A popular Government, 

without popular information or the mean

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Traged

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignoran

And a people who mean to be their ow

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power w

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
SECURITY ALIGNMEN

JAMES W. MORRISON 

McNair Paper 40 

April 1995 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC ST

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

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U.S. national s~rity in the post--Cold War era. These monographs present 

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Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implie

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University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Governm

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Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20

ISSN 
European Union and Western 

European Union .................... 

Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe ................ 

Commonwealth of Independent States ...

Other Regional and Sub-regional Groups 

. NATO EXPANSION QUESTIONS ........ 

Recent History ....................... 

Precedents ......................... 

Should NATO Expand Its Membership? ...

Should Additional Criteria for 

Membership Be Specified? ........... 

Full or Partial Membership? ............. 

Which States Should Be 

Considered for Membership? .......... 

Timing ............................. 

Sequencing ......................... 

Dividing Lines in Europe ................ 

Partnership for Peace As A 

Mandatory Route .................. 

Readiness of Western Parliaments 

and Publics ....................... 

Impact of Enlargement on NATO 

Effectiveness ..................... 

The Future of North Atlantic Cooperation 

Council and Partnership for Peace ...

Views Expressed in Different Countries ...

iii 
NATO POLICY ..................... 

Security Alignments .................. 

NATO Expansion .................... 

APPENDIXES ........................ 

A. Evolution of Select European Security 

Institutions Since World War II ........ 

B. A Growing Institutional Political and Se

Network ........................ 

C. Partnership for Peace Invitation and 

Framework Document .............. 

D. Chairman's Summary of Meeting of No

Atlantic Cooperation Council Meeting, 

December 1995, and Work Plan for Di

Partnership and Cooperation 1994/199

NACC and PFP) .................. 

E. NATO Participation Act of 1994 ....... 

F. Bill Under Consideration in U.S. 

Congress m "NATO Revitalization and 

Expansion Act of 1995" . ............ 

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ........... 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ............... 

iv 
 States in Central and Eastem Europe are seeking me

in NATO. NATO has responded with outreach progra

recently the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program. NAT

have said they expect and welcome NATO expansi

evolutionary process in which PFP will play an impor

In the public debate, officials and scholars have ma

arguments in favor of expansion, against it, and to def

• There appears to be general support in Cong

American and European publics, and the executive bra

NATO states for inviting Central and Eastern Europe

particularly the four Visegrad states of the Czech R

Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, to join NATO, but no 

have been made nor dates established. Russian offic

been ambivalent but often object to expansion of N

include Central and Eastem European states but not Ru

• NATO is conducting a study to address how NAT

expand and what the implications would be. Among t

that may be raised are: 

whether additional criteria for member-ship s

specified 

which states should be invited 

when and possibly in what sequence, if any, the

be invited 

how to avoid dividing lines in Europe 

the impact of enlargement on NATO effe

continuation of outreach programs with states n

the relationship between NATO and Russia. 

• Of six illustrative alternative future security align

Europe (three involving NATO expansion and three 

first-NATO expansion to include Central and Eastem 

states, adding from 1-11 new members, while continuing 

V 
to Europe. With the revolutionary changes in C

Eastem Europe beginning in 1989, many states in the 

pressing for membership in NATO and the ELI. 

NATO has responded by establishing the Nort

Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991 and the PFP in 

establishing PFP, NATO leaders announced that they 

and welcomed NATO expansion as an evolutionary 

which PFP would play an important role. NATO 

conducting a study to address how NATO might ex

what the implications would be. 

The EU and WEU have intensified and expanded c

in Western Europe and have also developed outreach 

to the East, which have lead to associate status for ma

and Eastern European states and may lead to full memb

some. 

OSCE is becoming increasingly active and institu

in human rights activities, helping to prevent or resolv

and promoting security. 

The CIS is promoting cooperation among its 12 m

NATO EXPANSIONmKEY ISSUES 

Should NATO Expand? 

• Arguments in favor: NATO expansion could: 

be responsive to requests for NATO member

by reform leaders in Central and Eastem Euro

enhance security from the West's perspe

improving stability in Central and Eastem Eur

avoid-ing a security vacuum, nationalization o

vi 
integrate with the West. 

- help keep NATO vibrant and alive. 

- take advantage now of the situation in Russia an

NATO before that situation possibly worsens. 

- not let NATO expansion be seen as subject to 

veto. 

Arguments against NATO expansion: 

- there is now no threat to Central and Eastem 

necessitating expansion. 

- Extending membership to some states but not st

as Russia and others in CIS and even some i

and Eastem Europe could mean drawing new 

lines in Europe between the West and Russia 

within Central and Eastern Europe which could: 

reformers in states not invited; set back the g

united Europe; and lead to tensions, bloc format

possibly confrontations. 

- NATO should not be extending security comm

particularly when NATO states are reducing reso

defense. 

- Expansion could ruin NATO, in terms of: losi

cohesion, and ability to reach consensus; jeo

relations between allies in favor of and 

expansion; possible introduction of a Troja

increasing pressures to withdraw U.S. forces fro

if forces are not forward deployed into Ce

Eastern Europe; possibly including Russia in 

with a veto. 

vii 
this will take time. 

There is too much instability or uncertainty 

and Eastem Europe now, and reforms are too 

insecure. 

More examination and debate is needed, and t

how much candidate states are prepared to coo

what they can contribute. 

Early expansion could discourage reformers in 

admitted and foster complacency in states adm

NATO will need detailed study of how to ex

implications of expansion. 

Parliaments and publics in NATO states 

sufficiently debated NATO expansion and ex

security guarantees to the East. 

If Russia or others threaten Central and Eastem 

states in the future, then NATO coul

membership at that time. 

SHOULD ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FO

MEMBERSHIP BE SPECIFIED? 

The North Atlantic Treaty's Article 10 provides that 

to be invited to accede to the Treaty it must be a "Euro

in a position to further the principles of this Trea

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." 

In the PFP invitation and framework agreement iss

January 1994, NATO Summit leaders indicated or im

to become a member a state must be located in Europ

to promote NATO principles and security, be demo

located east of NATO, and be an active PFP participan

leaders also implied that to join and be active in PF

viii 
resources for PFP cooperation; and be ready to exchange 

information. 

Congress has also attempted to establish criteria, p

democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian c

armed forces, rule of law, protection of citizens' rights

for the territorial integrity of neighbors, and non-su

international terrorism. 

NATO may consider specifying additional criteria, gu

or precepts. Attempting to agree on and specify a

criteria could suggest both a double standard (since such 

were not specified for earlier accessions) and moving 

line of membership further away. It could also cause p

as NATO tries to develop and agree on additional crit

cause contentious issues to be raised as states ap

membership and some are accepted and others are not. 

advisable for NATO ultimately to decide on new membe

political judgment backed by criteria or guidelines alread

FULL OR PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP? 

The U.S. Govemment and NATO appear to be conside

membership in NATO as the only step beyond particip

PFP, unlike the Western European Union which has ob

associate partners, associate members, and full member

WHICH STATES SHOULD BE 

CONSIDERED FOR MEMBERSHIP? 

Most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe ha

known their desire to join NATO, some more vocally tha

States in the CIS have been more ambivalent or h

ix 
relationships in PFP with Russia and other states. 

TIMING 

Neither NATO nor the U.S. Administration has su

timetable for accepting new members. New 

introduced in the House states that the U.S. and NA

should assist the Visegrad states to transition to fu

membership not later than 10 January 1999. 

SEQUENCING 

There are a number of sensitive issues inv

considering whether to address membership e

country-by-country or to consider countries as 

which countries to consider first; and how long 

might be between admission of states. 

X 
and Canada, out of a total of 40 European states plus an

in the CIS) does not constitute a division of Europe, n

addition of select new members to NATO, particularly 

continues to pursue cooperative outreach programs 

NACC and PFP. 

READINESS OF PARLIAMENTS AND 

PUBLICS 

Congress appears to support extending NATO memb

select Central and Eastem European countries, particu

Visegrad states, but it has not addressed the details. 

opinion polls in the United States and Europe show con

support for NATO membership for Central and Eastem E

states (ranging, by state, from 66% to 42%). Majo

Europe also believe Russia should be given the optio

when it meets all qualifications. 

IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON 

NATO EFFECTIVENESS 

The impact on NATO of adding new members woul

greatly on which states are admitted and how many 

admitted. Smaller states would likely have less impact 

or requiring changes in NATO and reaching consensu

states, however, should have more to contribute to 

security but would likely also be more influential. 

number of states admitted increases, so will the pote

diluting NATO's focus and creating problems in 

consensus. States in which reforms have not been con

and states with internal or extemal ethnic group tensio

xi 
COOPERATION COUNCIL AND THE 

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGR

To the extent NATO focuses attention on membership e

there could be less attention to NACC and PFP 

Cooperation in NACC and PFP will be important bot

toward NATO membership and as cooperation betwe

and states not joining NATO. 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

The United States and NATO should pursue an 

extending membership to states in Central and Eastem 

While giving primacy to expansion, NATO should enco

promote a broader web of European-related 

organizations, including OSCE, NACC, PFP, the EU a

NATO should pursue unique relations with Russia and 

NATO should: 

• move forward to expand. 

• proceed with utmost care. 

• not try to develop and specify new cr

membership. 

• address candidate countries individually. 

• be very selective. 

• work toward inviting at least one country withi

1-2 years to join NATO; at present, the first country 

should probably be the Czech Republic. 

• not close the door on possible associations wi

short of full membership. 

• work toward developing a unique relationship

NATO and Russia and Ukraine respectively. 

xii 
SECURITY ALIGNMENTS 

• 

PRESENT SITUATION AND TRE

IN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS 

INTRODUCTION 

The present NATO agenda contains a key issue: 

membership to countries of the East. NATO summit 

January 1994 spoke of expecting and welcomin

expansion, and President Clinton has said NATO expa

"no longer a question of whether, but when and how." A

the President's conclusion, this paper makes three asses

NATO expansion then offers certain recommendations

• An assessment of the present situation and 

NATO and other security institutions related to Eu

Eurasia 

• An assessment of key issues related to possible 

of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Org

(NATO) 

• An assessment of aitemative security align

Europe and extending to North America and Eura

Vancouver to Vladivostok) 

• Recommendations for U.S. and NATO policy

In the nearly 50 years since the end of World War I

agreements and institutions related to European secu

emerged and evolved. France and the United Kingdo
have been undertaken to develop a "European Sec

Defense Identity" and to revitalize the WEU and 

"Common Defense Policy." 

Post World War II trans-Atlantic security arrangem

formally set in 1949 when states in Westem Europea

United States and Canada concluded the North Atlan

and established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

In the preamble to the Treaty, parties expres

determination to "safeguard the freedom, common he

civilization of their peoples, founded on the prin

democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"; s

intent to "seek to promote stability and well-being in 

Atlantic area"; and resolved to "unite their efforts for 

defense and for the pre~rvation of peace and security"

the EU, and the WEU have expanded over the years 

new West European countries (see appendix A). 

In May 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (th

Pact) was established for the express purpose of p

mutual defense among the Soviet Union and seven 

Eastern Europe. Albania withdrew in 1968, and th

Democratic Republic withdrew in 1990. Beginning 

revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe an

in the Soviet Union led to the dissolution of the Warsa

1 July 1991. The organization that Moscow created in 

intemational economic cooperation among Warsaw Pac

as well as other states---the Council for Mutual 

Assistance (often called CEMA, CMEA, or Comec

dissolved in January 1991. 

In 1973, the first East-West institution, with 35 

was established in the form of the Conference on Se

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which, now grow

members, was renamed the Organization for Sec
Soviet Union are all members of the CIS, with the exc

the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, wh

not sought CIS membership The CIS deals with 

economic, and security cooperation. 

Following the revolutionary changes in Central an

Europe and the former Soviet Union during 1989-1991

the EU, and the WEU developed outreach programs to 

NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation 

(NACC) in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Pr

1994. NATO's outreach programs have been extende

all states of Central and Eastern Europe (except some 

the former Yugoslavia) and the CIS. In contrast, the W

EU have been more exclusive, particularly in focusing o

and Eastern Europe and avoiding or restricting their 

programs to states of the CIS, Albania, and states that 

of the former Yugoslavia (see appendix B). 

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION 

Now in its 46th year, NATO was established in 1949 to 

the goals established in the preamble to the North 

Treaty. The North Atlantic Council is the senior body a

regularly at the permanent representative level, twice a y

foreign minister level, and occasionally at the level of 

government and state. Defense ministers meet regula

a year. The NATO Military Committee meets in p

session with military representatives, and chiefs of staff

members meet twice a year. There are many other co

and an integrated military command structure. 

The future of NATO is currently being discusse

levels. At a broad level, scholars and analysts are ask
raise a number of problems regarding NATO and the c

the former Yugoslavia. Others raise the issue of the p

NATO when they discuss outreach programs to the 

possible NATO expansion. The overall issue has s

boiled down to "collective defense" or "collective se

whether NATO should focus on collective def

emphasized in the preamble and Articles 3-6 of t

Atlantic Treaty, or be transformed into or become 

collective security an'angement (in support of the go

Treaty's preamble of seeking "to promote stability and w

in the North Atlantic area"). 

At the more operational, govemment or bureaucra

NATO is addressing several key issues. NATO's 

programs to the East--the North Atlantic Cooperatio

(NACC), the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, 

possible expansion of NATO membership, often calle

enlargement, are addressed in greater detail later. 

Other key issues being addressed in NATO 

development of the European defense pillar, concent

West European integration and cooperation, an

development of the trans-Atlantic relationship betwee

and North America. These issues are often 

conceptually in work toward a European Security and 

Identity (ESDI), a Common Foreign and Security Pol

European Union, and the Common Defense Policy of th

European Union. The WEU is often seen as the embo

the European defense pillar. 

The relationship between NATO and the WE

important issue, as is the development in NATO and the 

the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, whic

on organizing multiservice forces from two or more 

primarily for peace operations presumably outside the t
from NATO. NATO itself is reviewing its mission

organization of its integrated military structure. 

Conflict in the Balkans is another issue in NATO

allies, along with Russia and other states supporting U.N

are attempting to help resolve or at least contain the c

the Balkans. Allies have provided humanitarian assis

airlift; some allies have deployed forces on the ground 

and Herzegovina, or have deployed ground forces in M

as a deterrent; NATO and the WEU have conducted 

interdiction operations in the Adriatic under Operati

Guard in support of U.N. economic and arms sanct

NATO has conducted Operation Deny Flight to preve

military aircraft by forces fighting in Bosnia and Her

Four allies the United States, the United Kingdom, Fr

Germany--along with Russia have established an Int

Contact Group to promote a negotiated settlement to 

conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

In early 1995, NATO announced a new initiative 

certain states in North Africa in a dialogue on Medi

security. In discussing the initiative, NATO Secretar

Willy Claes has said: "For the time being, we are still 

the problems with regard to fundamentalism, which a

connected to the proliferation of weapons of mass destru

terrorism. It is a new mission for NATO. ''1 The 

appears related to concerns expressed particularly b

Italy, and Spain. 

It should be noted that in addition to formal NATO 

and activities, individual member states of NATO are e

a wide range of bilateral relations and activities with oth

allies and with other countries in Westem Europe, Ce

Eastern Europe, and Eurasia. 
also attempting to develop a Common Foreign and 

Policy, is looking to the WEU to serve as the bas

European defense pillar of NATO. The EU enc

intergovemmental bodies including the decisionmaking 

of Ministers, which is assisted by a Committee of P

Representatives, and the European Council, which is 

level body that meets 2-3 times a year;, the EU also c

supranational institutions, including the Commissio

administers policy decisions, and the European Parliam

Even as it worked to deepen integration, the EU ha

expansion of its membership. Three new members-

Finland, and Sweden--joined the EU in early 1995. No

signed a treaty of accession, but a public referendum rej

accession, so Norway is not expected to join the EU 

ever. With three new members, the EU comprises 15 m

with the expanded membership, four or 25 percen

members (Ireland, plus Austria, Finland, and Sweden) 

that have traditionally been described as "neutral." T

result in any EU "Common Foreign and Security Polic

more independent of NATO and the U.S. than in the p

Six states from Central and Eastern Europe--Bulg

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak

signed "associate agreements" with the EU and hope e

to accede to the EU by treaty. On 15 December 199

formally opened negotiations with the Baltic states of 

Latvia, and Lithuania on "associate agreements"; the E

Commissioner has noted that the Baltic states will be tr

same way as the other six associate members w

negotiations are completed. 2 Additionally, Slovenia, M

Cyprus might be invited to join. Addition of these 

would bring the number of EU members to 27. 3 

membership between the EU and those states likely to b
human fights and basic rights for ethnic minorities, a

existence of market economy structures able to survi

EU. 5 

Albania, perhaps because of its relatively poor econ

the fact that its population is primarily Muslim, has 

invited to sign an "associate agreement." None of the 

states of the former Yugoslavia has been invited to sign 

agreement. 

Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova have signed "parlne

cooperation agreements" with the EU. There is little ex

at this time that these states will become members of 

None of the other states of the CIS have signed such agr

The WEU has been reinvigorated. It has m

headquarters from London to Brussels and created a 

staff of some 50 officers. The WEU is working on c

common defense policy. It has undertaken mission

Adriatic Sea in connection with establishing an embargo 

to parties fighting in the former Yugoslavia. The WEU

as NATO, is developing a concept for establishm

deployment of Combined Joint Task Forces, which wou

establish the basis for having available forces that are 

but not separate from NATO. 

The WEU has also expanded, adding "observers," "

members," and "associate partners." In December 199

member states, meeting in Maastricht at the time of 

meeting, invited members of the EU to accede to the 

become observers and invited other European members 

to become associate members of the WEU. ° In addition 

full members of the WEU, Ireland and Denmark are "ob

Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are "associate members;" 

CEE states are "associate parmers"--Bulgaria, th

Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, R
COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The mission of the Organization for Security and Coop

Europe (OSCE), established in 1973 as the Confe

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is to foste

and cooperation through programs related to press an

support for human rights, economic cooperation

prevention, and military security. Since 1990 it ha

increasingly institutionalized. 7 

Some view OSCE as a valuable link among the 53 

and the alliances or groups to which they belong

President Vaclav Havel, for example, has said that CS

contribute immensely to European security by providi

for cooperation between NATO and other Westem all

one side, and Russia or the Russian-led CIS on th

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, however, has suggest

ambitious role for OSCE by observing it could be an 

for European security, supported by NATO and Russia

Origin and Organization 

CSCE was established in 1973 as part of a compromis

the Soviet Union and Western allies. The Soviet U

proposed talks along the lines of what became CSCE, a

Allies had proposed negotiations on Mutual and Balan

Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. East-West agreem

reached to begin both sets of talks in 1973. In Aug

after 2 years of negotiations, 35 members of CSCE s

Helsinki Final Act, described as a politically binding d

understanding of democratic principles goveming relatio

nations. The Act provided for continued discussion

parties on a broad range of issues, and talks have been 

the years in what is often called the "Helsinki process
of the Charter of Paris at the CSCE Summit in Novem

A Council of Ministers, comprising foreign minis

established as the highest decisionmaking body. A s

working group or executive body, the Committee 

Officials, was established at the ambassadorial or foreig

political director level. A Permanent Committee was e

in 1993 in Vienna to handle day-to-day operational 

Permanent Committee engages in consultation and takes 

when the Committee of Senior Officials is not in sessi

In addition to these policy-related bodies, the p

OSCE Secretary General and an OSCE Secretariat, l

Prague, have been established. A Parliamentary A

composed of legislators from OSCE states, first met in J

An Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Righ

plays informational, educational, and review roles, 

position of High Commissioner on National Minoritie

mandate to provide early warning and early action on 

minority problems, have also been established. 

An OSCE Conflict Prevention Center has been esta

Vienna to oversee the sharing of data on military forc

host meetings related to OSCE provisions on military 

It is also to support implementation of the OSCE mech

peaceful settlement of disputes and provide support f

diplomatic, conflict-resolution, and peacekeeping miss

An OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation was esta

1992 as the only pan-European forum for security dia

arms control negotiations. This forum meets in semi-p

session and has as part of its mandate the development 

confidence- and security-building measures, exchange 

military information, cooperation on non-prolifera

cooperation on regional measures. 
part of the CSCEs 1975 Heisinki Final Act document

negotiations and agreement on CSBMs continued into 

and early 1990s, and the present CSBM regime was ag

March 1992 as part of the CSCE "Vienna Docume

supplemented by additional measures agreed in prepa

the December 1994 CSCE Summit. Agreed CSBMs no

measures related to exchange of military information 

personnel, force structure and training, weapons and e

and defense policies, doctrines, and budgets), risk 

military-to-military contacts, observers at specified 

activities, exchange of military activity calendars, limi

the frequency of large-scale military activities, evalu

verification visits, an armual implementation assessmen

and enhancing the OSCE communications network. 

Conflicts 

CSCE/OSCE has also engaged in many endeavors 

prevent, ameliorate, or end conflicts in Europe. 

• In the former Yugoslavia, OSCE has sent fact-fi

rapporteur missions and supported U.N. and E.U. sanc

humanitarian measures. OSCE also has sent missions to 

a presence and provide early warning of possible sp

hostilities into the Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Sandzak r

Serbia and Montenegro and into the Former Yugoslav 

of Macedonia (FYROM). Missions have also been 

Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herze

investigate alleged violations of OSCE principles. A p

diplomacy mission has been established in Bosnia-Her

Stemming from a request from the August 1992 

Coxfference on the Former Yugoslavia, OSCE has sent 

to Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, FYROM, Ukraine, an

to assist in monitoring compliance with sanctions. A p

"Sanctions Coordinator" was created to oversee O
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDEN

STATES 

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was e

in December 1991 in connection with the dissoluti

Soviet Union. Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine were th

members, and later other former republics of the Sov

were invited to join. Georgia resisted joining but e

appeared forced to join as the price for Russian ass

Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze when his govern

under attack by rebel forces in 1993. There are now 12 

of the CIS---all the former republics of the Soviet Uni

the Baltic states. 

Russia has sought to increase the authority of the C

gain international recognition for it as an institution. 

has a staff headquartered in Minsk, Belarus. Me

Ministerial and Head of State levels are held on occas

leaders deal with a range of political, economic, and 

issues. 1° 

Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet U

former Soviet military essentially became the CIS 

When the other republics moved to set up their own arm

and refused to subordinate them to a CIS Joint C

Russia, in spring 1992, established its own 

establishment. 11 The CIS military became primaril

headquarters. 

In August 1993, the CIS Council of Defense Min

to address an agenda of coordinating activity to improv

capabilities, creation of a collective security sys

deepening of military cooperation. Russian Defense 

Grachev was reported to have told the group that "no o
Treaty on Collective Security not become the same gu

the CIS? Let these two guarantors, collaborating 

another, ensure security and stability throughout the 

continent."~3 

In late 1994, leaders of the 12 members states co

the Council of the CIS Heads of State, where they r

discussed an agenda to "invigorate the processes of i

within the CIS." An Inter-State Economic Committe

established to monitor and further CIS economic co

within the context of a "Eurasian common market. ''14 

OTHER REGIONAL AND SUBREGION

GROUPS 

There are many other regional or subregional gro

Europe, including groups with political, economic, 

and/or arms control and arms reductions m

Organizations most relevant to security issues are dis

some detail below. 

Some groups, primarily economics-oriented ones, a

in membership to a relatively small number of West 

states, such as the Benelux Economic Union (3 mem

Nordic Council (5), the Nordic Investment Bank 

European Investment Bank (12), the European Space A

+ 2 associate or cooperating states), and the European F

Association (7 in 1994, but in flux). 

Others have been primarily economics oriented an

to West European and North American members 

included Japan (e.g., the G-7 or Big Seven, and at r

Summit meetings Russia has been invited to participat

of the discussions) and the G-10 or Paris Club (11). 

these are expanding beyond Western Europe, North Am
Central European Initiative (10 + 6 participating non-m

the European Organization for Nuclear Research (

observers), the Economic Commission for Europe (54, i

most CEE states and all members of the CIS except Taj

and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Developm

including most CEE states and all members of CIS 

Belarus.) 

Beyond these organizations are several organiza

groups that deal with issues that are more security relat

Council of Europe 

The Council of Europe (COE), established in 1949 

purpose of promoting increased unity and quality o

Europe, currently has 33 members (including 9 from Ce

Eastem Europe) and 8 "guest" states, from Central and 

Europe and the CIS, that have applied for membership 

whom accession procedures are underway. COE memb

are "committed to pluralist and parliamentary democr

indivisibility and universality of human fights, the rul

and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity

Summit leaders in October 1993 declared that the COE 

pre-eminent European political institution capable of we

on an equal footing, the democracies of Europe fre

Communist oppression." The COE Secretary General h

that accession of these states to the COE is "a central 

the process of European construction based on the Organ

values" and has indicated that the COE has a clear ma

"exercise a policy of openness and cooperation vis-a-v

countries of Central and Eastem Europe that opt for dem

human rights, and the rule of law." The COE is active i

standards and monitoring respect for human rights; pr

judiciary and law enforcement, training civil serva
g

and to establish CSCE in 1973 were worked out bet

and West as an implicit quid pro quo. The tw

discussions subsequently proceeded on separate track

talks involved all NATO allies and the seven memb

Warsaw Pact, a total of 23 states. These talks focused 

Europe, particularly forces located in the Federal R

German, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembou

NATO side, and the German Democratic 

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the Warsaw 

In 1986, MBFR talks foundered over disagreements o

of Soviet military manpower. 

A new set of negotiations on Conventional Armed 

Europe (CFE) "conducted within the framework of 

process" was subsequently opened among the 16 NATO 

and 6 Warsaw Pact members, x7 On 19 November 1

CSCE summit meeting in Paris a CFE agreement w

limiting five categories of military equipment--tanks

armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, an

aircraft--in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area, an area br

MBFR's Central Region but narrower than CSCE's V

to Vladivostok area. Subsequently, a "CFE-1A" agre

negotiated and finally signed at the July 1993 CSC

setting limits on manpower in the Atlantic-to-Urals 

states party to the agreement, x8 

French-Initiated Stability Talks 

At the initiative of French Prime Minister Edouard B

1994, France proposed a set of talks, called the Con

Stability in Europe, designed to contribute to good n

relations in Central and Eastern Europe. French Foreig

Alain Juppe has said the conference was "filling a vac

Balladur has said it would provide a "pragmatic and 
membership in the EU. 21 Balladur has said the aim 

conclude within a year's time a "Stability Pact," whic

involve signing of agreements between neighbors rec

their borders and guaranteeing the rights of minoritie

French have organized two "regional tables" to 

rapprochement among European states, and accords re

the round tables would be enshrined in the "Stability P

registered with CSCE/OSCE. 22 NATO Foreign Minist

welcomed this initiative, stating that it can make a su

contribution to stability in Europe. 23 

On the other hand, some in the East have e

reservations. The chief of Czech President Havel's cab

been critical of the concept, saying that the initiator

proposal do not have solid experience in CEE, the exp

CEE's intimate problems for all the world to see risks 

Pandora's box, and that "the kind of problem the conf

studying cannot be resolved with great pomp. ''u In Ju

then Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stat

region certainly needs the Balladur plan. But we do no

idea that its implementation could be a precondition for 

entry into the EU.. . We have signed treaties 

neighborly relations with our seven neighbors. This sh

desire for compromise. But if this desire was lacking i

two of our neighbors, I do not see why Poland's entry 

EU should be called into question. ''25 

Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev warned th

conference that the proposed "Stability Pact" might conf

CSCE; French Foreign Minister Juppe said the conferen

disappear within a year when the "Pact" was inaugura

denied that the conference was duplicating existing orga

such as CSCE, Council of Europe, or WEU. 26 
p

specifically to terminate activities of the Warsaw P

Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation. 27 Consult

continued even after the dissolution of the two 

organizations. The Visegrad four have held meetin

presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, an

ministers to discuss a range of political, economic, a

issues. 

Reluctant to insttufionalize this regional groupin

President Havel has criticized, "Visegrad cooperation 

be institutionalized. There should be no impressio

some kind of bloc or that it is an alternative to inte

West Europe. ''2s The Czechs support membership 

NATO, and WEU for all four Visegrad states, but t

not to want to be bound to a group approach 

organizations. The Czechs may believe that they are a

other states in political, economic, and military refor

too close of an identification with the three other s

lessen their chances for early membership in 

organizations. 

The Hungarian position may be somewhere betw

the Czechs and the Poles. An interviewer summ

Polish position in an article of September 1994: "It is b

four countries speak together with one voice than 

while the Czech position was "the Czechs will join th

Union sooner if they do it by themselves." In 

Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Istvan Pataki opin

Polish position was correct, going on to say "When 

together, our efficiency increases. ''29 The Hungarian

of 1994, however, appeared to comment in favor of an 

country approach so that no country has to wait for H

does Hungary have to walt for any other country 

join. s° 
told reporters that the Czech Minister was expected to a

May 1995 meetingY 

The Visegrad states and the United States have d

regional cooperation on management of airspace in t

According to an early January 1995 Hungarian press re

U.S. Govemment has offered $25 million to the four V

states to modemize their military air control center

Hungarian deputy state secretary of defense was said 

indicated that greater cooperation among the four w

required. The report suggested that such cooperation w

a significant step regarding membership in NATO

identification-friend-or-foe system and system of civi

military control become uniform among the four an

systems are manufactured to NATO specifications. 32 

The Visegrad four signed a Central European Fre

Agreement (CEFTA) in December 1992, aimed at cr

common market in 2001 but later moved up to 199

preparatory move toward joining the EU; Czech 

complained in December 1994 that there had been no 

results. 33 A press report from a Visegrad summit me

Poznan, Poland, on 25 November 1994, suggested that V

cooperation was dying, in that leaders had decided 

accelerate the reduction of customs tariffs but had n

mentioned political cooperation. ~ On the other hand, 

report indicated that at Poznan Visegrad leaders had 

CEPTA to new members who have signed association agr

with the EU and GATI', and Slovenia might become a m

Baltic Associations 

In March 1992, the Council of Baltic Sea States was est

by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, L

Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. The Baltic s
Notes 

1. Interview with NATO Secretary General Willy Cla

De Financieel Ekonomische Tijd, 8 Feb 95, 2, in Foreig

Information Service Daily Report for West Europe, FBIS-W

9 Feb 95, 8. 

2. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, 

Dec 94, 5. 

3. Interview with Albrecht Rothacher, Acting Head 

Commission's representation in Vienna, Vienna Die Presse

2, FBIS-WEU-95-032, 16 Feb 95, 4. 

4. Interview with European Commission President Jac

Paris Le Figaro, 2 Feb 95, 5, FBIS-WEU-95-024, 6 Feb 9

5. Rothacher interview in FBIS-WEU-95-32, 16 Feb 

6. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts a

(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1 lth Edition, 1989

7. This section draws heavily upon fact sheets on the 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), CSCE St

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, contained in 

no. 50 (U.S. Department of State, December 12, 1994), 8

8. Prague Prognosis Weekly, 14 Dec 94, 6, in Foreig

Information Service Daily Report for East Europe, FBIS-E

12 Jan 95, 5. 

9. OSCE Press Release. 24 Jan 95. 

10. For details, see Center for Naval Analysis Occa

"Commonwealth Defense Arrangements and International 

joint paper by the Institute for USA and Canada and the 

Naval Analysis, June 1992. 

11. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Reform in the Russian Arm

Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 12 (Dec 94), 534-537. 

12. Moscow ITAR-TASS, 23 Aug 93, Foreign 

Information Service, Daily Report for Eurasia (FBIS-SOV-

Aug 93, 1. 

13. Interview with Lt. Gen. Ivashov, Secretary of the C

Ministers Council, Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 21 Au

Edition, 5, FBIS-SOV-93-162, 24 Aug 93, 3-4. 
Area of Democratic Security, NATO Review, no. 6 (Dec 94

Jan 95), 8-12. 

17. John Fry, The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Secu

Cooperation in Europe (Washington, DC: National Defense U

Pre~s, 1993), 322. 

18. SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm International Peace 

Institute, Yearbooks for 1990-1993. 

19. Paris AFP, 27 May 94, in FBIS-WEU-94-104, 31 Ma

and Paris Le Quotidien De Paris, 27 May 94, 11, FBIS-WEU

31 May 94, 6. 

20. Paris AFP, 26 May 94, FBIS-WEU-94-102, 26 May 

21. Ibid. 

22. See NATO Foreign Ministers' Communique, 1 De

NATO Review, no. 6 (Dec 94), no. 1 (Jan 95), 26-28. 

23. See paragraph 13 in the Communique issued by the M

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, 

1 December 1994, NATO Review, no. 6 (Dec 94), no. 1( Jan 95

24. Interview with Czech cabinet chief Prince Karl Schwa

Paris Le Figaro, 26 May 94, 4, FBIS-EEU-94-122, 24 June 9

25. Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Ole

Paris Le Figaro, 14 Jun 94, 5, FBIS-EEU-94-115, 15 Jun 94, 

26. Paris AFP, 27 May 94, FBIS-WEU-94-104, 31 May 

27. Jil'i Payne, Chairman of Czech Parliament's Foreig

Committee, "How Were Things Regarding Visegrad?," Prag

Telegraf, 18 May 94, 3, FBIS-EEU-94-127, 1 Jul 94, 5. 

28. Interview with Vaclav Havel, Prague Mlada Fronta 

Nov 94, 7, FBIS-EEU-94-218, 10 Nov 94, 4. 

29. "Unauthorized interview" with Hungarian Deputy 

Minister Istvan Pataki, Warsaw Trybuna, 21 Sep 94, 7, FBIS-

184, 22 Sep 94, 10. 

30. Budapest Magyar Hirlap, 1 Dec 94, 7, in FBIS-EEU

13-14. 

31. Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 5 

FBIS-EEU-94-172, 6 Sep 94, 1. 
95, 45. 

36. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty DailyReport, no

94), 6. 
RECENT HISTORY 

With the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe beg

1989 and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 199

public officials and private citizens in Central and Eastem 

began expressing the desire for their countries to join 

The Visegrad states Poland, Czechoslovakia (now th

Republic and Slovakia), and Hungary--were the first 

seriously for membership in NATO. Largely in respons

NATO initiated an outreach program. 

The efforts of CEE states to gain NATO member

NATO's outreach responses to these have gone through 

of four stages (these are elaborated in the Europe ch

Strategic Assessment 1995, published by NDU Press). 1 

In 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Coo

Council (NACC), which has grown to 38 members an

agreed work plan of political and security activi

cooperation. 

When Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Poland 

Czech Republic in August 1993, Polish President Wales

Czech leadership pressed Yeltsin and appeared to 

acquiescence on the issue of Polish and Czech membe

NATO. Walesa and Yeltsin on 25 August issued a de

that in part stated, "The presidents touched on the m

Poland's intention to join NATO. President L. Walesa 

Poland's well-known position on this issue, which was 

understanding by President B.N. Yeltsin. In the long te

a decision taken by a sovereign Poland in the interests o

21 
to Poland. Until now the West has been using the arg

don't want to upset the Russians.' Now that is no long

argument. Now we will see the true intentions of 

toward Poland. ''4 

On 26 August in Prague, Yeltsin reportedly stated 

"has no right" to hinder the Czech Republic's joini

organization, indicating that Moscow would not o

possible accession to NATO by the Czech Republic

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at a meeting with 

counterpart reportedly pointed out that the Czech Re

sovereign state and that it has the right to join any or

it wishes to. 5 

About the same time, however, Russian officials w

cautionary remarks about NATO. The Warsaw pres

that on 23 August Kozyrev wamed that if the co

Eastem Europe joined NATO, the reactionary 

hardliners in Russia would be strengthened. He repo

that the East European countries should be friend

democratic Russia and democratic Westem Europe 

Germany, saying, "These states should not become a 

entente,' a buffer which could be crushed at any time, 

take on the role of a connecting link. ''6 Russian Prim

Chemomyrdin, in remarks made to reporters sometim

25 and 27 August apparently referring to NATO, ca

end to military blocs, suggesting that "blocs" shoul

formed to promote joint economic goals. 7 After Yelts

to Moscow, Russian government officials began sp

against any NATO expansion that included Central 

European states and not Russia. 

In the fall of 1993, Yeltsin wrote a letter to ke

leaders opposing NATO's admission of East European 

According to the text of this letter as carried in 
p

Russia not be excluded, stating that "From a long-term 

view, the idea of us joining NATO should not be dis

either. This notion, however, is presently a purely th

one." He called for relations between NATO and Rus

"several degrees warmer than the relations between the 

and Eastem Europe. ''s 

In late 1993, the United States proposed to NATO 

Partnership for Peace program, an outreach program to 

going beyond NACC and focused on defense and 

cooperation. At the January 1994 NATO Summit 

NATO heads of state and governments agreed to 

program and invited other European states that were me

NACC or CSCE to join. PFP was seen as a comprom

held out the prospect for later NATO expansion but re

that some relalionship had to be worked out with Russia 

NATO states, parliaments, and publics needed to giv

consideration to the whole NATO expansion issue befor

a decision. 

At the NATO Summit meeting on 10-11 Januar

heads of state and government issued a "Partnership fo

Invitation and Framework Document" (see appendix C 

complete text). In this document, NATO leaders decla

commitment to the goal of "enhancing security and st

the whole of Europe" and outlined the PFP program. T

addressed expansion of NATO, reaffirming that the Al

open to new members. They referred to the provisions o

10 of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding accession by a

states. They avoided delineating among possible new 

beyond that new members would be "democratic state

East." They characterized expansion as an evolutionary 

and emphasized PFP participation as important to this 

NATO Secretary General Willy Claes has indicated t
, , 

visiting in Warsaw in July 1994, expansion of NAT

longer a question of whether, but when and how." H

that when time comes to add new members to 

democratic Poland will have placed itself among those 

able to join" and announced that he would seek from 

$100 million to support PFP, with $25 million going t

By early 1995, 25 states of CEE, Westem Eu

Eurasia had joined NATO's 16 members as PFP partne

begun to cooperate in military activities. Ten had 

individual partnership programs, and many Eastem stat

representatives to participate in activities at NATO He

in Brussels and the PFP Coordination Cell at NATO 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium

NATO Foreign Ministers, meeting in Brussels on 1 

1994, tasked the North Atlantic Council in permane

with the advice of NATO Military Authorities, to 

examination inside the Alliance to "determine how N

enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the im

of membership." The study is also to examine how 

contribute to the process. NATO Foreign Ministers are 

progress at their spring 1995 meeting and to present 

their deliberations to interested Partners prior to t

Foreign Ministers meeting in December 1995. u 

In early February 1995, a press article related to 

joining carried NATO Secretary General Claes words

There is no formula for an expansion, not eve

agreements within the Alliance. We have only just 

internal debate. The political committee meets e

Important issues have to be clarified: 'How can enla

carried out while avoiding all risks to the Alliance?' The 

aspect' is open, as are questions regarding institutions

question on enforcing the principle of mutual assistanc
We intend to enlarge. But I cannot imagine that those 

willing to join want to have less security and weaker g

than the current member states. All this is not quite so ea

about the problem of the nuclear shield, the guarantee of a

or financial contributions? All this must be solved. In 

we must respect the principle of consensus. How can thi

with 22 or 24 members? So there are many questions. B

not wasting time. We want to complete our debate by 

We will then inform all parties interested without delay

will be discussed in the Council of Ministers [sic] in D

After that, the 16 member states will discuss the questio

will be admitted and when." 

Henry Kissinger articulated a distinction between 

expansion and PFP and suggested approaches that could 

on NATO expansion and development of a coo

relationship between NATO and Russia: 

Having started down the road of NATO expansio

administration must choose between the concept of 

alliance, based on defining an area to be protected, and t

behind the Partnership for Peace, designed--by Presiden

own statements--to unite the former blocs. NATO 

instrument to serve both purposes... NATO expansion 

a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear o

Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Cent

between Germany and Russia. A wise policy, instead of 

that Russia has an option for NATO membership, woul

steps. It would proceed with membership for the Visegra

and reject a Russian veto. But at the same time it would 

security treaty between the new NATO and Russia to mak

the goal is cooperation. Such a treaty would provide that 

troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO memb

model of the arrangement for East Germany (or, better

than a fixed distance from the eastern border of Poland.) 
The protocols themselves are relatively short and profo

that parties to the Treaty, being satisfied that the sec

North Atlantic area will be enhanced, agree that on ent

of the protocol an invitation to accede to the Trea

communicated to the prospective new member and this 

member will become a party to the Treaty upon d

instruments of accession. Other articles deal with ent

of the protocol (upon notification of acceptance by 

parties to the treaty) and depositing and copying the 

Accession by Greece and Turkey 

According to Dean Acheson's memoirs, Greece and 

abandoned when, in March 1949, Italy, not a North A

in terms of geography, was issued an invitation to 

original signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty and th

they lamented their status for the next 2 years unti

invited to join NATO. 15 

In January 1951, the U.S. Govemment began 

collaboration on establishing a Middle East Command. 

to Acheson, "Greece and Turkey insisted upon being a

the common defense through NATO and not indire

some regional organization. Furthermore, Turkey 

cooperate with a Middle East organization until her a

NATO had been assured. ''16 In September 1951, 

NATO Foreign Ministers' meetings, Acheson and U.

of the Army Frank Pace presented arguments for inv

and Turkey to join NATO. After much private exhorta

Ministers voted in favor of extending invitations. 17 

1951, NATO Deputy Ministers signed the protocol on 

Greece and Turkey. 18 The U.S. Senate voted appro

1952.19 With the approval of other NATO allies and 

by the parliaments of Greece and Turkey, on 18 Feb
States, France, and United Kingdom called for a Germa

contribution to NATO. Given French concerns abou

rearmament, a plan was developed to put German troops 

control of a continental European Defense Commun

within NATO. 23 The EDC was to merge forces of si

France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherla

Luxembourg. 

In May 1952, France, the United Kingdom, and t

States concluded an agreement with the Federal Re

Germany restoring its sovereignty, and on 27 May the 

Paris setting up the EDC was signed. During the r

process for the EDC Treaty, however, the French 

defeated the treaty. The United States then began c

substitutes, including one that provided for establishm

independent German military and admission of th

Republic of Germany into NATO as a sovereign state. ~ 

began to work on creating the Western European U

substitute for the EDC. 

The admittance of Germany to NATO was worked 

to admittance to the WEU. Germany's Bundestag 

admission to both NATO and the WEU in late Februa

the U.S. Senate in early April 1955 ratified agreement

rearmament and NATO membership. 26 With the approv

Allies, and despite Soviet objections, the FRG became 

of NATO and the WEU in May 1955. 

Accession by Spain 

The process of Spanish accession has many interestin

some more relevant than others for future NATO acc

early as 1952, in connection with accession by Greece an

Portugal, an original NATO member, urged that Spa

admitted into NATO. 27 In the mid-1970s, the possibility 
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo and Foreign Minister P

introduced for parliamentary debate the NATO acces

Several reasons have been advanced to explain Spanis

NATO membership and the timing of the raising o

First, President Calvo Sotelo, described as an 

Atlanticism as the focal point of Spanish foreign policy

early in 1981. 3~ Secondly, the military base agreem

United States was up for renewal, and the Spanish 

wanted to determine whether Spain should become a 

NATO and move the bilateral relationship with the U

into that context, or move to neutrality and break defe

the United States. 32 Finally, some have emphasiz

Spanish President believed that Spain's membershi

would improve prospects for Spanish entry into th

Community, which France had blocked. 33 In Octob

Spanish Congress of Deputies approved the applica

NATO by a vote of 185 for and 146 against, and ab

later the Senate approved it. 34 The Spanish Socialist W

(PSOE) then began a large scale anti-NATO campaig

NATO began its process of considering Spanish 

November 1981; 36 the Protocol of Accession was sign

later at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting. ~7 

ratification by all the Parties, in May 1982 Spain d

instnLrnents of accession, thereby becoming a Party t

Atlantic Treaty and a member of NATO. 38 

SHOULD NATO EXPAND ITS MEMBE

There are several issues regarding possible expansio

membership. The fundamental question is should NA

its membership? If the answer is yes, there are many 

issues related to which states to consider, how and wh

on expansion, and resultant implications. 
g p 

independent states of the former Soviet Union, althoug

see a need for some form of treaty between NATO a

Advocates of NATO expansion include many key po

military leaders in Central and Eastern Europe. In t

States, the administration has declared its support f

expansion and Congress has passed legislation in suppo

both cases without proposing a timetable. A new bill 

into Congress calls for working toward expansion by Jan

Among those who have written publicly in support of 

are former Senator Richard Lugar, former U.S. Secreta

Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Presidential National 

Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Securi

official Peter Rodman, columnist William Satire of The 

Times. The following are some of the arguments i

expanding NATO membership. 

Be responsive to requests for NATO mem

made by reform leaders In the new democ

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). NATO expa

critical issue now because leaders of CEE states have p

NATO membership. Former Secretary of State Henry 

calling NATO expansion "the most sensitive immediat

the Alliance, stated, "The expansion issue arose becau

the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (the 

countries)--all victims of Soviet occupation--soug

membership. ''39 Not only leaders of the Visegrad state

Czech President Vaclav Havel and Polish President Lec

but leaders of most all CEE states have now asked 

countries be allowed to join NATO and have emph

importance of this. 

Peter Rodman wrote, "The newly independen

European states--particularly Poland, Hungary, the Czec

and Slovakia--consider themselves part of the W
Not to act positively on such requests could und

reform leaders. It could suggest that the West is not 

to these states and their perceived vulnerability, and th

does not view these states as part of Europe or as imp

Enhance security from the West's perspe

Improving stability in Central and Eastern Eu

avoiding a security vacuum, nationalization of 

and an East-West clash. Including CEE 

NATO--rather than leaving them in a security vacuum 

neutrality--could extend stability to this important a

been fought over through the centuries. Including CE

the 16-member Alliance could provide security from u

to the east, help obviate renationalization of defenses i

and avoid an East-West clash. 

Senator Richard Lugar wrote, "Defining the curre

in terms of the future of Europe as a whole helps clari

of vital American national interests. The United St

afford to allow Europe to unravel for the third time t

Projection of stability to the East is a prudent investme

the peace in Europe .''41 

Henry Kissinger, cautioning against allowing 

between Germany and Russia that has tempted so ma

conflicts," wrote, "If this request [the Visegrad states 

join NATO] is rejected and the states bordering G

refused protection, Germany will sooner or later seek to 

security by national efforts, encountering on the wa

pursuing the same policy from its side. ''42 

Peter W. Rodman wrote, "If the history of this cen

anything, it is that ambiguity about the status of 

Central European states is exceedingly risky for peace

only invite future revisionist temptations. In the 

European stability, the uncertainty should be foreclos
want to be part of Europe. This then leads to the d

something for Europe, to take part in protecting of its v

Participation, for instance, in NATO peacekeeping forc

is also the air defense... Air defense is nowadays a

larger regions. Therefore, we can very well imagine join

of airspace."** 

Rand analysts Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, an

Larrabee have argued that including the Visegrad states 

would be in America's interests because the Visegrad l

pro-American, their views on security issues closely coi

those of the United States and other Atlanticist membe

the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the Netherlands, 

inclusion in NATO "would strengthen the Atlanticist ori

the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S

key security issues. ''45 

Enhance security in Central and Eastern Eur

the perspective of CEE states, providing ass

against what they see as their greatest t

challenge, I.e., Instability In and possible challen

Russia and other states of the CIS. Insta

uncertainty in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the 

possible Russian imperialistic or expansionist tende

viewed in CEE as the greatest threats to their nationa

Individual states see themselves as incapable of coping 

the magnitude of these challenges. They see NATO a

capable security institution to help protect them aga

threats, particularly because of U.S. involvement. 

While Russian military capabilities may have diminis

in Central and Eastern Europe, supported by some in the 

concerned about Russia's efforts to gain increased influ

member states of the CIS and to arrange for Russian 

bases in many of these states. 
members of NATO as soon as possible, 47 and for

Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle, who opp

expansion, has observed that "This remedy may seem 

urgent as Russian forces keep inflicting wanton des

Checlmya."48 

Indeed, Czech leaders have suggested that Russian 

Chechnya might influence NATO expansion, but larg

of NATO recognizing the importance of expansion. R

Checlmya, which he described as "very rash and very 

Czech President Vaclav Havel has said that "Perhaps th

politicians) have been too credulous. Now they 

understand why the Czech Republic wishes to join the 

Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan has commented 

that throughout recent history, including this situation in 

all those who have any say about these matters ha

realize that it is necessary for the Central European 

become a part of NATO. ''5° 

Provide stability and assistance so that C

can consolidate domestic reform, improve re

CEE, and Integrate with the West. NATO membe

benefit the new democracies of Central and Eastem 

helping to create a stable environment in which 

intemally advance and consolidate democracy, econo

with market economies, and military reform. CEE stat

be aware that their prospects for joining NATO, the E

WEU will depend in part on their efforts to improve re

their neighbors in CEE. 

NATO membership could also help the new dem

Central and Eastern Europe achieve their goals of bein

with the West. Many believe that Central and Easter

states were abnormally separated from the West after 

II and that to be integrated with the West is not only 
economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend 

the link between democracy and security. ''51 And Ran

Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee wrote, 

East-Central Europe's democrats well understand that dem

succeed only if their states belong to a secure European 

political, economic, and military community. The 

previously understood this link-- as demonstrated with 

West Germany. That nation might never have beco

Western democracy had imot been accepted into NA

Similarly, NATOmembership helped stabilize democra

authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece 

Those who insist that democratic credentials must be pre

to alliance membership should remember that the need 

security framework is greatest when democracy is mos

tttreatened, s2 

Help keep NATO vibrant and alive. Some su

NATO emphasize that, with the demise of the Warsa

the Soviet Union, the main threat to NATO has disap

that NATO will go out of business if it does not take o

outside the NATO area and does not further develop p

reach out to former adversaries in the East. Some m

direct link between expanding NATO to include states 

maintaining NATO as a viable Alliance. 

Zbigniew Brzezinski argued, "The absence of a 

design for Europe could deprive it (NATO) of its histo

for being" and that "Hesitation, inconsistency and we

not only discredit American leadership but probably do

altogether. ,,53 

Take advantage now of the situation In R

expand NATO before that situation possibly 

Some appear to believe that it is now much more 
expansion is deferred until an acute Russian threat in f

"Pressures against NATO expansion will grow more 

that point, compounded by the fact that a skillful Russia

will be made to appear ambiguous. It is not wi

obtaining fire insurance until the house is actually on 

Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, "Westemists" are 

ground in Russia and that a faction is rising in Russia 

"Russia is destined to exercise geopolitical sway over E

Russia's "special political status must be asserted--

Eurasia and indirectly in Central Europe." Brzezinski, 

time, however, notes that there is no imminent threat f

and that "expansion should not be driven by whippi

Russian hysteria that could become a self-fulfilling 

Brzezinski and others also emphasize the importance 

pursuing as a second track some form of security ar

with RussiaY 

William Satire, observing that Kissinger and Brz

Russia as "authoritarian at heart and expansionist by 

for extending NATO membership now to Poland, H

Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, which he sees 

Westemized nations of Eastem Europe. Satire argues

to push the protective line eastward is now, while Rus

and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later, w

move would be an insufferable provocation to a super

Not let expansion of NATO membership b

subject to a Russian veto. Some argue that 

announced its intention to accept new members and m

seen as giving Russia a veto on expansion. 

Peter Rodman argued that it is morally and 

objectionable to deny membership to the four Visegrad 

concem about provoking Russia. He also said, "Ou

proceed would be more dangerous than to proceed" a
to include some or all states in CEE and the CIS. Som

expanding NATO is not necessary and would be counte

and even dangerous. Some make the point that it is o

the CEE states have pressed for NATO membership th

of NATO expansion has arisen, and that NATO wou

pursued expansion on its own initiative. In arguing aga

expansion in present circumstances, some say that N

expand if and when Russia or other states present a mi

to Central and Eastern Europe. Many Russians oppos

of NATO, arguing that NATO should be disbanded, 

Warsaw Pact was disbanded. In the United States, for

specialists who have written in opposition to NATO 

include Fred C. Ild6, former Under Secretary of Defens

Charles Kupchan, a former member of the U.S. Nation

Council Staff, and Michael Brown of Harvard Univer

of the arguments that have been or could be advan

expanding NATO follow. 

There is now no threat necessitating exp

NATO. Neither Russia nor any other state appears t

military threat to states in Central and Eastern Europe 

Were Russia or some other state to attempt to devel

there could be sufficient waming time and willingness 

to react and take in new members for protection. 

Michael Brown has developed this argument, w

"Russia's military is in disarray at both the oper

ministerial levels." Observing that Poland and H

reducing military conscription and the Czech Republic 

its mechanized and infantry forces, he concludes, "Th

the actions of states worried about military threats." 

reports, "Westem defense experts believe that it 

Moscow at least a year or two to field an offens

capability, should it be inclined to do so." He con
military threat to Europe is nonexistent. Whatever r

would run by holding off can be minimized by develop

consensus with the alliance on its expansion strateg

recommends a strategy of having NATO offer memb

many states in the region as possible if Russia takes 

steps such as withdrawing from the Conventional Force

treaty, building up its forces near westem neighbors, us

threats, discontinuing denuclearization, violating 

Ukraine's sovereignty, absorbing Ukraine or Belar

Russian Federation, or transforming the Commo

Independent States into a federal entity. 5~ 

Expanding NATO membership could mean 

new dividing line In Europe, excluding primar

but also others. Instead of moving toward a Europe 

free, NATO enlargement that includes some states in 

Eastem but not Russia and others could create a ne

Russia particularly could be resentful, less cooperative, 

adversarial. 

President Clinton raised the issue of a new dividin

he made his intervention at the NATO Summit meeting 

1994 in support of the Partnership for Peace program 

immediately admitting the Visegrad states to NATO: 

Why should we, now, draw a new line through Europ

further east? Why should we, now, do something 

foreclose the best possible future for Europe? The b

future would be a democratic Russia committed to the s

its European neighbors. The best possible future 

democratic Ulwaine--a democratic government in ever

newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, a

to market cooperation, to common security, and to demo

We should not foreclose that possibility. 6° 
have known. 61 

Charles Kupchan wrote, "Pushing NATO's boundari

promises to resurrect Europe's dividing lines, not erase 

The chance to build a European security community th

Russia would be lost. The West might be larger and s

Europe would again be divided into hostile halves. ''62 

Michael Brown wrote, "A new line would be drawn 

a new Cold War could ensue, and the West would ha

blame for bringing this about. ''~3 

Expanding NATO could create not lust a 

between the West and Russia but divisions ev

Central and Eastern Europe. While the m

consequences could come from exclusion of Russia and 

in the CIS, adverse consequences could also flow 

including at least initially all states within Central a

Europe. There could be resentment and perhaps even 

states not invited to join NATO, both initially and even 

time goes by as other states are invited to join. States i

perhaps have felt more secure because they have join

who are not among those invited to join NATO could th

secure and more vulnerable. 

If only one to four of the Central European "Vise

were allowed in NATO initially, this could appear at 

to draw a temporary line within Eastem Eur6ope. Comp

sub-regional cooperation, could be stimulated if n

"Visegrad" states were "admitted initially. The Romani

concemed that Hungary might gain membership first a

invitation to Romania. If almost all Central and East

states are allowed in, some NATO allies might d

Albania be excluded, as it has been excluded from 

partnership in the WEU. Would NATO admit the 

states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia----states that 
would merely shove the vacuum ahead of itself." He al

that advocates of expansion who propose ruling out dep

allied forces onto the territory of new member states a

reduce Russian opposition to expansion would fill a

political vacuum" with "a real military vacuum. ''64 

Extending membership to some Eastern s

not to all--such as Russia and others~o

counterproductive and have adverse political an

consequences in states not Included. Expand

membership to some but not all Eastern states could 

states not included feel less secure, undercut reformers i

included, stimulate Russian influence over neighborin

least within the CIS and perhaps beyond, and lead to 

military efforts in Russia and the CIS. 

Charles Kupchan has made many of these points. 

"Enlarging the alliance would alter the balance of po

continent and make Russia feel less secure. The prob

NATO is still a military alliance that concentrates powe

extemal threat; this is precisely why the Central Euro

to join." Kupchan also said, "An expanded NATO 

Russia to reassert control over its former republi

remilitarize" and predicted "Even if NATO held open f

of eventual membership for Russia, nationalists wou

Central Europe's entry into NATO by charging th

reformers had sold out to the West and had jeopardize

security" and that pro-Western forces in Ukraine and o

Soviet republics, fmding themselves "outside the W

defense perimeter .... would look to Moscow to 

security needs. ''65 

Sergei Karaganov, a former advisor to Russian Pres

Yeltsin now serving on the Russian Federation's Securi

wrote that if "NATO expands eastward, Russia 
gg

not discouraged, by NATO expansion. Four countries 

brought into NATO, but eight--including the Baltic stat

be left out. Russian withdrawal from the Conventiona

Europe (CFE) treaty is not inconceivable. ''67 

Charles William Maynes believed that Ukraine and 

states would feel wronged if only CEE states were a

NATO.6g 

Russia's President Boris Yeltsin has opposed expand

membership while excluding Russia; to do so could un

within Russia. In general, such expansion could 

reformers in Russia and give grist to the mill for ultran

such as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Such expansion wou

isolate Russia and other states in the CIS, compared to 

that did not expand NATO or opened NATO to states 

A senior U.S. official reportedly has acknowledged this 

stating, "We certainly don't want to do anything that 

serious damage to the forces of reform" in Russia. 69 

On 19 December 1994, Belorusian First Deput

Minister Valerii Tsypkalo told a Russian news se

NATO's plans to expand were prompting a possible de

might be made soon in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine t

their commitments under the Conventional Forces 

Treaty. He was reported to have said that "If NATO dr

to the CIS borders, the CIS countries located in E

probably have to revise the agreement on cuts in conven

in Europe and stop scrapping their tanks, planes, and t

NATO should not be extending security com

to help defend the territory of other states, parti

a time NATO members are reducing resources 

to defense. Commentator and politician Patrick Bucha

"The United States cannot, and must not, give Poland an

East European countries the guarantee that it would 
of dollars to prepare for the defense of Central Europ

hard to imagine parliaments of all 16 NATO members 

extension of new security guarantees to Central Europ

rejection by one or more parliaments would be a crushi

Expansion could ruin NATO. Specialists hav

several arguments why including Central and East Euro

in NATO would ruin NATO. Fred Ik16 wrote, "Far fr

an alleged crisis, expanding NATO would fatally w

Some of the arguments on weakening NATO include: 

• Adding new members to NATO could mean t

would lose focus and cohesion and find it harde

consensus and decisions. 

• Pressuring NATO allies who may be reluctant 

NATO could jeopardize relations within the Alliance. 

• New members might introduce a Trojan horse i

• Pressures might increase to withdraw U

completely from Europe, if NATO decides it does n

station forces forward in CEE states admitted to NAT

undercutting the concept of forward deployment:. 

• Expanding NATO membership might eventua

membership for Russia, giving Russia a veto in NATO

Arguments Against Expansion For at L

the Next Several Years 

Some may oppose NATO expanding in the next severa

hold an open mind to expansion after several years or 

threat arose in the meantime. The following arguments 

or could be used in support of deferring expansion: 

NATO needs to address other Issues first 

becoming embroiled in NATO expansion. NA

focus now on developing a new Trans-Atlantic r

between North America and West Europeans working 

the European pillar through development of an EU 
Former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 

wrote, "What is required is a key concept for stable r

with the countries of Central and Eastem Europe and 

former Soviet Union, including Russia. Hasty and 

debates on an expansion of NATO merely cloud the 

internal cohesion and decision-making capability, 

undermining the requirement for comprehensiv

cooperation in the entire zone between Vanc

Vladivostok. ,,74 

U.S. officials have been reported to hope to assua

fears of NATO expansion by first locking Russia into 

cooperative relationships with the West; these officials 

reason that once these relationships with Russia are 

Russia will not see NATO expansion as threatening. E

such relationship are said to be inviting Russia to pa

portions of G-7 meetings of the heads of major 

countries, opening a direct line on consultations with 

the EU's offering Russia a "partnership and 

agreement. ,,75 

There is too much Instability or uncertaint

now. Taking in any states from CEE now risks embroi

in one or more potential ethnic conflict situations in 

defending CEE states against potential threats from 

other CIS states. The next several years will determ

the situation will become more stable or less stable. 

Reforms have been underway in CEE for fewer th

and they could be reversed. CEE states need to wo

reforms, and focusing on NATO could distract 

economic reform and economic integration with the We

states in CEE, non-Communists who led the revoluti

initial reform efforts have been voted out of power 

Communists, now generally called socialists, have bee
more than they need NATO, so that the quest 

membership turns them away from the main target

integration. ,,77 

Poland, for example, has been seen as a leading c

NATO membership but recently has had a crisis 

president, prime minister, and defense minister over w

officials control the military, and a former Communist m

Prime Minister. Poland is trying to work out civilian c

the military in a new constitution, but this will take ti

1 or 2 years or more. 

One report indicates that Pentagon officials have w

a state admitted to NATO too soon might revert to auth

communist leadership or provoke ethnic conflict, leavin

the position of having to defend a government with ign

More examination, debate, and time is nee

was initiated only in January 1994. Parmer states 

representatives to NATO and SHAPE Headquarters. 

been two PFP exercises. There has not been time enou

which of the 23 PFP partners have shown the most 

cooperating with NATO. 

Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of De

both wrote, "If we arbitrarily lock in advantages no

countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries 

and fostering complacency in countries that are. ''79 

NATO has only recently begun a study of how it m

and what the implications might be of expansion. Thi

take considerable time and should not be rushed. 

The U.S. Congress appears to be the only legislat

NATO states to have passed legislation favoring NATO 

In discussions in the Congress, there have note bee

hearings or debates on the details of possible NATO ex

the extension of NATO security guarantees. Senator 
present a serious military threat to Central and Easte

Kupchan, for example, argues, "Expanding NATO m

only if Russia again poses a military threat to Central E

act now might give the Poles and their neighbors a bo

alienating the Russians and undercutting the reform

would set in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy." H

"There is no need to take that risk when Central Euro

now face a serious extemal threat and when NATO 

expand later. Since it would take Russian years to rebu

that could invade and occupy Central Europe, NATO 

ample time to extend its protective umbrella eastward

SHOULD ADDITIONAL CRITERIA FO

MEMBERSHIP BE SPECIFIED? 

Should NATO attempt to specify criteria beyond that 

already have been specified? If so, what criteria? 

Atlantic Treaty, signed in April 1949 by the original 

of NATO, provides criteria for use in determining whet

other states to accede to the Treaty. Article 10 of 

which deals with accession of new parties to the Trea

that "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invit

European State in a position to further the principles of 

and to contribute to the security of the North Atlan

accede to this Treaty." 

At the 1994 NATO Summit, heads of state and 

issued statements specifying additional criteria for inv

to become members of NATO and joining and particip

Partnership for Peace program, which has been sug

prerequisite for joining NATO per se (see appendix C
Implied Criteria for Joining and Cooper

in PFP 

Elements of the NATO Summit document on PFP th

regarded as suggesting criteria for joining PFP and co

PFP, which the above suggests are prerequisites to bein

join NATO, include: 

• NACC and/or CSCE membership and ability a

contribute to PFP. 

• Share values of democracy, UN, and CSCE/O

• Support for stability and security through coop

• Support for political and military cooperation. 

° Readiness to participate in bodies at NATO h

and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. 

• Support for openness and democracy 

establishments and joint planning, exercises, and oper

NATO. 

• Plan fi~r and document PFP cooperation. 

° Commit resources for PFP cooperation. 

• Readiness to exchange defense information. 

Attempting to specify additional criteria f

membership could present problems. No additional crit

Article 10 appear to have been specified when Greece 

joined NATO in 1952, Germany joined in 1955, and S

in 1982; to specify additional criteria now would go b

precedent, and some might accuse NATO of hav

standards. In documents establishing PFP, NATO imp

for joining PFP; to specify additional criteria 

membership could suggest that NATO was unfairly 

goal posts for NATO membership further away more 

after the game had started. 

Additional criteria could be so general as to be mea
additional criteria might be so specific and stringent that 

would arise as to whether all present members of NAT

have met these criteria. Finally, in trying to develop 

upon additional criteria, NATO would have to expend 

and effort and run risks of internal conflict among allie

to reach consensus. 

There are arguments in favor of having NAT

additional criteria for membership. Zbigniew Brzez

example, has called for NATO early in 1995 to declare c

indicate which countries appear to meet these. ~z Anothe

would suggest that enumerating criteria would help ensu

new democracies pursue reforms desired by NATO. An 

can also be made that additional criteria could be used 

benchmarks on the path to NATO membership, instilling 

confidence in those following the path that they will 

gain NATO membership. Specifying additional criteria 

be useful if NATO wants to delay accession for one 

another. 

One report in the fall of 1994 indicated that 

Government, in an attempt to acknowledge East 

continued efforts to join NATO while avoiding 

consequences in Russia, had proposed to NATO allies 

December 1994 North Atlantic Council Meeting of NAT

ministers NATO announce new guidance in the form of 

for NATO expansion. U.S. Presidential National Securi

Anthony Lake was said to have ordered the developm

precepts because President Clinton and he wanted at le

the appearance of movement toward expansion. The pre

said to be a compromise between no further guid

providing clear criteria. U.S. officials were said to have 

the precepts as roles meant to provide more concrete gu

NATO membership but not to guarantee it. One U.S. o
Another report suggested that NATO would offe

but not specific dates for membership and that the 

would be sufficiently stringent that no country would 

meet them for several years. The guidelines were said 

either an "irreversible commitment to democracy" 

functioning democracy." They also would include f

control of the military, including civilianization 

ministries and militarization of the military in th

eliminating security organs from the military. Anothe

was said to be military equipment and comm

interchangeable with those of NATO members, u 

The U.S. Congress, in its NATO Participation A

expressed the sense of the Congress on NATO expan

six criteria---democratic institutions, free market econo

control of the military, rule of law, protection of citiz

and respect for neighbors' territorial integrity. The 

stated that it was the sense of the Congress that: 

Full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace 

to further the principles of the North Atlantic Tr

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area shou

to become full NATO members in accordance with A

such Treaty at an early date, if such participants - 

(A) maintain their progress toward establishing 

institutions, free market economies, civilian con

armed forces, and the rule of law; and 

(B) remain committed to protecting the rights of all 

and respecting the territorial integrity of their neigh

This legislation established another criterion for 

countries as eligible to receive U.S. assistance in tran

full NATO membership. This criterion requires a 

determination that the country is not: 
Representatives, H.R. 7, given the short title of Nation

Revitalization Act," includes as Title VI a propose

Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995," which 

additional new criteria for NATO membership (see text 

F.) This bill emphasizes that "In particular, Poland, Hu

Czech Republic, and Slovakia have made significan

toward establishing democratic institutions, free market 

civilian control of their armed forces, police, and i

services, and the rule of law since the fall of thei

Communist govemments." The bill goes on to state tha

countries should be invited to become full NATO memb

than 10 January 1999 provided they: 

(A) meet appropriate standards, including- 

(i) shared values and interests; 

(ii) democratic governments; 

(iii) free market economies; 

(iv) civilian control of the military, of the 

of intelligence services; 

(v) adherence to the values, principles, an

commitments embodied in the Helsinki Fi

the Conference on Security and Coop

Europe; 

(vi) commitment to further the principles o

and to contribute to the security of the Nor

area; 

(vii) commitment to accept the o

responsibilities, and costs of NATO memb

(viii) commitment to implement inf

development activities that will facilitate p

in and support for NATO military activitie

(B) remain committed to protecting the rights o

citizens and respecting the territorial integrity 
to defend the alliance and have the capable, professi

force to do it." They would have to "uphold democr

enterprise, protect freedom and human rights inside t

and respect sovereignty outside their borders." They 

to agree to decision-making by consensus, and their 

would have to be compatible with NATO's, working u

control, sharing common views of strategy and tactics

interchangeable equipment, especially in communicat

FULL OR PARTIAL MEMBERSHIP.'? 

Is full membership in NATO the only option, or is s

partial or associate membership, similar to the appro

the WEU, a possibility for NATO? 

The U.S. Government and NATO may earlier hav

the possibility of some form of "associate membership

but they appear more or less to have abandoned such 

least temporarily if not permanently. In January 

adopted PFP and the concept of "parmers." Leaders 

to be thinking of progression from "partnershi

membership." The communique issued by NA

Ministers in connection with their semi-annual 

December 1994 stated that "All new members of NA

full members of the Alliance, enjoying the fights and 

obligations of membership. ''88 The new legislation 

H.R. 7, calls for "full" membership for the four Viseg

later than 10 January 1999 (see appendix F). 

The WEU has four categories of association. In ad

WEU's 10 full members, the WEU has three "associa

(Iceland, Norway, and Turkey), two "observers" 

Denmark), and nine "associate partners" (the Visegra

Baltic states, and Bulgaria and Romania). The W

associate members, observers, and associate partners t
g, y 

to extending to PFP partners the benefits of Article 4 of 

which promises consultation if a party believes it 

threatened. Section 8 reads, "NATO will consult with 

participant in the Parmership if that parmer perceives a d

to its territorial integrity, political independence, or sec

In late 1993 Senator William S. Cohen proposed 

NATO step by step. He called for "growing select

institutions into NACC ones and opening up certain 

countries meeting appropriate conditions. This would 

countries capable of it to grow into NATO step by step, 

a more secure place to anchor during the transition p

minimize concerns of those unlikely ever to qualif

membership that NATO is seeking to isolate or exclud

WHICH STATES SHOULD BE CONSID

FOR MEMBERSHIP? 

Of the 25 states that have joined together with NA

members in PFP, most from Central and Eastem Eu

indicated interest in joining NATO. Some have been 

and desire membership as soon as possible. Others 

more reserved, perhaps believing that they are not r

candidates for early membership. Among the 25 PFP 

those who appear to desire NATO membership are 

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 

Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Austria, Finland, Slo

Sweden have not indicated an interest in acceding to t

Treaty. Russian officials have made ambiguous statem

joining NATO. Perhaps with the exception of Ukraine

state in the CIS has indicated an interest in acceding to t

When they adopted PFP in January 1994, NATO 

leaders did not differentiate among states, appearing to s
j

U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, in re

question during Congressional testimony appears to 

beyond previous U.S. statements when he indicated tha

participants would never qualify for NATO membershi

Perry's statement was made in response to a question 

Herbert H. Bateman, who had suggested that ad

statements had been misleading and should not deceive 

thinking that PFP is going to bring them to NATO 

"when it would be irrational to extend NATO that far.

reportedly replied that "For those countries qualified 

NATO members, and only those countries, the Par

Peace is a path to NATO membership. Many mem

Parmership for Peace will never qualify for NATO me

•. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify that point. 

article indicated that Mr. Perry said that PFP was "a n

not a sufficient condition for NATO membership. ''93 

The Washington Post article reporting this exc

reported that a Pentagon spokesman had indicated that 

remark "is not a policy statement as much as it is a s

the obvious," and that a Pentagon official has said th

such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are among the le

be invited to join NATO, and that Secretary of St

Christopher has insisted that giving preference to certa

over others would demoralize those left in waiting. 94 

Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State fo

and Canadian Affairs, reportedly has prepared an a

forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs in which he wrot

will be a permanent part of the European security sc

NATO expands to take in some, but not all, PFP mem

Henry Kissinger has criticized proposals for explo

expansion with all members of PFP, saying this will le

stalemate or confrontation. He has written that "Russi
progress toward establishing democratic institutions, fr

economies, civilian control of their armed forces, and t

law since the fall of their previous communist govemme

legislation provides authority so that "The President may 

a program to assist the transition to full NATO memb

Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia." It also 

authority for the President to designate for assista

Parmership for Peace countries emerging from c

domination when the President determines and repo

relevant committees of Congress that these countries me

specified by Congress. 97 

Central and Eastern Europe 

Most advocates of NATO expansion view the Czech Rep

Poland as two of the most qualified states. Many w

Hungary and possibly Slovakia to any "most qualified" l

would add the Baltic states, and some would add Bu

Romania, and perhaps others. 

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, in an 

published in early February 1995, stated, "The security 

the Central and East European countries and of the Ba

have been taken into account relatively strongly. It 

clarified whether they should join NATO. Now the q

only when and how they will join. And pursuing this 

how together with Russia---and certainly not against R

also in the interest of the Central and East European co

Kinkel did not elaborate on when NATO made 

clarifications regarding CEE and Baltic states. 

The Czech Republic. The Czech Republic has e

what appears to be a solid foundation for democracy and 

forward relatively aggressively on economic reform 

establishing a market economy. Czech President H
to duly elected civilian authorities. 

Poland. U.S. Ambassador to the United States

Albright, reportedly told Poland's President Lech Wals

of 1994 that Poland would be among the first to be all

NATO. ~°° Poland, however, has faced several 

governments and continuing disputes of a constitu

between the Polish president and successive defen

appointed by the prime minister over control of 

establishment. These disputes have continued and 

resolved until after Polish elections later in 1995. Al

months, former Communists have been named to pos

Polish government. President Walesa is reported to ha

the nomination for Prime Minister of Jozef Oleksy, "a 

liberal wing of Poland's post-communist Demo

Alliance," who would be "the first former-Communi

serve as prime minister since the Communist Party l

Solidarity in 1989. ''l°~ 

Hungary and Slovakla. Hungary and Sl

generally been considered the third and fourth mo

candidates for NATO membership. Their progress 

generally judged to be slightly behind that of the Cze

and Poland but ahead of most other countries in 

Eastern Europe. Slovakia, to its leaders' dismay, i

omitted from lists suggested by various individua

believed to be qualified for early NATO membershi

lists containing the names of the other Visegrad state

Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania 

to implement reforms than the Visegrad states, and 

appear to enjoy as much intemational support as t

states. 

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Baltic 

considerable sympathy and support in the West, but th
Times report in early February 1995 stated, "Senior dipl

NATO officials made it very clear that extendin

membership into the former Soviet Union, even to the B

Ukraine, was almost inconceivable for the next decade o

A similar report stated that as for the Baltic nations, o

said: "NATO will have a hard time accepting countrie

militarily indefensible. ''1°3 

Albania. Many states in Westem Europe, includi

allies, appear to regard Albania as in a separate categor

majority of Central and East European states. With the 

of states of the former Yugoslavia, Albania is the only 

not invited to enter into an "associate agreement" with 

to be invited to become an "associate partner" in t

European NATO allies might not accord Albania high p

NATO membership. 

Eurasian States 

Russia and all members of the CIS have joined NACC, a

states except Tajikistan have joined PFP. Russian offi

made conflicting statements as to whether Russia wan

NATO. Some in Ukraine might want to join NATO, 

may not. Other CIS states have not pressed fo

membership. 

Over 40 years ago, in March 1954, the Soviet Un

diplomatic note, sought membership in NAT0 in a mo

least one analyst has called a diversion, following Soviet 

for an altemative all-European security treaty. TM In a r

note of May 1954, France, the United States, and t

Kingdom rejected Moscow's bid for NATO mem

According to the draft approved by foreign ministers o

allies, the rejection was to have referred to "the comple

character" of the Soviet suggestion, characterized the sug
Whether Russia or CIS members located east 

Mountains could be invited to accede to the NATO 

question that might require legal review. Article 10 

Atlantic Treaty states that parties to the Treaty can inv

to the Treaty "any other European State in a position t

principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the se

North Atlantic area." Definitions of Europe usually 

Europe extends eastward only to the Ural Mountai

River and southeastward to the Transcaucasus. 1°7 

Russia--nearly three-quarters of its land mass--lies 

of the Urals. Accession of Turkey to the NATO Tre

however, would seem to offer a precedent for a state 

which lies partially in Europe and partially in Asia, t

to accede to the Treaty, other issues notwithstanding. 

to the Treaty's criterion of being able to contribute to 

of the North Atlantic area, a case could also be m

purely geographical standpoint, that Russia is physi

where it could contribute as much if not more to se

North Atlantic area than some other candidates. 

A narrow definition of Europe and a strict inte

Article 10 might disqualify from NATO membership 

of the CIS lying fully east of the Ural Mountain

Kazakhstan (which is south and mostly east of 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikista

Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan lie partly within 

Europe is debatable. 

All these successor states to the former Soviet 

been accepted as members of the Organization tot 

Cooperation in Europe--but then the United States 

clearly geographically outside Europe, are also membe

Moreover, these successor states were accepted as me

North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and furth
Belarus, and Moldova--all now COE "guests"--are c

"European" and could become members of COE, 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia if they indicate their w

to be considered as part of Europe. With regard to 

Central Asia, he did not mention either "guest" 

membership but only assistance in democratic reforms 

interested. 108 

Tarschys wrote that membership in the COE is "in 

open only to states whose national territory lies wholly o

Europe and whose culture is closely linked with Europea

Further, he suggested that "The boundaries of Europe ha

been comprehensively defined under international l

Council of Europe therefore should, in principle, base it

generally accepted geographical limits of Europe." Cont

line of reasoning, Tarschys said that all present membe

(33 in number) are "European," and so are states whose 

assemblies enjoy special guest status with the COE Par

Assembly, specifically, within the CIS, Russia, Ukraine

and Moldova, as well as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Latvia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced

these "guests," except Bosnia-Herzegovina, have applie

membership, and accession procedures are underway. 

Tarschys also stated that "In view of their cultural 

Europe, Armenia, Azerbaljan and Georgia would 

possibility of applying for membership provided th

indicate their will to be considered as part of Europ

ministers in 1992 indicated that closer relations with C

require democratic reform and commitment to resolvin

by peaceful means. Finally, with regard to the Central A

(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenis

Uzbekistan), Tarschys, mentioning a goal of enhancing 

the region, wrote that COE ministers considered tha
"associate" agreements, which have been concluded 

EU and the four Visegrad states and Bulgaria and Rom

being negotiated with the three Baltic states. The 

accepted these nine Central and East European states 

partners" but has not extended such invitations to any 

the CIS. 

Russia. There appears to be considerable sentime

member states that Russia should not be permitted to 

but that some form of unique relationship between 

Russia should be established. It is not clear whether o

would even want to join NATO. While President 

hinted that some day Russia might want to join, Defe

Grachev has indicated that Russia has no plans to ap

"We will go our own way. ''1°9 Arguments that have b

be used for not inviting Russia to join NATO 

following: 

• Russia is not a North Atlantic or European 

Eurasian state. (Turkey, of course, is a Eurasian 

member of NATO.) 

• Russia is too large. Russia is far larger tha

European member of NATO and admitting it to N

change the balance. 

• Russia is too instable to be considered now 

membership. 

• Russia might never be prepared to cooperate t

needed in NATO. It is difficult to imagine Russia 

detailed examination in NATO of its force planning 

under the Defense Planning Questionnaire process, o

integrating its forces under a NATO commander. N

also feel constrained in opening membership doors to R

Russia's aggressive intelligence services. 

• Russia might not be as willing as present NAT
Russia's territory lies east of the Ural Mountains and R

long border with China as well as with Mongolia and K

In an interview in June 1994, then-NATO Secreta

Manfred Woemer stated~ "I do not envisage Ru

membership in NATO being possible in the foreseeable 

German officials, particularly Defense Minister Vol

have been among the more vocal opponents to consideri

NATO membership for Russia. Minister Ruehe is repor

told a German-American business conference in early 

1994 that Russia would never achieve the "homogeneit

of NATO and EU members. He reportedly said: "If R

to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO 

would be like the United Nations of Europe--it woul

The Poles are learning English for NATO but the Rus

us to learn Russian. I just don't see Russia, long-t

governed by Brussels. It cannot be integrated. ''IH 

Former Czech Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier sp

opposition to Russian membership in NATO and 

reportedly saying that Russia is an unstable count

membership would not reinforce security but become a 

factor.X12 

Henry Kissinger argued, "Russian membership in NA

dissolve the Atlantic Alliance into just such a vag

(general collective security system similar to the Unite

without meeting the security concems of Europe, es

Eastem Europe, or of America. It would remove N

shield of Westem Europe because the NATO obligatio

run to protecting its members against each other. Instea

place NATO's frontiers at the borders of China. Th

Russian membership in NATO and in the European 

standard fare in Communist times. ''H3 

U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry reported
borders of Asiawinside Asia even--and this is why 

with common sense intend to include Russia in the E

must have a close agreement for paanership and coop

Russia. ''H5 

Many believe that NATO will have to develop 

some form of unique relationship of one kind or anoth

is, without offering NATO membersl~p, to have coop

Russia. This relationship would likely reflect Russia's 

in terms of the size of its territory, population, res

defense establishment, including its strategic nuclear 

German Defense Minister Ruehe reportedly propos

Defense Ministers in May 1994 offering Russia a 

without adjectives" such as "strategic," "pragmatic," "c

or "privileged. ''H6 

In June 1994, following Russia's signing the PFP 

agreement, NATO released publicly a document entitle

of Conclusions of Discussions Between the North Atla

and Foreign Minis'ter of Russia Andrey Kozyrev." Th

contained four main points: 

(1) calling for constructive, cooperative relations 

(2) development of an extensive PFP Individual 

Program corresponding to Russia's size, impo

capabilities 

(3) agreement to set in train development of a f

cooperative NATO/Russia relationship both inside and 

(4) agreement to pursue broad, eldaanced di

cooperation in areas where Russia has unique an

contributions to make, commensurate with its 

responsibility as a major European, international, 

power, n7 

NATO Foreign Ministers, in their December 1994 

communique, addressed NATO relations with Russia. 
Foreign Minister regarding areas where Russia has a 

particularly important contribution to make. They propo

the opportunity of their regular NATO Foreign Minister

to meet with Russian ministers whenever useful. 

proposed that experts meet to discuss key issues. "8 

The Russian Foreign Minister, however, surpris

Foreign Ministers during their December 1994 meeting b

at the last minute, to sign an individual parl~ership progr

to Russia's participation in PFP, saying he did not u

NATO's policy of expansiorL ~19 Kozyrev said he was 

protest of NATO's planned expansion into Eastern Euro

"Moscow's strategy is partnership. If the strategy of N

changed and is now aimed at enlargement, that requ

discussion and maybe further decisions. So we have to 

later to implement. ''~2° 

NATO Secretary-General Claes in an interview app

late January 1995 indicated that Russian Deputy Foreig

Afanazevskiy on 30 January had conveyed to him Russ

to reach agreements with NATO beyond those in PF

additional document for a "broad and consolidated 

dialogue" between Russia and NATO. Claes indicated th

the conflict in Chechnya, he thought if Russia were rea

the NATO Council would still vote in favor of signing 

agreements. Claes described the second agreement 

conceming a broad and more intensive political dia

involves, apart from a mutual exchange of inform

consultations, also political cooperation as laid down in 

document." He cites Afanazevskiy's statement, "In vie

intentions to expand NATO, we might require someth

order to settle our relationships." Claes' response: "

authority to provide an official response, but I suppo

prepared to provide additional elements." Claes indica
The United States was reported to be ready t

Russians on PFP participation during talks in Washin

February. A Clinton administration official reported 

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott would hand Rus

Foreign Minister Mamedov a letter from Presid

specifying the need for Russia to join the PFP program 

to a PFP individual partnership program) before mov

special relationshipJ 22 

In February 1995 German Defense Minister V

reportedly told the Bundestag Defense Committee 

intends to conclude an "agreement on a strategic 

between NATO and Russia." Ruehe reportedly said t

has specific expectations for new consultation instr

guarantee Russia "co-determination" in European secu

apparently also suggested that it was "absolutely nece

more intensive cooperation with Russia accompany 

acceptance of new members by NATO but also "the 

there," and he indicated that practical organizat

partnership has already "progressed quite far" and c

specific results in the first 6 months of this year, "fo

formal correspondence on the further handling of th

issue." Ruehe indicated it was important for Mosco

confronted with faits accomplis or surprises on NATO 

but he said NATO could not accept a Russian right 

suggested the formula for the negotiations has to be "N

surprises."x23 

A unique relationship between NATO and Russ

manifest in the form of a treaty. This could be 

friendship and cooperation or a more strategic one. 

might be made to keep each side informed of the other

to help prevent suspicion or misunderstanding. So

structure to the relationship might be negotiated, t
such a treaty would "provide the Russians with a 

recognition of their country's status as a major po

embracing Russia within a wider framework of 

security."l~ 

Christoph Bertram, currently a diplomatic correspond

German newspaper Die Zeit, argued in an article that R

not be invited to join NATO but that a new "Russia-NAT

must be created: 

Russia cannot join NATO without destroying it, hence al

that eventuality are eyewash. Nor can Russia be treat

another 'Partner for Peace.' Since Russia does not fit into 

existing organizations, a new one should be created

NATO forum. This would have to be a formal ar

designed to allow for day-to-day dizlogueand consu

capable of establishing a traditionof close security coope

this, it would haveto have all the trimmings of a proper i

institution--two secretary-generals, a political and 

committee, a council of permanent representatives, 

Russia's need for status would be respected, and NATO

extension could even less be misconstrued in Moscow 

Russian strategy. 125 

Lothar Ruehl, formerly German State Secretary of D

now a writer for Die Welt, suggested a European secu

between NATO allies, the Russian Federation, and 

interested European states. On the basis of such a Tre

could be within the OSCE framework or some new fra

European Security Council could be established, comp

United States, Russia, and the EU or Britain, France, Ger

Italy. 126 

Ukraine. If some form of special relationship is e

with Russia, what form of relationship might there 
established between NATO and Russia and Ukraine ma

the types of relationships between NATO and other 

CIS. It would be difficult to imagine that, if Russia i

to join NATO, any other states of the CIS would be inv

States in Western Europe. 

Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Austria, F

Sweden have joined PFP but have not to date sought 

in NATO. Austria only joined in early 1995. Govern

seem to regard NATO membership as unnecessa

established Western democracies, generally viewed i

as "neutral," would, from a political standpoint, s

candidates should they ever seek NATO membership

Slovenla. Slovenia has joined PFP. Two facto

against NATO membership for Slovenia are Sioveni

relationship to former Yugoslavia and a political-econ

with Italy dating back to World War II, which has 

closer EU-Slovenia relations. 

TIMING 

When should new members be admitted to NATO

extent is timing of CEE states' accession to NATO aff

timing of their joining the EU and WEU and by con

NATO relations with Russia? 

The U.S. administration and NATO have avoided 

any timetable for accession by new members. NA

Ministers announced at their 1 December 1994 meeti

had agreed, "It is premature to discuss the tim

enlargement or which particular countries would be in

the Alliance. ''127 

An article in The New York Times reported, "G
1994 meeting of German and Polish experts suggests th

become a bone of contention. The report indicates th

CEE states to join NATO first is supported by the C

German Defense Minister Ruehe, and the United State

for reasons of security and relative ease of joining NAT

is reported to be the primary opponent of this, arguin

membership should come first, as security guarantees 

credible if they have no solid political and economic f

The German government was said to adhere to a 

formula of "close links" between NATO and EU expans

was said to believe that combining NATO and EU mem

CEE states could dispel Russian fears. 129 

Another press report indicates that German Foreig

Kinkel and European colleagues have always linked EU 

with NATO membership. Kinkel is said to have a 

moving the states that wish to join closer to the EU a

"without a time constraint." French diplomats are said 

reason to speed up the NATO accession process, an

Minister Juppe is said to believe the end of 1996 wo

earliest date for starting EU membership negotiations. 1

report in mid-February 1995 suggested that Kinkel was 

favorable to NATO expansion. TM 

On the other hand, a Dutch press report referring to 

rule" that CEE states would have to follow the "royal pa

joining the EU, then the WEU, and only after tha

indicated in early November 1994 that the EU's Comm

External Affairs, Hans van den Broek, believes that C

which he sees not joining the EU before the tum of t

might join NATO before they join the EU and WEU. 

report suggested that the United States was inclined to 

states to join NATO earlier and not wait for EU memb

Others seem to tie timing of NATO accession more 
future is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposit

to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations 

Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. 

NSC Staff official Peter Rodman suggested t

administration's approach has been "gradualist to a 

argued, "It's time to accept the fact that NATO e

inescapable and necessary, that a negative Russian rea

unavoidable and that we might as well do it quickly an

with. ''135 

Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the P

Senior Director for European Affairs on the U.S. Natio

Council Staff, is reported to have told foreign reporters 

he could foresee NATO expansion in the first half 

term for President Clinton. TM A press report in early 

1994, prior to the NATO Ministerial meeting that l

year-long study of NATO expansion, indicated th

Western diplomats were suggesting that NATO wou

guidelines for joining NATO and that even the f

candidates--Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 

were unlikely to be able to meet these for several yea

unlikely to be admitted before the year 2000, perhaps w

2005. 137 

With NATO's decision to study and discuss th

issue through most of 1995, it seems clear 

circumstances arise resulting in accelerated action, ther

new NATO members in 1995. After NATO c

intemally and with Partners in 1995, it is an open quest

or not states may be invited to join NATO between n

beginning of the 21st century. 

German Defense Minister Ruehe's report to the B

February that within the next 6 months a formal exchan

between NATO and Russia for a bilateral security 
Havel was reported in mid-January to have said that the 

security integration of former Eastem bloc states into N

near and that he envisaged Czech integration into the 

end of this millennium. ~38 

An early February report on NATO expansion b

York Times stated, "In private, Westem diplomats a

officials make it clear that expansion will not be quic

five years away--and that it will be limited to the fou

Visegrad countries. ''~39 

SEQUENCING? 

The issue of sequencing admission of new mem

particularly sensitive one. Should one or two members

the Czech Republic and/or Poland--be admitted ini

others to follow, or should several--perhaps the Viseg

even moreIbe admitted at the same time? Should d

made and announced on an ad hoc basis, or should the

overall timetable or plan. 

At their 1 December 1994 meeting, NATO Foreig

agreed "That, when it occurs, enlargement will be de

case-by-case basis and that some nations may attain m

before others. ''14° 

Czech radio, reporting on a meeting between Czec

Havel and British Prime Minister John Major in early 

1994, stated that Major had repeated that the fundamen

on NATO's expansion has been made and that candid

be accepted individually, not suddenly but slowly and c

Following a September 1994 meeting among th

Ministers of Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, and C

Deputy Defense Minister Jiri Pospisil, Pospisil reported

the Czech Republic was blocking the idea of joint ac

four states regarding NATO and that was why the Cze
states and the extent to which all parties were c

advance, and the existence of other forms of cooperat

NATO and states not invited to join at the outset. 

In the states not admitted, the position of reforme

undercut, particularly if the reformers were advocate

membership, and if prospects for NATO accession 

uncertain or dim. 

States not admitted early on might be suspicious an

could create problems. They might be particularly di

state they view as a rival or possible threat is admitted 

not. Some could challenge what criteria NATO use 

new members and how NATO made its assessment of 

met the criteria. Some might be concerned that if a 

admitted to NATO and they were not, the rival, onc

might block their subsequent admittance. For exam

ethnic tensions between Romania and Hungary, the 

could be concerned that Hungary, if admitted first, m

block Romanian accession. 

DIVIDING LINES IN EUROPE 

Opponents of NATO expansion have emphasized t

creating new dividing lines between Europe and Russia

and the CIS, or even within Central and Eastern Euro

Supporters of expansion appear to recognize th

believe they can be managed. Allied officials appea

place NATO expansion in a broader security context 

and Eurasia, one without dividing lines. 

NATO Foreign Ministers, at their December 19

attempted to do this in the communique that they is

spoke of the Alliance's ability to "contribute to s

cooperation in the whole of Europe," and its ability 

broad approach to building political, military and 
• The enlargement of NATO will comple

enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process w

for its part, contributes significantly to extending se

stability to the new democracies in the East. 

• Enlargement should strengthen the effectiven

Alliance, contribute to stability and security of the en

Atlantic area, and support our objective of main

undivided Europe. 

• Enlargement should be seen in the context of 

cooperative structures of security which can extend to 

througout the whole of Europe. 

• Having just overcome the division of Europe, w

desire to see the emergence of new lines of partition. 

• A cooperative European security architecture r

active participation of Russia." Ministers also made r

Ukraine, CSCE, the WEU, and the French initiated Stab

among other things. TM 

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AS 

A MANDATORY ROUTE 

It seems clear that states wanting to join NATO wi

demonstrate their interest and qualifications through pa

in PFP. The PFP invitation, issued by NATO Summit 

January 1994, includes the statement that "Active parti

the Partnership for Peace will play an important r

evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO." 

questions now appear to be what will a state desiri

NATO have to do in PFP to demonstrate that it has the i

is qualified to become a member of NATO, and how lon

process take. 

Since the initiation of PFP in January 1994, 25 
constructed at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and a 

Coordination Cell has been established, with offices i

building, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Euro

Belgium. A good number of the PFP parmers ha

assigned liaison personnel to man these offices and p

PFP activities at these NATO headquarters. PFP is 

build closer relationships between NATO and PF

NATO Secretary General Willy Claes wrote, "Throu

seek to build the habits of consultation, trust and 

which the Allies have developed among themselve

decades. 145 Mr. Claes also indicated that much of the 

will be in the military area. NATO and PFP partners h

and conducted exercises of forces, including exerci

Poland and the Netherlands involving ground force 

many countries, and additional ones have been held or 

Partner states will nominate forces and assets that the

to the Partnership, and, related to those forces, approac

built to peacekeeping and humanitarian support operatio

will help share expertise on creating democratically or

accountable Ministries of Defense. A defense planning 

process based on the NATO system will be introduce

READINESS OF WESTERN PARLIAM

AND PUBLICS 

What views do parliaments and publics in NATO sta

the issue of NATO expansion? How much attentio

given to the issues, particularly the issue of extending 

guarantees of NATO to countries of the East? Ho

parliamentary and public support for NATO in genera
gp, 

103-447, Title II. This legislation expresses the se

Congress that NATO leaders are to be commended for 

that NATO membership remains open to PFP cou

encourages NATO membership for the Visegrad stat

others that meet six criteria specified in the legis

appendix E for enumeration of these criteria). 

The legislation authorizes the President to des

countries to receive U.S. assistance if they meet the 

plus a criterion against having provided defense articles 

states. The U.S. assistance program is to facilitate the t

states to full NATO membership by supporting and e

inter alia (1) joint planning, training, and military exe

NATO forces, (2) greater interoperability of military equ

defense systems, and command, control, and comm

systems, and (3) conformity of military doctrine. The 

authorizes the President to provide security assistance 

of transfer of certain types of excess defense articles, I

Military Education and Training, and Foreign Military 

Finally, the legislation expresses the sense of the Co

designated countries should be included in activities 

increased standardization and enhanced interope

equipment and weapons systems through coordinated t

procurement activities as well as other means undertake

and other allied countries. 147 

In September 1994, Republican candidates for ele

U.S. House of Representatives issued a legislative 

Contract with America, 14g that contains a two-page 

indicating that the Republicans would introduce into t

"National Security Restoration Act," which, in part

designed to "accelerate the expansion of NATO." The 

of renewing the U.S. commitment to a strong NATO 

the Clinton administration to proceed with full NATO 
that the U.S. should assist these nations as they w

NATO membership, and that other European countrie

invited to join NATO if they agree to contribute to NAT

The book also said that the legislation would give th

authority to assist these four states and other Europ

working toward full NATO membership. ~5° 

In January 1995, a bill that addresses NATO a

expansion was introduced into the House of Represe

Republican leaders and others (appendix F). ~51 The b

bears the short title, "National Security Revitalization 

bill states that one of its purposes is to "reemp

commitment of the United States to a strong and vi

Atlantic Treaty Organization." (See appendix F, Title V

Findings.) 

The bill would amend the NATO Participation A

specifically portions of Title II of Public Law 103-447; 

1928. Among the more important amendments: 

• Instead of leaving it to the President's di

establish a program to assist designated states in the t

full NATO membership, the bill would mandate it ("Th

may establish..." would be changed to "The Pres

establish..."). 

• States authorized (subject to Presidential desi

receive assistance, in addition to the four Visegrad state

amended to "other European countries" instead 

Partnership for Peace countries" emerging from 

domination. 

• The Congress would "hereby" designate the fou

states as eligible under this legislation, instead of stati

President "may designate countries emerging from comm

participating in the Parmership for Peace, especial

Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia" if the 
"Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund" to the 

assistance programs a designated country could receive

• It would modify the language prohibiting ass

states that have cooperated with states supporting in

terrorism. 

• The bill would require an annual report from the 

• Presidential reports would have to be sent not 

Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Foreign 

(now Intemational Relations) Committees as in the 1994 

but also to the Senate Armed Services and App

Committees and the House National Security and App

Committees. 

A version of the bill, said to be significantly change

sections, was passed in the House of Representatives i

1995. Press reports did not indicate any changes wer

Title VI dealing with NATO revitalization and expan

press reported, however, that prospects for the legislatio

because in the Senate there is no companion bill an

support for only some of the bills key elements. Mor

White House was repotted to be opposed to the bil

President suggested he might veto it. ~52 

In mid-February, Secretary of State Warren Chris

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry wrote a piece crit

National Security Revitalization Act, including Title V

Revitalization and Expansion Act." Regarding the NAT

of the bill, they wrote, 

The bill unilaterally and prematurely designates certain Euro

for NATO membership. NATO should and will expan

expansion will strengthen stability in Europe for me

nonmembers alike. But new members must be ready to un

obligations of membership, just as we and our "allies must 

extend our solemn commitments to them. Our present 
and fostering complacency in countries that are. Indeed, the 

measure before Congress could be instability in the very r

security we seek to bolster, j53 

Senator William S. Cohen in a speech to a con

Munich, Germany, in early February 1995 claimed that 

expansion issue needs much more debate in the U.S. 

He argued, "Stability is not a concept that is easy to sell

need is a thorough public debate, but in the United Stat

even begun." He stated that if a vote were to come 

Senate now, "The answer today would be no. The pu

even started to think about what expansion would mea

American Public. A GalIup/USA Today poll co

January 1994, just prior to the January NATO Summit m

agreed on the Partnership for Peace Program, reflected c

support for allowing Central and East European sta

NATO. Iss The poll listed only seven CEE states; the re

general distinctions among the states. Gallup specific

the security guarantee issue and identified Russia as 

threat in phrasing the question: "As you may know

committed to defending its members against a militar

any other nation, including Russia. Which, if any, of th

countries do you think should be allowed to join NAT

Yes, Allowed No, Not No Op

to Join Allowed Depen

Poland 66% 18% 16

Hungary 60 21 19 

Romania 53 28 19 

Czech Republic 52 28 20 

Lithuania 51 25 24 

Bulgaria 47 30 23 

Albania 42 32 26 
and the college educated than among Democrats and tho

college education (about 70 percent vs. 60 percen0. 

• Surveys in the past have shown that many Am

not recognize the term "NATO" and that the level of 

the Alliance obtained on surveys depends considerably 

the American-Western European alliance connection is 

• At least prior to 1994, support for NATO came 

a desire to maintain close U.S.-European ties than 

perception of an external (Sovie0 threat. 

A 4-7 December 1993 Los Angeles Times poll ind

61 percent of the American public favored maintaini

People were asked, "As you may know, the North Atla

Organization--known as NATO--is an alliance of 

Western European military forces set up after World 

resist aggression by the Soviet Communist bloc. Now 

communism has collapsed, some people think 

unnecessary and should be disbanded while others 

provides an important security alliance for the United 

you favor or oppose disbanding NATO? (If favor or 

you (favor/oppose) that strongly or somewhat?" 

Maintain NATO 61% 

Strong opinion 33 

Somewhat 28 

Disband NATO 26 

Somewhat 15 

Strong opinion 11 

Don't know 13 

According to the January 1994 GalIup/USA Tod

percent of the American public believed that the "NAT

alliance of Western Europe and the United States" 

maintained (vs. 18 percent who said it was no longer n
Western Europe 

There has been no legislation developed in Wes

parliaments specifically related to NATO expansion. In 

1994, however, North Atlantic Assembly Parliament

NATO states reportedly expressed their favor for 

possible admission of new states to NATO. ~Ss 

In November 1993, the United States Informati

(USIA) commissioned surveys in Belgium, France, Ger

Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom asking ques

extending security guarantees and using their own nat

to defend Central and Eastem Europe and admitting 

certain CEE states and Russia and Ukraine. 159 With 

security guarantees, majorities in these West 

states---except for Germany--believed that "NATO sho

a security guarantee to the countries of central a

Europe--that is Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic

Bulgaria and Romania--4o use NATO forces to defe

they were to come under attack." The majorities 

country polled, from 76 percent to 56 percent; in G

percent said "yes" and 45 percent said "no." Somew

majorities (generally 2-9 percentage points lower) also w

to use their nation's troops to help NATO defend these 

(for Germany, 47 percent said "yes" and 47 percent said 

admission to NATO, people were asked if they favored 

admitting into NATO eight specific Central and Eastem 

States, Russia, and Ukraine. Averaging the results

Eastern countries received the following percentage

European support for NATO membership: Poland, 

Hungary, 62 percent: Bulgaria, 54 percent; Czech R

percent; Russia, 53 percent; Lithuania, 53 percent; R

percent; Slovakia, 51 percent; Estonia, 50 percent; and 

percent. 
received the greatest support for NATO membership

ranging between 78-60 percent of those polled. Majori

percent) believed that Russia should be given the opt

NATO when it meets all qualifications. 

Germany. In Germany, 64 percent of the pu

believed that admitting Central and East European 

NATO would benefit the overall security of Europe. 

percent, however, believed NATO expansion would harm 

security because it might overburden the Alliance and d

into unwanted conflicts. Told to keep in mind that Ger

defend any NATO member that is attacked, the p

favoring NATO membership for specific states were: H

percent; Czech Republic, Poland, the three Baltic 

Slovakia, roughly 66 percent; Bulgaria, 55 percent;, S

percent; and Romania, 46 percent (with 44 percent 

Some 58 percent of Germans favored giving Russia th

join NATO when it meets established qualifications; 

opposed. Those in the eastern laender were more 

inclined than those in westem Germany. (Compared to 

polls showed more support for Russian membership in 

Italy (65 percent), France (67 percent), and the United 

(74 percent)). Germans were hesitant to defend CEE sta

as they were not members of NATO. Without NATO m

only some 25 percent of Germans polled would gra

guarantees to the Visegrad four and the three Baltic stat

figure was only 17 percent with respect to Bulgaria, Ro

Slovenia. 

France. In France, 54 percent of those poll

admission of CEE states to NATO would benefit 

security. About 30 percent believed expansion would b

Reminded that France must defend any NATO 

attacked, the percentages of those polled favoring mem
were not members of NATO. Some 38 percent wer

defend the Visegrad four, and 35 percent were willin

Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. 

United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, 54 

those polled believed admission of CEE states to NA

benefit European security, while 27 percent believed 

harmful by overburdening the Alliance and draw

unwanted conflicts. 

Told to keep in mind that the United Kingdom m

any NATO member attacked, the percentages of th

favoring membership for specific states were: Poland, 

Hungary, 66 percent; Czech Republic, 62 percent; the 

states, Bulgaria, and Romania, 57-60 percent; Slovakia, 

and Slovenia, 52 percent. Some 74 percent favored gi

the option to join NATO when it meets all qualificati

IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT 

ON NATO EFFECTIVENESS 

The impact on NATO of adding new members wo

greatly on which states are admitted and how many 

admitted. Looking at the extremes, smaller states wou

less influential and more willing to join a consensus in 

most issues. Large states, such as Russia, with a 

nearly double that of Germany, armed forces larger tha

European state, and a history of influential foreign po

likely change the political calculus in NATO; many hav

that membership would give Russia a veto in NATO. 

NATO Secretary General Claes has suggested tha

issues to be addressed in NATO's expansion study is 

not the "principle of unanimity" should continue to app

25, or 26 NATO members. He also suggested th
States that have consolidated democracies likely 

sustainable market economies, an in-place system of r

foreign policies reflecting respect for international law a

cooperation with neighbors and other states, and d

oriented military doctrines and forces will likely en

Alliance. Admissions of states that do not h

characteristics, or states that, once admitted, l

characteristics could pose serious problems for the Allia

cohesion. 

NATO would likely want to avoid to the exten

bringing into the Alliance territorial or ethnica

confrontations or conflicts. Such tensions might exist be

new members, a new member and an existing member

member and a state not being asked to join NATO

tensions exist, NATO might want to carefully analyze th

and seek as much assurance as possible that the tension

resolved or dealt with peacefully. 

The number of states that might be asked to join NA

also be an important variable. Again, at the extremes, 

to increase from 16 to 17 members would likely have lit

Increasing NATO to the size of OSCE with 53 memb

than tripling the size of NATO---would create signific

and disruption in NATO and require major changes i

NATO now handles consultations, planning, and operati

are major differences in preparing for and conductin

NATO ministerial and other meetings with 16 member 

also NACC meetings with 38, PFP meetings with 41, 

meetings with 53 member states. 

Depending on which states are admitted, there 

significant geostrategic implications for NATO, incl

territory to defend or made available for planning 

operations, forces to be brought into NATO's integrat
respectively. NATO will also need to address the 

expanded membership on the NATO committee system 

integrated NATO military command. There will be m

issues to address regarding force commitments, plannin

and control, infrastructure, standardization of strategie

tactics and equipment, and deployments. NATO wo

avoid a division between what is done in Westem Euro

is done with new states from the East. 

THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH 

ATLANTIC COOPERATION 

COUNCIL AND PARTNERSHIP 

PEACE 

To the extent that NATO and other states turn their 

membership in NATO, will there be less interest in a

to NACC and PFP? If so, will this exacerbate th

between, on one hand, NATO and its new members

other, states participating only in NACC and PFP? 

NACC predated PFP, and, indeed, NATO Summ

January 1994 announced that PFP was being establis

the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Cou

exactly this means is not entirely clear, but as indic

NACC Foreign Ministers, with the participation of Mi

states that have joined PFP but not NACC. have rev

NACC and PFP activities and approved a Work Plan f

1995. 

With the launching of PFP, less attention, at lea

seems to be accorded to NACC. On 1 December 1

Foreign Ministers met and issued a communique th

NACC only in passing and focuses primarily on 
reviewed NACC and PFP activities based on reports from 

of the relevant NACC and PFP committees and to have 

views on the relationship between NACC and PFP with 

achieving maximum efficiency and effectiveness betw

They were also reported to have consulted on the "evolu

European security architecture and ways to strengthe

reinforcing cooperation between different institutions 

with security issues. ''162 

Also released at the meeting was a "Work Plan for 

Partnership and Cooperation 1994/1995," approved by 

participating in the meeting. This relatively extensive 

summarizes topics and activities addressed by both N

PFP. In general, it appears that NACC will addres

economic, scientific, environmental, and informational i

will address peacekeeping and most defense planning a

issues; and NACC and PFP will both address civil 

planning/humanitarian assistance and air traffic manag

outline form, the headings for the topics and activities i

plan are: 

• Political and security related matters 

• Policy planning consultations 

• Economic issues (defense conversion, security 

economic development, and defense expenditures an

budgets and their relationship with the economy) 

• Science 

• Challenges of modem society (including envir

• Information 

• Peacekeeping (only PFP topics and activities) 

• Defense planning issues and military matters (N

and activity is air defense; PFP topics cover a broad 

issues, also including air defense, and PFP activities inc

exercises) 
many have officers at SHAPE, where they can p

consultations, planning, and reviews. The success o

PFP will depend on the attention and resources devo

activities by NATO Allies and other NACC and PFP 

VIEWS EXPRESSED IN DIFF

COUNTRIES 

central and Eastern Europe 

The majority of political leaders and publics in CEE 

to favor strengthening ties to or joining NATO. Ac

fall 1993 USIA survey of five CEE states, sizeable m

people polled favored "strengthening ties" between t

and NATO. Approval rates were as follows: Poland

Czech Republic, 67 percent; Slovakia, 60 percent; 

percent; and Bulgaria, 54 percent. 163 

Czech Republic. Czech President Vaclav Have

November 1993 set forth the rationale for why the Cz

wants to join NATO---basically, no large European con

Central Europe untouched, the Czech Republic is p

European civilization and shares NATO's values, an

Republic's geopolitical situation is precarious. TM 

Havel, in an interview published in February 199

the timing of joining NATO, saying that "For reason

being accepted into NATO is indeed more urgent for u

accepted into the European Union. No one knows wh

developments in Russia will be like and whether 

experience unpleasant surprises there. Now time is r

seriously negotiate about our membership in NATO; it 

a security guarantee. Integration in the European Un

a long-term process. 165 In December 1994 Havel rep

had talked to German Chancellor Kohl who "had said 
Summit on 9 December that joining the EU was his coun

strategic goal. :68 Klaus has, however, emphasized t

importance of NATO in terms of the U.S. relationsh

budgetary implications of NATO membership, saying

emphasize our ambitions regarding NATO, I emph

demand for an American presence in Europe . . . ad

NATO would necessarily entail a process of fu

rearmament stretching over several years, which would 

appreciable reinforcement of the Ministry of Defense 

Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan implied a 

between being ready to join NATO politically and mil

November 1994, he reportedly said that his country was 

prepared to join NATO and that, while the Czech Arm

to complete restructuring, this will soon be the case 

areas. :7° The same month he wrote, "If our admission t

indeed depended only upon our Army's organizational 

I would say that this could happen shortly after the com

the Army's transformation. Starting in 1996, we could 

for admission. Nevertheless, I am afraid that the situatio

more complicated. Admission to NATO on our part or 

into NATO from the point of view of our partners is p

political matter. It demands respect for common v

defense of common interests.., our endeavor for integ

structures such as the European Union and NATO is n

uncompromising and, apart from extremists, something 

both the coalition and the opposition parties concur. '':71 

was reported to have said that the Czech Republic will j

before the year 2006 and that it is possible that Czech a

PFP will be so high that they will virtually equ

membership. 172 

Both Havel and Klaus have said that Czech mem

NATO should be the subject of a referendum in 
citizens support NATO membership. Pressures on 

budget may hurt the effort for NATO membership. 

Walesa argued, "Our goal is to participate full

There cannot be a region of insecurity in the cente

Our participation in NATO is not only in our interests

interests of Europe. ''174 

Walesa has also been an advocate of joint Visegra

to the EU and NATO, saying, for instance, in January 

the formation of the Visegrad Group, Poland has bel

should discuss strategic questions together and enter jo

dialogue with the European Union and NATO. This 

trump card in the process of integration into these in

In mid-January 1995, then Prime Minister Wald

stated that there was a general consensus in Polan

foreign policy priorities and the first of these was int

the EU and NATO. 176 Speaking before the Polish p

19 January, Pawlak said Poland regarded participatio

a road to full NATO membership, that Poland did no

NATO membership to the development of the situation 

that Poland wanted to take to NATO its own defen

which was that of a democratic state, one economical

and politically stable, with an efficient and quite mod

said Poland expected to become an equal parl~er. 177 

Also, however, in mid-January 1995, Polan

Minister, Andrzej Olechowski, resigned, citing irreconc

differences with the government led by Pawlak. Olec

has been appointed by Walesa, viewed Polish me

NATO and the EU as of the utmost importance to Pola

policy: "My feeling is that the Government does not 

and will not actively and convincingly do, what I reg

in the state's interest: the fastest possible membersh

and the European Union." Olechowski, in an interv
participating in a collective security system, the core 

would be NATO. '':8° 

With regard to the Defense Ministry, in June 1

Deputy Minister of National Defense Jerzy Milewski 

emphasized that Poland should make efforts to be a

NATO structures gradually, with political integration 

military integration taking some time, given the ne

defense planning and adapting the Army. After all, 

signed six agreements on gradual integration before it w

admitted to NATO. TM In July 1994, he said that P

counting on full NATO membership before the e

decade. :~ In August, Milewski stated, "The bad state of 

and the lack of financial prospects is undoubtedly a v

negative political factor, which may delay Poland's mem

NATO. ''~g3 The press spokesman for the Polish Gener

August 1994 said that the Army needs no less than 3 per

gross domestic product, but even that would not be 

reach the armament level found in NATO. TM In Februar

article in the Polish press reported that it is difficult to 

1995 Polish defense budget enough money to cover the 

zlotys that the General Staff estimates will be needed to 

participation. 18-~ 

The Polish populace today supports membership in N

in June 1993, only about half those interviewed favore

participation in NATO military structures. ~s6 Results 

taken in Poland in February 1994 indicated that 79 perce

interviewed favored Poland seeking NATO members

only 7 percent were opposed and 14 percent had n

Some 66 percent believed PFP enhanced Poland's se

some 41 percent believed the West had betrayed Poland 

CEE states by refusing them immediate NATO memb

for the timing of Poland's entry into NATO, 6 percen
A poll taken of Polish military officers showed th

of those interviewed favored Polish membership in N

percent expressed positive opinions of Polish par

NATO's military missions. Some 75 percent said 

poses a danger to Poland, and 79 percent stated that R

to return to its empire policy. ~89 

Hungary. Views in Hungary about joining N

more ambiguous than those in the Czech Republic 

Although many Hungarian political leaders have spo

of NATO membership, and Hungary is a member of 

as NACC, there is sufficient or desire to defer NATO 

that a referendum has been proposed. Defense 

officials cite costs of PFP and NATO membership a

reasons for not participating in a PFP exercise last y

Prime Minister Gyula Hom, the first post-Commu

advocate NATO membership, ~9° has proposed a refer

issue of joining NATO, explaining that the public ha

on the issue--some wondering why, after 40 years in 

Pact, Hungary should join another alliance, and some 

favoring neutrality. Hom said he will argue feels he 

favor of NATO. TM He feels there is a national c

joining the EU, but the consensus does not apply to N

6 February 1995, President Arpad Goncz, who view

"the anchor with wtfich to cling tightly to the West," 

the referendum "would be approved with 70 to 75 p

votes" and, if undertaken, "will confer greater force an

to our joining. ''193 

According to a press report on the views of lead

political parties in Hungary, four favored NATO mem

(Workers Party) opposed it, and two said it was too 

NATO and that membership would require a r

Govemment leaders have also expressed differin
In December 1994, Kovacs said: "The number on

Hungarian foreign policy is the country's adjustment to 

Atlantic institutional system. It equally means joining t

NATO. We examine these two matters in unity, becaus

complementary processes that reinforce each other. ''1

interview published on 9 February 1995, Kovacs listed 

principal aims of Hungary's foreign policy to be integ

the West European and North Atlantic commu

membership in the EU and NATO, creation of the be

relations with Hungary's neighbors, and support for 

minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbian Vojvodin

On the timing of joining NATO and the EU, Prim

Horn has stated that Hungary will join NATO before j

EU, as NATO will decide on enlargement in Decem

Horn was said to expect that the EU Intergovemmental C

in 1996 would determine conditions for CEE accession 

then negotiations on accession would begin in 1997, thu

could join the EU by the year 2000.199 In an interview 

on 13 February 1995, Horn suggested, "Admission to NA

take place first, because NATO does not have long-term 

conditions as does the EU. The relevant NATO dec

orientation, if nothing else--might be made as early as 

1995 or the first half of 1996. 'a°° Defense Minister Gyo

also thinks NATO membership will precede EU memb

On the issue of sequencing of Visegrad states in

former President Josef Antall suggested in 1993 tha

Visegrad stales should enter NATO together, at one tim

Ministry official Istvan Gyarmati explained the reasoning

the security and stability of NATO would become stron

is also in our interest because our integration with NAT

much smoother if we have a land connection with t

NATO member countries, and also because we are conv
expressed a different view on the issue of Hungary h

connection to NATO states. In an interview publis

January 1995 he said, "This factor has not yet be

something important in assessing the accession. In m

could even become a NATO member as an 'island. '''

Chairman of the Hungarian National Assembl

Committee Imre Mecs has emphasized the im

Hungary's neighbors being admitted to NATO in t

"We should not only think in terms of Hungary, but in 

entire region. From this point of view, it is importan

are admitted to NATO, the neighboring countries sh

admitted to NATO within a certain period, depending 

can fulfill conditions set by Europe and NATO. ''2°4 

Defense Minister Keleti indicated in Novembe

Hungary favored approaching NATO membership b

hand-in-hand with others. Speaking about Hungaria

relations, he said, "We are looking for forms of coo

will promote this, but in all cases the give

circumstances and opportunities have to be taken into 

Hungarian defense and military officials have often 

that the military establish supports joining NATO 

behind the political impetus to join NATO and 

problems impacting on participating in PFP and join

Defense Minister Keleti said, 

All of those who work at the Defense Ministry or at the 

of the Hungarian Army are working for Hungary's be

member of NATO and for the modernization of the Ar

declaring its firm intention to join NATO, the Hungaria

provided enough proof that it is serious and will do ev

power to succeed in this endeavor. I think that the Hun

also agrees with this. The army does not yet fully agre

nothing to do with the spirit of this intention to join 2
problems in deciding not to participate in a PFP exercise 

last year;, as Defense Committee Chairman Mecs has 

must accept that membership in NATO involves conside

expenditures. ''2°9 When a Hungarian joumalist aske

Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino if NATO 

held a grudge against Hungary because of its nonpar

Balanzino said it would be a mistake to speak of grudg

"We count on the Hungarians' participation in the next 

or at least in a few upcoming exercises. If Hungary 

participate in these exercises--and I speak here 

hypothetically---this would show that the Partnership 

program does not mean much to you. However, we do 

this. "210 

SIovakla. The govemment of Slovakia strongly fav

membership, but less than half the population polle

Slovakiajoining NATO. Slovakians are sensitive to som

being given equal mention with the other Visegrad state

A broad policy statement on foreign and domes

issued by the Slovakian govemment on 20 January 19

"The purposeful rapprochement with the European Union

aim of obtaining full membership around the year 2

priority," and later said, "The fundamental course of t

Republic's security orientation is represented by the en

obtain membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and th

European Union .... We are linked to the Czech Republi

and Hungary by our shared interest in admission into 

European and Trans-atlantic structures. Therefore, we ar

to continue building our mutual relations so that they c

to the standard of relations between the individua

countries of the European Union and the North 

Alliance. ''21~ Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, as 

September 1993, stated, "It is our goal, program, and in
of a guarantee for the future is creating a climate of 

Central Europe. ''2t3 Also in 1993, Kovac, not expec

and WEU expansion at the moment, expressed in

altemative of associate membership in NATO and 

without full military integration and the guarantees of 

the two treaties. 2x4 

Defense Minister Pavel Kanis in November 19

political views in Slovakia on NATO membership a

think the individual political parties do not have ident

our becoming members in West European and NAT

economic, and political structures. There are differen

parties, but, all in all, one can say that basically the 

toward European and transatlantic structures is intrin

the parties, with a few exceptions. ''2~5 

Chief of the Slovak General Staff, General Jozef T

conditionally endorsed NATO membership, saying 

military is prepared to enlarge the NATO umbrella 

find some common ground in communications--and I 

about 50 percent of this common ground definitely e

the military is indeed prepared." He also stated, 

joining a certain entity, even NATO, as it were, wil

legitimate need to surrender a certain part of one's sov

the benefit of the entity. If we join NATO, we must 

fact that we will have to respect some of this or

requirements. Therefore, if we sign an agreement to 

we will have to meet the obligations we have tmderla

Polls taken in Slovakia show that less than 

questioned favor Slovakia joining NATO. The pr

different figures apparently from the same poll taken 

sponsored by the Foreign Ministry and Slovak radio. 

indicated only 27 percent favored Slovakia's entry into 

the EU, while 25 percent preferred neutrality. 2~7 An
percent describe NATO as more or less the only gu

European security. 219 Some have called for a public refe

joining NATO, and Prime Minister Meciar has said that 

joining of NATO would be preceded by a referendum. 

The Slovaks appear generally to support a c

approach to NATO by the Visegrad states, and there ap

concem that Slovakia might not fare as well as the othe

states in gaining NATO membership. In October 

Defense Minister Imrich Andrejcak was said to have bem

absence of a unified belief among the Visegrad states 

cooperation among them would get them NATO member

than if they worked alone. TM In 1993, then Slova

Minister Jozef Moravcik took this position: "I 

unequivocally that no one from the official represe

member countries or from the NATO headquarters has 

that a different approach would be applied to Slovakia th

member countries of the Visegrad Four. ''222 

In mid- 1994, Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan 

alleged slights of Slovakia. In an interview in J

following a meeting in Warsaw involving U.S. Secreta

Christopher and 7 other foreign ministers, a Slovak 

correspondent asked Kukan for a response to the fac

officials and Polish TV had recently indicated that 

Poland, and the Czech Republic enjoyed the best pro

being admitted quickly to NATO. Kukan replied that h

was one of indignation, that he had been "given 

everywhere that Slovakia would not be forgotten and th

has a firm place among these four countries," and tha

Christopher always spoke about four countries. Even 

spoke about prospects for NATO membership .... He n

countries and Slovakia was one of them. ''223 When ask

1994 about former U.S. National Security Advisor 
Bulgaria. Bulgarian leaders seek membership i

often perceive that the West views them with less pri

Visegrad states. Bulgarians may feel a greater a

Russia than do the Visegrad states. 

Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev stated in No

that he thought "Bulgaria stands equal chances of jo

with the Visegrad Four. ''225 Commander of the Bul

General Staff Army General Lyuben Petrov, when as

1994 if he thought Bulgaria would be the first new 

NATO, responded, "This is our wish and we would 

that it will be so." In September 1994, however, Pres

stated that sometimes Bulgarians have the feeling th

been left in the lurch by the West." He suggested th

have something to do with the war in neighbo

Yugoslavia, saying, "In the minds of European in

creates the impression that Bulgaria is a risky country

no one knows what can happen in this unpredictable B

Zhelev said this has led to a feeling of "isolation, ma

from the West. ''226 

Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov, when 

a recent interview reported in the Bulgarian press 

Bulgarian Defense Ministry would look toward Russ

NATO with regard to arms sales, replied, "We wi

toward Russia and NATO. To think that we can avoi

into the European structures is an illusion. On the 

Russia has been our ally for centuries. The issue 

being 'for' or 'against' NATO but about the road alo

would march toward NATO. In addition, it must be 

that 95 percent of our weapons were made in Russia

Romania. Romanians seek full membership in 

the WEU, as well as the EU. They were the first t

PFP, but are less vocal than the Visegrad states in se
joining NATO. 229 

In December 1994, loan Mircea Pascu, State Se

Defense, expressed concem that NATO might first 

Visegrad states to join NATO as a group, and that others 

left out for good. ~3° While relations between Hun

Romania have improved, Romanian officials may be 

that if Hungary were asked to join NATO before 

Hungary, as a new NATO member, might block Roma

or use the NATO admission issue to gain leverage on o

between Romania and Hungary. 

Albania. Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister Arian S

stated that Albania supports PFP as a program that bring

closer to NATO and that "Albania wants to be integrate

NATO structures. ''231 Albania also seeks membersh

WEU.232 

The Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 

favor membership in NATO but are not vocal on the is

congressional legislation has suggested that the Baltic st

be considered in a second category of priority after the 

states. 

On 8 December 1994, Estonian President Lennart 

joumalists that Estonia would become an associate mem

EU in 1995 and that the West should not delay incorpor

European states into Westem organizations because "R

the brink of chaos, and it is possible that the West doe

much time to act. ''233 

Latvian President Algirdas Brazauskas, during a v

Czech Republic in December 1994, when asked if he re

Czech Republic as a competitor in joining the EU an

responded, "No, I do not think we are competing. We 

the Czech Republic is several steps ahead of us. We can 

of your experience and take the well-tried path. I kno
py y 

some of which have been quoted earlier. 

Congress appears to be supportive of NATO exp

NATO Participation Act of 1994 encourages NATO 

although the Act calls for the President to report to 

Services Committees and the Foreign Affairs/Forei

Committees on, among other NATO issues, "The de

expanding the alliance to include traditionally neutral n

new democratic nations of Central and Eastem Eur

former Soviet Union that wish to join NATO." T

Revitalization and Expansion Act of 1995" goes eve

support of NATO expansion. (See appendix F for m

In February 1995, the Clinton administration a

program permitting sales of jet fighter aircraft, tank

sophisticated weapons to the four Visegrad states, the 

states, and Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. 235 

Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and other fo

specialists have advocated NATO expansion. Other 

Govemment officials and foreign affairs specialists h

expansion. A poll conducted in January 1994 indi

majority of those interviewed supported NATO memb

least five CEE states. 

Western Europe 

Germany. The German Government in gener

supportive of NATO expansion in principle, but there 

differences of view between Defense Minister Volke

Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Polls of the Germ

show support for NATO expansion. 

Some have described the German and French Gov

"eager for neither a timetable nor criteria to be laid d

hesitant both to "provoke an even greater right-wing 
He has also been very vocal on excluding Russia. Gen

Naumann, Chief of Staff of the German Armed Force

suggested that "possibly Ukraine and certainly Russia

realistic possibility of membership" in NATO. 23~ 

Foreign Minister Kinkel appears to differ wit

particularly in terms of timing and singling out states 

appears to see NATO expansion as a general goal an

must be linked to larger processes in Europe. He is also 

concerned that by adding 3 to 5 states to NATO now, th

status of other states, such as the Baltics and Ukrain

reduced. Kinkel has been reported to have argued in Oc

that anyone who takes the Maastricht Treaty with its v

common European defense policy seriously must oppose 

unequal security within the ELI. ''239 The Foreign Mi

argued, "The more the issue of NATO is related to th

European Union, the lesser the danger of confrontatio

NATO and Russia. ''~° 

Neverthless, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in a 

interview in December 1994 stated, "It makes sense t

NATO further by allowing our neighbors in Central a

Europe--the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians--t

members of the European Union and members of NAT

denied suggesting any simultaneity in expanding EU a

membership. He referred to the interests of Russia an

said he would reject any measures unilaterally direct

Russian interests, and said it was "quite possible for 

reach accords with Russia by which mutual fears can be 

He said he would fully agree with using the CSCE fra

bring Russia, Ukraine, and the other republic

Commonwealth of Independent States closer to the We

A newspaper report on the February 1995 W

conference on European security in Munich suggests t
views attributed to the German govemment and is sai

keen on NATO expansion. ''~3 In the fall of 1994, 

Minister Edouard Balladur and outgoing European C

President and potential French Presidential candid

Delors both criticized what they regarded as U.S.-le

expand NATO hastily. TM 

Defense Minister Francois Leotard wrote, "Our par

Europe--who were only forced away from our com

nations by a tragedy--have the authority to join NA

wish. I do not see what egoistic pretext we could u

them this right. ''~5 

Groat Britain. Britain's Foreign Minister Dougla

reported to have predicted in early November 1994 that 

Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic "w

in becoming NATO members, while stating, "No date

fixed. ''~5 In a speech in early February 1995, Mr. Hur

advocated forward progress on enlargement of the EU 

saying, "The process of reaching out must not lose ste

not fail prey to doubt. ''~7 Defense Minister Malco

however, seems more cautious. He was quoted in ear

1995 as saying: "We wanted to have the conditions fo

defined first. We cannot occupy ourselves with 

applicants and their problems right now. We have 

examining the impact of expansion on NATO and by 

conditions. ''248 In mid-February 1995, he was reporte

NATO must look at candidate new members individual

is automatic here. It is not that at one time we wou

whole group of countries or not accept any of them. ''2

Belgium. Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcro

visit to Bulgaria in December 1994 stated, "I think th

five years, Bulgaria should become a full-fled

member."25° 
could weaken defense of NATO's present 16 members

Scandinavia countries. Sweden and Finland ha

PFP partners. Swedish Defense Minister Andres Bjork, 

Sweden is a PFP partner, has ruled out NATO memb

Sweden over the long term and said Swedish relation

WEU would depend on the EU Intergovemmental Con

1996. 2s3 Swedish Moderate Coalition Party leader Car

taken this view: "There is no immediate reason for 

NATO, and NATO is not interested in having us join. 

we can pay for a Swedish defense capability that make

enough to defend ourselves there will be no urgen

foreign help .... We prefer strong national defenses 

NATO membership, and those are the two real altemat

is possible Sweden will end up there as a result of maki

on defense, but we prefer the other possibility. ''2~ Fini

Minister Elisabeth Rehn in September 1994 stated, "W

yet decided what attitude we are to assume toward th

European Union and NATO. I personally believe we 

become WEU observers. Apart from that, all doo

possibilities should remain open. ''255 

Austria.. Austria joined PFP in early 1995. Au

membership in the EU has given rise to a debate on m

in the WEU; Chancellor Vranitzky said that the iss

considered after the EU Intergovemmental Conference 

Defense Minister Wemer Fasslabend suggested that Au

move even beyond an observer status in the WEU to be

member. 257 Fasslabend indicated he does not consider i

for Austria to become a full member of NATO. 25s T

Austria's Freedom Party called for full membership in 

Austria. 259 
pp

states and not Russia or other states of the CIS to becom

palmers of the WEU, but Russian objections in the fi

appear to have been mild. The Russians may, of cour

concerned about NATO, which, in comparison to the 

may see as more important in terms of power, p

American involvement. 

There appears to be in Russia political circles c

mistrust of NATO and fear of isolation or encirclem

have argued that NATO should have been dissolve

Warsaw Pact was dissolved. Many Russians advoca

security architecture for Europe based on CSCE or 

structure, with NATO either playing a subordin

eventually being disbanded. How receptive Russians 

establish a unique relationship between NATO and Rus

through a treaty, remains to be seen. Beyond this ge

there is a range of positions. 

President Yeltsin and His Advisors. Russia

Boris Yeltsin has made ambivalent statements regar

expansion, initially appearing prepared to acquiesce 

European states joining NATO, but later taking a har

In August 1993, during his visit to Poland and 

Republic, Yeltsin appeared ready to acquiesce in Centr

states joining NATO. On 25 August, he and Polis

Walesa issued a declaration that indicated that Poland

to join NATO "was met with understanding" by Yelt

"In the long term, such a decision taken by a sovereig

the interests of overall European integration does not go 

interests of other states, including the interests of Russ

reportedly told the press that "in the new Russian-Poli

there is no place for hegemony and diktat, the psycholo

brother' and a 'little brother.'" On 26 August in Pragu

publicly that Russia "has no right" to hinder the Czech 
participant in the European community. TM In Septemb

a speech to the UN, Yeltsin cautioned against cre

"Cordon Sanitaire" or an "Iron Curtain" between R

Europe .262 

In August 1994, however, Yeltsin told reporters t

might join NATO in the future, indicating that it was 

of time. ''263 

In a 5 December 1994 address to the CSCE Summ

called for a pan-European security organization and 

concem over possible NATO expansion. Warning tha

even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy o

War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peac

declared that it was a "dangerous delusion to consid

destinies of continents and of the world community as a 

be decided from any one capital alone. Blocs and coa

likewise not provide genuine security guarantees. 

become a vital essential in Europe is the creation of a f

pan-European organization with a firm juridical basis." 

Yeltsin stated futher, "The plans for NATO exp

counter" to bringing European unity closer and not cr

demarcation lines. He asked, "Why sow the seeds o

after all we are no longer enemies, we are effectively al

He went on to say, "It is too soon to bury democracy 

and that "No single major cotmtry is going to live accor

laws of isolation, and will reject any such game. ''264 

On 10 December 1994, Yeltsin, speaking on tele

forth terms for Russian acceptance of NATO expa

Central and Eastem Europe, saying "first, no rush; se

severe conditions for admission into NATO." He indic

thought the American side "will agree" to the first con

"may agree" to the second condition after discussions w

He stated that the third term, "the crux of the matter," w
the gate for former Soviet republics such as Ukraine w

had been flirting with NATO. He opined that the We

that Russia could soon join NATO was groundless and 

a Western propaganda trick. 266 

Prime Minister Chernomyrflin. In August 

Minister Chemomyrdin emphasized to reporters that m

should be ended and suggested that "blocs" should be f

to promote joint economic goals. 267 On a visit to 

February 1995, Chemomyrdin said Russia could 

anything to anybody, but no one had explained to Rus

it necessary to join NATO in such haste? What is 

Does somebody really want to see confrontation again

Foreign Ministry. Foreign Minister Kozyrev emp

potential destabilization that could come from NATO 

or at least precipitous expansion without Russia. 

August 1993 Yeltsin visit to Central Europe, Kozyrev 

right of the sovereign Central European states t

organization they wanted but called for East Europe

take on the "role of a connecting link" between a 

Russia and democratic Western Europe and warned 

Europeans' joining NATO would strengthen the 

nationalist hardliners in Russia. 269 In September 1994, 

a German newspaper that if the West tried to iso

through new "iron curtains" and "buffer zones," 

contribute to nationalist and imperialist extremism in 

In November 1994, Kozyrev stated, "Probably, Russi

become a member of that organization [NATO] with ti

wamed against any "hasty" expansion of NATO, saying 

be exploited by Russian, ultra-nationalists, and Russi

"leaping over natural phases of establishing closer rel

that it "would be far better to have a frank discussion 

issues today than confrontation tomorrow". TM Ko
Poland joining NATO, responded "As equal partn

NATO, we shall have an equal fight to say what we t

Kozyrev and Russian foreign ministry officials emp

preference for CSCE as the basic structure for Europe

Kozyrev wrote, "In principle, the CSCE must aim to co

efforts of NATO, the European Union, the Council of 

West European Union, and the CIS in strengthening s

security, peacemaking, and protecting the fights 

minorities. Naturally this does not mean establishing a 

leadership or any kind of "command" on the part of th

Some have argued that intemal ethnic conflicts are t

source of conflicts at present and that CSCE is a better 

than NATO to deal with these. 275 Foreign Ministr

nevertheless, have generally supported Russian participa

as a way of building relationships with the West and 

control the future of NATOY 6 

Kozyrev was reported on 9 December 1994 as ha

NATO expansion "mindless," "egotistic," and "cynic

implying that Russia's apprehensions about NATO expa

be laid to rest if Russia were also admitted. 277 

The Russian ambassador to Poland, Yuriy Kashlev

the Russian position on NATO expansion is that they 

"understand why one military-political bloc should be c

and expanded if its adversary, the other bloc, has ceas

In addition, why should such importance be given to 

organization in today's Europe? ''278 

The Milita~. Russian military officials generall

be suspicious of NATO and have spoken out agai

expansion. The Russian military may have played a k

the immediate aftermath of Yeltsin's visit to Central Eu

summer of 1993, as Moscow adopted a hard l

incorporation of Central Europe into NATO. In Au
apply for NATO membership and "will go our own wa

far as to warn that "Russia will object strongly to 

certain countries to join NATO. We will react negati

events. ''28° More specifically, he has said that "Russia c

Poland to be admitted into NATO. ''281 He also observe

Central and East European states have used what he s

Russian arguments in seeking NATO expansion. 2~ He 

to PFP being used as an "intermediate stage" to NATO 

and has said PFP in such a case could jeopardi

fulfillment of the Conventional Armed Forces 

Agreement, especially flank limitations. 2s3 

In June 1994 Former Marshal Yevgeniy Sh

criticized Russia's joining PFP, asking "How can we 

with the expansion and strengthening of the NATO m

when we, the Russians, have made concessions beyo

that the intemational community could have 

Shaposhnikov said he was still in favor of cooperati

West but "this cooperation has started badly" and "bea

of an extremely dangerous imbalance. ''2~ The Deputy C

in Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Igor Kasato

Russian news service on 8 December 1994 that NAT

were maintaining only "superficial contact" with Rus

not changed their Cold War doctrine of military super

Fiusslan Parliament. Chairman of the State Du

Committee Vladimir Lukin reportedly expressed disagr

NATO expansion and suggested the security situation 

would deteriorate if NATO territory is extended 

western border. 286 Two Russian parliamentary 

November 1994 urged CEE states to consider the W

alternative to NATO and suggested that the further 

between these states and NATO the friendlier would 

between Russia and Westem countries. 2~ 
Russia should rely on itself, and 31 percent said Ru

work with other countries; a great majority of Moscow 

some form of alliance. 

• Asked to choose between five ways in which R

provide for its security, 36 percent favored an allianc

countries only, 15 percent favored full membership in 

percent favored an alliance with European countrie

percent favored Partnership for Peace with NATO; and 

favored no alliance. For Moscow elites, about a thir

military alliance with states in the CIS, and another th

some form of cooperation with NATO, either PFP or 

membership. 

• Most Russians said they have heard or read ve

percent) or nothing at all (18 percent) about NATO

percent have heard or read a fair amounL and 6 percent 

or read a great deal about NATO; for the Moscow 

percent felt poorly or not at all informed about NATO

percent felt at least somewhat informed. 

• Asked if NATO were essential for Europe's sec

40 percent didn't know, one-third replied affirmativ

quarter thought NATO was not needed; for Moscow 

thought NATO was essential to Europe's security and 

it was not. 

• Some 23 percent expressed at least a fair 

confidence in NATO, compared to 65 percent for 

Nations, 36 percent for CSCE/OSCE, and 33 percent 

for Moscow elites,it was 28 percent for NATO, 79 per

United Nations, 57 percent for CSCE/OSCE, and 52 per

EU. 

• Given a set of choices, about a third said an a

other CIS states would provide the best security arran

Russia; 
percent) than supported (29-32 percent) NATO m

individually for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic

or Bulgaria. 

• Some 44 percent opposed NATO membership f

while 27 percent favored it. Again, 44 percent oppo

membership for Lithuania, while 24 percent favored it

• For Moscow elites, half were against NATO m

for Russia itself as well as for Poland, Hungary, Ro

Czech Republic, and Bulgaria; 59 percent oppos

membership for Lithuania, and 63 percent oppos

membership for Ukraine. 

Other Eurasian States 

Views in Ukraine appear mixed. Some oppose NATO 

in general. Others oppose any expansion that does n

Ukraine as one of the first new members of NATO. Fin

welcome expansion of NATO into Central and Easte

arguing that the closer NATO is to Ukraine's borders

secure will be Ukraine. 

According to surveys commissioned by USIA in 

December 1993, more Ukrainians see Ukraine as prima

the CIS than as part of Europe (47 percent to 32 perce

support some form of alliance as the best security guar

4 percent favor no alliance). Given a choice of thr

security arrangements, 38 percent preferred an alliance w

32 percent favored an alliance with NATO (19 percent f

membership in NATO for Ukraine while 13 percent fav

and 10 percent favored a Europe-only alliance. W

separately about joining NATO, Ukrainians supporte

joining NATO by a two-to-one margin (48 percent to 2

Some 62 percent of Ukrainians were very receptive 

providing Ukraine a security guarantee, namely to "
view; about one-third favored NATO entry for each CE

a fifth or fewer opposed it. 289 

Notes 

1. See Europe chapter, Strategic Assessment 1995: U.

Challenges in Transition (Washington: National Defense 

Press, 1995), 37-38. 

2. Joint Russian-Polish Declaration by Presidents Y

Walesa, ITAR-TASS World Service, 25 Aug 93, in FBIS-SO

26 Aug 93, 13-15. 

3. Russian President Boris Yeltsin at 25 August 

conference in Warsaw, reported in Radio Free Europe/Rad

Daily Report, no. 163, 26 August 1993, 3. 

4. The New York Times, 26 Aug 93, 3. 

5. RFE/RL Daily Report, no. 164, 27 August 1993, 3

6. Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei K

PAP and Polityka, in RFE/RL Daily Report, no. 161, 24 Au

3. 

7. Remarks reported by ITAR-TASS and Russian TV, i

Daily Report, no. 165, 30 August 1993, 1. 

8. Reported "text" of a letter fi'om President Boris 

representatives of the United States, Germany, Great B

France: "Yeltsin's Secret Letter on NATO Expansion," publi

in an unofficial translation, Mlada Fronta Dnes, 2 Dec 93, 

in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia Da

(FBIS-SOV)-93-231, 3 Dec 93, 6. 

9. Report by Thomas Mayer, "Willy Claes: NATO Has 

Criteria for Expansion," Der Standard, 9 Feb 95, 3, in FBIS

028, 10 Feb 95, 2. 

10. President Clinton's address to the Polish parliament, 

11. Communique issued by Ministerial Meeting of 

Atlantic Council, 1 Dec 94. 

12. Report by Thomas Mayer in Vienna Der Standard
, 

17. Ibid., 570. 

18. The New York Times, 23 Oct 51, 14. 

19. The New York Times, 30 Jan 52, 1, and 8 Feb 52, 

20. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NA TO Handbook 

NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), 179. 

21. The New York Times, 18 Jan 52, 5. 

22. the New York Times, 23 Feb 52, 2, and 4 Mar 52, 

23. Encyclopedia Americana, entry for Germany, 

Connecticut: Grolier, Inc., 1989), 618-619. 

24. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 

(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), 398-408. 

25. The New York Times, 27 Feb 55, 1. 

26. The New York Times, 2 Apr 55, 1. 

27. The New York Times, 21 Feb 52, 5. 

28. Javier Tusell, "The Transition to Democracy an

Membership in NATO," in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tu

Spain's Entry Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Stra

spectives (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 

29. Ibid. 

30. Emilio A. Rodriguez, "Atlanticism and Europeanism

and Trends in Spanish Foreign Policy," in Spain's Entry Into 

31. Ibid. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Glen D. Macdonald, "European Community Enlarg

the Evolution of French-Spanish Cooperation, 1977-1987," 

Entry into NATO, 80; and Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain, 

States, and NATO: Strategic Facts and Political Realities," 

Entry into NATO, 124. 

34. Emilio A. Rodriguez, "Atlanticism and Europeanis

and Trends in Spanish Foreign Policy," in Spain's Entry In

62. 

35. Ibid. 

36. Ibid. 
g, 

The Washington Times, 19 Sep 93, B4. 

42. Kissinger. 

43. Rodman. 

44. Mlady Svet, 19 Jan 95, 22-23, in FBIS-EEU-95-022

3. 

45. Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen 

"Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs, Sep-Oct 93, 28

46. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 4 Jan 95, 3, in FBIS-WEU-

Jan 95, 13-14. 

47. lnterfax, 10 Jan 95, reported in Open Media Research 

OMRI Daily Digest 1, no. 8, 1. 

48. Fred C. Ild6, "How to Ruin NATO," The New York 

Jan 95, A21. 

49. Berlin DDP/ADN, 12 Jan 95, ill Foreign Broadcast In

Service Daily Report for East Europe, FBIS-EEU-05-O09, 

3. 

50. Radiozurnal Radio Network, 10 Jan 95, in FBIS-EE

11 Jan 95, 5. 

51. Senator Richard Lugar. 

52. Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee. 

53. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO--Expand or Die?," The 

Times, 28 Dec 94, 15. 

54. Kissinger. 

55. Brzezinski, "NATO---Expand or Die?" 

56. William Satire, "Strategic Dilemma," The New Yor

Dec 94, 32; this article is also carried under the title "The 

Rise Again, So Build the Alliance Now," in the Internation

Tribune, 2 Dec 94. 

57. Rodman. 

58. Michael E. Brown, "NATO Expansion: Wait and 

Washington Post, 26 Dec 94, 3,29. 

59. Ibid. 
, , 

63. Brown. 

64. Ikl6. 

65. Kupchan. 

66. Ibid. 

67. Brown. 

68. Charles William Maynes, as reported in Jiri Payne

of the Czech Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, Lido

10 Nov 93, 6, in FBIS-EEU-93-217, 12 Nov 93, 12-14. 

69. The Washington Post, 6 Nov 94, A19. 

70. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, no. 2

94, 3. 

71. Patrick Buchanan in The Washington Times, quoted 

Noviny, 10 Nov 93, 6, in FBIS-EEU-93-217, 12 Nov 93, 

72. Kupchan. 

73. Ildt. 

74. Article by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The Allia

Political Tasks for the Armed Forces," Welt Am Sonntag, 8 

in FBIS-WEU-95-O07, 11 Jan 95, 17-18. 

75. Ibid. 

76. Charles William Maynes, Lidove Noviny 10 Nov 93

77. Ibid. 

78. The Washington Post, 6 Nov 94, A19. 

79. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and U.S

of Defense William J. Perry, The New York Times, 13 Feb 

80. The New York Times, 10 Feb 95, A6. 

81. Kupchan. 

82. Brzezinski, "NATO--Expand or Die?" 

83. The Washington Post, 6 Nov 94, A19. 

84. Ibid. 

85. Public Law 103-447, Title II, NATO Participation A

103rd Congress, Second Session. 

86. Ibid. 

87. The New York Times, 10 Feb 95, A6. 
94 

95 

96 

97 

98 

The Washington Post, 

The New York Times, 

Kissinger. 

26 Feb 95, A26. 

10 Feb 95, A6. 

U.S. Congress, NATO Participation Act of 1994. 

Interview with German Foreign Minister Klau

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 4-5 Feb 95, 10, in FBIS-WEU-95-024

16-20. 

99. News, 12 Jan 95, 140, in FBIS-EEU-95-O08, 12 Ja

100. The Washington Post, 6 Nov 94, A19. 

101. The Wall Street Journal, 9 Feb 95. 

102. The New York Times, 9 Feb 95, A11. 

103. International Herald Tribune, 10 Feb 95, report from 

York Times Service. 

104. Major-General Edward Fursdon, "The Role of the 

Defense Community in European Integration," in NATO: The 

of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe," 

Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York: St

Press, 1992), 235. 

105. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Facts an

332. 

106. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-195

Western European Security, Part I, (Washington: GPO, 1983)

107. The New Columbia Encyclopedia, entry for "Euro

York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), 902. 

108. Tarschys. 

109. Berlingske Tidende, 9 Sep 94, 4, in FBIS-WEU-9

Sep 94, 36-37. 

110. Interview with then-NATO Secretary General 

Woerner, Bild, 22 Jun 94, 2, in FBIS-WEU-94-120, 22 Jan 

111. The Washington Post, 10 Sep 94, A16. 

112. Kyodo, 22 Apr 94, in FBIS-EEU-94-078, 22 Apr 9

113. Kissinger. 

114. The Washington Post, 10 Sep 94, A16. 
119. Interview with NATO Secretary General Willy 

Monde, 17 Feb 95, 2, in FBIS-WEU-95-034, 21 Feb 95, 

120. AFP, 1 Dec 94, in FBIS-WEU-94-232, 2 Dec 94, 

121. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2 Feb 95, 4, in FBIS-WE

3 Feb 95, 21. 

122. The Washington Post, 22 Feb 95, A15. 

123. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 16 Feb 95, 1-2, in FBIS

032, 16 Feb 95, 17. 

124. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership

Affairs, March/April 1994, 81-82. 

125. Christoph Bertram, "How to Expand NATO With

Russia," Moscow News, No. 2, 13-19 Jan 95. 

126. Lothar Ruehl, Die Welt, 13 Feb 95, 6, in FBIS-WE

16 Feb 95, 17-18. 

127. Communique issued by Ministerial Meeting of 

At'landc Council, 1 Dec 94. 

128. The New York Times, 10 Feb 95, A6. 

129. FrankfurterRundschau, 30 Dec 94, 12, in FBIS-WE

3 Jan 95, 16-17. 

130. Die Welt, 3 Nov 94, 3, ill FBIS-WEU-94-214, 4 N

131. The Financial Times, 10 Feb 95. 

132. De Volkskrant, 8 Nov 94, 5, in FBIS-WEU-94-2

94, 1. 

133. Interview with Vaclav Havel, Der Spiegel, 13 Feb 

138, in FBIS-EEU-95-031, 15 Feb 95, 3. 

134. Kissinger. 

135. Rodman. 

136. The Washington Post, 6 Nov 94, A19. 

137. The Washington Times, 8 Nov 94, 11. 

138. Radiozuranl Radio Network, 16 Jan 95, in FBIS-EE

17 Jan 95, 6. 

139. The New York Times, 9 Feb 95, All. 

140. NATO Foreign Ministers Communique, 1 Dec 94

141. Radiozurnal Radio Network, 6 Dec 94, in FBIS-EE

7 Dec 94, 18. 
,, 

146. Ibid. 

147. U.S. Congress, NATO Participation Act of 1994. 

148. Contract with America. 

149. Ibid., 92-93. 

150. Ibid., 107-108. 

151. H.R. 7, Short title "National Security Revitalization 

104th Congress, 1st Session, introduced on 4 January 1995. 

152. The Washington Post, 17 February 1995, A1. 

153. Christopher and Perry. 

154. The New York Times, 10 Feb 95, A6. 

155. Gallup poll, January 1994, cited in a USIA Mem

made available to the author. The author wishes to ex

appreciation for the assistance provided by Mr. Alvin Ri

USIA. 

156. G',dlup Poll, ibid. 

157. American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)/The W

Post poll, 5-9 January 1994. 

158. Die Welt, 21 Nov 94, 3, in FBIS-WEU-94-225, 2

1 

159. United States Information Agency, Opinion 

Memorandum, "On the Eve of the NATO Summit: Europea

View U.S. and European Security Interests as Different," 1

Table 9, "Support for Expanding NATO," 38. 

160. See U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research a

Reaction, Opinion Analysis: M-255-94, 15 Dec 94, "Germans 

NATO Expansion to Central and Eastern Europe;" M-258-9

94, "French Tend to Favor Expansion Eastward, Greater 

Europeans in NATO;" and M-257-94, 15 Dec 94, "Many Brit

NATO's Expansion Eastward." The author wishes to ex

appreciation for the assistance of Mr. Richard Dobson and 

Macintosh of USIA in making this information available. 

161. Frankfurt]Main Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2 Feb 95, 4

WEU-95-023, 3 Feb 95, 21. 

162. See NATO Review, No. 6 Dec 94/No. 1 Jan 95, 26
167. Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 9 Sep 93

EEU-93-174, 10 Sep 93, 8. 

168. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, n

Dec 94, 4. 

169. Interview with Vaclav Klaus, Prague Hospodarske 

Sep 93, 1, 7, in FBIS-EEU-93-180, 20 Sep 93, 10. 

170. Berlin DDP/ADN, 8 Nov 94, in FBIS-EEU-94-217

6. 

171. Vilem Holan, Czech Minister of Defense, "The 

and Costs of Admission to NATO," Lidove Noviny, 19 No

FBIS-EEU-94-226, 23 Nov 94, 1-2. 

172. Radiozurnal Radio Network, 6 Feb 95, in FBIS-EE

7 Feb 95, 5. 

173. OMRI Daily Digest, 25 Jan 95, 4. 

174. Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa, S

Makedonija, 4 Feb 95, 6, in FBIS-EEU-95-026, 8 Feb 95, 

175. Ibid. 

176. PAP, 13 Jan 95, in FBIS-EEU-95-OIO, 17 Jan 95

177. Radio WarszawaNetwork, 19 Jan 95, in FBIS-EEU

Jan 95, 18. 

178. Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej O

Liberation, 14 Dec 94, 13, in FBIS-EEU-94-241, 15 Dec 

179. "Poland's Foreign Minister, Advocate of NATO M

Quits," The New York Times, 15 Jan 94, 3. 

180. Ibid. 

181. Rzeczpospolita, 27 Jun 94, 28, in FBIS-EEU-94-

94, 21. 

182. Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 Jul 94, 9, in FBIS-EEU-94-13

17-19. 

183. Radio Warszawa Network, 16 Aug 94, in FBIS-EE

17 Aug 94, 18. 

184. Interview with Lt, Col. Z. Czekierda, Press Spokes

Polish General Staff, Trybuna, 17 Aug 94, 2, in FBIS-EEU

Aug 94, 17-18. 
188. Summer 1994 poll, reported in Przeglad Rzadowy, 

FBIS-EEU-94-226, 23 Nov 94, 18-19. 

189. Gazeta Polska, 12Jan 95, 3, in FBIS-EEU-95-O09, 

22. This reported on a poll conducted by the Military I

Sociological Research. 

190. Interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz

Della Sera, 6 Feb 95, 6, in FBIS-EEU-95-025, 7 Feb 95, 

191. Interview with Prime Minister Gyula Horn, Corr

Sera, 5 Nov 94, 8, in FBIS-EEU-94-217, 9 Nov 94, 15. 

192. Kossuth Radio Network, 9 Feb 95, in FBIS-EEU-9

Feb 95, 17. 

193. Gonz interview, Corriere Della Sera, 6 Feb 95, 

194. Nepszava, 27 Apr 94, 5, in FBIS-EEU-94-085, 

13-14. 

195. Interview with Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, 

16 Aug 94, 12-14, in FBIS-EEU-94-178, 14 Sep 94, 16-1

196. Financial Times, 11 Nov 94, 30, in FBIS-EEU-9

Nov 94, 21-22. 

197. Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Lasz

Duna TV, 7 Dec 94, in FBIS-EEU-94-236, 8 Dec 94, 21-2

198. Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Lasz

Dagens Nyheter, 9 Feb 95, A15, in FBIS-EEU-95-028, 10 F

199. Gazet Van Antwerpen, 10 Feb 95, 6, in FBIS-WE

13 Feb 95, 6. 

200. Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gy

Nepszabadsag, 13 Feb 95, 1, 3, in FBIS-EEU-95-030, 14 F

11. 

201. Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy 

Magyarorszag, 14 Nov 94, 1, 3, in FBIS-EEU-94-221, 16 N

14. 

202. Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Secu

Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Magyar Nem

93, 1, 3, in FBIS-EEU-93-173, 9 Sep 93, 13-14. 

203. Magyar Hirlap, 19 Jan 95, 3, in FBIS-EEU-95-O
207. Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorg

Magyarorszag, 14 Nov 94, 1, 3, in FBIS-EEU-94-221, 16 N

14. 

208. Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gy

Kossuth Radio Network, 21 Nov 94, 

209. Interview with Minister Keleti on Kossuth Radio N

Nov 94, 

210. Interview with NATO Deputy Secretary Gen

Bnlnnzino, Nepszava, 11 Nov 94, 1, 9, in FBIS-EEU-94-2

94, 18. 

211. Policy Statement of the Slovak Republic G

approved by the National Council in Bratislava on 20 Janua

Slovenska Republika, 12 Jan 95, 2-16, in FBIS-EEU-95-03

95, 1-2 and beyond. 

212. Pravda, 11 Sep 93, 2, in FBIS-EEU-93-179, 17 

213. Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac

Belgique, 3 Nov 93, 5, in FBIS-EEU-93-212, 4 Nov 93, 

214. Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 4 Nov 9

EEU-93-213, 5 Nov 93, 1. 

215. Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 15 Nov 9

EEU-94-221, 16 Nov 94, 10. 

216. Interview with General Jozef Tuchyna, Chief of 

General Staff, Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 21 

FBIS-EEU-94-205, 24 Oct 94, 6. 

217. Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 21 Sep 9

EEU-94-184, 22 Sep 94, 5. 

218. Narodna Obroda, 7 Oct 94, 3, in FBIS-EEU-94-

94, 7-8. 

219. Public Opinion Research Center at the Slov

Ministry, Republika, 19 Mar 94, 3, in FBIS-EEU-94-057, 

14. 

220. SME, 31 Oct 94, 1-2, FBIS-EEU-94-216, 8 Nov 

Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network, 14 Dec 94, in FB

241, 15 Dec 94, 13. 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 28 Sep 94, 12, in FBIS-WEU-94-18

94, 19-20. 

227. Interview with Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov, 24 

Jan 95, 6, in FBIS-EEU-95-022, 2 Feb 95, 2. 

228. La Vanguardia, 23 Jail 95, 4, in FBIS-EEU-95-O1

95, 22. 

229. Interview with Romanian Senate Defense Committee 

Radu Timofte, Radio Romania Network, 21 Nov 94, in FBIS

225, 22 Nov 94, 37. 

230. Interview with Ioan Mircea Pascu, Romanian State 

of Defense, Curierul National, 20 Dec 94, 3, in FBIS-EEU-9

Dec 94, 40-41. 

231. TVSH Television Network, 4 Feb 95, in FBIS-EEU-

Feb 95, 2. 

232. TVSH Television Network, 27 Aug 94, in FBIS-EE

29 Aug 94, 1. 

233. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, N

Dec 94, 4. 

234. Radiozurnal Radio Network, 7 Dec 94, in FBIS-EEU

8 Dec 94, 13. 

235. The Washington Post, 18 Feb 95, A1-A29. 

236. The Washington Post, 6 Nov 94, A19. 

237. DDP/ADN, 6 Oct 94, in FBIS-WEU-94-195, 7 Oct 

238. Article by Klaus Naumann, "Bundeswehr Faced w

Challenges," $oldat und Technik, Jan 95, 9-16, in FBIS-WEU

26 Jan 95, 11-17. 

239. Frankfurter Allgemeine, 7 Oct 94, 1-2, in FBIS-WE

11 Oct 94, 22-23. 

240. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 25 Nov 94, 2, in FBIS-WEU

Dec 94, 29-30. 

241. Interview with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Mu

Television Network, 8 December 1994, cited in FBIS-WEU-9

Dec 94. 

242. The Financial Times, 10 Feb 95. 
10. 

248. Interview with British Defense Minister Malco

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 6 Feb 95, 9, in FBIS-WEU-95-025

12-14. 

PAP, 13 Feb 95, in FBIS-EEU-95-030, 14 Feb 95

Khorizont Radio Network, 5 Dec 94, in FBIS-EEU

23. 

De Volksrant, 1 Oct 94, 5, in FBIS-WEU-94-194

249. 

250. 

Dec 94, 

251. 

9. 

252. 

253. 

13. 

EIPais, 11 Dec 94, 4, in FBIS-WEU-94-239, 13 D

Die Presse, 27 May 94, 5, in FBIS-WEU-94-104, 

254. Politiken Sondag, 29 Jan 95, 10, in FBIS-WEU-95

95, 21-23. 

255. Der Standard, 27 Sep 94, 2, in FBIS-WEU-94-1

94, 4. 

256. Die Presse, 31 Dec 94-1 Jan 95, 1, 4, in FBIS-W

3 Jan 95, 5. 

257. Wiener Zeitung, 15 Sep 94, p. 3, in FBIS-WEU-94-

94, 6. 

258. wiener Zeitung, 20 Sep 94, p. 2, in FBIS-WEU-94-

94,4. 

259. Handelsblatt, 30 Nov 94, p. 11, in FBIS-WEU-94

94, 5-6. 

260. See endonotes 2, 3, and 5 

261. The New York Times, 25 Feb 94, A6. 

262. Russian Television Network, 26 Sep 94, in FBIS-S

27 Sep 94, 6-10. 

263. Ostankino Television First Channel Network, 30 

FBIS-SOV-94-169, 31 Aug 94, 7-8. 

264. Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin, Address to 

Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 

Budapest, 5 Dec 94, as reported by Russian Television Netw

94, translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
EEU95031, 15 Feb 95, 8, 

269. PAP, 23 Aug 93, in FBIS-SOV-93-162, 24 Aug 93

270. Munich Focus, 26 Sep, 94, 338, in FBIS-SOV-94-18

94, 15. 

271. Interfax, 3 Nov 94, in FBIS-SOV-94-214, 4 Nov 94

272. ITAR-TASS, 8 Sept 94, and ITAR-TASS, 19 Oct 94, 

SOV-94-202, 19 Oct 94, 3.. 

273. Le Monde, 24 Jun 94, 4, in FBIS-WEU-94-123, 27 

274. Rossiyskiye Vesti, 17 Aug 94, 1-2, in FBIS-SOV-94

Aug 94, 3-5. 

275. Interfax, 19 July 94, in FBIS-SOV-94-139, 20 July 

276. Rossiyskiye Vesti, 17 Aug 94, 1-2, in FBIS-SOV-9

Aug 94, 3-5. 

277. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, No

Dec 94, p. 3. 

278. Interview with Yuriy Kashlev, Russian Amba

Warsaw, Gazeta Wyborcza, 2 Nov 94, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU-94-2

94, 7-8. 

279. Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 Aug 94, 2, in FBIS-SOV-94-16

94, 32-35. 

280. Berlingske Tidende, 9 Sep 94, p. 4, in FBIS-WEU-9

Sep 94, 36-37. 

281. Attributed to Polish Press Agency, 23 Aug 93, 

Brzezinski, "Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs, May/A

77, 

282. ITAR-TASS, 5 Sep 94, in FBIS-SOV-94-173, 7 Sep 

283. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 28 Sep 94, 1,7, in FBIS-SO

28 Sep 94, 5. 

284. Interview with Russian Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposh

Figaro, 29 Jun 94, p. 4, in FBIS-WEU-94-126, 30 Jun 94, 

285. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report, no

Dec 94, 2-3. 

286. STV 1 Television Network, 23 Nov 94, in FBIS-EEU

28 Nov 94, 1. 

287. Prognosis, 9 Nov 94, p. 8, in FBIS-EEU-94-231, 1 D
, , p

"Public in Ukraine Favors NATO Guarantees; Half Suppor

Jan 94. 
ALIGNMENTS 

From the perspective of NATO expansion, there is a 

altemative alignments that might emerge to address se

the broad area of the North Atlantic, Europe, and Euras

Vancouver to Vladivostok. If NATO expands, key 

would include which states join NATO and what type of 

NATO has with states not invited to join. If NATO 

expand, a key variable would be whether NATO remain

In either case-----expansion, or nonexpansion--NATO's 

with non-member states and with other security institut

be important factors, as will be what programs and 

NATO pursues intemally as an alliance. 

If NATO expands, three general, illustrative subalt

are: 

• NATO extends membership only to states from 

and Eastem Europe (NATO at 16 + 1-11). 

• NATO extends membership to CEE states and 

four states from the CIS, including Russia (NATO at 16 

CEE + 4 CIS). 

• NATO extends membership to all PFP partners 

at 16 + 25 and maybe more). 

Under the broad altemative of no NATO expansio

illustrative sub-altematives are: 

• NATO remains at 16, and pursues continued coo

with the East under NACC and PFP. 

• The focus of European security tums to OSC

overarching security umbrella, supported by two pillars

117 
NATO Extends Membership Only to CEE 

(NATO at 16 + 1-11) 

In the first alternative, NATO would extend members

CEE states. As to which CEE states would be inv

NATO, among the options are the following: 

• One state at a time, e.g., beginning perhap

Czech Republic, with invitations to others depen

number of factors internal to and external to th

candidates (NATO at 17 and then perhaps more). 

The Visegrad Four (NATO at 20). 

The Visegrad Four plus the three Baltic states 

23). 

at 22). 

The Visegrad Four plus Bulgaria and Roman

The Visegrad Four plus the three Baltic state

Romania, Albania, and Slovenia (NATO at 27). 

NATO might handle accession one country at a tim

invite several states to join simultaneously. In princi

would be prepared to invite additional CEE states con

factors used in agreeing to invite the first state 

Members of the CIS would not be invited to join NA

in the initial years, although NATO would not go on 

any statement specifically excluding them from 

consideration. 

Inviting one country at the outset and any oth

might ease objections from states not included, both th

and in CIS. The more states admitted, the fewer wou

states complaining about not being admitted, although 

in CEE and the CIS not invited would likely object i

to their not being included. 

Inviting only one or a very few states to join init

make it easier for NATO to make the transition and 
would be designed to help extend security into CEE a

NATO vibrant. It would help demonstrate that NATO 

and follow through on initiatives and is not subject to 

any outside powers. 

This altemative would reflect the interests of CEE 

have security guarantees that include the United States. 

reinforce efforts to keep the U.S. engaged in European 

and to maintain U.S. forces in Europe. 

On the issues of whether or not this altemativ

establish dividing lines in Europe, much would de

NATO's outreach to states not included and thos

reactions. If NACC and PFP remain active and if the

those not invited to become NATO members, then 

about dividing lines might be mollified. If NATO 

unique, effective relationships with Russia and Ukraine, 

might be further mollified. 

NATO Extends Membership to CEE States 

Perhaps 4 CIS States 

(NATO at 16 + 10-11 CEE + 4 CIS) 

In this altemative, NATO would extend membership no

states in CEF_,---10-11 states but also to states in CIS~p

including at least 4 states in the CIS (Russia, Ukraine, 

and Moldova) and possibly more. 

This alternative would be designed to extend 

eastward while taking into account concems express

NATO expansion by Russia, Ukraine, and others in the 

concerns about drawing new dividing lines at the 

between states in Central and Eastem Europe and tho

CIS. 

If a decision were made in principle to invite CEE 

states to join NATO simultaneously, this could de
NATO military command structure, this woul

fundamental changes in military sla'ategy, planning, or

and command and support arrangements. 

Inclusion of states from the CIS would significan

the size of NATO territory to be defended and raise m

about commitments to defend territory of CIS states, 

Russian territory along borders with states of the Midd

China. 

U.S. influence in NATO would likely be diminis

the United States would face increased demands on it 

security commitments in Eurasia. U.S. relations wit

Asia and the Middle East might undergo major cha

United States allied itself to Russia and other CIS sta

NATO. 

The relatively greater instability in states of 

compared to that in states of CEE, could pose 

problems for NATO. 

NATO Extends Membership to All PFP P

(NATO at 16 + 25 and Maybe More

In this alternative, NATO would invite or be p

principle at least eventually to invite all PFP parl~

NATO, which could mean that NATO would have 4

and maybe more if more states join PFP. As PFP is 

NACC and OSCE members, this could mean that NA

eventually increase to 53 states, the number in OSCE

This alternative would be designed to pursue NAT

and expansion while conceptually emphasizing a uni

and avoidance, at least in principle, of steps that migh

make distinctions or draw lines between states in E

Eurasia. 

Expansion to 41 or 53 members--more than d
bureaucracy and integrated military command would 

complicated, not only in sheer numbers of repres

working in NATO headquarters and commands, but also 

of the functioning of committees and planning st

preparation of studies and processing of papers. 

NATO security guarantees and the territory to be 

would be greatly expanded, stretching far out into Asia 

border areas with Asian and Middle Eastem states. Fun

changes in military strategy and planning, military c

organization and arrangements, and support functions w

required. 

U.S. influence in NATO would be diluted, while de

terms of the number of states enjoying security guarante

be greatly expanded. 

NATO would survive and perhaps be the center of 

planning for Europe and Eurasia, but it would be a far 

NATO from the one that has existed for more than 45 

ALTERNATIVE ALIGNMENTS 

INVOLVING NATO EXPANSION 

NATO Remains at 16, and Pursues Conti

Cooperation with the East Under NACC an

This altemative would be designed to retain the 

character of NATO and avoid appearances of creat

dividing lines in Europe or between Europe and Euras

continuing with NATO outreach programs to the East 

NACC and PFP. The option would avoid the many 

complications that might be involved in expansion, i

complications in NATO in adjusting to new memb

complications with Russia and perhaps other CIS st

might not be invited to join NATO. 
welcomed by CEE states who might continue to press 

membership. Furthermore, as the EU and WEU e

membership, NATO might be seen, in comparison, as 

and not adjusting to the changing environment. NATO 

from its central, leading role. 

The prestige of the United States, which has b

forefront of NATO's outreach programs and the expan

could suffer if NATO retreated from expansion. If 

that the European allies had worked against the Unite

reversing U.S. and NATO policy on expansion, cri

European allies in the United States could pres

withdrawal from Europe. 

OSCE-Type Umbrella for Europe with NA

16) and Russia/CIS as Pillars and Sec

Guarantors, 

as Russia has Proposed 

This altemative is essentially what Russian President 

proposed---an OSCE-type umbrella over Europe a

supported by both NATO and Russian/CIS pillars 

guarantees. 1 This alternative would inhibit NA

expanding. Moreover, NATO's prestige and position 

from being the leading security institution in Europe 

supporting institution. Russia could strengthen its pos

the CIS and help establish the CIS as an in

organization. Russia or the CIS would be elevated 

with NATO. 

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel sees t

proposal as undermining NATO and argued, The Rus

accept being told that NATO remains the nucleus 

European security architecture, in which we want 

Russia and from which we must not exclude it. W
rejected turning the NACC into an independent org

from NATO, in fact, into a superior organization to NA

Some, particularly the CEE states, could view th

effort to establish a NATO and Russian/CIS condomin

CEE. CEE states might be regarded as a neutral, buf

between the two pillars. They would almost certainl

such an altemative, preferring as they do closer relations 

even membership in NATO. U.S. prestige and influen

be diminished in CEE and within Europe in general. 

European Security Focus Shifts to the EU 

WEU, Which Expand to Include Most of C

While NATO Remains at 16 

This altemative would emphasize efforts to enhance the E

pillar of the trans-Atlantic relationship and to develop i

a "Common Foreign and Security Policy" and in Wester

a "European Security and Defense Identity," with the WE

basis for the European defense pillar and working to d

"Common Defense Policy." 

This altemative explicitly states what was assume

altemative if NATO remains at 16 the EU would g

expand into CEE and the WEU would also likely grow 

of converting some of the states presently associated w

full membership. NATO would not grow, and the 

security issues could increasingly tum to the EU an

NATO could remain strong and active, and many might 

to emphasize NATO's role in helping to provide the A

security guarantee for Europe. On the other hand, as 

shifted to the EU and WEU and their expansion, atten

support for NATO might diminish, and NATO might w

perhaps dissolve. If NATO were to wither, so too wo

involvement in European security. 
members of the EU, aud the WEU has invited only 

to join as "associate members," not reaching out to s

CIS. It may be that only NATO, involving the pa

power, and influence of the U.S., can engage Russia a

This altemative could lead to a situation in which t

WEU expand into CEE, NATO withers, the Un

withdraws from Europe, and Russia and the CIS 

respond to these developments. 

Notes 

1. Yeltsin letter, FBIS-SOV-93-231, 3 Dec 93, op. cit. 

2. Interview with German Foreign Minister Kla

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 4-5 Feb 95, 10, in FBIS-WEU-95-02

16-20. 

3. Handelsblatt, 9 Jun 94, 7, in FBIS-WEU-94-113, 

3.7. 

4. TRT Television Network, 10 Jun 94, in FBIS-WEU

Jun 94, 2. 
AND NATO POLICY 

Reaching decisions on the general approaches the Unit

and NATO should take toward European security alignm

NATO expansion demand the utmost care and sensitivi

SECURITY ALIGNMENTS 

Of the six alternative alignments for security from Vanc

Vladivostok outlined in the preceding section, t

altemative--a vibrant and growing NATO that conti

NACC and PFP outreach programs and moves beyond 

extend membership to selected states in Central and 

Europe--is the best. NATO would be a leading particip

active, broader web of European security institutions. 

would not, at least in the near future, extend membe

states in the Commonwealth of Independent States, but 

work to develop effective relations with these states, e

with Russia and Ukraine. 

NATO has been the leading, most active, and su

security organization in Europe for the nearly half cent

existence, playing a role, if not the key role, in ensuring 

in the North Atlantic area. It is the foundation for th

Atlantic link between North America and Europe. Memb

devote more attention and resources to NATO than to a

intemational, security-related institution. Members e

daily consultations by permanent representatives to 

institutions, regular meetings of foreign ministers, in

Summit meetings of heads of govemment and state, com

125 
orgalfizations. The United States and NATO should p

with or encourage security-related programs to engage 

out to states in Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, 

in Western Europe, in the following areas: 

• OSCE: contributing to the expanded ac

institutionalization of the 53-member OSCE; 

• NACC: further development and implementa

North Atlantic Cooperation Council work plan, focused 

on political and economic cooperation among the 38 m

NACC; 

• PFP: careful and intensive development, su

implementation of the Partnership for Peace program, 

defense and military cooperation between the 41 m

PFP; 

• EU and WEU: encouragement and su

development of a European Security and Defense 

European Union Common Foreign and Security 

enhanced Western European Union with a Commo

Policy; this should be done in a way that strengthens 

integration and the European pillar of the Tran

relationship, while maintaining open relations w

America and a strong NATO; 

• NATO Expansion: study, consultations, and de

NATO expansion, leading to invitations to selected c

CEE to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty and becom

of NATO along with the present 16 members; 

• NATO Relations with Russia and with Ukra

consultations, and decisions on development of re

between NATO and, respectively, Russia and Ukrain

be a basis for openness, confidence, and cooperation
with extending membership to selected states in Cen

Eastem Europe. 

• Proceed with utmost care. The expansion proc

be handled with the utmost of care. If handled carefully

expansion will enhance security in Europe and help 

NATO as a vibrant and vital institution. 

• Do not try to develop and specify new criteria

should not attempt to go beyond guidelines that alread

develop and specify a set of explicit criteria on which 

decisions on whether or not to invite states to join NAT

North Atlantic Treaty provides the essential criteria. 

the basis for the previous accession cases involving Gr

Turkey, Germany, and Spain, and NATO needs to b

about appearing to develop a double standard, with dif

tougher requirements for new democracies of the East

has already suggested more specific criteria in statement

issued at the January 1994 NATO summit. To issue new 

could give the appearance of moving the goal line furt

from those seeking membership. 

Efforts to develop detailed criteria beyond what alrea

could lead to several problems, including prolonged and 

even counterproductive debate in NATO, creating expect

many states of being invited to join NATO so long as 

make a good case of having met the criteria, tying the 

NATO allies, stimulating heated legalistic argume

whether a state has met the criteria and should be invite

and, perhaps, even raising challenges as to past or 

practices and qualifications of existing member states o

In the final analysis, decisions on inviting new membe

be made through judgments and consultations by 

members, taking into account a broad range of conside

• Address candidate countries individually. 

should address expansion on an individual country-b
whole group of states, an individual approach w

probably reduce concem, criticism, or adverse reac

states not being invited to join. 

• Be very selective. NATO must be very s

expanding membership, given the political, econ

military situation in the various candidate countrie

problems for NATO of expanding membership. 

• Invite at least one country to join NATO so

should work toward inviting, in the next year or two, a

country to join NATO, on the assumption that at th

decision there will be at least one country NATO will v

time as qualified. The first country should be the one t

deems most qualified and prepared and whose admiss

be highly in NATO's interest. At present, all factors c

the author would recommend the Czech Republic. Ad

least one state as a new member in the near fut

demonstrate NATO's vitality and its strength and det

in making and implementing decisions on expansion. 

of one country, as opposed to several or a large 

countries, would likely be viewed with less concem by 

invited to join. 

• Do not close the door on possible associat

NATO short of full membership. While NAT

ministers appear to have made a decision on a process 

a qualified state would move from PFP directly to f

membership, there may be good reasons for not 

completely other forms of association with NATO be

but short of full membership. The EU has a p

negotiating associate agreements as a step toward 

eventual full membership status, and the WEU h

categories of association short of full membership---

associate partners, and associate members--with al
Russia and NATO and Ukraine. NATO should 

carefully and soon what type of unique relationship 

propose to Russia, going beyond PFP. It should also e

unique relationship with Ukraine, recognizing its 

importance as a new independent state. 

NATO consultations should provide the basis for a 

or negotiation separately with Russia and with Ukraine

deliberations should, individually, take into account, am

things, the size and strength of these two states, their g

locations in Eurasia, the size of their military force

issues related to nuclear weapons, and counterprolif

weapons of mass destruction. 

NATO could look at unique forms of formal rel

and special arrangements for consultations, communica

cooperative programs. A treaty or other formal a

between NATO and each of these two states might be co

Any treaty or agreement between NATO and Russia s

have as its focus an official Russian-NATO security gua

Central and Eastem Europe, as Russian President Y

proposed. 1 Such a guarantee or provision could be s

effort to establish a Russian-NATO condominium ov

and Eastem Europe. 

Nor should any such treaty or agreement deny depl

forces of other NATO members into the territory of pr

NATO members from Central and Eastem Europe, 

Kissinger has proposed. While NATO might not env

such deployment in the immediate future, such a provis

again imply a condominium and legally inhibit de

defensive deployments to meet any possible threatening 

in the future. Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested that 

need not involve deploying NATO forces on the territo

CEE members of NATO but that periodic joint 

1947: Dunkirk Defense Treaty 

--UK & France 

1948: Brussels Treaty--UK, 

France, Benelux 

1949: NATO created with 12 

members: 

Belgium Iceland Norway 

Canada Italy Portugal 

Denmark United Kingdom 

Luxembourg France 

Netherlands United States 

1952: Greece & Turkey join 

NATO 

1954:Western European Union 

(WEU) created, incl. 

Belgium, France, 

Luxembourg, Italy, 

Netherlands, UK 

1955: Federal Republic of 

Germany joins NATO and 

WEU 

OTTO) 

1995: WTO created wit

members: 

Albania Ger. Dem

Poland Bulgaria 

Hungary Romania 

Czechoslovakia 

USSR 

1968: Albania withdraw

WTO 

East-West 

1973: Conference on Security and Cooperation i

established (35 original states, West and Eas0 

131 
(NACC), inviting Central & East European 

Independent States of the former USSR to join 

1992: Greece joins WEU subject 

to ratification; Iceland, 

Norway, and Turkey 

become associate members 

of WEU; Denmark 

and Ireland become 

observers in WEU 

1992: WEU creates Forum for Consultation with 

states 

1994: NATO announces Partnership for Peace (PFP

inviting NACC and other CSCE states to particip

offers associate membership to nearly all Cent.& E

states (except Albania and states of former Y

excluding members of the Commonwealth of I

States 
or associated with institutions related to European 

economics, and security. 

O N N 

S A P A W 

C C F T E E 

E C P O U U 

United States x x x x 

Canada x x x x 

Belgium x x x x x x 

France x x x x x x 

Germ any x x x x x x 

Italy x x x x x x 

Luxembourg x x x x x x 

Netherlands x x x x x x 

Portugal x x x x x x 

Spain x x x x x x 

United x x x x x x 

Kingdom 

Greece 

Denmark 

Iceland 

Norway 

Turkey 

Finland 

Sweden 

Austria 

Ireland 

Switzerland 

Czech 

Republic 

Hungary 

X X X X X X 

X X X X X 0 

X X X X am 

X x x x ~ ~In 

X X X X am 

X 0 X X 

x 2 x x 

x 2 x x 

X X 0 

X 

x x x 3 ap 

x x x 3 ap 

133 
Lithuania x x x 

4 

ap 

Russia x x x 

Ukraine x x x 

Moldova x x x 

Azerbaijan x x x 

Georgia x x x 

Kazakhstan x x x 

Turkmenistan x x x 

Kyrgyzstan x x x 

Uzbekistan x x x 

Belarus x x x 

Armenia x x x 

Tajikistan x x 

Slovenia x x x 

Bosnia & 

Herzegov. x g 

Croatia x g 

F.Y.R. 

Macedonia o g 

"Yugoslavia" 6 

Others 7 x 7_/ 

i Norwegian referendum rejected accession to EU on 28 Nov 

2 Austria and Sweden are not members of NACC, but, together 

(which has observer status), participate in the NACC Ad Ho

Cooperation in Peacekeeping. 

3 Signed "associate agreements." 

4 Negotiations on "associate agreements" began in December 

s Signed "partnership and cooperation agreements." 

6 "Yugoslavia" has been suspended from CSCE. 

7 Other states include Cyprus, the Holy See, Liechtenstein, Mal

and San Marino. All are members of CSCE. All but the H

Monaco are members of the Council of Europe; the Hol

observer. 
NACC 

PFP 

NATO 

EU 

WEU 

CE 

CIS 

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Euro

changed 1 January 1995. 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council, est. November 1991 

Partnership for Peace, est. January 1994. NATO Summit 

invited all members of NACC and CSCE, able and willin

contribute, to participate in PFP program. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, est. September 1949. 

European Union, formerly European Community, est. Apr

1965. Name changed January 1994. 

Western European Union, est. October 1954. 

Council of Europe, est. May 1949. 

Commonwealth of Independent States, est. December 199
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held a

Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994. 

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INVITAT

We, the Heads of State and Govemment of the member

of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the 

longstanding partnership among the North American and

Allies, are committed to enhancing security andstabil

whole of Europe. We therefore wish tostrengthen ties 

democratic states to our East. Wereaffirm that the Al

provided for in Article 10 of theWashington Treaty, rem

to the membership of otherEuropean states in a position 

the principles of theTreaty and to contribute to the secu

North Atlanticarea. We expect and would welcom

expansion that wouldreach to democratic states to ou

part of anevolutionary process, taking into account pol

securitydevelopments in the whole of Europe. 

We have today launched an immedia

practicalprogramme that will transform the relationship 

NATO andparticipating states. This new program

beyond dialogueand cooperation to forge a real partn

Parmership forPeace. We therefore invite the oth

participating in theNACC and other CSCE countries 

willing to contribute tothis programme, to join with 

pamaership. Activeparticipation in the Parmership for P

play an importantrole in the evolutionary proces

expansion of NATO. 

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate u

137 
to peace, and build strengthened relationships by prom

spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to d

principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO willco

any active participant in the Partnership if thatparmer 

a direct threat to its territorial integrity,political indepe

security. At a pace and scopedetermined by the cap

desire of the individualparticipating states, we wil

concrete ways towardstransparency in defence b

promoting democratic controlof defence ministries, join

joint military exercises,and creating an ability to op

NATO forces in suchfields as peacekeeping, search a

and humanitarianoperations, and others as may be agr

To promote closer military cooperation andintero

we will propose, within the Partnershipframework, pea

field exercises beginning in 1994. Tocoordinate join

activities within the Parlnership, wewill invite states pa

in the Partnership to sendpermanent liaison officers 

Headquarters and a separatePartnership Coordinatio

Mons (Belgium) that would, underthe authority of 

Atlantic Council, carry out themilitary planning ne

implement the Parmershipprogrammes. 

Since its inception two years ago, the North 

Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth 

tilts activities. We will continue to work with 

NACCparmers to build cooperative relationships a

entirespectmm of the Alliance's activities. With the 

of NACC activities and the establishment of the P

forPeace, we have decided to offer permanent fa

NATOHeadquarters for personnel from NACC cou

otherParmership for Peace participants in order to 

ourworking relationships and facilitate closer cooperat
and theother states subscribing to this document, reso

deepentheir political and military ties and to contribute 

tothe strengthening of security within the Euro-

area,hereby establish, within the framework of the 

AtlanticCooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace. 

2. This Partnership is established as an expression o

conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic

be achieved only through cooperation and c

action.Protection and promotion of fundamental freedo

humanrights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, an

throughdernocracy are shared values fundamental 

Partnership. Injoining the Partnership, the member State

North AtlanticAlliance and the other States subscribing 

Document recallthat they are committed to the preserv

democraticsocieties, their freedom from coercio

intimidation, and themaintenance of the principles of inter

law. Theyreaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good f

obligationsof the Charter of the United Nations and the pr

of theUniversal Declaration on Human Rights; specifi

refrainfrom the threat or use of force against the te

integrityor political independence of any State, to 

existingborders and to settle disputes by peaceful mean

alsoreaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final 

allsubsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfillmen

commit-ments and obligations they have undertaken in 

ofdisarmament and arms control. 

3. The other states subscribing to this d

willcooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organiz

pursuingthe following objectives: 

(a) facilitation of transparency in national defence p

and budgeting processes; 

(b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces; 

(c) maintenance of the capability and readiness 
operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed

(e) the development, over the longer term, of forc

better able to operate with those of the members of 

Atlantic Alliance. 

4. The other subscribing states will provid

NATOAuthorities Presentation Documents identifyin

theywill take to achieve the political goals of the P

andthe military and other assets that might be 

Partnershipactivities. NATO will propose a prog

partnershipexercises and other activities consistent 

Partnership'sobjectives. Based on this programm

PresentationDocument, each subscribing state will de

NATO anindividual Partnership Programme. 

5. In preparing and implementing their individualP

Programmes, other subscribing states may, at theirow

and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessa

Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison officew

Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate theirparti

NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, aswell 

others by invitation. They will also makeavailable 

assets, facilities and capabilitiesnecessary and appro

carrying out the agreed PartnershipProgramme. NATO 

them, as appropriate, in formulating and execu

individual Partnership Progranunes. 

6. The other subscribing states accept the 

undertandings: 

- those who envisage participation in missions re

in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part 

NATO exercises; 

- they will fund their own participation in P

activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the b

mounting exercises in which they take part; 
have access to certain NATO technical data rel

interoperability; 

- building upon the CSCE measures on defence plan

other subscribing states and NATO countries will 

information on the steps that have been taken or are be

to promote transparency in defence planning and budg

to ensure the democratic control of armed forces; 

- they may participate in a reciprocal excha

information on defence planning and budgeting which 

developed within the framework of theNACC/Partne

Peace. 

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objecti

Parmership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic 

will: 

- develop with the other subscribing states a plan

review process to provide a basis for identifying and e

forces and capabilities that might be made available by 

multinational training, exercises, and operations in co

with Alliance forces; 

- promote military and political coordination at 

Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance 

to Parmership activities with the other subscribin

including planning, training, exercises and the develo

doctrine. 

8. NATO will consult with any active partic

thePartnership if that Partner perceives a direct 

itsterritorial integrity, political independence, or securit
1994/1995 (for NACC and PFP) 

CHAIRMAN'S SUMMARY 

OF THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCI

2 I~(EMB[II 1 

I The Foreign Minfsrer~ and Work Planlor 1995. Mmi~ter~ txprez~d satin, and to reinforcing securlt~ and ~

Repre~entahv¢$ of the member cegntrtes of tbe faction with the practical cooperation so far Euro.Atlantw and CSCE area. 

North Allergic Ceogeratwa Cour~o~ [h~4CC) met adue~nd in parmersh~gfor Peace atd exchanged 4 ~ Minuter~ consulted 

in Brussels today. The Foreign Ministers and views on ho~ to proceed wilh ~arlhtr l~aplen~n- tion of the ~ropcan security arc

Representatives of cog, ants shtch ha~e joined ration of Parlnership for Peace, taking into wa3s to sa'engthtn mul~ally rein/G

tbePannerttupforPeace(PfFJ~ithoutbemg accour: the agreed lndt~utual Partnership ttonb~tweendzffertntinstit~n~conc

NA~'~al~rd~t~ardd~S'¢ct¢laryG¢~rM°flh¢ Y,'t~n~tmcsandtho~empreparatto~_ Th~'~el. set'~nty/za~a ThcMku~tttaloohe

WestcmEuropean O~tfonal~oanendedlhe raeet, comcd thc prograrrane of coopcralton acti~ines the forthcoming CSCE. Summit 

ing" under Panaersh~p for peacc for1995, lK~'also Budapest as a meanr to rtinforce 

2 The Secretary General of h'ATO agreedtop~tshthelatertrtportoftheAdltoc ~tcu:fit~inEarop¢ 

mformedthe~eelmg~h~adec*slotatakcntnth¢ G~p~C~perta'loninPe~dot¢~ng Inaddi. 5 The Mini~le~* cachaug

North Ada, lt~c Coa,lol on I lX~ember tlo~ the Mmislers noted lhal HA TO would ~n I regional conflict¢-, patlicuiarly the 

3 17w Mird~ters re ~i~'ed the develop- ly clrcglale to I~ Patmcrs a tee nfPff plannatg met Yugoltavla, ar, d on other regio

merit of coopermr~ acuvilles ~nder the ,¥ACC and roicw procedure~. ,ha'h ~11 be ~- 6 Yne Idtni~ers agreed to 

Work Plan and the Partner.flip foe Peace pro- cd for ine first tu~e ta 1995 and vddch ~ill make uiar NACC meetings ~ the future 

gramaw, on tht basis nf progr¢rs rxporu hy th¢ an tmpor~mt contrlb;alan lo enhanced proct[¢al wlth th¢ Sprmg Mintnerlal wwetm

Ckairmen of re~evard h'ACC/P~ Commitlees cooperatton The Mimsler~ excka,~ed ~icws on Atlantic Council each year. The 

They discussed h~a'¢s to strengtlk-m further he t~e relatianship bet~een NACC and PJP sllh a meeting n/the North Atiantic 

NACC e~ and coopcrati.~n proz'~e a,.at ~ ~ arhie~,lag n,ztr.*'a~ effic,.ency a,~d effec. Councii wdl thcrefere taD' ¢lace 

endorsed and agreed to publ~h a re~tscd NACC t~ vent~ in partncnhtp and cooi~ra~on acavitics h'etfitflandx 

WORK PLAN FOR DIALOGUL PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION 1994/1

I,,suld ~ Ike meqlinll d tl~ Ilo~/I/Ionfk Coo~qnalim Could, NATO Ileodqumters, Bru~t, ds, 2 Dt~r 1994 

lsanv~tetiaa ~ t~ut general problon~ of secw~ related b~cctorlescort troningfor CF

to r~clear ~exr: p~nners, u~:ludmg a CFE Cou

~he Fortngn Minislers and Rxpre~n~Cires o] 03 Slrenglhemng the consul~a~ve and ¢oc#~ra- cation teams' in,pectate ro b

the member ¢ounttaet of the North Atlantic nan peocegl: Schodmg Centre m ga~or~i H

Coogerahon Couacil. veRh the participatlon of O# Procacal cc~pcr~tion *l~ CSCE ceq. secunly 09 Contlnuazlect of ~appon tv CF

obllr,'er coa,'drter, ha~e agreed to the folJowbrg issues, patlaers in connecting Io an

rtvisinn ~¢ dqe Work Plan for I994 ~ktch wdl ~,RI"rY. 

alto be nalt4 for1995 h bedds on lhe faunda- Aetlvi#i~ 

Ol Ca~dultadons at Amlw~ndorral level, i~clud. ttonsandptug'lpks,qdmlo2ja¢,paa~t,hipand mgonlpecthclsauermbn:anttormmg/otra~: FOUCY PLANNING CONSU 

c°°i~tati°n altead~ esmbluht~ in parttcu[ar at 021~eg~lar and, aa ¢~nls dic~te, nd hec consal. ~'Ollc 

thc Rome S~l~it in Not~mber1991. the Bral~els ta~ons of the Eahtical ~ee ~h coop. OI Mid. and long.lerm fon~ign and 

S~trnil in Januar 1 1994 and NACC Mmulerlal eration partners, bwlnd~ng a~ appropriate Q" ~raes. 

~e~sgs Partn,r,h~pforPeacelPJ~Jtopi¢3arid wilhexpcrts: 

acdl'ilits to be combated in rh¢ NA CC frame. 03 Early coas~ltatlott~, pa~o~klrty on regional h~idO heatwns~,¢hapotentiaHo ra~tatocri~'ls; OIAvtwedngnfNATO'rAdatltlcPol~

workare, inaccorda~ce~idlthemltsandproce 041nforraalpollticalconsu~tatinn~belween Graupwithcooperaeiaapartner

dares set out in the ~ Framewo~ Document .~TO and individual partner countries, as Ylovatd~ 

and other relevant t~P d~lane~as, sabl¢ct to fur. appropriate: 

thcr consideratwn m that COntext OJ Meetings of Regional Experts Group. ~th ~ [~g~ 

e~ertsfro~parznercoan~aeioaceaye~; A. DE, FF~VCECONV~o.SIONflN

• "" 06 t~ie~mg nf cooperation l~rtner,, tacl,~,ng at HUM,4,Y DIMEf¢SION) 

AN~ S[~U~ RJ~ eke parmer's request when po~abte, on deck, Tcpks 

sinas takcn by tlw Ne.,th Ada~tic Cozexd and OI Convcr~ian and ~oclal stabili~ 

~her impono~ &q.el~nt-nu m the Alltance meg the ct~dmn economy of th

T°9~ hm'ing direct beanng an Jecunr~'and t~abduy, poleralal used in the railitar) a

OI Speclflc pol~e~d and .tecunty related minters. 07 Cotalnuadon of str~inars and experts meet. m~ats tnda~tT: 

including regtonal secunt)' users: w~s ~ith CFE coopcra~inn parmcrs on trapt¢. 02 Economic a.~tcts per~n~ag Io 

02 Concelmaal a~,oacgts to ar~ control, d~z. mcntation of Ow CFE ;teary; ~tr production ,~tcs and 

armament asd non.prohferattott incl~ng 08 Balding on curre~l progr~,asle o])o~nl .~in. rt.w~ and to pr~zffscmon af m

tkerec~r~lyofnewnoa.nuclearw¢¢pe~tale$ laleral inspection ream/ and joint rhea; 

NATOrevtcw ~ Dec. 94-Jan. 05 

143 
Oirectorate of the databa, le on techoioal in NATO cience pwgramme giing emoha. I[OR

¢a~erff~e ia defowe conw:r~ca with a ~4ew to $ig to priority areas of interest to NATO and Topl¢~ 

tts practical ua¢ in cooperation partner coun. coaperauon partners; 01 Contribution to increa

lric1: 02 Ways aod means of enhancing the output af NATO and its pohcies a

02 Developenent of defence con*wrsion pilot pra. ~cien¢~cooperatwa pragrammes, debate on secunty matw

jeers s~pparted by tun'ions ~th a view to pro. 02 Erpioratlaa of member

mating cooperation bePe..een zadustrles OJ A¢I~ iogpublicexpectatlor~o

Allied and coaperatinn partner ¢otaffrtes. Ot Meeting of the Sc~¢e Commiltee ~11 corm. g to, mine; 

03 Organization of workshop~ on practical terpartsfrom cooperatio~partnercountriesat 03 Dts~emlnation of infor

defence eon~ ersion acth~ties, wtth pa~ieular leo.el ot~=¢ a year. including holding the ]995 means. 

focus on problems encountered ia rear, clue- regular ~l ineett,~ of the NATO S~wnee 

ing ran)or anno~enta produel~n centres and Committee with cooperation partners in Aeti~des 

mditam installations, with participation of Budapest: 

local business and administrations and of 02 PartlcLpatton of saentlst~ fro'n cooperation Ol Meetings of the Comm

defencc industries (in 19~)5 to be held in a and Cultural Relatior, s 

partner countries in Advanced ~ Iratitutes hart ~n~ ~; 

coop*ninon p~wr country): tAM) and Advanced Re,earth g' orkshops 02 Information about NAT

04 Enlarged Economic Comraittee meeting~, az IA~W)as well a~ Ow holdlng of sachraeetmgs be made a~ailable to 

agreed; on topics related ta defence ¢on~wr. in cooperauoa panner countries; 

sire, mcinding a meeting ~th the Indattrial 03 Parttcipation of scier~ts from eooperatton cooperation panner 

selected inst2tutlon.~ an

Pionning Commitsee to d~cuas rele~ara t.~zes partner countries in th~ Collaborative aha lhrough embas.d

rdated lo defense conversion Research Grants, Linkage Graters and Science 

Fellowships: counsel senlng as co

B. SECURITY ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC 04 S,¢oding proceed2ngs, in hardcopy or compgt, dlplomatic liai~on chon

DE'vT.LOPM$'~'r erized format, Of A~ATO's scient*fic meeling$ 03 Continue and further 

To~.¢s to a cenl~al lib~ry in each cooperozlon part- related cooperanon w

OI Economic and ecological consequences of net eowttry aod di.uernmat~ng other ~iteralure llshnd by cooperation p

de'fence.related environmental degradation; on the Science programme to scientists in ested and able to pr

02- Economic and ecological consequences of coaperatwn partner countrtes; facifitw.~. ~ppon perso

nuclear disarrnantem; 05 Sponsoring visits of e~perls to cooperation 04 Suppor~ the errablLOtm

O? Fconomic aspect~ of migration and refugees parrner demonsrrat~on projects and provlding ed lofonnation Ctmlrc

affeermg sec~ri~ and stabibq; other ~c¢ in io~ such projects," net countne~ withio th

04 Consequences of the implementatwn of UN 06 Sp~nsonng ~ata of exoerts fr~wa coopernt~n resources; 

mandated economic sanctu~ns on soc~-e¢o, panner countries invited by project d~rectors 05 Virtu to .~4TO by targ

no~mc aspects of regional stobil~ty in NA TO number counmes: 06 Spon~o rsh~o of a num

07 Assiating cooperation parrner~ through the cooperation panner co

Activities ute of NATO't network of referee~ and ri~-rtlatedseminar~ in

Ol WorK~hopl/reinfor~ed meeangs on the abo~e expert: 07 Co-sponxor~hip with c

themes," 08 Examintng how computer noworka can facdl, seminar,r/~'orkshops in 

02 E4,onot~ic Cos~Ree with cod eolian purl. tale contacts and promote more effective co~tnes; 

ner~ seminar o~ impact aad ~uman ¢onse" coopera~inn among sctenti~als throagh the u.~e 08 Presentat~ons by NATO 

quenges of defence.relaled environmental o/Networking Infrastructure Grams and tion parrner countries," 

degradation and on economic and ecological Networking Sw~eraents to Unkage Grantt. 09 Demoerazl¢ l~ttt~ion~ 

aspects of nuclear disarmament mpported as ~l and insti~ronal xap

nere~xar¢, hv ,geienee/CCMg Committees" IO ltlerealed d~zernmatw

Er~m " ~q~LI.EtlraE$OIF~EIIN¢~d)¢AETY honaod~or,,~non,,~

03 NATO Economics annual CoRoquwo~ to be (~) coo~rat~on partners. 

~rganised by the Economwz Directorate on Tap~ 

"Stat~ of Econo,mc Reforms in Cooperation Ol Defenc¢.eelated and disarmament-related P[A(~K

Partner Countriea m the mid-1990s: en~nomnentaliss=es: 

Opportunmes. Constraints. Security 02 Pilot ~ud~es of interes~ to cOOl.ration part- PFP Tap~ a~dAc~r 

tmphcations. " herr Topk 

OI Cooperation in Peace

C. DEFENCE EXPENDI'rURES~DEEENCE A¢~¢~ Planning and Operatio

BUDGEIS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP Ol Meeting of the Comza~ee on the ChalIenges work nf PMSC Ad Hoc 

WITH THE ECONOMY of Modern Society with counterparts from ~ Peacekeeping; 

ToF~ coopera~on partner countne~ at least once a 

OI Interrelationship hetween defence expends, year; Ae~'vlgie~ 

turex/ho~et¢ and the economy: 02 ParlW*pation of cooperatwa parm~rs' e~ O1 De*eiopn~cnt of a com

in pilot study meetings. ~or~hops, confer, operatwnal concepts 

Attlvlti~ encex, seminars, and hotdingpdat sl~dy meet. peacekeeptag: 

O I Sentinar on Legislative Oversight of Narwhal ings in cooperation partner countr~s; . to exchange ~ie~s on 

Defence Bodgets to be held in an Alhed co~. 03 Du~'mmation of mformatwn on CCMS pilat aod nanonal doctemes 

try; stuaffes, workshops, conferences and semi- In the ;~t C'~']P p'amo

02 Enlarged Economlc Coromnee meetings, as nars. oa well at approved repotts to caopera- . to hold a semmar on l

agreed, on the economic aspects of topics lion pa~wrs; keeping m Spring 1995

Nh'lOreview '~ Dec. 94-
- clull-mtlitaty in;efface: ~obe tab.ca forvea~da~ 

aa mpect of work on hwnani~arian atpeas of 

pmcekeepisg aperation~: 

• public relations: a amunm" to be held daring 

1995. 

02 Cooperation in planning for peacekeeping 

ac~-aies: 

. command aad control: discussion in the 

Technical Sub*Groap (TSG), reisforced by 

experts: 

- cooperation in planning: further wor~ to 

d~'eklp~t~ts in other/pro: 

- identification of assets: [unh~r work us the 

7~30 at th~ stage aeeds to awali fun'ber dev¢l. 

aptera of the UN ~'ulby armngemems. 

03 De,elapse.at of a common ~t~nical ba~ in 

peacekeepmg: 

• comm~mcattons: sapportfor expert group 

work to da~elap a concept of r~mmuawmum~ 

and a fexmb~li O, seedy/or a commumeatlor, r 

database; 

• equ~n~nl ~nfll~.'wns: passible e:V~en-lo.d 

discussions of equipment requirements. 

mclu.~ng chaco1 oueroperabd~ m~e~. 

04 Peacekeeping tralmng, education, and e~er. 

ctge~: 

• sap~rtfor e~l~rt group work on peacekeep. 

b~g course repertoire: 

- consideration by TSG of PfP/NACCjoist 

e~etcise after.actlon reports, and of.qmilar 

reports offered by nalions concerning relevant 

bdateral and mulhl~ral e~erc*se~ coedac~d 

m th~ ~int Of~"P, 

• consoldat~ and ar~l>.,U o[icssons learned 

m all I~P reded peaca'kteptng exero~e~ 

05 ~gUtics a.~eu of peacekeepmg: 

- updutt the Compead~ ofl~as ~ar~ 

based on nutloe~ inputs: 

- briefings on the UN peacekeapisg logistics 

ma~l and :he new SHAPE logistic~ course. 

DffWCE PL4NNIHG ISSU[S 

AND MIUMRY MATTIRS 

N~CC 

OI Air d~encc reioted ~ners. for arptcts relnt. 

ed to NACC 

A~ 

Ol Enlarged NADC sessions to consult on air 

detente mpec~ of agreed mug.ad inttren 

PFP T~i~ and~ 

T~ 

Ol De/thee ~a~mag ~ budgeting: 

02 Defence polic)/ara~egsemilitary doctrine; 

03 The structure, organlaatlon and rotes of 

Defem+e Misistri~s; 

04 The structure aad organuation of t~ arn~d 

forc~ lndudl~ command structure; 

05 Reserve f~rces and mabilUatlan; 

06 Persormel i~s~ez; 

NATO rev~w 

. Tr~j.xt~ for crisis mae~n~ 

. T~g on mdiofie~ency mar,~eroat. 

- Tralnmgfor tnviron~at~ismts. 

I0 Planning, orgarasarion and management of 

national defence procure.~at program.s: 

• ~organua'aonfor~7"enceeq~ap 

ment p~umment 

• Defence procurement planmn 8 sy~er~ o~ad 

project m~n~ge~a conce~s. 

- Contrac~g procedures and m~wd~. 

11 Command and control systems and prate. 

dures, iseladmg comrnunicmionz and is/ormat,on systems and in~,rapemblti~y a~c~. 

12 Air Defence rdatedmaner~: 

. Airl)rflnceeonoe~andte,mnoloSy. 

• Air emergency and cross-border air move. 

meats. 

• Air l~er.~¢ teaming co~cept~ 

13 Sla.edardisation and iraeraperability: 

• Mmerual and teclm~al a.ep~cu of ~darduarian and inttraperabduy. 

• Procedures and in.ser~'ice equtpmrnt in 

ptatel:tt~ing. :torch a~ rexut, humanitan= 

and aeber agreed exerc~ws and oMrat~r~. 

- Military med~cln~ 

14 Log;,tic u~a.s, m pank'ular logtalc~ a~tcts 

of p~ac,~r~r~g. 

I5 Crins m~ag~t~ 

16 Exencues in peac ekeeping. ~arch and rescue. 

ho~namlanan operation, other exercisea and 

related ac~vitws. 

17 Cooper~'wn is Ibe fiebJ of Arran Control and 

Disarmament.'~ 

18 Aerospace Research and Develapmem 

19 Rad~ ~¢ctrum Management. 

20 Coordmution of PIP Mdua~' acliviti~. 

Aai~ 

01 ~ estrcn~s: 

The overall goal of grinning and exer. 

ores between NATO and P~ is to d~elop c~operati~e mimicry relations in order t~ 

strengthen t~ ~b~lu" 2" tO carry out combi~wd 

rni~m~ns in tbe field of Peace~eeplag. 

Peacd~episg ocliviae~ may usclade a 

range of exercnes, such as Map Exercises, 

Staff Exercises. Field Training Exercises. 

Command Post Exercises. Communications 

Exercises and Logistic Exercises. Similar 

ertrcises should be organtsed m other fields 

~uch as Search and Rescue, Humamtanan 

Op~atian~. and other areas a~ may ~d~sequenay be agree& 

Exercises will be preceded as neces. 

sary by seminars, study periods and work. 

~b~ps to ensure tsaxtm~rs training benefit 

from the ezerc~e itself I~ercbe~ rrpresent 

the cap~c~e of a comprehensive progrc~m.t 

and will be the final highlight to evaluate 

training and interoporability in an opera. 

nonal em~nt 

Tbe folla~mg tstrcises are proposed 

for 1995: 

0 

~i~,~~ aid aperatk~t

on partner TerrRory. 

L3 COOPERATI~ BRIDGE 9

Iraismg and exercising of s

zar>. peac~¢pisg ~ an

at i~vid~ [~a~oon ond c

limited number of NATO/P

partictpatthg in a 

regirnenta~bngade s~zed taz

Jwnt. on Partner Territory. 

lA I.ANDEX fESPERIA 1995). 

else dealing with peacekee

enhancisg mllilary isterop

ny/platoon level, May 199

RangeSou:h.rnhaly [Re

ord.u~n ~ M,VC.T). 

1.5 A possible land.based exer

US is under study with 

gACIANT is~h.eme~t 

MARITIME EX£REI$£S: 

MI 2 to 3 day NMD/PIP t.en

exercise (Cm~ercmve Supp

1995J to be planned an

gACL&~T, pr~eraply prio

PJP maritime livex, Loca

mined 

M2 Naval F.r~rctse us North N

Rarentt Sea. under the 

• ~probably in Spnn

M3 HAREX - a live excreter 

tram~ag and exercise of .~n

~wri~ae ale forces is poace

September, m :he BaRic. 

it4 JIAR~g . We e~erc~e to 

embargo operatton~ m add

~tration of Non-combata

Operation INEOi could be 

Sea. 

1/15 MAREX - Sran&ng 

Mediterranean (SNFM) e~

dures and train for Pa

(PASSEX~) dunng port vird

M6 ,~'IAREX (CLASSICA 1995

exercise dealing with peac

tlana isciodus~ a~i~l~we. ~

at sea, emb~go, in JuneJJ

Medite~'u~ Sea (rr

ordisaaon ~i~ MNCs). 

OTHER F-.XF~CIgES: 

Ol PCM 1995 * a Crisis Mana

[¢7~X) h~g~gtmng bring

of Crms Management prac

ease, as ~l as cons,.dtano

cal conflict affecting N

Counlrtes and AllieL 25th

NATO HQ. 

02 CPX A - a Con~ Post 

e~rcige ~fs ~ NATO pr

non making protean on m

peacek.~ng oper~o~. 

03 SHAPEX - a conference 

range of missions iraplled 

Dec. 94-Jan. 9
coordmatum .4th the PCC. 

05 Im~tot~on tO NAC &a Do), 

06 BALTAP PJT EXERCISE." PIP peacekeeping 

exercise 6.12 October 1995, m~l~ng land. 

morimne and air forces. Zealand group of 

[slande, Denmark. (Reqaires futthe¢ c~rdi. 

natumvdthMNC's) 

07 Other exercises and relaeed aetivMes: on a 

case-by-ease ba~s, appropriate phaxes of a 

nuMxr o/exercises vathnt the existing NATO 

programme may [re opened to PIP partners: 

proposals in this regard hnze bun /o~,arded 

by the N~As and are under conslderaeion by 

the NATO !mlitieal authorities, 

02 Er.am~es of nanonat exeeoses under 

-In the course of 1995, sag exercise With 

active participation of one or two PIP 

Parft~rs and/or toweled by observers pro. 

gramme accessible to other Allies and 

Partners conducted m Belgium. 

. Invitation afPfl a observers andlorpanici. 

pants dunng the training on BELBAT for 

deployment informer Yugoslavia The exer. 

cise lasts : I ~eek (3 t, mrs a year), A ± 3 

days visit * presentations to be set up/or 

ob~e~ers b~ the Arm) ger~oemel lhv~un. 

• lnvitatwn o/Pfl a observers to training of 

era'reAr /or deployment in former 

Yuxoslavia and P/P participants in UK 

fft,'MO courses. 

. Romaman maltmmlanal pfP bTO~ "CONFIDFA'CE 1995 ", to be conducted on Ro~ 

~'reilo 0 Blith the participation of aubunits 

(platoon level) from NATO and Partner 

,Vatto~ a~ obsen'ers (Sep~ember19951. To 

oOiance the wserotmalnl~ and the eapa~i. 

ty of acting in common ia the fraraework of 

• Romaman mait~nonal marlta~e PIP e~er. 

ci~ "BLACE SEA1995", Yo he held in the 

Romanian terraorial sea adjacem to MAN. 

GALIA harb~tr. June 1995: eachpardcipal. 

ing state v, ith a vessel (NATO/Par~ner 

nauo~). To es~abhsh comp~ble and vlable 

forms of co.aperalion regarding the main 

naval operations ia the field of P.H, SAR; 

obu~ler a~'c~ioll On ~re. 

. Baigarian multinational PIP mataime exer. 

cise. 1995. in the Black Sea. 

03 Examples of national exercises within the 

- BALTOPS 1993 (phase I): US m~raoonal 

mari¢~se exerci~s in lune. Exercise pw'pose 

/s to enhance na~y-~,-n~y coronets, co-oper. 

asian, and interoperabildy with northern 

European allies and eastern European Baltic 

Sea lifforal states. Act*vistas inc~ale seaman. 

ship and small beat operations, under~ay 

repleMaAmeal, personnel ~whanges. rnw~euvring. SAR demonstrations, medical 

e~c~ges, and at .s¢a rend~vout, 

. Quarterly Black Sea Passex: Marinme exercise with nca~es of US, Romania and Oaigana. 

NA'l'O revle~ 

th¢ fi¢ld. Planned for Apnl.Ma? 1995. the 

erxrcise vail inl'~ve approximately 200.250 

perwemel per nmio~ 

- Medical Exercises Central and E~stern 

Europe (MEDCEURI: Planned for L'& 

AlOania and Bulgarta 1.1 the flrst and second 

quarters of CY 1995. These e~w, us prowde 

joint medwal and civic actwn assilta~ce to 

~l~ ~1~ ~ C~ ~ medlcal per. 

sonnel. Aclivlttes include mass casualty. 

eoaet*~ion, and emergency medlctne training 

and techmque~, as well as medtcal, dental, 

and umru~tsation treoament at local facthtie~ 

- Romatu~n Tactical B~er E~erclse "D~'UBE 

1095" (hugmt 1~95) Eachparnclpating 

~tate (NATO/Parmer Na~c~) with one river 

vessel Toimprove co-operatwn/orriver 

operatinn~ in the field o/ P.H, SAR and/or 

embargo monitonng. Accommadallan for 

04 Olh~r ~lliMOl ~ilt#s. ~t~l~dmg : 

• C.out~r.s eg O~eNATO De/ante College: Rome, -~ 

- Courses at the NATO School (SHAPE); 

Ob¢~rgau; ~ 

- NATO Trairung Group Courses; 

- Vano~ other roar.s at .~,fferent locatto~, 

- Me~ngs/Work.~hnp~f3~smars/confereaces," 

- Mihtary Agen~'for Stondardisation IMAS: 

War~ Parry Se~nars: 

-activities of the Adq,isory Group for 

Aerospace and Development (AGARO). sub. 

lea tO ~al approva[ 

05 Specie co.operation aa~les ~n the field of 

d~/cr~e prv~z~:r~,'u ~ ~z~dardi~aon w~ti 

be taken fo~ard under the auspices of the 

Cor~ero~e of Natum~l Armaments Directors 

( CNADI ~h the a~n off 

• Promoting craasparency m defence planning 

and bu~ef~g processes; 

- Supportingjomtptanning. ~ralnmg and ~ercises tn the fields of peaceheeptag, search and 

rescue and humanitarian operazi¢~: 

- Develapr~wn£ over the longer term. afimerof 

erabilay Of NATO and Partner armed forces. 

1"rinse activaie~ will include multmattonal 

expert teams, technical workzhnps, semi. 

nars/spr, pasm and special meetmgs of expert 

groups, 

06 Specific co-operatie~ activl~s to be devel. 

aped under the direction of the S~dor ,¥A~O 

Logistic~ Conference ISNLCI in the field of 

logLnics (coacepls and procedures), ~'ladmg 

meetings, courter and e.xctlanses of ~qorma. 

tion and e~enence baween logimc expel. 

07Under the auspices of the NATO 

Communications and Information System 

Committee (NACISC) rp~clfw ac~ivtt~ex will 

arm at promating coranwn wnder~rtandmg a/ 

~u, p~ and plamung, and co.o~ration to improve interoperability in the 

Communication and Information Systems 

(CIS) area. [~s¢ activiltes will c~ist of 

joint meetings, workshops, seminar~ and 

exper~ ¢al£s 

@ 

possibly n ~¢raina

siam. 

09 Die NATO Econo

ea acridity aimed 

of defence budge

in¢ol.ng procedu

de/trice expendit~

[MIR6[

HUMANITA

NAOC 

OI Orgardsation. ro

Emergency Plan

responding to eme

aim, principles an

tary coopenmon m 

arrang~ and 

cies and dd~asters

aalviO 

01 Enlarged meetutg

m/ormatlon and e

nwt role and~ncn

vemion and d~llt

m///tary co~pe mti

PFP To~x~ nndA~;i

T~,ic 

01 Civil Emergency P

Ol £tch~ge of info

asset in the deve

preparedness inc

azpec*s of crisis 

iwntlen ~ dlmrte

itaffan assistance. 

02 Under the autho

Emergency Plann

will consist of me

and exchanges o

ences 

AIR TIMF[

NA 

r~ 

Ol Cwil military co.o

aMment; 

OI Enlarged CEAC 

required, subord

improve civil/mil

prm~Nes ,~ pra

PFP Tcpie~ a~ Ac

to/de 

Ol Airtm~'~ auma~x

• Ci~il.zilitory au',

l Multinatw,ml mr 

Dec. 
comp~d~d~ff m t~ls flel~ ~uding trauning. 

ANNEX 

UST OF S~EaFIC ~ SUItSUWD UNDER 

AGREED TOPI~ AND A£TTVmES 

The Annex is complemrntary to the Work 

Plan taut contains a ltsl Of S~¢C~C and detaLlcd 

proposals of pomcular inlerest to one ~r ~trdi 

parmers or All~s. ~7~ese are an elahor~on of 

geagrdi to~ics and acw.~ttes mcindnd in 

Work Plan for ~ m'um1~on by relevant fora 

Annex is hoe inrendnd to be exl~rive or cotaprehermve. It is understood that Ow~e proposals wdl 

be ¢~'ned o~ in harmony with t~ o~going worl 

in other faro. including in the CSCE and the 

Co~cfl of Europe 

AND $EOJRWf-ltlU~D 

gATIH$ 

Ol Pos~ble sub-folios could include: "C~qw~ 

and issues arising from ethnic and minori& 

problema affecting security in ~ changing 

E~rope" 

(Topic O l ) 

ECONOI~K: ISSUES 

A, DEFE#CE CONVERSION (IKCLUDING 

HUM~ DIMEA~IONI 

Ol Sub.toplo mighl include: "Problem of the 

human factor ~n the defence conversion 

pro~ess in regions end~gered by unemptvy. 

ment" 

tTopic OlJ 

02 Possible topics for dmcussmn at the enlarged 

Eco~onuc Corn~aUee might be: 

. znler~al m~gratlon frvm defence to other ~ectars of the eronocny: 

• intellectual property rights m cennectlo~ ~h 

industry reslmctaring and defence tanrer. 

stem 

(~cti~tv 04i 

03 Possible topics for workshops/seainars on 

defence conversion m¢ght be: 

. Internatlonalsemanaron "Dcmllaan~m~an & 

l~...armolmenl in Tr~u~aio~ Z,o,;io..Ccoaomlc 

Consequences". Minsk, February 1995; 

Princzpal sponsor in Belarus: Mimstr; of 

Economy; 

- International seminar on "De/rote 

Conversion in East-European Countries: 

{acti~ 03) 

04 Possible sub.toc~s i~xlade: 

. Exchange of~ri~ncu i~ con~ergu~n off~ctories and scienlific centers of Defence 

Induartol B~e (DIEt; 

• Meeting ofez?~ertsfor e~change ofvie~ and 

wor~m~ OUl pro~o'~d~ on conversion 

(Topic 03) 

Ol Possible thernes for /umre dncusnon under 

priori~ areas of the Science Comeainee mig~a 

be: 

• disarmament technologies: scientificprob. 

lems related to disarmament techoologics 

including the disposal of nuclear, biological 

and chemwdi weapons and defince industry 

conversion. 

- cnvico~ntal SeCUre)': ~ci~hfiC problem~ 

related to the em~ro~meat itwlad~g the reclaraano~ of contanunated mdlmry sacs. regional en~qronmeatal problema and natural and 

man.made d~aster~: 

• h~gh t¢chnoto D: scientific problems related w 

high technology including information ,~cience, materiaL~ science, b:orechoology and 

energy conservation and supply Coon. 

nuclear): 

. science and techoolog~, policy: problems 

related to human resources including science 

parle 7. technology transfer, bmo~atlon, man. 

age~ent, intellectual property rigMs and 

career mobilily l* g the redeployment of 

defe~ce.indusu7 scwnmts): 

- computer networking: strategies to enkaace 

the memi]ic didiog~ bet~,een NATO co;re. 

tries and coopcrca~on ponder countrws u~i~g 

computer ne~.odang 

¢Top~c 01) 

02 Possible Iopic~ for ASI and ARW meetings 

migla inclade: 

-International seminar on "Role of 

International Scientific & Technical 

Cooperation in Sut~or~ing the Development 

of Saence in Medium & gmdil-$i,.e European 

Countries ". MinsL 1995: Pnncip~l sponsor 

in Bctor~a" Mini~ of F~lucation & genre 

IAai~q 04) 

CHALLENGES Of MOOMN SOaffY 

(cc.m) 

Ol Pllo~ sandy topics to be parsund ~l~: 

. Envicoan~n~al asp¢cU ofreusingformermdi. 

tory lards; 

. Protecllng civilpopulatlonsfvom toxic raaterual sptlL~ danng ~nt: of milieu O. gOOd~; 

. Deprived urban areas; 

. Evaluation of demonstrate

remedial action Techoolag

raent of contaminated land a

- Indoor air q~diity (PAuse I1

- Methodology.focalization. 

~cop¢ of ~ era'trom~wntal u

- Ne~. agricultural techado~i

- Pollationpre~nt~on stratgg

de~,tlop~ra: 

- [;~¢ of~ma~atots as a mean

ronnk~l damage caused b) 

t Activity 04); 

02 Possible new pdot study top

lowing: 

. Seismic protection of insta

~ugh risk as sources of rad

and bactonologtcdi torctcon

oHi,es, flonds, ew~ns e

- ~elsratc protecaon of Omld

aoca supporting vital sedu

icdi, water, and energy sup~

- Em~roe~neatal co~alderatio

turn~ of economic bad de, r

• Prevention, simulation an

nuclear acodenu re~mg f

la general or accidental coo

ular; 

• Treatment of naval ba~¢ o

~vate~ter; 

. Defence.relctnd cononamco

sysw, ns. 

(Acti~ 05) 

Ig~odlON 

Ol The po~ible follov~ing top

sated seminars would he /

appropriate NATO bodu~s f

acoording to agreed proced

- Seminar on Romanian.Hu

ences in imp~rnenang the O

al agreement to take plac

1995; 

• Seminar on "the Nauoadi 

Romania ~irhin the prese

regis-w2 geo.stralegic enwr

• International seminar 

Organisnd Come: Ne

lnternaliondi & National 

April 1995; Principal spo

Development & SecunOt Re

. International .~rminar "'F

Society in Post-Totalitaria

Problems o/Democratic C

Forces". MinsL 1995. prin

Belaras. Na&mdi Iraatute o

[,4ct..ay 0;9 

NATOreui~ @' Dec. 94-J~t,1. 9
Text of Title II 

TITLE II--NATO PARTICIPATION ACT 

SEC. 201.--SHORT TITLE. 

This title may be cited as the "NATO Participation 

1994". 

SEC. 202. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS. 

It is the sense of the Congress that-- 

(1) the leaders of the NATO member nations a

commended for reaffirming that NATO membership 

open to Partnership for Peace countries emergin

communist domination and for welcoming eventual expa

NATO 

to include such countries; 

(2) full and active participants in the Partnership f

in a position to further the principles of the North Atlant

and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic are

be invited to become full NATO members in accorda

Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date, if such parti

(A) maintain their progress toward establishing de

institutions, free market economies, civilian control 

armed forces, and the rule of law; and 

149 
(4) in particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Rep

Slovakia have made significant progress toward e

democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian 

their armed forces, and the rule of law since the fa

previous communist govemments. 

SEC. 203. AUTHORITY FOR PROGR

FACILITATE TRANSITION TO NATO MEMBERS

(a) In General.--The President may establish a p

assist the transition to full NATO membership o

Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Part

Peace countries emerging from communist domination 

pursuant to subsection (d). 

(b) Conduct of Program.--The program establis

subsection (a) shall facilitate the transition to fu

membership of the countries described in such sub

supporting and encouraging, inter alia-- 

(1) joint planning, training, and military exer

NATO forces; 

(2) greater interoperability of military equipment, 

systems, and command, control, and communication

and 

(3) conformity of military doctrine. 

(c) Type of Assistance.--In carrying out the 

established under subsection (a), the President may pro
such section (relating to the eligibility of countries 

articles under such section). 

(2) The transfer of nonlethal excess defense articl

section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 

regard to the restriction in subsection (a) of such section 

to the justification of the foreign military financing pro

the fiscal year in which a transfer is authorized). 

(3) Assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the 

Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to international 

education and training). 

(4) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export 

Act (relating to the "Foreign Military Financing Program

(d) Designation of Parlnership for Peace Countries E

From Communist Domination.--The President may d

countries emerging from communism and participatin

Partnership for Peace, especially Poland, Hungary, th

Republic, and Slovakia, to receive assistance under the 

established under subsection (a) if the President determ

reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the H

Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relation

Senate that such countries-- 

(1) are full and active participants in the Partner

Peace; 

(2) have made significant progress toward esta

democratic institutions, a free market economy, civilian 

of their armed forces, and the rule of law; 
terrorism, as determined by the Secretary of State un

60) of the Export Administration Act of 1979. 

(e) Notification.--At least 15 days before desig

country pursuant to subsection (d), the President shal

appropriate congressional committees in accordanc

procedures applicable under section 634A of th

Assistance Act of 1961. 

(f) Determination.--It is hereby determined th

Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia meet 

required in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection 

SEC. 204. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES. 

(a) Arms Export Control Act.--The President is au

exercise the authority of sections 63 and 65 of the Ar

Control Act with respect to any country designated un

203(d) of this title on the same basis authorized with 

NATO countries. 

(b) Other NATO Authorities.--The President should 

any country designated under section 203(d) of th

eligible under sections 2350c and 2350f of title 10, Un

Code. 

(c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress 

interest of maintaining stability and promoting dem

Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 

Pam~ership for Peace country designated under sectio

this title, those countries should be included in all activ

section 2457 of title 10, United States Code, rela
SEC. 205. REPORTING REQUIREMENT. 

The President shall include in the report required by 

514(a) of Public Law 103-236 (22 U.S.C. 1928 n

following: 

(1) A description of all assistance provided un

program established under section 203(a), or otherwise p

by the United States Government to facilitate the transitio

NATO membership of Poland, Hungary, the Czech R

Slovakia, and other Partnership for Peace countries e

from 

communist domination designated pursuant to section 2

(2) A description, on the basis of information receiv

the recipients and from NATO, of all assistance prov

other NATO member nations or NATO itself to facil

transition to full NATO membership of Poland, Hung

Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other Partnership fo

countries emerging from communist domination de

pursuant to section 

203(d). 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and President of the 
Representatives 104th Congress, 1

Session 

"National Security Revitalization Act" 

Mr. SPENCE, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. BRYANT of Tennes

Mr. HAYES (for themselves), 

Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. DORNAN, Mr. SA

Mr. 

TORKILDSEN, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, Mr. LON

Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr.ROYCE, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. HO

HASTERT, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr.FUNDERBUR

CLINGER, Mr. KIM, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. POMB

NUSSLE,Mr. CRANE, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carol

CRAPO, Mr. KOLBE, Mr. HALL of Texas, Mr. PAXO

YOUNG of Florida, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. COBL

EHRLICH, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. STOCKMA

SMITH of Michigan, Mr. BAKER of Califomia" Mr. C

SHAW, Mr. HERGER, Mr. HEINEMAN, Mrs. FOWL

STEARNS, Mr. HUTCHINSON, Mr. HANCOC

ZIMMER, Mr. LINDER, 

Mr. EMERSON, Mr. HOSTETTLER, Mr. JONES, Mr. E

Mr. TIAHRT, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. HOUGHTO

FRELINGHUYSEN, Mr. EWING, Mrs. CUBIN, Mr. HA

of Washington, Mr. WELDON of Florida, Mr. GANS

COBURN, Mr. LARGENT, Mr. WELLER, Mr. LE

Kentucky, Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. BUNNING of Kentuc

FOLEY, Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina, Mr. LIGHTFO

155 
Mr. THORNBERRY, Mr. RIGGS, Mr. GOODLA

CHR/STENSEN, Mr. HILLEARY, Mr. WICKER, M

Mr. COOLEY, Mr. FRISA, Mr. MCINTOSH, Mr. 

New Jersey, Mr. SHADEGG, Mrs. JOHNSON of C

Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. CHRYSLER, Mr. CAN

MCCOLLUM, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. GILLM

BARR, Mr. 

ARMEY, Mr. FORBES, Mr. WALDHOLTZ, Mr. T

DUNN, Mr. MICA, and Mr. MCHUGH) intro

following bill; which was referred as follows: 

Title VI, referred to the Committee on In

Relations 

TEXT: 

* Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represe

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENT

(a) SHORT TITLE.-THIS ACT MAY BE CITED 

"NATIONAL SECURITY REVITALIZATION ACT"

(13) TABLE OF CONTENTS.-THE TABLE OF CO

FOR THIS ACT IS AS 

FOLLOWS: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
TITLE VI-REVITALIZATION AND EXPANSION O

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION 

Sec. 601. Short title. 

Sec. 602. Findings. 

Sec. 603. United States policy. 

Sec. 604. Revisions to program to facilitate transition to 

membership. 

Sec. 605. Annual reporting requirement. 

Sec. 606. Definitions. 

SEC. 102. POLICY. 

The Congress is committed to providing adequate reso

protect the national security of the United States. 

SEC. 103. PURPOSES. 

The purposes of this Act are- 

(6) to reemphasize the commitment of the United 

a strong and viable North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

°.o°.° 

TITLE Ill-REVITALIZATION 

SECURITY COMMISSION 

OF NAT
SEC° 303. DUTIES. 

(a) COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW.-THE COM

SHALL CONDUCT A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 

LONG-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS 

UNITED STATES. THE REVIEW SHALL INCLU

FOLLOWING: 

..oooo 

(10) AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS 

UNITED STATES OF EXPANDING THE MEMBER

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATI

SEC. 304. REPORTS. 

(a) FINAL REPORT.-THE COMMISSION SHALL 

TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE DESI

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES A REPORT 

ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFE

IN SECTION 303 NOT LATER THAN JANUARY 

THE REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED IN UNCL

AND CLASSIFIED VERSIONS. 

(B) INTERIM REPORT.-THE COMMISSION 

SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE DES

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AN INTERIM 

DESCRIBING THE COMMISSION'S PROGR

FULFILLING ITS DUTIES UNDER SECTION 

INTERIM REPORT SHALL INCLUDE ANY PREL

RECOMMENDATIONS THE COMMISSION MA

REACHED AND SHALL BE SUBMITTED NOT 

THAN OCTOBER 1, 1995. 
This title may be cited as the "NATO Revitaliza

Expansion Act of 1995". 

SEC. 602. FINDINGS. 

The Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) Since 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Org

(NATO) has helped to guarantee the security, freed

prosperity of the United States and its partners in the a

(2) NATO has expanded its membership on three 

occasions since its founding in 1949. 

(3) The steadfast and sustained commitment of the 

countries of NATO to mutual defense against the 

communist domination played a significant role in pre

the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the demise of th

Union. 

(4) In the place of that threat, new security th

emerging to the shared interests of the member cou

NATO. 

(5) Although these new threats are more geographi

functionally diverse and less predictable, they still impe

interests of the United States and its NATO allies. 

(6) Westem interests must be protected on a co

basis without an undue burden falling upon the United 

(7) NATO is the only multilateral organization 

capable of conducting effective military operations t

Western interests. 

(8) The valuable experience gained from ongoing 

cooperation within NATO was critical to the success 

military operations in the 1991 liberation of Kuwait. 

(9) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for d

of issues of concern to its member states and for the 

resolution of disputes. 
states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Ukra

expressed interest in NATO membership. 

(12) In recognition of this interest, the Partnership 

proposal offers limited military cooperation to many 

countries not currently members of NATO, but fails t

benchmarks or guidelines for eventual NATO membe

(13) In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Rep

Slovakia have made significant progress toward estab

democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian 

their armed forces, police, and intelligence services, a

of law since the fall of their previous Communist gov

SEC. 603. UNITED STATES POLICY. 

It should be the policy of the United States- 

(l) to continue the Nation's commitment to 

leadership role in NATO; 

(2) to join with the Nation's NATO allies to re

role of the alliance in the post-Cold War world, t

account- 

(A) the fundamentally changed security envir

Central and Eastern Europe; 

(B) the need to assure all counla'ies of the 

nature of the alliance and the desire of its member

cooperatively with all former adversaries; 

(C) the emerging security threats posed 

proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological w

mass destruction and the means to deliver them; 

(D) the continuing challenges to the intere

NATO member countries posed by unstable and und

regimes 

harboring hostile intentions; and 

(E) the dependence of the global economy o
(4) that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 

should be in a position to further the principles of th

Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of t

Atlantic area not later than January 10, 1999 (5 years 

date of the establishment of the Partnership for Peace)

accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty, should be i

become full NATO members not later than that date, 

these countries- 

(A) meet appropriate standards, including- 

(i) shared values and interests; 

(ii) democratic governments; 

(iii) free market economies; 

(iv) civilian control of the military, of the po

of intelligence services; 

(v) adherence to the values, principles, and 

commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of th

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 

(vi) commitment to further the principles o

and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 

(vii) commitment to accept the obligations, 

responsibilities, and costs of NATO membership; and 

(viii) commitment to implement infra

development activities that will facilitate participatio

support for NATO military activities; and 

(B) remain committed to protecting the rights o

citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of their 

neighbors; 

(5) that the United States, other NATO member nat

NATO itself should furnish appropriate assistance to fac

transition of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 

to full NATO membership not later than January 10, 1

(6) that other European countries emerging from co
SEC. 604. REVISIONS TO PROGRAM TO FAC

TRANSITION TO NATO 

MEMBERSHIP. 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.-SUBSECT

OF SECTION 203 OF THE NATO PARTICIPATION 

1994 (TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 103 447; 22 U.S

NOTE) IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: 

"(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.-THE PRE

SHALL ESTABLISH A PROGRAM TO ASSIST 

TRANSITION TO FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP OF P

HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND SLOVA

ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY EMERGIN

COMMUNIST DOMINATION THAT IS DESIGNA

THE PRESIDENT UNDER SUBSECTION (D)(2).". 

03) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.- 

(1) DESIGNATED COUNTRIES.-SUBSECTION 

SUCH SECTION IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOL

"(D) DESIGNATION OF ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.

"(1) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.-THE FOL

COUNTRIES ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED FOR PU

OF THIS TITLE: POLAND, HUNGARY, THE 

REPUBLIC, AND SLOVAKIA. 

"(2) AUTHORITY FOR PRESIDENT TO DES

OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EMERGING 

COMMUNIST DOMINATION.-TI-IE PRESIDEN

DESIGNATE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EM

FROM COMMUNIST DOMINATION (AS DEFI

SECTION 206) TO RECEIVE ASSISTANCE UND

PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBSECTION 

PRESIDENT MAY MAKE SUCH A DESIGNATION 

CASE OF ANY SUCH COUNTRY ONLY IF THE PRE
"(II) DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS; 

"(III) FREE MARKET ECONOMIES; 

"(IV) CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MIL

OF THE POLICE, AND OF INTELLIGENCE SERVI

"(V) ADHERENCE TO THE V

PRINCIPLES, AND POLITICAL COMMIT

EMBODIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF TH

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERAT

EUROPE; AND 

"(VI) COMMITMENT TO FURTHE

PRINCIPLES OF NATO AND TO CONTRIBUTE 

SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA; 

"(VII) COMMITMENT TO ACCEP

OBLIGATIONS, 

RESPONSIBILITIES, AND COSTS OF NATO MEMB

AND 

"(VIII) COMMITMENT TO IMPL

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIE

WILL FACILITATE PARTICIPATION IN AND S

FOR NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES; AND 

"(B) IS LIKELY, WITHIN FIVE YEARS O

DETERMINATION, TO BE IN A POSITION TO FU

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC T

AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY 

NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.". 

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.- 

(A) SUBSECTIONS (B) AND (C) OF SUCH S

ARE AMENDED BY STRIKING "COUNTRIES DES

IN SUCH SUBSECTION" AND INSERTING "COU

DESIGNATED UNDER SUBSECTION (D)". 

(B) SUBSECTION (E) OF SUCH SECT

AMENDED- 
203(D)(2)". 

(C) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE.- 

(1) ECONOMIC SUPPORT ASSISTANCE.-SUB

(C) OF SECTION 203 OF SUCH ACT IS AMENDE

(A) BY REDESIGNATING PARAGRAPHS 

(4) AS PARAGRAPHS (4) AND (5), RESPECTIVEL

(a) BY INSERTING AFTER PARAGRAPH 

FOLLOWING NEW 

PARAGRAPH (3): 

"(3) ASSISTANCE UNDER CHAPTER 4 OF PA

THE FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 (RELATING T

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND).". 

(2) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE.- 

(A) IN GENERAL-SUBSECTION (F) O

SECTION IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS

"(F) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE.-IN CARRYING 

PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER SUBSECTION 

PRESIDENT MAY, IN ADDITION TO THE SE

ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED TO BE PROVIDED 

SUBSECTION (C), PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO CO

DESIGNATED UNDER SUBSECTION (D) FROM 

APPROPRIATED UNDER THE 'NONPROLIFERAT

DISARMAMENT FUND' ACCOUNT.". 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.-THE AMENDMEN

BY SUBPARAGRAPH (A) DOES NOT APPL

RESPECT TO FUNDS APPROPRIATED BEFORE T

OF THE ENACTMENT OF THIS ACT. 

(D) DISQUALIFICATION FROM ASSISTAN

SUPPORT OF TERRORISM.-SECTION 203 OF SUC

FURTHER AMENDED BY ADDING AT THE E

FOLLOWING NEW SUBSECTION: 
AND CONDITIONS THAT APPLY UNDER SECTION 

THE FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCIN

RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS AC

(PUBLIC LAW 103-306), WITH RESPECT TO THE M

AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OF 

APPROPRIATED OR OTHERWISE MADE AVA

UNDER THAT ACT.". 

(E) ANNUAL REPORT.-SECTION 205 OF THE 

PARTICIPATION ACT OF 1994 (TITLE II OF PUBL

103-447; 22 U.S.C. 1928 NOTE) IS AMENDED- 

(l) BY INSERTING "ANNUAL" IN THE S

HEADING BEFORE THE FIRST WORD; 

(2) by inserting "annual" after "include in the" in t

preceding paragraph (1); 

(3) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as parag

and (3), respectively; 

(4) by inserting before paragraph (2), as so redesig

following new paragraph (1): 

"(1) An assessment of the progress made by 

Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia and by an

designated by the President under section 203(d)(2

meeting the standards for NATO membership set forth 

10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, including- 

"(A) an assessment of the progress of each suc

toward establishing- 

"(i) shared values and interests; 

"(ii) democratic govemments; 

"(iii) free market economies; 

"(iv) civilian control of the military, of the p

of intelligence services; 

"(v) adherence to the values, principles, and 

commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act of th
support for NATO military activities; and 

"(B) the commitment of each such country to 

the rights of all its citizens and respecting the territor

integrity of its neighbors."; and 

(5) in paragraphs (2) and (3), as so redesignated, 

"and other" and all that follows through the period at t

inserting "and any country designated by the Presiden

to section 203(d)(2).". 

(f) DEFINITIONS.-THE NATO PARTICIPATION 

1994 (TITLE II OF PUBLIC LAW 103-447; 22 U

NOTE) IS AMENDED BY ADDING AT THE E

FOLLOWING NEW SECTION: 

"SEC. 206. DEFINITIONS. 

"For purposes of this title: 

"(1) NATO.-THE TERM 'NATO' MEANS THE 

ATLANTIC TREATY 

ORGANIZATION. 

"(2) OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EM

FROM COMMUNIST 

DOMINATION.-THE TERM 'OTHER EU

COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM 

COMMUNIST DOMINATION' MEANS- 

"(A) ANY MEMBER OF THE PARTNERS

PEACE THAT IS LOCATED- 

"(I) IN THE TERRITORY OF THE 

UNION OF SOVIET 

SOCIALIST REPUBLICS; OR 

"(II) IN THE TERRITORY OF THE 

SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAV

"(B) ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, R

BULGARIA, OR ALBANIA. 

"(3) DESIGNATED CONGRESSI
(B) THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELA

THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AN

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS OF THE SEN
Russia," Moscow News, No. 2, 13-14 Jan 95. 

Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen L

"Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs, Sep-O

28-40. 

Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO----Expand or Die?," The N

Times, 28 Dec 94, 15. 

Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," 

Affairs, Mar-Apr 94, 67-82. 

Michael E. Brown, "NATO Expansion: Wait and S

Washington Post, 26 Dec 94, A29. 

Willy Claes, "NATO and the evolving Europe-Atlantic 

architecture," NATO Review 6, Dec 94/no. 1 Jan 9

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-195

York: Doubleday & Co., 1963). 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Repo

respectively, Central Eurasia, East Europe, and Wes

Washington, DC. 

John Fry, The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Secu

Cooperation in Europe (Washington: National 

University Press, 1993). 

Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, editors, Spain

Into NATO: Conflicting Political and Strategic Per

(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1

Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt G

Rep. Dick Armey, and the House Republicans to Ch

Nation, edited by Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellha

York: Times Books: Random House, 1994). 

NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Int

of Europe, edited by Francis H. Heller and 

Gillingham, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992. 

169 
University Press, Jan 95). 

Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," The Washin

19 Dec 94, A 27. 

Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO---And Split Eur

New York Times, 27 Nov 94, E11. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Fig

Ed. (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989). 

NATO Review, bimonthly, NATO Information Service

The New Columbia Encyclopedia, (New York and 

Columbia University Press, 1975). 

The New York Times, daily, New York. 

Open Media Research Institute, OMRI Daily Repo

Prague. 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute

Daily Report, daily, Washington, D.C. 

Peter W. Rodman, "4 More for NATO," The Washin

13 Dec 94, A27. 

William Satire, "Strategic Dilemma," The New York 

Dec 94, 32. The same article was also carried 

title "The Bear Will Rise Again, So Build the Allia

in The International Herald Tribune, 2 Dec 94. 

William Satire, "Baltics Belong in a Big NATO," The 

Times, 16 Jan 95, 17. 

Daniel Tarschys (Secretary General of the Council o

"The Council of Europe: towards a vast area of d

security," NATO Review 6 Dec 94/no. 1, Jan 95, 

U.S. Congress, Public Law 103-477, Title II, NATO Pa

Act of 1994, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 19

U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, H.R. 7

Security Revitalization Act. 104th Congress, 1s

introduced 4 January 1994. 

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 


Mr. Morrison retired from federal service in early 

1995 after having served in the DeparUnent of Defense fo

30 years, most of the time in the Office of the Secr

Defense. In 1983, he became a career member of the 

Executive Service. Before coming to the Institute in 

1993, Mr. Morrison was Principal Director for Russia, U

and Eurasia in the Office of the Under Secretary of Def

Policy. 

Mr. Morrison is the author of Vladimir Zhirinovs

Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist (McNair Paper 

NDU) and the primary author of the Europe chapter in S

Assessment 1995 (NDU Press). He has edited the procee

an NDU co-sponsored symposium on ethnic conflict, soo

published by NDU Press, and prepared summaries 

roundtables at NDU, both published as NDU Strategic F

173 
Normandy, 25 July 1944. 

The Jbllowing is a complete listing of published McNair 

For information on availability of specific titles, contact the Cir

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort Le

McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000 (telephone: commercial 2

1913; DSN 335-1913). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz. Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, Februar

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Regio

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Const#

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 19

5. Martin C. Libicki, WhatMakes Industries Strategic, Novemb

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in th

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplom

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic V

lnsurgencies: insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industr

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Natio

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealan

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn Ill, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and B

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land W

March 1992 
Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions ,and Carl R. Jones, Interoperability

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the Unit

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young: Jeff

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technolo

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," 

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines. October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, Novembe

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, an

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Fail

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold W

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and C

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Asses

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, November 1

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm a

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Ce

Impossible Dream, Janu,'u'y 1995. 
Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, Marc

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dyna

Continuity and Change, March 1995. 

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relatio

NATO Expansion, April 1995. 

40. James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative 

Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 
JR) 

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