Israel’s Attack on Osiraq: 

A Model for Future Preventive 

Strikes? 

Peter S. Ford 

INSS Occasional Paper 59 

July 2005 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of 

the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The 

paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: 

Peter S. Ford, Major, USAF, is an experienced fighter pilot with 

over 2,000 hours and more than 400 combat hours. He is currently 

assigned as an Operational Test and Evaluation Instructor Pilot in 

the F-15C at Nellis AFB, NV. He is a graduate of the US Air Force 

Academy. A graduate of the US Air Force Weapons Instructor 

Course, he has served in several operational assignments, most 

recently as a weapons officer in the PACAF theater at Kadena AB, 

Japan. He recently completed a Master of Arts in Security Studies 

(Defense Decision-Making and Planning) at the Naval 

Postgraduate School where he completed this thesis. During his 

course of study he traveled to Israel and interviewed several senior 

policymakers regarding the Osiraq attack and Israel's Counterproliferation doctrine.

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

 Background 1 

 Sources 3 

 Key Findings 3 

 Organization 4 

Anatomy of a Decision 5 

 Setting the Stage 6 

 Know Your Enemy 9 

 Out of Options 12 

 Conclusion 22 

The Attack 22 

 Setting the Stage 23 

 Choices...Choices 28 

 Launch the Fleet! 32 

 Conclusion 38 

Effects and Aftermath 38 

 Setting the Stage 39 

 Bomb Damage 44 

 The Value of Preventive Strikes 48 

 Conclusion 53 

Conclusion 53 

 Summary of Findings 53 

 Policy Recommendations 55 

References 57 

Notes 59 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this fifty-ninth volume in the 

Occasional Paper series of the United States Air Force Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS). The 1981 Israeli air raid on the 

Osiraq nuclear reactor to delay or destroy Iraq’s nuclear weapons 

program is often raised as a possible model for preventive strike and 

direct action counterproliferation. In this paper, Peter Ford presents 

that raid in both strategic and operational detail, directly addressing 

its wider applicability as a model for contemporary military action. 

Ford reviews the operational details of mission planning and 

execution as seen through a pilot’s eyes, but he also reviews the 

larger context of Israeli decisions and actions from both the 

domestic and international perspectives. Upon that history, he 

overlays a policy template to draw broader lessons and cautions for 

those contemplating preventive strikes in other contexts. The 

conclusion that they can, at best, buy time for other policy tools and 

efforts should not be lost on security planners today. This is a 

highly useful case study for the military classroom, and it also 

serves as a policy primer for practitioners at all levels. 

About the Institute

INSS is primarily sponsored by the Strategic Security 

Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF/XOS), and the 

Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Other sponsors include the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); the Air Force 

Information Warfare Center (AFIWC); The Army Foreign Military 

Studies Office (FMSO); the Army Environmental Policy Institute 

(AEPI); the United States Northern Command/North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORTHCOM/NORAD); and the 

United States Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center 

(CTC). The mission of the Institute is “to promote national security 

research for the Department of Defense within the military 

academic community, to foster the development of strategic 

perspective within the United States Armed Forces, and to support 

national security discourse through outreach and education.” Its 

research focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our sponsors: 

arms control and strategic security, counterproliferation and force 

protection, homeland defense and combating terrorism, regional and 

emerging national security issues, air and space issues and 

planning, and information operations and warfare. 
viii

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, 

selects researchers from within the military academic community, 

and administers sponsored research. It reaches out to and partners 

with education and research organizations across and beyond the 

military academic community to bring broad focus to issues of 

national security interest. And it hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. In these ways, INSS 

facilitates valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our 

sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our 

research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Twenty-four years ago, Israeli fighter pilots destroyed the 

Osiraq nuclear reactor and made a profound statement about global 

nuclear proliferation. In light of the recent preventive regime 

change in Iraq, a review of this strike reveals timely lessons for 

future counterproliferation actions. Using old, new, and primary 

source evidence, this paper examines Osiraq for lessons from a 

preventive attack on a non-conventional target. 

Before attacking Osiraq, Israeli policymakers attempted 

diplomatic coercion to delay Iraq’s nuclear development. 

Concurrent with diplomatic actions, Israeli planners developed a 

state-of-the-art military plan to destroy Osiraq. Finally, Israeli 

leaders weathered the international storm after the strike. The paper 

examines Israeli decisionmaking for each of these phases. 

The paper draws two conclusions. First, preventive strikes are 

valuable primarily for two purposes: buying time and gaining 

international attention. Second, the strike provided a one-time 

benefit for Israel. Subsequent strikes will be less effective due to 

dispersed/hardened nuclear targets and limited intelligence. 
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ISRAEL’S ATTACK ON OSIRAQ: A MODEL FOR FUTURE 

PREVENTIVE STRIKES? 

INTRODUCTION 

Twenty-four years ago, Israeli fighter pilots whistled, relaxing in 

the relative calm of the 100-foot low-level ingress as they raced toward 

a date with destiny and a profound statement on global nuclear 

proliferation.1

 In less than 90 seconds, eight Israeli F-16s demolished 

the Osiraq nuclear reactor. Before exercising this military option, 

Israeli policy makers attempted seven years of diplomatic, overt, and 

covert actions to stop Iraq’s nuclear plans. Concurrent with its nonmilitary efforts, Israeli leaders planned a state-of-the-art military 

operation. The execution and timing of this strike held marked political 

risks together with the obvious military dangers. 

In light of the recent events, the Osiraq strike is important to 

current and future counterproliferation actions. Putting the Osiraq 

strike in perspective will confirm measures other nations may take 

before resorting to military counterproliferation actions. It also will 

indicate the level of success a second preventive strike can have. 

Background 

Israel’s attack on Osiraq was a bold preventive strike. It reinforced 

Israel’s doctrine regarding nuclear weapons. According to Menachem 

Begin, “Israel would not tolerate any nuclear weapons in the region.”2

 

Israel still espouses this “Begin Doctrine” today. This study determines 

lasting lessons from the first attack. These lessons are important as the 

world anticipates an Iranian nuclear weapon in several years.3

The purpose of the study is to determine the strategic implications 

of the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor complex. 

What are the lasting effects of using non-conventional weapons as a 

means of counterproliferation against a nuclear threat? The strike 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

2

“killed” the Iraqi nuclear capability in the short term, but did this action 

diminish the long-term nuclear threat to Israel? This watershed event 

in the Middle East created new regional military and political realities,4

forcing nuclear proliferators to harden nuclear facilities that increased 

the cost to any regional country of going nuclear. However, the longterm consequences of the attack are global. A preventive strike would 

no longer be so easy to get away with, nor would the required 

intelligence assessments about nuclear proliferators be as easy due to a 

near universal emphasis on denial and deception following the Osiraq 

raid. This paper identifies several lasting ramifications United States 

policy makers contend with resulting from this strike. 

The overarching question of this study is whether the Israeli strike 

on Osiraq was an effective counter to Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. 

Evaluating the strategic factors that drove Israel to attack Osiraq frames 

the problem. How and when Israeli policy makers carried out the strike 

reveals the empirical results. Finally, the short- and long-term military, 

political, and diplomatic results paint a more complete picture of the 

strategic implications of this strike. 

The study argues that the Osiraq strike had two major purposes. 

First, it slowed down the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Second, it 

achieved domestic political benefits at a critical juncture. The strike 

had several unintended consequences, however. Other nuclear 

proliferators hardened their nuclear facilities or sought redundant 

facilities. These efforts reduced the time succeeding preventive strikes 

would buy. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein did not sacrifice his goal of 

developing nuclear weapons, but he did significantly change tactics 

toward achieving this goal. Although the preventive strike had several 

short-term benefits, this action demonstrated that deterrence is not a 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

3

long-term effect of such strikes. In fact, it is more likely that a country 

will restart a nuclear weapons program as soon as it clears the rubble. 

Sources 

My study uncovers new information from personal interviews 

about the Osiraq mission and the domestic political interaction 

preceding the strike. Aside from these first-hand sources, the study 

draws from selected books on the subject. It also incorporates 

numerous scholarly articles, government documents, recently 

declassified information, foreign policy speeches, and media sources 

worldwide. 

Key Findings 

This study confirms the short-term benefits of a successful 

preventive strike. It also illustrates the long-term drawbacks a nation 

must be ready for prior to ordering a preventive strike. A successful 

preventive strike, especially a conventional weapons strike on a nonconventional site like Osiraq, serves to buy time for the striker. In the 

case of Osiraq, the first modern conventional strike on a nuclear 

reactor, the strike bought Israel at least five to ten years of reprieve 

from an Iraqi nuclear threat. Another side effect of a preventive strike 

is the concomitant international media blitz the strike draws. The 

media results are both positive and negative. In the long term however, 

a preventive strike such as Osiraq may reinforce a state’s desire to 

acquire nuclear weapons. Such was the case with Iraq. 

The second conclusion of this study points to the importance of the 

diplomatic process of nonproliferation. Israeli decision makers 

attempted to counter Iraq’s nuclear plans diplomatically for seven years 

before concluding a military option was the only appropriate solution. 

Israeli policy makers justified the strike based on their perception of 

apparent United States indifference toward Iraq’s nuclear proliferation. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

4

US diplomats had many more tools at their disposal to allay Israeli 

fears that went unused. 

The next preventive strike against a nuclear proliferator will neither 

be as successful nor buy as much time as the first. Other nations 

seeking a nuclear option also have learned valuable lessons from the 

strike on Osiraq. Second, the media backlash after a strike will 

radicalize the proliferator’s stance toward accomplishing the goal of 

going nuclear. Third, as the global hegemon, US decision makers 

should balance the weight of nonproliferation system management 

wisely against valuable alliance considerations. Decision makers 

should make every attempt to work within the confines of current 

global constructs for stability. If this means taking diplomatic and 

economic actions against proliferators or pushing Israel to abandon the 

Begin Doctrine, then quick decisive action is best done through 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or United Nations (UN) 

auspices with full United States backing. Lastly, US leaders must 

weigh the potential misperception between slow, steady pressure to 

reverse proliferation, and Israel’s view of state survival. If US policy 

makers fail to take decisive action, Israeli decision makers may once 

again take preventive military action. 

Organization 

This study consists of five sections. The first section sets the stage 

by introducing the dilemma of proliferation in the Middle East and the 

Israeli Begin Doctrine. This section briefly covers Israel’s Osiraq 

strike, and its importance for current proliferation matters in the region. 

The section then covers methodology, key findings, and organization. 

The second section reviews Israeli defense principles to illustrate 

how key Israeli decision makers decided to attack Osiraq. Israel 

predominantly relies on deterrence, autonomy, preparation, and 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

5

aggressiveness as defense principles. Historically, these principles 

worked well to dissuade hostility against Israel. However, Israel’s 

diplomatic, overt, and covert efforts did not dissuade the Saddam 

Hussein regime from attempting to build a nuclear weapon. 

The third section presents the fine points of the attack itself and 

several previously uncovered facets of the strike. Israel faced 

significant domestic political pressures yet still employed sophisticated 

planning and execution well beyond the ability of its neighbors. The 

implementation of this strike speaks clearly of Israeli resolve regarding 

counterproliferation. Israel’s past ability to employ western-style 

planning and execution lends credibility to Israel’s ability to execute 

advanced military options against nuclear proliferators now. 

The fourth section reviews the physical effects and political 

aftermath of the Osiraq strike. A distinct comparison between shortterm goals and the long-term effects is readily apparent in the postOperation Iraqi-Freedom environment of 2004 when this study was 

undertaken. Previous literature focused specifically on the short-term 

benefits of preventive strikes like Osiraq. This section also describes 

the domestic and regional ramifications of the attack. 

The final section summarizes the paper’s findings and identifies 

several policy recommendations regarding preventive strikes. It also 

gives a broad perspective on the applicability of the Begin Doctrine in 

current regional affairs and potential US policy maker actions vis-à-vis 

nuclear proliferation. 

ANATOMY OF A DECISION 

A dramatic chain of events began thirty years ago when Saddam 

Hussein approached Jacques Chirac requesting the purchase of a 

French nuclear reactor. Hussein perceived that Iraq, an oil-rich nation, 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

6

needed a nuclear weapon to balance against Israel and as a status 

symbol. Israeli policy makers scrutinized the events altogether 

differently. According to Israeli government official and scholar Uri 

Bar-Joseph, unlike the superpowers’ relationship of Mutually Assured 

Destruction (MAD) that stabilized a nuclear balance of power, Israel’s 

leadership believed that a similar situation in the Middle East was a 

remote possibility “because of Israel’s vulnerability and the nature of 

the Arab regimes—especially that of Saddam Hussein.”5

 This section 

explores the strategic factors that lead Israel to attack the Osiraq 

nuclear reactor. It first examines Israel’s strategic doctrine regarding 

threats in the region. Second, it asks what the perceived threat from the 

Saddam Hussein regime was and whether this threat was credible and 

imminent. Third, the section examines the means and methods Israeli 

decision makers employed to prevent Iraq from developing a nuclear 

weapon. Although Israel was oversensitive to threats, its policy makers 

correctly perceived the threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime. Fourth, 

the section shows the failure of Israel’s overt, covert, and diplomatic 

actions to dissuade Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons prior to the 

Osiraq strike. 

Setting the Stage 

Israel is in a dangerous neighborhood. Several factors influence 

how Israel copes with emerging threats. The most critical of these 

factors are Israeli defense principles and inherent tactical dilemmas. 

Israel’s leadership creates doctrine that influences how it handles 

emerging threats. As Israel developed defense principles for nuclear 

weapons, it found several inherent problems with conventional defense 

principles. 

Israeli Decision Makers: An elite group of policy makers has led 

Israel. These men and women have very similar backgrounds and 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

7

ideological values. According to Efraim Inbar, “Israeli decision 

making in defense matters has always been extremely centralized and 

has remained the coveted privilege of the very few. The defense 

minister is the most important decision maker. He has almost exclusive 

authority within his ministry.”6

 This fact was especially true for Prime 

Minister Menachem Begin. Begin took over the job of Defense 

Minister as well as Prime Minister after Weizman resigned as Defense 

Minister. This made it much simpler to carry through with the decision 

to strike Osiraq. It also narrowed the amount of dissenting opinion the 

cabinet heard. 

The policy-making elite are familiar with military affairs. Indeed, 

most of the members of Begin’s cabinet fought side-by-side in Israel’s 

wars. Inbar states that for the period 1973-1996, “Most decision 

makers, grew up in the defense establishment, and had a good grasp of 

national security problems.”7

 During and after the time of the strike on 

Osiraq, most defense decision makers got their start in the Israeli 

Defense Force (IDF) and moved to politics once their military careers 

finished. This continuity gave Israel a relatively constant set of 

principles for its defense doctrines. 

Israeli Defense Principles: Israel relies on a steady set of values 

regarding its defense. Decision makers believe deterrence, autonomy, 

preparation, and aggression each pay dividends in the nation’s defense. 

The most critical element is a strong deterrence stance without enticing 

an enemy into further aggression.8

 According to Inbar, “A strong Israel 

is necessary for its acceptance as an unchallengeable fact, but Israeli 

military strength and the occasional use of force needed to maintain a 

reputation for toughness and readiness to fight could generate 

traditional fears in the Arab world regarding Israeli expansionism.”9

 

Prime Minister Begin acted upon this principle when he issued the 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

8

directive that became Israel’s nuclear doctrine. The Begin Doctrine is a 

clear order: under no circumstances would Israel permit a neighboring 

state on terms of belligerency with Israel to construct a nuclear reactor 

that threatens the survival of the Jewish state. This doctrine provides 

deterrence, preparation, and a foundation for aggression, and remains 

within Israel’s defense principles. 

The introduction of weapons of mass destruction exacerbated the 

Israeli sensitivity to loss of life. Even before the introduction of a 

nuclear threat, policy makers viewed the strategic environment with a 

much greater pessimism after the 1973 war. Inbar states, “The 1973 

war...did not provide Israel with a sense of victory. Israel suffered a 

painfully high number of casualties during the hostilities, and afterward 

it was isolated internationally. It also shattered Israel’s confidence in 

the IDF and caused the fundamentals of Israeli strategic thinking to be 

questioned.”10 This lack of confidence forced decision makers to 

choose overaggressive postures on several occasions and reinforced 

Israel’s need to act autonomously. 

Tactical Dilemma: As Iraq sought a nuclear capability in 1974, 

Israeli leaderships’ strategic outlook was pessimistic, and confidence in 

the IDF faltered. To Israeli policy makers, this shattered confidence 

combined with Israel’s natural weaknesses accentuated their 

susceptibility to attack. Israel has very little geostrategic depth. It is 

approximately 220 miles long and 45 miles wide at its farthest points. 

The population of neighboring states outnumbers Israel more than ten 

to one. In the past, Israel’s military preparedness and autonomy 

allowed it to succeed on the conventional battlefield. As Iraq grew 

closer to gaining a nuclear capability, however, it appeared 

conventional military deterrents, preparation, and autonomy would not 

overcome Israel’s lack of strategic depth in population or territory. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

9

This predicament forced Israel to compensate for weaknesses with 

alliances. US policy makers continually reaffirmed the alliance to allay 

any Israeli fears. This statement from Secretary of State Alexander 

Haig after the raid typifies the kind of information that affirmed the 

alliance but also reaffirmed Israel’s need to be autonomous: 

The United States recognized the gaps in Western military 

capabilities in the region, and the fundamental strategic value 

of Israel, the strongest and most stable friend and ally the 

Unites States has in the Mideast. Consequently, the two 

countries must work together to counter the full range of 

threats that the Western world faces in the region. While we 

may not always place the same emphasis on particular threats, 

we share a fundamental understanding that a strong, secure and 

vibrant Israel serves Western interests in the Middle East, We 

shall never deviate from that principle, for the success of our 

strategy depends thereupon.”11

Israel sought an ironclad guarantee against nuclear attack, but no 

ally could provide that guarantee. In 1980, Secretary of State Edmund 

Muskie informed Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, “In spite of 

being the leader of the West, the world’s greatest superpower did not 

wield unlimited power...also international bodies experience difficulty 

in effective supervision on nuclear activity, because nuclear materials 

are available from a variety of sources, not all subject to control.”12 

Without the needed infallible pledge, Israel chose the Begin Doctrine as 

its strategic doctrine against potential nuclear threats in the region. It 

remained Israel’s choice through 2004. 

Know Your Enemy 

Saddam Hussein made Israel’s doctrinal choice an easy selection. 

His constant offensive rhetoric and abrasive foreign policy were clear 

signs of aggression. It is critical to view the perceived threat Hussein’s 

regime projected to Israel with an equally important analysis of the 

credibility of that threat. Iraqi technological progress provides clear 

indication that Israel’s perception matched the credibility of threat. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

10

Iraq also proved its hostility toward Israel by remaining outside the 

1949 Armistice agreement and not recognizing the legitimacy of Israel 

as a state. Lastly, Saddam Hussein made it clear he would not hesitate 

to employ nuclear weapons if he possessed them. These indicators 

show Israel faced a rising credible threat matched to an unhesitatingly 

hostile regime. 

Iraqi Technological Signs: Iraqi scientists were in the infancy 

stages of nuclear research in 1974. Scientific experiments in their 

Soviet-built nuclear reactor did not explore the full capability of the 

research reactor. According to Nakdimon, “The level of Iraq’s nuclear 

research at that time could not justify the acquisition of an Osiris 

reactor. The Iraqis had barely begun to take advantage of the research 

possibilities offered by their Soviet reactor. Their interests stemmed 

from its plutogenic [plutonium producing] traits.”13 Additionally, 

policy makers in the Soviet Union did not consent to releasing 

weapons-grade uranium to Iraq along with the reactor it supplied. This 

forced Iraq to search for a reactor with dual-use capabilities. 

For Iraqi scientists, the two linked purposes of an Osiris-type 

reactor were to maintain a legitimate scientific front while possessing 

the ability to harness nuclear energy for a weapon. Legitimate 

purposes for nuclear reactors are primarily production of electricity. 

Nakdimon states, “Had the Iraqis indeed desired an electric-power 

reactor, they could have applied for one of the newer Americandesigned models the French were now manufacturing. But on learning 

that a gas-graphite reactor could not be supplied, the Iraqis showed no 

further interest, temporarily, in any French-built reactor.”14 Saddam 

Hussein pressured Jacques Chirac for a gas-graphite reactor and 

uranium enriched to at least ninety-three percent for Iraq’s nuclear 

reactor. 15 To deliver such a reactor to Iraq, France had to supply an 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

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older reactor type. Newer reactors were more efficient, less expensive, 

used Caramel (enriched to only twenty-thirty percent enriched 

uranium) fuel, and offered greater safety. Possessing an Osiris-type 

reactor offered two primary benefits to Hussein: its plutogenic traits 

offered him a potential source of weapons-grade nuclear material and 

the fuel used to run Osiris also was weapons-grade material. 

Still at War: Iraq insisted on remaining in a state of war with 

Israel. All other Arab states signed armistice agreements with Israel in 

1949. Iraq could not sign an armistice because it did not recognize 

Israel as a state. Iraqi soldiers have participated in every war against 

Israel. In 1969, Hussein ordered Iraqi Jews in Baghdad executed. 

Additionally, he took every opportunity to remind the Iraqi people they 

were at war with Israel. Nakdimon states, “In an interview published in 

the United States on May 16, 1977 Hussein stated, ‘never shall we 

recognize Israel’s right to exist as an independent Zionist state.’” On 

October 24, 1978, one week prior to the ninth Arab summit, an official 

statement from an Iraqi ambassador to India reaffirmed the continuing 

hostility, “Iraq does not accept the existence of a Zionist state in 

Palestine; the only solution is war.”16 This state of affairs between the 

two countries did not allow any diplomatic contact, and any interaction 

between the two came through a third party. 

The Butcher of Baghdad: Israel witnessed Hussein’s repeated 

use of chemical weapons on his own people and fellow Arabs. During 

the Iran-Iraq war, Israel observed Iraq’s merciless use of chemical 

weapons. Hussein showed no hesitation in launching the deadly poison 

as long as he received benefit from its use. Israel noted that Hussein’s 

use of these weapons was against people whom he professed not to 

hate. How much more devastating would an attack be on those whom 

he professed to hate? 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

12

Policy makers in Israel were convinced the Iraqi government under 

Saddam Hussein would employ nuclear weapons if they possessed 

them. Hussein and members of his regime also expressed this openly. 

Immediately after the final negotiations on Osiraq, in a September 1975 

interview, Hussein stated “the Franco-Iraqi agreement was the first 

actual step in the production of an Arab atomic weapon, despite the fact 

that the declared purpose for the establishment of the reactor is not the 

production of atomic weapons.”17 Five years later, following two 

unsuccessful Iranian attempts to destroy the reactor, the Iraqi 

newspaper ath-Thawra quoted Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz, “The 

Iranian people should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not 

intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist enemy.”18 For 

these myriad reasons, Israel correctly perceived the threat from Iraq’s 

nuclear program and foresaw with certainty that Saddam Hussein 

would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons on Israel. 

Out of Options 

Israel used countless means and methods to prevent Iraq from 

developing a nuclear capability. It planned each of these methods to 

delay or destroy Iraqi indigenous nuclear capability. None of these 

methods proved able to stifle Saddam Hussein’s motivation to join the 

nuclear club. Israel used overt methods consisting primarily of media 

reports and open contact with critical personnel. It reportedly used 

several covert methods to influence those involved in the Iraqi reactor 

project. Additionally, Israeli political leaders employed diplomatic 

tools to pressure the global community into stopping Saddam Hussein’s 

nuclear programs. These efforts failed to accomplish the overall task of 

dissuading Iraq from going nuclear. 

The art of statecraft lies in manipulating international pressure to 

obtain an objective without resorting to violence. Israel employed 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

13

these schemes and processes for seven years before resorting to a 

military solution. Many actions happened from 1974 to 1981 that will 

never be known, but certainly, the most visible confirm the attempts 

and, more importantly, the methods Israel used.19 Thus, this list is not 

all-inclusive, but it does cover the preponderance of means used to 

persuade Saddam Hussein to abandon his nuclear ambitions. 

Overt Methods: The primary overt method Israel used to 

influence international opinion was the media. Israel also used 

academic routes to present the threat,20 but the most effective was 

through newspapers and magazines. Charting the timeline for overt 

actions, two specific events stand out: the first is the January 1976 

revelation of the potential Iraqi nuclear capability by the London Daily 

Mail; the second is the July 1980 Israeli cabinet decision to invoke a 

media campaign globally.21

January 10, 

1976 

London Daily Mail wrote, “‘Iraq is soon liable to 

achieve a capacity for producing nuclear weapons. One 

of the most unstable states in the Arab world would be 

the largest and most advanced in the Middle East.’ The 

paper added that France would be powerless to impose 

effective control over the use to which the Iraqis would 

put it.” 

May 1977 Eliyahu Maicy, Paris correspondent for Ha’aretz 

uncovered a “conspiracy of silence”: France violated 

the French constitution on banning French (of Israeli 

descent) workers inside France based on Iraqi pressure. 

1977-1978 “Media revelations, domestic and foreign, forced the 

French government to admit that it did intend to supply 

Iraq with enriched uranium.” 

March 1980 “Prodded by a barrage of Israeli reminders, the United 

States made an indirect attempt to induce the Italians to 

pull out of the project. Information leaked to the New 

York Times and the Washington Post by US intelligence 

agencies recorded that Italy was selling advanced 

nuclear equipment to Iraq, as well as training Iraqi 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

14

engineers and technicians at its nuclear centers.” 

March 20, 

1980 

A London newspaper reported: Next year, Iraq will be 

capable of manufacturing a nuclear bomb-with the 

assistance of France and Italy. France provides the 

enriched uranium, Italy: the know-how and technology.” 

Summer 

1980 

Osiraq was a matter of life and death to the Israeli and 

“in the summer of 1980 Israel gave a public declaration 

of intentions, although it was not an official one 

July 1980 “US media published a startling declaration by President 

Carter: The United States would not attempt to impose 

it views upon states with a nuclear capability-such as 

France- with regard to the Mideast.” 

July 7, 1980 “At a cabinet meeting, committee members “called for a 

propaganda campaign to alert public opinion in the 

world at large and in France in particular.” 

July 15, 

1980 

In an interview with the German Die Welt, the director 

general of the Prime Minister’s office said, “Israel 

cannot afford to sit idle and wait till an Iraqi bomb drops 

on our heads.” 

July 20, 

1980 

“The first public mention of a possible Israeli air strike 

at al-Tuwaitha. That day’s Boston Globe cited 

observers discussing a worst case scenario to predict 

that Israel could launch a pre-emptive strike to put the 

reactor out of commission.” 

September 

1980 

“Israel’s campaign against the Iraqi nuclear program had 

hitherto been conducted behind closed doors. But the 

international media were given various signals of 

Israel’s resolve to deny Iraq a military nuclear option.” 

Table 1: Overt Israeli actions against Iraqi Nuclear Program 

Covert Methods: Any group or nation attempting covert action 

does not advertise its intentions or results. Normally, the results are 

attributed to a particular group after lengthy, classified investigation. 

However, this does not mean that nation or group actually 

accomplished the task. Undoubtedly, Israel accomplished many covert 

actions while attempting to prevent an Iraqi nuclear weapon. Some 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

15

listed below may be their handiwork, while other events may not be 

tied to Israeli action.22

April 6, 

1979 

The “French Ecological Group” claims responsibility 

for exploding both reactor cores in La-Seyne-sur-Mer. 

The French authorities never caught the group, but 

European authorities attributed the strike to the Israeli 

Secret Service, Mossad. 

June 13, 

1980 

Yehia al-Meshad was murdered in his hotel room in 

Paris. The only witness was Marie-Claude Magal, a 

French prostitute. She, too, was murdered less than one 

month later. The scientist was in France to oversee the 

delivery of the first shipment of nuclear material for 

Iraq. The international media pointed fingers 

immediately at Mossad, but French authorities were 

unconvinced. 

July 25, 

1980 

Iraq’s Ambassador to France revealed an Israeli plan to 

strike Iraq’s nuclear reactor in an effort to sabotage Iraqi 

nuclear efforts. He condemned this planning harshly, 

stating Iraq’s nuclear efforts were for peaceful purposes 

only. 

August 7, 

1980 

Three bombs exploded at the Italian company SNIA 

Techint, the company responsible for manufacturing the 

hot separation labs Iraq needed to produce weapons 

material from spent uranium rods. 

August and 

September 

1980 

Multiple threatening letters were sent to scientists and 

technicians involved anywhere in the process of 

enabling Iraq’s nuclear capability. The Committee to 

Safeguard the Islamic Revolution signed all of the 

letters. 

January 20, 

1981 

London Daily Mail reported the Iraqi government 

caught and executed ten suicide attackers before they 

accomplished their mission inside Osiraq. Additionally, 

investigators found and dismantled two ten-pound 

bombs before any damage was done to the reactor 

complex. Regardless of who was truly responsible for 

this group, Israel was credited for the attack. 

Table 2: Covert Israeli Actions against Iraqi Nuclear Program 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

16

Diplomatic Means: Israel exerted seven years of diplomatic 

pressure on nations around the world in the attempt to prevent Iraq 

from getting the Osiraq reactor. France was the primary recipient of a 

majority of the diplomatic pressure from Israel. Israel also approached 

Italy and West Germany on the issue. The most important part of 

Israel’s diplomatic effort is the sheer number of attempts Israel made to 

convince France to abandon its support of Iraq.23

April 29-

30,1975 

“The Israeli Foreign Minister, Yigal Alon, paid a 

working visit to Paris as the draft Franco-Iraqi 

agreement reached its final stages of completion.... In 

his talks with the three main pillars of the French 

administration, Pres. Giscard, Premier Chirac and 

Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, Alon conveyed 

Israel’s concern over the possibility of Iraq’s misuse of 

the nuclear technology and fuels whose purchase it was 

negotiating with France. They all gave the official 

French position, though not a party to the NPT, France 

would continue to behave as though its signature were 

appended to the treaty.” 

January 13, 

1976 

Israeli Director General for West European Affairs went 

to French Ambassador Jean Herly to clarify French 

contacts with Iraq on nuclear affairs. 

January 27, 

1976 

Israeli Knesset member Dr. Yehuda Ben Meir voiced 

concerns over Iraq’s dealings with France and France’s 

acceptance of Iraqi offerings (especially in light of the 

fact that the Soviet Union refused to supply Iraq with 

weapons-grade uranium). 

March 30, 

1977 

The new French Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud 

visited Israel and discussed the Iraqi project with similar 

reassurances to Israeli. 

July 15, 

1977 

Israeli Ambassador to Paris Gazit called on France to 

give Caramel fuel to Iraq, but France resisted the idea 

claiming the fuel was untested and not the fuel Iraq 

originally negotiated. 

January 13, 

1978 

Gazit again visited Guiringaud to slow down plans for 

delivery until the Caramel fuel could be tested and 

substituted for delivery to Iraq. Again, the Frenchman 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

17

declared this was impossible, as the Caramel fuel was 

not the fuel Iraq originally negotiated. 

October 19, 

1978 

Gazit again visited Guiringaud to question the weaponsgrade uranium issue and ask when France would deliver 

it to Iraq. 

January 

1979 

Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan visited French President 

Giscard and Premier Raymond Barre. Barre placated 

Dayan about Iraqi intentions, claiming Hussein and 

Hafez al-Asad had given up the idea of destroying 

Israel. 

July 28, 

1980 

Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir met with 

French Ambassador to Israel, Jean-Pierre Chauvet. 

Shamir told Chauvet, “Israel holds France exclusively 

responsible for the results liable to arise from operation 

of the reactor and misuse of the nuclear fuel.” Chauvet 

argued, “Acquisition of nuclear arms would be lunacy 

on the part of Iraq. After all, Israel’s Jewish and Arab 

populations are intermingled, and anyone dropping a 

nuclear bomb on Israel ran the risk of annihilating many 

thousand of Arabs.” 

August 

1980 

Dr Meir Rosenne, the new Israeli Ambassador to France 

visited the French Premier about the Iraqi nuclear 

contract. He received the same answers as those before 

him 

September 

1980 

Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir visited France’s UN 

delegate Francois-Poncet during the UN meeting in New 

York. Bolstered by the recent Iraqi attack on Iran, Israel 

expected France to withdraw from the supply of 

weapons grade fuel. The meeting with the French 

delegate, however, proved worthless. “Shamir sensed 

that European cynicism left Israel with no choice other 

than the one it had repeatedly adopted in the past: to 

take its fate into its own hands.” 

November 

1980 

Shamir again met with Francois-Poncet and days later 

with President Giscard. Both of these meetings “were a 

well-nigh precise rerun of everything said at previous 

meetings.” 

January 

1981 

Labor party leader, Shimon Peres met with French 

President Giscard. This meeting found no new 

information favorable to Israel. Giscard told Peres, 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

18

“The best thing for Israel is a military pact with the 

United States. Thereby, your security will be 

guaranteed by the world’s number-one superpower.” 

Peres replied, “Israel does not want to be an American, 

or a European protectorate.” 

Iran 

February 

1977 

Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Alon met with a topranking Iranian official who served as the Iranian liaison 

for Israel. The two countries did not have any officially 

sanctioned diplomatic ties. The Iranian official knew 

Iraq was working with the French to develop a nuclear 

reactor that could also allow Iraq to produce nuclear 

weapons. However, the official would not join Israel in 

alerting the international community due to fear of 

highlighting Iranian plans to do the same thing. 

Iran 

July 10, 

1977 

Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan met with the 

same Iranian official to inquire if Iran was concerned at 

all with Iraq developing nuclear weapons. The official 

passed on Dayan’s comments to the Shah. 

Iran 

Dec 27, 

1977 

Dayan met with the Shah of Iran to brief him on the 

progress of Israel’s peace negotiations with Egypt. 

Other Iranian government officials informed Dayan of 

Iraqi nuclear intentions. Iraqi officials reassured 

Iranians that any nuclear weapon was meant for Israel, 

not Iran. 

Italy 

July 1980 

After Moshe Dayan resigned from Begin’s cabinet, 

Yitzhak Shamir took over as Foreign Minister. He 

quickly sent a handwritten letter to the Italian Foreign 

Minister, Emilio Colombo in hopes of convincing 

Colombo and Italy to refrain from helping Iraq’s nuclear 

advance any further. “It is of the gravest when nuclear 

capability is endowed to a regime which achieved power 

by force, and which is constantly sustained by its fierce 

antagonism toward the Israeli people.” 

W. 

Germany 

Summer 

1979 

Foreign Minister Dayan contacted West Germany to 

persuade them not to produce any components for the 

Iraqi reactor complex. 

W. 

Germany 

Israeli Ambassador to Bonn, Yohanan Meroz contacted 

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the attempt 

to have West Germany intercede on Israel’s behalf to 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

19

Sept 4, 

1980 

the French. Schmidt labored over the decision, but 

eventually decided not to intervene. He stated, 

“France’s promises must suffice. I do not see what can 

be done now.” 

Table 3: Israeli Diplomatic actions with France, Germany, Iran, 

and Italy 

Lack of Results in United States: Israeli diplomats worked hard 

to convince US decision makers to act on their behalf. Israel requested 

American diplomatic assistance mostly against Iraqi aggression and 

French reticence. Israel spent almost as much time trying to convince 

US policy makers of the pending danger as they did trying to persuade 

France to forego its ill-conceived nuclear proliferation plans with Iraq. 

Two events caused Israel to lose faith in American anti-proliferation 

efforts. After initially vowing to take a hard-line nuclear proliferation 

stance, President Carter reversed plans in July 1980. He claimed his 

administration would not interfere with other nuclear-equipped 

countries and their Mideast affairs. Also in 1980, US policy makers 

decided to continue unfruitful diplomatic approaches with France 

instead of backing direct Israeli pressure on Iraq. The marked pressure 

of responsibility weighs differently as a superpower concerned with 

systemic problems than as a regional power concerned with survival.24

October 

1975 

Israeli Prime Minister Rabin urged US Secretary of 

State Henry Kissinger to obstruct the French nuclear 

negotiations with Iraq on Israel’s behalf. Kissinger 

claimed that he did try to intervene but to no avail. 

Winter 

1976 

Internal debate raged in France over whether or not to 

supply Iraq with military grade uranium or bend to the 

Carter administration’s demands to use Caramel fuel. 

Regardless of the internal fighting, France decided to 

press on with delivery of weapons-grade uranium. 

February 

1977 

Disappointed in Iran, Israel now pinned its hopes 

principally upon the United States, which had 

conducted, since 1975, a most vigorous campaign 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

20

against dissemination of military nuclear technology. In 

view of the vigorous US anti-proliferation campaign, it 

was only natural for the United States to attempt to talk 

Paris into renegotiating its agreement with Iraq.” The 

Carter administration, elected in November 1976, vowed 

to take a hard-line stance on nuclear proliferation. 

Election promises pledged sweeping international 

actions against countries promising nuclear technology 

for sale. The United States slowed down the delivery of 

uranium and reactors to France and Germany. This 

slow-down was designed to reflect US policy maker’s 

disapproval of France’s deals with Pakistan and Iraq. 

Next, the administration encouraged France to supply 

only Caramel fuel (uranium enriched only 20-25 

percent) to Iraq. 

March 1980 US media sources criticized Italy and France over 

selling advanced nuclear equipment to Iraq. 

July 16, 

1980 

Israel Ambassador to the United States met with 

Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie to inquire on the 

status of US diplomatic pressure on France vis-à-vis the 

Iraqi nuclear reactor. Whatever actions were taken 

proved fruitless in stopping France’s cooperation with 

Iraq. Additionally, President Carter made a public 

declaration that also did not help Israel: “the United 

States would not attempt to impose its views upon states 

with a nuclear capability—such as France—with regard 

to the Mideast.” 

July 17, 

1980 

US Ambassador Samuel Lewis visited Prime Minister 

Begin regarding Iraqi nuclear weapons. Begin urged 

Lewis to bring the matter to the attention of the White 

House. Lewis urged Begin to “put his trust in President 

Carter.” “No president has been so concerned and so 

active in trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. I 

am certain if he can find a way to stop the French, he 

will do so.” 

July 22, 

1980 

Israeli Ambassador Evron informed US Assistant 

Secretary of State Saunders that France again rejected 

America efforts to intercede on behalf of Israel. Evron 

and Israel suspected Washington of putting little effort 

into the developments in Iraq 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

21

July 24, 

1980 

Ambassador Lewis informs Begin his concerns are on 

the desk of the President and Secretary of State. 

December 

1980 

On results of President Carter’s influence on France and 

informing incoming Reagan administration of Israel’s 

concerns: “Was either effective? In both cases, the 

answer appears to be negative. There must have been 

some slipup in the transition from one administration to 

the next. Carter was to explain the omission by pointing 

out that “Reagan appointed his Secretaries of State and 

Defense ‘at the last moment’; consequently, there was 

no one to receive the information.” 

December 

1980 

“Washington claimed to be under no illusions as the 

gravity of the danger to be expected from Iraq’s 

possession of nuclear weapons; however the 

Administration held it preferable to pursue diplomatic 

approaches to France and Italy, rather than countenance 

direct Israeli pressure upon Iraq which, the Americans 

feared, could place obstacles before Mideast peace 

efforts.” 

April 1981 Secretary of State, Alexander Haig went to visit Prime 

Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Shamir in Israel. 

Haig confirmed Israel’s worst fears: The United States 

had been unable to stop or delay French and Italian 

efforts to equip Iraq with a nuclear reactor and hot cell. 

According to President Carter, “They—France and 

Italy—are sovereign states, just like Israel. We have 

intervened with France and Italy-but in vain.” 

Table 4: Israeli Diplomatic Results in the United States 

In October 1980, Israel held two critical cabinet meetings. On 14 

October, Begin was in favor of military action, but desired more 

meetings with French and American diplomats. Shortly thereafter, 

Israeli Ambassador Evron informed Begin that Iraq now possessed 30 

kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. Begin’s next cabinet meeting 

was an emergency meeting, and he was convinced of the action to take. 

According to Nakdimon, “Begin now urged the Cabinet to adopt a 

decision in principle, as recommended by a majority of the ministerial 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

22

team, in favor of destroying the reactor.”25 Begin’s decision now was 

simply a matter of when to strike the reactor. 

Conclusion 

After the 1973 war, Israel’s strategic outlook was insecure. The 

presence of potential Iraqi nuclear weapons only exacerbated the 

insecurity. When Israel considered the known behavior of Saddam 

Hussein, now hot on the trail of nuclear weapons, it concluded 

submissiveness was not an option. Israel elected to attack the Iraqi 

nuclear reactor by overt, covert, and diplomatic means first. This 

attack started in 1974 and concluded when Begin decided to switch the 

attack to military means. In 1981, Israel proved it lived by the Begin 

Doctrine. Once Israeli policy makers saw the ineffectiveness of other 

methods, they elected to strike. 

THE ATTACK 

The Israeli strike on Osiraq ranks among the most important aerial 

bombardments of the twentieth century. Every nation seeking to 

acquire nuclear weapons took notice, especially those in the Middle 

East. This strike added fuel to a region already ablaze with turmoil. 

According to Jason Burke, “In 1979...several massive events shook the 

Muslim world: a peace deal between Israel and Egypt, the Islamic 

Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the 

occupation of the grand mosque at Mecca by a radical Wahhabi 

group.”26 In 1981, Israel’s strike was yet another unsettling event in a 

region still marred by conflict. This section examines how Israel 

attacked Osiraq, and why the means and timing Israel chose for this 

attack are important. The section first examines Israeli political 

pressures influencing the attack timing. Next, it examines the 

alternatives Israel had to carry out this strike and the problems involved 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

23

in each choice. Finally, the section describes Israel’s tactical execution 

of the attack and its immediate strategic impact. The section concludes 

that Israel was the only country in the region that had the means to 

accomplish this demanding strike and chose the timing of the strike 

primarily in response to domestic political pressures. 

Setting the Stage 

Israel can take virtually no action without significant ramifications 

beyond its borders. It must constantly weigh domestic political 

demands against regional threats and US Middle East policies. 

Israel had no shortage of international and domestic political 

constraints as it contemplated, planned, and executed the strike on 

Osiraq. Mired in the first Intifada, growing tensions in Lebanon, 

surface-to-air-missiles in the Beka’a valley, the volatile Egyptian peace 

process, and facing enormous inflation domestically, Israeli policy 

makers found each decision crucially interconnected. Israel faced 

Knesset elections in 1981 amidst these building security concerns. 

Prime Minister’s Role in Foreign Policy: Israeli Foreign Policy 

is usually opaque and reactive. Driven by a myriad of factors, the 

primary author of Israeli Foreign Policy is the Prime Minister. 

According to Lewis Brownstein, “Since the establishment of the state 

in 1948, Israeli foreign policy decision making has tended to be highly 

personalized, politicized, reactive, ad hoc, and unsystematic.”27 The 

Prime Minister’s relative power within the Israeli coalitional 

government is the prevailing feature on foreign and security matters. 

The Prime Minister’s control is a function of personality, political 

authority vis-à-vis other Israeli political elites, public confidence, and 

the publicly perceived security environment. Brownstein implies the 

formative years of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion established the 

dominant role of the Prime Minister in Israel’s foreign policy 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

24

formulation. “Improvisation was the rule because it was the only 

choice. There can be no question that the memory of those years and of 

the monumental successes...resulted in a collective memory on the part 

of the leadership. It would be difficult to overemphasize the influence 

of those years on the pattern of Israel’s decision-making in foreign 

policy.”28 Consequently, Israeli foreign policy ebbs and flows 

primarily with Prime Ministerial decisions. 

The Prime Minister’s decisions are responsive to his coalitional 

government. Therefore, domestic political factors within Israel drive 

foreign policy, counter to Brownstein’s theory. The Prime Minister is 

the pre-eminent member of the policy elite with the foremost say on the 

direction of foreign policy, but his power extends only as far as the 

Knesset allows. According to Juliet Kaarbo, “Executive power is 

concentrated in the prime minister and the cabinet. While legitimacy 

lies with the parliament and the cabinet must maintain the confidence 

of the legislative assembly, the power to initiate and carry out policy 

making is to be found in the cabinet.” For parliamentary democracies, 

Kaarbo contends, “Power and resources are more fragmented and are 

divided along policy or ideological party lines.”29 The Prime Minister 

must constantly weigh driving security matters against his resident 

authority within the coalition government. 

Israeli Political Pressures: Prime Minister Menachem Begin 

drove Israeli Foreign Policy starting in 1977. His Likud party came to 

power in Israel after several smaller political parties won enough seats 

in the 1977 Knesset elections to overthrow the Labor majority. Rabin 

lost due to allegations of corruption, political in-fighting, and mediocre 

policy decisions. Zachary Lockman states, “[Begin’s] new talent and 

new policies were to replace the stagnations and entrenched machinery 

of the Labor Party bureaucracy which had dominated Israel for 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

25

decades.”30 Begin gained the confidence of the National Religious 

Party based on his uncompromising foreign policy stance. 

Israeli Foreign Policy in 1981 reflected the hard-line attitude of 

Prime Minister Begin. Indeed, Begin kept his hard-line policy 

direction throughout his time in office. He could remain relatively 

sheltered in his foreign policy for several reasons. According to 

Brownstein, “Israel has no independent ‘think tanks’ or councils where 

academics and government officials can come together to exchange 

views.”31 In addition, the Likud party had virtually none of the 

academic communication links the Labor party possessed. Nor, did the 

Likud party foster any interaction among academia and government 

decision makers. The cabinet remained moderately sheltered and the 

Prime Minister was one-step further secluded than his cabinet. Hence, 

Menachem Begin deserved his reputation as an autocratic leader who 

rarely sought advice from his cabinet. 

Domestic Political Timing of the Attack: Domestic political 

factors within Israel affected many foreign policy directives. Although 

Begin kept his hard-line policy posture, he could not act with impunity. 

According to Melvin Friedlander, “because Begin enjoyed only a 

narrow majority in the Knesset those right-wing groups and their 

representatives in the cabinet possessed a virtual veto over government 

decisions.”32 A junior party, the National Religious Party, established 

foreign policy as an area of influence under its coalitional agreement 

with Begin and the Likud party. This junior party demonstrated its 

power in 1979 during negotiations with Egypt. According to Kaarbo, 

“the autonomy talks were the second part of the Camp David Peace 

Treaty. The junior party...in coalition with Likud was successful at 

getting hard-line conditions adopted for these talks in May 1979 and 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

26

subsequently deadlocking them.”33 Therefore, domestic political 

factors were the primary influence on Israeli foreign policy 

Israel had a Knesset election scheduled for November 1981. The 

Labor party, lead by Shimon Peres, was gaining ground on Begin’s 

Likud party. Prime Minister Begin faced difficulties from unrest in 

Lebanon, dissatisfaction over the Palestinian issue, and a severe 

economic crisis. Inflation in Israel was over 120 percent during 1980. 

According to Zachary Lockman, “The Begin government, on the advice 

of such luminaries as Milton Friedman, has revised long-standing 

Labor policies that subsidized consumer goods, protected local 

industry, encouraged exports and controlled currency exchanges.”34 

This economic predicament combined with the increasing frustration 

over security issues did not bode well for the Likud party. 

In May 1981, Begin lagged behind Labor party leader Shimon 

Peres in voter polls. Although the Labor party offered no significant 

change to policies enacted by Begin, public opinion saw Menachem 

Begin as ineffective. His political capital was in decline, and a military 

action could bolster his hard-line reputation. In late 1980, Lockman 

guesses, “Begin might choose to gamble on a major military adventure, 

perhaps against the Syrians and Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Other 

scenarios are also possible.”35 Indeed, Begin readied plans for striking 

Osiraq as pressure of the Knesset election mounted. 

Begin’s desire to solidify his political position by a strike on Osiraq 

coincided with a strong opinion on Israeli defense measures. Indeed, 

from the outset of his tenure as Prime Minister, Begin revealed concern 

over the Iraqi nuclear program. However, Begin held strong memories 

of atrocities done to the Jews from World War II. Shlomo Nakdimon 

states, “But above all, what shaped Begin’s course, and his personal 

philosophy, was the Holocaust—that national calamity in which his 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

27

own father and mother perished, as did most of his family.”36 He saw 

the Iraqi nuclear program as another potential means to destroy the 

nation. In late 1977, Begin issued clear guidance within his cabinet 

that no belligerent states in the region could threaten Israel with nuclear 

weapons. 

The Political Costs of Osiraq: A strike against Osiraq would 

serve multiple purposes. A successful strike could sway voters to view 

Begin as a decisive man of action willing to buck world opinion to 

protect Israel. Additionally, a strike destroying another potential 

holocaust device before it could be unleashed on Israel matched 

Begin’s personal philosophy. If the strike was a failure, Begin stood no 

chance at retaining his role as Prime Minister. 

Furthermore, Begin believed Peres would opt for diplomatic means 

over action against Iraq. Shimon Peres was close friends with French 

President Francois Mitterrand, who opposed French involvement in 

Iraqi nuclearization. Four years of diplomatic exertion to prevent 

France from delivering a nuclear reactor to Iraq, however, yielded only 

failure. In addition, Begin believed Peres would not risk launching the 

strike even if diplomatic efforts fell short. Prime Minister Begin, 

therefore, saw this state of affairs as solely his responsibility. It was his 

job to protect Israel’s right to exist, but time was running out—for him 

and for Israel. 

The strike on Osiraq came about in this background of intense 

domestic political pressure and steady Iraqi nuclear advance. The 

domestic political payoffs for Begin offered significant rewards 

compared to the risks. Thus, Israeli domestic political pressure acted as 

Begin’s primary impetus for ordering the strike. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

28

Choices...Choices 

The government of Israel possessed several means of attacking the 

Osiraq reactor. Prior to June 1981, Israeli policy makers primarily used 

diplomatic pressure to preempt construction of the Iraqi reactor. They 

pressured many nations, but mainly France and Italy, to prevent them 

from supplying Iraq with the Osiris-type reactor and the fuel to run it. 

Italy also supplied technical training to Iraqi scientists and a specially 

designed shielded laboratory called a hot cell to extract plutonium and 

handle radioactive material. The hot cell was a particularly telling 

purchase. It allowed technicians to extract and harvest bomb-grade 

fuel. It could have no other purpose for Iraqi technicians. Israel’s 

diplomatic coercion was its first line of defense against an Arab bomb, 

and it failed. 

International Legal Factors: The implications of the strike were 

legally intimidating. According to McKinnon, “The Israelis expected 

Iraq to charge that any military action would be illegal, a violation of 

international law, and would therefore be considered an act of 

aggression.”37 However, the Iraqi regime never signed a peace 

agreement with Israel and refused to recognize Israel as a nation. Iraqi 

decision makers repeatedly confirmed their policy of aggression 

towards the “Zionist entity.” Thus, Israeli policy makers considered 

the strike legal based on the wartime status of the two countries. 

Other international law attorneys claim the strike legality based on 

Israel’s right to anticipatory self-defense. Anticipatory self-defense is 

defined as the entitlement to strike first when the danger posed is 

instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 

deliberation.38 Several decision makers claimed the strike was legal 

due to the overwhelming nature of nuclear weapons. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

29

Anthony D’Amato, a well-respected international law professor at 

Leighton University, however, claims neither of these reasons made the 

Israeli strike legal. Israel had no right to a legal strike in an illegal war 

(as D’Amato claims the shaky relationship between Israel and Iraq was 

at the time of the strike). D’Amato also notes that Article 51 of the 

United Nations Charter (the provision that includes the self-defense 

clause) only allows action “if an armed attack occurs.”39 D’Amato 

declares the strike was legal because Israel acted for the international 

community as a surrogate on the attack. If international law is designed 

“to create the precondition for peace and human rights,”40 then the law 

provides the international community a right to act upon any aggressive 

state willing to use nuclear weapons as blackmail. 

Israel’s action against Iraq gave the world relief from this potential 

global Iraqi threat. Regardless of the legal reasoning, Israel pressed 

ahead undaunted by the repercussions that would follow the attack. 

Risk versus Reward: Israeli planners weighed the risks and 

rewards of each method of attack on Osiraq. Once overt, diplomatic, 

and covert intelligence operations failed to produce results, Israeli 

policy makers had two basic military choices for destroying the Osiraq 

reactor: a military raid with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) commandos 

in the lead or a precision aerial strike with the Israeli Air Forces (IAF) 

in the lead. 

In 1977, Begin and his cabinet contemplated an attack against Iraq. 

At that time, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman approached Israeli Air 

Force Chief of Staff David Ivry with a proposal: plan and practice a 

long-range aerial attack of greater than 650 nautical miles.41 Weizman, 

a pilot and father of the modern Israeli Air Force, knew the IAF could 

complete the mission. Ivry worked hard to prove his mentor correct. 

Using the most advanced platform the IAF possessed, the F-4, Ivry 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

30

foresaw great risk but a mission that was not impossible. Ivry had 

several missions flown to determine the true distance an appropriately 

loaded F-4 would fly.42 The risk appeared great in 1977, but still 

within the realm of possibility. 

Decision against Commando Raid: The Israeli military had 

several commando teams available to attack Osiraq. Israel’s military 

was familiar with complex commando operations. In 1976, Israeli 

commandos completed a complex raid on Entebbe, Uganda, freeing 

trapped Israeli hostages. However, a raid deep into Iraq would face 

significantly different challenges than the Entebbe raid. IDF planners 

focused on the three main parts of a Special Forces operation: the 

insertion, the operation, and the extraction. Insertion and extraction 

were difficult due to Osiraq’s location greater than 1000 kilometers 

from Israel and surrounded by open desert. This would require a 

combination of large helicopters, heavy airlift, light-attack helicopters, 

and a multitude of logistics components. The operation at the reactor 

also would have serious risks. Israeli planners expected casualties 

among their commandos, the Iraqi guards, and a large number of 

international scientists in Osiraq.43 At a minimum, well over 200 

people would participate in a ground raid.44 Additionally, maintaining 

complete secrecy with many participants would be difficult. Planners 

concluded the risks of launching a multifaceted ground raid would far 

outweigh its benefits, and Israeli policy makers would not accept such a 

narrow margin of success. 

Decision on Air Strike: Israeli planners concluded the best option 

was to assign the IAF with a precision strike mission directly against 

the core of the reactor. According to Amos Perlmutter, “The total 

destruction of the nuclear reactor would in that case be achieved at the 

lowest risk to human lives and the smallest damage to Israel in terms of 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

31

world public opinion.”45 The IAF Planning Branch gathered all 

available information on the Osiraq reactor. This tasking gave Colonel 

Aviem Sella, chief of the planning branch, the opportunity to prove 

airpower’s central role in security of the small state. In 1980, the IAF 

had approximately 650 airplanes, most of which were second- and 

third-generation fighter aircraft.46 Based on number and type, the IAF 

was the third best Air Force in the world and arguably, the most 

experienced in modern tactical jet warfare. In the late 1970s, the Israeli 

government spent over 50 percent of its defense budget modernizing 

the IAF. Sella and the IAF took the Osiraq raid as the opportunity to 

justify the air force’s budget allocation. 

By 1980, the IAF had several different airplanes it could employ 

against Osiraq. Israel possessed the A-4N Skyhawk, the KFIR C-2, the 

F-4 Phantom, the F-15 Eagle, and the F-16 Fighting Falcon.47 The 

Skyhawk and the C-2 were Israel’s primary air-to-ground delivery 

platforms. However, they lacked the range to reach Osiraq without 

refueling. They also lacked speed for an effective egress from the 

target. The Phantom barely had the range to reach the target and would 

risk two lives (pilot and weapons systems officer) during the sortie. 

However, it was Israel’s only means of delivering precision weapons 

on target at the time. The Eagle and Falcon were Israel’s newest 

aircraft and the only third-generation fighters in the region at the time 

of the strike. These airplanes could fly the sortie without refueling. 

Furthermore, both had advanced Inertial Navigation Systems allowing 

them to fly long distances without the need for ground-based 

navigation aids. The IAF had the right tools to accomplish the mission. 

Employment Considerations: Operation Babylon, the code name 

for the Osiraq strike, was a simple, well-planned operation. The IAF 

Planning Branch chose non-precision weapons delivered by third-
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

32

generation aircraft to strike Osiraq. In choosing this option, the IAF 

planners kept focus on their primary task: absolute destruction of the 

Osiraq nuclear reactor. Their choice of weapon and delivery platform 

ensured the best odds of meeting this objective. Their ability to remain 

focused on a specific mission is the critical part of the Israeli planners’ 

professionalism. Israeli planners rejected several tactical options based 

on the overall goals of the operation. For example, the F-4 Phantoms’ 

standoff weapons could minimize potential losses by not exposing 

Israeli aviators to enemy Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and Surface to 

Air Missiles (SAMs) surrounding Osiraq. If inclement weather 

obscured the reactor, however, the ability to guide the precision 

munitions to the target would decrease. The resulting strike would be 

less effective than a non-precision weapon delivered by a professional 

aviator in a smart machine. Given Israeli sensitivity to loss of life, it is 

remarkable military planners were given this option by government 

officials. Therefore, Israeli military and government planners made the 

choices that gave the mission the best chance of success. 

Launch the Fleet! 

Israel was the only nation in the region with the ability to plan, 

practice, and execute this mission. Israeli tacticians were planning the 

mission even before the arrival of its second squadron of F-16s, which 

would be equipped with under-wing fuel tanks.48 To be successful, 

each phase of the mission called for detailed maps, navigation routes, 

weather data, aircraft performance charts, bomb fuse timing, release 

angles, target area flows, and contingency plans. This meticulous 

planning began in 1977, four years prior to the attack. 

The Plan: The plan for Operation Babylon remained a secret even 

from those practicing for the mission. All were aware of the fuel and 

time constraints of the secret mission without knowing the actual 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

33

target.49 Other than the cabinet members Begin consulted on the 

decision, only a handful of military members knew the complete details 

of the mission. Initially, only three of the men in the F-16 formation 

knew Osiraq was the target. Details about the pilots in the F-15 

formation remain classified. However, it is safe to assume less than a 

handful of pilots knew of the actual target. In this manner, Israeli 

decision makers limited the risk of spilling secrets that could 

potentially endanger the strike’s success. According to Perlmutter, “It 

is estimated that at least 80-100 people knew in advance of the 

intention to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor at some time and that a 

smaller number had knowledge of the precise day in advance once it 

was finally decided.”50 In this manner, the secrecy surrounding 

Operation Babylon secured the chance Israeli fighters would begin their 

attack as a surprise. 

Practice...Practice...Practice: Pilots involved in the strike 

practiced over nine months before the actual attack. Israel is a small 

country approximately 210 nautical miles from north to south and 

approximately 45 nautical miles from east to west. According to 

McKinnon, “Most combat flights in Israel are less than an hour long. It 

is 68 miles to Damascus from Ramat David, so long flights just are not 

part of the Israeli fighter pilot’s regimen. It took a lot of retraining in 

the skills of max-endurance flying for an Israeli pilot to convince 

himself to remain airborne for nearly three hours.”51 The low-level 

route to the target would take more than 90 minutes. However, the true 

stress lay beyond the extraordinary length of the sortie. 

The pressure point in the mission was the target run and the crucial 

pull up to safe-arming altitude. At this point, the pilots exposed the jet 

to ground fire, yet had to concentrate solely on aiming the jet for 

weapon delivery. The two-thousand pound bombs used to destroy the 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

34

Osiraq reactor had slightly delayed fusing to increase the cratering 

effect against the reactor dome.52 The explosion of this type bomb 

extends vertically 2800 feet and horizontally 3400 feet within nine 

seconds of impact. Israeli safe-arming altitude was 3800 feet. This 

meant any bomb released below this altitude would come off the jet 

unarmed since it held high potential to destroy the airplane that just 

dropped it. The key to hitting the reactor successfully was the rapid 

shift from climbing flight (to get above safe-arming altitude) to noselow stabilized on the target. According to McKinnon, “The Israeli 

pilots practiced and practiced and practiced so they could handle the 

mission so swiftly that their apex was less than 5000 feet above the 

ground and they could virtually drop the bombs with their eyes closed.” 

Moreover, to practice visual identification of a target, McKinnon states, 

“They all practiced dive-bomb targeting on an Israeli radar dome site in 

the Negev. It realistically portrayed the reactor dome.”53 This practice 

allowed Israeli pilots to limit their exposure in the target area and 

quicken the intervals between their attacks. After more than nine 

months of practice, the IAF was prepared for Operation Babylon. 

Execution: Operation Babylon launched from Etzion Air Base. 

Starting on Friday, 5 June, Israel staged six F-15s and eight F-16s at 

Etzion Air Base in the southeast part of the Sinai desert. These 

airplanes staged into Etzion early to avoid suspicion. Monday was 

Shavuot holiday and most Israelis expected limited military operations 

during the holiday break. The pilots flying in Operation Babylon 

stayed together 5-7 June in makeshift quarters waiting to carry out the 

mission. The briefing outlined intricate details of the flow of the 

mission. It covered every conceivable contingency operation, 

including how to handle ejection over Iraq. Months of practice made 

the tactical details of the mission seem mundane. IAF commander 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

35

Major General David Ivri and IDF Chief of Staff General Raphael 

Eitan attended the brief to support the mission first hand. After the 

brief, the pilots stepped to their aircraft. 

F-15s with ECM Pods

F-15s for Radio Relay

F-15 CAP for Egress

F-16s Strike Route –

100 feet and 360 kts

Strike Package flew directly 

over King Hussein’s Yacht

Figure 1: Overhead View of the Strike 

The level of professionalism displayed by each member of the 

strike team reinforced the reputation of the IAF. The ingress to the 

target lasted one hour and thirty-three minutes. The aircraft flew in a 

relatively close formation at approximately 360 knots and 100 feet 

above the desert floor. No radio calls or radar emissions, which could 

tip enemy outposts to the coming attack, came from the formation of F15s and F-16s. At the briefed locations, the F-15s split into two-ship 

formations, turned on their radars and climbed to cover the F-16s. 

Approaching the initial point, where the F-16s would make final 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

36

preparations to strike the target, the final two F-15s climbed away from 

the strike formation and turned on their radars and external electronic 

counter-measure pods. These aircraft served the dual purpose of 

protecting the F-16s from hostile aircraft as well as hostile search 

radars.54 Shortly thereafter, the F-16s spread their formation out for 

proper target spacing. Each two-ship arrived over the reactor as the 

explosion from the last formation subsided. In less than two minutes, 

Israeli F-16s dropped more than fourteen metric tons of ordnance 

around the center of the sixty-foot reactor. According to Perlmutter, 

“In all, sixteen Mk84 iron bombs were dropped on the reactor. The 

accuracy of the bombing, considering the IAF used no smart bombs, 

was astonishing. All but two were direct hits within thirty feet from the 

center of the target.”55 The strike on Osiraq unfolded precisely as 

Israeli tacticians planned. 

The battle damage assessment revealed the success of the mission. 

Israel most likely used in-flight video tape recorders (VTRs) to assess 

the reactor’s destruction.56 According to McKinnon, the tapes from 

aircraft number seven and eight reveal the reactor dome completely 

caved in and a destroyed cooling pool.57 However, Perlmutter claims a 

specially equipped F-15 flew by the reactor after the bombing on a 

special reconnaissance pass to verify the damage. Regardless of how 

Israel verified the damage, the Israeli fighters destroyed the Osiraq 

reactor. 

Reinforced IDF Dominance: Criticism of the strike covers 

important details, but neglects the most critical factor shaping this 

Israeli success. They each overlook the root cause of success: Israeli 

tacticians employed each weapon system in a well-suited mission. The 

IAF used the F-15, designed for long-range detection and air 

superiority, in its optimal role: protecting strikers as they dropped their 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

37

munitions. Similarly, the IAF used the F-16 in its optimal role as a 

strike fighter against heavily defended targets. Israel was the only 

nation in the region that possessed these aircraft and tactical knowledge 

about their optimal use. 

News of the strike came out of Israel on 8 June 1981 and had 

immediate domestic and regional implications. Begin received the 

political boost he envisioned. It also disheartened Israel’s enemies and 

reinforced the perception of IDF dominance. The strike also produced 

immediate international ramifications. Both the United Nations (UN) 

and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) condemned Israel 

strongly for the strike. Only US involvement forced these agencies to 

stop short of punitive actions. Israel’s Osiraq strike was a resounding 

vote of no confidence on IAEA safeguards. According to Shai 

Feldman, “Whatever else might be said about the Israeli attack on the 

Osiraq nuclear reactor near Baghdad, we now know that there is at least 

one effective anti-proliferation policy in the world.”58 Menachem 

Begin and Israel predicted harsh responses from the international 

community. They interpreted every condemnation short of punishment 

as leaders “going through the motions”59 of international diplomacy. 

Domestic Perceptions: The strike emboldened the Israeli 

population and carried Menachem Begin to a Knesset election victory. 

According to Shai Feldman, “Primarily, its brilliant execution enhanced 

the credibility of Israeli deterrence. The 7 June operation was a further 

indication of Israel’s superior military capabilities.”60 The biggest 

dilemma the strike alleviated was the short-term likelihood for a 

nuclear equipped Iraq. Thus, as an immediate strategic impact, the 

strike strengthened Israel’s military standing, bought time vis-à-vis the 

Iraqi nuclear program, and boosted Begin’s domestic political position. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

38

Conclusion 

Israeli decision makers planned the Osiraq strike to obtain shortterm gains, but the long-term consequences are now unappealing. 

According to Perlmutter, “The short-term price Israel had to pay for the 

operation was rather minimal. In early June 1982, Begin, Sharon, Eitan 

and other supporters of the raid could look back at the decision and 

conclude that the events of the passing year had proved it to be highly 

justified.”61 Domestically, Begin gained substantial political capital 

within Israel. In addition, the strike set Iraqi nuclearization back by ten 

years. However, long-term implications may counter these short-term 

benefits. According to Feldman, “The raid increased the Arabs’ 

motivation to accelerate their efforts in the nuclear field. Such 

acceleration is regarded by the Arabs as a form of resistance to Israel’s 

perceived intention to maintain nuclear superiority indefinitely.”62 In 

the future, Israel might not have the military capability to accomplish 

another Osiraq. In essence, the strike on Osiraq was a one-time 

counterproliferation operation for Israel and the global community. 

EFFECTS AND AFTERMATH 

This section identifies the deterrent effects of the Israeli strike on 

the Osiraq reactor and assesses the political impact of the preventive 

raid on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The section first examines 

Israeli political actions following the strike and analyzes Israel’s 

perception of the mission. Then it reviews empirical results of the 

strike from the Iraqi perspective, as well as political factors facing the 

Iraqi government after the strike. Finally, the section identifies the 

repercussions of preventive military strikes to provide policy makers 

lessons related to future preventive military actions. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

39

Setting the Stage 

Tactically, the strike on Osiraq was a brilliant success. However, 

Israeli leaders needed confirmation of the reactor’s destruction. 

Several avenues existed to validate battle damage. The foremost means 

was the amount of secondary explosions reported by the aviators after 

their bombs hit the target. Next was the Video Tape Recordings (VTR) 

of the F-16’s Heads-Up-Display (HUD), which showed the bomb 

impacts. Israel normally had the means to receive classified US 

satellite imagery, which would allow verification of the strike, but US 

imagery was restricted after the attack became public. Months later, 

when Israel finally received US satellite imagery, it verified that 14 of 

the 16 bombs dropped on the Tammuz reactor struck within 30 feet of 

the center of the reactor structure.63 Achieving tactical surprise for all 

14 Israeli fighter aircraft was a success in its own right. Striking the 

target with seven of eight aircraft, however, exceeded the Israeli 

leaders’ expectations. 

Domestic Factors in Israel: Israeli Prime Minister Menachem 

Begin perceived the strike as vital to shield Israel from Saddam 

Hussein’s growing military capability. Begin believed the Iraqi leader 

was a new “Hitler.” The Prime Minister referred to Hussein as the 

“Butcher of Baghdad.”64 In 1979, Iraq’s military had an army of 

190,000 men, 2,200 tanks, and over 400 attack aircraft. These 

conventional forces were formidable, yet Iraq was building chemical, 

biological, and nuclear weapons. Although Hussein was threatening 

Iran during this time, Begin saw Hussein as the foremost regional threat 

facing Israel. Thus, he justified his decision to strike based on the 

threat a nuclear-equipped Iraq posed to Israel. News of the mission’s 

success produced celebration at the Prime Minister’s house.65
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

40

Domestic political considerations, more than the Iraqi threat, 

obligated Begin to order the strike. At the time of the strike, Begin was 

both Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Pushing for Begin’s 

retirement, former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman had planned to 

succeed the Prime Minister at the Herut Party conference of 1979.66 

However, Begin maintained his position and further consolidated his 

power within the party. This forced Weizman to resign his position as 

Defense Minister. Improving his domestic political support was critical 

for Begin as a decision on the fate of Osiraq drew near (initially the 

strike was to happen in October 1980). When word on the strike spread 

among Israeli policy makers, however, “the October decision was no 

longer the property of a select few.”67 Labor party members were 

urging political caution on the hope diplomatic relations with France 

would yield results. High-ranking military advisors and intelligence 

officials also questioned the necessity of military action. In a secret 

memo to the Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, the Labor Party leader, 

stated, “I speak as a man of experience...what is intended to prevent 

can become a catalyst.”68 To these advisors the preponderance of 

evidence suggested Iraq would not have enough material to field a 

nuclear weapon until 1985 at the earliest. Begin saw the critical part of 

the equation not in terms of uranium but in domestic political capital. 

Knesset Elections: The Likud party controlled the Knesset during 

June 1981, but elections were scheduled later that year. According to 

Perlmutter, “Begin saw the reactor as a clear and present danger. He 

also knew that it represented a political weapon which could be used 

against him in more ways than one.”69 Begin limited the decision 

makers on the strike to three: himself, Finance Minister Ariel Sharon, 

and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Sharon and Shamir held similar 

strong opinions on Israel’s defense vis-à-vis Iraq. Begin warned his 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

41

cabinet about taking action against the reactor lightly. Ordering a strike 

of this magnitude was a high-stakes international and domestic political 

gamble. If the strike failed the Likud and Begin would certainly lose 

the election, but most importantly, Iraq would still have a viable 

nuclear program. Conversely, even if the strike succeeded the Israeli 

population might see the raid as only a political ploy taken to bolster 

Begin in the polls. Therefore, regardless of the strike’s outcome, the 

result politically was far from secure. Most politicians take action 

designed to keep them in power. However, Begin later stated, “If we 

had not done this, if we had not acted, I would never have forgiven 

myself.”70

The Likud party won the following election and consolidated 

power. The Labor party attempted to spin the Osiraq attack as a 

political display, yet a professional poll taken the week of the strike 

showed a five percent increase in Begin’s approval rating. 

Governmental support also increased to its highest levels since Begin 

took office. Perlmutter states, “The contest was no longer between 

Likud and Labor but between Begin and Peres...the 1981 elections 

centered on a personality contest: Peres won the TV debate—but 

Begin won the votes.”71 The resulting elections favored Likud by 46 

seats to 40 for Labor in the 120-seat Knesset. The other seats went to 

lesser parties. Many of these lesser parties (National Religion, Shinui, 

and Shas parties), however, backed Likud during this time. Begin’s 

government used action to voice its position clearly on nuclear 

weapons proliferation in the region. The election results illustrate the 

general Israeli approval of the Osiraq attack. 

International Factors after the Strike: International political 

ramifications were significant for Israel, but did no lasting damage. 

Other than Iraq, Egypt stood the most to lose from the Israeli attack. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

42

Egypt strongly reprimanded Israeli for the attack, but it could not afford 

to be “weak” toward the Zionist entity. In reality, Egypt could not 

afford the perception among other Arab nations it had abandoned the 

Palestinians. In this case, Israel stretched the loosely held boundaries 

between itself and Egypt by striking three days after the conclusion of 

the Sadat-Begin summit of Ophira.72 The Egyptian press raged against 

the Israeli attack. In addition, Egypt cancelled joint Israeli-Egyptian 

delegations discussing commercial ventures and agricultural planning 

altogether. Likewise, many European nations joined the international 

community in condemning the strike, but took no action to penalize 

Israel. The Israeli strike hurt France, in particular. The technology 

transfer from France to Iraq was lucrative and over one-quarter of 

Iraq’s $3.5 billion defense spending went to France. During the strike, 

Iraq used French and Soviet equipment in its air defenses, and use of 

these systems did not stop the attack. Further highlighting their 

equipment’s inability in combat against US military equipment would 

not increase global estimation of their value. After the attack, France’s 

flow of material and technology to Iraq would slow but would not 

cease, and diplomatic channels with Israel never closed. 

The United States joined the global outcry against the attack, but 

took no long-term action against Israel. The United States took three 

short-term actions against Israel. After issuing a strong verbal 

condemnation against the strike, the Reagan administration suspended 

the delivery of four F-16s to Israel. The State Department and 

Congress also officially initiated an investigation of the legality of the 

Israeli raid vis-à-vis the Arms Export Control Act. This act limits 

Israel’s employment of US military hardware only to defensive acts. 

The media within the United States was extremely outspoken against 

the raid, however. All of the attention paid to Osiraq quickly took a 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

43

lesser spotlight in July 1981 as Israel bombed Palestinian Liberation 

Organization (PLO) headquarters in Beirut. 

IAEA Aftershocks: The International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) initially drafted a resolution calling for Israeli removal from the 

IAEA. However, according to Shai Feldman, “The draft was opposed 

by the American delegation which argued ‘that punitive action against 

Israel would do great harm to the agency and to global 

nonproliferation.”73 The result was a resolution recommending Israeli 

IAEA suspension. This suspension passed but did not punish Israel 

significantly. Israel expected much worse. In essence, Israel’s strike 

on the Osiraq reactor was a long-distance vote of “no confidence” in 

IAEA safeguard measures. To the IAEA, this represented a possible 

Pandora’s Box, with other threatened nations taking up arms to strike 

the nuclear facilities of their enemies. Due to United States 

intervention, the IAEA did not expel, nor did it apply devastating new 

sanctions against, Israel. 

The Israeli attack forced the IAEA to interact with the UN Security 

Council. For the two regimes, this interaction was a significant 

transformation in the international order. According to David Fischer, 

“the Board sent a report to the Security Council after the Israeli 

bombing...however, it was the Gulf War ten years later that brought the 

IAEA for the first time into direct consultation with the Council.”74 

The first report condemned Israel: ten years later the IAEA called for 

the complete dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear facilities. As nonproliferation became critically important for international regimes, the 

IAEA looked back on actions in 1981 as a starting point. Israel’s vote 

of no confidence made a lasting contribution to the effectiveness of the 

international nonproliferation regime. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

44

United Nations Resolutions: The United Nations (UN) published 

a Security Council Resolution censuring Israel for the attack. 

However, this Resolution called for no punitive action against Israel 

since the United States again resisted such actions. Surprisingly, Iraq 

did not force a UN vote to expel Israel when it had the chance. 

According to Ghassan Bishara, “Iraq’s willingness to extricate the 

United States from a terribly embarrassing vote against the rest of the 

Security Council members is still puzzling.”75 If Iraq forced an 

embarrassing veto on the US Ambassador, however, it would alienate 

Washington’s Arab allies as well as the United States in the process. 

Such an action would not portray Saddam Hussein to other Arabs as a 

potential pan-Arab leader, as he so strongly desired. Another reason 

Iraqi delegates did not force the US delegation to veto was the relative 

warmth of the relationship with the United States at that time. The 

United States required a regional Arab ally, and Iraq, deep into the war 

with Iran, needed aid from the United States. Shai Feldman states the 

results: “The Iraqi–US cooperation in drafting the post-operation U.N. 

Security Council Resolution was a natural consequence of this 

requirement.”76 Thus, Israel managed to escape with a very meager 

reprimand considering the gravity of its actions against Osiraq. 

Bomb Damage 

Damage to the Tammuz 17 reactor complex at Tuwaitha was 

significant. Verifiable information about BDA open to international 

scrutiny was, at best, sketchy from the Government of Iraq. 

Unclassified reports indicate Iraq had two French nuclear reactors, one 

Russian nuclear reactor, and several reprocessing facilities at 

Tuwaitha.77 There were several technical laboratories surrounding 

Osiraq, the largest of the French reactors. Osiraq, named after the 

Egyptian god of the dead, was the only Iraqi reactor capable of 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

45

significant plutonium production. After the Israeli attack, Osiraq was 

no longer capable of producing plutonium. 

Physical Results at the Osiraq Reactor: Iraq lost incredible 

nuclear assets in the Israeli strike on Osiraq (Figure 4).78 Khidhir 

Hamza was a senior Iraqi scientist trained in America at Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology. He was a nuclear weapons designer in the 

Iraqi scientific community. His office was in the Tuwaitha complex. 

Hamza states the results of the Israeli strike: “The place was a disaster. 

The reactor dome was completely gone. The reactor cavity, kind of a 

swimming pool where the fuel rods were cooled, was cratered beyond 

any hope of repair. The uranium, however, was safe.”79 Yet, there 

were larger problems than the physical destruction of the reactor. 

Primarily, Iraqi scientists were now unable to use plutonium in 

developing the necessary fissile material for a bomb. The next most 

available route was to enrich uranium through a centrifuge process. 

This process was more time consuming and wrought with expensive, 

sophisticated, and scarce scientific material. The Osiraq reactor alone 

had cost the Iraqi government $300 million dollars to purchase from the 

French government. Iraq was now funding two wars, one against the 

Iranians and the other against nuclear non-proliferation. 

Immediate Strike Implications: The strike on Osiraq punished 

Iraq more in time than financial penalties. Milan Vego states, 

“Battlefields wax and wane in combat, but lost time is irreplaceable.”80 

Iraqi scientists began courting French officials in the effort to purchase 

Osiraq in the early 1970’s. The official purchase did not occur until 

1974. Safeguarding radioactive material and manufacturing highly 

technical equipment take enormous quantities of time. Thus, Tuwaitha 

was not operational until five years after purchase. According to 

Feldman, “There is no doubt that Osiraq’s destruction slowed the pace 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

46

of Iraq’s nuclear program. Even if Iraq could replace its loss with an 

identical reactor, which now seems likely, some 3 to 4 years will have 

been gained.”81 Eight Israeli F-16s destroyed five years of work in less 

than 90 seconds. On 8 June 1981, Iraq was once again years away 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon. 

After the strike on Osiraq, Iraqi scientists faced new obstacles in 

constructing a nuclear weapon. They were only able to obtain 

“Caramel” fuel; a lower grade radioactive material enriched only 7-10 

percent and used singly for experiment reactors.82 Yet, the strike on 

Osiraq did not destroy all of Iraq’s enriched Uranium. However, the 

scientists with expertise to use this Uranium were the most difficult 

piece to replace. Iraqi scientists, studying abroad, sought shelter from 

Saddam Hussein and refused to return to Iraq. Those who remained 

took the risk of losing their lives when traveling internationally. Yehia 

al-Meshad was murdered while in Paris attempting to buy enriched 

Uranium from the French government. The French police attributed 

the murder to robbery, but Iraqi scientists suspected Israel’s 

intelligence community as the culprit.83 Regardless of who 

accomplished this, fear slowed the Iraqi scientific community 

significantly. 

Domestic factors in Iraq: Domestically, Saddam Hussein faced 

political ramifications from the strike, but none that jeopardized the 

government. The Iraqi population was largely unaware of what 

Tuwaitha held. More importantly, the war with Iran offered a public 

diversion. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist government formed around the 

inspiration of a strongman ruling an equally strong-willed people. 

Thus, much of Hussein’s political legitimacy focused on the leader’s 

strength in conflict. Yet, the Iraqi government did not launch a media 

attack immediately decrying the illegitimacy of the raid as they did in 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

47

the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Instead, Israel was the first 

to announce the strike. Uri Bar-Joseph states, “Under these 

circumstances it was quite clear that the official Israeli announcement 

concerning the surprise attack came as the second shock for Saddam 

Hussein’s regime.”84 Politically, the attack appeared to Hussein as a 

setback in prestige and resulted in a 72-hour blitz against Zionism from 

Radio Baghdad. Bar-Joseph continues, “It was still interesting to note 

that Saddam Hussein himself kept quiet for ten days after the raid. As 

leader of the Iraqi people, he probably knew that some other reaction 

apart from the propaganda campaign against Israel was needed.”85 

Iraq, however, was in no position to oppose Israel militarily. 

Arab Responses: Arab sentiment against the Israeli attack was 

evident but did not convert into military action against Israel. The IranIraq war divided Arab sentiment in the early 1980’s, but once again, the 

Israeli strike unified the Arab world against the “Zionist entity.” Syria 

had much to gain from destruction of Iraqi nuclear weapons. Iraq’s 

Ba’ath party has always labored against Syrian Ba’athists. However, 

Syria vehemently declared Arab solidarity of action against Israel. 

Likewise, Saudi Arabia publicly condemned the Israeli strike calling 

for Arab unity. In addition, King Khalid offered to contribute funds to 

rebuild the Iraqi reactor. According to Uri Bar-Joseph, “It [the attack] 

was seen as an insult to the whole Arab world. This was the genuine 

feeling and perception of every Arab. The image of the Israeli pilot as 

Superman—similar to the one that existed following the Six Day 

War—had also been reinforced upon the Arabs.”86 Egyptian President 

Anwar Sadat also publicly condemned Israel. Fresh from the peace 

accords with Begin, he needed to limit his isolation from the Arab 

community. According to Feldman, “Egypt attempted to return to 

inter-Arab activity by-among other things-aiding Iraq in its war with 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

48

Iran. Thus, some military aid had been extended by Cairo to 

Baghdad.”87 Privately, all Arab states recognized Iraqi aims at 

hegemony and saw a nuclear-equipped Iraq as a destabilizing force in 

the region. The Arab nations needed a nuclear-equipped state to offset 

Israel’s nuclear ability, but did not want Iraq to be that state. 

The global uproar against the Israeli attack resulted in some 

compensation for Iraq. In the early 1980’s, the Reagan administration 

was in search of a regional ally (other than Israel) to replace Iran. In 

turn, Iraq was desperately in need of equipment and funding during the 

conflict with Iran. The Osiraq attack acted to stop Iraq’s nuclear 

proliferation, but simultaneously opened diplomatic avenues for the 

United States. Every meeting with United States officials reinforced 

Saddam Hussein’s stature and prestige to Iraqi citizens and brought 

some form of reimbursement. However, global aid and Arab solidarity 

could not replace the time and money Iraq lost during the strike. 

The Value of Preventive Strikes 

The overarching question remains: did Iraq lose all interest in 

obtaining a nuclear weapon after the Osiraq strike or did they redouble 

their nuclear efforts? The strike devastated Iraq’s nuclear program, 

decimated the regime economically, and hardened Saddam Hussein’s 

desire to become the leader of a nuclear nation. In his case study 

review, Patrick Morgan links deterrence to controlling conflicts by 

using appropriate threats and indicates that in spite of taking the correct 

deterrence steps, a motivated challenger can attack. The motivation of 

the challenger is a decisive issue in the level of success a deterrent 

relationship will have. Peter Lavoy indicates that a deterrence 

association between states can be offensive as well as defensive in 

nature. “The case studies show that many new actors plan to use 

unconventional deterrents both to support the status quo and to change 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

49

it.”88 Iraq clearly desired nuclear weapons as an unconventional 

deterrent against the Zionist entity. Thus, in this study deterrence 

includes offensive actions such as preventive strikes and allows the 

examination of motivating factors in both Israel and Iraq. 

Short-Term Value: The policy of the Government of Iraq was a 

direct reflection of Saddam Hussein’s private desires. His regime 

implemented his policy without question. Khidhir Hamza mentions his 

unflinching obedience to illogical orders due to the deadly 

consequences of disobedience. According to Morgan, “No wonder it 

was difficult to deter Iraq...the trouble was the coalition promised to 

damage Iraq’s economy and society...that was entirely ‘bearable.’ The 

way to deter Iraq was to have promised to kill him [Saddam Hussein] 

or remove him from power—the only things he really cared about.”89 

Power and regional hegemony motivated the Iraqi leader. In this 

manner, much of Iraq’s coarse foreign policy was a reflection of its 

dictator’s desire for power. 

Saddam Hussein’s attempt to obtain nuclear weapons was a natural 

extension of his need for influence. The Israeli strike on Osiraq 

occurred before the reactor went critical. Thus, the bomb-grade 

Uranium was still available to Iraqi scientists. According to Khidhir 

Hamza, they salvaged 25 kilograms from the rubble. Within six years 

after the strike, Hamza estimates Iraq had twelve thousand scientists 

and technicians working to develop a nuclear weapon. Economically, 

following the strike, Iraq poured an estimated ten billion dollars into its 

now buried nuclear facilities scattered throughout Iraq. These scientists 

were able to work relatively uninterrupted for four years before Desert 

Storm hampered their efforts. They developed viable shaped charges, 

manufactured their own explosive caps, and cast their own Uranium 

sphere. Although Iraqi scientists accomplished significant milestones 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

50

in design technology, they lacked an enriched core able to sustain a 

significant explosion.90 It was only a matter of time before Iraqi 

scientists obtained this fissile material. However, Desert Storm 

interrupted this attempt and further thwarted the Iraqi dictator’s plan for 

nuclear weapons. Thus, the Israeli strike on Osiraq delayed Iraq’s 

nuclear development, but did not dissuade Hussein’s search for “the 

bomb.” 

In attempting to dissuade Iraq, the Israeli government did not view 

Hussein as irrational. An intelligence dossier on Hussein correctly 

reported him as a power-hungry, calculating risk-taker. Lavoy states, 

“The common assumption is that we [the deterrers] are rational, they 

[the challengers] are constrained by culture.”91 Israel chose to restrain 

Saddam Hussein by attacking one of his instruments of power. While 

this action did not discourage Hussein from his desire for nuclear 

weapons, it did buy time for Israel in the conflict. One condition of 

successful deterrence is having a proper perspective of the challenger. 

While the Israeli preventive strike on Osiraq served several short-term 

goals for Israel, it had long-term repercussions for the world. 

Long-Term Value: The Israeli preventive strike solidified a longterm change in the deterrence landscape. The strike was the first 

example in the Middle East of a precision aerial attack on another 

nation’s nuclear facilities. This Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 

opened new realms of possibility based on a modern air force’s 

capability. According to Morgan, “Why is this a revolution? The best 

answer is that it should greatly affect the way force can be used. Force 

has usually been a blunt instrument.”92 Morgan claims nations with 

precision strike ability will now find deterrence much more appealing. 

This is incorrect. Precise force is still force. Military action should be 

the last resort any statesman chooses, due to its life and death nature. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

51

As quick and surgical as any precision strike appears prima facie, the 

long-term effects lie within the deterrence relationship of the states and 

not the effects of the weapons. Eliot Cohen states: “The days of 

Osiraq-type raids on a single, easily located, and above-surface nuclear 

facility are over. Secrecy, camouflage, deception and dispersion will 

make preemption a far more extensive and uncertain operation than 

ever before.”93 Osiraq was a one-time good deal for the Israelis. The 

lessons since Osiraq prove Cohen correct so far. The long-term effects 

of any surprise attack will produce the following results: “harder” 

targets and more staunchly antagonistic enemies. This does not mean 

this author condemns military strikes to serve the state’s purpose. On 

the contrary, a military strike should be devastating and used when a 

nation is prepared to follow with additional military action. 

Domestic political aspects often override significant international 

political factors. This was the case with Israel in June 1981. Every 

intelligence indicator Begin received indicated Israel had time to 

mitigate Iraq’s nuclear reactor by other than military means. Begin saw 

the attack as a political launching pad and his ideological responsibility 

to the people of Israel. Concerning domestic issues Morgan states, 

“there is recurring evidence that governments, elites, and leaders are 

often barely moved by general deterrence threats that they ought to take 

into account. Often short-term thinking, not attuned to larger 

implications and potential consequences of what they are considering, 

drives them. They seem caught up in domestic political or ideological 

preoccupations.”94 Strategically, Israel has a lack of geostrategic depth 

and extreme sensitivity to loss of Israeli lives. A nuclear weapon in the 

hands of a staunch, determined enemy provoked strong reactions in 

Begin’s government. Morgan also states, “Top decision makers rarely 

understand the military preparations made to deal with crises, resulting 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

52

in force postures unsuitable for deterrence situations.”95 Such was not 

the case in Israel, Begin and his trusted advisors were all very familiar 

with the Israeli Defense Force’s capabilities. The ideological and 

domestic political factors drove Begin for an early June strike. 

Asymmetric Effects: Military actions after a preventive strike 

require significant resolve by the deterrer. Historically, the 

Government of Israel has a poor record of accomplishment in 

deterrence. Morgan chose Yair Evron’s deterrence case study on 

Israel. Evron concludes, “Deterrence failed even though Israel was 

militarily superior, its resolve was clear, and it communicated threats 

clearly. The failures arose out of Arab domestic political pressures and 

the impact of crisis on Arab decision making.”96 Later in the case 

study Morgan confirms, “Nuclear weapons are not irrelevant but not 

dominant.”97 The first lesson in the aftermath of Osiraq is nuclear 

weapons were nice (and expensive) distracting mechanisms with little 

significant effect. By striking Osiraq, Israel demonstrated its resolve to 

deny nuclear weapons in Arab nations in accordance with its policy. 

However, the nature of this attack is “bearable” according to Morgan. 

It did not threaten the full sovereignty of Iraq. Thus, Saddam Hussein 

continued developing nuclear weapons clandestinely. Morgan states 

the second deterrent principle, “Where the threat is less than destruction 

of the regime, it is possibly ‘bearable’ so deterrence is less likely to 

work consistently and may have to be sustained by fighting, perhaps 

repeatedly.”98 The last principle is a corollary of the second; that the 

challenger must be willing to employ the threat on the deterrer in order 

to prove credibility. Thus, most deterring nations limit the threat in 

order to facilitate credibility. This succeeds in making the deterrence 

“bearable.” Morgan states this last lesson, “deterrence will more often 

involve not just threats but force and will be less likely to work quickly, 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

53

requiring repeated applications of force in repeated confrontations. 

This will make deterrence expensive, difficult, and hard to sustain over 

a long period, markedly eroding its effectiveness against opponents 

determined to outlast it.”99 The Osiraq reactor disappeared in 90 

seconds of bombing, but the remains haunt deterrence theory 

effectively today. 

Conclusion 

Preventive strikes are relatively simple to plan and execute. They 

make a global statement immediately. However, the repercussions of 

these strikes are lasting and costly. Currently, the United States can see 

the truth of this implication daily. Policy makers eagerly looked for a 

precision Navy Tomahawk or TLAM to meet momentary political 

needs in the Middle East several years ago. Now the United States is 

seeing the long-term consequences. The conclusion of Planning the 

Unthinkable encourages United States decision makers to be 

prepared.100 A one-size-fits-all precision strike course of action will 

not produce good results. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Israel is willing to enforce nonproliferation in spite of stepping 

beyond international standards and regimes. The attack on Osiraq did 

counter Iraq’s nuclear program in the decade following the strike. 

However, the strike also virtually guaranteed the need for future 

military action against Iraq. This section reviews a summary of 

research findings and offers policy recommendations for US policy 

toward Israel and future counterproliferation actions. 

Summary of Findings 

After the 1973 war, Israel’s strategic outlook was insecure. The 

presence of potential Iraqi nuclear weapons only exacerbated the 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

54

insecurity. When Israel considered the known behavior of Saddam 

Hussein, now in search of nuclear weapons, it concluded passivity was 

not an option. Israel elected to attack the Iraqi nuclear reactor by overt, 

covert, and diplomatic means first. This attack started in 1974 and 

concluded when Begin decided to switch the attack to military means 

In October 1980, Israeli decision makers held two critical cabinet 

meetings. On 14 October, Begin was in favor of military action, but 

desired further work in the diplomatic arena. At Begin’s next cabinet 

meeting, an emergency session, he was convinced of the action to take. 

He implored his cabinet to vote for the destruction of the reactor. Once 

Israeli policy makers saw the ineffectiveness of other methods, they 

quickly elected to strike. After gaining approval, Begin’s decision was 

simply a matter of when to strike the reactor. In 1981, the timing was 

right, and Israel proved it lives by the Begin Doctrine. 

Israeli decision makers planned the Osiraq strike to relieve shortterm pressure, but the long-term consequences are uncertain. The 

strike set Iraqi nuclearization back a decade, and domestically, Begin 

gained substantial political capital within Israel. However, continuing 

uncertainties may counter these short-term benefits. Two of these 

uncertainties are an intense desire among most Arab states to counter 

Israeli military dominance by going nuclear, and motivation for the 

prestige associated with being in the nuclear club. In the future, these 

factors may suggest military means to accomplish another preventive 

strike are significantly reduced as Israel copes with future nuclear 

proliferators who also learned lessons from the strike on Osiraq. In 

essence, the strike on Osiraq was a one-time good deal for Israel and 

the global community. 

The policy implications from a single military action taken over 

twenty-three years ago still apply today. Preventive strikes are simple 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

55

to plan and execute compared to major military actions on the national 

strategy scale. Moreover, in spite of their simplicity, they make a 

global statement immediately. Media attention serves to highlight the 

importance of the problem. In the long term however, a preventive 

strike such as Osiraq may reinforce a state’s desire toward nuclear 

proliferation. Such was the case with Iraq. 

This study results in three findings. First, future preventive strikes 

against nuclear targets will be less successful. Other nations seeking a 

nuclear option also have learned valuable lessons from the strike on 

Osiraq: dispersal and redundancy of facilities. Thus, while a future 

strike may hinder nuclear plans temporarily, the time will not be 

measured in years unless followed with more strikes. Second, the 

media backlash after a strike will serve as an impetus to radicalize the 

proliferator’s motivation toward going nuclear. Third, decision makers 

should make every attempt to work within the confines of current 

global constructs for stability. Regimes such as the IAEA and UN 

require cooperation for strength. By working within international 

norms, nonproliferation may take longer than through other means, but 

it stands a chance to be far more effective in the end. 

Policy Recommendations 

This leads to two policy recommendations. First, US policy 

makers should recognize the consequences of diplomatic failure on the 

process of nonproliferation. Israeli decision makers attempted to 

counter Iraq’s nuclear plans diplomatically for seven years before 

concluding a military option was the only appropriate solution. Israeli 

policy makers justified the strike based on their perception of apparent 

US vicissitude toward Iraq’s nuclear proliferation. US diplomats had 

many more tools at their disposal to allay Israeli fears that went unused. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

56

Currently, US policy makers, in consensus with global partners 

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have condemned Iran’s 

nuclear proliferation efforts and called for international action. 

The latest collaboration produced a joint statement encouraging 

Iran to stop its nuclear proliferation and open all facilities to IAEA 

inspection. While there was no automatic trigger for the IAEA to alert 

the UN Security Council if Iran failed to comply, the diplomatic 

pressure exerted through the regime was a good start. Coordinating 

activities between the IAEA and the UN Security Council is the best 

remedy to stop nuclear expansion. 

As the global hegemon, the next decision point for US policy 

makers is balancing the weight of nonproliferation system management 

wisely against valuable alliance considerations. Decision makers 

should make every attempt to work within the confines of current 

global constructs for stability. If this means taking diplomatic and 

economic actions against proliferators or pushing Israel to abandon the 

Begin Doctrine, then quick decisive action through IAEA or UN 

auspices with full United States backing are the best options. US 

leaders must weigh the potential misperception between slow, steady 

pressure to reverse proliferation, and Israel’s view of state survival. If 

US policy makers fail to take decisive action, Israeli decision makers 

may once again take preventive military action. 

The second policy recommendation is to reinforce that a one-sizefits-all, precision-strike course of action will not guarantee good results. 

However, if US decision makers see the need to explore the preventive 

strike option—such as on Iran or the DPRK—the factors covered in 

this study warrant consideration. The US military is the best in the 

world at global precision targeting on demand. Nevertheless, striking a 

target, regardless of the level of damage inflicted, does not alter the 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

57

motivating factors behind its existence. Before, choosing a military 

option, leaders should confirm that all other options are exhausted and 

remain ineffective. Along with the initial strike, military planners 

should plan contingency follow-on strikes and outline triggers for when 

to launch these strikes. The strike on Osiraq proved deadly, but did not 

prevent Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from rebuilding with vigor after the 

shock of the first strike subsided. Diplomats should arrange to 

coordinate incentives for stopping proliferation in conjunction with 

follow-on strike actions. These incentives may reduce the radical 

tendencies of a nuclear proliferator when leaders see the benefits of not 

going nuclear. 

Finally, the United States should continue pressuring Iran via the 

IAEA and UN, continue working in consensus with global partners, 

and pay close attention for Israeli signs of independent military action. 

The Osiraq attack is the benchmark for military counterproliferation 

actions. The world will judge the success of future strikes in 

comparison to the Israeli military action of 1981. However, a better 

standard of success should be the dedication a nation devotes to 

nonproliferation via diplomatic means. 

REFERENCES 

Albright, David, and Mark Hibbs. "Iraq's Nuclear Hide-and-Seek." 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47, no. 7 (Fall 1991). 

Bishara, Ghassan. "The Political Repercussions of the Israeli Raid on 

the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor." Journal of Palestine Studies 11, no. 3 

(March 1982). 

Brownstein, Lewis. "Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An 

Unplanned Process." Political Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (Summer 

1977): 259-79. 

Burke, Jason. Al-Qaeda : Casting the Shadow of Terror. London: I. B. 

Tauris, 2003. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

58

Cohen, Avner. "The Lessons of Osirak and the American 

Counterproliferation Debate." In International Perspectives on 

Counterproliferation, edited by Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller, 73-

102. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International 

Studies, 1995. 

D'Amato, Anthony. "Israel's Air Strike against the Osiraq Reactor: A 

Retrospective." International and Comparative Law Journal 10, no. 

259 (Dec 1996). 

Dunn, Lewis A, Peter R. Lavoy, and Scott D. Sagan. "Conclusions." In 

Planning the Unthinkable, edited by Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan 

and James J. Wirtz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000. 

Feldman, Shai. "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited." International 

Security 7, no. 2 (September 1982). 

———. Israeli Nuclear Deterrence : A Strategy for the 1980s. New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 

Fischer, David. History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: 

The First Forty Years. Vienna: The Agency, 1997. 

Friedlander, Melvin A. Sadat and Begin : The Domestic Politics of 

Peacemaking. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. 

Hamzah, Khidhir Abd al-Abb as, and Jeff Stein. Saddam's Bombmaker 

: The Terrifying inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological 

Weapons Agenda. New York: Scribner, 2000. 

Inbar, Efraim. "Israeli National Security, 1973-96." The Annals of the 

American Academy of Political and Social Science 555, no. 1 (January 

1998): 62-81. 

"Interagency Intelligence Assessment; Implications of Israeli Attack on 

Iraq." In Declassified Government Intelligence Assessment via internet 

http://www.foia.cia.gov/, edited by Central Intelligence Agency, 9. 

Washington D.C.: CIA, 1981. [Last accessed 21 July 2004] 

Israel Weighs Strike on Iran (26 September 2003) [Internet]. JANE'S 

INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, 2003 [cited 15 April 2004]. Available from 

http://80-www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/. [Last accessed 15 

April 2004] 

Kaarbo, Juliet. "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision 

Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli 

Foreign Policy." International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (Dec 1996): 

501-30. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

59

Lavoy, Peter R., Scott Douglas Sagan, and James J. Wirtz. Planning 

the Unthinkable : How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Weapons, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2000. 

Lockman, Zachary. "Israel at a Turning Point." MERIP Reports, no. 92 

(Winter 1980): 3-6. 

McKinnon, Dan. Bullseye One Reactor. Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1988. 

Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence Now. Cambridge, UK ; New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2003. 

Nakdimon, Shelomoh. First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel 

Foiled Iraq's Attempt to Get the Bomb. New York: Summit Books, 

1987. 

"Nuclear Weapons." In Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for 

Peace. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, March 1998. 

"Osiraq and Beyond." Air Force Magazine, August 2002. 

Perlmutter, Amos. The Life and Times of Menachem Begin. 1st ed. 

Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1987. 

Perlmutter, Amos, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph. Two 

Minutes over Baghdad. 2nd ed. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 

2003. 

Vego, Milan N. Operational Warfare. Rhode Island: Naval War 

College, 2000. 

Wilson, Heather. "Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and 

Nuclear Proliferation." The National Interest Winter 1993/94 

(December 1993). 

Ya'ari, Ehud. "Hi Eastward." Monitin September 1985, 25-27. 

NOTES 

 

1

Personal interview, 5 Aug 2004, with retired IAF Colonel Dov ‘Doobi’ 

Yoffe at his home in Israel after viewing the Heads Up Display (HUD) 

video of the 7 June 1981 strike. The video was a compilation of all F-16 

aircraft that participated in the raid. It included take-off, ingress, pre-strike 

maneuvering, footage of the attack, post-strike defensive maneuvering, and 

egress back to Israel. Doobi whistled to relax, while others talked to 

themselves or verbally rehearsed critical portions of the attack. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

60

 

2

Quoted in Avner Cohen, "The Lessons of Osirak and the American 

Counterproliferation Debate," in International Perspectives on 

Counterproliferation, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (Washington 

D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, 1995), 85. 

3 Israel Weighs Strike on Iran (26 September 2003) [Internet] (Jane's 

Intelligence Digest, 2003 [cited 15 April 2004]); available from http://80-

www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/. 

4

"Interagency Intelligence Assessment; Implications of Israeli Attack on 

Iraq," in Declassified Government Intelligence Assessment via internet 

http://www.foia.cia.gov/, ed. Central Intelligence Agency (Washington 

D.C.: CIA, 1981), 1. 

5

Amos Perlmutter, Michael I. Handel, and Uri Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes 

over Baghdad, 2nd ed. (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), xl. 

6

Efraim Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-96," The Annals of the 

American Academy of Political and Social Science 555, no. 1 (January 

1998): 63. 

7

Ibid.: 64. 

8

Efraim Inbar indicates a similar but fundamentally different set of 

strategic elements. However, deterrence is at the heart of both and drives 

most other parts of Israel’s Defense Principles. The Begin Doctrine is 

meant to deter Israel’s enemies. However, it also forces Israel to remain 

prepared for any regional nuclear threat and speaks to Israel’s willingness 

to act autonomously if necessary. 

9

Ibid.: 74. 

10Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-96," 63. 

11Shelomoh Nakdimon, First Strike: The Exclusive Story of How Israel 

Foiled Iraq's Attempt to Get the Bomb (New York: Summit Books, 1987), 

273. 

12Ibid., 148. 

13Ibid., 58. 

14Ibid., 54. 

15From: 1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace, Ch. 12 

“Nuclear Weapons”, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 

March 1998. 

16See Nakdimon pages 79 and 97 for these two quotations. There are 

multiple references inferring Iraq’s intent to remain at war with Israel and 

the Iraqi government’s stated intent of removing the Zionist entity from the 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

61

 

Palestinian land. Nakdimon’s most telling account of these facts are from 

a Kuwaiti newspaper, the a Siasia on 24 Mar 1978 [see 89-90]. 

17Nakdimon, First Strike, 59. 

18Ibid., 156. 

19There are four books in English on this subject. First Strike, Two 

Minutes over Baghdad, Bullseye One Reactor, and Raid on the Sun. Each 

one has strengths and weaknesses the others do not. By far the best work 

on the overt, covert, and diplomatic work done before the strike is Shlomo 

Nakdimon’s First Strike. This book is a translated version from the 

original in Hebrew, Tammuz in Flames. A newer version, in Hebrew, is in 

print. The new version does not use fictitious names and elaborates on 

details the first could not. It is not currently in English, so it will not be 

included. This section will also not introduce the varied conspiracy 

theories that follow a subject such as this. Instead, it will focus on known 

quantities/actions to determine success or failure of those actions. 

20Very similar to the way this study is presented. The author went to Israel 

and accomplished interviews and this study presents new information 

received in Israel, but while spreading the new information, the study is 

also an academic route to present information for Israel. 

21From: Nakdimon, First Strike, 63,79,114,115,115,125,126,131,132,133, 

and 147. 

22From: Nakdimon, First Strike, 101,120,122,123,137, and 181. 

23From: Nakdimon, First Strike, 56,63,66,75,83,88,96,99,138,144,152,174, 

180. 

24From: Nakdimon, First Strike, 59,73,75,115,125,126,131,135,147,154, 

174,175,186. 

25Nakdimon, First Strike, 160. 

26Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda : Casting the Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. 

Tauris, 2003), 54. 

27Lewis Brownstein, "Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An 

Unplanned Process," Political Science Quarterly 92, no. 2 (Summer 1977): 

260. 

28Ibid.: 267. 

29Juliet Kaarbo, "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: 

The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign 

Policy," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (Dec 1996): 503. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

62

 

30Zachary Lockman, "Israel at a Turning Point," MERIP Reports, no. 92 

(Winter 1980): 3. 

31Brownstein, "Decision Making in Israeli Foreign Policy: An Unplanned 

Process," 275. 

32Melvin A. Friedlander, Sadat and Begin : The Domestic Politics of 

Peacemaking (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 310. 

33Kaarbo, "Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making," 526. 

34Lockman, "Israel at a Turning Point," 4. 

35Ibid.: 6. 

36Nakdimon, First Strike, 82. 

37Dan McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1988), 88. 

38Anthony D'Amato, "Israel's Air Strike against the Osiraq Reactor: A 

Retrospective," International and Comparative Law Journal 10, no. 259 

(Dec 1996): 261. 

39Ibid. 

40Ibid.: 262. 

41Personal Interview with Retired IAF Chief of Staff, General David Ivry, 

1 August 2004. 

42Personal Interview with Retired General Avraham Barber, 1 August 

2004. General Barber flew the F-4 and helped verify the F-4’s inability to 

fly the long route. It would take a refueling over hostile territory to stretch 

the F-4’s range. The risk increased incrementally with additional aircraft 

and the necessity of these aircraft to refuel. 

43Personal Interview with Retired IAF Chief of Staff, David Ivry, 1 August 

2004. 

44Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 86. 

45Ibid. 

46Second and Third Generation fighter aircraft exhibit more advanced 

avionics, engines, and weapons respectively. An example of first 

generation jet fighters is the F-86/F-100. Second generation: MiG21/23/F-4 and Third Generation: F-15/16. 

47Lockheed Martin built the F-16s used in the raid on Osiraq for the Iranian 

Air Force. Ironically, Israel received these F-16 Falcons because the 

Iranian revolution dismembered the US-Iran Foreign Military Sales 

agreement. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

63

 

48External tanks attach under the wing and fuselage to extend the range of 

the aircraft. Once the pilot depletes the fuel in these tanks, they are 

jettisoned to decrease the overall drag of the aircraft. This effectively 

doubles the range of a fighter. 

49Personal Interview with Retired Colonel Dov “Doobi” and Michal Yoffe 

at their home in Israel, 5 August 2004. Early books on the subject claim 

Ilan Ramon, Zeev Raz, and Amir Nachumi were the only pilots who knew 

of the target. Ramon was responsible for the fuel planning and Raz and 

Nachumi were the flight leaders. However, Doobi Yoffe, whose mother 

was the stenographer for Menachem Begin also knew. And, Yoffe also 

confided in his wife, Michal. Michal Yoffe was Ezer Weizman’s daughter. 

After Ezer Weizman resigned from the cabinet, he was not privileged to 

the details of the strike’s timing. However, his daughter knew these details 

and could not share them with her father. She spent three tense days with 

her parents as Yoffe was flying the mission. Only after the mission did she 

tell her father. The newest book on the subject, Raid on the Sun, by 

Rodger Claire further expands on these facts. 

50Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 101. 

51McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor, 109. 

52Israeli F-16s used the Mark 84, 2,000-pound bomb, or Israeli equivalent, 

for the strike. The IAF started with USAF safety measures in altitude and 

timing and subsequently reduced these numbers as practice warranted. See 

McKinnon section 14 and 16. 

53McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor, 115. 

54Personal interview with Retired IAF Chief of Staff, David Ivry, 1 August 

2004. Other accounts of the strike do not note this fact. Other works 

describing the strike match most other information Mr Ivry described 

during the interview. However, the external ECM (electronic 

countermeasures) carried by the last two-ship of Israeli F-15s coincide with 

other details recorded by Iraqis during the strike. In Saddam’s 

Bombmaker, Khidhir Hamza, noted severe electronic interference moments 

prior to the Israeli strike. For the most technical account of the strike read 

McKinnon’s work, Bullseye One Reactor. 

55Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 125. 

56After: "Osiraq and Beyond," Air Force Magazine, August 2002. 

57Personal Interview with Colonel Retired Dov “Doobi” Yoffe on 5 August 

2004. Israel used the HUD film of number six, Col Iftach Spector, to 

verify Osiraq’s destruction. Spector was the only IAF pilot to miss the 

target. He misidentified the dome on his roll in to the target and 

subsequent maneuvering brought his aircraft perilously close to the dome 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

64

 

as the delayed fuses of the first four aircraft detonated. Fortunately, his 

aircraft filmed the explosion as he corrected his flight path. Although his 

bombs missed, he provided valuable information for Israel with his HUD 

film. The HUD film of number seven and eight reflect this damage also, 

but not as vividly as Spector’s film. 

58Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence : A Strategy for the 1980s

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 130. 

59McKinnon, Bullseye One Reactor, 190. 

60Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence : A Strategy for the 1980s, 126. 

61Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 172. 

62Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence : A Strategy for the 1980s, 141. 

63Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 124-5. 

64Amos Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, 1st ed. 

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1987), 361. 

65Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 125. 

66Personal Interview with Retired Colonel Doobi Yoffe and his wife, 

Michal, 5 August 2004. Michal Yoffe is Ezer Weizman’s daughter. Most 

political accounts claim Ezer Weizman left his position in the Begin 

government over a budget dispute with the Prime Minister. Others guess 

that Weizman disagreed with Begin’s handling of the Peace Accords with 

Egypt. However, this interview uncovered the real reason was a desire to 

be the next Prime Minister of Israel. 

If Weizman left the government, perhaps he could induce a vote of noconfidence on the faltering Begin leadership. Begin was an astute 

politician and garnered support to counter the threat. Beyond the desire for 

power, Weizman believed Begin was too callous toward the peace process 

with Egypt. Early in the Camp David talks, Weizman convinced Moshe 

Dayan, frustrated at Egyptian hard-line bargaining, to stay the course of 

peace. In this manner, Weizman unlike Begin, embraced the chance for 

Israel to gain peace with Egypt above domestic political considerations. 

67Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, 362-5. 

68Ibid., 364. 

69Ibid., 365. 

70Ehud Ya'ari, "Hi Eastward," Monitin September 1985, 27. 

71Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, 370. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

65

 

72Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," International 

Security 7, no. 2 (September 1982): 138. 

73Ibid.: 136. 

74David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The 

First Forty Years (Vienna: The Agency, 1997), 432. 

75Ghassan Bishara, "The Political Repercussions of the Israeli Raid on the 

Iraqi Nuclear Reactor," Journal of Palestine Studies 11, no. 3 (March 

1982): 68. 

76Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," 129. 

77David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Iraq's Nuclear Hide-and-Seek," 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47, no. 7 (Fall 1991): 18. 

78After: Section 12. "Nuclear Weapons," in Strategic Assessment: 

Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

University, March 1998). 

79Khidhir Abd al-Abb as Hamzah and Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker : 

The Terrifying inside Story of the Iraqi Nuclear and Biological Weapons 

Agenda (New York: Scribner, 2000), 129. 

80Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare (Rhode Island: Naval War College, 

2000), 47. 

81Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," 125. 

82Ibid.: 117. 

83Hamzah and Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker, 133. 

84Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over Baghdad, 142. 

85Ibid., 144. 

86Ibid., 169. 

87Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," 138. 

88Lewis A Dunn, Peter R. Lavoy, and Scott D. Sagan, "Conclusions," in 

Planning the Unthinkable, ed. Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James 

J. Wirtz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 235. 

89Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK ; New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2003), 267. 

90Hamzah and Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker, 334-5. 

91Dunn, Lavoy, and Sagan, "Unthinkable," 254. 

92Morgan, Deterrence Now, 217. 
Ford—Israel’s Attack on Osiraq 

66

 

93Heather Wilson, "Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and 

Nuclear Proliferation," The National Interest Winter 1993/94 (December 

1993). Quoted from an Interview with Cohen. 

94Morgan, Deterrence Now, 115. 

95Ibid., 146. 

96Ibid., 147. 

97Ibid., 165. 

98Ibid., 276. 

99Ibid., 223. 

100Peter R. Lavoy, Scott Douglas Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, Planning the 

Unthinkable : How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Weapons, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. (Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2000), 257.