CASE STUDY N O. 7

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Disarmament in South Sudan

Cecily Brewer

KAREN GUTTIERI

SERIES EDITOR

Naval Postgraduate School
COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of

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approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental

and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community

or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different

components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach.

Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives

to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development

of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States

Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the

need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought

argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the

pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the

problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed

this series of complex operations teaching case studies to address this need.

In this process, we aim to promote research and to strengthen relationships

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The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) emphasizes the importance of a whole of government approach to complex operations and provides a forum for a community of practice and plays a number of roles in the

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Dr. Karen Guttieri at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the

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1

CASE STUDY N O. 7

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Disarmament in South Sudan

Cecily Brewer

SETTING THE SCENE

South Sudan, January 2006. Wutnyang Gatkek, a spiritual leader from the Nuer

ethnic group travels to Yuai in northern Jonglei State, a large, undeveloped state

in the southeast of South Sudan.1 During Sudan’s north-south civil war (1983–

2005), he had fought with the White Army against the north. The White Army

was an unofficial armed group composed almost entirely of Nuer, Sudan’s second-largest ethnic group, many of them armed cattle-camp youth who joined

forces to respond to local threats. Yet, he now goes to Yuai as a representative of

the official South Sudanese army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)

to encourage Nuer youth to hand in their weapons. 

Sudan’s largest ethnic group and Nuer’s frequent adversary, the Dinka, dominate the SPLA. The Dinka, pastoralists renowned for their height, hold many of

the coveted administrative positions in the government. Still, Gatkek is chosen

for, and accepts, the mission to overcome south-south ethnic tensions. 

While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) [Appendix A] ostensibly ended the twenty-two-year Sudanese civil war in January 2005, as in

many “postconflict” states, one form of conflict has been replaced by

another. The CPA established a progression of events for north-south conflict resolution, including a census and elections culminating in the 2011 referendum on southern independence. However, ethnic groups in the south

often clash with each other in the absence of a common enemy to unite

them and in a context still dominated by a warring mentality and rife with

arms. Also, the South Sudanese state has had to rise out of the ashes of the

civil war, beginning with almost nothing. The SPLA has worked to solidify

its monopoly on the use of force, putting down unofficial armed groups that

challenge its power where it can. Thus, south-south interethnic conflict and

crime continue to threaten the population.

Gatkek is attempting to diffuse a very tense situation, indeed. NuerDinka tensions flared in late 2005 when the Lou Nuer, one of two main

Nuer groups, requested permission to graze their cattle on the lands of the

Dinka in Duk County. During the dry season, Lou Nuer cattle herders move

in search of wetter areas to graze their cattle, and inevitably they tred on
2 SETTING THE SCENE Cecily Brewer

Source: International Crisis Group, Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in

South Sudan, Africa Report No. 154, December 23, 2009, Appendix A, p. 26.
Disarmament in South Sudan 3

other tribes’ lands.2 This year,

Dinka authorities asked the Lou

Nuer pastoralists to surrender their

weapons before passing onto the

Dinka lands. But the Nuer refused,

saying they had never been

requested to do so in the past. 

To defuse the conflict, the Governor of Jonglei State, Philip Thon

Lek, a Dinka from Duk County,

brought the disputing ethnic

groups and representatives of the

White Army together to resolve

their dispute and discuss terms for

voluntary disarmament. Forced

disarmament was threatened

should weapons not be voluntarily

surrendered. However, the specific

terms for disarmament were never

clearly established and, while the

governor promised compensation,

he did not specify where he would

get the money. Further, neighboring communities occasionally hostile to the Nuer, such as the Murle,

were not asked to disarm simultaneously. 

When the debated disarmament campaign was eventually launched in

January 2006, the Nuer resist, afraid of being left unarmed and vulnerable to

attack. The White Army attacks the SPLA. Gatkek, intending to diffuse the

tension and transform a violent disarmament campaign into a voluntary

one, is killed. 

Meanwhile in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, SPLA leadership and the

Government of South Sudan (GoSS) Security Committee members consider a heavy-handed approach: a military campaign against the White Army

and forced disarmament of the Nuer. In a last-minute attempt to resolve the

issue peacefully, White Army leaders are brought together for a conference

encouraging the voluntary surrender of weapons to the SPLA, but to little

avail.3 It is rumored that during this time, the Military Intelligence branch of

the north’s army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), is supplying the White

Army with weapons and ammunition in order to foment south-south violence, despite other public efforts to aid the internationally backed disarmament process.4

On May 18, 2006, the conflict that had been building momentum for

over a year explodes. In violent clashes in northern Jonglei State, an estiTimeline of Civilian Disarmament in Northern Jonglei, 

December 2005–May 2006

Time Event

North-South 

Sudan Civil War

January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed

December 2005 Jonglei governor brings Lou Neur and 

Dinka together to resolve dispute

January 2006 Disarmament campaign begins, and 

Lou Nuer attack SPLA 

January 2006 Wutnyang Gatkek killed while in Yuai 

February 27-

March 7, 2006

Conference on Lou Nuer disarmament 

encourages voluntary disarmament

May 18, 2006 Major confrontation; at least 113 White 

Army killed, one SPLA killed; massive 

looting

May 20, 2006 SPLA meeting of chiefs and local authorities

Late May 2006 Chief-led disarmament 
4 SETTING THE SCENE Cecily Brewer

mated 113 White Army and one SPLA member are killed. The White Army,

recognizing its defeat, retreats north into Upper Nile State. 

In the aftermath of the fighting, a lawless rampage of looting, cattle raiding, and property destruction by both sides is unleashed. 

The SPLA considers pursuing the White Army. Instead, SPLA leadership brings chiefs and local authorities from Jonglei State together to plan a

voluntary disarmament campaign. In the ensuing campaign, the chiefs collect an estimated 3,300 weapons from their communities. These are handed

to local authorities, who give them to the SPLA. The final number of weapons collected is disputed, as the SPLA is reported to have taken some to

unknown locations, and an unspecified number are being held locally. 

While the Jonglei disarmament campaign was successful in collecting

weapons, an estimated 400 SPLA and 1,200 White Army fighters were

killed, and government officials reported at least 213 civilian deaths.5 In

addition, the forced disarmament campaign produced food shortages, as the

White Army took cattle and goats from civilians. Some SPLA soldiers died

of thirst and hunger during the campaign as well.6

Source: International Crisis Group, Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in

South Sudan, Africa Report No. 154, December 23, 2009, Appendix B, p. 27.
Disarmament in South Sudan 5

THE DILEMMAS OF DISARMAMENT 

Traditionally, disarmament is part of a three-part process: disarmament,

demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Typically, the United Nations

(UN) or the host government collects weapons (disarmament), disbands

nonofficial armed groups (demobilization), and assimilates ex-soldiers into

society through occupational training and support packages (reintegration).

South Sudan in late 2005 is fairly typical of a class of “postconflict” states

that are particularly challenging for disarmament, especially because large

numbers of the civilian population hold weapons. 

The Disarmament Time Line: Speed vs. Ownership

While the CPA provided a framework for the DDR process, like most peace

agreements it does not delve into the thorny details, such as how disarmament will be defined and implemented. Thus, the DDR process is left to be

defined by the implementers: “The details of the peace agreement can be
6 THE DILEMMAS OF DISARMAMENT Cecily Brewer

regarded as a ceiling for action or a floor from which agents can move forward to implement their interpretation of the intent of the accords.”7

The international community may only be comfortable with pledging

funds for a contained period of DDR, but analyst Nicole Ball cites a three-tofour-year period of demobilization and reintegration as more realistic than

the one year often prescribed.8 Tod Wilson, a U.S. government official

familiar with DDR implementation, notes that an appropriate time line is

not only essential to determine resource allocations, but it also plays an

important role in shaping popular expectations. A short time line can lead to

expectation of an immediate postconflict “peace dividend.” When the population does not see immediate improvement in their lives to match their

expectations, they may become frustrated with the process and disillusioned

with their government.9

The CPA details the DDR mandate and implementing institutions. Disarmament was defined as the “collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of

combatants and often also of the civilian population.”10

Article 24 states the guiding principles of the DDR process, such as

national ownership, transparency, accountability, and flexibility. National

ownership is established through the creation of a National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions (NSDDRC and SSDDRC), and State DDR commissions. 

While the international community respected the need for these indigenous institutions, they had to be newly created with little human or financial

capital in the south. At the same time, UN and NGO headquarters, donor

home offices, and general expectations demanded quick action. The

national DDR commissions were established in 2005 and 2006, according

to plan; however, the capacity of the fledgling South Sudan DDR Commission was weak and international support slow to arrive, inhibiting early DDR

efforts. By 2007, the SSDDRC had a building and trained staff, but the State

DDR commissions were barely functional. Setting up these new disarmament structures took time and money and, yet, the need for their role in the

immediate postconflict peace was immediate. Should any of the guiding

principles listed above be accommodated for speed?

The timing of each stage of the DDR process, which usually overlap, is

also complex, and the process is often delayed. The CPA specifies that the

first six months of DDR will target the demobilization of child soldiers and

vulnerable groups, such as women and the disabled. Next, the thirty-sixmonth Interim DDR Program aims to develop the capacity of the national

institutions and civil society groups to support the assessment, verification,

and eligibility processing of ex-combatants. The postinterim period focuses

on security sector reform of the national armed forces pending the outcome

of the 2011 referendum.11

DDR programs have begun but are behind the CPA time line. As of April

9, 2008, there were 182,900 participants in the DDR program, 51,000 of

whom were preregistered for reintegration. Over one thousand children
Disarmament in South Sudan 7

who were formerly associated with the armed forces have been returned to

their families and communities.12 Despite these, albeit slow, successes,

weapons collection from civilian populations stands out as an element that

has not been adequately addressed. Although two-thirds of arms are held by

civilians, there are no clear guidelines or credible mechanisms for voluntary

civilian disarmament.13 Should civilian disarmament come early in the process in order to reduce crime and violence, or should it be attempted only

after the security situation is in check?

The Dilemmas of Coordination and Cooperation

You’ll kill 500, but the rest will hand the guns over. It is necessary to use a wellequipped force to disarm. We don’t want to hurt anyone, but we must start

somewhere, and we must do our best to provide security to those disarmed.

— An SPLA official

Another challenge of the implementation process is coordinating the timing

and resources of a variety of military, private sector, host government, nongovernmental, international, and donor actors involved in DDR. This coordination can be viewed as an “implementation chain that needs to endure if

the process of disarming and demobilizing is to succeed.”14

Military actors, be they host-country army or UN peacekeepers, often

begin the process and then transfer it to civil authorities and police. More

significant than the usual interagency coordination issues, these taskings

require military institutions to work together with the peace-building development institutions. Yet they do not always share the same approach, language, or culture. When coordination does not occur, disarmed populations

are left vulnerable to attack. 

A host-government-developed DDR plan through which the international community can coordinate its funding and action aids the process,

but it can also take time for the government to develop such a plan. International-host country relations are delicate as well. Joseph Hanlon has criticized international organization and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) for undermining the government’s role as a service provider.15 On

the other hand, the international community often has good reasons to push

for action on disarmament quickly, due to imminent security concerns. 

Further complicating matters, international donor resources can be slow

to arrive. Tod Wilson suggests that funding conflict management activities,

especially through reestablishment of traditional mechanisms, can reduce

tensions before disarmament processes are established and resources have

time to take effect.16

The CPA clearly defines the role of the international community, stating

that it “shall only play a supportive role to these [Sudanese DDR] institutions.”17 Accordingly, United Nations Security Resolution 1590 identifies

the UN’s mandate as: to assist the governments of Sudan in the DDR

process with “particular attention to the special needs of women and child
8 THE DILEMMAS OF DISARMAMENT Cecily Brewer

combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and

weapons collection and destruction.” (italics added)18

On the other hand, the SPLA supported forced disarmament: “You’ll kill

500, but the rest will hand the guns over. It is necessary to use a wellequipped force to disarm. We don’t want to hurt anyone, but we must start

somewhere, and we must do our best to provide security to those disarmed.”19 Thus, when the Government of South Sudan chose forced disarmament in 2006, the United Nations opted out but did not interfere. When

the SPLA did not arrive to sufficiently protect a forced disarmament campaign in South Sudan, the vulnerable were attacked. 

Also, insufficient food supplies meant that SPLA forces subsisted on the

cattle of the northern Jonglei communities they were sent to disarm, leading

to starvation among the population.20 Further, the Government of South

Sudan’s ability to carry out disarmament equally and simultaneously among

all communities and ethnic groups, one of the key problems with the Jonglei

campaign, was limited by its transport capacity and the terrain. On the topic

of equal and simultaneous disarmament, one UN official said: “Forget it; it’s

not possible.”21

Although seemingly straightforward, the UN’s mandate put it in a difficult position when the Sudanese government chose forced disarmament in

Jonglei. Further complicating matters, the Sudanese do not have a monolithic approach, as views within the Sudanese Army and government vary.22

The United Nations attempted to remain a neutral actor and to discourage

forced disarmament. When asked for logistical support, UN officials have

told the Government of South Sudan that they will not support forced disarmament.23 Yet, the Sudanese often do not have the capacity to provide

transport and sustained security in Jonglei without the United Nations, thus,

UN involvement can save lives. Should the United Nations assist with

forced disarmament on occasion?

The UN’s division of labor in South Sudan highlights the complexity of

the implementation chain: the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan supports

disarmament and demobilization and reintegration; the UN Development

Programme is tasked with adult reintegration; the United Nations Children’s Fund focuses on child reintegration; and the World Food Programme

provides food assistance to ex-combatants and their families.24 As mentioned above, one challenge is how to get the units with guns to coordinate

with those who pride themselves on serving without. 

Sudan was one of the UN’s early test cases for an “integrated” civil-military approach. Yet, UN policymakers and practitioners admit that, despite

their best intentions, very little has been achieved so far beyond the approval

of a national DDR policy. In Haiti, the UN’s integrated mission has disintegrated into two separate programs.25 Robert Muggah, cofounder of the

Small Arms Survey, attributes these failings to “weaknesses in political leadership within and outside the United Nations, the absence of clear direction

from headquarters, competing understandings of DDR among managers

and practitioners, and confusion over financing mechanisms.”26
Disarmament in South Sudan 9

In the area of international resources, UN officials in South Sudan

expressed frustration that many key positions remained vacant, especially in

offices outside of Juba.27 They explained that the UN employment bureaucracy is cumbersome and that finding midlevel experts willing to live in rural

South Sudan is a challenge.28 At the same time, donors have been attentive

to Sudan, funding most of the Interim DDR Program’s 2005–2006 budget

of US$69.44 million.29

Consider the Implementing Environment

A UN document on DDR warns: “If the possession of weapons is of cultural

significance to the population and has been considered a habit that existed

before violent conflict broke out, weapons collection programs are likely to

fail.”30

Reducing demand for weapons in postconflict societies is difficult, especially if weapons are part of the civilian culture or important for self- or collective defense in the absence of a trustworthy and competent police force

and justice system. 

Even if there is popular support for weapons collection, the way it is

done determines its success. Governments often respond to pastoral violence, such as cattle raiding, through politically driven, coercive measures of

weapons collection. Yet, a community’s weapons may be a deterrent to

attacks by a neighboring community, and removing them may invite violence on that community.

 Collecting weapons, without also reducing crime and the roots of conflict, can also disarm individuals of their means of self-defense. Legitimate

security guarantees or disarmament programs in which arms are collected

by an authority figure for safekeeping are potential solutions. Resolution of

underlying causes of conflict, often through reconciliation and development, is another key element to reducing demand.31 In addition to demand,

the supply of arms, often a regional dimension, can affect the success of disarmament. How can implementers avoid such traps?32

In 2005, Sudan was perhaps one of the most complex environments in

which to attempt disarmament. The country is vast, and pockets of instability, few roads—only a handful of which are paved—and limited air travel

make travel logistics a nightmare. In addition, the sheer number of arms,

especially the number in civilian hands, was daunting. There were an estimated 1.9 to 3.2 million small arms in circulation, of which about 67 percent

were held by civilians.33

In a conflict that saw the arming of almost half of the current population

in some areas,34 drawing a line between a combatant and a civilian is no simple task. There are multitudes of ex-combatants associated with less-structured militia groups, such as the so-called Other Armed Groups and the

White Army.35 Much of the general population, including women and children, was involved in the conflict.36 Owing to the high numbers of arms, the

presence of Other Armed Groups, and the low levels of security and gover-
10 THE DILEMMAS OF DISARMAMENT Cecily Brewer

nance development, the potential for organized armed crime was extremely

high after the end of the civil war.37 Indeed, almost 85 percent of those surveyed in Jonglei State reported at least one victimization event, and more

than half reported being robbed at least once since the signing of the CPA.38

While the abundance of arms is a product of war, as in many pastoral

societies guns have long been a part of civilian culture and are now part of

coming-of-age rituals. James Wole, a South Sudanese local NGO employee,

said: “If I do not carry a gun, the men despise me as a defenseless woman.”39

Many armed young men were accustomed to a life of war or, in the case of

the Nuer, to protecting their cattle from would-be attackers with arms.40 As

one Lou Nuer citizen described, the society has been changed by “the

realization of power that came with the gun.”41 On the other hand, many

civilians express a desire for disarmament, provided neighboring communities are disarmed simultaneously and sufficient security is provided.42 Can

the “gun culture” be reversed? If so, how? 

In some sense, small arms are a commodity like any other: the market

(often the black market) sets their value, determined by supply and demand.

In Sudan, a ready supply of inexpensive weapons, compounded by porous

borders, means that individuals can easily rearm. Stories abound of old or

nonfunctioning weapons being traded for compensation cash used to buy

newer weapons. A 2004 weapons buyback scheme in Côte d’Ivoire paid

three times as much per weapon as a similar program in neighboring Liberia,

driving the flow of arms from Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire.43

The Lou Nuer were hesitant to disarm before the neighboring Dinka,

likely due to their distrust of the Dinka and lack of trust in the SPLA as an

adequate protection force. A public relations campaign that informs the

population of the government’s disarmament strategy and wins buy-in from

local authorities and chiefs has led to campaigns with limited violence in

South Sudan’s Lakes and Warrap states, granted that intertribal tensions are

not as pronounced there.44 However, the military is unaccustomed to such

initiatives and, as in Jonglei, does not always plan and resource them. 

A Political Implementation Plan

The attitudes of warring parties toward disarmament are another major consideration for disarmament implementers. As previously described, the balance of power implications of disarmament make it a potentially explosive

political tool. As exemplified in previous DDR programs, for example in the

Central African Republic,45 uneven DDR can disrupt the existing balance of

power between groups, potentially creating more serious human security

threats than existed before disarmament. A well-meaning UN disarmament

practitioner, unaware of the explosive politics of postwar South Sudan,

could easily become a pawn in a political agenda and potentially do more

harm than good. As the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good

intentions or, as Graham Greene puts it in his novel The Quiet American: “I

never met a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused.”46
Disarmament in South Sudan 11

Even if an implementer is aware of potential problems with disarmament, he/she does not always have the power to change them. If the Dinka

chief had refused to disarm his group when he was asking the same of the

Lou Nuer, what should be done? 

In South Sudan, the political maneuvering surrounding disarmament is

especially present because the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army

(SPLM/A) gained peace through negotiation but did not have a clear

monopoly on the use of power. Young argues that the SPLA “needed to

assert its hegemonic position in the South. That was best accomplished by

forcing allies and enemies to accept [that] the SPLA alone has the right to

bear weapons.”47 Communities, such as former White Army strongholds,

that do not trust the SPLA to meter justice fairly likely disagree. Was forced

civilian disarmament a convenient way for the SPLA to solidify community

power structures? Or, as one MP [Minister of Parliament] put it, “to hit out

at the Nuer and SSDF [South Sudan Defense Force]?”48

The uncertain political future of Sudan is another key driver of weapons

demand and an inhibitor on the will to disarm. As detailed in the CPA, a referendum in 2011 will determine whether South Sudan becomes an independent country or joins fully with the north. Thus, the incentives to retain

weapons are strong. The UN DDR guide recognizes this demand-side challenge: 

It is assumed that many armed actors (political and opportunistic) and individuals will attempt to retain their weapons and ammunition as insurance for the

outcome of elections and the referendum at the end of the interim period, considering the high levels of insecurity and uncertainty surrounding the outcome

of the interim period and unresolved violent conflicts in Darfur and eastern

areas of Sudan.49

In addition to citizen reluctance to turn in weapons, the Government of

South Sudan will likely be hesitant to destroy them, but this approach has

led to weapons reentering circulation in the past.50 As the referendum

approaches, will people be willing to surrender their guns? 

WHAT DEFINES SUCCESS?

How do disarmament implementers know when they have succeeded?

Some argue that when only old, defunct weapons are turned in, the process

is pointless. The incentives are for verifiers to overlook such cheating. Yet,

one UN special representative in Mozambique was not concerned by allegations of cheating: “I know very well that they will give us old and obsolete

material, and they will have here and there some hidden. I don’t care. What I

do is create the political situation in which the use of guns is not the question. So they stay where they are.”51 In other instances, such as Angola,

cheating can be used by one side for military advantage with the intent of

breaking the agreement and returning to war from a strengthened position. 
12 WHAT DEFINES SUCCESS? Cecily Brewer

The bigger question for disarmament implementation is what defines

success? The United Nations and other actors often report the number of

weapons collected as a measure of success. This question begs a return to an

initial question: What is the goal of disarmament? The UN has this to say

about the goal of DDR: 

• To increase security, reducing the number of weapons in circulation

remains a central goal of DDR;

• The aim of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability

in postconflict situations so that recovery and development can

begin; 

• The establishment of security through the management of armed

combatants is the primary goal of DDR;

• The primary objective of DDR is to increase human security;

• ‘Do no harm’ is the standard principle against which all DDR interventions shall be evaluated at all times.52

Is the end goal to reduce weapons? Increase human security? Do no

harm? What if these goals contradict each other? Assuming a goal of

increased human security, the question remains how to measure results. 

“With the exception of a smattering of assessments, post-mortems and

superficial indicators relating to the number of weapons collected and the

number of ex-combatants demobilized, there is virtually no proof that such

interventions strengthen ‘human security.’”53

What are the prerequisites for civilian disarmament that will have a longterm, positive effect on human security? 

As the case of Sudan exemplifies, this confusion of goals becomes more

than semantics when put into practice in the far-from-ideal real world. While

local authorities in Jonglei State described the campaign as 95 percent effective, it resulted in approximately 1,200 White Army, 400 SPLA, and 213

civilian deaths as well as destruction of property and food shortages.54 On

the other hand, Small Arms Survey reported that weapons-carrying had

declined and perceptions of public safety had increased after the disarmament.55 Did the 3,300 weapons collected determine success?56 How many

lives is one weapon worth? Due to the coerced nature of the disarmament,

the integrated UNDDR Unit remained largely on the sidelines. Was this the

appropriate position? What if the Nuer in South Sudan circa 2005 had

immediately rearmed and retaliated against the Dinka? 

Southern Sudanese authorities often say, “There is not development

without peace,” indicating that civilian arms control is an essential prerequisite to the development process.57 Yet, as the Jonglei disarmament campaign
Disarmament in South Sudan 13

illustrates, weapons reduction does not inherently produce security. And so,

the eternal question: Which must come first, development or peace?

ENDNOTES

1. See map in Small Arms Survey, “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament in Jonglei

State: Recent Experiences And Implications,” Sudan Issue Brief 3 (November 2006-

February 2007): 2.

2. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity

in South Sudan,” Africa Report 154 (December 23, 2009): 2.

3. The above paragraphs draw heavily from Small Arms Survey, “Anatomy of

Civilian Disarmament.”

4. Ibid.

5. John Young, “Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to

War,” Small Arms Survey (July 2007): 25–27.

6. Small Arms Survey, “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament.”

7. Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” in Ending Civil Wars: The

Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and

Elizabeth Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002), p. 149.

8. Ibid., p. 150.

9. Tod Wilson (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization), interview by the author, Washington, DC, November 6,

2009.

10. Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Sudan

(IDDRP), July 2005, Section 2.10, p. 5, <http://www.unmis.org/English/2006Docs/

ddr_IDDRP%20Programme-Jul05.pdf>.

11. UNMIS, “CPA Calendar and the Four Phases,” <http://www.unmis.org/

English/ddr-phases.htm>.

12. Ibid.

13. Small Arms Survey, “The Militarization of Sudan: A Preliminary Review of

Arms Flows and Holdings,” Sudan Issue Brief 6 (April 2007).

14. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” p. 154.

15. As cited in Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” p. 155.

16. Tod Wilson, Washington D.C., interview with author. In postconflict countries,

traditional leaders have often been replaced by military commanders and traditional

conflict management mechanisms disrupted. Thus, restoring power to these leaders and

facilitating dialogue is a delicate, but important, aspect of postwar conflict management.

17. “Comprehensive Peace Agreement Provision on Disarmament, Demobilization

& Reintegration Information Sheet,” from UNMIS website, <http://www.unmis.org/

english/ddr.htm>.

18. UNMIS website: <http://www.unmis.org/english/ddr.htm>.

19. A senior Jonglei SPLA official quoted in International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s

Tribal Conflicts,” p. 12.

20. Small Arms Survey, “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament,” p. 6.

21. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 18.

22. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 18; Small Arms

Survey, “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament,” p. 6.

23. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 18.

24. Ibid.

25. Robert Muggah, “Great expectations: (dis)integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti”

(London, UK: Overseas Humanitarian Institute, Humanitarian Practice Network, 2008).
14 ENDNOTES Cecily Brewer

26. Ibid., p. 1.

27. Interactions with UN officials by author, June-December 2007.

28. Various discussions with UN staff in Southern Sudan by author, JuneDecember 2007.

29. UNDDR website, <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35&

search=sudan>.

30. IDDRS, Operational Guide, Section 4.11 “SALW [Small Arms Light Weapons]

Control, Security and Development (Location: Publisher, Year), p. 141. 

31. IDDRP, p. 12; Small Arms Survey, “Anatomy of Civilian Disarmament,” p. 3.

32. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” pp. 151, 157.

33. Small Arms Survey, “The militarization of Sudan: A preliminary review of arms

flow and holdlings,” Sudan Issue Brief 6 (April 2007): 2.

34. Small Arms Survey reports that 46.6 percent of residents in the five counties in

Jonglei State surveyed in January 2007 indicated that they carried firearms for protection

prior to the CPA signing. Richard Garfield, “Violence and Victimization after Civilian

Disarmament,” HSBA Working Paper No. 11 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, December

2007): 14. 

35. For a list of Southern Sudan’s Other Armed Groups, see John Young, “The

South Sudan Defense Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration” (Geneva: Small Arms

Survey), November 2006, pp. 42–48.

36. IDDRP, p. 8.

37. IDDRP, p. 17.

38. Garfield, “Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament,” p. 14.

39. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” note 5.

40. Young, “Emerging North-South Tensions,” p. 26.

41. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 1.

42. Ibid., p. 11.

43. U.S. Department of State, “Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization,

and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations” (Washington,

DC: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, April 2006), p. 20.

44. International Crisis Group, “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 18.

45. Faltas, S., G. McDonald, and C. Waszink, “Removing Small Arms from

Society,” Occasional Paper No. 2 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001): 7.

46. From Graham Greene, The Quiet American (New York: Penguin Group, 1955).

47. John Young, “Emerging North-South Tensions,” p. 25.

48. Ibid.

49. IDDRP, pp. 17–18.

50. International Crisis Group, Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts,” p. 18.

51. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” pp. 156–7.

52. Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, Section 2.10. “The UN Approach to

DDR” Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards August 1,

2006, p. 10, <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/iddrs.php>.

53. Robert Muggah, “Reflections on Disarmament, Demobilization, and

Reintegration in Sudan” (London, UK: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian

Practice Network, 2008), p. 1.

54. Small Arms Survey, “Anatomy of civilian disarmament,” p. 3.

55. Small Arms Survey, “Responses to Pastoral Wars: A Review of Violence

Reduction Efforts in Dusan, Uganda, and Kenya,” Sudan Issue Brief 8 (September 2007): 4.

56. This is the UN estimate; the SPLA estimate is much higher.

57. Timothy Hayden-Smith (Acting Country Director, Pact Sudan), telephone

interview by the author, Juba, Sudan, May 14, 2008.
Disarmament in South Sudan 15

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, Mary. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War. Boulder: Lynne

Reinner Publishers.

Carney, Timothy, Victoria Butler, and Michael Freeman. 2005. Sudan: The Land and the People. Seattle: Marquand Books.

Eide, Espen, Anja Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen von Hippel. May 2005. Report on

Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/report_on_integrated_missons.pdf>.

Faltas, S., G. McDonald and C. Waszink. Removing Small Arms from Society. Occasional

Paper 2. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Garfield, Richard. February 2007. Violence and victimization in South Sudan: Lakes State in

the post-CPA Period. HSBA Working Paper 2. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

———. December 2007. Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament. HSBA

Working Paper 11. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

Greene, Graham. 1955. The Quiet American. New York: Penguin Group.

Hayden-Smith, Timothy. May 14, 2008. Telephone interview by the author. 

Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Sudan. July 2005.

<http://www.unmis.org/English/2006Docs/ddr_IDDRP%20Programme-Jul05.pdf>.

Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR. August 1, 2006. Section 2.10. “The UN Approach to

DDR.” In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards Operational Guide. <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/iddrs.php>.

———. Section 3.20. DDR Programme Design. In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization

and Reintegration Standards Operational Guide: <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/iddrs_

guide.php>.

———. Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the integrated disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration standards. <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/SMN-FINAL.pdf>.

International Crisis Group. December 23, 2009. Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan. Africa Report 154.

Knight, Mark. March 2008. Expanding the DDR Model: Politics and Organisations. Journal

of Security Sector Management 6:1.

Mangok, Mayen Daniel. New Governor of Sudan’s Jonglei Pledges to Disarm the State.”

Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2007. <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article

25308>.

Muggah, Robert. 2008. Great expectations: (dis) integrated DDR in Sudan and Haiti. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Practice Network.

———. 2008. Reflections on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Sudan.

London, UK: Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Practice Network.

———. April 2006. Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and

Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period. Contemporary Security Policy 27:1.

———. April 2005. No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts. The

Round Table 94: 379.

Small Arms Survey. November 2006-February 2007. Anatomy of civilian disarmament in

Jonglei State: Recent experiences and implications. Sudan Issue Brief 3.

———. September 2007. Responses to pastoral wars: A review of violence reduction efforts

in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya. Sudan Issue Brief 8.

———. April 2007. The militarization of Sudan: A preliminary review of arms flows and

holdings. Sudan Issue Brief 6.

Spear, Joanna. 2002. Disarmament and Demobilization. In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth

Cousens. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

UNDDR Unit Sudan. Interim DDR Programme, DDR Quarterly Report July-September 2006.

http://unddr.org/docs/UN_DDR_Quarterly_Report_July_-_September_2006.pdf.
16 BIBLIOGRAPHY Cecily Brewer

UNDDR website. <http://www.unddr.org>.

UNDDR Sudan website. <http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=35&search

=sudan>.

United Nations. 1998. The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa.

UNMIS. CPA Calendar and the Four Phases. <http://www.unmis.org/English/ddrphases.htm>.

———. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Provision on Disarmament, Demobilization &

Reintegration Information Sheet. <http://www.unmis.org/english/ddr.htm>.

———. April 9, 2008. Round table meeting on Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration. UNMIS Press Release No. 06/08.

UNMIS DDR website. <http://www.unmis.org/english/ddr.htm>.

UNMIS website. <http://www.unmis.org/english/ddr.htm>.

UN Security Council. April 22, 2008. Report of the Secretary General on the Sudan S/2008/

267.

Wilson, Tod. November 6, 2009. Interview by the author.

Young, John. November 2006. The South Sudan Defense Forces in the Wake of the Juba

Declaration. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
United Nations S/RES/1919 (2010)

Security Council Distr.: General 

29 April 2010 

10-33577 (E) 

*1033577* 

 Resolution 1919 (2010) 

 Adopted by the Security Council at its 6304th meeting, on 

29 April 2010 

The Security Council,

Recalling all its resolutions and presidential statements concerning the 

situation in the Sudan,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the 

protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms, inter alia, the relevant 

provisions of the United Nations World Summit outcome document, 1612 (2005) 

and 1882 (2009) on children in armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of 

humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 

(2009), and 1889 (2009) on women, peace, and security, 

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 

Mission in the Sudan dated 5 April 2010 (S/2010/168), and recalling the report on 

Children and Armed Conflict in Sudan dated 10 February 2009 (S/2009/84), 

including his recommendations, and taking note of the report on Children and 

Armed Conflict in the Sudan (S/2007/520) dated 29 August 2007, and recalling the 

conclusions endorsed by the Security Council Working Group on Children and 

Armed Conflict in the Sudan, S/AC.51/2009/5, 

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence, and 

territorial integrity of the Sudan and to the cause of peace, stability, and security 

throughout the region, 

Stressing the importance of the full implementation of the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005, including, in particular, the importance 

of pursuing further efforts to make unity attractive and respecting the right to selfdetermination of the people of South Sudan to be exercised through a referendum to 

determine their future status,

Emphasizing the need for the United Nations and the international community 

to support consolidation of mutual trust between the two parties, 

Taking note of the nationwide elections conducted in April, as elections are a 

component of CPA implementation, and commending the people in Sudan who are 

working toward democracy, 

APPEENDIX A
S/RES/1919 (2010) 

2 10-33577

Recognizing that regardless of the results of the referendum, both parties to the 

CPA will need to continue to discuss critical issues in a peaceful and constructive 

manner and that the United Nations, African Union and other regional organizations 

can play an important role in supporting and promoting this dialogue, 

Commending the work of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and 

the continuing commitment by troop and police contributing countries in support of 

the CPA and this mission, 

Commending the work of the African Union in Sudan, in particular the African 

Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and the role that it has played in 

focusing attention on the interrelatedness of conflicts in Sudan and assisting the 

Sudanese parties to comprehensively address these issues, along with the 

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other regional actors, 

Commending the continuing work of the Assessment and Evaluation 

Commission (AEC), 

Condemning all acts and forms of violence perpetrated by any party that 

prevent or hinder peace and stability in Sudan and the region, deploring their effects 

on the civilian population, in particular on women and children, and calling for 

compliance by all parties with their obligations under international humanitarian and 

human rights law, 

Stressing the ongoing importance of providing humanitarian and development 

assistance to the civilian populations throughout Sudan, encouraging comprehensive 

preparedness efforts by the United Nations in view of the upcoming referendum 

including the need for increased humanitarian and development assistance in the 

south for the remainder of the CPA implementation period as well as post-CPA and 

the need for continued cooperation among the CPA parties, the United Nations and 

humanitarian organizations and urging donors to support implementation of the CPA 

and to honour all pledges of financial and material support, 

Acknowledging that the CPA has reached a critical stage, and stressing the 

need to complete all remaining implementation tasks under the CPA, 

Welcoming increased and continuing cooperation among UNMIS and all other 

United Nations missions in the region, and stressing the importance of continued 

sharing of information among them to help counter regional threats such as the 

activities of militias and armed groups, including but not limited to such groups as 

the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 

Determining that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to 

international peace and security, 

 1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNMIS until 30 April 2011, with the 

intention to renew it for further periods as may be required; 

 2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue reporting to the Council 

every three months on UNMIS mandate implementation, CPA implementation 

progress, and respect for the ceasefire; 

 3. Additionally requests the Secretary General to provide in his quarterly 

reports information including (1) a detailed plan of measures UNMIS is taking to 

support the referenda and popular consultation processes, consistent with paragraph 7 

below, including lessons learned from the 2010 elections (2) the status of United 
S/RES/1919 (2010)

10-33577 3

Nations engagement with the parties to the CPA and the parties’ progress concerning 

the critical tasks that will need to be accomplished post-referendum and, as 

appropriate, information on (3) UNMIS’ planning in consultation with the parties 

concerning the United Nations presence in Sudan post Interim period; 

 4. Deplores the persistent localized conflict and violence and its effect on 

civilians, especially within Southern Sudan, and underscores the importance of 

UNMIS making full use of its authority and capabilities, as stated in paragraph 16 of 

resolution 1590 (2005), to take necessary action to provide improved security to the 

civilian population, humanitarian and development actors, and United Nations 

personnel under imminent threat of violence, and stresses that this mandate includes 

the protection of refugees, displaced persons, returnees, and other civilians with 

regard to the activities of militias and armed groups, including but not limited to 

such groups as the LRA, as recognized in resolution 1663 (2006); 

 5. Reiterates its call on UNMIS to coordinate strategies with other United 

Nations missions in the region for information on the protection of civilians in light 

of the attacks by the LRA and requests the Secretary General to include in his 

UNMIS quarterly reports, information on cooperation between United Nations 

missions in dealing with the threats of the LRA; 

 6. Calls upon UNMIS to implement a mission-wide civilian protection 

strategy, comprehensively throughout the mission area, including the 

implementation of tribal conflict resolution mechanisms, and urges UNMIS to 

enhance its presence in areas at high risk of localized conflict, including by 

conducting frequent patrols; 

 7. Recalls the CPA’s provision for referenda, as well as the parties’ 

responsibility to pursue efforts to make unity attractive, reaffirms UNMIS’ support 

for these activities, requests that UNMIS be prepared to play a lead role in 

international efforts to provide assistance, as requested, to support preparations for 

the referenda in 2011, including in consultation with those member states able and 

willing to provide support, an advisory role related to security arrangements for the 

referenda, and urges the international community to provide technical and material 

assistance, including referenda observation capacity, as requested by the relevant 

Sudanese authorities to support the referenda and popular consultations; 

 8. Stresses the importance of full, and expeditious implementation of all 

elements of the CPA, agreements on Darfur, and the October 2006 Eastern Sudan 

Peace Agreement, and calls upon all parties to respect and abide by their 

commitments to these agreements without delay; 

 9. Requests UNMIS, within its current mandate and capabilities, to continue 

to assist the parties, as requested, in the implementation of all elements of the CPA, 

including creation of, and appointments to, the referenda and popular consultation 

commissions, implementation of the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 

in The Hague regarding Abyei, north-south border demarcation, and wealth sharing, 

security arrangements, and resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue 

Nile states; 

 10. Welcomes continuing military capability reviews conducted into UNMIS’ 

deployment, stresses the importance of appropriate and flexible deployment of 

UNMIS in order to deter and prevent violence in areas where civilians are under 

threat of violence, and requests regular reviews of UNMIS deployment to ensure 
S/RES/1919 (2010) 

4 10-33577

that the mission is best placed to support the implementation of the CPA and protect 

civilians under imminent threat of violence; 

 11. Welcomes the CPA parties’ sustained commitment to work together and 

urges their continued cooperation in carrying out their responsibilities in further 

implementing the CPA and calls upon the CPA parties to cooperate fully with all the 

United Nations operations in the implementation of their mandates; 

 12. Reiterates its concern over the restrictions and impediments placed on 

UNMIS personnel and materiel, and the adverse impact such restrictions and 

impediments have on UNMIS’ ability to perform its mandate effectively and in that 

regard calls for all parties to cooperate by providing full and unrestricted access to 

UNMIS in monitoring and verification within its area of responsibility with special 

emphasis on monitoring of the Abyei region, and urges UNMIS, consistent with its 

mandate and within its means and capabilities, to consult with the parties, and to 

deploy sufficient personnel to the Abyei region to improve conflict prevention 

efforts and security to the civilian population; 

 13. Expresses its concern for the health and welfare of the civilian 

populations in Sudan; calls upon the parties to the CPA and the communiqué signed 

between the United Nations and the GNU in Khartoum on 28 March 2007 to support 

and protect all humanitarian personnel and facilitate all humanitarian operations in 

the Sudan; and urges the Government of Sudan to continue working with the United 

Nations to ensure continuity of humanitarian assistance throughout Sudan; 

 14. Notes that conflict in one area of Sudan affects conflict in other areas of 

the country, and therefore urges UNMIS, consistent with its current mandate, to 

cooperate closely with all United Nations entities operating in the region, including 

the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team and other stakeholders, so that 

implementation of these bodies’ mandates supports the overall objective of peace in 

Sudan and the region; 

 15. Recognizes the detrimental impact of the proliferation of arms, in 

particular small arms, on the security of civilians by fuelling armed conflict, 

encourages UNMIS to continue its efforts in providing assistance to the 

Government of South Sudan with regard to the civilian disarmament process, in 

particular by strengthening the capacity of local authorities to deter inter-communal 

conflicts and by monitoring forced civilian disarmament initiatives in an effort to 

avert disarmament operations that could exacerbate insecurity in Southern Sudan; 

 16. Requests UNMIS, acting within its current mandate and within its current 

means and capabilities, to continue to provide technical and logistical support to the 

Technical ad hoc Border Committee, as requested, to help the parties urgently 

conclude the process of demarcation of the 1956 North/South border, in accordance 

with the CPA; 

 17. Encourages UNMIS, consistent with its mandate, and within authorized 

levels of civilian police, to continue efforts to assist the parties to the CPA in 

promoting the rule of law, restructuring the police and corrections services 

throughout Sudan, particularly in the south due to lack of development of the police 

services, and assisting in the training of civilian police and corrections officers; 

 18. Encourages UNMIS to work closely with the Sudanese Armed Forces 

(SAF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to reinvigorate the 
S/RES/1919 (2010)

10-33577 5

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process and to assist in 

voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction efforts in 

implementation of DDR under the CPA; and to ensure the timely provisions of 

sustainable reintegration programmes, which will help to promote continued and 

enhanced funding support from donors for the reintegration phase, and to coordinate 

with local authorities and with the United Nations agencies programmes and funds, 

initiatives that strengthen DDR with the creation of economic opportunities for 

reintegrated individuals and further urges donors to respond to calls for assistance to 

the DDR process, in particular the reintegration phase, and calls on donors to 

honour all obligations and pledges of assistance, and takes note in this context of the 

need to also assist the victims in conflict-affected communities; 

 19. Welcomes the adoption of an action plan by the SPLA to release all 

children still associated with its forces by the end of 2010 and in order to achieve 

this goal, calls for a timely implementation of this action plan, requests UNMIS, 

consistent with its mandate and in coordination with the relevant parties and with 

particular emphasis on the protection, release and reintegration with their families of 

children recruited to and participating with armed forces and armed groups, to 

increase its support for the National DDR Coordination Council and the Northern 

and Southern DDR Commissions and to monitor the reintegration process; 

 20. Welcomes the continuing organized return of internally displaced persons 

and refugees to the Three Areas and Southern Sudan, and requests UNMIS, within 

its current mandate, capabilities and areas of deployment, to coordinate with United 

Nations and other partners to facilitate sustainable returns, including by helping to 

establish and maintain the necessary security conditions; 

 21. Stresses the critical role of the AEC in overseeing and monitoring 

implementation of the CPA; and urges all parties to cooperate fully with the AEC 

and implement its recommendations; 

 22. Stresses the importance of achievable and realistic targets against which 

the progress of UNMIS can be measured; in this regard, requests the SecretaryGeneral to report on and assess the progress in meeting benchmarks in each 

quarterly report, as well as any consequent recommendations regarding UNMIS’ 

configuration; 

 23. Encourages the periodical update and review of the UNMIS’ concept of 

operations and rules of engagement, fully in line with the provisions of the UNMIS 

mandate under relevant Security Council resolutions, and requests the SecretaryGeneral to report on progress against the concepts and rules to the Security Council 

and Troop Contributing Countries in each quarterly report, and to provide the 

Security Council in the same report specific updates on the security situation in the 

mission’s area of responsibility; 

 24. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the necessary measures to 

ensure full compliance by UNMIS with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on 

sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council fully informed, and urges

troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including 

predeployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in 

cases of such conduct involving their personnel; 

 25. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter. 
22

CASE STUDY N O. 7, TEACHING NOTES

COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES

Disarmament in South Sudan

Cecily Brewer

OBJECTIVE

This case explores the dilemmas that surround translating policy into practice in postconflict developing countries. The main focus of the case is disarmament in South Sudan in 2005, immediately after the signing of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The aim is to encourage students to

think critically about policy guidance and to consider what contradictions

and dilemmas they could encounter before they hit the ground as wellintentioned practitioners. 

The case is designed to be used in general introductory courses in international relations, international development, political economy, or public

policy. It can also be used for specialty courses on postconflict reconstruction, Sudan, or reconstruction and stabilization. It could also be used in the

training of practitioners participating in the disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration of ex-combatants or in security sector reform. 

OVERVIEW

South Sudan in late 2005 is fairly typical of a class of postkinetic conflict

states that are particularly challenging for disarmament. Joanna Spear identifies five key aspects of disarmament and demobilization in the aftermath of

civil wars. These form a framework through which to examine disarmament

and its potential for success. This case is structured around her five factors:58

• The feasibility of the peace agreement and its aims — Spear notes that

many peace agreements remain “silent” on issues of detail, such as

how disarmament will be defined and implemented, either because

disagreement on details could disrupt negotiations or because negotiators are not implementers and do not fully grasp the details of disarmament. Regardless, DDR is often left to be defined by the

implementers: “The details of the peace agreement can be regarded

as a ceiling for action or a floor from which agents can move forward

to implement their interpretation of the intent of the accords.”59
Disarmament in South Sudan 23

• The capability and resources of the international implementers — Spear

describes the variety of military, private sector, host government,

nongovernmental, international, and donor actors involved in DDR

as an “implementation chain that needs to endure if the process of

disarming and demobilizing is to succeed.”60

• The implementation environment — Implementers must know the

environment.61 Spear analyses the implementing environment on

multiple levels: individual, local, national, regional, and international.

At the local level, she emphasizes that “disarmament and demobilization must be attuned to the local and national situation, considering

such issues as the traditional role of guns and the sociocultural role of

warriors in the societies in question.”62

• The attitudes of the warring parties — The attitudes of warring parties

are a determining factor of the success of disarmament. Spear notes:

“If there is a will for peace, problems at other points in the implementation process, for example, resource constraints and minor instances

of cheating, can be overcome.”63

• Effective verification — Spear’s final factor for determining the success

of the disarmament process is effective verification. She states that

verification is difficult and that without methods built into an agreement to deal with cheating “short of abandoning the whole agreement,”64 the incentives are for verifiers to overlook cheating.

In addition, the case study refers to seven key dilemmas that are often

apparent as policy is translated into practice. These are by no means exhaustive. In the order they appear in the case study, these dilemmas are the following:

• The international community is directed to play a supporting role to

the host government’s disarmament campaign, but at times the campaign will not be in keeping with the UN’s other mandate parameters.

For example, the local political will to disarm may not match the mandated DDR scope and time line.

• The security and development organizations must work closely

together, but their mandates and auras do not always mesh easily.

• The environments most lacking in resources are often those most in

need of the rapid creation of new disarmament structures. 

• Civilian disarmament done too early leads to increased instability,

while its delay furthers instability.
24 PROCESS Cecily Brewer

• Forced disarmament can have extremely negative repercussions, but

groups do not always agree to being disarmed voluntarily. 

• The international community is to remain a neutral actor while supporting a potentially biased host government.

• Success is most easily measured by the number of weapons collected

but best measured by improvements in human security.

PROCESS

Below are suggestions for possible discussion or role-play based on the case

study. 

• What went wrong in the December 2005 to May 2006 disarmament

campaign in South Sudan’s Jonglei State? 

• What are the inherent dilemmas in the disarmament process? 

• What could a more successful “postconflict” disarmament campaign

look like?

• What are the goals of disarmament, and how does one measure success?

Spear’s article provides five characteristics of disarmament. Class discussion identifies how these apply to the case. Consider dividing the class into

five groups, each one discussing how one of the five elements applies and

reporting back to the class.

Role-play

This requires some additional background readings on Sudan, the CPA, disarmament, and other related topics that can set the scene in a way that best

addresses the themes and learning objectives of the course. 

Ask the class to list the key actors in the case study (likely outcome: a

Nuer cattle herder and member of the White Army, a Dinka elder, a member

of the SPLA, a member of the Government of South Sudan Security Committee, the governor of Jonglei State, Wutnyang Gatkek, a Government of

South Sudan DDR official, a UN DDR practitioner, among others) 

Assign roles to each student, requesting them to research their character

and identify his/her interests and motivations.

In class, ask each student, representing their assigned role, to explain

their desired outcome of the DDR process and their concerns.
Disarmament in South Sudan 25

Ask the governor and/or a UN mediator to facilitate a meeting to

address these interests and concerns and attempt to find a peaceful solution.

The group should attempt to reach agreements on the following:

• Who should be disarmed?

• How should this be achieved? Can force be used? If so, under what

conditions? Will weapons be paid for? If so, how will the price be set,

and where will the money come from? If not, will other incentives be

used? Will there be a public information campaign, or will it be a surprise?

• Who will run the campaign? What will the role of the different UN

agencies be, if anything?

• What is their goal/objective in doing disarmament?

• How will they evaluate if they are meeting/have met that goal?

End the role-play and lead a discussion with the whole class. Key questions for discussion:

• What went wrong in the December 2005 to May 2006 disarmament

campaign in South Sudan’s Jonglei State? 

• What are the inherent dilemmas in the disarmament process? 

• What could a more successful “postconflict” disarmament campaign

look like?

• What are the goals of disarmament and how does one measure success?

ENDNOTES

58. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization.”

59. Ibid., p. 149.

60. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” p. 154.

61. Ibid., pp. 151, 157.

62. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” p. 159.

63. Ibid., p. 156.

64. Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” p. 158.
26 RELATED THEORETICAL CONCEPTS AND SELECTED READINGS Cecily Brewer

RELATED THEORETICAL CONCEPTS AND 

SELECTED READINGS

International Relations

Sudanese History and Politics 

International Crisis Group. December 23, 2009. Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan. Africa Report 154.

Carney, Timothy, Victoria Butler, and Michael Freeman. Sudan: The Land and the People.

Seattle: Marquand Books.

Small Arms Survey. November 2006-February 2007. Anatomy of civilian disarmament in

Jonglei State: Recent experiences and implications. Sudan Issue Brief 3.

———. April 2007. The militarization of Sudan: A preliminary review of arms flows and

holdings. Sudan Issue Brief 6.

UNMIS. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Provision on Disarmament, Demobilization &

Reintegration Information Sheet. <http://www.unmis.org/english/ddr.htm>.

———. April 9, 2008. Round table meeting on Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration. UNMIS Press Release No. 06/08.

Balance of Power 

Waltz, K. N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House.

International Development

DDR and Small Arms Control

Muggah, Robert. April 2006. Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on

DDR and Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period. Contemporary Security Policy

27:1.

Spear, Joanna. 2002. Disarmament and Demobilization. In Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth

Cousens. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Anderson, Mary. 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War. Boulder: Lynne

Rienner Publishers.

Civil-Military Integration

Eide, Espen, Anja Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen von Hippel. May 2005. Report on

Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations.

RELATED NON-ACADEMIC RESOURCES

Sudan’s Civil War

Eggers, David. 2007. What is the What: The Autobiography of Valentino Achak Deng. New

York: Vintage. The reading could be shortened by selecting the sections of this book that

take place in South Sudan.

Arms Sales and Trade

Lord of War, a 2005 film (Warning: Preview this film before showing in class; it contains gratuitous violence).

Do No Harm Concept

Greene, Graham. 1955. The Quiet American. New York: Penguin Group.
Center for Complex Operations

National Defense University

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Telephone

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Dr. Karen Guttieri

Naval Postgraduate School

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guttieri@nps.edu
Center for Complex Operations

National Defense University