Introduction

to the

United States Air Force

B. CHANCE SALTZMAN, Capt, USAF

and

THOMAS R. SEARLE

Airpower Research Institute,

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and

Education, and Air University Press

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

2001
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

ii
Foreword

The initial concept of the Introduction to the United States Air Force was to facilitate the

process of learning how the US Air Force became what it is today: The most powerful military force in the history of the world. And as our Air Force continues to grow, so will this

“primer.” I wish to thank Tom Searle at CADRE for giving me the opportunity to help him

update this introduction from an “end-user” point of view. This revised edition will take the

student up to the twenty-first century by including some recent operations, aircraft, and significant personalities that were not included in the 1999 edition. Additionally, the 1999 edition included separate sections on significant operations and personalities but in this revised

edition operations and personalities have been merged and organized chronologically to

better match the needs of AS200. The original organization of the section on aerospace craft

has been retained to show the unique developments of each of the different types of platforms.

For ROTC AS200 instructors: This book is intended to supplement The Concise History

of the United States Air Force which is currently being used in the AS200 curriculum.

Assigned reading from these books are highly encouraged to ensure the student has a firm

grasp of the lessons prior to class.

Eric M. Moody, Capt, USAF

AFOATS Curriculum Development

iii
Authors’ Preface

To lead the US Air Force into the future, it is necessary to understand the past and present nature of the force. With this in mind, Air Force leaders have always sought to arm

members of the force with a basic knowledge and understanding of Air Force culture and

history. This volume is a contribution to that ongoing educational process, but as the title

states, this is only an introduction. The information provided here merely scratches the surface of the fascinating stories of the people, equipment, and operations of the Air Force.

Topics that are covered here in only a few short paragraphs have been, and will continue to

be the subject of entire books. We hope this volume will be a starting point and a reference

work to facilitate your continuing study of aerospace power.

The reader should keep in mind that all the people, operations, and aerospace craft

included in this book have been important to the US Air Force, but they are not the only

ones that have been important. The US Air Force has gained much from other nations,

other US military services, and civilian organizations and these outside influences on the US

Air Force are not included in this volume.

This Introduction to the United States Air Force is organized into two parts and five appendices. The first part is organized chronologically and groups significant operations and personalities together in several critical periods in the development of the US Air Force. The

second part covers aerospace craft and is organized by type (fighters, bombers, missiles, etc.)

in order to show the development of each type over time. Following Part II are appendices

listing the senior leaders of the early air forces (before the creation of the US Air Force in

1947), the Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force, Fighter

Aces, and Medal of Honor Winners.

While the biographical sketches and brief descriptions of operations are fairly self-explanatory, the information provided on aerospace craft requires some explanation. The dates

given for aircraft and missiles are the initial delivery of production models, so prototypes will

typically have been available earlier, and it may have been some years later before large operational units were fully trained and equipped with the new system. For satellites the date is

the first successful launch of a satellite in the system. Aircraft types are continuously

improved during their service lives so range, speed, and ceiling will vary widely between different models of the type. The statistics listed in this book are typical for the aircraft but on

a specific day, actual performance of any single aircraft may have been different. Aircraft

range is particularly difficult to specify because it can be changed by using external fuel tanks

of various sizes and aerial refueling can make range virtually infinite. Satellite systems pose

problems of their own due partly to security classification. Additionally, satellite systems are

listed by function rather than model and over a period of decades, continuous improvement

in the satellites performing that function will result in changes in the size, shape, and weight

of the satellites. Thus the pictures of satellites and the dimensions given for them represent

v
typical recent satellites performing that function, but may be quite different from past and

future systems. For all these reasons, the statistics provided in Part I must be considered simplified and incomplete synopses of much more complicated stories.

No work of this type could have been written without the invaluable assistance of many

people and institutions. We would like to take this opportunity to thank a few of them. Dr.

Daniel Mortensen and Col (Ret.) Phillip S. Meilinger are two outstanding airpower scholars who gave us enormous assistance and encouragement. At Air University Press, John

Jordan, Peggy Smith, Daniel Armstrong, and Mary Ferguson provided the editing, layout,

and photograph selection without which this volume would have been a mess. Any faults

that remain are, of course, entirely our own.

B. Chance Saltzman and

Thomas R. Searle

vi
Contents

Page

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

AUTHORS’ PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Part I

WORLD WAR I AND THE INTERWAR YEARS: 1916–40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Mexican Punitive Expedition (1916–17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

St. Mihiel Offensive of World War I (September 1918) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The Sinking of the Ostfriesland (1921) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Pan American Goodwill Flight (1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Question Mark Flight (1929) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Airmail Operation (1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

“Hap” Arnold’s B-10 Flights to Alaska (1934) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Maj Gen Benjamin D. “Benny” Foulois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Eugene Jacques Bullard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Capt Edward V. “Eddie” Rickenbacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Lt Frank Luke Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Maj Gen Mason M. Patrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Lt Gen Frank M. “Andy” Andrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

WORLD WAR II: 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (18 April 1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Kasserine Pass (February 1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Battle of the Bismarck Sea (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Ploesti Raid (August 1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Regensburg/Schweinfurt Raids (1943) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

“The Big Week” (February 1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Operation Overlord (1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Bombing Tokyo (9–10 March 1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings (August 1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

General of the Army Henry H. “Hap” Arnold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Lt Gen Claire L. Chennault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Col Francis S. “Gabby” Gabreski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Capt Colin P. Kelly Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Gen Laurence S. Kuter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

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Maj Richard I. “Dick” Bong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Lt Gen James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Gen George C. Kenney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Lt Gen Ennis C. Whitehead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Lt Gen Benjamin O. Davis Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Jacqueline “Jackie” Cochran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Gen Leon W. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Maj Thomas B. “Mickey” McGuire Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Brig Gen Paul W. Tibbets Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE, COLD WAR, AND KOREA: 1946–64 . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

X-1 Supersonic Flight (14 October 1947). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Berlin Airlift (1948–49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Pusan Perimeter Defense (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Corona (1960) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Strategic Air Command (1946–92). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Brig Gen Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Col Dean Hess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Col James Jabara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Capt Joseph C. “Joe” McConnell Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Maj Gen Frederick C. “Boots” Blesse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Brig Gen Robinson “Robbie” Risner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Gen Nathan F. Twining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Lt Gen William H. Tunner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Gen Curtis E. LeMay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Gen Bernard A. “Bennie” Schriever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Lt Col Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Lt Col Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Maj Donald K. “Deke” Slayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Paul W. Airey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965–75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–68). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Operation Arc Light (1965–67) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Operation Bolo (January 1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Operation Linebacker I (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Operation Linebacker II (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

A1C William H. Pitzenbarger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Lt Col Merlyn H. Dethlefsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Capt Lance P. Sijan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Gen John D. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Gen Daniel “Chappie” James Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

A1C John L. Levitow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

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Gen George S. Brown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Capt Richard S. “Steve” Ritchie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Gen David C. Jones. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Brig Gen Robin Olds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Brig Gen Harry C. “Heinie” Aderholt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

REBUILDING THE AIR FORCE AND THE GULF WAR: 1976–91 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

El Dorado Canyon (14–15 April 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Operation Just Cause (December 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Strategic Attack on Iraq (January 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

The Battle of Khafji (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

Col John W. Warden, III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Gen Charles A. Horner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Gen Merrill A. McPeak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

POST-COLD WAR: 1992–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Policing Postwar Iraq (1991–?) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Operations in Somalia (1992–94) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Operations Provide Promise and Deny Flight: Bosnia (1992–96) . . . . . . . . . . . 102

Operation Uphold Democracy: Haiti (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

The Kosovo Crisis (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Lt Gen Michael C. Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Part II

EARLY AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Wright 1909 Military Flyer and Curtiss JN-4D “Jenny”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

DeHavilland DH-4 and SPAD XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

PURSUIT/FIGHTER AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Curtiss P-6E and Boeing P-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Bell P-39 and Lockheed P-38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

Curtiss P-40 and Republic P-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

North American P-51 and Bell P-59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Northrop P-61 and Lockheed F-80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Republic F-84 and North American F-86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

North American F-100 and McDonnell F-101 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Convair F-102, Lockheed F-104, and Convair F-106 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Republic F-105 and McDonnell Douglas F-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

General Dynamics F-111 and McDonnell Douglas F-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Lockheed Martin F-16 and Lockheed F-117. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Boeing and Lockheed Martin F-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

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BOMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Martin GMB/MB-1, Boeing B-9, and Martin B-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Boeing B-17 and Consolidated B-24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

North American B-25 and Martin B-26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Boeing B-29 and Convair B-36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Boeing B-47 and Convair B-58 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Boeing B-52 and Rockwell B-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Northrop Grumman B-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

ATTACK AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Northrop A-17 and Douglas A-20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Douglas A-26 and Douglas A-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Vought A-7 and Fairchild A-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

TANKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Boeing KC-97 and Boeing KB-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Boeing KC-135 and McDonnell Douglas KC-10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

TRANSPORT AND SPECIAL ELECTRONIC AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Curtiss-Wright C-30 and Douglas C-47 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Curtiss C-46 and Douglas C-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Fairchild C-82/119 and Douglas C-124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Lockheed C-69/121 and Fairchild C-123 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Lockheed C-130 and Lockheed C-141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Lockheed C-5 and Boeing E-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Northrop Grumman E-8 and Boeing C-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

TRAINING AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Vultee BT-13 and North American AT-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Lockheed T-33 and North American T-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Beech T-34 and Cessna T-37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Northrop T-38 and Raytheon T-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

EXPERIMENTAL AND STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Bell X-1 and Lockheed U-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

North American X-15 and North American XB-70 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

Lockheed SR-71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

STRATEGIC MISSILES AND SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Douglas PGM-17 Thor and General Dynamics HGM-19 Atlas . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Martin LGM-25 Titan and Boeing LGM-30 Minuteman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Boeing LGM-118 Peacekeeper and McDonnell Douglas Delta II . . . . . . . . . . 157

Boeing AGM-86 and Boeing AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile . . . . . . . . . . 158

x
Page

SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Lockheed Corona . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Lockheed Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

and Defense Satellite Communications System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

TRW Defense Support Program and Rockwell Navstar

Global Positioning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Milstar Satellite Communications System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

Appendix

A Senior Leadership of the Early Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

B Air Force Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

C Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

D Fighter Aces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

E USAF Medal of Honor Winners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

xi
Part I

Major Operations and Personnel

of the

United States Air Force
World War I and the

Interwar Years

1916–40
I

n 1911 the Mexican government was overthrown and the country descended into civil

war. An incident in Vera Cruz in 1914 led to

US Navy intervention. Cross border raids by

Mexican revolutionaries (which killed nine soldiers and six civilians) and assaults on American

citizens and property in Mexico further heightened tensions. In January 1916 forces loyal to

the bandit/revolutionary Pancho Villa, deliberately killed 18 Americans in Mexico, and in

March, they crossed the border and attacked the

border town of Columbus, New Mexico, killing

eight soldiers and eight civilians. President

Woodrow Wilson ordered American forces

under the command of Gen John Pershing to

pursue and attack Villa’s forces in Mexico. On

15 March 1916 American troops crossed the

international border with grudging permission

from the Mexican government. Pershing’s force

included the newly-formed 1st Aero Squadron

with 8 aircraft, 10 pilots, 84 enlisted men, 10

trucks, one automobile, and six motorcycles.

The airmen should have been a great help to

the cavalry units operating against a very mobile

foe in difficult terrain. They should have been

ideal for reconnaissance and even in small numbers, their attacks should have had a major

impact on the campaign. Unfortunately, poor

equipment and woefully inadequate training

severely limited the role of the Aero Squadron.

The squadron was equipped with the Curtiss

JN-3 which was adequate as a trainer but could

not cross the 10,000-foot mountains in that part

of Mexico, could only carry a payload of 265

pounds, had no instruments, and was unarmed.

The pilots were no better prepared than their aircraft and the high accident and incident rate was

not a surprise. Maintenance was a further problem because the wood and canvas suffered from

the desert climate (especially the wooden props).

After a month of operations only two of the

original eight aircraft were still operational, and

they were condemned.

The squadron received Curtiss NBs and other

new aircraft and the pilots got a lot of on-the-job

training but the squadron’s main contribution to

the campaign was carrying dispatches and mail.

Their most significant single accomplishment was

to find a lost cavalry column. The weaknesses of

the United States air arm rapidly became clear to

everyone, as did many of the requirements for

conducting a sustained air campaign. The steps

taken to remedy these problems bore fruit less

than two years later when the 1st Aero Squadron

and the rest of the American Air Service demonstrated their combat capabilities in World War I.

5

Woefully inadequate equipment

and poorly trained personnel

limited the airmen’s contribution to delivering dispatches

and mail.

1st Aero Squadron JN-3 in Mexico.

The Mexican Punitive Expedition (1916–17)
On 12 September 1918, American forces

under Gen John J. Pershing, began the

offensive to reduce the St. Mihiel

salient. The bulge was a 24-mile wide, 14-mile

deep salient formed by the German advance

south of the fortress city of Verdun earlier in the

war. For the offensive, General Pershing commanded the Allied First Army in an excellent

example of a joint and combined operation. In

addition to US Army air and ground units, the

US ground contingent of Pershing’s force

included a large number of US Marines. The

Allies also contributed substantial forces. One

of Pershing’s four ground corps was made up of

French Colonial troops and air units were provided by France, Italy, Portugal, and Great

Britain. The American units were under what

we would now call Operational Control of

General Pershing, but the British air units came

from the “Independent Force.” They coordinated and cooperated with the St. Mihiel offensive, but in an early example of the complex

command relationships in combined operations, they were not under Pershing’s control. 

6

St. Mihiel Offensive of World War I (September 1918)

Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell

St. Mihiel represented the first large scale

massing of airpower under central command.

With 1,500 aircraft, General Mitchell seized the

initiative, gained air superiority, attacked

ground forces, and interdicted supplies, helping

Allied ground forces to achieve their objectives.

General Pershing appointed Col (later Brig

Gen) William “Billy” Mitchell as his air commander for the battle. Mitchell’s role was similar to that of a modern joint force air component commander (JFACC) in that he was both

commander of air forces and the chief advisor

to the overall commander (in this case General

Pershing) on the employment of air assets.

Mitchell’s forces, consisting of airplanes and

observation balloons, were the largest massing

of airpower the world had yet seen. About 600

of these planes were flown by US personnel. 

St. Mihiel represented the first large

scale massing of airpower under central command. With 1,500 aircraft,

General Mitchell seized the initiative,

gained air superiority, attacked

ground forces, and interdicted supplies, helping Allied ground forces to

achieve their objectives.

In 1918, the Allies organized their aircraft

into four types: observation (which we now call

reconnaissance and surveillance); pursuit

(which we now call fighters); daylight bombers;

and night bombers. With 1918 technology, the

artillery of the ground armies could deliver

vastly more firepower than the small number of

primitive bombers available to Colonel

Mitchell, so a large portion of the observation

force (and all of the observation balloons) provided targeting data to the ground artillery. To

facilitate the passing of data between the
artillery and aerial reconnaissance units, many of

these units were assigned to support the ground

commanders and their artillery units. General

Mitchell kept all of the pursuit and bombardment planes under his direct control and

retained many of the observation units as well. 

Mitchell believed that the first task of airpower was achieving air superiority and he was

concerned that ground commanders would try

to use his aircraft defensively to patrol over

friendly lines and protect ground units and aerial observers from German planes. Instead,

Mitchell was determined to use his pursuit

planes in offensive counterair operations to

attack the Germans deep in their own territory

and drive them from the air while the bombers

attacked targets deep in the German rear.

Mitchell’s approach was extremely successful

and helped the Allies gain and maintain control

of the air throughout the offensive. In a foreshadowing of “Big Week” and other air campaigns of World War II, German pursuit aircraft

came up to attack Allied bombers and observation planes and were destroyed by Allied pursuit

aircraft that were hunting for enemy aircraft

rather than merely defending friendly ones. 

While observation operations focused on areas

near the front lines, the 91st Aero Squadron conducted some deeper operations. This unit was particularly effective because it was one of the most

experienced units in the American Air Service and

had been operating in the St. Mihiel district since

the spring. The bombers focused on the counterland campaign with close air support missions and

interdiction missions against road and rail junctions in the German rear. The bombers operated

in larger formations to defend themselves and free

the Allied pursuit aircraft to hunt German planes

and balloons. 

During the four days of the offensive,

American airmen made 3,300 flights over battle

lines, logged 4,000 hours, made 1,000 individual bomb attacks dropping 75 tons of high

explosive. They also destroyed 12 enemy balCapt Eddie Rickenbacker with his Spad XIII, briefly took the

lead as the “Ace of Aces” on 15 September with his 8th victory.

Later that day, Lt Elliot Springs scored his 9th victory to reclaim

the lead.

loons and more than 60 enemy planes not to

mention the enormous damage done by strafing German units trying to escape along the

roads out of the salient. In this brief battle the

First Army cleared the St. Mihiel salient and

captured 15,000 prisoners and more than 250

cannons. Massed airpower contributed substantially to this achievement. In General Pershing’s

words, “The organization and control of the

tremendous concentration of Air Forces has

enabled the First Army to carry out its dangerous and important mission.”

In addition to famous US aces like Eddie

Rickenbacker and Frank Luke, US airmen in

the St. Mihiel offensive included George C.

Kenney, Joseph T. McNarney, and Carl A.

Spaatz. Kenney, McNarney, and Spaatz all went

on to become four-star generals in the US Air

Force and Spaatz became the first Chief of Staff

of the US Air Force. Rickenbacker, Luke, and

Spaatz all earned aerial victories during the St.

Mihiel air battles and Luke scored 8 of his 18

victories there. More importantly, many of the

future leaders of US airpower gained invaluable

experience in large-scale air operations at St.

Mihiel. This experience paid immediate dividends in World War I and was invaluable to the

future development of US airpower.

7
Following World War I, many Air Service

flyers supported the idea of an air arm,

independent of the Army and Navy, and

felt that aircraft could protect US shores more

efficiently and effectively than the battleships of

the US Navy that had traditionally done that

job. The most prominent advocate of this philosophy was Billy Mitchell.

When Mitchell suggested that US airpower

could defend the nation’s coasts from attacks by

enemy warships better than US sea power, a controversy developed as to whether an airplane

could even sink a battleship. No battleship had

ever been sunk by an airplane and the Secretary of

the Navy, Josephus Daniels, expressed the Navy’s

contempt for Mitchell when he offered to stand

bareheaded on the bridge of any ship the Army

attempted to bomb. He approved tests off the

Virginia capes to be conducted in June and July of

1921. During the tests, Mitchell’s bombers, MB2s of the 1st Provisional Brigade flying from

Langley Field, Virginia, sank three captured

German naval vessels including the Ostfriesland, a

fairly modern battleship built by the Germans

The Sinking of the Ostfriesland (1921)

An MB-2 hits its target, the obsolete battleship

USS Alabama during tests.

A Martin MB-2, an early version of the bombers used in the tests.

only 10 years before. In September 1921, the

obsolete United States Ship (USS) Alabama was

sunk. Two years later, additional tests were conducted off Cape Hatteras and two more obsolete

US battleships were sent to the bottom. The Navy

argued that the tests had been conducted under

artificial conditions. They contended that damagecontrol parties could have stopped the flooding

that sank the Ostfriesland and claimed that antiaircraft fire could have eliminated several of the

bombers before they could strike. Nevertheless,

bombs from aircraft had sunk battleships and a

realization that the Navy would require air cover

in future wars began to spread. This awareness

was a boon to Navy airmen who began to receive

much more attention as a result of these tests.

For Mitchell, the sinkings in 1921, and in

subsequent tests, proved conclusively that the

day of the battleship had ended and that an

independent air force could defend the coasts of

the United States and its possessions more

effectively and less expensively than any combination of the Army’s coast artillery and the

Navy’s warships. The Navy agreed that battleships were vulnerable when they came within

range of bombers, but they still firmly believed

that the dreadnought reigned supreme on the

high seas beyond reach of land-based aircraft.

The success of the bombing trials encouraged

the supporters of a separate air arm to press

even harder for their objectives but the Army

General Staff remained firm in its belief that airpower, acting independently, could not win a

war. For its part, the US Navy became even

more adamant that it, not an independent air

force, should control naval aviation. The debate

over proper and effective organization and use

of airpower began before the United States

entered World War I and continues to this day.

8
I

n the mid-1920s, very little flying had been

done in Latin America and anti-US feelings

were strong there in spite of the longstanding US strategic interest in the region.

Latin Americas were also buying European airplanes rather than American ones. In the hopes

of garnering good publicity for the US Army

Air Corps, opening up Lating America to military and commerical aviation, and interesting

Latin Americans in US-built airplanes, the War

Department authorized the Pan American

Goodwill Flight. The flight started in San

Antonio, Texas, and proceeded south through

Mexico and along the Pacific coast of Latin

America before crossing the continent in

southern Chile and returning to the US along

the Atlantic coast of South America and across

the West Indies to Washington, D.C.

Maj Gen James Fechet, deputy chief of the Air

Corps nominated 20 officers to Maj Gen Mason

M. Patrick, chief of the Air Corps. Patrick

appointed Maj Herbert A. Dargue as commander and nine other pilots, including Capt Ira

C. Eaker to fly the mission. Eaker’s copilot was

Lt Muir S. Fairchild. The Pan American flights

were highly publicized and captured world attention. Eaker and Fairchild won particular glory

because their OA-1, San Francisco, was the only

9

Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker

The Pan American Goodwill Flight (1927)

one that completed the entire 23,000-mile journey, making every scheduled stop.

The flight received front-page coverage

almost every day for five months in major US

newspapers and many foreign ones. The purposes of the flight included furthering relations

with Latin American countries, encouraging

commercial aviation, providing valuable training for Air Corps personnel, and giving an

extensive test to the amphibian airplane. The

OA-1 amphibian was designed for observation

work. The engine was a water-cooled Liberty

engine producing 400 horsepower, mounted

upside down so that the three-bladed aluminum propeller could clear the hull’s upturned

beak. Each aircraft was named after an American

city to further promote relations.

The flights did have their share of trouble. The

New York crash-landed in Guatemala and the

San Antonio required an engine change in

Columbia. Tragedy struck when two aircraft collided over Buenos Aires. Major Dargue and Lt

Ennis C. Whitehead escaped by parachute but

Captain Woolsey and Lieutenant Benton went

down with the Detroit and were killed instantly.

Despite these setbacks, the Pan American

flights were a success. Upon arrival at Bolling

Field, Washington, D.C., the fliers were met by

President Calvin Coolidge who presented each

of them with the first Distinguished Flying

Crosses, a medal authorized by Congress a few

months before. The Americans had aroused the

aviation interest of Latin Americans, many of

whom had never seen an airplane. The expedition maps became the basis for civil aviation

routes in Latin American.

The OA-1 amphibious aircraft, the San Francisco, flown 23,000

miles by Ira Eaker and Muir Fairchild.
I

n March 1928, Captain Eaker and Lt

Elwood R. “Pete” Quesada were involved in

the rescue of the three-man crew that accomplished the first east-west flight across the

Atlantic. The experience left Eaker and Quesada

with an idea—an effective way of refueling in

midair. Captain Eaker was just the man to turn

this project into reality. It took a mixture of

imagination, political savvy, opportunism, and

zeal to succeed. At Bolling Field, he spotted two

suitable aircraft, a trimotored Fokker and a

Douglas. Eaker then assembled his team. He

enlisted the help of Maj Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz

and suggested that he be the commander of the

project. Eaker would act as chief pilot with

Quesada as copilot. The C-1 crew included Lt

Harry Halverson and Sgt Roy Hooe.

On 1 January 1929, the Question Mark, so

named because the crew did not know how long

it would be airborne, took off from San Diego,

California. It flew back and forth over the 70

miles between Los Angeles, California, and San

Diego for six days. Major Spaatz rode in the tail

section of the airplane and was responsible for

connecting the refueling hose to the tank. The

refuelings were dangerous with the C-1 hovering

only 20 feet above the Fokker at all hours of the

day and night and through turbulence. When

the hose was lowered, Spaatz would ground it to

a copper plate fixed to the Fokker to prevent a

spark and then fit it in the tank’s funneled open10

ing. The gas would flow at 75 gallons per

minute. Oil in five-gallon containers, food, and

supplies were lowered from the C-1 by rope and

hauled into the Fokker by Spaatz.

On 7 January the Fokker’s left engine quit

and although the plane could remain aloft on

one engine it could not maintain the five thousand feet deemed safe. After 150 hours, 40

minutes, and 15 seconds, the Question Mark

touched down. It had flown about 11,000

miles and set an endurance record that would

last for many years. The contributions of this

flight were numerous. Besides the obvious airto-air refueling possibilities, the flight also

showed that a plane powered by 1929 engines

could fly 11,000 miles with five men aboard.

With new planes already on the drawing board,

regular nonstop transcontinental flights would

soon be practical. The flight also foreshadowed

American bombers seeking distant targets and

likewise that the United States would soon be

vulnerable to aerial attack. Finally, the ocean

was eliminated as a barrier and the Navy’s

wartime role was forever altered.

The Question Mark Flight (1929)

The record-setting Question Mark

flight demonstrated effective air-to-air

refueling and the range possibilities of

aircraft. Bombers would be able to seek

out distant targets and the oceans

would be eliminated as barriers.

The Question Mark Team, 1929.

The Question Mark refueling in flight.
11

The Airmail Operation (1934)

I

n February 1934, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt canceled the airmail contracts

between the Post Office and the commercial

airlines due to evidence of fraud in the conduct of

the business. Before issuing a formal cancellation

directive, Roosevelt had postal officials meet with

the Chief of the Air Corps, Maj Gen Benjamin D.

“Benny” Foulois, to determine if the Air Corps

could temporarily haul the mail. Foulois agreed

to the proposal because the publicity of the successful operation would be helpful in securing

badly need funds for the Air Corps.

On 9 February 1934, Foulois committed the

Air Corps to the task of delivery the nation’s airmail. The endeavor proved to be too much for

the Air Corps. The airmail flights took place at

night and regardless of weather conditions;

however, the average Army pilot lacked experience in this kind of flying. The Army’s open

cockpit planes were not normally equipped with

blind flying instruments or even radios. In addition to the equipment and training shortcomings, the staff was faced with a huge administration challenge. Hangars had to be acquired,

office space along the routes secured, refueling

arrangements made, and scheduling and maintenance logistics all had to be sorted out. The

task was truly daunting. The mail was carried in

every available type of aircraft. Twenty-five

pounds could be carried in the P-12, while two

thousand pounds could be hauled in the Martin

B-10 and Boeing B-9.

Maj Gen Oscar M. Westover, deputy chief of

the Air Corps, took over the airmail operation

and established geographic zones. The western

zone was commanded by “Hap” Arnold, the

central by Horace Hickam, and Byron Q. Jones

commanded the eastern zone.

The Army Air Corps began flying the mail on

19 February 1934. Unfortunately, the United

States experienced some of the worst late winter

weather in its history. Throughout February,

rain, snow, dense fog, and icy gales covered the

nation. Aircraft on ramps couldn’t be started,

carburetor icing caused engine failure, and

pilots became disoriented in fog and clouds.

Valor and eagerness could not overcome lack of

experience and poor weather. Six Army pilots

were killed in the operation’s first week. A frustrated President Roosevelt took steps to renegotiate with the commercial airlines.

By March, the weather was improving and a

quick course in instrument flying combined to

improve the Air Corps’ record. However, the

overall effort was dismal. In the 12 months that

the Air Corps delivered mail, there were 66

crashes, 12 deaths, and only a 66 percent sortie

completion rate. During this period, the number of deaths rose 15 percent from the average.

Despite its poor showing, the Air Corps

learned immensely from its airmail operation.

The Air Corps learned there was a need for an

extensive instrument training program, an automated landing system, and reliable radio communications. The airmail fiasco also led to the

convening of the Drum Board, which recommended the creation of General Headquarters

(GHQ) Air Force. Followed by the Baker Board

that supported the formation of a centrally controlled aerial strike force. The findings of these

boards established aviation policy that endured

through World War II, acknowledging that military aviation was valuable in both offensive and

defensive operations.

A Curtiss B-2 Condor over Airmail Route 4 (the Salt Lake

City––Los Angeles mail).
12

I

n the summer of 1934, Lt Col Henry H.

“Hap” Arnold was ordered to Wright Field

in Dayton, Ohio, to organize a flight of

bombers to Alaska. The planes to be used were

the Martin B-10s. The B-10 was a low-wing

monoplane, the Air Corps’ first all-metal

bomber. It was also the first 200 miles per hour

(MPH) bomber with a range of 900 miles. The

flight path would take the bombers from

Dayton, Ohio, to Washington, D.C. From

Washington, D.C., the bombers would travel to

Minneapolis, Minnesota, into Canada across

Alberta to Prince George then to Fairbanks,

Alaska. The mission would include aerial photography of Alaska to map airways in and out of

Alaska and to various ports of entry to Alaska

from the Soviet Union. The return flight would

send the bombers south from Juneau, Alaska,

to Seattle, Washington, then on to Washington,

D.C. The flight would include 10 bombers with

14 officers and six enlisted men. After a month

of preparation, the B-10s took off for

Washington on 18 July 1934. The mission was

without precedent but was not unusually

tough. The B-10s averaged 820 miles a day

“Hap” Arnold’s B-10 Flights to Alaska (1934)

The B-10 Alaska flights proved

the strategic application of the

Army’s bombers.

General of the Army “Hap” Arnold

Route of the B-10 Alaska flights.

except from Juneau to Seattle where there was

no landing field for 990 miles. The mission covered 18,000 miles over very rough terrain without a major incident. In Cooks Bay

(Anchorage), Alaska, one of the B-10s sank into

40 feet of water. It was hauled out and repaired

and continued the mission. Arnold’s crew chief,

TSgt Henry Puzenski, was largely responsible

for this miracle and remained Arnold’s crew

chief until he retired 13 years later. The B-10s

returned to Washington, D.C., landing on 22

August 1934. The return trip angered Army

Chief of Staff Gen Douglas MacArthur because

Arnold had flown his B-10s off course over the

ocean to demonstrate their coastal range. This

grandstanding angered the Navy and

MacArthur had to deal with the delicate situation centering on which service was responsible

for coastal defense. Arnold’s detour ensured that

no medals were given out for the Alaska flight as

long as MacArthur was Chief of Staff. Despite

the politics, the trip had proven the extensive

range and strategic application of the Army’s

bombers.
Benjamin D. Foulois taught himself to fly largely

through correspondence with the Wright

brothers in 1910. While many of his contemporaries died in plane crashes or quit flying, he continued as an operational pilot until World War I. 

Foulois came from a humble background and was

physically unimpressive; worse, he lacked the

charisma of his contemporary and chief rival within

the air arm, William “Billy” Mitchell. The animosity

between Mitchell and Foulois began in 1916 when

he and the 1st Aero Squadron were sent to Mexico

with John Pershing in pursuit of the bandit Pancho

Villa. At the same time, the chief of the Signal Corps

was forced from office due to financial improprieties,

and Mitchell, who had not yet even flown an airplane, was temporarily placed in charge. The poor

performance of the aviation unit in Mexico resulted

in mutual finger pointing between Mitchell and

Foulois, and the rift never healed. Pershing clearly

had respect for both of them, but thought neither

had the experience or maturity to run the Air

Service; hence, he appointed Mason M. Patrick to

lead the air arm and control its two main recalcitrants. Nonetheless, as chief of the Air Corps after

1931, Foulois’s steady perseverance in working to

shift War Department views regarding the importance of airpower gradually paid off, resulting in the

increased autonomy of the General Headquarters

(GHQ) Air Force, formed in 1935. On the other

hand, Foulois was not popular among his Army

brethren and the disastrous performance of the Air

Corps in the “Air Mail Fiasco” of 1934 earned him

the ill will of President Roosevelt. Looking for a

scapegoat, Congress, also embarrassed by the miserable Air Corps performance, held hearings into the

issue of aircraft procurement. Foulois was reprimanded for “misleading” Congress and violating the

spirit of procurement laws. The Air Corps chief’s

relations with the Navy were also stormy during this

period. But in truth––given the budget crunch during the bottom of the Depression, their inherently

conflicting views regarding the role of airpower in

war, and the poisoned atmosphere created by

Mitchell––such difficulties were inevitable. Without

friends in or out of the Army and with his usefulness

clearly limited, Foulois retired in December 1935, a

bitter and lonely man. But he lived to see the US Air

Force become the most powerful military force in

the world and he was a regular speaker at Air Force

bases in the 1960s.

13

Maj Gen Benjamin D. “Benny” Foulois

• Taught himself to fly largely through correspondence with

the Wright brothers in 1910.

• During World War I, Gen “Benny” Foulois was responsible

for all Air Service support functions.

• After serving as air attache in Germany and commanding

Mitchel Field in New York, General Foulois was named

Chief of the Air Corps in 1931.

• As chief of the Air Corps, Foulois was largely responsible

for the “Air Mail Fiasco” of 1934. Delivering the country’s

mail proved to be a task the young air force was not

equipped to undertake.
Of more than two hundred Americans who

flew for France during World War I, one of

particular uniqueness was Eugene Bullard,

the only black pilot of World War I. A fellow flier

describes Bullard in France, “His jolly face shone

with a grin of greeting and justifiable vanity. He wore

a pair of tan aviator’s boots which gleamed with a

mirror-like luster, and above his breeches smote the

eye with a dash of vivid scarlet. His black tunic, excellently cut and set off by a fine figure, was decorated

with a pilot’s badge, a Croix de Guerre, the fourragere of the Foreign Legion, and a pair of enormous

wings, which left no possible doubt, even at a distance of 50 feet, as to which arm of the Service he

adorned. The eleces-pilotes gasped, the eyes of the

neophytes stood out from their heads, and one

repressed a strong instinct to stand at attention.” 

There was scarcely an American at Atord who did

not know and like Bullard. He was a brave, loyal, and

thoroughly likable man but the US Air Service did

not accept black officers. Therefore, he fought as a

member of the French Army Aviation Service and

not as a member of the US Air Service.

Following World War I, Bullard remained in

France until the German occupation of Paris in

1940, at which time he had to flee the country

because of his previous spying activities against the

Nazis. He returned to the United States and lived in

New York City, New York, until his death in 1961.

Thus passed from the scene the first black pilot in the

history of military aviation.

14

Eugene Jacques Bullard

• First African-American military pilot.

• Served in the French Army Aviation Service in World War I.

• Remained in Paris after the war and spied on Germany in World

War II.

Bullard flew the Spad XVI, a French-designed and -built fast

two-seat reconnaissance-type aircraft developed from the Spad

VII. At the time of its entry into service (1916), it was one of

the fastest and most maneuverable two-seaters in combat.
Billy Mitchell is the most famous and controversial figure in American airpower history.

The son of a wealthy Wisconsin senator, he

enlisted as a private during the Spanish–American

War. Quickly gaining a commission due to the intervention of his father, he joined the Signal Corps. He

was an outstanding junior officer, displaying a rare

degree of initiative, courage, and leadership. After

challenging tours in the Philippines and Alaska,

Mitchell was assigned to the General Staff—at the

time its youngest member. He slowly became excited

about aviation, which was then assigned to the Signal

Corps, and its possibilities, and in 1916 at age 38, he

took private flying lessons. 

Arriving in France in April 1917, only a few days

after the United States had entered the war,

Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell rapidly earned a reputation as a daring, flamboyant, and tireless leader. He

eventually was elevated to the rank of brigadier general and commanded all American combat units in

France. In September 1918 he planned and led

nearly fifteen hundred Allied aircraft in the air phase

of the St. Mihiel offensive. Recognized as the top

American combat airman of the war (he was awarded

the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished

Service Medal, and several foreign decorations),

Mitchell managed to alienate most of his superiors,

both flying and nonflying, while in France. 

Returning to the United States in early 1919,

Mitchell was appointed the deputy chief of the Air

Service, retaining his one-star rank. His relations

with superiors continued to sour as he began to

attack both the War and Navy Departments for being

insufficiently farsighted regarding airpower. His fight

with the Navy climaxed with the dramatic bombing

tests of 1921 and 1923 that sank several battleships,

proving, at least to Mitchell, that surface fleets were

obsolete. Within the Army he also experienced difficulties, notably with his superiors, Charles Menoher

and later Mason M. Patrick, and in early 1925 he

reverted to his permanent rank of colonel and was

transferred to Texas. Not content to remain quiet,

when the Navy dirigible Shenandoah crashed in a

storm and killed 14 of the crew, Mitchell issued his

famous statement accusing senior leaders in the

Army and Navy of incompetence and “almost treasonable administration of the national defense.” He

was court-martialed, found guilty of insubordination, and suspended from active duty for five years

without pay. Mitchell elected to resign instead as of

1 February 1926, and spent the next decade continuing to write and preach the gospel of airpower to all

who would listen.

15

Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell

• Mitchell illustrated the power of strategic bombing by sinking several battleships during tests in 1921 and 1923.

• In September 1918, Gen Mitchell planned and led nearly

fifteen hundred allied aircraft in the air phase of the St.

Mihiel offensive.

• As the top American combat airman of World War I, Gen

Mitchell was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the

Distinguished Service Medal, and several foreign decorations after his 18 months in France.

• In 1925 Mitchell was court-martialed and found guilty of

insubordination. He resigned in 1926 and continued to

promote airpower in his civilian life.
Capt Eddie Rickenbacker was originally turned

down for enlistment for lack of education but

was persistent, and on 25 May 1917 in New

York City, he joined the Signal Enlisted Reserve

Corps with an assignment to the Aviation Section.

Three days later he was on his way to Paris, France,

for assignment to Aviation Headquarters American

Expeditionary Forces (AEF) as a sergeant first class.

Partly because Rickenbacker had been a successful

race car driver before the war, he was initially

assigned as Gen John J. Pershing’s staff driver. At his

insistence he was permitted to join a fighter unit,

being assigned as a student at the Aviation Training

School at Tours, France. He completed the course

10 October 1917, and was commissioned a first lieutenant. He then became engineering officer to HQ

Detachment, 3d Aviation Instruction Center at

Issoudun, serving under Maj Carl A. Spaatz, whose

own fame lay ahead in World War II. For many

months Spaatz refused to allow him to become a

combat pilot because he needed him on the staff.

However, in March 1918, Captain Rickenbacker

prevailed in his repeated requests and he was

assigned to the 1st Pursuit Group’s 94th Aero

Squadron, the famed “Hat-in-the-Ring” Squadron,

as a pilot under Maj Raoul Lufbery. Rickenbacker

was in action the next month, flying his Nieuport

fighter over the lines against the enemy on 25 April,

and shooting down a German flying a Pfalz, without

a single bullet hitting his own machine. 

By 1 June 1918, Rickenbacker had become an

ace, with five enemy kills to his credit. A daring, fearless, talented but never reckless flyer, Rickenbacker as

commanding officer, would never assign his men to

a target he wouldn’t lead. He continued as Hat-inthe-Ring Squadron leader until his return to the

United States on 27 January 1919, where he was

hailed for leading the Americans with 26 victories. 

In June 1929, Rickenbacker took a colonel’s commission as a Specialist in the Officers Reserve Corps,

but he gave it up at the end of the five-year appointment period as he had often stated he always wanted

to be remembered as Captain Eddie. During the

early part of World War II, he served as the personal

observer of Secretary of War Stimson in a flight over

Leningrad. On his return to Washington to report

on German war damage of the Russian city, his plane

was found downed in the Pacific, but he survived a

long ordeal on a raft and was eventually rescued.

After World War II, Rickenbacker returned to

auto racing and became president of the Indianapolis

Speedway. He moved back into aviation and built up

Eastern Air Lines into one of the commercial giants.

On the last day of 1963, Captain Eddie retired as

Eastern’s Board Chairman, more than 40 years after

his glory days over France.

16

Capt Edward V. “Eddie” Rickenbacker

• He had 26 confirmed aerial victories while engaging in 134 dogfights during World War I.

• One of his eight Distinguished Service Crosses was upgraded to

a Medal of Honor in 1930.

• He was the last witness for the defense in the court-martial of

Gen Billy Mitchell in 1925.

• The American “Ace of Aces,” went on to become president of

Eastern Airlines before his death in 1973.
Frank Luke, nicknamed “The Arizona Balloon

Buster,” was born in Phoenix, Arizona. He

enlisted in the US Army in September 1917,

learned to fly, and arrived on the front in France in

July 1918 where he was assigned to the 27th Aero

Squadron. His exceptional bravery earned for him a

reputation for being “wild and reckless” but his fellow pilots soon realized that he possessed that certain

element which distinguished a great fighter pilot

from the others—complete fearlessness. 

In September 1918 Luke began a personal campaign against German observation balloons and airplanes. During a seven-day period, 12–18

September, two days of which he did not fly, he

scored 13 confirmed victories, including an amazing

five victories (two balloons and three airplanes) on

the last day. At sunset on 29 September 1918, Luke

took off from an advance aerodrome at Verdun to

attack balloons in the area of Dun-sur-Meuse. He

never returned. 

Following the Armistice, US troops found Luke’s

grave in the cemetery of the small village of

Murvaux, France. According to the local French residents, Luke had been shot in the chest by ground

fire while circling Murvaux at low altitude, had

landed his Spad, crawled from it in the gathering

dusk, and had died while firing his service automatic

at German soldiers who were searching for him along

a creek bank. His remains were removed to the US

Military Cemetery at Romagne, France, for permanent burial. 

For his last flight on 29 September, Luke was

awarded the Medal of Honor for shooting down

three enemy balloons while under heavy fire both

from the ground and from eight pursuing enemy airplanes, and for strafing enemy troops, killing six of

them. The citation on Luke’s Medal of Honor reads,

“After having previously destroyed a number of

enemy aircraft within 17 days he voluntarily started

on a patrol after German observation balloons.

Though pursued by 8 German planes which were

protecting the enemy balloon line, he unhesitatingly

attacked and shot down in flames 3 German balloons, being himself under heavy fire from ground

batteries and the hostile planes. Severely wounded,

he descended to within 50 meters of the ground, and

flying at this low altitude near the town of Murvaux

opened fire upon enemy troops, killing 6 and

wounding as many more. Forced to make a landing

and surrounded on all sides by the enemy, who called

upon him to surrender, he drew his automatic pistol

and defended himself gallantly until he fell dead from

a wound in the chest.”

At the time of his death, Luke was the leading ace

of the US Air Service with 18 confirmed victories,

(14 balloons and 4 airplanes).

Lt Frank Luke Jr.

• Leading US ace at the time of his death on 29 September

1918 and second only to Rickenbacker among US World

War I aces.

• Awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions on 29

September 1918.

17
Mason M. Patrick was the first real head of

American aviation. Patrick entered West

Point in September 1882 and upon graduation stood second in a class of 77. Commissioned a second lieutenant of engineers, his first duty was with the

Engineer Battalion at Willets Point, New York. After a

couple of instructor tours at West Point, he sailed for

Cuba where he commanded the 2d Battalion of

Engineers and then as Chief Engineer in the Army of

Cuban Occupation until 1909. He served as commander, Engineering School at Washington Barracks

until sent to Europe in 1917. In France, he was in

charge of engineer instruction for the American

Expeditionary Forces.

Although an Army engineer for 30 years, in 1918

General Pershing, Patrick’s West Point classmate,

appointed him as commander of the Air Service in

France. In Pershing’s words, there were many fine

people in the air arm, but they were “running

around in circles,” he wanted Patrick to make them

go straight. Although knowing virtually nothing

about aviation at that point, Patrick was an excellent

organizer and administrator. By the end of the war,

the Air Service was an efficient and well run combat

arm. After the Armistice, Patrick returned to the

Corps of Engineers, but in late 1921 he was recalled

to the Air Service. His predecessor, Charles

Menoher, could not get along with the most famous

airman of the day, Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell,

and in the resulting power struggle, Menoher lost.

Because Patrick had managed the difficult airman

during the war, he was given the opportunity to do

so again. For the next six years Patrick remained at

the helm, although Mitchell left the service in 1926.

General Patrick retired on 12 December 1927.

While heading the young Air Service, Patrick

focused on developing a doctrine that explicitly

supported the need for autonomy. Patrick knew

the value of airpower, but more importantly, he

grasped the limitations and capabilities of airpower

at that point in time. Patrick built an airpower

agenda that included commercial aviation development, Air Service officer professionalization, the

development of airpower doctrine, and legislative

initiatives that would set the Air Service on the

path to independence.

Maj Gen Mason M. Patrick

• Appointed commander of the Air Service in 1918 and

again in 1921 by his West Point roommate, Gen John J.

“Black Jack” Pershing.

• Qualified as the world’s oldest Junior Military Aviator by

earning his wings at the age of 50.

• In 1925, General Patrick was a key instigator urging

Congress to create an Air Corps with relations to the

Army analogous to that which existed between the Navy

and Marine Corps.

• After seeing the US Army Air Corps founded in July

1926, he retired in December 1927 with nearly 40 years

of service to the country.

18
Frank Andrews was one of the great personalities in Air Force history. He was entrusted with

major commands in the Army at a time when

airman were often at odds with their Army superiors.

Andrews graduated from West Point in 1906 and

served his first 11 years as a Cavalry officer in the

Philippines, Hawaii, and in the United States. In

1917, he was transferred to the Signal Corps for duty

with the Aviation Division and learned to fly in

France during World War I.

From August 1920 to February 1923, Andrews

commanded the US Army Air Service’s European air

force of 13 DH-4s under his highly popular fatherin-law, Gen Henry Allen. While Andrews was attending the Air Corps Tactical School and the Command

and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, Billy Mitchell was fighting his battles in

Washington. Because of this absence, Andrews was

never considered one of “Mitchell’s Boys.”

On 1 March 1935 Andrews became the first commander of GHQ Air Force at Langley Field, Virginia.

GHQ Air Force was created to provide centralized

command and control of long-range bombardment

and observation aircraft not supporting friendly

ground forces. He handpicked his staff from the

brightest minds in the Air Service, among them

Harvey Burwell, Follett Bradley, George C. Kenney,

and Joseph T. McNarney. As commander of GHQ

Air Force, Andrews was in a position to translate

doctrine into strategy and tactics. He ordered all

pilots in GHQ to become instrument rated.

Instrument flying enlarged mobility as did everextending aircraft range, altitude, and speed. In

order to take advantage of long-range doctrine,

Andrews oversaw the development of the first truly

long-range bomber, the B-17 Flying Fortress.

In August of 1939, Andrews was named assistant

Chief of Staff for Training and Operations under

Gen George C. Marshall, the first airman to hold this

level of position. In September 1941, he was placed

in command of the Caribbean Defense Command

and the Panama Canal Department—the first unified

command. He impressed everyone with his administration of the command and the preparations for war

that Andrews had conducted with minimal

resources. In early 1943, General Marshall

announced the formation of a European theater of

operations. General Andrews was selected to command it. In the three short months that Andrews

commanded in Europe, he built up a decimated

Eighth Air Force and laid the foundation for the

buildup that would become Operation Overlord. 

General Andrews was killed on 2 May 1943 when

his B-24 crashed during a fog-shrouded landing near

Keflavik, Iceland.

19

Lt Gen Frank M. “Andy” Andrews

• First commander of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, appointed by

Chief of Staff Gen Douglas MacArthur in 1935.

• Appointed by General Marshall as assistant chief of Staff for Training and

Operations (G-3)—the first airman to ever hold a position this high on

the Army General Staff.

• Commanding General of US Middle East Forces in 1942.

• Commanding General of all US Forces in newly formed European theater

of Operations preceding Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower.

• On 2 May 1943, the B-24 carrying General Andrews crashed against a

fog-shrouded promontory while landing at Meeks Field near Keflavik,

Iceland.
World War II

1941–45
Navy Capt Francis S. Low conceived the

idea of flying Army medium bombers

off a Navy carrier and attacking Japan.

The B-25 was selected because it was small; had

sufficient range to carry two thousand-pound

bombs, two thousand miles; and because it took

off and handled very well. General Arnold

selected Lt Col James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle to

lead the attack. According to Arnold, “First I

found out what B-25 unit had the most experience and then went to that crew, that organization and called for volunteers and the entire

group, including the group commander, volunteered.” 

The training was hard, no one had ever taken

off a fully loaded B-25 in less than five hundred

feet. First they had to prove it could be done,

then they had to train the people to do it.

Before they were through, the bombers would

lift off in only 287 feet. The crews proved they

were good and so were their airplanes. 

The raid was carefully planned, nothing was

left to chance. Because the attack would be lowlevel, Norden bombsights were replaced by a

twenty-cent improvisation to prevent the secret

devices from falling into enemy hands. Doolittle

then considered what to do if the Japanese spotted the task force. If intercepted by Japanese

surface ships or aircraft, the aircraft would

immediately leave the decks. If they were within

range of Tokyo they would go ahead and bomb

Tokyo, even though they would run out of

gasoline shortly thereafter. That was the worst

possible scenario. If the aircraft were not in

range of Tokyo, they would go back to Midway.

If neither Tokyo nor Midway were in range, the

B-25s would be pushed overboard so the decks

could be cleared for the use of the carrier’s own

aircraft. 

On the morning of 18 April 1942, Japanese

patrol boats sighted the task force. The boats

were quickly destroyed, but they could have

transmitted a position report. It was eight hours

before scheduled takeoff, an additional four

hundred miles to the target. Gas reserves would

be dangerously low, but they were spotted and

they would have to go.

The program went almost according to plan.

The B-25s were to bomb the targets, turn in a

general southerly direction, get out to sea as

quickly as possible, and after being out of sight

of land, turn and take a westerly course to

China. 

The bombers came in on the deck and pulled

up to about fifteen hundred feet to bomb and to

make sure they were not hit by the fragments of

friendly bombs. According to Doolittle, the

feeling was “Get the job done and get the heck

out of there.” The actual damage done by the

raid was minimal. There were 16 B-25s each

carrying one ton of bombs. In later raids, Gen

Curtis E. LeMay with his Twentieth Air Force,

23

The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (18 April 1942)

Aviation pioneer, Gen James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle.

Doolittle’s B-25 takes off from the carrier Hornet en route to

Tokyo.
sent out five hundred planes on a mission, each

carrying 10 tons of bombs.

Reaching a safe haven after the raid wasn’t

easy, and because they had to take off much

sooner than planned, they were very low on

fuel. One crew went to

Vladivostok, the other 15

crews proceeded until they got

to the coast of China. When

they reached China, two of the

Mitchell Bombers were so low

on fuel that they landed in the

surf along side the beach.

Two people were drowned,

eight of them got ashore. The

weather was quite bad, so most

of the aircraft flew on until

they felt they were as close to

their final destination as possible. Having been on dead reckoning for quite awhile, most

crews were off target when

they jumped.

On 15 August 1942 it was

learned from the Swiss

Consulate General in Shanghai

that eight American flyers were

prisoners of the Japanese. After

the war, the facts were uncovered in a War Crimes Trial held

at Shanghai that opened in

February 1946 to try four

Japanese officers for mistreatment of the eight prisoners of

war (POW) of the Tokyo Raid.

Two of the original 10 men,

Dieter and Fitzmaurice, died

when their B-25 ditched off

the coast of China. The other

eight, Hallmark, Meder,

Nielsen, Lt William G. Farrow, Lt Robert L.

Hite, Lt George Barr, Sgt Harold A. Spatz, and

Cpl Jacob DeShazer were captured. In addition

to being tortured, they contracted dysentery

and beriberi as a result of the deplorable conditions under which they were confined. On 28

August 1942, Hallmark, Farrow, and Spatz

were given a “trial” by Japanese officers,

although they were never told the charges

against them. On 14 October 1942, Hallmark,

Farrow, and Spatz were advised they were to be

executed the next day. At 4:30 P.M. on 15

October 1942, the three Americans were

brought by truck to Public Cemetery No. 1

outside Shanghai. In accordance with proper ceremonial

procedures of the Japanese

military, they were then shot. 

The other five men remained

in military confinement on a

starvation diet, their health

rapidly deteriorating. In April

1943 they were moved to

Nanking and on 1 December

1943, Meder died. The other

four men began to receive

slight improvement in their

treatment and by sheer determination and the comfort they

received from a lone copy of

the Bible, they survived to

August 1945 when they were

freed. The four Japanese officers tried for their war crimes

against the eight Tokyo Raiders

were found guilty. Three were

sentenced to hard labor for five

years and the fourth to a nineyear sentence.

Eighty crew members flew

in the Doolittle Raid, 64

returned to fight again. They

were part of a team recognized

for its professionalism and

heroism, a rich heritage remembered by a new generation of

airmen. When the news of the

raid was released, American

morale zoomed from the

depths to which it had plunged following

Japan’s successes. It also caused the Japanese to

transfer back to the home islands fighter units

that could have been used against the Allies. In

comparison to the B-29 attacks against Japan

two years later, the Tokyo Raid was a token

effort. However, it was an example of brilliant

tactics and achieved a moral victory for the

nation.

24

The crew of Farrow’s plane after being

captured. In front, L to R, were Cpl Jacob

DeShazer and Sgt Harold A. Spatz; in

rear, L to R, Lt William G. Farrow, Lt

Robert L. Hite, and Lt George Barr.

Farrow and Spatz were two of those executed on 15 October 1942.

Lt Hite, blindfolded by his captors, is led

from a Japanese transport plane after he

and the other seven flyers were flown

from Shanghai to Tokyo. After about 45

days in Japan all eight were taken back to

China by ship and imprisoned in

Shanghai.
The Battle for Kasserine in central Tunisia,

February 1943, was the first serious

encounter between Germans and

American-led armor forces in World War II. It

has been generally regarded as a military embarrassment to Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of Allied forces in northwest Africa. It

laid bare the green, ill-equipped condition of

American air and ground warriors. Americans

lost thousands (killed, missing, or captured),

especially in the first actions in Faid Pass and

Sidi-bou-Zid. American “can-do-ism” could

not replace proper preparation when tangling

with a tough enemy. One of the positive results

was that airmen gained greater equality and

effective centralized control of air assets as a

result of Kasserine battle analysis.

Interestingly, the last of the three phases, this

in Kasserine Pass proper, was a victory over the

forces of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. He was

forced to pull back his troops, and disappointed,

left the African theater, never to return. 

American air units––the 33d Fighter Group

for one––led by Col William W. “Spike”

Momyer (later general), got so worn out in the

futile attempt to support the ground forces and

try to gain even a modicum of air superiority,

they were forced to retire from action before the

battle in Kasserine Pass. Desperate conditions

forced General Doolittle to take centralized

control of all Twelfth Air Force assets. Bad

weather, an old nemesis to effective air support,

prevented full application of theater airpower,

but Doolittle sent medium and heavy bombers

to help turn the tide. In the last days as Rommel

pulled back, fighters and bombers hit trucks and

tanks, giving a meaningful blow to the enemy

armor. 

The importance of Kasserine transcended the

actual combat, losses or victories. Allied air and

ground leaders, vowing never to be pushed

around by the Germans in the future, recognized the importance of the long-held doctrinal

point of gaining air superiority before undertaking land battle. Leaders in Africa also recognized another historically articulated point of

combat organization, that airmen needed to

centrally command the air aspect of modern

mobile warfare. This was suggested by the

recent reformation of the US Army combat

capabilities into two equal forces: Army Ground

Forces and Army Air Forces (AAF).

25

Kasserine Pass (February 1943)

Kasserine Pass illustrated the

importance of gaining air superiority before undertaking a

land battle and the need for centralized control of air assets.

In 1943, Gen Carl A. Spaatz commanded all

Allied air forces in Africa.

US troops inspecting German Tiger tanks destroyed by Allied aircraft in Tunisia.
At the same time the Guadalcanal campaign was raging, an equally bitter series

of battles was occurring on the island of

New Guinea. In early March, a Japanese convoy

set out from Rabaul to land much-needed reinforcements in the Buna-Gona area of New

Guinea. It was composed of eight transports,

escorted by eight destroyers, and screened by an

inadequate light combat air patrol.

If the reinforcements were permitted to land,

the Japanese would have an almost impenetrable

stronghold in New Guinea. It seemed the war in

the Pacific theater hinged on the United States

stopping this buildup. General MacArthur,

Southwest Pacific Area Commander, needed a

strategy to stop the convoy and a service to do

it. MacArthur could not depend on ground or

surface-naval forces because they had been

wiped out by previous Japanese attacks so he

turned to the Air Force. Under the guidance of

Gen George C. Kenney, Fifth Air Force

Commander, air units were organized and prepared to engage the convoy.

Unbeknownst to the Japanese, the American

air force had been experimenting with a new

aerial tactic called skip-bombing, wherein the

attacking airplane drops a bomb with a longdelay fuse close to the surface and lets it skip

into the side of the target ship. This was the first

occasion in which the Americans would use this

new tactic. On 3 March as soon as the Japanese

came under the radius of American airpower,

the convoy was attacked relentlessly. The first

day’s attack (by high altitude B-17s) sank two

transports and damaged a third. Two destroyers

were tasked with rescuing the survivors and

making a high speed run to New Guinea to

deposit them. This they did, and returned to the

plodding convoy before dawn the next day.

Coming within range of American and

Australian medium bombers, like the B-25

Mitchell Bomber, proved to be a disaster for the

Japanese on 4 March 1943. The convoy was

savaged by skip-bombing and strafing. By noon,

all six remaining transports and four of the

destroyers were sinking or sunk. The remaining

four destroyers recovered what few survivors

they could and fled north to Rabaul. After this,

the Japanese would never again attempt to run

slow transports into the face of American airpower.

The results of the attack on the convoy in the

Bismarck Sea were astounding. The victory

changed the direction of the war in the region,

preventing what could have been a series of

bloody battles of attrition in Southwest New

Guinea. 

26

Battle of the Bismarck Sea (1943)

The B-25 Mitchell Bomber employed skip-bombing techniques in the battle of the Bismarck Sea.

This small Japanese ship is about to be sunk by the 500-lb

bomb in the picture.
The oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania, provided Germany with 35 percent of its oil.

Air planners figured it would take many

high-level attacks by huge fleets of heavy

bombers to destroy the refineries. Col Jacob E.

Smart, a member of Arnold’s Advisory Council,

believed a low-level attack might prove successful. Smart had seen A-20s in training hit moving

targets while flying low and fast. This led him to

conclude that aircraft accuracy would allow a

low-level attack of Ploesti. Smart believed a lowlevel attack might mitigate the extensive air

defenses. Not everyone held this opinion. Col

Richard Hughes, an AAF target expert,

protested that Allied pilots did not have the necessary skills or experience to tackle such a complex mission. However, with President

Roosevelt and General Arnold’s backing, the

mission plans were built.

The plan called for a 2,700-mile mission conducted by more than three hundred bombers to

attack seven refineries. The mission was flown

by IX Bomber Command whose training

included bombing a full-scale outline of the

Ploesti complex in the Libyan desert. The operation included the

44th, 93d, 98th,

376th, and 389th

Bomb Groups. Because of other operational requirements the units

could not focus

their training on

Ploesti until after

19 July 1943, only 11 days prior to the mission

date.

On 1 August, 165 B-24s took off to bomb

Ploesti. The 376th Bomb Group, commanded by

Col Keith Compton, led the mission. The lead

navigator was in another plane that ditched into

the Mediterranean Sea several hours after launching. Colonel Compton misidentified the initial

point, a ground feature used to coordinate the

attack, and led his group on a route 30 miles

south of Ploesti. Three of the five groups were

behind schedule and Compton’s error eroded

any remaining attack coordination. 

One hundred sixty-four B-24 Liberators

reached Ploesti and attacked at levels often

lower than the refineries’ towers. Bombers flying through the explosions of oil tanks were

assaulted by merciless flak trains and machine

gun fire. B-24 gunners dueled with gunners in

towers and church steeples. Ploesti was also

defended by 120 German and two hundred

Romanian fighter aircraft. The 98th Bomb

Group, led by Col John Kane, was the only one

to fly its assigned course and arrive on schedule.

The courage and determination of the aircrews

is the sole reason the raid had any success.

Flying so low that aircraft had to ascend to

avoid smokestacks 210 feet high, the bombers

took high losses. Seventy-three B-24s were lost

in the raid and another 55 suffered major damage. Nearly five hundred aircrew were killed or

wounded and more than one hundred became

prisoners of war. Navigation and timing problems prevented a coordinated attack. Despite

this, aircrews managed to destroy 60 percent of

the complex’s output. Five airmen, including

Colonel Kane, received the Medal of Honor for

their bravery during the raid—the most of any

single engagement in World War II.

27

Ploesti Raid (August 1943)

The B-24 Liberator could carry 5,000 pounds of bombs

2,300 miles.

Low-level B-24 Liberators over

Ploesti.

The Ploesti raids illustrated the

danger of low-level strategic bombing but also the courage and

determination of US aircrews.
The growing strength of German fighter

operations in Europe was a great concern

to the Allies in 1943. On 10 June 1943

the combined Chiefs of Staff issued the directive

known as “Pointblank.” This directive placed

German fighter strength as the top strategic priority. In order to hurt the German’s fighter

operation, Colonel Hughes, an Allied air planner, decided to attack production facilities at

Regensburg and Schweinfurt. A large percentage of Germany’s fighters were produced in

Regensburg in southeast Germany. An equally

critical target was Schweinfurt, a major ballbearing production center. 

The plan was for General LeMay’s 4th Bomb

Wing to fly to Regensburg, bomb the

Messerschmitt plant, then fly across the

Mediterranean and land in North Africa. The

arrival of the new B-17F with greater range

made this possible. The Luftwaffe was expected

to meet the attack early, then land and refuel for

the attack on the bombers as they headed back

to England. The Allied plan, however, called for

the 1st Bomb Wing to follow the 4th by only 15

minutes along the same flight path before

breaking off to bomb Schweinfurt. By the time

the Germans figured out that the 4th Bomb

Wing was not returning and that the 1st was

heading for Schweinfurt, they would be on the

ground short of both fuel and ammunition. The

plan called for the biggest aerial diversion ever

attempted with three B-26 groups raiding

coastal airfields to draw Luftwaffe fighters from

the 1st Bomb Wing. This would allow the 1st to

attack Schweinfurt relatively unmolested. 

On 17 August 1943, 139 B-17s, with LeMay

in the lead, crossed the Dutch coast headed for

southeast Germany. The 4th Bomb Wing lost

17 aircraft en route to Regensburg but the

remaining 122 bombers conducted a very accurate mission from less than 20,000 feet. As the

4th left Regensburg, the 1st Bomb Wing was

still over the North Sea, five hours behind

schedule—the timing plan was awry.

The Luftwaffe expected the 4th Bomb Wing

to return to England and massed their fighters

in unprecedented numbers. The 1st Bomb

Wing flew into this mass of three hundred

enemy fighters over Germany. By the time the

1st reached the Schweinfurt initial point, 24 B17s were lost leaving 196 available for bombing.

The four ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt

were tough targets to find under ideal circumstances. However, the delay in launching caused

an approach heading change to avoid flying into

a setting sun. This change combined with the

Germans’ artificial fog generators made the task

nearly impossible. The 10 bomb groups scattered their bombs all over the town while the

Luftwaffe refueled and rearmed their aircraft.

The return trip for the 1st Bomb Wing was

tougher than the trip into Germany.

The Regensburg/Schweinfurt raids cost the

Allies 60 B-17s, 16 percent of the dispatched

force. General Arnold reported the operation a

success. In terms of lost production, the attack

on Regensburg probably accounted for one

thousand lost Me-109s or about three weeks of

total fighter production. At Schweinfurt, the

attack proved to have little if any effect. Three of

the five factories were severely damaged but few

of the machine tools that produced ball bearings

were destroyed. “The Raid” showed how difficult and costly it was to conduct air warfare.

However, “The Raid” foretold the story of the

day when the Luftwaffe would not be able to

stop Allied bombing.

28

The Regensburg/Schweinfurt Raids (1943)

Bomber formations were devised to maximize the number of

defensive guns brought to bear against enemy fighters.
After the heavy losses of the Regensburg/

Schweinfurt raids in August of 1943,

General Spaatz, commanding the US

Strategic Air Forces in Europe decided not to

attempt daylight raids deep into Germany until

he had assembled an adequate force of longrange fighters that could escort the heavy

bombers to their targets. By February 1944, a

sizeable number of long-range P-47 “Thunderbolts” were available and P-51 “Mustangs” were

starting to arrive. Spaatz knew that his force was

ready to get back to its main task: destroying the

Luftwaffe. 

The leaders wanted an extended period of

good weather over Germany (a rare event in the

fall and winter) so that they could launch a series

of heavy raids. On 20 February, the cloud cover

finally broke and Spaatz launched over one thousand heavy bombers, escorted by more than eight

hundred fighters. Between 20 and 25 February,

US bombers made almost four thousand sorties

and dropped 19,000 tons of bombs on key

German aircraft and ball-bearing factories. In

addition to Regensburg and Schweinfurt, the

B-17s and B-24s attacked Leipzig, Stuttgart,

Brunswick, Oschersleben, and Gotha. These

attacks became known as “The Big Week.” 

Big Week saw some of the largest and most

ferocious air battles in history. By the end of the

week, US aircrews were exhausted but the airwar had been transformed. United States losses

were heavy: 226 bombers were lost along with

28 fighters and more than twenty-five hundred

air crewmen were killed, seriously wounded, or

captured. But German losses were much worse.

The bombs did severe damage to the German

aircraft industry and the US fighters had devastated the Luftwaffe. During the month of

February, the Luftwaffe lost 33 percent of its

daylight fighters and 20 percent of its fighter

pilots, including some of its leading aces. The

German tactic of attacking the US bombers and

ignoring the US fighters had led to heavy US

bomber losses but had left the US fighters free

to annihilate the German fighters.

After Big Week, the US Strategic Air Force

had turned the corner. In a few months, the

United States would gain air superiority over all

of Europe. The Germans would later change

their tactics, and bring in jet fighters, but after

Big Week, their efforts were too little and too

late. There was another year of hard fighting

ahead in Europe, but once the results of Big

Week became clear, the outcome of the war was

no longer in doubt.

“The Big Week” (February 1944)

P-47s were the key to victory during “The Big Week” air battles.

During a week of ferocious air

battles, US planes destroyed 33%

of the Luftwaffe’s fighter planes

and killed 20% of its fighter

pilots.

29
On 6 June 1944 the Allies invaded occupied Europe. Code named Operation

Overlord, the assault hit five beaches

stretched along 50 miles of French coastline.

The largest amphibious assault ever, it required

massive air support for success. By the day’s

end, the IX Troop Carrier Command dropped

13,000 paratroopers, 4,400 glidermen, and

thousands of dummy parachutists on France.

The IX Bomber Command attacked the

defenses at Utah beach. Many bombers were

assigned to bomb the beaches prior to troops

landing; the bomb craters would serve as readymade foxholes. Heavy bombers were used to

destroy the towns surrounding Normandy to

create roadblocks and prevent resupply.

To hold down friendly-fire casualties, broad

white strips were painted around the wings and

fuselage of all aircraft. As a further precaution,

Gen William Kepner assigned the P-38

Lightning units to fly support over the fleet.

The Germans had no aircraft that resembled the

twin-fuselage of the P-38. The plan was nearly

flawless, the Navy only shot down two American

aircraft, both P-51s.

The Allies operated with air dominance over

Normandy. The two strategic air forces had

thirty-five hundred heavies and the tactical units

operated fifteen hundred mediums and fifty-five

hundred fighters. By comparison, the Luftwaffe

had only 319 aircraft in all of France. Hitler

refused to divert fighters to Normandy because

he felt the attack was a feint. Air superiority

allowed Allied trucks, tanks, and guns to move

in broad daylight without interference. In planning Overlord, a German counterattack was

projected for D day plus 14. However, it never

occurred because air interdiction made enemy

troop movement or massing impossible.

Nevertheless, the Allied troops were engaged in

a stalemate against the German defensive positions—a breakout was needed.

To breakout from Normandy, Eisenhower

suggested carpet bombing. One operation, code

named Cobra, began on 19 July 1944. The

bombing operation planned to saturate a rectangle three miles long and one and one-half

miles wide and destroy the Panzer Lehr division.

Gen Omar N. Bradley wanted the bombardment to occur only eight hundred yards in front

his troops. Eighth Air Force recommended a

separation of three thousand yards. Furthermore, Bradley wanted the bombers to fly parallel to the road, through the three-mile length of

the rectangle. Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg advised

against this because it would take hours to fly

fifteen hundred aircraft through a zone only one

and one-half miles wide. Bradley agreed. On 25

July 1944, Cobra was launched. As predicted,

with only an eight hundred yard buffer, short

bombs fell on the 30th Infantry Division killing

or wounding five hundred soldiers including Lt

Gen Leslie J. McNair. Despite these setbacks,

the carpet bombing was successful. When the

VII Corps attacked it met only sparse resistance.

By 31 July, American troops were on the

advance. 

Operation Overlord (1944)

P-38 Lightnings were assigned to provide air cover over the invasion

fleet to prevent confusion for Allied gunners.

Troops deploy on Normandy’s beaches.

30
The Doolittle raid on Tokyo had done a

lot for US morale, but it was not a viable

method of conducting sustained strategic

bombing of Japan. To bring the full weight of

airpower to bear on Japan, the United States

built bombers of unprecedented range (the B29s) and captured islands from which B-29s

could reach Japan. In November 1944, US

bombers finally returned to Tokyo in the form

of B-29s flying out of Saipan.

The Japanese tried to defend against the B29s but they grossly underestimated the power

of strategic bombing. They chose to concede air

superiority over Japan to the United States in

order to use their main air strength to oppose

Allied surface forces. This disastrous miscalculation was partly due to the fact that Japanese air

forces were tightly controlled by army and navy

leaders who had a weak understanding of airpower. 

Limited Japanese defenses, however, did not

guarantee successful US bombing. The B-29

was the best bomber of World War II, but it did

not have the ability to hit precision targets

through clouds. The consistently bad weather

over Japan made sustained precision bombing

of Japanese factories impossible. On the night of

9 March 1945, General LeMay, commanding

B-29 operations against Japan, ordered a radical

change in tactics. On this raid the B-29s did not

execute their normal daylight, high-altitude, formation attack with high-explosives but instead,

they hit Tokyo with incendiary bombs, at night,

from low altitude, flying individually. Flying at

night at low altitude took advantage of Japanese

weakness in night-fighters and low-altitude air

defenses. The low-altitude individual bombing

runs also enabled the B-29s to carry less fuel

and hence more bombs. Since LeMay expected

little enemy fighter opposition, he removed the

gunners, guns, and ammunition from the B-29s

and replaced them with still more bombs. The

change in tactics doubled the bomb-load of

each B-29 and incendiary bombs were much

more effective against the highly flammable

Japanese city than high-explosive bombs. 

The results were stunning. Before 9 March

1945, the B-29s had done very little damage to

the Japanese war effort, but on that night they

burned out 16 square miles of Tokyo and killed

more than 80,000 Japanese in the most devastating air raid ever. Subsequent firebombing

devastated more than 60 Japanese cities, left

millions of Japanese homeless, and radically

reduced Japan’s military production. 

31

Bombing Tokyo (9–10 March 1945)

The B-29 was the best bomber of the war and the main

weapon in the strategic bombing of Japan.

Gen LeMay ordered a radical change in

tactics.

The Japanese underestimated airpower and conceded air superiority over Japan to the United States

in order to concentrate their forces

against a surface invasion.
President Truman and the armed forces

had three strategic options for inducing

the Japanese surrender: continue the firebombing and blockade, invasion, or use the

atomic bomb. Truman was aware that the first

two options would probably not be very effective methods to induce the Japanese to surrender. The Battle for Okinawa caused 48,000

American casualties when the Japanese refused

to surrender. So it was the right time to resolutely make a decision. Gradually, US authorities made preparations for the decision to use

the bomb, as it was close to production. The

Interim Committee on S-1 suggested to the

president that the bomb should be used directly

against Japan, because a demonstration explosion was not thought to be a strong enough

representation of the power that the bomb held.

Several US military leaders went with the president to the Big Three meeting at Potsdam in

July, and discussions continued there. It was

determined then that the bomb should be used.

On 25 July Truman prepared the order for use

of the first atomic bomb as soon after 3 August

as weather permitted on one of the four target

cities. The Potsdam Proclamation was issued

during the Potsdam meeting by the heads of

government of the United States, Britain, and

China. It warned of “utter devastation of the

Japanese homeland” unless Japan surrendered

unconditionally.

At approximately 2:00 A.M. on the morning

of 6 August, the Enola Gay, carrying an atomic

bomb, started on the long flight from Tinian

Island. The Enola Gay was one of 15 B-29s

modified specifically for the highly secret atomic

bomb missions. These airplanes were outfitted

with new engines and propellers and fasteracting pneumatic bomb bay doors. Two observation planes carrying cameras and scientific

instruments followed behind her. After 6:00

A.M., the bomb was fully armed on board the

Enola Gay. Col Paul W. Tibbets Jr., pilot of the

Enola Gay, announced to the crew that the

plane was carrying the world’s first atomic

bomb. The trip to Japan was smooth. At about

7:00 A.M., the Japanese radar net detected aircraft heading toward Japan, and they broadcast

the alert throughout the Hiroshima area. Soon

afterward when an American weather plane circled over the city, the people went back to their

daily work thinking the danger had passed. At

8:00 A.M. the Japanese detected two B-29’s

heading toward Hiroshima. The radio stations

quickly broadcast a warning for the people to

take shelter, but many did not follow the advice.

They thought that it was the same as the first

time. At 8:09 A.M., the crew of the Enola Gay at

26,000 feet could see the city appear below; it

was time to drop the bomb. Just then, they

received a message indicating that the weather

was good over Hiroshima. The bomb was

released at 8:16 A.M. A terrible, strong, and

unimaginable explosion occurred near the central section of the city. The crew of the Enola

Gay saw a column of smoke rising fast and

intense fires springing up. The astonishing

result of the first atomic strike: it killed between

70,000 and 80,000 people, injured another

70,000, and burned almost 4.4 square miles.

On 9 August, Nagasaki was bombed by a B-29

named Bock’s Car. The Japanese unconditionally surrendered on 14 August 1945.

32

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombings

(August 1945)

The modified B-29, Enola Gay.
Henry H. Arnold was one of the truly great

men in American airpower. Taught to fly by

the Wright brothers, he rose steadily in rank

and responsibility throughout the ’20s and ’30s and

became the commanding general of the Army Air

Forces during World War II. In 1944 he was promoted to five-star rank, but his health was very poor,

he suffered several heart attacks during the war, and

retired less than a year after Japan surrendered. 

Graduating from West Point in 1907, Arnold

had hoped to join the cavalry. However, his cadet

performance was so dismal he was relegated to the

infantry. After a tour in the Philippines, he reapplied to the cavalry, but again was refused. Largely

out of a desire to escape from the infantry, Arnold

then applied for the Signal Corps and became one

of America’s first military pilots. Aviation was

extremely dangerous in those early days, and after

several crashes and near crashes, Arnold elected to

ground himself. After more than three years of desk

work, he overcame his fears and returned to flying.

Because of his relatively extensive experience in aviation, and much to his chagrin, he was forced to

remain in Washington on the Air Service staff during World War I.

After Armistice Day, he slowly began his steady rise

in rank and responsibility. He commanded wings and

bases, became a protégé of Billy Mitchell, twice won

the Mackay Trophy for aeronautical achievement, was

awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for leading a

flight of B-10 bombers to Alaska to display the range

of strategic airpower, and was named assistant to the

chief of the Air Corps in 1935. When Oscar Westover

was killed in a plane crash in 1938, Arnold succeeded

him as chief. In this position he was instrumental in laying the groundwork for the massive industrial expansion the war would require. During the war he sat as an

equal member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was

responsible for guiding the air strategy of the various

theaters. Belying his nickname “Hap” (short for

“happy”), Arnold was a difficult taskmaster. He drove

himself so hard during the war that he suffered several

heart attacks and he pushed his subordinates just as

hard. This did not endear him to everyone in the

USAAF, but it was just what was needed to run the

largest air force during the largest war in the history of

the world. His drive, vision, and sense of initiative were

indispensable in leading the air arm during the war and

setting the stage for the creation of the US Air Force

shortly after the war.

33

General of the Army Henry H. “Hap” Arnold

• Taught to fly by Orville and Wilbur Wright.

• A five-star general and two-time winner of the Mackay Trophy for

aeronautical achievement.

• In 1934, he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for

demonstrating the range of strategic airpower by leading a flight

of B-10 bombers from Washington, D.C., to Alaska.

• Named Chief of the Army Air Corps in 1938. During World War

II, he became the first Air Chief to sit as an equal member on the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• He was the commanding general of the Army Air Forces (AAF)

during World War II.
Claire L. Chennault’s reputation as leader of

the Flying Tigers has been immortalized in

movies and novels, making him one of

America’s more famous airmen. Chennault arrived at

the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in 1930 with

a reputation as a premier pursuit pilot. His ideas concerning pursuit employment evolved from much

thought and practical experience. But Air Corps doctrine was making a decisive shift in favor of bombardment, and Chennault’s attempts to stem that

tide were futile. Chennault’s abrasive personality

negated his arguments, and his colleagues found it

more satisfying simply to ignore him. Suffering from

a variety of physical ailments and realizing his theories were out of tune with Air Corps policy, he retired

in 1937. Soon after, he traveled to China, where he

served as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, and formed

the Flying Tigers volunteer group to fight against the

Japanese. The much-storied group of mercenariesturned-heroes was well suited to Chennault’s aggressive and unconventional personality. 

When America entered the war, the Flying Tigers

were incorporated into the Fourteenth Air Force,

and Chennault was promoted to brigadier general

and made its commander. Chennault was an outstanding tactician, whose determination in the face

of overwhelming supply and equipment difficulties

kept the Fourteenth Air Force in the field, but his

strategic ideas were limited to his tactical mindset.

Never on good terms with his Air Corps colleagues,

Chennault exacerbated this relationship with his constant complaints and his tendency to circumvent the

chain of command by dealing directly with Chiang

and President Roosevelt. Although knowing how

this infuriated his superiors, Chennault persisted. As

a consequence, George Marshall thought him disloyal and unreliable. Hap Arnold and Joe Stilwell disapproved of his command style. Even if his strategic

theories had been correct, his method of promoting

them ensured their demise. He believed that a small

force of aircraft, mostly pursuit with a handful of

bombers, could so disrupt Japanese logistics as to

lead to its eventual defeat. In retrospect, it is doubtful if any amount of tactical airpower could have prevented Japan from overrunning China, much less

brought about its defeat. 

34

Lt Gen Claire L. Chennault

• In the 1930s, he was the Air Corps Tactical

School’s most famous proponent of pursuit tactics at a time when strategic bombardment was

premier.

• Forced out of the Air Corps in 1937 because of

bronchitis, he went to China to advise Chiang Kaishek on building an air force.

• Commanded the American Volunteer Group, better known as the “Flying Tigers.”

• Under his leadership the Flying Tigers overcame

severe operational handicaps and achieved a twoto-one kill ratio over the Japanese.
One of the great pioneer airmen, Ira C. Eaker,

met “Hap” Arnold and Carl Spaatz at

Rockwell Field in 1918, and the three

became friends and colleagues for life. Eaker was one

of the premier pilots between the wars, participating

in the Pan American flight of 1926–27 and the

Question Mark flight of 1929. The Question Mark

project was the product of Eaker’s imagination,

political savvy, and zeal. He selected a trimotored

Fokker and a Douglas C-1 for the flights. On 1

January 1929, the Fokker took off from San Diego,

California, and droned back and forth at 70 MPH

between Los Angeles, California, and San Diego for

six days. Eaker piloted the Question Mark with Pete

Quesada as copilot and Maj Carl Spaatz in back to

hook up the hose during refueling. On 7 January the

Fokker’s left engine quit and the Question Mark was

forced to land with a record-breaking 150 hours, 40

minutes, and 15 seconds aloft.

Eaker was also politically well connected, serving

not only as an aide to Maj Gen James Fechet, the Air

Corps chief, but also as the private pilot of Gen

Douglas MacArthur. An excellent writer with a graduate degree in journalism, he figured prominently in

airpower public relations efforts during the 1930s

and coauthored several aviation books with Hap

Arnold. During World War II he joined Spaatz in

England to head the VIII Bomber Command and

eventually Eighth Air Force. In early 1944 Eaker

moved down to Italy to command the

Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. 

The task of organizing and standing up the

Eighth was extremely daunting. Eaker’s talents as a

leader and manager were essential. Strategic bombing was not a proven concept, the green Eighth was

entering combat against an enemy already battle

tested, and the prodigious production capacity of

America not yet manifest. Moreover, just as it

appeared the Eighth was strong enough to play a

major role in the war against Germany, it was

stripped of men and machines for operations in

North Africa and then Italy. Arnold pushed Eaker to

do more, and finally, against Eaker’s wishes, he was

promoted and moved to Italy, while his place at

Eighth was taken by James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle.

Soon after Doolittle took over, Eaker’s labors bore

fruit: air superiority over the Luftwaffe was gained,

the invasion of France took place, and the sweep

across northern Europe eventually led to victory. 

In April 1945, Eaker was named deputy commander of the AAF and chief of the Air Staff. He

retired from active duty on 31 July 1947.

Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker

• Lt Gen Ira Eaker was commander of the VIII Bomber

Command in England which became the Eighth Air Force

in 1944.

• He piloted the Question Mark in its record-breaking air refueling flight over California in 1929. The plane remained

aloft for 150 hours, 40 minutes, and 15 seconds.

• Served as aide to Maj Gen James Fechet, the Air Corps

Chief, and as private pilot to Maj Gen Douglas MacArthur.

• In 1927 he piloted the San Francisco, the only plane to

complete a 23,000 mile Pan American goodwill flight on

schedule. For this he was awarded his first Distinguished

Flying Cross.

• During World War II, he commanded Allied Air Forces in

the Mediterranian.

• He was deputy commander of the Army Air Forces in

1945–46.

35
Carl A. Spaatz was born 28 June 1891, in

Boyertown, Pennsylvania. In 1910 he was

appointed to the United States Military

Academy. Upon graduation on 12 June 1914, he was

commissioned into the Infantry. He served with the

Twenty-fifth United States Infantry at Schofield

Barracks, Hawaii, from 4 October 1914 to 13

October 1915, when he was detailed as a student in

the Aviation School at San Diego, California, until

15 May 1916.

Spaatz went to France with the American

Expeditionary Forces in command of the 31st Aero

Squadron and joined the 2d Pursuit Group in

September 1918. He was officially credited with

shooting down three German Fokker planes, and

received the Distinguished Service Cross. After

World War I he reverted to his permanent rank of

captain, 27 February 1920, but was promoted to

major on 1 July 1920.

Spaatz commanded the Army plane Question

Mark in its refueling endurance flight over southern

California, 1–7 January 1929, keeping the plane aloft

a record total of 150 hours, 40 minutes, and 15 seconds, and was awarded the Distinguished Flying

Cross.

A few weeks after Pearl Harbor, in January 1942,

General Spaatz was assigned as chief of the AAF

Combat Command in Washington, D.C. In May

1942 he became commander of the Eighth Air Force

to prepare for the American bombing of Germany.

On 7 July he was appointed commanding general of

the AAF in the European theater an addition to his

duties as commander of Eighth Air Force. 

On 1 December 1942, Spaatz became commanding general of the Twelfth Air Force in North Africa.

He returned to England in January 1944, to command the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, which

he headed throughout the preinvasion period and

the ensuing campaign which culminated with the

utter defeat of Germany. His service in Africa won an

award of the Distinguished Service Medal, and the

accomplishments of his Strategic Air Force in 1944

earned him the Robert J. Collier Trophy for that

year, awarded annually to the American making the

most outstanding contribution to aviation. He was

present at all three signings of unconditional surrender by the enemy—Rheims, Berlin, and Tokyo. In

February 1946, he was nominated to become commander of the Army Air Forces. In September 1947

he was appointed by President Harry S. Truman as

the First Chief of Staff of the new United States Air

Force until 30 April 1948. General Spaatz retired on

30 June 1948.

Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz

• One of the most favored American air commanders of

World War II. Both Generals Eisenhower and Bradley rated

Spaatz the best combat leader in the European theater.

• Received the Distinguished Service Cross for shooting

down three German aircraft during World War I.

• The project leader for the Question Mark flight which refueled in the air to stay aloft over 150 hours. Spaatz rode in

the rear of the aircraft where he reeled in and hooked up

the refueling hose from the tanker plane.

36
Francis S. Gabreski was the leading American

ace in the World War II European theater with

28 victories. He was born of Polish immigrants

in Oil City, Pennsylvania, and grew up bilingual.

While he worked his way through college at Notre

Dame, he became interested in airplanes and scraped

together money for flying lessons. He did not excel.

After his second year in college he joined the Army

Air Forces and squeaked through primary pilot training. His first assignment was at Wheeler Field,

Hawaii. On 7 December 1941 Gabby’s was one of

the first aircraft launched to chase the Japanese

armada. Taking off in an obsolete P-36, he was too

late to catch the departing enemy, however, he was

shot at by his own nervous troops upon his return.

After many delays, Gabby was posted to the Polishmanned 315th Squadron at Northolt in the United

Kingdom. After gaining much needed experience flying in combat, Gabby was assigned to the 56th

Fighter Group flying P-47 Thunderbolts. On 24

August 1943 he scored his first victory. From that

day on, victories came frequently, often by doubles

and triples. After flying 193 missions, the AAF

ordered him home. While waiting for the transport,

Gabby learned of a mission scheduled for that morning. He convinced the commander to let him fly just

one more. While strafing an enemy airfield, his prop

hit a rise at the end of the field and he was forced to

belly-in. After eluding the enemy for five days, he

was captured and spent the remaining eight months

of the war as a POW in Stalag Luft 1 in Germany.

During the Korean War, Gabreski commanded

the 51st Fighter Wing. He played a major role in

developing fighter tactics in the newly emerging jet

war. Gabby shot down six and one-half MiG-15s

between July 1951 and April 1952. He is one of only

seven USAF pilots who were aces in both World War

II and the Korean War.

37

Col Francis S. “Gabby” Gabreski

Capt Colin P. Kelly Jr.

Capt Colin P. Kelly Jr. was America’s first hero

of World War II. He was credited at that time

after attacking and sinking the Japanese battleship Haruna off Luzon in the Philippines on 10

December 1941. While returning to base, Kelly’s

B-17 was set on fire by Japanese airplanes and one

waist gunner was killed. Kelley then ordered the

remainder of the crew to bail out. All were saved but

Kelly who died when the B-17 crashed to the

ground. President Franklin D. Roosevelt posthumously conferred the Distinguished Service Cross

upon Kelly for his sacrifice. It was not until after

World War II had ended that it was learned that at

that early period of the war, the Haruna was operating hundreds of miles away off Malaysia. Kelly’s airplane had attacked a light cruiser named Ashigara

and not the Haruna.
38

Laurence S. Kuter was born in Rockford,

Illinois, on 28 May 1905. He graduated from

West Point on 14 June 1927. Originally an

artillery officer, serving at the Presidio of Monterey,

California, he saw a need for better air observation.

Smitten by flight, he asked for a transfer to the Air

Corps. He graduated from pilot training in June

1930. In 1933 Lieutenant Kuter flew alternate wing

position with Capt Claire Chennault’s acrobatic

group, The Flying Trapeze. This was the first recognized aerial acrobatic team in military service. 

One of the more accomplished air planners and

staff officers in Air Force history, he was on the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School from 1935 to

1939. Kuter was a staunch strategic bombardment

advocate. In 1941, he was one of four officers tasked

to write Air War Plans Division (AWPD)1,

Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Force, the

seminal war plan that served as the blueprint for the

air assault on Germany. Promotion followed quickly.

The youngest general officer in the Army in 1942,

he served on General Marshall’s War Department

staff and Arnold’s AAF staff; commanded a bomb

wing in England; was deputy commander of the

Northwest African Tactical Air Force; then returned

to Washington for the rest of the war, even representing the AAF at the Yalta conference in 1945 during Arnold’s illness. After the war he again served on

the Air Staff, headed the Military Air Transport

Service during the Berlin airlift, commanded Air

University (then Pacific Air Forces), and completed

his career as a full general and commander of North

American Air Defense Command (NORAD). 

Because of Hap Arnold’s illness (one of his five

heart attacks), then Major General Kuter was designated to attend the Allied conference at Yalta in

February 1945 as the AAF representative. The

Americans had hoped to establish a communication

system to coordinate the air efforts of the three

countries to avoid the danger of fratricide. In addition, the United States pushed for an agreement to

site B-29 bases near Vladivostok, USSR, from which

to bomb Japan. With the end of the war in Europe

approaching, however, the Soviets had little incentive to be agreeable: they rejected both proposals.

Gen Laurence S. Kuter

• One of the more accomplished air planners and staff officers in

Air Force history.

• On the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School from 1935 to

1939.

• In 1933, flew alternate wing position with Capt Claire Chennault’s

acrobatic group, “The Flying Trapeze.” This was the first recognized aerial acrobatic team in military service.

• As a major, he was one of the four principal authors of the basic

plan for employment of airpower in World War II.
After schooling in his hometown, Dick Bong

enlisted as a flying cadet at nearby Wausau,

Wisconsin, 29 May 1941. He took flying

training at Tulare and Gardner Fields, California, and

Luke Field, Arizona, receiving his wings and commission on 9 January 1942. He instructed other

pilots at Luke until May when he went to Hamilton

Field, California, for combat training in P-38s. 

He went to the Pacific as a fighter pilot with the

9th Fighter Squadron of the 49th Fighter Group in

Australia. In November 1942, Major Bong was reassigned to the 39th Squadron of the 35th Group with

which he destroyed five Japanese fighter planes

before returning to the 9th Squadron in January

1943. He flew with the 9th until November, being

promoted to first lieutenant in April and to captain in

August.

On 11 November 1943 he was given 60 days of

leave and reassigned to Headquarters V Fighter

Command, New Guinea, as assistant operations officer in charge of replacement airplanes. In this assignment Major Bong continued to fly combat missions

in P-38s and increased his enemy aircraft kills to 28.

In April 1944 he was promoted to major and sent

home to instruct others in the art of aerial superiority, with assignment to Foster Field, Texas. 

In September 1944 he returned to the Pacific

with the V Fighter Command as gunnery training

officer. Though not required to perform further

combat flying, he voluntarily put in 30 more combat

missions over Borneo and the Philippine Islands,

destroying 12 more planes to bring his total to 40. 

Gen George C. Kenney, his overall commanding

officer, who later wrote Major Bong’s biography,

decided that two hundred missions and five hundred

combat hours were enough for any individual and

ordered him returned to the United States, in

December 1944, with recommendation for the

Medal of Honor for his second overseas tour. Major

Bong then became a test pilot at Wright Field, Ohio.

In June 1945 he went to Burbank, California, as

chief of Flight Operations and Air Force Plant

Representative to Lockheed Aircraft Company, then

engaged in developing and manufacturing P-80 jet

aircraft. 

Major Bong received a full training course for P80s at Muroc Lake Flight Test Base, California, but

died that August when his plane’s engine failed during a flight over Burbank.

In combat he had earned the Distinguished

Service Cross, two Silver Stars, seven Distinguished

Flying Crosses, and 15 Air Medals, in addition to the

Medal of Honor.

39

Maj Richard I. “Dick” Bong

• America’s leading ace of all wars.

• Credited with 40 aerial victories in World War II.

• Awarded the Medal of Honor in 1944 personally

by Gen Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific, who

lauded him as the greatest fighter ace of all

Americans.

• Died test piloting a P-80 at Muroc, California, in

August 1945.
J

ames H. “Jimmy” Doolittle was educated in

Nome, Alaska; Los Angeles Junior College,

California; and the University of California

School of Mines, California. He enlisted as a flying

cadet in the Signal Corps Reserve in October 1917,

and trained at the School of Military Aeronautics,

University of California, and Rockwell Field,

California. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Signal Corps Aviation Section on 11

March 1918. 

In September 1922 he made the first of many pioneering flights which earned him major air trophies

and international fame. He flew a DH-4, equipped

with crude navigational instruments, in the first

cross-country flight, from Pablo Beach, Florida, to

San Diego, California, in 21 hours and 19 minutes.

He made only one refueling stop, at Kelly Field,

Texas. The military gave him the Distinguished

Flying Cross for this historic feat. 

He won the Schneider Cup Race, the World Series

of seaplane racing in 1925, with an average speed of

232 MPH in a Curtiss Navy racer equipped with

pontoons. This was the fastest a seaplane had ever

flown, and Doolittle received the Mackay Trophy for

this feat. 

At Mitchel Field, in September 1928, he assisted

in the development of fog flying equipment. He

helped develop the now almost universally used artificial horizontal and directional gyroscopes and made

the first flight completely by instruments. He

attracted wide newspaper attention with this feat of

blind flying and later received the Harmon Trophy

for his experiments. 

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel 2 January

1942, and went to Headquarters, Army Air Force to

plan the first aerial raid on the Japanese homeland. He

volunteered and received Gen H. H. Arnold’s approval

to lead the attack of 16 B-25 medium bombers from

the aircraft carrier Hornet with targets in Tokyo, Kobe,

Osaka, and Nagoya. The daring one-way mission on

18 April 1942 electrified the world and gave America’s

war hopes a terrific lift. Colonel Doolittle received the

Medal of Honor, presented to him by President

Roosevelt at the White House, for planning and leading this successful operation. 

In July 1942, as a brigadier general, he had been

advanced two grades the day after the Tokyo attack,

Doolittle was assigned to the Eighth Air Force and in

September became commander of Twelfth Air Force

in North Africa. He was promoted to major general

in November, and in March 1943 became commander of the North African Strategic Air Forces.

He took command of Fifteenth Air Force in

November, and from January 1944 to September

1945, he commanded Eighth Air Force in Europe

and the Pacific, until war’s end, as a lieutenant general, the promotion date being 13 March 1944.

40

Lt Gen James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle

• In 1921 Doolittle led a flight of DH-4s in Mitchell’s 1st

Provisional Air Brigade in the scientific sinking of German

battleships.

• He received one of the first PhDs awarded in aeronautical

engineering from Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(MIT) and established himself as one of the finest racing

pilots in the United States before World War II.

• In April 1942 he led 16 B-25s from the deck of the carrier Hornet and scored a stunning coup by bombing

Tokyo.

• During World War II, Gen Jimmy Doolittle commanded

the Twelfth, Fifteenth, and Eighth Air Forces.
George C. Kenney was America’s top airman

in the Pacific theater during World War II.

Kenney had served as a fighter pilot in the

First World War, downing two German aircraft and

winning the Distinguished Service Cross. Between

the wars he attended Command and General Staff

College, the Army War College, and taught at the

Air Corps Tactical School before heading Operations

and Training for General Headquarters Air Forces.

He also earned a reputation as an accomplished

engineer through assignments at Wright Field, and

became recognized as an expert in tactical aviation.

Significantly, he was serving as an air attaché to Paris

during the German invasion of France in 1940 and

witnessed the effectiveness of airpower in that campaign. 

In July 1942, Arnold selected Kenney to become

Douglas MacArthur’s air deputy. For the rest of the

war the short, fiery, and tireless Kenney served as

commander of the Fifth Air Force and then Far East

Air Forces under the difficult and demanding

MacArthur. His success in such battles as Bismarck

Sea, Rabaul, Wewak, and the Philippine campaign

were dramatic, and he has become the prototype for

the modern concept of an “air component commander,” the one individual in charge of all aviation

assets in a theater. Kenney’s grasp of what is today

called “operational art” and how airpower could be

used to complement the operations of land and sea

forces was outstanding, and he was considered by

many to be the most accomplished combat air strategist of the war. 

In April 1945 he was promoted to full general—

one of only four airmen holding that rank during the

war. However, Arnold had more complete confidence in Spaatz and after the war Spaatz was named

Arnold’s successor. Kenney had hoped to become

Chief of Staff after Spaatz but Hoyt Vandenberg,

nine years younger than Kenney, replaced Spaatz as

chief of staff in 1948. Kenney was instead given command of the new Strategic Air Command (SAC) after

the war. When the Berlin Crisis of 1948 broke out,

Vandenberg conducted an investigation of SAC’s war

readiness. The results were unacceptable, so

Vandenberg replaced Kenney with Curtis E. LeMay.

Kenney was then named commander of Air

University. He retired from that position in 1951. 

Gen George C. Kenney

• George C. Kenney was a fighter pilot during World War I. He

downed two German aircraft and won the Distinguished Service

Cross.

• Commander of Fifth Air Force and Far East Air Forces providing

airpower for Gen Douglas MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific

Theater during World War II.

• One of only four airmen to hold the rank of four-star general during World War II.

• One of the most innovative operational airmen of World War II.

• The first commander in chief of Strategic Air Command from

1946 to 1948.

41
Ennis C. Whitehead is another of the largely

forgotten figures of American airpower,

although he played an important role at an

important time. Enlisting in the Army in 1917,

Whitehead quickly joined the Air Service, won his

wings, and was sent to France. He was an excellent

pilot, but as a result he was made a test pilot and thus

saw no combat. After the war, his reputation as an

aviator grew within the small coterie of military airmen. He participated in Billy Mitchell’s bombing

tests against the Ostfriesland in 1921, joined the Pan

American flight of 1927, where he narrowly escaped

death in a midair collision over Buenos Aires, and set

a speed record from Miami, Florida, to Panama in

1931. When war came, he was sent to the Pacific

where he became George Kenney’s strong right arm.

Whitehead stayed in Asia for the next seven years,

becoming commander of the Fifth Air Force in

1944; and after Kenney left the theater, he took over

the Far East Air Forces. Returning to the States in

1949, Whitehead commanded the shortlived

Continental Air Command and then the Air Defense

Command until his retirement in 1951. 

In addition, although Kenney has received credit

for such innovations as skip-bombing, parafrag

bombs, nose cannons in medium bombers, and the

use of combat airlift, it was Whitehead who actually

pioneered them. Unquestionably, Whitehead was an

outstanding tactician who performed extremely well

in the Southwest Pacific theater. Whitehead was a

hard, uncompromising man with a heavy twinge of

chauvinism; he was a good combat commander who

engendered respect rather than admiration among

his subordinates. He was also seen by some in the Air

Force hierarchy as too attached to Kenney and

MacArthur, too political, too outspoken, and too

tactically focused. He was disappointed by President

Trumon’s choice of

Hoyt Vandenberg

rather than Kenney

as Chief of Staff in

1948 and was outraged when the

new chief quickly

relieved Kenney as

commander of Strategic Air Command.

These feelings, combined with ill health,

caused him to teder

his resignation in

early 1951.

Lt Gen Ennis C. Whitehead

• Participated in Billy Mitchell’s bombing tests against the

Ostfriesland in 1921.

• Joined the Pan American flight of 1927—where he narrowly

escaped death in a midair collision over Buenos Aires.

• Set a speed record from Miami, Florida, to Panama in 1931.

• George Kenney’s strong right arm in the Pacific, he became commander of the Fifth Air Force in 1944.

• Responsible for such innovations as skip-bombing, parafrag

bombs, nose cannons in medium bombers, and the use of combat airlift.

An MB-2 attempts to sink the USS

Alabama during Mitchell’s 1921

bombing trials.

42
During World War II, a group of blacks was

sent to Tuskegee Institute in Alabama and

trained as pilots. The famous Tuskegee airmen went on to serve with distinction in the

European theater and the years thereafter. The most

famous of these was Benjamin O. Davis Jr. 

Davis was the first black to graduate from West

Point in this century. His four years there were not,

however, pleasant. Because he was black, he was officially “silenced” by all cadets—no one spoke to him

for four years except on official business; he roomed

alone; he had no friends. That so many cadets, faculty members, and senior officers could allow such

behavior is astonishing. This was surely one of the

most shameful chapters in West Point history.

Nonetheless, Davis graduated but was promptly

turned down for pilot training—no black officers

were allowed in the Air Corps. While he was serving

in the infantry in 1940, this policy was reconsidered,

and Davis was sent to Tuskegee for pilot training.

Because of the war and his ability, promotion followed rapidly, and soon he was a lieutenant colonel

commanding the 99th Fighter Squadron in combat.

After one year with this all-black unit in Italy, Davis

was promoted to colonel and tasked to form the

322d Group. This black fighter group served

admirably for the remainder of the war. 

Segregation ended in the services in 1948 with a

presidential decree. Davis then attended Air War

College, served in the Pentagon, and was sent to Korea

in 1953 to command a fighter wing. The following

year he received his first star and moved to the

Philippines as vice commander of the Thirteenth Air

Force. After tours in Taiwan, Germany, the Pentagon,

and a return to Korea—while also gaining two more

stars—Davis became commander of the Thirteenth Air

Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. He relished this

command at the height of the Vietnam War and was

reluctant to leave in July 1968 to become deputy commander of US Strike Command. He retired from that

assignment in 1970. 

43

Lt Gen Benjamin O. Davis Jr.

• The first black to graduate from West Point this century

and later became the first African-American Air Force

general.

• During his years at West Point he was officially “silenced”

by all cadets—no one spoke to him for four years except

on official business.

• Commissioned in 1936, earned his wings at Tuskegee in

1941 and was a lieutenant colonel squadron commander

in August 1942.

• Commanded the all-black 99th Fighter Squadron in

North Africa in 1943 and a fighter wing in Korea in 1953. 

• His commands culminated with his third star and command of Thirteenth Air Force.

Col Davis with his P-47 as commander of the 332d Fighter

Group in Italy.
J

ackie Cochran was born in Florida into a life of

poverty, somewhere between 1905 and 1908.

She had almost no formal education and since

she was orphaned at birth, she had to depend on foster parents. By the age of 22 she was working at a

prestigious beauty salon and was at the top of her

profession. With money saved, she developed a line

of cosmetics, which would later become her empire,

Jacqueline Cochran Cosmetics. Her husband to be,

millionaire businessman Floyd Odlum, suggested she

learn to fly in order to use her travel and sales time

more efficiently. In two days she soloed and 18 days

later had her pilots license. Despite her lack of education, she mastered flying in mere weeks. Jackie

soon bought her first airplane, a Travelair. She was

the first woman to enter the Bendix Race in 1935. 

Jackie was hooked on flying and her taste for

record setting was strong. She set three speed

records, won the Clifford Burke Harmon trophy

three times, and set a world altitude record of

33,000 feet—all before 1940. With World War II on

the horizon, Jackie talked Eleanor Roosevelt (who,

like Jackie, had been friendly with Amelia Earhart)

into the necessity of women pilots in the coming war

effort. It was probably no small coincidence that

Jackie was soon recruiting women pilots to ferry

planes for the British Ferry Command, and became

the first female trans-Atlantic bomber pilot. 

In 1942 Jackie recruited over one thousand

WASPs and supervised their training and service until

they were disbanded in 1944. She didn’t stop there.

Jackie went on to be a press correspondent and was

present at the surrender of Japanese General

Yamashita, was the first US woman to set foot in

Japan after the war, went on to China, Russia,

Germany, and even the Nuremburg trials. Flying was

still her passion, and with the onset of the jet age,

there were new planes to fly and records to break!

And she did both. Access to jet aircraft was mainly

restricted to military personnel, but Jackie had

enough connections to get where she wanted to be.

With the assistance of her friend Gen Chuck Yeager,

Jackie became the first woman to break the sound

barrier in an F-86 Sabre Jet, and went on to set a

world speed record of 1,429 MPH in 1964.

Jacqueline Cochran broke the sound barrier when

she was well over 50 years old. After heart problems

and a pacemaker stopped her fast-flying activities at

the age of 70, Jackie took up soaring. At the time of

her death in 1980 she held literally hundreds of

speed and altitude records—more than anyone else

in the world, male or female.

44

Jacqueline “Jackie” Cochran

• First woman to break the sound barrier. 

• First Woman to enter the Bendix Race, 1935. 

• Won 14 Harmon Trophies in her lifetime. 

• Set altitude record of 33,000 feet, 1939. 

• First female trans-Atlantic bomber pilot, 1941. 

• Supervised the Women’s Air Force Service Pilots (WASP),

1942–44.

• Served as an advisor to the US Air Force, Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), and National Aeronautics Space

Administration (NASA) during the ’50s and ’60s.

• Set world speed record of 1,429 MPH, 1964.
Leon Johnson graduated from West Point in

June 1926 and went to Fort Crook, Nebraska,

as a second lieutenant in the 17th Infantry.

After flight training at Brooks and Kelly Air Fields,

Texas, he was transferred to the Air Corps with

assignment to the 5th Observation Squadron at

Mitchell Field. As a lieutenant colonel, he went with

Eighth Air Force to England in June 1942 as assistant chief of Staff for Operations. In January 1943,

he took command of the 44th Bomb Group, was

promoted to colonel and went to Africa on loan to

Ninth Air Force. 

On 1 August 1943, he led the 44th, called the

“Eight Balls,” as one of the major elements in the

massive B-24 bomber attack on the oil refineries at

Ploesti, Romania. The element he led became separated and temporarily lost from the lead elements.

Colonel Johnson reestablished contact with the main

formation and continued on the mission to discover

the assigned target had been attacked and damaged

by earlier B-24s. Having lost the element of surprise,

upon which the safety and success of such a daring

mission depended, Colonel Johnson elected to carry

out his planned low-level attack against another target

within the Ploesti complex. Despite heavy antiaircraft

fire, numerous enemy fighter planes, the eminent

danger of exploding delayed-action bombs from the

previous element, Colonel Johnson led the 44th forward. Oil fires and intense smoke obscured the target,

but Colonel Johnson demonstrated enormous

courage and superior flying skill as he led his formation on a bomb run that totally destroyed the important refining plants and installations. He was awarded

the Medal of Honor for his heroic leadership.

45

Gen Leon W. Johnson

• Awarded the Medal of Honor for heroic actions while leading the

44th Bomb Group attacking Ploesti, Romania on 1 August 1943.

B-24 Liberators during the low-level bombing of the oil

refineries at Ploesti, Romania, 1 August 1943.
Thomas “Mickey” McGuire completed high

school at Sebring, Florida, and attended

Georgia School of Technology. He enlisted at

MacDill Field, Florida, on 12 July 1941 and took

pilot training at Randolph and Kelly Fields, Texas,

getting his wings and commission in February 1942.

He then shipped out to the Pacific where he shot

down 38 Japanese planes with his P-38 Lightning. In

the entire history of the US Air Force, McGuire’s 38

aerial victories are second only to Richard Bong’s 40

kills. 

McGuire went to Australia in March of 1943 and

served with the 131st Fighter Squadron, 475th

Fighter Group, in the long campaign from Australia

to New Guinea, on to Biak Island and the

Philippines. He ran up his long score in all types of

fighter missions: bombers escort, fighter bomber

sweeps, and aerial combat. On Christmas day 1944,

McGuire volunteered to lead a squadron of 15

planes escorting heavy bombers attacking Mabalaent

Airdrome in the Philippines. As the formation

crossed Luzon it was jumped by a large group of

enemy fighters. In the ensuing battle, Major

McGuire shot down three enemy planes. This was

typical of many of his missions. In another action, he

scored one Zero and exposed himself to permit a

friendly bomber to escape and then shot down three

other fighters before the mission was completed. 

McGuire lost his life on 7 January 1945 while

leading four P-38s over a Japanese-held airstrip on

Los Negros Island. A single Japanese fighter jumped

the squadron so McGuire led them into a tight

Lufbery Circle snaring the Zero inside. The enemy

fighter made a sharp dive to get out of the trap, but

the P-38s stayed with him from 2,000 feet down to

200 feet. There the formation scattered and the

enemy plane maneuvered into position on the tail of

one of the Lightnings. The pilot called for help and

McGuire responded. However, a tight maneuver

with wing tanks still attached caused the fighter to

stall at low altitude and crash. 

Major McGuire received the Medal of Honor for

combat over the Philippine Islands on 25 and 26

December 1944 when he shot down seven enemy

fighters in two days, bringing his total to 38. The

citation for the medal concludes with a tribute to

McGuire’s spirit. “With gallant initiative, deep and

unselfish concern for the safety of others, and heroic

determination to destroy the enemy at all costs, Maj.

McGuire set an inspiring example in keeping with

the highest traditions of the military service.”

46

Maj Thomas B. “Mickey” McGuire Jr.

• Second highest scoring ace in Air Force history.

• Awarded Medal of Honor for heroic performance on 25 and 26

December 1944.
Paul Tibbets was born in Quincy, Illinois, on 23

February 1915. He entered the Army Air

Corps on 25 February 1937 at Fort Thomas,

Kentucky. After graduating from flying training in

February 1938, he was assigned to Fort Benning,

Georgia, in the 16th Observation Squadron. After

being assigned to the 29th Bomb Group in early

1942, he was selected to command the 340th Bomb

Squadron, taking it into combat operations from

England in June of 1942. Tibbets flew 25 combat

missions in B-17s, including the first American Flying

Fortress raid against occupied Europe. Tibbets also

flew combat missions in support of the invasion of

North Africa before returning to the United States in

March of 1943 to participate in the B-29 program. In

September 1944 Tibbets was assigned to the Atomic

Bomb Project as the Air Force officer in charge of

developing an organization capable of employing the

atomic bomb in combat operations and mating the

development of the bomb to the airplane. On 6

August 1945, Tibbets, commanding the B-29 Enola

Gay, dropped the first atomic weapon against enemy

forces on Hiroshima, Japan. The Japanese surrendered unconditionally on 14 August 1945. 

After the war, Tibbets was the technical advisor to

the AF commander during the Bikini Bomb Project.

From July 1950 to February 1952, Tibbets was the

B-47 Project Officer. After serving as 308th Bomb

Wing commander, 6th Air Division commander, and

deputy director of Operations on the Joint Staff,

Tibbets retired as a brigadier general with promotion

date effective 4 May 1960.

47

Brig Gen Paul W. Tibbets Jr.

• Led a B-17 Squadron on the first B-17 raid on Germany.

• Commanded the B-29 units tasked with modifying the aircraft to

carry an atomic bomb and developing tactics and techniques for

delivering atomic bombs.

• Dropped the first atomic bomb ever used in combat.

The Enola Gay was one of 15 B-29s modified specifically for

the highly secret atomic bomb missions. These airplanes were

outfitted with new engines and propellers and faster-acting

pneumatic bomb bay doors.
Independent Air Force,

Cold War, and Korea

1946–64
51

On the morning of Tuesday, 14 October

1947, ground crews completed final

preparations and hoisted the Bell XS-1

into the bomb bay of a B-29. At 10:00 A.M., the

B-29 took off from Muroc’s main eight-thousand-foot runway. Aboard the B-29 was 24-

year-old Capt Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager.

Yeager had made a name for himself as a fantastic stick and rudder test pilot at Wright Field,

Ohio, after World War II. During World War II,

Yeager had scored 12.5 aerial victories, including five in one day. Yeager had been selected by

Col Albert Boyd, chief of the Test Flight

Division, because he had demonstrated an

uncanny ability to find and understand any airplane’s flaws. The XS-1 project engineer was

Capt Jack Ridley. Ridley was a test pilot with an

advanced degree in aeronautical engineering

from the California Institute of Technology.

As the B-29 climbed slowly to altitude,

Yeager made his way back to the XS-1’s cockpit.

Over the weekend, Yeager had broken a couple

of ribs falling from his horse near the “Happy

Bottom Riding Club.” To avoid being

grounded by the flight surgeon, he had gone to

a civilian doctor off base and only told Ridley to

help him figure out how to close the XS-1’s

door. Ridley provided Yeager with a 10-inch

length of broom handle to use as leverage in

securing the hatch.

Bob Hoover flew the FP-80 chase plane to a

position 10 miles ahead of the B-29 and at an

altitude of 40,000 feet. From this position, he

would give Yeager an aiming point during his

climb. One minute prior to launch, Ridley asked

if Yeager was ready. “Hell, yes, let’s get it over

with.” A typical Yeager response. With that, the

B-29 went into a shallow dive and at 20,000

feet Ridley pulled the release mechanism and

the XS-1 dropped free.

The drop speed was slower than desired, and

the XS-1, nicknamed the Glamorous Glennis in

honor of Yeager’s wife, began to stall. Yeager

brought the nose down to gain airspeed and

then fired all four of his rocket chambers in

rapid sequence. Accelerating upward rapidly,

Yeager shut down two cylinders and tested the

stabilizer control system. Without it he would

lose elevator effectiveness and be “in a helluva

bind.” It was working. He reached Mach 0.92

as he leveled out at 42,000 feet with 50 percent

of his propellants left. Igniting the third cylinder

pushed the aircraft to Mach 0.98. The machmeter needle fluctuated at this reading momentarily, then passed off the scale. Yeager radioed,

“Ridley! Make another note. There’s something

wrong with this machmeter. Its gone screwy!”

Ridley replied, “If it is, we’ll fix it. Personally, I

think you’re seeing things.”

Postflight analysis revealed that Yeager had

attained a top speed of Mach 1.06, approximately 700 MPH, at 43,000 feet. The sound

barrier had been broken. Yeager had felt no wild

buffeting or any other indication that he had

broken the barrier. Somewhat disappointed he

later reported, “it took a damned instrument

meter to tell me what I’d done.” The flight had

lasted only 14 minutes but his “sonic boom”

resonated around the world. This major milestone had been accomplished in just over two

years in an era without simulator preflights and

despite scientists predicting the barrier to be

impenetrable. For the newly independent Air

Force, created less than a month before, it was a

signal for all the greatness to come.

X-1 Supersonic Flight (14 October 1947)

The Glamorous Glennis piloted by Capt Chuck Yeager, was the

first aircraft to break the sound barrier.
52

I

n the spring of 1948, tensions in Europe were

high because the United States, Britain, and

France were moving toward uniting their

three occupation zones in Germany into a single

country—West Germany—economically integrated into Western Europe. The Soviet Union

instead wanted all four zones united into a single

country dominated by the Soviets. The point

where the western nations were most vulnerable

was West Berlin, an island of western control in

the middle of the Soviet zone. In April, the

Soviets placed restrictions on surface transportation to the western troop in Berlin for 10 days,

but Lt Gen Curtis E. LeMay (US Air Force

Europe [USAFE] Commander) provided C-47

transports that supplied the garrisons. In June

1948 the Soviets announced new restrictions

intended to cut off all Western ground links to

Berlin.

USAFE began supplying the city by air

because the western powers were determined to

supply the city but did not want a ground confrontation with the Soviets. The airlift began

with C-47s but they were soon replaced by fourengine C-54s with three times the cargo capacity. Because of the strategic importance of the

airlift, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen Hoyt S.

Vandenberg ordered the formation of a task

force headquarters to run the operation under

the command of the famous airlifter, Maj Gen

William H. Tunner.

The difficulties of the Berlin Airlift were

mind-boggling. Air bases spread across Europe

participated but regardless of the point of origin, all aircraft were handled by flight controllers at the Berlin traffic center. The coming

of winter brought the need to carry tons of coal

in addition to food supplies. The Soviets felt the

Americans would be unable to supply the

needed fuel during the period of bad weather

and short days. Despite the poor conditions, US

and allied airmen accomplished their missions,

often depending on ground controlled

approach radar. The radar guided aircraft along

a flight path until the pilot could see runway

lights. Radar and tight control made it possible

to control the steady flow of aircraft, day and

night, in good and bad weather.

The Berlin Airlift frustrated the Soviet blockade by supplying the two million residents of

Berlin with food and fuel for almost a year.

Instead of discouraging the Western powers, the

joint and combined airlift operation strengthened morale in the West. Though the Soviets

agreed to lift the blockade in May 1949, the airlift continued until the end of September to

ensure a constant supply of fuel and food while

ground traffic resumed.

The Berlin Airlift delivered 2.3 million tons

of food and fuel. In spite of poor weather and

crowded flying conditions, the 15-month operation had an accident rate less than one-half that

of the entire Air Force. Gallant efforts by

Military Air Transport Service, Air Materiel

Command, the Air Weather Service, and

USAFE ensured the success of the operation.

Berlin Airlift (1948–49)

The USAF’s success in the Berlin

Airlift thwarted Soviet efforts to

intimidate the West in the first

“battle” of the Cold War.

C-47s line up during the airlift operations.
53

Air Force defensive operations played a

key role in the early days of the Korean

War against a formidable enemy. Some

30,000 Koreans who fought with Mao Tse-tung

in the Chinese communist revolution formed

the backbone of the North Korean People’s

Army or Inmun Gun. After US Secretary of

State Dean Acheson declared Korea outside the

United State’s “defense perimeter” in January

1950, it took only six months for Kim Il Sung

to invade South Korea. It took the Inmun Gun

only 48 hours to reach Seoul, claiming the city

on 28 June 1950. The Inmun Gun stopped for

nothing.

General MacArthur, commander in chief of

American forces in the Far East, examined the

invasion and recommended the United States

intervention to President Truman. The North

Koreans were trained, supplied, and advised by

the Russians; abandoning South Korea to them

would have been a dangerous form of appeasement. The United States sent troops into South

Korea in July, but they were inexperienced and

lacked good equipment. The Inmun Gun

moved with minimal opposition toward the

South Korean port of Pusan at the southern tip

of the peninsula. The only successful opposition

to the advance came from the six hundred combat planes of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF). 

In early August, North Koreans reached the

Naktong River that enclosed the southeastern

corner of Korea. Within this 50-mile by 80-mile

area was the Eighth Army, commanded by Lt

Gen Walton Walker. The Eighth Army faced the

gravest challenge of any American ground forces

in history. The North Koreans outnumbered the

United Nations forces, who had very few reserve

units and were spread dangerously thin along the

perimeter. However, Eighth Army did have

some important advantages, most notably the

FEAF. Because of American airpower the North

Koreans could only move and fight at night.

The FEAF had severely damaged the Inmun

Gun armor to the point of ineffectiveness.

Furthermore, no American Army had ever

received more close air support. During August,

the FEAF flew 7,397 close-air-support missions

averaging 238 sorties daily. The flexibility of airpower also brought a decided advantage. When

enemy troops achieved penetrations in the

perimeter against which no ground strength

could be brought to bear, General Walker

requested Maj Gen Earl E. Partridge, Fifth Air

Force commander, conduct an air attack. On

one occasion, massive enemy troop concentrations were targeted by B-29s at MacArthur’s

request. Ninety-eight B-29’s dropped 3,084

five-hundred-pound bombs on Waegwan,

destroying the enemy concentration and preventing any major attacks for weeks.

On 31 August 1950, the communists

decided to launch an all-out, human wave

assault against the Pusan perimeter. During the

day, Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers provided

167 close-air-support sorties. The communist

attack was repelled prompting Maj Gen William

Kean, 25th Infantry Division commander, to

remark, “The close air support strikes rendered

by the 5th AF saved this division as they have

many times before.” The Inchon landing finally

repelled the North Koreans, but the air operations in the defense of the Pusan Perimeter

saved the UN cause.

Pusan Perimeter Defense (1950)

North Korean T-34 tanks knocked out by US aircraft.

Korea showed airpower’s flexibility

when centrally controlled to meet situational needs.
54

I

n 1958, a few months after Sputnik, the

Soviets demonstrated that they would soon be

able to launch nuclear-armed intercontinental

ballistic missiles (ICBM) at the United States.

President Eisenhower authorized Corona, a top

priority reconnaissance satellite program managed

jointly by the Air Force and the Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Corona program

faced three major hurdles: getting the satellite

over the Soviet Union, taking useful pictures, and

getting the images back to US intelligence analysts. In all of these areas, Corona was at the technological limit of US capabilities. 

It took two years and 12 failed launches before

Corona finally managed to get a satellite into orbit

in August 1960. The next mission (Corona 14)

carried the first Corona camera into space and

took the first satellite pictures of the Soviet Union.

Its photos covered more of the Soviet Union than

all the previous U-2 flights combined. Although

the photographs could only distinguish objects

larger than 40 feet across, this was still an amazing

photographic achievement because the camera

was more than one hundred miles above the earth

and moving more than 17,000 MPH. Since there

was no way to electronically transmit the images

back to earth, the Corona film had to be physically brought back to the photo analysts. 

Once the Corona camera had taken all its pictures, the film was wound onto a reel in the nose

cone return capsule. (Later Corona satellites carried twice as much film and two capsules.) The

capsule was dropped back to earth at a prearranged time and place. When it had fallen to an

altitude of approximately 60,000 feet, it deployed

a parachute. Using a radio beacon on the capsule

and visually spotting the parachute, aircraft of the

6593d Test Squadron would snag the parachute

and reel in the capsule. The film was then analyzed on the ground. Newer systems that have

replaced Corona transmit images electronically in

real time.

Corona images were invaluable for piercing the

veil of secrecy surrounding the Soviet military and

improved technology increased the quality and

quantity of Corona images until the program was

superseded in 1972. More than one hundred

Corona missions returned over eight hundred

thousand photographs to earth. Since Corona,

our use of space has increased until it has become

vital to virtually all Air Force operations.

Corona (1960)

Schematic drawing of a later Corona satellite equipped with two

takeup reels and two return capsules.

Corona was the first Air Force

satellite program that accomplished a critical military mission.
55

Perhaps the greatest achievement of the US

military during the Cold War was its success in deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on

the United States. The centerpiece of US

nuclear deterrence throughout the Cold War

was the US Air Force’s Strategic Air Command

(SAC). Throughout its 46 year life, SAC was the

most powerful military force on earth.

SAC was created in 1946, shortly after the

end of World War II, to manage what were then

the world’s only nuclear weapons and nuclearcapable delivery systems (modified B-29s).

Though Gen George C. Kenney was the first

SAC commander, it was SAC’s second commander, Gen Curtis E. LeMay, who truly

shaped the character of the command. LeMay

commanded SAC from 1948–57—some of the

tensest years of the Cold War. LeMay felt that

SAC had to be prepared to destroy the Soviet

Union at a moment’s notice, and he therefore

demanded an unprecedented level of combat

readiness in peacetime. In 1948 some felt that

LeMay was over-reacting but in the early 1950s

the Soviets developed nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and Soviet pilots

battled US pilots over Korea.

These events made it clear that the Soviet

Union was ready and willing to confront the

United States militarily, and made nuclear deterrence an overwhelming national security need.

For more than 40 years, SAC remained continuously on alert with nuclear armed bombers

in the air, ready to immediately destroy any

adversary. As the United States developed

nuclear armed intermediate range missiles,

intercontinental ballistic missiles, and cruise

missiles, these all enhanced SAC’s awesome

capabilities. SAC’s technological capabilities

extended beyond nuclear weapons to surveillance and reconnaissance where it controlled the

U-2 and SR-71 and was also an early innovator

in using unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and surveillance. 

While SAC is best known for its invaluable

service preparing for, and thus deterring nuclear

war, it also achieved impressive results in conventional combat. During Vietnam and the Gulf

War, SAC bombers delivered devastating conventional strikes against strategic targets and

enemy ground forces. 

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

end of the Cold War, SAC’s initial mission was

complete and US nuclear forces could lower

their alert status. In 1992, the US Air Force

deactivated SAC as part of Chief of Staff

General McPeak’s efforts to reorganize the

force to meet the challenges of the post-Cold

War era. SAC’s nuclear deterrent mission went

to US Strategic Command, and the personnel

and equipment were consolidated with Tactical

Air Command (TAC) to form the new Air

Combat Command.

Strategic Air Command (1946–92)

Throughout most of SAC’s history, the B-52 was the backbone

of its manned bomber fleet. The B-52 continues in service

today and has been the longest-serving combat aircraft type in

USAF history.
56

I

n the early 1960s, the nuclear forces of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)

were vastly weaker than those of the United

States, and the US was trying to overthrow

Fidel Castro’s Communist government. Cuba

and the USSR felt that they could defend Cuba

and increase the nuclear threat they posed to

the United States by stationing Soviet nuclear

armed bombers, medium range missiles, and

intermediate range missiles in Cuba. These

weapons could hit US cities in a matter of

minutes.

In August 1962, the Soviets started building

missile sites in Cuba, and in October photos

from US Air Force U-2 reconnaissance aircraft

revealed what the Cubans and Soviets were up

to. President John F. Kennedy called on the

joint chiefs of staff (JCS) and his other advisors

to consider how the United States should

respond. Everyone agreed that the Soviet missiles had to be removed from Cuba but there

were several options for forcing the Cubans and

Soviets to remove them. One option, favored by

the JCS, was to destroy the sites with conventional air strikes followed by a US invasion of

the island. President Kennedy felt that this made

the risk of nuclear war with the Soviets too likely

and was not absolutely necessary because the

missile sites were not yet operational. Instead

Kennedy made a televised announcement on 22

October demanding that the Soviets remove the

missiles, and announcing that the United States

would enforce a blockade on Cuba to prevent

the delivery of offensive weapons to the island.

While the president and the national command authorities were weighing their options,

US military forces prepared for imminent war.

For the Air Force this meant adding RF-101

and RB-66 low-altitude reconnaissance flights

to the daily U-2 missions, moving large numbers of fighters to south Florida bases for attacks

on Cuba and for air defense of the United

States, and airlifting ground forces into Florida.

The most dramatic measures involved putting

the entire Strategic Air Command (which commanded virtually all US strategic nuclear forces)

on full wartime alert. The Soviets responded

belligerently and the world came closer to

nuclear war than at any other time during the

Cold War. Then the Soviets backed down and

offered to remove the missiles if the United

States agreed not to invade Cuba.

For some cold warriors it was hard to accept

the indefinite presence of Communist Cuba just

off the southern coast of the United States but

President Kennedy accepted the Soviet offer. As

the missiles were removed, US forces went back

to their normal peacetime bases and activities.

Backing down to US demands was a major

humiliation for the Soviet Union and forcing

them to do so without nuclear war was one of

the greatest accomplishments of the Kennedy

administration. Kennedy worked from a position of strength because of the power and high

readiness of the USAF Strategic Air Command.

Spotting the missile sites before they became

operational gave Kennedy the option of a blockade and was one of the greatest achievements of

USAF reconnaissance.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

This soviet freighter photographed in a Cuban port has missile

transporters on its deck. The shadow of the RF-101 that took this

picture is visible in the lower right of the photo.
57

Chuck Yeager grew up in Hamlin, West

Virginia. He enlisted in the Army Air Force in

1941 at the age of 18. In 1943 he became a

flight officer (a noncommissioned officer who was

allowed to fly) and went to England to fly fighter

planes over France and Germany. In his first eight

missions, at the age of 20, Yeager shot down two

Luftwaffe aircraft. On his ninth mission, his aircraft

was hit and he suffered flak wounds forcing him to

bail out over France. The French underground

smuggled him into Spain, where he found his way

back to England and returned to combat in time for

the Normandy Invasion.

On 12 October 1944, Yeager engaged five

German fighters and shot each of them down. Later

that year, flying a P-51 Mustang, he shot down an

ME-262 German jet fighter and four FW-190s. By

war’s end, he had tallied 13 and one-half kills.

After the war, he was trained as a test pilot at

Wright Field, Ohio, where he impressed his instructors with his ability to perform stunt flying. Despite

his abilities, people were amazed when he was

selected to go to Muroc Field, California, for the XS1 project at the age of 24. On 14 October 1947,

despite two broken ribs sustained in a horseback riding accident two days earlier, Yeager climbed into the

X-1 Glamorous Glennis in the belly of the mother

ship B-29. At 26,000 feet the B-29 went into a shallow dive, then released the X-1 like a bomb. Yeager

ignited the four rocket chambers and began a 45-

degree climb. At approximately 10:33 A.M. at 42,000

feet, Yeager made the famous radio call, “Say, Ridley

(X-1 Flight Engineer). . . make another note, will ya?

There’s something wrong with this machmeter . . .

it’s gone screwy.” Yeager had broken the sound barrier achieving Mach 1.05. He remained supersonic

for about 20 seconds before cutting off the engine,

coasting up to 45,000 feet and then gliding to a

landing at Rogers Dry Lake.

Yeager quit testing rocket planes in 1954 and went

to Okinawa where he tested a Soviet MiG-15. His

assessment confirmed the outstanding characteristics

of the MiG-15 but upheld the notion that the F-86

was a comparable aircraft with many advantages. In

1957, Yeager commanded an F-100 squadron at

George AFB, California. In 1966, he assumed command of the 405th Fighter Wing at Clark AFB,

Philippines. While there he flew 127 missions in South

Vietnam. General Yeager’s final assignment was director of the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center.

General Yeager won the Mackay and Collier

Trophies in 1948 and the Harmon International

Trophy in 1954. He retired from active duty on 1

March 1975.

Brig Gen Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager

• First person to break the sound barrier, 14 October 1947. Piloted

the Bell X-1 to Mach 1.05 at 42,000 feet.

• Fighter pilot ace in World War II with 13 and one-half aerial victories to his credit.

• Shot down five enemy aircraft in a single day—12 October 1944.
58

Hoyt S. Vandenberg graduated from the US

Military Academy in 1923, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Air

Service. He graduated from the Air Service Flying

School at Brooks Field, Texas, and from the Air

Service Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas,

in 1924.

His first assignment was with the 3d Attack Group

at Kelly Field, where he commanded the 90th Attack

Squadron and developed a reputation as an outstanding pilot and commander. From mid-1934 to 1936 he

attended the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell

Field, Alabama, and the Army Command and General

Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. With this

schooling behind him he became an instructor at the

Air Corps Tactical School before attending the Army

War College.

After graduating from the War College in 1939,

Vandenberg put his training to use in the Air Staff

until late 1942 when he was assigned to the United

Kingdom. In North Africa he was appointed Chief of

Staff of the Twelth Air Force, which he helped

organize. He returned to Washington in 1943 as

deputy chief of Air Staff but soon left for the Soviet

Union where he helped negotiate the use of bases in

the Soviet Union for bombing targets in Eastern

Germany out of range of bombers flying from

Britain, Italy, and North Africa. These frustrating

negotiations, and his participation in the conferences

Roosevelt and Churchill held with Chiang Kai-shek

in Cairo and with Stalin in Tehran, got Vandenberg

involved in wartime diplomacy at the highest levels

and helped prepare him for Cold War confrontations

with the Soviets. 

After a brief return to the Air Staff he went back to

Britain to serve as deputy Air Commander in Chief of

the Allied Expeditionary Forces and commander of its

American Air Component for the invasion of France.

Two months after D day Vandenberg assumed command of the Ninth Air Force—the largest tactical air

force ever fielded—and commanded it throughout the

liberation of France and conquest of Germany. He was

promoted to lieutenant general in March 1945, less

than four years after he made major. 

After the war he served as assistant chief of Air Staff

at AAF headquarters for six months before Gen

Dwight D. Eisenhower named him director of

Intelligence for the War Department. He was so effective in reorganizing Army intelligence that President

Harry Truman named him director of the Central

Intelligence Group (forerunner of the Central

Intelligence Agency). 

He returned to the Air Force in 1947 and, as deputy

commander and chief of Air Staff, he worked out all

the details of Air Force independence from the Army.

When the Air Force achieved the independence

Vandenberg and so many other airmen had sought for

so long, he became the first vice Chief of Staff of the

Air Force and was promoted to the rank of general. On

30 April 1948 Vandenberg became Chief of Staff of the

Air Force, succeeding Gen Carl A. Spaatz. 

During his tour as Chief of Staff he led the Air Force

through the early conflicts of the Cold War including

the Berlin blockade and the Korean War and struck a

balance between conventional tactical forces and strategic nuclear forces. Vandenberg retired from active duty

30 June 1953 and died of cancer the following year.

Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg

• Went from captain to lieutenant general in less than four years.

• During the North Africa campaign of World War II, Vandenberg

earned the Silver Star. For his role in planning the Normandy

invasion he received an oak leaf cluster for his Distinguished

Service Medal.

• Served as director of Central Intelligence from June 1945 to

April 1947.

• Served as vice chief under General Spaatz and then succeeded

him as Chief of Staff in 1948.

• Served as Chief of Staff during the Berlin Airlift, the deployment

of the Hydrogen bomb and the Korean War.
59

On 7 December 1941 Dean Hess was an

ordained minister of the Christian Church,

living in Cleveland, Ohio. Realizing he

could not expect his parishioners to bear arms for the

United States if he was not willing to do so, he

enlisted in the Aviation Cadet Program and became

a pilot. Sent to France in 1944, Hess flew P-47s on

63 combat missions. 

Following World War II, Hess returned to the

pulpit and to graduate school, but in July 1948 he

was recalled to active duty. He was stationed in Japan

in June 1950 when the Korean Conflict began and

immediately was sent to Korea as commanding officer of a detachment of USAF personnel training

South Korean pilots to fly F-51 type fighters. Despite

numerous obstacles, Hess was able to expand this

training into operational flights, which he often led.

By June 1951 when he left Korea, he had flown 250

combat missions. During this period, Hess started an

unofficial program for giving food and shelter to the

real victims of the war, children who had lost their

parents and their homes. 

So many were given shelter that Hess’s airfield

could no longer accommodate them and they were

taken to a central orphanage in Seoul, South Korea.

When the communists began to overrun the city,

Hess persuaded the USAF to lend assistance. In the

midst of grave defensive holding actions by United

Nations (UN) troops, 15 C-54s were sent to Seoul,

under “Operation Kiddy Car,” and evacuated hundreds of children to safety. The children were flown to

Cheju Island, off the southern coast of Korea, where

Hess had established an orphanage. With contributions from UN soldiers, the orphanage was gradually

able to accept more and more children. By the time

Hess was transferred from Korea, his orphanage had

taken in more than 1,054 Korean children who probably would have died without this assistance. 

In 1957, Hess published his story in a book entitled Battle Hymn. The story was made into a motion

picture starring Rock Hudson as Dean Hess. Hess’s

royalties from both the book and the movie were

used to construct a new orphanage near Seoul. Hess

retired from the USAF in 1969.

Col Dean Hess

• Was an ordained minister before joining the Army.

• Flew 63 combat missions in Europe during World War II.

• Flew 250 combat missions in Korea.

• Trained and led Korean pilots.

• Established an orphanage in Korea for the vast number of children orphaned by the war.
60

The world’s first jetversus-jet ace wasJames Jabara of the

US Air Force who scored

his initial victory on 3

April 1951 and his fifth

and sixth victories on 20

May 1951. He was then

ordered back to the

United States for special

duty. However, at his own

request, he returned to Korea in January 1953. By

June he had shot down nine additional MiG-15s,

giving him a total of 15 air-to-air jet victories during

the Korean War. Jabara was also credited with one

and one-half victories over Europe during World War

II. (The German Luftwaffe had 22 jet pilot aces during World War II but all claims were Allied propdriven aircraft.) On 17 November 1966, Jabara, a

colonel, was killed in an automobile accident while

traveling to a new assignment.

Col James Jabara

Capt Joseph C. “Joe” McConnell Jr.

F-86 Sabres take off heading

for “MiG Alley” during the

Korean War.

The leading jet ace of the Korean War was

Capt Joseph McConnell Jr., who scored his

first victory on 14 January 1953. In a little

more than a month, he gained his fifth MiG-15 victory, thereby becoming an ace. On the day

McConnell shot down his eighth MiG, his F-86

was hit by enemy aircraft fire and he was forced to

bail out over enemy-controlled waters of the Yellow

Sea west of Korea. After only two minutes in the

freezing water, he was rescued by helicopter. The

following day he was back in combat and shot down

his ninth MiG. By the end of April 1953, he had

scored his 10th victory to become a “double ace.”

On the morning of 18 May 1953, McConnell shot

down two MiGs in a furious air battle and became a

“triple ace.” On another mission that afternoon, he

shot down his 16th and last MiG-15. A little more

than a year later, 25 August 1954, while testing an

F-84H at Edwards AFB, California, Capt

McConnell crashed to his death.
61

Fred Blesse was born on 22 August 1921 in

Colon, Panama Canal Zone. He graduated

from the United States Military Academy at

West Point in 1945. For the next three years, Blesse

flew many different aircraft including P-40, P-51,

P-47, and F-80. During the Korean War, he flew two

volunteer combat tours. He completed 67 missions

in F-51 aircraft, 35 missions in F-80 aircraft, and 121

missions in F-86 aircraft. During his second combat

tour, he was credited with destroying nine MiG-15s

and one LA-9. He was the Air Force’s leading jet ace

when he returned to the United States in October of

1952.

In December of 1952, Blesse was assigned to

Nellis AFB, Nevada, as a jet fighter gunnery instructor, squadron operations officer, and squadron commander. In the 1955 Air Force Worldwide Fighter

Gunnery Championship, Blesse flew an F-86F and

claimed all six trophies offered for individual performance—a feat that has never been equaled. While

at Nellis, Blesse wrote a fighter tactics book, No

Guts, No Glory, that was used worldwide to teach

fighter operations. As recently as 1973, three thousand copies were sent to tactical units in the field.

In April 1967, Blesse was assigned as director of

Operations for the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing at

Da Nang AB, Republic of Vietnam. During this oneyear tour, he flew 108 combat missions over North

Vietnam and another 46 in Laos and South Vietnam.

In 1968, he was assigned to Nellis AFB as the director of Operations for the first F-111 wing and in

June of 1969 became its commander.

In August 1974, General Blesse was appointed

deputy Inspector General of the United States Air

Force. He accumulated more than sixty-five hundred

flying hours and 650 hours of combat flying. He is

the sixth ranking American jet ace.

Maj Gen Frederick C. “Boots” Blesse

• Credited with 10 aerial victories during the Korean War, he is America’s

sixth leading jet ace.

• 1954 and 1955 winner of the Air Training Command (ATC) Fighter

Gunnery Championship.

• In 1955, he won all six individual trophies at the Gunnery Championship—

a feat that has never been equaled.

Mikoyan and Gurevich’s (MiG) 15 was the premier communist

fighter during the Korean Conflict. Above 27,000 feet it was

faster and more maneuverable than the F-86.
62

Robinson Risner was born in Mammoth

Spring, Arkansas, on 16 January 1925. He

enlisted in the Army Air Corps in April of

1943 and was awarded pilot wings and his commission in May of 1944. After training in P-38s and

P-39s and serving in Panama, he was relieved of

active duty in 1946 and became an F-51 pilot in the

Oklahoma Air National Guard. Called back to service in 1952, he was assigned to Kimpo, Korea, with

the 4th Fighter Wing. He flew one hundred combat

missions in F-86s and is credited with eight aerial victories to become the 20th jet ace during the Korean

War. While assigned as a squadron commander at

George AFB, California, he was selected to fly the

Charles Lindbergh Commemoration Flight from

New York to Paris. Flying the F-100, he set a transatlantic speed record, covering the distance in six hours

and 38 minutes. In August 1964 Risner was assigned

commander of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron at

Kadena AB, South Korea, flying the F-105

Thunderchief. While TDY to Thailand in April of

1965, Risner was shot down over North Vietnam

and rescued. In September of 1965, he was shot

down again over North Vietnam and captured.

While prisoner in Hanoi, North Vietnam, Risner

served first as the Senior Ranking Officer and later as

vice commander of the 4th Allied Prisoner-of-War

Wing. He was repatriated in February 1973. Risner

was promoted to brigadier general effective 8 May

1974. His military decorations include the Air Force

Cross with one oak leaf cluster, Silver Star with one

oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with two

oak leaf clusters, Bronze Star with V device and one

oak leaf cluster, Air Medal with seven oak leaf clusters, and the Purple Heart with three oak leaf clusters. General Risner retired on 1 August 1976.

Brig Gen Robinson “Robbie” Risner

The F-86 Sabre combined with the pilots’ skills gave

Americans a 792 to 78 shoot down advantage over the MiG15 during the Korean Conflict from December 1950

through the summer of 1953.
63

Nathan F. Twining came from a rich military

background; his forebears had served in the

American Army and Navy since the French

and Indian Wars. Twining enlisted in World War I

but soon received an appointment to West Point.

Because the program was shortened to produce

more officers for combat, he spent only two years at

the academy. After graduating in 1919 and serving in

the infantry for three years, he transferred to the Air

Service. Over the next 15 years he flew fighter aircraft in Texas, Louisiana, and Hawaii, while also

attending the Air Corps Tactical School and the

Command and General Staff College. 

When war broke out in Europe he was assigned to

the operations division on the Air Staff; then in 1942

he was sent to the South Pacific where he became

chief of staff of the Allied air forces in that area. In

January 1943, he assumed command of the

Thirteenth Air Force, and that same November he

traveled across the world to take over the Fifteenth

Air Force from Jimmy Doolittle. 

When Germany surrendered, Arnold sent

Twining back to the Pacific to command the B-29s

of Twentieth Air Force in the last push against Japan,

but he was there only a short time when the atomic

strikes ended the war. He returned to the States

where he was named commander of Air Materiel

Command, and in 1947 he took over Alaskan Air

Command. After three years there he was set to

retire as a lieutenant general, but when Muir S.

Fairchild, the vice chief of Staff, died unexpectedly of

a heart attack, Twining was elevated to full general

and named his successor. 

When Vandenberg retired in mid-1953, Twining

was selected as chief; during his tenure, massive retaliation based on airpower became the national strategy. In 1957, President Eisenhower appointed

Twining chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the first airman to hold that position.

Gen Nathan F. Twining

• In 1957 he became the first Air Force Chief of Staff to serve

as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• Began his active service in June 1916 with Company H of the

Third Oregon Infantry (National Guard) and served as a corporal on Mexican border duty.

• In 1943, he was placed in tactical control of all Army, Navy,

Marine, and Allied Air Forces in the South Pacific, one of the

first Joint Air Commands in US history.

• On 2 August 1945 he was appointed commander of

Twentieth Air Force in the Pacific; a few days later, his command dropped the first atomic bomb, at Hiroshima.
64

Gen William H. Tunner was born in 1906 and

graduated from West Point in 1928. He

completed advanced flying school in 1929

and served in various Army Air Corps units throughout the 1930s, but he made his reputation as an airlift genius during World War II.

General Tunner’s first major assignment of the

war was as commander of the Ferry Division of Air

Transport Command. At that time the Ferry

Division was ferrying more than 10,000 aircraft a

month to users in the continental United States and

overseas. From there he took command of the

“Hump” airlift: the toughest airlift operation of the

war. 

When the Japanese cut the overland route

between Allied forces in China and Burma, the forces

in China had to be supplied by air from India over

the Himalayas. This route was called the “Hump”

and the entire operation defied common sense. The

austere “base” areas in northern India were about as

far from the United States as any place on earth; the

weather over the Himalayas was treacherous; the

navigational equipment was primitive; the pilots were

inadequately trained; and the unpressurized, pistonengine aircraft could barely get their loads over the

mountains. But General Tunner instituted maintenance, organization, and crew qualification programs

that drastically reduced the accident rate while moving more cargo than any previous airlift.

When the Soviets closed the land routes to Berlin

in 1948, the US Air Force called on General Tunner

to run the Berlin Airlift. Once again Tunner streamlined and standardized maintenance and operational

procedures driving up the cargo tonnage delivered

while maintaining an extraordinarily low accident

rate. In 1950, General Tunner was called upon to

direct airlift operations in Korea where he made

Combat Cargo Command into a remarkably flexible

and efficient theater airlift organization and made

history by parachuting in a bridge that enabled the

US Marines to get over Funchilin Pass. 

After the Korean War General Tunner served as

commander of US Air Forces Europe and then as

commander Military Air Transport Service (a predecessor of Air Mobility Command) before retiring in

1960.

Lt Gen William H. Tunner

• Greatest Airlift commander in USAF History.

• Commanded the “Hump” Operations in World War II.

• Headed the task force that ran the Berlin Airlift.

• Commanded airlift operations during the Korean War.
65

Curtis E. LeMay, one of the icons of American

military history, rivals Mitchell in importance

and controversy. Early in his career he

became known as one of the best navigators and

pilots in the Air Corps. War brought rapid promotion and increased responsibility. He had earned a

reputation as an unusually innovative tactician and

problem solver, so when Hap Arnold had difficulty

making the new B-29 combat effective, he chose

LeMay to take over B-29 operations in China. His

ability led Arnold to name him commander of the

XXI Bomber Command conducting the main air

effort against Japan from the Marianas. Always a tactical innovator, LeMay took the risky and controversial step of abandoning the long-held American doctrine of high altitude, daylight, precision bombing,

and instead stripped his B-29s of guns, loaded them

with incendiaries, and sent them against Japanese

cities at night and at low level. The new strategy was

remarkably successful; Japan was devastated, and

then with the dropping of the atomic bombs in

August 1945 brought the Pacific war to an end. 

In 1948, LeMay was sent to Germany to command the air forces in Europe arrayed against the

Soviets. In this position he was responsible for getting the Berlin Airlift started in 1948. This crisis precipitated a major reshuffling in Washington. A war

with the Soviets appeared increasingly possible, and

the Strategic Air Command, which would bear the

brunt of such a war, was seen as deficient. As a result,

Hoyt S. Vandenberg relieved George C. Kenney

from command at SAC and named LeMay his successor. The building of SAC into an effective and

efficient warfighting arm was LeMay’s greatest

accomplishment. To test his command’s state of

readiness he ordered a “bombing raid” on Dayton,

Ohio, but not a single SAC aircraft carried out the

mission as planned. He then set about the difficult

but essential task of retraining SAC. Using the

authority delegated him by Vandenberg, LeMay built

new bases, facilities, and training programs; began a

“spot promotion” system for rewarding his best aircrews; and, through his legendary use of iron discipline, soon transformed his command into one of the

most effective military units in the world. 

In 1957, LeMay was named vice Chief of Staff,

and when Thomas White retired in 1961, he was elevated to the position of chief. LeMay had strong feelings regarding American involvement in Vietnam,

arguing against the gradual response advocated by

the administration. He retired in 1965.

Gen Curtis E. LeMay

• Commissioned through the Reserve Officer

Training Corps (ROTC) at Ohio State University

in 1928.

• Began World War II as a group commander in

Eighth Air Force, but within 18 months had gone

from lieutenant colonel to major general and an

air division commander.

• Commanded the B-29 bombing campaign

against the Japanese home islands.

• In 1948, he commanded US Air Forces in Europe

(USAFE) and initiated the Berlin Airlift.

• Commander of SAC from 1948–57.

• After serving as vice Chief of Staff, he became

Chief of Staff in 1961.
66

Bennie Schriever was born in Bremen,

Germany, on 14 September 1910. His parents

migrated to the United States in 1917 and he

became a naturalized citizen in 1923. He graduated

from Texas A&M in 1931. Schriever entered flight

training at Randolph Field, Texas, in June of 1932

and graduated in 1933.

In 1939 Schriever was assigned as a test pilot at

Wright Field, Ohio. After receiving advanced schooling in engineering at Stanford University, he was

assigned to the 19th Bomb Group in the Southwest

Pacific in July 1942. While in the Pacific theater he

participated in the Bismarck Archipelago, Leyte,

Papua, North Solomon, South Philippine, and

Ryukyu campaigns.

From 1946 to 1954 Schriever served in several

positions at the headquarters concerning material

and development planning. In August 1954, he was

appointed commander of the Air Force Western

Development Division, ARDC, Inglewood,

California. In this capacity, he directed the nation’s

highest priority project—the development of a ballistic missile program and the initial space programs.

He was responsible for technical phases of the Atlas,

Titan, Thor, and Minuteman ballistic missiles, as well

as providing the launching sites and equipment,

tracking facilities, and ground support necessary for

missile operation.

Schriever assumed command of Air Force Systems

Command in April of 1961 and was promoted to

general in July 1961. He retired from active duty on

1 September 1966.

Gen Bernard A. “Bennie” Schriever

• The “Father” of the Ballistic Missile Program.

• In August 1954 he was appointed commander of the Air Force

Western Development Division, ARDC, Inglewood, California.

• Directed the nation’s highest priority project in the 1950s—

the development of a ballistic missile program.

• He was responsible for technical phases of the Atlas, Titan,

Thor, and Minuteman ballistic missiles.

• Assumed command of Air Force Systems Command in April of

1961.

The first Titan intercontinental ballsitic missile launch on 6

February 1959.
67

Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin was an American astronaut born in Montclair, New

Jersey. He was nicknamed Buzz by his sister. He trained at West Point,

flew combat missions in Korea, and later flew in Germany with the 36th

Tactical Wing. He logged over twenty-nine hundred hours of flying time.

Aldrin became an astronaut in 1963. In 1966 he set a world record by walking

in space for five hours and 37 minutes during the Gemini 12 mission, the last

Gemini mission. He was the second man to set foot on the moon in the Apollo

11 mission in 1969.

Lt Col Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin

Lt Col Virgil I. “Gus” Grissom

Gus Grissom was an American astronaut who was born on 3 April

1926 in Indiana. Before he became an astronaut, Grissom served as

a fighter pilot in the Korean War. He logged over forty-six hundred

hours of flight time. Grissom became an astronaut in 1959. He was one of

the original seven Mercury astronauts. He spent over five hours in space on

two spaceflights. In 1961, Grissom flew aboard Mercury 4. He became the

second American to make a suborbital flight into space during this 16-

minute flight. In 1965 Grissom piloted the first maneuverable spacecraft

aboard Gemini 3. Grissom was one of three astronauts to be killed in the

Apollo I fire in 1967. The three astronauts were training for the first

manned Apollo flight when an electrical fire broke out in the cockpit.

Maj Donald K. “Deke” Slayton

Donald “Deke” Slayton, an American astronaut, was born on 1

March 1924 in Wisconsin. Before he became an astronaut, Slayton

was a fighter pilot in World War II. He logged over nine thousand

hours of flight time. 

Slayton became an astronaut in 1959. He was one of the original seven

Mercury astronauts. He spent over 216 hours in space on one spaceflight.

In 1975 Slayton flew aboard the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. The Apollo

spacecraft linked up with a Soviet spacecraft. The crews of each country

spent nine days performing experiments together. Slayton left NASA in

1981.
68

CMSgt Paul W. Airey was selected from among

21 major air command nominees to become

the first Chief Master Sergeant of the United

States Air Force. He was formally installed on 3 April

1967, by Gen John P. McConnell, Air Force Chief of

Staff. His previous assignment was with the Air

Defense Command’s 4756th Civil Engineering

Squadron at Tyndall AFB, Florida, where he served

as the unit’s first sergeant.

Chief Airey spent much of his 24-year career as a

first sergeant. During World War II, however, he

served as an aerial gunner on B-24 bombers, and is

credited with 28 combat missions in Europe. Chief

Airey was a prisoner of war in Germany (19 July

1944–May 1945), following capture after he was

forced to bail out of his flak-damaged aircraft.

During the Korean Conflict, Chief Airey was

awarded the Legion of Merit while assigned at Naha

Air Base, Okinawa. The award, an uncommon decoration for an enlisted man, was earned for having

conceived a means of constructing equipment from

salvaged parts that improved corrosion control of

sensitive radio and radar components.

Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Paul W. Airey

Like the B-24 in this photograph, Airey’s B-24 was brought

down by German flak.
THE VIETNAM WAR

1965–75
71

The Rolling Thunder air campaign lasted

from February 1965 to March 1968. To

avoid escalating military actions until

after the 1964 elections, President Lyndon B.

Johnson did not send significant US ground

forces to Vietnam until July 1965. The US

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam,

had been operating in Southeast Asia since 1955

but had not prevented the Vietnamese communists from making steady progress against South

Vietnamese forces. By January 1965, Johnson

was under mounting pressure from his closest

national security advisors to “do something” in

response to the increasing communist attacks on

United States and South Vietnamese personnel

and installations. 

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara

spelled out the US strategic objective in a memorandum for the president. In McNamara’s

words, “Our objective is to create conditions for

a favorable settlement by demonstrating to the

[communists] that the odds are against their

winning.” The administration believed that

once the communist North Vietnamese realized

they probably would not win, they would stop

attacking the South. Johnson’s advisors considered three options: continue a policy of limited

military assistance; launch bold attacks against

the North; or gradually increase the use of military force.

Option three, perceived as a middle ground

between the hawks and doves, was endorsed by

the president. To the greatest extent possible,

the administration wanted to achieve its ends

through a finely calibrated use of airpower

known as “Rolling Thunder.” Fearing that the

Air Force would be too aggressive, the White

House maintained tight control of all phases of

the operation. Johnson correctly claimed that

the military could not bomb an outhouse in

North Vietnam without his permission. In the

words of one historian, “the policy-makers did

everything but fly the aircraft.” But the campaign failed to achieve US policy objectives. 

Top strategists within the administration

noted the ineffectiveness of the air campaign

from the beginning. For example, in April 1965

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

(Gen Earle G. Wheeler) told Secretary

McNamara that the February–April bombings

had not appreciably reduced “the overall military capability of the [communists]. I think it is

fair to state that our strikes to date, while damaging, have not curtailed [their] military capabilities in any major way.” 

Rolling Thunder demonstrated US support

for the government of South Vietnam and the

United States’ desire to contain communist

expansion but it failed to bring the North

Vietnamese to the negotiating table, failed to

impede the flow of logistics support from the

North, and failed to weaken the North’s

resolve. In all, the United States flew 304,000

fighter-bomber sorties and 2,380 B-52 bomber

sorties over North Vietnam, lost 922 aircraft,

and dropped 634,000 tons of bombs. The failure of Rolling Thunder also contributed to the

decisions that sent US ground troops to

Vietnam, escalating the war and raising the price

of our ultimate failure in Vietnam. 

Operation Rolling Thunder (1965–68)

The F-105 Thud delivered 75 percent of bomb tonnage during Operation Rolling Thunder.

Rolling Thunder’s use of precise

increments of force succeeded only in

preventing the attainment of US

strategic objectives. In fact, these

halfhearted attempts at using airpower bolstered the enemy’s resolve.
72

The United States began direct involvement in military operations in Southeast

Asia in the spring of 1965. In April, Gen

William C. Westmoreland, commander of

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(MACV), urged the use of B-52s against

Vietcong base camps in advance of ground

forces. These base camps were too spread out to

be effectively bombed by the more tactical

fighter-bombers. B-52s could deliver an even

pattern of bombs over a large area in a short

time. The Joint Chiefs approved the idea and by

May the details for the strikes had been worked

out. The first strike was scheduled for 18 June

1965.

At 1:00 A.M., 30 B-52s took off from Guam

and headed to the refueling area off the northwestern tip of Luzon in the Philippines. Most of

the bombers carried 51 750-pound bombs. Six

of the B-52s were loaded with one- thousandpound armor-piercing bombs. A tailwind caused

the bombers to arrive at the rendezvous early so

the lead cell of 10 aircraft began to circle. In the

dark, the turn caused two of the Stratofortresses

to collide killing eight of the 12 crewmembers.

Twenty-seven of the remaining bombers refueled and continued the mission.

At 6:45 A.M. and between 19,000 and

22,000 feet, the B-52s began dropping their

bombs on a one-mile-by-two-mile target box.

Slightly more than one-half of the thirteen hundred bombs hit the target box. Shortly after the

B-52s departed, 32 A-1Es from Bien Hoa

strafed the base camps to soften them up as

landing zones. Then three reconnaissance teams

performed a ground sweep of the target area

but found no enemy and little bomb damage.

The B-52s returned to Guam, completing the

13-hour mission. The immediate observable

results of the bombing were less than spectacular especially placed in the politically charged

atmosphere of the time. Journalists questioned

why such a powerful strategic weapon was used

on such a minuscule enemy. However, the B-52s

were one part of a large operation that included

tactical aircraft, ground troops, and helicopters.

The B-52s added an element to the air war that

had been missing. They could strike dug-in targets, saturate large areas, surprise the enemy,

reduce enemy safe areas, and encourage the

South Vietnamese soldiers to venture back into

enemy territory.

The tactic of using B-52s to surprise enemy

concentrations and soften them for a follow-up

ground sweep saw a steady increase in use after

this first mission in 1965. By July 1966, B-52s

had flown 4,309 sorties in 471 missions.

Westmoreland used subjective valuations of the

missions (weight of ordnance dropped, percent

of bombs planned and dropped) to press for

increases. He viewed the missions as extremely

effective in lowering enemy morale, increasing

desertions, forcing changes in tactics, and causing disruptions in the enemy’s economy.

American ground commanders considered

the B-52s as the most effective weapon system

used in South Vietnam. Their enthusiasm fell in

line with their view that bombers were “flying

artillery.” The Air Force objected to the B-52’s

Arc Light role because the strategic assets were

not being used effectively. The draw for politicians was clear due to the high enemy attrition

rate and an extremely low loss of US life.

During 1965 through 1967, the Air Force flew

25 percent of its tactical strike sorties (46,000)

and 30 percent of its B-52 sorties (3,300) in

supporting ground offensives.

Operation Arc Light (1965–67)

The B-52 Stratofortress proved its worth in Vietnam.
73

On 2 January 1967, 12 F-4s of the 8th

Tactical Fighter Wing shot down seven

MiG-21s over North Vietnam without

a loss. The commander of the 8th, Col Robin

Olds, led the sweep and got one of the kills.

Nearly two years into the Rolling Thunder air

campaign against North Vietnam, Operation

Bolo was the first time the Air Force managed

to destroy more than two enemy aircraft on a

single day.

By the end of 1966, President Johnson had

not yet permitted air strikes on North

Vietnamese airfields, where Soviet and Chinese

advisors were staying. Flying from these sanctuaries, MiG pilots attacked F-105s laden with

bombs. Although most F-105s survived such

attacks, North Vietnamese pilots often succeeded in getting F-105 pilots to jettison their

bombs. Meanwhile, MiG pilots carefully avoided

combat with F-4 escorts, screens, and sweeps.

Colonel Olds took advantage of the introduction of electronic jamming pods on F-105s

to fool MiG pilots and their controllers into

thinking that F-4s were actually more vulnerable

F-105s. The new pods protected F-105s against

surface-to-air missiles by jamming North

Vietnamese radar. During a New Year’s Day

cease-fire, Olds had the pods transferred from

F-105 bases to F-4 bases at Ubon, Thailand,

and Danang, South Vietnam. On 2 January, 28

F-4s flew north with jamming pods which made

them appear to be F-105s and enticed MiG-21s

at Phuc Yen into the air.

Olds flew lead for one flight of F-4s, his first

mission to Hanoi. The Hanoi Delta was a dangerous place to loiter particularly for the 55

minutes called for by the plan. As Olds pushed

his flight deep into North Vietnam airspace,

MiGs began to scramble from every base. Col

Daniel “Chappie” James Jr., flying lead on

another flight spotted a MiG closing on Olds

and warned him. Soon there were numerous

MiGs all over the sky and a no-holds-barred

dogfight ensued. The engagement lasted only

nine tense minutes before the MiGs dived

through the clouds and landed at Phuc Yen—

saved from further losses by President Johnson’s

rules of engagement.

The Vietnamese had launched 32 enemy

fighters and the F-4s had downed seven of

them. If the weather had cooperated and all the

MiGs been destroyed, mission planning would

have most certainly been affected. As it was,

Seventh Air Force returned to business as usual

shortly after the success of Operation Bolo. Not

until the spring did Johnson authorize attacks

on North Vietnamese airfields, and not until the

fall did he permit Phuc Yen airfield to be

struck—causing surviving North Vietnamese

MiGs to be based in neighboring China for the

remaining months of Rolling Thunder. 

In mid-1967, the F-4C kill ratio was an

impressive 21-to-1 against the MiG-21. By

1973, even with improved F-4E aircraft, missiles, and gun sights, the ratio had dropped to

1.06-to-1 against the same MiG-21s.

Operation Bolo (January 1967)

Col Robin Olds, an ace in World War II, won four

victories in Vietnam.

The F-4 Phantoms claimed 107.5 of the 137 aerial victories of

the Vietnam War.
74

By the spring of 1972, the United States

had withdrawn virtually all of its ground

troops from South Vietnam. On 29

March 1972 the North Vietnamese launched a

major invasion of South Vietnam expecting to

have an easy time against the South Vietnamese

army and hoping to influence the November

1972 US presidential election in their favor.

Unlike the guerrilla warfare that characterized

much of the Vietnam War, the Communist

Spring Offensive of 1972 was a conventional

invasion by 14 divisions and 26 separate regiments led by hundreds of tanks and supported

by ferocious artillery barrages. The United States

immediately responded with airpower in an

operation which became know as Linebacker I.

Like the US ground presence in Vietnam, the

US air presence had been radically scaled back

by early 1972. To meet the communist aggression, the US Air Force rapidly deployed forces

into the region. Soon the USAF had very powerful forces in the area including over 200 B-52s

in theater and almost 400 F-4s operating out of

Thailand and South Vietnam. 

In some of the most effective counterland

operations of the war, US Air Force B-52s

chewed-up the massed communist forces, and

F-4s used laser-guided bombs in interdiction

missions that cut communist supply lines. C130s dropped supplies to besieged towns and at

night, AC-119 and AC-130 gunships provided

vital close air support to hard pressed garrisons.

The devastating US airstrikes gradually turned

the tide of the fighting and enabled the South

Vietnamese to retake every important town that

the communists had managed to capture. 

One of the striking departures from earlier

Rolling Thunder campaign was in strategic

attack. Improved diplomatic relations with

China enabled US aircraft to attack important

targets that have previously been off limits out

of concern that attacking them might cause the

Chinese to intervene on the ground. At the

same time, laser-guidance kits made USAF

bombs 100 times as accurate as they had been a

few years earlier. These two changes enabled

fast-moving F-4s to strike key road and rail targets near the Chinese border efficiently and

effectively. In North Vietnam, strategic attacks

hit more than 400 bridges, cut key mountain

roads in over 800 places, demolished petroleum

storage facilities, power-generating plants, headquarters, and repair facilities (the North

Vietnamese did not have any factories).

Combined with mine-laying by US Navy planes

in North Vietnamese harbors, these strategic

attacks finally started to isolate North Vietnam

from outside support. 

This North Vietnamese attempt at a conventional offensive (requiring massed forces and

enormous quantities of supplies) came at a time

when the United States was improving relations

with North Vietnam’s ally, China. This mistake

made the North Vietnamese army an early victim of the counterland and strategic attack operations that make up the USAF’s “rapid halt”

strategy.

Operation Linebacker I (1972)

This F-4 is carrying 2,000 lb laser-guided bombs to strike strategic targets in North Vietnam in 1972.
75

Not since World War II had bombers

been employed in an operation the size

of Linebacker II. In December of

1972, the United States position in Southeast

Asia was precarious. The North Vietnamese had

successfully defeated the South Vietnamese

forces and were unwilling to pursue peace negotiations. The American ground presence had

been reduced to approximately 26,000. A force

this size could not engage the communists in

any large battle. President Richard M. Nixon

turned to the Air Force for a solution.

The resultant operation, Linebacker II,

occurred 18–29 December 1972, standing

down for Christmas day. The operation would

be fought Air Force style—a concentrated, sustained air attack against the enemy center of

power.

The operation would be very risky because

the enemy had massed an awesome air defense

system around the Hanoi-Haiphong area. The

system included 145 MiG fighters, 26 SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, concentrated

antiaircraft artillery and a very sophisticated

radar network. The mission was to destroy all

major target complexes in the Hanoi-Haiphong

area using B-52s and F-111s during the night

and tactical aircraft during the day.

The flight line at Andersen AFB, Guam, was

crowded with 99 B-52Gs and 50 B-52Ds. The

mission from Guam would take 12 hours and

require in-flight refueling. At U Tapao Royal

Thai Airfield, Thailand, there were another 54

B-52Ds available. Missions from Thailand

would only take three to four hours and not

require refueling. It took nearly two hours for

the 87 B-52s from Guam to taxi, take off, and

become airborne on the afternoon of 18

December 1972. They were joined in flight by

42 B-52s from Thailand. Targets on the 18th

included airfields, vehicle repair centers, rail

yards, railroad repair facilities, and the main

Hanoi radio station.

On day one of the operation, the North

Vietnamese launched two hundred SAMs often

in 4-6 weapon volleys. United States losses that

day totaled three B-52s and one F-111. SSgt

Samuel Turner, tail gunner on Brown 03, shot

down a MiG-21, the first in B-52 combat history. 

Tactics were revised for day two—altitudes

were lowered and time separation of aircraft was

increased to four minutes. The changes resulted

in no aircraft losses despite the North

Vietnamese shooting over 180 SAMs. Combat

losses for the entire campaign totaled 15 B-52s,

two F-111s, and two F-4 flying MiG combat air

patrol (MiGCAP). The B-52s had proven to be

an effective force able to meet and defeat the

enemy. Within 60 days of the Paris Peace

Accords signing, 591 American POWs were

released.

In Linebacker II, B-52s had flown 729 of

741 planned sorties and dropped 15,000 tons of

bombs. The North Vietnamese fired 1,240 surface-to-air missiles but the B-52s only suffered a

2 percent loss rate. Not long after Linebacker II,

the United States formally disengaged from the

war in Southeast Asia. Many believe a bombing

campaign like Linebacker II should have been

conducted in 1965. In 1965, the Hanoi air

defense system was severely limited and an operation of this nature would have achieved a military victory and prevented the costly US

involvement in Vietnam.

Operation Linebacker II (1972)

The B-52s of Linebacker II conducted the most concentrated bombing campaign of the war.
76

On 11 April 1966, 21-year old A1C William

H. Pitzenbarger of Piqua, Ohio, was killed

while defending some of his wounded comrades. For his bravery and sacrifice, he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. 

“Pits,” as he was known to his friends, was nearing his three hundredth combat mission on that fatal

day when some men of the US Army’s 1st Division

were ambushed and pinned down in an area approximately 45 miles east of Saigon. Two HH-43

“Huskie” helicopters of the USAF’s 38th Aerospace

Rescue and Recovery Squadron were rushed to the

scene to lift out the wounded. Pits was a pararescueman (PJ) on one of them. Upon reaching the site of

the ambush, Pits was lowered through the trees to

the ground where he attended to the wounded

before having them lifted to the helicopter by cable.

After six wounded men had been flown to an aid station, the two USAF helicopters returned for their

second loads. As one of them lowered its litter basket to Pitzenbarger, who had remained on the

ground with the 20 infantrymen still alive, it was hit

by a burst of enemy small-arms fire. When its engine

began to lose power, the pilot realized he had to get

the Huskie away from the area as soon as possible.

Instead of climbing into the litter basket so he could

leave with the helicopter, Pits elected to remain with

the Army troops under enemy attack and he gave a

“wave-off” to the helicopter which flew away to

safety. 

Pits continued to treat the wounded and, when

the others began running low on ammunition, he

gathered ammo clips from the dead and distributed

them to those still alive. Then, he joined the others

with a rifle to hold off the Vietcong. About 7:30 P.M.

that evening, Bill Pitzenbarger was killed by

Vietcong snipers. When his body was recovered the

next day, one hand still held a rifle and the other a

medical kit.

A1C William H. Pitzenbarger

An HH-43 Huskie on rescue alert could be airborne in about one

minute. It carried two rescuemen/firefighters and a fire suppression kit.
77

On 10 March 1967, Merlyn H. Dethlefsen

was flying an F-105F as No. 3 in a fourplane formation on a mission against the

Thai Nguyen Steel Mill, 50 miles north of Hanoi.

The task for the F-105s was to knock out surface-toair (SAM) and antiaircraft gun sites before the bombing forces arrived. When the four F-105s made their

low-altitude attack run, the flight leader was shot

down and No. 2 was damaged so heavily that he had

to head homeward. Although standard tactics called

for only one attack pass on such a heavily defended

area, or two at the most, Lt Col Dethlefsen decided

not to leave the area, but to continue his attacks.

However, a MiG appeared and he had to fly through

heavy antiaircraft fire to escape from the MiG; in

doing so, his F-105 was also hit and seriously damaged. Instead of heading for home, he elected to

carry-on and even after the steel mill had been

bombed and the bombing force had withdrawn, he,

along with his wingman, stayed in the target area

looking for SAM sites. After evading a second MiG

and then having his F-105 hit once again by flak, he

spotted two SAM sites and attacked, destroying

them both. Only then did he head his battered F105 for friendly territory. For his valor in combat

above and beyond the call of duty, Dethlefsen was

awarded the Medal of Honor, the third USAF member to receive the award during the South East Asian

(SEA) conflict.

Lt Col Merlyn H. Dethlefsen

The F-105 Thunderchief was called the “Thud” by its aircrews. 
78

On 9 November 1967, the F-4 flown by 1st

Lt Lance P. Sijan of Milwaukee, Wisconsin,

was hit by North Vietnamese ground fire

and exploded. Although badly wounded, he was able

to parachute from his stricken plane. Without food

and very little water he managed to avoid capture for

45 days. A serious compound fracture of the left leg

made it impossible for him to walk, but he did manage to pull himself backward through the jungle.

Even with the broken leg, a skull fracture, and a

mangled right hand, he was able to escape shortly

after his initial capture. Recaptured, he was taken to

Vinh and thrown into a bamboo cell. He was “interrogated” repeatedly, and in spite of his captors technique of twisting his damaged right hand he refused

to disclose any information but his name. When not

being interrogated he attempted additional escapes,

with beatings the only results. Lt Sijan was soon

moved to a POW camp at Hanoi. Even in his pitiful

condition, he attempted more escapes, all meeting

with failure. His physical condition continued to

weaken without proper food or medical attention

and soon he developed respiratory problems. After

many months of ill treatment, his health—but not his

spirit—broken, he was dragged one night from his

cell while delirious and never seen again. 

Lt Sijan was promoted posthumously to captain

on 13 June 1968. On 4 March 1976 he was awarded

posthumously the Medal of Honor that was presented to his parents by President Gerald R. Ford.

Captain Sijan thus became the first graduate of the

US Air Force Academy to receive our nation’s highest decoration for heroism above and beyond the call

of duty.

Capt Lance P. Sijan

An F-4 on a bomb drop during the Vietnam War.
79

General Ryan was born in Cherokee, Iowa, 10

December 1915. Following graduation from

Cherokee Junior College in 1934, he

entered the United States Military Academy from

which he graduated in 1938. He next attended flying

school at Randolph and Kelly Fields, Texas, and

received his pilot wings in 1939.

In February 1944, he was transferred to Italy

where he commanded the 2d Bombardment Group

and later became operations officer for the 5th

Bombardment Wing, Fifteenth Air Force. He

returned to the United States in April 1945, and

became deputy Air Base Commander, Midland Army

Air Field, Texas. In September 1945, he was assigned

to the Air Training Command (ATC) at Fort Worth

and Randolph Field, Texas, where he remained until

April 1946 when he assumed duties with the 58th

Bombardment Wing and participated in the Bikini

Atoll atomic weapons tests. 

Ryan became director of Materiel for the Strategic

Air Command in June 1956, and four years later

assumed command of SAC’s Sixteenth Air Force in

Spain. In July 1961 he was named commander of the

Second Air Force at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana.

In December 1962, he joined a select group of

athletes who have been successful in their professional careers since their college football days, when

he was chosen a member of the Sports Illustrated

Silver Anniversary All-American team.

In August 1963, General Ryan was assigned to

the Pentagon as Inspector General for the US Air

Force. One year later he was named vice

Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command and

in December 1964, became Commander in Chief.

He was assigned as Commander in Chief, Pacific Air

Forces, in February 1967.

Ryan was appointed vice Chief of Staff of the US

Air Force in August 1968, and Chief of Staff of the

US Air Force in August 1969. He commanded the

Air Force during the height of the Vietnam War.

Gen John D. Ryan

• In April 1946 Gen John D. Ryan assumed duties with the 58th

Bombardment Wing and participated in the Bikini Atoll atomic

weapons tests.

• In December 1962 General Ryan joined a select group of athletes

when he was chosen a member of the Sports Illustrated Silver

Anniversary All-American team.

• Appointed vice Chief of Staff of the US Air Force in August 1968,

and Chief of Staff of the US Air Force in August 1969.
80

One of the great Tuskegee airmen was Daniel

“Chappie” James Jr. Chappie won his wings

and a commission in 1943 but did not see

combat in World War II. After the war, James quickly

earned a reputation as an outstanding fighter pilot.

In Korea he flew one hundred combat missions, and

in Vietnam—by 1965 he was a full colonel—he flew

over threescore more. Not only was that war unpopular, but racial unrest was exploding into violence all

over the United States. James returned from

Vietnam and was often called upon to defend not

only America’s military policies, but also its racial

policies. An articulate speaker who commanded great

physical presence (he was six feet, four inches and

weighed nearly 250 pounds), he was an especially

effective spokesman for the Air Force. 

In 1967, he was named commander of Wheelus

AFB in Libya just as Colonel Gadhafi succeeded in

his revolution there. Gadhafi demanded that the air

base, which he saw as a vestige of European colonialism, be closed and its facilities turned over to the

Libyan people. This obviously was an extremely delicate position for James requiring restraint, tact,

diplomacy, and grit. He displayed an abundance of

all these qualities, and upon leaving Wheelus a year

later, he received his first star. 

After four years in the Pentagon working in Public

Affairs where he won two more stars, he was named

vice commander of Military Airlift Command

(MAC). After less than two years at MAC, he was

given a fourth star, the first black in American history

to attain that rank, and was named commander of

the North American Air Defense (NORAD)

Command. Surprisingly for a man of his size and

appearance, James was in poor health. He suffered a

heart attack in 1977 and soon after elected to retire.

His health continued to decline and in February

1978, one month after retirement, he suffered a fatal

heart attack. 

Gen Daniel “Chappie” James Jr.

• Gen Daniel “Chappie” James Jr. was a Tuskegee airman

who flew one hundred combat missions during the

Korean War.

• He flew over 60 combat missions as a full colonel during the Vietnam War.

• The first black in American history to attain the rank

of four-star general.

• Served as commander of the North American Air

Defense (NORAD) Command until his retirement in

January of 1978.
81

On 24 February 1969, Airman Levitow flew

combat patrol over South Vietnam as the

loadmaster of an AC-47 Dragon ship. The

gunship was patrolling in the vicinity of Tan Son

Nhut when the Army post at nearby Long Sinh came

under attack. The aircraft diverted to aid in the

defense of the post. Firing its mini-guns at the

enemy, the gunship knocked out two mortar positions, but further firings were observed a few kilometers away. As the AC-47 flew in the direction, a

mortar shell fell on the top of its right wing. A brilliant explosion shook the aircraft violently and the

fuselage was riddled by thousands of shell fragments.

Airman Levitow and another crew member were

standing near the open cargo door at that moment

dropping parachute illumination flares. The explosion knocked both of them to the floor and a flare

that they were handling was tossed inside the cargo

compartment. Spewing toxic smoke, the activated

magnesium flare was due to separate explosively from

its cannister and ignite within seconds. Although

stunned and wounded by shrapnel, Airman Levitow

moved toward the flare and flung himself on top of

it to keep the flare from rolling around the pitching

cargo hold. He then dragged himself and the flare

back toward the cargo door and tossed it out. The

flare ignited just as it cleared the aircraft. Levitow

was awarded the Medal of Honor for his selfless

heroism that saved his fellow crew members and the

gunship. President Richard M. Nixon presented the

award at the White House on 14 May 1970.

AlC John L. Levitow

An AC-47 at Nha Trang Air Base displays the three

Gatling type machine guns which make up its armament. The AC-47s were the first gunships and were

called a variety of nicknames—Puff, Spooky, and

Dragon ship were among the most popular.
82

General Brown was born in Montclair, New

Jersey, on 17 August 1918. He graduated

from high school in Leavenworth, Kansas,

and after attending the University of Missouri for a

year, he received a congressional appointment to the

US Military Academy, West Point, New York, in

1937. He graduated from the Academy in 1941, and

entered flying training at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. He

received his pilot wings at Kelly Field, Texas, in

1942. 

In August 1942, he flew with the 93d

Bombardment Group to England, the first B-24

group to join the Eighth Air Force. Until April 1944,

he served in various positions with the group, including commander of the 329th Bombardment

Squadron, group operations, and then executive officer. It was as executive officer that he took part in the

famous low-level bombing raid against oil refineries

at Ploesti, Romania, on 1 August 1943. The 93d

Group was the second of five B-24 groups that

raided Ploesti from a temporary base at Bengasi,

Libya. The 93d Group, led by its commander, flew

directly into heavy defenses to hit three of the six target refineries. The lead plane and 10 others were

shot down or crashed on the target. General Brown,

then a major, took over the lead of the battered 93d

and led it back to Bengasi. He received the

Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on that

mission. 

During the Korean War in May 1952, he joined

Fifth Air Force Headquarters at Seoul, Korea, as

director for Operations. He served as the assistant to

the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington,

D.C., from August 1966 to August 1968. He then

assumed command of the Seventh Air Force and also

became deputy commander for Air Operations, US

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). In

his MACV position, he advised on all matters pertaining to tactical air support and coordinated the

Republic of Vietnam and United States air operations in the MACV area of responsibility. In

September 1970, General Brown assumed duty as

commander, Air Force Systems Command, Andrews

AFB, Maryland.

General Brown was appointed by the president to

be Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, effective 1

August 1973, and to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Department of Defense, effective 1 July

1974. General Brown retired 21 June 1978, and

passed away 5 December 1978.

Gen George S. Brown

• As executive officer of the 93d Bomb Group, he took part in

the famous low-level bombing raid against oil refineries at

Ploesti, Romania, on 1 August 1943. 

• In 1957 he served as executive to the Air Force Chief of Staff,

Gen Thomas White. 

• In June 1959 he was selected to be Military Assistant to the

Deputy Secretary of Defense, and later was Military

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

• As Seventh Air Force Commander in 1969, he was responsible for all Air Force combat air strike, air support, and air

defense operations in Southeast Asia.
83

On 28 August 1972 Capt Richard S. “Steve”

Ritchie became the first USAF ace of the

Vietnam War, downing his fifth MiG-21.

Ritchie was a pilot attached to the 432d Tactical

Reconnaissance Wing flying F-4 Phantoms. His fifth

aerial victory came 30 miles west of Hanoi while he

and his Weapon Systems Operator, Capt Chuck

DeBellevue, were flying MiG Combat Air Patrol.

After receiving information that “bandits” were

threatening an F-4 strike force, Captain DeBellevue

picked the MiGs up on radar. The MiGs were four

thousand feet higher than Ritchie’s F-4 requiring a

quick climb and a hard turn to meet the bandits head

on. Ritchie fired two missiles but the MiG-21 was

able to evade them. After countering the MiG’s evasion “jinks,” Ritchie fired two more air-to-air missiles. The MiG went into a thin overcast and when he

came out, one of the missiles went by his left. Seeing

the missile, he immediately broke to the right causing the second missile to impact and completely

destroy the MiG. Ritchie’s fifth kill broke the

Vietnam record of four MiG kills set by Col Robin

Olds in 1967.

Capt Richard S. “Steve” Ritchie

The MiG-21 was a light refined aircraft with Mach 2 capability.

The proficiency of US aircrews mitigated the superior characteristics of the MiG-21 during the Vietnam War. Between 26 April

1965 and 8 January 1973, USAF F-4s and B-52s downed 68

MiG-21s.
84

General Jones was born in Aberdeen, South

Dakota. He graduated from high school in

Minot, North Dakota, in 1939 and attended

the University of North Dakota and Minot State

College until the outbreak of World War II. He

entered the Army Air Corps, beginning aviation

cadet training in April 1942, and receiving his commission and pilot wings in February 1943. 

In combat, General Jones was assigned to a bombardment squadron during the Korean War and

accumulated more than three hundred hours on missions over North Korea. In 1969, he served in the

Republic of Vietnam as deputy commander for

Operations and then as vice commander of the

Seventh Air Force. 

General Jones’ assignments included operational

and command positions in strategic, tactical, and

training units, as well as service in staff positions with

major headquarters in the United States and overseas. He served as inspector, operator, planner, and

Commander in Chief of United States Air Forces in

Europe. Concurrent with duty as Commander in

Chief USAFE, General Jones was commander of the

Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force and led the way

toward establishing the integrated air headquarters

in NATO’s Central Region, Allied Air Forces,

Central Europe. 

General Jones served four years as Chief of Staff of

the US Air Force, responsible for administering,

training, and equipping a worldwide organization of

men and women employing the world’s most

advanced defense systems. Concurrently, he was a

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Jones was appointed Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, on 21

June 1978. 

Gen David C. Jones

• In combat, he was assigned to a bombardment squadron during

the Korean War and accumulated more than three hundred hours

on missions over North Korea. 

• In 1969 he served in the Republic of Vietnam as deputy commander for Operations and then as vice commander of the

Seventh Air Force. 

• After serving four years as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General

Jones was appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21

June 1978. 

• After retirement from the Air Force, he served on the board of

directors for General Electric.
85

Robin Olds was born on 14 July 1922, in

Honolulu, Hawaii, the son of an Army Air

Corps major general. He graduated from the

US Military Academy at West Point and commissioned as second lieutenant in June of 1943. While at

West Point, he was honored for his football skills by

being named as an All-American tackle in 1942.

He began his combat flying in a P-38 Lightning

named Scat I during World War II and finished

World War II flying Scat VII, a P-51 Mustang.

During World War II, he flew 107 combat missions

and was credited with 12 aerial victories and destroying 11 and one-half aircraft on the ground.

In February 1946, Olds started flying P-80 jets at

March Field in the first squadron equipped with this

jet. In 1948, he went to England as a Royal Air Force

exchange pilot and flew the Gloster Meteor jet

fighter in the No. 1 Fighter Squadron at RAF

Tangmere.

Olds’s most notable accomplishments occurred

when he assumed duties as commander of the 8th

Tactical Fighter Wing at Ubon Royal Thai Air Force

Base, Thailand, in September 1966. While commanding this unit, he shot down two MiG-17s and

two MiG-21s. Olds, the aircraft commander, and Lt

Stephan B. Croker, the backseat pilot, scored two of

those victories in a single day, 20 May 1967. Olds

was a beloved leader who spent many hours talking

to his junior officers constantly trying to improve his

skills as well as theirs. On one such occasion, a junior

officer recommended swapping an F-4’s electronic

countermeasure pods with an F-105’s. The false signal would entice MiGs to engage the F-4’s thinking

they were engaging the slower, less agile F-105. Olds

liked the idea and managed to cut through the red

tape and employ the tactic. The resultant operation,

code named Bolo, was a great success.

From Vietnam, Olds returned to the United

States to serve as commandant of Cadets at the Air

Force Academy. He

retired from active duty

in June of 1973. His

decorations include: the

Air Force Cross, Distinguished Service Medal,

four Silver Stars, Legion

of Merit, six Distinguished Flying Crosses,

and 40 Air Medals. One

of the truly legendary

“stick and rudder” men

of the Air Force.

Brig Gen Robin Olds

• Credited with 12 aerial victories in

World War II and four in Vietnam making

him a triple ace. 

• Wingman on the first jet acrobatic team

in the Air Force.

• Won second place in the Thompson

Trophy Race (Jet Division) at Cleveland

in 1946. 

• Participated in the first one-day, dawnto-dusk, transcontinental roundtrip

flight in June 1946 from March Field,

California, to Washington, D.C.

Olds married film star Ella

Raines.
86

Harry C. “Heinie” Aderholt was born in

1920 and joined the US Army Air Forces

through the aviation cadet program in

1942. Commissioned out of pilot training in 1943,

he served in North Africa and Italy as a B-17 and C47 pilot until the end of the war. 

During the Korean War General Aderholt began

his long career in special operations by commanding

a Special Air Warfare Detachment that parachuted

Korean spies behind communist lines. Back in the

United States he helped the Central Intelligence

Agency with air operations, equipment, and training,

before beginning his long series of assignments alternating between Asia and the US Air Force Special Air

Warfare Center (predecessor of US Air Force Special

Operations Command) in Florida. 

In the early 1960s General Aderholt commanded

the air operations supplying and assisting the

Khamba tribesman during their guerrilla war against

China in Tibet. He also developed the system of

small airstrips in Laos (called Lima sites) that supported special operations and combat search and rescue operations in Laos and North Vietnam. In 1966

General Aderholt established the Joint Personnel

Recovery Center in Saigon and then took command

of the newly activated 56th Air Commando Wing in

Thailand conducting devastating low-level night

interdiction missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail

with old prop-driven aircraft. Later he served as chief

of the Air Force Advisory Group in Thailand.

During his US tours, General Aderholt commanded the 1st Air Commando Wing and was

instrumental in developing the Special Operations

capabilities of the US Air Force. After retiring in

1972, he was called back to active duty in 1975 to

command US Military Assistance Command in

Thailand during the desperate fighting that brought

the communists to power in Cambodia and Vietnam.

In Thailand General Aderholt helped manage the

evacuation of US personnel, employees, and allies,

and ensured that US-Thai relations remained strong

after Thailand’s neighbors fell to the communists.

Brig Gen Harry C. “Heinie” Aderholt

• Instrumental in developing Special Operations

capabilities in USAF. 

• Parachuted Korean spies behind communist lines in

Korean War.

• Commanded airlift operations supporting Khamba

revolt against China. 

• Established system of Lima Sites in Laos.

• Commanded night, low-altitude, B-26 raids on Ho

Chi Minh Trail.
Rebuilding the Air Force

and the Gulf War

1976–91
89

On 14 April 1986 the United States

launched an air attack, El Dorado

Canyon, against targets in Libya.

President Ronald W. Reagan declared the attack

a reprisal for the Libyan role in the 5 April

bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that

killed US citizens. More than six hours before

the attack, 24 F-111s took off from Lakenheath

Air Base, Great Britain, escorted by 28 tankers

and five EF-111 Ravens from Upper Heyford,

England. The group represented the largest aircombat group assembled over England since

World War II. The planes merged well away

from land over the English Channel and began

their twenty-eight hundred mile journey to

Libya. Because the French and Spanish governments denied overflight privileges, the strike

group was forced to fly a circuitous route

around the Iberian Peninsula. Five hours after

the F-111s took off, A-6 bombers and F-14s

were launched from the carriers USS America

and USS Coral Sea.

H hour was established as 7:00 P.M. eastern

standard time. Ten minutes before H hour,

Libyan radar operators reported confusing blips

on their screens; the electronic countermeasures

were already masking the attack. Minutes before

the bomb runs began, missile attacks were

launched against Libyan antiaircraft defenses.

These proved to be effective. No MiG interceptors were ever launched and many sites turned

off their electronic sensors to avoid being targeted by radar-guided high-speed antiradiation

missiles. However, the Libyans did manage to

put up some intense ground fire over Benghazi,

including surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft

guns of all types. 

Under the cover of darkness, 18 F-111

fighter-bombers roared across the coast of Libya

at more than 500 MPH and only two hundred

feet above the ground. They lined themselves up

with an electronic beacon from a US base on

Italy’s Lampedusa Island. The American aircraft

slipped in behind Libyan radar coming from the

west and south to destroy the military side of the

Tripoli International Airport, a naval facility, and

Mu`ammar Gadhafi’s barracks. Over Tripoli, the

F-111s faced Soviet-made ZSU-23 four-barreled

guns clustered around the Aziziya barracks. One

F-111 was badly damaged by these guns. Capt

Paul Lorence and Capt Fernando RibasDominicci, weapon systems operator, tried to

get the plane out to sea before ejecting. As they

crossed the coast, however, their plane exploded

killing both airmen. With the bomb run complete, the F-111s required eight more hours and

two more in-flight refuelings in order to return

to Lakenheath. The 15-hour mission was

exhausting; some men had to be lifted out of

their seats upon their arrival in Britain. 

The operation achieved the objective of hitting terrorist infrastructure targets in Libya.

Even with much publicity about mission shortcomings, the overall impact was one of success.

At the Benina airfield, four MiG-23s, two Soviet

helos, and two prop planes were destroyed. At

the Tripoli International Airport, five Il-76s and

several buildings were destroyed. The Sidi Bilal

naval base, as well as military barracks in

Benghazi and Tripoli were damaged. The

United States was able to achieve total surprise,

evidenced by lack of air raid alarms being

sounded and street lights illuminating the targets. The complex operation involved 150 aircraft and resulted in the dropping of 60 tons of

bombs. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Adm William Crowe, declared the operation “very successful” and made the world

smaller for the terrorists.

El Dorado Canyon (14–15 April 1986)

The EF-111 Raven was used to jam Libyan search radar

and provide electronic countermeasures against any surface-to-air threats.
90

By 1989 the administration of President

George W. Bush decided that the

Panamanian dictator Manual Noriega

had to be ousted from power because of his

involvement in the narcotics trade and his developing rapprochement with communist Cuba.

After the failure of various political initiatives,

Bush decided upon the use of force. The result

was Operation Just Cause, which began on the

night of 19 December 1989.

The Air Force played a central role in Just

Cause. No component was more deeply

involved than the Military Airlift Command

(MAC). In the weeks before the invasion, MAC

helped to pre-position troops and equipment

for Just Cause by ferrying them to Howard Air

Force Base, Panama. The plans for Just Cause

also sought tactical surprise through airborne

assaults by units flown directly from the United

States. MAC managed to airlift three companies

of the 75th Ranger Regiment and one brigade

of the 82d Airborne Division for an assault on

Torrijos-Tocumen Airport near Panama City.

Forty-five hundred paratroopers dropped in the

dead of the night, the largest airborne assault

since World War II. MAC transports also

brought five companies of the Army’s 75th

Rangers from Lawson Army Air Field, Georgia,

to Rio Hato, Panama, where the rangers were to

engage and destroy the 6th and 7th Companies

of the Panamanian Defense Forces—both mainstays of Noriega’s misrule. In all, MAC

employed 86 aircraft—63 C-141, 21 C-130s,

and 2 C-5s. Strategic Air Command (SAC) also

provided RC-135s and U-2s which patrolled

between the Yucatan Peninsula and Cuba to

determine if the Cubans had provided Noriega

with advance warning. They had not.

Apparently the transports successfully avoided

Cuban radar by descending to low altitude as

they passed by Cuba.

By the time the transports reached their

objectives in the early hours of 20 December,

fighting had already begun. A task force from

the 193d Infantry Brigade was driving from the

Panama Canal Zone toward the headquarters of

Panamanian Defense Forces. Two AC-130 gunships opened the attack on the headquarters.

Their weapons, however, could not penetrate

the concrete floors of the building, which permitted defenders to sally out to engage the

approaching infantry task force. In the resulting

firefight, the neighborhood of El Chorillo

caught fire, killing several hundred civilians.

Two F-117s also attacked Rio Hato, dropping

bombs near military barracks. Alerted by explosions, the Panamanians quickly brought the

parachuting Rangers under fire. It took two

AC-130s to suppress the defenders with automatic weapons, certainly preventing a disaster.

At Rio Hato—and elsewhere in Panama—the

AC-130 showed itself a superb instrument for

providing highly accurate fire support for

ground forces, as well as night surveillance and

navigation assistance.

During the invasion, Noriega fled to the residence of the Vatican’s ambassador, where he

surrendered on 3 January 1990. Fighting had

effectively ended by Christmas day, though Just

Cause did not officially end until 4 February

1990. A few figures convey the scale of the

operation: the Air Force flew 40,000 passengers

to and from Panama and delivered nearly

21,000 tons of cargo. There were no accidents,

and no airman lost his life. Just Cause, while not

unmarred by errors, was on the whole a highly

successful limited operation in support of political objectives.

Operation Just Cause (December 1989)

The AC-130 Spectre gunship.
91

The first phase of Desert Storm was the

strategic air campaign, initially code

named Instant Thunder. Gen Buster

Glosson reworked the plan developed by Col

John Warden and the Pentagon Checkmate staff

so that it addressed Iraqi forces in Kuwait as well

as command structures. Strategic attacks on Iraq

focused on three “centers of gravity”: Iraqi

National Command Authority; chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; and the

Republican Guard Forces Command.

Air superiority was the first priority of coalition forces and was achieved in the first days of

the campaign. The Gulf War was the first conflict in history in which a large percentage of the

air-to-air engagements that produced kills

involved “beyond visual range” shots. Coalition

counterair operations were so effective that the

Iraqi air force lost more than 400 combat aircraft while only one coalition plane was shot

down by an Iraqi plane.

Coalition destruction of Iraqi ground-based

air defenses was equally as overwhelming. The

best measure of its effectiveness was the relative

immunity with which coalition aircraft operated

over Iraq. During the first four days of Desert

Storm, radar SAMs downed or damaged nine

coalition fixed-wing aircraft. For the remainder

of the campaign, radar SAMs hit only four more

coalition aircraft in spite of the fact that coalition air forces maintained a daily average of over

1,600 “shooter” sorties and another 540 combat-support sorties.

Precision strikes in the first two nights

focused on the Iraqi leadership and its command, control and communications (C3).

Because of the heavy defenses, physical hardness, small size and urban location of these targets, the F-117/GBU-27 combination was the

primary attack weapon systems. There were over

70 strikes carried out on 17–18 January against

leadership and C3 targets by F-117s, tactical

land attack missiles, conventional air launched

cruise missiles, and F-111Fs. Hits from 2,000

pound bombs within feet of desired aiming

points on government ministries, national command and control facilities, headquarters and

communications centers destroyed or severely

disrupted Iraqi C3. The breakdown in Iraqi C3

was so complete that at the cease-fire meetings

that ended the war, coalition commanders had to

tell the Iraqi generals where the Iraqi troops were.

Coalition airpower was overwhelming in

both numbers and in quality. Coalition fighters,

attack aircraft, and airlift were superior and in

conjunction with coalition aerial refueling,

reconnaissance, electronic warfare and airborne

command and control capabilities, they gave the

coalition air dominance from the early days of

the campaign.

Strategic Attack on Iraq (January 1991)

The 38-day strategic air campaign

was so effective that the ground

campaign took only 100 hours

The F-117 Nighthawk was spectacularly successful against even

the toughest targets.

Initial air attacks of Instant Thunder.
92

On 17 January 1991 coalition airpower

started offensive actions against military

targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Planning

depended upon the air campaign to attrit Iraqi

forces, prevent them from detecting coalition

redeployments to the west, and to lock Iraqi

forces in place.

Indeed, Iraqi forces were well prepared for a

frontal ground assault against their positions in

Kuwait. During months of preparation, miles of

fortified positions, obstacles, minefields, and fire

trenches were constructed just north of the

Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Saddam Hussein was

convinced that bloody ground action would be

the ultimate determining factor. During an

interview, he declared that the United States

relied on its Air Force, but that air forces have

never been decisive in war.

Neither the Iraqis, nor the world in general,

expected independent air operations past the

first week. Indeed, classical theory and exercise

practice only allotted five to seven days for independent air actions in combined arms operations. The secretary of defense and chairman of

the Joint Chiefs stated on 23 January that air

supremacy had been achieved and there was “no

hurry” to stop pounding the Iraqi forces. 

By the second week, Iraqi commanders realized their much touted air defense system was

not exacting the toll they had counted on. They

further realized air action was steadily destroying their forces and the means of support and

sustainment, as well as the means of command

and control. They were facing a “use it or lose

it” situation and needed to recapture the initiative. 

Saddam started ground actions on the night

of 29 January to spur the coalition into the

bloody ground war of attrition he desperately

needed for either military or political victory.

The Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division units

attacked across the Saudi-Kuwaiti border at

three locations. Their 1st Mechanized Division

was to conduct screening operations to the west

and their 3d Armor Division was to exploit any

breakthroughs. Many other Iraqi units also had

supporting roles and were prepared to “grind

down” any subsequent coalition ground penetrations into Kuwait.

Two prongs of the attack were stopped by US

Marine Corps units with close air support. One

Iraqi battalion did make it into the town of

Khafji that had been evacuated because it was

within range of Iraqi artillery in Kuwait. The

joint surveillance, target attack radar system pinpointed the movements of Iraqi follow-on reinforcements for airpower strikes. With airpower

halting the majority of Iraqi forces in Kuwait,

the Saudis reclaimed the town of Khafji on 31

January.

While combat activity in the town was not

extensive, movement of the reinforcing divisions, stopped by airpower, was substantial. The

Joint Force Commander’s refusal to take

Saddam’s bait and the predominant use of airpower allowed redeployments and preparations

for the “Hail Mary” to continue without interruption. The impact on the Iraqis was even

more momentous as they attempted no other

offensive. Indeed, subsequent activity to dig

deeper, disperse, use more deception, move frequently, and use smaller convoys demonstrated

renewed efforts to simply survive continuing

joint air attacks.

The Battle of Khafji (1991)

Destroyed Iraqi armored columns.
93

J

ohn Warden had a full operational career including 266 combat missions in Vietnam as Forward

Air Control pilot flying OV-10s and flying and

command assignments in F-4 and F-15C units culminating in command of a F-15C Fighter Wing. He is

best known, however, as one of the leading airpower

theorists of the late twentieth-century and as the

guiding light behind the Gulf War air campaign.

Colonel Warden’s extensive writings contain

many original, provocative, and influential ideas and

he continues to be a prolific author and speaker. One

of his simplest and most influential ideas is that the

enemy (whether a nation or a drug cartel) can be

thought of as a system consisting of five concentric

rings: leadership, system essentials, infrastructure,

population, and fielded military forces. The most

important ring, leadership, is at the center and

fielded military forces are on the outside protecting

all the others (see figure). Airpower is uniquely capable of attacking any of these rings and is most effective when used against the most important inner

rings rather than the less important outer rings.

Attacking the inner rings and then working outward

is sometimes called “inside-out” warfare. This idea

was at the core of the air plan Warden and his subordinates on the Air Staff drafted for the Gulf War. The

plan as ultimately executed was enormously successful in paralyzing the Iraqi leadership and infrastructure before moving on to cripple the Iraqi ground

forces which were finished off by the ground invasion.

Col John W. Warden, III

• Author of The Air War.

• Created the “Five Rings” model of enemy systems and

“Inside-out” warfare.

• Developed the original draft for the “Instant Thunder” plan

for the air campaign in the Gulf War.

• Reinvigorated the Air Command and Staff College and

Airpower Theory throughout the Air Force.

The Warden “Five Ring” Model of the Enemy.

FIELDED MILITARY FORCES

POPULATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

SYSTEM ESSENTIALS

LEADERSHIP
94

Gen Charles Horner received his Air Force

commission in 1958 from the Reserve Office

Training Corps (ROTC) program at the

University of Iowa. During the Vietnam War he flew

41 combat missions over North Vietnam in F-105

fighters and an additional 71 combat missions in F105 Wild Weasel aircraft, hunting down North

Vietnamese air defenses. During his distinguished

operational career he commanded a tactical training

wing, a fighter wing, two air divisions, a numbered

Air Force, and served as commander in chief of the

North American Aerospace Defense Command and

US Space Command. He is best known for his five

years as commander of 9th US Air Force and US

Central Command Air Forces (1987–92) and particularly his command of air operations during the Gulf

War (1991). 

During the Gulf War General Horner served as

joint force air component commander (JFACC)

commanding all coalition air operations. In this

capacity he managed the enormously complicated air

portion of Operation Desert Storm, employing more

than 2,600 aircraft from 11 countries. General

Horner’s leadership helped produce one of the most

rapid and devastating air campaigns in military history. This campaign not only wiped out the Iraqi air

force and air defenses but also destroyed some of the

Iraqi infrastructure for building chemical, biological,

and nuclear weapons, and large parts of the Iraqi

army. The campaign disrupted Iraqi command and

control so effectively that at the surrender negotiations, the US representatives had to tell the Iraqi

generals where the Iraqi troops were. Most impressively, Horner accomplished all this in just over 40

days at a cost of only 42 coalition aircraft against very

powerful and experienced Iraqi forces.

After his retirement in 1994, General Horner has

lectured, consulted, and written extensively on

defense matters including a book on the Gulf War,

Every Man a Tiger, which he coauthored with Tom

Clancy.

Gen Charles A. Horner

• As JFACC for Operation Desert Shield/Storm he commanded all air operations in the Gulf War.

• Flew 112 F-105 combat missions over North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
95

Merrill McPeak was commissioned in 1957

from the ROTC program at San Diego

State College. He was a demonstration

pilot in the US Air Force Air Demonstration

Squadron (Thunderbirds) for two years before going

to Vietnam where he fought as an attack pilot and a

forward air controller. He went on to command a

wing, a numbered Air Force, and Pacific Air Force

before being named Chief of Staff of the US Air

Force in late 1990.

Appointed unexpectedly on the eve of the Gulf

War, General McPeak immediately guided the Air

Force through Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm, the largest airlift and largest air war in

decades. 

After the triumph of the Gulf War, General

McPeak became perhaps the most controversial

Chief of Staff in Air Force history. He pushed the Air

Force through the most extensive reorganizations it

had ever experienced. The most visible change was

that he scrapped the old three-part Air Force structure of Tactical Air Command (TAC), Strategic Air

Command (SAC), and Military Airlift Command

(MAC). The new Air Force organization fit better

with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization

Act and was the critical first step in reshaping the Air

Force to meet the needs of the post–Cold War era.

He was also a leading advocate for the Composite

Wing concept that combined several different aircraft

types in a single air wing.

Not everyone welcomed the changes General

McPeak made in the Air Force, but he was not

deterred by criticism or opposition from following

the path he felt was best for the service. Oddly

enough, he received more vociferous criticism for his

ill-fated efforts to change Air Force uniforms than

for the enormous changes he made in the way we do

business.

Gen Merrill A. McPeak

• Radically reorganized the USAF to meet new post-Cold

War challenges.

• USAF Chief of Staff during the Gulf War.

• Leading advocate of the “Composite Wing.”
Post-Cold War

1992–2000
99

The Gulf War drove Saddam Hussein’s

forces out of Kuwait and weakened him

dramatically and this prompted rebellions in March 1991 by ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiite religious group in southern Iraq. The rebels, however, were not well

equipped and the international community did

not support their efforts to break away from

Iraq because that would have further destabilized the already unstable Middle East. Without

international military support the rebels were

too weak to face the Iraqi army and they were

soon defeated.

The defeat of the Kurdish forces in the north

created a massive refugee problem as more than

a million Kurds fled their homes to escape violent reprisals by the Iraqi army. The United

States and the United Nations responded to this

humanitarian crisis with Operation Provide

Comfort in April 1991. In order to stabilize the

situation, US and coalition forces launched an

airlift to deliver relief supplies and used ground

forces to establish a ground security zone in

northern Iraq and refugee camps in northern

Iraq and southern Turkey to facilitate distribution of supplies. What made these efforts possible was coalition air supremacy. 

The ground security zone (where no Iraqi

troops were allowed) and the “no-fly” zone

(where no Iraqi aircraft were allowed) made it

safe for the Kurds to return to their homes and

by the end of May almost all of the refugees had

returned and by mid-July the coalition ground

forces had withdrawn from Iraq. The United

States has continued to maintain the no-fly zone

ever since and in recognition of the end of the

transition from a humanitarian mission to one

of monitoring Iraqi airspace, Operation Provide

Comfort was replaced by Operation Northern

Watch at the beginning of 1997.

Shortly after the Gulf War, the Iraqi army put

down a rebellion by Shiite Moslems in southern

Iraq and the repression there was so severe that

the United Nations adopted a resolution to protect them from Iraqi air attack. In August 1992

the United States announced a no-fly zone over

southern Iraq. Maintenance of the southern nofly zone has been the task of Operation

Southern Watch ever since. In October 1994, in

response to Iraqi troop movements that threatened another invasion of Kuwait, the United

States declared the southern no-fly zone a nofly/no-drive zone. In 1996, in response to

renewed Iraqi attacks on the Kurds, the United

States expanded the southern no-fly zone and

launched extensive attacks (Operation Desert

Strike) to destroy Iraqi air defenses in the new

patrol areas.

Since the completion of the airlift and

humanitarian relief phases of Operation Provide

Comfort, US and coalition efforts have focused

on continuous intelligence gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance over Iraq. These

efforts have put a heavy strain on E-3, RC-135,

and other surveillance aircraft and units but

have also produced some dramatic successes. In

counterair operations the most notable victories

were the downing of an Iraqi MiG-25 in

December of 1992 by a US F-16 assigned to

Southern Watch and the downing of an Iraqi

Policing Postwar Iraq (1992–?)
100

MiG-29 in January 1993 by a US F-16 assigned

to Provide Comfort. 

The most dramatic impact of operations has

been in strategic attack. When the Iraqi’s continued to block UN inspectors trying to dismantle Iraq’s missile and weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) programs, the United

States and United Kingdom launched a fournight series of attacks against roughly 100

strategic military targets in Iraq. These attacks

in December 1998 (Operation Desert Fox)

struck Iraq’s military through destruction of air

defense, command and control facilities, and air

bases. Oil facilities used by Iraq to evade UN

economic sanctions were also attacked. Most

importantly, though the Iraqis could keep

inspectors out of their missile and WMD sites,

they could not defend the sites from air and missile attacks, so Desert Fox shut them down. In

addition to F-15, F-16, F-117, A-10, and B-52,

the strike missions during Desert Fox witnessed

the combat debut of the B-1B. 

Though the Iraqis have not shot down any

coalition aircraft during our operations against

Iraq after the Gulf War, these missions have not

been cost-free. Two tragedies (the accidental

shoot-down of two US Army helicopters over

northern Iraq by USAF fighters and the death

of 19 US airmen in a terrorist attack in Saudi

Arabia) have reminded us of the difficulties and

dangers of these operations. Both of these

events have led to improvements in US operations to prevent a repetition. The demands of

10 years of operations against Iraq and the end

of the Cold War have led to a major reorganization of the US Air Force into Aerospace

Expeditionary Forces.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, then Air Force

Chief of Staff, summed up our postwar operations over Iraq nicely when he said that “What

we have effectively done since 1992 is conduct

an air occupation of a country.”

The B-1B bomber made its combat debut against Iraq in December 1999 as part of Operation Desert Fox.
101

Two years of civil war tore apart Somalia in

the early 1990s and contributed to a

famine that killed about one-third of a

million people in 1992 and drove three-fourths

of a million refugees out of the country. A shaky

cease-fire went into effect in March 1992,

United Nations troops from Pakistan arrived in

July, and the United States launched Operation

Provide Relief in August. By late December,

USAF C-141s and C-130s had delivered over

19,000 tons of food to starving Somalis.

Unfortunately, armed Somali groups were

intimidating relief workers and stealing the food

supplies. They even shelled cargo ships delivering supplies, and C-130s were hit by ground

fire. Additional UN troops were airlifted in, but

when the situation did not improve, the United

States launched Operation Restore Hope in

December 1992.

Operation Restore Hope deployed overwhelming ground forces from 23 countries into

Somalia and secured the ports, airfields, and

lines of communication necessary to conduct

effective relief operations. In addition, Marine

and Navy forces came in by sea, and the Restore

Hope airlift brought more than 32,000 troops

and 32,000 tons of supplies into Somalia. This

massive operation required more than 1,100

aerial refueling sorties by KC-135 aircraft.

Operation Provide Relief ended in February

1993 and Restore Hope ended in May with the

turnover of relief operations to the United

Nations and the redeployment of the vast

majority of the 25,000 US troops that had been

brought into Somalia.

Unfortunately, the UN’s efforts to build a

stable government in Somalia soon brought it

into conflict with a Somali warlord

(Mohammed Farah Aidid) who felt he was not

getting as much power as he deserved. In June,

Aidid’s forces ambushed and wiped out a

Pakistani convoy and from then on the UN was

in open conflict with Aidid. US Air Force and

joint special operations units were sent to try to

capture Aidid but his supporters kept him hidden. The US forces conducted raids to capture

his closest subordinates, as a means of increasing

pressure on Aidid. On 3 October 1993 US

forces conducted a successful raid deep into

Aidid’s stronghold and captured some of his key

supporters, but the Somalis managed to shoot

down one of the US Army helicopters. The

ensuing combat search and rescue effort turned

into a major pitched battle in the streets of

Mogadishu. When the battle ended the next

day, 19 US troops and hundreds of Somalis

were dead. The United States immediately

launched Operation Restore Hope II which airlifted US combat forces back into Mogadishu

(including 18 M-1 tanks and 44 Bradley fighting vehicles) and returned AC-130s to bases in

Kenya from which they could attack targets in

Somalia. These 8,000 mile one-way flights

directly from Georgia to Mogadishu were

another airlift triumph, but the willingness of

thousands of Somalis to die for Aidid indicated

that the UN’s plan to leave him out of the

future government was doomed and the last US

troops left in March 1994.

Operations in Somalia (1992–94)

An AFSOC MH-53 Pave Low delivers relief supplies to a remote

part of Somalia.
102

S

erbs were the largest ethnic group within

Yugoslavia and had most of the political

power, but this caused only limited friction

within the country until 1990 when the collapse

of the Soviet Union ended the threat of foreign

invasion and the communist party began to lose

control of the country. Without communism

and foreign threats, ethnic and religious loyalties became the strongest bonds among the people, and the various republics within Yugoslavia

began to break away and declare independence.

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in

1991 and Bosnia did so in 1992. The Serbdominated government of Yugoslavia, under

Slobodan Milosevic, opposed the independence

of the former Yugoslav republics as did the

Serbian minority in the break-away republics. 

With Milosevic’s support, the heavily armed

Serb minority in Bosnia began a campaign of

murder, rape, and arson that became known as

“ethnic cleansing.” The purpose of this campaign was to terrorize the Bosnian Croats and

Muslims into fleeing large parts of Bosnia that

the Serbs would then occupy and separate from

Bosnia. The ethnic cleansing campaign killed

thousands and left millions homeless. The

United States began to airlift humanitarian supplies into Bosnia in July 1992 as part of the UN

airlift. The US operation was named Provide

Promise and continued until January 1996. The

core of the airlift operations were deliveries of

aid to Sarajevo, the besieged capital of Bosnia,

where nearly 400,000 people depended on

Provide Promise for three and one-half years.

During that time aircraft from the United States

and 20 other nations flew nearly 13,000 sorties,

delivered more than 160,000 tons of food,

medicines and supplies, and evacuated 1,300

wounded Bosnians. In addition to being the

longest humanitarian airlift operation in USAF

history, Provide Promise was one of the most

hazardous. Ten US aircraft were hit by hostile

ground fire and an Italian aircraft was shot

down with the loss of all four crewmen. 

Sarajevo was not the only besieged Bosnian

city in danger of being ethnically cleansed.

Several other cities were surrounded by hostile

Serbs who periodically cut off ground contact

with the outside world. US aircraft had to airdrop supplies into these smaller cities that did

not have airports. The danger of Serbian ground

fire was so severe that some of these loads had

to be dropped from altitudes over 10,000 feet

and numerous innovations were required to

enable even GPS-equipped C-130s to successfully complete more than 2,200 airdrop sorties.

While C-130s were the backbone of the Provide

Promise airlift, USAF C-141s, huge C-5s, and

new C-17s also participated.

The United States and the UN were not content to merely relieve the suffering, they also

took positive steps to try to stop the fighting

and punish the aggressors. With this in mind,

the UN Security Council authorized NATO to

enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia. This enforcement operation (Deny Flight) began in April

1993. For example, in February 1994, Capt

Robert L. Wright (an F-16 pilot with the 512th

Fighter Squadron) shot down three Serbian jets

in a single day. Unfortunately, the politics of

enforcing the UN resolutions became very complicated because UN peacekeepers were

deployed in Bosnia to monitor one of the early

Operations Provide Promise and

Deny Flight: Bosnia (1992–96)

C-130s, like this one being deiced before a mission in the

Balkans, were the backbone of Operation Provide Promise.
103

cease-fires. These forces were scattered

throughout the country in small, lightly armed

groups ideal for monitoring a cease-fire but

unable to defend themselves effectively from

Serb attacks. Whenever US and NATO airstrikes

began to hurt them, the Serbs simply took

peacekeepers hostage and forced a halt to the

bombing. 

By the summer of 1995 NATO had run out

of patience with the Serbs and a mortar attack

on the Sarajevo marketplace was the last straw.

In July and August the peacekeeping forces on

the ground were reinforced and consolidated so

that they could defend themselves against Serb

attacks. On 30 August, NATO air forces (under

the command of Lt Gen Michael Ryan) began

an aggressive strategic attack and counterland

campaign called Operation Deliberate Force

that made full use of precision guided munitions. At the same time, Muslim and Croat

ground forces launched a major ground offensive against the Serbs. The Serbs quickly capitulated, so attacks stopped on 14 September. The

operation officially ended on 21 September.

Peace talks in November at Wright-Patterson

AFB, Ohio, produced the agreement that ended

the long war in Bosnia, and Operation Deny

Flight ended in December with Operation

Provide Promise ending the next month, in

January 1996.

US airpower was not the only thing that

finally brought a just peace to Bosnia but it was

decisive and essential to feeding the hungry,

protecting the innocent, and punishing the

aggressors. 

NATO counterair operations drove Serbian aircraft from the sky during Operation Deny Flight and strategic attack and counterland

strikes during Operation Deliberate Force drove the Serbs to sign the peace treaty that ended the war in Bosnia.
104

I

n December 1990, a leftist priest named

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President

of Haiti by a landslide. He took office in

February 1991 but was removed by a military

coup in September. The United States, the

Organization of American States, and the

United Nations all opposed this assault on

democracy and instituted diplomatic and economic sanctions. The vast majority of Haitians

still supported Aristide and the new government

could only stay in power through massive

repression. 

As the Haitian economy collapsed, the country was wracked by violence and a growing

number of Haitians tried to flee the 700 miles to

the United States in small boats. Vigorous

diplomatic efforts, including an agreement

between President Aristide and the military government in mid-1993, failed to resolve the crisis. Finally in September 1994 the US launched

Operation Uphold Democracy. 

US Atlantic Command had prepared two

plans for the operation. If the Haitian military

resisted, an airborne assault (like Operation Just

Cause in Panama in 1989) would forcibly

remove the current government and take over

the country before handing it over to Aristide,

the elected president. If the Haitian military

capitulated, the United States would conduct an

unopposed occupation of Haiti to facilitate a

peaceful transition of power. The US Air Force

had already launched the first two waves of aircraft (a total of 60 C-130s) loaded with US

Army Airborne troops and equipment rigged

for airdrop when the military government

agreed to step down. The military government

seemed to have realized, either through news

reports or some other means, that the US had

launched an invasion force and was suddenly

anxious to back down before the fighting

started.

The sudden capitulation of the illegal Haitian

government demonstrates that an aggressive

military plan, well resourced, and vigorously

executed, can intimidate an adversary into capitulation even before the first shot is fired. The

quick capitulation prevented a good deal of

bloodshed but enormously complicated the execution of Uphold Democracy because the airlift

had to switch from the invasion plan to the permissive-entry plan in midstream. When the US

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) got word that the

Haitian military had agreed to step down, they

ordered the aircraft already on their way to Haiti

to turn around and return to base, a 24-hour

pause in the movement to Haiti; and ordered

the execution of the permissive-entry plan

instead.

Operation Uphold Democracy: Haiti (1994)

Unloading a C-5 in Haiti.
105

I

n the late 1990s Serbian dictator Slobodan

Milosevic directed violent repression against

the ethnic Albanian population in the

Serbian province of Kosovo. After several brutal

massacres of ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces,

NATO demanded that Milosevic allow NATO

peacekeepers to police Kosovo. When Milosevic

refused, NATO launched an air campaign to

force him to comply.

NATO ruled out ground combat, so from

the outset on 23 March 1999, the NATO air

campaign (Operation Allied Force) was the only

combat effort. The initial hope was that

Milosevic was bluffing and that after a few days

of air attacks, he would have the excuse he

needed to give in to NATO demands, remove

his troops from Kosovo, and allow NATO

troops to move in. Instead he used the air campaign as an excuse to dramatically increase the

scale of his attacks on the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Within a week of opening

the air campaign, Milosevic’s troops had killed

thousands of Albanian civilians and driven

nearly one million from their homes. 

The vast and sudden flow of refugees out of

Kosovo and into neighboring Albania and

Macedonia created a massive humanitarian crisis

and the United States responded with a huge

humanitarian relief Operation: Shining Hope.

During its first 50 days, Shining Hope forces

(under the command of Commander 3d US Air

Force, Maj Gen William S. Hinton) delivered

more than 3,400 tons of food, equipment, and

medical supplies to the refugees. The ability of

the United States and NATO to sustain the

Kosovo refugees in Albania and Macedonia was

critical to our ultimate success in returning them

to their homes and thwarting Milosevic’s

attempt to wipeout the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.

The Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) for Allied Force, Lt Gen Michael

C. Short, had always favored a more aggressive

air campaign. When the initial small-scale air

attacks failed to convince Milosevic to comply

with NATO demands, General Short got his

wish. The United States and our NATO allies

dramatically increased the forces committed to

operations against Serbia. The political leaders

also approved additional targets for strategic

attack while NATO commenced a major counterland campaign to punish the Serb force in

Kosovo. This sort of gradual escalation was not

the most efficient way to use airpower, but was

ultimately successful in achieving NATO goals

after a 78-day campaign and contributed to

Milosevic’s downfall the following year. 

By the time Milosevic capitulated, NATO air

forces had conducted over 38,000 sorties.

NATO counterair operations rapidly wiped out

the Serbian air force but Serbian air defenses

continued to pose a significant threat throughout the 11-week campaign. Learning from the

rapid destruction of Saddam Hussein’s air

defenses during Desert Storm, the Serbs did not

The Kosovo Crisis (1999)

Refugees from Kosovo at a NATO refugee camp in Albania,

April 1999.

NATO troops in Bosnia inspect the remains of a Serbian MiG29, shot down by allied airmen.
106

immediately and aggressively try to defend their

airspace. Instead, they kept their air defenses

moving or hid them in populated areas (where

collateral damage considerations would keep

NATO from attacking them) and tried to

ambush NATO aircraft when they got the

opportunity. NATO tactics overcame this sort

of guerrilla-warfare technique of air defense.

Only two NATO aircraft were shot down during Operation Allied Force and both pilots were

rescued by bold Combat Search and Rescue

operations. This new air defense tactic did, however, force NATO to consider the surviving air

defenses throughout the campaign.

In keeping with NATO’s humanitarian goals,

the entire Allied Force air campaign was conducted under very tight collateral damage restrictions. To achieve the unprecedented level of precision called for by these rules, the campaign

relied more heavily on precision guided munitions

(PGM) than Desert Storm. In all, Serbian targets

were attacked with over 23,000 NATO bombs

and missiles but there were only 20 incidents of

collateral damage. In spite of this spectacular

NATO success, the Serbs conducted effective

information operations to make sure that the few

accidental civilian casualties received a great deal

of public attention. The diplomatic difficulties

created by collateral damage and the unfortunate

chain of events that led to an attack on the

Chinese embassy in Belgrade reinforced the need

to continue to improve the Allied targeting

process and the precision of our attacks.

The counterland campaign was particularly

challenging for NATO airmen. The rugged

wooded terrain in Kosovo and the persistent

bad weather made Serbian ground forces very

hard to find from the air. These difficulties were

compounded by the fact that the Serbs did not

have to face NATO ground forces so they could

concentrate on hiding from NATO aircraft. In

the last three or four weeks of the campaign,

new tactics and improved weather combined to

dramatically increase Serbian losses and helped

force Milosevic’s surrender.

Two systems that made their combat debut

during Allied Force were the B-2 bomber and

the GBU-31 joint direct attack munition

(JDAM). The JDAM was still in testing when

Operation Allied Force began but was used

extensively and achieved amazing accuracy

under all weather conditions. B-2 “stealth”

bombers made 30-hour round-trip missions

from their home base in Missouri, each dropping up to 16 2,000 pound JDAM’s on up to

16 different targets with devastating results. 

The B-2 and the JDAM made their combat debut during the

Kosovo crisis and were enormously effective.
107

Gen Ronald Fogleman was commissioned out

of the Air Force Academy in 1963 (the

Academy’s third graduating class). He flew

315 combat missions over Vietnam in F-100 aircraft

as a fighter pilot and high-speed forward air controller. On one of these missions he was shot down

and was rescued from a rice-paddy by a US Army

helicopter as the Vietcong were closing in on him.

He was wounded by Vietcong fire as he clung to the

skid of the damaged US helicopter.

Later in his career, General Fogleman earned a

masters degree in military history and political science at Duke University, taught history at the Air

Force Academy, flew as an F-15 demonstration pilot

for international air shows, and commanded an Air

Force wing, an air division, and a numbered air force.

He also served in Korea as deputy commander in

chief, United Nations Command; deputy commander, US Forces Korea; and commander Republic

of Korea/US Air Component Command before

becoming commander in chief of US Transportation

Command. 

General Fogleman served as Chief of Staff of the

US Air Force from 1994–97 and tried to calm some

of the passions that his predecessor aroused. General

Fogleman’s most visible change was “stylistic.” He

made sure that he spent as much time as possible out

with the force and he truly listened to the concerns

of airmen out in USAF units all over the world.

General Fogleman stressed personal accountability

and renewed the Air Force’s commitment to its core

values: integrity, service before self, and excellence in

all we do. Two of his primary areas of concern were

high technology and the role of the Air Force in

space. As Chief of Staff he did a lot to start the Air

Force on its transformation into an Air and Space

Force and to help the entire organization recognize

that we will ultimately become a Space and Air

Force.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman

• As Chief of Staff of the USAF he renewed service commitment to high

technology and space.

• Flew 315 combat missions during the Vietnam War.

• Shot down over South Vietnam and rescued, under fire, by a US helicopter.
108

Gen Michael Short was commissioned out of

the Air Force Academy in 1965. He flew 276

combat missions as an F-4 pilot in the

Vietnam War and commanded two squadrons and

the F-117 “stealth fighter” group (4450th Tactical

Group) while it was still a classified program. He also

commanded three wings and a numbered Air Force.

He is best known for his work as joint force air component commander (JFACC), commanding NATO

air operations during Operation Allied Force (the

conflict over Kosovo).

Operation Allied Force has been described as the

first time in history that a war has been fought and

won purely by airpower without the assistance of

friendly surface forces. The United States and NATO

Air Forces were not designed to fight without the

involvement of friendly ground troops and US Air

Force leaders did not advocate an all-air strategy, but

that was the approach favored by NATO’s political

leadership and General Short made it work. That was

no easy task. 

General Short had to work within very strict political guidance coming from not just US policy makers

but a wide variety of NATO capitals as well. The initial plan had envisioned only a small, brief bombing

campaign like the earlier one in Bosnia. When

Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic continued to

resist NATO demands, the forces involved had to be

dramatically expanded to more than three times the

initial force and nearly three times as many bases in a

total of 15 countries.

Victory over Milosevic ultimately required 78

days and over 38,000 sorties. General Short led this

air campaign so effectively that only two manned

NATO aircraft were lost and no NATO troops were

killed or injured by enemy fire.

Since his retirement in 2000, General Short has

lectured widely on defense topics.

Lt Gen Michael C. Short

• As JFACC during Operation Allied Force, he is credited with being the

commander of the only air campaign to win a war without the assistance of friendly surface forces.

• Flew 276 combat missions during the Vietnam War.
Part II

Aerospace Craft

of the

United States Air Force
Early Aircraft

Wright 1909 Military Flyer

The world’s first military airplane. It was built in response to United States Army Signal

Corps specification 486, issued December 1907. The specifications for the aircraft were a speed

of 40 miles per hour (MPH), a range of 125 miles, “and the ability to steer in all directions

without difficulty.” On 27 July 1909, Orville Wright, with Lt Frank P. Lahm as passenger, flew

the aircraft for one hour, 12 minutes, 40 seconds and covered 40 miles, which met the Army’s

endurance requirements. Three days later, Orville Wright, with Lt Benjamin D. Foulois as passenger, covered a 10-mile test course at an average speed of 42 MPH, earning the Wrights a

performance bonus (10 percent of the aircraft’s base price for each MPH over 40). The aircraft

was accepted on 2 August 1909 and redesignated Signal Corps Aeroplane Number 1.

Curtiss JN-4D “Jenny” (1916)

The Jenny was generally used for primary flight training, but some were equipped with

machine guns and bomb racks for advanced training. After World War I, hundreds were sold

on the civilian market. The “Barnstormer” airplanes of the 1920s attracted many future World

War II air force leaders to the thrills of flying. Powered by a Curtiss OX-5, 90 horsepower (hp)

engine it could reach 75 MPH and stay aloft for 2.5 hours.

111

Top Speed: 40 MPH

Range: 125 mi

Endurance: one hour, 12 min,

40 secs

Top Speed: 75 MPH

Ceiling: 6,500 ft

Engine: Curtiss OX-5, liquidcooled V-8 of 90 hp

Endurance: two hours, 30 min
DeHavilland DH-4 (1917)

The DH-4 was the only US-built airplane to get into combat during World War I.

Following World War I, the DH-4 continued in use with the Army for a decade. More than

1,500 were rebuilt to increase their strength and some were modified to carry the airmail in

the 1920s.

SPAD XIII (1918)

The Spad XIII was the best French fighter plane of World War I and the most common

fighter-type flown by the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Fifteen of the 16 AEF pursuit squadrons flew Spad XIIIs by the time the war ended. The main advantage of the Spad

XIII over previous Spads was that it had two machine guns instead of one. Capt Eddie

Rickenbacker, commander of the 94th Aero Squadron and America’s “Ace of Aces,”

recorded most of his victories in the Spad XIII.

112

Top Speed: 128 MPH

Cruise: 90 MPH

Ceiling: 19,600 ft

Engine: Liberty V-12, 421 hp

Top Speed: 138 MPH

Cruise: 124 MPH

Ceiling: 22,300 ft

Engine: Hispano-Suiza 8BEc,

235 hp
Pursuit/Fighter Aircraft

Curtiss P-6E Hawk (1929)

The Curtiss Hawk was a composite of the merits of the best pursuit aircraft of its day. The

turbosupercharged V-12 engine served as the predecessor for the V-12 fighter engines that

powered World War II aircraft. Lt Col Henry H. “Hap” Arnold designated the new aircraft

the P-6E. The Hawk was easy to fly but was usually outmaneuvered in mock dogfights by

lighter Army aircraft. This pursuit aircraft was the Army’s last major biplane purchase.

Boeing P-26 Pea Shooter (1933)

The Pea Shooter was the first all-metal monoplane in Air Corps pursuit-squadron service.

It was the last Army fighter with an open cockpit, fixed landing gear, and external wires to

brace the wings. After the first production delivery of the aircraft, flaps were added to reduce

landing speed and the headrest was raised to protect the pilot because the plane often overturned. The Pea Shooter was obsolete before the United States entered World War II, but

Filipino pilots took it into combat against Japanese bombers in 1941.

113

Top Speed: 204 MPH

Cruise: 167 MPH

Ceiling: 24,900 ft

Engine: Curtiss V-1570-23, 600 hp

Top Speed: 234 MPH

Cruise: 199 MPH

Ceiling: 28,300 ft

Engine: P&W R-1340-27,

600 hp
Bell P-39 Airacobra (1940)

The Airacobra was originally designed to attack enemy aircraft. The first design included

a turbosupercharger that was omitted in the P-39C to make the aircraft less expensive and

handier at low altitudes. The trade-off was poor high-altitude performance. Most P-39s

were lend-leased to the Soviet Union during World War II. Alexander Pokryshkin used a

P-39 to score 47 aerial victories making him the second greatest Soviet ace and the most

successful ace using an American fighter. The 37 millimeter (mm) cannon in the propeller

hub made the P-39 a devastating ground attack aircraft as well.

Lockheed P-38 Lightning (1941)

The Lightning, designed for pursuit intercept, was the first fighter fast enough to

encounter compressibility and consequently suffered buffeting when diving too steeply. The

problem was solved using wing fillets. Two drop tanks gave the Lightning a combat radius

of 795 miles making it the first fighter useful for long-range escort. The P-38’s main limitation was the awkward maneuverability inherent to the aircraft’s size. With proper tactics

emphasizing its superior speed and ceiling, these limitations were overcome and the

Lightning enjoyed great success in the Pacific theater, where range was important.

114

Top Speed: 375 MPH

Cruise: 308 MPH

Ceiling: 33,200 ft

Engine: Allison V-1710-35;

1,150 hp

Range: 450 miles normal

Top Speed: 414 MPH

Cruise: 290 MPH

Ceiling: 44,000 ft

Engine: (2) Allison V-1710-89;

1,425 hp

Range: 450 miles loaded
Curtiss P-40 Warhawk (1939)

The P-40 was originally dubbed the Kittyhawk but was renamed Warhawk in January

1942. Gen Claire L. Chennault’s AVG, “Flying Tigers” flew the P-40 with great success

against the Japanese largely because of the superior tactics he devised. The Allison engine

had poor high-altitude performance and the P-40 had overall maneuverability limitations.

Its strengths were speed, toughness, and firepower. Lt Boyd Wagner shot down eight enemy

planes with a P-40E to become World War II’s first Army Air Forces (AAF) ace. The P-40

helped the British defeat Erwin Rommel in North Africa.

Republic P-47 Thunderbolt (1942)

The Thunderbolt was affectionately called the “Jug.” The huge radial engine with bigger

turbo was built to speed the aircraft to 15,000 feet under five minutes. It, like all prewar

fighters, was designed as an interceptor. The P-47Ds were delivered to Ninth Air Force to

support the D day landing in France. The bubble canopy seen in this P-47 was so superior

to the old “razorback” shape that every model after the P-47D block 25 was fitted with it.

The heavily armed Thunderbolt was outstanding in its role as a low-altitude fighter-bomber

in the last year of the European war.

115

Top Speed: 354 MPH

Cruise: 277 MPH

Ceiling: 29,000 ft

Engine: Allison V-1710-39;

1,150 hp

Range: 700 miles

Top Speed: 428 MPH

Cruise: 350 MPH

Ceiling: 42,000 ft

Engine: P&W R-2800-59;

2,100 hp

Range: 475 miles with 500 lb

bombs
North American P-51 Mustang (1942)

The Mustang was the most effective American air superiority fighter of World War II. At

low altitudes, the early Mustangs were superior to the Kittyhawk, Airacobra, and Spitfire in

speed and maneuverability. However, the 1,150 hp Allison engine that was initially used had

severe limitations at altitude. In the summer of 1942, the Mustang was fitted with the

Packard Merlin V-1650-3 engine and a two-stage supercharger. The refitted Mustangs then

became the fastest fighters in combat but more importantly the superior design allowed

more fuel to be carried. This gave the Mustang the range to escort bombers to any target

in Germany.

Bell P-59 Airacomet (1944)

The Airacomet was the United States’ first jet fighter. Limitations in the jet’s performance

and tendency toward “snaking” made it a bad gun platform and confined its use to orientation experience with jet flying.

116

Top Speed: 437 MPH

Cruise: 362 MPH

Ceiling: 41,900 ft

Engine: Packard V-1650-7; 1,490 hp

Range: 950 miles

Top Speed: 413 MPH

Cruise: 375 MPH

Ceiling: 46,200 ft

Engine: (2) GE J31-GE-5;

2,000 lbs thrust

Range: 525 miles
Northrop P-61 Black Widow (1943)

The Black Widow was the first American fighter designed specifically for the purpose of

night fighting. The plane was equipped with an SCR-720 radar transmitter that permitted

location of targets 10 miles away. The P-61 was a very maneuverable aircraft and scored victories against the Japanese in 1944. The three-man crew was composed of pilot, gunner,

and radar operator.

Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star (1945)

The Shooting Star jet fighter, widely used as the T-33 jet trainer, was the most successful

jet produced during World War II. The Shooting Star could match the performance of the

ME262. However, the P-80 was delivered in April of 1945 and with the war all but won, it

did not see action. The P (pursuit) designation was replaced by F (fighter) in June of 1948.

On 8 November 1950, an F-80C destroyed a MiG-15 in air history’s first all-jet air battle.

Still, mostly unable to compete with the communist fighters, it gave way to the F-86.

117

Top Speed: 430 MPH

Cruise: 307 MPH

Ceiling: 41,000 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-2800-65;

2,000 hp

Range: 415 miles

Top Speed: 580 MPH

Cruise: 439 MPH

Ceiling: 42,750 ft

Engine: Allison J33-A-11;

4,000 lbs thrust

Range: 1,380 miles
Republic F-84 Thunderjet/Thunderstreak (1947)

The F-84 was the first new fighter of the postwar period. The early straight-wing versions

of the F-84 were dubbed “Thunderjets.” Subsequent modifications improved the jet’s

power bringing it close to the airframe’s speed limit. The F-84F was designed with sweptwings and called the “Thunderstreak.” They were equipped with a low-altitude bombing

system (LABS) to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. The F-84 saw extensive action in Korea

as a fighter-bomber, but, it too, could not compete with MiG-15s in air-to-air combat.

North American F-86 Sabre (1948)

The Sabre was the first American aircraft to be designed with swept wings. This modification delays the onset of compressibility troubles inherent with flying at sonic speeds.

Although the F-86 was inferior in climb and ceiling to the lighter Soviet type fighters, with

better pilots it proved superior in air-to-air combat. In Korea, Sabres downed 792 MiGs

while losing only 78.

118

Top Speed: 622 MPH

Cruise: 483 MPH

Ceiling: 42,100 ft

Engine: Allison J35-A-29;

5,600 lbs thrust

Range: 2,000 miles

Top Speed: 695 MPH

Cruise: 486 MPH

Ceiling: 48,000 ft

Engine: GE J47-GE-27;

5,910 lbs thrust

Range: 458 miles combat

radius
North American F-100 Super Sabre (1954)

The Super Sabre was the first supersonic aircraft in production anywhere in the world.

The F-100 was the first in the Air Force’s “Century” series of fighters. The F-100 created

maintenance and cost problems for the Air Force. Titanium was used in construction, raising the cost to over $1 million per aircraft. Old by the 1970s, the F-100 was used in

Vietnam as high-speed, forward air controllers (FAC). The Fast FACs and other F-100s

were used operationally until 1972.

McDonnell F-101 Voodoo (1955)

The Voodoo was the first 1,000-MPH fighter in production. The F-101 was intended to

serve as Strategic Air Command’s (SAC) fighter-escort but was transferred to Tactical Air

Command (TAC) as a low-altitude fighter-bomber to carry Mk 7 nuclear bombs.

119

Top Speed: 924 MPH

Cruise: 593 MPH

Ceiling: 38,700 ft

Engine: P&W J57-P-21;

10,200 lbs thrust

Range: 572 miles combat

radius

Top Speed: 1,005 MPH

Cruise: 550 MPH

Ceiling: 38,900 ft

Engine: (2) P&W J57-P-13;

10,200 lbs thrust

Range: 677 miles combat

radius
Convair F-102 Delta Dagger (1956)

The F-102 was the product of the Air Force’s intention to create an air defense fighter interceptor. It used guided missiles instead of guns or unguided rockets. The delta wing design originally had limitations, particularly a drag hump at sonic speed. A design fix saved the program

and the Delta Dagger served Air Defense Command (ADC) squadrons through 1973.

Lockheed F-104 Starfighter (1958)

The Starfighter was the first Air Force fighter with Mach 2 speed. The F-104 had the smallest and thinnest wings ever used on an American fighter. In 1958, it became the first aircraft to

set both the speed and altitude record. However, a small weapons load and limited endurance

made them unsuitable for the Vietnam War. Though the F-104 was passed onto the Air

National Guard in 1967, it was purchased by 14 foreign air forces and served into the 1980s.

Convair F-106 Delta Dart (1959)

The Delta Dart was a further refinement of the F-102B design. As intercontinental ballistic

missiles (ICBM) replaced bombers as the principle nuclear threat, the need for interceptors was

reduced. The F-106 remained in ADC in diminishing numbers through the 1970s.

120

Top Speed: 780 MPH

Cruise: 605 MPH

Ceiling: 53,400 ft

Engine: P&W J57-P-23; 10,200 lbs

thrust

Range: 386 miles combat radius

Top Speed: 1,324 MPH

Cruise: 584 MPH

Ceiling: 58,000 ft

Engine: GE J79-GE-7; 15,800 lbs

thrust

Range: 352 miles combat radius

Top Speed: 1,328 MPH

Cruise: 594 MPH

Ceiling: 52,700 ft

Engine: P&W J75-P-17;

16,100 lbs thrust

Range: 364 miles combat radius
Republic F-105 Thunderchief (1959)

The nuclear-carrying “Thud” contained the first internal bomb bay used on a fighter. The

F-105 made the first supersonic bomb drops. As emphasis shifted from nuclear warfare to

conventional bombs, the Thud’s internal bomb bay was closed and a centerline pylon was

added. All-weather capabilities and speed combined with a toss-bomb computer made it the

premier fighter-bomber of the Vietnam War. The F-105D delivered 75 percent of the bomb

tonnage of Rolling Thunder.

McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II (1962)

The F-4 Phantom opened the era of the Mach 2 missile-launching fighter. In 1960, the

F-4 made a number of record-breaking flights: a world-speed record (1,606 MPH or Mach

2.57), a climb to 49,212 feet in 114 seconds, and a zoom climb to 98,556 feet. The first

operational version was the F-4B, a Navy all-weather fighter. The Air Force purchased the

F-4C in 1962. The original F-4Cs that went to Vietnam in 1965 did not have guns. An alert

enemy pilot making a sharp turn could evade the Phantom’s missiles. A 20-mm external gun

pod was added in 1967. F-4Ds with laser-guided 3,000-lb bombs finally destroyed the

Thanh Hoa Bridge. Of 137 United States Air Force (USAF) aerial victories in Vietnam,

Phantoms were credited with 107.5. “Wild Weasel” F-4G aircraft provided lethal air defense

suppression for deep strikes on Iraq during Operation Desert Storm.

121

Top Speed: 1,372 MPH

Cruise: 778 MPH

Ceiling: 48,500 ft

Engine: P&W J75-P-19W;

6,100 lbs thrust

Range: 778 miles combat radius

Top Speed: 1,400 MPH

Cruise: 590 MPH

Ceiling: 55,850 ft

Engine: (2) General Electric

J79-GE-15; 17,000 lbs

thrust

Range: 1,750 miles
General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark (1967)

The F-111 program was extremely ambitious and controversial. The goal was to produce

a common fighter-bomber for both the Air Force and the Navy. The most unusual feature

of the design was a “swing-wing” that could be swept forward for take-off, landing, and low

speed operations and swept back for high speed operations. The attempt to make the F-111

all things to all people resulted in a plane that was too heavy for carrier operations so the

Navy developed a pure air-superiority swing-wing fighter (the F-14) instead. The F-111 was

not an effective air-superiority fighter but its high-speed, long-range, heavy bomb load, and

all-weather navigation and attack capability made it an effective bomber during and after the

Vietnam War. The electronic warfare version of the F-111 played a major role in Operation

Desert Storm.

McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle (1976)

The F-15 is the world’s premier air-superiority fighter achieving 32 aerial victories during

Operation Desert Storm with no air-to-air losses. Its advanced pulse-Doppler radar work

with the AIM-7 and AIM-120 air-to-air missiles to destroy enemy aircraft beyond visual

range. Within visual range, the F-15’s outstanding acceleration, speed, and maneuverability

(due to its high thrust-weight ratio and large wings) enable it to outmaneuver its foes so

they can be destroyed by the F-15’s AIM-9 missiles and the M-61 Vulcan cannon. The

F-15E is a two-seat strike version of the F-15, capable of devastating ground attacks deep

in enemy territory.

122

Top Speed: 1,875 MPH

Cruise: 570 MPH

Ceiling: 65,000 ft

Engine: (2) P&W F100-PW-100;

25,000 lbs thrust

Range: Ferry 3,450 miles

Top Speed: 1,453 MPH

Cruise: 498 MPH

Ceiling: 57,900 ft

Engine: (2) P&W TF30-P-100;

25,000 lbs thrust

Range: Combat radius, 700

miles with 1,200 lbs

bombs
Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon (1979)

The F-16 was designed as a light, relatively low cost, single-seat multirole fighter. It has

been so successful that the USAF has more F-16s than any other type of aircraft and the

F-16 is the backbone of many allied air forces. F-16s proved their worth in combat with the

Israeli air force and during Operation Desert Storm where F-16s flew more sorties than any

other aircraft type. Continuing improvements to the F-16 will enable it to serve as a workhorse of the Air Force for several more decades.

Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk (1983)

The F-117 represents a revolution in aircraft design. It was developed under conditions

of extreme secrecy at the famous Lockheed “Skunk Works.” It is the first production aircraft

designed specifically to take advantage of breakthroughs in low-observable (stealth) technology. The F-117’s unique shape makes it nearly invisible to radar while its engines give off

a minimal infrared signature and flying at night prevents visual detection. During Desert

Storm the F-117 few over twelve hundred strike missions against the most heavily defended

Iraqi targets without losing a single aircraft.

123

Top Speed: 1,500 MPH

Ceiling: >50,000 ft

Engine: General Electric

F110-GE-129

Range: Ferry >2,000 miles

Top Speed: NA

Cruise: 580 MPH

Ceiling: NA

Engine: (2) General Electric

F404-GE-F1D2; 10,500

lbs thrust

Range: Combat radius 750 miles
Boeing and Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor

The F-22 is the next generation air-superiority fighter, designed to defeat any adversary’s

aircraft and dominate the skies of the early twenty-first century. It possesses a unique combination of stealth, maneuverability, super-cruise, and integrated avionics: truly leap-ahead

technologies that make it vastly more capable than any previous aircraft. Stealth, or more

accurately “low observable,” technology makes the F-22 very difficult to identify by radar

or other means. The F-22’s unique engines provide extraordinary maneuverability through

“thrust vectoring”: not all the engine thrust is always going straight ahead, but is instead

redirected, to enhance the maneuvers commanded by the pilot. These engines also enable

“super-cruise”: supersonic flight maintained for long periods of time because the engines

achieve it without afterburners. Integrated avionics enable each F-22 to receive automated

information (such as the radar picture) from other F-22s in its formation and thus dramatically enhances teamwork within the formation. Though originally intended as a pure airsuperiority fighter, the F-22’s inherent ground attack capability is being developed through

adding the joint direct attack munition to its armament.

Top Speed: Mach 2

Cruise: Mach 1.5

Ceiling: >65,000 ft

Engine: (2) P&W F119-PW-100;

35,000 lbs thrust

124
Bombers

Martin GMB/MB-1 (1918)

The MB-1 and the improvements embodied in the MB-2, offered the Army a platform

to demonstrate the capability of aerial bombing. In 1921, William “Billy” Mitchell used

MB-2s to sink the ex-German battle cruiser Ostfriesland.

Boeing B-9 (1932)

With the world-class Pratt & Whitney radial engines, the B-9 could fly 50 percent faster

than contemporary bombers. This made bomber speed comparable to pursuit aircraft speed.

The B-9 monoplane design became the parent of World War II bombers.

Martin B-10 (1935)

The B-10 was the first all-metal monoplane bomber to be produced in quantity. It also

introduced such innovations as a monocoque fuselage, variable-pitch propellers, retractable

landing gear, enclosed cockpits, and a rotating gun turret. In 1934, Colonel Arnold led a

mass flight of B-10 crews 18,000 miles from Washington, D.C., to Alaska, proving the capability for strategic bombing.

125

Top Speed: 105 MPH

Cruise: 100 MPH

Ceiling: 12,250 ft

Engine: (2) Liberty 12A; 400 hp

Range: 390 miles with 1,040 lbs bombs

Top Speed: 188 MPH

Cruise: 165 MPH

Ceiling: 22,500 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-1860-11;

600 hp

Range: 540 miles with 2,260 lbs

bombs

Top Speed: 213 MPH

Cruise: 193 MPH

Ceiling: 24,200 ft

Engine: (2) Wright R-1820-33; 775 hp

Range: 1,240 miles with 2,260 lbs

bombs
Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress (1939)

The Flying Fortress, with a 10-12 man crew, was the first truly modern heavy bomber and

one of the most recognized airplanes of the World War II era. It was the Army’s first production four-engine bomber. The YB-17 made its first flight in 1935 but the B-17C ordered

in 1939 was the first into combat in World War II. Total B-17 production was 12,276 with

peak AAF inventory reaching 4,574 in August 1944.

Consolidated B-24 Liberator (1941)

More Liberators were built than any other American airplane in history (18,482), with

peak inventory reaching 6,043 in September 1944. The B-24 was used in every theater in

World War II, and it had greater range and could carry a much larger bomb load than the

B-17. It had a crew of 10. The B-24’s most famous missions were the raids on Ploesti oil

fields in Romania.

Top Speed: 287 MPH

Cruise: 182 MPH

Ceiling: 35,600 ft

Engine: (4) Wright R-1820-97;

1,200 hp

Range: 2,000 miles with 6,000

lbs bombs

Top Speed: 303 MPH

Cruise: 200 MPH

Ceiling: 32,000 ft

Engine: (4) P&W R-1830-65;

1,200 hp

Range: 2,300 miles with 5,000

lbs bombs

126
North American B-25 Mitchell (1940)

Named in honor of US airpower proponent Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell, the B-25

served in every theater of World War II and was made in larger quantities than any other

American twin-engine combat airplane. On 18 April 1942, Lt Col James H. “Jimmy”

Doolittle’s B-25 crews took off from an aircraft carrier and bombed Tokyo and other targets, the first time US aircraft had bombed Japan.

Martin B-26 Marauder (1941)

The B-26 was ordered off the drawing board (no prototypes were built) at the same time

as the B-25. With a troubled development history, it was called the “Flying Prostitute”—

with its high wing loading (51 lbs per square feet) and small wings, it was said to have had

no visible means of support. Less Marauders were built than B-25s because the B-26 proved

to be more expensive to build, maintain, and had higher accident rates. The Marauder had

a great war record, bringing back a higher percentage of crews than B-17s or B-24s.

127

Top Speed: 272 MPH

Cruise: 230 MPH

Ceiling: 24,200 ft

Engine: (2) Wright R-2600-29; 1,700 hp

Range: 1,300 miles with 3,000 lbs bombs

Top Speed: 282 MPH

Cruise: 214 MPH

Ceiling: 21, 700 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-2800-43;

2,000 hp

Range: 1,150 miles with 3,000

lbs bombs
Boeing B-29 Superfortress (1944)

The Superfortress was the best bomber of World War II and the first bomber to include

pressurized crew compartments and remote controlled gun turrets. On the night of 9

March 1945, B-29s conducted the most devastating air raid in history, destroying almost 16

square miles of Tokyo. In August 1945, specially modified B-29s dropped two atomic

bombs on Japan, ending World War II. During the Korean War B-29s also did extensive

conventional bombing. B-50s (B-29s with improved engines) were modified as the first aerial tankers used in large numbers and served as weather aircraft into the 1960s.

Convair B-36 Peacemaker (1948)

When it was first flown, the B-36 was the largest aircraft in the world. With its intercontinental range and ability to carry nuclear weapons (primarily the Mk 17 hydrogen bomb),

the B-36 served as the United States’ airborne nuclear deterrent through the 1950s. The

Peacemaker was politically controversial, and caused the “Revolt of the Admirals” in 1949

when it was acquired at the expense of a Navy Super Cruiser.

128

Top Speed: 399 MPH

Cruise: 253 MPH

Ceiling: 36,150 ft

Engine: (4) Wright R-3350-57;

2,200 hp

Range: combat radius, 1,931

miles

Top Speed: 418 MPH

Cruise: 227 MPH

Ceiling: 43,600 ft

Engine: (6) P&W R-4360-53;

3,800 hp (4) General

Electric J47-GE-19;

5,200 lbs thrust

Range: 3,990 miles combat

radius with 10,000 lbs

bombs
Boeing B-47 Stratojet (1951)

The B-47 was the world’s first swept-wing bomber and the first to use a bicycle arrangement for the landing gear, which was necessary because of the thin wing. At the time, the

design was so advanced that some writers called it “futuristic.” Over 2,000 entered service

with SAC and the B-47 was the nation’s primary nuclear deterrent until it was replaced by

the B-52 and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Convair B-58 Hustler (1960)

The B-58 was the first supersonic bomber put into production and the first bomber to

reach Mach 2. The Hustler used a “pod” instead of internal weapons stowage and made use

of stainless-steel honeycomb construction for lower weight and greater strength. Crew

members had individual escape capsules rather than individual ejection seats. The B-58 used

sophisticated inertial and star-tracking navigation methods. On 15 October 1959, one of

the first B-58s built was flown 1,680 miles in 80 minutes with one refueling, maintaining a

speed of more than Mach 2 for more than an hour.

129

Top Speed: 607 MPH

Cruise: 498 MPH

Ceiling: 40,500 ft

Engine: (6) General Electric

J47-GE-25; 7,200 lbs

thrust

Range: 2,013 miles combat

radius with 10,845 lbs

bombs

Top Speed: 1,321 MPH

Cruise: 610 MPH

Ceiling: 64,800 ft

Engine: (4) General Electric

J79-GE-5B; 15,300

lbs thrust

Range: 1,750 miles combat

radius
Boeing B-52 Stratofortress (1955)

The enormous range and bomb load of the B-52 has made it one of the US Air Force’s

most successful aircraft. Though originally designed as a high-altitude nuclear bomber, the

B-52 has also proven effective in low altitude and conventional bombing operations. It is

the longest serving combat aircraft in the history of the USAF and it will continue to be a

major part of the US bomber force well into the twenty-first century. In addition to serving as a cornerstone of the US nuclear deterrent, B-52s conducted devastating bombing

missions during both the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm.

Rockwell B-1 Lancer (1985)

The B-1 was the first US Air Force bomber to incorporate low-observable stealth technology and was designed for low-altitude, deep-penetration nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union.

It has a swing-wing that gives it outstanding performance at all speeds and altitudes. With the

end of the Soviet threat, nonnuclear bombing capability has been added to the B-1.

130

Top Speed: 650 MPH

Cruise: 530 MPH

Ceiling: 50,000 ft

Engine: (8) P&W J-57-P-43WB;

13,750 lbs thrust

Range: 3,500 miles combat

radius

Top Speed: >900 MPH

Cruise: high subsonic

Ceiling: >50,000 ft

Engines: (4) GE F-101-GE-102;

>30,000 lbs thrust

Range: >7,000 miles
Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit (1999)

The B-2 is the first operational combat aircraft ever built according to the “flying wing”

concept (i.e., without a tail or fuselage). Its unique shape and the exotic materials used in

its construction make it extremely difficult to detect with radar. This extraordinary level of

stealth is achieved in spite of the fact that the B-2 is a very large aircraft capable of delivering more than 32,000 lbs of bombs on enemy targets with great precision. Though originally designed to attack targets within the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, the B-2

made its combat debut during Operation Allied Force when B-2’s delivered 2,000 lb joint

direct attack munitions (JDAM) on targets in Serbia. The B-2’s had to fly out of their home

base—Whiteman AFB, Missouri—so each mission took over 30 hours. In spite of the low

sortie rate caused by these long missions and the small number of B-2’s operational in 1999,

the ability of each B-2 to deliver 16 JDAMs with extraordinary accuracy in all weather on

the most heavily defended targets made it the preferred system for attacking many targets

in Serbia. 

131

Top Speed: High Subsonic

Ceiling: 50,000 ft

Engine: (4) GE

F-118-GE-100

17,300 lbs

Range: 6,000 miles 
Attack Aircraft

Northrop A-17 Nomad (1936)

Northrop developed the A-17 in the early 1930s to fill an Army Air Corps (AAC) requirement for a ground-attack bomber. The aircraft would provide ground support for infantry,

attacking at tree-top level with its four forward-firing .30-caliber machine guns and fragmentation or chemical bombs carried internally.

Douglas A-20 Havoc (1940)

The A-20 was designed to meet an AAC attack specification in 1938 but it took British

and French orders to start production. Begun as a company-funded venture, the Havoc

eventually became the most produced AAF attack aircraft. It also helped start the trend for

nose wheels in American combat aircraft.

133

Top Speed: 206 MPH

Cruise: 170 MPH

Ceiling: 20,700 ft

Engine: P&W R-1535-11;

750 hp

Range: 650 miles with 654 lbs

bombs

Top Speed: 317 MPH

Cruise: 230 MPH

Ceiling: 25,000 ft

Engine: (2) Wright R-2600-23;

1,600 hp

Range: 1,025 miles
Douglas A-26 Invader (1941)

An updated A-20, it was used for level bombing, ground strafing, and rocket attacks.

When production halted after VJ day, 2,502 Invaders had been built. The A-26 was redesignated the B-26 in 1948 (forever confusing it with the Martin B-26). During the Korean

War, the airplane entered combat once again, this time as a night intruder to harass North

Korean supply lines. Early in the Vietnam War, the Invader went into action for the third

time. In 1966, the B-26K was redesignated the A-26A.

Douglas A-1 Skyraider (1963)

This rugged dump truck of an attack aircraft was originally developed for the Navy and

entered Navy service in the 1940s. The Air Force used A-1s to attack ground targets in

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (where it worked closely with the Central Intelligence

Agency’s [CIA] secret operations). It was nicknamed “Spad,” because pilots considered it a

throwback airplane in the jet-age Air Force. The Skyraider was also used to cover rescue

operations, where the type picked up a second nickname, “Sandy,” its radio call sign.

Top Speed: 355 MPH

Cruise: 284 MPH

Ceiling: 22,100 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-2800-27;

2,000 hp

Range: 1,400 miles with

4,000 lbs bombs

Top Speed: 325 MPH

Cruise: 240 MPH

Ceiling: 26,200 ft

Engine: Wright R-3350; 2,700 hp

Range: 1,500 miles

134
Vought A-7 Corsair II (1968)

The A-7 was originally designed for the US Navy which began purchasing them in 1965.

The A-7 was the USAF’s first jet attack aircraft and performed well in the later stages of the

Vietnam War. The A-7 was the Air Force’s primary ground attack aircraft throughout the

1970s.

Fairchild A-10 Thunderbolt II (1976)

The A-10 was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe by killing huge numbers of Soviet tanks. To do this it was equipped with one of the most powerful cannons ever

mounted in an aircraft in addition to bombs and ground attack missiles. The A-10 relies on its

exceptional maneuverability, heavy armor, and redundant systems, rather than speed, for its

survivability. Though the Soviets never invaded, the A-10 demonstrated its effectiveness

against Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm. Though its lack of night and all-weather

capability limit its effectiveness, the A-10’s heavy firepower, long station time, and ease of

maintenance have made it popular on peace enforcement missions in places like Bosnia.

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Top Speed: 663 MPH

Cruise: 545 MPH

Ceiling: 33,500 ft

Engine: Allison TF41;

14,250 lbs thrust

Range: 1,330 miles with

6,560 lbs bombs

Top Speed: 450 MPH

Cruise: 335 MPH

Ceiling: 44,200 ft

Engine: (2) GE TF34-GE-100;

9,000 lbs thrust

Range: 288 miles combat

radius with 9,540 lbs

bombs and 2 hours on

station
Tankers

Boeing KC-97 Stratofreighter (1950)

The KC-97, a tanker version of the C-97, was introduced in 1950 using the “flying

boom” refueling system. This was an improvement from the probe-and-drogue technique

tested earlier. The value of air refueling was demonstrated in 1952 by nonstop deployment

of the 31st Fighter-Escort Wing from Turner AFB, Georgia, to Japan. Jet squadrons could

now fly to any point in the world refueling from flying tankers at prearranged rendezvous

points. The jet engines were added in 1964 to give the Stratofreighter enough speed to

refuel faster jet aircraft.

Boeing KB-50 Superfortress (1956)

KB-50s were B-50 bombers modified as aerial tankers. The alterations involved the

removal of armament and the installation of additional fuel tanks and probe-and-drogue

equipment to permit the aerial refueling by hose of up to three fighter-type aircraft at one

time. As the performance of operational jet fighters increased, a J47 jet engine was installed

under each wing on some KB-50s to boost speed while refueling and to increase altitude

capability.

137

Top Speed: 400 MPH

Cruise: 230 MPH

Ceiling: 30,000 ft

Engine: (4) P&W R-4360;

3,500 hp (2) GE-J47s,

5,970 lbs thrust

Range: 2,300 miles

Top Speed: 445 MPH

Cruise: 410 MPH

Ceiling: 40,000 ft

Engine: (4) P&W R-4360;

3,500 hp (2) GE-J47s;

5,910 lbs thrust

Range: 2,500 miles
Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker (1957)

The KC-135 derives from the same prototype as the Boeing 707 commercial airplane and

uses the flying boom refueling system. It began replacing the KC-97s of the Strategic Air

Command in the late 1950s and later replaced Tactical Air Command’s KB-50s. KC-135s

played a central role in Air Force combat operations in Vietnam, Panama (1989), and

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There are more than 600 KC-135s in the Air

Force inventory and the new CFM-56 engines will enable them to remain the backbone of the

refueling force well into the twenty-first century. The EC-135 provides airborne command and

control for US nuclear forces in the event ground command and control is knocked out.

McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender (1981)

The KC-10 is a modified civilian DC-10. It is capable of aerial refueling using both

flying-boom and hose-and-drogue refueling systems. When used strictly as a refueling aircraft, the KC-10 can carry almost twice as much fuel as a KC-135. The KC-10 can also be

configured to transport personnel and equipment while conducting its primary aerial refueling mission. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, KC-10s refueled aircraft

from all branches of the US armed forces and many coalition forces.

138

Top Speed: 610 MPH

Cruise: 530 MPH

Ceiling: 50,000 ft

Engine: (4) CFM-56;

21,634 lbs thrust

Range: 1,500 miles with

150,000 lbs fuel

Top Speed: 619 MPH

Cruise: 564 MPH

Ceiling: 42,000 ft

Engine: (3) GE CF-6-

50C2; 52,500

lbs thrust

Range: 4,400 miles

with cargo
Transport and

Special Electronic Aircraft

Curtiss-Wright C-30 Condor (1933)

The older Army transports, like the C-30, were procured in small numbers and essentially

standard commercial aircraft modified to meet military requirements. In some cases larger

cargo doors were fitted; in others unusual engines were replaced by standard Army models.

Douglas C-47 Skytrain “Gooney Bird” (1941)

Few aircraft are as well known or were so widely used for so long as the C-47 or “Gooney

Bird” as it was affectionately nicknamed. The first C-47s were ordered in 1940 and by the end

of World War II, 9,348 had been procured for AAF use. After World War II, many C-47s

remained in USAF service, participating in the Berlin Airlift and other peacetime activities.

During the Korean War, C-47s hauled supplies, dropped paratroops, evacuated wounded, and

dropped flares for night bombing attacks. In Vietnam, the C-47 served again as a transport, but

it was also used in a variety of other ways which included flying ground attack (gunship), reconnaissance, and psychological warfare missions.

139

Top Speed: 181 MPH

Ceiling: 22,800 ft

Engine: (2) Wright R-1820-12;

700 hp

Range: 750 miles

Top Speed: 232 MPH

Cruise: 175 MPH

Ceiling: 24,450 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-1830;

1,200 hp

Range: 1,513
Curtiss C-46 Commando (1942)

The C-46 gained its greatest fame during World War II transporting war materials over

the “Hump” from India to China after the Japanese had closed the Burma Road. The

Commando carried more cargo than the famous C-47 and offered better performance at

higher altitudes, but under these difficult flying conditions, C-46s required extensive maintenance and had a relatively high loss rate. During the Korean War C-46s saw additional

service.

Douglas C-54 Skymaster (1942)

This long-range heavy transport gained its greatest fame in World War II, the Berlin

Airlift, and the Korean War. Originally developed for the airlines, the first batch of what

would have been DC-4s was commandeered off the assembly line by the Army Air Forces

in 1942 and redesignated C-54. The first presidential aircraft was the lone VC-54C.

President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, creating an independent Air Force, on board this aircraft on 12 July 1947.

140

Top Speed: 245 MPH

Cruise: 175 MPH

Ceiling: 27,600 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-2800;

2,000 hp

Range: 1,200 miles

Top Speed: 300 MPH

Cruise: 245 MPH

Ceiling: 30,000 ft

Engine: (4) P&W R-2000;

1,450 hp

Range: 3,900 miles
Fairchild C-82/119 Flying Boxcar (1945)

The C-82 appeared too late to participate in World War II and the C-119 was a major

redesign of the C-82. The C-119 had the same major design feature as the C-82—a rearloading, all-through cargo hold—but featured more powerful engines and a relocated flight

deck. In the 1950s, C-119s were used to ferry supplies to the Arctic for construction of the

distant early warning (DEW) line radar sites. In the late 1960s, the Air Force selected the

C-119 to replace the AC-47 Spooky in the gunship role.

Douglas C-124 Globemaster “Old Shaky” (1950)

The Globemaster performed yeoman service through two wars and nearly 25 years. The

C-124 was a major redesign of the C-74 that was developed at the end of World War II. It

used the same wings, tail, and engines as the C-74 but had a deeper fuselage that featured

clamshell doors in the nose to permit vehicles to drive on and off under their own power.

The C-124 retained the C-74’s electrically operated elevator in the rear of the aircraft for

loading of bulk cargo. It went on to provide a much-needed airlift capability in the Korean

War, as it was the only aircraft that could carry many of the Army’s vehicles.

141

Top Speed: 290 MPH

Cruise: 200 MPH

Ceiling: 30,000 ft

Engine: (2) Wright R-3350;

3,500 hp

Range: 2,000 miles

Top Speed: 320 MPH

Cruise: 200 MPH

Ceiling: 34,000 ft

Engine: (4) P&W R-4360;

3,800 hp

Range: 2,175 miles
Lockheed C-69/121 Constellation (1943)

Howard Hughes was one of the driving forces behind the design of the Lockheed

Constellation. A number of aircraft intended for Hughes’ Transcontinental and Western

Airlines (and for Pan American) were requisitioned off the production line by the United

States AAF after the attack on Pearl Harbor and designated C-69s. It was the heaviest and

the fastest transport built to date for the Army Air Forces. The improved Constellation (the

C-121) entered service after World War II and most of them were built as EC-121s and used

for electronic reconnaissance and airborne early warning. In the mid-1960s, the Air Force

sent the first Warning Stars to Vietnam to maintain radar surveillance over North Vietnam

and then later to warn of MiG attacks.

Fairchild C-123 Provider (1955)

The C-123 was a tactical transport originally designed as a glider, although the design was

drawn up with the intention of its eventually being powered. Two C-123Ks were modified

to the NC-123K configuration (also referred to as AC-123K) under the Black Spot project.

This was designed to give the Air Force a self-contained night attack capability to seek out

and destroy targets on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The C-123s contributed a substantial portion of in-country airlift and resupply in Vietnam and Cambodia.

142

Top Speed: 290 MPH

Cruise: 240 MPH

Ceiling: 18,000 ft

Engine: (4) Wright R-3350;

3,400 hp

Range: 4,000 miles

Top Speed: 240 MPH

Cruise: 170 MPH

Ceiling: 28,000 ft

Engine: (2) P&W R-2800;

2,500 hp (2) GE J-85;

2,850 lbs thrust

Range: 1,825 miles
Lockheed C-130 Hercules (1957)

The C-130’s primary mission is airlift within theater where its ability to operate from

rough, dirt airstrips is vital. It is also the primary aircraft for paradropping troops and equipment. C-130s dropped Army troops into combat in Grenada and Panama. The rugged and

versatile C-130 has been modified to perform aerial refueling (KC-130) and electronic warfare (EC-130) operations and as the AC-130, it has served as the nation’s primary gunship

since the early 1970s. The Air Force Special Operations Command relies particularly heavily on C-130 variants. The C-130 has been in production for over four decades, longer than

any other aircraft in history.

Lockheed C-141 Starlifter (1964)

The C-141 was Air Mobility Command’s first jet aircraft designed to meet military cargo

standards. It dropped Army troops and equipment into combat in Panama and Grenada and

was critical to airlift operations during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Between 1979

and 1982 the entire C-141 fleet was extensively modified to add air refueling receptacles and

lengthen each fuselage by over 23 feet. It has been the backbone of the US airlift fleet since the

mid-1960s and will continue to provide intercontinental airlift until replaced by the C-17.

143

Top Speed: 380 MPH

Cruise: 340 MPH

Ceilings: 33,000 ft

Engines: (4) Allison T-56-A-15;

4,300 hp

Range: 2,500 miles with

25,000 lbs cargo

Top Speed: 566 MPH

Cruise: 500 MPH

Ceiling: 41,000 ft

Engines: (4) P&W TF33-P-7;

20,250 lbs thrust

Range: 3,000 miles with

maximum payload
Lockheed C-5 Galaxy (1970)

The C-5 carries outsized cargo

intercontinental distances. It is one of

the largest aircraft ever built; so large

that the Wright brothers’ entire first

flight could have been conducted

inside a C-5’s cargo bay. Its upwardlifting “visor” nose, full-width aft

doors and ramps, and “kneel down” landing gear speed the loading and unloading of the

C-5. The C-5 fleet was critical to US airlift operations during Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm and there is no scheduled replacement date for the C-5.

Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS (1977)

The E-3 is a modified Boeing 707 with a large rotating radar dome. It serves as an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) providing all-weather surveillance, command,

control, and communications to United States and allied aircraft. Since they entered service, E-3s have been among the first aircraft dispatched to world trouble spots and they

directed more than 120,000 coalition sorties during Operation Desert Storm.

Top Speed: 570 MPH

Cruise: 518 MPH

Ceiling: >30,000 ft

Engine: (4) GE TF-39;

41,000 lbs thrust

Range: >2,000 miles with

200,000 lbs of cargo

Optimal Cruise: 360 MPH

Ceiling: >29,000 ft

Engine: (4) P&W TF33-PW-100A;

21,000 lbs thrust

Endurance: Over 8 hours without

refueling

144
Northrop Grumman E-8 JSTARS (1991)

The E-8 joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) is a modified Boeing 707

with a phased-array radar antenna mounted in a 26-foot long canoe-shaped radome under the

forward part of the fuselage. The JSTARS radar monitors ground activity deep inside enemy

territory and provides target data to both the USAF and US Army. Though it was still under

development in 1991, the test bed E-8s were deployed to the Persian Gulf and participated in

Operation Desert Storm. Since then they have been very active in other trouble spots.

Boeing C-17 Globemaster III (1993)

The C-17 is gradually replacing the C-141 in the USAF airlift fleet and the C-17 will be

the backbone of United States air mobility in the first half of the twenty-first century. The

C-17 can carry about twice as much cargo as the C-141 and can operate from shorter, more

austere airfields. These features greatly enhance the capabilities of Air Mobility Command.

145

Top Speed: 600 MPH

Cruise: 535 MPH

Ceiling: NA

Engines: (4) JT3D-7;

19,000 lbs thrust

Range: 5,700 miles

Cruise: 500 MPH

Ceiling: 45,000 ft

Engines: (4) P&W F117-PW-100;

40,440 lbs thrust

Range: 2,800 miles with

160,000 lbs cargo
Training Aircraft

Vultee BT-13 Valiant (1940)

The Valiant was the basic trainer most widely used by the USAAF during World War II.

Over 10,000 Valiants were built, which provided basic pilot training for the enormous number of pilots need for the war. The BT-13 had a powerful engine and was faster and heavier

than other trainers. It required the student pilot to use two-way radio communications with

the ground, and to operate both landing flaps and a two-position variable pitch propeller.

North American AT-6 Texan (1940)

The AT-6 was one of the most widely used aircraft in history. Nearly all USAAF pilots in

World War II trained in the AT-6 prior to earning their wings. This aircraft exposed students

to high-performance aircraft with retractable landing gear. The British version of the AT-6

the “Harvard” was widely used by the British Royal Air Force during the war. During the

Korean War, some AT-6s were used to spot enemy ground targets and mark them with

smoke rockets for attack by fighter-bombers.

147

Top Speed: 173 MPH

Engine: P&W R-985-25;

450 hp

Top Speed: 206 MPH

Engine: P&W R-1340-47,

600 hp
Lockheed T-33 Shooting Star (1948)

The two-place T-33 was the world’s first jet trainer. It was developed from the single-seat

F-80 fighter by lengthening the fuselage approximately three feet to accommodate a second

cockpit. Lockheed undertook the design of the T-33 with $1 million of its own money.

Entering service in 1948, the T-33 was the only Air Force jet trainer until the advent of the

Cessna T-37 in 1957.

North American T-28 Trojan (1949)

The winner of the competition to build the first new Air Force trainer after World War II,

the T-28A fell short of expectations, and the Air Force eventually added the T-34 to the syllabus to provide ab initio training. The United States used a number of T-28s in the early

stages of Operation Farm Gate to train the South Vietnamese in commando-type operations. In 1962, the USAF began to modify nearly three hundred T-28s as fighter-bombers

for counterinsurgency warfare, and these were redesignated T-28D Nomads.

148

Top Speed: 600 MPH

Engine: J33-A-23; 5,200 lbs

thrust

Top Speed: 285 MPH

Engine: Wright R-1300-1;

800 hp
Beech T-34 Mentor (1952)

The T-34A was used by the USAF for primary flight training during the 1950s. The

T-34A served as the standard primary trainer until the USAF introduced the Cessna T-37

jet trainer in the late 1950s. As they were replaced by the T-37, many T-34s were turned

over to base Aero Clubs. In all, 450 T-34As were produced for the USAF.

Cessna T-37 Tweet (1957)

The T-37 is one of the most successful training aircraft ever built and has been the primary trainer for several generations of Air Force pilots. The student and instructor sit side

by side to facilitate instruction and the twin engines and flying characteristics help prepare

students to move on to larger and faster aircraft. Modified T-37s have also served as attack

aircraft in counterinsurgency operations.

149

Top speed: 180 MPH

Engine: O-470-13; 225 hp

Speed: 410 MPH

Engine: (2) Continental

J69-T-25; 1,025

lbs thrust
Northrop T-38 Talon (1961)

The T-38 is a twin-engine, high-altitude, supersonic advanced jet trainer. More than

60,000 pilots have earned their wings in the T-38. In addition to teaching supersonic techniques, aerobatics, formation, night and instrument flying, and cross-country navigation,

the AT-38 teaches weapons delivery as well.

Raytheon T-1 Jayhawk (1993)

The T-1 is a version of the Beech 400A civilian aircraft and was the first new trainer aircraft purchased by the USAF in 30 years. The T-1 represented the beginning of a new era

in pilot training. From the late 1950s to the early 1990s, all pilot training students received

primary training in the T-37 and advanced training in the T-38. In 1993 the USAF went to

specialized undergraduate pilot training with all pilots still receiving primary training in the

T-37 but only fighter and bomber pilots moving on to the T-38. Pilots going to airlift and

tanker units receive their advance training in the T-1 instead.

150

Top Speed: 810 MPH

Engine: (2) GE J85-GE-5;

2,900 lbs thrust

Speed: 538 MPH

Engine: (2) P&W JT15D-5;

2,900 lbs thrust
Experimental and Strategic 

Reconnaissance Aircraft

Bell X-1 “Glamorous Glennis” (1947)

Developed in secrecy, the XS-1 (later redesignated X-1) research aircraft was the first to

explore flight beyond the speed of sound (761 MPH at sea level). Design basis for the aircraft

was a .50-caliber bullet. Air Force Capt Charles E. “Chuck” Yeager became the first pilot to

exceed Mach 1 when on 14 October 1947, he reached a speed of Mach 1.06 (700 MPH) at

an altitude of 43,000 ft. News of the flight was not revealed until nearly two months later.

Lockheed U-2 (1956)

The U-2 is a high-altitude, long-endurance reconnaissance aircraft. The U-2 operates at such

high altitudes that the pilots have to wear modified spacesuits. U-2 photos alerted the United

States to the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba at the start of the Cuban missile crisis. One

U-2 (operated by the CIA) was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960 and another was shot

down over Cuba in 1962. However, improved engines and surveillance equipment make the

U-2 an effective reconnaissance platform in the twenty-first century.

151

Top Speed: 700 MPH (Mach

1.06) Achieved on

14 October 1947

Ceiling: 45,000 ft

Engine: XLR11-RM-1 rocket

engine; 6,000 lbs

thrust

Speed: 430 MPH

Ceiling: >70,000 ft

Engine: P&W J75-P-13B;

17,000 lbs thrust

Range: >6,000 miles
North American X-15 (1958)

The X-15 was designed to explore the identifiable problems of atmospheric flight at very

high speeds and altitudes. The aircraft was the first to use a throttle-able rocket engine, the

first to be flown to speeds of Mach 4, 5, and 6, and the first to be flown to the lower edge

of space (considered by the Air Force and National Aeronautics and Space Administration

[NASA] to be an altitude of 50 miles). It demonstrated that pilots could perform at hypersonic speeds and in weightlessness. It also proved the effectiveness of reusable, piloted

spacecraft, and lifting reentry upon return to atmosphere.

North American XB-70 Valkyrie (1964)

One of the most exotic aircraft ever built. Originally conceived as a high-altitude, Mach

3-capable bomber to replace the B-52, budget cuts reduced the number of aircraft to two

and the program to a research effort aimed at studying aerodynamics, propulsion, and materials used on large supersonic aircraft. On one flight above Mach 3, the recorded skin temperature on the aircraft reached 620 degrees. At Mach 3, it took the aircraft an arc of 287

miles and 13 minutes to make a 180-degree turn. The aircraft utilized the phenomenon of

compression lift, where the aircraft actually rode its own shock wave. It was able to do this

in part because of the wingtips that could droop in flight.

Top Speed: 4,520 MPH (Mach

6.72)

Ceiling: 354,200 ft (67 miles)

Engine: XLR99 rocket engine;

57,000 lbs thrust

Top Speed: 2,000 MPH

(Mach 3.08)

Ceiling: 74,000 ft

Engine: (6) YJ93-GE-3;

30,000 lbs thrust

Range: 6,000 miles

152
Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird (1966)

Like the U-2 and the F-117, the SR-71 was a product of Lockheed’s famous Skunk

Works. The SR-71 has the most spectacular speed and altitude performance ever recorded

in an operational jet aircraft. Its powerful ramjet engines and unique shape enable the

SR-71 to cruise at speeds above Mach 3. No SR-71s have ever been shot down though they

have conducted high-priority reconnaissance missions in many of the world’s trouble spots.

153

Cruise: >2,000 MPH

Ceiling: >85,000 ft

Engine: (2) P&W J58;

32,500 lbs thrust
Strategic Missiles and

Space Launch Vehicles

Douglas PGM-17 Thor (1959)

The single-stage Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) was the free world’s

first operational IRBM. They could deliver their nuclear payloads over 1,700 miles and were

assigned to SAC until 1963. After 1963 they were used for space research and as single-stage

boosters.

General Dynamics HGM-19 Atlas (1959)

Atlas was the United States’ first ICBM. It was a one and one-half stage liquid-fuel missile. It was retired from SAC in 1965 in favor of the Titan II. Hundreds of Atlas rockets

have been used as space launch vehicles. Atlas I rockets were used to launch the Mercury

astronauts and Atlas II rockets launched portions of the Defense Satellite Communications

System in the 1990s.

155

Length: 65 ft 10 in

Diameter: 8 ft

Weight: 109,330 lbs at launch

Engine: North American Rockedyne, liquid-propelent

rocket; 150,000 lbs thrust

Speed: 10,250 MPH

Range: 1,725 miles

Altitude: 390 miles

Atlas I

Length: 75 ft

Width: 10 ft

Weight: 260,000 lbs

Range as ICBM: 11,500 miles
Martin LGM-25 Titan (1962)

Titan I was a two-stage liquid-fuel ICBM. The first

Titan I squadron became operational in 1962. By 1965 the

Titan Is were already being replaced by Titan IIs that had

twice the payload and could be fired from inside their silos.

Titan IIs remained part of the US nuclear deterrent until

1987 when the remaining missiles were released for use as

space launch vehicles. Modified Titan IIs launched the

Gemini astronauts. Titan III was a further improvement in

the Titan family used only for launching space vehicles.

Titan IV, with two solid fuel boosters attached, is a heavylift launch vehicle able to put almost 24 tons into low

Earth orbit.

Boeing LGM-30 Minuteman (1962)

Minuteman ICBMs are three-stage solid propellent missiles and have been the core of the US nuclear deterrent

for almost 40 years. Over 500 Minuteman III missiles

remain in the USAF inventory at the end of the twentieth

century and there are no plans to replace them. Steady

improvements since the 1960s have increased the range,

accuracy, and payload of the Minuteman series and the

Minuteman III can carry up to three independently targeted nuclear warheads. These missiles, however, carry

only one warhead in compliance with arms limitations

agreements.

156

Titan I/II

Length: 98 ft 4 in/103 ft

Diameter: 10 ft (Titan II second stage as wide as first)

Weight: 221,500 lbs/330,000 lbs

Range as ICBM: 6,300 miles/9,300 miles

Titan IV

Titan II

Titan I

Minuteman

III

Minuteman I

Minuteman I/III

Length: 55 ft 9 in/59 ft 10 in

Diameter: 6 ft

Weight: 65,000 lbs/78,000 lbs

Range: >6,300 miles/>8,000 miles
Boeing LGM-118 Peacekeeper (1986)

The Peacekeeper was designed to take full advantage of

developments in missile guidance and multiple reentry vehicle technology. Like the Minuteman, it is a three-stage, solid

propellent missile but the Peacekeeper can carry up to 10

highly accurate, independently targeted nuclear warheads. In

accordance with arms reduction treaties, the Peacekeeper will

be phased out by 2003.

McDonnell Douglas Delta II (1989)

The first Delta rocket was launched in 1960 and used the

US Air Force’s Thor rocket as its first stage. Delta rockets

became the workhorse of NASA’s unmanned space programs.

In the late 1980s the USAF started using improved Delta II

rockets to launch Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS)

satellites into orbit.

157

Height: 71 ft

Diameter: 7 ft 8 in

Weight: 195,000 lbs

Range: >6,000 miles

Delta II

Length: 125 ft 9 in

Width: 8 ft

Weight: 511,190 lbs
Boeing AGM-86 (1982)

The AGM-86 air-launched cruise missile represented a dramatic leap forward from previous USAF air-launched cruise missiles. It is the first such missile that can reasonably be considered a strategic weapon.

SAC used previous air-launched cruise missiles to assist in penetrating Soviet air defenses.

These cruise missiles were of two basic types: decoys designed to have the same radar signature as B-52s, and the inaccurate AGM-28 Hound Dog ground attack missile. The operational concept was for the B-52s to launch their decoys just outside the range of Soviet airdefense radar and flood Soviet air defenses with more targets than they could handle. If, in

spite of the decoys, the Soviet defenses found a B-52, then it would launch its nuclear-armed

AGM-28s to supress enemy air defenses.

As cruise missile accuracy improved, it became possible to design these weapons to attack

precision targets. The AGM-86B’s sophisticated terrain-following radar enables it to fly at

very low altitudes and deliver its nuclear payload with great accuracy. The AGM-86C (originally known as conventional air-launched cruise missile [CALCM]) has a conventional warhead and uses GPS guidance. AGM-86Cs were used in Operation Desert Storm and in subsequent attacks on Iraq. Because of its heavier conventional warhead, the AGM-86C has a

shorter range than the B model.

Boeing AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile (1991)

The AGM-129 is the USAF’s latest generation of air-launched cruise missiles with longer

range and better accuracy than the AGM-86. To enhance survivability, the AGM-129 also

incorporates low-observable stealth technology.

158

Speed: 550 MPH

Range: >1,500 miles

Speed and Range are classified.
Satellites

Lockheed Corona (1960)

The Corona project was a joint Air Force/CIA program to put camera-carrying satellites

into orbit over the Soviet Union and other areas of interest. The Corona satellites were

launched by Thor rockets and the exposed film was ejected at a predetermined time and

location in a return capsule. At about 60,000 feet, a parachute deployed and while it floated

to earth, a specially modified C-119 or C-130 aircraft used a “trapeze” bar with hooks to

snag the parachute in flight (photograph at right above). The aircraft then reeled the film

capsule into the aircraft and returned it to base for analysis. Key to Corona’s success were

the enormous improvements in camera technology that enabled later Corona photographs,

taken at an altitude of more than one hundred miles while traveling faster than 17,000

MPH, to identify objects as small as six feet across. More than 100 Corona missions were

conducted between 1960 and 1972, when the system was retired. The systems that replaced

Corona are still classified.

159

Corona Reconnaissance Satellite C-119 recovering a Corona capsule by snagging its parachute
Lockheed Defense Meteorological

Satellite Program (1960s)

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) has been collecting weather data

for military operations for more than 20 years. DMSP satellites operate in polar orbit and

provide continual visual and infrared imagery of cloud cover and monitor moisture, temperatures, electromagnetic fields, and other weather data. Since 1994, DMSP data has been

shared with NASA and the US Commerce Department.

Defense Satellite Communications System (1971)

The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) provides secure, high priority,

command and control communications to global United States military operations. The first

DSCS II was launched in 1971 and the first of the more powerful DSCS III’s were first

launched in 1982.

160

Weight: 1,750 lbs

Orbital Altitude: 500 miles

Dimensions: 12 ft long, 5 ft wide

Launch Vehicle: Titan II

DSCS II

DSCS II/III

Weight: 1,350 lbs/2,580 lbs

Orbital Altitude: 23,230 miles

Dimensions: Height 6 ft/7 ft

Width 9 ft/6 ft

Launch Vehicle: Atlas II

DSCS III
TRW Defense Support Program (1970)

Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites provide early warning by detecting and reporting missile and space launches and nuclear detonations. Continuous improvements have

kept the program up to date. These satellites provided critical early warning of Iraqi Scud

launches to United States and coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. The SpaceBased Infrared System will replace the DSP in the twenty-first century.

Rockwell Navstar Global

Positioning System (1978)

The first GPS satellite was launched in 1978, but the need for extensive testing and the

large number of satellites needed to provide full coverage of the Earth (currently 24 satellites) meant that the system was not complete until 1995. Though the system was not yet

fully operational, the GPS was critical to the success of United States and coalition forces in

Operation Desert Storm.

161

Weight: 5,250 lbs

Altitude: 22,000 miles

Dimensions: 33 ft long,

22 ft wide

Launch Vehicle: Titan IV

Weight: 3,670 lbs

Altitude: 12,000 miles

Dimensions: 11 ft long, 17 ft wide

Launch Vehicle: Delta II
Milstar Satellite Communications System (1994)

Milstar is the Air Force’s newest communications satellite. When fully operational, the

system will consist of four satellites in geosynchronous orbits and two more in polar orbit.

Each Milstar satellite serves as a smart switchboard directing traffic from terminal to terminal anywhere in the world with minimal requirement for ground controlled switching.

162

Weight: 10,000 lbs

Orbital Altitude: 25,000 miles

Dimensions: 37 ft long, 116 feet wide 

(with solar panels deployed)

Launch Vehicle: Titan IV
APPENDICES

Senior Leadership of the Early Air Forces

Air Force Chiefs of Staff

Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force

Fighter Aces

USAF Medal of Honor Winners
Appendix A

Senior Leadership of the Early Air Forces

Chief Signal Officer

Brig Gen Adolphus V. Greely (1891–1906)

Brig Gen James Allen (1906–07)

Chief, Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps

Capt Charles DeForest Chandler (1907–10)

Capt A. S. Cowan (1910–11)

Capt Charles DeForest Chandler (1911–12)

Lt Henry H. Arnold (1912–13)

Col Sam Reber (1913–16)

Aviation Section of the Signal Corps

Col George O. Squier (1916–17)

Lt Col John B. Bennet (1917)

Chief, Division of Military Aeronautics

Brig Gen Benjamin D. Foulois (1917)

Brig Gen Alexander L. Dade (1917–18)

Maj Gen William L. Kenly (1918)

Director of the Air Service

Maj Gen Charles Menoher (1918–21)

Maj Gen Mason M. Patrick (1921–26)

Chief of the Air Corps

Maj Gen Mason M. Patrick (1926–27)

Maj Gen James E. Fechet (1927–31)

Maj Gen Benjamin D. Foulois (1931–35)

Maj Gen Oscar Westover (1935–38)

Gen Henry H. Arnold (1938–41)

Commanding General Army Air Forces

Gen Henry H. Arnold (1941–46)

Gen Carl A. Spaatz (1946–47)

165
Appendix B

Air Force Chiefs of Staff

Gen Carl A. Spaatz (September 1947–April 1948)

Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg (April 1948–June 1953) 

Gen Nathan F. Twining (June 1953–June 1957)

Served as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (August

1957–September 1960) 

Gen Thomas D. White (July 1957–June 1961) 

Gen Curtis E. LeMay (June 1961–January 1965) 

Gen John P. McConnell (February 1965–July 1969) 

Gen John D. Ryan (August 1969–July 1973) 

Gen George S. Brown (August 1973–June 1974)

Served as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (July

1974–June 1978) 

Gen David C. Jones (July 1974–June 1978)

Served as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (June

1978–June 1982) 

Gen Lew Allen Jr. (July 1978–June 1982) 

Gen Charles A. Gabriel (July 1982–June 1986) 

Gen Larry D. Welch (July 1986–June 1990) 

Gen Merrill A. McPeak (October 1990–October 1994) 

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman (October 1994–September

1997)

Gen Michael E. Ryan (October 1997–present)

167
Appendix C

Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force

Paul W. Airey (3 April 1967–31 July 1969) 

Donald L. Harlow (1 August 1969–30 September 1971) 

Richard D. Kisling (1 October 1971–30 September 1973) 

Thomas N. Barnes (1 October 1973–31 July 1977) 

Robert D. Gaylor (1 August 1977–31 July 1979) 

James M. McCoy (1 August 1979–31 July 1981) 

Arthur L. Andrews (1 August 1981–31 July 1983) 

Sam E. Parish (1 August 1983–30 June 1986) 

James C. Binnicker (1 July 1986–31 July 1990) 

Gary R. Pfinsgton (1 August 1990–25 October 1994) 

David J. Campanale (26 October 1994–1 November 1996) 

Eric W. Benken (5 November 1996–30 July 1999)

Frederick J. Finch (2 August 1999–present)

169
Appendix D

Fighter Aces

In World War I France, Belgium, Italy, Russia, and the United States used the term ace.

It was first used to describe the exploits of Roland Garros, who when he was captured had

five kills. Thus, became the standard by which “acedom” was achieved.

World War I American Aces

Edward V. Rickenbacker 26 Frank K. Hays 6

Frank Luke Jr. 18 Donald Hudson 6

George A. Vaughn 13 Howard C. Knotts 6

Field E. Kindley 12 Robert O. Lindsay 6

Elliot White Springs 12 John K. MacArthur 6

Reed G. Landis 10 William T. Ponder 6

Jacques M. Swaab 10 David E. Putnam 6

Paul F. Baer 9 William H. Stovall 6

Thomas G. Cassady 9 Edgar G. Tobin 6

Lloyd A. Hamilton 9 Jerry C. Vasconcells 6

Chester E. Wright 9 William T. Badham 5

Henry R. Clay 8 Clayton L. Bissell 5

Hamilton Coolidge 8 Hilbert L. Blair 5

John Owen Donaldson 8 Arthur R. Brooks 5

William P. Erwin 8 Harold R. Buckley 5

Frank O. D. Hunter 8 Everett R. Cook 5

Clinton Jones 8 Charles R. D’Olive 5

James A. Meissner 8 Arthur L. Easterbrook 5

Martinus Stenseth 8 George W. Furlow 5

Wilbur W. White 8 Harold H. George 5

Howard R. Burdick 7 Charles G. Grey 5

Reed M. Chambers 7 Edward M. Haight 5

Harvey Weir Cook 7 James A. Healy 5

Jesse O. Creech 8 James Knowles Jr. 5

Lansing C. Holden 7 G. DeFreest Larner 5

Wendel A. Robertson 7 Frederick E. Luff 5

Leslie J. Rummell 7 Ralph A. O’Neill 5

Karl J. Schoen 7 John S. Owens 5

Sumner Sewall 7 Kenneth L. Porter 5

James D. Beane 6 Orville A. Ralston 5

Charles J. Biddle 6 John J. Seerley 5

Douglas Campbell 6 Victor H. Strahm 5

Edward P. Curtis 6 Robert M. Todd 5

Murray K. Guthrie 6 Remington D. Vernam 5

Leonard C. Hammond 6 Joseph F. Wehner 5

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World War II US Army Air Forces Aces with at Least 14.5 Victories

Richard I. Bong 40 John C. Herbst 18

Thomas B. McGuire Jr. 38 Hubert Zemke 17.75

Francis S. Gabreski 28 John B. England 17.5

Robert S. Johnson 27 Duane W. Beeson 17.33

Charles H. MacDonald 27 John F. Thornell Jr. 17.25

George E. Preddy Jr. 26.83 James S. Varnell Jr. 17

John C. Meyer 24 Gerald W. Johnson 16.5

David C. Schilling 22.5 John T. Godfrey 16.33

Gerald R. Johnson 22 Clarence E. Anderson Jr. 16.25

Jay T. Robbins 22 William D. Dunham 16

Neel E. Kearby 22 Bill Harris 16

Fred J. Christensen 21.5 George S. Welch 16

Ray S. Wetmore 21.25 Donald M. Beerbower 15.5

John J. Voll 21 Samuel J. Brown 15.5

Walker M. Mahurin 20.75 Richard A. Peterson 15.5

Robert B. Westbrook 20 William T. Whisner Jr. 15.5

Thomas J. Lynch 20 Jack T. Bradley 15

Don S. Gentile 19.83 Robert W. Foy 15

Glenn E. Duncan 19.5 Ralph K. Hofer 15

Glenn T. Eagleston 18.5 Edward Cragg 15

Leonard K. Carson 18.5 Cyril F. Homer 15

Walter C. Beckham 18 John D. Landers 14.5

Herschel H. Green 18 Joe H. Powers Jr. 14.5

172

Capt Robert S. Johnson of the 61st Fighter

Squadron shot down 27 aircraft between June of

1943 and May of 1944 in the European theater.
US Air Force Korean Conflict Aces

Joseph McConnell Jr. 16 Francis Gabreski 6.5

James Jabara 15 Donald E. Adams 6.5

Manuel J. Fernandez 14.5 George L. Jones 6.5

George Davis Jr. 14 Winton W. Marshall 6.5

Royal N. Baker 13 James H. Kasler 6

Fredrick Blesse 10 Robert J. Love 6

Harold E. Fischer 10 William T. Whisner Jr. 5.5

Vermont Garrison 10 Robert P. Baldwin 5

James Johnson 10 Richard S. Becker 5

Lonnie R. Moore 10 Stephen L. Bettinger 5

Ralph S. Parr Jr. 10 Richard D. Creighton 5

Cecil G. Foster 9 Clyde A. Curtin 5

James F. Low 9 Ralph D. Gibson 5

James P. Hagerstrom 8.5 Ivan C. Kinchloe 5

Robinson Risner 8 Robert T. Latshaw 5

George L. Ruddell 8 Robert H. Moore 5

Henry Buttlemann 7 Dolphin D. Overton III 5

Clifford D. Jolley 7 William H. Wescott 5

Leonard W. Lilley 7 Harrison R. Thyng 5

173
US Air Force Vietnam War Aces

Charles B. DeBellevue 6

Richard S. Ritchie 5

Jeffrey S. Feinstein 5

174
Appendix E

USAF Medal of Honor Winners

Name Date of Action Place of Action

World War I

2Lt Erwin R. Bleckley 6 Oct 1918 Binarville, France

2Lt Harold E. Goettler 6 Oct 1918 Binarville, France

2Lt Frank Luke Jr. 29 Sep 1918 Murvaux, France

Capt Edward V. Rickenbacker 25 Sep 1918 Billy, France

World War II

Lt Col Addison E. Baker 1 Aug 1943 Ploesti, Romania

Maj Richard I. Bong Fall of 1943 Southwest Pacific

Maj Horace S. Carswell Jr. 26 Oct 1944 South China Sea

Brig Gen Frederick W. Castle 24 Dec 1944 Liege, Belgium

Maj Ralph Cheli 18 Aug 1943 Wewak, New Guinea

Col Demas T. Craw 8 Nov 1942 Port Lyautey, French

Morocco

Lt Col James H. Doolittle 18 Apr 1942 Tokyo, Japan

SSgt Henry E. Erwin 12 Apr 1945 Koriyama, Japan

2Lt Robert E. Femoyer 2 Nov 1944 Merseburg, Germany

1Lt Donald J. Gott 9 Nov 1944 Saarbrucken, Germany

Maj Pierpont M. Hamilton 8 Nov 1942 Port Lyautey, French

Morocco

Lt Col James H. Howard 11 Jan 1944 Oschersleben, Germany

2Lt Lloyd H. Hughes 1 Aug 1943 Ploesti, Romania

Maj John L. Jerstad 1 Aug 1943 Ploesti, Romania

Col Leon W. Johnson 1 Aug 1943 Ploesti, Romania

Col John R. Kane 1 Aug 1943 Ploesti, Romania

Col Neel E. Kearby 11 Oct 1943 Wewak, New Guinea

2Lt David R. Kingsley 23 Jun 1944 Ploesti, Romania

1Lt Raymond L. Knight 25 Apr 1945 Po Valley, Italy

1Lt William R. Lawley Jr. 20 Feb 1944 Leipzig, Germany

Capt Darrell R. Lindsey 9 Aug 1944 Pontoise, France

SSgt Archibald Mathies 20 Feb 1944 Leipzig, Germany

1Lt Jack W. Mathis 18 Mar 1943 Vegesack, Germany

175
USAF Medal of Honor Winners (Cont.)

Name Date of Action Place of Action

Maj Thomas B. McGuire Jr. 25-26 Dec 1944 Luzon, Philippines

2Lt William E. Metzger Jr. 9 Nov 1944 Saarbrucken, Germany

1Lt Edward S. Michael 11 Apr 1944 Brunswick, Germany

2Lt John C. Morgan 28 Jul 1943 Kiel, Germany

Capt Harl Pease Jr. 7 Aug 1942 Rabaul, New Britain

1Lt Donald D. Pucket 9 Jul 1944 Ploesti, Romania

2Lt Joseph R. Sarnoski 16 Jun 1943 Buka, Solomon Islands

Maj William A. Shomo 11 Jan 1945 Luzon, Philippines

Sgt Maynard H. Smith 1 May 1943 St. Nazaire, France

2Lt Walter E. Truemper 20 Feb 1944 Leipzig, Germany

Lt Col Leon R. Vance Jr. 5 Jun 1944 Wimereaux, France

TSgt Forrest L. Vosler 20 Dec 1943 Bremen, Germany

Brig Gen Kenneth N. Walker 5 Jan 1943 Rabaul, New Britain

Maj Raymond H. Wilkins 2 Nov 1943 Rabaul, New Britain

Maj Jay Zeamer Jr. 16 Jun 1943 Buka, Solomon Islands

Korea

Maj George A. Davis Jr. 10 Feb 1952 Sinuiji-Yalu River, N. Korea

Maj Charles J. Loring Jr. 22 Nov 1952 Sniper Ridge, N. Korea

Maj Louis J. Sebille 5 Aug 1950 Hamch’ang, S. Korea

Capt John S. Walmsley Jr. 14 Sep 1951 Yangdok, N. Korea

Vietnam

Capt Steven L. Bennett 29 Jun 1972 Quang Tri, S. Vietnam

Col George E. Day While POW

Maj Merlyn H. Dethlefsen 10 Mar 1967 Thai Nguyen, N. Vietnam

Maj Bernard F. Fisher 10 Mar 1966 A Shau Valley, S. Vietnam

1Lt James P. Fleming 26 Nov 1968 Duc Co, S. Vietnam

Lt Col Joe M. Jackson 12 May 1968 Kham Duc, S. Vietnam

Col William A. Jones III 1 Sep 1968 Dong hoi, N. Vietnam

A1C John L. Levitow 24 Feb 1969 Long Binh, S. Vietnam

A1C William H. Pitzenbarger 11 Apr 1966 S. Vietnam

Capt Lance P. Sijan While POW

Lt Col Leo K. Thorsness 19 Apr 1967 N. Vietnam

Capt Hilliard A. Wilbanks 24 Feb 1967 Dalat, S. Vietnam

Capt Gerald O. Young 9 Nov 1967 Da Nang area, S. Vietnam

176
The Medal of Honor is the highest military award for

bravery that can be given to any individual in the

United States of America. Established by joint resolution of Congress, 12 July 1862 (amended by Act of 9 July 1918

and Act of 25 July 1963). The first Medals of Honor awarded

went to six Union Army volunteers, members of Andrews’s (or

Mitchel’s) Raiders. These men attempted to disrupt the

Confederate rail lines between Atlanta and Chattanooga.

Disguised as civilians, the 19 soldiers, along with civilians James

Andrews and William Campbell, captured the locomotive

General at Big Shanty, Georgia. Chased by the persistent conductor of the General the raiders charged north, attempting to

burn bridges and destroy track along the way. Less than 20 miles

south of Chattanooga the “Great Locomotive Chase” ended. All

of the raiders were captured and eight were tried and executed.

On 25 March 1863, six of the raiders arrived in Washington after

parole from a Confederate prison, and these six were the first to

be presented Medals of Honor by Secretary of War Stanton.

177
Introduction to the United States Air Force

Air University Press Team

Copy Editors

Peggy Smith

Lula Barnes

Book Design, Cover Design,

And Illustrations

L. Susan Fair

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Linda C. Colson

Mary P. Ferguson