Weapon of Denial 

Air Power 

and 

the Battle for New Guinea 

Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of Pacific forces in 

World War 11, viewed the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as a 

disaster for the Japanese and a triumph for the Allies. In 

that great air-sea confrontation, U.S. and Australian air forces proved that air power could be decisive in preventing the 

resupply of ground troops by sea. Months of torturous warfare in the jungles of New Guinea had left Japanese troops 

vulnerable to disease and starvation. In the end, Allied airmen were able to break Japan’s grip on New Guinea and end 

its threat to Australia through the innovative and aggressive 

use of air power. MacArthur’s strength lay in a dedicated and 

courageous band of airmen who could attack enemy ships 

from all directions at any time. 
The Japanese Onslaught 

The infamous attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan marked 

the beginning of a protracted and grueling war in the Pacific. 

Having dealt a stunning blow to the U.S. Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941, Japan moved quickly to seize the oil-rich 

Netherlands East Indies and establish a large defensive perimeter of islands between itself and Hawaii. Seemingly unstoppable at first, it had by late December gained a foothold 

in the Philippines. During the first three months of 1943, 

Japanese naval and ground units increased their attacks, 

consolidated their gains, and moved deeper into the southwest Pacific. 

New Guinea was their next target. From there, Imperial 

Forces planned to expand throughout the area, perhaps into 

Australia itself. By April 1, 1942, they had landed virtually 

unopposed at various sites from the northwest to Hollandia 

and down into the southeast. Their arrival spelled the beginning of the long and difficult New Guinea campaign, which 

lasted until July 1944. Eventually, they were repulsed in 

their advance toward Port Moresby on the southwest coast of 

the Papuan peninsula by Allied ground forces and pushed 

back to the island’s east coast. 

The turning point came in March 1943, when U.S. and 

Australian airmen won a decisive victory in the Battle of the 

Bismarck Sea, shattering the enemy’s ability to resupply its 

beleaguered New Guinea garrisons and setting the stage for 

the ultimate Allied victory that followed. 

Girding for Battle 

By the end of March 1942, Japanese forces had progressed into the Papuan peninsula and as far as the Solomon 

Islands, moving swiftly from Bougainville southeastward, 

where on April 30 they began their occupation of Tulagi. 

Countering this juggernaut, on March 31 U.S. Army Air 

Forces (USAAF) in the Southwest Pacific Area sent the 8th 

Bombardment Squadron to assist the small Australian garrison at Port Moresby with some Douglas A-24 dive bombers, 

the Army’s version of the Navy’s famed SBD Dauntless, 

which would soon be victorious in the Battle of Midway. A 

1 
PACIFIC AREA 

NaW Miles 

Marshall Is 

. I. I . 

Caroline Is ob * 

a 

*. 

New 

Cale 
month later, the 8th Fighter Group arrived, equipped with 

new Bell P-39 and P-400 Airacobra fighters-the latter export models of P-39s intended for use by the Royal Air Force 

(RAF). The fighters made their first attacks against Japanese forces 200 miles north of Port Moresby at two sites 19 

miles apart on the western shore of the Huon Gulf-Lae, a 

major enemy supply base, and Salamaua-on April 30. On 

May 15 Port Moresby-bound Australian reinforcements were 

dispatched. 

Strike and Counter-Strike 

On May 18 Japanese Imperial Headquarters directed 

the Combined Fleet to occupy Port Moresby and seize Allied 

bases throughout the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Fiji, 

and Samoa. Control of the Coral Sea and its shores-the 

gateway to Australia-would open virtually all of the central 

and south Pacific to conquest. Elements of the Japanese 

Fourth Fleet had begun this effort, known as Operation Mo, 

on May 4 by embarking the Army’s South Seas Detachment 

from their stronghold at Rabaul on New Britain, the largest 

island in the Bismarck Archipelago, to Port Moresby. Meanwhile, Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher had learned of the 

Japanese occupation of Tulagi and headed there immediately, taking Task Force 17, built around the aircraft carrier 

USS Yorktown. On May 4 the force launched fighters, divebombers, and torpedo bombers-forty right before dawn, 

thirty-eight later in the morning, and twenty-one in the afternoon-against enemy ships in the area. TF 17 quickly 

withdrew after sinking a destroyer, a merchant ship, four 

landing barges, and six seaplanes. 

Although the nadir of Allied fortunes in the Pacific occurred just two days later with the surrender of Lt. Gen. 

Jonathan Wainwright and his forces in the Philippines, the 

war for both sides was about to change. The Japanese invasion fleet, spearheaded by the light carrier Shoho and two 

Pearl Harbor veterans, the Shokaku and Zuikaku, continued 

to sail south into the Coral Sea, intent on capturing Port 

Moresby. On the morning of May 6, B-17 Flying Fortresses 

from the 19th Bombardment Group discovered the Shoho 

3 
sixty miles south of Bougainville and the rest of the invasion 

force later that day. 

Pursuing the enemy fleet, Admiral Fletcher’s Task Force 

17 joined Rear Adm. Aubrey W. Fitch’s Task Force 11, built 

around the carrier USS Lexington, and British Rear Adm. J. 

G. Crace’s support group of cruisers and destroyers. TF 11 

was absorbed into TF 17 to form TF 17.5, while the support 

group was redesignated TF 17.3. The entire force immediately steamed northwest toward New Guinea and the Japanese Fourth Fleet. 

Coral Sea through Milne Bay 

That night, the two opponents prepared for combat, 

which erupted on May 7, 1942, in the first naval battle ever 

fought strictly by carrier-based aircraft. When the Battle of 

the Coral Sea was over, the Allies had turned back the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, sunk the Shoho, and seriously damaged the Shokaku and the Zuikaku. Of critical 

importance to the Allies, neither of the two surviving Japanese carriers would be available in time for the coming Battle 

of Midway, the turning point of the Pacific War less than a 

month later, and although the Lexington was lost, the heavily damaged Yorktown was repaired in time to participate. 

The Battle of the Coral Sea saved the vital Allied stronghold 

of Australia and also ended the enemy’s attempt to conquer 

Port Moresby by strictly amphibious operations. 

In mid-May, Imperial Japanese Headquarters established the Seventeenth Army under the command of Lt. Gen. 

Haruyoshi Hyakutake. Operating with the Imperial Navy’s 

Second Fleet and First Air Fleet, the Seventeenth Army’s 

mission was the same as the original South Seas Detachment’s-to capture Port Moresby, New Caledonia, Samoa, 

and Fiji. This time the Japanese ground force was significantly larger, comprising nine infantry battalions including 

the South Seas Detachment. Maj. Gen. Tomitoro Horii would 

lead his troops overland along the Kokoda Trail to Port 

Moresby, a difficult route which required their traversal of 

the towering Owen Stanley Mountains. General Horii and 

his force moved out of Gona, a Papuan peninsular coastal 

settlement on Holnicote Bay, on July 21. By August 12 they 

4 
had pushed into the mountains and taken a key pass, behaving as brutally along the way as their comrades in China. In 

a particularly ghastly incident on August 13, the Sasebo 5th 

Special Naval Landing Force rounded up and beheaded every 

man, woman, and child in the village of Buna, just south 

southeast of Gona. When they reached their last victim, a 

sixteen-year-old girl, they bungled horribly, inflicting grievous wounds instead of immediate death, and had to finish 

their crime by holding her down as she struggled and 

screamed to the end. 

To support their drive against Port Moresby, the Japanese set out to seize Milne Bay, at the southeast tip of the 

Papuan peninsula in late August, planning to land troops at 

Rabi on its north shore and then capture a new Allied airfield 

being constructed nearby. General Horii and 11,000 reinforcements had set out along the Kokoda Trail on August 22. 

Five days later Japanese amphibious forces from New Ireland, in the Bismarck Archipelago, and Buna headed for 

Milne Bay. At the same time, the Australians had assembled 

six battalions of infantry along with the 46th U.S. Engineers, 

the 709th U.S. Airborne Anti-Aircraft Battery, two squadrons of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawks, and a detachment of RAAF Lockheed Hudson 

twin-engine reconnaissance aircraft. The Allies at Milne Bay 

numbered 9,500 men in all. Perhaps because the bay was 

often shrouded by rain and mist, they were hidden from the 

enemy. Worse for the Japanese, RAAF forces were commanded by a remarkably creative and tenacious officer, 

Group Capt. William H. “Bull” Garing, and would, under his 

leadership, be victorious in the coming battle there. 

The Japanese were shocked by their eventual discovery 

of this mighty Allied assemblage and driven to precipitous 

and intemperate action. Rather than wait for the Aoba Detachment, still in the Philippines, they proceeded with troops 

immediately at hand. The Kure 5th Special Naval Landing 

Force (612 men), a portion of the murderous Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force (197 men), and the 16th Naval Pioneer Unit (362 men) totaled 1,171 troops. This force sailed for 

Rabi on August 24 aboard two transports. In addition, 353 

men of the Sasebo force, fresh from their atrocities at Buna, 

followed on board seven large motorized barges. 

5 
CORAL SEA 
EASTERN NEW GUINEA 

AND 

BISMARCK 

ARCHIPELAGO 

0 20 40 60 80 100 

Nautical Miles 

####I 

Guadalcanal 
The ships got through, and the Japanese were able to 

land near their destination. Australian aircraft, fighting 

their way through bad weather to attack the convoy from 

New Britain on the 26th, managed to sink a minesweeper. 

Meanwhile, the barges foolishly landed at Goodenough Island, in the western D’Entrecasteaux chain, where their 

troops disembarked along the beach to prepare a meal. In a 

sudden surprise attack, twelve Australian P-40 strafers from 

Milne Bay came roaring over at low level, delivering a taste 

of real war. They destroyed all of the barges and most of the 

equipment and supplies. More important, they left the survivors stranded with no way to go on to Milne Bay or return to 

Buna. 

Heavy fighting followed at Milne Bay between Rabi and 

the Allies’ defenses, which stood firm. The Japanese were under orders to “kill without remorse”-orders that backfired 

when the Australians found the remains of several captured 

comrades who had been tied to trees and bayoneted. Tacked 

by their bodies was a sign: “It took them a long time to die.” 

This attempt at psychological warfare failed utterly. It filled 

the Australians with terrible resolve and they fought even 

more ferociously, driving the Japanese back to their landing 

sites. By August 30 the Japanese high command realized 

that its troops were in trouble. Adm. Matome Ugaki, chief of 

staff to Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet (and architect of the Pearl Harbor raid), noted: 

The situation at Rabi was critical. The commanding 

officers of both naval landing parties were killed. 

One-third of the officers and about 560 men remained, but only two hundred of them were capable 

of fighting. Though they dispatched their last sad 

telegram, some of them seemed to be still alive. 

Despite the arrival of reinforcements during the evening 

of August 28, the Japanese shortly withdrew, removing survivors hastily during the night of September 5-6 (within earshot of pursuing Australian troops). 

Afterwards, the Japanese shifted their attention to the 

troops marooned on Goodenough Island, launching the destroyers Isokaze and Yayoi on September 10 to rescue them. 

But the next day, Australian P-40s from Milne Bay struck, 

sinking the Yayoi and driving off the Isokuze and another de8 
stroyer, the Mochizuki. The trapped soldiers, having paid 

dearly for their imprudent stop, decided to send two parties 

in native canoes on a hazardous journey to Buna for help. 

One managed to get through, triggering futile air-drops to 

supply its stranded comrades. By late October, when Australians from the 2/12 Battalion, 18th Brigade, landed on the island, sixty Japanese had been evacuated by submarine. 

Renewed fighting, however, made their further orderly withdrawal impossible. On the evening of the 23rd shuttle runs 

by submarine between Fergusson and Goodenough Islands 

allowed more to escape and eventually make their way to Rabaul by cruiser. Those remaining were killed by the Australians. 

Japan on the Ropes 

While the Allies drove the enemy from Milne Bay, the 

main Japanese force in New Guinea pushed farther along the 

Kokoda Trail and by early September began to descend down 

the mountains toward Port Moresby in the face of stiffening 

Allied resistance. Together the USAAF and the RAAF had 

gained air superiority over the battlefront and used it to good 

advantage. Beset by both air and land opposition, the Japanese were stalled thirty miles short of their goal. 

Elsewhere in the Pacific, the American invasion of Guadalcanal, 300 miles southeast of Bougainville, in the late 

summer of 1942 was taking its toll on enemy plans and provisions. Eventually, the Japanese realized the impossibility 

of supporting major campaigns in both New Guinea and the 

Solomon Islands and chose to sacrifice New Guinea. The Port 

Moresby invasion force fell back over the mountains in a 

nightmarish retreat for soldiers virtually without supplies. 

Desperate, some resorted to cannibalism. War had stripped 

them of the last civilizing influences, reducing them to the infamous practices of New Guinea’s primitive tribes. 

Their retreat continued, with occasional fierce fighting. 

By November the Japanese had fallen back to their starting 

point near Buna. There amid swamps and jungles, the starving troops awaited inevitable Allied attack. Nature augmented their misery as temperatures averaged 96 degrees 

Fahrenheit, the humidity 85 percent. Both climate and ter9 
rain provided an ideal environment for disease. Ringworm, 

jungle rot, dhobie itch, malaria, typhus, and dengue fever, as 

well as ever-present poisonous snakes and venomous insects 

menaced defenders and attackers alike. 

On November 16 the Japanese reorganized their command in the southwest Pacific, ordering General Hyakutake 

and his bumbling Seventeenth Army to limit their operations 

to the Solomon Islands and Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi to assume command in New Guinea. Arriving in Rabaul in late 

November, Adachi continued the effort to reinforce the starving men around Buna. On November 17 additional units arrived by destroyer convoy, allowing the Japanese to field 

6,500 troops. Although only 2,500 were actually healthy and 

prepared for trench warfare, they held the defender’s traditional advantage-being dug-in-and were thus able to stave 

off Allied victory for two months. The inescapable and bitter 

fight for Buna would generate a voracious need among the 

combatants for supplies. That need would be felt, in the long 

run, more acutely by the Japanese than the Allies. 

Air Power and the Supply War 

For the Allies, air power became critical as Maj. Gen. 

George C. Kenney’s Fifth Air Force furnished air interdiction 

as well as aerial resupply, transport, and reconnaissance for 

the ground troops. The Allies’ repeated sweeps against the 

Japanese advancing across the Owen Stanley Mountains 

demonstrated that air power would mean the difference between victory or defeat. As early as May the Fifth Air Force 

airlifted the Australian 5th Independent Company to Wau, 

thirty-two miles southwest of Salamaua, to strengthen the 

weak and hard-pressed Kanga Force defending the Bulolo 

Valley. As the New Guinea campaign progressed, the Australians themselves depended more and more on aerial resupply 

and transportation. 

The potential of air attacks against enemy communication lines first became apparent in April 1942. Light bombers 

began striking Japanese forces on the Papuan peninsula, and 

by the 30th, twenty-six P-39s of the 8th Fighter Group were 

strafing aircraft and fuel tanks around Lae and Salamaua. 

The Fifth Air Force targeted enemy resupply ships off the 

10 
north coast. It achieved only limited success at first but improved its performance because of procedural and organizational changes made by Kenney when he arrived in the 

theater in August 1942. These affected, chiefly, supply and 

maintenance to increase the mission-ready rate for aircraft. 

Occasionally, individual initiative made the significant 

difference. During General Kenney’s inspection tour of the 

forward airfields, a sergeant commented that his unit had 

five B-25 Mitchell medium bombers out of commission for 

lack of wheel bearings. The general commiserated, noting 

that no suitable bearings were available anywhere in New 

Guinea or Australia. The sergeant then revealed that he 

could salvage some from a shot-down B-25 near Bena Bena, 

about ninety miles northwest of Lae. All he needed were 

“three other guys, some rations, a kit of tools, a couple of 

tommy guns, and some ammunition.” He was concerned, 

however, that local natives-“partially reformed cannibals7’- 

and Japanese might be lurking in the area. 

General Kenney gave the enthusiastic airman a chance. 

A Douglas C-47 Skytrain flew the sergeant and three men to 

Bena Bena under cover of air strikes against Lae and Salamaua. Four days later, as planned, the C-47 returned. As its 

crew waited nervously, the sergeant came running from the 

jungle. He had discovered a crashed P-39, he explained, and 

his team had stripped it of usable parts as well. As he spoke, 

the other airmen and a hundred natives appeared on the 

trail, all carrying components from both wrecked aircraft. 

The C-47 flew parts and passengers back to Port Moresby 

where, within three days, five B-25s and three P-39s were 

converted from hangar queens to frontline aircraft. 

A “can do” spirit suffused Kenney’s airmen during the 

arduous New Guinea campaign, and, as a result, the Fifth 

Air Force gained a reputation for innovative approaches to 

warfare. When it encountered problems it solved them, generally discounting their “impossibility.” Its ingenuity transformed the B-25 Mitchell from a horizontal, high-altitude 

medium bomber rarely able to hit enemy ships, to a low-altitude sea-skimming ship-buster. High altitude tactics had 

been driven by prewar doctrine and fear of antiaircraft fire. 

But in late 1942 the Fifth Air Force developed a creative solution-“skip-bombing.” The new tactic called for a B-25 to 

11 
Kenney’s Air War 

against the 

Japanese 

RIGHT As General MacArthur’s 

air chief, General George Kenney 

used Allied air power creatively to 

strangle Japanese supply lines. 

CENTER: Kenney used the long-range twin-engine Lockheed P-38 Lightning to secure air superiority for the Allies over the Southwest Pacific. 

BOTTOM: A Douglas A-20 Havoc drops parachute-retarded fragmentation bombs 

over a Japanese Mitsubishi G4M bomber (Allied code name “Betty”). 
LEFT: Japanese ground 

defenses were formidable. 

An A-20, on fire from a 

hit in its bomb bay, plunges into the sea, narrowly 

missing a squadron-mate. 

CENTER: The impressive Vought F4U-1 Corsair, operated by Navy and Marine pilots from island bases, also thwarted Japanese efforts to contest growing Allied air 

power. 

BOTTOM: Allied aircraft vigorously attacked Japanese fighter and bomber bases in 

New Guinea. Two Nakajima Ki-43 fighters (Allied code name “Oscar”) burn after 

being riddled with shrapnel from exploding fragmentation bombs. 
approach an enemy ship at very low altitudes, even below 

mast height, and release its bombs as it closed in. Each bomb 

skipped, much like a rock thrown in a flat trajectory across a 

pond, before impacting against the ship’s side or near its waterline. 

The problem of antiaircraft fire was lessened somewhat 

by the low altitude and high speed of the B-25; however, 

Japanese gunners still were a threat. Kenney turned to one 

of the Fifth Air Force’s most colorful figures, Maj. Paul I. 

“Pappy” Gunn. A maintenance officer, Major Gunn was a former Navy pilot who had retired from military service before 

the war to work in civilian aviation in Hawaii. He was, when 

the war broke out, general manager of Philippine Airlines, 

living with his family in Manila. Returning to active duty as 

a captain in the Air Corps on December 8, 1941, he was ordered out of the islands just before they fell. Unfortunately, 

his wife and children remained and were interned by the 

Japanese. (They survived the war.) Kenney asked Gunn to 

strengthen the Mitchell with more firepower to help it suppress enemy antiaircraft fire as it ran in on its target. The result was a B-25 with a total of ten forward-firing 50-caliber 

machineguns-four in the nose, two on each side, and two 

more in the top turret-which could be fixed to fire forward. 

The guns proved devastating, turning the Mitchell into a formidable sea attacker and ground strafer. 

The Fifth Air Force also produced the “parafrag”-a parachute-retarded fragmentation bomb dropped primarily on 

enemy airfields by speedy low-level attackers like the B-25 

and Douglas A-20 Havoc. Delayed explosions allowed the 

aircraft to escape the destructive blasts of their bombs. 

Waging Air War on the Convoys 

As the Fifth Air Force steadily increased its capabilities 

with reinforcements, artillery, and even armored vehicles, 

the bitter fighting around Buna was nearing an end. Most of 

the Allied troops and many of their supplies arrived by air at 

bases hacked out of the tall kunai grass just a few miles behind the front. Located near villages with strange names like 

Dobodura, Soputa, and Popondetta, these bases proved crucial in turning the tide of battle against the Japanese. Very 

14 
slowly but persistently, the Allies pushed them back into an 

ever-contracting perimeter. On November 21, 1942, Admiral 

Ugaki drearily noted in his diary: 

Buna has been entirely encircled. About fifty enemy 

planes attacked there today, and the situation worsened . . . Therefore we reached the conclusion that 

our policy . . . should be to wait and watch over the 

situation while securing strategic points on the one 

hand. This means that we will have to give up 

Buna, to our great regret. 

Despite the certainty of defeat, the Japanese continued 

to fight, and the battled dragged on. Allied intelligence intercepted two radio reports from Buna on December 29: 

. . . four enemy tanks are attacking the headquarters landing party; we are burning the code book. 

. . . we are destroying the radio sets at 1710. 

Three days later, on January 1, surviving Japanese 

troops took to the water, attempting to swim to their lines 

farther northwest along the coast. Harassed by fire from Allied forces offshore, their futile exodus lasted until the next 

morning, when artillery fire and attacks by Fifth Air Force 

P-39s and B-25s7 along with Australian Wirraways (small, 

two-place, single-engine attack airplanes patterned on the 

North American AT-6 Texan advanced trainer), brought it to 

an unpleasant end. That day marked the end of the Buna 

campaign. The two Japanese Army and Navy commanders, 

Col. Hiroshi Yamamoto and Capt. Yoshitatsu Yasuda, committed ritual suicide rather than risk capture. Of the Fifth 

Air Force’s and the Royal Australian Air Force’s instrumental roles in the Allied victory at Buna General MacArthur 

wrote: 

Their outstanding efforts in combat, supply, and 

transportation over both land and sea constituted 

the key-stone upon which the arch of the campaign 

was erected. 

Barely pausing to catch their breath, Allied troops 

moved north on January 5, beginning an all-out offensive 

against Sanananda, situated between Buna and Gona. The 

next day, cued by signals intelligence (SIGINT), their recon15 
Stopping Japanese Coastal Traffic 

- 

Kenney’s airmen modified North American’s powerful twin-engine B-25 Mitchell bomber into a potent 

anti-shipping aircraft, armed with heavy machine 

guns and bombs. Looking for trouble, four prowl the 

New Guinea coast. 

Maj. Paul I. “Pappy” Gunn, Kenney’s legendary innovator, in the cockpit of his 

colorful B-25 commerce destroyer, Pappy’s Folly. 
CENTER: By day, Kenney’s strafers effectively halted coastal traffic around 

New Guinea. A B-25 circles over a shattered boat after a devastating attack. By 

night, American PT torpedo boats patrolled coastlines, sinking barges and 

tugs. 

LEFT: One of the most spectacular and 

successful innovations was skip-bombing. Dropped from just above the water, 

bombs would skip like stones across a 

pond into the vulnerable sides of Japanese ships. A B-25 demonstrates the 

technique. One bomb has already skipped off the water’s surface; another has 

just left the plane’s bomb-bay. 
naissance aircraft spotted a Japanese convoy (carrying additional troops from the 51st Division at Rabaul) bound for 

Lae. The Allies, planning operations after the fall of Buna, 

had agreed that General Kenney’s Fifth Air Force would assume the “primary and continuing responsibility” for the isolation of enemy forces in New Guinea. Allied aircraft set 

upon the Lae convoy, bombing it continuously over several 

days. Nevertheless, an estimated 4,000 replacement troops 

made it safely to port, working feverishly to unload supplies. 

The convoy departed on January 9. Of five transports and 

five destroyer escorts, only two transports were lost. These 

affordable losses and successful arrivals of men and materiel 

led the Japanese to believe that subsequent convoys would 

get through. 

For a while, they did. In mid-January transports delivered, after an uneventful passage, the main body of the 20th 

Division (almost 10,000 men) to forces fighting in Wewak, on 

the northeast coast above the Papuan peninsula. It seemed 

clear enough to the Japanese that, with careful planning, 

supply convoys could get through. This revelation was particularly welcome in light of their continuing failures on the 

ground; they had been driven out of Wau, for example, by 

Australia’s Kanga Force and its air reinforcements. As they 

retreated and their positions around Lae and Salamaua became more and more vulnerable to aerial attack, the stage 

was being set for the most dramatic convoy battle of all-in 

the Bismarck Sea. 

A Massive Convoy Forms 

The Japanese in Lae and Salamaua, worn down by constant fighting and inadequate supplies, were to be bolstered 

from Rabaul by Eighteenth Army Headquarters and the bulk 

of the 51st Division-6,900 men in all who grouped for transferral to Lae during the last few days of February 1943. Combined with 3,500 holding the line, they would constitute a 

daunting force. Meanwhile, General Kenney had surmised 

that the Japanese were preparing to run another convoy 

from New Britain to New Guinea; reconnaissance flights had 

noted increased shipping in Rabaul Harbor and repairs underway at Gasmata airfield. On February 19 SIGINT re18 
vealed that troops were heading for Lae in early March. Additional SIGINT would keep Kenney aware of the convoy’s 

movement. The ever-resourceful Australian, Group Capt. 

Garing, saw an opportunity developing and encouraged Kenney to mount a massive Allied aerial onslaught against the 

convoy. 

In response, the Fifth Air Force increased its reconnaissance flights over the Bismarck Sea beginning in the last 

week of February. Kenney ordered his aircraft, particularly 

the formidable twin-engine, long-range Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters and B-25 ship-busters, ferried over the Owen 

Stanley Mountains to airfields on the east side of New 

Guinea, away from the vagaries of high-altitude weather and 

possible grounding. He also delayed a raid on Rabaul, allowing his bomber squadrons to attain full strength in time for 

the fight, and he organized coordinated attacks by a wide 

range of Allied bombers, including American B-17s7 B-24s, 

B-25s and A-~OS, and Australian Bristol Beaufighter and 

Beaufort antishipping aircraft. At Garing’s urging, he assigned his deputy, Brig. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead, to conduct 

large-scale training exercises. Allied airmen flew practice attacks against the SS Pruth, an abandoned ship that had run 

aground on Nateara Reef in Port Moresby Harbor. These 

training sorties were both realistic and risky. Two Allied 

planes were damaged by their own bomb blasts and another 

crashed after colliding with the ship’s mast. Meanwhile, coastal forecasts for the first few days of March over New Britain 

indicated bad weather in ‘the north and good weather in the 

south. Both Kenney and Whitehead, speculating on how they 

might direct such a convoy, concluded that the Japanese 

would use the bad weather to conceal their movements. Having considered the range of available aircraft and the probable route of the convoy, they predicted the ideal time of 

attack-“ten o’clock in the morning some day during the first 

week of March . . . just off Finschhafen.” 

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea 

Late on February 28, a convoy of sixteen ships-eight 

escorting destroyers and eight transports-left Rabaul for 

Lae. Shielded by Japanese Army and Navy fighters, it was 

19 
A Vital Partner: 

The Royal Australian Air Force 

One of Australia’s most creative 

air tacticians was Group Capt. 

William H. “Bull” Garing, a charismatic and tenacious veteran of 

both the European and Pacific 

wars. (Photo courtesy RAAF) 

Equipped with British and American aircraft, the Royal Australian Air Force vigorously contested the Japanese for control of New Guinea. Australian-flown Consolidated-Vultee PBY-5 Catalina flying boats performed reconnaissance, maritime 

patrol, and night attack duties. (Photo courtesy RAAF) 
TOP The Royal Australian Air Force operated the British-designed Bristol Beaufort torpedo bomber . . . (Photo courtesy 

RAAF) 

CENTER . . . as well as its derivative, the powerful and heavily 

armed two-seat Bristol Beaufighter, which the Japanese nicknamed ‘Whispering Death.” (Photo courtesy RAAF) 

BOTTOM It also operated the American A-20, adding extra 

nose guns to make it a formidable strafer. In RAAF service the 

A-20 was known by its British name, Boston. (Photo courtesy 

RAAF) 
hardly a "sitting duck." Its destroyers were armed with light 

cannon and heavy machineguns, and its merchant seamen 

and Imperial Navy sailors, all veterans of supply runs to 

Guadalcanal, had become seasoned defenders against aerial 

attack. The Japanese had wisely divided both cargo and 

fighting units among the different ships to achieve a relatively balanced force landing should losses occur. In addition, 

they planned preventive aerial strikes on the Allies at Port 

Moresby, Milne Bay, Buna, and Wau. (These did not materialize; in fact, the RAAF made preventive strikes on Lae and 

the Japanese airfield there.) Convoy commander, Rear Adm. 

Masatomi Kimura, was confident that his ships would reach 

Lae as he considered the strength of his air cover and naval 

escort, the experience of his crews, and the weather. What he 

had underestimated, however, was the ferocity and intensity 

of Allied resistance. 

Japanese Convoy Structure 

Battle of the Bismarck Sea 

Commander of Convoy and Escort Forces 

Rear Adm. Masatomi Kimura 

Commander of Transport Vessels 

Capt. Kametaro Matsumoto 

Destroyer Escort Force 

Arashio," Asashio," Shirayuki," Tokitsukaze," 

Asagumo, Shikinami, Uranami, Yukikaze 

Transport Force 

Aiyo Maru" 

Kem b u Ma ru * 

Kyokusei Maru" 

Oigawa Maru" 

Shinai Maru" 

Taimei Maru" 

Teiyo Maru" 

Nojima" 

2,746 tons 

953 tons 

5,493 tons 

6,493 tons 

3,793 tons 

2,882 tons 

6,869 tons 

4,500 tons 

*Sunk 

22 
After leaving Rabaul, the convoy sailed southwest 

through the night, buffeted by a storm with gale-force winds 

and lashing rain. Spume blew from the waves, forming a 

thick mist which hampered visibility and fostered hope 

among the Japanese that their voyage might proceed undetected. The weather continued to deteriorate the following 

day. Even so, and unfortunately for Kimura, the convoy was 

momentarily spotted and its position signaled in the Bismarck Sea on March 1 by a Port Moresby-based Consolidated-Vultee B-24 Liberator from the 321st Bombardment 

Squadron, 90th Bomb Group; but, worsening weather prevented reconnaissance planes from locating the convoy again 

until 0815 on March 2. 

It was still out of range for all but the heavy bombers, 

when, within two hours of its rediscovery, Kenney opened the 

battle with a strike by twenty-nine Flying Fortresses and another by eleven later that morning. By that afternoon, the 

Kyokusei Muru had sunk and the navy transports Nojimu 

and Teiyo Muru were both mortally damaged. Two Japanese 

aircraft attempting to defend the convoy were also shot 

down. About 950 men were pulled from the water onto the 

destroyers Yukikazt! and Asagumo, both proceeding at high 

speed ahead of the convoy, and delivered to Lae. The two 

lucky ships-for they survived the battle-returned to the 

convoy before daybreak the next morning. Throughout the 

night, a single Cairns-based Australian twin-engine Consolidated-Vultee PBY Catalina seaplane from 11 Squadron shadowed the convoy and heckled it with small bombs before 

handing it over to an American B-17 in the early hours of 

March 3. Having passed through the Vitiaz Strait between 

New Britain and Rook Island into the Solomon Sea, Admiral 

Kimura made a fatal mistake. Instead of heading straight for 

Lae, he foolishly circled in the darkness and delayed his arrival until the following morning. The convoy was still well at 

sea when Allied ship-hunters returned at dawn. 

Early on March 3, as the convoy steamed off the Huon 

Peninsula, several twin-engine Australian Bristol Beaufort 

torpedo bombers from 100 Squadron at Milne Bay set out in 

pursuit. However, all but three were prevented by bad weather from reaching their quarry. The first two Beauforts 

opened up at 0625, the third at 0700. When the third's tor23 
pedo failed to release, it began to strafe the Shinai Maru, 

causing minor damage. The Beauforts returned to Milne Bay 

in time for the form-up of the main Allied attack. From scattered airfields across New Guinea and northeast Australia, 

bombers, attack aircraft, and fighters lifted into the air, as 

RAAF A-20s returned to Lae to continue the suppression of 

Japanese air power. Witnesses to events later recalled that 

they had never before seen such a large Allied force over New 

Guinea. Certainly, it was the largest Allied land-based air armada massed for a single operation in the southwest Pacific 

to that time. 

By 0930 the first elements of the strike force had assembled off Cape Ward Hunt. At 1000, thirteen B-17s escorted 

by sixteen P-38s bombed the convoy from medium altitude, 

less to hit it than to break up its defensive formation and 

leave individual ships vulnerable to low-level attackers. Immediately thereafter, thirteen snub-nosed Australian Bristol 

Beaufighters, each armed with four 20-mm. cannon in the 

nose and six .303-caliber machineguns in the wings, began to 

run toward their targets. Beefy American B-25s followed so 

closely that the two formations merged. Other aircraft circled 

the convoy from all directions. As the “Beaus” closed in, they 

came under heavy and accurate antiaircraft fire. As if this 

were not enough, they entered a blanketing shower of drop 

tanks jettisoned by P-38s maneuvering to engage oncoming 

enemy fighters. Fortunately, none of the Beaufighters was 

hit and they continued past the destroyer screen, pressing on 

toward the transports. Once past the destroyers, the plucky 

Australians climbed to attack altitude, then dove on their 

hapless targets, engulfing them in a welter of exploding cannon shells and raking machinegun fire, silencing antiaircraft 

guns and hammering bridges and upper works. The deck 

cargo of one ship exploded in an enormous ball of flame. An 

observer on one Beaufighter described the fighting in vivid 

terms: 

You’ve gone around behind the warships, but 

they’re still banging away with their big guns, pompoms, and ack-ack. You can see tracers whipping 

by. A cargo ship is in the sights. She’s camouflaged 

and has goalpost masts. She looks blurred at first, 

but then comes into focus. The first thunder of fire 

24 

gives you a shock. It jars at your feet, and you see 

the tracers lashing out ahead of you, and orange 

lights dance before your eyes on the grey structure 

of the ship. 

Flying with the Australians were Pappy Gunn’s heavily 

armed, sea-skimming B-25s from the 90th Attack Squadron, 

commanded by Maj. Ed Larner; above them were conventional B-25s7 bombing from high altitude. Perhaps mistaking 

the modified Mitchells and Beaufighters for torpedo bombers, 

like the Beauforts that attacked at night, the Japanese skippers turned their ships directly toward the fast approaching 

Allied aircraft. By doing so they presented the smallest possible targets to the torpedoes, but ironically, enabled the heavily armed attackers to rake the ships fore to aft with 

devastating firepower. Sheets of flame from the bombers’ 

noses fooled some Japanese into believing the B-25s had 

caught fire. The Mitchells continued the deadly work begun 

by the Beaufighters, but they also carried 500-pound bombs 

which filled the air as they skipped across the sea toward the 

waiting hulls of the Lae convoy. One Beaufighter pilot briefly 

flew formation with a 500-pound bomb that had bounced off 

the water and was headed for the same ship as he. The 

Mitchells dropped thirty-seven bombs in all, seventeen of 

which hit their targets. Kenney’s A-20 Havocs scored with 

eleven of twenty 500-pounders. As the aircraft pulled off-target, the sea was littered with debris; listing and burning 

ships, their bridge crews already dead, slowed to a halt. 

High over the sea, an equally deadly struggle ensued as 

Japanese fighters desperately tried to save the ships below. 

One B-17, piloted by Lt. Woodrow Moore, shuddered under 

enemy attack and burst into flame. Moore broke off, pulling 

away from his formation and unloading his bombs. As the 

Flying Fortress disintegrated, seven of its eleven crewmen 

bailed out, only to be machine-gunned by Japanese fighter 

fire as they hung helplessly in their parachutes. 

At this point, the convoy was ablaze. Every ship but one 

had been hit, and most of the blazing transports were sunk, 

sinking, or abandoned. Aerial attacks continued all morning, 

followed by a short respite as Allied aircraft returned to base 

to refuel and rearm. That afternoon, they eagerly returned to 

swarm over the floating inferno in a grim aerial circus. By 

26 
day’s end, all eight transports and three of the eight destroyers had slipped beneath the sea or were awash and about to 

sink. A fourth was badly damaged but afloat. As the remaining destroyers retreated hastily northward from the area, 

they rescued numerous survivors from the water. 

Meanwhile, U.S. Navy personnel based at Milne Bay 

and Tufi, 125 miles to the northwest, had been plotting the 

advance of the Japanese convoy and planning their own patrol torpedo (PT) boat attacks. Ten of the swift PT boats sortied against the convoy on the night of March 3-4. Two boats 

hit debris in the water and were forced to abort. The others 

continued on, finding only one abandoned vessel, the Oigawa 

Maru. At 1120 hours PT-143 and PT-150 each launched a 

single torpedo, and the derelict quickly sank. The next day, 

as RAAF Beaufighters and Kenney’s B-25s raided Japanese 

installations near Lae, other Mitchells located the remaining 

badly damaged Japanese destroyer and quickly sent it to the 

bottom. Over the next few days, PT boats and Allied aircraft 

combed the waters off the Huon Peninsula searching for 

Japanese survivors and strafing and bombing them mercilessly. It was, Australian historian Alan Stephens noted, 

a grim and bloody work which many of the crews 

found nauseating, but, as one RAAF Beaufighter pilot said, “every enemy they prevented from getting 

ashore was one less for their Army colleagues to 

face.” 

American naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, likewise wrote: 

It was a grisly task, but a military necessity since 

Japanese soldiers do not surrender and, within 

swimming distance of shore, they could not be allowed to land and join the Lae garrison. 

By March 31, three-fourths of the convoy’s ships and all 

but one of its transports had been sunk. The Japanese 51st 

Division had essentially ceased to exist. Three-thousand of 

the 6,900 troops in the convoy were missing. Many perished 

by various causes-bombing, strafing, exposure, thirst, or 

shark attacks. Others struggled ashore, only to choose death 

over capture. A few managed to join Japanese forces there, 

but most did not survive the New Guinea campaign. 

27 
The - Battle of the Bismarck Sea 

RIGHT The Battle of the Bismarck 

Sea represented the decisive appplication of Allied air power against 

Japanese shipping. A B-25, caught 

by an observer in an Australian 

Beaufighter, bombs and strafes an 

enemy freighter while its first target burns in the background. (Photo 

courtesy RAAF) 

CENTER Two B-25s circle a desperately maneuvering and 

doomed Japanese ship. 

BOTTOM: A pilot’s view of a Japanese ship passing beneath him. 
TOP Badly hit, burning, and exploding, a Japanese 

freighter slews out of control despite desperate maneuvering as it slows to a halt. 

CENTER Aftermath of an aerial attack (I). A Japanese freighter burns before sinking off the New Guinea 

coast. 

BOTTOM: Aftermath of an aerial attack (11). A seriously damaged Japanese destroyer stops dead in the 

water, streaming oil from its ruptured fuel tanks, before sinking. 
Bismarck Sea: A Notable Air Power Victory 

Today, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea still stands as a 

striking example of the deadly effectiveness of land-based air 

power against naval targets. It marked the turning point in 

the New Guinea campaign. If Milne Bay was the “Coral Sea” 

of New Guinea, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea was clearly 

its “Midway.” As in other successful battles, victory depended 

on a number of factors. The Japanese made several grave errors. First, they seriously underestimated Allied air strength. 

Despite their original intent, they failed to neutralize Allied 

air bases before their convoy sailed within striking range of 

Allied aircraft. Also, they failed to provide sufficient cover for 

their ships or to safeguard their coded message traffic. Then, 

there was Admiral Kimura’s imprudent decision to remain at 

sea rather than run for shore after the convoy’s first encounters with the USAAF and the W. 

For their part, Allied aircrews were well-trained, highly 

motivated, and full of youthful confidence. They had developed the new antishipping tactic of skip-bombing and had 

practiced it assiduously. Also, their leaders-Kenney, Whitehead, and Garing-had a clear idea of how to wield air 

power: apply a maximum amount of force in the minimum 

amount of time. Allied intelligence was excellent; it included 

photographs, visual reconnaissance, and SIGINT. Fighter escorts benefited from topnotch tactics, technology, training, 

and motivation. Even initial anti-convoy operations, as disappointing as they were, gave the Allies valuable experience. 

The resulting catastrophe, then, is hardly surprising. It was 

predictable, even inevitable. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea 

stunned the Japanese. One destroyer skipper, Tameichi 

Hara, expressed their uniform dismay: 

More shocking to me was the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Japan’s defeat there was unbelievable. 

Never was there such a debacle. 

Two weeks after the last battered ship had slipped beneath the disturbed waters of the Huon gulf, the Japanese 

high command announced its decision that, in future, every 

soldier would be taught to swim. The decision was a prudent 

one for the Battle of the Bismarck Sea would be just a foretaste of the terrible toll land-based bombers would take of 

30 
Japanese shipping from 1943 through the final collapse in 

1945, particularly of convoys along the China coast. 

Theater commander General MacArthur described the 

Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement” in his area of responsibility. It was, he signaled Kenney, “one of the most complete and annihilating combats of 

all time.” As a result, the Japanese ceased resupplying their 

hard-pressed troops on New Guinea by means of large, exposed ship convoys. They sent, instead, fewer numbers of air 

transports, submarines, small motor vessels, and barges, but 

Allied aerial attacks exacted a dreadful price from even these 

as they hugged the coasts in desperate and sporadic operations. Eventually, a series of punishing assaults by Kenney’s 

airmen over the summer of 1943 against the enemy base at 

Wewak sealed the fate of the Japanese forces left on the island. 

By the end of 1943, the outcome was clear: land-based 

Allied air power had effectively blockaded New Guinea. The 

success of American and Australian airmen against Imperial 

Japan’s naval forces became an important example for all future conflicts. 

31 
Suggested Readings 

Bradley, John H. The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific, a volume in the West Point 

Cortesi, Lawrence. Operation Bismarck Sea. Canoga Park, CA: Major Books, 1977. 

Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate, eds. The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 

to July 1944, a volume in the Army Air Forces in World War II series. Chicago: University 

of Chicago Press, 1950. 

Dick, George Turnbull. Beaufighters Over New Guinea: No. 30 Squadron RAAF, 1942-1943. 

Pomt Cook, Victoria, Australia: Royal Australian Air Force Museum, 1993. 

Drea, Edward J. MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945. 

Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992. 

Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Annapolis: Naval 

Institute Press, 1978. 

Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. 

to the Present. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 

Hayashi, Saburo. Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War. Tokyo, 1951, as Taiheiyo 

Senso Rikusen Gaishi. Reprinted Quantico, VA Marine Corps Association, 1959. 

Hess, William N. Pacific Sweep: The 13th and 15th Fighter Commands in World War II. Garden City, Ny: Doubleday, 1974. 

Kenney, George C. General Kenney Reports, A Personal History of the Pacific War. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987. 

Military History series. Wayne, NJ Avery Publishing Group, 1989. 

. The Saga ofpappy Gunn. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1959. 

McAulay, Lex. Battle of the Bismarck Sea. New York: St. Martin’s, 1991. 

Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua, a volume in the United States Army in World War II, The 

War in the Pacific series. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957. 

RIorison, Samuel Eliot. Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July 1942-1 May 1944, a volume in 

the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II series. Boston: Little, 

Brown and Company, 1955. 

. Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942, a volume in the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II series. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959. 

Murphy, James T., with A. B. Feuer. Skip Bombing. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. 

Odgers, George. Air War Against Japan, 1943-1945, a volume in the Australia in the War of 

The RAAF in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945. Canberra: Royal Australian Air Force 

Rothgeb, Wayne P. New Guinea Skies: A Fighter Pilot’s View of World War II. Ames, IA: Iowa 

Tracy, Michael, Jeff Isaacs, and Irene Coombes. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea: 50th AnniverUgaki, Matome. Fading Victory: The Diary ofAdmira1 Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945. Pittsburgh: 

Wagner, Ray. American Combat Planes. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982 ed. 

Watson, Richard L., Jr. The Fifth Air Force in the Huon Peninsula Campaign, January to October 1943. USAF Historical Study No. 113. Washington, DC: Historical Office, Headquarters Army Air Forces, 1946. 

Williams, Mary H. Chronology, 1941-1945, a volume in the United States Army in World War 

IZ, Special Studies series. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960. 

Wilson, Stewart. Beaufort, Beaufighter, and Mosquito in Australian Service. Weston Creek, 

Australia: Aerospace Publications, 1993 ed. 

1939-1 945 series. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957. 

Air Power Studies Centre, 1993. 

State University Press, 1992 

sary Commemoration. Canberra: Australian Defence Force Journal, 1993. 

University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991. 

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