Cover

Preparations for evening flight operations

on board the aircraft carrier USS Harry

S. Truman (CVN 75) in March 2005.

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate

Airman Ryan O’Connor.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:48 PM
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 199

Selected Documents

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Newport, Rhode Island

Edited with an Introduction by

John B. Hattendorf, D.Phil.

Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime H

Naval War College

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Twenty-seven

September 2006

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford, U.S. Navy

Provost/Dean of Academics

Dr. James F. Giblin, Jr.

Acting Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Dr. Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Press

Editor: Dr. Carnes Lord

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.1071

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@nwc.navy.mil

Web: www.nwc.navy.mil/press

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies, and the

President of the Naval War College consider of particular

interest to policy makers, scholars, and analysts.

The views expressed in the Newport Papers are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the

Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Editor of the Naval War College Press. To

request additional copies, back copies, or subscriptions to

the series, please either write the President (Code 32S),

Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI

02841-1207, or contact the Press staff at the telephone, fax,

or e-mail addresses given.

Reproduction and printing is subject to the Copyright Act

of 1976 and applicable treaties of the United States. This

document may be freely reproduced for academic or other

noncommercial use; however, it is requested that

reproductions credit the author and Newport Papers series

and that the Press editorial office be informed. To obtain

permission to reproduce this publication for commercial

purposes, contact the Press editorial office.

ISSN 1544-6824

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
Contents

Foreword, by Carnes Lord 

Acknowledgments 

Introduction 

CHAPTER ONE “The Way Ahead” 

CHAPTER TWO The Navy Policy Book 

CHAPTER THREE “. . . From the Sea: Preparing the Nava

Service for the 21st Century” 

CHAPTER FOUR Naval Warfare:

Naval Doctrine Publication 1 

CHAPTER FIVE “Forward . . . from the Sea” 

CHAPTER SIX “The Navy Operational Concept” 

CHAPTER SEVEN “Anytime, Anywhere:

A Navy for the 21st Century” 

CHAPTER EIGHT “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance w

Long Range Planning Guidance” 

List of Abbreviations 

About the Editor 

Index 

The Newport Papers 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
Foreword

This collection of documents reflecting the evolution of official thinking within 

United States Navy and Marine Corps during the post–Cold War era concerning 

fundamental missions and strategy of the sea services is part of a larger project

designed to bring greater transparency to an important dimension of our recent 

history. This project was initiated by Professor John Hattendorf with his authori

study in Newport Paper 19, which utilized much previously classified material, o

so-called Maritime Strategy developed and promulgated by the Navy during the 

In the present volume, Newport Paper 27, covering the decade of the 1990s, Prof

Hattendorf assembles for the first time in a single publication all the major nava

egy and policy statements of this period. Though all are public documents, most 

these statements remain very little known and relatively inaccessible, at any rate 

the Navy itself. They are also not always easy to interpret, reflecting as they often 

subtle shifts in emphasis or the nuances of internal bureaucratic argument rathe

broadly understandable major changes in strategic thought or practice. Accordin

the documents are accompanied by an introductory essay that attempts to put th

the proper historical and institutional perspective, as well as by a brief comment

each that provides additional pertinent information and attempts to assess wider 

nificance. A second Newport Paper dealing with comparable naval strategy statem

of the 1970s and 1980s, in the same format and also edited by Professor Hattend

currently in preparation and is slated to appear in 2007.

It is important to bear in mind that this material is not merely of historical inter

his address to the annual Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Ju

2006, the Chief of Naval Operations. Adm. Michael Mullen, announced his inten

craft what he called a new “maritime strategy” geared to the contemporary and e

ing global security environment. The complex and not altogether happy story of 

efforts within the Navy along similar lines can contribute in vital ways to prepari

essential groundwork for such an undertaking.

CARNES LORD

Director, Naval War College Press

Newport, Rhode Island

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
Acknowledgments

The explanatory notes and introduction to this book of documents from the 199

a projected follow-on collection of similar documents from the 1970s and 1980s 

adaptations and extensions of the information initially gathered by Capt. Peter M

Swartz, USN (Ret.), of The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia, which he use

developing a PowerPoint presentation on the history of the U.S. Navy’s strategic 

ments over the thirty-six years between 1970 and 2006. The version used for refe

in this work was that presented at a 27 June 2006 Strategy Conference at CNA.*

Captain Swartz presented his briefing widely, extensively circulating it during its 

opment and garnering new insight and information at each iteration over severa

Additionally, in order to support my work in preparing this monograph, the 200

Strategy Conference devoted considerable time to the strategy documents includ

this volume. I am particularly grateful to Captain Swartz for sharing with me his

research materials and e-mail correspondence as well as reviewing and critiquing 

eral drafts of this book. In addition, I thank Rear Adm. Michael McDevitt, USN 

and Christine Fox of CNA for their permission and encouragement to use and el

rate upon these materials.

In essence, the introduction and the explanatory notes in this volume are compo

attempts by the editor to reconcile the various recollections and comments of a v

of the individuals who participated in writing these documents. As such, this vol

only a limited contribution toward a complete and detailed history of naval thin

this decade, a history written in the light of the additional documents and mater

that will progressively become available for historical research and open publicat

Many people who participated in various stages of the writing and publication o

documents made constructive comments and provided additional information a

2006 CNA Strategy Conference and in subsequent correspondence. I am grateful 

who have provided their insights at various points, whether in the development 

Captain Swartz’s briefing, during the 2006 CNA conference, or in subsequent e-m

correspondence with me, including: Capt. Roger Barnett, USN (Ret.), Capt. Joe

Bouchard, USN (Ret.), Capt. Linton Brooks, USN (Ret.), Cdr. Mitch Brown, USN

(Ret.), Capt. John Byron, USN (Ret.), Rear Adm. Bill Center, USN (Ret.), Dr. Gre

* Peter M. Swartz, principal author, with graphics by Karin B. Duggin, “U.S. Navy Capstone St

& Concepts (1970–2006): Insights for the U.S. Navy of 2006,” version of 8 June 2006.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
(Ret.), Capt. Will Dossel, USN (Ret.), Capt. Mike Dunaway, USN (Ret.), Dr. Norman

Friedman, Dr. Hank Gaffney (CNA), Cdr. Neil Golightly, USNR (Ret.), Gia Harrington

Capt. Robby Harris, USN (Ret.), Capt. Bradd Hayes, USN (Ret.), Rear Adm. Jerry Holland, USN (Ret.), Adm. James Holloway III, USN (Ret.), Dr. Tom Hone, Kate Lea

(CNA), Capt. Ed Long, USN (Ret.), Cdr. Paul Nagy, USN, Capt. Rod McDaniel, USN

(Ret.), Rear Adm. Mike McDevitt, USN (Ret.) (CNA), Edward S. Miller, Capt. Judy

(Holden) Myers, USN (Ret.), Rear Adm. Frank Pandolfe, USN, Dr. David Perin (CNA)

Dr. Peter Perla (CNA), Hon. Robin Pirie, Dr. Bruce Powers, Dr. Mike Price (CNA), Fred

Rainbow, Cdr. Steve Recca, USN (Ret.), Capt. Pat Roth, USN (Ret.), Jeffrey Sands, Capt

Brian Scott, USN, Capt. Larry Seaquist, USN (Ret.), Vice Adm. Joseph Sestak, USN,

Cdr. Winton Smith, USN, Rear Adm. James Stark, USN (Ret.), Rear Adm. Joseph

Strasser, USN (Ret.), Vice Adm. James Stavridis, USN, Capt. Sam Tangredi, USN, Capt.

George Thibault, USN (Ret.), Vice Adm. Pat Tracey, USN (Ret.), Cdr. Jim Tritten, USN

(Ret.), Dr. Scott Truver, Dr. Harlan Ullman, Cdr. Stan Weeks, USN (Ret.), Mark Werner

Maj. Gen. Tom Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.), and Capt. Robert Zalaskus, USN.

At the Naval War College, I thank Capt. Richard Suttie, USN (Ret.), and Dr. Carnes

Lord, who suggested that I undertake this series of volumes for the Naval War College

Press; Mrs. Alice Juda, reference librarian in the Henry Eccles Library, who provided

valuable assistance in locating copies of the documents published here; and Matthew

Cotnoir of Intekras, Inc. for scanning, composition, and final preparation for press.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
Introduction

The decade of the 1990s represents a distinctive period in American naval strateg

thinking. Bounded on one side by the end of the Cold War in 1989–91 and on th

other by the beginning of the era of the global war on terrorism after 11 Septemb

2001, these were years in which the U.S. Navy of the 1990s found itself faced with 

dramatically altered strategic situation. For the first time in at least four decades, 

U.S. Navy had neither a peer nor a superior naval adversary; further, no credible 

adversary could be discerned in the foreseeable future.

The Cold War, like the two world wars that preceded it, had been characterized b

naval strategic situations in which there was at least one major naval power capa

contesting America’s use of the seas. In all three conflicts, there had been a seriou

active threat from submarines that could conceivably have blocked the U.S. Navy

access to allies around the globe and to the major overseas theaters of war. For th

son, the Navy had invested heavily in ships, submarines, aircraft, sensors, and we

designed to meet and overcome that threat as an integral part of the U.S. Navy’s 

tional concepts for projecting power in overseas theaters. With the dissolution of 

Soviet Union, the withdrawal of the former Soviet navy, and the dispersal of the 

resources of the Warsaw Pact, that threat vanished. As a result, the U.S. Navy imm

ately faced questions as to what its role and functions were, what they should bec

in the future, and how they should be justified in terms of budget requests to Co

for the future development of naval forces. The eight documents in this collectio

the key published statements that the Navy’s leadership created during the 1990s 

explain itself to the men and women of the Navy and, in several instances, to Con

and to the general public.

The General Nature of the Documents

These documents have been typically characterized as being statements of the Na

strategic concept. The use of the word “strategic” in this context raises some que

and creates a degree of semantic confusion. To clarify the issue, one must first

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:54 PM
fering strategic concepts. In terms of military and naval operations, a most careful defi

nition of a strategic concept would be a statement of:

• What to control,

• For what purpose,

• To what degree,

• When to initiate control,

• How long to control, and, in general,

• How to control in order to achieve the strategic objectives.1

This definition is clearly appropriate to a combat commander dealing with the actual

employment of force to achieve a particular objective in a specific context, but the doc

uments here were not designed for that. They have a different, but fundamentally related

purpose. One may think of these documents as dealing with concepts designed to place

a large institution in a position, and with the appropriate equipment and mentality, to

apply a specific operational concept when and where needed for given purposes.

To call documents such as these “strategic concepts” evokes a particular sense of the term.

For the U.S. Navy, this use was emphasized in 1954 by Professor Samuel B. Huntington

who wrote, “The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in

implementing national policy. The statement of this role may be called the strategic

concept of the service.”2

Huntington continued, “If a military service does not possess

such a concept, it becomes purposeless, it wallows about amid a variety of conflicting

and confusing goals, and ultimately it suffers both physical and moral degeneration.”3

Even more pointedly for both the 1950s and the 1990s, Huntington wrote, “If a service

does not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and the political leaders

will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence,

and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resource of society.”4

A military service capable of meeting one threat to the national security loses its reason

for existence when that threat weakens or disappears. If the service is to continue to

exist, it must develop a new strategic concept related to some other security threat.5

While Huntington’s use of this terminology has continued in the U.S. naval service, it

has continued to cause confusion and dismay among those devoted to semantic clarification and precision. The documents assembled here, though labeled “strategic concepts,” are not framed in a specific context that allows them to meet the definition of

an operational strategy. In conceptual terms, they are closer to doctrine than to strategy; actually, they lie between doctrine and strategy, as strictly defined.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
of analysis of past experience, application of broad general professional principle

understanding of tried-and-true practical methods, along with an appreciation o

current capabilities of available equipment and the professional operators to u

take a range of specific tasks. Doctrine is generic, not placed in specific contexts, 

addresses how one generally expects, or even prefers, to operate to carry out the 

missions that are likely to appear in future scenarios.

Doctrinal statements can range from very broad and general views, or they can r

down to describe particular tactical approaches. At the broader level, one must u

stand the U.S. Navy’s traditional and distinctive views on doctrine. Traditionally, 

not accepted the views on the subject of the other American uniformed services 

has been very wary of attempts to make doctrinal statements into prescribed and

authoritative procedural directives. The U.S. Navy has typically regarded doctrin

general guidance to be implemented or ignored as the on-scene operational com

mander judges appropriate to the situation of the moment.6

The attitude is not u

how naval commanders in the Age of Sail regarded orders from their home gove

ments; the decentralized regime of that era emphasized a commander’s judgmen

how prudent it was to apply those orders in the light of the situation at the scene 

action.7

An analogous approach was taken in the U.S. Naval War College’s adapta

of military doctrinal ideas in its manual Sound Military Decision, used in the yea

leading up to and during World War II. In particular, this taught a philosophy of 

order form, which laid out the levels of command appropriate for issuing variou

gories of operational orders.8

The U.S. Navy has not as of 2006 published a gener

doctrinal manual of the kind that the Royal Navy issued in the 1990s; Sound Mil

Decision and Naval Warfare (the latter republished here) are its closest approach

The documents in this collection were all designed to explain the U.S. Navy’s bro

purpose, role, and contribution to national defense as well as to summarize its gu

ideas and principles. The documents constitute public declaratory strategy, state

to allies and to potential adversaries, meant also to influence others within the go

ment, including the Department of Defense and the Congress, as well as the gene

public. While these documents were specifically designed to inform and generall

reflect the exercise of actual operational strategy, they also touch upon other stra

formulations, variously including acquisition strategy, planned employment stra

the strategy of force architecture, and personnel education and training strategy.

These documents were typically created under the guidance of the naval service’s 

ers and in the Navy Department in Washington, D.C., not by the operational or c

gency planners. They were creations of relatively small groups of highly intelligen

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
ers. Accordingly, each document has its own story, one that arises from the specific

bureaucratic situation in which it was created. The personalities of the senior leaders

involved influenced the nature of each document, as the leaders themselves reflected

aspects of internal politics within the department as well as changing emphases in

national politics, Department of Defense strategy, and the U.S. Navy’s position relative

to the other services in political terms and in competition for roles.

At first sight, it seems remarkable that in the space of a decade the U.S. Navy created

and published eight different documents of this broad type. In this there is an aspect

that reflects changes in leadership and the desire of individual leaders to have their

own statements that defined their own tours of duty. The decade embraced two admin

istrations with presidents of two different political parties; at the same time, there were

four successive secretaries of defense, three chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, four

secretaries of the Navy, and three Chiefs of Naval Operations. To a degree such new

statements are a necessity, to be expected when national political administrations

change, bringing with them new national defense policies, or when changes take place

in the structure or nature of international politics. Yet, when one reads these eight documents together, one can discern an incremental and complementary process of development through one document to the next as the decade progressed. Compared and

contrasted, side by side, the documents show on one hand a consistency in certain fundamental naval values and approaches, and on the other signs of internal debate and

incomplete consensus as to what the Navy’s response to the new strategic environment

should be. These documents reveal shifting emphases, away from hedging against a

Soviet resurgence to defining missions, resisting administration budget priorities, and

surviving budget cuts. Nonetheless these documents, taken as a group, contain a common thread—an incremental, bureaucratic process during which the Navy as an institution wrestled to produce successively more comprehensive and overarching

statements of purpose, values, and substantive roles, statements that attempted to be

enduring as well as to be adaptive to changing circumstances.

A Changing Navy

The years between 1991 and 2000 saw the Navy gradually but steadily decline in total

numbers of active warships, dropping from 526 in 1991 to 318 in 2000. At the same time

the total number of active personnel fell from 570,262 in 1991 to 373,193 in 2000.

If total force numbers were declining, however, a range of new capabilities and significant improvements were entering the Navy during the 1990s. The Trident II (D-5)

intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of carrying a more sophisticated nuclear payload than its predecessor, was first deployed in USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) in 1990.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
new class of Aegis guided-missile destroyers. A substantial improvement in aeria

bat capabilities was introduced with the all-weather, beyond-visual-range Advan

Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM AIM-120A) in September 1991. Ev

more importantly, for communications, the Internet was effectively applied for c

fied purposes in the Navy with the introduction of the Secret Internet Protocol R

Network (SIPRNet) in March 1994.

In terms of organization and deployment, the Navy and all the other services we

the process of completing a series of major changes from the mid-1980s through 

1990s. The unified and specified combatant commands were first designated in t

National Security Act of 1947. The unified combatant command was designed to 

composed of forces from several different services, while a specified command w

composed of forces from a single command. Each was headed by a commander-i

chief. Carrying on some of the organizational structures from World War II, the 

diate postwar combatant commands included those that covered wide ocean area

the Atlantic and Pacific. Further changes to organization were made in the Defen

Reorganization Act of 1958, but this was only a step toward the more complete c

for joint service organization that emerged in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Re

nization Act of 1986. Its principal thrust was to eliminate counterproductive inter-

rivalry and to try to solve the problems that had emerged in the 1970s and 1980s

the Defense Department unsuccessfully tried to develop AirLand Battle Doctrine 

its follow-on documents as the sole operational doctrine for all the services and 

central approach to joint operations. One of the most serious impediments in do

this was the command structure of the armed forces.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act created a new system in which operational command

from all services reported to a combined arms commander-in-chief who was res

ble for a single region or for a specific broad function. The 1986 Act placed the c

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the key, centralized position as the principal m

advisor to the President and created a new position, Vice Chairman of the Joint C

This allowed the Chairman to direct broad national strategy, but prohibited the c

man from having operational control over any of the services or of the Joint Chi

the same time, the regional and functional commanders, called commanders-in-

(or CINCs) until October 2002, obtained increased authority over the forces. Th

CINCs reported directly to the Secretary of Defense, not the Chairman of the Joi

Chiefs of Staff, thereby emphasizing civilian control over the country’s military f

The restructuring in 1986 created a system that allowed for a combined defense e

with integrated planning, improved interoperability, shared procurement, and ro

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
command structure occurred during the First Gulf War in 1991.

The strengthening of the regional CINCs in 1986 and the delineation of the boundarie

for the regional areas of responsibility (AOR) for each of them had an important effect

on naval strategic thinking and planning. Before 1986, naval officers involved in strategic and operational planning had been used to thinking in terms of broad ocean areas

as single conceptual units and the older naval organization of the Atlantic and Pacific

commands had reinforced that way of thinking. The five regional commands—Atlantic

Command, Southern Command, European Command, Pacific Command, and Central

Command—divided up the globe among themselves with boundaries drawn between

their separate AORs. The majority of these dividing lines were placed in the middle of

oceans, dividing them up in ways that were quite foreign to maritime thought. At the

same time, the new divisions placed land areas, not maritime theatres, as the central

focus for each region, in some cases even dividing coastal areas from their related

open ocean regions. While this structural change in command authority had the

intended effect of increasing joint strategic and operational planning in specific geographical locations, it also had the unintended effect of making it more difficult to

implement coordinated concepts for oceans—the natural geographical unit of maritime space. However, this was echoed by the geographical and regional limitations of

the security threats in the late 1980s through the 1990s and mitigated somewhat by the

establishment of the four additional functional unified combatant commands—Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, Transportation Command, and Space

Command. Moreover, a Joint Forces Command was established in 1999, when Atlantic Command was renamed and given its new mission to focus on transformation of

the U.S. armed forces through joint experimentation in effects-based operations and

joint education.

Below this broad level of joint organizational change, the Navy activated a new fleet

command in July 1995—the U.S. Fifth Fleet, reestablished after a hiatus of forty-eight

years to operate once again in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea. In June

1996, the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night (LANTIRN) targeting system was delivered to Fighter Squadron 103 to give the F-14 Tomcat aircraft an

improved precision-strike capability for night and adverse weather operations. A month

later, three naval aviation commands were amalgamated into one—the Naval Strike

and Air Warfare Center, at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada—to create a “center of

excellence” in naval aviation training and tactical development.

“Information Technology for the 21st Century” (IT-21), launched in June 1997, a

reprioritization of the Navy’s command, control, communications, and intelligence

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
network in the fleets. The first of a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarin

USS Seawolf (SSN 21), was commissioned that same month. At the same time, Jo

Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), converting conventional, free-falling bombs in

“smart” guided weapons by adding a targeting and guidance system, were first de

ered for testing in 1997 and 1998 to solve problems that had been experienced in 

ation DESERT STORM at the beginning of the decade. A new and improved mediu

range precision-guided missile, the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW), was deploy

January 1998. At the end of the decade, Nulka, an active missile decoy, was introd

for the protection of surface ships through the collaboration of the U.S. Navy an

Royal Australian Navy; a new over-the-horizon, all-weather cruise missile capabl

automatically targeting land or sea targets, the Standoff Land Attack Missile-Exp

Response (SLAM-ER), went into service as well.

It was as these changes and innovations were taking place that the U.S. Navy pub

the series of eight documents presented here, as successive “capstone” explanatio

its broad thinking about the direction and approach it was taking at each stage to 

unfolding new strategic environment.

The Prelude within the OpNav Staff, 1989–90*

As the Cold War was coming to an end in 1989–90, a number of staff officers in t

Navy Department began to develop an informal coalition to begin to think abou

new vision statement for the Navy. Three key organizations were involved in this

CNO Executive Panel (Op-00K) headed by Capt. James Stark; a number of Marin

Corps colonels at Headquarters Marine Corps, including Colonel Bridger and Col

ard Vercautin; and Capt. Richard Diamond, the founding branch chief of the Na

Joint Doctrine and Operations Branch (Op-617), created in 1988 as a requireme

from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and then the head of the Strategic Concepts Br

(Op-603) from February 1990 to July 1991.

The catalyst for their work in this direction began with the Navy Long-Range Pla

Conference, held annually in a two-day session at the U.S. Naval Academy, which 

designed to bring together the various senior staff officers who were known as St

thinkers, either by their reputation or by the position of responsibility they held 

Navy’s strategic planning area.

A further catalyst for thinking in this direction was the monthly Navy Discussion

Group, hosted by Capt. James R. Stark after hours in his CNO Executive Panel O

* This section is based on Captain E. Richard Diamond, Jr., USN (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendor

tember 2006. See also, Naval Historical Center, Washington: Capt. E. Richard Diamond O

tory, in preparation.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
pendently of their immediate staff responsibilities, their relative ranks, or warfare com

munities. This group of a dozen to twenty political-military specialists in the

Washington, D.C., Navy-Marine Corps community, who were involved in working

broad policy issues, called themselves “the ancient mariners,” but were more middleaged, rather than young, Turks. The regular attendees of this group were officers such

as Capt. Roger Barnett, Captain Diamond, Capt. Thomas Fargo, Capt. Spencer Johnson,

Capt. Michael McDevitt, Capt. Larry Marsh, Capt. Michael Martus, Capt. Donald

Pilling, Dr. David A. Rosenberg, Capt. James Stark, Capt. James Suhr, Capt. Peter

Swartz, and Dr. Michael Vlahos, along with many others who came and went as their

available time, personal schedules, and official assignments allowed. For many working

in the political military area, this group was the key, informal gathering that created for

the Navy an unseen, off-the-record, informal alliance for exchanging stimulating ideas,

promoting critical thinking, and providing a backdrop for the official work of strategic

planning within the Navy Department, entirely independent of direction from the top

naval leadership. Another complementary informal gathering was Dr. David A.

Rosenberg’s Navy Study Group in 1992–93.

On 2 February 1990, Captain Diamond relieved Capt. Michael Martus as Head, Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-603). At the same time, Vice Adm. Robert “Barney” Kelly

relieved Vice Adm. Charles Larson as Deputy CNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations

(Op-06). The staff within Op-06 saw a noticeable difference between the two admirals

and their individual approaches to their position, with Larson stressing new policy

ideas and Kelly emphasizing operational priorities. Under Kelly, Rear Admiral P. D.

Smith, the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division (Op-60), sensed the need for a

new briefing that senior naval flag officers could use for Washington audiences, on

Capitol Hill, and at the range of public speaking opportunities that arose through invitations from organizations such as the Kiwanis Club, Rotary Club, and the Navy

League. Captain Diamond and the Op-603 staff completed this as Diamond’s first

assignment in Op-603, but this brief was not a replacement for the Maritime Strategy

of the 1980s that was still in place.

In the absence of any tasking or guidance from the senior leadership with the Navy

Department, the informal alliance of “the ancient mariners” began to take the initiative

and to pose the question to each other: “So what do we do for a vision to replace the

Maritime Strategy now that the Berlin wall is down and the evil Soviet empire is no

more?” After several false starts in February 1990, the informal members of the Navy

Discussion Group agreed to Diamond’s proposal that they form four independent,

two-man concept teams of action officers, who were given one month to draft the outlines of a new strategy that they would then present to a critical audience in an off-the

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
with current policy outlooks with the regular OpNav group to those from outsid

from think tanks and elsewhere. The teams were kept independent; members kn

ther the membership of the other teams nor the ideas they were likely to bring to 

discussion. Each team was given twenty minutes to brief their concept, while the

assembled audience was told to discuss the various proposals and to choose the s

points from each presentation and to make a composite list of those insights.

The meeting took place on a Saturday morning in late March 1990 in the CNO’s 

Command Center in the Pentagon. It was a relatively large group that cost Diam

$100 of his own money to pay for the juice, bagels, donuts, and coffee they consu

Among those who attended were Rear Adm. (select) Donald Pilling from the Wh

House staff, Rear Adm. Tim Wright from the Office of the Secretary of Defence A

Pacific desk, Capt. Robert Cepak from the office of the Assistant Chief of Naval O

tions for Surface Warfare (Op-03), and Capt. Thomas Fargo from the office of N

Program Planning (Op-08), among many others.

The results of this meeting produced some key concepts and themes that carried

though a number of iterations and presentations in the subsequent years. With n

unanimity, the group adopted Commander Joseph Sestak’s phrase: “The Navy-M

Corps team is the enabling force for follow-on joint operations.” Other key ideas

group adopted included:

• The future of the U.S. Navy is not about war at sea, but about supporting the land 

• The forward presence and expeditionary nature of the Navy-Marine Corps te

makes it the 911 crisis response team and the enabling force for subsequent jo

force operations in the world’s littorals.

• Neither anti-submarine warfare (ASW) nor anti-air warfare (AAW) remain th

number one missions of the Navy, but the Navy must still be able to maintain 

seamless ASW/AAW shield whenever it goes in harm’s way. Thus, major cuts c

made in submarines, maritime patrol air and global ASW sensors to free mon

expand expeditionary and littoral capabilities.

• Emphasis on formal alliances needs to be replaced by new thinking on cultura

awareness, increasing the numbers of foreign area officer (FAO) specialists an

develop a new paradigm for regional coalitions and bilateral naval cooperatio

Of the ideas agreed upon in this group, the last one proved to be one ahead of its 

and one that found little support either in the fleet or among the Navy’s senior le

ship. The other ideas, however took hold.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
proceed with a small group of writers who produced a central draft vision statement

and began to test it out within their various decision making chains of command,

reporting back to each other and maintaining a central file of comments and suggestions for improvement. In this, the various naval officers involved worked together to

try to avoid the development of diverging tracks. As far as they knew, the Navy’s senior

leadership was not aware of this process and had given no tasking for it. Within the

Marine Corps, Commandant Gen. Alfred Gray and Lt. Gen. Carl Mundy helped to

maintain active continuity for the process within the Marine Corps.

About this time another network appeared within the Navy to help develop a cross fertilization of ideas and new thinking. The Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-603) initiated

a catered monthly luncheon that became known as the “Strat Lunch Program.” The

idea was to invite the best strategic thinkers from various agencies in the Pentagon and

to have a controversial speaker whose talk might help to provoke and to correlate naval

strategic thinking. The first speaker, Dr. Edward Luttwak from the Center for Strategic

and International Studies (CSIS), did just that, when he spoke on the topic “Resolved:

The U.S. Navy should be Abolished.” This provocative topic succeeded in bringing in

nine admirals among the fifty who attended the first luncheon.

In June 1990, Adm. Frank Kelso arrived in Washington for his confirmation hearings a

the new Chief of Naval Operations and Op-603 worked up information to support

these hearings. With Kelso came a number of officers who had been associated with th

administration of Secretary of the Navy John Lehman a decade earlier. Among the key

people who soon became involved in the strategy process during the early 1990s, Capt.

Daniel Murphy moved from being aide to the Secretary of the Navy to executive Assistant to the new CNO and Vice Adm. Paul David Miller moved from being Executive

Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy to become Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for

Naval Warfare (Op-07).

Within Admiral Miller’s office Commander Richard “Rick” Wright moved from the

immediate office of the Secretary of the Navy, where he had been Secretary Lehman’s

special assistant, speechwriter, and idea man, to become Admiral Miller’s key idea man

and Capt. William Center emerged with a special talent for utilizing new desktop computer graphics technology to produce briefs much more efficiently and quickly than

other offices in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This skill eventually gave

the technological edge to Admiral Miller and his staff in effectively introducing new

strategic ideas to Admiral Kelso in competition with Vice Admiral Kelly, the Deputy

Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (Op-06).

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:55 PM
doing on a new concept for a post–Cold War naval strategy to Vice Admiral Kelly 

July 1990, while Kelly was en route to the Global War Game at the Naval War Co

The briefing proposed the concept of naval support for the land battle, littoral w

operations, and forward presence. At this point, these key concepts had been test

unofficially in a variety of ways through the various informal channels that had d

oped for substantive strategic discussion among staff officers and others in the W

ington area.

On the way back from the 1990 Global War Game, Kelly arranged for Captain Diam

to sit between him and Vice Adm. Paul David Miller to present the briefing with 

slides as a lap brief. Miller immediately liked the concepts and noted that it need

what he termed ‘catchy graphics” and “a snappy title.” For the title, Miller sugges

“Won if by Sea,” but Kelly was not impressed with this twist and pun on Longfell

famous poem describing Paul Revere’s lantern signals to announce the British

approach in 1775: “One if by land; two if by sea.”

Miller, however, asked Kelly to provide him with a copy of the Op-603 brief and 

Miller’s Op-07 staff took the initiative and began to redevelop it. Thus, this early 

opmental work became an ancestor to the series of statements that were soon to 

“The Way Ahead”

The first of these statements was an article, “The Way Ahead,” that appeared und

names of the secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett III, the Chief of Naval O

tions, Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. A

M. Gray, in the April 1991 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. After beco

the Chief of Naval Operations at the end of June 1990, Admiral Kelso had seen th

need to embrace publicly the changes that the new strategic environment sugges

an opening-page photo caption for the published article declared, “The way ahea

the sea services is rife with change and uncertainty. We must embrace that chang

continue to cover our best as best we can.”10

On 2 August 1990, shortly after Kelso took office, President George H. W. Bush h

publicly announced in a speech at the Aspen Institute the need to reduce the arm

forces sharply, by 25 percent, with a corresponding change in national military st

The basis for this announcement had been developing since 1989 in discussions

between Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Under Secretary of Defense for Polic

Wolfowitz, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Colin Powell, and the service chief

outcome of these discussions would eventually become known as “the Base Forc

which was understood as the level below which U.S. forces should not fall.11 By

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
opened the First Gulf War. Despite this new demand, however, it was already clear that

the U.S. Navy would need to reduce from 526 ships to the Base Force level of 450 ships

In the years between 1989 and 1991, the Navy Staff (particularly the Strategy and Concepts Branch, known as Op-613, the CNO Executive Panel [Op-00K], and the office of

Plans Policy and Operations in Headquarters, Marine Corps) had worked closely and

cooperatively to prepare updated revisions to the concepts of the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy. This thinking had been kept in the background, however, hedging

against a possible Soviet naval resurgence, while Admiral Kelso, with the active cooperation of Vice Adm. Paul David Miller and General Gray, concentrated on the best way

for the services to respond to the administration’s new defense policy and for the Navy

Department to shape naval forces. The result was “The Way Ahead,” the first significan

post–Cold War joint public statement on strategy by the Navy and the Marine Corps.

“The Way Ahead” argued that the new situation required the Navy to alter the length

and pattern of its deployments, the composition of its battle groups, and the makeup

of amphibious ready groups so as to meet the requirement for overseas naval presence

with fewer ships. There was now a need to break up the traditional operational hubs

and focus on forward presence and surge capabilities. The Navy’s new emphasis would

be not an opposing navy but rather presence operations, including humanitarian assistance, nation building, security assistance, and peacekeeping, along with counternarcotics, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and crisis response.

Despite unusually high-level personal endorsements—from the secretary of the Navy

and the Department of the Navy’s two service chiefs—and prominent publication in

the Proceedings, “The Way Ahead” had little impact. Its ideas proved farseeing but were

to take a long time to be realized. In the meantime, General Gray retired and Admiral

Miller was promoted, leaving the Pentagon arena to become Commander in Chief, U.S

Atlantic Command. The subsequent September 1991 Tailhook scandal eroded the cred

ibility of the Navy’s leaders and diverted attention from this sort of broad vision; further, the discussion around the Base Force plan and the immediate needs of active

operations overseas took precedence over long-range thinking.

The Navy Policy Book

Admiral Kelso became interested in a document that would describe the Navy’s fundamental guiding policies rather than its strategy. The new publication would complement, by addressing related issues, the already-published “The Way Ahead” and an

updated version of the Maritime Strategy, available should there be a sudden resurgence of Soviet naval power.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
and his thinking about “Total Quality Management,” which after its introduction 

U.S. Navy became known there as “Total Quality Leadership.”12 Deming had been 

ited with improving American business production in the United States during W

War II and, from the 1950s, had initiated in Japan a system of statistical process c

that led to innovative production techniques in that country and, ultimately, und

his ideas on Total Quality Management. One of Deming’s proposals was a “comp

owner’s manual” that explained to all who worked within the organization its va

basic culture, and processes.

With its explicit focus on policy and an implicit understanding that policy is the 

guide to the formulation of strategy, The Navy Policy Book did not attempt to cre

any new ideas; rather, it attempted to inculcate the ideas of Total Quality Leaders

and at the same time to express the existing values, proud heritage, and principle

seapower in a manner that everyone in the Navy could understand. The docume

included a professional reading list that echoed and adapted the recent Marine C

list, and it appended a general history of the Navy, written by staff members in O

and the CNO Executive Panel.

Coincidentally, a few weeks before The Navy Policy Book appeared, the Navy’s ins

general and the Naval Investigative Service issued a controversial two-thousand-

report about the September 1991 Tailhook Association’s Thirty-Fifth Annual Sym

sium on Naval and Marine Corps Aviation, held in Las Vegas, Nevada, during wh

reported eighty-three women and seven men had been victims of assault and sex

harassment. Naval leaders were eager to stress that the service had quite different 

than this incident implied.

In general, The Navy Policy Book seemed to have little direct impact on the Navy,

although it was cited in “. . . From the Sea.” Secretary of the Navy Garrett left offi

a month after the appearance of this document, as the Tailhook scandal began to 

deeply the credibility of the Navy’s senior leadership. However, and although exp

references to Total Quality Leadership quickly faded, many of the ideas and appr

that The Navy Policy Book suggested have endured to the present day.

“. . . From the Sea”

By coincidence, the Naval Institute published “. . . From the Sea” in a 1993 issue i

which another article reflected upon how the Navy could best get its message acr

The latter’s authors, Captains Peter Swartz and John L. Byron, argued that the Na

needed “a single voice, a single strong argument and a formal presentation—to s

the touchstone of Navy strategy, planning, resourcing, marketing, design, and

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
ranks and march as one Navy, with one message and one vision. Our uncertain future

hangs on it.”14

Appearing just four months after The Navy Policy Book, “. . . From the Sea” benefited

from the arrival of a new secretary of the Navy, Sean O’Keefe. The new document was

heavily influenced by thinking within the U.S. Marine Corps. It put forward key ideas

about naval expeditionary forces that moved into littoral areas, conducted joint operations, and enabled other services to carry out their missions. Emphasizing that the stra

tegic situation had changed and the Navy along with it, “. . . From the Sea” focused on

strike and power projection, underscoring the use of the Tomahawk missile for surface

and land attack, while downgrading antisubmarine and other campaigns designed primarily for winning and exercising sea control against an enemy force. Among fifteen

specific tasks to be completed immediately, “. . . From the Sea” announced the restructuring of the Navy to carry out the new strategy, including creation of the Naval Doctrine Command, to be alternately commanded by a Navy rear admiral and a Marine

major general, and of U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command. The new command, to be

headed by a vice admiral, was to develop naval doctrine consistent with the new focus,

creating and reorganizing procedures and organizations to meet joint expeditionary

requirements more effectively, resolve sealift deficiencies, reorient intelligence from

Soviet affairs to littoral threats, and restructure the Naval Reserve for immediate crisisresponse and peacetime support.

Overall, “. . . From the Sea” had wide influence within and outside the Navy. It was

extensively used as a basis for flag officer speeches and in testimony before Congress,

and it was favorably noted by civilian defense analysts.15 At the same time, it clearly

reflected how the fleet was currently operating and resonated with contemporary

thinking about the Navy.

Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1

The Naval Doctrine Command quickly produced a number of new documents. The

first, Naval Warfare, designed to be the basic and overarching volume of a projected

series, provided a general overview of its subject. The book and series were remarkable

for the U.S. Navy, in that they argued the importance of doctrine and emphasized the

principles of war, both ideas that met some skepticism within the service. However, in

these years the Department of Defense leadership was striving to have all the services

speak the same professional language and embrace congruent understandings of warfare, in order to facilitate the development of joint warfare. In this regard, NDP-1 was

modeled on its Army and Air Force counterparts, but considerably more condensed.

NDP-1 was very different from most of the other documents in this volume, as it

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
statement of “maneuver warfare,” one that had been carefully coordinated with M

Corps thinking on this subject; it discussed as well a whole range of issues, includ

wartime operations, deterrence, presence operations, and operations other than 

addition, it offered a section on U.S. naval history and a professional reading list

Outside the Navy, NDP-1 had a considerable influence that continues to this day

Readily available on the Internet, it has been used by professional military colleg

intermediate- and senior-level staff and warfare schools in other nations. In addi

has been used by modeling and simulation specialists, as well as by civilian analy

Within the U.S. Navy, however, Naval Warfare had limited impact, beyond a citat

an article on “Rethinking the Principles of War”;16 some in the service found it ra

bling and aimed at no clear audience but others writing in the U.S. Naval Institu

ceedings book review section17—such as Vice Chairman of the Joint Staffs Adm. D

Jeremiah, an army colonel who held the chair of joint warfare at the Naval War C

an Air Force colonel who was commandant of the Air Command and Staff Colle

Scott Truver, among others—found it had a good style and appropriately echoed 

Publication 1. In comparison to equivalent issuances by the other services, it had 

little doctrinal substance or apparent relationship to the 1991 Joint Warfare of th

Armed Forces, Joint Publication 1. Immediately after its publication, Admiral Kel

office. In 1998 the Naval Doctrine Command was disestablished, many of its fun

assumed by a newly created Navy Warfare Development Command (initially par

the Naval War College, later separated). The emphasis in the services on doctrine 

sided after a time, many in the Navy at large remained skeptical, and significant d

ences in approach between the Navy and the Marine Corps persisted. A new edit

Naval Warfare was written and planned for publication in 2004, but it had not

appeared by 2006.

“FORWARD . . . from the Sea”

Signed jointly in 1994 by Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, Chief of Naval Opera

Jeremy Boorda, and Marine Corps Commandant Carl E. Mundy, Jr., “FORWARD 

from the Sea” was widely recognized as a strategic concept. This new document b

directly upon the 1992 “. . . From the Sea” but went farther by introducing new id

and stressing the concepts of power projection, strategic nuclear deterrence, and 

bat-credible forward presence. In particular, in connection with forward presenc

proposed mobile sea bases to increase flexibility and encouraged thinking about 

measure effectiveness. The document reaffirmed the Navy’s traditional abilities i

control operations, strongly emphasized its role in joint operations, and made ex

connections to changes under way with regard to the service’s budget.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
officer speeches and congressional testimony. The document was widely discussed and

had contemporary influence.18 It played a role as conceptual background for the Navy’s

force structure decisions and the service’s contribution to the 1995 Commission on

Roles and Missions. The document had significant influence in underscoring forward

presence as one of the Navy’s main missions. It satisfied naval leaders’ desire to explain

what they meant by forward presence in a way that reflected current employment patterns and made sense to others in terms of national strategy.

Nonetheless, the paper was also criticized. Some critics found the effects of forward presence hard to quantify or even prove—in which case the document seemed to be making

unsustainable promises about what the Navy could offer. Others pointed out that naval

presence is not always necessary to enable joint-force operations. Naval presence overseas

yet others argued, downgrades readiness to surge from a home base and is costly to sustain for long periods. A number of people in the Marine Corps were concerned that

“FORWARD . . . from the Sea” signaled a Navy return to a blue-water focus and away

from joint expeditionary warfare. Accordingly, in doctrinal and planning matters the

Marine Corps tended to emphasize the original “. . . From the Sea” rather than “FORWARD . . . from the Sea.” Finally, the Army and Air Force reacted to “FORWARD . . .

from the Sea” by emphasizing and modernizing their own service contributions to joint

forward presence in their presentations on Capitol Hill and within the Department of

Defense as well as in their positions in the various overseas theaters. At the same time,

some Army and Air Force officers denigrated the Navy’s roles beyond enabling the other

services to act. They claimed that the sea services would have little to do in sustained

operations once the Navy and Marine Corps had enabled the Army and Air Force to act.

In December 1995 General Mundy, now retired, published in the Naval Institute Proceedings an article that was to stimulate a public exchange of views that highlighted

some of the tensions between the two services. Mundy’s article began under the epigraph, “Department of the Navy ‘blue’ dollars that fund some Marine Corps programs

have a distressing tendency to suffer from a blue-green split that too often resembles a

horse-and-rabbit stew: one horse and one rabbit. It’s time for a change.”19 Recalling the

cooperative team spirit that had arisen in the drafting of “. . . From the Sea” and “Forward . . . from the Sea,” Mundy argued that determining team requirements and equita

bly managing and allocating team resources to meet them were problems that needed

to be resolved. Responding in Proceedings the following month, Admiral Kelso declared

that the documents were “important concepts in the post–Cold War world and give the

Navy–Marine Corps team new meaning and strategy.” He continued,

They did not, however, take away a major responsibility of the Navy to ensure safe passage of our

Army and Air Force by sea. We have controlled the sea lanes for so long that we take their use for

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
gic deterrence must be maintained—and much of that chore is the responsibility of the Navy. 

requirements persist and cannot be ignored by the Navy. They must be considered among the 

quirements of the Navy, in addition to Navy support of Marines in the littorals.20

In the following month, retired rear admiral Riley D. Mixson, Director of Air Warfar

1991–93, took up Mundy’s points with respect to Marine Corps aviation. Mixson po

out that under the leadership of Vice Adm. William Owens as Deputy Chief of Nava

ations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments (N-8) and of Lt. Gen. 

Krulak as Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, t

services had jointly taken on the task of eliminating redundancies in warfighting cap

ties. This partnership, he recalled, had resulted in the establishment of a new Navy St

division for Littoral Warfare (N-85), headed by a Marine Corps major general. In thi

period, Mixson wrote, emphasizing his point with italics, “there was no paucity of Ma

presence or influence in any of our budget/requirement deliberations.”21

The Navy Operational Concept

The discussion and tension that arose between the Navy and the Marine Corps a

result of the perception that “Forward . . . from the Sea” signaled Navy movemen

from joint warfare led Gen. Charles Krulak to suggest to the Chief of Naval Oper

Admiral Boorda, that the two services develop an overarching framework tying

together “. . . From the Sea,” “Forward . . . from the Sea,” and the Marine Corps co

of “operational maneuver from the sea.” Admiral Boorda agreed, and a Navy-Ma

team began work, cochaired for the Navy by Capt. Joseph Bouchard, head of the 

Staff ’s Strategy and Concepts Branch (N-513).22

The Navy team found the project difficult, in part because the Marines did not h

one single overarching concept of its own but three, all tending to justify a large

Marine Corps. “Operational maneuver from the sea” was the latest, but there was 

concept for the employment of land-based, nonamphibious expeditionary forces

well as one for sea basing, developed from an earlier idea of the Maritime Preposit

Force. Also, it was controversial within the Navy itself. The Naval Doctrine Comm

saw it as a Navy Staff intrusion upon its own area of responsibility; the Deputy C

Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments saw it a

Marine Corps attempt to take a larger share of the Navy Department budget; and 

naval aviation community saw it as interference with its efforts to make projecting 

ashore the Navy’s primary mission and acquisition of the F/A-18E/F aircraft the 

vice’s number-one budget priority. In particular, it was thought a new “naval ope

concept” might involve Admiral Boorda’s “Arsenal Ship” proposal and so divert f

from aviation programs. (The latter fear was entirely unjustified; the Strategy Co

Branch [N-513] was looking at another concept of small, fast, expendable vessels

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
a joint naval operating concept was disbanded and the project canceled, but some of the

ideas remained in circulation and carried over into a project that succeeded it. (A related

project from Boorda’s tenure, “Naval Vision 2010,” also canceled after his death, was

eventually published in 1997 as chapter 1 of the “Force 2001” annual program guide.)23

The new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jay Johnson, was well aware that the Navy had

felt marginalized in Operation DESERT STORM, having declined during the Cold War to

participate in the development of “AirLand Battle” joint doctrine, concentrating instead

on the Maritime Strategy. Specifically, the command and control systems used in DESERT

STORM had tended to emphasize the Air Force and so precluded a strong Navy role.

In thinking about a conceptual document, therefore, Admiral Johnson made clear that

it was not to be a new strategy or a budgetary justification. It was instead to be an

internal paper (the CNO initially expressed no interest in publishing it) that would

stimulate doctrinal thinking in the Navy as a preliminary to the development of joint

doctrine. Captain Bouchard was placed in charge. The completed paper, known as the

“The Navy Operational Concept,” affirmed “. . . From the Sea” and “Forward . . . from

the Sea” as the U.S. Navy’s capstone conceptual statements. It focused not on detailed

strategic exposition but on broad, operational themes—“operational maneuver from

the sea” (but also amphibious operations as only one of many roles of the U.S. Navy),

networked command and control, deep and precise naval fires, protection for joint and

coalition forces, superior speed of command, and, notably, the idea of naval operations

as a continuum, ranging from peacetime through crisis to full-scale war.

The “Navy Operational Concept” was important in that it was the first reflection of

ideas that would later become known as “network-centric warfare” and also in that it

provided a basis upon which the Navy could begin to reengage with the Marines in the

development of a Navy–Marine Corps concept of operations. None of the flag officers

to whom Admiral Johnson circulated the paper criticized its ideas, but many found

them new, not the time-honored themes by which the Navy had justified its budget and

its programs—inevitably a concern to those involved in the program and budgeting

process, should the paper be widely circulated. As it happened, however—and although

it was published in the Navy League’s magazine, Sea Power—the paper had little effect

beyond its intended purpose of stimulating thought inside the Navy.24

“Anytime, Anywhere”

In contrast, “Anytime, Anywhere,” published in November 1997, was designed to be a

public statement of the Navy’s vision of its broad roles. It too had its distant conceptua

roots in the work that had been done during Admiral Boorda’s tenure as Chief of Nava

Operations, particularly in a series of war games on the revolution in Military Affairs

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:56 PM
headed by Andrew Marshall, to assess how the Navy might project power ashore

terms of its substance, “Anytime, Anywhere” represented clear conceptual contin

with “. . . From the Sea,” “Forward . . . from the Sea” and “The Navy Operational 

cept.” Declaring the U.S. Navy was able to win wars anytime, anywhere, the docu

stressed its ability to influence events ashore directly and decisively. The article a

lated an expanded role for the Navy in national strategy. It underscored the Navy

ity to deliver precision strikes from the sea that could foreclose an enemy’s optio

support completely a joint force ashore. It also envisioned sea-based campaigns. 

addition, it hinted at, but was not explicit about, some of the concepts of networ

centric warfare that would emerge later in 1997 and in 1998.

The title of the article quickly became a catch phrase. The Department of the Na

Posture Statement for 1998 was titled “Forward . . . from the Sea: Anytime, Anyw

In July 2000, the new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Vern Clark, used it in his 

message to the fleet: “We sail anytime, anywhere as powerful representatives of A

can sovereignty.”25

“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance”

The final document in this collection, “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance with L

Range Planning Objectives,” was published in 2000. It was designed to bridge the 

that had emerged between the Navy’s strategic and budgetary statements, in ligh

presumption that strategy should be the guiding force for the programming and 

geting process.

The largest and most detailed of all the documents presented here, “Navy Strateg

Planning Guidance” subsumed many ideas and statements developed earlier in t

decade, merging them with and adapting them to the new concept of network-ce

warfare. The document emphasized the importance of forward presence and “kn

edge superiority” as the means to the desired ends of regional stability, deterrenc

timely crisis response, and successful war fighting, and the resulting necessity tha

Navy be able to operate in a multidimensional battle space.

“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” was a detailed catalogue of naval warfare areas, l

them to, on one hand, broad strategic concepts and service roles, and on the other, to 

Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR) programming process and to the Quadrenn

Defense Review (QDR), which recurred every four years to examine defense prioritie

The success of “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” was fairly modest, even if it d

focus the Navy’s efforts in the 2001 QDR.26 All the key people behind the paper’s 

ation were transferred to new positions shortly after it appeared. The new Chief 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
programming process. Clark did not sign a proposed revision to the document completed in 2001, deciding instead to change the process and alter the organizational

structure involved.

The eight documents discussed here show incremental developments as the Navy

worked throughout the decade of the 1990s to develop an all-encompassing statement

of a strategic concept for the its roles and missions—a process as yet incomplete in

2006. The documents here grow in breadth, range, and refinement from one to anothe

as the U.S. Navy wrestled with the changed security environment of the 1990s. The following eight chapters reprint, respectively, the full text of each of the documents discussed here, under brief head notes that offer additional information and describe the

specific circumstances surrounding the writing of each document.

Notes

1. Admiral Henry E. Eccles [Rear Adm., USN],

“Strategy: The Theory and Application,” Naval War College Review 22 (May–June 1979),

pp. 11–21, quotation at p. 3.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and

the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings (May 1954), pp. 483–93, quote at

p. 483.

3. Ibid., p. 483.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 484.

6. See “Naval Doctrine,” in Naval History and

Maritime Strategy: Collected Essays, ed. John

B. Hattendorf (Malabar, Fla.: Robert Krieger,

2000), pp. 241–51.

7. See for example, “English Governmental Machinery in the Conduct of War,” in England

in the War of the Spanish Succession: A Study

of the English View and Conduct of Grand

Strategy, 1702–1714, ed. John B. Hattendorf

(New York and London: Garland, 1987), pp.

43–51.

8. U.S. Naval War College, Sound Military Decision, with an introduction by Capt. M. Frank

Snyder, USN (Ret.), Classics of Sea Power

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992).

9. Great Britain, Defence Council, Naval Staff

Directorate, British Maritime Doctrine. BR

1806, 2nd ed. (London: Her Majesty’s Statio

nery Office, 1997).

10. “The Way Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1991), p. 36.

11. For a detailed study of this, see Lorna S. Jaffe

The Development of the Base Force, 1989–

1992 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Historical Of

fice, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 1993).

12. For an exposition of these ideas, see W. Edwards Deming, Out of the Crisis (Cambridge

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1986).

13. Peter M. Swartz and John L. Byron [Capts.,

USN], “Make the Word Become the Vision,”

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November

1992), p. 71.

14. Ibid., p. 73.

15. Bradd C. Hayes [Capt., USN], “Keeping the

Naval Service Relevant,” U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings (October 1993), pp. 57–60;

William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Pas

sage to an Uncharted World (Annapolis, Md.

Naval Institute Press, 1995); Edward A.

Smith, “What ‘. . . From the Sea’ Didn’t Say,”

Naval War College Review 48, no. 1 (Winter

1995), pp. 9–33; Charles A. Meconis, “Main

Aspects of the ‘New U.S. Naval Strategy,’” in

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
Makeev and Charles A. Meconis (Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, 1996), pp. 53–67. See especially footnote 16, with numerous references

to additional literature.

16. John Morgan [Vice Adm., USN], Dr. Anthony D. McIvor, and the Secretary of the

Navy Action Team, “Rethinking the Principles of War,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

(October 2003), pp. 34–38.

17. “Book Reviews,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1994), pp. 82–85.

18. See discussions on this period, see for example, Edward Rhodes, “‘. . . From the Sea’ and

Back Again,” Naval War College Review 52,

no. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 43, an earlier version

of which appeared in Robert S. Wood and

Pelham Boyer, eds., Strategic Transformation

and Naval Power in the 21st Century (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1998),

pp. 307–53; Sam J. Tangredi, “Who’s Afraid

of the NETF?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1999), pp. 44–47.

19. Carl E. Mundy, Jr. [Gen., USMC (Ret.)],

“Navy Marine Corps Team: Equalizing the

(December 1995), pp. 27–30.

20. Frank B. Kelso II [Adm., USN, Ret.], 

ment and Discussion,” U.S. Naval Ins

Proceedings (January 1996), pp. 13–1

21. Riley D. Mixson [Rear Adm., USN, R

“Comment and Discussion,” U.S. Na

stitute Proceedings (February 1996), 

16–18.

22. This and the following four paragraph

based on Capt. Joseph Bouchard, USN 

e-mail to Swartz, Fred Rainbow, Rona

Harris, and Hattendorf, 20 March 200

23. Dr. Scott Truver e-mail to Swartz, 14 

2006.

24. Ibid.

25. NavOp 09/00, Chief of Naval Operat

message date-time group R222200Z 

Subj: “Assuming the Watch.”

26. Gregory V. Cox, Naval Defense Plannin

the 21st Century: Observations from Q

(Alexandria, Va.: CNA, December 200

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
“The Way Ahead”

The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and the Marine Corps Gazette simultaneou

lished “The Way Ahead” in April 1991 as an article by Secretary of the Navy H. La

Garret III, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Frank B. Kelso II, and Commandant 

Marine Corps Gen. Alfred M. Gray, Jr.* It was the U.S. Navy’s first formally publ

statement on strategy that attempted to look ahead beyond the Cold War, and it 

first of the four key documents that appeared during Kelso’s four years as Chief of 

Operations, 1990–94.

The article appeared during the very final phase of the Cold War, a year and a ha

the fall of the Berlin Wall in early November 1989 and immediately after the end 

Operation DESERT STORM, the First Persian Gulf War, which had only just been 

in January and February 1991. It was published before the unification of West an

Germany on 3 October 1991 and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union 

December 1991. Appearing midway in the terms of President George H. W. Bush 

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, it reflected the ideas of the new Chief of 

Operations, Admiral Kelso, who had taken office ten months before, on 29 June 1

and of the outgoing Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Gray, who retire

months later, on 1 July 1991.

The document reflected both the broad aspects of the changing structure of intern

politics and at the same time the very recent operational experience of the First G

War, which had demonstrated an increased operational role for the chairman of 

Chiefs of Staff and for the Joint Staff. In that context, the document also showed a 

mination on the part of both the Navy and the Marine Corps to share fully in pre

a new strategic statement. In preparing the ideas for “The Way Ahead” Kelso did 

depend primarily upon the usual source for such work, the Office of the Deputy C

Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations (Op-06), but turned instead t

colleagues with whom he had personally worked in the past—most importantly, h

utive assistant, Capt. Dan Murphy, and Vice Adm. Paul David Miller, then servi

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare (Op-07). In this effort, Vic

CHAPTER ONE

* H. Lawrence Garrett III, Frank B. Kelso II, and A. M. Gray, “The Way Ahead,” U.S. Naval 

Proceedings (April 1991), pp. 36–47; Marine Corps Gazette 75, no. 4 (2 April 1991), p. 1.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
drafts of the article were reviewed by Admiral Kelso, Admiral Miller, and General Gray

sitting around the kitchen table in weekend meetings at the CNO’s official residence in

the Washington Navy Yard.*

The article’s avowed purpose was to replace the Navy’s Cold War–era Maritime Strategy

which had been formulated in the 1970s and 1980s, and to explain the rationale for the

Navy’s force levels in the newly emerging post–Cold War period. In particular, this document signaled a shift away from the Navy’s role in blue-water antisubmarine warfare

and reinforced an emphasis on its role for power projection, strikes on land targets, and

direct contributions to operations ashore. 

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the world’s preeminent

military power—especially at sea, where we enjoy clear maritime superiority. In

achieving and maintaining this preeminence, U.S. naval forces have sailed the high

seas virtually unchallenged for nearly half a century. Since 1945, most of the world’s

developed nations have enjoyed peace and stability, often guaranteed by U.S. maritime power.

But now the winds of change are blowing throughout the world—from Washington to

New Delhi, from Moscow to Pretoria. Events since the summer of 1989 have brought a

fundamental shift in the post–World War II balance of power. No longer do we have

the sense of certainty that accompanies a bipolar world power structure and a central,

agreed-upon threat.

It is time to challenge many of our ground rules and assumptions. Some will require

revision; others must be revalidated. We must reshape naval force structure, strategy,

tactics, and operating patterns that are wedded too closely to the concept of an Armageddon at sea with the Soviet Union. At the same time, we will deal increasingly with

political and fiscal pressures to reduce the national debt—pressures that unquestionably will affect the level of resources available for defense in the future.

Mastering the post–Cold War challenges will require our full range of skill and knowledge as practitioners of the art of naval warfare. We must respond to new initiatives

and be prepared to march in different directions. The old excuse—“Because that’s the

way we’ve always done it”—no longer will do. We must work to shape and guide the

forces of change in the direction that best serves the needs of our nation. At times, this

will be an arduous task, but we have a basic edge over potential adversaries in the quality of our people, whose talent and hard work have given us dominance over the high

seas for nearly half a century. We must keep before us one goal: to maintain maritime

* Capt. W. Michael Dunaway, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Peter Swartz, 2 May 2005; Capt. E. Richard

Diamond, Jr., (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 7 July 2006.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
the challenges of an uncertain future.

Even though we cannot predict with confidence exactly what the new century wi

like, we know that our fundamental interests will remain unchanged. The defens

our nation, our people, and our way of life will continue to be our foremost obje

It also will remain in our interest to contribute to the maintenance of a stable an

secure world—a world that will advance the welfare of all peoples, within an env

ment that fosters economic development and furthers individual freedom and h

rights. We live in a world that is more economically interdependent than ever, an

can never afford to retreat into isolationism.

Clearly, international turmoil, aggression, and conflict are not things of the past. 

for regional hegemony, resurgent nationalism, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug 

ficking, and terrorism are certain to challenge international order during the fina

decade of this century. Within developing nations, dramatic increases in populat

and growing dissatisfaction with the perpetual gap between rich and poor will co

tinue to be major causes of unrest and insurgency.

As we confront tomorrow’s challenges we must remember that there are things o

the United States can do. As General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

Staff, has noted, the superpower shingle hangs above only one nation’s door. For 

United States—a maritime nation—to remain a superpower, it needs a Navy and M

Corps that can maintain maritime power in the world’s ocean and littoral areas, wh

this nation and its citizens have political, economic, and individual interests.

Implications of Change: National Security Policy

How will this far-reaching change affect our national security policies?

• We are likely to face increasing limitations on U.S. access and influence. Absen

Saddam Hussein as a focal point, developing nations, friends, and even allies m

reluctant to subordinate national interests to a broader common purpose.

• Another reality of the new era will be proliferation of advanced military techn

and equipment. As major military powers reduce forces and pull back from fo

positions, regional powers and emerging Third World nations will accelerate 

acquisition of modern combat weapons and delivery platforms. These countr

arming themselves with high explosives, precision-guided munitions, sophisti

air-defense warfare systems, and guided missiles. In addition, regional powers 

continue to develop and acquire the technology to pose chemical, biological, 

nuclear threats. The widespread proliferation of advanced weapons—plus a

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
and military forces.

• Finally, this will be a period of uncertainty. Warning signs will become increasingly

ambiguous and reaction times will be shortened as the identity and motives of

potential adversaries—and the timing and scenarios of threatening events—become

more difficult to discern. Instead of simply facing a diminished but still-potent forc

of Soviet tanks and warships, we increasingly will confront new and diverse

challenges to worldwide political and economic stability, from organizations and

nations bent on disruption or conquest.

An Evolving Strategy

For almost half a century we focused on the possibility of global war, to be fought primarily on the European continent and in its adjacent waters. To deal with the many

changes and cope with the new uncertainties, we must shift the objective of our

national security strategy from containing the Soviet Union to maintaining global stability. Our evolving strategy must focus on regional contingencies in trouble spots

wherever our national interests are involved.

For U.S. naval forces, this shift—from global commitment against a single threat to

global commitment against a number of regional threats—poses a dilemma: What do

we do with a maritime strategy formulated during the Cold War, focused primarily on

global conflict with the Soviet Union? The answer: We extract the strategy’s enduring

principles, and apply them to current planning. The maritime strategy itself remains

on the shelf, with Atlantic and Pacific operations plans as bookends, ready to be

retrieved if a global threat should reemerge.

In an address at Aspen, Colorado, on 2 August 1990, President George Bush stated that

U.S. defense policy must adapt to the significant changes in the world, without neglect

ing the enduring realities of the nation’s security. The President outlined a future U.S.

defense policy based on four major elements:

• Deterrence

• Forward Presence

• Crisis Response

• Force Reconstitution.

Deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, costs less than any level of conflict, and wil

remain the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy. Nuclear deterrence will be required as

long as any country possesses the nuclear-weapon capability to strike the United States

or endanger U.S. forces abroad.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
preserving U.S. regional influence. In a time of decreasing availability of overseas 

for U.S. land and air forces, the presence of capable naval forces near areas of pot

crisis remains a key element of national security. In addition to contributing to d

rence, deployed naval forces strengthen our ties with allies and demonstrate cont

U.S. commitment to maintaining world peace. If deterrence fails, forward-deploy

forces guarantee timely responses at points of conflict.

Since most of the world’s population lives within 50 miles of the sea, our naval p

projection capabilities will remain particularly useful in applying U.S. military m

appropriate places and times. Naval crisis response means much more than simp

maintaining the capability to keep the sea lines of communication open to our alli

sources of critical materiel. We must be able to project credible military forces ra

to meet threats posed to our interests, in places where no friendly forces-in-bein

Having the capability to project sea-based power is essential to the defense of the

interests, most of which are found in littoral areas. To maintain stability, we mus

able to influence events on land, as well. As noted earlier, the reality of declining 

levels and shrinking overseas infrastructure means that our naval expeditionary 

will have to be forward-deployed and self-sustaining as they project power over o

across the beach. In some cases, they may pave the way for longer-duration joint 

combined operations, in which forward-deployed naval forces are present or arri

on the scene to enable the sequential introduction of additional forces.

While our new defense strategy is geared primarily to regional threats to U.S. int

it also must take into account the uncertainty surrounding the ongoing upheava

Soviet Union and Central Europe, and the capabilities of the Soviet military that 

expect to remain in place during the foreseeable future. A global conflict with the S

Union appears to be far less likely than in the recent past, but we must preserve o

ability to reconstitute adequate forces, if faced with a resurgent global threat to p

Combined and Joint Operations

Collective security remains central to U.S. strategy. In the past, our primary secu

ties and operations centered on countries with whom we maintained formal allia

Such alliances remain a strategic necessity for the nation, but their character may 

substantially in the future. The Gulf War’s allied coalition may be a harbinger of 

security arrangements that will complement longstanding treaties, such as NATO

must heighten our emphasis on combined operations and training with national 

of many regions—both to facilitate cooperation and coordination with them and 

maintain our own expertise in likely operating environments.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
When each service fulfills its respective role, we can capitalize on synergistic capabilities that stem from decades of organizational focus and institutional ethos.

The unique missions and functional capabilities of the services are intended to be com

plementary, enabling, and enhancing, and they provide us with the means to generate

the greatest total combat capability in the shortest time. Operations DESERT SHIELD

and DESERT STORM will serve as prototypes for future joint operations. During the

DESERT SHIELD buildup in Southwest Asia, we demonstrated the enabling role of mari

time forces. Forward-deployed naval forces already on scene were augmented within

days by two carrier battle groups, a Marine Expeditionary Force, the Air Force’s 1st

Tactical Fighter Wing, and paratroopers from the Army’s 82d Airborne Division. These

forces contributed to the initial defense of Saudi Arabia and covered the subsequent

arrival of additional ground and air units. U.S. Navy warships maintained sea control

and enforced United Nations sanctions throughout the buildup period. Naval capabilities, which complemented those of allied air and ground forces, were integrated fully

into theater-wide planning before hostilities commenced.

But as ongoing developments in both the Soviet Union and Southwest Asia demonstrate, it is difficult to foresee the course of future events. Replays of Operations

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM certainly are not the only scenarios we expect to

see in the 1990s, so we must maintain prudent hedges against uncertainty. Accordingly

maritime forces will continue to be required to establish and maintain the sea control

essential to power projection operations, whenever and wherever they are necessary.

Battle space will be more complex. Control of the air, sea, and undersea environments,

essential to successful military operations on land, will take on a different character bu

certainly will be as complex as maintaining control in an open-ocean environment.

Sensors and communications systems designed for blue-water operations may not

work as well in confined areas, shallow seas, or over land. The threats posed by small

coastal-patrol boats, shore-launched cruise missiles, and shallow-water mines will pres

ent new challenges to our operators. Quick-reaction combat capabilities and the ability

to maintain an accurate and timely tactical picture will be critical for operational success in these non-ocean areas.

Changing Employment/Deployment Concepts

Forward deployment of naval forces in peacetime promotes regional stability by demonstrating continuity of commitment, strengthening friendships, enhancing readiness,

and reducing reaction time in crises. Nonetheless, the realities of the post–Berlin Wall

era cause us to rethink our employment and deployment concepts.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:57 PM
missions: from peacetime situations through crisis to conflict resolution. Many o

missions, such as strategic deterrence and protection of American lives and prop

have been with us for years. Others—such as presence; humanitarian assistance;

nation-building; security assistance; and peacekeeping, counternarcotic, counter

terrorist, counterinsurgency, and crisis-response operations—will receive new em

sis as we focus our efforts on developing and maintaining regional stability.

It is not easy to determine just how much presence may be required in a given re

a given time. It is clear, though, we no longer can rely on the Cold War’s deploym

data base. It is also clear that gaps in presence can lead to instability, power vacuu

and regional perceptions of lack of interest or disengagement by the United State

whether accurate or not.

Meeting our presence requirements with fewer assets calls for full exploitation of 

mobility and flexibility of our naval expeditionary forces. That means new patter

length and location of deployments, as well as in the composition of carrier battle 

and amphibious ready groups. The crisis-action and deterrent-force modules rec

developed by the Marine Corps are examples of the kind of flexibility that is nee

From the Korean War until the end of the 1980s we concentrated our operations 

deployment hubs, where American and Soviet interests overlapped at likely poin

crisis. The changes occurring in our security environment will require us to brea

of these hubs. Fortunately, changes in U.S.-Soviet political and military relations 

allow greater freedom for operations in broader, less-rigid zones of national inte

At the same time, reduced superpower friction enables differing configurations o

naval forces to meet specific regional requirements. Recent operations off the coa

Liberia and Somalia, for example, were executed successfully by a task force com

of amphibious ships, a Marine special-purpose force, and surface combatants. To

respond effectively to larger crises, however, we need carrier aviation and forcible

power, together with credible surge capability. U.S. naval force levels in and arou

Persian Gulf rose from a handful of ships on 2 August to more than 100, followin

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The force included six aircraft carriers, 30-plus amphib

ships, dozens of surface combatants, and several attack submarines. The Marine 

deployed more than 90,000 active-duty and Reserve Marines to the region—eith

ashore or afloat. Concurrently, naval forces continued their presence operations 

Mediterranean, Western Pacific, around the Philippines, and off Central and Sou

America, to provide support to U.S. and allied interests in those regions.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
more than historical deployment patterns—will dictate peacetime employment of

naval forces.

Changing Force Capabilities and Structure

To meet the demands of our national security strategy, we need naval forces that possess a wide range of capabilities. These must include: sea-based strategic forces, for

continued deterrence of nuclear attack; surge forces that can react rapidly to any crisis;

forward-deployed expeditionary forces capable of going anywhere, with full logistic,

medical, and repair support; and a sea-based maritime prepositioned force.

By maintaining a credible Trident submarine force, we will have a modern, survivable,

and potent sea-based strategic deterrent capability well into the next century. At the

same time, our attack submarine force will retain the numbers and capability needed

to hold at risk sea-based strategic platforms able to threaten the United States. We cannot discount the major open-ocean warfighting potential of the Soviet submarine

force, which has yet to experience any downturn in production rates or technological

developments. Threat of its use could reemerge quickly, should the intentions of the

Soviet leadership change—so we can never afford to cede our current technological

edge in submarines and antisubmarine warfare.

Preserving our edge does not require a massive building program. Continuation of our

current attack submarine force through its programmed service life, together with a

construction program to maintain our industrial base for building submarines, will

allow us to retain a credible attack submarine force into the next century. Freed from a

nearly full-time requirement to train for ASW in far-forward areas, this force now can

be available for more regional power-projection and support missions.

Our carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are the cornerstones of our

forward deployed forces, and will remain so. These supremely independent forces can

be tailored to include varying numbers and mixes of tactical aircraft, surface combatants, submarines, logistic support ships, and Marine air-ground task forces. They can

be tasked on short notice to conduct combat operations—for extended periods—

anywhere in the world.

During the 1990s, we expect to adjust the composition of our carrier battle groups and

amphibious ready groups routinely, to suit specific situations. Untethered from the ear

lier predominant concern with the global war-at-sea scenario, we have new flexibility

to shape our combat punch to prescribed missions and expected threats. Often, we will

be operating with smaller battle groups, particularly as our older surface combatants

are replaced by fewer—but more capable—cruisers, amphibious ships, and destroyers.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
century, will enhance our capability significantly. But improved capability never 

a substitute for adequate numbers. A single unit still cannot be in two places at o

time. We must have enough carriers, amphibious ships, and surface combatants 

maintain focused, forward, simultaneous peacetime presence in several regions—

with a surge capability to respond to larger crises.

Complementing carrier air power is the formidable firepower distributed throug

modern surface combatants and attack submarines. Major advances in weapons 

nology have brought longer ranges and greater accuracy in weapons and combat 

tems small enough to be employed from a variety of platforms, making it possib

disperse a significant amount of firepower. The effective employment of Tomaha

missiles against Iraq from battleships, attack submarines, cruisers, and destroyer

precursor of the multi-mission utility we must continue to emphasize in the futu

Our need to exploit the tactical advantages and flexibility of distributed firepowe

sophisticated, state-of-the-art weapons does not obviate the need for guns and o

less-complex weapons. We must continue to distribute all forms of striking firep

among many platforms, to give our war fighters a menu of complex and simple

weapon systems of varying capabilities and costs. Longer ranges, complex emplo

considerations, and a wider variety of available weapons will bring renewed emp

on tactics and techniques, fully as important as firepower itself.

Distributed firepower expands our capability to project power landward. But con

ling events ashore ultimately means putting warriors over the beach with the cap

to do what must be done. The flexibility inherent within the Marine Corps’s forc

structure of three active (and one reserve) divisions, three active (and one reserv

wings, and three active (and one reserve) force service support groups—formed 

Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)—provides warfighting commanders with a 

range of military capabilities. Our existing MEFs provide a reservoir of integrate

bined arms power from which Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs)—all sp

operations capable—can be task organized to execute simultaneously a wide ran

missions around the globe.

All MAGTFs are fully prepared to deploy rapidly by a variety of means. Using

amphibious shipping, strategic sealift, strategic airlift, or maritime preposition

ships, these expeditionary forces are light enough to get where needed and hea

enough to win. More importantly, they arrive capable of conducting sustained 

bat operations. Taking advantage of the synergistic combat capability resulting 

the integration of ground combat, air combat, and combat service support elem

under a single commander, a variety of MAGTFs can be formed. Each MAGTF

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
either independently or as a part of a joint task force. Each also possesses the command and control capabilities needed to form a command element for joint and

combined operations.

Marine Expeditionary Forces are the Corps’s principal organization for combat and

peacetime preparedness. Today, drawing upon the forces assigned to the MEFs within

the Atlantic and Pacific commands and Selected Marine Corps Reserve forces, two

task-organized MEFs have been committed to Operation DESERT STORM. Ashore is the

I Marine Expeditionary Force, which because of its size and composition is, in essence,

a Marine Expeditionary Corps. It is composed of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions

(Reinforced), the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Reinforced), and the 1st and 2d Force Service

Support Groups, four naval construction battalions, and an Army armored brigade.

Additionally, a MEF afloat has been formed by combining two Marine Expeditionary Bri

gades and one Marine Expeditionary Unit.

Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) are designed specifically to deploy by a variety

of means. They are capable of conducting sustained operations, and they also are the

lead elements for larger Marine expeditionary forces. The rapid buildup of combinedarms power demonstrated during Operation DESERT SHIELD resulted from this capability. Two MEBs deployed by strategic airlift and married up with equipment and supplies brought into the theater by two squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships. In

addition, two other MEBs deployed to the region on board amphibious shipping.

These forces became the lead elements of the MEFs currently serving in Operation

DESERT STORM.

Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) are forward deployed routinely to maintain

influence and enhance stability in regions of interest. Afloat in task-organized

amphibious ready groups, these MEUs represent our nation’s on-scene, immediately

responsive amphibious power-projection capability. MEUs routinely deploy with a

special-operations capability. The 22d MEU recently was tasked with providing security for the U.S. Embassy and the evacuation of threatened U.S. and foreign citizens

and diplomats in Liberia.

Special-Purpose MAGTFs are configured to accomplish specific missions. These

MAGTFs are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide range of conventiona

and unconventional operations. They can deploy by a variety of means and normally

are composed of Marines and sailors who are highly trained in both day and night

operations, to include raids and strike operations. Recently, a Special-Purpose MAGTF

was formed from amphibious forces in Southwest Asia to respond rapidly to the unexpected crisis in Somalia. Two amphibious ships were detached from the task force

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
from the objective, two helicopters loaded with a special-purpose force were laun

They were refueled in-flight by Marine aircraft. This force was able to reach Som

time to protect and evacuate threatened American and foreign citizens, before re

ing to the Persian Gulf to continue with its other mission.

Any consideration of conducting naval operations in shallow waters along the w

littorals raises the specter of mines. In the maritime environment of the 1990s, w

have to be proficient in mine warfare, both offensive and defensive. On the offen

our P-3 aircraft and Air Force B-52s can carry large quantities of mines over long 

tances and place them with accuracy. Tactical carrier-based and Marine aircraft a

can deliver mines, as part of a coordinated air strike. Our submarines can plant m

in heavily defended areas and then engage ships with torpedoes or cruise missile

they try to evade the mine fields.

We have focused most of our mine warfare efforts in the area of countermeasure

helicopter and surface mine countermeasures forces are getting better all the tim

we face new challenges as mine technology spreads worldwide. Shallow-water mi

for example—readily available at low cost—are simple weapons easily employed 

potential adversaries. In the 1990s, we will continue to explore and develop new 

nologies, including laser mine detection and the use of remotely piloted underw

vehicles for locating and neutralizing naval mines. Our surface mine-countermea

force, manned by both active and reserve personnel employing these new techno

will be a vital part of our balanced naval force.

An equally vital—though until recently less-noticed—contribution to our marit

power is strategic sealift. During the first 60 days of Operation DESERT SHIELD, 8

all cargo sent into the Persian Gulf theater moved by sea. We have long recognize

strategic sealift would be a critical component of our maritime force structure in 

1990s, and we were ready for the challenge.

Over the past ten years, we have spent more than $7 billion on sealift. Our sealift 

numbers 130 ships, including eight fast-sealift ships capable of meeting demandi

high-speed schedules, as they carry vital materials for forces airlifted to the scene 

action. We expect to add to our inventory over the next few years.

The current shipping pool is sufficient for scenarios with long warning times, bu

large numbers of fast-sealift ships would be insufficient for most short-warning 

ios. This is why we have maintained three sets of prepositioned equipment and

sustainability on 13 naval ships, with each set capable of equipping and sustainin

Marine Expeditionary Brigade. All of these equipment sets, together with the Ma

who use them, are now in Saudi Arabia. This propositioning program proved its 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
matter what the mode of transportation, however, sea and air superiority are the keys

to our ability to deliver materials when and where needed.

Preserving our leadership base is more important to our ability to maintain maritime

superiority than any category of weapon systems or delivery platforms. A professional

officer and enlisted leadership core is essential for any combat-ready military force.

Rebuilding an educated, trained, and experienced cadre of professional leaders takes a

great deal of time, and is far more difficult than rebuilding force structure.

Training and education will be top priorities in the 1990s. In a constrained fiscal environment, a well-trained and educated force will provide the highest payoff for our

investment. Professionalism will remain our primary force-multiplier. As the threats

we face become more capable and more technologically sophisticated, shrinking both

battle space and reaction time, we will not have the luxury of a practice shot; we will

have to do things right the first time.

In addition to the appropriate mix of skills and experience levels our personnel force

will require in the 1990s, we also will need the right mix of active and reserve forces. As

specified in Title 10, U.S. Code, reserve forces exist to buttress active forces in times of

war or national emergency, and when other exigencies demand. The value of a ready,

trained reserve component is being demonstrated dramatically in Operation DESERT

STORM. Navy and Marine Corps Reserve personnel have responded superbly, and are

integrated into our force structure to enhance not only our capability in Southwest

Asia, but also our capability to maintain presence and respond to crises in other

regions of the world. We will continue to need the reserves.

Since we now anticipate additional warning time with respect to global threats, we can

best use shrinking resources by planning for phased mobilization of those reserves

needed to augment regular forces in the event of major East-West conflict. Toward that

end, we are transferring roughly 25% of our current inventory of surface combatants, the

Knox (FF-1052) class frigates, to the reserves. Most of these frigates, primarily designed

for the ASW convoy mission, will be placed in reduced availability (ready for full duty

in 180 days), with operating time devoted exclusively to Selected Reserve training.

The Navy of the 1990s and Beyond

How big a force do we need?

The size of our force will be determined by the following three criteria:

• We need a force capable of supporting the President’s national security strategy. We

must be able to maintain forward deployments and be able to reinforce in the event

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
resurgent global threat.

• We need a force that can sustain the level of readiness and response capabili

required to implement that strategy. To sustain that level of readiness, our s

submarines, and aircraft must be well-maintained and combat ready. Suffici

time and resources must be allocated for overhaul and maintenance. We als

afford opportunities for adequate basic and advanced training in a realistic,

stressful environment.

• Our people remain the strong foundation upon which our maritime strength 

built. We must continue to attract and retain the best of our nation’s youth. T

that we must operate our force in a way that provides our sailors and Marines 

decent, realistic quality of life—beginning with stable sea and shore rotation pa

Current guidelines concerning the time sailors and Marines are away from ho

port must be followed, even while force structure shrinks. We also must provi

them adequate time for maintenance and training. Our sailors and Marines m

continue to have confidence in their ships, their equipment, and their shipma

With these criteria, we can size our balanced total force for the future at about 45

active and reserve ships, plus three active and one reserve Marine division/wing t

(Marine expeditionary forces). Plans to achieve necessary reductions are in place

will get smaller in a rational way. And, we remain committed to building a force 

will provide a realistic and affordable margin of security for our nation.

With a smaller force, we will find it harder and harder to maintain the wide balan

capabilities required to counter sudden, unexpected geopolitical challenges and n

emerging threats or capabilities. There are clearly increased risks associated with 

reduction in our naval forces. Given the fiscal realities of the coming decade, a fo

adequate to meet our quality-of-life goals during routine peacetime operations l

would be unable to support a regional crisis or conflict for more than a few mon

without major departure from the preferred rotation and deployment policies. H

tempo operations will be even more difficult to sustain. Smaller forces will be les

balanced, will have less surge capability, and will be less able to respond in a time

manner. This will place a premium on early political decisions. We must be caref

to encourage, by untimely absence, anyone who might seek to fill a perceived pow

vacuum or exploit an apparent weakness in our force structure.

Moving into the 20th century’s last decade, the naval forces of the United States h

adapted rapidly to the dramatic changes of the past year—and stand poised in an

pation of changes yet to come. The forces that U.S. taxpayers bought over the pas

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
well into the new century.

As we anticipate the changes and challenges that lie ahead, our efforts will be focused

on several key areas:

• Training and education, because they are our primary force multipliers

• Joint and combined operations, because they generate the greatest combat capability

in the shortest time

• Power projection, because it is the key to successful implementation of a stability strategy

• Deployment flexibility, because we must make adjustments to get the job done with 

smaller force

• Surge capability, because a premium will be placed on getting adequate combat

power rapidly to the scene of action.

We also must continue to ensure that, as technology evolves, we employ it to our best

advantage, and have the capability to counter developments by others, if required. The

technological gap between our systems and those of potential adversaries most likely

will narrow, but we must never lose our comparative advantage.

We must match technology to the battle space of the future, keeping in mind that many

of our platforms will spend three or more decades in active service. Low observables,

improved weapon seekers, remotely piloted vehicles, netted high-speed computers, and

multi-dimensional electronic warfare and command, control, and communications

systems are some of the promising areas we are exploring actively.

An affordable technological advantage is essential to successful implementation of our

national strategy. The fiscal realities of the 1990s have made affordability an ever more

important factor in sustaining our maritime strength. To meet this challenge, we have

initiated a top-down Total Quality Leadership approach throughout the Navy and

Marine Corps. Our goal is to strive for continuous improvements, in order to provide

the best affordable mix of forces and capabilities and to maintain those forces in a high

state of readiness, able to get the job done right the first time.

New developments—as dramatic and unforeseen as those capturing our attention and

imagination over the past year—surely lie ahead. But as ongoing events in the Soviet

Union and Southwest Asia demonstrate, the future may not be as different from the

past as we once hoped it might be.

In the years ahead our nation’s leaders still will find naval forces just as useful, just as

necessary, and just as important as they have been so often during the years of the Cold

War. In peacetime, crisis, or conflict, naval forces will continue to serve our nation and

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
tive representation to massive retaliation. They will continue to provide a stabiliz

forward presence, protecting U.S. lives and property, and safeguarding the comm

of our maritime nation. They will continue to demonstrate America’s resolve, fo

ing or punishing hostile acts, and, if required, engaging in combat.

Naval forces have a staying power and mix of capabilities unique to our nation’s 

forces. Independent of political access or foreign bases, they have the capability t

swiftly and decisively anywhere in the world—through unilateral action, joint U.

forces operations, or as part of a coalition of allies.

Future large-scale regional deployments, like Operations DESERT SHIELD and DE

STORM, necessarily will be joint-service efforts. Naval forces, complementing and

enhancing the capabilities of the other services, will serve as enabling and partici

elements, making possible rapid and effective concentration of the country’s pow

support of our national interests and security policies—anywhere.

The task before us—one which needs to be kept in clear focus more than at any t

the last four decades—is to avoid relearning the lessons of the past as we adjust t

geopolitical and fiscal realities of the present and prepare for the future. This fut

regardless of its uncertainty, will still require the United States to have a Navy an

Marine Corps of sufficient size, quality, and capability to ensure freedom of the s

and the application of naval power, to maintain peace and stability wherever our

national interests lie.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
The Navy Policy Book

The Navy Department published The Navy Policy Book in May 1992, with a state

purpose signed by the secretary of the Navy, H. Lawrence Garrett, and the Chief of 

Operations, Admiral Kelso. The unclassified, forty-three-page illustrated pamphlet 

tributed throughout the U.S. Navy. The publication was designed to summarize wh

Navy was all about. It stated the Navy’s main values and its enduring broad princip

to make a statement of any new policies or strategic concepts but to try to establish 

mon, Navywide understanding of leadership principles and management approach

The second of the four documents published during Admiral Kelso’s tenure, this p

phlet appeared just a year after “The Way Ahead,” in the last half of the four-yea

administration of President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard

Cheney, and shortly before Secretary Garrett left office on 26 June 1992. This was 

when the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, was promoting 

concept of a flexible “Base Force” to meet a variety of far-flung threats, in the pla

concentrating on the single threat that the communist block had created during t

War era.*

The Navy Policy Book reflected Admiral Kelso’s conviction that the service nee

basic policy. In developing the original concept for this publication, Admiral Ke

hoped to institutionalize within the Navy an adaptation of the leadership appr

that W. Edwards Deming had developed in the business world, “Total Quality M

ment” (TQM), later known as “Total Quality Leadership” (TQL), in the Navy. N

standing the contemporary Tailhook scandal, this publication was designed to sho

as an organization, the U.S. Navy was committed to accountability, responsibility

cal conduct, and good stewardship. Its purpose was to explain to everyone with th

vice what the Navy was about and how it went about its business.

In starting off the process of writing this document, Admiral Kelso called in Capt

Stark, head of the CNO Executive Panel (N-00K), and told him that the United P

Service (UPS) Company had a manual that he wanted to use in adapting Demin

CHAPTER TWO

* See, for example, Colin L. Powell [Gen., USA], “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign A

71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/1993), pp. 32–45.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:58 PM
from UPS to use as a model for a projected Navy publication but was told that it was

private information and not for distribution. The Navy Policy Book was drafted without it, by a CNO Executive Panel group led by Captain Stark, including his deputy, Cdr.

Kevin Cosgriff, and Capt. Richard Diamond, head of the Policy and Concepts Branch

(Op-603). At the CNO Executive Panel, Cdr. Judy Holden was the key point person for

this project, coordinating the drafting and using information she obtained throughout

the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the fleet staffs.* 

As we distribute the flagship edition of The Navy Policy Book, it is important to explain

the purpose of this document and to share with all hands the evolution of thought

leading to its publication.

The Navy Policy Book was written to provide a single reference of the most important guiding principles of our Navy. It was written for every member of the Navy

team: seaman recruit to admiral; military and civilian; active duty and reservist. By

stating our ideals, missions, objectives and policies, we believe each of us can develop

a better appreciation of the Navy’s many strengths. Equally important, the ongoing

analysis of how well we execute our policies will help us identify and focus on areas

requiring improvement.

The idea of continuous improvement—the permanent commitment to do things better

every step of the way is at the heart of the Policy Book. It is important we carefully preserve those concepts that have served the Navy so well throughout its history. At the

same time, we are determined to identify what we need to change to do our jobs better

and to take care of our people more effectively. There is no finer source of talent to meet

this challenge than the men and women of the Navy. Your ideas will shape the future.

Every member of the Navy team should read the Navy Policy Book and use it as a catalyst for improvement. Discuss it frankly up and down the chain of command, and

share it with those outside the Navy. Keep it handy and use it as a source of guidance in

your work place, afloat and ashore. Like you, we are deeply interested in improving the

way we work and how we live.

* Hattendorf interview with Rear Adm. James Stark, USN (Ret.), 7 July 2006; Stark, comments during CNA Conference, 27 June 2006; Capt. Judith Holden Meyers, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Swartz, 8

April 2005; Captain Meyers, e-mail to Hattendorf, 26 June 2006; Capt. E. Richard Diamond,

USN (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 7 July 2006.

H. Lawrence Garrett III

Secretary of the Navy

Frank B. Kelso

Chief of Naval Operations

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
Department of the Navy Vision

The fully-integrated Navy–Marine Corps team remains the world’s premier force 

carry out the national will in an increasingly hostile global maritime environmen

deploys a high-quality, multi-purpose, flexible force designed to meet a variety o

most likely contingencies.

To respond to the volatile and unpredictable nature of the worldwide threat, our 

must provide deterrence through presence and an ability to project power quickl

The combined force is sustained in this mission by a support establishment whic

dramatically decreased the time necessary to field new weapons systems, alter tra

cycles, accomplish overhaul, etc.

These and other supporting services, including medical care, are of a uniformly h

quality because our leadership accepts responsibility for continuously improving 

systems and processes which govern our support establishment.

The support establishment consists of leaders prepared to exercise their responsi

with quality as the principal focus, properly maintained necessary shore and sup

facilities, acknowledged experts in the technologies key to maritime operations, a

sition and maintenance strategies which will strengthen the public/private relatio

ships to produce quality products and services faster and at competitive prices, a

well trained professionals dedicated to excellence with confidence and pride in th

Navy and Marine Corps.

Department of the Navy Guiding Principles

The purpose of the DON support establishment is to provide our sailors and Ma

with the ability to go anywhere, anytime, to defend the nation’s interests successf

and survive.

In achieving this purpose, the following principles will guide our decisions and a

We will accomplish the mission.

We recognize the central fact that our sailors and Marines are the best prepared a

that our units have the highest rates of operational readiness in our history. They 

the heart of our ability to perform the mission. We must maintain that quality.

We are all responsible for accomplishing the mission. That is our first loyalty. We 

strive to find new ways to cooperate within the DON which look beyond a single 

vice warfare community or traditional role and responsibility. Pride, professiona

and a sense of community are extremely important, but we must ensure that the

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
resources and roles must not be carried to divisive and destructive extremes.

We accept responsibility for taking control of and improving all the systems and processes through which we support sailors and Marines. We can ensure that the weapons

ammunition, training, transport, health care, housing and all other goods and services

which constitute that support are of predictable high quality and available on time and

in sufficient quantity for any task they may be called upon to perform.

We must use innovation to meet current and future requirements and challenge ourselves to develop creative methods, including new technologies, to enhance our suppor

to our operating forces.

We are committed to honesty and integrity, recognizing that the public trust and

defense of the nation require the highest standards of moral conduct. By integrity we

mean that we will make decisions which are in the best interests of the Navy, the

Marine Corps and the nation without regard to personal consequences.

We have adopted the term Total Quality Leadership (TQL) as the general term under

which we will pursue total quality efforts. However, we understand that the concepts

and content of those efforts are the important aspects—not what they are called.

Department of the Navy Strategic Goals

We, the leaders in the Department of the Navy, will optimize the effectiveness of the

Navy–Marine Corps team by leading our people and managing our systems as an integrated force within a quality-focused organization. We will work to influence our

future by translating our vision, mission and guiding principles into goals, strategies

and actions so that resources and improvements are aligned with the same intent.

We believe that everyone has a legitimate contribution to make in accomplishing these

goals; Navy and Marine Corps; military and civilian; operational and support. In starting this translation, we have developed a vision and identified five major strategic goals

for the Department of the Navy. These strategic goals are: Integration; Human Resources

Education and Training; Acquisition; Innovation and Technology; and Facilities. We

believe that continuous improvements in these areas are mandatory if the Department

of the Navy is to meet the challenges that confront us.

Integration. The Department of the Navy will operate a fully-integrated Navy–Marine

Corps team that will provide maximum operational capability, capitalizing on the synergism of our operating forces and our support establishment.

Specifically, the DON will develop broad strategies and tactical doctrines that maximize naval service combat effectiveness within the framework of joint and combined

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
acquisition, maintenance and logistics infrastructure that is efficient and respons

the building, support and sustainability needs of our naval service forces; and in

the focus and efforts of staffs and management organizations to facilitate integra

and educate our personnel, both military and civilian, in multiple disciplines tha

naval service capabilities and applications.

Human Resources, Education and Training. The Department of the Navy will co

uously improve the quality of our military and civilian work force through fact-b

innovative, systemic changes affecting recruitment, training and quality of life.

Specifically, the DON will identify and remove the barriers to equal opportunity 

our people; improve the military recruiting system through better requirements 

mination, resource allocation and day-to-day operations; improve determination 

military training requirements, feedback systems and delivery of training to mee

requirements, and foster student success, properly fund training and eliminate re

dancies in the system; improve the civilian recruiting and hiring system through 

requirements determination and resource allocation and by assessing national ve

local recruiting responsibilities and needs; and enhance the working environmen

improve the performance of quality military and civilian personnel.

Acquisition. The Department of the Navy will continuously improve the acquis

process to achieve timely design, development, test, manufacture and support of 

time weapon systems for our Navy Marine Corps team.

Specifically, the DON will reduce the time from concept definition to fleet in

duction; stress reduced operating and support costs in all aspects of system d

and field fully supported systems with emphasis on interoperability and oper

tional availability; and foster contractor/government working relationships,

emphasizing teamwork built on trust, sound business practices and the highe

standards of ethical behavior and ensure that an industrial capability for uni

naval requirements is maintained.

Innovation and Technology. The Department of the Navy will continuously imp

the process of identifying and introducing new technologies; ensure our recognit

a world leader in key maritime technologies; and create a climate that fosters inn

tion and invention.

Specifically, the DON will improve the process of selecting and evaluating technolog

opportunities, focus DON investment on those technologies that form the foundatio

future Navy–Marine Corps system developments and introduce cost-effective techno

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
vices, academia, industry and our allies to support the DON technology investment.

Facilities. The Department of the Navy will operate an adaptable and responsive shor

facilities establishment that is properly sized and properly supported to allow continuous improvement in the quality of service to operating forces, that consists of well

maintained and attractive facilities, resulting in improved living and working conditions and increased productivity at all its installations, and that consistently performs

in an environmentally responsible manner and contributes to the quality of life in the

communities of which it is a part.

Specifically, the DON will define and implement quality standards for facilities that

support mission requirements, family and bachelor housing, family support functions,

and morale, welfare and recreational activities; provide the resources to achieve the

defined quality standards over time and maintain the support establishment at these

levels; in addition to traditional military construction, consider innovative financing

and management arrangements (e.g., cost-sharing, public-private venture, leasing);

integrate environmental awareness to all DON planning, management and operations to

comply with all applicable environmental laws and to protect the natural resources found

on Navy and Marine Corps installations: and minimize waste, and conserve energy and

adopt pollution prevention measures to avoid adverse impacts on the environment.

Our vision and associated strategic goals require a significant transformation throughout

the naval services. By pursuing our vision, we believe we will enhance our ability to deter

mine our future. Achieving these strategic goals will be neither quick nor easy; however,

we believe that our people are capable of meeting the challenges that all members of the

team have valuable contributions to make to our strategic efforts. As leaders, we will

strive to provide the direction and support required for this transformation.

Chapter One: Introduction

The Purpose of The Navy Policy Book

The Policy Book was written to provide a common understanding within the Navy of

our most important guiding principles. This book is designed to promote a better

appreciation of the ingredients of the Navy’s strengths and identify areas which need

improvement. The Policy Book, therefore, has two overall objectives:

Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr.

Commandant of the

Marine Corps

H. Lawrence Garrett III

Secretary of the Navy

Adm. Frank B. Kelso II

Chief of Naval Operations

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
we need to preserve and continue;

(2) To assist in the ongoing process of identifying those things we want to chang

help us do our jobs and take care of our people more effectively.

The Policy Book is not intended to be a substitute for the large number of author

Navy documents, instructions, manuals and other directives that establish curren

orders and procedures.

Rather, it is intended to capture the spirit of Navy policies and to establish the ba

for instructions and directives when they are written or revised.

For Whom Was the Navy Policy Book Written?

The Policy Book is written for every member and level of the Navy team, civilian 

military, active and reserve. The diverse nature of our organization requires that 

individual member understand the purpose and objectives of the U.S. Navy and 

her role in its success. Though Navy uniformed personnel and civilians are led an

administered by different sections of U.S. law, we are a team mutually dependent 

each other. Whether civilian or military, it is critical for every individual to unde

and comply with the guiding principles of this book as they apply to him or her. 

enable it to achieve its twofold purpose, the Policy Book should be read by everyo

the Navy and discussed frankly and openly.

Why You Should Share the Navy Policy Book with Others

We are proud of the Navy and of the part each of us contributes to it. This pride 

engender a desire to tell others about the naval service. Because this Policy Book w

enable you to provide others a unique insider’s look at the Navy, all hands are en

aged to share it with family members, friends and any others who care to learn ab

how we view ourselves.

What Do We Mean by Objectives and Policies?

Objectives are statements of purpose, of things we are trying to achieve. In Chapt

Two, you will read about the Navy’s objectives. Policies are guiding principles wh

help us accomplish those objectives. Some policies, such as honesty or integrity, 

described as ideals, principles or values. Other policies, such as how we regard ou

ple or how we view the value of training, may be more accurately defined as attit

Still other policies, such as providing performance evaluations to our people, are 

procedures or rules. Finally, policies such as striving to provide quality facilities fo

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
Navy what we are today.

Why We Have Policies

Policies serve three useful purposes:

(1) They provide all the members of the Navy with a common understanding of the

Navy’s basic philosophy and the ethical principles and ideals which underlie all

our professional and personal actions;

(2) They promote better communication and an environment of cooperation;

(3) They provide leaders with an overall framework so they can act independently but

within the bounds of our ideals, principles, procedures and rules.

The Origin of The Navy Policy Book

The idea of a U.S. Navy Policy Book had several origins. In 1990, the Chief of Naval

Operations began introducing Total Quality Leadership (TQL) to the leadership and

management of our operating forces. It became apparent that a brief, straightforward

publication about how the Navy viewed itself, its people and its responsibilities would

be useful in the implementation of TQL throughout the Navy. Such a book could help

all of us on the Navy team focus on the character of our organization, examine our

beliefs as Navy professionals and communicate policies within the Navy more effectively. Additionally, such a book could provide valuable information about the naval

service to those outside the Navy. Some American business corporations produce their

own policy books to accomplish similar objectives for their companies and employees.

Both the idea and style of the Navy Policy Book were influenced by these examples.

Chapter Two: The Navy’s Objectives

Objectives Are Statements of Purpose. They Are What We Need to Do to Accomplish the

Navy Mission

Organizations, as well as individuals, need a sense of direction, a planned course

toward which they direct their efforts. The objectives in this chapter are statements

about what the Navy must do in order to achieve its purpose.

Maritime Superiority Is a Fundamental Requirement for U.S. Security

The Navy’s purpose throughout history has been directly linked to the economic and

political well-being of our nation and the security of our way of life. As a maritime

nation, the United States uses the oceans as barriers for defense, as broad avenues of

commerce and access to our overseas allies and as a springboard for projection of

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
and is prepared to deny the use of the seas to its enemies.

The U.S. Navy Mission

The Constitution of the United States empowers the Congress to “provide and ma

a Navy.” In exercising that power, Congress, in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, directs the 

to “be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained comba

dent to operations at sea.” To carry out that mission successfully, the Navy must or

maintain and equip its forces in a way that most effectively achieves maritime supe

We Must Have a Navy Capable of Carrying Out U.S. National Security Strategy

The Navy’s capabilities must reflect what our nation expects of us. America’s nat

security strategy requires all the armed forces to work together to contribute to s

gic deterrence, provide peacetime presence overseas, respond to regional crises a

prepared to counter a global threat. Navy objectives reflect this strategy through 

ability to deter both nuclear and non-nuclear (conventional) conflicts, to deploy 

seas and to project power at sea and ashore. Further, we sustain our ability to bui

operate ships, aircraft and weapons by supporting research and development and 

tinuing to attract quality people.

Our Navy Must Be Mobile and Flexible

A constantly changing world requires a U.S. Navy prepared to meet new threats a

circumstances. We must have the capability to respond quickly to support U.S. in

in any region of the world. Navy forces must be able to transition to combat whe

directed to do so, seize the initiative, carry the fight to the enemy and conclude th

conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

We Must Be Able to Fight in Multiple Dimensions

To project power and win, we must control the battle space. This requires that w

forces—air, surface and subsurface—trained and ready to fight together and with 

other services. We must ensure our warfighting concepts include the dimension 

space and the use of the entire electromagnetic spectrum. We rely on terrestrial a

space-based assets to assist us in navigation, global surveillance, C4I (command, 

trol, communications, computers and intelligence) and electronic warfare. These 

tems provide key linkages among our forces. We must ensure our shore establish

provides the essential logistical, maintenance, training and education support to 

operating forces.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
While our primary role is to deter conflict, we are war fighters first and foremost. We

must never forget, especially during periods of prolonged peace, that we may be

called upon to apply swift and decisive force anywhere in the world in support of

national objectives.

Total Honesty and Integrity Are Essential to Our Profession

We recognize the public trust and the defense of our nation require the highest standards of moral conduct. We do not tolerate illegal or improper behavior or even the

appearance of such behavior. We make decisions which are in the best interests of the

Navy and the nation without regard to personal consequences. We fulfill our legal and

ethical responsibilities in our public and private lives.

Leadership at All Levels Is a Fundamental Requirement

Leadership is the single most important ingredient in motivating people and successfully getting the job done regardless of the demands or hardships. Improving leadership skills at all levels of the organization must be a continuous process.

We Operate Closely with the Other U.S. Services and Our Allies

All of the U.S. armed services have unique capabilities which complement one another

Because future combat is likely to involve more than just the Navy, we must train and

operate effectively with other U.S. armed services to increase our combat capability.

Similarly, we must plan and conduct combined exercises with the armed forces of othe

countries to ensure we can work well together in a future crisis or conflict.

We Must Be Responsible for Both Our Mission and Our People

For Navy men and women, carrying out our mission to the very best of our ability is

our primary responsibility. Caring for the safety and the professional and personal

well-being of our people is inherent in Navy values—it is indispensable to mission

accomplishment.

We Must Retain Our Quality People

Our system depends on self-motivated, reliable and well-trained people. We need to

attract and retain proven professionals by combining the best available equipment,

training and experience with leadership which challenges, inspires pride in accomplishment and recognizes effort. We strive to provide a quality standard of living for

our people, and we recognize the importance of family well-being to our Navy men

and women.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
Defend the Nation’s Interests Successfully, and to Survive

It is our fundamental responsibility to ensure our people possess the right equip

training, education and support to do their jobs effectively and safely. According

must prioritize our resources to ensure our people are trained and equipment is 

tained at the highest possible state of readiness.

Concern for the Environment Must Be an Integral Part of Our Operations

Every one of us must be aware of the potential impact of our actions on the envi

ment. From littering to oil spills, we have the potential to damage the world in w

we live. Consequently, we have a special responsibility to safeguard our world. W

stress constantly the requirement for every Navy member to support initiatives t

improve and protect the environment.

We Must Manage Responsibly the Money the American Taxpayer Provides to Mai

a Navy

The cost of keeping America’s military defense strong and effective is borne by th

American people. We must ensure we use the monies entrusted to us in an hones

careful and efficient way. Every one of us has a responsibility to fight waste and w

use the resources provided us.

We Require a Robust Research and Development Program

We must pursue new technologies which anticipate future requirements while im

ing our efficiency and effectiveness today.

We Are Committed to Continuous Improvement

We must be alert to the need for positive change and be willing to adjust to new 

lenges. We support change which produces improvements to the way we do our j

and the way we take care of our people. This must involve all hands. By continuou

examining our jobs, procedures and functions, we identify areas for improvemen

follow through with the right changes. We call this overall process “Total Quality 

ership,” or TQL.

Chapter Three: The Navy’s Structure: How We Are Organized, Led and Managed

We Are Responsible to Civilian Authority for the Nation’s Defense

The ultimate authority over the nation’s armed forces rests with the President, ou

Commander-in-Chief. The Secretary of Defense is his principal adviser on all ma

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:57:59 PM
ity. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the

President and Secretary of Defense. The other Joint Chiefs (military Chiefs of the Services) also serve as military advisers.

We Follow a Chain of Command

The chain of command is a structure of communication which enables orders and

information to pass from one level to another. Its purpose is to provide each commander and member with a clear sense of direction so all members of the team know

their jobs and responsibilities, who they work for and who works for them. It also provides the opportunity and means for seniors to receive the views, recommendations

and concerns of their people.

We Are Organized into Operational and Administrative Chains of Command

The Navy is divided into two categories: “providers” (administrative) and “combatant

forces” (operational). The administrative chain of command stems from the responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to train, equip

and provide naval forces to conduct operations and flows through the Fleet Commandersin-Chief (CINCs) to all naval units. The operational chain of command runs from the

Unified CINCs to the combatant or operational forces, normally through the Fleet

CINCs. Unified CINCs are the military commanders who command forces from all the

armed services and report to the Secretary of Defense. These two chains of command

interact to provide trained, well-equipped combatant forces to fight successfully alongside the other services.

The Navy Team Is Composed of Active and Reserve Components and Civilian Personne

In addition to our regular active duty personnel, military personnel also include

Reservists. Some Navy mission areas are nearly exclusively assigned to the Reserves.

Mobilization of the Reserves can expand the force to meet various threats. Our

Reserves must be trained and ready at all times. We require a properly balanced mix of

active duty and Reserve personnel and must ensure the Naval Reserve is fully integrated into our planning objectives and policy. Civilian employees are an integral part

of the Navy team and serve in all levels of the organization. Predominately assigned

ashore, especially in sustaining repair, design and acquisition requirements, they provide the continuity and expertise required to support our operating forces fully.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
Us by Higher Authority

As professionals we follow orders from seniors in the chain of command. It is Na

policy to assign responsibility and delegate the necessary authority to the lowest 

fied level. This encourages individual initiative and develops in subordinates the 

they need to assume greater responsibility.

Accountability Is Critical to Our Success

We accept the consequences of our own actions. In leadership positions, we bear

responsibility for the actions of our subordinates. We are members of the naval s

24 hours a day, and we are accountable for our professional and personal behavio

both on and off the job.

Leadership Is the Essence of Our Profession

Leadership is the ability to inspire people, to make them feel confident they can d

job no matter how tough it gets. Leadership provides direction, sets priorities an

upholds standards. We strive to give our people the tools and training they need 

their jobs correctly. Through effective leadership we guide and assist subordinate

achieve individual and team goals. We also must train our subordinates to becom

good leaders. The best way to do this is to lead by example. We strive to be openminded, to be willing to accept change and to solicit feedback actively. Good lead

understand their own success is measured through the success and the personal a

professional growth of their subordinates.

Individuals Have the Right to Communicate Directly with Their Commanding O

Each individual’s chain of command ultimately leads to the Commanding Office

Although most issues will be resolved by the chain of command, each individual 

guaranteed the right to speak directly with the Commanding Officer without any

suppressing that right and without fear of retribution. Commanders are respons

for ensuring everyone understands this prerogative and for putting in place the p

dures to make it happen. Of primary importance is the requirement for the chain 

command to respond to suggestions and to solve problems. Feedback must be pa

the process. Each individual deserves to know what action has been taken on his 

suggestion or recommendation.

We Are Committed to Total Quality Leadership (TQL)

We have adopted Total Quality Leadership (TQL) as the way to achieve continuous 

ity and productivity improvement. TQL is defined as the application of quantitativ

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
significant processes within the organization and responsiveness to those we serve both

inside and outside of the Navy.

TQL is a top-down approach to managing work and leading people that has quality as

its focus. Quality is defined by the user or customer of the organization’s products and

services. What this means in a practical sense is that customer needs drive the design

and continuous improvement of processes and systems affecting those products and

services. In other words, the needs of our sailors and their families drive the systems that

support them. It is the job of our leadership to ensure that the weapons, ammunition,

training, transport, health care, housing and all other goods and services supplied to

sailors are of predictable high quality, are of sufficient quantity and are available on time

TQL is an approach to leading and managing that is based on an understanding of

how all systems of work and people blend together to meet mission requirements. W

know from experience that as quality improves, operational readiness also improves,

productivity increases and costs decline, benefitting the user and, ultimately, the

American taxpayer.

Improvements and innovations of processes and systems are accomplished through

fact-based decision making and team participation. All naval personnel are members

of the team and have valuable contributions to make to these efforts.

Good Judgment, Trust and Effective Communication Are Critical

We balance the need to complete our mission successfully with the responsibility to care for

our people. Trust exists where there is confidence in the abilities and integrity of shipmates

We must be willing to make honest recommendations, deliver bad news even when it is

unpopular and encourage good ideas. Judgments and decisions must be made regardless of

their potential consequences to ourselves. We reward people who show us where improvements are needed or how improvements can be made, no matter how big or small.

Privileges Are Earned

Privileges are granted to those who have earned them through successful performance.

Privileges also may be withheld for substandard performance. In this way, superior per

formance and professional growth are encouraged and positively reinforced.

We Are Committed to the Efficient Management of Our Resources

Managing our wide-ranging resources requires establishing goals and priorities and

innovative decision making. We emphasize continuous improvement at all levels of

responsibility.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
capabilities and shore activities.

Platforms and weapons systems are designed for maximum performance with th

imum number of operators and maintainers needed. Our manpower requiremen

reviewed and updated on a periodic basis, when new capabilities are added to sh

aircraft and when the shore establishment is modified. We recognize the individu

of all our people and strive to use them in areas best suited to their strengths. We 

recognize that some individuals will not adapt and may become detriments to th

commands. Money and time invested in training is not justification for transferr

poor performers to another command or into another warfare or staff communi

when further useful service is unlikely. We attempt to provide a fair balance betw

sea assignments and jobs ashore to maintain readiness, professional developmen

an acceptable quality of life.

Time. We must set realistic milestones for what we need to accomplish. We com

cate goals and use the chain of command to complete our objectives. We encoura

both independent thinking and teamwork to ensure the experts at the most junio

are given the opportunity to apply the most efficient procedures to achieve desir

timely results.

Technology. We maintain and expand the technological superiority of our naval 

with a robust research and development (R&D) program. We apply the most pro

ing scientific research to develop programs which solve specific fleet problems or 

hance our warfare capabilities. We test newly developed systems for their effectiv

and suitability to provide superior equipment for our forces. We thoroughly evalua

systems to ensure they will be capable of absorbing future technology developmen

Acquisition. We must develop and prioritize our requirements for new resource

based on our warfighting needs and quality of life for our people. Our purchasin

acquisition programs are designed to fulfill those requirements. Our acquisition 

cess must ensure the best value.

Maintenance. We take care of our equipment and property by ensuring the righ

training and the right tools are available at all levels. We train continuously to en

our equipment is maintained properly and is always ready to perform at its high

pacity. We develop maintenance programs during the purchase or construction p

for the entire life of equipment. Preventive maintenance is scheduled for our syst

ensure all aspects of support are identified and resources are available on deliver

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
technological performance.

We Stress the Importance of Procedures

We establish procedures to ensure the job—administrative, maintenance or operational—is accomplished right every time. Approved procedures ensure a process is

understood by everyone at all levels and give us confidence tasks will be properly completed. They are a primary guarantee of safety. Certain critical procedures require a

two-person check as an additional assurance. The use of proper procedures promotes

good communication throughout the command and helps develop individual and

team skills. Rather than inhibiting innovation, standard procedures can provide the

pathway to see where improvements can be made.

We Conduct Inspections to Help Us Manage Our Resources and to Ensure Safety

The purpose of inspections is to ensure each command, unit, division, watch team and

individual performs at a required uniform standard. Every ship, squadron and station

should be trained and operated every day in such a manner that it continually meets

the required uniform standards. The inspection is a periodic check to confirm the

required standards are being applied and followed. Inspectors must look at the right

areas, in the right way, at the right time. Inspectors and command teams measure mission capability, observe procedures to assist with making actual improvements and

plan for possible follow-on assistance to include identifying institutional or procedural

obstacles. They must be open, realistic and committed to solving problems as well as

finding them. Inspections can be conducted by people outside the command or within

the command, but the purpose and goals are the same.

Chapter Four: The Navy’s People

People Are the Navy’s Most Valuable Asset

All Navy decision making must include careful consideration of the professional and

personal needs of our men and women. We must devote our efforts and resources to

meet those needs.

The Navy Must Attract Quality Individuals

Attracting highly motivated, qualified and dedicated young men and women is essential to a combat-ready Navy. We recruit and hire without regard to race, gender or religion and seek people who have the potential to work capably and successfully within

the Navy.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
We want to keep people in the Navy who are proven professionals, skilled in lead

management and technical ability. Retaining these people allows us to continue t

the benefits of their training and apply their knowledge, skills and experience. It 

ical, therefore, that we support quality-of-life initiatives, especially job satisfactio

encourage our best men and women to make the Navy a career. We also recogniz

valuable contributions made by those who do not wish to make the Navy a caree

show our appreciation and provide them as much assistance as possible in transiti

to civilian life. Whenever possible, we will encourage our veterans to remain a pa

the Navy team through participation in the Naval Reserve.

We Provide Frequent Recognition to Deserving Individuals and Units

Everyone appreciates an occasional pat on the back. It lets us know we are on the 

track, helps us to feel we belong, provides job satisfaction and inspires our best e

We make a conscious effort to praise our people to show our appreciation for the

everyday efforts. We award medals and other forms of recognition to acknowledg

publicly exceptional performance and bravery. We reward outstanding civilian p

formers with a variety of honorary and cash awards. We need to be generous in m

award recommendations. We determine the level of award based on the contribu

of the individual to the overall mission, independent of his or her pay grade. Del

gating to Commanding Officers the authority to award Navy Achievement Meda

to advance outstanding enlisted individuals serving at sea to the next pay grade e

ages immediate recognition of superior performance at the unit level. Awards pr

incentive and build morale. As such, they must be timely, appropriate and meani

Our Goal Is to Promote People to the Highest Grade or Rank according to Their A

We believe in the importance of upward mobility and provide the opportunity to

advance throughout a career. We promote our people based upon their proven a

All those who perform their duties capably and have the capacity to assume grea

responsibility are eligible for further promotion. We seek qualified enlisted perso

for officer programs. Navy leaders are responsible for developing their subordina

and encouraging them to advance.

We Make Duty Assignments Based on Both the Needs of the Navy and the Individ

When we detail an individual to a job, we take into account three important facto

needs of the Navy, to make sure the right individual is in the right place when req

the professional needs of the individual, to ensure continued career growth; and 

individual’s personal desires. Each case is considered on its own merits. Assignm

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
the length of billet gaps will be minimized. Collocation of military spouses and geographic stability for enlisted personnel are given special consideration. The Exceptiona

Family Member Program (EFM) seeks to ensure transfers to areas where necessary health

care and special education are available for family members with handicaps or other

special medical conditions. While not precluding service members from sea duty or

unaccompanied tours, these policies encourage and permit individuals and their detail

ers to work together to meet professional goals and family needs whenever possible.

Some Personal Hardships May Require Reassignment or Discharge from Naval Service

We recognize the unpredictability of personal problems and try to respond appropriately, with understanding and support. At the same time, we have a responsibility to

ensure all Navy personnel can be assigned to duty anywhere in the world or can deploy

to sea when required. Without this guarantee, our ability to meet our responsibilities o

get our ships underway is seriously impaired. We realize there are unforeseen developments which can be resolved only through release from active duty. Should an individual or a member of his or her family face this situation, we consider the active duty

individual for a Hardship Discharge. In cases which can be resolved, but which require

more time than leave provides, we may reassign individuals for humanitarian reasons

to enable them to alleviate the hardship situation.

Training and Education Are Vitally Important

Training. Training to improve our ability to fight and win is our number one peacetime priority. Training must be a continuous process throughout our careers. It includes specialized and on-the-job training, indoctrination programs and instruction

associated with new systems and equipment. Training needs to be, as much as possible,

a hands-on approach. Quality training performance is more important than mere

training attendance or training completion. We must measure our training performance against real-life requirements to ensure we are learning the correct lessons and

practicing the correct procedures. We must train so people understand why procedures

are necessary as well as how the procedures are used to do the job. Through quality

training in peace, we develop the confidence necessary to perform capably in combat.

Education. Education provides the framework for learning and better prepares our

people, regardless of Navy rating or specialty. Education produces better-informed,

more capable and more highly motivated men and women. We encourage Navy personnel to take advantage of available educational opportunities, including the Navy

Campus and tuition assistance programs. We help people on sea duty continue their

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
to ride ships. We send selected enlisted personnel to college full-time for a degree 

subsequent commissioning. We award advancement points to enlisted members 

achieve degrees through off-duty education programs. We send selected officers 

vanced education at service colleges or through graduate education at the Naval 

graduate School or civilian institutions. We encourage civilians to continue their

education through training opportunities and educational assistance.

We Value and Depend on Professional Input and Ideas from All Our People

Cooperation and teamwork are essential to our readiness and mission accomplis

We must be loyal to superiors, peers and subordinates. We encourage open comm

cation up, down and across the chain of command. By involving our subordinate

planning, decision making and problem solving, we encourage teamwork and a s

of ownership. We encourage our people to suggest improvements, and we provid

them feedback on what is being done with their suggestions.

We Do Not Tolerate Discrimination

Respect for all citizens is the cornerstone of our Constitution. We fully accept res

bility for demonstrating this personal respect toward all Navy members without 

to race, religion or gender. We teach all Navy people to recognize discrimination, 

we expect them to take positive steps to eliminate it. We know that teamwork, wh

so essential to mission accomplishment, requires that we accept, train, inspire an

port every member of our team. We recognize the importance of a Navy that refl

the diversity in gender, race and culture of our nation, and we seek to ensure rep

tation from this diversity in all ranks and ratings. We must provide whatever trai

education and counseling is needed to develop the skills and leadership necessar

ensure equal opportunity to senior positions. Duty assignments, advancements a

promotions must reflect the objective of equal opportunity. This requires the per

commitment of everyone, especially those in supervisory and leadership position

We Do Not Tolerate Any Form of Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment violates the Navy’s commitment to maintaining high standard

integrity and impartiality. It is unprofessional and ultimately damages the missio

effectiveness of the command involved. It will not be tolerated at any level. This p

applies to all military and civilian supervisors, co-workers and peers. Sexual hara

ment prevention is addressed through periodic quality training; a proper, suppor

command climate; and a system that inspires confidence that all complaints will 

handled in a swift, fair and effective manner.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
Inappropriate personal relationships between seniors and subordinates within the

same chain of command or between officers and enlisted personnel are unprofessional

Fraternization inevitably results in favoritism or the perception of favoritism. Whether

actual or perceived, favoritism is detrimental to our organization.

We Provide Timely, Constructive Counseling to Each Individual

We use informal and formal, documented counseling to ensure our people know at all

times what we think of their performance. We make sure they understand what is

expected of them. They must be praised for good performance, informed of unsatisfac

tory or inadequate performance and counseled about how to improve. Counseling is

provided to assist with career planning and to help resolve personal problems such as

financial and family support difficulties.

We Provide Periodic, Constructive Written Evaluations of Performance

Goal setting, counseling and performance evaluations are separate (although related)

processes. Evaluations must be given significant thought because they are meant not

just to record performance but to motivate and instruct. Written evaluations must be

completed on time. They should emphasize what an individual has accomplished during the reporting period; how well he or she has done it; the individual’s most important strengths, and if necessary, significant weaknesses; and the individual’s potential

for increased responsibility and advancement. No one should be surprised by the contents of his or her evaluation. Regular counseling and feedback, including guidance on

how to improve, are the primary vehicles to encourage strengths and identify weaknesses. Once addressed, weak performance that has been corrected during the reporting period normally will not be addressed in the written evaluation.

We Provide Leave for Every Member

All members earn 30 days leave per year to ensure ample time for leisure, family activities and personal business. Leave normally may be taken in any number or length of

increments the member desires. However, operational commitments may dictate when

and how much leave is granted at a particular time. Commands are responsible for

ensuring their people have the opportunity to take up to 30 days leave per year. Commands must be organized and personnel trained to allow all individuals to take leave

without impairing the accomplishment of the command’s mission.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
Liberty and working hours should be clearly defined. Leaders are responsible for o

ing work schedules which do not extend beyond the normal workday except in ext

nary circumstances. Liberty is normally granted at the end of working hours until 

start of the next day’s work. Liberty is a privilege, however, and it may be curtailed 

work assignments have not been completed or when the member’s presence is requ

to maintain readiness or to complete emergent work. Special liberty is time off gra

on a case-by-case basis during the workday to conduct personal business.

We Provide All Benefits Allowed by Law and Seek to Keep Pace with Changing

Economic Conditions

Pay and Allowances. Few things are more important than making sure Navy me

women receive fair compensation for their services. We strive to make Navy pay 

lowances comparable to the wage scales of private industry. We seek periodic adj

ments to special allowances to provide adequately for our people stationed in hig

areas or overseas. We provide additional pay and incentives for people serving in 

cial jobs and programs. We recognize the unique hardships associated with sea d

and reward our people accordingly. We provide non-taxable allowances to assist 

rent or mortgage payments for those members not residing in Navy housing. We 

subsistence allowance to assist with food purchase. We also maintain a commissa

exchange system to provide food and retail goods at reasonable cost for our peop

their families.

Medical and Dental Care. Good health is important, and we are committed to m

ing the health needs of our people and their families. We strive to provide moder

cient medical and dental facilities near most major naval installations. When a N

member is not stationed near a military medical facility, we must provide quality 

cal and dental coverage through the civilian health care system. The Civilian Hea

and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) program provid

medical care for families of Navy members at civilian facilities, both to augment 

tary health care and as the primary health care source, depending on the proxim

military facilities. Overseas military dental facilities can provide dental care for b

our active duty personnel and their dependents. Within the United States, Navy f

lies are provided emergency and preventive dental coverage with low-cost, volun

insurance through the Dependent Dental Plan (DDP). Though DDP guidelines a

mandated by Congress, we actively seek to expand dental services under DDP wh

maintaining its low cost.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance (SGLI) program. The SGLI policy currently pays a

maximum $100,000 in survivors benefits.

Retirement. The United States military offers a unique retirement program by which

our members are eligible for retirement after 20 years of service. Members have the potential to remain on duty up to 30 years, and, with waivers for specialized expertise,

some members may serve beyond 30 years. Retirement pay is based on a percentage of

active duty base pay and the number of years served. We seek to ensure retirement pay

reflects changes in the cost of living. Navy retirees receive the rights, privileges and ben

efits to which their faithful service and sacrifice entitle them, including medical, dental

commissary and exchange privileges. Moreover, we treat them with the same respect

and courtesy they received on active duty.

We Strive to Provide High-Quality, Attractive, Modern Facilities for Our People

We must commit the resources to provide efficient, high-quality work places; available

attractive and high-quality housing; and a range of modern recreational facilities.

These efforts must include making our bases and housing areas safe and free from

crime. We work closely with local authorities to make sure the areas around our facilities are also safe. We must keep pace with the support requirements of our operating

forces, the commands and people who support them and Navy families. We emphasize

shore infrastructure improvement at all decision-making levels. We act in an environmentally responsible manner and contribute to the ecological well-being of the communities where Navy installations are located.

We Are Committed to the Safety of Our People

Protecting the well-being and lives of our people is a fundamental obligation of the

Navy. Our safety program is instituted to foster operational readiness while preserving

both lives and material resources. Its basic elements consist of trained, qualified and

properly supervised personnel; well-designed and maintained equipment; and approved

operating procedures. In especially critical areas we observe formal two-person checks

to guarantee safety. In peacetime, there can be no commitment or operation which jus

tifies the compromise of safety. Safety must always underscore training and procedures

Ensuring our own personal safety and the safety of our shipmates is the responsibility

of all members of the team. Safety is a way of life and must be stressed both on and off

the job. Safety compromised on the job sets the wrong standard for behavior off the

job. We also work actively to prevent unsafe actions during off-duty time because they

jeopardize the well-being of our personnel, their families and unit readiness.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:00 PM
Our standards of conduct and performance are different from and more demand

than those of the civilian community we protect and defend. We hold ourselves

accountable for adherence to these standards and know we likewise will be held

accountable by both our superiors and the American public. Accountability is en

through our personal commitment, strong leadership and when necessary, the la

regulations which govern our conduct.

We Do Not Tolerate the Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs or Alcohol

Abuse of alcohol and drugs is incompatible with our high standards of performa

military discipline and combat readiness. It undermines the very foundations of

morale, health, safety and reliability. We stress preventive education, active deter

and detection at all levels. Use of illegal drugs violates the law and will not be tol

Drug abusers will be promptly separated from the Navy. For those who elect to d

alcohol, we stress a responsible, socially acceptable approach. However, we take f

constructive disciplinary action against those who choose to abuse alcohol. For t

who suffer from the disease of alcoholism and show potential for future useful se

we provide state-of-the-art rehabilitation programs.

We Look After the Individual Needs of Our People

Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR). We encourage all Navy people, active a

tired, and their families to use the services of our MWR activities. These include 

ation (fitness, sports, libraries, movies, recreation centers, skill development, gym

activities aboard ship); retail activities (base exchanges, bowling, golf, marinas, cl

and community support (child development centers, youth programs, family home 

We encourage innovation and sound practices to provide better programs and to 

erate non-appropriated revenues. We spend MWR appropriated and non-approp

funds only on MWR facilities, equipment and activities.

Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO). We have a specific policy called

PERSTEMPO to balance the amount of time our people spend away from their f

lies with the maintenance of readiness and the Navy’s forward deployed commitm

It is built around the following specific goals: maximum peacetime deployment l

of six months; at least twice the deployment length between deployments (e.g. si

months deployed, 12 months until next deployment); at least 50 percent time in 

port for a command during its operating cycle. We are fully committed to adheri

this policy, except in extraordinary circumstances such as a major military contin

or conflict.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
support and assist them in meeting individual needs. We strive to ensure everyone is provided opportunities for pastoral care, religious education and divine worship. Special

programs, such as personal growth retreats, initiatives to address the well-being of singles

and families and suicide prevention are provided through our own religious resources.

Legal Services. We provide legal assistance to enhance the morale and welfare of military personnel and to relieve the stress that personal legal problems may cause on the job

Assistance is provided routinely concerning wills, powers-of-attorney, consumer problems, domestic relations, support and indebtedness, landlord/tenant matters and protection offered by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act. We also provide legal advice and

support to Commanding Officers who are responsible for enforcing regulations. Navy

lawyers provide both defense services for personnel charged with violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and prosecution services on behalf of the government.

Chapter Five: The Navy’s Character and Reputation

The United States Navy Is Special

We in the Navy have a pride which has evolved from attitudes and convictions steeped

in honored tradition. This pride is a direct result of the incomparable experience of liv

ing and fighting on the sea—a dangerous and unforgiving environment which

demands from all of us a high degree of personal and family sacrifice. It includes the

spirit of adventure in travel and living overseas. Most important, it is the experience

known to every Navy man and woman of being on watch around the clock in the service of our country and of being a shipmate to all past, present and future sailors.

The United States Navy Has Always Been Ready to Respond to America’s Needs

We are dedicated to maintaining a Navy upon which the American people can count in

times of peace or conflict. We are committed to constant improvement of our ability to

respond to the needs of the nation in time of crisis.

We Accept Change and Plan for Uncertainties

We must work continuously to shape a Navy which can respond to the world of the

future. We cannot be constrained by the limitations or scenarios we face today. Our

planning gives us the capability to support national objectives in a world in which

there is a limitless variety of problems which may require military response. Our planning process also must reflect fiscal realities. We must ask difficult questions and consider all appropriate options for the future Navy when we look ahead. We explore

promising new ideas and discard flawed and unproductive concepts.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
We must conduct ourselves in the highest ethical manner in all relationships with

peers, seniors and subordinates. Navy people do not lie, cheat or steal. Honesty is 

cornerstone of our profession, and we must be truthful in our dealings with each 

and with those outside the Navy. As professionals, we embrace mission accompli

ment and improvement. Our commitment to teamwork and mission reflects trad

passed down since our founding more than 200 years ago. These include patrioti

courage to meet the demands of our job, a genuine concern for our people and a 

in the fundamental principles of our spiritual and ethical heritage.

The Commanding Officer Is the Focal Point of Leadership, Authority, Responsibil

and Accountability

The position of the Commanding Officer rests on more than 200 years of Navy t

tion and is virtually unique in its scope. In the earliest days of our Navy, U.S. war

represented the interests of the nation worldwide—usually doing so for months 

time without communication with authorities ashore. Those chosen to comman

selected carefully because their skill, leadership and judgment would ensure the s

of the ship’s tasking. Accordingly, they were given great authority to lead their cr

care for their ships and execute their assigned missions. They were held strictly

accountable for the performance of their commands in all circumstances. This u

combination of authority, responsibility and inescapable accountability continue

this day. This is the essence of command and sets the Navy’s Commanding Office

apart from those in other senior positions in the world of business or governmen

We Stress the Importance of Protecting Classified Information

Security is the safeguarding of information, capabilities, procedures and intentio

which would damage the nation if revealed to potential enemies. The U.S. govern

and all the military services have strict laws and regulations which govern the ha

of classified material (physical security) and the responsibilities of individuals fo

tecting it (personal security). Two basic criteria are applied to determine if an in

ual may receive classified material: (1) possession of a proper security clearance; 

(2) a genuine need to know the information. Providing classified information to 

thorized individuals is an extremely serious offense in war or peace, as it can pro

significant combat advantage to enemy forces and result in the loss of lives of ou

and friendly forces. We are required to know our responsibilities for the protecti

classified information, to carry out those responsibilities to the best of our ability 

to ensure practices dangerous to sound security are identified and properly repo

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
As a public institution, the Navy has a legal and moral responsibility to keep our

nation’s citizens informed about matters under our cognizance. It is Navy policy to

provide maximum disclosure of unclassified information to the public through the

media, with minimum delay. This policy, which applies to both negative and positive

stories, ensures that reporting on matters of public interest includes the Navy point of

view and gives us the opportunity to secure public recognition of the superb jobs our

people do. Public affairs is a function of command and a key component of Navy leadership. Public Affairs Officers are assigned throughout the Navy to provide advice and

assistance to Commanding Officers for timely release of information through the chain

of command.

We Seek to Expand Our Professional Technical Knowledge as Well as Our Understanding

of History, Culture and Politics

We strongly encourage our people to increase their professional knowledge and to

appreciate the history, institutions, culture and geography which shape our world. The

Navy Professional Reading List recommends both fiction and non-fiction books

designed to complement Navy training and outside education courses. A copy is contained as Appendix A to this Policy Book. Reading encourages both emotional and

intellectual growth. Intellectual growth improves reasoning and analytical skills,

teaches us to evaluate critically and enhances our ability to think rather than simply

react. Use of the reading list is voluntary. No one is expected to read all the books identified on the list, nor is the list intended to be all-inclusive. Most of the books are available at major shore station libraries and in shipboard libraries of larger ships.

We Subscribe to the Military Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct applies to all members of the Navy and contains the guiding

principles upon which our actions must be based should we become prisoners of war.

The Code also is the basis of similar rules which apply if we are detained by a hostile

government or terrorists in peacetime. The Code emphasizes that members of the

Armed Forces guard our country and our way of life. We are prepared to give our lives

in their defense. Should we become prisoners, we must keep faith with our country and

our fellow prisoners. We must not give any information or take any action which

would be harmful to our country, its allies or our fellow prisoners.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
States Armed Forces

Esprit de corps (team spirit) is an intangible but important element of the Navy’

acter. It is seen through our pride in the accomplishments of our shipmates, our 

our Navy and our nation’s armed forces. We stand side by side in times of need a

ebration. Esprit de corps helps us work together as a team to accomplish what ca

be accomplished alone. It is reflected in our loyalty and respect for our peers, ou

ordinates and our seniors. We demonstrate respect through giving and returning

salutes and addressing each other by the rank and title we have earned.

The Navy Has Specific Uniform Requirements and Sets High Standards of Person

Appearance

We wear uniforms to identify quickly our rate and position and thus our skills an

level of authority. The uniform identifies us as members of the Navy and reflects 

pride in our profession. It inspires confidence and trust both within and outside 

Navy. Therefore, we wear our uniforms as a visible standard of excellence. As rep

tatives of the Navy at home or abroad, we always maintain our appearance—in u

form or civilian attire—as a reflection of the special organization to which we be

We Require High Standards of Health and Physical Readiness

Physical fitness is a way of life for Navy people regardless of rank or rating. Physi

ness promotes good health and helps relieve physical and mental stress. Obesity 

incompatible with Navy standards and requirements for mission readiness. Our 

cal fitness program is designed to ensure stamina for whatever demanding task w

particularly the stress of battle. Fitness also builds self-esteem and confidence. Le

are responsible for setting the example and encouraging all hands to exercise ind

ally or as teams to build a winning spirit. We provide a variety of healthy food ab

ships and in Navy facilities, encourage proper eating habits for good health, disco

tobacco use and promote a greater awareness of positive lifestyles.

We Are Responsible Citizens and Support Our Local Communities

We stress the importance of our responsibilities as citizens by encouraging our peo

participate in local community activities during off-duty time. It is important for N

personnel to foster a sense of belonging to their communities and for communitie

recognize Navy men and women as contributors to their well-being. Involvement i

community activities also provides a focus for off-duty time and builds self-esteem

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
American men and women gave their lives for this privilege—a privilege citizens of

many other nations do not share. We emphasize the responsibility of all citizens to par

ticipate in our form of government by voting for their candidates of choice. We provid

voting assistance to help simplify absentee voting procedures.

Partnerships in Education. Our young people are the future of America. Further, a

strong educational system ensures that future generations of sailors will have the intellectual and mechanical skills to deal with a more complex and demanding world. Navy

people participate in numerous projects to promote the development of America’s

youth. Helping young people in local schools is an investment in our country’s future

and is rewarding to student and sailor alike.

Combined Federal Campaign. We encourage our members to participate in the Combined Federal Campaign as a direct channel for support of charities, programs and

community assistance efforts.

We Are Committed to Operating Ships and Shore Facilities in a Way Which Is Compatible

with the Environment

To accomplish its mission, the Navy must operate around the globe on land, in the air

and on and under the sea. An important part of the Navy’s mission is to protect the

environment, prevent pollution and conserve natural, historic and cultural resources.

To do so, we must provide formal training to ensure knowledge of environmental laws

and regulations. By leadership and personal example, each one of us must demonstrate

an everyday appreciation for environmental protection. The Navy provides the necessary resources to implement responsible environmental programs and then confirms

our commitment with accountability. Environmental considerations are an integral

element of our acquisition process. We ensure the public is provided accurate and

timely information about our efforts to protect and improve the environment.

Navy Leadership Represents Our Requirements and People before Congress

The Navy’s leadership has the responsibility to represent Navy requirements and personnel interests within the government. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of

Naval Operations provide advice to the Executive and Legislative branches concerning

the Navy and its people.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
Representatives

All citizens have the right to convey their views to their Senators and Representat

This applies to everyone in the Navy, military and civilian.

We Take Care of Our Own through Navy Relief, Sponsor Programs, Ombudsmen 

Family Support Programs

Our well-being and that of our families rest primarily with us as individuals. Eac

command must be prepared to offer support and assistance through a variety of 

mal and formal routes. In addition, the Navy invests in larger programs where a 

expertise is required or to simplify extended support to the family.

Sponsors. We recognize the difficulties involved in changes of duty station. To e

burden of relocation of Navy personnel and their families, Navy commands desi

sponsors who play an important role in easing the difficulties and reducing the a

hensions encountered during a move. A sponsor represents the new command, p

ing information about the new duty station, acting as a liaison between the new 

and local organizations and meeting and orienting the new member reporting to 

new command. Sponsors are trained thoroughly in their duties and are fully sup

by command leadership.

Ombudsmen. Commanding Officers appoint one or more Ombudsmen to prov

better link between Navy commands and the families of our sailors. Normally, th

budsman is the spouse of a service member and has both an interest in helping o

and experience as a Navy spouse. Command Family Ombudsmen are valuable as

stimulating better communication between Commanding Officers and family m

bers, fostering a better understanding of the needs and viewpoints of Navy perso

and their families and providing information, assistance and support to family m

bers. Ombudsman activities may include information and outreach, family supp

through visits and newsletters, coordination of welcoming programs and interac

and cooperation with military organizations on behalf of command family mem

Ombudsmen work directly with the Commanding Officer of each unit to addres

family’s welfare, morale and safety. This important network is especially critical d

deployments when Ombudsmen play a major role in coordinating activities of a

communicating with families of deployed sailors.

Family Service Centers. We train and develop our leaders to be sensitive to the p

role families play in readiness and retention. We also have a network of professio

staffed Family Service Centers worldwide to help Navy families and single sailors

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
information and referral service on a large number of programs available in both the

military and civilian communities, as well as counseling and educational and training

programs that address practically every area of Navy life. Each Center also aids command Ombudsmen and sponsor programs and functions as the major delivery system

for overseas duty support.

Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society. The Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society is a

private organization dedicated to taking care of Navy and Marine Corps members. It is

supported by our voluntary contributions, not tax dollars. Navy Relief provides financial counseling and financial aid in the form of interest-free loans, grants or a combination of both based on need.

Navy Men and Women Are Ambassadors of the Navy and the United States at Home

and Abroad

Wherever we go, we represent the United States Navy. Through pride in and knowledge

of our profession, we are the Navy’s best envoys at home and abroad. Our overseas

presence offers us a unique opportunity to symbolize the attributes of our country and

its Navy—professionalism, integrity, honesty and compassion. This is reinforced by ou

frequent humanitarian activities. Wherever we are, Navy men and women have an obli

gation to represent our country actively and positively.

Chapter Six: Navy Operations

The Navy’s Vital Role in History and Its Importance for the Future

As our country has grown, ultimately to its position as a world superpower, the U.S.

Navy has been a key factor in support of a wide range of national policy objectives.

From the round-the-world cruise of the Great White Fleet early in this century, the

United States established itself as an international leader willing to use its Navy as an

instrument of national policy. The U.S. Navy’s global reach, forward presence and tech

nological leadership set the pace for the growth of American influence. To this day,

Navy men and women and the ships and aircraft they operate continue to be a very

flexible and effective means of influencing events and protecting U.S. interests worldwide. This national capability rests upon the quality of our readiness, continuous presence abroad, a dedication to American values and a willingness to combat aggression

whenever and wherever required. For a more detailed account of the Navy’s role

throughout America’s history, see Appendix B.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
Because the United States is a maritime nation, the Navy plays a critical role in n

security. America must be able to use the oceans to guarantee our defense, protec

trade and ensure access to our allies. The Navy’s maritime strategy is designed to 

antee a naval force to ensure maritime superiority. Our strategy reflects how we

respond to the four primary elements of the National Security Strategy as determ

by the President: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution

support these four elements through readiness with quality personnel, high tech

and cooperation with our allies and sister services.

We Conduct Joint Operations with Other U.S. Services and Combined Operation

Our Allies

Each of our armed services has unique assets and capabilities. Using them togeth

well-designed, integrated campaign allows us to generate the greatest combat cap

in the shortest time and assures the best use of our power. We train and operate 

sively with the other U.S. armed services as well as with the armed forces of man

nations to take advantage of their unique capabilities and to enhance communic

Cooperation with these other forces improves our ability to provide peacetime p

ence abroad, to respond to crises and when required, to conduct combat operatio

The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Team

Since the earliest days of this nation, the Navy and the Marine Corps have been a

effective combat team. These complementary forces represent the principal elem

power projection from the sea. Our robust amphibious warfare capability provid

access to virtually any coastal area in the world. The Navy–Marine Corps team u

same strategic concepts in development of doctrine and tactics. We train and exe

together to ensure interoperability of equipment and procedures. We deploy toge

and Navy men and women provide logistical, medical, dental and religious supp

the Marines.

Naval Forces Conduct a Wide Variety of Operations

Our capabilities give the President a wide range of options from low-key, diplom

representation to massive retaliation. Naval forces provide the capability to respo

crises by quickly concentrating military force at the scene of a problem. Our forces 

tect American citizens and property worldwide. They provide rapid disaster relie

humanitarian assistance around the globe. In times of crisis, they may protect ou

sea and air traffic or interdict those of our enemies. They can defeat enemy nava

and project power ashore. The Navy has the ability to operate independent of ov

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
We also can tailor our diverse forces to meet specific missions and threats. The core of

this capability is the striking power of our battle groups and our amphibious forces.

Deterrence Applies to Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Conflict

During peacetime, forward-deployed forces promote regional stability and discourage

aggression by their very presence in potential trouble spots around the world. Our

long-range nuclear delivery systems—fleet ballistic missile submarines—along with

potent, visible conventional forces and the ability to use them are designed to deter any

adversary from initiating conflict.

Forward Presence Is Essential to Maintain Stability and for Timely Response to Crises

Forward-deployed naval forces help preserve U.S. influence overseas, even in places

where we have no bases or political access. They enhance our ability to deter aggression, promote regional stability, strengthen diplomatic relations abroad and respond

quickly to crises. Naval forces provide policy-makers with unique flexibility. We can

quickly position a powerful fighting force off the coast of a country, out of sight to

influence subtly or within sight to make a strong statement.

Similarly, we can remove ourselves from the situation quickly once our objectives have

been achieved. We can shift our forces rapidly between regions in reaction to changes

in the world situation. Our forces can be deployed into a theater, disperse to conduct a

wide variety of operations and then regroup quickly to form a powerful battle force.

Force Projection Is Our Number One Warfighting Priority

To be effective in support of national policy we must have the ability to influence

events on land and at sea. When required, we must be able to respond with appropriate

firepower from our carrier, surface, submarine and amphibious forces to take the battle

to the enemy. This will require:

Sea Control. Sea control is a fundamental function of the Navy and is defined as the

ability to control designated areas in, over and under the sea as necessary to perform

our mission. It does not necessarily mean permanent control of an entire ocean. Instead, it is selective, requiring that we control specific portions of the ocean whenever

needed. Sea control is a prerequisite for most naval operations and includes antisubmarine, anti-surface and anti-air warfare.

Power Projection. We must be able to strike an enemy at sea and affect events ashore.

Power projection is the use of naval forces to launch strikes against the enemy. It includes attacks by carrier aircraft, strikes by cruise missiles, amphibious assaults by

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:01 PM
of supplies and equipment by sealift vessels. Power projection is an offensive arm 

operations which helps us to defeat the enemy on land.

Balanced Naval Forces. Because of the many tasks the Navy must be able to acco

plish, we require balanced forces. This means that every element of the Navy play

tal role—combatants, aircraft, special warfare, logistics, support units, mine warf

forces and the shore establishment. While some may be more necessary than oth

specific situations, we need them all to perform our mission.

Distribution of Firepower. The distribution of our offensive firepower among a 

ety of platforms gives us tremendous flexibility. It allows us to tailor units rapidl

specific missions and to choose the right weapon and launching platform for eac

ation. Distributing our offensive power makes it harder for an enemy to target ou

units or successfully carry out a preemptive strike.

Sealift. Since America is separated from most of the world by vast expanses of o

our ability to move large amounts of military equipment and supplies by sea is c

to U.S. strategy. When sealift is combined with airlift and programs which prepo

military equipment in ships or storage depots located in key foreign areas, we stren

our ability to move U.S. military forces quickly to any region of the world.

Hedging Against Global War

Changes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have lowered the threat 

global war. These changes should give us a greater period of warning if circumsta

in that region were to change for the worse. This enables us to reduce the forces a

at countering a global war scenario and to place those forces in reserve. The natio

invest those defense dollars in other necessary programs with the option to recal

reconstitute forces if threatened by global war.

Logistics Are Essential

We provide our forces the support they require to conduct operations anywher

the world.

Unit and Battle Group Logistics. We design our ships, aircraft and systems to be l

self-sustaining. Using our combat logistics force, Navy ships can be resupplied with 

ple, ammunition, food and stores even while underway. We also pool our expertise 

equipment for maintenance and repair capabilities within each deployed Battle Gr

and have mobile repair and support units to sustain our readiness while deployed.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
port our operating forces. We have the capability to maintain the flow of material and

personnel to those forces at all times, during all levels of operations. We maintain construction and repair facilities. We can return damaged weapons systems and equipmen

to the fleet through stateside base repair facilities, through deployable units and

through overseas repair activities and supply depots.

Tactics and Training Help Us Use Our Forces More Effectively

Tactical Development. The battlefield of the future will be increasingly technical and

complex. Tactics and techniques will be as important as firepower. We develop tactics

and techniques to optimize our capabilities. Our tactics ensure effective coordination

among the different areas of the Navy (aviation, surface and submarine). We integrate

our tactics with operating doctrine and with the tactics of other U.S. and allied forces.

We conduct tactical training in the most stressful, realistic environment we can create

without compromising safety. Training programs must result in demonstrated tactical

and technical competence, increased confidence and new initiatives to improve performance under fire.

We Employ New Technologies to Maintain Our Technological Edge

As new technologies are developed, we must use them to our operational advantage.

The ships we build today will serve in the fleet for an average of 30 or more years. We

must ensure ships and airplanes are designed to employ new technologies to fight in

the battlefields of tomorrow. We also must be able to counter the technological developments of potential adversaries.

Chapter Seven: The Navy’s Forces

Battle Groups and Task Forces Are the Centerpieces for Naval Operations

To carry out assigned missions, Commanders-in-Chief and their subordinate naval

commanders organize their forces by task capabilities. In practice, this means organizing various ships, aircraft, submarines, support units and often units of other services

or nations to carry out each specific task. Some examples of task-organized groups tha

are commonly employed are: Joint Task Forces, Carrier Battle Groups, Surface Action

Groups, Amphibious Task Forces, Underway Replenishment Groups and Convoy

Escort Groups. Since a situation may not always require a full battle group, the fleet

commander can tailor the size of a specific task force to the military objective or

expected threat.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
Aircraft carriers with their embarked air wings are the most capable ships at sea 

form the nucleus of our carrier battle groups. An air wing is composed of fighter

attack, airborne early warning, electronic warfare, anti-submarine and logistics a

These modern, long-range forces are capable of striking airborne, surface or 

surface targets at sea, as well as targets ashore deep in an enemy’s homeland. The 

craft carrier is essential to achieving and maintaining sea control. Not every miss

requires a carrier—or a carrier battle group—but there are certain events or cris

when only a carrier can do the job.

Surface Combatants

Our multi-mission surface combatants are important elements of battle group a

amphibious operations and are also able to operate together as surface action gro

Cruisers and destroyers commonly operate with all types of battle groups and po

extensive anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface and strike warfare capabilities. Fr

are designed to escort shipping and also can be used as part of a battle group

surface combatants carry helicopters which add an important dimension to a

submarine warfare, anti-ship surveillance and targeting operations. The Harpoon 

Tomahawk cruise missiles allow surface combatants to conduct lethal strikes on d

surface targets and on targets ashore.

The Submarine Force

Our submarines are the most capable undersea force in the world today. Cost-eff

and survivable, fleet ballistic missile submarines are the cornerstone of America’

tegic deterrent forces. Our powerful, quiet attack submarines are designed to def

enemy naval forces alone or in battle group operations, lay mines off enemy port

vide covert intelligence, support special operations and conduct cruise missile st

on targets ashore.

Land-Based Naval Aircraft

We operate a variety of land-based aircraft to carry out important Navy missions

Long-range antisubmarine patrol planes detect, track and destroy enemy submar

and keep track of surface ships over large areas of the ocean. Special communica

aircraft link the President with our submerged ballistic missile submarines. Vario

types of logistics aircraft provide transport, training and refueling support to ou

ating forces.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
Amphibious forces, working together with the U.S. Marine Corps, provide the United

States with an unmatched capability to project land combat power ashore nearly anywhere along the world’s coastlines. Amphibious vessels transport, land and sustain

Marines and their equipment via embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles and

helicopters. This forward-based, mobile and highly flexible Navy–Marine Corps team

ensures our ability to influence events ashore rapidly.

Special Warfare

Naval Special Warfare forces are highly trained units which specialize in unconventional warfare missions. They are composed of SEALs (Sea-Air-Land Units) and Specia

Boat Units. They perform such missions as beach and coastal reconnaissance, underwater demolition, direct action, intelligence collection, coastal and riverine interdiction, hostage and prisoner rescue and other specialized tasks in support of Battle

Group and Joint Task Force operations. Quickly deployable and highly mobile, Special

Warfare forces are lightly armed and rely on stealth, concealment and surprise to

accomplish their tasks.

Mine Warfare

Mines are formidable weapons. Cheap, difficult to detect and deadly, they are in the

hands of many countries around the world today. Modern U.S. mines and our air and

subsurface delivery platforms allow us to threaten the seaborne traffic and naval forces

of any adversary. Additionally, our helicopter and surface minesweepers and

minehunters give us the capability to clear vital waterways of even the most sophisticated mines.

Mobile Logistics and Support

Combat logistics ships enable us to sustain our naval forces anywhere in the world.

They shuttle petroleum products, ammunition, stores and other goods to battle groups

and task forces. Support ships, which include such vessels as tenders, repair ships, tugs

and hospital ships, provide essential maintenance, repair and logistics force support fo

forward deployed forces. Additionally, large stocks of Marine Corps equipment are

stored afloat in Maritime Prepositioned Ships for immediate use in Navy/Marine

Corps operations. As overseas U.S. bases decline in numbers, these logistics and support forces will become increasingly important.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
The intelligence and cryptologic communities provide a wide range of intelligen

port to tactical forces and commands and staffs ashore. Shore-based intelligence 

cryptologic operations involve the collection, processing, analysis and reporting 

information from many sources from communications intelligence to human in

gence. Afloat intelligence provides immediate, on-scene warfighting support to t

commanders in the form of immediate combat information, indications and wa

(I&W) of impending enemy activity and assessments of ongoing hostile force int

tions and capabilities. Such afloat support is produced through the combined us

tactical sensors within the force, those of the other military services and national 

nical collection systems. Our emphasis is on joint intelligence efforts to provide t

accurate and complete information to our tactical commanders.

Space and Electronic Warfare

The gathering, processing and transmission of information is becoming an incre

important part of all warfare. Our ability to use assets in space; the exploitation o

entire electromagnetic spectrum for surveillance, targeting and communication; 

the countering of an opponent’s ability to perform these functions are all crucial 

success. This new warfare area is an integral supporting element for all other war

areas, and is key to ensuring interoperability with other U.S. military services and 

armed forces of other nations.

The Shore Establishment

The focus of the shore establishment is to support the requirements of the opera

forces. From training, logistics and maintenance to direct support of operational 

the shore establishment has a vital role in keeping the fleet ready to fulfill its mis

To be effective, the shore establishment must understand and be responsive to th

requirements of the operating forces. It also must measure in a meaningful way t

effectiveness of the support it provides. The shore infrastructure must be compa

with and reflect the size of the operating forces. We strive to maintain modern, e

shore facilities and equipment to provide state-of-the-art support to the fleet and 

ity conditions for military and civilians assigned to duties ashore.

Chapter Eight: The Navy’s Future: Continuity and Continuous Improvement

The Navy’s Fundamental Purpose Will Remain Unchanged

As a maritime nation, the United States will continue to depend upon the world’

oceans for security, economic strength and access to trading partners and allies. F

future, just as over the past 200 years, the Navy will be required to preserve freed

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
U.S. foreign policy. Our missions are enduring.

The World Is Changing

In today’s world we are witnessing many profound and rapidly unfolding changes. The

end of the Cold War is very welcome, but it also has removed restraints on many

nations. This, coupled with the spread of high technology weapons, growing competition for energy sources and economic advantage and longstanding political, social, territorial and religious disputes among and within numerous nations, makes our securit

environment more complicated.

The Navy Must Improve Continuously to Ensure It Remains a Strong Instrument for

National Security

The Navy must be well prepared to meet the challenges posed by the dramatic changes

in the world. We need to maintain our current high degree of readiness, flexibility,

responsiveness and dependability if we are to address the challenges of the 1990s and

beyond. We also must take into account the need to operate within a tight budget. We

may not have the resources which have been available to us in the past. Affordability,

efficiency and the need for quality and continuous improvement will become ever

more important to our ability to remain a strong, effective Navy. For this reason, the

day-to-day job of every Navy man and woman will be to work together as a team to

improve the quality of our work, our people and ourselves; to take advantage of new

ideas and new technologies; and most important, to understand that the pursuit of

quality never ends.

The Navy’s People Have Been the Essence of Our Strength in the Past, and You Are the

Future of Our Navy

We have built, operated and maintained the best Navy ever to sail the world’s oceans.

Our countrymen and women have provided us with the world’s finest aircraft, ships,

submarines and weapons. But the true source of our strength, the linchpin of our

effectiveness as a fighting force, has been and always will be the resourcefulness and

devotion to duty of our finest asset, the Navy men and women who serve our country

around the world.

Appendix A: Navy Professional Reading List

The Professional Reading List includes a number of books, both fiction and non-fiction,

which address our profession. Naturally, there are many others you also will want to

examine; this is simply a starting point. The list has been divided into three categories:

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
tion of our commitment to professional growth for all Navy men and women.

TITLE AUTHOR

A. BASIC

All Quiet on the Western Front Erich M. Remarque

American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur

1880–1964

William Manchester

Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang

to Black Holes

Stephen M. Hawking

Command of the Seas: A Personal Story John F. Lehman

Everything We Had: An Oral History of the

Vietnam War

Al Santoli, ed.

Flight of the Intruder Steven Coontz

Hunt for Red October Tom Clancy

In Love and War James B. & Sybil Stockdale

In Search of Excellence Thomas J. Peters

On Watch Elmo Zumwalt

Red Badge of Courage Stephen Crane

Red Storm Rising Tom Clancy

Run Silent, Run Deep Edward L. Beach

The Caine Mutiny Herman Wouk

The Cruel Sea Nicholas Monsarrat

The Killer Angels Michael Shaara

The Right Stuff Tom Wolfe

The Russians Hedrick Smith

The Sand Pebbles Richard McKenna

The Source James A. Michener

The United States Navy: A Two Hundred

Year History

Edward L. Beach

Two-Ocean War Samuel E. Morison

War and Remembrance Herman Wouk

Winds of War Herman Wouk

B. INTERMEDIATE

A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and

America in Vietnam

Neil Sheehan

Admiral Arleigh Burke: A Biography E. B. Potter

At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of

Pearl Harbor

Gordon W. Prange

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
Bull Halsey: A Biography E. B. Potter

Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano

Roosevelt: His Lieutenants and Their War

Eric Larrabee

Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns

of Japanese Culture

Ruth Benedict

Eagle Against the Sun: An American War

with Japan

Ronald H. Spector

Eisenhower: At War, 1943–1945 David Eisenhower

Fate Is the Hunter Ernest K. Gann

First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S.

Marine Corps

Victor H. Krulak

From Hiroshima to Glasnost Paul Nitze

Kaizen: The Key to Japan’s Competitive

Success

Masaaki Imai

Makers of Modern Strategy Peter Paret

Master of Seapower: A Biography of Fleet

Admiral Ernest J. King

Thomas Buell

Miracle at Midway Gordon W. Prange

Modern Times: The World from the

Twenties to the Eighties

Paul Johnson

Mountbatten Philip Ziegler

Nelson, The Biography David Walder

Nimitz E. B. Potter

Out of the Crisis W. Edwards Deming

Presidential Management of National

Security

Carnes Lord

The Deming Management System Mary Walton

The Guns of August Barbara W. Tuchman

The Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics and the

Defense of the West

Colin S. Gray

The Mask of Command John Keegan

The Pentagon and the Art of War Edward N. Luttwak

The Quiet Warrior Thomas Buell

Today’s Isms: Communism, Facism,

Capitalism, Socialism

William Ebenstien & Edwin Fogelman

Sea Power: A Navy History E. B. Potter & Chester Nimitz

Silent Victory: The U.S Submarine War

against Japan

Blair, Clay, Lippencott

The American Way of War Russell F. Weigley

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
Great Struggle at Sea

The Future of Sea Power Eric J. Grove

The KGB Today: The Hidden Land John Barron

The Face of Battle John Keegan

The Last Lion: Visions of Glory, 1874–1932 William Manchester

The Last Lion: Alone 1932–40 William Manchester

The Price of Admiralty John Keegan

The Rise of American Naval Forces,

1776–1918

Harold & Margaret Sprout

The Rivals: America and Russia since WW II Adam B. Ulam

The Second World War John Keegan

The U.S. and the Origins of the Cold War John L. Gaddis

Vietnam: A History Stanley Karnow

C. ADVANCED

America at Century’s End James R. Schlesinger

Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT John Newhouse

Democracy in America Alexis de Toqueville

Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:

Theory and Practice

Alexander George

Fleet Tactics: Theory & Practice Wayne P. Hughes

From Beirut to Jerusalem Thomas L. Friedman

How Democracies Perish Jean-Francois Revel

Man, the State and War: A Theoretical

Analysis

Kenneth N. Waltz

Military Strategy: A Naval Theory of Power

Control

Joseph C. Wylie

Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American

Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade

Michael A. Palmer

On War Carl Von Clausewitz

Power & Change: The Administrative

History of the Office of the CNO

Thomas C. Home

Seapower and Strategy Colin S. Gray & Roger Barnett

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy Julian S. Corbett

Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect U. S. Grant Sharp

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace Edward N. Luttwak

The Art of War Sun Tzu

The Geopolitics of Superpowers Colin S. Gray

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
Appendix B: The Navy’s Purpose through History

Throughout our history, the United States has depended upon the world’s oceans for

its security and economic well-being. For more than 200 years, the roles played by the

United States Navy have remained remarkably consistent: to guard our shores from

foreign attack, preserve freedom of the seas for the passage of trade and commerce,

protect our overseas interests, support our allies and serve as an instrument of America’s foreign policy. The bravery, dedication and hard work of generations of American

sailors have ensured the Navy’s success in these diverse and challenging tasks.

The Revolution (1775–1785): The Navy’s Vital Role in the Birth of Our Nation

America’s origins are intimately linked to the sea. North America was discovered and

colonized by Europeans who took passage across the Atlantic Ocean to the New World

Overseas trade was a mainstay of the economies of the 13 English colonies for more

than a century before the War of Independence. During that war, the Continental Navy

privateers and commerce raiding squadrons chartered by individual American states,

and the navy of our French ally all played vital roles in our fight against the British.

The Continental Navy’s squadrons and individual ships attacked British sea lines of

communications and seized transports laden with munitions, provisions and troops.

Continental and state Navy ships and privateers also struck at enemy commerce, taking

nearly 200 British ships as prizes, forcing them to divert warships to protect convoys and

trade routes. In one of those shipping raids, off Flamborough Head on the coast of England in 1779, Captain John Paul Jones, commanding an old, half-rotten former merchantman, Bonhomme Richard, gave the new Navy one of its first battle cries, “I have

not yet begun to fight!” as he defeated a much superior British ship, the frigate Serapis.

The Battle of Yorktown in 1781 was a near-perfect example of how naval forces can

support an army. At the Battle of the Virginia Capes off Chesapeake Bay, the French

Navy under Admiral De Grasse prevented the British from evacuating their troops

under siege at Yorktown. This led to the surrender of British forces under General

The Soldier and the State: The Theory &

Politics of Civil-Military Relations

Samuel P. Huntington

The White House Years Henry Kissinger

The U.S. Navy: The View from the Mid-1990s James L. George

The Ultra Secret F. W. Winterbotham

U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of

Constrained Resources

War and Politics

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. &

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Bernard Brodie

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
newborn United States.

The War of 1812 and the Rebirth of the U.S. Navy (1785–1815): Protecting Free T

and Preserving Freedom of the Seas as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

In the 1780s and 1790s, pirates from the Barbary states on Africa’s north coast at

our defenseless merchant ships, stealing their cargoes and enslaving their crews. 

mined to protect the freedom of the seas, the new American Congress authorized 

building of a naval force to be sent to the Mediterranean. After a series of sea figh

operations ashore between 1801 and 1807, and another expedition in 1815, the B

rulers agreed to stop their attacks on American shipping.

Conflict with Revolutionary France in the so-called Quasi-War prompted the est

ment of the permanent Navy Department in 1798. French attacks on U.S. merch

men led to intermittent hostilities between American and French warships throu

1800. American warships captured more than 80 French vessels and defeated two

French men-of-war in combat on the high seas, giving the world a convincing de

stration of both the new Navy’s force and capability and U.S. determination to p

its commerce.

In the early 1800s, as the Napoleonic Wars in Europe wore on, Britain also interf

with U.S. merchant shipping, boarding our ships and forcibly “pressing” U.S. sail

into the Royal Navy. Congress declared war on Britain in June 1812, in part over 

issue of freedom of the seas and free trade. Outnumbered by the powerful British 

American sailors nevertheless distinguished themselves in a series of ship-to-ship

engagements on the high seas, in squadron combat on Lakes Erie and Ontario an

coastal waters defending New Orleans.

Following the War of 1812, Navy ships participated in the suppression of piracy 

Caribbean, anti-slavery patrols off Africa and Brazil, diplomatic initiatives such a

Commodore Matthew Perry’s expedition to open relations with Japan in 1852 to 

naval exploration in the Pacific and the Arctic and amphibious and blockade ope

tions during the Seminole and Mexican Wars.

Civil War (1861–1865): Blockade and Joint Riverine Operations

The Navy’s principal role during the Civil War was to blockade the South’s coastl

and support Union army operations on inland rivers. Over the course of the war

joint operations with the Army cut the South off from outside support and grad

constricted its trade and commercial livelihood.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:02 PM
tion in naval technology, illustrated by the construction of ironclad warships by both

sides. The Union Navy’s Monitor contained more than 40 patentable inventions. The

Monitor was built to counter the Confederate Virginia, an armored ship built on the

hull of the former USS Merrimac. Although the 1862 battle between the Monitor and

Virginia ended in a draw, this first battle of ironclads signalled a profound change in

the nature of naval warfare. The war also saw innovations in mines, mine countermeasures and submarines.

In the years following the Civil War, the Navy was reduced in size until the 1880s when

with the settlement of the American West essentially complete, the U.S. became

increasingly interested in overseas trade and foreign affairs. The Navy had undergone

considerable decline since the Civil War. Many of the technological innovations introduced from 1861 to 1865 had been adopted and improved upon by foreign navies, but

the U.S. fleet was essentially a force of antiquated wooden-hulled gunboats. Construction began in the late 1880s and early 1890s on a new Navy of all-steel ships. The ideas

of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan about the role maritime power played in building

great nations and how battle fleets were critical components of those nations’ defense

provided a useful framework for the resurrection of American sea power.

The Spanish-American War: The Navy’s First Two-Ocean Conflict

American support for Cuban independence from Spain escalated into conflict when

the battleship USS Maine exploded and sank in Havana harbor in February 1898. The

United States blamed Spain for the explosion and declared war on April 25. Five days

later, the Spanish Navy was completely defeated in the Pacific at the Battle of Manila

Bay, and on July 3, the U.S. Atlantic Squadron devastated the bulk of Spain’s remaining

naval power in a fleet engagement off Santiago, Cuba. A subsequent naval blockade of

Santiago enabled the U.S. Army to capture the city.

As a result of the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded the Philippines and Puerto Rico

to the United States. Congress subsequently annexed Hawaii, Wake Island and part of

the Samoa Islands, giving the U.S. far-flung possessions to protect and overseas bases

from which to defend its interests.

World War I (1917–1918): Submarine Warfare and Sealift to Europe

During World War I, the principal contributions of the U.S. Navy were to help neutralize the German U-boats which were sinking allied shipping in the approaches to the

British Isles and the ports of France, and to provide the ships to transport men and

material to Europe. By 1918, more than 2 million American troops of the American

Expeditionary Force had safely crossed the Atlantic.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
American bluejacket proved his professionalism in a completely new area of nav

combat, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), while the infant shore-based U.S. naval 

tion force saw its first combat over European shores and coastal seas. In addition

American minelayers helped lay the North Sea Mine Barrage designed to isolate 

German submarine force in home waters, and after hostilities ended, American m

sweepers helped take up the vast minefields.

In the years following World War I, the United States signed a series of naval arm

trol treaties which limited shipbuilding and modernization and restricted growth 

the size of the U.S. Navy. By the mid-1930s, however, as international tensions

increased, those treaties expired and were not renewed, allowing the U.S. to begin 

naval buildup which became critical for victory in World War II.

Despite the limits placed on the interwar fleet, the American Navy had at last rea

point where it was second to none in both size and capability. The U.S. Fleet was 

unsurpassed in the innovations in naval warfare it introduced and tested. In the 

the first U.S. aircraft carrier, USS Langley, was commissioned, and additional flat

followed. In the 1930s, the Marine Corps established the Fleet Marine Force and 

perfecting the amphibious assault techniques that would make the island-hoppin

campaign of World War II possible.

World War II (1941–1945): The Navy’s Role in Global War

The Atlantic. The United States followed a strategy of defeating Germany first du

the second World War. This meant that while the Navy had to fight in both oceans 

taneously, the threat presented by Nazi Germany generally received highest priority 

men and material being mobilized and the offensive campaigns being planned. Jus

World War I, the primary role of the Navy in the Atlantic was to ensure the safe tra

of American soldiers and equipment overseas. In 1942, large numbers of experienc

German U-boats threatened to sever Allied sea lanes and starve Britain into submi

In a long and bitter anti-submarine campaign, American, British and Canadian sh

gradually gained the upper hand. Wise allocation and routing of precious shipping 

sources saved many convoys from attack, and after 1943, intelligence derived from 

phered German naval radio messages gave the Allies a vital edge. But it still took m

destroyers, escort carriers and shore-based air units to drive the U-boats from the s

the Atlantic battle had not been won, there would have been no victory on land.

Larger Navy units supported Allied landings in North Africa in October 1942, an

Sicily and mainland Italy in 1943. These ever more powerful amphibious operati

formed the prelude to the largest amphibious assault ever—the Allied invasion o

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
ing craft, Allied navies put 150,000 U.S. Army, British, Canadian and French troops

ashore and supported them as they steadily destroyed the Nazi army in Western Europe.

The Pacific. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor sank or damaged most of the Pacific

Fleet’s battleships, but the U.S. aircraft carriers, submarines and Hawaii’s critical fuel

depots and repair installations remained unscathed. The Japanese overran British possessions in Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies and,

after a valiant fight by Americans and Filipinos, the Philippines. By the spring of 1942,

Japan appeared to be threatening Australia, Hawaii and the American West Coast.

In May 1942, U.S. Navy carriers stopped the Japanese advance on Australia in the first

naval battle waged entirely by aircraft against ships, the Battle of the Coral Sea. In early

June, U.S. naval intelligence revealed that the Japanese were planning to attack Midway

Island in preparation for an assault on Hawaii. A badly outnumbered American Fleet

met the Japanese armada near Midway, sinking four Japanese carriers and destroying

322 enemy aircraft, breaking the back of Japanese naval aviation for much of the rest o

the war. The Battle of Midway marked the end of the Pacific War’s defensive phase.

During the next three years, the U.S. Navy fought its way across the Pacific, supporting

Marine and Army landings aimed at bypassing heavily-defended Japanese island bases.

The bitter six-month sea, air and land struggle for Guadalcanal in the South Pacific from

1942 to 1943 was followed by a march across the Central Pacific, from the Gilbert Islands

through the Marshalls, Marianas and Palaus. In June, the remainder of Japanese naval air

power was destroyed off the Marianas at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The newly taken

Marianas gave the Army Air Forces bases to attack Japan itself. In October, a combined

assault by Central Pacific forces under Admiral Chester Nimitz and Southwest Pacific

forces under General Douglas MacArthur on Leyte island led to the largest naval battle

ever fought, the Battle of Leyte Gulf. That battle allowed U.S. Army troops to liberate the

Philippines without fear of any further Japanese naval intervention. In 1945, American

assaults on Iwo Jima and Okinawa brought the U.S. Navy to the shores of Japan itself.

Beginning immediately after Pearl Harbor, American submariners carried the war into

Japanese sea lanes and home waters. By 1944, they had effectively cut Japan off from

access to East Indies oil, severely curtailing the ability of the surviving units of the

Imperial Navy to threaten American landings. U.S. submarines relentlessly blockaded

Japan, bringing down her industry as well as her war machine. By the time the United

States dropped the atomic bomb in August 1945, the Navy’s carriers, surface combatants and submarines were in position to starve Japan into surrender or support an

invasion of the Japanese home islands.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
Regional Conflict

In the nearly half a century since the end of World War II, U.S. sailors and Marin

have been called upon more than 200 times to support our allies, or, in conjunct

with Army and Air Force units, to stabilize a troubled area. Because of its mobilit

staying power, the Navy has been called upon whenever it has been necessary to p

serve our interests overseas. Some of these episodes have been relatively minor, w

others have been major conflicts.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the U.S. Navy adopted a peacetime 

egy of deploying a significant portion of its offensive striking power overseas to t

Northeast Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Western Pacific and later, the Indian Oce

a continuing basis to deter aggression against U.S. allies and interests. Army and 

Force units were based overseas in Western Europe and East Asia as well. This wa

departure from pre-war years when the bulk of the battle fleet and nearly all of t

Army was based at home. If deterrence failed, those forward-deployed forces wou

halt enemy advances and undertake offensive operations against the adversary as 

as possible.

The basis of U.S. naval war planning for four decades, this forward strategy was p

licly codified in the Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1980s.

In June 1950, Communist North Korea invaded South Korea. Navy units in the S

Japan quickly flew air strikes against the Communists and secured command of 

seas while U.S. Marines, Army, Air Force and Allied units moved to support Sout

Korea ashore. In September, the brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon turned t

against the North Korean aggression. Two more years of hard land and air fightin

lowed until the war ended with an armistice in 1953.

During the Cold War, as the Soviet Union and the United States faced each other 

opposite sides of the Iron Curtain, the Navy contributed a key element to the U.S

icy of nuclear deterrence. In 1955, the U.S. Navy began developing the Fleet Balli

Missile system, which in 1960 demonstrated that nuclear-armed missiles could b

accurately fired from submerged submarines against targets more than a thousan

miles away. Thereafter, nuclear-powered submarines, equipped first with Polaris, 

with Poseidon, and now with Trident missiles, have patrolled beneath the seas as 

invisible, secure and survivable deterrent against thermonuclear aggression.

When the Soviet Union attempted to install nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba in 1

President John F. Kennedy established a naval quarantine of the island, emphasiz

American determination to see the missiles removed. Because the U.S.S.R. then l

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
its missiles after 14 tense days.

Through the 1960s and early ’70s, the Navy played an important role in efforts to sustain a non-Communist government in South Vietnam. After the Tonkin Gulf incident

in August 1964, Navy aviators flew the first air strikes against North Vietnam. After

1965, when the U.S. bombed North Vietnam and Laos to stop the flow of men and sup

plies moving south on the Ho Chi Minh trail, Navy aircraft played a major part in the

air campaign. Surface ships provided gunfire support for American, South Vietnamese

and Allied forces in South Vietnam and shelled targets in North Vietnam. Navy

riverine forces supported Army and Allied units in operations on Vietnam’s inland and

coastal waterways. Although the U.S. withdrew after 1973, Navy and Air Force units

moved quickly to rescue as many refugees as possible when the government of South

Vietnam collapsed in 1975.

The Atlantic Fleet played a key role with Marine, Air Force and Army contingency forces

in dealing with crises in the Caribbean and Central America, notably the Dominican

Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. In 1985, the Sixth Fleet in the

Mediterranean helped apprehend the terrorist hijackers of the cruise ship Achille

Lauro. In 1986, Navy and Air Force aircraft struck at Libyan command and control cen

ters in response to Libyan support of international terrorism. During the Iran-Iraq Wa

in 1987 to 1988, U.S. Navy ships escorted oil tankers and swept mines in the Persian

Gulf, thus maintaining Free World access to oil and preserving freedom of the seas.

When Iraq overran Kuwait in August 1990, Navy units were first on the scene, and thei

presence helped deter Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. The Navy’s fast sealift and mar

itime logistics forces ensured the rapid buildup of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD.

This massive movement of Army, Air Force, Marine and Allied manpower, equipment

and supplies from Europe and the U.S. depended on the free use of the seas made possible by American maritime supremacy. Subsequently, Navy ships formed the core of

the multinational coalition and put teeth into U.N. decisions by undertaking maritime

interdiction operations that cut off Iraq’s seaborne trade links. When Iraq refused to

evacuate Kuwait by the Jan. 15, 1991, United Nations deadline, Navy aircraft and Toma

hawk cruise missiles operating from both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea were among

the first to hit Iraqi forces in Kuwait and in Iraq.

Throughout America’s history, the U.S. Navy has played a key role in the defense of our

nation and its interests overseas. As the United States faces the post–Cold War world,

the Navy will be there to serve the nation’s objectives in times of crisis and conflict. Th

same pride, professionalism and fighting spirit that enabled the 13 colonies to survive

more than 200 years ago remain alive and well in the Fleet today.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
“. . . From the Sea:

Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century”

Originally dated and distributed in September 1992, “. . . From the Sea” was also 

as a U.S. Navy news release on 6 October.* It was eventually published in three s

differing versions. The first version appeared with several grammatical errors, wh

were corrected for the version that appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedin

the Marine Corps Gazette.†

The publication of “. . . From the Sea” coincided with the national presidential el

campaign in the autumn of 1992. In January 1993, after the election and just as 

Clinton administration was taking office, the Navy published the same text, with

signatures of the secretary and service chiefs. This glossy-covered, illustrated pam

with a circulation of some 140,000 copies, was a key tool in an eighteen-month-lo

coordinated media campaign.‡

The third of the four key documents published during Admiral Kelso’s term of 

“. . . From the Sea” appeared just four months after The Navy Policy Book, a

benefited directly from the appointment on 29 October 1992 of the new secretary of 

Navy, Sean O’Keefe, whose considerable political influence helped overcome the persis

negative influence of the Tailhook scandal. Even after O’Keefe’s departure from office 

January 1993 at the end of George H. W. Bush’s administration (Admiral Kelso serve

tionally as acting secretary of the Navy during the first six months of the Clinton adm

tion, from 20 January to 21 July 1993), “. . . From the Sea” continued to be widely circ

This document was written to underscore the determination of the Navy’s leaders

change, align itself more effectively with the concept of the Base Force developed b

CHAPTER THREE

* A photocopy with facsimile signatures is in the Naval War College Library, shelf numb

VA56.4.V546 1992, c.1. The text is available online at www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/p

fromsea/fromsea.txt. Originally published as item NNS130 of Navy News Service (Nav

048/92), 6 October 1992.

† U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1992), pp. 93–96; Marine Corps Gazette 76, n

(November 1992), p. 18.

‡ U.S. Navy Dept.,... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century (Wash

D.C.: [1992]).

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
learned from the First Gulf War, and to take into consideration the context of the technology provided by the Tomahawk missile and the Aegis combat system.

The document was initially drafted by a concepts group known as the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort, headed by Brig. Gen. (select) Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC.* Their

work was revised after the arrival of Vice Adm. Leighton W. Smith as Deputy Chief of Naval

Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (Op-06). Having just come from a tour of duty

as Director of Operations, U.S. European Command (1989–91), Admiral Smith emphasized

joint operations as a key element and directed that the document reflect the concept of naval

power as joint, littoral, and enabling. “. . . From the Sea” continued the earlier deemphasis on

antisubmarine warfare, as a “post–Cold War dividend,” and the renewed stress on crisis

response and long-range reach. In the end, the principal drafters were Vice Admiral Smith

and Capt. Howard A. “Rusty” Petrea from the OpNav staff. Their final draft was edited personally by Secretary O’Keefe, with help from his special assistant, Cdr. James Stavridis.† 

A New Direction for the Naval Service

“. . . From the Sea” is a Navy and Marine Corps White Paper. It defines a combined

vision for the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy Policy Book and the Marine Corps’

Master Plan describe internal policy issues and serve to complement the task of articulating the shape and size of our service for the next century.

Introduction

The world has changed dramatically in the last two years, and America’s national security

policy has also changed. As a result, the priorities of the Navy and Marine Corps have

shifted, leading to this broad assessment of the future direction of our maritime forces.

The fundamental shift in national security policy was first articulated by the President

at the Aspen Institute on 2 August 1990. The new policy is reflected in the President’s

* The members of the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort included Cdr. Bradd Hayes, USN

(Capt. sel.); Capt. Howard A. (Rusty) Petrea, USN; Col. Michael Strickland, USMC; Col. Richard

(Rick) Stearns, USMC; Capt. Larry Kelly, USN; Capt. Edward Smith, USN; Cdr. Richard (Rich)

Snead, USN; Col. Wallace (Chip) Gregson, USMC; Mr. Ferd Neider, CNA analyst; Dr. Thomas

Barnett, CNA analyst; Capt. Robert Crawshaw, USN; Capt. Eric Briggs, USN; Capt. Charles

Schaefer, USN; Cdr. Joseph Connelly, USN; Cdr. Al Seifert, USN; Capt. Frank Dobrydney, USN.

† Vice Adm. James Stavridis, USN, e-mail to Hattendorf, 6 July 2006; Stavridis e-mail to Swartz, 28

June 2006; Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 7 July 2006.

FRANK B. KELSO II

Admiral, U. S. Navy

Chief of Naval

Operations

SEAN O’KEEFE

Secretary of the Navy

C. E. MUNDY, JR.

General, U. S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the

Marine Corps

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This National Security Strategy has profound implications for the Navy and Mar

Corps. Our strategy has shifted from a focus on a global threat to a focus on regi

challenges and opportunities. While the prospect of global war has receded, we a

entering a period of enormous uncertainty in regions critical to our national int

Our forces can help to shape the future in ways favorable to our interests by und

ning our alliances, precluding threats, and helping to preserve the strategic positi

won with the end of the Cold War.

Our naval forces will be full participants in the principal elements of this strateg

strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstit

With a far greater emphasis on joint and combined operations, our Navy and Ma

Corps will provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our futu

security challenges. American Naval Forces provide powerful yet unobtrusive pre

strategic deterrence; control of the seas; extended and continuous on-scene crisis

response; project precise power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale

warfighting scenarios emerge. These maritime capabilities are particularly well ta

for the forward presence and crisis response missions articulated in the Presiden

National Security Strategy.

Our ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future operations a

us to resize our naval forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in 

complex operating environment of the “littoral” or coastlines of the earth. With 

demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations of the world claim preeminent cont

the seas and ensure freedom of commercial maritime passage. As a result, our na

maritime policies can afford to de-emphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas

the challenge is much more complex than simply reducing our present naval forc

must structure a fundamentally different naval force to respond to strategic dem

and that new force must be sufficiently flexible and powerful to satisfy enduring

national security requirements.

The new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps team, both active and reserve, i

provide the nation:

Naval Expeditionary Forces

Shaped for Joint Operations

Operating Forward From the Sea

Tailored for National Needs.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
damental shift away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward joint operations

conducted from the sea. The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and

can provide the initial, “enabling” capability for joint operations in conflict—as well as

continued participation in any sustained effort. We will be part of a “sea-air-land”

team trained to respond immediately to the Unified Commanders as they execute

national policy.

In addition to our new direction, the Navy has a continuing obligation to maintain a

robust strategic deterrent by sending nuclear ballistic submarines to sea. As long as the

United States maintains a policy of nuclear deterrence, our highly survivable nuclear

powered ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security. We also

need to turn our attention and explore potential naval contributions to other forms of

conventional strategic defense. In particular, we are carefully examining the naval capa

bilities which could contribute to theater missile defenses.

Beyond the shift in emphasis for the naval forces, there are some traditional naval missions for which we must redouble our efforts to improve our capability. Of particular

importance, sealift is an enduring mission for the Navy. Our nation must remain capable

of delivering heavy equipment and resupplying major ground and air combat power

forward in crisis. Sealift is the key to force sustainment for joint operations and we are

committed to a strong national sealift capability.

Defining the New Direction

Naval Expeditionary Forces

The restructured Naval Force must expand on and capitalize upon its traditional expeditionary roles. “Expeditionary” implies a mind set, a culture, and a commitment to

forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly. Specifically, Naval

Expeditionary Forces are:

• Swift to respond, on short notice, to crises in distant lands. Naval Forces, deployed

overseas, are poised to respond to national tasking. Recent examples include the initia

rapid response to meet the requirements for DESERT SHIELD and provide assistance to

storm battered Bangladesh and the war torn Kurds following DESERT STORM.

• Structured to build power from the sea when required by national demands. The

Navy and Marine Corps “sea-air-land” team is capable of a full range of action—

from port visits and humanitarian relief to major offensive operations. Even as

DESERT SHIELD intensified, tailored Naval Forces responded to evacuation

requirements in both Liberia and Somalia.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:03 PM
world have a healthy self-sufficiency. Naval Forces can remain on station for

extended periods. Amphibious forces remained off Liberia for seven months. 

USS Eisenhower task force remained in the Indian Ocean at sea for five month

during the Iranian Hostage Crisis.

• Unrestricted by the need for transit or overflight approval from foreign

governments in order to enter the scene of action. The international respect f

freedom of the seas guarantees legal access up to territorial waters of all coast

countries of the world. This affords Naval Forces the unique capability to pro

peaceful presence in ambiguous situations before a crisis erupts.

• In sum, Naval Expeditionary Forces provide unobtrusive forward presence wh

may be intensified or withdrawn as required on short notice.

Shaped for Joint Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps are full partners in joint operations. The battlefield 

future will demand that everyone on the field be teammates. Such teamwork “en

joint combat operations. Some examples of how Naval Forces will implement th

cept include:

• As a highly sustainable force on scene, a Naval Force commander can command 

joint task force while the operation is primarily maritime; and shift that comma

ashore if the campaign shifts landward at the discretion of the Unified Comman

• Focusing on the littoral area, the Navy and Marine Corps can seize and defend 

adversary’s port, naval base or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavy Army 

Force forces. The success of modern U.S. military strategy depends on forces organ

trained, and equipped for this division of combat labor.

• Sealift will provide the maritime bridge to ensure heavy joint forces can arrive 

fight effectively in major crisis.

Operating Forward, from the Sea

As the U.S. withdraws from overseas bases, Naval Forces will become even more 

vant in meeting American forward presence requirements.

The Navy and Marine Corps operate forward to project a positive American ima

build foundations for viable coalitions, enhance diplomatic contacts, reassure fri

and demonstrate U.S. power and resolve. Naval Forces will be prepared to fight

promptly and effectively, but they will serve in an equally valuable way by engagi

day-to-day as peacekeepers in the defense of American interests. Naval Forces are

unique in offering this form of international cooperation.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:04 PM
promote American interests. A scheduled, coalition-building multinational exercise

involving U.S. Navy and Marine forces provides visible assurance to friends—and a

warning to potential enemies. Humanitarian assistance and nation-building efforts

have similar effects.

Naval Forces also contain crises through forward operations and rapid responses with

flexible and sustainable sea-based forces. The seeds of conflict will continue to sprout

in places where American interests are perceived as vulnerable. The art of managing

crises in these areas is delicate and requires the ability to orchestrate the appropriate

response and to send precisely tailored diplomatic, economic, and military signals to

influence the actions of adversaries.

Naval Forces provide a wide range of crisis response options, most of which have the

distinct advantage of being easily reversible. If diplomatic activities resolve the crisis,

Naval Forces can withdraw without action or build-up ashore.

THE LITTORAL REGION

Operating forward means operating in the littoral or “near land” areas of

the world. As a general concept, we can define the littoral as comprising

two segments of the battlespace:

Seaward: The area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore.

Landward: The area inland from shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:06 PM
can project United States combat power as required.

The littoral region is frequently characterized by confined and congested water a

space occupied by friends, adversaries, and neutrals—making identification prof

difficult. This environment poses varying technical and tactical challenges to Nav

Forces. It is an area where our adversaries can concentrate and layer their defense

an era when arms proliferation means some third world countries possess sophis

cated weaponry, there is a wide range of potential challenges.

For example, an adversary’s submarines operating in shallow waters pose a particula

lenge to Naval Forces. Similarly, coastal missile batteries can be positioned to “hide” f

radar coverage. Some littoral threats—specifically mines, sea-skimming cruise missil

tactical ballistic missiles—tax the capabilities of our current systems and force struct

Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from comm

of the high seas. It is an objective which requires our focused skills and resources.

Tailored for National Needs

As Naval Forces shift from a Cold War, open ocean, blue water naval strategy to a

regional, littoral, and expeditionary focus, Naval organizations will change. Resp

to crises in the future will require great flexibility and new ways to employ our fo

As an example, the Naval Services will make available to Unified Commanders a

notional Expeditionary Force Package from among the following:

• Aircraft carrier and air wing

• Submarines

• Amphibious ships with embarked Marines

• Maritime Patrol Aircraft

• Surface combatants

• Mine Warfare Forces

• Navy Special Warfare Forces.

Under the aegis of the Unified Commander, these forces would be available for t

in the full range of joint operations with the other services, thus providing a coh

joint team capable of rapid and decisive action—from peacetime presence and ex

cises to joint strike in major crisis.

The Expeditionary Force Package can operate with other elements of joint or com

bined task forces, including:

• Air Force composite wing

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:06 PM
• Special Operations forces

• Surveillance, refueling, air defense assets

• Coast Guard assets

• Reserve Forces in contributory support

• Allied forces and assets.

Naval Forces can be continuously tailored to developing events. The answer to every

situation may not be a carrier battle group. It may be an amphibious readiness group

and a surface action group with Tomahawk missiles. It may be a group of minesweepers, with several guided missile frigates for defense. Or it may be the overwhelming

power of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group with embarked

Marines, operating with Air Force and Army forces. The key is continuously tailoring

our forces to anticipate and support national needs.

Forces can be “shared” across theater boundaries to demonstrate capabilities, signal

commitment to local leaders and promote opportunities for regular exercises and

exchanges with air, sea, and ground forces of our allies and coalition partners.

Rapid movement of these forces across Unified Command boundaries will occur to

forestall or respond to crises.

Operational Capabilities

All services are enhancing and streamlining their capabilities to maximize efficiency,

particularly in joint and combined operations. The Naval Service will focus on comple

menting the capabilities of the other Services, examine ways to minimize duplicative

capabilities, and thereby efficiently meet the challenges of the new security environment. The shift in focus to littoral operations requires a corresponding shift of emphasis toward accelerating the adaption of existing forces to counter littoral threats.

In addition to our traditional operational capabilities of forward deployment, crisis

response, strategic deterrence, and sealift, four key operational capabilities are required

to successfully execute the new direction of the Navy and Marine Corps:

• Command, Control, and Surveillance

• Battlespace Dominance

• Power Projection

• Force Sustainment.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:06 PM
The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to structure command and control capa

to promote efficient joint and combined operations as part of an overarching com

control, and communications architecture that can adapt from sea to shore. We wi

exploit the unique contributions which Naval Forces bring to littoral operations.

Our surveillance efforts will continue to emphasize exploitation of space and ele

warfare systems to provide commanders with immediate information, while den

and/or managing the data available to our enemies. Integrated information and n

sensors will allow us to use surveillance data from all sources—national and comb

and to target and strike from a variety of land, sea, and air platforms.

The Naval Force Commander will have the capability to command a joint task fo

and function as, or host, a Joint Force Commander. Command and control syste

capabilities enable domination of the battlespace and power projection, and are 

to the precise application of power.

Particular emphasis will be placed on the ability to collect intelligence through c

surveillance early in crisis. Naval intelligence efforts will be directed to a regional 

Battlespace Dominance

The battlespace is the sea, air, and land environment where we will conduct o

operations. The dominated battlespace expands and contracts and has limits

inating the battlespace presupposes effective command and control capabilit

serves as the logical prerequisite for the projection of power ashore. Battlespa

dominance means that we can maintain access from the sea to permit the effe

entry of equipment and resupply. This dominance implies that Naval Forces 

bring to bear decisive power on and below the sea, on land, and in the air. We 

use the full range of U.S., coalition and space-based assets to achieve domina

space as well.

Naval Forces must also have the capability to deny access to a regional adversar

interdict the adversary’s movement of supplies by sea, and control the local sea 

air. For the Naval Service, then, dominating the battlespace means ensuring eff

transition from open ocean to littoral areas, and from sea to land and back, to

accomplish the full range of potential missions. This is the essence of naval ada

ability and flexibility which are the keys to contingency response. Battlespace d

nance is the heart of naval warfare.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:07 PM
Naval Forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral areas to mas

forces rapidly and generate high intensity, precise offensive power at the time and

location of their choosing under any weather conditions, day or night. Power projection requires mobility, flexibility, and technology to mass strength against weakness

The Navy and Marine Corps Team supports the decisive sea-air-land battle by providing the sea-based support to enable the application of the complete range of

U.S. combat power.

Power projection from the sea means bombs, missiles, shells, bullets, and bayonets.

When Marines go ashore, naval aviation aboard aircraft carriers and—if required—

land based expeditionary aircraft will provide them sustained, high-volume tactical air

support ashore to extend the landward reach of our littoral operations. Rugged naval

aircraft are well suited for expeditionary airfield operations. These capabilities—the

ability to generate high intensity power projection from the decks of our carriers and expeditionary airfields—are critical. They must continue to be sufficiently available and

ready to contribute to joint warfare and decisive victory.

Our carrier and cruise missile firepower can also operate independently to provide

quick, retaliatory strike capability short of putting forces ashore. Remaining ready

indefinitely to strike, this potential force from the sea is a critical tool for diplomacy

and influence. The mere arrival of naval strike forces into an area of heightened U.S.

interest sends a clear signal.

Joint operations between Naval and Air Force strike assets—including carrier-based

aircraft, land-based naval expeditionary aircraft, land-based Air Force aircraft from

both local and distant bases, and Tomahawk missiles from surface forces and attack

submarines—have become standard.

Finally, forces projected ashore can maneuver and build up power rapidly deep in the

objective area to disorient, divert, and disrupt the enemy.

Force Sustainment

America’s influence depends on its ability to sustain military operations around the

globe. The military options available can be extended indefinitely because sea-based

forces can remain on station as long as required. Naval Forces encompass the full range

of logistics support that is the critical element of any military operation. It requires a

comprehensive and responsive logistics support system, including air and sealift,

replenishment ships, mobile repair facilities, and advanced logistic support hubs. It

requires open sea lanes of communication so that passage of shipping is not impeded

by an adversary.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:07 PM
Forces. During crisis, warfighting materiel afloat in maritime prepositioning ship

enables the near-immediate projection of credible military power. Finally, during 

strategic sealift ships will deliver heavy equipment and resupply heavy ground an

combat forces. Forward logistics, prepositioning, and strategic sealift, coupled with 

gic airlift, are the keys to force sustainment.

Conclusion

The Navy and Marine Corps Team is changing in response to the challenges of a 

security environment. The shift in strategic landscape means that Naval Forces w

centrate on littoral warfare and maneuver from the sea. Maneuver from the sea, th

cal equivalent of maneuver warfare on land, provides a potent warfighting tool to 

Joint Task Force Commander—a tool that is literally the key to success in many l

contingency scenarios.

The new direction of the Naval Service signals changes in doctrine, education, 

integration, training, acquisition, infrastructure, operations, risk reduction, an

other areas.

Amplifying documents and policy statements will follow on these subjects.

Naval Forces must be both capable and affordable, supported by relevant concep

doctrine, and training. These changes will refine and implement the operational 

bilities of expeditionary warfare so that Naval Forces can help provide the Nation

leaders with a full range of options to preserve regional balances, lay the foundat

for coalition operations, provide assistance to Americans in danger, respond to c

of every type, and project decisive power ashore in conflict.

Implementation

Naval Doctrine Command

We are establishing a Naval Doctrine Command. Integration on the battlefield st

with integration of doctrine and training. The regional and littoral warfighting e

ronment requires new doctrinal thinking to get the most out of integrating the N

Marine Corps and the joint sea-air-land team. The new Naval Doctrine Comman

alternately commanded by a Navy Rear Admiral and a Marine Corps Major Gen

will provide for smooth integration of Naval Forces into joint operations at any l

close the gap between the air-land battle and amphibious warfare, and translate “

ational maneuver from the sea” into naval doctrine. Above all, it will build doctri

expeditionary warfare.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:07 PM
Examining Our Current Force

We will examine functions and capabilities, seeking to eliminate areas of redundancy

and enhancing areas considered deficient in light of this shift in strategy. Navy and

Marine Corps equipment design, tactical training, logistics support, and task force

structure will be optimized for taking and holding objectives on or near the enemy’s

coastline. We specialize in maneuver warfare from over the horizon, using the ocean to

project force at soft points in the enemy’s defense. Our job during a regional conflict is

to control the ocean adjacent to the littoral battlefield, the ground from the shore to

our objectives, and the skies above both. We rely on Navy and Marine Corps strike

assets to neutralize enemy threats that may engage us from outside of established

defense perimeters. Our goal is to focus our procurement strategy on systems that best

support the unique capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Immediate Tasks

Fiscal realities and a newly defined regional, littoral naval focus require new thinking,

significant changes, and a commitment to undertake challenging tasks. The Navy and

Marine Corps will:

• Restructure to accommodate the strategy outlined in this document.

• Link air, land, and naval warfare to ensure truly joint warfare.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:07 PM
examination of functions and capabilities.

• Organize, train, and implement new Naval force packages for expeditionary

operations. Train commanders and man their staffs for joint operations.

• Configure, train, and man numbered fleet and Marine expeditionary staffs to 

able to command a joint task force and function as, or host, a Joint Force Air

Component Commander.

• Enhance communications, command, and control on naval flag ships to the d

necessary to host the commander of a joint task force.

• Establish Commander U.S. Naval Forces Central Command as a Vice Admira

provide additional permanent staff billets and communications command an

control capabilities necessary to execute his responsibilities.

• Provide the Marines with the medium-lift they require.

• Increase emphasis on generation of high intensity power projection, support 

force ashore, and weapons necessary to fulfill the mission.

• Expand the integration of Navy and Marine Corps fixed-wing air capabilities

• Fully integrate attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and mine warfare 

into the expeditionary task forces.

• Resolve sealift deficiencies.

• Continue to reorient naval intelligence resources from the former Soviet Navy 

regional, littoral threats.

• Structure the Naval Reserve for immediate crisis response and peacetime

contributory support.

• Procure equipment systems to support this strategy and remain ahead of the 

technological revolution in military systems.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:07 PM
Naval Warfare

Naval Doctrine Publication 1

Naval Warfare was published on 28 March 1994, the first of a series of six uncl

capstone documents projected by the newly established Naval Doctrine Comma

Norfolk, Virginia. Five of the six documents eventually appeared as uniformly

designed, glossy, illustrated booklets—respectively, Naval Doctrine Publications 

5, and 6. The third of the series, Naval Operations, which might have had relev

this volume, was never published. The first, Naval Warfare, also published on t

World Wide Web, was designed to stand alone, but still be a part of the series. I

pose was to explain the inherent nature of the enduring principles of naval forc

translate the vision and strategy of “. . . From the Sea” into doctrinal reality.*

The booklet appeared when the administration of President William J. Clinto

Secretary of Defense Les Apsin, Jr., was just two months old. The fourth and f

document to appear during Admiral Kelso’s tenure as Chief of Naval Operati

was signed jointly by Admiral Kelso and the Commandant of the Marine Cor

Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr., just three weeks before Kelso was relieved by Adm. Je

M. Boorda.

The idea behind this booklet, and the work of the Naval Doctrine Command in 

eral, was to contribute to commonality in thinking about joint warfare and esta

for naval affairs an approach and language comparable to that being used in th

Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Traditionally, the U.S. Navy had, by and l

never been sympathetic to the Army’s use of the principles of war as a basis for 

trinal thinking, preferring a much broader and more flexible approach in think

about operational concepts, notwithstanding the long effort of the Naval War C

to merge military ideas and theory into naval thinking in the late nineteenth ce

and the first half of the twentieth. By the mid-1990s, the pressures for joint ope

outside the Navy and the difficulties in joint operations experienced during the 

Gulf War had combined with an desire to establish within the service a basic u

standing about the roles of the Navy. At this same time, these trends presented a

CHAPTER FOUR

* Available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ndp.1.pdf.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
merge some Marine Corps doctrinal thinking into naval thought, most particularly th

Corps’s recent thinking on maneuver warfare.

The Naval Warfare booklet was drafted entirely in-house at the Naval Doctrine Command

whose establishment in 1993 had been heralded in “. . . From the Sea.” The key figures

involved with its preparation in Norfolk, were the Commander, Naval Doctrine Command, Rear Adm. Fred Lewis, and his deputy, Col. Marvin Floom, USMC; they were

assisted by Capt. Peter Bulkeley, Cdr. Robert Zalaskus, and Dr. James Tritten. The Naval

Historical Center, at the Washington Navy Yard, was tasked to supply historical insights;

other ideas came from a wide range of sources, among them an academic advisory commit

tee that included faculty members at the Naval War College. Cdr. Zalaskus was assigned as

the principal writer. Few of the staff members involved were graduates of the Naval War

College and so they developed their ideas from wide and independent reading as well as

discussion among themselves. They specifically avoided collaboration in order to develop a

independent approach. Although they sought comment and constructive criticism, they

chose what they wanted to accept and to include. The final product was designed and laid

out in one of the first versions of Adobe Pagemaker.* 

The only satisfactory method of ensuring unity of effort lies in due preparation of the minds of the various commanders, both chief and subordi

nate, before the outbreak of hostilities. Such preparation comprehends

not only adequate tactical and strategic study and training, but also a

common meeting ground of beliefs as to the manner of applying principles to modern war.

LCDR DUDLEY W. KNOX, USN, “THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE IN NAVAL WARFARE,”

U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 1915

Department of the Navy

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Washington, DC 20350-2000

and

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-0001

28 March 1994

* Dr. James J. Tritten e-mails to Swartz, 11 April and 21 May 2005; Capt. Roger Barnett, USN

(Ret.), comments at CNA Conference, 27 June 2006; Capt. Robert Zalaskus e-mail to Hattendorf

10 August 2006.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
Naval doctrine is the foundation upon which our tactics, techniques, and proced

are built. It articulates operational concepts that govern the employment of nava

forces at all levels. A product of more than 218 years of U.S. Navy and Marine Co

experience in warfighting, it incorporates the lessons of history, learned in both t

flush of success and the bitterness of failure.

This publication outlines the principles upon which we organize, train, equip, an

employ naval forces. It explains how naval forces attain both enduring and evolv

national objectives, emphasizing our participation in joint and multinational op

tions. It presents broad guidance for the total Navy and Marine Corps team, activ

reserve. Every naval professional must understand its contents.

Introduction

The success of an organized military force is associated directly with the validity 

doctrine. Doctrine is the starting point from which we develop solutions and opt

to address the specific warfighting demands and challenges we face in conductin

operations other than war. Doctrine is conceptual—a shared way of thinking tha

not directive. To be useful, doctrine must be uniformly known and understood. W

doctrine we gain standardization, without relinquishing freedom of judgment an

commander’s need to exercise initiative in battle.

Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component of our nation’s mili

strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our N

Warfare Publications and Fleet Marine Force Manuals. A commander, however, c

operate solely under the guidance of broad strategy. Neither can he make approp

mission decisions if guided only by tactics and techniques. Doctrine guides our a

toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual understanding with

among the Services and the national policymakers. It ensures our familiarity and 

ciency in the execution of procedures and tactics.

Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1, Naval Warfare, provides a framework for d

Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. It describes the character and employment of 

naval forces, highlighting the distinctiveness of warfare in the maritime environm

Its concepts apply to all who serve in or work with the Naval Services.

C. E. MUNDY, JR.

General, U. S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

F. B. KELSO, II

Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
links—commercial and military—to allies, friends, and interests. Our nation’s maritime strength has enabled us to endure more than two centuries of global crisis and

NDP 1 confrontation that have reflected the world’s unending religious, ethnic, economic, political, and ideological strife. Whenever these crises have threatened our

national interests, our leaders traditionally have responded with naval forces.

This publication introduces who we are, what we do, how we fight, and where we must

go in the future. It examines the importance of readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability,

and mobility in expeditionary operations. It shows how these characteristics make

naval forces inherently suitable for maintaining forward presence and responding to

crises. NDP 1 outlines the varied missions naval forces routinely execute and the wide

range of capabilities that naval forces possess.

Naval forces alone however, never were intended to have every military capability

needed to handle every threat or crisis that our nation may face. Just as using complementary capabilities within our naval forces compounds our overall strength, combining the capabilities and resources of other Services and other nations in joint and

multinational operations can produce overwhelming military power. In future conflict

and calls for major assistance, our nation will answer with joint forces in most cases. To

be prepared for those challenges, we must maintain our ability to conduct day-to-day

operations with other Services and other nations. NDP 1 emphasizes the importance o

honing the teamwork needed to operate efficiently in the joint and multinational

environment.

NDP 1 describes the ways naval forces accomplish their missions and execute their

roles as part of the joint military team of the future. It reviews the principles of war

from the naval perspective, and describes how naval forces focus their resources to

attain operational superiority. The ultimate source of peacetime persuasive power,

however, lies in the implied guarantee that both the intent and capability to protect ou

national interests are present just over the horizon, with the fortitude and staying

power to sustain operations as long as necessary.

This introductory publication is the first in a series of six capstone documents for

naval forces that translate the vision and strategy of the White Paper “ . . . From the

Sea” into doctrinal reality. The top-down focus will help ensure consistency between

naval and joint doctrine, increase fleet awareness and understanding, and provide stan

dardization for naval operations. The full series is composed of the following:

• NDP 1, Naval Warfare, describes the inherent nature and enduring principles of

naval forces.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
requirements of both regional conflicts and operations other than war.

• NDP 3, Naval Operations, develops doctrine to reaffirm the foundation of U.

Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary maritime traditions.

• NDP 4, Naval Logistics, addresses the full range of logistical capabilities that a

essential in the support of naval forces.

• NDP 5, Naval Planning, examines planning and the relationship between our

capabilities and operational planning in the joint and multinational environm

• NDP 6, Naval Command and Control, provides the basic concepts to fulfill th

information needs of commanders, forces, and weapon systems.

Clearly, the uses of military force are being redirected toward regional contingencies 

political persuasion, moving away from the prospect of all-or-nothing global war wit

another superpower. Nevertheless, a significant theme of this publication is that our 

Services’ fundamental missions have not changed. Our nation’s continued existence i

to the seas, and our freedom to use those seas is guaranteed by our naval forces.

Chapter One: Who We Are—The Nature of Naval Services

Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.

THEMISTOCLES (524–460 

We are a maritime nation with many interests, global economic interdependence, a

heritage inextricably tied to our geography. Routine intercontinental commercial f

and instantaneous worldwide communications have created new trade opportunit

brought nations closer together, yet we still rely on the oceans to serve as both a de

barrier and a highway to commerce abroad. World economic stability depends upo

orous transoceanic trade. Today, 90% of the world’s trade and 99% of our import-

tonnage is transported on the sea. Although the U.S. economy, with vast industrial

nological, agricultural, and resource components, is one of the most powerful in th

world, it is not self-sufficient. We depend on the continued flow of raw materials a

ished products to and from our country. Ensuring that the world’s sea lanes remain 

is not only vital to our own economic survival; it is a global necessity.

Establishment of the Naval Services

In both war and peace, the oceans and coastal waters of the world have been the 

lines of supply and communications. Recognizing the strategic importance of Br

resupply by sea during the American Revolutionary War, General George Washin

initiated America’s first sea-based offensive against the British. Washington’s arm

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
itary operations at sea.

We assembled the initial continental fleet from converted merchantmen. As Congress continued to commission ships, notable leaders such as John Paul Jones helped to develop a

proud and capable Navy. It was not long before that force was able to capture the world’s

attention by displaying its ability to carry the fight overseas, far from American shores.

In manning their early fleets, American commanders provided for Marines as part of their

ships’ crews. In essence, the first Marines were soldiers detailed for sea service. Convinced

that crews with Marines could fight successfully at sea and also mount military operations

ashore, Congress passed an Act stating “That, in addition to the present military establishment, there shall be raised and organized a Corps of Marines.” Congress continued to provide for Marines as long as there was one Navy ship still at sea. After the Revolutionary War

however, both the Continental Navy and Marine Corps were disbanded.

The government of the United States soon recognized new threats to our young nation

Smuggling was diverting desperately needed tax money from our almost empty treasury. Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, proposed, and the Congress authorized in 1790, a fleet of “ten boats for the collection of revenue.” It became

commonly known as the Revenue Marine, precursor to the U.S. Coast Guard.1

Another

threat was the seizure of U.S. merchant shipping by predatory French privateers and

pirates from the Mediterranean’s Barbary coast. In addition to their Treasury duties,

the ten boats, or “Revenue Cutters,” constituted the sole seaborne defense of the United

States until Congress exercised its constitutional power and voted to “establish and

maintain a Navy.” For the next few years, struggling with postwar debts, the nation stil

was not united in supporting the costly venture. In 1794, however, Congress authorized

the Department of War to construct six frigates, for the protection of American merchantmen against the Barbary corsairs. Four years later, in response to renewed aggression by France during its war against Great Britain, Congress finally established the

Department of the Navy, authorized the Marine Corps, and began the first significant

buildup of naval forces2

as we know them today.

The palpable necessity of power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure which has spared few other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered

among the greatest blessings of America that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime

strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad.

JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 1788

Our three maritime Services—Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard—conduct operations in the world’s oceans and littoral regions.3

With such capable naval forces, we

view the oceans not as an obstacle, but as our base of operations and our maneuver

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
adversary without a blue-water fleet, the oceans serve as barriers for our defense

important though, the oceans provide the United States avenues of world trade a

military lines of communication with allies and friends—when they are protecte

our strong naval forces. To appreciate operations in the maritime environment, i

necessary to understand the distinctive character of naval forces.

The Character of Naval Forces

We are, first, American fighting men and women. We take ships and submarines 

fly aircraft, land on foreign shores, stand watches around the clock and around th

world and, when required, engage the enemy at sea and ashore. Our people are o

most valued resource and provide the element of will against adversity, supply es

creativity amid the uncertainties of conflict, and combine inspiration, reason, an

experience to achieve our national objectives in peace and in war.

Every day, dedicated Sailors and Marines make countless sacrifices while supporting 

national objectives. At the heart of this selflessness are core values that drive personal 

dards of excellence and moral strength. Our nation places special trust and confidenc

these men and women while giving them the sobering responsibility of properly exer

military power that is greater than any in history. This trust is warranted by our cont

competence in carrying out roles, absolute integrity in actions and relationships, and p

sonal courage that overcomes moral dilemmas and physical obstacles through an uny

sense of duty and commitment. This professional ethic, shared by every member of o

naval forces, enhances cohesion and promotes teamwork. It establishes an environm

which we are able to share and delegate responsibilities in working toward a common 

Naval forces reflect the partnership among our active, reserve, and civilian comp

nents. Our planning is predicated on each component contributing its part in da

day support operations, mobilization, and force augmentation. Our reservists an

civilian employees share the same sense of dedication and purpose, and fill critic

positions in carrying out our operations. Working and training together, the acti

reserve, and civilian components permit naval forces to maintain readiness to res

effectively to a wide array of demands on short notice.

Naval forces have been organized for fighting at sea—or from the sea—for more 

two thousand years. The qualities that characterize most modern naval forces as 

cal instruments in support of national policies are the same as those that define t

essence of our naval Services today. These qualities are readiness, flexibility, selfsustainability, and mobility. They permit naval forces to be expeditionary—that i

being able to establish and maintain a forward-based, stabilizing presence aroun

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
trained and well-equipped integrated task forces of the Navy and Marine Corps, organized to accomplish specific objectives. Naval expeditionary forces draw upon their

readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility to provide the National Command Authorities4

the tools they need to safeguard such vital national interests as the

continued availability of oil from world producers and maintenance of political and

economic stability around the globe. Through these qualities, naval forces reassure

allies and friends, deter aggressors, and influence uncommitted and unstable regimes.

A Ready Force

A man-of-war is the best ambassador.

OLIVER CROMWELL, 1650

To be effective instruments of power, our naval forces must be available and credible—

not just when crises occur but daily, wherever our allies and friends rely on our presence and wherever potential adversaries must perceive our firm commitment to defend

our interests. Since the early 1800s, the United States consistently has made naval force

readily available to defend its vital interests abroad by maintaining a forward naval

presence. Naval forces first deployed to South America, the Mediterranean, the Far

East, and the Caribbean to protect our sea lines of commerce from pirates. Today, our

national economic interests are still tied directly to sea-based commerce, and the

United States accepts certain responsibilities with respect to the health of the global

economy. Our ready force promotes regional stability and safeguards the flow of

resources among trading partners, helping preserve our national well-being.

We are operational; in keeping with the National Military Strategy,5

forward-deployed nava

forces help deter conflict and attain a rapid, favorable end to hostilities if conflict should

occur. A strength of our naval forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies through tangible readiness. Our deploying forces certify their proficiency in their

advertised capabilities by demonstrating their ability to carry out specific tasks and missions prior to departure. When they arrive in the operating theater, they are ready to operate; trained and organized to function as a cohesive force. It is no coincidence that naval

operations in war—especially in supporting roles such as construction, medical functions,

and logistics—are similar to peacetime operations. To maintain our readiness, we design

many peacetime operations to parallel wartime operations as closely as possible.

Operating in forward regions of the world enables us to maintain a situational awareness

that is critical in gaining the upper hand during any conflict’s early stages. By training in the

places and climates where we expect to fight, we also gain familiarity with the operational

environment and its effects on our people and equipment. Because the transition from

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
in the region are likely to form the core of the initial response. The readiness and pre

of deployed naval forces provide the Commander-in-Chief the enabling force he nee

respond decisively and without the limitations of lengthy transit times.

Operating forward from the sea has long been a characteristic of the Navy–Marin

Corps team. With limited overseas basing, naval forces become especially relevan

meeting national forward presence requirements. National policymakers rely upo

ward presence to display U.S. commitment and resolve to allies and friends. This 

ence is called upon to deter aggression, to participate in regional coalition-buildi

and collective-security efforts, to further regional stability, to promote U.S. acces

influence over critical areas, and to provide initial crisis response wherever neces

Forward deployed naval forces, including selected Coast Guard forces, demonstr

that the United States is involved and committed to shaping events in the best in

of itself, its friends, and its allies.

A Flexible Force

The seas are no longer a self-contained battlefield. Today they are a 

from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the ba

erations from which navies project power onto land areas and target

mission of protecting sealanes continues in being, but the Navy’s cen

sions have become to maximize its ability to project power from the s

the land and to prevent the enemy from doing the same.

TIMOTHY SHEA: PROJECT POSEIDON, 

Naval forces have been on scene independently or as part of joint task forces tim

again, assisting those in distress. Since 1945, U.S. naval forces have been involved 

more than 280 crises, including 75 since 1976, and 80% of all post–World War II 

dents. The flexibility of naval forces enables us to shift focus, reconfigure, and rea

forces to handle a variety of contingencies.

We provide our commanders and decisionmakers a wide range of weapon systems 

military options, supported by a core of trained professionals equipped as a sea, air

land team. Capable of adapting to a variety of situations, naval forces can support 

many challenges facing our theater Commanders-in-Chief. Our ability to fight oth

naval forces or land-based air forces, to conduct air strikes, to battle ground forces 

or to evacuate noncombatants creates uncertainty in the adversary’s mind about w

our naval forces might do in any given situation. The combination of a robust amp

ous ready group integrated with a carrier task force, for example, provides both a p

tion and a potential for offensive action ashore without committing such forces.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
their associated Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard equipment, vehicles, and personnel are the building blocks of our multidimensional operating capability. Naval

forces provide the National Command Authorities the tools to respond to a full range

of needs, from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to forcible entry and strike

operations. Naval flexibility—as shown in our forward deployed posture, mobility, and

self-sustainability—enables us to control the seas and provide diplomatic leverage, in

peace or time of crisis.

A Self-Sustaining Force

When we operate in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without a significant

land-based supply structure, we need the ability to resupply at sea. Consequently, naval

forces carry their own ammunition, spares, and consumables—as well as support and

repair facilities for use early in a crisis or throughout a protracted conflict. This selfsustainability provides the National Command Authorities critical time to create an

environment that will bring success. Our ships are designed to travel significant distances without replenishment. They carry the striking power of aircraft, guns, missiles,

and Marine forces that can execute operations ashore immediately, without an assembly period or a lengthy logistics buildup. If conflict should continue over an extended

period, naval forces can remain on station through augmentation and resupply by

combat logistics ships. With provisions made for on-station replacement of personnel

and ships, such operations can be continued indefinitely.

A Mobile Force

Naval forces, with their strategic and tactical mobility, have the ability to monitor a situation passively, remain on station for a sustained period, respond to a crisis rapidly,

and maneuver in combat with authority. Naval forces can respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries, as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, our agility permits us to withdraw

promptly from the area without further action or buildup ashore.

Mobility enables naval forces to respond to indications of pending crises by relocating

rapidly from one end of the theater to another or from one theater to another, independent of fixed logistics. Operational speed is part of our flexibility. Maintaining control of the seas permits us to exercise our mobility in positioning naval forces to meet

the crisis of the moment, then moving on to other potential crisis locations. Naval

mobility ensures that an adversary cannot take offensive action with any confidence

that the expanse of the oceans will protect him from the long reach of U.S. retaliation.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:08 PM
ity to launch a credible attack. Mobility complicates the enemy’s efforts to prepar

quate defenses because he cannot be certain of our attack axis. To cover all possib

the enemy may be forced to spread his defenses too widely, thus exposing

vulnerabilities.

Mobility is a key to decisive naval operations. The ability to maneuver ships into 

tion to strike vulnerable targets, or to threaten amphibious assault at multiple lo

along an extended coastline, is a significant tactical and operational advantage. A

we have launched our strikes, our ships can press the advantage, maneuver out o

range, or reposition themselves for the next strike phase. In amphibious operatio

place troops in a position to attack the weakness of the enemy while avoiding his 

strength. A landing force’s ability to maneuver from attack positions over the hor

through designated penetration points—without a slowdown or loss of moment

could be critical to the success of the landing. When the Marines have accomplis

their mission ashore, they can backload to await the next contingency.

Supported by a rich maritime heritage, the strength of our naval Services continu

reside in our well-trained, high-quality people—active duty, reserves, and civilian

remain at the heart of our force readiness and warfighting effectiveness. As a team

operating at sea and in the world’s littorals, naval forces are able to shift quickly f

low-profile, passive, forward-deployed operations to high-tempo crisis response. 

environment, we are expeditionary in character, a force whose readiness, flexibili

self-sustainability, and mobility is capable of deterring and, if necessary, winning

regional battles, resolving crises, or serving as the naval component of joint task 

to protect our national interests.

Chapter Two: What We Do—Employment of Naval Forces

Congress assigns the armed forces of the United States specific roles.6

The basic rol

our naval forces are to promote and defend our national interests by maintaining m

time superiority, contributing to regional stability, conducting operations on and f

the sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land oper

as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns. Naval forces accomplish 

roles through deterrence operations and specific peacetime operations, while main

ing warfighting readiness through continuing forward deployed presence, exercisin

robust sealift capability, and developing our interoperability with all Services.

Fundamentally, all military forces exist to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight a

wars. To carry out our naval roles, we must be ready to conduct prompt and sust

combat operations—to fight and win at sea, on land, and in the air. Defending th

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
Gaining and maintaining control of the sea and establishing our forward sea lines of

communication are our next priorities. As we operate in littoral areas of the world on a

continuing basis, naval forces provide military power for projection against tactical,

operational, and strategic targets. In both peace and war, we frequently carry out our

roles through campaigns. A campaign, although often used only in the context of war,

is a progression of related military operations aimed at attaining common objectives.

Campaigns focus on the operational level of war.

The concept of “levels of war” can help us visualize the relative contribution of militar

objectives toward achieving overall national goals and offer us a way to place in perspective the causes and effects of our specific objectives, planning, and actions. There

are three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic—each increasingly broader in scope

Although the levels do not have precise boundaries, in general we can say that the tacti

cal level involves the details of individual engagements; the operational level concerns

forces collectively in a theater; and the strategic level focuses on supporting national

goals. World War II, for example, a strategic-level and global war, included operational

level combat in the Pacific theater consisting primarily of U.S. led maritime, air, and

supporting allied land campaigns. Within each specific campaign were a series of

important and often decisive battles. At the tactical level, each contributed to the

achievement of that campaign’s objectives. The culmination of these campaign objectives resulted in overall victory in the Pacific theater.

The naval contribution in the Pacific in World War II exemplifies all the strategies of

campaigning: protection of U.S. ports; maneuver warfare at sea to check the advance o

the Japanese Navy; submarine warfare against Japanese shipping; war at sea to gain

control of the sea; and amphibious assault of enemy-held islands, pushing the enemy

back and forcing his final unconditional surrender. Campaigning is not an activity seen

only in war. In peace, naval forces actively engage in forward presence and peace-support

campaigns. Today, campaigns range from supporting economic sanctions imposed by

United Nations and other international organizations, to maintaining a visible deterrent to regional aggression, and to efforts that stem the flow of illicit drug traffic.

Deterrence

It is our nation’s policy to deter aggression. Deterrence is the state of mind brought

about by a credible threat of retaliation, a conviction that the action being contemplated cannot succeed, or a belief that the costs of the action will exceed any possible

gain. Thus, the potential aggressor is reluctant to act for fear of failure, costs, and consequences. The presence of naval forces or their movement to a crisis area are two of

the strongest deterrent signals we can send. They are unequivocal evidence that a fully

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
force—whatever it takes—will be forthcoming. Our naval forces are the leading e

the world’s most capable military, and their well-understood ability to project po

a key factor in deterrence. Forward deployed naval forces are available to respond

quickly, require minimal support, and are not restricted in their movements. The

available for diplomatic, political, and economic deterrent actions that can influe

persuade or pressure uncooperative governments around the world to choose pe

means of achieving their goals.

Nuclear Deterrence

Deterring nuclear war is a cornerstone of our national security strategy. Credible

nuclear deterrence is based on adequate capability and the certitude that our nat

can and will inflict unacceptable losses on any adversary that uses nuclear weapo

attack the United States or its allies. Although the risk of a global nuclear conflic

diminished significantly, proliferation of nuclear weapons is continuing, and the 

ger of attack from an unstable, hostile, and irresponsible maverick state or terror

organization cannot be discounted. Since deterring nuclear attack remains the hi

defense priority of the nation, we maintain a credible, survivable, sea-based strat

deterrent capability through continued deployment of ballistic-missile submarin

Conventional Deterrence

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—including chemical and biolo

weapons—and other threats such as terrorism directed against U.S., allied, and o

friendly nations’ interests dictate that we maintain a full array of retaliatory capa

ties. Our nation’s clear willingness to employ its military might against adversari

may consider employing such weapons will remain our primary deterrent to the

Chemical or biological weapons are so repulsive to world society that most majo

countries are signatories to international treaties banning the production, storag

use of such weapons. The United States is a party to these treaties. Yet, chemical 

biological weapons already exist in many countries and they are still proliferating

nation’s continuing involvement with friends, allies, and potential coalition partn

helping to dissuade further proliferation and buildup of these arsenals. By being 

depend on the strength and commitment of the United States, friendly nations s

not feel the need to own weapons of mass destruction for their defense. Our con

regional naval presence is helping to provide assurance to our friends and is an im

tant part of our nation’s conventional deterrence.

Naval forces provide U.S. military presence around the world and can be tailored 

meet these growing regional threats. Our nation’s use or threatened use of our

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
national interest, resolve, and capability to influence events. Naval forces can move rap

idly to a specific area to influence political action. In such a show of force, we establish

credibility by demonstrating our readiness to use force if necessary. A show of force

can be particularly effective when conducted with allies to prove solidarity and resolve

Limited use of force includes counterterrorist operations, self-defense, retaliatory raids

rescue operations, or a direct attack to achieve a specific objective. In this sense, it is th

employment of military force by the National Command Authorities without a formal

declaration of war.

Forward Presence

Overseas presence promotes national influence and access to critical global areas,

builds regional coalitions and collective security, furthers stability, deters aggression,

and provides initial crisis-response capability. Naval presence is more than the day-today operation of our forces in a forward region. Those operations have crucial significance, but governments, like individuals, react to change. The sortie of powerful forces

such as the repositioning of a highly visible carrier battle group or an amphibious

ready group sends a powerful signal to the political leaders of nations or regimes who

might seek to press their temporary advantage against U.S. interests. Routine presence

includes our permanently based forces overseas and periodic deployment of naval

forces, as well as port visits and participation in a broad range of regional, bilateral, or

multilateral training exercises. Crisis response, the emergent, timely dispatch of naval

forces to a specific area, allows us to render assistance or exert military force. Forward

deployed Navy ships, aircraft, and Marine forces are essential to permit the United

States to act quickly in meeting any crises that affect our security. Such a forward presence enables us to support our security interests and is a critical element in encouraging regional stability and continuing world confidence in America’s leadership.

Forward presence assures our nation that potential partners will join with us when the

time comes. In addition to assured U.S. response, an adversary may be deterred from

conducting hostile actions if he perceives that regional neighbors will actively oppose

him. A strong balance of power in a region can isolate an aggressor. One way to establish this deterrent environment is through coalitions and alliances. Our nation promotes stability throughout the world by establishing supportive relationships with

responsible nations to ensure that the balance of power discourages aggression. In the

face of enemy threats, these allies and coalition partners need the assurance of knowing

they are joining the side that will win. We establish and strengthen this assurance in

our day to day relationships with these partners through a robust program of exercises

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
that region.

Naval Operations—Other than War

Sea power in the broad sense . . . includes not only the military st

afloat that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also 

peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military flee

rally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.

CAPTAIN ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, 

Our nation routinely calls upon naval forces—independently or as part of joint t

forces—to exercise two fundamental elements of our national military strategy: f

ward presence and crisis response. Our operations include rendering assistance i

peacetime activities as providing disaster relief and assistance to civil authorities

support U.S. law-enforcement agencies, as illustrated by the close cooperation be

Navy and Coast Guard units in counterdrug operations. Additionally, naval force

be tasked to conduct such contingency activities as shows of force, freedom-of-navig

operations, combat operations associated with short duration interventions, and 

combat restoration of security.

Under international law, nations have a right to use force for individual or collec

self-defense against armed attack, and to help each other in maintaining internal 

against insurgency, terrorism, and other threats. Naval forces operating under th

direction of the National Command Authorities and unified commanders imple

this international right to:

• Conduct contingency operations.

• Evacuate noncombatant personnel.

• Combat terrorism.

• Aid host nations through security assistance and foreign internal defense.

• Assist other nations in defending themselves.

• Enforce United Nations’ economic sanctions.

• Participate in peace-support operations.

• Intercept vessels to prevent uncontrolled immigration.

• Plan and conduct disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and civil support opera

• Coordinate public health operations.

• Assist interagency counterdrug operations.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
ests. We defend our nation by maintaining a visible and credible capability both to

fight and to take that fight abroad. Application of our expertise in operations other

than war also exercises many of our wartime capabilities and our ability to accomplish

our Service roles in defense of our nation.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Peacekeeping Operations

Former Yugoslavia/Adriatic Sea, 1993/1994—Supporting United Nations

Security Council resolutions, NATO Standing Naval Forces and other U.S.

and Western European Union naval forces in a cooperative effort join to

form combined task forces. In the Adriatic Sea, destroyers, frigates, attack

submarines, and support ships from 11 nations conduct maritime patrols

for Operation Sharp Guard. In the airspace over the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina, five nations support Operation Deny Flight—enforcing a NoFly Zone with shore and carrier-based fighter and attack aircraft.

Noncombatant Evacuation

Liberia, 1990—Increasing internal unrest threatens U.S. diplomats and civilians. Elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit embarked in the USS

Saipan (LHA-2) amphibious ready group provide support to the U.S. Embassy and stood by to evacuate American citizens and others from 2 June

to 5 August. They evacuate a total of 2,609 people between 5 August and

9 January 1991.

Disaster Relief

Bangladesh, 1991—A tropical cyclone sweeps a wall of water nearly 20

feet high across the coast of Bangladesh and three miles inland, killing as

many as 140,000 and rendering 1.7 million people homeless. Within 24

hours of a request for support from the government of Bangladesh, Operation Sea Angel is launched, and advance teams from the III Marine Expeditionary Force arrive in country for initial liaison. A fifteen-ship

amphibious task force composed of Amphibious Group 3 and the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, homeward bound from five months of operations in the Persian Gulf, is diverted to the Bay of Bengal to assist. Over the

next month, 6,700 Navy and Marine Corps personnel working with U.S.

Army, Air Force, and multinational forces, provide food, water, and medical care to nearly two million people.

Counterdrug Operations

United States, 1989 and ongoing—Congress declares illicit drug trafficking a threat to national security. The Department of Defense takes the lead

in federal detection and monitoring efforts against illegal drug traffic into

the United States. Joint task forces are formed that include U.S. Navy and

Coast Guard ships, aircraft and personnel, dedicated to stop the influx of

illegal drugs into our country. Naval forces continue to provide surveillance

of smuggling routes and to assist in the search of suspect vessels and seizure of illegal drugs.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
Sealift is a national asset, providing the majority of support for large-scale deplo

reinforcement, and resupply. As military operations have progressed, sealift has

accounted historically for 90–95% of the total cargo delivered over their duration

meet these requirements, strategic sealift forces include ships in three broad cate

• Prepositioning—This capability allows us to place sustainment supplies—e.g

quantities of petroleum products, ammunition, and fleet hospitals—near cris

areas for delivery to contingency forces. (The Maritime Prepositioning Force 

considered a part of sealift. It consists of complete equipment sets to support

Marine Corps operations in theater. The Maritime Prepositioning Force is dis

in Chapter Four as a power projection asset.)

• Surge—The initial deployment of U.S.-based equipment and supplies in supp

a contingency, transported in rapid-reinforcement shipping.

• Sustainment—Shipping that transports resupply cargoes to stay abreast of for

consumption rates and to build up theater reserve stock levels.

Joint Operations

Campaigns of the U.S. Armed Forces are joint. . . . Modern war figh

quires a common frame of reference within which operations on lan

sea, undersea, and in the air and space are integrated and harmoniz

JOINT PUB 1, JOINT WARFARE OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES, 

We are committed to full partnership in joint operations. The value of naval forces 

ating and fighting in concert with our Army and Air Force has been underscored

throughout the 20th century from the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 to the 

liberation of Kuwait in Operation DESERT STORM. By routinely operating with oth

vices, we establish common procedures and mutual credibility, reinforcing bonds o

nership. The many successes achieved by joint forces in carefully planned and intri

operations remind us not only of the importance of interservice cooperation, but a

the inherent complexities involved in coordinating such major efforts.

In refining our ability to operate as a completely integrated force we face many cha

lenges, but we remain committed to achieving success in conducting the full range 

joint operations. To bring this about in a confluence of complex warfighting needs

focus on standardization and improving our interoperability with other Services. T

may require rethinking our force organization and even our warfighting methodol

Members of each Service—from warfighter to planner—must be thoroughly train

gain expertise in each other’s doctrine and capabilities. Training, education, and

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
develop innovations and new doctrine—advance our understanding of ways to work

with each other efficiently. This knowledge permits us to integrate basic warfighting prin

ciples properly and to support effectively the Joint Force Commander’s intent and focus

of effort. Success in joint warfare depends on mutual understanding and cooperation.

Coherent joint doctrine is the catalyst for this essential cooperation between Services.

Our naval doctrine must fully support and be a logical extension of joint doctrine.

Naval Operations in War

Control of the sea is fundamental to accomplishing our naval roles. It supports directly

our ability to project power ashore by encompassing control of the entire maritime

area: subsurface, surface, and airspace, in both the open oceans and the littoral regions

of the world. Control of the sea allows us to:

• Protect sea lines of communication.

• Deny the enemy commercial and military use of the seas.

• Establish an area of operations for power projection ashore and support of

amphibious operations.

• Protect naval logistic support to forward deployed battle forces.

• Control of the sea can be accomplished through decisive operations by:

• Destroying or neutralizing enemy ships, submarines, aircraft, or mines.

• Disabling or disrupting enemy command and control.

• Destroying or neutralizing the land-based infrastructure that supports enemy se

control forces.

• Seizing islands, choke points, peninsulas, and coastal bases along the littorals.

• Conducting barrier operations in choke points that prevent enemy mobility

under, on, and above the sea.

By establishing control of the sea in every dimension, thus ensuring access to an adversary’s

coast from the sea, we open opportunities for power projection, insertion and resupply.

Control of the sea, however, has both spatial and temporal limits. It does not imply absolut

control over all the seas at all times. Rather, control of the sea is required in specific regions

for particular periods of time, to allow unencumbered maritime operations.

War from the Sea

Control of the sea is usually a prerequisite for larger strategies involving a land-based

objective. Our national well-being may require that we direct military power or

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
the extension of our naval influence through power projection over the shore.

Amphibious assault capability is an integral component of our overall naval forc

Maritime forces provide not only sea lines of communication to bring men and

materiel to the area of concern, but also mobile bases from which to conduct mi

operations. Naval forces may be tasked to spearhead joint and multinational pow

projection operations, as part of a larger sea-air-land team.

Power projection takes the battle to the enemy. It means applying high-intensity, 

cise, offensive power at the time and place of our choosing. We provide comman

with a full range of power projection options that include: employment of long r

accurate cruise missiles; Marines conducting high-speed maneuver across the sh

and inland aided by naval surface fire support; and a great variety of weapons rel

from naval strike aircraft.

In some cases, power projection by naval forces alone may be sufficient to meet

national objectives. But, the teamwork and diversity that enable naval forces to d

nate all dimensions of the battlespace simultaneously while conducting strike op

tions also facilitate the addition of joint, multinational, or coalition forces. Arriv

the scene of a crisis with a flexible command and control structure already in pla

operating, a naval forces commander can command a Joint Task Force afloat or s

command ashore, depending on the tactical situation. When acting as an “enabli

force,”7

the naval component may conduct operations initially to seize a hostile p

facility or airfield as a precursor to the arrival of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned 

After achieving maritime and air superiority, naval forces can continue to operat

integrated part of a larger joint organization or disengage to respond to another 

for their presence.

War at Sea

War at sea is the application of decisive offensive force to achieve control of the s

conjures visions of classic struggles for dominance between battle fleets armed w

short-range weapons and maneuvering within sight of each other—relics of a pa

when the most heavily armed ship was the arbiter of national power. Today, the a

racy, lethality, and range of modern weaponry favor the force that first detects its

enemy, launches an effective strike, and counters incoming weapons. Battles betw

heavily armed and armored battle lines have given way to short, sharp, and usual

decisive engagements which may have been preceded by periods of increasing ten

and substantial diplomatic effort.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:09 PM
naval forces. Dominating the enemy at sea permits our forces to maintain a forward

presence and is the first step in establishing our superiority in any region. War at sea

emphasizes the offensive, bringing to bear information, intelligence, and tactical initiative against an adversary. It requires appropriate and well-understood rules of engagement at the brink of war to win the first clash of arms. But offensive action is

incomplete without full consideration of defensive requirements. Success in engagements at sea demands preparation to counter an adversary’s gunfire, missiles, torpedoes, and mines. Additionally, we must thwart the enemy’s information base—his

capability to control his forces and to locate and target ours—while enhancing our

own. War at sea involves fully integrated offensive and defensive tactics that span the

subsurface, surface, air, space, and electromagnetic environments.

In accomplishing our assigned roles, naval Services prepare to fight and win wars. We

also play an important role in preventing them. Routine forward presence establishes

and maintains regional, economic and political stability and deters aggression. We further strengthen positive relations with our world neighbors day-to-day by providing

humanitarian assistance and supporting operations other than war. Naval presence is

an important factor in minimizing regional conflict, but, when hostilities threaten U.S.

interests, naval forces can provide the initial crisis response, projecting decisive military

power from the sea to land if necessary, and an enabling capability to support followon joint forces. These daily, on-going operations significantly promote the world’s con

fidence in America’s leadership.

Chapter Three: How We Fight—Naval Warfare

The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will

cover the whole ground he has traveled, but for those who come after

him and would profit by and extend his knowledge, his map is the first

thing with which they will begin. So it is with strategy. . . . It is for this

reason that in the study of war we must get our theory clear before we

can venture in search of practical conclusions.

SIR JULIAN CORBETT, 1911

War is an instrument of a nation’s power, initiated to achieve national objectives when

other means to resolve differences have failed. Our fundamental military purpose is to

attain national policy objectives through our capacity to wage war successfully. How

well we in the Naval Services accomplish our mission depends on how thoroughly we

understand both the nature and the conduct of war and learn war’s many lessons.

Only through such understanding can we prepare ourselves for its tests.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
Naval forces have followed several styles or philosophies of warfare throughout h

Two specific types—attrition and maneuver—have evolved in response to partic

needs and force capabilities. Although they vary significantly in efficiency, flexib

and decisiveness, each type of warfare has its own utility, depending on circumst

and both types are conducted today.

Attrition Warfare. A key difference between attrition warfare—the wearing do

an enemy—and maneuver warfare—a high tempo, indirect philosophy—is our

method of engaging the enemy. In the days of sail, fleet “line” tactics were muc

involved. Ships in single lines exchanged heavy broadsides against an enemy sim

arrayed, all within sight of each other. Their simple doctrine called for sailing d

rectly to the enemy’s location and systematically engaging his fleet. Attrition w

is the application of our strength against an enemy’s strength. It is typically a “

or two-dimensional style of fighting that is frequently indecisive and inherentl

costly in terms of personnel, resources, and time. When success in war on the o

tional and strategic levels depends on our ability to destroy or deny the enemy 

cial resources faster than he can recover, we are employing classic attrition war

techniques. We attrite the enemy through systematic application of overwhelm

force that reduces his ability or capacity to resist.

THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Using Attrition Warfare

In World War II, allied naval forces engaged in attrition warfare by employing their resources against the German undersea fleet. Analyzing the effectiveness of submarine warfare, the former Soviet Union Admiral of the

Fleet, Sergei Gorshkov, noted in his study of this period that German submarines nearly ended the war through the rapid destruction of the allied

merchant fleet. German forces, especially U-boats, were credited with

sinking more than 2,800 merchant ships—68% of all tonnage sunk by

Nazi Germany in the war. So devastating was this weapon that, at the

height of the allied counteroffensive, for each German U-boat, there were

25 U.S. and British warships and 100 aircraft in pursuit. For every German

submariner at sea, there were 100 American and British antisubmariners.

A total of six million men, 5,500 specially constructed ships, and 20,000

small craft were dedicated to the antisubmarine war. As the allies pressed

their offensive, Germany’s losses exceeded its war industry’s capacity to

keep pace. At the same time, the allies were able to replace their damaged

merchant fleet and even expanded it by adding replacements numbering

twice the losses suffered. In the Battle of the Atlantic, the threat of the Uboat was checked by overwhelming allied response. This resource-intensive, time-consuming effort was an effective use of attrition warfare.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
albeit more difficult to master—fighting style known as maneuver warfare. Closely associated with the writings of Sun Tzu and used by the great practitioners of expeditionary, naval, and land war, maneuver warfare is a philosophy, rather than a formula—

an approach, rather than a recipe. Like attrition warfare, it has long served as common

doctrine for naval forces. It emphasizes the need to give the commander freedom to

deal with specific situations. Maneuver warfare is further characterized by adaptability

and is not limited to a particular environment. Though enhanced by a variety of technologies, it is not dependent upon any one of them.

Maneuver warfare emphasizes the indirect approach—not merely in terms of mobility

and spatial movement, but also in terms of time and our ability to take action before

the enemy can counter us. Maneuver warfare requires us to project combat power.

Unlike attrition warfare, however, this power is focused on key enemy weaknesses and

vulnerabilities that allow us to strike the source of his power—the key to his existence

and strength as a military threat.

INCHON—SEOUL

Using Maneuver Warfare

The Navy and the Marines have never shone more brightly

than this morning.

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, 15 SEPTEMBER 1950

The amphibious operation at Inchon in the Korean War was a classic example of how the naval Services have employed maneuver warfare. Prior to

the operation, the North Korean Peoples’ Army had driven the U.S. and allied forces into a constricted corner of South Korea and threatened to

push them from the peninsula altogether. Even though his forces were in

dire straits, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the

United Nations forces in Korea, recognized that the naval Services in his

command had the ability to reverse dramatically the tide of the battle. A

landing on the Korean peninsula north of the enemy lines, he reasoned,

would allow his forces to sever the critical north/south rail and road supply

lines running through nearby Seoul that provided vital support to the

North Korean siege of the Pusan perimeter. By 15 September 1950, U.S.

Navy surface combatants and carrier air squadrons, along with shorebased

Marine and Air Force air units, had cleared Korean waters and air space of

North Korean opposition. Thus protected and concealed from the enemy,

Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble’s nine-navy, 260-ship, Joint Task Force Seven

transported Army and South Korean ground units and the amphibioustrained 1st Marine Division to the strategically important port of Inchon,

north of enemy lines. These troops stormed ashore via lanes cleared of obstructions by naval underwater demolition teams and behind the gunfire

of four cruisers, eight destroyers, and the aircraft of six carriers. Amphibious support ships soon brought in reinforcements and the supplies

needed to maintain and expand the beachhead. This bold, surprise maneuver severed the lines of communications to 90% of the enemy’s

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
The Conduct of War

Hold the attention of your enemy with a minimum force, then quick

him suddenly and hard on his flank or rear with every weapon you 

GENERAL A. A. VANDEGRIFT, USMC, BATTLE DOCTRINE FOR FRONT LINE LEADERS, 

Success in war often is the result of decisive action that destroys the enemy’s will or c

to resist. Because protracted war can cause high casualties and unwanted political an

nomic consequences, the rapid conclusion of hostilities is a key goal. Maneuver warfa

based on the twin pillars of decisiveness and rapidity, is our preferred style of warfigh

is as applicable today in the maritime environment as it has been in traditional land w

fare. Modern maneuver warfare requires integration and understanding of four key c

cepts—center of gravity, critical vulnerability, focus of effort, and main effort. We co

these concepts in context to our forces using a mechanism called the commander’s in

Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability

The center of gravity is something the enemy must have to continue military operati

source of his strength, but not necessarily strong or a strength in itself. There can onl

one center of gravity. Once identified, we focus all aspects of our military, economic, 

matic, and political strengths against it. As an example, a lengthy resupply line suppo

forces engaged at a distance from the home front could be an enemy’s center of gravi

resupply line is something the enemy must have—a source of strength—but not nec

capable of protecting itself. Opportunities to access and destroy a center of gravity ar

called critical vulnerabilities. To deliver a decisive blow to the enemy’s center of gravi

must strike at objectives affecting the center of gravity that are both critical to the en

ability to fight and vulnerable to our offensive actions. If the object of a strike is not c

cal—essential to the enemy’s ability to stay in the fight—the best result we can achiev

some reduction in the enemy’s strength. Similarly, if the object of a strike is not vuln

to attack by our forces, then any attempts to seize or destroy it will be futile.

ter. By the end of September, faced with entrapment and almost certain

destruction, the North Korean Peoples’ Army fled the Republic of Korea, a

nation they had invaded so eagerly only a few months before.

YORKTOWN

Exploiting A Critical Vulnerability

During the Revolutionary War, British forces in North America depended on

free use of the adjacent seas to move and resupply their ground troops. This

became especially critical to the British ability to continue fighting in August

1781, on the peninsula between Virginia’s York and James Rivers, when

American land forces successfully severed the British Army under General

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
The appearance of critical vulnerabilities depends entirely upon the situation and specific objective. Some—such as electrical power generation and distribution facilities

ashore or the fleet oilers supporting a task group—may be obvious. On a strategic

level, examples may include a nation’s dependence on a certain raw material imported

by sea to support its warfighting industry, or its dependence on a single source of intel

ligence data as the primary basis for its decisions. Alternatively, a critical vulnerability

might be an intangible, such as morale. In any case, we define critical vulnerabilities by

the central role they play in maintaining or supporting the enemy’s center of gravity

and, ultimately, his ability to resist. We should not attempt to always designate one

thing or another as a critical vulnerability. A critical vulnerability frequently is transitory or time-sensitive. Some things, such as the political will to resist, may always be

critical, but will be vulnerable only infrequently. Other things, such as capital cities or

an opponent’s fleet, may often be vulnerable, but are not always critical. What is critica

will depend on the situation. What is vulnerable may change from one hour to the

next. Something may be both critical and vulnerable for a brief time only. The commander’s challenge is to identify quickly enemy strengths and weaknesses, and recognize critical vulnerabilities when they appear. He must rapidly devise plans to avoid the

strengths, exploit the weaknesses, and direct the focus of effort toward attacking the

critical vulnerabilities so that he can ultimately collapse the enemy’s center of gravity.

Focus of Effort and Main Effort

The focus of effort is the paramount objective to be accomplished by the force and is

therefore always on the critical vulnerability that will expose the enemy’s center of gravity. Since we concentrate all our resources and energy on that objective, designating the

focus of effort is an important decision requiring the acceptance of risk. Responsibility

for attaining the focus of effort lies with the main effort. A commander unifies the force

toward the focus of effort by assigning one unit or group as the main effort.

resupply by sea was vulnerable because access to the Yorktown port could

be denied by controlling entry at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. The

French West Indian Fleet under Rear Admiral François de Grasse positioned

itself at this strategic location in advance of the British fleet. When British

Admiral Thomas Graves arrived to support Cornwallis, de Grasse maneuvered his ships to engage the enemy outside the bay. His actions not only

denied Cornwallis his needed support, but permitted another French

squadron sailing from Rhode Island to enter the bay and reinforce American

and French land forces. As a result, the British succumbed at Yorktown surrendering their entire Army of 7,600 men. The Franco-American alliance

was effective in blocking British access to and from the sea and thereby exploiting this critical vulnerability. Losing their ability to sustain their forces by

sea doomed the British war effort in North America.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
elements of the force are focused, the strengths of each element can be brought t

on the enemy effectively. There is only one main effort at a time and it is always

directed against the focus of effort. Designating a main effort does not imply tha

offensive is limited to a single attack or series of attacks. A commander may shift 

nation of the main effort as necessary and that designation may assign the bulk o

force or only a small fraction of the resources available. Whatever the size, design

as the main effort means that this element is central to the complete success of th

operation and supporting units are obligated to do everything they can to ensure 

the main effort succeeds. Supporting units are crucial to the success of mission. L

of supporting units, guided by the commander’s intent, choose actions aimed at 

all they can to support the main effort.

Commander’s Intent

Decisive action requires unity of effort—getting all parts of a force to work toget

Rapid action, on the other hand, requires a large degree of decentralization, givin

those closest to the problem the freedom to solve it. To reconcile these seemingly 

tradictory requirements, we use our understanding of the main effort and a tool 

the commander’s intent.

The commander’s intent conveys the “end state,” his desired result of action. The 

cept of operations details the commander’s estimated sequence of actions to ach

this end state and contains essential elements of a plan—i.e., what is to be done a

how the commander plans to do it. A commander issues the concept of operatio

part of a formal operation plan or order. The commander’s intent differs from th

cept of operations; a significant change in the situation that requires action often 

alter the concept of operations, but the commander’s intent is overarching and u

remains unchanged. The commander’s intent reflects his vision and conveys his t

ing through mission-type orders, in which subordinates are encouraged to exerc

tiative and are given the freedom to act independently.

Mission-type orders define the contract that the commander’s intent establishes

between the delegating commander and his subordinates. We achieve unity of ef

promulgating the commander’s intent, designating a focus of effort, and training 

ordinates to think in terms of the effect of their actions “two levels up” and “two 

down” in the chain of command. Since stereotyped actions are inherently predic

and thus easily countered, commanders must tailor their actions to the situation 

hand, using initiative, imagination and experienced judgment.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
their subordinates. Nor do they profess to foresee or attempt to plan for each contingency. Two great commanders in naval history, Admirals Horatio Nelson and Arleigh

Burke, rarely issued detailed instructions to their subordinate commanders. Instead,

they frequently gathered their captains to discuss a variety of tactical problems.

Because of these informal discussions, the captains became aware of what their commanders expected to accomplish and how they planned, in various situations, to

accomplish it. Thus prepared, they later were able to act independently, following their

commanders’ intent, even though formal orders either were brief or nonexistent.

The commander’s intent is particularly important in cases where the situation that

gave rise to orders has changed and, as a result, the original orders are no longer applicable. In such cases, subordinates can structure their decisions by asking such question

as “What would my commander want me to do in this situation?” and “What can I do

to help my commander attain the objectives?”

Tempo

Using the philosophy of maneuver warfare, we destroy or eliminate an adversary’s

center of gravity indirectly by attacking weaknesses or vulnerabilities that are vital

to his source of power. One method of indirect attack is to create a dilemma, by

putting the enemy in a situation where any step taken to counteract one threat

increases his vulnerability to another. This is an indirect approach. Through rapid

high-tempo actions, we present him with a series of unexpected situations and

developments, each of which demands a response. In the ideal situation, the enemy

would find that his best counter in one situation puts him at unacceptable risk in

another—a no-win situation.

A powerful enemy can protect his critical vulnerabilities. A skillful enemy may disperse

them. In each case, there is little chance of striking a decisive blow unless such an

enemy can be forced to expose one or more of his critical vulnerabilities. One way of

doing this is to exploit the dynamics of warfighting by maintaining a high tempo.

Tempo is the pace of action—the rate at which we drive events. A rapid tempo requires

that commanders be provided timely, accurate intelligence to find enemy weaknesses,

enough decentralization to allow subordinate commanders to exploit opportunities,

and clearly understood and well-rehearsed procedures at the lowest levels.

The decision cycle is a vital aspect of tempo. Forces with rapid decision cycles enjoy an

advantage over those whose leaders need more time to gather and process information

before making decisions. Tempo is more than a means to employ weapons better; it is a

weapon itself. Directed against an enemy with a slower decision cycle, a series of rapid

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
of his power to react effectively and ultimately destroying his center of gravity.

As in the martial art of judo, the objective in fighting with a high tempo is to take a

that sets in motion a series of actions and reactions, each of which potentially expo

if only for a brief time—a critical vulnerability. In such a contest, we achieve victor

making the most rapid and unpredictable moves specifically selected to catch the e

in a vulnerable position long enough to deliver a decisive blow. It is an aggressive s

warfare in which we gain advantage by observing the enemy, orienting ourselves to 

surroundings, deciding on a move, and acting more rapidly than the enemy.

On a tactical level, this warfighting technique, formally noted in the extraordinar

cess enjoyed by U.S. pilots during the Korean War,8

also served as the root of succ

similar experiences of naval aviators during the latter stages of the Vietnam War.

Because tempo is so important in maneuver warfare, commanders must have the 

dom of action to make decisions and execute them without any externally impos

delay. Commanders must be allowed to seize the initiative and respond to rapidly

changing situations. Response time is a key to maneuver warfare. Activity at the o

tional level must contribute directly to the military strategic aim. Such aims, bro

set, demand that the operational commander have wide-ranging independence t

cise creativity and originality. Such freedom allows him to gain and retain the ini

and adapt to the developing situation. Mission-type orders, specifying a result bu

AIR COMBAT MANEUVERING

Tactical Use of Tempo

During the early stages of the Vietnam War, our aircraft exchange rate in

combat was only two to one. Air-to-air missiles, thought to be the technological answer to future aerial combat, were ineffective in many cases. Our

pilots needed to develop close-in maneuvering skills and proficiency in the

use of their missiles as well as newly installed guns to counter the principal

communist fighters, the MiG-series.

In several traditional measures of aircraft performance the MiG was superior to the U.S. F-4. However, following the lessons taught at Top Gun—

the Navy Fighter Weapons School established to study and improve air

combat maneuvering skills—fighter crews improved the kill ratio sixfold in

the skys over Vietnam. The F-4 crew forced its opponent into a series of

tactical actions designed to gain and maintain advantage after each maneuver. The F-4 crew quickly saw how the situation changed and immediately followed with new actions. With each change, the MiG’s actions

became more inappropriate, until it gave the F-4 an acceptable firing opportunity. Occasionally, the MiG pilot realized what was happening to him,

panicked, and ultimately made the F-4 crew’s job that much easier. Success resulted from conducting a series of sudden unexpected moves to

which the enemy could not adjust.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
for local rapid response.

Success in war depends upon properly implementing our overall warfighting philosophy which includes understanding the commander’s intent and the concepts center of

gravity, critical vulnerabilities, focus of effort, and main effort. Additionally, we must

correctly apply the basic tenets or principles of war.9

The principles of war are based on

hard-won and often bitter experience gained in conflict. These important lessons

emphasize its nature and form the basis for our warfighting doctrine.

The Principles of War

An important issue throughout military history has been the way a military organization addresses the qualities that war demands from its participants. Military leadership has dealt best with the intractable problems of war as a form of military and

naval art. In the maritime environment, with its distinctive factors, we fight using the

principles that apply to combat everywhere. Wisdom gained from study of the basic

principles of war underscores that war is not the business of managers with checklists; it is the art of leaders.

• Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and

attainable objective. The naval Services focus their operations to achieve political

purposes defined by the National Command Authorities. With national strategic

purpose identified, we can select theater military objectives and form operational

and tactical objectives based on specific missions and capabilities. Whether the

objective is destroying an enemy’s armed forces or merely disrupting his ability to

use his forces effectively, the most significant preparation a commander can make is

to express clearly the objective of the operation to subordinate commanders.

• Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive time and place. Use strength against

weakness. A force, even one smaller than its adversary, can achieve decisive results

when it concentrates or focuses its assets on defeating an enemy’s critical

vulnerability. A naval task force, using the sea as an ally, can compensate for

numerical inferiority through the principle of mass. Mass further implies an ability

to sustain momentum for decisive results.

• Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the feasible application

of combat power. Use of maneuver (mobility) capitalizes on the speed and agility of

our forces (platforms and weapons) to gain an advantage in time and space relative to

the enemy’s vulnerabilities. Whether seen in historic warships “crossing the T,” or

modern ground forces enveloping an enemy, or forcing the tempo of combat beyond

an adversary’s ability to respond, maneuver allows us to get ahead of the enemy in

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:10 PM
differential—our superiority in speed and position relative to our adversary.

• Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Since the days of sail—racing 

opponent for the upwind advantage to take the initiative—offensive action ha

allowed us to set the terms and select the place of confrontation, exploit

vulnerabilities and seize opportunities from unexpected developments. Takin

offensive through initiative is a philosophy we use to employ available forces

intelligently to deny an enemy his freedom of action.

• Economy of Force. Employ all combat power available in the most effective way

possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. With m

more available targets than assets, each unit must focus its attention on the pr

objectives. A successfully coordinated naval strike at an enemy’s critical

vulnerability—for example, knocking specific command-and-control nodes o

commission—can have far more significance than an attempt to destroy the e

command-and-control system.

• Unity of Command. Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one respons

commander. Whether the scope of responsibility involves a single, independen

at sea or the conduct of an amphibious landing, we achieve unity in forces by

assigning a single commander. After he expresses his intent and provides an o

focus, he permits subordinate commanders to make timely, critical decisions 

maintain a high tempo in pursuit of a unified objective. The result is success,

generated by unity in purpose, unit cohesion, and flexibility in responding to 

uncertainties of combat.

• Simplicity. Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning, and conducting

military operations. The implementing orders for some of the most influential n

battles ever fought have been little more than a paragraph. Broad guidance rath

detailed and involved instructions promote flexibility and simplicity. Simple pla

clear direction promote understanding and minimize confusion. Operation Or

001, dated 17 January 1991 summarized the allied objectives for the Desert Stor

campaign into a single sentence: “Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and

command and control; sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy chemical, biological and

nuclear capability; destroy Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; libe

Kuwait.” These objectives were succinct, tangible, and limited.

• Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is

unprepared. Catching the enemy off guard immediately puts him on the defen

allowing us to drive events. The element of surprise is desirable, but it is not

essential that the enemy be taken completely unaware—only that he becomes 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
covert techniques and deceptions gives us the opportunity to strike the enemy when

he is not ready.

• Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Protecting the forc

increases our combat power. The alert watchstander, advanced picket, or such

measures as electronic emission control all promote our freedom of action by

reducing our vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Tools such as

gaming and simulation allow us to look at ourselves from the enemy’s perspective.

We enhance our security by a thorough understanding of the enemy’s strategy,

doctrine, and tactics.

MIDWAY

The Principles of War Applied at Sea

After the Battle of the Coral Sea, 4–8 May 1942, Admiral Chester W.

Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, learned from signals intelligence that a large Japanese naval force, led by Admirals Isoroku

Yamamoto and Chuichi Nagumo, would attack Midway, a strategic atoll

west of the American fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Other enemy

forces would make a feint toward the Aleutian Islands in the North Pacific.

The priceless advantage afforded by intercepting Japanese communications gave the Americans unprecedented knowledge of enemy intentions

and force dispositions.

Every available carrier and escort the United States could muster was assigned to the operation—including the carrier Yorktown, which made a

hasty sortie after repairs thought impossible by the Japanese Naval Staff.

Nevertheless, the U.S. force was numerically inferior to the Japanese striking group. Nimitz assigned Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, a veteran of

battle who had recently faced Japanese carrier forces at Coral Sea, as the

officer in tactical command. Nimitz’s objectives were clear and simple:

“hold Midway and inflict maximum damage on the enemy by strong attrition tactics.” Nimitz further added “In carrying out the task assigned...

you will be guided by the principles of calculated risk.” Fletcher had unity

of command and broad latitude in executing his tasks. He directed Rear

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander Task Force 16, to attack the

enemy carriers as soon as the ships were located. Fletcher, embarked in the

carrier Yorktown with Task Force 17, would follow soon afterward. Early in

the battle, when enemy air attacks placed his flagship out of action,

Fletcher transferred that unity of command to Spruance who retained tactical control for most of the fight.

Knowledge of the Japanese plan allowed Nimitz to invoke economy of

force by deploying minimal forces in front of a Japanese diversion toward

the Aleutian Islands while massing his most effective combat power—his

three aircraft carriers—against the main enemy thrust at Midway. Also,

knowing that the Japanese would use submarines and long-range flying

boats to determine if the U.S. fleet had sortied from Pearl Harbor, Nimitz

used maneuver to frustrate the operation of these enemy units. With our

intelligence advantage, the U.S. carriers were able to deploy and were in

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
The principles of war have been proven effective in preparing for combat, but the c

plexities and disorder of war preclude their use as a simple checklist. Instead, we m

able to apply these principles in war’s turbulent environment, to promote initiative

plement professional judgment, and serve as the conceptual framework in which w

uate the choices available in battle. These principles provide a solid basis for our

warfighting doctrine, that complements the experience and operational skill of ou

manders by describing a flow of action toward objectives, rather than prescribing s

action at each point along the way. In a chaotic combat environment, doctrine has 

cohesive effect on our forces, while enabling us to create disorder among our adver

It also promotes mutually understood terminology, relationships, responsibilities, 

processes, thus freeing the commander to focus on the overall conduct of war.

units maintained security through radio silence and darken-ship procedures at night. The fact that the U.S. carriers had departed the base before

the battle was not known to Yamamoto. The Japanese were also conscious of the need for security and surprise. In contrast, however, excessive

emphasis on security and surprise actually worked against Yamamoto and

Nagumo. Convinced that the invading force would catch the island of

Midway unprepared, the Japanese admirals failed to assess fully the size

and location of their opposing forces. Complete reconnaissance would

have shown that the U.S. Navy did not have adequate fleet strength at the

time to win in a direct at-sea confrontation. The Japanese could have concentrated their efforts against Fletcher’s and Spruance’s forces and then

attacked the lightly defended Midway later.

On the morning of June 4, 1942, Nagumo launched a routine, limited

dawn air search, convinced that the Americans could not be in the vicinity.

He then followed with his initial attack against Midway, opposed only by

the relatively few ground-based Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps

search, attack, and fighter aircraft on the island. By the time Japanese reconnaissance aircraft did discover the presence of the American force, it

was too late. After the Japanese aerial assault, Spruance and his staff reasoned that Yamamoto’s force might be in the process of recovering their

aircraft and preparing for additional land attacks. Seizing the initiative,

Fletcher and Spruance immediately attacked the Japanese carriers with every aircraft available. Although outnumbered, Fletcher and Spruance

maintained an aggressive offensive. Japanese combat air patrol intercepted the U.S. attack, but became preoccupied with low-flying torpedo

planes. When the dive bombers from Yorktown and Enterprise arrived at

the battle site, the fight was taking place at low altitude, allowing them to

attack Yamamoto’s force unimpeded. In fact, the American air strike did

surprise the Japanese carriers in an exceptionally vulnerable situation—

with unstowed ordnance and bomb- and torpedo-laden planes on deck

being refueled. In the fighting that followed, the Japanese lost the carriers

Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi, and Kaga and their scores of veteran aviators. Deprived of air cover, Admiral Yamamoto canceled the planned invasion of

Midway Island. The Japanese never regained the initiative in the Pacific.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
Success in naval warfare is founded on properly applying sound doctrine and understanding the principles of war. With a foundation established and reinforced through a

continuing education and training program, we are able to plan our operations and

readily adapt when situations change.

Doctrine. “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof

guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” (Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)

Doctrine is the heart of naval warfare. It governs our actions beyond the ordered execution of military operations, but is not prescriptive. Within the broader guidelines of

national strategy, doctrine provides the basis for mutual understanding and trust within

our naval Services as well as with other Services and our national leaders. It is not a set of

concrete rules, but rather a basis of common understanding throughout the chain of

command. Composed of “shared convictions” that guide naval forces as a whole, it fuses

our Service-unique tactics, techniques, procedures, and warfighting philosophies.

Tactics is the art of selecting the right tools for the job. A technique describes a way sys

tems or units can be employed in combat. Our choice of specific techniques—as well a

ways we might combine them—depends on many factors, including the overall operating situation and surrounding environment. Techniques specify ways to use various

systems. Procedures provide us with instructions for specific systems and equipments.

Techniques and procedures are tools a commander employs in his tactics. For example

procedures tell us how to maintain a particular weapon system; a technique describes

ways to employ it against an enemy threat; and tactics is the art of choosing the right

systems and techniques for the situation. Doctrine is the underlying philosophy that

guides our use of tactics and weapons systems to achieve a common objective.

Naval doctrine forms a bridge between the naval component of our nation’s military

strategy and our tactics, techniques and procedures, such as those found in our Naval

Warfare Publications and Fleet Marine Force Manuals. A commander, however, cannot

operate solely under the guidance of broad strategy. Neither can he make appropriate

mission decisions if guided only by tactics and techniques. Doctrine guides our actions

toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual understanding within and

between Services and our national policymakers. It ensures our familiarity and efficiency in the execution of procedures and tactics.

Our training and education are based on doctrine. Within this common framework of

understanding, we maintain readiness for war by tasking forces with day-to-day missions and exercising our tactics, techniques, procedures, and planning.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
pecially in modern naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what has b

done in the way of thorough preparation and training before the beginning of w

(President Theodore Roosevelt, Graduation Address at the U.S. Naval Academy, 

The primary means for improving and displaying our readiness to fight and win 

training, which includes basic military, skill-specific, and weapons-specific traini

(both hardware and tactical), as well as formal education. We train at each level o

employment: individual, unit, task force, and joint or multinational force.

Training and education build proficiency, cohesion, and teamwork while providi

opportunities to supplement limited combat experience. In this post–Cold War e

naval professionals may never experience general war. A realistic training progra

the best means, short of actual combat, of preparing our force and generating co

dence in and knowledge of our plans, tactics, and procedures. Through large-sca

play exercises, including war gaming, and command-post exercises—enhanced b

ulation—we involve all elements of naval forces and connect people to their miss

before they are actually employed. We focus our training and education on main

ing a capability to fight, as if war were imminent. This goal should not change w

naval forces are involved in operations other than war. The same organizational s

ture, procedures, command and control, equipment, and thinking apply. The key

combat effectiveness are realistic training and relevant education.

Training provides us with skills, abilities, and a base of knowledge that supports 

development of tactics. It should provide all members of our naval forces an und

standing of the roles of each group and of how each group supports the force. N

training does not seek to turn Marines into capable Sailors, nor does it seek to pr

those who operate our ships to land across a beach; but within limits, training is 

mental to achieving unity of effort. We master ways to employ our basic skills, ab

and knowledge through professional military education.

Education hones our thinking and ability to make decisions. The foundation of k

edge developed early in a career supports the leader—officer or enlisted—in app

experience and understanding to the complex relationships of our naval forces a

whole. Professional military education focuses on the science and art of warfight

Such art challenges the professional to analyze, reaffirm, and perhaps rethink tru

seek innovations through new and varied application of conventional guidance t

has been successful in the past; and to recognize the cases when the paths taken i

tory no longer apply. Education refines our ability to see more than the final stat

of a conflict or operation. It enables us to see war’s lessons and the thinking of it

ters, as well. The refined tools of education may be provided by the experience of

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
mitment and self-discipline.

Naval Warfare Planning. When military action is one of the potential responses to a

situation threatening U.S. interests, a plan is prepared using either the joint deliberateplanning process or crisis-action procedures.10 Although military flexibility demands a

capability to conduct short-notice crisis planning when necessary, U.S. military

strength is best enhanced by deliberate peacetime analysis, planning, and exercises.

An operation plan is a commander’s complete description of a concept of operation. It

is based on the commander’s preparation of the battlespace,11 a formal evaluation, supported by intelligence, that integrates enemy doctrine with such factors as physical and

environmental conditions. From this evaluation, the commander identifies the forces

and support needed to execute the plan within a theater of operations. Naval forces

operation plans are integrated into the complete inventory available to the Joint Force

Commander. For execution, plans become operation orders. Operation plans include:

the theater strategy or general concept and the organizational relationships; the logistics plan shows ways the force will be supported; and the deployment plan sequences

the movement of the force and its logistical support into the theater. Elements of planning that produce a concept of operations include the commander’s estimate, deciding

possible courses of action, preparation of the mission statement and its execution

strategy, situation analysis, and formulation of the commander’s intent. These element

are applicable up, down, and across chains of command.

Effective deliberate and crisis-action planning is essential and should be complementary at all levels in the chain of command. For example, where a joint campaign plan

coordinates all available land, sea, air, space, and special-operations forces, each component of those forces must plan for its particular assets to support the focus of effort.

Additionally, commanders must account for the operational limits of logistics and

transportation and the associated risks to their units.

By its nature, the uncertainty of war invariably involves the acceptance of risk. This is especially true when we employ high-tempo operations characteristic in maneuver warfare.

High tempo involves risks when all possible information is not available at the time decisions must be made and executed. We are sometimes placed in a position of weighing certainty in outcome against the benefits of taking prompt action. We have seen how prompt,

decisive action can have significant advantages in keeping ahead of the enemy’s decisionand-action cycle. The risk of uncertainty in our decisions must be balanced by the gains of

striking during a fleeting window of opportunity. Every commander can expect to be faced

with accepting a certain level of risk in conflict. We assess risk to the overall mission and to

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
advanced planning.

Risk management and risk assessment are formal, essential tools of operational p

ning. Sound decisionmaking requires the use of these tools both in battle and in 

ing. Naval commanders evaluate risk by using combinations of real-time, deliber

and indepth assessments to determine the cumulative effect on the mission and s

ways to eliminate or control unnecessary hazards to their forces. Go/No-Go crite

one form of evaluating our tolerance to risk. A mission may not be initiated, for 

ple, if the base of operations is in jeopardy or would be unprotected when the fo

departed. Because risk is often related to gain, leaders weigh the risks against the 

fits to be obtained from an operation, recognizing that unnecessary risk can be a

a hindrance to mission success as enemy action. On the other hand, carefully ide

ing the risks, analyzing and controlling as many factors as possible, and executin

supervised plan that accounts for these factors have contributed to the success of 

of the greatest military operations in history.

How well we fight depends upon how we think about fighting.

Our thinking is shaped and reinforced by a continuing professional military train

and education process drawing upon:

• Sound military doctrine—the framework and philosophy for our approach to

fighting, which complements the principles of war.

NORMANDY

Accounting for Risk in Warfare

An excellent application of risk assessment and risk management is illustrated in the largest amphibious operation ever conducted—the Allied

landing at Normandy, June 6, 1944. Operation Overlord was one of the

most intricately planned invasions in history. One uncertainty however, the

weather, threatened its success. General Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme

Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, recognized that high winds, low

clouds, and heavy seas converging in the objective area presented unacceptable risk to his forces. He therefore delayed the operation, despite the

realization that this might upset the precise timing of the enormous military undertaking. Carefully monitoring the situation, Eisenhower sought a

balance where the advantage of attacking under adverse physical conditions, which might surprise the enemy not expecting him to take this risk,

would offset the hazards associated with the poor weather itself. After 24

hours the weather had only moderately improved, but Eisenhower felt he

had found that balance. With the risk now warranted, he made his irrevocable decision, launching a force of more than 5,000 vessels, 11,000 aircraft, and 700,000 men, in one of the most significant joint and

multinational operations of the war.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
judgment, have led to success.

• Planning—formal, detailed analysis of options and contingencies for known situations.

But theory alone does not win battles. Our ability to fight is also dependent upon the

physical means we have to fight—making the best use of our technology and having

the ability to sustain our forces in conflict and day-to-day operations—and our ability

to lead and motivate our forces to fight as a team. Leadership, the foremost quality of

command, enhances our physical ability to fight by inspiring unit cohesion and sense

of purpose. It is the means by which we draw upon the courage, fortitude, and dedication within our people. Confident in our ability to fight and win as a team with the

Army and Air Force, we are ready to carry out our assigned roles supporting our

nation’s objectives into the 21st century.

Chapter Four: Where We Are Headed—Into the 21st Century

The United States is and will remain a maritime nation, relying on the day-to-day forward presence of strong naval forces that can project power as required to execute

national policy. Our extensive security commitments and vital global interests will not

diminish in the next century. Presence forces, both deployed periodically and permanently stationed, are essential elements in extending U.S. influence, enhancing stability

promoting interoperability among allies and potential coalition partners, deterring

aggression and providing rapid response to crises. The challenge facing U.S. defense

planners today is to provide forces that are flexible, capable, and able to dominate in a

broad array of scenarios.

While naval forces are built to fight and win wars, perhaps as important, is their contri

bution to deterring conflict. They are significant contributors to this aim because they

represent a credible, survivable, and timely crisis response capability on a daily basis in

critical regions of the world. “. . . From the Sea,” published in September 1992, forms

the basis of the naval input to the National Military Strategy. Its philosophy replaces

the “Maritime Strategy”12 and sets the direction of naval forces in the 1990s by reemphasizing their expeditionary role. It is a shift from the global struggle envisioned

under the Cold War maritime strategy—which called for independent blue-water,

open-ocean naval operations on the flanks of the Soviet Union—to preparation for

regional challenges. Though we retain our Service roles of deterrence, sea superiority,

and the protection of maritime trade, our naval focus has shifted to the world’s unstable regions holding critical and vital interests of the United States, placing a new

emphasis on littoral operations. Naval expeditionary forces play a central role in safeguarding national interests. To maintain a strong peacetime forward presence capable

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
combat capabilities.

Naval expeditionary forces are cohesive, self-sustaining, and tactically and strategic

mobile. These task-organized, forward deployed teams can execute a broad range o

options initiated from the sea. The specific composition of naval expeditionary for

tailored by operational need to become one of the basic building blocks for maritim

joint and multinational options ordered by the National Command Authorities. Su

options range from what has become our day-to-day peacetime employment—for

presence, humanitarian, and peacekeeping operations—to fighting in regional con

Naval expeditionary forces can respond to crises unilaterally or provide the initia

enabling capability for joint and multinational operations. These forces capitaliz

the expanding capabilities of modern naval forces to project power in an increas

sophisticated and lethal environment. Our continuing challenge is to enhance U.

naval warfare superiority and contribute to our nation’s campaigns, through team

and cooperation—particularly in joint and multinational operations. Our nation

interest in remaining engaged with other nations of the world forges special bon

with regional leaders. Naval presence is used to provide a regional stabilizing infl

foster strong alliances, and encourage multinational friendships. This spirit of co

tion is desirable in deterring or confronting crises.

In most contingencies, naval forces complement the capabilities and resources of 

Army and Air Force, and possibly forces of other nations. Although we have man

inherent capabilities that can be used independently, naval forces simply cannot 

form independently every military function that our nation may require. Howev

critical operational capabilities naval expeditionary forces can provide include:

• Command, Control, and Surveillance

• Battlespace Dominance

• Power Projection

• Force Sustainment.

Command, Control, and Surveillance

Command, control, and surveillance encompasses the gathering, processing, and 

bution of information vital to the conduct of military planning and operations. 

forms the foundation of unity of command and is essential to the decision proce

all levels. In peacetime, command, control and surveillance systems permit us to 

tor situations of interest, giving us indications and warnings that allow us to pos

our forces when necessary. In humanitarian relief and other support operations, 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
diverse government and non-government agencies, as well as the many international

and interservice forces that may join the operation.

Warfare in every dimension of the battlespace—and even within many weapon systems—requires external information. Commanders and their forces have many

requirements for information such as navigation, meteorology/oceanography, mapping/charting, communications, and evaluated information—intelligence. Because

“command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence” (C4I) is so important, commanders also seek to degrade or interrupt an adversary’s information suppor

systems and structure. At the same time, operations security is essential to deny the

enemy knowledge of our capabilities and intentions. It also contributes to our ability to

exercise the element of surprise. Intelligence identifies key enemy information vulnera

bilities and can allow the commander to focus his resources against the enemy’s center

of gravity.

Good intelligence results from collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation,

and interpretation of available information concerning potential adversaries. It produces timely indications and warnings, locations, identifications, intentions, technical

capabilities, and tactics of potential enemies and other countries of interest. Current

and relevant intelligence permits commanders to make decisions based on accurate

estimates of the enemy’s forces, capabilities, and intentions.

Intelligence is central to the decisionmaking process. Proliferation of technology

increases the complexity of joint battlespace information management, and compresse

the time cycle for decisionmaking. Space systems rapidly collect and distribute large

volumes of information. They also provide services that link widely separated forces

and provide an important advantage to naval forces in all areas of the world. Intelligence estimates, disseminated in a timely fashion, center on the focus of effort, identify

critical vulnerabilities, and enhance combat effectiveness.

Integrating global C4I systems that directly link and support naval forces and joint

forces will provide us an accurate picture of the battlespace. Some C4I operational

capabilities include: enhanced battle management systems; fully interoperable, user

centered, multimedia (voice, video, and data) links; embedded cryptographic security;

and the ability to collect, evaluate, disseminate, and receive near-real-time, all-source,

fused intelligence and surveillance data.

Technologically advanced equipment is available to any nation or individual that can

afford to pay for it. It presents our potential adversaries with new capabilities through

off-the-shelf information-management systems, global navigation, and commercial

communications. Nevertheless, these capabilities, though modern, are still vulnerable

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:11 PM
important that it has become a warfare objective in its own right. Battlespace dom

nance and projection of power ashore are intricately linked with and dependent 

effective C4I capabilities.

Battlespace Dominance

Modern battlespace is multidimensional. Navy and Marine Corps operations enco

air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and time. Dominance of these dimensions con

to be an important factor in the survival and combat effectiveness of our force. Co

mand and control integrates ships, submarines, aircraft, and ground forces, so thei

range of capabilities can be extended effectively throughout our battlespace.

The battlespace in which naval forces operate is neither fixed in size nor stationary

can visualize it as zones of superiority, surrounding one or more units or even the 

force, that are shifted as the situation requires. The zones are regions in which we m

tain superiority during the full period of our operations by detecting, identifying, t

ing, and neutralizing anything hostile that enters or passes through. The battlespac

our base of operations that we position over any area of concern and from which w

project power. We can establish multiple zones of superiority as specific task forces 

separated from the main force. All these zones are regions into which we receive in

tion and support from outside sources, and from which we project power. Theater 

manders may direct naval forces to conduct a mission independently if the size of 

battlespace they can dominate adequately covers the region of concern. By combin

complementary capabilities of units working together—including the U.S. Army a

Force, allied, or coalition capabilities in joint or multinational operations—we effe

extend the range and geographic influence of our battlespace.

What distinguishes naval forces among armed forces is the combination of opera

readiness and agility that creates these zones of superiority. These zones, based o

capabilities of our sensor and weapon systems, can reach out for hundreds of na

miles and protect other entities such as convoys, amphibious groups, and land m

We maintain our protective zones of superiority around us, establishing them no

upon arrival, but enroute to our objective area. The battlespace moves with the f

By extending zones of superiority over landing forces, naval commanders protec

forces while they are accomplishing their missions and establishing their own de

zones. This concept applies both in war and in operations other than war.

Power Projection

Our ability to project high-intensity power from the sea is the cornerstone of eff

deterrence, crisis response, and war. In peacetime, the recognized and credible ca

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
aggressors, promote regional stability, and provide, in conjunction with friends and

allies, a means of collective security. In war, the capacity to develop sustained and letha

power rapidly stems from the use of combined arms to generate concentrated offensive

power at the time and location of our choosing. Combined arms include, but are not

limited to: bombs, bullets, missiles; the synergy of sea, ground, and air operations; elec

tronic warfare operations; deception and ruses; psychological operations; and special

warfare operations. The ability to take the fight to the enemy is a strength enjoyed by

naval forces and has always been one of our nation’s primary objectives in war.

Naval expeditionary forces provide the National Command Authorities with the opera

tional depth of naval power projection, independently or as part of a joint or multinational operation, by using:

• Carrier-Based Strike Aircraft. These tailored air wings are equipped with heavy

payloads of advanced precision-guided munitions, capable of long-range strikes

over hundreds of nautical miles. They provide a variety of power projection and

crisis response options.

• Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. These forces, the most capable of their kind in the

world, are task-organized, self-sustaining, rapidly deployable air, ground, and logistic

units. They provide a wide range of power projection options from short-duration raids

to large-scale forcible-entry operations. Amphibious forces provide the ultimate

conventional demonstration of power by landing on an adversary’s sovereign territory.

• Long-Range Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles. These precision-guided munitions

launched by our surface ships and submarines are a key element of power

projection and provide a flexible and powerful application of force at ranges to

nearly a thousand nautical miles.

• Special Warfare Forces. These forces, capable of operating clandestinely, are task

organized to provide advance-force operations, hydrographic and near-shore

reconnaissance in advance of a landing, direct-action missions, combat search-andrescue missions, and the ability to degrade enemy lines of communications.

• Naval Surface Fire Support. This support provides accurate, all-weather fire support

responsive to the task force commander, augmenting air-delivered strike munitions

in the destruction of enemy emplacements, systems, and personnel.

• Command and Control Warfare. This warfare discipline provides the capabilities and

organization needed to disrupt, neutralize, and deceive the enemy’s command and

control systems while protecting our own. A classic example is the suppression of

enemy air defenses through overt electronic warfare.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
integral to our operational power projection and provide the United States with 

rapid, sustainable, global-response capability. By employing maritime prepositi

ships that are maintained in-theater, naval expeditionary forces can travel direc

conflict areas, joining with these ships to build a potent fighting force.

Power projection takes the battle to the enemy. This is best done before the enem

influence can become established, developed, or expanded. Even if no offensive a

is planned, naval forces can be used as a credible show of force that can influence 

potential adversary’s actions by providing unequivocal evidence that a fully comb

ready force stands poised to inflict unacceptable losses upon him.

Force Sustainment

Sustained naval and joint operations are made possible by a logistic support syst

that has two major components: fleet-based sustainment assets and strategic sust

ment assets. Fleet-based sustainment assets include replenishment ships of the co

logistics force providing direct fleet support, combat service support units, mobi

repair facilities, and advanced logistic support hubs. Strategic sustainment is pro

by air and sea assets that are shared by all Services. Successful global response to 

tingencies depends upon our ability to project and sustain U.S. forces in all theat

operations. Integrated support resources in the form of fleet-based sustainment 

and strategic assets provide naval expeditionary forces and joint and multination

forces the ability to operate in peacetime and in war wherever and whenever our

national interests demand. Our ability to move and sustain forces at great distan

from our shores is critical to the forward presence component of our military str

The same sustainment system that makes it possible for us to conduct operation

war also allows our nation to extend its influence in the form of credible U.S. pre

in operations other than war. Naval forces can provide critically needed support 

sonnel and relief supplies in the earliest stages of need.

Sustainment starts with combat-ready forces that are provided with effective, rel

and maintainable weapon systems, trained operators and maintenance personne

the necessary consumable supplies, spare parts, and facilities to be operationally 

sufficient. Naval forces bring a significant organic logistic capability—afloat with 

Navy’s Combat Logistics Force ships and ashore with the Marine Corps’ force ser

support groups—providing a task-organized combat service support element. O

naval logistical support systems are built around six areas of operational logistics

• Supply. From the producer to the user, the supply system provides our forces w

the requisite materiel for conducting naval operations.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
capabilities, maintenance activities afloat and ashore keep equipment operating.

Private and public shipyards, aviation depots, and logistic bases form the core of

our industrial support.

• Transportation. Coordinated transportation is required to get personnel, equipment

and supplies from point of origin to destination. The Navy is responsible for the

management, operation, and protection of all strategic afloat assets.

• General Engineering. Such specialized units as Marine Corps engineer support battalion

and naval construction battalions construct temporary or permanent facilities such as

roads, airfields, and port facilities to support combat-forces operations.

• Health Services. Afloat and ashore, the Navy provides medical and dental care for

the naval Services to maintain, preserve, or restore personnel combat readiness.

Assets include fleet hospitals, hospital ships, and organic Marine Corps assets.

• Other Services. Filling the administrative, security, and personnel-support

requirements of combatant forces is necessary to keep them fully operational.

Logistic support provides assured delivery of the materiel required for U.S. forces to

remain on station, combat ready, for as long as necessary. These forces are served by a

support organization that begins at the loading dock of the manufacturer in the United

States and ends when the needed materiel is put in the hands of the user. Their delivery

depends upon our ability to maintain open sea lanes of communications to ensure the

unimpeded flow from origin to destination.

As we move forward into the 21st century, naval forces will continue to play a significant role in providing peacetime influence and safeguarding our nation’s interests

around the globe. Alone or as part of a joint or multinational force, naval forces provide critical operational capabilities that include:

• Command, Control, and Surveillance

• Battlespace Dominance

• Power Projection

• Force Sustainment.

These capabilities will be increasingly relevant in facing future regional threats and

challenges to U.S. interests. They allow naval forces to maintain a strong forward presence to deter and react effectively to armed aggression with the ability to project sustainable power from the sea in time of crisis.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
NDP 1, Naval Warfare, describes our warfighting philosophy, distinctive characte

capabilities, and basic missions. Our warfighting philosophy incorporates the pr

ples of war while making the best use of the inherent characteristics and advanta

our naval forces. The enduring characteristics of readiness, flexibility, sustainabil

and mobility make us uniquely suited to be our nation’s first response to crises o

sizes at sea and along the world’s littorals. Through the effective employment of 

sors and weapons, and supported by a comprehensive intelligence and logistics i

structure, naval forces dominate the battlespace from which we project power as

The intent of this introductory publication is to reaffirm the reader’s sense of ide

and purpose in the naval Services. The varied seniority, experience, and employm

its readers influences what each person will gain from its concepts. For some, ND

may prompt a search for essential elements of our warfighting philosophy—such 

identification of the commander’s intent—in their review of operation orders an

cedures. For others, it might suggest a review of other Service doctrines. If it stim

discussion, promotes further study, and instills in readers a feeling of ownership 

contributing members of a coordinated Navy/Marine Corps team, then NDP 1 w

have properly served its purpose.

Our naval forces contribute decisively to U.S. global leadership and are vital to 

ing an environment that enhances our national security. A strong naval team—c

of deterrence, war at sea and from the sea, and operations other than war—is e

tial to that effort. Our forward presence, timely crisis response, and sustainable

power projection provide naval and joint force commanders a broad and flexib

array of combat capability.

Glossary

Area of Influence: A geographical area in which a commander is directly capable o

influencing operations by maneuver or fire support.

Area of Interest: That area of concern to the commander, including the area of in

ence, areas adjacent, and areas extending into enemy waters or territory to the ob

tives of current or planned operations. This also includes areas occupied by enem

forces that could jeopardize the mission.

Attrition Warfare: The application of overwhelming combat power that reduces t

effectiveness of an enemy’s ability to fight through his loss of personnel and mat

Battlespace: All aspects of air, surface, and subsurface, land, space, and the electro

netic spectrum that encompass the area of influence and area of interest.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
that enhances friendly freedom of action and denies the enemy freedom of action. It

permits power projection and force sustainment to accomplish the full range of potential missions.

Center of Gravity: That characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and

friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.

Coalition Force: A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a

temporary alliance for a specific purpose.

Combined Arms: The use of several arms or branches of one military Service together

in an operation such as Marine Corps infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation.

Crisis Response: The ability to maintain the forces and agility to respond quickly and

decisively to regional crises with a range of options.

Focus of Effort: The most important task to be accomplished by the force. It is the critical vulnerability we have chosen to exploit, the paramount objective we desire to

accomplish. All our actions should be oriented on that task. If we focus our effort on

the destruction of an enemy capability, then the destruction of that capability becomes

our “focus of effort.”

Force Sustainment: Capabilities, equipment, and operations that ensure continuity,

freedom of action, logistic support, and command and control.

Forward Presence: Maintaining forward deployed or stationed forces overseas to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and

enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingency operations.

Joint: Activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

Lines of Communication: The routes (sea, air, and land) that connect a military force

with a base of operations and along which military forces and logistics support move.

Littoral: Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct

control of and vulnerable to the striking power of naval expeditionary forces.

Main Effort: The friendly unit or group (controlled by a single designated commander)

that constitutes the principle means by which we will accomplish an objective. The

commander ensures the success of the main effort by providing it the preponderance

of the support and by alerting supporting units to reinforce—or, if necessary,

assume—the main effort.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
tiveness through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a tu

lent and rapidly deteriorating situation, with which he cannot cope.

Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A task organization of Marine forces (ground com

air, and combat service support elements) under a single command and structur

accomplish a specific mission. The MAGTF will also include Navy support eleme

Multinational: An alliance, coalition, or other international arrangement.

Multi-Service: Two or more Services in coordination.

National Command Authorities: The President and the Secretary of Defense or th

duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as the NCA.

Naval Special Warfare: A designated naval warfare specialty that conducts operat

generally accepted as being unconventional in nature and, in many cases, covert 

clandestine in character. These operations use specially trained forces to conduct

unconventional warfare, psychological operations, beach and coastal reconnaissa

operational deception operations, counterinsurgency operations, coastal and riv

interdiction, and certain special tactical-intelligence-collection operations, in ad

to intelligence functions normally required for planning and conducting special 

tions in a hostile environment.

Naval Surface Fire Support: Fire provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electr

warfare systems in support of a unit or units on land.

Power Projection: The application of offensive military force against an enemy at 

sen time and place. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphib

assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations.

Suggested Follow-On Reading

O’Keefe, Sean, Frank B. Kelso, II, and Carl E.

Mundy, Jr. “ . . . From the Sea: Preparing the

Naval Service for the 21st Century” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992).

Joint Publication 1, “Joint Warfare of the U. S.

Armed Forces” (Washington, D.C.: Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 1991).

Joint Publication 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations” (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff,

1993).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, “Warfighting” (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1989).

Fleet Marine Force Manual 1-2, “The Role 

Marine Corps in the National Defense” 

ington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 

Field Manual 100-5, “Operations” (Washin

D.C.: Department of the Army, 1993).

Air Force Manual 1-1, “Basic Aerospace D

of the United States Air Force” (Washi

D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 199

Clausewitz, Karl von. On War. Ed. and tran

chael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princet

N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976)

Corbett, Sir Julian S. Some Principles of M

Strategy. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti

Press, 1988).

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
(New York: Dutton, 1991).

Wylie, Joseph C., Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.) Military

Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control.

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1989).

Ed. J.B. Hattendorf. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval

Institute Press, 1991).

Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Ed. and trans. Samuel.

B. Griffith. (New York: Oxford University

Press, 1988).

Notes

1. The United States Coast Guard was established in 1915 as the functional successor to

the Revenue Marine of the 1790s, which later

had become known as the Revenue Cutter

Service. The Coast Guard is a military Service and a branch of the armed forces at all

times. It is also a federal maritime law enforcement agency that operates under the

Department of Transportation. In time of

war, or when the President directs, the Coast

Guard operates as a Service in the Navy, reporting to the Secretary of the Navy and the

Chief of Naval Operations as guided by wartime directives.

2. Hereafter, the term naval forces will mean

both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and

when under Navy operational control, the

Coast Guard.

3. The term littoral, as it applies to naval operations in this publication, is not restricted to

the limited oceanographic definition encompassing the world’s coastal regions. Rather, it

includes that portion of the world’s land

masses adjacent to the oceans within direct

control of and vulnerable to the striking

power of sea-based forces.

4. Joint Publication 1-02 defines the National

Command Authorities (NCA) as the President and Secretary of Defense together or

their duly deputized alternates or successors.

The term NCA is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the Armed Forces

in their execution of military action. Both

the movement of troops and execution of

military action must be directed by the NCA;

by law, no one else in the chain of command

has the authority to take such action.

5. The National Military Strategy conveys the

advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of

Staff and the combatant commanders, to the

President, the National Security Council,

and the Secretary of Defense regarding how

the military supports attaining national security objectives. It is combined with political, diplomatic, and economic strategies to

support the National Security Strategy. The

National Military Strategy is published “as

needed,” when changes in the strategic environment dictate.

6. “Roles,” “missions,” and “functions” often are

used interchangeably, but the distinctions

between the terms is important. “Roles” are

the broad and enduring purposes for which

the Services were established in law. “Missions” are the tasks assigned by the National

Command Authorities to the combatant

commanders. “Functions” are specific respon

sibilities assigned by the National Command

Authorities to enable the Services to fulfill

their legally established roles. Thus, the primary function of the Services is to provide

forces organized, trained, and equipped to

perform a role—to be employed by a combatant commander in the accomplishment

of a mission. The cited roles of the Navy and

Marine Corps are a consolidation of Title 10

U.S.C, DOD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components,

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions

of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993.

7. The term enabling refers to our ability to respond rapidly to a crisis and take the action

necessary to control its escalation, while facilitating the introduction of a larger joint

force. This may include establishing a lodgment or seizing usable ports and airfields.

8. A discussion of air-to-air combat in the Korean War can be found in Boyd, John R. Col

USAF (Ret.), “Patterns of Conflict,” an unpublished lecture cited in William S. Lind,

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
Westview Press, 1985), pp 4–6.

9. Nine principles of war are discussed in such

authoritative publications as Joint Publication 0-1 “Basic National Defense Doctrine,”

Joint Publication 1 “Joint Warfare of the U.S.

Armed Forces,” FM 100-5 “Operations,” and

FMFM 1 “Warfighting.”

10. Joint Publication 5-0, “Doctrine for

Planning Joint Operations” (Washington,

D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993) has additional discussion of joint planning.

11. Commander’s Preparation of the Battlefield is

a term used by the Marine Corps and Army.

In a naval context, we use battlespace to

mean analysis of the physical and

graphic area and its effects on our ab

establish superiority in every dimens

this space. It includes a detailed study 

emy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 

ble enemy courses of action.

12. The Maritime Strategy/Amphibious W

Strategy was, for the 1980’s, our “Wh

per”—that is, an official statement o

icy—on how naval forces, in combin

with other Services and the forces of 

lies, would prepare for, fight, and term

war on favorable terms. The U.S. Nav

tute published an unclassified version 

these strategies as a special suppleme

Proceedings in January 1986.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:12 PM
“Forward . . . from the Sea”

On 9 November 1994, the Chief of Naval Information released the text of “Forward 

from the Sea.” Signed by President Clinton’s secretary of the Navy, John H. Dalton, 

the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Boorda) and the Commandant of the Mar

Corps (General Mundy), the document appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Procee

the Marine Corps Gazette, and two undated pamphlet versions.* The first pamphl

circulated in photocopy form with black-and-white charts, while the second was an 

publication with glossy paper, color graphics, and well-designed typographical layo

This document was written to provide a statement of naval thinking that reflected 

Clinton administration’s defense policy, with two new civilian leaders in office: Secr

Dalton and the new secretary of defense, William J. Perry. “Forward . . . from the S

intended to reflect the concepts of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review of the Defense Depa

and of the president’s 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargem

The Navy hoped that this broadly conceived conceptual statement would be widely 

lated and received as a credible rationale for the Navy’s renewed emphasis on forwa

deployment, supporting the budgetary requests that would be necessary to develop 

forces for this role. The Bottom-Up Review endorsed the Navy and Marine Corps e

on forward presence to the chagrin of some officers in the other services. In “FORWAR

from the Sea,” the Navy and Marine Corps sought to maintain and to enhance thei

found claim to the conceptual high ground within the Department of Defense by

emphasizing combat-credible forward presence as the centerpiece of their new state

The key people involved in the preparation and writing of “Forward . . . from the 

were Secretary Dalton, who initially requested a document specifically reflecting P

dent William Clinton’s policies and his own administration of the Navy Departm

Rear Adm. Philip Dur, USN, head of the Strategy and Policy Division in the Offi

Chief of Naval Operations (N-51); and in Admiral Dur’s office, Capt. Joseph Ses

USN, head of the Strategy and Concepts Branch (N-513), with Lt. Cdr. Edward

CHAPTER FIVE

* U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1994), pp. 46–49; Marine Corps Gazette 78, n

(October 1994), pp. 32–35.

† A copy of the first pamphlet version is in the Naval War College Library, shelf number V

58.4.U5461 1994a.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:13 PM
USN, in the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs, made the case that in this document the

Navy should more effectively establish a relationship between forward presence and force

structure. At Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the key person was the Chief Marine

Corps planner, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Wilkerson.* 

In 1992 the Navy–Marine Corps paper . . . From the Sea defined the strategic concept

intended to carry the Naval Service—the Navy and Marine Corps—beyond the Cold

War and into the 21st century. It signaled a change in focus and, therefore, in priorities

for the Naval Service away from operations on the sea toward power projection and the

employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of

the world—those areas adjacent to the oceans and seas that are within direct control of

and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based forces.

The purpose of U.S. naval forces remains to project the power and influence of the

nation across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war. Forward . . .

From the Sea updates and expands the strategic concepts articulated in our 1992 paper

to address specifically the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts. Forward . . . From th

Sea amplifies the scope of our strategic concept while confirming the course and speed

for the Naval Service as defined in the original document.

Introduction

With the publication of . . . From the Sea in September 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps

announced a landmark shift in operational focus and a reordering of coordinated priorities of the Naval Service. This fundamental shift was a direct result of the changing strate

gic landscape—away from having to deal with a global maritime threat and toward

projecting power and influence across the seas in response to regional challenges.

In the two years since . . . From the Sea became our strategic concept, the Administra

tion has provided expanded guidance on the role of the military in national defense.

A major review of strategy and force requirements resulted in a shift in the Department of Defense’s focus to new dangers—chief among which is aggression by

* Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 7 July 2006; Capt. Ronald

R. Harris, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Swartz, 11 April 2005; Dr. Henry H. Gaffney e-mails to Swartz, 7

April 2006, 22 April 2005; Capt. Bradd Hayes, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Swartz, 22 April 2005.

Admiral J. M. Boorda, USN

Chief of Naval Operations

John H. Dalton

Secretary of the Navy

General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.,

USMC

Commandant of the

Marine Corps

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:13 PM
ject decisive military power to protect vital U.S. interests and defend friends an

allies. In defining our national strategy for responding to these new dangers, th

review emphasized the importance of maintaining forward-deployed naval for

and recognized the impact of peacetime operational tempo on the size of Navy 

Marine Corps force structure. In addition to recognizing the unique contributi

the Navy and Marine Corps in the areas of power projection and forward prese

restated the need for the Navy to support the national strategic objectives thro

our enduring contributions in strategic deterrence, sea control and maritime

supremacy, and strategic sealift.

Forward . . . From the Sea addresses these naval contributions to our national sec

Most fundamentally, our naval forces are designed to fight and win wars. Our mo

recent experiences, however, underscore the premise that the most important rol

naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the 

tives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises.

Naval forces thus are the foundation of peacetime forward presence operations a

overseas response to crisis. They contribute heavily during the transitions from c

conflict and to ensuring compliance with terms of peace. At the same time, the u

capabilities inherent in naval expeditionary forces have never been in higher dem

from U.S. theater commanders—the regional Commanders-in-Chief—as eviden

operations in Somalia, Haiti, Cuba, and Bosnia, as well as our continuing contrib

to the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq.

The Strategic Imperative

The vital economic, political, and military interests of the United States are truly 

in nature and scope. In many respects these interests are located across broad oce

and to a great extent they intersect those of current and emergent regional powe

in the world’s littorals where the Naval Service, operating from sea bases in inter

tional waters, can influence events ashore in support of our interests.

Because we are a maritime nation, our security strategy is necessarily a transocea

one. Our vital interests—those interests for which the United States is willing to

fight—are at the endpoint of “highways of the seas” or lines of strategic approac

stretch from the United States to the farthest point on the globe. Not surprisingly

strategic lines and their endpoints coincide with the places to which we routinely

deploy naval expeditionary forces: the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Pacific, Indian O

Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Caribbean Sea. Reductions in fiscal resources, howeve

tate that we must refocus our more limited naval assets on the highest priorities 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:13 PM
the United States.

Naval forces are particularly well-suited to the entire range of military operations in

support of our national strategies. They continue the historic role of naval forces

engaged in preventive diplomacy and otherwise supporting our policies overseas.

Moreover, forward-deployed naval forces—manned, equipped, and trained for combat—play a significant role in demonstrating both the intention and the capability to

join our NATO and other allies, as well as other friendly powers, in defending shared

interests. Finally, if deterrence fails during a crisis and conflict erupts, naval forces provide the means for immediate sea-based reaction. This could include forcible entry and

providing the protective cover essential to enabling the flow of follow-on forces which

will be deployed, supported, and sustained from the continental United States.

In short, forward-deployed naval forces will provide the critical operational linkages

between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of a developing crisis or

major regional contingency.

Peacetime Forward Presence Operations

Naval forces are an indispensable and exceptional instrument of American foreign

policy. From conducting routine port visits to nations and regions that are of special interest, to sustaining larger demonstrations of support to long-standing

regional security interests, such as with UNITAS exercises in South America, U.S.

naval forces underscore U.S. diplomatic initiatives overseas. Indeed, the critical

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:14 PM
National Security Strategy:

. . . presence demonstrates our commitment to allies and friends, underwrites regional stabilit

U.S. familiarity with overseas operating environments, promotes combined training among th

of friendly countries, and provides timely initial response capabilities.

In peacetime U.S. naval forces build “interoperability”—the ability to operate in co

with friendly and allied forces—so that in the future we can easily participate fully 

of a formal multinational response or as part of “ad hoc” coalitions forged to react 

short-notice crisis situations. Participation in both NATO Standing Naval Forces a

variety of exercises with the navies, air forces, and land forces of coalition partners

around the Pacific rim, Norwegian Sea, Arabian Gulf, and Mediterranean basin pro

solid foundations for sustaining interoperability with our friends and allies.

Additionally, the outreach to the former Warsaw Pact countries in the NATO Partn

for Peace program will further build solidarity and interoperability. We have alread

made solid progress in expanding and intensifying our cooperation with the navie

Eastern Europe with exercises such as BALTOPS 94 and BREEZE 94, which included 

from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.

U.S. forward-deployed naval forces have also contributed to humanitarian assista

and disaster-relief efforts—from the Philippines to Bangladesh to Rwanda—with 

lar, very positive, results.

Although naval presence includes a wide range of forward-deployed Navy and M

Corps units afloat and ashore in friendly nations, our basic presence “building b

remain Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups—with versatile, multipurpose, naval tactica

tion wings—and Amphibious Ready Groups—with special operations–capable M

Expeditionary Units. These highly flexible naval formations are valued by the the

commanders precisely because they provide the necessary capabilities forward: r

and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies and available to pa

pate in allied exercises, which are the bedrock of interoperability.

We have also turned our attention to examining the naval capabilities that could 

tribute to extending conventional deterrence. In this regard, forward-deployed su

warships—cruisers and destroyers—with theater ballistic missile defense capabil

will play an increasingly important role in discouraging the proliferation of balli

missiles by extending credible defenses to friendly and allied countries. By maint

the means to enhance their security and safety, we may reduce the likelihood tha

of these nations will develop their own offensive capabilities. Our efforts will the

slow weapons proliferation and enhance regional stability.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:14 PM
jection from sea to land, the Navy continues to provide a robust strategic nuclear deter

rent by maintaining strategic ballistic missile submarines at sea. As long as it is U.S.

policy to ensure an adequate and ready strategic nuclear deterrent, our highly survivable strategic ballistic missile submarines will remain critical to national security.

Crisis Response

U.S. naval forces are designed to fight and win wars, as are all elements of our military

arsenal. To successfully deter aggressors, we must be capable of responding quickly and

successfully in support of U.S. theater commanders. Forces deployed for routine exercises and activities undergirding forward presence are also the forces most likely to be

called upon to respond rapidly to an emerging crisis. The potential for escalation dictates that presence forces must be shaped for missions they may encounter. This provides theater commanders with credible crisis-response capabilities in the event norma

conditions or outcomes do not turn out as we expect.

Building on normally deployed forces, we can mass, if the situation requires, multiple

Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups into Carrier Battle Forces, Amphibious Ready Groups

with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units, and as needed project our naval expeditionary forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force. Such a massing

of naval units can be complemented by the deployment of Army and Air Force complements to provide a joint force capable of the full range of combat operations that

may be required.

A U.S. warship is sovereign U.S. territory, whether in a port of a friendly country or

transiting international straits and the high seas. U.S. naval forces, operating from

highly mobile “sea bases” in forward areas, are therefore free of the political encumbrances that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land-based operations in for

ward theaters. The latter consideration is a unique characteristic and advantage of

forward-deployed naval forces. In many critical situations, U.S. naval forces alone provide theater commanders with a variety of flexible options—including precise measures to control escalation—to respond quickly and appropriately to fast-breaking

developments at the operational and tactical levels.

Whether surging from adjacent theaters or from continental U.S. deployment bases,

naval forces are uniquely positioned, configured, and trained to provide a variety of

responses in the event of an unexpected international crisis. Their operational flexibility and responsiveness are a matter of record. The most recent examples of crisisresponse measures are summarized in table 1:

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:14 PM
Regional Conflict

Naval forces make a critical contribution in a major regional contingency during 

transition from crisis to conflict. Forward naval forces deployed for presence and 

forced in response to an emerging crisis can serve as the transition force as land-

forces are brought forward into theater.

Using a building-block approach, U.S. naval forces can be “tailored” with specific 

bilities. The resulting naval expeditionary force—conceptually built around fleet 

ational forces and a forward-deployed Marine Expeditionary Force—can provide 

highly flexible force for a wide range of missions, including long-range strike op

tions and early forcible entry to facilitate or enable the arrival of follow-on force

Focusing on the littoral area, Navy and Marine Corps forces can seize and defend

advanced bases—ports and airfields—to enable the flow of land-based air and gr

forces, while providing the necessary command and control for all joint and allie

DATE FORCES

ORIGINAL

DEPLOYMENT CRISIS LOCATION

December 1992 USS Ranger Battle Group

USS Tripoli Amphibious

Ready Group/15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (SOC)*

Persian Gulf Somalia

Humanitarian Relief

January 1993 USS Kitty Hawk Battle

Group

Somalia Persian Gulf

Strike Operation Agains

June 1993 USS Theodore Roosevelt

Battle Group

Mediterranean/

Adriatic

Red Sea

Support Tomahawk Str

Against Iraq

October 1993 USS America Battle Group

USS Guadalcanal

Amphibious Ready Group

22nd Marine Expeditionary

Unit (SOC)*

Mediterranean/

Adriatic

Somalia

Response to

Increasing Casualties on 

April 1994 USS Peleliu Amphibious

Ready Group/11th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (SOC)*

Somalia Mombasa

Support of DISTANT RU

Rwanda Non-combata

Evacuation Operations

August 1994 USS Tripoli Amphibious

Ready Group/15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (SOC)*

Mombasa Entebbe, Uganda to R

Humanitarian Relief—Op

tion SUPPORT HOPE

October 1994 USS George Washington

Battle Group

USS Tripoli Amphibious

Ready Group/15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (SOC)*

Mediterranean/

Adriatic

Persian Gulf/Red Sea

Iraq

Sharing of Major Forces between Theaters/Operations

*SOC—Special Operations Capable

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:14 PM
forces can contribute to blunting an initial attack and, ultimately, assuring victory. The

keys to our enabling mission are effective means in place to dominate and exploit littoral battlespace during the earliest phases of hostilities.

Moreover, the unique capabilities inherent in naval tactical aviation operating from ou

sea bases or expeditionary airfields, as well as the capability to contribute to sustained

land combat operations, provide theater commanders with flexibility in the conduct of

littoral operations. Throughout the 20th century, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces,

placed ashore initially as an enabling force, have fought and contributed decisively in

every major ground conflict. Similarly, naval tactical aviation has made pivotal contributions when the nation’s air power was needed in combat.

In the event of a future regional conflict, U.S. naval forces will assume critical roles in

the protection of vital sealift along the strategic lines of approach to the theater of conflict including the air- and sea-ports of debarkation. Our success in a major regional

contingency will depend upon the delivery of heavy equipment and the resupply of

major ground and air elements engaged forward. Sealift is the key to force sustainment

for joint operations, and we are committed to a strong national capability.

Joint and Combined Operations

No single military service embodies all of the capabilities needed to respond to every

situation and threat. Our national strategy calls for the individual services to operate

jointly to ensure both that we can operate successfully in all warfare areas and that we

can apply our military power across the spectrum of foreseeable situations—in peace,

crisis, regional conflict, and the subsequent restoration of peace.

The enhanced combat power produced by the integration of all supporting arms,

which we seek to attain through joint operations, is inherent in naval expeditionary

forces. For example, the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group integrates and focuses diverse

technologies and combat capabilities to assure the dominance of the air, surface, and

sub-surface battle space necessary for the prosecution of subsequent campaigns. Further, Marine Expeditionary Forces, employing Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

combined-arms doctrine, are the most versatile expeditionary force in existence. Estab

lished by law to be “forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components,” MAGTFs are expeditionary, rapidly expandable air-ground formations, capable

of operating from sea bases, ashore, or both, simultaneously. They are the model for

the joint air-ground task forces evolving as conflicts grow smaller and the forces available grow fewer.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:14 PM
ing with other joint or allied sea, land, air, and space forces. Just as the compleme

capabilities of Navy and Marine Corps forces add to our overall strength, combin

the capabilities and resources of other services and those of our allies will yield d

military power.

Maintaining Our New Direction

The new direction for the Naval Service remains focused on our ability to projec

power from the sea in the critical littoral regions of the world. We remain comm

to structuring our naval expeditionary forces so that they are inherently shaped f

joint operations, with the emphasis on operations forward from the sea, tailored 

national needs. Recent Department of the Navy budget decisions, which resulted in 

increase in spending on littoral warfare and the means for power projection, are ill

tive of the shift in priorities we have undertaken since the publication of . . . From 

Sea. (Figures 1 and 2.) As we continue to improve our readiness to project power 

littorals, we need to proceed cautiously so as not to jeopardize our readiness for t

spectrum of missions and functions for which we are responsible.

In the two years since . . . From the Sea was published, we have expanded on and 

talized upon its traditional expeditionary focus. “Expeditionary” implies a mind 

FIGURE 1

Department of the Navy Budget History

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:15 PM
culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to be deployed forward and to

respond swiftly. Our new direction provides the nation:

• Naval Expeditionary Forces—Shaped for Joint Operations

• Tailored for National Needs—Operating Forward . . . From the Sea.

Conclusion

. . . From the Sea was the initial step in demonstrating how the Navy and Marine Corps

responded to the challenges of a new security environment. Our strategy and policies

continue to evolve as we learn from our recent experiences and prepare for the new challenges and opportunities of this highly dynamic world. Naval forces have five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National Security Strategy: projection of power

from sea to land, sea control and maritime supremacy, strategic deterrence, strategic

sealift, and forward naval presence. We will continue to carry out these roles to protect

vital U.S. global interests, citizens, allies and friends, wherever they may be at risk.

The Cold War may be over, but the need for American leadership and commensurate

military capability endures. Many of our most vital interests remain overseas where the

Navy and the Marine Corps are prepared for new challenges—forward deployed, ready

for combat, and engaged to preserve the peace.

Department of the Navy Support of Littoral Warfare

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
“The Navy Operational Concept”

On 26 March 1997, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jay L. Johnson, ann

at a luncheon given in his honor during the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exp

that he would shortly publish a new operational concept to implement the Na

1994 “Forward . . . from the Sea.” Admiral Johnson had already communicat

new document to flag officers by e-mail; shortly after this announcement to t

League, the Chief of Naval Information published it on the Internet.* It then

appeared in print in the May issue of Sea Power, the Navy League’s magazine

“The Navy Operational Concept: Forward . . . From the Sea.”† This was the f

three important documents to be produced during Johnson’s four-year tenure 

Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Johnson had moved up from Vice Chief of Naval Operations on 16 May 

upon Admiral Boorda’s sudden death. During Admiral Boorda’s tenure, the Mari

Corps Commandant, Gen. Charles M. Krulak, had been pressuring the Navy to p

an operational schema for naval operations that complemented what the Marine 

already had in place, the “operational maneuver from the sea” concept. The Navy 

done some work toward that goal but had stopped when Boorda died. Starting an

Admiral Johnson moved ahead with two simultaneous, but separate, initiatives: w

became “The Navy Operational Concept” and “Anytime, Anywhere,” reprinted in 

next chapter of this collection.

“The Navy Operational Concept” was published in January 1997, shortly after W

S. Cohen became secretary of defense. Created in the context established by the ch

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John M. D. Shalikashvili, USA, in the 1995 Natio

Military Strategy and the 1996 Joint Vision 2010, the new document was design

focus the Navy’s doctrinal work. Its purpose was to stimulate innovative thinking 

would create a prominent role for the service in the joint doctrine process. Its inte

audience was primarily within the Navy, but the paper was aimed also at the Ma

CHAPTER SIX

* Available at www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ffseanoc.html.

† “The Navy Operational Concept: Forward . . . From the Sea,” Sea Power 40, no. 5 (May 

pp. 15–22.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
work for its operations and to emphasize that the Navy had roles beyond its connection

to the Marine Corps in amphibious warfare.

The key drafter was Capt. Joseph Bouchard, USN, then head of the Strategy and Concepts Branch (N-513) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Johnson

directed Bouchard to work closely with Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, Director

for Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N-6). Vice Admiral Cebrowski

was at this time separately developing the concept of network-centric warfare, which

Johnson first publicly announced at Annapolis on 23 April 1997, a month after “The

Navy Operational Concept” appeared.* 

Foreword by Admiral Jay L. Johnson, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations

The Navy and Marine Corps published . . . From the Sea in 1992 as our combined

vision for the 21st century. Since then, we have been constantly checking our bearings

to ensure we stay on course. We refined our direction in 1994 with Forward . . . From

the Sea. These two documents continue to drive the on-going process of innovation

that is rapidly transforming the Navy into a 21st century force.

I have expressed my vision for the Navy in four guiding stars: operational primacy,

leadership, teamwork, and pride. This paper promulgates guidance on operational primacy—the ability to carry out swiftly and effectively any naval, joint or coalition mission and to prevail decisively over any foe that may oppose us. It directs how we operate

Forward . . . From the Sea across the three components of the National Military Strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win.

This paper sets our direction for operational primacy in the next century. Emerging

technology and innovative operational concepts are creating new opportunities for

employing naval forces in support of national strategy. We will have an integral role in

future joint operations, including those described in Joint Vision 2010. In the 21st century as today, the most important contributions we make to national security will

exploit fully the advantages we gain from operating on, under, above and from the sea.

Introduction

The Navy’s unique contributions to national security stem from the advantages of

operating on, under, above and from the sea. This is the message of Forward . . . From

the Sea. The primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project American

power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across

* Capt. Joseph Bouchard, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Swartz, Fred Rainbow, Ronald R. Harris, and

Hattendorf, 20 March 2006; Dr. Joseph F. Bouchard, “Thoughts on Selected Navy Capstone Doc

uments,” unpublished paper, 8 April 2005.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
describes how we do it today, and how we will do it in the future.

The roles of America’s armed forces are defined by the three components of the

National Military Strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict preve

and fight and win. Although national policy changes as the strategic landscape ev

there will be continued emphasis on using the armed forces across this spectrum

Operations in peacetime and crisis to—maintain regional economic and politica

bility are traditional roles of the Navy–Marine Corps team. These roles are roote

our fundamental ability to maneuver independently of political constraints and 

and win. A key operational advantage of forward-deployed naval forces is that w

vide on-scene capabilities for executing simultaneously all three components of t

National Military Strategy, and do so without infringing on any nation’s sovereignt

advantage exists because we operate in international waters. Our hallmark is forwa

deployed forces with the highest possible readiness and capability to transition

instantly from peace to crisis to conflict. This flexibility positions us to fight and 

early, or to contain conflict. More importantly, our presence may prevent conflic

gether. By any standard or measure, peace is cheaper than war.

Our forces are optimized for this forward role in national strategy. As we enter th

century, we will continue to develop and adopt innovative concepts and technolo

remain the force on the cutting edge of our nation’s defense.

How the Navy Operates

Forward. . .From the Sea provides the basis for a simple, yet powerful, operationa

cept of how we will operate to carry out expeditionary operations. We conduct f

naval operations both to ensure unimpeded use of the seas and to project Ameri

influence and power into the littoral areas of the world. Expeditionary operation

achieve U.S. objectives across the spectrum of the National Military Strategy. The

potent and cost-effective alternative to power projection from the continental Un

States and are suited ideally for the many contingencies that can be deterred or q

handled by forward-deployed forces. Expeditionary operations complement, ena

and dramatically enhance the effectiveness of continental power-projection force

when a larger military response is needed.

Our attention and efforts will continue to be focused on operating in and from t

littorals. The landward side of the littoral can be supported and defended directl

the sea. It encompasses areas of strategic importance to the United States. Sevent

percent of the Earth’s population and a similar proportion of national capitals an

major commercial centers lie in the littorals. These are the places where America

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
deployed naval forces, the littorals are a starting point as well as a destination. Tactically, the distance we reach inland from the sea depends on terrain and weather, the

contributions of joint and coalition forces, the potential adversary’s capabilities, and

the nature of our mission. The mission may require us to exercise our considerable

reach and operate far inland.

We will deploy carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups with embarked

Marines to provide naval expeditionary forces for the Combatant Commanders. When

required, we deploy separate units—such as for maritime interception force operations—but each remains capable of being integrated into a larger naval expeditionary

force. We train carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups together to ensure

immediate readiness for a wide range of contingencies. Once overseas, we disperse the

force and maintain a dynamic presence posture. Our forces are constantly in motion to

make their capabilities visible throughout the theater while carrying out numerous

simultaneous missions in support of U.S. interests. We can operate individual units—

such as submarines—independently or completely integral to the force. We link dispersed units as an integrated force with command and control networks. When necessary for a specific crisis-response operation, we rapidly assemble elements of the force

into a mission-tailored task group, such as a surface battle group. We rapidly converge

from our forward deployment hubs to the scene of a potential conflict to deter aggression or to project power should deterrence fail. We take advantage of the reach of our

sensors and weapons to project power over vast areas from a dispersed, networked

force—concentrating combat power rather than our platforms and delivering firepower far inland when required by the mission. We are on-scene and ready for peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning.

Peacetime Engagement

The Navy’s role in peacetime engagement is to project American influence and power

abroad in support of U.S. efforts to shape the security environment in ways that promote regional economic and political stability. Stability fosters a sense of security in

which national economies, free trade practices, and democracies can flourish. Democratic states, especially those with growing economies and strong trade ties, are less

likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States. Thi

stability and cooperation, which our peacetime engagement promotes, assists in meeting security threats and promoting free trade and sustainable development. We execute

peacetime engagement by staying constantly engaged abroad as a visible tool of U.S.

foreign policy and by supporting U.S. coalition-building efforts.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
policy. Our global presence ensures freedom of navigation on international trade

routes and supports U.S. efforts to bring excessive maritime claims into complian

with the international law of the sea. When disaster strikes, we provide humanita

assistance, showing American compassion in action. Our forward deployments a

include a wide range of diplomatic activities, such as: sending Sailors and Marin

ashore as representatives of the American people; bringing foreign visitors onto 

eign U.S. naval vessels; and carrying out a wide range of community relations ac

These efforts promote American democratic ideals abroad, enhance mutual resp

and understanding with the peoples of other countries, and demonstrate U.S. su

for friendly governments. Our forces support U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at sh

the security environment, such as improving relations with former adversaries o

reducing tensions with potential adversaries. We take advantage of our mobility 

sovereignty at sea to extend the reach of U.S. peacetime engagement efforts to co

tries not readily accessible by other forces.

Our forward-deployed forces support peacetime coalition building efforts. We ex

and train frequently with the naval, ground and air forces of friendly nations, im

ing our ability to operate together and increasing mutual understanding, confide

and respect. These exercises allow us to explore means of coordinating the opera

of diverse forces to achieve maximum combat power. We build confidence in U.S

rity pledges by demonstrating our ability to ensure that land-based forces deploy

from the continental United States will have ready access to the region in a crisis

Deterrence and Conflict Prevention

Signaling with military forces is an important element of deterring aggression an

venting conflicts, and forward-deployed naval forces are a superb means of signa

U.S. capabilities and resolve to friend and foe alike. Credible military presence in 

of long-standing interest or immediate concern reaffirms the U.S. leadership role

abroad, reassures allies with tangible proof of U.S. commitment to their security

helps prevent potential sources of instability from generating crises. We deter by pu

potent combat power where it cannot be ignored, and by serving as a highly visib

symbol of the overwhelming force the United States can deploy to defeat aggress

We enhance the credibility of conventional deterrence by demonstrating our com

capabilities in live-fire training and in exercises with friends and allies.

In peacetime, we position the wide range of capabilities inherent in naval expedi

ary forces where they are readily available for any contingency. Operating in inte

tional waters, our forces are sovereign extensions of our nation, free of the politi

constraints that can hamper land-based forces. We put the right capability in the 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
warning that either would not justify costly deployments from the continental United

States, or might be insufficient to persuade nations in the region to host U.S. forces on

their soil. When a visible presence might be provocative or foreclose U.S. military

options, we can position submarines covertly to provide on-scene surveillance capabili

ties and firepower. Rotational deployments allow us to maintain our forward posture

indefinitely. We spread our surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities across a wide

area, providing detailed coverage that improves our knowledge and understanding of

the region. We maintain combat readiness during forward operations by training and

exercising regularly for potential contingencies. As we carry out peacetime tasks in distant waters, we often are laying the groundwork for a crisis-response operation or joint

campaign that has not yet even begun.

Ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deterrence patrols will continue to be an essential

element of U.S. strategy for deterring a wide range of potential threats. SSBNs are central to U.S. nuclear strategy due to their stealth and survivability, the reliability and

security of their command and control systems, and the accuracy and flexibility of

their weapons.

Forward-deployed naval forces rapidly bring a wide range of capabilities to bear in crisis response operations. We can take direct action to protect American lives and interests, to prevent an unstable situation from deteriorating further, and to control or even

resolve a crisis. In recent years, naval crisis response has included landing Marines to

reinforce endangered U.S. embassies, non-combatant evacuation operations, maritime

interception operations to enforce international sanctions, show of force operations to

counter intimidation and deter aggression, escort operations to protect shipping

endangered by a local conflict, and air and missile strikes against transgressors. We pro

vide on-scene command and control capabilities for rapidly executing joint crisis

response operations. Our self-sustaining endurance allows us to remain on scene as

long as necessary to stabilize or resolve the situation. When required, we rapidly redeploy—without incurring additional expense or political debts—to deter a potential

aggressor who might exploit U.S. involvement in a major contingency elsewhere.

Naval deterrence and crisis-response operations prevent aggressors from achieving a

fait accompli. Having combat-credible naval forces on scene shapes the battlespace and

demonstrates our capability to halt aggression early in a conflict, well before the

aggressor can achieve his objectives. These efforts to deter aggression and resolve crises

while prudent, do not always succeed—but our efforts make a profound difference in

how we think about our role in a potential conflict. Our ability to shape the battlespace

well before a joint campaign commences is vital because even small changes in the

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
aggression early in a conflict. We enhance the credibility of deterrence by thwarti

potential aggressor who hopes to prevail by delaying or disrupting the U.S. respo

Our organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities augment nat

sensors, enhancing U.S. awareness of a potential aggressor’s activities. We can do th

overtly—with surface ships and aircraft—signaling U.S. interest in the situation an

covertly—with submarines and Naval Special Warfare units—learning what we ne

know without being provocative or tipping our hand as to our future intentions.

On-scene naval forces begin shifting the strategic and operational situation in th

of the U.S. and its allies by forcing a potential aggressor to consider our combat c

bility when formulating his plans. We make it exceedingly difficult for an adversa

target us and deny him the option of pre-emption by keeping our forces disperse

moving, by operating unpredictably or covertly, and by employing deception. Th

range of options we provide for immediate response to aggression leaves a poten

aggressor uncertain of the intended U.S. course of action. This uncertainty keeps 

off balance, disrupting his ability to formulate a coherent campaign plan and ero

confidence in his ability to effectively execute operation plans. Uncertainty may c

a leader to redeploy forces from his main objective to hedge against our wide ran

capabilities. Our sensors can monitor such redeployments to detect weaknesses o

we can exploit. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations in the Arabian Gulf duri

Desert Shield demonstrated these advantages by pinning down significant Iraqi f

on Kuwaiti beaches during Desert Storm.

We extend our protective shield over allies, potential coalition partners, and criti

infrastructure ashore to enhance the effectiveness of deterrence. Our emerging th

air and missile defense capabilities are particularly important elements of our sh

We create a sanctuary that neutralizes a potential aggressor’s attempts at intimid

and encourages the perception that he is powerless to prevent the U.S. from reinf

our allies. This reality may cause him to alter campaign plans, forego use of certa

forces or weapons, or focus efforts on more limited objectives.

Fight and Win

We will take advantage of our robust command and control systems and the reac

our sensors and weapons to concentrate combat power from dispersed, networke

forces and project power far inland. In contingencies of limited size and duration

project power with decisive impact ashore. In larger conflicts, we are an integral 

joint operations to fight and win. We have a vital role throughout a joint campai

from beginning to end.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
The United States normally enters a conflict in response to aggression against an ally o

vital American interest. Consequently, U.S. and allied forces are usually on the strategic

defensive early in a conflict. Our ability to deliver a wide range of naval firepower and

generate very high aircraft sortie rates can have major impact on the course and outcome of a conflict, especially during this critical early period of a joint campaign, when

continental U.S.-based forces are just starting to arrive in theater. We can use submarines, lurking covertly in littoral waters, to deliver naval fires or special operations

forces where the enemy least expects to be attacked. Our forces also take offensive

action to hold enemy centers of gravity at risk and seize the strategic advantage. We

degrade and destroy enemy defensive systems with uniquely naval offensive operations

including suppression of enemy air defenses, leaving opponents vulnerable to sustained attacks. While we are crippling enemy defenses, we hit his offensive forces hard

to disrupt important campaign objectives and to achieve a quick fait accompli.

Initial operations by forward naval forces are critical for enabling the joint campaign.

We ensure access to the theater for forces surging from the United States by supporting

coalition forces to keep them in the fight, by seizing or defending shore bases for landbased forces, and by extending our defensive systems over early-arriving U.S. joint

forces ashore. Our ability to dominate the littorals, including the undersea environment, allows us to operate with impunity in the face of enemy area denial threats while

taking initial action to defeat those threats and prepare the battlespace for follow-on

forces. By defeating enemy area denial threats and keeping vital sea and air lanes open,

we ensure an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements into the theater. We provide highly

capable afloat command and control capabilities to launch initial combat operations

without delay. For example, we lead early efforts to gain air superiority and take the

war to the enemy by initially taking charge of the joint air battle as afloat Joint Force

Air Component Commander. Our forward-deployed fleet flagships and carriers can

provide fully equipped afloat command centers for the Commander Joint Task Force,

as we did when USS Mount Whitney served as afloat JTF headquarters in Operation

RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. Our afloat systems allow joint forces deploying from the continental United States to “plug” into on-scene networked command

and control systems.

Our counter to the aggressor seeking to prevent the United States from bringing in

overwhelming forces is to disrupt and exploit enemy efforts to target U.S. and allied

forces. Area denial threats to joint air, ground and maritime forces include enemy tacti

cal and theater ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, air threats, and sea

denial capabilities. They also include enemy use of ground or special operations forces

to seize or destroy vital en route and on-scene infrastructure ashore. Area-denial

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:16 PM
not defeat us, but they can delay our response, prolong the conflict and increase 

cost of thwarting aggression. Our ability to counter enemy area-denial threats eff

tively with potent information warfare, power projection and force-protection ca

ities increases our decisive impact early in a joint campaign. The more an enemy

depends on denial capabilities to achieve his objectives, the greater our impact w

we defeat those capabilities.

Naval operations continue throughout the joint campaign. Naval operations incl

delivering precision naval fire, conducting naval operational maneuver, providin

tection for joint and coalition forces ashore, keeping the seaborne logistics pipeli

flowing, and remaining on scene after the joint campaign to enforce sanctions an

maintain regional stability.

We deliver precision naval fires to accomplish strategic, operational and tactical o

tives. Precision means having the desired effect on the enemy, limiting collateral 

age, lessening the risk to our forces, and achieving maximum impact with our co

resources. We can deliver all naval fires—strike, interdiction and fire support—w

degree of accuracy required to accomplish the mission. We exploit the tactical de

gain from our weapons reach to attack the enemy throughout the battlespace. Pr

includes smart targeting, so that our ordnance is directed against key targets for 

est impact, and rapid, accurate battle damage assessment. New systems, such as

unmanned aerial vehicles and afloat mission planning systems, are essential elem

of smart targeting. Precision also includes extremely accurate delivery of “level-o

effort” munitions. We must organize our forces and focus their efforts to rapidly 

decisively accomplish campaign objectives. Precision encompasses how we emplo

Naval Special Warfare forces and Marines, as well as naval fires. In some tactical 

tions, such as operations on urban terrain, a SEAL or Marine with a sniper rifle m

the optimum precision weapon.

The closely related concepts of naval operational maneuver and speed of comma

define how we employ naval combat power to have decisive impact ashore. Nava

ational maneuver means using the advantages we gain by operating on and from 

sea to establish operational and strategic advantage over enemy forces ashore. W

this by defeating enemy sea denial efforts and gaining maritime superiority, thus 

viding unimpeded use of strategic sea lanes and freedom of operation in littoral 

We take advantage of our maritime superiority by operating in the fluid manner

described earlier—dispersed, yet rapidly concentrated; constantly moving and ev

changing; appearing to be a distant threat far over the horizon, then suddenly str

the enemy where he felt secure. Our simultaneous ability to attack the enemy

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
ates an inescapable tactical quandary. Not knowing when or where we will strike, the

enemy must either concentrate his forces where he guesses we will attack, or spread his

forces to defend as many potential targets as possible. In either case, the enemy exposes

weaknesses we can exploit.

Our superior speed of command enhances the advantages of operating from the sea.

Speed of command is the ability to rapidly collect information, assess the situation,

develop a course of action, and immediately execute with overwhelming effect. Just as

in the modern high-tech market place, speed of command achieves disproportionately

larger returns for relatively modest, but precisely placed, initial investments. This capability is characterized by extraordinarily high rates of change that lock out enemy solutions, while locking in our success. We use speed, deception and surprise to create and

exploit enemy vulnerabilities, to seize rapidly fleeting opportunities, and to shift the

tactical and operational situation to our advantage. We apply combat power in a hightempo continuum, vice in incremental steps, to keep the enemy disoriented and reactive, unable to take the initiative or carry out a coherent plan of action. Our actions

foreclose enemy options to reverse our gains or alter the ultimate outcome of a conflict, and develop powerful self-fulfilling expectations of victory that demoralize the

enemy while increasing coalition and domestic support.

Naval forces can provide sustained protection for joint and coalition forces ashore, creating a sanctuary from which they can operate at will against the enemy. We support

joint and coalition forces ashore, securing vital sea and air lines of communication,

establishing battlespace dominance in the littoral, and providing defensive capabilities,

such as air superiority and theater ballistic missile defense. Just as important, we use

offensive operations to protect forces by countering threats at their source, placing the

enemy on the defensive, and degrading his ability to employ his forces.

As we have always done, we keep the vital seaborne logistics pipeline flowing throughout the joint campaign. During the 1991 Gulf War and every other large-scale conflict

in this century, more than 95 percent of all material, supplies, and equipment sent to

the theater went by sea. We protect strategic sealift and afloat prepositioning ships and

logistics facilities critical for large-scale joint operations.

Finally, naval forces can remain on scene after the joint campaign concludes to enforce

sanctions and to maintain a U.S. presence for regional stability. We prevent the need

for yet another joint campaign by taking advantage of our self-sustaining endurance to

keep combat credible forces in the region. Our most significant contribution well may

be to prevent the next conflict entirely through our forward presence for engagement

and deterrence.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
Forward . . . From the Sea emphasizes that projecting influence and power ashore

requires naval forces shaped for joint operations. Joint Vision 2010 provides the t

plate for joint combat operations in the 21st century and envisions future joint c

operations leveraging information superiority to execute dominant maneuver, p

sion engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. These opera

concepts were anticipated in large measure by Forward . . . From the Sea. In many 

the Navy is at the leading edge of Joint Vision 2010 capabilities. We will continue

actively to develop and implement a wide range of technological and operationa

vations. Our Fleet Battle Lab experiments will be a process by which we make vit

tributions to these efforts. The fleet is our battle lab. We will test new ideas and

equipment every time we deploy or get underway for a significant exercise.

Our innovation efforts will examine operational concepts and doctrine, how we 

nize and command our forces to carry out our missions, the capabilities of futur

tems and platforms, the manner in which we provide maintenance and supply su

and the education and training of our people. We will focus our innovation and 

ernization efforts in the following areas.

Naval forces will be able to provide sea-based overt and covert surveillance, recon

sance, and information warfare capabilities for joint forces, and sea-based comm

and control up to the Commander Joint Task Force level. Our forces will be integ

into networked command and control systems that provide a common tactical p

of the battlespace to all commanders and are fully interoperable with joint comm

and control systems. Our Cooperative Engagement Concept will provide an unp

dented level of battlespace awareness and combat power by linking the sensors a

weapons systems of an entire force into a highly integrated network. We will ach

faster speed of command, closer joint integration, and enhanced means of ensur

warrior has the right information in the optimum display for immediate action.

We will be a full partner in developing new amphibious warfare concepts and cap

ties for implementing the Marine Corps concept Operational Maneuver from the 

(OMFTS). OMFTS emphasizes using the sea as a secure area from which to cond

ship-to-objective movement. We will have a vital role in OMFTS-style operation

part of a highly integrated sea-air-land combined-arms team. We will provide

enhanced naval fires, force protection, command and control, surveillance and re

naissance, and logistics support for Marines ashore—enabling the high-tempo o

tions envisioned by OMFTS.

We will be capable of providing every type of joint fire the nation requires, throu

the battlespace and with the precision the operation dictates. We will deliver prec

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
networked command and control systems and cooperative engagement, are a significant step in this direction. We will be able to deliver a large volume of firepower

through new ways of achieving very high aircraft sortie rates and new weapons and

platforms for delivering joint fires. Emerging precision and information capabilities

rapidly are making traditional views—that specific platforms (air, surface or

subsurface) and specific types of ordnance (missile, bomb or shell) have specialized

roles—obsolete. We will deliver integrated joint fires with enhanced range, lethality,

accuracy and timeliness from aircraft, ships and submarines for any type of mission.

Building upon our already robust information, air and maritime superiority capabilities, we will provide integrated protection for joint and coalition forces. Naval defensive capabilities, such as theater air defense and ballistic missile defense, will be

integrated with joint systems for maximum protection of the joint force. Our defensive

capabilities will complement land-based systems and in some situations may be the only

U.S. capabilities readily available, particularly in the opening phase of a crisis or conflict. We will enhance the range, lethality and joint integration of our force-protection

capabilities and enhance our ability to defeat sea-denial threats and dominate the littoral battlespace.

We will increasingly be capable of providing secure afloat joint logistics support. Our

logistics innovation efforts will enhance strategic sealift and seaborne logistics. These

efforts also support Department of Defense initiatives to improve logistics support,

such as the total asset visibility system and “just-in-time” logistics. We will seek alternatives to maintaining large quantities of spares and explore ways of enhancing the

joint and commercial commonality of system components.

Conclusion

The Navy’s course for the 21st century set by Forward . . . From the Sea has proven to b

the right one for executing our critical roles in all three components of the National

Military Strategy and for conducting the future joint operations envisioned in Joint

Vision 2010. We will maintain our on-going process of technological and operational

innovation that has put us on the cutting edge of future warfighting capabilities. Our

Navy people—well-led, working as a team, and taking pride in our Navy—will be the

source of these innovations. The imagination and initiative of individual Sailors have

given our Navy a rich heritage of innovation. Our people will keep us on a steady

course toward continued operational primacy as we enter the 21st century.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
“Anytime, Anywhere:

A Navy for the 21st Century”

The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings of November 1997 published the article “A

Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century.”* This document appeared just seven mo

after “The Navy Operational Concept,” reprinted in the last chapter. “Anytime, A

where” was designed to be quite different from the latter, presenting a broad publ

vision for the Navy, where “The Navy Operational Concept” focused on doctrina

ters. Written within the same broad context, “Anytime, Anywhere” was additiona

affected by events that had occurred since the publication of “The Naval Operatio

Concept.” Chief among them were the publication of the results of the Defense De

ment’s first Quadrennial Defense Review and General Shalikashvili’s announcem

the updated National Military Strategy, “Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Milita

Strategy for a New Era,” both of which appeared in May 1997. The National Def

Panel’s report appeared just a month after “Anytime, Anywhere.”

“Anytime, Anywhere” was the second of Admiral Johnson’s three key documents t

on strategy and operational concepts. It was designed to be a statement of positiv

gic vision for the Navy and its future development, one that would offset the bad 

ity from the series of unfortunate incidents, including Admiral Boorda’s death, w

Navy had suffered over the past decade. The article was part of Admiral Johnson’

to get the Navy out of this sort of headline news and establish a low-key but posit

lic presence. The article was meant to put substance behind Johnson’s idea, which 

shared privately with President Clinton, that “the Navy was going to steer by the 

that were out ahead of us and not the wake that was behind us.”†

The article was drafted in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, at the CNO 

utive Panel (N-00K), by Capt. Ronald R. Harris, USN, and Capt. Edward A. Sm

USN. Their work was overseen and inspired by the CNO Strategic Planning Grou

which consisted of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Donald Pilling; the 

CHAPTER SEVEN

* U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 1997), pp. 48–50.

† Johnson quoted from an interview in Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., American Admiralship: The M

Imperatives of Naval Command (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 35.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assets (N-8), Vice

Adm. Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.; the Chief of Naval Information, Rear Adm. Kendall

Pease; and Captain Harris as director of the CNO Executive Panel. Smith became the

principal writer of the article and, at one point, it was going to be published as a joint

article by Admiral Johnson and Smith together. As the initial basis of the article, Smith

utilized a draft article he had written earlier, but never submitted, based on his earlier

work from the Boorda period and the first months of Johnson’s tenure as Chief of Naval

Operations. The title of the article echoed the motto of Captain Harris’s former command, Destroyer Squadron 32, “Anywhere, Anytime”—which the Naval Institute

reversed in publishing the article.* 

As it looks to the 21st century, the Navy is redefining sea power: to shape the strategic

environment, fight through any opposition, and project and sustain enough power

ashore—carrier air, gunfire, missiles, and Marines—to deter a conflict, stop an aggressor, or pave the way for heavier joint forces. Simply put, the U.S. Navy will influence,

directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea—anytime, anywhere.

This is an exciting time for the U.S. Navy, a time of great promise and a time to make bold

plans for the future. We stand on the threshold of a new century, in an era of almost dizzying technological change. Change is our ally. It presents an unprecedented opportunity to

transform the face of warfare, to give a new dimension to sea power, and to expand enormously the contribution that the U.S. Navy will make to our nation’s security.

Yet, this also is a time of transition, with the concomitant uncertainty, dislocation, and anxiety—a period that will be marked by continued crises and threats to American lives and

security and in which maintaining the operational primacy of our naval forces will be critical. We are unquestionably the world’s premier maritime power, but I foresee a 21st century

in which “power” will be measured differently from today and in which power from the sea

more than ever will be the key to shaping the peace and stability of a troubled world.

We already are shaping our Navy to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The

landmark 1992 white paper “. . . From the Sea” took the first steps, followed by “Forward . . . from the Sea” in 1994 and the “Navy Operating Concept” earlier this year.

Each of these steps revolved around a simple idea: the purpose of the U.S. Navy is to

influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea—anytime, anywhere.

That straightforward statement is the core of my vision of 21st-century naval power. It

describes who we are and what we do. It encompasses our broad missions of sea control, power projection, presence, and deterrence, and it says how we will use naval

* Capt. Robert L. Harris, USN (Ret.), manuscript notes to Swartz; Edward A. Smith, Jr., e-mail to

Hattendorf, 10 July 2006.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
tary Strategy, while we continue to perform enduring operations such as sanctio

enforcement and strategic sealift. But it does more than that. It says to the Ameri

people that we, with our sister services, can and will shape the strategic environm

and have a decisive impact from the sea on the crises and conflicts of the future; 

we can and will fight our way through any opposition at sea or in the air; and tha

can project and sustain enough power ashore—carrier air, gunfire, missiles, and

Marines—to deter a conflict, to stop an aggressor, or to pave the way for heavier 

forces. That is a bold promise and a greater task than any other navy has ever un

taken. Our challenge—the challenge of every Navy man and woman, and mine m

all—is to implement that bold promise, now and in the decades to come.

New Challenge, Old Realities

Three points are obvious to me from the outset:

• A military force that cannot win is worthless, in war and peace.

• War is a messy endeavor with unpredictable outcomes.

• A big part of being more effective is being able to fight smarter.

The first point means that the focus of whatever we do has to be our ability to w

conflict, anytime, anywhere. We cannot sacrifice today’s readiness to invest in tom

row’s promises. We must be able to answer the call both tomorrow and today.

The second point says that there is no simple, absolute technological answer to a

warfare problems. We cannot assume that our future conflicts will be swift and b

less. We still will face many contingencies in which more traditional combat capa

ties on land and at sea will be needed and may be our only option. We must take 

advantage of new technologies, but we also must retain traditional combat skills

The final point says that we must move aggressively to harness change and make 

work for us. However, there is more to harnessing change than simply adapting n

technologies to current warfare tasks. We must think differently and creatively ab

what our Navy does and what it might do to better serve our nation in the years 

Specifically, we must ask ourselves how we can give a highly trained, well-equipp

perhaps smaller military force such as ours an impact so disproportionate to its n

bers as to make it decisive in peace and in war. That problem is not unique to the 

all of our sister services are grappling with the same dilemma. The Navy, howeve

brings unique sea-based solutions to the equation and can make a unique contri

to our country’s security.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
Mahan was right: navies are about more than just fighting other navies; they are powerful instruments of national policy whose special strength stems from their ability to

command the seas. In fact, at the core of U.S. security requirements lies one prerequisite—sea control. U.S. military strategy is based on forward presence and power projec

tion—maintaining a presence in key regions and, when necessary, deploying and

sustaining sea, land, and air forces overseas. If we cannot command the seas and the

airspace above them, we cannot project power to command or influence events ashore;

we cannot deter; we cannot shape the security environment. That is a consequence of

our geography; it will not change in the 21st century.

What will change is our foes, ability to block such presence and power projection. Over

the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and information

technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for the forward deployment of our land-based forces. I anticipate that the next century will see

those foes striving to target concentrations of troops and materiel ashore and attack

our forces at sea and in the air. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem; it is an area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most

crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military power where it is needed.

The future world that I foresee will demand a new and expanded understanding of sea

control and battlespace dominance. It still will be necessary to dominate the air and sea

to secure the air and sea lanes and project power ashore; however, we also will have to be

able to defeat a foe’s land-, air-, and space-based surveillance and strike capabilities over a

broad theater of operations. We will have to merge our sea control seamlessly into control of the littorals and fully integrate our capabilities into the land battle. We can and

will do this. In fact, expanded sea control and battlespace dominance, as I see it developing, will encompass everything from an information warfare battle of surveillance systems, to precise strikes against critical surveillance nodes, to theater missile defense, to

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and a cooperative engagement capability that includes a comprehensive defense of both the fleet and forces ashore. Indeed, without the ability to assert such

area control, any sustained forward operations, whether by land-based or seabased forces

quickly could become very costly in American lives and very risky—if not impossible.

Power Projection

If expanded area control is our greatest challenge for the early 21st century, power projection is one of our greatest opportunities. I believe we will be able to use sea power in

a way that Alfred Thayer Mahan could only dream about at the turn of this century.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
aircraft and missiles of today’s Navy can project power to distances 1,000 miles o

from the coast, and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft can insert Marines hundreds of mil

inland. This means that our “littoral” operations even today can encompass mos

the earth’s land masses, more than 80% of its population, and most of its capital

major cities. And this is just the beginning. If we accept the challenge of a new ag

grasp its opportunities, our future sea power will take on a whole new dimension

As precision weapons become cheaper and more numerous, naval dominance of 

littorals will acquire a new scale and importance. Advanced joint and national in

tion and targeting systems will multiply the impact of our long reach with globa

battlespace awareness. This will enable us to mass the effects of distributed but p

fires from the sea wherever they will have the greatest effect and to support the la

battle well inland. In addition, they will give us the capacity to act and react so qu

as to anticipate and forestall an enemy’s moves. In short, we will possess the mea

disorient and shock an enemy sufficiently to break his resistance.

When these emerging capabilities are combined with traditional strengths of sea

power—such as the ability to maneuver freely in international waters and to sust

operations without bases or access for as long as needed—an exciting new dimen

of sea power begins to emerge. I envision a hard-hitting future naval campaign t

combines highly mobile Marine operations deep into the littoral with responsive 

air and fire support and long-range precision strikes—all mounted and sustained

entirely from the sea.

Presence and Deterrence

The Navy’s enhanced control and power projection capabilities also will have a ma

impact on the ability of naval forces to prevent war and to both shape and keep an

uneasy peace in the 21st century. One irreplaceable element is and will remain the 

gic nuclear deterrence of our ballistic-missile submarine force, but deterrence is m

than that. Our national strategy places great emphasis on the active use of military 

to prevent conflict, to shape our security environment, and to serve as the basis for 

ing peace. Forward naval presence always has been inextricably linked to conventio

deterrence, but I see a new dimension for sea power here, too. I look to a future in 

balanced forward naval presence will be increasingly vital in shaping the peace.

One reason for this expanded naval role already is apparent. The number of U.S. 

overseas is declining, and our access to facilities in friendly countries can be prob

atic—especially in times of crisis. Under such circumstances, the ability of naval 

to get where they are needed and to stay as long as needed is essential. Naval forc

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:17 PM
support its friends in time of need.

There is, however, an even more exciting prospect. Forward naval forces offer us the

opportunity to combine a demonstrable assurance of protection across the full range of

operations—including theater missile and air defense with balanced power projection

capabilities and an implied guarantee of a rapid expeditionary deployment of additional

forces from the continental United States. That is, we can use naval presence to foreclose

an enemy’s options entirely. Naval forces can deter by demonstrating that any aggression

large or small, is doomed to failure. No matter what a foe’s intentions or how much he

may strive for a swift military fait accompli, he would be forced to recognize that our

forces can deny him his objective, defend against his threats, and bring sufficient tailored

power to bear quickly enough to prevent even temporary success. In effect, forward nava

forces shape the peace by becoming a force-in-being—a tangible part of the local security

calculus that any would-be aggressor must take into consideration.

Deterrence also depends on the power our allies can bring to bear. Enhanced forward

naval forces will build such deterrence in two new ways. We will provide potential part

ners an offshore air and missile defense against an aggressor’s threats and thereby

enable them to freely join us or grant access to our land-based forces. And we will use

our technology, especially our battlespace awareness, to help them help themselves by

multiplying the impact of their forces and lending a new dimension to what they can

do in battle. Truly, forward naval forces are the key to regional stability.

We have the opportunity and the means to make the next century a golden age of maritime power. Over the past five years, we have come a long way. We have experimented

with new ideas and technologies and have made some hard choices. Now, the goal is

within our grasp. I challenge our Navy to think still more innovatively and to build on

the Navy–Marine Corps team’s unmatched expeditionary tradition. Together, we will

set a new standard for operational primacy both at sea and over vast overland reaches

of our chaotic world. We will redefine sea power in new, far-reaching terms that can

change the face of 21st-century warfare. And together, we will continue building a

strong, balanced Navy that will prevail today, tomorrow, and for decades to come—

anytime, anywhere.

Admiral Johnson is Chief of Naval Operation

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance with Lo

Range Planning Guidance”

In April 2000, Adm. Jay Johnson released the second edition of “Navy Strateg

Planning Guidance,” just three months before Adm. Vernon Clark relieved hi

Chief of Naval Operations on 21 July 2000. The last of the three key documen

touching strategy and operational concepts published during Johnson’s tenure

“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance,” appeared two and a half years after “An

Anywhere” in November 1997 and a year and a half after Richard J. Danzig b

his term as secretary of the Navy on 16 November 1998. It reflected the ideas 

ident Clinton’s 26 February 1999 speech, which became known as the “Clinto

trine” on selective intervention.

For some time before actual work began on this document, Capt. Joseph Bouc

and like-minded officers had observed that the Navy’s approach to strategy w

sporadic, that it needed ongoing and cyclical reviews to keep it attuned to cha

world affairs and joint planning, as well as linked to the Planning, Programm

and Budgeting System and the recurring Quadrennial Defense Reviews. Ther

considerable opposition in some quarters to a new process that might constra

getary flexibility within the specialized warfare communities. Nonetheless, th

all line of thinking made sense to many and led to work on “Navy Strategic P

Guidance,” as the Navy began to plan for the second Quadrennial Defense Re

scheduled for 2001.

In August 1999, the Navy had issued a “Strategic Planning Guidance,” but this h

classified, because of a section that contained intelligence information. It had bee

intended to provide specific guidance to the Navy in implementing the basic presi

and Defense statements on strategy: the National Security Strategy, the National 

tary Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance. The original “Navy Strategic Pla

Guidance” described “the organizing principles and operational concepts, and pr

by which future naval forces will exploit new opportunities and capabilities to ass

U.S. access and influence forward in the Information Age, despite an adversary’s 

to preclude our presence.”

CHAPTER EIGHT

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
the Navy as a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System document. Fairly quickly,

however, Navy Department officials distributed it to widen its influence and even posted it

on the Navy Department’s website, where it was cited as a source in publications.*

The principal person coordinating the writing work on the second “Navy Strategic

Planning Guidance” was Rear Adm. Joseph Sestak, head of the Strategy and Policy

Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (N-51). In addition, Sestak

was the principal driver and conceptualizer for this work. Within his office, Sestak

assigned responsibility to the N-512 branch, with Cdr. Craig Faller and Lt. Chris

Cavanaugh drafting.† 

Preface

As we continue to build a Navy for the Information Age, it is imperative that we remain

focused on both our enduring role of forward presence and our transformation to a

network-centric and knowledge-superior force. Implementing a strategy-based

approach to the planning, programming, and budgeting process will provide our

nation a Naval Service that remains capable of assuring U.S. access abroad and influence ashore in the 21st Century. The maritime concept described in Section III is the

first step in this process. It guides our transformation by describing the organizing

principles, operational concepts, and priorities by which future naval forces will exploi

new opportunities and capabilities to ensure our access forward. This second edition o

Navy Strategic Planning Guidance provides a critical bridge from the ideas contained in

our maritime concept to a set of prioritized strategic capabilities that are linked

directly to operational concepts and serve as the foundation for the Integrated Warfare

Architecture assessment process. The IWAR process then captures these prioritized

capabilities in end-to-end analyses, providing programmatic recommendations in the

form of the CNO’s Program Assessment Memorandum, upon which resource sponsors

base their programs.

In this planning cycle, we must all be cognizant of the upcoming Quadrennial Defense

Review. Our ultimate objective will be to maintain and enhance our ability to project

U.S. power and influence from the sea to directly and decisively impact events ashore

during peacetime, crisis, and war. Forward presence and knowledge superiority are the

two means upon which we will structure our Navy for the Information Age. Now and

in the future, our command of the seas must be complemented by an improved speed

* See, for example, Daniel Gouré, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,“ Naval War College Review,

volume LIV, no. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 23, footnote 6, in which the author refers to Chief of Nava

Operations (N3/N5), Navy Strategic Planning Guidance, April 2000, available at www.hq.navy

.mil/n3n5/files/NSPG2000.pdf.

† Cdr. Paul Nagy, USN, e-mail to Swartz, 12 April 2005; Cdr. Winton Smith, USN, e-mail to Swartz

27 June 2006; Bouchard, “Thoughts on Selected Navy Capstone Documents.”

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
expanded battlespace—sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. We must also outline 

our planning process the new mission areas that will become an integral part of 

Navy’s operations early in the 21st Century. As we expand this mission envelope 

include new capabilities such as Theater Missile Defense and Land Attack, we mu

ensure that we have the capacity to perform them with power and responsivenes

Throughout this planning process, we must also be mindful of our most valuable

resource: the men and women of the U.S. Navy. They are the brightest and most 

motivated individuals that our nation has to offer, and keeping faith with them i

highest duty. We must take full advantage of emerging technologies and concept

order to equip them with increasingly capable ships, aircraft, systems, and equipm

as they stand ready to respond to our nation’s call—anytime, anywhere.

Jay L. Johnson

Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Naval Operations

Introduction

This second edition of Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) provides a prio

set of capabilities to the IWAR/OPNAV PPBS planning process with direct strate

linkage to a maritime concept (described in Section III) that builds upon From t

and Forward . . . From the Sea and provides the organizing principles by which n

forces will exploit new concepts and capabilities to assure U.S. access forward in 

to continue to influence events directly and decisively ashore in the future. The N

expands on these principles and provides the conduit to translate the strategic gu

ance of the maritime concept into specific required operational capabilities that 

build the foundation upon which the OPNAV planning process will be based.

After detailing the key capabilities of potential 21st Century adversaries, based o

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assessment, the NSPG describes the maritime 

cept that provides the organizing principals and concepts developed in response 

ONI’s assessment. The NSPG then defines the strategy-based process that will be 

foundation of the OPNAV planning process in the 21st Century. This section inc

(1) a discussion of the genesis of the Operational Concepts that are based on the 

time concept; (2) the requirement for a set of prioritized operational capabilities 

form of Long Range Planning Objectives; (3) a description of the end-to-end cap

ity assessment process of the IWARs that will be used to guide the CNO’s Progra

Assessment Memorandum (CPAM) development and, finally; (4) because of the

unique implications of this upcoming planning process on the first Defense revie

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
Defense Review (QDR) and the potential naval implications. The fifth section of the

NSPG provides the critical link between these concepts and resources by providing a

series of Long Range Planning Objectives in the form of prioritized, strategy-based

capabilities. The last section of the document then presents a list of studies that the

Navy needs to undertake in order to help sustain our strategy in the future.

This document establishes the bridge from strategy to capabilities within the IWAR

assessment process. Accordingly, the IWAR assessment process will employ this guidance in their end-to-end analyses. The NSPG will be released on an annual basis in the

March–April timeframe, and will provide IWAR teams an updated focus on capability

priorities enhancing stability throughout a continuous planning process.

Abstract

The following is a brief synopsis of the remaining sections of the NSPG:

• Section II summarizes key 21st Century potential adversary capabilities. ONI

capabilities-based assessments offer IWAR teams the in-depth critical information

necessary for a rigorous analysis of potential adversary capabilities in the 21st

Century. Leveraging these analyses will be fundamental to a successful IWAR planning

effort, enabling IWAR Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) to clearly identify areas where

risks can be taken and where we need to hedge against an uncertain future.

• Section III contains a summary of the maritime concept that will guide the IWAR

and CPAM efforts in terms of the relevancy and the prioritized capabilities outlined

in Section V. In those instances where capabilities do not enhance the key tenets of

this concept, those capabilities should be considered lower priority.

• Section IV details the OPNAV PPBS planning process. Contained in this section is

an overview of the genesis for the operational concepts that are applied to each of

the “means” and “ways” of the martime concept, the Long Range Planning

Objectives associated with them, the background of the IWAR process and an

abstract of each IWAR domain, and finally, the issues/topics that will impact the

Navy in the upcoming QDR.

• Section V details the NSPG Long-Range Planning Objectives. It provides the link

between strategy and the assessment and programming process in the form of a series o

prioritized, strategy-based capabilities that will guide the CPAM/POM development.

• Section VI provides a listing of topics for study and analysis to be completed within

OPNAV, CNA, NWDC and the Fleet to better assess emerging concepts and

capabilities for the Navy of the future.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
timeframe to provide OPNAV planning forums an updated focus on capability p

ties. This will maximize stability throughout the continuous planning process.

Additional Planning Guidance Documents: Related documents that will significan

impact the continuing development of the PR-03 IWAR roadmaps and CPAM is

development include the FY02–07 Defense Planning Guidance and the PR-03 SE

Planning Guidance.

Section II: The Strategic Environment

The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncer

replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potent

grow more deadly.

PRESIDENT CLINTON, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, 

The Strategic Environment at the Turn of the Century

No one can predict with certainty the future security environment, but there are

emerging trends that make it imperative for our Navy to focus on the littorals an

land beyond. The growing role of regional and non-state actors in international 

and the increasing globalization of the world economic networks and systems po

a future security environment of greater complexity. These and other forces com

to lend uncertainty to the planning process.

To frame the planning guidance of Section V, the Navy assumes that no peer com

tor on a global scale will arise prior to 2020. The United States and the Navy will

remain engaged in areas of vital interest in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and th

Americas. Potential adversaries will obtain technologically advanced weapon syst

and access to sensor systems to employ these weapons in an effort to thwart our 

in geographically limited regions. We must continue to be prepared to fight and 

the high end of military conflict, while maintaining a clear focus on the day to da

shaping responsibility through the forward presence and engagement activities t

our forces conduct throughout the world.

In preparing for the high intensity end of conflict, the Navy must consider those 

tries, with the potential and desire to exercise regional hegemony which may be h

to the U.S. or its presence. These countries will seek to exercise influence antithet

U.S. interests in their corners of the world. The political influence of regional po

derived from their economic and military power, and they may often employ mi

strategies aimed at raising the perceived cost of engagement to the United States

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
region of influence.

The Navy must maintain the capability to dominate the maritime environment to dissuade global naval ambitions by a future regional power, while also retaining the capac

ity to handle operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and to perform

our enduring role in strategic deterrence. By ensuring credible U.S. combat capability

remains forward, the Navy assures U.S. influence is always present across the spectrum

of operations, promoting U.S. and allied interests through day to day engagement. This

engagement process also encompasses the spectrum of military operations other than

war (MOOTW), which repeatedly employ naval forces in missions such as humanitarian disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace support missions, enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, counterproliferation measures, and

rapid reaction to terrorism. Future forces also must be prepared to support law

enforcement agencies to deal effectively with non-military challenges to our national

security, such as illegal immigration, illegal drug trafficking, and other international

criminal activity. These types of activities will not necessarily be inhibited or stopped

through traditional military means; and, while these challenges pose less risk than war,

they occur with much greater frequency.

The Rise of Regional Actors

For the foreseeable future, regional and local actors will continue to pursue increased

influence within their areas of interest. These actors include rogue states, states with

aspirations of regional hegemony, and new non-state actors with a capability to influence events on a disproportionate scale. While none are projected to have the ability to

challenge the United States on a global scale, the availability of weapons and technology on the global market permits potential adversaries the opportunity to challenge

U.S. interests on a limited or regional scale.

Each of the world’s countries has its own approach to its national defense, but none

can match the United States’ capability to project power and very few, if any, can confront the United States on equal terms, even close to their own territories. Some, however, can mount a defense designed to discourage the United States from initiating or,

once initiated, from continuing operations against their forces and territory. Analysts

in the United States have collectively termed these widely differing strategies as “area

denial” strategies.

The objective of an area denial strategy is to form the impression that presence in, or entry

into, the region would produce unacceptable losses, thereby limiting U.S. involvement and

influence. An area denial strategy may employ naval mines, submarines, anti-ship cruise

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
movement of U.S. forces into or through an area. The objective is not necessarily 

destroy U.S. forces but to inflict enough damage to make the political cost of inv

ment in a region unacceptably high.

The increased globalization of the world marketplace puts sophisticated military 

nology in the hands of any nation or group with sufficient economic means. Ult

mately, the success of any foreign area denial strategy relies on U.S. willingness a

ability to remain forward to enable the successful transition to conflict and in or

fight and win any contingency.

Globalization

The interconnection and interdependence of national economies, networks and 

tems present new challenges in the security environment. This globalization affe

every day operations as well as future planning. The global economy permits the 

spread proliferation of advanced weapons which has the potential to limit the tra

tional technological edge of U.S. weapons and sensors. We must also recognize th

globalization and the power available from access to the new competitive domain 

cyberspace provides a new international medium for non-state, as well as region

actors to advance their agendas by unconventional means.

As borders open and the flow of information, technology, money, trade and people across bor

creases, the line between domestic and foreign policy continues to blur. We can only preserve 

curity and well-being at home by being actively involved in the world beyond our borders.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENT

From terrorism to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, potential adve

will challenge us in innovative and insidious ways by using commerce, information 

technology readily available on the global market. The Navy must use cyberspace t

a superior knowledge position if we are to act with timeliness and decisiveness des

adversary’s denial efforts. Knowledge superiority combined with forward presence 

provide stability and further our national security objectives in an era of globalizat

The Naval Environment

Foreign military forces will acquire more effective and sophisticated sensors, weapo

and platforms over the coming two decades through indigenous and cooperative in

trial development, technology transfer and outright arms purchases. The force tha

best combine surveillance, strike, and support capabilities to secure control of the l

battlespace and large ocean areas will prevail. Despite the advances in the military 

bilities of foreign governments and non-state actors, it will be the intentions of the

actors, which will determine whether or not they pose a threat to U.S. naval forces.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
tion attack operations and pirates in small go-fast boats to fully modernized regional

combat fleets of surface combatants, aircraft and submarines. Capabilities will vary

from region to region and regime to regime and exist in virtually every theater from

East Asia to Western Europe and across the entire spectrum of operations from peacetime presence to combat missions.

Additionally, the potential for U.S. forces to be involved as a third party in a conflict

remains high, with several regions of the world where the United States retains vital

national interests, such as the Middle East and Korea, being historic areas of unrest.

Tensions exist in many other parts of the world on an international, national and subnational level, and the potential failure of a state, for example, may require U.S.

involvement in either support of a government or faction or in dealing with the

humanitarian crises resulting from civil war. It is from a posture of forward presence

that the Navy will respond to such crises.

In view of the above, there are two likely challenges for which our forces must be prepared: Potential Adversary Capabilities, and Probable Other Areas of Concern.

Potential Adversary Capabilities. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assesses that

our potential adversaries will continue to pursue area denial strategies over the next 15

to 20 years. These challenges will primarily be land-based and in the near-coastal regions. Some potential adversaries will expand their denial strategy to include space and

cyberspace as well as adjacent sea and air space to provide a defense in depth.

Both the sophistication and the performance of weapons will increase substantially.

Platform and weapons survivability will increase through multi-spectral signature con

trol and advanced countermeasure designs. Increasingly, these weapon systems and

platforms will be supported by more sophisticated sensor systems. This requires

sophisticated counter-targeting systems and doctrine to enable U.S. and allied forces to

defeat such weapons. There will be significant threats to forward presence forces from

defensive mine warfare; massed small boat attacks employing man-portable weapons;

advanced air, surface and submarine launched cruise missiles; and potential for chemical/biological weaponry. Another area of concern is the availability of advanced air

independent propulsion systems for submarines.

Ballistic missiles will remain the primary strike capability for many states. The range

and accuracy of available systems are expected to increase due to the proliferation of

technology and advances in miniaturization techniques, although the capability to target mobile naval forces will remain low. The greatest threat will be to allied state population centers and fixed infrastructures including both air and surface points of

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:18 PM
biological, and nuclear warheads.

Most states attempting area denial face a number of challenges in effectively exec

such a strategy. The most significant shortfalls are: (1) a lack of precision strike c

bility; (2) a lack of national or regional-level C4ISR capabilities; (3) a lack of cred

area air defense systems; (4) limited quantities of modern military equipment; an

an inability to sustain most military operations. However, many of the technolog

and systems required to overcome these shortfalls are readily available on the int

tional open market. The operational proficiency of potential adversaries must be

closely monitored to strategically anticipate risk.

The following areas are of specific interest and must be accounted for when cond

risk analysis. Each potential adversary capability is presented in the following for

Trends; Representative states pursuing; and U.S. Navy implications. Also listed is 

cast of future capabilities (including select friendly and neutral countries).

I. Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBM)

A. Trends:

The TBM threat continues to grow in complexity, and advances are to be expecte

multiple warhead technology that will allow for tactical flexibility. This implies b

multiple warheads on the same missile and different warhead types available for 

same missile system.

• Accuracy will improve due to satellite navigation and/or terminal guidance

capability. GPS will allow the user to quickly and accurately determine coordi

positions, thereby reducing targeting and set-up time.

• Warhead survivability will increase due to warhead cross section reduction, d

and onboard jammers included with the ballistic missile package.

B. States Pursuing:

Among the states pursuing advanced ballistic missile systems are Iran, Iraq, Liby

China, North Korea, Pakistan and India.

C. Navy Implications:

Challenges to battlespace control will increase as TBM/WMD technologies im

and proliferate. While mobile naval forces will remain difficult to target, the

greater accuracy of the systems will increase the risk in the future. The greate

ety of warheads and the potential for decoys make the defense of allied territ

more difficult. This will require a large number of interceptor missiles or imp

intelligence to allow for acceptable Pk on threats. These issues point out the n

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
courses of action.

II. Submarines

A. Trends:

The challenge of detecting, tracking, and if necessary, destroying nuclear and conventional submarines will increase. The driving factors are improved quieting techniques,

better submarine deployed sensors, improved torpedoes, and improved endurance for

conventional submarines.

• Improved quieting techniques increase the stealth of submarines. Advances are

occurring in pumpjet/propulsor technology, improved outer hull coatings, skewed

propellers, and machinery sound isolation mounting.

• Flank and towed array sonars are available for export.

• Improvements noted in torpedo technology include improved counter–counter

measures (CCM) that employ advanced logic, multiple influence fuses, and stealth

designs; ultra high speed torpedoes on the export market; and advanced seekers

capable of improved target discrimination in the littoral environment.

• The evolution and proliferation of air independent propulsion will greatly improve

the endurance of conventional submarines. The use of fuel cell technology will

allow submerged operation for up to thirty days with an acoustic signature

comparable to current battery operations.

B. States Pursuing:

Russia is one of the leaders in developing advanced submarine systems. The Russians

use exports to fund future quieting research and development. They are continuing to

develop ultra high-speed torpedoes. China and Iran employ advanced conventional

submarines and will continue to improve their ability to employ these platforms.

C. Navy Implications:

The reduction in detectability of future submarines and the increased export of the

technology impose significant challenges for naval operations in and beyond the

littorals. Advances in detection, prosecution and torpedo defenses are required.

III. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM)

A. Trends:

ASCM design trends indicate a focus on defeating ship air defense systems.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
speeds now through supersonic speeds in the next ten years to hypersonic by 20

• Designers are employing radar and IR signature reduction to reduce missile

detectability.

• Complex terminal maneuvers and seekers are being designed to tax point defe

systems with improved countermeasure discretion.

• Expect flight profiles to get lower in altitude, making detection and targeting 

more difficult.

B. States Pursuing:

Several suppliers of advanced cruise missiles compete in the world market. Russi

China and North Korea are all suppliers. In addition, several Western states are d

involved in advanced research and sales of cruise missiles. The missile market is g

and advanced missiles will be available to anyone with hard currency. Assume th

many states will have a variety of launch platforms, including manned aircraft, sh

submarines and mobile land based launchers.

C. Navy Implications:

Naval forces will be exposed to increased missile capabilities over time. To oper

effectively in the littorals, active and passive defense systems must be improved

Counter-targeting of launchers may provide the only high probability means o

defeating the threat.

At a minimum, ships will require advanced sensors to detect more stealthy mis

improved stealth characteristics to complicate enemy target selection, effective

hardkill and softkill capability and the ability to sustain missile damage and co

to function.

IV. Mines

A. Trends:

Mine warfare continues to provide many potential adversaries a potent and relatively 

pensive tactic for area denial. Significant advances are projected in the following area

• Improved explosives and directional warheads to improve lethality.

• Increased stealth through use of advanced materials.

• More complex, multiple influence fusing technology to reduce susceptibility t

current countermeasure techniques.

• Layered mine threats from the surf zone to deep water.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
• Mines designed to attack countermeasure platforms (e.g., helicopters).

B. States Pursuing:

Russia, China and North Korea have extensive mine stockpiles and sophisticated mine

tactics. Iran and Iraq have previously employed mine warfare in the Arabian Gulf. Due

to the low technology required to employ even very advanced mines, non-state actors

may easily use mines.

C. Navy Implications:

Naval forces must be able to either breach or avoid mine fields to execute a littoral

strategy. We must think in terms of “counter-mine” vice “mine countermeasures.”

This will require investment in intelligence and sensor capabilities. Adversary use

of mines may lead to significant delays in the execution of U.S. and allied operational plans.

V. Surface to Air Missiles

A. Trends:

Advances in airframes, propulsion, guidance and warheads will increase the lethality of

air defense systems both ashore and afloat.

• Improvements in airframes and propulsion will be required to meet the challenge o

countering ballistic missiles. These improvements will be equally effective against

air breathing systems.

• Sensor and fusing improvements will improve missile performance against stealthy

targets. These improvements will include multispectral guidance and search systems.

• These advances will also decrease the effectiveness of current countermeasure systems

B. States Pursuing:

Russia, China and Iran possess advanced weapons and are actively pursuing air defense

technology. Advanced man-portable missiles are expected to proliferate widely.

C. Navy Implications:

Counters to both manned and unmanned aircraft will improve. Battlespace attack with

missiles will also be more difficult.

• Manned aircraft will be placed at greater risk due to sophisticated air defense systems.

• The importance of stealth will continue, but Electronic Warfare support will

remain critical.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
A. Trends:

Surface warship design trends depict a movement toward modular construction 

signature reduction.

• Modular design allows for customer specific variation without significant adde

• All new surface combatants for sale on the world market incorporate signatur

reduction. Signature reductions include not just radar cross section reduction 

multi-spectral low observability (IR, visual, magnetic and acoustic).

• Fire control systems are beginning to evolve from radar/electro-optical (EO) t

combine radar/EO/IR and laser for AAW and ASUW.

• At the low technology end of the spectrum, the advances in man-portable we

increase the lethality potential of small boat attacks.

B. States Pursuing:

Major warship procurement is expensive. Russian production has decreased mar

over the past ten years. China is developing indigenous designs, and also is acqui

(at least) two Sovremennyy-class destroyers from Russia. Iran has the potential fo

acquiring advanced Western built warships. Iran is the major small boat operato

small boats are within the reach of all foreign countries.

Advanced weapons may be backfitted into older platforms, but many existing sh

reaching the end of projected service lives.

C. Navy Implications:

Advanced warships will require improved sensors for detection and targeting. W

global peer competitor is projected, the global arms market will make advanced 

available to many foreign actors. The increasing availability of technology will m

the individual warship lethal within its weapons envelopes.

VII. Identifying Future Capabilities

There are no states at present that can challenge the maritime capabilities of the 

States nor do there appear to be any within the timeframe of this estimate. There 

however, a small number of states that have been hostile to the United States, its 

cies, and, frequently, its allies—in some cases, for decades. There is no evidence o

son to believe that the most obvious examples, North Korea, and Iraq, will chang

attitudes. Therefore, they will continue to be of significant interest with regard to

future naval planning. Moreover, it is clear that other states could easily become 

and threatening to the U.S. and its interests; Iran’s “overnight switch” in 1979 fro

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
states that are also pursuing area denial capabilities but are not currently in an

adversarial relationship with the United States.

A. North Korea:

North Korea is, and likely will remain, at the lower end of the technology scale. Th

country nonetheless maintains significant coastal defense and monitoring capabili

ties. Primary area denial tactics would rely on mine warfare and cruise missiles.

The major shortcoming is the lack of advanced over-the-horizon sensors that limit

defensive measures to visual range. The development of ballistic missile technology

capable of attacking U.S. facilities and allies in the region utilizing a sizable chembio stockpile affords the North Koreans an avenue for attack. North Korea also has

been the source of ballistic missiles and related technology for Iran, Iraq, and

Pakistan.

B. Iran:

By virtue of its size and geographic location, Iran will remain a significant player

in the Persian Gulf region. Although recent political events in Iran hold the promise of improving relations between Iran and the U.S., no official Iranian “sea

change” with respect to U.S. interests and presence in the Gulf region has been

seen. Unless and until real movement towards better relations occurs, it is only

prudent to continue to accept Iran’s publicly stated positions and past actions representing Iran’s policies and stance towards the United States. Since one of Iran’s

most important goals is the eventual elimination of the U.S. presence from what

Iran considers its sphere of influence, there are bound to be periods of increased

tension, especially with U.S. naval forces that are the centerpiece of U.S. presence

in the Gulf. Iran employs a layered defense in support of a stated area denial strategy. The Iranians are actively seeking advanced aircraft, cruise missiles and mines.

The continued modernization of their forces increases the risk to opponents. The

mix of air, surface and subsurface platforms provides significant ability to control

strategic choke points in the Persian Gulf. Iran will continue to improve its capabilities over the coming years. Its geography and natural resources afford it the

ability to remain a significant player in the region. It is actively developing ballistic

missiles and WMD that will give it an area denial capability and the ability to hold

U.S. allies and its neighbors in the region at risk.

C. Iraq:

Iraq suffers from continued isolation and international sanctions. This forces reliance

on older systems. The elimination of the Iraqi Navy during the Gulf War limits the

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
for asymmetric attacks, principally with ballistic missiles and WMD. Iraq retains 

icant conventional ground forces at the low end of the technology scale, and reta

ability to hold its neighbors at risk.

D. China:

Heavy emphasis is being placed on modernizing both naval and air forces. Chi

seeks to develop or purchase effective electronic countermeasures, low observa

technologies, laser targeting, satellite navigation technology, improved space su

lance and tracking capability, anti-satellite weapons and advanced surface to ai

sile systems. Naval forces could expect limited coordinated joint air, surface an

subsurface attacks. At present Chinese C4ISR systems are poor to good with lim

range, but technology globalization offers the ready ability to improve in this a

Mine warfare offers China a means of area denial. In addition, China is trying 

jump several generations ahead in technology by purchasing submarines, surfa

ships, and cruise missiles. It is actively seeking system improvements across the

weapons spectrum, including the continued development of its ballistic missile

their nuclear capability.

E. Russia:

Russia continues to use arms and exports as a major source of hard currency. Mi

readiness and modernization has suffered greatly due to economic difficulties, bu

sia retains strategic and tactical capabilities, including an extensive NBC arsenal. 

terms of area denial capabilities, Russia maintains submarine, mine and cruise m

inventories. It is continuing to invest in research and development of sensors and

weapons. This research is often funded by foreign military sales.

Probable Other Areas of Concern. As previously noted, naval forces can expect t

involved in a multitude of missions at the lower end of the violence continuum. 

Navy must retain the capability to act in support of maritime interdiction operat

humanitarian support, terrorist reaction, and peace-support missions. These mis

are much more likely than regional—or even local—war and will require focused 

bilities. Of emerging interest are non-lethal force capabilities.

Military objectives in these types of actions are often less clear than during war. Th

objective is often not the destruction of an enemy force, but humanitarian action. 

requires tools to conduct relief operations and limited force demonstrations. Exam

such actions include hurricane relief operations in the Caribbean basin, maritime 

ception operations in support of United Nations sanctions, and peacekeeping oper

in numerous hot spots throughout the world. These operations remain dependent 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
world are poised to take prompt action in support of unplanned situations.

Of particular note, many of these situations require immediate response with very limited planning. The ability to gather and disseminate information on a daily basis during peacetime provides a background to conduct contingency operations in a crisis.

Short or no-notice tasking in response to either natural disasters or terrorist attack

remains highly likely for forward-deployed naval forces. The response required ranges

from providing basic life sustaining aid to precision military strikes.

At an increased level of violence, it is reasonable to assume that sustained low level tactical responses may be required to enforce U.S. policies. The continued pace of naval

operations following the Gulf War stands as a case in point. There has been a repeated

need to swing naval forces between theaters to support military action in order to contain a foreign actor with extra-territorial aspirations. The risk is not just war on a theater scale, but isolated situations of military violence. The requirement for knowledge

superiority is just as great in these circumstances. Naval forces must remain capable of

preempting hostile actions.

Significant proliferation of high technology weapons continues. The same weapons

that threaten U.S. forces during major theater wars will threaten them during smalle

scale contingencies. The technology proliferation factor must be considered in all

military planning. The risks to U.S. forces posed by this trend will continue to grow

as the technology improves and becomes more affordable and accessible through

globalization.

Any of the technologies discussed in the threat section are available to any nations or

groups with sufficient means to purchase them. Therefore, the most benign operations

may imply significant military risk from either state-controlled formal military groups

or other nonstate actors with technologically advanced munitions. The capabilities and

operational employment likely to be encountered include, but are not limited to:

• Massed small boat attacks, armed with a wide variety of man-portable weapons

including RPG’s, shoulder-launched missiles and automatic rifles

• Small-scale mining of strategic sea-lanes and straits

• Unalerted, single-salvo cruise missile attacks on naval and merchant shipping

• Short-range ballistic missile attacks upon civilian population centers or strategic

military installations

• Terrorist actions against U.S. or allied installations and personnel.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
must be postured appropriately to handle both the high-end and the lower-level

still lethal, capabilities:

• Ready Duty Strike

• Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

• Maritime Interception Operations

• No-Fly Zone Enforcement

• Migrant Interdiction—to include humanitarian operations, security operatio

potential hostile force interdiction

• Strategic Sealift/Pre-positioned Force Escort

• Engagement/Exercise

• Area Defense

• C4ISR and IPB.

Another emerging concern is asymmetric warfare—attempts to circumvent or un

mine U.S. strength while exploiting U.S. weaknesses using methods that differ sig

cantly from the expected method of operations. Asymmetric approaches often em

innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be applied 

levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical and across the spectrum of 

tary operations. Asymmetric warfare may range from weapons of mass destructi

to guerrilla warfare, but it is almost always intended to be unanticipated or diffic

counter by the stronger opponent. It is clear that the imperative for future oppon

to employ asymmetric counters against technologically superior U.S. armed forc

becoming greater. Furthermore, advances in technology and proliferation of cert

means of warfare, such as information warfare, will generate new types and com

tions of asymmetric threats to the United States.

Asymmetric warfare is not limited to nation-states; sub-national and transnation

groups will also use asymmetric means as the only form of military action availa

influence and attack the U.S. or any other nation. Opponents engaging in asymm

warfare will probably not limit their attacks to our deployed and deploying force

Asymmetric measures may be taken across the spectrum of military operations a

virtually all crisis and conflict scenarios in which U.S. naval forces could become

involved. These measures may be taken to prevent or delay U.S. deployment into 

region, limit U.S. ability to form an effective coalition and obtain and sustain bas

support, and degrade U.S. military effectiveness—especially limiting U.S. applica

of technology—before and during combat. As a result, we must analyze the evide

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
logistical and staging nodes, neighboring countries, actual and potential U.S. coalition

partners, and the U.S. homeland, including our national infrastructure. The ultimate

goals of such asymmetric warfare actions will be to raise the risks and costs of U.S.

action such that an opponent would hope we would elect not to intervene militarily in

a situation; or once intervention has begun, to compel disengagement because of unac

ceptable costs.

The spectrum of asymmetric options available to potential opponents is broad and

will likely grow over the next two decades. Potential forms of asymmetric warfare

that are the objects of ongoing, dedicated intelligence community (including ONI)

analysis include: information operations, use of weapons of mass destruction

(nuclear, chemical, and biological), use of unconventional forces and state-sponsored

terrorism, environmental sabotage, denial and deception, guerrilla warfare tactics

and prolonged insurgency, inflicting and accepting mass casualties, use of urban terrain, and mine warfare.

These military measures will often be combined with political actions to achieve

desired results. Future opponents will probably select asymmetric measures based on

available capability and means on hand, observation and analysis of our capabilities

and vulnerabilities, cultural incongruities, and desired effects. Some countries may

elect to obtain an asymmetrical capability by concentrating available resources on the

development of specific technologies to counter U.S. advantages in weaponry, communications and intelligence. While no country is expected to have achieved the ability to

counter the United States across the entire range of technological capabilities by 2015,

“niche competitors” are likely.

In the context of future conflict environments, asymmetric warfare can be a means

through which an opponent, by combining advanced technologies with unexpected,

non-linear operational concepts can render our preferred strategy militarily or politically untenable. Given the present and growing reliance of U.S. forces on global distrib

uted information networks, coupled with the increasing proliferation of information

technologies, one prominent asymmetric threat against which the Navy must plan is

Information Operations (IO).

IO refers to efforts to disrupt or manipulate the flow of information across distributed networks as well as efforts aimed at preventing an opponent from disrupting or

manipulating one’s own flow of information. These efforts aim to deny the commander the use of his information processing systems, to drive the adversary to use

more exploitable media, or to shape the adversary’s understanding of the battlefield.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
paign. IO tactics include:

• Trusted insiders who destroy the system from within

• Sabotaging equipment during the manufacture, transport, storage, repair, and

installation of updates

• Network penetration and compromise

• Electronic and/or physical attack

• Denial of service attacks

• Denial/spoofing/jamming of sensors

• Manipulation of trusted information sources in order to condition/control th

adversary’s thinking.

The ultimate goal of IO is information dominance, defined as a superior underst

ing of an adversary’s strengths, weaknesses, intentions, and locations, while deny

adversary similar information on friendly assets. The side with information dom

is best able to enjoy battlespace dominance over his opponent. Effective IO is a p

ful force multiplier. Perfectly effective IO may even enable the commander to usu

opponent’s understanding of battlefield reality.

An adversary may conduct IO either as an alternative to a costly conventional en

ment with a superior U.S. force or as a complement to conventional operations. 

does not necessarily require high-technology or strictly military systems to disru

deny our information systems, corrupt key data, or alter our perceptions of a situ

Increasingly, as the U.S. naval advantage turns on the superior information proce

capability of U.S. forces, potential adversaries will develop the knowledge and th

bilities to attempt IO attacks against us. Virtually any state, group—even friendly 

neutral—can use IO to attack other nations. Four countries—Russia, China, Ind

Cuba—currently have an acknowledged IO policy and a rapidly developing IO c

ity. Rogue states, such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria have some IO 

bility and may covertly employ it at any time that suits their needs. Many other n

including France, Japan, and Germany, are players in IO and are also potential

proliferators of IO capabilities to other states.

Knowledge superiority and credible combat capability remain vital to the success o

Navy’s forward presence mission due to the short notice responses and limited pla

timelines demanded of our forces during the course of routine operations. The Na

must therefore be prepared to address the challenges from both the dangers presen

traditional military operations as well as from anti-access and asymmetric capabili

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:19 PM
For more than 200 years, the United States has depended on the Naval Service—the

Navy and Marine Corps Team—to promote peace and stability and to defeat adversaries when necessary. The current National Security Strategy outlines a broad

approach to enhance America’s security, bolster prosperity, and promote democracy through active engagement abroad in partnership with allies and friends. The

National Military Strategy supports these goals and describes the application of

military power to help shape the international environment and respond to dangers, while preparing for an uncertain future. Naval forces are uniquely suited to

support these strategies by remaining forward in peacetime, ready to provide

timely initial crisis response, and, when called upon, to fight and win—anytime,

anywhere.

While the traditional objectives of the United States and its military remain largely

unchanged, we are compelled to constantly reassess the methods by which they are

achieved. The Navy–Marine Corps vision . . . From the Sea steered us from blue

water into the littorals where most of the world’s population resides and where

most conflicts occur. The strategic concept Forward . . . From the Sea refined this

course by articulating the naval contributions to national security made by expeditionary forces present forward and credibly shaped for combat during peacetime,

crisis, and war.

The maritime concept presented here builds upon the landward focus of those documents and, more specifically, describes the organizing principles, operational concepts, and priorities by which future naval forces will exploit new opportunities and

capabilities to assure U.S. access and influence forward in the Information Age,

despite an adversary’s efforts to preclude our presence. By maintaining a robust and

scalable forward presence, and with superior knowledge of the battlespace, the Naval

Service will continue to achieve its ultimate objective: projecting U.S. power and

influence from the sea to directly and decisively influence events ashore throughout

the spectrum of operations.

The vast majority of America’s global trade will continue to move by sea, and freedom of the seas remains the enduring responsibility of the Naval Service. However

the ultimate objective of our nation’s overall maritime strategy has always been to

impact political, military, and economic interests ashore—where U.S. interests predominantly lie. Until recently, the Naval Service could only pursue this strategy

indirectly by first winning or denying command of the seas; naval forces were

therefore only available to directly affect a land campaign on a sequential, or secondary, basis. But the Navy–Marine Corps contribution to national security has

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:20 PM
from humanitarian and evacuation missions to contingency responses agains

coastal and landlocked countries—affirm that the Naval Service is steering th

proper course by emphasizing the ability to influence, directly and decisively

events ashore . . . from the sea. We must also recognize that assuring naval ac

forward will remain a prerequisite for continuing this strategic heading landw

in the future.

The Strategic Imperative

No nation will match the United States globally in the foreseeable future, but som

regional actors will seek to exercise influence that competes with U.S. interests in 

respective corners of the world. Pursuing economic, political, and military polici

designed to raise the cost of U.S. engagement, they will seek to diminish the statu

cohesion of regional partnerships with the United States. These regional actors w

value their militaries to the extent that they are perceived to affect America’s will

ness or ability to remain engaged on behalf of friends and allies. Our unrivaled a

to dominate the world’s oceans and operate in forward areas dissuades the globa

ambitions of regional powers, affording us the opportunity to focus upon defeat

conventional, asymmetric, and anti-access capabilities they are likely to field. By

remaining forward, combat-credible naval expeditionary forces guarantee that th

landward reach of U.S. influence is present to favorably shape the international e

ronment. Through the international medium of the seas, forward naval forces—

to respond to any contingency—promote regional stability, reassure allies, and ch

the competing influence of regional actors.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:20 PM
information age has revealed a second international medium—cyberspace—equally

critical to the global interchange. The globalization of markets, networks, and systems

inextricably links U.S. economic and security interests. This trend also accelerates the

proliferation of information and technology, providing state and non-state actors both

conventional and unconventional means to advance their agendas. The rapid exchange

of information has, in fact, become so much a part of our day-to-day operations and so

critical to our success that cyberspace must be viewed as a new element of the

battlespace. We must, therefore, exploit our own access to cyberspace to provide naval,

joint, and combined forces a superior knowledge position relative to our opponents,

from which to act with timeliness and decisiveness. Combat-credible forward presence

through the seas and knowledge superiority via cyberspace will, together, provide the

means for effective maritime power projection.

Maritime Power Projection—Shaping and Responding

Projecting U.S. power and influence from the sea is the heart of the Navy and Marine

Corps’ contribution to national security. The unrivaled strategic agility and operational flexibility of forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces provide the United

States extraordinary reach and access overseas. Sea-based, self-contained, and selfsustaining naval forces are relatively unconstrained by regional infrastructure

requirements and uniquely suited to exploit the access afforded by the seas to

respond to the full spectrum of contingencies. Our inherent versatility allows us to

seamlessly expand the size and capability of forces to match a broad range of missions and situations. At one end of the spectrum, naval forces are engaged daily

around the globe to project U.S. influence and favorably shape the security environment. These same forces are available at a moment’s notice for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or crisis response. At the other end of the spectrum, on-station

naval expeditionary forces can provide timely and powerful sea-based response

through the full range of amphibious and precision strike operations. These forces

also enable the unimpeded flow and sustainment of follow-on naval, joint, and combined forces in both small-scale contingencies and major theater war. Naval forces

also provide the most cost-effective and survivable component of America’s strategic

nuclear deterrence triad. Ultimately, naval expeditionary forces, capable of direct and

decisive influence through maritime power projection, are the nation’s essential first

responders and shape the early phases of hostilities to set the conditions for victory.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:21 PM
Together, the means of forward presence and knowledge superiority enable mari

power. Acting through the international media of the seas and cyberspace, naval 

assure access and project both power and influence in peacetime, crisis, and war.

Forward Presence. Forward Presence is being physically present with combat cre

forces to Deter Aggression, Enhance Regional Stability, Protect and Promote U.S

ests, Improve Interoperability, and provide Timely Initial Crisis Response where 

national interests dictate.

The foundation of maritime power projection is our ability to go where America 

us to go. Naval expeditionary forces that are present forward—where our econom

political, and military interests are most concentrated—provide a security frame

that helps to permit the other instruments of national power to build stability an

favorably shape regions of interest. Our engagement with potential coalition nav

and ground forces enhances interoperability and helps to develop critical partne

In cooperation with these friends and allies, forward forces also discourage chall

to shared interests. The powerful presence of a Navy–Marine Corps team deters a

sion on the part of would-be adversaries; and when deterrence fails, these on-sce

forces provide both a unique understanding of an emerging crisis and the means 

timely response. Should combat operations by joint and coalition forces be requi

resolve conflict, the early, sustained response of naval expeditionary forces will h

shaped the battlespace to the advantage of U.S. and allied forces.

Combat-credible forward presence is an enduring contribution of naval expediti

forces. But structuring the Naval Service to continue this contribution in the futu

means exploiting new opportunities made possible by technology and addressing 

anti-access strategies and asymmetric approaches that adversaries may seek to co

U.S. access and influence. Sea control will remain the cardinal prerequisite that g

tees access forward for naval forces as well as for our sister Services that increasin

rely both on movement of assets by the sea and their pre-positioning on the sea. 

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:21 PM
remain forward in peacetime—both overtly and covertly—routinely collecting intelligence and gaining valuable knowledge of the operating areas where they will most

likely be called to respond during crisis or conflict. Further, network-centric operation

among these geographically dispersed, forward forces will serve as the “bridge” that

transforms today’s Naval Service into the knowledge-superior Naval Service of the

future. A shared knowledge of the battlespace and the ability to synchronize our

actions, along with new defensive capabilities, will allow naval forces to remain forward

with assured access.

Now and in the future, command of the seas must be complemented by an improved

speed of command via cyberspace.

Knowledge Superiority. Knowledge Superiority is the ability to achieve a real-time,

shared understanding of the battlespace at all levels through a network which provides the

rapid accumulation of all information that is needed—and the dissemination of that information to the commander as the knowledge needed—to make a timely and informed

decision inside any potential adversary’s sensor and engagement timeline. In peacetime,

this provides the assured knowledge to be an appropriate instrument for shaping events in

the region. During a crisis, this knowledge superiority ensures a confident and timely response by in-theater forces.

Knowledge superiority will allow us to know what is occurring and to act quickly; it is

the second means that underpins the projection of maritime power. Through our

access to cyberspace, naval forces will achieve an unprecedented awareness of the

battlespace. Information, however, will not improve understanding unless it provides

commanders the real-time knowledge required to make timely and informed decisions

And improvements in networking and communications technology, matched by agile

and adaptive organizations, will dramatically accelerate the operations of dispersed and

maneuvering naval forces. Knowledge superiority will also provide us a better understanding of adversaries’ decision-making and engagement timelines. Further, it will

provide naval forces the speed of command to operate faster than those adversaries—

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:22 PM
operational tempo and provide the knowledge to maneuver or produce effects th

“lock out” an opponent’s intended actions and defeat his overall strategy. In shor

combat credibility in the information age will depend as much on speed of comm

as on weapon or platform. No foe, present or future, will match our knowledge—

our ability to apply it.

U.S. Armed Forces, as well as interagency and coalition partners, will benefit from 

regional knowledge base that is built and enhanced by day-to-day naval presence

familiarity with forward operating environments, and foreign-area expertise. Du

peacetime, knowledge superiority will enable naval forces to act as effective instr

ments for shaping the international environment. During a crisis or conflict, it w

mitigate “fog” and “friction” and permit a confident, timely response by in-theat

forces. Further, interoperable communications networks will allow all elements o

foreign policy to “plug-and-play” in this regional knowledge base upon their arr

theater.

Just as forward presence has become a way of life for the Navy and Marine Corps

too will knowledge superiority become a part of our naval character. The ability 

master this new domain in warfare—cyberspace—must become a core competen

across all warfare specialties. Forward presence and knowledge superiority are, in 

like two sides of the same coin. By routinely operating forward, naval forces gain

knowledge of the environment where they will be called to act during crisis or co

This superior knowledge and the resultant ability to operate inside an adversary’

sion and engagement timeline will then contribute, in large measure, to the abili

naval forces to remain forward. Ultimately, these two means will provide the Nav

vice both the capability and capacity to assure U.S. access and to project power in 

Information Age.

Our Ways

The ways we use the means can be described through the three components of m

time combat power: battlespace control, battlespace attack, and battlespace susta

ment. These components underwrite the conduct of naval expeditionary operati

sea, in the littorals, and beyond. The battlespace—determined by our dispersed, 

worked forces and their organic and joint sensor and weapon reach—is the only 

priate dimension in which to consider the boundaries of our operations. Naval

expeditionary forces must be able to control, attack, and sustain seamlessly acros

elements of the battlespace, transitioning smoothly from peacetime presence to c

response or large-scale warfighting and forcible-entry operations as the situation

warrants.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:22 PM
assure our access and shape the battlespace for naval, joint, and combined forces. Our

enduring mission of sea control remains both a cardinal prerequisite for, and a unique

naval contribution to, joint warfighting; it is essential to assuring the flow of follow-on

forces into a theater. However, it is no longer sufficient to think only in terms of sea or

area control.

Future naval forces will be challenged by anti-access capabilities such as land-based

cruise missiles, space-based satellite targeting, and information operations. Naval

forces must therefore control the entire battlespace—sea, air, land, space, and

cyberspace—in order to defend against, defeat, deny or negate these capabilities. Forward naval forces will also project defensive power over land to protect U.S. and allied

forces and their homelands with sea-based theater air and missile defense. Long-range,

responsive and accurate reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; strike

operations; and the range of actions required to protect our forces will enable simultaneous offensive operations. Battlespace control is therefore more than efforts to assure

access in order to place follow-on forces and power ashore; it permits naval forces to

simultaneously produce decisive effects—both offensively and defensively.

Ultimately, countering an adversary’s anti-access capabilities will have an overwhelming impact on his overall warfighting strategy because the heart of his investment—

these anti-access capabilities—will have been defeated. In the final analysis, our

battlespace control capabilities may foreclose the attractiveness of an adversary’s

investing in or employing anti-access capabilities as that adversary recognizes the ability of naval forces to credibly operate forward and project power despite his area-denia

efforts. Together, command of the seas and speed of command will provide the freedom of action necessary to control the battlespace and assure access for the naval, joint

combined, and interagency team.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:23 PM
precision strike and ship-to-objective maneuver exploit the advantages of maneu

and firepower from the sea. The speed of employment afforded by networked for

forward is invaluable when speed of deployment from the United States—and th

of surprise—is a disadvantage. But the unprecedented reach, volume, and precisi

our weapons and sensors, along with the flexibility described in Operational Man

from the Sea, allow us to project power deep inland. Improving and connecting o

sensor, information, and targeting systems—including focusing on the real-time 

tion of an adversary’s mobile and time-critical targets—will accelerate the opera

tempo at which attacks can be delivered for decisive effects. The ability to apply t

effects inside an adversary’s decision timeline, with a knowledge and understand

their impacts, permits effects-based planning to disrupt his operational design. C

current offensive and defensive operations—attack and control—will also enable 

and combined battlespace attack by making follow-on forces more immediately 

able for offensive operations as they enter a battlespace where naval forces have a

asserted control. In the end, the battlespace attack capability afforded by forward 

ence and knowledge superiority will deter would-be aggressors in peacetime, and 

mit the decisive application of combat power in crisis or conflict.

Battlespace Sustainment. Mobile, dispersed forces require an equally agile and t

logistics system to support their dynamic operations. Logistics from the sea that 

cused to arrive where and when needed, without a large footprint requiring sign

protection, will support sustained maneuver in an expanded battlespace. Netted 

tics that include pre-positioning, strategic sealift, and airlift are key to sustaining 

joint and coalition forces. Moreover, maneuvering sea-based forces will permit co

manders to conduct fully integrated joint command and control, surveillance, ta

ing, logistics and re-supply.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:24 PM
Configured to the mission, sea-based logistics and joint command and control will

support maneuver forces across the battlespace—from replenishing and refueling

forces at sea to delivering tailored seaborne logistics that sustain operations on land. In

the future, both conventional and asymmetric threats will require ground forces to

become less dependent on vulnerable fixed bases or stockpiles ashore. Force sustainment through sea-based logistics will reduce the threat of an attack on key logistics

nodes and the requirement for dedicated forces to protect shore-based logistics

concentrations.

In the end, the joint team will depend upon the ability of forward naval forces to provide sustainment from the sea and protection of the entire logistics pipeline at sea for

as long as U.S. interests require.

Our Ends

The Navy and Marine Corps support America’s security objectives by promoting

regional stability, deterring aggression, providing timely crisis response, and defeating

the enemy—anytime, anywhere. In the future, regional disturbances will have a more

immediate and disproportionate effect on the global community and U.S. national

interests. Expeditionary naval forces, present forward with sustainable combat power,

help shape the regional security environment. As sovereign and maneuverable bases,

they can be uniquely positioned to project influence and reassure allies and friends.

The credible presence of both conventional and nuclear naval forces is an effective

deterrent that convincingly demonstrates aggression will not succeed. Translating

national strategic interests into military objectives and tasks allows us to effectively size

and configure future forces with the correct capabilities and capacity for deterrence. As

a result, defining the forces required forward to support regional security interests and

deter a prospective opponent need not be guesswork.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:25 PM
Forces rotationally deployed and permanently stationed for peacetime presence a

also the forces most likely to be called upon by theater and joint force command

respond rapidly during an emerging crisis. Naval expeditionary forces can provid

powerful and timely crisis response from forward positions, free of the political

encumbrances that can limit the access of land-based forces.

The most important contribution of naval forces is their ability to prevent wars—

like all elements of a military arsenal, they are built to fight and win them. The u

contribution of the Naval Service comes as enabling forces during the critical tra

tion from crisis to conflict. Combat-credible naval expeditionary forces forward, 

figured to handle the spectrum of contingencies and prepared to operate jointly 

with interagency and coalition partners, are key to this enabling role.

Operational Concepts

Two complementary capstone operational concepts will chart our course to the f

Naval Operations in the Information Age outlines our transition from platform-c

to network-centric warfare and Operational Maneuver from the Sea underwrites t

conduct of naval expeditionary operations in the littorals by combining the prov

principles of maneuver warfare and maritime power projection. Together, Naval 

ations in the Information Age and Operational Maneuver from the Sea capitalize o

nology and improvements in mobility, weaponry, sustainment, and command an

control, as well as doctrine and organization. These concepts will guide our effor

dominate the entire battlespace across the full operational continuum and to

seamlessly project power ashore to attain critical campaign objectives. Each is tai

to the unique challenges of naval expeditionary operations and consistent with t

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
Full-Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics.

Our Priorities—Preparing Now

The paramount objective of the Navy and Marine Corps will remain the projection of

American power and influence—anytime, anywhere. But taking the proper “lead angle”

on the future requires balancing the Naval Service in terms of both capabilities and

force levels. It also demands a steadfast commitment to innovation and experimentation. Our priorities for meeting the challenges and exploiting the opportunities of the

information age are described below.

Keeping Faith with Our People. People will always be our top priority. The recruiting,

training, and retention of quality men and women is key to the Naval Service’s continued success. The consistent lesson of naval operations is that their outcomes often

hinge on the actions of even our most junior personnel.

To prevail in the complex battlespace of the future, tomorrow’s Sailors and Marines

will require the training, experience, and strength of character to make sound and

timely decisions. We must, therefore, ensure that our people are proficient in the use of

increasingly sophisticated weapons, sensors, and information systems and have an

understanding of the entire battlespace. Regional, joint, combined, and interagency

experts must be cultivated. We must also harness the leadership ability and dedication

to excellence resident in all our personnel and develop in each Sailor and Marine a lifelong commitment to education and innovation. Our recruiting efforts must extend to

all segments of the population to ensure that we represent the nation’s rich diversity.

Finally, we must act to improve the quality of life of the entire Navy–Marine Corps

team—Sailors, Marines, civilians, and their families.

Influence Ashore. The unprecedented reach and accuracy of our sensors and weapons

provide the Naval Service the ability to influence events far inland—in both peace and

war. In the future, that capability will be improved through the refinement of precision

strike capabilities, naval fires, ship-to-objective maneuver, sustained land operations,

operations other than war, and special operations. Enhancing our maritime prepositioning

force; developing effective doctrine, organization, training, and equipment for military

operations on urban terrain, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation operations;

and building close working relationships with other governmental and non-governmental

security actors are also priorities. Person-to-person interactions in vital areas of the

world are equally important. And finally, our ability to enable the flow and sustainment of follow-on joint and combined forces will be strengthened.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
be enhanced by improvements in information technology and agile, adaptive com

mand organizations in order to operate within an adversary’s sensor and engagem

timeline. Network-centric operations will link shooters, sensors, and commande

will permit effects-based planning in order to provide the knowledge required to 

rapidly an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, avoid strengths, and destroy centers 

gravity. Sensors under the tactical control of commanders and networked system

real-time shared awareness are priorities for improving our exploitation of cyber

synchronization, and overall combat-effectiveness.

Numbers Count. The conspicuous forward presence of combat-credible naval fo

a visible and compelling deterrent, and a symbol of American power and influen

we build the future force, we must remember that numbers for presence are not 

lesser-included case of regional contingencies; sufficient platforms and personne

required to maintain a presence wherever we require access and influence. Suffic

numbers of platforms permit naval forces to shape regions of U.S. interest and en

they can be positioned for timely crisis response. Manpower levels are also critica

must support the demands of both routine deployments and contingency respon

Insufficient numbers entail strategic risk as well as excessive personnel and opera

tempos. Clearly, numbers of platforms and naval forces matter.

Assured Access. Sea control is a unique naval contribution to joint warfighting, a

is fundamental for projecting U.S. power and influence overseas. But the battlesp

has expanded and now includes—alongside the traditional dimensions of air, lan

sea—space and cyberspace. In the future, naval forces will be challenged by anti-

strategies built upon varied asymmetric and conventional threats and weapons. I

der to assure U.S. access forward, naval forces will be required to counter a host o

threats: sea and land mines, cruise missiles, submarines, chemical and biological 

ons, space-based sensors, and information warfare. Maintaining our ability to as

access and project power in light of these threats will be increasingly vital and re

one of our most important priorities.

Projecting Defense. Naval forces must be capable of projecting both offensive an

fensive power ashore to protect American forces, those of our allies, and their ho

lands. Control of the multidimensional battlespace will hinge on our ability to p

a defensive umbrella landward. This umbrella will be built largely on our emergi

and missile defense capabilities. Projecting defense ashore will enable Operationa

neuver from the Sea, and it will be critical for setting the conditions necessary to p

the flow of follow-on forces into a theater. Moreover, this unique capability will m

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
Our priorities in this area include the development of capable sensors and networks

and credible theater ballistic missile defense.

Sea-based Logistics. Efficient sea-based command, control, and logistics will be crucia

to naval and joint warfighting as well as the realization of emerging operational concepts. Robust Maritime Prepositioning Forces and strategic lift capabilities will be key

to the projection and sustainment of combat power. Advanced work practices, borrowed from the ongoing revolution in business affairs, will also improve the overall efficiency of sustainment operations and permit the development of near real-time, intransit supply and underway replenishment tracking.

Force Protection. Asymmetric and conventional threats will make protection of naval,

joint, and combined forces increasingly challenging. Improving our ability to protect

air and sea ports of debarkation, intermediate staging bases, strategic “hub” ports,

other assets, and personnel throughout all dimensions of the battlespace is a high priority. Enhancing our capabilities to counter terrorism, to respond to chemical or biological attack and operate in a chemical or biological environment, and to treat and

process mass casualties is essential. The extension of a missile defense umbrella, effective counter-mine capabilities, and the ability to locate and negate or destroy key enemy weapon systems are also fundamental to our efforts to achieve full-dimensional

protection.

Homeland Defense. By remaining forward, naval forces are positioned to address

threats as far from the United States as possible. However, some of the dangers that

characterize the international security environment will undoubtedly reach America’s

shores. The precise nature of our involvement in homeland defense and coastal security is evolving, but we must be prepared to support civil authorities in the areas of

civil disturbance, disaster relief, migrant and refugee control, counter-terrorism, and

counter-drug operations if called to do so. Our role in consequence management, as

exemplified by our Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, will also likely

expand.

Conclusion

The Naval Service exists to project U.S. power and influence from the sea throughout

the spectrum of operations in peacetime, crisis, and war. Forward presence and knowledge superiority are the means that will guarantee both the capability and the capacity

of naval forces to influence, directly and decisively, events ashore. Concurrent

battlespace control, attack, and sustainment are the ways we will assure the United

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
forces will guarantee the achievement of our ends: regional stability, deterrence, t

crisis response, and when called upon, warfighting and winning.

In almost every instance, future challenges to our national security will originate 

ward. Having achieved its naval prerequisite—command of the seas—the Naval 

is afforded an unprecedented opportunity to expand our contribution to nationa

security by focusing landward. No matter where or when the challenge arises, na

expeditionary forces will be there, as they have always been, with credible comba

power from the earliest stages of a crisis or conflict through the return to peace a

stability. In short, an increasingly capable Navy and Marine Corps team will rem

station, protecting and promoting U.S. interests with forces for presence that are

shaped for combat.

Section IV: The Process

A primary objective of the planning process is to develop a thorough understand

how naval forces contribute to the nation’s joint force capabilities, and then to en

this contribution is translated into operational capability requirements that guid

grammatic decisions. The planning process has four essential phases that must b

understood at all levels of the organization to achieve the above objective: (1) Th

development and continuous refinement of a strategic concept; (2) the operationa

of the concept into warfighting concepts and capabilities; (3) the establishmen

set of prioritized strategic planning objectives that will achieve the operational 

cepts and capture the strategic direction of the organization; and, finally, (4) th

assessment of those capability requirements translated into programmatic

recommendations.

The maritime concept described in Section III establishes the organizing princip

new concepts and capabilities required for enhancing and transforming the Navy 

21st Century. This concept also provides the strategic framework from which the

OPNAV planning process evolves. The next step is to clearly define the overarchi

Operational Concepts that are derived directly from the maritime concept that w

shape the employment of our forces. These concepts provide the structure to ide

and prioritize a set of Long-Range Planning Objectives (LRPOs) that define spec

capability requirements directly linked to the maritime concept. The LRPOs (con

in Section V) are structured under the “means” of Forward Presence and Knowle

Superiority, as well as the “ways” of Battlespace Control, Attack and Sustainment

Integrated Warfare Architecture process captures these prioritized capabilities in 

to-end analyses and provides balanced programmatic recommendations in the C

Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM) allowing the resource sponsors to dev

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
cess forms the foundation of OPNAV PPBS planning for the 21st century.

The catalyst for the strategy-based process described above is the Navy Strategic

Planning Guidance (NSPG). The NSPG provides the Fleet and OPNAV staff a vehicle

that guides the planning phase. The NSPG is designed to impact strategic planning and

assessments through the IWAR and QDR 2001 process. Structured under the “means”

and “ways” of the maritime concept we have defined the Operational Concepts and

prioritized specific long-range capability planning objectives. The combination of concepts and capabilities provide the initial focus for the IWAR “road maps.” Additionally,

this year we need to think about how the Navy can leverage the ongoing assessments of

the IWARs to support the identified themes of the QDR. To provide a fuller understanding of the steps of the planning process, the following paragraphs identify the

methodology behind the development of the Operational Concepts, the Long Range

Planning Objectives associated with them, a description of the individual IWARs, and,

finally; a look ahead at the QDR process identifying current and planned actions and

issues that will best position the Navy for the QDR.

I. Operational Concepts

If the United States is to remain the world’s leading Naval power, it is imperative that

we maintain our edge over our potential adversaries, now and in the future, through

innovation and the application of emerging technologies and ideas. Over the past year,

emerging concepts have been further developed by various naval organizations, includ

ing: in particular, the Concepts Branch and Maritime Battle Center of the Naval Warfare Development Center, the CNO’s Strategic Studies Group, and professional naval

writings. The methodology for refining current operational concepts and the development of future ones relies to a large extent on our ability to determine and understand

the strategies being pursued by potential adversaries. The operational concepts presented (in section V) will build upon current operating modes and expand them into

the 21st Century.

The maritime concept outlines how our Navy intends to operate in broad terms to

meet the objectives of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. In order to best determine what capabilities our naval forces require to accomplish

these strategies, specific operational concepts have been applied to each of the “means”

and “ways” of the maritime concept. These operational concepts will, in effect,

“operationalize the strategy” and are grounded in the real world application of naval

assets to meet our mission. As such, the operational concepts described for the “means

of Forward Presence and Knowledge Superiority, and the “ways” of Battlespace Control, Attack, and Sustainment, are the warfighting links between strategy and resources

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
needed to execute the concept of operations.

II. Long-Range Planning Objectives

To ensure the Operational Concepts discussed above can be executed, specific ca

ity requirements must be identified, developed and acquired. Additionally, becau

resources are not unlimited and a balance of capabilities is required to meet the o

tives of the concepts, there must be some reference to priority among the capabil

Section V presents the capabilities in terms of strategic risk and the requirement 

directly support or enhance the core naval competencies.

The NSPG (specifically Section V) provides a set of prioritized operational capab

requirements that can be directly linked to the maritime concept. It is these capa

requirements that provide the IWAR end-to-end capability assessments a “road m

to focus their assessments. These capabilities when coupled with the operational 

cepts will provide a fleet that is trained, organized and equipped to support the N

role in the National Security and National Military Strategies.

III. Navy Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWAR) Assessment Process

Established in 1998, the IWAR provides the CNO an end-to-end, capabilities-bas

view of the Navy for the near, mid and far terms. It is not tied to any specific PPB

milestones, but is continuously refined to reflect a comprehensive and accurate r

sentation of the Navy’s present and projected capabilities. The primary focus is o

warfighting capabilities as opposed to the traditional focus on platforms and syst

The Assessment Division (N81) leads a process organized into five Warfare and s

Support IWAR teams. The individual IWAR teams carefully integrate their analys

ensure that all dependencies between Navy capabilities and programs are unders

In this sense, the IWAR teams are building an “architecture” that captures the co

ity of, and relationships among, naval warfare and support capabilities, thereby p

ing the CNO a more accurate understanding of current and programmed capabi

and the capability impacts of programmatic and process changes and decisions.

Starting with the guidance on strategic goals and capabilities provided in the Lon

Range Planning Objectives in the NSPG, the twelve IWAR teams (the “architects

identify the operational tasks necessary to achieve the objectives. They then asses

capabilities necessary to carry out those tasks; the effectiveness and efficiency wit

which these capabilities are provided by current, funded, and projected program

systems, balanced against the projected threat. The teams take care to ensure that 

analyses of these capabilities include all the components necessary to field the ca

ity—support resources such as personnel, training, maintenance, and infrastruct

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
tary or redundant capabilities. Each year, in the fall, each of the twelve IWAR teams

report the results of that year’s IWAR analyses to the CNO. This provides senior leader

ship with a basis for decision-making and the baseline necessary to judge proposed

programmatic alternatives.

The programmatic element of the IWAR process is the CNO’s Program Analysis

Memorandum (CPAM) that, unlike the IWAR, is linked directly to the PPBS cycle.

CPAM development initiates the programming phase of the annual PPBS cycle as

IWAR teams examine the upcoming Navy program and assess the difference

between desired capabilities, capabilities being provided by the current Program of

Record, and available resources. Out of this examination come programmatic and

process alternatives designed to balance capability risk and resource availability.

The IWAR teams carefully analyze the cost, operational risk, and effectiveness

(benefits) of each of the alternatives. These analyses and a set of recommendations

form the CPAM. The CPAM is thus a decision tool for senior DoN leadership as

well as the analytic foundation for the Navy’s programming guidance (published

by N80) for the next POM.

Although the CNO Staff is responsible for developing IWARs and the CPAM, active

support and input from Fleets, Systems Commands, and Headquarters Marine Corps

are critical to the effectiveness of the process.

Information Superiority and Sensors. Information Superiority and Sensors (ISS) is

concerned with those capabilities that enable commanders at all levels to control and

shape the pace, phasing, and space of battle by rapidly integrating and synchronizing

dispersed forces to apply appropriate effects at the right place and time. ISS includes:

• Access and assurance of radio-frequency spectrum

• Sensors and primary detection systems

• Local, operational, regional, and global area networks, communications, and

information distribution services

• Command and control

• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

• Meteorology and oceanography

• Navigation

• Information Operations.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
establish and sustain superiority on and below the surface of the world’s oceans. 

Dominance includes the employment of naval mines in offensive and defensive o

tions and mine countermeasures, surface warfare superiority, and anti-submarin

fare superiority. These capabilities are essential to joint-force operations in both 

points and littoral regions worldwide.

Sea mining and offensive/defensive mine countermeasures include those capabil

used to employ mines against an adversary’s forces or to neutralize an enemy’s ef

to use mines against U.S. or allied forces. Surface warfare superiority involves tho

actions necessary to neutralize an adversary’s efforts to utilize his surface combat

against friendly forces. Antisubmarine warfare superiority includes capabilities t

neutralize or defeat an adversary’s efforts to employ submarines against friendly 

Acting either independently or as a joint force component, naval forces provide c

bilities that are critical to ensuring freedom of maneuver and power projection f

the sea.

Air Dominance. Air Dominance includes those naval warfighting capabilities th

tablish and maintain overwhelming control of theater air space, in both open-oc

and littoral regions. By providing a protective umbrella above U.S. and friendly f

through Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and air superiority, Air Dominance is a 

enabler of the Navy’s role in power projection and is a core mission required for 

tection of naval, joint, and allied forces.

Theater Missile Defense, which includes both Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) and 

ater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD), employs aircraft, air warfare-capable surf

warships, and self-defense-capable surface units to defend against enemy cruise a

ballistic missiles. Included in Theater Missile Defense is the capability to engage 

missiles through both hardkill and softkill measures, and to conduct attack oper

against missile launch systems.

Air Superiority provides the capability to ensure full use of theater airspace by U

allied forces through offensive and defensive operations. Offensive options involv

attacking the enemy’s warfighting capabilities with Offensive Counter-Air (OCA

ations that include attack operations, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD

Electronic Warfare (EW), and fighter escort and sweep. Defensive Counter-Air (D

operations focus on maintaining air superiority with the capability to detect, ide

intercept, and destroy enemy air forces with aircraft or air warfare-capable surfac

ships before they attack or penetrate the friendly air environment.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
When naval fires are required, the joint task force commander will have a variety of na

val weapons to choose from including accurate stand-off munitions delivered from air

craft, gun-fired precision guided munitions, and sophisticated ballistic and cruise

missiles launched from surface warships and submarines. The essence of this capability

is aircraft carriers equipped with long range attack aircraft, surface warships and submarines capable of launching a variety of responsive, accurate long range missiles, and

a robust naval surface fire support capability.

Amphibious warfare includes the ability to amass overwhelming naval, joint and allied

military force and deliver it ashore to influence, deter, contain, or defeat an aggressor.

Amphibious forces provide the joint task force commander with the ability to conduct

military operations in an area of control extending from the open ocean, to the shore,

and to those inland areas that can be attacked, supported, and defended directly from

the sea.

Navy–Marine Corps expeditionary forces—acting independently, jointly with the

Army and Air Force, or combined with allied forces—provide the backbone of America’s ability to project credible and effective military power throughout the world,

quickly and effectively.

Deterrence. Deterrence connotes the ability to influence the decision-making and actions of a nation’s or a group’s leadership based on a perceived credible military capability. It is the use of a clear, convincing, and precisely tailored military capability to

hold potential opponents’ most-valued assets at risk so that they will assess the cost of

aggression or escalation and conclude that their best option is to remain at, or return

to, peace.

Conventional deterrence rests on credible capability and willingness to deny an aggressor his objectives or make him suffer unacceptable consequences for his actions.

The critical element of conventional deterrence is the full-spectrum, non-nuclear

warfighting capability enhanced by the positional advantage of combat-credible, forward-deployed forces.

Deterrence focused on countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD—chemical,

biological, nuclear/radiological devices) includes activities that ensure U.S. forces and

interests are protected from WMD by countering their effective use. This can be

accomplished by counter-force measures taken to destroy these weapons or their

means of delivery before they can be launched, active defense measures taken to intercept these weapons after their launch but prior to their delivery, and passive defense

measures. Nuclear deterrence involves maintaining a survivable, responsive, secure, and

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:27 PM
WMD against the United States or its allies would far exceed any gain.

Thus, deterrence is applied to the entire spectrum of aggression and is accomplis

through Navy’s ability to shape regional political-military environments, to respo

incidents and crises, and ultimately to the actual employment of U.S. convention

nuclear weapons.

Sustainment. Sustainment—the specific naval surface and air logistics function

abling the movement and support of U.S. combat forces and other friendly force

afloat and ashore—remains an area of intense interest. During Operations DESER

SHIELD and DESERT STORM, for example, sealift transported some 95 percent of 

supplies and equipment to and from the Arabian Gulf. This mission area also inc

the Combat Logistics Force (CLF), hospital ships, the fleet hospital program, Ma

Prepositioning Force ships, Ready Reserve Force strategic sealift assets, and comm

lift assets.

Marine Corps Assault Echelon and Assault Follow-On Echelon operations are su

ported by prepositioned ships and surge sealift. Sealift also carries Navy sustainm

supplies and ammunition from storage sites to forward logistics bases where CLF 

tle ships pick up and deliver this material to combatant forces at sea. Likewise, se

vital to Army and Air Force regional operations, as the nation’s land-based Arme

vices are almost totally dependent upon the “steel bridge” of sealift ships to deliv

everything a modern fighting force requires to accomplish its missions.

Sealift and the protection of in-transit ships by naval expeditionary forces allow 

and allied forces to deploy and sustain operations, without the compelling requir

for shoreside infrastructure in forward areas. In the near future, sea-based logisti

assets will increasingly support emerging concepts for operational maneuver and 

to-objective maneuver.

Infrastructure. This IWAR consists of the supporting infrastructure—shore faci

and services—necessary to support operational units. It includes the capability t

vide waterfront and air operations; community support, including housing, med

morale/welfare/recreation (MWR), and child care services; readiness support, in

ing shipyards and Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs); ranges; and shore force pro

tion. As the Navy sails into the 21st century, our challenge will be to find ways to

support our infrastructure using a smaller percentage of Navy resources while m

taining acceptable quality of profession, quality of life, and operational standard

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
manpower and personnel capability—active, reserve and civilian. Our capacity to provide sufficient operational forces, as well as shore support, to sustain a force structure

that provides credible naval combat power is critical to meeting the missions of the

Navy. It ensures critical naval capabilities to support national strategic requirements

for sustained deployed presence, deterrence, prompt and assured crisis response, and

warfighting. It also includes the capabilities provided by the personnel system for the

acquisition, development, retention and management of the civilian and military

workforce, including programs for recruiting, community management, and the distribution of personnel.

Readiness. The Navy is changing the way it does business—finding innovative and les

costly methods while supporting the critical training, supply, and maintenance programs that are essential to readiness. This IWAR team evaluates these programs and reviews current indicators and trends to ensure that readiness is maintained. Included in

the readiness area are Navy operating funds, force operations, flying hour/steaming day

programs, all levels of maintenance, spares, and safety and survivability.

Training/Education. Training and education capabilities are provided in four major

functional categories: accessions, skills, professional development, and unit/force train

ing. Programs include the staff, facilities, equipment, and services required to train.

The objective of naval training and education programs is to deliver efficiently and effectively the appropriate level of quality training and education as part of a cost-effective process to provide a career-long continuum supporting Navy operational readines

and personal excellence.

Technology. One of the foundations of U.S. military strategy is technological superiority

over potential adversaries. For the Navy, maintaining this technological edge has become

more challenging as the size of the fleet declines and high technology weapons become

readily available to potential adversaries on the world market. Research, development,

test and evaluation (RDT&E) funds must be spent as efficiently and effectively as possible. This IWAR analyzes and assesses Navy RDT&E funding and priorities to ensure that

Navy technology investments meet current and emerging warfighting needs.

Force Structure. Naval force capabilities are most visibly manifested in the number of

ships, submarines, and aircraft in the Fleet. This IWAR is focused on assisting Navy

leadership in best matching available resources with desired capabilities in the near,

mid, and far terms. Evolving threats, desired capabilities, developing technologies, doctrinal and operational concepts, and fiscal realities all play a role in shaping resourceallocation decisions leading to the naval forces the United States actually deploys. The

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
the force, develops alternative force structure paths and subsequent consequence

the trade-offs, and frames relevant issues via integrated decision timelines.

IV. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

The QDR is the latest in a series of comprehensive national security posture review

have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Most of those reviews were conduc

a biennial basis. The first QDR was mandated by the National Defense Authorizati

of 1996, which also indicated a need for recurring reviews every four years.

The outcome of the first QDR, completed in May 1997, has been widely judged a

portive of the naval contribution to national security. However, one of the most 

cant lessons learned from QDR 1997 is the need to make early preparations for

participation in the next QDR process. This is especially important because, whi

1997 QDR’s force of 305 ships—if fully manned, properly trained, and adequatel

resourced—is sufficient for today’s requirements within acceptable levels of risk, 

is mounting evidence that this naval force posture is not likely to be enough to m

the security challenges of the next century.

The next QDR is scheduled to begin in early 2001 and should be completed arou

September of that year. N3/N5 has been charged with directing the initial OPNA

preparations for QDR 2001. Such preparation includes, but is not limited to, the 

tification of key issues, the assignment of areas for study and analysis, developme

models and other analytical tools, development of information and associated st

products, and recommendations on Navy positions on defense issues to the Chie

Naval Operations through the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

The QDR Planning Group has developed three major themes for the Navy to gui

during and beyond QDR 2001:

• The Navy’s enduring contribution is combat-credible forward presence, providin

Nation with the means for both continuous shaping and timely crisis response. 

other Services are transforming to become expeditionary—which we already are

• The Navy’s transformation is into a knowledge-superior force, enabling it to d

the operational tempo across sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace—an expand

battlespace.

• Technology is driving Navy into new mission areas—such as theater ballistic m

defense and deep land attack—and these, in turn, drive requirements for both 

capabilities and additional capacity.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
tify and research potential issues for QDR 2001. To this extent, ten subgroups were

established in the following areas: Overseas Presence; Asymmetric Warfare and Homeland Defense; Space; Force Structure; Strategy for Balance Among Readiness, Recapital

ization and Transformation; 21st Century Defense Support/RBA; Transformation;

Nuclear Deterrence and NMD; Total Force; and Modeling. These subgroups identified

potential issues, determined what areas have been studied and what issues require further study to prepare the Navy for the next QDR.

Following six months of issue identification, QDR Phase II (Issue Development) commenced. Each of the ten subgroups was given a detailed Plan of Action and Milestones

(POAM) to execute. The POAMs consisted of a series of issue papers, roundtable discussions and articles that synergistically work to develop, test and disseminate the

Navy’s national security contributions.

Intertwined with the POAM was the Engagement Plan for QDR 2001. This plan consisted of the following:

• Roundtables: to present the Navy rationale to the larger defense community on

QDR related issues, and obtain an early look at criticism, opposing views, and an

opportunity to engage non-DoD personnel.

• Strategic Concepts Wargame: to assess organizing principles of the Maritime

Concept for assuring access in peacetime, crisis, and conflict despite an adversary’s

anti-access strategy.

• Forward Presence Workshops: a series of seven workshops, beginning in

November 1999 with the goal of describing the relationship between regional

strategic and diplomatic interests and the presence of combat-credible naval

forces. Participation comes from a multitude of government agencies to include

DoD, Departments of State and Commerce, regional CINCs, all Services, the Joint

Staff as well as the Fleets, NWDC, ONI and representatives from the Center for

Naval Analyses. The workshop process is based on a methodology that uses a

strategy-to-task approach to describe the relationship between the strategic

interests, military objectives that support those interests and the force and

capabilities required in achieving those objectives. The workshop process will

make a meaningful contribution to the discussion of how forward presence forces

support regional stability, deter conflict, provide timely crisis response, and

ultimately support the transition to war fighting and winning. An additional goal

of the workshops is to articulate the linkage between strategic risk and the

availability (or non-availability) of forces for forward presence.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
discuss the concept of Knowledge Superiority and how the service will best pu

this concept as one of the “means” of the maritime concept. During the first s

workshop seven goals under which objectives and strategies were produced w

agreed upon.

• Develop a process for the coherent development of the Knowledge

Superiority capability.

• Develop a Navy “all hands” training and education continuum for core

Knowledge Superiority competencies.

• Develop levels of Knowledge Superiority in the Navy.

• Develop the Information Operations protection capability of Knowledge

Superiority to affect adversary information and information systems while

protecting our own.

• Develop an architecture process which supports/enhances the full range 

naval missions.

• Develop and resource an integrated, end-to-end investment strategy to ens

effective, efficient, interoperable naval Knowledge Superiority capability.

• Change the organizational structure and culture of the Navy to achieve

Knowledge Superiority.

The Navy has created and implemented an aggressive plan to prepare the Service 

QDR 2001. It will require the continued dedicated effort of all those involved to 

that the naval contribution to our nation’s security is properly assessed during th

major defense review.

Section V: Long Range Planning Objectives

Introduction

This section contains Operational Concepts and the Long Range Planning Objec

based upon the maritime concept. It is intended to provide the link between stra

and resources by identifying a set of prioritized capabilities for incorporation int

IWAR analysis process to ensure that the Navy is properly trained, equipped and 

nized to execute the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strateg

The FY02–07 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) identifies the following as the o

arching resource programming priorities:

• Readiness and sustainability

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
• Force structure

• Infrastructure.

The Secretary of the Navy’s Planning Guidance for POM-02 reiterates these concepts and

stresses the need to improve our business practices by building upon the work of the

Strategic Sourcing Committee. SECNAV direction is: maintain current operational readiness while sustaining our recapitalization program within fiscal guidance; invest to make

the DoN a much better employer for our sailors, marines and civilians; end strength

reductions should not be relied upon to produce savings; and, finally, over the long term

aim for balanced and affordable sensors/C4/weapon/munitions/platform investments.

The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance ties strategy to capabilities. The “means” and

“ways” of the maritime concept map directly to the capability assessments done by

each of the IWAR teams as discussed in Section III. With our maritime concept and the

defense guidance above as the foundation of the IWAR roadmaps, this section is

intended to steer planning efforts for the near term (FYDP) and the mid-to-long term

(2008–2025). The objective is not to provide specific programming guidance, but

rather to provide strategic planning guidance, which identifies force attributes and

capabilities required—and the priorities among them—to provide a fleet trained, orga

nized and equipped in accordance with the concept. The goal, as stated in the maritime

concept is to provide the Fleet with the capability and capacity to conduct concurrent

battlespace control, battlespace attack and battlespace sustainment as the “ways” to

achieve the ends of the concept through the two “means” of Forward Presence and

Knowledge Superiority.

The maritime concept will support the objectives of the National Security Strategy and

National Military Strategy by two “means”: Forward Presence and Knowledge Superiority. These “means,” therefore, comprise the highest naval strategic priorities. Naval

capabilities that contribute to the “ways” in which we will achieve these “means” must

be considered a higher priority than those that do not. IWAR efforts should refer to

Forward Presence and Knowledge Superiority as the Navy’s strategic landmarks.

Fiscal constraints dictate that we maintain a balance between costs and numbers. We

therefore must establish concept-based priorities. We must look at every program, plat

form, organization, concept and technology to systematically judge whether it support

the maritime concept and provides positive progress along the path toward a Navy that

is fully “knowledge-centric,” present forward and combat-credible.

NSPG priorities therefore are linked to the “means,” “ways” and “ends” of the maritime

concept. They are built upon the historic and enduring role for the Navy in the service

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
bilities to remain forward in the future in spite of challenges to do so. Demands

imposed by those responsible for promoting U.S. foreign policy, along with the

requirements from the combatant commanders responsible for ensuring military 

paredness and the protection of U.S. and allied interests, require balancing the N

terms of both capabilities and force levels to meet these challenges in the future. 

provide a framework for prioritization, the following criteria will be used:

PRIORITY (I): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring 

naval competencies without which severe strategic risk would be incurred.

PRIORITY (II): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring 

naval competencies without which significant strategic risk would be incurred.

PRIORITY (III): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the endurin

naval competencies without which moderate strategic risk would be incurred.

PRIORITY (IV): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the endurin

naval competencies without which marginal strategic risk would be incurred.

PRIORITY (V): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring 

naval competencies without which minimal strategic risk would be incurred.

This priority scheme provides the framework of overarching capabilities necessa

achieve the maritime concept. The IWAR end-to-end capability assessment proc

reviews the current, mid, and far-term programs and assesses their ability to prov

the capabilities necessary to achieve the Long-Range Planning Objectives in the N

Guided by the IWARs, the CPAM then provides a prioritized, fiscally balanced se

programmatic recommendations upon which the resource sponsors base their P

Numbers of assets for presence are no longer a lesser-included case of regional co

gencies; there must be enough assets to maintain a forward presence where we w

have influence from the seas. Additionally, through the access of cyberspace we m

have the assured capability to directly impact events ashore. Sensors under the ta

control of commanders and networked systems for real-time shared awareness a

priorities for exploiting this access. With sufficient platforms and netted sensors, 

time power will continue to ensure freedom of the seas in order to directly influe

events beyond the seas.

Throughout Section V, italicized text contains direct extracts from the maritime c

cept. The frequent references to this maritime concept document emphasize the 

between NSPG guidance and strategy, facilitating a clear decision path from strat

IWAR in order to produce a strong strategic foundation for PPBS resource decisi

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:28 PM
The maritime concept clearly articulates our overarching strategic imperative as Maritime Power Projection. The paramount objective of the Navy and Marine Corps will

remain the global projection of American power and influence—anytime, anywhere.

But taking the proper ‘lead angle’ on the future demands a balancing of the Naval Service in terms of both capabilities and force levels. It also requires a steadfast commitment to innovation and experimentation. The cornerstone to achieve this goal is our

most valued resource: People. As illustrated in the maritime concept discussion, people

remain our number one priority. In warfighting terms, while forward presence remain

the enduring role of the Navy, it is only by leveraging the brightest and most highly

motivated individuals that our nation has to offer that we can accomplish our mission.

To prepare the warfighter of the future will require taking full advantage of emerging

technologies and new concepts so that we provide them the skills required to employ

the highly capable ships, aircraft, weapons and equipment they will be operating. Addi

tionally, we must also identify capabilities that improve the quality of life and quality o

service of all our personnel, both military and civilian. These capabilities, when coupled with the unique opportunities of naval service, will provide the incentives

required to retain our Sailors and Marines and attract the new generation of

warfighters. Our priorities for meeting the challenges and exploiting the opportunities

of the future are described below.

Keeping Faith with Our People. People will always be our top priority. The recruiting, training, and reten

tion of quality men and women is key to the Naval Service’s continued success. The consistent lesson of na

val operations is that their outcomes often hinge on the actions of even our most junior personnel. To

prevail in the complex battlespace of the future, tomorrow’s Sailors and Marines will require the training,

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:29 PM
that our people are proficient in the use of increasingly sophisticated weapons, sensors, and inform

systems and have an understanding of the entire battlespace. Regional, joint, combined, and intera

experts must be cultivated. We must also harness the leadership ability and dedication to excellenc

dent in all our personnel and develop in each Sailor and Marine a lifelong commitment to educati

innovation. Our recruiting efforts must extend to all segments of the population to ensure that we 

sent the nation’s rich diversity. Finally, we must act to improve the quality of life of the entire Nav

rine Corps team—Sailors, Marines, civilians, and their families.

The following readiness capabilities directly support the Long-Range Planning O

tives detailed in the capability-based sections:

1. Manpower and Personnel. . . . Sufficient platforms and personnel are required t

maintain a presence wherever we require access and influence....Manpower levels 

also critical and must support the demands of both routine deployments and contin

responses.

To attain knowledge superiority in the battlespace of the future, we will need inc

numbers of officer and enlisted that are comfortable with the conduct of warfare 

new realms of space and cyberspace. To ensure correct future manpower require

planning is achieved and changes to warfighting capability requirements are sup

Manpower and Personnel Capability requirements should be verified/checked ag

the requirements identified by the IWARs process. There will likely be a vast incr

the battlespace, the limits of which will be determined by the broad dispersion o

highly mobile forward forces and the extended reach of their sensors and weapo

Within this battlespace forces will act continuously and seamlessly across sea, air

space, and cyberspace. Common shared awareness of the threat within this battle

and the ability to control the timing of our actions will permit the best possible m

agement of our assets. The following are the priorities for Manpower & Personn

tem capabilities:

• PRI (I): The capability to recruit the personnel that support the manning

requirements of our current and future force. To ensure our force is manned 

projected requirement levels, emphasis must be placed on providing the right

quantity and quality of personnel that will be needed to operate the Navy of t

future.

• PRI (I): The capability to meet established retention goals for the correct man

structure to support the Navy’s mission. Job satisfaction, career paths, and

incentives should all be considered as tools for improving retention. Innovativ

leadership and management of enlisted and officers alike will be required to m

the retention challenges of the future.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:29 PM
with the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle. Priority should be given to personnel

transfers early in the IDTC in order to stabilize manning and maximize training

evolutions prior to deployment.

• PRI (II): The capability to provide our Sailors and Marines career patterns that

provide stability and predictability and lead to increased job satisfaction. This

capability must include the ability for personnel to manage career milestones with

some degree of predictability. The development of standardized career patterns

across all ratings will provide an enhancement to the quality of life for our enlisted

Sailors and Marines and will lead to increased retention.

• PRI (IV): The capability to assess the impact of increasing joint staffing

requirements and emerging “specialist” requirements (e.g., FAO, IT, AP) on the

ability to meet warfighter and staff needs. Develop a capability for assessing future

afloat and ashore requirements as related to officer and enlisted mix ratios and

potential trends to increase officer specialty manning requirements. Assessment

capability must include appropriate manning of URL/RL and Staff officers to meet

both warfighter and staff needs, and should include required changes in career

paths to employ and fully exploit information assets and networked systems.

Associated cost analysis is an additional requirement of the assessment process

capability (fiscal, manpower and opportunity).

• PRI (V): The capability to assess the impact of changing demographics on our

ability to acquire future officers and enlisted that have the ability to function in an

environment that requires knowledge superiority. Develop capability for assessing

changing demographic effects on finding the right personnel to function in an

“information smart” environment.

• PRI (V): The capability to centralize responsibility and authority over all Manpowe

and Personnel areas. A centralized M&P system will provide for common visions

and goals across all warfare and support areas. The capability will maximize intersystem efficiencies by removing counter-productive practices and competition for

resources.

2. Training. To prevail in the complex battlespace of the future, tomorrow’s Sailors and

Marines will require the training, experience, and strength of character to make sound and

timely decisions. We must, therefore, ensure that our people are proficient in the use of increasingly sophisticated weapons, sensors, and information systems and have an understanding of the entire battlespace.

Readiness will remain the highest Navy programming priority for our Active and

Reserve Component forces. We must be ready to effectively execute the full range of

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:29 PM
tingency deployments. Force Protection must be an integral part of naval strateg

planning efforts; however, future capabilities must balance the need for adequate

defense with a risk analysis of current and potential threat so as to properly man

investment in this area. As we move toward a network centric Navy, information 

tions become an increasingly critical element to the successful execution of assig

missions. Therefore, policies, procedures and technology must be developed to p

and defend information and information systems. Naval strategic planning effor

must incorporate offensive and defensive information operation capabilities acro

Integrated Warfare Architectures. The following priorities apply to Readiness and

Training capabilities:

• PRI (II): Technology should be utilized, where appropriate, to support the mo

efficient training and education system possible. The throughput of students 

be maximized, and training pipeline delays and inefficiencies should be elimi

• PRI (II): The capability to achieve the highest level of warfighting mission

proficiency while sustaining a high level of non-deployed Quality of Life. Thi

allow for a balanced fleet training program that sustains readiness at levels to

support OPLAN and contingency requirements while simultaneously reducin

IDTC workload and retaining the ability to incorporate new missions.

• PRI (II): The capability to conduct realistic and stressful training at the unit, b

group and joint levels based on specific objectives correlated to joint mission 

tasks. The capability must reflect emerging threats and include both informat

saturation and total interruption of information flow.

• PRI (III): The capability to use technology to move training to people. Reduc

class specialized skill training in favor of progressive individual training. For

example, computer-based training (CBT), web-based training, and afloat deg

programs (PACE).

• PRI (III): The capability to provide officer corps with educational opportunit

necessary to develop competence, leadership and character to succeed and em

technological advances. Expanded educational opportunities are needed for o

officer corps to ensure the Navy of the future is equipped with the best cadre 

leaders possible. Technological advances and future concepts of operation dem

that our officers continue to develop and learn and as an added benefit will le

greater recruitment and retention.

• PRI (III): The organic capability to provide interactive training, including the

capability to incorporate direct “red team” interaction. Realistic training requ

distributed interactive tools. Appropriate Battle Group and JTF level simulati

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:29 PM
tactical picture and provide for rapid scenario development for enroute training. It

is important to reduce the number of observer/controller personnel involved in the

training evolutions.

3. Metrics.

• PRI (I): The capability to provide improved metrics that will accurately measure key

readiness factors. The development and application of these metrics for the

measurement of personnel, training, equipment and maintenance requirements

(spares, flying hours, steaming days and depot maintenance) will provide an

accurate prediction of readiness gains/losses during the programming and

execution phase of the budget cycle.

Forward Presence

The “means,” “ways” and “ends” of our maritime concept for the next century are all

built upon the historic role of the Navy in the service of our maritime nation, forward

naval presence. This is the enduring role of the Navy in those areas of the world where

our most vital interests are concentrated. In cooperation with our friends and allies,

deployed forces deter the emergence of dangers to shared interests. In the most serious

situations, when deterrence fails, combat-ready forward deployed forces will provide

the “means” for timely initial crisis response. We must ensure that we develop the capa

bilities that permit us to remain forward in spite of challenges to do so.

Combat-credible forward presence is an enduring contribution of naval expeditionary forces. But structur

ing the Naval Service to continue this contribution in the future means exploiting new opportunities made

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:30 PM
ies may seek to counter U.S. access and influence. Sea control will remain the cardinal prerequisite 

guarantees access forward for naval forces as well as for our sister Services that increasingly rely bo

movement of assets by the sea and their pre-positioning on the sea.

I. Operational Concepts for Forward Presence. Forward naval forces are the key 

gional stability. They shape the peace by becoming a tangible part of the local sec

calculus that any would-be aggressor must take into consideration. Naval forces a

visible guarantee that the United States can and will react to provocation and wil

port its friends in time of need. The operational application of the forward posit

of naval assets and personnel to operating theaters around the world is based on 

needs of the Unified CINCs as apportioned through the guidelines of the Global 

Force Presence Policy (GNFPP).

The core of the forward-deployed surface naval force will be the Carrier Battle G

(CVBG). The CVBG contains the combined deterrence capabilities of surface,

subsurface and air power to present the most combat credible presence forward.

• The CVBG is composed of an aircraft carrier and its air wing, surface combat

submarines, and combat logistics ships.

• The CVBG capabilities consist of theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD), air

warfare, long-range strike, undersea warfare, surface warfare, naval surface fir

support C4ISR and mine counter measures.

• The Carrier Battle Group normally operates as a contained, self-sustaining fo

with little dependence on shore based support able to maintain a stable base o

operations for long periods of time in international waters and airspace, unfe

by sovereignty concerns.

• In certain circumstances, two or more CVBGs may join forces to operate as a

Carrier Battle Force (CVBF).

The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is a naval force that is capable of providing 

ward presence and power projection. The ARG with its Marine Expeditionary Un

(MEU), Special Operations Capable (SOC) will be able to perform missions rang

from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to crisis response and full-scale 

bat operations. By virtue of its forward-presence and self-contained capability, th

ARG/MEU can be one of the initial forces to react to a crisis or potential area of

concern.

• The ARG will normally be composed of a mix of amphibious/landing assault 

with Air Combat Element (ACE), amphibious transport (dock) ships, and

associated landing craft.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:30 PM
well as a wide range of MOOTW actions such as non-combatant evacuation

operations (NEO), security operations, and reinforcement operations. It will be

capable of acting as an enabling force for follow-on forces.

• The ARG/MEU (SOC) may operate in concert with one or more CVBGs to operate

as part of a Carrier Battle Force.

• Multiple/expanded ARGs can be created as necessary to accommodate larger

Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), including the Marine Expeditionary

Brigade (MEB) and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). These larger expeditionary

forces are more capable and adaptable than the ARG/MEU and are classified

Amphibious Task Forces (ATF).

Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (MPR) forces are land based, forward deployed

forces consisting of squadrons of variants of the P-3 Orion (VP/VQ). The MPR squadrons are a highly visible forward presence since their dependence on forward basing

presents their operations over the land, in the littorals and far out to sea for host and

neighboring nations to observe.

• MPR squadrons will be forward deployed to each fleet AOR on a continuous basis.

• Mission capabilities include undersea warfare, over the horizon targeting/surface

warfare, ISR, C2, land attack, strike support (targeting, BDA) and mine warfare.

• MPR forces are capable of operating independently or in conjunction with all naval

forces in a supporting role and act as a force multiplier in all mission areas.

II. Long Range Planning Objectives for Forward Presence. Numbers Count. The conspicuous forward presence of combat-credible naval forces is a visible and compelling deterrent, and a symbol of American power and influence. As we build the future force, we

must remember that numbers for presence are not a lesser-included case of regional contingencies; sufficient platforms and personnel are required to maintain a presence wherever we require access and influence. Sufficient numbers of platforms permit naval forces

to shape regions of U.S. interest and ensure they can be positioned for timely crisis response. Manpower levels are also critical and must support the demands of both routine

deployments and contingency responses.

Force Posture:

Insufficient numbers entail strategic risk as well as excessive personnel and operational tempos. Clearly,

numbers of platforms and naval forces matter.

Force posture changes, by definition, directly impact naval forward presence. Force

posture alternatives must meet Unified CINC requirements as well as current Navy

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:31 PM
must utilize a methodology in the determination of overseas presence requireme

Forces for presence—shaped for combat—provide the framework of security wit

which the instruments of U.S. policy would be unable to be engaged to help favo

shape the regional environment for U.S. interests. Naval forces shape the peacetim

strategic environment through their continued forward presence regardless of w

direct foreign interaction is involved. Therefore, a methodology to determine the 

cific requirements for naval forces to support strategic interests—and the militar

objectives and tasks, which underpin those interests, must be used. Additionally, 

assessment is needed of the manner in which naval forces for presence contribut

our military’s overall “shaping” effort. The methodology must translate regional 

gic interests into military objectives and tasks, doing so with sufficient precision 

enable the Navy to train, equip, and organize forces to accomplish those military 

tives. The defining linkage between the regional interests and the forces required 

perform those strategic interests in terms of military objectives, supporting tasks 

capabilities then permits one to identify the resources needed to accomplish thos

interests and objectives. The analytical rigor in such a strategy-based approach m

determine both the capability and force levels needed to accomplish those region

objectives and associated tasks. The methodology will, therefore, also provide a m

to assess which regional strategic interests are at risk if the forces and capabilities

required to support the identified military tasks and military objectives are not p

in the region.

. . . A force of 305 ships—fully manned, properly trained, and adequately resourced—would be suf

for today’s requirements—within acceptable levels of risk. But the mounting evidence leads me to 

that 305 ships is not likely to be enough in the Future.

CNO QUOTE BEFORE THE SASC, SEP

We must analyze our experience in the years since the last QDR; specifically, in te

of how the force has been and will be used, to arrive at a credible, confident and 

ent plan to make sure we have the force sized and shaped correctly for the future

then are the priorities for Force Posture capabilities:

• PRI (I): The capability to deploy the CVBG and ARG fully combat ready as th

naval combat force package, directly augmented and supported by other mari

air and logistics forces. Force planning should account for other missions sup

by dispersed combatant forces.

• PRI (I): The capability for forward deployed forces to maintain survivability m

be a design characteristic of all future platforms. Survivability in the 21st cent

will integrate a combination of reduced detectability (consider stealth and sig

reduction), improved defensive systems and sensors, and improved recoverab

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:31 PM
exposed to chemical or biological contamination.

Knowledge Superiority

Just as we have historically capitalized on the freedom of the international seas, we

must now exploit our access to cyberspace to leverage our ability to directly and decisively impact events ashore. U.S. combat credibility in this era of globalization will

depend upon our ability to gather all the information that is needed, and then present

the information to every operator who requires it. Access to data must ultimately resul

in real-time awareness of the battlespace by the commander so he has the knowledge to

make timely and informed decisions inside the decision timeline of a potential

adversary.

This acceleration of the decision-making process places us inside an adversary’s sensor

and engagement timeline where speed of command matters as much if not more than

weapon or platform. Knowledge superiority places the strategic priority on sensor over

weapon and network over platform. As a result, a regional adversary’s anti-access strategy supported by superior weapons reach will not preclude our presence with a netted

system that provides the knowledge to act within the adversary’s engagement timeline.

This improved battlespace awareness and ability to rapidly transfer information when

and where needed also provides a decisive advantage to naval forces conducting operations other than war or peacetime engagement. The ability to apply timely and decisive

effects at a critical point will prevent—or pre-empt—the adversary’s use of weapons

and systems, thereby “locking out” his options. Because of the assured knowledge

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
sequently, the focus on applying our offensive and defensive power ashore can be

orders of magnitude greater than before. Whether responding to a crisis or cond

presence operations in support of CINC objectives, forward naval forces will enh

the fidelity of the knowledge network by using their mobility and forward positi

leverage their information advantage and further increase the options for achiev

military objectives. The control of the adversary’s timeline by the subsequent inc

in speed of command is how knowledge superiority will ensure operational prim

We must keep in mind however, that the analyses of potential measures of effecti

remain challenging and require continued study.

Through our access to cyberspace, naval forces will achieve an unprecedented awareness of the bat

Information, however, will not improve understanding unless it provides commanders the real-tim

knowledge required to make timely and informed decisions. And improvements in networking and 

munications technology, matched by agile and adaptive organizations, will dramatically accelerat

erations of dispersed and maneuvering naval forces.

I . Operational Concepts for Knowledge Superiority. The Navy of the future will 

duct all operations based on the concept of Network Centric Operations (NCO)

derives its power from the robust, rapid networking of well-informed, geographi

dispersed warfighters to create a precise, agile style of maneuver warfare and ove

ering tempo. It focuses on operational and tactical warfare, but impacts all levels 

military activity from tactical to strategic operations. A multi-sensor information 

will provide all commanders access to essential data, sensors, command and cont

systems, and weapons. The concept pairs networking and information technolog

effects-based operations.

• NCO will include implementation of Information Technology for the 21st Ce

(IT-21), improved and integrated data links, combined with an all-weather, d

and tiered sensor grid.

• Reachback to ashore expertise and information will be provided via Teleport

connectivity with the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet.

• Knowledge Superiority gained through Network Centric Operations will facil

the penetration, disruption, denial and deception of the adversary’s informati

processes, while providing friendly forces a superior understanding of comple

operations.

• IT-21 will provide wide-band information exchange; ensure voice, video, data

imagery availability to shipboard Local Area Networks (LANs); enable ship-sh

tactical data exchange; and enhance Over-the Horizon (OTH) and line-of-sig

(LOS) capabilities. It will also provide Low Probability of Intercept/Low Prob

of Detection (LPI/LPD) low/medium/high data rate satellite communications

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
jam-proof communication and connectivity.

Sophisticated land attack operations will require a shift to an intelligence cycle that

enables on-line, on-demand digital targeting. The goal will be total integration of information at all command levels to produce a single, merged operations and intelligence picture of the battlespace that is tailored by the commander for his warfighting needs.

• The new approach to intelligence will have four building blocks: understanding the

enemy better; organizing to counter key adversary capabilities; targeting smarter,

and building a precision targeting system.

A tiered system of sensors will be used to provide continuous surveillance to detect and

track all-important activities and objects over the entire battlefield. It will incorporate

satellites, manned and unmanned aircraft, ground-based sensors, and troops.

• The fusion of sensors and intelligence data received near real-time will be

distributed throughout the NCO network to allow commanders to gain the needed

knowledge superiority to launch attacks against multiple targets simultaneously and

accurately.

Information Operations (IO) are those actions we will take to affect adversary information

and information systems while defending our own information and information systems.

• Defensive IO includes Information Assurance (IA), Physical Security, Operations

Security, Counter-Deception, Counter-psychological Operations, Counterintelligence

Electronic Warfare, and Special Information Operations.

Information Assurance will use Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, Qualified Systems Administrators, Multilevel System Security, and Encryption to protect and defend

our information systems.

II. Long Range Planning Objectives for Knowledge Superiority. Sensors and Networks.

Today’s naval forces have impressive striking power, but it must be enhanced by improvements in information technology and agile, adaptive command organizations in order to operate within an adversary’s sensor and engagement timeline. Network-centric operations wil

link shooters, sensors, and commanders and will permit effects-based planning in order to

provide the knowledge required to attack rapidly an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, avoid

strengths, and destroy centers of gravity. Sensors under the tactical control of commanders

and networked systems for real-time shared awareness are priorities for improving our exploitation of cyberspace, synchronization, and overall combat-effectiveness.

Establishing capability priorities within the domain of Knowledge Superiority is challenging due to the difficulty of quantifying risk and the lack of established metrics to

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
notwithstanding, sensors, information transfer/management systems and advanc

data display remain the key enablers for a transition to network-centric, knowled

based operations. Operational maneuver, precision effects and speed of comman

upon exploiting the U.S. C4ISR and data network capabilities. Navy investments 

be synchronized with emerging technological developments and the implementa

of the new operational concepts identified in the maritime concept.

Therefore, the following are the priorities for Knowledge Superiority capabilities

1. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Network-centric operations will link shooters, sensors, and commanders and will permit effects-ba

planning in order to provide the knowledge required to attack rapidly an adversary’s critical vulne

ties, avoid strengths, and destroy centers of gravity.

• PRI (I): The capability to direct Naval, Joint and Combined Task Force operat

afloat. Leverage collaborative planning systems and improved C4I capabilities 

better support the command and control of distributed naval, joint, and com

task force operations from sea-based platforms. Emerging C2 concepts, proce

and technology should be assessed using advanced C2 wargames, the Fleet Ba

Experiment and the Joint Experimentation processes.

• PRI (I): The capability to link shooters, sensors and command nodes with an 

architecture integrated information grid that leverages Commercial Off-the S

(COTS) technology wherever possible. A grid of interoperable Data Links, Co

Systems and networks is required to support joint and combined operations. 

systems must be compatible with the communications and computing backpl

provided by IT-21 and the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet, which provide the cr

path to connectivity across the force, both afloat and ashore.

• PRI (II): The capability to dynamically manage information to produce maxi

awareness of the battlespace for the maximum number of decision-makers.

Embedded equipment, software applications dedicated personnel and new

procedures are required to manage the increasing information flow to achieve 

actionable knowledge at all levels and nodes.

• PRI (II): The capability to effectively detect and report chemical and biologic

warfare agent detections via networks. This capability is needed to ensure tha

chemical and biological warfare agents are detected quickly, but more import

rapidly and efficiently reported to the force. Through the early countering of 

agents their effects will be minimized, thereby assuring our forces will be able 

continue to fight and win.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
Knowledge superiority will allow us to know what is occurring and to act quickly; it is the second means

that underpins the projection of maritime power. Through our access to cyberspace, naval forces will

achieve an unprecedented awareness of the battlespace.

• PRI (II): The capability to fuse and display sensor data into an integrated, near

realtime common operational picture. The distributed operations, speed of

command and decentralized command structures dictated by the maritime concept

demand a common operational picture (COP) focused on the operational theater

which is timely, accurate and interoperable with joint and combined forces.

• PRI (II): The capability to rapidly process data into useful knowledge by

userfriendly displays and decision aids. In addition to rapid access to raw sensor,

intelligence and logistics data, advanced information systems must automate

processing and include evaluation aids for decision-makers and supporting

commanders, providing translation of raw data into adaptive information and

knowledge. These systems must employ push-pull architectures, with data transfer

priorities determined by operational commanders.

• PRI (II): The capability to fuse and display weapons-quality sensor data into a

realtime, common/coherent tactical picture. System architectures and tactical

procedures must support a common/coherent tactical picture (CTP) focused on the

battlespace. It must also support inter-agency and combined force operations.

3. COMMUNICATIONS/DATA LINK

And improvements in networking and communications technology, matched by agile and adaptive organiza

tions, will dramatically accelerate the operations of dispersed and maneuvering naval forces . . . it will provid

naval forces the speed of command to operate faster than those adversaries—inside their decision timelines.

Ultimately, networked operations will improve our operational tempo and provide the knowledge to maneuver or produce effects that “lock out” an opponent’s intended actions and defeat his overall strategy.

• PRI (I): The capability for all combatants and tactical aviation platforms to operate

a common tactical data link system. This will provide the capability to achieve

responsive, accurate fires and effective battlespace control. Priority should be placed

on joint integration and achieving a common baseline across the force. Satellite

connectivity is required to integrate distributed naval forces and land-based forces.

• PRI (I): The capability to produce and sustain a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP),

where all assets share one near real-time joint/fused picture, identifying friendly,

adversary and neutral air contacts. This capability is necessary to reduce fratricide,

and increase the confidence of units’ ability to engage designated hostile targets.

• PRI (II): The capability to positively identify enemy, friendly and neutral ships,

aircraft and ground forces at extended ranges in all weather conditions. This will

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
minimize fratricide.

• PRI (II): The capability to receive, translate, and forward multiple data links

(TADIL-A, TADIL-B, TADIL-J, PADL, ATDL, etc.) to Joint and Coalition forc

over-the-horizon. Near real-time data fusion is needed to correlate tracks in

overlapping sensor coverage areas, particularly air tracks reported on differen

Reliable combat identification sharing among Joint and Coalition tactical forc

also required. Data link capability must provide the picture to Joint forces in 

tactically useful time period (example: the air picture must be updated every 

seconds), and visualization tools in tactical displays which ensure that on-scen

commanders can quickly grasp mission-critical information. All elements (pr

collection, fusion and dissemination architecture, deconfliction, classification

broadcast, and display technologies) are critical.

4. SURVEILLANCE/RECONNAISSANCE

To ensure America’s continued maritime dominance, the Navy and Marine Corps must remain fo

in peacetime—both overtly and covertly—routinely collecting intelligence and gaining valuable kn

of the operating areas where they will most likely be called to respond during crisis or conflict.

• PRI (I): The capability to conduct covert surveillance in the littoral battlespac

Real-time awareness of the battlespace is required to support an accurate com

tactical picture. The relatively long dwell time capabilities resident in manned 

unmanned aerial and sub-surface naval vehicles provide a means to surveil su

shore targets of interest and detect the presence of mines in shallow or conges

littoral waters with minimal risk to naval forces.

• PRI (I): The capability to conduct armed maritime and littoral ISR. Operation 

the littoral environment requires an armed maritime and littoral ISR capabili

U.S. Naval forces in traditional, joint and combined roles to counter changing 

emerging threats. Improve capabilities for armed surveillance and reconnaissa

maritime and littoral areas; collection, processing and dissemination of

environmental data and acoustic, signals, imagery, communications, and elec

intelligence; and evolution into a network-centric warfare environment.

• PRI (I): The capability to identify and provide near real-time targeting data to

shooters against mobile and re-locatable targets ashore. The potential adversa

we face in the future will have a growing number of mobile re-locatable threa

as TELs that can be broken down and moved in a matter of minutes after use

essential to be able to neutralize these threats to be able to dominate the littor

battlespace and protect our forces at sea and ashore.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
and Landing UAV) from all air-capable platforms. Distributed operations in the

littoral place a premium on organic, tactical sensors, which extend the horizons of

our ships and allow us to search/surveil a greater volume of the battlespace. An

organic unmanned tactical aerial reconnaissance capability is needed. This asset

must: be organic to naval forces afloat and ashore; be deployable from all aviationcapable ships and from shore; be survivable in multiple threat environments;

provide the range, speed, and endurance to support tactical missions; have accuracy

capable of supporting precision guided munitions; quickly and accurately acquire,

recognize, and designate targets (all weather, night and day); be integrated with

attack/re-attack planning aids; and perform BDA, with real-time data

communications for battle management.

• PRI (II): The capability for stand-off detection of chemical and biological warfare

agents. Networked chemical and biological sensors will improve the common

tactical picture and when combined with stand-off agent detection capability,

improve operational response.

5. SENSORS

Network-centric operations will link shooters, sensors, and commanders and will permit effects-based

planning in order to provide the knowledge required to attack rapidly an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities, avoid strengths, and destroy centers of gravity. Sensors under the tactical control of commanders and

networked systems for real-time shared awareness are priorities for improving our exploitation of

cyberspace, synchronization, and overall combat effectiveness..

• PRI (I): The capability to operate in an environment in which the Global

Positioning System (GPS) is jammed or degraded. To achieve the rapid, precise

effects integral to our concept, we must ensure GPS does not become a single point

failure in future warfighting capability. We must therefore reduce the risk of current

mission-critical reliance upon GPS navigation data across the spectrum of

operations and platforms. Total reliance places network-centric operations at risk.

Near-term analysis is required to assess aggregate GPS vulnerability across warfare

areas, prioritize mission-critical systems, assess the costs of technology options to

improve current systems (such as jamresistant antennas, high gain receivers and

INS/GPS coupled navigation) and assess risks of not providing back-up for mission

critical systems.

• PRI (II): The capability to generate and disseminate precise time and time-interval

signals to appropriate nodes on the network. These signals are critical to the

calibration and operation of space-based systems for fleet precise geolocation, and

navigation systems as well as for targeting, BDA, and communications.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
and terrestrial environmental characteristics in real-time. Real-time

characterization of the battlespace environment is essential for the operationa

decision-making and is a required input for sensor/weapons systems perform

prediction and optimization as part of the common operational picture.

• PRI (IV): The capability of deployed radars and sensor systems to evolve rapidl

simple component replacement. Capabilities not available when the system is

originally deployed should be easily added as emerging technologies mature. Ja

improvements must be designed for deployment as rapidly and easily as the up

to the threat systems they are designed to counter. A method to anticipate, prod

and field “just in time” counter tactics and system upgrades is required.

6. SATELLITES

Naval forces must therefore control the entire battlespace—sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace—

to defend against, defeat, deny or negate (an adversary’s) capabilities.

• PRI (I): The capability to dynamically manage and assign bandwidth for max

efficiency. As inherently mobile subscribers, Navy platforms are and will cont

be bandwidth limited relative to the other Services. The Navy should maintain 

leading role in satellite communication support to the mobile user. Bandwidt

usage needs to be made more efficient and effective. The combined bandwidt

requirements of the transmission of national imagery, tactical imagery, comm

consistent tactical picture, tactical data networks, command voice networks, v

etc., need to be addressed. The IT-21/Navy-wide intranet core capability shou

developed to efficiently accommodate the full spectrum of requirements.

• PRI (IV): The capability to deny our adversaries accurate positioning, navigat

and timing signals from space-based systems. Allowing adversaries access to p

position and time information will allow them to target and re-target U.S./all

forces faster and with greater accuracy.

7. INFORMATION OPERATIONS

No foe, present or future, will match our knowledge—or our ability to apply it.

• PRI (II): The capability to conduct offensive and defensive information operation

across the spectrum of warfare. Information operations, particularly computer ne

at sea and ashore, will become increasingly important as the Navy moves toward

network-centric operations. Specific priorities include: Naval Security Group acti

Operational Security (OPSEC), Operational Deception (OPDEC), Psychological

Operations (PSYOPS), Physical Destruction, Civil Affairs (CA) and Electronic Wa

(EW) to include denial of adversary C4ISR systems, as well as denial/exploitation 

adversary access to friendly information and networks (CNA/CND).

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:32 PM
languages to use for information operations and intelligence gathering. Accurate

and timely information from foreign sources can only be assured if we have a

sufficient group of linguists available for rapid translation. These linguists must be

fluent in their particular language specialty, and available to be dispersed

throughout the fleet and positioned forward as well as at the central analysis nodes

for optimum effectiveness. A worldwide language capability should be pursued to

ensure that all contingencies can be covered.

8. INTEROPERABILITY

. . . Interoperable communications networks will allow all elements of U.S. foreign policy to “plug-andplay” in this regional knowledge base upon their arrival in theater.

• PRI (III): The capability to provide automated, timely access and exchange of nationa

source data to tactical forces (Joint and Coalition). Automated exchange protocols

should be developed to allow timely sharing of information between all Joint and

Coalition forces. It is only through the judicious sharing of this information that true

Knowledge Superiority and dominance of the battlespace can be achieved by Joint

and Coalition forces.

• PRI (III): The capability to share with allies the full range of digital communications

that is releasable. In order to be truly interoperable with allies, the maximum use of

shared digital communications must be a priority. Current and future systems should

be upgraded to allow appropriate communications flow with allies.

Battlespace Control

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:34 PM
to shape the future battlespace. Theater missile defense, cruise missile defense, ai

defense for the protection of U.S. and allied forces, and their homelands, will be 

ble. Battlespace control is more than efforts to ensure naval survivability in order 

subsequently place power ashore; our access through forward presence and know

superiority will now permit the cumulative effects of our protections, fires and m

vers to simultaneously impact events offensively on land. Naval forces must rema

capable of operating regardless of a future adversary’s area denial strategy. This m

mean overcoming varying levels of space-based, non-acoustic and acoustic senso

ered defenses of undersea platforms and cruise missiles, information warfare, int

gent mines or weapons of mass destruction.

Battlespace control encompasses the range of actions required to assure our access and shape the

battlespace for naval, joint, and combined forces. Sea control remains both a cardinal prerequisite 

a unique naval contribution to, joint warfighting; it is essential to assuring the flow of follow-on fo

a theater.

I. Operational Concepts for Battlespace Control. Battlespace control for forward 

will require a combination of strategic, surface, subsurface and air superiority.

• Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the Navy’s contribution to nucle

deterrence at the strategic level. Continuously forward deployed to classified

locations, the SSBNs represent a secure and reliable counter to any potential

adversary’s attempt to obtain a nuclear advantage over the United States.

• Although the mission requires stealth and invisibility on station, the knowled

a certain portion of our ballistic missiles are always at sea in safe locations an

to launch against any adversary with a very short lead time will continue to b

credible deterrent.

The primary force enabler for air superiority is the carrier air wing. The air wing 

be capable of projecting air power over the littoral and far inland, attacking enem

craft, and suppressing or destroying enemy land-based surface to air and surface 

surface threats.

• The carrier airwing will consist of strike/fighter, early warning, and CSAR/SU

aircraft. The airwing assets will contain all required capabilities to gain and

maintain air superiority.

• These aircraft will be able to accomplish all the required missions including fi

attack, aerial refueling, C2, ISR, CAS and SEAD.

• MPR and HSL aircraft will act as force multipliers and provide mid to long ra

attack, C2, ISR, ASUW and USW.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:34 PM
can launch special operations forces and stand off land attack munitions.

• Aegis cruisers and destroyers use precision stand off land attack munitions to

prepare the battlespace. Cruise missiles attack enemy command and control, and

communications nodes. Missile attacks will also be aimed at the anti-aircraft

installations/TELS to soften up enemy defenses. Marine Corps assets ashore will be

supported with Naval Surface Fire.

Force Protection consists of a layered defense concept of shipboard, aircraft and submarine systems. Central to ship defense is the ability to defend against surface and

subsurface, theater ballistic, and anti-ship cruise missile attack.

• The Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) system fielded on Aegis capable

platforms will be the Navy’s primary theater defense asset to counter the ballistic

missile threat. Multiple TBMD ships will combine forces to provide a defense in

depth against long/short range theater ballistic missiles.

• All platforms will use a system of integrated self-defense capabilities including

advanced radars for detecting threats and directing fires, anti-ship cruise missile

defenses, decoys, and close-in weapons systems.

• An example of Network Centric Operations applied to force protection is

encapsulated in the Navy’s revolutionary “Ring of Fire” concept for naval fire

support. Aircraft, surface ships, and submarines are linked into a single battle group

LAN. The Ring of Fire automatically matches requests for fire with available assets,

saving both manpower and time, while ensuring the correct ordnance is on target

when and where needed.

• Surface combatants, submarines, MPR aircraft, helicopters and IUSS assets combine

forces to counter the undersea warfare threat.

• Protection against mines will be accomplished through the use of organic and

dedicated mine countermeasures to include detection, avoidance, marking and

neutralization.

II. Long Range Planning Objectives for Battlespace Control. Battlespace control encompasses the range of actions required to assure our access and shape the battlespace for naval, joint, and combined forces. Our enduring mission of sea control remains both a

cardinal prerequisite for, and a unique naval contribution to, joint warfighting; it is essential to assuring the flow of follow-on forces into a theater.

1. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

Naval forces also provide the most cost-effective and survivable component of America’s strategic nuclear

deterrence triad.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:34 PM
The SSBN force will be sized as directed by Defense Planning Guidance and

constrained by treaty limitations.

2. ANTI-SHIP CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

In order to assure U.S. access forward, naval forces will be required to counter . . . cruise missiles.

The ONI capabilities based assessments indicate significant advances in cruise m

technology and its widespread proliferation. Missile speed and ability to discrim

countermeasures are projected to increase. At the same time, missile detectability 

likely decrease due to the spread of stealth technologies. In view of this increased

threat, the following capabilities are required with respect to Theater Air and Mi

Defense with a near-term priority placed on the deployment of improved close-i

point defense systems.

• PRI (I): The Fleet-wide, point defense capability to achieve high-probability hard

against sub- and super-sonic cruise missiles. Future dispersed operations as envis

in the maritime concept, and a robust multi-axis threat as projected by ONI requ

improved self-defense capabilities for all combatants against advanced ASCMs.

• PRI (I): The capability to develop and deploy advanced active countermeasur

systems and expendable decoys to facilitate deception operations and self-def

against ASCMs. Ships must have the capability to defeat advanced weapons w

multi-spectral seekers.

• PRI (I): The capability to integrate self-defense stand-alone sensors and hard/

softkill systems. Engagement timelines imposed by advanced adversary capab

and the compressed littoral battlespace dictate further automation of detectio

decision-making processes to maximize system and operator responsiveness a

low observable sea-skimming threats.

3. AREA AIR DEFENSE

Forward naval forces will also project defensive power over land to protect U.S. and allied forces an

homelands with sea-based theater air and missile defense. . . . Battlespace control is therefore more 

forts to assure access in order to place follow-on forces and power ashore; it permits naval forces to 

neously produce decisive effects—both offensively and defensively.

Priorities for area air defense (AAD) are as follows:

• PRI (I): The capability for naval air forces to maintain air superiority over po

adversaries with technologically advanced and tactically superior aircraft poss

enhanced lethality and survivability, and capable of seamless interoperability. 

requires modernization of current aircraft as well as development and procur

of follow-on aircraft capable of air dominance over potential adversaries.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:34 PM
threats, including advanced cruise missiles. Development of a multi-sensor

capability to complement radar systems should be considered. Improve capabilities

to plan and execute joint air defense operations afloat. Modernization efforts must

focus on collaborative planning systems, middleware for systems integration and

supporting C4I/bandwidth to facilitate afloat planning and real-time battle

management/operational decision making.

• PRI (II): The capability to project the maritime air and missile defense umbrella

inland over critical port facilities, ground forces and allied/coalition infrastructure.

Overland air and missile defense should leverage off improvement of current

shipboard and carrier air wing sensor and weapons system capabilities.

4. UNDERSEA WARFARE

In the future, naval forces will be challenged by anti-access strategies built upon varied asymmetric and

conventional threats and weapons. In order to assure U.S. access forward, naval forces will be required to

counter a host of threats. . . .

The following are the priorities for USW capabilities:

• PRI (I): The capability to conduct undersea surveillance in littoral waters. This

capability will support sustained littoral campaigns against coordinated submarine

and mine strategies in coastal waters and geographic choke points. Emphasis must

be placed on improvement of sensors and processors required for ASW and MIW.

Non-acoustic technologies should be given emphasis given the environmental

conditions in most littoral waters.

• PRI (II): The capability to simultaneously detect targets, process, fuse and display

near real-time multi-sensor data for USW tactical decision making. Defense against

the undersea threat will require the combined efforts of numerous platforms and

sensors operating simultaneously in different locations in the battlespace. Fusion of

the information from these sensors will enable the battle force to be able to apply

the appropriate neutralization techniques in a timely manner.

5. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

In order to assure U.S. access forward, naval forces will be required to counter . . . submarines.

The complexity of the littoral battlespace requires that undersea warfare adopt an integrated approach utilizing a variety of sensors including non-acoustic, multi-static

active and passive technologies. These capabilities will support sustained littoral campaigns against coordinated submarine and mine strategies in coastal waters and geographic choke points. The following are the priorities for anti-submarine warfare:

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:34 PM
and conventional submarines in a littoral environment. Processed data must b

capable of integration into the common operational picture.

• PRI (II): The capability to ensure adequate inventories of expendable USW se

are available to achieve combat readiness prior to forward deployment and ab

sustain combat/contingency operations in 2 MTW. The inventory of active an

passive expendable sensors must be maintained at a level that will support the

requirement to sustain combat in a 2 MTW scenario. Additionally, training an

readiness events must be accounted for to ensure that combat-ready forces ar

always deployed.

• PRI (II): The capability to engage low doppler, near bottom threat submarine

operating in shallow, high ambient noise water. Anti-submarine warfare in th

littoral involves some of the most difficult acoustic environments in the ocean

order to ensure a capability against slow, quiet submarines in this environmen

improved acoustic and non-acoustic sensors must be developed.

• PRI (II): The capability to conduct extended range passive acoustic target

classification, and threat weapon alertment. The latest generation submarine

weapon threats require early alertment in order to achieve survivability. High 

multi-mode torpedoes and missiles are a growing threat to the battle force.

• PRI (III): The capability to exploit non-acoustic submarine signatures such a

periscope/mast exposure and wake phenomena. Submarine quieting technolo

proliferated worldwide in recent years, making the detection and tracking of

submarines through passive acoustics alone very difficult. All detection metho

must be exploited to ensure a probability of success in ASW.

• PRI (III): The capability to operate active, multi-static acoustic systems with

improved performance and reduced false alarm rates. Multi-static acoustic sy

will provide the ability to track quiet, elusive submarines, particularly diesels 

littorals. Continue improvement of current capabilities including reducing fa

alarm rates.

• PRI (IV): The capability to conduct enhanced ASW modeling and simulation

generation submarines have presented a challenge to ASW forces. Training m

realistic and include accurate threat modeling and simulations in all environm

that will be encountered.

6. MINE WARFARE

. . . Effective counter-mine capabilities, and the ability to locate and negate or destroy key enemy w

systems are also fundamental to our efforts to achieve full-dimensional protection.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:34 PM
objectives may require operations in close proximity to mined waters. The Navy will

continue to aggressively research and prepare mine countermeasure systems to ensure

effective operational capability in littoral waters in support of land campaigns. Countermeasure technology must keep pace with the increased sophistication in mine fusin

and stealth technology. The following are therefore the priorities for mine warfare:

• PRI (I): The organic capability of surface forces to detect, avoid and/or neutralize

mines within operationally acceptable timelines and with acceptable levels of

operational risk. Navy capabilities must include airborne, shipboard and

submarinebased sensors and vehicles, using acoustic and non-acoustic sensors (e.g.

sonar, electrooptics, and lasers). As organic capabilities are brought on-line, standalone Mine Counter Measures (MCM) will be balanced with organic systems to

meet warfighting requirements.

• PRI (II): The capability to transit mined areas in very shallow water and surf zones

in order to land troops and supplies ashore in support of combat operations and/or

operations other than war. The threat assessment of potential adversaries indicates

mined landing zones will be a probable obstacle to amphibious forces. In order to

project our power ashore through ground forces, while protecting those forces and

transport craft, this threat must be neutralized.

7. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE (TMD)

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:36 PM
ward. This umbrella will be built largely on our emerging air and missile defense capabilities. Proj

defense ashore will enable Operational Maneuver from the Sea, and it will be critical for setting th

tions necessary to protect the flow of follow-on forces into a theater.

To achieve useful Theater Missile Defense capability, naval forces require the abil

detect and plan destruction of threat missiles prior to launch; detect, track, ident

and kill all in-flight threats; conduct reactive in-flight planning for strike/counte

strike assets; conduct cooperative engagement operations; distribute threat missi

tracks, situational awareness and warning information to concerned areas, perso

and facilities; and launch prompt counter-strikes against missile launch and infr

ture sites. The following are priorities for TMD capabilities:

• PRI (I): The capability for command and control in a theater ballistic missile

environment. Continue development and implementation of a Joint Compos

Tracking Network (JCTN) and Joint Data Network (JDN) to achieve a multi-

integrated ship and aircraft sensor data for real-time fire control quality comp

track picture.

• PRI (II): The capability to integrate Navy (Aegis) and USMC/Army (Avenger/

Patriot) air defense systems to provide direct support to USMC/USA ground

elements. Communications are currently the limiting factor.

• PRI (III): The capability to rapidly coordinate remote infrared detection with

tactical radar, and a theater-wide communications link to enable early destruc

of threat missiles. Fusion of remote sensors, radars and command and contro

nodes will enable early detection and destruction of missiles.

• PRI (III): The capability for Aegis ships to quickly shift between tactical and T

Ballistic Missile mode. The utility of naval ships is in their multi-function/mu

mission capabilities. The numerous tactical capabilities of the Aegis ships mu

made quickly available to the battle group when needed, yet be responsive to 

defense in the Theater Ballistic Missile mode.

• PRI (IV): The capability to positively identify targets detected by national sen

with an overall reduction in false alarm rate and a reduced need for operator

intervention. Owing to the short travel times for missile threats, the latency o

launch point and impact point predictions must be reduced, tactical informat

must be rapidly passed theater-wide, and cooperative engagement initiatives m

be extended to all potential fixed and mobile defense assets. Improvements ar

required to defend against an attack by multiple simultaneous lower tier weap

• PRI (V): The capability to access and to exploit foreign sensors, links, and net

in order to determine best own-force asset deployment. Theater missile defen

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:36 PM
Allied/Coalition assets.

8. CHEM-BIO

Enhancing our capabilities to counter terrorism, to respond to chemical or biological attack and operate in

a chemical or biological environment, and to treat and process mass casualties is essential.

To enable naval forces to operate effectively in a chemical/biological threat environment, the following capabilities and associated priorities are required:

• PRI (III): The capability for small units and individual warfighters to sense low,

sublethal concentrations of chemical/biological agents. Capabilities include sensors

notification architecture, vulnerability assessment, planning TDA’s, and tactically

responsive modeling and simulation.

• PRI (III): The capability to continue full tactical operations while wearing

protective gear. Capabilities include operations in extreme climates including

rapidly donned, lightweight and long duration individual protection as well as

rapidly established and highly sustainable collective protection.

• PRI (III): The capability to conduct a large-scale decontamination including the use

of a waterless chemical decontamination process. Capabilities also include faster,

more effective, and less toxic means for decontaminating individual personnel,

small units, large surfaces, aircraft and other vehicles, and electronic equipment.

• PRI (III): The capability to administer chemical and/or biological weapon antidotes

that are effective against new threats. Protection of our forces requires defense

against all chem/bio threats including any new developments. They must be made

widely and readily available to all forces, with priority for those forward deployed.

9. SURFACE WARFARE

The vast majority of America’s global trade will continue to move by sea, and freedom of the seas remains

the enduring responsibility of the Naval Service.

Surface warfare (SUW) remains a core naval mission. In order to meet the advances in

surface combatant technology and to provide flexibility to deal with current and projected contingency operations in support of interagency tasking, the following sea control capabilities are needed:

• PRI (I): The capability to detect, identify, track and destroy high numbers of small

craft in the littorals. A combination of airborne and surface weapons systems is

required to achieve adequate standoff ranges and provide force defense in depth

against small boat raids.

• PRI (II): The capability to conduct long-range, high-endurance maritime and

electronic surveillance. Improvements to current systems should focus on

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:36 PM
signature surface and subsurface targets.

• PRI (III): The capability to intercept small boats in support of maritime

interdiction, counter narcotics and migrant interdiction operations. High spe

maneuverable aircraft and ships will be needed to be able to intercept go-fast 

used in smuggling operations.

Battlespace Attack

Battlespace attack will disrupt an adversary’s decision making process by an early

exploitation of the access provided by both forward presence and preemptive kn

edge superiority. The speed of employment and tactical surprise afforded by forw

naval forces permit achieving battlespace control through simultaneous battlespa

attack. Whether conducting long range strike or naval fires for dominant effect, i

ing Marine Corps or Special Operations Forces, or conducting a noncombatant e

ation, the capability to apply a precise effect on target when needed is paramoun

control of the situation. Therefore, the impact of events on land by battlespace a

concurrently results in battlespace control. The result is that sequential operation

both on-scene and follow-on, CONUS-based forces can be conducted as require

These joint, follow-on forces can, to a larger degree, then join the ongoing battle

attack posture and be immediately available for offensive operations.

The ability to apply these effects inside an adversary’s decision timeline, with a knowledge and und

standing of their impacts, permits effects-based planning to disrupt his operational design

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:38 PM
massed firepower of the carrier battle group, its air wing, associated amphibious landing forces, and MPR, all using precision aiming and network centric operations. Power

Projection will be the overarching operational concept for battlespace attack, providing

massed effects across the littoral and far inland. The Navy’s forward presence and assured access means that naval forces will usually be the first ones on scene and availabl

to confront a developing crisis.

• Ships, submarines and aircraft will achieve strategic effect and shape the battlespace

with massed, precision guided munitions launched from numerous platforms

aimed at the enemy’s centers of gravity and critical nodes.

• Carrier air wings are launched to provide tactical air power, achieve air dominance

and strike at critical targets while providing support to ground forces ashore.

• Submarines provide covert intelligence, surveillance, and indications and warning

in addition to landing and recovering special operations forces.

• Marine Expeditionary Forces project power ashore, enabling follow-on entry of

heavy land-based air and ground forces. The operational concept for amphibious

operations is defined as the uninterrupted movement of forces from ships located in

the littorals as well as from platforms located over the horizon, rapidly and directly

to decisive objectives. OMFTS is the capstone concept for the 21st Century and is

applicable across a range of military operations from small-scale contingencies to

major theater war.

• MPR aircraft augment the air wing from forward bases by bringing the capability to

conduct C2, ISR, SUW, USW, and land attack missions to the operation.

• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will be launched and recovered from ships to gain

critical ISR and provide additional SEAD capability for force protection.

Future battlespace attack concepts will build on the concept of land attack and expand

its capabilities further to achieve direct and decisive impact ashore. The theme selected

by the CNO for the focus of the Strategic Studies Group XVIII was “Sea Strike . . .

Attacking Land Targets From the Sea Base.”

• Sea Strike is a future capability of forward deployed naval forces firing thousands of

munitions per hour, with extended range, using fully integrated and simultaneous

fires from distributed netted forces, with precision targeting.

• This type of attack would produce overwhelming physical destruction and

psychological shock to enemy forces.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:38 PM
contributing to the shaping of a region.

• Network Centric Operations with a vastly improved ISR sensor network will

provide the ability for precision effects-based targeting required for Sea Strike 

successfully conducted.

Information Operations (IO) will be conducted against an adversary to affect his 

mation systems while defending our own systems.

• IO operations will include attacks on adversary computer networks and opera

security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and

special information operations.

• Naval forces will be able to perform all the necessary Command and Control

functions to execute their operations, and at the same time be prepared to ass

the responsibility for those same functions in conjunction with joint forces.

• As soon as the battle force is joined by other U.S. military, coalition, or civilia

forces, the Naval Commander will be designated the Joint Force Commander 

and naval forces will exercise command and control for the Joint Task Force (

• Network Centric Operations will enable naval forces to execute the roles of Jo

Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Force Air Compon

Commander (JFACC), Area Air Defense Commander (AADC), and Airspace

Control Authority (ACA).

II. Long Range Planning Objectives for Battlespace Attack. Concurrent with batt

control, attack operations such as precision strike and ship-to-objective maneuver ex

the advantages of maneuver and firepower from the sea. The speed of employment a

forded by networked forces forward is invaluable when speed of deployment from th

United States—and the loss of surprise—is a disadvantage.

1. LONG RANGE STRIKE AND INTERDICTION

. . . The unprecedented reach, volume, and precision of our weapons and sensors . . . allow us to pr

power deep inland. Improving and connecting our sensor, information, and targeting systems—in

focusing on the real-time location of an adversary’s mobile and time-critical targets—will accelera

operational tempo at which attacks can be delivered for decisive effects.

Naval forces must be able to project power far inland to effectively shape the

battlespace and achieve the desired strategic effect. Navy surface combatants, airc

and submarines will use long range strike and interdiction to hold an adversary’s 

cal nodes at risk from the littoral to deep inland. These capabilities will improve 

Navy’s ability to apply long range strike and interdiction to achieve the desired re

The following priorities apply to long range strike and interdiction. These capab

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:38 PM
ral to deep inland:

• PRI (I): The capability for aircraft carriers to conduct all-weather precision strike

operations. Advanced strike fighter programs should focus on survivability,

detectability, and full integration of the next generation of joint precision guided

munitions to include all-weather precision strike munitions.

• PRI (I): The capability to direct responsive, precision lethal naval fire against a wide

range of tactical and strategic targets from surface combatants and submarines.

Investigate in-flight re-targeting and organic BDA options to improve Tomahawk

Land Attack Missile (TLAM) responsiveness and operational flexibility. Due to recent

combat expenditures, TLAM programs must remain on course to restore inventory

stability and avoid a gap in attack capabilities. Increase the capability of surface

combatants to provide high volumes of precision fires capable of interdicting enemy

ground maneuver forces, and relocatable targets such as TBM systems.

• PRI (I): The capability to provide sea-based Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

(SEAD). SEAD capabilities must keep pace with the proliferation of mobile,

advanced, and integrated air defense systems (IADS) in support of joint operations

and retain the ability to affect adversary EW and communication systems.

• PRI (I): The capability to conduct non-cooperative target identification equally wel

in the active or passive mode. Identification needs include air, ground, surface, and

subsurface assets. Additionally, improved identification friend or foe (IFF)

capabilities are required. This should include the ability to discriminate between

friends, foes, and neutrals.

• PRI (II): The capability to conduct flexible, rapid mission planning for use of

precision guided munitions. TLAM mission planning time must be significantly

reduced, to allow re-targeting minutes prior to launch and/or while airborne. The

strike planning process must be compressed by applying technology to conduct

battle damage assessment more rapidly, to update target databases and target lists,

and to communicate strike plans. Planning systems must also support re-targeting

after strike packages are airborne, by rapidly de-conflicting an evolving tactical

scene and communicating new targeting data to the aircraft. New strike planning

capabilities must be capable of managing more targets with the same number of

strike platforms. Revolutionary battle damage assessment and target identification

tools, including new sensors and unmanned platforms, are desired to optimize

strike planning and updating as operations unfold. The capability to use high-speed

communications networks and protocols to pass weapon assignments and timecritical targeting information in both text and graphical formats is desired.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:38 PM
precise effects fire to support operations from the sea and ashore. The ability 

project power ashore will depend on an integration of sea-based air power,

amphibious landing forces and naval fire support. This naval fire must be lon

range and accurate to be able to extend our influence deep into the littorals an

provide decisive effects.

• PRI (III): The capability to perform BDA with rapid response time and video

communications. BDA plays an essential role in knowledge of the battlespace 

only effective if obtained rapidly and accurately. The need for follow-on attac

with costly precision munitions must be determined quickly to ensure that w

are not wasted to ensure their availability to be placed when and where neede

unmanned capability is desired.

• PRI (IV): The capability to attack Hard, Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT). Navy

capability to hold HDBTs at risk is extremely limited. To provide an effective

deterrent against and flexible response to projected adversary area denial stra

forward deployed naval forces require the ability to neutralize selected HDBT

as leadership/C2 centers and weapons of mass destruction facilities).

• PRI (IV): The capability to employ scalable munitions with selectable yield (f

both minimizing collateral damage or for increasing suppressive power).

2. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

Operational Maneuver from the Sea underwrites the conduct of naval expeditionary operation

littorals by combining the proven principles of maneuver warfare and maritime power projectio

capitalizing on technology and improvements in mobility, weaponry, sustainment, and comman

control, as well as doctrine and organization . . . to seamlessly project power ashore to attain cri

campaign objectives.

We must continue to evolve the capability to conduct sea-based, expeditionary o

tions across the spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement to major theat

The following are the priorities for Battlespace Attack amphibious operations ca

ties and Close Air Support (CAS):

• PRI (I): The capability for improved day, night and all-weather close air supp

amphibious operations ashore. Ensure the mix and balance of Navy targeting

sensors and munitions to support the capability to conduct day, night and all

weather close air support missions.

• PRI (II): The capability to provide sufficient lift to support and sustain naval

expeditionary maneuver operations from the sea. Prepositioned assets, maritim

sealift and combat logistic forces must be able to support the full range of amph

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:39 PM
forward deployment.

• PRI (III): The capability for upgraded C4I on amphibious ships. Sufficient C4I is

required on all amphibious ships to support the baseline demands of decentralized,

network-centric naval and joint operations.

• PRI (IV): The capability to employ expanded munitions, to include non-lethal

weapons that minimize collateral damage in a densely populated environment.

Urban warfare, anti-terrorist actions and certain special operations require the

capability to neutralize a threat with precision while minimizing damage to the

surrounding area and populace.

• PRI (V): The capability to detect human-portable munitions. Security operations

require the ability to detect hidden human-portable munitions to minimize the risk

to US forces.

• PRI (V): The capability for enhanced personal communication systems that allow

hands-free voice communications with unit commanders. Examine the possibility

for future forces to be able to be connected through personal communications units

that allow hands-free contact at all times.

Battlespace Sustainment

Our mobile, dispersed forces will require an equally agile and tailored logistics system

for support within their dynamic tempo of operations. Configured to the mission,

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:41 PM
support to sustain operations and maneuver across the extended battlespace. Ma

vering sea-based forces permit commanders to conduct fully integrated joint com

and control, surveillance, targeting, logistics and re-supply. This sea-based sustai

of military forces also enhances other operational concepts such as Operational M

ver from the Sea and Ship to Objective Maneuver.

Configured to the mission, sea-based logistics and joint command and control will support maneu

forces across the battlespace—from replenishing and refueling forces at sea to delivering tailored se

logistics that sustain operations on land. In the future, both conventional and asymmetric threats 

quire ground forces to become less dependent on vulnerable fixed bases or stockpiles ashore. Force s

ment through sea-based logistics will reduce the threat of an attack on key logistics nodes and the

requirement for dedicated forces to protect shore-based logistics concentrations.

I. Operational Concepts for Battlespace Sustainment. Battlespace sustainment d

pends upon the delivery of tailored and focused support and logistics from the s

across the spectrum of peacetime presence, crisis response and conflict. Force su

ment encompasses the comprehensive and responsive logistic support system tha

cludes air and sealift, replenishment ships, mobile repair facilities, and advanced

logistics support hubs. Battlespace sustainment is the backbone of any operation 

critical to its success. This capability underpins the Navy’s future ability to opera

worldwide.

Combat Logistics Forces (CLF) are integral to the operation of forward positioned 

rapidly deployable forces surged from out of theater. The ability to replenish forc

underway and to respond rapidly to changing operational requirements is essent

the effective employment of these forces.

• Ships of the CLF provide the organic support that will allow U.S. naval forces 

maintain a forward presence in any location worldwide with little or no depen

on shore based facilities. These ships will incorporate anti-terrorism/force

protection capabilities during operations in areas where there is a threat of te

or pirate activities.

• Improvements in warfighting ability will require a commensurate revolution 

way CLF ships are operated, maintained and protected. In order to be success

the future, Network Centric Operations must be applied to all units in the bat

force including the CLF ships.

• Protected, hardened communications and command and control will be used 

distribute necessary supplies. At-sea replenishment of weapons will be

accomplished quickly and safely with increasingly sophisticated, systems. Rap

turn-around times will enable the speed of command necessary for such adva

concepts as Sea Strike and Ring of Fire.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:41 PM
expeditionary sustainment capability. It permits the rapid deployment of expeditionary forces anywhere in the world through the linkup of personnel from the operating

forces with prepositioned, sea-based equipment and supplies.

• When the MPS and its combat forces are joined it becomes a Maritime

Prepositioning Force (MPF). This operation will be protected from asymmetric

threats.

• The equipment, supplies, facilities, and security afforded by an MPS provide a

unique capability in response to a wide variety of operations from natural disasters,

peace operations, and humanitarian missions to the full range of warfare.

Ships of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) provide the Navy with the capability to

move and sustain U.S. forces overseas by strategic sealift. Equipment, ordnance, and

supplies needed to conduct any sizable projection of joint military power must move

by sea. Future conflicts will depend on the MSC and commercial assets to sustain forward forces for any period of time.

• MSC ships will incorporate anti-terrorism/force protection capabilities during

operations in areas where there is a threat of terrorist or pirate activities.

II. Long Range Planning Objectives for Battlespace Sustainment. Sea-based Logistics.

Efficient sea-based command, control, and logistics will be crucial to naval and joint

warfighting as well as the realization of emerging operational concepts. Robust Maritime

Prepositioning Forces and strategic lift capabilities will be key to the projection and sustainment of combat power. Advanced work practices, borrowed from the ongoing revolution in

business affairs, will also improve the overall efficiency of sustainment operations and permi

the development of near-real-time, in-transit supply and underway replenishment tracking.

The development of efficient sea-based command, control, and logistics will be crucial

to naval and joint warfighting as well as the realization of emerging operational concepts and capabilities. It is imperative that the Navy balance the size and cost of its

infrastructure relative to its operating forces. The vision for Infrastructure is that it is

the foundation of the Navy/Marine Corps fighting enterprise bringing together the

right mix of people, knowledge, technology, structure and culture to provide effective

and focused support to the warfighter.

Infrastructure as defined by the RBA chartered Strategic Infrastructure Plan working

group encompasses the people, processes, and properties that support Navy and

Marine Corps forces and includes:

• Installations

• Logistics (Ordnance, Supply, Maintenance and Mobilization)

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:41 PM
• Recruiting/Retention

• Individual Training/Development

• Medical and Dental

• Communications and Information Technology (data/voice/video)

• Management Headquarters

• Quality of Service (live, work, learn and play)

• Acquisition—including RDT&E.

Battlespace sustainment prioritization is difficult due to the corporate decision t

torically mortgage recapitalization to fund readiness and modernization. It is im

tive that we develop innovative investment strategies that will ensure naval force

properly sustained to fight and win in the 21st Century. The following are priori

battlespace sustainment:

1. REPLENISHMENT

Configured to the mission, sea-based logistics and joint command and control will support maneu

forces across the battlespace—from replenishing and refueling forces at sea to delivering tailored se

logistics that sustain operations on land.

• PRI (I): The capability for day and night connected and vertical replenishmen

transfer of personnel and cargo at sea. The Navy must retain an afloat, organi

capability for tactical logistics and combat support missions (i.e., SAR, MEDE

• PRI (III): The capability to conduct ship-to-shore resupply in sea states up to 

ability to provide logistics and re-supply for naval forces ashore is presently li

to sea state 1 or 2.

2. OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS

Mobile, dispersed forces require an equally agile and tailored logistics system to support their dyna

erations. Logistics from the sea that are focused to arrive where and when needed, without a large f

requiring significant protection, will support sustained maneuver in an expanded battlespace.

• PRI (III): The capability to provide in-transit tracking of logistics spares. Inte

Focused Logistics and Total Asset Visibility concepts throughout shore and af

logistics infrastructure to reduce redundancy in shipboard logistics loadouts a

improve efficiency and responsiveness of re-supply.

• PRI (IV): The capability to fully integrate logistics information into the Comm

Tactical Picture. Naval force commanders lack a means of obtaining, displayin

analyzing the status of equipment and resources necessary for operational/tac

planning. Current logistics reporting systems are not focused on providing

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
part of the Common Operational Picture.

3. WEAPONS HANDLING AND LOADING

. . . Maneuvering sea-based forces will permit commanders to conduct fully integrated joint command and

control, surveillance, targeting, logistics and resupply.

• PRI (I): The capability to sustain forward deployed precision guided munitions

levels in support of rotational deployment requirements, contingency operations,

and DPG directed two MTW requirement. While cross-decking may be necessary to

provide desired levels of certain special purpose ordnance, we should not be

dependent upon this process for fundamental combat capabilities—we must deploy

combat-ready.

• PRI (II): The capability to conduct underway reload and cross-deck of land attack

munitions. Retain the capability for theater reload of Tomahawk and follow-on land

attack missiles. This capability should be met through an optimum mix of organic

naval forces, host nation and contractor support.

• PRI (II): The capability to provide required support equipment, training shapes,

and mission essential tactical equipment to all deploying and follow-on forces. The

requirement to maintain combat readiness while deployed necessitates access to

appropriate below the line support equipment.

4. FORCES SUPPORT

Netted logistics that include pre-positioning, strategic sealift, and airlift are key to sustaining future joint

and coalition forces. . . . Force sustainment through seabased logistics will reduce the threat of an attack on

key logistics nodes and the requirement for dedicated forces to protect shore-based logistics concentrations.

• PRI (I): The capability to support MAGTF contingency deployments from maritim

preposition force assets. The maritime pre-positioning force must support Marine

Corps expeditionary operations at Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed

levels of readiness.

• PRI (III): The capability to conduct expeditionary naval construction support, naval

expeditionary operations, Marine Corps operations ashore, humanitarian assistance/

disaster relief operations, and naval construction/installation support. In addition to

contingency employment, construction capabilities provide unique opportunities for

engagement with Allies and emerging partners when the employment or exercise of

combat forces may be inappropriate or ineffective due to political sensitivities or

significant differences in military capabilities/security interests.

5. MAINTENANCE

Advanced work practices, borrowed from the ongoing revolution in business affairs, will also improve the

overall efficiency of sustainment operations.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
needed to ensure that our equipment is maintained to our best ability. More aust

budgets have dictated reduced acquisition of new equipment—it is therefore imp

tive that our extant equipment be maintained efficiently and properly. The follow

priorities apply to Infrastructure Maintenance capabilities:

• PRI (I): The capability to determine the physical condition of ship, amphibio

vehicle, ground vehicle and aircraft systems (especially electro-mechanical sys

that signal when maintenance is required. Sensors, neural networks, vibration

monitors, analyzers and fluid quality test equipment or monitors are example

technologies that may be applied. The goal is to increase asset availability and 

reduce total ownership costs.

• PRI (IV): The capability to incorporate new or alternate materials that are mo

resistant to corrosion and fouling into new and replacement systems and plat

New, faster and less expensive stripping and surface preparation techniques fo

and irregular surfaces are required. New coating materials must be long lastin

weather and damage resistant, anti-fouling, environmentally safe, and applied 

equipment and techniques that are not hazardous to personnel or to the

environment. Better and longerlasting deck coverings (interior and exterior) 

required. In each instance (coatings, surface preparations, and deck coverings

affordability and easy application and use by operational personnel is essentia

technologies for anti-corrosion and corrosion control for USMC vehicles and

systems are needed.

• PRI (V): The capability to use composite material repair equipment and tools

techniques and environmentally safe materials to allow quick and affordable r

at lower and intermediate maintenance levels. These new capabilities are requ

repair the composite to original specifications with simple equipment, and be 

for the user and the environment.

6. INFRASTRUCTURE

Finally, we must act to improve the quality of life of the entire Navy–Marine Corps team—Sailors

Marines, civilians, and their families.

• PRI (I): The capability to provide base, port, airstation, and installation

infrastructure that supports the current and planned Navy force structure. Th

Navy must maintain and operate shore installations in the most efficient, effe

manner to provide operational support to the warfighter.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
• Priority (I): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring core nava

competencies without which SEVERE strategic risk would be incurred.

• The capability to recruit the personnel that support the manning requirements of

our current and future force.

• The capability to meet established retention goals for the correct manning structure

to support the Navy’s mission.

• The capability to provide improved metrics that will accurately measure key

readiness factors.

• The capability to deploy the CVBG and ARG fully combat ready as the core naval

combat force package, directly augmented and supported by other maritime, air

and logistics forces.

• The capability for forward deployed forces to maintain survivability must be a

design characteristic of all future platforms.

• The capability to direct naval, Joint and Combined Task Force operations afloat.

• The capability to link shooters, sensors and command nodes with an openarchitecture integrated information grid that leverages Commercial Off-the Shelf

(COTS) technology wherever possible.

• The capability for all combatants and tactical aviation platforms to operate a

common data link system.

• The capability to produce and sustain a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP), where

all assets share one near real-time joint/fused picture, identifying friendly, adversary

and neutral air contacts.

• The capability to conduct covert surveillance in the littoral battlespace.

• The capability to conduct armed maritime and littoral ISR.

• The capability to identify and provide near-real time targeting data to shooters

against mobile and re-locatable targets ashore.

• The capability to operate in an environment in which the Global Positioning System

(GPS) is jammed or degraded.

• The capability to dynamically manage and assign bandwidth for maximum

efficiency.

• The capability to maintain current sea-based strategic nuclear deterrence.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
suband super-sonic cruise missiles.

• The capability to develop and deploy advanced active countermeasure systems a

expendable decoys to facilitate deception operations and self-defense against AS

• The capability to integrate self-defense stand-alone sensors and hard/soft-kill sy

• The capability for naval air forces to maintain air superiority over potential

adversaries with technologically advanced and tactically superior aircraft poss

enhanced lethality and survivability, and capable of seamless interoperability.

• The capability to provide area air and missile defense against emerging threat

including advanced cruise missiles.

• The capability to conduct undersea surveillance in littoral waters.

• The capability to deploy undersea networks that can detect nuclear and

conventional submarines in a littoral environment.

• The organic capability of surface combatants to detect, avoid and/or neutraliz

mines within operationally acceptable timelines and with acceptable levels of

operational risk.

• The capability for command and control in a theater ballistic missile environm

• The capability to detect, identify, track and destroy high numbers of small cra

the littorals.

• The capability for aircraft carriers to conduct all-weather precision strike opera

• The capability to direct responsive, precision lethal naval fire against a wide ra

tactical and strategic targets from surface combatants and submarines.

• The capability to provide sea-based Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEA

• The capability to conduct non-cooperative target identification equally well in 

active or passive mode.

• The capability for improved day, night and all-weather close air support for

amphibious operations ashore.

• The capability for day and night connected and vertical replenishment and tr

of personnel and cargo at sea.

• The capability to sustain forward deployed precision guided munitions levels 

support of rotational deployment requirements, contingency operations, and 

directed two MTW requirement.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
preposition force assets.

• The capability to determine the physical condition of ship, amphibious vehicle,

ground vehicle and aircraft systems (especially electro-mechanical systems) that

signal when maintenance is required.

• The capability to provide base, port, airstation, and installation infrastructure that

supports the current and planned Navy force structure.

• Priority (II): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring core

naval competencies without which SIGNIFICANT strategic risk would be incurred.

• The capability to synchronize Fleet Manpower and Personnel distribution with the

Inter-Deployment Training Cycle.

• The capability to provide our Sailors and Marines career patterns that provide

stability and predictability and lead to increased job satisfaction.

• Technology should be utilized, where appropriate, to support the most efficient

training and education system possible.

• The capability to achieve the highest level of warfighting mission proficiency while

sustaining a high level of non-deployed Quality of Life.

• The capability to conduct realistic and stressful training at the unit, battle group

and joint levels based on specific objectives correlated to joint mission and tasks.

• The capability to dynamically manage information to produce maximum awareness

of the battlespace for the maximum number of decision-makers.

• The capability to effectively detect and report chemical and biological warfare agent

detections via networks.

• The capability to fuse and display sensor data into an integrated, near real-time

common operational picture.

• The capability to rapidly process data into useful knowledge by user-friendly

displays and decision aids.

• The capability to fuse and display weapons-quality sensor data into a real-time,

common/coherent tactical picture.

• The capability to positively identify enemy, friendly and neutral ships, aircraft and

ground forces at extended ranges in all weather conditions.

• The capability to receive, translate, and forward multiple data links (TADIL-A,

TADILB, TADIL-J, PADL, ATDL, etc.) to Joint and Coalition forces over-the-horizon.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
• The capability to generate and disseminate precise time and time-interval sign

appropriate nodes on the network.

• The capability to conduct offensive and defensive information operations acr

spectrum of warfare.

• The capability to develop sufficient numbers of linguists fluent in specific lan

to use for information operations and intelligence gathering.

• The capability to project the maritime air and missile defense umbrella inland 

critical port facilities, ground forces and allied/coalition infrastucture.

• The capability to simultaneously detect targets, process, fuse and display near 

time multi-sensor data for USW tactical decision making.

• The capability to ensure adequate inventories of expendable USW sensors are

available to achieve combat readiness prior to forward deployment and able t

sustain combat/contingency operations in 2 MTW.

• The capability to engage low doppler, near bottom threat submarines operatin

shallow, high ambient noise water.

• The capability to conduct extended range passive acoustic target classification

threat weapon alertment.

• The capability to transit mined areas in very shallow water and surf zones in o

to land troops and supplies ashore in support of combat operations and/or

operations other than war.

• The capability to integrate Navy (Aegis) and USMC/Army (Avenger/Patriot) 

defense systems to provide direct support to USMC/USA ground elements.

• The capability to conduct long-range, high endurance maritime and electron

surveillance.

• The capability to conduct flexible, rapid mission planning for use of precision

guided munitions.

• The capability for naval guns to provide sustained volumes of long-range, pre

effects fire to support operations from the sea and ashore.

• The capability to provide sufficient lift to support and sustain naval expeditio

maneuver operations from the sea.

• The capability to conduct underway reload and cross-deck of land attack muni

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
essential tactical equipment to all deploying and follow-on forces.

• Priority (III): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring core

naval competencies without which MODERATE strategic risk would be incurred.

• The capability to use technology to move training to people.

• The capability to provide officer corps with educational opportunities necessary to

develop competence, leadership and character to succeed and employ technological

advances.

• The organic capability to provide interactive training, including the capability to

incorporate direct “red team” interaction.

• The capability to operate organic remote sensors (e.g., Vertical Take Off and

Landing UAV) from all air-capable platforms.

• The capability to organically measure and evaluate atmospheric, oceanic, and

terrestrial environmental characteristics in real-time.

• The capability to provide automated, timely access and exchange of national source

data to tactical forces (Joint and Coalition).

• The capability to share with allies the full range of digital communications that is

releasable.

• The capability to minimize the effectiveness of enemy targeting efforts against

maritime forces.

• The capability to exploit non-acoustic submarine signatures such as periscope/mast

exposure and wake phenomena.

• The capability to operate active, multi-static acoustic systems with improved

performance and reduced false alarm rates.

• The capability to rapidly coordinate remote infrared detection with tactical radar,

and a theater-wide communications link to enable early destruction of threat

missiles.

• The capability for Aegis ships to quickly shift between tactical and Theater Ballistic

Missile mode.

• The capability for small units and individual warfighters to sense low, sub-lethal

concentrations of chemical/biological agents.

• The capability to continue full tactical operations while wearing protective gear.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
waterless chemical decontamination process.

• The capability to administer chemical and/or biological weapon antidotes tha

effective against new threats.

• The capability to intercept small boats in support of maritime interdiction, co

narcotics and migrant interdiction operations.

• The capability to perform BDA with rapid response time and video/data

communications.

• The capability for upgraded C4I on amphibious ships.

• The capability to conduct ship-to-shore resupply in sea states up to 3.

• The capability to provide in-transit tracking of logistics spares.

• The capability to conduct expeditionary naval construction support, naval

expeditionary operations, Marine Corps operations ashore, humanitarian

assistance/disaster relief operations, and naval construction/installation supp

• Priority (IV): Those capabilities that directly support or enhance the enduring co

naval competencies without which MARGINAL strategic risk would be incurred.

• The capability to assess the impact of increasing joint staffing requirements a

emerging “specialist” requirements (e.g., FAO, IT, AP) on the ability to meet

warfighter and staff needs.

• The capability of deployed radars and sensor systems to evolve rapidly with si

component replacement.

• The capability to deny our adversaries accurate positioning, navigation and ti

signals from space-based systems.

• The capability to conduct enhanced ASW modeling and simulation.

• The capability to positively identify targets detected by national sensors, with 

overall reduction in false alarm rate and a reduced need for operator interven

• The capability to attack Hard, Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT).

• The capability to employ expanded munitions, to include non-lethal weapons 

minimize collateral damage in a densely populated environment.

• The capability to fully integrate logistics information into the Common Tacti

Picture.

• The capability to incorporate new or alternate materials that are more resistan

corrosion and fouling into new and replacement systems and platforms.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
naval competencies without which MINIMAL strategic risk would be incurred.

• The capability to assess the impact of changing demographics on our ability to

acquire future officers and enlisted that have the ability to function in an

environment that requires knowledge superiority.

• The capability to centralize responsibility and authority over all Manpower and

Personnel areas.

• The capability to access and to exploit foreign sensors, links, and networks in order

to determine best own-force asset deployment.

• The capability to employ scalable munitions with selectable yield.

• The capability to detect human-portable munitions.

• The capability for enhanced personal communication systems that allow hands-free

voice communications with unit commanders.

• The capability to use composite material repair equipment and tools, techniques

and environmentally safe materials to allow quick and affordable repair at lower

and intermediate maintenance levels.

Section VI: Directed Studies

To support forward presence in the next century, the Navy must investigate and study

the capabilities and programs that will allow us to retain our uncontested access to the

high seas. N81 and N51 will jointly identify lead responsibilities and supporting roles

within the framework of the current IWARs and QDR processes to accomplish the following studies during FY01. Lead organizations will be selected from OPNAV, Fleets,

NWDC, and SYSCOMs in addition to the ongoing efforts of N81 IWAR teams and

N51 QDR teams. Directed studies should be integrated with already approved studies

where practical, and the results of these studies should be available to support QDR

2001 analyses.

• Develop an assessment tool in order to identify the level of forward presence

required—in terms of both numbers and capability—to support our national interest

Forward Presence Workshops provide a means to determine the specific requirements

for naval forces to support strategic interests—and the military objectives and tasks

which underpin those interests—but an assessment is needed of the manner in which

naval forces contribute to our military’s overall “shaping” effort. (N51)

• Examine the long-term impact of a strategy to procure greater numbers of missionfocused ships (with robust survivability features and point defense systems) to allow

for increased forward presence/numbers of operational nodes. (N86/NAVSEA)

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
destruction. This doctrine will be used as a foundation for a Navy/Marine Co

Counter Proliferation Master Plan designed to enhance our ability to particip

a wide spectrum of counter proliferation operations. (NWDC)

• Examine the implications of Navy force structure requirements and the assoc

programmatic impact of resourcing emerging Marine Corps Operational Man

from the Sea and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver concepts. (N81)

• Assess the Navy implications of supporting Military Operations in Urban Ter

(MOUT). (N85)

• Analyze the impact of emerging mission areas and system capabilities on VLS

weapons loadouts and rotational inventory requirements for current and plan

missile systems. Examine alternatives for nominal loadouts as well as tailored

loadouts for land attack, TMD, and TBMD missions. (N41)

• Balance the affordability of hard kill systems versus significantly improved

countermeasures (e.g., missile countermeasures, anti-torpedo systems, and

countermine system development) for surface and subsurface platforms. (N8

• Due to the increasing importance of unmanned sensors and platforms to netw

centric forces, examine future roles and missions for tactical and combat UAV

including intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, interdiction, SEAD/JS

airborne early warning, and CBR detection. (N85/N88)

• Examine the need for a Navy contingency plan in case space assets (e.g., GPS) 

denied. (N6)

• Conduct a study on naval access for presence, crisis response and warfighting

requirements in accordance with the access issues identified in Strategic Conc

Wargame X. (CNA)

In addition to capability assessments, current programs require supporting Conc

of Operation (CONOPS). NWDC in conjunction with the OPNAV, SYSCOM an

staffs should examine the following issues:

• Assess the Navy role in OCMD. Include in the study proposed CONOPs and

Operational Architectures development. (NWDC)

• Assess Blue in support of Green requirements in the development of CONOP

supporting Operational Architectures for OMFTS. Include the examination o

MCM, COP/CTP, naval fires requirements (range, volume, C2 and precision

targeting) and Tactical IW in support of OMFTS and JV2010. (NWDC)

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
Marines in CBW, CB recon and decon of landing craft, aircraft, UAVs. (NWDC)

The following studies from the 1999 NSPG Directed Studies section have been undertaken by various organizations and their progress will be monitored until conclusion

pending potential incorporation of the results into future Navy planning documents:

• Assess the impact on current and planned personnel recruitment, training and

utilization in light of potential manpower requirements for information operations

jointness, pipeline training, and staff positions. (CINCPACFLT)

• Assess the Navy’s contribution to Ballistic Missile Defense and the role TBMD

contributes to Joint warfighting. Include in the study proposed CONOPs and

Operational Architectures development. (N865)

• Examine and assess the envisioned CONOPs and Operational Architectures being

developed for organic MCM. (N85/CNA)

• Examine the scope of OTH-T/SUW engagement CONOPs and the impact of

platform multi-tasking, potential time delay in positioning firing units and

magazine limitations. (CNA)

• Examine and assess the CONOPs and Operational Architecture for SEAD/JSEAD.

(CNA)

Conclusion

POM-02 marked a significant opportunity to establish a program that will field naval

forces capable of operating in challenging new 21st Century realms. The IWAR/CPAM

process provides a mechanism that promises to capture the end-to-end capabilities

required for meaningful transformation. The success of capturing this integrated process of strategic force planning will depend upon a firm organizational commitment

throughout POM-02 IWAR and CPAM production efforts. The capabilities outlined

herein provide the strategic foundation to guide the PR-03 planning and subsequent

programming process. As we commence these critical efforts, it is imperative that we

continue to build upon the unmatched capabilities of U.S. naval forces—trimmed for

peace, rigged for war—into the next century.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
List of Abbreviations

A ASW antisubmarine warfare

ATDL Advanced Tactical Data Link

C CHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed S

CINC commander in chief

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

D DDP Dependent Dental Plan

DON Department of the Navy

E EFM Exceptional Family Member [Program]

I I&W indications and warning

M MAGTF Marine air-ground task forces

MEB Marine expeditionary brigade

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MEU Marine expeditionary unit

MTW major theater war

MWR Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

P PERSTEMPO personnel tempo of operations

R R&D research and development

S SEAL Sea-Air-Land [Unit]

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:42 PM
T TADIL-J Tactical Digital Information Link—Joint Service

TQL Total Quality Leadership

TQM Total Quality Management

U UPS United Parcel Service [Company]

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:43 PM
About the Editor

Professor Hattendorf, chairman of the Naval War College’s Maritime History De

ment, has served since 1984 as the College’s Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime 

tory. His service to the U.S. Navy extends over three decades—as an officer with

combat experience at sea in destroyers, at the Naval Historical Center, and as bot

uniformed and a civilian Naval War College faculty member. He earned his mast

degree in history from Brown University in 1971 and his doctorate in war history 

the University of Oxford in 1979. Kenyon College, where he earned his bachelor’

degree in 1964, awarded him an honorary doctorate in 1997, and the National M

time Museum, Greenwich, awarded him its Caird Medal in 2000 for his contribu

to the field of maritime history. From 1988 to 2003 he directed the Advanced Res

Department in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. He is the author, coauthor, 

or coeditor of numerous articles and more than thirty books on British and Ame

maritime history, including Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the Na

War College, studies on Alfred Thayer Mahan and Stephen B. Luce, and America 

Sea: A Maritime History. His most recent works include coediting War at Sea in t

Middle Ages and the Renaissance (2002); a major exhibition catalog for the John C

Brown Library, The Boundless Deep: The European Conquest of the Oceans, 1450–

(2003); and The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newp

Paper 19 (2004).

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:43 PM
Index

AAD See area air defense

AADC See area air defense commander

AAW See anti-air warfare

abilities 55

ACA See airspace control authority

access 25, 196, 199, 202, 205

accountability 51, 63

Achille Lauro 86

acquisition 42–43, 53, 97

“ad hoc” coalitions 153

Adriatic Sea 116

advanced bases 155

advanced tactical data link (ATDL) 260

afloat degree programs (PACE) 225

air defense system 261

air dominance 213

Air Force Manual 145

air superiority 239

aircraft 30, 33, 73, 93, 99, 140, 188, 213

aircraft carrier 73, 83, 93

aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) 72,

153–154, 156, 162, 227, 258

AirLand Battle 18

AirLand Battle Doctrine 5

airspace control authority (ACA) 249

alcohol 61

allies 48, 69, 80, 83, 92, 113, 116, 122, 124,

152–153, 155, 162, 176, 193–194, 199

American Revolution (1775–1785) 80, 106, 123

amphibious forces 74

amphibious ready group (ARG) 153–1

227, 258

amphibious task forces 72

anti-access capabilities 202

anti-air warfare (AAW) 9

anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) 186

anti-ship cruise missile defense 241

anytime, anywhere 179, 196, 204, 206, 

“Anytime, Anywhere” (article) 18–19, 1

anywhere, anytime 49

AOR See area of responsibility

AP 263

area air defense (AAD) 241

Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) 

area defense 193

area denial 182

area of influence 143

area of interest 143

area of responsibility (AOR) 6

area-denial 174

ARG See amphibious ready group

ASCM See anti-ship cruise missile

Aspen Institute 11, 26, 88

assured access 207

ASW See warfare, anti-submarine

asymmetric threats 204

ATDL See advanced tactical data link

Atlantic Command 6, 12

authority 63

awards 55
Balanced Naval Forces 71

ballistic missile defense 170

ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 113, 164, 239

See also submarine

BALTOPS 94 153

Bangladesh 90, 116

Barbary War 106

Barnett, Roger 8

Barnett, Thomas 88

Base Force 11, 39, 87, 89

battle damage assessment (BDA) 250–251

battle forces 154

battle groups 30, 72

Battle of the Atlantic 121

battlespace 28, 92, 94, 119, 134, 138, 143,

167–169, 188, 201, 206, 232

battlespace attack 203, 247–249

battlespace awareness 175

battlespace control 185, 202, 208–209,

238–240

battlespace dominance 95, 137, 139, 142,

144, 168, 174

battlespace sustainment 203–204, 252–254

BDA See battle damage assessment

biological attack 246

Boorda, Jeremy M. 15, 17–18, 101, 149–150,

159, 171

Bosnia 151

Bottom-Up Review of the Defense

Department 149

Bouchard, Joseph 17–18, 160, 177

BREEZE 94 153

Bridger, Colonel 7

Briggs, Eric 88

budget 157–158

Bulkeley, Peter 102

Bush, George H. W. 11–12, 23, 26, 39, 87–88

Byron, John L. 13

C2 See command and control

C4I See command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence

C4ISR See command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance

CA See civil affairs

campaign 112, 196

carrier battle group See aircraft carrier battle

group

CAS See close air support

Cavanaugh, Chris 178

CBT See computer-based training

Cebrowski, Arthur K. 160

center of gravity 123–124, 144, 166

Center, William 10

Central Command See U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command

Cepak, Robert 9

chain of command 50, 134

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 5, 23, 25

50, 89, 159

CHAMPUS See Civilian Health and Medical

Program for the Uniformed Services

character 107, 206

and reputation 62

chemical attack 246

Chemical/Biological Incident Response

Force 208

Cheney, Richard B. 11, 23, 39

Chief of Naval Information 172

Chief of Naval Operations 18–19, 23, 39–40, 44,

50, 66, 88, 101, 103, 149–150, 171–172, 179, 217

China 185–189, 191, 195

CINC See commander-in-chief
Civil War (1861–1865) 81–82

civilian authority 49

civilian employees 50

Civilian Health and Medical Program for the

Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) 59

Clark, Adm. Vernon 19–20, 177

classified information 63

Clausewitz, Karl von 145

CLF See Combat Logistics Force

Clinton, William J. 87, 101, 149, 171, 177, 181

close air support (CAS) 239, 251

CMD See cruise missile defense

CNA/CND 237

CNO Executive Panel (Op-00K/N-00K) 7,

12–13, 39, 171–172

CNO Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM)

179–180, 209, 212, 266

CNO’s Strategic Studies Group 210, 248

coalition force 144

Cold War 1, 24, 26, 29, 85, 89, 109, 133, 136, 158

Combat Logistics Force (CLF) 215, 253

combat readiness 164

combatant commanders 162

combined arms 144

Combined Federal Campaign 66

command 167

command and control (C2) 105, 119, 140, 169,

203, 233, 239

command, control, and surveillance 94–95,

137, 142

command, control, communications, and

intelligence 6

command, control, communications,

computers, and intelligence (C4I) 7, 47, 138,

242, 252

command, control, communications,

computers, intelligence, surveillance, and

233, 237

command of the seas 196, 202

Commandant of the Marine Corps 44, 

101, 103, 150

commander-in-chief (CINC) 5–6, 50, 

151, 218

commander’s intent 125–126

commerce 105

Commission on Roles and Missions (CO

common operational/tactical picture 2

communications 105, 138

communications/data link 234

competence 107

computer-based training (CBT) 225

concept of operations 125, 134

conduct of war 123

conflict prevention 160

Congress 66–67

Connelly, Joseph 88

control 2, 28, 47, 118, 139

control of the sea 118–119

convoy escort groups 72

Cooperative Engagement Concept 169

Coral Sea 130

Corbett, Sir Julian S. 120, 145

CORM See Commission on Roles and M

Cosgriff, Kevin 40

COTS See Technology, commercial off-th

counseling 58

countermeasures 33

counter-terrorism 206, 208

courage 107

CPAM See CNO Program Analysis

Memorandum

Crawshaw, Robert 88
crisis management 85

crisis response 26–27, 92, 109, 114, 144,

152, 154, 164, 198–199, 205, 209

critical vulnerability 123–124, 126–128

Cromwell, Oliver 108

cruise missile 140, 190–192

cruise missile defense (CMD) 213, 239

cryptology 75

Cuba 151, 195

Cuban Missile Crisis 85

culture 64

CVBG See aircraft carrier battle group

cyberspace 197–198, 207

Dalton, John H. 149–150

Danzig, Richard J. 177

DCA See Defensive Counter-Air

decision cycle 126

decisions 206

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 177,

219, 256

Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) 213

definition of strategic concept 2

Deming, W. Edwards 13, 39

deployment flexibility 36

deployments 164

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval

Warfare (Op-07) 10, 23

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans,

Policy, and Operations (Op-06) 8, 10, 23, 88

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for

Resources, Warfare Requirements, and

Assessments (N-8) 17, 172

Destroyer Squadron 32 172

deterrence 26–27, 30, 70, 85, 112–113, 152,

160, 164, 168, 176, 199, 204–205, 209, 214

and conflict prevention 163

directed studies 264

Director for Operations, Plans, and Policy

(N-3/N-5) 171

Director for Space, Information Warfare,

Command and Control (N-6) 160

Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division

(Op-60) 8

disaster relief 115–116, 198, 208

discharge 56

discrimination 57

distribution of firepower 71

Dobrydney, Frank 88

doctrine 2–3, 42, 97, 99, 101–103, 118,

131–132, 135, 206

Dominican Republic 86

DPG See Defense Planning Guidance

drugs 61

Dur, Philip 149

economic interdependence 105

economic sanctions 115

economy 105

economy of force 129–130

education 36, 42–43, 56–57, 66, 97, 132–133, 21

effort 124–125, 128

Eisenhower, Dwight 135

Ellis, James O., Jr. 172

employment of naval forces 111

enabling 146

engagement 193

engineering 142

Entebbe 155

entry 155

environment 49, 66

evaluations of performance 58

EW See warfare, electronic
expeditionary force 27, 89–91, 93, 136,

151, 197, 199

facilities 42, 44, 60

Faller, Craig 178

Family Service Centers 67

FAO See foreign area officer

Fargo, Thomas 8–9

firepower 31, 96, 164

First Gulf War 23, 27, 33, 86, 88, 101, 129,

168, 192

See also Operation DESERT SHIELD, Operation

DESERT STORM

Fleet Battle Lab 169

Fleet Marine Force 83

Fleet Marine Force Manual 103, 132, 145

Fletcher, Frank Jack 130–131

flexibility 107, 109, 143

flexible force 109

Floom, Marvin 102

focus of effort 144

force capabilities and structure 30

force posture 228

force projection 70, 167, 169–170

force protection 208, 240

force reconstitution 26

force structure 216, 218, 220

force sustainment 94, 96, 137, 141–142, 144

forces support 256

foreign area officer (FAO) 9, 263

forward deployed 137

forward deployment 28

“Forward . . . from the Sea” 15–16, 18–19,

141–161, 169–170, 172, 179, 196

forward naval forces 176

forward naval presence 175

136, 144, 152, 178, 195, 197–199, 201, 2

220, 222, 226–227

Forward Presence 26, 70, 114, 144, 152

209–210, 220, 226–227

forward-deployed forces 27, 152, 163–

France 195

fraternization 58

freedom of the seas 75, 80

“. . . From the Sea” 13–16, 18–19, 87–10

136, 145, 150, 157–158, 160, 172, 179, 1

functions 146

Garrett, H. Lawrence III 11, 13, 23, 39–

Germany 195

Global Positioning System (GPS) 236, 

global reach 68

global war 71, 83

Global War Game 11

globalization 183, 198

Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganiza

Act of 1986 5, 7

GPS See Global Positioning System

Gray, Alfred, Jr. 10–12, 23–24

Great White Fleet 68

Gregson, Wallace (Chip) 88

Grenada 86

guiding principles 41

Gulf War See First Gulf War, Operation

DESERT SHIELD, Operation DESERT STO

Haiti 151, 166

Hamilton, Alexander 106

Hard, Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT) 2

Harris, Ronald R. 150, 171–172

Hayes, Bradd 88

HDBT See Hard, Deeply Buried Target
health services 142

history of the U.S. Navy 64, 68, 80–86,

105–106, 112, 116, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127,

129, 130, 131, 135, 155

Holden, Cdr. Judy 40

Homeland Defense 208, 218

honesty 48

human resources 42–43

humanitarian assistance 115, 198

humanitarian relief 155

humanitarian support 191

Huntington, Professor Samuel B. 2

IADS See Integrated Air Defense System

identification friend or foe (IFF) 250

IDTC See Inter-deployment Training Cycle

IFF See identification friend or foe

illegal drugs 116

immigration 115

improvement 49

India 185, 195

Indian Ocean 91

influence 25, 27, 206

information 120

information superiority 212

“Information Technology for the 21st

Century” (IT-21) 6

infrastructure 215, 220, 257

innovation 42–43

insurance 60

integrated air defense systems (IADS) 250

Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR) 19,

180, 210–211, 215–216, 220–221, 223, 225, 229,

264, 266

Integrated Warfare Architectures

Assessment Process 211

integrity 48, 63, 107

intelligence 75, 99, 105, 120, 138, 165, 194

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) 239, 248–249, 258

Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) 224

international law 115

interoperability 199, 238

IO See operations, information

Iran 185–186, 188–190, 195

Iranian Hostage Crisis 91

Iraq 12, 31, 86, 185, 188–190, 195

ISR See intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance

IT 263

IT-21 See “Information Technology for the

21st Century”

IWAR See Integrated Warfare Architecture

Japan 195

JDN See joint data network

Jeremiah, Adm. David 15

JFACC See Joint Force Air Component

Commander

JFC See Joint Force Commander

JFMCC See Joint Force Maritime Component

Commander

Johnson, Adm. Jay L. 18, 159–160, 171–172,

177, 179, 229

Johnson, Spencer 8

joint campaign 166

Joint Chiefs of Staff 4–5

joint command and control 204

Joint Data Network (JDN) 245

joint doctrine 118

Joint Force Air Component Commander

(JFACC) 249

Joint Force Commander (JFC) 134, 249
(JFMCC) 249

Joint Forces Command 6

Joint Publication 145

Joint Task Force (JTF) 72, 119, 166, 169, 249

Joint Task Force Commander 97

Joint Task Forces 72

Joint Vision 2010 159–160, 169–170, 206

Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, Joint

Publication 1 15, 117

Jones, John Paul 80

JTF See Joint Task Force

judgment 52

Kelly, Larry 88

Kelly, Robert “Barney” 8, 10–11

Kelso, Adm. Frank B. II 10–13, 15–16, 23–24,

39–40, 44, 87–88, 101, 103

Kennedy, John F. 85

knowledge superiority 178, 183, 185, 197–201,

208–210, 219–220, 222, 226, 230–232

Knox class frigates 34

Knox, Dudley W. 102

Korean War 29, 85, 122, 127, 146

Krulak, Charles M. 17, 159

Kuwait 12, 29, 86, 129

Larson, Charles 8

Lautenbacher, Conrad C. Jr. 172

leadership 48, 51, 63, 136, 160

leave 58

legal services 62

Lehman, John 10

level of violence 192

levels of war 112

Lewis, Fred 102

Liberia 29, 90–91

Libya 86, 185, 195

Liddell Hart, B. H. 146

lines of communication 144

littoral 27, 98, 111, 144, 146, 155, 161–

166, 168, 175, 186, 213

littoral region 92–93

logistics 71, 97–98, 105, 141, 169–170,

203–204, 206, 208, 252

logistic support 118

logistic support ships 30

logistics and support 74

logistics forces 86

long range strike and interdiction 249

Long-Range Planners Conference 7

Long-Range Planning Objective (LRPO

179–180, 209–211, 219, 221, 233

LRPO See Long-Range Planning Objec

Luttwak, Edward 10

MacArthur, Douglas 122

Madison, James 106

MAGTF See Marine Air-Ground Task F

Mahan, Alfred Thayer 82, 115, 146, 174

main effort 144

maintenance 53, 142, 256

major theater war 256, 259

management 52

maneuver 119, 128, 130, 167, 204, 206, 

261

manpower and personnel 216

Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGT

30–32, 140, 145, 156, 228, 236, 260

Marine Corps 29

Marine Corps Combat Development

Command 17

Marine Corps Gazette 23, 87, 149
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

32–33, 228

Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) 31–32, 35,

155, 228, 248

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 32, 154, 227

maritime concept 196, 209, 220

maritime interdiction 191

Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (MPR) 228

Maritime Prepositioned Ships 74

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) 154,

208, 254

Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) 254

Maritime Strategy 85, 136, 147

maritime superiority 46, 69, 167, 170

Marsh, Larry 8

Marshall, Andrew 19

Martus, Michael 8

mass 128

McDevitt, Michael 8

MCM See mine countermeasures

MEB See Marine Expeditionary Brigade

medals 55

medical and dental care 59

MEF See Marine Expeditionary Force

Metrics 226

MEU 32, 227

Mexican War 81

Midway 84, 130–131

migrant interdiction 193

Military Code of Conduct 64

Military Sealift Command (MSC) 254

Miller, Paul David 10–12, 23–24

mine 33, 213

mine countermeasures (MCM) 213, 244

mine warfare See warfare, mine

missile defense 176, 179, 202

Mixson, Riley D. 17

mobile force 110

mobility 107, 110–111, 128, 143

modernization 220

Mombasa 155

Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) 61, 215

MPF See Maritime Prepositioning Force

MPR See Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance

MPS See Maritime Prepositioning Squadron

MSC See Military Sealift Command

MTW See major theater war

multinational 145

multi-service 145

Mundy, Carl E., Jr. 10, 15–16, 44, 88, 101, 103,

149–150

Murphy, Daniel 10, 23

MWR See Morale, Welfare and Recreation

N-00K See CNO Executive Panel

N-3/N-5 See Director for Operations, Plans,

and Policy

N-513 See Strategy and Concepts Branch

N-6 See Director for Space, Information

Warfare, Command and Control

N-8 See Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and

Assessments

National Command Authority 50, 110,

114–115, 128, 137, 140, 145–146

National Defense Authorization Act of 1996

217

National Military Strategy 43, 108, 136, 146,

159–161, 170–171, 173, 177, 196, 210, 220

National Security Act of 1947 5

National Security Strategy 34, 47, 69, 89–90,

149, 153, 158, 173, 177, 183, 210, 220

NATO 27, 116, 153
Naval Doctrine Command 14–15, 17, 97–98,

101–102

naval environment 183

naval expeditionary forces 158, 198, 205

Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort 88

naval forces 146

Naval Historical Center 102

Naval Operations in the Information Age 205

Naval Special Warfare 145

Naval Surface Fire Support 145

“Naval Vision 2010” 18

Naval War College 3, 101–102

Naval Warfare Development Center 210

Naval Warfare Publications 103, 132

Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1

3, 14–15, 101–147

Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society 68

Navy and the Marine Corps 69

Navy Discussion Group 8

Navy League 18, 159

“Navy Operating Concept” 172

“Navy Operational Concept” 17, 19, 159–171

Navy Policy Book 12–14, 39–88

Navy Professional Reading List 64, 76

Navy Program Planning (Op-08) 9

“Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” (NSPG)

19, 177–266

Navy Study Group 8

Navy Warfare Development Command

(NWDC) 15

Navy–Marine Corps team 69

NCO See Network Centric Operations

Neider, Ferd 88

Nelson, Horatio 126

Network Centric Operations (NCO) 207, 231,

240, 249

news media 64

Nimitz, Chester W. 84, 130

no-fly zone enforcement 193

noncombatant evacuation 116

Normandy 84, 135

North Korea 185, 187–188, 190, 195

NSPG See “Navy Strategic Planning Gu

nuclear deterrence 26, 90

numbers 207

NWDC See Navy Warfare Developmen

Command

objective 46, 128

OCA See Offensive Counter-Air

O’Callahan, Edward 149

offensive 129

Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) 213

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 179

194, 218

Office of Net Assessment 19

O’Keefe, Sean 14, 87–88

ombudsmen 67

OMFTS See Operational Maneuver from 

ONI See Office of Naval Intelligence

OOTW See operations other than war

Op-00K See CNO Executive Panel

Op-06 See Deputy Chief of Naval Oper

for Plans, Policy, and Operations

Op-07 See Deputy CNO for Naval War

Op-08 See Navy Program Planning

Op-60 See Director, Strategy, Plans, an

Division

Op-603 See Strategic Concepts Branch

OPDEC See Operational Deception

Operation DENY FLIGHT 116
90, 165, 215

See also First Gulf War

Operation DESERT STORM 18, 23, 28, 32, 34,

37, 90, 117, 129, 215

See also First Gulf War

operation plan 125, 134

Operation RESTORE/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY 166

Operation SEA ANGEL 116

Operation SHARP GUARD 116

Operation SUPPORT HOPE 155

operational capabilities priority 258

operational concept 2, 101, 179, 210

Operational Deception (OPDEC) 237

operational level of war 112

operational logistics 255

operational maneuver 167

Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)

169, 203, 205, 207, 245, 253, 265

operational primacy 160

operational readiness 139

operational security (OPSEC) 237

operational superiority 104

operations

amphibious 81, 83, 118, 251

barrier 118

blockade 81

civil support 115

combined 36, 69, 156

contingency 115

counterdrug 115–116

counter-proliferation 206

crisis-response 164

evacuation 197

information (IO) 194–195, 232, 237, 244

joint 36, 69, 81, 89, 91, 117, 156

maritime interception 193

peacekeeping 116

peace-support 115

psychological (PSYOPS) 237

public health 115

special 94, 166, 206, 227, 247

strike 155

operations in war 118

OPSEC See operational security

OPTEMPO 229

organization 206

overseas interests 80

Owens, William 17

PACE See afloat degree programs

PADL 260

Pakistan 185, 190

Panama 86

Partnership for Peace 153

pay and allowances 59

peace-support 191

peace-support operations See operations,

peace-support

peacetime engagement 160, 162

Pease, Kendall 172

people 53–54, 206, 222

Perry, William J. 149

Persian Gulf 29, 33, 155

Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO)

61, 229

PERSTEMPO See Personnel Tempo of

Operations

Petrea, Howard A. “Rusty” 88

Pilling, Donald 8–9, 171

Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) 218

planning 105, 134–136

planning process 179–180, 209
Marine Corps 12

POAM See Plan of Action and Milestones

Policy and Concepts Branch 40

politics 64

POM 180

Powell, Colin 11, 25, 39, 88

power projection 28, 36, 70, 94, 96, 118–119,

137, 139, 142, 145, 156, 161, 167, 174–175,

197–199, 213–214

precision 167, 169

precision engagement 206

precision naval fire 167–168

precision strike operations 198

precision weapons 175

preparation for war 132

prepositioning 97, 117, 141, 168

presence 113, 120, 136–137, 152–153, 155,

163, 168, 207, 218

president 49

pride 160

principles of war 15, 101, 104, 128, 131, 136, 147

privileges 52

procedures 54

professional military education 133

professionalism 34, 63

project power 175

Projecting Defense 207

projection of power 139

proliferation 25

protection 170, 206

PSYOPS See operations, psychological

purpose 75, 80

QDR See Quadrennial Defense Review

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 19, 171,

177, 180, 217, 291, 264

quasi-war 81, 106

R&D See research and development

RDT&E See research, development, tes

evaluation

readiness 107, 143, 216, 218–219

reading list 64, 145–146

ready force 108

recapitalization 218

reconnaissance 169

Red Sea 155

refugee control 208

regional conflict 85, 120, 152, 155

regional stability 176, 204–205, 209

religious support 62

replenishment 255

research and development (R&D) 49, 5

research, development, test and evaluat

(RTD&E) 216

reserve 50, 94, 99

reserve components 50

reserve forces 34, 224

resources 52, 54

responsibility 63

retirement 60

Revolutionary War See American Revo

(1775–1785)

risk 135

roles 101, 146

Roosevelt, Theodore 133

Rosenberg, David A. 8

Russia 186–189, 191, 195

Rwanda 155

safety 54, 60
Saudi Arabia 28

Schaefer, Charles 88

sea bases 154, 156, 163

sea-based power 27

sea control 70, 174, 199, 207

sea dominance 213

sea lanes 105, 166, 192

sea lines of communication 27, 96, 118

sea power 175

Sea Power 18, 159

Sea Strike 248

sea-air-land 169

sea-air-land team 119

sea-based logistics 204

seaborne logistics 167

SEAD See suppression of enemy air defenses

sea denial 170, 174

sealift 33, 71, 82, 90, 99, 117, 156, 168, 193,

203, 254

secretary of defense 5, 23, 39, 49–50, 149

secretary of the Navy 10, 23, 39–40, 44, 50, 66,

88, 150, 177

security 130, 142

Seifert, Al 88

self-sustainability 107

Self-Sustaining Force 110

Seminole War 81

sensors 232, 236

sensors and networks 207, 230

sequential 196

Sestak, Joseph 9, 149, 178

sexual harassment 57

Shalikashvili, John M. D. 159, 171

Shea, Timothy 109

Ship to Objective Maneuver 253, 265

shore establishment 75

simplicity 129

Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) 234, 258

Smith, Edward A., Jr. 88, 150, 171–172

Smith, Leighton W. 88

Smith, P. D. 8

Snead, Richard (Rich) 88

Somalia 29, 33, 90, 151, 155

Sound Military Decision 3

Soviet Union 1, 26–28, 136

space 75, 207, 218

Spanish-American War 82

Special Warfare Forces 93

speed 167–168, 202, 247

sponsors 67

Spruance, Raymond A. 130–131

SSBN See ballistic missile submarine

stability 136, 162, 199

standards of conduct 61

Stark, James 7–8, 39–40

Stavridis, James 88

Stearns, Richard (Rick) 88

strategic concept 1–2

Strategic Concepts Branch (Op-603) 7–8, 10–11

strategic environment 181

strategic goals 41–42

strategic imperative 197

strategic risk 260, 262–264

strategy 2

Strategy and Concepts Branch (N-513) 12, 17

149, 160

Strickland, Michael 88

strike 183

submarine 30–31, 70, 84, 93, 99, 186, 191

See also ballistic missile submarine

submarine force 73

Suhr, James 8
superiority 119, 139, 213

supply 105, 141

support capabilities 183

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)

213, 230, 250, 259

surface action groups 72

surface combatants 73, 93

surface fire support 140

surface ships 189

surface to air missiles 188

surge 117

surge capability 36

surprise 129, 247

surveillance 94, 164, 169, 183, 203

surveillance/reconnaissance 235

sustainability 143, 219

sustainment 117, 215

Swartz, Capt. Peter M. 7, 8, 13

Syria 195

tactical development 72

tactical initiative 120

tactics 120

TADIL-A 260

TADIL-B 260

TADIL-J 260

Tailhook scandal 12, 13, 39, 87

targeting 167, 203

task forces 72

TBM See theater ballistic missile

TBMD See theater ballistic missile defense

TDA 246

team spirit 65

teamwork 160

technological developments 72

198, 216, 260

commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)

technology 258

TBM/WMD technologies 185

tempo 126–127, 134, 168, 179

tempo of combat 128

terrorism 115, 194

terrorist 191–192

theater ballistic missile (TBM) 185

theater ballistic missile defense (TMBD

213, 240

theater missile defense (TMD) 174, 21

244–245

Themistocles 105

“The Way Ahead” 11–12, 23–37, 39

time 53

Title 10, U.S. Code 34, 47

TLAM See Tomahawk Land Attack Mis

TMD See theater missile defense

Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLA

31, 86, 94, 250

Total Quality Leadership (TQL) 13, 36

46, 51–52

TQL See Total Quality Leadership

trade 105, 162, 196

trade and commerce 80

tradition 63

training 36, 42–43, 56, 97, 132–133, 2

216, 224

transformation 218

transportation 142

Trident 85

Trident submarine force 30

Tritten, James 102

Truver, Scott 15

Two-Ocean Conflict 82
Uganda 155

Underway Replenishment Groups 72

Unified CINC 227

unified combatant commands 6

unified command 94

unified commander 6, 90, 93, 115

uniform requirements 65

UNITAS 152

United Nations 28, 115–116, 122, 191

United Parcel Service (UPS) 39

unity of command 129–130

UPS See United Parcel Service

U.S. Coast Guard 94, 106, 109, 115, 146

U.S. Marine Corps 14

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command 14, 99

U.S. Naval Institute 147

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 11–13, 15–16,

23, 87, 102, 149, 171

USS America 155

USS George Washington 155

USS Guadalcanal 155

USS Kitty Hawk 155

USS Mount Whitney 166

USS Peleliu 155

USS Ranger 155

USS Saipan (LHA-2) 116

USS Theodore Roosevelt 155

USS Tripoli 155

USW See warfare, undersea

Vandegrift, A. A. 123

Vercautin, Richard 7

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 5, 15

Vice Chief of Naval Operations 159, 171, 217

victory 168

violence continuum 191

Virginia Capes 80

vision 41, 172

Vlahos, Michael 8

voting 66

war fighting and winning 205

war gaming 133

War of 1812 81

War of Independence See American Revolution

(1775–1785)

warfare

amphibious 169

anti-submarine (ASW) 9, 30, 34, 83,

242–243

asymmetric 193, 218

attrition 121–122, 143

electronic (EW) 75, 213

guerrilla 194

information 167

joint 98

littoral 158

maneuver 112, 122, 127, 145

mine 33, 74, 93, 99, 187, 190–191, 194, 243

naval 120

special 74, 140, 165

submarine 82, 112

surface 240

undersea (USW) 242–243, 261

Washington, George 81, 105

weapons 72

biological 25, 113

chemical 25, 113

nuclear 25, 113

of mass destruction (WMD) 183, 190,

214–215
Wilkerson, Thomas L. 88, 150

WMD See weapons of mass destruction

Wolfowitz, Paul 11

World War I (1917–1918) 82–83

World War II (1941–1945) 24, 83, 85, 112,

121, 135

Wright, Richard “Rick” 10

Wylie, Joseph C. 146

Yorktown 80, 123–124

Zalaskus, Robert 102

zones of superiority 139
The Newport Papers

Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, edited b

Carnes Lord (no. 26, February 2006).

The Regulation of International Coercion: Legal Authorities and Political Constrain

James P. Terry (no. 25, October 2005).

Naval Power in the Twenty-first Century: A Naval War College Review Reader, edi

Peter Dombrowski (no. 24, July 2005).

The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States, by William

Hopkinson (no. 23, May 2005).

China’s Nuclear Force Modernization, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S.

Erickson (no. 22, April 2005).

Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and Sou

edited by Paul D. Taylor (no. 21, 2004).

Global War Game: Second Series, 1984–1988, by Robert Gile (no. 20, 2004).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John Hattend

(no. 19, 2004).

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Indus

Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Ghol

Andrew L. Ross (no. 18, 2003).

The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military A

by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (no. 17, 2003).

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Sovi

marines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (no. 16, 2003).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Con

tions during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suo

(no. 15, December 2000).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component 

mander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (no. 14, August 1998).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, with David G. Freymann (n

March 1998).

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:44 PM
Nordquist (no. 12, August 1997).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strategy:

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (no. 11, April 1997).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James,

U.S. Air Force (no. 10, October 1996).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired) (no. 9

December 1995).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenberg

(no. 8, December 1994).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States,

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (no. 7, June 1994).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the Eve of

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (no. 6, October 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, by

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 5, August 1993).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (no. 4, June 1993).

The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B.

Robertson, Jr. (no. 3, October 1992).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (no. 2, April

1992).

“Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombing,” by

Christopher C. Harmon (no. 1, December 1991).

Newport Papers 4, 10, and from 14 on are available online (Acrobat required) at

www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/newpaper.htm.

T:\Academic\Newport Papers\NPJH\Ventura\NPJH.vp

Friday, October 20, 2006 3:58:45 PM