INSS Special Report

T

his report summarizes the key 

judgments and recommendations of a

forthcoming NDU Press book entitled

The United States and the Persian Gulf: 

Redesigning U.S. Forces for the PostContainment Era. The report was drafted by

Richard D. Sokolsky, distinguished research

fellow in the Institute for National Strategic

Studies (INSS) at NDU. Other contributors

include Richard L. Kugler, distinguished

research fellow, INSS; Kenneth Pollack,

Director of Research, The Saban Center for

Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution;

Joseph McMillan, distinguished research

fellow, INSS; Eugene B. Rumer, senior 

research fellow, INSS; and Judith S. Yaphe,

senior research fellow, INSS. Mr. Sokolsky

can be contacted at (202) 685–2249 or 

sokolskyr@ndu.edu. 

Key Points

With or without regime change in Iraq,

the U.S. military posture toward the Persian

Gulf will require significant adjustments over

the next decade. The future of Iraq—and the

outcome of U.S. efforts to effect regime change

and Baghdad’s compliance with United Nations

Security Council resolutions—will be the key

driver of the size and character of these

changes. Regardless of how regime change

occurs in Iraq—whether it happens quickly

and decisively or is protracted and messy—and

whatever type of post-Saddam regime finally

emerges, the United States will need to diversify

its dependence on regional basing and forward

presence, as well as reduce the visibility and

predictability of its forward-deployed forces.

In the long term, eliminating Iraq’s

ability to threaten its neighbors and destabilize

the region is the sine qua non for success in

guaranteeing the security of the Gulf while

reducing the political costs that the U.S. military presence imposes on other American

interests and Gulf partners. Unless and until a

stable, moderate, and nonexpansionist regime

assumes power in Baghdad, significant American forces will be strategically “fixed” in the

Gulf area, performing the containment mission. The United States will need to redesign its

forward presence in the region through transformed capabilities and operational concepts

that provide improved combat capabilities

while reducing dependence on forwarddeployed forces in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere

in the region.

However, even successful regime change

in Iraq does not mean that the United States

can safely end its military engagement in the

Persian Gulf, given its strategic location, role in

global energy markets, and vulnerability to

other potential threats. In short, removing

Saddam is no panacea. There is no escaping

the U.S. role as a guarantor of Gulf stability.

Thus, the United States needs a viable concept

for its future forward presence that can be

sustained over the long haul. There are three

broad options: long-term access to the lower

Gulf with reduced ground and air presence; an

over-the-horizon presence, as existed pre-1990

with diversification of bed-down locations; and

a combination of reliance on other regional

partners and U.S. capabilities.

Changes Ahead

Significant changes lie ahead for U.S.

security strategy in the Persian Gulf after

almost a decade of stasis. In the decade 

between the Gulf War and the September 11,

2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon, the strategy of dual

containment of Iraq and Iran was a key driver

of U.S. military planning and force posture for

the region. The overriding American concern

was preserving access to Gulf oil at reasonable

prices and keeping the region secure from

threat or invasion. The U.S. strategy benefited

from the facts that both Iraq and Iran possessed a limited ability to project power and

influence beyond their borders; the Gulf States

acquiesced in a significant U.S. military presence on their soil despite the domestic costs;

and the United States was reasonably successful, at least until the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000, in insulating U.S.

relationships with key Gulf States from the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

At the end of the Clinton administration,

it seemed safe to assume that the regional

security environment would continue to evolve

more or less on its present trajectory, and the

challenge confronting the United States was

how to manage its forward presence for the

long haul under increasingly stressful conditions. This premise is no longer valid. Most

importantly, the strategy of dual containment, which is just barely alive, will

expire in one way or another—in

all likelihood because the United

States decides to end Saddam’s rule. U.S. success in

engineering a regime

Beyond Containment: Defending

U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf

Institute for National Strategic Studies September 2002

National Defense University

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change in Baghdad will require a substantial

increase in U.S. forward-deployed forces, probably followed by a multinational occupation of

Iraq that is likely to include a significant U.S.

military component.

Even if regime change does not occur in

Iraq, other factors are likely to put pressure on

the United States to alter the shape of its military posture toward the region. The enduring

long-term campaign against global terrorism

will still demand a closer look at U.S. policies

toward the Persian Gulf that undermine this

effort, including the U.S. military presence.

Political and social trends in Saudi Arabia will

make the ruling family even more wary of U.S.

forces on their soil. Iran and Iraq are likely to

improve their conventional capabilities and,

more importantly, to deploy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons

and longer-range ballistic missiles to threaten

U.S. access and force projection capabilities. In

addition, the demands of the war on terrorism,

and U.S. defense strategy more broadly, could

make it increasingly difficult to sustain current

military operations in the region.

With or without a regime change in Iraq,

the U.S. military posture toward the region will

become increasingly brittle unless it adapts in

creative ways to these looming changes. If the

Gulf security environment stays on its present

course—continued deterioration and eventual

collapse of dual containment and no American

effort to reorder the geopolitical landscape—

the central dilemma facing U.S. policymakers

will be reconciling the military requirements of

a containment strategy with the political imperatives of reducing the American military

profile in the Gulf. By the same token, the

elimination of Iraq as a strategic threat or the

installation of a new but equally antagonistic

regime would confront the United States with a

number of complex and novel policy choices:

the role of Saudi Arabia in U.S. regional security strategy, the degree to which a friendly and

pro-American Iraq could become the focus of

U.S. regional defense strategy, and the type of

military presence the United States should

maintain in the region if the removal of the

Saddam regime ushers in a period of prolonged

instability and disorder inside Iraq and beyond.

Regional Dynamics

In thinking about alternative U.S. force

postures in the region under a variety of circumstances, a key question is how changing

security priorities and threat perceptions will

affect Gulf State attitudes toward U.S. presence.

If the geopolitical status quo continues, the key

factors influencing Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) defense and security policies are likely to

diverge from those of the United States in

several important ways.

From the GCC perspective, neither Iraq

nor Iran is seen as a major or imminent danger to regional security. Iraq has been effectively weakened and contained, Iran has been

tamed, and concerns about Iraqi or Iranian

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation take a back seat to addressing domestic

difficulties.

U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict has eroded U.S. influence in the Gulf

and increased the sense of vulnerability of Gulf

Arab regimes. Furthermore, public opinion in

the GCC states is wary of the U.S.-led war on

terrorism, viewing it mainly as an anti-Islamic

campaign. In this climate, many Gulf State

rulers see their ties to the United States as a

growing political liability.

Support for sanctions against and isolation of Iraq has evaporated. Saddam has

gained the backing of most Arab and Muslim

states for an end to sanctions and opposition to

a unilateral U.S. military attack. He has also

been able to mend fences with Saudi Arabia

and paper over tensions with Kuwait. United

Nations (UN) agreement on reshaping sanctions to ease their impact on the Iraqi population will not restore support for sanctions

among GCC governments or populations.

The preference of GCC governments is to

restore a balance of power similar to the one

that existed prior to Operation Desert Storm—

a balance maintained by de facto partnership

with a regional power and backed by a less

visible U.S. military presence. The realization

of this vision will require a delicate balancing

act between maintaining a necessary U.S.

military presence, gradually improving relations with Iraq and Iran, and moderating

domestic discontent over American policies.

Regardless of how the Gulf States cope with this

dilemma, they will remain at odds with the

United States over their willingness to reach an

accommodation with a weakened Saddam and

a cautious, internally divided Iran, even as both

countries acquire WMD and long-range ballistic

missiles. This fault line is unlikely to prompt

the Gulf States to seek a complete withdrawal of

U.S. forces or to leave the U.S. security umbrella. However, when coupled with popular

outrage at U.S. support for Israel, it will lead

GCC governments to distance themselves further

from U.S. policies and reduce their cooperation

with U.S. military forces.

Deteriorating Status Quo

The future survival of Saddam Husayn’s

Iraq will be the most critical variable in determining the evolution of the U.S. military presence in the region. As long as Iraq constitutes a

threat to U.S. interests in the Gulf, the United

States has little choice but to maintain the

capability to deter or defeat that threat with a

combination of in-theater and rapidly deployable forces. The decision of previous administrations to deal with Iraqi defiance of UN Security Council resolutions through a policy of

containment has until now driven the United

States to maintain the status quo in its force

presence rather than adopt a more sustainable

concept of Gulf security at reduced levels of

presence, as was envisioned immediately after

Desert Storm. Under present conditions, therefore, the U.S. military footprint in the Gulf is

determined by the military concept of operations for the region’s defense against Iraq.

A decision not to use U.S. military force to

evict Saddam in favor of continuing long-term

containment must confront three realities: first,

sanctions are already almost impossible to

enforce; second, Iraq will eventually possess

and deploy WMD and longer-range ballistic

missiles; and third, the U.S. military presence

in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, is a

source of growing resentment and a mounting

domestic liability for the ruling families of host

countries. Hence, the political and military

risks to the U.S. force posture in the region are

likely to grow, and efforts to maintain the

status quo will only exacerbate these dangers.

Containing a hostile Iraq under these circumstances over the long term would require a

2 SPECIAL REPORT

with or without a regime

change in Iraq, the U.S.

military posture toward

the region will become

increasingly brittle unless

it adapts in creative ways

to looming changes
much larger and open-ended U.S. military

presence than we currently maintain—one

that might be more than the local traffic will

bear in most of the GCC states.

Redesigning Forces

Consequently, if the United States decides

to maintain a strategy of containment, it will

need to think creatively about how to sustain it

over the long haul. The challenge is to create a

new posture for peacetime presence and

wartime reinforcement that supports the execution of U.S. defense strategy without creating

an unsustainable footprint in the region or

draining the overall U.S. force posture of too

many forces and resources. This tension can be

effectively managed by realigning U.S. forces in

the Gulf States, taking advantage of new basing

concepts, enhancing the combat capabilities of

forward-deployed forces, diversifying patterns of

deployment, giving higher priority to expanded

prepositioning, and investing new energy into

expanding multilateral security cooperation.

Equally important, the successful creation of a

spearhead force and other improvements in

U.S. rapid force projection capability would

help to alleviate pressures to continuously

maintain larger combat forces in the Gulf as

well as to reduce dependence on large, inflexible reinforcement plans if the Iraqi and Iranian military threats continue to grow.1

Realigning Forces. While the U.S. forward presence cannot and should not be eliminated or even significantly reduced as long as a

hostile Iraqi regime remains in place, it can

and should be made less visible, and less seemingly permanent, than it is today. In the short

term, to minimize political risks, changes in

the size and configuration of U.S. forwarddeployed forces will need to be carried out

incrementally, since technological advances in

U.S. force projection capabilities will not be in

hand for some time. In the longer run, as the

U.S. military transforms and political constraints on large stationed forces grow in intensity, it should be possible to accelerate the pace

of change because the United States will be

able to bring overwhelming force to bear on

the battlefield without having to rely on a

substantial permanent presence in the theater.

At the same time, bringing U.S. military posture in the Gulf in line with the overall direction of transformation will entail adjustments

in U.S. relations with the Gulf States that need

to be carefully thought through.

The focal point of force realignment is

inevitably Saudi Arabia, given its central role in

U.S. regional strategy, its size and importance,

and the considerable discontent in both the

United States and Saudi Arabia over how the

U.S. military presence there is handled. A key

question with Saudi Arabia is, how much

reduction is enough? The United States operates out of only one major base in the Kingdom, which constrains realignment options.

Are less tangible ways of underscoring our

commitment to Saudi security available that

would not concurrently compromise deterrence

and U.S. combat capabilities?

Herein lies a central political paradox: the

need to reduce the U.S. footprint in Saudi

Arabia without abandoning the country. This

longstanding conundrum has no simple solution. Regardless of the outcome of the Iraq

scenario, the United States will need to maintain forces in the region, and Saudi Arabia will

continue to play an important role in its forward-deployed posture. Withdrawing from

Saudi Arabia would send the inaccurate political signal to regional players and domestic

opponents of the Saudi regime that the United

States was washing its hands of the Kingdom.

At the same time, however, the U.S. military

presence in Saudi Arabia is having deleterious

consequences for regime stability. In time, this

circle can be squared by projected improvements in U.S. force projection capabilities and

new operational concepts.

Undoubtedly, more can be done in other

GCC countries, although political and physical

limits exist on how much of the military burdens they can pick up from Saudi Arabia. In

the immediate future, the United States is

wisely pursuing Qatar as the most attractive

alternative to Saudi Arabia for additional

prepositioning and regular deployments of U.S.

strike aircraft. Over the longer term, possibilities could be pursued with Oman. None of

these locations, either singly or in combination, could ever replace Saudi Arabia entirely,

and there are grounds for questioning whether

shifting more of the political and military

burdens of supporting U.S. military strategy to

the smaller Gulf States is sustainable in the

long haul. Nonetheless, deemphasizing the

military component of the U.S.-Saudi relationship could have a positive effect on political

development in the Kingdom. Moreover, while

the United States should diversify the countries

upon which it depends and create redundant

capabilities in multiple locations, it should do

so out of political and military prudence, not

as a step toward jettisoning the relationship

with Saudi Arabia. That relationship needs to

be repaired, not trashed.

New Basing Concepts. The Persian Gulf

region is a good place to explore the feasibility

and cost-effectiveness of mobile offshore basing. In the near term, a particularly useful step

would be to create command and control

capabilities afloat to improve combat redundancy and eliminate the ability of any regional

state to veto U.S. operations by blocking access

to command facilities. Rotating forces in and

out of locations outside the Gulf, such as the

Red Sea littoral and South Asia, could be

worthwhile, particularly if the U.S. presence

was periodic rather than continuous at any

location. Militarily, this concept will become

increasingly practicable as force transformation creates capabilities to deliver decisive force

from longer range. In the more distant future,

a mobile offshore base might be large enough

to accommodate aircraft that currently fly out

of Saudi locations.

Enhanced Combat Capabilities. Reducing the number and visibility of forwarddeployed forces while maintaining necessary

military capabilities will require qualitative

improvements of forward-deployed capabilities.

There are several priorities for force enhancements. First, defense against missile attacks

should be bolstered; additional Patriot advanced capability units and high-tech aircraft

for rapid strikes against WMD targets should 

be stationed in the region; forces deployed 

in the Gulf should have first claim on nextgeneration ballistic missile defense systems;

and the Gulf should be used as a test-bed for

early deployment of emergency missile defense

capabilities and for maintaining a continuous

presence of these assets in the region. Second,

steps should be taken to lessen the vulnerability

of local bases and infrastructure to enemy

SPECIAL REPORT 3

while the U.S. forward

presence cannot and

should not be eliminated,

it can and should be made

less visible, and less

seemingly permanent,

than it is today
4 SPECIAL REPORT

missile strikes and related antiaccess/area

denial threats. In addition to improved missile

defenses, ports, airfields, and command posts

should be hardened and diversified, and consequence management capabilities should be

stationed in the region. Finally, efforts should

be accelerated to create the spearhead force for

the Gulf that will be capable of rapid deployment and employment without the benefit of

prepositioned combat forces.

Deployment Patterns. The continuous

presence of U.S. land-based forces at five or six

major fixed locations has undesirable political

and operational consequences. The United

States should reduce the visibility and predictability of such fixed deployments by adopting a rotational peacetime posture that relies

on regular movements of Army, Air Force, and

Navy units in and out of a wider variety of

locations for operations and training and

exercises with local forces. Critical infrastructure would be replicated at multiple locations,

enabling forces to be positioned in a number of

possible configurations depending on the

contingency and political circumstances. The

Air Force should regularly deploy strategic

bombers to the region for joint and combined

exercises; afloat, the Navy and Marine Corps

should fully fund programs that would permit

early deployment to the Gulf of expeditionary

strike groups/forces that would improve their

ability to strike land targets from augmented

Marine amphibious groups and carrier groups.

Prepositioning. Prepositioning of heavy

and bulky equipment remains the key to rapid

reinforcement of the Gulf region and therefore

to the eventual reduction in the number of

regularly deployed forces. While substantial

progress has been made in this area, there is

room for improving the flow rates for arriving

U.S. forces. Additional bare-base sets should be

located at various airfields in the region as

well as additional Army brigade sets of equipment; the Navy and Marine Corps should be

directed to invest more heavily in equipment

that would be prepositioned afloat in the

region. For example, the Navy and Marine

Corps should be encouraged to invest more

heavily in research, development, testing, and

evaluation of the maritime prepositioning

force and the sea-based logistics concept,

which together would improve deployment

times, reduce the U.S. footprint ashore, and

improve the ability of U.S. forces to operate in

an antiaccess environment. Because of both

political and operational factors, an expanded

prepositioning program would be most successful if Saudi Arabia granted approval to

place critical war reserve stocks in the Kingdom. Although the Saudis have rejected these

proposals in the past, with some U.S. prodding

they could come to see the political and military advantages of trading forces-in-place for

prepositioned material.

Regional Security Cooperation. Overcoming obstacles to improving regional security cooperation will be difficult, but it is one of

the most practical steps the United States could

take to reduce its continuing profile in the

Gulf. It is unrealistic to expect the Gulf States

to defend the region against major aggression

without U.S. military intervention. But this is

the wrong standard to apply; it is not unreasonable to expect them to provide forces to

delay a major attack and inflict costs on an

aggressor and to be capable of handling minor

regional contingencies (for example, raids on

offshore oil installations) without relying on

U.S. forces. In other words, the mountain the

Gulf States have to climb to improve their

military effectiveness is not as high as commonly portrayed, partly because they do not

need to be held to Western standards and partly

because the United States has not made a

serious and sustained effort in this area, its

sales of sophisticated military equipment

notwithstanding. Indeed, when the United

States has made such a commitment, as in the

case of Kuwait, there have been measurable

results. There are a number of steps that could

be taken to redress shortfalls in GCC capabilities. For instance, the United States could:

■ discourage the Gulf States from focusing

their attention on unrealistic and ineffective standing multilateral forces like Peninsula Shield at the

expense of developing force specialization and niche

capabilities.

■ recognize formally the GCC as an international organization, which would permit the United

States to provide enhanced training and supplies.

■ adjust the U.S. Central Command exercise

program to encourage intra-GCC cooperation;

instead of trying to develop U.S. exercises with the

GCC as a group, priority should be given to developing trilateral and quadrilateral exercises with forces

from the United States.

■ encourage the GCC to adopt selected NATO

standardization agreements to promote interoperability. The GCC states lack the capability to replicate the NATO standardization process, but this is

not a standard to which they need be held.

■ explore ways of developing a combined GCC

professional military education system to raise the

standard of command and staff work, promote

common doctrine, and build personal links among

officers.

Coalition Forces. The United States

should also try to improve extraregional contributions to Gulf security. The GCC states are

unlikely to accept a major peacetime role for

non-Gulf Arab countries in regime security,

which would put their survival at the mercy of

the vagaries of inter-Arab politics. Nonetheless,

there would be substantial political, if not

military, benefits if larger or more capable

forces from Islamic countries (for example,

Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco) could

play a more meaningful part in the Gulf security equation in an emergency. As in

1990–1991, the presence of Islamic forces in

an international coalition would strengthen

the perceived political legitimacy of bringing

outside forces into the region in a crisis. The

United States could facilitate improved extraregional contributions to defense of the Gulf

without resorting to the formal arrangements

that have proven ineffective in the past. For

example, the United States could: 

■ restructure the U.S.-Egyptian security

assistance program to emphasize the capability to

deploy a significant Egyptian force using U.S. (or

allied) lift in a regional crisis

■ exercise Egyptian, Jordanian, and other

capabilities to deploy small heavy forces to hotspots,

including refocusing the biennial Bright Star

exercise with Egypt

■ create a Gulf security fund within the U.S.

foreign military financing program to underwrite

the development of expeditionary capabilities of

regional powers so that, in extremis, they could

contribute more effectively to the defense of the Gulf.

When Saddam Goes

Looking beyond a change of the Iraqi

regime, the military and political calculus

about the continuing U.S. presence that might

be required in the longer run will depend on

how that change takes place—with or without

a U.S. military intervention or occupation of

the continuous presence

of U.S. land-based forces

at five or six major fixed

locations has undesirable

consequences
Iraq—as well as the damage inflicted by the

change itself, and what kind of government

succeeds Saddam Husayn.

If regime change occurs without direct

U.S. military involvement, the U.S. presence

required in the region will depend to some

extent on what kind of government replaces

Saddam. Given the weakness and disorganization of the ostensibly democratic Iraqi opposition, the most likely successor would be another strongman emerging from the existing

political milieu and sharing its fundamentally

hostile orientation. Somewhat less likely, but

also plausible, would be a weak government

focused primarily on resolving internal economic and political problems. 

Depending on which of these comes to

pass, the new regime may recognize the futility

of continuing defiance of the international

community and redirect resources from offensive programs, including WMD, effectively

limiting its capabilities and allowing the

United States to restructure its deterrent capability in the region. The problem is that judging what kind of regime we are dealing with is

apt to be difficult, since even a hostile leader

may find it tactically useful to play along with

the international community by accepting

WMD inspections, renouncing territorial

claims, and taking whatever other steps are

necessary to secure the end of sanctions and

buy time to consolidate power. This uncertainty

will be all the more serious should civil strife

follow the collapse of the Ba’athist machinery

of repression. In the face of such uncertainty,

the United States will want to proceed cautiously before substantially reducing its quickresponse capabilities. Moreover, there will be a

high risk that the United States will be called

on by Iraq’s worried neighbors to play a military role in the post-Saddam transition—at

best, to provide humanitarian assistance; at

worst, to intervene to prevent the collapse of the

Iraqi state if order begins to deteriorate.

If regime change comes about as a result

of U.S. intervention, we will face a somewhat

different set of demands. In the near term, a

substantial U.S. military presence is very likely

to be required in Iraq, either as an occupation

force or to assist the new regime in getting

control of and rebuilding the country. On the

positive side, such a presence will allow the

United States to satisfy itself that Iraqi weapons

programs are totally and completely dismantled and to shape the new government and the

new Iraqi army to the greatest possible degree.

Furthermore, as long as U.S. forces are present

in Iraq, the necessity of defending neighboring

states against Iraq will cease to exist. On the

negative side, the challenge of pacifying and

policing the country should not be underestimated, nor should that of building rule of law

and a functioning civil society where neither

has existed for many years.

Finally, neither of these alternatives—an

internally driven succession or one achieved

through U.S. intervention—leads easily to a

stable, sustainable, legitimate outcome. A

successor regime that comes to power by force

and controls the country through a more or

less effective continuation of the historic pattern of authoritarian repression will share not

only the present regime’s methods and attitudes

but also its lack of legitimacy. Conversely, a

regime installed by U.S. military force could be

viewed as a tool of neoimperialism and an

American puppet regime. Groups that supported the U.S. intervention would be looking

for a payoff afterward that in some cases would

be contrary to the interests that the United

States was trying to protect, such as the territorial integrity of Iraq. The steps that could be

taken to mitigate those perceptions and disappointments, such as full enfranchisement of

the entire population (that is, elections that

resulted in political dominance by the 65

percent Shi’a majority in a democratic state

and formal autonomy for the Kurds), would

pose problems of their own.

The precise permutations are thus practically unlimited. Nevertheless, it is reasonable,

in thinking through U.S. responses to these

differing outcomes, to identify three alternative

models:

■ The European or East Asian model, under

which the United States is viewed as the only credible and acceptable stabilizing force for a critical

region. This assumes that either Iraq or Iran, if not

both, would continue to present a threat to U.S.

interests even under less objectionable regimes and

that the GCC states would be unable or unwilling to

develop their own capabilities to meet those threats.

Under this alternative, the United States would seek

long-term access to bases in the lower Gulf for a

robust but reduced ground and air presence—

probably about a composite air wing and a heavy

battalion task force—that would continue in the

foreseeable future. In addition, this alternative

would envision the presence in the Gulf of a carrier

task force most if not all the time.

■ An over-the-horizon presence, similar to the

normal pre-1990 arrangement but with greater

diversification of bed-down locations. The United

States would attempt, through diplomacy and other

means, to ensure that Iraq and Iran balance each

other in such a way that neither of them is strong

enough to challenge vital U.S. interests. Meanwhile,

the United States would attempt to strengthen

friendly forces and ensure through a combination

of prepositioning, exercises, transformed military

capabilities and operational concepts, and assets to

counter the antiaccess/area denial capabilities of

Iraq and Iran, that U.S. and coalition forces could

return rapidly in a crisis.

■ A combination of reliance on local and U.S.

capabilities, based on the assumption that the

regional situation would not tolerate a continuing

U.S. military presence at anything resembling

current levels. Enhancements to local forces would

be combined with active encouragement of regional

cooperation, continued improvements in U.S. rapid

deployment capabilities, and a continuing force

presence well below that currently in place, maintained through a series of deployments shifting

among various locations.

In sum, while more aggressive efforts to

unseat Saddam would not be cost-free, neither

would be the alternatives. Either a continuation of the policy of active containment or a

policy of retrenched defense and deterrence

would require the maintenance of a significant

military presence in the Gulf, with all its attendant political and security risks for both the

Gulf Arab countries and the United States.

Moreover, the longer the United States needs

military access to the Gulf States to deal with a

continuing Iraqi threat, the longer it will be

identified with resistance by some Gulf states to

political evolution.

Whither Iran?

The second key variable that will determine U.S. success in bringing peace and stability to the Persian Gulf over the coming

decade is how Iran’s political evolution plays

out and is reflected in Iranian foreign policy.

Iran’s political factions are gridlocked, and

SPECIAL REPORT 5

the longer the United

States needs military

access to the Gulf States,

the longer it will be

identified with resistance

to political evolution
neither side is likely to emerge the victor any

time soon. U.S. criticisms of Iran’s lack of

cooperation in the war on terrorism have

strengthened internal elements opposed to

dialogue with the United States and driven

both factions into an unwanted embrace at

U.S. expense. Nonetheless, it is not inconceivable that the United States and Iran might

someday normalize relations. Realistically,

however, change in Iran will take years to play

out and is unlikely to yield a regime that is

fully responsive to U.S. interests. Indeed, any

Iranian government will see itself as the dominant power in the Gulf—a role that any U.S.

administration will be loath to accept. Thus,

even under optimal conditions, there

inevitably will be tension between Washington

and Tehran over the structure of regional

security—and conditions are likely to be far

from optimal, as Iran continues its quest to

acquire weapons of mass destruction. In short,

while it is likely that Iran’s political evolution

will eventually allow the United States to

adjust its commitments and deployments in

the Gulf, it is unlikely that it will be able to

shed them altogether, let alone soon.

Nonetheless, Iran should not be seen as

the major determinant of U.S. military presence in the Gulf region—especially land-based

presence—under foreseeable circumstances. It

is true that Iran has upgraded its military

capabilities in the past several years, but primarily in the areas of naval forces, air defense,

and ballistic missiles. Iran’s amphibious warfare capability is extremely limited, and it has

no plausible way of bringing significant land

force to bear against the GCC states. Iran could

more seriously challenge U.S. interests through

heightened support for terrorism and renewed

support for subversion, as well as through the

threat or use of WMD or conventional missiles,

airstrikes against critical petroleum infrastructure, closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and

interdiction of seaborne movement of naval

forces or commerce. The Gulf Arab states are

quite capable, however, of dealing with the

possibility of airstrikes, just as the U.S. Navy

can handle any attempts to close the sealanes.

Otherwise, none of the other threats would

require the presence of significant U.S. landbased forces, with the possible exception of

missile defense units. They certainly would not

require a presence beyond that already required

to deal with Iraq.

Domestic Change

The third critical variable in determining

U.S. success in bringing peace and stability to

the Persian Gulf and in uprooting terrorism

from the region is how effectively regional

governments respond to pressures for domestic

change. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the

Saddam Husayn regime or the strategic character and intentions of a successor regime, fighting terrorism needs to become a central element in the redefinition of U.S. security

strategy in the Gulf with one important caveat:

the relationship between political reform and

terrorism—or “reform to forestall revolution”—is extremely complicated and needs to

be approached with great caution.

September 11 graphically illustrated that

any strategy aimed at defeating terrorism must

focus heavily on the region, where so many of

the terrorists originated and so many ideas and

attitudes that motivate terrorist behavior have

sunk deep roots. Devising a coherent antiterrorist strategy poses a serious conceptual challenge. In recent decades, the American people

have come to expect national strategy to be

driven by a conjunction of vital interests and

core values. In the Persian Gulf, however, U.S.

security relations with regional states are not

built on shared values, of which there are few,

but on shared interests, of which there are

many. Managing the divergence between interests and values will only grow more difficult in

the coming decade.

Suppressing terrorism on a long-term

basis will require addressing the conditions that

breed it, principally political repression, failed

economic liberalization and reform, and lack

of political reform, including popular participation in governance. Hence, achieving political stability and ending terrorism in the Gulf

will depend to some extent on political, economic, and social reforms, particularly responding effectively to popular demands to

open the political system. It is therefore in the

interest of the United States to encourage

political pluralism, good governance, transparency in decisionmaking, and economic

liberalization.

But how hard should the United States

press for an agenda of democratization, respect

for human rights, and expanding civil liberties

and economic opportunities? Although Saudi

Arabia and other countries in and around the

Persian Gulf share some measure of the blame

for the climate that breeds anti-Western terrorism, dealing with this problem presents dilemmas. On the one hand, the United States will be

accused of imperialism if it pressures regional

governments to make democratic reforms and

improve their human rights performance.

Perhaps more importantly, applying such

pressure could be counterproductive. For many

countries, for instance, abandoning repressive

practices could have unintended and undesirable consequences—among which is allowing

at least a short-term flourishing of radical

movements, including those that preach and

practice violence against America and the West.

Likewise, granting full freedom of expression to

media that already sanction vitriolic antiAmerican sentiments could increase rather

than diminish such rhetoric. Still more worrisome, liberalization could unleash passions

that are difficult to control or to channel into

orderly and meaningful political change. 

In short, the consequences of greater

pluralism in most Gulf countries, particularly

Saudi Arabia, would be governments (and

foreign policies) that are much less friendly to

the United States than the current regimes.

Indeed, it is difficult to pressure local rulers to

change domestic political arrangements that

have served them well, especially when the

United States is asking them to take risks on

other issues—for example, supporting a U.S.

invasion of Iraq. These regimes would not

have any easier of a time supporting contentious U.S. policies if their political systems

were more pluralistic.

On the other hand, if the United States

does not apply pressure for reforms, it will be

criticized for propping up regimes that are

seen by their opponents as corrupt and oppressive and thus will remain a lightning rod for

anti-American violence. This dilemma underscores an important point about U.S. interests

and military presence in the Gulf. The objective of U.S. involvement in the region is stability, not preservation of the status quo. America

6 SPECIAL REPORT

the consequences of

greater pluralism in most

Gulf countries would be

governments that are

much less friendly to the

United States than the

current regimes
has no interest in the kind of stability that

results from immobility, and structures that try

to remain rigid are apt to be overwhelmed by

the currents swirling around them. The U.S.

presence in the Gulf is primarily intended to

maintain the flow of oil by preventing a hostile

power from establishing hegemony over the

region; it is not designed to shield regimes—

however friendly to our interests—from having to deal constructively with the implications

of a changing world.

Nonetheless, over the course of 3 centuries

Islamic societies have sought to confront the

challenges of Westernization and modernization by alternately imitating and rejecting

them, with neither option providing satisfaction. The results of this failure are visible

throughout the Islamic world. Moreover, political and social Westernization that failed when

it was embraced by indigenous elites is even

less likely to succeed if it is foisted upon the

region by outside forces. To be successful and

survivable, political reform must develop organically, adapting the region’s traditional

religious, political, and cultural practices to

modern realities. Thus, the best course of

action for the United States is to encourage

evolutionary adaptation. This is necessarily a

delicate task, and whether it is feasible remains

an open question.

Conclusion

For the United States, there is no escaping

the role of security guarantor of the Gulf for

the foreseeable future. But trying to guarantee

that security through a large-scale, visible, and

permanent-looking U.S. presence will erode

security, undermine security relationships with

key Gulf States, impede needed political reforms, stir domestic opposition within Saudi

Arabia and other Gulf States, and feed antiAmerican Islamic extremism. In the absence of

successful regime change in Iraq, the transformation of military capabilities provides a way

to guarantee security while reducing the military footprint, but the adjustment of the U.S.

profile will need to be carried out before the

promise of transformation can be realized.

Unfortunately, time is not on the U.S. side: if

left to his own devices, Saddam will become

more threatening in the years ahead. Thus,

until Saddam disappears from the scene and

Iraq is no longer a menace to U.S. interests and

regional security, there is scope for reengineering the U.S. force posture, but it would be

foolhardy to make significant reductions in

U.S. forward-deployed forces.

If the continued survival of the Saddam

Husayn regime (or a hostile successor regime)

extracts huge costs for regional security, success in removing him and his circle would

yield an enormous payoff. It would not eliminate all problems from the region, but it

would drastically reduce the requirement for

U.S. military forces to deal with the problems

that remained. It would give Iraq the opportunity to develop, for the first time in decades, a

system of government that would not depend

on a permanent state of hostility with its

neighbors to justify its domestic power structure. It would allow the United States and the

Gulf Arabs to return their relationships to a

more normal footing, free of many of the

irritants that inevitably arise from the presence

of foreign forces in an alien culture. Most

importantly, it would provide the opportunity

for the Gulf States and others in the Middle

East to develop and nurture new institutions

and processes, firmly rooted in the religious

and cultural legacy of the region, that will

allow their people to thrive and prosper in the

21st century. Only by doing so can they hope to

escape the cycle of warfare, repression, and

terrorism that was the lot of so many throughout the previous century. Simply put, the status

quo has its own costs and is not sustainable

over the next decade. The costs of going to war

with Iraq have been fully aired and are well

understood. The costs of not going to war are

far less appreciated.

The potential benefits of toppling Saddam

will need to be carefully weighed against the

substantial costs to the United States if it has to

occupy Iraq indefinitely to ensure an orderly

transition, preserve territorial integrity, and

protect the new regime. With or without regime

change in Iraq, however, the United States

needs to fashion a post-containment strategy

that reduces the political, diplomatic, and

military burdens on both the United States and

its Gulf State partners of meeting America’s

security responsibilities. Saudi Arabia needs to

remain an important pillar of U.S. security

strategy for the region, but one that the United

States puts less weight on in the future.

Note1

A spearhead force for the Gulf would be the lead element

of a larger U.S. reinforcement plan for warfighting. Configured to

deploy swiftly within a few days, its mission in defending Kuwait

against an Iraqi invasion, for example, would be to gain control

of the early battle (the halt phase) by carrying out early strike

operations, thus setting the stage for bigger operations later. To

accomplish this mission, it would also need to be capable of

gaining access against area denial threats and securing key

infrastructure. A spearhead force would be composed of joint

assets, would possess sophisticated technologies, and would be an

early candidate for transformation. It might include, for example, airborne warning and control systems and joint surveillance

and target attack radar systems, two or three fighter wings backed

by strategic bombers, an expeditionary strike group and/or

expeditionary strike force, and two or three ground brigades with

enough tanks, attack helicopters, and self-propelled artillery for

high-speed, lethal maneuvers.

SPECIAL REPORT 7

INSS publications present original research by members

of the National Defense University as well as other

scholars and specialists in national security affairs from

this country and abroad. The opinions expressed or

implied in this publication are solely those of the authors

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

National Defense University, the Department of Defense,

or any other governmental agency.

NDU PRESS

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode

Director of Publications General Editor

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)

publishes books, monographs, and reports on national

security strategy, defense policy, and national military

strategy. For information on NDU Press visit the Web

site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS

also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at:

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear

Director Director of Research

time is not on the U.S.

side: if left to his own

devices, Saddam will

become more threatening

in the years ahead
8 SPECIAL REPORT

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