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An Air Campaign in Support of National Policy

Col Perry L. Lamy, USAF
DISCLAIMER NOTICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST

QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY

FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED

A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF

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REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.
BARREL ROLL, 1968-73

An Air Campaign in Support ofNational Policy

PERRY L. LAMY

COL, USAF

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 1996

DTTC QUALITY INSPECTED 1
Disclaimer

The author produced this publication in the Department of Defense school environment in the

interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The

views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for

public release.
Ho my loving wife, (Peggy

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Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER a

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . vii

PREFACE ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi

INTRODUCTION xüi

1 STRATEGIC APPRECIATION 1

Laos—the Country 1

Laos—the Conflict 5

US National Policy for Laos 7

US National Strategy for Laos 9

Objectives for Laos—United States 10

Objectives for Laos—North Vietnamese 10

Notes 11

2 MILITARY SITUATION 15

US Military Strategy 15

The Old Course ofAction 16

A New Course ofAction 18

Notes 18

3 THE AIR CAMPAIGN PLAN 19

Theater Air Campaign Plan: Barrel Roll (1 November 1968-

21 February 1973) 20

Command Relationship . 20

Situation 21

Phasing 25

Military Assistance Program 27

Notes 29

4 ANALYSIS 33

Airpower Effort, Effects, and Effectiveness 33

Resource Allocation—Measuring Airpower Effort in

Barrel Roll 35

Bomb Damage Assessment—Measuring Airpower Effects

and Effectiveness ofBarrel Roll 37

Congruence with National Policy—Measuring Airpower

Effectiveness 38

Notes 39
Chapter Page

5 CONCLUSION 41

Barrel Roll as an Air Campaign 41

Relevant Lessons 44

Notes 46

EPILOGUE 47

APPENDIX 49

BIBLIOGRAPHY '. 67

Illustrations

Figure

1 The Levels of War xv

2 Map of Laos with Military Regions and Ho Chi Minh Trail

Depicted 2

3 Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger Areas of Operations in Laos 20

4 Command Structure for Laos Operations 21

Table

1 Analysis Model and Roadmap xvi

2 Causes ofthe War in Laos, 1962-1973 7

3 Elements of a Campaign Plan 19

4 USAF Attack Aircraft in Southeast Asia 24

5 Airpower Effort, Effects, and Effectiveness 34

VI
About the

Author

Col Perry L. Lamy

Col Perry L. Lamy received his BS degree from the United States Air Force

Academy; MA, Central Michigan University; and MS, University of Idaho. He

graduated from Air War College in 1995.

Colonel Lamy has enjoyed a diverse career in bomber operations, acquisition,

flight test, and overseas joint duty and as a staff officer at the academy, major

command, and theater-headquarters. Following an operational tour as a combat

crew member in B-52s, Colonel Lamy completed an Air Staff training assignment at

Headquarters USAF.

In 1983 Colonel Lamy graduated from the USAF Test Pilot School and was

selected as a project pilot for the B-1B flight-test program. In 1987 he attended

Armed Forces Staff College followed by a joint assignment on the Combined Forces

Staff in South Korea. Returning from overseas, Colonel Lamy became the program

element manager for the B-1B at Headquarters Strategic Air Command. His most

recent assignment was squadron commander of a 100-person test organization

responsible for planning, executing, and reporting the 4,000-hour B-2 flight test

program at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California. He is a command pilot with

over 3,000 hours of flight experience in 25 different aircraft to include the B-l, B-2

B-52, FB-111A, A/T-37, and T-38A.

Following graduation from Air War College, Colonel Lamy became systems

program director at the Sacramento Air Logistics Center.

uu
Preface

Barrel Roll (1968-73) was the US air campaign conducted over northern Laos in

support of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG). Although the campaign supported

US national policy in Southeast Asia (SEA), it was constrained by US military

strategy and objectives in South Vietnam and responded to North Vietnamese

military strategy and objectives. The mission of Barrel Roll was to conduct air

operations in support of the RLG by (1) interdicting enemy supplies moving through

northern Laos and (2) providing air support for Laotian ground forces fighting the

North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. The last four years of Barrel Roll—from

November 1968 to February 1973—hold especial interest due to changes in US

national and military strategy in SEA. An examination of air operations relies on the

"campaign model" found in Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for

Joint Operations. It answers five questions: Why is the campaign conducted? What is

to be accomplished? How will it be accomplished? How much resource is applied? and

What are the results? Results are assessed in terms of effects and effectiveness of

airpower. Effects are the direct or immediate outcome, for example, the destruction

of a target. Effectiveness examines the indirect outcome at the operational or

strategic level, including defeating the enemy in battle or achieving theater

objectives.

From the perspective of achieving objectives, Barrel Roll was an effective air

campaign in support of national, strategic, and operational objectives in SEA.

Relevant lessons of Barrel Roll include the central control of airpower, employment

of airpower in an undeveloped country, and use of airpower in unconventional

combat. Cost is assessed in terms of attack sorties, ordnance delivered, and bomb

damage assessment results. This data is listed in an appendix.

vc
Acknowledgments

As with any research project, several people provided me assistance and

encouragement. Principal among this group was Dr Alexander ("Sandy") Cochran of

the Air War College faculty. As my research adviser, Sandy provided motivation and

encouragement along the way and a critical review. He also gave me a new

perspective and appreciation for America's war in Southeast Asia. My unofficial

adviser, Col Jim Roper, USAF, Retired, provided the inspiration for the research

question and thesis. Colonel Roper, a Raven forward air controller, furnished a

first-hand perspective for the secret war in Laos that was invaluable. Both of these

gentlemen are American heroes!

This project involved many hours spent in the Air Force Historical Research

Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base. Without the help and advice of Joe Caver, I

would not have survived the experience of combing through scores of reports and

historical documents. Joe made the project fun and exciting and the research easy.

In addition, I want to single out Dr Richard Bailey at the Air University Press,

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education for special thanks. As editor,

Dr Bailey transformed my passive English into a manuscript that was active and

alive.

Finally, I wish to thank my family for their special contributions. My wife, Peggy,

helped to compile the data that resulted in the report's graphs. I also appreciate the

patience of my sons, Alex and Nicholas, during the many hours Dad spent either at

the archives or in front ofthe computer.

XI
Introduction

Laos was not all that... important.

—Chester Cooper

When US aid to Laos ended in 1975, 25 years of US military involvement

concluded—most of it conducted secretly. Despite the publicity from presidential

disclosure and congressional hearings in 1969, the scope of US operations continues

to unfold from recently declassified US military records. However, most Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and State Department records continue to be inaccessible.

This lack of public awareness obscures the awesome US airpower effort: 551,552

fighter attack sorties—almost 60 percent of the "out-of-country" effort—and an

additional 391,380 support sorties. The costs of this contest are equally staggering:

493 aircraft lost, more than 400 US military persons killed, 505 individuals missing

in action, a generation of Hmong citizenry lost, and $1.4 billion in US military

assistance spent.1

The conflict in Laos created a theater of operations separate from the rest of SEA.

Terms including out of country, up-country, extreme western demilitarized zone

(DMZ), over the fence, and the secret war characterized US military involvement in

Laos. After 20 years few chronicles have covered the covert war. They have

mentioned almost nothing about the effectiveness of air operations in support of US

strategic and national objectives in Laos.2

The war in Laos had a dual character: first, it was a struggle for the survival of

Laos—basically, a civil war; and second, it was a spillover of the conflict in South

Vietnam. Lacking the will to commit US ground forces to Laos, the direct US combat

involvement was with airpower. Consequently, two distinct air wars resulted in the

skies above Laos between 1964 and 1973. In the southern panhandle, Steel Tiger

involved the interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail used by North Vietnam to

prosecute their war in South Vietnam. In northern Laos a different war was fought.

Barrel Roll provided air support for the ground forces of the RLG fighting communist

insurgents. The survival of the RLG and ultimately Laos as a neutral country was

the object of this war.3The impetus for US involvement in both of these air wars

stems from US national policy and objectives in SEA. Air operations in Steel Tiger

directly supported US military activities in South Vietnam and were conducted with

consent of the RLG. Those in Barrel Roll directly supported the RLG and were the

"price of admission" for US operations in Steel Tiger.

xiu
Objective

This paper focuses on air operations during the last four years of Barrel Roll, from

1 November 1968 to 21 February 1973. It answers five questions: Why did the US

conduct Barrel Roll? What was it suppose to accomplish? How were US operations in

support of Barrel Roll conducted? How much resource was applied? and What were

the results? To answer the why questions, this research examines the development of

US involvement, US national objectives, and military strategy. The what issue

examines how the military strategy is transformed into a course of action. Next, the

how concern analyzes the context of a campaign plan. Did Barrel Roll constitute an

(implicit) air campaign plan? Finally, to address the results of Barrel Roll, this paper

examines the costs, effects, and effectiveness of US air operations. Did US airpower

as applied in northern Laos support US objectives in SEA? Was airpower effective?

and What were the lessons learned?

Thesis

Airpower employed by the US in northern Laos between 1968 and 1973 supported

US national policy in SEA, was constrained by US military strategy and objectives in

South Vietnam (both policy and resources), and was responsive to North Vietnamese

military strategy and objectives.

Approach

This writer uses a campaign analysis to examine Barrel Roll. Both the US Air

Force's JFACC Primer and Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint

Air Operations, provide a useful model to observe the connection between national

objectives and tactical action. Both describe the evolution of a campaign plan.

Accordingly, this paper examines the employment of airpower in Barrel Roll at three

levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. Objectives and results exist at each of

these three levels and are part of the discussion. Figure 1 shows the hierarchical

relationship between these three levels. The paper concentrates principally on the

strategic and operational levels.4

Prior to conducting air operations, planners must have a strategic appreciation of

the theater and conflict—the why for the conflict. Based on the strategic

appreciation, the commander can formulate a course of action that defines what will

be accomplished. The campaign plan states how to conduct the course of action. An

air operations plan is devised to support the campaign. Finally, execution of daily

operations (tactics, strikes, targeting, and bomb damage assessment) is performed by

daily guidance that adjusts the plan based on the dynamics of the conflict.5

Airmen cannot appreciate campaign planning or the operational art without

practice or experience. History offers a method to gain this insight. Using a

campaign plan format to analyze a historic conflict provides a structured way to

examine the conflict, along with an opportunity to exercise and appreciate the

thought process of campaign planning. Table 1 outlines the approach used in this

xiv
STRATEGIC LEVEL

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

TACTICAL LEVEL

*bomb damage assessment

Figure 1. The Levels of War

paper to analyze Barrel Roll. This approach is offered as a model that can be used to

analyze other campaigns historically.

Why examine Barrel Roll? An academic treatment of Barrel Roll awaits

accomplishment. For now, the period November 1968 to February 1973 provides an

interesting period during the war. The termination of bombing in North Vietnam, a

new administration in Washington, declining aircraft resources, political constraints,

changing objectives, and a unique theater which has not been previously scrutinized

combine to produce a treasure ofinformation for examination and analysis.

xv
Table 1

Analysis Model and Roadmap

ANALYSIS QUESTION ELEMENT SECTION OF PAPER

Why the campaign is conducted? Political Objectives

National Strategy STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

What will be accomplished?

Military Strategy

Concept of Operations

Course of Action

MILITARY SITUATION

How will it be accomplished? Campaign Plan THE AIR CAMPAIGN PLAN

How much resource is applied?

What were the results?

Effort

Effects

Effectiveness

Lessons Learned

ANALYSIS

Was Barrel Roll an (implicit) air

campaign plan?

Objectives versus

Campaign Plan CONCLUSIONS

Notes

1. Senate, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Kingdom ofLaos, Hearings

before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad ofthe Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1970, p. 2 (hereafter cited as Laos Hearings). For Central

Intelligence Agency and State Department classified documents, see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the

Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1993), xi. Sortie data come from the Air Force, "Summary of Air Operations in

Southeast Asia," vol. 103, Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, February 1973, 4-A-l

(for period 18 May 1965 to 28 February 1973). Attack and support sorties include US Air Force, US

Navy, and US Marine Corps sorties and do not include B-52 sorties, Royal Lao Air Force, Vietnamese

National Air Force, or US Army sorties. Southeast Asia sorties in support of combat outside of South

Vietnam were considered out of country. These areas consist of North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

See Capt Peter A. W. Liebchen, Department of the Air Force, "MAP Aid to Laos, 1959-1972," Project

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 25 June 1973, 171.

2. Two books provide a fresh examination of this conflict. Timothy N. Castle's At War in the Shadow

of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1953) gives a historical account of US military assistance to Laos from the early 1950s until 1975.

It is a detailed study of events and provides an excellent overview of the conflict. The bibliography is

exceptionally thorough and lists nearly every source available on the subject. However, the book does

not offer an airman's perspective of the employment of airpower. See Jacob Van Staaveren, Interdiction

in Southern Laos: 1960-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993) is a USAF Office of

History account of the Steel Tiger campaign in eastern Laos. Both are highly recommended for studying

the conflict in Laos.

3. Department of the Air Force, "Air War in Northern Laos 1 April-30 November 1971," Project

CHECO, Maj William W. Lofgren, USAF and Maj Richard R. Sexton, USAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii:

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 22 June 1973, 2.

4. Department of the Air Force, JFACC Primer, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Deputy Chief of Staff,

Plans and Operations, Headquarters USAF, February 1994), 19-24; and Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994, A-l to A-5.

5. Department of the Air Force, JFACC Primer, 36.

xvi
Chapter 1

Strategic Appreciation

The basic U.S. policy toward Laos is that of support for its independence and

neutrality. The United States has undertaken no defense commitment—written,

stated, or understood—to the Royal Lao Government.

—Amb William H. Sullivan, 1969

This is the end of nowhere. We can do anything we want here because Washington

doesn't seem to know it exists.

—An American official, Vientiane, Laos

November 1960

To establish the purpose of Barrel Roll (the why question), understanding

its strategic context is necessary. The environment, the national policy and

objectives, and the national strategy provide the strategic appreciation for

why the operation was undertaken.

Laos—the Country

Upon briefing president-elect John F. Kennedy, President Dwight D.

Eisenhower identified Laos as the strategic key to Southeast Asia (SEA).

Then within weeks, Laos became the principal focus of the Kennedy

administration. Why did US policymakers regard Laos as so important? Part

of the answer lies with the characteristics of Laos, its geography, people, and

culture, and its politics, government, and history.1

Geography

The location and geography of Laos are the first aspect of its strategic

significance. Laos occupies a key position in SEA as a land-locked country

that borders six other countries. Three prominent geographical features play

an important role in the Laotian conflict: the Annam Cordillera mountain

range, the Mekong River, and the Plaine de Jarres (PDJ) or Plain ofJars. The

Annamite chain forms the eastern boundary of Laos and extends from China

south to the Gulf of Thailand, along the entire 1,324-mile border with

Vietnam. The Mekong River, along the western border of Laos, flows from

China south to Cambodia. The PDJ, located between these two features in the

center of northern Laos, is a rolling grassland surrounded by high mountains.
The PDJ is particularly strategic as crossroads for trade and armies at war.

Two major lines of communications run south through Laos. The first, on the

west side of the Annamite chain and including parts of the Mekong River,

becomes the Ho Chi Minh trail and the focus ofthe war in southern Laos. The

second, the crossroads on the PDJ connecting China and North Vietnam with

Cambodia and Thailand, forms the arena for the war in northern Laos.

Figure 2 offers a map of Laos.2

Figure 2. Map of Laos with Military Regions and Ho Chi Minh Trail Depicted
Climate

The seasonal weather pattern also plays a prominent role in the war. Laos

is part of monsoon Asia. Between mid-September and March, the dry season

coincides with a yearly communist offensive and logistics movement through

Laos. At the same time, the period between May and September experiences

heavy rains and the Royal Lao Government (RLG) counteroffensive.

Eighty-five percent of the economy is agricultural. While rice is the principal

crop, opium is a lucrative cash crop and a principal objective of external

aggressors.3

People and Culture

Laos, about the size of Great Britain, is sparsely populated with

approximately 3 million people from four ethnic groups: Lao Lum (45

percent), Lao Theung (30 percent), Lao Tai (20 percent), and Lao Soung (5

percent).4The majority group (the Lao Lum or Lao of the lowland valleys) are

Theravada Buddhist and ethnically identical to people of northeast

Thailand.5The Lao Lum are the best educated and the most influential

people in Laotian society and government. The royal family is ethnic Lao

Lum. The three minority groups share a common characteristic as animist.

The Lao Tai (or Lao of the upper valleys) migrated into the area and have the

same language. The Lao Theung or (Lao of the mountainside) are the slave

tribes (Kha) of Laos and descend from the aboriginal inhabitants displaced by

the Lao Lum. Finally, the Lao Soung (Lao of the mountain tops) are Hmong

and Yao tribesmen who migrated from southern China. The Hmong grow

opium poppy and comprise the natural warriors of Laos. Historically, the Lao

Tai and Lao Theung suffered from mistreatment and discrimination by the

Lao Lum. In contrast, the independent lifestyle and cash from the sale of

opium permit the Hmong to escape the influence ofthe Lao Lum.6

Politics and Government

The RLG was a constitutional monarchy composed of a prime minister,

council of ministers, and a national assembly. The elite lowland Lao Lum

dominated the government, while the minorities—Lao Tai, Lao Theung, and

Lao Soung—had little or no representation.7

A nationalist movement developed in 1945 to oppose the return of French

colonialism. Two half-brothers played prominent roles in the movement.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, a neutralist, became a leading figure in

the nationalist movement and RLG. Prince Söuphanouvong, joined the

communist Viet Minh in Vietnam and formed a nationalist guerrilla

organization that evolved into the Pathet Lao (land of Laos).8

Communists in Laos formed the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS, Lao Patriotic

Front), which became the political party of the Pathet Lao and a front

organization for the secret Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP).
Principally the North Vietnamese comprised the LPRP, who reported directly

to Ho Chi Minh.9

History before 1964

Laos shares a modern history similar to Vietnam. The French occupied the

area from 1856 to 1954, with a brief intermission by the Japanese during

World War II. The Laotian conflict began in 1953 as part of the First

Indochinese War. The People's Army of Vietnam assisted by Pathet Lao

troops attacked the French on the PDJ. They sought a psychological blow to

the French and the capture of the opium crop to provide cash for weapons.

But the monsoon rain prevented the continuation of a Vietnamese offensive.

The French denied the Viet Minh their objective by buying the opium crop.

French deployment to the outpost at Dien Bien Phu prevented future

incursions into Laos. However, in May 1954 the French defeat there set up

the agreements in Geneva.10

The Geneva Accords of 1954 made Laos an independent, neutral buffer

between China and Thailand. Unlike Vietnam, Laos was not partitioned by

the Geneva Accords of 1954. Instead, the provisions called for a cease-fire, the

withdrawal of all external military attachments, and the establishment of a

Pathet Lao administration zone in the northeastern provinces of Phong Saly

and Sam Neua pending further negotiations.11

The Geneva Accords recognized the RLG and expelled French rule, but the

Vietnamese never departed Laos as required by the accords. In support of the

RLG, the US provided economic aid to assist the RLG to repel the

communists. Thus, a nationalist struggle against foreign influence continued:

the RLG fighting North Vietnamese infiltration and the Pathet Lao fighting

US involvement.12

In November 1957 the first coalition government with representation from

the NLHS and led by Prime Minister Phouma was formed. Unfortunately, the

coalition was short-lived. Widespread corruption due to the influx of large

amounts of US aid allowed the Pathet Lao to show substantial strength in the

1958 election. The RLG's flirtation with communism led to a cutoff of US aid

and the coalition government fell in July 1958. A US-sponsored, right-wing

government that was hostile towards Pathet Lao representation took control.

A civil war erupted in May 1959. The RLG, with US-supplied arms, fought

the Pathet Lao openly.13

In 1960 a neutralist coup followed by a right-wing countercoup created

additional confusion. The civil war continued with neutral forces, allied with

the Pathet Lao and supported by Soviet airdrops, fighting the right-wing

forces supported by US aid. By the end of 1960, two legal governments took

charge of Laos: Souvanna Phouma's neutral government supported by the

communists and Prince Boun Oum's right-wing government supported by the

US.14

In 1961 the new Kennedy administration called for a review of US policy in

Laos. Despite favoring a diplomatic solution, Kennedy took a firm stand by
making US military aid to Laos visible to the Soviets and Hanoi. A

confrontation between the superpowers began. In May 1961 a cease-fire was

called and the three parties—Souphanouvong, Boun Oum, and Souvanna

Phouma—negotiated a coalition government. Despite a discussion of Laos

between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in

Vienna, talks in Geneva continued for more than a year. During this time,

Kennedy increased covert operations in Laos.15

In 1962 a communist offensive advancing towards Thailand with

implications of Chinese communist involvement caused Kennedy to deploy

US forces to the area. The crisis ended and the three princes agreed to

form the second coalition government in June. On 23 July 1962 the

parties signed a new set of Geneva Accords and formed an international

agreement of neutrality for Laos. In support of the Geneva Accords, the US

immediately withdrew all 666 military personnel from Laos; however, only

44 North Vietnamese officially departed Laos. As for North Vietnamese

presence in Laos, the US established a disguised military aid mission called

the Requirements Office and staffed the office with retired military civilians;

trained Laotian pilots in Thailand; and, supplied T-28s to the Laotian Air

Force. By May 1963 the coalition government unraveled and again open

conflict erupted in Laos. Fearful of North Vietnamese insurgents and

unable to defend his country, Souvanna called on security measures offered

by the US.16

Laos—the Conflict

For the next 11 years chaos characterized conditions in Laos. The Kingdom

of Laos started the 1960s at the forefront of superpower confrontation only to

become a "war in the shadow of Vietnam" and ultimately forgotten when the

communists took over in 1975. Throughout the years of US involvement,

many names colored the war in Laos. The secret war or the CIA war defined

the participants: Department of Defense, State Department, and Central

Intelligence Agency (CIA). Sullivan's war, still another name, denoted the

covert nature of a war that required strict in-country direction by the US

ambassador. Laos became the area out of country or over the fence for

Americans stationed in SEA. US servicemen in Thailand referred to the area

as up-country, while those in South Vietnam called it the extreme western

DMZ. Still others called the war the forgotten war. This name reflected the

secondary nature of this war to other US foreign policy issues.17

Combatants

The combatants were divided into two camps: forces supporting the RLG

and forces supporting the NLHS. Supporting the RLG, the Royal Lao Army,

also known as the Forces Armee Royaume (FAR), organized into five military

regions (MR) with a warlord general in command of each region. These forces
proved only marginally effective throughout the conflict—thus a surrogate

ground force was needed to fight for the RLG. Likewise, the North

Vietnamese sought surrogates to advance their military agenda.

Both sides targeted the minority peoples of Laos as agents. The population

provided a political base for future negotiations and a legitimate government.

These people also formed a labor base for armed forces, food production, and

supply porters. Consequently, control of the population in northern Laos was

an objective of both sides. To maintain access to this labor pool during the

conflict, each side had to move and protect large groups of people.18

US officials focused on the Lao Soung or Hmong tribesmen. Financing by

the US and training by the CIA enabled special guerrilla units (SGU) or the

clandestine armee of Hmong tribesmen to organize into an irregular army. In

1960 the US solicited the legendary Gen Vang Pao to lead the SGU against

the communists. Subsequently, he commanded the Hmong SGU in military

region 2 in northern Laos. It developed into the most effective anticommunist

ground combat unit during the war. Additionally, the US employed Thai

"volunteers" to fight in Laos.19

The Pathet Lao appealed to the discriminated Laotians—the Lao Tai and

Lao Theung—for support. This appeal naturally pitted them against RLG

forces dominated by the Lao Lum and the SGU, which were made up of

Hmong tribesmen. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) entered Laos early in

the conflict and provided aid and manpower to the Pathet Lao. By 1970

approximately 80,000 North Vietnamese were in Laos.20

North Vietnamese Involvement

Early in their struggle for a unified Vietnam, the North Vietnamese

realized the strategic importance of Laos. The North Vietnamese began their

political and military presence in Laos immediately after WWII. Ho Chi Minh

sent military agents to Laos in 1945 to ensure the security of the common

border and keep the imperialist out. The fight against the French in 1953

culminated in Dien Bien Phu. In December 1960 North Vietnam decided to

intervene in Laos as part of a strategy against South Vietnam. During 1961

the North Vietnamese presence transformed from a semicovert advisory role

for the Pathet Lao into a full-blown operational theater. Although they never

left Laos following the 1962 Geneva Agreement, they, like the US, refused to

acknowledge their presence in Laos for the remainder of the war.21

To avoid the appearance of imperialist tendencies, beginning in 1955 the

LPRP, Ho Chi Minh's secret communist party, hid behind the NLHS.

Consequently, the NLHS became a front for the North Vietnamese

communists, who actually made the important decisions. They viewed Laos as

crucial to their security and as a conduit to spread their influence west into

Thailand. The LPRP's ultimate goal was dominance of the Lao government

and society. Meanwhile, NLHS participation in the coalition government was

allowed as a tactical expedient to the LPRP's ultimate goal.22
Causes

Given the geographic, political, and military importance of Laos in SEA,

the conflict reached its climax with US involvement in the 1960s. Table 2 lists

the causes for this war. The war, disguised as a civil war, was actually an

extension of the conflict in Vietnam. As the keystone of SEA, Laos provided

communist access to Thailand, Burma, and South Vietnam.

Table 2

Causes of the War in Laos, 1962-1973

Primary Causes Vietnam's traditional attempt to assert hegemony over SEA.

North Vietnam's struggle to take over South Vietnam.

Civil war between Lao communist (left) and anti-communist

(right).

Secondary Causes Communist capture of SEA strategic crossroads and keystones.

Laotian desire for independence, free of foreign influence

(neutralist).

The cold war, US versus China and USSR.

Control of Hmong opium harvest by Viet Minh.

Class struggle between Lao Lum dominated society and Laotian

minorities.

US National Policy for Laos

US policy toward Laos depended on US interests in SEA. Each

administration dealt with Laos differently. The course selected by the United

States resulted from objectives in SEA, particularly after the US became

militarily involved in Vietnam. Initially, US interests sought to limit

communist influence in SEA; however, following the Tet offensive in 1968, the

Nixon administration viewed withdrawal and a negotiated settlement as

policy. A broader understanding of the 1968-73 Barrel Roll campaign

requires a knowledge of the evolution of US policy. The following data helps

to answer the why question ofBarrel Roll.

Containment

Through the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the guiding policy

with respect to Laos sought containment of communism. This view regarded

communism as a threat spreading to the West, and SEA vulnerability was
considered as one of the dominos in Eisenhower's monolithic communist

model. Eisenhower viewed the loss of Indochina to the communists as a

severe strategic consequence. Unwilling to commit ground troops, he used

economic and military assistance to fill the void left by the departing French

and to support a pro-West/anticommunist government.

Neutralization

Kennedy's first international crisis occurred in Laos. With communist

insurgencies threatening South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and a possible

confrontation against the Soviets over Laos, he preferred a negotiated

settlement to a direct military intervention. US policy changed from

supporting a right-wing, anticommunist government to supporting a neutral

Laos led by a coalition government that included the communists in control of

the eastern part of the country. In addition, Khrushchev assured Kennedy

that the USSR would not fight the US over Laos. As the keystone of SEA,

Laos acted as a buffer in two dimensions between North Vietnam and

Thailand and between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The US viewed

Geneva as offering a choice between which buffer would receive the most

attention. Since Kennedy believed that South Vietnam, with military aid,

counterinsurgency assistance, and air support, could defeat the Vietcong

insurgents, the US chose a stalemate in Laos to protect Thailand. A neutral

government in Vientiane, assisted by covert US aid, would maintain the

buffer for Thailand.23

Military Solution

President Lyndon B. Johnson became focused primarily on US support for

South Vietnam. He initiated a large military intervention—an air bombing

campaign and introduction of ground forces—to coerce North Vietnam out of

the south, Laos was an important part of the strategy for interdicting North

Vietnamese supply lines to South Vietnam, which secretly began as Barrel

Roll. The war in Laos was fought covertly due to the 1962 Geneva Accords,

because of the tacit agreement with the Soviets, and to avoid the public

appearance of expanding the war. Rolling Thunder was the air campaign

against North Vietnam. But after three years, unable to coerce the North,

Johnson terminated Rolling Thunder in October 1968. Air operations then

focused primarily on interdiction ofthe Ho Chi Minh trail in eastern Laos.

Withdrawal

The Nixon administration brought a new policy to SEA. It shifted the

burden for the war to the South Vietnamese accompanied by a slow

withdrawal of US forces. This change increased the importance of the

bombing campaign in Laos for several reasons. The cessation of bombing in

North Vietnam provided untasked tactical aircraft for employment in Laos. In

addition, bombing the trail played a critical role in protecting the flank for US

withdrawal, and the air war in Laos changed from a support role to the main

8
effort. Consequently, maintaining access to the country of Laos became the

primary motivator for supporting the RLG. This change in policy altered the

purpose of Barrel Roll operations. Up to this point, Barrel Roll sought to keep

Laos neutral; but with the war in Vietnam turning sour, Barrel Roll provided

the US time to withdraw from SEA, and the outcome of events in Vietnam

would determine the fate of Laos.

US National Strategy for Laos

In support of the national policy, each administration in Washington

developed a national strategy for Laos that synchronized with US strategy for

SEA.

Eisenhower

The US pursued its policy for containment of communism in Laos by

providing economic and military aid to the country. Eisenhower viewed

Laotian security as dependent on a strong army with a right-wing

government in control. Unfortunately, the US poorly coordinated the strategy

within its bureaucracies involved in Laos. The uncoordinated execution of the

strategy produced graft, corruption, inflation, and finally the overthrow of the

US-backed government in August 1960. A subsequent countercoup by

right-wing army factions caused the country to erupt in civil war when the

neutralistsjoined the communists.24

Kennedy

The switch in US policy to support a neutral Laos was a key to US strategy

in SEA. The strategy removed the requirement for a military solution in Laos

and created a buffer against communist infiltration of South Vietnam and

Thailand. It also made South Vietnam an internal insurgency problem ideal

for development and employment of counterinsurgency doctrine. Of course,

this strategy assumed the North Vietnamese would abide by the terms of the

1962 Geneva agreement and depart Laos.25

Johnson

In early 1963 US intelligence estimates placed eight North Vietnamese

army battalions, about 4,000 troops, plus 2,000 advisors, in Laos. Convinced

that the North Vietnamese would not leave Laos, the US turned to a new

strategy, counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Not wanting to commit

ground combat forces in Laos caused the US to enlist the aid of the CIA. The

CIA got this task due to US desires to minimize any violation of the 1962

Geneva agreement and because the State Department believed that US

military management would lead to greater pressure to introduce ground

combat troops. The CIA employed the indigenous Hmong tribesmen, who it

9
organized and trained prior to the Geneva agreement, to fight the ground war

while USAF Air Commandos trained Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) pilots

in T-28s to support these ground forces. In addition, in 1964 the USAF began

covert direct air support and interdiction of North Vietnamese supply lines. It

employed this strategy in Laos until the end ofthe war.26

Nixon

Another policy change in Vietnam altered the strategy for Laos. The US

employed massive air strikes against North Vietnamese supply lines. Not

wanting to escalate the war in northern Laos, the US resorted to airpower in

support of the ground forces to hold the North Vietnamese in place. The US

leveraged airpower against each increase in North Vietnamese combat power

on the ground. The war effort in Laos became a war of attrition: killing enemy

trucks on the trail and destroying communist ground forces in the north. US

strategy also continued with the financing of Hmong tribesmen to fight North

Vietnamese conventional forces, providing military assistance to the RLG,

employing US airpower to support the light ground forces, and interdicting

communist supply lines.

Objectives for Laos—United States

The political end-state of US efforts in Laos signalled the withdrawal of the

North Vietnamese and was followed by the reestablishment of the 1962

Geneva provisions. To accomplish this goal, US objectives sought to do the

following:

1. Maintain an outward appearance of strict neutrality for diplomatic

reasons (covert operations);

2. Maintain a relatively stable balance of political, military, and economic

position between the communist and the pro-US factions in Laos (support for

Hmong ground forces);

3. Maintain a friendly or at least a neutral government on the borders of

Thailand, while providing strict control on the levels of aid and military effort

in support of and consistent with objective 2 (support of government); and

4. Achieve maximum attrition and disruption of North Vietnamese

logistics flow through the use of airpower (interdiction campaign).27

Objectives for Laos—North Vietnamese

The North Vietnamese, interestingly enough, had the following similar

objectives:

1. Maintain access to the Lao panhandle as their support of the war in

South Vietnam depended on using the Ho Chi Minh trail;

10
2. Balance the force used to maintain a foothold in northern Laos and

avoid escalation offorce which would cause the US to introduce ground troops

in Laos;

3. Pressure the RLG militarily to seek a negotiated settlement and expel

US presence from Laos; and

4. Maintain an appearance of neutrality and hide all involvement in Laos.

The primary objective for the North Vietnamese always centered on South

Vietnam. Other objectives were subordinate to or in support of this goal. The

North Vietnamese continued to hide their presence in Laos to avoid an overt

violation of the Geneva agreements and Laotian neutrality. They also desired

to maintain the illusion that the war in South Vietnam was a popular

uprising.28

Notes

1. The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 5:260.

2. The Plain of Jars takes its name from large stone jars believed to be ancient Chinese

funeral urns. More than 100 of these jars, large enough to hold a small, squatting man, were

found in meadows at the center of the plains. The jars were about 2,000 years old. The plain

has an average elevation of 3,600 feet and resembles the dairy land of southern Wisconsin. See

Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization (New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1971), 2-3. For additional information on the strategic value of Laos, see Dommen,

1-3; and Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics ofForeign Policy in the Administration

ofJohn F. Kennedy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1967), 93-94.

3. Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, eds., The Air War in Indochina (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1972), xviii; and Dommen, 137-38.

4. The total population number is the popular estimate for the period. The first official

census occurred in March 1985, and United Nations statistics listed it as just over 3.5 million.

See Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao

Government, 1955-1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 141, note 13. The

principal difference between the ethnic groups—excluding language, history, and

customs—were their societal status, living altitude, and method of agriculture. See Charles A.

Stevenson, The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954 (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1972), 11.

5. In fact, eight times as many Laotians live in Thailand than in Laos. Castle, 141, note 16.

6. Castle, 4-6; and Arthur J. Dommen, Laos: Keystone of Indochina (Boulder, Colo.:

Westview Press, 1985), 3-6.

7. Castle, 4.

8. Prince Phetsarath and his two younger brothers, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma

and Prince Souphanouvong, organized the nationalist movement. They called their newly

formed government the Lao Issara or Free Lao. However, the return of French rule in 1946

forced this government into exile. By 1949 the Lao Issara had dissolved, and the three brothers

had gone their separate ways. See Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 18-36.

9. Dommen, Laos, 105-6.

10. Edward G. Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia

(New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 103-13; and Gary D. Wekkin, "The Rewards of Revolution:

Pathet Lao Policy Towards the Hill Tribes since 1975," in Contemporary Laos: Studies in the

Politics and Society ofthe Lao People's Democratic Republic, ed., Martin Stuart-Fox (New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1975), 186-87. Also, Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 16-17.

11. The countries represented in Geneva included France, the Soviet Union, the US, the

People's Republic of China, Great Britain, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi

11
Minh, the Republic of Vietnam under Bao Dai, Laos, and Cambodia. Although the US did not

sign the agreement, it recognized the importance of maintaining an independent Laos,

Cambodia, and South Vietnam outside the communist sphere. From this viewpoint, President

Eisenhower did not consider the US bound by decisions made at Geneva. See Castle, 11-12;

Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 53; and Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, 5:249.

12. Stevenson, 9; and Dommen, Laos, 61-62.

13. Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, 5:250-58.

14. Capt Kong Le, an army battalion commander, frustrated by the direction of the

right-wing government, seized control of the capital at Vientiane. Kong Le, a neutralist, called

for an end to the civil war, an end to aid corruption, and removal of all foreign troops and

foreign influences. After a brief period, he handed power over to Souvanna Phouma, who the

king appointed as prime minister. Phouma attempted without success to establish a neutral

coalition government, as existed in 1957. US pressure against this course caused Phouma to

request assistance from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Col Phoumi Nosavan, supported directly

by US military aid, staged a countercoup and established a right-wing government under

Prince Boun Oum. See Dommen, Laos, 60-65.

15. Kennedy upgraded the US military mission to a full-scale military assistance advisory

group (MAAG) with 400 personnel. The presence of US military personnel sent a strong signal

to North Vietnam and the USSR of US and Kennedy's resolve. See Pentagon Papers: Gravel

Edition, 5:260-65.

16. Ibid., 5:265-67.

17. War in the Shadow of Vietnam was taken from the title of Castle's book. Journalists

used secret war and CIA war because northeastern Laos was off-limits to them during much of

the conflict. Despite the common knowledge of the war among journalists, they found no one

who would discuss operations. Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountain: The Hmong, the

Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University

Press, 1993), xi-xviii. Stevenson (208-9), used Sullivan's war in referring to the conflict in

Laos. William Sullivan was the US ambassador to Laos from 1964 until 1969 and acted as

commander in chief of the ground and air campaigns in Laos. President Kennedy in 1961 gave

the ambassador to Laos extraordinary powers over all US government agents in-country.

Effectively, the US ambassador to Laos commanded US operations from 1961 until 1975.

Castle titled his chap. 6 William Sullivan's War and provided a detailed description of

Sullivan's role. Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma called the struggle in Laos the

forgotten war because the Vietnam conflict overshadowed it. See Castle, chap. 6; and Paul F.

Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for

Laos (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1. Walt Haney calls it the forgotten

war because the US government hid its existence from the Congress and the American people.

See Hane/s article in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, 5:248.

18. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 7th/13th AF End-of-Tour report of Maj Gen

Louis T. Seith, USAF, 19 June 1968 to 27 May 1969, Udorn, Thailand, 25 June 1969,1.

19. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 295-96. Vang Pao was born in Nong Het, a village east of the

Plain of Jars. At the age of 13, he fought against the Japanese as a resistance fighter.

Alongside the French, he later fought the Viet Minh forces and in 1953 led a 300-man rescue

attempt of Dien Bien Phu. Despite being a Hmong, he was commissioned in the Royal Lao

Army and in 1960 took command of military region 2, which contains the Plain ofJars area. He

was extremely loyal to the government, the king, and Laos. His leadership was paramount in

SGU successes during the conflict in Laos. See also, Hamilton-Merritt, 89; Pentagon Papers:

Gravel Edition, 5:273; and Castle, 30-31, 34-43, 57-61.

20. Castle, 6-7.

21. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, vol. 2

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), iv, A5, tab 4, 66-77.

22. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 105-8.

23. Dommen calls Laos the keystone ofIndochina. Department of the Air Force, oral history

interview, Amb William H. Sullivan, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 91-92. Ambassador Sullivan was

involved in the 1962 Geneva agreements. Interestingly, he described the general US strategy

as two-fold: (1) to achieve protection for Thailand and (2) to achieve protection for South

12
Vietnam by a combination of the fighting capabilities of South Vietnam and US forces coming

into Vietnam and cutting off the Ho Chi Minh trail on the ground in Laos. One has to wonder if

this strategy would have been more effective had it been pursued when the US introduced

ground forces into SEA in 1965.

24. Hilsman, 111-12, 114; and Col William Von Platten, USAF, Department of the Air

Force, oral history interview, 10 May 1975, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 13.

25. Norman B. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, Md.:

Madison Books, 1967), 33-34.

26. Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, vol. 2, iv, A5, tab 3, 62;

Hamilton-Merritt, 123; and Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine

and Performance, 1950 to Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), 147.

27. William H. Sullivan, Obbligato 1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (New

York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 209; and Seith, End-of-Tour report, tab B, 2.

28. John Morrocco, Rain ofFire: Air War 1969-1973 (Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1985),

26.

13
Chapter 2

Military Situation

We still must consider our interest in Laos . . . as the protection of the flank of

Thailand.

—Amb William H. Sullivan, 1968

Instead of overt military aid or military intervention with US ground forces

in Laos, the US decided to fight the North Vietnamese on their own terms by

using an indigenous force employing guerrilla tactics supplied through a

deniable system of paramilitary assistance and directed by a US country

team. The CIA advised the ground forces to avoid the presence of US military

advisors in Laos. Accordingly, the US military strategy consisted of three

components.1

US Military Strategy

The US used military assistance to develop a RLG military capability and

support active combat operations. This assistance provided the training and

equipment for the CIA-led Hmong irregulars and Thai mercenaries. The CIA

selected the Hmong due to their aggressiveness and location in northern

Laos. These troops did the majority of the ground combat. In addition, the

USAF provided training, equipment, intelligence, and maintenance to the

RLAF. Project Water Pump at Udorn Air Base in Thailand trained Thai and

Laotian pilots in the T-28 and AC-47 and instructed aircraft maintenance

personnel. USAF advisors also provided aircraft maintenance to the RLAF

and USAF reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities.2

US Air Support

The absence of a dependable road system in Laos and the need for mobility

and fire support by the US-led guerrilla force created the need for flexible and

accommodating air support. An air transportation system was developed by

constructing a set of landing strips, called Lima Sites, throughout the

country. In addition, Air America, Continental Air Transport, and Byrd

Air—all financed by the CIA—provided contract airlift support. The USAF

provided reconnaissance, close air support, and interdiction through tactical

aircraft based in Thailand and South Vietnam.3

15
Covert War

A variety of reasons explains the need for covertness. The ruse of neutrality

was primary, along with the US desire to avoid embarrassing the Soviets.

Since Khrushchev and Kennedy had jointly agreed on Laotian neutrality in

1961, overt involvement by the US in Laos would have forced the Soviets to

respond directly. Overt action or public disclosure of US involvement would

have forced the Soviets to close ranks with their communist brothers. The

Soviets were satisfied to look the other way to limit Chinese hegemony in SEA.4

William Bundy, assistant secretary of state for Far East Affairs, asserts

the war was anything but secret. However, the Laotian desire to preserve

an apparent neutral posture was paramount. Keeping the war secret

served many interests. For the State Department, secrecy avoided a

violation of the 1962 Geneva agreement. The Laotian government did not

want to appear as a US puppet. Washington policy made South Vietnam

the center of US activity and made public recognition of involvement in

Laos appear as an expansion of the war effort. This covert aspect of the

war was paramount in selecting the US team to control military activity

out of the US Embassy in Laos.5

The Old Course ofAction

The battlefield in Laos was divided into five military regions as shown in

figure 2. Each MR had its own component of FAR ground forces who were led

by a Laotian general.

Ground Operations

The war in northern Laos was primarily fought in military region 2.

Operations in this area centered on a 130-mile-long contested battlefield with

each side established in a stronghold at the ends. To the northeast in Sam

Neua province were the Pathet Lao and NVA. To the southwest at Long Tieng

were Maj Gen Vang Pao's CIA-financed Hmong forces. The battlefield

between them was the Plain of Jars. Each dry season (September-March)

found the communists on the offense pushing west toward the PDJ. As the

offensive progressed to the west, long lines of communication became

vulnerable to interdiction by air or guerrilla infiltration, causing the North

Vietnamese to approach a culminating point and stalling their offense. The

wet season (May-September) caused the initiative to go over to the RLG. The

intractability of the roads, together with friendly air support, caused the

enemy to retreat into its sanctuaries near the North Vietnamese border. The

North Vietnamese spent the season building up supplies in preparation for

the next dry season, when the cycle was repeated.6

During his tenure (1964-69), Ambassador Sullivan gradually increased

operations against an aggressive North Vietnamese threat. The Hmong

infantry grew to about 40,000. From 1965 until 1968 the war in northern

16
Laos generated a military stalemate. Each dry season saw the communist

offensive across the PDJ followed during the subsequent wet season by an

Hmong counteroffensive. Since the Hmong were lightly armed and depended

on airpower for mobility and fire support, they opted for a defensive, guerrilla

strategy, using time and space in defensive operations against enemy

offenses. Civilian villages left behind enemy lines provided a valuable

intelligence network against North Vietnamese location and supply routes.

During enemy withdrawal, the Hmong exploited their advantage in mobility

and fire support to attack the enemy. Sullivan's war depended on "good

comm, rapid mobility, intrepid hill-fighters, and friendly village population."

Despite a massive interdiction campaign in the panhandle, the US was

unsuccessful in stopping the flow of North Vietnamese supplies. Neither could

it force the North Vietnamese out of Laos. Consequently, a slow escalation in

US aid resulted in a military stalemate and the slow attrition of its surrogate

force, the Hmong tribesmen.7

Air Operations

In 1964 US involvement in Vietnam expanded dramatically. Intent on

stopping the flow of supplies from North Vietnam to the south, the US began

bombing the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos. This operation was the first

air campaign of the war and began as Barrel Roll on 14 December 1964.

Barrel Roll continued through the duration of US involvement in SEA. Later,

with the start of Rolling Thunder, Barrel Roll sought to punish North

Vietnam and make continued support of the Vietcong insurgents

unproductive. Operations conducted by June 1965 made it apparent that the

limited bombing operations of Barrel Roll had failed to deter North

Vietnamese transit through Laos. To meet its objectives, the operation was

divided into two air campaigns. Operators designed Steel Tiger to interdict

North Vietnamese supply routes to South Vietnam in the panhandle of Laos

and Barrel Roll to support RLG ground forces fighting Pathet Lao and North

Vietnamese regulars in northern Laos. In exchange for allowing these

operations, the Souvanna Phouma government requested additional covert

US aid and bombing operations in northern Laos.8

Air operations in Laos had a dual nature due to political and military

considerations. Each operation required a different application of airpower.

The first operation, Steel Tiger, was a war of interdiction waged by a military

organization in support of the ground war in Vietnam. The other war, Barrel

Roll, was direct air support ofthe indigenous forces waged by the ambassador.

Both operations depended on the same USAF tactical air resources.9

A New Course ofAction

By November 1968 complete chaos had engulfed Laos. The RLG held

dubious control of the country and engaged itself in a five-year civil war

17
against the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese, who controlled about

two-thirds of the terrain. The FAE barely defended itselflet alone protect the

kingdom. CIA-trained indigenous minorities, along with CIA-financed Thai

mercenaries, took the fight to the enemy; however, the situation in northern

Laos remained a military stalemate. Chinese road crews built a path across

the northern part of the country. The war displaced thousands of refugees

from their homes. Meanwhile, representatives from each side of the conflict

conducted business in Vientiane as ifthe war did not exist.

On 31 October 1968 President Johnson suspended the bombing of North

Vietnam, since he was unable to coerce the North Vietnamese out of South

Vietnam. US policy shifted toward withdrawal and turned the fight over to

the South Vietnamese. To protect US servicemen during the pullout and give

the South Vietnamese time to assume a greater role in their conflict, the new

US military strategy interdicted the flow of North Vietnamese supplies to

South Vietnam. Accordingly, due to the increased availability of attack

sorties, the focuses of the air war turned to Laos and the interdiction of the

Ho Chi Minh trail. The US pursued a new military course of action.

Barrel Roll operations intensified to protect the northern flank of Steel

Tiger and to maintain the neutral RLG that supported US operations in the

panhandle. Despite its low priority, Barrel Roll competed for a share of

diminishing tactical air resources until the end of the war. This scheme then

became the US military strategy and the course of action pursued in Barrel

Roll between 1 November 1968 and 23 February 1973.

With this background information on the conflict in Laos, along with an

overview of the strategic elements (US policy, strategy, and military

situation), the focus of this research turns now to the operational level of the

conflict. This examination uses a campaign plan format.

Notes

1. Amb William H. Sullivan, Obbligato 1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (New

York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), 210.

2. Ibid.; and Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine & Performance,

1950 to Present (New York: Free Press, 1970), 160-61.

3. Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountain: The Hmong, The Americans, and The Secret

Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1973), 74-75.

4. Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics ofNeutralization (New York: Praeger

Publishers), 305.

5. Blaufarb, xii; and John Morrocco, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969-1973 (Boston: Boston

Publishing Co., 1985), 29.

6. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 7th/13th AF End-of-Tour report of Maj Gen

Dewitt R. Searles, USAF, 1 July 1971 to 8 September 1972 (Udorn, Thailand, 9 September

1972), 11.

7. Sullivan, 210-12.

8. Dommen, Conflict in Laos, 89.

9. Majs William W. Lofgren and Richard R. Sexton, Department of the Air Force, "Air War

in Northern Laos, 1 April-30 November 1971," Project CHECO report, Hickam AFB, Hawaii:

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 22 June 1973, 5.

18
Chapter 3

The Air Campaign Plan

A series of related military operations aimed at attaining common objectives,

normally in a finite period oftime and which can achieve strategic results.

—Definition of a campaign

A plan for a connected series ofjoint air operations to achieve the joint force

commander's objectives within a given time and theater ofoperations.

—Definition of a Joint Air Operations plan

No single extant historical document constitutes the Barrel Roll air

campaign plan. Instead, this author has assembled here fragments of

historical evidence to indicate which elements of the air campaign plan

existed. War planners initially formalized some elements of the air campaign,

but most of these plans evolved over the course of the conflict.1By reviewing

the historical data in context of the elements of the air campaign plan,

readers can find an answer to the question, "Did Barrel Roll constitute an

(implicit) air campaign plan?" Table 3 lists the five parts of an air campaign

plan as defined in the JFACC Primer.

Table 3

Elements of a Campaign Plan

Plan Name

Command Relationship

1 Situation Strategic Guidance

Enemy Forces

Friendly Forces

Allied Forces

II Mission

III Air Operations Strategic Concept

Phasing

Coordination

IV Logistics

V Command, Control, and Communications Command Communication

19
Theater Air Campaign Plan: Barrel Roll

(1 November 1968-21 February 1973)

The area of operation included principally northern Laos, but the campaign

also included the area known as Steel Tiger West as shown in figure 3. The

Steel Tiger East area involved the interdiction effort against the Ho Chi Minh

trail and was not included in this campaign.

CHINA

BURMA

NORTH

VIETNAM

Figure 3. Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger Areas of Operations in Laos

Command Relationship

Figure 4 shows that a complex command relationship existed due to the

military and political aspects of the campaign. USAF managed tactical air

resources employed in Laos. USAF and Navy tactical aircraft operated under

the control of Headquarters Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). PACAF exercised

operational control through Headquarters Seventh Air Force, at Tan Son

Nhut Air Base in South Vietnam and retained operational control of tactical

air sorties flown into Laos, including Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger West.

Meanwhile, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) exercised

20
CINCPAC

X

PACAF

13th AF J 7'h/13>h j

x

MACV

7th AF

BARREL ROLL STEEL

& TIGER

STEEL TIGER WEST EAST

US EMBASSY

MISSION LAOS

APPROVAL

AIRA CAS

ROES

c \ (

\

HMONG

IRREGULAR SGU*

<. J V /

REQUIREMENTS MAAG-THAI

DEPCHIEF

EQUIPMENT

&

AID

Figure 4. Command Structure for Laos Operations

operational control of tactical air sorties flown into South Vietnam and Steel

Tiger East through the Seventh Air Force.2

A Kennedy directive in 1962 charged the US ambassador in Vientiane with

US activities in Laos. The embassy and staff organized to conduct a covert

war. The ambassador submitted and validated targets for strike and

approved all strikes in Laos. He controlled the air war through a set of

stringent rules of engagement (ROE). Several agencies within the embassy

advised the ambassador on the war effort. The CIA assumed the pseudonym

controlled American source (CAS). CAS directed the ground war by training

and advising the Hmong and Thai SGU forces. The air attache office (AIRA)

advised the ambassador on the employment and use of airpower. Finally, the

deputy chief, Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group Thailand

(DepChief), located in Bangkok, assumed responsibility for the military

assistance program (MAP).3

The last organization, deputy commander, Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force at

Udorn AB, exercised administrative control over Thai-based USAF units.

Without operational control, it provided a conduit between the American

Embassy and Headquarters Seventh Air Force.

Situation

The bombing halt of North Vietnam made interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh

trail the principal military strategy for limiting enemy activity in South

Vietnam. Consequently, access to the country of Laos was crucial to US

21
objectives in SEA. This access depended on a RLG favorable to US interests.

Since the fate of Laos did not depend on a military solution in the air or on

the ground in Laos and could only be decided by the outcome in Vietnam,

winning the war against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos was not the

objective. Instead, maintaining access to the country was paramount, and

keeping the RLG in power became the primary objective ofBarrel Roll.4

Strategic Guidance

The US desired to remain within the provisions of the 1962 Geneva

agreement. In addition, the RLG desired complete deniability of US actions in

Laos. Therefore, military involvement in Laos required all activity be

conducted covertly. With limited control over the employment of air strikes

and the need for deniability, the ambassador employed strict ROE to govern

air operations in Laos. ROE helped to balance the application of force within

the delicate political and military situation. The presence of Chinese and

Russian diplomats, friendly villages, and refugees also dictated strict control

over the use offorce.5

Enemy Forces

The enemy held a limited capability to employ air in Laos. Following the

cessation of US bombing in North Vietnam, MiGs provided an occasional but

insignificant threat to US air operations in Laos. Ground forces offered the

principal threat to US air operations. These threats consisted of antiaircraft

defenses that targeted friendly tactical air and the capture of Lima Sites that

denied air mobility to friendly forces.6

Ground forces consisted of Pathet Lao guerrillas operating principally in

military region 2 and North Vietnamese regulars and advisors. By 1971 about

two divisions of the NVA comprised of approximately 16,500 troops,

positioned themselves in military region 2. The NVA had to porter their

supplies. Estimates state that each man engaged in combat required four

porters to sustain himself. Consequently, of the 16,500 troops, approximately

3,000 actually fought on the front lines. The North Vietnamese held the

capability to employ sufficient combat power to defeat RLG forces; however,

such an operation would have risked escalation of force by the US with the

possibility of US ground combat troops. This scheme ran counter to NVA

objectives. Accordingly, they employed only sufficient force to maintain at

least a stalemate in northern Laos.7

As a conventional road-bound army, the enemy ground forces depended on

resupply using long vulnerable lines of communications during the dry-season

offensive. This tactic involved an enemy operational level center of gravity. To

mitigate this liability, the enemy used North Vietnam, now safe from US

aircraft, as a sanctuary to stockpile resources and continually upgrade the

road infrastructure in Laos. These two actions indicated a new intent to

sustain forward locations through the wet season.

22
Friendly Forces

The US provided the preponderance of attack sorties and airlift support for

the war in Laos. It located the principal available USAF air assets in

Thailand and South Vietnam. Carriers in the Task Force 77 provided limited

US naval air support. At the start of the campaign in December 1968,

approximately 700 USAF strike aircraft were in-theater and available for

employment. During this period, consistent with the Nixon administration

withdrawal strategy, USAF aircraft began to depart SEA. Consequently,

available tactical air resources decreased throughout the four-year period of

the campaign. During this drawdown, the RLAF assumed an increasing share

of the attack sortie tasking. Table 4 shows the air order of battle at the start

of the campaign in 1968, prior to the North Vietnamese invasion of South

Vietnam in 1972, and near the end ofthe campaign in 1973.

As previously stated, suspension of bombing operations against North

Vietnam provided more sorties for employment in the Laotian theater.

Slow-moving aircraft were well suited for the kind of war encountered in

Laos, but as air defense threats increased these aircraft became more

vulnerable. In response, jet aircraft were employed for survivability with a

corresponding trade-off of decreased effectiveness. USAF tactical aircraft used

in Barrel Roll for strike operations included the A-l, B-57, F-105, F-4, F-100,

and F-lll. Such gunships as the AC-47, AC-119, and AC-130 were employed

for truck interdiction and night air support to defend Lima Sites. The 0-1,

0-2, U-17, T-28, and OV-10 provided visual reconnaissance and strike control.

B-52 Arc Light sorties were employed occasionally beginning in February

1970 against tactical targets with operational level results. Combat missions

included interdiction, support of friendly ground troops, and armed

reconnaissance. The Seventh Air Force, with a recommendation from MACV

and Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, determined apportionment of sorties for

SEA.8 No US ground combat forces were stationed in-country; however, about

200 military advisors assisted the embassy and RLG military.9

Allied Forces

The RLAF was equipped with T-28s and AC-47s. RLAF strike sorties

tripled from 10,000 T-28 combat sorties in 1968 to more than 30,000 in each

year from 1970 to 1972.10

Laotians provided ground forces that fought in-country. These ground

forces consisted of the Royal Laotian Army, the Neutralist Army, Hmong

irregulars, and Special Guerrilla Units. The Laotian and Neutralist Army's

quality and motivation fell far short of the standard required to deal with

Pathet Lao and NVA. These forces were unable to conduct offensive

operations and reluctant to conduct guerrilla warfare. The brunt of the

ground fighting was borne by the Hmong tribesmen and SGU, who became an

air mobile guerrilla force. These forces were light but skilled in guerrilla

tactics, collecting intelligence, and operating behind enemy lines. They were

not suited to hold ground against a determined conventional attack.11

23
Table 4

USAF Attack Aircraft in Southeast Asia

Base 30 Dec 68 30 Dec 71 30 Dec 72

S. Vietnam

Bein Hoa

Binh Thuy

Cam Ranh Bay

Da Nang

Nha Trang

Phan Rang

Phu Cat

Pleiku

Tan Son Nhut

Tuy Hoa

Total

60

4

49

59

9

84

3

22

74

364

62

9

71

5

15

20

Thailand

Korat

Nakhon

Phanom

Takhii

Ubon

Udorn

Total

54

56

55

76

40

281

52

30

101

42

225

122

47

119

121

409

Source: Data compiled from Department of the Air Force, "Summary of Air Operations," December 1968

to January 1972.

The allied ground forces contributed to the strategic objectives by performing

the following tasks: sealing off the southern Mekong Valley, thus providing a

buffer for Thailand; insulating the Vientiane government from direct communist

threat; draining North Vietnamese manpower and resources; and,

interdicting of the northern approaches to the Ho Chi Minh trail.12

The SGU depended on air support. The Pathet Lao and NVA outnumbered

RLG forces; therefore, airpower provided a tactical equalizer against the

enemy. It offered the ground forces mobility, static defense, reconnaissance,

and long-range fire support. Airpower provided an operational center of

gravity for the allied ground forces.13

Mission and Air Operations

US air forces sought to conduct air operations in support of the RLG by

interdicting supplies moving through northern Laos and providing air

support for RLG ground forces fighting insurgents in Barrel Roll and Steel

Tiger West. RLAF forces assisted in support of FAR and irregular troops.14

24
The campaign sought to keep the neutralist government and political

solution in place. It accomplished this goal by providing support to ground

forces and interdicting enemy forces in northern Laos, thus preventing the

destruction of irregular combatants and denying the Pathet Lao and NVA

additional territory and population.15

Strategic Concept

Force applied had to be consistent with US objectives and balanced

between two thresholds. Too much force would escalate the war beyond an

upper threshold that would cause the North Vietnamese to further escalate

its forces or lead to intervention by Chinese ground forces. In addition,

escalation of the violence would force the RLG to seek a negotiated settlement

with the Pathet Lao that would be unfavorable to the US and cause the

subsequent termination of all air operations in Laos. Insufficient force, below

a lower threshold, would result in the destruction of Vang Pao and RLG

forces. Such a defeat would threaten the population centers of the Mekong

Valley. In this situation the RLG would transform into a government with

stronger representation or even dominance by the Pathet Lao. Likewise, this

alternative would not favor the US for the same reasons. Therefore, the

amount of force applied had to respond to the political and military situation

in Laos, but remain between the two thresholds.

Phasing

Three distinct phases characterized the campaign. Not only did a different

approach to achieving the objectives and the declining availability of US

tactical air resources mark each phase, but so did the operational situation in

Laos and South Vietnam.

Phase I (November 1968 to July 1970)—Offensive

During this period the USAF provided air support for the RLG ground

forces to maintain the tempo of combat operations dictated by the traditional

seasonal pattern. An escalation in force by both sides characterized the

period. In 1969, assisted by a large increase in air support, the forces in Vang

Pao's military region 2 made their deepest penetration into Pathet Lao/NVA

territory. The NVA brought in additional forces and during the following dry

season pushed the Hmong back past the PDJ and threatened Long Tieng, the

military region 2 headquarters. War weary and facing a strong enemy

conventional force, Vang Pao found it imperative to call up 13- and 14-year

olds. The combination of US air strikes, B-52 bombing, and additional Thai

mercenaries helped to break the siege of Long Tieng.16

From the summer of 1970 until the end of the war in February 1973, a

tactical stalemate resulted on the battlefield along the original 1962 cease-fire

lines. The Hmong defended against sieges around the Laotian tactical centers

25
of gravity, Long Tieng, and Luang Prabang. The NVA, with the benefit of an

improved road structure and the safe supply lines within North Vietnam,

continued the pressure around both sites. Only US tactical air kept the

Hmong in the field and the RLG in power.17

Phase II (August 1970 to March 1972)—Defensive

The seasonal pattern of ground combat in northern Laos that had occurred

every year since 1962 was broken in 1970. Instead of withdrawing to the east,

the enemy held onto the territory it had gained during the dry-season

offensive. A MACV concept paper in August 1970 initiated this phase of the

campaign by reflecting a Washington SEA policy to disengage from direct

offensive combat and thereby reducing US casualties. The document states

that the US objective remained the maintenance of a neutral buffer in Laos

between Thailand and North Vietnam/China; however, it recognized that the

enemy could take over Laos and Cambodia. The loss of Cambodia held greater

significance than the loss of Laos. Consequently, airpower was employed in

Cambodia. Public awareness of US activity in Laos, due to congressional

hearings and President Nixon's disclosure of the conflict, further limited the

force that the US could apply.18

Despite Gen Vang Pao's desire to attack enemy positions (as in previous

years), the ground situation became defensive. The US employed sufficient

support to defend the area around the military region 2 headquarters (Long

Tieng/Moui Soui) and the capital at Luang Prabang. When enemy strength on

the ground increased, the US air forces surged to provide additional air

support to maintain the ground held by RLG forces and to prevent further

loss ofterritory.

The enemy offensive during the 1970-71 dry season grew stronger, and the

NVA put enormous pressure on Long Tieng. US employment of air again

broke the enemy's determination, and the site remained in RLG control.19

Political and fiscal decisions in 1971 further limited US air support in SEA.

This decreasing pool of tactical air resources was thinned between South

Vietnam, Cambodia, Steel Tiger, and Barrel Roll. The reduction in airpower

made close coordination of air and ground operations vital to extract the

maximum effectiveness from every sortie. Accordingly, more attack sorties

were dedicated to Raven forward air controllers (FAC), who selected the

targets and directly employed airpower. Some officers at Seventh Air Force

felt this decision violated the doctrine of centralized control by making

airpower reactive to the ground battle. Nevertheless, sufficient airpower was

effectively employed to defend RLG positions throughout the phase.20

Phase III (April 1972 to February 1973)—Withdrawal

Once the US decided to begin withdrawing forces from SEA, it employed

airpower to cover the withdrawal of US forces and to support renewed

fighting in South Vietnam (by increasing the tempo of activity against the

trail and by keeping pressure on activity in northern Laos).

26
The invasion of South Vietnam by NVA in March 1972 brought additional

tactical air resources back to the theater. The US increased the tempo of air

operations in Laos to support the defense of South Vietnam with the priority

of air support going to North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, then Steel Tiger

East. Following the reinitiation of US bombing in North Vietnam, the NVA in

northern Laos lacked sufficient strength to reinitiate a strong offense against

Long Tieng and Luang Prabang. However, they were able to hold territory

and were well postured for the peace negotiations.21

Coordination. The target selection and approval process evolved over the

course of the campaign. Initially, target recommendations for strike were

submitted to the ambassador for approval. Approved targets were then

forwarded to Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force. The mission was scheduled based

on available assets and other SEA priorities. The process required up to five

days to complete and did not exploit the flexibility of airpower. The number of

organizations involved, the political sensitivity, and the covert nature of the

war further complicated effective targeting and efficient use of strike aircraft.

In response, several methods were devised to enhance the targeting process.

These included the use of strike boxes, quick-reaction alert strike aircraft,

and improved coordination between agencies.22

Administration and Logistics

The conduct of the Barrel Roll air campaign depended heavily in several

aspects of logistics. These aspects included the Military Assistance Program

(MAP), the use of Lima Sites, and contract airlift support.

Military Assistance Program

The US MAP provided the Laotian military with equipment and advisors.

Between 1962 and 1973 MAP provided $1.4 billion in aid. To support US

objectives in Laos the deputy chief of the Military Assistance Advisory/Group

Thailand wanted to build "an effective Air Force within Laos, while

simultaneously supporting active combat operations within the country." The

American advisors did an effective job in training the Laotians in technical

skills, for example, and in flying and aircraft maintenance. But, by 1970 the

greatest deficiency in the RLAF centered around command, control, and

middle management. The operational nature of the war dictated that US

personnel perform these duties precluding RLAF personnel from learning on the

job. Consequently, despite becoming an effective fighting force, the RLAF lacked

some vital components necessary to continue the fight after US withdrawal.23

Lima Sites

The early 1960s witnessed the development of a system of almost 200

airfields. Throughout the war, these Lima Sites proved vital to the ground

operations of the Hmong irregulars. These sites ensured the delivery of aid to

27
indigenous population and refugees and supplied Vang Pao's forces. The

Hmong forces used these sites to employ guerrilla tactics—attacking the NVA

rear and their lines of communication. Often built into mountain tops or

along hillsides, the Lima Sites provided the ground forces with mobility and

maneuver. Together with tactical air support, the airfields allowed these

lightly equipped fighters to execute vertical operations in-depth.24

Contract Air Support

Air America, a contract airline, played a central role in the air campaign by

providing airlift within Laos. As a private enterprise providing subsistence to

the indigenous population, refugee evacuation, and search and rescue, Air

America was not prohibited by the Geneva Accords. Obviously, other tasks,

including the movement of guerrillas, intelligence gathering, and airlift of

munitions and weapons, did not fall within the intent of the agreement. For

this reason, Air America's involvement in the war was strictly covert.

Nevertheless, the airlift provided by Air America and other contractors

proved invaluable to guerrilla operations against the Pathet Lao and NVA

forces and the movement of population loyal to the Hmong cause.25

Command, Control, and Communications

The US ambassador's responsibilities included the "overall direction,

coordination, and supervision" of US military operations in Laos. The

ambassador directly controlled the war in Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger West

while delegating targeting and control of the war in Steel Tiger East to

Seventh Air Force and MACV. Command and control of USAF tactical air

relied on ROE, air operation centers, and Raven forward air controllers.

Command and control underwent complications due to the command

relationship, political sensitivity of the conflict, desire to limit civilian

casualties, turnover of personnel in the many organizations providing

support, and the unconventional nature of the war. The following excerpt

from a USAF report on the war describes this command and control

challenge:

USAF FACs were flying secretly from Laos, under the control of the Air Attache for

a Meo [Hmong] ground commander advised by the CIA, to direct strikes by USAF

planes based in Thailand under control of a command center in Vietnam.26

Rules of Engagement. The ambassador employed a well-defined set of

ROE to restrict the employment of US tactical air. Each area of operation had

different rules. In addition, he established free-strike zones, restricted areas,

and special operating areas to provide more flexibility for the employment of

tactical air.27

Operation Centers. Two sets of operating areas controlled the war in

Laos. The ground and RLAF effort was divided into five military regions, each

with its own ground forces and air force squadron. Each region had an air

operations center (AOC) to control the employment of RLAF resources in that

28
military region. Each AOC was staffed with USAF advisors who coordinated

the air-ground operations in that military region.28

The US tactical operating areas were subsets of Barrel Roll (that is, East,

West, and North) and Steel Tiger (East and West) areas. Each area had

specific ROE for employment oftactical air.29

Ravens. In 1968 the ambassador requested the deployment of combatexperienced USAF FACs to control the employment of US tactical air. Ravens

were volunteers with 500 combat flying hours' (usually six months)

experience as FACs in Vietnam. They were assigned directly to the air

attache and operated in Laos covertly for a tour length of six months. Small

groups of Ravens were attached to the AOC of each of the five military

regions. The Ravens exercised decentralized control of airpower by

formulating their own plans and operations to support the ground campaign

in each military region. Raven FACs assisted in the management and control

of airpower in that area. Over the course of the campaign, they directly

controlled and employed between one-third and two-thirds of the tactical air

sent to Barrel Roll.30

This air campaign plan for Barrel Roll supported US strategy and policy in

Laos and SEA. The operational level concept dictated tactical action and

specific targets in support of US objectives. This information provided the

how of Barrel Roll. The next task analyzes the results and costs of the

campaign.

Notes

1. Primary sources were located at the USAF Historical Research Agency and the Air

University Library. The interview of participants added valuable detail, and follow-on research

should seek first-hand witnesses, participants, and decision makers for their perspectives.

2. Maj Gen Dewitt R. Searles, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 7th/13th AF

End-of-Tour report, 1 July 1971 to 8 September 1972, Udorn, Thailand, 9 September 1972, 1-7;

Capt Peter A. W. Liebchen, Department of the Air Force, "MAP to Laos 1959-1972," Project

CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 25 June 1978, 25-27; and,

Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 7th/13th AF End-of-Tour report of Maj Gen

Andrew J. Evans, Jr., USAF, 16 October 1970 to 30 June 1971, Udorn, Thailand, 30 June 1971,

2-3.

3. Majs William W. Lofgren, Jr., and Richard R. Sexton, Department of the Air Force, "Air

War in Northern Laos, 1 April-30 November 1971," Project CHECO report, Hickam AFB,

Hawaii: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 22 June 1973, 5.

4. Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to

Present (New York: Free Press, 1977), 164; and Laos Hearings, 398.

5. Col Paul A. Pettigrew, oral history interview, USAF, Department of the Air Force, 5

March 1970, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 9-10.

6. An action in 1968 demonstrated the state of North Vietnamese capabilities to employ

air in support of ground objectives in Laos. On 12 January 1968 two Soviet-built AN-2 Colt

biplanes conducted an attack on Phu Pha Thi (Lima Site 85) with minimal results. The site was

located about 20 miles from the North Vietnamese border and 160 miles west of Hanoi. It

contained USAF navigation equipment used to help Air Force aircraft bomb North Vietnam.

The AN-2 Colts dropped converted 120-millimeter mortar rounds, fired machine guns, and

inflicted minor injuries and damage to the facility. Both airplanes were shot down, and the

29
damage inflicted to the site was minimal. One aircraft was shot down by an Air America UH-1

helicopter while the other crashed trying to evade. See Timothy N. Castle, At War in the

Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1993), 94-95; and Carl Berger, ed., The United States Air Force in

Southeast Asia, 1961-1973: An Illustrated Account, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, 1984), 126.

7. Lofgren and Sexton, 5-6; Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of

Neutralization (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1971), 386; and Pettigrew, oral history

interview, 34.

8. Ibid.; and Searles, 7-9.

9. As of September 1969, nearly 950 personnel were stationed in Laos as part of the US

war effort. Amb William H. Sullivan, in testimony to a Senate foreign relations subcommittee

in 1969, provided the following breakout.

On the embassy staff:

Department of State, 59; Marine Guards, 15; direct hires for US Agency for

International Development (USAID), 338; US Information Service (USIS), 19; and,

Military Attache, 127 for a total of 558. Contract personnel included 53

international voluntary service personnel; Air America, 207; and, Continental Air

Service, 73 for a total of 333. The Military Attache1 numbers included the Project

404 special forces augmentation, but did not include 91 additional military

personnel on temporary duty for up to six months in Laos. These 91 plus the 127

attached to the Military Attache result in 218 military personnel in-country during

this period. See US, Laos Hearings, 369.

10. Data compiled from Maj John C. Pratt, The Royal Laotian Air Force: 1954-1970

(Christianburg, Va.: Dalley Book Service, 1994), fig. 12; and Department of the Air Force,

"Summary ofAir Operations," January 1971 to December 1972.

11. Maj Gen Louis T. Seith, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 7th/13th AF,

End-of-Tour report, 19 June 1968 to 27 May 1969, Udorn, Thailand, 25 June 1969, tab E, 1, 5.

12. Blaufarb, 161.

13. Searles, 11.

14. Liebchen, Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 24-26; Pratt, Royal Lao Air Force,

xix-xx; Seith, tab B, 1; and Capt William R. Burditt, Department of the Air Force, Rules of

Engagement, October 1972-August 1973, Project CHECO, Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters

Pacific Air Forces, 1 March 1977, 9.

15. Blaufarb, 164; and Burditt, 9.

16. Blaufarb, 162-63.

17. See Department of the Air Force, "Air Support of Counterinsurgency in Laos July

1968-November 1969," Project CHECO, Pratt, USAF, et al., Hickam AFB, Hawaii:

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 10 November 1969; Department of the Air Force, "Air

Operations in Northern Laos, 1 November 1969-1 April 1970," Project CHECO, Kenneth Sams,

Lt Col John Schlight, USAF, and Maj John C. Pratt, USAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii:

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 5 May 1970; and, Department of the Air Force, "Air

Operations in Northern Laos, 1 April-1 November 1970," Project CHECO, Lt Col Harry D.

Blout, USAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 15 January 1971.

18. See Department of the Air Force, "Air Operations in Northern Laos, 1 November 1970-1

April 1971," Project CHECO, Lt Col Harry D. Blout, USAF, and Melvin F. Porter, Hickam

AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, 3 May 1971; and Lofgren and Sexton, 29.

19. Blout and Porter, 5.

20. Budget limitations on air support to SEA were 10,000 tactical air, 1,000 B-52, and 750

gunship sorties each month. This was a 50 percent reduction from the previous year. See

Lofgren and Sexton, 6, 34-35.

21. Department of the Air Force, "The Air War in Laos, 1 January 1972-22 February 1973,"

Project CHECO, Maj William W. Lofgren, Jr., USAF, Hickam AFB, Hawaii: Headquarters

Pacific Air Forces, 15 October 1974.

22. From the ambassador's viewpoint, these criticisms did not reflect a big picture view of

the world and the situation in Laos. In Ambassador Sullivan's opinion, the nature of the war in

30
Laos made these inefficiencies necessary to attain US objectives. See Maj Richard B. Clement,

Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala., interview with Amb William H.

Sullivan, April 1970,10-15.

23. Liebchen, 171. Although MAP occupied a critical part of the US military strategy in

Laos, the amount of aid and the number of organizations involved complicated coordination

between each. See Pratt, "Royal Laotian Air Force," xx.

24. Col Harry C. Aderholt, USAF, oral history interview, 5 March 1970, Maxwell AFB, Ala.,

116-19; and Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountain: The Hmong, the Americans, and the

Secret Wars for Laos 1942-1992 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1993), 103.

25. Liebchen, 21, 22; Lt Col Drexel B. Cochran, USAF, oral history interview, 20 August

1969, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 133; Hamilton-Merritt, 118-23; and Christopher Robbins, Air

America (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1979) provide an anecdotal account ofthe airlift operation.

26. Blout, 5.

27. See Burditt for details ofROE during the October 1972 to August 1973 time frame.

28. Searles, 4.

29. Lofgren,42.

30. Blout, 5; and Pettigrew, 60. For a first-hand account of Raven activity, see Christopher

Robbins, The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America's Secret War in Laos (New York: Crown

Publishers, Inc., 1987).

31
Chapter 4

Analysis

The military student does not seek to learn from history the minutiae ofmethod and

technique. In every age these are influenced by the characteristics of weapons

currently available and the means at hand for maneuvering, supplying, and

controlling combat forces. But research does bring to light those fundamental

principles, and their combinations and applications, which, in the past, have

produced success.

—Gen Douglas MacArthur

The idea that superior air power can in some way be a substitute for hard slogging

and professional skill on the ground is beguiling but illusory. Air support can be of

immense value to an army; it can fight—and not only defensively—in the face of

almost total air superiority.

—Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor

At the time of the cease-fire at 2400 hours on 21 February 1973, the NVA

controlled approximately two-thirds of the land area of Laos and one-third of

the population—virtually the same situation that existed at the cease-fire in

1961. Over a four-year period, the expenditure of approximately 1.7 million

tons of ordnance and 401,296 tactical air sorties resulted in no net gain in

terrain or population from the enemy. However, the RLG remained in power

as the legitimate government of Laos.1

Having focused on the why, what, and how of Barrel Roll, two questions

remain: How much resource was applied? and Was Barrel Roll effective? The

answer to these questions must consider the strategic objectives, the

campaign objectives, the cost, and the results. This section analyzes the air

campaign from a perspective of airpower effort, effects, and effectiveness.

Airpower Effort, Effects, and Effectiveness

To answer the questions of cost and results, consider the employment of

airpower in Barrel Roll from the three aspects of effort, effects, and effectiveness.

Each of these three dimensions has tactical, operational, and strategic

components. Table 5 summarizes this concept and provides examples for each

dimension.2

33
Table 5

Airpower Effort, Effects, and Effectiveness

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL

National Resources Theater assets Resources allocatallocated to the allocated to a ed to a specific

theater/conflict campaign task

Type of weapon Apportionment Number of aircraft

COST EFFORT systems/ordnance

committed

Allocation Losses for a target or in a

strike package

Ordnance expended against a

target

Sorties flown

Destruction/damage Destruction/dam- TACC, C

3

of a target with age of a target nodes

strategic level with opeational/

consequences theater level

EFFECTS Target examples: consequences

(direct) critical industry, Target examples:

RESULTS government,

National leadership, weapons of

mass destruction

supply depots,

corps headquar

ters

Achieves national Achieves campaign Decides outcome

EFFECTIVENESS objectives objectives of a battle

(indirect) Enemy defeated Enemy terminates a

seasonal offensive

Cost ofAirpower

The cost of a campaign focuses on resource allocation and effort. With limited

resources or competing military tasks, effort reflects priority. Effort translates

available resources into the accomplishment of military tasks. Airpower effort

considers the number and types of assets available for employment. In its

simplest form, the number of tactical aircraft deployed to SEA defines the

strategic effort. The number of sorties these aircraft generate indicates the

priority of the objective. At the operational level, effort is measured in the

amount of resources allocated for a campaign or to achieve theater objectives.

The apportionment or allocation of sorties is an operational level measure of

effort.3Finally, observers may view effort at the tactical level as the number

of sorties leveled against a target or the number of aircraft in a strike package.

The expenditure of resources on the battlefield determines the effort applied to

meet an objective. One must compare effort to effects and effectiveness and vice

versa because some minimum level of resource exist below which objectives,

whether tactical, operational, or strategic, cannot be achieved.

34
Direct Versus Indirect Effects

The results of airpower strikes are both direct and indirect. The implication

of direct results relates to the effects of airpower, while the indirect results

include the effectiveness of airpower. Airpower effects involve the immediate

outcome of the employing airpower against a target of significance to the

enemy. The physical destruction or damage of the target focuses on a

first-order result of airpower. Because targets fall into strategic, operational,

and tactical categories, the destruction of the target influences the conflict at

these three levels. For example, the destruction of a single tank is the tactical

effect of airpower, but the destruction of a division of tanks removes that unit

from the battlefield and has operational consequences. Likewise, the

destruction ofseveral operational targets results in strategic effects.

Airpower effectiveness is the second-order or indirect outcome of the

employment of airpower. This outcome does not often manifest itself clearly

as it deals with objectives. Similar to effort and effects, effectiveness plays at

the three levels of warfare. If airpower decides or influences the outcome of a

battle, it has tactical effectiveness. Take the destruction ofthe enemy's armor,

for example. The destruction of eight tanks results from the effect of airpower,

but if the loss of this armor forces the enemy to withdraw or terminate an

offensive, that result measures airpower's effectiveness. Measuring

effectiveness manifests itself in terms of objectives achieved. If a nation attains

its objective through airpower, then it has obtained airpower effectiveness.

Because airpower operates in three levels of warfare, it provides a unique

asset because tactical effort sometime results in strategic effectiveness.

Analyzing Barrel Roll in terms of these three aspects assists in formulating a

conclusion about the success and effectiveness ofthe air campaign.

Resource Allocation—Measuring

Airpower Effort in Barrel Roll

The lack of complete historical records that delineate specific airpower

apportionment data during the course of the campaign requires that we find

an alternate measure. Effort is derived by examining the resources committed

to the theater, the sorties generated, the sorties allocated by tasks, and the

ordnance expended. By analyzing this data, we can draw a conclusion on the

issue of cost and priority ofthe Barrel Roll campaign.

Resources Available

Table A-l in the appendix shows the air order of battle for USAF strike

aircraft in SEA during the period of analysis. Figure A-l in the appendix

displays this information graphically and shows a decline in total available

USAF strike aircraft in SEA, which is consistent with the US policy of

withdrawal. The data shows a significant decrease in the South Vietnam-based

35
attack aircraft, while the level in Thailand remained relatively constant until

the 1972 North Vietnamese invasion of the south. The decline in aircraft

meant that fewer resources were available in-theater and that we would

assume a decrease in the attack sorties available for tasking to Barrel Roll.

Sorties Flown

Examining US sorties flown by theater focuses on one aspect of

determining priority or effort of Barrel Roll within the context of the total

SEA effort. Table A-2 illustrates these priorities in each phase of Barrel Roll

by showing the relative distribution of attack sorties throughout SEA for each

period. The table indicates that Barrel Roll was the third overall SEA priority

until phase three, when the North Vietnamese invaded South Vietnam.

Eighty percent of the tactical air employed in Vietnam occurred during phase

three, and Barrel Roll occupied the lowest priority in SEA next to Cambodia.

Another significant conclusion—that the amount of effort applied toward

Laos during phases one and two of Barrel Roll—indicates the area's

importance during this time frame. Overall, for the 52-month campaign,

Barrel Roll received 10 percent ofthe total US tactical air effort of SEA. Thus,

effort, in terms of attack sorties flown, shows Barrel Roll as a low-SEA

priority during the four-year period.

Ordnance Delivered

Tables A-3 and A-3a provide a similar indication of effort. The available

data does not distinguish between Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger; however, the

trends are similar to the attack sorties flown. Nevertheless, looking at the

ordnance expended provides another dimension to measure effort. The

addition of B-52 strike sorties adds about 2 million tons of ordnance

distributed across all theaters and phases and only a minor effect on priority.

Laos turned out to be one of the most heavily bombed areas during the SEA

conflicts—the large majority of ordnance employed along the trail in Steel

Tiger East.

Sorties by Task

Some apportionment data for Barrel Roll was available for the period

January 1970 through August 1971, thus making possible some conclusions.

Sorties were tasked against three roles: interdiction of trucks and storage

areas, distribution to Raven FACs for support of ground forces, and usage

against enemy air defenses. Figure A-4a shows the distribution of US attack

sorties. Interdiction loomed as the top priority between June 1970 and

February 1971, with approximately 75 percent of the sorties dedicated to this

effort. The periods from January 1970 to April 1970 and from February 1971

to June 1971 identify the support of ground forces. This period coincided with

the seasonal enemy offensive. Deeper enemy starting positions characterized

both periods. Something of this nature, along with the use of sieges around

Long Tieng and Luang Prabang, had not occurred in previous years.

36
Barrel Roll—the Third Priority in Southeast Asia

Having examined the resources available, attack sorties flown, ordnance

delivered by theater, and sorties by task within Barrel Roll, we identified this

operation as third in priority behind South Vietnam and the interdiction

effort in Steel Tiger. Once the NVA invaded South Vietnam during phase

three, 83 percent of the attack sorties went directly to support the war in

Vietnam, and Barrel Roll drew less than 5 percent of SEA attack sorties.

Within Barrel Roll, the air effort was divided between interdiction and

support of ground forces with the preponderance of the air being dedicated to

the interdiction effort against enemy supply lines. Since this was the enemy's

center of gravity, it follows that interdiction of enemy lines of communication

was consistent with trying to stop or defeat the enemy's offensive capability.

Bomb Damage Assessment—Measuring Airpower

Effects and Effectiveness ofBarrel Roll

Translating effort into effects is determined by examining targets destroyed

in comparison to sorties flown or ordnance expended. In other words, how

were the resources expended converted into enemy targets destroyed or

damaged. In Barrel Roll, airpower effects were reported using bomb damage

assessment (BDA).

What to Measure

BDA measured five target sets: vehicles, buildings, antiaircraft guns,

bridges, and road cuts. BDA emanated from direct observation by the crew of

the strike aircraft or the forward air guide (FAG)4or by poststrike

reconnaissance aircraft or ground team. Figures A-4 and A-4a show the

results for these targets. Except for the period from December 1969 to August

1970, BDA showed good trend correlation with attack sorties flown (also

shown in figure A-4). The spring of 1970 was a precarious time due to the

siege of Long Tieng, and many attack sorties focused directly on the support

of ground forces. The effect of the interdiction effort against vehicles,

buildings, bridges, and roads was reflected in these results. Likewise, the

effort against enemy air defenses also correlated with the results.

Reporting Bomb Damage Assessment

Using reported BDA from historical records came with liabilities. Report of

BDA in Laos suffered from the same affliction that the Army experienced

with body count. The management influence of the USAF reduced each strike

sortie to its contribution for the war effort. Truck kills became a measure of

effectiveness. Inflated reports were common. During one year, the number of

trucks damaged or destroyed exceeded the total number of trucks in North

Vietnam almost by a factor of three. Other reports became equally inflated.

37
Accordingly, recorded BDA may not have provided a totally accurate measure

of effects and must be used cautiously. Since it is the only measure available,

BDA is used relatively to compare phases or roles. BDA may not be valid in

the absolute. For example, it may not reveal how many trucks were destroyed

during a given period.

Another problem in determining airpower effects concerns the lack of BDA

report from the employment of airpower in support of ground forces. The

source of the problem was twofold. First, observing enemy dead was more

difficult than observing other targets. The second concern centered around

the issue of accuracy as described above. The FAGs who helped to direct

strikes often provided BDA following the attack. FAGs reasoned that a higher

kill rate would look good for the pilot and FAG at headquarters. The standard

BDA was a 100-body count, something headquarters began to question and

later demanded a more realistic and accurate count. In one instance a US

pilot received a BDA report from a FAG: "You killed ninety-eight bad guy[s]."

The pilot replied, "Oh, come on Pogo. What do ya mean, ninety-eight?" After a

short silence, Pogo responded with, "Okay, you kill[ed] one hundred and

two."5 Because of these problems, more often than not, only the second-order

results of airpower or effectiveness became apparent when air was employed

in support of ground forces; that is, the overall results of the engagement in

terms ofterrain held or taken, sieges broken, or enemy attacks repelled.

Congruence with National Policy—Measuring

Airpower Effectiveness

The indirect results of force employment measure airpower effectiveness.

Where airpower effects were most apparent at the tactical level (tanks

destroyed or damaged), airpower effectiveness manifested itself principally at

the operational or strategic level (battle won or objective achieved). To

determine effectiveness one must examine how well airpower achieved the

strategic and operational objectives of the campaign. Let us now describe an

example of each level.

Tactical Level—The Siege ofLong Tieng

In March 1970 North Vietnamese forced Hmong irregulars into military

region 2 headquarters at Long Tieng. The enemy put intense pressure on the

RLG forces hoping to capture the site. Loss of this installation would have

seriously compromised the RLG's ability to maintain control of the country.

As a tactical target, Long Tieng had operational level significance for the RLG

forces. Airpower—tactical air and B-52s—was used in support of the ground

forces attempting to hold Long Tieng. Although the effects of the employment

ofthese strike sorties may reveal themselves immediately, airpower broke the

siege, which was the tactical objective of employing airpower in the first

place. Airpower's effect at the tactical level had operational and strategic level

38
effectiveness by achieving the objectives of supporting RLG forces and

preserving the RLG.6

Operational Level—Allowed the Prosecution ofthe Trail War

Whether or not it was an effective strategy for the war in South Vietnam,

interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail served as a primary objective of

airpower in Laos during this period of the war. Given that objective,

maintaining access to Laos proved critical to the US strategy and support of

the neutralist government providing that access. Consequently, the

second-order results of the Barrel Roll campaign focused on the ability of the

US to conduct Steel Tiger. Since this campaign was executed in total, we

conclude that Barrel Roll achieved its operational level objectives and was

effective.

Strategic Level—Security ofThailand

Preventing the communist insurgency of Thailand by denying the Chinese

and North Vietnamese access to Thailand was a strategic objective of the US.

Although South Vietnam and Laos eventually fell, the security of Thailand

was secured principally through the war in northern Laos. North Vietnamese

forces were prohibited from using Laos as a sanctuary or a staging area for

action against Thailand. Since Thailand remains free of communist

insurgency today, we can conclude that Barrel Roll had some effectiveness in

achieving this strategic objective.

Political Level—Royal Lao Government

Finally, maintaining the RLG in power was a political objective of US

strategy in Laos. The government remained in power through the end of the

Vietnam war, which allowed US access to the country to prosecute the

interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh trail. Consequently, while the

US needed access to Laos to support the withdrawal of US forces from SEA,

Barrel Roll helped to achieve this political objective. The original objectives of

keeping Laos neutral had been previously abandoned and were not objectives

of this period of Barrel Roll. The campaign's principal contribution between

1968 and 1973 centered around support of US interests and objectives in

SEA, mainly South Vietnam.

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, "Summary of Air Operations," February 1973, 1-1. Totals

are shown for Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger during the period from 1 November 1968 to 28

February 1973. Ordnance total includes all US tactical air and B-52 but not Royal Laotian Air

Force or Vietnamese National Air Force. The breakout by area of operations for the same

period was 316,880 tactical air sorties to Steel Tiger and 84,416 tactical air sorties for Barrel

Roll. Tactical air ordnance was 955,544 tons and B-52 was 743,703 tons. Data obtained from

"Summary of Air Operations" for November 1968 through February 1973.

39
2. Mr Barry D. Watts and Dr Thomas A. Keaney provided the inspiration for these

dimensions in GulfWar Air Power Survey, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing

Office, 1993), 27-57. They define airpower effects and effectiveness as described here. I

expanded the concept to include effort along with the three dimensions of each of the aspects of

cost and results.

3. Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994,

denned apportionment as the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by

percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or

geographic areas for a given period. It defined allocation as the translation of the

apportionment into total numbers ofsorties by aircraft type available for each operation/task.

4. Forward air guides were US or allied personnel who helped to direct attack fighter

sorties to the target from the ground.

5. John Morrocco, Rain ofFire: 1969-1973 (Boston: Boston Publishing Co., 1985), 45.

6. Kenneth Sams, Escalation of War in Southeast Asia, July-December 1964 (Hickam AFB,

Hawaii: Project CHECO, Pacific Air Forces, n.d.), 1-4.

40
Chapter 5

Conclusion

The pronounced characteristics of the air war in Laos was that the USAF was

reacting rather than acting in the employment ofits air assets.

—Lt Gen James D. Hughes

U.S. tactical air has been the major factor in preventing wholesale reverses and

making these friendly moves possible. USAF and the RLAF T-28 force have

performed remarkably well in defense of friendly ground positions, in providing

close air support for offensive moves, and in destroying enemy supplies, equipment

and bivouac areas. But air forces cannot substitute for ground force; they can only

supplement them and increase theirfire power and maneuverability.

—Maj Gen Louis T. Seith

Having addressed the four aspects of the campaign analysis—the why,

what, how, and results—this section examines the last question: "Did Barrel

Roll constitute an [implicit] air campaign plan?" The answer must consider

the tenets of a campaign. The JFACC Primer states a campaign should

convey the commander's intent, define success, orient on enemy centers of

gravity, phase a series of operations, provide direction, and synchronize joint

forces.1In addition, the campaign must link strategic objectives with tactical

actions. This section concludes by providing several lessons learned from the

campaign.

Barrel Roll as an Air Campaign

Throughout the period from November 1968 to February 1973, Barrel Roll

protected friendly centers of gravity, exploited enemy centers of gravity, and

achieved the operational and strategic objectives denned during the course of

the campaign. Despite complicated command and control, the use of airpower

as long-range artillery, and questionable coordination between ground and air

efforts, this phase of Barrel Roll accomplished US objectives in support of the

overall SEA war effort, and the force employed (resource allocated) was

consistent with US policy.

41
Friendly Center of Gravity

The fate of the RLG rested with the Hmong irregular forces' ability to

remain in the field and engage the Pathet Lao and the NVA. The Hmong

army occupied an operational center of gravity in Laos. Its defeat would have

compromised the RLG with accompanying strategic ramifications—most of

all, the loss of US access to the country for the mission of interdicting NVA

supply lines into South Vietnam and supporting US objectives in Vietnam.

Primarily, Barrel Roll supported the RLG forces. The US identified this

support as a friendly center of gravity and used airpower to keep Gen Vang

Pao's forces in the fight. Although airpower never could have won this war,

the absence of airpower certainly would have resulted in the defeat of Vang

Pao's forces and led to the fall ofthe RLG.

Tactically, the Lima Sites were centers of gravity because the Hmong used

these centers to gather intelligence and to prosecute a guerrilla style war

against the conventional NVA. Air mobility support by contract airlift and

Lima Sites provided the Hmong an advantage over the road-bound NVA. The

employment of gunships in defense of the Lima Sites demonstrated a

recognition by the US ofthe importance ofthese airfields to the conduct ofthe

ground war against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese.

The effectiveness of the Pathet Lao and NVA in identifying friendly center

of gravity also must be discussed. The NVA focus on the Hmong guerrillas

and their siege of Long Tieng demonstrates a recognition ofimportance ofthis

site and friendly ground forces. The concentration on and capture of Lima

Sites also shows an NVA understanding of how the Hmong utilized these

facilities. Finally, the NVA identified the importance of airpower for the RLG

forces. Attacking the Lima Sites disrupted the air mobility of the guerrillas

and improving the road structure inside Laos minimized the effects of air

interdiction against NVA supply lines by allowing the enemy to remain

forward during the wet season and to negate the effectiveness oftactical air.

Enemy Center of Gravity Identified

The North Vietnamese had several vulnerabilities. Without a developed

infrastructure in northern Laos, the NVA were constrained by long lines of

communications for resupply. Without useable roads during the monsoon

season, the North Vietnamese quickly confronted a culminating point and

were forced to withdraw. In addition, the ability to use Vietnam as a

sanctuary for supplies without the threat of interdiction also proved

advantageous. The buildup of supplies prior to the start of the seasonal

offensive allowed them to increase the level of force and violence in 1969 and

1970. With a larger cache of supplies and by weather proofing the roads, the

NVA eventually were able to hold their gains and not be forced to withdraw

during the monsoon season. The ability of the North Vietnamese to wage an

offensive campaign depended on prepositioning supplies and maintaining

year-round use of their lines of communication. These lines were the enemy's

centers of gravity. NVA road improvements concentrated on the enemy's

42
effort to protect these vulnerabilities. Conversely, the US recognized the

importance of interdicting the NVA lines of communication. The development

and use of all-weather bombing techniques and the continued emphasis on

interdiction throughout the campaign demonstrated a recognition of the

enemy's center of gravity. When interdiction fell short of stopping the

seasonal offensive as it did in 1970 and 1971, the US intensified its support

for the ground forces in the besieged areas until it defeated the concentrated

attacks of the enemy. Correctly identifying the enemy's centers of gravity and

minimizing the friendly vulnerabilities made Barrel Roll an effective air

campaign.2

Consistent Employment with United States Objectives

and Military Strategy

Tactical actions supported US objectives and military strategy. The US did

not seek to defeat the Pathet Lao or NVA in Laos but to support engaged

irregulars and SGU while keeping the RLG in power. The US accomplished

this objective through strict rules of engagement, covert operations, and

airpower to make up for the ground force deficiency in firepower. Given the

large amount of airpower available, the US carefully avoided escalating the

conflict beyond the bounds determined by the enemy and the objectives. In

addition, despite being a low priority for airpower with respect to other

theaters in SEA, airpower was available when the US needed it to support

the RLG.

Accomplished Objectives

From the standpoint of achieving objectives, Barrel Roll was an effective air

campaign. It supported national, strategic, and operational objectives in SEA.

In this regard, Barrel Roll supported the US withdrawal from Vietnam and

the interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh trail. Given the command

and control structure, political constraints, number of agencies involved, and

environment and geography, the employment of airpower carefully balanced

these conditions to achieve its objectives.

Although the campaign succeeded in containing the conflict and forced a

stalemate in Laos, it failed to accomplish the original policy objectives in Laos

and the later withdrawal of all North Vietnamese from the country. The

political end-state was defined as the restoration of the 1962 Geneva

agreement conditions, that is, a neutral Laos. Neutrality never became a

reality, as Laos fell to the communists in December 1975. Subordination of

this campaign to a redefined US policy and objectives in South Vietnam

resulted in modifying the military strategy and course of action in Laos.

With respect to Barrel Roll as an implicit air campaign, historical

documents showed no record or description of a defined military end-state or

success criteria. The lack of a military success criterion was a severe

deficiency in the Barrel Roll campaign. Today's standard for campaign

planning requires that these criteria are clearly identified and have a close

43
relationship to the political objectives. In this regard, Barrel Roll cannot be

considered a campaign according to current doctrine.

Cost of the Conflict

This study would be incomplete without some mention of the cost expended

in Barrel Roll. In terms of Hmong lives, aircraft loss, and US aircrew losses,

this effort cost enormously. US military advisors and Ravens served finite

lengths of time in Laos, six months to one-year tours. However, the Hmong

fought this war until they died. An entire generation of Hmong men lost their

lives in this conflict. Likewise, the RLAF aircrew flew until the war ended or

they died. Several hundred thousand refugees lost their homes and were

displaced. Ultimately, the cost to the Laotians was their country and the

subsequent communist retribution taken against the minority people of Laos

who fought the North Vietnamese. This punishment continued well into the

1980s.3

During the four-year period of this study, US air loses numbered 80

aircraft. Total aircraft losses for Barrel Roll, starting with the first sortie on

18 May 1964, were 131. Total attack sorties for the four-year period were

84,416, which was about 9 percent of the tactical air employed in Laos. As the

data shows, the largest effort occurred with Steel Tiger against the trail. In

dollars, although no breakdown of the cost by campaign exists, the US spent

$1.4 billion in military aid for Laos.

Relevant Lessons

No analysis of a military operation would be complete without identifying

the important lessons that may apply to future conflicts. Countless books

have been written about the employment of airpower in SEA, but few have

looked at the unique contributions of airpower as applied during Barrel Roll.

The following four areas are most important to the prosecution of future

conflicts the US may encounter.

Central Control ofAirpower

Despite enormous pressure from the ambassador, who wanted operational

control of airpower, the USAF resisted providing the embassy with its own

private air force. To have done so would have violated the fundamental tenet

of centralized control, decentralized execution. By maintaining operational

control of USAF air assets, Seventh Air Force apportioned assets where they

were needed most—in the theater. Several instances occurred when the

embassy claimed it had insufficient air or the USAF lacked responsiveness,

but given the environment—complex command and control, political

restrictions, covert war, limitations on the amount of violence—airpower was

employed based on prioritized needs as seen by Seventh Air Force. Future

44
conflicts may necessitate inefficient utilization of airpower, but the tenet of

central control never should be compromised.4

Fighting in an Undeveloped Country

The lack of an airpower infrastructure in Laos, the need to operate from

outside the country, the use of airpower in support of indigenous troops, and

the covert employment of US forces all have relevance to future US military

involvement in the world. The reduction of forward presence in today's world

makes reflecting on the required infrastructure needed for operations and the

ability to operate from outside the country a vital consideration. In addition,

the current US aircraft inventory may not be adaptable to this type of

situation. The difficulties posed by interoperability in an environment of

different languages, culture, and unsophisticated weapons make the cause for

a capable special operations capability, as well as, a way to project airpower

from outside an area of employment. Africa, South America, and SEA are all

areas the USAF could have difficulty conducting future operations due to poor

airpower infrastructure.

Use of Air in Unconventional Ways

Many critics feel the US poorly utilized its airpower in Laos.5Principally

USAF senior officers at Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, these critics lacked a

first-hand view or understanding of the situation in Laos. Employment of

tactical air during Barrel Roll often did not conform to airpower doctrine. The

criticisms of serving targets or use of air as long-range artillery were common

in historical references examined. The nature of guerrilla warfare—its

mobility and light firepower—may transform airpower into long-range

artillery. However, in this manner the use of air for mobility and for fire

support proved invaluable to the ground scheme of maneuver. What the

critics overlooked was that a guerrilla force does not fight like a conventional

army. Preplanned and coordinated operations in Laos conformed more

frequently to the exception than to the norm. Accordingly, the employment of

airpower had to be responsive to the politics and dynamics of the tactical

situation.

The mobility provided to Gen Vang Pao's forces by airpower must not be

overlooked. The ability of these lightly equipped forces to engage effectively a

conventional and heavier equipped force was not only due to the fighting

spirit of the Hmong but also to their ability to move around the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the special airlift assets needed for this kind of conflict do not

exist in the USAF inventory, but the US Army's helicopter force could provide

the support needed in this type of environment.

Employment of Special Operations Forces

A principal success story involved the effectiveness of special operations

forces in this unique environment. Air Commandos, through Project Water

Pump, developed an air force, and ground commandos trained an effective

45
guerrilla force. The covert employment of special forces provided presence

without visibility. Perhaps such employment in future operations, given the

open media environment that now exists, is not possible; nevertheless, the

use of special forces to train and advise foreign military units and

governments may be more necessary today than during the cold war. The

lessons of special forces' operations in Laos should be studied for relevant

application in future situations.

Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, JFACC Primer, ed. Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and

Operations, Headquarters USAF, 19.

2. Maj Gen Dewitt R. Searles, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters 7th/13th AF,

End-of-Tour report, 1 July 1971 to 8 September 1972, Udorn, Thailand, 9 September 1972,

17-20.

3. Jane Hamilton-Merritt's book, Tragic Mountains, focuses primarily on the Hmong

people, who fought with the French, Royal Lao government, and Americans during the three

Indochina wars. The book highlights the tragic plight of these people at the hands of the North

Vietnamese Communist.

4. Amb William H. Sullivan, Department of the Air Force, oral history interview, 5-19; and

Searles, End-of-Tour report, 3-9.

5. An example of this view is General Hughes' quote at the beginning of this section.

46
Epilogue

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so—without first

being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by war and how he intends to

conduct it.

—Carl von Clausewitz

The Gulf War created new standards by which to judge future air

campaigns; however, caution must be employed in light of potential future air

wars. Today's world appears to be more unconventional than the type of war

encountered during Desert Storm. The desert was a unique environment that

favored airpower, unlike the conditions that existed in Laos during the 1960s

and early 1970s. US military forces would be wise to remember the lessons

learned in Vietnam, but should especially study those learned in Laos.

The application of airpower, at times, conflicting with the strict

interpretation of Air Force doctrine, made a definite contribution in Barrel

Roll. Like most conflicts—airpower alone was unable to completely defeat the

enemy in northern Laos, but the lack of air support would have doomed the

Hmong guerrillas early in the conflict. Air made the difference in keeping

pressure on the North Vietnamese and maintaining the RLG in power. The

political and geographical constraints of Laos ultimately resulted in a war of

attrition both on the ground and in the air.

Unfortunately, the tragedy of this story focuses on the loyal Hmong

tribesmen, who, having fought so valiantly for their beloved Laos, were left to

wilt after the US departed. Like airpower, these individuals became a tool in

achieving US objectives in Laos. Their attrition became part of US strategy to

maintain the military stalemate. Sadly, this will remain forever the dark side

of Barrel Roll and US involvement in the secret wars of Laos.

47
Appendix

The following tables and charts comprise a compilation of data obtained

during the course of research for this project. The majority of the data was

obtained from Headquarters Pacific Air Force, "Summary ofAir Operations in

Southeast Asia," archived at the Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air

Force Base. These documents are organized in 109 volumes, one for every

month, beginning July 1964 and ending August 1973. The reports present a

summary by theater (Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia) of

sorties, ordnance, bomb damage assessment, and losses and an overview of

the month's activity. Most of these reports recently have been declassified.

They offer a wealth of data awaiting analysis.

The charts in this section provide information for the period of this study,

mid-1968 to early 1973. Comparing the effort of air activity in Barrel Roll to

other areas in SEA provides a good perspective for the priorities and

utilization of available tactical air sorties. The data was plotted to support the

analysis and conclusions of this study. Complete analysis and correlation

await another study or paper. Nevertheless, this data provides an interesting

perspective of the employment of airpower and relationship between theaters

in SEA.

49
Table A-1

Air Order of Battle, USAF Attack Aircraft, July 1968-December 1972

SOUTH VIETNAM

31

Jul

68

30

Dec

68

30

Jun

69

30

Dec

69

30

Jun

70

30

Dec

70

30

Jun

71

30

Dec

71

30

Jun

72

30

Dec

72

Bien Hoa A-1

AC-47

AC-119

F-100

3

6

47

5

56

5

50 22

2

19

2

4 5

Binh Tuy AC-47 4 3

Cam Ranh Bay F-4 54 49 47 42 , . Da Nang A

-1

AC-47

AC-119

F-4

: 4

55

2

4

53

3

5

57

11

6

47

9

9

48

2

a

48

2

4

55

2

5

55-

2

3 15

Nha Trang AC-47

AC-119

7 9 13

7

Phan Rang AC-47

AC-119

B-57

F-100

3

23

68

3

15

66

6

9

67

11

77

9

65

9

75

13

59

Phu Cat AC-47

AC-119

F-4

F-100

4

69

3

65

3

34

3

34

6

30

1

32 36 .

Pleiku A-1

AC-47

18

3

18

4

17

3

TanSonNhut AC-119 5 5 5 9 10

Tuy Hoa AC-119

F-100 : 88 74 86

4

88 86

TOTAL,

South Vietnam

455 428 417 350 288 186 179 62 9 20

THAILAND

31

Jul

68

30

Dec

68

30

Jun

69

30

Dec

69

30

Jun

70

30

Dec

70

30

Jun

71

30

Dec

71

30

Jun

72

30

Dec

72

Korat A-7

F-4

F-105 55

20

34

40

18

34 32 27

11

32

12

38

14

53

30

67

31 .

24

Nakhon Phanom

A-1

A-26

F-105

33

12

39

17

54

16

70 47 .26

5

25

7

19

11

16

8

:

Takhli F-4

F-105

F-111

55 55 64 70 65 55

96

47

Ubon A-1

AC-130

B-57

F-4

1

74

4

72

4

73

7

67

2

3

67

1

10

9

73

8

10

56

18

10

73

12

100

13

106

Udorn AC-47

AC-119

F-4 39 40

2

35

3

35

3

34 27 37 42 104 121

TOTAL,

Thailand

269 281 296 290 253 243 187 225 419 409

GRAND TOTAL 724 709 713 640 541 429 366 287 428 429

50
Table A-2

US Attack Sorties (Tacair) by Phase of Barrel Roll

Fjt^l^jhyj: WyfPj&J

18.8

'4&s${fo:

ifel? ^% '

38,767 80,921

• •.'<'4^c'

•*^:';. HI

ssiiiiii

South Vietnam 239,952 48.8 53.9 359,640 42.4

North Vietnam 867 0.2 1,702 0.8 44,431 29.6 47,000s 5.5

Cambodia 9,266 1.9 25,065 12.2 5,479 3.6 39 810 4.7

Laos-Steel Tiger 186;755 38.0 118,038 57.4 12,087 8.0 316,880 37.4

Laos-Barrel Roll 54,986 11.2 22,179 10.8 7,251 4.8 84,416 10.0

Total 491,826 205,751 150,169 847,746.

51
Table A-3

US Tacair Ordnance Delivered by Phase of Barrel Roll (tons)

South Vietnam

North Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Total

WS

;.y. .1..-.:.-. ji,j

-471,825

.1,559

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575,590

1,048,974

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87,908

4,989

20,547

321,540

434,984

20.2

1.1

4.7

73.9

\<ti£ü&&rk*,r}

201,933

121,701

17,396

58,414

399,444

«fei

las

50.6

30.5

4.4

14.6

fii£*$

s®*ft%:..-

N*fc£i

761,666

128,249

37,943

955,544

1,883,402

UV)

iy^vrö'.,

40.4

6.8

2.0

50.7

Table A-3a

US Tacair & B-52 Ordnance Delivered by Phase of Barrel Roll (tons)

wiiiiiMJy^iiiiiiÄtiisiii^M St"""" ~$ •:?Üi'.

"'Sin. i^^^^^^^mi (rr.YjVli.' ,.

South Vietnam 1,044,024 53 0 203,941 20.9 541,062 58.5 1,789,027 46.2

North Vietnam 1,559 0.1 4,989 0.5 230,588 24.9 237,136 6.1

Cambodia 21,384 1.1 76,856 7.9 45,305 4.9 143,545 3.7

Laos 902,223 45.8 688,935 70.7 108,089 11.7 1,699,247 43.9

Total 1,969,190 974,721 925,044 3,868,955

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