1

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1886

In re: OMAR BOTERO-PARAMO,

Debtor,

-----------------------

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

TYSONS FINANCIAL, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:11-cv-00370-AJT-IDD)

Argued: May 16, 2012 Decided: June 8, 2012

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and DUNCAN, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion 

in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge King joined.

ARGUED: Christopher Allan Glaser, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Gabrielle Marcus Duvall, 

LINOWES & BLOCHER, LLP, Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: David H. Cox, James N. Markels, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC, 
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Washington, D.C., for Appellant. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from an adversary proceeding that 

Sutton Funding, LLC (“Sutton”) initiated against Tysons 

Financial, LLC (“Tysons”) on August 17, 2009, during the 

pendency of Omar Botero-Paramo’s bankruptcy. Sutton sought to 

have the bankruptcy court either declare that its lien against 

some of Botero-Paramo’s property had priority over Tysons’s lien 

or to subrogate its lien into a prior position. The bankruptcy 

court granted summary judgment and awarded attorneys’ fees in 

favor of Tysons. Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. 

(“BONY”), which had by then purchased Sutton’s interest in the 

property, appealed both the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary 

judgment and its award of attorneys’ fees in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The 

district court affirmed, and this appeal ensued. For the 

reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I.

Omar Botero-Paramo and his wife, Maritza Urdinola,

owned two pieces of real property: 10447 New Ascot Drive, Great 

Falls, Virginia (the “New Ascot Drive Property”), and 10511 

Lawyers Road, Vienna, Virginia (the “Lawyers Road Property”). 
4

When Botero-Paramo filed for bankruptcy on December 5, 2008,1 his 

creditors quickly learned that the paperwork effectuating the 

many liens on these properties was less than a model of clarity. 

We will first describe the various liens against the properties, 

then the bankruptcy filing, and finally the procedural history 

of this appeal.

A.

Botero-Paramo and Urdinola (collectively, the 

“Debtors”) kept the Lawyers Road Property as their residence and 

constructed a home on the New Ascot Drive property as a “spec” 

home, that was to be sold. The earliest lien relevant to this 

appeal is a June 2005 First Deed of Trust from First Savings 

Mortgage for $2.79 million (the “FSM First DOT”), which the 

Debtors used to purchase the New Ascot Drive Property. The FSM 

First DOT was a short-term construction loan due on July 1, 

2007. This lien encumbered only the New Ascot Drive Property.

The next lien in this appeal is a September 2005 Third 

Deed of Trust from Congressional Funding USA, LLC for $400,000 

(the “CFUSA Third DOT”). This lien encumbered only the Lawyers 

 1 Urdinola filed her own Chapter 11 petition on August 3, 

2009. This appeal resolves pending issues in both bankruptcies.
5

Road Property. A sloppy refinancing of this lien created much 

of the controversy in this case.

In December 2005, the debtors refinanced the CFUSA 

Third DOT with a new loan from the same lender for $500,000 (the 

“CFUSA Refinancing DOT”). As a condition for this refinancing, 

CFUSA required a lien against the New Ascot Drive Property as 

additional security. The closing instructions indicate that 

this lien was to encumber both the Lawyers Road Property and the 

New Ascot Drive Property, but, for reasons that are unclear, the 

deed of trust only referenced the New Ascot Drive Property. The 

attached “Balloon Rider” also mentions only the New Ascot Drive 

Property on its face, although at least one of its exhibits 

refers to the Lawyers Road Property, as well.

To further complicate matters, the parties incorrectly 

filled out the form deed of trust. After some apparent 

crossing-out, the CFUSA Refinancing DOT, as recorded, failed to 

name a trustee and listed the intended trustee as the lender. 

Tysons purchased the CFUSA Refinancing DOT on December 27, 2005,

and recorded a deed of trust correcting the above deficiencies 

on July 24, 2006, but the debtors neither re-executed nor reacknowledged this corrected deed of trust as required by 

Virginia law.

So that they could again refinance the Lawyers Road 

Property in 2006, the Debtors had Tysons release its lien by 
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signing and recording a “Certificate of Release of Deed of 

Trust” (the “Release”) in November 2006. As recorded on 

December 19, 2006, the “Affidavit and Release” on the Release 

reads: “I certify I am the holder of the above mentioned note

secured by the above mentioned Deed of Trust. The Lien thereon 

created and retained on the above mentioned property is hereby 

released.” The only property previously mentioned on the 

Release is the Lawyers Road Property.

BONY’s predecessors did not take an interest in the 

New Ascot Drive Property until June 4, 2007, when the Debtors 

refinanced the FSM First DOT--the loan used to purchase that 

property--with a 30-year loan from American Brokers Conduit for 

$2.66 million (the “ABC DOT”). At the same time, another bank,

Secured Lending, took what it intended to be a Second Deed of 

Trust (the “Secured Lending DOT”) from the debtors for $625,000. 

The Secured Lending DOT was accidentally recorded before the ABC 

DOT, but later subordinated to the ABC DOT.

It is nonetheless undisputed that the CFUSA 

Refinancing DOT was properly recorded against the New Ascot 

Drive Property, even if the document recorded contained numerous 

errors. However, title reports prepared during this refinancing

did not include the CFUSA Refinancing DOT and similarly did not 

reveal that Tysons now owned that lien.
7

Barclays purchased the ABC DOT for Sutton, which held 

the lien until roughly one month after Sutton filed this 

adversary proceeding. Then, in September 2009, BONY purchased 

Sutton’s interest in the lien at a discount in light of this

ongoing litigation.

B.

Botero-Paramo filed for bankruptcy on December 5, 

2008. In June 2009, he filed a motion to approve the sale of 

the New Ascot Drive Property. This motion treated the CFUSA 

Refinancing DOT, which was then held by Tysons, as the first 

lien against the property. Tysons first objected to the sale 

because it proposed to repay only the principal amount, without 

any interest or other charges. Tysons later relented and 

entered into a consent order on July 17, 2009, under which it 

would receive the full amount of its claimed pay-off, Sutton 

would receive the balance, and Secured Lending would receive 

nothing.

Secured Lending objected to the sale on July 27, 2009, 

claiming that Tysons should not receive anything from the sale 

since it had released its lien on the New Ascot Drive Property

with the Release that it recorded on December 19, 2006. Sutton 

echoed this claim when it too objected to the sale on August 7, 
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2009. Sutton began the adversary proceeding underlying this 

appeal ten days later.2

C.

In its complaint, Sutton claimed that Tysons had 

released its interest in the New Ascot Drive Property, and that, 

in the alternative, it was entitled to equitable subrogation 

such that its lien would have priority over Tysons’s lien.3 The 

bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of Tysons in 

a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion. The bankruptcy court 

first decided the threshold question of whether deficiencies 

with the CFUSA Refinancing DOT rendered the intended lien 

unenforceable; if so, Tysons could not have priority over BONY. 

Applying Virginia law, the bankruptcy court determined that the 

deficiencies in the CFUSA Refinancing DOT did not render the 

 2 The parties entered into a consent order on September 2, 

2009, that allowed the sale of the New Ascot Drive Property free 

and clear of all liens for $2.78 million. The parties agreed to 

hold in escrow the funds needed to resolve this appeal and to 

disburse the remainder to BONY, as Sutton’s successor, to 

satisfy the portion of its lien that would be paid even if it 

were junior to Tysons's lien. As the bankruptcy court noted, 

BONY received more pursuant to this agreement than it paid for 

Sutton’s interest in the lien. J.A. 1713.

3 Tysons counterclaimed but the bankruptcy court declined to 

decide those claims because deciding Sutton’s, then BONY’s, 

claims settled all of the issues in the case.
9

lien unenforceable; at the very least, it could be enforceable 

as an equitable mortgage.

Turning to the question of whether the Certificate of 

Release of Deed of Trust released Tysons’s lien against the New 

Ascot Drive Property, the bankruptcy court determined that the 

Release conformed with neither the statutory form for a 

“Certificate of Satisfaction,” which would release all of the 

property covered by a lien, nor the statutory form for a 

“Certificate of Partial Satisfaction,” which would release only 

some of the property covered by a lien. The bankruptcy court 

determined that the Release was more similar to a partial 

satisfaction since it lacked the phrase “has been paid in full,” 

which Virginia law requires when a satisfaction releases all of 

the property covered by a lien. Also supporting this conclusion 

was that the Release claimed only to release the lien “on the 

above-mentioned property,” here, the Lawyers Road Property. 

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court found that the Release applied 

only to the Lawyers Road Property and that the New Ascot 

Property remained encumbered.

As to subrogation, the bankruptcy court found that the 

equities did not favor granting BONY the same priority as the 

FSM First DOT. In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy 

court noted that BONY was not a holder in due course, but had 
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purchased its interest after the deed of trust “had been 

squarely challenged in litigation.” J.A. 1726.

Finally, the bankruptcy court awarded Tysons's

attorneys' fees at a separate hearing on February 28, 2011. 

J.A. 2164.4 Relevant to this appeal, the bankruptcy court found

that it could “almost take judicial notice of what are 

prevailing fees in the Virginia area for bankruptcy-related 

litigation.” J.A. 2159. Although Tysons had presented only 

testimony from its own attorney on the reasonableness of its 

fees, the bankruptcy court found that these fees were 

comfortably with the normal range of its experience and 

therefore found the fees to be reasonable.

BONY appealed to the district court, which affirmed 

the holdings of the bankruptcy court in all respects. We will 

consider first the claims that the bankruptcy court decided on 

summary judgment and then its award of attorneys’ fees and 

costs.

 4 The bankruptcy court capped any fee award at the sum held 

in escrow in excess of the value of Tysons’s lien. Therefore, 

although Tysons actual fees exceeded the amount in escrow, the 

bankruptcy court refused to award it a damages award against 

BONY. J.A. 2110.
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II.

We begin our analysis of the claims decided on summary 

judgment by briefly considering the standard of review. We then 

turn to BONY’s claim that Tysons lacked an enforceable lien 

against the New Ascot Drive Property. Finding its lien 

enforceable, we proceed to consider BONY’s argument that Tysons 

released its lien against the New Ascot Drive Property when it 

recorded the Release on December 19, 2006, and conclude that the 

Release did not cover the New Ascot Drive Property. We finally

examine, and ultimately reject, BONY’s alternative argument that 

it is entitled to equitable subrogation because the proceeds of 

its lien paid off the FSM First DOT.

A.

When reviewing a district court’s decision on appeal 

from a bankruptcy court, we apply the same standard of review 

that the district court applied when it reviewed the decision of 

the bankruptcy court. Terry v. Meredith (In re Stephen S. 

Meredith, CPA, P.C.), 527 F.3d 372, 375 (4th Cir. 2008).

We review a grant of summary judgment by the 

bankruptcy court and its affirmance by the district court de 

novo. United Rentals, Inc. v. Angell, 592 F.3d 525, 530 (4th 

Cir. 2010). “Summary judgment in bankruptcy is governed by 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, which incorporates 
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the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 into 

bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. Accordingly, “we view the facts 

and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.

B.

The threshold question in this appeal is whether 

Tysons ever had an enforceable lien against the New Ascot Drive 

Property. As discussed above, the CFUSA Refinancing DOT had 

three deficiencies: (1) it failed to name a trustee; (2) it 

named the intended trustee as the beneficiary (otherwise known 

as the lender); and (3) it failed to mention the Lawyers Road 

Property. Tysons attempted to correct these deficiencies by 

filing a corrected deed of trust in 2006, but the debtors 

neither re-executed nor re-acknowledged this corrected deed of 

trust. The bankruptcy court noted that correcting the trustee 

and beneficiary did not materially alter the estate being

conveyed but ultimately declined to rest its decision on this 

ground since a failure to name a trustee nonetheless creates an 

enforceable mortgage under Virginia law.5

 5 BONY’s suggestion that the CFUSA Refinancing DOT did not 

create a lien against the Lawyers Road Property is irrelevant to 

this appeal, and we express no opinion on that question.
13

We find the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Bank 

of Christianburg v. Evans, 178 S.E. 1 (Va. 1935), largely 

dispositive on this issue. That decision explains that “it is 

well settled that a deed of trust on real estate to secure 

creditors, in which the name of the trustee is left blank, is an 

equitable mortgage, and may be enforced as such upon the 

principle that equity will treat that as done which, by 

agreement, is to be done.” Id. at 2. BONY suggests that 

Virginia’s revised property codes, which require the listing of 

a trustee, changed this rule. However, it cites no case law 

supporting this claim. We decline to read Virginia’s 

requirements for deeds of trust as eliminating the longstanding 

doctrine of equitable mortgages absent any Virginia authority 

indicating that such a fundamental change was intended.

BONY further contends that Tysons’s lien is invalid 

because the CFUSA Refinancing DOT named the trustee as the 

beneficiary instead of Congressional Funding, and as a result,

only the trustee had the authority to convey the lien to Tysons. 

As the bankruptcy court noted, BONY has cited no authority for 

the proposition that “mere misidentification of the lender’s 

name invalidates an otherwise proper deed of trust.” J.A. 1716. 

Indeed, “the principle that equity will treat that as done 

which, by agreement, is to be done,” Bank of Christianburg, 178 

S.E. at 2, appears equally applicable to misidentified lenders. 
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We agree with the bankruptcy court that as recorded, the deed of 

trust was sufficient to give a subsequent searcher notice that 

there was a lien against the New Ascot Drive Property. Indeed, 

as we discuss in greater detail in addressing equitable 

subrogation, BONY has argued neither that the lien was 

improperly recorded nor that one of the deficiencies on the deed 

of trust would prevent a title search from finding the lien. In 

sum, we find Tysons’s lien to be enforceable.

C.

We find BONY’s second argument--that the Release 

terminated Tyson’s lien against the New Ascot Drive Property--

also lacking merit. As the district court noted, the usual 

process for releasing a deed of trust in Virginia is to file 

either a “Certificate of Satisfaction” or a “Certificate of 

Partial Satisfaction.” Va. Code Ann. § 55-66.3(A)(1). Section 

55-66.4 contemplates a partial satisfaction through which a lien 

covering multiple properties would be released only as to some 

of the properties.6

 As the bankruptcy court correctly observed, 

the statutory forms for a complete release and a partial release 

 6 For the sake of clarity, we refer to a “Certificate of 

Satisfaction” as a “complete satisfaction” since it releases all 

of the property encumbered by a lien and a “Certificate of 

Partial Satisfaction” as a “partial satisfaction” since it 

releases only some of the property encumbered by a lien.
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differ in that a complete satisfaction has the lender certify 

that it has been paid in full while the partial satisfaction has 

the lender certify that “[t]he lien of the above-mentioned deed 

of trust securing the above-mentioned note is released insofar 

as the same is applicable to _____ (description of property) 

recorded in deed book _____ at page _____ in the clerk's office 

of this court.” Id. at § 55-66.4:1.

Although the Release does not comply exactly with 

either form--for example, it styles itself as a “release” 

instead of a “satisfaction”--it better comports with the form of 

a partial satisfaction. As noted above, the “Affidavit and 

Release” reads: “I certify I am the holder of the above 

mentioned noted secured by the above mentioned Deed of Trust. 

The Lien thereon created and retained on the above-mentioned 

property is hereby released.” The only property previously 

mentioned on the release is the Lawyers Road Property. Notably 

absent is any language suggesting that the lender had been paid 

in full as would be customary for a complete release. In sum, 

we read the plain language of the Release as applying only to

the lien against the Lawyers’ Road Property.7

 Accordingly, we 

agree with the bankruptcy court that because Tysons’s lien was 

 7 We have considered BONY’s other arguments in favor of 

construing the Certificate of Release of Deed of Trust as a 

complete satisfaction and find them to be without merit.
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recorded before BONY’s, Tysons’s lien has priority over BONY’s 

unless BONY can show that it is entitled to assume a prior 

position through subrogation.

D.

BONY seeks to have us give its lien the same priority 

as the FSM First DOT through equitable subrogation, and thereby 

grant it priority over Tysons’s lien. As the Virginia Supreme 

Court explained in Federal Land Bank of Baltimore v. Joynes, 18 

S.E.2d 917 (Va. 1942), “[s]ubrogation is the substitution of 

another person in the place of the creditor to whose rights he 

succeeds in relation to the debt.” Id. at 920. It is “not 

dependent upon contract, nor upon privity between the parties” 

but is “the creature of equity, and is founded upon principles 

of natural justice.” Id. “Subrogation not being a matter of 

strict right, but purely equitable in its nature, dependent upon 

the facts and circumstances of each particular case, no general 

rule can be laid down which will afford a test in all cases for 

its application.” Id. Virginia courts have “‘long been 

committed to a liberal application of the principle of 

subrogation.’” Centreville Car Care v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 559 

S.E. 2d 870, 872 (Va. 2002) (quoting Joynes, 18 S.E. 2d at 920).

Although the fact-intensive inquiry required in 

subrogation claims does not generally support bright line rules, 
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Virginia courts have traditionally adhered to two guiding 

principles when deciding the merits of a subrogation claim: 

“First, subrogation is not appropriate where intervening 

equities are prejudiced.” Id. (internal citations removed). As 

the Joynes court explained, “[i]n the case of conventional 

subrogation where the lender of money lent it with the intention 

and understanding that he be substituted to the position of the 

creditor whose debt he paid, but without taking an assignment, 

where there are no intervening equities to be prejudiced, the 

matter will be treated as if an assignment has been executed.” 

18 S.E. 2d at 920. The second guiding principle is that the

“ordinary negligence of the subrogee does not bar the 

application of subrogation where an examination of the facts . . 

. shows that the equities strongly favor the 

subrogee.” Centerville, 559 S.E. 2d at 872 (internal quotation 

marks and alterations removed).

BONY claims that the bankruptcy court did not properly 

analyze its claim under these principles. BONY’s argument in 

this regard comprises two issues: whether the purchaser of a 

lien assumes the equitable position of the seller, and, if so, 

whether subrogation is appropriate, or equitable, under these 

circumstances. As to the former, the bankruptcy court expressed 

its reluctance to conclude that BONY assumed Sutton’s position 

vis-à-vis whether the equities favored subrogation. As to the 
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latter, the bankruptcy court also disagreed, finding that the 

equities did not favor subrogation.

We need not decide the complex threshold question of 

whether the purchaser of an interest in a lien assumes the 

equitable position of the seller under Virginia law. Even 

assuming that BONY stepped into the equitable position of Sutton 

and ABC, the original lender, we find that subrogation is 

inappropriate in these circumstances because it would prejudice 

Tysons.

BONY argues that it is entitled to priority over 

Tysons because the proceeds of its lien paid off the FSM First 

DOT and Tysons intended for its lien to be junior to the FSM 

First DOT. Thus, BONY argues that not giving its lien priority 

over Tysons’s lien would give Tysons more than it bargained for. 

Although it is undoubtedly true that Tyson’s predecessor, CFUSA, 

originally had a lien junior to the FSM First DOT, the FSM First 

DOT was due on July 1, 2007. In other words, the CFUSA 

Refinancing DOT would become the senior lien 18 months after it 

was recorded. We find that the Virginia Supreme Court’s 

decision in Centreville Car Care v. North American Mortgage Co.,

559 S.E.2d at 373, instructive on this point. There, the court

found that effectively extending the term of a senior lien would 

prejudice a junior lienholder. Id. at 373. Centerville Car 

Care had a lien of $150,000 against a property valued at 
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$210,000. Id. Centerville was undersecured because its lien 

was junior to a $199,000 lien held by Fleet Bank against this 

same property. Id. The court explained that “[n]evertheless, 

Centreville had the right to anticipate that the obligors would 

ultimately satisfy these loans to extinguish the liens upon 

their interests in the property.” Id.

BONY seeks to distinguish Centreville by contending

that in a typical construction financing arrangement that Tysons 

would have expected the short-term FSM First DOT to be replaced 

with long term financing once a home was built on the property. 

However, BONY has presented no evidence to support this 

proposition. Although we construe facts in favor of the nonmoving party on summary judgment, we need not accept 

conjecture. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 

(1986) (“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment 

rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims 

or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that 

allows it to accomplish this purpose.”). BONY has shown no 

issue of material fact suggesting that the bankruptcy court

inappropriately granted summary judgment on the question of 

whether subrogation would prejudice Tysons.

Further counseling against subrogation is BONY’s

failure to show that the equities “strongly favor” 

subrogation. Centerville, 559 S.E. 2d at 872. As we have 
20

noted, the fact that the title report on which BONY relied 

failed to indicate any liens other than the FSM First DOT does 

not aid its cause. In Virginia, sellers are deemed to have 

constructive notice of all recorded liens. Fox v. Templeton,

329 S.E. 2d 6, 8-9 (Va. 1985) (“A purchaser of real estate has 

constructive notice of the recorded title papers of his vendor, 

and is charged with notice of all that an actual examination of 

them would disclose.”). In fact, BONY conceded at oral argument 

that the CFUSA recording served as notice of the lien. To the 

extent that the title report on which BONY relied failed to 

reflect it, BONY must seek relief elsewhere. On the undisputed 

facts presented here, where, as noted, BONY has already received 

more from the sale of the property than it paid for Sutton’s 

interest, we find no basis for finding that the equities 

strongly favor BONY. Accordingly, we hold that the bankruptcy 

court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Tysons on 

BONY’s claim for subrogation.

III.

A.

We lastly turn to BONY’s contention that the 

bankruptcy court improperly granted Tysons's attorneys’ fees. 

We review an award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of 

discretion. Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 
21

243 (4th Cir. 2009). Where courts are statutorily permitted to 

award attorneys’ fees, our review “is sharply circumscribed” 

because we recognize that “a district court has close and 

intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and the value of the 

services rendered.” Id. (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 

277-78 (4th Cir. 1990)). We see no reason not to afford a 

district court’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court’s award of 

fees this same deference. Accordingly, we reverse the 

bankruptcy court’s award only if we determine it to be “clearly 

wrong.” Id.

B.

The crux of BONY’s argument is that Tysons failed to 

meet its burden to establish the prevailing market rate of 

attorneys’ fees in the relevant community where the bankruptcy 

court sat, namely, Alexandria, Virginia. To calculate an award 

of attorney's fees, we “first determine a lodestar figure by 

multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a 

reasonable rate.” Robinson, LLC, 560 F.3d at 243. This circuit 

uses a 12-part test to determine the reasonableness of the rate 

and the hours billed:

(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and 

difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill 

required to properly perform the legal services 

rendered; (4) the attorney’s opportunity costs in 

pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee 
22

for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations at the 

outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations 

imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount 

in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the 

experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; 

(10) the undesirability of the case within the legal 

community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and 

length of the professional relationship between 

attorney and client; and (12) attorneys’ fees awards 

in similar cases.

Id. at 243-44 (quoting Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 

226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978)). The court has previously explained 

that the party seeking fees has the burden of proving the 

reasonableness of the rate sought. Id. “In addition to the 

attorney’s own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce 

satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in 

the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks 

an award.” Id. at 244 (internal quotation marks and emphasis 

removed).

BONY argues that Tysons should have submitted 

affidavits from local attorneys other than its own counsel since 

the Bankruptcy Court was not itself qualified to determine 

whether Tysons’s fees were reasonable for the Alexandria area.8

 

 8 BONY also argues that Tysons’s own attorney, Ms. Duvall, 

was unable to provide adequate testimony about reasonable 

attorneys’ fees in the community because she is not a member of 

the Virginia bar. BONY has offered no authority suggesting that 

only members of the Virginia bar are qualified to testify about 

reasonable attorneys’ fees in Alexandria. We do not think that 

the district in which a testifying attorney is barred is 

dispositive in this inquiry.
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Although this court has reversed and remanded fee awards where 

the only evidence that the prevailing party presented was 

affidavits from her own counsel, id. at 245, we have not 

previously considered whether a bankruptcy court may consider 

its own expertise when determining the reasonableness of the 

rate charged by attorneys as the bankruptcy court did in this 

case. Several of our sister circuits have recognized that when 

the prevailing party has failed to provide adequate evidence of 

reasonable fees, a district court may rely on its own expertise 

in determining a reasonable hourly rate, as the bankruptcy court 

did here. E.g., Miele v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conference 

Pension & Ret. Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987) (opining

that a district court may rely on its knowledge of private firm 

hourly rates in the community in assessing the reasonableness of 

fees); Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 

1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Where documentation is inadequate, 

the district court is not relieved of its obligation to award a 

reasonable fee, but the district court traditionally has had the 

power to make such an award without the need of further 

pleadings or an evidentiary hearing.”); Lucero v. City of 

Trinidad, 815 F.2d 1384, 1385 (10th Cir. 1987) (“The 

establishment of hourly rates in awarding attorneys’ fees is 

within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with 

the case and the prevailing rates in the area”); see also CoStar 
24

Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (D. Md. 

2000) (“Evidence of the prevailing market rate usually takes the 

form of affidavits from other counsel attesting to their rates 

or the prevailing market rate. However, in the absence of 

sufficient documentation, the court may rely on its own 

knowledge of the market.” (citations omitted)). Here, the 

bankruptcy court observed that it had several similar cases 

before it in which it had awarded attorneys’ fees. It 

determined that Tysons sought fees that were within the range of 

fees awarded in those similar cases. Based on these 

comparables, it then thoroughly analyzed whether certain costs 

that Tysons claimed were better considered overhead and whether 

certain issues were overlawyered. Although this approach lacked 

the usual expert testimony, because nearly every case on a 

bankruptcy court’s docket involves reviewing attorneys’ fees and 

costs in the community, we find that bankruptcy courts are, in 

certain circumstances, particularly qualified to determine the 

reasonableness of fees based on their own expertise. Moreover, 

BONY has not argued that Tysons’s fees were unreasonable, only 

that Tysons did not meet its burden of proving that its fees 

were reasonable. We see little value in remanding a case only 

so that it can generate additional attorneys’ fees. On these 

facts, we hold that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its 

discretion when it awarded Tysons's attorneys’ fees and costs.
25

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the district court.

AFFIRMED