20 May 2010

Joint Airspace Control

Joint Publication 3-52
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

 This publication provides doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of 

airspace control during joint operations across the full range of military operations. It 

also discusses airspace control across the phases of military operations, emphasizing 

transitions from, and back to, civilian controlled airspace. 

2. Purpose 

 This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and 

performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides 

the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and US military involvement in 

multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by 

combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine 

for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed 

Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to 

restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a 

manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment 

of the overall mission. 

3. Application 

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate 

components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when 

significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when 

significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances 

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the 

contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of 

joint forces unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of 

forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command 
Preface 

ii JP 3-52 

should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For 

doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate 

and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and 

consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

LLOYD J. AUSTIN III 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Director, Joint Staff
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-52, DATED 30 AUGUST 2004 

• Changes title from Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone to Joint 

Airspace Control 

• Replaces unmanned aerial vehicle with unmanned aircraft and adds use of term 

unmanned aircraft system 

• Expands the basic principles of airspace control to include centralized airspace 

planning and for having trained joint airspace users and joint airspace control 

system personnel to work complex airspace 

• Addresses airspace control with regard to differing priorities between civil and 

military airspace procedures

• Incorporates paragraph to address airspace control risk considerations 

• Gives explanation of the joint air tasking cycle

• Expands the discussion on methods of airspace control 

• Adds chapter to address airspace execution in the various phases of a joint 

operation 

• Updates figure listing and describing/defining airspace coordinating and fire 

support coordination measures 

• Deletes airspace control order development appendix 

• Modifies the definitions for airspace control, coordinating altitude, fighter 

engagement zone, high-altitude missile engagement zone, joint air operations plan, 

joint engagement zone, low-altitude missile engagement zone, low-level-transit 

route, and weapons engagement zone. 

• Removes the terms and definitions from Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, for aircraft control and 

warning system, aircraft vectoring, airport surveillance radar, airport traffic 

control, airspace control boundary, airspace control center, airspace control facility, 

airspace control in the combat zone, airspace restrictions, air space warning area, 

air traffic control and landing system, air traffic control center, air traffic 

controller, air traffic identification, combined operations, and unmanned aerial 

vehicle 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-52 

Intentionally Blank 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

 INTRODUCTION 

 General ....................................................................................................................... I-1 

 Joint Airspace Control ............................................................................................... I-2 

 Basic Principles ......................................................................................................... I-2 

CHAPTER II 

 ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION 

 General ......................................................................................................................II-1 

 Organization .............................................................................................................II-1 

 Liaison Requirements ...............................................................................................II-3 

 Airspace Control Plan ...............................................................................................II-3 

 Airspace Control Order .............................................................................................II-5 

 Airspace Control Order Development ......................................................................II-6 

 The Joint Air Tasking Cycle .....................................................................................II-6 

 Communications and Security Considerations .........................................................II-7 

CHAPTER III 

 AIRSPACE CONTROL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

 Airspace Considerations by Phase .......................................................................... III-1 

 Airspace Control Risk Considerations .................................................................... III-3 

 Planning for Joint Airspace Control ....................................................................... III-3 

 Integration of Joint Airspace Control and Civil Air Traffic Control Operations ... III-5 

 Integration of Joint Airspace Control and Air Defense Operations ....................... III-5 

 Airspace Integration and Joint Fires ....................................................................... III-6 

 Methods of Joint Airspace Control ......................................................................... III-7 

 Enemy Air Engagement Operations ....................................................................... III-8 

 Multinational Integration Issues ........................................................................... III-10 

 Unmanned Aircraft ............................................................................................... III-10 

 Theater Missiles .................................................................................................... III-11 

 Airspace Control in Maritime Operations ............................................................ III-12 

 High-Density Airspace Control Zone Integration with 

Other Airspace Coordinating Measures ................................................................ III-13 

 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-52 

CHAPTER IV 

 AIRSPACE CONTROL EXECUTION BY PHASE 

 Phase 0 — Shape .................................................................................................... IV-1 

 Phase I — Deter ...................................................................................................... IV-3 

 Phase II — Seize the Initiative ............................................................................... IV-4 

 Phase III — Dominate ............................................................................................ IV-8 

 Phase IV — Stabilize ............................................................................................ IV-10 

 Phase V — Enable Civil Authority ...................................................................... IV-12 

APPENDIX 

 A Airspace Control Plan Development Considerations ....................................... A-1 

 B Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures ....................B-1 

 C References .........................................................................................................C-1 

 D Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. D-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Fundamental Considerations of Airspace Control ...................................... I-3 

 I-2 Basic Principles of Airspace Control .......................................................... I-4 

 I-3 Airspace Control Cost, Risk, and Efficiency Continuum ........................... I-7 

 II-1 Airspace Control Authority Responsibilities .............................................II-3 

 II-2 Airspace Control Plan Considerations .......................................................II-4 

 III-1 Notional Airspace Control Authority ....................................................... III-2 

 III-2 Principles for Planning Airspace Control for Military Operations ......... III-4 

 III-3 Airspace Control Procedures Objectives .................................................. III-6 

 III-4 Methods of Airspace Control ................................................................... III-8 

 B-B-1 Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures ...............................B-B-2 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

vii 

• Prescribes doctrine for joint airspace control in the joint 

operational area 

• Discusses the organization and coordination for and the broad 

duties central to effective airspace control 

• Sets out the principles for airspace control planning to include 

phasing considerations

• Details requirements for effective airspace control execution by 

operational phase 

Overview 

General. This joint publication prescribes doctrine for joint 

airspace control in the operational area. The prescribed 

doctrine is broadly stated to fit a wide range of 

situations requiring military control of airspace. It 

outlines fundamental principles, relationships, and 

broad operational-level guidelines, and is intended to 

provide the basic framework upon which to build an 

airspace control system (ACS) for an operational area. 

Command and Control. The joint force commander (JFC) normally designates 

a joint force air component commander (JFACC) as 

commander for joint air operations. The JFC also 

normally designates an area air defense commander 

(AADC) and an airspace control authority (ACA). 

When the JFC designates a JFACC, the JFC also 

normally designates the JFACC as the AADC and 

ACA. The ACA plans, coordinates, and develops 

airspace control procedures and operates the ACS. The 

JFC may designate a separate ACA and/or AADC, in 

which case, close coordination is essential for unity of 

effort. 

Airspace Control Plan 

(ACP). 

The ACA develops a specific airspace control plan 

(ACP) that is approved by the JFC. The ACP should 

be closely integrated with the JFC-approved area air 

defense plan (AADP) developed by the AADC. 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-52 

Joint Airspace Control. Joint airspace control increases combat effectiveness 

by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of 

airspace with minimum restraint upon airspace users, 

and includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating 

airspace to increase operational effectiveness. 

Effective airspace control reduces the risk of fratricide, 

enhances air defense, and permits flexibility. Airspace 

control operations may begin prior to (and continue 

after) combat operations and may transition through 

degrees of civil and military authority. The JFC 

defines the relationship between the ACA and 

component commanders. Airspace control is essential 

to operational effectiveness in accomplishing JFC 

objectives across the range of military operations. 

Basic Principles. Airspace is a crucial part of the operational 

environment used by all components. A high 

concentration of friendly surface, subsurface, and airlaunched weapon systems must share this airspace 

without unnecessarily hindering the application of 

combat power. The primary goal of airspace control is 

to enhance effectiveness of the joint force and increase 

the safety of joint air operations. Basic principles 

include: 

 Support unity of effort. 

 Reduce the risk of fratricide and increase the 

effectiveness of air defense. 

 Centralized airspace planning and decentralized 

execution. 

 Close liaison and coordination among all 

airspace users. 

 Airspace control procedures provide flexibility 

through a combination of positive and 

procedural control measures. 

 A reliable, integrated, jam-resistant, and secure 

communications network for the ACS. 

 Survivable and redundant air control assets. 

 The structure of the ACS is responsive to 

developing threats and the unfolding operation. 

 Airspace control functions rely on airspace 

management resources, but these functions are 

separate and distinct from air traffic control 

(ATC), which is nevertheless interoperable with 

and integral to the ACS. 

 Flexibility and simplicity are emphasized. 
Executive Summary 

ix 

 ACSs should be interoperable and integrated. 

 Support 24-hour operations in all weather and 

environmental conditions. 

 Provide appropriate training for joint airspace 

users and joint ACS personnel. 

Organization and Coordination 

Organization. The following broad duties are central to effective 

airspace control: 

 The JFC is responsible for airspace control in 

the joint operations area (JOA). 

 The JFACC plans, coordinates, and monitors 

joint air operations and allocates and tasks joint 

air operations forces based on the JFC’s concept 

of operations (CONOPS) and air apportionment 

decision, and is normally designated as both 

AADC and ACA. 

 Component commanders advise the JFC on 

employment, direction and control of 

component forces, and each plans and executes 

a portion of the total air effort and interacts with 

other components. 

 The ACA develops airspace control policies 

and procedures for all airspace users and 

establishes an ACS that coordinates and 

integrates airspace use under JFC authority. 

 The AADC is responsible for defensive 

counterair (DCA) operations, which include 

both air and missile threats. 

Liaison Requirements. Liaison requirements vary based on the mission, size of 

the force, and various operation and mission variables; 

identification of liaison requirements is a key planning 

and command and control (C2) consideration. 

ACP. The ACP establishes general guidance and procedures 

for the ACS in the operational area and is approved by 

the JFC. The ACP and AADP are integrated with the 

JFC’s operation plan and orders, and considers 

procedures and interfaces with international or regional 

air traffic systems. The ACP should be preplanned, to 

the degree possible, in a simplified, understandable 

format. Because the airspace control area normally 

coincides with air defense boundaries, coordination 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-52 

between airspace control and area air defense 

operations is essential. 

Airspace Control Order 

(ACO). 

The airspace control order (ACO) implements specific 

control procedures for established time periods, and is 

an order published either as part of the air tasking order 

(ATO) or as a separate document. It defines and 

establishes airspace for military operations as 

coordinated by the ACA, and notifies all agencies of 

the effective time of activation and the structure of the 

airspace. Timely promulgation of ACO changes to all 

airspace users, to include multinational forces, is 

essential. 

ACO Development. The JFC may elect to delegate specific authority for 

airspace control to the component commanders, and 

may also task component commanders to generate 

individual ACOs for assigned sectors. The ACA 

provides continuity along sector boundaries and 

integration of each sector authority’s ACO within the 

ACP guidelines. 

The Joint Air Tasking 

Cycle. 

The joint air tasking process is a systematic cycle that 

focuses joint air efforts on supporting operational 

requirements. It provides for effective and efficient 

employment of joint air capabilities through an 

iterative, cyclic process for the planning, 

apportionment, allocation, coordination, tasking, and 

execution of joint air missions and sorties within the 

guidance of the JFC. The process accommodates 

changing tactical situations or JFC guidance as well as 

requests for support from component commanders. 

Planners develop airspace control and air defense 

instructions in sufficient detail to allow components to 

plan and execute air missions listed in the ATO. The 

ATO is the operation order or mission assignment for 

all aircraft missions flown under control of the JFACC 

in the operational area and shows all missions 

operating in the operational area during the effective 

time period. In some theaters, numerous airspace 

procedures and airspace usages are published in the 

special instructions (SPINS). 

Communications and 

Security Considerations. 

The ACS should be joint, interoperable, survivable, 

sustainable, redundant, and supported by jam-resistant, 

secure C2 networks. It should allow users to maintain 
Executive Summary 

xi 

situational awareness and respond to an evolving 

enemy situation and friendly air operations. Timely 

integration of various data networked among 

authorized airspace control agencies and C2 nodes 

permits developing a common operational picture. 

Secure ACSs are crucial to effective airspace control 

capabilities. Information assurance (IA) programs are 

methods to protect ACSs and information. IA is 

essential to airspace control, and considerations for 

operations security (OPSEC) must be applied. ACSs, 

especially voice radio communications, are susceptible 

to frequency jammers, data emitters, or other radio 

transmitters operating in the same segment of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. Communications outage 

procedures should be clearly defined. Airspace 

management planning and execution must be integrated 

with spectrum management. 

Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

Airspace Considerations by 

Phase. 

Phasing provides an orderly schedule of military 

operations, indicates preplanned shifts in priorities and 

intent, and is a way to view and conduct a complex 

joint operation in manageable parts. The main purpose 

of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related 

activities. Phasing may be used to modify the 

prioritization of airspace control missions and priorities 

for operations. Airspace planners should consider that 

all operations will not smoothly transition between 

phases. The phasing construct is a model to start 

planning efforts, but each conflict is different and may 

not resemble the model at different points in time. 

Airspace control and management should be a part of 

contingency and crisis action planning from the 

beginning. During joint operations, the likely mix of 

military and commercial air traffic activity during 

various phases may make airspace control more 

complex than during combat. 

Airspace Control Risk 

Considerations. 

Risk is a fundamental consideration of airspace control. 

Each Service and functional component uses the 

airspace with maximum availability consistent with the 

JFC’s acceptable level of risk for all airspace users 

(including fires), which should be clearly delineated in 

the ACP. During all phases the assumption of risk is a 

command decision. 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-52 

Planning for Joint Airspace 

Control.

Each operational area has specific requirements for 

airspace control. These requirements must be 

determined as early as possible and incorporated in the 

overall planning effort. Every joint/multinational force 

is different, and the forces assigned will have specific 

operational requirements for airspace. The following 

broad principles of planning are essential: 

 Interoperability 

 Mass and timing 

 Unity of effort 

 Integrated planning cycles 

 Degraded operations 

Integration of Joint 

Airspace Control and Civil 

Air Traffic Control 

Operations.

Integration of joint airspace control and civil ATC is 

vital to successful joint/multinational air operations. 

The ACP should provide procedures to fully integrate 

the military and civil ATC resources responsible for 

terminal-area airspace control or en route ATC when 

required. 

Integration of Joint 

Airspace Control and Air 

Defense Operations. 

Integration of joint airspace control and air defense and 

the prioritization and integration of joint airspace 

control and air defense activities are essential. 

Airspace control procedures assist in aircraft 

identification, facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft, 

and provide safe passage of friendly aircraft. Rules of 

engagement and procedures must give air defense 

forces freedom to engage hostile aircraft and missiles, 

but procedures must be established in the ACP and the 

ACO to allow identification of friendly aircraft, to 

prevent delays in offensive operations, and reduce the 

risk of fratricide. These procedures need to be simple 

to execute and may include visual, electronic, 

geographic, and/or maneuver means for sorting friend 

from foe. The procedures should allow coordinated 

employment of air, land, or maritime air defense 

systems, and use the inherent flexibility of air defense 

airborne platforms to mass forces to meet enemy 

attacks. 

Airspace Integration and 

Joint Fires. 

Airspace control procedures increase in complexity and 

detail when air forces operate in proximity to, or in 

conjunction with, surface forces. Liaison elements are 

vital. Each area of operations (AO) may be defined 

with specific boundaries, and within each AO there are 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

typically maneuver control measures such as 

boundaries, fire support coordination measures 

(FSCMs), airspace coordination measures (ACMs), a 

fire support coordination line (FSCL), or multiples of 

these measures. Close coordination is required to 

deconflict and integrate airspace use with the 

employment of joint fires. Component fire support 

agencies establish FSCMs. ACMs facilitate the 

efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and 

simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. 

The airspace coordinating entities should be included in 

the ACP and promulgated in the ACO. 

Methods of Joint Airspace 

Control. 

The methods of airspace control vary across the range 

of military operations, from positive control of all air 

assets in an airspace control area to procedural control 

of all such assets, or any effective combination. ACPs 

and systems accommodate these methods based on 

component, joint and national capabilities, and 

requirements. The airspace control structure must be 

responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and 

changing tactical situations. 

Enemy Air Engagement 

Operations. 

Engaging enemy aircraft with friendly air, land, and 

maritime assets must be fully coordinated to optimize 

all aspects of friendly combat power. Joint engagement 

zone (JEZ) operations involve the employment and 

integration of multiple air defense systems in order to 

simultaneously engage enemy targets in the operational 

area. Successful JEZ operations depend on positively 

identifying friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft. JEZ 

operations require effective C2 and positive control is 

normally used in a JEZ. Fighter engagement zone 

operations usually occur above and beyond the range of 

surface-based air defenses, and are highly dependent on 

coordination and flexibility within the ACS. Missile 

engagement zone (MEZ) operations are ideal for point 

defense of critical assets, protection of maneuver units, 

and area coverage of the joint security area. MEZ 

operations offer the ability to engage the enemy with a 

high- and low-altitude, all-weather capability beyond 

the forward line of own troops (FLOT) or disrupt 

massed enemy air attacks prior to committing fighter 

assets, and are effective across the full range of air 

defense operations and enemy threats. For urgent or 

emergency combat situations, the ACA can authorize 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-52 

deviations from established policies and procedures. 

When the circumstances necessitate rapid deployment 

and employment of forces for which there are no 

approved plans or previously established ACPs, a 

temporary ACS responsive to immediate tactical or 

operational requirements will be established. Airspace 

control and integration of friendly electronic warfare 

and suppression of enemy air defenses are integrated 

into the overall planning effort. 

Multinational Integration 

Issues. 

International agreements, enemy and friendly force 

structures, commanders’ CONOPS, and the operational 

environment determine specific arrangements for 

airspace control during multinational operations. 

Effective coordination among multinational forces is 

essential, and all multinational aircraft involved in the 

operation should appear on the daily ATO. 

Unmanned Aircraft. Unmanned aircraft (UA) may be operated in the 

airspace control area by each joint force component, 

multinational forces, and other government agencies. 

The established principles of airspace management 

used in manned flight operations will normally apply to 

UA, but since UA may be difficult to visually acquire 

may not always provide a clear radar or electronic 

signature, UA operations require special considerations 

in terms of airspace control and usage. 

Theater Missiles. Theater missiles are standoff weapons fired from a 

launch point on a preprogrammed flight profile to a 

designated target. Because these missiles have a small 

radar cross-section, they are difficult to track with 

normal radar units conducting airspace control, and 

positive control is not an effective means to these 

operations from other air operations. It is imperative 

that procedural ACMs be established in the ATO, 

ACO, or SPINS. 

Airspace Control in 

Maritime Operations. 

In joint maritime operations, specific control and 

defensive measures may differ from those used in a 

land-based operation. The joint force maritime 

component commander (JFMCC) may be designated 

the control authority for a specific airspace control area 

or sector. To ensure unity of effort, the commander 

responsible for maritime airspace control must 

coordinate with the ACA. In joint operations 
Executive Summary 

xv 

composed of adjacent maritime and land environments, 

specific control and defensive measures may be a 

composite of those measures normally employed in 

each environment. The JFC for such operations needs 

to ensure detailed coordination of control and defensive 

measures among component commanders. 

High-Density Airspace 

Control Zone Integration 

with Other Airspace 

Coordinating Measures. 

In some cases, the operational environment may 

require an airspace/fires density level that exceeds the 

capability of a single high-density airspace control zone 

(HIDACZ) controlling authority. One method to 

prevent overloading the controlling authority is to 

establish another ACM (restricted operations area, 

HIDACZ, etc.) above or adjacent to the HIDACZ, 

controlled by another agency or component. 

Airspace Control Execution By Phase 

Phase 0 — Shape. The shape phase includes normal and routine military 

airspace activities to deter potential adversaries and 

ensure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. 

Activities are designed to ensure success by shaping 

perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries 

and allies, developing allied and friendly military 

capabilities, improving information exchange and 

intelligence sharing, and providing US forces with 

peacetime and contingency airspace access. The host 

nation (HN) retains ACA and joint forces primarily use 

existing international or HN airspace procedures or 

guidelines. The JFC may not designate a standing 

ACA during this phase, but should appoint a lead agent 

for coordinating the resolution of issues related to 

airspace management, air traffic control, terminal 

instrument procedures, and navigation aids. Joint force 

airspace planners ensure continuation of routine flight 

operations, establish relationships with key operational 

area airspace authorities, develop airspace control plans 

in preparation for future operations, and build planning 

expertise. 

Phase I — Deter. Transition to phase I begins with a crisis situation 

requiring joint force action and crisis action planning. 

Airspace planning is refined, entailing coordination 

with international and multiple national authorities and 

is politically sensitive. Release of airspace planning 

information may entail OPSEC issues but may also 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-52 

have a deterrent or deceptive effect, and should be 

treated as a strategic consideration. This phase 

normally is a demonstration of joint force capabilities 

and is largely characterized by preparatory actions to 

facilitate execution of subsequent operational phases. 

The ACA (or lead agent for airspace management) 

establishes a dedicated airspace planning team to 

finalize the ACP, coordinates with the AADC for 

AADP deconfliction, and develops the ACO for current 

and future operations. The ACP should contain 

procedures to integrate military and civil ATC 

resources; HN agreements that could impact air 

operations must be considered. Proper coordination 

with civil air operations is especially important. 

Phase II — Seize the 

Initiative.

Transition to phase II may be accomplished on the 

JFC’s initiative or in response to enemy attack. The 

ACP should contain instructions to transition from 

peacetime to combat in simple, clear steps. Redesign 

of airspace or notification of impending changes to 

airspace control could signal a pending operation so 

timing for airspace transition should be considered. 

Joint air operations play a critical role seizing the 

initiative or gaining access to a theater or JOA. 

Integrating the airspace control function with DCA and 

offensive counterair (OCA) operations is especially 

critical during efforts to gain air superiority. The 

JFACC is typically the supported commander for the 

counterair effort in the operational area and integrates 

OCA and DCA to achieve air superiority, and also 

normally is the supported commander for the JFC’s 

overall air interdiction effort. The joint force land 

component commander (JFLCC), if designated or one 

or more land component commanders will normally 

become the supported commanders for their AOs 

during the latter stages of phase II. The ACP and ACO 

are fully coordinated with supporting components, 

coalition partners, and HN air and air defense forces. 

Phase II airspace control planning should fully 

integrate fires from all friendly and coalition forces. A 

key role of the ACP is to define the processes to 

propose, approve, modify, and promulgate ACMs and 

FSCMs. 

Phase III — Dominate. Phase III includes the full employment of joint force 

capabilities and continues the appropriate sequencing 
Executive Summary 

xvii 

of forces into the operational area as quickly as 

possible. When an operation or campaign is focused 

on conventional enemy forces, the “dominate” phase 

normally concludes with decisive operations that drive 

an enemy to culmination and achieve the JFC’s 

operational objectives. The ACP/ATO/ACO and 

SPINS should be updated to include responsibilities 

and authorities (including special operations forces and 

coalition) for designated areas within JFLCC/JFMCC 

AOs, procedures for forward operating bases (FOBs) 

and airfields, ATC/air traffic service at FOBs, ATC/air 

traffic service at captured airfields, area air defense and 

short-range air defense integration behind the FSCL 

and FLOT, and fixed wing, UA, and rotary wing 

deconfliction methods. Airspace control elements 

should expect a significant increase in the number of 

indirect fires in the JFLCC/JFMCC AO, and to 

effectively integrate fires and airspace control, airspace 

control elements should determine which ACMs must 

also be protected by an airspace coordination area or air 

corridor and coordinate accordingly. Airspace planners 

should minimize the number of combined ACM/FSCM 

requests so as not to overly restrict fires, and fires 

planners should understand there are some areas in 

which the JFC cannot accept the risk of mixing fires 

and manned aircraft. Missions such as air assaults, 

airborne assaults, and other incursions into enemy 

territory require specific airspace control coordination. 

Phase IV — Stabilize. Phase IV operations ensure that the threat (military or 

political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be 

controlled by the HN authority and that the situation 

which led to the original crisis does not recur. The 

joint force may be required to perform local 

governance until legitimate local entities are 

functioning, and ACA may be required to perform roles 

associated with HN aviation authorities. A key 

requirement is to plan for an effective transfer of 

airspace control from the joint force to the HN in phase 

V. The ACP should address airspace access criteria for 

non-JFC organizations, joint force to civil airspace 

priority, and identification and acceptance of associated 

civil airspace operating risks. Reducing threats to air 

operations and establishing security are required. 

Normally, a government or civil organization will 

handle the planning for reconstituting the HN ACS, but 
Executive Summary 

xviii JP 3-52 

the ACA may be the only one able to assume this role 

in some cases. The pre-conflict HN airspace control 

structure should provide the basic airspace end-state 

concept unless destroyed or deemed ineffective. From 

an ACA’s perspective, the end of phase IV and the 

beginning of phase V milestone is reached when the 

framework of the HN ACS is in place and the HN is 

ready to assume ACA. 

Phase V — Enable Civil 

Authority. 

This phase is characterized by joint force support to 

legitimate civil governance. Depending upon the level 

of HN capacity, joint force activities may be at the 

behest of that authority or they may be under its 

direction. The joint force will perform key airspace 

functions either as the delegated ACA or as supporting 

airspace service provider under the HN aviation 

authority. Phase V could result as a normal phased 

transition from phase IV or as joint force support to a 

humanitarian relief effort, natural disaster, etc. During 

this phase HN aviation regulations and guidance are the 

authoritative source for airspace control procedures. 

Airspace control personnel may be required to provide 

Service-specific controllers, ACS, liaisons, or trainers 

to support HN authorities. Setting the conditions and 

milestones for the relief of joint forces and the 

reestablishment of effective HN airspace control is 

crucial. Risk is a fundamental consideration of 

airspace control, and the JFC’s acceptable level of risk 

for all airspace users (including fires) should be clearly 

delineated in the ACP. 

CONCLUSION 

 This publication provides doctrine for the planning, 

execution, and assessment of airspace control during 

joint operations across the full range of military 

operations. It also discusses airspace control across the 

phases of military operations, emphasizing transitions 

from, and back to, civilian controlled airspace. 
I-1 

CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTION 

1. General 

a. This joint publication (JP) prescribes doctrine for joint airspace control in the 

operational area. The prescribed doctrine is broadly stated to fit a wide range of 

situations requiring military control of airspace. International agreements, enemy, and 

friendly force structures and deployments, commander’s concept of operations 

(CONOPS), and operational environments in foreign countries, on the high seas, and 

within amphibious objective areas (AOAs) may necessitate different specific 

arrangements for joint airspace control. 

b. In today’s complex airspace environment, civilian use of airspace will likely 

occur alongside ongoing military operations. Civilian airliners, nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and relief agencies will require use of airspace to continue their 

associated operations. The advent of military integrated air defense systems, cruise 

missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) further complicates airspace control 

requirements. Indirect fire systems are also airspace users and today range higher and 

farther than ever before. These increased user demands require an integrated airspace 

control system (ACS) that facilitates mission accomplishment while reducing the 

possibility of fratricide. 

c. This publication outlines fundamental principles, relationships, and broad 

operational-level guidelines. It is not intended to limit commanders’ authority over and 

responsibility for their forces, but is intended to provide the basic framework upon which 

to build an ACS for an operational area. 

d. The joint force commander (JFC) will normally designate a joint force air 

component commander (JFACC) as the commander for joint air operations. In addition 

to a JFACC, the JFC also normally designates an area air defense commander (AADC) 

and an airspace control authority (ACA). When the JFC designates a JFACC, the JFC 

also normally designates the JFACC as the AADC and ACA, because the three functions 

are so integral to one another. The ACA is responsible for planning, coordinating, and 

developing airspace control procedures and operating the ACS. When the situation 

dictates, the JFC may designate a separate ACA and/or AADC. In those circumstances 

where separate commanders are required and designated, close coordination is 

essential for unity of effort, prevention of fratricide, and deconfliction of joint air 

operations. 

“Gulf lesson one is the value of air power...we must retain combat superiority in 

the skies.” 

President George H. W. Bush 

29 May 1991 
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-52 

e. Upon indication of, or receipt of, tasking from higher commanders, the ACA 

develops a specific airspace control plan (ACP) that is approved by the JFC. The plan 

should take into consideration the likelihood of multinational operations, as well as the 

need for developing policies and procedures that foster compatibility and interoperability 

of support systems and methods to accommodate potential civilian air operations. US 

forces participating in multinational operations may be subject to command arrangements 

and authorities established in international agreements. The ACP should be closely 

integrated with the JFC-approved area air defense plan (AADP) developed by the AADC. 

2. Joint Airspace Control 

a. Airspace control increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, 

and flexible use of airspace with minimum restraint placed upon the airspace users. 

Joint airspace control includes coordinating, integrating, and regulating airspace to 

increase operational effectiveness. Effective airspace control reduces the risk of 

fratricide, enhances air defense operations, and permits greater flexibility of joint 

operations. Airspace control operations may begin prior to (and continue after) combat 

operations and may transition through varying degrees of civil and military authority. 

The JFC defines the relationship between the ACA and component commanders. 

The ACA has authority to approve, amend, or disapprove airspace requests for the 

designated operational area in accordance with JFC guidance and objectives. The ACA 

does not have the authority to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. That 

authority is only vested in operational commanders. If the ACA and an affected 

component commander are unable to obtain agreement on an airspace issue, the issue will 

be referred to the JFC for resolution. 

b. Airspace control is essential to military operational effectiveness in 

accomplishing JFC objectives across the range of military operations. Given the 

speed and physical characteristics of flight, airspace coordinating measures (ACMs) are 

integrated into operations to deconflict airspace users and decrease the potential for 

fratricide. Available technical capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and 

communications between airspace users and airspace control agencies often determine 

the required ACMs. In general, lower technical capabilities result in decreased airspace 

efficiency potential. Conversely, higher technical capabilities result in increased airspace 

efficiency potential. Airspace control is extremely dynamic and situational, and it needs 

to be flexible and responsive enough to accommodate users with varied technical 

capabilities in order to optimize airspace use. Airspace control provides the JFC 

operational flexibility to employ forces effectively. Fundamental considerations are 

shown in Figure I-1. 

3. Basic Principles 

 Airspace is a crucial part of the operational environment and is used by all 

components of the joint and multinational forces. A high concentration of friendly 

surface, subsurface, and air-launched weapon systems must share this airspace without 

unnecessarily hindering the application of combat power in accordance with the JFC’s 
Introduction 

I-3 

intent. The primary goal of airspace control is to enhance effectiveness of the joint 

force and increase the safety of joint air operations. Basic principles of airspace 

control are listed in Figure I-2 and described below. 

FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS OF 

AIRSPACE CONTROL

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The need for each component within the joint force to operate a variety of 

aircraft and weapon systems, both high and low speed, rotary- and fixedwing (manned and unmanned).

The need for each component to use the airspace with maximum freedom 

consistent with the degree of risk operationally acceptable to the joint force 

commander.

The need for airspace control activities to be performed in congruence with 

air defense operations to integrate and synchronize surface-to-air defense 

weapons and air defense aircraft for maximum effectiveness.

The need to discriminate quickly and effectively between friendly, neutral, 

and enemy air operations, vehicles, and personnel.

The need for the airspace control system to be responsive to the 

requirements of the joint force. The airspace control system needs to be 

capable of supporting high-density traffic and surge operations as may be 

required by the joint force commander.

The need for close coordination and integration of surface force operations, 

supporting fires, air operations, air defense operations, special operations, 

and airspace control activities.

The need to accommodate US, host-nation, and multinational airspace 

control activities.

The need to recognize the saturation levels and limitations of airspace 

control networks.

The need for temporary restrictive airspace coordinating measures for 

certain areas of airspace to allow subordinate commanders maximum 

freedom of action.

The need to incorporate, in detail, coordinated offensive operations using 

electronic warfare elements, strike aircraft, and missiles to ensure that 

defensive elements of procedures of the force do not unacceptably inhibit or 

degrade offensive capabilities.

The need to ensure that the airspace control network remains survivable and 

effective.

The need to provide maximum opportunities to employ deception measures.

The need to standardize communications data, format, and language 

requirements in multinational operations to reduce the possibility of 

differences in interpretation, translation, or application of airspace control 

procedures during multinational operations.

The need to support 24-hour operations in all weather and environmental 

conditions.

Figure I-1. Fundamental Considerations of Airspace Control 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-52 

a. The ACS must support JFC objectives and facilitate unity of effort. A 

coordinated and integrated ACS is essential to the conduct of successful operations. In 

many operations, wide-ranging interagency and NGO involvement may challenge unity 

of command; nevertheless, unity of effort should be preserved to ensure common focus 

and mutually supporting actions. Airspace is a finite commodity which requires effective 

management and prioritization for use. 

b. A major reason for close coordination between airspace control, air traffic control 

(ATC), and air defense elements is to reduce the risk of fratricide and increase the 

effectiveness of air defense. Identification requirements for airspace control must be 

compatible with those for air defense. Airspace control, air defense, ATC, supporting 

procedures, equipment, and terminology need to be compatible, mutually supporting, 

integrated, and interoperable. 

 c. The designated ACA maintains situational awareness of the airspace environment, 

while focusing on the designated operational area and JFC mission requirements, and is 

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

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Unity of effort requires the airspace control system and associated 

procedures to be fully coordinated, integrated, and centrally planned by the 

airspace control authority.

Reduce the risk of fratricide and optimize the effectiveness of air defense. 

Centralized airspace planning facilitates meeting joint force commander 

priorities.

Decentralized execution gives subordinate commanders the flexibility to 

execute their missions effectively

Maintain close liaison and coordination among all airspace users.

Require common airspace control procedures, which include procedural 

and/or positive control measures.

Require reliable, jam-resistant, beyond line of sight, and secure 

communications networks.

Require survivable, integrated, and redundant airspace control systems.

Respond to developing threat conditions and to the unfolding operation.

Airspace control functions rely on airspace management resources, but they 

are different than the air traffic control environment.

.

Emphasize flexibility and simplicity.

Airspace control systems must be integrated to the maximum extent 

practical.

Support 24-hour operations in all weather and environmental conditions.

Require appropriate training for effective and safe airspace control 

operations.

Figure I-2. Basic Principles of Airspace Control
Introduction 

I-5 

best suited to balance competing airspace needs against the conflict. Centralized 

airspace planning by the ACA facilitates meeting JFC priorities with a fully coordinated 

and integrated ACS. Decentralized execution allows subordinate commanders to take 

the initiative and increase airspace control effectiveness through real-time airspace 

integration during execution. The ACS and procedures must be flexible enough to permit 

decentralized execution to the extent warranted by the operational environment. In those 

situations where there is one theater-wide ACA supporting more than one subordinate 

JFC (more than one joint operations area, [JOA]), a separate and distinct ACP and 

airspace control order (ACO) will need to be developed and then approved by the 

respective subordinate JFC. 

d. Close liaison and coordination among all airspace users inside and outside 

the JOA is necessary to promote timely and accurate information flow to airspace 

managers. Effective liaison and coordination directly relate to the success of the 

campaign or operation. 

e. Airspace control procedures provide flexibility through an effective 

combination of positive and procedural control measures. The control structure 

encourages close coordination between joint force components to allow rapid 

concentration of combat power. As operations progress through different phases, the 

ACS adapts to changing requirements and priorities. 

 (1) Procedural control relies on common procedures, designated airspace, 

and promulgated instructions by an authorized control agency to deconflict and activate 

ATC areas, ACMs, fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), and air defense control 

measures. Procedural control activates the airspace by defined volume and time through 

standard ACMs or updates to weapons control status. This serves to deconflict the 

defined airspace and aircraft from other airspace users. When appropriate 

communications exist, an authorized airspace control agency can provide procedural 

control instructions in real time to increase operational flexibility for airspace users. 

Procedural control establishes the minimum common criteria and concepts for airspace 

control. Although potentially not as efficient as positive control, procedural control 

provides effective airspace system capabilities for low density airspace situations and in 

areas that lack positive control coverage. Procedural control measures need to be 

uncomplicated and readily accessible to all forces and disseminated in the ACP, ACO, 

and special instructions (SPINS) of the air tasking order (ATO). Use of these documents 

is essential for the planning and integration of manned and unmanned aircraft (UA) 

operations. 

 (2) Positive control relies on surveillance, accurate identification, and 

effective communications between a designated airspace control agency and all 

airspace users. It is normally conducted by agencies equipped with radar; identification, 

friend or foe (IFF) interrogators and receivers; beacons; track processing computers; 

digital data links; and communications equipment. The minimum requirements for 

surveillance, identification, and communications equipment will vary in each theater, but 

are likely to be driven by a combination of military and civil aviation regulations and the 
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-52 

level of risk the JFC is willing to accept. Positive control requires two primary 

conditions: the means to locate and identify airspace users and the ability to 

maintain continuous communications with them for required control instructions. 

Positive control procedures must include provisions for transition to procedural control if 

positive control systems are degraded or become unavailable. They must also take into 

account differences between civil and military communications and surveillance systems. 

 (3) There is a continuum of efficiency, level of effort, resources required, 

and risk between procedural and positive control. Uncontrolled airspace exerts a 

small drain on resources, but increases risk. Standing ACMs, such as a restricted 

operations zone (ROZ), incrementally increase control and resources required, but do not 

provide the best mitigation for risk. Full military or civilian positive control provides the 

best mitigation for risk, but has a large cost in resources. This comparison assumes a 

constant volume of air traffic. Ideally, the entire airspace control area would be under 

positive control with radar and communication coverage. However, limited resources or 

other factors, such as terrain and lack of integrated technology, may make this goal 

unrealistic. Airspace planners should determine where the JFC’s tolerance for risk is 

lowest, or the needs for efficiency are highest, and establish the appropriate combination 

of positive and/or procedural control in those areas first. In areas where positive control 

isn’t feasible, standing ACMs should establish the minimum standard for airspace 

control. These standing measures form a crucial backup in the event positive control 

capability is diminished. Figure I-3 depicts these relationships. 

f. The ACS should have a reliable, integrated, jam-resistant, and secure 

communications network. However, care should be exercised to avoid control 

procedures that rely heavily on voice communications. Emphasis should be placed on 

simple, flexible airspace management procedures. Airspace management provisions 

should allow for possible degradation in control capability. In this manner, flexibility 

and responsiveness are preserved. Coordinated and detailed planning is required to 

ensure that communications systems and procedures are compatible among all airspace 

managers and users. 

g. Air control assets comprising the overall ACS need to be survivable and 

redundant because they are likely to be prime targets for an attacker. 

h. The structure of the ACS needs to be responsive to developing threats and to 

the unfolding operation. The design, responsiveness, and procedures of the ACS should 

support the rapid massing of combat power. 

i. Airspace control functions rely on airspace management resources, but these 

functions are separate and distinct from ATC. However, ATC equipment, procedures, 

and personnel are integral to any ACS and must be able to communicate and coordinate 

within such a system. 

j. The system developed for airspace control is generally based on compromise 

between a wide variety of conflicting demands for airspace use. Flexibility and 
Introduction 

I-7 

simplicity must be emphasized throughout to maximize the effectiveness of forces 

operating within the system. This flexibility must include the ability to incorporate a 

civil air traffic structure where no host nation (HN) capability exists. 

k. ACSs should be interoperable and integrated. Integrated ACSs are synergistic 

and more effective than the sum of their parts. 

l. Airspace control needs to support 24-hour operations in all weather and 

environmental conditions. 

m. Effective and safe operations in today’s complex airspace require 

appropriate training for joint airspace users and joint ACS personnel. Core airspace 

training is primarily a Service component responsibility with theater-specific training as 

required. To provide a realistic training environment, ACS components (such as the 

theater air control system and ATC) should be exercised as an overall system rather than 

AIRSPACE CONTROL COST, RISK, AND 

EFFICIENCY CONTINUUM

Airspace Continuum of Control

Cost vs. Risk

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System Efficiency

Resources, Cost

Uncontrolled Standing Airspace 

Coordinating 

Measures

Procedural 

Control

Positive Control

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Full Surveillance

Communications

Controller

Procedures

Common Reference

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Communications

Controller

Procedures

Common Reference

Some Surveillance

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Procedures

Common Reference

Figure I-3. Airspace Control Cost, Risk, and Efficiency Continuum 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-52 

as separate entities. Exercises and simulations involving multiple agencies and users 

across the range of military operations provide complexity and realism to effectively train 

airspace agencies and users. Joint, coalition, other government agencies, and 

international civil airspace elements should be incorporated whenever possible to validate 

emerging interoperability capabilities. Airspace control units should establish procedural 

agreements and establish required communication links to ensure effective interagency 

coordination. 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION

1. General

a. Consistent with the provisions of JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, a JFC has the authority to organize forces to accomplish the assigned 

mission based on the CONOPS. The organization of forces will depend on the mission 

assigned, the manner in which the mission is to be fulfilled, and the capabilities and 

strength of the component elements of the forces assigned. Consequently, the 

organizational form of the ACS may vary. 

b. The following organizational arrangements may apply to airspace control for 

joint forces. When circumstances dictate, appropriate modification may be prescribed 

by the JFC.

2. Organization 

The following descriptions of broad duties are central to effective airspace 

control. Understanding the roles of the JFC, the JFACC, other component commanders, 

the ACA, and the AADC is essential. Other key airspace control definitions are 

addressed in Annex B to Appendix B, “Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support

Coordination Measures,” and in the glossary. 

a. Joint Force Commander. The JFC is responsible for airspace control in the 

JOA. The ACP and ACO express how the airspace will be used to support mission 

accomplishment.

b. Joint Force Air Component Commander. The JFC will normally designate a 

JFACC and assign responsibilities. The JFACC’s responsibilities normally include, but 

are not limited to: planning, coordinating, and monitoring joint air operations, and the 

allocation and tasking of joint air operations forces based on the JFC’s CONOPS and air 

apportionment decision. The JFC normally designates the JFACC as the AADC and 

ACA since air defense and airspace control are so integral to joint air operations. 

The JFACC may be designated the ACA by the JFC, or the JFC may designate a separate 

ACA. In either case, the ACA is responsible for planning, coordinating, and developing 

airspace control procedures and operating the ACS. The air operations directive (AOD) 

provides the JFACC’s guidance for each ATO and the successive planning steps. 

Furthermore, this document conveys the JFC’s guidance with respect to acceptable levels 

of risk, usually based on mission type orders. This gives the operational level planners 

the information they need to allocate sorties to meet JFC objectives within imposed risk 

“Generally, management of the many is the same as management of the few. 

It is a matter of organization.”

Sun Tzu
Chapter II

II-2 JP 3-52 

constraints. When the situation dictates, the JFC may designate a separate AADC and/or 

ACA. In those joint operations where separate commanders are required and designated, 

close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of fratricide, and 

deconfliction of joint air operations. 

For additional details on the organization and functioning of a JFACC, see JP 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

c. Component Commanders. Component commanders advise the JFC on the 

employment of component forces and the direction and control of those forces. Each 

component commander plans and executes a portion of the total air effort and interacts 

with other components. Subject to the authority of the JFC, each component 

commander within a joint force:

(1) Employs air defense weapons systems in accordance with the rules of 

engagement (ROE), the AADP, and other operational guidance. 

(2) Coordinates, deconflicts, and integrates operations with other 

component commanders when appropriate. Coordination for airspace control may be 

facilitated through collocation of key airspace control, air defense, and fire support 

coordination agencies. When collocation is not possible, such facilities need to be 

connected with appropriate secure communications, and liaison personnel should be 

exchanged. This coordination is especially important during the planning phases of an 

operation. 

(3) Forwards requests for ACMs and FSCMs in accordance with the ACP.

(4) Develops detailed airspace control instructions, plans, and procedures

in accordance with ACP guidance. These detailed instructions, plans, and procedures 

must be consistent with JFC-approved airspace control guidance in the ACP. 

(5) Provides necessary facilities and personnel for airspace control functions 

in assigned areas and identifies these facilities and personnel for inclusion in the ACP. 

d. Airspace Control Authority. The ACA develops airspace control policies and 

procedures for all airspace users. The ACA establishes an ACS based upon JFC 

requirements and integrates the ACS with the HN. The ACA coordinates and integrates 

airspace use under JFC authority. The ACP is a directive for all joint force elements 

using the airspace to include manned and unmanned aircraft and indirect fires. 

Implementation of the ACP begins with the distribution of the ACO, and is executed 

when components and users comply with the ACO as described in JP 3-30, Command 

and Control for Joint Air Operations. The ACP establishes the ACS, the control nodes, 

and airspace procedures. The ACO implements the ACP. ACA responsibilities are 

summarized in Figure II-1. 
Organization and Coordination

II-3 

e. Area Air Defense Commander. The AADC is responsible for defensive 

counterair (DCA) operations, which include both air and missile threats. The 

AADC identifies ACMs that support and enhance DCA operations, identifies required 

airspace management systems, establishes procedures for systems to operate within the 

airspace, and incorporates them into the ACS.

3. Liaison Requirements

Liaison requirements will vary based upon the nature of the mission, size of the 

force, and various operation and mission variables; therefore, the proper identification of

liaison requirements is a key planning and command and control (C2) consideration. 

4. Airspace Control Plan

The ACP establishes procedures for the ACS in the operational area. An 

example of the topics that should be considered when developing an ACP is provided in 

Appendix A, “Airspace Control Plan Development Considerations.” The JFC approves 

the ACP. To provide effective operational procedures the ACP and AADP must be 

integrated with the JFC’s operation plan (OPLAN) and orders. The ACP considers 

procedures and interfaces with the international or regional air traffic systems necessary 

to effectively support air operations, augmenting forces and JFC objectives. 

Consequently, the ACP should be preplanned, to the degree possible, and be put in a 

simplified, understandable format. Because the airspace control area normally coincides 

with air defense boundaries, coordination between airspace control and area air defense 

operations is essential. Key factors to consider are listed in Figure II-2. 

AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

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Coordinate and integrate the airspace.

Develop policies and procedures for coordinated airspace control required 

among units within the operational area.

Establish an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the 

joint force commander, provide for integration of the airspace control 

system with that of the host nation, assist in establishing a civil structure 

where none exists, and coordinate and deconflict user requirements.

Develop the airspace control plan and, after joint force commander 

approval, distribute it throughout the operational area. Implement the 

airspace control plan through the airspace control order.

Provide necessary facilities and personnel for airspace control functions in 

assigned areas and identify these facilities and personnel for inclusion in 

the airspace control plan.

Figure II-1. Airspace Control Authority Responsibilities
Chapter II

II-4 JP 3-52 

a. The ACP should be coordinated with HN representatives if appropriate and 

available. 

b. Planning factors to be addressed when developing the ACP include familiarity 

with the basic OPLAN or operation order (OPORD), combined with knowledge of HN 

and multinational considerations, understanding the operational and mission variables, 

familiarity with the capabilities and procedures of civil and military airspace management 

systems, and general locations of friendly and enemy forces. 

AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN CONSIDERATIONS

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Procedures that include rules of engagement and disposition of air defense 

weapon systems, such as air defense fighters, air defense artillery, surfaceto-air missiles, and air defense command and control operations.

Limitations or adverse conditions within air, land, and maritime situations in 

the operational area, such as existing equipment limitations, electronic 

warfare, and communications system requirements that may adversely 

affect the airspace control plan.

Anticipated restricted areas based on initial deployment of friendly air, land, 

maritime, and special operations forces and bases.

Existing air traffic control areas, base defense zones, controlled or 

uncontrolled airspace, and overflight of neutral nations.

Mission profiles; combat radii; and identification, friend or foe (IFF), or other 

identification capability of aircraft that will operate in the operational area.

Enemy air defense weapons capabilities and deployment.

Electronic attack and deception capabilities.

Emergency procedures for aircraft experiencing difficulties (including IFF 

problems).

Procedures for day or night operations and for aircraft experiencing adverse 

weather.

En route and terminal-area air traffic control procedures for aircraft 

transiting to and from the operational area.

Procedures to support surge operations requiring high volumes of air traffic.

Enemy offensive air capabilities. Additionally, the vulnerability of friendly 

aircraft to enemy surface-to-air missiles and the vulnerability of friendly 

surface-based air defenses to enemy long-range indirect fires are important 

planning and execution considerations.

Procedures, routes, and restricted areas for air mobility assets performing 

direct combat support of forces, logistic resupply, aerial refueling, or 

aeromedical evacuation.

Civil air traffic corridors and procedures.

Provisions for fire support coordination measures.

Figure II-2. Airspace Control Plan Considerations
Organization and Coordination

II-5 

c. The ACP needs to support an orderly transition between peacetime and 

combat operations. Such a transition could occur during a period of increasing and/or 

decreasing tensions or suddenly without much warning. 

d. The ACP specifies ACMs and FSCMs to be used in the operational area and 

how these measures will be distributed and implemented. The ACP should provide 

guidance on what FSCMs will be placed in the ACO. The ACP should also provide 

guidance on component-unique ACMs, terms, or graphics that may be included in the 

ACO.

e. The ACP provides procedures to fully integrate the resources of military ATC 

facilities responsible for terminal-area airspace control or en route ATC. ATC facilities 

are interfaced and linked with ACS communications to form a system that fosters

the safe and efficient flow of air traffic.

f. The AADP includes detailed engagement procedures. Airspace control and 

area air defense operations should have plans for operations in a degraded 

communications environment. Detailed engagement procedures and decentralized 

weapons control procedures (as applied to air defense) are key to operations in a 

degraded environment. Integration of air defense forces within the overall ACP is 

critical to effective airspace control. The geographic arrangement of weapons and the 

location of specific types of air defense operations, as well as specific procedures for 

identification of aircraft, are critical factors to include in the ACP. 

g. The ACP and AADP are distributed to all forces providing intertheater or 

intratheater air support. Not understanding or following the ACP and AADP may result 

in hazardous air traffic situations, cause confusion between aircraft and control agencies, 

and increase the risk of fratricide.

5. Airspace Control Order

The ACP provides general guidance for the control of the airspace, but the ACO 

implements specific control procedures for established time periods. The ACO is an 

order that provides the details of the approved requests for ACMs and FSCMs. It is 

published either as part of the ATO or as a separate document. The ACO defines and 

establishes airspace for military operations as coordinated by the ACA. It notifies all 

agencies of the effective time of activation and the composite structure of the airspace to 

be used. The ACO may include ACMs and FSCMs such as air routes, base defense 

zones (BDZs), coordinating measures/lines, drop zones, pickup points, restricted areas, 

carrier control zones, and other areas. A change to the ACO should be distributed 

whenever a new area is established or an existing area deleted. Timely promulgation of 

ACO changes to all airspace users, to include multinational forces, is essential to avoid 

fratricide and increase operational effectiveness. 
Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-52 

6. Airspace Control Order Development 

a. While the ACP provides general guidance on the airspace control function, the 

ACO implements airspace control procedures for specified time periods and may be

distributed as part of the ATO or as a separate document. Normally, the ACO is 

published and distributed daily and contains ACMs, procedural control instructions, and 

the airspace required to support the corresponding ATO. The ACO activates and 

deactivates procedural control measures and updates positive control measures.

b. Procedures for developing and updating the ACO are included in the ACP. 

Normally, component commanders consolidate, deconflict, and forward their airspace 

requests to the ACA by a specified time for further consolidation with other inputs. All 

inputs are integrated and conflicts among the components are resolved. Planners should 

be aware that not all information that goes into the ACO is the result of a request for 

airspace. Guidance should be given, depending on the level and the number of forces in 

the operational area, on what other information should be included, e.g., FSCMs and 

other control measures. 

c. The JFC may elect to delegate specific authority for airspace control to the 

component commanders through ACP guidelines. The JFC may also elect to task the 

component commanders to generate individual ACOs for their assigned sectors. 

Regardless, the ACA is tasked with providing continuity along sector boundaries and 

ensuring integration of each sector authority’s ACO within the ACP guidelines. 

d. The ACA remains responsible for airspace control for the entire operational area. 

The decision to develop a single ACO or multiple ACOs will be situation-dependent. 

Normally, a single ACO is used. 

7. The Joint Air Tasking Cycle 

a. The joint air tasking process provides for the effective and efficient employment 

of joint air capabilities and forces. This process provides an iterative, cyclic process for 

the planning, apportionment, allocation, coordination, tasking, and execution of joint air 

missions and sorties within the guidance of the JFC. The process accommodates 

changing tactical situations or JFC guidance as well as requests for support from other 

component commanders. The joint air tasking process is a systematic cycle that 

focuses joint air efforts on supporting operational requirements. Much of the day-today tasking cycle is conducted through an interrelated series of information exchanges 

and active involvement in plan development, target development, air execution, and 

assessment, which provide a means of requesting and scheduling joint air missions. 

b. Planners must develop airspace control and air defense instructions in 

sufficient detail to allow components to plan and execute all air missions listed in the 

ATO. These directions enable combat operations without undue restrictions, balancing 

combat effectiveness with the safe, orderly, and expeditious use of airspace. Instructions 

provide for quick coordination of task assignment and reassignment and direct aircraft 
Organization and Coordination

II-7 

identification and engagement procedures and ROE appropriate to the nature of the 

threat. These instructions should also consider the volume of friendly air traffic, friendly 

air defense requirements, IFF technology, weather, and adversary capabilities. 

Instructions are contained in the SPINS and in the ACO, and are updated as frequently as 

required. The ATO, ACO, and SPINS provide operational and tactical direction at 

appropriate levels of detail. 

c. The ATO is the OPORD or mission assignment for all aircraft missions flown 

under the control of the JFACC in the operational area and shows all missions 

operating in the operational area during the effective time period. Other air missions 

not under the control of the JFACC may be added to the ATO to provide visibility for 

overall coordination and deconfliction. A timely ATO is critical — joint force 

components conduct their planning and operations based on a timely, executable ATO 

and are dependent on its information. 

d. In some theaters, numerous airspace procedures and airspace usages are published 

in the SPINS. The SPINS include a section on airspace procedures. Other SPINS 

sections will include tanker procedures, cruise missile procedures, etc., as required. The 

SPINS may include ROE and combat identification criteria for air defense along with any 

additional guidance/directives/information for weapons system operators and/or aircrews 

such as HN restrictions, BDZ procedures, and special weapons systems control 

procedures. SPINS are published as baseline SPINS, weekly SPINS, and daily SPINS. 

For further discussion of the joint air tasking cycle see JP 3-30, Command and Control 

for Joint Air Operations.

8. Communications and Security Considerations

a. ACSs should be joint, interoperable, survivable, sustainable, and redundant. 

The ACS should be jam-resistant with secure C2 networks. The ACS should allow users 

to maintain situational awareness and effectively respond to evolving enemy situation 

and friendly air operations. Timely integration of sensor data; intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) information; aircraft, ground, maritime, and special operations

forces (SOF); and networked inputs between authorized airspace control agencies and C2 

nodes to develop a common operational picture (COP) provides crucial situational 

awareness for airspace agencies, users, and decisionmakers.

b. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected 

advantage. Secure ACSs including sensors, communications, data processing, and 

common operating databases are crucial to effective airspace control capabilities. 

Information assurance (IA) programs such as communications security, physical security, 

emissions security, and network defense are methods to protect ACSs and information. 

Due to the US military’s dependency on and the general vulnerability of electronic 

information and its supporting systems, IA is essential to airspace control. 

Considerations for operations security (OPSEC) must be applied when developing 

communication policies and procedures. 
Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-52 

c. ACSs, especially voice radio communications, are susceptible to frequency 

jammers, data emitters, or other radio transmitters operating in the same segment of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. Such interference can result in degraded communications 

between airspace control agencies and users creating potential safety of flight and/or 

fratricide situations. Potential sources of interference should be identified and alternate 

frequencies allocated and alternate means of communication established. Additionally, 

specific communications outage procedures should be clearly defined in the event 

communications are lost or jammed entirely. Airspace management planning and 

execution must be integrated with spectrum management throughout all phases of 

operations. 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

AIRSPACE CONTROL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

1. Airspace Considerations by Phase 

a. Phasing provides an orderly schedule of military operations and indicates 

preplanned shifts in priorities and intent. Phasing is a way to view and conduct a 

complex joint operation in manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate 

and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during 

execution. Phasing may be used to modify the prioritization of airspace control missions 

and priorities for operations. Phasing is a useful tool to communicate the CONOPS and 

the shifting priorities between ongoing airspace operations. Airspace planners should 

consider that all operations will not smoothly transition between phases, and depending 

on the nature of the conflict, national political objectives, and JFC intent, operations may 

cease prior to the beginning of phase IV (Stabilize) or phase V (Enable Civil Authority). 

It is of the utmost importance to remember that the phasing construct is just a 

model to start planning efforts. Each and every conflict is different and will not 

resemble the model at different points in time. 

For more details on phasing see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

b. Transferring airspace control authority from civilian to military control, adapting 

the ACS to JFC needs during each phase, and eventually returning it to civil authority are 

complex tasks requiring joint military, diplomatic, and interagency efforts. Since a crisis 

may occur unexpectedly, airspace control and management activities should be a part of 

contingency and crisis action planning from the beginning. For instance, moving C2 and 

airspace control equipment is a time-phased force and deployment data consideration. 

Since much of this equipment may deploy (or redeploy) late in the operation due to 

intertheater airlift (or other lift) limitations, a dynamic plan from the beginning is 

required to ensure critical airspace control capability. 

c. During joint operations, the likely mix of military and commercial air traffic 

activity during various phases may make airspace control more complex than during 

combat. In addition, the ACA may transfer airspace control to the HN during these 

phases which gives the JFC and ACA a less direct voice in the conduct of airspace 

control for continuing JFC operations. The tasks and responsibilities of ACA may play a 

role in the support of strategic and operational partnerships as part of theater security 

cooperation. Figure III-1 depicts notional airspace control authority and the differing 

priorities and intent between civil and military airspace procedures. 

“The first and absolute requirement of strategic air power in this war was control 

of the air in order to carry out sustained operations without prohibitive losses.” 

General Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz 

Air Force Chief of Staff, 1947 
Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-52 

d. Noncombat activities across the range of military operations, such as disaster 

relief or other support to government activities share many of the same characteristics of 

phase IV or V activities. For instance, a disaster may destroy a nation’s airspace control 

capability and the US Government (USG) may elect to provide assistance until the 

capability can be restored. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has 

guidelines for airspace practices in the event of a disaster or significant noncombat events 

and these should be referenced together with existing HN procedures. Coordination with 

the HN; determination of authorities; interfacing with joint, interagency, and 

multinational organizations; providing service; and deconflicting military and civilian 

traffic are all applicable to operations other than combat. 

NOTIONAL AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY

Level/ 

Type

of

Control

Authority

PEACE LEVEL OF INTENSITY MAJOR OPS

Civil Airspace 

Procedures

Military 

Airspace 

Procedures

NOTIONAL AUTHORITATIVE DOCUMENT SCALE

LEGEND

ACO airspace control order

ACP airspace control plan

AIP aeronautical information 

publication

FLT PLAN flight plan

ICAO International Civil Aviation 

Organization

OPS operations

SPINS special instructions

ICAO

AIP

FLT PLAN

ACP

SPINS

ATO/ACO

Figure III-1. Notional Airspace Control Authority
Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

III-3 

e. Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the homeland air defense operations launched by 

North American Aerospace Defense Command after the attacks of 11 September 2001, 

and military support operations after Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for a clear 

understanding of responsibilities and effective coordination between civil and military 

airspace control agencies during homeland defense or civil support operations. Specific 

information for homeland airspace coordination considerations is included in JP 3-28, 

Civil Support. 

2. Airspace Control Risk Considerations

Risk is a fundamental consideration of airspace control. Joint doctrine recognizes 

the need for each Service and functional component to use the airspace with maximum 

availability consistent with the JFC acceptable level of risk. The JFC’s acceptable level 

of risk for all airspace users (including fires) should be clearly delineated in the 

ACP. During all phases the assumption of risk is a command decision. Definitions of 

high, moderate, and low risk vary from theater to theater based on the geographic 

combatant commander’s guidance. In general terms, high risk prioritizes mission 

accomplishment over the preservation of resources; moderate risk seeks to balance 

mission accomplishment with potential resource losses and may require slight mission 

adjustments to achieve objectives; and low risk prioritizes the preservation of resources 

and may require substantial mission adjustments to achieve objectives. As the volume of 

airspace users increases, control should be enhanced to keep the level of risk acceptable 

to the JFC. The ACP should specify areas where high volumes of airspace users are 

projected and plan for increased control capability. If an enhanced control capability is 

not an option, then commanders should understand they are accepting a higher risk of 

midair collisions and fratricide with indirect fires, manned systems, and UA. 

Commanders may accept different levels of risk based on the systems involved. For 

example, a commander may direct that a higher level of risk be accepted for possible

fratricide between indirect fires and some or all UA than between indirect fires and 

manned aircraft.

3. Planning for Joint Airspace Control

Each operational area has specific operational requirements for airspace 

control. These requirements must be determined as early as possible and incorporated in 

the overall joint force planning effort. Political constraints, national and military airspace 

management systems, and procedures and their capabilities and limitations are important 

considerations. ROE, disposition of air defense weapons, fire support plans, and 

procedures for identification of US and multinational aircraft are also important items to 

consider. Every joint/multinational force is different, and the forces assigned will 

have specific operational requirements for airspace. The following broad principles 

of planning (see Figure III-2) are essential to effective airspace control:
Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-52 

a. Interoperability. Airspace control should be exercised in the joint and 

multinational environments during peacetime and in conflict. Planning for airspace 

control includes considerations for interoperability of equipment, as well as personnel 

and terminology. 

b. Mass and Timing. Planning considerations should include the aircraft traffic 

volume anticipated for the operations, the timing constraints placed on those operations, 

as well as requirements. 

c. Unity of Effort. Liaison requirements, especially between joint force 

components and multinational forces, should be identified and exercised prior to 

hostilities. Representatives from different components and multinational forces need to 

integrate information flow throughout the system and provide expertise to the designated 

ACA.

d. Integrated Planning Cycles. The airspace planning cycle should be integrated 

with the overall planning cycle for the joint operation or campaign. Once input from all 

organizations involved in the operation is consolidated, the final ACP is devised and 

disseminated to users of the ACO. The ACP can be added as an appendix to the 

operations annex to the joint force OPLAN or OPORD. 

e. Degraded Operations. Plans should anticipate the effects of electronic warfare 

(EW), combat losses, and communications degradation on system operations. An 

effective ACS needs to plan for the full spectrum of communications from no 

PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING AIRSPACE CONTROL 

FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Interoperability

Unity of Effort Integrated Planning Cycles

Degraded Operations

Mass and Timing

Figure III-2. Principles for Planning Airspace Control for Military Operations
Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

III-5 

degradation to full degradation and should consider degradation due to changing

environmental conditions. 

4. Integration of Joint Airspace Control and Civil Air Traffic Control Operations

Integration of joint airspace control and civil ATC is vital to successful 

joint/multinational air operations. The ACP should provide procedures to fully 

integrate the resources of the military and civil ATC facilities responsible for 

terminal-area airspace control or en route ATC when required. Civil ATC 

integration may require detailed negotiations through the Department of State or national 

and local ATC agencies. All ATC elements or their liaisons should be involved from the 

outset in planning and executing airspace management and should make sure airspace 

requirements get coordinated with and approved by the appropriate agencies. Elements 

may need to participate in the development and integration of an HN airspace 

infrastructure. ATC personnel may also provide planning, terminal, airspace information, 

and forward-area support services to aviation assets conducting nation assistance.

5. Integration of Joint Airspace Control and Air Defense Operations

Integration of joint airspace control and air defense is also vital to successful 

joint/multinational air operations. 

a. Prioritization and integration of joint airspace control and air defense 

activities is essential. Airspace control procedures will be used to assist in aircraft 

identification, facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft, and provide safe passage of 

friendly aircraft.

b. ROE and procedures must give air defense forces freedom to engage manned 

and unmanned hostile aircraft and missiles. However, procedures must be established 

in the ACP and promulgated in the ACO to allow identification of friendly aircraft, to 

prevent delays in offensive operations, and mitigate situations which could cause 

fratricide. These procedures need to be simple to execute for both aircrews and 

surface air defense personnel and may include visual, electronic, geographic, and/or 

maneuver means for sorting friend from foe. Air defense operations should not cause 

delays in air operations by creating unnecessarily complicated or lengthy air route 

structures. ACMs should not unduly restrain surface-to-air weapons. Airspace control 

procedures objectives are shown in Figure III-3. 

c. Air defense forces and systems are vulnerable to massed attacks across narrow 

frontages, therefore a flexible and adaptable ACP with well thought out airspace control 

procedures is essential to providing the JFC freedom of maneuver within the operational 

area. The procedures should allow coordinated employment of air, land, or maritime air 

defense systems against the threat, and use the inherent flexibility of air defense airborne 

platforms to mass forces to meet the enemy attackers. 
Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-52 

6. Airspace Integration and Joint Fires

a. Airspace control procedures increase in complexity and detail when air forces

operate in proximity to, or in conjunction with, surface forces. Liaison elements are 

vital when integrating air and surface elements in close proximity. Each area of 

operations (AO) may be defined with specific boundaries. Within each AO there are 

typically maneuver control measures such as boundaries, FSCMs, fire support 

coordination line (FSCL), ACMs, or multiples of these measures. 

b. Close coordination is required to deconflict and integrate airspace use with 

the employment of joint fires. Component fire support agencies establish FSCMs. 

Deconfliction of airspace and joint fires normally occurs during mission planning and 

FSCMs and ACMs are disseminated through command and fire support channels. Realtime coordination, deconfliction, and integration of airspace and joint fires with airspace 

control agencies and C2 nodes are essential in fluid situations.

c. ACMs are employed to facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish 

missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. Examples 

include restricted operation areas, air-to-air refueling area (AAR), and corridors. ACMs 

provide the three-dimensional description of the airspace, associated restrictions, requests 

for access, and other applicable coordination procedures. The ACP should specify the 

categories of ACMs in use for the JOA along with coordination and promulgation 

methods. The ACP also should include FSCMs and any coalition or HN ACMs in use.

d. The coordinating altitude (CA) is an ACM. It uses altitude to separate users and 

as the transition between different airspace coordinating entities. Examples of airspace 

coordinating entities include command and reporting center, air support operations 

center, Airborne Warning and Control System, E-2C, air traffic service, Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System, air defense artillery, Marine tactical air 

command center, direct air support center, or Army corps/division airspace C2 element, 

AIRSPACE CONTROL PROCEDURES OBJECTIVES











Enhance effectiveness in accomplishing the joint force commander's 

objectives.

Facilitate air defense identification.

Prevent mutual interference.

Prevent fratricide.

Safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic in the 

operational area.

Figure III-3. Airspace Control Procedures Objectives
Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

III-7 

air defense airspace management/brigade airspace element, etc. The airspace 

coordinating entities should be included in the ACP and promulgated in the ACO. Army 

echelons incorporate ACP guidance and integrate the ACO, AADP, SPINS, and ATO via 

operations orders. All airspace users should coordinate with the appropriate airspace 

coordinating entities when transitioning through or firing through the CA. 

e. FSCMs are employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid 

engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. FSCMs 

are usually activated for a limited time and refer to areas where fires may be permitted or 

restricted. 

f. The requirement to integrate airspace use in support of ground fire missions 

requires the determination of the firing locations, the impact location, and the airspace 

that will be transited by the projectile during flight. Those projectile parameters are 

integrated with other airspace users. Service liaisons and airspace control agencies work 

closely to ensure that appropriate ACMs and FSCMs integrate surface operations and 

airspace operations. See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for further details. 

7. Methods of Joint Airspace Control 

The methods of airspace control vary across the range of military operations. 

They range from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to 

procedural control of all such assets, or any effective combination of the two. ACPs 

and systems need to accommodate these methods based on component, joint, and national 

capabilities and requirements. Positive control relies on radars, other sensors, 

cooperative identification systems (IFF/selective identification feature [SIF], precise 

participant location and identification, blue force tracker, etc.), digital data links, and 

other elements of the air defense system to positively identify, track, and direct air assets. 

Procedural control relies on ACMs, such as comprehensive air defense identification 

procedures and ROE, low-level transit routes (LLTRs), minimum-risk routes (MRRs), 

aircraft identification maneuvers, FSCMs, CAs, ROZs, restricted fire areas, free fire 

areas, no fire areas, standard use Army aircraft flight routes (SAAFRs), and high-density 

airspace control zones (HIDACZs). Procedural ACMs for UAS, Army Tactical Missile 

Systems (ATACMS), Global Positioning System Multiple Launch Rocket System 

(GMLRS), Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs), and other cruise missile systems 

include special corridors, surface-to-surface missile system measures, restricted 

operations areas, and altitude reservations. Figure III-4 summarizes positive and 

procedural methods of airspace control. A list of ACMs with accompanying descriptions, 

discussion of uses, and considerations is contained in Appendix B, “Airspace 

Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures.” The airspace control 

structure needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and changing 

tactical situations. Enemy forces will attempt to degrade airspace control capabilities by 

direct attack and electronic measures. 
Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-52 

8. Enemy Air Engagement Operations 

Engaging enemy aircraft with friendly air, land, and maritime assets must be 

fully coordinated to optimize all aspects of friendly combat power. This reduces 

uncoordinated simultaneous engagements, unengaged penetrators, and fratricide. 

a. Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) Operations. These operations involve the 

employment and integration of multiple air defense systems in order to simultaneously 

engage enemy targets in the operational area. Targets within the JEZ may be prioritized 

for engagement based on friendly weapons system strengths; for example, fighters could 

be designated to primarily engage enemy aircraft, while concurrently, surface-based 

missiles would be designated to primarily engage enemy missile threats in the same zone. 

METHODS OF AIRSPACE CONTROL

POSITIVE CONTROL PROCEDURAL CONTROL

Positively identifies, tracks, and 

directs air assets using:













Radars

Other sensors

Identification, friend or foe

Selective identification feature

Digital data links

Other elements of the 

communications system

Relies on previously agreed to and 

distributed airspace control 

procedures and measures such as:











Comprehensive air defense 

identification procedures and 

rules of engagement

Airspace coordinating measures 

such as:

-- Low level transit routes

-- Minimum-risk routes

-- Coordinating altitudes

-- Restricted operations 

zone/restrictive fire area

-- Standard use Army aircraft 

flight route

-- High-density airspace control 

zone

Aircraft identification maneuvers

Fire support coordination 

measures such as:

-- Restrictive fires

-- No-fire area

Maneuver control measures 

such as boundaries

Figure III-4. Methods of Airspace Control
Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

III-9 

However, successful JEZ operations depend on positively identifying friendly, 

neutral, and enemy aircraft. Positive control may ensure that real-time engagement 

taskings are based on comprehensive situational awareness. Under procedural control, all 

air defense systems must be capable of accurately discerning between enemy, neutral, 

and friendly aircraft in a highly complex environment before full joint engagement 

operations can occur. If these conditions cannot be met, separate zones for missile and 

fighter engagement should be established. JEZ operations require effective C2. 

Positive control is normally used within a JEZ during maritime operations.

b. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ) Operations. These operations usually take 

place above and beyond the range of surface-based (land and sea) air defenses. 

Effective FEZ operations are highly dependent on coordination and flexibility within the 

ACS. FEZ operations enable the JFC to respond immediately with fighter assets to 

an enemy air offensive regardless of its location. FEZ and missile engagement zone 

(MEZ) operations present the enemy with the dilemma of defending against two entirely 

different weapon systems, greatly decreasing enemy survivability. FEZ operations within 

the airspace control area should not result in undue restraints on the ability of surfacebased air defense systems to engage the threat.

c. MEZ Operations. These operations are ideal for point defense of critical assets, 

protection of maneuver units in the forward area, and area coverage of the joint security 

area. MEZ operations offer the JFC the ability to engage the enemy with a highand low-altitude, all-weather capability. Advanced surface-to-air missile systems have 

long-range, high-firepower capability that can engage enemy aircraft beyond the forward 

line of own troops (FLOT) or disrupt massed enemy air attacks prior to committing 

fighter assets. Properly employed, MEZ operations are effective across the full range 

of air defense operations and enemy threats. MEZ operations need to be designed 

to maximize the full range and capabilities of various systems. MEZ operations 

within the airspace control area should not result in undue restraints on the flexibility and 

ability of friendly air assets to respond to changing threats. 

d. Coordination for Engagement Operations. The following general guidelines 

apply for coordination of engagement operations: 

(1) For urgent or emergency combat situations, the ACA can authorize 

deviations from established policies and procedures. In these situations, the ACA 

should notify all affected air defense assets and airspace users prior to authorizing 

deviations. The JFC should be informed as soon as possible. 

(2) When the circumstances necessitate the rapid deployment and employment 

of forces for which there are no approved OPLANs or previously established ACPs, a 

temporary ACS responsive to immediate tactical or operational requirements will be 

established. 

e. Airspace Control and Integration of Friendly EW and Suppression of Enemy 

Air Defenses (SEAD). The JFC integrates EW and SEAD into the overall planning 
Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-52 

effort, and an EW coordination cell may be established to perform this function. Proper 

integration of EW can help prevent degrading the effectiveness of airspace control assets 

and ensure the positive control aspects of the system. Failure to integrate EW may

degrade the effectiveness of some airspace control assets, degrade some of the positive 

control aspects of the system, reduce the capability to identify aircraft, and require 

increased dependence on coordination through procedural control measures. Additional 

procedural control measures may also be required to compensate for foreseen 

degradations that cannot be avoided. Thorough planning is required to preclude EW and 

SEAD efforts from unduly degrading air defense and airspace control efforts. 

9. Multinational Integration Issues 

International agreements, enemy and friendly force structures, commanders’ 

CONOPS, and the operational environment will determine specific arrangements for 

airspace control while conducting multinational operations. Effective coordination 

between all multinational forces is essential to mission success and to avoid 

fratricide. All multinational aircraft involved in the operation should appear on the daily 

ATO to help ensure deconfliction and effective airspace control. 

See JP 3-16, Multinational Operations, and Allied Joint Publication 3.3.5(A), Doctrine 

for Joint Airspace Control, for more information regarding the responsibilities and 

requirements of ACSs during multinational operations. 

10. Unmanned Aircraft

a. UA may be operated in the airspace control area by each joint force component, 

multinational forces, and other government agencies. The established principles of 

airspace management used in manned flight operations will normally apply to UA 

operations. However, UA may be difficult to visually acquire and do not always provide 

a clear radar or electronic signature, presenting a potential hazard to other aircraft. 

Therefore, UA operations require special considerations in terms of airspace control and 

usage. Specific UA volumes of airspace may need to be included in the ACO. 

Additionally, the ACO should provide times of activation of airspace for UA operations. 

In cases where a standing ACO is used, specific details will be addressed in the 

ATO/SPINS. In either case, efforts should be made to integrate UA with manned flight 

operations to enable a more flexible and adaptable airspace structure.

b. While the C2 processes for UA are similar to those for manned assets, several 

characteristics of UA can make C2 particularly challenging: 

 (1) UAS communication links are generally more critical than those required 

for manned systems. In the event of lost communications, a manned aircraft will 

typically press with the mission and/or return safely to a home base or alternate field. 

However, UA rely on a nearly continuous stream of communication (for both flight 

control and payload) to successfully complete a mission. Therefore, communications 

security, and specifically bandwidth protection (from both friendly interference and 
Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

III-11 

adversary action), is imperative. Although UA may be capable of autonomous reaction 

(i.e., collision avoidance) or preplanned response in the event of lost communication (i.e., 

return to base), they typically rely on a near-continuous data exchange for both flight 

control and payload management. Accordingly, airspace planners must account for these 

contingencies.

 (2) UA may be capable of transferring control of the aircraft and/or payloads to 

multiple operators while airborne. Close coordination amongst all potential operators is 

required. Additionally, specific communications-outage procedures should be clearly 

defined in the event communications are lost or jammed entirely. 

 (3) Current UA are typically not as robust as manned systems when component 

failures or environmental extremes are encountered. Wind, precipitation, turbulence, and 

icing can significantly degrade or altogether nullify UA platform and/or sensor 

capabilities. 

 (4) Most larger UA have considerably longer endurance times than comparable 

manned systems. Planners must exploit this capability when tasking UA assets. 

c. Defensive Considerations. Our adversaries are developing and acquiring UA so it 

is imperative for our C2 and DCA nodes to be able to differentiate between friendly and 

enemy UA and cruise missiles. The ACP must not allow a window of opportunity for 

adversaries to exploit. Specifically, the use of CA and SAAFR by UA enables efficient 

and timely use of the airspace, but also makes it more difficult for air defense operators to 

differentiate between friend and foe. This type of airspace control is typically procedural 

control, and not positive control. Therefore, UAS operators must follow prescribed 

airspace control procedures and air defense identification procedures in order to prevent 

fratricide and/or prevent enemy UA exploitation of that airspace. 

For a more detailed discussion of UA considerations, see Field Manual (FM) 3-

04.15/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-55.14/Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.64 Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

11. Theater Missiles

Theater missiles (e.g., conventional air launched cruise missiles, ATACMS, 

GMLRS, and TLAM) are standoff weapons fired from a launch point on a 

preprogrammed flight profile to a designated target. Because these missiles have a small 

radar cross-section, they are difficult to track with normal radar units conducting airspace 

control. Therefore, positive control is not an effective means to deconflict theater missile 

operations from other air operations. It is imperative that procedural ACMs be 

established in the ATO, ACO, or SPINS. Procedural ACMs for theater missiles may

include ROZs for launch and target locations, missile flight path, corridors, which include 

specified altitudes and position area hazard/target area hazard locations for ATACMS. 
Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-52 

12. Airspace Control in Maritime Operations

a. In joint maritime operations, specific control and defensive measures may differ 

from those used in a land-based operation. The joint force maritime component 

commander (JFMCC) may be designated the control authority for a specific airspace 

control area or sector for the accomplishment of a specific mission. The massing of 

maritime forces into a strike force of combined arms (air, surface, and subsurface) under 

a single commander reduces the front to be defended, enhances mutual support, and 

simplifies identification and deconfliction of friendly aircraft and other air defense 

measures. To ensure unity of effort and minimal interference along adjacent boundaries, 

the commander responsible for maritime airspace control must coordinate with the 

ACA.

b. In joint operations composed of adjacent maritime and land environments,

specific control and defensive measures may be a composite of those measures normally 

employed in each environment. The JFC for such operations needs to ensure detailed 

coordination of control and defensive measures with the affected air, land, and 

maritime component commanders. Additionally: 

(1) Assignment of airspace allows the JFC to exercise C2 of forces, deconflict 

high volumes of aircraft and missiles, and defend forces. During amphibious operations,

JFMCC or the commander, amphibious task force (ATF), is normally designated as the 

control authority. The complexity and size of an amphibious operation directly 

determines the amount of airspace allocated.

(2) The level of airspace control allocated to the amphibious force depends on 

the type of ACM approved for the operation. If an AOA is established, air control 

procedures are identical to HIDACZ procedures. If only an AO is established, the 

amphibious force will normally request that the ACA establish a HIDACZ over this 

geographic area. A HIDACZ is airspace designated in an ACP or ACO in which there 

is a concentrated employment of numerous and varied weapons and airspace users. 

Access is normally controlled by the maneuver commander who can direct a more 

restrictive weapons status within the designated area. For air defense, the amphibious 

defense zone includes the AOA plus a buffer zone so that the incoming threat can be 

engaged before it crosses into the AOA. The items shown below should be considered 

when establishing a HIDACZ: 

(a) Airspace control capabilities of the maritime force.

(b) Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the 

HIDACZ.

(c) Range and type of naval surface fire support available. 

(d) Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control 

orders or status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ. 
Airspace Control Planning Considerations 

III-13 

(e) Entry and exit routes and procedures into and out of the HIDACZ and 

to the target area.

(f) Air traffic advisory as required. Procedures and systems must also be 

considered for ATC service during instrument meteorological conditions. 

(g) Location of enemy forces inside and in close proximity to the HIDACZ. 

(h) At a minimum, the HIDACZ should cover the ATF sea echelon areas 

and extend inland to the landing force’s FSCL. Additionally, the HIDACZ should be 

large enough to accommodate the flow of fixed-wing aircraft into and out of the 

amphibious airspace. 

(3) Under the ATF, the Navy tactical air control center is normally the agency 

responsible for controlling all air operations within the allocated airspace regardless of 

mission or origin, to include supporting arms. An airborne element or surface combatant 

with the requisite air C2 capabilities may also serve this function. Regardless of where 

actual airspace control is exercised, close and continuous coordination between airspace 

control and air defense agencies is essential in any amphibious operation. Emphasis will 

be placed on simple, flexible ATC plans and a combination of positive and procedural 

airspace control. Most amphibious operations will take place in a radar environment, 

allowing for increased control over air missions. Amphibious forces operating in a nonradar environment will rely exclusively on procedural control. Amphibious air control 

plans employ a combination of positive and procedural control methods. 

For further details on airspace control in amphibious operations, refer to JP 3-02,

Amphibious Operations. 

c. Considerations need to be made for aircraft based outside the AO. There is a 

good probability that aircraft will have to transit carrier control zones. Corridors can be 

preplanned, limiting impact on carrier operations. Corridors should be planned to 

minimize aircraft flight time/fuel requirements.

13. High-Density Airspace Control Zone Integration with Other Airspace 

Coordinating Measures

In some cases, the operational environment may require an airspace/fires density 

level that exceeds the capability of a single HIDACZ controlling authority. One method 

to prevent overloading the controlling authority is to establish another ACM (restricted 

operations area, HIDACZ, etc.) above or adjacent to the HIDACZ, controlled by another 

agency or component. 

For more information on HIDACZ, see FM 3-52.1/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.78, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Airspace Control. 
Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-52 

Intentionally Blank
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV

AIRSPACE CONTROL EXECUTION BY PHASE

The JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, phasing construct is an extremely useful guide 

to generalize airspace control responsibilities, activities, systems, documents, and liaison 

requirements across the range of military operations. Although an operation could 

proceed logically from phase 0 to V, most operations will not. Each operation is unique 

and will require unique solutions to military obstacles. 

1. Phase 0 — Shape

a. The shape phase is inclusive of normal and routine military airspace activities to 

deter potential adversaries and ensure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. 

Various joint, multinational, and interagency airspace activities are executed with the 

intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain cooperation in support of defined 

military and national strategic objectives. They are designed to ensure success by 

shaping perceptions and influencing the behavior of both adversaries and allies, 

developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition 

operations, improving information exchange and intelligence sharing, and providing US 

forces with peacetime and contingency airspace access. 

b. The HN retains ACA and joint forces primarily use existing international or 

HN aeronautical information publications (AIPs) for airspace procedures or 

guidelines; airspace and navigation services are the sovereign right and responsibility of 

the HN. 

c. Although the JFC may not designate a standing ACA during this phase, the 

JFC should appoint a lead agent, normally the commander, Air Force forces, for 

coordinating the resolution of issues related to airspace management, ATC, terminal 

instrument procedures, and navigation aids within the operational area. The 

commander, Navy forces, is normally assigned responsibility for airspace procedures 

applicable to fleet air operations over international waters within the operational area and 

only advises the JFC’s lead agent as appropriate. The JFC’s lead agent is delegated the 

authority for developing joint force airspace requirements in coordination with the other 

Service components and representing those joint force airspace requirements to the 

Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, international, or HN authorities as 

appropriate. Additionally, the lead agent normally serves as the focal point to: 

(1) Provide assistance to the JFC, components, Services, and supporting 

commands on airspace, air traffic, or navigation aid matters. 

“The way of the warrior is to master the virtue of his weapons.”

Miyamato Musashi, A Book of Five Rings
Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-52 

(2) Develop appropriate ACMs in support of JFC contingency planning to 

include airspace requirements for UA. 

(3) Ensure current and future airspace and navigation aid availability for 

components and supporting commands through joint mission essential task listing inputs. 

(4) Coordinate HN navigation aids inspections with US Air Force Flight 

Standards Agency, US Army Air Traffic Services Command, Headquarters US Army, 

United States Army Aeronautical Services Agency, Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA)/ICAO aviation system standards, and the DOD program management office for 

flight inspection.

(5) Ensure navigation aids are included on the DOD essential foreign-owned 

navigation aids list if deemed an enduring requirement. 

(6) Develop and establish procedures for airspace actions or issues that cannot 

be resolved by component commands consistent with applicable DOD, JFC, component, 

international, and HN guidance.

(7) Ensure altitude reservations are coordinated for all DOD aircraft transiting 

or operating within the operational area.

(8) Develop friendly HN airspace capabilities through the joint force theater 

engagement plan, training, and exercises. 

d. In addition to ensuring continuation of routine DOD flight operations during the 

shaping phase, joint force airspace planners establish effective relationships with key 

operational area airspace authorities, develop specific ACPs in preparation for future 

operations, and build airspace planning expertise. Regular DOD or joint force interaction 

with HN authorities and participation in regional airspace conferences establishes 

relationships with the HN for quick resolution of issues and effective coordination of 

airspace requirements. 

e. Development of ACPs should be as thorough as possible and include airspace 

control considerations from peace to combat operations and through all follow-on phases 

of the OPLAN. Additionally, the ACP should integrate known international or HN

air traffic airspace and air defense capabilities. Primary planning considerations 

include identification of airspace required for joint force operations and proposed 

coordination process for obtaining that airspace. Joint operation planning should 

consider procedures to transfer ACS from the HN to the ACA, rerouting of airways, ACA 

responsibilities to continuity of civil aviation operations, and HN notification of ACA 

areas of control through notices to airmen (NOTAMs) or AIP entries. Appendix A,

“Airspace Control Plan Development Considerations,” illustrates the ACP development 

process. 
Airspace Control Execution by Phase

IV-3 

f. Special consideration should be given to planning airspace management responses 

to long-range missile launches into friendly territory. Rapid notification procedures 

should be developed and practiced to allow unhindered rapid response to defeating 

enemy missiles in flight.

2. Phase I — Deter

a. Transition to phase I begins with identification and determination of a crisis 

situation requiring joint force action and crisis action planning to develop a campaign 

plan with ACP if no OPLAN or concept plan exists. Available joint force airspace 

planners will develop or revise the ACP for airspace actions required in phase I execution 

as well as considerations and planning for follow-on phases. 

b. Strategic Considerations. Upon receipt of authoritative planning direction, 

airspace planning must be refined to reflect and support the planning effort in light of the 

situation. Airspace planning necessarily entails coordination with international and 

multiple national authorities and is politically sensitive. Release of airspace plans can 

potentially compromise OPSEC, but can also increase the geographic uncertainty of 

potential adversaries and may have deterrent or deceptive effects. Since the airspace 

planning and preparation measures discussed in the following paragraphs may also have 

the same effects, airspace planning and coordination efforts must be considered with 

other strategic undertakings.

c. The deter phase is normally a demonstration of joint force capabilities and resolve 

to deter undesirable adversary action. It is largely characterized by preparatory actions 

that specifically facilitate execution of subsequent phases of the operation or theater 

campaign. Specific airspace actions may include developing the finalized ACP and 

airspace database build for ACO publication; obtaining initial over flight and airspace 

permission; and assignment of joint force airspace liaison personnel to Department of 

State, US embassies, multinational, or HN organizations to coordinate airspace 

requirements for subsequent phases of the operation. Liaisons can facilitate timely 

exchange of airspace control information, especially in a multinational environment 

where language barriers can impede crucial cross-communication necessary for safe and 

effective airspace control. 

d. The ACA (or JFC’s lead agent for airspace management) establishes a dedicated 

airspace planning team to finalize the ACP, coordinate with the AADC for AADP

deconfliction, and develop the ACO for current and future operations. The ACP and 

AADP should complement each other and ensure the orderly transition from 

peacetime operations to combat operations. The ACA (lead agent) may:

(1) Coordinate with the JFC, components, interagency, coalition, and HN to 

define airspace boundaries for inclusion in the ACP (if granted liaison authority from the 

JFC). 
Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 3-52 

(2) Request airspace planning augmentation from components, Services, 

interagency or multinational organizations as required for planning efforts and/or as 

liaisons. 

(3) Establish key relationships or agreements with appropriate international and 

regional airspace control agencies concerning ACA and coordination during joint force 

operations. 

(4) Identify required joint force ACSs and personnel required to support 

airspace control through phased operations and deploy those assets as required. 

(5) Coordinate DOD/FAA/ICAO NOTAM system availability to support 

intertheater dissemination of flight operating information, flight check aircraft, and 

scheduling for air traffic facility inspection. 

(6) Identify the desired concept for the ACSs in phase IV/V and consider 

placing critical components of the enemy air control system on the restricted target list to 

preserve them for future use.

e. For the deter phase, the ACP should contain procedures to fully integrate the 

resources of military and civil ATC facilities responsible for terminal-area airspace 

control or en route ATC. Airspace management personnel should coordinate the ACP 

with representatives of the HN in whose airspace the operations will take place and with 

civil air activities that may occur in or near the airspace. Broad areas of concern for 

developing the ACP include familiarity with the basic OPLAN, knowledge of host and 

multinational capabilities, procedures of military and civil airspace control and ATC

systems, and general locations of friendly and enemy forces. 

f. Additionally, any HN agreements that could impact air operations must be 

considered. HN agreements concerning airspace control may only be negotiated by 

authorized personnel in accordance with DOD instructions and ICAO protocols. Surfaceto-air weapons and air defense aircraft should be integrated for maximum effectiveness. 

Proper coordination with civil air operations is especially important during 

transitions into or out of wartime status or during non-wartime periods of 

heightened tensions. Political constraints, national and military ACSs and procedures, 

and the capabilities and limitations of these systems are important considerations in 

planning for required joint force airspace control. Applicable information from the ACP 

should be distributed to joint and coalition forces as well as HNs, allies, and international 

organizations such as ICAO. 

3. Phase II — Seize the Initiative

a. Transition to phase II may be accomplished on the JFC’s initiative or in response 

to an enemy attack. During combat operations, peacetime airspace rules and 

organizations change, and the nature of these changes will vary from theater to theater. 

The ACP should contain instructions to transition from peacetime to combat in 
Airspace Control Execution by Phase

IV-5 

simple, clear steps. The ACP should include the airspace control concepts for transition 

to phase II operations and robust control methods for potential degraded operations. 

Airspace planners should be integrated into development of the master air attack plan to 

ensure required airspace is designed for combat operations and the transition from 

peacetime to combat airspace control is seamless.

b. At the outset of phase II combat operations every effort should be made to 

exclude civil aviation operations from the affected JOA. Redesign of airspace or 

notification of impending changes to airspace control could signal adversaries of a 

pending operation so timing for airspace transition to potential combat should be 

considered. Advanced or open notification of airspace changes should be integrated into 

the information OPLAN for OPSEC or tactical deception considerations. 

c. Joint air operations play a critical role in actions to seize the initiative or gain 

access to a theater or JOA. During phase II, the JFC seeks to seize the initiative in 

combat and noncombat situations through the application of appropriate joint force 

capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing offensive operations at the 

earliest appropriate time, forcing the enemy to offensive culmination and setting the 

conditions for decisive operations. Normally the beginning of phase II signals the shift 

from peace to combat operations. 

d. Integrating the airspace control function with DCA and offensive counterair

operations is especially critical during efforts to gain air superiority. Effective 

identification procedures are required for both airspace control and DCA to facilitate 

engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles, and provide safe passage of friendly aircraft 

and missiles. 

e. In the opening stages of phase II, effective airspace control hinges on 

understanding the OPLAN, JFC intent, the airspace environment, and the requirements to 

effectively control it. The JFACC will publish the AOD which describes the JFACC’s 

implementation of JFC intent and provides guidance for operations prioritization. 

During major operations the JFACC is typically the supported commander for the 

counterair effort in the operational area and integrates offensive and DCA to 

achieve air superiority. Against adversaries with a credible air and air defense threat, 

efforts to “seize the initiative” will likely be more sequential than simultaneous because 

many operations may require air superiority as a precondition for success. For phase II 

operations where the US already has access and air superiority, the ACP and the AADP 

may be less restrictive, and operations to establish the required access may be either 

sequential or simultaneous. 

f. Until air superiority is achieved, the phase II ACP may restrict friendly military 

and civil airspace users. Operating platforms with limited identification and 

communications equipment places those systems at risk and also complicates 

counterair operations by increasing the risk of fratricide and the probability of 

successful enemy air or missile attacks. Certain friendly airborne systems (cruise 

missiles, UA) may be mission-essential and yet lack identification, communications 
Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-52 

equipment, or autonomous sense-and-avoid capability. Specific ACMs are required for 

these users to minimize the impact to the counterair fight while maximizing efforts to 

seize the initiative. Systems that cannot be positively identified as friendly may be 

restricted during the opening stages of combat operations prior to obtaining air 

superiority. At commencement of combat operations the JFACC should immediately 

execute plans and procedures to reduce civil aviation to levels most compatible with 

combat operations. Some level of civil aviation, especially commercial airlift flying in 

support of coalition operations, will probably be ongoing throughout all the phases. 

g. The JFACC should ensure the ACP and ACO are fully coordinated with 

supporting components, coalition partners, and HN air and air defense forces, even if the 

HN is not participating in combat operations. This coordination should also include all 

SOF elements that participate in the phase II access operations. Because some of these 

plans are highly sensitive, the JFACC should ensure alternate communication means are 

available to pass information to friendly organizations that do not have access to normal 

military communications. 

h. Phase II airspace control planning should fully integrate fires from all friendly 

and coalition forces. Failure to integrate all fires in initial planning significantly 

increases the potential for fratricide and may delay execution of combat operations. 

Early integration of airspace and fires prevents costly decisions which result when two 

components plan to use the same airspace, at the same time, for different missions. 

i. The JFACC, working with the JFC and other components, should clearly 

identify the risk of combining fires and aircraft operations (manned and unmanned), 

particularly at the outset of the campaign when airspace may be more constrained due to 

the higher density of air and land operations. These risks should be codified in the ACP, 

along with the level of risk the JFC is willing to accept for each phase. 

j. Component fires systems, such as conventional air-launched cruise missile, 

TLAM, ATACMS, and other systems, have small radar cross sections and are difficult to 

track with typical air control radar systems. In addition, most of these systems are 

uncontrolled once they are fired or launched. They should be deconflicted with 

procedural ACMs. The ACP should establish procedures to include procedural control 

and coordination of fires. These procedures should also include real-time deconfliction 

measures for missions in the ATO, ACO, and SPINS. 

k. The JFACC normally serves as the supported commander for the JFC’s 

overall air interdiction effort. Airspace control, to include integration with fires, is 

critical to the success of air interdiction. The JFACC should ensure that all air 

interdiction operations use common reference systems and tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTP). The JFACC advises the JFC and includes the coordinated common

reference systems and TTP in the ACP, AADP, ATO, ACO, and SPINS. These plans 

should also include real-time airspace control procedures for the engagement of timesensitive targets. 
Airspace Control Execution by Phase

IV-7 

l. The use of UA over the battlefield has increased significantly in recent years. UA

require access to airspace with manned aircraft, particularly in the vicinity of high value 

targets. In order to minimize risk and maximize the effectiveness of UA, the ACP 

should direct the deconfliction of joint, component, and coalition UA platforms. 

Unlike their manned counterparts, the vast majority of UA do not have on-board senseand-avoid capabilities. Therefore, other means of aircraft separation must be employed 

to reduce the risk of mid-air collisions. UA deconfliction is critical during all phases of 

an operation and requires detailed planning and coordination. 

m. During phase II the JFC and the components should conduct thorough 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace as part of the joint intelligence preparation of 

the operational environment. Part of this intelligence preparation includes information 

gained through the use of ISR platforms. Many ISR platforms are airspace users and may 

require access to the same airspace. Prior to the JFACC achieving air superiority, 

friendly airborne ISR platforms that do not meet identification or control 

requirements increase the difficulty of counterair operations and increase the risk of 

successful enemy air attack. If the JFC decides to restrict the use of friendly platforms 

without sufficient identification or communications systems, the ACP should clearly 

delineate which operating areas are restricted, and what capabilities (e.g., IFF) are 

required to operate within them. If the JFC elects not to restrict operations by these 

systems, the ACA should clearly outline the increased risk to the JFC for approval. 

n. ISR asset airspace congestion over high interest areas may be mitigated through 

an effective and integrated airborne ISR collection plan. In addition, the ability to 

disseminate ISR products rapidly across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels 

(Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver [ROVER] down-link, for example) may 

decrease airspace congestion. Multiple, component-organic, airborne ISR assets 

staring at the same objective area add complexity to airspace control operations and 

may delay fire support to forces on the ground. For more information, see JP 2-0, 

Joint Intelligence. 

o. Regardless of whether the operation or campaign is sequential or simultaneous, 

the joint force land component commander (JFLCC), if designated, or one or more land 

component commanders will normally become the supported commanders for their AOs

during the latter stages of phase II. Ideally, the air component will have achieved at least 

localized air superiority over the AO; however, this may not always be the case. Once air 

superiority is achieved, the JFC may allow increased operations by airborne systems with 

limited identification and communications capabilities. An area-wide COP with 

minimum latency is a significant contributor to both air defense and airspace control. 

The ACP may employ fewer restrictions on certain systems which are visible on the 

airspace COP, whereas systems with less identification and communications 

equipment may require more restrictions and coordination.

p. When one or more land component commanders become supported commanders 

for their AOs, the ACS should be modified and integrated to meet mission requirements. 
Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 3-52 

The ACA should consider the following when creating the phase II transition portion of 

the ACP:

(1) The C2 plan for the initial employment of ground forces. 

(2) Adequate communications within the operational area to execute the plan.

(3) ACS elements required to meet the scheme of maneuver for component 

commanders.

(4) Delegation of ACA to components (e.g., joint special operations area, AOA, 

HIDACZ, or sectors) and integration of component airspace control agencies. 

(5) Planned use of adversary systems for the post-hostility ACS (consider 

which, if any, facilities should be placed on the restricted target list for preservation).

q. A key role of the ACP is to define the processes to propose, approve, modify, 

and promulgate ACMs and FSCMs. The ACA establishes ACMs with components 

and coalition airspace users and provides recommended airspace control procedures for 

JFC approval and publication in the ACP. Once approved, these ACP ACMs are 

promulgated throughout the joint and coalition forces via the ACO, ATO, and SPINS. 

For effective airspace control it is critical that all joint and multinational airspace users, 

including indirect fires platforms, understand the area-wide ACMs including: 

(1) Activation of FSCMs including FSCL, kill box, etc. 

(2) Establishment of the CA if used. 

(3) ACMs required for special missions (e.g., air assaults, airborne operations). 

(4) Areas that will become high density airspace and the type of control 

procedures used to mitigate risk. 

(5) Automated tools and systems that ensure promulgation of the ACO and 

changes to airspace users. 

4. Phase III — Dominate

a. Phase III includes the full employment of joint force capabilities and continues 

the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area as quickly as possible. 

When an operation or campaign is focused on conventional enemy forces, the “dominate” 

phase normally concludes with decisive operations that drive an enemy to culmination 

and achieve the JFC’s operational objectives. During major operations, phase III may 

involve ground forces and require bringing a large number of manned and unmanned 

aircraft into the operational area. In addition, the amount of fires assets using airspace 

will likely increase, requiring additional planning, deconfliction, and airspace control 
Airspace Control Execution by Phase

IV-9 

actions. The ACP should include updates and changes that will occur as the JFC 

transitions the force to phase III.

b. During phase III operations, the ACP/ATO/ACO and SPINS should be updated to 

include responsibilities and authorities (including SOF and coalition) for the following: 

(1) Designated areas within JFLCC/JFMCC AOs.

(2) Procedures for forward operating bases (FOBs) and airfields.

(3) ATC/air traffic service at FOBs.

(4) ATC/air traffic service at captured airfields.

(5) Area air defense and short-range air defense integration behind the FSCL 

and FLOT. 

(6) Fixed wing, UA, and rotary wing deconfliction methods. 

c. During phase III, airspace control elements should expect a significant increase in 

the number of indirect fires in the JFLCC/JFMCC AO. Indirect fire systems are airspace 

users; however, current airspace control TTP and FSCMs do not lend themselves to 

seamless integration. ACMs do not normally prevent fires from entering the airspace; 

only FSCMs serve to restrict fires. To effectively integrate fires and airspace control, 

airspace control elements should determine which ACMs must also be protected by 

an airspace coordination area or air corridor and coordinate accordingly. As an 

example, an AAR is an ACM which would prevent other aircraft from entering the area 

without coordination with the controlling agency. Without an airspace coordination area 

or air corridor, however, nothing prevents fires from passing through the AAR. 

Integrating fires with other airspace users requires careful consideration of risk and user 

priority as well as an understanding of the joint air operations plan (JAOP) and land 

component fires plan. 

d. Airspace planners should minimize the number of combined ACM/FSCM 

requests so as not to overly restrict fires. In the same manner, fires planners should 

understand there are some areas in which the JFC cannot accept the risk of mixing fires 

and manned aircraft. Effective real-time execution can solve many of these issues by 

moving either fires or aircraft to allow both systems to operate. Deconfliction of fires 

and aircraft is a critical part of phase III airspace control planning. 

e. Missions such as air assaults, airborne assaults, and other incursions into 

enemy territory require specific airspace control coordination. These events may 

require ACMs such as: HIDACZ, ROZ, MRR, or LLTR. These missions may require 

specific C2 relationships, organizations, and authorities which should be planned for and 

included in ACP/ATO/ACO and SPINS. 
Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-52 

5. Phase IV — Stabilize

a. Phase IV operations ensure that the threat (military or political) is reduced to a 

manageable level that can be controlled by the potential HN authority and that the 

situation which led to the original crisis does not recur. During this phase, the joint force 

may be required to perform local governance until legitimate local entities are 

functioning. The ACA could be required to perform roles traditionally associated with an 

HN aviation authority and may include the development of aeronautical information (e.g., 

instrument procedures, publications, NOTAMs), civil flight planning procedures, 

certification of procedures, aviation safety investigation, training of HN and/or contract 

personnel, or operation of airspace infrastructure systems. Considerations should be 

given to developing aeronautical information to end-state standards expected when 

control is returned to HN. 

b. A key ACA requirement is the development of a plan to establish HN capabilities 

to effect a successful transfer of airspace control from the joint force to the HN in phase 

V. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat 

operations to stability operations with increased requests for airspace and airfield access 

by HN or other non-JFC supporting organizations. The ACP should address airspace 

access criteria for non-JFC organizations, joint force to civil airspace priority, and 

identification and acceptance of associated civil airspace operating risks. A thorough 

review of all written guidance should be conducted when the transition to phase IV of 

operations is anticipated. Documents such as the JAOP, AOD, ACP, AADP, SPINS, 

ROE, letters of agreement, and international agreements may significantly change in this 

phase. Priorities for airspace control should be redefined to address increasing civil 

authority for the airspace environment. Inextricably linked to this review of priorities is a 

clear determination of what level of risk will be accepted during this phase. The impacts 

of a catastrophic event involving a civil aircraft could significantly damage the strategic 

objectives of the JFC and the governments involved in the joint operation. Assistance 

from the defense attaché office, Department of State, the FAA, ICAO, or a contracted 

agency should be considered in assisting to establish HN capabilities.

c. Reducing threats to air operations and establishing security are required to 

set conditions to transfer airspace control authority to the HN government. 

Particularly during this phase, the airspace environment is dynamic and may transition 

rapidly between varying levels of stability. Throughout this phase, the JFACC 

continuously balances the needs of military operations against increased civil airspace 

access and effective transfer of airspace control authority to a legitimate HN entity. 

Transition of airspace control to the HN should be considered carefully with regard 

to continuing JFC military operations. Reduced military airspace control authority 

may result in decreased flexibility for operations with increased coordination and 

approval requirements from the HN. The main transition planning concepts include: 

(1) Installation or increased use of commercial systems.

(2) Consolidation and reduction of JFC manpower/systems footprint. 
Airspace Control Execution by Phase

IV-11 

(3) Use of contracted airspace control capabilities.

(4) Joint force ACS linkage to HN systems.

(5) Leveraging HN capabilities and systems.

(6) Transfer of contracts or excess systems to the HN. 

(7) Decrease in joint force airspace control support requirements.

(8) Planning to ensure a successful airspace turnover to the HN. 

(9) Ensuring required HN capabilities exist.

(10) Developing a clear agreement and timelines for airspace control transfer.

(11) Ensuring continuing joint force airspace mission needs are supported. 

d. Interagency coordination and development of an airspace transition plan with key 

transition milestones are required to reduce friction between the various JFC, USG, 

international, and HN agencies that may be involved in the airspace transition process. 

The identification of and agreement on milestone criteria and the airspace infrastructure 

end state by the various stakeholders are key to a successful transition plan. Normally, a 

government or civil organization will handle the planning and requirements for 

reconstituting the HN ACS. However, the ACA may be the only one able to assume 

this primary leadership role especially in seriously degraded or failed state scenarios. 

The ACA’s responsibilities as the acting HN ACA should be detailed in an appropriate 

delegation document from the HN and referenced in the HN AIP. 

e. The pre-conflict HN airspace control structure (civilian or military 

controlled) should provide the basic airspace end-state concept unless destroyed or 

deemed ineffective. Simplicity and basic effectiveness of the HN airspace system 

should be a primary goal of the ACA’s transition plan. Additionally, the ACA should 

focus specifically on the ACS to prevent excessive requirements or delays from other 

aviation-related issues such as airfield construction or certification issues. Also the HN

or other supporting agencies may desire to modify or upgrade the ACS which will most 

likely increase the timelines for the end-state transition milestone. Ideally, the final HN

end-state airspace infrastructure plan should meet the minimum requirements for ICAO 

certification (unless post-conflict situations dictate otherwise) and also take into account 

HN airspace sovereignty requirements. Interim transfer of airspace control to HN

military forces or contracted airspace control services should be considered to allow the 

redeployment of joint force airspace control forces. 

f. Interoperability between military and civil airspace users and control 

agencies is crucial for safe and effective integration of airspace control including air 
Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-52 

defense, joint fires, and civil aviation. Use of military liaison teams embedded in HN

control facilities may be required to ensure the adequate coordination and representation 

of continuing joint force airspace requirements. Civil documents that govern the HN

airspace system may become more authoritative for all airspace users and by the end of 

phase IV should be the primary source of guidance and regulation. The joint force should 

ensure that proper agreements exist between the HN and adjacent nations to enable the 

effective air defense of the country as well as the safe and efficient flow of air traffic 

across borders. Management and guidance of information assurance and spectrum 

management should be accounted for in the transition plan. The proliferation of devices 

that exploit, interrupt, or use the frequency spectrum is likely during this phase as a result 

of increased activity of other international and HN agencies and general increase in 

economic communications activities. 

g. From an ACA’s perspective, the end of phase IV and the beginning of phase V 

milestone is reached when the framework of the HN ACS is in place and the HN is ready 

to assume ACA. Phase V is characterized by the processes and events that take place 

during that transition as joint force personnel and equipment are redeployed and HN

personnel and equipment take control. 

6. Phase V — Enable Civil Authority

a. This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate 

civil governance in the operational area. Depending upon the level of indigenous state 

capacity, joint force activities during phase V may be at the behest of that authority or 

they may be under its direction. The joint force will perform key airspace functions 

either as the delegated ACA or as supporting airspace service provider under the 

HN aviation authority. The JFC’s ACA can expect frequent coordination and 

interaction on airspace issues with HN, multinational, interagency, and other airspace 

system participants. The ACA is in a supporting role to the legitimate civil aviation 

authority in the region throughout the enable civil authority phase. Normally operations 

are concluded when joint force redeployment is complete. However, continued joint 

force support and involvement with the HN and other agencies, beyond the termination of 

the joint operation, may be required to achieve the desired end state. 

b. Phase V could result as a normal phased transition from phase IV stability 

operations or as joint force support to a humanitarian relief effort, natural disaster, 

or other catastrophic event. During this phase HN aviation regulations and guidance 

are the authoritative source for airspace control procedures. To the maximum extent 

possible, original HN aviation and airspace documents should be used by the joint force 

to comply with HN aviation authority intent. If derivative HN guidance is required for 

dissemination or amplification in joint force ACP, ACO, ATO, or SPINS, the information 

should be included verbatim and referenced to the original source document. In 

situations where HN procedures must be modified by the military for airspace access or 

use, HN authorities should be consulted and provide appropriate approval of the 
Airspace Control Execution by Phase

IV-13 

deviation. Formal agreement or understanding should be coordinated between joint 

forces and the HN authority to ensure clarity on exact airspace control responsibilities. 

Frequent and extensive coordination among the joint force, HN, and other agency 

personnel on airspace control issues may require close proximity of staffs or use of 

liaisons. 

c. Based on the level of required support, airspace control personnel may be 

required to provide Service-specific controllers, ACS, liaisons, or trainers to support 

HN authorities. JFC and JFACC staff personnel need to ensure that an agreement is in 

place with the HN authorizing DOD personnel or equipment to provide air traffic 

services in sovereign HN airspaces. Joint force personnel may be required to use systems 

provided by the HN or other agencies. Joint force personnel may also be embedded with 

HN or other agency personnel to provide airspace control services. In these situations, 

training and certification for joint forces personnel or systems should be determined by 

the HN authority. Given that few organizations have the deployable airspace control 

personnel and systems, it should be expected that joint forces support airspace operations 

using Service ACSs. A combined FAA/Air Force system certification flight check is a 

unique capability often requested to certify HN radar or navigation aids that have been 

installed or returned to service. Note: Until acquisition of self-defense capable flight 

check aircraft, the JFACC may have to orchestrate special procedures (ground patrols in 

vicinity of approach path, escorts, night-only operations, etc.) to accomplish flight checks 

in hostile airspace. 

d. Setting the conditions and milestones for the relief of joint forces and the 

reestablishment of effective HN airspace control is crucial for successful phase V 

termination. HNs with limited capabilities may rely on joint forces for long-term 

airspace control functions and divert available resources to other higher priority HN

programs. In such situations, international, NGO, or contracted services may provide a 

bridging alternative to take airspace control functions from joint forces until the HN is 

prepared to accept them.

e. Risk is a fundamental consideration of airspace control. Joint doctrine recognizes 

the need for each Service and functional component to use the airspace with maximum 

availability consistent with the JFC acceptable level of risk. The JFC’s acceptable level 

of risk for all airspace users (including fires) should be clearly delineated in the 

ACP. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the JFACC develops the AOD to establish the 

prioritization of operations which may restrict airspace. During all phases the assumption 

of risk is a command decision. Definitions of high, moderate, and low risk vary from 

theater to theater based on commander’s guidance. In general terms, high risk prioritizes 

mission accomplishment over the preservation of resources; medium risk seeks to 

balance mission accomplishment with potential resource losses and may require slight 

mission adjustments to achieve desired objectives; and low risk prioritizes the 

preservation of resources and may require substantial mission adjustments to achieve 

desired objectives. As the volume of airspace users increases, control should be 
Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 3-52 

enhanced to keep the level of risk acceptable to the JFC. The ACP should specify areas 

where high volumes of airspace users are projected and plan for increased control 

capability. If an enhanced control capability is not an option then commanders should 

understand they are accepting a higher risk of mid-air collisions and fratricide with 

indirect fires, manned systems, and UA. Commanders may accept different levels of risk 

based on the systems involved. For example, a commander may direct that a higher level 

of risk be accepted for possible fratricide between indirect fires and some or all UA than 

between indirect fires and manned aircraft.
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS 

1. Purpose 

This appendix provides an example of the topics that should be considered when 

developing an ACP. 

2. Airspace Control Plan Topics 

Every ACP will be different and must be based on the objectives of the military 

operations, the capabilities and limitations of both friendly and enemy forces, and the 

contributions and complexities introduced by HN and multinational forces, as well as the 

access required to the airspace by nonbelligerent aircraft. ACP topics include: 

a. Description of the conditions under which the guidance and procedures in the 

ACP are applicable (e.g., the exercise, OPLAN, OPORD, military operation). 

b. Description of the operational area within which the ACP applies. 

c. Appointment of the ACA; location of ACA headquarters (HQ) (if required). 

d. List of the capabilities that exist within the joint force and in the operational area 

and that provide airspace control (ground sites, airborne capability) and the means of 

communicating with those airspace control elements. 

e. Description of the duties and responsibilities of: 

(1) The ACA. 

(2) Each airspace user within the joint force (to include requirements for liaison 

to and coordination with the ACA). 

(3) Each element used in the ACS (site, facility, or airborne platform) and 

agency specific duties. The plan should delineate whether the agency provides 

procedural or positive control and its assigned sector. 

f. Description of the interface between commanders and coordination elements and 

the procedures adopted to integrate the ACP with the AADP and deconflict or 

synchronize airspace requirements for DCA operations and other joint operations. 

g. Description of the interface with the FAA, HN ATC system, and/or ICAO. 

h. Description of the interface among the theater air control system(s) and the 

elements within those systems for ATC. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-52 

i. If operations include forces from other nations, description of the interfaces 

between US and multinational forces to coordinate and deconflict airspace requirements. 

 j. Plans to provide for continuity of airspace control operations under degraded conditions 

(alternate HQ, alternatives for key radar or C2 nodes, and other required capabilities). 

 k. Description of the AOD mission and airspace priorities. 

 l. Description of ACMs and procedures for the joint force. 

m. Description of the procedures to propose, approve, modify, and promulgate each 

procedural ACM available for use within the operational area (i.e., HIDACZ, JEZ, FEZ, 

MEZ, MRR, CA, air refueling tracks, corridors, ROZs, and other appropriate procedures). 

n. Description of IFF/SIF procedures. 

o. Description of orbit procedures with retrograde plans. 

p. Description of procedures and systems to compile and promulgate the ACO that 

provides airspace control procedures and/or guidance in effect for a specified time period. 

The ACO would normally contain: 

(1) Modifications to guidance and/or procedures contained in the ACP. 

(2) Active or current IFF/SIF procedures. 

(3) Location and procedures associated with active procedural ACMs (HIDACZ, 

JEZ, FEZ, MEZ, MRR, CA, corridors, ROZs, and other appropriate procedures). 

(4) Procedures for entering and transiting active ROZs (e.g., AOA). 

(5) Location of active orbit areas. 

(6) Active UA launch, recovery, and mission areas. 

(7) Launch and impact ROZs for surface-to-surface missiles. 

(8) FSCMs, both restrictive and permissive (e.g., FSCLs, no-fire areas, 

restrictive-fire areas, free-fire areas). 

(9) Applicable ground force control measures (e.g., battle positions, 

engagement areas, air axes of advance). 

q. Description of the interface with agencies/commands providing intertheater air 

mobility support for the purpose of coordinating and distributing airspace control 

information/procedures. 
B-1 

APPENDIX B 

AIRSPACE COORDINATING AND FIRE SUPPORT 

COORDINATION MEASURES

United States message text format (USMTF) organizes ACMs into a set of broad 

categories called TYPES. Each type includes a subset of control measures called 

USAGES. The USMTF TYPES: air defense area, air defense operations area, air traffic 

control (ATC), air corridor/route, procedural control, reference point, restricted 

operations zone (ROZ), special use airspace.

 Annex A Airspace Coordinating Measure Request Representative Format

 B Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-52 

Intentionally Blank
B-A-1 

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B 

AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURE REQUEST 

REPRESENTATIVE FORMAT 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Request for Airspace 

 (A) Airspace Coordinating Measure Requested 

 (B) Location (Latitude/Longitude) 

 (C) Altitude(s) 

 (D) Valid/Void Times (normally ZULU) 

 (E) Type Aircraft/Mission 

 (F) Controlling Agency 

 (G) Comments 

NOTE: This format is representative of the appropriate USMTF. Refer to Military 

Standard (MIL-STD)-6040, US Message Text Formatting Program, and associated 

directives for detailed instructions. 
Annex A to Appendix B 

B-A-2 JP 3-52 

Intentionally Blank 
B-B-1 

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX B 

AIRSPACE COORDINATING AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION 

MEASURES

1. Definitions

The definition and descriptions of airspace coordinating and fire support 

coordination measures are presented in Figure B-B-1. ACMs are measures employed to 

facilitate the efficient use of airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide 

safeguards for friendly forces. ACMs are organized into a set of broad categories called 

TYPES. Each type includes a subset of control measures called USAGES. The ACM 

TYPES (with United States Message Test Format [USMTF] abbreviations and number of 

associated usages) are:

 a. Air Defense Area (ADAREA). An area and the airspace above it within 

procedures are established to minimize mutual interference between air and ground 

based/Army air defense and other operations. 

 b. Air Defense Operations Area (ADOA). An area and airspace above it within 

which procedures are established to minimize mutual interference between maritime and 

amphibious air defense operations. 

 c. Air Traffic Control (ATC). Airspace of defined dimension within which air 

traffic control service is provided to IFR and VFR flights in accordance with civil air 

traffic control regulations.

 d. Air Corridor/Route (CORRTE). A bi-directional or restricted air route of travel 

specified for use by aircraft.

 e. Procedural Control (PROC). An airspace coordinating measure that defines 

airspace dimensions for enabling other systems (e.g., fire support systems) to 

discriminate: friendly coordination joint engagement measures from enemy, employ fires 

across boundaries, coordinate joint engagement of targets for a particular operation, or to 

delineate an airspace boundary.

 f. Reference Point (REFPT). A point or set of coordinates generally used for control 

purposes or to indicate a reference position. 

 g. Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ). Airspace reserved for specific activities in 

which the operation of one or more airspace uses is restricted. 

 h. Special Use Airspace (SUA). Airspace defined for a specific purpose; or to 

designate airspace in which no flight activity is organized. 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-2 JP 3-52 

2. Figure

AIRSPACE AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES

AIR DEFENSE AREA (ADAREA)

(Mapped Usages)

Air Defense Identification Zone ADIZ

Base Defense Zone BDZ

Buffer Zone BZ

High-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone HIMEZ

High-Density Airspace Control Zone HIDACZ

Joint Engagement Zone JEZ

Joint Operations Area JOA

Land Fighter Engagement Zone (LFEZ is the USTMF 

used for Fighter Engagement Zone [FEZ])

LFEZ

Land Missile Engagement Zone LMEZ

Low-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone LOMEZ

Short-Range Air Defense Engagement Zone SHORAD

Weapons Free Zone WFZ

AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS AREA (ADOA)

(Mapped Usages)

Air Defense Action Area ADAA

Amphibious Defense Zone ADZ

Amphibious Objective Area AOA

Approach Corridor APPCOR

Battlefield Coordination Line BCL

Coordinated Air Defense Area CADA

Carrier Control Zone CCZONE

Crossover Zone COZ

Fleet Air Defense Identification Zone (USMTF positive 

identification radar advisory zone [PIRAZ])

FADIZ 

Fire-Power Umbrella FIRUB

Identification Safety Range ISR

Maritime Fighter Engagement Zone MFEZ

Missile Arc MISARC

Maritime Missile Engagement Zone MMEZ

Return to Force RTF

Safe Sector (USMTF Safety Sector) SAFES

Ship Control Zone SCZ

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC)

(Mapped Usages)

Advisory Route ADVRTE

Airway ARWY

Air Traffic Service Route ATSRTE

Conditional Route CDR
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-3 

Class-A Airspace CLSA

Class-B Airspace CLSB

Class-C Airspace CLSC

Class-D Airspace CLSD

Class-E Airspace CLSE

Class-F Airspace CLSF

Class-G Airspace CLSG

Control Zone CONTZN

Cross Border Area CBA (NATO)

Control Area CTA

Danger Area DA

Flight Information Region FIR

Area Navigation Route NAVRTE

Prohibited Area PROHIB

Reduced Coordination Area RCA (NATO)

Restricted Area RA

Temporary Segregated Area TSA

Terminal Control Area TCA

Terminal Radar Service Area TRSA

Warning Area WARN

AIR CORRIDOR/ROUTE (CORRTE)

(Mapped Usages)

Air Corridor AIRCOR

Air Route AIRRTE

Minimum Risk Route MRR

Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Route SAAFR

Special Corridor SC

Safe Lane SL

Transit Corridor TC

Temporary Minimum Risk Route TMRR

Transit Route TR

PROCEDURAL CONTROL (PROC)

(Mapped Usages)

Airspace Coordination Area ACA

Altitude Reservation ALTRV

Boundary BNDRY

Coordinated Fire Line CFL

Coordinating Altitude (USMTF uses Coordination 

Level)

CA (CL)

Forward Edge of the Battle Area FEBA

Free Fire Area FFA

Forward Line of Own Troops FLOT

Fire Support Coordination Line FSCL
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-4 JP 3-52 

Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Switch Off Line IFFOFF

IFF Switch On Line IFFON

Restrictive Fire Area RFA

Restrictive Fire Line RFL

Safe Area for Evasion SAFE

Traverse Level TL

REFERENCE POINT (REFPT)

(Mapped Usages)

Air Control Point ACP

Bulls-Eye BULL

Contact Point CP

Entry/Exit Gate EG

Hand Over Gate HG

Identification Safety Point ISP

Marshalling Gate MG

Search and Rescue Point SARDOT

RESTRICTED OPERATIONS ZONE (ROZ)

(Mapped Usages)

Air-to-Air Refueling Area AAR

Airborne Command and Control Area ABC

Airborne Early Warning Area AEW

Combat Air Patrol CAP

Close Air Support Holding Area CAS

Drop Zone DZ

Electronic Combat EC

Landing Zone LZ

Pickup Zone PZ

Reconnaissance Area RECCE

Restricted Operations Area ROA

Special Electronic Mission Area SEMA

Special Operations Forces (USMTF used for joint 

special operations area [JSOA])

SOF

Training Area TRNG

Unmanned Aircraft (USMTF uses UAV [unmanned 

aerial vehicle])

UA

SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE (SUA)

(Mapped Usages)

Airspace Control Subarea/Sector ACSS

Alert Area ALERTA

Airspace Control Area ASCA

Force Air Coordination Area FACA

Forward Arming and Refueling Point FARP

Kill Box KILLB

Military Operations Area MOA
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-5 

No Fly Area NOFLY

No Fire Area NFA

Surface-to-Surface Missile System SSMS

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

Advisory Route 

(ADVRTE)

A designated route along 

which air traffic advisory 

service is available

Air-to-Air Refueling 

Area (AAR)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions set aside for airto-air refueling operations.

AAR tracks are typically set up 

in a race track configuration.

Airborne Command 

and Control Area 

(ABC)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions established 

specifically for aircraft 

conducting battlefield 

command and control. 

Airborne Early 

Warning Area 

(AEW)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions established 

specifically for aircraft 

conducting early warning. 

Air Control Point 

(ACP)

A point that is defined and 

used for navigation, 

command and control, and 

communication. 

Unmanned aircraft system 

(UAS) routing is normally 

accomplished through existing 

air control points.

Air Corridor 

(AIRCOR)

A restricted air route of travel 

specified for use by friendly 

aircraft and established for 

the purpose of preventing 

friendly aircraft from being 

fired on by friendly forces. 

Air corridor procedures are 

used to route aviation combat 

elements between such areas 

as forward arming and 

refueling points, holding areas, 

and battle positions. Altitudes 

of and air corridor do not 

exceed the coordinating 

altitude, if established.

If a coordinating altitude has 

been established, an air 

corridor is implemented by the 

using authority. If a 

coordinating altitude has not 

been established, an air 

corridor is established by the 

airspace control authority 

(ACA) at the request of the

appropriate ground 

commander.

Air Defense Action 

Area (ADAA)

An area and the airspace 

above it within which friendly 

aircraft or surface-to-air 

weapons are normally given 

precedence in operations 

except under specified 

conditions. 

An ADAA is used for 

preference of a specific 

weapon system over another 

without excluding the other 

from use under certain 

operational conditions. From 

an airspace control 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-6 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

perspective, it provides 

airspace users with the 

location of air defense areas 

for mission planning purposes.

Air Defense 

Identification Zone 

(ADIZ)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions within which the 

ready identification, location, 

and control of airborne 

vehicles are required. 

Associated with nations or 

areas of operation, the ADIZ is 

normally the transition between 

procedural control areas 

(outside) and the positive 

control areas (inside). 

Typically, ADIZ is used for 

sovereign national boundaries, 

or in the case of areas of 

operations, for identification in 

the rear areas.

See flight information 

publications/International Civil 

Aviation Organization for 

theater-specific ADIZ and 

associated procedures and 

limitations.

Airspace Control 

Area (ASCA)

Airspace that is laterally 

defined by the boundaries of 

the area of operations. The 

airspace control area may 

be subdivided into airspace 

control subareas. (AAP-6)

Airspace control areas are a 

means of planning or dividing 

responsibility.

Geographically defined, an 

airspace control area may 

include political boundaries.

Air Route (AIRRTE) The navigable airspace 

between two points, 

identified to the extent 

necessary for the application 

of flight rules. 

Established to route 

nonoperational and operational 

support traffic through air 

defenses.

Airspace Control 

Subarea/Sector 

(ACSS)

A subelement of the 

airspace control area, 

established to facilitate the 

control of the overall area. 

Airspace control sector 

boundaries normally 

coincide with air defense 

organization subdivision 

boundaries. Airspace 

control sectors are 

designated in accordance 

with procedures and 

guidance contained in the 

airspace control plan in 

consideration of Service 

component, host-nation, and 

multinational airspace 

control capabilities and 

An airspace control sector 

provides airspace control of an 

area by a component or other 

airspace control-capable entity 

best able to provide control in 

that geographic area.

An airspace control sector 

interface with the airspace 

control system needs to be 

developed. 

Airspace control sectors are 

designated by the ACA in 

consideration of joint force 

component, host-nation, and 

multinational airspace control 

capabilities and requirements.
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-7 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

requirements. 

Airspace 

Coordination Area 

(ACA)

A three-dimensional block of 

airspace in a target area, 

established by the 

appropriate ground 

commander, in which 

friendly aircraft are 

reasonably safe from friendly 

surface fires. The airspace 

coordination area may be 

formal or informal. 

An airspace coordination area 

is used primarily in close air 

support situations for highvolume fire. Friendly aircraft 

are reasonably free from 

friendly surface fires, with 

artillery, helicopters, and fixedwinged aircraft given specific 

lateral or vertical airspace 

within which to operate.

Timely implementation of the 

area is dependent on the 

ground situation. Burden of 

deconfliction rests with the 

ground commander.

It is established by the 

appropriate ground 

commander.

Air Traffic Service 

Route (ATSRTE)

A specified route designed 

for channeling the flow of 

traffic as necessary for the 

provision of air traffic 

services.

Airway (ARWY) A control area or portion 

thereof established in the 

form of a corridor equipped 

with radio navigational aids. 

Alert Area (ALERTA) Airspace that may contain a 

high volume of pilot training 

activities or an unusual type 

of aerial activity, neither of 

which is hazardous to 

aircraft.

Altitude Reservation

(ALTRV)

A block of altitude reserved 

for aircraft to transit or loiter. 

Amphibious Defense 

Zone (ADZ)

An area encompassing the 

amphibious objective area 

and adjoining airspace as 

required for the 

accompanying naval forces 

for the purpose of air 

defense.

An ADZ provides an anti-air 

warfare area for protection of 

the amphibious task force. If 

an amphibious defense zone 

overlaps other land-based air 

defense areas, appropriate 

coordination for division of 

responsibilities and boundaries 

must be conducted.

Amphibious 

Objective Area 

(AOA)

A geographical area 

(delineated for command 

and control purposes in the 

initiating directive) within 

It allows the Commander, 

Amphibious Task Force, 

freedom of air operations 

within the AOA.
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-8 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

which is located the 

objective(s) to be secured by 

the amphibious force. This 

area must be of sufficient 

size to ensure 

accomplishment of the 

amphibious force’s mission 

and must provide sufficient 

area for conducting 

necessary sea, air, and land 

operations.

Coordination with nonorganic 

aircraft for entry into and exit 

from the AOA, and 

deconfliction within the AOA 

with operations just outside the 

AOA normally requires the 

continuous, active involvement 

of the affected commanders 

and staffs.

Approach Corridor 

(APPCOR)

Airspace established for the 

safe passage of land-based 

aircraft joining or departing a 

maritime force. 

Area Navigation 

Route (NAVRTE)

An air traffic services route 

established for the use of 

aircraft capable of employing 

area navigation.

Base Defense Zone

(BDZ)

An air defense zone 

established around an air 

base and limited to the 

engagement envelope of 

short-range air defense 

weapons systems defending 

that base. Base defense 

zones have specific entry, 

exit, and identification, friend 

or foe, procedures 

established. 

A zone established around 

airbases to enhance the 

effectiveness of local 

ground-based air defense 

systems. 

A BDZ provides airspace users 

with location of the 

engagement zone for the air 

defense systems defending a

base for mission planning 

purposes.

Battlefield 

Coordination Line 

(BCL)

A supplementary measure, 

which facilitates the 

expeditious attack of surface 

targets of opportunity 

between the measure (the 

BCL) and the fire support 

coordination line.

Boundary (BNDRY) A line that delineates surface 

areas for the purpose of 

facilitating coordination and 

deconfliction of operations 

between adjacent units, 

formations, or areas.

In land warfare, a line by 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-9 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

which areas of responsibility 

between adjacent units 

and/or formations are 

defined (AAP-6). 

Buffer Zone (BZ) Airspace designed 

specifically to provide a 

buffer between various 

airspace coordinating 

measures. 

Bulls-Eye (BULL) An established reference 

point from which the position 

of an object can be 

referenced.

Carrier Control Zone 

(CCZONE)

The airspace within a 

circular limit defined by 5 

miles horizontal radius from 

the carrier, extending 

upward from the surface to 

and including 2,500 feet 

unless otherwise designated 

for special operations, and is 

under the cognizance of the 

air officer during visual 

meteorological conditions. 

Class-A Airspace 

(CLSA)

Generally, airspace from 

18,000 feet mean sea level 

(MSL) up to and including 

flight level 600, including 

airspace overlying the 

waters within12 nautical 

miles of the contiguous 

states and Alaska. Visual 

Flight Rules (VFR) 

operations are not permitted 

in Class A airspace. 

This definition is based on 

classification of airspace within 

the US. Airspace classification 

may vary by specific location. 

Airmen and airspace planners 

should refer to the appropriate 

flight information publication 

(FLIP) and notices to airmen 

(NOTAMs), etc., for detailed 

information and international 

airspace requirements. 

Class-B Airspace 

(CLSB)

Generally, airspace from the 

surface to 10,000 feet MSL 

surrounding the nation’s 

busiest airports in terms of 

airport operations or 

passenger enplanements. 

ATC provides separation 

between all aircraft inside 

Class B airspace. 

This definition is based on 

classification of airspace within 

the US. Airspace classification 

may vary by specific location. 

Airmen and airspace planners 

should refer to the appropriate 

FLIP and NOTAMs, etc., for 

detailed information and 

international airspace 

requirements. 

Class-C Airspace 

(CLSC)

Generally, airspace from the 

surface to 4,000 feet above 

the airport elevation (charted 

in MSL) surrounding those 

airports that have an 

operational control tower, 

This definition is based on 

classification of airspace within 

the US. Airspace classification 

may vary by specific location. 

Airmen and airspace planners 

should refer to the appropriate 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-10 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

are serviced by radar 

approach control, and have 

a certain number of 

instrument flight rules (IFR) 

operations or passenger 

enplanements. ATC 

provides separation between 

VFR and IFR inside Class C 

airspace. 

FLIP and NOTAMs, etc., for 

detailed information and 

international airspace 

requirements. 

Class-D Airspace 

(CLSD)

Generally, airspace from the 

surface to 2,500 feet above 

the airport elevation (charted 

in MSL) surrounding those 

airports that have an 

operational control tower. 

The configuration of each 

Class D airspace is 

individually tailored and 

when instrument procedures 

are published, the airspace 

will normally be designated 

to contain the procedures. 

Prior to entering Class D 

airspace, two-way radio 

communication must be 

established and maintained 

with the ATC facility 

providing air traffic service.

This definition is based on 

classification of airspace within 

the US. Airspace classification 

may vary by specific location. 

Airmen and airspace planners 

should refer to the appropriate 

FLIP and NOTAMs, etc., for 

detailed information and 

international airspace 

requirements. 

Class-E Airspace 

(CLSE)

Generally, if the airspace is 

not Class A, B, C, or D, and 

it is controlled airspace, it is 

Class E airspace. Also 

includes federal airways. 

This definition is based on 

classification of airspace within 

the US. Airspace classification 

may vary by specific location. 

Airmen and airspace planners 

should refer to the appropriate 

FLIP and NOTAMs, etc., for 

detailed information and 

international airspace 

requirements. 

Class-F Airspace 

(CLSF)

Airspace in which instrument 

flight rules (IFR) and visual 

flight rules flights are 

permitted; all participating 

IFR flights receive an air 

traffic advisory service, and 

all flights receive flight 

information service if 

requested.

This classification of airspace 

is not used within the US 

(FAAO JO 7400.9T). Airspace 

classification may vary by 

specific location. Airmen and 

airspace planners should refer 

to the appropriate FLIP and 

NOTAMs, etc., for detailed 

information and international 

airspace requirements. 

Class-G Airspace 

(CLSG)

Airspace not assigned as A, 

B, C, D, or E is uncontrolled 

airspace and is designated 

as Class G airspace. 

This definition is based on 

classification of airspace within 

the US. Airspace classification 

may vary by specific location. 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-11 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

Airmen and airspace planners 

should refer to the appropriate 

FLIP and NOTAMs, etc., for 

detailed information and 

international airspace 

requirements. 

Close Air Support 

Holding Area (CAS)

Airspace designated for 

holding orbits and used by 

rotary-and fixed-wing aircraft 

that are in close proximity to 

friendly forces. 

Combat Air Patrol 

(CAP)

An aircraft patrol provided 

over an objective area, the 

force protected, the critical 

area of a combat zone, or in 

an air defense area, for the 

purpose of intercepting and 

destroying hostile aircraft 

before they reach their 

targets. 

An anti-air warfare activity 

conducted in support of air 

operations. 

Conditional Route 

(CDR)

A non-permanent air traffic 

service route or portion 

thereof that can be planned 

and used only under certain 

conditions.

Contact Point (CP) In air operations, the position 

at which a mission leader 

makes radio contact with an 

air control agency. 

Control Area (CTA) A controlled airspace 

extending upward from a 

specified limit above the 

Earth. (AAP-6)

Control Zone 

(CONTZN)

A controlled airspace 

extending upward from the 

surface of the Earth to a 

specified upper limit. (AAP6)

Coordinated Air 

Defense Area 

(CADA)

A mutually defined block of 

airspace between a landbased air commander and a 

naval commander when their 

forces are operating in close 

proximity to one another. 

(AJP-3.3.5)

Coordinated Fire 

Line (CFL)

A line beyond which 

conventional and indirect 

surface fire support means 

may fire at any time within 

the boundaries of the 

establishing headquarters 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-12 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

without additional 

coordination. The purpose 

of the coordinated fire line is 

to expedite the surface-tosurface attack of targets 

beyond the coordinated fire 

line without coordination with 

the ground commander in 

whose area the targets are 

located.

A line beyond which 

conventional or improved 

indirect fire means, such as 

mortars, field artillery, and 

naval surface fire may fire 

without additional 

coordination. (AJP-3.3.5)

Coordinating Altitude 

(CA)

An airspace coordinating 

measure that uses altitude to 

separate users as the 

transition between different 

airspace coordinating 

entities.

The airspace coordinating 

entities should be included in 

the ACP and promulgated in 

the ACO. Army echelons 

incorporate ACP guidance and 

integrate the ACO, AADP, 

SPINS, and ATO via 

operations orders. All airspace 

users should coordinate with 

the appropriate airspace 

coordinating entities when 

transitioning through or firing 

through the coordinating 

altitude. 

Coordination Level 

(CL)

A procedural method to 

separate fixed- and rotarywing aircraft by determining 

an altitude below which 

fixed-wing aircraft normally 

will not fly.

Cross Border Area 

(CBA) (NATO)

A temporary segregated 

area established over 

international boundaries for 

specific operational 

requirements. 

Crossover Zone

(COZ)

Airspace beyond the missile 

engagement zone into which 

fighters may pursue targets 

to complete interception. 

Danger Area (DA) In air traffic control, an 

airspace of defined 

dimensions within which 

activities dangerous to the 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-13 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

flight of aircraft may exist at 

specified times.

Drop Zone (DZ) A specific area upon which 

airborne troops, equipment, 

or supplies are airdropped. 

Electronic Combat 

(EC) 

Airspace established 

specifically for aircraft 

engaging in electronic 

combat.

Entry/Exit Gate (EG) The point to which an aircraft 

will be directed to 

commence the transit 

inbound/outbound from an 

airfield or force at sea. 

Fighter Engagement 

Zone (FEZ) (USMTF 

Land Fighter 

Engagement Zone 

[LFEZ])

In air defense, that airspace 

of defined dimensions within 

which the responsibility for 

engagement of air threats 

normally rests with fighter 

aircraft. 

NOTE: To ensure the 

operational utility of a FEZ, 

input a LFEZ into a USMTF 

system. USMTF does not 

recognize the term FEZ.

These operations usually take 

place in airspace above and 

beyond the engagement 

ranges of surface-based (land 

and sea), short-range air 

defense systems, and are an 

alternative type of engagement 

operation if the detailed control 

aspects of joint engagement 

operations cannot be met.

A FEZ normally is used when 

fighter aircraft have the clear 

operational advantage over 

surface-based systems. These 

advantages could include 

range, density of fire, rules of 

engagement, or coordination 

requirements. From an 

airspace control perspective, it 

provides airspace users with 

location of the engagement 

zone for fighter aircraft for 

mission planning purposes.

Coordination and flexibility 

within the combat airspace 

control system may be a 

limiting factor. Under FEZ 

operations, surface-to-air 

missile systems will not be 

allowed to fire weapons unless 

targets are positively identified 

as hostile and assigned by 

higher authority, or unless they 

are firing in self defense.

Fire-Power Umbrella An area of specified 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-14 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

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DEFINITION/

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USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

(FIRUB) dimensions defining the 

boundaries of the airspace 

over a naval force at sea 

within which the fire of ships’ 

anti-aircraft weapons can 

endanger aircraft, and within 

which special procedures 

have been established for 

the identification and 

operation of friendly aircraft.

Fire Support 

Coordination Line 

(FSCL)

A fire support coordination 

measure that is established 

and adjusted by appropriate 

land or amphibious force 

commanders within their 

boundaries in consultation 

with superior, subordinate, 

supporting, and affected 

commanders. Fire support 

coordination lines facilitate 

the expeditious attack of 

surface targets of 

opportunity beyond the 

coordinating measure. A fire 

support coordination line 

does not divide an area of 

operations by defining a 

boundary between close and 

deep operations or a zone 

for close air support. The 

fire support coordination line 

applies to all fires of air, 

land, and sea-based weapon 

systems using any type of 

ammunition. Forces 

attacking targets beyond a 

fire support coordination line 

must inform all affected 

commanders in sufficient 

time to allow necessary 

reaction to avoid fratricide. 

Supporting elements 

attacking targets beyond the 

fire support coordination line 

must ensure that the attack 

will not produce adverse 

effects on, or to the rear of, 

the line. Short of a fire 

support coordination line, all 

air-to-ground and surface-tosurface attack operations 

are controlled by the 

appropriate land or 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-15 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

amphibious force 

commander. The fire 

support coordination line 

should follow well-defined 

terrain features. 

Coordination of attacks 

beyond the fire support 

coordination line is 

especially critical to 

commanders of air, land, 

and special operations 

forces. In exceptional 

circumstances, the inability 

to conduct this coordination 

will not preclude the attack 

of targets beyond the fire 

support coordination line. 

However, failure to do so 

may increase the risk of 

fratricide and could waste 

limited resources.

Within an assigned area of 

operations, a line 

established by a land or 

amphibious force 

commander to denote 

coordination requirements 

for fires by other force 

elements that may affect the 

commander's current and 

planned operations. The fire 

support coordination line 

applies to fires of air, 

ground, or sea weapons 

using any type of 

ammunition against surface 

or ground targets. The 

establishment of the fire 

support coordination line 

must be coordinated with the 

appropriate commanders 

and supporting elements. 

Attacks against surface or 

ground targets short of the 

fire support coordination line 

must be conducted under 

the positive control or 

procedural clearance of the 

associated land or 

amphibious force 

commander. Unless in 

exceptional circumstances, 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-16 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

commanders of forces 

attacking targets beyond the 

fire support coordination line 

must coordinate with all 

affected commanders in 

order to avoid fratricide and 

to harmonize joint 

objectives. Note: In the 

context of this definition the 

term "surface targets" 

applies to those in littoral or 

inland waters within the 

designated area of 

operations. (AAP-6)

Boundary used to coordinate 

fires of air, ground, or sea 

weapon systems against 

surface targets. (AJP-3.3.5)

Fleet Air Defense 

Identification Zone 

(FADIZ) (USMTF 

refers to this as a 

positive identification 

radar advisory zone 

[PIRAZ])

A specified area established 

for identification and flight 

following of aircraft in the 

vicinity of a fleet-defended 

area.

A FADIZ provides tracking, 

control, and assistance to 

friendly aircraft within the 

antiair of the battle group.

Flight Information 

Region (FIR)

An airspace of defined 

dimensions within which 

flight information service and 

alerting service are provided.

Forward Arming and 

Refueling Point 

(FARP)

A temporary facility —

organized, equipped, and 

deployed by an aviation 

commander, and normally 

located in the main battle 

area closer to the area 

where operations are being 

conducted than the aviation 

unit’s combat service area 

— to provide fuel and 

ammunition necessary for 

the employment of aviation 

maneuver units in combat. 

The forward arming and 

refueling point permits 

combat aircraft to rapidly 

refuel and rearm 

simultaneously.

Forward Edge of the 

Battle Area (FEBA)

The foremost limits of a 

series of areas in which 

ground combat units are 

deployed, excluding the 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-17 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

areas in which the covering 

or screening forces are 

operating, designed to 

coordinate fire support, the 

positioning of forces, or the 

maneuver of units.

Forward Line of Own

Troops (FLOT)

A line that indicates the most 

forward positions of friendly 

forces in any kind of military 

operation at a specific time. 

The forward line of own 

troops normally identifies the 

forward location covering 

screening forces. The 

forward line of own troops 

may be at, beyond, or short 

of the forward edge of the 

battle area. An enemy 

forward line of own troops 

indicates the forward-most 

position of hostile forces. 

A line that indicates the most 

forward positions of friendly 

forces in any kind of military 

operation at a specific time. 

(AAP-6)

Free Fire Area (FFA) A specific area into which 

any weapon system may fire 

without additional 

coordination with the 

establishing headquarters. 

Hand-Over Gate

(HG)

The point at which the 

control of the aircraft, if radar 

hand-over is used, changes 

from one controller to 

another. 

High-Altitude Missile 

Engagement Zone 

(HIMEZ)

In air defense, that 

airspace of defined 

dimensions within which 

the responsibility for 

engagement of air threats 

normally rests with highaltitude surface-to-air 

missiles. 

HIMEZ normally is used when 

a high-altitude missile system 

has a clear operational 

advantage over using aircraft. 

These advantages could 

include range, command and 

control, rules of engagement, 

or response time. It provides 

airspace users with location of 

the engagement zone of a 

high-altitude missile system for 

mission planning purposes. 

Design of the HIMEZ is 

contingent on specific weapon 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-18 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

system capabilities.

High-Density 

Airspace Control 

Zone (HIDACZ)

Airspace designated in an 

airspace control plan or 

airspace control order, in 

which there is a 

concentrated employment of 

numerous and varied 

weapons and airspace 

users. A high density 

airspace control zone has 

defined dimensions, which 

usually coincide with

geographical features of 

navigational aids. Access to 

a high density airspace 

control zone is normally 

controlled by the maneuver 

commander. The maneuver 

commander can also direct a 

more restrictive weapons 

status within the high density 

airspace control zone. 

Airspace of defined 

dimensions, designated by 

the airspace control 

authority, in which there is a 

concentrated employment of 

numerous and varied 

weapons/airspace users. 

(AAP-6)

HIDACZ allows ground/Marine 

air-ground task force 

commanders to restrict a 

volume of airspace from users 

not involved with ongoing 

operations. It restricts use of 

the airspace because of the 

large volume and density of 

fires supporting the fround 

operations within the described 

geographic area.

The volume of air traffic 

demands careful coordination 

to limit the potential conflict 

among aircraft needed for 

mission essential operations 

within the HIDACZ and other 

airspace users. When 

establishing a HIDACZ, 

consider the following:

(1) Minimum-risk routes 

(MRR) into and out of the 

HIDACZ and to the target area.

(2) Air traffic advisory as 

required. Procedures and 

systems also must be 

considered for air traffic control 

(ATC) service during 

instrument meteorological 

conditions.

(3) Procedures for expeditious 

movement of aircraft into and 

out of the HIDACZ.

(4) Coordination of fire 

support, as well as air defense 

weapons control orders or 

status within and in the vicinity 

of the HIDACZ.

(5) Location of enemy forces 

inside of and within close 

proximity to the HIDACZ. 

HIDACZ is nominated by the 

ground commander and 

approved by the ACA.
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-19 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

Identification Safety 

Point (ISP)

A point at which aircraft, on 

joining a maritime force, will 

attempt to establish two-way 

communications with the 

surface force and 

commence identification 

procedures. 

Identification Safety 

Range (ISR)

The minimum range to which 

aircraft may close to a 

maritime force without 

having been positively 

identified as friendly to 

ensure that the task 

force/task group does not 

mistake the aircraft for 

hostile. 

Identification, Friend 

or Foe (IFF) Switch 

Off Line (IFFOFF)

The line demarking where 

friendly aircraft stop emitting 

an IFF signal. 

IFF Switch On Line 

(IFFON)

The line demarking where 

friendly aircraft start emitting 

an IFF signal. 

Joint Engagement 

Zone (JEZ)

In air defense, that airspace 

of defined dimensions within 

which multiple air defense 

systems (surface-to-air 

missiles and aircraft) are 

simultaneously employed to 

engage air threats. 

A JEZ provides airspace user 

with a location for mission

planning purposes.

JEZs are highly dependent on 

correct differentiation between 

friendly, neutral, and enemy 

aircraft.

Joint Operations 

Area (JOA)

Area of land, sea, and 

airspace, defined by a 

geographic combatant 

commander or subordinate 

unified commander, in which 

a joint force commander 

(usually a joint task force 

commander) conducts 

military operations to 

accomplish a specific 

mission.

A temporary area defined by 

the Supreme Allied 

Commander Europe, in 

which a designated joint 

commander plans and 

executes a specific mission 

at the operational level of 

war. A joint operations area 

and its defining parameters, 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-20 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

such as time, scope of the 

mission, and geographical 

area, are contingency- or 

mission-specific and are 

normally associated with 

combined joint task force 

operations. (AAP-6)

Joint Special 

Operations Area

(JSOA)

An area of land, sea, and 

airspace assigned by a joint 

force commander to the 

commander of a joint special 

operations force to conduct 

special operations activities. 

It may be limited in size to 

accommodate a discrete 

direct action mission or may 

be extensive enough to 

allow a continuing broad 

range of unconventional 

warfare operations. 

NOTE: To obtain the 

operational utility of a JSOA, 

input SOF into a USMTF 

system as USMTF does not 

recognize JSOA.

Kill Box (KILLBX) A kill box is a threedimensional area used to 

facilitate the integration of 

joint fires.

Landing Zone (LZ) Any specified zone used for 

the landing of aircraft.

Land Missile 

Engagement Zone 

(LMEZ)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions within which 

responsibility for 

engagement of air threats

normally rests with surface 

based air defense system.

Low-Altitude Missile 

Engagement Zone 

(LOMEZ)

In air defense, that airspace 

of defined dimensions within 

which the responsibility for 

engagement of air threats 

normally rests with low-tomedium-altitude surface-toair missiles.

LOMEZs provide airspace 

users with the location of the 

engagement zone of lowaltitude missile systems for 

mission planning purposes.

The design of the LOMEZ is 

contingent on specific weapon 

system capabilities.

Maritime Fighter 

Engagement Zone 

(MFEZ)

The airspace beyond the 

crossover zone out to limits 

defined by the officer in 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-21 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

tactical command, in which 

fighters have freedom of 

action to identity and engage 

air targets. 

Maritime Missile 

Engagement Zone 

(MMEZ)

A designated airspace in 

which, under weapons 

control status “weapons 

free,” ships are automatically 

cleared to fire at any target 

which penetrates the zone, 

unless known to be friendly, 

adhering to airspace control 

procedures or unless 

otherwise directed by the 

anti-warfare commander. 

Marshalling Gate 

(MG)

A point to which aircraft fly 

for air traffic control 

purposes prior to 

commencing an outbound 

transit after takeoff or prior to 

landing. 

Military Operations 

Area (MOA)

Airspace designated outside 

Class A airspace area to 

separate or segregate 

certain non-hazardous 

military from IFR traffic and 

to identify for visual flight 

rules (VFR) traffic where 

these activities are 

conducted. 

Minimum-Risk Route 

(MRR)

A temporary corridor of 

defined dimensions 

recommended for use by 

high-speed, fixed-wing 

aircraft that presents the 

minimum known hazards to 

low-flying aircraft transiting 

the combat zone. 

MRRs are used primarily for 

cross-forward line of own 

troops operations. Close air 

support aircraft do not usually 

use MRRs in the vicinity of the 

target area.

MRRs are established based 

on known threats.

Missile Arc 

(MISARC)

An area of 10 degrees or as 

large as ordered by the 

officer in tactical command, 

centered on the bearing of 

the target with a range that 

extends to the maximum 

range of the surface-to-air 

missile.

No Fire Area (NFA) An area designated by the 

appropriate commander into 

which fires or their effects 

are prohibited. 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-22 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

No Fly Area 

(NOFLY)

Airspace of specific 

dimensions set aside for a 

specific purpose in which no 

aircraft operations are 

permitted, except as 

authorized by the 

appropriate commander and 

controlling agency. 

Pickup Zone (PZ) Aerial retrieval area. 

Prohibited Area 

(PROHIB)

A specified area within the 

land areas of a state or its 

internal waters, archipelagic 

waters, or territorial sea 

adjacent thereto over which 

the flight of aircraft is 

prohibited. May also refer to 

land or sea areas to which 

access is prohibited. 

Reconnaissance 

Area (RECCE)

Airspace established 

specifically for aircraft 

conducting reconnaissance. 

Reduced 

Coordination Area 

(RCA) (NATO)

A portion of defined 

dimensions within which 

general air traffic is 

permitted “off-route” without 

requiring general air traffic 

controllers to initiate 

coordination with operational 

air traffic controllers.

Restricted Area (RA) Restricted area (air) — 

Designated areas 

established by appropriate 

authority over which flight of 

aircraft is restricted. They 

are shown on aeronautical 

charts, published in notices 

to airmen, and provided in 

publications of aids to air 

navigation. 

An airspace of defined 

dimensions, above the land 

areas or territorial waters of 

a state, within which the 

flight of aircraft is restricted 

in accordance with certain 

specified conditions. 

Restricted 

Operations Area 

(ROA)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions, designated by 

the airspace control 

authority, in response to 

A ROA is used to separate and 

identify areas. For example, 

artillery, mortar, naval surface 

fire support, UAS operating 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-23 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

specific operational 

situations/requirements 

within which the operation of 

one or more airspace users 

is restricted.

areas, aerial refueling, 

concentrated interdiction 

areas, areas of combat search 

and rescue (CSAR), SOF 

operating areas, and areas 

which the area air defense 

commander (AADC) has 

declared “weapons free.”

Commonly used for drop 

zones, landing zones, SAR 

areas, UAS launch and 

recovery sites, UAS mission 

areas, surface-to-surface 

missile launch sites, missile 

flight paths (if necessary), and 

predicted missile munitions 

impact locations, and special 

electronics mission aircraft.

ROA can adversely affect air 

defense operations; therefore, 

air defense missions generally 

have priority over ROAs.

Restrictive Fire Area 

(RFA)

An area in which specific 

restrictions are imposed and 

into which fires that exceed 

those restrictions will not be 

delivered without 

coordination with the 

establishing headquarters. 

Restrictive Fire Line 

(RFL)

A line established between 

converging friendly surface 

forces that prohibits fires or 

their effects across that line.

Return to Force 

(RTF)

Planned route profiles for 

use by friendly aircraft 

returning to an aviationcapable ship. 

RTF provides a means for 

easily identifying friendly 

aircraft.

Safe Area for 

Evasion (SAFE)

A designated area in hostile 

territory that offers the 

evader or escapee a 

reasonable chance of 

avoiding capture and of 

surviving until he can be 

evacuated.

Safe Lane (SL) A bi-directional lane 

connecting an airbase, 

landing site, and/or base 

defense zone to adjacent 

routes/corridors. Safe lanes 
Annex B to Appendix B 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-24 JP 3-52 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

may also be used to connect 

adjacent activated 

routes/corridors. 

Safe Sector (USMTF 

Safety Sector) 

(SAFES)

Established to route friendly 

aircraft to maritime forces 

with minimum risk. (AJP 

3.3.5)

Search and Rescue 

Point (SARDOT)

A reference point used in 

search and rescue 

operations. 

Ship Control Zone 

(SCZ)

An area activated around a 

ship operating aircraft, which 

is not to be entered by 

friendly aircraft without 

permission, in order to 

prevent friendly interference. 

Short-Range Air 

Defense 

Engagement Zone 

(SHORAD)

In air defense, that airspace 

of defined dimensions within 

which the responsibility for 

engagement of air threats 

normally rests with shortrange air defense weapons. 

It may be established within 

a low-or high-altitude missile 

engagement zone. 

A short-range air defense 

engagement zone is normally 

established for the local air 

defense of high-value assets. 

It provides airspace users with 

the location of the engagement 

zone of short-range air 

defense systems for mission 

planning purposes.

Centralized control of a shortrange air defense engagement 

zone may not be possible.

Special Corridor 

(SC)

An area established to 

accommodate the special 

routing requirements of 

special missions. 

Special Electronic 

Mission Area 

(SEMA)

Airspace of defined 

dimensions established 

specifically for airborne 

platforms conducting 

missions. Generally, it is 

designed for aircraft such as 

Compass Call. 

Standard Use Army 

Aircraft Flight Route 

(SAAFR)

Route established below the 

coordinating altitude to 

facilitate the movement of 

Army aviation assets. 

Routes are normally located 

in the corps through brigade 

rear areas of operation and 

do not require approval by 

the airspace control 

authority. 

SAAFR is an airspace 

coordinating measure used by 

Army assets for administrative 

and logistic purposes.

If altitudes are at or below the 

coordinating altitude, SAAFRs 

are implemented by the using 

authority. If a coordinating 

altitude has not been 

established, an air corridor is 
Airspace Coordinating and Fire Support Coordination Measures 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures

B-B-25 

COORDINATING 

MEASURE

DEFINITION/

DESCRIPTION

USES/PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS

established by the ACA at the 

request of the appropriate 

ground commander.

See FM 100-10 for additional 

information.

Surface-to-Surface 

Missile System 

(SSMS)

Airspace defined specifically 

for Army Tactical Missile 

System and Tomahawk 

land-attack missile launch 

and impact points. 

Temporary Minimum 

Risk Route (TMRR)

A temporary route 

established to route air traffic 

between transit routes or the 

rear boundary of the forward 

area and their operations 

area in direct support of 

ground operations.

Temporary 

Segregated Area 

(TSA)

An airspace of defined 

dimensions within which 

activities require the 

reservation of airspace for 

the exclusive use of specific 

users during a determined 

period of time.

Terminal Control 

Area (TCA)

A control area or portion 

thereof normally situated at 

the confluence of air traffic 

service routes in the vicinity 

of one or more major 

airfields. 

Terminal Radar 

Service Area 

(TRSA)

Airspace surrounding 

designated airports wherein 

ATC provides radar 

vectoring, sequencing, and 

separation on a full-time 

basis for all IFR and 

participating VFR aircraft. 

Training Area 

(TRNG)

Airspace created during 

contingency for the purpose 

of conducting training. 

Transit Corridor (TC) A bi-directional corridor in 

the rear area. Air traffic 

services not normally 

provided. 

Established to route aircraft 

through air defenses, in the 

rear area where appropriate, 

with minimum risk.

Pre-planned TCs will be 

published in ACPs, as will their

horizontal and vertical 

dimensions.
Annex B to Appendix B 

B-B-26 

Transit Route (TR) In air operations, a 

temporary air corridor of 

defined dimensions 

established in the forward 

area to minimize the risks to 

friendly aircraft from friendly 

air defenses or surface 

forces. 

Traverse Level (TL) That vertical displacement 

above low-level air defense 

systems, expressed both as 

a height and an altitude, at 

which aircraft can cross that 

area. 

TLs normally will be used in 

conjunction with TCs as 

specified in ACPs. 

Unmanned Aircraft 

(UA) 

Airspace of defined 

dimensions created 

specifically for UA 

operations. Generally, this 

airspace will consist of the 

area in which UA missions 

are conducted, not en route 

airspace. 

Warning Area 

(WARN) 

Airspace of defined 

dimensions extending from 

three nautical miles outward 

from the coast of the US that 

contains activity that may be 

hazardous to 

nonparticipating aircraft. 

Weapons Free Zone 

(WFZ) 

An air defense zone 

established for the protection 

of key assets or facilities, 

other than air bases, where 

weapons systems may be 

fired at any target not 

positively recognized as 

friendly. 

A weapons free zone is 

normally used for high-value 

assets defense and in areas 

with limited command and 

control authority. This zone 

provides airspace users with 

the location of a weapons free 

area for mission planning 

purposes. 

The AADC declares weapons 

free with the ACA establishing 

the zone. 

Figure B-B-1. Airspace and Fire Support Coordinating Measures 

For the standard formats, contents, and procedures for the US Message Text Format 

(USMTF) Program, refer to MIL-STD-6040B, DOD Interface Standard, US Message 

Text Format (USMTF) Description. The USMTF web site on DKO is URL 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/441756. 

For detailed ACM and fires systems interoperability, see FM 3-52.1/AFTTP 3-2.78, 

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Airspace Control. 
C-1 

APPENDIX C 

REFERENCES

1. General

a. Title 10, US Code. 

b. Federal Aviation Administration Order (FAAO) JO 4200.2G, Procedures for 

Handling Airspace Matters.

c. FAAO JO 7110.10T, Flight Services. 

d. FAAO JO 7400.9T, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points.

2. DOD Publication

DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major 

Components. 

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Publications

a. CJCS Instruction 3151.01A, Global Command and Control System Common 

Operational Picture Reporting Requirements. 

b. CJCS Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System (JOPES),Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures. 

c. CJCSM 3122.03C, JOPES, Volume II, Planning Formats. 

d. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

e. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

f. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

g. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. 

h. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

i. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

j. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats. 

k. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

l. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-52 

m. JP 3-04, Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations. 

n. JP 3-05, Special Operations. 

o. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations.

p. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations.

q. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. 

r. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support. 

s. JP 3-14, Space Operations. 

t. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

u. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations. 

v. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

w. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations. 

x. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

y. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics. 

 z. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

4. Multi-Service Publication 

 a. FM 3-04.15/NTTP 3-55.14/AFTTP(I) 3-2.64, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. 

 b. FM 3-52.1/AFTTP 3-2.78, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Airspace Control.

5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Publications 

 a. Allied Administrative Publication, NATO Dictionary. 

 b. Allied Joint Publication-3.3.5, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control. 
D-1 

APPENDIX D 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These 

comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), 

writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine 

sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3). 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-52, August 2004, Doctrine for Joint Airspace 

Control in the Combat Zone. 

4. Change Recommendations 

 a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

 TO: LEMAY CENTER MAXWELL AFB AL//CC// 

 INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDR: USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//DOC GP// 

 Routine changes should be submitted to the Commander, Joint Warfighting Center – 

Doctrine and Education Group, and info the Director for Operational Plans and Joint 

Force Development (J-7)/JEDD, via the CJCS JEL at http://www.ditc.mil/doctrine. 

 b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

 c. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 

________________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-52 

5. Distribution of Publications 

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must 

be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications 

 a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are 

available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), and https://jdeis.js.smil.mil

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

 b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant 

commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments 

or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché 

Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 

20340-5100.

 c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs.
GL-1 

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AADC area air defense commander

AADP area air defense plan

AAR air-to-air refueling area

ACA airspace control authority 

ACM airspace coordinating measure

ACO airspace control order

ACP airspace control plan

ACS airspace control system

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

AFTTP(I) Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) 

AIP aeronautical information publication

AO area of operations

AOA amphibious objective area 

AOD air operations directive 

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATC air traffic control

ATF amphibious task force 

ATO air tasking order

BDZ base defense zone

C2 command and control 

CA coordinating altitude

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CONOPS concept of operations 

COP common operational picture 

DCA defensive counterair

DOD Department of Defense

EW electronic warfare

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAAO Federal Aviation Administration order 

FEZ fighter engagement zone 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FM field manual

FOB forward operating base 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordination measure

GMLRS Global Positioning System Multiple Launch Rocket System
Glossary

GL-2 JP 3-52 

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters

IA information assurance 

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IFF identification, friend or foe 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JAOP joint air operations plan 

JEZ joint engagement zone 

JFACC joint force air component commander 

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

JP joint publication

LLTR low-level transit route

MEZ missile engagement zone

MRR minimum-risk route 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NOTAM notice to airmen

NTTP Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security

ROE rules of engagement

ROZ restricted operations zone 

SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight route

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses 

SIF selective identification feature

SOF special operations forces

SPINS special instructions

TLAM Tomahawk land attack missile

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 
Glossary

GL-3 

UA unmanned aircraft 

UAS unmanned aircraft system 

USG US Government 

USMTF United States message text format
GL-4 JP 3-52 

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

airborne early warning. The detection of enemy air or surface units by radar or other 

equipment carried in an airborne vehicle, and the transmitting of a warning to 

friendly units. Also called AEW. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

air corridor. A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and 

established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by 

friendly forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

aircraft control and warning system. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term 

and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

aircraft vectoring. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition 

will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles 

in the atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Also 

called AD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

air defense identification zone. Airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready 

identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. Also called 

ADIZ. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the 

enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against 

friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at 

such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with 

the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-0) 

airport surveillance radar. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

airport traffic area. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition 

will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air route. The navigable airspace between two points, identified to the extent necessary 

for the application of flight rules. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace control. A process used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the 

safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. (Upon approval of this revision, this 

term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be 

included in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-5 

airspace control area. Airspace that is laterally defined by the boundaries of the 

operational area and may be subdivided into airspace control sectors. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility 

for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area. Also 

called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace control boundary. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

airspace control center. None. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

airspace control facility. None. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

airspace control in the combat zone. None. (Upon approval of this publication, this 

term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

airspace control order. An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides 

the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is 

published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. Also 

called ACO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace control plan. The document approved by the joint force commander that 

provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system 

for the joint force operational area. Also called ACP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace control procedures. Rules, mechanisms, and directions that facilitate the 

control and use of airspace of specified dimensions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace control sector. A subelement of the airspace control area, established to 

facilitate the control of the overall area. Airspace control sector boundaries normally 

coincide with air defense organization subdivision boundaries. Airspace control 

sectors are designated in accordance with procedures and guidance contained in the 

airspace control plan in consideration of Service component, host nation, and 

multinational airspace control capabilities and requirements. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-52) 

airspace control system. An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, 

procedures, and facilities required to perform airspace control functions. Also called 

ACS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 
Glossary

GL-6 JP 3-52 

airspace coordinating measures. Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of 

airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly 

forces. Also called ACMs. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace coordination area. A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, 

established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are 

reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be 

formal or informal. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09.3) 

airspace management. The coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of 

airspace of defined dimensions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

airspace restrictions. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition 

will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air space warning area. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate 

units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces 

to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include 

call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also 

called ATO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

air traffic control and landing system. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this 

term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air traffic control center. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air traffic control facility. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

air traffic controller. An air controller specially trained and certified for civilian air 

traffic control. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

air traffic identification. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

alerting service. A service provided to notify appropriate organizations regarding 

aircraft in need of search and rescue aid, and assist such organizations as required. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

allocation. In a general sense, distribution for employment of limited forces and

resources among competing requirements. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, 
Glossary

GL-7 

nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, 

nuclear weapons, etc. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0) 

amphibious objective area. A geographical area (delineated for command and control 

purposes in the initiating directive) within which is located the objective(s) to be 

secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure 

accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient area 

for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-02) 

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by 

percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for 

a given period of time. Also called air apportionment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified

command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for

air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component

commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command,

control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense

operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as

appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

base defense zone. An air defense zone established around an air base and limited to the 

engagement envelope of short-range air defense weapons systems defending that

base. Base defense zones have specific entry, exit, and identification, friend or foe 

procedures established. Also called BDZ. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-10) 

carrier control zone. The airspace within a circular limit defined by 5 miles horizontal 

radius from the carrier, extending upward from the surface to and including 2,500 

feet unless otherwise designated for special operations, and is under the cognizance 

of the air officer during visual meteorological conditions. (Upon approval of this 

revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.) 

centralized control. 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon 

makes direct target assignments to fire units. 2. In joint air operations, placing 

within one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and 

coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

collateral damage. Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects 

that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. 

Such damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall 

military advantage anticipated from the attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60) 
Glossary

GL-8 JP 3-52 

combat airspace control. None. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

combat zone. 1. That area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations. 2. 

The territory forward of the Army rear area boundary. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

combined operation. None. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely 

expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be 

done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of 

the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 5-0) 

controlled airspace. An airspace of defined dimensions within which civilian air traffic 

control services are provided to control flights. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

control zone. A controlled airspace extending upwards from the surface of the Earth to a 

specified upper limit. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

coordinating altitude. An airspace coordinating measure that uses altitude to separate 

users and as the transition between different airspace coordinating entities. (Upon 

approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term 

and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52.) 

counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and 

maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to 

destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1-

02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

defensive counterair. All defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and 

destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly 

airspace. Also called DCA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-01) 

fighter engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within 

which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter 

aircraft. Also called FEZ. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 

1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-9 

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that targets are 

adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 3-09) 

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious 

commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide 

safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

flight information region. An airspace of defined dimensions within which flight 

information service and alerting service are provided. Also called FIR. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

flight information service. A service provided for the purpose of giving advice and 

information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights. Also called FIS. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

flight path. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be 

removed from JP 1-02.) 

flight plan. None. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be 

removed from JP 1-02.) 

forward line of own troops. A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly 

forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own 

troops normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. 

The forward line of own troops may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of 

the battle area. An enemy forward line of own troops indicates the forward-most 

position of hostile forces. Also called FLOT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03) 

high-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined 

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally 

rests with high-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called HIMEZ. (Upon approval 

of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its 

definition and will be included in JP 1-02.) 

high-density airspace control zone. Airspace designated in an airspace control plan or 

airspace control order, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and 

varied weapons and airspace users. A high-density airspace control zone has defined 

dimensions which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. 

Access to a high-density airspace control zone is normally controlled by the 

maneuver commander. The maneuver commander can also direct a more restrictive 

weapons status within the high-density airspace control zone. Also called HIDACZ. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

identification, friend or foe. A device that emits a signal positively identifying it as a 

friendly. Also called IFF. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 3-52) 
Glossary

GL-10 JP 3-52 

identification, friend or foe/selective identification feature procedures. None. (Upon 

approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be removed from JP 1-02.) 

identification maneuver. A maneuver performed for identification purposes. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface 

capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise 

achieve objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-03) 

joint air operations. Air operations performed with air capabilities/forces made 

available by components in support of the joint force commander’s operation or 

campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

joint air operations plan. A plan for a connected series of joint air operations to achieve 

the joint force commander’s objectives within a given time and joint operational 

area. Also called JAOP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-30) 

joint engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which 

multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously 

employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ. (Upon approval of this revision, 

this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be 

included in JP 1-02.) 

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned 

or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint 

force commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The 

joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant 

command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called 

JFC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1) 

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic 

combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force 
Glossary

GL-11 

commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to 

accomplish a specific mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

low-altitude missile engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined 

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally 

rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Also called LOMEZ. 

(Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing 

term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

low-level transit route. A temporary corridor of defined dimensions established in the 

forward area to minimize the risk to friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses or 

surface forces. Also called LLTR. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

master air attack plan. A plan that contains key information that forms the foundation 

of the joint air tasking order. Sometimes referred to as the air employment plan or 

joint air tasking order shell. Information that may be found in the plan includes joint 

force commander guidance, joint force air component commander guidance, support 

plans, component requests, target update requests, availability of capabilities and 

forces, target information from target lists, aircraft allocation, etc. Also called 

MAAP. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60) 

minimum-risk route. A temporary corridor of defined dimensions recommended for 

use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that presents the minimum known hazards to 

low-flying aircraft transiting the combat zone. Also called MRR. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition 

or alliance. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-16) 

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for 

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas 

include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of 

war, theater of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint 

special operations area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) 

point defense. The defense or protection of special vital elements and installations; e.g., 

command and control facilities or air bases. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

positive control. A method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, 

tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace, conducted with electronic 

means by an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 
Glossary

GL-12 JP 3-52 

procedural control. A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of 

previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 

3-52) 

prohibited area. A specified area within the land areas of a state or its internal waters, 

archipelagic waters, or territorial sea adjacent thereto over which the flight of aircraft 

is prohibited. May also refer to land or sea areas to which access is prohibited. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

radar advisory. The term used to indicate that the provision of advice and information 

is based on radar observation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

restricted areas (air). Designated areas established by appropriate authority over which 

flight of aircraft is restricted. They are shown on aeronautical charts, published in 

notices to airmen, and provided in publications of aids to air navigation. (JP 1-02. 

SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

restricted operations area. Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace 

control authority, in response to specific operational situations/requirements within 

which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. Also called ROA. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

risk. Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-33) 

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate 

the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate 

and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called 

ROE. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1-04) 

selective identification feature. A capability that, when added to the basic 

identification, friend or foe system, provides the means to transmit, receive, and 

display selected coded replies. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

short-range air defense engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined 

dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally 

rests with short-range air defense weapons. It may be established within a low- or 

high-altitude missile engagement zone. Also called SHORADEZ. (Upon approval 

of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its 

definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

standard use Army aircraft flight route. Route established below the coordinating 

altitude to facilitate the movement of Army aviation assets. Route is normally 

located in the corps through brigade rear areas of operation and do not require 

approval by the airspace control authority. Also called SAAFR. (Upon approval of 

this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its 

definition and will be included in JP 1-02.) 
Glossary

GL-13 

terminal control area. A control area or portion thereof normally situated at the 

confluence of air traffic service routes in the vicinity of one or more major airfields. 

(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 

unmanned aircraft. An aircraft or balloon that does not carry a human operator and is 

capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming. Also called 

UA. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be sourced 

to JP 3-52.) 

unmanned aircraft system. That system whose components include the necessary 

equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft. Also called 

UAS. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its definition will be sourced 

to JP 3-52.) 

unmanned aerial vehicle. None. (Upon approval of this publication, this term and its 

definition will be removed from JP 1-02.)

weapon engagement zone. In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within which 

the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular 

weapon system. Also called WEZ. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its 

definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52.) 

weapons free zone. An air defense zone established for the protection of key assets or 

facilities, other than air bases, where weapon systems may be fired at any target not 

positively recognized as friendly. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-52) 
Glossary

GL-14 JP 3-52 

Intentionally Blank
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS

COMMUNICATION

PLANS SYSTEMS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to

fill extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-52 Operations