida. An artilleryman all his life, Florida was 

not necessarily good artillery country, hence why most of the artillery 

was pressed into “red-legged infantryman” duties, something common in 

many conflicts that did not fit the “traditional” war concepts. However, 

as a true artillery professional, he would find a way to utilize his branch’s 

tools as effectively as possible.

Described by Private Bemrose – Gardiner had been his first company 

commander when Bemrose arrived in Saint Augustine – as a “most manly 

and determined little character and a perfect gentleman.” (Bemrose, 65). 

This was high praise from a young enlisted soldier of an officer in that 

time period.

Captain Gardiner, aside from being a proficient soldier in both infantry 

and artillery tactics as noted in his assignments of instruction at the Academy 

and his commented “gentlemanliness,” was a man of strong character and 

devotion to both his family and to his men who he unquestioningly saw as 

family. As his service in the waning days of the War of 1812 and his time 

in garrison duties and instructing at West Point certainly prepared him, 

his poise, skills, and professionalism would be highest in his conduct in 

Dade’s final battle. With his skills, specifically with use of artillery along 

with natural leadership attributes he demonstrated, Gardiner’s role in the 

battle with the Seminoles would be pivotal. This was all in light of the fact 

that having been relieved of his requirement by Major Dade to attend to 

his wife but after taking care of his family, he returned to care for his other 

family, only speaks more of the character of Captain Gardiner.
89

Upton Sinclair Fraser hailed from New York City, New York and 

was born in 1794. Fraser was the only line officer under Major Dade’s 

command to not be a graduate of West Point. 

Though he was an artilleryman by the time of his service in Florida, 

Captain Fraser had begun his career as an infantry lieutenant in the 

Fifteenth Infantry. He joined the Fifteenth Infantry in 1814 and after only 

a short term with the unit, he changed branches to serve in the artillery. It 

was in the artillery branch that Fraser would serve through the ranks during 

the War of 1812. In 1828, Fraser made captain and therefore outranked 

Captain Gardiner by four years and was second only to Major Dade in the 

command on the day of the battle.

By military tradition and custom, he should have been the commander 

of the detachment rather than Captain Gardiner prior to Major Dade’s 

voluntary assumption of command. In fact, Fraser had commanded Fort 

Brooke off and on for months leading up to the December march along Fort 

King Road. However, in an agreement among the officers, Fraser conceded 

command of the detachment to Captain Gardiner on acknowledgement of 

Gardiner’s West Point education and training assignment and Gardiner’s 

experience in the field. 

Described by fellow officers as a brave officer and one who cared for 

his men, Fraser was known to have the respect of the men of his command. 

He was also known to be a man of letters and during the march, left hand 

written notes along the route for the relief column meant to follow them to 

Fort King. His calmness along the march was noted by those around him 

each night while the others showed nervousness from the situation. He 

remained collected and found solace in writing his messages informing the 

relief column of the situation and encouraging their haste. His dedication 

to duty and leadership by example was demonstrated up until the battle 

commenced, as he regularly accompanied the advance guard including on 

the day of the ambush.

Ransom Clark was an extraordinarily lucky individual, or as some to 

include himself may have concluded towards the end of his life, a cursed 

individual. He stood at five feet and 10 inches, a little taller than average 

US Soliders of the time. From New York, Clark was 23 years old when he 

left the gates of Fort Brooke with Dade’s command. A rough character, he 

joined the Army for lack of other available occupation and a desire to get 

away from home. An artilleryman by trade, he enlisted into the 2d Artillery 

Regiment and served with Captain Belton but he found himself later in 

Captain Gardiner’s C Company for the march to join General Clinch. 
90

In Mobile Bay in early 1835, Private Clark had been on a transport 

ship when the boat capsized, killing all but one on board. Clark was the 

only survivor when he came out of the water. He considered himself a fair 

shot, had a steely disposition, cool-headed even if he was rough on the 

edges but even if he had not been rough before, a few years in a peacetime 

intimately small army with unrecognized frontier duty, one could become 

a bit rough. 

Clark would leave various accounts of the battle. The first was a 

matter of days after the event, others years later. They virtually all were 

unchanged from his first report. This report of Clark was validated by the 

subsequent report from first person accounts of others who had first gone 

to the battle site, which was seemingly untouched and matched Clark’s 

narrative, including many specifics. Clark would attempt for a time to live 

off the profits of his tales in print and speaking engagements as his pension 

from the government at eight dollars a month, though more than he was 

making as an enlisted soldier at five dollars a month, was not much to 

live off outside of military life. He would die only five years later due to 

complications from the wounds suffered on 28 December of which he 

never fully recovered.

Chief Micanopy, also known 

as the Pond-Governor, was the 

hereditary leader of the widely 

scattered and loosely organized 

Seminole Nation. This hereditary 

power came from a genealogy 

traced to him being a descendant 

of the revered Cowkeeper and of 

the Alachua band of the original 

tribes making up the Seminoles. 

At the time of Dade’s March, 

he was thought by his US 

Government contemporaries to 

be about 50 years old. The issue 

Micanopy had was not one of 

hereditary leadership, he had that through blood, but was from true 

leadership skills. He displayed minimal traits of a great uniting leader.

He was thought personally to be lazy, more into food and drink rather 

than into the cares of his people. He was shorter than the average Seminole 

being only five feet and six inches tall compared to an average of six feet. Credit: The State Archives of Florida 
91

He was of large build, probably a trait that led to charges of laziness as he 

weighed a reported 250 pounds, also indicative of his indulgence in food 

and wine. General Clinch observed of Micanopy, “a man of but little talent 

or energy of character but from age and wealth, has much influence in 

the nation.” (Mahon, 124). This influence was illustrated in that Alligator 

was reputed in 1837 to have said in the presence of a Washington treaty 

delegation that when Micanopy speaks, all listen. 

Perhaps the most damning trait attributed to Micanopy, when it comes 

to his role as leader, was his gullibility. He was manipulated by various 

more junior chiefs. Though he advocated for peace, he was manipulated 

and at times even strong armed into violent actions against the US, both 

against Dade and even later at the next major engagement between the 

Seminoles and the US Army. Micanopy’s indirect and ineffectual attempts 

to deter Osceola’s more bombastic and robust calls for war, led to his loss 

of influence as an adviser or prosecutor of the war as the Seminole’s grew 

to choose war over forced relocation. None were willing to challenge 

Micanopy to his face due to his hereditary and cultural prestige but his 

“opinions and advice were generally unheeded” Alligator later asserted. 

(Sprague, 93). However, Micanopy’s influence and role had not faced this 

discredit before Dade’s men encountered the Seminoles on the road to Fort 

King.

After Dade’s Battle, Chief Micanopy would nominally lead the 

Seminole Nation in its revolt against the US Government’s enforcement 

of the removal treaties until 1837 when he surrendered himself to the US 

Army in June and began to negotiate anew the plans to move the Seminoles 

westwards. He was kidnapped (or “rescued”) by Osceola to further inspire 

resistance. He would be captured again by Brigadier General Thomas 

Jesup under a flag of truce, a developing US military method to capture 

key Seminole leaders even though this was sharply against the accepted 

ethics of war. Though he had already agreed to peace once before being 

taken by Osceola, Micanopy was, in December 1838, sent to prison at Fort 

Moultrie, South Carolina where he remained until he and nearly 200 other 

prisoners were shipped to the new Indian Territory the Seminoles were to 

share with their longtime nemesis and parent tribe, the Creek. He died on 

the 2nd of January in 1849 at Fort Gibson, Oklahoma.

Micanopy’s principle subordinates at the battle were two junior 

chiefs, Jumper and Alligator. Osceola was usually the main manipulator 

of Micanopy, bending his ear (or arm in some cases) to his point of view. 

However, Osceola was undertaking the other half of the Seminole plan. 

Osceola would not be present at the battle with Dade as he was focusing on 
92

the other task, that of targeting the political power of the US Government 

in Florida, the Indian Affairs agent Wiley Thompson.

Jumper, or Ote Emathla (on the left in this image) was said to be cunning, 

intelligent and outspoken – a manipulator of Micanopy – as well as selfabsorbed and eloquent. He was said to be about 40 years old at the time 

of the battle with Dade. He was known to be individually a brave warrior. 

His battlefield leadership and outspoken persuasiveness were to be critical 

to the Seminole actions.

Jumper continued to wage war against the US Army after Dade’s 

Battle and was later captured and shipped west to the new lands promised 

to the Seminoles. Once there, Jumper solidified his leadership and would 

become head chief of the Seminoles upon the death of his brother in 1849. 

The following year, Chief Jumper led a delegation back to Florida to try 

to convince the few remaining Seminoles to leave the territory and join 

the rest of the Seminole Nation out west and avert another Seminole war. 

However, there was still a Third Seminole War. 

When the American Civil War broke out in 1861, he organized an 

alliance with the Confederate States of America when the Seminole Nation 

was split with varying allegiances. He served as a major with the First Credit: The State Archives of Florida 
93

Battalion of Mounted Seminole Rifles and later obtained a colonelcy in the 

First Regiment of Seminole Volunteers and served in numerous skirmishes 

in the western theater of war. He died at his home on the 21st of September 

in 1896.

Alligator, or Halpatter 

Tustenuggee was one of the 

planners of the Seminole 

operation. He was known to 

be shrewd and calculating. 

Like Micanopy, he was 

short for a Seminole 

standing at barely five 

feet. Perhaps this led to 

his over compensation as 

he was said to be a selfstyled comedian in all the 

meetings with the white 

delegations. He was said 

to also display delusions 

of grandeur, grandstanding in dealings with 

whites specifically. Some 

of this bombast could be 

attributed to his ability to speak English and his amiable nature as recorded 

by some of the delegates. Even they, though, were said to recognize his 

manipulative qualities and his fellow Seminoles were said to be wary of 

his cunning and political skills. He was estimated to be about 40 years of 

age at the time of the outbreak of hostilities.

The role Alligator played in the battle with Dade’s troopers was a 

strong tactical influence as evidenced by the Seminole’s actions. Alligator 

was said to hold extensive knowledge of the countryside and in tactics, 

demonstrated by his regular use of flanking maneuvers, coordinated 

assaults and retreats and even feints. He was known as “a dangerous foe” 

by contemporary US Army officers. (Sprague, 97-98). These skills were 

displayed first at Dade’s final battle and again throughout the war until 

Alligator fought his final battle. Similar to Private Clark, however, it was 

not just Alligator’s actions on the field of battle that made him important to 

Dade’s Battle; it was also his being the only Seminole account of the battle 

left to posterity. Whether or not this was due to his ability to speak English, Credit: The Smithsonian
94

the fact of Alligator’s account of the fight makes his role and place in the 

battle of important interest.

Alligator more than either of the other chiefs at Dade’s Battle, would 

go on to serve extensively in the Second Seminole War. He was present 

at every major battle from the Battle of the Withlacoochie only days after 

Dade’s Battle to the Battle of Camp Izard’s and the only large set-piece 

battle of the war, the Battle of Okeechobee on Christmas day in 1837. 

Shortly after the Battle of Okeechobee, of which he played a major role, he 

surrendered, tired of the killing, and willingly went west. He was brought 

back to Florida as part of a Seminole commission in late 1841 to convince 

the remaining Seminole holdouts to move west. He was said to have been 

successful and himself would return to the territory in Oklahoma. There 

he continued to advocate for the recognition of a Seminole Nation separate 

from the Creek Nation in the Oklahoma (Indian) Territory. History would 

last hear of him in 1857 when he sent his children to missionary school but 

his actual date of death is unknown.
95

Appendix C

Historical Maps

Map 1. Fort Brooke.
96

Map 2. Area of Dade’s March.
97

Map 3. Initial Assault.
98

Map 4. The Final Assault.
99

Bibliography

Primary Accounts of the Second Seminole War. Only works used in 

the writing of this handbook are listed.

Bemrose, John. Reminiscences of the Second Seminole War. Edited with 

an Introduction and Postscript by John K. Mahon. Tampa, FL: 

University of Tampa Press. 2001.

Cohen, M.M. Notices of Florida and the Campaigns. Charleston, SC: 

Burges and Honour. 1836.

McCall, George A. Letters from the Frontiers. Philadelphia, PA: J.B. 

Lippincott and Company. 1868.

Potter, Woodburne. The War in Florida. Baltimore, MD: Lewis and 

Coleman. 1836.

Sprague, John T. Origin, Progress and Conclusion of the Florida War. D. 

Broadway, NY: Appleton and Company. 1847.

Stoddard, Amos. Exercise for Garrison and Field Ordnance Together 

with Maneuvers. New York, NY: Pelsue & Gold. 1812.

Secondary Sources of the Second Seminole War. As with the primary 

accounts, this list consists of only works used in the writing of this 

handbook.

Covington, James W. The Seminoles of Florida. Gainesville, FL: 

University Press of Florida. 1993.

Cubberly, Frederick. The Dade Massacre. Washington: Government 

Printing Office. 1921.

Graves, Donald E. “Field Artillery of the War of 1812: Equipment, 

Organization, Tactics and Effectiveness”: in Arms Collecting, Vol. 

30, No. 2 (May 1992), p. 39-48.

Hall, John. “Dubious Means and Unworthy Ends: Colonel William 

Worth’s Campaign to End the Second Seminole War”: in War 

Termination: The Proceedings of the War Termination Conference, 

USMA. Edited by Mathew Moten. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute Press. 2010.

Hsieh, Wayne Wei-siang. West Pointers and the Civil War: The Old Army 

in War and Peace. 

Chapel Hill, NC: The University North Carolina Press. 2009.

Laumer, Frank. Dade’s Last Command. Gainesville, FL: University Press 

of Florida. 1995.
100

Mahon, John K. History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (revised 

edition). Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press. 1967.

McReynolds, Edwin C. The Seminoles. Norman, OK: University of 

Oklahoma Press. 1957.

Missall, John and Mary Lou Missal. The Seminole Wars: America’s 

Longest Indian Conflict. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 

2004.

Webb, George. “Dade Battlefield Staff Ride Questions.” Message to 

Michael Anderson. 19 December 2012. E-mail.

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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