Occasional Paper Number Nine

JOINT MILITARY

INT

E

LLIGENCE COLLEGE

1

9

6

2

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, E
i

Occasional Paper Number Nine

THE CREATION OF THE 

NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGE

CONGRESS’S ROLE AS OVERSEER

by Anne Daugherty Miles, Ph.D.

JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, DC

April 2002

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author

and do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

This paper has been approved for unrestricted public release by 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

iii

CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Creation of NIMA: Congress’s Role as Overseer. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Why NIMA?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Early 1990s—Powell Objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CIO—A Sponge Hammer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Mid 1990s—The Executive Branch Presents a United Front. . . 

Understanding Turf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

DMA Brought into the Fold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Legislative Strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

“Inside Baseball”—David versus Goliath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

NIMA in Conference—HNSC and SASC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Three-Ring Circus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Appropriators. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

A Letter from the Speaker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Created “On Schedule” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Recommendation for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendixes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix A—1996 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence . 

Appendix B — 1996 House Permanent Select Committee 

 on Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix C—Executive Branch Players at a Glance . . . . . . . . 

Appendix D—Shared Jurisdiction Over the Intelligence Budge

Appendix E—Senate Committee Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix E-1—104-277, SASC Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix E-2—104-278, SSCI Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
iv

Appendix E-3—104-337, SGAC Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix F—Letter to Newt Gingrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix G—Memorandum of Agreement, SASC and SSCI . . . . 

Appendix H—Legislative Package Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix I—NIMA Decision Process Briefing Chart . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix J—Imagery Functional Management Briefing Chart . . . 

Appendix K—NIMA—What’s Included Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix L—NIMA—What’s Excluded Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix M—DoD Directive 5105.60, 11 Oct 96, 

 Establishing NIMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
v

PREFACE

In October 2000, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) 

fourth anniversary. That occasion marked a significant milestone for the new

the Intelligence Community. In the previous four years the leaders and people 

established an identity and culture for the agency and had defined and refined 

strategy. That is not to say that there are no more challenges for this organiz

government agencies, NIMA faces issues of downsizing and outsourcing, 

transformation and integration. However, in view of the agency’s customer-

for meeting these challenges, at the Agency’s fourth annual customer confe

Henry H. Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked, “NIMA has es

as a key component in arming decisionmakers and operators with superior in

knowledge... NIMA’s customer focus is the big reason that you’ve been such 

in the four short years of your existence as a separate agency.”

During the spring and summer of 1995, I served as executive secretary of 

known as the NIA (National Imagery Agency) Steering Group, as well as 

various NIA Working Groups. I was in a unique position to observe the proc

tics that led to the decision to establish NIMA. Thereafter, I led the Integratio

the implementation period from December 1995 until NIMA stand-up in 

NIMA was formed from eight different agencies from throughout the D

Defense and the Intelligence Community. At the outset, NIMA leadershi

above all else, the quality and timeliness of service to customers would not f

sition. This meant “protecting” imagery intelligence and mapping produc

from the bureaucratic blizzard of new policies and procedures that come with 

new organization (literally hundreds of policies had to be reviewed and either 

or modified, and the streamlining process still goes on today). But perhaps t

ing task was to begin the process of creating a NIMA culture and identity.

In December 2000, the congressionally-mandated independent NIMA 

found that “NIMA is an essential component of U.S. national security and 

mation dominance.” This agency has come a long way in a short time. Bu

1995, the future of this agency was dependent on the approval of the U.S. 

Creation of NIMA: Congress’s Role as Overseer provides an accurate and d

the “behind the scenes” roles played by NIMA leaders, other members of 

branch, and most interestingly, the role of the U.S. Congress and its var

committees. This paper provides government leaders and students of gove

primer on “how things get done” so that they may have a greater appreciatio

plex relationships within and between the executive and legislative branche

David A. Broadhurst

Director, National Imagery and Mapping College

vii

FOREWORD 

Although several articles have been written on the creation of the Nat

and Mapping Agency (NIMA) from the executive branch’s perspective, non

icled the attendant debate on Capitol Hill. “Creating the National Imagery 

Agency: A Studies Roundtable,” is the most comprehensive of those article

on a discussion in November 1997 between the editorial board of Studies 

and key participants of the NIMA implementation team.1 That article prov

point for the present case study of congressional decisionmaking in the inte

which focuses on the struggle in Congress, rather than in the executive bran

The present monograph may be characterized as a case study of congress

seer of the U.S. Intelligence Community. A case study can follow an intell

Congress on a day-to-day basis, offering a perspective that goes beyond textbo

of procedure to illustrate the human dynamics of the decisionmaking proces

study offers the advantage of depth and detail, but only one case does not pro

generalization. Works that do offer a more theoretical overview based on many 

a context within which to judge whether elements of a particular case are us

Thus, it is has become the norm in academic treatments to pair the general w

Eric Redman’s, The Dance of Legislation, is a classic example.2 Redman’s st

the creation of the National Health Service Corps in the early 1970s and ha

augment textbooks about Congress in countless classrooms across the country 

cation in 1973. Similarly, Birnbaum and Murray’s more recent Showdown a

details the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and has also become a com

supplement in courses on the Congress.3 Unfortunately, in-depth case studi

sional decisionmaking on intelligence issues are too few to have resulted in a 

textbook offering a theoretical context for this decisionmaking.

The case study presented here illustrates the combination of personalit

that resulted in the establishment of NIMA in 1996. It has been written s

those who are studying Congress and the U.S. Intelligence Community. It 

role of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and how those comm

with other committees—most specifically the Armed Services Committee

the few good sources that exist on this very narrow subject—the most im

Frank Smist’s Congress Oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community,

4 Loc

Season of Inquiry5 and Britt Snider’s Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers.

6 Th

1 “Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: A Studies Roundtable,” in Stud

42, 1 (1998): 39-49. 2 Eric Redman, Dance of Legislation (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1973). 3 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch (NY: Vintage Book

4 Frank Smist, Congress Oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community: 1947-1994, Second E

University of Tennessee, 1994). 5 Loch Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington: U

tucky Press, 1985). 6 L. Britt Snider, Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers (Washington D.C.: Center for the 

gence, 1997).
viii

be read with that context in mind, and any generalizations based on this one 

be made with extreme care.

Although oversight is often associated with confrontational investigatio

pected wrongdoing, the reality is that most oversight is routine and occurs wit

mal authorization and appropriation process.7 Legislative oversight is designe

that Congress has the information it needs to develop legislation, monitor the 

tation of public policy and disclose to the public how its government is perform

sight objectives vary. “The focus may be on promoting administrative effi

economy in government, protecting and supporting favored policies and progr

an administration’s failures or wrongdoing, or its achievements, publicizing 

member’s or committee’s goals, reasserting congressional authority vis-a-vis 

tive branch, or assuaging the interests of pressure groups.”8 Oversight contin

law is passed. According to Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) “Congress’s duty d

passing this law. We have to make sure the law works.”9 In the NIMA case

adopted its role as overseer in first determining whether the concept of NIMA 

one, and it has continued to exercise its oversight responsibilities in the yea

establishment to ensure that the agency evolved in the way envisioned by its c

Beyond the personality and politics evident in this case, it is important to re

fact that congressional members and staffers take their oversight responsibilitie

ously. The creation of NIMA was an executive branch proposal that was scrut

every angle on the Hill. The concerns of a myriad of interested parties—to incl

workers, NIMA customers, NIMA components, constituents, the White Hou

Staff—were all funneled into 13 different congressional committees—to be re

marily by the Intelligence and Armed Services committees. The beauty of Co

ability to weigh the merits of a host of special interests in a way that satisfies a 

its members and hopefully results in good public policy. In its role as oversee

skeptical, demanding justification for each and every proposal. To continue 

overseer, to stay a part of the process, “to have a seat at the table,” congression

tees must have jurisdiction over an executive branch agency or program. As m

in this case, jurisdictional concerns were paramount largely because Membe

wanted to play a part in guiding NIMA’s evolution over time.

7 See Walter Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Washington D.

1989), 266-272 for a comprehensive list of oversight techniques. 8 Oleszek, 266.

9 Roger Davidson and W. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2
1

THE CREATION OF NIMA: 

CONGRESS’S ROLE AS OVERSEER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee... we can no longe

redundant capabilities in several different agencies.... I will move 

ately to consolidate the management of all imagery collection, analy

distribution. In my judgment both effectiveness and economy can be i

by managing imagery in a manner similar to the National Security A

organization for signals intelligence.10

— Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Candidate Joh

WHY NIMA?

The consolidation of imagery promised by John Deutch during his te

SSCI, in his confirmation hearings for the position of Director of Centra

was a direct reference to the concept of a National Imagery and Mapping A

agreed with those who wanted to assemble all or part of as many as eight ag

grams into a single, focused imagery agency. The pieces to be assembled w

■ Defense Mapping Agency (DMA),

■ Central Intelligence Agency’s National Photographic Interpretation C

■ Central Imagery Office (CIO), 

■ National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Imagery Processing, 

■ Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), 

■ Defense Intelligence Agency’s Photographic Interpretation Section (D

■ Defense Dissemination Program Office (DDPO) and 

■ Central Intelligence Agency’s imagery-related elements/programs.

According to Leo Hazlewood, then CIA Deputy Director for Science an

Deutch’s announcement “came as a complete surprise to the bureaucrac

(CIA headquarters).11 Senior leadership there thought the NIMA idea h

early 1990s, due to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin P

sition. Deutch brought the idea back to life in April 1995.

The idea for such an agency seems to have been first put into writing as a 

the Burnett Panel Report.12 The panel, established in 1992 by DCI Gates

10 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Confirmation Hearings of J

Congress, 1st sess., 26 April 1995, 1, 8 and 9. 11 Leo Hazlewood, Deputy Director, NIMA Implementation Team, interview by the autho

12 The Burnett Panel was made up of active or retired senior military officers according 

tractor with Booz, Allen and Hamilton, in “Creating the National Imagery and Mapping A

Roundtable,” in Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 1 (1998): 42. According to Hazlewood, DCI Ga

members. It was one of 15-17 task forces created by Gates when he first became DCI. Hazlew
2

with examining the structure guiding the Intelligence Communitys imagery 

one of its recommendations was to integrate imagery and mapping.13 Reorga

the entire defense establishment was a popular idea in the early 1990s, follow

of the Berlin Wall in 1989.14 At about the same time, reorganization of the I

Community was popular in the aftermath of DESERT STORM. Leo Hazlewoo

the attractiveness of a NIMA concept to three particular problems encountered 

operation: jurisdictional disputes over the dissemination of imagery, compet

authorities, and confusion over who owned NPIC (CIA or DIA).15 The Bu

sought solutions to these problems and many others. Its recommendation for 

like NIMA was based on a conceptual seed planted by Keith Hall, the person 

wood calls the “intellectual father” of the NIMA concept. As Deputy Assistan

of Defense for Intelligence and Security at the time the Panel was deliberatin

his idea to several panel members. In fact, the FY 1992 Intelligence Author

recommended establishing a National Imagery Agency (NIA) in line with 

Panel recommendation. The timing was not right, however, in either the execu

islative branches, for reasons discussed later in this article. It would take a

years and the notoriety of problems associated with the Central Imagery Offi

“make NIMA happen.”

NIMA was created near the end of the 104th Congress—a Congress in w

were numerous proposals to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC

sive review undertaken by the House Permanent Select Committee on I

(HPSCI) culminated in a lengthy document titled IC21: Intelligence Comm

21st Century and legislation called the Intelligence Community Act (H.R. 323

to the floor of the House on 13 June 1996. Also in 1996, the Senate Select Co

Intelligence (SSCI) was engaged in its own hearings, building upon an exte

interviews carried out in the early 1990s. The Commission on the Roles and C

of the U.S. Intelligence Community, known as the Aspin-Brown Commissio

winding up a year-long investigation along these same lines. The Aspin-Brow

sion presented its report to the SSCI in formal testimony on 6 March 1996;

Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senators Specter and Kerrey, introduced the r

Senate as S. 1593 on the same day. 

In all of these reviews, one theme predominated: “the extent to which the N

ous intelligence agencies should be managed more corporately. DCI’s have ha

tive mechanisms... but they have not created a corporate body with more tightly 

13 According to Leo Hazlewood in “Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: A S

table,” in Studies in Intelligence 42, no. 1 (1998): 42. Article cited hereafter as “Creation of NIMA

14 The “peace dividend” was widely viewed as an opportunity to cut defense spending and incr

on domestic issues such as education. Thus, a variety of terms such as downsizing, restructuring

consolidation of assets, and so on, came to be associated with budget cutting. These ideas fit nic

President Gore’s Reinventing Government initiatives. Many reorganization studies, undertaken i

greater efficiency, also had budget cutting goals as a high priority. 15 Hazlewood interview.

16 Harold Brown, Warren Rudman, and Les Aspin, Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appra

telligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 6 March 1996). The report is widely known as “Aspin-Brown.
3

budget execution, missions, procedures, products and methods of dissemi

reports recommended, to varying degrees, expanded authority for the DCI to 

obligate or spend IC funds to better manage his domain. These expanded auth

the expense of the Secretary of Defense’s authorities—creating immediate op

Armed Services committees. There was a feeling that intelligence agencies 

different ways without any plan—creating redundancies and such organizati

no DCI could manage it well. Part of the need for an increased corporate st

increase efficiency, and in the process, also increase the quality and timeline

support. Thus, the NIMA was part of a larger plan to group similar kinds 

activities together in an effort to improve management of the IC, eliminate 

improve efficiency, and improve customer support. Disagreement within the 

tered on whether a NIMA would, in fact, accomplish those goals.

In order to understand the larger context in which NIMA was created, 

the activities of the intelligence committees in the early 1990s.

EARLY 1990s—POWELL OBJECTS

The early 1990s found the intelligence committees concerned with how 

nize the community—but not equally so. The two committees have much in 

act autonomously much of the time. The priorities and attributes of the

change over time and have much to do with the leadership provided by the 

Staff Director. Senator Boren (D-OK) was nearing the end of his tenure a

the SSCI and clearly saw this reorganization effort as his legacy to the com

IC. Senator Boren was also a good friend of DCI Bob Gates and the tw

worked closely throughout this period.18 A staffer remembers that the SSC

approximately 185 people, all “off the record,” and for “nonattribution.”19

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) was a

with reorganization of the Community but not to the same extent as the 

by Representative David McCurdy, the HPSCI tackled reorganization onc

how deeply the SSCI was immersed in it. Despite the fact that the two inte

mittee chairmen were both from Oklahoma, they did not get along and d

concert with one another. The extensive recommendations proposed by the 

Resolution 2198) caught the HPSCI off guard, but the HPSCI struggled 

ground and emerged with recommendations of its own. In a show of unity 

17 Richard A. Best, Jr., “Intelligence Reorganization in the 104th Congress: Prospects for A 

Community,” CRS Report for Congress 96-681F (Washington DC: Congressional Research Serv

18 According to Gates, “Apart from the President, my most important ally and friend w

Boren.... Boren and I had developed a strong mutual trust and friendship (along with Vice Chair

Cohen) in the aftermath of Iran-Contra when, as Acting Director, I worked with him to build a 

between the CIA and Congress. He had confidence that I was a true believer in congressional 

I played straight and honest.” Robert Gates, From the Shadows (NY: Simon and Schuster, 199

19 A source, SSCI Professional Staffer in 1996, who wishes to remain anonymous, interv

14 July 2000.
4

true relationship between the two committees, the package of reorganization 

offered jointly by Boren and McCurdy—the bulk of which made it into th

Authorization Bill.20 The legislation recommended establishing a Nation

Agency (NIA)21 in line with the Burnett Panel recommendation.

Some of the recommendations in the intelligence authorization bill we

received by either the executive branch or the Armed Services committees. 

were considered “too far reaching.”22 DCI Gates, in a statement to the Congres

in the Intelligence Community, warned of “deep reservations” held by CIA, DM

Military Services about a proposed NIA that would include NPIC and DMA a

Imagery. He said that he, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Cheney and CJCS 

agreed to approach the problem “a step at a time including at a minimum, defe

changes to strengthen the coordination and management of tactical imagery pr

my creation of a small organization that will become part of this new defense st

According to Leo Hazlewood, Gates recognized the fact that imagery prob

be solved and was willing to place national imagery assets within the DoD if 

fix the problems associated with DESERT STORM. He remembered that the 

bling block to a NIMA in 1992 was CJCS Colin Powell.24 Secretary of Defe

was supportive, telling a staffer, “We need a strong DCI, and we need to su

DCI initiatives.”25 General Powell was briefed on the Burnett Panel recommen

convinced that DMA was “not broken,” could not be persuaded to include D

NIMA plan. According to Hazlewood, once Powell “killed NIA,” Gates got all 

together to see what could be done “to fix imagery” within the Intelligence C

From that meeting, the Central Imagery Office (CIO) was born.26

The CIO was deemed acceptable by all parties in the executive branch and 

Leo Hazlewood stressed that CIO was an executive branch compromise that th

accepted as a first-step solution.27 The CIO alternative had limited functions a

ties. As noted in the Aspin-Brown report, “most imagery elements of the I

Community, including the largest imagery exploitation organization (NPIC

20 SSCI Professional Staffer interview. The HPSCI and SSCI offered separate bills but the 

effort was offered jointly. 21 Though referred to as NIA from 1992-1995, NIA stood for the IC imagery community plus D

minus DMA to others. DMA was opposed to joining an NIA throughout this period, arguing that 

agery user, not producer, and that inclusion into an intelligence agency could jeopardize internat

agreements. “NIMA Decision Brief,” October 1995, JCS “Tank” Presentation, Slide 8. 22 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.

23 DCI Gates’ “Statement on Change in the IC, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee Hearings, 

American Intelligence Journal (Winter/Spring 1992): 10. 24 Hazlewood interview.

25 Rich Haver, Special Assistant to SecDef Cheney in a conversation with Hazlewood, Hazlew

26 Hazlewood interview. Despite Powell’s opposition, Powell and Gates were close friends. 

back many years, both having been deputies to Weinberger and Casey, respectively, at the same 

they met, with their bosses, every week at the “Friday Breakfasts.” Both had also been on the Nat

Council, though not at the same time, and had many Washington experiences in common. 27 Hazlewood interview.
5

outside the new office, which had limited policy authority and no resource 

outside elements. CIO did retain control of the tasking of imagery collec

and made strides in setting standards and policy to govern exploitation a

tion.”28 In sum, “Politics,” after all, “is the art of the possible.”29

CIO—“A SPONGE HAMMER”

In January 1993, Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) took over the SSC

with Senator John Warner (R-VA) as the Vice Chairman, while Congressm

man (D-KS) took over the HPSCI with Congressman Larry Combest (R-T

Minority Member. During this period, a growing number of people in Co

executive branch became convinced that CIO was “not the answer.”30

Its Director, Dr Annette Krygiel, described CIO as a “sponge hammer”

real clout because of its lack of budget authority and lack of ability to e

CIO’s problems stemmed from the fact that DMA, NPIC, CIA Imagery and 

were all outside its authority! It had real control over only DIA collection 

DCI’s tasking committee (the Committee on Imagery Requirements and 

Despite these organizational difficulties, its responsibilities were large.

By the time the 1994 elections ushered in a new Republican Congress, 

the climate had shifted and there was “more of a grassroots interest in a na

agency.”32 Leo Hazlewood recalls, however, that if there was support in 19

for an NIA, it was only in DIA/PGX (Imagery) and CIO. DMA, CIA and N

opposed.33 In fact, many organizations were vocal in their opposition, lobb

against an NIA (despite Deutch being in favor), and refusing to accept the 

the situation, all the way up to its actual establishment.34 Sharon Basso was 

being brought onto the NIMA Implementation Team as its Director of Co

and Congressional Liaison. She recalls that the Team was surprised by “the i

guerrilla warfare aimed at us. The Implementation Team was often in the m

tough bureaucratic fights between CIA and DoD, and we were ‘the enemy.’”

28Preparing for the 21st Century, 23. Former SecDef Les Aspin died three months after 

began. Aspin was replaced by former SecDef Harold Brown as Chair and the final report was 

and Vice-Chairman and former Senator Warren Rudman. 29 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.

30 Bobbi Lenczowski, Leader of Implementation Working Group on Organization, “Creati

31 Greg Jay, Contractor from Booz, Allen and Hamilton who supported the Implementation 

of NIMA,” 42. 32 Lenczowski, “Creation of NIMA,” 42.

33 Hazlewood interview.

34 David Broadhurst, Director, NIMA College, Interview with the author, 27 November 2

explain why many lower level employees in the organizations that eventually made up NIMA 

what was happening at the top or in Congress. Top managers were aware, but many proba

NIMA was not going to happen and thus did not feel compelled to spread the word. 35 Sharon Basso, email interview by the author, 1 January 2001.
6

January 1995 ushered in the first session of the 104th Congress.36 Congres

Combest (R-TX) took over the House Intelligence Committee with Congress

Dicks (D-WA) as Ranking Minority Member. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) to

Senate Intelligence Committee as Chairman37 with Senator Bob Kerrey (D-

Vice Chairman.38

Senator Specter’s opportunity to Chair the SSCI came somewhat as a surpris

Specter left the committee in 1990, even though he had served only six years o

year term, having made an agreement (in writing) with Senate Minority Lea

return in January 1993, with his seniority intact, and serve as the committee’s 

man. However, by 1993, Senator John Warner, who was co-equal to Specter in 

seniority and had lost his ranking member position on the SASC, also want

Chairmanship position. After heated discussions among Dole, Specter and War

ary 1993, and more assurances from Senator Dole, Senator Specter agreed to dela

until January 1995. By waiting the extra two years, Senator Specter became SS

man when the Republicans gained control of the Senate in the November 1994 e

Also in January 1995, DCI Woolsey’s resignation was accepted by Presid

General Michael Carnes (USAF, Ret) was nominated40 to take his place, and J

was still Deputy Secretary of Defense. In his role as DepSecDef, Deutch was brief

Hall (in his role as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Security) on 

the Intelligence Community along with Hall’s solutions—one of which was an N

The idea was apparently well received because when John Deutch was no

be the new DCI, Hall’s idea emerged in Deutch’s testimony, and the creatio

became just a matter of time and determination. The agenda laid out by Deutc

timony became known as “the symphony,” and Admiral Dennis Blair wa

charge of implementing it. To achieve the NIMA objective, Admiral Blair esta

NIA Steering Group.41

In mid-June, the Steering Group approved a Terms of Reference (TOR) w

tered an NIA Task Force. The Task Force, chaired by Evan Hineman,42 

options for the NIA that took the current CIO with a few additional author

36 Each Congress is numbered, lasts two years, and has two regular sessions. The first session b

election, with the start of the terms of all representatives and one-third of the senators. The s

begins in January of even numbered years. Thus, January 1995 was the 104th Congress, first sessi

37 Charlie Battaglia, Staff Director for SSCI in 1996, interview by the author, 24 August 2000

38 See Appendix A and B for a list of key players on the SSCI and HPSCI respectively.

39 The details of Senator Specter’s rise to chairmanship are included to illustrate the complexi

of the committee assignment process. 40 General Carnes subsequently withdrew his nomination due to allegations that he may have v

gration and labor laws when he brought a Filipino to the U.S. in 1987 to live in his home. See D

“Undesignated Director,” Time (20 March 1995): 37. 41 See Appendix C for a brief list of executive branch players.

42 Evan Hineman had been a member of the Burnett Panel and had argued for an NIA in the Pa

ommendations. A 30-year veteran of CIA, he spent the last seven as its Deputy Director for Scie

nology. He was reputedly “brilliant,” and a “straight shooter.” Hazlewood interview.
7

extreme (the so-called CIO on steroids solution) and a highly centrali

full budgetary and management authority as the other extreme with nin

choices in-between. Over the summer, the options were narrowed down f

finally 1.43 DIA, the Service Intelligence Chiefs and the J2s of the Unit

agreed to some “Abiding Principles,” one of which was that NIA should 

Support Agency.44

MID 1990s—THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

PRESENTS A UNITED FRONT

The mid 1990s found the entire Congress fully engaged in reorganizati

Aspin-Brown Commission, chartered by the Congress in 1994, had conduct

throughout 1995 and reported in March 1996 that its conclusions concerning 

cided with the DCI’s.45 Despite early promises that Aspin-Brown would “pu

the table,”46 the final report made only modest, incremental suggestions for 

SSCI began building on its previous research and the modest Aspin-Brown 

tions, with many staffers still present who had conducted the original SS

Because the changes the committee ended up with tended to have come from 

themselves, they were largely evolutionary in nature—and were acceptable

part, to both the executive branch and other committees such as Armed Serv

The HPSCI elected to break new ground, not having previous testimony 

took a different path under Chairman Larry Combest, resulting in the length

ligence Community in the 21st Century, published by the HPSCI in April 19

Combest hired Mark Lowenthal, a man with many years of experience wi

and the executive branch and noted for his numerous publications on the I

because he could conduct the broad type of inquiry Combest wanted to s

and Combest agreed on a manner of approach.49 The report summarized it

43 According to Mark Lowenthal, staffers felt that these options were “false choices, that the 

broad range of alternatives but only a few really had any chance of happening.” Lowenthal rem

much to Keith Hall, suggesting that they had “rendered the verdict before the trial.” Interview 

24 August 2000. Dave Broadhurst, one of those on loan from CIO who drafted the eleven orig

firmed this perception, saying that the NIMA Deutch wanted was a forgone conclusion.” Broadhu

44 “DCI Plans a National Imagery Agency,” DIA Communique 7, no. 8 (Aug 1995): 1. Th

agency designation became a big issue between the SSCI and SASC. Senator Kerrey’s positio

in this article in the section titled “Legislative Strategy.” 45 Aspin-Brown, 124. According to Leo Hazlewood, the NIMA Implementation Team ha

with members of the Aspin-Brown Commission justifying the concept of NIMA. Hazlewood 

46 L. Britt Snider, Staff Director, Aspin-Brown Commission and General Counsel, SSC

Fialka in “Congress Set to Approve Big Review of Costly U.S. Intelligence Community,” W

26 Sep 94, 6. 47 David Wise, “I Spy a Makeover,” Washington Post, 24 Mar 96, C2. “The panel labored m

up with a mouse.” 48 “The SSCI was more invested in Aspin-Brown recommendations than the HPSCI, beca

had come largely at the initiative of Senator Warner and was thus more a Senate creation th

Lowenthal interview.
8

saying, Everything is on the table. There are no sacred cows in terms of org

missions or functions.”50 The changes proposed in IC-21 were revolutionary, f

and largely unacceptable to both the executive branch and other committe

Armed Services (at least at first, for reasons mainly due to turf).51

A major theme in IC-21 was the elimination of “stovepipes”52 within t

House Intelligence committee suggested more “synergy” and “corporateness” 

break down barriers created by too many stovepipes and warned that “the cu

within the IC seems to be one that would reinforce the stovepipe approach, fu

pounding problems for little or no perceived gain.”53 Thus, the HPSCI’s resp

executive branch proposal for an NIA was “Why do you want another stovep

fact, the SSCI thought that the HPSCI’s reorganization of the IC would crea

different stovepipes by inserting another layer of authority over all the organ

Leo Hazlewood remembers responding that NIMA would be a “porous 

designed to improve access to imagery-derived information.56

The HPSCI was also opposed to NIMA because it thought that “tactical sup

win, strategic support would lose.”57 As Mark Lowenthal recalls, “We thought 

would ‘suck up’ imagery to the military with nothing left over for State, etc. 

too hard for non DoD to get the assets they needed when they needed them..

believe that an ‘organizational fix’ like NIMA was the right way to tackle distrib

lems associated with the Gulf War.... And, we also saw too many cultural 

between cartographers and imagery analysts for the agency to overcome.”58

It is important to note, however, that the House Intelligence Committee me

not united in their opposition to the NIMA concept. While Chairman Com

Director Lowenthal and most of the Republican members or staffers opp

“another stovepipe,” the Democratic members and staffers either suppo

remained undecided. The Democrats were more inclined to support the Admi

position than the Committee Chairman’s.

49 Lowenthal interview.

50 Lowenthal interview.

51 For example, IC-21 recommended increased budgetary authority for the DCI; the creation 

dent Clandestine Service made up of the Defense HUMINT Service and CIA’s DO; and regroupin

cies so that management of all technical collection assets would be consolidated together, all acq

consolidated, and so on. 52 Stovepipes refer to any narrow hierarchy of assets. For example collection stovepipes are de

as “types of collection that are managed so as to be largely distinct from one another” resultin

competition for resources and too little central control of overall collection needs. IC-21, 22. 53 IC-21, 22.

54 Hazlewood, “Creation of NIMA,” 41.

55 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.

56 Hazlewood interview.

57 Lowenthal interview. Lowenthal was defining “strategic” as support to the national policym

larly the White House and State Department, and “tactical” support as that to military commanders. L

worked at State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prior to his position on the HPSCI.

58 Lowenthal interview.
9

UNDERSTANDING TURF

In Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction, David 

that committee jurisdictions are like property rights “and few things in W

more closely guarded or as fervently pursued.”59 Turf “battles are about po

ence in their rawest forms. They are about property rights over public pol

legislatures, jurisdictions distinguish one committee from another. They are i

sense, a lawmaker’s legislative power base.”60

The two intelligence committees are not equal in their jurisdictions. Wit

gence Community, resources have traditionally been categorized for budg

as national intelligence assets in the National Foreign Intelligence Program 

under the supervision of the DCI, or tactical intelligence assets in the Tactic

and Related Activities (TIARA) Program, belonging to the Secretary of De

creation in the 1970s, the HPSCI was given jurisdiction over both NFIP an

grams, while the SSCI was given jurisdiction over only the NFIP.

61 In 199

gory, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), was added to enco

defense-wide intelligence assets.62 This development caused a number o

until a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the SSCI and S

ing that the SSCI had no formal jurisdiction over either the JMIP or TIAR

can and does make recommendations to the SASC concerning JMIP and T

zations, and those recommendations are usually accepted. (see Appendix D

Within the NFIP, the situation for the two intelligence committees is 

SSCI and HPSCI have sole jurisdiction over the non-defense National F

gence Program (NFIP).64 Armed Services has the authority to review thes

sequential referral, but they cannot claim shared or sole jurisdiction over an

grams.65 The SSCI and HPSCI share jurisdiction with Armed Services ov

portions of the NFIP.66

59 David King, Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction (Chicago: 

cago Press, 1997) 11. 60 King, 11-12.

61 Rules of the House of Representatives, 106th Congress, Rule 10, Section D, i-iii. Sena

94th Congress, Section 3 (a) (4) A-G and Section 14, (a) (4). 62 JMIP assets serve multiple defense consumers outside a single service, such as the Defens

gram. See Dan Elkins, An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide (Washington D.C.: DIA, 199

63 Senate Res 400 from the 94th Congress and Memorandum of Agreement, 26 April 1

SASC and SSCI, Relating to the JMIP and TIARA. See Appendix F for a copy of this MOA. 64 Non-defense NFIP programs fund civilian intelligence activities: Central Intelligence 

(CIAP); Dept of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); Dept of Justice, FBI Forei

gence Program; Dept of Treasury, Office of Intelligence Support Program; Dept of Energy, Fo

Program; and CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS). Dan Elkins, 44-45. 65 Sequential referral is explained, in detail, later in this article.

66 Defense NFIP Programs include: General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), Con

logic Program (CCP), DoD Foreign Counterintelligence Programs (FCIP), NIMA Program (N

Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the Specialized DoD Reconnaissance Activities. Elkins, 
10

Thus, in 1995, since the House National Security Committee67 shared j

with the HPSCI for all defense intelligence programs, it was important that 

concept be supported by both the Intelligence and Armed Services commit

the Pentagon (the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense) supported a

HNSC had little reason not to. According to Mark Lowenthal, “The HNSC 

increasing its turf.”68 Since members of the HNSC were united in their suppo

the HPSCI Republicans ultimately stood alone in their opposition to NIMA.

69

The SSCI’s concerns about NIMA were jurisdictional in nature. The comm

dered “whether all the money associated with imagery was going to go int

Military Intelligence Program,”70 and thus remain under the purview of the SA

SSCI’s jurisdictional concerns reflected its deeply felt commitment to keepi

strategic focus intact. Senator Kerrey72 in particular, was worried that if NIM

ignated a combat support agency that fell entirely under the Secretary o

NIMA would focus all or most of its energy on military support to the e

national-level policymakers at the National Security Council, State Departme

like. Without jurisdiction, the SSCI would lose important influence in shaping 

which NIMA was conceived and implemented.73 The NIMA Implementation 

NIMA as falling within the NFIP and briefed it that way.74

Like its House counterpart, the Senate Armed Services Committee was r

the idea of NIMA. Unlike the Senate Intelligence Committee, the SASC had 

tional issues because the new agency would fall either completely within SAS

tion or be shared with the SSCI. The DoD wanted NIMA designated a “Comb

Agency” and as such, to fall under an amended Title 10 of the National Sec

the result of which would place it within SecDef and SASC jurisdiction 

SSCI jurisdiction. 

67 The House Armed Services Committee became the House National Security Committee in 

changed back to the House Armed Services Committee in 1999. 68 Lowenthal interview. He believes that Intelink is helping to solve dissemination problem

than creation of NIMA did, and that time has proved him right about the insurmountability of c

ences. 69 SSCI Professional Staffer interview; confirmed in Lowenthal interview.

70 Hazlewood, “Creation of NIMA,” 41.

71 To be considered a national-level intelligence agency under DCI and SSCI jurisdiction, NI

fall under an amended Title 50 of the United States Code. If NIMA fell under Title 10, it would 

Secretary of Defense and be outside the SSCI’s budgetary jurisdiction and thus outside its oversig

72 Senator Kerrey was Vice Chairman of the SSCI and handled most of the organizational issu

Specter preferred to take the lead on the more contentious oversight issues such as evidence of IC 

SSCI Professional Staffer interview. 73 SSCI Professional Staffer interview, and a source, SASC Professional Staffer in 1996, w

remain anonymous, Interview by the author, 26 September 2000. 74 See Appendix J for a diagram of the Intelligence Budget. The NIMA budget (or “NIMAP”

within the NFIP on this briefing slide.
11

DMA BROUGHT INTO THE FOLD

Sometime between September and November 1995, it was decided

objections, that DMA would be included in the envisioned agency. Reco

DMA continued to have reservations about joining throughout 1995; 

Deutch’s remarks throughout 1995 indicate that he always included DM

organization.75 From a strategic point of view, Deutch would have recogniz

7,000 people added great clout to the proposed organization in terms of bo

jurisdiction. In addition, as William Allder recalls, “When John Deutch 

potential for shared and complementary technologies that would be dri

imagery and mapping businesses in the future, he saw a set of technologica

that could be pursued most effectively through a single set of plans and pro

target date for stand-up of the new agency was set for 1 October 1996.

On 27 November 1995, a joint letter of agreement on the “concept” t

agency, to be known as NIMA, was sent to House Speaker Newt Gingrich, S

ity Leader Robert Dole and “appropriate Congressional Committees.”77 Sig

tary of Defense Perry, DCI Deutch, and General Shalikashvili, CJCS, the let

We believe that the consolidation of imagery resources and management 

gle agency within the Department of Defense will improve the overall e

ness and efficiency of imagery and mapping support to both national and 

customers. Accordingly, we have agreed in concept to create a National 

and Mapping Agency that would have responsibility for imagery and 

similar to what the National Security Agency has for signals intelligence

At this point, a NIMA Director-Designate was appointed to lead an Im

Team drawn from the intelligence and mapping communities. On 28 No

RADM Joseph (“Jack”) Dantone, Jr., USN, was announced as the Direc

His three deputies were Dr. Annette Krygiel from CIO, Leo Hazlewood fro

Douglas Smith from DMA. Sharon Basso moved over from CIO to take c

munications and Congressional Liaison and was responsible for developing 

strategy” to push NIMA through Congress quickly. The team had a pack

Congress by 15 April 1996.78 Leo Hazlewood was told by staffers on th

Committees, “If it ain’t here by 15 April, it ain’t.”79

75 According to a “NIMA Decision Brief,” Oct 95, slide presentation (Slide 8) prepared f

“Tank,” proponents of DMA’s joining NIMA included the Senior Steering Group, agencies 

some unified commands. Opponents included DMA, EUCOM, PACOM and SOCOM. 76 William Allder, “Creation of NIMA,” 41. 77 William J. Perry, John Deutch and John M. Shalikashvili, Letter to the Honorable Newt 

95. Provided as attachment to “Memo to Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Techno

Background Information for 16 Jan 96 Meeting,” by RADM J.J. Dantone. See Appendix F for c

78 “Creation of NIMA,” 45. See Appendix H for a copy of a briefing summarizing NIMA

mentation Team members, and team schedule, working groups, and other background materia

for a diagram of the NIMA decision process. See Appendices K and L for what agencies 

included in or excluded from the NIMA concept. 79 Hazlewood interview.
12

THE LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY

Thus, by the time the Implementation Team was assembled, it had about f

to craft a package acceptable to both the executive branch and Congress. T

from Deutch was constant. He ordered them to be on the Hill in December to 

the interests and concerns of relevant committees, members and staffers. Sh

was the team’s “eyes and ears” on the Hill. She remembers the extraordinary 

team received from CIA’s Congressional Affairs Office.80 Team members arra

ings with anyone who would agree to hear them out. According to Hazlewoo

rarely had the time and most considered it “a staffer issue.” He found House 

Members the hardest group to schedule time with and remembers resch

appointment four times with one Congressman before finally giving up.81 It w

tion year, and setting up a new agency was not high on their list of priorities.82

Leo Hazlewood remembers that the team had to worry about thirteen differe

tees—Intelligence, Armed Services, Appropriations, Foreign Relations, Judiciar

dom of Information matters), Government Operations (on personnel authorities) 

the House and Senate)—plus the Joint Committee on Printing (for a GPO exem

in-house capability was needed for printing classified information). Most of its 

ever, was spent with the Intelligence Committee staffers. Questions usually focu

mittee jurisdictional concerns (protecting DCI or Secretary of Defense interes

balance national and combat commander support, the nature of NIMA’s leade

ture, cost and programmatics (NFIP or JMIP), personnel concerns such as the D

membership issue, and constituent interests. He recalled being asked, “Are y

take jobs out of my district?” This became a big concern of Minority Leader Dic

(DMA in St Louis, MO) and Senator Arlen Specter (DMA in Philadelphia, PA).

In both January and February 1996, the team held “NIMA Days” at its office

inviting staffers from all relevant committees out for briefings to explain “Why 

Why Now?” About nineteen staffers came to the first, representing Appropriati

Services and the Intelligence Committees. Staff members from the Aspin-Brow

sion were present as well. Sharon Basso remembers it was at the first session tha

mmes, a Senate Armed Services Committee staffer, became convinced that “we 

we were doing. He had been skeptical prior to that point. From that day on, 

staffer who successfully eliminated many obstacles on the Hill.”84 The February 

other staffers from the same committees plus DoD representatives.85 The team a

the Hill to hold meetings with all the appropriate committee Staff Directors in F

80 Basso credits Bev Harrington and John Mossman at CIA. Bev, in particular, “had excep

with Hill staffers, and spent many hours working in the background, smoothing problems a

Interview. 81 Hazlewood interview.

82 Basso interview.

83 Hazlewood interview.

84 Basso interview.

85 “IMA News,” Internal DIA Report, Feb 1996.
13

Edward Obloy, the teams legal counsel and Chairman of the Legal W

described three most contentious issues the legislative strategy had to take in

personnel issues to include how to keep employee unions in DMA and whe

CIA personnel into NIMA, (2) how to ensure both a strategic and tactica

agency, and (3) who (the DCI or SecDef) should be responsible for collectio

Compromise characterized the final solution to all three concerns.

The union issue was particularly sensitive because it was an election year, 

House had no intention of alienating a key constituency. The Intelligence C

always prohibited unions based on national security concerns, but clearly an ex

be made for DMA union members or the NIMA concept was not going to ma

executive branch. Leo Hazlewood remembers that Harold Ickes, White House 

of Staff, became personally involved in resolving the issue. Union members w

accepted into NIMA with resolution of the issue deferred until after NIMA wa

The strategic and tactical focus was resolved through language placed in bo

Title 50. The CJCS was placed in charge of reviewing NIMA’s ability to provi

port and the DCI was tasked to review its ability to provide support to its nati

tomers. Likewise, collection and tasking responsibilities were placed in both T

Thus NIMA officially, by statute, serves two masters—the DCI and SecDef—

gressional overseers—Armed Services and Intelligence.

On the floor of the Senate, Senator Kerrey explained his position concerning 

as a combat support agency, which would distance NIMA from the four defens

cially designated by Congress as combat support agencies. He reminded the 

term was first used in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1

DoD agencies that have wartime support functions and a requirement for periodi

CJCS to ensure combat readiness.86 Using that logic, Congress did not designa

Security Agency (NSA) as a combat support agency because NSA serves custom

DoD. Congress subjected NSA to periodic review by the CJCS only so far as it

were concerned. Senator Kerrey argued that NIMA should have been treated li

ever, he agreed that since DMA would make up the largest portion of NIMA, t

go along with the combat support agency designation under Title 10 “for the p

review” (but only with respect to its combat support functions)—so long as the 

also included a reference to the NIMA’s “significant national missions.” Accor

Kerrey, “We would not object to this formulation because it emphasizes that 

equally important functions: combat support and support for national missions.”

The team was willing to do whatever it took to get NIMA approved. Accor

Basso, “We did have some tension with SSCI, which felt we had put a knife 

moving toward larger control for Defense, but that aside, HPSCI was our onl

lem.88 By March, Hill staffers had a pretty good idea of what the agency w

86 Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE), Congressional Record (26 June 1996), vol 142, no. 96, S7

combat support agencies specified in Goldwater-Nichols are the Defense Communications 

Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Defense Mapping Agency. 87 Kerrey, S7013.

88 Sharon Basso, “Creation of NIMA,” 46. “Serious” added to quote in email interview.
14

Obloys legal team wrote the statute, legislative history and legislative findings

“drafting service” for the Hill.89 This saved considerable time for the legislative b

In putting the legislative package together so thoroughly, the team was also e

all the “stakeholders”90 in the executive branch (including the Office of Mana

Budget) knew what was going on. Regular meetings were held with all the pla

the working groups were drawn from throughout the relevant agencies. For e

NIMA team briefed all the CINCs at a CINC Conference being held in Washing

February 1996. At that meeting, General Shalikashvili reiterated his support for 

NIMA.91 February 1996 was also when the first meeting of the Customer Adv

(CAB) was held. That group comprised national and military organizations brou

to provide a customer perspective to the Implementation Team. The CAB was co

the National Intelligence Council and Joint Staff representatives. 

Ultimately, the most important executive branch player was the Office of Mana

Budget (OMB). A “clearinghouse” for all executive branch legislative proposals, O

bless NIMA by 15 April. Fortunately, by mid-April, the legislative package had 

sively coordinated within DoD, was in OMB at the time, and had the blessing of 

officials and their general counsels. The final signature was pro forma at that poin

remembers having to take the package to the Hill on 15 April, without OMB’s fin

although it did get cleared by the 23rd. He knew the Hill staffers were firm on 

deadline, that missing the deadline would kill all chances of passage during tha

session, and he was sure enough of OMB support to take the chance. He credits Ju

DoD General Counsel, for helping NIMA through its last executive branch hurdle

“INSIDE BASEBALL”—DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH

The jurisdictional disputes between the SASC and SSCI came to a head in th

1996 when the committee bills were ready for markup. Committees and subcomm

revise bills in a process called a “markup session” in which the bill is reviewed 

According to congressional rules, a bill with overlapping jurisdictions (meaning 

more committees have formal budgetary authority over some part of that one bill) 

sequentially so that each concerned committee has an opportunity to markup the b

goes to the floor for a vote. This is not uncommon because any broad subject typ

laps numerous committees. Sequential referral allows the gaining committee 3

days to consider the bill’s provisions. In practice, this can amount to two months.9

The Senate Intelligence Committee Authorization bill is always sequentia

to the Senate Armed Services Committee, just as the House Intelligence Au

bill is always sequentially referred to House Armed Services Committee 

National Security as it was known then) in large measure because most of the 

89 Edward Obloy, NIMA General Counsel, Interview by the author, 4 October 2000.

90 Stakeholders referred to leadership of the organizations contributing resources to NIMA.

91 “IMA News,” Internal DIA Report, February 1996. 92 Obloy interview.

93 See Senate Resolution 400 establishing the SSCI for sequential referral provisions. Senate R

is available on-line at <www.intelligence.senate.gov>.
15

budget is hidden in the defense budget. Because so many bills involve sever

sequential referral is a necessary evil but one that can play havoc on bill 

gies.” Some staffers like to refer to sequential referral as “inside baseball.”9

In terms of member priorities—reelection, influence within the chamber, a

intelligence and armed services committees are not equal. The four top m

include: Appropriations, Armed Services, Commerce and Finance.95 Since de

is the single largest controllable segment of the yearly federal budget, mem

Armed Services Committee has always been popular. With jurisdiction o

defense establishment, the immense size of the annual Armed Services Comm

tion bill makes these committees the “thousand pound gorilla” on Capitol H

Services committees are used to being deferred to. As one staffer reminds us

other committees are always trying to get a piece of that pie.96 Because human 

interpersonal relationships are so important on the Hill, it is unusual for any 

anything to upset cordial relations with any committee—especially Armed Ser

In 1996, this baseball game (the sequential referral process) suddenly g

esting than usual. The Senate Armed Services Committee took the Sena

Committee’s authorization bill (numbered S. 1718) on sequential referral. I

the SASC took the SSCI’s bill in order to have a chance to change it—to m

was as usual, and in accordance with Senate rules, precedent, and normal r

its referral period, the SASC took exception to many of the SSCI’s reorgani

als, and crossed out all SSCI references to NIMA (placed by the SSCI unde

ing its “mark.” Still supportive of the NIMA concept, the SASC transferre

establishing NIMA into the SASC bill under Title 10 and eliminated other S

completely, particularly those that appeared to increase the power and au

DCI at the expense of the Secretary of Defense.97

94 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.

95 Davidson and Oleszek, 208. In comparison, the intelligence committees are prestigious 

tive that membership indicates a congressman’s trustworthiness and access to the nation’s t

members get little in terms of publicity or pork. 96 SASC Professional Staffer interview.

97 In the normal course of events, the HPSCI/SSCI always try to pass their respective bills 

Services committees pass theirs. Armed Services then takes the Intelligence bill on sequentia

Intelligence Committee reports it out. Once Armed Services reports the Intelligence Bill to t

sequential referral), the Intelligence Committee can take it back or let it go to the floor. If the 

mittee takes it back to reassert its jurisdictional rights, there probably will not be sufficient tim

round on the bill before the end of that congressional session! Thus, as an alternative, the Inte

tee can begin negotiating changes to the Armed Services report—of the Intelligence bill—

results of the negotiations as floor amendments. The Intelligence Committee can also disrega

vices report of the Intelligence Authorization Bill and try to get a better outcome during the H

ference of the bill. Because a conference report cannot be amended and is not available to be ta

referral, Armed Services must accept the outcome of the conference—they either have to 

lobby other Senators to have it defeated on the floor. As always, the selection of what to do w

on the issues and the personalities involved. SSCI Professional Staffer interview.
16

The SASCs actions so infuriated the SSCI that Senator Specter persona

the SSCI’s taking the SASC’s National Defense bill (numbered S. 1745) on 

referral—a highly unusual move! In other words, it was not unusual for Gol

David’s bill on sequential referral, but very unusual for David to take Goliath’

In the committee report issued by the SASC to accompany the SSCI’s I

Authorization Bill, SASC Chairman Senator Thurmond voiced his displeasu

SSCI over the issue of sequential referral.98

The SSCI nonetheless included many of the controversial provisions in S. 

thereby creating a significant disagreement between the SASC and the 

Once S. 1718 had been referred to the SASC on sequential referral (as the 

ligence Authorization Bill is every year), the SASC Chairman and Ra

Minority Member agreed to enter into negotiations with the SSCI to attem

resolve these differences. Notwithstanding this effort to work out a consen

good faith, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI took the unp

dented step of requesting sequential referral of the Defense Authorization 

The SASC Chairman’s anger was also apparent in other paragraphs of the s

His comments concerning a “Department of Intelligence” are in reference to 

posals in the SSCI bill which would have expanded the DCI’s authority at the 

the SecDef’s. (Italics added by author.)

S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, contains a number of controversial p

sions, which the SASC opposes and the executive branch does not sup

On April 15, 1996 the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the S

wrote to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI to express co

regarding these issues and to urge the SSCI not to include such provisio

the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 1997. 

In general, these provisions seek to shift a significant degree of authority 

the Secretary of Defense to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 

cially in the area of budget formulation and execution. The bill also con

a number of provisions that, taken together, lay the foundation for the 

ation of what amounts to a ‘Department of Intelligence.’

The SASC supports a strong DCI yet maintains that the DCI’s function 

to act as a quasi-departmental head, but to coordinate the intelligence a

ties of various departments and to act as the principal intelligence advi

the President and the National Security Council. Providing the DCI the 

of authority recommended by the SSCI would seriously undermine the S

tary of Defense’s ability to manage the Department of Defense. The com

tee notes that the Secretary of Defense strongly opposes such a shift of p

98 U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Report 104-277, 104th Congress, 2d S

Appendix E-1 for a complete copy of this report.)
17

and the DCI has not sought such authorities. If S. 1718 were passed in 

rent form, it would almost certainly be vetoed....

Title VIII of S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, establishes the Nation

ery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in Title 50, U.S.C., not as a Com

port Agency. The executive branch had requested that NIMA be estab

Title 10, U.S.C., and be designated in law as a Combat Support Age

SASC-reported Defense Authorization Bill contains a comprehensive 

tive charter for NIMA, which, with a few minor exceptions, is consist

the executive branch proposal. 

As one staffer notes, the SASC is “used to assaults from all sides,” and 

just another assault to be warded off. In fact, he remembered that tension

SASC and SSCI were high at that particular time. The two committees had 

resolved the issue of jurisdiction over JMIP funds, with the SSCI finally sig

randum of Agreement in April 1996 relinquishing to the SASC any claim to 

According to both Leo Hazlewood and Ed Obloy, Eric Thoemmes (a staffer 

was NIMA’s guardian angel. Convinced at the January “NIMA Day” (held 

NIMA was “the right thing to do,” and persuaded by the letter to the Hil

SecDef and CJCS approved, Thoemmes helped to shepherd the legisl

through the committee. He helped team members talk to the right people at 

and calm the waters stirred up by the sequential referral uproar.100

SASC members may have been unaware of how deep the SSCI comm

NIMA under Title 50—thinking it to be a “Staffer issue” as opposed to a “Me

In fact, the SSCI felt so strongly about keeping NIMA within the DCI’s ju

members decided as a committee to fight the SASC by requesting the SASC 

bill on sequential referral—a request never made by the SSCI before or sinc

confrontation between the two committee chairmen—Strom Thurmond and A

99 SASC Professional Staffer interview. See Appendix F for a copy of the MOA. 100 Hazlewood interview. 101 Some programs or initiatives are considered “staffer issues,” others “Member issues.” 

refer to issues that members feel strongly about. For example, a member may insist upon fu

program and use every tool available to make that happen. Alternatively, “Staffer issues” r

staffers feel strongly about. Often, in legislation, members “go along” with staffer recommend

when it is very important to the staffer and unimportant to the member. However, if a “Sta

under fire in a debate between members, then members tend to capitulate more readily becau

they did not feel strongly about. Not surprisingly, Members tend to pay less attention to, an

fight “Staffer issues.” When the SSCI and HPSCI were created, each committee was desig

“crossover members” from the Judiciary, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropria

One of the purposes for this arrangement was to facilitate information sharing between all 

since their oversight responsibilities regarding the Intelligence Community overlapped. In 19

members on the SSCI who also were members of the SASC. Thus the apparent lack of commu

the two committees was all the more surprising. The SSCI and HPSCI lists at Appendix A and 

over members.

102 SSCI Professional Staffer interview.
18

A SASC staffer remembers that confrontation and the many meetings it l

staff level. Ultimately, it came down to a meeting between “the Big Four”103 

out the most contentious issues. At one point, these Members met with D

DepSecDef White and Vice-Chairman, JCS Ralston to decide whether the DC

with NIMA as a Combat Support Agency under the DoD.

One big issue between the SASC and SSCI had to do with whether NIMA

would be military; if military, whether it would be a two- or three-star bill

three-star billet, whether the services would get an additional three-star (“pl

would have to take it “out of hide” (meaning the total number already auth

divided among the services). A three-star billet was agreed to so that the NI

tor would be equal in rank to the Director of DIA, NSA, NRO and so on. H

SASC wanted no increase in three-star billets. According to Hazlewood, D

did not lobby hard enough for an additional three-star billet with the SASC 

although NIMA did end up with the option of either a senior civilian or a thr

three-star billet has to be “borrowed” from the service that nominates the NI

tor. Thus, RADM Dantone had to be called Acting Director after 1 Oc

because he had two stars, not three. 

Having taken the SASC bill, and earned the wrath of Senator Thurmond 

such as Senator Stevens, the SSCI released it ahead of schedule. Senator Spe

SSCI committee report accompanying the SASC Defense Authorization Bill 

conciliatory, although he makes some pointed references to Senator Thurmond

tee report. Senator Specter makes a point of justifying the SSCI’s taking of the 

and the speediness of its review.104

After careful review, including extensive discussions and negotiations 

staff and member level with the Armed Services Committee and wit

Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee voted to report th

with amendments on June 11—well before the expiration of the thirty da

session allotted in Senate Resolution 400 for consideration upon referral

The SSCI report also discussed points of contention with the SASC such 

Thurmond’s remark about a “Department of Intelligence.” Senator Specter use

to highlight the SSCI’s success in protecting NIMA’s national mission and to 

its losses over expanded DCI authorities. 

According to Senator Specter, the Committee believes the consensus rea

by the two Committees preserves significant elements of the reform effo

significantly enhances the ability of the DCI to manage intelligence activ

In addition, the Committee is more comfortable that, with the changes a

103 SASC Chair Thurmond, SASC Ranking Member Nunn, SSCI Chair Specter, and SSCI Vice

104 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Intelligence Committee, Report 104-278, 104th Congress, 

(See Appendix D-2 for complete copy.)
19

upon, the DCI will have the ability to ensure that a new National Ima

Mapping Agency will be responsive to the needs of all national custo

NIMA IN CONFERENCE—HNSC AND SASC

Typically, once the HPSCI and SSCI have resolved their differences wi

vices, and any other committee with overlapping concerns, such as Foreig

Judiciary, each bill is “reported from committee” and subject to a vote 

chamber. Here is where the reputation of the Intelligence committee and i

most critical. In the words of one HPSCI staffer, the chairman has to pre

the entire chamber and ask fellow members to “trust him, and trust the 

have made the right decisions because the majority of the bill’s contents 

Members can come to the committee’s work spaces and review the class

the bill but few do. Most trust the committee and its staffers to have “

thing.” He calls the committee’s role “the lubricant” between the wheels o

and legislative branches, allowing a secret part of the government to func

in an open society that inherently distrusts any operation that operates in s

Before bills can be sent to the president, however, they must be passe

House and Senate in identical form. House and Senate differences are recon

ference.” In the usual course of things, conferees include all members from 

tees that sponsored the legislation, but can sometimes include members fro

with important overlapping jurisdiction.107

NIMA would normally have been “conferenced” by the HPSCI and SS

in which HPSCI committee members sit across the table from SSCI comm

to “iron out” any differences.108 Had that happened, the SSCI would proba

to take advantage of the “divided House,” using the isolated position of H

cans on the NIMA issue to win its passage.109 NIMA, however, was not in 

(since the SSCI had, in fact, eliminated NIMA language in its FY 97 Intell

rization Bill in order to gain Senate passage of the bill) and there was now 

HPSCI110 or SSCI bills pertaining to NIMA. NIMA was in the SASC bill, s

the HNSC to conference directly with the SASC. Thus, with the SASC and H

of NIMA, HPSCI objections stood little chance of carrying the day.

105 Report 104-278, 5. 106 A source, HPSCI Professional Staffer, who wishes to remain anonymous, intervie

5 May 2000. 107 Davidson and Oleszek, 253. 108 “In conference anything is tradeable. It’s like a ‘congressional swap meet.’” Lowenthal 

109 SSCI Professional Staffer interview. 110 HPSCI Intelligence Authorization Bill, HR 3237, contained no reference to NIMA

Authorization Bill, HR 3259, amended the HPSCI Bill and added NIMA language comparable 

guage as amended by the SSCI.
20

A THREE-RING CIRCUS

Newspaper articles discussing committee differences referred to the dispute 

ring “turf battle par excellence.” Washington Post staff writer and intelligenc

Walter Pincus named the ring leaders as DCI John Deutch, DepSecDef John W

senting SecDef Perry) and Senator Specter. “Waiting just outside the center r

Pincus, “is Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Chairman of the Appropriations D

committee and booster of the Pentagon and Senate Armed Services Committee

man of the Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee handling civil service 

has gotten sequential referral on Specter’s bill and is holding it hostage.”111

Senator Stevens’ actions came as a great surprise to the SSCI member

According to Charlie Battaglia, Senator Stevens’ staff never provided him with 

why the committee was taking a sequential referral on the SSCI’s authorization 

of his several offers to negotiate changes or provide clarification. Mr. Battaglia 

Senator Stevens was using the procedure as a tool to show support for Senator 

and reprimand the SSCI for “overstepping its bounds.”112

THE APPROPRIATORS

The committees discussed thus far (Intelligence, Armed Services, Foreign 

and so on) are authorizing committees and through their bills programs are p

exist. Authorization committees review the merit of existing or proposed pro

decide whether to authorize money for them in the coming fiscal year. The bas

authorizers is whether programs have merit, and how to prioritize a variety of g

There is only one Appropriations Committee in each house. The federa

divided up among its 13 subcommittees. Each agency in the federal governme

upon one of those thirteen appropriations bills for its budget dollars. In theory

gram is both authorized by an authorizing committee, such as Armed Services, 

priated funds by an appropriating subcommittee such as the Appropriation C

Subcommittee on Military Construction.

Authorizers set ceilings for how much money should be spent on a program

outline conditions to control how the money is spent. Appropriators, on the 

must decide exactly how much money an authorized program can receive, wor

budgetary spending level constraints. Broadly speaking, they are more conce

program’s cost than with its merit. In theory, if authorized, it must have merit. 

authorizers and appropriators try to work closely together.

Ordinarily, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and S

have little reason to fight a concept like NIMA, if authorized by both the Intel

Armed Services Committees, since its authorization required little, if any

funds. NIMA constituted a “policy issue” and as such, would normally be 

111 Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Battleground: Reform Bill,” Washington Post, 30 May 1996, A 

112 Battaglia interview. See S Report 104-337. (The complete report can be found in Appendix 
21

authorizers. In addition, Sharon Basso recalled that Senator Stevens, Ch

Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, had wanted a NIA/NIMA organiz

time. “He was unhappy with CIO and his staffer kept whacking at CIO’s bu

to pay attention.” She also remembered that “House appropriators were o

that information ‘got to the guy in the foxhole’ and thought that NIMA w

able to do that.”113

Not surprisingly, appropriators focused in on DCI Deutch’s promises o

ciency and cost savings as a result of the consolidation of imagery assets a

cover ways in which the new agency could save money. The money issue

resolved, however, and the implementation team considered the Appropria

cause for concern.114

A LETTER FROM THE SPEAKER

Despite their isolated position, Leo Hazlewood remembers that HPSCI Re

to mobilize other House Republicans to “Just Say No” to NIMA in the HNSC

ence committee over the DoD Authorization Bill. Furthermore, Chairman Co

HPSCI staff briefed Speaker Gingrich on the issue and convinced him that it w

In response, the Speaker wrote a letter of objection.115 Lowenthal points out th

is, after all, an ex officio member of the HPSCI and is therefore, perfectly with

express his opinion on the subject within the House and Senate.116 The letter w

have been circulated among key Republican members throughout the House a

signal to the conference committee members not to support the creation of NIM

The fact that the Speaker’s letter had so little effect illustrates not only th

the Senate, but also the momentum that the NIMA concept had gained. It 

support from both key players in the executive branch and Congress to be br

at this late stage. Leo Hazlewood recalled that the NIMA team “discover

period the importance of reaching out to people who could contact influentia

Hill.”117 One such person was Senator Trent Lott.118 Sharon Basso explaine

was particularly lucky because Senator Lott was the subcommittee chairm

sored the NIMA legislation.” As its sponsor, he had a “personal vested intere

lation,” and as Majority Leader was in a good position to aid its passage.119

CREATED “ON SCHEDULE”

Sharon Basso kept a board in her office from January to October 1996 

the “NIMA heartbeat.” Depending on where the center of gravity seemed 

113 Basso interview. 114 Obloy interview. 115 Interview data conflicts over exactly whom the letter was addressed to. It may have be

on the SSCI or it may have been to the Chairman of the HNSC, Mr. Spense. 116 Lowenthal interview. 117 Hazlewood, “Creation of NIMA,” 46. 118 Basso, “Creation of NIMA,” 46. 119 Basso interview.
22

given day, the heartbeat grew stronger or weaker. Team members discovered 

correlations, like the fact that the more the HPSCI disliked NIMA, the greate

support! They also learned that proposed legislation can falter at any mom

potentially disastrous Gingrich letter demonstrated at the very end of the proce

Having survived the scrutiny of these many committees as a concept for s

the management of imagery intelligence, and having faced huge opposition 

executive branch, NIMA was legislated into existence in the FY97 DoD Au

Bill.121 The bill passed on 30 September 1996—meeting the 1 October 1996 

by DCI Deutch in November 1995—an incredibly short time from a congre

spective. This retrospective case study highlights just how remarkable its su

How can we explain its success despite all the odds against its passage?

The importance of the combined support of the Secretary of Defense, Chai

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director of Central Intelligence cannot be oversta

they not been united, the “fast track” approach would not have been possible. 

overcame the tremendous opposition within the executive branch, as or

clashed over such fundamentally contentious issues as budget, turf, employee 

benefits, and organizational cultures. Despite all that, the “big three” had decid

ing was right, and so it happened. As David Broadhurst concludes, the creatio

was the biggest change in the Intelligence Community since the National Sec

1947.123 Such revolutionary change probably had to happen quickly to m

weight of the opposition.

In conclusion, it appears that policymakers in the executive branch sometim

Congress is an ally, sometimes a foe. In the case of NIMA it was primarily 

advocate. According to Helen Sullivan, Office of the Deputy General Counsel, 

primary drafter of the NIMA legislation,

[i]t has been said that it can be easier to get legislation through Congress 

through the executive branch. NIMA may be proof of that. If we had tr

seek an administration solution to the problem, having the DCI and Secr

of Defense sign some kind of charter, that would have played into the h

of the bureaucracies, and we would probably still be waiting for app

Bureaucracies can take a look at senior leadership, recognize the amou

turnover at that level and wait them out.124

RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This case concentrates solely on NIMA’s creation, but Congress’s role in i

after October 1996 continues. As overseer of the Intelligence Community, th

120 Hazlewood interview. 121 See Appendix L for the DoD Directive 5105.60, 11 Oct 96, establishing NIMA. 122 Obloy, “Creation of NIMA,” 41. 123 Broadhurst interview. 124 Helen Sullivan, “Creation of NIMA,” 45. 
23

sional intelligence committees have a variety of responsibilities—one of wh

cise “continuous watchfulness” over the agencies within their jurisdictio

“administration of a statute is, properly speaking, an extension of the l

cess.”125 Congress gave the NIMA several years to overcome the initial hu

in starting a new agency and then sought an independent assessment of wh

cerns of the various committees were well-founded and what changes migh

support national policymakers more fully. Using the Classified Annex to 

DoD Appropriations Conference Bill, Congress established a commission 

NIMA and directed the DCI and SecDef to appoint its members. The 

chaired by Peter Marino, conducted its study throughout 2000 and release

January 2001. The Commission concludes that “while NIMA’s transfor

incomplete, and progress against some goals is mixed, the Commission obs

in virtually every area.”126 The commission’s report offers a useful snapsh

as of the year 2000. Researchers might consider using this report as a baseli

to measure progress at some future date.

125 Oleszek, 263-264. Oleszek is quoting from the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

126 Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, “Introducti

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, (Washington D.C.: 

tion 1.5, URL: <http://www.nimacommission.com>, accessed 21 Jan 01.

25

APPENDIX A

1996 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 

ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)

(Republicans shown in Roman type, Democrats in italic 

224-1700 SH-211 Party Ratio: R 9- D 8

● MEMBERS:127

Arlen Specter, PA, Chairman (SAC

Richard Lugar, IN (SFR

Richard Shelby, AL (SAC

Mike Dewine, OH (SJC)

Jon Kyl, AZ (SJC)

James Inhofe, OK (SAS

Kay Bailey Hutchinson, TX

Connie Mack, FL

William Cohen, ME (SAS

Bob Dole, KS, ex officio

J. Robert Kerrey, NE, Vice Chair (SAC

John Glenn, Ohio (SAS

Richard Bryan, NV (SAS

Bob Graham

John Kerry, MA (SFR

Max Baucus, MN

J. Bennett Johnston, LA

Charles Robb, VA (SAS

Thomas Daschle, SD, ex officio

● KEY STAFF:

Charles Battaglia, Staff Director

Chris Straub, Minority Staff Director

Suzanne Spalding, General Counsel

Art Grant, Professional Staff, Liaison for Senator Kerrey

Mary Sturtevant, Professional Staff (Budget)

127 “Crossover” members on the SSCI sit not only on the SSCI but also other committee

oversight responsibilities. The committee in the parenthesis indicates which committee the pe

member from: Judiciary (SJC), Foreign Relations (SFRC), Armed Services (SASC), or Appropr

27

APPENDIX B

1996 HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT 

COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (HPS

(Republicans shown in Roman type, Democrats in italic 

225-4121 H405 Capitol Party Ratio: R 9-D 7

● MEMBERS:128

Larry Combest, TX, Chairman

Robert Dornan, CA (HNS

Bill Young, FL (HAC

Jim Hansen, UT (HNS

Jerry Lewis, CA (HAC

Porter Goss, FL129

Bud Shuster, PA 

Bill McCollum, FL (HJC

Michael Castle, DE

Newt Gingrich, GA, ex officio

Norman Dicks, WA, Ranking Minority Mbr (HAC

Bill Richardson, NM

Julian Dixon, CA (HAC

Bob Torricelli, NJ (HIR

Ronald Coleman,TX (HAC

David Skaggs, CO (HAC

Nancy Pelosi, CA (HAC

Dick Gephardt, Mo, ex officio

● KEY STAFF:

Mark Lowenthal, Staff Director

Louis Dupart, Chief Counsel

Michael Sheehy, Minority Counsel

Karen Wagner, Majority Staff

Tim Sample, Majority Staff

Mary Englebreth, Majority Staff

128 “Crossover” members on the HPSCI sit not only on the HPSCI but also other committee

oversight responsibilities. The committee in the parenthesis indicates which committee the pe

member from: Judiciary (HJC), International Relations (HIRC), National Security (HNSC), 

(HAC). (The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) was renamed the HNSC in 1994 and 

to the HASC in 1999.) 129 By chance, Porter Goss also sits on the Rules committee. It is very helpful for the HPS

ber on the committee that determines under what rules a bill will be debated on the House flo

29

APPENDIX C

EXECUTIVE BRANCH PLAYERS AT A GLA

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

John Deutch Director of Central Intelligence

Jeff Smith General Counsel, CIA

SENIOR STEERING GROUP

● CO-CHAIRPERSONS:

Paul Kaminski Under SecDef for Acquisition an

George Tenet Deputy Dir, CIA

Adm Bill Owens Vice Chairman, JCS

● MEMBERS:

Keith Hall Exec Dir, Intel Community Affai

Emmet Paige Asst SecDef for C3

I

Nora Slatkin Exec Dir, CIA

Ted Warner Asst SecDef, Strategy and Requi

Randy Beers National Security Council Staff

NIMA IMPLEMENTATION TEAM

● MEMBERS:

(Position at the time)

RADM Jack Dantone, Director Dep Director for Military Suppo

Dep Dir for Ops, Natl Sys Spt, Jt 

Dep Dir for Def Spt Proj Off, OS

Leo Hazlewood, Deputy Director Dep Dir for Admin, CIA

Dr Annette Krygiel, Deputy Director Dir, CIO

W. Douglas Smith, NIMA Team Ldr Dep Dir, DMA

David Broadhurst, Integration Team CIO

Edward Obloy, Team Counsel General Counsel, DMA

Sharon Basso, Communications CIO

● WORKING GROUP CHAIRPERSONS:

(Working Group Titles)

Bill Allder (CIO) Responsibilities & Boundaries

Marna Bowytz (NPIC) Contracting Activities

Jeff Boyle (CIO) Infrastructure

George Clark (CIA) Human Resources

Bobbi Lenczowski (DMA) Organizational Structure

Tish Long (DIA) Program and Budget

Edward Obloy (DMA) Legal 

Bob Roger (NPIC) Strategic Planning

31

APPENDIX D
32
33

APPENDIX E

SENATE COMMITTEE REPORTS

E-1: 104-277, SASC RPT ON SSCI BILL S 1718

E-2: 104-278, SSCI RPT ON SASC BILL S 1745

E-3: 104-337, SGAC RPT ON SSCI BILL S 1718

35

APPENDIX E-1

104-277, SENATE ARMED SERVICES 

COMMITTEE REPORT ON SSCI BILL S 1

104th Congress, 2nd Session Senate Repo

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YE

FOR INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-REL

ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNM

June 6, 1996- Ordered to be printed

Mr. THURMOND, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted th

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1718]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill (S. 

considered the same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and rec

the bill as amended do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

S. 1718 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for intelligen

gence-related activities of the United States Government, including certain 

Defense intelligence-related activities within the jurisdiction of the Sena

vices Committee (SASC).

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) reported the bil

1996 and it was referred to the Committee on Armed Services on May 2, 

dance with section 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress.

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

The committee conducted a detailed review of the intelligence community 

request for fiscal year 1997. The committee conducted hearings and met with 

and Vice Chairman of the SSCI to discuss budget matters and legislative pro

cern to both committees. The committee also engaged in lengthy and detaile

in an attempt to resolve issues of disagreement between the SASC and the S

The committee has carefully reviewed the report of the SSCI (Sen. 

and has incorporated the relevant budget decisions of the SSCI into 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, which was re

Senate on May 13, 1996.

The following explains the committee’s proposed amendment to the bill 

the SSCI, as well as the committee’s clarification to the report issued by the 
36

Overview

S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, contains a number of controversial 

which the SASC opposes and the Executive Branch does not support. O

1996, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the SASC wrote to th

and Vice Chairman of the SSCI to express concern regarding these issues and 

SSCI not to include such provisions in the Intelligence Authorization Bill for 

1997. In general, these provisions seek to shift a significant degree of auth

the Secretary of Defense to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), es

the area of budget formulation and execution. The bill also contains a 

provisions that, taken together, lay the foundation for the creation of wha

to a ‘Department of Intelligence.’ The SASC supports a strong DCI yet 

that the DCI’s function is not to act as a quasi-departmental head, but to 

the intelligence activities of various departments and to act as the princi

gence advisor to the President and the National Security Council. Providi

the type of authority recommended by the SSCI would seriously undermi

retary of Defense’s ability to manage the Department of Defense. The 

notes that the Secretary of Defense strongly opposes such a shift of pow

DCI has not sought such authorities. If S. 1718 were passed in its curre

would almost certainly be vetoed.

The SSCI nonetheless included many of the controversial provisions 

thereby creating a significant disagreement between the SASC and the S

S. 1718 had been referred to the SASC on sequential referral (as the I

Authorization Bill is every year), the SASC Chairman and Ranking Mino

ber agreed to enter into negotiations with the SSCI to attempt to resolve th

ences. Notwithstanding this effort to work out a consensus in good 

Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI took the unprecedented step 

ing sequential referral of the Defense Authorization Bill.

After three weeks of negotiations and four proposals and counter-proposa

the committees, the SASC concluded that, given the SSCI’s insistence on reta

of the controversial elements of S. 1718, the differences between the comm

unresolvable through negotiation. Therefore, the SASC has decided to report 

the Senate, with a proposed amendment addressing the bill’s major deficie

SSCI retains the right to follow a similar procedure with regard to S. 1745. Th

would leave it to the Senate to resolve issues of disagreement between the com

both S. 1718 and S. 1745.

The committee notes that its proposed amendment only deals with issues 

jurisdiction of the SASC, and that S. 1718 contains a number of other controve

sions that fall within the jurisdiction of other committees. The committee has 

position on these matters, per se, but individual members of the committee, or 

bers of the Senate, may offer amendments to S. 1718 to address these issues.

The committee recommends the following specific amendments to S. 1718
37

Section 707—Enhancement of authority of Director of Central Intellige

budget, personnel, and activities of intelligence community

Section 707, as reported by the SSCI, would significantly expand the D

over the DOD elements of the intelligence community. It would: (1) require 

of Defense to get DCI concurrence on the Joint Military Intelligence Pr

budget, and consult with the DCI on the Tactical Intelligence and Rel

(TIARA) budget; (2) give the DCI authority to manage all the national co

ties of the intelligence community (including Defense human intelligenc

that any reprogramming within the JMIP receive DCI approval; (4) give the 

to reprogram funds and transfer personnel among National Foreign Intellig

(NFIP) elements after consultation with (in lieu of concurrence by) agency 

the DCI authority to allocate and expend all NFIP funds for the National R

Office (NRO), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the National Imag

ping Agency (NIMA) (giving the DCI authority he now only has for the C

gence Agency (CIA)).

The proposed SASC amendment would enhance the DCI’s participatio

agement of Defense intelligence activities, but would not alter the authority 

tary of Defense over such activities. Specifically, the amendment would: (

the participation of the DCI in the development of budgets for JMIP and 

leaving the final authority on these matters with the Secretary; (2) give the D

time authority to approve national collection requirements, determine natio

priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on national co

(3) require the Secretary of Defense to consult with the DCI on JMIP r

actions; (4) strike SSCI language allowing the DCI to transfer NFIP funds o

tion of the affected Defense Agency head; (5) strike the SSCI language g

authority to manage and expend funds for Defense Department elements of 

substitute language establishing a database on intelligence funding to give t

insight into the overall intelligence budget; (6) strike SSCI language g

authority to rotate personnel in the absence of coordination with agency he

Section 708—Reallocation of responsibilities of Director of Central In

Secretary of Defense for intelligence activities under National Foreign Intellig

Section 708, as reported by the SSCI, would give the DCI joint manage

with the Secretary of Defense over the NFIP elements in the Departmen

including NRO, NSA, and NIMA.

The proposed SASC amendment would strike the SSCI’s language an

provision that would require the Secretary of Defense to consult with the D

his responsibilities pertaining to the NFIP (as provided in Section 10

U.S.C.). The SASC amendment would also require the DCI to submit an 

tion to Congress and the National Security Council on the performance of th

and NIMA in meeting their national missions.
38

Section 709—Improvement of intelligence collection

Section 709, as reported by the SSCI, would establish the position of Assist

Collection, to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. S

would also transfer the responsibilities and authorities of the Secretary of Def

clandestine elements of the Defense Human Intelligence Service to the DCI.

The proposed SASC amendment would modify the authorities of the Assist

Collection, limiting them to general responsibilities in assisting the DCI in c

existing collection authorities. The proposed SASC amendment would also 

SSCI language regarding the transfer of authorities over the Defense Human I

Services, and substitute language requiring a report by the DCI and the Deput

of Defense regarding on-going activities of those officials to achieve co

interoperability, and, where practicable, consolidation between the clandes

intelligence activities of the Defense Human Intelligence Service and the CIA

Section 711—Improvement of administration of intelligence activities

Section 711, as reported by the SSCI, would establish the position of Assist

Administration to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

The proposed SASC amendment would modify the SSCI language spe

duties of the Assistant DCI for Administration by dropping a detailed listing 

administration.

Section 714—Office of Congressional Affairs

Section 714, as reported by the SSCI, would establish an office of congressi

for the intelligence community.

The proposed SASC amendment would change the designation of this ne

‘Office of Congressional Affairs for the Director of Central Intelligence’ to 

this new office would not manage the activities of the various congressional af

in the Department of Defense.

Section 715—Assistance for law enforcement agencies by intelligence comm

Section 715, as reported by the SSCI, would authorize U.S. intelligence a

the request of a U.S. law enforcement agency, to collect information on non-U

outside the U.S. for law enforcement or counterintelligence purposes.

The proposed SASC amendment would (1) limit this authority to NRO

NIMA; (2) preclude direct participation of military personnel in arrests; (3) pro

tance if it would adversely affect military preparedness; and (4) require the S

Defense to prescribe such regulations as necessary to implement this authority 

tect sources and methods.
39

Section 716—Appointment and evaluation of officials responsible fo

related activities

Section 716, as reported by the SSCI, would require the Secretary of D

the concurrence of the DCI before making a recommendation to the Preside

NRO and NSA. The SSCI provision would also require the DCI to provide 

mance evaluations for the heads of NRO and NSA to the Secretary of Defe

The proposed SASC amendment would modify the SSCI language requ

currence on appointments to provide that the Secretary, after seeking con

make the recommendation to the President without the DCI’s concurrence i

notes that the DCI does not concur. This modification is consistent with the 

tion to extend this recommendation process to the director of NIMA (a mat

up on the Defense Authorization bill). The amendment would also strike 

guage requiring the DCI to provide annual performance evaluation. But 

intends to include language in the Defense Authorization bill that would 

input on performance evaluations for the directors of NSA, NRO, and NIM

eration by the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the Secretary

mances evaluations of these directors.

Section 717—Intelligence community senior executive service

Section 717, as reported by the SSCI, would establish an intelligen

Senior Executive Service.

The proposed SASC amendment would strike this provision. The comm

the Department of Defense strongly opposes the establishment of a DCI-m

Executive Service that would include a large number of Department of D

nel. The SSCI provision contradicts a proposal made by the Executive Bran

DOD intelligence civilian personnel management, which the DCI has ch

one of his top priorities, and which the Secretary of Defense strongly supp

mittee is considering options for including a version of the Executive Bran

ligence personnel proposal in the Defense Authorization bill.

Title VIII—National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Title VIII of S. 1718, as reported by the SSCI, establishes the Nati

and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in Title 50, U.S.C., not as a Combat Sup

The Executive Branch had requested that NIMA be established in Ti

and be designated in law as a Combat Support Agency. The SASC-rep

Authorization Bill contains a comprehensive legislative charter for N

with a few minor exceptions, is consistent with the Executive Branch p

The proposed SASC amendment would strike the SSCI langua

NIMA and would substitute language regarding NIMA’s national miss

fying the peacetime status of the DCI’s national imagery collection ta

ity. The proposed SASC amendment would also provide that the Secreta

and the DCI, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
40

identify deficiencies in the capabilities of NIMA to accomplish assigned na

sions and develop policies and programs to review and correct such defici

committee expects that disagreements between the DCI and the Secretary 

relating to the identification of NIMA’s deficiencies in performing its nation

would be settled according to normal interagency procedures, with the Presid

the ultimate authority to resolve differences. These provisions would be inclu

50, U.S.C. The SASC intends to include identical language in the Defense Au

bill in addition to language specifying that the Secretary of Defense shall 

actions to correct deficiencies jointly identified by the Secretary and the DCI.

COMMITTEE ACTION

In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amen

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the committee approved a motion to r

ably S. 1718 with an amendment.

FISCAL DATA

The committee will publish in the Congressional Record information on fiv

projections when such information is received from the Congressional Budget 

REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate requ

report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in the report on the bill. T

tee finds that there is no regulatory impact in the cost of S. 1718.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing R

Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portions of the bill hav

shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of the committee, it 

essary to dispense with showing such changes in order to expedite the busi

Senate and reduce the expenditure of funds.
41

APPENDIX E-2

104-278, SENATE SELECT COMMITTE

ON INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON SASC BILL 

104th Congress, 2nd Session Senate Repo

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YE

FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTME

DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND 

DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF E

TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FO

SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES

FOR OTHER PURPOSES

June 11, 1996—Ordered to be printed

Mr. SPECTER, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted th

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1745]

The Select Committee on Intelligence, to which was referred the bill (S. 

considered the same, favorably reports the bill with amendments.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

S. 1745 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for militar

the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense ac

Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year 

Forces, and for other purposes.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) reported the bill on May 

it was referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence in accordance with S

Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress.

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

The Committee requested an opportunity to consider S. 1745 because it 

visions authorizing a major reorganization of the intelligence community th

ation of a new agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, as well 

provisions directly conflicting with the Committee’s efforts this year to m

improvements in the management and operation of U.S. intelligence activit

ful review, including extensive discussions and negotiations at the staff and 

with the Armed Services Committee and with the Director of Central Intellig

uty Secretary of Defense, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf

tee voted to report the bill with amendments on June 11—well before the ex

thirty days of session allotted in Senate Resolution 400 for consideration upo
42

Prior committee action

These amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act, along with 

gence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, S. 1718, reflect the conclusion

mittee has reached after six years of focused examination aimed at makin

Intelligence Community operate more effectively, more efficiently, and w

accountability in light of the significant changes in the world over the last 

1994, this effort led Congress, at the urging of Senator Warner, Senator Graha

ers, to establish a Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. I

Community (the ‘Aspin-Brown Commission’) to conduct a ‘credible, indepe

objective review’ of U.S. intelligence. The Commission was given a deadline 

1996, with the expectation that its report would inform a legislative debate 

enactment of needed changes during this Congress.

Armed with the Commission’s report and enlightened by the Committee’s 

nation, including numerous hearings, briefings, and interviews, the Select Co

Intelligence voted on April 24, 1996, to report S. 1718, the Intelligence Autho

for Fiscal Year 1997, containing a number of measures to improve policy guid

Intelligence Community, strengthen the DCI’s ability to manage the Communit

of all intelligence consumers, and enhance the ability of the Congress and th

public to ensure that the secrecy necessary for the conduct of intelligence does 

the vigilance and oversight necessary for an effective democracy. The Arm

Committee took the Intelligence Authorization bill on a 30-day sequential refe

have done every year since the establishment of the Select Committee on Intelli

The Armed Services Committee staff was briefed on S. 1718 in the weeks 

to the April 24 vote to report the bill and the Chairman and Vice Chairman test

sively on the Committee’s legislation in a hearing before the Armed Services 

following that vote. During this same time frame, the Armed Services Com

considering the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997

reported to the Senate on May 13. Despite expressing in a letter to the Select 

on Intelligence dated April 15, 1996, initial concerns about passage of intellige

legislation in this compressed legislative year, the Armed Services Committee 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 a number of pro

intelligence reorganization, including the creation of a new national imagery ag

new structure for military intelligence under a Director of Military Intellige

They also included a number of other provisions that directly conflicted with 

attempts of the Intelligence Committee contained in S. 1718. The Intelligence 

requested referral of the bill to consider these intelligence provisions, pursuan

3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, which provides for referral to the Committee o

lation containing provisions within its jurisdiction for up to thirty days, not co

on which the Senate is not in session.

Discussions with Armed Services Committee

During the weeks of negotiations that followed, the Intelligence Committee 

number of changes in S. 1718 to address concerns raised by the Armed Services 
43

about protecting the equities of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chief

withstanding that the objective of the reform provisions in S. 1718 was to im

ity of intelligence provided to all consumers, including the Department o

Armed Services Committee did not want any changes that might dimini

authority of the Secretary of Defense, who now controls about 85 percent of t

community budget. The Intelligence Committee is concerned that the curren

under which the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for ensurin

intelligence needs are met effectively and efficiently while having direct auth

the CIA—which represents only a small portion of the intelligence budget—h

lems like those reflected in the recent revelation that several billion dollars 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in funds were never expended and were carrie

after year.

As the current DCI John Deutch, who was formerly Deputy Secretary o

tified on April 24, ‘[t]he Deputy Secretary of Defense has got a tremendou

covering a much larger range of resources—10 times—managing t

resources...of the whole intelligence community. So to say that you are goi

deputy—and I am not talking about personalities—and say to the Deput

Defense, why didn’t you catch this, he’s going to say, well, I count on th

track of this and to let the Secretary of Defense know. So in some sense, if w

say that the Director of Central Intelligence does not view himself or he

responsible for the NRO, fundamentally nobody will be.’

The Director of Central Intelligence is in a unique position to balanc

effectiveness of intelligence programs throughout the government. It make

this person responsible for ensuring that the various elements of the intellig

nity are more responsive to this national objective than to parochial, turf-dr

too often typify bureaucracies. Yet he lacks the authority needed to accomp

tive, particularly with regard to the intelligence elements within the D

Defense. The DCI can be given enhanced authority without removing the e

intelligence community from the various agencies in which they reside or in

the ability of those agency heads to manage their departments, i.e., with

‘Department of Intelligence.’ The reform provisions in the Intelligence Aut

for Fiscal Year 1997 were designed to accomplish this goal.

This fundamental difference of opinion over the need to strengthen the a

DCI made reaching consensus with the Armed Services Committee over it

the DoD bill and the provisions in the intelligence bill difficult. However, b

accommodations and ultimately resolved all but a few issues, agreeing to c

bills. On June 6, the Armed Services reported S. 1718 with amendments th

consensus and the two remaining areas of disagreement.

Remaining areas of disagreement

The first area of disagreement was on the national mission of the Nationa

Mapping Agency. The creation of this agency, provided for in the defense a

bills, eliminates the DCI’s independent photographic interpretation center a
44

the Department of Defense authority for processing and disseminating satelli

While the Intelligence Committee supports this consolidation, believing it can 

by the benefits of the synergy it will bring to imagery analysis, it has worked to 

national customers outside of DoD will continue to receive the imagery suppor

Specifically, the Committees disagreed on the appropriate role of the DCI in r

these national customers, including the President and the National Security 

well as the Secretary of State and other Cabinet officials and key decisionmaker

administration’s decision to establish NIMA as an agency within the Dep

Defense, with its budget controlled by the Secretary of Defense, and to desig

combat support agency subject to review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the De

Defense clearly will be able to ensure appropriate consideration of DoD’s ima

both tactical and national. The issue debated by the Committees was whether th

of Defense should be able to effectively block adjustments in the programs and 

NIMA that might be needed to address deficiencies in the imagery agency’s abi

the needs of other national customers such as the Departments of State, Justic

Commerce, and Energy, as well as the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative a

Representative to the United Nations. The Committee was concerned that the p

the Armed Services Committee would allow the Secretary of Defense to effe

changes needed to meet these other national needs.

The second issue that remained unresolved was the ability of the DCI to m

ments in the allocation of funds within the National Foreign Intelligence Prog

during the fiscal year to meet unexpected intelligence needs. Director Deutch, 

all former DCI’s who testified before the Committee, publicly supported thi

authority as important to effective management of the national intelligence c

The DCI has the authority today to make the initial allocations within the NFI

lating the budget. However, when unforeseen requirements arise during the fisc

funds are available from a lower priority intelligence activity, the DCI does n

authority to transfer those funds unless the affected agency head does not obje

contained a provision to enhance the DCI’s authority by shifting the burden to 

agency to convince the President or his designee that the transfer is unwar

Armed Services Committee objected to giving the DCI this authority an

S. 1718 to delete the provision.

With the exception of these two issues, the Committee believes the consen

by the two Committees preserves significant elements of the reform effort 

cantly enhances the ability of the DCI to manage intelligence activities. In a

Committee is more comfortable that, with the changes agreed upon, the DCI w

ability to ensure that a new National Imagery and Mapping Agency will be re

the needs of all national customers.

RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO S. 1745

Defense HUMINT Service

Section 905 of the bill, as reported by the SASC, would have made the S

Defense the sole executive official responsible for oversight of the clandes
45

intelligence activities of the Department of Defense and prohibited the 

Defense from delegating this authority to anyone other than the Deputy 

Defense. The provision would have severely hampered the ability of the D

Defense Intelligence Agency to manage the Defense HUMINT activit

agency today and would have effectively prohibited the consolidation of t

activities of the Defense HUMINT Service into the Directorate of Operatio

under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence. This consolida

recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission, and the Committee had i

vision to effect it in S. 1718.

The two Committees have agreed to the deletion of this provision and th

the SSCI bill that would require consolidation and to require instead that the D

tary of Defense submit a report on efforts to achieve greater cooperation and 

Director of Military Intelligence

Section 906 of the bill would have designated the Director of the DIA a

of Military Intelligence (DMI) and would have created a Military Intel

(MIB) inside the Department of Defense.

This Committee has previously opposed the creation of a single Direc

Intelligence inside the Department of Defense because military intelligence 

appropriately shared among the Director, DIA; the J-2 of the JCS; and the 

retary of Defense for Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligenc

son, the Aspin-Brown Commission also recommended against creation of a 

The Committee also notes that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has 

against legislation creating a DMI and a MIB.

The Committee recommends that Section 906, as reported by SASC, b

the bill.

DCI role in appointment and evaluation of national agency heads

The Committee recommends that a new Section 906 be added to S. 17

amend Section 201 of Title 10, U.S. Code, to require the Secretary of Def

the concurrence of the DCI, or note the non-concurrence of the DCI, when r

to the President an individual to be Director of NSA or NRO. (A separate 

in Title 10, USC, would require the Secretary of Defense to obtain similar c

the DCI with respect to appointment of the Director of NIMA.) This wou

amendment to Section 106 of the National Security Act that would be made 

amended by the Armed Services Committee. Section 201 would also b

require the DCI to provide to the Secretary of Defense an annual performa

of the Directors of NSA, NRO, and NIMA.

Restriction on obligation of DOD funds

Section 1007 of the bill, as reported by the SASC, would have added 

2215 to Title 10, U.S. Code, prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of fund
46

to the Department of Defense for intelligence activities of the Department by a

ual who is not an officer or employee of the Department of Defense.

This provision, the intent of which is unclear, would have far-reaching impl

the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities, the funds for which are largely app

the Department of Defense. The Administration is still studying the full effect 

vision if it were enacted, but it is clear, at minimum, that it would significant

with the obligation and expenditure of funds by the NRO, many of whose o

employees are not DoD employees. The provision would also likely interfere 

fers of funds under the Economy Act.

The Committee recommends that Section 1007 be deleted from the bill.

The National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Title IX, Subtitle B of S. 1745, would consolidate the Defense Mappi

the Central Imagery Office, the National Photographic Interpretation C

the imagery-related functions of a number of other agencies into a singl

Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).

The creation of NIMA would constitute a major reorganization of U

gence activities, and accordingly the Committee has focused considerabl

on the provisions of Subtitle B. The Committee believes that Subtitle B, a

by SASC, must be amended in several key respects.

Most important, the Committee believes that the DCI must have clear 

to set imagery collection requirements and priorities, and to resolve confl

priorities. The DCI has such authority under existing executive orders and 

tial decisions, but, in light of the establishment of NIMA as an agency of t

ment of Defense, the Committee believes the DCI’s authorities should be 

statute. The Committee recommends that these authorities be specified b

10, U.S. Code (together with other provisions establishing NIMA) a

National Security Act of 1947 in Title 50 (which specifies the DCI’s aut

director of the Intelligence Community).

In addition, as noted above, the Committee paid particularly close atten

provisions of Section 921 of Subtitle B that would define the national 

NIMA. As reported by SASC, these provisions would have been include

Section 442(b) of Title 10. The Committee has not recommended chan

wording of the provisions but believes that, like the DCI’s tasking autho

should be included as part of the National Security Act in Title 50, rath

Title 10. In addition, while the Committee has not changed the requireme

DCI and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine whether and what 

action is necessary to address deficiencies in NIMA’s performance of i

mission, the Committee expects that neither the DCI nor the Secretary 

will use the requirement of a joint determination to block corrective act

by the other. The Committee expects that the DCI and the Secretary of D
47

work together cooperatively to ensure that NIMA provides adequate su

DoD customers.

The Committee is also concerned that, as reported by the SASC, S

Subtitle B would have stated that NIMA is established ‘as a combat su

of the Department of Defense.’ The Committee recognizes that the la

nent of the new NIMA is the Defense Mapping Agency, which is curren

in statute (10 U.S.C. 193) as a combat support agency, and that NIMA 

to have significant combat support functions. But unlike the Defe

Agency, NIMA will also have important responsibilities to provide im

military customers. Accordingly, the Committee believes it would be 

establish NIMA ‘as a combat support agency,’ even if other statutory p

cifically state that NIMA also has national missions. The implication 

that NIMA’s primary purpose is to provide combat support.

In this regard, the Committee notes that when Congress enacted S

Title 10, which specified the combat support agencies of the Departme

Congress specifically declined to list the National Security Agency as a 

port agency because NSA serves customers outside the Department of D

gress, nevertheless, subjected NSA to the same JCS review proced

combat support agencies but only with respect to its combat support f

Committee believes that it would be most appropriate to treat NIMA 

not list NIMA as a combat support agency but subject it to JCS review 

to its combat support functions. The Department of Defense and the SA

have insisted that NIMA be listed as a combat support agency. G

Defense Mapping Agency will comprise the largest activity within NIM

mittee is willing to agree to have NIMA listed as a combat support 

U.S.C. 193 for purposes of JCS review of its combat support function

mends that Section 921 be amended so that NIMA is not established sp

combat support agency.’

The Committee also disagrees with provisions in Section 921 of t

relating to the appointment and status of the Director of NIMA. T

package drafted by the Administration to create NIMA provided that 

tor of NIMA could be either a civilian or a military officer; and (2) the 

Defense must obtain the concurrence of the DCI, or note the nonconcu

DCI, when recommending an individual to the President for appointm

tor of NIMA. As proposed by the SASC, new Section 441(b) of Title 1

required that the Director of NIMA be a military officer and that the 

Defense simply consult the DCI before recommending a nominee from 

civilian Director of NIMA (thus implying that NIMA performs exclus

functions) and would have given the DCI only a minor voice in the ap

the head of a critical national intelligence agency. The SASC form

opposed by the DCI and by the Secretary of Defense. Accordingly, th

has amended proposed Section 441(b) to revert to the Administration’s 
48

Finally, pursuant to agreement with the Armed Service Committee, th

tee has deleted proposed Section 445 of Title 10. This section would have 

the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency from condu

inspection, investigation, or audit of NIMA without the written conse

Inspector General.

COMMITTEE ACTION

On June 11, 1996, the Select Committee on Intelligence voted to report S

amendments. Because the provisions considered by the Committee constitu

tively small portion of the entire National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

the Committee did not make a recommendation to the Senate on the overall bil

the Committee supports the provisions related to intelligence as amended.

REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate requ

report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in the report on the bill. Th

tee finds that there is no change in the regulatory impact of S. 1745 as a res

amendments. 

ESTIMATE OF COSTS

The Committee finds no changes in the estimate of costs as a result of these am

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing R

Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portions of the bill hav

shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of the Committee, 

sary to dispense with showing such changes in order to expedite the business 

ate and reduce the expenditure of funds.
49

APPENDIX E-3

104-337, SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFA

COMMITTEE REPORT ON SSCI BILL S 1

104th Congress, 2nd Session Senate Repo

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YE

FOR INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-REL

ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNM

July 29, 1996—Ordered to be printed

Mr. STEVENS, from the Committee on Governmental Affairs, submitted 

REPORT

[To accompany S. 1718]

The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to which was ref

(S. 1718) having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with am

recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

S. 1718, as reported from the Governmental Affairs Committee, wo

appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for intelligence and intelligence-relate

the United States Government, including certain activities within the juri

Governmental Affairs Committee.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported the bill on Apr

was referred to the Senate Committee on Armed Services on May 2, 1996, 

with section 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress. At the request 

Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. 1718 was, on June 6, 1996, referre

mittee for a 30-session day period.

II. SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

The committee requested an opportunity to review those provisions of 

addressed federal government organization. In broad terms this included pro

ate a commission to assess government structure and efficiency relating to n

and a new senior executive service for the intelligence community. The c

noted language in the report accompanying S. 1718 which suggested a la

coordination on joint matters by the various inspectors general (IGs) in those 

prising the intelligence community. After careful review of S. 1718, including 

cussions with the staffs of both the Armed Services and Intelligence Co

Governmental Affairs Committee voted to report the bill favorably, with am

July 25. This is prior to the expiration of the 30 days of session allotted in Sen

400 for consideration upon referral.
50

On June 6, 1996, the Senate Armed Services Committee published its repor

on S. 1718 and suggested several amendments, one of which strike the conce

senior executive service personnel program for the intelligence community. A

the Armed Services Committee report a number of provisions in S. 1718 

authority over DoD intelligence assets from the Secretary of Defense (Sec

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Most of these provisions were amen

Armed Services Committee and eventual compromises negotiated between th

Intelligence Committee.

On June 11, the Intelligence Committee published its report (104-278) on S

Department of Defense Authorization bill, agreeing to the Armed Services 

recommendation to strike the new senior executive service personnel program 

The Governmental Affairs Committee only addressed issues within our j

however, we fully concur in all the changes recommended by the Armed Ser

mittee including its recommendation to strike all language establishing a new s

utive service personnel program for the intelligence community.

III. GLENN AMENDMENT

Senator Glenn’s amendment to S. 1718 (1) provides more specificity as to 

cations of commission members; (2) enumerates how the commission will 

effectiveness of the U.S. cooperation with other countries with respect to nonp

activities; and (3) calls on the commission to address export controls, fundin

tion flow, and the organization of counterproliferation activities of the U.S., a

issues. The committee voted to report the bill with this amendment.

IV. INSPECTORS GENERAL

An earlier draft version of the Intelligence Authorization Bill containe

which would have broadened the role of the CIA’s Inspector General to act, i

an inspector general for the entire intelligence community. That version of the 

have included in the duties of the CIA IG the duty inter alia to ‘(a) identify to t

programs and operations conducted by elements of the intelligence communit

priate subjects for inspections, investigations and audits’; and (b) upon the req

Director, or his designee, arrange for and coordinate the conduct of’ these 

well as ‘(c) establish standards for the staffs and products of the inspectors ge

elements of the intelligence community.’ The Intelligence Committee felt t

need to establish a central point of coordination or accountability for intelligen

nity IG issues. Better arrangements exist for coordinating interagency IG act

empowering one of the concerned IGs to act as the central point of contact for 

matters. The Intelligence Committee, following a discussion with the staff of t

mental Affairs Committee, subsequently agreed to drop this provision from 

however, their committee report still expresses concerns over the IGs’ ability 

or coordinate activities involving intelligence matters.
51

As the committee charged with the oversight of the statutory inspecto

have found no evidence indicating Congress should take the extraordinary s

a ‘community’ inspector general. This would be analogous to empoweri

Department IG to act as coordinator and central point of contact on all IG m

ing the law enforcement ‘community’ which, like the intelligence commun

various organizations spread across more than one department.

This committee has heard from a number of the inspectors general in de

agencies comprising the intelligence community expressing concern over 

raised in the Intelligence Committee report. These are: the suggestion by t

Committee of a lack of effective coordination between intelligence commun

consistent IG coverage of high risk or high dollar intelligence programs, la

management support and attention to the IGs and their products and recomm

inconsistent training and professional standards for IG employees. In additi

gence Committee noted that concerns have been expressed by intelligence o

the IG community regarding the professionalism, experience, and training o

The IGs expressed their view that these concerns were for the most part unfo

In our view adequate mechanisms for coordinating interagency IG act

exist. We reference the August 1994 establishment of the DoD/CIA Intellig

General Forum (the Forum) created to ensure adequate coverage of top

involving interagency functions and programs. In addition, the President

Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE), comprised of representatives from the stat

the responsibility for coordinating interagency IG activities throughout the 

ernment. The Government Affairs Committee has been in dialogue with 

Management and Budget with a view toward formalizing a PCIE mechanis

statutory IG representatives from all those agencies and departments compr

ligence community. We believe this would be the proper venue for coordin

activities involving those intelligence community agencies outside DoD an

The Intelligence Committee report calls for the thirteen intelligence c

(Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Ju

Intelligence Agency, Central Imagery Office, Department of Energy, Depar

Department of the Treasury, the Military Services, National Reconnaissan

National Security Agency) to provide by January 15, 1997, a report to th

describing the reviews involving joint intelligence issues in which they hav

since January 1, 1994. Copies of those reports should also be provided to th

tal Affairs Committee as the oversight committee for the statutory inspecto

V. COMMITTEE ACTION

On July 25, 1996, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held 

S. 1718. Senator Glenn’s amendment was approved by roll call vote of sev

following Senators were recorded as voting aye: Cohen (by proxy), Glenn

(by proxy), Lieberman (by proxy), Akaka (by proxy), and Dorgan. The fo

tors were recorded as voting no: Stevens, Roth (by proxy), Thompson, Coc
52

and Smith. A voice vote then occurred on the motion to report S. 1718, as ame

Glenn Amendment, from the Governmental Affairs Committee.

VI. ESTIMATES OF COSTS

The committee finds no changes in the estimate of costs as a result of these am

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing R

Senate, the changes in existing law made by certain portions of the bill hav

shown in this section of the report because, in the opinion of the committee, 

sary to dispense with showing such changes in order to expedite the business 

ate and reduce the expenditure of funds.

VIII. REGULATORY IMPACT OF LEGISLATION

Paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate re

each report accompanying a bill evaluate ‘the regulatory impact which would 

in carrying out the bill.’ The enactment of this legislation would not have a sign

ulatory impact.
53

APPENDIX F

LETTER TO NEWT GINGRICH
54
55

APPENDIX G

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

 26 April 1996, SASC and SSCI, JMIP and TI

57

APPENDIX H

LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE BRIEFING, 29 MA
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

73

APPENDIX I

NIMA DECISION PROCESS 

6 FEB 96 BRIEFING CHART

75

APPENDIX J

IMAGERY FUNCTIONAL MANAGEMEN

6 FEB BRIEFING CHART

77

APPENDIX K

NIMA—WHAT’S INCLUDED CHART

Source: Status Report on Implementation Planning for NIMA

presented to NRO/IMINT Employmees 10 April 96, Hazlewood Slide Presentation
78
79

81

APPENDIX L

NIMA—WHAT’S EXCLUDED CHART
82
83

APPENDIX M

DoD DIRECTIVE 5105.60

11 OCT 96, ESTABLISHING NIMA
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

103

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basso, Sharon. Director of Communications and Congressional Liaison, NI

Implementation Team. Interview by the author by email, 1 January 2

Battaglia, Charlie. Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Interview by the author, 24 August 2000.

Best, Richard A. Jr. “Intelligence Reorganization in the 104th Congress: Pr

More Corporate Community,” CRS Report for Congress no. 96-681F

DC: CRS, 13 Sep 96.

Birnbaum, Jeffrey and Alan S. Murray. Showdown at Gucci Gulch. NY: 

Books, 1987.

Broadhurst, David. Director, NIMA College. Interview by the author, 27 No

Brown, Harold; Rudman, Warren and Les Aspin. Preparing for the 21st Ce

Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence. Washington, DC: Commission on the 

Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996.

“Creating the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (U): A Studies Roun

Studies in Intelligence, 42, 1 (1998): 39-49.

Davidson, Roger and Walter Oleszek. Congress and Its Members. Washing

Press, 2000.

“DCI Plans a National Imagery Agency,” DIA Communique 7, no. 8 (Aug 

Duncan, Philip D. and Christine Lawrence. Politics in America 1996: the 10

Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995.

Elkins, Dan. An Intelligence Resource Manager’s Guide. Washington, DC

Fialka, John. “Congress Set to Approve Big Review of Costly U.S. Intellig

Community,” Wall Street Journal, 26 Sep 1994, 6.

Gates, Robert. From the Shadows. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

___________. “Statement on Change in the IC. U.S. Congress, Joint Commi

1 April 1992.” American Intelligence Journal (Winter/Spring 1992): 

Hazlewood, Leo. Deputy Director, NIMA Implementation Team. Interview 

6 October 2000.

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. R

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Ag

Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001. URL: <http://www.nimacommission.

Accessed 21 Jan 01.

Johnson, Loch. A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation. 

University of Kentucky Press, 1985.

Kerrey, Senator Robert (D-NE). Congressional Record (26 June 1996), vol

King, David. Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdictio

University of Chicago Press, 1997.
104

Lowenthal, Mark. Staff Director, House Permanent Senate Committee on Inte

1996. Interview with author, 24 August 2000.

Memorandum of Agreement, 26 April 1996, between the SASC and SSCI, Rela

JMIP and TIARA.

“NIMA Decision Brief,” October 1995 Joint Chiefs of Staff “Tank” Presentat

Obloy, Edward. General Counsel, NIMA Implementation Team. Interview by 

4 October 2000.

Oleszek, Walter. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. Washingto

Press, 1989.

Pincus, Walter. “Intelligence Battleground: Reform Bill.” Washington Post, 

1996, A29. 

Redman, Eric. Dance of Legislation. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1973.

Smist, Frank J. Jr. Congress Oversees the U.S. Intelligence Community: 1947–

Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1994.

Snider, L. Britt. Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers. Washington, DC: Center fo

of Intelligence, 1997.

A source, HPSCI Professional Staffer in 2000, who wishes to remain anonym

Interview by the author, 5 May 2000.

A source, SASC Professional Staffer in 1996, who wishes to remain anonymous

by the author, 26 Sep 2000.

A source, SSCI Professional Staffer in 1996, who wishes to remain anonymous

by the author, 14 July 2000.

U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Senate Committee on Intelligence. IC-21: Inte

Community in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Government Printing O

U.S. Congress, House, Rules of the 106th Congress. Washington, DC: Govern

Printing Office, 1998.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Resolution 400, 94th Congress, 2d Session. Washingto

Government Printing Office, 1976.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Report 104-277, 104th Co

Session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996. 

U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Confirmation Hearin

Deutch, 94th Congress, 2nd sess., 26 April 1995.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Intelligence Committee, Report 104-278, 104th 

2d Session. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996.

Waller, Douglas. “Undesignated Director.” Time, 20 March 1995, 37.

Wise, David. “I Spy a Makeover,” Washington Post, 30 May 1996, A 29.
105

For further information about Congress and its members, or to access t

legislation referenced in this case study, the following websites are highly r

<www.access.gpo.gov> (Government Printing Office)

<www.nara.gov> (National Archives)

<www.house.gov> (House of Representatives)

<www.senate.gov> (Senate)

<clerkweb.house.gov> (Clerk’s Office, House of Representatives)

<thomas.loc.gov> (Library of Congress)

<intelligence.senate.gov> (SSCI site, the HPSCI does not currently have 

107

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

In her U.S. Air Force career, Dr. Anne Daugherty Miles served as Mil

to the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces and later as Assistant Chie

Executive Officer to the Commander of First Air Force. She was select

Force Academy to teach political science, and under the sponsorship of 

attended Georgetown University, where she earned a master’s degree in A

ernment. She taught a wide variety of courses in government at the acad

sponsored for doctoral work in political science, again at Georgetown. S

faculty of the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1995, where she tau

Intelligence and the National Security Policy Process, Congressional Over

Intelligence, and Intelligence Research and Analytic Methods. In 1997

opportunity to serve as a congressional fellow for several months in the of

sentative Tom Davis (R-VA). Lt Col Miles received the JMIC’s Beland Aw

lence in Teaching in 1999. She retired from the U.S. Air Force in 2000. As 

continues to teach courses as an adjunct professor at the JMIC, as well as 

ington, DC-area institutions.

109

Joint Military Intelligence College

Occasional Papers

Unclassified papers are available through <www.ntis.gov>; selected pa

able through U.S. Government Printing Office <www.gpo.gov>.

1. Classified paper.

2. Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure, Capt (U

S. Brei, 1996.

3. An Office Manager’s Guide to Intelligence Readiness, Russell G. Swe

4. Classified paper.

5. A Flourishing Craft: Teaching Intelligence Studies, Papers Prepared f

1999 JMIC Conference on Teaching Intelligence Studies at Colleges and Uni

6. Intelligence Essentials for Everyone, Lisa Krizan, 1999.

7. Intelligence Analysis in Theater Joint Intelligence Centers: An Experi

ing Structured Methods, MSgt (USAF), Robert D. Folker, Jr., 2000.

8. Dangerous Assumption: Preparing the U.S. Intelligence Warning S

New Millennium, Jan Goldman, 2000.

9. The Creation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency: Cong

Overseer, Anne Daugherty Miles, 2001.
Occasional Paper Number Nine

JOINT MILITARY

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LLIGENCE COLLEGE

1

9

6

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA