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" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

112TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2011

112–15 

ANOTHER U.S. DEFICIT 

—CHINA AND AMERICA— 

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 

AGE OF THE INTERNET 

A MINORITY STAFF REPORT 

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 15, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... v 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................. 1 

Findings, Observations and Recommendations ..................................................... 4 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 7 

Public Diplomacy (PD) ..................................................................................... 7 

Why Does China Even Need PD? .................................................................... 7 

PD As A Mirror: How China Views Itself .............................................................. 9 

Chinese PD—Modern Day Reliance on a Distant Past ................................. 9 

Chinese PD Platforms: The Rise of the Confucius Institute ......................... 10 

American PD Platforms in China—Too Small, Too Few To Matter ............ 12 

U.S.-China People to People PD ...................................................................... 15 

How Mighty is ‘‘100,000 Strong’’?—Higher Education as PD ....................... 16 

Introducing the World to China—the 2008 Olympics; Introducing China 

to the World—the 2010 World Expo ............................................................ 18 

Chinese PD in Uniform .................................................................................... 22 

PD Realities: The World’s View of China .............................................................. 23 

KFPD—‘‘Kung Fu Panda Diplomacy’’ and the Role of Cinema in PD ......... 24 

No Nobel for Liu Xiaobo—Poor Human Rights Undermine China’s PD 

Efforts ............................................................................................................ 25 

China—First or Third World? ......................................................................... 29 

Commercial Dominance and Territorial Saber Rattling Strain Local Relationships ........................................................................................................ 30 

An iPhone Does Not Equal Democracy ........................................................... 34 

The ‘‘Google-ization’’ of Internet Freedom ...................................................... 35 

‘‘The Web is Fundamentally Controllable’’—The Great Firewall of China . 36 

China’s Answer —Create Our Own Internet Sites We Can Control ............ 39 

Beating the Censors at Their Own Game—Proxies and VPNs .................... 40 

U.S. Broadcasting—Already Practicing Internet Censorship Circumvention Every Day .............................................................................................. 43 

APPENDIXES

Appendix A.—List of Confucius Institutes in USA by Year ................................. 45 

Appendix B.— U.S. Legislation Regarding Funding of International Expositions .................................................................................................................... 47 

Appendix C.—Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010 .................... 49 

Appendix D.—October 11, 2010 Open Letter to the Standing Committee of 

the National People’s Congress Calling for Greater Press Freedom ............... 55 

Appendix E.—Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2010 List of Imprisoned Chinese Journalists ................................................................................................... 63 

Appendix F.—Screen Shots of Baidu Searches as Seen from Inside the Great 

Firewall ................................................................................................................. 65 

Liu Xiaobo ......................................................................................................... 65 

Tiananmen Square ........................................................................................... 66 

Tibet ................................................................................................................... 67 

Radio Free Asia (RFA) ..................................................................................... 68 

Cairo’s Tahrir Square ....................................................................................... 69 

(III)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, February 15, 2011. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: Official U.S. interest in China for political, 

economic and strategic reasons has been part of our foreign policy 

for decades. Most Americans, on the other hand, when they have 

thought about issues outside our borders, have tended to focus on 

events in Europe and more recently the Middle East. But no more. 

The latest Pew Research poll shows that for the first time Asia has 

now overtaken Europe, by a wide margin, as the area of the world 

most important to Americans. 

This is not that surprising given the extent to which the United 

States and China are currently entwined in our most complex bilateral relationship. While we are increasingly dependent on each 

other for credit and markets, we nonetheless eye each other warily 

as each country copes with the economic challenges confronting it. 

At the same time, U.S. global strategic dominance will face pressures from China’s growing military expenditures and nascent but 

rising nationalist sentiment. Greater focus on China is necessary 

not only to enhance our national and economic security but to improve our ability to compete with China in markets overseas as 

well. 

One way to address these issues is through our public diplomacy 

with China. Yet in the same way that our trade with China is out 

of balance, it is clear to even the casual observer, that when it 

comes to interacting directly with the other nation’s public, we are 

in another lop-sided contest. China has a vigorous public diplomacy 

program, based on a portrayal of an ancient, benign China that is, 

perhaps, out of touch with modern realities. Nonetheless, we are 

being overtaken in this area of foreign policy by China, which is 

able to take advantage of America’s open system to spread its message in many different ways, while using its fundamentally closed 

system to stymie U.S. efforts. 

Chinese obstruction of our efforts to engage their citizens 

through both U.S. Government and commercial means is of particular concern given how China restricts its own population’s access to information about the outside world and even the very 

workings of its own government and society. Internal scandals involving tainted milk, shoddy construction of schools that collapsed 

in recent earthquakes and corruption by high ranking officials or 

their family are but some of the many topics deemed too sensitive, 

risking the ‘‘harmonious balance’’ in Chinese society. 

(V) 

vi 

But Beijing’s efforts to suppress information are beginning to 

produce stresses on its political system that will have lasting repercussions as more and more Chinese grow frustrated with their own 

government’s ‘‘Great Firewall of China.’’ China’s suppression of 

news regarding the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo, cyber attacks on Google and repeated harassment of those who voice their opinion on the Internet are but a few 

illustrations. 

China is also beginning to export its Internet censorship technologies to other countries bent on controlling information. In part 

because of this, and because U.S. international broadcasting must 

already use Internet circumvention technology on a daily basis to 

reach its audience in countries such as China, Iran, Cuba, Belarus 

and other closed societies, I have come to the conclusion that the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees these operations—and not the State Department, which has been somewhat 

dilatory in disbursing the $50 million in Internet Freedom funds 

granted by Congress—should be the primary driver in the U.S. 

Government on this issue. 

One manner of communication that cannot be blocked by technology is interaction with American officials, academics, authors 

and ordinary citizens. However, the United States has only five 

American Centers in all of China, while China has some 70 Confucius Institutes throughout the United States. This disparity is indicative of the aggressive push China is making to project itself on 

the world’s stage. It is also simply unacceptable. We must do more 

to establish greater opportunities for Chinese citizens to meet with 

and discuss issues of mutual concern with American diplomats, 

scholars and visiting citizens. Our recent efforts at the Shanghai 

World Expo drew some 7,000,000 Chinese visitors to the USA Pavilion but also drew criticism for its hastily organized presentations 

and lack of a cogent message. 

With these issues as a back-drop, I asked the Foreign Relations 

Committee staff under the leadership of Senior Professional Staff 

Member Paul Foldi to continue the committee’s oversight on this 

issue by visiting the region and preparing the following report. 

This is now the committee’s third report aimed at reinvigorating 

U.S. Public Diplomacy in order to address the continued challenges 

that confront our nation in the new century. I hope this report will 

stimulate a dialogue within the Congress and I will welcome any 

comments you might have. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

Ranking Member. 

(1) 

1See Pew Research January 12, 2011 poll which shows Europe’s decline as ‘‘the area most 

important to the U.S.’’ from 50 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 2011 while Asia rose from 31 

percent to 47 percent for the same period. 

http://people-press.org/report/692/. 

2http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html. 

3Some $880 billion as of September 2010 according to the US Treasury: 

http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt. 

4https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html. 

5See New York Times ‘‘Solar Panel Maker Moves Work to China’’ from January 14, 2011: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/business/energy-environment/15solar.html. 

ANOTHER U.S. DEFICIT 

—CHINA AND AMERICA— 

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE 

AGE OF THE INTERNET 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Concern in the United States over events in China is nothing 

new, dating back to the ‘‘loss’’ of China in 1949, through the 1989 

Tiananmen Square crackdown, Congress’s 1999 ‘‘Cox Report’’ on 

Chinese military espionage activities and the attempted Chinese 

cover-up of the SARS epidemic in 2003. In part because of recent 

events, Americans now believe, for the first time, that Asia is more 

important to the United States than Europe—a truly historic 

shift.1

There is no question that China’s recent explosive economic advances are of new concern to Americans with our ever-mounting bilateral trade deficit (which has exceeded $200 billion every year 

since 2005) 2 coupled with China’s continued dominance as the 

number one holder of U.S. Treasury securities3 and its $2.4 trillion 

in foreign currency and gold reserves.4 This erosion of our economic 

position in the world, and the concomitant loss of manufacturing 

jobs, blamed by many on China,5 has only added to the rising tensions between our two nations. China’s recent actions in the South 

China Sea and Beijing’s refusal to join the rest of the world in trying to contain North Korea’s nuclear program and Pyongyang’s aggression towards South Korea are further stress points. 

The economic liberalizations that began slowly in the late 1970’s 

and grew exponentially in the last decade have transformed much 

of China’s urban landscape as virtually every major city, particularly those on the coast, are gleaming beacons of China’s new 

wealth, with their towering skyscrapers, the ultra-modern, efficient 

public transportation systems and traffic packed with brand-new 

luxury cars. One need not even visit China to experience this new 

level of confidence; a trip to any retail store in America, and indeed 

most of the world, will demonstrate the economic export dominance 

2 

6See Zheng Bijian’s ‘‘China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status’’ in the Sep/Oct 2005 volume of Foreign Affairs: 

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61015/zheng-bijian/chinas-peaceful-rise-to-great-powerstatus. This same language/imagery is used in 2011; see Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang’s 

piece in the Financial Times ‘‘The World Should Not Fear a Growing China’’ from January 9, 

2011: 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/64283784-1c23-11e0-9b56-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AevrpiPL. 

7http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-andpresident-hu-peoples-republic-china. 8Such developments range from the stirrup, to the 365-day calendar, to inoculation against 

smallpox, the chain drive, and even the banknote. There are even assertions that China’s powerful navy visited North America some 80 years prior to Columbus. 9 Nationally, per capita income is only $6,700, ranking China just above Turkmenistan and 

five places below Albania. For more information, see 

coming from China today. Everything from inexpensive apparel to 

high-end sophisticated electronics is now stamped ‘‘Made in China.’’ 

Meanwhile, state-sponsored troupes of Chinese dancers, acrobats 

and orchestras criss-cross the United States packing philharmonics 

and community centers alike. China’s hosting of the globally televised 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and the 2010 World Expo 

in Shanghai drew millions of viewers and visitors alike, with the 

former serving to ‘‘introduce China to the world,’’ the second as the 

‘‘world coming to China.’’ 

The new China now presents itself as an alternative center of 

power, and financial largesse, to the United States—and has the 

resources to back it up. Having flexed its muscles to reinforce this 

new position, Beijing sought to allay growing fears that China’s 

success might pose either an economic or military threat with the 

establishment in 2005 of the ‘‘Peaceful Rise of China’’ Public Diplomacy campaign.6 China’s successful implementation of this campaign in playing down the possible negative consequences of China’s ever-increasing dominance was illustrated in President 

Obama’s response to a question during the recent 2010 state visit 

by Chinese President Hu, ‘‘I absolutely believe that China’s peaceful rise is good for the world, and it’s good for America.’’ 7

Few in the United States appreciate how far China has rebounded from its nadir. For most of America’s time as an independent nation, China was a weak and divided shadow of its 

former self. Many forget that for hundreds of years, while Europe 

was plunged into its Dark Ages, China was the preeminent power 

in the world and the source of many so-called ‘‘European inventions,’’ which actually originated in China hundreds if not thousands of years before.8

Today, Chinese students are taught of this vaunted past, and 

many see their nation’s recent economic success, with its current 

lead in green technologies and record-setting high speed trains, as 

a clear sign that China is reclaiming its former glory. Some in 

China argue that we are now in a ‘‘bi-polar’’ world, while others 

contend China will soon overtake the U.S. as the new, lone ‘‘super 

power.’’ 

However, just as Japan’s rise in the 1980s provoked unwarranted 

fears of American decline, it is important to note that life is not 

perfect in the ‘‘Middle Kingdom.’’ Inland from the coast, many 

areas remain poverty-stricken; environmental degradation is worsening by the year, profiteering, corruption and land grabs by local 

officials continually provoke protests, working conditions are often 

dangerous, and quality control is lax.9 Recent recalls for excessive 

3 

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html? 

countryName=China&countryCode=ch®ionCode=eas&rank=130#ch. 10http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Chinese-toys-tainted-by-lead-or-made-by-child-labour18907.html. 11http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-09-11-tainted-formula_N.htm. 12 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303891804575576272885290234.html?KEYWORDS=china+drywall. 13See the 2010 ‘‘Open Doors’’ study compiled the Institute of International Education. For the 

academic year 2009–2010 (the most current data available), 127,000 Chinese students were in 

the United States (a 30 percent increase in the number of Chinese students from the year before) making China the #1 ‘‘sending’’ country, having overtaken India. By contrast, a mere 

14,000 American students were in China during this same period, making China the number 

five ‘‘receiving’’ country behind France, Spain, Italy, and number one Britain with 31,000. According to IIE, of the roughly 19.5 million Americans enrolled in college during this period, 

250,000 (or just over 1 percent ) studied abroad: 

http://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors. 

lead in toys made in China10 and tainted baby-formula produced 

in China,11 as well as toxic drywall produced in China,12 have led 

to a significant backlash both here in the United States and within 

China. Even Beijing’s vaunted Olympic ‘‘Birds nest’’ stadium is already showing signs of disuse. 

China’s aging population and one-child policy have led to a socalled 4-2-1 pyramid where one adult’s salary has to support his/ 

her own two parents and four grandparents. China’s recent aggressive moves in the fall of 2010 in the East China Sea have driven 

many of the nations surrounding it to look to the United States for 

greater military cooperation and possible arms sales. China’s aggressive economic activities have sparked riots in other nations as 

they too begin to suffer from ‘‘Made in China’’ fatigue and job loss. 

There seems little question that the next 50 years will witness 

a competition between our two countries in much the same way the 

United States and the Soviet Union vied for allies and global influence during the last fifty. The great unknown is whether this competition will shift from the economic sphere to a more military-oriented direction. What is known is that our nation is not doing all 

it can to prepare for the increasingly prominent role China will play 

in our economic and foreign policy. 

As a public, our knowledge of China is limited and concentrated 

among a few diplomats and academics. Not enough students are 

learning Chinese in our schools. While China sends almost 130,000 

students each year to the United States, roughly one-tenth of that 

number of Americans make the reverse trek.13 Chinese students 

return home with a better understanding of the value of multiparty democracy, free speech, and the power of the individual, as 

well as knowing our language, our culture and our world-view. 

While the Obamaadministration’s recently announced program to 

increase Americans studying in China to 25,000 a year over 4 years 

through private sector support—the so-called ‘‘100,000 Strong’’ 

project—is laudable, it remains woefully under-resourced by some 

of the very sectors of our economy who carry out the most trade 

with China and who would therefore most benefit from a bi-lingual 

workforce. 

China, for its own reasons, is helping to teach Americans about 

China. Beijing has invested millions in so-called ‘‘Confucius Institutes’’ throughout the world that provide classes in Chinese language, literature and the arts. In the United States alone, there 

are some 70 such Institutes, located primarily at universities and 

colleges. This is an opportunity for Americans who might not be 

4 

able to afford overseas studies to delve into such subjects here. 

However, our ability to make similar outreach to the many Chinese 

unable to come to the U.S. to study has been sharply curtailed by 

China which has limited the U.S. to only five similar American 

Centers in China. Likewise, America’s press freedoms are available 

to foreign news agencies inside our borders. The Chinese Government-owned Xinhua News, the official press agency of the Chinese 

Government, will soon be allowed to open a multi-floored office in 

Times Square and already broadcasts from an AM transmitter in 

Texas. By contrast, Beijing limits the Voice of America to a single, 

two-person office there and blocks the opening of a VOA bureau in 

Shanghai. Furthermore, China forces both VOA and Radio Free 

Asia to beam in on Short Wave radio from distant locations well 

outside its borders. China also routinely jams these transmissions 

as well as blocks both VOA’s and RFA’s Internet sites. Meanwhile, 

Congress has provided tens of millions of dollars to assist in Internet freedom issues including Internet Censorship Circumvention 

Technology, but little of that money has been allocated by the State 

Department in spite of clear bipartisan support. 

Since Fiscal Year 2008, Congress has given the State Department some $50 million targeted for Internet Freedom. To date, 

some $30 million of this money remains unobligated, with few of 

the spent funds dedicated to Internet Censorship Circumvention 

Technology (ICCT). The Broadcasting Board of Governors entities— 

the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Network— 

must all work on a daily basis to ensure their radio, Internet and 

television programs are being received by audiences in certain 

countries that try to block, jam or outlaw these efforts. As such, the 

BBG, and not the State Department, would appear to be the logical 

lead agency in the federal government to focus current and future 

ICCT funding. 

Each of these facets of our Public Diplomacy with China—Educational Exchanges, Public Diplomacy Platforms and U.S. Broadcasting as well as others—is in serious need of greater focus and 

attention if we are to be competitive and remain ‘‘in the game’’ 

with China. 

FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• China routinely jams Voice of America and Radio Free Asia 

transmissions in Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur and Tibetan. It 

blocks access to VOA and RFA’s websites via its ‘‘Great Firewall,’’ requiring its citizens to circumvent such censorship 

through Internet proxy sites and virtual private networks. China’s refusal to allow the opening of a Voice of America office 

in Shanghai cannot remain unchallenged given the domestic 

access granted Xinhua and other Chinese state media here in 

the United States. 

• The Secretary of State’s January 2010 major speech on Internet Freedom received scant follow-up as twelve months elapsed 

before the State Department moved to disburse some $30 million in funds specifically appropriated for Internet freedom promotion, including the development of Internet Censorship CirVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
5 

cumvention Technology. Such technology should be given a 

much higher priority by the U.S. Government. Recent delays in 

allocating pre-existing funding, and the inept handling of an 

untested technology, have strengthened the hands of those governments, including China’s, who seek to restrict their citizens’ 

access to information. The State Department is poorly placed 

to handle this issue due to its reliance on daily bilateral interaction with these very same governments, particularly China. 

The Broadcasting Board of Governors—because of its unique 

position in combating Internet censorship on a daily basis on 

behalf of Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and its other entities—is more properly poised to become a leader in the field for 

the U.S. Government. 

• China has some 70 ‘‘Confucius Institutes’’ in the United States 

where Chinese language, literature, culture and arts are 

taught and Americans made more aware of life in China. We 

have been unable to reciprocate these projections of soft power 

as the United States has been allowed to open only five American Centers in China. To help circumvent this unjustifiable 

restriction, theadministration has begun to assist American 

universities who have pre-existing programs in China in opening Centers for American Studies at Chinese universities. 

Pending a reversal of China’s intransigence, such partnerships 

will have to be the way of the future in the near term, but will 

also require increased funding to keep pace with Confucius Institutes. 

• China’s moves toward a greater market-oriented economy 

should not be mistaken for the Communist Party’s willingness 

to tolerate organized political opposition—an iPhone does not 

equal democracy! Nonetheless, these new technologies are symbols to millions of Chinese that there is much new information 

available to the rest of the world—information that their government denies them. Determining how to enable reformers to 

use this technology to safely communicate with like-minded activists should remain a constant goal of the U.S. Government. 

• China continues to harass, prosecute and imprison bloggers 

and journalists on a routine basis. Those who dare raise topics 

related to Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen Square—the so-called 

‘‘Three Ts’’—as well as HIV/AIDS in China and issues related 

to the Xinjiang province (with its Muslim Uyghur population) 

are often ‘‘invited for tea’’ at the local police station, resulting 

in a stern verbal warning for a first offense. Those who continue discussing these topics on-line risk being fired or imprisoned for ‘‘disturbing the social order.’’ In 2010, China was tied 

for first with Iran in the number of imprisoned journalists—34; 

additionally, there are over 1,400 political prisoners in China 

as of the date of this report. 

• Nobel prizes have been awarded eleven times to Chinese recipients; 326 to Americans. Of the 11 Nobel Prizes awarded to 

Chinese citizens, only one was living in China at the time—the 

2010 Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned human rights activist 

Liu Xiaobo. China views this as an example of Western ‘‘hegeVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
6 

monic lecturing’’ and in 2010 created its own ‘‘Confucius Peace 

Prize,’’ the winner of which declined to accept the award. 

• The Chinese lifting of the annual cap of twenty foreign (mostly 

American) films allowed into China would give the average 

Chinese viewer a broader exposure to the United States and do 

much to offset the millions of dollars in lost revenue due to illegal copying in China. 

• Currently, 690,000 international students are enrolled in the 

United States, generating over $19 billion in tuition and living 

expenses. Of these, 130,000, roughly 19 percent , are from 

China—making it the number one ‘‘sending nation.’’ In comparison, there are some 14,000 Americans students in China. 

Increasing the number of Americans studying in China is in 

our nation’s vital interest if we are to have the needed commercial, academic and policy experts to address the challenges 

a rising China will pose to our nation. The State Department’s 

recently announced ‘‘100,000 Strong’’ four-year goal is laudable 

but was accompanied by no U.S. Government funding and will, 

therefore, need significant financial support from the private 

sector which has much to gain in terms of competitiveness 

with a bi-lingual American workforce. The Chinese Government, however, has already agreed to fund 2,500 scholarships 

each year for the 4 years of the program. 

• The current U.S. Peace Corps program in China of some 140 

‘‘Chinese-American Friendship Volunteers’’ primarily engaged 

in English-language instruction provides invaluable, long-term 

interaction with American citizens and should be expanded but 

amounts to only one American volunteer for every 10 million 

Chinese. 

• Beijing’s ‘‘Peaceful Rise of China’’ Public Diplomacy campaign 

is also being carried out by an ever-increasing number of Chinese military personnel in United Nations peacekeeping operations. To reinforce the nature of the campaign, none of these 

troops have come from combat units, but rather engineering, 

medical and police divisions. 

• Many Americans now view World Expos as antiquated affairs. 

The rest of the globe does not, and U.S. ambivalence towards 

participation unduly offends the host nations. Given that more 

than 7,000,000 Chinese visited the U.S. Pavilion at the Shanghai Expo in 2010, the lack of effort caused by unnecessary hesitation and delays on the part of the Obamaadministration 

only squandered an unprecedented opportunity to put our best 

foot forward to an audience over 10 times the size of the number of Chinese who visit the United States in a single year. Although large crowds streamed in, many were disappointed by 

the low-tech and rather ordinary exhibits inside which failed 

to demonstrate American technological, scientific and commercial expertise. Those same mistakes should not be repeated in 

the lead up to the 2012 Expo in Korea. Given recent interest 

by Texas and California in hosting the 2020 Expo, the U.S. 

should seek immediately to re-join the Bureau of International 

Expositions in order to bid for the 2020 Expo. Consideration 

7 

14See China Daily ‘‘China Needs More Public Diplomacy’’ from March 3, 2010: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010npc/2010-03/11/content_9570697.htm 

should be given to repealing legislation limiting U.S. Government involvement in Expos, an action that would give the private sector greater confidence in our efforts and lead to more 

coherent funding. 

INTRODUCTION

Public Diplomacy (PD) 

The generally recognized definition of Public Diplomacy is practice of governments communicating directly with the citizens, rather than the leadership, of another country. While the term ‘‘Public 

Diplomacy’’ first appeared in the United States in 1965, governments had long been going over the heads of leaders and working 

directly with foreign audiences. Nonetheless, China currently acts 

as if it had only just discovered Public Diplomacy (PD) as a tool 

of foreign policy and seems bent on furiously trying to reverse engineer it as yet another Western invention that must be produced in 

China.14

The goal of effective PD is to convey or project to a foreign public 

a specific image or attitude about your country through words and 

deeds. In order to accomplish this, a country must have an agreed 

upon message it wishes to convey that will resonate with the audience. Also, a nation must be willing to recognize how the rest of 

the world views it. If the message a nation tries to project through 

its PD is significantly out of balance with what the rest of the 

world perceives, PD efforts will not be viewed as a sincere attempt 

to engage but more as pure propaganda. This is the case confronting China today, particularly in its dealings with the West. 

Why Does China Even Need PD? 

Modern China holds a unique position in history in terms of its 

interaction with the United States. Like the former Soviet Union, 

China is run by a repressive Communist government that has no 

qualms about quashing human rights and imprisoning democracy 

advocates. But the Soviet Union was economically isolated, having 

little need to interact outside its Eastern Bloc system of satellite 

nations with whom it conducted the majority of its trade by fiat 

rather than market economics. Like Japan in the 1980s, China’s 

trade issues with the United States are a major source of bilateral 

friction. But unlike Japan (both a treaty ally of the United States 

and heavily dependent on the U.S. for its defense), which opened 

numerous auto plants in the U.S. and obtains the raw materials it 

needs on the open market, China feeds its economic engine through 

a series of equity stakes in raw material production—buying everything from oil fields in Sudan, to Australian coal deposits and Peruvian copper mines. 

China is thus putting itself in a very tenuous spot where public 

sentiment could easily turn and harm its economic expansion. Such 

was the case in 2005 when CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil 

Corporation) attempted to purchase the American oil company 

8 

15See Bloomberg BusinessWeek ‘‘Why China’s UNOCAL Bid Ran Out of Gas’’ from August 

4, 2005: 

http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2005/nf2005084_5032_db016.htm. 16These commissions are the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, 

http://www.uscc.gov/index.php, and the Congressional-Executive Commission, which monitors 

human rights and the rule of law in China: 

http://www.cecc.gov/. 

UNOCAL for $18.5 billion—an all-cash bid which surpassed 

ChevronTexaco’s next highest offer by over $1 billion. Even though 

there was no legal prohibition for such a purchase, UNOCAL 

shareholders eventually rejected the CNOOC bid, in part due to 

Congressional and public outcry which noted that China’s own 

market structure hampered reciprocal type purchases in China.15

Another example where the American public’s perception of Beijing 

directly affected China’s economic fortunes was the debate over its 

admission to the WTO during the Clinton administration. Until 

that time, Congress voted every year, with lengthy debate beforehand, on China’s ‘‘normal trade relation’’ status (formerly called 

Most Favored Nation). This gave many members an opportunity 

annually to castigate China for its record on human rights, Tibet, 

Taiwan, its potential threats to U.S. security, etc. The WTO debate 

turned not so much on the economic pros and cons of the accession 

deal reached by the Clinton administration—a deal which has 

added billions to U.S.-China trade—as on the loss of this regular 

public forum to air grievances against China. Separately, Congress 

created two permanent commissions to study and report regularly 

on China’s human rights record, adherence to rule of law, and potential risks to the U.S. from its economic and security policies.16

Such single-country focus is unique to China. 

Unlike the past, when an economically insular and isolated 

China could allow its Public Diplomacy to rely solely on a random 

scattering of a handful of pandas, China must now engage full-on 

with publics around the world as part of its foreign and economic 

policy. In addition to strains caused by trade policies, China is also 

under U.S. and international pressures over its abysmal human 

rights record and its willingness to coddle and support dictators 

ranging from Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe to Kim Jung-il in North 

Korea. China’s Public Diplomacy is therefore geared towards reshaping the world’s image of China. 

As part of our democratic and, primarily, Euro-centric heritage, 

most American studies of ancient times focus on ancient Greece 

and Rome and into the Dark Ages, leading through the Renaissance/Reformation/Counter-Reformation into Columbus and the Pilgrims, until we arrive at 1776. Many forget that during that entire 

lead-up to the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent 

234-year history of our nation, China had existed for more than 

4,000 years. (In the Chinese calendar, 2011 is the year 4709.) For 

much of that time, China was, in fact, the world’s lone superpower, projecting itself far beyond its borders through its trade and 

military. It is to this former glory that China now wishes to return. 

For a nation that old, which did not even deem an Embassy in the 

West necessary until 1876, the past 300 years in which nations of 

the West dominated and colonized much of the world present just 

a minor blip in the Chinese timeline. Those who fail to recognize 

that ‘‘new’’ China has every intention and will use every method 

9 

17See Wall Street Journal ‘‘In China’s Orbit: After 500 Years of Western Predominance, the 

World is Tilting Back East’’ from November 18, 2010: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704104104575622531909154228.html. See 

Wall Street Journal ‘‘In China’s Orbit: After 500 Years of Western Predominance, the World is 

Tilting Back East’’ from November 18, 2010: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704104104575622531909154228.html. 

18 In the United States, Public Diplomacy was handled from 1953 to 1999 solely by the U.S. 

Information Agency. The Clintonadministration bowed to Congressional critics of USIA and 

budget hawks looking for ‘‘peace dividends’’ following the collapse of the Soviet Union. USIA 

went from being a separate Cabinet agency to a division in the State Department headed by 

an Under Secretary of State who oversees the Bureaus of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 

International Information Programs and Public Affairs. The only portion of USIA that was allowed to remain outside the State Department was U.S. international broadcasting; today, the 

Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, Radio Free Asia and the 

Middle East Broadcasting Network are run by the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

(economic, social and even military) to reclaim its old mantle woefully underestimate the pride and determination its ancient history 

imbues in its leaders and citizens.17

This report will examine the disparities and tensions between 

how China uses its ancient history as the lens through which it 

sees itself and how the rest of the world focuses on China’s more 

modern developments to form its impressions. This disconnect 

should, in theory, offer the perfect opening for greater U.S. engagement with China through our Public Diplomacy; however, China is 

doing everything it can to obstruct, limit and blunt these efforts 

and using its own soft power efforts to project and regain its place 

atop the world. While some of their efforts are more effective than 

others, China currently has the resources and determination needed to drive this policy forward. 

PD AS A MIRROR: HOW CHINA VIEWS ITSELF

Culture has become a more and more important source 

of national cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing 

significance in the competition in overall national 

strength.—Chinese President Hu Jintao to the 17th Communist Party Congress in 2007 

Chinese PD—Modern Day Reliance on a Distant Past 

In its desire to return to what it views as its rightful position as 

the preeminent global power, 21st century China seeks to avoid the 

appearance of an aggressive or hostile country, lest the nations of 

the world unite to confront it and derail its political and commercial efforts. To do so, China relies on the early part of its 4,000 

years of cultural history to form the core of its Public Diplomacy 

(PD) and project a stable and inward looking nation that could not 

possibly be a threat to others. In spite of this focus, Chinese PD 

is confusingly dispersed in three separate government ministries: 

the State Council on Information Office which controls ‘‘Soft Power’’ 

themes, the Foreign Ministry which handles formal Public Diplomacy and the Ministry of Education, which runs the ‘‘Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language,’’ best 

known by its colloquial name ‘‘Hanban.’’ 18

In spite of its name, Hanban deals with more than just teaching 

Chinese; its mission is also to help explain China to the world. To 

accomplish this, Hanban relies on the nation’s distant past to 

project a reflective, harmonious, yet inventive nation capable of 

greatness—not in terms of the modern, industrialized Communist 

10 

19 China claims everything from matches, the crossbow, the decimal system, playing cards, the 

suspension bridge and the fishing reel were first developed thousands of year before their ‘‘reinvention’’ in the West. For other examples see The Genius of China: 3,000 Years of Science, 

Discovery and Invention by Robert Temple; published by Simon and Schuster, 1986. Some ask 

what has China developed or discovered in the last 200 plus years and point to the wide disparity now between the U.S. and China in the number of patents applied for/granted in recent 

years. Although China has made phenomenal patent gains from 2000–2006 and is clearly growing, it still lags behind both the U.S. and Japan by nearly half in the number of patents applied 

for. See the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 2008 World Patent Report: 

http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo_pub_931.pdf. 20See PC World ‘‘U.S. Panel Looks at Intellectual Property Violations in China’’ from June 

15, 2010: 

http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/198901/ 

us_panel_looks_at_intellectual_property_violations_in_china.html. Chinese Government officials 

argue that they are in fact cracking down, while economists note that countries only begin to 

take IPR issues seriously when they have their own, home-grown inventions and technologies 

to protect. See Xinhua’s ‘‘China cracks down on IPR violations as new year approaches’’ from 

December 17, 2010, 

http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/newsarticle/news/government/201012/981909_1.html, found on the 

Chinese Government’s own ‘‘IPR Protection in China Website’’: 

http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/. 

21Quoted from Asia Times ‘‘The Language of Soft Power in the U.S.’’ from May 24, 2007: 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IE24Ad01.html. 

state. China’s Public Diplomacy imagery is thus centered on the socalled Four Great Inventions (paper, the compass, printing and 

gunpowder—to be used for firecrackers, not cannons) as well as the 

building of the 4,000 mile long Great Wall and the teachings of 

Confucius. Each of these images dovetails with the ‘‘Peaceful Rise 

of China’’ campaign announced in 2005. 

Confucius and the Great Wall promote images of an inward-looking nation in both the spiritual and geo-political sense. Confucian 

reverence for stability focuses on family loyalty and respect for 

one’s elders, which can easily be transferred to the need to respect 

one’s leaders and loyalty to the nation as the ultimate embodiment 

of family. The Great Wall was meant to keep foreigners out and 

suggests a static, non-aggressive nation-state bent on preserving 

itself, not one seeking to expand beyond its borders. 

The so-called Four Great Inventions reinforce China’s contention 

that it should be viewed as the true source of science and technology, and that the West simply copied its technology centuries 

later and claimed the credit, such as Gutenberg ‘‘inventing’’ movable type some 400 years after its introduction in China. China believes that the list of such inventions later claimed to have been 

‘‘discovered’’ by Europeans who brought the ideas back from visits 

to the East is as lengthy as it is unrecognized by the modern 

West.19 [While the West may shrug off such issues, China views 

the credit for creating such inventions with the same tenacity and 

pride that we now hold to modern Intellectual Property Rights, 

which the West feels China routinely violates.] 20

Chinese PD Platforms: The Rise of the Confucius Institute 

Confucius Institutes are ‘‘an important channel to glorify 

Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture spread to the 

world’’, which is ‘‘part of China’s foreign propaganda strategy.’’ —Li Changchun, one of the nine members of the 

Standing Committee of the Politburo in charge of ideology 

and propaganda21

11 

22 A list of the Confucius Institutes in the United States can be found in Appendix A. 23See China Daily ‘‘Confucius Institutes Enhance China’s International Image’’ from April 23, 

2010: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-04/23/content_9766116.htm; Hanban’s list of Confucius Institutes, Application Procedure and By-Law can be found here: 

http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. 

In addition to helping shape the imagery of Chinese Public Diplomacy, Hanban is in charge of China’s version of the British Council—the Confucius Institute. The Confucius Institute, China’s flagship PD program, is an effective, expansive and expensive effort to 

promulgate the teaching of Chinese language and ancient culture 

throughout the world through classes, teacher training, cultural 

events and sponsored trips to China. By doing so, China hopes to 

convey a thoughtful, innovative, responsible and, most importantly, 

peaceful friend to all nations. 

Since 2004, Hanban has established approximately 320 Confucius Institutes throughout the world. China has focused on these 

efforts on the United States, which now has over 70 nstitutes.22

Russia and Korea follow with only 17 institutes in each, France 

with 15, the UK with 14, and Thailand and Japan with 13 each. 

China’s efforts to demonstrate both its largesse and it influence 

have even lead to institutes in Iceland, Jamaica and Malta.23

When establishing a new Confucius Institute, Hanban will partner primarily with universities and provide up to $100,000 to cover 

start-up costs. The institute will often leverage or enhance an existing Chinese studies program and be situated in pre-existing class 

rooms donated by the university, but institutes can also be created 

from scratch. Institute offerings range from Chinese language instruction, cultural events and Tai Chi classes to subsidized trips to 

China and proctoring the ‘‘HSK’’ test which scores an individual’s 

proficiency in Mandarin (the Chinese equivalent of the English-lanVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL china1.eps
12 

24See Asia Pacific Bulletin ‘‘China’s Confucius Institutes: Crossing the River By Feeling the 

Stones’’ from January 6, 2011, 

http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb091.pdf, which questions the actual long-term effectiveness and sustainability of CIs and cites Hanban figures of $145 Million for 

the Confucius Institute annual budget for 2009. 25For more information on American PD facilities, see the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee’s February 2009 report ‘‘U.S. Public Diplomacy—Time To Get Back In The Game’’: 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:47261.pdf. 26The American Center in Beijing’s website, 

http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/irc_services.html, is available in both English and Mandarin and offers links to the Center’s collection as well as to the Education USAChina office. 

This office assists Chinese applicants to American colleges and universities and is co-located in 

guage TOEFL test) used to determine a person’s language abilities 

for either professional or education accreditation purposes. 

As originally envisioned, institutes would be established using 

the initial fusion of Hanban funding and up to 5 years of financial 

assistance from Beijing; afterwards, tuition costs would be used to 

cover operating expenses. However, observers note that without 

significant and continued funding in the out-years, many institutes 

will not be sustainable. As one critic noted to committee staff, 

‘‘How many citizens of Krakow, Poland do you think really want to 

pay for Tai Chi classes?’’ While there is indeed strong interest in 

the institutes’ offerings in some locations, few institutes seem successful enough to be financially independent, thus creating a drain 

on Beijing for many years to come.24

American PD Platforms in China—Too Small, Too Few To Matter 

In many ways, Confucius Institutes are also analogous to American Public Diplomacy platforms such as American Centers, American Libraries, Information Resource Centers (IRCs) and American 

Corners. Centers are the largest and most formal of these PD platforms, often stand-alone facilities, which combine a library, Internet stations, meeting spaces and often English language classrooms. Libraries are often co-located with other USG agencies, such 

as the Department of Commerce, and tend to have smaller meeting/programmatic areas and fewer Internet terminals. IRCs (Information Resource Centers) were created when Libraries were downsized and moved inside our newer embassies’ compounds. American 

Corners, the smallest of all these, are spaces obtained in existing 

university or municipal buildings, usually outside capital cities, via 

a Memorandum of Understanding between the Embassy and the 

local institution; the Embassy provides several computers and 

stocks the shelves with books on U.S. history, culture and literature, but the Corner is wholly run by a local coordinator whose 

salary is paid by the host institution.25

There is one significant exception to this analogy with Confucius 

Institutes—the numbers. China currently has 71 Confucius Centers 

in the U.S., while the United States has five Public Diplomacy 

spaces in China—for a country of some 1.3 billion. The United 

States currently has stand-alone American Centers located in commercially leased spaces in Beijing, Guangzhou and Shanghai. The 

Center in Beijing sits, isolated, on one of the middle floors of a 

commercial high-rise. While near to a subway and bus lines, its 

book and periodical collection is too limited to serve as a significant 

magnet. Additionally, the public meeting space is limited and in 

need of refurbishing.26

13 

the Center. Webpages of the other Centers/IRCs reveal a discouraging disparity in information 

and services listed as well as operating hours that seem poorly designed to encourage foot traffic—Guangzhou is open 9 am–5 pm, but closed each day from noon–2pm; Shanghai is closed 

daily from 11:30 am–1:30 pm but is the only center to offer free Wi-Fi service; Chengdu is only 

closed from noon–1pm (the same as Beijing), but its webpage is barren; Shenyang is closed 11:30 

am–1:30 pm, but it is open by appointment only—a further disincentive for visitors. 27 China has an Embassy in Washington and Consulates in Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, 

New York and San Francisco. The United States has an Embassy in Beijing and Consulates 

in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang and Wuhan. 28 Hanban’s Organizational Chart can be found here: 

http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm. 

The limited collection of the American Center in Beijing (right) dwarfs that of the 

even smaller American Center in Shanghai. 

Access to the Center is readily available, and visitors are not required to undergo the rigorous screening required to enter the Embassy; however, U.S. officials acknowledge that the Chinese Government monitors guests to the Center. The American Centers in 

Guangzhou and Shanghai are similarly housed apart from the 

main U.S. diplomatic facilities, enabling easier entry by the public, 

but these Centers also share space with those Consulates’ Public 

Affairs Sections—reducing their public spaces even further. Small 

IRCs exist inside the two U.S. Consulates in Chengdu and 

Shenyang, while the tiny U.S. Consulate in Wuhan has no Public 

Diplomacy space. 

The Chinese Government has been resistant to any further opening of U.S. public diplomacy facilities, claiming that each country 

has six diplomatic facilities in the other’s country and that this is 

a matter of strict reciprocity.27 This is particularly troubling as 

China considers even the aforementioned American Corners— 

which, like Confucius Institutes, tend to be situated in local universities and whose staff is paid by the hosting institution whom the 

U.S. Embassy cannot even dismiss—as diplomatic facilities and 

thus has blocked even these from being established in China. Attempts to argue reciprocity on the basis of the 71 Confucius Institutes are dogmatically rebuffed by claims that the institutes are 

run by the Hanban, which the Chinese consider a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), not the Chinese Government, and 

therefore cannot be counted. However, such assertions are specious 

at best given the direct line of authority to the Chinese Ministry 

of Education found on Hanban’s own organizational Chart.28

14 

Chinese officials argue that the United States should create its 

own version of Hanban. Given our decentralized education system, 

this seems unrealistic from both the bureaucratic and budgetary 

standpoint, especially as the U.S. version would only serve one 

country, given that no other nation has these pre-conditions. The 

alternative is to force China to recognize that Hanban is in fact not 

an NGO but an entity directly affiliated with the Chinese Government in an effort to leverage more U.S. PD facilities. 

There is one positive development for the United States. As part 

of her re-invigoration and re-examination of U.S. PD efforts, Under 

Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith 

McHale created a $2 million Innovation Fund from which Embassies worldwide can compete for one-time grants. As part of this, the 

U.S. Embassy in Beijing submitted a winning proposal that is assisting Arizona State University with $100,000 in financial and 

material support to open a Center for American Culture in Sichuan 

University in Chengdu—in essence an expansion of ASU’s prior relationship with Chengdu. ASU is adding $150,000 for in-kind services, and Sichuan is providing the space as well as a Chinese codirector, graduate student assistants, and lodging and meals for 

American scholars from ASU. The Center offers free Internet 

connectivity (students normally have to pay), regular movie 

showings, visiting speakers, English conversation, and collaboration between ASU and Sichuan students as well as faculty. Plans 

for a full-time ASU professor on the ground for a semester or a 

year will require additional funding. While Internet access will 

have to be in accordance with Chinese law, the Center stocks several thousand volumes and several dozen periodicals from around 

the world. 

15 

29 As this report was going to print, The Ohio State University confirmed that in January 

2011 it signed a similar MOU with Wuhan University to open an American Center there. OSU 

officials report that to date they have not yet received funding from the State Department but 

hope to receive assistance similar to ASU. 30http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm 

Scenes from inside ASU’s Center for American Culture at Chengdu 

As innovative as the ASU-Sichuan partnership may be, such a 

one-off success hardly suggests a coherent strategy to increase the 

number of U.S. PD platforms, official or otherwise. Nonetheless, 

the role of American universities as projectors of ‘‘soft power’’ 

should not be under-estimated, and the State Department should 

be encouraged to provide similar funding for other such U.S. university projects in China to serve as a dual-track PD effort.29

U.S.-China People to People PD 

In addition to its Confucius Institutes, Hanban has created Confucius Classrooms to promote Chinese language and culture in primary and secondary schools overseas. As opposed to Institutes, the 

Classrooms generally involve the funding of a single teacher to a 

single school. According to Hanban, there are approximately 330 

Confucius Classrooms in 98 countries with 37 in the United States, 

for a total of some 260,000 people receiving instruction either in 

Confucius Institutes or Classrooms. Similarly, Hanban sponsors 

the Chinese Bridge Competition testing Chinese language proficiency among non-native speakers. Hanban and the College Board 

partnered in 2006 to send over 300 volunteer Chinese teachers to 

U.S. schools with struggling Chinese programs, and this partnership subsidized $13,000 of the teachers’ salaries. Additionally, 

Hanban has recently expanded its operations to provide Chinese 

language programs to foreign diplomats. The first seventeen-week 

program took place in February 2010, and another program in the 

fall of 2010.30

The United States has no comparable teacher exchange program 

but there still exists a U.S. Peace Corps program in China with 

U.S. participants known as ‘‘Chinese-American Friendship Volunteers.’’ The program began in 1993 following a formal request by 

China, and some 600 volunteers have served there since then. Currently, some 138 volunteers serve in China in the provinces of 

Sichuan, Gansu, Guizhou and the Chongqing municipality where 

they provide English language training and methodologies to some 

30,000 local middle school English language teachers. 

16 

31While the Peace Corps is a separate agency and thus not part of official Public Diplomacy 

run by the State Department, it is nevertheless a critical piece of the mosaic of U.S. Public Diplomacy in the 77 countries in which some 8,600 Volunteers currently work. Since its establishment in 1961, some 200,000 Americans have conducted some of the best PD the U.S. has to 

offer through direct people-to-people efforts. 

Peace Corps programs are among the most effective tools of 

American ‘‘soft power’’ as volunteers traditionally live in communities far from capitals, often in villages with only the barest of 

amenities.31 Some argue that China’s huge foreign currency reserves are proof that China should be ‘‘graduated’’ from the Peace 

Corps program, while others say that China uses the presence of 

Peace Corps volunteers as ‘‘proof’’ that it is still a developing nation 

(For more on this debate, see page 28.). Given the difficulties in 

opening formal U.S. Public Diplomacy facilities in China, the ripple 

effect of 138 U.S. citizen volunteers living in Chinese communities, 

engaging with them not only in academic settings but in casual 

conversations about American history and social and cultural 

issues on a daily basis, benefits American PD efforts considerably 

and should be expanded. Recognizing the vicissitudes of the official 

Chinese media’s attitude towards the U.S., these people-to-people 

contacts are all the more important for dispelling myths and 

misperceptions/misrepresentations. 

How Mighty is ‘‘100,000 Strong’’?—Higher Education as PD 

One of the lesser-recognized U.S. exports is American higher 

education. The academic freedoms and opportunities afforded foreign researchers and scholars in the United States remain unparalleled in the world today. According to the most recent analyses 

available, in the 2009–10 academic year, some 690,000 foreign students were enrolled at American colleges and universities, making 

up approximately 3.9 percent of total higher-education enrollment 

in the U.S. of 19.6 million. This figure also represents a new record 

for international enrollment and is a 3 percent increase over the 

previous academic year. The total income generated by the students in the form of tuition, living expenses and incidentals has 

17 

32See U.S. Commerce Department ‘‘Survey of Current Business’’ from October 2010, p. 25, 

which lists U.S.-Cross Border Trade for Education at $19.9 Billion (a $4 Billion increase from 

just 2 years before): 

http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2010/10 percent20October/1010_services.pdf. The U.S.-based Association of International Educators (NAFSA) uses a figure of $18.78 Billion: 

http://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/eis2010/usa.pdf. 33 According to IIE, the exact figure is $513.8 Million. The statistic for each state can be found 

here: 

http://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data/Fact-Sheets-by-US-State. 

34Figures from the Institute of International Education’s 2010 annual ‘‘Open Doors’’ study of 

foreign students: 

http://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data. India remained a strong 

second, sending 105,000 students, but this was only a modest 1.6 percent uptick from the year 

before. South Korea (72,000), Canada (28,000) and Taiwan (27,000) round out the top five, 

though each of these nations saw a decline from the previous year. Saudi Arabia was the only 

other nation with a notable gain (25 percent ) over the prior year with 16,000 students studying 

in the U.S. 35Of the eleven Nobels awarded to China, ten (including the Dalai Lama) live and work outside of China. The only one residing in China is imprisoned activist Liu Xiaobo. All of which 

has added to China’s perception that the West refuses to recognize China’s recent developments 

and only uses such opportunities to embarrass China. 36http://www.iie.org/en/Research-and-Publications/Open-Doors/Data 

been estimated at some $19 billion.32 The state of Indiana alone received over half a billion dollars in the 2009–10 academic year from 

international student enrollment in its colleges and universities.33

China clearly appreciates the educational opportunities the U.S. 

offers. By the 2009–10 academic year, China overtook India as the 

number one ‘‘sending’’ nation with some 130,000 Chinese students 

in the United States. Not only was this an all-time high for any 

nation, it also represented a staggering 30 percent increase over the 

year before.34 This is equally impressive given that 10 years ago 

China sent only 55,000 to the United States. These full-tuition-paying students—who make up 18.5 percent of all foreign students— 

provide much needed financial benefits to American universities, 

amounting to roughly $3.5 billion a year. Additionally, the prolonged exposure they receive during their time in the United States 

is one of the best forms of Public Diplomacy. Many of those who 

choose to remain in the United States help form part of the core 

of our research and scientific base in public and private enterprises, and several who have become U.S. citizens have won Nobel 

Prizes.35

In spite of this rising prominence in our nation’s economy and 

foreign policy, China ranked only fifth in the order of destination 

countries for the 260,000 Americans studying overseas in academic 

year 2008–2009 with 14,000 Americans studying there—some 5.3 

percent of the total. Most Americans still prefer Western Europe 

for study, whether for cultural, linguistic or other reasons, with the 

United Kingdom ranked first (31,000), Italy second (27,000), Spain 

third (24,000) and France fourth (17,000).36

Recognizing the long-term consequences of such an imbalance, as 

well as the ever-increasing role that China plays in our bilateral 

relationship, the Obamaadministration launched in November 2009 

the ‘‘100,000 Strong Initiative.’’ Citing the exchange disparity, and 

noting that 600 times more Chinese students study English than 

Americans study Mandarin, theadministration called for a bold 

step forward to increase the number of students going to China 

from 14,000 to 25,000/year for at least 4 years. This ambitious program is estimated by the State Department to total some $68 milVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
18 

37 http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/100000_strong/index.htm 38The 2004 games in Athens cost Greece some $12.8 Billion. See U.S. News ‘‘London Admits 

It Can’t Top Lavish Beijing Olympics When It Hosts 2012 Games’’ from August 22, 2008: 

http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/08/22/london-admits-it-cant-top-lavish-beijingolympics-when-it-hosts-2012-games.html. 39Though not everything was flawless; see BBC ‘‘Web Curbs for Olympic Journalists’’ from 

July 30, 2008: 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7532338.stm. Following this uproar, China relented, but 

then quickly returned to heavy content censorship once the Games ended; see Guardian (UK) 

‘‘China Relaxes Internet Censorship For the Olympics’’ form August 1, 2008: 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/01/china.olympics. 

40This success is particularly true when one contrasts the Olympics with South Africa’s 

squandered hosting of the 2010 World Cup Soccer tournament where the only memory left with 

the viewer aside from the competition was of the cacophonous ‘‘vuvuzela’’ trumpets. 41While admittedly, 2 years later, the stadium is largely under-utilized and already beginning 

to show signs of age, it remains a considerable tourist draw for the curious—a testament to both 

its unique design and the positive memories it and the 2008 Olympic hold. The Olympic Basketball Stadium has no such shortage of events nor difficultly generating revenue, and in January 

2011, it was re-named the ‘‘Master Card Center’’; see 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-01/22/content_11900630.htm. 

lion.37 Unlike other U.S. Government exchanges, however, ‘‘100K’’ 

is intended to be financed solely through private-sector donations. 

To date, such contributions have been minimal, reaching far less 

than $5 million. 

The Chinese Government, however, is not waiting for the U.S. 

and has already committed to funding the first 10,000 of ‘‘100K,’’ 

using its ubiquitous Confucius Institutes to award 2,500 scholarships each of the 4 years to cover the various programs covered in 

‘‘100K’’: 

• 800 for Bridge ‘‘summer camp’’—a language and cultural immersion program targeted at high school students; 

• 800 for semester and full-year college-level programs; 

• 800 for short-term (7–10 days) study tours for educators and 

school administrators; and 

• 100 for ‘‘teacher training’’ for American teachers. 

Introducing the World to China—the 2008 Olympics; Introducing 

China to the World—the 2010 World Expo 

By all accounts, the 2008 Beijing Olympics were a stunning success for China and left a positive impact on the minds of the hundreds of millions (some say billions) who watched the event, from 

the opening ceremony in the iconic ‘‘Bird’s Nest’’ stadium to the operatic closing ceremonies two weeks later. China set the bar high 

for all future host nations in terms of pageantry—and cost, with 

Beijing splurging an estimated $44 billion to show off its new 

wealth and position.38 China rightly considered the Olympics as an 

opportunity to ‘‘introduce a new China to the world,’’ and for the 

most part it succeeded,39 both in the athletic and Public Diplomacy 

sense with images of China’s impressive Olympic facilities, coupled 

with images of modern Beijing.40 Somewhat surprisingly, China 

has done little to incorporate this into the PD imagery used by 

Hanban discussed earlier.41 Two years later it was time to ‘‘introduce China to the world’’ via the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. 

19 

42 Understandably, as a matter of national pride, and heavy marketing, the Chinese pavilion 

was the most popular with the Japanese and the USA pavilion either second or third depending 

on the day—reflecting a high degree of curiosity about each on the part of the average Chinese 

citizen. Of the 192 participating nations, over 80 committed significant resources to funding 

their own, stand-alone pavilion with China quietly providing financial assistance to many countries to ensure universal participation. See LA Times ‘‘Curious About the Saudi Pavilion, Better 

Get in Line’’ from July 30, 2010: 

http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/world/la-fg-china-expo-crowds-20100731 and The Atlantic ‘‘China Rules the World at Expo 2010’’ from April 29, 2010: 

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/04/china-rules-the-world-at-expo2010/39566/. 43For the U.S. legislation regarding funding of International Expositions, see Sec. 204 of Title 

II P.L. 106–113 from November 29, 1999: 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ113.106.pdf. The full text of the Section 204 is printed in Appendix B. 44See Popular Science ‘‘The USA Pavilion is a Disgrace’’ from May 6, 2010: 

http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-05/usa-pavilion-disgrace ; Washington Post ‘‘The 

United Corporations of America’’ from May 24, 2010: 

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/05/the_united_corporations_of_ame.html; 

USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy ‘‘Shanghai’d, or the USA Pavilion as Corporate Theme Park’’ 

from June 8, 2010: 

http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/ 

shanghaid_or_the_usa_pavilion_as_a_corporate_theme_park/, a consistent critic of the entire effort. For a more positive appreciation of the U.S. effort see U.S. Commissioner General to the 

World Expo Jose Villareal’s piece ‘‘Defending the USA Pavilion’’ in Foreign Policy.com from 

April 2, 2010: 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/02/defending_the_usa_pavilion 

Britain’s iconic Pavilion/USA Pavilion’s VIP Reception Desk 

While less well known outside of China, the Shanghai Expo was 

judged an equal success, with some 70 million visitors attending 

during the six-month long event. Understandably, the vast majority of the visitors were from China. Most nations realized the Expo 

offered an unprecedented opportunity to present themselves to the 

average Chinese citizen, many of whom were not likely to leave 

their shores but who were willing to wait in lines often over four 

hours to visit certain pavilions.42

Many governments spent years working with their cultural and 

industry leaders to prepare the content and design of their pavilions in order to offer the visitor both a profound and pleasant experience. The iconic British, hedgehog-like ‘‘Seed Cathedral’’ bristled 

with 60,000 fiber-optic rods. The Saudi Pavilion displayed scenes 

on the world’s largest IMAX screen, and China’s massive, six-story 

pagoda dominated the event. Most left positive, lasting impressions 

on the visitor. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the U.S. 

submission, which, in contrast, was completely dependent on private design and sponsorship,43 resulting in criticism for its lack of 

imagination and heavy corporate branding.44

20 

45The film ‘‘The Garden’’ can be seen here: 

http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMjE3Mzc2Mjgw.html. State Department officials note the 

movie is now being used by public diplomacy offices in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 46Since 1994, legislation now requires the United States to rely solely on private (mostly corporate) donations to fund its Expo efforts. Such efforts failed to raise sufficient funds for the 

2000 Hanover, Germany Expo, and for the first time since 1851, the U.S. did not participate. 

Similar funding difficulties for the 2005 Aichi, Japan Expo almost sank those efforts until Toyota USA and its U.S. parts subsidiaries stepped in at the last minute. Additionally, since 2001, 

the U.S. has been the only major country (with the exception of India) not to be a member of 

the Bureau of International Expositions that governs Expos. Based on the success of Shanghai, 

states including California, Texas and Minnesota are now expressing interest in hosting the 

2020 World Expo; however, absent U.S. membership in the BIE (annual dues of which are less 

than $40,000), no U.S. bid will likely be considered. A February 2011 study by San Francisco’s 

Bay Area Council estimates an Expo there would generate $5.6 Billion in economic activity. See 

Bay Area Council Press Release from February 7, 2011: 

http://www.bayareacouncil.org/news/2011/02/07/press-release-world-expo-in-silicon-valleywould-generate-5-6-billion-in-economic-activity-for-bay-area-according-to-new-report/ 47 These expos included: 1962 Seattle, 1964/65 New York, 1968 San Antonio, 1974 Spokane, 

1982 Knoxville and 1984 New Orleans. 48The Bushadministration had taken none of the major steps necessary to advance the USA 

Pavilion’s progress by the time it left office in January 2009, some argue since the Expo would 

not occur under their watch, this is understandable, others note that the timetable of Expos and 

U.S. elections makes this almost unavoidable. The Bushadministration did not participate in the 

Hanover, Germany Expo of 2000 (the first time the U.S. did not participate in an Expo since 

they began in 1851) for many of these same reasons, but also the inability of the NGO in charge 

to raise the needed funds. A similar fate almost occurred at the Aichi, Japan Expo in 2005, but 

Cobbled together at the last minute, the U.S. Pavilion experience 

consisted simply of three short films. When visitors finally made it 

to the entrance following an often two hour-plus wait, they were 

greeted by the first film, which presented clips of average Americans trying to say ‘‘Welcome’’ and ‘‘Hello’’ in Mandarin, with varying degrees of success until a final shot of U.S. Ambassador Huntsman, himself fluent in Chinese, presenting a polished welcome. 

Guests were then shuffled to a theater where they sat on benches 

to watch the second film, which included messages from the various corporate sponsors as well as from Secretary of State Clinton 

and finally President Obama. Next, they were moved to another 

benched theater for an eight-minute ‘‘4-D’’ movie experience portraying the efforts of small girl trying to plant a garden in an abandoned city lot. Proponents of the video argued it was a subtle message regarding the power of the individual to affect the world 

around them while detractors complained it was too juvenile.45

The only universally positive and well-received aspect of the pavilion was the use of cadres of American university student ‘‘hosts,’’ 

all of them fluent in Mandarin and many of whom were of non-Chinese descent, who kept the crowds entertained and informed during their long waits. According to the State Department, some 

70,000,000, mainly Chinese, visitors attended the Expo during its 

six months of operation, of whom some 7,000,000 visited the USA 

Pavilion. Given that less than one million Chinese visit the U.S. 

each year, the Expo was a squandered opportunity to have maximum impact on our bilateral relationship.46

Americans may forget the significant role World Expositions 

played in our own Public Diplomacy efforts. Until 2000, the United 

States participated in every Expo since the initial Expo in London 

in 1851, and from 1962–1984, the U.S. hosted six of the eight 

Expos that took place.47 While many in the U.S. now view Expos 

as antiquated events of a by-gone era, the rest of the world does 

not. Thus, U.S. dithering about participation in Shanghai quickly 

became a high-level diplomatic topic.48 During her first overseas 

21 

was saved by last minute funding, partially by Toyota. See NPR: ‘‘U.S. May Need China’s Money 

To Build Expo Pavilion’’ from March 27, 2009: 

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102432591, 

for images of the 2005 Aichi Pavilion see 

http://www.brcweb.com/brand/usaexpopavilion-design.html#picture 

49See Washington Post ‘‘U.S. Running Out of Time to Join Shanghai Expo’’ from May 7, 2009: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/06/AR2009050603888.html. 

50Due to the haste required, no architectural competition took place. Instead, the NGO which 

the State Department selected to create and run the Pavilion selected the Canadian firm Clive 

Grout (http://clivegrout.com/) which had designed similar exhibition halls in the past. The offthe-shelf look of the final product was met with scorn by most who viewed the entire enterprise 

as a major wasted opportunity to highlight American design, see Foreign Policy ‘‘A Sorry Spectacle’’ from March 8, 2010: 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/08/a_sorry_spectacle?page=full. For images of 

past U.S. Expo design efforts, see Fast Company.com ‘‘Exporting Architecture: The Rise and Fall 

of U.S. World Expo Pavilions’’ from February 24, 2010: 

http://www.fastcompany.com/pics/exporting-architecture-rise-and-fall-us-world-expo-pavilions?slide=8#10. 51See Shanghai Daily ‘‘Thumbs Down for U.S. Pavilion’’ from November 3, 2010, which cites 

a poll finding the U.S. the ‘‘most disappointing’’: 

http://expo.shanghaidaily.com/news_detail.asp?id=453502; for an opposite view, see the three 

minute clip on YouTube, produced by the company (BCRI) that developed much of the pavilion’s 

content: 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1xjqpgXHqc. 

52 The lack of a formal Participation Agreement was particularly frustrating given the important signal it would have sent a beleaguered South Korea in 2010—the 60th anniversary of the 

Korean War—following the sinking of the South Korean Navy ship Choesen in March 2010 and 

the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November, both by North Korea. 53For Shanghai 2010, the NGO tasked with creating and running the USA Pavilion was originally also tasked with raising the $61 million needed. When it failed to do so, Secretary Clinton 

lent her position to the effort and funds eventually were forthcoming from U.S. corporations. 

See New York Times ‘‘Famous Fund Raiser Delivers’’ from January 2, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/world/asia/03clinton.html. For Yeosu, which is a shorter 

Expo—only 3 months in duration to Shanghai’s 6 months—and smaller, the State Department 

decided to raise the money itself, yet as of this writing, it had only raised less than $5 million 

of the $10 million needed. Regardless, the State Department released the RFP for the USA Pavilion in Yeosu on January 20, 2011: 

http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/01/20/2011-1185/bureau-of-educational-and-cultural-affairs-request-for-proposals-the-design-development-installation noting to committee staff 

that as long as they did not award the contract prior to obtaining all the needed funding, there 

were no legal impediments to looking at prospective bids. 

trip as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton received an earful from 

concerned Chinese officials regarding the lack of commitment on 

the part of the U.S., and theadministration finally became engaged 

in the process.49 When the U.S. Pavilion was completed, it met 

with mixed reviews—‘‘It’s fine,’’ was the best the Secretary of State 

could muster during her visit to the Expo—and critics complained 

of the slap-dash building design50 and the lack of imagination and 

content that went into the project.51 A similar fate seems to await 

the U.S. participation in the 2012 Yeosu, Korea Expo, as a formal 

Letter of Participation had still not been signed with the Korean 

Government as of February 2011.52 This inability to learn from 

mistakes of Shanghai is as troubling as it is confounding. The State 

Department has not yet raised the full $10 million estimated for 

the cost of Yeosu, yet it has already released an RFP for the design 

and operations of the USA Pavilion with bids due March 15, 

2011.53

22 

54 Bangladesh and Pakistan each contribute over 10,000; India almost 9,000; Nigeria, Egypt 

and Nepal contribute over 5,000. The United States ranks 89th with 89 personnel: 

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/nov10_2.pdf. 55See China Daily ‘‘China Opens First Peacekeeping Training Center’’ from June 25, 2009: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-06/25/content_8324367.htm . While the Chinese facility has so far been used only for the training of Chinese peacekeepers, Beijing intends for it 

to become a global training center. The United States has no formal static facility and therefore 

loses a significant PD icon that the Chinese facility will surely become. However, through the 

State Department’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), it has already trained and 

equipped nearly 140,000 personnel since 2004. Of these, more than 110,000 troops from 29 

GPOI countries have deployed to 19 UN, African Union, and other regional peace support operations around the world. In FY2010, GPOI’s budget topped some $97 million. See 

http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/. 

Chinese PD in Uniform 

One of the most recent innovations in the evolution of Chinese 

Public Diplomacy has been its increasingly public and prominent 

role at the United Nations, particularly through its increased presence in U.N. peacekeeping operations. While still nowhere near becoming one of the top five Troop Contributing Countries, China’s 

2,100 military personnel ranked it number fourteen for 2010.54

Keeping with its desire to project a non-threatening image, to date 

none of these troops have come from combat units but are mostly 

engineers who assist in infrastructure repair. While their projects 

may not be stamped ‘‘Made in China,’’ they leave lasting positive 

impressions on locals long after they have returned to China. 

While their current troop contribution levels may not be significant when viewed over recent years, it is clear that China has 

sought to step up its peacekeeping personnel dramatically. This increase, combined with the 2009 opening of a $29 million peacekeeping training facility outside Beijing, indicates that China will 

continue to expand its presence in U.N. peacekeeping in order to 

demonstrate to the world it should be considered a major factor in 

maintaining world peace.55

23 

56The United States assumes the most (27 percent ) of the U.N.’s $7.9 billion peacekeeping 

budget. Japan is number two (12.5 percent ), the UK and Germany are roughly tied (8 percent 

). France (7.5 percent ) and Italy (5 percent ) assume the next highest percentages of the budget 

followed by China. See 

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/factsheet.pdf. 

57 In the same poll of some 30,000 respondents, the United States saw an upswing from 2005’s 

39 percent Positive rating down to 29 percent in 2007 and back up to 40 percent in 2010. See 

pp. 5–8 of 

http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbc2010_countries/BBC_2010_countries.pdf. 58See 

http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=9&response=Unfavorable&mode=table. 

59When pressed for a more relevant image that China would want to come to mind for the 

rest of the world that would reflect China’s current technological and economic capabilities, the 

same official who felt the world viewed China as ‘‘authoritarian’’ offered the image of a businessman. 

At the same time, others point to China’s minute portion (3.94 

percent ) of the total U.N. peacekeeping budget as yet another example of China’s desire to demand respect at the same time it portrays itself as a developing nation.56

PD REALITIES: THE WORLD’S VIEW OF CHINA

China has spent countless millions to portray itself as a benign, 

gentle, reflective nation, and most Chinese officials, when asked by 

committee staff during travel to the region how the rest of the 

world views China, waffled and fell back on Hanban imagery of ancient China. One official, however, said ‘‘authoritarian.’’ Based on 

China’s recent actions, statements and attempts to control information and clamp down on anything it thinks smacks of dissent, most 

of the world would agree with that lone opinion. This view of China 

has been born out in recent polling data and has only worsened in 

recent years. 

In the 2010 annual BBC World Opinion Poll, when asked whether China’s influence in the world was having a mainly positive or 

negative impact, only 34 percent of the respondents in 28 countries 

replied ‘‘Positive.’’ While the 2010 figure is the same as in 2009, it 

represents a dramatic drop since 2005 when China received a 49 

percent positive rating.57 The same poll and the Pew Research’s 

Global Attitudes Project show significantly high negative numbers 

for China in Europe.58

China clearly understands there is an important role for Public 

Diplomacy in its foreign policy and continues to pour money and 

resources into it. Yet China has not adequately addressed two critical elements for Chinese PD efforts necessary to gain real traction 

with foreign audiences. The first issue is the widely-held perception 

that China, through the ruling Communist Party, controls every 

aspect of those portions of society that are generally used in PD— 

the arts, TV, movies, the press and education. Therefore, China’s 

biggest stumbling block is convincing its audience that its PD offerings are anything but a pure projection of the political State rather 

than the cultural, intellectual, scientific and artistic expressions of 

the Chinese people. The second key issue is that China’s reliance 

on its Confucian heritage has failed to square with the world’s view 

of a 21st century China—in spite of its popular Olympics and Expo. 

Without addressing these two key areas, China’s PD efforts will be 

viewed, at best, as pure propaganda.59 This fact, coupled with recent major missteps by China, will only cause this perception/reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
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60Some observers only half-jokingly stated that the only positive and concrete result of President Hu’s January 2011 visit to the U.S. was the agreement to extend the loan of the pandas 

DC’s National Zoo for another 5 years (and to lower the cost to about $500,000). Given the enormous and enthusiastic crowds they draw and the fact that China tightly controls their distribution, making them even more desirable, one could argue that ‘‘Panda Diplomacy’’ is China’s best 

form of PD. One wonders if a reciprocal ‘‘American Buffalo’’ program would be equally rapturously received in China. See Washington Post ‘‘Five Year Extension for Pandas’’ from January 

20, 2011: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/19/AR2011011907126.html; 

The Scotsman (UK) ‘‘Pandas Head for Scotland, But It’s Not Black and White Yet’’ from December 11, 2010: 

http://news.scotsman.com/news/Pandas-head-for-Scotland-.6657432.jp. 

61See Appendix C for a list of foreign film box office earnings in China. 62See L.A. Times ‘‘China Had to Import Kung Fu Panda’’ from July 28, 2008: 

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/asia/la-et-panda28-2008jul28,0,4115116.story. 

ality gap to widen but will in no way diminish China’s PD efforts 

and spending. 

KFPD—‘‘Kung Fu Panda Diplomacy’’ and the Role of Cinema in PD 

Before there was truly modern, organized Chinese Public Diplomacy, China relied on the Giant Panda to project its image. With 

its gentle nature—the panda is perhaps the epitome of non-threatening. Once China—as the only source of these illusive bears—appreciated the world’s fascination with these animals, they became 

a veritable PD goldmine but that took time. It was not until 1957 

that China first bestowed a panda as a state gift to Russia, with 

North Korea receiving the second in 1965. The U.S. was next in 

1972, following President Nixon’s historic visit to Beijing. This was 

followed by a spate of gifts to other countries in the next 10 years; 

however, most of these animals died in captivity. When the program restarted, China began to ‘‘loan’’ pandas to various zoos for 

10 years (and for a fee that often reached $1 million per year) with 

the agreement that any cubs produced would be returned to China. 

In the U.S., Washington, Atlanta, San Diego and Memphis each 

have a pair.60

This embracing of the panda by the West is one of the few successes China has scored for its current crop of home-grown cultural 

icons. Yet, frustratingly for China, the United States, through Hollywood, has done at least as much to shape the rest of world’s 

image of China. Recent U.S. films, including Disney’s ‘‘Mulan,’’ and 

Columbia Pictures’ 2010 ‘‘Karate Kid’’ have had as large an impact 

on China’s image in Western popular culture as anything China 

produced domestically. For a nation trying to project and protect its 

ability to shape its own image, the fact that these films were wildly 

popular inside China could not have been welcome news. This was 

particularly true of DreamWork’s ‘‘Kung Fu Panda,’’ which became 

the highest grossing animated film in Chinese history.61 Chinese 

commentators also lamented that it took Americans to portray 

their ancient symbols in such a successful format, albeit with certain Hollywood liberties.62 Given its success, DreamWorks is set to 

release a sequel in May 2011. 

The role of cinema as part of a nation’s Public Diplomacy often 

receives little attention, in part because, for most countries, film 

production is privately run and therefore not under the official control of the state. Nonetheless, the images they convey, the stories 

they tell and the emotional and cultural imprints they leave on auVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
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63See New York Times ‘‘China’s Zeal for ‘Avatar’ Crowds Out ‘Confucius’ ’’ from January 29, 

2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/business/global/30avatar.html. 

64While the current cap of twenty films may seem puzzlingly low, prior to China’s accession 

to the World Trade Organization, the quota had been a mere five. Thus, when China offered 

to quadruple the limit to twenty, the offer, at the time, seemed too good to pass up. 65See Fast Company ‘‘The Chinese Film Industry is Ready for Its Close-Up’’ from January 

11, 2011: 

http://www.fastcompany.com/1716119/chinese-film-industry-taking-over-the-globe. 

66While Chinese movies such as ‘‘Raise the Red Lantern,’’ ‘‘Red Sorghum’’, ‘‘Crouching TigerHidden Dragon’’ and ‘‘Farewell My Concubine’’ have done well overseas, they are the exceptions, 

not the rule. 67For more on IPR/Piracy issues, see New York Times ‘‘Software Piracy in China’’ from January 19, 2011: 

http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/software-piracy-in-china. 

diences do as much, if not more, to paint a portrait of a nation than 

any formal PD efforts. 

As with almost all societies, a middle class with more disposable 

wealth and free time on its hands views entertainment as a natural outlet. The rising middle class in China clearly thirsts for 

more varied fare than Chinese producers are willing (or permitted) 

to offer. One need only recall the official backpedaling last year 

when Chinese authorities tried to force cinema houses to pull the 

wildly popular 20th Century Fox movie ‘‘Avatar’’ and replace it 

with the domestic biographic film ‘‘Confucius.’’ 63

China’s lifting of its official cap beyond the current twenty foreign titles allowed each year would have major impact on Chinese 

PD in three areas. Firstly, the move would demonstrate willingness 

on the part of China to address, in part, the festering U.S.-China 

trade imbalance issue. Secondly, Chinese audiences would be offered a product they clearly desire and can now afford—a further 

demonstration of how much their economy has grown in the last 

30 years. Lastly, China is still viewed by most of the world as a 

closed society, and such an opening would help suggest otherwise 

to the rest of the world.64

However, Beijing remains steadfast in its desire to control the 

message as well as the medium. Officially, Chinese officials insist 

that opening its film market would damage their nascent domestic 

film industry and point out that there are only 313 movie theaters 

with 6,200 screens in the entire nation (of those, over 1,500 were 

added in just 2010, again demonstrating domestic demand).65 However, as the Confucius/Avatar issue demonstrates, the Chinese certainly know how to make movies; they just do not yet seem to 

know how to make many movies with broad domestic or international appeal.66

China seems similarly unwilling to recognize the Intellectual 

Property Rights issues involving the countless shops that hawk 

bootleg DVDs of the latest fare that Hollywood and China produces, and the impact this is having on its domestic movie theater 

and cinema industries. According to the most recent estimates provided by the Motion Picture Association of America, video piracy in 

China in 2005 cost the U.S. some $244 million in lost revenue.67

No Nobel for Liu Xiaobo—Poor Human Rights Undermine China’s 

PD Efforts 

A more profound impact on China’s PD image was Beijing’s reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo (an imVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
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68This is not the first time the Nobel Committee has incurred China’s wrath. The exiled Dalai 

Lama won the Peace Prize in 1989 and dissident writer Gao Xingjian, now a French citizen, 

won for Literature in 2000. 69See Financial Times ‘‘China Snubs Nobel With Rival Peace Prize’’ from December 9, 2010: 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7e5f1282-02b8-11e0-a07e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz17dPbt6bi; Christian Science Monitor ‘‘Chinese Authorities Silence Friends of Liu Xiaobo in Extensive Roundup’’ 

from December 9, 2010: 

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/1209/Chinese-authorities-silence-friends-ofLiu-Xiaobo-in-extensive-roundup. 70See New York Times ‘‘Ex-Chinese Officials Join in Call for Press Freedom’’ from October 

13, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/world/asia/14china.html. The text of the letter is printed 

in Appendix D. 71See CNN ‘‘Winner a No-Show as China Hands Out its First Peace Prize’’ from December 

9, 2010: 

http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-09/world/china.confucius.peace_1_prize-committee-norwegiannobel-prize-jury?_s=PM:WORLD. 

prisoned Chinese human rights activist sentenced in 2009 to 11 

years for ‘‘subversion’’). Beijing’s tone-deaf nature in reacting to 

outside criticism shocked much of the world.68 Chinese official 

media lambasted the Nobel Committee and called the ceremony in 

Oslo an ‘‘anti-China farce.’’ Not content with denying Liu Xiaobo’s 

wife, Liu Xia, permission to travel to Oslo to accept the award on 

her husband’s behalf, Chinese authorities also put dozens of human 

rights activists who applauded the Nobel award under house arrest 

or surveillance and denied them foreign travel.69 The timing of all 

this could not have been worse, as it followed on the heels of an 

open letter signed by a group of 23 former Communist Party officials, former high ranking state media officials, professors and researchers entitled ‘‘Enforce Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution, 

Abolish Censorship and Realize Citizens’ Right to Freedom of 

Speech and Freedom of Press: A Letter to the Standing Committee 

of the National Peoples Congress.’’70

In an effort to diffuse the international firestorm, Chinese officials, between the announcement of the Nobel and the actual presentation ceremony, decided to award their own ‘‘Confucius Peace 

Prize.’’ Lien Chan, Taiwan’s former Vice President, was selected as 

the recipient of the Prize for his role repairing ties between Beijing 

and Taipei and for his 2005 visit to mainland China (the first such 

high level visit since Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong met in 

1945). However, when the Confucius Prize was handed out, the day 

before the Nobel award, Lien Chan was not present and confusion 

reigned regarding his knowledge of the award.71

27 

72See BBC News ‘‘Nobel Peace Prize: Who Is Boycotting the Ceremony’’ from December 10, 

2010, which lists stated reasons by some of the boycotters as to why they did not attend: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11879731. Initially, the Philippines, Serbia, and the Ukraine 

were also reported as planning to boycott see The Norway Post ‘‘19 Nations Boycott Peace Prize 

Ceremony’’ from December 7, 2010: 

http://www.norwaypost.no/news/19-nations-boycott-the-peace-prize-ceremony.html; but in the 

end, these countries sent officials to the ceremony. 73See Amnesty International’s 2009 report on China: 

http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china/report-2009; Human Rights Watch 2009 report on 

China: 

http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87491; Freedom House’s 2009 country report on China report is 

here: 

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010. 

74See Committee to Protect Journalists: 

http://cpj.org/. CPJ’s list of the 34 imprisoned Chinese journalists is found in Appendix E. 

75The full list of all 1,452 can be found here: 

http://cecc.gov/pages/victims/20101010_PPD_AR10.pdf?PHPSESSID=6a812e6c3794e335- 

cdb5cfc620eecfa9. 

A searchable version of the Database is here: http://ppd.cecc.gov/. 

76The full text of China’s ‘‘Human Rights Record of the United States in 2009’’ can be found 

here: 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/12/c_13208219.htm; the U.S. State Department’s 2009 Human Rights Report on China can be found here: 

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135989.htm. 

Following the announcement of the Nobel Prize, Beijing also 

warned Norway that the award would strain bilateral relations and 

urged (some say threatened) nations to boycott the award. Of the 

seventeen nations listed by the media that joined China in skipping 

the ceremony, some have a common view on domestic democracy 

activists. Others, even some who are significant recipients of U.S. 

democracy training and military professionalization assistance, 

joined the boycott as well.72 They included: 

Afghanistan Iraq Sri Lanka 

Algeria Kazakhstan Sudan 

China Morocco Tunisia 

Cuba Pakistan Venezuela 

Egypt Russia Vietnam 

Iran Saudi Arabia 

China’s posturing throughout this entire period accomplished 

nothing except to reinforce negative perceptions of China as a reactionary and oppressive state. As noted, China bristles whenever 

this issue of human rights is raised, but, as has been well documented, China continues to imprison human rights activists and 

journalists as well as restrict freedom of association, speech and religion.73 China’s all too comfortable relationship with Iran was 

ironically highlighted when both nations tied for first in the number of imprisoned journalists in 2010 (34 in each). According to the 

NGO Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), China has been the 

leader in this field since CPJ began keeping statistics in 2000.74 As 

of October 2010, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China’s Political Prisoner Database lists the details on over 1,450 

cases.75

In the same manner that China created its own Peace Prize, in 

May of 2010, China published, for the eleventh year in a row, its 

own report on the human rights of the United States—just in time 

to coincide with the State Department’s annual Human Rights Report on every country.76 This was another example of China bridling at what it views as U.S. hegemonic hectoring and moral douVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
28 

77What Beijing seems to fail to recognize is that the majority of the statistics listed in its 

report are sourced to U.S. press articles and official U.S. Government documents. Such information reflects a transparency and oversight of government that does not yet exist in China, a fact 

that the average Chinese reader of the report on the U.S. can easily recognize when they compare it to their own government. 78 China’s February 2009, 33 page submission to the UN Human Rights Council can be found 

here: 

http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session4/CN/A_HRC_WG6_4_CHN_1_E.pdf; the 

U.S. 22 page submission to the Council from August 2010 can be found here: 

http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session9/US/A_HRC_WG.6_9_USA_1_United 

percent20States-eng.pdf. 79See NPR ‘‘Momentum Slows for Political Reform in China’’ from October 25, 2010: 

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130752569. 

80See Washington Post Editorial ‘‘President Obama Makes Hu Jintao Look Good on Human 

Rights’’ from January 19, 2011: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/19/AR2011011906123.html 

81Text of the press conference: 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-andpresident-hu-peoples-republic-china. 82See Washington Post ‘‘Hu’s Remarks Censored Back Home’’ from January 21, 2011: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012005348.html. 

There is no mention of ‘‘a lot of work still needs to be done.’’ Rather just bland promises to 

‘‘learn from each other in terms of best practices’’ on China Daily’s ‘‘Quotes from Hu and 

Obama’’ from January 21, 2011: 

ble standards and for ‘‘posing as the world judge on human rights.’’ 

China’s report focused on such issues as criticizing the U.S. for 

using Human Rights as ‘‘a political instrument to interfere in other 

countries’ internal affairs, defame other nations’ image and seek its 

own strategic interests.’’ China’s report also comments on activities 

by the National Security Agency wiretapping, the level of domestic 

violent crime, economic hardship leading to increasing suicide rates 

and the $64 billion 2010 arms sales to Taiwan.77 China’s view that 

the United States is somehow beyond review was blunted this year 

when it was the turn of the U.S. to appear before the United Nations Human Rights Council in August and defend its human 

rights record as outlined in its 29-page submission.78

This aversion to public discourse on human rights is not limited 

to activists and NGOs. China blocks any words on the subject from 

entering the mainstream conversation. Such was the case with Premier Wen Jiabao’s comments made during an interview with CNN 

on the need for greater reforms. Wen’s statement that ‘‘The people’s 

wish and need for democracy and freedom are irresistible,’’ apparently pushed the envelope too far and censors quickly informed 

China media to expunge it.79 However, this example of censoring 

China’s top Communist leadership is not a rarity. 

During his January 2010 state visit to the U.S.,80 President Hu 

was praised by some in the West for his ‘‘candor’’ of his statement 

that: 

China is a developing country with a huge population, 

and also a developing country in a crucial stage of reform. 

In this context, China still faces many challenges in economic and social development. And a lot still needs to be 

done in China, in terms of human rights.81

But even President Hu Jintao himself could not escape the Chinese censors, as his statement on human rights received virtually 

no coverage in China’s media. The Obama-Hu press conference was 

not covered live in China, nor, according to the Washington Post, 

was any video even available on CCTV—China’s main television 

channel—or its website.82

29 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011huvisistsus/2011-01/21/content_11892220.htm. However, the full interchange on human rights, including Hu’s by-now famous phrase, can be found 

on China Daily’s English website at 2:30 into the video clip: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/video/2011-01/20/content_11888250.htm—how many Chinese 

citizens routinely hear their president via this method is unclear. 83From Mao Zedong On Diplomacy, Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 2007. p. 454. 84See CNN’s Fareed Zakaria’s September 29, 2008 interview with China’s Premier Wen Jiabo 

in which he states, ‘‘I need to correct some of the elements in your question first. China is NOT 

a superpower. Although China has a population of 1.3 billion and although in recent years 

China has registered fairly fast economic and social development and opening up, China still 

has this problem of unbalanced development between different regions and between China’s 

urban and rural areas. China remains a developing country. We still have 800 million farmers 

in rural areas, and we still have dozens of million people living in poverty. As a matter of fact, 

over 60 million people in rural and urban areas in China still live on allowances for basic living 

costs in my country. And each year we need to take care of about 23 million unemployed in 

urban areas and about 200 million farmers come and go to find jobs in China.’’ Read the full 

text here: 

http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-29/world/chinese.premier.transcript_1_financial-crisis-interview-vice-premier?_s=PM:WORLD. 85See Reuters ‘China Denies Softening On Emissions Stance’’ in which Chinese officials denied reports the country would back away from its position that China should be free to grow 

its economy unfettered by an internationally binding emissions commitment, from December 8, 

2010: 

http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFTOE6B607120101208?sp=true. 

86G-77 is a misnomer. The original Group of 77 coalition, founded in 1964 to include the Lesser Developed Countries, has since expanded to 131 member countries. Of these China, India and 

Brazil are the largest economies. Perhaps the opposite of the G-77 would be the 34-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that arose from the recipients of America’s Marshall Plan assistance and later began admitting non-European countries in 1961. A 

complete list to the G-77 is here: 

http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html; OECD member list: 

http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_36734052_36761800_36999961_1_1_1_1,00.html. 

Chile, not China, is currently the only nation to be a member of both organizations. 87See New York Times ‘‘China Resisted U.S. Pressure on Rights of Nobel Winner’’ from December 8, 2010 where the Deputy Minister in America Section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry 

lectures an American diplomat that Washington must ‘‘cease using human rights as an excuse 

to meddle in Chinese internal affairs’’: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/asia/09wikileaks-oslo.html?_r=1&hp. 

China—First or Third World? 

I hold that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are the First 

World. The middle elements, such as Japan, Europe Australia and Canada, belong to the Second World. We are the 

Third World. 83 —Mao Zedong, February 22, 1974 

China’s reactions to pressure from the West on human rights and 

other issues related to rule of law come as no surprise, given China’s view of itself as the leader of the G-77 and thus the bulwark 

against former colonial powers ‘‘lecturing’’ their prior subjects. 

Mao’s quote and President Hu’s previous statement that ‘‘China is 

a developing nation.’’ demonstrate China’s public protestations that 

it is anything but a Superpower.84 China is, however, decidedly 

ambivalent about its position in the G-77. 

When issues such as economic or monetary policies, climate 

change85 and intellectual property rights are raised, China eagerly 

portrays itself as a developing nation that still needs time to develop and should not be bound by the same rule set as OECD nations.86 China will point to its low per capita income of $6,700 

when compared to over $33,000 for the OECD, rather than its trillions of dollars in foreign currency reserves. However, in matters 

of sovereignty, internal affairs and international relations, China 

bristles when it is treated as anything like a struggling nation. 

When other nations criticize or even critique China in these areas 

they are seen as lecturing and self-righteous for ‘‘daring’’ to try to 

tell China how it should act.87

30 

88See Maria Wey-Shen Siow’s ‘‘Chinese Domestic Debate on Soft Power and Public Diplomacy’’ from the December 7, 2010 Asia Pacific Bulletin; 

http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/apb086_2.pdf. 89See U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report ‘‘U.S. International Broadcasting: Is 

Anybody Listening?’’ from June 9, 2010: 

http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/diplomacy/report.pdf. 

90See Newsweek ‘‘All the Propaganda That’s Fit to Print: Why Xinhua, China’s state news 

agency, could be the future of journalism’’ from September 3, 2010: 

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/09/03/is-china-s-xinhua-the-future-of-journalism.html. The decline of the international coverage is not limited to U.S. media as the BBC is also reducing its 

number of translators of foreign news stories, see ‘‘BBC Monitoring Cutting 72 Posts’’ from January 17, 2011: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12209342. Further cuts to the BBC were announced soon thereafter, including the shuttering of 5 of its 32 language services and eliminating one quarter of its staff over 3 years, see New York Times ‘‘BBC, Facing Budget Cuts, 

Will Trim World Service and Lay Off 650’’ from January 26, 2011: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/world/europe/27bbc.html. 

91See Washington Post ‘‘From China’s Mouth to Texans’ Ears: Outreach Includes Small Station in Galveston’’ from April 25, 2010: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/24/AR2010042402492_pf.html. 

China’s recent multi-billion dollar push to expand its public diplomacy and international media operations is a logical follow-on 

for a nation that has risen almost phoenix-like from the ashes of 

the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward. From Beijing’s 

perspective, China must be doing something right to have achieved 

such economic success in less than a generation. China believes the 

reporting in the Western media is almost ‘‘hegemonic,’’ with its 

seemingly constant criticism and refusal to give China credit for its 

past and present achievements.88 This is a common belief held by 

most of the G-77, but only China is in a real position financially 

to try to promote itself through its own global media network. 

China is perfectly content to carry this global mantle as the 

counter-weight to Western media, as this stance comports to China’s view of itself as a world leader. 

As noted in a prior committee report,89 China’s state-run Xinhua 

News has expanded its reach throughout the world, in part to provide what China believes is ‘‘balance’’ to the ‘‘anti-China bias’’ 

found in Western reporting. With budget cuts dramatically curtailing the number of Western media foreign correspondents, 

Xinhua by-lines in papers over the world may soon be a reality as 

its journalists and stringers are being posted to corners of the 

world deemed of lower priority by other major media services.90

Xinhua has announced plans to open a two-floor headquarters in 

Times Square, NY and has begun broadcasting from within the 

United States.91 Additionally, Xinhua has some 75 correspondents 

based in the United States, and since 2007 the State Department 

has issued some 2,900 press visas to Chinese journalists. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government has refused to allow the Voice of 

America to open a bureau in Shanghai and restricts VOA to only 

two correspondents in Beijing. Both VOA and Radio Free Asia’s 

broadcasts into China are routinely and heavily jammed, forcing 

them to reach their audiences primarily through (and around) China’s heavily censored Internet. 

Commercial Dominance and Territorial Saber Rattling Strain Local 

Relationships 

Recent Chinese actions in the East China Sea brought increased 

negative attention to China following the collision of a Chinese 

fishing trawler with one or more Japanese naval vessels near the 

31 

92The video of the Chinese trawler ‘‘Minjinyu’’ clearly ramming one of the Japanese patrol 

boats can be seen here: 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lv031K_lV4I . 93See Financial Times ‘‘China and Japan Spat Mars Youth Expo Visit’’ from September 20, 

2010: 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3dd2228-c48c-11df-bc11-00144feab49a.html#axzz17eOcxBEN. 

94These 17 minerals are vital to the production of virtually every modern technology from cell 

phones to computer circuits to virtually every nascent green technology, and China has a lock 

on some 95 percent of the production of them. See BBC News ‘‘Rare Earth: The New Great 

Game’’ from November 18, 2009: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/newsnight/paulmason/2009/11/ 

rare_earth_the_new_great_game.html. See pp 128–9 of the U.S. Geological Survey for a breakdown of production and reserves for the U.S., China, Australia, Brazil and others: 

http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/rare_earths/mcs-2010-raree.pdf. 95See St. Louis Business Journal ‘‘Senators Bond and Bayh Introduce Rare Earth Legislation’’ 

from December 17, 2010: 

http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2010/12/17/bond-bayh-introduce-rare-earth-bill.html; 

NY Times ‘‘Block on Minerals Called Threat to Japan’s Economy’’ from September 28, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/business/global/29rare.html; See NTD (Japan) Television 

‘‘Japan Seeks to Secure Rare Earth Supplies from U.S. Firm’’ from December 7, 2010: 

http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/ns_bus/2010-12-07/630950685742.html. China mines some 93 

percent of these minerals, with the U.S. (which used to be a major producer) woefully unprepared for any long-term cutoff of overseas production; see New York Times ‘‘Challenging China 

in Rare Earth Mining’’ from April 21, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/business/energy-environment/22rare.html and Wall Street 

Journal ‘‘China’s Rare Earth Gambit’’ from October 19, 2010: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304410504575559532707753878.html. China’s 

actions on these minerals has not abated in the ensuing months, see Wall Street Journal ‘‘China 

Moves To Strengthen Grip Over Supply Of Rare-Earth Metals’’ from February 7, 2011: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704124504576117511251161274.html. See The 

People’s Daily ‘‘China Wise to Guard Its Rare Earth Wealth’’ from October 18, 2010; 

http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91344/7169357.html; the English edition of the official Chinese paper China Daily ‘‘Regulation of Rare Earth Exports Needed’ from November 24, 

2010: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-11/24/content_11600838.htm. 96See New York Times ‘‘China’s Fast Rise Leads Neighbors to Join Forces’’ from October 30, 

2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/world/asia/31china.html; BBC News ‘‘China Boosts Maritime Fleet Amid Disputes: from October 28, 2010: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11646489. 

contested and remote Senkaku Islands (or as China calls them, the 

Diayou Islands) in September 2010.92 Even though Japan released 

the crew after a few days, Beijing allowed ultra-nationalists to spin 

up the continued detention of the captain to what many considered 

an alarming degree, with large anti-Japan demonstrations in most 

major cities. In addition to traditional expressions of discontent 

such as the canceling of several high-level bilateral meetings, Beijing also stooped to petty levels and blocked the visit of 1,000 Japanese children, who had been officially invited by Chinese Premier 

Wen Jiabo, to the Shanghai World Expo.93 More ominously, China 

suspended shipments of so called rare earth minerals94 to Japan— 

a move that has the potential benefit of Japan now seeking these 

vital minerals from the United States and Canada, though Western 

production of them is currently dwarfed by China.95

Similar territorial issues exist even farther south. Fears throughout the region were raised by the publication of official Chinese 

maps that include an inset claiming the entirety of the South 

China Sea. (Because of its shape, this area is known colloquially 

as the Cow’s Tongue). China’s claims to this vast territory, virtually touching the shores of Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines and 

Malaysia (and including the disputed Spratly Islands), go well beyond internationally recognized maritime territorial limits, and are 

now driving many nations in the region to begin looking towards 

the United States as a potential buffer.96

32 

97See BBC News ‘‘Chinese Bosses Charged Over Zambian Mine Shooting’’ from October 18, 

2010: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11568485; ‘‘Zambia Mine Shooting: Chinese Bosses 

Miss Court Hearing’’ from January 5, 2011: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12119002; see China Daily ‘‘Chinese Businessmen in 

Kyrgyzstan Suffer Heavy Losses’’ from April 20, 2010: 

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-04/10/content_9710377.htm . 98See Washington Post ‘‘As China Finds Bigger Place in World Affairs, its Wealth Breeds 

Hostility’’ from September 8, 2010: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/07/AR2010090707448.html; Financial Times ‘‘Mongolia Makes Tracks to Escape Its Neighbor’’ from January 19, 2001: 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e81f0366-23ed-11e0-bef0-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Bms6DhXD; Financial Times ‘‘Cash Flow Into Peru Mine Brings Rights Fear’’ from January 19, 2011: 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77666ad0-23f0-11e0-bef0-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Bms6DhXD. 

99Others contend that these are the purest examples of how China believes that business is 

business, and a nation’s internal matters are for it to decide. See Washington Post ‘‘China 

Fights UN Report on Darfur’’ 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/15/AR2010101506100.html 

from October 16, 2010; See Deutche Welle ‘‘Controversy Over Myanmar-China Pipeline’’ from 

February 3, 2010: 

http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5311293,00.html; See China.org ‘‘China Signs U.S. $20Bn 

Loan-for-oil Deal with Venezuela from April 20,2010: 

http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-04/20/content_19866278.htm; See UK Telegraph ‘‘China 

to Build $2 Bn Railway for Iran’’ from September 7, 2010: 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/7985812/China-to-build-2bn-railway-forIran.html. 

While a great source of domestic pride for a nation that in some 

30 years has gone from an industrial backwater to production powerhouse, China’s economic ‘‘rise’’ has not come without its consequences and has provoked backlashes in some markets which 

seem to have come as a ‘‘shock’’ (whether real or feigned) to China. 

Events such as the recent riots against Chinese merchants in 

neighboring Kyrgyzstan, or accusations that Chinese mine operators opened fire on their Zambian workers are becoming more common.97 While this has provoked a frustrated ‘‘after all we have 

done for them’’ reaction in Beijing, which views China’s economic 

development projects with a mixture that is part profit and part benevolence. Such expressions are not always reciprocated by these 

nations who detect instead what they view as China treating locals 

with an attitude bordering on patronizing colonialism and officially 

treating countries as ‘‘vassal’’ nations.98

Global concern over China’s willingness to openly support regimes such as Sudan and Iran both diplomatically and militarily 

in exchange for access to mineral and oil rights have led many to 

call China to task for its seemingly insatiable appetite for natural 

resources and its willingness to do business with anyone.99 To 

many nations, China’s most perplexing relationship is its continued 

financial and military support for the brutal North Korean dictatorship, with Beijing acting as both Pyongyang’s protector and benefactor in the international area. This relationship was laid bare 

for all to see following the North’s sinking of the South Korean 

naval corvette Cheonan on March 26, 2010 and the more recent 

North Korean artillery attack on South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island 

on November 23, 2010. 

33 

100See the official China.org.cn ‘‘Lessons from Cheonan’’ from July 28, 2010: 

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-07/28/content_20587399.htm. Note the passive ‘‘When 

the Cheonan sank’’ with no mention of North Korean actions except to critique the international 

investigation led by the U.S. Australia, Sweden and the UK of which ‘‘the findings are not objective, because the four are either allied with South Korea or allied with South Korea’s allies. An 

objective investigation should involve countries not allied with South Korea, especially those 

with key interests in Northeast Asia, such as China and Russia.’’ 

Photo of Inset on Official Chinese Map of the so-called Chinese ‘‘Cow Tongue’’ 

claiming virtually the entire South China Sea 

China’s muted reaction and dilatory tactics when the incidents 

were brought to the U.N. puzzled even the most seasoned China 

watchers.100 The U.N. Security Council was only able to pass a 

Presidential Statement on July 9 after it was watered down by 

34 

101Text of the July 9, 2010 Statement: 

http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/443/11/PDF/N1044311.pdf?OpenElement; 

China’s recent obstructionism stands in sharp contrast to a year ago when the 15 member U.N. 

Security Council unanimously passed a condemnation of North Korea for its April 7, 2009 provocative missile tests—and issued a Presidential Statement in less than a week on April 13: 

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/301/03/PDF/N0930103.pdf?OpenElement. 

102See Financial Times ‘‘Levi’s Launches New Brand in China’’ from August 18, 2010: 

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a7a1c2e-aaaa-11df-80f9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BXDRC4ZU 

China. China has blocked any such statement regarding the November attacks.101

An iPhone Does Not Equal Democracy 

Part of China’s frustration with the West’s constant focus on censorship, human rights and democracy stems, in part, from the remarkable achievements it has made in improving living standards. 

Whatever the West may think China lacks, the average Chinese 

citizen today experiences incredible advantages relative to his/her 

parents. Many in the West forget that for tens if not hundreds of 

millions of Chinese citizens, life is generally significantly better 

than it was even 5 or 10 years ago, particularly with regard to access to commercial goods. The desire for the latest fashion or technology is normal in the U.S. but even more so in a society when 

so many can easily remember when, only a few years ago, such luxuries were unaffordable or forbidden to all but Communist Party 

elites. 

Cash-rich China is now experiencing its own trickle-down effect 

and spurring domestic consumption, and the oft-promised commercial opportunities in a nation so large are finally being realized by 

both domestic and overseas firms—as the proverbial ‘‘billion pairs 

of blue jeans’’ are at last being bought.102 However, it would be a 

mistake to conflate the rising consumerism experienced by some 

with a demand for multi-party elections on the part of all. In fact 

wanting an iPhone does not always equal wanting democracy. 

There are millions of Chinese content with their lives and their 

government. As author James Mann has noted, the urban elites 

who make up the consumer culture are greatly outnumbered by the 

poor and rural, and would be outvoted in a democratic election. ‘‘To 

protect their own economic interests,’’ he wrote, they ‘‘may opt for 

a one-party state over one-man, one-vote.’’ 

Conversely, as New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof has 

written, ‘‘No middle class is content with more choices of coffees 

than of candidates on a ballot.’’ The Chinese Government mistakes 

the commercial opportunities suddenly available to its citizens as 

a replacement for the democratic advancements desired by many, 

including greater transparency and accountability of their government, greater press freedoms and above all, greater access to 

unfiltered information about China and the world around them. It 

is to this audience (some with the latest version iPhone or the newest laptop on the market, some with their shortwave radios in rural 

farming villages) that the U.S. has directed its international broadcasting efforts through the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia’s 

Mandarin and Cantonese services. And it is to this audience that 

the U.S. Government must direct its energies and support for 

Internet Censorship Circumvention Technology that enables users 

to tunnel under/break through the Great Firewall of China. 

35 

103Google’s press release on the incident can be found here: 

http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html. 

104The only other major instance of Chinese Internet activity drawing worldwide attention 

was the surprising decision by China in 2009 to rescind a previous mandate that all computers 

sold domestically had to contain pre-loaded ‘‘Green Dam Youth Escort’’ censorship enabling software (so-called because it was officially touted as a protection against pornography, but quickly 

recognized as more pervasive in its blocking abilities) developed in China for a Windows operating system. See AP ‘‘China Postpones Controversial Web Filter’’ from June 30, 2009: 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31662862/ns/technology_and_science-security/; A 2009 analysis 

by the University of Michigan of the Green Dam software and its vulnerabilities can be found 

here: 

http://www.cse.umich.edu/jhalderm/pub/gd/. A U.S. firm Cybersitter filed a copyright infringement suit against the Chinese Government and computer companies trying to install Green 

Dam softeware, claiming it uses some 3,000 lines of Cybersitter’s own code; see ComputerWorld 

‘‘Law Firm in Green Dam Suit Targeted With Cyberattack’’ from January 13, 2010: 

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9144618/ 

Law_firm_in_Green_Dam_suit_targeted_with_cyberattack; China’s rebuttal to the charge can be 

found here: Xinhua in Intellectual Property In China ‘‘Chinese Legal Experts Challenge U.S. 

Court’s Ruling Over Green Dam Suit’’ from December 9, 2010: 

http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/casesarticle/cases/caseothers/201012/980781_1.html. As a result of 

the outcry and public attention, the Green Dam project ended in mid 2010, see Global Times 

‘‘Costly Green Dam Trial Ends as Funds Dry Up’’ from July 14, 2010: 

http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010-07/551295.html. 

105Most agreed with Rebecca MacKinnon writing in the Wall Street Journal ‘‘Google Gets on 

the Right Side of History’’ from January 13, 2010: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/ 

SB10001424052748704362004575000442815795122.html#articleTabs percent3Darticle.For prior 

criticisms of U.S. Internet companies in China, including Google, see Wired.com ‘‘Yahoo Strictest 

Censor on the Net’’ from June 15, 2006: 

http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2006/06/71166; Sunday Times (UK) ‘‘Bill 

Gates Defends China’s Internet Restrictions’’ from January 27, 2006: 

http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/china/article721120.ece; CNET News 

‘‘Google to Censor China Web Searches’’ from January 24, 2006: 

http://news.cnet.com/Google-to-censor-China-Web-searches/2100-1028_3-6030784.html. 106Perhaps China failed to appreciate Google’s total absorption into the English lexicon to the 

point of becoming formally recognized in 2006 as a verb by the prestigious Merriam-Webster 

dictionary—‘‘to Google something’’ is now on the same level of acceptance as ‘‘to Xerox something’’ was for a previous generation. 

The ‘‘Google-ization’’ of Internet Freedom 

On January 12, 2010, Google made an announcement that 

abruptly altered the general public’s perception of Chinese censorship.103 The Internet search giant declared it was no longer willing 

to self-censor its China-based ‘‘google.cn’’ website. It charged that 

Chinese Government-sponsored hackers had infiltrated Google’s 

network to access the emails of numerous Chinese civil rights activists. Prior to this, few outside Washington had paid much attention to Beijing’s rigorous censorship efforts.104 Some contend that 

Google’s public reactions were an attempt to avoid the same U.S. 

public backlash Microsoft and Yahoo suffered for their prior complicity with Chinese Internet regulations, and others believe this is 

exactly what Google had been doing up to this time.105 Nonetheless, Google is simply too big a company for the incident to have 

gone unnoticed or unanswered.106

Within ten days of the incident, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a major speech deliberately set in Washington’s museum of American journalism, the Newseum, in which she outlined 

the U.S. Global Internet Freedom Agenda. Secretary Clinton 

warned, ‘‘Countries that restrict free access to information or violate the basic rights of Internet users risk walling themselves off 

from the progress of the next century.’’ Additionally, she cautioned, 

‘‘Technologies with the potential to open access to government and 

36 

107The text of Secretary Clinton’s January 21, 2010 speech and Q&A session can be found 

here: 

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm. 

108Google’s press release can be found here: 

http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html. Cnet.com ‘‘Google 

Moves China Search to Hong Kong’’ from March 22, 2010: 

http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-20000905-265.html. Note, even though Google may not filter the searches, users inside will still not be able to open those links which the Great Firewall 

otherwise blocks, unless they are using internet circumvention software. See Xinhua ‘‘China 

Says Google Breaks Promise, Totally Wrong to Stop Censoring’’ from March 23, 2010: 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-03/23/c_13220853.htm. See Gigaom.com 

‘‘Google and China: What You Need to Know’’ from March 25, 2010: 

http://gigaom.com/2010/03/25/google-and-china-what-you-need-to-know/. 

109See Xinhua ‘‘Google, Don’t Politicize Yourself’’ from March 21, 2010; 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-03/21/c_13219289.htm. 110Quoted from an unnamed Chinese official from a summary of U.S. Embassy Beijing diplomatic cables on China’s internet attacks on Google and various U.S. Government departments, 

see New York Times ‘‘Vast Hacking by a China Fearful of the Web’’ from December 4, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/world/asia/05wikileaks-china.html. 

111See ‘‘Snowball Fight Flash Mob in DC’’ from January 27, 2011: 

http://abclocal.go.com/wtvg/story?section=news/bizarre&id=7924242; The Atlantic Monthly 

‘‘The Tea Party Used the Internet to Defeat the First Internet President’’ from November 2, 

2010: 

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/11/the-tea-party-used-the-internet-to-defeatthe-first-internet-president/65589/. 112For examples of Chinese citizens ‘‘disturbing social and public order’’ see Global Voices 

‘‘China: Blacklisting Netizens’’ from November 3, 2010: 

http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/11/03/china-blacklisting-netizens/. 

promote transparency can also be highjacked by governments to 

crush dissent and deny human rights.’’ 107

Following Google’s formal March 2010 announcement that it 

would re-direct google.cn users to its google.hk servers located in 

Hong Kong (which is not covered by Beijing’s Internet regulations), 

‘‘Internet Freedom’’ and ‘‘Internet Censorship Circumvention’’ have 

become the watch words of many countries’ approaches to China, 

its protests of innocence and vilification of Google notwithstanding.108 Chinese officials quickly sought to add their own spin 

to the Google episode with Xinhua lecturing, ‘‘Regulation of the 

internet is a sovereign issue. The Chinese Government regulates 

the Internet according to laws and will improve its regulations step 

by step according to its own needs.’’ 109

‘‘The Web is Fundamentally Controllable’’ 110—The Great Firewall 

of China 

Americans tend to view the chaotic and de-centralized nature of 

the Web as one of the purest forms of democracy, allowing every 

citizen’s voice to be heard. Posting an individual blog, leaving an 

anonymous comment on a web site, organizing ‘‘flash mobs’’ for impromptu snowball fights or creating new political movements capable of re-shaping the electoral landscape—each of these acts is perceived as the epitome of ‘‘freedom of expression’’ in the United 

States.111 In China, it is often the reverse. China views control of 

the Web as vital to eliminating domestic dissent and maximizing 

‘‘domestic harmony.’’ As one expert told committee staff, ‘‘China is 

perfectly willing to tolerate a thousand armies of one.’’ However, 

when these ‘‘armies of one’’ use the Web to organize and demand 

change, China views them—and the Internet—as a threat to the 

very core of social order.112

China controls the Web by using its official Golden Shield Project 

Internet software (more commonly known as the Great Firewall of 

China) combined with more subtle methods of conveying censorship 

37 

113See Bloomberg BusinessWeek ‘‘The Great Firewall of China’’ from January 12, 2006: 

http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jan2006/tc20060112_434051.htm; Freedom 

House’s chapter on China pp 34–44 ‘‘Freedom on the Net’’ from March 2009: 

http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/specialreports/NetFreedom2009/ 

FreedomOnTheNet_FullReport.pdf; OpenNet Initiative Country Report on China from June 15, 

2009: 

http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china; ONI—a consortium of Harvard’s Berkman Center 

for Internet and Society, the Munk Center for International Studies at the University of Toronto 

and the SecDev group in Toronto. ONI is also critical of the United States but notes in its report 

on the U.S. and Canada that ‘‘Governments in both countries have experienced significant resistance to their content restriction policies, and, as a result, the extreme measures carried out 

in some of the more repressive countries of the world have not taken hold in North America.’’ 

One of the leading experts on China’s Internet censorship, Rebecca MacKinnon, has a detailed 

analysis from February 2009 ‘‘China’s Censorship 2.0, How Companies Censor Bloggers,’’ which 

can be found here: 

http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2378/2089. Her Senate 

Judiciary Committee testimony from March 2, 2010 can be found here: 

http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-03-02MacKinnon’sTestimony.pdf. 

114Guardian (UK) ‘‘Chinese Twitter User Seized After Supporting Liu Xiaobo’’ from October 

26, 2010: 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/26/china-nobel-liu-xiaobo-tweet-arrest; New York 

Times ‘‘Woman Imprisoned for Twitter Message’’ from November 18, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/asia/19beijing.html?_r=2&src=twrhp. One democracy 

activist with whom committee staff met has found Twitter so crucial to his efforts that he uses 

the phrase BT/AT (Before Twitter/After Twitter) to express how it has revolutionized his ability 

to communicate with his fellow activists. Opponents of Twitter in China point to the U.S. ability 

to keep the site from shutting down during the Iranian Green Revolution as ‘‘proof’’ that Twitter 

is nothing but a front for the CIA. Far right nationalist activists are equally opposed to the 

Great Firewall as their sites are often blocked, for example during the incident with the fishing 

boat captain being seized by the Japanese Coast Guard when their messages were judged too 

militaristic and aggressive. 115See Guardian (UK) ‘‘China Relaxes Internet Censorship For the Olympics’’ form August 1, 

2008: 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/01/china.olympics. Chinese officials are at a loss for 

words when Internet censorship issues arise and are reminded of the fact that as anti-American 

as sites such as Al Jazeera may be, they can be accessed in both their English and Arabic form 

from within the United States: 

http://www.aljazeera.net/portal. 

116 Chinese officials are at a loss for words when Internet censorship issues arise and are reminded of the fact that as anti-American as sites such as Al Jazeera may be, they can be 

accessed in both their English and Arabic form from within the United States: 

http://www.aljazeera.net/portal. 

instructions to its media and Internet Service Providers regarding 

what issues, stories, subjects and websites cannot be covered or retransmitted as well as what searches are to be blocked or re-directed to more ‘‘friendly’’ sites.113 In some cases, websites are completely blocked based upon their IP (Internet Protocol) address or 

by a site’s URL (Uniform Resource Locator). In other cases, reporters, bloggers and ‘‘netizens’’ are ‘‘invited for tea’’ at the local police 

station for a stern ‘‘talking to’’ when they cross the line. This can 

escalate with individuals dragged out of their beds in the middle 

of the night and their equipment confiscated for using their Twitter 

accounts to suggest that supporters of Liu Xiaobo demand his freedom or sentenced to a year of hard labor for forwarding a satirical 

Tweet.114

While restrictions are sometimes relaxed when the world is focused on China—such as during the Beijing Olympics—restrictions 

are quickly reinstituted once attention is diverted elsewhere.115

This inconsistent application of censorship is compounded by the 

overlapping jurisdictions of government ministries who make the 

regulations including the Ministry of Industry and Information 

Technology (MIIT), the Information office of the State Council Information Office (SCIO), the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and perhaps a few more.116

38 

117See footnote 110. For an American perspective on Chinese censorship, see Nicholas 

Kristof’s recounting of how his blog was ‘‘harmonized’’ in New York Times ‘‘Banned in Beijing!’’ 

from January 22, 2011: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/opinion/ 

23kristof.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=opinion&adxnnlx=1296748837-EqZ4g6yH+c3fNOCGTtfCvw . 118 All quotes taken from China Digital Times: 

http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/12/latest-directives-from-the-ministry-of-truth-december-10- 

2010/, which provides both the Mandarin and English of each and is updated frequently. A Reporters Without Borders interview on this subject with veteran Chinese journalist Zhang Ping 

can be found on the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) site: 

http://cima.ned.org/chang-ping-state-media-china. CIMA, a department of the National Endowment for Democracy provides excellent daily media updates on efforts to stifle the press: 

http://cima.ned.org/tools-and-resources/daily-media-news. 

119See Wall Street Journal ‘‘Mr. Zuckerberg Goes To China: Facebook CEO Makes the Rounds 

With Tech Executives, Fueling Efforts to End Ban’’ from December 23, 2010: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703814804576035143409583806.html. 

Known as the ‘‘3 T’s’’ (Tiananmen, Taiwan and Tibet), the list of 

taboo subjects in China has grown to include HIV/AIDs, Xinjiang 

(home to China’s ethnic Muslim population) and Falun Gong. Negative stories related to Communist party officials or their families 

are especially suppressed. According to some sources, the attack on 

Google came when Li Changchun—Propaganda Chief and fifth 

highest ranking member of the Communist Party—was displeased 

with what he found when he ‘‘Googled’’ his own name.117 Some typical examples of censorship notifications, taken from December 10, 

2010, range from the general, to the mundane to the minutia, and 

include: 118

A General Order From the Central Propaganda Bureau—All media outlets are requested to strictly and rigorously examine and check images, videos, and web pages 

and prevent acrostics, caricatures other forms of reporting 

that hype the news of Liu Xiaobo receiving the Nobel 

Prize. 

From the Central Propaganda Bureau—Regarding the 

ticket refund mechanisms and related policies issued by 

the Railroad Ministry, all media outlets are not to criticize 

or to question. As a principle, publish copy from Xinhua 

News Agency. 

An Urgent Directive From the State Administration of 

Radio Film and Television—In tonight’s entertainment, 

scrupulously monitor Hong Kong television programs that 

are rebroadcast in the Pearl River Delta region of 

Guangdong. Around 8 pm, completely screen out ‘‘special 

news reports’’ from HK television about the Noble Peace 

Prize. 

A partial list of websites that are currently or routinely blocked 

in China includes: 

Facebook119

YouTube 

Twitter 

Blogspot 

Typepad 

Voice of America 

Radio Free Asia 

39 

120 Ambassador Huntsman and his Embassy team maintain no less than eight blogs and three 

microblogs in Mandarin from the Embassy’s website: 

http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/. 

121

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-town-hall-meeting-with-future-chinese-leaders 122

http://www.baidu.com/ ; 

http://www.alibaba.com/; 

http://www.taobao.com/index_global.php Note: As this Report was going to print: Wall Street 

Journal ‘‘Alibaba.com CEO Resigns In Wake Of Fraud By Sellers’’ From February 22, 2011: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/ 

SB10001424052748704476604576157771196658468.html?KEYWORDS=alibaba&mg=com-wsj. 

Also, on February 28, 2011, the U.S. Trade Representative cited both Baidu and TaoBao in its 

‘‘Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets’’ as examples ‘‘of marketplaces dealing in infringing 

goods and helping to sustain global piracy and counterfeiting.’’ 

http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2595 123See BBC ‘‘China Unveils Own Mapping Service’’ from October 22, 2010: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11605940. The MapWorld site can be found at the following link: 

http://www.chinaonmap.cn/map/index.jsp. 

Internet control is even imposed on the President of the United 

States. In anticipation of President Obama’s November 16, 2009, 

Town Hall meeting in Shanghai with Chinese youth, the White 

House had hoped to have a student panel pick questions submitted 

by email during the actual event. When Chinese officials blocked 

that idea, the Embassy put a notice on its website asking for questions in advance, but Chinese officials insisted that only questions 

from their hand-picked student audience would be allowed. U.S. 

Ambassador Huntsman then did his own bit of firewall circumvention at the meeting by standing up and asking the President about 

Internet censorship in China from a submission received by the 

Embassy prior to the event.120

AMBASSADOR HUNTSMAN: (Reading the question sent in 

via the Embassy’s website) In a country with 350 million 

Internet users and 60 million bloggers, do you know of the 

firewall? 

PRESIDENT OBAMA: . . .I think the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then 

citizens of countries around the world can hold their own 

governments accountable. They can think for themselves 

. . . I’m a big supporter of non-censorship. This is part of 

the tradition of the United States that I discussed before, 

and I recognize that different countries have different traditions. I can tell you that in the United States, in fact 

that we have free Internet—our unrestricted internet access is a source of strength and should be encouraged. 121

China’s Answer: Create Our Own Internet Sites We Can Control 

Chinese officials are quick to point out that their citizens have 

a home-grown search engine—Baidu—that is just as efficient as 

Google as well as online market places—AliBaba and TaoBao—that 

compete toe-to-toe with Amazon and eBay.122 In frustration with 

what China believed to be GoogleMap’s unwillingness to obscure 

sensitive Chinese military sites, China launched its own version 

‘‘MapWorld’’ in October 2010.123 China is perfectly happy to promote these companies for both the inherent pride in their Not-JustMade-But-Designed-In-China nature and because of their stagVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:05 Mar 28, 2011 Jkt 062931 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\STAFF TOPIC REPORTS\CHINA, PAUL FOL
40 

124One of Baidu’s founders, Robin Li, dropped out of his PhD program at the State University 

of New York/Buffalo in 1994 after he received his Masters degree in computer science. 125Google stock ‘‘GOOG’’ began in 2010 at over $600/share, dipped to $430 during its China 

crisis and climbed to over $600 by year’s end. 126 See Guardian (UK) ‘‘U.S. Embassy Cables: Google Hacking Directed by Chinese Politburo 

Itself’’ from December 4, 2010: 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/245489. While Baidu’s market 

capitalization is some $37 billion, Google’s is approaching $200 billion. Still, it is clear that with 

China now virtually closed to Google and China seeking to export its own internet technologies 

to willing recipients, Google will face stiff competition wherever Baidu sets up shop. See BBC 

News ‘‘China Baidu Search Engine Profits More Than Treble’’ from January 31, 2011: 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12331266. 

127For examples of searches that an average Internet user inside the Great Firewall would 

see using Baidu—including ‘‘Tibet,’’ ‘‘Tiananmen Square,’’ ‘‘Liu Xiaobo,’’ ‘‘Radio Free Asia’’ and 

Egypt’s ‘‘Tahrir Square’’ see Appendix F. Note: Baidu may face internal competition after all. 

As this Report was going to print: See Associated Press ‘‘China’s State News Agency Launches 

Search Engine—Panguso’’ from February 22, 2011: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011022201448.html. 

128See AP in Ethiopian Review ‘‘Obama Putting Human Rights Issues on Back Burner?’’ from 

March 13, 2009: 

http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/8891; Huffington Post ‘‘Obama’s Failure to Deliver on 

His Cairo Speech’’ from June 9, 2009: 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/supporting-occupationand_b_604448.html; AFP ‘‘Obama’s Visit Leaves Dissidents Disappointed’’ from November 19, 

2009: 

gering market penetration and brand recognition by the average 

Chinese citizen. They also cooperate with the censorship rules established by Beijing. 

One consequence of this is that some mistakenly equate Baidu, 

for example, as a formal unit of the Chinese Government. In fact, 

Baidu is a privately held company developed by two Chinese nationals who studied overseas.124 Baidu is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the 

ticker symbol ‘‘BIDU.’’ Baidu closed at $100/share in December 

2010, having started the year at $40/share, and was less than $20/ 

share in January 2009.125 Many point out that Baidu had the most 

to gain by Google shuttering its operations in China, and there are 

some allegations the company had direct complicity in the attack 

on Google.126

By their willingness to play by Beijing’s rules, Baidu and other 

Chinese companies virtually guarantee a lock on China’s massive, 

and ever-growing, middle class—an internal market that will soon 

surpass the entire population of the United States in number. Until 

the Chinese market system and society develop to the point that 

shareholders’ desire for profits matches their demand for corporate 

accountability and social responsibility, Western companies doing 

business there will continue to be seriously disadvantaged, and 

China will be the worse for it. 

This is of little consequence to Beijing, which prefers instead to 

point to the hundreds of search results that Baidu will provide the 

average user as ‘‘proof’’ that its citizens are not denied access to information.127 The fact that the results of these searches are almost 

exclusively Chinese Government-controlled media sources is the 

reason so many in China are turning to technology produced in the 

U.S. to circumvent the censors. 

Beating the Censors At Their Own Game—Proxies and VPNs 

The Obama administration has received criticism from foe and 

friend alike for what many perceive as a weakness in the promotion of human rights.128 This was particularly true regarding 

41 

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gHHrGSBYMtuFEoXFEAR0y07iucGA; 

Heritage Organization ‘‘Two Faces of Obama’s Human Rights Policy’’ from April 8, 2010: 

http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/08/the-two-faces-of-obama’s-human-rights-policy; Washington 

Post ‘‘Dangerously Silent on Human Rights’’ January 3, 2011: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/02/AR2011010202381.html. 

129See Washington Post ‘‘U.S. Risks China’s Ire With Decision to Fund Software Maker Tied 

to Falun Gong’’ from May 12 2010: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/11/ 

AR2010051105154.html?sid=ST2010051105253; Washington Post ‘‘Time to Re-boot Our Push for 

Global Internet Freedom’’ from October 25, 2010: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/24/AR2010102402215.html; 

Weekly Standard ‘‘Battle Over Internet Freedom’’ from October 26, 2010: 

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/battle-over-internet-freedom_512987.html; Rebecca 

MacKinnon’s paper ‘‘Networked Authoritarianism: China and Beyond’’ from October 2010 can 

be found here: 

http://rconversation.blogs.com/MacKinnon_Libtech.pdf?tag=contentMain;contentBody . 130See Newsweek ‘‘Up Against Tehran’s Firewall’’ from January 26, 2010: 

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/25/up-against-tehran-s-firewall.html. 

131Falun Gong began in China in 1992 and peaked with some 70 million practitioners of the 

peaceful spiritual movement. Beijing authorities dubbed it a ‘‘heretical organization’’ and 

cracked down on practitioners, particularly after some 10,000 gathered in April 25, 1999, unannounced, in the capital in a mass, silent protest. This protest caught authorities completely offguard and only increased the levels of arrest, suppression and sometimes torture of its members, 

including officially designating Falun Gong a ‘‘cult.’’ See 

http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t36570.htm. Many Falun Gong members fled to the 

West shortly thereafter. For additional information, see U.S. Congressional Research report 

‘‘China and Falun Gong’’ from May 25, 2006: 

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67820.pdf. 

132For a detailed discussion of the differences between Proxies and VPNs, see the Harvard 

Berkman Center’s ‘‘2007 Circumvention Landscape Report’’ from March 2009: 

http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/ 

2007_Circumvention_Landscape.pdf. 133To access these sites, visit 

http://www.ultrareach.com/index_en.htm and 

http://www.dit-inc.us/. 

134See The Times (UK) ‘‘China’s Latest Export: Web Censorship’’ from February 10, 2007: 

http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article1352239.ece. 

Secretary Clinton’s Internet Freedom Agenda with its promise to 

push nations to allow freer access to the Web. From Fiscal Year 

2008 to 2010, Congress provided some $50 million in funding to assist in Internet Freedom. As of January 2011, the State Department had obligated less than $20 million, of which little went to 

Internet Censorship Circumvention Technology (ICCT). According 

to the Washington Post and others, the reason for this is simple— 

China.129

Some of the most sophisticated ICCT software is being developed 

by two U.S. companies, whose founders fled China to escape persecution for being members of Falun Gong.130 Their software was initially designed to allow fellow Falun Gong practitioners in China 

(whom Beijing authorities continue to prosecute, harass and imprison) 131 to circumvent the Great Firewall by enabling their users 

to surf the Web as if they were in the U.S. or other ‘‘Internet 

friendly’’ nations via a combination of Proxy Websites and Virtual 

Private Networks.132 However, both DIT and UltraReach133 soon 

found their products being used by democracy activists and ordinary citizens to circumvent Internet censorship in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Burma and Vietnam—countries which have 

looked to China for lessons in Internet control or to whom China 

has directly provided such technologies to counter such products.134

Both companies were part of a loose-knit Global Internet Freedom 

Consortium that made its case known to Congress in hopes for U.S. 

42 

135See New York Times ‘‘Aid Urged For Groups Fighting Internet Censors’’ from January 20, 

2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/technology/21censor.html. 

136See Freedom House’s ‘‘Freedom on the Net’’ report from April 1, 2009: 

http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/specialreports/NetFreedom2009/ 

FreedomOnTheNet_FullReport.pdf. 137The remaining $200,000 was retained by the State Department’s bureau of Democracy 

Human Rights and Labor (DRL) to hire program staff to provide monitoring and oversight of 

the two grants. In FY2006, DRL obligated $500,000 for Internet freedom initiatives and none 

in FY2007. 138To access Tor and Psiphon, visit the following: 

http://www.torproject.org/; 

http://psiphon.ca. 

139 See Wall Street Journal ‘‘Senate to Hillary: Support Dissidents’’ from July 23, 2009: 

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574300641911723378.html?mod 

=googlenews_wsj. 140The FY2011 Statement of Interest can be found: 

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/p/127829.htm. 

141See New York Times ‘‘Target Iran’s Censors’’ from February 18, 2010: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19iht-edcohen.html?_r=1, the Guardian (UK) 

paper named Haystack’s founder Austin Heap its Innovator of the Year see ‘‘MediaGuardian Innovation Awards: Austin Heap vs Iranian Censors’’ from March 29, 2010: 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/mar/29/austin-heap-megas-innovator-award, Newsweek 

‘‘Needles in a Haystack’’ from August 6, 2010: 

http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/06/needles-in-a-haystack.html. 

142See Fast Company ‘‘How Haystack Risked Exposing Iranian Dissidents’’ from September 

20, 2010: 

funding. Congress has responded by appropriating some $50 million to the State Department to support Internet freedom:135

FY 2008 $14.8 Million 

FY 2009 $5 Million 

FY 2010 $30 Million 

Of the FY08 funding, $1.6 Million was granted to the U.S. NGO 

Freedom House which uses the three-year funding to train bloggers 

and democracy activists in Internet security protocols and as seed 

funding for their annual Freedom of the Net Report which was 

launched in 2009.136 $13 Million was given, en bloc, to the American NGO Internews Network.137 Internews awarded a variety of 

sub-grants, some of which went to American-Based ICCT firm Tor 

($1.6 Million) and Toronto-based Psiphon ($2.9 Million) because, 

according to Internews officials, Internews had worked with them 

in the past.138 None of the FY2009 money was released by the 

State Department until mid-2010, drawing much Congressional ire 

as a result.139 The Statement of Interest for FY2010 funding was 

not released until January 3, 2011.140

One piece of ICCT software that did receive special U.S. attention was developed by the San Francisco-based Censorship Research Center—Haystack, which had none of these China connections or issues. Haystack software was developed to assist Iranian 

democracy activists outwit Tehran censors, and its lead developer 

received accolades in the media.141 However, the Haystack team 

had not sufficiently tested its software nor allowed it to be submitted for independent cryptological analysis before it released a 

beta version to unsuspecting Iranians. In September 2010, just 

after the beta version was released, an independent team was able 

to crack the code in six hours and also determined that the Iranian 

Government would be able to manipulate the software to identify 

any users. Once these weaknesses were made public, the Haystack 

project quickly collapsed, and Haystack’s website, and that of CRC, 

are now defunct.142

43 

http://www.fastcompany.com/1690075/haystack-austin-heap-iran-fail; Slate ‘‘The Great Internet Freedom Fraud: How Haystack Endangered the Iranian Dissidents It Was Supposed to Protect’’ from September 16, 2010: 

http://www.slate.com/id/2267262. Following Haystack’s collapse,administration officials were 

quick to point out that the OFAC license granted Haystack [see Haystack’s April 14, 2010 press 

release: 

http://www.prlog.org/10625421-anti-censorship-software-licensed-by-us-government-for-exportto-iran.html] was not a validation that the technology worked, only that its export could not be 

used by Iran to harm America, and deny the Secretary was referring to Haystack in the following interchange with Bloomberg TV ( 

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/138677.htm): 

INTERVIEWER: And how would you deal with the Iranian Government’s response to the U.S. 

trying to get in there and help the internet access? 

SECRETARY CLINTON: We are working to help information flow freely into and out of Iran 

as well as within Iran. We have issued a license to a company with technology that would enable that to occur. 143 The Onion Router (or ‘‘Tor’’ as it became known) was originally sponsored by the U.S. 

Naval Research Laboratory. Since December 2006, Tor has been registered 501(c)3 NGO: https:// 

www.torproject.org/index.html.en. 144See The Tor Project ‘‘Ten Things to Look for In a Circumvention Tool’’ from March 2010: 

http://tor.cybermirror.org/press/presskit/2010-09-16-circumvention-features.pdf. 

145

http://www.bbg.gov/ 

146PNN uses ICCT to broadcast its own wildly popular version of The Daily Show— 

‘‘Parazit’’—produced by two former Iranian journalists working for PNN. See Washington Post 

‘‘Expats ‘Daily-Show’-style VOA Program Enthralls Iranians, Irks Their Government’’ from December 31, 2010: 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123101327.html. 

In addition to giving Tehran much to cheer about, the entire episode set back on its heels the priority that had been accorded Internet Censorship Circumvention Technology. However, U.S. Government support for ICCT development is vital, given the weak private sector market interest in funding such technologies.143 Most 

ICCT users tend to be democracy activists with little or no money 

to pay for such services, quite often having lost their day jobs as 

a result of their activities. Requiring users of ICCT software either 

to register or pay for such services would appear illogical in societies where doing either might enable repressive governments to 

find them and use such information against them.144

U.S. Broadcasting—Already Practicing Internet Censorship Circumvention Every Day 

U.S. international broadcasting, run by the Broadcasting Board 

of Governors (BBG), however, offers a natural ‘‘market’’ in need of 

this technology.145 The BBG entities—Voice of America, Radio Free 

Europe, Radio Free Asia, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting and the 

Middle East Broadcasting Network—all transmit to countries 

whose governments routinely block not only U.S. radio and satellite 

signals but their Internet content as well. 

For this reason, BBG entities already use ICCT on a daily basis. 

These include UltraReach, DIT, Tor and Psiphon products as well 

as individually produced ICCT software, some designed in-house, 

and others created through a network of like-minded Internet activists. Without such software, most U.S. Government news content 

to China, Iran, Burma, Egypt, Venezuela, Russia, Belarus and others would be inaccessible. For example, each of RFA’s websites (in 

English, Mandarin, Korean, etc.) has a ‘‘Getting Around Internet 

Blockage’’ icon on the home screen. VOA’s Persian News Network 

has the same on its Farsi language page.146 PNN also has its own 

‘‘iPhone App,’’ though reviews are mixed, with some users having 

44 

147PNN’s iPhone App and comments can be found here: 

http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/voa-pnn/id348178315?mt=8. 

148Of the FY2009 Internet Freedom funding, the BBG received $1.5 Million. The BBG 

promptly used to contract with DIT to expand its Freegate software operations for some 

$600,000 and with UltraReach for $840,000. Critics contend that this sub-contract is ample evidence of the State Department aversion to offending China given that the Department could 

just as well have written direct grants with DIT and UltraReach. 149The BBG is already in the process of seeking outside vendors to assist it in pushing news 

via SMS services into closed societies. See ‘‘Broadcasting board seeks text-message services’’ 

from December 20, 2010: 

http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20101220_1780.php?oref=search. 

commented, ‘‘Due to filtering software in Iran it doesn’t work properly,’’ while others gave it higher marks.147

The biggest difficulty confronting such efforts is the lack of servers and bandwidth. As a result, ICCT software users are reporting 

slower and slower download speeds or inability to access the Web 

at all as the crush of users clogs the system. Indeed, the crush has 

reached the point that some users are no longer bothering to use 

the software and/or access these sites. U.S. money for additional 

servers and greater bandwidth is essential. 

Given the poor relations the U.S. already has with Iran, Burma, 

Cuba and North Korea (though Internet penetration in the last two 

is very low), there is little political cost for the State Department 

to be seen as the driver of ICCT activities. The same certainly cannot be said of China, Egypt, Russia and others where our bilateral 

trade and security relationships often require close cooperation. Because of the firewall that prevents political interference in its reporting of the news, the BBG is immune to such pressures.148 The 

BBG is in the business of using ICCT around the clock to ensure 

its readers, viewers and listeners can access its products. For that 

very reason, the BBG is perfectly placed to serve as the lead U.S. 

Government agency in assisting ICCT efforts.149

(45) 

A P P E N D I X E S 

Appendix A.—List of Confucius Institutes 

in USA by Year 

2004 

• University of Maryland: College Park, Maryland 

2005 

• San Francisco State University: San Francisco, California 

2006 

• Bryant University: Smithfield, Rhode Island 

• Confucius Institute in Chicago: Chicago, Illinois 

• Confucius Institute at China Institute: New York, New York 

• University of Hawaii at Manoa: Honolulu, Hawaii 

• University of Iowa: Iowa City, Iowa 

• University of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas 

• University of Massachusetts Boston: Boston, Massachusetts 

• Michigan State University: East Lansing, Michigan 

• University of Oklahoma: Norman, Oklahoma 

2007 

• Arizona State University: Tempe, Arizona 

• University of California Los Angeles: Los Angeles, California 

• Community College Denver: Denver, Colorado • Confucius Institute in Indianapolis: Indianapolis, Indiana • University of Memphis: Memphis, Tennessee • Miami University: Oxford, Ohio • University of Nebraska-Lincoln: Lincoln, Nebraska • New Mexico State University: Law Cruces, New Mexico • North Carolina State University: Raleigh, North Carolina • University of Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania • Portland State University: Portland, Oregon • Purdue University: Lafayette, Indiana • University of Rhode Island: Kingston, Rhode Island • Rutgers, the State of University of New Jersey: New Brunswick, New Jersey • University of Texas at Dallas: Richardson, Texas • University of Toledo: Toledo, Ohio • University of Utah: Salt Lake City, Utah • Wayne State University: Detroit, Michigan 

2008 

• University of Akron: Akron, Ohio 

• University of Arizona: Tucson, Arizona 

46 

• Confucius Institutes in Atlanta: Atlanta, Georgia • University of Central Arkansas: Conway, Arkansas • Cleveland State University: Cleveland, Ohio • University of Minnesota: Twin Cities, Minnesota • University of Montana: Missoula, Montana • University of South Carolina: Columbia, South Carolina • University of South Florida: Tampa, Florida • Stony Brook University: Stony Brook, New York • Texas A&M University: College Station, Texas • Troy University: Troy, Alabama • Valparaiso University: Valparaiso, Indiana • Webster University: St. Louis, Missouri • University of Wisconsin-Platteville: Platteville, Wisconsin 

2009 

• University of Alaska Anchorage: Anchorage, Alaska • Alfred University: Alfred, New York • George Mason University: Fairfax, Virginia • Kennesaw State University: Kennesaw, Georgia • University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, Michigan • State University of New York at Binghamton (Confucius Institute of Chinese Opera): Binghamton, New York • Pace University: New York, New York • Pfeiffer University: Charlotte, North Carolina • Presbyterian College: Clinton, South Carolina • San Diego State University: San Diego, California • Confucius Institute of the State of Washington: Seattle, Washington 

2010 

• University of Chicago: Chicago, Illinois • Columbia University: New York, New York • University of Delaware: Newark, Delaware • Georgia State University: Atlanta, Georgia 

• University of Kentucky: Lexington, Kentucky 

• Miami Dade College: Miami, Florida 

• Middle Tennessee University: Murfreesboro, Tennessee 

• University of New Hampshire: Durham, New Hampshire 

• State University of New York at Buffalo: Buffalo, New York 

• State College of Optometry, State University of New York: 

New York, New York 

• University of Oregon: Eugene, Oregon 

• Stanford University: Palo Alto, California 

• University of Texas at San Antonio: San Antonio, Texas 

• University of Western Kentucky: Bowling Green, Kentucky 

2011 

• Pennsylvania State University: University Park, Pennsylvania 

• Western Michigan University: Kalamazoo, Michigan 

(47) 

Appendix B.—U.S. Legislation Regarding 

Funding of International Expositions 

SEC. 204. INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITIONS. 

(a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided in subsection (b) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Department of State 

may not obligate or expend any funds appropriated to the Department of State for a United States pavilion or other major exhibit 

at any international exposition or world’s fair registered by the Bureau of International Expositions in excess of amounts expressly 

authorized and appropriated for such purpose. 

(b) EXCEPTIONS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State is authorized to 

utilize its personnel and resources to carry out the responsibilities of the Department for the following: 

(A) Administrative services, including legal and other 

advice and contract administration, under section 102(a)(3) 

of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 

1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(a)(3)) related to United States participation in international fairs and expositions abroad. 

Such administrative services may not include capital expenses, operating expenses, or travel or related expenses 

(other than such expenses as are associated with the provision of administrative services by employees of the Department of State). 

(B) Activities under section 105(f) of such Act with respect to encouraging foreign governments, international organizations, and private individuals, firms, associations, 

agencies and other groups to participate in international 

fairs and expositions and to make contributions to be utilized for United States participation in international fairs 

and expositions. 

(C) Encouraging private support of United States pavilions and exhibits at international fairs and expositions. 

(2) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this subsection 

authorizes the use of funds appropriated to the Department of 

State to make payments for— 

(A) contracts, grants, or other agreements with any 

other party to carry out the activities described in this 

subsection; or 

(B) the satisfaction of any legal claim or judgment or the 

costs of litigation brought against the Department of State 

arising from activities described in this subsection. 

(c) NOTIFICATION.—No funds made available to the Department 

of State by any Federal agency to be used for a United States pavilion or other major exhibit at any international exposition or 

world’s fair registered by the Bureau of International Expositions 

48 

may be obligated or expended unless the appropriate congressional 

committees are notified not less than 15 days prior to such obligation or expenditure. 

(d) REPORTS.—The Commissioner General of a United States pavilion or other major exhibit at any international exposition or 

world’s fair registered by the Bureau of International Expositions 

shall submit to the Secretary of State and the appropriate congressional committees a report concerning activities relating to such pavilion or exhibit every 180 days while serving as Commissioner 

General and shall submit a final report summarizing all such activities not later than 1 year after the closure of the pavilion or exhibit. 

(e) REPEAL.—Section 230 of the Foreign Relations Authorization 

Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (22 U.S.C. 2452 note) is repealed. 

(49) 

Appendix C.—Foreign Film Box Office Gross 

in China 1999–2010 

Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010 

(All figures are in $US, converted from Renminbi 6.5871 RMB/$1 

on December 31, 2010) 

Year Film 

Production 

Company 

Box Office 

Receipts 

($ millions) 

1999 1. Rush Hour ................................................................. New Line ............ 3.80 

2. Mulan ........................................................................ Disney ................. 1.72 

3. Enemy of the State ................................................... Disney ................. 3.37 

4. Star Wars, Ep1 .......................................................... Fox ...................... 5.15 

5. Tarzan ....................................................................... Disney ................. 2.08 

6. Entrapment ............................................................... Fox ...................... 4.46 

2000 1. Matrix ........................................................................ W.B ..................... 2.72 

2. Stuart Little ............................................................... Sony .................... 3.24 

3. Double Jeopardy ........................................................ UIP ...................... 2.34 

4. General’s Daughter ................................................... UIP ...................... 3.31 

5. U-571 ........................................................................ EDKO .................. 4.42 

6. Dinosaur .................................................................... BVI ...................... 4.34 

7. Gladiator ................................................................... UIP ...................... 4.24 

8. MI: 2 .......................................................................... UIP ...................... 4.45 

9. Perfect Storm ............................................................ Warner ................ 3.16 

10. Bone Collector ........................................................... Sony .................... 2.62 

11. Big Momma’s House ................................................. Fox ...................... 1.51 

2001 1. Charlie’s Angels ........................................................ Sony .................... 2.82 

2. Chicken Run .............................................................. CJ ....................... 0.94 

3. Vertical Limit ............................................................ Sony .................... 4.03 

4. The 6th Day .............................................................. Sony .................... 2.22 

5. Meet the Parents ...................................................... CJ ....................... 0.99 

6. Proof of Life .............................................................. Warner ................ 1.32 

7. Enemy at the gates .................................................. UIP ...................... 3.32 

8. Pearl Harbor .............................................................. BVI ...................... 16.13 

9. Swordfish .................................................................. Warner ................ 2.61 

10. The Mummy Returns ................................................. UIP ...................... 4.36 

11. Lara Croft: Tomb Raider ........................................... UIP ...................... 2.69 

12. Antitrust .................................................................... MGM ................... 0.92 

* Moulin Rouge ............................................................. Australia/Fox ...... 1.63 

50 

Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010—Continued 

(All figures are in $US, converted from Renminbi 6.5871 RMB/$1 

on December 31, 2010) 

Year Film 

Production 

Company 

Box Office 

Receipts 

($ millions) 

2002 1. Planet of the Apes .................................................... Fox ...................... 1.56 

2. Shrek ......................................................................... CJ ....................... 1.07 

* Jurassic Park III ......................................................... UIP ...................... 2.68 

3. Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone ...................... Warner ................ 9.45 

4. The One ..................................................................... SONY .................. 1.88 

5. Princess Diaries ........................................................ BVI ...................... 1.50 

6. The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Rings New Line ............ 8.53 

7. E.T ............................................................................. UIP ...................... 2.01 

8. Star Wars: Episode II-Attack of the Clones ............. FOX ..................... 6.90 

9. Spider Man ................................................................ SONY .................. 6.26 

10. Stuart Little 2 ........................................................... SONY .................. 2.75 

11. Wind Talkers ............................................................. MGM ................... 4.48 

12. Ice Age ...................................................................... Fox ...................... 1.06 

13. Bourne Identity .......................................................... UIP ...................... 2.43 

14. Tuxedo ....................................................................... CJ ....................... 2.49 

* Lagaan ....................................................................... Sony .................... 0.19 

15. Bad Company ............................................................ BVI ...................... 2.71 

2003 1. Sweet Home Alabama ............................................... BVI ...................... 1.30 

2. Harry Potter & Chamber of Secrets .......................... Warner ................ 7.80 

3. The Recruit ................................................................ BVI ...................... 2.60 

4. Maid in Manhattan ................................................... Sony .................... 0.94 

5. Catch Me If You Can ................................................ CJ ....................... 1.60 

6. The Lord of the Rings: Two Towers .......................... New Line ............ 3.64 

7. Daredevil ................................................................... Fox ...................... 1.55 

8. The Core .................................................................... UIP ...................... 1.71 

9. The Matrix Reloaded ................................................. Warner ................ 6.33 

10. Finding Nemo ............................................................ BVI ...................... 5.28 

11. Charlie’s Angel: Full Throttle .................................... Sony .................... 2.15 

12. Terminator 3: Rise of the Machine .......................... Sony .................... 4.40 

13. X2 .............................................................................. Fox ...................... 1.37 

14. The Hulk .................................................................... UIP ...................... 1.23 

15. The Matrix Revolutions ............................................. Warner ................ 6.38 

* Johnny English ........................................................... UIP ...................... 1.25 

* Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black 

Pearl.

BVI ...................... 4.13 

* Italian Job .................................................................. UIP ...................... 2.65 

2004 1. The Rundown ............................................................ Sony .................... 2.53 

* Master and Commander ............................................ Fox ...................... 3.08 

* Mona Lisa Smile ........................................................ Sony .................... 0.71 

2. The Lord of the Rings ............................................... New Line ............ 13.10 

3. Paycheck ................................................................... DreamWorks ....... 2.05 

4. Cold Mountain ........................................................... Miramax ............. 4.02 

* Looney Tunes: Back in Action ................................... Warner ................ N/A 

51 

Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010—Continued 

(All figures are in $US, converted from Renminbi 6.5871 RMB/$1 

on December 31, 2010) 

Year Film 

Production 

Company 

Box Office 

Receipts 

($ millions) 

* Cheaper By the Dozen ............................................... Fox ...................... 0.85 

* 50 First Dates ........................................................... Sony .................... 0.78 

5. Day After Tomorrow ................................................... Fox ...................... 12.60 

6. Troy ............................................................................ Warner ................ 10.51 

7. Spider Man II ............................................................ Sony .................... 7.86 

8. Shrek 2 ...................................................................... DreamWorks ....... 1.87 

9. Harry Potter 3 ........................................................... Warner ................ 5.89 

* Two Brothers .............................................................. UIP ...................... 1.19 

10. King Arthur ................................................................ Disney ................. 4.17 

11. The Bourne Supremacy ............................................. UIP ...................... 2.27 

12. Ladder 49 .................................................................. Disney ................. 1.17 

13. I, Robot ..................................................................... Fox ...................... 2.29 

14. Garfield ..................................................................... Fox ...................... 3.18 

2005 1. The Polar Express ..................................................... Warner ................ 1.48 

2. The Incredibles .......................................................... Disney ................. 3.30 

3. Anacondas II ............................................................. Sony .................... 3.85 

4. Wimbledon ................................................................. UIP ...................... 0.32 

5. Thunderbird ............................................................... UIP ...................... 0.21 

6. A Very Long Engagement .......................................... Warner ................ 0.67 

7. National Treasure ...................................................... Disney ................. 5.45 

* Casablanca ................................................................ Warner ................ 0.06 

8. Taxi ............................................................................ Fox ...................... 1.48 

9. Interpreter ................................................................. UIP ...................... 4.14 

10. Flight of the Phoenix ................................................ Fox ...................... 2.29 

11. Star Wars III .............................................................. Fox ...................... 11.47 

12. xxx 2 .......................................................................... Sony .................... 2.20 

13. Batman Begins ......................................................... Warner ................ 3.20 

14. Mr. & Mrs. Smith ...................................................... Fox ...................... 9.41 

15. War of the Worlds ..................................................... UIP ...................... 8.04 

16. Stealth ....................................................................... Sony .................... 4.02 

17. Fantastic Four ........................................................... Fox ...................... 3.07 

* Charlie and the Chocolate Factory (IMAX) ................ Warner ................ 0.06 

18. The Legend of Zorro .................................................. Sony .................... 4.69 

19. Harry Potter 4 ........................................................... Warner ................ 14.39 

2006 1. The Da Vinci Code .................................................... Sony .................... 16.07 

2. King Kong .................................................................. UIP ...................... 15.53 

3. MI 3 ........................................................................... Paramount ......... 12.32 

4. Poseidon .................................................................... Warner ................ 10.46 

5. Superman Returns .................................................... Warner ................ 9.50 

6. The Chronicles of Narnia .......................................... Disney ................. 9.26 

7. Garfield: A Tail of Two Kitties .................................. Fox ...................... 8.73 

8. Eight Below ............................................................... Disney ................. 8.46 

9. Ice Age II ................................................................... Fox ...................... 5.54 

52 

Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010—Continued 

(All figures are in $US, converted from Renminbi 6.5871 RMB/$1 

on December 31, 2010) 

Year Film 

Production 

Company 

Box Office 

Receipts 

($ millions) 

2006 10. The Transporters 2 .................................................... Fox ...................... 4.61 

11. Miami Vice ................................................................ Universal ............ 4.49 

12. When A Stranger Calls ............................................. Sony .................... 3.59 

13. World Trade Center ................................................... Paramount ......... 3.46 

14. The Sentinel .............................................................. Fox ...................... 3.42 

15. Firewall ...................................................................... Warner ................ 3.43 

16. Cars ........................................................................... Disney ................. 3.41 

17. X-men 3 .................................................................... Fox ...................... 3.20 

18. Open Season ............................................................. Sony .................... 2.33 

19. Goal ........................................................................... Disney ................. 1.03 

* Ant Bully .................................................................... Warner ................ 0.17 

2007 * Happy Feet ................................................................. Warner ................ 0.59 

1. The Guardian ............................................................ Disney ................. 3.88 

2. Casino Royale ........................................................... Sony .................... 14.12 

3. Night at the Museum ............................................... Fox ...................... 9.81 

4. The Devil Wears Prada ............................................. Fox ...................... 2.83 

5. Deja vu ...................................................................... Disney ................. 4.32 

6. Eragon ....................................................................... Fox ...................... 5.19 

7. Click .......................................................................... Sony .................... 1.81 

8. Shooter ...................................................................... Paramount ......... 4.36 

9. Spiderman III ............................................................ Sony .................... 22.09 

10. TMNT ......................................................................... Warner ................ 5.68 

11. Ghost Rider ............................................................... Sony .................... 4.36 

12. Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End ................ Disney ................. 19.02 

13. Transformers ............................................................. Paramount ......... 42.67 

14. Mr. Bean’s Holiday .................................................... Universal ............ 3.54 

15. Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix .............. Warner ................ 21.60 

* Shrek III (Digital New Line) ....................................... DreamWorks ....... 1.61 

16. No Reservations ........................................................ Warner ................ 2.23 

17. Ratatouille ................................................................. Disney ................. 3.33 

18. Die Hard 4 ................................................................ Fox ...................... 4.11 

19. The Bourne Ultimatum .............................................. Universal ............ 3.57 

2008 1. Blinkers ..................................................................... Sony .................... 0.17 

2. The Pursuit of Happyness (Digital) .......................... Sony .................... 1.03 

3. The Water Horse ........................................................ Sony .................... 9.50 

4. Atonement ................................................................. Universal ............ 2.28 

5. National Treasure ...................................................... Disney ................. 11.11 

6. 10,000 BC ................................................................. Warner ................ 12.20 

7. The Golden Compass ................................................ New Line ............ 4.67 

* Spiderwick (IMAX) ...................................................... Paramount ......... 0.36 

8. Ironman ..................................................................... Paramount .......... 13.76 

9. Fool’s Gold ................................................................ Warner ................ 2.09 

10. 27 Dresses ................................................................ Fox ...................... 0.82 

53 

Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010—Continued 

(All figures are in $US, converted from Renminbi 6.5871 RMB/$1 

on December 31, 2010) 

Year Film 

Production 

Company 

Box Office 

Receipts 

($ millions) 

11. The Chronicles of Narnia: Prince Caspian ............... Disney ................. 12.58 

12. Kung Fu Panda ......................................................... Paramount .......... 27.32 

13. Hancock ..................................................................... Sony .................... 15.79 

14. Speed Racer .............................................................. Warner ................ 3.37 

15. Incredible Hulk .......................................................... Universal ............ 9.27 

* Journey to the Center of the Earth ........................... Warner ................ 10.02 

16. Wanted ...................................................................... Universal ............ 11.14 

17. 007 Quantum of Solace ............................................ Sony .................... 21.04 

18. Babylon A.D. .............................................................. Fox ...................... 1.28 

19. Hellboy ....................................................................... Universal ............ 2.47 

* Bolt ............................................................................ Disney ................. 6.94 

2009 1. Madagascar 2 ........................................................... DreamWorks Animation/UIP 

Distribution.

5.76 

2. Australia .................................................................... Fox ...................... 2.69 

3. Valkyrie ...................................................................... Fox ...................... 9.15 

4. Dragonball: Evolution ................................................ Fox ...................... 9.58 

* Monsters vs. Aliens ................................................... Paramount ......... 4.81 

6. Fast & Furious 4 ....................................................... Universal ............ 4.27 

7. X-Men Origins: Wolverine .......................................... Fox ...................... 12.17 

8. Star Trek ................................................................... Paramount ......... 9.24 

9. Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian ... Fox ...................... 18.06 

10. Terminator Salvation ................................................. Sony .................... 17.63 

11. Transformer ............................................................... Paramount .......... 68.39 

* Ice Age III .................................................................. Fox ...................... 23.47 

12. Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince ................... Warner ................ 25.07 

* Up .............................................................................. Disney ................. 12.54 

13. G.I. Joe ...................................................................... Paramount ......... 20.42 

14. State of Play ............................................................. Universal ............ 2.58 

15. The Taking of Pelham 123 ....................................... Sony .................... 4.51 

16. This Is It ................................................................... Sony .................... 6.95 

17. 2012 .......................................................................... Sony .................... 71.23 

* G-force ....................................................................... Disney ................. 4.28 

2010 1. Avatar ........................................................................ Fox ...................... 211.36 

2. Alvin and the Chipmunks: The Squeakquel ............. Fox ...................... 1.56 

3. Sherlock Holmes ........................................................ Warner ................ 12.02 

4. Percy Jackson & The Olympians: .............................. Fox ...................... 5.01 

* The Lightning Thief ................................................... ............................ 0.15 

5. Alice in Wonderland .................................................. Disney ................. 35.50 

* Clash of the Titans ................................................... Warner ................ 26.63 

6. Iron Man 2 ................................................................ Paramount ......... 27.15 

7. How to Train Your Dragon ........................................ Paramount ......... 13.95 

8. Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time ........................ Disney ................. 24.36 

54 

Foreign Film Box Office Gross in China 1999–2010—Continued 

(All figures are in $US, converted from Renminbi 6.5871 RMB/$1 

on December 31, 2010) 

Year Film 

Production 

Company 

Box Office 

Receipts 

($ millions) 

2010 9. Robin Hood ................................................................ Universal/Edko ... 6.43 

* Toy Story 3 ................................................................. Disney ................. 18.05 

10. Knight & Day ............................................................ Fox ...................... 14.11 

* Shrek Forever After .................................................... Paramount ......... 13.55 

11. The Last Airbender .................................................... Paramount .......... 4.54 

12. Inception ................................................................... Warner ................ 69.23 

13. The Sorcerer’s Apprentice ......................................... Disney ................. 9.11 

* Cloudy With A Chance Of Meatballs (IMAX) ............. Sony .................... 0.28 

14. Wall Street 2 ............................................................. Fox ...................... 7.47 

15. Unstoppable .............................................................. Fox ...................... 9.18 

* Legend of The Guardians: The Owls of Ga’Hoole ..... Warner ................ 4.40 

* Resident Evil: Afterlife (3D) ...................................... Sony/DMG 

(Chinese 

distributor).

21.71 

16. Harry Potter and The Deathly Hallows 1 .................. Warner ................ 31.27 

* My Name is Khan (non US film (India) quota) ........ Fox ...................... 0.07 

** Hot Summer Days ...................................................... Fox (Huayi Bros) 19.99 

** The Karate Kid ........................................................... CFG/Sony ............ 7.06 

* Denotes 3D, IMAX, digital titles or other reasons counted outside the quota 

** Denotes co-productions counted as Chinese domestic movies 

The titles indicated that are counted against the quota is based on MPA internal tracking. 

Source: Motion Picture Association of America 

(55) 

Appendix D.—October 11, 2010 Open Letter 

to the Standing Committee of the National 

People’s Congress Calling for Greater 

Press Freedom 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

62 

(63) 

Appendix E.—Committee to Protect Journalists’ 

2010 List of Imprisoned Chinese Journalists 

Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2010 List of Imprisoned 

Chinese Journalists 

Name 

Year 

Imprisoned Media Summary of Charges 

Xu Zerong (David Tsui) ........ 2000 freelance ........................................... ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ 

Jin Haike ............................... 2001 freelance ........................................... ‘‘subverting state authority’’

Xu Wei ................................... 2001 freelance ........................................... ‘‘subverting state authority’’ 

Abdulghani Memetemin ........ 2002 freelance ........................................... ‘‘leaking state secrets’’ 

Huang Jinqiu (Qing Shuijun, 

Huang Jin).

2003 freelance, columnist for Boxun News ‘‘subversion of state authority’’ 

Kong Youping ........................ 2003 freelance essayist and poet, Minzhu 

Luntan.

subversion 

Shi Tao .................................. 2004 editorial director, Dangdai Shang 

Bao.

‘‘providing state secrets to foreigners’’ 

Zheng Yichun ........................ 2004 freelance, Epoch Times contributor subversion 

Yang Tongyan (Yang 

Tianshui).

2005 freelance, Boxun News, Epoch Times ‘‘subverting state authority’’ 

Zhang Jianhong .................... 2006 freelance, founder/editor of Aiqinhai ‘‘inciting subversion’’ 

Yang Maodong (Guo 

Feixiong).

2006 freelance ........................................... ‘‘illegal business activity’’ 

Sun Lin ................................. 2007 freelance, Boxun News ..................... possessing illegal weapon/organizing disorderly crowd 

Qi Chonghuai ........................ 2007 freelance, Epoch Times contributor carrying false press card 

Lu Gengsong ......................... 2007 freelance ........................................... ‘‘inciting subversion of state 

power’’ 

Hu Jia .................................... 2007 freelance blogger ............................. ‘‘incitement to subvert state power’’ 

Dhondup Wangchen .............. 2008 Tibetan documentary filmmaker ...... subversion 

Chen Daojun ......................... 2008 freelance, Zheng Ming contributor .. subversion 

Huang Qi ............................... 2008 founder of website 6-4tianwang ..... illegally holding state secrets 

Du Daobin ............................. 2008 freelance Internet writer .................. violating probation 

Mehbube Abrak (Mehbube 

Ablesh).

2008 Xinjiang People’s Radio Station ...... promoting ‘‘splittism’’ 

Liu Xiaobo ............................. 2008 freelance, BBC, Epoch Times, Observe China.‘‘inciting subversion’’ 

Kunchok Tsephel Gopey 

Tsang.

2009 online writer for Chomei (Tibetan 

site).

disclosing state secrets 

Kunga Tsayang (Gang-Nyi) ... 2009 freelance, Zindris website ................ revealing state secrets 

Tan Zuoren ............................ 2009 freelance ........................................... ‘‘inciting subversion’’ 

Gulmire Imin ......................... 2009 freelance, contributor to Salkin 

(Uighur site).

separatism, leaking state secrets 

Nureli .................................... 2009 manager of Salkin (Uighur site) ...... endangering state security 

Nijat Azat .............................. 2009 manager of Shabnam (Uighur site) endangering state security 

Dilixiati Paerhati ................... 2009 editor of Diyarim (Uighur site) ........ endangering state security 

Gheyrat Niyaz (Hailaite 

Niyazi),.

2009 manager of Uighurbiz (Uighur site) ‘‘endangering state security’’ 

64 

Committee to Protect Journalists’ 2010 List of Imprisoned 

Chinese Journalists—Continued 

Name 

Year 

Imprisoned Media Summary of Charges 

Tashi Rabten ........................ 2010 freelance, editor Shar Dungri (Tibetan journal).‘‘subverting state authority’’ 

Dokru Tsultrim (Zhuori 

Cicheng).

2010 freelance, Khawai Tsesok (Tibetan 

journal).

N/A 

Buddha ................................. 2010 contributor to Shar Dungri (Tibetan 

journal).

‘‘separatism’’ 

Jangtse Donkho (Rongke) ..... 2010 contributor to Shar Dungri (Tibetan 

journal).

‘‘separatism’’ 

Kalsang Jinpa ....................... 2010 contributor to Shar Dungri (Tibetan 

journal).

‘‘separatism’’ 

(65) 

Appendix F.—Screen Shots of Baidu Searches as 

Seen from Inside the Great Firewall 

66 

67 

68 

69 

Æ