IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-20-00247-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.B.G., A CHILD

From the County Court at Law No. 1

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 20-001430-CV-CCL1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On July 1, 2020, the trial court signed its order terminating the parental rights of 

appellants, Teresa Nicole Guajardo and Abel Benjamin Casas, based on the fact that both 

Guajardo and Casas had “executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of 

relinquishment of parental rights as provided for by chapter 161 of the Texas Family Code 

. . . .” Two days after the trial court signed its order of termination, both Guajardo and 

Casas attempted to revoke their affidavits of relinquishment and filed a joint motion to 

dismiss the original petition in suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Guajardo and 

Casas also filed briefs arguing that the trial court had plenary power to modify its July 1, 

2020 termination order and that their motion to dismiss should be considered as a motion 
In the Interest of A.B.G., a child Page 2

for new trial. In an email dated September 14, 2020, the trial court denied Guajardo and 

Casas’s joint motion to dismiss, stating that the trial court “lost plenary power 30 days 

after signing the Order of Termination in this cause. No further action will be taken.” In 

response to this email, Guajardo and Casas filed a joint request for findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. 

On September 21, 2020, Guajardo and Casas filed a joint notice of appeal with the 

Brazos County District Clerk’s Office. In their joint notice of appeal, Guajardo and Casas 

indicated that they desired to appeal from the trial court’s July 1, 2020 order of 

termination and that this appeal is accelerated. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a) 

(providing that an appeal from an order terminating parental rights “is governed by the 

procedures for accelerated appeals in civil cases under the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure”). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) provides that the notice of appeal 

in accelerated cases must be filed within twenty days after the judgment or order is 

signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). Furthermore, the filing of a “motion for new trial, any 

other post-trial motion, or a request for findings of fact will not extend the time to perfect 

an accelerated appeal.” Id. at R. 28.1(b). Therefore, because more than twenty days 

elapsed between July 1, 2020 and September 21, 2020, Guajardo and Casas’s joint notice 

of appeal is untimely. Moreover, because the notice of appeal is more than fifteen days 

past the date it was due, Guajardo and Casas cannot rely on the “implied” motion for 

extension under Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Tex. 1997). And finally, the 
In the Interest of A.B.G., a child Page 3

filing of the post-judgment motion to dismiss by Guajardo and Casas did nothing to 

extend the appellate deadline. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(b).

By letter dated September 25, 2020, the Clerk of this Court notified Guajardo and 

Casas that their joint notice of appeal is untimely and that this appeal will be dismissed 

unless, within ten days of September 25, 2020, a response is filed showing grounds for 

continuing the appeal. Guajardo and Casas timely filed a response to our September 25, 

2020 letter.

In their response, Guajardo and Casas argue that the trial court’s July 1, 2020 

termination order is void or voidable because the order failed to include mandatory 

language from section 263.405(b), which provides as follows:

A final order rendered under this subchapter must contain the following 

prominently displayed statement in boldfaced type, in capital letters, or 

underlined: “A PARTY AFFECTED BY THIS ORDER HAS THE RIGHT 

TO APPEAL. AN APPEAL IN A SUIT IN WHICH TERMINATION OF 

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP IS SOUGHT IS GOVERNED BY 

THE PROCEDURES FOR ACCELERATED APPEALS IN CIVIL CASES 

UNDER THE TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. FAILURE 

TO FOLLOW THE TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR 

ACCELERATED APPEALS MAY RESULT IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE 

APPEAL.”

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(b).

While Guajardo and Casas are correct that the trial court’s July 1, 2020 termination 

order does not include the mandatory language from section 263.405(b), they have not 

adequately explained how the exclusion of this language makes their notice of appeal 

timely to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction, we cannot determine the 
In the Interest of A.B.G., a child Page 4

impact, if any, the omission of the referenced language has on the judgment. 

Accordingly, because Guajardo and Casas’s joint notice of appeal was not filed within 

the deadline for accelerated appeals, we conclude that this appeal is untimely and, 

therefore, dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care 

Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (holding that, absent a timely notice of appeal, this Court is 

without jurisdiction to consider an appeal).

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed October 14, 2020

[CV06]