[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10345

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

CORDELIUS BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TITLEMAX OF GEORGIA, INC., 

INSURANCE AUTO AUCTION OF RINCON, 

GREG LUDWIG, 

STEVE THOMAS, 

NATHANIEL ANDERSON, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10345

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cv-00082-WTM-CLR

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The district court dismissed Cordelius Brown’s second and 

third amended complaints against TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. because they were shotgun pleadings. Brown appeals, arguing the 

district court abused its discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, 

we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brown sued TitleMax—and seventeen other defendants—in 

the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Brown 

requested to file a first amended complaint (which she was able to 

do as of right), and the magistrate judge granted that request. Her 

first amended complaint was 153 pages long and referenced a litany 

of federal and state causes of action, including discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. After the heading for almost each claim, Brown wrote, “Plaintiff restates, re-alleges, and 

incorporates by reference all other [p]aragraphs of this [c]omplaint 

as if fully stated herein.” 

A magistrate judge screened the first amended complaint 

and concluded it was a shotgun pleading. The magistrate judge 

explained the categories of shotgun pleadings recognized in our

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Circuit, and it concluded the first amended complaint fell “into at 

least three of these categories” because each claim “restate[d], reallege[d], and incorporate[d] by reference all other [p]aragraphs of 

this [c]omplaint,” it “fail[ed] to articulate against whom each specific claim [was] made” and which “factual allegations support[ed]

each specific claim,” and some of its factual allegations were 

“wholly conclusory.” The magistrate judge afforded Brown “a single opportunity to amend her [c]omplaint in order to comply with 

the pleading standards” of the federal rules and to “better articulate 

the claims asserted against the named defendants.” But the magistrate judge warned Brown that “failure to timely comply with this 

[o]rder may result in dismissal for failure to prosecute or comply 

with a court order.” 

Brown filed a second amended complaint—this time only 

100 pages long—that again referenced a variety of federal and state

causes of action, including discrimination, retaliation, hostile work 

environment, and breach of fiduciary duty. And again, after each 

claim, Brown wrote, “Plaintiff allege[d] and re-allege[d] by reference the allegations set forth” in the preceding paragraphs. 

Five days later, before the magistrate judge could address 

the second amended complaint, Brown filed a 101 page third 

amended complaint without leave. In her third amended complaint, Brown “allege[d], state[d,] and reallege[d] by reference the 

allegations set forth in” the preceding paragraphs when introducing each claim. Brown later moved for sanctions against the defendants and their attorneys. 

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The magistrate judge recommended, among other things, 

that the district court dismiss Brown’s complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. The magistrate judge explained that 

Brown’s “continued shotgun pleadings remain[ed] the threshold, 

dispositive issue” because the second amended complaint “did not 

address the deficiencies highlighted by the [c]ourt’s prior [o]rder” 

and because Brown failed to “abide any instruction from the [c]ourt 

besides shortening her [c]omplaint” and instead “continued the impermissible restatement and incorporation by reference of all preceding paragraphs.” The magistrate judge concluded the third 

amended complaint—which the magistrate judge noted was filed 

without leave—also failed as a shotgun pleading. Because Brown 

had been informed of the shotgun pleading deficiencies in the first 

amended complaint but failed to fix them in her later amended

complaints, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal. 

Brown objected to the recommendation, arguing that “her 

amended complaint address[ed] all factors that would have made 

it a shotgun pleading.” She argued that when she changed the 

words “restates, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference,” to “alleges, states, and reallege[s] by reference,” she cured the defect the 

magistrate judge had identified, so her complaint was not a shotgun pleading, “[a]ssuming that realleges and incorporate ha[ve] different meanings.” 

The district court agreed with the portion of the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation relevant to this appeal and adopted it. 

The district court pointed out that the magistrate judge’s initial 

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order on the first amended complaint had identified the “adopt[ion 

of] all of the allegations of each preceding count” as one defect. 

And it pointed out that the magistrate judge gave Brown “an opportunity to file an amended complaint and advised her that the 

failure to timely comply with the order may result in dismissal.” 

Against this backdrop, the district court concluded that 

Brown’s second and third amended complaints were still shotgun 

pleadings. It explained that “[t]he issue is not in [p]laintiff’s word 

choice.” Instead, it was Brown “continu[ing] to incorporate all of 

the factual allegations and counts into every count that follows.” 

And “due to [her] adoption of the allegations of all preceding 

counts, it [was] still impossible to decipher which defendants are 

responsible for the acts or omissions giving rise to each claim.” Because Brown’s amended complaints “remain[ed] shotgun pleadings” and her “persistent attempts to avoid, rather than address, the 

defects identified by the [m]agistrate [j]udge confirm[ed] the futility 

of further opportunities to amend,” the district court dismissed the 

case with prejudice—except for any state law claims which it dismissed without prejudice to refile in state court—and denied all 

other pending motions as moot. 

Brown appeals the dismissal of her complaints. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s dismissal of a shotgun pleading 

for failure to follow pleadings rules for an abuse of discretion. 

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th 

Cir. 2015).

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DISCUSSION

The district court did not err in dismissing Brown’s amended 

complaints because they were impermissible shotgun pleadings. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must 

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement 

must provide “fair notice” of the claim and “the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citation omitted). If a plaintiff has been given fair notice of a defect 

in her complaint and a meaningful chance to fix it but files an 

amended complaint plagued by the same defect, then dismissal 

with prejudice is proper. Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 

1358–59 (11th Cir. 2018). 

One common defect occurs when a complaint is filed as a 

shotgun pleading. Shotgun pleadings fail to comply with rule 8 because they do not provide a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th 

Cir. 2001). “They waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably 

broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court 

dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts”—so we 

naturally “have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.” Vibe Micro,

Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). 

We have explained that shotgun pleadings come in several varieties, and “[t]he most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint 

containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry 

all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the 

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entire complaint.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 & n.11 (collecting 

cases). We have explained that this “mortal sin of re-alleging all 

preceding counts” fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of 

the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim 

rests.” Id. at 1322–23. 

It’s true that dismissal with prejudice—as the district court 

did with Brown’s federal claims—is “an extreme sanction that may 

be properly imposed only when: ‘(1) a party engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt (contumacious conduct); and 

(2) the district court specifically finds that lesser sanctions would 

not suffice.’” Id. at 1321 (quoting Betty K. Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V 

MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2005)). But “we have 

condemned shotgun pleadings time and again, and this is why we 

have repeatedly held that a [d]istrict [c]ourt retains authority to dismiss a shotgun pleading on that basis alone.” Jackson, 898 F.3d at 

1357. 

Here, the magistrate judge expressly concluded that the first 

amended complaint was a shotgun pleading, explained why, and

directed Brown to replead. The magistrate judge also warned 

Brown that “failure to timely comply with this [o]rder may result 

in dismissal for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order.” 

Yet Brown’s later amended complaints repeated the same defects. 

To the district court, Brown’s “persistent attempts to avoid, rather 

than address, the defects identified by the [m]agistrate [j]udge confirm the futility of further opportunities to amend.” This shotgun 

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pleading “basis alone is sufficient grounds for affirming the district 

court’s dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.” Id. at 1359. 

In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion when 

it found that the second and third amended complaints were shotgun pleadings and dismissed the case. The second and third 

amended complaints failed to meet rule 8’s requirements because 

they essentially incorporated by reference all preceding factual allegations into each successive claim. See Weiland, 792 F.3d. at 1321–

23.1

 

AFFIRMED. 

1

In her initial brief, Brown mentions in passing the denial of her motion for 

sanctions, but the passing reference was insufficient to preserve the issue for

our review. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 682 (11th 

Cir. 2014) (“Abandonment of an issue can also occur when passing references 

appear in the argument section of an opening brief . . . .”).

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