CASE STUDY N O. 4

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

The Kuwait Task Force:

Postconflict Planning and 

Interagency Coordination

Dennis Barlow

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of

irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability operations frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including

establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social wellbeing, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive

approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach.

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need.

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships

among civilian and military researchers and practitioners. 

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the

production and distribution of learning about complex operations, including supporting the compilations of lessons and practices. 

Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the

research direction and overall leadership for this project.

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University, Washington, DC 20319.

© 2010 by National Defense University. All rights reserved. Published 2010.

Note: The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or 

National Defense University. Material in this case study may be used with approriate citation.
1

CASE STUDY N O. 4

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

The Kuwait Task Force:

Postconflict Planning and 

Interagency Coordination 

Dennis Barlow

THE POSTCONFLICT PLANNING DILEMMA

Immediately after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990,

three U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) staff officers in Washington, DC,

were concerned that operational plans might ignore key civil-military considerations. These Army Reserve officers had been involved in developing

civil-affairs plans for Operation Just Cause in Panama the year before and

had seen those plans scuttled—to the detriment of the operation—just

prior to the execution of the mission.

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Paul Mikesh of the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict;

LTC Dennis Barlow of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-3;1 and Colonel (COL)

Randy Elliott of the 352d U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Command—and

also chief of the Middle East Division of the State Department—were now

poised to support the civil-military dimensions of Operation Desert Shield.

A key civil-military issue had been framed by President George H.W. Bush,

when he identified one of the four “simple” goals driving U.S. participation

as “restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government in place of a puppet regime.”2

However, they knew that accomplishing that goal would be anything but

simple. Some Kuwaiti officials had gone to ground while others had emigrated abroad to await the conclusion of the ground war. The puppet regime

installed by Saddam Hussein would follow the Iraqi dictator’s every wish

and could wreak havoc on the society and infrastructure of Kuwait. Trying

to sort out, identify, and install a legitimate regime poised to revive a postSaddam Kuwait seemed a daunting task. While the mission seemed to

devolve on the State Department, recent operations in Panama suggested

that aid from the State Department would not be available until well after

hostilities had ceased. Who, if anyone, in the U.S. government would take

on the mission until peace was restored? What these two officers feared was

that war planners and strategists would again ignore or misuse the structure

designed to support just such a mission. 
2 THE CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITY Dennis Barlow

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS CAPABILITY

Toward the end of World War II, Army Civil Affairs units and forces were

developed to provide the U.S. military with the capacity to minimize civilian

interference with combat operations, thus helping the commander fulfill

international requirements relating to the civilian populace in his area of

operations and allowing him to take on military government roles. During

the Cold War and after, Civil Affairs doctrine downplayed the military government role and added skill sets typically found in the civilian public and

professional sectors. The doctrine also fostered cultural and linguistic

knowledge of the countries in Civil Affairs’ area of responsibility. The “new

breed” of Civil Affairs officer was therefore oriented toward civic action,

infrastructure-restoration efforts, and coordination with host-nation officials.

But the way ahead for Civil Affairs was rocky. U.S. Army Reserve Civil

Affairs forces found themselves under attack in the mid-1980s—not by an

armed enemy force but by the commander of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command. General William R. Richardson and others believed that

Civil Affairs forces were anachronisms and needed to be expunged from the

army. The concept of recruiting soldiers with professional functional skills,

such as city planners, public transportation specialists, and health and safety

specialists, seemed unnecessary and wasteful. Richardson spoke for many

when he attacked the concept of government support by U.S. military personnel as an outmoded and politically unacceptable idea. He felt that more

mundane civil-military roles required of Civil Affairs units could readily be

performed by other forces or agencies in lieu of Army Reserve units composed of rank-heavy citizen-soldiers.

After a heated debate, in which Senator Strom Thurmond (himself a former Civil Affairs officer) took strenuous part, Army Reserve Civil Affairs

units were retained; but the memory of the political struggle left a bitter

taste in the mouths of many on both sides of this issue. The debate immediately spawned a secondary question: Where did these units belong? After

another hotly debated season, Civil Affairs in 1987 found a home under the

command of the newly formed U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In the process, the U.S. Army redesigned Reserve CA units to

accomplish missions across the spectrum of operations (from foreign internal defense to conventional combat) and apportioned (designated) them to

support most major maneuver and logistical units in specific regions of the

world. This meant that the units were expected to recruit mostly field grade

officers who possessed specified professional expertise (for example, public

labor, public utilities, public health) and cultural and linguistic knowledge of

the countries in their unit’s area of responsibility. This force was structured

and assigned on the premise that units that combined civilian professional

skill sets—negotiating, diplomatic, and management prowess and would

possess or acquire cultural and language knowledge—would be powerful

assets for commanders dealing with foreign officials during operations.
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 3

CIVIL MILITARY PLANNING AND CENTRAL COMMAND 

The late 1980s were a difficult time to be an Army Reserve Civil Affairs soldier on fulltime Active Guard and Reserve duty in the nation’s capital. Not

only was the acrimony born of the recent political battle over the survival of

Reserve Civil Affairs forces still rife, but also the debate that accompanied

the assignment of CA forces to USSOCOM gave rise to new debates that

caused even more friction between, and among, various military constituencies.3 

The three officers—Mikesh, Barlow, and Elliot—endured scores of discussions and proposals in Washington that cast doubt on the validity of the

application of Reserve Civil Affairs forces. They also observed key decision

points in which these forces—doctrinally required to support civil-military

operations—were bypassed or misapplied. The officers were aware that, in

spite of repeated recommendations that U.S. Central Command

(USCENTCOM) develop a civil affairs plan relating to Iraq, none had been

devised. Worse, the Civil Affairs officer billet at Third U.S. Army, the executive agent for Civil Affairs for USCENTCOM, was vacant.4 Elliott, from his

perspective as USCENTCOM team chief, and then as operations officer of

the 352d Civil Affairs Command, knew that his unit, required by the Department of the Army and USSOCOM to support both the army component

and the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command, had not been assigned

the task to fulfill these key missions and had been excluded from the

USCENTCOM planning process.5 The Joint Staff was aware that

USCENTCOM had not developed the required Annex G (Civil Affairs) to

its operational plans, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense was given no

assurances that any consideration would be given to postcombat missions. 

Therefore, each of the three Civil Affairs officers had reason to fear that

CA missions and forces would be given short shrift in war planning consideration, and each was determined to do everything possible to see that operations involving Kuwait and Iraq included a robust and effective civilmilitary element.

U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs assets, although not employed to their

full potential in the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, had received very positive reviews.6 Civil Affairs plans, though thoroughly vetted and approved

prior to the operations, were called off just hours before the insertion of U.S.

combat forces there. It was only after days of lawlessness in Panama City

that a variation of the original plan was reconstituted, and carried out by a

CA volunteer task force rather than the units originally selected. The volunteers came from numerous units and suffered by operating under an ad hoc

command and control structure in which they reported to a staff element of

U.S. Southern Command.7

The impromptu CA task force was hurriedly deployed to Panama and

given the name Civil Military Operations Task Force. Among other accomplishments, the task force supported host-government ministry offices; reestablished correctional facilities; jump-started the economy; produced a
4 NATIONAL POLICY AND POSTCONFLICT PLANNING Dennis Barlow

national agriculture plan; reestablished customs and immigration procedures; and coordinated the restoration of sanitation, feeding, and medical

services. However, the hasty formation of the task force, and its place within

the command, created confusion and a lack of direction.8 Afterward, the

U.S. commander, General Max Thurmond, decried his own handling of the

CA forces under his control: “It is a bad plan when the J-5 ends up commanding anything. . . . If you ask me why I did not catch this, I can only say

that my primary focus was on [Operation] Just Cause.”9

It was in the aftermath of Operation Promote Liberty (the civil-military

mission in Panama), and in the context of managing and overseeing an

invigorated, yet untested, Civil Affairs system, that Mikesh and Barlow were

assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, respectively.

NATIONAL POLICY AND POSTCONFLICT PLANNING

As Pentagon and Washington action officers and military planners, Mikesh,

Barlow, and Elliott were well aware of the prerogatives of regional commanders to write plans, set requirements, and carry out operations. They

were also aware of the responsibilities and authorities of the Department of

the Army as the force provider, and the U.S. Special Operations Command

as the trainer and peacetime commander, to prepare and deploy effective

CA units. What worried them was that they knew of no mechanism to forge

the linkage of the White House policy calling for the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait to operations nor how to drive civil affairs doctrine in support of that effort. While cautious not to override the system—a

charge often leveled against Civil Affairs officers as a result of the contentious political debate of the ‘80s—they were ready to engage the CA force in

what they saw as a classic civil-military mission. 

On August 14, 1990, less than a week after President Bush demanded

the immediate and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait,

Mikesh and Barlow collaborated on a staff paper, which they submitted to

Mikesh’s boss, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and

Low-Intensity Conflict Jim Locher. It would be up to Locher to determine

the paper’s usefulness. Given the civil affairs dilemma in Panama, and with

awareness of the CA vacuum at USCENTCOM, this paper suggested that

the Office of the Secretary of Defense consider raising the issue of postconflict planning. It recommended that the Department of Defense (1) consider its role in the “restoration of Kuwait;” (2) coordinate restoration plans

with the State Department; and (3) activate the Joint Civil Affairs Committee, a board of senior advisors designed to provide advice to the chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on CA matters.10 The Joint Civil Affairs Committee,

which has never officially convened, has been ensconced in Department of

Defense (DOD) policy guidance for over fifty years. 
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 5

Locher concluded that the President’s statements provided clear guidance to begin CA planning at once.11 He crafted a memo that he coordinated with Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Henry Rowan and sent it to the director of the Joint Staff on August 22,

requesting comments and approval to develop an approach to crafting a

postconflict strategy.12 Within a week, Locher received a handwritten note

from the director of the Joint Staff, who rejected the idea from Locher and

Rowan, noting that activation of the Joint Civil Affairs Committee would be

inappropriate.13 While no explanation accompanied this response, verbal

discussions within the Joint Staff characterized the activation of the committee as being relatively unimportant compared to the urgent mission of preparing combat operations plans.14

During the next six weeks, neither USCENTCOM nor its army component took any significant action to develop civil-military or postconflict

plans in conjunction with rapidly developing war plans, nor did it engage its

CA-apportioned unit, the 352d Civil Affairs Command, with regard to contingency planning. Nor, for that matter, were there plans to request presidential authority to call up CA reservists and units. Message traffic was quite

explicit in concluding that “CENTCOM was ill-prepared to conduct CA

operations.”15 Discussion among action officers in the Pentagon continually

centered on the point that planning must emphasize combat objectives and

that other considerations—specifically postconflict or “mop-up” operations—must be attended to after the war-fighting was over. 

Despite midlevel requests from LTC Barlow on the Joint Staff and LTC

Mikesh in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Civil Affairs contacts in

USCENTCOM, the Department of the Army, and USSOCOM did not

promise any postconflict planning related to Operation Desert Shield.16 A

common response to these requests was that no one wanted to tell a

regional commander—and especially not a strong-willed leader like General

Norman Schwarzkopf—“how to suck eggs.”

Jim Locher, nevertheless, decided that it was the right time to construct a

policy directive on civil affairs that would benefit “the field.”17 He believed it

would be the kind of guidance General Schwarzkopf would find helpful.

Working with Mikesh, Barlow suggested that the Joint Staff was the proper

avenue for requesting policy guidance from the Office of the Secretary of

Defense for application in theater. To ensure the fullest participation in the

process, the assistant secretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict18 invited representatives from the army, USSOCOM, and

the Joint Staff to develop the directive. Accordingly, a draft version was completed around August 25. Over the next several weeks, however, the process

slowed significantly as the army staff at the headquarters of the Department

of the Army raised concerns with points in the paper and continually offered

alternatives. First, the Department of the Army suggested that the twenty

functional specialties identified in Civil Affairs doctrine be dealt with on a

case-by-case basis; then, it asked to review the State Department’s role.

Additionally, the army asked to consider the Corps of Engineers as the
6 THE KUWAITIS COME TO TOWN Dennis Barlow

appropriate force to take on the mission. The process dragged on into early

October when the project, which had slowed to a near stop, was ended. The

commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, who had become aware of

the effort within the Pentagon, declared that no policy guidance should be

provided, because he required none.19

Locher persevered and aimed higher. In late summer he worked the

Civil Affairs message up his chain of command to Undersecretary of

Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, as well as to senior officials of the army,

USSOCOM, and the Joint Staff. There was very little response from these

key organizations.20 He was, however, able to bring the issue to the attention

of many decisionmakers in the Pentagon and developed alliances with the

like-minded assistant secretaries of Defense for International Security

Affairs and Reserve Affairs.21

Mikesh and Barlow were assigned key roles within the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Crisis Coordination Center and the Joint Staff’s National

Military Command Center, respectively—both twenty-four-hour-a-day

hubs—where they were able to stay abreast of the latest developments and

coordinate quickly with each other. Their spirits were low, when a diplomatic lightning bolt struck.

THE KUWAITIS COME TO TOWN

On September 20, 1990, an event occurred that set in motion a series of proceedings that not only ended the stalemate but also infused great energy

into the process. It was a simple diplomatic event, which was accompanied

by little fanfare and presaged no great results. The Kuwaiti government-inexile dispatched twenty specialists to Washington to establish a reconstruction planning structure under the authority of Ambassador Saud Nasir AlSabah. 

COL Elliott, as a result of his civilian position at the State Department,

knew Ambassador-Designate to Kuwait Edward “Skip” Gnehm, who

informed him about the newly arrived Kuwaiti team of specialists. Elliott

told Gnehm that his Army Reserve CA unit possessed the kind of planning,

cultural, and functional expertise that the Kuwaitis might find useful.

Gnehm wasted no time in taking this information to the Kuwaitis, who

wanted to hear more.22

Elliott called Barlow and Mikesh and informed them of an impending

request from the State Department to brief the Kuwaitis on CA capabilities.

Mikesh prepared the Office of the Secretary of Defense offices for the message, while Barlow informed the J-3 hierarchy. When the Kuwaiti government-in-exile sent a request to the director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant

General Michael P.C. Carns, via Assistant Secretary of Defense Rowan, for a

State Department briefing, the request was quickly approved.

As the CA staff officer on the Joint Staff, Barlow was selected to prepare

and deliver the brief—the army having declined the offer—as the executive
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 7

agent of Civil Affairs. During the briefing, the army representative sat

silently, as he would in most subsequent meetings relating to the Kuwait

Civil Affairs mission.23

On October 4, 1990, Barlow briefed the Kuwaiti contingent, now known

as the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program in the Pentagon. Also

present at the briefing were Ambassador Gnehm; the J-3 of the Joint Staff,

Lieutenant General Tom Kelly; Headquarters of the Department of the

Army and USCENTCOM representatives; and Office of the Secretary of

Defense officials, including members of the Office of the General Counsel.

At the conclusion of the presentation, the Kuwaitis showed considerable

interest in obtaining CA support to help restore their country and asked

how they could request it. This is the kind of question not often asked

openly. Sam Routson of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict suggested they send a

request in writing to the President. At the time, he did not think this idea

would have much chance of success.24 The letter was delivered to the President on October 9, 1990.25

A scant ten days later, Locher attended a Deputies Committee meeting

in which the topic of support to the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program was on the agenda. The committee agreed to provide restoration and

planning advice, in addition to assistance, to the government of Kuwait,

when restored.26

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS FOCUSES ON 

POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES 

Even before the request from the Kuwait government-in-exile, members of

several U.S. government departments were concerned about postconflict

issues likely to surface in Kuwait. Not only were officials thinking about

infrastructure destruction and the status of basic life-supporting services, but

also there was enormous concern for the safety of those (especially thirdcountry nationals) the Kuwaitis might see as Iraqi collaborators. Locher had

been communicating with both Rowan and the assistant secretary for

Reserve Affairs, who shared these concerns. As Iraqi control of Kuwait tightened, it was becoming evident that the scope of postcombat missions relating to the care of displaced civilians, restoration of order, and a return to

normalcy—not only in Kuwait, but possibly in Saudi Arabia and Iraq—was

likely to overwhelm the small, active duty Civil Affairs force assigned to the

region.27 Such possibilities appeared even more dire when considering that

USCENTCOM had not yet requested support from its apportioned CA

U.S. Army Reserve units. To Mikesh and Barlow, it presaged another ad hoc

Civil Affairs mission.28

Various government officials saw the Kuwaiti request as a chance to

stimulate the preparation of an appropriate postconflict plan and to prepare

appropriate organizations, such as Army Reserve Civil Affairs, for the
8 THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS FOCUSES ON POSTCONFLICT ACTIVITIES Dennis Barlow

challenges ahead. Immediately following Barlow’s briefing to the Kuwaitis,

CA action officers on the Joint Staff, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary

of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, the Office of

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and on

the army staff created an ad hoc working group that met frequently during

the next weeks to track developments relating to possible postconflict scenarios and to develop likely courses of action. When the Deputies Committee met on October 15 and approved CA support to the Kuwaitis, the group

was then ready to react.

While awaiting official follow-on guidance from the Deputies Committee meeting, the Joint Staff was given the task of developing various courses

of action to support it. The ad hoc Pentagon CA team devised considerations to guide the Joint Staff in developing guidelines for CA support to the

Kuwaitis.29

Meanwhile, senior leaders in the Pentagon were acting on decisions

made at the October 19 Deputies Committee meeting. National Security

Council member Robert Gates had recommended that the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff establish a

steering group—with Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Rowan taking the lead—to make necessary arrangements to

develop a plan in conjunction with the Kuwaitis.30 Rowan and his deputy,

Fred Smith, therefore developed and issued a draft set of Terms of Reference and circulated them for comment. Rowan requested that a military service act as executive agent and urged members of various agencies to

provide qualified representatives to be assigned to a Kuwait restoration

steering group.31

The Terms of Reference specified that the U.S. objective would be to

assist the legitimate government of Kuwait in planning government restoration efforts. The State and Defense departments were to share joint responsibilities for developing a civic-restoration program, with other departments

and agencies to be called upon when appropriate. The Steering Group

Committee, chaired by the Department of State, was to oversee the planning effort along with members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense

and the Joint Staff. Planning was to be based on the twenty professional CA

skills. The government of Kuwait was expected to execute applicable contracts for services and equipment with civilian firms, and the U.S. government was to be allowed to request reimbursement for the cost of services

rendered. Semimonthly reports were to be distributed to the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

National Security Council, and USCENTCOM. 32

On October 22, a State Department official attending an interagency

meeting hosted by Assistant Secretary Locher volunteered to draft a memorandum of understanding between the United States and the government of

Kuwait. Meanwhile, at the bidding of General Thomas Kelley on the Joint

Staff, LTC Barlow began staffing a message from the chairman of the Joint
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 9

Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, asking the Department of the Army to

create a task force to assist in planning with the Kuwaiti officials. 

On November 1, the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program

received an update briefing. The same day, the Deputies Committee confirmed the members of the Steering Group Committee, an impressive array

of Washington expertise. Its members were Ambassador-Designate Gnehm;

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asian Affairs

Hughes; Joint Staff J-33 Rear Admiral David Fitzgerald; the Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs Rear Admiral Merrill Ruck; and Brigadier

General Charles Wilhelm of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The Steering Group

authorized the establishment of a U.S.-Kuwait Civil Affairs Group, specifically to oversee Civil Affairs planning efforts, and endorsed working groups

for each of the Civil Affairs functional areas. Within twenty-four hours, the

Steering Group Committee approved the Terms of Reference.33

With a full head of steam and a high-level interagency engine, the mission appeared to be on an unstoppable course. The question seemed to

devolve on how the CA task force would get its job done rather than if it

would be done.34 Elliott, Mikesh, and Barlow believed that the call-up, task

organization, and deployment of the U.S.-Kuwait Civil Affairs Group were

imminent. They were wrong.

NOT SO FAST!

Several key organizations were not about to jump on the bandwagon. During the nine-month period in which the Kuwait Task Force was conceived,

activated, deployed, and redeployed, the Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

and Plans was the headquarters of the Department of the Army’s focal point

for civil affairs actions relating to the army.35 During that period, that office

offered numerous objections to the formation and employment of the

Kuwait Task Force.

The reasons for the army’s reluctance to accede to the creation of a

Kuwait Civil Affairs task force can be traced to several factors. The army’s

headquarters staff resented the speed and authority with which the interagency Steering Group Committee intervened in what was seen as army

business. The Department of the Army felt it had been denied the opportunity to weigh in adequately or to provide alternate viewpoints. This argument stretches the point, however, since army representatives were invited

to all meetings and given opportunities to comment on the Terms of Reference and other documents, despite generally declining to do so. There is

also the necessity of timeliness in dealing with fast-moving operational

imperatives during a time of imminent war.

Army headquarters also felt that the State Department and other civilian

agencies should have been considered for the role that the CA Reserve
10 NOT SO FAST! Dennis Barlow

soldiers would have to assume; after all, the restoration of government dealt

with traditional civilian, not military, matters.36 While the concept of interagency involvement was very much in question, the fact remained that the

army would play a crucial role as executive agent for Civil Affairs, and a vast

amount of resources (personnel and money) earmarked for the headquarters of the Department of the Army and USSOCOM had been directed to

the training, equipping, and employment of the CA force. Civil Affairs policy and doctrine have been developed specifically for civil-military roles to

be undertaken by the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs force across the spectrum of

conflict.

A third argument was that using army manpower and money to plan

reconstruction activities would have diverted resources from other more

important military operations. This case was never made strongly or consistently, since significant combat or logistical resources were not required to

plan restoration activities nor were they diverted to support the Kuwait restoration mission.37

Perhaps the most powerful argument made by the army for not advocating the Kuwait CA task force was that it was not required by USCENTCOM

Commander General Schwarzkopf. Given the roles and missions of the

regional commands and services, this made sense. If the commander did not

require a force, he should not be saddled with one. However, USCENTCOM’s actions with regard to civil affairs planning may lead one to conclude

that postconflict considerations in the early portion of USCENTCOM planning processes were ignored.38 Representatives of various U.S. government

agencies considered such efforts necessary. 

Nevertheless, the issue of army prerogatives in conflict with interagency

actions calls attention to an evergreen topic in Washington: the primacy of

policy guidance over organizational authorities. The issue was: How firm,

and how binding, was the guidance of interagency representatives (the

National Security Council, the Deputies Committee, the State Department,

and Department of Defense officials), which called for the formation of a

CA task force, on the army and the commander of USCENTCOM? 

But the most pressing reason that the Department of the Army’s Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization Directorate office did not support the

Kuwaiti Task Force was that it wanted to avoid any controversy that might

attach itself to the actions of the CA force. More than once, the senior civilian official in the army office confided to Barlow that he did not want to be

personally humiliated by an Army Reserve Civil Affairs failure; and he was

well aware of the skeptical view that many held of Reserve CA soldiers.

Despite numerous conversations in which several of his protégés and Civil

Affairs officers attested to the quality of the CA force39 and tried to change

this official’s mind, he was unmoved. His position only was reinforced by a

number of active duty officers on the army staff who generally distrusted the

quality and dedication of Reserve soldiers.40 This issue was never raised formally or officially, but provided a backdrop for the life of the mission. 
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 11

From November 5 to 21, events slowed considerably. There was intense

debate between the staff of the headquarters of the Department of the Army

and elements of the Joint Staff as to whether the army was indeed the appropriate organization to lead the planning effort. Since the draft Joint Staff

message authorizing activation required concurrence from army headquarters, the issue was again debated and centered on the army’s argument that

the State Department or other civilian agencies should have been given the

mission. The arguments of the army, certain elements within the Joint Staff,

and a silent USSOCOM41 gave the director of the Joint Staff pause.42

The director, General Carns, had heard the debate within the Pentagon

and among interagency players. He delayed the activation order for the

selected Reserve members of the 352d CA Command pending other alternatives. He again considered the option of declaring the mission a State

Department responsibility. However, the members of the unit had already

alerted their spouses, bosses, and families that they might be called up to

active duty and deployed to a war zone.43 In an emotional roller-coaster ride

for members of the unit, the unit was alerted for activation twice, and

ordered to stand down twice, in a four-day period (November 17–20).44

On the evening of November 21, after an exasperating and frustrating

week, Assistant Secretaries of Defense Locher and Rowan requested a meeting with Director of the Joint Staff Carns. Locher brought General Wilhelm

with him, and together they argued that giving the mission to a U.S. Army

Reserve CA element was not only doctrinally correct but also an effective

way of bringing various agencies into the mix.45 Carns grudgingly agreed

and immediately summoned his staff, which included J-33 Rear Admiral

Fitzgerald, the Psychological Operations and CA division chief, and CA staff

officer LTC Barlow. General Carns, however, wanted personal assurances

that, if activated, the Civil Affairs Reserve soldiers would not become glory

hounds overcome with visions of “coming home to ticker-tape parades

down Constitution Avenue.” With that assurance, Carns gave the deployment package to Barlow and told him to “make it happen.”

Barlow coordinated the package that night, and the next morning the

message went out from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its subject

was “Restoration of Kuwait,” and it tasked the chief of staff of the army and

the commander of USSOCOM to activate a CA task force to support the

government of Kuwait in developing restoration plans in Washington, DC.46

THE KUWAIT TASK FORCE STANDS UP

As the senior CA unit designated for support to USCENTCOM, the 352d

CA Command was tagged for the job. Both the commander, Brigadier General Howard Mooney, and COL Elliott had not let the policy tug-of-war

deter them from preparing for what they felt was inevitable. Mooney had a

strong background in logistics and transportation; Elliott was the smooth
12 THE KUWAIT TASK FORCE STANDS UP Dennis Barlow

diplomat with an excellent understanding of the talent in his unit. It looked

like the perfect fit.

Mooney and Elliott had been spending long hours at their Riverside,

Maryland, armory, where they weighed and planned future actions. With the

activation notice, key members of the CA Command worked tirelessly from

November 25 to December 1, when the call-up was to take effect; Elliott had

by then volunteered for active duty and was spending his days at the armory,

no longer reporting to his civilian office at the State Department.47

At this time, Mooney met with numerous officials of the State and

Defense departments and the Working Group Committee, establishing and

clarifying guidelines and activities for his task force. On December 1, 1990,

fifty-seven specially selected members of the 352d CA Command and the

354th CA brigade mustered at the armory and began processing. On

December 3, they went to the Pentagon for meetings with various agency

representatives and then to downtown Washington to meet with their

Kuwaiti counterparts. It was an exhilarating day for General Mooney, until

he was notified, immediately prior to a Pentagon briefing, that he had been

relieved of command of the task force and was to have nothing further to do

with it, even informally. The news was as embarrassing as it was stunning,

and, at the time, inexplicable. Mooney was told only that “DA [the Department of the Army] won’t buy it [his command of a deployable task force].”48

The activation of Reserve general officers was a sore point with army headquarters officials; many did not want to establish the precedent of having

active duty officers reporting to a flag-rank Reserve officer.

While Mooney returned to Riverdale to resume command of the rest of

his unit, the operational control of the newly dubbed Kuwait Task Force was

passed to COL Elliott. He lost no time in setting up shop, which meant finding office space for his task force. Mikesh and Barlow, acting under the

authority of the Working Group Committee, opened discussions with various agencies. The Army Corps of Engineers and the General Services

Administration came forward and provided office space and equipment;

office furniture was given by the army headquarters.49 The choice of office

space was inspired, as it was only three blocks from the Kuwait embassy and

offered easy access to the Pentagon and other government agencies.50

COL Elliott had selected his team well. It consisted of members of his

unit who had had experience in the Panama restoration effort the year

before51 and highly qualified members of the unit whose professional skills

matched perceived shortfalls. His designated deputy was Major Andrew

Natsios (in civilian life the director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]).52 The team

assessed hot-button issues, such as due process of law regarding suspected

Iraqi sympathizers, possible sabotage done by the Iraqis, the rebuilding of

electrical grids, dealing with possible oil fires, and furnishing needed food

and medicine). 

The unit worked every day—including Christmas Day—between its

activation and its eventual deployment date of January 26, 1991. Elliott put
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 13

into place an ambitious phased plan that culminated in the creation of the

preliminary Annex G, Civilian Action Plan, designed to become part of the

USCENTCOM operational plan.53 The Kuwait Task Force developed

these plans in coordination with twenty-seven different U.S. government

agencies—a happy circumstance owing to operating in the nation’s capital.

Elliott introduced the Kuwaitis to Army engineer personnel who were later

to deliver critical support to Kuwait in the spring and summer of 1991. The

Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program group also received briefings

from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USAID’s

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.54 COL Elliott was making the most of

his task force’s location in downtown Washington, DC.

The crucial work of the Kuwait Task Force was made possible by creating bonds of trust between its members and their Kuwaiti counterparts on

the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program. While much of the planning

support took the form of Kuwait Task Force members acting as “honest brokers” to identify reliable contractors and develop workable procedures, a

great deal of effort was focused on the sequencing of postconflict actions

and identifying agencies (both U.S. and Kuwaiti) that would support a comprehensive plan of action. Of particular import to the United States was

ensuring the rights and safety of Palestinian and other third-party nationals

after the liberation of Kuwait, since the region was rife with rumors of the

collusion of these groups with Iraqis committing horrifying atrocities against

Kuwaitis.55 Colonel Ron Smith, a senior official of the Justice Department in

civilian life, made it clear to all members of the Kuwait Emergency and

Recovery Program that the protection of the rights of suspected collaborators immediately after cessation of hostilities would be the first global

impression of Kuwaiti justice and due process.

THE BALANCING ACT

Acutely aware that his command-and-control structure, which spanned the

gap of military and civilian jurisdiction, was as sensitive as it was unusual,

Elliott was precise and timely in delivering regular reports to the Steering

Group Committee, the Joint Staff, the headquarters of the Department of

the Army, USSOCOM, and USCENTCOM. He found that the USCENTCOM Civil Affairs staff was hungry for his reports, yet it did not share its

plans with the Kuwait Task Force; nor, as it turns out, did USCENTCOM/

ARCENT (U.S. Army Central Command) correlate the plans of the Kuwait

Task Force with its CA plans. COL Elliott invited USCENTCOM to send a

liaison officer to the Kuwait Task Force to obviate this deficiency, but the

offer was declined.56

Several reasons have been advanced for the apparent lack of coordination between the two civil affairs plans, which common sense dictated

should have been synchronized. One is that USCENTCOM, operating in a

secure mode, was leery of sharing information with an organization (the
14 THE KUWAIT TASK FORCE GOES TO WAR Dennis Barlow

Kuwait Task Force) whose day-to-day operations were open to the scrutiny

of foreign nationals.57 While such misgivings could be understandable concerning combat operations, it is harder to comprehend how coordinating

postconflict recovery actions would incur significant risks that would obviate the advantage of developing complementary plans.

A second reason is an observation that by dint of unfortunate timing,

both ARCENT and USCENTCOM, at the time of the Iraqi invasion of

Kuwait, were bereft of appropriate Civil Affairs staff expertise.58 This unfortunate circumstance was exacerbated by the reality that General Schwarzkopf, a very effective and direct communicator with extensive Middle East

experience, tended to rely on his personal relationships with Kuwaiti and

Saudi officials instead of relying on his CA staff.59

A third reason was that the Kuwait Task Force—having been created

outside of USCENTCOM authority and reporting to interagency officials in

Washington, DC—was an interagency group outside of its command, control, and communications scheme.60

Nevertheless, COL Elliott persevered in sending reports to the

USCENTCOM Civil Affairs staff (now designated as the CCJ5), but he

resisted any attempts to classify any work the Kuwait Task Force was doing

so that he could maintain the clearest channels of communication with the

Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program, U.S. agencies, and potential

contractors.

THE KUWAIT TASK FORCE GOES TO WAR

Early in January 1991, the emir of Kuwait, apprised of the progress of the

Kuwait Task Force, requested that it deploy to the area of operations.

USCENTCOM concurred with this request. The Steering Group Committee and the undersecretary of State for Political Affairs coordinated this

request with the Pentagon, and on January 29 LTC Barlow was asked to

provide a decision briefing at the Pentagon. The briefing, entitled “The

Kuwait Restoration Plan,” was accepted and approved with little discussion.

On January 31, the Kuwait Task Force deployed to Saudi Arabia.61

The Kuwait Task Force acted quickly, continuing to coordinate with the

Kuwaiti ministerial representatives who made up the Kuwait Emergency

and Recovery Program organization. COL Elliott assumed that their longterm planning with Kuwaiti government officials would continue. However,

when in theater, the Kuwait Task Force came under the control of the commander of Central Command. USCENTCOM, ARCENT, and the recently

deployed 352d CA Command all expected the Kuwait Task Force to “fall

in” under the regional commander’s chain of command and to accomplish

its tasks in that context.62

This was a crucial moment. The Kuwait Task Force had been created to

develop long-term and high-policy issues relating to the restoration of the

society of Kuwait; USCENTCOM was more focused on the immediate
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 15

Civil Affairs missions of managing displaced civilians and assuring that lifepreserving goods and services were delivered.

The solution was hammered out via a meeting between Ambassador

Gnehm and General Schwarzkopf, in which it was decided that the Kuwait

Task Force would continue its higher-level coordination while providing

liaison duties for ARCENT and USCENTCOM. The focus of the Kuwait

Task Force’s work, however, was shifted from long-term to short-term

(emergency) restoration projects.63

The situation was clarified with the deployment of Brigadier General

Mooney to the area of operations. Mooney, the commander of the 352d,

now assumed full control of the Kuwait Task Force, his unit, and other CA

assets in the area and melded them into the Combined Civil Affairs Task

Force. This allowed synchronization of all civil affairs plans and initiated

integrated actions and results. In turn, the Combined Civil Affairs Task

Force became part of Task Force Freedom, a composite service-support

unit commanded by the deputy commanding general of ARCENT, Brigadier General Robert Frix. The authority and influence of Frix provided

Mooney and the Kuwait Task Force a “home” within the USCENTCOM

structure in which it could conduct its civil-military activities.64

The U.S.-led coalition ground war began on February 24, 1991; the

Combined Civil Affairs Task Force was ordered to Kuwait City on March 1.

The work of the Kuwait Task Force was accomplished within the context of

Task Force Freedom’s missions and continued until April 15 when General

Mooney turned the job over to Major General Patrick Kelly, the head of the

Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office, an agency of the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers. Although the government of Kuwait requested that the

Kuwait Task Force remain until December 1991, it was redeployed with its

parent unit, the 352d, on May 10 of that year.

WHY NOT A TICKER-TAPE PARADE?

In spite of the fact that much infrastructure damage was deliberately committed by the invading Iraqis and by subsequent plundering and vandalism,

within one month after the end of the fighting 50 percent of the telecommunications and transportation systems in Kuwait was restored, and 30 percent

of the devastated electrical grid was repaired.

More important was the fact that not one Kuwaiti died from thirst, starvation, or lack of medical attention after the liberation.65 Civil rights were

immediately restored and, astonishingly, there were virtually no acts of retribution or vigilantism directed against suspected collaborators.

The sheer volume of supplies coordinated by the Combined Civil Affairs

Task Force in the first days was staggering: 2.8 million liters of diesel fuel,

1,250 tons of medicine, 12.9 million liters of water, 12,500 metric tons of

food, 250 electric generators, and 750 vehicles.66
16 GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS Dennis Barlow

By the time the Kuwait Task Force departed, the Kuwaiti medical system was operating at 98 percent of its prewar capacity, the international airport was reopened, and the police force was fully operational. All major

roads were opened—as was one port—while two others were being swept

of mines.

The work of the Kuwait Task Force has been hailed almost universally.

From the New York Times67 to officials of the State Department and the

Department of Defense68 there is unstinting praise for both the levels of

expertise and the passion and dedication the task force members brought to

this task. 

The members of the Kuwait Task Force must have been pleased when

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said to them, “Your role in the U.S. government assistance to the Government of Kuwait in the reconstruction of

that country was exceptional, both for its swiftness and the depth of expertise which you provided. The extraordinary skills resident only in the

Reserve Component were absolutely essential to these successes.”69 But

they might be excused if they were more gratified to read the words of Secretary of the Army Michael Stone in describing their mission: “It is not an

exaggeration to say that bringing Kuwait back to life in the early days following the Iraqi departure would not have been possible without the 352d.” 70

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ARCENT U.S. Army Central Command

CA Civil Affairs

DOD Department of Defense

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command

ENDNOTES

1. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Web site, “The J-3 Operations

Directorate is where all the joint staff’s planning, intelligence, manpower, communications

and logistics functions are translated into action.”

2. National Security Directive 45 (a report on U.S. policy in response to the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait, August 20, 1990), at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/

nsd_45.htm.

3. The chief of the Army Reserves was concerned about reservists being

commanded by a joint active duty headquarters; Special Forces advocates were leery of

watering down their very robust force; army officials were uncertain about assigning units

that had conventional application to a command with Special Operations as its focus; and

Civil Affairs soldiers were uncertain as to who would be their proponent. These concerns

remain today.

4. John R. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War and Winning the Peace: Civil Affairs in

the war with Iraq.” (report prepared for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, by the

Andrulis Research Corporation, Arlington, VA, October 9, 1991), p. 48.

5. Ibid., p. 21. 
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 17

6. Richard H. Shultz, Jr, “In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for

Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama following Just Cause” (Maxwell Air Force

Base, Alabama: Air University Press, August 1993), p. 30.

7. Ibid., p. 28.

8. Shultz, “In the Aftermath of War,” p. 30.

9. Ibid., p. 28.

10. Patrick W. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force: A Unique Solution to Kuwait’s

Reconstruction Problems” (Box 1, Carlton Papers), p. 5.

11. “Readahead for the Civil Affairs Symposium–October 25, 1991,” Civil Affairs in

the Persian Gulf War: Proceedings (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center

and School, October 25–27, 1991), p. 211.

12. Ibid., p. 212.

13. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 5.

14. While the director of the Joint Staff was considering this request, the military

options escalated, perhaps eclipsing the need for activating the Joint Civil Affairs

Committee. The president authorized the call-up of reserves on August 22, and the United

Nations authorized military interdiction in Kuwait on August 25.

15. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 8.

16. Final Report to Congress on Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (prepared by

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and signed by Secretary of Defense

Richard Cheney, April 1992), p. 625. The report confirms that early Civil Affairs planning

for Operation Desert Shield was insufficient. 

17. “Readahead,” p. 212.

18. The assistant secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict is the interagency proponent for Civil Affairs.

19. Ibid., p. 212.

20. While it seems astounding that there was no traction on the CA issue at this

time (fall 1990), it must be remembered that the United States was preparing for a massive

combat operation that understandably was the focus of military planning. Nevertheless,

this event came less than one year from an operation (Panama, Just Cause/Promote

Liberty) that disclosed the dangers of not paying sufficient attention to postconflict issues.

21. “Readahead,” p. 212.

22. The fact that Skip Gnehm was a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense

was no doubt of great value in his ability to work the processes within the Pentagon.

23. Throughout late 1990, it became apparent that the Department of the Army

and, to a lesser extent, USSOCOM was unenthusiastic about activating or deploying U.S.

Army Reserve Civil Affairs personnel. This negative attitude persisted through subsequent

operations in Kurdistan (Operation Provide Comfort).

24. John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and

Desert Storm” (report prepared at the request of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle, PA, August 31, 1992), p. 18.

25. “Readahead,” p. 213.

26. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 10.

27. Active duty Army Civil Affairs in 1990 consisted of one battalion (the 96th CA

Battalion), which possessed no functional or professional expertise and whose mission was

to engage in short-term, life-preserving, tactical civil-military actions.

28. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 8.

29. “Readahead,” p. 214.

30. Ibid.

31. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 10.

32. Ibid., p. 11.

33. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 50.

34. Ibid.
18 ENDNOTES Dennis Barlow

35. Allan W. Keener, “Civil Affairs Operations in Southwest Asia: The

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Perspective,” Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War:

Proceedings (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, October

25–27, 1991), p. 226.

36. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 51.

37. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 12.

38. A view shared by many and affirmed in the Defense Department’s Final Report

to the Congress, April 1992.

39. To the contrary, a very stringent program for preparing and validating the

qualifications of Army Reserve Civil Affairs soldiers and units was carried out during the

Persian Gulf War operations at Fort Bragg, NC.

40. One senior USSOCOM officer, in providing a rationale for the exclusion of

Reserve CA personnel from activation, blurted out in an open meeting that “the Reserves is

just another name for waste, fraud, and abuse!”

41. USSOCOM generally remained silent as this issue developed. Several times

when it had the opportunity to state a position, it took no stance or interposed no objection

to actions contemplated by the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

42. “Readahead,” p. 214.

43. On November 8, President Bush had ordered additional deployments to bolster

U.S. forces in the region. 

44. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 52.

45. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 15.

46. Dennis C. Barlow, “Joint Staff Civil Affairs Actions During Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm,” Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: Proceedings (Fort Bragg,

NC: U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, October 25–27, 1991), p. 217.

47. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 53.

48. Ibid., p. 54.

49. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 13.

50. Ibid., p. 21.

51. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue,” p. 22.

52. Ibid.

53. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 55

54. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue,” p. 22.

55. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 22.

56. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 55.

57. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 19.

58. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 20.

59. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 17.

60. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue,” p. 20.

61. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 25.

62. Ibid.

63. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 26.

64. Ibid., p. 28.

65. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 56.

66. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 30.

67. John Kifner, “After the War; U.S. Army Doing the Work in Kuwait,” New York

Times, April 5, 1991, at http://www.query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html (accessed

March 16, 2009).

68. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War,” p. 56.

69. Carlton, “The Kuwait Task Force,” p. 31.

70. Ibid., p. 31.
19

CASE STUDY N O. 4, TEACHING NOTES

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

The Kuwait Task Force:

Postconflict Planning and 

Interagency Coordination 

Dennis Barlow

CASE DISCUSSION TEACHING PLAN

Objectives

1. To understand that policy guidance is often difficult to ascertain and

transmit.

2. To appreciate that civil-military planning is important in the context

of current national security strategy.

3. To grasp the fact that interagency coordination is difficult owing to

• organizational prerogatives;

• lack of coordinating mechanisms; and 

• understanding “who’s in charge,” which is not always apparent or

accepted.

4. The U.S. military is not a monolith but is made up of diverse and

often competing agencies and forces.

5. Civil Affairs forces and doctrine can be valuable to national security

policy but need to be assessed and addressed more precisely.

Target Audiences

1. U.S. government agency officials with national security responsibilities:

• National Security Council
20 CASE DISCUSSION TEACHING PLAN Dennis Barlow

• State Department

• U.S. Agency for International Development

• Office of the Secretary of State/Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization

• Commerce Department

2. High-level U.S. military staffs (Joint Staff, regional commands)

3. Potential senior military leaders

4. Civil-military planners

5. Civil Affairs officers

6. Army Reserves planning and employment in support of operations

Knowledge, Skills, and Attitudes to be 

Considered in this Case Study

1. Knowledge of Civil Affairs capabilities

2. Knowledge of prerogatives and authorities relating to planning and

conducting national security operations:

• Joint Staff

• Regional Command 

• Other U.S. government agencies

• Armed services

• National Security Council

3. Appreciation of complexities of policy formulation

4. Appreciation of sensitivities and prerogatives of Defense Department agencies

5. Appreciation of the need for appropriate, timely, and effective development of policy guidelines

6. Understanding of the personality factors that are always in play in

high-level politics

7. Consideration of when aggressive staff actions are appropriate
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 21

8. Consideration of the best ways to coordinate State Department/

embassy and regional commander/Pentagon actions

Analysis and Process

During this case study, have the students adopt different organizational

roles in order both to understand and to evaluate the motivations and perspectives of various organizations involved in formation and oversight of

national security policy.

1. Perspectives to Consider: 

• Civil Affairs planners at each level

• Civil Affairs commanders and unit members

• Prerogatives and concerns of the Department of the Army

• Prerogatives and concerns of USSOCOM

• Prerogatives and concerns of USCENTCOM

• Prerogatives and concerns of the Joint Staff

• Prerogatives and concerns of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense

• State Department

• U.S. ambassador to Kuwait

• National Security Council, White House

2. Issues to Consider and Questions to Ask:

• Role of a Civil Affairs staff officer on Pentagon staffs:

What is the relationship between the service provider, the regional commander, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense with

regard to civil-military plans and operations?

What is the proper relationship between CA staff officers and other

agency (for example, Department of State, USAID, embassy, Department of Commerce) officials?

• Roles of State Department and embassy officials

How do they engage and effect military plans?

Who decides who has the lead?
22 TEACHING PLAN Dennis Barlow

• Should there be more structured ways of bringing military and

civilian agencies together on civil-military matters?

• Roles of CA commanders and their unit members

Are CA commanders also advisers? To whom?

How can CA Reserve soldiers make more of an impact on active duty

commanders and civilian agencies?

How proactive can one be without being insubordinate?

• The interagency process relating to operations

Is the National Security Council read into civil-military concerns and

issues?

Who should coordinate civil-military plans and guidance?

Who is in charge of policy oversight during an operation?

• How could unity of effort have been achieved better?

• Did the process work? Why?

• Can we trust to this process working in the future? 

• Have we learned from this and other civil-military challenges

(Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan) so that the problems encountered here have been solved?

• Was the formation of the Kuwait Task Force the best option?

• Was the creation of the Kuwait Task Force merely due to fortuitous circumstances?

• What points of friction were there in forming the Kuwait Task

Force?

• Have these points of friction been overcome, or are they still

there? Are potential points of friction even greater today?

TEACHING PLAN

The commonly accepted view of the restoration of Kuwait is that it worked

well only because of the deep pockets of the Kuwaitis. The simple fact is that

the operation was a success because of the efforts of a few dedicated officials

to create good policy quickly. 
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 23

How much initiative should middle managers exercise in driving

national security issues?

Introduction

Assign the case study as a read-ahead. Provide the following guideline questions to be considered from the frame of reference of each organization that

took part in the scenario described in the case study.

• What authority did each organization represent as this situation

played out? 

• Were its prerogatives, capabilities, and authorities properly framed

and carried out or was the organization marginalized, left out, or ill

used?

• What organizational prerogatives did each organization believe were

important for it to protect?

• What organizations were necessary or appropriate for each organization to coordinate with; which of these should have been regular

meetings?

• Were there meetings or planning linkages that occurred that you

think were inappropriate?

Priming

Lead a short discussion of the opening days of Desert Shield/Desert Storm

to set the stage.

Questions and Process

1. Assign groups of two to three students (or one each if small class size

will allow) to represent the views of the agency assigned to him or

her. Allow students to volunteer for organizations they would like to

represent. Assign the following roles:

• 352d CA Commander, Brigadier General Howard Mooney

• State Department and 352d member, COL Randy Elliott

• Office of the Secretary of Defense CA staffer, LTC Paul Mikesh

• Joint Staff CA planner, LTC Dennis Barlow

• Member of the staff of the headquarters of the Department of the

Army
24 TEACHING PLAN Dennis Barlow

• Member of the staff of USSOCOM

• Member of the staff of USCENTCOM

• Chief, Army Reserves

• Ambassador to Kuwait Edward “Skip” Gnehm

• National Security Council member Robert Gates

2. Task the student groups to answer the following questions:

• What authority did your organization have in this situation? Was it

properly framed, or were you marginalized, left out, or ill used?

• What organizational prerogatives did you believe were important

for your organization to protect?

• What organizations do you feel were necessary or appropriate to

coordinate with; which of these should be regular meetings?

• What meetings or planning linkages occurred that you think were

inappropriate?

• If you (your organization) could have a “redo” on this, what would

you do differently?

3. Allow the student teams fifteen minutes to develop answers to these

questions, then have one of the group answer the questions in such a

way that they can be presented to the class. Do not allow any critique

or discussion at this point—just capture the responses.

4. Now reassign the roles, this time assigning students to organizations

to which they showed the greatest disdain or negativism during the

first round. Give the new groups ten minutes to develop answers to

the same questions, and have those answers posted directly under

the comments of the first group for the same organization.

5. Class Discussion

• Review both sets of comments for each organization, and pull out

consistencies/discrepancies between the two different student

groups.

• Develop consensus on what were effective and ineffective actions

of each group (including acts of omission and commission).

• Discuss whether difficulties arising from this action seventeen

years ago have been remedied, remain the same, or have grown

worse.
The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination 25

• Allow students to opine about the best ways to assure adequate

implementation of policy guidance.

6. Homework assignment: Have each student take the list of persons

involved (both by-name individuals and those named only by organization) and place the following “Personnel Action to be Taken” for

each player. Each must be assigned one of four actions: (1) promote

early, (2) give a poor evaluation (precluding promotion), (3) give an

impact award, or (4) take no action.

Board Plan

Use ten slides (butcher block paper, etc.)—one for each organization

involved in the process—and identify its key prerogatives, considerations,

and imperatives.

Center for Complex Operations

National Defense University

300 5th Avenue SW

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319

Telephone

Commercial: 202-685-2529

DSN: 325-2529

Fax: 202-685-3581

Web Site

http://ccoportal.org

Dr. Karen Guttieri

Naval Postgraduate School

1411 Cunningham Road

GE-306

Monterey, CA 93943

Contact Information

831-656-2294

guttieri@nps.edu
Center for Complex Operations

National Defense University