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HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE? STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

Serial No. 115–36 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

RON ESTES, Kansas 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

J. LUIS CORREA, California 

VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida 

NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGA ́ N, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

STEVEN S. GIAIER, Deputy Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

MOIRA BERGIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Timothy Rice, Battalion Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch 

Coordinator, City of New York Fire Department: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

Dr. Gerald W. Parker, Jr., Associate Dean for Global One Health, College 

of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Texas A&M University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Jake Parker, Director of Government Relations, Security Industry Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Reginald Brothers, Principal, The Chertoff Group, LLC, Testifying as 

Former Under Secretary, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

(1) 

HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE? STAKEHOLDER 

PERSPECTIVES 

Tuesday, November 7, 2017 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Donovan, Payne, Langevin, and Watson 

Coleman. 

Also present: Representative Jackson Lee. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Response, and Communications will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the 

effectiveness of the Science and Technology Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security. I now recognize myself for an 

opening statement. 

I want to welcome our witnesses here today to discuss an issue 

that is important to our homeland security: The role of the Science 

and Technology Directorate within the Department of Homeland 

Security, and the Homeland Security Enterprise. Science and Technology, by law, is the primary research and development arm of the 

Department. However, it seems that over 15 years since its creation, Science and Technology is still struggling to fulfill its role 

within DHS and the Homeland Security Enterprise. 

Given the evolving threat we face from terrorist attacks, from 

last week’s attack in New York City to powerful hurricanes and expansive wildfires, we need to ensure that there is a component or 

office at the Department looking for both the short-term and longterm innovative solutions to address the challenges the Nation currently faces. By design, this should be Science and Technology. 

However, budget constraints and the changes to R&D priorities 

have restricted Science and Technology’s abilities to meet its mission. The committee has heard concerns about the lack of coordination between Science and Technology and other DHS components 

and offices on R&D. 

Additionally, in the past, it was unclear how Science and Technology prioritizes its R&D. In 2015, DHS reinstituted the Integrated Product Teams Process. These teams, comprised of a crossVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:18 Apr 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17EP1107\17EP1107.TXT HEATH
2 

section of DHS components and offices, identify capability gaps 

which direct Science and Technology research and development priorities. This is a step in the right direction, but more still needs 

to be done. 

I am troubled that Science and Technology has repeatedly 

changed its focus, both on whether to focus on short-term technology or long-term research on larger unknown threats, and 

whether to deal only with DHS components or external stakeholders. This back-and-forth needs to stop, and there needs to be 

a candid conversation on what Science and Technology’s mission 

should be. I hope this hearing is just the start of these conversations. 

Moving forward, this subcommittee is committed to working with 

all relevant stakeholders as we consider the appropriate mission 

and structure of Science and Technology. While Science and Technology has faced constant challenges and obstacles, there are some 

Science and Technology programs that have made a positive impact 

on the Homeland Security Enterprise. The National Urban Security Technology Lab, also known as NUSTL, in New York City, 

serves as a Federal resource for first responders by supporting the 

development and testing and evaluation of new technology. 

I have had the opportunity to visit NUSTL, and have seen firsthand the remarkable resources NUSTL provides for our first responders. I was very concerned that the President’s fiscal year 

2018 budget request proposed its closure, in addition to the closure 

of two other DHS labs that focus on chemical and biological 

threats. Now is not the time to be cutting Federal resources to 

counter chemical and biological threats and support for our first responders. I am pleased that the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. 

Delaney, and I were able to successfully restore funding for these 

three vital labs during the appropriations process on the floor. 

I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses on the current State of Science and Technology and its programs, and what 

more needs to be done to ensure that Science and Technology is an 

effective and efficient partner with first responders, academia, and 

industry, as well as DHS components and offices. I look forward to 

our discussion. 

[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL M. DONOVAN

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

I want to welcome our witnesses here today to discuss an issue that is important 

to our homeland security: The role of the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) 

within the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Enterprise. 

S&T, by law, is the primary research and development (R&D) arm of the Department. However, it seems that over 15 years since its creation, S&T is still struggling 

to fulfill its role within DHS and the Homeland Security Enterprise. 

Given the evolving threat we face from terrorist attacks, like last week’s attack 

in New York City, to powerful hurricanes and expansive wildfires, we need to ensure that there is a component or office at the Department looking for both the 

short-term and long-term innovative solutions to address the challenges the Nation 

currently faces. By design, this should be S&T. 

However, budget constraints and the changes to R&D priorities have restricted 

S&T abilities to meet its mission. The committee has heard concerns about the lack 

of coordination between S&T and other DHS components and offices on R&D. Additionally, in the past, it was unclear how S&T prioritized its R&D. In 2015, DHS 

3 

reinstituted the Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) process. These teams, comprised 

of a cross-section of DHS components and offices, identify capability gaps which directs S&T R&D priorities. This is a step in the right direction, but more still needs 

to be done. 

I am troubled that S&T has repeatedly changed its focus—both on whether to 

focus on short-term technology transferring or longer-term research on larger unknown threats and whether to deal only with DHS components or external stakeholders. This back-and-forth needs to stop and there needs to be candid conversations on what S&T’s mission should be. I hope this hearing is just the start of these 

conversations. Moving forward, this subcommittee is committed to working with all 

relevant stakeholders as we consider the appropriate mission and structure of S&T. 

While S&T has faced constant challenges and obstacles, there are some S&T programs that have made a positive impact on the Homeland Security Enterprise. 

The National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL), in New York City, 

serves as a Federal resource for first responders by supporting the development and 

testing and evaluation of new technology. I’ve had the opportunity to visit NUSTL 

and see first-hand the remarkable resources NUSTL provides to our first responders. I was very concerned that the President’s fiscal year 2018 budget request proposed its closure in addition to two other DHS labs that focus on the chemical and 

biological threats. Now is not the time to be cutting Federal resources to counter 

chemical and biological threats and support for our first responders. I’m pleased 

that the gentlemen from Maryland, Mr. Delaney, and I were able to successfully restore funding for these three vital labs during the appropriations process on the 

House floor. 

I’m looking forward to hearing from our witnesses on the current state of S&T 

and its programs and what more needs to be done to ensure S&T is an effective 

and efficient partner with first responders, academia, and industry as well as DHS 

components and offices. I look forward to our discussion. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement that 

he may have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Good morning. I want to thank the Chairman for 

holding this Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, 

and Communications, first hearing to review the activities of the 

Science and Technology Directorate. I look forward to working with 

S&T and its stakeholders to ensure that components of the Department, and their State and local partners have the technology they 

need to do the jobs better and safer. 

I would like to begin, however, by addressing a few matters not 

directly related to today’s hearing. 

First, I would like to send my sympathies to those affected by the 

horrific terrorist attack in New York City on Halloween, and express my gratitude to the brave firefighters, EMS, and law enforcement personnel who responded. 

I would also like to join the people of Sutherland Springs, Texas 

in mourning the 26 people murdered for being at the wrong place 

at the wrong time—in this case, at church on Sunday. To those 

grieving loved ones, we pray for your strength in the difficult days 

that are to come. 

To those fed up with Members of Congress sending their 

thoughts and prayers to victims of mass shootings every time it 

happens, and then refusing to do anything to stop it, I stand with 

you as well. Instead of letting senseless actions take place, it is 

long overdue that we do what makes the most sense to significantly 

change, or to stop this from ever happening again. 

Finally, I would like to express my disappointment that last 

week’s full committee hearing with the FEMA administrator and 

the mayor of San Juan was postponed, and join full committee 

Ranking Member Thompson in asking that it be rescheduled as 

4 

soon as possible. As I said at our last hearing, our National response doctrine is not working for the people of Puerto Rico and 

the U.S. Virgin Islands, and we need to figure out what we can do 

to expedite the response and recovery efforts there. They are American citizens as well. 

I have heard first-hand from citizens attempting to get goods to 

struggling family members back in Puerto Rico, and finding unsurmountable financial obstacles at every single turn. We must do better, and not tomorrow—right now. 

Returning to the subject of today’s hearing, one thing that these 

recent tragedies have taught us is that the threats we face, from 

natural disasters to man-made attacks, are continuing to evolve. 

From extreme weather events becoming more frequent and more 

severe, to terrorists weaponizing cars and trucks, to bad actors 

wreaking havoc on soft targets, the kind of threats facing our country demands Science and Technology Directorate that is sufficiently 

innovative and dynamic to be responsive to the demands of the 

ever-changing threat landscape. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, particularly Dr. Reggie Brothers, the former under secretary of science 

and technology. During the 3 years he spent leading S&T, Dr. 

Brothers focused on cultivating relationships with the Homeland 

Security industrial base to better leverage off-the-shelf technologies, coordinating research development priorities across the 

Department, and launching programs to attract business to work 

with S&T by streamlining the bureaucratic processes. 

Dr. Brothers navigated tight budgets and organizational challenges within DHS to create incentives for private-sector engagement, and did so while working to overcome long-held industry concerns that S&T did not have the budget or clout within the Department to guarantee a market for homeland security solutions. 

Although S&T matured under Dr. Brothers’ leadership, it continues to face budget challenges, struggles to gain the confidence 

of the private-sector partners, and is involved in large DHS reorganizations of certain chemical, biological, and radiological and nuclear counterterrorism activities. 

Now that Dr. Brothers is a free agent, no longer bound by OMB, 

I will be interested in his candid observations on these issues, and 

how the committee can help bolster S&T credibility as the research 

and development hub that drives acquisition decisions in the Department. 

With that, I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony, and I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. 

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

I look forward to working with S&T and its stakeholders to ensure that components of the Department and their State and local partners have the technology 

they need to do their jobs better and safer. 

I would like to begin, however, by addressing a few matters not directly related 

to today’s hearing. 

First, I would like to send my sympathies to those affected by the horrific terrorist 

attack in New York City on Halloween and express my gratitude to the brave firefighters, EMS, and law enforcement personnel who responded. 

5 

I would also like to join the people of Sutherland Springs, Texas in mourning the 

26 people murdered for being at the place at the wrong time—in this case, at church 

on Sunday. 

To those grieving loves ones, we pray for your strength in the difficult days that 

are to come. 

And to those fed up with Members of Congress sending their thoughts and prayers to the victims of the mass shootings every time it happens and then refusing 

to do anything to stop it, I stand with you. Instead of letting senseless actions take 

place, it is long overdue that we do what makes the most sense and take significant 

action to stop this from ever happening again. 

Finally, I would like to express my disappointment that last week’s full committee 

hearing with the FEMA administrator and the mayor of San Juan was postponed, 

and join full committee Ranking Member Thompson in asking that it be rescheduled 

as soon as possible. 

As I said at our last hearing, our National response doctrine is not working for 

the people of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and we need to figure out 

what we can do to expedite the response and recovery efforts there. 

I have heard, first-hand, from citizens attempting to get goods to struggling family 

members back in Puerto Rico and find unsurmountable financial obstacles at every 

single turn. We must do better and not tomorrow, right now. 

Returning to the subject of today’s hearing, one thing these recent tragedies have 

taught us is that the threats we face—from natural disasters to man-made attacks—are continuing to evolve. 

From extreme weather events becoming more frequent and more severe, to terrorists weaponizing cars and trucks, to bad actors wreaking havoc on soft targets, the 

kind of threats facing our country demands a Science and Technology Directorate 

that is sufficiently innovative and dynamic to be responsive to the demands of an 

ever-changing threat landscape. 

I want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today, particularly Dr. Reggie 

Brothers, the former under secretary for science and technology. 

During the 3 years he spent leading S&T, Dr. Brothers focused on cultivating relationships with the Homeland Security Industrial Base to better leverage off-theshelf technologies, coordinating research and development priorities across the Department, and launching programs to attract businesses to work with S&T by 

streamlining bureaucratic processes. 

Dr. Brothers navigated tight budgets and organizational challenges within DHS 

to create incentives for private-sector engagement and did so while working to overcome long-held industry concerns that S&T did not have the budget or clout within 

the Department to guarantee a market for homeland security solutions. 

Although S&T matured under Dr. Brothers’ leadership, it continues to face budget 

challenges, struggles to gain the confidence of private-sector partners, and is involved in a large DHS reorganization of certain Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear counterterrorism activities. 

Now that Dr. Brothers is a free agent, no longer bound by OMB, I will be interested in his candid observations on these issues and how the committee can help 

bolster S&T’s credibility as the research and development hub that drives acquisition decisions in the Department. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields back. I thank him for his 

statement. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

I want to send my condolences to the families affected by last week’s tragic terrorist attack in New York City and to thank the first responders for their heroic 

efforts. 

I also want to send my thoughts and prayers to the families of those killed at the 

First Baptist Church in Sutherland Springs, Texas on Sunday. Over the past 5 

years, we have seen mass killings at an elementary school, a movie theater, a work 

place, a night club, a college campus, and a music festival. 

No community is immune from the indiscriminate pain that mass shootings inflict. It is time for Republican leadership to put aside politics and take meaningful 

6 

steps to ensure that this Nation‘s gun laws work to protect our citizens and law enforcement. 

Turning to the subject of today’s hearing, I am pleased that this subcommittee 

is continuing the committee’s efforts to help S&T mature into a dynamic research 

and development organization capable of meeting the evolving needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise. 

When the committee last held a hearing on the Science and Technology Directorate, I raised concerns about the lack of a unified DHS policy defining research 

and development priorities, stakeholder engagement processes, and on-going budget 

challenges. 

I am pleased that the former under secretary for science and technology, Dr. 

Reggie Brothers, is here today to talk about what he did to tackle those challenges. 

From identifying DHS’s Visionary Goals and establishing the Integrated Product 

Team process to launching the Homeland Security Innovation Program, Dr. Brothers provided clarity to S&T’s long-term priorities, improved the coordination of research and development activities, and attracted new industry to the homeland security space. 

I commend Dr. Brothers for his efforts to leave S&T a better organization than 

it was when he found it. 

That said, there are on-going challenges undermining S&T’s potential. First, 

S&T’s budget is not what it should be, and the Trump administration’s fiscal year 

budget request sought irresponsible cuts that would have cut into the bone of S&T’s 

activities. 

Although I am pleased that some of the funding was restored in the House spending measure, I remain concerned that research and development of security technologies is not a top priority of the Trump administration. 

Second, Congress has failed to enact legislation to clarify S&T’s mission and authorities. Despite this committee’s efforts to address long-standing challenges at 

S&T, our Senate counterparts have so far refused to act. I hope for a different outcome this Congress. 

Last, I am not confident we are fully leveraging the expertise of all of the colleges 

and universities that are capable of contributing in this space, and I hope to learn 

more about how S&T can better work with academic institutions. 

Before I close, I want to echo Ranking Member Payne’s comments regarding the 

need to reschedule the full committee hearing on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s preparedness and response capabilities as soon as possible. 

The Federal response to the devastation caused by hurricanes in Puerto Rico and 

the U.S. Virgin Islands is not what it should be, and American citizens are suffering 

as a result. If we can put a man on the moon and bring him back, surely we can 

turn the power back on and provide reliable access to clean water within 7 weeks. 

Mr. DONOVAN. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel 

before us today on this important topic, and I assure you all that 

your testimony is very important to us. This subcommittee has 

used testimony in every hearing that we have conducted in the last 

21⁄2 years to come up with some results, so your efforts here today 

will be taken into consideration, and a product will be developed 

from them. 

Chief Timothy Rice serves as the weapons of mass destruction 

branch coordinator for the New York City Fire Department. He 

currently serves on New York City’s Radiological Response and Recovery Committee, and New York City BioWatch Stakeholders 

Working Group. 

Dr. Gerald Parker, Jr. is the associate dean for Global One 

Health at the College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical 

Sciences, and campus director for Global One Health at Texas 

A&M University. Dr. Parker also serves on several advisory 

boards, including the Homeland Security Science and Technology 

Advisory Committee, and Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel. 

Mr. Jacob Parker is the director of government relations for the 

Security Industries Association, and leads the development of the 

association’s legislative and regulatory programs. Before coming to 

7 

SIA, Mr. Parker served for more than a decade on Capitol Hill, covering homeland security, defense, foreign policy and other issues. 

Dr. Reginald Brothers served as the under secretary for science 

and technology from April 2014 to January 2017. Prior to leading 

S&T, Dr. Brothers served in the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Research and Engineering as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for research. 

In this position, he was responsible for policy and oversight of the 

Department’s science and technology programs, from basic research 

through the advanced technology development. 

The witnesses’ full statements will appear on the record, and the 

Chair now recognizes Chief Rice for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY RICE, BATTALION CHIEF, WEAPONS 

OF MASS DESTRUCTION BRANCH COORDINATOR, CITY OF 

NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. RICE. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member 

Payne, and Members of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. My name is Battalion Chief 

Timothy Rice, and I am the weapons of mass destruction branch 

coordinator for the New York City Fire Department. Thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the relationship between the FDNY and 

the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate. 

In May 2001, FDNY’s chief of Hazardous Materials Operations, 

Jack Fanning, appeared and testified before Congress on the topic 

of Government capabilities against terrorism. Chief Fanning was 

one of the firefighters who responded to the World Trade Center 

bombing in 1993. Beginning with that attack, the role of the fire 

service began to shift into the area of disaster preparedness and responding to acts of terrorism. In his testimony, Chief Fanning described this shift, and he detailed some of the plans and coordination that the FDNY and Federal partners were undertaking as a 

result. He made it clear that those efforts were the tip of the iceberg, and that much work remained to be done. 

I have seen the value of S&T in my own career. As a young firefighter in Washington Heights, I remember our fires had a radiation survey meter. It was kept in the office under the captain’s 

bunk, and we were not sure quite how to use it. However, today 

we have radiation equipment on every apparatus, and every firefighter carries not just the equipment, but the competency to employ it. 

As the range of threats against New Yorkers has grown and the 

risk of terror incidents broadens, the department continues to 

adapt. We confront a wide variety of challenges beyond the traditional view of firefighters running into burning buildings. As Chief 

Fanning put it in 2001, ‘‘At mass casualty incidents, no matter the 

scale, firefighters and other first responders will be there within 

minutes, and they will do what they have always done: Act to protect the public they serve.’’ Knowing this, he urged Congress, ‘‘Let 

us provide them with the tools they need to perform their duties 

safely and effectively.’’ 

Four months after delivering that testimony, Chief Fanning 

made the ultimate sacrifice at the World Trade Center. However, 

8 

his tremendous legacy endures, as has the point that he made during that Congressional hearing. Members of the FDNY, NYPD, 

emergency management, and all first responder agencies are going 

to show up and protect the public, and we are tremendously appreciative of the ways in which our Federal partners, such as our colleagues at S&T, provide us with the tools to perform our duties 

safely and effectively. 

For more than 15 years, the National Urban Science and Technology Laboratory, NUSTL, in New York City has been a valuable 

resource to the FDNY. NUSTL is our conduit to S&T, and it helps 

the FDNY develop capabilities necessary to provide the highest levels of security for the New York UASI region. 

The scientific data, equipment testing, training, and support provided by NUSTL assist the FDNY in navigating the thousands of 

products, equipment, technology, and reports that we would otherwise be left to evaluate our own. We have invested heavily in all 

hazards and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear preparedness in units throughout the department, including hazmat 

and marine resources. 

In addition to our partnerships, I must also highlight the critical 

importance of homeland security grants, particularly UASI, in facilitating the FDNY’s ability to make many of these investments. 

We pride ourselves on being good stewards of those programs, and 

with the support of S&T, have been very successful. 

NUSTL also helps to enhance the fire department’s capabilities 

to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate potential radiological and 

nuclear threats. Incidents around the world like Goiania, 

Chernobyl, and Fukushima have all shown that radioactive contamination will lead to wide-spread public panic. By working together with our partners at S&T and the scientific community, we 

have been able to operationalize procedures such as the deployment 

of community reception centers, which will enable us to rapidly 

screen nearly a million people or more who may fear contamination. We have also provided input into an S&T operational guide 

titled ‘‘RDD Guidance for the First 100 Minutes.’’ 

The knowledge we have gained and the plans we have developed 

inform first responder agencies across the Nation. New York City 

agencies have broad outreach, and it is through these avenues that 

we disseminate what we have learned, gain valuable feedback, and 

consistently work to improve preparedness. 

The NUSTL lab’s location in lower Manhattan enables fire department personnel to access it with regularity. Our members attend monthly meetings for first responders, and periodic forums 

such as the New York Area Science and Technology Forum. 

NUSTL personnel also travel to fire department facilities across 

the city, and provide critical on-site guidance and evaluation. 

Homeland security is an immense challenge, and the New York 

City Fire Department is in a constant state of assessing and improving our resources to meet that challenge. Through our frequent 

and valuable interactions with NUSTL, the FDNY has greatly benefited from our partnership with S&T. The advantages of this relationship, both tangible and intangible, strengthen the department’s 

ability to save life and property, and ultimately, make the people 

of New York and millions of visitors to the region safer each day. 

9 

I thank you for your invitation to share experience with the 

Science and Technology Directorate, and that is the end of my 

statement, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rice follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY RICE

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

Good afternoon Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the 

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. My 

name is Battalion Chief Timothy Rice and I am the weapons of mass destruction 

branch coordinator for the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). Thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the relationship between the FDNY and the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). 

In May of 2001, FDNY’s Chief of Hazardous Materials Operations—Jack Fanning—appeared and testified before Congress on the topic of Government Capabilities Against Terrorism. Chief Fanning was one of the firefighters who responded to 

the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Beginning with that attack, the role of 

the fire service began to shift into the area of disaster preparedness and responding 

to acts of terrorism. In his testimony, Chief Fanning described this shift and he detailed some of the plans and coordination that the FDNY and Federal partners were 

undertaking as a result. He made it clear that these efforts were the tip of the iceberg and that much work remained to be done. 

I have seen this first-hand throughout my own career. As a young firefighter in 

Engine 84 in Manhattan, I remember that our firehouse had a radiation survey 

meter. At the time, we kept it in the office under the Captain’s bunk. However, as 

the range of threats against New Yorkers has grown and the risk of terror incidents 

broadened, the Department has had to adapt. We now confront a wide variety of 

challenges beyond the traditional view of firefighters running into burning buildings. As Chief Fanning put it in 2001, at mass casualty incidents—no matter the 

scale—firefighters and other first responders will be there within minutes and they 

will do what they have always done: Act to protect the public they serve. Knowing 

this, he urged Congress, ‘‘let’s provide them with the tools they need to perform 

their duties safely and effectively.’’ 

Four months after delivering that testimony, Chief Fanning made the ultimate 

sacrifice at the World Trade Center. However, his tremendous legacy endures, as 

does the point that he made during that Congressional hearing. Members of the 

FDNY, NYPD, Emergency Management, and all first responder agencies are going 

to show up and protect the public, and we are tremendously appreciative of the 

ways in which our Federal partners such as our colleagues at S&T provide us with 

the tools to perform our duties safely and effectively. 

It is not an easy task for a fire department to evolve from a role of traditional 

firefighting to a department that is also responsible for disaster preparedness, including acts of terrorism and the deliberate release of chemical and/or radiological 

materials and explosives. To stay ahead of emerging threats, the FDNY sought a 

partner in the scientific community to provide independent scientific research, data, 

expertise, and testing. 

For more than 15 years, the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory 

(NUSTL) in New York City has been a valuable resource to the FDNY. NUSTL is 

our conduit to S&T and it helps the FDNY develop capabilities necessary to provide 

the highest levels of security for the New York Urban Area Security Initiative 

(UASI) region. The scientific data, equipment testing, training, and support provided by NUSTL assists the FDNY in navigating the thousands of products, equipment, technology, and reports that we would otherwise be left to evaluate on our 

own. We have invested heavily in All Hazards preparedness and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness in units throughout the Department including HazMat and Marine resources. In addition to our partnerships, I 

must also highlight the critical importance of Homeland Security grants—particularly UASI—in facilitating the FDNY’s ability to make many of these investments. 

We pride ourselves on being good stewards of those programs, and with the support 

of S&T, we have been very successful. 

NUSTL also helps to enhance the Fire Department’s capabilities to prepare for, 

respond to, and mitigate potential radiological and nuclear threats. Incidents around 

the world like Goiana, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, have all shown that radioactive 

contamination will lead to wide-spread public panic. By working together with our 

partners at S&T and the scientific community, we have been able to operationalize 

10 

procedures that will greatly assist the response and recovery from incidents of this 

magnitude, such as the deployment of Community Reception Centers (CRCs), which 

will enable us to rapidly screen nearly a million people or more who may fear contamination. By performing screenings at CRCs, we will avoid flooding area hospitals 

and emergency rooms and preserve resources for the seriously injured, thereby saving more lives. We’ve also provided input to an S&T operational guide covering RDD 

Guidance for the First 100 Minutes. 

The knowledge we have gained and the plans we have developed inform first responder agencies across the Nation. New York City agencies have broad outreach 

and it is through these avenues that we disseminate what we have learned, gain 

valuable feedback, and consistently work to improve preparedness. 

To give one example, understanding the impact of a dirty bomb on the city involves understanding and predicting a number of scientific factors. Firefighters do 

not receive intensive training to study the physics of radiological material or to 

model plume clouds. NUSTL and other partners within S&T help first responders 

to understand the relationship between modeling and ground truth data, and they 

provide us with the capability to use data to better inform our radiation modeling. 

This allows us to respond in a more informed and effective manner. It is a collaboration that empowers the FDNY to make educated decisions about where we should 

set up equipment, create zones in which first responders may safely operate, and 

understand dangerous areas to be avoided. The Department benefits from having 

access to subject-matter experts in close proximity and in turn we share the knowledge and experience we have gained with first responder agencies Nation-wide. 

The NUSTL lab’s location in lower Manhattan enables Fire Department personnel 

to access it with regularity. Our members attend monthly meetings for first responders and periodic forums on CBRN preparedness and emerging threats. NUSTL 

hosts and manages the New York Area Science and Technology Forum, which 

brings together Government and private-sector resources to promote and discuss advances in science and technology. NUSTL personnel also travel to Fire Department 

facilities across the city to provide critical on-site guidance and evaluation. NUSTL 

plays a key role in the Department’s preparedness and response planning for terrorist incidents, industrial accidents, and routine emergencies. 

This level of on-going support and engagement with NUSTL has helped the Department build a preparedness cycle of continuous learning and training. The more 

we train for specific scenarios, the more prepared we are to face them when they 

arise. 

With the help of NUSTL, the Department developed the Tiered Response System, 

which functions as a force-multiplier, outfitting FDNY with a mechanism to scale 

and adapt the appropriate expertise to the incident or emergency. We also build systems of collaboration, partnering with other city agencies and regional responders 

to share lessons learned and to develop interagency plans, protocols, and drills. 

Members of the Department have acquired a tremendous amount of knowledge and 

know-how since 9/11 and this knowledge is helping the city plan and prepare for 

extreme hazards and emergencies. 

Specific NUSTL programs that FDNY participates in include: 

• Radiological/Nuclear Response and Recovery (RNRR) Research and Development 

• This project is aimed at improving State and local response to radiological 

and nuclear events. FDNY and other New York-area agencies participate in 

working groups and coordinate to develop guidance and tools to enhance preparedness and response capabilities. 

• System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responder (SAVER) 

• The SAVER program provides first responder agencies with the results of 

NUSTL testing and assessments of commercially-available emergency response technologies. As a city agency, the SAVER program is useful for learning about the existence of new technology as well as the availability and performance of that technology. This enables us to redeploy resources that may 

otherwise have been consumed by the process of investigating, testing, and 

assessing potential advances in the market. In addition, FDNY and other 

New York-area agencies have the opportunity to articulate gaps and needs 

and receive guidance about potential solutions. 

• Critical Incident Management Technology Assessment (CIMTA) 

• The Critical Incident Management Technology Assessment is an annual event 

that is staged by NUSTL in order to provide FDNY and other New York-area 

agencies with an opportunity to test cutting-edge first responder technologies 

on a large scale under real-life conditions. In the course of the event, first responder agencies are able to provide training, field-test equipment, understand the strengths and weaknesses of preparedness training, and collaborate 

11 

with technology developers to fill potential equipment gaps. Past examples 

have included testing handheld mobile detection and collection equipment, 

wide-angle thermal imaging cameras, and video content analysis and video 

analytics. 

• Urban Operational Experimentation (OpEx) 

• Urban Operational Experimentation provides first responder agencies such as 

FDNY an opportunity to view demonstrations of innovative products and a 

chance to experiment with those products in an urban environment. The program brings private-sector partners in contact with first responder agencies, 

serving as a catalyst to allow agency feedback to spur advances in technology. 

• New York Area Science and Technology Forum (NYAST) 

• The New York Area Science and Technology Forum convenes Federal, State, 

and local first responders as well as groups from academia and the private 

sector to meet and discuss advances in science and technology. These regular 

meetings bring together a wide variety of groups and lead to critical sharing 

and learning among the participants, helping the entire first responder community stay up-to-date on advances in the field. 

• Performance Test and Evaluation (PTEN) 

• NUSTL’s Performance Test and Evaluation program provides testing of radiation detection equipment to ensure that it works properly and that all supporting accessories and devices are functional. Performed in conjunction with 

the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Securing the Cities program, PTEN 

involves not only equipment testing but also provides first responder agencies 

with technical guidance and support and expert advice regarding storage and 

deployment of the devices. This includes equipment such as personal radiation detectors, backpack detectors, mobile detection units, and isotope identifiers. 

• Responder Training and Exercise (RTE) 

• Also performed in conjunction with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s 

Securing the Cities program, NUSTL’s Responder Training and Exercise program provides first responder agencies with radioactive sources, training 

equipment, and technical expertise to enhance training on radiation detection 

equipment. This includes supplying health physicists and technical staff, 

training equipment, and materials. 

Homeland security is an immense challenge and the New York City Fire Department is in a constant state of assessing and improving our resources to meet that 

challenge. Through our frequent and valuable interactions with NUSTL, FDNY has 

greatly benefited from our partnership with S&T. The advantages of this relationship—both tangible and intangible—strengthen the Department’s ability to save life 

and property and ultimately make the people of New York and millions of visitors 

to the region safer each day. 

I thank you for your invitation to share our experience with the Science and Technology Directorate and I am happy to answer your questions at this time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief Rice. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Parker for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GERALD W. PARKER, JR., ASSOCIATE DEAN 

FOR GLOBAL ONE HEALTH, COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member 

Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today to provide my perspectives on the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate. 

The complexity and changing nature of the threats we face today, 

from terrorism to pandemics, are compounded by the complexity of 

our Nation’s vast Homeland Security Enterprise that extends far 

beyond the Department of Homeland Security. The S&T Directorate has a critical role in helping unlock our Nation’s creative 

imagination and innovative spirit, which is vital to defending 

against the known and unknown threats to homeland security. I 

believe our Nation’s universities must be strong partners with S&T 

12 

in this effort, either through the Centers of Excellence programs, 

or other programs. 

The S&T Directorate has made great strides since its founding, 

and particularly more recently, under the leadership of my panel 

colleague, Dr. Brothers. Dr. Brothers applied sound leadership 

principles that effectively brought focus to the Department’s evolving near and longer-term needs. He also placed priority on the employee morale that improved the command culture of the directorate. 

Although the S&T Directorate is in better shape than ever, continued evolution is essential, as the threats and challenges will 

evolve, too. But harnessing the broader interagency Homeland Security Science and Technology Enterprise, particularly for biodefense, is also an important policy question. 

What is the role of the S&T Directorate? To serve only the DHS 

components, or to help drive the broader interagency research enterprise, to include funding shared homeland security gaps that 

may be a primary purview of another Federal agency? Examples 

include defense against animal agriculture from bioterror attacks, 

and biological attribution. 

I believe DHS/S&T interagency leadership is essential. As originally envisioned, the S&T Directorate should have assumed a larger biodefense leadership role through biological risk assessments. 

But a link between risk assessments to interagency homeland security priorities and appropriations remains elusive. It is now clear 

this will require White House leadership coupled to a new National 

strategy, as recommended by the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel. 

The administration’s pending biodefense strategy and decisional 

leadership may result in renewed interest in a need to reboot the 

DHS/S&T risk assessments, and play a larger interagency role. A 

near-term concern, the President’s 2018 budget request, proposed 

to eliminate agricultural and animal-specific homeland security research by the S&T Directorate, and has recommended closure for 

the National Biodefense and Analysis Countermeasures Center, or 

NBACC, to provide savings for other priorities. 

DHS, with substantial contributions from the State of Kansas, 

will spend well over $1 billion to construct the National Bio and 

Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF. The homeland security research 

needs of NBAF have been documented. However, NBAF will not 

reach its potential without Federal funding for the critical research 

its planners envisioned. That included USDA and DHS/S&T research programs. 

Recommended closure of the NBACC also raises questions about 

the NBAF that is still under construction. Does the same fate 

await the NBAF? 

These examples signaled diminished DHS and Executive branch 

support for agricultural biosecurity research specifically, and biodefense in general at a time that we should elevate this issue, not 

push it off until next outbreak or bioterror attack, when it will be 

too late. The recent Ebola and avian flu outbreaks demonstrate 

this threat. 

Beyond biodefense, these two homeland security examples—the 

need for interagency leadership and adequate funding support— 

may be symptomatic of a larger policy issue for the S&T DirecVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:18 Apr 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17EP1107\17EP1107.TXT HEATH
13 

1 Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and 

Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October 2015. 2 Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. Defense for Animal Agriculture. October 2017. 

torate. Is the S&T Directorate saddled with legacy laboratory infrastructure that does not fit the DHS internal priorities today, even 

if these assets are important to the broader enterprise? It may be 

better policy to transfer it to the appropriate lead Federal agency 

to own, operate, and maintain critical laboratory infrastructure, 

such as the NBAF, NBACC, or other laboratories, rather than proposed closure, or maintaining the status quo within DHS/S&T. It 

is a policy question. 

There are many issues to consider in such a policy option where 

pursued, but the end result may be better stewardship of critical 

laboratory assets needed for the broader Homeland Security Enterprise. It may also allow the S&T Directorate to focus on a research 

innovation portfolio that can more easily flex to changing needs 

over time, and better engage university scientists. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will 

be happy to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerald Parker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GERALD W PARKER, JR. 

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the 

subcommittee, I am honored to appear before you today for this hearing entitled, 

‘‘How Effective is the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology 

Directorate? Stakeholder Perspectives’’. 

As a matter of full disclosure, I am a member of the Homeland Security Science 

and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC), but I appear before you today representing my own perspectives, and not of the HSSTAC nor Texas A&M University. 

I will offer insights from my role as a public servant that spanned 26 years activeduty military service primarily in Army medical research & development at the 

Unites States Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and the United 

States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases; 10 years in the career senior executive service (DHS, HHS, and DOD); and now as faculty/administrator at Texas A&M University. 

I do not have to tell you how difficult the homeland security mission is today. You 

are well aware of the challenges, and the difficult decisions that must be made regarding authorizations, budget allocation, and appropriations for the many competing demands. 

The homeland security mission is extremely complex and the threats we face are 

constantly evolving and range from terrorism, natural disasters, and pandemics. 

Threats from terrorism and violent extremism include the use of weapons of mass 

destruction against our Nation, the civilian population, and our critical infrastructure. 

Today, I am more concerned than ever about the risks from biological threats— 

including bioterrorism and naturally-occurring transboundary emerging infectious 

diseases that could affect humans, animals, and our economy. Although we are 

much better prepared today, partly due to the dedicated efforts of the DHS Science 

and Technology Directorate and many others across the vast U.S. Government interagency; State, local, territorial, and Tribal governments; and non-government organizations. However, recent reports by the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel tell us that 

we have a long way to go; These reports include ‘‘A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts’’1 and ‘‘Defense of Animal Agriculture: A Report of the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel’’2. Recent high-consequence infectious disease outbreaks, to include the Ebola outbreak of 2014–2016 

and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreaks in the United States from 2014 

to 2016, also tell us we are not prepared, and remain highly vulnerable to naturallyoccurring transboundary infectious diseases, as well as bioterror attacks. 

14 

3Gerald W Parker, Jr., DVM PhD. Hearing of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Attacks, Outbreaks and Attacks. February 12, 

2016. 4 Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and 

Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October 2015. 

I previously testified before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, and I will repeat a statement I made 

then in my testimony today:3

1. Biological threats are real, and the bioterror threat has the potential to cause 

mass casualties on a scale similar to a nuclear weapon; 

2. The inter-epidemic period, or time between outbreaks, requires urgent action 

to optimize available resources and biopreparedness; and 

3. Strong centralized leadership will be necessary to drive urgent action in the 

inter-epidemic period. 

This statement has relevancy to the topic today regarding the DHS Science and 

Technology Directorate. We cannot afford to remain complacent about biological 

threats, nor can we afford to continue business as usual. Innovation, creative imagination, and leadership are more important than ever. 

The complexity and changing nature of the threats we face today, including from 

biological threats, are confounded by the complexity of the vast homeland security 

enterprise. The homeland security enterprise extends far beyond the Department of 

Homeland Security. Other Federal department/agencies have homeland security responsibilities, as do State, local, territorial, and Tribal governments, and the private 

sector. I also believe that communities, families, and individuals have homeland security and preparedness responsibilities, too. 

Science and Technology will play a key, if not a vital, role in defending against 

the many threats to homeland security. But, harnessing the interagency science and 

technology enterprise that extends beyond the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Science and Technology Directorate to take urgent action on the highest priorities 

in a focused manner that optimizes available resources remains elusive. I am also 

concerned that Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate may not give biological threats priority consideration. I am particularly concerned that the DHS Science and Technology Directorate may eliminate funding for 

research and development for animal agriculture defense, and that the National 

Biodefense and Analysis Countermeasures Center may be closed. 

Finally, funding for the University Centers of Excellence is significantly reduced 

by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate in the President’s budget request 

on a yearly basis only to be restored by Congress; I can understand the Science and 

Technology Directorate’s need to have more budget discretion for research and development accounts, but if the S&T Directorate is not satisfied with the performance 

of the University Centers of Excellence then the whole program should be considered for elimination, rather than a slow attrition through reduced funding for the 

centers. That uncertainty only serves as a disincentive for university participation. 

However, the original intent of the Science and Technology Directorate to engage 

university scientists in homeland security solutions remains unchanged and should 

be valued and embraced by the Department rather than continually reduced in the 

budget exercise. I strongly recommend maintaining the University Centers of Excellence program, or an alternative strategy that maintains meaningful university involvement to ensure our best and brightest academicians are included in homeland 

security solutions in a manner to how the Defense Department ensures that universities are included in National security solutions. 

Fortunately, the Trump administration is developing a new National strategy for 

Biodefense as recommended by the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel.4 Although the 

new strategy has not been released, I am hopeful that the biodefense strategy will 

be comprehensive, and include strategies for the defense against attacks, outbreaks, 

and accidents; linked to a unified interagency budget; and include strong White 

House leadership with clearly-identified lead and supporting accountability metrics 

for all Departments and Agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security 

and the underpinning Science and Technology Directorate. 

Interagency coordination and leadership for the homeland security science and 

technology enterprise is an important policy question that hopefully will be addressed in the new National strategy. The strategy should include a clearly-identified role for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology 

Directorate. 

Regarding the primary question for this hearing, I believe the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate has made great strides 

since its establishment by the original homeland security act, and particularly in 

15 

5 Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and 

Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October 2015. 

recent years under the leadership of Dr. Brothers and Dr. O’Toole. Dr. Brothers established new, visionary goals and areas of focus that included: (1) Responder of the 

future; (2) Enabled decision makers; (3) Screening at speed; (4) Trusted Cyber Future; (5) Transformed airport borders; (6) Resilient communities; and (7) CBRN defense. Dr. Brothers also extended the APEX Program initiated by Dr; O’Toole, and 

brought a sense of priority to meeting near-term requirements of the Department 

of Homeland Security components over those needs of the broader homeland security enterprise. Command culture and worker satisfaction of the Science and Technology Directorate also made great strides during Dr. Brother’s tenure as the under 

secretary. I know several program managers and scientists in the Science and Technology Directorate. They are dedicated professionals working hard to make a difference, and I believe they are making a difference. 

Performing organizations supported or funded by the Science and Technology Directorate—whether from National laboratories, universities, and the private sector— 

are also making a difference, and I believe largely enjoy the working relationship 

they have with the Science and Technology Directorate. However, I also believe the 

uncertainty of not having a new under secretary for the Directorate is causing apprehension for the Directorate’s staff and performing organizations. It is critical that 

a new under secretary be appointed and approved soon. 

Despite the hard work by many and the progress to date, I believe the Science 

and Technology Directorate has ceded responsibility to be a lead coordinator for the 

broader science and technology homeland security enterprise. I believe an interagency lead role for the broader homeland security enterprise is required as originally envisioned when the DHS Science and Technology Directorate was established—particularly for biodefense. It is clear now that strong leadership for the 

interagency biodefense enterprise is needed now more than ever before. 

To provide context, I joined the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and 

Technology Directorate in 2004. There was a true sense of urgency at that time as 

the Directorate was established after the terrorist’s attacks on September 11, 2001, 

the anthrax letter attacks a few weeks later, enactment of Project BioShield, and 

issuance of Homeland Presidential Directives 9 and 10. The Science and Technology 

Directorate placed high priority on defense against weapons of mass destruction— 

including biological threats—and assumed an interagency leadership role for the 

homeland security scientific enterprise. Biodefense threat, risk, and net assessments 

were established with the intent to drive interagency requirements and provide 

leadership for biodefense programs across the interagency. The National Security 

Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy also provided effective White 

House-level policy leadership that relied on early DHS risk assessments. Initial attempts by DHS S&T to lead, coordinate, and fund, where appropriate, the broader 

science and technology homeland security enterprise were initially successful. However, over time it became clear that other agencies were not receptive to being ‘‘coordinated’’ by DHS S&T. In defense of the interagency, the style of leadership practiced by DHS S&T as time went on was not as collegial and transparent as it could 

have been for success. 

Today, I see a Science and Technology Directorate that is more concerned with 

staying in their ‘‘lane’’ and serving only the DHS components as more important 

than playing a broader homeland security enterprise leadership coordinating role. 

I also see a broader interagency homeland security enterprise that does not place 

value on the DHS threat and risk assessments in driving their own homeland security requirements. From what I can discern, DHS S&T seems to have also abandoned their practice of conducting interagency biodefense net assessments, too. 

In defense of the S&T Directorate, competing and ‘‘siloed’’ interagency biodefense 

interests are now common-place, leading to a relative lack of interagency coordination and inefficient use of available resources for the growing biological threats.5 Departmental and Congressional pressures have also led to an inward, DHS-only component focus. These issues only highlight the critical importance for a new biodefense strategy and renewed strong White House leadership for Biodefense. 

There are two other concerns of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate that 

I will highlight in my testimony. Defense of Animal Agriculture and Biological Attribution. 

The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Director assumed 

operations for the Plum Island Animal Disease Laboratory and has embarked on an 

aggressive construction campaign to move those unique large animal research and 

defense functions from Plum Island in New York to the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas. ConstrucVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:18 Apr 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17EP1107\17EP1107.TXT HEATH
16 

tion is well under way and promises to provide a state-of-the-art facility to enable 

critical animal health and biodefense research. The DHS S&T Directorate also supported critical research and development funding for defense against agriculture bioterrorism that is filling critical gaps identified by USDA and other key homeland 

security stakeholders that otherwise would not have been funded by USDA. 

The President’s 2018 budget request eliminates DHS Science and Technology 

funding for animal agriculture bioterrorism defense. This is a concern not only of 

mine, but several animal health stakeholders, that include State veterinarians, as 

well as animal health and production industries that have homeland security responsibilities. As a policy option, there is merit to shifting DHS S&T requirements 

and funding to USDA under existing USDA authorities and appropriations. If this 

is done, DHS S&T should also consider transferring the NBAF to USDA. But it is 

not apparent that DHS research and development requirements and programs have 

been coordinated with USDA for an effective transition. Rather, it appears that ongoing research and development programs supported by DHS S&T for agriculture 

bioterrorism defense will be terminated. This will not only cause a research and development gap, but it also causes uncertainty for the business and operations model 

envisioned for the NBAF, as well as on-going commitments to the importance, or 

not, of defense against agriculture bioterrorism. Time will tell if the new biodefense 

strategy and Congressional intent will address this gap. It is hoped that the new 

National biodefense strategy will incorporate the recommendations of the Biodefense 

Blue Ribbon Panel on issues related to animal health, and incorporate the practice 

of one health into that strategy. If not, the business and operations model of the 

NBAF could be in jeopardy, as well as our capability to conduct research and 

diagnostics for high-consequence foreign animal diseases. I hope that latter is not 

the case as it could be a costly mistake to our economy and well-being in the long 

run. The President’s DHS S&T budget request for fiscal year also eliminates funding 

that would force closure of a state-of-the-art, one-of-a-kind biocontainment laboratory—the National Biological Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at 

Fort Detrick, MD. This decision seems short-sighted and not well-considered. 

Naturally-occurring and man-made biological threats pose a grave risk to our 

health and National security. Globalization, population growth, urbanization, and 

other factors are creating a perfect storm for the emergence of high-consequence infectious diseases. A terrorism nexus also exists in many of these same global disease 

‘‘hot spots’’, and together, are changing the nature of biological risks. 

This is exacerbated by the diffusion of technical expertise coupled with the biotechnology revolution, drastically increasing the threat of bioterrorism. New technologies have decreased resources and financial requirements for entry, and increased capabilities that could be misused by a determined bioterrorist. 

There are many that believe we need to strengthen infectious disease surveillance 

and laboratory capabilities to detect threats early—an area that DHS also plays a 

role. Similarly, we need core microbial forensic laboratory capabilities to enable attribution—an area that DHS has a primary role. 

As stated earlier in my testimony, I am more concerned than ever about the risk 

of biological threats—whether from outbreaks, accidents, or attacks. This includes 

a need to underpin no-regret attribution decisions with a sound scientific foundation 

in microbial forensics. 

The anthrax letter attacks marked the first significant act of bioterrorism in the 

United States. That attack was one of the easiest bioterror attacks to confront, yet 

the impact was far-reaching. As bad as it was, it could have been much worse had 

the pathogen involved been a contagious agent, resistant to antibiotics, an unknown 

pathogen, or delivered in a covert wide-spread aerosol attack across multiple jurisdictions. As it was, the anthrax letters shut down the Hart Senate Office Building 

for 3 months, wreaked havoc with the U.S. Postal Service, reduced business productivity, cost the Nation more than $1 billion, and tragically, took 5 lives and sickened 

17 more. More than 30,000 people required post-exposure antibiotics. 

Many still recall frightening moments experienced during that time, particularly 

those who were potentially exposed to anthrax spores in the Hart Senate Office 

Building, postal processing facilities, and media offices. 

This event also forever changed our notions of laboratory biosecurity, biosafety, 

and personal reliability in the biological sciences, and the emerging science of microbial forensics. An understanding of the importance of microbial forensics was greatly 

accelerated at that time. I, along with many others at the FBI and in the DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate were involved in defining the laboratory requirements needed to support a core capability for microbial forensics. Unfortunately, decisions being made today regarding the NBACC seem to have lost our lessons learned from first-hand experience during that era. 

17 

The follow-on FBI Anthrax investigation applied the emerging science of microbial 

forensics, and along with traditional investigative procedures, ultimately attributed 

the attack to a lone U.S. scientist. 

Attribution to determine who is responsible for an attack, whether a crime, act 

of terror, or warfare is essential to hold those responsible accountable for their actions, prevent future attacks, and serve as a deterrent. Attribution and the supporting microbial forensic sciences are also important to exonerate—and rule out— 

suspected perpetrators, whether a nation-state, terror group, or criminal that is innocent. 

The stakes could be very high, particularly when a nation-state is involved or suspected—and a rush to judgment before the science and evidence are in, should be 

avoided. Decisions to attribute, especially a nation-state, will be consequential, noregret decisions—that must be guided by a strong scientific and evidentiary foundation. 

It is similarly important to differentiate a naturally-occurring infectious diseases 

outbreak from an attack. It may not be readily apparent that an outbreak was natural or due to an intentional cause at the first sign of disease—or even after an outbreak has run its course—whether in people or animals. 

Prior to 9/11 and the anthrax letter attacks, scientists and operators from the 

FBI, CDC, and DOD had already begun establishing needed protocols to enable collaboration to account for public health and law enforcement requirements for sample collection and analysis, and imitated what we know today as the science of microbial forensics. 

This same group also began planning for unique laboratory capabilities and the 

scientists that would be needed to support attribution—whether for an attack, accident, or outbreak—and to uncover and document illicit proliferation activities. The 

facilities envisioned then and soon after the anthrax attacks include the laboratory 

that was subsequently constructed and in use today at Fort Detrick—The National 

Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, or NBACC. 

I cannot overstate the importance of having dedicated, core laboratory capabilities 

and scientists that are focused on microbial forensics to support attribution. It is 

not a part-time job, or other-duties-as-assigned function. 

Microbial forensics is still, and will always be an evolving science—perhaps not 

well understood outside of the relatively few professionals in their field. But, prosecutors and National command authorities who will one day be thrust into the position of making no-regret attribution decisions will quickly grasp the importance of 

microbial forensics as essential to underpin their pending difficult decisions. 

The science of microbial forensics will only get more complex with the continued 

rapid advancement of new biotechnology tools that are readily available, and as new 

examples of dual use research of concern emerge from our scientific enterprise that 

could be misused to do harm. A recent example is the report by Canadian scientists 

on the synthesis of the horse pox virus. 

There was considerable thought that went into the establishment of the NBACC 

laboratory to support law enforcement and National security attribution. To my 

knowledge, those original planning assumptions have not substantially changed. I 

strongly recommend that those strategies and needed capabilities are not abandoned. 

Finally, it is important to reiterate that the DHS Science and Technology Directorate has made great strides; the Directorate’s program managers, scientist, and 

their contract performers are doing everything in their power to help keep our 

homeland safe and secure. But, we must acknowledge that the DHS Science and 

Technology Directorate has a difficult task. Budget limitations and other pressures 

will not allow them to satisfy all competing needs of the vast homeland security enterprise, not to mention those needs of just the DHS components. Given that, the 

Science and Technology Directorate should focus available resources on those programs that only the Federal Government must do, and address threats that are 

more existential in nature that the private sector cannot or will not be able to address. Biological threats, and other weapons of mass destruction largely fit this category. The Directorate should also take a longer-term view and imbed creative 

imagination, innovation, university scientist, and sound leadership practices in their 

programs. A true DARPA-type approach as originally envisioned for HSARPA is 

needed. Business as usual will not get the job done. 

Recommendations: 

1. The committee should ensure that the administration develops a comprehensive biodefense strategy that is tied to a unified and transparent budget, with 

clearly-identified lead and supporting roles—and support a strong White House 

leadership role to elevate the importance of biodefense to homeland security and 

drive interagency coordination and optimal use of available resources. 

18 

6 Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and 

Reform Needed To Optimize Efforts. October 2015. 7 Blue Ribbon Biodefense Study Panel. Defense for Animal Agriculture. October 2017. 

2. The committee should ensure that the DHS Science and Technology Directorate reestablishes leadership role in the new National strategy to help drive 

broader homeland security biodefense and homeland security requirements 

through a transparent and trusted bio-risk threat assessment and net assessment process that White House leadership can use to enforce interagency outcomes, performance, and accountability. 

3. The committee should ensure the DHS Science and Technology Directorate 

does not eliminate their animal agriculture bioterrorism defense research and 

development programs unless there is a plan in place to transition those R&D 

requirements and programs to USDA. The committee should also work with 

DHS and USDA to also consider transferring NBAF to USDA if DHS does not 

maintain animal defense R&D programs. 

4. The committee should work with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to ensure that the National Biodefense and Analysis and Countermeasures Laboratory is not closed and to ensure that a plan for transition of 

ownership and operations of the laboratory to either the FBI, DOD, or the intelligence community is completed and implemented. 

5. The DHS S&T Directorate and the broader DHS department should implement recommendations of the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Report.6 7

6. The DHS S&T Directorate should ensure that there is an effective mechanism to keep university scientists engaged on homeland security solutions, 

whether that is sustainment of the Centers of Excellence model or an alternate 

strategy. 

7. The DHS S&T Directorate should continue implementing a more innovative, 

DARPA-type culture for the homeland security science and technology enterprise. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the hearing of the U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communications today. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Dr. Parker. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Parker for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JAKE PARKER, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT 

RELATIONS, SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 

Mr. JAKE PARKER. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking 

Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. 

I am Jake Parker, director of government relations for the Security 

Industry Association, which represents nearly 800 companies that 

provide security technology solutions. 

Thanks for the opportunity to speak about the important partnership between DHS S&T and its stakeholders in the private sector. The input I am providing here is based broadly on the experiences and perspectives that SIA member companies have shared 

with me, including both small and large businesses. I have tried to 

summarize these for you, and provide an unfiltered way as possible. 

Technology provided by our industry plays a key role in DHS 

component operations in protecting critical infrastructure. Since 

November, this month, is Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month, I first wanted to highlight S&T’s work through the 

Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act, 

known as the SAFETY Act. This is the most common interface between our member companies and S&T. 

As you know, the SAFETY Act was passed in the aftermath of 

the September 11 attacks to establish a way to encourage the development and deployment of security technologies to protect critVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:18 Apr 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17EP1107\17EP1107.TXT HEATH
19 

ical infrastructure, and the vast majority of that infrastructure is 

owned and operated by the private sector. It provides liability protections for certified suppliers and end-users against claims arising 

from terrorist attacks, which this has been identified as a major obstacle to the deployment of the effective security measures at that 

time. 

Not only does the SAFETY Act provide liability protections, but 

the designation and certification provides assurances that a product or system meets high standards of safety and effectiveness, and 

that it works as intended. Our industry provides manufactured 

products, as well as systems integration services, and even software, such as cybersecurity programs. All of these are potentially 

eligible, but more recently, owners and operators of facilities, such 

as sports stadiums, are making use of the SAFETY Act designation 

for their entire system of security measures as a comprehensive 

program, and in this, our security technology plays a key role as 

well. 

So over the past year, we understand that 91 applications were 

approved by the SAFETY Act Office out of 133 submitted, taking 

an average of nearly 4 months to get through the process, and this 

has a significant jobs and economic impact. The office projected 

that the approval of these technologies will support 87,000 jobs, 

and greatly increase local business revenue. 

So we believe that Congress should work to ensure this important program continues to be successful, and is provided with the 

resources necessary to meet the demand. Specifically, we believe 

that Congress should provide the SAFETY Act Office with a line 

item appropriation. This will provide budgetary certainty and program continuity, as well as help measure the return on investment. 

On the broader array of S&T programs, we are encouraged with 

the recent signs the directorate is strengthening its efforts to coordinate research across DHS components and industry stakeholders. 

Two years ago, when Dr. Brothers, who we are honored to have 

with us here today, was serving as under secretary, the integrated 

product teams were reestablished to track and harmonize Department-wide research and development efforts, which the Chairman 

highlighted was a step in the right direction, which we agree with. 

The most recent IPT report is only the second since this data has 

begun to be gathered, and a new process has been implemented for 

involving the operational components and identifying the gaps 

where S&T efforts will be the most effective. According to this most 

recent report, IPT’s are intended to sustain a year-round process in 

which a specific component is designated to shepherd the process 

for each gap that is identified, from the point it is identified to the 

transition to solutions that close it. 

We think this is really encouraging, because in the view of our 

member companies, the business case for involvement in S&T programs would be much stronger if each effort was championed by 

a DHS operational component that is involved at some level from 

the beginning of the process, and committed to making use of the 

technologies explored. This may result from the fact that there is 

a perception out there that the S&T programs only infrequently 

impact the operational procurement activities of DHS components 

20 

in a significant way. More involvement from the components up 

front could help improve this perception, as well as efforts to increase industry awareness of these new initiatives by S&T, which 

are more focused. 

So in October, S&T released a new industry guide which I think 

does a great job at providing industry with the road map, teaching 

the ways they can participate, and summarizes the directorate’s 

current and future needs. We understand this is the first step toward providing a centralized on-line interface for industry. 

Members also tell us that for many smaller companies, responding to the call for proposals needs to be aligned with something 

they are already doing in order to help justify the use of resources 

to apply. This is especially true if the responding to grant proposals 

and other research opportunities is not a normal and significant 

part of a technology company’s business model. Whether large or 

small, though, companies tell us that it would benefit them greatly 

if the process of working with S&T was easier and less bureaucratic. 

We are optimistic about plans to update and improve S&T’s longrange broad agency announcements process, which is sustaining requests to the private sector to develop needed technology, and it is 

available for funding over multi-year periods. 

We understand that early next year, S&T is planning to make 

significant changes to this process, based on industry feedback, as 

it is retooled for 2019 and beyond. This includes a more direct linkage to component needs, administrative simplification, shortened 

review times, and clarification of a streamlined application process, 

and actually, an involvement from program managers prior to submission to make sure that there is the highest quality. 

When it comes to the S&T research and divestment outlook for 

the next 4 years, the security industry is poised to contribute significantly, particularly when it comes to areas like biometrics collection and utilization, robotics and autonomous systems, enhanced 

situational awareness, identity credentialing and access management, automated vetting, and other technologies. 

We applaud S&T’s goals, outlining its 2017 innovation strategy 

to ensure the industry is fully engaged in meeting the demands of 

the Homeland Security Enterprise, and that the end-users of homeland security technology in both the public and private sectors have 

access to the best available products. 

So we are committed to doing our part as an association to help 

engage industry with this effort, and look forward to answering 

any questions you may have. I will do my best, but if I can’t, I will 

definitely go back to our members and provide you an answer. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jake Parker follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAKE PARKER

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished 

Members of the subcommittee. I am Jake Parker, director of government relations 

for the Security Industry Association, a non-profit international trade association 

representing nearly 800 companies that develop, manufacture, and integrate security solutions, and employ thousands of technology leaders. 

21 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the partnership between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and its stakeholders in the private sector. The input I am providing 

is based, broadly, on the experiences and perspectives SIA member companies have 

shared with me, which include both small companies and large corporations. 

Technology provided by the security industry plays a key role in DHS component 

operations, and in protecting critical infrastructure such as chemical facilities, airports, seaports, mass transit systems, the energy sector, Federal offices, and even 

K–12 schools and universities. 

Since November is Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month, I want 

to first highlight S&T’s work through the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act Office, which is the most common interface between SIA member companies and the Directorate. As you know, the SAFETY Act 

of 2002 established a process to encourage the development and wide-spread deployment of security technologies addressing the terrorist threat by providing liability 

protections for qualified providers against claims arising from terrorist attacks. The 

potential for such claims was identified as major obstacle to the deployment of effective security solutions following the attacks of September 11. 

From our point of view, the program has been a major success and a catalyst for 

adoption of new technology in many ways. The private sector owns and operates the 

vast majority of critical infrastructure in the United States. Not only does the 

SAFETY Act protect these end-users from liability for deploying technology, SAFETY Act designation and certification provides a level of assurance that a product or 

system meets high standards of safety and effectiveness, and works as intended. 

Our industry provides manufactured products, and well as systems integration 

services and software such as cybersecurity programs—all of which are potentially 

eligible for SAFETY Act designation or certification. In addition, owners or operators of critical infrastructure are making increasing use of the SAFETY Act designation for their comprehensive security programs, in which security technology plays 

a key role. 

According the SAFETY Act Office, during fiscal year 2017, 91 applications were 

approved out of 133 submitted, taking an average of nearly 4 months to get through 

the process. The Office projects that approval of these technologies will support 

87,000 jobs and significantly increase revenue for providers. 

We believe that Congress should work to ensure this important program continues, and importantly, is provided with the resources necessary to meet demand. 

Specifically, Congress should provide the SAFETY Act Office with a line item appropriation. This will provide budgetary certainty and program continuity, as well as 

help measure the return on investment. 

As far as the broader array of S&T programs, we are encouraged with recent 

signs the Directorate is strengthening efforts to better coordinate research and development (R&D) activities across DHS components and with industry stakeholders. 

Two years ago, when Dr. Brothers—who we are honored to have with us here 

today—was serving as under secretary, Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) were reestablished to track and harmonize Department-wide research and development efforts between S&T and the components. The most recent IPT report for fiscal year 

is based upon only the second round of data gathering across DHS components, as 

well as a new process for involving operational components in the identification of 

capability gaps on which to focus R&D efforts. IPTs are aimed at sustaning a yearround process in which a designated component ‘‘shepherds each gap from the identification of needs to the transition of solutions to close the gap’’ according to the 

report. 

In gathering feedback from our member companies, a recurring theme was the 

importance of bolstering the business case for participation in S&T programs. Our 

members tell us that for S&T programs to be truly successful from their standpoint, 

each effort needs to be of championed by a DHS operational component, and accompanied by some form of commitment to make use of the technologies being explored 

if the Government is the intended end-user. The component should have some level 

of involvement in the project being executed from the beginning of the process, and 

prior to making any significant expenditures. 

There is a perception among some in the industry that S&T programs only infrequently significantly impact the operational or procurement activities of the DHS 

components, even with a successful engagement. For this reason, the choice may be 

made to devote more time and resources to focus primarily on relationships with 

the program offices on the component side. 

More involvement from the components up front could help address this perception, as well as efforts to increase industry awareness of S&T’s new initiatives. Last 

month, S&T released its new Industry Guide, which very effectively summarizes 

22 

current needs and programing, providing a future R&D outlook and linking industry 

to each of the ways to participate. We understand from discussions with personnel 

at S&T that they are working toward a providing a centralized on-line interface for 

industry to pull together information about opportunities that is currently listed in 

disparate locations. 

Successful engagement with industry also depends on the business model of companies that possess the expertise S&T is seeking. For many smaller companies, the 

topic often needs to be aligned with something they are already doing to justify the 

use of resources to apply, especially those with limited experience with grant proposals and similar processes. S&T should do everything possible to simplify and 

streamline the process to make it easier for companies that do not have this expertise to participate. 

Whether large companies or small, industry would benefit from making the process of working with S&T easier and less bureaucratic. This is one reason we are 

optimistic about plans to update and improve S&T’s Long-Range Broad Agency Announcements (LRBAA) process. We understand that early next year S&T is planning to make significant changes to the process based on in industry feedback, as 

LRBAAs are initiated for 2019 and beyond. This includes a clarification of priorities 

that are linked directly to component needs, a simplified and streamlined application process, increased communications with program managers prior to submission, 

shortened review time as well as feedback to submitters. This feedback is particularly important for accepted proposals that are unfunded, to increase the chance of 

success with future submissions. Further, we think the evaluation process can be 

improved to the extent it can be aided by personnel with product development experience. 

As you know, the Government is challenged by the fact that technology is now 

evolving so quickly that it often outpaces traditional Government R&D and acquisition vehicles. Meanwhile, technology-based solutions are more important than ever 

to achieving DHS component missions. According to the 2017 S&T Innovation Strategy, among the Directorate’s goals are to ensure that industry applies its resources 

toward meeting the demands of the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE), as well 

as to ensure that technology end-users are more satisfied with products available 

on the commercial market. 

When it comes to the S&T R&D investment outlook for the next 4 years, the security industry is poised to contribute significantly, particularly when it comes to priority areas like biometrics collection and utilization, robotics and autonomous systems, enhanced situational awareness, identity credentialing and access management, automated vetting and other technologies. 

SIA and S&T have maintained a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that facilitates information sharing on the adaptation of electronics-related technological 

innovation for use at the Federal, State, and local level for homeland security applications. SIA is committed to continuing to do our part to facilitate the participation 

of our industry in helping meet HSE needs, and we look forward to working with 

S&T in new and more effective ways in the future as new leadership is appointed. 

On behalf of the Security Industry Association, I appreciate the opportunity to 

provide collective input from our industry on working with S&T. I will do my best 

to answer any questions you may have, however if there is any information requested I cannot provide today, I will be happy to work with our members to provide helpful responses. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Parker. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Brothers for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF REGINALD BROTHERS, PRINCIPAL, THE 

CHERTOFF GROUP, LLC, TESTIFYING AS FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BROTHERS. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, and Ranking 

Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the committee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the 

role and effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security 

Science and Technology Directorate. 

We are now living in a post-industrial age with a globally interconnected web leading to a highly integrated world with supply 

chains that reach thousands of miles. Things that were previously 

23 

done only by nation-states are now accomplished by sub-state actors, gangs, groups, and even individuals. Our new reality is an 

asymmetric threat environment, where individuals attack government institutions, and nation-states attack civilian infrastructure 

with little fear of retaliation, or even attribution. 

In the past, we discussed precision targeting of kinetic weapons. 

We are now discussing precision targeting of individuals and content on Facebook. 

Technology continues to accelerate with artificial intelligence, the 

internet of things, commercial drones, synthetic biology and quantum computing, all promising tremendous benefits to society, but 

also the potential to create complex and vulnerable threat surfaces. 

This global threat context informs us that the Nation needs its efficiently and consistently funded agile, adaptive, and relevant and 

rapid innovation engine to confront the current and future threats 

to our National security. 

DHS S&T has worked hard to focus on being highly relevant, 

shifting from the past focus on long-term basic research to nearterm operational impact. S&T can now be an important asset for 

the Secretary as one of the few cross-departmental entities. S&T 

create a laboratory as a Department-wide resource for leading-edge 

data analytic and machine-learning software, where operational 

personnel work with S&T staff to evaluate and co-develop missioncentric solutions. 

This capability resulted in a tool, using advanced facial recognition that identified 475 child sex victims, leading to their rescue 

from abusers. 

In partnership with the New York Police Department and Metropolitan Transportation Authority, S&T installed a permanent test 

bed in New York City’s Grand Central Terminal, an extension of 

our pilot demonstrations that successfully measured and mapped 

how and where a bioagent would be transported in the event of a 

terrorist attack in the subway system. 

S&T completed a Tucson border security operational exercise for 

Customs and Border Protection and ICE to evaluate border security technology capabilities, looking at Border Patrol, HIS, and industry. 

S&T also provided support of the response and recovery efforts 

from hurricanes Irma and Harvey with training, decision support 

software, and communications equipment. 

Starting in December 2015, S&T initiated the Silicon Valley Innovation Program as an effort to engage creative technologists from 

across the world in solving pressing problems in National security. 

At the present time, an awareness has been built with more than 

1,000 start-ups, accelerators, and venture capitalists. Six topic calls 

have been published, ranging from internet of things security to 

airport passenger processing. Applications have been received from 

across the country and from the international community. To date, 

there have been nine Phase 1 awards, and four Phase 2 awards, 

with the average time to award being only 45 days. 

For operational relevance, collaboration with users and industry 

is essential. The Cybersecurity Division has developed specific and 

relevant industry collaborations with the energy, financial, and 

automotive sectors. 

24 

With the initiatives discussed above, S&T is demonstrating that 

it is working toward being the agile, adaptive, and rapid innovation 

engine I described. That said, there is a second context to consider 

when evaluating the potential of S&T to be effective. That second 

context is funding. 

If the fiscal year 2018 budget cuts were to remain in effect, there 

would be severe impacts to the ability of DHS S&T to do its job. 

For example, these budget cuts would reduce the funding of the 

Cyber Security Division by 20 percent, the Chemical Biological Division by approximately 60 percent. 

Cybersecurity is a challenge that is exponentially increasing with 

time. Observed malware has increased 40 times in the past 10 

years. Observed attacks on critical infrastructure have increased 

1.5 times in just the past 3 years. With the emergence of the internet of things, autonomous vehicles, and other networked innovations, the threat surface of our National security are rapidly expanding. 

While awareness of the need for cybersecurity is increasing, the 

same is not necessarily true for chemical and biological security. 

Threats from chemical and biological threat agents, known and yetunknown synthetic variations are real, and becoming more attractive to terrorist organizations. The National Biodefense Analysis 

and Countermeasures Centers, NBACC, and Chemical Security 

Analysis Center, CSAC, are recognized within the United States as 

the Nation’s focal points for biological and chemical defense awareness and response. But the funding for these centers is threatened 

to be cut due to the fiscal year 2018 budget pressures, as well as 

the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. 

Given the threats to National security that our current global 

context mandates, I am very concerned about the impact of these 

potential budget cuts. From my personal experience, I know that 

one of the most disruptive forces for technologists and innovation 

organization is uncertain and unstable funding. This challenge is 

magnified at DHS, because a threat environment can change on a 

frequent basis, which can call for rapid change of investment across 

the R&D portfolio to meet an immediate or near-term threat. 

However, while I am concerned, I also believe with the appropriate support of the Department and Congress, S&T can meet the 

challenges of the 21st Century. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brothers follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REGINALD BROTHERS

NOVEMBER 7, 2017 

Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished 

Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 

today on the role and effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). S&T’s mission is to deliver effective and 

innovative insight, methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE). Technology simultaneously enables both homeland security 

operators and malevolent actors and, as a result, has a significant and expanding 

impact on current and future threat environments. Having served in both the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security in senior leadership positions in 

science and technology, I’d like to start by giving my thoughts on the current and 

future threat environment as a way of providing context for the work of S&T. 

25 

We are now in a post-industrial age, with a global interconnected web leading to 

a highly integrated world with supply chains that reach thousands of miles. Things 

that previously were done only by nation-states are now accomplishable by sub-state 

actors, gangs, groups, and even individuals. 

For the period of the Cold War, it was possible to develop strategic nuclear weapons, stealth platforms and precision weaponry and retain a competitive advantage 

for a decade or more. However, with the hyper-connectedness of our world and the 

subsequent democratization of technology, it no longer possible to develop technology-based capabilities for National security that have any significant temporal 

advantage. The power to inflict harm is no longer based solely with nation-states. 

Our new reality is an asymmetric threat environment where individuals attack government institutions and nation-states attack civilian infrastructures with little fear 

of retaliation or even attribution. With easily accessible technologies such as cyber 

tools, drones, and potentially bio-weapons, it is possible for individuals to cause significant financial and physical damage as well as endanger human life. While we 

are used to discussions of precision targeting of kinetic weapons, we are now discussing precision targeting of individuals and content on Facebook. And technology 

continues to accelerate with artificial intelligence, the internet of things, commercial 

drones and satellite constellations, synthetic biology, blockchain and quantum computing all promising tremendous benefits to society but with also the potential to 

create devastating threat vectors and complex and vulnerable threat surfaces. 

What this context tells us is that the nation needs a sufficiently and consistently 

funded, agile, adaptive, relevant, and rapid innovation engine to confront the current and future threats to our National security. DHS S&T has worked hard to 

focus on being highly relevant—shifting from the past focus on long-term basic research to near-term operational impact. I think S&T is now an important asset for 

the Secretary as one of the few cross-Departmental entities. I’d like to now provide 

a few examples. 

DHS S&T created the Data Analytics Engine (DA–E) which is a Department-wide 

resource for leading-edge data analytic and machine learning technologies applied 

to Homeland Security mission sets. A laboratory has been developed where operational personnel can work with S&T staff to evaluate and co-develop technological 

solutions. Using this capability S&T helped NPPD deploy a social media capability 

to monitor publicly-available posts regarding critical infrastructure and public 

health. S&T delivered over 370 requests for help to emergency responders. The S&T 

DA–E provided solutions using advanced facial recognition tools that identified 475 

child sex trafficking victims, leading to their rescue from abusers. 

At the direct request of the NYPD, conducted further experiments in identifying 

and characterizing live streaming social media sources that are affiliated with terrorist or other criminal activity. In addition, outside of New York, S&T will evaluate 

an even more extensive selection of social media analytical tools on behalf of I&A, 

CIS, and CBP for screening and vetting to detect, characterize, and locate source(s) 

of content of interest on social media platforms like Periscope and Facebook Live. 

In partnership with the New York Police Department and Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), S&T installed a ‘‘permanent’’ testbed in New York City’s 

Grand Central Terminal, an extension of S&T’s pilot demonstrations successfully 

measuring and mapping how and where a bioagent would be transported in the 

event of a terrorist attack in the subway system. 

On behalf of TSA, S&T conducted three live-fire exercises to better understand 

Home Made Explosives (HME) capabilities and impacts on critical infrastructure. 

S&T completed the SkyNet Field Experiment, a Tucson Border Security Operational Exercise for CBP and ICE to evaluate border security technology capabilities 

linking Border Patrol, HIS, and industry. This field exercise will be used to further 

develop and deploy tactical data and video from Border Patrol sensors and Small 

UAS platforms. S&T developed sensors for Field Agents at the Tactical Operations 

Center, the Border Patrol eGIS system, and remote locations such as the Air Marine 

Operations Center. The FE was a series of scenarios centered on illegal entry by 

walkers, vehicles, and air platforms such as ULAs (Ultra Light Aircraft) in a Southern Border environment. 

S&T finalized the stand-up of the Common DHS UAS Test Site for use by S&T, 

FEMA, Coast Guard, CBP, and Secret Service for testing and training on UAS technologies. Unlike the counter UAS program this test site will allow for development 

of UAS technologies by DHS operational components. In addition, S&T will finalize 

counter UAS agreements with DOD to consolidate all UAS threat databases and libraries under the JIDO umbrella. 

S&T deployed the Counter Small Unmanned Aerial System (C–UAS) Advisory 

and Review Toolkit (C–SMART) to the Secret Service. C–SMART is a suite of computer models, databases, and analysis tools to analyze and plan C–UAS security 

26 

postures for specific operations—this capability has helped Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) partners understand the C–UAS threat, and optimize security posture plans. C–SMART has been used in direct support of National Special Security 

(NSSE) and Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) identified events, such as the 

Inauguration and the Super Bowl. 

S&T deployed the Next Generation Incident Command Center (NICS) to even 

more emergency operational centers across the Nation and world. NICS is a webbased communication platform that enables responders on scene to share data and 

information using open standards, and request and receive assistance from remote 

experts in real-time. Developed in collaboration with MIT Lincoln Labs and the 

Coast Guard, S&T’s NICS is in use by Coast Guard assets, Cal Fire, California 

OES, State of Victoria Australia, and NATO member and partner countries as part 

of NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Project Advanced Regional Civil Emergency Coordination Pilot. S&T received funding from Australia and NATO for further development of this platform. S&T has made NICS available on GitHub, the 

world’s leading software development platform. 

S&T transitioned the National Hurricane Program Technology Modernization 

HURREVAC-eXtended (HVX) to FEMA. HVX enables emergency managers to visualize hurricane risks associated with their specific evacuation zones, resulting in 

reliable and better-informed evacuation decisions. Two major improvements for HVX 

include providing a web-enabled system to make training widely available to emergency managers on-line, as well as accessible via mobile phone—a FEMA requirement. The initial HVX Beta will complete its transition in May 2017. Once fully 

operational at FEMA in 2018, substantial savings are expected by avoiding unnecessary ‘‘over’’ evacuations and saving lives by preventing ‘‘under’’ evacuations. HVX 

makes it possible for web-based training allowing FEMA to train hundreds of thousands of emergency managers compared to less than 100 per year with the previous 

system, greatly reducing training costs and making it possible for greater numbers 

of emergency managers to gain critical skills in evacuation decision making. 

S&T developed the First Responder Jamming Exercise. The focus of the work are 

the technical and operational challenges of commercially available jamming technologies on first responder communications. This work done with NPPD, FEMA, 

Coast Guard, Los Angeles, Houston, Arizona, NYPD among others, and brings industry to the field to work through this growing threat. S&T and OGC have 16 limited purpose Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) in place 

to test equipment. From last year’s exercise S&T was able to develop a training 

module with FLETC which was used at the inauguration to train first responders 

to identify and mitigate use of jamming technologies. 

S&T also provided support to the response and recovery efforts from Hurricanes 

Irma and Harvey: 

• As of Sept 12, 9 S&T surge capacity volunteers had been deployed. A system 

the S&T First Responders Group (FRG) and NPPD collaborated on is preparing 

reports on the number of businesses open and progress of business restoration. 

Information from the reports is being shared to emergency managers and others. 

• FRG has provided approximately $76K in communications equipment to emergency managers in Georgia to support Irma recovery. As of 11 September, the 

Program Manager, Shawn McDonald, the Irma ATAK server is in full deployment more than a hundred organizational users. 

• S&T is providing the Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK) technology and 

training to DHS components and responders Supporting Hurricanes Irma 

that allows them to see where and collaborate with responders and support 

personnel in real-time as well as to plan and track multiple locations where 

support/response is needed. 

• S&T has used a software program to develop aerial and satellite photos that 

maps high-risk structures in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina to allow for 

better response and recovery and made these photos available to FEMA and 

search and rescue teams as well. 

• Flood APEX Map data sets have been completed for Georgia and South Carolina as well as Florida, in support of Irma. Flood apex has worked with ORNL 

to put together building outlines datasets from high-resolution satellite imagery for the GA and SC coastal counties. Previously completed initial map 

data sets of building structure outlines for Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, 

and south Florida and assisted FEMA with publishing those data to the web 

for broad community access as well as distribution to search and rescue and 

volunteer teams. 

27 

• S&T FRG is providing additional access to the HVX prototype system, which 

allows emergency managers, FEMA response officials and others to make timely 

and accurate evacuation related decisions more efficiently. 

• 200+ FEMA, State, and local users have been given access to HVX Prototype. 

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a HVX user. 

• S&T is providing a social media monitoring tool and training to allow NPPD 

analysts real-time updates on threats and issues including health issues, people 

requesting medical assistance or rescue, status of utilities and resources, and 

more, to allow better allocation of resources and response. 

• The S&T-funded storm surge software (ADCIRC) provides emergency managers 

early and accurate predictions about storm surge and coastal flooding to allow 

them be make better decisions on evacuations, positioning of resources, and 

other response and recovery issues. 

• RADM Peter Brown is using the ADCIRC results to plan for evacuation of 

USCG staff from Key West USCG housing. On September 6, told Dr. Rick 

Leuttich, CRC leader, ‘‘The [ADCIRC] model was key to my decision regarding aircraft protection in Puerto Rico and our COOP decision for Miami. I’ll 

be watching it with every update.’’ 

• The DHS S&T Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (CRC) worked closely 

with the Texas State Operations Center and NOAA to provide modeling and 

storm surge predictions to better enable prepositioning of resources, evacuations, and recovery. The CRC ADvanced CIRCulation (ADCIRC) storm surge/ 

coastal flooding modeling team is providing models for Texas/Gulf of Mexico. 

DA–E social media analysis tools: S& T’s HSARPA Data Analytics Engine (DA– 

E) continues generating reports from open-source and social media data. The 

tool, requested by NPPD, monitors social media for emergent threats and augments situational awareness regarding public health and critical infrastructure. 

It provides automated, real-time monitoring of social media data related to public health, communications, dams, electricity, oil and natural gas and water. Urgent requests for help (e.g., infant not breathing) were forwarded to FEMA’s 

National Watch Center. Updated reports and documents were provided approximately every 3 hours to NPPD. As of August 28, nearly 4,000 posts had been 

collected and analyzed to identify approximately 250 of the most relevant. DA– 

E also established a new collection effort on August 28 to identify an additional 

100+ posts specifically focused on calls for help and will be sending these posts 

to FEMA. The DA–E team continues to analyze information related to infrastructure protection interests and producing regular reports. HSARPA DA–E 

has initiated transition of technical capabilities for situation awareness regarding critical infrastructure using open-source and social media data to NPPD. 

SILICON VALLEY INNOVATION PROGRAM

Starting in December 2015, DHS S&T initiated the Silicon Valley Innovation Program as an effort to engage creative scientists, engineers, and technologists from 

across the world in solving pressing problems in National Security. As of the present 

time, an awareness has been built with more than 1,000 start-ups accelerators and 

venture capitalists. Six topic calls have been published: IoT Security, K9 Wearables, 

sUAS Capabilities, Enhancements to the Global Travel Assessments System 

(GTAS), and Enhancing CBP, Airport Passenger Processing, Financial Services 

Cyber Security Active Defense (FSCSAD). One hundred sixteen Phase I and 5 Phase 

II applications have been received. Applicants have been from across the country 

and international. There have been 9 Phase I awards and 4 Phase II awards to date. 

COLLABORATIONS

For operational relevance, collaboration with users and industry is essential. The 

DHS S&T Cyber Security Division has developed specific and relevant collaborations with the Energy, Financial, and Automotive sectors: 

• Energy sector 

• Linking the Oil and Gas Industry to Improve Cybersecurity (LOGIIC) is an 

on-going collaboration of oil and natural gas companies and DHS S&T. 

• LOGIIC facilitates cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation 

procedures to improve cybersecurity in petroleum industry digital control systems. 

• Financial sector 

• The Next Generation Cyber Infrastructure (NGCI) Apex program will identify, test, evaluate, and deploy cutting-edge technologies to deter cyber attacks 

against the financial sector. The program will concentrate on delivering capaVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:18 Apr 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17EP1107\17EP1107.TXT HEATH
28 

bilities identified by the financial sector to address five primary functional 

gaps • Stakeholders: U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Financial Services Sector, 

the OTA Contractor and private technology vendors. • Automotive Sector 

• The (Cyber Physical Systems Security) CPSSEC program focuses include 

working collaboratively with automakers and leading researchers to increase 

vehicle cybersecurity, funding research projects to enhance auto cybersecurity, 

and helping to upgrade the Federal Government’s fleet of automobiles. 

With the successes discussed above, it is clear that DHS S&T is working towards 

being the agile, adaptive, and rapid innovation engine I described. That said, there 

is a second context to consider when evaluating the potential of S&T to be effective. 

That second context is the breadth and depth of its mission and the level of appro- priated funds. The S&T Budget for DoD for fiscal year 2018 is approximately $14 

billion while that of DHS S&T is approximately $600 million. DoD has a significant 

National laboratory infrastructure for evolutionary capability improvements and the 

Defense Advanced Research Project Agency funded at approximately $3 billion for 

revolutionary/disruptive improvements. In contrast S&T is asked to provide all R&D 

across both evolutionary and revolutionary domains with less than an order of magnitude of funding. While there is some cross-pollination possible between the departments, in many cases mission specificity and affordability factors limit the ability 

of DHS components to procure and sustain DoD technologies. As such, I believe that 

S&T is underfunded for its stated responsibilities across all of the DHS mission sets. 

In fact, if the fiscal year 2018 budget cuts remain in effect there will be severe 

impacts to S&T ability to do its job. For example, these budget cuts will reduce the 

funding of the Cyber Security Division by 20% and the Chemical Biological Division 

by approximately 60%. 

Cybersecurity is a challenge that is exponentially increasing with time. Observed 

malware has increased 40 times in the past 10 years. Observed attacks on critical 

infrastructure have increased 1.5 times in just the past 3 years. With the emergence 

of the internet of things, autonomous vehicles, and other networked innovations, the 

threat surfaces of our National security are rapidly expanding. 

While awareness of the need for cybersecurity is increasing, the same is not necessarily true for chemical and biological security. 

Threats from chemical and biological threat agents—known and yet unknown synthetic variations—are real, growing in potential and consequence, and becoming 

more attractive to terrorist organizations. As law enforcement organizations around 

the world make it more difficult to acquire materials to make explosives and gain 

access to quantities of firearms, chemical agents and eventually, biological agents 

will become the terror weapons of choice. 

Recently, researchers at the University of Alberta announced the artificial synthesis of Horse Pox, a close ‘‘relative’’ of Small Pox. A number of prestigious scientific journals have refused to publish the details of this accomplishment for fear 

that if a step-by-step procedure were to become available, those with skills in this 

technology could easily produce the human Small Pox virus and unleash this terror 

on an unsuspecting world population. 

After the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. Government recognized that defensive measures had to be implemented and maintained to protect civilians from these methods 

of terror attack. To this end, Congress and President Bush created a dedicated organization and facilities within the Department of Homeland Security to work closely 

with law enforcement and the intelligence community to identify growing threats, 

develop technologies to detect threats and support first responders if the unthinkable ever happened. In addition to establishing a specialized Federal and contractor 

workforce in chemical and biological defense technology development, two unique facilities, the National Biodefense Analysis & Countermeasures Center (NBACC) and 

Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) were approved and funded by Congress. 

Each of these facilities is recognized within the United States as the Nation’s focal 

points for biological and chemical defense awareness and response. These centers 

not only support many domestic Government agencies at the Federal, State, and 

local levels but also work closely with international partners in thwarting potential 

terrorists from using chemical and biological warfare agents. There is wide-spread 

agreement that the DHS capabilities in chemical and biological defense science and 

technology are unique and needed to provide a foundation for this critical area of 

National security. But the funding for these centers is being cut due the fiscal year 

2018 budget pressures. 

Given the threats to National security that our current global context mandates, 

I am very concerned about the impact of the fiscal year 2018 budget cuts. From my 

personal experience I know that one of the most disruptive forces for a technologist 

29 

and an innovation organization is uncertain and unstable funding. This challenge 

is magnified at DHS, because the threat environment can change on a frequent 

basis which can call for rapid change of investment across the R&D portfolio to meet 

the immediate threat. However, while I am concerned, I also believe with the appropriate support from the Department and Congress, S&T can meet the challenges of 

the 21st Century. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Dr. Brothers. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. 

We have a unique opportunity here. We have representatives of 

first responders, academia, industry, and the insight from Dr. 

Brothers of having served in that agency for 3 years. I would just 

like to ask the panel if you could share with us, if there is one 

thing you would like to see going forward from S&T. You certainly 

deal with it on a daily basis. You study it. Industry creates it. Doctor, you have seen it in use. What would you like to see this agency 

do? What would you like to see this committee do? What would you 

like to see Congress do? Aside from funding, what direction would 

you like to see? What is needed for our country’s security from S&T 

that, if you had the ability, what one thing, or two things would 

you like to see, from each of your perspectives? 

Chief. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you. I would say, just from my personal experience in working on Rad/Nuc projects and planning issues around 

the region, I think in the chemical sector and the bio sector, a lot 

of the technology and data integration that we have seen with Rad/ 

Nuc, there is a lot of discussions about it, a lot of the conferences 

that we go to, a lot of the meetings we attend, and I would like 

to see the same amount of effort that we have seen in that Rad/ 

Nuc integration of technology apply to the chem and bio world. It 

seems that that reach-back capability, a common operating picture, 

visuals for incident commanders, it has been breaking over the last 

couple of years for the Rad/Nuc forum. 

But when it comes to chem-bio, there is still some disconnect between the first responders and what command or emergency management might be seeing in the back. So I would like to see a 

greater effort in that regard, to bring those other threats up into 

the same level that the Rad/Nuc preparedness is. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you for sharing that. 

Dr. Parker. 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Well, I would first, maybe, echo my colleague, that many of these, I would call it common operating picture-type things were actually called out HSPD–9 and HSPD–10 

quite some time ago, so that is something else that remains elusive, and it really should not continue to remain elusive. 

I think one thing, though, that I think S&T ought to be positioned so it can be a real driver of innovation. It needs to be 

unencumbered, and unfortunately, funding is part of that, and Dr. 

Brothers said it best. It is the budget uncertainty that is so disruptive. But it really needs to focus on a DARPA-esque research and 

innovation that can really attract the best and brightest minds 

across the country, whether that is in universities, whether it is in 

a private sector, and it has got to be nimble and agile. 

I did make a comment about laboratory infrastructure in my 

opening remarks. Now, laboratory infrastructure, like the NBAF, 

NBACC, and the other laboratory, they are all necessary for the 

30 

Homeland Security Enterprise. But I think one question is, are 

they best placed in DHS, where there may be threats of closure, 

or are they best placed in their lead Federal agency for—that may 

have responsibility, say, for animal health, or attribution, the FBI, 

or DOD command authorities? Those are policy questions. 

But S&T must be really agile, and innovative, and drive cuttingedge solutions that if this is impossible to do to meet near-term 

and longer-term needs. But we have got to be thinking about the 

unknown threats of the future. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. Parker. 

Mr. JAKE PARKER. I guess from our perspective, you know, in our 

industry, the security industry, we see a lot of innovation happening in the private sector for the commercial market, and I think 

that the pace of that is such that a focus on operationalizing some 

of these advances and innovations for Government missions would 

be a really high-value activity, and a focus on that. 

If you look at the R&D outlook, many of those that S&T has put 

forward, a lot of those technology areas have seen really swift advances in the last year or 2. I think that, you know, often, you 

know, the Government mission requires something different, and 

the mission for first responders requires something slightly different, but it can be adapted for those uses, so—— 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Doctor. 

Mr. BROTHERS. Sure. I appreciate the question. I really do appreciate the question. I think, Ranking Member, you asked a question 

about, you know, some of my thoughts since having been served as 

the under secretary. Here is one of the big things I ran into. 

So S&T has to, obviously, report—I am sorry? Oh, it is not close 

enough? How is that? Better? Great. 

What I am saying is that S&T has to report very specifically, in 

terms of the kinds of spends it does across the portfolio. Dr. Parker 

mentioned a good point; that we need kind of a DARPA-esque kind 

of agility. 

One of the challenges, having served at DARPA and DOD, is that 

with the way S&T has to report early commitments and obligations 

of funding makes it difficult when things happen. So let me give 

you an example. 

When I was there we had, if you probably remember, the drone 

landed on the White House lawn. So all of a sudden, there is concern. Now, so I have got a portfolio where all my funding has been 

reported where I am spending all this money. But now, I have got 

to respond to an emerging threat. How do I do that? 

So the agility that Dr. Parker is talking about, and I applaud, 

I don’t have the tools to make that happen, because I can’t move 

money like that, even though there is an observed threat. 

So I think one of the things that we need help with is how do 

we understand your role as a short oversight, and the effective and 

efficient use of funding? How do we also give S&T the ability to be 

agile with this funding, when we have these emerging threats that 

we didn’t necessarily predict, you know, the so-called black swan 

events happen? How do we handle that? It is an issue. 

31 

I think more specifically, we have done a good job. S&T has done 

a good job of reaching out to industry through the Silicon Valley 

Program, for example. One of the tools for doing that, the investment vehicles, calls it other transactions authority, other transactions. 

This has come up a number of times. I think S&T does need the 

authority for that, as opposed to going through management, so I 

think that is something that S&T could definitely use as well. 

Something that is more inside the Department, but could be encouraged, is better integration into the acquisition process itself. 

Because I think you are probably familiar that with all S&T organizations, whether you are talking about DARPA, or the DOD laboratories, or S&T itself, fundamental challenge is what? It is the 

valley of death, as people call it, right? That valley of death is 

when you have to come up with a research prototype. A prototype 

has a lot of the capabilities you need, but it is not manufacturable 

at that point. 

How do you get that prototype, that concept in the actual acquisition process? That is a challenge all research organizations has. 

But I think it would be an encouragement to actually better integrate that into the Department’s way of thinking, the Joint Requirements Council, for example, which is part of the way the Department is moving toward some of the more process-oriented ways 

of doing requirements that the Department of Defense has. How do 

you integrate these systems better? 

You mentioned the IPT process, and the IPT process, I think, is 

an important process, and it is, for the first time, really tried to 

give S&T an opportunity to focus on agreed-upon Department capability priorities. There are challenges there though, right? The challenges there are that that is a year-long process. So that means 

that you do not really start working on those until the next year. 

So again, you have a delay. 

So how do we get more speed in this innovative process? That 

is a start, but we need to be able to handle these type, like I said, 

these emerging technologies, emerging threats in a much more 

rapid basis. 

So I think those are some of the areas I would encourage you to 

look at. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Well, I thank you all for your insight. 

My time is expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Brothers, as you know, the Science and Technology Directorate is still operating without a permanent under secretary. How 

important is it that S&T have a strong leadership and clear direction in place, as it carries out its mission? 

Mr. BROTHERS. Sure, thanks for the question. I think it is very 

important, and the reason why I say that is even though there is 

fully capable leadership from career, as well as acting under secretary currently, typically, what you find happens is that changes 

don’t happen, because everyone is waiting for the political appointee to actually come on board. 

Until that happens, you know, not a lot changes, and I think one 

of the challenges we have, as I think many of the panelists here 

32 

have agreed: We have a very fluid threat environment, and we 

have to be ready to adapt to this. Without strong leadership on top, 

that is not really possible right now. So even though I think we 

have made good changes, I think we need leadership that is going 

to be able to keep up with the change that we are seeing in our 

threat environment. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let us see. Mr. Parker, would you like to weigh in 

on that? 

Mr. JAKE PARKER. Absolutely. I think that is, I would definitely 

agree with Dr. Brothers that, you know, there has definitely been, 

you know, the folks we have worked with, the S&T, I think, many 

of them are new in their positions in the last couple months. They 

have some great ideas about what they want to do, but they need, 

you know, leadership from the top to give them their green light 

to proceed, and so that is, I think, what Dr. Brothers was getting 

at. 

Mr. PAYNE. Dr. Parker. 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. I totally agree. There is outstanding professionals there in the Department that are keeping things moving. 

But the—it is, again, it is the uncertainty. Who it is going to be, 

when are they going to come in? They are ready to roll up their 

sleeves and work very hard, but it is the uncertainty that is, it is 

really, I think, an issue. 

Mr. PAYNE. Possibly going in a totally different direction than 

they have been? 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Well, you know, I don’t know that, but I 

think it is really more the uncertainty. I think Dr. Brothers did a 

whole lot to steady the ship, so to speak, in S&T. The command 

culture has greatly improved, and people are happy to come to 

work, and they are working hard, and you don’t want to lose that 

momentum. We have threats that we face every day, and we can’t 

wait ’til—we can’t wait. 

Mr. PAYNE. Chief Rice. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you. Yes, I would have to agree with my colleagues here, that that leadership needs to be there, and it needs 

to be strong. On a personal level, and in our interactions with the 

folks down at NUSTL, it came as quite a shock that, you know, 

they may have been on the cut side of this. But, you know, they 

rolled up their sleeves, and they continue to work on their portfolios, and continue to contribute and make positive impacts for us 

on the responder side. So having that leadership in place so that 

they can reaffirm their mission and continue this work going forward is critical. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Dr. Brothers, when you first were named under 

secretary of science technology, you told me that one of your priorities was to energize the homeland security industrial base. What 

are some of the challenges that you experienced trying to attract 

businesses to participate in the homeland security industrial base? 

Mr. BROTHERS. You know, one of the biggest challenges—and Mr. 

Parker brought this up—with the new outreach to industry that 

you were mentioning. It is communication, right? I think one of the 

biggest challenges is that industry would, of course, like to solve 

these challenges. They don’t necessarily know what those challenges are. They don’t necessarily know who to talk to in a departVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:18 Apr 12, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\115TH CONGRESS\17EP1107\17EP1107.TXT HEATH
33 

ment, who to email. They don’t necessarily know what the funding 

looks like. 

I think that is still an issue. It is not just unique to DHS/S&T. 

But I think one of the biggest challenges I have had was actually 

communicating what are our needs, who do you talk to, and what 

kind of funding is out there. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. Let us see. As you know, the President’s fiscal 

year 2018 budget submission was criticized for its massive cuts to 

the Science and Technology Directorate budget. What message did 

the budget send to the stakeholder community about the administration’s commitment to research and development at S&T? 

Mr. BROTHERS. Well, I mean, the way I take that is that it is 

much lower priority, and I think as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, my concern is when we are in an environment where 

the threats are increasing, that, I think, is the wrong message. I 

think we need to be messaging that we see this research and development working with industry as essential for our defense. I don’t 

think that is the message that the budget shows. 

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Parker. 

Mr. JAKE PARKER. Yes, I would agree. I mean, the message 

would be uncertainty about the future, and that is the, you know, 

very concerning. Obviously, there are other things in that submission, too, really, the DHS, particularly FEMA grants that we would 

be very concerned with as well. But uncertainty would be the message that I would send. 

Mr. PAYNE. Dr. Parker. 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Yes, there is no doubt that the threats that 

we face are actually going to require a strong innovative science 

and technology approach. No doubt, our emergency operations and 

so forth are part of it as well, but we have a lot of unknown 

threats, and it will require the scientific engine of this country to 

address these threats. So the budget cuts to research and development, S&T does not send a good signal to the community that I 

come from. 

Mr. PAYNE. OK. 

Chief Rice. 

Mr. RICE. I agree with everything my colleagues said. I have no 

further comment at this time. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, I see that my time has expired, so I will yield 

back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes the 

gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. Watson Coleman. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you all for being here today. 

I want to follow up, I guess, on both what the Chairman and the 

Ranking Member were talking about, but perhaps from a different 

perspective. As—and this has to do with the Trump administration’s fiscal year 2018 budget cuts. I know some of those cuts have 

been restored through an appropriations process, but we still are 

grappling with some serious underfunding. 

You all have been asked by the Chairman on the first sense what 

is it that you think—what is it you would like for us to do? What 

is you think that the agency should do? What would be the priorities? 

34 

I would like to know, from your perspective, based upon some the 

things that you said—agility, innovation, identifying the brightest 

and the best, working with private sector, et cetera. Tell me, from 

your perspectives, each of you, if you don’t mind, what this budget 

does specifically to accomplishing those things that you said were 

vitally important, from an operations perspective. 

I will start with you, Chief. 

Mr. RICE. Specifically, what the S&T Directorate does for us, 

from an operations perspective, or was it a budgetary question? 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. What is, yes. How does this budget impact those things that you are interested in in this directorate? Responding to the Chairman having said what would you think we 

need to do, and then you indicated some issues with regard to agility, and innovation, and, you know, to be able to move and respond 

to different threats. 

So I want to know, with the cuts that are proposed, so this budget that is proposed, what specifically impact would it have on 

where you think this directorate should be going? 

Mr. RICE. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman. So I think, as my colleague mentioned, you know, the emerging technology is going at 

such a rapid pace, as is the evolving threats, and that cuts to this 

program, and cuts to S&T will hamper our ability to keep up with 

those technologies and those threats, and as our equipment comes 

to reach its life expectancy, and as further threats evolve, we will 

start to lose pace with those, and not be on the cutting edge of preparedness and response. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Parker. 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Yes, I may mention something that hasn’t 

been mentioned yet in regards to the cuts. There is also a proposed 

cut to the university Centers of Excellence effort. So what will that 

mean? I don’t know, but as possibilities are decreased numbers of 

Centers of Excellence, decreased funding to that. So there is decreased university input as being part of the solution for homeland 

security. 

I think it has another effect, and that is affecting the next generation. I know one of things that we do at Texas A&M is really 

focus on, and we have been able to leverage having a Center of Excellence to make sure that we give opportunities to students and 

student interns, graduate students. So they get exposed to homeland security issues, and maybe take a career in homeland security. So I think this is also going to have an effect on the next generation, and diminish the number of people who take a career path 

in this area. 

As I said in my opening statement, and thankfully, some of the 

budget has been restored to save closure of the NBACC. But I can’t 

imagine if that were closed, what our ability to be able to bring to 

bear microbial forensics and attribution for potential biological attack, or trying to differentiate a natural from a biological attack. 

That could be catastrophic. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Parker. 

Mr. JAKE PARKER. So I know, you know, much of what was proposed in the budget has been restored through the appropriations 

35 

process, as my colleagues mentioned. But, you know, as proposed, 

as Dr. Brothers mentioned, the budget would have cut chem/bio by 

60 percent, cybersecurity by 40 percent. I think that, I guess, the 

impact of that could be that you would slow the development of 

some really important technologies. 

I was just talking recently with one of our member companies, 

who was working on a project funded through the chem/bio portion, 

about—that would basically now enable smart buildings to detect 

chem and bio threats on an affordable basis. Something that our 

industry is working on, you know, generally, is building security. 

That would be, you know, a great addition there that could, especially in urban areas, that could be important also. 

On the cybersecurity front, there is a company that is involved 

in application security in mobile devices at a very high level. It is 

something that they could possibly be affected by, so—— 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Brothers. 

Mr. BROTHERS. So I think I can be general, and then get to some 

specifics. Mr. Parker just mentioned specific budget cuts to both 

cyber—well, to cyber and the bio division. 

So the bio division, they are interested in expanding the work 

they are doing in New York City to not just look in the subways, 

but also to look at a test-bed for bio security. The challenge is, how 

do you do this when your budget is being severely cut? How do you 

do that, starting kind-of a new initiative? How do you do that? It 

is a challenge. 

The cybersecurity division: I mentioned how they are reaching 

out to industry—financial, automotive sectors, energy sectors. 

Again, this all takes funding. They are doing this to increase the 

cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure. They are also reaching 

out to industry, this in Silicon Valley, Austin’s, Boston’s, District 

of Columbia’s, et cetera, to reach out to the creative communities 

around the world. Again, need the funding for that. 

I think there are a number of challenges with—actually, I want 

to go back to what Dr. Parker said about the Centers of Excellence. 

Let me give you an example, if I can. 

I was at USC, and actually, before that, I was at LAPD. They 

have instituted something called predictive policing. In predictive 

policing, they were using technology to actually reduce crime by 14 

percent in certain areas. 

I then went to USC, which was one of DHS’s Centers of Excellence. What they showed was that using game theoretic techniques, 

they were able to improve that to almost 25 percent. 

So the importance of university research shouldn’t be understated at all. It is part of the S&T ecosystem—the laboratories, universities, Government, industry, et cetera. So I think these budget 

cuts impact that entire ecosystem. But in specific ways, you can 

look at programs that DHS has, S&T has instituted, and they get 

impacted directly. 

Ms. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you. I see my time is 

up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentlewoman yields back. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin. 

36 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony this morning. 

I thank my colleague, Ms. Watson Coleman, for addressing a lot 

of the things that I have in my questions, so I am going to give 

you an opportunity to elaborate on some of those topics, both chem/ 

bio in particular, and cyber. 

Dr. Parker, I would like to just start with you, if I could. As you 

mentioned in your testimony, the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2018 ends DHS’s S&T funding for the state-of-the-art, oneof-a-kind biocontainment laboratory, the National Biological Analysis and Countermeasures Center, the NBACC facility at Fort 

Detrick, Maryland, and without transferring the responsibility for 

operating the facility to different a department or agency. So can 

you elaborate on the impacts on National security and law enforcement if this facility were to close? 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Yes, thank you for the question. The 

NBACC, and then specifically—actually, both missions of the 

NBACC, the threat assessment and the forensics, bioforensics mission was—actually, I had something to do with the original vision, 

back when I was at the United States Army Medical Research and 

Material Command, and then subsequently, in DHS’s S&T. It was 

a strong collaboration between the FBI, law enforcement, the intelligence community, Defense, and then it was the Office of Homeland Security, before it became the Department of Homeland Security. 

So this laboratory facility has had a lot of thought that went into 

why it was needed, what capabilities it required to support what 

was a new science that was born out of the anthrax letter attacks, 

and that was microbial forensics. So it really is a very key mission 

in trying to determine who may be responsible for a biological attack, whether it is an individual, whether it is a terrorist, whether 

it is a nation-state. Those are no-regret decisions, as well. So the 

science and everything associated with what is needed for a law enforcement investigation has got to be beyond reproach. 

So there was a lot of thought that went into this, and I certainly 

would not want to be in the National Command Authority, and we 

had to make decisions about retaliation, say, for a nation-state bioattack—that is not out of the realm of possibility today—unless I 

knew that science behind the microbial forensics was solid. It is a 

no-regret decision. That is the impact that we have with that laboratory potentially closing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I appreciate the answer, and I agree. 

I hope that that is going to be something that will be reversed as 

we go through the budget process, and get through the appropriations process. That is something that I hope is going to reverse 

itself, so, and so it is something that I will advocate for. 

Dr. Brothers, if I could thank you for being here. It is good to 

see you again before the panel. I always appreciate your candor, 

and your testimony. I just want to thank you for all your work securing the homeland, and all the things you have done to improve 

DHS. 

So DHS specifically, the Science and Technology Directorate has 

funded important cybersecurity research to protect the homeland. 

I know you had this conversation just a minute ago. For instance, 

37 

though, S&T grants have played an important role in catalyzing research to catalog free and open-source projects that represent the 

core internet structure, infrastructure. Obviously, it is vital to understand which libraries are integral to critical infrastructure in 

order to ensure that they are adequately secured, and which is why 

the S&T support really has been so important. 

So needless to say, this research is just one example of many 

that the directorate supports in this emerging security domain. You 

know, just to further elaborate on the cybersecurity front, based on 

your experience, how would cutting-edge—how would cutting the 

cybersecurity research budget, as proposed by the Trump administration, affect the ability of DHS to secure the homeland? 

Mr. BROTHERS. So I think one of the challenges that we run 

into—and the panel, we have said this a couple times—is emerging 

threats coming out. One of the things that DHS/S&T, the Cyber Security Division as well, is try to think ahead, right? Think ahead. 

So here is an example, autonomous vehicles that I mentioned a 

little bit earlier. A number of years ago, the Cyber Security Division started working with industry to think about, what are going 

to be some of the challenges securing not just autonomous vehicles, 

but networked vehicles? So there are a lot of conversations about 

smart transportation, right? This is where you have got cars that 

are communicating with infrastructure to improve the transportation experience, if you will, right? 

The challenge is, what if you hacked into that? One of the things 

that Cyber Security Division did was to start thinking about that 

early on, and develop a consortium of automotive makers to try to 

address some of those issues. 

The same is true getting the oil and gas companies together in 

a program called LOGIIC to think through, what are some of the 

threats to the infrastructure? 

So the challenges you run into is that when you look at infrastructure that is privately owned, there is not necessary the motivation to start thinking ahead for these kinds of things. But the 

motivation is there for the Cyber Security Division and the rest of 

S&T. 

So in thinking about 20 percent budget cuts to the Cyber Security Division, those are the kinds of things that get impacted, is 

that ability to look ahead, the ability to invest moneys to understand what potential problems there will be with emerging technologies and develop mitigating solutions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I have one brief last question. Would that be all 

right? 

So Dr. Brothers, one last question. So cybersecurity, obviously, is 

an international issue by its nature. How essential to securing our 

Federal networks and critical infrastructure is cooperative research 

and development with our international allies? What are some of 

the examples of successful projects that S&T has supported in 

that? 

Mr. BROTHERS. Yes, that is a great question. I think one of the 

things that we have to realize is that because of the 

hyperconnected nature that we live in, technology, this kind of engineering side of expertise is really democratized. Everyone has 

38 

this. So we don’t necessarily have the only best ideas. It is important that we reach out to all the people—our friends, our allies— 

to try to understand what some of the best ideas are out there. 

We have relationships. We have 13 bilateral relationships across 

the world, and we leverage all of those, in cyber as well as in some 

of the other areas as well to try to get some of the best advantages. 

We have actually started the idea of having, with the Netherlands, 

with having a mutual—with joint BAs, broad area announcements, 

meaning that we now work with the Netherlands to put out solicitations to the international community. 

So it is that kind of joint work that DHS is doing—DHS/S&T is 

doing to leverage the entire global ecosystem of creative thinkers. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Brothers, thank you very much. 

Thank you all, the witnesses, for your testimony, and Mr. Chairman, thank you for the latitude in being able to ask that last question. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Absolutely. 

We have such an advantage of having the four of you here. I just 

asked the ranking Chairman; I think we are going to just let each 

Member have 2 more minutes with you, just because we have you 

here. My one question to all you, because your testimony was incredible. Your efforts to protect our Nation, we are so grateful for. 

As you are doing this research, Doctor, as you were speaking 

about reaching out to others, how do we protect what we discover? 

Everything we create, the bad guys try to intrude on. So without 

divulging trade secrets or National security issues—and I promised 

my colleagues, we are only going to get 2 minutes each, because we 

have to let you go. I know the chief has to get to another part of 

our Nation right now. 

The challenge I see, besides creating these great things you are 

speaking of, is how do we keep them to us? If you just have a 

thought about that, and then I am going to pass the questions on 

to my colleagues. 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Yes, I will just, I will start. You know, it 

is an excellent question. I am not sure if I have the best answer, 

but it is a must that we protect our science, and secure our science. 

I would actually maybe recommend that you talk to a very good 

colleague and friend of mine from the FBI, Special Agent Ed Woo, 

who has thought about this topic a lot. He used to think about it 

just in the terms of biosecurity, but it is really emerged into how 

do we—it is protecting our science. How do we do it securely? Perhaps, maybe universities have the biggest challenge, but it is an 

area that I know that Texas A&M takes very, very seriously, 

and—— 

Mr. DONOVAN. I suspect you have to report on your research if 

you are using Federal monies for it—— 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Of course. 

Mr. DONOVAN [continuing]. And do you protect your—— 

Mr. GERALD PARKER. Yes, of course. Of course 

Mr. DONOVAN [continuing]. Your research. Doctor, how do we 

protect this stuff? 

Mr. BROTHERS. It is hard. It is hard, and we all know about the 

cyber intrusions, that kind of thing. I think there are a number of 

people, including S&T, looking at different architectures for cyber 

39 

defense. There are people looking at different ways of encrypting 

information, whether that information is in storage, transit, or in 

computation. That can help. 

But I think you also have to consider there are different paradigms, because of democratization of all this knowledge. You can’t 

keep everything secret. So the question is: How do you continue to 

innovate even more rapidly? Because part of it is going to be not 

just keeping things secret, but it is going to be outpacing the innovation of our adversaries, and never stopping, and that is what requires the agility and adaptability we were talking about earlier. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Doctor. 

I already violated my 2-minute rule. The Chair recognizes the 

Ranking Member from New Jersey, Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Brothers, during your term as under secretary of science and 

technology, you took a number of steps like reinstituting the integrated product teams to create formal channels of R&D coordination among DHS components. Can you elaborate on some of the obstacles the directorate faces when it comes to streamlining and coordinating R&D throughout the Department? 

Mr. BROTHERS. Sure. One of challenges just is a large organization, large bureaucracy, right? So you have a lot of different stakeholders. So the IPT, again, the Secretary signs that out. That is excellent, because that gives some top-level mandate to that. 

But then you have other processes. You have got the Joint Requirements Council is a process. It has to be approved through the 

DMAG, these kinds of things. 

So a lot of it is messaging and socialization, and I think those— 

it is all in culture, right? I mean, a lot of these big organizations, 

they struggle because of culture. You look at an organization like 

DHS has multiple cultures because of the way it was created. How 

do you create a joint culture that understands what S&T is doing 

in the larger context, as well as the context that each individual 

component has? I think that is one of the biggest problems. It is 

not so much the IPT process, or convincing people it is a good idea. 

It is how do they accept it, and how do you message to them how 

this is a good thing for them as well? It is a work in progress. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I have more of a statement than another question. I think, as we have gone through this process, we see how important S&T is with the evolving threats that we have in this area, 

and with the world. I think it is incumbent upon us to continue to 

have the administration, whichever administration it is, understand how important this is, because when we are attacked, and 

God forbid, when we are, we are always sorry and remorseful after 

it. But if we can do the things that we need to do to thwart it, then 

we wouldn’t find ourselves in that position. 

We have to get the administration, regardless of whatever administration it is, to take this seriously, and put in place a budget 

that is consistent, and would allow S&T to do the work and the 

type of things that it needs to do to make sure that we are successful in this area, and I yield back. 

40 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields, and I hope that your testimony didn’t scare my colleagues, who left to go protect themselves 

somewhere in a bunker. 

I want to thank our witnesses, first of all, for your valuable testimony; second, for your contributions to the safety of our Nation. I 

would like to also to thank my colleagues for their questions. 

The Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(D), the hearing record will be 

held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands 

adjourned. 

Thank you all. 

[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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