NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUDWIN ALEXANDER BARRERACORDOVA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

Nos. 18-72713 

Agency No. A206-891-050 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Ludwin Alexander Barrera-Cordova, a citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the 

order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We 

have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252, and § 2242(d) of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as 

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 10 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–91 (2020). 

We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for 

substantial evidence. See Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under the substantial evidence standard, “administrative 

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the 

petition.

1. In reviewing the agency’s determination that Barrera-Cordova’s 

mistreatment did not rise to the level of persecution, we need not decide whether 

we review only for substantial evidence or whether we review de novo because we 

conclude that the standard of review does not make a difference here. See Fon v. 

Garland, 34 F.4th 810, 813 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022). Even assuming that de novo 

review applies, we agree that the harms to Barrera-Cordova did not rise to the level 

of persecution. 

Barrera-Cordova, a member of the ARENA political party, testified that, 

after he protested at a public meeting of the rival FMLN party, police forcibly 

removed him from the meeting but that he was not physically harmed. BarreraCordova claimed that, after this incident, the FMLN began extorting money from 

his father, who owned an orange grove, in exchange for not harming BarreraCordova. Barrera-Cordova’s father made ten payments, totaling approximately 
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$30,000. On May 31, 2014, four unidentified armed men arrived at BarreraCordova’s father’s house in a police patrol vehicle and, with guns drawn, 

confronted the father about Barrera-Cordova’s whereabouts. The family’s dogs 

began attacking the men, and Barrera-Cordova’s father, armed with a machete, was 

able to close the front door. He and Barrera-Cordova, who was inside at the time, 

were then able to leave through a back door and hide in the orange grove on the 

family property until the men left. After this incident, Barrera-Cordova’s father 

made the last extortion payment. Barrera-Cordova returned to his own home in 

San Salvador, and neither he nor his father received any further threats or extortion 

demands from the FMLN. 

We have held that “extortion, plus the threat of violence, on the basis of a 

protected characteristic can constitute persecution.” Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 

1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(en banc)); see also Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(stating that, although “mere economic disadvantage alone, does not rise to the 

level of persecution,” a “substantial economic deprivation that constitutes a threat 

to life or freedom can constitute persecution”). However, because “persecution is 

an extreme concept,” the combination of threats of violence and economic 

deprivation must be sufficiently “severe and pervasive” to rise to the level of 

persecution. Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995). That standard is 
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not met here.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s specific factual finding that BarreraCordova’s family “had ample financial resources” to absorb the extortion 

payments with “no change in lifestyle” for Barrera-Cordova or his family. Thus, 

while the payments were large in absolute terms, they did not deprive BarreraCordova or his family of the ability to earn a livelihood or even to maintain their 

current lifestyle. See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that, where alien was fired from her job for discriminatory reasons but 

subsequently “found steady work,” her economic harm was “not the type of 

economic deprivation that rises to the level of persecution”). Moreover, BarreraCordova testified that he had only been directly threatened once, that he never 

received any threats or demands while at his home in San Salvador, that neither he 

nor his family were ever physically harmed, and that no further threats occurred 

after 2014. On this record, the combination of economic harms and threats that did 

not result in physical harm was not sufficiently severe to rise to the level of the 

extreme concept of persecution. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1061–63

(9th Cir. 2021) (identifying factors to consider in assessing persecution and 

underscoring, as a “significant consideration,” whether the alien “was subject to 

‘significant physical violence’” (quoting Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016)). 

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of relief under the 
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Convention Against Torture. To qualify for such relief, “an applicant bears the 

burden of establishing that she [or he] will more likely than not be tortured with the 

consent or acquiescence of a public official if removed to her [or his] native 

country.” Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020). On this 

record, the BIA reasonably upheld the IJ’s finding that Barrera-Cordova had failed 

to show that he would be subject to torture, much less that the government of El 

Salvador would “acquiesce or turn a blind eye to anyone torturing him.” We 

cannot say that the record compels a contrary conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

The petition for review is DENIED.