NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 220461-U

Order filed October 31, 2023

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

DEMETRIUS A. BEAL, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellee. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois,

Appeal No. 3-22-0461 

Circuit No. 12-CF-2382 

Honorable 

Sarah-Marie F. Jones, 

Judge, Presiding.

__________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices McDade and Albrecht concurred in the judgment. 

___________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s motion in limine

to admit other-crimes evidence.

¶ 2 The State appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion in limine to admit evidence of other 

crimes committed by defendant, Demetrius A. Beal. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
2 

¶ 4 On October 12, 2012, defendant was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a 

child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)). The charge alleged defendant anally assaulted the 

20-month-old female child of his live-in girlfriend on May 26, 2006. The victim’s great 

grandmother was changing the victim’s diaper when she noticed blood inside the diaper and fecal 

matter. The victim was taken to the hospital along with the diaper and wipe. A sexual assault kit 

was then performed, and it was determined the victim had been anally assaulted. Trace amounts 

of semen were detected on a baby wipe, and a DNA profile was obtained. There was no match for 

the DNA, and the case went unsolved until defendant went to the Department of Corrections 

(DOC) for an unrelated offense and his DNA was obtained. Defendant’s DNA was a match to the 

DNA found on the wipe. Defendant admitted to detectives that he had changed the victim’s diaper 

earlier in the day.

¶ 5 The case proceeded to a jury trial on February 7, 2017, and ended in a mistrial when the 

State’s first witness violated a pretrial ruling.

¶ 6 While awaiting retrial, on March 1, 2022, defendant was charged with predatory criminal 

sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)) for his conduct involving T.H.

and I.H. The charges alleged that defendant anally and orally assaulted T.H. and I.H. between 

January 1, 2011, and February 1, 2012. At the time of the offenses, the victims were approximately 

four to six years old. Defendant was the live-in boyfriend of the victims’ mother. T.H. and I.H.

gave victim sensitive interviews in 2021, when they were 14 and 15 years old. T.H. and I.H. alleged 

defendant anally and orally assaulted them multiple times. At the time of the assaults, defendant 

was dating their mother and living with them. According to the victims, defendant threatened them 

not to tell anyone. 
3 

¶ 7 The State moved in limine to admit evidence of defendant’s conduct involving T.H. and 

I.H. under section 115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115-

7.3 (West 2022)). The court heard the motion on October 17, 2022. The State argued the 

circumstances surrounding the two alleged acts were “virtually identical.” In support of its

argument, the State heavily relied upon the alleged fact that defendant was the live-in boyfriend of 

the victims’ mothers in both cases. The State explained “[t]he way in which defendant gained the 

trust of a woman with children, moved in with the family, and then preyed on those children when 

the mother was not home is exact.” 

¶ 8 Defendant primarily argued T.H. and I.H.’s statements were unreliable as they were

inconsistent and “def[ied] common sense.” Defendant pointed out that T.H. and I.H. did not 

remember the abuse until nearly a decade later. Further, T.H. stated he remembered it was his 

mother’s ex-boyfriend but did not know his name. T.H.’s mother then showed him a photograph 

of defendant on Facebook, and he identified him as his abuser. Further, T.H. stated that he and I.H.

were always abused while in the same room, and that it happened “at least 5 [times].” I.H. stated 

that defendant would abuse him “every time after his mom would go to work,” and that I.H. and 

T.H. were never in the same room during the abuse. T.H. also did not recall ever being anally 

assaulted, while I.H. stated he believed he was anally assaulted over 15 times. Defense counsel 

clarified his argument concerning the statements’ reliability was not meant to go toward the 

victims’ credibility, which would be a jury determination, but rather the relevancy of the othercrimes evidence. Defendant further argued that introducing the other-crimes evidence posed the 

risk of creating a mini-trial given the nature of the allegations and the need for extensive testimony 

to introduce the evidence. Finally, defendant argued he was in the DOC for a large portion of the 
4 

dates he was alleged to have assaulted T.H. and I.H. and, if allowed, defendant would be required 

to introduce evidence of his detainment to rebut the victims’ allegations. 

¶ 9 Following the bulk of the oral argument, the court asked the State if they sought to 

introduce the evidence for propensity only. The State replied they sought to introduce it for “motis 

[sic] operandi, absence of mistake, for any purpose that it could be admitted into evidence.” The 

State informed the court it would call T.H. and I.H. to testify at trial to introduce the other-crimes 

evidence. The court took the motion under advisement and, on November 14, 2022, denied it in 

open court without explanation. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and 

appealed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 11 On appeal, the State argues the other-crimes evidence should have been admitted. 

However, before we reach this issue, we must first consider our jurisdiction to hear this appeal and 

the applicable standard of review. 

¶ 12 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 13 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017), allows the State to appeal in a 

criminal case where a trial court’s decision results in suppressing evidence which “substantially 

impairs [the State’s] ability to prosecute the case involved.” People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 

(1980). Defendant argues we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because preclusion of the 

other-crimes evidence does not substantially impair the State’s ability to prosecute the case, 

particularly because the State previously brought the matter to trial without the other-crimes 

evidence. However, when “the prosecutor evaluate[s] the effect of the circuit court’s order and 

indicate[s] that the order substantially impair[s] the ability to prosecute the case,” the court must

“accept that good-faith evaluation.” People v. Sneed, 2023 IL 127968, ¶ 58. Here, the evidence 
5 

was suppressed, and the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment. We must rely solely 

upon that evaluation and therefore have jurisdiction. 

¶ 14 B. Standard of Review

¶ 15 The parties dispute the standard of review we should use in our analysis. Generally, we 

may not reverse the trial court’s decision to admit or deny other-crimes evidence unless the court 

abused its discretion. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182-83 (2003). When reviewing matters 

within the trial court’s discretion, we may not simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 371 (1991). Rather, we may disturb the trial court’s ruling 

only when no reasonable person would take the trial court’s position. People v. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d 

44, 106 (2011). 

¶ 16 The State urges us to review the matter de novo because the court did not “explain why [it]

denied the State’s motion.” The State does not provide any authority for its argument that the trial 

court’s failure to explain its ruling somehow transformed the trial court’s discretionary decision to 

deny the admission of evidence into a legal question, thus making de novo review appropriate. Nor 

does the State point to anything in the record showing the trial court did not perform the balancing 

required by section 115-7.3 and the Illinois Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the mere absence of 

disputed facts does not require that we apply de novo review to the trial court’s discretionary 

evidentiary ruling. People v. Zimmerman, 2018 IL App (4th) 170695, ¶¶ 65-69. We, therefore, 

review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 17 C. Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 18 Turning to the merits, the State argues the other-crimes evidence was admissible either 

under section 115-7.3 of Code (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2020)) or the common law. Under the 

common law, other-crimes evidence is not admissible to demonstrate a defendant’s propensity to 
6 

commit the charged crime. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 169. Evidence of other crimes is admissible only 

if it is offered for a specific relevant purpose, such as consciousness of guilt, modus operandi, 

design, motive, absence of mistake, or knowledge. People v. Banks, 161 Ill. 2d 119, 137 (1994).

¶ 19 Section 115-7.3 of the Code provides an exception to the common law rule against othercrimes evidence when, as here, the defendant is accused of predatory criminal sexual assault. 

Under this section, evidence of another criminal sexual assault “may be admissible (if that 

evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing 

on any matter to which it is relevant” (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(b) (West 2020)), including a 

“defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses.” Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 176. Under section 115-

7.3(c), the court may consider “(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense; (2) the 

degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or (3) other relevant facts and 

circumstances[,]” when weighing the probative value of the evidence against the undue prejudice.

725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West 2020).

¶ 20 Relying upon the above factors, we do not believe the court abused its discretion when it 

denied the State’s motion in limine. The roughly five-year gap between the offenses does not 

weigh heavily in favor of the admission of the other crimes. But even if we agreed with the State 

that the proximity in time strongly supported admission of the other-crimes evidence, the 

“admissibility of other-crimes evidence should not, and indeed cannot, be controlled solely by the 

number of years that have elapsed between the prior offense and the crime charged.” Illgen, 145 

Ill. 2d at 370. “There is no bright line rule about when a crime is too distant in time to be admitted; 

instead, the proximity in time must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and is a factor in 

determining the other crime’s probative value.” People v. Raymond, 404 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1046 

(2010). 
7 

¶ 21 When other-crimes evidence is not being offered under the modus operandi exception, 

mere general similarities are sufficient to support admissibility. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184. As the 

similarities between the acts increase or decrease, the offered evidence’s probative value also 

increases or decreases. Id. Here, the State relies heavily upon the fact that defendant was the livein boyfriend at the time of both assaults, both of which included anal assault. But the trial court 

could have properly found the other-crimes evidence less probative given the specific differences 

of the acts. The victims were at significantly different stages of development, different genders, 

and defendant was alleged to have assaulted T.H. and I.H. numerous times orally and anally over 

the course of 13 months, whereas this case stems from a single act of anal assault on May 26, 2006. 

Therefore, even if the general similarities between the acts could sufficiently support the offered 

evidence’s admission, those similarities alone are insufficient to render the court’s decision an 

abuse of discretion. 

¶ 22 Moreover, the fact that this evidence would likely cause a mini-trial in itself was a sufficient 

basis to deny the State’s request to present the evidence. In admitting evidence of other crimes, a 

trial court “should not permit a mini-trial of the other, uncharged offense[s].” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) People v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926, 938 (2001). As we have previously held, 

“trial courts must ensure that the jury is not tempted to convict the defendant based upon his past 

crimes rather than his commission of the charged offense.” People v. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d 747, 

756 (2010). Section 115-7.3 “does not alter this basic principle of fundamental fairness.” Id. 

¶ 23 The State’s case-in-chief here will likely center around the reliability of both the DNA test 

and the health care professionals’ opinion that the victim was anally assaulted and will not include 

any victim testimony. Conversely, to bolster their case and prove propensity, the State sought to 

admit lay witness testimony regarding continuous and extensive abuse from two victims who are 
8 

now teenagers and only recently remembered the assaults nearly 10 years after the fact. The trial

court could have reasonably concluded the asymmetric nature and volume of the evidence posed 

an impermissible risk of creating a mini-trial. See, e.g., id. at 755 (“[T]he trial court’s exclusion of 

[other-crimes] evidence *** appears even more reasonable when we consider the sheer volume of 

other-crimes evidence proffered by the State.”); and see People v. Cardamone, 381 Ill. App. 3d 

462, 496 (2008) (“[Illinois case law] instruct[s] that a large volume may make probative othercrimes evidence overly prejudicial.”). 

¶ 24 The State next argues the other-crimes evidence is admissible under the common law either 

to prove modus operandi or bolster the identification of defendant. Defendant maintains this 

argument was forfeited. Generally, issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal. 

People v. Hammons, 2018 IL App (4th) 160385, ¶ 14. One purpose behind the forfeiture rule is to 

encourage parties to raise issues in the trial court to ensure that the court is given an opportunity 

to correct any errors prior to appeal. People v. Denson, 2014 IL 116231, ¶ 13. Given this purpose, 

we do not believe the State forfeited their argument. The court was made aware the State sought 

to admit the other-crimes evidence to establish modus operandi, absence of mistake, or for any 

other purpose it could be admitted, before taking the matter under advisement. The State’s initial 

brief on the matter additionally discussed the established common law at issue.

¶ 25 Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the evidence to show 

either modus operandi or to bolster the identification of defendant as the State now argues on 

appeal. Modus operandi refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinct that separate crimes are 

recognized as the work of the same person. People v. Colin, 344 Ill. App. 3d 119, 127 (2003). If 

other-crimes evidence is offered to establish modus operandi, there must be a “ ‘strong and 

persuasive showing of similarity[,]’ ” between the other crime and the crime charged. People v. 
9 

Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 521 (1989) (quoting People v. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d 134, 141 (1981)). Othercrimes evidence offered to establish modus operandi requires a “higher degree” of factual 

similarity than other exceptions to the general prohibition against other-crimes evidence. People 

v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 140 (2005). Here, the factual similarities between the two acts are not 

so striking that no reasonable person would have taken the trial court’s position. 

¶ 26 Nor can we conclude the trial court’s decision to deny admission of the other-crimes 

evidence for purposes of identification was unreasonable. Admission of other-crimes evidence 

which bolsters the identification of defendant is proper when identification is at issue. People v. 

Bowman, 227 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613 (1992). The State does not explain how the testimony from the 

other victims would bolster the identification of defendant here. Defendant was charged after it 

was discovered his DNA matched the DNA found on the wipe used when changing the victim’s 

diaper. Defendant also admitted to changing the victim’s diaper earlier in the day. That is the 

evidence the State will rely upon in establishing defendant’s identity, and the other-crimes 

evidence at issue would not bolster either of those facts. Instead, it would only encourage the jury 

to impermissibly convict defendant because “ ‘he *** is a bad person deserving punishment.’ ” 

People v. Felton, 2019 IL App (3d) 150595, ¶ 42 (quoting Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 170).

¶ 27 In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State’s motion 

in limine. 

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County. 

¶ 30 Affirmed.