[Cite as Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551.] 

KAUFFMAN RACING EQUIPMENT, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. ROBERTS, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 

126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551.] 

Civil procedure — Long-arm jurisdiction — Alleged defamation via Internet — 

Right to due process not violated here — Judgment affirmed. 

(No. 2008-1038 — Submitted April 22, 2009 — Decided June 10, 2010.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Knox County, No. 07-CA-14, 

2008-Ohio-1922. 

__________________ 

PFEIFER, J. 

{¶ 1} In this case, we address whether an Ohio court can properly assert 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when jurisdiction is predicated 

on that defendant’s publication of allegedly defamatory statements on the 

Internet. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court erred when it 

declined to assert personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in this case. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} Appellee, Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C. (“KRE”), is an 

Ohio limited liability company that constructs engine blocks and related highperformance automotive equipment for public sale. Although its business 

dealings are nationwide, KRE maintains its sole business operations and office in 

Glenmont, Ohio. 

{¶ 3} Appellant, Scott Roberts, is a 30-year resident of Virginia. Roberts 

has never physically entered Ohio. On February 6, 2006, using the name “Central 

Virginia Machine,” Roberts purchased from KRE an MR-1 Pontiac engine block 

after viewing the block on KRE’s website. 
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{¶ 4} In October 2006, eight months after purchasing the engine block, 

Roberts contacted KRE by telephone, claiming that the block was defective. 

Although its products are sold “as is,” KRE offered to retrieve the block from 

Virginia and bring it back to KRE’s Ohio office for inspection. KRE and Roberts 

agreed that if KRE could verify that the product was defective, it would buy back 

the engine block at the price paid by Roberts. 

{¶ 5} KRE’s inspection revealed that after KRE had delivered the block 

to Roberts, substantial modifications had been made from the block’s original 

specifications. When KRE contacted Roberts and presented this information, 

Roberts admitted that Central Virginia Machine had altered the block. Because 

KRE believed that Roberts’s modifications were the cause of the defects, it 

declined to buy back the block and instead shipped it back to Roberts in Virginia. 

{¶ 6} Roberts was dissatisfied. As a result, from October 18, 2006, 

through November 2006, Roberts posted numerous rancorous criticisms of KRE 

on various websites devoted to automobile racing equipment and related subjects. 

His commentary appeared on the public-forum section of the websites 

PerformanceYears.com and PontiacStreetPerformance.com and in an item 

description on the Internet auction website, eBay Motors. 

{¶ 7} Roberts sought to affect KRE’s reputation. In an October 18, 2006 

post on the PerformanceYears.com website, Roberts wrote: 

{¶ 8} “Bought a MR-1 Block from Kauffman in march [sic] of this year 

* * * 

{¶ 9} “Now, I have and have had since the day the block was delivered, 

a USELESS BLOCK. I didn’t say worthless! I plan to get a lot of mileage out of 

it[.] And when i’m [sic] done Steve Kauffman will be able to attest to its worth." 

(Capitalization sic.) 

{¶ 10} Later the same day, Roberts added: 
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{¶ 11} “I did send it back. They still have it. Steve Kauffman admitted 

on the phone that he got similar numbers on the sonic test as i [sic] did but he 

won’t take it back because I did some work to it and have had it to [sic] long. I 

guess it doesn’t matter that the day I got it all of the defects exsisted [sic] and 

nothing I have done caused them. But don’t worry about that. What I loose [sic] 

in dollars I will make up in entertainment at their expence [sic].” (Boldface sic.) 

{¶ 12} The following day, October 19, 2006, Roberts wrote: 

{¶ 13} “You don’t seem to understand. As far as Steve kauffinan [sic] is 

concerned the issue is resolved. * * * Again, this is not to get a resolution. I have 

a much bigger and dastardly plan than that and this is the perfect place to start. * * 

* (LOL) * * * Here is another good board to visit! * * * Just trying to help other 

potential victims.” (Emoticons omitted.) 

{¶ 14} On the eBay Motors auction site, Roberts ostensibly listed the 

block for sale. In the item description, he wrote: 

{¶ 15} “This is a Kauffman MR-1 Block. It has some real issues. * * * 

Steve Kaufmann [sic] says it’s the best aftermarket block out there for a Pontiac, 

but I now know better. * * * Basically this block is junk and I have bought an IAII block to replace it. It has never been assembled. * * * Also the service you 

would get from Steve Kauffman of K&M performance is less than honorable. I 

brought the issues to his attention and he basically gave me the middle finger 

salute. He would not take it back because I had it for more than 90 days. I will 

never do business with Kauffman or KRE again. Not just because of the block 

issues but mostly the lack of service issues. E-mail me and I will tell you the 

whole story. However the block (junk) is for sale ‘as is’!” 

{¶ 16} Roberts explained his eBay Motors auction in another post on 

PerformanceYears.com: 

{¶ 17} “As far as the block on e-bay. Thats [sic] nothing more than 

getting the FACTS out to more people. Do you believe anyone will read that add 
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[sic] and buy it? I can assure you this block issue is faaaaar from over. Do you 

think I would spread this around like I have and plan to if I thought I couldn’t 

back EVERYTHING up? 

{¶ 18} “Again, I am not here to stir any pots. I posted facts I can back up 

100%. I can’t control what others say or do!” (Capitalization sic.) 

{¶ 19} Steve Kauffman of KRE personally received separate inquiries 

regarding Roberts’s Internet postings from at least five Ohio residents. 

{¶ 20} Consequently, KRE filed a complaint in Knox County Court of 

Common Pleas seeking money damages from Roberts for defamation and 

intentional interference with contracts and business relationships. The trial court 

granted Roberts’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on June 1, 

2007, and dismissed KRE’s complaint. 

{¶ 21} KRE appealed. The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the 

trial court’s judgment. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, Knox App. 

No. 07-CA-14, 2008-Ohio-1922, ¶ 36. The court of appeals held that the Ohio 

long-arm statute and Civ.R. 4.3(A) confer jurisdiction on the trial court and that 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Roberts did not deprive him of his right 

to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Id. at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 22} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 

discretionary appeal. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 119 Ohio St.3d 

1471, 2008-Ohio-4911, 894 N.E.2d 331. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 23} This case emanates from comments Roberts allegedly made on the 

Internet. Does this fact affect the way this court should approach the 

jurisdictional question? In this case, we think not. 

{¶ 24} Over 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged 

that jurisdictional jurisprudence must evolve alongside technological 
January Term, 2010 

5 

developments: “As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce 

between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a 

similar increase.” Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235, 250-251, 78 S.Ct. 

1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283. Along comes the Internet, and with it, the opportunity for 

civil disputes has greatly expanded. “As [Internet] availability expands, the 

opportunity for civil disputes could expand proportionately, meaning that the 

American court system will be called upon to adjudicate an even greater number 

of cases. Since these cases will be predicated on Internet activity, the parties often 

will be from different parts of the country, or even from different countries. As a 

threshold issue, courts must decide whether such cases are properly before them.” 

Scott T. Jansen, Oh, What a Tangled Web * * * The Continuing Evolution of 

Personal Jurisdiction Derived from Internet-Based Contacts (2006), 71 Mo.L.Rev. 

177, 180. 

{¶ 25} The rise in Internet-related disputes does not mean courts should 

ignore traditional jurisdiction principles. “ ‘[T]he Internet does not pose unique 

jurisdictional challenges. People have been inflicting injury on each other from 

afar for a long time. Although the Internet may have increased the quantity of 

these occurrences, it has not created problems that are qualitatively more 

difficult.’ ” Jansen, 71 Mo.L.Rev. at 182, 183, quoting Allen R. Stein, 

Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through 

the Lens of Regulatory Precision (2004), 98 Nw.U.L.Rev. 411. 

{¶ 26} In some cases involving the Internet, the Zippo test, developed in 

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (W.D.Pa.1997), 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124, 

has been employed to determine whether Internet activity between the defendant 

and the forum state establishes jurisdiction. The court established a “sliding 

scale” approach to Internet-based jurisdiction whereby the level of interactivity of 

the website is examined to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

is proper. At one end of the scale are “situations where a defendant clearly does 
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business over the Internet.” Id. “A defendant purposefully avails itself of the 

privilege of acting in a state through its website if the website is interactive to a 

degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the state.” 

Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc. (C.A.6, 2002), 282 F.3d 883, 890. At 

the other end of the Zippo scale are informational websites. Zippo, 952 F.Supp.2d 

at 1124. But as Roberts points out in his brief, “[t]he Zippo model was developed 

in a commercial or business context and is factually distinct from this case.” 

When the Internet activity in question “is non-commercial in nature, the Zippo

analysis * * * offers little to supplement the traditional framework for considering 

questions of personal jurisdiction.” Oasis Corp. v. Judd (S.D.Ohio 2001), 132 F. 

Supp.2d 612, 622, fn. 9, citing Mink v. AAAA Dev. L.L.C., (C.A.5, 1999), 190 

F.3d 333, 336. We continue, then, with a traditional jurisdictional analysis. 

{¶ 27} Personal jurisdiction is a question of law that appellate courts 

review de novo. In this case, upon Roberts’s motion to dismiss, it became KRE’s 

burden to show that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Roberts; because 

the trial court decided Roberts’s Civ.R. 12(B)(2) motion upon written submissions 

and without an evidentiary hearing, KRE had to make only a prima facie showing 

of jurisdiction. Fallang v. Hickey (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 532 N.E.2d 

117. In making its determination, the court must “view allegations in the 

pleadings and the documentary evidence in a light most favorable” to the plaintiff 

and resolving all reasonable competing inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 

Goldstein v. Christiansen (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541. 

{¶ 28} Determining whether an Ohio trial court has personal jurisdiction 

over a nonresident defendant involves a two-step analysis: (1) whether the longarm statute and the applicable rule of civil procedure confer jurisdiction and, if so, 

(2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the nonresident defendant 

of the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. U.S. Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s 
January Term, 2010 

7 

Foods, Inc. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183-184, 624 N.E.2d 1048. We address 

those two factors in turn. 

{¶ 29} Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, enumerates specific acts 

that give rise to personal jurisdiction and provides: 

{¶ 30} “(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who 

acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s: 

{¶ 31} “* * * 

{¶ 32} “(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 

{¶ 33} “ * * * 

{¶ 34} “(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act 

outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might 

reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this 

state.” 

{¶ 35} Civ.R. 4.3 allows service of process on nonresidents in certain 

circumstances and mirrors the long-arm statute: 

{¶ 36} “(A) Service of process may be made outside of this state, as 

provided in this rule, in any action in this state, upon a person who, at the time of 

service of process, is a nonresident of this state or is a resident of this state who is 

absent from this state. ‘Person’ includes an individual * * * who, acting directly 

or by an agent, has caused an event to occur out of which the claim that is the 

subject of the complaint arose, from the person's: 

{¶ 37} “ * * * 

{¶ 38} “(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state, 

including, but not limited to, actions arising out of the ownership, operation, or 

use of a motor vehicle or aircraft in this state; 

{¶ 39} “ * * * 

{¶ 40} “(9) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act 

outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when the person 
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to be served might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured 

by the act in this state.” 

{¶ 41} Roberts contends that Ohio’s long-arm statute does not confer 

personal jurisdiction because he did not direct the alleged tortious statements to 

Ohio or publish them here. Despite the fact that Roberts’s publication of his 

comments did not emanate from Ohio, those comments were received in Ohio. 

KRE submitted evidence that at least five Ohio residents had seen the comments 

posted by Roberts. In Fallang, 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 532 N.E.2d 117, paragraph 

one of the syllabus, this court held, “Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3) authorizes assertion of 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a defamation action when 

publication of the offending communication occurs in Ohio.” In Fallang, the 

defendant had written an allegedly defamatory letter and had sent it to a person in 

Ohio. “The tort of libel occurs in the locale where the offending material is 

circulated (published) by the defendant to a third party. Keeton v. Hustler 

Magazine, Inc. (1984), 465 U.S. 770, 777, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790. In the 

instant case, [the defamatory] letter was published in Ohio by virtue of its receipt 

through the mail. Thus, under the principle announced in Keeton, supra, the tort 

was committed in Ohio.” Fallang, 40 Ohio St.3d at 107, 532 N.E.2d 117. 

{¶ 42} Roberts posted his allegedly defamatory statements on the Internet, 

ostensibly for the entire world to see. How much of the world saw the comments 

is unknown; but we do know that at least five Ohioans saw Roberts’s statements. 

The comments were thus published in Ohio. Because Roberts’s allegedly 

defamatory statements were published in Ohio, his alleged tort was committed in 

Ohio, and he falls within the grasp of R.C. 2307.382(A)(3) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(3). 

{¶ 43} But even if Roberts did not publish or circulate his statements 

within the territorial boundaries of Ohio, he is not shielded from the reach of 

Ohio’s long arm. “R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(9) permit a court to 

exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant and provide for 
January Term, 2010 

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service of process to effectuate that jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from a 

tortious act committed outside Ohio with the purpose of injuring persons, when 

the nonresident defendant might reasonably have expected that some person 

would be injured thereby in Ohio.” Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 

313, 695 N.E.2d 751. 

{¶ 44} Thus, even if we assume that Roberts’s alleged tortious conduct 

did not take place within the territorial boundaries of Ohio, he nonetheless “might 

reasonably have expected that [KRE] would be injured thereby in this state.” 

R.C. 2307.382(A)(6). When defamatory statements regarding an Ohio plaintiff 

are made outside the state yet with the purpose of causing injury to the Ohio 

resident and there is a reasonable expectation that the purposefully inflicted injury 

will occur in Ohio, the requirements of R.C. 2307.382(A)(6) are satisfied. It is 

clear from the postings that Roberts’s statements were made with the purpose of 

injuring KRE. Therefore, the long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over Roberts in Ohio. 

{¶ 45} Ohio’s long-arm statute is not coterminous with due process. 

Goldstein, 70 Ohio St.3d at 238, 638 N.E.2d 541, fn. 1. Therefore, although 

Ohio’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over Roberts, an Ohio court 

cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Roberts if doing so would violate his 

constitutional right to due process. The United States Supreme Court noted in 

Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington that due process is satisfied if the defendant has 

“minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit 

does not offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” 

(1945), 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, quoting Milliken v. Meyer

(1940), 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278. The minimum-contacts 

requirement is met when a nonresident defendant “purposefully avails [himself] 

of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Hanson, 357 

U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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{¶ 46} Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific, depending 

upon the nature of the contacts that the defendant has with the forum state. Conti 

v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp. (C.A.6, 1992), 977 F.2d 978, 981. “General 

jurisdiction is proper only where ‘a defendant's contacts with the forum state are 

of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant's 

contacts with the state.’ ” Bird v. Parsons (C.A.6, 2002), 289 F.3d 865, 873, 

quoting Third Natl. Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc. (C.A.6, 1989), 882 

F.2d 1087, 1089. KRE does not allege that Roberts has continuous and 

systematic contacts in Ohio such that he would be amenable to jurisdiction for 

claims arising outside of Ohio. 

{¶ 47} Instead, KRE asserts that Ohio has specific jurisdiction over 

Roberts. Specific jurisdiction applies when “a State exercises personal jurisdiction 

over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with 

the forum.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984), 466 U.S. 

408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, fn. 8. KRE alleges that its cause of 

action is related to or arises out of the defendant's contact with Ohio. 

{¶ 48} In Bird, the court held that specific jurisdiction “is permissible 

only if [a defendant’s] contacts with Ohio satisfy the three-part test that this court 

established in Southern Machine Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 

374, 381 (6th Cir.1968): 

{¶ 49} “ ‘First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the 

privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. 

Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities there. 

Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must 

have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of 

jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.’ ” Bird, 289 F.3d at 874. 
January Term, 2010 

11 

{¶ 50} In this case, we, too, employ the three-part test from S. Machine, 

401 F.2d at 381, in determining whether specific jurisdiction here is consistent 

with due process. 

{¶ 51} The first S. Machine factor is whether the defendant purposefully 

availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a 

consequence in the forum state. “Purposeful availment” is present when the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum state “proximately result from actions by the 

defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” 

(Emphasis sic.) Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 

S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, quoting McGee v. Internatl. Life Ins. Co. (1957), 355 

U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223. The defendant’s conduct and 

connection with the forum must be such that he “ ‘should reasonably anticipate 

being haled into court there.’ ” Id. at 474, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 

v. Woodson, (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490. “This 

‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into 

a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts,” 

id. at 475, citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790, or of 

the “ ‘unilateral activity of another party or third person,’ ” id., quoting 

Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 417, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404. In 

certain circumstances, the “plaintiff’s residence in the forum may, because of 

defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, enhance the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum. Plaintiff’s residence may be the focus of the activities of the defendant 

out of which the suit arises.” Keeton, 465 U.S. 770 at 780, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 

L.Ed.2d 790. 

{¶ 52} This is a defamation case. The United States Supreme Court 

addressed purposeful availment in regard to jurisdiction in defamation cases in 

Calder v. Jones (1984), 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804. In 

Calder, a California resident and actress, Shirley Jones, brought a libel action in 
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California against Florida-resident employees of the National Enquirer, a Florida 

corporation. Id. at 785. The defendants were the writer and editor of an article 

that was written in Florida and appeared in the National Enquirer, alleging that 

Jones drank so heavily that she was unable to fulfill her professional obligations. 

Id. at 785-786, 788-789, fn. 9. The court held that jurisdiction was proper in 

California because “[t]he allegedly libelous story concerned the California 

activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an 

entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was 

drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms of [Jones’s] 

emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in 

California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm 

suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on 

the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id at 788-789. 

{¶ 53} The defendants argued that California lacked personal jurisdiction 

over them because it was their publisher that was responsible for the circulation of 

the article in California, not they. The defendants analogized themselves to 

welders employed in Florida who worked on a boiler that subsequently exploded 

in California. They argued that although jurisdiction would be proper over the 

manufacturer, it should not be applied to welders, who have no control over and 

derive no direct benefit from their employer’s sales in another state. 

{¶ 54} The court exploded the defendants’ boiler analogy, focusing on the 

targeted nature of their activity: 

{¶ 55} “Whatever the status of their hypothetical welder, petitioners are 

not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional, and 

allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South 

wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a 

potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of 

that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works 
January Term, 2010 

13 

and in which the National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the 

circumstances, petitioners must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court 

there’ to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article. World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 

490; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1699-1700, 56 

L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2586, 

53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). An individual injured in California need not go to Florida 

to seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause 

the injury in California.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-790, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 

804. 

{¶ 56} To rephrase the court’s conclusion in Calder in a question, should 

a company injured in Ohio need to go to Virginia to seek redress from a person 

who, though remaining in Virginia, knowingly caused injury in Ohio? Like the 

defendants in Calder, Roberts is not alleged to have engaged in untargeted 

negligence. Roberts’s Internet commentary reveals a blatant intent to harm 

KRE’s reputation. Roberts knew that KRE was an Ohio company. Roberts 

impugned the activities that KRE undertakes in Ohio. Roberts hoped that his 

commentary would have a devastating effect on KRE and that if there were 

fallout from his comments, the brunt of the harm would be suffered in Ohio. 

{¶ 57} The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Calder “effects” 

test narrowly in Reynolds v. Internatl. Amateur Athletic Fedn. (1994), 23 F.3d 

1110. In that case, Butch Reynolds, an Olympic gold-medal-winning track star 

from Ohio, brought a defamation claim against the International Amateur Athletic 

Federation (“IAAF”) for its publication of a press release announcing that 

following a Monte Carlo track meet, Reynolds had tested positive for banned 

substances. Reynolds alleged personal jurisdiction against the nonresident 

defendant, IAAF, because its defamatory acts had brought injury to Reynolds in 

Ohio. 
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{¶ 58} The court held: 

{¶ 59} “We find Calder distinguishable for several reasons. First, the 

press release concerned Reynolds' activities in Monaco, not Ohio. Second, the 

source of the controversial report was the drug sample taken in Monaco and the 

laboratory testing in France. Third, Reynolds is an international athlete whose 

professional reputation is not centered in Ohio. Fourth, the defendant itself did 

not publish or circulate the report in Ohio; Ohio periodicals disseminated the 

report. Fifth, Ohio was not the ‘focal point’ of the press release. The fact that the 

IAAF could foresee that the report would be circulated and have an effect in Ohio 

is not, in itself, enough to create personal jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen 

Corp., 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566[, 62 L.Ed.2d 490]. Finally, although 

Reynolds lost Ohio corporate-endorsement contracts and appearance fees in Ohio, 

there is no evidence that the IAAF knew of the contracts or of their Ohio origin. 

Calder is a much more compelling case for finding personal jurisdiction.” 

Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1120. 

{¶ 60} The within case is much closer to Calder than it is to Reynolds. 

The distinguishing aspects in Reynolds are not at play here. Unlike the IAAF’s 

statements about Reynolds’s Monaco drug test, Roberts’s statements concerned 

KRE’s Ohio activities – the manufacture and postsale inspection of the engine 

block. Unlike Reynolds, who ran races throughout the world, KRE’s reputation is 

centered in Ohio, where it performs all its work. Also, Roberts’s Internet postings 

were published to Ohio residents by Roberts, not by third parties. In sum, the 

facts of this case square with Calder rather than Reynolds. 

{¶ 61} We note that neither Calder nor Reynolds involved Internet 

communication of the allegedly defamatory material. Two cases from the Sixth 

Circuit do involve defamation cases arising from Internet activity; in both cases, 

courts attempt to determine whether the case is closer to Calder or to Reynolds. 
January Term, 2010 

15 

{¶ 62} In Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann (C.A.6, 2005), 123 Fed.Appx. 675, 

Schlichtmann, of Massachusetts, created a website to reveal what he believed to 

be the unlawful activities of Cadle, an Ohio-based debt collector, in 

Massachusetts. Cadle filed suit in Ohio for defamation. The court, while 

proclaiming that Schlichtmann’s operation of a website would alone be 

insufficient to establish jurisdiction, did acknowledge that Schlichtmann’s 

statements on the website may be sufficient to justify jurisdiction. Id. at 678-679. 

The court, in determining whether the defendant’s Internet statements gave rise to 

the exercise of personal jurisdiction, then looked to Calder and Reynolds and 

distinguished the two cases. Finding the facts more like those in Reynolds, the 

court declined to assert personal jurisdiction because the alleged defamatory 

statements were not related to any activities Cadle undertook in Ohio. Id. at 680. 

In contrast, in this case, Roberts’s posts were premised solely on the activities of 

KRE in Ohio.

{¶ 63} In Oasis Corp., 132 F.Supp.2d 612, Oklahoma residents had 

launched a “gripe site” concerning the products of an Ohio corporation. Id. at 614. 

The Oklahoma residents had not purchased any item from Oasis, but were upset 

that an Oasis water cooler had caused a fire in a building the defendants were 

renting. Id. The district court declined to exercise personal jurisdiction because 

there was no evidence to suggest that the defendants’ communications were 

received by anyone in Ohio other than the plaintiff. Id. at 621. Further, the court 

found more of a tie to Reynolds than to Calder: 

{¶ 64} “The facts of this case much more closely resemble Reynolds than 

Calder. First, Defendants claim on their site that a defective Oasis water cooler 

started a fire in Oklahoma, not Ohio. Second, Oasis is an international company 

whose reputation is not centered in Ohio. Third, Defendants’ site does not 

specifically target an Ohio audience. As in Reynolds, ‘[t]he fact that [Defendants] 

could foresee that [their proclamations would be viewed] and have an effect in 
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16 

Ohio is not, in itself, enough to create personal jurisdiction.’ ” Id. at 624, quoting 

Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1120. 

{¶ 65} In contrast to the plaintiff in Oasis Corp., Kauffman has alleged – 

and produced at least some evidence – that the alleged defamatory statements 

were communicated to Ohio residents other than Kauffman. Kauffman received 

inquiries from at least five Ohio residents who read the Roberts postings. 

Moreover, KRE is an Ohio-based company whose reputation is centered in Ohio 

and that had engaged in commercial activity with Roberts before the controversy. 

{¶ 66} The Calder effects test is not beyond reproach. It has been called 

“the source of considerable uncertainty because Internet-based activity can 

ordinarily be said to cause effects in most jurisdictions.” Michael A. Geist, Is 

There a There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction (2001), 16 

Berkeley Tech.L.J. 1345, 1381. We find this criticism to be invalid. The effects 

analysis necessitates conduct “calculated to cause injury” in a “focal point” where 

the “brunt” of the injury is experienced. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-791, 104 S.Ct. 

1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804. “While the effects of Internet conduct may be felt in many 

[forums], the intent requirement allows a court to find a particular focal point.” 

Jansen, 71 Mo.L.Rev. at 192. 

{¶ 67} Roberts argues that mere foreseeability by a nonresident defendant 

of the effects in the forum state is insufficient to justify the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction. Roberts’s reliance on this conclusion is inapposite because the 

effects of his conduct went well beyond foreseeability: Roberts intended the 

effects of his conduct to be felt in Ohio. His statements were communicated with 

the very purpose of having their consequences felt by KRE in Ohio. The 

contention that his statements were not made with the purpose of injuring some 

person in Ohio is unavailing. The postings themselves indicate his purpose of 

injuring Kauffman. For example, on his October 18, 2006, posting, Roberts 

stated: “What I loose [sic] in dollars I will make up in entertainment at their 
January Term, 2010 

17 

expence [sic].” On October 19, 2006, he wrote: “Again, this is not to get a 

resolution. I have a much bigger and dastardly plan than that and this is a good 

place to start.” Many of the postings name Kauffman directly and specifically 

mention Ohio. 

{¶ 68} Here, Roberts not only knew that Ohio resident KRE could be the 

victim, he intended that it be the victim. The allegedly defamatory 

communications concerned KRE’s activities in Ohio. We are not dealing with a 

situation in which jurisdiction is premised on a single, isolated transaction. The 

posts detailed the transactions between Roberts and KRE. Moreover, the 

purchase of the engine block and subsequent transfers from Virginia to Ohio and 

back again served as the foundation from which this dispute arose. Roberts’s 

allegedly defamatory posts were predicated on his course of dealing with an Ohio 

resident corporation. At least five Ohio residents other than Kauffman read these 

postings. Finally, although KRE does business nationwide, its business reputation 

is centered in Ohio, because Ohio is the location of its sole base of operations. 

Roberts knew, and in fact intended, that the brunt of the harm caused be felt by 

KRE in Ohio. Thus, the focal point of the damage was Ohio, and Roberts’s 

actions therefore fulfill the requirement of causing a consequence in Ohio. 

{¶ 69} Here, KRE has made a prima facie showing that Roberts 

purposefully availed himself of Ohio law. When viewed in a light most favorable 

to KRE, the evidence shows that Roberts intentionally and tortiously sought to 

harm KRE’s reputation and negatively affect its contracts and business 

relationships. Therefore, KRE meets the first of the S. Machine factors. 

{¶ 70} Having recognized Roberts’s contacts in Ohio, we now address the 

second S. Machine prong, which involves an analysis of whether KRE’s claims 

arise from those contacts. “If a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are 

related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to 

have arisen from those contacts.” CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson (C.A.6, 1996), 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

89 F.3d 1257, 1267. This “does not require that the cause of action formally 

‘arise from’ defendant's contacts with the forum; rather, this criterion requires 

only ‘that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection 

with the defendant's in-state activities.’ ” (Emphasis added in Third Natl.) Third 

Natl. Bank, 882 F.2d at 1091, quoting S. Machine Co., 401 F.2d at 384, fn. 27. 

Further, a “lenient standard * * * applies when evaluating the ‘arising from’ 

criterion.” Bird, 289 F.3d at 875. Under this standard, KRE has made a prima 

facie showing that the cause of action arose from Roberts’s contacts with Ohio. 

Not only does the cause of action arise from defamatory statements, those 

statements themselves are predicated on the business dealings between Roberts 

and KRE. The catalyst for Roberts’s actions was his Ohio contacts. In fact, but 

for his contacts with Ohio, Roberts’s allegedly defamatory statements would not 

have been posted.

{¶ 71} Under the third and final prong of the S. Machine test, the acts of 

the nonresident defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a 

substantial connection with the forum state to make exercise of jurisdiction over 

the defendant reasonable. When “the first two elements of a prima facie case [are 

satisfied] then an inference arises that this third factor is also present.” 

CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1268, citing Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn (C.A.6, 

1988), 839 F.2d 1164, 1170. “ ‘[O]nly the unusual case will not meet this third 

criterion.’ ” Am. Greetings, 839 F.2d at 1170, quoting First Natl. Bank of 

Louisville v. J.W. Brewer Tire Co. (C.A.6, 1982), 680 F.2d 1123, 1126. 

{¶ 72} A number of factors are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. A 

court first must consider Ohio’s interest in the controversy. In-Flight Devices 

Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc. (C.A.6, 1972), 466 F.2d 220, 232. “[I]t is beyond 

dispute that [a forum state] has a significant interest in redressing injuries that 

actually occur within the State.” Keeton, 465 U.S at 776, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 

L.Ed.2d 790. “Ohio has a legitimate interest in protecting the business interests of 
January Term, 2010 

19 

its citizens * * *.” Bird, 289 F.3d at 875. “The United States Supreme Court has 

indicated that a high degree of unfairness is required to erect a constitutional 

barrier against jurisdiction. * * * This is especially true in a case (such as the one 

herein) in which the defendant has intentionally directed his activity at forum 

residents * * *, and the ‘effects’ of the activity occur in the forum state. Calder v. 

Jones, [465 U.S.] at 788-789 [104 S.Ct. at 1486-87, 79 L.Ed.2d 804].” Fallang, 

40 Ohio St.3d at 108, 532 N.E.2d 117. KRE and Ohio clearly have an interest in 

KRE’s obtaining the relief sought, and Ohio is the appropriate forum. 

{¶ 73} We conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over Roberts in this 

case is reasonable, satisfying the third part of the S. Machine test.

Conclusion 

{¶ 74} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to KRE, we 

conclude that Ohio’s long-arm statute and the applicable rule of civil procedure 

confer jurisdiction over Roberts and that an exercise of jurisdiction of the trial 

court would not deprive this nonresident defendant of the right to due process of 

law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. KRE has 

made a sufficient showing that Roberts caused tortious injury in this state by acts 

committed outside of Ohio with the purpose of injuring KRE. His 

communications specifically targeted a known Ohio resident, and the cause of 

action arises from the substantial connection Roberts made with Ohio through his 

course of dealing with KRE. We decline to allow a nonresident defendant to take 

advantage of the conveniences that modern technology affords and 

simultaneously be shielded from the consequences of his intentionally tortious 

conduct. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 

 BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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__________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 75} Respectfully, I dissent. Today, the majority has extended the 

personal jurisdiction of Ohio courts to cover any individual in any state who 

purchases a product from an Ohio company and posts a criticism of it on the 

Internet with the intent to damage the seller. This holding changes long-arm 

jurisdiction dramatically. In my view, because minimum contacts with Ohio are 

not present in all such circumstances, the majority’s holding does not withstand 

due process scrutiny. 

{¶ 76} “[T]he constitutional touchstone [of long-arm jurisdiction] remains 

whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum 

State.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 

2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528. While the majority focuses on the fact that Roberts could 

foresee and even intended to cause injury to Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C. 

(“KRE”), an Ohio company, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently 

held that this kind of foreseeability is not a ‘sufficient benchmark’ for exercising 

personal jurisdiction.” Id., quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

(1980), 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490. Rather, personal 

jurisdiction is proper if the defendant’s conduct and connections with the forum 

state “proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a 

‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 475, 

quoting McGee v. Internatl. Life Ins. Co. (1957), 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S. Ct. 

199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223. The defendant’s actions must have created that connection to 

such a degree that he “ ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’ 

” Id., quoting World-Wide Volkswagen at 297. When the defendant does not 

have an ongoing relationship with the forum state, a defendant must deliberately 

engage in significant activities within that state and “ ‘purposefully direct[]’ his 

activities at residents of the forum” to satisfy this standard. Id. at 472, quoting 
January Term, 2010 

21 

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984), 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 

L.E.2d 790; see also Anilas, Inc. v. Kern (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 163, 164, 31 OBR 

366, 509 N.E.2d 1267 (“the focus of analysis ought to be whether one purposely

established contacts with the forum state,” [emphasis sic]). 

{¶ 77} Relying primarily on Calder v. Jones (1984), 465 U.S. 783, 104 

S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804, the majority concludes that Roberts exercised 

minimum contacts with Ohio sufficient to satisfy due process because he posted 

defamatory comments relating to a consumer transaction with KRE on three 

websites, intending them to have effects felt in Ohio, and the evidence indicates 

that five identified Ohio residents read them. However, Calder does not 

conclusively confer jurisdiction in the forum state simply because the defendant’s 

intended effects of the communication are felt in that state. Rather, the court in 

Calder considered the location of the injury and the pervasive nature of the 

contact when assessing whether the defendants had the minimum contacts with 

the forum state. The court stressed that the newspaper in which the article 

appeared, the National Enquirer, had its largest circulation, almost twice that in 

any other state, in California, where the plaintiff resided. It was that detail 

coupled with the fact that the person about whom the article was written lived and 

would suffer injury in California that rendered California the focal point of the 

publication. Based upon those facts, the court identified minimum contacts 

sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants could “reasonably anticipate being 

haled into court there.” Id. at 790, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 

297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490. 

{¶ 78} But the facts of this case are easily distinguishable from those in 

Calder. Here, Roberts posted his comments on three general auto-racing websites 

and an auction site, none of which have any specific connection to Ohio or are 

more likely to be viewed by a resident of Ohio than by a resident of any other 

state. In fact, KRE could identify only five Ohio residents it believes actually 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

viewed Roberts’s comments. In Calder, on the other hand, the National Enquirer 

sold approximately 600,000 copies of the offending article in the forum state. 

Calder, 465 U.S. at 785, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804. The reach of Roberts’s 

comments to Ohio residents is not at all comparable to the reach of the National 

Enquirer’s circulation to California residents. 

{¶ 79} By merely posting to general websites, Roberts neither deliberately 

engaged in significant activities within Ohio nor purposefully directed his 

activities at an Ohio resident sufficient to establish minimum contacts and satisfy 

due process — regardless of his intent.1

 See, e.g., Oasis Corp. v. Judd (S.D.Ohio 

2001), 132 F. Supp.2d 612, 623 (declining to find jurisdiction because “[t]he 

computers hosting Defendants’ [web]site are not located in Ohio, there has been 

no meaningful interactivity between the site and a significant number of Ohioans, 

and the site is not directed toward an Ohio audience * * *”); see also Young v. 

New Haven Advocate (C.A.4, 2002), 315 F.3d 256, 263 (“the fact that the 

newspapers’ websites could be accessed anywhere, including Virginia, does not 

by itself demonstrate that the newspapers were intentionally directing their 

website content to a Virginia audience”). While it is evident from Roberts’s 

Internet posts that he sought to discourage others from purchasing KRE’s 

products, any individual who posts a negative review of a product or service in a 

public forum arguably seeks the same objective. Subjecting all individuals to suit 

in Ohio who post Internet reviews — no matter how scathing — of purchases 

 

1. The majority does not find sufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction based solely on the parties’ 

underlying transaction, nor should it. See Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 314, 695 

N.E.2d 751, 756, quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L.E.2d 528 (finding 

that an in-state plaintiff's contract with an out-of-state defendant, standing alone, does not establish 

sufficient minimum contacts and that “ ‘prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, 

along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing’ ” must be 

considered). Here, while the transaction involved the purchase and return of a product, there is no 

evidence that the parties expressly or implicitly contemplated future consequences or a longer 

relationship. 
January Term, 2010 

23 

made from Ohio companies does not comport with the due process notions of 

“fair play and substantial justice.” Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, Office of 

Unemp. & Placement (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. 

{¶ 80} The foreseeability of causing injury to an Ohio company, whether 

the injury is intended or not, without directing activity at forum residents, is not 

sufficient to establish minimum contacts. See Burger King,471 U.S. at 474, 105 

S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528; see also New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d at 263 

(narrowly construing Calder and holding that “[t]he newspapers must, through the 

Internet postings, manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers”). 

Notwithstanding this traditional jurisdictional principle, the majority has provided 

an avenue for any affected Ohioan to sue the originator of any negative Internet 

post in an Ohio court when the product has been purchased in Ohio and the 

negative post is read by an Ohio resident. But this standard falls far short of due 

process. 

{¶ 81} Since this case is limited to the jurisdictional aspects of the 

litigation, the parties have not briefed, nor has the court addressed, the First 

Amendment rights of those who post comments on the Internet. The Supreme 

Court of the United States in Calder “reject[ed] the suggestion that First 

Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis [and] declined * * * to 

grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions 

in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws.” 

Calder, 465 U.S. at 790-791, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804. Nonetheless, the 

practical impact of the majority’s holding in this case is to unnecessarily chill the 

exercise of free speech. 

{¶ 82} Because Roberts’s conduct does not establish minimum contacts 

with Ohio sufficient to comport with due process, I would reverse the judgment of 

the court of appeals. 

 LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

__________________ 

 Brett Jaffe and Dennis C. Belli, for appellee. 

 Kepko & Phillips Co., L.P.A., William J. Kepko, and Sherry M. Phillips, 

for appellant. 

_____________________