J-S05009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEFFERY JOSEPH ANDERSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 897 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 19, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-25-CR-0000593-2020, 

CP-25-CR-0003063-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: April 20, 2023

Appellant, Jeffery Joseph Anderson, appeals nunc pro tunc from the 

aggregate judgment of sentence of 27 to 60 months’ incarceration, imposed 

after he pled guilty, in two separate cases, to burglary and receiving stolen 

property. On appeal, Appellant maintains that his plea was involuntary. After 

careful review, we affirm.

The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions are not relevant to our 

disposition of his instant appeal. The procedural history of his case can be 

summarized as follows. On February 8, 2021, Appellant entered guilty pleas,

in two separate cases, to the above-stated offenses. On April 19, 2021, 

Appellant was sentenced to the aggregate term set forth above. He did not 

file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal. 
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On April 7, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se petition under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. On April 20, 2022, 

the PCRA court entered an order reinstating Appellant’s post-sentence motion 

and appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The order also stated that Tina Fryling, Esq.,

was appointed to represent Appellant, and that “[c]ounsel shall file a postsentence motion within 30 days.” Order, 4/20/22, at 1 (single page).

On May 23, 2022, Attorney Fryling filed a motion for an extension of 

time to file a post-sentence motion. Although that motion was facially 

untimely, as the prior order directed counsel to file a post-sentence motion 

within 30 days from April 20, 2022 (which would have been Friday, May 20, 

2022), the trial court nevertheless granted the motion on May 23, 2022. The 

court gave Attorney Fryling 14 days from “the date the transcripts are filed 

with the Clerk of Courts and [Appellant’s] counsel is notified in writing of the 

filing....” Order, 5/23/22, at 1 (single page; unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). The trial court’s docket shows that transcripts were filed on July 6 

and July 7, 2022. Attorney Fryling filed a post-sentence motion on July 8, 

2022, and the trial court denied that motion on July 12, 2022. 

Attorney Fryling filed a notice of appeal on August 10, 2022. The notice 

of appeal lists both trial court docket numbers, implicating Commonwealth 

v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018) (holding that an appellant is required to 

file separate notices of appeal when a single order resolves issues arising on 

more than one trial court docket). Accordingly, on October 12, 2022, this 

Court issued an order directing Attorney Fryling to show cause why the appeal 
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should not be quashed as untimely, as a facially untimely post-sentence 

motion does not toll the 30-day appeal period. See Commonwealth v. 

Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1125-29 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc). Counsel filed 

a timely response on October 18, 2022, wherein she simply stated, “I do not 

have any further information to add to the Court’s information regarding the 

filing of the Motion for Extension in this case.” Response, 10/18/22, at 1

(single page). Nevertheless, we discharged the show-cause order and 

deferred the matter to this panel. Thus, before addressing the issue Appellant 

raises herein, we must examine the timeliness of the present appeal, as well 

as whether quashal is appropriate under Walker. 

First, we conclude that Appellant’s appeal is timely, as a breakdown in 

the operations of the court occurred in this case. Specifically, Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 114(C)(2)(c) states that trial court docket entries 

“shall contain ... the date of service of the order or court notice.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

114(C)(2)(c). Further, “in computing any period of time under these rules 

involving the date of entry of an order by a court..., the day of entry shall be 

the day the clerk of the court ... mails or delivers copies of the order to the 

parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1). See also Commonwealth v. Carter, 122 

A.3d 388, 390-92 (Pa. Super. 2015) (directing that the appeal period does not 

run until the clerk of court mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties 

as shown on the docket). Here, the trial court’s docket entry for the April 20, 

2022 order does not list service on Attorney Fryling, who was appointed to 

represent Appellant in that same order. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1) (“A copy 
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of any order or court notice promptly shall be served on each party’s 

attorney....”). Because the trial court entry does not appropriately list service

on counsel for Appellant, we conclude that the appeal period did not begin to 

run on April 20, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 

(Pa. Super. 2000) (finding that because there was no indication on the trial 

court’s docket that the clerk furnished a copy of the final order to the 

appellant, we would “assume the period for taking an appeal was never 

triggered,” and consider the appeal as being timely).

Further, the April 20, 2022 order only stated that Attorney Fryling shall 

file a post-sentence motion within 30 days; it did not advise Appellant that an 

appeal must be filed within 30 days if no post-sentence motion was filed. See 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(concluding that a breakdown in the operations of the court occurs in instances 

where the court misadvises or fails to advise appellants of their appeal rights). 

A breakdown may excuse the untimely filing of a notice of appeal. Id. at 499. 

Instantly, because the order reinstating Appellant’s appeal rights did not 

advise him of the time limit within which to file a notice of appeal in the 

absence of a post-sentence motion, there was a breakdown in the operations

of the court that excuses the untimeliness of Appellant’s notice of appeal.

Second, we address Attorney Fryling’s decision to file a single notice of 

appeal from orders entered at two trial court docket numbers. While a Walker

violation may result in the quashal of an appeal, there are exceptions to the 

rule. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 160 (Pa. 
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Super. 2019), this Court concluded that a breakdown in the operations of the

court occurs when a court misadvises an appellant that they can pursue

appellate review by filing a single notice of appeal, even though the court is

addressing cases at multiple docket numbers. See also Commonwealth v.

Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (reaffirming

Stansbury); and see Patterson, 940 A.2d at 498 (“The courts of this 

Commonwealth have held that a court breakdown occurred in instances where 

the trial court, at the time of sentencing, either failed to advise [appellants] 

of [their] post-sentence and appellate rights or misadvised [them]”). Here, 

the order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion listed two trial court 

docket numbers and did not advise Appellant of his appeal rights. We find 

that this constituted a breakdown pursuant to Stansbury, Larkin, and 

Patterson. Thus, we do not quash Appellant’s appeal, despite his Walker 

violation. 

We now move on to addressing the following, single claim that Appellant 

raises for our review: “[Appellant’s] plea was unknowingly and involuntarily 

entered when [Appellant’s] counsel indicated they were not prepared for trial.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

Appellant “argues that he did not enter his plea knowingly and 

involuntarily” because, while “he had informed his trial counsel that he wished 

to take his case to trial, ... his attorney stated to him at the time of his plea 

that [counsel was] unprepared to go to trial and that [Appellant] should enter 

a plea.” Id. at 3. As evidence of counsel’s lack of preparedness, Appellant 
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contends that his counsel “did not file some of the necessary motions that 

would have assisted with evidentiary issues that were present in his case.” 

Id. 

Additionally, as proof that he only pled guilty after “being pressured ... 

by his attorney,” Appellant stresses that “[o]n December 15, 2020, prior to 

entering his plea, [he] filed a letter with the Erie County Clerk of Courts Office, 

in which he expressed his desire to take his case to trial.” Id. Specifically, in 

the letter (which Appellant attached to his petition), he 

sets forth [his] concern over his attorney’s lack of correspondence 

with him and his request that his case move towards trial, rather 

than being continued. He also states that he had given his 

attorney names of witnesses and other information for trial, and 

he analyzes his case in general and states that he is confident that 

he will prevail at trial. He specifically writes regarding a specific 

witness[,] “[S]ince the prosecutions [sic] entire case relies on her 

credibility, then I am confident of our chances. So, any further 

continuances are a waste of time. If the [Assistant District 

Attorney] doesn’t wish to resolve things prior, then lets [sic] do 

trial[.”] He also requests that a bench trial be requested if it will 

help with the delay. In that letter, [Appellant] also requests that 

trial counsel pursue some pre-trial evidentiary issues, which he 

believed would have assisted his victory at trial. These issues 

include the illegal search of his phone and residence, counsel’s 

failure to provide electronic discovery to him, and issues regarding 

the values of stolen items. There is no evidence in the record that 

those motions were ever filed or pursued by counsel, and 

[Appellant] specifically maintains that those avenues were never 

pursued by counsel.

Id. at 4-5. 

According to Appellant, this letter demonstrates that he “clearly wished 

to go to trial as of December” of 2020. Id. at 5. Furthermore, “[h]e maintains 

that he did not change his intention regarding not entering a plea, and there 
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is no written evidence submitted after his original letter that would 

demonstrate any change of his intention in this regard.” Id. at 4. Therefore, 

Appellant avers that the record proves his plea was involuntarily and 

unknowingly entered, and the court erred by not permitting him to withdraw 

it. 

Initially, we note that,

[i]n Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.3d 124 (Pa. Super. 

2009), we summarized the principles governing post-sentence

motions to withdraw pleas:

[P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to

higher scrutiny since courts strive to discourage entry of

guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices. A defendant must

demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court

were to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty

plea. Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was

not tendered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In

determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine

the totality of circumstances surrounding the plea. A

deficient plea does not per se establish prejudice on the

order of manifest injustice.

Id. at 129 (citations omitted). “It is well-settled that the decision

whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within

the sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Hart,

174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. 2017) (applying abuse of discretion

in post-sentencing context). The term discretion

imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to

reach a dispassionate conclusion, and discretionary power

can only exist within the framework of the law, and is not

exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the

judges. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of

reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations,

caprice or arbitrary action. Discretion is abused when the

course pursued represents not merely an error of judgment,

but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or

where the law is not applied or where the record shows that

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
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Commonwealth v. Shaffer, ... 712 A.2d 749, 751 ([Pa.] 1998)

(citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 756–57 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Here, the trial court concluded that “Appellant’s claim that his pleas were

entered involuntarily is belied by the record.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO),

9/6/22, at 1. It explained:

Appellant was represented by counsel and was informed of his

rights prior to entering a guilty plea:

[The Commonwealth]: Good afternoon, Your honor. We are

here — obviously, we were scheduled for a plea [for

Appellant] at Dockets 3063 of [20]19 and 593 of 2020. It

was scheduled for trial today, but I believe a plea agreement

has been reached or a plea has been reached. First and

foremost, [Appellant], were you in the [c]ourtroom a

moment ago when I went over the rights that you have prior

to entering a guilty plea?

[Appellant]: Yes.

[The Commonwealth]: Do you have any questions about

those rights?

[Appellant]: No.

[N.T. Plea, 2/8/21, at] 5-6. The Commonwealth informed

Appellant that in exchange for pleading guilty at the two counts,

the remaining counts would be nolle prossed. [Id. at 6.] The

Commonwealth also explained the maximum possible sentences

Appellant could face. [Id. at 7.] In response, Appellant indicated

he understood the plea agreement and signed his Statement of

Understanding of Rights. [Id. at] 6-9.

The Court: Sir, do you understand your rights?

[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Do you understand the plea agreement?

[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Do you understand the elements of crimes to

which you’re pleading guilty?
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[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Are you guilty of those crimes?

[Appellant]: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: [Is a]nyone forcing you to do this or

threaten[ing] you or promis[ing] you anything to take this

plea?

[Appellant]: No, Your Honor.

[Id. at] 9-10. Thus, the record demonstrates that Appellant

entered his pleas knowingly and voluntarily. As to Appellant’s

claim that he filed a letter indicating his desire to go to trial, that

letter was filed December 15, 2020, almost two months prior to

entering the guilty plea. No such request was docketed after the

plea. Moreover, at his April 19, 2021[] sentencing, Appellant did

not indicate a desire to withdraw his plea.

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s appeal is meritless and

should be dismissed.

TCO at 1-2. 

We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision. Although

Appellant wrote a letter in December of 2020 expressing his desire to proceed

to trial, at the guilty plea hearing two months later, he did not reiterate that

wish. Instead, he confirmed that he understood the terms of the plea, the

maximum sentences he faced, the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty,

and that he was making the decision of his own free will. At no point did

Appellant indicate that his attorney was pressuring him to plead guilty, or that 

he was unhappy with his counsel’s failure to file pretrial motions.1 Accordingly, 

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1 To the extent Appellant suggests his counsel acted ineffectively in these 

regards, the circumstances permitting us to review such claims on direct 

appeal are not present in this case. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s plea 

was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that no manifest injustice would 

result by denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2023

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A.3d 562, 577-78 (Pa. 2013) (reaffirming that, absent certain circumstances, 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be deferred until collateral 

review under the PCRA, unless the trial court addressed the claim(s) of 

ineffectiveness because they are “both meritorious and apparent from the 

record so that immediate consideration and relief is warranted,” or the 

appellant’s request for review of “prolix” ineffectiveness claims is 

“accompanied by a knowing, voluntary, and express waiver of PCRA review”).