No. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum 1

forces, the United States still deploys only 

warheads and delivery systems built during or shortly after the Cold War. The 

United States has no existing capability to develop and produce new nuclear 

weapons, and it would take more than 

a decade to reconstitute that long-lapsed 

capability. The United States earlier had 

ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

(CTBT). The President is torn over whether 

to test explosively some existing warheads 

for reliability. Opposition to a withdrawal 

from or violation of our CTBT obligations 

would be intense, but reports of warhead 

failure already have leaked. While successful tests would allay concerns about warhead reliability, unsuccessful tests could 

lead allies and adversaries alike to conclude that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is no 

longer reliable.

Perceptions of a compromised U.S. 

nuclear deterrent as described above would 

have profound policy implications, particularly if they emerge at a time when a nucleararmed great power is pursuing a more 

aggressive strategy toward U.S. allies and 

partners in its region in a bid to enhance its 

regional and global clout. 

■ A dangerous period of vulnerability 

would open for the United States and those 

nations that depend on U.S. protection while 

the United States attempted to rectify the 

The United States needs to modernize and 

ensure the long-term reliability and responsiveness of its aging nuclear deterrent force 

and nuclear weapons infrastructure. It cannot 

otherwise safely reduce its nuclear weapons, 

responsibly ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty, confidently deter and contain challenges from rising or resurgent nuclear-armed 

near peers, and effectively dissuade allies 

and partners from acquiring their own nuclear 

weapons. Modernization is fundamental to 

avoiding a future crisis of confidence in the 

U.S. nuclear deterrent.

A Hypothetical Scenario

In 2030, U.S. nuclear weapons scientists discover an anomaly during component testing of nuclear warheads used on 

U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles that raises serious doubts as to those 

warheads’ reliability. These doubts arise 

when an increasingly assertive, nucleararmed great power has been exerting pressure upon U.S. allies and partners in its 

region to reduce their defense cooperation with the United States, and has even 

made nuclear threats to that end. Whereas 

this increasingly assertive great power 

recently fielded new warheads on new 

delivery vehicles as part of a major modernization and expansion of its nuclear 

 Strategic Forum No. 252

January 2010

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence in 

the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

by John P. Caves, Jr.

problems with its nuclear forces. As it would 

take more than a decade for the United States 

to produce new nuclear weapons, ensuing 

events could preclude a return to anything 

like the status quo ante.

■ The assertive, nuclear-armed great 

power, and other major adversaries, could 

be willing to challenge U.S. interests more 

directly in the expectation that the United 

States would be less prepared to threaten or 

deliver a military response that could lead 

to direct conflict. They will want to keep 

the United States from reclaiming its earlier 

power position.

■ Allies and partners who have relied 

upon explicit or implicit assurances of U.S. 

nuclear protection as a foundation of their 

security could lose faith in those assurances. They could compensate by accommodating U.S. rivals, especially in the short 

term, or acquiring their own nuclear deterrents, which in most cases could be accomplished only over the mid- to long term. A 

more nuclear world would likely ensue over a 

period of years.

■ Important U.S. interests could be compromised or abandoned, or a major war could 

occur as adversaries and/or the United States 

miscalculate new boundaries of deterrence 

and provocation. At worst, war could lead 

to state-on-state employment of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) on a scale far more 

catastrophic than what nuclear-armed terrorists alone could inflict.
No. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum 2

Continuing Salience of 

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons, like all instruments of 

national security, are a means to an end—

national security—rather than an end in 

themselves. Because of the catastrophic 

destruction they can inflict, resort to nuclear 

weapons should be contemplated only when 

necessary to defend the Nation’s vital interests, to include the security of our allies, 

and/or in response to comparable destruction inflicted upon the Nation or our allies, 

almost certainly by WMD. The retention, 

reduction, or elimination of nuclear weapons 

must be evaluated in terms of their contribution to national security, and in particular the extent to which they contribute to the 

avoidance of circumstances that would lead 

to their employment.

Avoiding the circumstances that could lead 

to the employment of nuclear weapons involves 

many efforts across a broad front, many outside the military arena. Among such efforts are 

reducing the number of nuclear weapons to the 

level needed for national security; maintaining 

a nuclear weapons posture that minimizes the 

likelihood of inadvertent, unauthorized, or illconsidered use; improving the security of existing nuclear weapons and related capabilities; 

reducing incentives and closing off avenues for 

the proliferation of nuclear and other WMD to 

state and nonstate actors, including with regard 

to fissile material production and nuclear testing; enhancing the means to detect and interdict the transfer of nuclear and other WMD and 

related materials and capabilities; and strengthening our capacity to defend against nuclear 

and other WMD use. For as long as the United 

States will depend upon nuclear weapons for its 

national security, those forces will need to be 

reliable, adequate, and credible.

Today, the United States fields the most 

capable strategic nuclear forces in the world 

and possesses globally recognized superiority in any conventional military battlespace. 

No state, even a nuclear-armed near peer, 

rationally would directly challenge vital 

U.S. interests today for fear of inviting decisive defeat of its conventional forces and risking nuclear escalation from which it could 

not hope to claim anything resembling victory. But power relationships are never static, 

and current realities and trends make the 

scenario described above conceivable unless 

corrective steps are taken by the current 

administration and Congress.

Consider the challenge posed by China. 

It is transforming its conventional military 

forces to be able to project power and compete militarily with the United States in East 

Asia,1 and is the only recognized nuclear 

weapons state today that is both modernizing 

and expanding its nuclear forces.2 It weathered the 2008 financial crisis relatively well, 

avoiding a recession and already resuming 

robust economic growth.3 Most economists 

expect that factors such as openness to foreign investment, high savings rates, infrastructure investments, rising productivity, and 

the ability to leverage access to a large and 

growing market in commercial diplomacy are 

likely to sustain robust economic growth for 

many years to come, affording China increasing resources to devote to a continued, broadbased modernization and expansion of its 

military capabilities. In contrast, the 2008 

financial crisis was the most severe for the 

United States since the Great Depression,4

and it led in 2009 to the largest Federal budget deficit—by far—since the Second World 

War5 (much of which is financed by borrowing from China). Continuing U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are 

expensive, as will be the necessary refurbishment of U.S. forces when those conflicts end. Those military expenses, however, 

are expected to be eclipsed by the burgeoning entitlement costs of the aging U.S. “baby 

boomer” generation.6 As The Economist

recently observed:

China’s military build-up in the past decade 

has been as spectacular as its economic 

growth. . . . There are growing worries in 

Washington, DC, that China’s military power 

could challenge America’s wider military 

dominance in the region. China insists 

there is nothing to worry about. But even 

if its leadership has no plans to displace 

American power in Asia . . . America is 

right to fret this could change.7

As an emerging nuclear-armed near 

peer like China narrows the wide military 

power gap that currently separates it from 

the United States, Washington could find 

itself more, rather than less, reliant upon its 

nuclear forces to deter and contain potential 

challenges from great power competitors. The 

resulting security dynamics may resemble 

the Cold War more than the U.S. “unipolar 

moment” of the 1990s and early 2000s.

Concerns about Longterm Reliability

With continuing U.S. dependence upon 

nuclear forces to deter conflict and contain challenges from (re-)emerging great 

power(s), perceptions of the reliability, adequacy, and credibility of those forces will 

determine how well they serve those purposes. 

Perception is all important when it comes to 

nuclear weapons, which have not been operationally employed since 1945 and not tested 

(by the United States) since 1992, and, hopefully, will never have to be employed or tested 

again. If U.S. nuclear forces are to deter 

other nuclear-armed great powers, the individual weapons must be perceived to work as 

intended (reliability), the overall forces must 

be perceived as adequate to deny the adversary the achievement of his goals regardless 

of his actions (adequacy), and U.S. leadership 

must be perceived as prepared to employ the 

forces under conditions that it has communicated via its declaratory policy (credibility). 

John P. Caves, Jr., is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 

at the National Defense University. Comments or questions may be addressed to cavesj@ndu.edu.

for as long as the United 

States will depend upon 

nuclear weapons for 

its national security, 

those forces will need 

to be reliable, adequate, 

and credible
No. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum 3

These perceptions must be, of course, those of 

the leadership of adversaries that we seek to 

deter (as well as of the allies that we seek to 

assure), but they also need to be those of the 

U.S. leadership lest our leaders fail to convey 

the confidence and resolve necessary to shape 

adversaries’ perceptions to achieve deterrence. 

Weapons reliability is the essential foundation 

for deterrence since there can be no adequacy 

or credibility without it.

Reliability is a serious emerging issue for 

U.S. nuclear weapons. As Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates observed, “No one has designed 

a nuclear weapon in the United States since 

the 1980s, and no one has built a new one 

since the early 1990s.”8 Indeed, the United 

States is the only nuclear weapons state party 

to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 

that does not have the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead.9

 Russia, China, 

and France currently are modernizing their 

nuclear weapons systems, and the United 

Kingdom has decided to replace its current 

Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines 

and is investing in the sustainment of its 

nuclear warhead maintenance and replacement capabilities.10 In lieu of a nuclear weapons production infrastructure and nuclear 

testing, the United States relies upon its 

Stockpile Stewardship Program (utilizing 

computer simulation and component testing) 

to evaluate and validate the continued viability of existing warheads; service life extension 

programs to prolong the operational life of 

warheads (and delivery vehicles); and a stockpile of nonoperationally deployed warheads to 

provide spares for destructive component testing under the Stockpile Stewardship Program 

and a reserve to be pressed back into service 

to augment operationally deployed warheads, 

if deemed necessary.

The Achilles’ heel of this current 

approach to ensuring the reliability of U.S. 

nuclear forces is the possible advent of critical systemic failure(s) in entire classes of 

aging warheads. That such failures could 

occur can be anticipated as a general matter for any aging system, particularly one that 

is no longer physically tested as a complete 

assembly. Specific failures, however, cannot 

be accurately forecast since the United States 

has no prior experience with warheads of this 

age. The potential for such failures emerging is increased by the relatively narrow performance margins to which the warheads 

were engineered by Cold War nuclear weapons designers tasked with maximizing the 

number and explosive power of warheads that 

could be delivered by a ballistic missile.11

U.S. nuclear weapons scientists have 

warned of this problem for years.12 The preceding administration proposed to address 

this problem by reconstituting and exercising 

the infrastructure needed to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The proposal involved 

both facilities (consolidation, refurbishment, and replacement), work force (maintenance of highly specialized nuclear weapons 

skills), and nuclear weapons design, development, and production work (for refurbishment and replacement of existing warheads). 

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear 

Security Administration, which is responsible for the nuclear weapons infrastructure, 

expected that the infrastructure transformation plan could be implemented within 

its existing budget projections if the savings realized from the plan were allowed to 

be reinvested into the infrastructure.13 While 

some aspects of the proposed new infrastructure have moved forward (for example, the 

National Ignition Facility), much of the plan 

has not because Congress has declined to provide the requisite funding.14

Of particular significance, Congress 

withheld funding for the previous administration’s proposed Reliable Replacement 

Warhead (RRW) program. Under this program, one or more new types of nuclear 

warheads would have been developed 

and produced, if the designs were validated by experts, to replace existing warheads. The new warhead design(s) would 

have been based on previously tested and 

proven designs but would have incorporated increased performance margins, safer 

materials, and improved security controls. 

It was anticipated that the new warheads 

also could permit a reduction in the number 

of warheads maintained in reserve by virtue of their designs being considered more 

reliable over the long term than existing ones (which are reliable today) and the 

associated reconstitution of the U.S. capacity to produce additional weapons, should 

the need arise, thus supporting the further reduction in the overall number of U.S. 

nuclear weapons.15 RRW also was expected 

to result in lower life cycle costs for the 

weapons by eliminating some processes 

needed to maintain existing weapons.16

A lack of consensus and trust underlay 

the standoff between the preceding administration and Congress over RRW. Many 

Americans, including many of their representatives, desire a world in which nuclear weapons 

would be less salient to security and the weapons could be reduced and eventually eliminated. Indeed, almost all of the world’s nations, 

including the United States, have formally 

embraced that aspiration as part of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty. Aspects of the preceding administration’s early nuclear weapons policy were interpreted by some as increasing the 

role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy 

by articulating new missions for nuclear weapons (in particular, holding at risk hardened and 

deeply buried strategic targets of WMD-armed 

rogue nations) and proposing the investigation 

of modified or new types of nuclear weapons 

systems that would be more capable of accomplishing those missions (for example, Robust 

Nuclear Earth Penetrator and new, low-yield 

nuclear weapons). The administration unsuccessfully argued that such critics had fundamentally misinterpreted the intent of its nuclear 

weapons policy.17 Rebuffed, it eventually stopped 

pressing its controversial proposals to make U.S. 

nuclear weapons more capable and instead put 

forward RRW as a means to make those weapons reliable for the long term. Yet it proved too 

difficult for the administration to disassociate 

RRW from the earlier controversies.

the Achilles’ heel of 

this current approach 

to ensuring the reliability 

of U.S. nuclear forces is 

the possible advent of 

critical systemic failure(s) 

in entire classes of 

aging warheads
concept of national power, enjoy pride of 

place in their ongoing defense modernization efforts, and are brandished even today 

against U.S. allies and partners. Despite its 

call for abolition of nuclear weapons, China 

is the only recognized nuclear weapons state 

that is both modernizing and expanding 

its nuclear forces. Neither Russia nor China 

could be expected to join the United States in 

eliminating nuclear weapons as long as the 

United States (or any other power) enjoyed 

clear conventional military superiority. And 

if one or both of those countries gained conventional parity with the United States, the 

vision does not address what, in the absence 

of nuclear weapons, would preclude the 

return of great power conventional war, such 

as devastated the world twice in the 20th century. Perhaps that is because implicit in the 

vision is what is more explicit in Article VI 

of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: that 

nuclear disarmament is something that 

would be accomplished in conjunction with 

general disarmament, a noble but even more 

ambitious goal.

The biggest potential risk associated 

with the vision of a nuclear-free world, however, is that it will be used as a reason for 

inaction on the modernization needs of U.S. 

nuclear forces today. Why modernize U.S. 

nuclear forces if the goal is to get rid of all 

nuclear weapons? The reality is, as previously 

discussed, that geopolitical developments 

actually could increase rather than decrease 

U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons to deter 

and contain challenges from nuclear-armed 

great powers, and that a failure to modernize U.S. nuclear forces in a timely manner 

risks technical developments that may fundamentally call into question the reliability of 

those forces. That, of course, would seriously 

Part of the preceding administration’s 

problems in persuading Congress of the merits of its nuclear weapons enterprise proposals can be attributed to a paucity of senior 

policymakers in the Defense Department and 

the White House who had sufficient expertise on, and devoted the requisite attention 

to, nuclear weapons issues.18 This has been a 

growing weakness of both civilian and military leadership as the nuclear mission has 

been eclipsed since the end of the Cold War. 

Fewer and fewer military and civilian defense 

leaders have professional experience with the 

nuclear mission. The military’s neglect of 

the nuclear mission recently was highlighted 

by the Air Force’s unintentional transportation of nuclear weapons across the United 

States and various Defense Department activities’ involvement in the unwitting transfer 

of components for nuclear-capable ballistic 

missiles to Taiwan. The disciplinary action 

taken by Secretary Gates, including firing the 

Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

and the Schlesinger Commission’s report on 

these incidents, make clear the need for the 

national security community to refocus on 

the critical nuclear mission.19

Search for Consensus

Congress deferred key decisions on the 

future of U.S. nuclear weapons, including 

RRW, until after the incoming administration 

could address these issues. The Congressional 

Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States was established to provide outside advice to Congress and the new administration on these matters and to inform the 

administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, 

which is to be submitted by early 2010.

In March 2009, the Obama administration formally terminated the RRW program.20 In May 2009, the Strategic Posture 

Commission delivered its report. That report 

did not seek to resurrect RRW but made it 

clear that the current reliance on stockpile 

stewardship and life extension programs will 

not suffice over the long term. It explained 

that a spectrum of options exists for ensuring 

the arsenal’s long-term reliability that ranges 

from the pure remanufacturing of existing 

warheads with existing components at one 

end to complete redesign and new producNo. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum 4

tion of all system components at the other. 

Rather than apply a single solution to the 

entire arsenal, it advocated applying whatever 

technical option along this spectrum is most 

appropriate for each type of warhead and 

consistent with broader U.S. nuclear weapons policy.21

The deliberations of the Obama administration and Congress on the future role 

and structure of U.S. nuclear forces also will 

play out against the backdrop of the popular vision of a “world free of nuclear weapons,” which former Secretaries of State 

George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former 

Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn initially called for in 

January 2007.22 President Obama embraced 

this vision and the associated special responsibility of the United States to lead the world 

in that direction. He concedes that achieving 

the actual elimination of all nuclear weapons 

is a difficult and long-term task, something 

that may not be attained in his lifetime, but 

contends that articulating the vision and taking practical steps toward its achievement 

are essential to containing and reversing the 

ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons 

capabilities and to reducing the likelihood 

that such weapons will be used. However, 

President Obama also pledged to maintain 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter adversaries and to guarantee the 

defense of our allies as long as nuclear weapons exist.23 The President further has disavowed the development of any new nuclear 

weapons.24 It is not yet clear how he will reconcile these various commitments.

Many other political leaders, including in the Congress and abroad, also have 

enthusiastically embraced the vision of 

a nuclear-free world. That vision, however, leaves some fundamental issues unaddressed. First, it tends to assume that the 

world will follow if the United States leads 

toward nuclear disarmament. Many states 

no doubt would—most do not have nor 

currently plan to acquire nuclear weapons—but it is by no means evident that the 

states that most need to follow would do so. 

Iran and North Korea long have defied the 

expressed will of the international community in pursuing their nuclear weapons programs. Nuclear forces are central to Russia’s 

the biggest risk associated 

with the vision of a 

nuclear-free world is 

that it will be used as a 

reason for inaction on the 

modernization needs of 

U.S. nuclear forces
No. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum 5

compromise the security of the United States 

and its allies.

The United States can modernize its 

nuclear forces to enhance their reliability while still providing leadership for the 

world toward reducing, and perhaps one distant day even eliminating, nuclear weapons 

while instituting other practical measures to 

halt nuclear weapons proliferation and avoid 

the employment of such weapons. Redesigned 

or refurbished nuclear warheads that are no 

more militarily capable but that are more 

reliable, safe, and secure than existing weapons can replace those aging warheads and 

enable reductions in the overall number 

of nuclear weapons the United States must 

retain to ensure its security.

What Needs to be Done 

The United States should undertake the 

following four actions:

■ Build a smaller, safer, and more secure 

U.S. nuclear deterrent force that will be reliable over the long term. Reconstitute the U.S. 

capability to develop and produce nuclear 

weapons so the United States can undertake the necessary modernization of its aging 

nuclear arsenal. Authorize and fund a program to replace existing warheads with ones 

that are safe, secure, more easily manufactured, and reliable over the long term, which 

would make it less likely that the United 

States would need to resume nuclear testing, and which would enable the safe reduction in the number of warheads the United 

States must keep in reserve to meet new or 

greater threats that may emerge in the future. 

Modernize U.S. strategic delivery vehicles.

■ Accord and sustain a high policy priority to U.S. nuclear weapons issues. Ensure 

that senior policy officials in the White 

House and the Defense, Energy, and State 

Departments accord and sustain a high policy priority to U.S. nuclear weapons issues. 

Ensure that military and civilian leaders 

at all levels with responsibilities for nuclear 

weapons issues have professional experience 

with or adequate education on these matters.

■ Forge a new national consensus on the 

role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security. Those senior policy officials, especially 

in the White House and Defense Department, 

need to engage Congress and public opinion 

leaders to reach a shared understanding on 

the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and the shape 

of the future U.S. nuclear posture. Recognize 

that nuclear weapons will remain an indispensable element of national security policy 

for the foreseeable future, particularly given 

the potential for nuclear-armed near peers to 

reduce the military gap with the United States 

and become more assertive on the world stage. 

Recognize that a reliable, adequate, and credible U.S. nuclear force posture over the long 

term is essential to maintaining the security of not only the United States but also of 

its allies, and in dissuading those allies from 

acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

■ Provide leadership to reduce the dangers that nuclear weapons pose to U.S. 

national security. As President Obama already 

has already done or is on course to do: reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the full implementation of the nuclear nonproliferation 

regime; actively pursue with Russia a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty that carries forward its most 

valuable aspects (including binding and verifiable arms reduction obligations), advances 

nuclear arms reduction to safe levels below 

those established in the Moscow Treaty, and 

contributes to a posture that minimizes the 

likelihood of accidental, unauthorized, or 

ill-considered nuclear weapons employment; 

develop a strategy for bringing other nuclear 

weapons states into a future nuclear arms 

control and reduction framework; reduce 

incentives and close off avenues for nuclear 

weapons proliferation, including with regard 

to fissile material production and nuclear 

testing; enhance national and international 

capacity and cooperation to detect and interdict nuclear and other WMD and related 

capabilities and materials; and strengthen 

defenses against nuclear and other WMD.

The Nation risks a future crisis of confidence in its nuclear deterrent if it does not 

initiate soon the lengthy process of modernizing its nuclear arsenal and supporting infrastructure. Notwithstanding the goal 

of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in 

U.S. security strategy, nuclear weapons will 

remain highly salient to the Nation’s security 

for the foreseeable future, particularly as one 

or more nuclear-armed near peers narrow the 

gap that currently separates our conventional 

military power. By modernizing its aging 

nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure, the United States can more confidently 

ensure its own and its allies’ future security 

with fewer, safer, and more secure nuclear 

weapons that are less expensive to maintain 

than existing ones. It also can ratify and pursue entry into force of the CTBT with greater 

confidence. The United States can set an 

the Nation risks a future 

crisis of confidence in 

its nuclear deterrent if 

it does not initiate soon 

the lengthy process of 

modernizing its nuclear 

arsenal and supporting 

infrastructure

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

Phillip C. Saunders 

Interim Director of Research

Christopher J. Lamb

Interim Director

The Strategic Forum series presents original 

research by members of NDU as well as other 

scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of Defense or any 

other agency of the Federal Government. Visit 

NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu. 

The mission of the Institute for National 

Strategic Studies is to conduct strategic 

studies for the Secretary of Defense, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the combatant commanders, to support 

the national strategic components of the 

academic programs at the National Defense 

University, and to provide outreach to other 

U.S. Government agencies and to the broader 

national security community.
the 21st Century, January 31, 2008. D’Agostino also observed, 

“Delay and inaction will only increase the costs and elevate 

the risks associated with maintaining an ageing stockpile.”

14 Thomas P. D’Agostino, Administrator, National 

Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, 

statement before the House Committee on Armed Services, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, February 27, 2008.

15 Ibid.

16 D’Agostino, “Complex Transformation and Strategic 

Weapons in the 21st Century.”

17 The preceding administration explained that the 

intent of its nuclear weapons policy was to reduce U.S. dependence upon nuclear weapons through greater reliance upon 

precision conventional weapons and missile defenses. It also 

explained that it sought to reduce the overall number of U.S. 

nuclear weapons by relying more on a reconstituted ability to produce new weapons than on a large reserve of existing weapons and by making the nuclear weapons that were 

retained more relevant to post–Cold War threats.

18 This challenge is discussed further in Paul I. 

Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and John F. Reichart, The Future 

Nuclear Landscape, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Occasional Paper 5 (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, April 2007), 29–30. 

19 See the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force 

on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, both Phase I: The 

Air Force’s Nuclear Mission (September 2008), and Phase II: 

Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission (December 2008).

20 America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of 

the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of 

the United States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 

Peace Press, 2009), 41.

21 Ibid., xvii–xviii.

22 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. 

Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear 

Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, A15.

23 Remarks by President Barack Obama in Hradcany 

Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available 

at <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-ByPresident-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered>.

24 Peter Eisler, “Nuclear Weapons Decision Awaits 

Obama,” USA Today, December 9, 2008, available at <www.

usatoday.com/news/military/2008-12-08-obamanuke_N.htm>.

example of responsible force modernization 

that moves toward a nuclear weapons–free 

future for the other recognized nuclear weapons states, all of which already are pursuing 

their own force modernization.

The Obama administration commendably has committed to a number of measures to reduce the risks posed by nuclear 

weapons, many of which will be addressed 

at the Global Summit on Nuclear Security 

that it is convening in April 2010 and at the 

NPT Review Conference the following month. 

But the Obama administration has not yet 

revealed its hand with regard to the future of 

the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This President and 

this Congress need to choose wisely and commit the requisite leadership and resources to 

ensuring a reliable and credible U.S. nuclear 

deterrent for decades to come.

Notes

1

 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report 

to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of 

China 2008, Executive Summary, 1. Also of note, Admiral 

Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, 

recently observed, “I would contend that in the past decade 

or so, China has exceeded most of our intelligence estimates 

of their military capability and capacity every year. They’ve 

grown at an unprecedented rate in those capabilities.” 

See Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” The Washington Times, 

November 5, 2009, B1. ADM Willard’s remarks were made to 

reporters in Seoul, Republic of Korea, on October 21, 2009.

2

 U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department 

of Energy, Joint Report, National Security and Nuclear 

Weapons in the 21st Century, September 2008, 1.

3

 See “Asia Recovering Rapidly, but Faces Challenges, 

says IMF,” International Monetary Fund (IMF) Survey 

Magazine (October 29, 2009), chart entitled “Asia rebounding,” footnote 1, available at <www.imf.org/external/pubs/

ft/survey/so/2009/CAR102809A.htm>; and Takatoshi Kato, 

Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, keynote speech at the Korean International Financial Association 

First International Conference, Seoul, Korea, October 16, 2009.

4

 David Wheelock, “Ask an Economist,” The Regional 

Economist, U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, available at <http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/

regional/09/07/reader_exchange.pdf>.

5

 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “The Budget and 

Economic Outlook: An Update,” August 2009, 1, available at 

<www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10521/2009BudgetUpdate_

Summary.pdf>. CBO predicted a 2009 budget deficit at the 

time of $1.6 trillion, corresponding to 11.2 percent of gross 

domestic product (GDP). According to the Final Monthly 

Treasury Statement for fiscal year 2009 (www.fms.treas.

gov/mts/mts0909.pdf), the 2009 deficit was $1.4 trillion, but 

that was still 10 percent of GDP. The second highest deficit since World War II as a percentage of GDP was 6 percent 

in 1983, per Historical Tables, Budget of the United States 

Government, Fiscal Year 2008, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/hist.pdf>.

6

 Congressional Budget Office, 4.

7

 “A wary respect, a special report on China and the 

United States,” The Economist, October 24, 2009, 4, available at <www.economist.com/specialreports/PrinterFriendly.

cfm?story_id=14678579>.

8

 Robert M. Gates’ remarks at the Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, Washington, DC, October 28, 2008.

9 National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st

Century, 19.

10 Ibid., 5, 9.

11 Nuclear Weapons Complex Assessment Committee, 

American Academy for the Advancement of Science, Center 

for Science, Technology, and National Security, “The United 

States Nuclear Weapons Program, The Role of the Reliable 

Replacement Warhead,” April 2007, 17.

12 For example, see National Security and Nuclear 

Weapons in the 21st Century, 17, and “The United States 

Nuclear Weapons Program, The Role of the Reliable 

Replacement Warhead,” 14–16.

13 Thomas P. D’Agostino, Administrator, National 

Nuclear Security Administration, “Complex Transformation 

and Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century,” delivered at 

the Los Alamos National Laboratory/Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory Conference on Strategic Weapons in 

No. 252, January 2010 Strategic Forum 6

U.S.-Cambodia Defense Relations: 

Defining New Possibilities

Lewis M. Stern

(Strategic Forum 251, November 2009)

STAR–TIDES and Starfish Networks: 

Supporting Stressed Populations with 

Distributed Talent

Linton Wells II, Walker Hardy, Vinay Gupta, 

and Daniel Noon

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 70, 

December 2009)

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