Disaster Labs 

Disaster Labs

How American States Use Partnerships 

to Manage the Unthinkable

Austen D. Givens, PhD

Quantico, Virginia

2020
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Names: Givens, Austen D., 1982- author. 

Title: Disaster labs : how American states use partnerships to manage the 

unthinkable / Austen D. Givens. 

Description: First edition. | Quantico, Virginia : Marine Corps University 

 Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: 

“Disaster Labs examines the promise and potential drawbacks of publicprivate disaster response frameworks during the course of seven chapters. After the introduction, the author introduces a series of case studies 

and then provides a detailed discussion of public-private collaboration 

in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia. A concluding chapter then 

comparatively assesses the value of these partnerships. The cases discussed in Disaster Labs range from informal ad hoc collaborations to 

formalized initiatives with detailed structures defined in contracts and 

memoranda, setting expectations for performance and accountability for 

both the government and private actors. Such accountability is desirable 

as it can limit fraud and corruption. But it is important to emphasize that 

not all solutions work in all situations, either”— Provided by publisher. 

Identifiers: LCCN 2020006958 | ISBN 9780160955242 (paperback) 

Subjects: LCSH: Disaster relief—United States. | Emergency management—

United States. | Public-private sector cooperation—United States. 

Classification: LCC HV555.U6 G58 2020 | DDC 363.34/80973—dc23 

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020006958

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors. They 

do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations for which they 

work, Marine Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of 

the Navy, or the U.S. government. The information contained in this book 

was accurate at the time of printing. Every effort has been made to secure 

copyright permission on excerpts and artworks reproduced in this volume. 

Please contact the editors to rectify inadvertent errors or omissions.

The production of this book and other MCUP products is graciously supported by the Marine Corps University Foundation.

Published by

Marine Corps University Press

2044 Broadway Drive

Quantico, VA 22134

www.mcu.usmcu.edu/mcupress

First edition, 2020

F ro as le t yb eh S epu ri tn e edn tn fo D co mu e tn S.U ,s G . evo r emn tn P Office

I tn er en t: tskoob ro e P vog.opg. enoh : lot l f ree ( )668 -215 ;0081 D C a re ( a )202 -215 0081

Fa :x ( )202 -215 aM 4012 il: I potS DCC W , ihsa tgn no D , C -20402 1000

ublishing

ISBN 978-0-16-095524-2

0
This book is dedicated to four members 

of the greatest generation:

Melvin A. Gianniny

Curtis D. Givens

Randolph R. Lang

William L. Metzger

vii

Contents

Foreword ix

Acknowledgments xv

Abbreviations xvii

Introduction 3

CHAPTER

ONE The Rise of State Disaster-Oriented 47

 Public-Private Partnerships

TWO California Dreaming? 76

THREE Disaster-Oriented PPPs in Florida 116

FOUR The Divided Empire State 152

FIVE Disasters in the Old Dominion 193

SIX Toward New Understandings 222

 of State Disaster-Oriented PPPs

Epilogue: The 2019 Coronavirus Disease 275

Appendix A: Interview Participants 285

Appendix B: Interview Questions 288

Appendix C: Human Subjects Protection 290

Bibliography 293

Index 321

ix

Foreword

Disasters have profound effects on communities. 

Tragically, they often lead to deaths and injuries. They 

can also disrupt vital services such as water, electric 

power, and natural gas.

Since disasters adversely impact communities, 

disaster responses must be rapid, flexible, and prioritize critical needs. They also must integrate actions 

from a variety of disciplines: law enforcement, fire 

services, pre-hospital health care or emergency medical services, hospitals (including trauma and specialty care centers), utilities, sanitation, transportation, 

and the community itself. 

Disasters not only impact people and property. They can influence organizational capacity and 

behavior too. These human and organizational dimensions demand the incorporation of crisis management skills and activities into the overall response 

architecture. 
FOREWORD

x

Public-Private Partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPP) are part of a growing trend in emergency management. These partnerships leverage private resources—corporate, private 

voluntary, or humanitarian contributions—to respond 

to and recover from disasters within communities. 

The nature of private contributions varies across 

communities, but in general PPPs add important capabilities and capacities to emergency responses. 

A recent Rand study found that PPPs are integral to 

effective and efficient disaster management by reducing the burden on governments at all levels and 

facilitating the flow of critical goods, services, and logistics that may not be immediately available to government agencies after disasters.1

This is especially true of private sector assets 

such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals for 

epidemic response, and surge capacity for critical infrastructure components. PPPs are also an important 

component of global disaster risk reduction efforts 

as illustrated by the Sendai Framework for Disaster 

Risk Reduction, 2015–2030.

2

1

 Anita Chandra, Shaela Moen, and Clarissa Sellers, What Role 

Does the Private Sector Have in Supporting Disaster Recovery, and 

What Challenges Does It Face in Doing So? (Santa Monica, CA: 

Rand, 2016), https://doi.org/10.7249/PE187. A good academic overview of this can be found in Marino L. Eyerkaufer, Fabiana S. Lima, 

and Mirian B. Gonçalves, “Public and Private Partnership in Disaster Risk Management,” JAMBA: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 8, 

no. 1 (2016): 277, https://dx.doi.org/10.4102%2Fjamba.v8i1.277.

2

 See Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–2030 

(New York: UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015).
FOREWORD

xi

Disaster Labs: How American States Use Partnerships to Manage the Unthinkable examines the 

promise and potential drawbacks of public-private 

disaster response frameworks during the course of 

six chapters. After the introduction, the author introduces a series of case studies and then provides a 

detailed discussion of public-private collaboration in 

California, Florida, New York, and Virginia. A concluding chapter then comparatively assesses the value of 

these partnerships. 

The cases discussed in Disaster Labs range from 

informal, ad hoc collaborations to formalized initiatives with detailed structures defined in contracts 

and memoranda, setting expectations for performance and accountability for both the government 

and private actors. Such accountability is desirable 

as it can limit fraud and corruption. But it is important 

to emphasize that not all solutions work in all situations, either. 

Balancing Interoperability and Flexibility

Achieving optimal disaster response demands a 

balance between flexibility and structure. Ideal responses also include interoperability and standards 

to suit unique local needs and concerns, but disaster 

responses present different circumstances and challenges. These include the hazards encountered, the 

scope of damage, cascading impacts, population(s) 

affected, resources available, and agencies (or private 

actors) responding. These unique response networks 
FOREWORD

xii

bring tailored capabilities and challenges to the disaster response. Managing these circumstances calls for 

a form of command known as meta-leadership where 

trust, command capacity, and command climate 

emphasize collaboration and organizational agility. This dynamic requirement can be nurtured and 

sustained by implementing a public-private disaster 

coordination center, which acts as the civil analog of 

a civil-military operations center (CMOC) within the 

various emergency operations centers (EOCs) activated to support disaster response.

Emphasizing State and Local Capacity

Because disasters exceed local abilities to respond, 

some see an opportunity to supplant local capabilities with federal response capacity. This is natural, but 

it ignores the unique set of local understandings and 

capacity that bolster and sustain ongoing emergency management and resilience. Rather than replace 

state and local governments’ roles, federal actions 

are most effective when they build from and support 

local capacity and address local circumstances, including terrain, political considerations, population/

social factors, and economic dynamics. These local 

networks must incorporate and integrate federal and 

military support, as well as private-public contributions for humanitarian aid and post-disaster recovery. 

The future is likely to bring new and more challenging disasters. Earthquakes, floods, epidemics, 

and food crises are all amplified in urban settings, in-
FOREWORD

xiii

creasing the probability that comprehensive disaster 

responses, including those to catastrophic events, 

will require federal and military intervention to save 

lives, restore normalcy, and rebuild viable communities. These future crises will also demand support 

from private actors. 

Protecting the public, preserving homeland security, and meeting the challenges of future disasters 

requires integrated and mutually supporting elements. Disaster Labs offers compelling evidence 

that interorganizational collaboration is indispensable for large-scale emergency responses today. 

And, if the recent past is any guide, this interorganizational collaboration will remain vital in the emergencymanagement field for the foreseeable future.

Dr. John P. Sullivan

Los Angeles, June 2019

xv

Acknowledgments

I begin by thanking my wife, Rachel, and daughters, 

Serafina and Augusta, for the love and encouragement that they have shown me throughout the writing of this book.

At King’s College London (KCL), the late Ken 

Young—together with Ami J. Abou-bakr, Wyn Q. 

Bowen, and Emily C. Skarbek—provided crucial research and editorial guidance. I also thank Sir David 

Omand, GCB, from KCL’s Department of War Studies, 

and Martin Lodge, from the London School of Economics and Political Science, for their suggestions 

and comments. I am indebted to Joe Giordano and 

James Norrie for carving out the physical and temporal space necessary for me to continue my research 

at Utica College, New York. The Center for American 

Studies at Christopher Newport University, Virginia, 

provided me with generous support and guidance 

during the course of writing this book. One cannot 

overstate the value of good mentors in academia, so I 

offer my gratitude to Nathan Busch and Dale Jones in 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xvi

particular for helping shape my career through their 

sound counsel. This book would not have been possible without them.

I am especially grateful to Angela Anderson and 

Jason Gosnell of Marine Corps University Press, who 

together with Alex Kindell from the Marine Corps Operations Analysis Directorate helped shepherd this 

project from conception to completion. 

Finally, my thanks go to the women and men in 

the emergency-management profession who generously spent many hours with me during the course 

of writing this book. While most have chosen to identify themselves, some have elected to remain anonymous. 
xvii

Abbreviations

ALAN American Logistics Aid Network

APIP Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure 

Protection

BBB Better Business Bureau

BCP business continuity planning

BECC Business Emergency Coordination Center

BENS Business Executives for National Security

BUOC Business and Utility Operations Center

CalOES California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services

CEO chief executive officer

CGA California Grocers Association

CRA California Resiliency Alliance

DEO Department of Economic Opportunity

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EOC Emergency Operations Center

ESF emergency support function
ABBREVIATIONS

xviii

FDEM Florida Division of Emergency Management

FEMA Federal Emergency Management 

Agency

FRF Florida Retail Federation

GIS geographic information system

HREMC Hampton Roads Emergency Management Committee

ICS Incident Command System

ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

MLS Major League Soccer

MOU memorandum of understanding

NIMS National Incident Management System

NRF National Response Framework

NRP National Response Plan

NYCOEM New York City Office of Emergency 

Management

NYS New York State

NYSE New York Stock Exchange

NYSOEM New York State Office of Emergency 

Management

PPP public-private partnership

SBA Small Business Administration

SEOC State Emergency Operations Center

SIP Safeguard Iowa Partnership

SOC State Operations Center

VBEOC Virtual Business Emergency Operations Center

VDEM Virginia Department of Emergency 

Management
ABBREVIATIONS

xix

VDH Virginia Department of Health

VDOT Virginia Department of Transportation

VEOC Virginia Emergency Operations Center

VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters

U.S. United States

USA United States of America

Disaster Labs

3

Introduction

Hurricane Sandy swept through the New York City 

metro area on 29 October 2012. Lisa Perez, a resident 

of Staten Island—one of New York City’s five boroughs—was fortunate to survive the storm.1

 While 

Sandy blew through Staten Island, Perez exited her 

house to move her car to higher ground.2 Before she 

could move her car, however, rushing floodwaters 

overwhelmed her.3 Perez felt herself being pulled 

away by the rushing water, and yelled to her daughter, 

“If I die, just stay there!”4 Eddie Perez (no relation), Lisa 

Perez’s neighbor, was pulled away by the flood at the 

same time.5 Eddie Perez indicated to Lisa Perez that 

they both should attempt to make their way through 

1

 For a detailed explanation of the human subjects protection measures used for this study, see appendix C.

2

 Alan Taylor, “Hurricane Sandy: Staten Island Survivors,” Atlantic 

(photo gallery), 21 November 2012.

3

 Taylor, “Hurricane Sandy.” 

4

 Taylor, “Hurricane Sandy.” 

5

 Taylor, “Hurricane Sandy.” 
INTRODUCTION

4

the floodwater to a nearby tree.6 For the next two 

hours, they clung to the tree, riding out the storm.7

This exceptional story demonstrates the depth of 

destruction in areas of New York City that were hit 

hardest by Hurricane Sandy. Estimates show that the 

storm killed at least 117 people and caused approximately $50 billion in damages.8

 The storm triggered 

fires in the New York City borough of Queens, burning 

an entire neighborhood to the ground.9 Subway tunnels filled with water, and as a result this vital mode 

of public transportation was halted.10 In addition, five 

city hospitals were evacuated by authorities due to 

flooding and power outages.11 The storm deposited 

8.5 million cubic yards of debris onto streets.12

After the hurricane passed, government and private sector officials immediately began collaborating 

to recover from the effects of the storm. Andrew M. 

6

 Taylor, “Hurricane Sandy.” 

7

 Taylor, “Hurricane Sandy.” 

8

 In 2012 dollars, unadjusted for inflation. Eric S. Blake et al., Tropical 

Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy (AL182012), 22–29 October 2012

(Miami, FL: National Hurricane Center, 2013), 1; and U.S. Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, “Deaths Associated with Hurricane Sandy—October–November 2012,” Morbidity and Mortality 

Weekly Report 62, no. 20 (May 2013): 393–97. 9

 “Breezy Point, Queens Looks Forward after Devastating Fire Following Superstorm Sandy,” CBS News, 31 October 2012. 

10 Matt Flegenheimer, “Flooded Tunnels May Keep City’s Subway 

Network Closed for Several Days,” New York Times, 30 October 

2012. 

11 “NYC Hospitals Evacuated for Superstorm,” CBS News, 2015, accessed 29 March 2017. 

12 “6 Months Report: Superstorm Sandy from Pre-Disaster to Recovery,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 25 April 

2013. 
INTRODUCTION

5

Cuomo, the governor of New York State, advocated 

for a state law to facilitate post-Sandy reconstruction. This law gave private businesses an explicit role 

in financing, designing, and rebuilding damaged public sector infrastructure, such as roads and bridges.13

Moreover, the New York Bankers Association and 

New York Business Development Corporation, in 

conjunction with the State of New York, made emergency loans available to small businesses impacted 

by Hurricane Sandy.14

These examples of public-private sector coordination after Hurricane Sandy are part of a growing 

trend within the emergency-management profession.15 In this book, emergency management refers 

to the managerial framework that works to reduce 

public vulnerability to disasters and addresses the effects of disasters when they occur.16 Disasters refer to 

13 Freeman Klopott, “Cuomo Aims to Speed New York Sandy Recovery with Private Funding,” Bloomberg, 23 January 2013.

14 “Governor Cuomo Announces Small Business Emergency Loan 

Fund to Provide Assistance to Businesses Affected by Sandy,” New 

York State, 14 November 2012.

15 Principles of Emergency Management Supplement (Washington, 

DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007), 4; and Michael K. Lindell, Carla Prater, and Ronald W. Perry, Introduction to 

Emergency Management (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 

10–13. Businesses now perform roles in all phases of the emergency management cycle—mitigation, preparedness, response, and 

recovery. See also Anita Chandra, Shaela Moen, and Clarissa Sellers, What Role Does the Private Sector Have in Supporting Disaster 

Recovery, and What Challenges Does It Face in Doing So? (Santa 

Monica, CA: Rand, 2016), 5–7, https://doi.org/10.7249/PE187. 16 “Emergency Management: Definition, Vision, Mission, Principles,” FEMA, accessed 6 December 2017.
INTRODUCTION

6

natural, human-caused, or technological events that 

result in a substantial number of fatalities, extensive 

property damage, injuries, and environmental damage, 

frequently triggering requests for outside assistance.17

In the United States, emergency-management offices exist at the local, state, and federal levels of government.18 Today, public-private sector partnerships 

for emergency management are also present at each 

of these levels of government.19 Moreover, nonprofits, 

civic groups, and individual citizens cooperate and 

collaborate to help communities manage the effects 

of large-scale emergencies.20 Each of these actors 

plays important roles in emergency management.21

This book, however, focuses on state-level, publicprivate sector partnerships for emergency manage17 “Glossary of Terms,” in Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, State and Local Guide (SLG) 101 (Washington, DC: 

FEMA, 1996), GLO-2; and Catastrophic Incident Annex to the National Response Framework (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2008), CAT-1. 18 For example, see Governor’s Office of Emergency Services Public/Private Partnership Initiative (Mather, CA: Governor’s Office of 

Emergency Services, n.d.); “FEMA Continues to Support Response 

to Colorado Flooding,” FEMA, 15 September 2013; and “Take Action 

to Protect Your Business,” New York City Office of Emergency Management, 2015, accessed 29 March 2017. 19 Ami J. Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private 

Partnerships (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 

50–52; Governor’s Office of Emergency Services Public/Private Partnership Initiative, 2; and “Take Action to Protect Your Business.” 20 Naim Kapucu, “Collaborative Emergency Management: Better Community Organizing, Better Public Preparedness and Response,” Disasters 32, no. 2 (June 2008): 247, https://doi.org/10.1111/

j.1467-7717.2008.01037.x.

21 Kapucu, “Collaborative Emergency Management,” 249–56.
INTRODUCTION

7

ment, or disaster-oriented PPPs.22 For the sake of 

variety in this book, related terms are also used to 

signify disaster-oriented PPPs. These terms include, 

but are not limited to, disaster partnerships, interorganizational partnerships, emergency-management 

accords, and collaborations for disaster management. Readers should assume that the author means 

disaster-oriented PPP when these alternative formulations are used, unless stated otherwise.

What Are Disaster-Oriented PPPs?

Disaster-oriented PPPs in this book refer to deliberate, purposeful collaboration between at least one 

state agency and one profit-seeking private sector entity or nonprofit organization for emergencymanagement purposes. Disaster-oriented PPPs can 

include a wide range of collaborative public-private 

sector activities. As Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers have shown, these partnerships can 

include service contract partnerships in which governments use contracts to obtain goods or services 

from firms in exchange for payment; supply chain 

partnerships, in which one or more firms contribute 

goods or services in the creation of a complex product, such as a computer server; ad hoc partnerships, 

which form in response to a particular situation, such 

as a sudden flood or hurricane; channel partnerships, 

where companies carry out certain transactions on 

22 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 1. “Disaster-oriented PPPs” is Abou-bakr’s formulation.
INTRODUCTION

8

behalf of government entities; information dissemination partnerships, such as through a shared online 

information portal containing data provided by both 

government and private sector entities; and civic 

switchboard partnerships, where government or private sector bodies use their connections to link third 

parties with one another, much like telephone operators once used wires and plugs to connect calls in 

the past.23

One popular form of collaboration that is beyond 

the scope of this book is the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC). The EMAC is a mechanism that permits states to request and receive mutual aid and legal protections in the event of disasters. 

EMACs are administered by state governors through 

their respective emergency-management agencies. 

While there is no doubt that EMACs play vital roles 

in emergency management, the focus of the present 

book is primarily on agreements between governments and nongovernmental entities such as firms 

and nonprofits. Since EMACs, by contrast, focus on 

state-to-state cooperation, this book does not offer a 

deeper examination.

The definition of disaster partnerships used in 

this book also excludes independent public or private initiatives for emergency management as well 

23 Stephen Goldsmith and William D. Eggers, Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 69–70; and E. S. Savas, Privatization 

and Public-Private Partnerships (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000), 88–89.
INTRODUCTION

9

as what has been called parallel play—that is, when 

agencies work alongside one another to achieve a 

common objective but without coordinating their 

respective actions.24 However, the definition incorporates the activities of nonprofit entities such as 

the American Red Cross or Salvation Army.25 The reason for the inclusion of nonprofit organizations here 

is that these organizations often partner with state 

government agencies and firms simultaneously for 

disaster-management purposes, making it difficult to 

disentangle nonprofits’ disaster-management work 

from that of their profit-seeking corporate partners, 

at least in the context of state-level emergencymanagement practices. And as will be shown in 

chapters 3 through 6, nonprofit entities act frequently as trusted agents for firms that wish to participate 

in disaster-management activities with state government agencies. 

Why State-Level Partnerships?

Disaster Labs builds directly on research the author 

conducted with Nathan E. Busch for his last book, The 

24 Scott E. Robinson and Benjamin S. Gaddis, “Seeing Past Parallel Play: Measures of Collaboration in Disaster Situations,” Policy 

Studies Journal 40, no. 2 (May 2012): 260, https://doi.org/10.1111/j

.1541-0072.2012.00452.x.

25 Previous studies have examined the role of public-nonprofit partnerships for emergency management in depth. For example, see 

Naim Kapucu, “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action 

in Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies,” Public Administration 84, no. 

1 (March 2006): 216–17; and Naim Kapucu, “Non-profit Response to 

Catastrophic Disasters,” Disaster Prevention and Management 16, 

no. 4 (2007): 555–58, https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560710817039.
INTRODUCTION

10

Business of Counterterrorism: Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security, which included a 

chapter on the interactions between firms and government agencies in the disaster-management 

field.26 As the author wrote The Business of Counterterrorism, he began to wonder whether state governments, as opposed to the federal government, were 

experiencing a similar movement to grow publicprivate sector partnerships for disaster-management 

purposes. The desire to learn more about how state 

governments managed disasters was the genesis of 

Disaster Labs. 

At first, the author assumed that states were already partnering with firms for disaster-management 

purposes and that this organizational behavior was 

being driven by federal-level leadership, such as 

within the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA). However, that assumption proved to be incorrect. 

After interviewing state government, business, 

and nonprofit leaders for Disaster Labs, it became 

clear that it was, in fact, the federal government that 

followed the lead of state governments in advancing public-private sector partnerships for disaster 

management. Put another way, the tail (i.e., state 

governments) was wagging the dog (i.e., the feder26 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, The Business of Counterterrorism: Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security (New 

York: Peter Lang, 2014).
INTRODUCTION

11

al government). That realization helped shape this 

book’s two central arguments. 

First, public-private partnerships for emergency 

management provide essential support for statelevel disaster management across the United States. 

These partnerships are innovative, messy, productive, and unique. They sometimes fall apart. But what 

is striking about these partnerships—and what continues to be a point of fascination now—is that they 

are conceptualized, planned, and managed by state 

governments, firms, and nonprofits with virtually no 

direction or support from the federal government. 

Emergency managers in state capitals are not waiting around for federal policy makers to tell them to 

create disaster collaborations. They cannot afford to. 

The stakes are too high, and the costs of inaction too 

great.

For an era in which federal government influence seems to loom in virtually every area of societal 

endeavor—business, education, health care, technology, and so on—disaster partnerships stand out 

as an anomaly. These agreements are a bottom-up, 

grassroots public policy solution for communities 

struggling to respond to and recover from large-scale 

emergencies.27 The author believes that these examples of public-private coordination also reflect Amer27 David Colander and Roland Kupers, Complexity and the Art of 

Public Policy: Solving Society’s Problems from the Bottom Up 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 35–36.
INTRODUCTION

12

ican communities at their best, because they can 

combine the efforts of government agencies, businesses, and nonprofit organizations to aid disaster 

survivors in desperate circumstances. 

These observations lead to the second argument 

in this book: that state governments should be left 

to develop their own public-private partnerships 

without federal interference. There is a tendency 

within the emergency-management profession to 

standardize practices and procedures, and this standardization is almost always driven by the federal government. At times, this tendency can be helpful. For 

example, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) 

terrorist attacks, emergency officials recognized the 

need to establish a universal management system 

for large-scale emergencies involving multiple jurisdictions and organizations. The purpose of such a 

system is to avoid the coordination problems evident 

during the emergency responses to the 9/11 terrorist 

attacks, most notably in New York City. With this in 

mind, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security developed the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS)—a standardized emergency-management 

method that has now been widely adopted by governments at all levels in the United States.28

However, the federally driven standardization of 

emergency-management practices can have unde28 Charles R. Wise, “Organizing for Homeland Security after Katrina: 

Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing?,” Public Administration 

Review 66, no. 3 (May–June 2006): 307, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-

6210.2006.00587.x.
INTRODUCTION

13

sired consequences too. For example, the successful 

use of NIMS depends heavily on pre-incident planning. If emergencies occur that fall outside the scope 

of these emergency plans, then reliance on NIMS can 

lead to inflexible response actions.29 And while NIMS 

is a helpful framework for coordinating emergency 

response actions among multiple organizations, the 

ability to clearly tackle value-based trade-offs among 

those organizations during disasters is less transparent.30

Consider the following hypothetical example. Let 

us suppose that a large wildfire in California threatens to burn two essentially identical communities at 

the same time. How do first responders with limited 

resources choose which community to protect first? 

NIMS offers us no clear answer. Responders instead 

must look to local values and circumstances to make 

well-informed emergency response decisions.31 This 

hypothetical example underlines why it is so crucial 

for the federal government to leave state governments to manage their own partnerships as they like. 

The states know best what works well for them. 

But there are also practical reasons to study 

how state governments, firms, and nonprofits work 

together to deal with the effects of disasters. These 

29 Rui Chen et al., “Coordination in Emergency Response Management,” Communications of the ACM 51, no. 5 (May 2008): 70, 

https://doi.org/10.1145/1342327.1342340.

30 Dutch Leonard and Arnold Howitt, “A Command System for All 

Agencies?,” Crisis Response Journal 1, no. 2 (June 2005): 42. 31 Colander and Kupers, Complexity and the Art of Public Policy, 36.
INTRODUCTION

14

interorganizational partnerships for emergency management can have far-reaching effects. For example, 

to reduce the exposure and vulnerability of local 

communities to natural and man-made disasters, 

state government leaders can carry out systematic 

risk assessments. These risk assessments may be 

conducted by firms that state governments retain 

on contract, especially when state governments lack 

the personnel or expertise to carry them out.32 The 

results of these assessments may lead to more stringent local building codes and rezoning property in 

disaster-prone areas, which can ultimately save lives 

and property.

Moreover, state government agencies and businesses can collaborate to develop statewide evacuation plans. If a particular state region is then affected 

by a disaster, residents in that region can evacuate 

to another safe region en masse.33 Once these residents evacuate, state governments may open statemanaged emergency shelters for evacuees until the 

emergency ends. These evacuees will usually require 

food, water, and basic hygiene supplies for the duration of their stay in the shelter. State government 

agencies can obtain food, water, and hygiene sup32 For example, see the Risk and Strategic Management Corporation, accessed 29 March 2017.

33 State Governments and Community Disaster Recovery (Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber Foundation, n.d.), 15. Developing local 

plans to reduce the risks of disasters requiring mass evacuations 

are also a global goal. See Sendai Framework for Disaster risk Reduction, 2015–2030 (New York: United Nations, n.d.), 12.
INTRODUCTION

15

plies for evacuees from firms through cash payments 

and charitable donations.34

Disaster response collaborations can also be 

critical in post-disaster recovery efforts and help 

mitigate the effects of future disasters. After a disaster, state governments can work with private insurance companies to help ensure the availability 

of insurance payments to disaster survivors.35 State 

agencies can encourage local governments to write 

locally focused disaster recovery plans, and those recovery plans can include roles for businesses. When 

firms sell goods and services after disasters, their 

engagement in business transactions with residents 

can deliver a helpful short-term boost to local economies that may have slowed because of the disaster’s 

impact.36 State agencies and firms can collaborate to 

rebuild damaged state infrastructure such as bridges 

and tunnels. Additionally, states can accelerate building permit and licensing processes, which allow construction firms to begin repair work quickly.37

State governments can even serve as incubators for new emergency-management practices 

that encourage further collaboration between state 

agencies and businesses. For example, after the 9/11 

terrorist attacks, the federal government elevated the 

Incident Command System (ICS)—an emergency 

34 State Governments and Community Disaster Recovery, 15. 35 State Governments and Community Disaster Recovery, 16. 36 State Governments and Community Disaster Recovery, 3. 37 State Governments and Community Disaster Recovery, 20–21.
INTRODUCTION

16

response methodology first developed in California

—to the nationwide emergency-management method and made it the conceptual cornerstone of NIMS.38

Since the federal government has now mandated 

the use of ICS for large-scale emergencies throughout the United States, what was once a Californiaspecific emergency-management practice now 

affects all 50 U.S. states, territories, and insular areas 

by providing a means for government agencies and 

firms to integrate their operations during disaster responses.39

California is one of several states that have embraced disaster partnerships. The next section outlines the specific methods used to explore these 

agreements in this study.

General Methodology Used for This Study

This book presents a qualitative study based on elite 

interviews with senior government, business, and 

nonprofit leaders in four U.S. states: California, Flor38 Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. Aguirre, “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 3, 

(September 2006): 1, https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1252; and 

National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 45.

39 George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/

HSPD-5—Management of Domestic Incidents (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 2003), 231–32; and National Incident 

Management System (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017), 3n5. 
INTRODUCTION

17

ida, New York, and Virginia.40 The leaders interviewed 

for this study are in an excellent position to describe 

how these partnerships function, to recount examples of how these partnerships have (or have not) 

met expectations, and to provide the data necessary 

for deeper analyses.41

Data collected from these interviews was analyzed in tandem with other primary and secondary 

source material. Searches were conducted for articles about disaster partnerships published by the 

Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, the National Governors Association, industry trade associations, and government 

agencies in the four states. 

News accounts about disaster response coordination from national periodicals such as the New 

York Times and the Washington Post, as well as state 

periodicals such as the Sacramento Bee (California), 

the Miami Herald (Florida), the Albany Times-Union

(New York), and the Richmond Times-Dispatch (Virginia) were also searched. While this study is primarily based on data provided by the interviewees, these 

secondary sources were also valuable in that they 

added greater context and meaning to the informa40 Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 5.

41 Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing, 5–6.
INTRODUCTION

18

tion that surfaced during the interviews conducted.42

The initial interviewees in this study were selected based on the author’s own prior experience 

working in the fields of U.S. homeland security and 

emergency management as a practitioner and researcher between 2005 and 2011. The interviewees 

were chosen for their seniority within their respective 

organizations as well as for their work in these partnerships. Referrals from these public sector officials 

were then used to identify additional interviewees 

within other state government agencies and private 

firms. The process also worked in the opposite direction; in some cases, referrals obtained from private 

sector officials were used to arrange interviews with 

public sector employees.

To increase the reliability and validity of this 

study, the researcher also sought out opponents and 

skeptics of partnerships in the four states.43 Government and private sector officials may oppose these 

partnerships because they see these collaborations 

as opportunistic and exploitative of vulnerable populations, an example of war profiteering that unfairly takes advantage of extreme circumstances, a 

42 This is a form of data triangulation. See Bruce A. Chadwick, Howard M. Bahr, and Stan L. Albrecht, Social Science Research Methods (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984), 40; and Steven J. 

Taylor and Robert Bogdan, Introduction to Qualitative Research 

Methods: The Search for Meanings, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley 

& Sons, 1984), 80–82.

43 Chadwick, Bahr, and Albrecht, Social Science Research Methods, 40–41; and Taylor and Bogdan, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, 7–8.
INTRODUCTION

19

hindrance to transparent and effective governance, 

a drain on tax revenue, or an obstacle to organizational efficiency and effectiveness.44 This list of potential reasons to oppose disaster partnerships is 

not exhaustive, but these may be valid observations 

that merit further investigation. These opposing perspectives are valuable for this study, because while 

emergency-management collaborations offer a host 

of benefits for governments and businesses, they 

also introduce a range of challenges for the public 

and private sectors.

Most interviews were conducted via telephone 

or online videoconferencing. In an effort to encourage candid responses from the interviewees, the interviews were not recorded. Instead, the author took 

detailed written notes, then transcribed these notes 

for recordkeeping and analysis purposes. The next 

section introduces the four cases that will be evaluated in this book and offers an initial glimpse of how 

these states leverage partnership agreements for 

disaster-management purposes.

The Four Cases

Sometimes dubbed the “laboratories” of American 

democracy, state governments are often testing 

grounds for creative policies designed to reduce the 

effects of large-scale emergencies. The four cases 

44 Criticisms of private sector engagement in emergency management include Vincanne Adams, Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith: 

New Orleans in the Wake of Katrina (Durham, NC: Duke University 

Press, 2013), 4–7. 
INTRODUCTION

20

that are explored in this book were chosen to provide 

a representative sample of state governments engaged in disaster partnerships in the United States.45

The cases were selected specifically because they 

represent different geographic regions of the United 

States, experience different and overlapping hazards 

each year, are known for a range of industries, and 

vary in their population sizes and population densities. This mixture of characteristics means that the 

four cases serve as a reasonable proxy for state-level 

emergency-management partnerships nationwide.46

Table 0.1 provides a brief profile of each state.

The first state, California, has taken several steps 

to develop these partnerships. For example, in September 2005, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger 

signed California Senate Bill 546, which expanded 

the authority of the California Governor’s Office of 

Emergency Services (CalOES) to partner with businesses.47 The bill included language that encourages 

45 Examples of states that use disaster partnerships but are beyond 

the scope of this book are Louisiana, Washington State, Colorado, 

Iowa, and Missouri. See Ramesh Kolluru, Compendium of PublicPrivate Partnerships for Emergency Management (Lafayette: 

NIMSAT Institute, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 2012), 38–45.

46 Purposive sampling is common in disaster research, for example, 

Fran H. Norris, “Disaster Research Methods: Past Progress and Future Directions,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 19, no. 2 (April 2006): 

176, https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.20109; and Thomas R. Dye, “Executive Power and Public Policy in the States,” Western Political Quarterly 22, no. 4 (December 1969): 928, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591

296902200414. 

47 Business and Utility Operations Center (BUOC) Administrative 

Policy—December 2016 (Mather: California Governor’s Office of 

Emergency Services, 2016), 7–8. 
INTRODUCTION

21

Table 0.1: Overview of states examined in Disaster Labs

State Region Examples of hazards 

faced by state

Examples of state 

industries

State 

population

(millions)

State population density

(approximations)

California West earthquakes, fires, 

and floods

agriculture, technology, and television/film production

39.5 239 people per square 

mile

Florida Southeast hurricanes, nuclear 

incidents, and floods

agriculture, international trade, space research/exploration

21.4 350 people per square 

mile

New York Northeast hurricanes, winter 

weather, and terrorism

construction, finance, and health care

19.4 411 people per square 

mile

Virginia Mid-Atlantic floods, hurricanes, 

and tornadoes

data centers, plastics, and food processing

8.5 202 people per square 

mile

Source: State-level population data are taken from “QuickFacts,” U.S. Census Bureau, accessed 23 February 2019. 
INTRODUCTION

22

sharing technology, outreach to firms, and protection for business proprietary information that may be 

shared by businesses with the state.48 Schwarzenegger also signed Executive Order S-04-06, which provided further authority to the director of the California 

Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) 

to secure advance agreements with businesses for 

resources that may be needed during disasters.49

Senate Bill 546 and Executive Order S-04-06 sent a 

powerful signal that California makes partnering with 

businesses and nonprofits a public policy priority.

California has transformed emergency-management collaborations from a theoretical aspiration 

into an operational reality. CalOES established a 

Business and Utility Operations Center (BUOC), an 

umbrella group that links private sector officials with 

state government officials during crises.50 The BUOC 

connects the state with numerous large, well-known 

firms, including Lowe’s, Home Depot, Walmart, Target, Bank of America, Gap, UPS, and Wells Fargo.51

During a disaster, the state can activate the BUOC 

and request that a BUOC representative report to the 

state’s operations center or regional emergency op48 Business and Utility Operations Center (BUOC) Administrative 

Policy, 7–8. 49 Office of the Governor of the State of California, Executive Order 

S-04-06, 2006, 1–2. 50 “State Partnership—California Emergency Management Agency,” FEMA, accessed 26 February 2014.

51 “State Partnership”; and “Business & Utility Operations Center,” 

California Office of Emergency Services, accessed 30 October 

2019.
INTRODUCTION

23

erations centers.52 The BUOC representative serves 

as a liaison between state officials and the firms that 

comprise the BUOC.53 In this way, if the state needs 

private sector goods or services, it can route requests 

for those goods and services through the BUOC representative.54 The BUOC provides an excellent example of how California uses these agreements today. 

Florida, the second state, also employs emergency-management partnerships. The former head 

of the Florida Division of Emergency Management 

(FDEM), W. Craig Fugate, was long a vocal advocate 

for these interorganizational collaborations, suggesting that there is high-level support within the state 

government for them.55 The state also hosts a number of prominent conferences each year that address 

these public-private partnerships, further underlining 

that the state embraces the concept of working with 

firms.56 These examples suggest that the state offers 

a potentially illustrative case study. 

The third state, New York, has also taken steps 

to develop these partnerships. For example, New 

York law contains specific provisions that require the 

state Office of Counter Terrorism (OCT) to work with 

firms to conduct vulnerability assessments of criti52 “State Partnership,” 2.

53 “State Partnership,” 2.

54 “State Partnership,” 2.

55 Abby Brownback, “Florida’s Former Manager of Natural Disasters 

Took His Training National,” Tampa Bay (FL) Times, 26 March 2011. 56 Governor’s Hurricane Conference, accessed 30 October 2019; 

and “Save the Date: 2015 Public-Private Partnership Summit,” Florida Association of Counties, accessed 30 October 2019.
INTRODUCTION

24

cal infrastructure.57 These vulnerability assessments 

evaluate potential weak points in critical infrastructure components, such as bridges, hospitals, and water treatment facilities.58 The goal of the assessments 

is to reduce these vulnerabilities, which in turn can 

help avoid disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure, whether by man-made (e.g., terrorism) 

or natural hazards (e.g., hurricanes).59 Cooperation 

between emergency managers and private sector 

officials is integral to this process of vulnerability assessment and protection.60 Other recent examples of 

partnerships in New York State include efforts to rebuild damaged infrastructure after Hurricane Sandy 

(2012) and support affected businesses after Hurricane Irene (2011).61

Virginia, the fourth state, has used emergencymanagement partnerships for several years. The 

Virginia Department of Emergency Management 

(VDEM) has a dedicated private sector liaison officer who is charged with cultivating relationships 

with businesses for emergency-management pur57 2012 New York Consolidated Laws: Executive Article 26—(70–

9718), Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, NY 

Exec L § 709 (2012).

58 “Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit,” New York State Office of 

Counter Terrorism, accessed 29 March 2017.

59 “Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit.”

60 “Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit.”

61 Klopott, “Cuomo Aims to Speed New York Sandy Recovery with 

Private Funding”; and New York State Responds: Hurricane Irene 

and Tropical Storm Lee: One Year Later (Albany, NY: New York State, 

2012), 7, 9.
INTRODUCTION

25

poses.62 Similar to New York State’s emphasis on 

developing connections with critical infrastructure 

sectors, VDEM also prioritizes building connections 

with these sectors, including energy providers, transportation companies, and commercial facilities.63

To date, these interorganizational agreements have 

helped VDEM make arrangements for post-disaster 

clean-up and recovery operations, among other activities.64 California, Florida, New York, and Virginia 

each provide a unique perspective on and approach 

to state-level partnerships for disaster management.

Questions and Context

Disaster Labs asks two central questions. First, 

how do interorganizational partnerships influence 

state-level emergency-management practices in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia today? In seeking to answer this question, this book develops new 

understandings of these partnerships in the United 

States. 

Second, the book asks whether a particular analytical framework, described later in this chapter, 

is viable as a tool to assess these partnerships, particularly when they are executed at the state level 

of government. The book’s response to this second 

62 “Private Sector Liaison Program,” Virginia Department of Emergency Management, 2.

63 “Private Sector Liaison Program,” 3.

64 “Commonwealth of Virginia Standard Contract: Contract Number 127-11-0001,” Virginia Department of Emergency Management, 

accessed 31 October 2019.
INTRODUCTION

26

question contributes to growing lines of research 

on interorganizational collaboration for emergencymanagement purposes and interorganizational collaboration in general.

Government partnerships are now a major force 

in emergency management that can improve societal resilience by helping the public sector attend 

better to citizens’ needs before, during, and after disasters. For example, in Managing Disasters through 

Public-Private Partnerships, Ami J. Abou-bakr suggests that disaster partnerships may prove helpful for 

state-level emergency-management practices and 

societal resilience by providing the same kinds of 

benefits that federal emergency-management partnerships confer.65

A related book, Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability, discusses the significant role of businesses in 

critical infrastructure protection activities, such as in 

securing computer networks and preparing for public health crises.66 Critical infrastructure protection is 

not the focus of the present study; however, Seeds 

of Disaster is nevertheless valuable, for it highlights 

the essential nature of public-private sector collaboration in the post-9/11 era, and this cross-sector collaboration is a central theme of this book. 

65 See generally Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through PublicPrivate Partnerships. 66 Philip E. Auerswald et al., eds., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability (New 

York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
INTRODUCTION

27

Other scholars have explored the nature of public sector partnerships in emergency management, 

but they do not approach the level of depth and sustained emphasis on PPPs that Abou-bakr or Seeds 

of Disaster achieve. For example, a few researchers 

have looked at the utility of government-private sector insurance schemes for disaster survivors and 

using PPPs as tools to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure.67 Still others have characterized 

the rise of public sector partnerships for emergency 

management as both a necessary and inevitable development to enhance resilience.68

Related research has explored how best to structure these PPPs. Emergency-management agreements need to be designed in ways that provide 

incentives for public and private sector actors if they 

67 Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer and Reinhard Mechler, “Disaster Safety 

Nets for Developing Countries: Extending Public-Private Partnerships,” Environmental Hazards 7, no. 1 (2007): 56, 58, https://doi.org

/10.1016/j.envhaz.2007.04.004; and Geoffrey T. Stewart, Ramesh Kolluru, and Mark Smith, “Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to 

Improve Community Resilience in Times of Disaster,” International 

Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 39, no. 

5 (2009): 350, https://doi.org/10.1108/09600030910973724.

68 For example, Beth Gazley, “Building Collaborative Capacity for 

Disaster Resiliency,” in Disaster Resiliency: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Naim Kapucu, Christopher V. Hawkins, and Fernando I. Rivera (New York: Routledge, 2013), 89, https://doi.org/10

.4324/9780203102459; Kapucu, “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for 

Collective Action in Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies,” 217; and 

Naim Kapucu and Montgomery Van Wart, “The Evolving Role of 

the Public Sector in Managing Catastrophic Disasters: Lessons 

Learned,” Administration and Society 38, no. 3 (2006): 303, https://

doi.org/10.1177/0095399706289718.
INTRODUCTION

28

are to be useful.69 Perhaps the most rigid example of 

this structure is the business contract. In this book, 

business contracts refer specifically to formal documents in which state emergency-management agencies agree to pay firms for products or services.70

These partnerships can be structured in ways 

that deliver nonmonetary incentives, as well. These 

agreements may foster a shared sense of responsibility to communities.71 Leaders of public and private 

sector entities may recognize the importance of this 

interdependence, and this recognition can incentivize them to work for the good of the partnership, as 

well as the community at large.

Despite the importance of building incentives 

into the structure of these partnerships, to date 

there has not been a study that closely examines 

the mixture of incentives used in these emergencymanagement agreements at the state level. Disaster 

Labs addresses this need by comparing a range of 

state emergency-management partnerships, identifying their structures, and exploring the key variables 

within them. This new knowledge expands under69 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Achieving Resilience 

in Disaster Management: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships,” 

Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 10, http://dx

.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.2.1.

70 Stewart, Kolluru, and Smith, “Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships,” 346. This definition follows Stewart, Kolluru, and Smith’s 

chosen definition for contracts.

71 Peter J. May and Chris Koski, “Addressing Public Risks: Extreme 

Events and Critical Infrastructures,” Review of Policy Research 30, 

no. 2 (March 2013): 151, https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12012.
INTRODUCTION

29

standing of how incentives can improve PPPs. Moreover, these insights add to previous scholarship that 

examines how the structure of these partnerships 

can be a critical determinant of their long-term viability.72

While state-level emergency-management partnerships may hold great promise, they also introduce 

a range of potential public policy challenges. For 

example, state involvement in private homeowner 

insurance—one type of agreement that is especially relevant after disasters—can lead to situations in 

which homeowners take risks that they would not 

otherwise take precisely because they are insured.73

If homeowners take unnecessary risks because they 

are insured, then experience damage to their homes, 

governments that partly subsidize homeowner insurance policies must pay out insurance benefits to 

those homeowners. That can drain government coffers quickly.

Other challenges can result from these partnerships too. If a state business partner blunders during 

a disaster, it can be difficult to pin responsibility for 

the mistake entirely on the partner, since state officials decided to enter into the partnership, and there72 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 191. 73 Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, “Disaster Safety Nets for Developing Countries,” 58. It is also the case that local zoning decisions 

to permit building in hazardous areas can contribute to property 

losses during disasters. Since these zoning decisions are municipal matters, rather than state-level affairs, they are not addressed 

in depth here.
INTRODUCTION

30

fore share some degree of accountability with the 

partner.74 But when accountability is shared, fixing 

problems with the partnership can be more difficult 

than if accountability for the mistake rests solely on 

a single business or state agency. Overreliance on 

contractors can also lead to a “hollowing out” effect 

in which long-term state capacity to perform certain 

functions erodes.75 If the state’s ability to perform diminishes, this can feed a cycle of government dependence on contractors in the long run.

There is also a body of literature on disasters 

and emergency management that omits discussions 

of these partnerships. It is worth highlighting two 

of these works in particular, because while they are 

quite broad treatments of emergency management, 

they do not address these partnerships at all. This 

absence illustrates the degree to which these agreements remain underexamined by scholars, and underscores the contribution that Disaster Labs makes. 

The edited volume Emergency Management: The 

American Experience, 1900–2010 surveys the federal 

government’s role in emergency management exclusively, and at most includes scattered discussions 

of businesses during disasters, but without any explicit reference to partnerships between businesses 

74 Busch and Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management,” 15.

75 Busch and Givens, “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management,” 15–16.
INTRODUCTION

31

and government agencies.76 For example, Richard T. 

Sylves mentions two professional baseball teams—

both independent business franchises—in a wider 

discussion of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in 

California, because the temblor interrupted game 

three of the 1989 World Series, baseball’s annual bestof-seven-games championship.77 In the same volume, 

John R. Harrald examines BP’s role in the context 

of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, including the awkward tension between politicians, first responders, and business officials during 

the incident.78 However, apart from these few mentions of businesses in emergency management, this 

book does not include discussion of emergencymanagement partnerships.

A second wide-ranging work that omits discussion of disaster partnerships is Thomas A. Birkland’s 

Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events, which examines how potential “focusing 

events” can advance policy change.79 Notable failures 

76 Claire B. Rubin, ed., Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010, 2d ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012). 77 Richard T. Sylves, “Federal Emergency Management Comes of 

Age: 1979–2001,” in Emergency Management, 146. 78 John R. Harrald, “The System Is Tested: Response to the BP 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,” in Emergency Management, 224–25. 79 Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

2006), 2. Focusing events refer to sudden, harmful events that attract policy maker attention and can lead to policy changes. See 

also Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 

Press, 1997), 3.
INTRODUCTION

32

in disaster responses shape public policy agendas 

and can prompt policy makers to reform emergencymanagement practices. For example, Birkland notes 

that state agencies in Florida have learned a great 

deal about how to respond to hurricanes over the 

years because that state has been hit repeatedly by 

hurricanes.80 This cumulative learning has sparked 

state-level policy changes that seek to mitigate the 

damage hurricanes cause.81 One possible consequence of this cumulative state-level learning is the 

development of disaster PPPs. Indeed, Florida has 

recently embraced interorganizational agreements 

as a tool to enhance emergency management and 

resilience, and this book explores the case of Florida in depth.82 Yet, Birkland’s work neither addresses disaster partnerships in Florida, nor in any other 

context.

That sweeping works such as Emergency Management and Lessons of Disaster exclude discussion 

of these agreements means significant questions 

remain about how partnerships shape emergencymanagement practices. Disaster Labs contributes to 

this discussion by showing how these partnerships 

fit into the recent history of emergency management 

in the United States and advancing understanding of 

80 Birkland, Lessons of Disaster, 139. 81 Birkland, Lessons of Disaster, 140–46. 82 For example, see “Public Private Partnership Case Study: Digital 

Billboards Deliver Emergency Messages,” Florida Division of Emergency Management, accessed 15 February 2014. 
INTRODUCTION

33

how they can form as a result of post-focusing event 

policy learning.

This book also contributes to broader theoretical 

literature on public sector collaboration. For meaningful public sector collaboration to occur, there are 

certain preconditions that must be met by prospective collaborators. Dialogue among potential partners and a confluence of organizational interests are 

baseline requirements for collaboration to begin.83 In 

the case of emergency-management partnerships, 

those interests can include improving service delivery (a public sector motivation) or securing government contracts (a private sector motivation).84 There 

must also be trust among the partners—absent 

trust, the partners cannot be certain that they will 

be unharmed by the outcome of the partnership, and 

83 Judith E. Innes and David E. Booher, “Collaborative Policymaking: Governance through Dialogue,” in Deliberative Policy Analysis: 

Understanding Governance in the Network Society, ed. Maarten A. 

Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511490934.003; 

and Anne Marie Thomson, James L. Perry, and Theodore K. Miller, 

“Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration,” Journal of Public 

Administration Research and Theory 19, no. 1 (January 2009): 27, 

https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum036.

84 Ken Coghill and Dennis Woodward, “Political Issues of PublicPrivate Partnerships,” in The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships: Learning from International Experience, ed. Graeme A. 

Hodge and Carsten Greve (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 88; and Jocelyn M. Johnston and Barbara S. Romzek, 

“Traditional Contracts as Partnerships: Effective Accountability in 

Social Services Contracts in the American States,” in The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships, 118.
INTRODUCTION

34

this uncertainty can block collaboration.85 However, 

even a mutual desire to partner does not necessarily 

mean that the parties are able to partner or make significant contributions in partnership.86 For state-level 

partnerships to form, there must also be dialogue, 

shared interests, mutual trust, and a capacity or ability to partner. 

Public sector partnerships are subject to a variety of tensions that can impact both the individual 

actors in the partnerships and the partnerships as a 

whole. In the context of a partnership, there is a natural tendency for organizations to return to working 

independently; at the same time, however, there is a 

competing tension that pulls organizations together 

toward working in partnership.87 Moreover, there are 

underlying motivational tensions that can tug at public and private sector partners. Businesses are set up 

to make money; government agencies exist to serve 

the public interest. The presence of a profit motive in 

the private sector can be a source of frustration for 

public sector officials who view emergency manage85 Erik-Hans Klijn and Geert R. Teisman, “Governing PublicPrivate Partnerships: Analysing and Managing the Processes and 

Institutional Characteristics of Public-Private Partnerships,” in 

Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 

Perspective, ed. Stephen P. Osborne (London: Routledge, 2000), 92. 86 Ronald W. McQuaid, “The Theory of Partnership: Why Have Partnerships?,” in Public-Private Partnerships, 29. 87 Angel Saz-Carranza and Sonia M. Ospina, “The Behavioral Dimension of Governing Interorganizational Goal-Directed Networks

—Managing the Unity-Diversity Tension,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21, no. 2 (April 2011): 356–57, https://

doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq050.
INTRODUCTION

35

ment as a matter of purely serving the public interest.88

It is worth pointing out here that significant disagreement exists among scholars about what a true 

public sector “partnership” is.89 The notion of a partnership is closely linked to the ideas of collaboration 

and networks, and in this book, partnerships require 

purposeful steps toward collaboration, rather than a 

coincidental convergence of effort among organizations.90 As Robert Agranoff puts it: 

[N]etwork activity goes beyond serendipitous interactions to incorporate this variety 

of regular and purposive interorganizational 

contacts. Network activity is thus a variant of 

collaboration.91

At the same time, however, the boundaries of the 

activities that do or do not constitute collaboration 

can be blurry.92 This book contributes to these lines 

of inquiry by examining specific types of public sector partnerships, exploring the level of collaboration 

present within them, as well as assessing the effectiveness of this collaboration.

88 For examples of how the profit motive can complicate PPPs, see 

Savas, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 77–78. 89 Goldsmith and Eggers, Governing by Network, 69–70; and Savas, 

Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 88–89. 90 Robert Agranoff, Collaborating to Manage: A Primer for the Public Sector (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 2; 

and Thomson, Perry, and Miller, “Conceptualizing and Measuring 

Collaboration,” 23–24. 91 Agranoff, Collaborating to Manage, 15. 92 Agranoff, Collaborating to Manage, 12–16.
INTRODUCTION

36

The Analytical Framework

Disaster Labs sits at the intersection of two distinct 

but related literatures. The first of these is a body of 

literature focused on collaboration, coordination, 

and networks, or what will be referred to here as 

“public policy literature on collaboration.”93 The second stream of literature specifically addresses public 

sector collaboration, coordination, and networks for 

emergency-management purposes, or “public policy literature on collaboration for emergency management.”94 Since the research design and topic 

is located at the intersection of these two streams 

of literature, both streams were examined to identify potential frameworks for analysis. The analytical 

framework selected for this book was chosen after 

an exhaustive search of these literatures for robust 

93 For example, see Kirk Emerson, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh, “An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance,” 

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22, no. 1 

(January 2012): 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mur011; Kit Van 

Gestel, Joris Voets, and Koen Verhoest, “How Governance of Complex PPPs Affects Performance,” Public Administration Quarterly 

36, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 140–88; and Eugene Bardach, Getting 

Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 

1998). 

94 Examples of this literature include Naim Kapucu, Tolga Arslan, 

and Matthew Lloyd Collins, “Examining Intergovernmental and 

Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disasters: Toward 

a Network-Centric Approach,” Administration & Society 42, no. 2 

(2010): 222–47, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095399710362517; and 

Kapucu, “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in 

Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies,” 205–20.
INTRODUCTION

37

analytical frameworks that were especially appropriate for studies of state emergency-management 

partnerships.

This section first introduces the analytical framework and offers working definitions for each of the 

terms within the framework. It then assesses the advantages and potential shortcomings of the chosen 

framework in light of other, similar frameworks that 

scholars have used in related studies. Throughout 

Disaster Labs, Abou-bakr’s analytical framework is 

used to evaluate disaster partnerships. The factors 

that comprise the framework include crisis, leadership, organizational structure, information sharing, 

shared benefits, trust, and adaptability or sustainability.95 Working definitions for each of the terms in the 

framework are as follows.

Crisis, the first term in the framework, is understood to mean an exigent circumstance caused by 

a potential or actual disaster and/or catastrophe 

that presents an immediate threat to life, property, 

or the environment. Examples of crises, in this context, could include the need to evacuate flooded 

neighborhoods for safety reasons, preparations for 

impending infectious disease outbreaks, or supply 

shortages during post-hurricane cleanup efforts. It 

is important to emphasize that crisis is considered 

within the context of emergency management, rath95 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 43. The framework was first developed by Abou-bakr to evaluate federal-level, disaster-oriented PPPs.
INTRODUCTION

38

er than within the context of crisis management or 

crisis governance.

Leadership, the framework’s second factor, refers to the exercise of organizational authority—real 

and perceived—by government, business, and nonprofit officials at senior levels within their respective 

organizations. Leadership could be interpreted literally to mean the top officials within state emergencymanagement agencies. Moreover, leadership could 

include the decision by a state official to implement 

a new policy related to post-disaster food aid or a 

nonprofit official coordinating their organization’s 

preparations for disasters with local business executives.

Organizational structure, the third factor, is understood to mean the architecture or organizational design of a disaster-oriented PPP. For example, 

organizational structure could take the form of a 

memorandum of understanding (MOU); a centralized 

facility to which public and private sector official report during disaster responses; or a more ambiguous, 

informal agreement among partnership stakeholders 

to provide certain goods in the event of a disaster.

Information sharing, the fourth term in the framework, means the exchange of data among public 

sector, private sector, and nonprofit representatives—

and, by extension, their respective organizations. The 

types of information shared, and the means through 

which this sharing occurs, can vary significantly. One 

government official might place a telephone call to 
INTRODUCTION

39

a business official to request supplies, for example. 

At the same time, a group of nonprofit organizations might share access to an online informationsharing portal developed by a university but under 

the organizational control of a state emergencymanagement agency. Each of these examples qualifies as information sharing.

Mutual benefits, the framework’s fifth factor, refers to the monetary and nonmonetary advantages 

conferred on partnership stakeholders by other partnership stakeholders as a result of their participation 

in a disaster-oriented PPP. Examples of these mutual 

benefits could include no-cost marketing exposure 

for firms that partner with government agencies for 

disaster relief purposes or businesses granting public sector agencies access to scarce goods and services.

Trust, the sixth factor in the framework, means 

confidence that one’s expectations will be met, usually (though not always) based on past confirming 

evidence that one’s expectations will be met. For instance, a government official may trust that a vendor 

with whom they have worked in the past will deliver 

certain goods on time and at a previously agreed on 

price. Alternatively, a business representative may 

trust a government official not to disclose their proprietary business information to a journalist.

Adaptability, the seventh term in the framework, 

is understood to signify the ability of a disasteroriented PPP and its constituent stakeholders to 
INTRODUCTION

40

modify their responses to changing circumstances. 

This could mean that a disaster-oriented PPP originally developed around information-sharing needs 

morphs into a more complex partnership involving 

the formal exchange of personnel for rotational tours 

of duty.

Sustainability, the eighth and final factor in the 

framework, refers to the capacity of a disasteroriented PPP to meet or exceed its stakeholders’ 

expectations in the medium- to long-run. For example, all else being equal, a disaster-oriented PPP that 

forms solely to address the needs of a particular disaster likely is unsustainable, absent some form of adaptation that would make the partnership well-suited 

to address other, future disasters. It should be noted 

here that the concepts of adaptability and sustainability are frequently linked in the context of disasteroriented PPPs, since the latter concept frequently 

hinges on the former.

Abou-bakr’s framework offers at least three specific advantages that make it especially well-suited 

to the present study. First, the framework focuses 

on U.S. emergency-management practices.96 Aboubakr’s original study examined federal disaster collaborations in the United States through data she 

gathered in elite interviews with public and private 

sector officials.97 Abou-bakr compared what she 

96 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 1. 97 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 6.
INTRODUCTION

41

termed a contemporary “strategic alliance” (the U.S. 

Federal Reserve System) and a historical “responsive 

alliance” (the U.S. War Industries Board during World 

War I) with existing national disaster partnerships to 

understand better how these agreements work in 

practice, as well as to offer suggestions about how 

they might be improved.98 Given diverse global understandings of what PPPs are, Abou-bakr’s U.S.-centric 

study makes it well-suited to the present study, which 

also looks at U.S. emergency-management partnerships.99

The second key advantage to Abou-bakr’s framework for the purposes of the present study is the 

methodology she used to construct the framework. 

Abou-bakr developed her analytical framework 

based on key factors that emerged repeatedly in 25 

interviews with senior public and private sector officials who were asked about their direct participation 

in interorganizational collaboration for emergency 

management.100 The eight factors themselves, Aboubakr notes, were identified by the interviewees “either 

as necessary conditions for the success of disasteroriented PPPs or as challenges that must be overcome for them to function effectively.”101 The present study similarly uses elite interviews with public 

98 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 6–10. 99 See earlier in this chapter for an extended discussion of PPPs.

100 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 9. 101 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 9–10.
INTRODUCTION

42

and private sector officials in California, Florida, New 

York, and Virginia. The approach of the present study 

therefore offers an excellent setting in which to apply 

Abou-bakr’s framework for analytical purposes, as 

well as to consider whether the framework might be 

viable for analyses of disaster partnerships in other 

U.S. states and territories.

The third key advantage of Abou-bakr’s framework is its tight focus on collaboration between government agencies and profit-seeking businesses for 

emergency-management purposes, as opposed to 

collaboration between government agencies and nonprofit organizations. The present study of state disaster partnerships focuses primarily on the agreements 

and interactions between government agencies and 

businesses, while also capturing interactions among 

government agencies, firms, and nonprofit agencies. 

As will be shown in subsequent chapters, in individual states, it is difficult to disentangle government, 

private sector, and nonprofit organizations’ efforts in 

the context of emergency management. Abou-bakr’s 

study of federal emergency-management partnerships paints a different picture, in that they appear to 

be relatively insulated from nonprofit organizations 

involved in emergency management.

Despite its analytical strength and suitability for 

the present study, Abou-bakr’s framework also has 

a number of potential limitations worth addressing. 

The first potential limitation is that the eight factors in Abou-bakr’s framework appear to be general 
INTRODUCTION

43

enough that they could lend themselves to scholarly analyses of any number of government programs 

or organizations, such as those found in education, 

finance, or transportation, for instance. One could 

therefore claim that the framework has weak explanatory power, since the factors themselves are so 

broad and generic. 

Upon closer scrutiny, though, this potential limitation is unfounded. As shown above, numerous 

highly regarded studies of public sector collaboration 

for emergency management employ similarly broad 

analytical frameworks. Abou-bakr’s framework keeps 

with this research tradition of using categorical analytical frameworks in studies of emergency management. Moreover, as discussed earlier in this section, 

Abou-bakr’s framework is derived from elite interviews with public and private sector officials who 

have firsthand knowledge of disaster partnerships in 

the United States by virtue of their direct involvement 

in these PPPs. This means that while the categories 

in Abou-bakr’s framework may seem broad, they are 

in fact quite specific to emergency management. 

A second potential limitation to Abou-bakr’s analytical framework is that its qualitative orientation 

may fail to capture other important quantitative data 

about these partnerships. Examples of these types of 

data may include the number of agreements in which 

a given government agency participates or the specific amount of money passed from a government 

agency to a vendor to buy emergency supplies. How-
INTRODUCTION

44

ever, these quantitative data, while important in their 

own right, paint an incomplete picture. 

Related work by scholars such as Naim Kapucu 

shows that there is a rich stream of data about the 

performance of collaborations in emergency management that cannot be easily captured or measured 

by quantitative methods; and, in contrast, can be 

described and evaluated in a deep and meaningful 

way using qualitative methods.102 The total number 

of partnerships in which a government agency participates offers limited information about the quality 

or richness of those partnerships, for instance. The 

amount of money a government agency spends on 

emergency supplies is relatively meaningless unless it is placed in a broader analytical context—as 

a percentage of total annual agency spending, for 

example, or in a year-over-year comparison. In contrast, the studies described above fit into a long line 

of qualitative studies of emergency management in 

general, as well as a more limited literature on collaboration in emergency management, demonstrating 

that qualitative analytical tools, such as Abou-bakr’s 

framework, are commonplace in studies of emergency management.

Abou-bakr’s framework also shares a number 

102 Naim Kapucu, “Non-profit Response to Catastrophic Disasters,” 

551–61; Kapucu, “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies,” 205–20; Kapucu and 

Van Wart, “The Evolving Role of the Public Sector in Managing Catastrophic Disasters,” 279–308; and Daniel B. Prieto, “Information 

Sharing with the Private Sector: History, Challenges, Innovation, 

and Prospects,” in Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response, 404–28.
INTRODUCTION

45

of theoretical and conceptual links with the public policy literature on collaboration, in general, and 

collaboration for emergency management, specifically. Abou-bakr situates her framework alongside 

Philip E. Auerswald et al.’s Seeds of Disaster, Roots 

of Response: How Private Action Can Reduce Vulnerability.

103 Seeds of Disaster is arguably the single most influential study in the development of 

Abou-bakr’s framework, in that it surveys publicprivate partnerships for disaster prevention and 

management purposes in a wide range of contexts, 

including cybersecurity, insurance markets, and public health emergencies.104 Abou-bakr’s study, as well 

as the present study, also share a linkage with Seeds 

of Disaster by focusing on public-private partnerships 

for emergency management. 

In addition, Abou-bakr’s framework shares a 

number of theoretical and conceptual links with the 

public policy literature on collaboration in general. 

Past studies by Kit Van Gestel et al., Kirk Emerson et 

al., and Eugene Bardach, for example, use similarly 

broad categories within their own respective analyt103 Auerswald et al., eds., Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. 104 Sean P. Gorman, “A Cyber Threat to National Security?,” in Seeds 

of Disaster, Roots of Response, 239–57; Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, 

“Insurance, the 14th Critical Sector,” in Seeds of Disaster, Roots 

of Response, 279–91; and Patrick Lagadec and Erwann O. MichelKerjan, “The Paris Initiative, ‘Anthrax and Beyond’: Transnational 

Collaboration among Interdependent Critical Networks,” in Seeds 

of Disaster, Roots of Response, 457–80.
INTRODUCTION

46

ical frameworks.105 Abou-bakr’s framework is consistent with this approach to qualitative analysis in that 

it employs a framework that consists of broad categories. Given the numerous advantages Abou-bakr’s 

framework offers, as well as the similarities it shares 

with two distinct yet related streams of public policy 

literature, it is well-suited for the present study of disaster response partnerships.

105 Gestel, Voets, and Verhoest, “How Governance of Complex PPPs 

Affects Performance,” 140–88; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh, “An 

Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance,” 1–29; and 

see generally, Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together.
47

Chapter One

The Rise of State DisasterO r i e n t e d P u b l i c - P r i v a t e 

Partnerships

Each year, approximately 75 percent of all goods entering and exiting the United States pass through 

maritime ports.1 This activity can generate billions 

of dollars in revenue for state economies.2 Many U.S. 

maritime ports also feature an array of government 

agencies that perform diverse functions, from inspecting cargo containers to providing physical security.3

 This means that managing maritime ports—and 

coping with disasters involving maritime ports—

requires excellent cooperation between businesses 

and public sector agencies. 

In 2010, California state agencies designed the 

1

 Marc Thibault, Mary R. Brooks, and Kenneth J. Button, “The Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives,” Transportation Journal 45, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 6. 2 2018 National Economic Impact of the U.S. Coastal Port System: 

Executive Summary (Lancaster, PA: Martin Associates, March 2019). 3

 “Cargo Examination,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 15 May 

2017; and “ACN 134/18–NOV 2018 Promulgation of Foreign Freight 

Vessel Exam (FFVE) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), 

CGTTP 3-72.8,” U.S. Coast Guard, 16 November 2018.
CHAPTER ONE

48

Golden Guardian Exercise to practice their disaster 

response procedures and to assess their state emergency-management partnerships in the context of 

maritime port disasters.4 As part of the exercise, the 

fictitious M/V Goodship struck an underwater bomb 

in the Port of Oakland on 18 May 2010 and lost its 

ability to navigate, blocking the entrance to the port.5

On the next day of the exercise, “terrorists” in Long 

Beach seized a private ferry and took its passengers 

hostage.6 Throughout the exercise, private sector 

liaisons went to various emergency operations centers around the state to coordinate response actions 

with their local, state, and federal government counterparts.7

 In the state’s formal report on the results 

of Golden Guardian, state officials specifically noted 

that one of the exercise’s key strengths was its reinforcement of the value of disaster partnerships.8

The 2010 Golden Guardian Exercise demonstrated several of the key themes related to the rise of 

emergency-management collaborations in recent 

years. The state of California recognizes that firms 

should be involved in state-level disaster responses.9

And public-private sector cooperation is particularly 

essential when disasters impact components of criti4 2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary

(Mather: California Emergency Management Agency, 2010), 5.

5

 M/V refers to motor vessel, a common prefix for merchant ships. 

2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary, 8. 6 2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary, 11. 7 2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary, 13. 8 2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary, 13. 9

 2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary, 13.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

49

cal infrastructure such as maritime ports.10 Critical infrastructure, in this context, refers to those industries 

and assets within the United States that are so vital, 

their disruption or destruction would have significant 

adverse effects on society as a whole.11 These characteristics distinguish critical infrastructure from other types of businesses or organizations. Additional 

examples of critical infrastructure include hospitals, 

airports, banks, and power plants. Perhaps most importantly, California sees the advance of emergencymanagement partnerships as a generally positive 

development that can prove helpful in preparing for 

and responding to disasters.12

This chapter will show that the role of businesses 

in government emergency-management efforts has 

been increasing since at least 2001.13 Although this 

trend has been most visible at the federal level of gov10 Austen D. Givens and Nathan E. Busch, “Realizing the Promise 

of Public-Private Partnerships in U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 6, 

no. 1 (March 2013): 39–50, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.02.002. 11 This definition is adapted from Steven M. Rinaldi, James P. Perenboom, and Terrence K. Kelly, “Identifying, Understanding, and 

Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,” IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21, no. 6 (December 2001): 12, https://doi.

org/10.1109/37.969131.

12 2010 Golden Guardian After Action Report Executive Summary, 13. 13 Ami J. Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private 

Partnerships (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

2013), 46–47; and Brian Lopez, “Critical Infrastructure Protection 

in the United States Since 1993,” in Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability, ed. 

Phillip E. Auerswald et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2006), 37–50.
CHAPTER ONE

50

ernment, evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that firms are having a substantial impact on 

state-level emergency-management practices too. 

The chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it 

traces the evolution of private sector involvement 

in emergency management from 2001 to 2012. Second, it surveys state disaster partnerships around the 

United States using the analytical framework first 

introduced in chapter 1. These examples of emergency-management agreements suggest that the 

framework is a viable tool to engage with disaster 

partnerships at the state level and to assess the four 

cases in this book. Third, the chapter highlights the 

absence of federal interventions in the state partnerships that it surveyed. That absence of federal interventions implies that state governments are willing 

and able to establish and manage disaster-oriented 

PPPs independently. The chapter closes with a discussion of the key themes that this chapter presents.

The Evolution of Private Sector 

Engagement in Emergency Management: 

2001–12

In the years preceding the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the 

federal government undertook various initiatives to 

bolster public-private sector cooperation for emergency management-related reasons. For example, in 

1953 the federal government created the U.S. Small 

Business Administration’s (SBA) Disaster Loan Assistance program to provide emergency financing 
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

51

to business owners affected by large-scale emergencies.14 Since its creation, the program has been 

used many times to support businesses after disasters: when Hurricane Andrew hit Florida in 1992, for 

instance, the SBA received emergency loan applications worth hundreds of millions of dollars from Florida firms whose facilities were damaged or destroyed 

by the storm.15 The federal government provided similar financial assistance to businesses in Oklahoma 

City following Timothy McVeigh’s bombing of the 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 1995.16 One year 

after the Oklahoma City bombing, President William 

J. “Bill” Clinton commissioned a joint group of public 

and private sector officials to examine multiple U.S. 

commercial industries for security vulnerabilities.17

That group, known as the President’s Commission 

on Critical Infrastructure Protection, for the first time 

explicitly linked the viability of U.S. businesses to federal national security interests.18

14 Ronald Smothers, “After the Storm; Money, and Gripes, in Loan 

Program,” New York Times, 3 September 1992, section A, 19. 15 Smothers, “After the Storm,” 19; and Marcia Heroux Pounds, “SBA 

Hurricane Loans Top $554m,” South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 16 November 2004. 16 Todd S. Purdum, “Terror in Oklahoma: The Overview; Clinton 

Seeks More Anti-Terrorism Measures,” New York Times, 27 April 

1995, section A, 1.

17 Exec. Order No. 13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 15 July 

1996. 

18 Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures (Washington, DC: President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997), vii.
CHAPTER ONE

52

But today’s federal government efforts to enhance 

public-private sector cooperation for emergency 

management were sparked by the recognition that 

businesses played significant roles in the responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. During the attacks, 

terrorists used private sector assets (i.e., commercial aircraft) to attack other elements of the private 

sector (i.e., the World Trade Center towers).19 Firms 

like Verizon, which quickly repaired network cables 

used by the New York Stock Exchange that had been 

damaged by the collapse of the World Trade Center, 

contributed significantly to recovery efforts after the 

attacks.20 The private sector controls most U.S. critical infrastructure, and the private sector is therefore 

in the best position to protect critical infrastructure 

and to repair it in the event of damage or destruction.21 Consequently, governments at all levels in the 

United States have little choice but to partner with 

firms to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure.

Efforts to grow public-private sector ties after 

the 9/11 attacks occurred in the broader context of 

huge organizational changes in the federal government to prevent future terrorist incidents. The most 

19 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 16. 20 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 18. 21 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Report) 

(Washington, DC: National Commission of Terrorist Attacks upon 

the United States, 2004), 397–98.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

53

notable of these changes was the creation of a new 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, 

which placed agencies responsible for counterterrorism activities and the nation’s top-level emergencymanagement agency—FEMA—together within the 

same government organization.22 In the years following DHS’s creation, the department published a 

series of foundational documents about emergency 

management that made the need for private sector 

involvement in government emergency-management 

efforts at the federal, state, and local levels of government increasingly explicit. 

The first two significant DHS documents outlining the department’s views of private sector involvement in emergency management were the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP).23 First published in 

2004, NIMS and the NRP stressed the importance 

of coordination between government agencies 

and businesses in emergency management.24 The 

language used in the NIMS and NRP publications 

22 Richard J. Harknett and James A. Stever, “The Struggle to Reform Intelligence after 9/11,” Public Administration Review 71, no. 

5 (September/October 2011): 700, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210

.2011.02409.x; “About the Agency,” FEMA, last updated 3 June 2019; 

and “Mission,” U.S. Transportation Security Administration, accessed 14 September 2015. 

23 National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, 2004); and National Response 

Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

2004), x.

24 National Incident Management System, 17; and National Response Plan, x. 
CHAPTER ONE

54

framed the private sector as one of a wide range of 

actors involved in emergency-management efforts. 

In the NRP in particular, it seems as though the private sector was to play an important but assisting

role in emergency management vis-à-vis government agencies:

Private-sector owners and operators . . . are 

encouraged (or in some cases required under law) to develop appropriate emergency 

response and business continuity plans . . . 

that clearly map to regional, State, and local 

emergency response plans and informationsharing networks.25

With the NRP and NIMS’s recognition of the need 

for businesses to be involved in emergency planning, 

the stage appeared set for a future disaster that could 

help the federal government reinforce the lessons it 

learned from the 9/11 attacks and further assess the 

need for private sector involvement in emergency 

management. That disaster came just one year after 

the publication of the NRP and NIMS.

When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast 

in 2005, DHS confronted the most significant test 

it had faced during its short existence. The destructive force of the storm’s floodwaters and wind were 

compounded by what was later viewed as a bungled 

25 National Response Plan, x. 
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

55

federal government response.26 Despite shortfalls in 

the federal government’s response to the hurricane, 

private sector involvement in the response to the 

storm proved helpful for Katrina survivors and further highlighted the value of private sector engagement in emergency management. Anticipating the 

storm’s arrival days before it made landfall, Walmart 

sent truckloads of relief supplies to the area around 

New Orleans, Louisiana.27 Clothing, diapers, toothbrushes, bottled water, ice, and nonperishable food 

items emerged from Walmart’s fleet of vehicles as 

the storm passed.28 Following the storm, a local government leader noted in an interview that if the governmental response to Katrina had been like that of 

Walmart, the post-Katrina humanitarian crisis itself 

might have been averted.29 In the midst of a significant disaster, Walmart filled important gaps in governmental response efforts.

Other firms contributed significantly to the Katrina response as well. For example, Weyerhaeuser, a 

26 Saundra K. Schneider, “Administrative Breakdowns in the Governmental Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Public Administration 

Review 65, no. 5 (September 2005): 515–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/j

.1540-6210.2005.00478.x; and A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina 

(Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, 2006), 1. 

27 Steven Horwitz, “Wal-Mart to the Rescue: Private Enterprise’s Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Independent Review 13, no. 4 (Spring 

2009): 511–28; and see also Michael Barbaro and Justin Gillis, “WalMart at Forefront of Hurricane Relief,” Washington Post, 6 September 2005.

28 Barbaro and Gillis, “Wal-Mart at Forefront of Hurricane Relief.”

29 Barbaro and Gillis, “Wal-Mart at Forefront of Hurricane Relief.”
CHAPTER ONE

56

large wood and paper products firm, donated more 

than $1 million through its charitable foundation to assist the American Red Cross and local relief agencies 

in the Gulf Coast region.30 The firm also developed an 

adopt-a-family program, wherein firm employees affected by the storm were connected with other Weyerhaeuser employee groups. These employee groups 

pledged for one year to assist Katrina-affected families and provide them with resources and support 

after the disaster.31 Chevron, an energy company, 

donated more than $5 million to local organizations 

in need, including day care centers for children, the 

United Way, and school districts.32 Walmart, Weyerhaeuser, and Chevron’s actions demonstrated that 

private sector responses to disasters could be helpful. They delivered aid directly to disaster survivors, 

helped boost other relief agencies’ capacities to assist affected residents through cash donations, and 

complemented government responses to the storm.

The federal government acknowledged in its formal report on the Hurricane Katrina response that 

the private sector could and should participate in 

future emergency-management efforts.33 The report’s 

lessons learned underlined the wide range of poten30 George Haddow, Case Studies in Emergency and Risk Management (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2004), chapter 11, 6. 31 Haddow, Case Studies in Emergency and Risk Management, 7–8. 32 Haddow, Case Studies in Emergency and Risk Management, 17. 33 Frances F. Townsend, “Lessons Learned,” in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 

White House, 2006), 56, 59, 61, 64.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

57

tial roles that the private sector could play in disaster 

response. By improving logistical capabilities, developing temporary housing options for disaster survivors, and assessing the impact of disasters on critical 

infrastructure, businesses could supplement and 

build on government emergency-management practices.34 Subsequent versions of the NRP and NIMS 

appeared to draw from the lessons learned after 

Katrina by elevating the role that the federal government envisioned for the private sector in emergency 

management.

In 2008, DHS published revisions to the NRP and 

NIMS, renaming the NRP the National Response 

Framework (NRF). The 2008 revisions to the NRF and 

NIMS again emphasized the essential private sector 

role in U.S. emergency management, but the language in the documents was notably strengthened 

from the 2004 versions of these documents and established more firmly the importance of businesses 

in emergency management.35 For example, in the 

NIMS there is growing federal recognition that firms 

and government agencies would be better off as coequal partners, as opposed to simply cooperating in 

emergency plans:

The private sector plays a vital role in emergency management and incident response 

34 Townsend, “Lessons Learned,” 56, 60, 61. 

35 National Response Framework, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 19–20; and National Incident Management System, 15.
CHAPTER ONE

58

and should be incorporated into all aspects 

of NIMS. . . . It is essential that private-sector 

organizations directly involved in emergency management and incident response, or 

identified as a component of critical infrastructure (e.g., hospitals, public and private 

utility companies, schools), be included, as 

appropriate, in a jurisdiction’s preparedness 

efforts.36

By framing the private sector role as “vital” and 

calling for the incorporation of businesses into all aspects of NIMS, DHS made the private sector an indispensable participant in emergency management. 

Two years after the release of the 2008 NRF and 

NIMS, the federal government faced a new disaster 

that showed how necessary businesses could be in 

managing crises.

The response to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon

oil rig explosion and spill involved scores of governmental, nonprofit, and private sector actors.37 The 

spill’s geographic scale and logistical demands were 

enormous. At its peak, more than 45,000 people participated in the response effort.38 However, the private sector’s responsibilities in the oil spill response 

36 National Incident Management System, 15. 37 Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling—Report to the President (Washington, DC: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 

2011), 129–70. At the time of this writing, the BP incident remains 

the largest oil spill in U.S. history. 

38 Deep Water, 133.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

59

differed from the private sector role after the 9/11 

attacks and Hurricane Katrina in at least one key respect. Unlike the role of businesses following the 9/11 

attacks and Hurricane Katrina, which complemented government emergency-management efforts, in 

this case it was a business—BP—that was directly 

responsible for the oil spill because of questionable 

drilling safety practices and faulty equipment its employees installed to pump oil from the Gulf of Mexico 

sea floor.39 BP’s role in the Deepwater Horizon response was necessary precisely because it was BP’s 

equipment that had failed, and only BP had the special tools to repair that failed equipment.40 The federal government’s role was to help contain the spill 

and manage the response and recovery effort, but it 

could only go so far in this role, as it lacked the equipment and technical expertise to shut off the leaky oil 

well.41

While BP eventually stopped the oil flow, the 

delicate interplay between government officials and 

BP representatives throughout the response led to 

moments of tension. Rear Admiral Sally Brice-O’Hara 

of the U.S. Coast Guard, one of the federal agencies 

involved in the spill response, called BP the government’s “partner” at a White House press conference; 

Secretary of Homeland Security Janet A. Napolitano, 

who was Brice-O’Hara’s boss at the time, quickly cor39 Deep Water, vii, 114. 40 Deep Water, 161–62, 164–67. 41 Deep Water, 243.
CHAPTER ONE

60

rected her and said, “They are not our partner.”42 Other federal officials were significantly more blunt. Ken 

Salazar, secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, which regulates oil drilling for the federal government, said that “[the federal government’s] job is to 

keep the boot on the neck of BP to ensure it meets 

its obligations.”43 Brice-O’Hara, Napolitano, and Salazar’s remarks encapsulate the tensions faced by 

federal government officials who needed to appear 

in charge of the incident response while remaining 

accountable to the public and working closely with 

BP to stop the oil flow. Their comments also highlight how essential the private sector can be to 

emergency-management efforts, especially in managing the effects of damage to privately owned critical infrastructure.

In 2011, remnants of Hurricane Irene hit New York 

State, prompting the state government to work with 

businesses to help communities recover from flood 

damage. Private construction companies dispatched 

workers to assist state employees.44 With cranes, trailers, and other heavy equipment, these companies 

partnered with the public sector to remove debris 

42 Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing on the BP Oil Spill in 

the Gulf Coast,” press release, 29 April 2010.

43 “Salazar Calls Oil Spill ‘Massive’ and a Potential Catastrophe,” 

CNN, 2 May 2010. 

44 Mark Herbst, Testimony before the New York State Senate Standing Committee on Transportation (27 September 2011), 49, lines 

16–20, hereafter Herbst testimony.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

61

and begin rebuilding.45 These actions further demonstrated the wide range of roles that firms can play in 

immediate disaster response and recovery activities. 

New York State also moved to support small 

businesses in areas affected by the storm through 

emergency grants.46 This state assistance was shrewd. 

Nearly 50 percent of all private sector jobs in the United States are with small businesses.47 When small 

businesses fail after disasters, their failure can have 

negative knock-on effects on local economies.48 By 

providing emergency grants to affected small businesses, New York State helped prevent these firms 

from failing. 

State aid was not limited to small businesses, 

however. BAE Systems, a large defense contractor, 

lost an entire office complex in New York State due 

to flooding from Irene.49 Yet after negotiating with the 

state, BAE was able to secure a mixture of job and 

investment-related tax credits. These financial incentives prompted the company to keep its operations in 

45 Herbst testimony, 49, lines 16–20. 46 Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee: One Year Later (Albany: 

New York State, 2012), 7, 9.

47 “Frequently Asked Questions,” U.S. Small Business Administration, September 2012, 1.

48 Yu Xiao and Shannon Van Zandt, “Building Community Resiliency: Spatial Links between Household and Business Post-disaster 

Return,” Urban Studies 49, no. 11 (August 2012): 2526, https://doi

.org/10.1177/0042098011428178.

49 “Governor Cuomo Announces BAE Systems to Remain in the 

Southern Tier, Saving Nearly 1,400 Jobs,” New York State, 17 November 2011.
CHAPTER ONE

62

New York State after the flood, rather than relocating 

to another state.50

DHS published a revised version of the NRF in 

2013. The 2013 version further enhances the private 

sector role in emergency management. The language 

in the NRF elevates firms to partners, and states that 

these private sector partners should be directly involved in emergency decision-making when necessary:

During an incident, key private sector partners should have a direct link to emergency 

managers and, in some cases, be involved in 

the decision making process. Strong integration into response efforts can offer many benefits to both the public and private sectors.51

The federal government continues to integrate 

businesses into emergency management. FEMA has 

established a private sector liaison office whose mission is to cultivate professional relationships with 

businesses for emergency-management purposes.52

While the future of private sector involvement in 

emergency management is uncertain, recent history 

shows that firms can play a significant role in supporting government emergency-management efforts. 

Although this section focused primarily on federal 

government cooperation with businesses, incidents 

50 “Governor Cuomo Announces BAE Systems to Remain in the 

Southern Tier.” 

51 National Response Framework, 10. 52 “Office of External Affairs,” FEMA, 2 September 2015.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

63

like Hurricane Irene demonstrate that state governments can work with firms to manage emergencies 

as well. But how can we measure this public-private 

cooperation? The next section explores how the analytical framework used in this book serves as a valuable tool to assess disaster partnerships.

The Analytical Framework 

and State Disaster-Oriented PPPs

The analytical framework presented in the introduction, which was first developed to assess federal emergency-management partnerships, is largely 

applicable to state disaster partnerships for at least 

three reasons.53 First, state governments and the 

federal government are structured and function in 

similar ways. This means that the federal and state 

governments probably enjoy comparable benefits 

from these agreements, and they also share many 

of the same pathologies and dysfunctions.54 Second, 

preliminary evidence from states other than those 

examined in this book—Washington, Oklahoma, 

Alaska, Iowa, Utah, Arizona, and Missouri, specifically—shows that the eight factors in the analytical 

framework each can play a part in the formation of 

state disaster-oriented PPPs. Third, since disasters 

53 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 9–10. 54 Donald F. Kettl, “The Transformation of Governance: Globalization, Devolution, and the Role of Government,” Public Administration Review 60, no. 6 (November/December 2000): 488–97, https://

doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00112.
CHAPTER ONE

64

can simultaneously affect state governments and the 

federal government, it makes sense that emergencymanagement collaborations at both levels may react 

similarly to disasters. 

Crisis, the first factor in the analytical framework, 

can be pivotal in the formation of state partnerships. 

For example, in 2006, a significant windstorm in 

Washington State knocked out electricity to 400,000 

residents. This experience prompted the Washington 

State Emergency Management Division to elevate 

the presence of businesses in its emergency operations by creating a Corporate Relations Program to 

strengthen private sector ties.55 This crisis-driven 

approach to forming emergency-management collaborations had a direct impact during a subsequent 

incident in the state. In 2009, the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, which directs large civil engineering 

projects, became concerned about seepage out 

of the Howard A. Hanson Dam on the Green River in Washington. The Corps of Engineers warned 

the surrounding Green River Valley community that 

there was a 1 in 3 chance that the valley could flood 

because of the dam seepage. Numerous area businesses began to request emergency preparedness 

information from the Washington State Emergency 

Management Division because of these warnings.56

To share this preparedness information easily with 

businesses, the division used an online, password55 “State Partnership—Washington,” 2. 56 “State Partnership—Washington,” 1–2.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

65

protected information portal.57 The division posted 

emergency plans and alerts on the portal that business owners could download.58 The division also employs a mechanism on the portal for business owners 

to share information on their own operations with 

the division, creating a two-way flow of emergency 

preparedness data between the state and the private 

sector.59 Washington State’s experiences in the 2006 

windstorm, as well as the 2009 Green River Valley 

flood preparedness initiative, show that crises can directly influence the formation of state partnerships.

The second factor, public and private sector 

leadership, can also influence the formation of state 

emergency-management collaborations. The Oklahoma Safe Room Initiative, a program to build specially constructed tornado-resistant rooms inside 

houses, exemplifies this. After tornadoes tore through 

the state in 1999, killing 44 and injuring nearly 800, 

Oklahoma launched the initiative with strong political support from then-governor Francis A. Keating 

and assistance from the construction industry.60 The 

initiative employed a combination of federal funding, 

state-level program administration, and private sector technical expertise to educate the public about 

safe rooms, to outline the terms under which homeowners could apply for rebates for the construction 

57 “State Partnership—Washington,” 1.

58 “State Partnership—Washington,” 1–2.

59 “State Partnership—Washington,” 1.

60 “Gov. Francis Anthony Keating,” National Governors Association, 

accessed 12 November 2019.
CHAPTER ONE

66

of safe rooms, and to successfully complete the construction of safe rooms. Two firms involved in the 

initiative—American Polysteel and Liteform International—assembled a safe room kit that contained all 

the materials a construction company would need 

to install a safe room in a home, including walls and 

doors. Taking a cue from the program’s success, BMI 

Construction, a local homebuilder, formed a team 

to construct an entire subdivision of new homes in 

Tulsa, each with its own safe room—the first subdivision of its kind in the nation. The initiative ultimately 

resulted in more than 6,000 privately constructed, 

publicly financed safe rooms, and demonstrated that 

a combination of focused state and private sector 

leadership can lead to positive outcomes.61

Organizational structure, the third factor, can 

similarly affect the creation of state partnerships. 

Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify 

that organizational structure here refers specifically to the organizational framework governing these 

agreements.62 Although there is no standardized 

framework for state emergency-management collaborations, such a framework would likely include 

factors such as consistent political support, regulatory guidelines, cross-sector communication, and so 

61 Safe Rooms Save Lives: Oklahoma Safe Room Initiative (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2003), 2–17. 

62 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 52–53.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

67

on.63 The varying structures of state disaster-oriented 

PPPs that exist today show that the lack or presence 

of an organizational template can influence the formation of these partnerships in the first place. 

Some emergency-management agreements are 

well organized, and this may be attributable to a preexisting framework for the disaster-oriented PPP. For 

example, the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure 

Protection (APIP) was created to engage owners and 

operators of critical infrastructure in emergency preparedness initiatives. The APIP was formed in 2004 

as an evolution of the Critical Infrastructure Committee of the Federal/State Anti-Terrorism Advisory 

Council-Alaska, which had been created after the 

9/11 terrorist attacks. Made up of government and 

business representatives, the APIP boasts a tightly 

defined set of strategic and tactical objectives and 

works “to enhance private sector emergency preparedness for all-hazards through information sharing and preparedness activities.” Working across a 

range of industries, APIP members have participated 

in emergency exercises and use a secure information 

portal to exchange sensitive or confidential data.64 

The APIP’s well-defined objectives and track record 

of tangible achievements illustrates that preexisting 

organizational structures can potentially be helpful in 

the formation of state partnerships.

63 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 52–53. 64 “State Partnership––Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection,” FEMA, accessed 2 January 2020, 1–3.
CHAPTER ONE

68

Grassroots emergency-management partnerships, which are created without a preexisting organizational structure, may also work well. In 2006, 

Business Executives for National Security (BENS), a 

professional association and advocacy group, contacted the Iowa Business Council to discuss the possibility of creating a partnership for the state. BENS 

recognized that Iowa had no organized system for 

distributing private sector goods and services after 

disasters.65 Several Iowa state agencies and BENS 

supported the eventual launch of the Safeguard 

Iowa Partnership (SIP), an emergency-management 

agreement that focuses on strengthening information sharing, post-disaster business continuity, and 

growing businesses and communities.66 A board of 

directors governs SIP, its members pay dues, and the 

organization can send representatives to emergency 

operations centers during crises.67 One of SIP’s roles 

is to facilitate donations of private sector goods and 

services before and after disasters.68 To that end, SIP 

has collaborated with the Iowa Department of Public 

Health to develop plans for distribution of privately 

produced medicines in the event of severe disease 

outbreaks.69 

The fourth factor in the framework—information sharing—can be essential in forming disaster 

65 “State Partnership––Safeguard Iowa Partnership,” 1.

66 “State Partnership––Safeguard Iowa Partnership,” 1.

67 “State Partnership––Safeguard Iowa Partnership,” 2–3.

68 “State Partnership––Safeguard Iowa Partnership,” 3.

69 “State Partnership––Safeguard Iowa Partnership,” 1–3.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

69

partnerships. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, government counterterrorism agencies recognized the need 

to exchange more information with one another.70 

Moreover, the 9/11 attacks underscored the value of 

sharing information with businesses, for the private 

sector played a substantial role in response and recovery efforts.71 The rise of disaster partnerships was 

therefore one response to this need for increased information sharing.72

It was against this post-9/11 backdrop of increased information sharing among government 

agencies and firms that Salt Lake City, Utah, hosted the Winter Olympics in 2002.73 Preparing for the 

2002 Olympics required significant coordination 

and information sharing among state agencies and 

businesses in Utah.74 A few years later, the state’s 

BeReady Utah/Private Sector Section in the Division of Homeland Security formed and was built in 

part on the relationships established to prepare for 

70 The 9/11 Commission Report, 416–19. 71 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 18–21. 72 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 21; and Austen D. Givens and Nathan E. Busch, “Information Sharing and Homeland Security: The Role of Public-Private 

Partnerships,” Homeland Security Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 

123–50.

73 “State Partnership—Utah,” FEMA, 1, accessed 2 January 2020.

74 “State Partnership—Utah”; and The 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake 

City, Utah: Cooperation between Federal, State, Local, and Private 

Agencies to Address Public Safety Concerns: Hearing Before the 

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 107th Cong. (31 

May 2001). 
CHAPTER ONE

70

the 2002 Winter Olympics.75 The coordinating council’s primary objective is to strengthen information 

sharing and collaboration among its members, who 

represent a range of critical infrastructure industries, 

and the Utah Department of Public Safety’s Division 

of Homeland Security, which is responsible for statewide emergency management.76 The council also 

helps its members plan, train, and perform exercises 

in advance of disasters for the purpose of supporting themselves and the state’s response efforts.77 The 

information-sharing foundation of the council, first 

established in advance of the 2002 Winter Olympics, 

continues to serve it in advancing public and private 

sector emergency preparedness in Utah.

Mutual benefits, the fifth factor, are indispensable for the formation and success of disaster 

partnerships.78 The Arizona Division of Emergency 

Management’s (ADEM) efforts to work with businesses provide a ready example of how state PPPs can 

be beneficial for both sectors. The Arizona Business 

Emergency Coordination Center (BECC) serves as 

a central facility for firms to coordinate disaster responses with the state government.79 During crises, 

the BECC passes information about private sector 

needs and concerns to the State Emergency Oper75 “State Partnership—Utah,” 1.

76 “State Partnership—Utah,” 1.

77 “State Partnership—Utah,” 1.

78 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 67. 79 “State Partnership—Arizona,” FEMA, accessed 12 November 2019. 
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

71

ations Center (SEOC), a government-owned and operated facility.80 This information can be helpful for 

state emergency-management officials by showing 

them how a disaster is affecting the private sector. 

The state provides businesses benefits for partnering 

with it in emergency management too. ADEM makes 

emergency-management classes normally intended 

for public sector employees available to firms, for 

instance.81 These classes offer businesses greater 

expertise in specialized topics such as hazardous 

materials response and the Incident Command System.82 This specialized knowledge can help businesses make more informed emergency-management 

decisions during disasters.

The sixth factor, trust, is a key determinant of 

whether these agreements succeed.83 The Missouri 

Public-Private Partnership Committee, which facilitates coordination among state agencies and businesses for emergency-management purposes, 

recognizes trust as foundational for cross-sector 

relationships.84 In an official information handout, 

the committee identifies “[e]stablishing strong trust80 “State Partnership––Arizona,” 3.

81 “State Partnership––Arizona,” 3.

82 “State Partnership––Arizona,” 3. 

83 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 74; and Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Achieving 

Resilience in Disaster Management: The Role of Public-Private 

Partnerships,” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 

9, http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.2.1.

84 “State Partnership—Missouri,” FEMA, 3, accessed 17 January 

2020.
CHAPTER ONE

72

ing relationships” as one of four key objectives for 

emergency-management collaborations.85 One of 

the most visible committee initiatives is its Business 

Emergency Operations Center (BEOC), which is designed to serve as a coordination hub that provides 

private sector expertise to the state before, during, 

and after disasters.86 The committee’s emphasis 

on trusting partnerships and its activities in the 

BEOC can link directly with one another, for without cross-sector trust, it would be implausible that 

firms would send representatives to the BEOC during 

crises.

The seventh and eighth factors, adaptability and 

sustainability, are qualities that permit these partnerships to continue evolving and thriving as needs 

change over time. Many PPPs, however, remain “too 

new to rate.”87 That is, these partnerships are so new 

that there is not a long track record to show how 

important adaptability and sustainability are in their 

formation and continued operation. However, there 

is at least some evidence that preexisting state 

partnership structures can morph into emergencymanagement agreements, such as those in Utah and 

Alaska.88 It is therefore plausible that partnerships 

85 “State Partnership—Missouri,” 3.

86 State of Missouri Business Emergency Operations Center (BEOC)

(Jefferson City: State of Missouri, 2012), 3.

87 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 76. 88 For example, see “State Partnership—Utah,” 1; and “State Partnership—Alaska,” 1.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

73

can also adapt to changing circumstances and remain sustainable in the long run.

As these examples demonstrate, the eight factors are directly relevant to state disaster partnerships and provide a framework to evaluate their 

viability. Moreover, the evidence presented in these 

examples strongly suggests that states themselves 

possess impressive capacity to create, launch, and 

manage agreements on their own terms.

Disaster-Oriented PPPs: 

State-Managed Solutions

The analysis above shows that the states of Washington, Oklahoma, Alaska, Iowa, Utah, Arizona, and 

Missouri have each successfully created emergencymanagement agreements with public and private 

sector actors. These partnerships reflect the unique 

hazards faced in each state. They are managed independently by state governments without direct federal government intervention, though in some cases, 

such as Oklahoma, they have also been the recipients 

of federal grant money earmarked for emergencymanagement purposes. In many cases, the existence 

of these partnerships actually predates the federal 

government’s recognition of the importance of partnerships in policy documents, such as the NRP and 

NRF. These agreements have emerged from diverse 

circumstances, ranging from the experience of floods 

(i.e., Washington State) to cooperation built on the 

existing structures of other organizations (i.e., Utah). 
CHAPTER ONE

74

The confluence of these factors strongly suggests 

that state-level disaster partnerships nationwide 

can be launched and successfully managed without 

federal government involvement. In fact, the striking 

success of certain state-level partnerships, such as in 

Oklahoma’s Safe Room Initiative, inveighs against the 

direct involvement of the federal government in managing or leading state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs. 

And as this book will show in subsequent chapters, 

there is ample evidence to support this argument 

against federal involvement in other states, as well.

Conclusions

This chapter argued that the importance of businesses in emergency management has been rising 

since at least 2001. Although this trend has been 

most apparent at the federal level of government, 

evidence in this chapter shows that the private sector is also deeply involved in state-level emergencymanagement practices. 

The chapter first traced the history of emergencymanagement partnerships from 2001 to 2012. During 

these years, firms played roles in prominent disasters, including the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, 

the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and Hurricane Irene. 

Moreover, since 2001, the federal government has 

explicitly increased its emphasis on the role of businesses in emergency management, as demonstrated 

in prominent federal emergency-management documents such as the NRF and NIMS.
THE RISE OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

75

This chapter then explored the analytical framework that will be employed throughout this book 

in the context of state disaster-oriented PPPs. The 

framework’s eight factors play important roles in 

the formation and operation of state emergencymanagement agreements. The cases of Washington, 

Oklahoma, Alaska, Iowa, Utah, Arizona, and Missouri were each explored to demonstrate where and 

how the framework applied. These analyses indicate 

that an analytical framework is equally applicable 

to federal and state disaster partnerships. In addition, the strength of the collaborations observed in 

these states indicates that disaster partnerships can 

be created and led at the state level of government 

without direct federal intervention or guidance. This 

suggests, at least, that the federal government would 

be well-served by leaving states to manage their own 

partnerships independently. The four cases that this 

book will examine in later chapters—California, Florida, New York, and Virginia—further demonstrate that 

the framework is applicable to state disaster partnerships and that the management of these PPPs is 

best left to state governments. Chapter 2 examines 

the first of the four cases—disaster partnerships in 

California.
CHAPTER TWO

76

Chapter Two

California Dreaming?

As wildfires raged across southern California in late 

2017, wealthy homeowners in Los Angeles, Ventura, 

and San Diego counties became the unexpected 

beneficiaries of an innovative emergency-management practice—the use of private firefighters. Insurance firms such as Chubb, AIG, and PURE have in the 

past decade teamed up with private firefighting companies to protect the expensive homes of wealthy 

clients who live in wildfire-prone areas. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the 

state’s firefighting agency, has procedures in place 

that now permit crews of certified private firefighters to obtain special permission to enter otherwise 

restricted areas, all in an effort to prevent damage to 

insured houses. These private-sector firefighters may 

remove combustible material from near the outer 

walls of homes, for instance, or turn on outdoor water sprinkler systems. If a fire is closing in rapidly, the 

private firefighting crews may even spray homes’ ex-
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

77

teriors with fire-retardant foams and gels.1 Because 

wildfire response duties like these are typically handled by government-employed firefighters, the private firefighters augment and supplement the state’s 

efforts to keep homeowners’ properties safe. 

Today, California is an impressive model for the 

development of emergency-management partnerships. The state has earned national recognition 

for its approach to working with businesses during 

disasters.2

 The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) employs a dedicated public-private sector partnership coordinator.3

 Within 

the State Operations Center (SOC), a separate unit 

called the Business and Utility Operations Center 

(BUOC) permits business representatives to work 

directly with one another and state officials during 

disasters.4 Moreover, nonprofit organizations such 

as the American Red Cross and California Resiliency Alliance act as “trusted agents” in the state and 

help bring state officials and business representa1

 Leslie Scism, “As Wildfires Raged, Insurers Sent in Private Firefighters to Protect Homes of the Wealthy,” Wall Street Journal, 5 

November 2017.

2

 “State Partnership—California Emergency Management Agency,” 

FEMA, accessed 17 January 2020.

3

 Erika Baker, interview with the author via telephone, 16 April 2014, 

hereafter Baker interview.

4

 Baker interview.
CHAPTER TWO

78

tives together for disaster management purposes.5

This chapter first evaluates California’s disaster 

partnerships using the analytical framework, then 

argues that nonprofit and industry organizations—a 

potential ninth factor—play significant, if understated, roles in California’s approach to managing largescale emergencies. The chapter then makes the case 

that California’s partnerships are managed well without federal government involvement. They should remain that way if they are to endure in the long run. 

The chapter concludes by summarizing its key findings.

Crisis

Disasters can spark crises in California. These crises 

can create the conditions necessary for emergencymanagement collaborations to form in at least three 

ways. First, crises are engines for the formation of 

hastily formed networks—ad hoc groupings of organizations—and these networks frequently bring 

CalOES and firms together. Wildfires in 2007–8 and 

a widespread power outage in 2011 show how shortterm collaboration to address the immediate effects 

of California’s crises led to longer-term relationships 

between the state and its corporate partners. 

Second, crises offer a means to assess existing partnerships between businesses and the state, 

5

 Tracy McBroom, interview with the author via telephone, 10 November 2014, hereafter McBroom interview; and “Welcome to the 

California Resiliency Alliance,” California Resiliency Alliance, accessed 11 June 2015.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

79

such as when a 2010 earthquake in Mexico prompted 

CalOES to work quickly with its private sector partners to ship supplies to earthquake survivors in Mexico. This 2010 incident is explored in greater depth 

below. 

Third, crises help reinforce the connections between state officials and business representatives 

by cementing professional relationships. The state’s 

need for data exchanges during disasters, as well as 

the American Red Cross’s work with a firm whose employees were affected by a recent wildfire, illustrate 

how crises help bolster relationships between individual public and private sector representatives.

The crises created by California’s disasters have 

triggered the creation of numerous partnerships 

there. For example, in 2007–8, fires near San Diego 

led to evacuations of area residents and livestock on 

nearby farms.6

 The California Grocers Association 

(CGA), a trade group representing grocery stores in 

the state, offered the state donations of grain, alfalfa, and hay to feed the evacuated animals.7

 The California Highway Patrol and California Department of 

Transportation worked with the CGA to transport 

the donated food securely to help feed the livestock, 

thereby avoiding a secondary disaster—the deaths 

of farm animals from hunger.8 Similarly, a large power outage in California in 2011 left Walmart officials 

6

 Baker interview.

7

 Baker interview.

8

 Baker interview.
CHAPTER TWO

80

scrambling to get a better sense of how the power outage impacted its business operations in the 

state.9 In the wake of these communication difficulties, however, Walmart representatives made contact 

with CalOES representatives, beginning a partnership that continues at the time of this writing.10

An international disaster involving CalOES shows 

how large-scale emergencies can test the state’s 

emergency-management partnerships. In 2010, a 7.2 

magnitude earthquake caused widespread damage 

in the state of Baja California, Mexico, which borders 

California’s southern tip.11 CalOES saw this disaster as 

an opportunity to donate goods to help earthquake 

survivors in the region. The agency first contacted 

the U.S. Department of State, which told CalOES officials that they approved of the idea of donating these 

supplies in principle, but added that any shipment 

of donated goods to Mexico could take weeks to get 

through customs.12

Eager to ship these supplies to Mexico quickly, 

CalOES’s public-private sector liaison officer asked 

BUOC members if they had any suggestions about 

how to proceed faster. One member of CalOES’s 

BUOC offered to get in touch with a representative of 

UPS, a global shipping company, whom she already 

9

 Brooke Brager, interview with the author via telephone, 5 December 2014, hereafter Brager interview.

10 Brager interview.

11 For more on the earthquake, see Jennifer Steinhauer, “Strong 

Mexico Quake Shakes Buildings and Nerves in California,” New 

York Times, 5 April 2010. 12 Baker interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

81

knew. The UPS representative offered to fly the donated goods to Mexico. Because of UPS’s assistance, 

the donated goods were able to pass through customs and enter Mexico faster than the original twoweek time line proposed by the Department of State. 

Moreover, the UPS official with whom CalOES communicated about transporting the donated supplies 

later became a new member of the BUOC, in part due 

to his participation in this disaster-response effort.13

This incident provides evidence of how an existing 

partnership—the alliance between BUOC members 

and CalOES—was tested in the context of a specific 

crisis and was able to yield helpful results, underlining the value of the partnership itself.

Crises can also strengthen professional relationships among CalOES and business representatives. 

For instance, CalOES’s partnerships with retailers 

help it to better understand Californians’ needs 

during disasters.14 When retailers share aggregated 

customer purchase data with CalOES, the agency 

can learn what popular items retailers need to keep 

in stock are during disasters.15 This crisis-specific 

information provides value to CalOES, because the 

organization can then use the retailers’ aggregated 

customer purchase data to adjust how it deploys its 

own equipment and supplies.16 The exchange also 

13 Baker interview. 

14 Dan Bout, interview with the author via telephone, 21 November 

2014, hereafter Bout interview.

15 Bout interview. 

16 Bout interview. 
CHAPTER TWO

82

benefits firms, because it helps CalOES avoid duplicating the sale and distribution of goods that the private sector already has in stock. 

The American Red Cross, which partners with 

CalOES and businesses in the BUOC, has also bolstered the strength of its ties with firms during crises. 

It is important to note here that the American Red 

Cross enjoys a special relationship with governments 

at all levels in the United States. It also differs from 

other private sector and nonprofit actors discussed 

in this book. The American Red Cross is a unique, 

congressionally chartered humanitarian organization with mandatory responsibilities under the federal government’s National Response Framework.

17 In 

addition, the Red Cross subscribes to a humanitarian 

ethics that prizes neutrality, impartiality, and independence. For these reasons, the Red Cross shares 

the characteristics of other nonprofits and also humanitarian aid organizations, but during disasters it 

acts as a quasi-government agency. 

The American Red Cross’s collaboration with one 

firm took on a new dimension following a large wildfire that directly impacted the firm’s employees. The 

American Red Cross provided disaster assistance to 

the business’s employees who were affected by the 

fire. At the same time, the organization ramped up its 

17 “Our Federal Charter: Our Relationship with the Federal Government,” American Red Cross, accessed 2 January 2020; and National Response Framework, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: FEMA, 2019), 

28–29. 
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

83

efforts to collect monetary donations from the firm’s 

employees who were not affected by the fire.18 The 

crisis faced by the firm’s employees strengthened the 

partnership between the American Red Cross and 

the firm, as both organizations benefited from their 

respective actions.

Thus, crises influence California’s approaches 

to disaster management in multiple ways. They can 

serve as catalysts for the creation of new partnerships, borne out of disaster-specific needs. Crises 

can also act as a testing ground for existing partnerships, permitting government and business officials 

to evaluate their partnerships. Crises triggered by 

large-scale emergencies also can strengthen ties 

between California state agencies and businesses, 

helping maintain these partnerships. Public and private sector leadership is a significant determinant 

of the health of the state’s emergency-management 

agreements. 

Leadership

Organizational leaders in California exercise significant influence in shaping the success or failure of the 

state’s partnerships. Top-level leaders in government, 

business, and nonprofit organizations help promote 

these agreements by providing the resources to build 

and grow these partnerships. Mid-level managers 

execute their day-to-day administration. These 

18 McBroom interview.
CHAPTER TWO

84

mid-level managers leverage a different but essential 

form of leadership from that of their organizational 

superiors.

Government agency leaders can influence partnerships by earmarking money and resources to 

build and sustain them. For example, CalOES employs a public-private sector liaison coordinator who 

steers the BUOC.19 The decision to fund this position 

is at least in part attributable to the agency director’s 

views of PPPs’ value, because if they did not view 

these partnerships as important, then they probably would not agree to finance the liaison position in 

CalOES’s budget. CalOES employees say that their 

leadership has been essential in building the agency’s agreements with firms and nonprofits, reinforcing the connection between agency-level leadership 

and CalOES’s efforts to expand its public-private partnerships.20

Corporate executive-level leadership can also 

prove pivotal in shaping the success of emergencymanagement collaborations. Cisco, a multinational internet technology company, is connected to 

CalOES via the California Resiliency Alliance (CRA).21

John T. Chambers, the former CEO of Cisco, was said 

to respect and appreciate his employees’ work in 

emergency management.22 Walmart’s CEO similar19 Baker interview.

20 Bout interview; and Baker interview.

21 Rakesh Bharania, interview with the author via telephone, 4 December 2014, hereafter Bharania interview. 

22 Bharania interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

85

ly offered support to develop the firm’s emergencymanagement capabilities after Hurricane Katrina 

struck New Orleans in 2005.23 The success of 

Walmart’s partnership with CalOES hinges on 

Walmart executives’ continuing support for the firm’s 

emergency-management department, and that support remains strong today.24

Executive leadership in nonprofit organizations, 

too, helps build and grow California’s emergencymanagement partnerships. For example, the former 

head of the CRA previously worked in the business 

and government sectors.25 The CRA counts among 

its members blue chip technology companies such 

as Google, Apple, and Facebook. And in addition to 

local and state government agencies, it also includes 

well-known banks, credit card companies, consultancies, and shipping corporations.26 The CRA’s former leader continued this type of work by fostering 

communication and coordination among the CRA’s 

public and private sector members for emergencymanagement purposes.

The roles of mid-level organizational coordinators 

in managing these partnerships also appear essential 

to their success in California. CalOES’s public-private 

sector liaison is cited frequently as a linchpin in the 

state’s efforts to work with businesses for disaster 

23 Brager interview.

24 Brager interview.

25 Jim Turner, interview with the author via telephone, 18 November 

2014, hereafter Turner interview.

26 “Members,” California Resiliency Alliance, accessed 11 June 2015. 
CHAPTER TWO

86

management purposes.27 CalOES’s deputy director 

of planning and preparedness is also mentioned as 

a key figure in building the state’s agreements with 

firms and nonprofits.28 These positions play different 

but complementary roles within CalOES, as their duties include overseeing CalOES’s partnerships with 

firms and securing formal agreements to cooperate 

with businesses for emergency-management purposes.29

Organizational coordinators play an essential 

part in California’s partnerships too. Walmart divides California into different regions for business 

management purposes.30 Corporate leaders in each 

region look to Walmart’s emergency-management 

department as a central repository of disaster-related 

information.31 To meet this need, Walmart’s emergency-management team collects disaster-related information from California state officials, compiles the 

information, then sends the information back out to 

local Walmart representatives in California.32 Among 

nonprofits, the American Red Cross employs a liaison 

to work directly with the state government and firms.33

27 McBroom interview; anonymous executive interview with the 

author via telephone, 6 October 2014, hereafter anonymous executive interview; and Kendall Skillicorn, interview with the author 

via telephone, 24 April 2014, hereafter Skillicorn interview.

28 Baker interview; and Skillicorn interview.

29 Skillicorn interview; and Baker interview.

30 Brager interview.

31 Brager interview.

32 Brager interview.

33 McBroom interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

87

Leadership is invaluable in shaping California’s 

emergency-management partnerships. Government 

and business executives can provide the top-tier 

support needed for their respective organizations to 

forge and grow these agreements. Mid-level coordinators offer a different but no less important form of 

leadership by carrying out the day-to-day management of the partnerships. Leaders’ actions can give 

rise to distinct structures for CalOES’s emergencymanagement agreements.

Organizational Structure

California officials prefer a formal structure, codified 

in memoranda of understanding (MOUs), for their 

disaster-oriented PPPs.34 Once firms cosign MOUs 

with CalOES, they automatically become part of 

the BUOC, embedding firms organizationally within 

CalOES.35 However, public and private sector officials 

acknowledge openly that this MOU-driven structure 

suffers from numerous shortcomings, including a 

general reluctance for firms to sign MOUs; MOUs 

may lack tangible commitments, raising questions 

about the MOUs’ value; and the number of signed 

MOUs can act as a misleading indicator of success.

Firms can be reluctant to sign MOUs with CalOES 

for numerous reasons.36 For example, MOUs may lead 

to concrete agreements for goods or services; but 

34 Baker interview; Skillicorn interview; and Bout interview.

35 Skillicorn interview.

36 Anonymous executive interview.
CHAPTER TWO

88

during disasters, firms may be impacted and unable 

to meet their MOU obligations.37 If firms are especially nervous about signing an MOU, they will sometimes opt for an MOU that is more symbolic than 

committal.38 An additional challenge is that CalOES 

seeks to limit the number of MOU signatories, which 

can stymie firms’ flexibility in responding to disasters, 

since only MOU signatories may be given access to 

information from CalOES.39 The American Red Cross 

prefers MOUs for its partnerships, but in practice can 

leave some of the terms of MOUs ambiguous during 

negotiations.40

Despite these limitations, state officials stress 

the value of MOUs in structuring their partnerships.41

However, if MOUs are so flexible that they lack any 

concrete commitments, this calls into question the 

value of MOUs in the first place. If CalOES’s MOUs do 

not commit either the agency or its partners to significant obligations, then what purpose do they serve? 

MOUs appear to perform at least two key functions necessary for disaster partnerships in California. 

First, MOUs provide tangible proof that an organizational relationship exists between CalOES and firms. 

Having this tangible proof at hand benefits CalOES.42

For example, if there is ever a question about the 

37 Anonymous executive interview.

38 Anonymous executive interview.

39 Brager interview.

40 McBroom interview.

41 For example, see Skillicorn interview.

42 Bryan Koon, interview with the author via telephone, 9 February 

2015.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

89

original purpose of the relationship between CalOES 

and one of its partners, the MOU provides CalOES 

and its partner with a shared foundational document 

for reference purposes. The MOU itself is evidence 

that the relationship between CalOES and its partner 

was developed in a thoughtful manner and agreed to 

by organizational leaders. 

The second key function that MOUs perform is 

to ease the effects of personnel turnover for both the 

state and its private sector partners. The absence of 

measures to mitigate the impact of personnel turnover can harm partnerships.43 The reason for this is 

that if the specific organizational representatives involved in PPPs leave their respective roles, then the 

partnerships themselves can fall apart.44 When personnel leave, having a written document on file that 

formally codifies the relationship can act as a helpful 

reference point for the partners’ respective organizations.45

Getting MOUs signed can be arduous for businesses. In large firms, MOUs may go through multiple 

layers of corporate approvals prior to signature, making the approval process as a whole difficult.46 In contrast, the MOU template that CalOES uses with its 

partners has already been heavily vetted and revised 

by CalOES’s lawyers, so the MOU process imposes a 

comparatively light organizational burden on CalOES 

43 Bout interview; and McBroom interview. 

44 Bout interview.

45 McBroom interview.

46 Brager interview.
CHAPTER TWO

90

vis-à-vis its private sector partners.47 All of this suggests that it is CalOES, not the private sector, which 

is the chief beneficiary of signed MOUs. 

CalOES measures its success in forging partnerships by the number of MOUs it cosigns with firms. 

But when used as a metric to gauge the success of 

the state’s partnerships, the total number of signed 

MOUs can hide dysfunction and variation in partnership quality, revealing little about the true level of 

private sector commitment to these partnerships.48

One executive cautions that the most important 

consideration for firms participating in these agreements is not cosigned MOUs, but the extent to which 

these partnerships can help firms cut costs or boost 

profits.49 This executive emphasizes that MOUs offer 

limited value both as a tool to increase businesses’ 

willingness to partner with CalOES and as a means to 

assess the success of CalOES’s collaborations.

California’s emergency-management agreements 

are primarily structured in a formal way. These partnerships are rooted in MOUs between CalOES and 

firms. This approach has numerous drawbacks that 

47 Skillicorn interview.

48 Nathan E. Busch and Austen D. Givens, “Achieving Resilience 

in Disaster Management: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships,” 

Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 14–16, http://

dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.2.1; Austen D. Givens and Nathan E. 

Busch, “Realizing the Promise of Public-Private Partnerships in U.S. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection,” International Journal of Critical 

Infrastructure Protection 6, no. 1 (March 2013): 42–45, http://dx.doi

.org/ 10.1016/j.ijcip.2013.02.002; and Bout interview.

49 Anonymous executive interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

91

state officials and business representatives acknowledge. Moreover, the state’s focus on the number of 

MOUs that it has in place as a metric of success may 

mistakenly lead state officials to believe that their 

partnerships are stronger than they truly are. Regardless of the specific form that these accords between 

CalOES and firms take, it is essential for organizational partners to exchange information.

Information Sharing

Virtually all of the information shared between firms 

and CalOES relates to specific disaster responses 

or disaster preparedness activities. Public and private sector officials in California appear to agree 

that both of these types of information exchange 

are useful. Nevertheless, organizational roadblocks 

to information sharing; conflicting information; and 

high-volume, low-quality information can challenge 

this type of emergency-management partnership in 

the state.

During disaster responses in California, business 

representatives in the state’s BUOC are given full access to the SOC’s data systems.50 Having access to 

these systems can be useful for firms, because they 

provide private sector representatives with a live 

view of how the state responds to disasters. This type 

of information exchange, carried out in the specific 

context of disaster responses, permits CalOES and 

50 Baker interview.
CHAPTER TWO

92

private sector officials to address disaster needs in a 

more coordinated manner. 

The state and its partners also share disasterspecific information when they are not physically 

located in the BUOC. For instance, Walmart manages emergency operations from its headquarters in 

Bentonville, Arkansas, and receives information on 

vehicle traffic, road closures, and shelter locations 

from CalOES via email.51 The American Red Cross 

and Walmart have access to state information flows 

remotely via the state’s web-based computer application for logging and tracking situational updates and 

resource requests.52 The American Red Cross also 

uses the state’s web-based application to broadcast 

its own requests for resources during disasters, such 

as difficult-to-locate supplies or personnel with special skills.53

CalOES and its partners also share disaster preparedness information. Utility companies sometimes 

offer information such as entrance and exit points for 

their facilities with CalOES.54 In the event of a disaster that affects the utility companies, CalOES can relay this information to first responders, saving them 

valuable time when they arrive at the scene. CalOES 

sponsors disaster preparedness training events for 

its private sector partners as well. One CalOES official 

51 Brager interview.

52 McBroom interview; and Brager interview.

53 McBroom interview.

54 Baker interview. 
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

93

recalled a recent disaster preparedness workshop 

that CalOES hosted with the U.S. Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), a federal public health 

agency.55 The workshop brought together representatives from businesses, nonprofits, and different state 

agencies to exchange views about disaster preparedness. The CalOES official said, “Just getting opinions 

about what the non-profit/private sector thinks and 

needs was very enlightening to a lot of us.”56

Conflicting information, however, can limit the 

utility of data exchanges between the state and its 

partners. For example, during the 2009 H1N1 (a.k.a. 

swine flu) flu virus outbreak, federal, state, and local 

government agencies provided differing guidance 

about how to control the spread of the virus.57 This 

led to confusion on the part of private sector employers, because some encouraged their employees to 

work from home, while other employees continued to 

come to work and send their children to school each 

day.58 The H1N1 flu virus outbreak response shows 

that even well-intentioned information sharing between the state and its partners can run into prob55 Skillicorn interview. See, for example, “California Specialized 

Training Institute (CSTI): Training Opportunities,” Bulletin No. 01-

2020, CalOES, January 2020.

56 Skillicorn interview.

57 Turner interview. See, for example, Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Swine 

Flu Prompts W.H.O. to Issue Higher Alert, with Advice,” New York 

Times, 27 April 2009; and Vicki Freimuth et al., “Trust During the 

Early Stages of the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic,” Journal of Health Communication 19, no. 3 (2014): 321–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/1081073

0.2013.811323.

58 Turner interview.
CHAPTER TWO

94

lems if different government agencies do not agree 

about proper courses of action during large-scale 

emergencies. 

Organizational roadblocks to information sharing 

can affect California’s partnerships too. In all government bureaucracies there is the possibility that specific government employees will hoard information 

to maintain a sense of organizational control.59 This 

means that government employees may be in a position to block information sharing with firms.60 Employees within businesses may be prone to similar 

behavior. They also have numerous behavioral incentives to withhold information.61

A third potential limitation to California’s information-sharing partnerships is information overload. 

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, governments at all 

levels in the United States have emphasized the 

need to break down information silos and share 

more data.62 As a result of this renewed emphasis 

on information sharing, many government officials 

now say that their inboxes are filled with reports that 

59 Bout interview.

60 Joel M. Evans, Michael G. Hendron, and James B. Oldroyd, 

“Withholding the Ace: The Individual- and Unit-Level Performance 

Effects of Self-Reported and Perceived Knowledge Hoarding,” Organization Science 26, no. 2 (March–April 2015): 13, https://doi.org

/10.1287/orsc.2014.0945.

61 Evans, Hendron, and Oldroyd, “Withholding the Ace,” 3.

62 Austen D. Givens and Nathan E. Busch, “Information Sharing 

and Homeland Security: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships,” 

Homeland Security Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 125.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

95

are not timely or useful.63 Although none of the public or private sector officials the author spoke with 

indicated that they were overwhelmed by highvolume or low-quality information from their partners, 

this possibility exists for California’s emergencymanagement agreements.

CalOES shares information for emergency-management purposes in two key categories: data specific to disaster responses and information related to 

emergency preparedness. There is also evidence suggesting that this information sharing may not always 

function as intended. Conflicting guidance, organizational roadblocks, and high-volume, low-quality information can impose limits on the benefits of CalOES’s 

information exchanges with its partners. 

Mutual Benefits

CalOES and its partners derive specific benefits from 

working together. BUOC members, such as Home 

Depot, Cisco, Walmart, and the American Red Cross, 

enjoy sales and access to nonpublic information 

through their collaboration with CalOES. The state 

benefits from firms through material and logistical 

assistance, as well as access to private sector information. CalOES and its partners appear to understand, too, that inattention to these mutual benefits 

can damage their relationships.

63 Givens and Busch, “Information Sharing and Homeland Security,” 

134–36; and Hamilton Bean, “Exploring the Relationship between 

Homeland Security Information Sharing and Local Emergency Preparedness,” Homeland Security Affairs 5, no. 2 (May 2009): 6–11.
CHAPTER TWO

96

California’s partnerships can result in revenue for 

firms. For instance, one private sector representative 

says that their firm’s collaboration with California 

state officials helps them to work within California’s 

disaster-procurement laws.64 This collaboration with 

the state can potentially lead to the company selling 

goods to the state, because it helps the firm know 

precisely what it must do to bid on and win business 

from the state.65 CalOES also can encourage citizens 

to purchase goods from its partners during disaster 

situations. For example, Home Depot, a CalOES partner, sells protective masks that prevent the inhalation of particulate matter contained in smoke. During 

wildfires, if residents become concerned about air 

quality, CalOES can direct them to Home Depot to 

purchase the masks. In both of these cases, public-private sector collaboration has the potential to 

generate corporate revenue directly. 

These partnerships also can generate revenue 

indirectly. Cisco’s Tactical Operations (TacOps) team, 

which deploys to disaster zones to restore communications capabilities, field-tests Cisco equipment 

during their responses to disasters.66 The team then 

relays information about how well the Cisco equipment worked—or did not work—to potential Cisco 

customers, including government agencies, alongside Cisco’s sales personnel.67 The team is not re64 Brager interview.

65 Brager interview.

66 Bharania interview.

67 Bharania interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

97

sponsible for generating money for the company, but 

their assessments of the Cisco equipment can lead 

indirectly to equipment sales for Cisco.68 

Public-private sector collaboration can deliver 

helpful material and logistical assistance for CalOES. 

For example, following a 2014 earthquake in Napa Valley, California, the American Red Cross struggled to 

obtain accessible portable showers for earthquake 

survivors.69 The state’s corporate BUOC partners 

banded together to purchase the showers for the 

American Red Cross.70 The BUOC members’ assistance in this case offered numerous mutual benefits for CalOES, the Red Cross, and BUOC members. 

CalOES benefited because it was not burdened with 

having to locate and purchase the showers using 

state funds. The American Red Cross benefited because its need for accessible showers was fulfilled, 

relieving it of the financial cost of paying for the 

showers independently. BUOC members also gained 

from the purchase of the showers, because in buying 

this sort of disaster aid for the nonprofit American 

Red Cross, they would then be able to write off the 

expense of the showers when paying corporate taxes, helping them to reduce their business operating 

costs.

68 Bharania interview.

69 McBroom interview. See, for example, Elizabeth Weise, “120 Injured, 3 Critical after Napa, California Quake,” USA Today, 24 August 2014.

70 McBroom interview. 
CHAPTER TWO

98

State officials appear keen to avoid duplicating 

the private sector’s material and logistical services, 

emphasizing the value of CalOES’s collaborations. 

The agency says that its priority is to get businesses up and running after a disaster, because that can 

help communities return to normalcy. There is also 

recognition within CalOES that the private sector is 

simply more efficient at certain types of tasks integral to emergency responses, such as the logistics of 

moving thousands of water bottles from one point to 

another.71 Given this recognition of private sector efficiencies in certain facets of emergency response, as 

well as CalOES’s emphasis on reopening businesses 

after disasters, CalOES is eager to leverage the private sector’s capabilities to increase disaster resilience.

An additional benefit for the state of California 

and its corporate partners is access to information. 

Receiving real-time private sector information during 

disasters can be valuable for CalOES, because the 

state can use this information to adjust its own response actions.72 Information sharing is also helpful 

for nonprofits. For example, when the American Red 

Cross shares its plans and response actions with 

businesses, firms are then able to assist the Red 

Cross faster, because firms will not have to spend as 

much time learning about what the organization has 

71 Bout interview.

72 Baker interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

99

done during the disaster, or what they need for the 

purposes of disaster response.73

While disaster partnerships offer benefits for 

firms and the state, neglecting these mutual benefits 

can harm the partnerships between the state and 

firms. If a firm or the state focuses solely on what it 

can derive from a partnership rather than what it can 

contribute to a partnership, there is a risk of the partnership deteriorating due to a lack of reciprocity.74 For 

nonprofit organizations, having mutual benefits in 

their relationships can be essential for organizational survival, since these mutual benefits can include 

money, volunteers, and resources that nonprofit organizations need to continue operating.75 Because 

of these factors, the existence of mutual benefits in 

California’s disaster-oriented PPPs is a key predictor 

of their success.76

Emergency-management agreements can benefit the state and firms through sales, positive media 

coverage, materiel and logistical assistance, and access to information. At the same time, government 

and business representatives seem to agree that 

sensitivity to and awareness of one another’s benefits 

is imperative for their partnerships to be successful. 

73 McBroom interview.

74 Brager interview; and Alberto Caimo and Alessandro Lomi, 

“Knowledge Sharing in Organizations: A Bayesian Analysis of the 

Role of Reciprocity and Formal Structure,” Journal of Management

41, no. 2 (2015): 679, https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206314552192. 

75 McBroom interview.

76 Skillicorn interview.
CHAPTER TWO

100

Trust is a key factor in strengthening this sensitivity 

to public and private sector benefits.

Trust in Organizational Relationships

Business and government representatives in California are emphatic about the indispensable role of 

trust in their organizational relationships.77 The trust 

present in these PPPs can be classified broadly into 

three types: interfirm trust, intersector trust, and 

trust related to information sharing.

Firms that partner with the state must trust one 

another to collaborate well. Several of the state’s corporate partners are business competitors.78 However, 

business representatives in the BUOC have strong 

incentives to cooperate with one another during 

crises, because in collaborating, they can help their 

own respective businesses return to normal operations faster.79 An official with Walmart’s emergencymanagement team points toward the progress firms 

in the BUOC have made in recent years:

The [BUOC] concept has served as a strong 

networking platform for the private sector 

for information sharing purposes as it has 

allowed us a better understanding of what 

other private sector organizations are doing 

before, during and after a disaster for associates, operations and the communities they 

77 McBroom interview; Bharania interview; and Baker interview. 

78 Baker interview.

79 Baker interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

101

serve. Prior to the [BUOC] concept, sharing 

information [between firms] was not as common simply because we didn’t have an understanding of who to reach out to for this 

type of information. Now we all understand 

that we’re in this together in an effort to create overall resiliency.80

In addition to highlighting how trust within the BUOC 

can spur cooperation, these comments also reveal 

insights about the dynamics of interorganizational 

relationships generally, a theme to which we will return in chapter 6.

It is important to note that while concerns about 

interfirm competition during disasters are plausible 

in theory, they may not be grounded in reality. There 

is a common misperception that trust exists between organizations, but interfirm trust is in reality 

cultivated by specific individuals on whom that interorganizational trust hinges.81 Strong one-to-one professional relationships among BUOC members may, 

therefore, go a long way toward building trust between their respective employers. It may also be the 

case that firms do not use disasters as an opportu80 Brooke Brager, email to the author, 26 June 2015.

81 Bout interview; and Mick Marchington and Steven Vincent, “Analysing the Influence of Institutional, Organizational, and Interpersonal Forces in Shaping Inter-Organizational Relations,” Journal of 

Management Studies 41, no. 6 (September 2004): 1036–37, https://

doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00465.x.
CHAPTER TWO

102

nity to gain business advantages over competitors.82

Trust between firms and CalOES appears essential for partnerships in California as well. This interorganizational trust can have direct impacts on 

disaster responses. For example, business owners 

sometimes must enter restricted areas during disasters to access their business facilities.83 This action 

requires that first responders trust business owners 

not to endanger themselves when they enter these 

areas.84 It also requires that business owners trust 

first responders to permit them to access their commercial facilities, even if the conditions within them 

are potentially unsafe. Concerns about trust in partnerships extend to nonprofit organizations as well. 

For example, an American Red Cross official stresses 

the implications of the organization associating with 

private sector firms during disasters, suggesting that 

the Red Cross is sensitive to public perceptions of 

its organizational brand, so “you wouldn’t want to cobrand with a brand that’s doing bad stuff or something 

illegal.”85 These observations imply that interorganizational trust and public perceptions of the American Red Cross’s disaster responses are intertwined. 

Cisco deliberately steeps its employees in emergency-management culture and jargon to help build 

intersector trust. The Cisco TacOps team includes 

82 Jim Williams, interview with the author via telephone, 1 December 2014.

83 Turner interview.

84 Turner interview.

85 McBroom interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

103

a significant number of former military personnel, 

police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical 

technicians.86 Every member of the Cisco TacOps 

team receives formal training in the NIMS and ICS, 

which are standardized emergency-management 

methods promoted by FEMA.87 Hiring employees 

with experience managing disasters and providing 

them with high-quality training pays dividends for 

Cisco by helping the firm to build trust with its government partners during disasters.88

The trust needed for the state of California and 

its partners to share sensitive information with one 

another is essential for that information sharing to 

continue. Utility companies that partner with the 

state, for instance, may share confidential or proprietary information about their operations to help 

the state better respond to disasters.89 But leaks of 

this kind of information can damage the trust that 

exists between the state and its partners, reducing 

the possibility of future cooperation.90 The trust relationship goes both ways: firms also must trust that 

the state will share information with them and firms 

must have confidence that the public sector will 

also fulfill its promises to businesses and maintain 

emergency-management partnership programs over 

86 Bharania interview.

87 Bharania interview; and “NIMS: Frequently Asked Questions,” 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed 11 June 2015.

88 Bharania interview.

89 Baker interview.

90 Skillicorn interview.
CHAPTER TWO

104

time.91 These factors highlight that trust is a crucial 

element in facilitating data exchange between businesses and CalOES.

Trust among firms that partner with the state, 

trust between companies and CalOES, and trust 

surrounding information-sharing practices each play 

significant roles in California’s partnerships. Information sharing in particular can place challenging demands on CalOES and firms in the BUOC. Over time, 

though, government agencies and companies must 

adjust their practices, as well as other facets of their 

cooperation with one another, to sustain their partnerships.

Adaptability and Sustainability

Emergency-management agreements in California 

show limited evidence of adaptation to changing circumstances, suggesting that adaptability is not an 

essential component of CalOES’s relationships with 

firms and nonprofits.92 The longer-term sustainability of the state’s partnerships is also threatened from 

at least two corners. First, a decrease in the number 

of disasters may lead policy makers to diminish the 

importance of CalOES’s partnerships. To counter this 

possibility, CalOES and its partners communicate 

frequently with one another and participate often in 

disaster preparedness exercises. Second, potential 

cuts to disaster aid budgets in government agencies 

91 Turner interview.

92 Baker interview; and anonymous executive interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

105

and businesses may make it harder to sustain the 

state of California’s disaster partnerships into the future.

There are few indications that California’s emergency-management partnerships can adapt. Perhaps the most significant adaptation in the history 

of CalOES’s partnership program occurred at the creation of the program itself.93 A cooperative response 

to San Diego wildfires in 2006–7 led to firms signing 

MOUs with CalOES and the establishment of the 

BUOC.94 Yet, this shift from short-term wildfire response partnerships to long-term partnerships may 

be the only substantial way in which CalOES’s disaster management agreements have changed. In the 

BUOC’s early days, CalOES sought to partner with 

professional industry organizations, because doing 

so would permit CalOES to reach and interact with 

hundreds of businesses at once.95 Later, the agency 

shifted its approach to focus on large retailers, such 

as Home Depot and Lowe’s, and developed partnerships with these big firms.96

California has experienced no shortage of disasters in recent years. However, it is worth pointing out 

that the passage of time without disasters can be 

problematic, because it can lead policy makers to believe incorrectly that the risks of disasters have dimin93 Turner interview.

94 Turner interview.

95 Baker interview.

96 Baker interview.
CHAPTER TWO

106

ished.97 Since policy makers may believe that certain 

risks are diminishing, they may also deprioritize emergency management, generally, and partnerships, in 

particular. Deprioritizing these collaborations means 

that the professional relationships that are integral 

for these partnerships may erode over time, harming 

them. Underscoring the potential for this deprioritization, one California executive notes that a lack of 

disasters can change a once-healthy relationship 

marked by frequent interorganizational contact into 

an “on-demand” relationship, in which one party calls 

another only on an as-needed basis.98

To help sustain California’s emergency-management partnerships in the future, CalOES and its 

corporate partners know that they must keep in frequent contact with one another. For instance, one 

American Red Cross official says that they speak 

with the organization’s partners frequently and ensures that the Red Cross has up-to-date contact 

information for its partners.99 These contacts between organizational representatives can keep interorganizational relationships fresh. A CalOES official 

concurs with their American Red Cross counterpart, 

saying that disaster partnerships require continuous 

engagement between public and private sector representatives.100

Despite efforts to sustain the state’s partner97 Bout interview.

98 Anonymous executive interview.

99 McBroom interview.

100 Baker interview.
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

107

ships, CalOES’s collaborations are threatened by potential future shortfalls in funding, with the money 

committed for building and growing these disaster 

partnerships absorbed in diverse parts of the CalOES 

budget rather than in a dedicated section of the organization’s budget.101 If CalOES is unwilling to fund a 

dedicated budget line for building and growing these 

partnerships, that leaves CalOES with the option to 

halt the state’s emergency-management partnership 

program easily. However, CalOES officials have not 

indicated they have plans to end the agency’s program. 

Shortcomings in private sector funding for 

these agreements can threaten the sustainability 

of CalOES’s partnerships too. Cisco’s TacOps team 

is funded by the firm’s overhead budget and is not 

responsible for generating any revenue for the company.102 Since the TacOps team does not generate 

revenue directly, the firm could opt to cut the team 

in part or whole to increase Cisco’s profitability.103 The 

American Red Cross is highly dependent on outside 

financial support for its operations.104 Gaps in funding could cause the organization to scale back many 

initiatives, including its work in emergency management. Walmart has invested heavily in its emergencymanagement capabilities. Though, like Cisco, a de101 Baker interview.

102 Bharania interview.

103 John-Paul Marney and Heather Tarbert, Corporate Finance for 

Business (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 17–18. 104 McBroom interview.
CHAPTER TWO

108

sire to improve corporate profitability could lead the 

firm’s executives to cut costs, including trimming 

back the staff dedicated to managing the firm’s relationships with emergency-management agencies.105

No one that was contacted for this study indicated that their organization planned to scale back or 

cut its disaster partnership program. But this could 

change at any time. 

CalOES’s emergency-management relationships 

do not appear to have adapted significantly over time. 

A decline in the number of disasters and the potential 

for budget shortfalls may threaten the sustainability 

of the state’s partnerships as well. California state 

government and private sector officials acknowledge 

the need to remain engaged with one another, and 

they do this primarily through regular communication and participation in disaster response exercises. 

If budgetary constraints lead CalOES and its partners 

to trim funding for the state’s disaster management 

partnerships, they may then seek ways to make their 

coordination more efficient. One way to improve the 

efficiency of these agreements is through the use of 

nonprofit organizations.

The Role of Nonprofit Organizations: 

A Ninth Factor?

Throughout this chapter, two nonprofit organizations consistently emerged as trusted facilitators of 

partnerships in California: the American Red Cross 

105 Brager interview. 
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

109

and the CRA. The Red Cross facilitates these agreements by partnering with businesses and the state 

to support its own organizational operations, as well 

as by participating in the BUOC alongside state officials and business representatives.106 The CRA exists 

for the sole purpose of bringing together public and 

private sector actors to improve emergency-management capabilities.107

The American Red Cross acts as a trusted agent 

in California’s disaster partnerships, connecting businesses and government agencies for emergencymanagement purposes. The Red Cross develops close 

working relationships with its organizational partners, because it relies on external funding, resources, 

and volunteers for its day-to-day operations.108 These 

partnerships are fundamentally different from those 

of profit-seeking BUOC members. Unlike firms such 

as Walmart, which generate revenue independent of 

their partnerships with government agencies or businesses, the Red Cross’s very existence depends on 

strong ties to other organizations.109 The Red Cross 

carries these strong ties inside the BUOC during cri106 McBroom interview.

107 “About Us,” California Resiliency Alliance, accessed 11 June 2015. 

108 McBroom interview.

109 Douglas R. White and Michael Houseman, “The Navigability of 

Strong Ties: Small Worlds, Tie Strength, and Network Topology,” 

special issue, Networks and Complexity 8, no. 1 (September/October 2002): 72–81, https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.10053; and see also 

Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–80, https://doi.org/10

.1086/225469.
CHAPTER TWO

110

ses, creating a network multiplier effect.110 The network multiplier effect, in this context, means that by 

adding a single, well-connected organization to the 

BUOC, such as the Red Cross, the net present value 

of participating in the BUOC increases for all members, and the expected future value of participating in 

the BUOC increases for prospective BUOC members 

as well. The American Red Cross’s strong ties to its 

partners provide a significant boost to the BUOC in 

this regard.

The CRA, whose work to build emergency-management capacity includes and extends beyond the 

BUOC, also creates a network multiplier effect in 

the BUOC.111 The CRA was instrumental in the creation of the BUOC.112 Today, the CRA boasts more 

than 400 government, business, and nonprofit sector 

members.113 At the inception of the BUOC, CalOES 

would have benefited immediately from the CRA’s 

connections. Engaging with the CRA would have given CalOES a single point of contact to reach a huge 

range of firms, including banking, information technology, and shipping companies.114 In addition, just 

110 Keith G. Provan and H. Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really 

Work?: A Framework for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks,” Public Administration Review 51, no. 4 (July/August 

2001): 420, https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00045. 

111 California Resiliency Alliance members also include local and 

federal government representatives. See “Members,” California 

Resiliency Alliance, accessed 11 June 2015.

112 Turner interview.

113 “Members.” 

114 “Members.” 
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

111

as with the American Red Cross, the CRA depends 

on the engagement of its members for its own organizational survival. Absent revenue and participation from CRA members, they would probably fold. 

This means that independent of its partnership with 

CalOES, the CRA has powerful financial incentives 

to develop strong ties with its members. Thus, when 

CalOES partners with the CRA, it benefits from the 

alliance’s strong ties to its members. 

The American Red Cross and CRA’s partnerships 

with CalOES indicate that nonprofit organizations 

play a vital role in facilitating California’s disaster 

partnerships. When nonprofits with ties to other 

organizations partner with the state, these connections can offer immediate benefits to the state and 

its other corporate partners. The increasing size and 

strength of the state’s partnership network boosts 

the range and number of resources available to the 

state and its partners. Moreover, this larger and more 

robust interorganizational network lifts the expected 

future value of the state’s emergency-management 

agreements. Knowing that the state already partners 

with well-connected organizations such as the Red 

Cross and CRA may prove enticing for firms that are 

considering, but have not yet committed, to develop 

their own partnerships with the state.

California’s Disaster-Oriented PPPs: 

A State-Managed Solution

This chapter has discussed CalOES’s management 
CHAPTER TWO

112

of an array of disaster partnerships. These partnerships are concentrated in the BUOC, which traces 

its origins to a series of California wildfires in 2006–7. 

That time line means that the BUOC, and California’s 

embrace of emergency-management agreements, 

predates the federal government’s recognition of the 

need to include businesses as full participants and 

partners in emergency-management operations. In 

other words, with respect to disaster-oriented PPPs, 

California set an example of public-private sector cooperation that the federal government was able to 

study. 

California’s partnerships serve many purposes, 

from the procurement and distribution of physical aid 

(e.g., Walmart and UPS) to sheltering operations (e.g., 

the American Red Cross). And these partnerships, 

like the other agreements that we have seen so far, 

are tailored to the unique variety of hazards and circumstances that California faces. The totality of this 

evidence makes a powerful case for CalOES to be left 

to create and manage its partnerships without federal interference. Indeed, federal involvement—such as 

the imposition of a particular template or set of administrative requirements for partnerships—would 

likely disrupt the success the BUOC has enjoyed to 

date. Not only would this be a misguided decision, 

but it would run contrary to the safety interests of ordinary Californians, who must count on CalOES and 

its private sector partners during disasters. 
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

113

Conclusions

California’s partnerships help the state government 

and firms manage disasters. However, adaptability does not appear to play an important role in the 

state’s agreements. In addition, nonprofit organizations in the CalOES BUOC exert surprising influence 

within the state’s disaster partnerships. Two other 

aspects of CalOES’s partnerships are also noteworthy. CalOES relies on MOUs as the preferred organizational structure for its partnerships, and the state 

and its partners share information using a range of 

tools and methods.

California’s emergency-management agreements 

appear to work well. In disaster responses ranging 

from wildfires to earthquakes, CalOES has benefited 

tangibly from the knowledge, physical resources, and 

logistical capabilities of BUOC members. For their 

part, CalOES’s partners gain from their partnerships 

with the state through potential increases in sales, 

media exposure, and access to nonpublic information from CalOES. 

At the same time, CalOES’s corporate partnerships are striking for their lack of adaptability. Apart 

from the creation of the BUOC, which transformed 

a handful of short-term disaster response relationships into longer-term partnerships, there has been 

virtually no evolution in the state’s partnerships 

with firms since the creation of the BUOC itself. But 

this absence of evolution does not seem to matter. 

CalOES’s partnerships have routinely been used to 
CHAPTER TWO

114

respond successfully to disasters in California and 

outside the state. 

The influence of the American Red Cross and CRA 

on the BUOC suggests that the analytical framework 

could be enhanced through the addition of a ninth 

factor—the role of nonprofit organizations. The Red 

Cross and CRA depend on strong interorganizational 

relationships for their day-to-day operations. Both organizations carry these relationships into their work 

with CalOES, benefiting existing BUOC members and 

increasing the potential future value of BUOC membership for prospective members. 

The state’s emphasis on developing MOUs with 

its corporate partners is notable as well. MOUs primarily benefit CalOES—not firms—and offer little in 

the way of concrete commitments from businesses. 

CalOES uses the number of cosigned MOUs it has 

on file as a metric to gauge the success of its disaster partnership program. This practice can present a 

misleading picture of the strength of CalOES’s PPPs, 

but to the agency’s credit, CalOES recognizes that it 

needs to develop new ways to assess its collaborations. 

CalOES and its corporate partners share disaster 

response information and disaster preparedness information using multiple tools and methods, including proprietary databases. This information sharing 

may at times face obstacles, such as individual employees who hoard information. But when consid-
CALIFORNIA DREAMING?

115

ered in the aggregate, information-sharing practices 

in California’s partnerships appear to be robust.

California’s emergency-management agreements show remarkable success, despite the fact 

that they have not evolved significantly. This success 

is also attributable, at least in part, to the fact that the 

state has so far been able to forge agreements in the 

absence of federal government pressure or requirements. In the next chapter, we turn our attention to 

Florida, where in contrast to California, state-level, 

disaster-oriented PPPs have transformed repeatedly 

during the past decade.
116

Chapter Three

D I S A S T E R - O R I E N T E D P P P S 

IN FLORIDA

The Orlando, Florida, emergency dispatcher who took 

the 911 call at 0235 on 12 June 2016 was initially confused by what they heard. The caller spoke rapidly 

in Arabic: “Praise be to God, and prayers as well as 

peace be upon the prophet of God.” The caller then 

switched to English and delivered a chilling message 

to the emergency dispatcher: “I wanna let you know, 

I’m in Orlando and I did the shootings.” The caller next 

declared their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 

the leader of the terrorist organization Islamic State 

of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and informed the dispatcher 

that he was located in Orlando.1

 Then the line went 

dead. 

The entire call lasted only 50 seconds. Investigators later learned that the caller, Omar Mateen, 

had dialed 911 from inside an Orlando nightclub 

called Pulse, where he used a pistol and a high1

 Andrea Aprea, “Investigative Update Regarding Pulse Nightclub 

Shooting,” FBI, 20 June 2016.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

117

powered rifle to murder 49 people and injure 53 others.2

 At the time, Mateen’s was the deadliest mass 

shooting in modern American history.3

In the wake of the Pulse nightclub shooting, the 

Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) 

worked with an array of companies to provide services for survivors. JetBlue offered free flights.4 Airbnb, a home-sharing website, assisted survivors with 

lodging.5 Uber, a ridesharing service, provided ground 

transportation.6 The Walt Disney Company maintains a large presence in the Orlando area, and set 

up a children’s recreation area inside an improvised 

family assistance center.7 In addition, Disney donated $1 million to the OneOrlando Fund, which Orlando 

mayor John H. “Buddy” Dyer created to collect and 

disburse money for organizations involved in the response to the Pulse nightclub shooting.8

 Assistance 

2

 Tripp Mickle and Laura Stevens, “Federal Authorities Call Orlando Shooting Hate Crime, Act of Terrorism,” Wall Street Journal, 15 

June 2016.

3

 Mickle and Stevens, “Federal Authorities Call Orlando Shooting 

Hate Crime.”

4

 Lizette Alvarez and Nick Madigan, “In the Dead in Orlando, Puerto 

Ricans Hear a Roll Call of Their Kin,” New York Times, 14 June 2016. 5

 “Orlando Nightclub Response,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce 

Foundation, 23 August 2016.

6

 “Orlando Nightclub Response.”

7

 Larry Griffin, “To Find ‘New Normal’ after Pulse Attack, City and 

County Launch Family Assistance Center,” Orlando Rising, 23 June 

2016.

8

 Caitlin Dewey, “How GoFundMe Is Making Sure All of Those Orlando Victim Fundraisers Are Legit,” Washington Post, 14 June 

2016; and Kate Santich, Susan Jacobson, and Kyle Arnold, “Mayor 

Creates OneOrlando Fund; Disney Is Biggest Donor So Far with $1 

Million to Help Pulse Victims,” Orlando (FL) Sentinel, 14 June 2016.
CHAPTER THREE

118

came from the nonprofit community too. The American Red Cross does not usually service hospitals in 

the Orlando area, yet following the Pulse nightclub 

shooting, it delivered 30 units of blood to area hospitals for survivors of the attack, many of whom had 

suffered severe blood loss from bullet wounds.9 The 

Red Cross also opened a center staffed by mental 

health counselors to aid the loved ones of shooting 

victims.10 Throughout the tragic aftermath of the 

Pulse nightclub shooting, firms and nonprofit organizations rallied to aid survivors and support the Orlando community.

Today, the FDEM maintains a well-developed disaster partnership program. This program consists 

primarily of state agreements with industry organizations, such as Enterprise Florida, a business recruitment group; the Florida Restaurant and Lodging 

Association; and the Florida Chamber of Commerce.11

In addition, two nonprofit organizations that work directly and indirectly with the FDEM—the American 

Logistics Aid Network (ALAN) and Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD)—show the 

potential and promise of emergency-management 

agreements in Florida. 

9

 “Red Cross Issues Statement on Orlando Mass Shooting,” American Red Cross, 12 June 2016; and Denise Grady, “Orlando Injuries 

Were Severe, but Trauma Care Was Nearby,” New York Times, 14 

June 2016. 

10 “Caring for Each Other After the Orlando Shooting,” American 

Red Cross, 22 June 2016.

11 “Emergency Support Functions,” FDEM, accessed 2 January 

2020. 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

119

In this chapter, an analytical framework is used 

to explore disaster partnerships in Florida. This will 

show that these partnerships rely heavily on the 

roles of industry and nonprofit organizations. This 

reliance is so acute that the analytical framework 

should be amended to include the roles of these 

types of organizations to be useful for broader analyses of state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs. This chapter then argues that the federal government should 

leave Florida emergency-management officials to 

manage their agreements as they wish. The chapter 

concludes by making the case that it remains uncertain how Florida’s partnerships will fare during future 

large-scale emergencies. 

Crisis

The 2004–5 hurricane seasons saw eight storms directly impact Florida.12 These hurricanes sparked 

crises that led to long-term disaster partnerships in 

the state. Because power outages were widespread 

during the 2004–5 hurricane season, Publix, a large 

Florida-based grocery chain, spent millions of dollars 

during several years installing emergency electrical 

generators in their stores.13 The FDEM assisted Publix 

to obtain the permits required to install the generators.14 The FDEM likely provided this assistance be12 The hurricanes were Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne (2004); 

and Dennis, Katrina, Rita, and Wilma (2005). 

13 Chuck Hagan, email to the author, 26 June 2015, hereafter Hagan 

email.

14 Hagan email.
CHAPTER THREE

120

cause the agency’s leaders recognized that having 

grocery stores open after disasters would free FDEM 

from having to worry about delivering emergency food supplies directly to citizens. And instead of 

FDEM providing emergency rations to disaster survivors, survivors could instead purchase food directly 

from grocery stores themselves. This arrangement 

benefited Publix by increasing customer traffic and 

sales revenue; it also benefited FDEM by permitting 

the agency to focus on other disaster response priorities. Publix’s experience illustrates how one common 

type of disaster-caused crisis—power outages—can 

lead directly to partnerships for emergency management. 

Crises affecting the private sector during emergencies can also lead to new state laws. Many Florida 

gas stations lost electricity during the 2004 hurricane 

season, for instance.15 The loss of power at gas stations, coupled with increased demand for vehicle fuel 

after the storm, led to general shortages of vehicle 

fuel in Florida.16 The chief executive officer (CEO) of 

Tropical Shipping, an international maritime freight 

company based in Florida, recognized the longer-term 

business implications of gas shortages during such 

natural disasters after the 2004 hurricane season. The 

firm relies on rail and truck shipments of goods, both 

15 Florida State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes (Washington, DC: Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 

Reliability, U.S. Department of Energy, 2005), 8. 

16 Florida State’s Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes, 13.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

121

of which require a great deal of fuel.17 That realization 

prompted the CEO to hire an attorney to draft a state 

law requiring gas stations located along hurricane 

evacuation routes to have generators or generator 

hookups on site.18 The CEO points out that when gas 

stations can function during disasters, the chances 

of fuel shortages triggered by inoperative gas stations 

diminish. Backed by the FDEM, the CEO—as a private 

citizen—lobbied behind the scenes to introduce the 

law in Florida’s legislature.19 The legislation eventually 

passed the state legislature and was signed into law 

by Florida governor John E. “Jeb” Bush in 2007.20 In 

this case, the impact of gas shortages on a private 

business was addressed through privately initiated 

legislation, which later gained the political support of 

state officials. 

The need to address crises has led to formal 

public-private sector cooperation in Florida’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as well. The Florida 

EOC is organized into 18 distinct emergency support 

functions, or ESFs, to manage crises.21 Each ESF consists of a cluster of government employees respon17 Rick Murrell, interview with the author via telephone, 23 January 

2015, hereafter Murrell interview.

18 Chuck Hagan, interview with the author via telephone, 29 January 2015; and Murrell interview.

19 Murrell interview; and Jim Williams, interview with the author 

via telephone, 1 December 2014, hereafter Williams interview. See 

Florida Statute, “Alternate Generated Power Capacity for Motor 

Fuel Dispensing Facilities,” Title 32, § 526.143 (2007).

20 Murrell interview. 

21 “Emergency Support Functions.”
CHAPTER THREE

122

sible for managing specific types of disaster-caused 

crises, such as opening roads blocked by debris or 

restoring electricity to neighborhoods. One of these 

ESFs, called ESF-18, is dedicated to addressing the 

impacts of disasters within the business community, 

illustrating the extent to which the FDEM prioritizes 

its cooperation with the private sector.22 During disasters, representatives from industry organizations, 

such as the Florida Retail Association and Florida 

Banking Association, sit in ESF-18 alongside state 

officials.23 The physical proximity of these representatives helps them communicate quickly when disasters affect the state.24

Crises in Florida have also spurred cooperation among businesses in the state. For example, 

recognizing that employees who are worried about 

their families will not be able to work well, Tropical 

Shipping’s CEO instructs employees to bring their 

immediate family members with them to work after 

disasters.25 Through the firm’s partnerships with other businesses, such as Walmart and Publix, Tropical 

Shipping provides its employees and their families 

with food, water, fuel, and other supplies for free after 

disasters.26 Rick Murrell claims that this approach to 

crises yields benefits for Tropical Shipping. Within 24 

22 “Emergency Support Functions: ESF #18 Business, Industry and 

Economic Stabilization,” FDEM, accessed 2 January 2020. 

23 Hagan interview. 

24 Greg Blosé II, interview with the author via telephone, 5 February 

2015, hereafter Blosé II interview.

25 Murrell interview.

26 Murrell interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

123

hours after every disaster since 1989, he says, the firm 

and its employees have been fully functional again.27

Leadership

Public and private sector leaders in Florida have 

played important roles in the development of partnerships in the state. This leadership exists in at 

least three distinct tiers. The first tier is executivelevel public and private sector leadership, which 

gives government and business managers the 

organizational buy-in necessary to strengthen 

emergency-management capabilities, establish emergency-management collaborations, and grow them 

over time. The second tier is management-level public and private sector leadership. Mid-level managers 

in government and firms steer the day-to-day administration of the state’s partnerships. The third tier is 

multiorganizational leadership that is specific to the 

demands of particular disasters. All three varieties of 

leadership are indispensable in the state’s partnerships.

Strong public sector executive leadership creates an environment favorable for emergency-management accords in Florida. The state government’s 

executive branch is said to be business friendly, and 

this makes the creation of partnerships easier.28 The 

27 Murrell interview.

28 Larry McIntyre, interview with the author via telephone, 3 February 2015, hereafter McIntyre interview; and Bryan Koon, interview 

with the author via telephone, 9 February 2015, hereafter Koon interview.
CHAPTER THREE

124

immediate past head of FDEM was appointed by former governor Richard L. “Rick” Scott and came into 

government service after having worked in the private 

sector.29 These factors seem to have influenced the 

state’s current approach to disaster partnerships.30

Executive-tier leadership in the private sector 

helps create the organizational conditions necessary for these partnerships to take root. For example, corporate leaders of Walgreens, an international 

pharmacy chain and partner with FDEM, offer strong 

support for the firm’s emergency-management personnel, providing the firm’s managers with the buy-in 

necessary to launch and build emergency-management agreements.31

Private sector executives in Florida can help foster a broader organizational culture conducive to 

collaboration with the FDEM as well. Waffle House, 

a restaurant chain with which FDEM collaborates 

during disasters, sometimes sends top corporate 

executives into the field during large-scale emergencies to wash dishes, serve coffee, and clean toilets.32 Publix is said to have a similarly strong cultural 

commitment to disaster resilience, earning it praise 

from FDEM officials.33 Waffle House and Publix’s institutional dedication to disaster preparedness as part 

of their respective corporate cultures demonstrates 

29 McIntyre interview.

30 McIntyre interview.

31 Williams interview.

32 Hagan interview. 

33 Hagan interview. 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

125

that private sector executives’ support for disaster 

management can contribute to developing partnerships with the FDEM, since FDEM has worked closely 

with both firms, and FDEM personnel are impressed 

by their respective corporate disaster preparedness 

cultures.34

Beyond public and private sector executive leadership, mid-tier managers in Florida government and 

businesses also play key leadership roles by steering 

the day-to-day operations of the state’s partnerships. 

W. Craig Fugate, a former head of the FDEM who later ran FEMA, is cited often as having been a leading 

advocate for these public-private sector agreements 

during his tenure at the FDEM.35 Bryan Koon, Fugate’s 

successor, once led Walmart’s global emergencymanagement department, giving him key insights 

into the business world.36 A former senior emergency 

planner for Walgreens facilitated conference calls of 

more than 200 participants during disasters, underscoring the degree to which their work brought together representatives from FDEM, Walgreens, and 

other agencies and firms.37

An additional leadership-related consideration 

in Florida relates to the development of incidentspecific networks of responders. Since no two inci34 Hagan interview; and Koon interview.

35 Williams interview; Hagan interview; and Kathy Fulton, interview 

with the author via telephone, 5 February 2015, hereafter Fulton 

telephone interview.

36 McIntyre interview.

37 Williams interview.
CHAPTER THREE

126

dents are exactly alike, it follows that the groups and 

individuals responding to specific emergencies will 

differ. These emerging multiorganizational networks, 

or EMONs, vary in structure.38 Some may be flexible, 

while others may be governed by the dictates of contracts or standard operating procedures. But regardless of their form or structure, EMONs are shaped 

by the leaders of the respective organizations within 

them. And in the absence of effective EMON-level 

leadership, disparate groups and agencies are unlikely to work well with one another. 

Organizational Structure

The FDEM prefers its partnerships to be informally 

structured. The author has found no evidence that 

any of FDEM’s partnerships are structured in a formal way, such as via MOUs. On the contrary, FDEM 

officials and their private sector partners express a 

nearly uniform disdain for MOUs. Still, the FDEM’s 

public-private sector cooperation occurs primarily 

with FDEM’s ESF-18. Therefore, despite the stated 

preference for informality, FDEM’s partnerships are 

located within a formal organizational framework. 

The FDEM’s partners do not like MOUs.39 Their 

partners’ dislike for MOUs appears, in part, to be connected to the MOUs’ perceived weakness as tools to 

codify the existence of organizational relationships. 

38 Thomas E. Drabek, “Managing the Emergency Response,” Public Administration Review 45, Special Issue (January 1985): 86–90, 

https://doi.org/10.2307/3135002.

39 Williams interview. 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

127

MOUs are not legally binding, so they may actually 

be of little value in Florida’s partnerships.40 A representative from Walgreens, for instance, says that 

their firm is willing to assist other organizations when 

asked.41 ALAN, a nonprofit that connects businesses with charities in need after disasters, also prefers 

informal agreements with its partners, since the dynamic nature of disasters often requires partners to 

be flexible.42 All of this suggests that the rigidity of 

MOUs may not be compatible with the fluid nature of 

disaster responses, a theme to which the author will 

return to in chapter 6.

The FDEM also prefers to develop emergencymanagement agreements without the use of MOUs. 

Its former head was blunt, saying that MOUs are “a 

waste of time, lawyers, money, and paper.”43 Instead 

of using MOUs in FDEM’s partnerships, the real value 

of these collaborations is located in the strength of 

the relationships between the organizational representatives who are working with one another.44

A former researcher with Florida State University’s (FSU) Center for Disaster Risk Policy recounts 

a story that similarly illustrates the FDEM’s preference for informally structured partnerships. While 

working for FSU, a public university, the researcher 

40 Williams interview.

41 Williams interview.

42 Kathy Fulton, email to the author, 1 February 2015, hereafter Fulton email interview; and Fulton telephone interview. 

43 Koon interview. 

44 Koon interview.
CHAPTER THREE

128

built an internet-based information sharing application for FDEM at the organization’s request.45 Had 

the project to develop the application gone through 

FDEM’s formal procurement process, it may have run 

into bureaucratic obstacles, slowing the project.46

The researcher believes that they avoided these potential headaches associated with FDEM’s procurement process by approaching the development of 

the platform as a research project for FSU and doing 

the work for free.47 The benefit to FDEM in this case 

is that it obtained a valuable information-sharing tool 

built by the researcher at essentially zero cost. And 

the researcher benefited from the value of the project, because it gave him keen insights into the information-sharing needs of the FDEM. 

While FDEM officials say that they prefer informally structured partnerships, the agency nonetheless 

manages its partners within a defined organizational 

unit—ESF-18.48 There is not a formal agreement between ESF-18 members and FDEM. Instead, the state 

views the fluid, informal nature of ESF-18 members’ 

associations with the FDEM as an asset, because 

some ESF-18 members may be needed in certain 

types of disasters, but not in others.49

The tension between formal and informal part45 Tom Duffy, interview with the author via telephone, 2 February 

2015, hereafter Duffy interview.

46 Duffy interview.

47 Duffy interview.

48 “Emergency Support Functions: ESF #18.”

49 McIntyre interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

129

nership agreements exemplified by FDEM’s approach 

to its partnerships points toward a larger issue worth 

mentioning: the need to balance structure and flexibility in disaster responses. The FDEM may not be 

fond of MOUs, but MOUs can serve important functions. They help to set mutual expectations. They 

provide a common reference point that confirms the 

existence of an interorganizational relationship. And 

they help instill accountability among the stakeholders in the partnership. Accountability, in turn, can 

lead to better emergency management and help reduce potential waste and fraud.50 Another key way in 

which FDEM and its partners engage with one another is via information sharing.

The Importance of Information Sharing

Florida and its partners exchange information in a 

variety of ways. Conferences provide a forum for the 

FDEM and private sector representatives to step 

away from their day-to-day responsibilities and learn 

from one another. Disaster exercises offer the FDEM 

and its partners another way to share information 

about their hypothetical responses to large-scale 

emergencies. During actual disasters, private sector 

representatives and FDEM officials share business 

opening and closing information as well as status 

updates. Having access to this type of information 

50 B. E. Aguirre and David Lane, “Fraud in Disaster: Rethinking the 

Phases,” International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, no. 39 

(October 2019): 3, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2019.101232. 
CHAPTER THREE

130

during disasters can help FDEM and firms make better tactical decisions, because it provides them with 

a fuller picture of what is happening during disasters. 

Businesses and FDEM are increasingly likely to use 

web-based applications for information-sharing purposes, because electronic information sharing tools 

offer advantages in terms of speed, ease of access, 

and cost. The rise of electronic information sharing 

also presents data integration challenges for the 

FDEM and its partners.

One way FDEM and its partners have exchanged 

information is through two annual conferences: Florida’s Annual Governor’s Hurricane Conference and 

the FDEM’s Public-Private Partnership Summit. While 

the former conference continues to be put on each 

year, the latter has been consolidated into a broader, southeastern region conference that is facilitated 

by DHS. Both events attract representatives from 

the business and government sectors in Florida that 

are interested in learning more about how to manage disasters.51 For example, the 2014 Public-Private 

Partnership Summit featured a seminar about how 

private sector officials can work with government 

representatives to access their own damaged business facilities during disasters, a process emergency 

managers call reentry.52 Representatives from Waffle 

51 “Governor’s Hurricane Conference,” accessed 2 January 2020; 

and “Southeast Private-Public Partner Summit,” FEMA, 29 April 

2019.

52 Duffy interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

131

House and Publix attended this seminar on reentry 

at the 2014 summit, along with key FDEM officials, 

illustrating the degree of public and private sector interest in learning more about the topic.53 But beyond 

simply providing information to participants, conference attendees can benefit in other ways as well. For 

instance, corporate executives who attend the conferences may learn more about emergency management in general, a subject with which they may not 

be familiar.54

Disaster response exercises and real-world disaster responses offer business and government representatives a chance to share crucial information 

with one another. Exercise participants from Florida 

state agencies report that these exercises are highly realistic and the learning that takes places in the 

exercises is valuable.55 And when actual disasters 

impact Florida, firms and FDEM share a range of disaster-specific information. For example, the FDEM 

views businesses as a “service delivery partner,” so 

it uses a stoplight color code system—green, yellow, 

and red—to indicate store opening and closing information. Businesses that are coded green are open 

and functioning normally. Those that are yellow are 

open but operating at limited capacity. Firms that 

are coded red are closed. This simple coding system 

53 Duffy interview.

54 Murrell interview.

55 McIntyre interview; and Koon interview.
CHAPTER THREE

132

helps the agency determine where to locate FDEM’s 

distribution points for supplies, with the goal of targeting areas where retailers are not open.56

The FDEM and businesses also share status updates with one another during disasters. For example, FDEM gives firms information on curfews, road 

closures, and supply chain disruptions during largescale emergencies, and all of this data can help firms 

make better decisions.57 ALAN pulls information continually from electronic data feeds from its government and business partners, all in an effort to help 

businesses operate more efficiently during disaster 

conditions.58 The Florida Chamber of Commerce 

is similar. Its representative in ESF-18 will call local 

chambers of commerce throughout the state to let 

them know about the state’s information needs in advance.59 This kind of proactive information exchange 

helps the Florida of Chamber of Commerce act as a 

conduit for data passing between local chambers of 

commerce and FDEM.

To exchange information during disasters, firms 

and FDEM increasingly rely on proprietary web-based 

information sharing platforms rather than email. Integrating data from multiple information platforms, 

however, can prove difficult. For example, FDEM’s Virtual Business Emergency Operations Center (VBEOC),

an online information sharing platform, is intended 

56 Hagan interview. 

57 Koon interview.

58 Fulton telephone interview. 

59 Blosé II interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

133

for smaller firms with 7–10 employees.60 Larger firms 

such as Walgreens or Walmart have their own systems, so synchronizing the data from the large and 

small firms’ systems, and determining what data to 

display to some versus all the users of the system, 

can be onerous.61 This suggests that FDEM and its 

partners will have to work carefully through the process of integrating their information-sharing systems 

to synchronize their work with both large and small 

firms. 

The FDEM and its private sector partners share 

information via professional conferences and disaster 

response exercises. When disasters happen, they exchange business opening and closing information 

and status updates. While web-based informationsharing systems appear to hold promise as a tool for 

FDEM and its partners, integrating data from multiple 

systems and displaying it correctly to system users 

can be problematic. But despite these issues, access 

to state and private sector information is one of a 

host of benefits enjoyed by FDEM and other ESF-18 

members.

Mutual Benefits

The FDEM uses its partnerships to access private 

sector supplies in times of emergency. This can 

lead to increased organizational efficiency for the 

FDEM, because it means that FDEM does not need 

60 Duffy interview.

61 Duffy interview.
CHAPTER THREE

134

to hold these supplies in storage; instead, it can rely 

on a firm’s own product inventories, which ultimately saves the FDEM money. In addition, private sector 

partners benefit from exchanging data with both the 

FDEM and with one another. By cooperating in times 

of disaster, firms benefit from faster business restoration times, which can lead to increased sales and 

stronger brand loyalties from customers.

During his tenure as director of the FDEM, W. 

Craig Fugate understood that firms could provide repair supplies and medications for disaster survivors, 

which the state would not be able to deliver on its 

own.62 By partnering with firms, Fugate enhanced 

FDEM’s abilities to respond to disasters, since the 

organization was able to rely on firms for access to 

supplies that the state did not have in stock. 

Today, FDEM could choose not to partner with 

the private sector, but doing so would almost certainly increase operating costs for the organization, 

and disaster survivors would probably not be satisfied with the quality of goods and services that they 

would receive from state officials.63 “We will never 

be as good as the private sector; we can never give 

you a hotel room or a meal as well as the private sector does,” says one former director of FDEM.64 The 

FDEM increases its own effectiveness by turning to 

businesses for higher quality goods and services, be62 Williams interview.

63 Koon interview.

64 Koon interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

135

cause officials realize that they are unable to supply 

certain goods and services with the same efficiency 

that the private sector delivers.

Access to information also proves valuable for 

FDEM and its partners. For example, knowing where 

stores are open in a given area after a disaster helps 

FDEM, because it provides the agency with data that it 

can use to develop its own supply distribution plans.65

The FDEM also benefits from disaster-specific information that it receives from businesses. For example, 

when businesses give FDEM information on local 

flooding, this can help the agency develop a more 

complete picture of how disasters have impacted 

particular areas of the state. Not only does this type 

of disaster-specific information help FDEM develop 

greater awareness of how disasters affect the state, 

but it also can shrink the agency’s labor costs, since 

it means that fewer personnel will be out in the field 

assessing damage. FDEM information about road 

and school closures during disasters can help firms 

make more well-informed decisions during disasters 

too.66 When schools close due to disasters, for instance, this can generate childcare issues for firms’ 

employees, leading to increased employee absentee65 Hagan interview.

66 Koon interview.
CHAPTER THREE

136

ism.67 Knowing about school closures in advance can 

therefore be especially useful in contingency planning, for it offers firms a way to assess how school 

closings might affect their workforce absentee rates, 

permitting them to make staffing adjustments.

State and business representatives agree that 

partnering together can help businesses return to 

normal operations faster. Florida officials believe 

that firms’ partnerships with the state can make the 

difference between firms reopening or closing permanently after disasters.68 Disaster partnerships, 

in this respect, can help businesses reopen quickly 

after disasters, because they give firms access to 

state information and resources that they would not 

have otherwise.69 Florida firms agree that working 

with FDEM permits them to return to normal operations as soon as possible after disasters, which can 

strengthen Florida communities’ resilience.70

There is some evidence that working with FDEM 

and resuming business operations quickly after a 

disaster can result in longer-term financial benefits 

for businesses as well. For example, Publix saw great 

67 For example, one study estimates that about 16 percent of the 

United Kingdom’s workforce would be absent from their jobs because of school closures to prevent a flu pandemic. See Md Z. 

Sadique, Elisabeth J. Adams, and William J. Edmunds, “Estimating 

the Costs of School Closure for Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic,” BMC Public Health 8, no. 135 (December 2008): 137, https://doi

.org/10.1186/1471-2458-8-135. 

68 Koon interview; and McIntyre interview. 

69 McIntyre interview. 

70 Blosé II interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

137

financial benefits as a result of working with FDEM 

to install emergency electrical generators in many of 

their stores. The generators initially cost Publix several hundred million dollars, but as a result of the installation of the generators, Publix will minimize (if not 

eliminate) losses on foods that would otherwise spoil 

during power outages. In addition, the generators will 

likely lead to increased revenue because stores will 

be able to reopen more rapidly after disasters. The 

ability of stores to open quickly with fresh goods to 

sell will probably help build long-term brand loyalty 

among customers, who have already seen that Publix 

is a disaster-resilient business.71

Florida firms and FDEM benefit from working 

with one another for emergency-management purposes. The agency gains access to important private 

sector emergency supplies and services through its 

partnerships. Businesses in Florida and FDEM share 

information with one another, which helps them both 

make better-informed decisions during disasters. 

There is also evidence that emergency-management 

partnerships help businesses in disaster-affected 

areas of Florida return to normal operations faster. 

This can result in long-term benefits for Florida firms, 

including increased revenue and customer loyalty. 

Trust proves essential in launching and growing Florida’s disaster partnerships.

71 Hagan interview. 
CHAPTER THREE

138

Building Trusting Relationships

The FDEM’s emergency-management agreements 

are underpinned by trusting relationships between 

the agency and business officials. While business 

representatives and Florida officials do not agree 

about how the trust between FDEM and its partners 

forms, trust nonetheless seems to be the key factor that permits the organization and its partners to 

rely on one another during disaster responses, even 

if they have not been in close contact prior to the 

event. However, unlike the other states examined in 

this book, trust does not appear to be as explicitly 

significant as other factors in the analytical framework, such as leadership or information sharing. 

There is no consensus among FDEM officials and 

Florida business representatives about how to build 

mutual trust. Meetings between public and private 

sector officials during nonemergency circumstances appear to be a valuable first step to build trusting cross-sector relationships.72 Close personal ties 

between individual organizational representatives 

also seem to have a positive influence upon the 

trust-building process.73 Nonetheless, simply knowing one another well does not automatically mean 

that either Florida business or FDEM representatives will trust one another. Time is also necessary 

to slowly build up these trusting relationships.74 An 

72 Murrell interview.

73 Hagan interview. 

74 Fulton email interview; and McIntyre interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

139

additional factor essential to trust building is mutual observation of how well public and private sector 

representatives perform during disaster responses 

and exercises.75 Getting together under nonemergency circumstances, building strong relationships 

over time, and repeatedly meeting or exceeding 

performance expectations seem essential to build 

emergency-management accords in Florida.

Trust is central to FDEM and its partners’ reliance 

on one another. For example, trust is indispensable in 

Walgreens’ partnership with FDEM because the firm 

partners with all 50 state governments, and actively managing the partnerships with all of these state 

agencies can be logistically difficult. Trust also means 

that public sector partners know that Walgreens will 

be willing to assist them during disasters—and conversely, trust is connected with the belief that government agencies will assist Walgreens when they 

are called on for support.76

Although trust plays a role in FDEM’s partnerships, it did not stand out in an explicit way in the 

author’s conversations with Florida government and 

business officials as an especially significant factor in 

FDEM’s disaster collaborations. At the same time, it 

is obvious that trust influences how much FDEM and 

its partners feel that they can rely on one another. 

Regardless of how trust forms between Florida firms 

75 McIntyre interview.

76 Williams interview.
CHAPTER THREE

140

and FDEM, their partnerships must remain flexible to 

endure in the long run.

Adaptability and Sustainability

Florida’s partnerships show evidence of adaptability 

in at least two key ways. First, the agency’s work with 

large industry organizations is now expanding to include smaller firms via the VBEOC. Second, ESF-18 

shows adaptability as an organization, for its members are able to shift comfortably into leadership 

positions, even in the absence of a formal leader. To 

maintain these agreements into the future, state and 

private officials emphasize steady growth and informal communications. They also participate jointly in 

disaster-response exercises along with professional 

mentoring and outreach programs.

The FDEM’s work with large industry organizations is expanding to include smaller firms that may 

not be represented in these industry organizations. 

ESF-18 remains a physical place within FDEM’s EOC, 

but the ESF-18 concept is being adapted to meet 

changing needs with the creation of the VBEOC.77

FDEM officials recognize that it is impossible for all 

ESF-18 members to share information with many 

Florida businesses at once, so FDEM’s VBEOC holds 

promise as a way to get small- and medium-size 

businesses to share information electronically with 

the agency in much the same way that ESF-18 

77 Hagan interview. 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

141

members share information with FDEM face-toface.78

ESF-18 members also show evidence of adaptability. For example, ESF-18 members are familiar 

with one another’s disaster response capabilities by 

virtue of having worked together. Even if ESF-18’s formal leader is absent during disasters, other members 

are able to assume leadership responsibilities for the 

group.79 Having ESF-18 personnel that are able to shift 

into different leadership and supporting roles shows 

that FDEM’s partnerships are flexible.

The FDEM views the development of emergencymanagement agreements as a long-term, strategic 

process.80 Disasters serve as reminders of the need 

to prepare for emergencies, but in their absence, 

business owners are likely to focus on other threats 

to their firms, such as rival businesses or regulatory issues.81 Some of FDEM’s partnerships may not 

be needed during certain types of disasters.82 This 

means that years may pass between the disasters 

during which FDEM and a subset of its partners work 

together.83 To be sure, disasters have a way of concentrating the attention of government policy makers 

and business owners on emergency-management 

78 Duffy interview.

79 McIntyre interview.

80 McIntyre interview.

81 McIntyre interview.

82 Fulton telephone interview; and McIntyre interview.

83 Fulton telephone interview; and McIntyre interview. 
CHAPTER THREE

142

related matters.84 But in the absence of disasters, this 

focus can potentially wane. 

Florida businesses and FDEM officials take deliberate steps to sustain their partnerships in the absence of disasters. One way they do this is through 

informal communications with their respective partners. It is important to note that this activity is not 

quite the same thing as information sharing. Rather, 

it is simply touching base to maintain these partnerships. For instance, one FDEM official calls contractors at least monthly to reconnect with them. This 

practice helps keep relationships with the FDEM’s 

contractors fresh.85

The executive director of ALAN will sometimes 

call the organization’s partners in advance of severe 

weather events that may impact them. These actions 

are not tied to a deliberate communication strategy for ALAN; instead, they are ad hoc and reflect a 

concern for the welfare of ALAN’s partners, on whom 

ALAN relies for physical aid. Not only does this informal practice help ALAN maintain official communications with its partner organizations, but it also 

assists the executive director and their counterparts 

in strengthening professional relationships.86 These 

actions show that the long-term sustainability of 

84 For example, see Thomas A. Birkland, “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting,” Journal of Public Policy 18, no. 1 (January–

April 1998): 55, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X98000038.

85 Hagan interview.

86 Fulton telephone interview. 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

143

these partnerships is a priority for both the state and 

its partners.

Florida businesses and FDEM also rely on disaster-response exercises to sustain their professional 

relationships and disaster response skills.87 FDEM officials take disaster-response exercises seriously and 

try to make them as realistic as possible.88 Still, even 

well-designed exercises cannot replicate the exact 

conditions of true disasters.89

A third way that Florida sustains agreements is 

through professional mentoring. The FDEM runs a 

mentorship program in which the agency invites firms 

to send representatives to ESF-18 to familiarize them 

with the agency’s structure and functions during disasters.90 FDEM mentees participate in ESF-18 during 

the program, learning from the organization’s officials 

and other private sector representatives who are already ESF-18 members. 

The FDEM’s mentorship program complements 

a fourth agency initiative to ensure the longer-term 

sustainability of the state’s partnerships: outreach 

to other businesses and governments. The agency’s 

mentorship program helps develop relationships 

with other firms that may not already be ESF-18 members. For example, Bank of America is identified as 

one of FDEM’s biggest advocates in encouraging other businesses to work with government emergency 

87 Koon interview.

88 Koon interview; and McIntyre interview. 

89 Duffy interview; and Koon interview.

90 McIntyre interview.
CHAPTER THREE

144

managers, due in part to its participation in ESF-18’s 

mentorship program.91 Having FDEM’s private sector 

mentees market the virtues of collaboration in this 

way could make it easier for the agency to maintain 

partnerships with firms. The reason for this is that the 

FDEM’s mentees are in an excellent position to assess the value of partnering with them from a private 

sector perspective—a perspective that would likely 

resonate with other firms as well.

It is also apparent that FDEM wants to build support for partnerships at the local level of government 

throughout the state, because this can strengthen 

local governments’ disaster resilience without direct 

agency assistance. The FDEM’s role is to support 

local government emergency-management capabilities.92 Encouraging local-level agreements is important, because doing so may build local governments’ 

disaster-response capacity.

Florida’s partnerships appear to be adaptable to 

changing needs and circumstances. Florida firms 

and FDEM communicate informally and participate 

jointly in disaster-response exercises to help sustain their partnerships. The organization also uses 

professional mentorship and outreach initiatives 

to engage with business representatives, grow the 

number of agency partnerships with firms, and expand these agreements to local governments. The 

FDEM’s partnerships with industry groups and non91 McIntyre interview.

92 McIntyre interview.
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

145

profit groups suggest that the agency’s outreach efforts are working.

Industry and Nonprofit Organizations

Two key traits of Florida’s partnerships stand out in 

this chapter. The FDEM’s deliberate strategy of partnering with industry organizations, rather than individual firms, is unique among the states explored by 

Disaster Labs. In addition, the existence of organizations designed to facilitate private-private partnerships for emergency management is also an unusual 

and interesting attribute of the state’s partnerships. 

The FDEM seems to have deliberately chosen 

a strategy of partnering with industry organizations 

to develop its emergency management agreements. 

One likely explanation for this is that industry organizations provide a means for FDEM to reach many 

businesses at once. An agency official notes that the 

Florida Retail Federation (FRF), one of the FDEM’s industry partners, “has members from major corporations to little mom-and-pops.”93 He adds that the FRF, 

one of several associations that have a representative in the state EOC during activations, provides 

an efficient means to distribute information to state 

businesses under ESF-18.94 These comments suggest 

that convenience, efficiency, and speed may be the 

primary motivations that underpin the FDEM’s partnerships with industry organizations.

93 Hagan email.

94 Hagan email.
CHAPTER THREE

146

Other evidence indicates that the idea of private-private partnerships for emergency management is gaining wider traction in Florida. While ALAN 

and VOAD carry nonprofit status, they both rely heavily on businesses for members, supplies, and financial support.95 These nonprofits in Florida exemplify 

broader business community interest in emergency 

management.96

ALAN and VOAD may represent the future of 

Florida’s partnerships. These groups are, in effect, hybrid partnerships, because they combine elements 

of public-private partnerships with private-private 

partnerships and public-nonprofit partnerships. The 

organizational model of these groups is roughly as 

follows: businesses first bind themselves within a 

nonprofit organization dedicated to emergency management and that nonprofit organization itself—not 

its individual business members—then partners with 

FDEM. 

For business officials, there are at least two advantages to this hybrid partnership model. First, this 

arrangement places firms in close organizational 

proximity to other individual businesses—that is, 

other members of the nonprofit group—who can 

assist them directly during disasters. This means 

that individual firms may receive assistance faster from other businesses than if they had to funnel 

95 “Who We Are,” National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, accessed 22 June 2015; and “About ALAN,” American Logistics 

Aid Network, accessed 22 June 2015.

96 Fulton interview. 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

147

their requests for assistance through government 

agencies. The nonprofit organizational structure of the hybrid partnership model offers firms 

a second advantage as well—it permits profitseeking businesses to organize themselves formally 

for emergency-management purposes while simultaneously shielding them from certain state tax obligations, since U.S. nonprofit organizations are generally 

tax-exempt.97

This hybrid partnership model stands in contrast to FDEM’s current model for emergencymanagement accords. Florida’s current model offers 

fewer direct advantages to individual businesses 

than the hybrid model of partnership exemplified 

by groups such as ALAN and VOAD. Under the current partnership model, industry organization representatives—whose daily work centers primarily on 

nonemergency management related matters—sit 

alongside one another in ESF-18. 

However, this arrangement may actually increase 

the time required for individual businesses to receive 

disaster assistance from the state. The reason for this 

is that the individual businesses must direct their requests for disaster assistance through industry organizations in ESF-18, rather than going directly to other 

firms. Moreover, organizing disaster assistance for 

firms under the current model does not offer firms tax 

97 “What Benefit Does Being 501(c)(3) Offer My Nonprofit and Its 

Contributors?,” Foundation Group, accessed 22 June 2015. 
CHAPTER THREE

148

benefits. The hybrid model, on the other hand, offers 

direct tax benefits for businesses and may be more 

appealing to firms as a result. For these reasons, the 

hybrid partnership model exemplified by VOAD and 

ALAN holds promise as a potential new way for Florida to structure its partnerships.

Florida’s Disaster-Oriented PPPs: 

A State-Managed Solution

The organizational partnerships that we have examined in Florida stand out in multiple ways. They are 

efficient in that they leverage nonprofit and industry 

organizations to link FDEM and many firms at once. 

These partnerships are also nuanced, in the sense 

that the exceptional dedication of business leaders 

and government executives helps shape a broader 

policy environment that is conducive to public-private 

sector cooperation. The FDEM’s partnerships are 

used to serve a variety of emergency-management 

objectives, including obtaining and delivering physical aid (e.g., ALAN) and feeding Floridians (e.g., Publix) during disasters. 

As we have already observed in several states, 

Florida’s partnerships are created and managed 

without federal government direction. In fact, some 

emergency-management leaders in the state, such 

as one former head of FDEM, appear eager to involve 

more private sector entities than public sector entities in emergency-management activities. They do 

this because of a sober recognition that the private 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

149

sector is able to provide certain goods and services 

better than government agencies can. For these 

reasons, it is difficult to see how greater federal government involvement or guidance could improve 

Florida’s emergency-management agreements. Not 

only would this federal involvement potentially disrupt the state’s existing partnerships, but it may even 

be resisted actively by Florida state government officials. In light of these possibilities, direct federal 

government involvement in the state’s emergencymanagement partnerships is not advisable.

Conclusions

Florida’s disaster-oriented PPPs are organized informally and primarily place representatives of industry 

organizations like the Florida Restaurant and Lodging 

Association in ESF-18. Both of these characteristics 

are noteworthy. The informal organizational structure 

of the state’s partnerships means that FDEM’s partnerships are flexible in a way that may not be possible 

under the terms of a formal MOU, for instance. The 

FDEM’s preference for informal partnerships is driven 

both by its leadership as well as the agency’s private 

sector partners. The author found no evidence that 

this preference for informally structured partnerships 

has had any negative effects on the state’s collaboration with firms, though it is nonetheless possible 

that such evidence exists. The FDEM also prefers 

partnerships with industry groups, rather than individual businesses. This arrangement is beneficial for 
CHAPTER THREE

150

FDEM because it permits the agency to reach and interact with a large number of firms at once, without 

the administrative burdens that would come from 

developing individual relationships with thousands 

of businesses. Hybrid groups such as ALAN and 

VOAD that allow private sector businesses to operate together under nonprofit, tax-exempt status for 

disaster relief may represent the future of Florida’s 

partnerships. 

Trust plays a subtle—yet vital—role in Florida’s 

emergency-management agreements. FDEM representatives and business officials agree that trust is 

important for their partnerships with one another. 

Private sector and FDEM representatives say that 

trust helps individuals in these partnerships work 

smoothly with one another, even if they have not 

been in contact for extended periods of time. Still, 

there is no consensus among state officials and business representatives on precisely how trust forms 

within their partnerships. 

Irrespective of how trust is built within the state’s 

partnerships, it is hard to see how federal government involvement in Florida’s public-private partnerships for emergency management could improve 

matters. For whatever weaknesses may exist within 

the state’s current partnership environment, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates persuasively that FDEM is able to create and manage 

these partnerships on its own. Even as Florida continues to develop new ways to coordinate the efforts 
DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS IN FLORIDA

151

of government and private sector actors in disasters, 

the next chapter will show that a comparably populous state—New York—boasts a diversity of disasteroriented PPPs.
152

Chapter Four

THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

Some media outlets called it “Snowzilla.”1 Others 

chose the more benign-sounding “Winter Storm Jonas.”2

 In January 2016, large portions of the U.S. East 

Coast were hit by a winter nor’easter, an enormous 

counterclockwise rotation of powerful coastal winds 

and precipitation.3 More than two feet of snow fell 

in Manhattan, and government officials in New York 

City struggled to respond to the effects of the storm.4

New York City mayor Bill de Blasio imposed a temporary travel ban to keep vehicles off city streets.5

 New 

York City’s public transportation infrastructure, which 

1

 James Samenow, “Snowzilla Makes History from Northern Virginia to New York,” Washington Post, 24 January 2016. 2

 “Winter Storm Aftermath: Live Updates,” New York Times, 24 January 2016.

3

 Jeff Halverson, “The Nuts and Bolts Meteorology of an Epic Snowstorm in Washington, D.C.,” Washington Post, 24 January 2016. 4

 Jason Barron and Rick Rojas, “Major Cities Grind to a Halt and 

Face Days of Digging Out Snow,” New York Times, 23 January 2016. 5

 “Winter Storm Aftermath.”
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

153

moves millions of people each day, was shut down.6

Thousands of passengers at LaGuardia Airport in 

Queens were stranded due to canceled flights.7 Many 

city garbage trucks were repurposed to plow snow, 

causing city residents’ trash to pile up on sidewalks 

more than usual.8

Yet, amid the disruptions that Snowzilla caused 

in New York City, local government officials assisted 

area businesses in a remarkable way. Mayor Bill de 

Blasio activated the Corporate Emergency Access 

System (CEAS), a special badge permit that authorizes certain business owners to travel on city streets, 

even during emergency travel bans, to reach their 

business facilities.9

 The thinking behind CEAS is 

straightforward. Firms sell goods and services to people, and the ability to sell goods and services to residents who need them is indispensable for disaster 

recovery. Therefore, restricting business owners’ abilities to reach their firms during disasters makes little 

sense. Not only does this inconvenience residents, 

but it also exacerbates the challenges faced by local 

governments during disasters, which must simultaneously manage the physical effects of disasters and 

ensure that area residents have access to adequate 

6

 Chas Danner, “New York Nears Record Snowfall After Blizzard 

Pummels City, East Coast,” New York, 24 January 2016. 7

 Mark Berman, “More than 10,000 Flights Canceled as Storm 

Shuts Down Subways, Buses and Roads,” Washington Post, 23 

January 2016.

8

 “Winter Storm Aftermath.”

9

 “New York City Activates CEAS for Winter Storm Jonas,” press release, Corporate Emergency Access System, 23 January 2015.
CHAPTER FOUR

154

food, clothing, and shelter. The CEAS offers an innovative solution to this problem by balancing the city 

government’s responsibilities to manage the physical effects of disasters and ensure the safety of New 

Yorkers. The CEAS is the brainchild of the New York 

City Office of Emergency Management’s (NYCOEM) 

public-private partnership initiative and exemplifies 

the type of positive outcomes that disaster partnerships can generate.10

The New York State government’s response to 

Hurricane Sandy in late 2012 shared many similarities with the New York City government’s response 

to Snowzilla in 2016. More than 200,000 personnel 

from 23 state agencies participated in response and 

recovery efforts after Hurricane Sandy.11 The governor’s office worked with oil and gas company Hess 

to ensure that following the storm its stores could 

receive adequate supplies of fuel.12 Garner Environmental Services, a Texas firm that responds to disasters, rushed supplies such as outdoor lighting to 

areas of the city affected by power outages.13 There 

was widespread cooperation between state agencies 

10 The NYCOEM rebranded itself as NYC Emergency Management 

in 2015. The interviews and research in this chapter were completed prior to the rebranding.

11 New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission 2012 Annual 

Report (Albany: Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Services, Office of Emergency Management, New York State, 2013), 10. 

12 Anonymous official, interview with the author via telephone, 6 

October 2014, hereafter anonymous official interview.

13 Kenny Hayes, interview with the author via telephone, 7 October 

2014, hereafter Hayes interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

155

and firms to help New Yorkers begin to recover from 

Hurricane Sandy.

New York City and New York State’s approaches 

to disasters, and their use of partnerships in these 

two incidents, may at first glance seem similar. But 

surface appearances mask a more complex reality. There is no organized effort to forge emergencymanagement agreements at the state level.14 Instead, 

the state government partners with the private sector during disasters on a largely ad hoc or contractual 

basis.15 By contrast, there is a longstanding New York 

City-level commitment to establishing and growing 

disaster partnerships.16

Further complicating matters, New York City 

strongly influences the state government, making 

it difficult to assess New York State’s partnerships 

without also examining New York City. Approximately 8.4 million people live in New York City, representing about 43 percent of the state’s total population.17

New York City residents pay about 45 percent of all 

14 Bill Davis, Nora Porter, and Bill Dugan, interviews with the author, 

New York State Office of Emergency Management, Albany, NY, 18 

September 2014, hereafter Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

15 Anonymous official interview.

16 “Big City Partnership—New York City Office of Emergency Management,” FEMA, accessed 15 June 2015; Ira Tannenbaum, interview with the author via telephone, 21 October 2014, hereafter 

Tannenbaum interview; anonymous official interview; and Hayes 

interview.

17 “Quick Facts: New York City, New York,” U.S. Census Bureau, 19 

November 2019. 
CHAPTER FOUR

156

state-level personal income tax.18 New York City residents also receive around 40 percent of state tax 

distributions.19 Given the significant percentage of 

the New York State population that lives in New York 

City and the influence of New York City residents on 

state-level tax revenues and distributions, disentangling the city from the rest of the state for state-level 

policy analyses is difficult. Moreover, the New York 

City government is known for being progressive in its 

approach to public safety generally, and this progressive approach is also true of the city government’s 

use of disaster partnerships in particular.20 For these 

reasons, analyses of both New York State and New 

York City’s approaches to emergency management 

are necessary to understand fully the statewide approach to disaster-oriented PPPs.

This chapter describes the institutional differences in New York State and New York City’s approaches 

to disaster partnerships. It then assesses New York 

State and New York City’s emergency-management 

agreements using the analytical framework. This 

analysis shows that New York State and New York 

City’s uses of disaster partnerships diverge in many 

18 “Giving and Getting: Regional Distribution of Revenue and 

Spending in the New York State Budget, Fiscal Year 2009–10,” New 

York State Brief, December 2011, 5, table 1a. 19 “Giving and Getting,” 5, table 1a.

20 Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, “Broken Windows: New 

Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment,” 

University of Chicago Law Review 73, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 271–320; 

and “Big City Partnership.” 
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

157

ways. The chapter then makes the case that nonprofit and industry associations play an understated yet 

vital role in New York State and New York City’s partnerships. The chapter concludes by arguing that New 

York State and New York City’s disaster response collaborations are well-positioned to endure over the 

long run—provided that they continue to function 

without direct federal involvement.

New York’s Differing Approaches 

to Disaster-Oriented PPPs

Putting aside significant geographic and demographic differences, New York State and New York City’s 

approaches to partnering diverge for at least two 

key institutional reasons. The first key reason is financial. State officials say that the state’s emergencymanagement budget, and the budgets of its corporate 

partners, have been constrained for years. As a result, 

the state’s ability to grow its partnerships is limited. 

Matters are different in New York City, where government leaders openly acknowledge that the NYCOEM 

is generously funded. Differing funding levels have 

meant that the NYCOEM is better able to establish 

and expand disaster partnerships than the New York 

State Office of Emergency Management (NYSOEM). 

Staffing is the second main difference between the 

approaches of New York State and New York City. 

While New York City has a full-time employee working solely on these partnerships, the state does not.

Budget cuts have stymied the NYSOEM’s ability 
CHAPTER FOUR

158

to establish and expand disaster partnerships. The 

2008 recession led to an agency hiring freeze.21 Experienced NYSOEM managers were given financial 

incentives to retire early to cut agency costs. This 

led to a loss of both institutional memory and retiring 

officials’ business contacts. These personnel losses hampered continuity in the agency’s work with 

firms.22

A further challenge to the state’s ability to build 

these agreements is the need for post-disaster funding. The two primary sources of federal post-disaster 

funding for the NYSOEM are the U.S. Small Business 

Administration and FEMA. When FEMA funding flows 

to the NYSOEM after disasters, the agency finds it 

easier to work with businesses to buy the resources that it needs. However, during smaller-scale disasters for which FEMA funding is not available, 

NYSOEM must rely on the Small Business Administration for smaller amounts of money.23 To make up 

for any shortfalls in federal funding, NYSOEM must 

pay out more money for resources from its own organizational budget. This reduces the availability of 

money for other NYSOEM priorities. So, when smallerscale disasters drain NYSOEM’s coffers, and only 

small amounts of federal money are available to fill 

in NYSOEM’s funding gaps, this in turn means that 

21 Bill Dugan and Nora Porter, interviews with the author, NYSOEM, 

Albany, NY, 18 September 2014, hereafter Dugan and Porter interview. 

22 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

23 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

159

the chances that there will be an NYSOEM employee paid and dedicated to forging interorganizational 

agreements will diminish.24

The NYSOEM has just one funded full-time employee dedicated to coordinating the procurement 

and distribution of resources for disaster survivors, 

and only one portion of this person’s job description 

is to work with businesses. That makes it difficult for 

the agency to sustain any effort to develop disaster 

partnerships. The NYSOEM is a relatively new agency, 

only coming into existence in 2010 following a large 

state government reorganization.25 The short amount 

of time that the NYSOEM has existed in its current 

form means that it has not had the time to fully mature its capabilities—including by hiring an employee 

to manage its partnerships.

Private sector emergency-management personnel, with whom state emergency managers would 

normally work, were similarly affected by the 2008 

recession. Firms trimmed private sector emergencymanagement positions.26 This means that in recent 

history there have been fewer dedicated emergency 

managers working in businesses. Since these positions would be the mostly likely to work directly with 

the state in these partnerships, the probability of firms 

coordinating directly with the state for emergencymanagement purposes is reduced.

24 Anonymous official interview.

25 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

26 Anonymous official interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

160

Unlike the state’s emergency-management office, NYCOEM is comparatively well-funded and has 

a full-time coordinator with a staff dedicated to establishing and growing disaster partnerships. This 

means that the agency is able to devote considerable 

resources toward its work with businesses. NYCOEM 

personnel attend meetings regularly with businesses 

across the city and engage with industry organizations representing clusters of firms. During disasters, 

private sector representatives come to the city’s 

emergency operations center (EOC) and are involved 

in the agency’s decision-making processes.27 These 

factors contribute to the relative sophistication of 

the NYCOEM’s partnership program compared with 

the NYSOEM’s approach to collaborating with firms 

and nonprofits.

A historical example demonstrates the longstanding commitment within the New York City 

government to support disaster partnerships. An 

emergency manager with Texas-based Garner Environmental Services recalls how city money and political will were used to manage the West Nile Virus 

in New York City in 1999.28 After being summoned to 

New York City, Mayor Rudolph W. “Rudy” Giuliani told 

the emergency manager directly that he wanted a 

can of Off!—a brand of insect repellent in an aerosol 

can—for every New York City resident to control the 

27 Tannenbaum interview.

28 This specific incident falls outside the time scope of the present 

study, which runs from 2002 to 2014, but it is included here for illustrative purposes.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

161

spread of the West Nile Virus, which is transmitted by 

mosquitoes.29 The emergency manager continued:

I said, “Ok, let me see what I can do.” Now, 

keep in mind that we’re talking about 8 million 

residents—that’s 8 million cans of Off!. Well, 

in four hours we had located every can of Off! 

that wasn’t on a store shelf inside the continental United States. I called my Chief Financial Officer and said, “I need a credit card”. . . . 

I [leased] a 727 jet on a credit card. We called 

the Federal Aviation Administration director, 

the U.S. Secretary of Transportation, and a 

Congressman to sign a safety waiver and we 

loaded the entire 727 in St. Louis [where Off! 

is manufactured], from cockpit to tail, with 

cases of Off!30

The 727 jet flew from St. Louis, Missouri, to New 

York City. Under the emergency manager’s direction, 

UPS—a shipping company—then off-loaded and 

delivered 8 million cans of Off! from John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens to the command 

post where the West Nile Virus response was being 

managed. The cases of Off! were then placed in city 

police cars, and police officers distributed the Off! to 

citizens in neighborhoods where they patrolled normally.31

29 Hayes interview; and “West Nile Virus,” U.S. Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention, 9 June 2015.

30 Hayes interview.

31 Hayes interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

162

That the New York City government was able to 

retain a contractor who coordinated the fast purchase 

and air delivery of 8 million cans of Off!—more than a 

decade prior to this writing—underlines that the New 

York City government has been involved seriously in 

emergency-management partnerships for some time. 

The response to this incident shows that New York 

City is willing to spend significant amounts of money on private contractors when disasters take place. 

New York State and New York City’s approaches 

to disaster partnerships differ. These differences exist for at least two key institutional reasons: finances and staffing. The analytical framework highlights 

crucial differences when used to assess how New 

York State and New York City work with firms for 

emergency-management reasons. When disasters 

happen in New York, the state and city’s differing approaches to these partnerships can surface quickly.

Crisis: Opportunities for Cooperation

Disasters in New York State provide opportunities for 

the public and private sectors to cooperate. At the 

state level, partnerships are used during crises primarily to procure and deliver physical aid to those in 

need.32 In contrast, the NYCOEM uses its agreements 

mostly to exchange information in disasters, and to a 

much lesser degree, gain access to scarce physical 

resources.

Hurricanes Sandy (2012) and Irene (2011) brought 

32 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

163

private sector firms and the New York State government together for emergency-management purposes. Representatives from Walmart and FedEx were in 

the state’s EOC after Hurricane Sandy.33 FedEx provided free shipping services for the NYSOEM, and 

Walmart delivered bottled water to Sandy survivors.34

That these firms’ representatives were present in the 

NYSOEM offices—and provided specific goods for 

the agency—shows how the state focuses on obtaining physical aid from firms during disasters. Personnel from Garner Environmental Services deployed 

to New York City after Sandy to track distribution of 

emergency equipment and set up outdoor lighting 

in areas that suffered electrical outages.35 Packaged 

food giant PepsiCo, along with restaurants in the New 

York City area, donated food to disaster survivors.36

These examples underline further the notion that crises drive the need for physical aid in New York State, 

and government officials turn frequently to firms to 

provide that aid. 

After Hurricane Irene in 2011, New York’s governor established a volunteer disaster recovery program called Labor for Your Neighbor. This volunteer 

program explicitly integrated firms such as Walmart 

and Home Depot into disaster responses to obtain 

33 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

34 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

35 Hayes interview.

36 Anonymous official interview; and “Governor Cuomo Secures 

First Major Private Donation to Support New Yorkers in Recovery 

Efforts,” State of New York, 4 November 2012.
CHAPTER FOUR

164

needed supplies.37 The state’s work with the private 

sector after Hurricane Irene through the Labor for 

Your Neighbor program shows the strong focus of the 

state’s partnerships on obtaining physical aid during 

crises. From bottled water to shipping services to 

outdoor lighting and other supplies, private firms enhanced the state’s ability to respond to disasters.

The NYCOEM develops disaster-management 

agreements before large-scale emergencies occur 

and uses disasters as an opportunity to make use 

of those partnerships.38 In the months leading up to 

November 2014, an outbreak of the Ebola virus had 

killed more than 5,000 people in West Africa.39 By November 2014, fewer than five total cases of Ebola had 

appeared in the United States, but the virus’s high 

mortality rate spurred U.S. government agencies to 

accelerate preparations for Ebola patients. Against 

this backdrop, the NYCOEM’s public-private partnership coordinator shuttled between meetings with private sector officials concerned about the Ebola virus 

coming to New York City:

They’re asking questions like, “What happens 

if somebody comes into my lobby and starts 

vomiting? What is the cleanup process like?” 

They’re looking for answers from people on 

the public health side. . . . I find myself spending a lot of time explaining what the expecta37 Anonymous official interview.

38 Tannenbaum interview. 

39 “Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Case Counts,” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 12 June 2015.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

165

tions are. We’re not going to show up in moon 

suits and start collecting samples without 

telling you what’s going on.40

This official’s comments demonstrate proactive 

concern from business leaders about the Ebola virus, 

since the first case of Ebola had not yet appeared in 

New York City. This was a forward-leaning approach 

to informing private sector representatives about 

how to handle the virus if it were to appear, and an 

understanding of the need for the NYCOEM to manage private sector expectations about city responses 

to the virus—all in advance of the Ebola virus arriving 

in the city. 

Hurricane Irene, which hit New York City in 2011, 

further demonstrates how the NYCOEM partners 

with businesses during disasters to address crises. 

As Irene approached the city, local business leaders 

made their way to the New York City EOC. Representatives of many industry umbrella groups—apartment 

buildings, utilities, hotels, security services, financial 

firms, universities, supermarkets, and restaurants—

were all in the EOC as Irene closed in on the East 

Coast. While these industry representatives were in 

the EOC, a rumor about a preemptive shutdown of 

the electrical grid appeared in a New York City newspaper, making business owners skittish, since business operations of all types depend on electricity. 

Because so many different industry representatives 

40 Tannenbaum interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

166

were together in the EOC, they were able to correct 

and address the rumor quickly; an employee of ConEdison, one of the leading electricity suppliers in the 

city, stressed that shutting down the electrical grid 

was a purely hypothetical option and not something 

that the company was considering seriously. The 

business officials in the EOC were then able to relay 

this clarification from ConEdison to their respective 

stakeholders, quashing the rumor.41 This example of 

private sector action in a crisis demonstrates the 

degree to which NYCOEM has gone to forge relationships with private sector industry groups. It also 

shows the value of having representatives of those 

groups colocated with the NYCOEM during disasters.

Leadership and Disaster-Oriented PPPs

Government and business leadership shape New 

York’s disaster-oriented PPPs. The arrangement of 

this leadership, however, differs between the state 

and city levels of government. The state’s interactions 

with businesses for emergency-management purposes flow primarily through the state executive, not 

the NYSOEM. In contrast, New York City’s disasteroriented PPPs are managed by the NYCOEM, not the 

New York City mayor’s office. Each approach appears 

to work well for New York State and New York City, 

respectively. 

41 Tannenbaum interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

167

At the state level, the governor’s office controls 

the state government’s approach to emergency management, and has even relocated responsibility for 

some emergency management-related tasks to the 

governor’s office itself.42 Moreover, NYSOEM’s top 

leaders are gubernatorial appointees, meaning that 

their management decisions are influenced directly 

and indirectly by the governor.43 These factors mean 

that during disasters it is the governor’s office, not 

the NYSOEM, that is the primary point of interface 

between businesses and the state government. This 

arrangement limits significantly the NYSOEM’s ability to build and grow disaster-oriented PPPs. At the 

same time, the governor’s strong ties to the business 

sector appear to play a part in helping the state secure corporate donations after disasters.

Part of the reason that firms appear to turn first 

to the governor’s office during disasters, rather than 

to the NYSOEM, is that the governor’s office has built 

strong relationships with firms outside the context 

of emergency management and leverages these relationships during crises.44 These relationships can 

build political capital, which the governor’s office 

can then spend to benefit the state during and after disasters.45 For example, after Hurricane Sandy, 

42 Anonymous official interview; and “Governor’s Office of Storm 

Recovery: About,” State of New York, accessed 15 June 2015.

43 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

44 Anonymous official interview. 

45 Anonymous official interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

168

companies called the governor’s office—not the 

NYSOEM—directly to ask what resources they could 

contribute for post-Sandy relief.46

Business leaders have been instrumental in providing support to the New York State government 

during disasters too. For example, New York governor 

Andrew Cuomo specifically requested a particular 

FedEx manager to be the company’s point of contact for the purpose of working with the state after 

Sandy.47 Since there is no formal disaster-oriented 

PPP program in New York State, Cuomo’s request 

suggests that a business relationship between the 

governor’s office and FedEx developed before Hurricane Sandy came along. Similarly, high-level contacts 

between state officials and Garner Environmental 

Services, which already held contracts in New York 

State, helped the state retain the firm for the Sandy 

response effort.48 Both FedEx and Garner’s collaboration with the state after Sandy show how government 

and business leadership can facilitate disaster-oriented PPPs. 

In New York City, top-level political support 

has been invaluable for the city’s disaster-oriented 

PPPs. In 2004, the New York City mayor directed the 

NYCOEM commissioner to develop relationships 

with firms for emergency-management purposes.49

46 Anonymous official interview.

47 “FedEx among Companies Recognized by NYSE for Hurricane 

Sandy Relief Support,” FedEx, 9 November 2012. 

48 Hayes interview.

49 Tannenbaum interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

169

Since 2004, the NYCOEM has built a large portfolio of 

disaster-oriented PPPs, including partnerships with 

law firm WilmerHale, as well as retail giants Macy’s 

and Gap, to help prepare these businesses to continue operations during disasters.50 These examples 

illustrate that city government leaders have been important drivers of New York City’s disaster-oriented 

PPPs.

Leaders in government and business have an 

impact on disaster-oriented PPPs in New York State. 

Relationships between the governor’s office and 

businesses, formed outside of disasters, appear to 

help the state secure corporate assistance during 

and after disasters. In New York City, top-level political support for disaster-oriented PPPs gives the 

NYCOEM the executive buy-in necessary to make 

these partnerships a priority. At both the state and 

city levels, these partnerships can vary significantly 

in their structure, from loose, informal relationships 

to formal written agreements between public- and 

private-sector leaders.

Organizational Structure

New York State’s interactions with businesses for 

emergency-management purposes usually take one 

of two forms: a formal contract for goods or services 

or ad hoc cooperation. New York City’s disasteroriented PPPs range more widely in their structures, 

50 “Partners in Preparedness: List of Program Partners,” NYCOEM, 

accessed 29 September 2015. 
CHAPTER FOUR

170

from formal MOUs to informal, relationship-based 

partnerships. 

New York State’s work with businesses for emergency-management purposes is usually tied either to 

business contracts or is purely improvisational. For 

example, firms perform tasks such as budget assessments and organizational planning for the state.51 That 

businesses perform budget assessments indicates a 

potentially integral role for firms in state-level emergency management. However, structuring disasteroriented PPPs formally can be difficult. Regional 

NYSOEM representatives may have informal agreements in place with local firms, for instance, but if the 

need for a formal public-private sector agreement 

reaches the NYSOEM main office in Albany, the approval process for those formal agreements can be arduous.52 Outside of the formal cooperation that takes 

place between the NYSOEM and businesses, most 

of the agency’s engagement with firms is ad hoc and 

driven by the circumstances of individual disasters.53

Regardless of whether the disaster-oriented PPP in 

question is contractual or ad hoc, the state manages to 

work with firms, as demonstrated by its collaboration 

with businesses such as Garner, Home Depot, PepsiCo, and FedEx after Hurricanes Sandy and Irene.54

51 Hayes interview.

52 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

53 Anonymous official interview.

54 Hayes interview; anonymous official interview; and “FedEx Among 

Companies Recognized.”
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

171

In New York City, disaster-oriented PPPs can take 

many forms. For example, the New York Mets, a professional baseball team, are written formally into New 

York City’s coastal storm response plan as a full partner with the NYCOEM.55 ConEdison also works with 

the organization to promote emergency preparedness and also made former NYCOEM head Joseph F. 

Bruno a keynote speaker at a ConEdison employees’ 

conference.56 Less formal partnerships also exist. The 

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for instance, partners with NYCOEM by participating in the CEAS.57

While NYCOEM hopes to institutionalize disasteroriented PPPs through formal agreements, there are 

organizational obstacles that can make this hard. 

Partnerships can deteriorate when the NYCOEM’s 

contacts in firms turn over. Business executives may 

worry about being sued for potential mistakes they 

make during disasters, causing them to think twice 

about formalizing disaster-oriented PPPs. During disasters or catastrophes, companies may be unable 

to fulfill orders for goods due to supply chain disruptions.58 Despite these pressures, NYCOEM enjoys 

a range of organizational structures in its disasteroriented PPPs.

55 Tannenbaum interview.

56 New York Office of Emergency Management Biennial Report, 

2009 (New York: NYCOEM, 2009), 13. 57 “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: October 2013: The New 

York Stock Exchange,” NYCOEM, accessed June 15 June 2015.

58 Tannenbaum interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

172

The organizational structures of New York’s 

disaster-oriented PPPs vary significantly. At the state 

government level, disaster-oriented PPPs are largely 

ad hoc or carried out in the context of business contracts. The New York City government’s partnerships 

range in structure from formal written agreements 

to more informal cooperation in select emergencymanagement initiatives. Information sharing is one 

of the most frequent activities in which government 

agencies and firms engage in New York.

Information Sharing

New York State government agencies share limited 

information with firms for emergency-management 

purposes, and firms share little information with the 

state. The information that is exchanged between the 

two communities relates mostly to the movement 

and delivery of physical aid during and after disasters. By contrast, in New York City, businesses and 

NYCOEM share information on a wide range of topics, from emergency preparedness tips, to situational awareness reports, to data about staging physical 

aid in advance of natural disasters. This information 

sharing occurs before, during, and after disasters. 

The New York State government shares select 

emergency management-related information with 

firms and nonprofit organizations during disasters. 

For example, during Hurricane Sandy, a FedEx representative at the New York State EOC taught state 

employees how to load and unload large trucks of 
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

173

supplies that were traveling to the New York City metro area.59 FedEx’s experience shows that the types of 

information that firms share with New York State can 

relate closely to deliveries of physical aid. 

But it does not appear that the state government 

has prioritized information sharing with firms in general. State officials offer firms information about road 

conditions, the weather, public health, and safety 

concerns.60 Yet, the state would distribute this information anyway, since state governments routinely collect and disseminate data on road conditions, 

weather forecasts, and public health matters, regardless of whether there is an emergency taking place. 

This suggests that the state is not pushing confidential, restricted, or otherwise high-value, nonpublic 

data to firms. This can frustrate business officials.61

It also seems that state government officials are not 

fully aware of the other types of information businesses could offer to the state, such as reports on 

local store traffic, staffing levels, or store closings.62

By contrast, the NYCOEM exchanges information 

freely with businesses before, during, and after disasters. The agency first began exchanging information 

regularly with firms in anticipation of the year 2000 

(a.k.a. Y2K) rollover in 1999, and information shar59 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

60 Anonymous official interview.

61 Hayes interview.

62 Anonymous official interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

174

ing remains a top priority for the NYCOEM today.63

In addition to sharing information with firms during 

crises, such as the Ebola virus scare of October 2014 

or Hurricane Irene in 2011, the NYCOEM now uses 

firms as a way to gather ground-level intelligence on 

disaster conditions. In a recent telling example of this 

intelligence collection, the NYCOEM used an automated telephone call system to gather data on local 

restaurant opening schedules after Hurricane Sandy. 

The automated phone call would dial the telephone 

numbers of restaurants, and a preprogrammed audio 

message would play, inviting the listener to press 1 

if the restaurant was currently open, press 2 if the 

restaurant would be open within the next 48 hours, 

and so on. Using this information on restaurant openings, NYCOEM was able to increase its situational 

awareness and place food distribution points in hardhit areas where few restaurants reopened after the 

hurricane.64

Information sharing between the NYCOEM and 

firms also benefits businesses. Private sector officials want access to timely and accurate information from the NYCOEM that can help them on the 

63 Tannenbaum interview. The Y2K bug, also called Year 2000 bug 

or Millennium Bug, was a potential issue in the coding of computerized systems projected to create worldwide havoc networks. After more than a year of international alarm, feverish preparations, 

and programming corrections, few major failures occurred in the 

transition from 31 December 1999 to 1 January 2000. See Geoff 

Manaugh, “When Russia and America Cooperate to Avert a Y2K 

Apocalypse,” New Yorker, 30 December 2019. 64 Tannenbaum interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

175

job.65 Business officials can gain credibility within 

their respective organizations by receiving this information.66 Several firms exemplify how information 

sharing between the NYCOEM and businesses improves private sector emergency preparedness. For 

example, CME Group, a financial derivatives trading 

marketplace, hosted the NYCOEM head in meetings 

with employees to discuss how to improve personal 

and organizational emergency preparedness.67 AIG, 

an insurance giant, has worked with the NYCOEM 

to improve its disaster preparedness measures, and 

in 2013 ran a simulated disaster drill in which employees were forced to work from home during a 

Manhattan-wide power outage.68 Major League Soccer (MLS), the United States’ largest professional 

soccer organization, is headquartered in New York 

City.69 MLS worked with the NYCOEM after Hurricane Sandy to improve its emergency-preparedness 

measures.70 One outgrowth of this collaboration was 

MLS’s implementation of a new emergency communications system for employees.71

The New York State and New York City govern65 Tannenbaum interview.

66 Tannenbaum interview.

67 “Partners in Preparedness: March 2014: CME Group,” NYCOEM, 

accessed 15 June 2015. 

68 “Partners in Preparedness: July 2013: AIG,” NYCOEM, accessed 

15 June 2015. 

69 “Partners in Preparedness: April 2013: Major League Soccer,” 

NYCOEM, accessed 15 June 2015. 

70 “Partners in Preparedness: April 2013.”

71 “Partners in Preparedness: April 2013.”
CHAPTER FOUR

176

ments share information with firms in different ways. 

At the state level, information exchange with businesses centers primarily on the movement and delivery of 

physical aid after disasters. State communication with 

firms about emergency management rarely occurs 

outside the context of disasters. In New York City, 

by contrast, the NYCOEM’s approach to information 

sharing is more well-developed than the state’s approach. The NYCOEM shares information with firms 

on a range of topics, from emergency-preparedness 

tips to resource-sharing agreements. This information exchange takes place before, during, and after disasters. At both the state and city levels, information 

sharing benefits governments and firms alike.

Mutual Benefits

The public and private sectors must derive benefits 

from disaster-oriented PPPs, for without these benefits, they would lack incentives to work with one 

another. At the state level, these mutual benefits 

relate mostly to physical aid. In New York City, the 

chief mutual benefits of disaster-oriented PPPs appear to be access to useful information and scarce 

resources.

Physical aid, whether purchased or donated, generates most of the benefits for the state government 

and businesses in New York. The NYSOEM has contracts with firms for a range of supplies that may be 

needed during disasters.72 When the state obtains 

72 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

177

these items during a disaster, it helps the state provide needed physical aid for citizens. 

Delivering physical aid brings financial and marketing benefits for firms. If goods are delivered on 

contract, then the state pays firms money. If firms 

donate physical aid, this can provide firms with tax 

advantages, since such donations usually can be 

written off.73 Corporate donations to the state also 

can generate positive press for firms. After Hurricane 

Sandy, for example, beer brewer Anheuser-Busch 

provided the state with free drinking water in aluminum cans.74 Honda motor company donated a truck 

full of gasoline-powered electrical generators to the 

state.75 In both of these cases, firms were able to use 

these donations to gain positive marketing exposure, 

as well as to meet their own corporate citizenship 

goals.76

In New York City, the chief mutual benefits of 

disaster-oriented PPPs are information sharing and 

access to scarce resources. This information sharing 

is valuable for the NYCOEM and businesses. Meeting 

regularly with corporate partners, NYCOEM officials 

learn about private sector needs and concerns—giving them the information they need to voice those 

73 Anonymous official interview.

74 “Governor Cuomo Suspends Regulations to Allow Drinking Water Donations for New Yorkers Affected by Hurricane Sandy,” State 

of New York, 4 November 2012. 

75 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

76 Laura Petrecca, “Businesses Step Up to Aid Victims of Superstorm Sandy,” USA Today, 4 November 2012; and “What We Believe,” Honda Corporate Social Responsibility, 26 November 2019.
CHAPTER FOUR

178

private sector concerns within the NYCOEM. The 

NYCOEM also can gain a better sense of how a largescale emergency is unfolding by tapping into its network of business partners across the city.77

Information sharing by the NYCOEM benefits 

firms as well. Emergency preparedness information, 

for instance, helps companies improve their own 

readiness for disasters. The law firm Cravath, Swaine 

& Moore LLP incorporates NYCOEM emergency preparedness information into its internal corporate 

training plans.78 ABC, a national television network 

with offices in New York City, distributed NYCOEM information on business continuity planning at a company event focused on disaster preparedness.79 Bank 

of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon), a global financial 

institution headquartered in New York City, also has 

disseminated preparedness information from the 

NYCOEM to its employees.80 Information sharing 

during crises benefits firms too. The NYCOEM strives 

to provide its corporate partners with the “latest and 

greatest and most accurate information”—information that is not generally available through public 

sources.81 This data can help firms make business decisions faster, since their leaders do not have to wait 

77 Tannenbaum interview.

78 “Partners in Preparedness: February 2013: Cravath, Swaine, & 

Moore LLP,” NYCOEM, accessed 15 June 2015. 

79 “Partners in Preparedness: October 2012: Featured Partner: ABC 

TV,” NYCOEM, accessed 15 June 2015. 

80 “Partners in Preparedness: January 2012: Featured Partner: Bank 

of New York Mellon,” NYCOEM, accessed 15 June 2015. 

81 Tannenbaum interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

179

for disaster-specific information to go public before 

reacting to the information.

New York City’s disaster-oriented PPPs also can 

help the city government access scarce resources. 

The New York City government possesses many physical resources to deal with the effects of disasters.82

For instance, the city government owns some 25,000 

vehicles, ranging from backhoes to large trucks. 

However, there are certain physical commodities 

that are hard to come by in the city, and the NYCOEM 

leverages its partnerships to access these scarce 

commodities. For example, large patches of open 

space—especially space that is paved with concrete

—are hard to find in New York City. The NYCOEM 

needs such spaces during disasters to serve as staging areas for emergency supplies. To meet this need, 

the NYCOEM partnered with the New York Mets. 

After Hurricane Sandy, the NYCOEM took over the 

Mets’ paved parking lots for months, packing them 

with hurricane-relief supplies.83 The NYCOEM later 

nominated the Mets for a federal award for their assistance after Hurricane Sandy—which the Mets received in December 2013.84

Mutual benefits present in New York’s disasteroriented PPPs vary between the state level of government and the city level of government. At the state 

82 Tannenbaum interview.

83 Tannenbaum interview.

84 “The Department of Homeland Security Announces Recipients 

of the 2013 Rick Rescorla National Award for Resilience,” press release, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 4 December 2013. 
CHAPTER FOUR

180

level, contacts with businesses are geared mostly toward acquiring and distributing physical aid. In 

New York City, disaster-oriented PPPs deliver mutual 

benefits through information exchange. Moreover, 

the city government gains from access to scarce resources in the private sector domain. Participants in 

New York’s disaster-oriented PPPs need to maintain 

high levels of mutual trust to collaborate well.

Trust

Trust plays a central role in New York’s disasteroriented PPPs, but the state and city governments 

view trust differently. State officials point toward an 

implicit trust in the firms with which it works. This 

implicit trust is based on corporate reputations, the 

quality of personal relationships between state representatives and business officials, and contacts 

between the state and private sector outside the 

context of disasters.85 The NYCOEM, by contrast, 

views trust as a direct function of engagement in 

partnership-oriented activities.

Public officials in New York State believe that 

trust is indispensable for disaster-oriented PPPs.86

Yet, the state government’s trust in firms does not appear to come from firms consistently meeting or ex85 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview; and David M. Van Slyke, “Collaboration and Relational Contracting,” in The Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas for the Twenty-first Century, ed. Rosemary 

O’Leary and Lisa Blomgren Bingham (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 149–50. 86 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

181

ceeding the state’s expectations. Instead, the state’s 

trust in firms is in part a product of the firms’ public 

reputations, as well as the quality of direct relationships between state and private sector officials.87

These observations are consistent with studies of 

public sector networks, which have found that factors such as high-quality personal relationships are 

essential for interorganizational collaboration.88

State representatives also work extensively with 

business groups outside the context of disasters. 

This work with firms outside of disasters can build 

trust, which is then leveraged during disasters. For 

example, representatives from the Business Council of New York State, a major lobbying group for the 

private sector, interact frequently with state government officials. These repeated interactions help build 

trust between state officials and the business community. During disasters, this trust between the private sector and state officials provides a foundation 

from which firms and the state can then collaborate 

to address disaster-caused crises, thereby increasing 

the state’s resilience.89

Firms that work with the state agree that trust is 

essential in disaster-oriented PPPs as well. Businesses must trust government agencies to give them 

87 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

88 For example, see Barbara Romzek et al., “Informal Accountability 

in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations,” Journal of Public 

Administration Research and Theory 24, no. 4 (October 2014): 825, 

https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut027.

89 Anonymous official interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

182

accurate information during disasters. For example, 

retailers occasionally use government announcements about utility restoration times to set staffing 

levels during large-scale emergencies. If these projections are wrong, then employers can lose significant amounts of money on employees who report to 

work but have to remain idle, because without power 

or water, they cannot open their businesses.90 If firms 

trust the public sector to provide them with correct 

information during disasters, and this information is 

not correct, then trust between the public and private sectors can erode.

NYCOEM also views trust as central to disasteroriented PPPs. However, unlike the New York 

State government, the city agency sees this trust 

as a function of direct participation in disasteroriented PPPs. The NYCOEM is well-funded and has 

the staff and resources to meet regularly with business groups to discuss emergency-management 

priorities. This routine engagement with business 

representatives helps build interorganizational trust, 

because it attunes the agency to the private sector’s 

concerns and interests.91

The NYCOEM’s private sector partners agree that 

trust is essential in disaster-oriented PPPs. For example, after Hurricane Sandy, a particular hardware store 

owner failed to deliver building supplies to a borough 

president at an appointed date and time. This failed 

90 Hayes interview.

91 Tannenbaum interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

183

delivery damaged the relationships between the 

hardware store owner and the borough president, as 

well as those between the borough president and its 

residents.92

Trust matters in New York State’s disasteroriented PPPs. At the state level, this trust is a function of the reputation of the firms with which the 

state collaborates, personal relationships between 

public and private sector officials, and regular contacts between companies and the state in nondisaster circumstances. In New York City, trust is built 

through meetings, planning, and communication—

all of which are made possible by the NYCOEM’s 

generous funding and staffing levels. To sustain New 

York’s disaster-oriented PPPs in the long term, it will 

be essential for these partnerships to adapt to new 

and uncertain circumstances.

Adaptability and Sustainability

NYSOEM partners with businesses for emergencymanagement purposes in a short-term, transactional 

manner. However, the city agency, NYCOEM, strives 

to sustain its disaster-oriented PPPs in the long run. 

These differing approaches mean that the NYSOEM’s 

development of disaster-oriented PPPs is stunted, 

while the NYCOEM’s disaster-oriented PPPs program 

thrives.

State officials interviewed for this book cannot 

cite any examples of a state-level, disaster-oriented 

92 Hayes interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

184

PPP evolving.93 There are several plausible explanations for this. First, the NYSOEM has no organizational “owner” of its disaster-oriented PPPs. Instead, the 

responsibility for working with businesses is concentrated in the state governor’s office. Second, contacts 

within the state government and its partners turn over 

regularly. This turnover can interrupt or sever disasteroriented PPPs, because there are no procedures in 

place to smoothly transition the management of 

PPPs from outgoing to incoming employees. A lack of 

state-level succession planning for disaster-oriented 

PPPs means that when key individuals leave, certain 

PPPs can dissolve.94 Severed ties mean that the relationships between the state and businesses do not 

have the opportunity to change—let alone sustain 

themselves into the future.

The NYCOEM’s relationships with firms, by contrast, have progressed, helping sustain its disasteroriented PPPs. The agency’s relationship with the 

New York Mets exemplifies how disaster-oriented 

PPPs can adapt to shifting needs. As part of a larger initiative to encourage New Yorkers to prepare for 

disasters, the NYCOEM first contacted the Mets to 

ask if the team would be willing to show a public service announcement about emergency preparedness 

on the Mets’ jumbotron scoreboard during a baseball game. Today, the NYCOEM and the Mets work 

93 Anonymous official interview; and Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

94 Davis interview.
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

185

together to create emergency plans and have jointly 

produced public service announcements featuring 

the Mets’ mascot. From an initial drive to publicize 

information about emergency preparedness to citizens, the Mets have now become a full partner with 

the NYCOEM and are written into the agency’s official 

emergency response plans for the city.95

The NYCOEM has seen a similar adaptation and 

evolution in its partnerships with the legal industry. 

An initial contact with a single individual in a prominent law firm and the agency unexpectedly blossomed into something much larger. The law firm 

employee was interested in learning about emergency preparedness and contacted the NYCOEM to set 

up a meeting. This initial meeting between city representatives and the employee grew eventually into 

a consortium of 42 New York City law firms, which today meet monthly to discuss business continuity and 

crisis management. The success of the NYCOEM’s 

outreach in this case came as a pleasant surprise to 

agency officials.96

At the state level, disaster-oriented PPPs are 

short-lived and transactional in nature. There is no 

organized effort to sustain this public-private collaboration, so New York State’s disaster-oriented PPPs 

have not evolved. In New York City, however, there 

is an organized effort to create and grow disasteroriented PPPs in the long term. This means that part95 Tannenbaum interview.

96 Tannenbaum interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

186

nerships between the NYCOEM and businesses have 

evolved and adapted. The city’s work with the New 

York Mets and a consortium of law firms that have 

made business continuity planning a high priority 

exemplify this adaptation. The rising importance of 

nonprofit and industry organizations for emergency 

management in New York, too, may offer important 

insights into the evolution of disaster-oriented PPPs 

in New York.

Nonprofit and Industry Organizations: 

A Ninth Factor

NYSOEM and the NYCOEM work closely with nonprofit and industry organizations to manage emergencies. Frequently, nonprofit organizations obtain 

donations from firms and pass them on to government agencies, which distribute them to citizens in 

need. Industry associations provide a mechanism for 

the NYSOEM and NYCOEM to connect with many 

businesses at once. While the analytical framework 

does not account for these organizations, they nonetheless play such a key role in state disaster responses that it is crucial to incorporate nonprofit and 

industry groups in the framework. 

The NYSOEM’s work with nonprofit and industry 

organizations helps it respond to disasters. The agency’s collaboration with nonprofits focuses on distributing physical aid and emergency planning. For 

example, the state partners with the Aidmatrix Foundation, a nonprofit organization that develops supply 
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

187

chain software for humanitarian relief efforts.97 The 

foundation receives financial donations and supplies 

from firms, which it passes on to the state or individual citizens in need.98 This collaboration demonstrates 

that Aidmatrix plays an important role as NYSOEM’s 

partner for emergency-management purposes and 

acts as a bridge between firms and the state. The 

state agency has also worked with trade associations 

representing supermarkets and the insurance industry, as well as regional branches of Catholic Charities 

USA, a nonprofit network of charities, for emergencyplanning purposes.99 These examples of collaboration between the NYSOEM, nonprofits, and industry 

organizations highlight the broader role that charities 

and professional groups can play to enhance statewide emergency planning.

The NYCOEM also has used partnerships with 

industry organizations to build connections with the 

business community. These partnerships help the 

agency gather information about the business community’s needs outside the context of emergencies 

as well as to coordinate response actions with the 

business community during crises.100 By identifying 

the needs of individual business groups through 

97 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview. 

98 Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview. The Aidmatrix Foundation 

merged with the Atlanta-based nonprofit TechBridge in 2015.

99 Anonymous official interview; and Davis, Porter, and Dugan interview.

100 Tannenbaum interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

188

these business association meetings, the NYCOEM 

is able to strengthen relationships with the associations’ individual members. In time, these strengthened relationships can be valuable for the agency, 

especially when they have specific needs for information or resources.

During disasters, the NYCOEM works with nonprofits and industry organizations to address ongoing 

emergency-management challenges. For example, 

the Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City, a nonprofit organization, played a pivotal role in securing 

financial and physical aid donations from firms for 

residents impacted by Hurricane Sandy.101 During disasters, representatives from business associations 

sit in the New York City EOC, because this arrangement permits a single representative from an organization to act as a point of contact for thousands 

of businesses at once. Working directly with these 

organizations can help the NYCOEM avoid logistical 

challenges. 

There are more than 200,000 businesses in New 

York City, so it is physically impossible to accommodate representatives from every firm in the city’s EOC. 

Even having multiple representatives from a single 

industry in the EOC can create physical space constraints and trigger corporate and political friction, 

especially when two companies’ representatives are 

in direct business competition with each another. 

101 Hurricane Sandy 6-Month Update (New York: Mayor’s Fund to 

Advance New York City, 2013). 
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

189

Working with individual association representatives 

is helpful in this regard, because the NYCOEM can 

avoid having to contend with business competition 

issues and space constraint difficulties.102 The presence of individual business association representatives in the New York City EOC during disasters makes 

the NYCOEM’s disaster-oriented PPPs more efficient 

by streamlining disaster response coordination.

Nonprofit and industry organizations play significant roles in emergency management in New York 

State and New York City. At the state level, these 

organizations connect with businesses, directly or 

indirectly, and in turn work with the NYSOEM to distribute physical aid and facilitate emergency planning. The NYCOEM uses partnerships with nonprofits 

and industry organizations as a way to collect information about private sector needs, as well as to coordinate disaster response actions during crises. The 

NYSOEM and NYCOEM’s work with nonprofit and industry organizations shows that these groups can be 

natural complements to disaster-oriented PPPs.

New York’s Disaster-Oriented PPPs: 

A State-Managed Solution

New York State and New York City’s disaster-oriented 

PPPs vary considerably. Because there is no organized 

disaster-oriented PPP program at the state level, one 

could argue that the state would be well-served by 

looking toward peer states for model programs to em102 Tannenbaum interview.
CHAPTER FOUR

190

ulate, such as those in California or Florida. The state’s 

PPPs, while mostly ad hoc in nature, serve a variety 

of objectives, from delivering electricity (e.g., Honda) 

to basic foodstuffs (e.g., PepsiCo). The NYCOEM’s 

disaster-oriented PPP program has operated since 

at least 1999—well before the federal government 

advocated explicitly for private sector involvement 

in emergency management—and incorporates a remarkable range of organizations, from the New York 

Mets to law firms and retail stores. At both the state 

and city levels of government, nonprofit and industry organizations connect government agencies with 

many other organizations instantaneously. 

It is therefore challenging to understand how 

direct federal government involvement in disasteroriented PPPs could be beneficial in New York. One 

could make the case that the state’s underdeveloped 

collaboration program would be somehow enhanced 

through federal assistance, for instance. And, to be 

fair, the NYSOEM benefits from federal funding via 

FEMA and the SBA after disasters. Nonetheless, 

funding for the NYSOEM’s disaster-relief efforts and 

the administration of a disaster partnership program 

are fundamentally different things. Forcing a federal 

“disaster-oriented PPP template” on the NYSOEM, 

for example—one comparable to NIMS—would be 

counterproductive, because it either would be rejected by the governor’s office, which has amassed significant responsibility for emergency-management 

activities in the state, or it would damage existing 
THE DIVIDED EMPIRE STATE

191

informal agreements between firms and state agencies. 

New York City’s partnership program is robust. 

If anything, it could serve as a model for the federal 

government’s outreach to the private sector. Compelling the NYCOEM to follow federal guidance for 

developing and managing these partnerships would 

ultimately run contrary to the public safety interests 

of New Yorkers, since it would disrupt what is by any 

reasonable measure an impressive disaster-oriented 

PPP program.

Conclusion

This chapter showed that each of the eight factors in 

the analytical framework—crisis, leadership, organizational structure, information sharing, trust, mutual 

benefits, adaptability, and sustainability—are present 

in New York State and New York City’s disaster partnerships, but to very different extents. Across each of 

the eight factors, New York State and New York City 

employ these agreements in distinct ways. New York 

State’s partnerships are primarily ad hoc or contractual and focus on obtaining and distributing physical 

aid. By contrast, New York City’s are longer lasting 

and focus on information sharing and gaining access 

to scarce resources. These differences appear to be a 

function of how the state and city governments fund 

their respective emergency-management agencies 

and allocate staff to manage these partnerships.

Nonprofit and industrial organizations also fig-
CHAPTER FOUR

192

ure prominently at the state and city levels in New 

York—a factor for which the analytical framework 

does not account. At the state level, nonprofits work 

with firms to obtain and distribute physical aid for 

disaster-management purposes. The NYSOEM’s work 

with these nonprofits means that the agency is connected indirectly with firms through these nonprofits. Moreover, the state has worked with groups of 

firms representing specific industries, such as grocers and insurers, and used this collaboration to access private sector resources. In New York City, the 

NYCOEM works closely with industry associations, 

since these associations provide a way for the city 

agency to connect with multiple firms simultaneously. This interaction with industry associations takes 

place both outside the context of disasters as well as 

during disasters.

While New York State and New York City’s partnerships differ substantially, it is challenging to see 

how federal involvement in these agreements at either level of government could yield more desirable 

outcomes. The governor’s office appears to steer 

much of the day-to-day activity in emergency management, so it is unreasonable to expect it to defer 

to the federal government’s requirements without 

resistance. The NYCOEM’s program is exemplary. It 

would be a mistake to make changes to this program, 

because it appears to work well as-is. 
193

Chapter Five

D I S A S T E R S 

IN THE OLD DOMINION

Earthquakes are rare in Virginia. But a highly unusual August 2011 temblor in the state provided an opportunity for the Virginia Department of Emergency 

Management (VDEM), in conjunction with a corporate partner and teams of dedicated volunteers, to 

aid disaster-stricken citizens. Residents of Mineral 

City, a rural community halfway between Charlottesville and Richmond, rely heavily on wood to heat their 

homes during colder months. After the earthquake 

cracked residential chimneys in Mineral City, local officials worried that damage to these chimneys could 

lead to carbon monoxide poisoning and chimney fires 

during the coming winter.1 Local government officials 

contacted VDEM to voice their concerns. VDEM, in 

turn, reached out to Lowe’s, a national chain of hardware stores. Lowe’s donated 1,000 smoke and car1

 Amanda Reidelbach, interview with the author via telephone, 3 

June 2014, hereafter Reidelbach interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

194

bon monoxide detectors to VDEM.2 Local volunteers 

in Mineral City, in conjunction with VDEM, handed 

out the smoke and carbon monoxide detectors to 

residents at a central pick-up site. The arrangement 

proved mutually advantageous for the state, which 

was able to deliver assistance to Mineral City via its 

partnership with Lowe’s, as well as local officials, who 

gained some degree of assurance that their citizens 

would be provided sufficient warning in their homes 

of potential carbon monoxide poisoning and chimney fires.3

Today, VDEM retains a full-time disaster partnership coordinator, a position that was first created in 

2011.4 VDEM also partners with Dominion, a Fortune 

500 energy company, along with other businesses 

and nonprofit organizations, to prepare for, respond 

to, and recover from disasters.5 

This chapter explores Virginia’s emergencymanagement accords using the analytical framework, 

then argues that nonprofit and industry organizations appear to play an essential role in the smooth 

functioning of Virginia’s partnerships. The chapter 

2

 Benjamin Muncy, interview with the author via telephone, 5 August 2014, hereafter Muncy interview.

3

 Muncy interview.

4

 Ryan Garnowski, interview with the author via telephone, 27 May 

2014, hereafter Garnowski interview.

5

 For example, see Tracey Lamb, interview with the author via telephone, 18 June 2014, hereafter Lamb interview; Robert Conley, 

interview with the author via telephone, 24 June 2014, hereafter 

Conley interview; and David Vanderbloemen, interview with the 

author via telephone, 1 July 2014, hereafter Vanderbloemen interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

195

then makes the case that VDEM should be permitted 

to continue managing its agreements without federal 

interference and concludes by drawing together the 

main themes from the preceding analyses.

Crises

Crises caused by disasters such as the Mineral City 

earthquake are important drivers of Virginia’s partnerships. Crisis situations have prompted VDEM officials to reexamine their private sector relationships 

to fill resource gaps that they otherwise might have 

overlooked. Moreover, crises have generated opportunities to cement relationships between business 

representatives and VDEM officials, strengthening 

ties between their respective organizations.

Crises spur the state government to reexamine 

its emergency-management agreements to identify 

and close gaps in capabilities. For instance, Dominion learned from issues after Hurricane Irene in 2011 

that after hurricanes it should assign response crews 

to work alongside Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) workers.6

 VDOT crews are responsible 

for removing debris from roads after hurricanes, such 

as fallen trees. Toppled trees often fall on power lines. 

By pairing Dominion employees with VDOT workers, both organizations are able to help citizens and 

achieve efficiencies by opening blocked roadways 

and restoring electricity in sync with one another.

Responding to crises can also reinforce organi6

 Vanderbloemen interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

196

zational relationships. During Hurricane Irene, for 

example, the pharmacy chain Walgreens used its 

Virginia stores’ outdoor electronic display boards 

to show emergency management-related messages 

at the direct request of state government officials.7

Using Walgreens’ technology helped state officials 

disseminate information more widely than if they had 

relied solely on state government resources. It also 

reinforced to both Walgreens and state officials the 

value of their partnership.8 In addition, retailers such 

as Home Depot rely on VDEM for vetted, high-quality 

information reports on weather emergencies, such 

as hurricanes or snowstorms.9 Home Depot store 

managers may use these reports to adjust staffing 

and inventory levels prior to weather emergencies 

occurring.10

Leadership

The actions of individual leaders in both the public 

and private sectors have helped forge and sustain 

disaster partnerships in Virginia. In several cases, 

leaders have played the pivotal role in transforming 

the vision of a partnership into a functional reality. 

There are two primary types of leadership in Virginia’s partnerships: executive leadership in firms and 

state government, and the day-to-day management 

7

 Jim Williams, interview with the author via telephone, 1 December 

2014, hereafter Williams interview.

8

 Williams interview.

9

 Muncy interview.

10 Muncy interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

197

of public-private partnerships. These collaborations 

have sprouted and flourished in Virginia because of 

these types of leadership.

Public and private sector executives can provide 

the top-level organizational support that is essential for building partnerships.11 Leaders deliver this 

support by providing organizational approvals and 

endorsements to empower their subordinates to 

build and maintain extraorganizational contacts and 

relationships. This top-level buy-in helps ensure that 

leaders’ subordinates, who manage the partnerships, 

collaborate well with their partners.12

For example, Virginia 811 is a nonprofit organization whose 500 members are private utility companies doing business in Virginia, including Verizon, 

Dominion, and Cox Communications. The CEO of Virginia 811 has pushed the organization to partner with 

VDEM, in part to ensure that Virginia 811 has a backup plan to continue supporting its members during 

large-scale emergencies. Virginia 811’s members are 

frequently active in disaster responses; the organization’s staff supplies utility companies with vital infor11 Ami J. Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private 

Partnerships (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 

46–52; Ari Ginsberg and Eric Abrahamson, “Champions of Change 

and Strategic Shifts: The Role of Internal and External Change Advocates,” Journal of Management Studies 28, no. 2 (March 1991): 

185–86, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1991.tb00276.x; and Stanley E. Fawcett et al., “Organizational Commitment and Governance 

for Supply Chain Success,” International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 36, no. 1 (January 2006): 31, https://

doi.org/10.1108/09600030610642913. 

12 Garnowski interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

198

mation to help them make repairs to their damaged 

infrastructure after disasters.13 Since VDEM and Virginia 811’s disaster recovery objectives align, Virginia 

811’s drive to partner with VDEM makes sense.

Like Virginia 811, Virginia 1st is a nonprofit organization for the financial industry, but its members are 

private sector financial institutions such as banks 

and credit unions.14 The executive director of Virginia 1st encourages the organization and its members 

to partner with the state.15 For example, Virginia 1st 

divides the state into separate regions for management purposes.16 Those regional boundaries were 

designed deliberately to mirror the regional boundaries used by VDEM during disasters, demonstrating Virginia 1st’s desire to cooperate with the state.17

The leadership displayed by the heads of Virginia 

811 and Virginia 1st to forge ties with the state 

emergency-management apparatus underscores 

how private sector executives can help create and 

grow state partnerships.

Executive leadership within VDEM also can be a 

boon to the development of these agreements. The 

13 Lamb interview.

14 “Virginia 1st,” Ready Hampton Roads, accessed 30 September 

2015.

15 Multiple interviewees individually identified Gary T. Lupton by 

name for his work in disaster-oriented PPPs, including Robert Conley of Cox Communications; Ryan Garnowski of VDEM; and Benjamin Muncy, formerly of VDEM.

16 Gary Lupton, interview with the author via telephone, 14 August 

2014, hereafter Lupton interview.

17 Lupton interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

199

founder of VDEM’s public-private partnership program credits VDEM leaders with advocating for the 

creation of their position in 2011.18 A second VDEM 

employee, who manages donations of physical aid 

from the private sector, echoes these sentiments by 

pointing out that their job exists because of a specific commitment from VDEM leaders to fund the 

position in the agency’s budget—a tacit recognition 

of the value VDEM leaders saw in setting aside money to develop relationships with businesses.19 These 

observations are important because they illustrate 

that leaders’ commitments to forge partnerships led 

to the financing of full-time equivalent jobs within 

VDEM. Those positions, in turn, helped cement Virginia 811 and Virginia 1st’s partnerships with VDEM.

Leadership is also critical in the daily management of disaster-management agreements. These 

day-to-day needs can range from dealing with mundane administrative matters to reaching out to organizations that are not yet partners but may become 

partners in the future. An official from Cox Communications, a telecommunications company, recalls that 

one official in the Virginia governor’s office was pivotal in encouraging state-level partnerships and facilitating cooperation among private sector actors for 

emergency-management purposes.20 Without this 

state official’s management skills, communication 

18 Muncy interview.

19 Reidelbach interview.

20 Conley interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

200

between Cox and the state may have been less than 

ideal. Today Cox and VDEM invite one another’s representatives to table-top exercises to practice simulated disaster responses.21 A former VDEM private 

sector liaison shows the importance of leadership by 

highlighting his agency’s work to connect Walgreens 

with the Virginia Department of Health for collaboration on public health-related projects.22 Without 

these efforts, it is doubtful that the Walgreens/

Virginia Department of Health partnership would exist.

Organizational Structure

Most state-level partnerships in Virginia lack a formal 

organizational structure. They are not governed by 

MOUs or other legally binding agreements, except 

in the case of contracts for specific products or services to be provided during a disaster. This informality is by design. VDEM has resisted creating MOUs; 

private firms do not appear eager to enter into MOUs 

either. Despite the predominant lack of formal organizational structure, there is a pattern to PPPs in 

the state. The organization of partnerships is primarily a function of a mutual commitment to so-called 

“handshake” agreements, coupled with the strength 

of relationships between pivotal individual actors 

in the partnership. The commitment to handshake 

agreements provides the foundation for these part21 Conley interview.

22 Garnowski interview. 
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

201

nerships, while the key actors in the partnership help 

build, launch, and sustain the partnership.

VDEM’s commitment to informally structured 

partnerships began in earnest when the agency first 

hired a full-time, public-private sector liaison in 2011.23

The information shared at the time was not sensitive 

enough to warrant an MOU and firms often did not 

want formal agreements with VDEM. Instead, the organizational structure of the partnerships was based 

on trust. Despite internal resistance to MOUs, at 

least two MOUs were signed during the early years of 

the emergency-management collaboration program 

at VDEM—one with a telecommunications company and another with an electricity provider.24 VDEM’s 

next public-private sector liaison continued largely 

to advance the view within VDEM that partnerships 

should not be structured formally.25 However, VDEM 

uses a new online information sharing portal called 

WebEOC, and access to the site is governed by 

MOUs.26 Therefore, while VDEM’s informal approach 

to most partnerships dominates, it also seems that 

MOUs continue to hold a minor role.

VDEM’s coordinator of private sector donations 

takes a nuanced view of how the state’s partnerships are structured. They believe that while informal 

agreements are preferable, it is also possible to have 

23 Garnowski interview.

24 Muncy interview.

25 Garnowski interview.

26 Garnowski interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

202

an MOU and at the same time to act informally.27

This implies that in Virginia, firms can simultaneously 

have elements of both formal and informal PPPs with 

VDEM. VDEM’s public-private sector liaison echoes 

this theme. VDEM partners were sometimes told up 

front that a significant amount of their collaboration 

with VDEM would be improvisational, suggesting that 

the demands of particular emergencies dictate the 

precise ways in which a partnership manifests itself.28

Individual leaders contribute significantly to the 

development and organizational structure of Virginia’s agreements. In many cases, the professional 

relationship between just two organizational heads 

provides the impetus for a broader partnership. For 

example, one representative from Cox Communications formerly served in the U.S. Air Force.29 They underline how their military background helped them 

bond with VDEM’s director of operations, who had 

served in the U.S. Marine Corps.30 This experience 

highlights the importance of one-to-one relationships in the broader context of Virginia’s emergencymanagement partnerships. Similarly, Virginia 811’s 

CEO approached VDEM personally because they 

were interested in bolstering Virginia 811’s disaster 

resilience.31 Interpersonal conversations among the 

actors in the PPP can also deepen the ties between 

27 Reidelbach interview.

28 Garnowski interview.

29 Conley interview.

30 Conley interview.

31 Lamb interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

203

organizations.32 These strong ties can yield dividends 

during emergencies, says one VDEM official, directly 

associating the notions of strong relationships and 

effectiveness in emergency responses.33

There are, however, drawbacks to informally structured partnerships. When the personnel who actively 

manage PPPs for their respective organizations turn 

over, this causes a de facto reset of the partnership, 

since there may not be a formal document in place 

attesting to the existence of a partnership.34 Public 

and private sector managers must be introduced to 

one another and build a relationship again from the 

ground up.35 Rebuilding working relationships in this 

way takes time and commitment from government 

and business representatives. If efforts to rebuild the 

relationship founder, it is possible that a once healthy 

and active partnership can atrophy or disappear altogether. 

An additional potential risk to informally structured partnerships is that they may increase the risks 

of breakdowns in accountability and corruption. No 

one interviewed for this study suggested that there 

is anything improper happening in Virginia’s disaster 

partnerships. But it is true that informally structured 

partnerships lack the accountability present within more formal agreements such as contracts and 

MOUs. For these reasons, when problems arise in 

32 Reidelbach interview.

33 Reidelbach interview.

34 Garnowski interview.

35 Garnowski interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

204

disaster responses, identifying the actors responsible for the problems becomes harder, since responsibilities are loosely defined in informal agreements. 

And there may also be greater potential for graft.36 So, 

while the flexibility of informal structures carries numerous advantages, the lack of a formal organizational structure for disaster-oriented PPPs can also prove 

to be a weakness.

Information Sharing

Information exchange among businesses and VDEM 

appears to be the chief objective and primary benefit of emergency-management collaborations in the 

state.37 This sharing of information can be broken 

down into two types: informal exchange, such as 

in telephone conversations, meetings, and conferences; and formal exchange, including situational 

updates, forecasts, and resource requests. It is fair 

to say that informal information sharing is more valuable for both VDEM and businesses than formal information sharing. 

VDEM and its private sector partners value informal information exchange. Part of the reason this 

informal sharing is so important is that it acts as a 

kind of currency to build social capital among VDEM 

36 For an example of this line of argument, see William F. Shughart 

II, “Disaster Relief as Bad Public Policy,” Independent Review 15, no. 

4 (Spring 2011): 521.

37 Garnowski interview; Reidelbach interview; Lamb interview; Conley interview; Vanderbloemen interview; Muncy interview; and Lupton interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

205

and its partners. For example, within VDEM itself, two 

officials who work regularly with private sector and 

volunteer organizations participate in one another’s 

meetings and include each other in programs and 

presentations. This type of informal information exchange permits them both to work together better. 

The degree to which these officials have been able 

to jointly build a network of private sector actors and 

share information with them has yielded benefits for 

VDEM too. VDEM’s private sector partners occasionally meet other business representatives seeking official emergency-related information. Active VDEM 

partners will steer non-VDEM partners to these two 

agency employees for information.38 These new contacts permit partnerships to form between VDEM 

and businesses, reinforcing the value of its publicprivate sector liaison program.

The social capital accrued from informal information exchanges is of such value that especially strong 

PPPs are handled with great care. For example, one 

former VDEM official resisted another state office’s 

requests to share their business sector contacts with 

them.39 There was a risk, the official says, of the other 

state office sending their business sector contacts 

unwanted email, which they feared would then damage their partnerships.40 The VDEM official’s efforts 

to shield partners from unwanted communications 

38 Reidelbach interview.

39 Muncy interview.

40 Muncy interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

206

underlines the significance of informal information 

sharing in Virginia’s partnerships. This perceived value of informal information exchange is not exclusive 

to VDEM either; a telecom company representative 

that works with VDEM agrees that strong interpersonal communication skills used in informal exchanges, such as attentive listening and discretion, 

are essential for successful partnerships.41

Meetings, conferences, and exercises involving 

VDEM and firms are frequently cited forms of informal information sharing that can strengthen disaster partnerships. VDEM representatives participate 

routinely in business continuity planning (BCP) tabletop exercises, in which businesses simulate how 

they would respond to a disaster. This type of activity is helpful for firms, because if BCP assumptions 

are based on flawed understandings of VDEM’s own 

plans, then firms’ plans may prove useless during disasters. This type of information sharing from VDEM 

to firms enables businesses to make corrections and 

modifications to their own emergency plans, potentially benefiting them during disasters. VDEM also 

has shared its business contacts with local government emergency managers. This connection allows 

corporate donors with existing state-level relationships to be paired with local governments in need of 

donations for assistance.42

Meetings, conferences, and exercises can also 

41 Conley interview.

42 Garnowski interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

207

be valuable for firms. For example, Cox Communications has invited VDEM representatives to give 

presentations to its employees and has participated 

with VDEM in exercises to test disaster response capabilities.43 The executive director of Virginia 1st was 

introduced to the former head of VDEM at a meeting of the Hampton Roads Emergency Management 

Committee (HREMC), a regional organization to support emergency preparedness.44 That initial meeting 

eventually led to a working relationship between 

Virginia 1st and VDEM.45 Dominion is invited regularly to state-sponsored conferences on emergency 

management. In these conferences, state organizations praise Dominion for its collaborative approach 

to emergency management. In this way, Dominion 

showcases its enthusiasm for state emergencymanagement agreements and influences other firms 

to partner with the state.46

Formal information exchange, such as sharing 

situational updates and resource requests during crises, permits VDEM and its partners to act more effectively during large-scale emergencies. State officials 

routinely bring representatives from firms such as 

Walmart and Home Depot to the Virginia Emergency 

Operations Center (VEOC) during disasters, which is 

operated by VDEM.47 This practice facilitates disaster43 Conley interview.

44 Lupton interview.

45 Lupton interview.

46 Vanderbloemen interview.

47 Hayes interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

208

related information sharing between the state and 

the private sector.48 Dominion assigns one of its employees to work from the VEOC every day, regardless 

of whether a disaster is happening.49 Other firms can 

access a web-based information sharing tool that 

VDEM uses during large-scale emergencies.50 These 

forms of formal information sharing between the 

state and businesses permit both the state and the 

private sector to be better informed during emergencies.

Mutual Benefits

Private firms and VDEM would have little reason to 

partner without the presence of immediate or expected benefits. VDEM officials therefore make a 

conscious effort to ensure that their PPPs are mutually beneficial. These mutual benefits tend to fall 

into one of the following two categories: situational 

awareness or functional knowledge. 

A former public-private sector liaison for VDEM 

says that they recognized the need for partnerships 

to be mutually beneficial.51 VDEM’s efforts in this 

regard left a positive impression on the agency’s 

partners. Officials from Dominion, Virginia 811, and 

Virginia 1st offered high praise for the VDEM liaison’s 

work in interviews, demonstrating that VDEM’s focus 

48 Hayes interview.

49 Vanderbloemen interview.

50 Garnowski interview.

51 Garnowski interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

209

on maximizing value for its corporate partners is having a positive effect.52

One of the most significant shared benefits of 

Virginia’s partnerships is situational awareness, which 

FEMA defines as the ability to “identify, process, and 

comprehend the most critical informational elements” about a disaster.53 Without good situational 

awareness, there is potential for overlapping or conflicting emergency response actions, as well as unnecessary duplication of effort.54 The relationships 

that form in these agreements and the information 

sharing that occurs within them improve situational 

awareness. For example, Towne Insurance generates 

reports on local branch closings and provides this 

information to VDEM.55 This type of information can 

help VDEM develop a better sense of where needs exist during crises. In a similar way, Virginia 1st receives 

VDEM’s daily briefing—an email report for situational 

awareness purposes—which is then distributed internally among Virginia 1st’s members.56

Functional knowledge is a key mutual benefit 

of Virginia’s partnerships. In this context, functional 

52 Vanderbloemen interview; Lamb interview; and Lupton interview.

53 “Glossary and Acronyms,” FEMA, accessed 28 August 2015, 17.

54 For an example of how effective coordination can reduce duplication of effort in disaster responses, see Dave Yates and Scott 

Paquette, “Emergency Knowledge Management and Social Media 

Technologies: A Case Study of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake,” International Journal of Information Management 31, no. 1 (February 

2011): 10, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2010.10.001.

55 Lupton interview.

56 Lupton interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

210

knowledge refers to a detailed awareness of the inner machinations, processes, hierarchies, internal 

relationships, and personalities within organizations. 

There are two especially successful areas where 

functional knowledge has increased. First, VDEM has 

passed state-level private sector contacts on to local government emergency managers. With these 

state-level contacts in hand, local emergency managers are able to address their own emergency needs 

better by taking advantage of VDEM’s private sector 

network. Second, VDEM has helped firms to improve 

their own emergency plans by participating with 

them in emergency exercises. This new functional 

knowledge can empower firms to continue operating 

during crises, which benefits local economies.57 At 

the same time, VDEM gains from these exchanges, 

because they help the agency become more familiar with private sector emergency plans. Dominion 

shares geographic information systems (GIS) data on 

critical infrastructure sites throughout the state with 

VDEM.58 This information is valuable for VDEM during 

emergencies, especially if there is a chance that 

these sites may be offline during a crisis. During a Virginia 1st meeting in Richmond, VDEM brought a mobile incident command post, a kind of disaster “war 

room” on wheels, to show Virginia 1st members.59 Familiarizing Virginia 1st members with this equipment 

57 Garnowski interview.

58 Vanderbloemen interview.

59 Lupton interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

211

was beneficial, because it helped them be aware of 

the types of technology VDEM might deploy to their 

own businesses during disaster responses.60

Physical aid, while important in its own right, 

does not appear to be a commonly shared benefit 

in Virginia’s disaster-management accords. No state 

officials or business representatives that were interviewed identified specific additional examples of 

physical aid as a by-product of these partnerships. 

There are a few potential explanations for this. It is 

possible that physical aid is not perceived to be as 

valuable as information during Virginia’s disasters. 

Alternatively, it may be that while firms are eager to 

share information with the state, they are less willing 

to give up valuable physical inventory, which costs 

them more than sharing information. A third possible explanation is that state requests for physical aid 

after disasters are infrequent, insignificant, or both. 

Trust

Trust is of unparalleled importance in Virginia’s partnerships. VDEM officials and business representatives consistently emphasize the pivotal role that trust 

plays in forming, maintaining, and growing emergencymanagement agreements.61

The early establishment of trust between VDEM 

and businesses appears critical to forming partner60 Lupton interview.

61 Vanderbloemen interview; Garnowski interview; Lamb interview; 

Conley interview; Muncy interview; and Lupton interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

212

ships. The agency takes a deliberately slow approach 

to building trust with private sector partners and 

tends to view partnerships as personal relationships.62 In initial meetings with prospective partners, 

VDEM will give the partner a sense of its capabilities 

as an agency but also sets the expectation with firm 

representatives that much of their joint cooperation will be unplanned.63 This open, candid approach 

helps foster trust between VDEM and its partners.64

An official from Virginia 811 is quick to describe the 

VDEM liaison’s professionalism, efficiency, and productivity in their partnership.65 They also indicate the 

importance of trust, suggesting a link between the 

VDEM liaison’s efforts and the importance of trust in 

their partnership.66

Trust is essential to maintain these partnerships 

over time. State and business officials agree that 

they must be able to rely on the information that they 

share with one another during disasters.67 Without 

trustworthy information from their partners, employees may report to inoperable business facilities or 

government officials may wait for hours for deliveries 

of supplies that never materialize.68 A representative 

from Cox Communications says trust is indispensable, especially when there are sensitive communi62 Garnowski interview.

63 Garnowski interview.

64 Garnowski interview.

65 Lamb interview.

66 Lamb interview.

67 Vanderbloemen interview; and Hayes interview.

68 Vanderbloemen interview; and Hayes interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

213

cations among partners during emergencies that 

could prove damaging to reputations if aired publicly.69 Moreover, banks will sometimes need to share 

proprietary information with VDEM and other government agencies.70 These banks have to trust that 

the proprietary information they share with VDEM 

will not be disclosed.71

As these agreements evolve, trust remains vital 

to keep partnerships strong. When VDEM’s private 

sector contacts turn over, the agency has to begin 

the time-consuming work of building trust and relationships with the new private sector contacts.72

Institutional-level trust does not transfer automatically from one person to another when personnel 

leave or change jobs. Rather, trust must be built 

again with each new contact. The founder of VDEM’s 

private sector liaison program describes an example 

demonstrating why trust and personal relationships 

influence the growth of partnerships. VDEM created a dedicated email address for its private sector 

program, but the agency’s partners would not use 

the address because it felt impersonal.73 “Trust plays 

into that because they want to believe there’s a person behind this, that there is a person advocating for 

them,” the founder says.74 Even as VDEM’s partner69 Conley interview.

70 Lupton interview.

71 Lupton interview.

72 Garnowski interview.

73 Muncy interview.

74 Muncy interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

214

ship program expanded, its private sector collaborators wanted a dedicated contact person whom they 

knew and trusted personally.

Adaptability and Sustainability

Virginia’s disaster-oriented PPPs adapt continually to changing circumstances. In some cases, early 

one-to-one relationships between a single VDEM 

representative and a business executive grow into 

partnerships. Existing PPPs change too. Disasters are 

becoming more complex, so the state’s disaster-oriented PPPs shift to keep pace with their demands. 

Public expectations are also changing. Uncertain 

budget outlooks and personnel turnover can make it 

harder for management agencies and businesses to 

keep their disaster-oriented PPPs going.75 Collectively, these challenges show why adaptability is critical 

for the long-run success of disaster-oriented PPPs.

There is evidence of individual contacts between VDEM and business representatives leading 

to disaster partnerships between their respective 

organizations.76 Virginia 811’s experience with VDEM 

exemplifies this adaptability. Initial informal contacts 

between Virginia 811’s CEO and VDEM representatives have pushed forward the relationship between 

the two organizations.77 Today, Virginia 811 employees 

take emergency-management courses to acquire a 

75 Vanderbloemen interview.

76 Garnowski interview.

77 Lamb interview; and Garnowski interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

215

technical knowledge base that will permit them to 

engage further with VDEM. This suggests that Virginia 811 is committed to working with VDEM permanently to increase its resilience.78

Public expectations of emergency-management 

agencies are changing. VDEM and its partners must 

adapt to keep pace. For instance, Cox is now using 

social media platforms and trying to determine the 

best way to communicate with technology-savvy 

customers.79 The need for government agencies 

to build public support for their work is prompting 

VDEM and its partners to use new tactics as well. 

One such initiative, called the Superstars program, 

honors outstanding community volunteers working 

in the public safety arena at local city council meetings.80 Virginia 1st members attend these meetings, 

providing a way for banks to demonstrate their engagement in local communities while also highlighting their partnerships with VDEM.81

Sustaining the momentum and strength of disaster partnerships can be challenging for VDEM and 

businesses. For example, firms can be restricted by 

budgetary shortfalls and constraints on personnel, 

preventing them from dedicating many resources 

to the partnership.82 Moreover, firms face a different 

78 Lamb interview.

79 Conley interview.

80 Lupton interview. See “Superstar Awards 2010,” Virginia Citizen 

Corps, accessed 6 February 2020.

81 Lupton interview.

82 Vanderbloemen interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

216

set of behavioral incentives than government agencies. While government agencies are taxpayer funded and designed to serve the public interest, private 

firms must ensure that their own leaders, clients, and 

shareholders are getting the financial results that 

they desire.83 This fundamental difference in publicand private-sector behavioral incentives means that 

the partnership may not get the level of attention 

that representatives on either side consider to be 

ideal. When personnel change roles, representatives 

on both sides of the partnership must also adapt 

to new circumstances.84 The time required to adapt 

to new personnel can mean that actions within the 

partnership diminish temporarily until new personnel 

are up to speed.

Nonprofit and Industry Organizations: 

A Missing Link

Nonprofit and industry organizations play a quiet, yet 

instrumental, role in Virginia’s disaster partnerships. 

Nonprofit professional associations like the Better 

Business Bureau (BBB) permit VDEM to connect instantly with a slew of firms. This arrangement can 

make forming partnerships easier for VDEM than 

attempting to form individual partnerships with one 

firm at a time. Volunteers, such as those that assisted Mineral City residents after the 2011 earthquake 

there, or the recipients of Superstar awards at local 

83 Vanderbloemen interview.

84 Garnowski interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

217

council meetings, play a pivotal role in disaster response too. They can perform many of the disaster 

response tasks that otherwise would be filled by 

government employees, such as distributing aid or 

assisting homeowners with cleanup tasks. Nonprofit 

and industry organizations are missing from the analytical framework, but the evidence from Virginia suggests that the framework may be worth modifying to 

incorporate these organizations to capture more fully 

the dynamics of state partnerships.

The BBB, Virginia 1st, and Virginia 811 demonstrate why partnering with nonprofit organizations 

can be a powerful way for the state to develop agreements with profit-seeking firms. For example, a former VDEM private sector liaison highlights their 

relationship with the former Richmond-area BBB 

head, since the BBB acted as a gateway for VDEM to 

connect with many small businesses that were BBB 

members.85 This experience shows a connection between VDEM’s desire to partner with businesses and 

their liaison’s professional relationship with the head 

of the BBB. VDEM’s experience with Virginia 1st is 

similar. In some ways, VDEM’s relationship with Virginia 1st was a natural fit, as the financial sector has 

long been a leader in continuity planning.86 Virginia 

1st also provided a way for VDEM to connect with 

many financial firms at once.87 Virginia 811, whose 

85 Muncy interview.

86 Muncy interview.

87 Garnowski interview.
CHAPTER FIVE

218

partnership with VDEM is new, is similar to the BBB 

and Virginia 1st because its members are almost exclusively profit-seeking utility companies.88

Volunteer organizations can perform roles that 

bridge gaps between business and government capabilities, making them valuable intermediaries in 

disaster management partnerships. For example, volunteers can play essential roles in post-disaster responses, such as mold remediation or debris removal, 

which are both tasks that could be performed by either government or business employees, depending 

on the specific circumstances of the disaster.89

Virginia’s Disaster Partnerships: 

A State-Managed Solution

The emergency-management agreements present 

in Virginia vary. While nonprofit and industry organizations play key roles within them, VDEM also partners directly with many firms. These partnerships 

have yielded tangible results for Virginians affected 

by disasters, such as residents impacted by the Mineral City earthquake who needed carbon monoxide 

detectors. Additionally, during Hurricane Irene, residents received emergency warning messages posted 

on Walgreens’ outdoor display signs. The culture of 

VDEM’s partnership program is also noteworthy because of its informal nature. While VDEM does not 

88 Lamb interview.

89 Reidelbach interview.
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

219

reject the trappings of formal partnerships, such as 

MOUs, the leaders of the state’s partnership program 

make a point to approach partnerships as personal 

relationships. That seems to strengthen the sense of 

trust that exists between VDEM and its partners. 

The unique approach that VDEM takes in forming and creating partnerships invites us to consider 

what advantages, if any, federal government involvement would bring to the state’s partnership program. 

The state budget outlook in Virginia can shift with 

political fortunes in Richmond. This means that a 

generous amount of emergency-management funding today may vanish tomorrow. To guard against 

this possibility, an injection of federal funding, such 

as a homeland security grant, may help ensure that 

VDEM retains a public-private sector coordinator 

position. But if that funding has specific conditions 

attached to it—such as the need to structure these 

agreements in a particular way—then VDEM leaders 

would do well to reconsider the decision to accept 

these federal dollars. 

Restructuring the state’s emergency-management partnership program would make little sense at 

this point. The program has demonstrated that it can 

produce results that advance VDEM’s mission. Moreover, the agency’s partners have gone on the record 

to express their satisfaction with the state’s administration of its program. None of this is to suggest that 

all of VDEM’s partnerships are somehow ideal. But it 

does indicate that federal involvement in Virginia’s 
CHAPTER FIVE

220

emergency-management accords, particularly dictating the ways in which those partnerships are administered or structured, would likely do more harm 

than good.

Conclusions

This chapter showed that Virginia’s disaster-oriented 

PPPs are driven by the eight factors—crisis, leadership, organizational structure, information sharing, 

trust, mutual benefits, adaptability, and sustainability. Of the eight factors, state and business officials 

appear to agree that trust is the most important of 

the factors, with shared benefits a close second. 

The evidence presented also shows that the analytical framework is viable a tool to assess disaster 

partnerships in Virginia. However, an additional factor—the role of nonprofit and industry organizations 

as a facilitator of PPPs—appears pivotal in the state’s 

partnerships. Nonprofits can serve as convenient 

hubs that permit many firms and VDEM to partner en 

masse; they can be valuable intermediaries between 

businesses and government. Nonprofit organizations can provide volunteers who perform roles that 

bridge gaps in emergency-management capabilities 

between the public and private sectors. Since nonprofit and industry organizations can play these important roles in emergency management, and act as 

important links between government agencies and 

businesses, it may be that the analytical framework 

requires modification to capture more completely 
DISASTERS IN THE OLD DOMINION

221

the roles of these organizations in disaster partnerships.

The special culture of VDEM’s disaster-oriented 

PPPs combines an informal approach with a degree 

of admirable candor and trust among partners. While 

it is difficult to quantify the value of that culture, the 

evidence presented here suggests that it is worth 

preserving, because it seems to fit VDEM’s needs 

well. Imposing federal structures or guidelines on 

the state’s disaster-oriented PPP program would be 

unwise, because to do so risks disrupting an established, successful emergency-management initiative.
222

Chapter Six

TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS 

OF STATE DISASTER-ORIENTED PPPS

Thus far, we have seen how disaster partnerships 

influence emergency-management practices in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia. Each state 

faces an array of natural and man-made hazards, and 

to varying extents their partnerships were designed 

with these hazards in mind. The states have also 

developed emergency-management agreements in 

ways that reflect the unique political, economic, and 

demographic characteristics that each state possesses. 

In this final chapter, the analytical framework is 

used to compare partnerships that are present in the 

four states. The purpose of this analysis is twofold: 

first, it is to assess how viable the analytical framework is for evaluations of state-level partnerships and 

to show how the eight factors were observed across 

the four cases. Second, this analysis serves to compare and contrast the emergency-management col-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

223

laborations present in California, Florida, New York, 

and Virginia, highlighting their unique traits and the 

degree to which they reflect local conditions and circumstances.

The chapter proceeds in three steps. First, a 

table is presented that summarizes how the eight 

factors were manifest across the four cases. Next, 

a systematic comparative analysis of each of the 

eight factors is presented for California, Florida, New 

York, and Virginia’s disaster partnerships. For added 

clarity, this comparative analysis is organized across 

four themes: key findings, unexpected results, comparative similarities and differences, and analyses of 

the reasons for the underlying differences observed 

across the cases. The chapter closes with an assessment of how these findings can lead to new understandings of partnerships, as well as advising that 

the federal government not interfere in the direction 

or management of state-level partnerships for emergency management.

Crises

KEY FINDINGS

Crises triggered by disasters exert a powerful influence on state-level disaster partnerships. Across 

each of the states, crises consistently led to two types 

of events: the creation of disaster-oriented PPPs and 

the cementing of professional relationships within 

preexisting partnerships.
Table 6.1. Summary of findings—disaster-oriented PPPs in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia

Framework factors Crisis Leadership Organizational 

structure

Information 

sharing

Mutual 

benefits

Trust Adaptability Sustainability Nonprofit 

and industry

organizations

States California ü ü ü ü ü ü ü X ü

Florida ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü

New York ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü

Virginia ü ü ü ü ü ü ü X ü

ü= factor present in stateX= factor not present in stateSource: compiled by author.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

225

Disaster-caused crises in all four states led to 

new emergency-management partnerships. Indeed, 

crises appear to be the primary generator of statelevel disaster partnerships. For example, in Virginia, 

the Mineral City earthquake (2011) led to new levels 

of public-private sector engagement in the state. This 

collaboration provided potentially lifesaving smoke 

and carbon monoxide detectors to residents who 

needed them. Hurricanes Irene and Sandy, which 

struck New York State in 2011 and 2012, respectively, 

prompted the NYSOEM to work with FedEx, Walmart, 

PepsiCo, and Home Depot, among many other firms, 

to deliver physical aid to disaster survivors. The Ebola virus outbreak of 2014 led the NYCOEM to coordinate closely with private sector officials concerned 

about the possibility of the virus spreading from 

West Africa to New York City. California wildfires in 

2006–7 and the 2004–5 hurricane season in Florida 

had similar effects, in that they led CalOES and the 

FDEM to work with businesses to meet the material needs of disaster survivors and help restore local 

economic activity. In each of these cases, specific disaster-caused crises brought state government and 

business officials together to address the crises in a 

coordinated manner.

Preexisting professional relationships within existing emergency-management accords also were 

strengthened through crises. For instance, in Virginia, Home Depot managers have relied on VDEM 
CHAPTER SIX

226

reports to adjust their staffing levels during hurricanes. This sort of activity plays an important role 

in maintaining disaster partnerships, for it can reinforce the bonds between firms and state agencies. 

A senior CalOES official acknowledges that the 

agency’s regular contact with firms during crises is 

evidence of why strong professional relationships 

among partners are vital. In Florida, crises caused 

by disaster events led to the creation of privateprivate partnerships between a shipping firm and 

other businesses, as well as the involvement of 

groups such as the ALAN and VOAD, reinforcing the 

ties between south Florida businesses. The trial by 

fire nature of crises bolsters partnerships because 

they allow state officials and business representatives to collaborate in mutually beneficial ways. 

When this government-business collaboration successfully meets public and private sector objectives, it also strengthens the relationships between 

government and business partners.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

That disaster-caused crises can drive the creation 

of state partnerships is, in itself, unsurprising. This 

finding is consistent with research carried out by 

other scholars. For example, Ami J. Abou-bakr found 

that crises have significant influence on federal 

emergency-management agreements, and Thomas 

A. Birkland identified the potential of disasters as 

policy “focusing events” that can spur governmental 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

227

action, including, perhaps, the formation of disaster 

partnerships.1

Researchers already know that crises can induce 

altruistic, cooperative, community-oriented behavior 

from individuals.2 The phenomenon is so acute that it 

has been dubbed the “post-disaster Utopia,” though 

this feeling of altruism is not a universal experience.3

But given that disasters—and by extension, disaster-caused crises—can spur this sort of behavior 

among individuals in communities, it is not surprising 

that disaster-caused crises can also help strengthen 

professional relationships among public and private 

sector actors involved in disaster responses. 

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

In California and Florida, disaster-caused crises 

have led to the development of CalOES’s BUOC and 

FDEM’s ESF-18, respectively. New York and Virginia have each experienced disaster-caused crises, 

which led to the development of partnerships. These 

accords differ sharply from those of California and 

1

 Ami J. Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private 

Partnerships (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

2013), 43–45; and Thomas A. Birkland, After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1997), 59–62. 2

 Krzysztof Kaniasty and Fran Norris, “The Experience of Disaster: 

Individuals and Communities Sharing Trauma,” in Response to Disaster: Psychosocial, Community, and Ecological Approaches, ed. 

Richard Gist and Bernard Lubin (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor & Francis, 

1999), 28–35. 3

 Kaniasty and Norris, “The Experience of Disaster,” 31.
CHAPTER SIX

228

Florida, in the sense that they do not operate within 

comparable formal organizational frameworks. While 

disaster-caused crises have driven the creation of 

collaborations across the four cases, the forms of the 

resulting partnerships are distinct. In all four states, 

disaster-caused crises reinforce professional relationships among government and business representatives. 

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

The effect of crises on the creation of disaster partnerships are negligible across the four states. The 

diverse organizational structures of the resultant 

partnerships, however, can be attributed to a host of 

potential variables, such as the state political climate, 

economic health of the state in question, staffing levels at individual state emergency-management agencies, and so on. These variables will be explored in 

greater depth later in this chapter.

Leadership

KEY FINDINGS

Leaders within business entities and government 

agencies hold considerable influence over the creation and future directions of disaster partnerships. 

This leadership consistently occurs in two tiers. The 

top tier—executive-level leadership—offers crucial 

organizational direction and support for the development and maintenance of disaster partnerships. 

The second-tier, management-level leadership, is re-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

229

sponsible for shaping the daily operations of state 

emergency-management agreements. 

Without top-level engagement within government agencies and businesses, the partnerships 

explored here would likely not exist. One way that executives make emergency-management agreements 

possible is through their ability to manage their respective organizations’ budgets. In Virginia, for example, VDEM leaders decided to create and fund 

a public-private sector liaison position, as well as a 

coordinator of donations from businesses. A second 

way executives support partnerships is to foster organizational cultures conducive to interorganizational collaborations. The CEO of Virginia 811 reached 

out directly to VDEM to enhance their organization’s 

emergency preparedness, leading to a partnership 

between VDEM and Virginia 811. 

The governor’s office in New York State has a 

strong commitment to and relationship with business leaders, and this support translates into coordination with firms during disasters. New York City 

differs from New York State in this regard, because 

while the state government has no formal disaster 

partnership program, the city does, and it is backed 

by explicit support from both the New York City mayor’s office and the commissioner of the NYCOEM. 

In California, the former executive director of the 

CRA organized hundreds of public and private sector 

representatives involved in emergency management 

throughout the state. Across all four states, execu-
CHAPTER SIX

230

tive-level leaders consistently provide the organizational support necessary for disaster partnerships 

to exist by channeling money and personnel toward 

developing these partnerships.

Mid-level organizational managers in state agencies and businesses direct the day-to-day administration of these agreements, and their leadership skills 

permit disaster partnerships to continue operating. 

For instance, in California, CalOES’s public-private 

sector coordinator is cited repeatedly as the organizational keystone in the state government’s efforts 

to launch and maintain emergency-management 

partnerships. Managers at Walmart, the American 

Red Cross, and Cisco, all of whom work directly or 

indirectly with CalOES, manage their respective organizations’ relationships with the agency. Florida 

government officials with the Department of Economic Opportunity and the FDEM are strong proponents of the business community in general, and 

their favorable views of the private sector seem to 

translate into their consistent support of and work 

with the state’s private sector partners. 

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

The influence of leadership in the context of state 

partnerships is somewhat predictable, given the similarities among federal- and state-level emergencymanagement activities. What stands out, however, is 

the degree to which New York State officials are able 

to partner with firms, despite the absence of a formal 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

231

partnership program in the state. Through a combination of efforts in the NYSOEM and the governor’s 

office, New York engages with firms during disasters 

to deliver goods such as food and emergency electrical generators to disaster survivors. New York State is 

unique among the four cases in this regard, because 

only New York State lacked a formal partnership program.

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

Senior officials in government agencies and businesses in all four states are instrumental in the 

initial formation and operations of these emergencymanagement agreements. Yet, subtle differences are 

apparent across the four cases too. In California and 

Virginia, for example, few officials interviewed mentioned the role of state-level political forces in those 

states’ partnerships. By contrast, political forces in 

New York and Florida seemed to loom large within 

the state bureaucracy, since so much of New York’s 

partnership efforts are concentrated in the office of 

the governor; and in Florida, former governor Rick 

Scott made boosting business activity a prominent 

policy priority. 

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

The differing roles of political forces across the cases 

are likely attributable to historical factors too complex to examine in detail here. But, in brief, it may 

be that New York and Florida are known as states 
CHAPTER SIX

232

with executives who are perceived to be particularly hands-on leaders, whereas California and Virginia’s governors are not known to be deeply engaged 

in the machinations of the state bureaucracy. It may 

also be the case that senior state officials within the 

NYSOEM and the FDEM enjoy especially strong trust 

from the state’s political leaders and are given a correspondingly wide latitude to forge partnerships and 

otherwise engage with businesses to help the state 

manage disasters.

Organizational Structure

KEY FINDINGS

No topic of discussion elicited more animated responses from the officials interviewed for this book 

than organizational structure—and, specifically, discussions of MOUs. Only California finds MOUs desirable for its partnerships, although at least one 

CalOES official acknowledges the limitations of 

MOUs as tools to manage interorganizational relationships and measure program success. Virginia, 

New York, and Florida officials take varied positions 

on MOUs, from a somewhat tepid embrace of MOUs 

(i.e., New York) to outright opposition (i.e., Florida).

California uses signed MOUs as a way to gauge 

the success of its partnership program. This approach to measuring success offers a mixture of 

benefits and disadvantages. MOUs provide CalOES 

with a tangible way to demonstrate that an organi-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

233

zational relationship exists between the organization 

and BUOC members. MOUs also can help buffer the 

effects of personnel turnover for both CalOES and its 

partners. Yet, MOUs have at least one downside: relying on them as a metric to assess the success of 

CalOES’s program can be misleading, for the sheer 

number of signed MOUs offers no details about the 

quality of the partnerships themselves. Moreover, 

MOUs can be written in such a way that they do not 

explicitly commit either CalOES or its partners to 

anything. To CalOES’s credit, the agency recognizes 

that the MOU structure has limitations and is working to develop new metrics to measure the success 

of its program.

New York, Virginia, and Florida government and 

business representatives use MOUs in different ways 

from California. In New York State, there is no formal partnership program, so MOUs governing statelevel, disaster-oriented PPPs do not exist—though 

this does not indicate that the state would either embrace or reject MOUs if the NYSOEM were to create 

an emergency management collaboration program. 

Instead, the bulk of the state’s work with businesses 

during disasters is improvisational. The NYCOEM aspires to develop formal agreements with firms, and in 

many cases has done so successfully; however, the 

NYCOEM recognizes that official agreements can be 

problematic for businesses. Virginia and Florida both 

lean away from developing MOUs. In the eyes of gov-
CHAPTER SIX

234

ernment and business officials in these states, the 

strength of the personal relationships between public and private sector representatives in partnerships 

are fundamentally more important than any type 

of written agreement and offer a more robust way 

of predicting whether a partner will deliver results 

during disasters.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

The divisions among the states regarding their attitudes toward MOUs were surprisingly diverse. These 

divisions reflect a variety of state-level understandings of the roles that MOUs can play in the context 

of partnerships. Scholars have recognized the degree to which informal factors such as trust can play 

roles alongside and interact with formal partnership 

mechanisms and tools such as MOUs or contracts. 

These findings are consistent with other literature on 

the dynamics of public policy partnerships. For example, writing of partnerships for international development, such as HIV prevention campaigns, Thomas 

Franklin notes:

Successful partnerships do not always have, 

nor do they always need, formal structures. 

Viability often depends as much on intangibles such as good personal and social relations as it does on finely honed memoranda 

of understanding. Mutual respect and reciprocity often determine the degree to which 

partners are genuinely committed to joint ac-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

235

tion. Trust and confidence are as important 

as signatures and logos.4

Franklin demonstrates here that instruments 

such as MOUs can exist alongside other informal 

mechanisms in institutional partnerships. So, while 

California’s focus on MOUs may be understandable 

from the standpoint of government measurement 

and evaluation, many other forces converge to make 

partnerships work well. New York, Virginia, and Florida appear to recognize this distinction among formal and informal partnership factors, because MOUs 

play a far less significant role in those states’ disasteroriented PPPs.

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

Disaster management agreements in the four cases exist along a spectrum of formality, ranging from 

a mostly improvisational approach to partnership 

(New York) to a rigid, formal organizational structure (California). At the same time, there are obvious 

similarities among the cases; each of the four states 

partners with firms that provide goods (e.g., Walmart 

in California) and services (e.g., FedEx in New York). 

While it is challenging to develop a generalizable 

conclusion from this evidence, it appears that the 

diversity of the partnership structures themselves is 

4

 Thomas Franklin, “How Partnership Works,” Development in 

Practice 19, no. 6 (August 2009): 790–91, https://doi.org/10.1080

/09614520903027106.
CHAPTER SIX

236

a point of strength across the cases. In other words, 

there is no one correct way to create or maintain 

partnerships.

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

The differing approaches to partnership structures 

that appear across the four cases are probably attributable to a mixture of public policy and political 

variables unique to each individual state. California’s 

focus on signing MOUs with its partners may be a 

symptom of a broader state tendency toward formal government regulations of activities in a host of 

public policy areas. For example, California has long 

been seen as a national leader among states for its 

stringent pollution restrictions, which exceed those 

of the federal government, and today are increasingly 

adopted by other states.5

 Yet, this explanation—that 

California prizes formal regulation of public policy 

activities, and therefore is more partial to MOUs 

than the other states—is not satisfying. New York 

has a similar reputation for regulatory heavy-handedness but lacks a formal partnership program in the 

NYSOEM.6

It is here that we might speculate on the role of 

5

 Roger Karapin, Political Opportunities for Climate Policy: California, New York, and the Federal Government (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2016), 4.

6

 Michael J. Malbin and Peter W. Brusoe, “Campaign Finance Policy 

in the State and City of New York,” in The Oxford Handbook of New 

York State Government and Politics, ed. Gerald Benjamin (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 79, https://doi.org/10.1093

/oxfordhb/9780195387230.013.0004.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

237

politics within the states, and especially the working 

relationships among elected officials and state bureaucrats. For instance, it is possible that California 

politicians—especially the governor—somehow give 

CalOES employees less professional leeway than in 

other states. Such broad generalizations are practically impossible to demonstrate, but these generalizations do provide a partial explanation. Moreover, of 

relevance here is what Christopher Hood and Martin 

Lodge refer to as “public service bargains”; that is, the 

professional interplay between bureaucrats and politicians, including the risk/reward systems that can 

incentivize action among state workers and elected 

officials.7

 For example, state governors who appoint 

agency heads, such as the director of CalOES, may implicitly trust some of those agency heads more than 

others. Alternatively, certain cabinet officials may be 

perceived as more loyal to the governor than others. 

Governors, in turn, may reward these most trusted 

appointees by giving them considerable discretion to 

manage their agencies without interference from the 

governor’s office. It may be that the types of public 

service bargains that exist in California differ from the 

bargains seen in other states, and these differences 

influence how CalOES officials act.

An additional point worth noting here is the degree to which informal partnership structures can 

7

 Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge, The Politics of Public Service 

Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty—and Blame (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2006), 15, https://doi.org/10.1093/0199269

67X.001.0001.
CHAPTER SIX

238

potentially reduce accountability and provide opportunities for corruption. No evidence surfaced during 

the course of this study to suggest that disaster 

management-related corruption is an issue in California, Florida, New York, or Virginia. But we would also 

be naïve to assume that such corruption has never, 

and will never, occur in any of these states. Informal 

partnership structures offer partnership participants 

degrees of flexibility and latitude that help facilitate 

easier communication and collaboration among organizational partners. However, that same flexibility can, under the right circumstances, provide an 

opening for potential mismanagement of funds and 

physical aid that are earmarked for disaster-stricken 

communities.8

Information Sharing

KEY FINDINGS

Data exchange is the most common activity in each 

of the four state-level partnership programs examined in this book. This information sharing can be 

characterized as either strategic or tactical. Strategic 

communication refers to interactions that take place 

8

 See, for example, Eiji Yamamura, “Impact of Natural Disaster on 

Public Sector Corruption,” Public Choice 161, no. 3/4 (2014): 385–

405, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0154-6; Adriana Cordis and 

Jeff Milyo, Don’t Blame the Weather: Federal Natural Disaster Aid 

and Public Corruption, Mercatus Working Paper (Arlington, VA: 

Mercatus Center, George Mason University, 2015); and Aimee Ortiz, “Plot to Steal Florida Hurricane Aid Leads to Indictments,” New 

York Times, 20 November 2019.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

239

outside of specific disasters, including regular meetings, conferences, disaster response exercises, and 

informal contacts via phone or email. Tactical communication relates to the exchange of data in the 

context of specific disasters and crises. Both varieties of information sharing are fundamental in Virginia, 

New York, California, and Florida’s partnerships.

Strategic communications between state emergency-management agencies and firms can enhance 

state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs. In Virginia, for example, companies such as Cox Communications and 

groups such as Virginia 1st participate in meetings and 

exercises that build rapport with VDEM representatives. CalOES hosts disaster-preparedness workshops 

with private sector representatives. Florida sponsors 

two large conferences every year that bring together 

government emergency-management officials and 

business representatives to discuss disaster preparedness. New York State is unique in its use of strategic communications. Although there is no formal 

program in New York State, frequent informal contact 

takes place between the governor’s office and businesses, and these contacts appear to have created a 

range of strong public-private sector relationships in 

the state that are leveraged during disasters. Each of 

these initiatives by state governments demonstrate a 

focus on strategic information sharing between state 

government agencies and firms. This type of data 

exchange helps partnerships to remain fresh and engaging, even in the absence of disasters. 
CHAPTER SIX

240

Tactical communications are concerned chiefly 

with the myriad issues that must be sorted through 

in responding to disasters. For example, in Florida, 

firms share status updates with the FDEM, and the 

agency provides businesses with information on curfews, road closures, and supply chain disruptions. 

Firms with operations in California, such as Walmart, 

send information to CalOES using a proprietary, webbased information sharing system. CalOES offers 

its BUOC partners access to the system for its own 

benefit, because this can give CalOES a window into 

the business community’s needs, helping the agency deploy its own resources and operations more 

productively. The vast majority of the public-private 

sector information sharing that takes place between 

businesses and the NYSOEM concerns the movement and delivery of physical aid during and after 

disasters. In Virginia, private firms and the VDEM exchange situational updates and resource requests in 

the context of disasters. Tactical information sharing 

is integral to partnerships in the four states, reinforcing the value of this facet of the analytical framework 

in assessments of state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

Although each of the four cases above provided 

strong evidence of information sharing, New York 

State proved to be the most surprising case, given 

that the state lacks an organized emergency management collaboration program. Since so much emer-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

241

gency management–related activity is concentrated 

in the office of governor, rather than within the bureaucracy, it is logical that the bulk of public-private 

sector information sharing examined in the present 

study would also take place in the governor’s office, 

rather than within the NYSOEM. New York State also 

presents a curious puzzle: the strategic information 

sharing that takes place in the governor’s office is 

centered primarily around ordinary commercial and 

business activity, not emergency management. This 

same information sharing proves valuable in the context of disasters, because it helps strengthen relationships between state and private sector officials, 

and those professional relationships are then used 

during disaster responses.

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

The extent to which states now use dedicated electronic information sharing platforms, in addition to 

more conventional communication methods such as 

telephone calls and email, is impressive. In California, 

BUOC members can send and receive information 

with CalOES using a web-based information sharing 

system, and in Florida, ESF-18 members stand to benefit from the state’s new Virtual Business Emergency 

Operations Center (VBEOC). In Virginia, interviewees 

mentioned the WebEOC system, which seems analogous to the systems used in California and Florida. In 

New York, by contrast, interviewees did not bring up 

any such dedicated web-based information sharing 
CHAPTER SIX

242

platform. Although this does not preclude the possibility of such platforms existing in the state, it does 

suggest that, at some level, these platforms were 

not important enough to mention for emergencymanagement personnel in New York during their 

conversations.

A second finding of note is the mixture of formal and informal information sharing that takes 

place across the cases. Florida stands out here for 

its two annual emergency management–related 

conferences that draw attendees from the public 

and private sectors. No comparable conferences or 

gatherings came up in the other states’ discussions. 

Florida and Virginia also are notable for the informality of their information sharing. The VDEM and the 

FDEM partnerships seem to be cultivated through 

strong interpersonal relationships among public and 

private sector officials in those states, in contrast to 

New York and California’s approaches to developing 

disaster partnerships.

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

The use of online information-sharing platforms in 

California, Florida, and Virginia is attributable to a 

range of potential causes, none of which offers robust 

explanatory power. For instance, one could make the 

far-fetched argument that because Silicon Valley is 

located in California, arguably the world’s leading region for new technology, it is only natural that CalOES 

would be on the cutting edge of using web-based in-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

243

formation sharing tools for emergency-management 

purposes. There was no supporting evidence for 

such an argument, however. Florida’s development of 

the VBEOC was more the product of opportune timing than a natural affinity for technology. Tom Duffy, 

the lead developer of the VBEOC, noted that his employer offered to build the VBEOC for free, in part to 

avoid bureaucratic red tape associated with procurement processes, but also to provide researchers at 

Florida State University in Tallahassee with access 

to unique data relevant to the study of emergency 

management.9

 The history of how WebEOC came 

to be used in Virginia is unknown, though it is likely 

that a technology-savvy VDEM leader championed 

its adoption.

The contrasting formal and informal approaches to information sharing across the states defy 

easy explanation, but they are in part attributable to 

the management philosophies of emergencymanagement leaders in those states. In Virginia, for 

example, the founder of VDEM’s private sector liaison 

program made a point of approaching partnerships 

as interpersonal relationships, rather than impersonal, organizational-level relationships. They actively 

resisted MOUs, preferring a more loosely organized 

structure for the state’s PPPs. Those early efforts 

appear to have helped create a culture of informal9

 Tom Duffy, interview with the author via telephone, 2 February 

2015.
CHAPTER SIX

244

ity around Virginia’s partnerships that endures. One 

former director of the FDEM came into their position after having served as director of emergency 

management for Walmart. That previous experience 

with Walmart colors their views of how to manage 

these agreements in government, and they advocate 

strongly for partnerships that are nimble and flexible. 

Informal information sharing, it would seem, goes 

hand in hand with this desired flexibility. California 

and New York’s information-sharing activities appear 

to differ from those of Florida and Virginia, though 

the reasons for this likely have to do with California 

and New York’s more tightly controlled approaches to 

managing their respective partnerships.10

Mutual Benefits

KEY FINDINGS

There is evidence of state partnerships benefiting 

government agencies through access to information 

and physical aid in each of the cases that this study 

examines. Yet, only in California and Florida is there 

evidence that these agreements offer financial benefits for firms as well. While it is understood that firms 

in Virginia and New York likely benefit financially from 

working with state emergency-management agencies, the evidence of businesses benefiting in this 

way is far weaker in these states. Notwithstanding 

10 These differences are detailed above under the heading “Organizational Structure.”
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

245

this variation across the four cases, mutual benefits 

are a critical element of state disaster partnerships.

The mutual benefits of disaster partnerships in 

Florida and California appear more balanced than 

those in Virginia and New York in the sense that 

they offer financial benefits for firms, specifically. 

For instance, in California, Walmart and Cisco representatives point toward direct and indirect sales 

of products, as well as positive media exposure, as 

examples of how disaster partnerships can benefit 

their respective firms financially. Florida businesses can also reap other direct financial benefits from 

their work with the FDEM: when Florida firms reopen quickly after disasters, this can translate into 

increased sales revenue and brand loyalty from customers. The FDEM and CalOES also exchange data 

with firms, which helps both these government agencies and their private sector partners make more 

well-informed decisions. 

Virginia and New York’s state-level emergencymanagement agencies appear to benefit disproportionately from their private sector partners’ 

participation in emergency-management agreements. For example, when disasters occur, Virginia 

firms and VDEM exchange intelligence on local-level 

disaster conditions, which helps them both make 

better-informed decisions. VDEM also jointly exercises with firms to practice disaster responses, helping 

public and private sector representatives learn who 

to contact during actual large-scale emergencies. 
CHAPTER SIX

246

While the benefits of this information exchange and 

joint exercising seem intuitive, no one interviewed 

indicated that these partnerships offer particular financial rewards for firms, independent of the revenue that they collect through contracts with VDEM. 

In fairness, however, several of VDEM’s partners also 

indicated that they are satisfied with the benefits 

they derive from their work with VDEM independent 

of any financial rewards they might expect to receive 

from partnering.

In New York, the NYSOEM benefits almost solely from access to private sector physical aid during 

disasters. This reflects the underdeveloped nature 

of the state government’s approach to disaster partnerships in general. A significant proportion of the 

physical aid received by the NYSOEM is also donated, 

which potentially can provide the firms donating the 

physical aid with tax benefits. The NYCOEM boasts a 

well-organized partnership program, but the available 

evidence shows that the bulk of the benefits from 

these partnerships are enjoyed disproportionately by 

the NYCOEM, and not its partners. For instance, one 

of the most common ways that the NYCOEM offers 

direct benefits to its partners is by sharing emergency 

preparedness tips and emergency planning information. Distributing this type of information is not especially burdensome for the NYCOEM, since it posts 

this information on its website, and can duplicate it 

freely without significant additional effort. However, 

the NYCOEM relies a great deal on its private sector 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

247

partners for disaster-related intelligence and access 

to scarce resources that it cannot obtain otherwise, 

suggesting an imbalance in the benefits derived from 

the NYCOEM’s disaster partnerships.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

New York State stands out among the four cases 

for the absence of mutual benefits for the NYSOEM 

and its private sector partners. With the exception 

of physical aid delivered by firms, the state’s partnerships suffer from a lack of organization. As previously 

noted, the state does not have an emergency management collaboration program, and the benefits the 

state reaps from firms seem to begin and end with 

physical aid. 

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

The pattern of mutual benefits seen across California, 

Florida, and Virginia’s partnerships is similar. Government agencies and firms in these three states are able 

to draw on one another’s resources for emergencymanagement purposes. For businesses, this can result 

in more revenue, positive marketing, and strengthened customer loyalty. For state emergency-management agencies, partnerships can yield access to 

useful intelligence and generate better responses. 

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

The reason New York State differs so sharply from the 

other cases with respect to mutual benefits is most 
CHAPTER SIX

248

likely the lack of any organized disaster partnership 

program at the state level. It is simply unrealistic—

and unlikely—to expect any change in the status of 

these mutual benefits in the absence of a dedicated 

program in the state.

Trust

KEY FINDINGS

Trust is a key element of each of the partnerships 

in Disaster Labs. However, there is no consensus 

among business and government representatives 

about how trust forms, and once formed, what specific aspects of partnerships require high levels of 

trust. Despite the lack of consensus on how trust 

forms and the particular roles that trust plays in state 

emergency-management collaborations, no one interviewed sought to downplay or deny its importance.

The process by which trust forms is understood differently by representatives of state-level emergencymanagement agencies and businesses. VDEM officials,

for example, stress the importance of building oneto-one personal relationships with private sector officials slowly. In New York, interpretations of 

the trust-forming process are more nuanced. At the 

state level of government, relationships between 

government and business representatives have a 

quasi-political connotation, since they are forged 

and handled primarily by the governor’s office, rather than within the NYSOEM. Leaders at the NYSOEM 

base their trust on the firms’ public reputations. The 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

249

NYCOEM takes a different view of trust from the 

NYSOEM, interpreting it as a direct function of businesses’ participation in partnerships. Regardless of 

the specific approaches used to build public-private 

sector trust in state partnerships, trust is essential.

Trust plays diverse roles in state-level, disasteroriented PPPs. One of the most commonly cited areas 

in which trust figures prominently is in the context 

of information sharing. For example, VDEM and Dominion officials say that trust is indispensable when 

they share information with one another, because if 

the information that they exchange is incorrect, this 

can impose significant costs on their respective organizations. The trust that exists between firms and 

the New York State government acts in a similar way. 

Although there is no formal partnership program 

in the NYSOEM, private sector representatives still 

need to receive accurate, timely information from the 

NYSOEM. If this government-supplied information 

is incorrect, then businesses can make decisions 

about personnel staffing that waste money, such as 

by telling employees to report to a facility that has 

been rendered inoperable by a disaster. For CalOES 

and its corporate partners, trust and the protection 

of confidential or proprietary information go hand in 

hand. At least one private sector official in Florida explains how their trust in FDEM public relations staff is 

directly related to how willing FDEM is to share sensitive information with them.

Trust figures prominently in sustaining partner-
CHAPTER SIX

250

ships over time as well. One of the chief difficulties 

for state agencies and firms is that when key personnel in partnerships leave, there are no procedures in 

place to mitigate the effects of this personnel turnover. As a result, trust between their successors 

must be rebuilt. Firms that participate in disasteroriented PPPs have to be able to trust that the program itself will continue in the long run; otherwise, 

firms’ engagement in these programs could simply be 

a waste of time and money.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

Although trust was evident as a key factor across all 

the states, its presence was surprisingly subtle in Florida and New York’s partnerships. Few interviewees in 

Florida brought up trust explicitly. Instead, trust was 

described in terms of met and unmet expectations, 

which can build or damage trust. In New York, state 

officials were candid that the public reputations of 

the organizations with which they partner foster 

trust between the NYSOEM and those private sector 

organizations. It seems that in the NYSOEM, trust is 

linked more closely with perceptions than past contact and experience with those business entities.

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

In California, Florida, New York, and Virginia’s emergency-management accords, trust stands out consistently as a pivotal factor in the context of information 

sharing. The sometimes confidential or proprietary 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

251

nature of data exchanged among state agencies and 

businesses means that they each expose themselves 

to potential reputational losses or competitive disadvantages if sensitive information leaks. To partner 

meaningfully, it would seem that state agencies and 

businesses must trust one another not to disclose—

inadvertently or purposefully—potentially harmful or 

damaging information.

As detailed above, the four cases have different 

understandings of trust, and the means by which 

trust is built varies. For example, in Florida, trust is 

built through interpersonal contacts as well as performance in disaster response exercises and actual 

disasters. Partnerships in Virginia, by contrast, are 

developed in a slow, calculated manner so as to build 

trust over time. 

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

It is challenging to understand precisely why trust is 

understood differently across the cases, as well as 

why trust is built in such diverse ways. A partial explanation begins with the nature of the states’ partnership programs themselves. In New York State, there 

is no organized program, so it is understandable that 

the NYSOEM would look to the public reputations of 

its potential partners as a proxy for their trustworthiness. Awareness of brand perceptions, in this regard, 

is important for state partner organizations. For example, Tracy L. McBroom of the American Red Cross 

in California pointed out that, in general, her organi-
CHAPTER SIX

252

zation is sensitive to how partnering with a disreputable organization could be perceived negatively by the 

Red Cross’s stakeholders.11

The NYCOEM, VDEM, and the FDEM, each of 

which boast well-organized partnership programs, 

seem to root their understandings of trust in past experiences with their partners. For the NYCOEM, trust 

may be the by-product of past successful collaborations with firms. At VDEM, interorganizational trust 

with a business may be based on a single professional relationship between a VDEM representative and 

a private sector leader. In the FDEM, past experience 

working with firms in disaster response exercises—

as well as actual disaster responses—shape how the 

FDEM views the trustworthiness of its private sector 

partners.

Adaptability/Sustainability

KEY FINDINGS

Several patterns emerge when examining the adaptability and sustainability of the state partnerships explored in this study. State emergency-management 

accords form and adapt constantly to new circumstances. Moreover, the absence of recent disasters 

can threaten the sustainability of partnerships, suggesting that state governments and firms would 

do well to find ways to continue working together, 

even when no disasters have occurred recently. The 

11 Tracy L. McBroom, interview with the author via telephone, 10 

November 2014.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

253

potentially damaging effects of public and private 

sector budget cuts, as well as personnel turnover, 

demonstrate why it is prudent for stakeholders in 

disaster-oriented PPPs to develop plans to mitigate 

their effects.

State emergency-management collaborations 

appear to adapt to changing circumstances in a consistent pattern across all four cases. First, a disaster 

or catastrophe acts as a focusing event, bringing 

public and private sector actors together, or making 

public and private organizations recognize that they 

need to work more closely with one another. Second, 

government officials and business representatives 

track the development of their partnerships over 

time and ensure that they remain in close contact 

with one another. Doing this sustains these partnerships and helps them continue to evolve.

A significant amount of time between major 

disasters, however, can threaten the sustainability 

of certain partnerships. At least one senior CalOES 

official recognizes that the passage of time without 

a disaster can cause complacency in disaster preparedness for policy makers and the general public. 

A former FDEM head voices similar concerns about 

sustaining Florida’s agreements into the future, since 

long periods between disasters can mean that “people are less likely to pay attention to them.”12

Nevertheless, state governments and their part12 Bryan Koon, interview with the author via telephone, 9 February 

2015.
CHAPTER SIX

254

ners can engage in an array of activities to help sustain their focus on disaster preparedness, even when 

there have not been any recent disasters. In Florida, 

for instance, the FDEM and firms participate in regular conferences and disaster response exercises to 

keep their relationships fresh and their focus on disaster preparedness sharp. The FDEM’s private sector 

mentorship program, in which business representatives sit in ESF-18 to learn about disaster response 

procedures, is particularly innovative among the four 

states in this regard. The NYCOEM offers other examples of ways to sustain partnerships in the absence 

of disasters. The agency embraces a strategy of cultivating individual private sector advocates for PPPs, 

whose efforts can ultimately lead the NYCOEM to 

develop a partnership with these private sector representatives’ firms. The VDEM and its partners participate in regular meetings, conferences, and exercises 

regardless of whether a disaster is occurring. These 

activities keep them connected and engaged with 

one another during periods of low disaster activity.

Budget cuts and personnel turnover can hamper the ability of partnerships to adapt and endure 

over time, since these events remove key employees 

and resources from the partnerships themselves. Of 

the four states examined, California and Virginia appear to confront the greatest potential threats from 

budget cuts and personnel turnover. The possibility of budget cuts and personnel turnover suggests 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

255

that joint succession planning for state partnerships 

would be prudent.

UNEXPECTED RESULTS

One of the more surprising findings is the extent to 

which the four states fail to prepare for the impact of 

personnel turnover on their disaster-oriented PPPs. 

The data show that this turnover, though a natural 

part of any organization’s lifecycle, can impede the 

perceived success of disaster partnerships. Institutional memory can be lost when key figures leave. 

Trust between public and private sector representatives, which can take significant amounts of time 

to build, erodes or vanishes when they depart their 

respective organizations. Information exchange between partner organizations, which may have been 

a by-product of a strong, trusting, interpersonal relationship among specific representatives, has the 

potential to slow or stop when those same representatives leave.

COMPARATIVE SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES

The greatest similarity across the four cases is the 

effect of personnel turnover on the health of the 

states’ disaster-oriented PPPs. There was a divergence among the states with respect to sustainability, however. California experienced devastating 

wildfires in 2019, for example, but the state has not 

seen a disaster like the 1994 Northridge earthquake 
CHAPTER SIX

256

in the San Fernando Valley in many years.13 Florida 

has not suffered from notable disasters in recent 

years either. For these reasons, the staying power 

of those states’ partnerships is questionable, since 

the PPPs themselves have not been severely tested 

recently under disaster conditions. In New York and 

Virginia, by contrast, disasters like Hurricane Sandy 

(2012) and the Mineral City earthquake (2011) have 

kept those states’ partnerships engaged in real-world 

responses to disasters, as opposed to disaster response exercises. 

A second key difference across the cases was 

the extent to which California and Virginia’s agreements may be threatened by potential budget cuts. If 

CalOES and VDEM do not fund certain positions that 

are instrumental to those agencies’ programs, then 

the agencies’ partnerships may weaken over time for 

want of key personnel to give the partnerships the 

necessary time and attention that they require.

ACCOUNTING FOR OBSERVED DIFFERENCES

The differences among the cases discussed above 

appear to be attributable to divergent weather patterns and statewide budgetary priorities. California 

and Florida, for example, are each known to face significant natural disasters on a consistent basis, such 

as wildfires and hurricanes. 

13 See Alan Taylor, “The Northridge Earthquake: 20 Years Ago Today,” Atlantic, 17 January 2014.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

257

Differing state budgetary priorities also play a 

role in the sustainability of California and Virginia’s 

partnerships. It is challenging to generalize about 

statewide budgets, but interviewees in California and 

Virginia both suggested that budgetary concerns 

could have long-term impacts on the sustainability 

of emergency-management accords in those states. 

Funding key positions that work directly on disasteroriented PPPs in CalOES and VDEM appears pivotal 

to the sustainability of partnerships in California and 

Virginia. Without the work of partnership-focused 

employees in CalOES and VDEM, it seems improbable that California and Virginia’s programs would be 

as well developed as they are. 

A shift in state budgetary priorities could upend 

California and Virginia’s partnerships by scaling back 

or eliminating the personnel funded to work on those 

states’ partnership programs. Although no one interviewed indicated that personnel cuts are looming or 

imminent, the possibility remains, potentially jeopardizing the future of California and Virginia’s programs.

The Missing Ninth Factor: 

Nonprofit and Industry Organizations

The eight factors discussed in the analytical framework are, to varying extents, applicable to statelevel, disaster-oriented PPPs in California, Florida, 

New York, and Virginia. This indicates that the analytical framework is viable as a tool to evaluate statelevel, disaster-oriented PPPs. However, the framework 
CHAPTER SIX

258

consistently failed to account for the significant role 

of nonprofit and industry organizations in each of the 

cases that have been explored. Because industry and 

nonprofit groups played such consistent and substantial roles in the four cases and were instrumental in bringing state agencies and firms together for 

emergency-management purposes, they should be 

included as a ninth factor in the framework.

One cannot overstate the significance of nonprofit and industry organizations in the four states. 

In California, groups such as the CRA and the American Red Cross link many firms and other government agencies with CalOES. The NYSOEM maintains 

strong relationships with nonprofits such as the Aidmatrix Foundation and Catholic Charities USA, which 

each work closely with businesses to obtain supplies 

for disaster survivors, linking the NYSOEM indirectly 

with the for-profit community at large. For NYCOEM, 

ties to nonprofit and industry organizations are more 

important, because city agency representatives meet 

regularly with such groups to gather information 

about their needs, and these groups send representatives to the New York City EOC during disasters too. 

Organizations such as the Better Business Bureau, Virginia 1st, and Virginia 811 form an integral 

part of VDEM’s interorganizational partnership program. The overwhelming majority of ESF-18 members 

in Florida are industry organizations, suggesting that 

the FDEM has embraced a strategy of partnering with 

industry organizations as the most efficacious means 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

259

to develop ties with the private sector in general.

Nonprofit and industry organizations should be 

included as a ninth factor in the analytical framework 

because they appear to play at least three pivotal 

roles in state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs. First, they 

offer a one-stop shop for states and businesses to 

gather information from and disseminate information 

to one another. VDEM’s work with the Richmond, Virginia, area Better Business Bureau (BBB) exemplifies 

this type of activity. Second, nonprofit organizations 

in particular act as trusted agents to funnel resources to businesses and government emergencymanagement organizations. The American Red 

Cross in California and ALAN in Florida illustrate this 

concept well, since they both work regularly with 

businesses to obtain money and physical aid, then 

redistribute this money and physical aid to disaster 

survivors, complementing the efforts of government 

emergency-management agencies. 

Third, industry and nonprofit organizations permit 

state emergency-management agencies and firms 

to economize the process of building, maintaining, 

and growing partnerships. Florida’s near-exclusive 

work with industry organizations in ESF-18 provides 

strong evidence of this. The organizational reach of 

the industry groups with which the FDEM partners in 

ESF-18 is vast. It would be logistically impossible for 

the FDEM to form individual relationships with all of 

the firms to which the FDEM is connected via these 

industry groups. By deliberately partnering with in-
CHAPTER SIX

260

dustry groups in ESF-18, the FDEM reduces the time, 

cost, and organizational effort required to connect 

with many businesses at once. Excluding nonprofit 

and industry organizations from the framework omits 

an indispensable element in the formation, maintenance, and success of state partnerships. For these 

reasons, the framework should incorporate the role 

of nonprofit and industry groups.

How Nonprofit and 

Industry Organizations Relate 

to the Analytical Framework

Since nonprofit and industry organizations appear 

to play pivotal roles in state disaster-oriented PPPs, 

it is helpful now to reassess the original analytical 

framework’s factors and their relationship to this new 

finding. Nonprofit and industry organizations seem 

to connect most directly to three of the original analytical framework’s factors: information sharing, trust, 

and organizational structure. 

Nonprofit and industry organizations appear to 

facilitate information sharing in disaster-oriented 

PPPs in ways not envisaged by the analytical framework. The framework, it is worth recalling, was first 

created to evaluate partnerships involving federal agencies and profit-seeking businesses.14 Still, 

groups such as the BBB in Virginia, American Red 

14 Abou-bakr, Managing Disasters through Public-Private Partnerships, 5.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

261

Cross in California, and the Florida Chamber of 

Commerce are integral to information-sharing practices in those states. It may be the case that understandings of information-sharing practices in the 

framework are artificially constrained by considering PPPs as simple two-party relationships between 

one state emergency-management agency and one 

business. Information sharing in state emergencymanagement agreements is far more complex than 

a two-party partnership and can involve nonprofit/industry intermediaries in partnerships between state 

agencies and businesses. 

Trust can also be reassessed as part of the original analytical framework in light of the role of nonprofit and industry organizations. The previous chapters 

have shown that direct trust between state emergency-management agencies and businesses may not be 

necessary for partnerships, though the importance of 

trust in general is viewed by public and private sector 

officials as vital. For example, in Florida, trust is seen 

as a function of repeated contact between public and 

private sector representatives in disaster response 

exercises. As state official Larry McIntrye pointed 

out, this type of trust is earned through repeated 

observations of performance during exercises and 

actual disaster responses. Nonprofit and industry organizations also can act as trusted third parties between government agencies and firms. They may play 

roles as collectors of donated goods, for instance, 

and redistribute these goods to disaster survivors, 
CHAPTER SIX

262

thus complementing public sector efforts to provide 

disaster relief services. Therefore, trust as understood in the analytical framework can be complicated by the role of nonprofit and industry organizations.

Organizational structure may also need to be 

reevaluated as a result of the evidence developed in 

this book. In Florida, for instance, the nonprofit and 

industry organizations that make up ESF-18 complicate the notion of what a disaster-oriented PPP is, 

since the state partners with nonprofit and industry 

groups to reach individual businesses. What might 

have been understood as a public-private partnership could be more precisely described as a public/

nonprofit/private partnership here, since Florida’s 

partnerships with firms would be curtailed sharply 

without the involvement of nonprofit and industry 

organizations.

Given the ways in which nonprofit and industry 

organizations complicate three of the existing framework’s factors, it seems appropriate to consider the 

roles of nonprofit and industry organizations separately, in addition to the original analytical framework 

in future studies. In other words, the influence of 

nonprofit and industry organizations on state partnerships is significant enough that the presence (or 

absence) of these organizations in a given state’s 

emergency-management apparatus has the potential to change altogether how that state’s agreements 

are assessed. 

For these reasons, the role of nonprofit and in-
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

263

dustry organizations makes sense as a new, ninth 

factor in the analytical framework. Overlooking the 

potential roles of these organizations may risk skewing analyses of state partnerships in ways that do 

not portray accurately the forces at work in state 

emergency-management accords. 

Assessment of Findings

Of the eight factors used to examine disasteroriented PPPs in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia, organizational structure emerges as the most 

important. Personnel turnover also threatens disaster partnerships in all four states. To sustain these 

emergency-management agreements into the future, 

state government and business leaders would do 

well to create succession plans for their partnerships. 

Organizational structure appears to be the most 

critical factor in the state partnerships examined 

here. Three of the four states—Florida, New York, and 

Virginia—do not seem to make the creation of formally structured partnerships a high priority. California, however, makes MOUs a precondition for formal 

cooperation with businesses. In this instance, the totality of the available evidence suggests that MOUs 

are not a good predictor of successful partnerships. 

A second finding related to the organizational 

structure of disaster-oriented PPPs—the advent of hybrid partnerships for emergency management—may 

offer a glimpse of the future of state-level, disasteroriented PPPs. For firms, the chief advantages of hy-
CHAPTER SIX

264

brid partnership groups like the ALAN and VOAD in 

Florida are that they permit businesses to provide 

direct relief to nonprofit agencies affected by disasters, bypassing the involvement of state government 

agencies. Members of these groups may also benefit from the tax advantages associated with being 

involved in nonprofit organizations. Both of these 

characteristics suggest that hybrid partnerships 

may offer a more beneficial model for firms involved 

in disaster management than existing state-level organizational structures for disaster-oriented PPPs. 

Moreover, when groups such as ALAN partner with 

state emergency-management agencies, state governments benefit immediately from direct access to 

a group of businesses that have strong ties to one 

another. All of this could mean that state emergencymanagement agencies will increasingly seek to work 

with hybrid partnership organizations in the future, 

rather than connecting directly with businesses. 

Given the profound influence of nonprofit and industry organizations in state-level, disaster-oriented 

PPPs, it is worth examining briefly why the framework 

does not account for these groups’ roles in the first 

place. The simplest and most likely explanation for 

why the analytical framework does not account for 

the roles of nonprofit and industry organizations is 

that Ami J. Abou-bakr, who first used the framework 

in a study of federal disaster-oriented PPPs, deliberately avoided discussion of nonprofit and industry 

organizations in her original analysis. As a result, it is 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

265

logical and understandable that the analytical framework did not account for these groups either.

A second possible explanation for the absence 

of nonprofit and industry organizations in the analytical framework relates to how the federal government, 

vis-à-vis state governments, defines the term private 

sector. FEMA, for example, states that “we see the 

nation’s vast network of business, industry, academia, 

trade associations, and other non-governmental organizations as equal–and equally responsible–partners in every phase from preparedness to response 

and recovery to mitigation.”15 In other words, from the 

federal government’s perspective, nongovernmental 

organizations such as the American Red Cross, as well 

as trade associations, are part of the private sector. 

FEMA’s definition of the private sector is not uniformly shared across state government emergencymanagement agencies. VDEM, for example, has one 

full-time employee charged with managing disasteroriented PPPs—that is, partnerships with profitseeking businesses—and another full-time employee 

who works with groups in the nonprofit sector. These 

two positions report to different division heads within 

VDEM, although in practice there is substantial overlap and interaction between these two employees. 

VDEM’s arrangement demonstrates that there 

may be a kind of artificial separation between collab15 “The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emergency Management,” FEMA, November 2013, 3–6.
CHAPTER SIX

266

oration with for-profit firms and nonprofit organizations in the context of state emergency-management 

agencies. The author did not appreciate it fully at the 

time, but one VDEM representative recognized this 

artificial separation of responsibilities during the 

conversation with them:

A primary role for the profit-oriented private 

sector is understanding how it can affiliate 

with the voluntary sector in emergency management. So from a CEO/President perspective, they have certain resources that they 

can give directly to  the voluntary sector  or 

indirectly through  [government] emergency 

management [agencies].16

These comments imply that when state emergency-management agencies attempt to filter out 

nonprofit and industry groups from their disasteroriented PPPs, they are imposing an artificial—and 

arguably counterproductive—barrier to public-private 

sector cooperation. A more inclusive arrangement 

that incorporates for-profit and nonprofit organizations under the broader category of public-private 

partnerships would reflect better the working reality of for-profit, nonprofit, and public sector collaboration in state-level emergency management today.

The most damaging organizational pathology 

16 Amanda Reidelbach, interview with the author via telephone, 3 

June 2014. 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

267

affecting state disaster-oriented PPPs is personnel 

turnover. Developing simple succession plans—

which are common in the business world—could go 

a long way toward smoothing personnel transitions 

and ensuring that disaster-oriented PPPs continue to 

work as intended over the long run. There is a degree 

of irony here, in that none of the emergency management agency representatives the author spoke with 

appear to have developed contingency plans for their 

disaster-oriented PPPs, despite the fact that so much 

of the emergency management field itself rests on 

the idea of planning for unforeseen contingencies. 

Developing succession plans would likely not prove 

overly burdensome for either state emergencymanagement agencies or their private sector partners.

Conclusions

This book explored, analyzed, and compared disaster-oriented PPPs in four U.S. states—California, 

Florida, New York, and Virginia—using an eight-factor 

analytical framework, consisting of crisis, leadership, 

organizational structure, information sharing, mutual benefits, trust, adaptability, and sustainability. The 

author began with two primary questions in writing 

this book: first, the author wanted to explore how 

disaster-oriented PPPs influence state-level disaster management in the United States; and second, 

the author sought to assess whether the analytical 

framework that was selected is viable as a tool to as-
CHAPTER SIX

268

sess disaster-oriented PPPs at the state level of government.

This chapter analyzed the four cases comparatively by highlighting unexpected results, evaluating 

similarities and differences, and explaining observed 

differences across each of the factors. The key findings below summarize and highlight the three most 

significant findings from this study, which are derived 

from the evidence presented in preceding chapters. 

First, of the eight factors used to explore disaster partnerships, organizational structure stands out 

as the most important. This finding has important 

implications for state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs. 

The evidence presented here strongly suggests that 

informally structured partnerships that feature high 

levels of interpersonal trust tend to be the most 

successful. Therefore, to the extent that state emergency-management agencies and firms can strike 

informal agreements to partner with one another for 

emergency-management purposes and provide opportunities for employees of their respective organizations to get to know and trust one another, they 

will likely increase the probability that both sides will 

benefit from working together during future disasters.

Second, nonprofit and industry organizations play 

an indispensable role in state-level, disaster-oriented 

PPPs. This finding has important theoretical implications, for it suggests that the analytical framework 

requires the addition of a ninth factor—the role of 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

269

nonprofit and industry organizations—to capture 

more fully the key variables involved in state partnerships. Nonprofit and industry groups frequently act as 

hubs for the collection and distribution of information 

in emergency-management collaborations. They are, 

in effect, trusted agents that facilitate the exchange 

of essential physical aid among firms, nonprofits, 

and government emergency-management agencies. 

Industry and nonprofit organizations also permit 

both state emergency-management agencies and 

businesses to economize on the process of forging, 

building, and maintaining partnerships by increasing interorganizational efficiencies. The remarkable 

roles played by nonprofit and industry organizations 

in state partnerships suggest that state emergencymanagement organizations would benefit from 

adopting strategies that integrate these groups 

into their partnerships alongside stand-alone businesses.

The third major finding is that the primary obstacle to maintaining state partnerships over time is 

personnel turnover. Firms and state emergency management agencies would be well-served by developing plans to mitigate the effects of this turnover. When 

key personnel leave, the prior existence of MOUs 

cannot guarantee these partnerships will survive. 

Instead, it is apparent that these PPPs are actually 

just functions of the strength of the one-to-one relationships of those who manage these partnerships. 

Creating formal relationship hand-off procedures, 
CHAPTER SIX

270

in which organizational representatives introduce 

their successor to their respective counterpart, 

could prove valuable for state government emergency managers and their private sector partners.

Preserving the Disaster Labs

State governments have long served as proverbial 

laboratories for the development and testing of innovative public policies.17 The most successful of these 

state-level policies are occasionally adopted by the 

federal government and implemented nationally. 

The state-level, disaster-oriented PPPs explored in 

this book offer another potential way for the federal 

government to learn what works well in emergency 

management—and what does not work well in emergency management—through the disaster laboratories of state governments. 

Yet, this model of policy innovation for emergency management—in which states can act as testing 

grounds for public policies later adopted at the federal level of government—is, as first seen in chapter 1, potentially threatened by a movement toward 

the centralized planning of disaster partnerships. 

FEMA’s creation of a national private sector liaison 

office and the deployment of federal private sector 

liaisons in FEMA regional offices nationwide shows 

17 For example, see Keith Boeckelman, “The Influence of States on 

Federal Policy Adoptions,” Policy Studies Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1992): 365–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1992.tb00164.x.
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

271

that FEMA may be interested in a standardized national model for these agreements. Moreover, the 

eight-factor analytical framework used in Disaster 

Labs comes from a study that assumed that a standardization of these partnerships would be desirable at the federal level.

Imposing an organizational model for disasteroriented PPPs from the top down—that is, from the 

federal government down to state governments—

would be a serious mistake. The sometimes unruly, 

messy nature of state-level public policy making is 

one of the key ways in which it is a source of innovation that attracts the attention of national policy 

makers. This book offers a counterpoint to the federal government’s tendency to standardize emergencymanagement practices. It also provides an alternative 

to Abou-bakr’s work, which favors a fixed template for 

disaster-oriented PPPs. 

California, Florida, New York, and Virginia boast 

a diversity of disaster partnerships, each tailored 

to the unique conditions and circumstances of the 

state governments that employ them. The federal 

government can learn much from their experiences 

of using these partnerships to achieve their respective organizational missions. It is also essential that 

the federal government permit state governments 

to test, evaluate, and recalibrate their emergencymanagement agreements without attempting to 

impose a standardized model of partnerships on 

them. Doing so would risk dampening, or eliminating, 
CHAPTER SIX

272

the innovative forces at work in state emergencymanagement agencies.

Elected representatives, government policy makers, and leaders from firms and nongovernment organization can draw at least three additional key lessons 

from this book. For public sector officials, forging alliances with umbrella organizations, such as industry groups, offers an efficient means for government 

agencies to develop partnerships with businesses. 

However, the evidence presented here demonstrates 

that it is important for government officials to look 

closely at the strength of ties within those umbrella 

groups, too. Organizations such as the American Red 

Cross offer government agencies the promise of an 

engaged network of other public sector and private 

sector partners with strong incentives to cooperate. 

The Red Cross depends heavily on monetary donations from firms and individuals, so its representatives take pains to ensure that its many stakeholders 

benefit from partnering with them. Other umbrella 

groups may not have such strong incentives to cooperate or may do a poor job of keeping their respective stakeholders satisfied. As a result, they might not 

offer the most efficient means for government agencies to develop partnerships with the private sector.

To avoid potential conflicts in partnerships, private sector representatives should work to define 

expectations with their government partners up 

front. This is not to say that formal MOUs are essential for emergency-management agreements. On the 
TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDINGS

273

contrary, one can point to multiple examples of successful partnerships that do not feature MOUs. The 

process by which government agencies and firms 

come to mutual understandings of their expectations and roles in disaster partnerships, however, is 

indispensable. Whether these mutual understandings come about via face-to-face dialogue in formal 

meetings, through repeated informal contact among 

organizational representatives, in MOUs, or through 

some combination of these measures, seems immaterial.

Nonprofit organizations and industry groups often are in search of financial support to keep their 

operations going. Participation in partnerships may 

offer a way for these groups to help shore up their 

financial futures. When nonprofit organizations 

engage with the public and private sectors in the 

context of emergency management, this elevates 

the public profiles of nonprofit organizations. This 

offers nonprofits what is, in effect, free marketing 

exposure. Organizations ranging from the California 

Grocers Association to the Florida Retail Federation find themselves playing essential roles in statelevel emergency management. Their participation in 

emergency management–related activities, and the 

public attention that comes with this participation, 

may expose them to a much larger potential membership and donor pool. 

The future offers several avenues for other scholars to build on this research in the disciplines most 
CHAPTER SIX

274

closely related to this book: political science (encompassing public policy as well as political economy) and economics, with a view to informing and 

illuminating government policy discourse. The most 

apparent pathway for future exploration seems to be 

examinations of the roles of nonprofit organizations 

in state-level emergency-management organizations. Disaster Labs has shown that nonprofit organizations make important contributions to state-level 

emergency management, but the nature of these 

contributions—and their impacts—are not wellunderstood. More broadly, the post-9/11 literature on 

disaster management tends to emphasize the role of 

the federal government. Nevertheless, there is also 

a rich seam for scholars to mine at the state level of 

government. Academics could benefit from learning 

more about how California, Florida, New York, and 

Virginia officials keep state policy makers focused 

on emergency preparedness, even in the absence of 

disasters. After all, there is little doubt that disasters 

will strike these states again. 
275

Epilogue

The 2019 Coronavirus Disease 

As this book was going to press in early 2020, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)—a heretofore unknown pathogen—was silently infecting thousands 

of people in Wuhan, China. COVID-19 can cause pulmonary inflammation and congestion, accompanied 

by persistent fever, cough, and gastrointestinal distress, among other symptoms. The disease spreads 

via respiratory droplets during human-to-human contact, even among asymptomatic carriers of the virus, 

and can remain alive on uncleaned surfaces for at 

least 17 days.1

 In older adults, as well as persons with 

compromised immune systems, COVID-19 can be fatal. Within a matter of weeks after first emerging in 

Wuhan, COVID-19 cases appeared in dozens of countries, killing tens of thousands and leading the World 

1

 Leah F. Moriarty et al., “Public Health Responses to COVID-19 Outbreaks on Cruise Ships—Worldwide, February–March 2020,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 69, no. 12 (March 2020): 347–52, 

http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6912e3.
EPILOGUE

276

Health Organization (WHO) to officially designate the 

spread of COVID-19 a global pandemic.2

While the author writes these words in late 

March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic is disrupting a 

staggering and unprecedented amount of activity at 

every level of society. Several world leaders, including British prime minister Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, Prince Charles Philip Arthur George of 

Wales, Canadian prime minister Justin Pierre James 

Trudeau, German chancellor Angela D. Merkel, and 

Prince Albert Alexandre Louis Pierre Grimaldi of 

Monaco are either in self-isolation or have tested 

positive for COVID-19.3

 City centers stand empty as 

billions of people shelter in place under government 

orders to slow the spread of the pandemic. Some 

morgues and crematoria in Italy and Spain are unable to keep pace with the influx of human corpses.4

Global trade and capital markets are plummeting. 

Schools and universities are closed. Religious services are canceled. There are widespread anecdotal 

reports in the United States of toilet paper and hand 

2

 “WHO Announces COVID-19 Outbreak a Pandemic,” World Health 

Organization Regional Office for Europe, 12 March 2020.

3

 Johnny Diaz and Derrick Bryston Taylor, “Celebrities, Athletes and 

Politicians Who Have Tested Positive for Coronavirus,” New York 

Times, 27 March 2020; and Katrin Bennhold and Melissa Eddy, “Germany Bans Groups of More Than 2 to Stop Coronavirus as Merkel 

Self-Isolates,” New York Times, 22 March 2020. 4

 James Mackenzie and Crispian Balmer, “Italy Passes China’s 

Coronavirus Death Toll, Prepares to Extend Lockdown,” Reuters, 

19 March 2020; and “Spain’s Coronavirus Death Toll Overtakes China’s,” Japan Times, 25 March 2020.
THE 2019 CORONAVIRUS DISEASE

277

sanitizer shortages.5 Many U.S. health care providers 

say that they lack adequate supplies of disposable 

medical masks and ventilators to care for large numbers of COVID-19 patients.6

 There is a purgatorial feel 

to daily life for millions of Americans too, because no 

one—not even the top public health experts in the 

United States—knows precisely when the COVID-19 

pandemic will ebb. 

In the midst of this turmoil, several U.S. state governments—including California, Florida, New York, 

and Virginia, which this book examined in detail—

have taken actions to stop the spread of COVID-19. 

In addition to limiting the movement and gathering 

of people in their respective states, they are partnering in unique ways with businesses and nonprofit 

organizations. From deploying innovative staffing 

solutions to sharing information and producing vital 

supplies, these arrangements underline the value of 

public-private disaster collaborations.

California governor Gavin C. Newsom is working with the private sector and nonprofits to arrest 

the spread of COVID-19 in his state. He directed the 

California National Guard to assist food banks, which 

have seen an understandable decline in volunteer 

5

 David Lazarus, “Stockpiling Sanitizer, Toilet Paper Is Understandable. But Is It Rational?,” Los Angeles Times, 5 March 2020. 6

 “Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators: Crisis/

Alternate Strategies,” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 17 March 2020.
EPILOGUE

278

workers during the pandemic.7 Newsom signed Executive Order N-33-20, instructing nearly all California 

residents to stay home, but exempting many private 

sector workers in critical infrastructure sectors, such 

as health care and agriculture, whose services will be 

indispensable during the pandemic.8 The state government is collaborating with the U.S. Small Business 

Administration to make emergency loans available 

for California firms affected by the economic slowdown caused by COVID-19.9

 The state has also set up 

an online portal to recruit volunteers to aid nonprofit 

organizations engaged in the pandemic response.10

In Florida, Governor Ronald D. DeSantis and the 

Department of Health are monitoring nearly 2,000 

possible cases of COVID-19 infections and are working closely with private testing labs.11 The state has 

made available lists of governmental, private sector, 

and nonprofit resources for Florida residents who 

may experience emotional distress during the pan7

 “Governor Newsom Deploys California National Guard to Help 

Distribute Food at Food Banks & Protect California’s Most Vulnerable,” press release, Office of Governor Gavin Newsom, 20 March 

2020.

8

 “Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers,” California State Government, 22 March 2020.

9

 Bryan May, “SBA Offers Disaster Assistance to California 

Small Businesses Economically Impacted by the Coronavirus 

(COVID-19),” California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 

17 March 2020.

10 “Help Your Community Safely with COVID-19,” California Volunteers, Office of the Governor, accessed 27 March 2020.

11 “Florida Department of Health Updates New COVID-19 Cases, 

Announces Two New Deaths Related to COVID-19, 11 a.m. Update,” 

Florida Department of Health, 25 March 2020.
THE 2019 CORONAVIRUS DISEASE

279

demic.12 DeSantis issued a number of directives related to COVID-19, as well, including Executive Order 

20-82, which mandates that individuals traveling to 

Florida from areas of “substantial community spread” 

self-isolate for 14 days.13

New York governor Andrew M. Cuomo is also leveraging partnerships with the private sector to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. His administration 

has turned to unusual sources to acquire needed 

goods and services. For example, after appealing to 

the private sector for assistance, Cuomo struck an 

agreement with Christian Siriano—a fashion designer and former star on the television show Project Runway—to have Siriano’s sewing team create protective 

masks for health care workers in New York State.14

The state’s correctional enterprise, Corcraft, started to bottle its own New York State-branded hand 

sanitizer.15 In addition, Cuomo enlisted Hollywood 

actors Ben Stiller, Danny DeVito, and Robert De Niro 

to shoot brief public service announcements (PSAs) 

encouraging New Yorkers to stay home to combat 

the spread of COVID-19.16 The state government also 

12 “Coping with COVID-19: Supportive Resource Links,” Florida Department of Emergency Management.

13 Exec. Order No. 20-82, State of Florida Office of the Governor, 24 

March 2020.

14 “Pop Superstar Rihanna Donates $5 million to Relief Efforts,” ABC 

News, 21 March 2020.

15 Jesse McKinley, “Cuomo’s Fix for Sanitizer Shortage: 100,000 Gallons Made by Prisoners,” New York Times, 9 March 2020. 16 Tyler McCarthy, “Robert De Niro, Ben Stiller and Other Celebrities 

Share Coronavirus PSAs,” Fox News, 24 March 2020.
EPILOGUE

280

issued an open call for workers in the technology 

sector, such as software developers and engineers, 

to contribute to COVID-19 “SWAT teams” that will use 

technology skills to, in their words, “accelerate and 

amplify our response to COVID-19.”17

In the Commonwealth of Virginia, Governor Ralph 

S. Northam and the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM) have taken a proactive 

approach to engaging with businesses and nonprofits to address the COVID-19 pandemic. A prominent 

banner on the VDEM website invites private sector 

organizations to register with VDEM and to identify, 

in writing, the types of goods and services that they 

may be able to contribute.18 The State Corporation 

Commission has published categories of private sector critical infrastructure workers whose services will 

remain essential during the pandemic, as well.19

Despite these state governments’ positive steps 

to work with firms and nonprofits, the COVID-19 

pandemic is going to devastate the private sector. 

Many state governments have ordered the closure 

of nonessential businesses to limit human-to-human 

contact. These closures have already led to massive 

employee layoffs and lost revenue. Especially vulnerable during these times are small businesses. They 

17 “New York State COVID-19 Technology SWAT Team: Leveraging 

Technology Expertise to Scale Our Efforts,” New York State, 27 

March 2020.

18 “Coronavirus,” Virginia Department of Emergency Management, 

27 March 2020.

19 “Order Certifying Critical Infrastructure Workers,” Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation Commission, 23 March 2020.
THE 2019 CORONAVIRUS DISEASE

281

typically operate on thin margins with minimal cash 

reserves. But small firms also account for about 44 

percent of the annual U.S. gross domestic product 

(GDP), a measure of economic output.20 That level of 

contribution to annual GDP means that damage to 

small businesses across the country will have a large 

aggregate effect on U.S. economic prospects. Nonprofits, which rely on private philanthropy to operate, 

are certain to suffer from the economic downturn 

that the pandemic is causing.

It is difficult to forecast how this situation will end. 

At the time of this writing, no medical interventions 

have been verified in randomized controlled trials 

to treat COVID-19 infections directly. Governments 

and researchers around the world—in China, Germany, Israel, the United States, and elsewhere—race 

to develop a COVID-19 vaccine. Firms and nonprofit 

organizations in U.S. states are delivering increasingly scarce supplies to health care facilities caring for 

COVID-19 patients. Epidemiologists at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have 

modeled the potential trajectory of the pandemic in 

the United States using a range of input variables. 

Those models indicate that absent certain kinds of 

interventions, such as social distancing, between 

200,000 and 1.7 million people in the United States 

20 Kathryn Kobe and Richard Schwinn, Small Business GDP, 1998–

2014 (Washington, DC: U.S. Small Business Administration, 2018), 

3.
EPILOGUE

282

may perish from COVID-19.21 If the United States were 

to not implement mitigation measures at all, a study 

published by a team at Imperial College London estimates that 2.1–2.2 million Americans would die from 

COVID-19.22

But there are also reasons for cautious optimism. 

The actions of state governments, such as those in 

California, Florida, New York, and Virginia, are likely to 

have a positive effect on the COVID-19 pandemic by 

slowing the infection growth rate and easing pressure 

on health care facilities and workers. Current circumstances force governments, firms, nonprofits, civic 

groups, and citizens to communicate and cooperate 

in extraordinary ways. The U.S. federal government, as 

well as allied foreign governments, are taking steps to 

buttress their economies through stimuli such as direct cash payments to citizens and central bank purchases of government bonds. As public awareness of 

the need to practice social distancing and good hygiene increases, one expects that the total number 

of COVID-19 infections will decline.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a once-in-a-lifetime 

kind of event. Its outcome remains uncertain. But 

when the history of this pandemic is eventually writ21 Sheri Fink, “Worst-Case Estimates for U.S. Coronavirus Deaths,” 

New York Times, 13 March 2020. 22 Patrick GT Walker et al., The Global Impact of COVID-19 and Strategies for Mitigation and Suppression (London: WHO Collaborating 

Centre for Infectious Disease Modelling, MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis, Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for Disease 

and Emergency Analytics, Imperial College London, 2020).
THE 2019 CORONAVIRUS DISEASE

283

ten, the disaster labs of U.S. state governments—and 

their vital work with firms and nonprofits—will offer 

powerful reminders of the creativity, energy, and grit 

upon which Americans drew to survive this ordeal.

Austen D. Givens

Utica, New York

27 March 2020

285

Appendix A

INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

Author’s note: the organizational names, affiliations, and 

titles of the individuals below were current at the time they 

were interviewed.

Erika Baker

Senior Emergency Services Coordinator, California 

Governor’s Office of Emergency Services

Rakesh Bharania

Tactical Operations, Cisco

Greg Blosé II

Grassroots Development and Engagement Manager, Florida Chamber of Commerce

Dan Bout

Assistant Director for Response, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services

Brooke Brager

Senior Manager, Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Walmart Stores, Inc.

Robert Conley

Director of HR-Security, Risk, and Safety, Cox Communications
APPENDIX A

286

Bill Davis

Director, New York State Office of Emergency Management

Tom Duffy

Former Researcher, Florida State University Center 

for Disaster Risk Policy

Bill Dugan

Human Services and Individual Assistance Section 

Chief, New York State Office of Emergency Management

Kathy Fulton

Executive Director, American Logistics Aid Network

Ryan Garnowski

Private Sector Liaison, Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Chuck Hagan

Chief, State Joint Logistics, Florida Division of Emergency Management

Kenny Hayes

Project Manager, Disaster Response Division, Garner 

Environmental Services; former Chief of Logistics, Virginia Department of Emergency Management

Bryan Koon

Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management; President, National Emergency Management 

Association; former Director of Emergency Management, Walmart Stores, Inc.

Tracey Lamb

Public Awareness and Training Manager, Virginia 811

Gary T. Lupton

Executive Director, Virginia 1st

Tracy L. McBroom

Director, Division Disaster State Relations-Pacific, 

California and FEMA Region IX, American Red Cross
INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

287

Larry McIntyre

Coordinator, Florida Department of Economic Opportunity

Benjamin L. Muncy

Founder, Private Sector Liaison Program, Virginia 

Department of Emergency Management 

Rick Murrell

President and CEO, Tropical Shipping, LLC; Chairman, South Florida Disaster Resiliency Coalition

Nora Porter

Citizen Corps Coordinator, New York State Office of 

Emergency Management

Amanda Reidelbach

Disaster Relief and Volunteers Coordinator, Virginia 

Department of Emergency Management

Kendall Skillicorn

Senior Program Analyst, California Governor’s Office 

of Emergency Services

Ira Tannenbaum

Director of Public/Private Initiatives, New York City 

Office of Emergency Management

Jim Turner

Executive Director, California Resiliency Alliance

David Vanderbloemen

Director, Electric Distribution Operations Centers, 

Dominion

Jim Williams

Manager, Emergency Preparedness and Response, 

Walgreens
288

Appendix B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

(Adapted as needed for each interview)

1. How would you characterize your agency/firm’s role 

in emergency management within your state?

2. What would you say is the general role of the public sector/private sector in emergency management 

within your state? 

3. Has your agency/firm participated in a public-private 

partnership for emergency management? If so, can 

you explain why the partnership formed and describe the nature of that public-private partnership? 

4. What role does leadership play in forming and nurturing public-private partnerships for emergency 

management?

5. What role does trust play in public-private partnerships for emergency management?

6. If your agency/firm has participated in a publicprivate partnership for emergency management, 

could you speak about how that partnership played 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

289

a role in response to a few recent large-scale emergencies?

7. Have public-private partnerships for emergency 

management helped to prepare your state for disasters? If so, how? If not, why?

8. What are the most pressing challenges facing publicprivate partnerships for emergency management in 

your state? Why do you think this is so?

9. In what areas do public-private partnerships for 

emergency management work well in your state? 

Why do you think this is so?

10. What needs to be changed about public-private 

partnerships for emergency management in your 

state?

11. How do you determine if a public-private partnership for emergency management is successful? 

How would you measure that success?
290

Appendix C

HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION

Disaster Labs began as a PhD thesis written at King’s College London. Like any other academic study that requires 

direct contact with human subjects, this study was vetted 

by an institutional review board and approved prior to the 

author commencing this research. The purpose of this appendix is to summarize the process that was followed to 

ensure the safety of human subjects in the course of the 

present study.

To obtain ethical clearance to begin the research, the 

author completed and submitted to King’s College London’s College Research Ethics Committee (CREC) a copy of 

the Low Risk Ethics Application Form (2013/14), as this research involved only minimal risk to human subjects, since 

it consisted exclusively of interviews and conversations, 

rather than experimentation or hands-on interventions. 

That application was approved by the CREC on 4 March 

2014 and assigned a reference code of REP/13/14-35. The 

author filed an amendment to the initial application form in 

December 2014—specifically to modify one of the participant groups, update relevant documentation to reflect the 

change in participant groups, and extend the time during 

which he was permitted to collect data.

Interviewees in the present study were selected using 
HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION

291

“snowball” sampling, beginning with professional contacts 

of the author from previous work in the homeland security/

emergency management field.1

 Each interviewee was provided with a copy of an information sheet about the study 

as well as a consent form to sign and return, which the 

author retained electronically for record-keeping purposes. The interviews were conducted via video conferencing 

technology, telephone, email, and/or face-to-face. The interviews were not audio recorded. The author instead took 

notes about the conversations, transcribing them verbatim 

when needed. Participants’ names and identifying information were stored separately from the interview notes in an 

encrypted, password-protected document. Interviewees 

were given the opportunity to review for accuracy and clarity their responses to interview questions that the author 

wanted to include in the final book, as well as to revise and 

update their comments, if necessary.

1 Snowball sampling refers to a nonprobability sampling technique 

where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from their 

acquaintances.

293

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Official Publications

The 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah: Cooperation between Federal, State, Local, and Private Agencies to 

Address Public Safety Concerns: Hearing Before the 

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 

107th Cong., 31 May 2001. 

2012 New York Consolidated Laws: Executive Article 26–

(709–718). Albany, NY: Division of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Services, 2012. 

Abtew, Wossenu, R. Scott Huebner, Violeta Ciuca, and Eric 

Swartz. The 2005 Hurricane Season in South Florida, Technical Publication ERA #439. Florida: Water 

Quality Assessment Division, Environmental Resource Assessment Department, South Florida Water Management District, 2006. 

Aprea, Andrea. “Investigative Update Regarding Pulse 

Nightclub Shooting.” Press release. FBI Tampa, FL, 

20 June 2016. 

Arizona Division of Emergency Management. “Private/Public Partnership.” 2003. 

Bloomberg, Michael R., and Megan Sheekey. Mayor’s Fund 

to Advance New York City: Hurricane Sandy 6-Month 

Update. New York: New York City Service, 2013. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

294

Bush, George W. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5—Management of Domestic Incidents.” 

In Administration of George W. Bush, 2003. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003. 

California Department of Finance. A Brief History of the California Economy: 20th Century Industries—Motion 

Pictures Immigrate. Sacramento, CA: n.d. 

———. A Brief History of the California Economy: Leading 

the Way. Sacramento, CA: n.d. 

California Emergency Management Agency. “Business and 

& Utility Operations Center.” 2019. 

———. “Business and Utility Operations Center (BUOC) 

Administrative Policy—December 2016.” 2016. 

———. Golden Guardian 2010 After Action Report: Executive Summary. Mather, CA: 2010. 

———. “MyHazards: Hazard Mitigation Portal.” 2014. 

California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. “Governor’s Office of Emergency Services Public/Private 

Partnership Initiative.” n.d. 

Clinton, William J. “Executive Order EO 13010: Critical 

Infrastructure Protection.” Intelligence Resource 

Program, Federation of American Scientists, 15 July 

1996. 

Commonwealth of Virginia. “Hazard Identification and Risk 

Assessment.” In Commonwealth of Virginia Hazard 

Mitigation Plan. Richmond, VA: Virginia Department 

of Emergency Management, 2018. 

Commonwealth of Virginia State Corporation Commission. 

Special Report of the Division of Energy Regulation: 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Isabel by 

Virginia’s Electric Utilities. Richmond, VA: 2004. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. “6 Months Report: Superstorm Sandy from Pre-Disaster to Recovery.” 25 April 2013. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

295

———. “About the Agency.” 3 June 2019. 

———. “Big City Partnership—New York City Office of 

Emergency Management.” n.d. 

———. “Catastrophic Incident Annex.” 2008.

———. “The Disaster Process and Disaster Aid Programs.” 

2012. 

———. “FEMA Continues to Support Response to Colorado Flooding.” Press release. 16 September 2013. 

———. “Glossary and Acronyms.” January 2008. 

———. “Glossary of Terms.” September 1996. 

———. “Hurricane Sandy: A Timeline.” 2013. 

———. “Office of External Affairs.” 2 September 2015. 

———. “Private Sector.” 12 May 2015. 

———. “Private Sector Liaison Program.” n.d. 

———. “Public Private Partnership Case Study: Digital Billboards Deliver Emergency Messages.” n.d. 

———. “Public Private Partnership Models.” n.d. 

———. “The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emergency 

Management.” November 2013. 

———. Safe Rooms Save Lives: State of Oklahoma Safe 

Room Initiative. Mitigation Case Studies. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2003. 

———. “State Partnership––Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection.” n.d. 

———. “State Partnership––Arizona.” n.d. 

———. “State Partnership—California Emergency Management Agency.” n.d. 

———. “State Partnership––Missouri.” n.d. 

———. “State Partnership––Safeguard Iowa Partnership.” 

n.d. 

———. “State Partnership––Utah.” n.d. 

———. “State Partnership: Washington Emergency Management Division.” n.d. 

———. Testimony of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Feder-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

296

al Emergency Management Agency, Before U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security, 25 September 2012. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency and Florida 

State Emergency Response Team. “Backgrounder: 

‘Charley Command’: The Beginning of a Unified FEMA-State Team.” 13 August 2009. 

Florida Association of Counties. “Save the Date: 2015 

Public-Private Partnership Summit.” 12 November 

2015. 

Florida Disaster, Division of Emergency Management. “3rd 

Annual Public-Private Partnership Summit: December 15–16, 2014.” 12 November 2014. 

———. “Emergency Support Functions.” 2019. 

———. “ESF #18 Business, Industry and Economic Stabilization.” 2019. 

———. “Public Sector-Private Sector Disaster Preparedness Summit: Summary Report.” 2012. 

Fugate, Craig W. “One Year Later: Examining the Ongoing 

Recovery from Hurricane Sandy.” FEMA, 6 November 2013. 

Gibbs, Linda I., and Caswell F. Holloway. Hurricane Sandy 

After Action: Report and Recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg. New York: New York City 

Government, 2013. 

Governor’s Hurricane Conference. 2019. 

Governor’s Hurricane Conference. “2015 Training Sessions.” 

2014. 

———. “Directors and Officers: 2014–2015 Governor’s Hurricane Conference.” 2014. 

Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. “Public & Private 

Partnerships.” 2015. 

Herbst, Mark. Public Hearing: How to Utilize Public-Private 

Partnerships (P3s) to Repair and Improve New York 

State’s Transportation System. Before the New York 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

297

State Senate Standing Committee on Transportation. 27 September 2011. 

International Association of Emergency Managers. Principles of Emergency Management Supplement. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2007. 

Martin Associates. 2018 National Economic Impact of the 

U.S. Coastal Port System: Executive Summary. Los 

Angeles, CA: 2019. 

Mayor’s Fund to Advance New York City. “Relief and Recovery: Hurricane Sandy Recovery.” 2015. 

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 

Spill and Offshore Drilling. Deep Water: The Gulf Oil 

Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling. Washington, DC: 2011. 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. Washington, 

DC: 2004. 

National Governors Association. “Former Oklahoma Governors.” 2011. 

New York City. “About the Fund.” 2015. 

New York City Office of Emergency Management. Biennial 

Report, 2009. New York: New York City Government, 

2009. 

———. “Building Partnerships. Enhancing Resiliency. Supporting Businesses and Organizations Before, 

During, and After Emergencies.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: April 2013: 

Major League Soccer.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: December 

2013: Con Edison.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: February 

2013: Cravath, Swaine, & Moore LLP.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: January 

2012: Featured Partner: Bank of New York Mellon.” 

n.d. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

298

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: January 

2013: SelectCare.” 2015. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: July 2013: 

AIG.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: March 2014: 

CME Group.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: November 

2013: Central Park Conservancy.” 2015. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: October 

2012: Featured Partner: ABC TV.” n.d. 

———. “Businesses: Partners in Preparedness: October 

2013: The New York Stock Exchange.” n.d. 

———. “Partners in Preparedness: List of Program Partners.” 2015. 

———. “Take Action to Protect Your Business.” 2015. 

New York Police Department. “Terrorist Plots Targeting 

New York City.” 2015. 

New York State Department of Labor. Significant Industries: 

A Report to the Workforce Development System. Albany: New York State Department of Labor, 2010. 

New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission. 2012 

Annual Report. Albany: NYS Division of Homeland 

Security & Emergency Services Office of Emergency 

Management, 2013. 

New York State Empire State Development. “Storm Recovery.” 2010. 

New York State Office of Counter Terrorism. “Critical Infrastructure Protection Unit.” n.d. 

New York State Office of Emergency Management. “Section 

3.0: Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment.” In 

New York State Hazard Mitigation Plan. Albany, NY: 

Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, 2014. 

Office of the Governor of the State of California. Executive 

Order S-04-06. Sacramento, CA: Office of the Governor, 2006. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

299

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures. Washington, DC: White House, 1997. 

Richardson, James A. The Economic Impact of the Ports of 

Louisiana. Baton Rouge: Ports Association of Louisiana, 2012. 

State of Florida. “Florida Quick Facts.” 2015. 

State of Missouri. “State of Missouri Business Emergency 

Operations Center (BEOC).” January 2012. 

State of New York. “Governor Cuomo Announces BAE Systems to Remain in the Southern Tier, Saving Nearly 

1,400 Jobs.” Press release. 17 November 2011. 

———. “Governor Cuomo Announces Small Business 

Emergency Loan Fund to Provide Assistance to 

Businesses Affected by Sandy.” 14 November 2012. 

———. “Governor Cuomo Secures First Major Private Donation to Support New Yorkers in Recovery Efforts.” 

4 November 2012. 

———. “Governor Cuomo Suspends Regulations to Allow 

Drinking Water Donations for New Yorkers Affected 

by Hurricane Sandy.” 4 November 2012. 

———. “Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (GOSR): 

About.” n.d. 

———. New York State Responds: Hurricane Irene and 

Tropical Storm Lee: One Year Later. Albany, NY: Office of the Governor, 2012. 

Townsend, Frances F. The Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington, DC: White 

House, 2006. 

United Nations. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–2030. Geneva, Switzerland: Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, n.d. 

U.S. Census Bureau. “Quick Facts: New York City, New 

York.” 29 May 2015. 

———. “State & County QuickFacts: California.” 28 May 

2015. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

300

———. “State & County QuickFacts: Florida.” 28 May 2015. 

———. “State & County QuickFacts: New York.” 28 May 

2015. 

———. “State & County QuickFacts: Virginia.” 28 May 2015. 

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Deaths 

Associated with Hurricane Sandy—October–November 2012.” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report

62, no. 20 (24 May 2013): 393–97. 

———. “Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Case Counts.” 12 June 

2015. 

———. “West Nile Virus.” 9 June 2015. 

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation. “Hurricane Sandy

—Corporate Aid Tracker.” 2015. 

———. “Orlando Nightclub Response.” 23 August 2016. 

———. State Governments and Community Disaster Recovery: A Critical Role. Washington, DC: U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, n.d. 

U.S. Coast Guard. “ACN 134/18 - NOV 2018 Promulgation of 

Foreign Freight Vessel Exam (FFVE) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP), CGTTP 3-72.8.” 16 November 2018. 

———. “Missions: Maritime Security.” 5 September 2014. 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “Cargo Examination.” 

15 May 2017. 

U.S. Department of Energy and National Association of 

State Energy Officials. Appendix B: Florida State’s 

Energy Emergency Response to the 2004 Hurricanes. 

Arlington, VA: National Association of State Energy 

Officials, 2005. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). “The Department of Homeland Security Announces Recipients 

of the 2013 Rick Rescorla National Award for Resilience.” Press release. 4 December 2013. 

———. National Incident Management System. Washington, DC: DHS, 2008. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

301

———. National Response Framework. 2d ed. Washington, 

DC: DHS, 2013. 

———. National Response Plan. Washington, DC: DHS, 

2004. 

———. “NIMS: Frequently Asked Questions.” n.d. 

———. A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, DHS, 

2006. 

U.S. Small Business Administration. “Frequently Asked 

Questions.” September 2012. 

U.S. Transportation Security Administration. “Mission.” 

n.d. 

Virginia Department of Emergency Management. “Commonwealth of Virginia Standard Contract 127-11-

0001.” 2011. 

———. “Hurricane History: 21st Century Hurricanes.” 2012. 

———. “VDEM Emergency Contracts.” 2012. 

Virginia Economic Development Partnership. “Data Centers: Industry Overview.” 2015. 

———. “Food Processing: Industry Overview.” 2015. 

———. “Plastics and Advanced Materials: Industry Overview.” 2015. 

White House. “Press Briefing on the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf 

Coast.” Press release. 29 April 2010. 

Magazine and Website Articles

American Red Cross. “Red Cross Issues Statement on Orlando Mass Shooting.” Press release. 12 June 2016. 

———. “Our Federal Charter.” n.d. 

———. “Red Cross Providing Support in Orlando After Tragic and Deadly Shooting.” Press release. 13 June 2016. 

Bell, Beverly. “Recession Hits Emergency Management,” 

Capitol Ideas. July/August 2009. 

CBS News. “Breezy Point, Queens Looks Forward after Dev-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

302

astating Fire Following Superstorm Sandy.” 31 October 2012. 

———. “NYC Hospitals Evacuated for Superstorm.” 2015. 

CBS New York. “One Year Later, Superstorm Sandy Survivors to Light Up Shore.” 29 October 2013. 

CNN. “Salazar Calls Oil Spill ‘Massive’ and a Potential Catastrophe.” PoliticalTicker (blog). 2 May 2010. 

Corporate Emergency Access System. “New York City Activates CEAS for Winter Storm Jonas.” Press release. 

23 January 2015. 

Danner, Chas. “New York Nears Record Snowfall after Blizzard Pummels City, East Coast.” New York. 24 January 2016. 

Duke, Alan. “Superstorm Sandy Breaks Records.” CNN. 31 

October 2012. 

Farmer, Liz. “Federal Government Budget Problems Make 

State Budgeting Impossible.” Governing, 22 November 2013. 

Griffin, Larry. “To Find ‘New Normal’ after Pulse Attack, City 

and County Launch Family Assistance Center.” Orlando Rising. 23 June 2016. 

Klopott, Freeman. “Cuomo Aims to Speed New York Sandy 

Recovery with Private Funding.” Bloomberg. 23 January 2013. 

PressConnects. “It’s Official: BAE Systems to Remain at Endicott’s Huron Campus.” USA Today. 7 March 2012. 

Taylor, Alan. “Hurricane Sandy: Staten Island Survivors.” Atlantic. 21 November 2012. 

WTXL. “Twelve State Agencies Provide Updates on Response to Orlando Shooting.” 15 June 2016. 

Secondary Sources

SCHOLARLY BOOKS AND REPORTS

Abou-bakr, Ami J. Managing Disasters through PublicPrivate Partnerships. Washington, DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

303

Adams, Vincanne. Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith: New 

Orleans in the Wake of Katrina. Durham, NC: Duke 

University Press, 2013.

Agranoff, Robert. Collaborating to Manage: A Primer for the 

Public Sector. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012.

Aldrich, Daniel P. Building Resilience: Social Capital in 

Post-Disaster Recovery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.

Auerswald, Phillip E., Lewis M. Branscomb, Todd M. La 

Porte, and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, eds. Seeds of 

Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private Action Can 

Reduce Public Vulnerability. New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2006.

Bardach, Eugene. Getting Agencies to Work Together: The 

Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship. 

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.

Birkland, Thomas A. After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy, and Focusing Events. Washington, DC: 

Georgetown University Press, 1997.

———. Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after Catastrophic Events. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006.

Blake, Eric S., Todd B. Kimberlain, Robert J. Berg, John P. 

Cangialosi, and John L. Beven II. Tropical Cyclone 

Report: Hurricane Sandy (AL182012): 22–29 October 

2012. Miami: National Hurricane Center. 12 February 

2013. 

Bushman, Edward. “Policy Options to Address Crucial Communication Gaps in the Incident Command System.” 

Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 

Chadwick, Bruce A., Howard M. Bahr, and Stan L. Albrecht. 

Social Science Research Methods. New Englewood 

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1984.

Colander, David, and Roland Kupers. Complexity and the 

Art of Public Policy: Solving Society’s Problems from 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

304

the Bottom Up. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2014.

Comfort, Louise K., Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak, eds. 

Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events. 

Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.

Dexter, Lewis Anthony. Elite and Specialized Interviewing. 

Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Flynn, Stephen E. The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation. New York: Random House, 2007.

Goldsmith, Stephen, and William D. Eggers. Governing by 

Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004.

Hood, Christopher, and Martin Lodge. The Politics of Public 

Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty—

and Blame. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Kapucu, Naim, Christopher V. Hawkins, and Fernando I. 

Rivera, eds. Disaster Resiliency: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge, 2013.

Karapin, Roger. Political Opportunities for Climate Policy: 

California, New York, and the Federal Government. 

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Kolluru, Ramesh. Compendium of Public-Private Partnerships for Emergency Management. Lafayette: National Incident Management Systems and Advanced 

Technologies, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 

2012. 

Lindell, Michael K., Carla Prater, and Ronald W. Perry. Introduction to Emergency Management. Hoboken, NJ: 

John Wiley & Sons, 2007.

Marney, John-Paul, and Heather Tarbert. Corporate Finance for Business. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 2011.

Miskel, James F. Disaster Response and Homeland Security: What Works, What Doesn’t. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

305

Patton, Michael Q. Qualitative Evaluation and Research 

Methods. 2d ed. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990.

Quarantelli, E. L. “Catastrophes Are Different from Disasters: Some Implications for Crisis Managing and 

Planning Drawn from Katrina.” Social Science Research Council. 11 June 2006. 

Rosenau, Pauline Vaillancourt, ed. Public-Private Policy 

Partnerships. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

Rubin, Claire B., ed. Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010. 2d ed. Boca Raton, FL: 

CRC Press, 2012.

Savas, Emanuel S. Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships. New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000.

Schultz, Laura, and Michelle Cummings. Giving or Getting?: 

Regional Distribution of Revenue and Spending in 

the New York State Budget, Fiscal Year 2009–10. New 

York State Brief. Albany, NY: Nelson A. Rockefeller 

Institute of Government at the University of Albany, 

State University of New York, 2011. 

Taylor, Stephen J., and Robert Bogdan. Introduction to 

Qualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings. 2d ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984.

CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

Alexander, David. “An Interpretation of Disaster in Terms of 

Changes in Culture, Society, and International Relations.” In What Is a Disaster?: New Answers to Old 

Questions. Edited by Ronald W. Perry and E. L. Quarantelli. London: International Research Committee 

on Disasters, Routledge, 2005.

Almqvist, Roland, and Olle Hogberg. “Public-Private Partnerships in Social Services: The Example of the City 

of Stockholm.” In The Challenge of Public-Private 

Partnerships: Learning from International Experi-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

306

ence. Edited by Graeme Hodge and Carsten Greve. 

Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.

Beauregard, Robert A. “Public-Private Partnerships as Historical Chameleons: The Case of the United States.” 

In Partnerships in Urban Governance: European and 

American Experience. Edited by Jon Pierre. London: 

MacMillan Press, 1997.

Boin, Arjen. “From Crisis to Disaster: Towards an Integrative 

Perspective.” In What Is a Disaster?: New Answers to 

Old Questions. Edited by Ronald W. Perry and E. L. 

Quarantelli. London: International Research Committee on Disasters and Routledge, 2005. 

Boin, Arjen, Louise K. Comfort, and Chris C. Demchak. “The 

Rise of Resilience.” In Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events. Edited by Louise K. Comfort, 

Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak. Pittsburgh, PA: 

University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.

Britton, Neil R. “What’s a Word?: Opening Up the Debate.” In 

What Is a Disaster? Edited by Perry and Quarantelli. 

Buckle, Philip. “Disaster: Mandated Definitions, Local 

Knowledge and Complexity.” In What Is a Disaster? 

Edited by Perry and Quarantelli. 

Coghill, Ken, and Dennis Woodward. “Political Issues of 

Public-Private Partnerships.” In The Challenge of 

Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by Hodge and 

Greve. 

Common, Richard. “The East Asia Region: Do PublicPrivate Partnerships Make Sense?” In Public-Private 

Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 

Perspective. Edited by Stephen P. Osborne. London: 

Routledge, 2000.

Corner, David. “The United Kingdom Private Finance Initiative: The Challenge of Allocating Risk.” In The 

Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by 

Hodge and Greve. 

Cutter, Susan L. “Are We Asking the Right Question?” In 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

307

What Is a Disaster? Edited by Perry and Quarantelli. 

English, Linda M. “Using Public-Private Partnerships to 

Deliver Social Infrastructure: The Australian Experience.” In The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by Hodge and Greve. 

Gazley, Beth. “Building Collaborative Capacity for Disaster 

Resiliency.” In Disaster Resiliency: Interdisciplinary 

Perspectives. Edited by Naim Kapucu, Christopher V. 

Hawkins, and Fernando I. Rivera. London: Routledge, 

2013.

Greve, Carsten, and Graeme Hodge. “Introduction.” In The 

Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by 

Hodge and Greve. 

Gorman, Sean P. “A Cyber Threat to National Security?” In 

Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response: How Private 

Action Can Reduce Public Vulnerability. Edited by 

Phillip E. Auerswald, Lewis M. Branscomb, Todd M. 

LaPorte, and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan. New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Haddow, George. Case Studies in Emergency and Risk Management. Washington, DC: FEMA, 2004. 

Harrald, John R. “The System Is Tested: Response to the BP 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.” In Emergency Management: The American Experience, 1900–2010. Edited 

by Claire B. Rubin. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2012.

Innes, Judith E., and David E. Booher. “Collaborative Policymaking: Governance through Dialogue.” In Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance 

in the Network Society. Edited by Maarten A. Hajer 

and Hendrik Wagenaar. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2003.

Johnston, Jocelyn M., and Barbara S. Romzek. “Traditional 

Contracts as Partnerships: Effective Accountability in Social Services Contracts in the American 

States.” In The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by Hodge and Greve. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

308

Kaniasty, Krzysztof, and Fran Norris. “The Experience of 

Disaster: Individuals and Communities Sharing 

Trauma.” In Response to Disaster: Psychosocial, 

Community, and Ecological Approaches. Edited by 

Richard Gist and Bernard Lubin. Philadelphia, PA: 

Taylor & Francis, 1999.

Klijn, Erik-Hans, and Geert R. Teisman. “Governing PublicPrivate Partnerships: Analysing and Managing the 

Processes and Institutional Characteristics of Public-Private Partnerships.” In Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by Osborne. 

Lagadec, Patrick, and Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan. “The Paris Initiative, ‘Anthrax and Beyond’: Transnational 

Collaboration Among Interdependent Critical Networks.” In Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. 

Edited by Auerswald, Branscomb, LaPorte, and Michel-Kerjan. 

Linder, Stephen H. “Coming to Terms with the PublicPrivate Partnership: A Grammar of Multiple Meanings.” In Public-Private Policy Partnerships. Edited by 

Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau. Cambridge, MA: MIT 

Press, 2000.

Lopez, Brian. “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States Since 1993.” In Seeds of Disaster, Roots 

of Response. Edited by Auerswald, Branscomb, 

LaPorte, and Michel-Kerjan. 

Malbin, Michael J., and Peter W. Brusoe. “Campaign Finance 

Policy in the State and City of New York.” In The Oxford Handbook of New York State Government and 

Politics. Edited by Gerald Benjamin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

McQuaid, Ronald W. “The Theory of Partnership: Why Have 

Partnerships?” In Public-Private Partnerships. Edited 

by Osborne. 

Michel-Kerjan, Erwann O. “Insurance, the 14th Critical Sector.” In Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. Edited 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

309

by Auerswald, Branscomb, LaPorte, and MichelKerjan. 

Moulton, Lynne, and Helmut K. Anheier. “Public-Private 

Partnerships in the United States: Historical Patterns and Current Trends.” In Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by Osborne. 

Pedraza, Jorge M. “Elements for Effective Management of 

a Business Corporation Crisis Situation.” In Crisis 

Management. Edited by Patrick Alvintzi and Hannes 

Eder. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010.

Perry, Ronald W. “Disasters, Definitions and Theory Construction.” In What Is a Disaster? Edited by Perry and 

Quarantelli. 

Pollitt, Michael. “Learning from the UK Private Finance 

Initiative experience.” In The Challenge of PublicPrivate Partnerships. Edited by Hodge and Greve. 

Prieto III, Daniel B. “Information Sharing with the Private Sector: History, Challenges, Innovation, and Prospects.” 

In Seeds of Disaster, Roots of Response. Edited 

by Auerswald, Branscomb, LaPorte, and MichelKerjan.

Smith, Denis. “Through a Glass Darkly: A Response to Stallings.” In What Is a Disaster? Edited by Perry and 

Quarantelli. 

Sylves, Richard T. “Federal Emergency Management Comes 

of Age: 1979–2001.” In Emergency Management. Edited by Rubin. 

Teisman, Geert R., and Erik-Hans Klijn. “Public-Private Partnerships in the European Union: Officially Suspect, 

Embraced in Daily Practice.” In Public-Private Partnerships. Edited by Osborne. 

Townsend, Francis F. “Lessons Learned.” In The Federal 

Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 

Washington, DC: White House, 2006.

Van Slyke, David M. “Collaboration and Relational Contracting.” In The Collaborative Public Manager: New Ideas 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

310

for the Twenty-first Century. Edited by Rosemary 

O’Leary and Lisa Blomgren Bingham. Washington, 

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Bean, Hamilton. “Exploring the Relationship between 

Homeland Security Information Sharing & Local 

Emergency Preparedness.” Homeland Security Affairs 5, no 2 (May 2009): 1–18.

Birkland, Thomas A. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and 

Agenda Setting.” Journal of Public Policy 18, no. 1 

(January–April 1998): 53–74, https://doi.org/10.1017/

S0143814X98000038.

Boeckelman, Keith. “The Influence of States on Federal Policy Adoptions.” Policy Studies Journal 20, no. 

3 (September 1992): 365–75, https://doi.org/10.1111

/j.1541-0072.1992.tb00164.x.

Busch, Nathan E., and Austen D. Givens. “Achieving Resilience in Disaster Management: The Role of 

Public-Private Partnerships.” Journal of Strategic Security 6, no. 2 (June 2013): 1–19, http://dx.doi.org/10

.5038/1944-0472.6.2.1.

———. “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 

Opportunities and Challenges.” Homeland Security 

Affairs, no. 8 (2012): 1–24.

Caimo, Alberto, and Alessandro Lomi. “Knowledge Sharing 

in Organizations: A Bayesian Analysis of the Role of 

Reciprocity and Formal Structure.” Journal of Management 41, no. 2 (February 2015): 665–91, https://doi

.org/10.1177/0149206314552192.

Chen, Justine, Ted Hsuan Yun Chen, Ilan Vertinsky, Lilia Yumagulova, and Chansoo Park. “Public-Private Partnerships for the Development of Disaster Resilient 

Communities.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 

Management 21, no. 3 (September 2013): 130–43, 

https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12021.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

311

Curley, Tyler M. “Models of Emergency Statebuilding in the 

United States.” PS: Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 3 

(September 2015): 697–713.

Daniels, R. Steven. “The Rise of Politics and the Decline of 

Vulnerability as Criteria in Disaster Decisions of the 

United States, 1953–2009.” Disasters 37, no. 4 (October 2013): 669–94, https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12026.

Day, Christine L. “Katrina Seven Years On: The Politics of 

Race and Recovery—Notes on a Roundtable Meeting Organized for the 2012 APSA Annual Meeting.” 

PS: Political Science and Politics 46, no. 4 (October 

2013): 748–52.

Dye, Thomas R. “Executive Power and Public Policy in the 

States.” Western Political Quarterly 22, no. 4 (December 1969): 926–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591 

296902200414.

Emerson, Kirk, Tina Nabatchi, and Stephen Balogh. “An 

Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance.” Journal of Public Administration Research 

and Theory 22, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–29, https://doi.

org/10.1093/jopart/mur011.

Evans, Joel M., Michael G. Hendron, and James B. Oldroyd. 

“Withholding the Ace: The Individual- and Unit-Level 

Performance Effects of Self-Reported and Perceived 

Knowledge Hoarding.” Organization Science 26, no. 

2 (March–April 2015): 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1287/

orsc.2014.0945.

Fawcett, Stanley E., Jeffrey A. Ogden, Gregory M. Magnan, 

and M. Bixby Cooper. “Organizational Commitment 

and Governance for Supply Chain Success.” International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 

Management 36, no. 1 (January 2006): 22–35, https://

doi.org/10.1108/09600030610642913.

Franklin, Thomas. “How Partnership Works.” Development in 

Practice 19, no. 6 (July 2009): 789–91, https://doi.org

/10.1080/09614520903027106.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

312

Galle, Brian D., and Kirk J. Stark. “Beyond Bailouts: Federal Tools for Preventing Budget Crises.” Indiana Law 

Journal 87, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 599–644.

Ginsberg, Ari, and Eric Abrahamson. “Champions of Change 

and Strategic Shifts: The Role of Internal and External Change Advocates.” Journal of Management 

Studies 28, no. 2 (March 1991): 173–90, https://doi.org

/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1991.tb00276.x.

Givens, Austen D., and Nathan E. Busch “Information 

Sharing and Homeland Security: The Role of PublicPrivate Partnerships.” Homeland Security Review 7, 

no. 2 (Summer 2013): 123–50.

———. “Realizing the Promise of Public-Private Partnerships in US Critical Infrastructure Protection.” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 

6, no. 1 (March 2013): 39–50.

Goldberg, Stephen D., and Beverly B. Harzog. “Oil Spill: 

Management Crisis or Crisis Management?” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 4, 

no. 1 (March 1996): 1–9, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468

-5973.1996.tb00070.x.

Granovetter, Mark S. “The Strength of Weak Ties.” American 

Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–80, 

https://doi.org/10.1086/225469.

Greve, Carston. “New Avenues for Contracting Out and Implications for a Theoretical Framework.” Public Performance & Management Review 24, no. 3 (March 

2001): 270–84, https://doi.org/10.2307/3381089.

Grimsey, Darrin, and Mervyn K. Lewis. “Are Public-Private 

Partnerships Value for Money? Evaluating Alternative Approaches and Comparing Academic and 

Practitioner Views.” Accounting Forum 29, no. 4 (December 2005): 345–78, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accfor

.2005.01.001.

Harcourt, Bernard E., and Jens Ludwig. “Broken Windows: 

New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

313

Social Experiment.” University of Chicago Law Review 73, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 271–320.

Harknett, Richard J., and James A. Stever. “The Struggle 

to Reform Intelligence After 9/11.” Public Administration Review 71, no. 5 (September/October 2011): 

700–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02409.x.

Hodge, Graeme A., and Carsten Greve. “Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review.” 

Public Administration Review 67, no. 3 (May 2007): 

545–58, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00736

.x.

Horwitz, Steven. “Wal-Mart to the Rescue: Private Enterprise’s Response to Hurricane Katrina.” Independent 

Review 13, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 511–28.

Howell, Jane M., and Christopher A. Higgins. “Champions 

of Technological Innovation.” Administrative Science 

Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 1990): 317–41, https://doi.

org/10.2307/2393393.

Jacobitz, Steve. “Learning from Disaster; Florida’s 2004 Hurricane Season Provides a Number of Lessons for Improving Transportation and Response.” Public Roads 

69, no. 3 (November/December 2005). 

Kapucu, Naim. “Collaborative Emergency Management: 

Better Community Organizing, Better Public Preparedness and Response.” Disasters 32, no. 2 (June 

2008): 239–62, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2008

.01037.x.

———. “Disaster Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Central Florida, US, and in Eastern Marmara Region, 

Turkey.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: 

Research and Practice 14, no. 3 (June 2012): 202–16, 

https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2012.687620.

———. “Non-Profit Response to Catastrophic Disasters.” 

Disaster Prevention and Management 16, no. 4 (2007): 

551–61, https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560710817039.

———. “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Ac-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

314

tion in Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies.” Public Administration 84, no. 1 (March 2006): 205–20, 

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0033-3298.2006.00500.x.

Kapucu, Naim, and Montgomery van Wart. “The Evolving 

Role of the Public Sector in Managing Catastrophic 

Disasters: Lessons Learned.” Administration & Society 38, no. 3 (July 2006): 279–308, https://doi.org/10

.1177/0095399706289718.

Kapucu, Naim, Tolga Arslan, and Matthew Lloyd Collins. 

“Examining Intergovernmental and Interorganizational Response to Catastrophic Disasters: Toward 

a Network-Centric Approach.” Administration & Society 42, no. 2 (April 2010): 222–47, https://doi.org/10

.1177/0095399710362517.

Kettl, Donald F. “The Transformation of Governance: Globalization, Devolution, and the Role of Government.” 

Public Administration Review 60, no. 6 (November/

December 2000): 488–97, https://doi.org/10.1111/0033

-3352.00112.

Linnerooth-Bayer, Joanne, and Reinhard Mechler. “Disaster Safety Nets for Developing Countries: Extending 

Public-Private Partnerships.” Environmental Hazards

7, no. 1 (2007): 54–61, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envhaz

.2007.04.004.

Lund-Thomsen, Peter. “Assessing the Impact of PublicPrivate Partnerships in the Global South: The Case 

of the Kasur Tanneries Pollution Control Project.” 

Journal of Business Ethics 90, no. 1 (2009): 57–78, 

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-008-9914-x.

MacManus, Susan A., and Kiki Caruson. “Emergency Management: Gauging the Extensiveness and Quality of 

Public- and Private-Sector Collaboration at the Local Level.” Urban Affairs Review 47, no. 2 (March 2011): 

280–99, https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087410362050.

Malmstadt, Jill, Kelsey Scheitlin, and James Elsner. “Florida 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

315

Hurricanes and Damage Costs.” Southeastern Geographer 49, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 108–31.

Marchington, Mick, and Steven Vincent. “Analysing the 

Influence of Institutional, Organizational, and Interpersonal Forces in Shaping Inter-Organizational 

Relations.” Journal of Management Studies 41, no. 6 

(September 2004): 1029–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j

.1467-6486.2004.00465.x.

May, Peter J., and Chris Koski. “Addressing Public Risks: 

Extreme Events and Critical Infrastructures.” Review 

of Policy Research 30, no. 2 (March 2013): 139–59, 

https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12012.

Minamoto, Yuriko. “Social Capital and Livelihood Recovery: 

Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka as a Case.” Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 19, no. 5 (2010): 548–64, https://doi.org/10.1108

/09653561011091887.

Norris, Fran H. “Disaster Research Methods: Past Progress 

and Future Directions.” Journal of Traumatic Stress

19, no. 2 (April 2006): 173–84, https://doi.org/10.1002/jts

.20109.

Pearson, Christine M., and Ian I. Mitroff. “From Crisis Prone 

to Crisis Prepared: A Framework for Crisis Management.” Executive 7, no. 1 (February 1993): 48–59, 

https://doi.org/10.5465/ame.1993.9409142058.

Pearson, Christine M., and Judith A. Clair. “Reframing Crisis 

Management.” Academy of Management Review 23, 

no. 1 (January 1998): 59–76, https://doi.org/10.5465/

amr.1998.192960.

Petak, William J. “Emergency Management: A Challenge 

for Public Administration.” Public Administration Review, no. 15, Special Issue: Emergency Management: 

A Challenge for Public Administration (January 

1985): 3–7, https://doi.org/10.2307/3134992.

Posner, Eric A., and Adrian Vermeule. “Crisis Governance 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

316

in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial 

Meltdown of 2008.” University of Chicago Law Review 76, no. 4 (Fall 2009): 1613–81.

Provan, Keith G., and H. Brinton Milward. “Do Networks 

Really Work?: A Framework for Evaluating PublicSector Organizational Networks.” Public Administration Review 61, no. 4 (July/August 2001): 414–23, 

https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00045.

Robinson, Scott E., and Benjamin S. Gaddis. “Seeing Past 

Parallel Play: Measures of Collaboration in Disaster 

Situations.” Policy Studies Journal 40, no. 2 (May 

2012): 256–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2012

.00452.x.

Romzek, Barbara, Kelly LeRoux, Jocelyn Johnston, Robin 

J. Kempf, and Jaclyn Schede Piatak. “Informal Accountability in Multisector Service Delivery Collaborations.” Journal of Public Administration Research 

and Theory 24, no. 4 (October 2014): 813–42, https://

doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut027.

Sadique, Md Z, Elisabeth J. Adams, and William J. Edmunds. 

“Estimating the Costs of School Closure for Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic.” BMC Public Health, 

no. 8 (December 2008): 135–41, https://doi.org/10

.1186/1471-2458-8-135.

Saz-Carranza, Angel, and Sonia M. Ospina. “The Behavioral Dimension of Governing Interorganizational 

Goal-Directed Networks—Managing the UnityDiversity Tension.” Journal of Public Administration 

Research and Theory 21, no. 2 (April 2011): 327–65, 

https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muq050.

Schaeffer, Peter V., and Scott Loveridge. “Toward an Understanding of Types of Public-Private Cooperation.” 

Public Performance & Management Review 26, 

no. 2 (December 2002): 169–89, https://doi.org/10

.1177/1530957602238261.

Schneider, Saundra K. “Administrative Breakdowns in the 
BIBLIOGRAPHY

317

Governmental Response to Hurricane Katrina.” 

Public Administration Review 65, no. 5 (September/

October 2005): 515–16, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-

6210.2005.00478.x.

Shugart II, William F. “Disaster Relief as Bad Public Policy.” 

Independent Review 15, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 519–39. 

Stewart, Geoffrey T., Ramesh Kolluru, and Mark Smith. 

“Leveraging Public-Private Partnerships to Improve 

Community Resilience in Times of Disaster.” International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management 39, no. 5 (2009): 343–64, https://

doi.org/10.1108/09600030910973724.

Sweetser, Kaye D., and Emily T. Metzgar. “Communicating 

during Crisis: Use of Blogs as a Relationship Management Tool.” Public Relations Review 33, no. 3 

(September 2007): 340–42, https://doi.org/10.1016/j

.pubrev.2007.05.016.

Thibault, Marc, Mary R. Brooks, and Kenneth J. Button. “The 

Response of the U.S. Maritime Industry to the New 

Container Security Initiatives.” Transportation Journal 45, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 5–15.

Thomson, Anne Marie, James L. Perry, and Theodore K. 

Miller. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Collaboration.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 

Theory 19, no. 1 (January 2009): 23–56, https://doi

.org/10.1093/jopart/mum036.

Van Gestel, Kit, Joris Voets, and Koen Verhoest. “How Governance of Complex PPPs Affects Performance.” 

Public Administration Quarterly 36, no. 2 (Summer 

2012): 140–88.

Waugh, William L. Jr., and Gregory Streib. “Collaboration and 

Leadership for Effective Emergency Management.” 

Public Administration Review, no. 66, Special Issue 1 

(November 2006): 131–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540

-6210.2006.00673.x.

White, Douglas R., and Michael Houseman. “The Naviga-
BIBLIOGRAPHY

318

bility of Strong Ties: Small Worlds, Tie Strength, and 

Network Topology.” Complexity 8, no. 1 (September/

October 2002): 72–81, https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx

.10053.

Wise, Charles R. “Organizing for Homeland Security After 

Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What’s Missing?” 

Public Administration Review 66, no. 3 (May–June 

2006): 302–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006

.00587.x.

Xiao, Yu, and Shannon Van Zandt. “Building Community 

Resiliency: Spatial Links between Household and 

Business Post-Disaster Return.” Urban Studies 49, 

no. 11 (August 2012): 2523–42, https://doi.org/10.1177

/0042098011428178.

Yates, Dave, and Scott Paquette. “Emergency Knowledge 

Management and Social Media Technologies: A 

Case Study of the 2010 Haitian Earthquake.” International Journal of Information Management 31, 

no. 1 (February 2011): 6–13, https://doi.org/10.1016/j

.ijinfomgt.2010.10.001.

WEBSITES/OTHER

American Logistics Aid Network. “About ALAN.” 2012. 

California Resiliency Alliance. “Welcome to the California 

Resiliency Alliance.” 2015. 

Central Park Conservancy. “About Us: We Are the Caretakers of Central Park.” 2014. 

FedEx. “About FedEx: FedEx among Companies Recognized by NYSE for Hurricane Sandy Relief Support.” 

9 November 2012. 

Foundation Group. “FAQs: What Benefit Does Being 501(c)

(3) Offer My Nonprofit and Its Contributors?” 2015. 

Honda Corporate Social Responsibility. “Hurricane Sandy.” 

1 November 2012. 

———. “What We Believe.” 26 November 2019.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

319

Insurance Information Institute. “Spotlight On: Catastrophes—Insurance Issues.” August 2015. 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster. “Who 

We Are.” 2014. 

PREP Oregon. “Planning for Resilience and Emergency Preparedness.” n.d. 

Ready Hampton Roads. “Virginia 1st.” 2015. 

Risk and Strategic Management Consulting. 2010. 

321

Index

11 September 2001 terrorist 

attacks (9/11), 12, 15; and 

recognition of the need to 

exchange more information during disasters, 69; 

significant roles played by 

businesses in responses 

to, 52, 69, 

2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 93–94

Abou-bakr, Ami J.: analytical 

framework of, 37, 42, 44, 

45–46; analytical framework applicable to state 

disaster partnerships, 63, 

75, 257–58, 262, 267; different factors of analytical 

framework, 37–41, 63, 72; 

failure to account for nonprofit and industry organizations, 258–59, 262–65; 

limitations of framework 

of, 42–43

Alaska: creation of emergencymanagement agreements, 

73

Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection (APIP), 67

al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr, 116

American Logistics Aid Network (ALAN), 226; and hybrid model of partnership, 

147–48, 150, 264; reliance 

on businesses for support, 

146; work with FDEM, 118, 

132, 259; work with partners, 142

American Red Cross, 9, 56, 77, 

79, 102; dependence on 

outside financial support, 

107, 272; facilitator of partnerships in California, 109–

10, 259–61; influence on 

BUOC, 114; information 

sharing with California, 92, 

108; partnerships with, 82–
INDEX

322

83, 86, 97, 106, 111, 258; preference for MOUs, 88; and 

Pulse shooting, 118

Anheuser-Busch: and Hurricane Sandy relief efforts, 

177

Arizona: creation of emergencymanagement agreements, 

73; State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), 

70–71

Arizona Business Emergency Coordination Center (BECC): 

coordination with firms for 

disaster responses, 70

Arizona Division of Emergency 

Management (ADEM), 70; 

emergency-management 

classes available for firms, 

71

Bank of America, 143–44

BeReady Utah/Private Sector 

Section: formation of to 

prepare for 2002 Winter 

Olympics, 69–70

Better Business Bureau (BBB), 

216–17, 259–60

BP, 31, 58–60. See also Deepwater Horizon, 68

Bush, John E. “Jeb,” 121

Business and Utility Operations 

Center (BUOC), 22–23, 

77, 80–81, 84, 87, 90–91, 

99, 112; and coordination 

with American Red Cross, 

109–10; establishment of, 

105, 112, 227; importance 

of trust to, 101; information 

sharing with firms, 92, 104, 

241; and MOUs, 233; mutual benefits for the state 

and firms, 97; nonprofit 

organizations’ influence 

in, 113–14; private sector 

members of, 95. See also 

California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES)

business continuity planning 

(BCP): VDEM’s use of, 206

Business Council of New York 

State, 181

Business Emergency Coordination Center (BECC)

Business Emergency Operations Center (BEOC): 

provides private sector expertise to Missouri during 

disasters, 72

businesses: and role in emergency-management efforts, 49, 50

Business Executives for National Security (BENS), 68

California: crises and triggering of partnerships, 79, 81, 

83; development of Golden Guardian Exercise to 

practice disaster responses, 47–48; and disastermanagement partnerships, 

16, 20, 23, 115; emergencymanagement partnerships, 

77, 112, 222–23; Executive 

Order N-33-20, 278; and 

Executive Order S-04-
INDEX

323

06, 22; fires near San Diego, 79; importance of 

trust in organizational 

relationships, 100, 103; incentives for firms to partner with, 96; leadership’s 

importance to emergencymanagement partnerships 

of, 87; limitations to California’s information-sharing partnerships, 94; and 

Loma Prieta earthquake, 

31; limited adaptation of 

emergency-management 

agreements, 104, 113; mutual benefits for the state 

and firms partnerships, 

99, 244–45, 247; Napa 

Valley earthquake, 97; 

nonprofit and industry associations’ involvement in 

disaster management, 78; 

Northridge earthquake, 

255–56; power outages in, 

79; response to COVID-19, 

277–78; and Senate Bill 

546, 20; use of private firefighters in, 76–77; wildfires 

in, 76, 78, 105, 255

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 

76

California Department of Transportation, 79

California Governor’s Office 

of Emergency Services 

(CalOES), 20, 22, 77–78, 

80–82, 106, 112; and disaster preparedness, 93; 

emergency-management 

agreements of, 87, 90, 230; 

and expanding publicprivate partnerships, 84; 

importance of trust to 

partnerships, 102, 104, 249–

50; information sharing 

with firms, 90–92, 95, 98, 

104, 114–15, 226, 239–42, 

249; lack of adaptation of 

emergency-management 

agreements, 108, 113; 

partnership with CRA, 111, 

258; and partnership with 

Walmart, 85; and partnerships with private firms, 

86, 96, 98, 225; preference 

for MOUs, 87–91, 105, 113–

14, 232–33, 235–36, 263; 

and public-private sector 

liaison, 84–86; State Operations Center (SOC), 77; 

threats to sustainability, 

107–8, 256–57

California Grocers Association 

(CGA), 79, 273

California Highway Patrol, 79

California National Guard: and 

COVID-19 response, 277–

78

California Resiliency Alliance 

(CRA), 77, 84, 109–10, 229; 

dependence on revenue 

from members, 111; influence on BUOC, 114; partnership with CalOES, 111, 

258; private sector members of, 85

Centers for Disease Control and 
INDEX

324

Prevention (CDC), 93; and 

COVID-19 response, 281

Chevron: donations to local 

organizations after Hurricane Katrina, 56

Cisco, 84; and Tactical Operations Team, 96–97, 102–3, 

107

Clinton, William J. “Bill,” 51

ConEdison: partnership with 

NYCOEM, 171

COVID-19: economic effects of, 

281–82; spread of, 275–77; 

state government actions 

to stop spread of, 277–82; 

in the United States, 277, 

281–82

Cuomo, Andrew M., 4–5, 168; 

response to COVID-19, 279

de Blasio, Bill, 152

Deepwater Horizon: and oil spill, 

31, 58–59. See also BP

Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO), 230

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 12; creation 

of, 53; and Hurricane Katrina, 54

disaster-oriented public-private 

partnerships (PPPs), 10; 

and analytical framework 

used to examine state, 

75; definition of, 7; lack of 

federal involvement in, 

11, 12; and nonprofits, 9; 

other terms for, 7; and private sector involvement in 

emergency management, 

58; and revised version of 

NRF, 62; rising importance 

of business to since 9/11, 

74; state governments 

leading advancement of, 

10; and state-level disaster 

management, 11. See also 

emergency management; 

state partnerships

Department of the Interior, 60

Department of State, 80–81

DeSantis, Ronald D., 278

disaster-response collaborations: and post-disaster 

recovery efforts, 15

Dyer, John H. “Buddy,” 117

earthquakes: Loma Prieta, 31; 

in Mexico, 79–80; Mineral 

City, 193–94, 216, 218, 225; 

Northridge, 255–56 

emergency management: definition of, 5; and development of partnerships for, 

33; differences between 

states in partnerships for, 

235–36, 242; similarities in 

states in partnerships for, 

235; use of private-public 

partnerships for, 5–6, 11. 

See also state partnerships

e m e r g e n c y - m a n a g e m e n t 

agreements, 27–28, 50; 

absence of federal intervention in, 50; at the state 

level, 28

ESF-18: adaptability of, 140, 41; 

dedicated to addressing 
INDEX

325

disasters within the business community, 122; development of, 227; Florida’s 

public-private sector cooperation in, 126; industry 

organizations and, 147, 149; 

and information exchange 

with partners during disasters, 132–33, 140–41, 145, 

241; mentorship programs 

with firms, 143–44, 254; 

as an organizational unit 

for FDEM to manage its 

partners, 128, 258–60, 262. 

See also Florida Division of 

Emergency Management 

(FDEM)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

10, 53, 103; definition of 

private sector, 265; establishment of private sector 

liaison office, 62, 270–71

FedEx: and Hurricane Sandy, 

163, 168, 172–73

Florida: adaptability of partnerships with, 140; and agencies learning to deal with 

hurricanes, 32; and emergency-management partnerships, 23, 123; disasters 

as a catalyst for the development of disaster-management partnerships, 119, 

141–42, 222–23, 226; Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC), 121–22; 140, 145; 

efficiency of partnerships 

with, 148; Executive Order 

20-82, 279; hosting conferences that address publicprivate partnerships, 23; 

and Hurricane Andrew, 51; 

interorganizational agreements, 32; response to 

COVID-19, 278–79; state 

law requiring generators at 

gas stations on evacuation 

routes, 121; strong public 

sector executive leadership, 123–24; use of hybrid 

partnership models, 146–

48, 150, 264 

Florida Chamber of Commerce, 

118, 132, 261

Florida Department of Health: 

response to COVID-19, 278

Florida Division of Emergency 

Management (FDEM), 23; 

assistance in installing 

emergency generators at 

Publix, 119–20; benefits to 

firms of partnering with, 

134, 136–37, 244–45, 247; 

and conferences for disaster preparedness, 130–31, 

242, 254; disaster-response 

exercises, 143; efficiency of 

partnerships with, 148; and 

emergency-management 

agreements of, 118; expansion to partnering with 

smaller firms, 140; FSU and 

development of an information-sharing application for, 128; gas shortages 

during disasters, 120–21; 
INDEX

326

information exchange with 

partners, 129–33, 135, 140–

41, 239–40, 242; incident 

specific networks of responders, 125–26; lack 

of MOUs, 126–27, 232–33; 

mentorship program with 

ESF-18, 143–44, 254; outreach to other business 

and governments, 143–45; 

partnering with industry 

organizations, 145, 149, 

258–59; partners within 

a formal organizational 

framework in, 126, 128; 

power outages leading to 

disaster partnerships, 120; 

preference for informally 

structured partnerships, 

126–28, 149; private sector 

partners of, 124–25, 225, 

230;public-private sector 

agreements of, 125; state 

law requiring generators at 

gas stations on evacuation 

routes, 121; support for 

local government emergency-management capabilities, 144; sustainability 

of partnerships with, 142–

43; trust as a key factor in 

partnerships, 138–39, 249–

50, 252, 261; use of partnerships to access private 

sector supplies during 

emergencies, 133–35; and 

Virtual Business Emergency Operations Center 

(VBEOC), 132–33, 140, 241, 

243; work with private sector after Pulse shooting, 

117. See also ESF-18

Florida Restaurant and Lodging 

Association, 118

Florida Retail Federation (FRF), 

145, 273

Florida State University: and development of an information sharing application 

for FDEM, 128, 243

Fugate, W. Craig, 23, 125, 134

Giuliani, Rudolph W. “Rudy,” 160

Golden Guardian Exercise, 48

Hampton Roads Emergency 

Management Committee 

(HREMC), 207

Honda: and Hurricane Sandy relief efforts, 177

Howard A. Hanson Dam, 64

Hurricane Andrew, 51; 

Hurricane Irene, 24, 60, 63, 162–

63, 195–96, 218, 225; private 

sector aid during, 74

Hurricane Katrina, 54; and 

federal government acknowledgment of need for 

private sector help during 

disasters, 56, 57; and private sector aid during, 

55–56, 74, 85 

Hurricane Sandy, 3–5, 24, 162–

63, 167–68, 172–74, 177, 179, 

225, 256

Incident Command System 

(ICS), 15–16, 71, 103
INDEX

327

Iowa: creation of emergencymanagement agreements, 

73; launch of emergencymanagement agreement 

SIP, 68. See also Safeguard 

Iowa Partnership (SIP)

Iowa Business Council, 68

Iowa Department of Public 

Health, 68

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 

(ISIS), 116

Keating, Francis A., 65

Koon, Bryan, 125

Lowe’s: and relief for Mineral 

City earthquake, 193–94

Major League Soccer (MLS), 175

Mateen, Omar, 116–17

McVeigh, Timothy, 51

memorandum of understanding (MOU), 38; differences 

in uses between states 

studied, 232–35, 263

Mineral City, Virginia: earthquake in, 193–94, 216, 218, 

225, 256

Missouri Public-Private Partnership Committee, 71

Napolitano, Janet A., 59–60

National Incident Management 

Systems (NIMS), 12, 13, 16, 

53–54, 57, 103; private sector incorporation into, 58, 

75

National Response Framework 

(NRF), 57–58, 73; 2013 version, 62; and private sector 

role in emergency management, 62, 74

National Response Plan (NRP), 

53–54, 57, 73, 82

New Orleans, Louisiana: and 

Hurricane Katrina, 55, 85

Newsom, Gavin C., 277

New York Bankers Association, 

5

New York Business Development Corporation, 5

New York City: benefits to partners of, 180, 244–45; collaboration with New York 

Mets, 171; commitment to 

establishing disaster partnerships, 155, 162; and Corporate Emergency Access 

System (CEAS), 153–54, 171; 

differences with state in 

emergency management, 

156–57, 162, 166,175–76, 

179–80, 183, 189–90, 229; 

disaster-oriented PPPs in, 

169–71; emergency operations center (EOC) of, 160, 

165–66, 188–89; emergency responses during 9/11, 

12; and fires in Queens, 4; 

and Hurricane Irene, 165, 

225; and Hurricane Sandy, 

3–4, 24, 225; information 

sharing with partners of, 

172, 177, 180, 191; influence 

on state government, 

155–56; and management 

of West Nile Virus, 160–62; 

and Snowzilla, 152–54; vital 
INDEX

328

role of nonprofits in partnerships with, 157, 191–92

New York City Office of Emergency Management (NYCOEM): ability to establish 

and expand disaster partnerships, 157; adaptability 

of partnerships with, 185–

86; benefits to partners of, 

174–78, 246; collaboration 

with New York Mets, 171, 

179, 184–85; and creation 

of CEAS, 154; development 

of emergency-management

agreements, 164–65, 233; 

disaster-oriented PPPs of, 

166, 171; generous funding 

of, 157, 160, 182–83; importance of trust to, 180, 

182–83, 249, 252; and information exchange with 

partners, 173–78, 246–47; 

partnership with ConEdison, 171; partnerships 

with businesses, 165–66, 

169, 225, 254; partnerships with industry organizations and nonprofits, 

187–88, 258; regularly 

meeting with businesses, 160, 164; response 

to Hurricane Sandy, 174, 

179, 188; sustainability of 

disaster-oriented PPPs, 

184; use of firms to gather information, 174; use of 

partnerships to acquire 

scarce resources during 

disasters, 179; work with 

nonprofits and industry organizations during disasters, 188–89

New York Mets: and collaboration with NYCOEM, 171, 

179, 184–85

New York State: benefits to 

partners of, 176, 244–45; 

businesses’ support during

disasters, 168–70; differences with New York City 

in emergency management, 156–57, 162, 166, 

175–76, 179–80, 183, 189, 

229; and disaster-management partnerships, 23–24, 

172, 222–23, 227; emergency management budget 

constraints, 157–58; governor’s relationships with 

firms, 167, 241, 248; and 

Hurricane Irene, 24, 60–61, 

63, 163; importance of 

trust for disaster-oriented 

PPPs, 180–83; and information sharing, 172–73, 

176, 239–41, 249; lack of 

organized effort to forge 

emergency-management 

agreements, 155, 231, 233, 

236, 247–49, 251; partnerships with the private sector, 163–64, 166; response 

to COVID-19, 279–80; and 

response to Hurricane 

Sandy, 5, 154, 163, 172–73; 

vital role of nonprofits in 

partnerships with, 157, 191–

92; and volunteer disaster 
INDEX

329

recovery program, 163–64; 

work with firms outside of 

disasters, 181

New York State Office of Emergency Management (NYSOEM): absence of mutual 

benefits for private sector 

partners, 247; benefits to 

partner firms, 177; budget 

constraints of, 157–59; collaboration with firms and 

partnerships, 160, 225, 231; 

creation of, 159; firms providing physical aid during 

disasters, 176–77, 191, 246; 

funding by FEMA and SBA, 

158, 190; gubernatorial appointee leadership of, 167; 

influence from governor of 

New York, 167, 231, 241, 248; 

key role of nonprofits and 

industry organizations in 

disaster responses, 186–

87, 189, 258; sustainability 

of disaster-oriented PPPs, 

183–84

New York Stock Exchange, 52, 

171

Northam, Ralph S., 280

Office of Counter Terrorism 

(OCT), 23

Oklahoma: creation of emergency-management agreements, 73

Oklahoma City: bombing of the 

Alfred P. Murrah Federal 

Building, 51; construction 

of homes in Tulsa with safe 

rooms, 66; Oklahoma Safe 

Room Initiative, 65, 74

OneOrlando Fund, 117

Orlanda, Florida: mass shooting 

at Pulse nightclub, 116–17

PepsiCo: and Hurricane Sandy, 

163

President’s Commission on 

Critical Infrastructure Protection, 51

public-private partnerships (PPPs),

6; evolution of, 50; use of 

incentives to improve, 29

Publix: and benefits of partnering with Florida in disaster 

management, 136–37; and 

disaster management, 124–

25, 130–31; FDEM assistance

in installing emergency 

generators, 119

Safeguard Iowa Partnership 

(SIP), 68

Salazar, Ken, 60

Salt Lake City, Utah: hosting 

of 2002 Winter Olympics, 

69; information sharing in 

preparation for Olympics, 

70

Salvation Army, 9

Schwarzenegger, Arnold: as 

governor of California, 20, 

22

Scott, Richard L. “Rick,” 124

Small Business Administration 

(SBA): Disaster Loan Assistance Program, 50–51

Snowzilla, 152–53
INDEX

330

Staten Island, 3

state partnerships: accounting 

for difference between, 

256–57; adaptability of, 

252–53; crisis as pivotal in 

the formation of, 64, 223, 

225–26, 228–29, 252–53, 

256, 274; importance of 

nonprofits and industry 

organizations to, 258–61, 

266, 268–69, 273–74; and 

informally structured partnerships of, 268; and information sharing in, 68–69, 

238–39, 244, 261; influence 

of leaders on the development of, 228–31; mutual 

benefits of, 70, 244; organizational structure of, 66, 

263, 268; and personnel 

turnover, 255, 263, 267–68; 

public and private sector 

leadership as an influence 

on emergency-management collaborations of, 

65; and success without 

federal involvement, 74; 

sustainability of, 252–54, 

256–57; trust as key to success of, 71, 248–51, 255, 261, 

268; use of hybrid partnerships in, 263–64. See also

emergency management

strategic communications, 238–

39

tactical communications, 240

United Way, 56

UPS, 80–81

U.S Army Corps of Engineers, 

64

Utah: creation of emergencymanagement agreements, 

73; Department of Public 

Safety’s Division of Homeland Security, 70

Verizon, 52

Virginia: and crises as important drivers of partnerships, 

195, 225, 227; emergency-management partnership with Walgreens, 196, 

218; and emergency-management partnerships of, 

24, 218, 220, 222–23; and 

Hurricane Irene, 195–96, 

218; lack of formal organizational structure to 

partnerships, 200; Mineral 

City earthquake, 193–95, 

216, 218, 225, 256; partnership with Dominion, 

207–8; partnership with 

Virginia 1st, 198; resistance 

to MOUs, 200, 233, 243; 

use of handshake agreements, 200–1

Virginia 1st: partnership with 

VDEM, 207, 209–11, 217, 

258; partnerships with the 

State of Virginia, 198–99

Virginia 811: disaster-management responses, 197–98; 
INDEX

331

partnership with VDEM, 

197–99, 202, 212, 214–16, 

229, 258

Virginia Department of Emergency Management (VDEM),

24–25; adaptability of partnerships, 214–15; benefits 

to partners, 208–9, 244–47; 

collaboration with Cox 

Communications, 200, 

207, 212–13; drawbacks 

to informal partnerships, 

203–4; and essential role 

of nonprofit and industry 

associations, 194, 216–18, 

220, 258, 265–66; importance of relationships 

to partnerships, 202–3, 

219; information sharing 

with partners, 196, 204–6, 

208–10, 213, 239–40, 242, 

245; lack of formal organizational structure to partnerships, 200–2, 221; and 

leaders’ commitments to 

forge partnerships, 199; 

partnership with Dominion, 210, 249; partnerships 

with firms, 193–94, 218, 

229, 265–66; partnership 

with Virginia 1st, 207, 209–

11, 217, 258; partnership 

with Virginia 811, 197–98, 

202, 212, 214–18, 229, 258; 

and private sector liaison 

program, 205, 213, 243; response to COVID-19, 280; 

sustainability of partnerships, 256–57; trust as basis for partnerships, 201, 

211–13, 219–21, 248–52; use 

of planning exercises, 206, 

245, 254; and WebEOC, 

201, 241, 243

Virginia Department of Health 

(VDH): collaboration with 

Walgreens on public 

health-related topics, 200

Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT): and 

partnership with Dominion, 195

Virginia Emergency Operations 

Center (VEOC), 207–8

Voluntary Organizations Active 

in Disasters (VOAD), 226: 

and hybrid model of partnership, 147–48, 150, 264; 

reliance on businesses 

for support, 146; work with 

FDEM, 118

Waffle House: and disaster 

management, 124–25, 130–

31

Walt Disney Company, 117

Walgreens, 124–25, 127, 196; collaboration with VDH, 200; 

partnership with FDEM, 

139

Walmart, 84–85; and Hurricane 

Katrina relief supplies, 55; 

and Hurricane Sandy relief, 

163; and organizational co-
INDEX

332

ordinators in California, 85; 

and partnership with state 

agencies, 85, 92, 100–1; and 

power outage in California, 

79–80

Washington State, 64; coordination with businesses due 

to risk of disaster, 64–65; 

creation of emergencymanagement agreements, 

73; and Green River Valley 

risk of flooding from dam, 

64–65

Washington State Emergency 

Management Division, 64

Weyerhaeuser: contribution to 

Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, 55–56

World Health Organization, 276–

77

World Trade Center, 52

Wuhan, China: and COVID-19, 

275

Y2K, 173