Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer: 

US Policy Options for North Korean 

Nuclear Weapons 

Daniel J. Orcutt 

INSS Occasional Paper 56 

August 2004 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The 

paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 

Daniel J. Orcutt, Major, US Air Force, is a White House Fellow for 

2004-2005. He is a distinguished graduate of the US Naval Academy, 

where he also completed exchange programs in Spain and at the US 

Air Force Academy. He was commissioned into the Air Force, and has 

flown both the KC-10 and F-15E aircraft. He was selected as the Air 

Combat Command Daedalian Exceptional Pilot of the Year for 2000. 

He served at the Korean Air Operations Center in its strategy division 

during the increase in tension addressed in this paper. He recently 

completed a Master of Arts in Security Studies (Defense DecisionMaking and Planning) at the Naval Postgraduate School where he 

completed this thesis.

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

 The Epicenter of Northeast Asia 4 

 Assumptions 6 

 Measures of Policy Comparison 9 

 Spectrum of Interest and Policy 11 

 Roadmap 13 

The Carrot 14 

 Background 15 

 Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 23 

 Impact on Neighbors 29 

 Costs 32 

 Precedent 34 

 Summary 35 

The Stick 35 

 Coercive Theory Review 36 

 Background to Current Situation 40 

 Theory to Policy: Filling in the Blanks 45 

 Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 47 

 Impact on Neighbors 48 

 Costs 52 

 Precedent 54 

 Summary 54 

The Sledgehammer 55 

 Background 56 

 Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 63 

 Impact on Neighbors 63 

 Costs 66 

 Precedent 70 

 Summary 70 

Conclusion 71 

 Summary of Findings 71 

 Policy Recommendations 73 

Notes 79 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fifty-sixth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). In this paper Dan Orcutt, a bright 

young military officer with a keen analytical mind, examines 

perhaps the most difficult, often intractable proliferation challenge 

facing the United States and key Northeast Asia regional allies 

today: the North Korea nuclear challenge. The strengths of his 

analysis are the use of a fairly comprehensive, structure, and 

systematic framework that measures policy options against several 

of the most important criteria for both diplomacy and broader arms 

control and counterproliferation efforts. The end result, regardless 

of your agreement or disagreement with the paper’s conclusions, is 

a paper that provides a solid foundation for planning for a range of 

actions and outcomes: military support to coercive diplomacy, 

contingency planning, arms control compliance monitoring and 

verification, or weapons search and program elimination. We 

therefore commend the paper for its methodology, its analysis, and 

its operational utility. It also stands as testament to the quality 

product of the recently implemented USAF Intermediate 

Development Education program where select officers attend 

programs such as the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) for their 

intermediate professional military education experience. INSS is 

proud to partner with NPS in supporting this developmental 

experience. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division of the Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, 

Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP), and the Dean of 

the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors include the Secretary 

of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); the Air Force Information 

Warfare Center (AFIWC); the Army Environmental Policy Institute 

(AEPI); the United States Northern Command/North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORTHCOM/NORAD); and the 

United States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center 

(CTC). The research leading to this paper was sponsored by the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency. The mission of the Institute is 

“to promote national security research for the Department of 

Defense within the military academic community, to foster the 
viii

development of strategic perspective within the United States 

Armed Forces, and to support national security discourse through 

outreach and education.” Its research focuses on the areas of 

greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: arms control and 

strategic security; counterproliferation and force protection; 

homeland defense, military assistance to civil authorities, and 

combating terrorism; air and space issues and planning; information 

operations and warfare; and regional and emerging national security 

issues. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners 

with education and research organizations across and beyond the 

military academic community to bring broad focus to issues of 

national security interest. And it hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. In these ways, INSS 

facilitates valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our 

sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our 

research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has shaken the 

foundations of US policy in Northeast Asia. Because of North 

Korea’s record of state-sponsored terrorism, illicit activities, human 

rights violations, arms sales, and fiery rhetoric, its development of 

operational nuclear weapons is deeply disturbing. Although most 

agree that North Korea should not possess nuclear weapons, nobody 

has a simple solution. This thesis evaluates three US policy options 

for the North Korean nuclear crisis: incentive-based diplomacy, 

coercive diplomacy, or military force. It analyzes them according 

to four criteria: the impact on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the 

impact on its neighbors (China, Japan, and South Korea), US policy 

costs, and the precedent for future proliferation. This thesis shows 

that diplomacy will fail to achieve US objectives for three reasons. 

First, neither the United States nor North Korea trust one another 

following decades of aggression and the demise of the 1994 Agreed 

Framework. Second, Kim Jong-il will not permit the extensive 

inspections that the United States demands to increase transparency. 

Third, multilateral coercive diplomacy is difficult, time-consuming, 

and not supported by Washington’s regional partners. Ultimately, 

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s question must be 

answered: “What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm 

North Korean nuclear weapons?” If Washington is not willing to 

follow through with the threat of military force, it should not risk 

coercive diplomacy. Likewise, US leaders may need to decide 

between maintaining the US-ROK alliance and eliminating North 

Korean nuclear weapons. 
CARROT, STICK, OR SLEDGEHAMMER: US POLICY 

OPTIONS FOR NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

INTRODUCTION 

North Korea has been a vexing US foreign policy problem 

since 1950. Pyongyang has sought to develop a nuclear capability 

for over forty years and in September 2003 declared its possession 

of nuclear weapons.1

 The current crisis can trace its roots to five 

distinct events: President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” comment in his 

2002 State of the Union address, the new US National Security 

Strategy, the US global war on terrorism, the demise of the Agreed 

Framework, and North Korea’s revelation of its possession of 

nuclear weapons. In February 2004, President Bush described the 

situation as follows: 

In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested 

long-range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of 

nuclear weapons, and now threatens to build more. 

Together with our partners in Asia, America is insisting 

that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly 

dismantle its nuclear programs.2

A typical policy debate proceeds with a claim that North 

Korea’s latest game of brinkmanship is just another attempt to gain 

aid for bad behavior, and that there should be no more deals with 

North Korea. Opponents of taking a hard line with North Korea 

highlight US failures to comply with portions of the 1994 Agreed 

Framework and to the unimaginable devastation that a second 

Korean war could cause. While most agree on the desire for a 

nuclear free North Korea, no one has a simple solution. 

There are four general policy options available to the United 

States: incentive-based diplomacy, coercive diplomacy, military 

force, or acceptance of a nuclear North Korea. What is the best US 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

2

policy option to achieve our objectives? Diplomacy is the first step 

toward conflict resolution, and its success would eliminate the need 

for more aggressive policies that could lead to war. But is a 

diplomatic solution possible for such a difficult issue, especially 

when neither party appears willing to compromise? In light of 

President Bush’s February remarks, the assumption is that America 

will not accept a nuclear-armed Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea (DPRK). Accordingly, this thesis compares and contrasts the 

remaining three policy options with respect to four evaluation 

criteria and evaluates each policy’s chance for success. 

Incentive based diplomacy, such as security guarantees or 

energy and economic aid in exchange for nuclear disarmament 

without a threat of force, will most likely fail to remove North 

Korean nuclear weapons completely, verifiably, and irreversibly. 

Although relatively inexpensive and enthusiastically supported by 

regional partners, it will fail for three key reasons. First, US 

reluctance to pursue another incentive-only type policy following 

the demise of the 1994 Agreed Framework may remove this policy 

option even prior to opening dialogue. Second, North Korea has 

repeatedly refused to allow high levels of transparency as required 

by any future diplomatic policy options. Finally, North Korea’s 

tough negotiating tactics indicate a reluctance to accept an offer 

without pushing for more concessions, especially absent any threat 

of negative repercussions for non-compliance. 

Next along the spectrum of conflict resolution comes coercive 

diplomacy, such as threatening North Korea with economic 

sanctions or military force unless it surrenders its nuclear weapons 

program by a certain deadline. But coercive diplomacy’s track 

record of success and its prospects for North Korea are bleak. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

3

Similar to an incentive based policy, transparency and its requisite 

verification regime are problematic for North Korea. In addition, 

US coercive diplomacy has a low success rate and is more difficult 

to execute successfully in a multilateral environment.3

 Finally, 

North Korean leaders are able to insulate themselves from the 

desired effects of coercion. Failure is virtually guaranteed unless 

properly targeted carrots are offered. 

A second Korean war could be won by Combined Forces 

Command (CFC) that would provide the highest level of control 

over North Korean nuclear weapons; however, its costs are 

excessive, and US regional partners oppose the use of force to 

resolve the crisis. Seoul and Tokyo are immediately at risk to North 

Korean artillery and ballistic missiles, respectively. The American 

public does not perceive a significantly high enough threat from 

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons to spend billions and 

endure military losses in the tens of thousands.4

 

Delays in disarming North Korea’s nuclear weapons provide its 

leaders time to increase their stockpile. It is time for the six party 

talks to produce tangible results. If not, the United States needs to 

apply just enough stick to convince North Korean leaders that the 

carrots being offered are more palatable than a sledgehammer. 

Presented with the examples of Libya or Iraq, which policy option 

would North Korea prefer? Is this a valid comparison or are the 

strategic situations radically different? Should coercion fail, the 

United States must be ready to follow through on its threat of 

military action to disarm North Korea of its nuclear weapons 

completely. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

4

The Epicenter of Northeast Asia 

The Korean Peninsula is the geopolitical epicenter of Asia. 

Five of the top fourteen economic powers and four of the ten largest 

armies in the world are within 600 miles of each other. Seoul and 

Pyongyang are 111 nautical miles apart, separated by the most 

heavily armed area on the planet.5

 The Korean demilitarized zone 

(DMZ) divides two countries that are not at peace, but rather coexist under a 1953 armistice that has witnessed thousands of 

violations and hundreds of deaths. Like other epicenters, Korea 

rumbles periodically: the 1968 USS Pueblo seizure, the 1994 

nuclear crisis, and the DPRK’s recent declaration that it possesses 

nuclear weapons all sent shockwaves through the region. The 

magnitude of the fault lines linking the United States, China, North 

Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia are enormous and span 

political, cultural, economic, and military categories. Note the 

sizable differences in gross domestic product, economic growth, 

and military force depicted in Table 1. 

US vital interests in the region include 500,000 citizens, 

100,000 troops, and $500 billion in annual trade.6

 Maintaining 

security and stability is paramount to US, Chinese, South Korean, 

and Japanese interests. However, regional stability continues to be 

problematic. 

One example of instability in the region is North Korea’s 

relations with Japan. Japan’s brutal colonization of Korea from 

1910 to 1945 left indelible marks on Korean society. North Korea’s 

extensive methamphetamine trafficking and its acknowledgement 

that it kidnapped Japanese citizens for two decades heightened an 

already troubled relationship. Pyongyang is 700 nautical miles 

from Tokyo—mere minutes of missile flight time. North Korea’s 
Orcutt—Car

5 

Table 1: Selected Comparison of the Six-Party Talk Countries.7

USA 10.1 T 1 3.10% 1,396,200 276.7B 3.20% 288.3 China 5.7 T 2 9.40% 2,200,000 55.9B 4.30% 1.28 Japan 3.2 T 3 6.80% 234,000 39.5 B 1.00% 127.1 DPRK 22 B 99 # 1,173,000 5.2B 11 - 33.9% ^ 22.5 ROK 784 B 14 10.30% 672,000 13.1B 2.80% 47.6 Russia 1.1 T 10 ? 1,010,000 * NA NA 144 M

Mil Expen 

in US $

Mil Spending 

% GDP

2002 

Popula

Total Active 

Country Mil Troops

PPP GDP US $

World 

Rank

Growth Rate 

1960 - 2000

LegendPPP GDP = Purchasing Power Parity Gross Domestic Product? = Unknown : NA = Not available# = Negative Growth 9 years from1990 - 1998, positive since 1999 approx 1% each yr* = Soviet Troop Strength includes Strategic Rocket Forces^ = low of 11% (’03 Janes North Korea country profile) to a high of 33.9% (CIA worldfactbook ’03)
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

6

proximity to Japan provides opportunity, its missiles provide a 

threat, and its public statements display hostile intent. North 

Korea’s threat to turn Tokyo into a “sea of fire” caused Japanese 

Diet Member Mr. Shingo Nishimura to comment: “there is no 

bigger threat than that.”8

 With hundreds of missiles, including No 

Dong missiles with an 800-mile range, North Korea can strike all 

countries in Northeast Asia.9

 In addition, North Korea’s September 

1998 Taepo Dong I test demonstrated over 1,000 mile range along 

with multi-stage missile capability.10 Japan showed considerable 

restraint following the missile test, but Northeast Asia is rumbling 

again following the complete breakdown of the Agreed Framework, 

the new US National Security Policy, and North Korea’s 

withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 

Assumptions 

What are US policy goals and constraints? The United States is 

committed to preventing Kim Jong-il from using, threatening to use, 

or selling nuclear weapons. In accomplishing this objective, US 

policy options are constrained by key regional partners. For 

example, US State Department officials refer to the three “No’s” 

that China and the United States agreed upon with respect to 

common goals for North Korea: no nuclear weapons, no war, no 

collapse. In developing alternative strategies for resolving the 

current crisis, however, strategists should not rule out any policy 

option prior to submission for debate, selection, and approval. In 

addition, if the United States will not accept a nuclear-armed North 

Korea and diplomacy ultimately fails, how should the United States 

proceed? For these reasons, it is essential to consider military force. 

The basis for eliminating accepting North Korean nuclear weapons 

as a policy option are President Bush’s numerous statements 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

7

reflecting his desire to protect the United States from the Axis of 

Evil, his policy preference for action versus inaction, and his 

personal distaste for Kim Jong-il.11 

Policy Goals. US policy objectives for North Korean nuclear 

weapons include complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear 

disarmament.12 At the heart of any solution will be a verification 

mechanism that must meet the requirements of the United States, 

North Korea, and the International Atomic Energy Association 

(IAEA). But, North Korea’s difficulty in accepting even low levels 

of transparency was apparent in its April 2004 handling of the train 

disaster near Ryongchon. With its self-reliance ideology known as 

juche, North Korea has several reasons for remaining isolated. 

When negotiating with North Korea, one must not forget the 

country’s outrageous track record of violating international norms. 

Consider the following short list: 

• 1968 Seizure of USS Pueblo, held the crew of 82 for 11 

months; 

• Three assassination attempts on South Korean Presidents 

(’68, ’74, ’83); 

• November 1987 bombing of KAL flight 858, killing 115 

innocent people; 

• 1976, two US Officers clubbed to death in DMZ tree 

cutting detail; 

• 2001, DPRK sold approximately $580 million worth of 

ballistic missiles to the Middle East alone;13

• Although no evidence of selling WMD, DPRK sold 

ballistic missiles to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and 

Yemen;14

• 2002, DPRK admitted to kidnapping Japanese citizens in 

the 1970’s-1980’s; 

• Since 1976, trafficking narcotics, other criminal activity, 

and passing counterfeit US notes resulted in the 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

8

apprehension of DPRK officials over 50 times in 20 

countries.15

The United States cannot permit a country with North Korea’s 

record of state-sponsored terrorism, human rights violations, and 

arms sales to possess and threaten the use or sale of nuclear 

weapons. 

Why did North Korea toil for four decades to develop nuclear 

weapons? Some strategists argue that in order to formulate precise 

policy, it is necessary to understand North Korea’s motivation for 

building nuclear weapons. Blackmail, black-market, deterrence, or 

detonation is an easy memory aid to describe four potential 

explanations. North Korea may intend to blackmail the United 

States into providing security guarantees, humanitarian aid, or 

energy assistance by threatening to detonate or sell its nuclear 

weapons. North Korea’s foremost policy goal is regime survival. 

Accordingly, the most logical explanation for its pursuit of nuclear 

weapons is to deter what it perceives to be a US desire to overthrow 

its government with military force. The risk of selling or using its 

nuclear weapons is what spurs the United States into action. 

Constraints. In light of blowback from perceived US unilateral 

action in Iraq and the vital interests of regional partners, the United 

States must follow a multilateral approach in its conduct of 

Northeast Asia policy. The United States cannot afford to alienate 

China while attempting to coerce North Korea. From a pragmatic 

standpoint, China’s military and economic strength poses a 

significant obstacle if it disagrees with US policy. In fact, China is 

in a position to help. China’s significant leverage over North Korea 

stems from its coal and oil exports which comprise approximately 

80 percent of North Korea’s energy resources.16 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

9

North Korea’s military forces and ballistic missiles also hold 

major South Korean and Japanese cities at risk. Seoul’s 

metropolitan area of over 19 million is well within range of 

thousands of artillery pieces, and Tokyo’s metropolitan area of 31 

million has been threatened by North Korean rhetoric (e.g., the “sea 

of fire” remark) and military capabilities (e.g. the 1998 Taepo Dong 

I missile test over Japan). South Korea’s partnership with the 

United States has long been viewed as the center of gravity. North 

Korea intends to divide and the United States struggles to maintain 

the Washington–Seoul partnership. The January 1998 inauguration 

of former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung limited the US 

policy options. Kim’s Sunshine Policy encouraged dialogue, 

reconciliation, and confidence building between the two Koreas. 

South Korea’s current president, Roh Moo-hyun, met with President 

Bush in May 2003, and their very limited “agreement on further 

steps” to resolve the nuclear crisis had the roar of a butterfly. 

Finally, although President Bush enjoyed an approval-rating surge 

for firm leadership following the attacks of 11 September 2001, he 

is constrained by 2004 reelection concerns and questions regarding 

pre-war intelligence on Iraq in pursuing a more vigorous policy 

against Pyongyang. 

Measures of Policy Comparison 

To compare and contrast policy options, four selected criteria 

will measure the impact of US policy choices: nuclear weapons, 

neighbors, price, and precedent. 

Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons. Because US 

policy seeks to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible North 

Korean nuclear disarmament, the first and foremost consideration is 

how policy impacts the status of current North Korean nuclear 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

10

weapons and the country’s capability to develop future nuclear 

weapons. This includes not only North Korea’s already 

acknowledged plutonium production, but also its currently 

disavowed highly enriched uranium path to nuclear weapons. The 

first step is full disclosure while freezing production, followed by 

verification, and then ultimately dismantling any current weapons. 

Impact on North Korean Neighbors. Since US policy options 

will be constrained by the proximity to and strength of North 

Korea’s neighbors, it is necessary to analyze the impact of each 

policy on its neighbors: China, Japan, and South Korea. Russia’s 

relatively minimal role and limited ability to leverage North Korea’s 

actions marginalizes its impact on the crisis.17 

Policy Costs. As with any US policy, the President is 

ultimately responsible for explaining the cost of his choices to 

American taxpayers. Costs will not only be measured in treasure, 

but also in the potential loss of life. Lives will be lost most 

obviously in a second Korean War scenario; however, coercive 

diplomacy such as economic sanctions also can lead to civilian 

casualties. One coercive policy implementation problem in North 

Korea is the leadership’s ability and willingness to insulate 

themselves from the effects of sanctions. Finally, risk analysis is a 

paramount consideration in policy selection. North Korea has 

repeatedly threatened a military response to either United Nations’ 

Security Council resolutions or economic sanctions. Furthermore, 

the United States cannot sit idly while North Korea develops 

nuclear weapons due to the high risk of resulting nuclear 

proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 

Precedent. How the world resolves the current North Korean 

nuclear crisis will affect future nuclear proliferation cases. Nuclear 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

11

nonproliferation has been an objective of the United States and the 

United Nations since the development of nuclear weapons. On 5 

March 1970, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) codified 

international support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The 

NPT regime has had numerous successes such as South Africa and 

Ukraine, but it has no answer for non-signatory countries that have 

developed nuclear weapons such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. 

North Korea is what former Secretary of Defense William Perry 

referred to as, “the poster-child of proliferation problems.”18 Forced 

to enter the NPT in December 1985 by the Soviet Union, North 

Korea threatened to withdraw in March 1993. North Korea’s 

second threat to withdraw actually became effective on 10 April 

2003, after it kicked out International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) inspectors, and was the first country to ever deny IAEA 

requests for special inspections.19 

Spectrum of Interest and Policy 

For most situations, there is a spectrum of a country’s interest, 

influence, and policy tools to achieve its objectives. Consider the 

diagram at Figure 1. From this spectrum, coercive diplomacy is the 

most relevant in helping to explain the formulation of US policy 

options for North Korean nuclear weapons. North Korean nuclear 

weapons development is the act that has occurred and President 

Bush has stated America’s interest in reversing this action. 

Although some may perceive that US diplomacy with respect to 

North Korea is inherently coercive due to the 37,000 US troops in 

South Korea, these forces are in place to help deter a North Korea 

attack and should deterrence fail, to defeat North Korean 

aggression. Beyond its deterrence mission, the United States may 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

12 

Figure 1: Spectrum of Interests and Policy Tools 

No InterestDo Nothing

VD

Reassure Influence Request An Act

Occurs

Persuade Deter Demand Convince CoerceMilitary Force

Mild Interest High Interest

CARROT STICK 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

13

soon threaten or actually use military force as part of a coercive 

diplomatic policy to resolve the nuclear crisis. 

Roadmap 

This introduction explains why security in Northeast Asia is 

paramount to US interests, what assumptions were made, and why 

the author selected four specific criteria for evaluation. The core of 

this thesis is the analysis of three policy options when compared to 

four evaluation criteria and each policy’s chance for success. The 

analysis of each policy option forms its own section, with each 

organized in the same fashion: an overview, analysis of the policy 

on each of the four criteria, and a summary. 

The first section analyzes an incentive-based policy, referred to 

as “the carrot.” It also reviews the 1994 nuclear crisis and the 

implications for future incentive-based policies. Due to the demise 

of the Agreed Framework, North Korea’s previous difficulty in 

agreeing to inspection formats, and its negotiating tactic of 

maximum gain for minimum concessions, it is unlikely that 

incentives alone will buy North Korean nuclear disarmament. 

The next section analyzes a coercive diplomatic solution known 

as “the stick.” It also reviews US policy development during the 

1994 nuclear crisis and the debate over Kim Jong-il’s rationality. 

Although capable of analyzing the costs and benefits of various 

options, Kim Jong-il remains reluctant to permit transparency into 

North Korea and has the ability to isolate himself and his support 

base from economic strangulation. When combined with the low 

success rate and difficulty of conducting multilateral coercive 

diplomacy, the prospects for coercion are slim. 

The third section reviews the advantages and disadvantages of 

using military force to rid North Korea of nuclear weapons and the 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

14

prospects for this policy option. Regardless of who wins the debate 

on how widespread damage to Korea’s infrastructure or how high 

the loss of life will be, a second Korean war is not currently 

diplomatically or politically feasible. Ironically, although it has the 

greatest ability to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons, it has the 

least regional support. 

The thesis concludes with a summary of findings and policy 

recommendations. For a variety of reasons, neither incentive-based 

nor coercive diplomacy will cause North Korea to surrender its 

nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, military force is currently 

untenable. The best option is to convince North Korea that the 

Libyan model is better than the Iraqi model, in that it offers 

Pyongyang otherwise impossible security guarantees, regime 

survival, and improved economic and diplomatic conditions. 

THE CARROT 

This chapter evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of an 

incentive-based US policy for meeting the North Korean nuclear 

challenge and evaluates its chance for success. Although an 

incentive-based policy is both relatively inexpensive and favored by 

key regional partners, such as South Korea and China, it is unlikely 

to succeed. The United States government fundamentally mistrusts 

North Korea. Consider the high level of mistrust evident in 

Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s remark: 

We tried the bilateral approach 10 years ago, by negotiating 

the Agreed Framework...and we found the North could not 

be trusted. This time, a new and more comprehensive 

approach is required.20 

A potential US incentive-based policy could promise not to 

attack the DPRK in addition to providing energy and food aid in 

exchange for verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, the 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

15

resolution of the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis resulted from 

this incentive-type approach, and Secretary Kelly’s comment is an 

indicator of one of three reasons that this type of policy approach is 

likely to fail. First, the current US administration appears reluctant 

to give North Korea a second chance after feeling burned by the 

DPRK’s secret pursuit of the highly enriched uranium path to 

nuclear weapons while under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Second, 

North Korea has repeatedly balked at various inspection regimes. 

The DPRK failed to agree to an inspection protocol under the Joint 

Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), refused to allow IAEA 

special inspections, and is opposed to increased levels of 

transparency. Finally, experts believe that without some real threat, 

North Korea will not voluntarily concede anything. Former Special 

Assistant to the President Daniel Poneman passed on given advice. 

One of the first things told me by somebody older and 

wiser than I about dealing with North Korea back in the 

early 1990s was that North Korea does not respond to 

pressure, but without pressure they do not respond.21

This manifests itself in North Korea’s hard-line negotiating 

tactics, which consistently push for maximizing gains while 

minimizing concessions. This negotiating strategy is not unique to 

North Korea, but the DPRK’s willingness to accept high levels of 

risk by using brinkmanship demonstrates a uniquely hard-line 

approach to international relations. 

Background 

The Agreed Framework. In June 1994, tensions escalated to 

what former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called the biggest 

nuclear crisis since the Cuban Missile Crisis. That same month, 

while President Clinton met with National Security Council 

principals to receive military strike briefings and while General 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

16

Luck was making emergency evacuation plans for 80,000 

noncombatants from South Korea, former President Carter called 

the White House with a possible solution.22 Flying to Pyongyang, 

he secured a peaceful resolution not as an official envoy of the 

United States, but as a concerned citizen. The Agreed Framework 

negotiations survived the July 1994 death of the Great Leader, Kimil Sung, and the document was signed on 21 October 1994. 

Alexander George cited the Agreed Framework as an example of 

“conditional reciprocity” to achieve a lesser objective of policy 

modification versus regime behavioral modification.23 In other 

words, the United States attempted to change DPRK nuclear 

policies by offering incentives that could meet the country’s energy 

needs. Among several stipulations, North Korea agreed to comply 

with nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) required safeguards and 

to allow IAEA inspectors to visit Yongbyon’s nuclear facilities. 

Those who argue against providing North Korea incentives to 

halt its nuclear ambitions claim that the 1994 Agreed Framework 

failed. North Korea promised to freeze its plutonium production at 

Yongbyon and Taechon in exchange for two light-water nuclear 

reactors and 500,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) per year until 

the first reactor was operational.24 Not only did North Korea 

recently declare the Agreed Framework null and void, but also 

withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and expelled 

IAEA inspectors. However, there are two sides to every story. The 

execution phase of the Agreed Framework proved much more 

difficult than the drafting phase. Both the United States and North 

Korea created obstacles to the timely completion of key tasks. The 

United States overestimated potential contributions from member 

countries (Japan and South Korea) of the newly created consortium, 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

17

the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 

and underestimated the costs of procurement.25 The book by the 

Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Solving the 

North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, summarized US excuses for delays 

of HFO shipments as follows: 

The United States first overestimated the potential 

contributions to be received from member countries and 

then underestimated the costs of procurement and delivery, 

thereby underestimating the amount needed from 

Congress.... Thus, deliveries of HFO have often slipped to 

the point that the United States was technically in violation 

of the Agreed Framework.26

US State Department officials counter North Korea’s 

accusations by explaining that during low-level detailed 

negotiations, North Korea repeatedly asked for more than what the 

Agreed Framework provided, and these numerous demands 

significantly delayed the delivery of goods. Examples ranged from 

intentionally delaying South Korean construction workers’ visas to 

seeking comparable pay and housing standards for North Korean 

construction workers.27 If the DPRK did not possess nuclear 

weapons in 1994 and it does now, did the diplomatic solution of 

nine years ago fail? Several experts claim that the Agreed 

Framework verifiably froze plutonium weapons production 

capability and thus bought the United States time. Experts argue 

that the United States accepted the risk of North Korea cheating 

under the Agreed Framework in exchange for slowing the pace of 

weapons development. It has also been argued that acceptance of 

this solution was influenced by the administration’s prevailing 

belief that North Korea’s communist dictatorship would suffer 

economic collapse. David Albright, President of ISIS, stated the 

following: 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

18

The Agreed Framework does not solve the basic 

verification problem. When it was signed in 1994, the 

United States said that inspections would start in five years. 

Those five years have come and gone, and it may still be 

another four years before inspections start. For these 

reasons, we remain concerned about the lack of 

transparency of the North Korean nuclear program.28 

The Agreed Framework was the best of only bad options 

available at the time. Moreover, although, it secured a tactical 

victory (freeze plutonium production) with legalistic compliance, it 

was a strategic failure since North Korea’s pursuit of highly 

enriched uranium violated the “spirit and intent” of the agreement’s 

premise: preventing a nuclear-armed North Korea by offering 

energy alternatives. 

North Korean Negotiating Tactics. Dr. Yong-Sup Han’s 

research of North Korean negotiating tactics yielded several 

findings.29 First, North Korea employed different tactics with South 

Korea than it did with the United States. Second, North Korea used 

brinkmanship (creating a crisis) to bring the United States to the 

negotiating table. Third, once at the table, North Korea sought to 

expand the negotiation’s scope to include other items such as 

normalizing relations with the United States. As Dr. Han noted, 

“North Korea again pursued a strategy of maximizing gains while 

minimizing concessions.”30 He explained that North Korea 

subdivided issues to exploit every possible piece of the negotiations 

to achieve maximum gains from the United States. Unique to 

negotiations with the United States, North Korea feigned an internal 

struggle between diplomats and hard-line military leaders to explain 

the reason for not pushing North Korean diplomats too hard for 

concessions as their removal from any negotiations was possible. 

Finally, his article concluded with policy implications that urged a 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

19

balanced “carrot and stick” approach to North Korea. He argued 

that in order to correct North Korea’s misperception that 

brinkmanship will benefit its position, “the United States needs to 

design more effective and varied sticks.”31

More of the Same? Contentious comparisons are often made 

between the 1994 crisis and the current crisis. Is the current crisis 

similar to the 1994 crisis? The answer is not simply yes or no, but 

rather a little yes mixed with mostly no. There are tremendous 

differences in leadership, economic situations, North Korean 

nuclear weapons status, and regional influences. The US global war 

on terrorism is an additional factor that separates the two situations. 

The leaders of every country involved in the six-party talks 

were new to nuclear negotiations, and most were relatively new 

leaders of their respective countries. Negotiations over the Agreed 

Framework survived the July 1994 death of “the Great Leader,” 

Kim il-Sung, and after a few years, his son, Kim Jong-il, 

consolidated his powerbase and became known as “the Dear 

Leader.” Hu Jintao was elected president of China on 15 March 

2003, only one month prior to Beijing hosting three-party talks and 

six months prior to hosting the six-party talks. There have been six 

Japanese Prime Ministers since the 1994 nuclear crisis. The current 

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi enjoyed widespread support 

when he took office in 2001, but now faces criticism for a sluggish 

economy. US President George Bush took office in January of 

2001 and soon faced the challenges created by the attacks on 11 

September 2001. South Korean President Roh took office on 25 

February 2003 with gifts from North Korea that included two antiship missile firings, an airspace violation, and the announcement 

that the DPRK had restarted its 5MW reactor!32 Furthermore, he 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

20

was recently distracted by a presidential impeachment process; a 

case that was ultimately dismissed by South Korean courts. 

The economic situation in Asia is different following the 

economic crisis of 1997-98. North Korea’s failing economy was 

predicted to collapse shortly after the floods of the 1990s and was 

reported to be a consideration for the choice of a diplomatic solution 

based upon the belief that the country would collapse internally 

prior to developing nuclear weapons. The impact of economic trade 

in the region can hardly be understated. North Korea has a 

desperate need for hard currency, food, and energy. Japan has 

publicly tied any future North Korean assistance to nuclear 

concessions and resolution of the abductees issue, while other 

countries such as China have continued to trade with North Korea 

due to potential economic gains and possibly to stave off the chaos 

of a North Korean collapse. 

North Korea most likely did not possess nuclear weapons 

deliverable by missile in 1994. Recently, unclassified Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports and Congressional testimony 

claim that North Korea most likely already possesses one or two 

nuclear weapons.33 In addition, it is no longer possible to confirm 

the status of some of the 8,000 spent fuel rods previously under 

IAEA monitoring. Using these fuel rods, North Korea may be able 

to produce several more nuclear weapons quickly. Beyond the 

plutonium path, North Korea’s pursuit of highly enriched uranium, 

and its now publicly revealed ties to Pakistan nuclear technology 

via A.Q. Khan’s international nuclear black-market, increase the 

urgency of finding an acceptable solution. 

The influence of regional powers also has changed. The 

collapse of the Soviet Union ended its ability to support North 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

21

Korea economically. Some argue that Russia is seeking to improve 

relations with North Korea due to economic gains from increased 

arms-sale markets. China has shown a greater interest in resolving 

the tension peacefully as demonstrated by its decision to host the 

six-party talks in Beijing. In the past, US requests for China’s 

support and involvement in resolving the conflict were coolly 

received. Kim Jong-il’s hushed visit to Beijing followed shortly 

after Vice President Cheney’s April 2004 visit to China. Leaked 

only to South Korean journalists, there were reports that Beijing 

was relating to North Korea an increased sense of urgency to 

resolve the nuclear issue.34 North Korea’s 1998 missile test over 

Japan frightened the country into launching two reconnaissance 

satellites, and for the first time publicly, Diet members discussed 

increased security to include possible nuclear weapons. Two men 

defused the 1994 crisis: former US President Carter and Kim ilSung. In contrast, the current multilateral diplomatic path 

significantly complicates negotiations. 

Although controversial, US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 

sent a clear message to Kim Jong-il. In fact, the message was so 

clear the dictator went into hiding for approximately 48 days around 

the start of US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom.35 Experts have 

proposed that North Korea learned two important lessons from US 

policy toward Iraq. First, North Korea may have determined after 

the first Gulf War that allowing United Nations inspections simply 

permits the collection of evidence that will lead to further military 

intervention. Second, North Korea may believe that chemical 

weapons will not deter US military action; only nuclear weapons 

will effectively stop US military action in the Korean peninsula. 

There are several possible motivations for North Korea’s pursuit of 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

22

nuclear weapons—prestige, blackmail, or military use—but a 

leading theory is to deter a US invasion. The irony lies in the fact 

that North Korean nuclear weapons development may be the 

tripwire that causes what North Korea hopes to avoid. Although 

there are numerous differences, issues such as mistrust, 

incompatible policy objectives, and fear of North Korean collapse 

remain in the current crisis. 

Critics of the 1994 Agreed Framework point to North Korea’s 

pursuit of highly enriched uranium based weapons. Supporters of 

the policy argue that it “bought the United States time” by delaying 

North Korean plutonium production capabilities. During an August 

2003 lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, former CIA Director 

James Woolsey clearly articulated his position by stating, “any 

agreement with North Korea is worse than worthless.”36 This 

attitude appears common enough among diplomats in Washington 

to create intense policy debate, but it remains in the shadows of US 

policy in Iraq. 

US policy objectives for North Korean nuclear weapons include 

verifiable nuclear disarmament and cessation of all efforts to 

procure nuclear weapons. North Korea seeks security guarantees 

from the United States and has previously opposed comprehensive 

inspections for fear of revealing the status of not only their nuclear 

capabilities, but also their conventional and chemical weapons 

status. Even if North Korea is willing to trade away future nuclear 

weapons production capability, it will most likely demand 

additional incentives for weapons surrendered or worse to 

“grandfather” current weapons. Referring to these types of 

demands, President Bush commented, “What this country won’t do 

is be blackmailed.”37 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

23

China and South Korea fear a refugee problem and the negative 

economic effect associated with a North Korean collapse. Although 

economic studies differ on South Korea’s cost for peaceful 

reunification with the North, estimates, measured in the hundreds of 

billions, show a high of $1.7 trillion.38 In addition, China views its 

smaller communist neighbor as a nice security buffer to both US 

forces and South Korea’s market economy. 

Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 

For the United States to understand the impact any diplomatic 

policy will have on North Korean nuclear weapons, it must be able 

to verify compliance by means of an agreed inspection regime. The 

United States also would need to know the actual status of both 

North Korea’s current nuclear weapons and both forms of fissile 

material production (i.e. plutonium and highly enriched uranium.) 

Establishing an agreed upon inspection regime to determine the 

baseline and ensure compliance has proven to be problematic in the 

past. 

North Korea does not view the United Nations as a neutral 

party since it fought the Korean War against United Nations 

Command and remains obligated to its 1953 armistice. Next, 

considering two previously failed inspection attempts—one interKorean under the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), and 

one via a United Nations inspection vehicle, the IAEA—the 

prospect of successfully building an inspection mechanism appears 

bleak. 

The IAEA: Objective Organization or US Coercion Tool? 

Created in 1957 as the “Atoms for Peace” Agency, the IAEA is, “an 

independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based 

organization, in the United Nations, that serves as the global focal 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

24

point for nuclear cooperation.”39 The IAEA has 137 member states, 

an annual budget of approximately $268 million, and is 

headquartered in Vienna, Austria. The 35-member Board of 

Governors and the General Conference determine IAEA policies 

with reports submitted to both the UN Security Council and General 

Assembly.40 

The IAEA interacted with North Korea prior to the DPRK’s 

joining the NPT on 12 December 1985. On 20 July 1977, the IAEA 

and North Korea completed an agreement on safety measures for 

the IRT research reactor supplied to North Korea by the Soviet 

Union in the 1960s.41 The IAEA underwent significant changes 

following lessons learned from Iraqi inspections and the increased 

sharing of classified information to focus agency inspections on 

suspect sites. The United States and other countries deemed it 

prudent to share classified information with the agency and the 

world to establish the necessary global interest, support, and 

credibility for nonproliferation initiatives. Although receiving 

classified information from various nations has resulted in improved 

inspections, it came at a cost to the IAEA’s reputation of neutrality. 

By sharing information, the agency risks losing its reputation as an 

impartial inspector of international norms and may be perceived as 

an instrument of US foreign policy. 

Previous Failed Inspection Attempts. 

a. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). On 31 

December 1991, North and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration 

on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Among its 

pledges was the promise to ban the possession and use of nuclear 

weapons, nuclear reprocessing, and uranium enrichment facilities to 

include any testing, manufacturing, production storage, or 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

25

deployment of these types of weapons. These pledges were to be 

verified by establishing the Joint Nuclear Control Commission 

(JNCC), responsible for conducting inspections of, “particular 

subjects chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the two 

sides.”42 The JNCC was established in March of 1992, but after 

optimistic beginnings, it failed when both parties could not agree on 

inspection terms. The JNCC has not met since 1993. According to 

Holly Higgins, an ISIS analyst, the JNCC failed due to a lack of 

experience in bilateral inspection negotiations, a lack of trust, and 

the failure to agree on three elements of an effective inspection 

regime: equal number of inspections, no sanctuaries, and 

“challenge” inspections which could be given with a mere 24 hours 

notice.43 Dr. Yong-Sup Han concurs that North Korea is reluctant 

to permit the level of transparency requested by South Korea and 

the United States. Referring to North Korea’s position on challenge 

inspections, he wrote 

North Korea remained consistent on the issue of the 

inspection regime. North Korea strongly opposed the 

concept of intrusive inspection regime such as the 

challenge inspection requested by the South in the interKorean nuclear talks and the special inspections requested 

by the IAEA. North Korea especially disliked inspections 

of military bases, but it demanded inspections of US bases 

in the South, charging that the United States had stationed 

more than 1,000 nuclear weapons on South Korean soil.44 

The JNCC’s failure occurred nearly simultaneously with tension 

over the US-ROK exercise Team Spirit and the escalating nuclear 

crisis, which culminated in 1994. This was not a stellar start for 

building trust by means of an inspection regime. 

b. IAEA’s Role in the 1994 North Korean Nuclear Crisis.

As a result of the North-South impasse, the DPRK announced its 

intended withdrawal from the NPT and sought direct negotiations 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

26

with the United States. The 1994 Crisis had at its core, two major 

events: North Korea’s failure to resolve discrepancies found by 

IAEA inspections satisfactorily, and the US-ROK Combined 

military exercise Team Spirit. In April 1992, North Korea made its 

initial declaration of plutonium to the IAEA and agreed to host 

inspectors. Although North Korea joined the NPT on 12 December 

1985, it failed to conclude the required safeguard agreements within 

the proscribed 180 days. The DPRK did not miss the deadline by 

weeks or months, but by nearly six years. It finally came into full 

compliance in May of 1992 when it permitted Hans Blix, then 

IAEA Director General, and his team to conduct inspections of the 

Yongbyon nuclear research complex.45 When compared with North 

Korean initial disclosure statements, the results of these inspections 

did not match. The IAEA went through extensive internal debates 

on North Korea’s required level of reporting accuracy and 

repeatedly requested clarification and updates from North Korea. It 

was during these back-and-forth communications that the leaders 

within the IAEA began to agree that things did not add up. Several 

interactions then occurred between the IAEA and North Korea: 

• 11-16 May 1992: IAEA inspection at Yongbyon goes 

well. DPRK releases press statement that essentially states 

IAEA inspectors are welcome anywhere, anytime; 

• Fall 1992: IAEA discovers discrepancies between declared 

plutonium and inspection results; 

• February 1993: IAEA and DPRK are at an impasse over 

discrepancies; 

• February 1993: IAEA first ever request for “special 

inspections” in North Korea; 

• 12 March 1993: DPRK notifies both IAEA and UN 

Security Council of its intention to withdraw from the NPT; 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

27

• 11 May 1993: UN Security Council adopts a resolution 

calling on North Korea to honor its nonproliferation 

obligations and to reconsider.46 

North Korea remains the only country to have ever refused IAEA 

special inspections. Based upon these past experiences, both with 

fellow Koreans and an international organization, the chance for 

future North Korean voluntary cooperation with inspection regimes 

appears slim. 

Future Inspection Regimes: How Much Transparency? 

Verification is the crux of any diplomatic solution. How many and 

what type of inspections to demand is a tightrope balancing act: 

which regime will achieve enough transparency to ensure North 

Korean compliance without demanding so much that it gets nothing. 

David Albright, an expert from ISIS, offered the following insights 

and recommendations. First, the 1994 Agreed Framework did not 

solve the basic verification problem because it gave North Korea 

five years before inspections were to commence. Second, given the 

tense relationship between the IAEA and North Korea, a parallel 

bilateral US-DPRK inspection mechanism should be established 

immediately to provide feedback on compliance and permit faster 

implementation of the Agreed Framework. In addition, in the event 

of another IAEA-DPRK dispute, transparency could continue via 

this bilateral arrangement.47 Third, Albright provided a detailed 

description and recommendation for what standard of accuracy 

North Korea should be held to as compared to other IAEA 

inspections such as South Africa. In short, he argued that North 

Korea should be held to a plutonium reporting accuracy that is 

within 10-20 percent of inspector’s estimates.48 Seongwhun Cheon 

also addressed the inspection issue, detailing the pros and cons of 

five different inspection regimes. Regardless of the inspection 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

28

regime’s format, to achieve greater openness she recommended 

inspectors recognize and promote North Korea’s scientific advances 

due to North Korean cultural emphasis on pride and self-respect.49 

Even accepting a wider range of accurate reporting, North 

Korea will be reluctant to open its doors to inspectors. A 1984 taperecorded conversation with Kim Jong-il smuggled out by a 

kidnapped South Korean actress, reveals his reluctance to open up 

his country to any foreign influence: 

After having experienced about thirty years of socialism, I 

feel we need to expand to the Western world to feed the 

people. The reality is that we are behind the West. 

However, we cannot afford to open up even as the Chinese 

are urging because we have been stuck strategically. 

Opening up the country even for tourism would be 

naturally tantamount to disarmament and could only be 

done after unification.50

Overall Prospects for Increasing Transparency. Absent a 

threat for non-compliance, other than losing whatever incentive the 

United States offers, this policy approach will result in limited 

transparency. Proponents of this policy point out that some 

visibility is better than none—none being the level provided by 

coercion or military force until the policy achieves North Korean 

capitulation. In addition, North Korea has a history of rejecting 

higher levels of inspections that both the United States and the 

IAEA demand to ensure compliance. Since North Korea can 

choose to accept or reject whatever inducements the United States 

offers in return for surrendering its nuclear weapons, it has greater 

leverage to limit inspections. 

Assuming North Korea agrees to special inspections, an 

incentive-based policy runs a relatively high risk of North Korean 

cheating. Even utilizing a quid-pro-quo approach, the chances for 

North Korea to cheat by hiding nuclear weapons or future 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

29

production capability is relatively high as compared to a coercive 

approach or military force. Incremental verification mechanisms 

may prevent another financially costly mistake if North Korea 

violates protocol. It cannot force a high enough level of 

transparency, however, to achieve acceptably low risk. In short, the 

risk of North Korea retaining or selling nuclear weapons or 

technology is higher than the chance for successful compliance. 

Similarly, it is not in anyone’s best interests to dismiss past North 

Korean violations of signed agreements. Although it can be argued 

that North Korea technically adhered to the specifics of the Agreed 

Framework, it clearly violated the spirit and intent of the 1994 

Agreement and the specifics of the 1991 joint North-South 

declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 

Impact on Neighbors 

China. China would like nothing more than for the United 

States to resolve the current crisis quietly by providing North Korea 

the carrot it so desperately seeks, security guarantees. China’s 

threat perception of North Korean nuclear weapons is low; 

however, it fears nuclear proliferation in the region, especially the 

implications of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan going nuclear. In 

addition, China fears that North Korea may provoke a preemptive 

US attack that would trigger massive refugee flows into China and 

result in a unified Korea under ROK control with the US alliance 

intact. This policy approach would be the easiest to sell to North 

Korea and permits China to tout itself as the great mediator that 

peacefully resolved the most pressing security issue in Northeast 

Asia without sacrificing anything significant. The carrot approach 

achieves all three of China’s objectives: no nuclear weapons, no 

war, and no North Korean collapse. It also would have no negative 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

30

impact upon key economic considerations such as trade with South 

Korea and China’s continued supply of coal and oil to meet North 

Korea’s energy needs. 

Japan. In contrast to China, Japan perceives North Korean 

nuclear weapons and its ballistic missiles as a direct, credible threat. 

Even though incentive based policies would also benefit Japan, it is 

not likely to trust North Korean compliance. Extensive drug 

trafficking, admitted kidnappings, threats to turn Tokyo into a sea of 

fire, and lobbing a 3-stage missile over mainland Japan have left a 

lasting negative impression of North Korea on the Japanese psyche. 

Although in the past, there has been little public support to change 

Japan’s “peace constitution,” in April 2003, the Japanese Defense 

Agency (JDA) revised its policy of, “possessing the minimum 

defense capability necessary for an independent country” to, 

“coping with new threats.”51 In response to the 1998 Taepo Dong 

launch, Japan launched two spy satellites in March 2003, in a 

calculated move to be less reliant upon American intelligence 

sources. Other military defense measures include more active 

support of US missile defense, consideration of procuring new 

PAC-3 missile systems to place around critical infrastructure, and 

mounting ship-based missile defense systems on Aegis-class 

destroyers.52 

In addition to considering military posture changes, Japan has 

withheld humanitarian assistance to North Korea during the current 

crisis. They have also begun to consider policy options in the event 

incentive based diplomacy fails. For example, during the 1994 

crisis, Japan estimated that it might be able to reduce some of the 

approximately $600 million per year that flows into North Korea 

from Korean sympathizers living in Japan.53 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

31

South Korea. The popular expression, “The road from 

Washington to Pyongyang must pass through Seoul,” indicates the 

precarious position of the US-ROK alliance.54 Even though North 

Korea’s record of aggression against the South is replete with 

outrageous examples of unconstrained aggression, some current 

ROK leaders do not appear to believe that North Korea will employ 

nuclear weapons against the South. Similar to the Chinese reaction, 

an incentive-based approach conforms nicely with South Korea’s 

Sunshine Policy of engagement through dialogue and exchanges. 

Although difficult for US diplomats to comprehend in light of past 

violence, many South Koreans feel a kinship with North Korea and 

actually view the United States as the key obstacle to peaceful 

reunification of the peninsula and the true target of North Korean 

nuclear weapons.55 

President Roh’s inexperience in national politics and 

international crisis was evident at the outset of his administration. 

Any of Roh’s comments viewed as too supportive of a US hard-line 

approach toward North Korea met angry domestic resistance. 

Eventually, Roh’s administration settled on a policy of not 

tolerating North Korean nuclear weapons, but resolving the 

situation peacefully. He appears unwilling to even consider what 

steps should be taken if diplomacy fails, referring to the situation as 

an issue, not a crisis. This unwillingness to even consider military 

strikes against North Korea negatively impacts the perception of the 

US-ROK alliance, limits the chance for coercive diplomacy success, 

and could cripple potential military operations by denying US 

forces the ability to operate from South Korea. 

China and South Korea favor an incentive-based policy 

approach, are not supportive of coercive options, and explicitly 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

32

object to any discussion of the use of military force.56 Japan, would 

also prefer an incentive-based policy approach, but has similar 

views to most US diplomats that the prospects for success are not 

good. 

Costs 

It is possible, however, to buy North Korean concessions—

sometimes. If the allegations are confirmed in court, the historic 

North-South summit of 2000 may have been financed under the 

table. To summarize an article from the Korea Herald, a South 

Korean probe alleges that Kim Dae Jung’s former culture minister 

Park transferred hundreds of millions of dollars from Hyundai’s 

Asian chairman Chung Mong-hun to North Korea in order to entice 

them to agree to the summit.57 Park was alleged to have secret 

contacts within the North Korean government. Domestically, 

former South Korean Presidents Roh and Kim Dae Jung publicly 

admitted taking illegal payoffs and stated that operating political 

slush funds had been the norm for decades.58

North Korea has a track record of seeking financial or 

humanitarian aid for any concessions. In August 1998, US 

intelligence uncovered a suspected secret North Korean 

underground facility that it wanted to inspect. According to Don 

Oberdorfer’s sources, North Korea initially requested $300 million 

to permit US inspectors access to the site.59 New York Times

correspondent David Sanger published an article on 17 August 1998 

that put the issue on the front page. According to Oberdorfer, after 

six months of negotiations that established a price of 600,000 tons 

of food and a new potato-production program, a 14-member US 

team inspected Kumchang-ni for three days in May 1999. Their 

findings released 25 June 1998, revealed a grid pattern of 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

33

underground tunnels totaling six miles in length, but the facility did 

not contain a nuclear reactor or reprocessing plant. 

In addition to money and food, it is possible to trade North 

Korean concessions for issues they view as critical. For example, 

the cancellation of the joint ROK-US exercise Team Spirit achieved 

major gains in previous negotiations with North Korea. An 

incentive-based policy approach is less costly to all countries than a 

second Korean War both in terms of treasure and of lives. Paying 

for incentives such as energy and food would cost South Korea 

more than they would lose in trade with the North. China should 

not be expected to offer any public incentives for North Korea to 

surrender its nuclear weapons and thus incurs no costs beyond 

participating in the six party talks. US Congressional approval for 

incentive policy costs will be difficult to obtain, but would most 

likely cost less than enforcing rigid economic sanctions via a 

blockade or more flexible sanctions such as the Proliferation 

Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush in December 

2002. 

KEDO. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development 

Organization (KEDO) was established as a financial consortium to 

facilitate financing agreed to under the 1994 Agreed Framework. 

The European Union joined the three original countries, the United 

States, South Korea, and Japan, in 1997. The organization’s charter 

requires consensus and provides each country veto power. KEDO 

began operating in July 1995 and ran aground almost immediately. 

Facing both internal and external challenges, its former executive 

director called managing the organization as difficult as “herding 

cats.”60 One internal source of frustration was the disparity in 

financial support for the Light Water Reactor Construction Project 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

34

in North Korea. A Republican controlled House of Representatives 

accused the Clinton administration of being soft on North Korea 

and refused to pay for any construction costs. Congress 

begrudgingly appropriated approximately $35 million annually to 

pay for HFO shipments.61 In stark contrast, South Korea 

shouldered most of the economic burden, paying approximately $4 

billion and Japan funding $1 billion.62 Tension developed when 

South Korea and Japan pointed out that the United States demanded 

to lead an organization in which it provided less than one percent of 

the funding. 

Risks. Successful implementation of an incentive based policy 

approach has virtually no risk of escalating into military conflict 

and thus no predictable potential loss of life. It does however run a 

high risk of failure. The result of incentive based policy failure is a 

shift in policy that most likely leads to coercion or military force. 

Precedent 

An incentive-only policy approach establishes a horrendous 

precedent for future proliferation cases. The purported view is that 

North Korea is successfully blackmailing the United States into 

paying to stop its behavior, which violated the NPT among other 

protocols. The potential lesson learned for other countries such as 

Syria and Iran could be that rapid development of nuclear weapons 

not only brings the United States to the negotiating table, but also 

opens its treasury. Consider the recent opposite precedent 

established by Libya’s unveiling of its nuclear program in order to 

secure the benefits of cooperating with the United States and avoid 

the costs of getting caught. 

President Bush publicly praised Colonel Ghadafi for 

abandoning Libya’s pursuit of illegal weapons and promised 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

35

improved relations pending completion of promises made. In his 

speech to announce increased nonproliferation policies in February 

2004, President Bush called on other regimes to follow Libya’s 

example.63 Analysis of Libya’s nuclear capitulation may reveal the 

true reasons it quit pursuing nuclear weapons, but one could argue 

that the benefits gained by compliance with international norms 

outweighed the costs of non-compliance. What remains to be seen 

in Libya’s case is what key Libyan leaders believed to be their costbenefit analysis. 

Summary 

Even though an incentive-based policy approach is an easy sell 

to North Korea’s neighbors and is relatively inexpensive, its 

chances for success are slim. In light of joint bitterness following 

the demise of the Agreed Framework, previous failures to agree 

upon an acceptable inspection regime, and North Korea’s tendency 

not to act unless threatened, there is little chance for an incentiveonly based policy to succeed. The United States most likely will 

not offer something valuable enough to entice North Korea to 

surrender the nuclear weapons that it sacrificed so much to produce. 

Even assuming the deal was sweet enough for North Korea to 

accept, it will presumably not accept the high level of transparency 

that US negotiators will demand. 

THE STICK 

This section compares and contrasts the advantages and 

disadvantages of potential coercive diplomatic solutions and their 

chances for success based on information on US plans for coercive 

diplomacy during the 1994 nuclear crisis. Coercive diplomacy 

without incentives that meet North Korea’s dire energy and food 

needs and provide a face-saving exit ramp will fail to achieve the 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

36

US objective of complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear 

disarmament. Transparency problems that emerge during an 

incentive-based policy also exist with a coercive policy. Quite 

simply, North Korea opposes opening its country to external review. 

In addition, the required multilateral approach significantly reduces 

the chances for successful execution of coercive diplomacy. In 

short, the United States will not be able to “herd the cats” toward 

coercing North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. Finally, 

coercive diplomacy would likely only increase the misery suffered 

by North Korean citizens because Kim Jong-il can insulate his 

regime from the effects of economic disaster. 

Coercive Theory Review 

Coercive Diplomacy. George limited his study of coercion to 

what he termed defensive strategies and differentiated them from 

other non-military strategies. He described defensive coercion as, 

“efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action.”64 

Defensive coercion differs from offensive uses of coercion, which 

he referred to as blackmail strategies and defined as, “efforts to 

persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up 

resistance.”65 Since North Korea’s development of nuclear 

weapons violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the 1991 

Joint North South declaration for a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, 

and the 1994 Agreed Framework, it is possible to view coercive 

diplomacy as defensive since the policy goal would be to stop the 

action of nuclear weapons development. A counter argument would 

be that coercive diplomacy at this time would be offensive in nature 

because it seeks to force North Korea to surrender something of 

extreme value, their nuclear weapons. Regardless of the nuances, 

coercive policy application strives to first halt, then reverse North 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

37

Korea’s nuclear weapon’s development, an action that it values 

dearly and that the United States wants it to surrender. 

George also differentiated defensive coercion from four other 

non-military strategies: drawing a line, buying time to explore a 

negotiated settlement, retaliation and reprisals, and engaging in a 

test of capabilities. In drawing a line, one party simply warns their 

opponent that any further action will provoke a strong response. 

The buying time strategy is self-explanatory and can be used if a 

defender is operating from a position of disadvantage or believes 

that their opponent’s dissatisfaction has some merit. George 

described reprisals as carefully measured responses that match, but 

do not exceed, the adversary’s actions.66 Finally, he used the US 

airlift response to the ground-based Russian blockade of Berlin 

following the Second World War as an example of testing 

capabilities as a response to an adversary’s action. 

George preferred not to use Thomas Schelling’s term, 

compellance, because it was often used as an over-arching term to 

describe diplomatic strategies that included offensive and defensive 

coercion and occasionally deterrence.67 Deterrence is strategy to 

prevent an adversary from taking an action and thus different from 

coercion that seeks to stop or reverse an opponent’s action. With 

respect to how lofty an objective coercive diplomacy can hope to 

achieve, George used three levels: stop an action, reverse past 

accomplishments, and cease hostile behavior by forcing 

governmental or regime change. Current Bush administration 

policy seeks a second-level objective, the surrender of nuclear 

weapons, but stops short of the third level, North Korean regime 

change. Obviously, the higher the policy goal, the higher the 

required level of effort. In addition, how dearly an adversary values 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

38

what they have accomplished will increase the level of coercive 

effort and ultimately decrease the probability of success. 

Turning Theory into Policy. George listed two requirements 

for coercive diplomacy to succeed. First, coercion requires a 

credible and potent enough threat to convince an adversary that it 

should acquiesce to their opponent’s demands. Second, coercive 

diplomacy assumes a “rational” opponent. George explained three 

limitations of his abstract model of coercion. First, the model only 

identifies the general logic of coercion and does not include what is 

necessary to convert it into policy. Second, an operationalized 

model is required to give it a predictive capability. Last, it is not a 

stand-alone strategy, and it is essential to incorporate it into a 

broader strategy. George recommended four tasks to design a 

coercive policy recommendation: 

• Fill in the four key variables: a demand, level of urgency, a 

threat, and potential incentives; 

• Identify a preferred variant (level) of coercion: Classic 

Ultimatum, Tacit Ultimatum, Turn the Screw, or Try & 

See; 

• Replace the purely rational actor theory with an empirically 

derived behavioral model; 

• Take into account the contextual variables of the given 

situation. 

The first task consists of four critical decision points. First, 

leaders must decide what to demand of an adversary. Second, 

policy makers must decide if they wish to create a sense of urgency 

for compliance and if so, how. Third, strategists must develop a 

credible and potent threat of punishment commensurate with 

operational capabilities as well as how much they are demanding of 

an adversary. Finally, diplomats must decide whether to offer any 

incentives (carrots) for compliance or the speed of reply. This 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

39

section discusses turning theory into specific policy for North Korea 

Also, both the Perry Report and Richard Armitage’s suggestions on 

dealing with North Korea contain specific policy recommendations. 

Richard Armitage Recommendations and the Perry Report. 

Richard Armitage chaired a working group on US policy toward 

North Korea in the late 1990s, and the group’s findings, initially 

published in March 1999, were reprinted in the 2000 Institute for 

Science and International Study book, Solving the North Korean 

Nuclear Puzzle.68 The group outlined the debate surrounding the 

failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework and its three underlying 

assumptions: the Framework ended North Korea’s nuclear weapons 

development, North Korea was a failed state on the verge of a “hard 

landing,” and that the Agreement would induce North Korea to 

open up to the outside world.69 The well-written policy 

recommendations included a reality check as of 1999, supported the 

conduct of the Perry Report, and called for such things as security 

assurances, food and economic assistance, the possibility of 

sanctions for compliance failure, as well as the six-party talks 

format currently being used. Furthermore, Armitage asked two 

fundamental questions, the first of which has been answered by the 

Bush administration. “What precisely does the United States want 

from North Korea?”70 US policy objectives are the complete, 

verifiable, and irreversible disarmament of North Korean nuclear 

weapons. Second, “what price is the United States prepared to pay 

for it?”71 He also outlined the two dismal options available should 

diplomacy fail: live with and deter a nuclear North Korea or 

preemption.72 

In November 1998, President Clinton tasked Dr. William J. 

Perry to lead a team of experts to conduct a comprehensive US 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

40

policy review toward North Korea. His team worked for eight 

months with an interagency group headed by the Counselor of the 

Department of State, Wendy R. Sherman, and consulted with senior 

officials from several agencies and nations, including the DPRK. 

An unclassified report, released on 12 October 1999, detailed 

numerous findings, policy options, and a policy recommendation. 

At the heart of the report’s “new comprehensive, and integrated 

approach” toward negotiations with North Korea were “complete 

and verifiable assurances that the DPRK does not have a nuclear 

weapons program.”73 The Perry Report did not make more detailed 

recommendations on inspection team composition or locations to 

visit. 

Background to Current Situation 

The second round of six-party talks met in Beijing in late 

February 2004 with little or no tangible success. How long the 

United States and North Korea will continue to dance with their 

Northeast Asian partners remains to be seen, but at some point, it 

can be assumed that the US administration will want to change the 

music by shifting to a more coercive policy approach. During the 

1994 crisis, former Secretary of Defense Perry stated that the policy 

shift from “preventive diplomacy” to “coercive diplomacy,” 

including sanctions, occurred in early June 1994 when the IAEA 

reported that North Korea was defueling its nuclear reactor earlier 

and faster than announced.74 

Then. During the 1994 shift in policy, the United States 

adopted a coercive policy of gradual sanctions that followed 

Alexander George’s steps for turning theory into policy. The 

United States had a plan for filling in the blanks for its demands, 

level of urgency, threat, and potential incentives. The 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

41

administration demanded that North Korea comply with NPT 

safeguards, specifically to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor its 

nuclear facilities. With respect to the level of urgency, the 

administration intended to give North Korea thirty days to comply 

before enforcing the first level of what George would call a “turn 

the screw” type policy. The first-level punishment would ban arms 

sales and nuclear technology transfers. If needed, the second level 

would cut off remittances and vital oil supplies from abroad. The 

third level would blockade shipping to and from North Korean 

ports.75 China, South Korea, and Japan expressed very little interest 

in pursuing even the first level of sanctions. 

Now. The Bush administration is resisting the temptation to 

advance to the next level of diplomatic pressure. The 

administration has avoided open discussion on the prospects of 

coercion such as sanctions for fear of alienating China with its 

Security Council Veto authority. Vice President Cheney’s April 

2004 visit to Beijing reportedly included discussion of the North 

Korean issue, but no published insight into the details of the 

discussion appear. North Korean rhetoric is not as restrained. An 

official North Korean press release countered every aspect of US 

policy objectives for disarmament. 

Complete nuclear dismantling is a plot to overthrow the 

North’s socialist system after stripping it of its nuclear 

deterrent. Verifiable nuclear dismantling reflects a US 

intention to spy on our military capabilities before starting 

a war. Irreversible nuclear dismantling is nothing other 

than a noose to stifle us after eradicating our peaceful 

nuclear-energy industry.76

Domestically, the policy debate surrounding coercive 

diplomacy begins with the issue of rationality, which Alexander 

George originally viewed as a potential non-starter. He later 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

42

relaxed this assumption by stressing the importance of behavioral 

model theory development as a solution to rationality’s 

limitations.77 Determining Kim Jong-il’s rationality and creating an 

accurate behavioral model appears more problematic than funding a 

manned mission to Mars. However, how much fidelity into Kim’s 

thinking does the United States require? Does Kim’s apparent 

irrationality increase his diplomatic strength? 

Kim Jong-il: Rational Actor or Midget Madman? Kim’s 

rationality is relevant because coercive diplomacy assumes that an 

adversary has a process in place to conduct cost benefit analysis 

based on correct, relevant information. Kim Jong-il is a rational 

actor—as far as he is concerned. A short man, standing 5’ 3”, he is 

reported to have said, “I know I’m an object of criticism in the 

world, but if I am being talked about, I must be doing the right 

things.”78 Some experts refer to him as a malignant narcissist 

whose father built over 34,000 monuments to himself.79 For US 

politicians, it is easier to refer to him as a cognac-guzzling, 

womanizer whose paranoia sent him in pursuit of weapons of mass 

destruction. Most likely, his foreign policy decisions fall 

somewhere in between the two extremes of rational actor and 

madman. As a review, “to describe behavior as ‘rational’ is to say 

little more than that the actor attempts to choose a course of action 

that he hopes or expects to further his values.”80 The combination 

of ideas from the scholars on rationality produces five key points. 

• Gather all available information; 

• Understand pertinent cause and effect relationships; 

• Have a process for developing courses of action; 

• Have a method to evaluate chance of success and impact to 

values; 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

43

• Select course of action that provides the greatest utility. 

A rational process, however, does not require leaders to have 

similar values, desired outcomes, or willingness to accept risk. 

Why would a rational leader continue to conduct state-sponsored 

terrorism and other illegal activities that limit foreign investment 

and international relief while millions of his people starve? 81 Due 

to North Korea’s extreme isolation, the world will probably never 

know the truth, but one theory that provides insight in analyzing 

Kim’s behavior is cognitive consistency theory. 

Consistency theory suggests that leaders deviate from 

rationality because of their inability to accept three concepts: 

uncertainty in international affairs is common, preconceptions may 

be wrong, and their preferred options are not always the best.82 

These three misperceptions lead the decision maker to avoid 

inconsistencies, ignore potentially valuable information, and 

attempt to remove doubt from possible outcomes. The result is a 

faulty decision-making process that only evaluates alternatives 

aligned with preconceived notions. 

There are four potential core beliefs that drive DPRK policies. 

First, Kim Jong-il probably believes that the United States intends 

to topple his regime by military force. Second, Kim probably 

believes that possessing nuclear weapons will deter US military 

action. Third, Kim could believe that any external influence or 

information allowed into North Korea is inherently bad. Last, he 

may believe that the best policy for dealing with the United States is 

to threaten or use force to achieve limited objectives, or a fait 

accompli. There is irony in these core beliefs. The preconception 

that possessing nuclear weapons will deter US military action may, 

in fact, motivate the United States into action, also providing the 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

44

regional support it requires. Next, when viewed through Kim’s 

paradigm, he may be correct that external influence or information 

(the “truth” about such things as ROK quality of living) would 

result in public unrest. 

The present situation on the Korean peninsula remains 

dangerous owing to the reckless moves of the US war 

hawks and their followers to unleash a war of aggression 

against the DPRK so that nuclear war may break there 

anytime.83

As crazy as press releases such as the above appear, Alexander 

George cautions people to avoid using the term “irrational.” He 

points out that errors in a decision-making process such as 

oversimplification or arriving at different conclusions based upon 

different values do not make a process or a leader “irrational.” He 

defined irrationality as a person who, “has abandoned realitytesting, is totally lacking in sense, behaves impulsively or 

mindlessly, etc.”84 Former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright 

met with Kim Jong-il in January 2000 and stated that she had 

expected to meet a womanizing madman, but found him to be 

charming and able to speak knowledgably on a wide range of 

subjects without notes.85 In addition, North Korea’s history of 

challenging the United States with “bad behavior” to achieve 

economic benefits indicates a higher tolerance for risk taking than 

the United States, but is not a stand-alone indicator of irrationality. 

It would be a mistake for US officials to assume that DPRK 

leaders are irrational or “totally lacking in sense” just because their 

policies are unethical, risky, or based upon values with which the 

United States disagrees. Consistency theory provides a starting 

point from which US diplomats may form a better behavioral model 

of Kim Jong-il. In addition, applying consistency theory to North 

Korea leads us to expect little change in Kim Jong-il’s foreign 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

45

policy. He may misinterpret or choose to ignore shifts in US policy 

based upon his core beliefs. However, limited transparency of 

DPRK decision-making will continue to frustrate our ability to 

formulate an accurate behavioral model of Kim Jong-il. 

Theory to Policy: Filling in the Blanks 

Assuming an incentive-only strategy fails and the Bush 

administration believes Kim is rational enough to comprehend the 

ramifications of a US coercive policy, the United States will need to 

fill in the four key variables of George’s first task, the first being 

what to demand of North Korea. The current US administration’s 

demand has manifested itself in the press as the acronym CVI; 

complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean nuclear 

disarmament. The administration is delicately handling the second 

variable, level of urgency. No time limit has been given for North 

Korean compliance with US demands while six-party talks 

continue. However, actions such as the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI) indicate a sense of urgency to North Korea and send 

a message to other countries that seek to develop nuclear weapons. 

Third, the United States will have to communicate a credible and 

potent enough threat clearly that matches US operational 

capabilities against the level of change it seeks in North Korea’s 

nuclear program. This presents the most precarious position for the 

US-ROK alliance and all Northeast Asian partners. This step is the 

reason George noted that coercive diplomacy executed by multiple 

countries has a lower chance of success due to the difficulty in 

reaching consensus on implementation measures. The fourth and 

final variable facing US policymakers is determining if after making 

demands and threatening force, they intend to offer any incentives 

to provide North Korea a way out. As George and other political 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

46

experts indicated, the timing of incentives is critical. They should 

only occur after the adversary clearly understands the demands and 

threats. 

To complete the second task, policymakers will need to choose 

between a gradual approach and demanding their ultimate objective. 

A graduated approach could incrementally demand that the DPRK 

acknowledge and halt all forms of nuclear weapons production, 

surrender current weapons, and dismantle the means of production. 

Task three, deriving an empirical behavioral model, is the more 

difficult portion of coercive diplomacy policy recommendations and 

usually the weakest aspect of US strategy. It may be the underlying 

cause of what George’s case studies identified as a low US success 

rate: two successes, three failures, and two ambiguous results.86 

Regardless of past success rates, tasks three and four are very 

complicated when dealing with the world’s last heavily armed 

totalitarian communist country. 

North Korea is a behavioral model conundrum. Led for the 

past 55 years by the world’s only father-son communist 

dictatorship, North Korea is renowned for hostile negotiating tactics 

and fiery public statements. As George highlighted, to build an 

actor-specific behavioral model accurately, it is necessary to 

understand the adversary’s motives, needs, and goals.87 Moreover, 

this understanding is completely reliant on the adversary’s 

perception, not what western diplomats believe to be North Korea’s 

motives, needs, and goals. This allows for a level of fine-tuning 

that George argued differentiates conditional reciprocity from the 

blunter tit-for-tat cold war strategy to elicit cooperative behavior 

between actors in a prisoner’s dilemma.88 Therein lays the problem. 

US intelligence knows very little about the intimate decision-
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

47

making process within North Korea other than the fact that Kim 

Jong-il retains a secure power base with complete control despite 

catastrophic domestic conditions. In addition, North Korea’s senior 

leaders can insulate themselves from potential coercive policy 

effects such as food shortages, demonstrated by their hording of 

humanitarian relief supplies during disastrous floods in the 1990’s. 

The population tolerates governmentally rationed rice based on their 

complete indoctrination into juche, a self-reliant ideology cemented 

by terror. An ever-increasing number of defectors also report the 

existence of harsh political-criminal camps.89 

It is essential the policy, once it takes shape, be evaluated 

within the context of a broader strategy toward North Korea. 

Regarding the Bush administration’s 2001 strategy, Selig Harrison 

commented 

The problem is the Bush administration attitude. What they 

have in mind is the use of multilateral action to pressure 

North Korea with no incentives—just all sticks, no 

carrots.90

Coercion that offers no incentives is not likely to disarm a nuclear 

North Korea based upon its staggering energy and food aid 

requirements, past negotiating tactics, and significant investment in 

nuclear weapons development. 

Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 

Coercion alone is the least likely policy approach to ensure 

compliance for three reasons. First, North Korea will resist an 

inspection regime to increase transparency. Second, North Korean 

leaders are “hyper-insulated” from the hardships suffered by the 

general population. One of Kim Jong-il’s reported methods of 

control is to reward loyalty with gifts while terrorizing unsupportive 

behavior. According to a US State Department human rights report, 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

48

the DPRK has detained without trial between 150,000 to 200,000 

political prisoners in “re-education camps.”91 Simultaneous with 

such internal human rights violations, Kim uses extravagant gifts to 

ensure military and party loyalty. Reportedly, the ultimate gift is a 

Mercedes-Benz with a license plate beginning with “2-16”, in honor 

of Kim’s 16 February 1942 birthday.92 Third, coercion runs a 

relatively high risk of cheating. Consider the following analogy. If 

you press your boot into the neck of an adversary prostrate on the 

ground, are they more likely to acquiesce to your demands or to 

search for sand or a stick to throw in your eye? Thus goes the 

debate surrounding the question whether or not a Security Council 

resolution or economic sanctions increases the probability of North 

Korea surrendering its nuclear weapons or allowing more intrusive 

inspections. It is highly doubtful that absent any incentives, the 

threat of military force will coerce North Korea to surrender what it 

views to be its best deterrent to US aggression, especially having 

invested decades of work and an enormous percentage of very 

limited government funds. 

Impact on Neighbors 

Coercive diplomacy policy application is complicated in a 

multilateral environment, especially in Northeast Asia where Japan, 

South Korea, and China rely on regional stability that permits 

economic trade and growth. Even if all countries agree that North 

Korean nuclear weapons will destabilize the region, none agrees on 

the best approach to resolve the situation. All three countries also 

stand to lose varying amounts of trade with North Korea. 

According to economic data from 2000, over half of all North 

Korean imports come from China (26.7 percent), South Korea (16.2 

percent), and Japan (12.3 percent).93 More recently, even though 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

49

one-half of North Korea’s total trade volume is with China, it is 

only $1.05 billion.94

China. Agreeing on the policy objective of no North Korea 

nuclear weapons, China currently opposes coercive diplomatic 

methods such as economic sanctions to achieve the goal. Internally, 

China continues to focus its efforts on controlling its economic 

growth (2002 GDP growth of 8 percent95) and preserving domestic 

single-party political stability in order to achieve great power status. 

Externally, its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence articulate 

China’s policy: 

• Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 

• Mutual non-aggression; 

• Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 

• Equality and mutual benefit; 

• And peaceful coexistence.96

Regional experts are both excited by and leery of China’s 

increased willingness to assert itself with respect to North Korean 

nuclear weapons as evidenced by hosting the six-party talks. China 

is quietly balancing both sides of the issue by restraining the United 

States and pressuring North Korea. China has repeatedly asked the 

United States to reduce its level of urgency to resolve the issue and 

its insistence that North Korea admit to its highly enriched uranium 

nuclear weapons program. To pressure North Korea to stop 

provoking the United States, China closed its oil pipeline to North 

Korea for three days in late February 2003.97 As the sole provider 

of 80 percent of North Korea’s energy needs along with the 

majority of its foreign aid, China is the key to leveraging North 

Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. As the recipient of the 

preponderance of North Korean refugees, referred to as economic 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

50

migrants, China opposes coercion such as economic sanctions that 

would increase the flow of an already malnourished North Korean 

population. A 2002 Human Rights Watch report estimated the 

number of North Korean refugees living in hiding in China to be 

anywhere from 10,000 to 300,000.98

Japan. Japanese outrage at the 1998 North Korean missile 

launch and North Korea’s admitted kidnapping of Japanese citizens 

is tempered only slightly by its security agreement with the United 

States, its constitutionally based belief on non-aggression as 

manifested by the maritime Self-Defense Force (SDF), and the 

country’s preoccupation with economic issues. Enabled by the 

1997 renegotiated bilateral defense guidelines with the United 

States, Japan’s reactions to the 1998 North Korean missile test have 

been subtle, yet significant. Japan has been very supportive of the 

US global war on terrorism, to include the first overseas deployment 

of Japanese destroyers and support ships.99 Initiatives to increase 

the SDF’s ability to respond included legal authorizations to pursue 

and fire upon vessels in the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and 

an air-refueling capability to enable the right to attack missile sites 

in self-defense.100 

In conjunction with these initiatives, an apparent shift in 

attitudes of some Japanese leaders has led to internal debates on 

policy. Stephen Kim outlined the divide between Japan’s Deputy 

Vice Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka who favors dialogue and 

Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe who commented “there 

is no one in the world who believes you can solve gangster troubles 

through dialogue.”101 

According to T. J. Pempel, an American academic expert on 

Japan, North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens is as high a 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

51

priority to Japanese leaders as the nuclear issue.102 In addition, a 

significant group of DPRK sympathizers exists and resides in Japan, 

believed to contribute between 60 to 120 billion yen per year to 

North Korea.103 The North Korean kidnappings, trafficking of 

methamphetamines, and the 1998 missile test frustrated previous 

Japanese attempts to normalize relations with North Korea and to 

establish economic ties. As a result, although Japan accounts for 

approximately one-half of Northeast Asia economic output, it 

currently only consists of 17-18 percent of North Korea’s trade.104 

Furthermore, North Korea’s trade with Japan is declining, falling 

nearly 30 percent from 2002 to 2003, due to Japan’s crackdown on 

North Korean illicit activities such as drug trafficking and other 

illegal exports.105

Finally, Japan has already tied future North Korean 

humanitarian aid directly to its behavior. Due to a long-standing 

history of conflict between the two countries, its limited economic 

interests in North Korea, and its desire for regional stability, Japan 

would most likely support a US led push for coercive diplomacy. 

South Korea. Determined to be the “Hub of Northeast Asia,” 

South Korea remains focused on democratic and economic reforms 

to continue its rise in stature in the region. The split on how South 

Koreans view North Korea is largely divided along the generation 

gap. Historically, students are the voice of change and constitute 

the vast majority of protestors. This younger generation, referred to 

as the 386’rs (in their 30s, educated in the 1980s, and born in the 

1960s), view a unified Korea as a goal whereas veterans of the 

Korean War, still familiar with its devastation, view it as a threat. 

Accordingly, it is possible to generalize the population’s view of a 

nuclear-armed North Korea as divided with conservatives fearful 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

52

and the opposition party arguing that North Korean nuclear 

weapons are not a significant issue for two key reasons. First, they 

believe North Korea would not use the weapons on fellow 

countrymen. Second, that following reunification, North Korean 

nuclear weapons would simply become Korean nuclear weapons. 

Further, South Korea has made significant economic investments in 

its outreach to North Korea. Therefore, it would shoulder the 

economic brunt of reunification costs and humanitarian relief 

involved with North Korean collapse. For these reasons, South 

Korea would most likely not support coercive diplomacy, but rather 

incentive based diplomacy or accepting a nuclear armed North 

Korea. 

Costs 

Pursuing coercive diplomacy in Northeast Asia requires the 

United States to spend international diplomatic capital, domestic 

political capital, and treasure; none of which it can currently afford. 

Prior to the November 2004 US Presidential election and the 

resolution of the South Korean Presidential impeachment process, 

no significant policy shifts will occur. In light of domestic and 

international blowback from the failure to find Iraqi weapons of 

mass destruction, the perceived unilateral action, and the current 

civil unrest in Iraq, major policy moves in Northeast Asia are 

currently politically impossible. However, North Korea has a track 

record of brinkmanship at vulnerable times such as these. If it 

elects to test a nuclear weapon or conduct another long-range 

missile test, that which was politically impossible could become 

imperative. It is possible to categorize the costs of coercive 

diplomacy into financial, human life, and the risk of the threat of the 

execution of military force. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

53

Financial. Economic sanctions will not adversely affect the 

US economy directly due to long-standing sanctions in place since 

the Korean War. Although the 1994 Agreed Framework slightly 

eased sanctions, suffice it to say North Korea is not a key US 

trading partner. However, if the United States executes some type 

of blockade of North Korea, the required military buildup would 

entail operating expenses and have a chilling effect on world trade 

and financial markets. 

Lives. Although executing economic sanctions against North 

Korea would significantly increase tension in the region, it should 

not have a large toll in military casualties unless the blockade leads 

to war. However, coercion such as economic sanctions would 

increase the suffering of an already beleaguered society. Insulated 

from the masses, Kim maintains a firm policy of isolationism and 

continues to espouse self-reliance while experts estimate that at 

least 2.5 million North Koreans died of starvation in the past 

decade.106 In fact, following disastrous floods in the 1990s, the 

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Doctors Without 

Borders and Action Against Hunger protested the North Korean 

government’s control of their relief efforts and supplies. The 

NGOs’ objections were ignored as emergency relief supplies were 

diverted to the military and other government officials. As a result, 

the NGOs pulled out of North Korea.107 

Risk: Will Sanctions Lead to War? Economic sanctions, 

specifically a naval blockade of North Korea, run a very high risk of 

leading to a second Korean War. North Korean press releases along 

with diplomatic statements have stated as much. Strategists must 

account for the likelihood that if Kim’s regime determines its 

survival is at stake, it will lash out while it still can. South Korea 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

54

and China refer to the risk of war as one of the reasons they do not 

support this policy approach. In fact, during the 1994 nuclear crisis, 

Secretary of Defense Perry asked General Luck to prepare three 

options for force buildup and to estimate the devastation of fullscale war on the peninsula. Although some South Koreans may 

support the “Sunshine Policy” of engagement, others realize that 

one third of South Korea’s 47 million people live in Seoul, less than 

30 miles from the DMZ.108 

Precedent 

If the United States were able to convince its regional partners 

that coercive diplomacy was the best policy approach, it would 

establish a favorable precedent for future nonproliferation cases. In 

a best-case scenario, it would not only resolve the current nuclear 

crisis, but also establish the framework for a regional security 

structure for future “tough cases” unable to be resolved by regional 

organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) or the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In contrast, if an 

agreement is not possible, or coercive diplomacy is applied and 

ultimately fails, it will simply embolden future countries weighing 

the cost-benefit analysis of developing nuclear weapons. 

Summary 

Coercive diplomacy was on the US policy option table during 

the 1994 nuclear crisis, but never tested multilaterally due to the 

bilateral breakthrough that led to the Agreed Framework. Even 

during the discussion phase ten years ago, China and South Korea 

were reluctant to pursue coercive policy development seriously. 

Assuming the successful herding of regional partners toward an 

agreed upon policy, North Korean leaders are immune to the 

consequences of coercion due to their insulation from the 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

55

population’s strife. Furthermore, North Korea resists increased 

transparency and is more likely to cheat if the US puts a boot to the 

throat than if it put a ship full of relief supplies in port. The 

execution of severe coercive diplomacy to force North Korea to 

surrender its nuclear weapons runs a high risk of war, high risk of 

cheating, is not supported by two key regional partners, and thus 

unlikely to succeed. This leaves few palatable options available, 

one of which may be to strike the right balance of adequate coercion 

combined with attractive incentives in order to lure North Korea out 

of its shell. A less desirable option is the transition from diplomacy 

to military force, or the sledgehammer. 

THE SLEDGEHAMMER 

Is military force to disarm a nuclear North Korea a policy 

option worth considering? Last year, President Bush thought so: “I 

still believe this (crisis) will be solved diplomatically.... All 

options are on the table of course.”109 Less than one month later, he 

was even more open about the use of force when he stated, “If they 

don’t work diplomatically, they’ll have to work militarily.”110 Mr. 

Levi, of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), cautioned: 

There is not a military solution that provides the same 

comprehensive solution that diplomacy might. Taking out 

Yongbyon would not affect North Korea’s highly enriched 

uranium program. It’s very hard for us to verify how far 

along they are because we don’t know where the uranium 

facilities are. That means there is no military option short 

of regime change that will completely remove the North 

Korean nuclear threat.111 

Although a combined US-ROK force could defeat North 

Korea’s military forces, a second Korean war would decimate the 

peninsula’s infrastructure, negatively impact the region’s economy, 

and cost all three countries billions of dollars and hundreds of 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

56

thousands of lives. Do the benefits of preventing North Korea from 

potentially threatening, using, or selling nuclear weapons outweigh 

the costs of devastation associated with military conflict? Can the 

United States justify unilateral action against North Korea if South 

Korea objects? I propose it currently cannot do so, but that a North 

Korean nuclear test or another Taepo Dong missile test over Japan 

would change the political situation in favor of more aggressive US 

policy options. This section delves into the unthinkable, a second 

Korean war. If the United States is determined to eliminate North 

Korean nuclear weapons and all forms of diplomacy fail, military 

force can disarm North Korea, but at an extremely high cost. 

Following a brief analysis of force disposition in Northeast 

Asia, this section evaluates the advantages and disadvantages of 

using military force to achieve policy objectives and its chance for 

success. It evaluates potential military operations taken against 

North Korea with the political objective of completely, verifiably, 

and irreversibly disarming North Korean nuclear weapons. This 

objective implies North Korean regime change. The threat or actual 

use of surgical air strikes, special forces operations, and limited 

military force are valid techniques during coercive diplomacy, but 

are not capable of achieving the stated US policy objective of 

complete disarmament. 

Background 

It is not a coincidence that the USS Pueblo, seized in 

international waters on 23 January 1968, is on display near 

Pyongyang in the Taedong River, relatively close to where the USS 

General Sherman ran aground, was burned, and its crew massacred 

by Koreans in August 1866.112 On the thirty-fifth anniversary of the 

Pueblo seizure, a North Korean official press release entitled “US 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

57

warned not to forget the lesson of the Pueblo incident” included 

rhetoric about the ship’s historic capture and how it is now visited 

by “an endless stream of people.”113 When advocating a second 

Korean War scenario, one must not forget that North Korea is 

heavily armed, motivated, and fearful of a US preemptive attack. 

The first Korean War, fought with antiquated weapons by 

today’s standards, killed or wounded 900,000 Chinese, 520,000 

North Koreans, and 400,000 United Nations Command soldiers. 

Nearly two-thirds of the 400,000 UN casualties were South Korean, 

along with 36,000 US troops killed in action.114 Approximately 

three million Korean civilians, one-tenth of the peninsula’s 

population, were killed, wounded, or missing because of the war.115 

US air power was particularly devastating to North Korea, and the 

country’s military realized that anything on the surface of the earth 

would be destroyed. As a result, North Korea’s military started 

digging in the 1950’s and has not stopped. Approximately four 

thousand underground facilities (UGFs) within one hundred miles 

of the demilitarized zone house virtually every type of weapon in 

North Korea’s arsenal, including aircraft, armor, command centers, 

and even naval forces along the coastline.116 

Force Strengths. Seventy percent of North Korea’s millionman army is garrisoned within one hundred miles of the 

demilitarized zone and is supported by 8,000 to 11,000 artillery 

pieces in hardened artillery sites (HARTS).117 Thousands of 

expansive UGFs protect most of the troops, equipment, weapons, 

and supplies supported by five thousand metric tons of chemical 

agents including, nerve, choking, blister, and blood agents.118 In 

addition to their large numbers and chemical weapons, North 

Korean troops should be considered highly motivated following 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

58

decades of political and social indoctrination, in addition to 

enjoying a higher quality of life than average North Korean citizens 

enjoy. Unlike Iraq’s military, North Korea’s military will fight with 

discipline and the esprit-de-corps that flows from defending one’s 

homeland. 

Across the DMZ, 4.5 million reservists and 37,000 US troops 

support South Korea’s army of 672,000 men. The United States 

maintains roughly 100,000 troops in the Pacific Rim, mainly in 

Japan, and has a total force of nearly 1.4 million service 

members.119 Consider the destructive potential of the military 

power listed in Table 2. 

In time of war, the 37,000 US forces in South Korea are 

expected to be rapidly augmented by tens of thousands more troops. 

However, the timing and size of US force buildup has tremendous 

political and military implications. Too little or too late and North 

Korea may be able to achieve significant breakthroughs. Too much, 

too early could make North Korea feel threatened and determine it 

is better to strike first before a window of opportunity closes. North 

Korea observed and learned from US deployments during Operation 

Desert Storm. In May 1994, a North Korean colonel told a US 

officer at Panmunjom, “We are not going to let you do a 

buildup.”120 North Korea has the ability to monitor US operations 

on the peninsula that indicate intentions such as force build-ups and 

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). This monitoring 

ability, when combined with North Korea’s heightened threat 

perception of a preemptive US attack, makes large-scale force 

movements to the peninsula similar to throwing matches into a dry 

powder keg. 
Orcutt—Car

59 

Table 2: Northeast Asia Military Force Strength121

DPRK ROK US China J

Total 1,173,000 672,000 1,396,200 2,200,000 23Army 1,003,00* 560,000 482,000 1,700,000 14Navy 60,000 60,000 547,136^ 220,000 43Air Force 110,000 52,000 374,700 420,000 42

Legend * = Includes approximately 100,000 SOF troops ^ = includes 170,000 USMC troops
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

60

Objectives. What motivated North Korea to invest four decades 

worth of limited research and procurement assets to develop nuclear 

weapons? Four potential explanations are easy to remember by the 

terms blackmail, black market, deter, or detonate. As mentioned in 

a typical debate about the 1994 Agreed Framework, some argued 

that North Korea claimed to have nuclear weapons in order to 

blackmail the United States and its regional partners into providing 

much needed energy aid. Others refer to North Korea’s prolific 

ballistic missile sales, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting of US 

currency as proof that once North Korea possessed enough nuclear 

weapons for its own purposes, they would likely sell nuclear 

weapons to terrorist organizations capable of meeting North 

Korea’s demand for hard currency. Advocates of deterrence refer to 

North Korea’s press releases that state North Korea had to develop 

nuclear weapons to deter US imperialist aggression. Last, some 

argue that because Kim Jong-il ultimately seeks not only his 

regime’s survival, but also the forceful reunification of the Korean 

peninsula under communist rule, he could detonate nuclear weapons 

to achieve his political objectives. 

According to multiple unclassified sources, North Korean 

political/military objectives are threefold: regime survival, quick 

peninsula reunification under a communist regime using 

overwhelming military force, and status as a “great and powerful 

nation.”122 Military planners anticipate that the start of any North 

Korean offensive will include insertion of one of the country’s 

asymmetric strengths, the world’s largest standing special 

operations forces, totaling over 100,000.123 North Korea could 

attempt its own version of “shock and awe” by combining special 

operations force insertions under cover of an artillery barrage 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

61

capable of 500,000 rounds per hour for several hours and the use of 

a chemical weapons stockpile believed to be 5,000 metric tons.124 

Although obsolete compared to US-ROK weapons, North Korea’s 

1,600 aircraft, 2,000 tanks, and 800 ships combined with the 

element of surprise, could be enough to overwhelm even the most 

advanced military initially.125 Realizing that Seoul has one-third of 

South Korea’s population, it is conceivable that a concentrated 

North Korean attack on Seoul could destroy, if not occupy, the 

city’s infrastructure, compelling South Korea to negotiate with Kim 

Jong-il following a fait accompli. Moreover, South Korea has a 

limited number of aerial ports and seaports capable of receiving 

large numbers of incoming troops or outgoing evacuees. 

As obvious as it may seem, which opponent initiates hostilities 

dramatically impacts the conduct of the war. Knowing exactly 

when to increase force levels, conduct last-minute combat 

preparations, evacuate non-essential personnel, and strike first 

significantly alters the duration and conduct of the war. Troops 

moving forward are more exposed than troops defending wellfortified positions. If North Korea starts the war, will there be 

adequate strategic warning to flow into country appropriate forces? 

Can the United States and South Korea defend Seoul long enough to 

permit a shift of forces from Iraq? If US and South Korean forces 

start the war, how survivable are North Korean underground 

facilities? How much international or regional support can be 

expected if the US conducts another preemptive war? These are 

just a few of the strategic questions to answer when evaluating the 

ramifications of using military force to achieve North Korean 

nuclear disarmament. These questions demonstrate the complexity 

of proposing military force and fuel the debate on this policy option. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

62

Obstacles. Warfighting in Korea is difficult for many reasons, 

two of which are geography and environment. A peninsula of 

mountains, Korea has few avenues of approach for large forces to 

cross the demilitarized zone. The operational significance of these 

two corridors, Kaeson and Chorwon, which were well used in the 

1950s, is completely understood for future conflicts. Both North 

and South, along with the United States, grasp the significance of 

occupying the high ground, its corresponding fields of fire, and thus 

controlling the limited traversable valleys. Limited airspace and 

weather also present more significant problems than warfare in Iraq, 

for example. 

North Korea has limited airspace in which to fight. The 

country’s 74,819 square miles is 18.6 percent of that of Iraq, and is 

reduced even more when realizing that the majority of North 

Korea’s forces are within one hundred miles of the demilitarized 

zone. Thus, the air “battlespace” is reduced to approximately 

14,800 square miles or 5.5 percent of Iraq, ignoring deep-strike 

sorties. De-conflicting airspace slightly smaller than Mississippi 

that contains two to three thousand sorties per day is no small 

task.126 Another obstacle can be weather. On the ground, 

monsoons cause severe flooding with summer monthly average 

rainfalls nearly ten inches, bitterly cold winters, and fog often 

reducing visibility.127 In contrast, during the air-war of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, 70 percent of Iraq was completely cloud free one out 

of every three days, and only 4 percent of sorties were scrubbed or 

ineffective due to bad weather.128 Finally, if North Korea occupies 

Seoul, airpower’s ability to perform close air support (CAS) is more 

restricted than in the two primary north-south corridors along the 

demilitarized zone. Close air support in an urban area such as Seoul 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

63

would significantly complicate operational issues such as 

minimizing collateral damage, positive target identification, and 

preventing fratricide. 

Impact on North Korean Nuclear Weapons 

The military force policy option provides the greatest control of 

North Korean nuclear weapons, but it does so at an extraordinarily 

high cost. If the United States determines that it cannot risk future 

North Korean cheating under diplomatic agreements, regime change 

and temporary occupation offer an alternative. In addition to the 

devastation of war, critics argue that military occupation of North 

Korea may not even achieve US policy objectives in light of 

intelligence failures in Iraq, resulting in the inability to locate 

weapons of mass destruction. Not knowing where North Korea’s 

highly enriched uranium program and facilities are located is a 

debilitating limitation to quick military success. Likewise, losing 

tens of thousands of soldier’s lives without finding a smoking gun 

would be everyone’s worst nightmare. Despite the high cost and 

risk, military force provides greater transparency of North Korean 

nuclear weapons than a diplomatic solution. 

Impact on Neighbors 

Formal security alliances exist between several key Northeast 

Asian countries: the Japanese-US Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 

and Security, the 1953 ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, and the 

1961 Agreement between China and North Korea. The JapaneseUS Defense Agreement was re-confirmed as recently as 1996.129 

Similarly, the 1966 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the 

1991 Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement reinforced the 

ROK-US Alliance.130 Beyond formal alliances, Northeast Asia has 

experienced globalization (increased inter-dependence) similar to 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

64

the rest of the industrialized world, which reduces the participating 

countries willingness to interrupt the status quo. 

China. Will China provide North Korea support during a 

second Korean War? Second to South Korea in its unwillingness to 

support the use of US military force, China strongly opposes this 

policy option. The United States has to assume that China will not 

commit ground forces, or US policy makers must fundamentally 

reconsider the use of military force. The central question is how 

much support (publicly or privately) would China provide North 

Korea? North Korea was shrewd enough to build some of its 

infrastructure near the border with China. The United States must 

be extremely cautious in conducting operations near China’s border 

with North Korea. China could expect to have no physical 

collateral damage to its property; however, the economic impacts of 

war, tens of thousands of refugees, and US-ROK forces near its 

border remain China’s primary concerns. 

Although China publicly supports Korean reunification, this 

support assumes the resulting Korean state is not anti-Chinese. In 

addition, China does not want the entire Korean peninsula 

converted to capitalism, nor would it like to have US troops near its 

border.131 China’s ability to influence US policy stems from more 

than its military strength. In 1991, the US trade deficit with China 

was $12.6 billion.132 Twelve years later, it was ten times that 

amount, reaching $124 billion in 2003.133 After China established 

trade offices in Beijing and Seoul in October 1990 and it established 

full diplomatic relations with South Korea in August 1992, bilateral 

trade steadily increased. Hitting $41.2 billion in 2002, China 

actually replaced the United States as South Korea’s number one 

trading partner.134 In comparison, even though one-half of North 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

65

Korea’s total trade volume is with China, it totaled only $1.05 

billion.135 

Japan. Even though Japan would be the only regional partner 

not to oppose military force, it is not eager to consider its use. 

Japan, in range of North Korean ballistic missiles and clandestine 

special-forces insertions, is the likely target in a North Korean 

attempt to divide the Japanese-US alliance. Based upon decades of 

mistrust and disputes such as the Japanese colonization of Korea 

and North Korea’s kidnappings, drug trafficking, and naval 

skirmishes, Japan should expect a strike by North Korea. The 

debate is by what and how bad the damage would be. Although 

some may argue that the US military buildup would be an economic 

boost to Japan’s economy, a major war on the Korean peninsula 

would have disastrous effects on the region’s economies. 

South Korea. South Korea strongly opposes even the 

consideration of military force to disarm a nuclear North Korea. 

President Roh repeatedly has stated in public that peaceful 

diplomatic means must resolve the nuclear issue. Not only do 

younger South Koreans view the United States as the obstacle to 

reunification and the target of North Korean aggression, but also 

they understand the devastation that peninsula-wide war would 

cause. “The hub of Northeast Asia” is tough to market abroad if the 

entire peninsula is a war zone. In addition, war would obliterate 

South Korea’s goal of becoming a top-ten economic power. How 

many chemical Scuds into Seoul could the US-ROK alliance absorb 

before the political-military relationship changed significantly? The 

answer is very few. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

66

Costs 

Financial. In June of 1994, South Korea conducted a largescale civil defense exercise in the event the nuclear crisis led to war. 

As a result, in the two days following the 13 June 1994 exercise 

announcement, the Seoul stock market dropped 25 percent.136 In 

any future conflict, Northeast Asia could expect catastrophic stock 

market drops across the region, home to approximately one-half of 

the world’s economic output. Following the direct costs of combat 

operations, the United States would likely have to shoulder a 

significant portion of the cost of rebuilding Korea’s infrastructure, 

both North and South. Assuming the cost of Korean reconstruction 

would be at least as much if not more than the cost of reconstruction 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, this figure could exceed the $87 billion 

authorized by Congress in early 2004. 

Lives. On 19 May 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry, along 

with US Army Generals Shalikashvili and Luck met with President 

Clinton to inform him of the gravity of the situation building on the 

Korean peninsula. Regarding the meeting, Oberdorfer wrote: 

If war broke out...they estimated it would cost 52,000 US 

military casualties, killed or wounded, and 490,000 South 

Korean military casualties in the first ninety days, plus an 

enormous number of North Korean and civilian lives, at a 

financial outlay exceeding $61 billion, very little of which 

could be recouped from US allies.137

The casualty predictions did not improve following the first ninety 

days. During coercive diplomacy planning, Secretary Perry asked 

General Luck to estimate the damage of a full-scale war on the 

peninsula. According to Oberdorfer, General Luck, a veteran of 

Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, reported that 

Due to the lethality of modern weapons and Korea’s urban 

environment, as many as one million people would be 

killed, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans, that out-of-
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

67

pocket costs to the United States would exceed $100 billion 

and the destruction of property and interruption to business 

activity would cost more than one trillion dollars to the 

countries involved and their immediate neighbors.138 

However, the lethality of modern weapons and the US 

military’s ability to limit collateral damage has caused some 

military experts such as retired Air Force Lieutenant General 

Thomas McInerney to argue that although a second Korean war 

would cause significant damage, it would not be nearly as bad as 

some experts predict. In an August 2003 Wall Street Journal

opinion article, former Central Intelligence Agency Director James 

Woolsey and retired Lieutenant General McInerney proposed that 

military force is a viable option for resolving the North Korean 

nuclear crisis and that, in fact, “North Korea could be defeated 

decisively in thirty to sixty days.”139 They proposed that the muchdiscussed 11,000 artillery pieces, of which half can target Seoul, 

could be destroyed or sealed in their hardened facilities with the 

combination of stealth and precision-guided munitions. Citing the 

available infrastructure in Northeast Asia and the access to North 

Korean targets from the sea, they view airpower as decisive with the 

possibility of generating and employing, “around 4,000 sorties a day 

compared to 800 a day that were so effective in Iraq.”140 In 

addition, the threat of Marine Corps amphibious assault on both 

coasts of North Korea could place both Pyongyang and Wonsan at 

risk of rapid seizure, especially since North Korea’s army mainly 

rests along the demilitarized zone.141

Recently, changes have occurred in both US military assets on 

the peninsula and the strategy by which to engage North Korean 

troops. According to an April 2004 Aviation Week & Space 

Technology article, US military planners in Korea are attempting to 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

68

take advantage of improved assets such as AH-64D Apache 

Longbow helicopters, GPS-guided munitions, Shadow 200 

unmanned aircraft, and PAC-3 ballistic missile interceptors.142 The 

current Seventh Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Trexler, 

who is responsible for planning and executing the air campaign in 

the Korean theater, commented as follows: 

There is a shift happening. The improved equipment gives 

us a capability to attack these enemy forces very quickly 

and prevent some of the mass casualties.143

He went on to indicate that Korea “always has to be looked at 

differently” from operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, not 

only because of North Korea’s massive army, but also because 

North Korean artillery can, “rain havoc on a very large civilian 

population.”144 

Regardless of who is correct regarding the extent of damage a 

second Korean War would cause or how long a war would last, the 

United States cannot justify initiating a preemptive attack on North 

Korea under the current strategic situation, especially when South 

Korea and China are adamantly opposed to it. If South Korea 

strongly opposed the use of military force, it could ultimately deny 

the use of South Korean infrastructure to conduct US operations. 

This would significantly hinder the US ability to wage war against 

North Korea. Although it is militarily possible for the United States 

to defeat North Korea without conducting combat operations from 

South Korea, it is politically impossible to do so without destroying 

the US-ROK alliance. 

Risk: Will War Lead to Limited Nuclear Exchange? An 

adversary’s threat perception of its opponent is a critical factor in 

selecting a course of action. As such, US actions need to account 

for North Korea’s heightened fear of US military force used to 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

69

resolve the current crisis. According to a 10 January 2003 KCNA 

statement, North Korea views the Bush administration as hostile 

toward the country, singling it out for a possible preemptive attack, 

to include nuclear weapons.145 If Kim Jong-il believes that US 

military force is to be used to achieve regime change, why would he 

not use every weapon at his disposal to survive? 

In Inadvertent Escalation, Barry Posen provided keen insight 

into how large-scale conventional war in Europe between the 

United States and the Soviet Union could have led to nuclear war.146 

Fully developing the prospects for a nuclear exchange between 

North Korea and the United States is beyond the scope of this 

thesis; however, US military force policy planning must factor in 

this prospect. As scary as this prospect is, maybe Kim is rational 

enough not to fight to the death. On 5 August 2000, a delegation of 

South Korean media executives dined with Kim Jong-il in 

Pyongyang, including Choe Hak Rae, then publisher of Hankyoreh 

Shinum, a newspaper that covered North Korea favorably. Choe 

asked Kim why North Korea spent so much of its scarce resources 

on ballistic missiles instead of social programs. Kim replied 

The missiles cannot reach the United States and if I launch 

them, the US would fire back thousands of missiles and we 

would not survive. I know that very well, but I have to let 

them know I have missiles. I am making them, because 

only then will the United States talk to me.147

If both the context and content of this reported quote are 

accurate, it indicates that Kim may be rational enough to understand 

the cost-benefit analysis of engaging the United States in military 

action. It also supports the speculated blackmail, black market, or 

deterrence theories for North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

70

Precedent 

US willingness to pay the high cost of war sends the strongest 

possible indicator of political resolve. If US leaders (the President, 

with adequate support from Congress) determine that North Korean 

nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated, the diplomatic stakes are 

tremendous. There is more at stake than the status of North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons. If the United States was willing to invade Iraq yet 

avoids military conflict with North Korea, other countries may 

conclude that nuclear weapons are the key to deterring US military 

action. One potential benefit of the Iraq war may be that 

henceforth, a US threat of military force is credible enough to 

convince North Korea to acquiesce. Other potential benefits are 

lessons re-learned in verifying intelligence reports and the difficulty 

of building democracies to fill the void caused by regime change. 

Summary 

Stand-alone, limited military operations against North Korea 

cannot achieve US policy objectives. Regardless of technological 

advances in stealth, effects-based targeting, and precision-guided 

munitions, a second Korean War will be protracted, costly, and 

devastating. As to the quality of the weapons advantage that the 

US-ROK team enjoys over North Korea, remember Stalin’s 

comment to Lenin regarding tanks, “Quantity has a quality all its 

own.” No matter how much “shock and awe” rains down on the 1.1 

million-man North Korean army, they are dug-in, well trained, and 

capable of unleashing a tremendous volume of fire upon Seoul. 

Under the current situation, none of the US’s regional partners 

support military force. As such, it cannot be justified in light of the 

widespread destruction it would cause. Unfortunately, it also has 

the greatest chance of achieving the stated objective of completely, 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

71

verifiably, and irreversibly disarming North Korean nuclear 

weapons. 

CONCLUSION 

North Korea remains an enigma, and the multilateral approach 

is both a blessing and a curse. The blessing comes from possible 

increased pressure on North Korea to comply with regional 

demands for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. The curse is 

in the fact that with incentives likely to fail, a multilateral coercive 

approach or military force in the current strategic situation has little 

hope of success due primarily to a lack of regional support. Herein 

lays the policy challenge; if North Korea cannot be enticed, 

coerced, or clubbed over the head, how should the United States 

proceed? This chapter provides a summary of research findings and 

offers US policy recommendations for North Korean nuclear 

weapons. 

Summary of Findings 

The Carrot: Not Tasty Enough. The Agreed Framework was 

the best of only bad options available in 1994; and it failed to 

remove North Korea’s incentive to develop nuclear weapons or to 

permit significant increases in transparency. A similar approach in 

the current situation is unlikely due to the current administration’s 

predominant belief that North Korea cannot be trusted. Moreover, 

North Korea has repeatedly balked at permitting increased levels of 

inspections regardless of the nationality of the inspectors or the 

organization they represent. North Korea’s refusal to accept US 

demands for increased transparency, and the requisite inspections, is 

the primary reason diplomacy will most likely fail to disarm a 

nuclear North Korea. An incentive-based solution would be the 

least expensive in the long-term and has the greatest regional 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

72

support. However, incentive-based diplomacy will not entice North 

Korea to surrender the nuclear weapons in which it has invested so 

heavily and views as the penultimate deterrent to US military force 

and the source of achieving “great power status.” 

The Stick: Too Many Hands, Wrong Target. With its low 

success rate, coercive diplomacy lacks the regional support 

necessary to conduct multilateral coercion successfully. In addition, 

coercion would affect the wrong target and has the same 

transparency problems as incentive-based diplomacy. North 

Korean leaders are hyper-insulated from an already suffering 

population. Virtually cutoff from all economic interaction with the 

United States, North Korea continues to receive reliable assistance 

from China and bilateral trade with South Korea. Unless North 

Korea provokes the regional powers or increases tension with 

brinkmanship, it is unlikely that China and South Korea would 

support cutting North Korea off economically, thus limiting the 

United States’ ability to strangle North Korea. 

The Sledgehammer: Potentially Effective, but Blunt and 

Expensive. Major military operations taken against North Korea, 

i.e. a second Korean War, is the policy most capable of achieving 

North Korean nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, it is also the 

most costly, lacks regional support, and places the US-ROK alliance 

at risk of collapse. A second Korean War also implies North 

Korean regime change, generates several negative consequences, 

and risks a limited nuclear exchange. The list of obstacles to the 

use of military force is long. A lack of regional support to discuss, 

let alone use, military force, international blowback from Iraqi prewar intelligence failures and perceived US unilateral preemptive 

war, US domestic concerns with the cost of Iraqi reconstruction, 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

73

and the assured destruction of Korea’s infrastructure combine to 

remove it as a feasible US policy option at the present time. 

However, a credible threat of force is crucial to successful coercive 

diplomacy. Moreover, the United States must still be politically and 

militarily ready to execute its threat if North Korea calls the bluff. 

Policy Recommendations 

What Price Is the United States Willing to Pay? Anyone 

making policy recommendations for North Korea should remember 

the saying, “Anyone who claims to be an expert on North Korea is 

either a liar or a fool.” The United States successfully took the first 

step by achieving regional agreement for its policy objective: 

complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean nuclear 

disarmament. The next most important step for US policymakers is 

to answer the second question Richard Armitage’s working group 

asked in 1999, “What price is the United States willing to pay to 

disarm North Korea?”148 If the answer to this question does not 

include options on the far right end of the spectrum of influence 

(Figure 1) then the United States should not pursue coercive 

diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy assumes a credible threat of 

military force, sometimes combined with incentives, to achieve 

political objectives. To threaten North Korea with the use of 

military force, either limited strikes, or major combat operations, 

and then not follow through would be worse than simply accepting 

a nuclear North Korea and continuing deterrence. If a second 

Korean War is rejected as an acceptable policy to disarm North 

Korean nuclear weapons and incentive-based diplomacy fails, the 

United States should attempt to mitigate further nuclear 

proliferation in Northeast Asia while continuing to deter North 

Korea from invading the South. Although inexpensive in the near 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

74

term, accepting a nuclear-armed North Korea simply postpones a 

difficult decision that will be more costly to resolve in the future 

and places US vital interests in Northeast Asia at an unacceptably 

high level of risk in the present. 

Shift to Coercive Diplomacy and Prepare for War. Each 

policy option alone will fail to disarm North Korean nuclear 

weapons. Currently, the only politically feasible alternative is the 

judicious use of just enough stick to convince North Korea to take 

the carrots offered before the deal expires. However, time is on the 

side of North Korea. North Korea can work quietly while observing 

the recent South Korean opposition party’s success in the April 

elections and the upcoming US presidential elections in November 

2004. Each passing day allows North Korea to pursue nuclear 

weapons without international inspections, providing it the 

opportunity to build an even greater deterrent. 

The United States must convince China and South Korea that 

disarming North Korea is a vital interest to not only the United 

States, but also Northeast Asia and that if not addressed soon, 

nuclear proliferation throughout Asia will become the world’s 

concern. The six party talks should not continue indefinitely 

without tangible results. A tightly held meeting between Kim Jongil and Chinese leaders, including President Jintao, closely followed 

Vice President Cheney’s April 2004 visit to Northeast Asia and 

Beijing. The South Korean press reported that China stressed the 

importance of continuing the six-party talks and that Kim Jong-il 

should be more flexible in negotiating with the United States.149 An 

allegation also circulates that China gave North Korea economic 

assistance for simply traveling to Beijing and publicly stating that it 

would continue meaningful dialogue at the six party talks. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

75

Multilateral diplomacy is the proper path, but it should be walked 

briskly in order to determine its chance for success without allowing 

North Korea unlimited time to build more nuclear weapons. 

Regardless of the outcome of the November 2004 United States 

election, the next administration should decide if it wants to shift 

from talks to coercion. It is vital that this critical foreign policy 

decision be thoroughly vetted with a wide range of experts, inputs, 

and policy options, including a review of the Perry Report and 

Armitage recommendations. Aggressive US policy in Northeast 

Asia could easily escalate to a second Korean War, and as a result, 

it is necessary to measure both Congressional and public support. If 

Congress and the American people believe North Korean nuclear 

weapons are a threat to US vital interests, then they should realize 

the policy’s potential costs. Whatever the policy debate outcome, a 

clear and credible policy should be ready for implementation 

immediately following the Presidential election, since delays favor 

North Korea. If the decision is to pursue coercive diplomacy, the 

next step is to reaffirm precisely what to demand of North Korea. 

Due to consensus with regional partners, it is likely the United 

States will continue to demand North Korea’s complete, verifiable, 

and irreversible nuclear disarmament, and not publicly advocate 

North Korean regime change. The next step would be to develop 

and communicate a credible threat based upon realistic military 

capabilities within the constraints of very limited regional support. 

For example, in order to conduct operations from Japan in 

preparation for limited South Korean support it is necessary to draft 

contingency plans. Actual force deployments into the region, 

similar to Pacific Theater buildups prior to operations in Iraq, to 

deter North Korean opportunistic aggression, must back the threat 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

76

of military force. However, the timing and extent of regional force 

buildup to support a threat requires careful planning and execution. 

Operations in Iraq placed a tremendous strain on US forces, military 

logistics, and public support. For example, US troops stationed in 

Korea are planned to deploy to Iraq. Likewise, increasing troop 

strengths in the Korean Theater heightens tension not only with 

North Korea, but also South Korea, China, and to some extent 

Japan. However, if properly executed, these buildups could 

accomplish three objectives. First, they would support the threat of 

using force. Second, they would be better prepared to conduct 

combat operations either to demonstrate US resolve or to counteract 

North Korean aggression. Finally, their redeployment out of the 

theater becomes bargaining chips for US policymakers negotiating 

the details of any potential agreement. 

In communicating the threat of military action to North Korea, 

the United States should invite as many senior North Korean leaders 

as possible to review US capabilities in South Korea and force 

demonstrations in the United States. The purpose of these displays 

would be to demonstrate clearly that the threat of US military force 

is credible. Furthermore, that US forces employed on the Korean 

peninsula would be overwhelming, lethal, precise, and victorious. 

The format for these military demonstrations could be similar to Air 

Power Demonstrations previously conducted near Nellis Air Force 

Base, Nevada for high-ranking US leaders such as members of 

Congress and all new flag rank officers in the US military. 

After communicating a credible threat, the United States should 

offer incentives that allay North Korea’s fears and meet its dire 

energy and food needs. Providing incentives, that some refer to as 

an “exit ramp,” allows Kim Jong-il a face-saving way out of his 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

77

nuclear dilemma. This is especially important when dealing with an 

insecure leader of a failed state who aspires to be a “great power,” 

especially when Korean culture places great emphasis on pride. 

Although President Bush has stated he will not permit America to 

be blackmailed, when faced with either a second Korean War or 

accepting a nuclear North Korea, providing incentives may appear 

easier to swallow when offered after the threat of force. Future 

incentive decisions should consider the pros and cons of continuing 

construction of the 1994 Agreed Framework’s two light-water 

reactors or scrapping these programs for alternative energy sources. 

Since North Korea objected to South Korean workers being 

permitted inside North Korea to build the light-water reactors, 

China could potentially assist North Korea in rebuilding its 

electrical infrastructure or an alternative energy source using South 

Korean and Japanese funding. Finally, the United States must 

determine a deadline for North Korea’s compliance and be 

militarily and politically prepared to execute its declared threat. 

US policy will need to be “sold” both internationally and 

domestically. Absent a significant threat, the average American 

largely ignores US foreign policy. The war in Iraq increased 

concern over intelligence accuracy and the viability of preemptive 

wars in pursuit of the “Axis of Evil.” United Nations support for 

either coercion or military force to disarm North Korea will be more 

difficult to sell than the failed attempt to rally support for the Iraq 

War. A Chinese veto of any proposed resolutions condemning 

North Korea or a call for an aggressive policy that it does not 

support is almost a certainty. Domestically, building support for a 

potential second Korean war would be difficult at best. The average 

American has little interest in foreign policy and does not perceive 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

78

North Korea as a threat to Homeland Security. If a North Korean 

nuclear weapon sold to Al Queda and detonated at the Superbowl 

had Kim Jong-il’s fingerprints on it, America would mobilize. 

Short of that, many Americans wonder why the United States 

should risk killing tens of thousands of people to remove a threat 

that young South Koreans fail to perceive. It is necessary to use 

credible evidence of North Korea’s record of illicit activities and 

human rights violations to inform the American people and the 

international community of the repressive nature of Kim Jong-il’s 

regime. Although Iraqi pre-war intelligence tarnished the United 

States’ reputation, it must pursue international and domestic support 

by convincing people that North Korea does, in fact, have nuclear 

weapons and that this is unacceptable. 

If both incentive and coercive diplomacy fail to disarm North 

Korean nuclear weapons, the steps taken during coercive diplomacy 

will better position the United States to conduct military operations 

at the time and place of its choosing to disarm North Korea. 

Ideally, this would occur with at least South Korea’s tacit support 

and China’s promise to remain neutral. However, military planners 

should prepare for the worst, and have contingency plans that 

assume no permitted offensive operations from South Korea and 

that China could possibly provide North Korea limited assistance 

short of military force. Among the myriad of considerations, 

strategists should avoid creating situations that are likely to trigger 

North Korean employment of nuclear weapons. They also need to 

determine how best to convince senior North Korean military 

leaders that the outcome of war is not the question, but rather how 

much destruction they wish to endure. Psychological operations 

always play a role in military conflict, but the potential impact of 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

79

exposing Kim Jong-il’s leadership failures, repressive actions, and 

economic incompetence could convince North Korean military 

leaders that the Libyan model is a better alternative than Iraq. 

The two alternatives available if diplomacy fails are both 

unattractive. The United States, however, should not shy away 

from protecting its vital interests because a potentially effective 

policy is costly. If after being informed of the potential costs of 

military force, Congress and the American people still support the 

US objective of complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean 

nuclear disarmament, the United States should act resolutely. In 

addition, US diplomats should make every effort to convince our 

regional partners that the benefits of supporting US and regional 

policy goals outweigh the costs of opposing them. At the end of the 

day, containing a nuclear-armed North Korea is better than a second 

Korean War. Of course, policy makers want to avoid having to 

present the President with this stark choice. But if diplomacy fails 

to disarm a nuclear North Korea, advisers must be clear which of 

the two choices is preferable. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Stephen Kim, “North Korea,” in Robert Litwak and Mitchell Reiss, 

ed. Proliferation Challenges After Iraq (Washington, DC: Woodrow 

Wilson Center for International Studies, December 2003), 6. 

2

 George Bush, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferation,” speech delivered to National Defense 

University, Washington, DC, 11 February 2004, www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html. (accessed April 2004). 

3

 Alexander L. George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder: 

Westview Press, 1994), 7. 

4

 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 

315. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

80

 

5

 Congress, House, Asia-Pacific Subcommittee on International 

Relations, testimony by Admiral Fargo, Commander Pacific Command, 

26 June 2003. 

6

 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and 

Response (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 

2001), 7, www.defenselink.mil. (accessed April 2004). 

7

www.worldbank.org, www.cia.gov/publications/factbook, 

www.4Janes.com, and NS4207 class notes of Professor Kim Deok 

Yeong, visiting Professor from the Korean National Defense 

University. 

8

 Mr. Shingo Nishimua, interview by Eric Weiner (07 March 2003), 

National Public Radio Transcript. 

9 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 11. 

10 Ibid. 

11 The Axis of Evil reference occurred in the 2002 State of the Union 

address. Policy preference for action versus inaction comes from the 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 

2002, 1. President Bush’s distaste for Kim Jong-il was reported by 

Washington Post’s Bob Woodward from a summer 2002 interview 

quoted in The CQ Researcher, 13, no. 14, (11 April 2003), 324. 

12 George Bush, speech to NDU, 11 February 2004. 

13 Kim, “North Korea,” 7. 

14 Mary H. Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” The CQ Researcher (11 

April 2003): 333. 

15 Congress, Senate, Governmental affairs subcommittee on Financial 

Management and the Budget and International Security, Testimony by 

William Bach, Department of State, Director, Office of African, Asian 

and European Affairs Bureau (22 May 2003), usembassy.state.gov/ 

posts/pk1/wwwho3052208.html. (accessed April 2004). 

16 Kim, “North Korea,” 8. 

17 Ibid., 7. 

18 William J. Perry, “North Korea: The Real Nuclear Crisis,” Speech at 

Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation 

Studies, (16 December 2003). 

19 This fact is not meant to be overly incriminating. North Korea was 

the first country that the IAEA demanded to submit to special 

inspections. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

81

 

20 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony 

(12 March 2003), as quoted by Mary H. Cooper in “North Korean 

Crisis,” The CQ Researcher (16 November 2001): 327. 

21 “Nuclear Confrontation with North Korea: Lessons of the 1994 

Crisis for Today,” Daniel Poneman, former Special Assistant to the 

President of the United States for Nonproliferation and Export Control 

Policy, Remarks made during a Nautilus Seminar (20 March 2003), 

www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreedFramework/1994Crisis. 

html (accessed April 2004). 

22 While the military strike briefings were widely reported, the fact that 

the commander of US Forces Korea, General Luck, was preparing for a 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) was not widely reported. 

See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History

(Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 326. 

23 Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and ActorSpecific Behavioral Models of Adversaries,” Comparative Strategy 22 

(December 2003): 471. 

24 For details of the Agreed Framework, refer to Richard Armitage, “A 

Comprehensive Approach to North Korea by Richard Armitage,” in 

David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, ed. Solving the North Korean 

Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, DC: ISIS Reports, 2000), 315. 

25 Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, 44. 

26 Ibid. 

27 US State Department officials interview by the author, Washington, 

DC, 25 August 2003. 

28 David Albright, 2001 speech “Ensuring Nuclear Transparency on the 

Korean Peninsula: What is an Adequate Approach?” 59, 

www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/monitoringVerification/index.

html. (accessed April 2004). 

29 Dr. Han, a professor at the Korea National Defense University, was a 

senior South Korean staff member who participated in the JNCC, a 

Principal Assistant to the Korean Minister of Defense in 1993, and a 

visiting fellow to the RAND Corporation. 

30 Yong-Sup Han, “North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations,” 

The Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 51. 

31 Ibid., 53. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

82

 

32 The term “gifts” jokingly refers to events such as missile test firings 

and other provocative actions North Korean does to embarrass South 

Korea. 

33 David A. Albright, “North Korea’s Current and Future Plutonium 

and Nuclear Weapon Stocks,” ISIS Brief (15 January 2003), www.isisonline.org/publications/dprk/currentandfutureweaponsstocks.html. 

(accessed April 2004). 

34 Jim Yardley, “Kim in Beijing but Nowhere to be Seen,” New York 

Times, 21 April 2004. 

35 Michael O’Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean 

Peninsula (New York: Brookings, 2003), 33. Kim Jong-il was last 

seen at a 12 February 2003 meeting with visiting Russian dignitaries 

and was not seen again in public until a 3 April 2003 military 

ceremony. US operations began in Iraq on 20 March 2003. 

36 James Woolsey, remarks during speech given as part of Secretary of 

the Navy, Guest Lecture Series, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 

CA, 21 August 2003. 

37 CNN.com. (accessed December 2003). 

38 Robinson Noland and Li, “The Economics of Korean Reunification,” 

as found in Susan F. Bryant, Beyond the Sunshine Policy: An Argument 

in Favor of Continued US Military Presence in Northeast Asia, 

Institute for National Security Studies Occasional Paper 47 (USAF 

Academy, Colorado Springs: November, 2002). 

39 www.iaea.org/about/mission.html. (accessed April 2004). 

40 Ibid. 

41 Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, 257. 

42 Ibid., 245. 

43 Ibid., 246. 

44 Yong-Sup Han, “North Korean Behavior in Nuclear Negotiations,” 

The Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 45. 

45 Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, 9. 

46 Ibid, 265. 

47 David Albright, “Ensuring Nuclear Transparency on the Korean 

Peninsula: What is an Adequate Approach?” 59 (2001), www.nautilus. 

org/DPRKBriefingBook/monitoringVerification/index.html. (accessed 

April 2004). 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

83

 

48 Ibid, 62. 

49 Seongwhun Cheon, “North Korea’s Nuclear Problem: Political 

Implications and Inspection Formats,” 27 January 2003, US-DPRK 

Next Step Workshop, Nautilus Institute, Washington, DC. 

50 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 

2001), 349. Cited text is both quotations and the conversation’s 

context as written in Oberdorfer’s book. 

51 Kongdan Oh Hassig, “Confronting North Korea’s Nuclear 

Ambitions: US Policy Options and Regional Implications,” Institute 

for Defense Analyses Paper P-3831 (September 2003): 14. 

52 Ibid., 15. 

53 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 319. 

54 Amy E. Smithson, “North Korea: A Case in Progress,” in Thomas 

Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, ed. The Politics of Positive Incentives in 

Arms Control, quoting Berry and Lee, (1995), 82. 

55 Yoo Dong-ho, “6 in 10 Koreans Back US Military Presence: Nearly 

Half Say US Biggest Barrier to Unification,” Korea Times, 23 February 

2004. According to a Korea Times Poll of 1,000 South Koreans, 46.3% 

picked the United States as the largest barrier to unification. The 

United States as a target from Kongdan Hassig article, September 2003 

56 China’s limited support of US policy toward North Korea is well 

documented, but China’s lack of support of sanctions in the 1994 crisis 

is from Amy E. Smithson, “North Korea: A Case in Progress”, 81. 

57 Kyung-ho Kim, “Hyundai’s Slush Fund Probe Expands,” The Korea 

Herald, 8 July 2003. 

58 Don Oberdorfer summarizes this ROK domestic political scandal in 

The Two Koreas, 376-382. 

59 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 412. 

60 Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, 189. 

61 Ibid. 

62 Ibid. 

63 George Bush, “Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Proliferation,” speech delivered to National Defense 

University at Fort Lesley J. McNair, 11 February 2004, Washington, 

DC, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html. 

(accessed April 2004). 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

84

 

64 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 7. 

65 Ibid. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Ibid. 

68 Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, 315. 

69 Ibid. 

70 Ibid., 318. 

71 Ibid. 

72 Ibid., 324. 

73 Albright and O’Neill, 308. 

74 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 316. 

75 Ibid., 318. 

76 Joseph Khan, “North Korea Rejects US Demand to Scrap its Nuclear 

Programs,” New York Times, 28 March 2004, 5. 

77 George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific 

Behavioral Models of Adversaries.” 

78 “Profile: Kim Jong-il,” BBC News (31 July 2003), 

news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1907197.htm. 

(accessed April 2004). 

79 “Malignant Narcissist” term from David Smith, Terry C. Stevens, 

Chuck Downs, and Robert Dujarric, “Deterring North Korea: US 

Options,” Comparative Strategy 22 (December 2003): 490. The 

number of monuments found in O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on 

the Korean Peninsula, 25. 

80 Alexander L. George, “The Importance of Beliefs and Images,” in 

Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 

1980), 67. 

81 Experts estimate that at least 2.5 million North Koreans died of 

starvation in the past decade. Tom O’Neill, “Dangerous Divide,” 

National Geographic 204, no. 1 (July 2003): 18. 

82 Alex Roberto Hybel, “A Fortuitous Victory: An Information 

Processing Approach to the Gulf War” in Eugene R. Wittkopf and 

James M. McCormick, ed. The Domestic Sources of American Foreign 

Policy: Insights and Evidence, 3rd ed. (Roman & Littlefield, 1999), 

340. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

85

 

83 Joseph Khan, “North Korea Rejects US Demand to Scrap its Nuclear 

Programs,” The New York Times, March 28, 2004, 5. 

84 George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy, 62. 

85 Madeline Albright, “Nuclear Nightmare: Understanding North 

Korea,” interview by Discovery Channel Spotlight television show, 6 

August 2003. Also reported by Peter Maas, “The Last Emperor,” New 

York Times, 19 October 2003. 

86 George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 7. 

87 George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific 

Behavioral Models of Adversaries,” 464. 

88 Ibid., 472. 

89 “The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of 

China,” A Human Rights Watch Report 14, no. 8 (November 2002), 

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/northkorea/norkor1102.pdf. (accessed 

April 2004). 

90 Selig S. Harrison, quoted in Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” 338. 

91 Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” 334. 

92 Peter Maas, “The Last Emperor,” New York Times, 19 October 2003. 

93 Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” 325. Data for China and South 

Korea are 2001 estimates and Japan’s data was from 2000. 

94 Jong-Heon Lee, Analysis: N. Korea Relies on China (United Press 

International, 23 February 2004), www.washtimes.com/upibreaking/20040223-043834-110r.htm. (accessed April 2004). 

95 Janes, Executive Summary of China, www.janes.com. (accessed 

April 2004). 

96 China’s National Defense, Section I, the International Security 

Situation (Beijing: Office of the State Council, July 1998); quoted by 

Thomas A. Drohan, Effects, Targets, and Tools: A Primer for US 

Strategy and an Application Examining the Security Dynamics of 

Northeast Asia, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional 

Paper 50 (USAF Academy, Colorado Springs: May, 2003), 34, 

english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/2(1).html. (accessed April 

2004). 

97 “China And The North Korean Nuclear Issue,” www.nti.org/db/ 

china/koreapos.htm, updated last on 25 June 2003, (accessed July 28, 

2003). Article also reported that in late February 2003, two high level 

DPRK groups visiting Beijing were treated coldly and told, “stop 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

86

 

provoking the Americans” and hinted that China may not be able to 

oppose sanctions as reported by Leslie Fong, “China washes hands of 

N. Korea’s antics,” The Straits Times, 5 April 2003. 

98 “The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of 

China,” A Human Rights Watch Report 14, no. 8 (November 2002), 

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/northkorea/norkor1102.pdf (accessed 

April 2004). 

99 Drohan, Effects, Targets, and Tools, 43. 

100 Ibid. 

101 Kim, “North Korea,” 7. 

102 T. J. Pempel, remarks during a briefing given at University of San 

Francisco, “North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis,” 2 April 2004. TJ Pempel is 

the director of the Institute of East Asian Studies and Professor of 

Political Science at the University of California, Berkely. North Korea 

allowed some of the abductees to return to Japan for visitation under an 

agreement they would be returned to the DPRK. Five abductees were 

not returned to North Korea, and this is a source of tension between the 

two countries. 

103 Ibid. Also Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 319. He wrote that during 

the 1994 crisis, Japan told the United States that they may not be able 

to cut off Korean sympathizers funds estimated at $600 million 

annually. 

104 Ibid. 

105 Jong-Heon Lee, “Analysis: N. Korea Relies on China,” United 

Press International, 23 February 2004, www.washtimes.com/upibreaking/20040223-043834-110r.htm. (accessed April 2004). 

106 Tom O’Neill, “Dangerous Divide,” National Geographic 204, no. 1 

(July 2003): 18. 

107 North Korean defector, “Nuclear Nightmare: Understanding North 

Korea,” interview by Discovery Channel Spotlight television show, 06 

August 2003. 

108 www.janes.com (accessed April 2004). 

109 George Bush, quoted by Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” 328. 

President Bush’s comment made on 7 February 2003. 

110 Ibid., President Bush’s comment made on 3 March 2003. 

111 Cooper, “North Korean Crisis,” 330. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

87

 

112 USS General Sherman sources: www.globalsecurity.org/military/

ops/sherman.htm (accessed April 2004), Library of Congress Studies, 

and Cooper, “North Korean Crisis. Ship was dispatched to Asia to 

protect US interests. 

113 “US Warned Not To Forget Lesson From The Pueblo Incident,” 23 

January 2002, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. (accessed April 

2004). 

114 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 9. Also, Kenneth Jost, “Future of 

Korea: Chronology,” CQ Researcher (19 May 2000): 435. CQ 

Researcher’s Chronology stated that more than 54,000 US troops were 

killed in action in Korea. 

115 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 10. 

116 “US Warned Not To Forget Lesson From The Pueblo Incident,” 23 

January 2002, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. (accessed April 

2004). 

117 www.4janes. (accessed April 2004). 

118 US Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Situation 

on the Korean Peninsula 2000,” Report to Congress, 12 September 

2000, www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/korearpt.htm. (accessed 

April 2004). 

119 www.4janes. (accessed April 2004). 

120 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 326. 

121 Military data from Janes Country Executive Summaries. US data 

pulled from each services online personnel statistics, 2004. DPRK has 

over 100,000 Special Operations Forces (SOF). 170,000 US Marines 

are included in the US Navy force strength. 

122 See, for example, Janes.com, FAS.org (Federation of American 

Scientists), and US Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the 

Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula 2000,” Report to Congress, 

(12 September 2000), www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/

korearpt.htm. (accessed April 2004). 

123 US Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Situation 

on the Korean Peninsula 2000,” Report to Congress, 12 September 

2000, www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/korearpt.htm. (accessed 

April 2004). 

124 Ibid. 

125 Ibid. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

88

 

126 Personal experience from serving in the Air Operations Center, 

Osan Air Base, ROK, 2003. 

127 Average Monthly Conditions for Pyongyang, North Korea, 

“Weather Channel,” http://www.weather.com/outlook/travel/ 

climatology/monthly/KNXX0006/ (accessed 12 October 2003). 

128 T. Michael Mosley, Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers

(Assessment and Analysis Division, USCENTAF, 30 April 2003), 9. 

129 www.4janes.com. (accessed April 2004). 

130 US Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Situation 

on the Korean Peninsula 2000,” Report to Congress, (12 September 

2000), www.usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/easec/korearpt.htm. (accessed 

April 2004). 

131 Susan F. Bryant, “Northeast Asia Regional Security and the United 

States Military: Context, Presence, and Roles,” Beyond the Sunshine 

Policy: An Argument in Favor of Continued US Military Presence in 

Northeast Asia, Institute for National Security Studies Occasional 

Paper 47 (USAF Academy, Colorado Springs: November, 2002), 49. 

132 Dar Haddix, “US-China trade: Is the Honeymoon Over?” United 

Press International, 19 March 2004, www.upi.com/view.cfm?storyID= 

20040319-062546-5072r/ (accessed April 2004). 

133 Ibid. 

134 Scott Synder and Ah-Young Kim, China-ROK-US Relations and 

Regional Security in Northeast Asia, Comparative Connections Special 

Annual Issue (Honolulu: Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, July 2003), 6, www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal/ 

html/ (accessed April 2004). 

135 Jong-Heon Lee, Analysis: N. Korea Relies on China, United Press 

International, 23 February 2004, www.washtimes.com/upibreaking/20040223-043834-110r.htm. (accessed April 2004). 

136 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 322. 

137 Ibid., 315. 

138 Ibid., 324. 

139 R. James Woolsey and Thomas G. McInerney, “The Next Korean 

War: Using the Military is an Option. Here’s How It Can Be Done,”

The Wall Street Journal Editorial Page, Opinion Journal, August 4, 

2003, www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110003836. 

(accessed April 2004). 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer

89

 

140 Ibid. 

141 Ibid. 

142 Robert Wall, “Better Defense, Better Offense,” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology (12 April 2004): 65. 

143 Ibid. 

144 Ibid., 66. 

145 Mary H. Cooper, “KCNA Press Release,” The CQ Researcher (10 

January 2003): 324. 

146 Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and 

Nuclear Risks (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1991). 

147 Peter Maas, “The Last Emperor.” 

148 Albright and O’Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,

315. 

149 Jim Yardley, “North Korean Leader tells China He’s Committed to 

Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, 22 April 2004. 
Orcutt—Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer 

90