* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the (continued...) 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### September 20, 2005

Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

FREDERICK P. HARRISON; C.L.H.; J.Y.H., (Children), appearing by and through their father Frederick P. Harrison; CHRISTINA A. HARRISON; I.A.H., (A Child), appearing by and through his mother Christina A. Harrison, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. DAVID A. GILBERT, Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court, El Paso County, Colorado; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO; JOHNNY BOHNEN, El Paso County Attorney Office for the Department of Human Services; DIANE C. BOLDT, Guardian ad Litem; ANN ROTOLO, Guardian ad Litem; PHILLIP BRADLEY SHARP, Esq.; BRYAN HUNT, Esq.; KEN LARSON, Detective, El Paso County Sheriff's Office; TINA-MARIE T. HARRISON, Defendants-Appellees. No. 04-1420 (D. Colo.) (D.Ct. No. 03-N-2442 (BNB))

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ** (...continued)

doctrines of law of the case, res judicataand collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

-2- Before TACHA , Chief Circuit Judge, andPORFILIO and BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Frederick P. Harrison, a pro se litigant appearing for himself and his minor children; and his daughter, Christina A. Harrison, also a pro se litigant appearing for herself and her minor child (hereafter the Harr isons), appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaint relating to ce rtain 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other claims against various county and city officials an d other private parties. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and af firm.

The federal district court which entered the order dismissing the Harrisons’ complaint has succinctly set forth the facts, parti es, and allegations relevant to-3-

their complaint, which we reiterate in part. As th e district court noted, their action arises out of an El Paso County, Colorado, D istrict Court proceeding in which the state district court found Mr. Harrison’s minor children to be dependent and neglected. The Colorado Court of Appeals rever sed and remanded for further evidentiary hearing, but affirmed the state distric t court’s order directing Mr. Harrison to undergo genetic testing to determine if he fathered the child of his then minor daughter, Christina Harrison. The Harri sons then commenced their federal lawsuit, naming “just about anybody who hadanything to do with the state court proceedings.” Although the federal district court described the complaint as “rambling and frequently nonsensical,” it neverthel ess discerned that the Harrisons alleged: 1) the state district court jud ge committed multiple legal errors, acted arbitrarily, and denied them numerous constitutional rights; 2) the El Paso County Assistant Attorney, who represented the El Paso County Department of Human Services in initiating the dependency and neglect proceedings, conspired to violate their constitutional rights bypresenting statements to the court falsely attributed to Christina Harrison for the purpose of requiring Mr. Harrison to undergo invasive genetic testing; 3) tw o court-appointed guardianad litem attorneys, who represented Mr. Harrison’s minor ch ildren, including Christina, similarly violated their constitutional rights; 4) two private attorneys, one who represented Mr. Harrison, and the other who represented Christina, in the-4-

state court proceedings, participated in a civil ri ghts conspiracy and provided ineffective representation; 5) a county sheriff’s o ffice detective, who investigated the underlying facts in the state case, similarly v iolated their constitutional rights; and 6) Mr. Harrison’s “entangle” wife, who the district court assumed to be his ex-wife and who appeared to be the mother of Christ ina, participated in a conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights b y causing Christina to cooperate with the other defendants in providing information, now claimed to be false, which led to the dependency and neglect allegations and the order for Mr. Harrison to undergo genetic testing.

After setting out the parties and allegations, the federal district court carefully and concisely applied the applicable law to the allegations asserted and then dismissed the complaint. In short, the distri ct court explained: 1) neither Frederick nor Christina, acting pro se , could represent the interests of their minor children; 2) the allegations made against the state district court judge were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as the doctrine of absolute judic ial immunity; 3) the attorneys acting as guardians ad litem were entitled to quasijudicial immunity; 4) the assistant county attorneywas protected by the doctrine of quasi-judicial absolute immunity concerning any claims regarding his representation and advocacy in the state district c ourt; 5) the vague and-5-

insufficient conspiracy allegations against the she riff's detective were time barred; 6) the private attorneys were not acting under colo r of law as required under § 1983, the “vague general, conclusory” conspiracy claims against them failed to set forth allegations sufficient for a conspiracy, and any claims of legal malpractice against them under state law would be d ismissed for lack of jurisdiction given the dismissal of all federal cla ims; and 7) the “entangle” wife of Mr. Harrison and mother of Christina was a private party so she did not act under color of law with respect to the insufficient ly alleged conspiracy claims against her. In addition to dismissing the complai nt, the district court awarded costs to the defendants.

Following the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the Harrisons filed a motion for reconsideration, which the distr ict court reviewed and found to be without merit. The Harrisons now appeal the dis trict court’s order dismissing their complaint as well as the order denying their motion for reconsideration. In a repetitive and rambling forty-seven-page document, the Harrisons continue to essentially allege that the named defendants violat ed their constitutional rights and participated in a conspiracy to violate those r ights and that the district court erred in dismissing each of the named defendants, d enying their motion for reconsideration, and awarding costs to the defendants.-6-

We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. See Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002); Durre v. Dempsey , 869 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir. 1989). This court
construes pro se pleadings liberally, applying a less stringent sta ndard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend .” See Perkins v. Kan. Dept. of Corr. , 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). “In determin ing whether dismissal is proper, we must accept the allegations of the co mplaint as true and ... construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences th at might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. While we must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaint iff, we will not accept bare conclusory allegations as true or consider concluso ry allegations on the legal effect of the events set out if they do not reasona bly follow from the description of those events. See E.F.W. v. St. Stephen’s Indian High Sch. , 264 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir. 2001); Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc. v. Buchanan , 874 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Fed. Lands Legal Consortium v. United States , 195 F.3d 1190 (1999).-7-

With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the pleadings, including the Harrisons' appellate and reply briefs, the reco rd on appeal, and the district court’s decision, considering them in light of the applicable law. The district court issued a comprehensive and well-reasoned deci sion, and for the purposes of judicial economy, we will not repeat its discussion of the applicable law or reasoning for dismissing the complaint, other than to specifically conclude it is obvious the Harrisons cannot prevail on the facts a lleged. See Perkins , 165 F.3d at 806. Under the circumstances presented, we also find the district court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration or in awarding costs to the defendants.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision for substantially th e same reasons articulated in its September 10, 2004 Order of Dismissal and September 28, 2004 Order on the Harrisons’ motion f or reconsideration. We
DENY the Harrisons’ “Motion to Strike Counsel’s Entry o f Appearance For Defendants Johnny Bohnen and Ken Larson,” “Motion T o Strike Counsel’s Response Brief for Defendants Johnny Bohnen and KenLarson,” and “Motion To-8-

Strike Counsel’s Response Brief For Defendants [sic ] Phillip Bradley Sharp.”

Entered by the Court: WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge