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America’s First Air Battles Purdham

Lessons Learned or 

Lessons Lost?
COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

America’s First Air Battles

Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost?

ALDON E. PURDHAM JR.

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 16

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

October 2003
ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Purdham, Aldon E., Jr. 1965–

America’s first air battles : lessons learned or lessons lost? / Aldon E. Purdham Jr.

—p. ; cm. – (CADRE paper, ISSN 1537-3371)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-123-6

1. United States. Air Force—History. 2. Airpower—United States. 3. Military doctrine—United States. 4. Korean War, 1950–1953—Aerial operations, American. 5.

Vietnamese Conflict, 1961–1975—Aerial operations, American. 6. Persian Gulf War,

1991—Aerial operations, American. I. Title. II. Series. III. Air University (US). College of

Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.

358.4/009/73—dc21

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iii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE

KOREAN WAR, 25 JUNE–25 JULY 1950 . . . . . . 5

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE

VIETNAM WAR, 2 MARCH–1 APRIL 1965 . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

4 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN DESERT

STORM, 17 JANUARY–15 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . 45

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

5 ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

v
Foreword

America’s First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons

Lost? provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard’s

construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what

matters is the capability of the military to get it right when

a particular conflict begins. In the course of this evaluation,

Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr. examines several important

airpower factors to include familiarity with the nature and

geography of the conflict; parity with the adversary, especially in terms of air superiority; command and control of air

assets, especially in interdiction and close air support missions; and the confluence of airpower weapons with doctrine

and training.

Colonel Purdham filters these airpower factors through

three conflicts of the last half-century—Korean War, Vietnam

War, and Operation Desert Storm—looking as much as possible at the early air operational stages of the conflict. He

concludes that Professor Howard’s construct has some

validity, but the real world offers alternative conclusions.

The reasons the military doctrine seems out of alignment in

the early stages of conflict is not because of poorly developed doctrine, but rather quick changes made in national

strategy that cannot be perfectly anticipated in doctrinal

writing and conferred in training regimes. Ultimately, the

greatest lesson seems to be that airpower leadership and

doctrinal focus need to have the flexibility to adapt to

changing national direction. It helps immensely that our air

forces go to war well trained in the way they will fight. The

effectiveness of Desert Storm validates this concept.

Perhaps the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom provide

even greater proof. 

Originally written as a master’s thesis for Air University’s

School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS),

America’s First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost?

was selected by the Air Force Armament Museum

Foundation as the best SAASS thesis for academic year

2001–2002. The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research

vii
and Education (CADRE) is pleased to publish this excellent

study as a CADRE Paper and thereby make it available to a

wider audience within the US Air Force and beyond.

DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

Chief of Research

Airpower Research Institute, CADRE

viii
About the Author

Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr., is chief, Future Plans Branch,

Headquarters US Central Command, Directorate of Intelligence,

Plans Division, MacDill AFB, Florida. He is a career intelligence

officer who has served as a Soviet strategic threat analyst and

command briefer at the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing and

Headquarters Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB, Nebraska;

as a member of the National Intelligence Community’s Targeting

Team at the Pentagon in support of Operation Desert Storm;

as chief, Operational Intelligence for the 8th Fighter Wing at

Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea; as a North Korean politicalmilitary intelligence analyst and briefer for the assistant chief

of staff, Intelligence, in the Pentagon; as a program element

monitor on the Air Staff; and as a human intelligence operations

officer, command briefer/speechwriter, and congressional liaison

at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Colonel Purdham is a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training

Corps at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, and

Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned a

Bachelor of Arts degree in Foreign Affairs from the University

of Virginia and a Master of Science degree in Education from

Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, and a graduate of the School of Advanced

Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He and his

wife, Lauralyn, have four children—Jordan, Delaney, Lindsey,

and Sydney.

ix
Acknowledgments

I am indebted to several people for assisting me with this

study. I thank Brig Gen William Stofft and Lt Col Charles

Heller whose book, America’s First Battles: 1776–1965, was

the inspiration for this study. While reading their book as a

student at the US Army Command and General Staff College,

I was intrigued by its insights on the US Army’s ability to prepare for and adjust to battle. I thought that such analysis

would be equally beneficial for the USAF if conducted from an

air perspective. I also greatly appreciate the assistance,

encouragement, and enthusiasm of my advisor and reader, Dr.

Harold R. Winton and Dr. James Corum. Finally, I owe my

family the greatest thanks. Words cannot express my gratitude

to my wife, Lauralyn, whose cheerfulness never wavered

despite the additional family demands placed on her because

of my long hours in the library. As for our children, Jordan,

Delaney, Lindsey, and Sydney, I can only hope that my time

away from them this year and during my Air Force career will

have contributed to keeping them safe. I can think of no better

return for my time away from them.

xi
Chapter 1

Introduction

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of

preserving peace.

—George Washington

In his 1973 Chesney Memorial Gold Medal acceptance lecture, Prof. Michael Howard made the following statement

about military doctrine: “I am tempted indeed to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working

on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare

that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does

matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment arrives.”1 There are two key assertions in Howard’s observation. First, in times of peace, armed forces imperfectly

prepare for their next conflict. Second, their ability to make

adjustments to overcome this shortcoming is critical to their

combat success.

In America’s First Battles: 1776–1965, edited by Charles

Heller and William Stofft, a number of distinguished historians

determined that Howard’s two propositions hold true for nearly

two centuries of US Army history. The intent of this study is

to conduct a similar analysis of the experiences of the United

States Air Force in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Desert Storm. An analysis of the effectiveness with

which the Air Force prepared for and adjusted to these conflicts’ initial periods of operations should provide Air Force

personnel with invaluable insight in developing and implementing doctrine for future conflicts.

Such doctrine will have a significant influence on the Air

Force’s success in those conflicts. A former chief of staff of the

Air Force, Gen Curtis E. LeMay, was aware of this influence

when he remarked, “At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It

prepares the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve

victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge

reinforced by experience that lays the pattern for the utilization

1
of men, equipment, and tactics. It is fundamental to sound

judgment.”2 Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-1, Basic Aerospace

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, reiterated LeMay’s belief

by proclaiming, “Doctrine is a guide for the exercise of professional judgment.”3 Consequently, since the Air Force expects

its airmen to derive sound judgment from its doctrine, the applicability of that doctrine to a given conflict is critical.

Thus, an analysis of the Air Force’s ability to prepare for and

adjust to initial periods of operations in past conflicts will assist

today’s airmen in developing doctrine for tomorrow’s conflicts.

While many studies have analyzed the USAF’s performance

over the entire duration of these conflicts, few have emphasized the Air Force’s war preparation during the years leading

up to them. George Santayana, the noted Spanish-American

philosopher, warned of ignoring lessons from the past when he

stated, “Those who can not remember the past are condemned

to repeat it.”4 In an effort to avoid such a fate, this study seeks

to answer the following question: What do the initial periods of

operations in the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Operation

Desert Storm reveal about the effectiveness with which the Air

Force prepares for and adjusts to the onset of combat?

One of the greatest difficulties in answering this question is

determining the length of combat that represents the initial

period of operations. The historians who wrote America’s First

Battles: 1776–1965 focused on land battles that were identified by specific dates. It is far more difficult to identify air battles in this manner because air operations normally consist of

multiple missions that are conducted against different targets,

over different areas, and for different durations. For this reason,

even when air superiority, close air support (CAS), and interdiction occur simultaneously, they may not be associated with

the same battle. Instead, they are intended to have a synergistic effect on the overall conflict. Consequently, identifying a

specific period of air operations at the beginning of each of the

aforementioned wars is not as simple as determining the first

ground battles of those wars.

To overcome this dilemma, this study classifies the first 30

days of the Korean War and Desert Storm as the initial periods

of operation. It was during these dates that the Air Force devised,

2

CADRE PAPER
executed, and modified a considerable breadth of air operations.

For this reason, the time frame serves as an effective duration

from which to analyze how well the Air Force prepared for and

adapted to the nature of these conflicts. However, determining

the initial period of operations for Vietnam is more problematic

because the United States incrementally increased its involvement and operations in Vietnam from an advisory role in the

late 1950s to direct combat in the early 1960s.

Given that, this study views 2 March–1 April 1965 as the

initial period of operations for the Vietnam War. This determination was based on three primary considerations: first, on 2

March the USAF began its interdiction campaign, known as

Rolling Thunder, against North Vietnam; second, during the

first week of March, the USAF lifted restrictions on the employment of jet aircraft; and third, also during this time, the

USAF allowed pilots to fly fighter missions without a Vietnamese copilot for the first time. Thus, the author concluded that

2 March–1 April 1965 marked the first 30 days during which

the USAF was engaged in full-scale air operations in Vietnam.

The analysis of the USAF’s preparation for and adjustment

to each of these conflicts’ initial period of operations consists

of a four-step process. In the first step, this study assesses the

overall readiness of the USAF to engage in combat operations

both in general and in the specific theater on the eve of war.

This includes an assessment of the USAF’s prewar strategy,

doctrine, command and control (C2), aircrew training, and

equipment. Additionally, this study examines the influence of

the previous conflict in determining and shaping these five factors. It also addresses the degree to which these five factors—

and the previous war’s influence on them—resulted in success

during the initial period of operations.

The second step is an analysis of the effectiveness with which

the USAF performed its primary missions of air superiority,

CAS, and interdiction. Because historical reporting lacks the

fidelity to determine first-order effects definitively, this study

assesses the effectiveness of these missions primarily on the

basis of second-order effects. In the case of air superiority, the

key second-order effect was the extent to which friendly forces

were able to operate without prohibitive interference by the

3

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opposing air force. The key second-order effect for CAS was

the extent to which friendly ground forces were able to gain

ground against the adversary. In regard to interdiction, the

key second-order effect was the extent to which enemy ground

forces were able to launch offensives or their ability to defend

against offensives by friendly forces.

In the third step, this study examines the USAF adjustments to its prewar strategy, doctrine, C2 system, crew training, and equipment during the initial period of operations of

each conflict. This part of the study analyzes the degree to

which USAF leaders recognized the need for adjustments, decided what those adjustments should be, and implemented

them. Ultimately, this step illustrates the ingenuity and flexibility that is required for combat success.

The fourth step is an assessment of the degree to which

these adjustments enhanced the USAF’s air superiority, CAS,

and interdiction missions. This analysis provides the analytical

heart of this study by revealing both negative and positive aspects of the USAF’s adaptability. Of even greater significance,

this step examines the tremendous influence that these successes and failures had on the USAF’s performance of its primary missions.

Notes

1. Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Royal United

Services Institute Journal, March 1974, 7.

2. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United

States Air Force, 1984, ii.

3. AFMAN 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,

vol. 2, 1992, vii.

4. On-line, Internet, 22 May 2002, available from www.quoteland.com/

author.asp?AUTHOR_ID=124.

4

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Chapter 2

Initial Period of Operations in the Korean

War, 25 June–24 July 1950

People back home in the Pentagon will draw conclusions

from this war which will not be true.

—Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer

—Commander, Far East Air Forces

—Personal Diary Entries, 2 October 1950

After withdrawing American troops from Korea in 1949, the

administration of President Harry S. Truman did not imagine

that just a year later it would have to deploy US forces back to

South Korea to repel a North Korean invasion. US national security and military strategy were focused on deterrence of a

Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) nuclear attack.

This emphasis stemmed from the USSR’s initial test of a nuclear

weapon in August 1949, which shattered Americans’ utopian

perspective of US security. As W. Sterling Cole, chairman of

the US Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, stated,

“Prior to that explosion, Americans thought [they] would enjoy

an atomic monopoly for some years, and that there would be

international control of atomic weapons.”1

The following year, President Truman approved National Security Council (NSC) Memorandum 68, which established a

strategy to deter the nuclear threat posed by the Soviets. This

mandate produced an increased focus on a nuclear-capable

bomber force and nuclear war-fighting strategy by the USAF.

In fact, most of the 1951 USAF budget was earmarked for that

part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) that would have to

deter or win a general nuclear war with the USSR.2

NSC 68 was based on an assessment that it would likely be

years before the USSR was willing to risk war against a nuclearsuperior United States.3 Gen Douglas MacArthur, the commander of Far East Command (FEC), and Secretary of State

Dean Acheson also perceived no imminent Soviet danger on the

Korean Peninsula. In public statements in mid-1949 and early

5
1950, respectively, they both excluded Korea from America’s

defense responsibilities in the Pacific. These estimates, combined with the aforementioned nuclear focus, reveal why the

USAF was ill-prepared for a North Korean invasion of South

Korea. The noted Korean War scholar, Dr. Robert Frank Futrell,

also contended that even FEC, which one would suspect was

oriented toward defense of the Korean Peninsula, lacked a

contingency plan for such a development.4

The Air Force was also temporarily handicapped by the inability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States to

reach a consensus regarding the war’s strategic objective. The

State Department argued that US military effort in Korea

should be intended solely to restore the ROK to its original territorial status. But the South Korean president, Syngman Rhee,

envisioned a reunification of the Korean Peninsula under his

control. While this divergence did not pose a problem for the

Army (because its troops were retreating southward at the

time), it did for the Air Force, which desired to balance the destruction of hostile industrial targets against some foreknowledge as to whether such plants would be rebuilt during a

friendly occupation of North Korea. This balancing act was

made more difficult by Truman’s concern that bombardment

of North Korea not be indiscriminate.

Doctrine

Following World War II, the doctrine of the Army Air Forces

was articulated in War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20,

The Command and Employment of Airpower, published in

1943. This manual listed the Air Force’s primary missions as

being strategic bombardment, air superiority, interdiction,

and CAS. In 1946, the Army published additional doctrine for

tactical air employment in FM 31-35, Air-Ground Operations.

After the Air Force became a separate service in 1947, Air

Force leaders realized that both field manuals should be revised. As Air Force leaders sought to revise FM 100-20, they

were divided over the difference between strategic and tactical

missions and the proper role for theater air forces.5 Meanwhile, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had become responsible

for developing tactical air operations in the new Air Force. In

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CADRE PAPER
February 1949, TAC recommended that Headquarters Army

Field Forces review FM 31-35 and create a new document

upon which to base future joint training. The impetus for this

review was the following shortfalls that had been identified

during joint tactical exercises from 1947 to 1950: (1) jet

fighter-bomber’s limited time over target and difficulty identifying targets, (2) the services’ inadequate manning of joint operations centers (JOC), and (3) the lack of skill and interest

among tactical air control parties (TACP).6 All three of these

shortfalls would prove to be persistent during the Korean War.

The effort to revise FM 31-35 led to the development of the

Joint Training Directive (JTD) for air-ground operations published in September 1950. Neither the Air Force nor the Army

accepted this new joint directive as service policy.7 The Air

Force contended that the new directive jeopardized its control of

mission priorities, while the Army argued that it failed to provide ground commanders with sufficient influence over tactical

air support. Despite these sentiments, an Air Force-sponsored

study group chaired by Dr. Robert L. Stearns, president of the

University of Colorado, concluded that the doctrine espoused

in FM 31-35 and the JTD was sound.8 According to the board,

the problem was that neither the Air Force nor Army had provided the trained staffs, control agencies, and communications

systems to make the doctrine work.9 According to this analysis,

the CAS system was sound in design but required more aggressive implementation by both services.10

Maj Gen Earl E. Partridge and Brig Gen Edward Timberlake,

the commander and vice commander of Fifth Air Force, respectively, led the primary air support effort. They were familiar

with the employment of tactical airpower and of the organization required for the cooperative operations of tactical air force

and a field army in a theater war.11 General Partridge believed

that the way to achieve optimal air and ground cooperation was

through close teamwork between air and ground commanders,

such as that experienced between Generals Otto P. Weyland

and George S. Patton Jr. in World War II. At the onset of war,

General Partridge directed that the advance element of Fifth Air

Force be located at Taejon where the commander of US Army

Forces in Korea (USAFIK), Gen Willliam Dean, had located his

7

PURDHAM
command post.12 However, because of a lack of communications capability, the advance echelon of Fifth Air Force was

unable to deploy forward. 

Partridge was also aware that official doctrine called for a

joint agency through which Army and Air Force commanders

could request and control air resources. Such an agency was

called a JOC. A tactical air control center (TACC), which

served as the focal point for control of aircraft operations, was

supposed to operate in close association with the JOC. Because he was unable to relocate the entire advance echelon to

Taejon, on 5 July 1950 General Partridge opened a JOC at

Taejon with personnel and equipment deployed from Fifth Air

Force in Japan.

Doctrine also required formation of TACPs, which served as

the most forward element of the tactical control system and

controlled aircraft strikes from forward locations. Partridge

provided one TACP to each US infantry regiment and higher

unit headquarters engaged in active combat operations and

one to each ROK division and corps.13 Additionally, in spite of

a shortage of qualified officers, Partridge assigned experienced

air liaison officers (ALO) to units of the Eighth Army and Task

Force 77.14 These officers served as personal representatives of

the Air Force commander and were responsible to advise the

ground commander on all air matters.

Command and Control

The execution of airpower was complicated by the attempt of

MacArthur’s staff to direct air operations in Korea from its

headquarters in Tokyo. In fact, his staff ordered the air officer

on the Far East Advance Command’s staff in Suwon, Korea,

not to contact Fifth Air Force advance headquarters in Itazuke,

Korea, and arrange for air support. Rather, he was told to direct

requests for air support to FEC General Headquarters (GHQ)

in Tokyo, which would then pass them through Far East Air

Forces (FEAF) and Fifth Air Force in turn. General Timberlake

stated, “This was a shameful way to operate because it normally took about four hours to get the messages.”15 Recognizing

that air resources could not continue to operate in this manner,

Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, prevailed

8

CADRE PAPER
upon MacArthur to direct USAFIK to route its air support requests directly to Fifth Air Force advanced headquarters in

Itazuke, which was now commanded by General Partridge. 

General Stratemeyer also integrated into FEAF the 22d and

92d Bombardment Groups that deployed to the theater from

SAC several days after the war commenced. By creating a new

command—FEAF Bomber Command (Provisional)—to control

strategic bombers, Stratemeyer felt the control of air operations could then reside in the field and not in FEAF and GHQ.

Despite this arrangement, MacArthur’s staff continued to

issue directives that Bomber Command’s B-29s were to be

used exclusively for CAS.16 While Stratemeyer was not against

such employment, he was concerned that FEC GHQ was still

attempting to dictate air operations. Consequently, he appealed to MacArthur to allow him to oversee air operations

much as MacArthur had allowed Generals George C. Kenney and

Ennis C. Whitehead during World War II.

MacArthur responded by saying that Stratemeyer “was to

run his show as he saw fit, regardless of instructions from

GHQ staff members.”17 Upon receiving this favorable response

from MacArthur, Stratemeyer ordered Bomber Command to fly

against deep interdiction and strategic targets on 11 July. The

following day, he informed Fifth Air Force that it would be responsible for all tactical air operations in Korea.18 This

arrangement was postponed, however, due to the critical situation of USAFIK troops. MacArthur stated that exceptional

measures were required. Consequently, both Fifth Air Force and

Bomber Command continued to focus their aircraft against the

adversary along the front line of the battle area until late July.

Coordination of land-based and carrier-based air operations

over Korea also posed a significant problem. To obtain synergy

between air force and naval air attacks, Stratemeyer sought to

attain operational control of all airpower in-theater, except for

those responsible for aerial mining or antisubmarine warfare

missions. To overcome Navy objections, Stratemeyer agreed to

change the term operational control to coordination control.19 It

soon became obvious that the Navy and MacArthur did not associate coordination control with centralized control. Thus, for

the remainder of the Korean War, Stratemeyer would merely

9

PURDHAM
be able to work closely with the Navy in the execution of airpower. He would exercise control over only Air Force assets.

Based on the operational complications caused by the C2

practices among the Air Force, Army, and Navy, it should not

be surprising that similar problems existed regarding targeting practices as well. On 14 July, General MacArthur’s chief of

staff, Maj Gen Edward Almond, created an FEC GHQ Target

Group that consisted of G2 (Intelligence), G3 (Operations), Air

Force, and Navy representatives. The purpose of this group

was to advise MacArthur on the employment of Air Force and

Navy airpower, recommend measures to ensure coordination

of available airpower, and maintain analysis of targets and priorities.20 While the intent of the group was sound, it was soon

apparent that the level of expertise of the group members was

not. Therefore, the group had difficulty effectively matching

objectives with targets.

Upon his arrival on 20 July as the new FEAF vice commander for Operations, General Weyland recognized this

shortfall. Weyland observed that the GHQ staff was unable to

accomplish the most efficient and timely employment of airpower in Korea because it lacked joint representation of air,

naval, and ground officers.21 He recommended the implementation of a senior target committee, comprised of officers of

each service with wide military experience. MacArthur approved

this suggestion by 22 July, and he agreed that the group’s first

task should be the development of an interdiction plan that

would sever the flow of supplies to the North Korean forces.

The group was in existence for only six weeks, but in that

short time it built effective relationships for the control of theater

air forces in FEC.22 The FEC GHQ Target Group was also soon

disbanded. However, in its absence the FEAF Target Committee

grew in stature, adding representatives from the Fifth Air Force

and FEAF Bomber Command to complement the members

from the Intelligence and Operations staffs of the headquarters.

This committee selected major targets for attack and devised

air campaigns against entire target systems.23 As a result, almost

30 days after the start of the war, ad hoc procedures had managed to bring order to the chaotic C2 situation that existed at

the onset of the war.

10

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Training

As mentioned earlier, the nuclear focus of the US military

strategy subsequent to World War II became even more intensified following the Soviet detonation of a nuclear weapon in

1949. During the congressional hearings on the B-36, Gen

Omar N. Bradley, USA, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (JCS), declared that all of the joint chiefs “believe that

the number one priority for the Air Force must be strategic

bombing ability.”24 Air Force funding reflected this strategic

priority. Although USAF force strength decreased from 60 to

48 groups in 1949, SAC’s force strength actually increased

from 18 to 19 groups.

In contrast to SAC’s expansion, by December 1948 TAC was

stripped of its units and had become merely an operational

and planning headquarters under the Continental Air Command. Gen Elwood Quesada, the commander of TAC, elected

to retire in part because he was so disappointed by this action.

His successor, Maj Gen Robert M. Lee, attempted to maintain

the doctrine and mission for his organization. Due to growing

criticism from the other services of the USAF’s de-emphasis of

tactical aviation, USAF convened a Board of Review for Tactical

Air Operations in 1949. The board’s 1950 recommendations

were one of several factors that convinced the USAF to restore

TAC as a major command. While proponents of TAC had preserved some semblance of tactical air doctrine, TAC’s ability to

implement this doctrine would not occur overnight.25

The Far East Air Forces were not immune to the budget and

training reductions that befell TAC. Such reductions had severely degraded FEAF training for several years prior to 1950.

Cross-country missions in Japan had been terminated for an

extensive period before the Korean War. As a result, most navigational flights were conducted between two bases with which

pilots were well familiar, thereby enabling pilots to rely extensively on radios and ranges. In the process, their dead-reckoning

abilities deteriorated and left them poorly prepared for the difficult flying conditions over Korean terrain.26 A USAF policy

prohibiting the depletion of high-velocity aircraft rocket

(HVAR) reserves also limited rocket training. While pilots were

permitted to use practice projectiles in training, they quickly

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discovered in combat that the trajectory of the HVAR was

vastly different from the projectiles with which they had

trained.27

Additionally, because FEAF’s primary mission was air defense, FEAF focused its unit tactical training almost entirely

on air-intercept and counterair missions instead of on CAS or

other bombing missions that are typically expected of theater

air commands. Meanwhile, while Fifth Air Force could claim

that it had met all of Eighth Army’s requests for joint airground training, it could do so only because the joint operations were neither realistic nor extensive.28 Similarly, the

training of TACPs prior to the war was marginal at best, because the close support demonstrations between Fifth Air

Force and Eighth Army were unrealistic and well-rehearsed

scenarios over well-known ranges.29 An additional problem

that handicapped FEAF training was a lack of gunnery ranges.

Ultimately, FEAF pilots had to overcome these prewar training

shortfalls much like pilots did in World Wars I and II—through

combat experience.

Although they were not at peak effectiveness, FEAF aircrews

were able to operate on the day the war began. The same cannot be said for the engineer aviation units assigned to FEAF.

In fact, engineering units were particularly poorly trained and

marginally capable. Poor construction capability proved to be

very detrimental to offensive planning and operations from the

onset of the Korean War. Old equipment, poor training, and

rapid rotations were the greatest problems.30 Collectively,

these impediments degraded FEAF’s ability to operate from

Korean airfields during the initial period of operations. As was

the case with pilots, engineers had no alternative but to improve their performance as the war progressed.

Because of the Soviet nuclear threat, the Air Force was focused on SAC at the onset of the Korean War. This translated

to budget reductions in TAC and FEAF, which severely reduced

these commands’ aircrew training. Because FEAF’s primary

mission was air defense, FEAF training focused predominantly

on air-intercept and counterair missions—not CAS or interdiction. Consequently, FEAF aircrews entered the Korean War

with little preparation for what awaited them.

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Equipment

In February 1949, ROK President Rhee tasked Maj Gen

Claire L. Chennault, USAF, retired, to devise a plan for a 99-

aircraft ROK Air Force (ROKAF). MacArthur opposed such an

effort for three reasons: it was not essential to the maintenance of internal order in Korea, it might increase the possibility of war between North and South Korea, and it would

substantiate North Korean charges that the United States was

creating an arms race in Korea.31 Consequently, South Korea

assembled an air force on its own; and when US military

forces departed on 29 June 1949, the ROKAF consisted of 16

planes (L-4s, L-5s, and T-6s) and 39 trained pilots.32 This

small force was by no means a credible deterrent to a North

Korean invasion. Therefore, when war broke out, the ROKAF

was completely reliant on US airpower.

Air Force chief of staff Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg described

the USAF in 1950 as a shoestring Air Force. Of that “shoestring” force, FEAF had 30 squadrons, which equated to nine

of the USAF’s 48 combat wings.33 These units represented the

largest grouping of USAF force strength outside of the United

States. FEAF’s aircraft were reflective of FEAF’s defensive priority. The 553 operational planes included 365 F-80s, 32

F-82s, 26 B-26s, 22 B-29s, 25 RF-80s, 6 RB-29s, and 26

C-54s.34 Most fighter wings had received the latest F-80 model

(F-80C) between 1949 and 1950. However, the recent conversion of F-51s to F-80Cs was not without its problems, the

most significant of which was the F-80C’s requirement for

longer and stronger runways. By July 1950, only four airfields

in Japan had 7,000-foot (ft) runways that combat-loaded jet

fighters required, and there were no such airfields in Korea.35

The F-80C’s inability to deploy to the primitive airfields in

Korea meant that it had to base its operations out of Japan.

However, its limited fuel load, range, loiter time, and bombcarrying capacity reduced its effectiveness. General Partridge

wanted to replace the F-80 with the P-47, which he thought was

a better strafing and dive-bombing airplane, but none were available.36 As an alternative, in July 1950, Fifth Air Force decided

to replace the F-80s in six squadrons with the propeller-driven

F-51s—the all-around workhorse of World War II. In recalling

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the F-51’s prowess during World War II, it must be noted that

ground troops greatly supported the employment of the F-51

for CAS operations.37

The fact that the F-51 carried a larger munitions load, had

a greater loiter time, and could operate from shorter airstrips

than the F-80 made the decision to replace the F-80 with the

F-51 seem logical at first.38 However, Fifth Air Force soon realized

that the jet fighter-bomber capability of the F-80 had advantages over the F-51. FEAF’s “Summary Report” cited numerous

ways in which the F-80 was superior to the F-51: it had an advantage in speed for surprise attack and rapid escape, it had

far better self-defense ability, it could overfly the weather

when required, and it required less maintenance.39 Further, in

comparing the F-80 and F-51, the F-51 losses to enemy action

in relation to sorties flown were more than double those of the

F-80, which also could fly twice the sorties of the F-51 per day

because of better parts availability and less maintenance

time.40 The F-51’s liquid-cooled engine, which was especially

vulnerable to ground fire, accounted for this high loss rate.

Mindful of this vulnerability, General Partridge declared, “One

lucky shot in the radiator could bring the plane down.”41

In addition to the aircraft that were assigned to it at the

onset of the Korean War, FEAF was also assigned B-29s from

SAC’s 22d and 92d Bombardment Groups on 3 July 1950.

General Vandenberg initiated this action due to the necessity

of destroying North Korean objectives beyond the 38th parallel.

Several weeks into the war, Vandenberg ordered two additional

bombardment groups (98th and 307th) of B-29s to deploy to

Korea.

Air Superiority

Air-to-air combat in the Korean War was dramatically different than in World War II. In the Korean War, jet fighters approached, engaged, and disengaged at much higher speeds

than did propeller-powered fighters during World War II. The

primary USAF jet fighter, the F-80C, was called on during the

first days of the Korean War to provide escort for the C-54s

that were evacuating American citizens from South Korea.

During these operations on 27 June 1950, four F-80C fighters

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engaged eight North Korean IL-10 fighters. The F-80C pilots

shot down four of the IL-10s, which marked the first aerial victories for a USAF jet fighter.42

Despite this success, General Stratemeyer argued that aerial

cover responsibilities were limiting FEAF’s ability to establish

air superiority by attacking North Korean airfields. Realizing

the criticality of this request, MacArthur permitted Stratemeyer

to begin air attacks against enemy airfields north of the 38th

parallel. But due to the worsening situation in the forward

battle area, F-80Cs continued to focus on air patrols in the

Seoul area well into July. The F-80C performed these patrols

so effectively that, in referring to this aircraft, Stratemeyer remarked: “I wouldn’t trade the F-80 for all the F-47s and F-51s

you could get me. It does a wonderful job in ground support

and can take care of the top-side job if enemy jets appear.”43

While the F-80 received glowing praise from Stratemeyer,

the North Korea air force (NKAF) quickly learned to exploit its

short range and limited fuel capacity. Specifically, NKAF pilots

discovered the length of time that Fifth Air Force jets could

remain in the battle area before they exhausted their fuel supply.44 One instance of this occurred on 12 July 1950 when

three North Korean Yak-9s attacked a flight of F-80s that were

strafing ground targets. The F-80s evaded the attackers; but

because they were low on fuel, they could not counterattack

the Yaks. A similar scenario unfolded the next day when two

Yaks surprised a flight of F-80s that were strafing along the

front. Yet again, the F-80s escaped; but they were unable to

pursue the Yaks due to low fuel.

MacArthur was so concerned about these developments

that he instructed Stratemeyer to dedicate a part of the FEAF

specifically to counterair operations. In response, on 15 July,

General Partridge tasked F-80s and B-29s to strafe the Yak

aircraft and crater the runways at Kimpo airfield.45 On 18 July,

pilots from the aircraft carriers in Task Force 77 also continued

attacks against airfields in the Pyongyang area. These attacks

resulted in the destruction of 14 enemy aircraft and damage to

13 more. While this action served as a quick-fix solution to the

problem, Fifth Air Force FACs and fighter pilots began to work

together to produce a long-term solution. They discovered a

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way to break up the NKAF scheme of operations by improving

the coordination of their air-ground radio control. The effectiveness of this coordination was evident along the front line of

the battlefield when F-80s shot down one Yak on 17 July,

three on 19 July, and two on 20 July. One F-80 pilot from the

19 July attacks said: “We were attacking enemy targets when

we were called by the ground controller and informed of the

Yaks, and that controller took us right to them although we

were low on ammunition and just about ready to go back to

our home base.”46

As a result of these improvements in FEAF tactics and performance, the NKAF attempted no more offensives after 20

July 1950. Thus, while facing the small NKAF that possessed

not a single jet turbine aircraft in the summer of 1950, FEAF

aircraft enjoyed virtual air supremacy over all of Korea. FEAF

aircraft would not be truly tested until late November 1950

when the Chinese, with fast and maneuverable MiG-15 jet

fighters, entered the conflict.47 Consequently, in July 1950,

Stratemeyer could declare, “the air battle was short and sweet.

Air supremacy over Korea was quickly established.”48 Such

supremacy in the air was a critical enabler for numerous

facets of the US military effort during the first few weeks of the

war. It allowed B-29s to conduct strategic bombing missions

into North Korea without fighter escorts, navy aircraft carriers

to launch air attacks within close proximity to the shore, and

Eighth Army troops to maneuver during the day while large

CAS efforts forced North Korean ground forces to remain in

defensive positions during the day and attack only at night.49

Close Air Support

Because of their amphibious operations against Japan during World War II, the Navy and Marine Corps’s emphasis on

CAS prior to the Korean War exceeded that of the Air Force.

The Navy–Marine Corps system for air requests and air direction stressed rapid response and decentralized management of

CAS sorties.50 After World War II, these two services nurtured

their CAS system in amphibious exercises to the point that

they ensured CAS strikes would arrive within minutes.51 The

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Army–Air Force CAS relationship, on the other hand, was quite

different upon entering the Korean War.

“There was no definite system. We saw some tanks, got on

each radio channel until we got fighters in the Chochiwon

area, and any fighter who heard us would give us a call and

we would give them the target.”52 These words from a Korean

War airborne controller in July 1950 convey the chaotic CAS

system that operated at the onset of the war. In the summer

of 1950, the Eighth Army did not have the necessary communications net to make such a process viable. As the G-3 air officer in the JOC at that time stated, “The Army had no equipment available. We had no strike-request nets.”53

CAS was particularly reliant on effective C2 for success because it required close coordination between air and ground

components. The absence of this coordination was evident

early on when one Army L-19 liaison aircraft and an Air Force

fighter-bomber collided in the air and others narrowly missed

colliding.54 Additionally, fratricide would remain a concern

throughout the war. Between June 1950 and April 1953, aircraft dropped ordnance on friendly positions 108 times.55 Fortunately these incidents resulted in few casualties. Based on

these occurrences, the effectiveness of CAS depended more on

the Eighth Army/Fifth Air Force organization to request and

direct ground attack sorties than it did on the operational

characteristics of FEAF aircraft.56

Communication between Army and Air Force elements improved with the employment of TACPs. However, attrition became an increasing problem for TACPs’s men and equipment.

Korea’s rough roads caused much damage to the radio equipment, and the TACPs’s unprotected jeeps made it difficult for

them to get close enough to the adversary. Consequently, the

responsibility fell on the US Army to call in air-support requests directly to the JOC. However, Army troops had a difficult time doing so during the first few weeks of the war because

they were unable to identify concentrated enemy formations

while they were rapidly retreating. 

The employment of airborne TACs was perceived as the solution to this problem. Such a tactic was not new. In Italy during World War II, “Horsefly” liaison pilots had led fighters to

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hard-to-find targets. In Korea, these airborne TACs became

known by their call sign as Mosquitoes. The results of this tactic were so successful that Lt Col John R. Murphy, chief of the

operations section in the JOC, described the first day’s use of

this tactic as “the best day in Fifth Air Force history.”57 The

flight activity of the Mosquitoes attests to the important role

they performed. They flew 269 sorties in July 1950 and more

than 1,000 sorties each month for the rest of the year.58

Eighth Army battalion commanders quickly learned the

value of the Mosquitoes. They discovered that TACPs could

forward a strike request to the Mosquitoes, which remained on

station over the battle area for as long as three hours at a

time. The Mosquitoes, in turn, could rapidly pass the request

to the TACC. The TACC coordinated all air requests within the

JOC. This process quickly became the accepted means to

communicate air-support requests from the frontline ground

units to the JOC. While this process was effective, it also produced several undesirable outcomes. Most notably, higher

echelons were unable to review air requests because they went

directly from the regiment to the JOC.

Because ground commanders relied on TACPs for this information, regimental commanders, in particular, insisted that

TACPs remain near their command posts. These command

posts were a considerable distance from the front. As a result,

TACPs normally passed target information to a Mosquito controller, who then directed fighters to a given target.59 In the

process, ground commanders soon became just as possessive

of Mosquitoes as they had of TACPs. With the ground commanders focusing on Mosquito and TACP operations along the

front lines, Fifth Air Force deployed additional Mosquitoes to

locate enemy targets in the enemy’s assembly areas behind

the lines.60

Mosquitoes also played another significant role. As mentioned

earlier, the short range of the F-80 limited its ability to support

the war from its Japanese air bases. Mosquitoes reduced the

need for F-80 pilots to loiter in the target area by locating

enemy targets for attack prior to the arrival of the F-80s. The

F-80s’s use of Misawa tanks also helped to overcome the range

limitation. With the 265-gallon Misawa tanks instead of the

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standard Lockheed wing tanks, F-80s could loiter for as much

as 45 minutes. Although some F-80 pilots expressed concern

about the stress these tanks placed on the aircraft’s wing tips,

others stated that with these tanks “the general attitude . . .

toward the F-80 is one of confidence and pride.”61

A second significant problem with the F-80 in July 1950

was its lack of wing racks for weapons employment. As a result, up to this point in the war, F-80 pilots had to rely entirely

on the aircraft’s six .50-caliber nose guns. The aircraft’s excellent aim and fast airspeeds enabled pilots to surprise enemy

forces and attack them with precision before they had time to

take defensive action. Despite this, more powerful weapons

were needed to destroy heavily armored enemy vehicles such

as the Soviet-built tanks used by North Korean ground forces.

The only such weapon that an F-80 could carry was a 5-inch

HVAR. Because they received virtually no training on the employment of this weapon during peacetime, F-80 pilots learned

to use this weapon in combat. Largely through trial and error,

pilots discovered that HVARs were most effective when they

approached a tank from the four o’clock position and fired the

weapon from a 30-degree angle and a range of 1,500 ft.62

In the first few weeks of the war, F-80s flew approximately

200 sorties each day against the enemy’s forward troops and

communications. Although the F-80 was not suited ideally for

CAS, North Korean prisoners reported that F-80 air attacks

destroyed nearly all of their transportation. They added that

because of these attacks, the North Korean commander told

his superiors he would need more troops to accomplish his

mission.63

Meanwhile, despite its vulnerability to ground fire, the F-51

sought to match the results of the F-80. Because the F-51s at

Taegu had communications connectivity with the TACC at

Taejon, they could scramble when the ground situation demanded immediate air support. During the first few days of

the war, Taegu F-51s effectively dropped 500-pound (lb) bombs

filled with thermite and napalm against North Korean tanks

and troops. These firebombs were especially demoralizing to

enemy troops. According to one officer at Taegu, “as soon as

we would start dropping thermite or napalm in their vicinity

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they would immediately scatter and break any forward movement.”64 In addition to these frontline air operations, B-26s effectively attacked bridges and supply dumps immediately behind the battle line.

Collectively, these attacks by the F-80s, F-51s, and B-26s

forced the North Korean troops to change their tactics. “Enemy

forces were reluctant to move or fight by day, tanks and trucks

used back roads and trails when they had to make daylight

marches, forward-area supply dumps were dispersed, and all

troops exercised vigorous camouflage discipline.”65 While these

tactics reduced the vulnerability of North Korean troops to air

attack, they also slowed their advance. Using steeper anglerocket attacks and napalm, FEAF pilots destroyed the enemy’s

tanks. The North Korean soldiers attested to the damage and

demoralization of USAF air strikes.66 Likewise, Eighth Army

ground units believed that CAS was essential.67 In fact, General

Dean, commander of USAFIK, declared, “Without question the

Air Force definitely blunted the initial North Korean thrust to

the southward.”68

Interdiction

As alluded to earlier, a comprehensive and coordinated interdiction campaign was not formulated or conducted in Korea

until late July 1950. The primary reasons for this were twofold.

First, MacArthur and his headquarters staff pressed for FEAF

to focus its airpower against the enemy forces on the front

line. Second, the chaotic and uncoordinated C2 and targeting

infrastructures made the development and execution of an interdiction plan almost impossible. By late July, MacArthur

was willing to broaden airpower’s role beyond that of CAS, and

General Weyland had organized a targeting committee of senior

officers to devise an interdiction plan for the war. Thus, nearly

30 days after the war began, airpower was finally being employed as Vandenberg and Stratemeyer had originally advocated.

In fact, on 3 July, Vandenberg had informed Stratemeyer, “It

is axiomatic that tactical operations on the battlefield cannot

be fully effective unless there is simultaneous interdiction and

destruction of sources behind the battlefield.”69

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Even though an interdiction campaign did not begin before

late July, interdiction operations certainly did. FEAF B-26s,

F-82s, and F-80s conducted the initial interdiction missions.

The B-26Bs, which operated out of Iwakuni Air Base in Okinawa,

were extremely effective during early operations. Their adequate

fuel capacity allowed them to reconnoiter the enemy’s lines of

communication (LOC), and the preponderance of “gun-nose”

variants enabled them to optimize their 14 forward-firing machine guns during low-level attacks.70 Meanwhile, the allweather F-82s also had the range to both escort bombers into

North Korea and search for targets at night along the Han

River. The North Koreans’ lack of understanding of US airpower contributed to the B-26 and F-82’s early success. The

North Korean forces were constantly wide open to attack from

the air as they took little, if any, cover while moving along

roads.71

Despite these early successes, FEAF interdiction operations

entailed several problems. Fifth Air Force encountered communications and intelligence delays. This was especially true

regarding the official bomb line along the Han River. While no

bombing restrictions existed north of the line, a pilot had to

have positive identification of a target south of the line before

attacking it. Due to the fluid ground situation, it was difficult

for pilots to distinguish friendly from enemy troops. On 3 July,

five F-51s erroneously attacked ROK troops south of the bomb

line. In response, on 7 July MacArthur ordered USAFIK to establish a more realistic bomb line and to report changes in the

line throughout the day. He also mandated that all ROK vehicles be painted with a white star similar to US vehicles.72

Some problems were more easily solved than others. F-82s,

for instance, were FEAF’s only night and all-weather capable

counterair fighters. Consequently, FEAF considered it too critical

to the defense of Japan and withdrew it from the war in early

July. B-26 light bombers compensated fairly well for the F-82’s

departure, but they were difficult to maneuver at low levels;

and they were susceptible to small-arms fire. While FEAF directed that the B-26s perform their missions at medium altitude to avoid the ground threats, this complicated their ability

to destroy road and rail bridges. By showing their ingenuity,

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B-26 pilots soon devised effective tactics to overcome this

challenge. B-26C “glass noses,” which were equipped with

bombsights for medium-altitude bombing, led B-26B “hard

noses” to the target.73 Shortly thereafter, B-26B crews began

to make their own successful attacks from medium altitude

with glide and dive-bombing tactics. 

B-29s also experienced some problems during the first few

weeks of the war. Having never flown missions before to the

front, the B-29 crews were unable to contact the forward

TACPs. As a result, they never located their targets. On the

next day, the B-29 crews successfully contacted the TACP and

attacked their assigned targets. Nevertheless, General Partridge

reported that he had more fighter-bombers than targets. For

this reason, he suggested that the B-29s be released from CAS

missions so they could strike targets deeper in North Korea.74

Conclusion

The USAF was unprepared for the Korean War largely because prior to 25 June 1950 the US national security and military structures had placed little significance on South Korea

or the conventional military capability that was required to defend it. Not surprisingly, the USAF put its emphasis on SAC

and its long-range bombers instead of TAC and its tactical

fighters. Even though strategy was heavily centered on nuclear employment, Air Force tactical doctrine had remained

relatively sound. However, sound doctrine is of little benefit if

it lacks the necessary training and communications to make it

work. Such was the case with the USAF’s tactical airpower at

the onset of the Korean War. Despite this, the USAF’s aircraft

and pilots demonstrated significant flexibility and ingenuity in

overcoming aircraft, training, communications, and other shortfalls as they began combat operations in Korea.

It is also significant to note that the USAF had the tremendous

advantage in Korea of facing an adversary that lacked a modern

air force. Thus, the USAF was able to make adjustments, improvements, and innovations during the first few weeks of

combat that it would not have been able to make had it faced

a formidable opponent. The Korean War did not, however,

prompt a major reevaluation of USAF air doctrine or capability.

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Consequently, the ability of the USAF to operate against a more

sophisticated air threat would not be closely examined until

the USAF was faced by such a threat, as it would in Vietnam.

Notes

1. Congressional Record, 83d Cong., 2d sess., daily ed. (8 April 1954):

100, A2716.

2. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1978), 2.

3. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 1, Basic Thinking

in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1989), 289.

4. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 24.

5. Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953

(Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 16.

6. Headquarters Tactical Air Command, record and routing sheet, subject: Joint Training Directive, vol. 2, historical documents file for 1950, USAF

Historical Research Agency (USAFHRA), file no. 417.01.

7. Allan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950–1953,” in Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History, 1990), 350; and Daniel R. Mortensen, ed., Airpower and Ground Armies: Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air

Doctrine, 1940–1943 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1998), 138.

8. Ibid., 372.

9. Ibid.

10. Headquarters USAF, Korean Evaluation Project, subject: Report on

Air Operations, 16 January 1951, USAFHRA, file no. K168.041-2.

11. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 78.

12. Fifth Air Force Advanced Staff Summary Sheet, 5 July 1950, USAF

HRA, file no. K730.144.

13. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 106.

14. Ibid., 107.

15. Ibid., 45.

16. William T. Y’Blood, ed., The Three Wars of Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer:

His Korean War Diary (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums

Program, 1999), 61–66.

17. Ibid.

18. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 48.

19. Ibid., 50.

20. Ibid., 50–51.

21. Ibid., 52.

22. Ibid., 55.

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23. “Far East Air Forces Staff Report—Evaluation of the Effectiveness of

the United States Air Force in the Korean Campaign,” vol. 1, 31 December

1950, 141–42, USAFHRA, file no. K168.041-1.

24. Crane, 21.

25. Caroline F. Ziemke, “In the Shadow of the Giant: USAF Tactical Air

Command in the Era of Strategic Bombing, 1945–1955” (PhD diss., Ohio

State University, 1989), 63–115; and Jerome V. Martin, “Reforging the

Sword: United States Air Force Tactical Air Forces, Air Power Doctrine, and

National Security Policy, 1945–1956” (PhD diss., Ohio State University,

1988), 54–59.

26. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 60.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 60.

29. Ibid., 61.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 17.

32. Ibid.

33. US House, Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st sess.,

1951, 1378–79.

34. “Far East Air Forces Staff Report.”

35. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 59.

36. Crane, 24.

37. Millett, 363.

38. Crane, 25–26.

39. “Far East Air Forces Staff Report.”

40. Crane, 26.

41. Maj Gen Earle E. Partridge, interviewed by Tom Sturm and Hugh

Ahmann, 23–25 April 1974, 594, USAFHRA, file no. K239.0512-729.

42. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 13.

43. Y’Blood, 61–66.

44. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 99.

45. Ibid., 99.

46. Ibid., 101.

47. Steven Rearden, “US Strategic Bombardment Doctrine,” in Case

Studies in Strategic Bombardment, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington, D.C.: Air

Force History and Museums Program, 1998), 482.

48. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 102.

49. Ibid., 103.

50. Millett, 351.

51. Ibid., 353.

52. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 83.

53. Ibid.,108.

54. Millett, 368.

55. Ibid., 391.

56. Ibid., 363.

57. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 81.

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58. Millett, 365.

59. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 108.

60. Ibid., 109.

61. Ibid., 87.

62. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces

in World War II, vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to

July 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 646–51.

63. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 97.

64. Ibid., 95.

65. Ibid., 97.

66. Millett, 396.

67. Ibid., 396.

68. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 97.

69. Ibid., 83.

70. Ibid., 85.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 86.

73. Ibid., 87.

74. Y’Blood, 77.

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Chapter 3

Initial Period of Operations in the Vietnam

War, 2 March–1 April 1965

In retrospect, I’m absolutely convinced that we lost the war

wrong. We should have fought that war in an advisory mode

and remained in that mode. When the South Vietnamese

failed to come up and meet the mark at the advisory level,

then we never should have committed US forces. We should

have failed at the advisory effort and withdrawn.

—Gen Voney F. Warner, 1983

After the Korean War, President Dwight D. “Ike” Eisenhower

declared that never again would the United States become

involved in a war such as the one in Korea in which the full

capability of the US armed forces could not be employed.1 As

a result, military strategists focused on nuclear deterrence

and massive retaliation instead of conventional warfare. The

Air Force was no exception. In fact, until about 1960, the Air

Force continued to believe that its robust nuclear capability

would satisfy the requirements of any limited war.2 Gen T. R.

Milton, former commander of Thirteenth Air Force, corroborated this condition when he noted that the theater air forces

in the 1950s were “all trying to be little SACs with the primary

and almost the only mission being the nuclear one.”3

Many senior defense and Air Force officials did not view this

lack of balance as inimical. In fact, Secretary of Defense

Charles E. Wilson believed “the problem of deterring small

wars cannot be considered separately from the problem of

deterring war generally [and that] the capability to deter large

wars also serves to deter small wars.”4 The Air Force’s belief

that it could tailor airpower entirely for nuclear war and still

handle any lesser form of warfare was inherently shortsighted.

Gen John P. McConnell recognized this and concluded that

the Air Force was very unprepared for conventional warfare in

the early 1960s.5

27
President John F. Kennedy recognized this ill-preparedness

as well. He assumed office just two weeks after Soviet Premier

Nikita S. Khrushchev’s speech decrying Soviet support for “wars

of national liberation.”6 Contrary to the nuclear exchanges on

which the US military had focused, a war of national liberation

consisted of guerilla actions aimed at subversion. While such

actions would not trigger nuclear retaliation, they could,

nonetheless, weaken the power of the targeted state until it

was defeated. Consequently, the Soviet premier’s remarks led

to an intense reexamination of US national security and military strategy. President Kennedy did not think his predecessor’s

massive retaliation strategy was appropriate for this new international environment. Consequently, he initiated a strategy of

flexible response, which allowed the military to respond to

potential threats with a variety of force options.

As part of this effort, Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense

Robert S. McNamara on 1 February 1961 to train and equip

US troops for counterinsurgency warfare. As Gen William W.

Momyer, USAF, retired, points out in Air Power in Three Wars:

World War II, Korea, Vietnam, “This reorientation of our defense

priorities toward smaller conflicts prompted considerable

debate about how best to cope with [wars of national liberation].”7 In the Air Force, the debate ensued between two sides.

One side advocated that existing tactical forces could adjust to

counterinsurgency warfare without major changes, while the

other believed that counterinsurgency was the combat of the

future that required a special force.8

By 1964 the US armed forces were fully engaged in combat

operations in Vietnam. Early that same year, General LeMay,

the Air Force chief of staff, called for concentrated air attacks

against targets in North Vietnam. The JCS agreed that air

strikes against North Vietnam would show the resolve of the

US commitment to South Vietnam and would force North Vietnam to end its support to the Vietcong.9 However, the joint

chiefs favored a graduated response that would enable them

to gain their objectives without severely straining US military

resources.10 The US military began its combat involvement in

Vietnam with these competing strategies.

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Doctrine

Not surprisingly, the Air Force’s growing preoccupation with

nuclear war had a significant influence. Even General LeMay’s

views on Air Force doctrine changed as the Soviet nuclear

capability became an increasing threat to the United States.

During the postwar years, LeMay believed that the United States

“could afford the luxury of devoting a substantial portion of

[its] Air Force effort to support ground forces,” because none

of the world’s hostile countries had the capability to threaten

America.11 He declared, “The enemy didn’t have the capability

to destroy us. He couldn’t initiate an effective air offensive blow

against us because he couldn’t mount one.”12 However, by

1956 LeMay was convinced that Soviet aircraft were capable of

attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. In light of

this development, LeMay argued, “Offensive air power must

now be aimed at preventing the launching of weapons of mass

destruction against the United States or its Allies. This transcends all other considerations, because the price of failure

may be paid with national survival.”13

Consequently, in 1955 the Air Force released its new doctrine, Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-2, United States Air Force

Basic Doctrine, with the backdrop of this Cold War mentality.

Air Force vice chief of staff Gen Thomas D. White stated that

this edition of AFMAN 1-2 provided “a clear discussion of the

area between the two extremes of conflict [general war and full

peace] so as to permit emphasis on the broad potentialities of

air forces as a persuasive instrument in combating the international tension brought about by Cold War conditions.”14

Additionally, while the old doctrine associated the control of

air only with wartime activity, the new doctrine stated, “Control of the air is achieved when air forces, in peace or war, can

affect the desired degrees of influence over other specific

nations.”15 Col Jerry Page and Col Royal Roussel of the Air War

College Doctrine Division added that control of the air did not

require continuous attacks against something. Rather, they contended that the Air Force could have much influence even

when it did not drop a bomb or fire a bullet. They believed this

to be the case during the Korean War.16

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Due to this focus on the Cold War and the national security

strategy of massive retaliation, neither the Air Force’s 1955 nor

its 1959 doctrine was well suited for the Kennedy administration’s new national security strategy in 1961 of flexible response.

In fact, Air Force doctrine had changed so little since its origin

that LeMay remarked in the autumn of 1961, “I think we have

been consistent in our concepts since the formation for the

GHQ Air Force in 1935. Our basic doctrine has remained generally unchanged since that time.”17

Despite this preoccupation with nuclear warfare, the Air Force

leadership anticipated the Kennedy administration’s interest

in counterinsurgency. In fact, in March 1961, the Air Force presented a study on “Cold War problems” to President Kennedy.18

As part of this study, the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat

Crew Training Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The 4400th

was tasked to develop tactics and techniques for counterinsurgency operations. However, in reality, the Air Force—as

well as the other services—paid only lip service to counterinsurgency and continued to focus on its strategic nuclear

role. It considered the 4400th to be adequate for counterinsurgency commitments.19

Consequently, three years would pass before the Air Force

published its newest doctrinal document, AFMAN 1-1, United

States Air Force Basic Doctrine, in August 1964. AFMAN 1-1

reflected the Air Force’s desire to look forward—not backward.20

The previous edition of Air Force doctrine stated, “Basic doctrine

evolves from experience and from analysis of the continuing

impact of new developments.”21 But the new manual declared,

“Basic doctrine evolves through the continuing analysis and

testing of military operations in the light of national objectives

and the changing military environment.”22 By choosing to

exclude experience from doctrinal development, Air Force

doctrine makers in 1964 failed to incorporate valuable lessons

from the Korean War. The US Air Force entered the Korean

War convinced that it would fight an unlimited war against an

industrialized nation by attacking clearly defined strategic targets. Although none of these assumptions proved to be true for

Korea, the Air Force viewed Korea as an anomaly. Consequently, the 1964 doctrine was based on the same assumptions

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as the Joint Training Directive of 1950. Worse yet, the Air Force

in 1964 distanced itself even further from its tactical doctrine

upon which Air Force leaders in the Korean War heavily relied.

As a result, the Air Force struggled to overcome some of the

same problems in Vietnam that it had faced in Korea.

Command and Control

As early as 1962, Air Force chief of staff General LeMay

advocated a more imaginative and responsive employment of

airpower.23 According to General Momyer (Seventh Air Force

commander from 1966 to 1968) on 23 April 1962, LeMay

made the following observations to Gen Paul D. Harkins, commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. “The

command system was too cumbersome; the TACS was not

being allowed to operate as efficiently as it had during World

War II and the Korean War. Requests for air cover and for

strikes against the ambush forces operating along most of the

major roads were being processed much too slowly.”24 LeMay

recommended that to correct all these things, airpower would

have to be centrally controlled by an air operations center

(AOC) using the facilities of the already established tactical air

control system (TACS). He added that the proper use of TACS

would eliminate much of the delay.25 The AOC of the 2d Air

Division was selected to fulfill the former recommendation.

Meanwhile, the latter recommendation would take longer to

resolve because all four services in Vietnam were using both

the South Vietnamese Air Force–USAF TACS and the US Army

air-ground system.

According to the Air Force, these dual systems resulted in a

lack of overall air efficiency and safety.26 To resolve this dispute, the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff eventually signed

a “Concept for Improved Joint Air-Ground Coordination” in

March and April 1965.27 This agreement specified that the

joint commander would determine the daily proportion of aircraft for CAS, air superiority, and interdiction missions. In

turn, the air commander had to report the apportionment for

CAS to the ground commander, who would then allocate the

CAS missions to his subordinate commanders. By early 1965,

this agreement also led the Army and Air Force to restructure

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TACS for more timely and responsive CAS, thereby fulfilling

LeMay’s recommendation.28 The focus of the new TACS was

TACC. TACC ordered all preplanned CAS missions to the

South Vietnamese Army and US Army forces.

Although the kinks in TACS had been worked out by the

start of Rolling Thunder in March 1965, the unity of control of

the Air Force assets employed against North Vietnam had not.

Instead of acting under a single commander, the air organizations operated under several different commanders. In Southeast Asia, Air Force assets were part of Thirteenth Air Force,

which was located in the Philippines and was subordinate to

the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander in Hawaii. In South

Vietnam, meanwhile, Air Force assets belonged to the 2d Air

Division (redesignated Seventh Air Force on 14 March 1966),

which was located at Tan Son Nhut airfield in South Vietnam.

The commander of the 2d Air Division was expected to perform

two roles: air component commander for MACV and forward

commander for Thirteenth Air Force (2d Air Division’s higher

echelon). Finally, Navy carrier air units in the Gulf of Tonkin

were organized as Task Force (TF)-77 and received their orders

from the Seventh Fleet and from the commander in chief

Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in Hawaii.29

In an effort to centralize control of airpower, the Air Force

sought to place carrier aircraft under the operational control

of CINCPACAF. However, CINCPACFLT preferred that the naval

air assets stay under his control. Specifically, the CINCPACFLT

wanted TF-77 to have the same relationship with the 2d Air

Division that it had with Fifth Air Force during the Korean

War.30 The commander in chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC)

concurred with CINCPACFLT on this issue; and in March

1965, PACAF was designated the “coordinating authority” for

Rolling Thunder.31 As was the case when FEAF was appointed

the “coordinating authority” for air operations during the Korean

War, such authority did not provide PACAF with operational

control over TF-77 during Vietnam.

As was the case during Korea, PACAF and the 2d Air Division still struggled to transform “coordinating authority” into

a harmonious relationship with TF-77. This impasse was

finally overcome by a proposal to divide North Vietnam into six

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“route packages,” or areas of operations, beginning at the

demilitarized zone.32 The Air Force was assigned three of the

areas—route packages one, four, and five—while the Navy was

assigned four. However, the Air Force did not consider this to

be an ideal solution. General Momyer represented the Air

Force’s view in stating, “Dividing North Vietnam into route

packages compartmentalized our airpower and reduced its

capabilities.”33 Consequently, the route package system,

which was a compromise effort to produce a unified and concentrated air effort, failed to effectively control two air forces

from two different services. While such an arrangement rested

outside of the control of the Air Force, it, nonetheless, had a

tremendous impact on Air Force operations and decisions.

Training

Despite the Kennedy administration’s new national security

strategy of flexible response, the Air Force’s training prior to

the Vietnam War remained locked to its nuclear-oriented doctrine. General McConnell stated in 1968 that “[The Air Force]

did not even start doing anything about tactical aviation until

about 1961 or 1962.”34

In September 1961, TAC teamed with the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), the Air Force Reserve, and the Army’s

82d and 101st Airborne Divisions to conduct Swift Strike, an

exercise that included more than 15,000 airborne troops.35 Of

the exercises that occurred up to 1965, perhaps the most

prominent was Operation Desert Strike, which was held in the

western United States and involved more than 100,000 soldiers and airmen.36 Fifteen squadrons from TAC flew from a

total of 25 airfields located between Texas and Oregon, and

MATS completed 2,500 tactical transport sorties. Consequently,

while TAC was engaged in tactical training during its largescale exercises prior to the Vietnam War, that training was not

focused heavily on missions such as air superiority and CAS.

In light of its inattention to CAS since the end of the Korean

War, the Air Force dismantled the TACS that successfully

directed strikes on the battlefields of World War II and Korea

and rebuilt a new one for Vietnam.37 The forward air controllers

(FAC) and their O-1 aircraft were an important component of

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the new control system. The aircrews who flew the O-1s in the

19th Tactical Air Support Squadron received training in visual

reconnaissance and strike control at the Tactical Air Command’s FAC School.38 While waiting to receive more than 100

more O-1s from the Army in early 1965, TAC accelerated its

training to ensure that three new squadrons of O-1s would be

available in Vietnam later that summer.

Meanwhile, SAC continued to train its bombers for its

nuclear mission. However, in light of the focus on flexible

response, this training was not intended to prepare bombers

only for a strategic role as had historically been the case. Rather,

the training was meant to mold SAC bombers into a conventional retaliatory force. The Kennedy administration was determined to optimize the use of the existing bomber force for this

purpose.39 In that light, the B-58 proved to be a particularly

valuable member of the retaliatory force. This was evident

from the B-58 training in 1961 alone that included flights from

New York to Paris, New York to Los Angeles and back, and

Tokyo to London. Similarly, the B-52 showed its prowess for

worldwide deployability with training flights of more than

12,500 miles from Okinawa to Spain and more than 11,300

miles during a route that began and ended in North Carolina.

Based on the Air Force’s focus on SAC, US aircrews were

very effective in employing nuclear weapons, but they were far

less effective in employing conventional weapons as the Vietnam

War approached. At the onset of Rolling Thunder, the average

circular error probable (the radius of a circle centered on the

target within which half of the bombs fall) was approximately

750 ft.40 Such a level of inaccuracy was relatively insignificant

when nuclear weapons were used. However, it could prove

very costly when trying to hit small targets with conventional

weapons. Conventional air training was so far behind that the

Air Force needed several years to improve the circular error

probable of its conventional bombing to roughly 365 ft.41

Equipment

In early 1965, the Air Force was only beginning to build up

its air strength in South Vietnam. At that time, the Air Force

had deployed more than 200 aircraft to the country. Just three

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years later, Air Force strength in South Vietnam consisted of

more than 750 aircraft.42 The increase in the number of KC135 refueling aircraft in Southeast Asia is a particularly telling

example of this buildup. In March 1965, four KC-135s were

based in Thailand; by 1972, that number was 110, not including the Okinawa-based tankers that supported B-52s.43 In

addition to the low number of aircraft at the start in Vietnam,

the Air Force also relied heavily on old aircraft that were near

the end of their useful service. The F-100, F-104, RF-101, and

F-102 are a few examples of such aircraft.

The most significant air-to-air threat facing USAF aircraft

during the initial period of operations in the Vietnam War was

the MiG-17. While the F-105 was faster at all altitudes than

the MiG-17, the MiG was far more maneuverable; and North

Vietnam’s ground-control intercept (GCI) radar network further enhanced the MiG’s capability by vectoring it directly to

ingressing F-105s. Since the F-105D had been developed to

employ tactical nuclear weapons, it was designed to ingress

and egress target areas at extremely high speeds. Thus, F-105s

“never tried to out turn or out climb a MiG.”44 Instead, F-105s

chose to outrun MiG-17s. To improve its performance against

the MiG-17, the Air Force began replacing the F-100Ds with

F-4Cs. The F-4C was superior to the F-100D in speed, acceleration, climb rate, and radar-intercept capability. Although it

lacked the maneuverability of the MiG-17, the F-4 could dictate the terms of an air-to-air engagement because of its

greater power.45

The Air Force’s CAS and interdiction capability underwent

significant improvements from 1964 to 1965. The impetus for

these improvements was the severe problems that the USAF

experienced with its B-26 bomber and T-28 air-to-ground aircraft. All of the B-26s and T-28s were grounded in 1964

because of flying mishaps attributed to wing failures. This

measure caused Maj Gen Joseph Moore, the commander of

the 2d Air Division, to state that “Second Air Division is practically out of business.”46 In May 1964, an excellent replacement was found in the Navy’s A-1 airframe. With its long loiter

times and large ordnance loads, the A-1 was ideally suited for

CAS operations. The only major weakness of the A-1 was its

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low airspeed, which occasionally resulted in long response

times to tasked targets.47

Following the authorization to employ jet aircraft in South

Vietnam, B-57 aircrews flew the first jet air strikes in South

Vietnam on 19 February 1965. Soon after, F-100 and F-4 jets

also began flying attack missions. The F-100, with its multiple

arrays of weapon loads, and the F-4, which could carry as many

as seventeen 750 lb bombs, represented a substantial increase

in firepower.48 Modified versions of USAF undergraduate training airframes, such as the T-38 (became the F-5) and T-37

(became the A-37), also joined the war effort in early 1965.49

The fact that each was highly maneuverable, maintainable,

and forgiving contributed to their success.

Air Superiority

The air superiority tactics employed in Vietnam were fundamentally different from those of Korea. In Korea, the USAF

achieved air superiority early. It maintained air superiority by

preventing Chinese air units from using the North Korean air

bases located behind the positions held by the Chinese army

in North Korea. It did so by damaging North Korean airfields.50

During the Vietnam War, on the other hand, the USAF’s protective fighter screen covered only Thailand and South Vietnam.

Therefore, the North Vietnamese air force (NVAF) operated

from airfields that were immune to attack until the third year

of the Rolling Thunder campaign.51 Additionally, in 1965 the

NVAF began bolstering its integrated air defense system by

gradually increasing its number of surface-to-air missiles

(SAM).52 Consequently, beginning in 1965, the Air Force carried

out air missions, such as interdiction, while simultaneously

trying to gain air superiority.

While the US Air Force was concerned about the air-to-air

threat in South Vietnam, the most significant threat facing US

aircraft at the beginning of 1965 was antiaircraft fire. At that

time, older US aircraft were ideally suited for missions over North

and South Vietnam. However, the North Vietnamese were also

rapidly increasing their air defense threat in 1965. In September

1964, North Vietnam had 22 early warning (EW) and four fire

control (FC) radars.53 By March 1965, the North Vietnamese had

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increased their EW radars to 31 and their FC radars to nine.54

SAMs would later pose a significant threat to USAF aircrews in

Vietnam. However, that was not the case as early as March 1965.

In fact, North Vietnam did not launch the first of thousands of

SA-2 SAMs at Air Force aircraft until July 1965.55

On 21 March 1965, Air Force aircraft began attacking North

Vietnamese supply routes south of the 20th parallel and gradually shifted their assault north. Over the first month of these

attacks, US aircraft did not face any NVAF fighters. However,

NVAF training proved its effectiveness when a MiG-17 first

downed a US aircraft on 4 April 1965.56 In response to the

increased MiG-17 threat, the Air Force deployed EB-66 electronic warfare aircraft to Southeast Asia in April 1965. The

EB-66s carried radar jammers that could mask the approach

of US strike aircraft and degrade the effectiveness of North

Korean GCI radars.57 As mentioned earlier, the F-4C was also

introduced into the Vietnam War at this time. The F-4’s

extended range AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided air-to-air missile

(AAM), and close range AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared AAM provided the F-4 with a tremendous air-to-air capability.

Even though the F-4 was not as maneuverable as the MiG-17,

the AIM-7 and AIM-9 allowed the F-4 to counter the MiG-17

without engaging in a dogfight. With its radar and AIM-9 capabilities, the F-4C could detect and destroy enemy aircraft before

they were close enough to pose a threat.58 However, in Vietnam,

the F-4 was unable to capitalize on these advantages, because

US Air Force rules of engagement (ROE) required that aircrews

identify aircraft visually before attacking them.59 Consequently,

when pursued by an F-4, a MiG-17 could stay just outside of

the effective threat envelope of the AIM-7 and use its maneuverability to overcome the high speed and acceleration of the

F-4. Although NVAF pilots did not achieve air superiority, they

did challenge US air dominance in Vietnam more so than Chinese pilots did in the Korean War.

Close Air Support

Because counterinsurgency operations provide only few and

fleeting opportunities for the employment of CAS, the CAS

system in Vietnam developed gradually, and that development

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was sometimes painful and uneven.60 In fact, after examining

this system in one study in 1965, the Air Force’s Special Air

Warfare Board concluded, “The present tactical air control system has grown up in the absence of a framework of doctrine for

the conduct of tactical operations.”61 General Momyer corroborated this conclusion when he stated that prior to 1965 “it

required a magician to figure out where the planes were flying.”62

To improve this situation, CINCPAC announced in April

1965 that the primary air mission in South Vietnam would be

CAS, with the highest priority given to troops in contact.63 CAS

sorties increased dramatically following this mandate from

approximately 2,000 sorties in January to more than 13,000

in December. This new focus on CAS required the Air Force to

perform a mission for which two decades of doctrine and training had poorly prepared it.64 This new emphasis on support of

the ground war differed greatly from the Air Force’s strategic

mission that had monopolized its attention since World War II.

While the CINCPAC mandate to focus on CAS was issued in

April 1965, the impetus for the change had already begun. The

Air Force provided advisors to each Army echelon down to the

battalion level. These advisors served as FACs and ALOs in

TACPs. In this arrangement, ground commanders would specify

targets, prioritization, and desired effects. The Air Force advisors,

meanwhile, would inform the ground commanders how tactical

airpower could best satisfy their requests. Even though FACs

had operated very effectively from the air during the Korean

War, the Air Force largely ignored this practice between the

Korean War and the beginning of US involvement in Vietnam,

preferring to limit FAC operations to the ground. For this reason,

the Air Force gave all of its light spotter planes to the Army

after the Korean War. It was not until 1963 that the Army provided the Air Force with O-1 aircraft for FAC training.65

On 9 March 1965, the Air Force removed most of the remaining restrictions on the use of jet aircraft in Vietnam. Removing

these restrictions required new tactics and procedures for

CAS. An important consideration in formulating these tactics

was striking a balance between attacking the target accurately

and avoiding ground fire. To achieve this balance, Air Force

pilots flew at 1,500 ft as frequently as possible, because the

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enemy used predominately small arms fire and antiaircraft

artillery (AAA) against ingressing aircraft. Air Force pilots also

devised a plan of attack to confuse the enemy forces and keep

them from determining from which direction the strikes would

come. A flight of four jets normally would coordinate with the

FAC, who would provide the flight leader with additional

details of the mission. The flight leader could then recommend

changes, and the FAC would determine whether to implement

them. Finally, the FAC would mark the target with smoke, and

the flight leader would strike the target while still operating

under control of the FAC.66

Despite improved coordination and practices, the CAS mission

continued to encounter difficulties. Ultimately, foliage, terrain,

and weather conditions of South Vietnam hindered CAS operations.67 More importantly, the nature of the war itself in March

and April 1965 was not ideally suited for CAS. Unlike conventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations rarely involved

definitive battles of large-scale forces. Instead, most engagements in Vietnam consisted of small-size hit-and-run raids by

the Vietcong that normally lasted 20 minutes or less.68 Consequently, very seldom did US aircrews have well-defined CAS

targets to attack. Even when they did, enemy soldiers usually

took cover before the aircrews arrived. Of note, USAF achieved

more favorable CAS results as larger battles developed in late

1965 and early 1966.69 However, such results remained elusive

in early 1965.

Interdiction

After the North Vietnamese and Vietcong attacked US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon in early 1965, President Lyndon

B. Johnson moved from a strategy of exchanging retaliatory

strikes to one of gradually increasing pressure.70 The first

strikes implementing this strategy were initiated in February

1965 in Operation Flaming Dart. These attacks were soon followed by those on 2 March 1965, which marked the start of

the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign that would continue

through October 1968.

The initial plans for Rolling Thunder called for attacks

against LOCs in Laos and below the 19th parallel in North

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Vietnam. Generals LeMay and McConnell—the Air Force chiefs

of staff immediately before and after February 1965, respectively—strongly argued that the initial view of Rolling Thunder

was overly restrictive. While they agreed that LOCs in the

southern part of North Vietnam were valid targets, they

thought the most significant elements of the enemy’s logistical

network were ports, railroads, marshalling yards, supply centers, and bridges in the northern part of North Vietnam. They

argued that attacks against hundreds of jungle trails in the

South would be less effective than attacks against key logistical

targets in the North.71

On 2 March 1965, the first Rolling Thunder attack struck

the Xom Bang ammunition depot just north of the 19th parallel.

The next attack, which targeted an island off the coast of Vietnam and another ammunition depot north of the 19th parallel,

was not conducted until 13 days later on 15 March.72 While

Air Force senior leaders were displeased with the focus and

irregularity of the bombing, they could not blame the process

for the poor results of the bombing operations. The bomb damage assessment of the Flaming Dart raids during February

1965 revealed that air attacks destroyed less than 10 percent

and damaged less than 5 percent of the 491 buildings that

were targeted.73 As mentioned earlier, the Air Force’s training

focus on nuclear bombing between the Korean and Vietnam

Wars largely accounted for this poor performance. While it

would take some time, the Air Force would improve its bombing effectiveness.

By the end of March, the purpose of Rolling Thunder had

shifted from attacking North Vietnam’s will to fight to interdicting the country’s supply routes. As a result, target selection became even more focused on interdiction targets such as

bridges, tunnels, rail lines, roads, river transportation, and

other key rail, road, and river chokepoints. Looking beyond

the initial period of operations, Rolling Thunder sorties flown

each week increased fourfold to fivefold from the outset of the

campaign.74 These attacks began to degrade North Vietnam’s

rudimentary transportation system. However, ultimately, the

Rolling Thunder attacks would not be successful in bringing

the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

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Conclusion

After the Korean War, the United States was convinced that

never again would it become involved in a war like the one in

Korea, where the full capability of the US military could not be

employed.75 Consequently, Air Force strategy and doctrine

remained as committed to nuclear deterrence and massive

retaliation as ever. While the Air Force attempted to develop

counterinsurgency doctrine, it essentially only paid lip service

to this form of warfare. Lack of joint doctrine also resulted in

a chaotic C2 structure that involved even less coordination and

integration of air operations than was the case in Korea.

Because much of the Air Force’s training prior to the Vietnam War corresponded with its nuclear-oriented strategy and

doctrine, US aircrews were very effective in employing nuclear

weapons but not conventional ones. However, unlike their

counterparts in the Korean War, these aircrews were able to

operate at airfields in-country for several years prior to the initial period of operations. This advantage likely assisted them

in making adjustments during that initial period, thus resulting

in improved CAS and interdiction operations. Additionally, the

A-1 and F-4 CAS aircraft that aircrews flew in Vietnam were

more effective than the F-51 and F-80 CAS platforms that aircrews flew in Korea. Yet, despite the employment of a new

fighter and AAMs, the Air Force was not as successful in

improving its air superiority capability. This diminished success was largely due to restrictive ROE and a robust North

Vietnamese effort to strengthen its air defense system as the

war ensued.

By the end of the Vietnam War, enemy tactics had evolved

from counterinsurgency to conventional force-on-force operations. Given that, as the US Air Force looked to the future, it

would once again be faced with the dilemma of predicting on

which type of war it should base its strategy and doctrine.

Desert Storm would reveal the answer to that dilemma.

Notes

1. John J. Sbrega, “Southeast Asia,” in Case Studies in the Development

of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History, 1990), 411.

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2. USAF Activities in Southeast Asia, 1954–1964, Project Corona Harvest

Final Report, 54/00/00–64/00/00, 4, USAF Historical Research Agency

(USAFHRA), K239.034-1.

3. Command and Control of Southeast Asia Air Operations, Project Corona

Harvest Final Report, USAFHRA, K239.034-4.

4. US House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958: Hearings

before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 85th Cong., 1st

sess., 1957, 120–21.

5. Command and Control of Southeast Asia Air Operations.

6. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia:

The Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History,

1981), 63.

7. William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington, D.C.:

Department of the Air Force, 1978), 9.

8. Ibid.

9. United States Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The

Defense Department History of United States Decision-Making on Vietnam

(Senator Mike) Gravel ed., vol. 3 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 208.

10. Ibid., 232.

11. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 1, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 441.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 399.

15. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1954, 13–14.

16. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 400.

17. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 2, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1961–1984 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 172.

18. Wray R. Johnson, Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars

(Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Co., 2001), 66.

19. Ibid., 67–68.

20. Ibid., 235.

21. AFMAN 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1959, i.

22. AFMAN 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1964, i.

23. Momyer, 73.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 73.

26. Ibid., 79.

27. Sbrega, 428.

28. Ibid., 430.

29. John J. Lane, Command and Control and Communications Structures

in Southeast Asia, Air War in Indochina Series, vol. 1, monograph 1 (Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1981), 40–60.

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30. Momyer, 90.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 53.

33. Ibid., 95.

34. Command and Control of Southeast Asia Air Operations.

35. Bernard C. Nalty, Winged Shield, Winged Sword, vol. 2, A History of

the United States Air Force, 1950–1997 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History

and Museums Program, 1997), 207.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 263.

38. John Schlight, The War in South Vietnam: The Years of the Offensive,

1965–1968 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), 24.

39. Ibid., 213.

40. Dennis M. Drew, Rolling Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 37.

41. George Weiss, “Tac Air: Present and Future Lessons, Problems, and

Needs,” Armed Forces Journal, September 1971, 31.

42. Thomas C. Hone, “Southeast Asia,” in Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.:

Center for Air Force History, 1994), 520.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 526.

45. Ibid.

46. Working Papers of Gen William W. Momyer, William Wallace Momyer

Collection 10, 1969, USAFHRA, file no. K168.7041-144.

47. Hone, 441.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 510.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. James Eastman et al., Aces and Aerial Victories: The United States Air

Force in Southeast Asia, 1965–1973 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Albert F. Simpson

Historical Research Center, 1976), 4.

54. Ibid.

55. Hone, 511.

56. Ibid., 526.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 528.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., 446.

61. Minutes, Army Air Forces: Air Documents Research Board, “Organizational and Functional Data,” chap. 38, USAFHRA, file no. K168.15-18.

62. Carl A. Pacharzina, “Seventh Air Force Concepts and Force Requirements,” summary sheet report of a trip to Southeast Asia, USAFHRA, file no.

K740.132.

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PURDHAM
63. Department of Defense Report by the Special Military Construction

Study Group, 19 July 1968, 23, USAFHRA, file no. K160.041-20.

64. Schlight, 33.

65. George W. McLaughlin, Seventh Air Force 1968 End of Tour Report,

Brig Gen G. W. McLaughlin, commander, 3d Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 September 1967–1 May 1968; director, TACC, 1 May 1968–1 May 1969, USAFHRA,

file no. K740.131.

66. Ibid., 19.

67. Gordon F. Blood, Seventh Air Force End of Tour Report, E/17-18,

deputy chief of staff for operations, Seventh Air Force, USAFHRA, file no.

K740.131.

68. Sbrega, 439.

69. Headquarters Seventh Air Force CHECO, and Headquarters PACAF

CHECO, DOAD, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report: Summaries of Published CHECO Reports (Honolulu, Hawaii: Headquarters PACAF, 1971), 2.

70. Momyer, 18.

71. Ibid.

72. Department of Defense (DOD) Study, United States—Vietnam Relations 1945–1967, bk. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,

1971), iv, 7.

73. Drew, 37.

74. DOD Study, bk. 5, chap. 7, (a):2.

75. Sbrega, 411.

44

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Chapter 4

Initial Period of Operations in Desert

Storm, 17 January–15 February 1991

What we did not learn was how to defeat a modern, welltrained, well-motivated, well-led force in a dynamic environment. We did not learn how to engage in a combat scenario

without any significant preparation time or how to engage in

an air operation where you did not have a large indigenous

infrastructure to depend on for support.

—Frank Kendall

—Undersecretary of Defense for

—Tactical Warfare Programs, 1991

The Soviet Union dramatically expanded its nuclear and

conventional military capability during and following the Vietnam War. While the Soviet nuclear buildup was of concern to

the United States, the United States was able to counter this

threat with its own robust nuclear capability. However, the

United States was not able to counter the rapidly expanding

Soviet conventional forces in the Warsaw Pact as easily. In

1986, Soviet and Warsaw Pact mechanized infantry divisions

in Eastern Europe numbered between 90 and 120. In contrast,

the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) could counter this threat with only 45 divisions. To

make matters worse, Soviet armored forces were prepositioned

in the forward area, poised to attack the weaker NATO forces

before US reinforcements could arrive on the scene.1

While the Soviet conventional military capability increased

during the 1970s, President Jimmy Carter’s administration

focused on countering the Soviet nuclear threat. The administration’s countervailing strategy was intended to “deter any

strategic exchange [with the Soviet Union] by insuring the

required overall survivability of our own strategic forces, together

with the maximum possible flexibility in their use.”2 Meanwhile, in the 1980s, the administration of President Ronald W.

Reagan emphasized the importance of increasing both the US

45
military’s strategic and conventional capabilities. When he

accepted the Republican Party’s presidential nomination in

1979, he stated, “America’s defense strength is at its lowest ebb

in a generation, while the Soviet Union is vastly outspending

us in both strategic and conventional arms.”3 Secretary of

Defense Caspar W. Weinberger corroborated the importance of

increased flexibility and capability in US security strategy in

March 1981 when he told a congressional hearing “Wars break

out over irreconcilable conflicts in vital interests. To cope with

that situation requires a far more comprehensive doctrine,

strategy, and policy. Neither mutual assured destruction nor

essential equivalence is sufficient for this purpose.”4

The concern of Soviet conventional military capability was

not based only on the increased strength of Soviet ground

forces. Rather, it was based on the substantial improvements

of the Soviet air force during the 1970s and 1980s. These

improvements included the introduction of MiG-23, MiG-29,

Su-27, and Su-24 aircraft as well as forward-hemisphere,

extended-range missiles. The upgrades in aircraft and

weapons enabled the Soviets to conduct head-on attacks

against NATO aircraft. This was a significant improvement

over the rear-only attack capability demonstrated by the

adversary during the Vietnam War. These upgrades and

increases in the Soviet air force played a role in the Reagan

administration’s decision to bolster the US conventional warfighting capability. The Air Force followed suit by modifying its

strategy to include not only strategic nuclear attacks but tactical conventional attacks as well.

Doctrine

The concern of the Soviet conventional threat to NATO

prompted the Air Force and Army to combine their efforts to

achieve and exploit their understanding of Soviet military doctrine and operations. In October 1973, the new commander of

TAC, Gen Robert J. Dixon, initiated a formal dialogue with Gen

William E. DePuy, the commander of the Army’s Training and

Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Dixon declared that the purpose

of this dialogue was to achieve “an unprecedented cooperative

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effort to develop concepts, procedures and tactics in order to

make the most efficient and effective use of existing forces.”5

General Dixon further believed that “neither the Army nor

the Air Force alone [could] win a significant conflict; they could

only win as a team.”6 Consequently, when the Army transitioned from its defensive war-fighting construct to a more

offensive one, the new strategy—known as AirLand Battle—

called for air and land assets to fight the close battle collectively, while air resources simultaneously attacked the enemy’s

second-echelon forces deep in his own territory. In 1982 the

Army updated FM 100-5 to reflect this new AirLand Battle

doctrine that emphasized the counteroffensive and the engagement of second-echelon forces. In April 1983, the two services

took this doctrine one step further when the Air Force and Army

chiefs of staff released a joint-service memorandum of agreement that specified how the two services would work together

in executing the AirLand Battle concept. This memorandum

involved several revolutionary concepts. As the Gulf War Air

Power Survey (GWAPS) points out, “The new doctrine recognized,

for the first time, the concept of a single air component commander and land component commander, and it also increased

the amount of joint coordination required between land and

air units in conducting tactical air support for land forces.”7

By this time, TAC and TRADOC began to examine how the

new AirLand Battle philosophy could be applied to regions

other than central Europe where contingencies were more

likely to occur. One of these regions was the Persian Gulf.8

When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)—the

predecessor of US Central Command (USCENTCOM)—was

formed in early 1980, the Army and Air Force components,

later US Army Forces Central Command (USARCENT) and US

Air Forces Central Command (USCENTAF) adopted the AirLand Battle procedures during their exercises and contingency

plans. As a result of its components’ focus on AirLand Battle,

CENTCOM was familiar with joint Air Force-Army operations

upon its activation in January 1983.

Despite these gains in Army–Air Force battlefield coordination in 1983, CENTCOM’s exercise Internal Look in 1990 did

not include AirLand Battle. While airpower did support ground

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PURDHAM
forces in this exercise, it did so in a new mission. Lt Gen

Charles A. Horner, CENTAF commander, called this new mission “Push CAS.” Horner intended for Push CAS to maintain

constant airpower over the battlefield to ensure that CAS was

always immediately available to the Army. If CAS was not

needed, these Push CAS sorties would be “rerouted” to an

interdiction role. This concept that Horner employed and Gen H.

Norman Schwarzkopf supported in Internal Look became

CENTAF’s standard operating procedure when Desert Storm

began six months later.9 Because Push CAS differed from the

AirLand Battle concept that was practiced in NATO, Desert

Storm ground commanders who had been stationed in NATO

were very frustrated with this practice. Lt Gen Frederick Franks

was arguably the most vocal in voicing that frustration.

The greatest obstacle facing the Air Force and Army was the

fact that AirLand Battle was not a joint doctrine. Consequently, even though the two services agreed on some issues,

particularly that close air support was important and it should

be an Air Force mission, they disagreed about the two following issues: (1) the influence senior ground commanders

should exercise over Air Force interdiction operations and (2)

the process for coordinating the effects of fixed-wing air and

extended-range Army systems.10 As Dr. Harold R. Winton contends, “One can conclude that although very significant agreement existed at the tactical level, noticeable divergence characterized the operational level.”11

The most contentious issue dividing the Army and Air Force

concerned the two services’ interpretation of the fire support

coordination line (FSCL). The ground commander controlled

and coordinated any air operations in direct support of the

land battle inside of the FSCL, while the joint force air component commander (JFACC) exercised control of air operations

beyond the FSCL. The Army’s interpretation of AirLand Battle

resulted in the Army pushing the FSCL further back, thereby,

increasing the territory within which the Air Force had to coordinate its strikes. Although the FSCL was not intended to be a

boundary, it became one in Desert Storm. Consequently, as

the FSCL continued to be pushed back as the VII and XVIII

Corps advanced during the ground offensive, the Air Force

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refused to fly interdiction short of the FSCL.12 Meanwhile, the

corps did not use their allocation of CAS sorties because they

were not in contact with Iraqi forces.13 This confusion between

the Army and Air Force may have contributed to the escape of

two Iraqi Republican Guard divisions to Iraq.

As important as the Air Force and Army doctrinal changes

were, perhaps the most significant doctrinal development was

the Defense Reorganization (Goldwater–Nichols) Act of 1986,

which redistributed power among the unified commands, the

JCS, and the military services. It further empowered the

CINCs and the chairman of the JCS by bestowing on them new

responsibilities in resource allocation as well as national security planning and operations.14 This reorganization had a dramatic impact on the JFC. Yet, while this legislation gave birth

to the role of a JFACC, this role would not likely have matured

in Desert Storm if not for General Schwarzkopf’s delegation of

the entire air offensive to Horner.

Command and Control

In his book, AirLand Combat: An Organization for Joint Warfare, Col Thomas A. Cardwell III concludes that Desert Storm

marked “the first time the US did not experiment with a command structure, but used the one specified in joint publications. Specifically, the use of a JFACC allowed the joint force

commander, CINCCENT, to effectively conduct the war.”15 As a

single joint force air commander, the JFACC brought a level of

unity of command to Desert Storm that was not observed in

Korea or Vietnam. Particularly, the JFACC exercised tactical

control over all air assets by providing “detailed and, usually,

local direction and control of movements and maneuvers necessary to accomplish mission or tasks assigned.”16

Consequently, General Horner’s role as the JFACC represents perhaps the most significant difference between the airpower operations in Desert Storm and those in Korea and Vietnam. No longer was the Air Force commander authorized only

coordination control over Navy and Marine Corps air assets as

had been the case in Korea and Vietnam. Rather, the JFACC

served as the focal point for air planning and employment

decisions. As a result of this arrangement, “Centralized control

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PURDHAM
and decentralized execution became the norm.”17 Further, not

only did the JFACC gain tactical control over the aircraft of the

Navy and Marine Corps but he also gained operational control

of the SAC bombers that were tasked for Desert Storm. In the

process, “two generations of command and control problems

went away nearly overnight.”18

Despite these improvements in C2, some of the practices

from Korea and Vietnam continued—albeit to a lesser degree—

during Desert Storm. While the concept of route packages was

not officially practiced in Desert Storm as it was in Vietnam,

the Air Force sorties flown from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey

against targets in northern Iraq were similar in practice to

route packages. This operation, known as Proven Force, was

responsible for attacking targets north of 34.5 degrees north

latitude in Iraq.19 The greatest difference from the Vietnam

route packages is that Proven Force aircraft eventually attacked

targets further south, and other coalition aircraft later struck

targets in northern Iraq.

The air tasking order (ATO) was also a critical means for the

JFACC to carry out C2 of his air assets, because it contained

all of the sorties the JFACC desired to be flown. Thus, ATOs

approved by the JFACC were directive in nature and guided

the actions of the relevant component commanders. However,

the ATO process involved a very complicated organizational

architecture. GWAPS describes this complex architecture as

one that “combines technology, compartmented information,

many people having myriad occupational specialties and perspectives, sometimes conflicting organizational responsibilities,

and numerous agencies—with so many linkages and pathways that naming, let alone tracing, all the connections may

be impossible.”20 Thus, the interdependent and interlocked

nature of the ATO process increases the potential for C2 failures.

“At some point,” adds GWAPS, “the system may become so

complicated that Gulf War–type organizational ad hoc solutions

or fixes may be inadequate.”21

One of the greatest obstacles at the beginning of Desert

Storm was disseminating the ATO to the deployed units. A

combination of systems was first used to transmit the ATO to

deployed wings. The computer assisted force management

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system (CAFMS) later replaced these systems and transmitted

the ATO throughout the theater. Eventually, CAFMS was

linked directly to wing operations centers, control and reporting centers, air support operations centers, and the Marine

Corps Tactical Air Operations Center. By 24 December 1990,

CENTAF received the eight central processors it needed to

complete its ATO dissemination network in the theater. However, because the Navy did not have CAFMS terminals and it

operated under a different communications format, the Air

Force transmitted the ATOs to Navy carriers via three different

systems in succession.22

The TACS was another critical factor to effective C2 of air

operations during Desert Storm. As stated in GWAPS:

TACS is the working manifestation of what Air Force personnel refer to

as “centralized control and decentralized execution.” As such, its conceptual architecture is straightforward. AWACS [airborne warning and

control system] aircraft, for example, monitor the movement of friendly

and hostile aircraft, pass their pictures of the air situation to fighters

and ground command centers, and then direct other aircraft to carry

out the orders which commanders on the ground give to that portion

of the TACS.23

Development of TACS was delayed by the CINC’s decision to

put a higher priority on the movement of combat units into

theater. Despite this, by the end of 1990, CENTAF had completed

a working multinational TACS. The TACS integrated the capabilities of the E-3 AWACS, Navy E-2C, airborne battlefield command and control center, E-8A joint surveillance target and

attack radar system (JSTARS), and numerous other aircraft and

capabilities.24 With such a network, General Horner believed

that he had real-time control of the air. Although he did not,

he came closer than any previous air component commander.

Training

Due to the lackluster US air-to-air performance in Vietnam,

the Air Force in 1973 began to focus on dissimilar air combat

training (DACT). The Air Force believed that the value of airto-air training between like aircraft was limited, because it

revealed only who was the better pilot. Meanwhile, DACT

allowed pilots to better leverage their aircraft’s advantages

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PURDHAM
against an adversary’s weaknesses. As a result of this new

focus on DACT, General Momyer, the TAC commander, activated the first aggressor squadron at Nellis AFB, Nevada, in

June 1973. The aggressor squadron flew DACT against the

aircrews attending Fighter Weapons School at Nellis.

Instead of following USAF tactics and doctrine, the aggressor

squadron used those of the Soviet air force.25 Consequently,

Fighter Weapons School pilots familiarized themselves with the

air-to-air tactics they could expect to encounter in engagements

with Soviet aircrews. To do so, the aggressor squadrons received

the F-5E. With its long-range radar and significant maneuverability, the F-5E demonstrated the characteristics of the Soviets’

most advanced fighter—the MiG-23. Additionally, each aggressor

squadron relied heavily on GCI controllers to emulate the

Soviets’ rigid and close control over aircraft maneuvers.

The most intense DACT flying took place during Red Flag

exercises, which simulated a wartime environment at Nellis AFB.

Vietnam also revealed that a pilot’s performance during his

first 10 sorties in combat was critical to his long-term combat

survival.26 Those who were well prepared for and learned quickly

from those first 10 missions were normally those who survived

their tours of duty. Those who failed to prepare and learn did

not survive. The purpose of Red Flag was to provide pilots with

training that equated to 10 combat sorties, thereby, increasing pilots’ probability of survival during combat. The fact that

aircrews described Red Flag as “the heart-pumpinest, palmsweatinest war we have” attests to the realism with which this

exercise simulated combat flying.27

Gen Wilbur L. Creech, who succeeded General Dixon as the

commander of TAC, expanded the command’s training program

by initiating the following exercises: Green Flag (Nellis AFB),

Maple Flag (Cold Lake, Canada), Blue Flag (Eglin AFB, Florida),

Checkered Flag (home bases), and Copper Flag (Tyndall AFB,

Florida).28 These exercises trained aircrews on sophisticated

and realistic electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air

defenses, ground-attack, air superiority, and mission employment training.

Seven years after the first Red Flag was conducted, TAC

began to tailor Red Flag to a contingency in Southwest Asia. In

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doing so, aircrews could familiarize themselves with the requirements, demands, and environment they could expect to face in

that theater. To further enhance the realism of aircrew training, Air Force leadership initiated a program that allowed aircrews to conduct live air-to-air and air-to-ground attacks at

Tyndall AFB and Eglin AFB, respectively. Such an opportunity

enabled pilots to learn valuable lessons about weapons

employment prior to rather than during combat. Aircrews who

flew in the Korean and Vietnam Wars did not have the luxury

of learning these lessons before entering those conflicts.

The Air Force’s lackluster air-to-air performance over the

skies of Vietnam also revealed the importance of specialized

aircrew training. In an effort to improve in that area, the Air

Force required aircraft to focus on either an air-to-air role or

an air-to-ground role—not both. In the process, the Air Force

abandoned the welded-wing tactic that had restricted its Vietnam performance and replaced it with the “fluid two,” which

paralleled the “loose deuce” approach practiced by the Navy.29

Both Air Force fighter pilots in a two-ship formation were now

free to engage the enemy, thereby dramatically increasing

their effectiveness. This tactic was taken one step further

when the Interceptor Weapons School at Tyndall AFB integrated “Six Pack” tactics with the F-106.30

The Air Force’s air-to-ground training was not to be outdone

by these significant improvements in air-to-air training. The

Air Force increased its focus on training at low-altitude in

high-threat environments. Pilots indicated that the stress they

experienced from this training was far greater than that during air-to-air training. As one pilot shared, “It’s a demanding

mission and not for the faint of heart or those behind the

power curve.”31 This training involved sophisticated threat

avoidance techniques such as low-level terrain masking to

avoid enemy radar detection and maneuvering to escape the

AAA and man-portable SAM threats.

This increased emphasis on training would prove to be very

valuable during Desert Storm. Because a strike package

against a target in the Baghdad area might include a variety of

air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft, aircrew familiarity with

other aircraft operations was critical. The experience mission

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PURDHAM
and package commanders gained from Red Flag and other

large-scale exercises provided them with knowledge on planning, coordinating, and executing missions involving large

strike packages.32 In fact, GWAPS stated, “Red Flag had provided the Air Force with a solid basis on which to plan and

execute strikes involving multiple types of aircraft.”33

In an effort to ensure aircrews were well prepared to conduct operations over Iraq, General Horner continued to train

aircrews once they arrived in-theater. While Horner strove to

make these exercises as realistic as possible, he raised the

minimum training altitude for fighter aircraft to 1,000 ft after

a series of accidents occurred in early October. He permitted

only the B-52s to practice missions at 500 ft.34 While these

changes were attributed to safety considerations, they mirrored the practice during the air campaign of flying above

10,000 ft as opposed to low level. Additionally, the heavy sortie

flow during the first several days of Desert Storm meant that

the risk of coalition aircraft flying into each other would be

high. To reduce this risk, Horner continued to increase the

size and scope of training exercises. The hour-long exercises

that began with a dozen aircraft in September became weeklong exercises with more than 2,000 sorties in November.35

Equipment

While USAF aircrews were well trained upon entering Desert

Storm, the systems employed by those aircrews also added to

the USAF’s overwhelming advantage over Iraq in Desert Storm.

During the almost 20 years between Vietnam and Desert

Storm, the Air Force fielded several improvements in aircraft,

weapons, and capabilities.

In 1978, the F-4G replaced the F-105G as the primary aircraft for defense suppression. It was equipped with a new antiradiation missile (ARM) and high-speed ARM. Meanwhile, the

F-15E became operational in 1989 as a supplement to and eventual replacement for the F-111. The F-15E’s capabilities included

day-night, adverse-weather, extended-range, and increased

payload. Perhaps the aircraft that represented the greatest

advancement between Vietnam and Desert Storm was the

F-117, which was used operationally for the first time in

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December 1989 during the Panamanian invasion. Its stealth

and precision-strike capabilities enabled it to attack targets

well within the enemy’s threat envelope without the aid of a

large defense suppression package. This ability allowed the

F-117 to capitalize on the element of surprise while reducing

the risk to additional aircrews.

Consequently, by the time of Desert Storm in 1991, some of

the post–Vietnam War aircraft had been in the Air Force operational inventory for over a decade, while others had for less

than a year. Thus, as Eliot A. Cohen and Thomas A. Keaney

pointed out in Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian

Gulf, “It was the combination of US capabilities coalition, not

all of which were based on advanced technologies, that made

airpower so predominant [in Desert Storm].”36 Cohen and

Keaney summarized the technological advantage as follows:

The F-117s, Tomahawk missiles, and conventional air-launched cruise

missiles delivered conventional warheads with great precision,

unchecked by Iraqi defenses. Airborne warning and control aircraft

monitored Iraqi and coalition flight activity, and the JSTARS aircraft

monitored and targeted Iraqi ground forces throughout the Kuwaiti

theater. In addition, satellites and airborne platforms provided communications, precise navigation, and reconnaissance information to

air and ground forces.37

In addition to the newest aircraft, a variety of tried-and-true

aircraft supported the Air Force effort. F-111s, A-6s, and B-52s

performed air strikes involving both advanced precisionguided and unsophisticated unguided bombs. Strike missions

were also critically reliant on aircraft, such as F-4Gs, EA-6Bs,

and A-7s, which destroyed enemy radars; as well as aircraft,

such as EF-111s and EA-6Bs, which electronically jammed

radars. Tanker aircraft, such as KC-10s and KC-135s, also

made it possible for the Air Force to conduct mass formations

of aircraft. Likewise, these operations would not have been

possible if not for the airlift platforms—the C-5s and C-141s—

that brought assets to the theater.38

Aircraft munitions had also undergone significant improvements since Vietnam. The AIM-7F and AIM-9L upgrades

represented the principal improvements in air-to-air combat.

The AIM-7F was a semi-active radar missile with a beyondvisual-range capability, and the AIM-9L was an infrared missile

55

PURDHAM
intended for close-in engagements. While each of these missiles could be launched at a target from any aspect within the

missile’s range, the AIM-9L involved a substantial improvement. Its all-aspect capability enabled the pilot to fire its missile head-on against an enemy aircraft before it entered dogfight range. In addition to the upgrades in air-to-air weapons,

air-to-ground munitions were also enhanced after Vietnam.

These weapons included precision-guided bombs, laserguided penetrator weapons, AGM-80 HARMs, runway-attack

munitions, and imaging infrared antitank missiles.39

Air Superiority

GWAPS stated that during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi pilots had

not only avoided air-to-air engagements but had generally broken off strike missions and returned to base if their aircraft

received a radar lock-on from an Iranian fighter.40 Consequently,

coalition air planners devised a twofold strategy for achieving

air superiority. First, coalition aircraft would destroy Iraq’s

ground-based air defenses. Second, they would decrease the

will of the Iraqi pilots to such an extent that none would take

off at all.41

To achieve the former, the coalition sought to destroy Iraq’s

KARI system—which provided C2 throughout its air defense

network—and its robust radar-guided SAM capability.42 The

coalition initially sought to achieve this objective by conducting precision-guided, hard-target penetrating bomb attacks by

F-117s against hardened targets such as the KARI sector

operations centers and interceptor operations centers. A-10s

also strafed numerous reporting posts in remote areas of Iraq

during the first few days of the war. However, more strikes followed against KARI using a combination of guided and unguided

bombs such as the GBU-10 and GBU-24 A/B (2,000 lb warhead). Thus, as GWAPS suggests, “A-10s and F-117s were used

to blind and paralyze the system; thereafter, bombing, predominantly with nonprecision weapons, was used to keep the

system ineffective in coordinating the defense of Iraqi airspace.”43 The objective of this effort was to degrade Iraq’s

capabilities to coordinate the defense of its airspace with its

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fighter-interceptors and radar-guided SAMs. This was achieved

after just a couple of days of coalition air attacks.

In suppressing Iraq’s radar-guided SAMs, the coalition’s

intent was to convince Iraqi SAM operators on the first day of

the war that they would be attacked if they activated their firecontrol radars sufficiently long to guide their missiles into

coalition aircraft. To achieve this, the coalition employed complex attacks. In particular, F-117s first struck Iraqi SAM sites

using precision-guided munitions. These attacks were followed

soon afterward by Tomahawk land attack missile strikes. Next,

large numbers of BQM-74 drones entered Iraqi airspace simulating the speeds, profiles, and radar signatures of attacking

fighter-bombers. Falsely associating these drones with actual

aircraft, Iraqi air defenses activated their radars in an effort to

acquire, target, and engage the drones. This enabled large

packages of fighter-bombers, supported by standoff jammers,

to follow the drones and fire HARMs against the unsuspecting

Iraqi SAM sites. Meanwhile, F-4Gs targeted individual enemy

emitters. While these tactics did not result in the destruction

of all of Iraq’s SAM threats, they did cause Iraqi SAM crews to

become increasingly disinclined to employ their weapons.

Even when they did, they typically launched their missiles ballistically with no guidance from their radars.44

The second aspect of the coalition’s air-superiority strategy

was to neutralize Iraq’s air-to-air capability. The coalition

sought to achieve this objective by defeating Iraqi aircrews in

the air and by destroying Iraqi airfields. Coalition aircrews

shot down 14 Iraqi aircraft between 17 and 19 January 1991.

These results almost single-handedly grounded the Iraqi air

force for the remainder of the war. The overwhelming advantage of USAF pilot proficiency over that of Iraqi pilots contributed to the coalition’s air-to-air success during the first

three days of the war. The Iraqi pilots shot down during that

time usually did not react to radar lock-ons by coalition fighters and performed almost no effective maneuvering.45 Another

key to the coalition’s air-to-air success was the ROE enabling

an AWACS to authorize coalition pilots to fire beyond visual

range once a target was known to be hostile and no friendly

aircraft were at risk.46

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Neutralizing Iraq’s air-to-air capability also included isolating Iraq’s aircraft at their airfields. The coalition conducted

this effort during the first five days of the war by striking the

runways. After this time, the focus of the coalition effort shifted

to the hardened aircraft bunkers and shelters. This was done

largely because Iraqi flight activity was already declining precipitously by the end of the first week of the war. Thus, on the

night of 22 January 1991, this campaign began with F-111s

employing laser-guided GBU-10s and GBU-24s. F-117s also

played a large role in this effort due to their precision-guided,

hard-target kill capability.

By achieving this objective, coalition forces encountered

several unforeseen difficulties. First, Iraq was able to play a

shell game by moving aircraft in and out of shelters. This prevented coalition aircraft from destroying both an aircraft and

a shelter with a single laser-guided bomb. Second, F-111s,

with their forward-looking infrared sensor, rarely were able

to detect an aircraft in the open during their night sorties.

Third, Iraq flew many of its aircraft to Iran. Trying to intercept

these aircraft before they traveled the short distance to the

Iranian border was an extremely difficult task.

Close Air Support

According to Air Force Doctrine Document 1, “CAS consists

of air operations against hostile targets in close proximity to

friendly forces.”47 In the case of Desert Storm, Iraqi troops

were not in close proximity to coalition ground forces until the

ground war began on 24 February 1991. Consequently, with

the possible exception of the Al Khafji battle in late January

1991, CAS was not employed during the initial period of operations (17 January–16 February) of Desert Storm.

GWAPS concluded, “The lack of determined Iraqi resistance

made close air support a rather peripheral aspect of [the

entire] war.”48 This was caused by the bombing operations

against Iraqi troops. The survey also stated that another reason

for the limited number of fixed-wing CAS sorties was that

artillery, rockets, or helicopters struck the regions close-in to

the ground forces, while fixed-wing CAS was employed at

extended range from the forward troops.49 For these reasons,

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FACs often turned back CAS-dedicated aircraft with their ordnance. As a result, primary CAS aircraft, such as A-10s and

AV-8Bs, flew far fewer CAS missions than expected. A-10s did

not drop their bombs in 316 of 909 (35 percent) missions,

while AV-8Bs had fewer missions with drops (131) than without them (143).50

Several fixed-wing CAS operations took place between 25

and 27 February 1991. The first involved support of the 1st

Armored Division of the VII Corps, which came in contact with

Iraqi forces during its advance north on the morning of 25

February. According to The Whirlwind War: The United States

Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the 1st

Division called in fixed-wing CAS strikes when it was about 35

to 40 miles away from its objective.51 These strikes were followed by attack helicopter strikes. When the division is close

to within 10 to 15 miles, artillery, rocket launchers, and tactical

missile batteries then delivered preparatory fires. Operations

then proceeded as follows: “psychological operations teams

broadcast surrender appeals. If the Iraqis fired on the

approaching Americans, the attackers repeated artillery,

rocket, and missile strikes . . . that sequence was enough to

gain the surrender of most Iraqi Army units in a given objective.”52 The 1st Division also directed fixed-wing CAS and

attack helicopter sorties on an Iraqi brigade position prior to a

subsequent attack on the afternoon of 25 February. These

attacks destroyed artillery pieces, several vehicles, and resulted

in the 1st Division taking almost 300 prisoners.

GWAPS also states, “A-10s were called to strike the positions

of the Iraqi Tawakalna Division on 26 February, prior to what

came to be called the Battle of 73 Easting.”53 While these sorties

served to prepare the battle area, The Whirlwind War, which

GWAPS cites in this instance, states that fixed-wing aircraft

did not provide CAS during the battle itself. Rather, it indicates that for four hours on that day the 2d Armored Cavalry

Regiment of the VII Corps “killed tanks and armored personnel

carriers while attack helicopters knocked out artillery batteries.”54 Despite these successes, the CAS that USAF aircrews

performed in support of the VII Corps was not mistake free. One

friendly fire incident occurred in the afternoon of 27 February.

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USAF A-10 aircraft that were supporting the British advance

mistakenly fired on two infantry vehicles, killing nine British

soldiers.55

Fixed-wing CAS was also provided to the 24th Mechanized

Infantry Division of the XVIII Airborne Corps on 26 and 27

February.56 The 24th Division was tasked to seal the Iraqis’

escape route along the Euphrates River. One of its objectives

was to secure Tallil airfield, which was located about 20 miles

south of the town of An Nasiriyah. While advancing toward

this objective on 26 February, the 24th Division orchestrated

six USAF fixed-wing CAS sorties against two enemy mechanized battalions and one enemy artillery battalion. Subsequently, at midday on 27 February, the division directed heavy

artillery and rocket launcher preparations, followed by 28

fixed-wing CAS sorties, against Tallil airfield. According to Maj

Jason K. Kamiya, the deputy G-3 of the 24th Mechanized

Infantry Division, the division destroyed six MiG aircraft, three

helicopters, four ZSU 23-4 artillery pieces, and two T-55 tanks

after advancing across the newly cratered runway at Tallil.57

After the seizure of this airfield, the 24th Division oriented

east, and a new series of phase lines was drawn between the

Tallil airfield and the Ar Rumaylah oil fields.

The coalition air planners made several discoveries regarding CAS employment during the four-day ground offensive.

First, these planners utilized kill boxes, which were specific

areas within which aircrews were to attack Republican Guard.

This methodology became known as Push CAS because it

prepositioned CAS aircraft over enemy ground forces. Second,

coalition aircrews discovered that general-purpose bombs

dropped from medium altitude (15,000 ft) were not capable of

destroying armor targets. Bombing accuracy varied from 320

ft for the F-15E to 1,040 ft for the A-10, and this did not

account for sighting error.58 In an effort to improve these

results, Horner authorized A-10s to decrease their attack altitudes from 15,000 to 4,000–7,000 ft, and the weapon of choice

against Iraqi armor was changed from general-purpose to

laser-guided bombs.59 Third, as a result of testing during the

first week of February, F-111s determined that their infrared

sensors could differentiate the hot skin of tanks at night from

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the cooler sand of the desert. Due to this discovery, coalition

planners tasked most of the F-111 sorties, about one-half of

the F-15E sorties, and some of the A-6 sorties against Iraqi

armor, particularly tanks.60 These actions substantially

increased the number of Iraqi armor and artillery kills by

coalition aircrews.

Air attacks had degraded the resistance of Iraqi ground

troops tremendously by the time of the ground offensive. For

this reason, coalition forces did not often require CAS. However, in those cases when fixed-wing CAS was tasked, coalition

aircrews performed effectively. Such was the case in support

of the 1st Armored Division on 25 February and the 24th

Mechanized Infantry Division on 26 and 27 February. In the

process of performing CAS, Horner and the coalition aircrews

also demonstrated creativity and flexibility in modifying their

altitude and tactics to improve their mission performance.

Interdiction

“Our strategy to go after this enemy is very, very simple.

First, we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it.”61

These words by Gen Colin L. Powell during a news briefing on

23 January 1991 clearly indicate that an important part of the

coalition strategy during Desert Storm was to isolate the Iraqi

army. To achieve this, Central Command developed plans “to

sever Iraqi supply lines throughout all phases of Operation

Desert Storm.”62 Coalition air interdiction operations against

Iraqi supply routes, bridges, and railroad yards were an

important part of those plans. Air interdiction was expected to

weaken the enemy’s defense against the coalition’s ground

offensive by depriving the Iraqi army of ammunition, petroleum,

oils, and lubricants, food, water, and other essential supplies.

The coalition also wanted to prevent Iraqi forces from departing Kuwait intact.63 The principal LOCs between Baghdad, the

main military supply center, and the Kuwaiti theater usually

followed and often crossed rivers. For this reason, coalition air

planners viewed bridges as the key targets for isolating the

theater. This section addresses both types of these interdiction

operations—those directed toward supply (or logistics) and those

directed toward force (or mobility).64

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Coalition air planners tasked numerous types of aircraft for

interdiction operations, including F-16s, F-111s, F-117s, and

GR-1s. While these aircraft employed both free-fall bombs and

precision-guided munitions (PGM), the F-111s, F-117s, and

GR-1s collectively accounted for more than 80 percent of the

PGM strikes during the war.65 Through these efforts, coalition

aircrews destroyed or heavily damaged 46 highway and railway bridges, which accounted for more than one-half of those

placed on the Master Target List.66 Of these bridges, about

two-thirds were located along the LOCs from Baghdad to the

theater. The Iraqis attempted to overcome destruction on their

highway bridges with temporary bridges, causeways, and ferry

vehicles. In mid-February, F-16s, F-15Es, and F-111s flew

armed reconnaissance missions along key river areas to thwart

Iraqi efforts to maintain river crossings on the main LOCs.

They destroyed 31 pontoon bridges during these operations.67

While Iraq made attempts to overcome coalition interdiction

strikes against its highway bridges, it was unable to do so with

the strikes against its single-track railway bridges. In fact, the

damage from strikes against several key rail bridges precluded

traffic between Baghdad and the Kuwaiti theater.68 The loss of

the railroad system was very significant. According to a 1990

Army intelligence report, the rail net had been the principal

means for transporting armor and self-propelled artillery from

central Iraq to the theater before the air offensive.69 Consequently, together with the damage of the highway bridges, the

destruction of the rail system severely impacted Iraq’s ability

to move additional heavy ground equipment into the Kuwaiti

theater.

Another key aspect of the coalition interdiction effort was air

attacks against Iraq’s supply vehicles. Iraqi convoys backed up

at damaged and destroyed bridges were vulnerable targets.

During much of February, coalition attack aircraft, especially

F-16s, flew armed reconnaissance missions along sections of

the key highways leading into the Kuwaiti theater.70 These

missions not only destroyed supply trucks but also placed all

Iraqi military traffic on the highways at risk. Even when Iraq

tried to overcome these strikes by moving to nighttime resupply

operations, these efforts proved fruitless against the coalition

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aircraft’s night capability.71 Iraq’s shift from convoys to single

truck resupply efforts was also counterproductive because it

dramatically reduced the amount of supplies reaching the

theater each day.72

Prisoners of war (POW) stated during interrogations after

the war that their units had suffered from significant supply

shortages. They especially cited distribution problems within

the Kuwaiti theater that resulted in a lack of food and water.73

The troops began experiencing these food shortages shortly

after 17 January—the start of the coalition’s air offensive.

Many of the POWs who complained of these shortages were

from frontline infantry units and cited lack of food as a key

reason for their surrender.74 Consequently, while coalition air

strikes may not have been the only factor in Iraq’s distribution

problems, they were without question a very significant one.

Conclusion

As James A. Winnefeld and Dana J. Johnson conclude in

Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control,

1942–1991, the Air Force was fully prepared for the Persian

Gulf War in doctrinal and organizational terms. Additionally,

unlike its entry into the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Air

Force was equipped with a state-of-the-art and well-trained

conventional force structure upon its entry into Desert Storm.

However, improved C2 was perhaps the greatest factor that

aided air operations in Desert Storm. The establishment of a

JFACC, the development of the ATO process, and the implementation of TACS went a long way in eliminating many of the

problems that had hampered the coordination and integration

of air operations in Korea and Vietnam.

As for the air operations themselves, coalition air forces rapidly achieved air superiority—even securing air supremacy

after two weeks of the air offensive. Consequently, air interdiction operations could then be conducted with impunity

against Iraqi LOCs and military forces. This, in turn, resulted

in the coalition ground forces requiring few CAS sorties in

support of the four-day ground offensive. Therefore, while

coalition air forces were able to effectively adapt during Desert

Storm’s initial period of operations, they were not required to

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do so to the same degree as their counterparts did one and two

generations earlier in Korea and Vietnam. The reason for this

is that the strategy, doctrine, C2, training, and equipment of

USAF was far better tailored in 1991 for Desert Storm than

they were in 1950 and 1965 for Korea and Vietnam, respectively.

Notes

1. Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power

(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), 57.

2. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 2, Basic Thinking

in the United States Air Force, 1961–1984 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1989), 353.

3. Ibid., 364.

4. Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on

the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request, and FY 1983–1987

Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO],

1985), I-3.

5. Robert J. Dixon, “TAC-TRADOC Dialogue,” Strategic Review, winter

1978, 45.

6. Lambeth, 84.

7. Ibid., 87.

8. Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), “Command and

Control,” in vol. 1, pt. 2, Planning and Command and Control (Washington,

D.C.: GPO, 1993), 86.

9. Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 28.

10. Dr. Harold R. Winton, “An Ambivalent Partnership: US Army and Air

Force Perspectives on Air-Ground Operations,” in The Paths of Heaven: The

Evolution of Airpower Theory, ed. Phillip S. Meilinger (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

University Press, 1997), 429.

11. Ibid.

12. Terrance J. McCaffrey III, “What Happened to BAI? Army and Air

Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001”

(Master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2002), 42.

13. Ibid., 44.

14. James A. Winnefeld and Dana A. Johnson, Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942–1991 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval

Institute Press, 1993), 100.

15. Thomas A. Cardwell III, AirLand Combat: An Organization for Joint

Warfare (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1992), 37.

16. Winnefeld and Johnson, 125.

17. Ibid., 126.

18. Ibid., 121.

19. Ibid., 135.

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20. GWAPS, 262.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 116–17.

23. Ibid., 128.

24. Eliot A. Cohen and Thomas A. Keaney, Revolution in Warfare? Air

Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995),

160–62.

25. Lambeth, 60.

26. Ibid., 62.

27. Gerald Volloy, “Red Flag in Perspective,” USAF Fighter Weapons

Review, spring 1979, 1–5.

28. Timothy J. Brennan, “TAC’s New Flag,” USAF Fighter Weapons

Review, summer 1985, 21–24.

29. Barry D. Watts, “Fire, Movement and Tactics,” Topgun Journal,

fall/winter 1979, 4–24; and idem., “A Comparison of ‘Team’ and ‘SingleShip’ Approaches to Aerial Combat,” Bulletin of the ANG Fighter Weapons

School, spring/summer 1980, 6–69.

30. Lambeth, 77.

31. Clyde Phillips, “Air-to-Surface: Target Destruction with Force Survival,” USAF Fighter Weapons Review, spring 1977, 53.

32. GWAPS, 105.

33. Ibid., 105.

34. Ibid., 47.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 153.

37. Cohen and Keaney, 153.

38. Ibid., 153–55.

39. Lambeth, 77.

40. GWAPS, 127.

41. Ibid., 127, 128.

42. KARI (Iraq spelled backwards in French) was the air-defense command and control system that Iraq used to track airborne threats and allocate

particular tracks to fighters or radar-guided SAM batteries. It was designed,

built, and installed by the French firm Thompson CSF. On 17 January

1991, KARI consisted of early-warning and low-altitude radars, more than

two dozen operations centers, more than 100 reporting and control posts,

computers and software, line-of-sight microwave and troposcatter communication links, and hardware interfaces.

43. GWAPS, 137.

44. Ibid., 141.

45. Ibid.,122.

46. Ibid.

47. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1997, 49.

48. GWAPS, 245.

49. Ibid., 247.

50. Ibid., 245–46.

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51. Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War:

The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1995), 186.

52. Ibid.

53. GWAPS, 249.

54. Schubert and Kraus, 192.

55. Ibid., 197.

56. Jason K. Kamiya, A History of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division

Combat Team during Operation Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Library of

Congress, 1991), 29; and GWAPS, 239.

57. Kamiya, 29.

58. Viewgraph, SAF/AQPF Brief, “Desert Storm Lessons Learned Acquisition,” to the Defense Science Board Task Force, 5 September 1991.

59. GWAPS, 208.

60. Ibid., 209.

61. Ibid., 159.

62. Ibid., 170.

63. Ibid., 171.

64. Air Interdiction: Lessons from Past Campaigns (Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND Corporation, 1981).

65. Ibid., 178.

66. Ibid., 174.

67. Ibid., 186.

68. Ibid., 187.

69. Ibid., 190.

70. Ibid., 192.

71. Briefing, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-2, subject: Daily Bomb Damage

Assessment for Operation Desert Storm, 19–24 February 1991.

72. Report, Defense Intelligence Agency, Persian Gulf War: Trends and

Outlook, 19–24 February 1991.

73. GWAPS, 197.

74. Ibid., 198.

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Chapter 5

Analysis

To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of

preserving peace. In jet-atomic warfare, there will be no

room for gross errors of judgment. There will be no time,

should hostilities start, to correct mistakes in the types of

forces that we have provided, the manner in which they

have been organized and trained, or the way we fight.

—Lt Gen Laurence S. Kuter

Lessons from the initial period of operating in the Korean

War, Vietnam War, and Desert Storm hopefully provide doctrine and strategy makers with insights—as opposed to tools—

they can use to assist the Air Force in better preparing for and

adapting to future conflicts.

National security strategy influences national military strategy. National military strategy influences Air Force strategy.

Air Force strategy influences Air Force doctrine. Air Force doctrine influences training. And training determines the Air Force’s

preparation for conflict. Consequently, if one assumes these

relationships are valid, national security strategy ultimately

has a tremendous influence on the Air Force’s preparation for

conflict. It follows that Air Force strategy is likely to be well

suited for a given conflict if national security strategy forecasts

a conflict of that nature. Such was the case in Desert Storm.

For a decade prior to that conflict, the Reagan administration

emphasized both nuclear and conventional military capabilities.1 In following suit, USAF devised a well-trained and

equipped force capable of waging nuclear or conventional warfare effectively. Consequently, the Air Force performed very

effectively during the initial period of operations in Desert

Storm’s conventional environment.

In contrast, Air Force strategy is likely to be poorly suited for

a particular type of conflict if national strategy fails to foresee a

conflict of that nature. In the case of Korea, President Truman’s

massive retaliation policy led to the Air Force’s development of

67
a nuclear-focused strategy.2 Thus, the Air Force entered the

initial period of operations in Korea unprepared for a conventional environment. The Air Force’s situation prior to Vietnam

was different from that of either Desert Storm or Korea. Prior to

Vietnam, national strategy changed from Eisenhower’s nuclearoriented containment policy to Kennedy’s flexible response

policy, which emphasized unconventional warfare.3 USAF,

mired in debate on how to adjust to flexible response, stuck

with the status quo—nuclear deterrence. As a result, the Air

Force initially performed very poorly in Vietnam’s unconventional warfare environment.

Doctrine

Of the three conflicts, doctrine had the most positive influence

on the initial period of operations in Desert Storm. Air Force

doctrine makers did not want to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam

in a future conflict, so they modified Air Force doctrine accordingly. The Air Force incorporated this doctrine into its training

in the early 1980s, thereby allowing nearly a decade of such

training before Desert Storm. AirLand Battle and joint doctrine

also enabled the Air Force to become more familiar with its sister services. Although General Horner deviated from the AirLand Battle doctrine, the net result of these doctrinal changes

was a positive one on Air Force performance in Desert Storm.

In Korea, on the other hand, the Air Force had the right doctrine by September 1950, but by that time—three months into

the war—it was difficult to incorporate it into air operations

because of a lack of trained personnel and communications

systems. The reason is attributed to the Air Force’s nuclear

focus, which has been addressed previously. Consequently,

the Air Force—particularly FEAF—did not practice the tactical

air operations that were specified in its post–World War II

doctrine. It was only as a result of Generals Partridge and

Timberlake’s personal initiative that FEAF was able to begin

executing its doctrine by the end of the initial period of

operations.

As for Vietnam, the Air Force completely disregarded lessons

from Korea and kept its doctrine intact. Unlike Korea, no senior

Air Force leaders in-theater took actions to overcome this. In

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defense of these leaders, their challenge was greater. They

needed an entirely new doctrine, while their predecessors in

Korea only needed to implement existing doctrine. Nonetheless,

this does not change the fact that the Air Force made no

attempt to modify its doctrine either prior to or during the initial period of operations.

Desert Storm demonstrated that appropriate doctrine facilitates effective training, which translates into successful preparation for and adaptation to combat. Meanwhile, in Korea, Air

Force commanders and aircrews alike learned the hard way

that appropriate doctrine without effective implementation is

of limited value in preparing for combat. Consequently, these

leaders adjusted their operations to correspond to—as opposed

to deviate from—existing doctrine. Vietnam revealed the negative impact of inappropriate doctrine. While Air Force leaders

were able to make some adjustments, such doctrine handicapped their ability to do so on a larger scale.

Command and Control

The C2 of airpower demonstrated in Desert Storm stands

out from that in Korea and Vietnam. Joint doctrine specifying

the role of the JFACC made this possible. In his role as the

JFACC, General Horner had a level of command far superior

to that of his predecessors in Korea and Vietnam. This

included operational control of the SAC bombers tasked for

Desert Storm as well as tactical control over Navy and Marine

Corps air assets.

The ATO was another key improvement in C2 of airpower

that was employed in Desert Storm but not in Korea or Vietnam.

The ATO contained all the sorties the JFACC wanted flown. As

such, it guided the actions of all air assets under his control.

Because they lacked such a targeting process, Horner’s predecessors in Korea and Vietnam were unable to dictate the operations of Navy and Marine Corps air assets.

A commonality between all three conflicts was that each Air

Force leader relied upon TACS. TACS served as a conceptual

architecture through which the JFACC executed centralized

control and decentralized execution over air assets. General

Stratemeyer worked tirelessly to achieve this capability in

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Korea; and in Vietnam, the Air Force restructured TACS in

early 1965 to improve its capability. While such improvements

did take place and benefited Air Force–only operations, centralized control of all air operations remained an elusive goal

in Korea and Vietnam.

Training

All three of the case studies reveal that the nature and effectiveness of Air Force training is related to the strategy and doctrine on which that training is based. As was discussed earlier,

the national and Air Force strategy leading into both Korea

and Vietnam was deterrence against a Soviet nuclear attack.

Air Force doctrine reflected this same mind-set. Based on such

doctrine, Air Force training was heavily focused on SAC and

the nuclear mission. As a result, aircrews were poorly prepared for the conventional nature of air operations in those

two wars.

On the other hand, following Vietnam, national and Air

Force strategy paid equal attention to both nuclear and conventional warfare. Prior to Desert Storm, TAC had trained to

the point that it was as proficient in conventional war fighting

as SAC was in nuclear war fighting. The advent of an aggressor

squadron, combat simulation exercises, and increased specialization all contributed to the improvement in TAC’s training.

The coalition also had the benefit of continuing its training

once in-theater for Desert Storm. This enabled USAF aircrews

to become familiar with aircrews of other components and

nations as well as with the Iraqi terrain and airspace. Such a

luxury was unavailable to aircrews in Korea and Vietnam

because they began flying combat missions as soon as they

arrived in-theater.

Equipment

While training—or lack thereof—was an important factor in

determining how well the Air Force performed during the initial period of operations in each of the case studies, equipment

played a significant role also. Based on its effort to deploy the

latest and most sophisticated aircraft to theater in Korea (F-80C),

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Vietnam (F-4C), and Iraq (F-117), the Air Force believed its

technologically advanced aircraft provided it with an advantage. The performance of these and other aircraft and weapons

supported the Air Force’s belief. However, this was far more

evident in Desert Storm than in the two earlier conflicts. The

primary reason for this is that in 1990, USAF was a far more

sophisticated and technologically advanced Air Force in comparison to the Iraqi air force than was USAF in comparison to

the North Korean air force (NKAF) in 1950 and especially the

North Vietnamese air force in 1965.

Air Superiority

Because air superiority was one of the few missions for which

FEAF was well suited, it is not surprising that it performed

this mission well during the initial period of operations in Korea.

FEAF likely would have achieved air superiority even sooner

by striking NKAF airfields. However, General Stratemeyer’s

requests to do so were denied by General MacArthur who,

understandably, wanted all available aircraft tasked against

the worsening situation in the forward battle.

In Vietnam, meanwhile, USAF aircraft were restricted from

striking air bases in North Vietnam until 1968 and from

employing their missiles from beyond visual range throughout

the war. Additionally, North Vietnam built up a formidable

SAM and AAA network that was unprecedented at that time.

Because of this combination of America’s restrictive ROE and

North Vietnamese expansive air defense, USAF struggled to

achieve air superiority not only at the beginning of the war but

also throughout the entire conflict. While these restrictions

were out of its control, the Air Force could blame no one else

for having trained poorly prior to Vietnam.

In Desert Storm, the problems that had limited air operations

in Korea and Vietnam were removed. Coalition aircrews were

able to begin attacking air defense sites (SAMs, AAA, and airfields) from the onset of the air offensive. Due in part to this

carte blanche authorization, coalition aircrews rapidly achieved

air superiority over Iraq and soon thereafter acquired air

supremacy.

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Close Air Support

The Air Force CAS system was in disarray prior to Korea and

Vietnam. However, in both cases, the Air Force quickly began

to overcome this through close coordination between FACs

and ground controllers in the forward area. In both conflicts,

the Air Force displayed an ability to adapt in a timely manner.

This ability undoubtedly saved South Korea by halting the

North Korean ground advance. The results were less favorable

during the initial period of operations in Vietnam because of

jungle terrain, which served as a sanctuary from USAF attacks.

However, USAF’s CAS performance improved as larger battles

developed beginning in late 1965.

Desert Storm was unique, since USAF was able to conduct

an air offensive against Iraq’s infrastructure and military for

more than a month before the ground offensive began. This air

offensive was very successful in degrading the morale and

fighting ability of Iraqi ground units. So much so that coalition

forces encountered little resistance from those units during

the ground offensive. For this reason, coalition forces required

very little CAS.

Interdiction

The nature and outcome of interdiction operations were different during each of the three case studies. In Korea, focus on

frontline forces and a chaotic C2 infrastructure resulted in the

delay of a coherent interdiction plan for almost 30 days.

Despite this, FEAF was adaptive in devising and employing

new aircraft and tactics for interdiction. While the impact of

these efforts was not realized during the initial period of operations, those efforts would later prove to be very valuable contributions to halting the North Korean advance.

In Vietnam, Air Force leaders contended that political decisions restricting target selection prevented them from performing air interdiction operations effectively. However, the logistics

support that China and the USSR provided North Vietnam, the

sanctuaries North Vietnam had in Laos and Cambodia, the concealment of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the small supply requirements for insurgent warfare combined to make interdiction

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operations difficult regardless of which targets were struck.

Further, debate about target selection could not discount USAF’s

poor bombing performance during the initial period of operations. While the Air Force improved its bombing accuracy over

time, its impact on North Vietnamese operations was minimal.

Unquestionably, interdiction operations were most successful during the initial period of operations in Desert Storm. The

coalition’s twofold approach was responsible for this outcome.

First, the coalition isolated Iraq’s forward deployed troops by

destroying highway and railway bridges between Kuwait and

Iraq. Second, the coalition also targeted Iraqi resupply vehicles

in Kuwait, which tremendously disrupted Iraq’s distribution

capabilities. According to POWs, this significantly decreased

morale and was a primary cause for their surrender. Unlike

Vietnam where the Vietcong were dedicated completely to Ho

Chi Minh’s cause, most Iraqi soldiers (with the exception of the

Republican Guard) were ambivalent about Saddam’s quest for

Kuwaiti territory. Thus, their will to fight was far more susceptible to interdiction than was that of the Vietcong.

Factors Influencing USAF’s Ability 

to Adjust to Conflict

While numerous factors influence the Air Force’s ability to

adjust to conflict, the findings from this study identify five factors that are particularly significant. They include familiarity

with the nature of the conflict, parity with the adversary, C2 over

available air assets, terrain, doctrine, and training. Air Force

leaders should be cognizant of these factors as they seek to identify and implement adjustments in future combat environments.

Based on this analysis of the initial period of operations in

the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Desert Storm, one can discern numerous factors that influence the Air Force’s ability to

adjust to conflict. Of these, five stand out.

The first factor is the Air Force’s familiarity with the nature

of the conflict. In Korea, FEAF aircrews quickly adapted air

superiority, CAS, and interdiction operations even though they

had trained extensively only for air superiority (in defense of

Japan). The reason for this is that CAS was flown against

troops along a linear front, and interdiction was executed

73

PURDHAM
against clearly defined LOCs and fixed targets. As for Desert

Storm, USAF had practiced these missions for nearly a decade

prior to the start of this conflict; thus, aircrews easily made

minor adjustments in performing them. In Vietnam, however,

aircrews struggled to adapt air superiority and interdiction

missions against the unconventional warfare waged by the

Vietcong.

The military parity of the adversary is a second factor influencing the Air Force’s ability to adjust to conflict. In Vietnam,

USAF’s capability did not exceed the enemy’s to the extent it did

in Korea and Iraq. The primary reason for this is that the USSR

provided Vietnam with modern equipment. As a result, USAF

aircrews in Vietnam faced a greater challenge in outperforming

enemy aircrews. In Korea, USAF aircrews were not tested seriously in the air until Chinese MiG-15s entered the conflict in

November 1950. Meanwhile, in Desert Storm, USAF faced an

Iraqi air force whose equipment and technology were very inferior. This was perhaps most evident in the intelligence arena, in

which the coalition’s unparalleled battle-space awareness

enabled USAF to make the adjustments it deemed necessary.

The third factor is the level of C2 the Air Force commander

has over air operations when serving as the JFACC. Even

though Air Force combatant commanders do not determine

their span of C2 authority, their operations are impacted

tremendously by that decision. The limited C2 granted to the

Air Force commander in Korea resulted in a compromise

agreement of “coordination control” with the Navy. Likewise,

route packages were instituted in Vietnam as a result of the

Air Force commander’s lack of C2. Both of these practices

resulted in marginal effectiveness. In Desert Storm, on the

other hand, General Horner was authorized centralized control over all air assets in-theater. His span of control was

enhanced also by the close relationship he developed with the

JFC (General Schwarzkopf). This authority, combined with an

effective communications capability, enabled him to consider

and institute more adjustments than his predecessors.

The fourth key factor that influences the Air Force’s ability

to adjust to conflict is terrain. In Vietnam, heavy vegetation

and jungle-like terrain severely complicated USAF’s ability to

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CADRE PAPER
perform CAS and interdiction missions. Vietcong troops and

resupply efforts could seek refuge under the canopy of this

terrain. In Korea, terrain degraded USAF efforts less so than

in Vietnam. And in Iraq, terrain served as an advantage to

USAF aircrews, because it offered virtually no sanctuaries for

Iraqi air and ground forces.

The fifth key factor is a combination of doctrine and training. Training is based largely on doctrine. For this reason, it is

difficult to consider one of these as a factor without the other.

Although these two factors primarily influence the Air Force’s

preparation for conflict, they also influence the Air Force’s

adjustment to conflict. This was plainly evident in Vietnam, for

which Air Force doctrine and training were poorly suited. Consequently, although numerous factors contributed to the Air

Force’s poor performance, a lack of useful doctrine and training made it more difficult for the Air Force to adjust operations

in Vietnam than in Korea and Desert Storm.

Notes

1. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol. 2, Basic Thinking

in the United States Air Force, 1961–1984 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1989), 353.

2. Ibid., 289.

3. John J. Sbrega, “Southeast Asia,” in Case Studies in the Development

of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.:

Office of Air Force History, 1990), 411; and Robert Frank Futrell, The United

States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965 (Washington,

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1981), 63.

75

PURDHAM
Chapter 6

Conclusion

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment

that the statesman and commander have to make is to

establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking;

neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something

that is alien to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz

—On War

History typically reveres the victor for having the right strategy

and criticizes the vanquished for having the wrong one. The

effectiveness of doctrine is normally judged in the same manner. However, this is a superficial way to judge strategy and

doctrine because it only considers a combatant’s preparation

for conflict; it does not address the combatant’s adjustment to

what Carl von Clausewitz called the friction of war. He described

the friction of war as “the force that makes the apparently easy

so difficult.”1 “Countless minor incidents—the kind you can never

really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal.”2

Thus, a successful combatant must not only prepare sufficiently

for conflict but he must also adapt effectively to that conflict.

Based on the findings of this study, Michael Howard is only

partially correct in his assertion that the armed forces normally

produce the wrong doctrine. In the three conflicts analyzed,

the Air Force poorly implemented the right doctrine in the

first, had the wrong doctrine in the second, and effectively

implemented the right doctrine in the third. Thus, this study

concludes that predicting the right type of war (or strategy) on

which to base doctrine is perhaps more difficult than developing the doctrine itself. As Clausewitz stated, “The first, the

supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind

of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for,

nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”3

77
While such a statement seems easy to appreciate, it is far from

easy—as this study revealed—to accomplish.

This study concurs with the importance that Professor

Howard places on the armed forces’ capacity to “get it [doctrine] right quickly when the moment arrives.” However, he

appears to discount the benefit that existing doctrine has on

the armed forces’ ability to do so when he declares, “It does not

matter that they have got it [doctrine] wrong.” As was evident

in the three case studies, the Air Force was able to make

adjustments more readily and easily when its doctrine was

closely related to the nature of the given conflict. While the Air

Force has shown that it can achieve success in spite of—

rather than because of—its doctrine, the case studies also

show that proper doctrine benefits the Air Force’s performance.

Professor Howard grasped this point as well, for later in his

1973 Chesney Memorial Gold Medal acceptance speech, he also

stated, “Still it is the task of military science in an age of peace

to prevent the doctrines from being too badly wrong.”4 In order

to avoid creating doctrine that is “too badly wrong” for a given

contingency, the Air Force must develop doctrine that has wide

application. This suggests that future Air Force doctrine should

not only address airpower’s missions. Rather, it should also

broaden airmen’s understanding of the flexible applications of

those missions across a spectrum of warfare environments. With

this approach, doctrine would serve to educate aircrews on the

primary missions of airpower, provide direction on which to

develop training to ensure aircrews become proficient in these

missions, and allow for these missions to be employed in a variety of combat scenarios. Because future adversaries may range

from jungle-based insurgents in the Philippines to horsemounted fighters in Afghanistan to conventional forces in Iraq,

such doctrine has never been more critical to the Air Force.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter

Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 121.

2. Ibid., 119.

3. Ibid., 88.

4. Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” Royal United

Services Institute Journal, March 1974, 7.

78

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85
America’s First Air Battles

Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost?

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