Homeland Security: 

The New Role for Defense

by Steven J. Tomisek

No. 189, February 2002

Strategic Forum

Before the terrorist attacks of September

11, the Armed Forces focused on deterrence, stability, and warfighting missions arising in overseas theaters. The U.S.

homeland was regarded as a rear area, not 

a front line, and the job of securing it was

primarily a task for civilian law enforcement

agencies at the Federal, state, and local

levels. The attacks on the World Trade Center

and the Pentagon, and the bioterrorist acts

that followed, have prompted a review that

reaffirms the Constitutional role of the Federal

Government as protector of the states against

foreign aggression and restores defense of

the American homeland as the primary mission of the Department of Defense (DOD).

If the highest DOD priority is defense of

American national territory, this mission must

receive the level of attention it merits. A

fundamental shift in the mindset of DOD

decisionmakers will be required. Evolving

national strategy for homeland security requires that DOD consider the employment of

military forces in ways previously considered

outside the scope of operations. As President

George W. Bush has said, “To win this war,

we have to think differently.”

Homeland security should not be viewed

as exclusively or even primarily a military

task. Securing the “domestic battlespace”—

a highly complex environment—requires

Federal departments and agencies, state and

local governments, the private sector, and

individual citizens to perform many strategic,

operational, and tactical level tasks in an

integrated fashion. These actions must be

synchronized with others that are being taken

on the international front to prosecute the war

against global terrorism. The challenges and

demands associated with this undertaking are

immense. Success will depend largely upon

the Nation’s ability to achieve unity of effort at

all levels of government.

Protecting the Homeland:

Status Quo Ante

Americans have become accustomed to

the idea of a forward defense of U.S. interests.

Accordingly, the Nation has organized,

trained, equipped, maintained, and deployed

its military forces to deal with threats beyond

its shores—an engagement strategy that

generally has been met by stationing or deploying over 250,000 U.S. forces at key points

around the Eurasian periphery. The strategic

construct is evolving to include an element of

internal engagement.

Within the United States, homeland protection has long been considered the domain of

civilian law enforcement and other agencies at

the Federal, state, and local levels. With few

exceptions, most defense resources tasked for

such civil support missions have been authorized on a basis of noninterference with primary

mission requirements (for example, warfighting

outside the continental United States). Department of Defense (DOD) employment within the

United States and its territories and possessions

typically has fallen under the broad category of

military assistance to civil authorities (MACA)

and is heavily weighted toward managing the

consequences of terrorist use or threat of a

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or

high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapon of mass

destruction (WMD) (see figure 1).

The MACA Approval Process. The range of

possible requests to DOD for civil support assistance is enormous. Utilizing procedures in place

before September 11, the Secretary of Defense

retains approval authority in dealing with the

most sensitive requests, such as those requiring

the use of forces (personnel, units, and equipment) already assigned to combatant commanders; military support of responses to civil

disturbances or acts of terrorism; and any support for planned events that raise the potential

for confrontation with specifically identified

individuals or groups, including actions that

may involve the use of lethal force. Below this

threshold, the Secretary has delegated

approval authority for all other emergency support in response to natural

or manmade disasters to the

Secretary of the Army. At any

level, however, all requests

No. 189

February 2002

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Key Points

Post-9/11 Critical 

Issues Series

Our first priority must always be the security of our nation....America is no longer protected by vast oceans. 

We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.

—President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002
for DOD military assistance are evaluated

against several criteria:

■ Legality: Is the requested support in

compliance with applicable law?

■ Lethality: Is there a potential use of

lethal force by or against DOD forces?

■ Risk: How will the safety of forces be

jeopardized?

■ Cost: Who pays and what is the impact

on the defense budget?

■ Appropriateness: Is the requested mission in the DOD interest to conduct?

■ Readiness: What is the impact on the

ability of the DOD to perform its primary

mission?

Always in Support. DOD responsibilities

in support of the lead Federal agency during

both crisis management and consequence

management are delineated in the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism

Concept of Operations Plan (Concept Plan)

and the Federal Response Plan, respectively.

The Concept Plan provides overall guidance for

the Federal response to a potential or actual

terrorist threat or incident (in particular, one

involving WMD) within the United States. The

Federal Response Plan provides the framework

under which 26 Federal departments and

agencies and the American Red Cross carry out

assigned functional responsibilities in response

to state requests for Federal assistance when the

consequences of major disasters and emergencies overwhelm state and local capabilities.

When terrorist attacks occur without adequate

warning, crisis and consequence management

measures are performed concurrently and in

close coordination. In the event of a domestic

terrorist incident, state and local governments

exercise primary authority in responding to the

consequences. The Federal Government provides assistance, as required, with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation acting as the lead

Federal agency for crisis management and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency having the lead for consequence management. 

Resourcing Reflects (Perceived) Reality.

Despite these elaborate arrangements, the preSeptember 11 threat environment simply did

not galvanize a national consensus around the

proposition that DOD should commit substantial dedicated resources to civil support or

homeland security (HLS) more generally.

Indeed, the relative DOD prioritization between

internal and external HLS mission areas is

apparent when viewed from the perspective of

resource allocation. The Defense Science

Board, as part of its 2000 Summer Study, was

asked to assist DOD and the intelligence community in defining their roles in protecting the

Nation from unconventional attacks against

the homeland. Their report concluded that less

than 2 percent of the defense and intelligence

community fiscal year 2001 budgets was devoted to protecting the homeland against

biological, chemical, information, and unconventional nuclear attacks and to providing civil

and counterdrug support.1

DOD Domestic Response

to September 11

Approximately 6 minutes after receiving

Federal Aviation Administration notification of

a problem with American Airlines Flight 11,

the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) North East Air Defense Sector

issued a fighter scramble order to two F–15s at

Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth,

Massachusetts. The scramble order was issued

at the estimated time of Flight 11’s crash into

the World Trade Center North Tower. The

horrific events of that day have transformed,

perhaps forever, DOD roles and missions in the

HLS arena.

As an immediate first step, Operation

Noble Eagle was announced on September 14,

2001. Noble Eagle pulls together the full

range of task-organized military activities

supporting the homeland defense and civil

support missions throughout the United States.

Key activities include:

2 Strategic Forum No. 189, February 2002

Colonel Steven J. Tomisek, USMC, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies 

at the National Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Colonel Tomisek at 

(202) 685–2348 or via e-mail to tomiseks@ndu.edu.

Figure 1. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

■ Immediate Response (any form of immediate action taken to save lives, prevent human

suffering, or mitigate property damage under imminently serious conditions)

■ Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (loans of equipment, facilities, or

personnel to law enforcement)

■ Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances

■ Support for Domestic Counterterrorism Operations

■ Sensitive Support Operations

■ Counterdrug Operational Support

■ Terrorism Consequence Management (to include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,

and high-yield explosive consequence management)

■ Military Support to Civil Authorities

– Support for Civil Disasters—Natural or Manmade (other than terrorism)

– Military Cooperation with Civil Agencies

– Response under Other Authorities

• Oil or Hazardous Material Spills

• Radiological Emergencies/Incidents

• Emergency Water Requirements

• Response to Flooding

• Forest Fire Emergencies

• Mass Immigration

• Transportation Support

Source: Department of Defense Directives 3025.1, 3025.12, and 3025.15.
Aerospace Defense. Activities include

establishing streamlined rules of engagement

for hostile acts over domestic airspace; increasing alert posture involving more than 200

military aircraft at 26 airbases; maintaining

continuous combat air patrols over New York

City and Washington, DC, as well as random

patrols over other metropolitan areas and key

infrastructure; increased liaison with the Federal Aviation Administration; and reorienting

radar coverage, to include the employment of

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Airborne

Warning and Control System aircraft. (Prior to

September 11, the NORAD air defense posture

was aligned to counter the perceived external

threats to North American air sovereignty—

hostile aircraft carrying bombs or cruise missiles; it has now expanded to protect against a

domestic airborne threat.)

Land Defense. Activities include providing

physical security at airports, ports, and other

critical infrastructure sites; deterring future

attacks; designating rapid reaction forces and

placing them on increased readiness; and

prepositioning airlift support aircraft to move

those forces.

Maritime Defense. Activities include

providing naval forces to support the U.S. Coast

Guard as it patrols over 120 coastal security

zones and increasing liaison between U.S. Joint

Forces Command and the Coast Guard.

Civil Support. Activities include providing

temporary increased security capabilities to

other lead Federal agencies; dispatching an

assessment team from Joint Task Force-Civil

Support to New York City; using WMD-civil

support teams to support state/local first responders; and providing security to more than

400 airports and other designated key infrastructure.2

All these activities are being conducted

under an interim command relationship

schema. U.S. Joint Forces Command has the

lead responsibility (that is, its commander in

chief [CINC] is “supported”) for land defense,

maritime defense, and civil support in the

continental United States and its maritime

approaches. This command established a

Homeland Security Directorate within its headquarters to focus on the HLS mission. CINC

NORAD, meanwhile, has the lead on continental aerospace defense. In areas abutting the

continental United States, U.S. Southern and

Pacific Commands are the supported CINCs for

land, maritime, and aerospace defense and civil

support activities in their respective areas of

responsibility. U.S. Space Command is the lead

for computer network operations in support of

homeland security.3

The full impact of these operations on

forces and resources remains to be seen. DOD

figures on incremental costs for Noble Eagle

from September 11 through January 8 were

$2.6 billion, including $432 million for combat

air patrols and the remainder for participating

National Guard and Reserve personnel. The

total number of Reserve component personnel

on active duty in support of the partial mobilization was 71,386 as of January 23, 2002,

with over 9,200 Army and Air National Guard

personnel performing state duties under 

Title 32 (governor controlled, Federally

funded). Another 1,941 Guard personnel were

performing emergency support duties in a state

active-duty status (governor controlled, state

funded). As of January 23, roughly one-third

into fiscal year 2002, total man-day usage in

support of state emergencies was 295,993 (for

comparison, the total man-day usage providing

domestic mission support during fiscal year

1999 was 261,276). Typical state missions

include providing security at nuclear power

plants, other key state assets, and airports;

rendering disaster support to local and state

authorities; assisting local law enforcement

authorities at border crossings; and providing

force protection at National Guard facilities.

The 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt

Lake City were designated a National Special

Security Event under existing Presidential

directives and as such required special safety

and security measures. The Attorney General

certified and approved five categories of DOD

support to the Utah Olympic Public Safety

Command: aviation, communications, explosive ordnance disposal, physical security, and

temporary facilities. This routine support has

been provided through Joint Task Force

Olympics, a subordinate joint task force established by U.S. Joint Forces Command on January 16, 2001. The command also had plans to

provide CBRNE consequence management or

military assistance for civil disturbances support, if required.

Near-Term Challenges

The tragic events of September 11 reinforced the adage, “All emergencies are local.”

On that premise—given a U.S. population of

over 285 million, some 56 states, territories, and

possessions, 3,066 counties, and thousands of

municipalities—the greatest challenge of the

Bush administration in formulating a comprehensive HLS strategy will be ensuring that it is

truly national in scope. This National Homeland Security Strategy is the keystone to achieving the unity of effort necessary to succeed on

this battlefield. It must coherently integrate the

ends, ways, and means of the Federal, state, and

local levels to enable the effective use of all

available resources, at all levels of government,

toward a common purpose: the security of

America and its citizenry.

Similarly, an effective national military

strategy in mounting a global war on terrorism

must account for the aims and objectives of the

various stakeholders. Because of their involvement within the homeland theater of war,

Federal agencies, state and local governments,

and certain nongovernmental organizations

must be given the same consideration as would

be afforded allies or coalition partners in a

foreign theater. An integrated national military

strategy that derives from the strategic direction

provided in both the National Security and the

Homeland Security Strategy documents must

in turn provide strategic guidance for effective

employment of military forces across all fronts.

As overall strategy is formulated, DOD will

confront many challenges in translating its

emerging HLS priorities into capabilities. In the

near term, three of the hardest challenges

revolve around key legal, definitional, and

organizational issues that together establish

the foundation for an array of subsequent, and

no less difficult, choices concerning the allocation of resources.

The Legal Framework

The subordination of military forces to

civilian authority at Federal and state levels has

served the Nation well for more than 2 centuries and must continue to guide our actions

as we confront new challenges. Numerous

statutes, regulations, and policies allow for

military employment domestically in support

of civil authorities while guarding against

abuse. These strictures reinforce the division of

labor between the military and Federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies.

For example, the Posse Comitatus Act

prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force for

law enforcement, except in cases and under

circumstances expressly authorized by the

No. 189, February 2002 Strategic Forum 3
4 Strategic Forum No. 189, February 2002

Constitution or an act of Congress. Congress

has created exceptions in four major areas:

insurrections/civil disturbances, counterdrug

operations, disaster relief, and counterterrorism/weapons of mass destruction. There are

also a number of minor statutory exceptions,

covering a wide range of activities.4

Prohibitions that are applicable to forces

in the active military service of the United States

under Title 10 (Armed Forces) authority (for

example, posse comitatus) do not apply to those

employed under the authorities of either Title

14 (Coast Guard) or Title 32 (National Guard).

The flexibility afforded by these statutory authorities must be considered in DOD force

design and force allocation processes for the

HLS mission. In addition, the ability of states to

establish State Defense Forces, as authorized by

U.S. Code, Title 32, Section 109, and employ

them under the exclusive jurisdiction of the

governor must also be addressed. Each of the

above has associated policy and funding implications that must be considered.

As DOD conducts its HLS mission requirement validation process, it should concurrently review applicable statutes, regulations,

and policies with a view toward asking Congress for additional legislation that would

grant the freedom of action necessary to

achieve mission success.

Focus through Definition

Establishing a common definition of

homeland security is essential to a unified

approach. Lacking either statutory or regulatory definition, the meaning of homeland

security must be derived from a variety of

sources. Foremost among them is Presidential

Executive Order 13228, which establishes the

Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President. The order specifies

and assigns key HLS functions—“to detect,

prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to,

and recover from terrorist [threats or] attacks

within the United States”—that provide a

baseline for the overall effort.5

The DOD working definition takes a

different tack, describing homeland security as

“the preparation for, prevention of, defense

against, and response to threats and aggressions directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty,

domestic population, and infrastructure; as

well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. Also

called HLS.” Under this formulation, approved

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the functions of

defense (as opposed to protection) and other

domestic civil support are added to the scope of

HLS-related activity, but detection and recovery

are not addressed. Additionally, homeland

security as defined by the Joint Chiefs contains

two key subordinate elements:

Homeland Defense: The protection of U.S.

territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and

critical infrastructure against external threats

and aggression. (Also called HLD.)

Civil Support: DOD support to U.S. civil

authorities for domestic emergencies, and for

designated law enforcement and other activities.

(Also called CS.)

In these DOD formulations, the threats at

issue in homeland defense are specified as

emanating from foreign sources, and the

precise scope of the term critical infrastructure (beyond the reference to computer networks) remains vague. The potential for DOD

involvement in detection, preemption, and

recovery also is unclear.

That such differences should exist at this

early stage is not surprising, given the newness

of the whole endeavor. Final agreement on a

definition clearly will carry significant resource

implications for DOD and many other agencies. To cite just one example: What capabilities

must the Department of Defense develop to

protect the Nation’s critical information infrastructure against attack? Insofar as most of that

infrastructure is privately owned and operated,

what legal authorities are required? What

coordination mechanisms must be put in

place? To what extent will DOD forces be required to provide security for the physical

infrastructure associated with that critical

infrastructure? What will other Federal agencies be expected to do to support DOD in areas

where it has the lead, and how will those efforts

be coordinated? Absent a clear consensus

within the government on how to define homeland security, DOD will have a difficult time

determining what level of resource commitment is required to do its fair share.

Organizing for Operations

on the Home Front

Unity of command—that is, having all

forces operate under a single commander with

the requisite authority to direct their employment—assures unity of effort toward a common end. To be sure, intergovernmental and

interagency operations in our highly complex

national security architecture involve many

stakeholders across multiple entities, but the

requirement for unity of effort in the HLS architecture is essential because vital national interests are at stake. 

The President took a step toward ensuring

unity of effort when he established both the

Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland

Security Council (see figure 2), but much work

remains across all levels of Federal government.

Almost every department has offices or subordinate agencies with a role in homeland security,

as do many independent agencies. All department and agency heads must press forward with

ongoing, deliberate reviews of their organizational structures to ensure that they are organized in the best way to meet the demands of the

current operating environment.

Defense officials are reviewing both the

Unified Command Plan and DOD organization

for the coordination of policy, planning, and

resource allocation with a view toward consolidating HLS-related responsibilities, developing

operational solutions for the future, and improving interagency coordination. The likely

outcome will be recommendations to consolidate HLS oversight responsibilities (policy,

planning, and resource allocation) within the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, perhaps

under a new Under Secretary-level position,

and to assign all HLS mission responsibilities to

a single combatant commander.6 Organizational changes should, among other things,

simplify interagency, intradepartment, and

external coordination matters and should

enhance the Secretary’s ability to create, support, and employ military HLS capabilities.

They also should address the regional command and control architectures that are required to interface most effectively with other

Federal, state, and local partners. Decisions on

overall command relationships must be taken

quickly to enable the appropriate focus during

the planning, programming, and budgeting

process for the Future Years Defense Program

2004–2009.

final agreement on a

definition clearly will

carry significant resource

implications for DOD 

and many other agencies
Essential Defense

Contributions

However the legal, definitional, and organizational issues are resolved, the HLS mission

clearly is going to levy large requirements upon

DOD. Although homeland security represents a

new mission priority for the Armed Forces, no

other missions are being removed or downgraded to accommodate this task. In any event,

homeland and overseas defense activities across

a spectrum of missions will be closely linked.

Consequently, as it develops recommendations

for the President, DOD will need to figure out

how best to balance requirements generated by

the new HLS mission against many other

competing priorities. Consider, for example, the

following issues the Department must address,

arranged by the battlespace functions assigned

the Office of Homeland Security:

Detecting the Threat. Intelligence is critical

to the HLS mission. DOD must ensure it has the

requisite collection and analysis capabilities to

support the national effort to prevent future

terrorist attacks at home and abroad. Unity of

the intelligence effort for homeland security

requires not only a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment, but also the capability to join domestic

law enforcement and foreign intelligence information seamlessly. For homeland security,

ensured access to any needed mission-related

intelligence capability and coordination of all

intelligence efforts in a particular mission area

are key. Achieving a unified coordinated effort

will require innovative methods, consistent with

law and regulation, to overcome current barriers

(such as classification and compartmentalization) to the provision of actionable intelligence

without compromising sources and methods.

Preparedness. Although jurisdictional

lines may be clear, indiscriminate terrorist acts

will not differentiate between large, urban

municipalities and small rural communities—a reality driven home in the recent

bioterrorism incidents. DOD must participate in

a deliberate community outreach effort, in

support of a larger national campaign, to

ensure that the American people understand

the military’s role in the overall HLS effort.

Installation commanders, for example, must

coordinate preparations in areas such as public

health, training and exercises, resource allocation, mutual aid agreements, and measures of

effectiveness development with those of their

host and neighboring jurisdictions to ensure

seamless execution. They also must understand

the Incident Command System procedures in

their local jurisdictions. National-level response

forces must include Federal, state, and local

partners in exercises and simulations to ensure

the adequacy of their plans. Planning must

account for the levels of support that the “host

nation” may provide if DOD forces are employed domestically. Rules for the Use of Force

for domestic operations require intense scrutiny

to prevent placing forces at undue risk. Issues

such as the conditions under which force is

allowable to enforce quarantine during a

public health emergency must be resolved in

advance. Similarly, forces must be trained to

ensure that their conduct, once deployed,

fulfills relevant legal standards.

Prevention. National prevention efforts

probably will hinge on measures to secure a

historically porous border through both physical

enhancements and the tightening of immigration policies and enhanced information exchange. While national attention is fixated on

the security of civil aviation, our flanks—the

maritime and land transportation systems—

remain exposed. In 1999 alone, for example,

more than 200,000 ships docked in U.S. ports

and harbors, unloading 4.4 million containers

and 4 billion tons of cargo. Of this, the U.S.

Customs Service inspected less than 3 percent of

goods arriving. More than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal,

and coastal waterways serve over 300 ports, with

more than 3,700 terminals that handle passenger and cargo movement. Waterways and ports

link to 152,000 miles of rail, 460,000 miles of

pipelines, and 45,000 miles of interstate highways. The DOD role in efforts to improve the

security of U.S. borders, territorial waters, and

airspace remains unclear. Current DOD involvement in port, border, and airfield security, 

however, suggests that the planning effort must

consider potential near-term and enduring

mission requirements in support of the national

effort. DOD also must examine its role in support of domestic preemptive operations.

Protection. Significant and varied challenges await the Defense Department as it

attempts to identify mission requirements for

protecting designated physical infrastructure

from terrorist attack. These requirements will

likely involve more than the protection of

military power projection platforms and other

critical infrastructure assets. Measures for

protecting energy production, transmission,

and distribution services and critical facilities

(including those facilities that produce, use,

store, or dispose of nuclear material) must be

strengthened. Critical public and private information systems must be shielded. Special

events of national significance must be protected. Transportation and telecommunication

systems within the United States require protection, as do the Nation’s food and water supplies. In most instances, non-Federal assets will

logically undertake the preponderance of

protective measures and capabilities. Defense,

however, may be required to protect certain

critical physical infrastructure until such time

as the responsible agency can meet the same

standards of security, compounding the complexity of the task. The Federal Government

must complete its analysis of the key assets

requiring protection before DOD may conduct a

thorough mission area analysis.

Response and Recovery. Both the Federal

Response Plan and Concept Plan establish the

general framework under which the Federal

Government responds to and promotes recovery

from terrorist threats or attacks within the

United States. Under the Federal Response

Plan, incident response is initiated at the local

level and builds in a tiered fashion as requirements exceed available capabilities. The coordinated Federal response to requests for assistance will supplement, rather than supplant,

local and state efforts. A domestic terrorist

incident involving WMD can reasonably be

expected to exceed state and local capabilities

and require a DOD response. Accordingly, the

unique capabilities required to mitigate the

consequences of such an attack must be available for immediate employment. DOD must

either ensure that its force design process

accounts for all mission requirements or accept

the operational risk associated with an insufficient resource allocation.

No. 189, February 2002 Strategic Forum 5

DOD will need to figure

out how best to balance

requirements generated

by the new HLS mission

against many other

competing priorities
HLS Missions: Bridging 

or Enduring?

Although the job of combating terrorism is

hardly new, the terrorist attacks of September 11

revealed a significant gap in U.S. national

military strategy and have caused DOD to

reexamine its proper role in defense of the

Nation. The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001(QDR 2001) establishes the

framework for a new national military strategy

that, inter alia, “restores the emphasis once

placed on defending the United States and its

land, sea, air, and space approaches.” According

to the QDR 2001 report, the United States will

maintain sufficient military forces “to protect

the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and

its critical defense-related infrastructure against

attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders, as

appropriate under U.S. law.”

This new strategic construct will likely have

profound effects in many areas, such as force

planning, resource allocation, human resource

management, command arrangements, and

defense transformation. A critical overarching

question for DOD in this regard is: Which of the

evolving HLS missions (listed in figure 3) will be

enduring ones for the Defense Department, and

which will be “bridging” missions performed by

DOD until the appropriate Federal, state, or local

authorities have generated replacement capabilities? A related question is: Among all those

missions in which the DOD role is to backstop

another agency—in effect, providing a surge

capacity for response—what level of preparedness should DOD (and the lead agency) seek to

attain, and in the DOD case, at what cost to

other missions? 

6 Strategic Forum No. 189, February 2002

Figure 2. Homeland Security Council System

Homeland 

Security Council (HSC)

(President)

Homeland Security Council

Principals Committee (HSC/PC)

(Assistant to the President for Homeland Security)

Homeland Security Council

Deputies Committee (HSC/DC)

(Deputy Director, Office of Homeland Security)

Homeland Security Council

Policy Coordinating Committees

(HSC/PCC)

Detection, Surveillance, 

and Intelligence

(Senior Director, Intelligence and Detection)

Key Asset, Border, Territorial

Waters, and Airspace Security

(Senior Director, Protection and Prevention)

Domestic Threat Response and 

Incident Management

(Senior Director, Response and Recovery)

Plans, Training, Exercises, 

and Evaluation

(Senior Director, Policy and Plans)

Domestic Transportation 

Security

(Senior Director, Protection and Prevention)

Economic 

Consequences

(Senior Director, Response and Recovery)

Law Enforcement 

and Investigation

(Senior Director, Intelligence and Detection)

Research and 

Development

(Senior Director, Research and Development)

Public

Affairs

(Senior Director, Communications)

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Consequence Management

(Senior Director, Response and Recovery)

Medical and Public 

Health Preparedness

(Senior Director, Protection and Prevention)

Homeland Security Council Members

President

Vice President

Secretary of the Treasury

Secretary of Defense

Attorney General

Secretary of Health and Human Services

Secretary of Transportation

Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director of Central Intelligence

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security

Such officers of the Executive branch as the 

 President may from time to time designate 

Invited to Attend on Issues of Responsiblity

Secretary of State

Secretary of the Interior

Secretary of Labor

Secretary of Veterans Affairs

Secretary of Agriculture

Secretary of Energy

Secretary of Commerce

Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency

Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy

Assistant to the President for Economic Policy

Heads of other Executive departments and agencies 

 and other senior officials, when appropriate

Invited to Attend All Meetings

Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff

Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff 

 to the Vice President

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Counsel to the President

Director, Office of Management and Budget

(The Homeland Security Council and its interagency committees 

and are chaired by the incumbents annotated in parenthesis)

Source: Executive Order 13228 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1.
Questions such as these raise hard choices

of balancing competing risks and priorities. As

senior DOD leadership begins to allocate limited resources with the aim of acquiring or

sustaining capabilities to meet validated, strategy-driven mission requirements, they will face

a series of tough balancing tests. Taking the

categories of risk management developed in

QDR 2001 and applying them to homeland

security, the following problems emerge:

Force Management. From what pools

will the department draw to meet new requirements for trained personnel? What are the

unintended consequences of force management decisions taken with respect to, for

example, heavy reliance on the National

Guard and Reserve? Will increased reliance on

the Guard for recurring HLS tasks adversely

impact recruitment and retention? Will use of

the Reserve components draw down local

capacities for emergency response? How will

HLS requirements impact the development of

rotational presence requirements and unit

stationing? What are the readiness implications of emerging HLS missions? What are the

implementation strategies to bridge from

existing to required force structures?

Operational Risks. How do we mitigate

the operational risks associated with insufficient low-density/high-demand units and

capabilities? How are DOD efforts to develop

required HLS capabilities coordinated with

those of Federal, state, and local partners? How

do we maintain the strategy-driven balance to

mitigate risk across the entire spectrum and

simultaneously engage in a multidimensional

war against global terrorism? What new capabilities, operational concepts, or organizational

designs may be applied to enhance security

without increasing force structure? What consideration must be given to valid state mission

requirements in planning for National Guard

employment under Title 10 authority? What

command and control architectures are required to ensure interoperability with domestic

first responders and coordinate unity of effort?

Future Challenges. These challenges

concern our ability to invest in new capabilities

and develop new operational concepts needed to

dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term threats.

How do we ensure that military department and

defense agency transformation roadmaps provide the service-unique capabilities to meet

critical operational goals within the required

time frames? How are Federal, state, and local

partners and their respective capabilities integrated into our experimentation, research and

development, and selective procurement

processes? Can emerging technologies be applied

to enhance personnel and infrastructure security

while reducing force protection personnel requirements (for example, biometrics, nonlethal

weapons, and all-hazards screening devices)?

Institutional Risks. These risks include

the ability to develop management practices

and controls that use resources efficiently and

promote the effective operation of the defense

establishment. How will institutional changes

of other Federal departments or agencies with

HLS responsibilities affect DOD processes? For

example, will the DOD contribution to the

National Disaster Medical System be impacted

by this new mission focus? What infrastructure

adjustments are necessary to support the HLS

mission area? What business process reengineering measures, legislative or policy changes,

and infrastructure streamlining must be undertaken to make best use of DOD resources in

day-to-day operations?

The Goal: One Team, 

One Fight

Clearly, DOD faces many tough challenges

in operating effectively within the increasingly

complex HLS environment. The questions

sketched out above provide only a rough menu

of the public policy choices that lie ahead in

making the country a much tougher target for

terrorists. Many of these choices will invite or

require agreements within the Executive branch

(supported by Congressional overseers) regarding the appropriate division of labor between

DOD and its civilian counterparts.

No. 189, February 2002 Strategic Forum 7

Figure 3. Evolving Homeland Security Missions

DOD DOD

Mission Area Enduring Bridging Lead Support

Air Defense ✓ ✓

Sea Defense ✓ ✓✓

Land Defense ? ✓ ? ✓

Critical Physical Infrastructure 

Protection ? ✓ ? ✓

Airport Security ? ✓ ✓

Seaport Security ? ✓ ✓

Border Security ? ✓ ✓

Space Defense ✓ ✓

Cyber Defense ✓ ✓

Military Support to Civil 

Authorities (MSCA) ✓ ✓

Military Assistance for Civil 

Disturbances (MACDIS) ✓ ✓

Support for Domestic 

Counterterrorism Operations ✓ ✓

Sensitive Support Operations ✓ ✓

Counterdrug Operational Support ✓ ✓

Terrorism Consequence 

Management ✓ ✓

Emerging/Undefined ? ???

Source: Author’s assessment.

? = undetermined
Given the resources at stake, burden

sharing usually makes for rancor and contentiousness in official Washington. But the

country can ill afford the costs of delay, and the

public expects results; homeland security is a

national problem requiring a national solution. This monumental undertaking to secure

the American homeland must be accomplished

with the sense of immediacy appropriate for a

nation at war. The terrorists who orchestrated

the attacks of September 11 achieved a level of

strategic surprise equaling or exceeding any in

this Nation’s history. The total weight of U.S.

national power must now be brought to bear in

developing and implementing the requisite

strategy and capabilities to prevent future

attacks. To do so will require commitment,

resolve, and new modes of thinking about our

roles, missions, and functions. It will also

require recognition that we are one team with

a common purpose: securing the inalienable

rights of Americans by defeating the enemies of

freedom at home and abroad.

Notes

1 Defense Science Board, Protecting the Homeland:

Report of the Defense Science Board, 2000 Summer Study

Executive Summary, Volume I (Washington, DC: Office of

the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,

and Logistics, February 2001), 7. 2 Joint Task Force-Civil Support, a subordinate JTF of

Joint Forces Command, was established to support military

and civil authorities in managing the consequences of a

WMD incident. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil

Support Team (WMD–CST) is a high-priority response unit

supporting civil authorities in responding to a WMD situation. Jointly staffed by Army and Air National Guard personnel, the WMD–CST mission is to assess a suspected WMD

event in support of the local incident commander; advise

civilian responders regarding appropriate actions; and work

to both facilitate and expedite the arrival of additional

military forces if needed. Congress has authorized 32

WMD–CSTs. As of January 28, 2002, 24 of the 32 teams have

been certified as possessing the requisite skills, training, and

equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements. 3 Testimony of the Honorable Thomas E. White,

Interim DOD Executive Agent for Homeland Security;

General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff; General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF, Commander in

Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command; and,

General William F. Kernan, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S.

Joint Forces Command, at a hearing of the Senate Armed

Services Committee on October 25, 2001. 4 Appendix R to the Second Annual Report of the

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore

Commission), Toward a National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism, December 15, 2000. Posse comitatus translated

from Latin means “the power or force of the country.” The

specific provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act (U.S. Code,

Title 18, Section 1385) are applied to the Navy and Marine

Corps as a matter of DOD policy.

5 Executive Order (EO) 13228 was issued on October 8, 2001. Through its amendment of EO 12656, this

issuance stipulates that actions taken in relation to terrorist

acts outside of the United States remain under the purview

of the National Security Council. 6 In conjunction with conference consideration of the

Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Authorization Bill (Public Law

107–107), the Secretary of Defense requested authority to

establish two Under Secretaries (Homeland Security and

Intelligence). Public Law 107–107, Section 1511 instead

directs that DOD “shall conduct a study on the appropriate

role of the Department of Defense with respect to homeland

security. The study shall identify and describe the policies,

plans, and procedures of the Department of Defense for

combating terrorism, including for the provision of support

for the consequence management activities of other Federal,

State, and local agencies.” A report of the study’s finding is

due to Congress not later than 180 days from date of

enactment (December 28, 2001).

8 Strategic Forum No. 189, February 2002

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by

members of the National Defense University as well as

other scholars and specialists in national security affairs

from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions,

and recommendations expressed or implied within are

those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect

the views of the Department of Defense or any other

agency of the Federal Government.

PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes

books, monographs, and reports on national security

strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy.

For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also

produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

Other recent titles in the

Strategic Forum series

For on-line access to Strategic Forum, go to: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html

M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and

Richard D. Sokolsky

Regional Conflicts with Strategic 

Consequences

(No. 183, July 2001)

John C. Holzman

A Golden Opportunity: The Next 

Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations

(No. 182, July 2001)

Anthony C. Zinni

A Military for the 21st Century:

Lessons from the Recent Past

(No. 181, July 2001)

Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D.

Sokolsky

Normalizing U.S.-Russian

Relations

(No. 180, April 2001)

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler

Revising the Two-Major Theater 

War Standard

(No. 179, April 2001)

Judith S. Yaphe

U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization 

in the Future?

(No. 188, January 2002)

John F. Reichart

Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: 

A Neglected Challenge

(No. 187, December 2001)

Joseph McMillan

U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding 

the Strategic Consensus

(No. 186, November 2001)

Michael E. Marti

China: Making the Case for

Realistic Engagement

(No. 185, September 2001)

Kori N. Schake

Do European Union Defense

Initiatives Threaten NATO?

(No. 184, August 2001)