CASE STUDY N O. 8

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options

John Hodgson

The Pennsylvania State University

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of

irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including

establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive

approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach.

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need.

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships

among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the

production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the

research direction and overall leadership for this project.

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.

Produced 2010. Material in this case study may be used without permission.

Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University.
1

CASE STUDY N O. 8

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options

John Hodgson

The Pennsylvania State University

. . . and [Brig. Gen. Graham Binns] said to me, “Come ‘round the corner and

let’s have a quick smoke break before you see my commanders . . . I’ve worked

out I could easily get into Az Zubayah now with the most powerful armored brigade the United Kingdom’s [UK] ever put in the field. But if I do, I’ll trash the

place. I'll take unnecessary casualties myself. I will kill lots of civilians. And this

can’t be right.” And I said to him, “Well, my conclusion was precisely the same

for Basra.”

Major General Robin Brims1

INTRODUCTION

On March 24, 2004, British Major General Robin Brims faced a difficult

decision. In just four days, his 1st Armoured Division had traversed nearly

one hundred miles from the Kuwait border, secured the Rumaila oil fields,

had begun to secure the port of Umm Qasr, cleared the Al Faw Peninsula at

the southern tip of Iraq, and surrounded Iraq’s second largest city, crushing

any organized resistance in the process. The first stage of British operations

in the Iraq War was conducted almost flawlessly, with very slight casualties.

But now, at the gates of Basra, Brims faced several daunting tasks, and competing pressures from the American military and his leadership in London;

and every step he made was scrutinized by the British and international

media. Basra presented difficult, if not insurmountable, strategic, operational, and tactical challenges. 

BACKGROUND OF OPERATIONS IN BASRA

Despite the British historic connection to Basra, their role in the south in the

Iraq War occurred largely by accident. The initial planning considerations in

the spring and summer of 2002 depended on a two-pronged ground campaign, with thrusts from the south and the north. While the southern component was already beginning to stage out of existing bases in Kuwait, the

northern component required some level of agreement from Turkey, if only
2 THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN PLAN, MARCH 20, 2003 John Hodgson

to allow the U.S. 4th Infantry Division and other coalition forces, including

those of the British, to pass through to reach the Kurdish territories in northern Iraq. Coalition planners were confident that an agreement could be

reached in time for the ground campaign, and it was in those northern

regions, most likely Mosul, that the British would operate.

However, the U.S. planners underestimated the international pessimism

regarding the Iraq War that would affect the Turkish decision and were

seemingly unaware of the record of British-Turkish relations, especially in

the early twentieth century. The Turks, with their longer historical memory,

had been engaged by the British for similar negotiations before, and it had

not worked out in their favor; the 1932 Treaty of Lausanne gave the oil-rich

area of Mosul to Iraq, not Turkey.2 By the end of 2002, it was clear that the

Turks would not allow coalition forces to operate through their territory and

certainly would not approve of any plan that would enable the British to

operate near their border. Ground forces, including the British, would have

to stage and deploy only from Kuwait.

The overall strategic objective of the coalition was clear: remove the

Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein. Critical tasks included locating and

eliminating stores of weapons of mass destruction, protecting oil infrastructure and reserves and, of course, eliminating armed resistance, including

destroying both the conventional threat of the Iraqi armed forces and any

unconventional threats. American planners, informed by U.S. Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “cut the head off, but the body will remain

intact” ideal, envisioned a surgical air campaign against high-value targets.

This would be followed by a rapid ground advance to and securing of the

capital of Bagdad (seen as the decisive point of the war), in order to force a

collapse in the highest levels of the regime.

In order to accomplish these tasks, the 3rd Infantry Division was to race

to Bagdad through the deserts west of the Euphrates and provide the “left

hook” of the coalition as it passed through the Karbala Gap to the south and

west of the capital. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) would traverse at a slightly slower pace through the heavily populated areas in

between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, with trail elements cleaning up any

pockets of resistance. It was with these latter units that Brims’ 1st Armoured

Division was joined, with the initial responsibility of securing the southeastern tip of Iraq, including the port of Umm Qasr, the Al Faw Peninsula, the

Rumaila oil fields and, ultimately, the city of Basra.

THE OVERALL CAMPAIGN PLAN, MARCH 20, 2003

Brims led a combined arms force consisting of the 7th Armoured Brigade,

the 16th Air Assault Brigade, and the 3rd Royal Marine commandos. He

assumed that at the first signs of a ground campaign, the Iraqis would set fire

to the oil wells and dump reserve stores of crude into the Persian Gulf as

they had done in the Gulf War. So securing the Rumaila oil fields was given
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 3

the first priority. Brims assigned this task to the 3rd Royal Marines, with the

assistance of U.S. and British Special Operations forces. Modeling the overall campaign strategy of rapid movement and clearing pockets of resistance

backwards, the 7th Armoured Brigade and the 16th Air Assault Brigade

would move directly to the outskirts of Basra, securing only the exterior of

the city. Then they would secure the Al Faw Peninsula, support the U.S.

Marines in securing the port of Umm Qasr, and eliminate any other residual

resistance. At that point, American planners counted on the high-powered

and experienced “Desert Rats” of the 7th Armoured Brigade to join the

march of the 1st MEF to Bagdad. Only the lighter air assault and commando

units would remain if needed to clear and secure the southeastern area of

operations. 

Regardless of the initial operational tasks, the United States and their

British partners did not envision continued British responsibility for civil

administration of Basra and the surrounding areas. Rather, the Danish

ambassador to Syria, Ole Wohlers Olsen, was seen as the Basra representative for the emerging Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

The plan was based on two key assumptions. The first, which applied to

all of Iraq, was that the regional and local civil administration would remain

intact and functioning after the removal of Hussein and the destruction of

the armed forces. The second, which applied specifically to the heavily Shia

Basra, was the expectation of a sequel to the Gulf War’s active and armed

resistance of Iraqi citizens against the Ba’athist regime and the Iraqi Army.

Although coalition leaders anticipated heavy, albeit chaotic and disorganized conventional resistance as they sprinted to the immediate objectives,

Source: Map from “The Invasion of Iraq,” PBS website. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/

pages/frontline/shows/invasion/cron/popup_map1.html.
4 THE GROUND CAMPAIGN John Hodgson

they did so with every confidence that the Iraqi people would take up arms

against their Ba’athist overlords and install their own local authorities and

institutions. This would allow the ground campaign to Bagdad to proceed

without any of the distractions of providing stability, support, transition, and

reconstruction along the way.

I thought once ground forces crossed into Iraq, that might be the trigger for a

large-scale Shia insurgency.

Lieutenant General David McKiernan3

Brims had evidence to support those assumptions. During the Gulf War,

the United States had encouraged and inspired Shia resistance in Basra but

had failed to support it. Saddam Hussein had placed Ali Hassan Al-Majid,

“Chemical Ali,” the individual responsible for the 1988 genocide of Kurdish

villagers, the 1996 assassinations of Saddam Hussein’s prodigal sons-in-law,

and numerous other atrocities, in command of the Basra region, specifically

to prevent and eliminate any Shia separatist activity. After the war, Al-Majid

sought vengeance on the city and ruthlessly murdered tens of thousands.4

This time, Brims intended to support Shia hatred of Al-Majid and the

Ba’athist regime. British intelligence operatives were present inside the city

and had relationships and contacts with midlevel representatives of the Iraqi

Army and within the regional government. 

We told them our argument wasn’t with them, it was only with the regime. We

said . . . “Surrender, and you can then rejoin your army under a new leadership.”

We even asked some to come and be part of our coalition.

Major General Robin Brims5

We’d even gone so far as thinking about the possibility of arming those who

were prepared to rebel.

Brigadier General Graham Binns6

THE GROUND CAMPAIGN 

March 20–21, 2003

Triggered by a surgical airstrike on the suspected location of Saddam Hussein, coalition forces stormed across the Kuwait border. According to plan,

the 3rd Royal Marines and their Special Forces partners seized the Rumaila

oil fields in rapid and dynamic fashion, preventing any major damage to oil

reserves or infrastructure. They were able to transition quickly to their second task, clearing the Al Faw Peninsula. The majority of the 7th Armoured

and 16th Air Assault brigades bypassed Umm Qasr and raced the seventy

miles to Basra in less than twenty-four hours and blocked the major high-
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 5

ways and avenues of approach to Bagdad.7 In effect, Major General Robin

Brims’ forces had sealed off the city from any organized, conventional threat

from the Iraqi Army, which had been largely absent from the movement. As

with other units, the 51st Iraqi Army Division faced widespread desertion of

their conscripted soldiers. Unlike the experience of 1991, however, there

were few en masse surrenders. Rather, the soldiers simply donned civilian

apparel and returned to their homes to face whatever fate had in store for

their family and friends. The conventional threat facing Brims was reduced

but not eliminated; remnants still remained in Basra and, with such a large

area of operations, his forces were vulnerable to counterattacks from reinforcing elements.

It was just a constant barrage for 16 hours. We were told that they were going to

surrender in their droves and it was going to be like the first Gulf War . . . But I

never saw any of that.

Sergeant Major Keith Armstrong8

They’re on the ground. They’re firing tracer. We’re firing tracer. They would

just walk up to tanks with RPG’s [rocket-propelled grenades] on their shoulders, trying to get as close as they could . . . when you see the whites in their eyes

and they’re throwing grenades at you, it’s very frightening.

Sergeant Kevin Fletcher9

March 22–23, 2003

Despite the initial success of the first twenty-four hours of the ground campaign, and casualty numbers that were much lower than initial estimates,

coalition forces experienced several setbacks on days three and four of the

war. Iraqis had successfully defeated a U.S. Apache raid by the 11th Attack

Helicopter Regiment, the 507th Maintenance Company had made a muchpublicized wrong turn in Al-Nasiriya, and the much-anticipated Shia revolt

did not occur. 

Fearing a backlash from “Chemical Ali” and with no confidence of support from coalition forces, the residents of Basra had no stomach for resistance. Al-Majid still possessed a means to control the Basra population and

defend the city—the fedayeen militia, a threat coalition planners had not

considered. Inspired by the Somali fighters that had gained international

infamy in early October of 1993, Saddam Hussein’s sons had created the

fedayeen primarily to serve as enforcers for the Ba’ath party. What they

lacked in training was made up for in ruthlessness.

It was quite clear . . . that we were now up against something the size and scale of

which we had yet to sort of [sic] really work out.

Colonel Mike Riddell-Webster10
6 THE GROUND CAMPAIGN John Hodgson

They came forward very stealthily, using civilian vehicles mounted with RPGs

[and] heavy machine guns.

Major Michael Waymouth11

They were willing to fight till the end. They were willing to stay there against all

odds.

Sergeant Kevin Fletcher12

When the British parked at the gates of Basra, the fedayeen became the de

facto authority within the city. Any semblance of civil administration had

vanished, discussions with British intelligence notwithstanding. Unchecked,

their ruthlessness intensified; anyone suspected of unquestioning obedience

to the Ba’ath regime was interrogated, tortured, and/or murdered. Kidnappings and hostage-taking, the fedayeen equivalent of recruiting, became commonplace. 

They were held to account by somebody behind them with a gun, or their families were being detained and would suffer the consequences of their failure to

act correctly.

Major General Robin Brims13

Brims was also aware of a humanitarian crisis within the city as well. Water

services, electricity, etc., for a rebellious Shia population were dilapidated to

begin with due to intentional neglect by the Sunni Ba’ath regime and, with

the absence of civil servants, were abandoned. Although the 3rd Royal

Marines had now secured the port of Umm Qasr, in theory allowing a flow

Figure 1. “Saddam’s Enforcers:” the fedayeen militia.

Source: Associated Press/CBS, from Carol Kopp, “Saddam’s Enforcers,” CBS News.com,

March 26, 2003. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/26/60II/main546259.shtml. 
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 7

of humanitarian aid, no organized body existed within the city to accept and

distribute it in any organized fashion.

Conditions inside the city were bad and deteriorating rapidly and, as a

result, the British now faced a steady and increasing two-way flow of displaced persons. Basra residents were attempting to flee the city, the fedayeen,

a lack of food and water, and the inevitable destructive result of the pending

urban combat. People from the surrounding region were arriving in droves

as well to assist their friends’ and relatives’ transition from resident to refugee. The British quarantine of the city was intended for organized, uniformed resistance. The fedayeen, however, were indistinguishable from other

refugees and, in the coming days, more of the irregular warriors from Iraq,

Iran, and elsewhere infiltrated Basra to prepare the city for the coming fight. 

March 24–25, 2003

In addition to the challenges of March 23rd for the 11th Attack Helicopter

Regiment and the 507th Maintenance Company, a violent sandstorm

caused both the 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st MEF to come to a grinding halt. Despite the optimism of the first forty-eight hours, pundits turned

sour on the prospective outcome. In addition, from the perspective of U.S.

commanders, the British were bogged down in Basra.

. . . there was pressure on the part of [U.S.] higher command to encourage the

British to actually take Basra at an earlier date than they wanted to . . .

Lieutenant General James Conway14

Source: www.war2003action.com. 

Figure 2. British Soldiers Distribute Food Near Al Zubayr, March 31, 2003
8 THE GROUND CAMPAIGN John Hodgson

* * * NEWSCLIP * * *

Crisis in Basra as Troops Fail to Create Corridor for Aid:

Nearly 100,000 Children Could be at Risk, Warns UN Agency

Ewen MacAskill, diplomatic editor, The Guardian, Tuesday, March 25, 2003

The U.S. and British governments are facing a worsening humanitarian crisis in

besieged Basra, Iraq’s second city, where electricity and water supplies have

been severely disrupted. 

The coalition forces are still encountering pockets of resistance in and

around Basra, and have been unable to establish a safe corridor for aid.

Large parts of the city have been without water since Friday.

Unicef [the UN Children’s Fund] and the International Committee of the

Red Cross [ICRC] said yesterday that the people had resorted to drinking from

the river, which is also used for sewage, which could result in disease spreading

through a population vulnerable after more than a decade of UN sanctions.

Unicef warned that 100,000 children under the age of five were at risk.

The UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, appealed for urgent measures to

restore electricity and water.

“A city of that size cannot afford to go without electricity or water for long,”

he said.

“Apart from the water aspect, you can imagine what it does for sanitation.”

The International Committee of the Red Cross said that Basra’s main water

treatment plant, Wafa al-Quaid, on the northern edge of the city, had been out

of action for want of power since Friday, and although other plants were able to

supply about 40% of the usual needs, the quality of the water was poor.

The treatment centre also supplies water to the Zubair hospital.

A Red Cross spokeswoman, Nada Doumani, said: “This is an emergency

situation. We need to restore the full supply.”

Adequate drinking water is vital for the local population because the daytime temperature in Basra, which has a population of 2m, can soar toward 40C

(104F), she said.

An ICRC team worked in Basra at the weekend to restore enough electricity for pumps.

With the main treatment plant out of action, the source of water has been

switched from the Tigris to the Shatt-al-Arab, as the river is known below its

confluence with the Euphrates.

An ICRC spokesman said the population was more vulnerable to waterbased diseases because they have had years of poor food. The spokesman said

there was also a risk of cholera.

The ICRC team was working yesterday to try to get some generators running to provide the remaining 60% of the population with power.

Tamara al-Rifai, the ICRC spokesperson in Kuwait, said the ICRC was

waiting for guarantees of safe passage from the combatants in order to be able to

repair Wafa al-Quaid.

Fighting was continuing yesterday.

US and British forces surround Basra and allow Iraqi civilians to pass in and
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 9

out through checkpoints, but they do not yet have control of the city.

Huge supplies of food, clean water, blankets and medical supplies are sitting

on Royal Navy and US navy ships in the Gulf.

But the commander of the Royal Marines, Brigadier Jim Dutton, said it

would be days rather than hours before humanitarian aid could be unloaded.

The approach to the port has only just been declared safe for Royal Navy

mine hunters to travel through. Yesterday minesweepers began checking the

approach to the port for 70 mines said to have been planted by Iraqi forces.

Brig Dutton said: “There is a delay in getting aid through Umm Qasr and

anything that delays the aid’s movement is bad news. The town is now reasonably secure, but my estimation is that it will still be days rather than hours before

the first ship can start unloading, because of the mine threat.

“But there are other ways we are looking at to get the aid in.”

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship Sir Galahad, laden with food and other

humanitarian supplies, is waiting to enter the port.

Brig Dutton said he was pleased with progress, but added: “It was inevitable

that we would be slightly slower in some areas than we originally expected, and

faster in others, which has been the case.”

A Unicef spokeswoman said: “There must now be a threat of disease as tens

of thousands of people in their homes, hospitals and care institutions attempt to

cope and find what water they can from the river and other sources. Unfortunately, the river is also where sewage is dumped.”

She added: “Not only are they suffering from high rates of malnutrition, in

Basra there is the very real possibility now of child deaths not only from the conflict but from the additional effects of diarrhea and dehydration. We estimate

that at least 100,000 under the age of five are at risk.” 

guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010.

Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2003/mar/25/iraq.disasterresponse/print. 

* * * NEWSCLIP * * *

Desert Rats Retreat under Fierce Onslaught: Marines and Paratroopers

Could be Called in as British Officers Admit Underestimating Resistance

Martin Bentham near Basra, and Ewen MacAskill, The Guardian, 

Tuesday, March 25, 2003

British commanders are considering calling in paratroopers and the Royal

Marine commandos to assist in the battle for Basra after meeting fiercer than

expected resistance. 

British officers admitted they had vastly underestimated the extent of resistance and expressed disappointment that so far they had not been enthusiastically welcomed as liberators. 

The option of calling in the marines and the paratroopers came after some

units of the Desert Rats were forced to withdraw about 10 miles from Basra yesterday. 
10 THE GROUND CAMPAIGN John Hodgson

The US and Britain had hoped that once the city had been surrounded, the

defenders would give up. However, fighting has continued - not against regular

forces but in sporadic episodes against Iraqi fighters, including some said to be

in civilian clothes. 

British artillery shells were fired into the city yesterday, while exchanges

between British tanks and armoured cars and small groups of Iraqis continued

throughout the day. 

The Desert Rats were forced to retreat to avoid an ambush by Republican

Guards, who were reported to be heading out of Basra in civilian clothes in an

attempt to kill or capture British troops. 

During the fighting, British tanks shuffled back and forwards, refuelling and

then heading back to join the fray. Troops approaching along the main road ran

a gauntlet of fire. The soldiers nicknamed a stretch of the road notorious for

rocket-propelled grenade ambushes “RPG alley.” 

One British unit reported coming under fire near a bridge on the outskirts

of Basra airport. Troops said two men dressed as civilians opened up with

rocket-propelled grenades. 

Major Charlie Lambert, second-in-command of the Royal Scots Dragoon

Guards battle group, said the difficulties British troops were facing were caused

by Iraqi renegades out of uniform who were “not playing by the rules.” 

The reaction of British troops to the unexpectedly severe opposition has

been mixed, with some showing little sign of concern and others expressing fear

that the war could drag on for months. 

Sergeant Mark Smith, 38, a provost sergeant with the Royal Scots Dragoon

Guards, said that he remained determined to remove President Saddam but

expected a prolonged struggle. 

“It’s not the Iraqi army we have to worry about, it’s the person with the

Kalashnikov in the back garden,” he said. 

“The Iraqis are smiling assassins. They wave at you as you go past, then

shoot you in the back. I thought from the moment we left camp in Germany

that this would go on for ages.” 

Captain Patrick Trueman, also of the dragoon guards, said a lot of thinking

had to be done before another attempt to clear Basra was made. 

He said: “It was expected that the Iraqi government wouldn’t concern itself

too much with the fall of Basra because of the perceived hatred of Saddam

among the local Shi’ite population. 

“We always had the idea that everyone in this area hated Saddam. Clearly,

there are a number who don’t.” 

British reporters said some Iraqis tried to lure British infantry into a false

sense of security by flying white flags of surrender before opening fire. They

were also said to have used women and children as decoys. 

As some Desert Rats enjoyed a short respite from battle yesterday, there

was time for relaxation. 

Troops washed clothes and chatted, while some played music by Simon and

Garfunkel and the David Gray song Babylon. 

Even at such moments, however, thoughts of the tests ahead were not far
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 11

away. 

“What we really need is Good Morning Vietnam,” said one officer. “Yes,”

agreed another soldier. “That’s what we’ve got here.” 

guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010.

Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/25/iraq.uk1/print.

Southern Iraq, March 20–28, 2003

Facing the immediate challenges in Basra conflicted with the overall Iraqi

campaign needs. Although the postwar narrative that contends that the British were more aware of and concerned with support and reconstruction

requirements than the Americans in the planning stages may be overstated,

the British had to make a decision at that point that would affect Iraq for the

next several years.15 With the fog of war thickening and the heaviest fighting

ahead in Bagdad, Americans longed for the capabilities of the 7th Armoured

Division. In addition, there was still no assumption that the British would

take on the CPA responsibilities in Basra at this point. On the other hand,

Brims faced significant military and humanitarian challenges as his units

staged on the outskirts of the city, challenges that already stretched his available manpower. Remnants of the 51st Iraqi Division sporadically attacked

outposts with T-55 tanks and other antiquated equipment; fedayeen

attempted raids and constantly harassed patrols, often grabbing children as

human shields to prevent the British from returning effective fire. Conditions within the city and the humanitarian crisis worsened. The mobs of displaced persons grew larger. 

Source: Map accessible at WorldMonitor.info website. http://www.worldmonitor.info/

chron/mar2003.html.
12 THE GROUND CAMPAIGN John Hodgson

Brims maintained the loose quarantine of the city and began to plan and

shape the battlefield. Surgical airstrikes targeted high-value targets—key

individuals, Ba’athist headquarters, remaining military command posts and

equipment, and fedayeen strongholds. Armoured patrols ventured just inside

the city, and reconnaissance and sniper teams infiltrated into hide sites. 

We will not desert you this time. Trust us and be patient.

British Army loudspeaker announcement16

It would have been ideal if Basra had surrendered and we had been able to take

the city without a fight. But we will probably need to go in and beat any resistance.

Captain Al Lockwood17

Taking down a city quickly would have been inviting us to attack it very hard,

rubble-ize it, to use one expression, but certainly to go in fairly hard. And one of

our campaign objectives was to make sure we concentrated on thinking about

how we actually rebuilt the infrastructure once the war was over.

Lord Michael Boyce18

March 29, 2003

“Colonel, Maj. Gen. Brims is on his way. He wants a decision brief in 30

minutes. . . .”

Figure 3. Displaced Civilians near Basra, March 21, 2003

Source: Al Jazeerah website. http://www.aljazeerah.info/News%20Photos/2003%20

News%20photos/Jan-May%2015/March%202003%20News%20Photos.htm. 
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 13

Appendix

ESCALATION OF FORCE OPTIONS:

BEYOND SHOUT, SHOOT, OR RUN AWAY 

. . . We are very good at fighting and breaking things and teaching other people

to do the same. But non-lethal effects are critical to winning the war in Iraq. So,

if we are really serious about fighting an insurgency, we have to change our culture and accept the importance and sometimes preeminence, of non-lethal

effects.

Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli19

A variety of nonlethal weapons exist in today’s arsenal that can provide additional capabilities to warfighters and peacekeepers facing one of the most

complex aspects of twenty-first century “hybrid” warfare—the mix of combatants and noncombatants on the battlefield and the difficulty in distinguishing between the two. From twentieth century technologies of rubber

bullets and riot control agents (usually referred to as “tear gas”), to the

recent acoustic warning systems, optical distracters, and vehicle nets, to the

near-science fiction millimeter wave, directed energy technology of the

active denial system, nonlethal weapons have the potential to provide additional time and space for military forces to distinguish between combatant

and noncombatant. Such weapons also allow military forces to make better

decisions and to complete their missions while minimizing the strategic

impact of tactical errors, e.g., the number and scale of noncombatant deaths

and damage to civilian property due to unfortunate but unavoidable mistakes and accidents, and the subsequent impact on domestic and international opinion. For good or ill, military success, in the postmodern world of

24/7 sensationalist news coverage, has been defined to a large extent as an

absence of news to report. 

Nonlethal technologies can support two key tenets of twenty-first century warfare in particular: 1) proportionality in the use of force; and 2) legitimacy of a military presence and, by extension, the host nation/supported

government. In theory, nonlethal weapons, used appropriately in specific

situations, can support those reoccurring themes. However, the historical

record is mixed. U.S. forces employed nonlethal weapons successfully in

Somalia in 1995 and Kosovo in 2000. Experience in Northern Ireland and

Israel-Palestine may suggest that the improper and punitive use of rubber

bullets and tear gas bred additional dissent, served as a rallying cry for

“insurgents,” and decreased the perceived legitimacy of military and law

enforcement operations. 

Operations in Northern Ireland provided the British military with more

experience than any other force in the world in employing rubber bullets

and tear gas. Despite (or because of) that experience, and although President Bush had authorized the use of tear gas in theatre,20 the British elected

not to deploy nonlethal weapons to Iraq. Facing the crowds of displaced
14 ENDNOTES John Hodgson

persons, rioters, and looters, British forces’ options were limited to shouting,

shooting, or running away. 

ENDNOTES

1. Maj. Gen. Robin Brims (commander, 1st Armoured Division) in “The Invasion

of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS, Richard Sanders and Jeff Goldberg, February 26, 2004. Transcript

at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/etc/script.html. 

2. Williamson Murray and Robert Scales, The Iraq War: a Military History

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 135.

3. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, in “The Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline,

PBS.

4. Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, p. 146, and “The Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline,

PBS.

5. Brims, in “The Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.

6. Brig. Gen. Graham Binns (commander, 7th Armoured Brigade), in “The

Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.

7. An accessible map that depicts operations in southern Iraq can be viewed at

http://www.worldmonitor.info/chron/mar2003.html. 

8. Sgt. Major Keith Armstrong (7th Armoured Brigade), in “The Invasion of

Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.

9. Sgt. Kevin Fetcher (7th Armoured Bridade), in “The Invasion of Iraq,”

Frontline, PBS.

10. Col. Mike Riddell-Webster (7th Armoured Brigade), in “The Invasion of Iraq,”

Frontline, PBS.

11. Major Michael Waymouth (7th Armoured Brigade), in “The Invasion of Iraq,”

Frontline, PBS.

12. Fletcher, in “The Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.

13. Brims, in “The Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.

14. Lt. Gen. James Conway, supplemental interview for “The Invasion of Iraq”

website. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/conway.

html#basra. 

15. See, for example, Jonathan Steele, Defeat; Why America and Britain Lost Iraq

(London: Counterpoint, 2008), pp. 159–192. 

16. Quoted in Martin Bentham, “British Snipers, Baath Stoolies Chip at Basra,”

Daily Telegraph (UK), April 4, 3003.

17. Cpt. Al Lockwood (British Army spokesman), quoted in “Basra now military

target, says UK,” CNN.com/World, March 25, 2003. http://www.cnn.com/2003/

WORLD/europe/03/25/sprj.irq.basra/index.html. 

18. Lord Michael Boyce (UK chief of Defense staff, 2001–2003) in “The Invasion

of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.

19. Peter Chiarelli, interview in Field Artillery magazine, September-October, 2005.

20. Although both the United States and the United Kingdom signed the Chemical

Warfare Convention of 1993, the Untied States did so with the caveat that the United

States “is not restricted by the [Chemical Warfare Convention] in its use of [tear gas] in

various peacetime and peacekeeping operations.” See the President’s Certification

Document to the Chemical Warfare Convention, April 27, 1997 and the earlier Executive

Order 11850 (1975).
15

CASE STUDY N O. 8, TEACHING NOTES

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options

John Hodgson

The Pennsylvania State University

PURPOSE

The events in Basra in the spring of 2003 provide an example of an intersection of major issues: differences in national interest, differences in opinion

regarding strategy and tactics, and competing priorities and resources. All of

these appeared in the context of a “hybrid” conflict, that is, elements of conventional and unconventional warfare, humanitarian assistance, control of

displaced persons, and security operations with multiple state and nonstate

actors, all occurring simultaneously in the same geographic area. In that

regard, the situation in Basra in late March and early April 2003 presented a

worst-case scenario for military commanders and civilian leadership. As a

worst-case scenario, this case represents a challenging test-bed, a venue for

students to discuss the dilemmas and issues facing the key actors and to

develop a plan—including aspects of the strategic, operational, and tactical

levels of warfare—with the benefit of hindsight, to bring the situation to an

acceptable conclusion quickly and efficiently.

The purpose of the case study is not to discuss the legitimacy of the Iraq

War, the British involvement therein, or the decisions, largely American, in

the early planning stages (e.g., appropriate troop levels and the “rolling

start”) of the war. As tempting as it will be for some students to engage in

those discussions, the instructor should avoid those arguments and focus on

the problems facing the British at Basra. The instructor should discuss U.S.

and UK national interests and coalition strategic objectives in an earlier class

and, more importantly, should emphasize to students that they are roleplaying military leaders in this case study. They have been given a job to do

and must objectively identify and address the critical issues with the

resources available. 

TEACHING SUGGESTIONS

1. Clips from the Frontline documentary, “The Invasion of Iraq,” (PBS,

Richard Sanders and Jeff Goldberg, February 26, 2004) regarding

the British experience in Basra are particularly suitable to begin the
16 TEACHING SUGGESTIONS John Hodgson

class. The video and supporting website, http://www.pbs.org/

wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/cron/, include interviews

with civilian and military leaders, soldiers, Iraqi residents, military

commanders, and fedayeen, maps, a timeline of events, and analyses.

2. Background maps are also useful; some are provided within the case

and annotated in the footnotes. The book by Williamson Murray

and Robert Scales, The Iraq War; a Military History (Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), includes more detailed maps

in the inserts after pages 88 and 152. 

3. The initial questions, as with all case studies, should provide the students an opportunity to frame the case, (e.g., What is the case about?

Who are the major actors? What are their interests? What are their

challenges/problems? Specific to this case, opening questions might

include:

– What are the British operational objectives?

– What were the key planning assumptions?

– What is the priority/what are the essential tasks?

– According to the plan, what is the British sustained involvement to

be in postwar Iraq?

4. Ideally, the students will focus on the issues facing Major General

Robin Brims and his 1st Armoured Division. As discussed above, the

purpose of this case study is to provide a venue for the students to

develop a plan to solve the array of challenges, i.e., what are the

issues, and how do you address them? The events suggest that Brims

faced two key decision points that allow the instructor to focus and/

or segment the discussion:

4a. The primary decision point occurred on or about March 24 and 25,

2003. The 1st Armoured Division had accomplished its initial objectives, had arrived at Basra, and had paused to survey and assess the

situation. At that point, Brims and his subordinate commanders, as

the opening quote alluded to, began to realize the enormity of the

challenges in Basra. Yet, they were urged to release the 7th

Armoured Brigade to join the efforts in the march to Bagdad. The

two-week pause between March 24 and April 6 illuminated the strategic, operational, and tactical differences in opinion on how to proceed between the Americans and the British. Events during that

period caused some to realize the fault of key planning assumptions,

i.e., a mass Shia uprising and the stability of the local civilian administration. Questions include:
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 17

– Should Brims release the 7th Armoured Brigade?

– What are the major challenges/problems?

– In what order do you prioritize them?

– How do you solve/address those challenges?

Some of the “shaping of the battlefield” tasks that Brims executed,

such as surgical air and artillery strikes, reconnaissance and intelligence operations, and information and psychological operations

(loudspeakers and leaflets), that may not be obvious to the civilian

student are provided. A learning objective of this case is that in

“hybrid” warfare, how the expeditionary force accomplishes its mission is as important as or more important than what it does. For

example, if the students identify the need to screen the displaced

civilians for fedayeen and/or deserting Iraqi soldiers, how will they

determine if a person is a threat or not? What resources do you allocate to accomplish that task? At the expense of what other requirements?

4b. This case may also be used to highlight the challenges in the transition from major combat operations to stability and reconstruction

operations (in the context of “hybrid” warfare). In Basra, that point

occurred on April 7, 2003. The British seized the fedayeen stronghold

in the College of Literature and effectively ended large-scale resistance within the city and surrounding regions. Some sections of the

city showed evidence of urban combat, but the vast majority of the

homes remained unscathed. Widespread looting, a lack of services

(e.g., water, electricity) and other civil disorder disproved the

assumption that local authority would remain intact. The British recognized the transition and reconstruction needs but were not

resourced nor mandated to fill them. Questions include:

– What are the major challenges/problems? In what priority?

– What resources are available?

– How do you solve the challenges/problems?

Again, for recommended solutions to each identified challenge or

problem, it is important that the students specifically address how the

solution will be accomplished and estimate the second- and thirdorder effects of each. For example, if students identify the need to

create a city/regional police force, who will they hire and train? How

will they screen applicants? Who will train them? How will they be

resourced? If they recommend reinstating the Hussein-era local

authorities, how will the residents react? If they recommend creating
18 TEACHING SUGGESTIONS John Hodgson

a new force based on a quota system, how will they integrate the

members in a nonsectarian manner in a society rooted in sectarian

and tribal division?

If the instructor wishes to emphasize this aspect of Basra operations, the section “Epilogue; the Siege of Basra and Aftermath”

should be included in the student read-ahead.

5. While students in political science and international relations likely

will focus on the dilemmas facing the British at the political and strategic level, students in a military history and professional military

education venue likely will focus on the operational and tactical

tasks. A more focused class also could discuss specifically the variety

of lethal and nonlethal force options available to deal with the tactical problems. Many technologies are available to separate combatants from noncombatants and to control crowds, for example, in

order to provide additional space and time for soldiers to make better decisions and mitigate collateral damage and other unintended

consequences. The case study, “The British and the Iraqis in Basra in

2003,” in David Koplow, Non-Lethal Weapons; the Law and Policy of

Revolutionary Technologies for the Military and Law Enforcement

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) is better suited for a

discussion on the use of specific nonlethal weapons in this scenario.

The insert, “Escalation of Force Options; Shout, Shoot, or Run

Away,” is intended as a point of departure for both a general discussion of nonlethal weapons within the framework of the overall Basra

strategic dilemmas or the decision to employ these weapons in Basra

or not. Possible discussion questions include:

– Strategic implications: Will nonlethal weapons help or hinder the

mission? Will they add to or detract from the perceived legitimacy

of the operation? How will they affect international opinion?

– International treaties: The United States and the United Kingdom

interpret the Chemical Warfare Convention differently (the

United States authorizes the use of tear gas in specific situations).

In coalition warfare, how do you resolve those differences?

– Capabilities: If you were a British soldier, what nonlethal capabilities would you want to have?

– Personnel/training: As a commander, into whose hands do you

entrust nonlethal weapons?

– Legal/ethical: As a commander, what rules of engagement criteria

or other instructions regarding lethal and nonlethal capabilities do

you give your soldiers?
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 19

– Strategic communications and information operations: What

information about your nonlethal weapons do you provide to the

citizens of Basra?

– Logistics: You cannot bring everything. What capabilities do you

leave behind in order to allow space for nonlethal weapons, their

ammunition, and their associated equipment?

6. This case may also be presented as a planning scenario. Professional

military education students will be experts in military planning processes and techniques, but undergraduate and graduate students

could benefit from this teaching method as well. While it would be

cumbersome for those students to become familiar with Field Manual 5.0, Army Planning and Orders Production, and Joint Publication

5.0, Joint Operation Planning, a review of applicable publications such

as the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project’s Military Planning Guide may be useful for civilian students to augment a simple

problem-solving outline (define the problem, list assumptions, identify resources, explore options). 

7. The takeaway of this scenario is to highlight the complexity and difficulties of military and political operations in a “hybrid” environment.

It is not to debate the legitimacy of the Iraq War overall, dwell on

planning failures, nor critique the British conduct, although some of

those points, if focused, can further demonstrate the challenges of

hybrid conflict. Rather, the case study challenges students to face the

daunting task of identifying, prioritizing, and addressing issues in the

most challenging of environments. As a worst-case scenario, the lesson of this class is that there are no right answers, only a series of

choices, of which the long-lasting effects are unknown. 

REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READING

1. For a discussion of “hybrid” warfare, see, for example, Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st

Qtr. 2009): 34-39. http://www.potomacinstitute.org/media/mediaclips/2009/Hoffman_JFQ_109.pdf, Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal; Leadership in a Three Block War,” Marines (January

1999), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_cor

poral.htm. 

2. For a history of Basra in the modern era, focusing on the issue of

popular uprising and revolt, see Reidar Visser, Basra, the Failed Gulf

State; Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq (Munster: Lit

Verlag, 2005).
20 REFERENCES AND ADDITIONAL READING John Hodgson

3. Williamson Murray and Robert Scales, The Iraq War; a Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 129-

153, “The British War in the South.”

4. For a discussion of possible nonlethal force options specific to the

Basra situation, see David Koplow, Non-Lethal Weapons; the Law and

Policy of Revolutionary Technologies for the Military and Law Enforcement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 113-128,

“The British and the Iraqis in Basra in 2003.” For a summary of current nonlethal technologies, see National Research Council, An

Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and Technologies (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003).

5. For planning references, see Mass Atrocity Response Operations

(MARO) Military Planning Guide (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy

School, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, and the Carlisle, PA:

U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, 2010),

available at http://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/Handbook%20or%20Guide/MARO%20Planning%20Handbook_Index

ed-CDR-379.pdf. 

6. For a first-hand account of the events and challenges in Basra after

the end of major combat operations, see Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in

Basra; My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).
Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options 21

EPILOGUE: THE SIEGE OF BASRA AND AFTERMATH

Over the next two weeks, Brims’ approach proved successful; Basra residents provided intelligence to British patrols on the location of fedayeen,

Ba’athists, and their caches. Brims retained command of the 7th Armoured

Brigade and prepared them to enter the city. On April 5, Brims launched

surgical air strikes on a Ba’ath meeting and on the suspected location of

“Chemical Ali.” Many Ba’ath leaders were killed. Al-Majid survived but was

believed to have been killed. The rumor was as successful as the intended

result and, on April 6, Brims thought the city ready for a British entrance. 

Brims launched the 7th Armoured Brigade and air support on a daytime

raid deep into the city, planning on pulling them out prior to nightfall, when

their vehicles would be more vulnerable to RPG ambush. However, any

remaining Ba’ath control of the city collapsed, and Brims decided to destroy

any further resistance immediately. Major fighting occurred at a factory

complex and at the College of Literature, which the fedayeen occupied as a

headquarters and barracks. While the fighting was described as a picture of

violent, street-to-street and house-to-house combat, the British suffered

only three deaths and, by the morning of April 7, resistance had effectively

ended. The people of Basra rejoiced.

The coalition planning assumption that the Iraqi people would greet

coalition forces as liberators proved to be correct in Basra, at least for a time.

The Shia population certainly demonstrated their joy at having the yoke of

Ba’ath oppression thrown off. However, they soon reacted to years of frustration by destroying and looting government buildings and other locations

associated with the Hussein regime and the Ba’ath party. The British seemingly understood and approved the actions and watched, at the time still

focused on rousting residual fedayeen. However, in scenes repeated all over

Iraq as cities and towns were cleaned of Ba’ath leadership, looters expanded

their spread from government offices to homes, sometimes abandoned,

sometimes not. In the absence of any police force and adequate civilian

administration, the looting escalated to other criminal activity as well. The

practice of hostage-taking continued; however, the perpetrators were not

merely fedayeen but members of rival clans, tribes, and other factions.

The humanitarian crisis did not abate, either. More aid arrived through

Umm Qasr, welcomed by disorganized mobs. Meanwhile, the water supply,

the electric grid, and other services remained in shambles. The two-way traffic of displaced persons continued. The residents of Basra needed leadership

and assistance in reconstruction efforts, a mission that the British were illprepared and ill-equipped to accomplish.

. . . We got advice about managing a humanitarian crisis, but that wasn’t what

was required. We needed professional engineers to rebuild things. We needed

water engineers. We needed bank managers.

Brigadier General Graham Binns1
22 EPILOGUE: THE SIEGE OF BASRA AND AFTERMATH John Hodgson

Olsen, the CPA’s senior civilian in southern Iraq, left Basra only weeks

after the British toppled the Ba’ath regime. He was replaced by Sir Hilary

Synnott, an appointment that formalized British control over the city and

region. Since then, the British efforts in counterinsurgency, stability, security, transition, and reconstruction have experienced significant and dramatic ups and downs. Those efforts, after the spring of 2003, as part of the

overall coalition experience in Iraq, have been the subject of much debate

and scrutiny and are outside the scope of this case. The purpose of this case

is to explore the options available to the British in the early stages of the

Basra operation. However, it is interesting to ask the question: If the British

had pursued other options in late March and early April in Basra, would the

experience of the subsequent years have worked out differently?

1. Binns, in “The Invasion of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS.
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