CIA’s SUPERSONIC A-12 

RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

ARCHANGEL:

BY DAVID ROBARGE
The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) was founded in 1974 in response to 

Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger’s desire to create within CIA an 

organization that could “think through the functions of intelligence and bring the best 

intellects available to bear on intelligence problems.” The Center, comprising both 

professional historians and experienced practitioners, attempts to document lessons 

learned from past activities, explore the needs and expectations of intelligence 

consumers, and stimulate serious debate on current and future intelligence 

challenges.

To support these efforts, CSI publishes Studies in Intelligence and books and 

monographs addressing historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of 

the intelligence profession. It also administers the CIA Museum and maintains the CIA 

Library’s Historical Intelligence Collection.

Comments and questions may be addressed to:

Center for the Study of Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, DC 20505

Copies of this book are available to requesters outside the US government

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ISBN: 978-1-929667-16-1

Second Edition, January 2012
DAVID ROBARGE

CIA CHIEF HISTORIAN

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Second Edition

2012

CIA’s SUPERSONIC A-12 

RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

ARCHANGEL:

iii

This history of the A-12 reconnaissance aircraft was occasioned by CIA’s acquisition 

on loan from the Air Force of the eighth A-12 in the production series of 15 in 

September 2007. Known as Article 128, the aircraft is on display at the Agency’s 

Headquarters compound in Langley, Virginia. This history is intended to provide an 

accessible overview of the A-12’s development and use as an intelligence collector.

Writing this story was a fascinating challenge because I am not an aviation historian 

and have never flown any kind of aircraft. Accordingly, I have tried to make the 

narrative informative to lay readers like myself, while retaining enough technical detail 

to satisfy those more knowledgeable about aeronautics and engineering. I have drawn 

on the sources listed in the bibliography and the extensive files on the A-12 program 

in CIA Archives. Hundreds of those documents were declassified and released to the 

public in conjunction with the dedication of Article 128 in September 2007 as part of 

the Agency’s 60th anniversary commemoration. I have limited citations to specific 

documentary references and direct quotes from published works. When discrepancies 

arose among the sources regarding dates and other details, I have relied on the 

official records.

For their contributions to the substance and production of this work and to the 

documentary release, I would like to thank my colleagues on the CIA History Staff 

and at the Center for the Study of Intelligence, the information review officers in the 

Directorate of Science and Technology, designers and cartographers in the Directorate 

of Intelligence, and publication personnel at Imaging and Publishing Support. I also 

am grateful for historical material provided by the Lockheed Martin Corporation and 

the A-12 program veterans, the Roadrunners.

FOREWORD

David Robarge

CIA Chief Historian

January 2012

From Drawing Board to Factory Floor 1

Breaking Through Technological Barriers 11

Full Stress Testing 21

Hiding OXCART in Plain Sight 27

Finding a Mission 31

A Futile Fight for Survival 41

References 47

 A-12 Schematic

 Timeline of OXCART Milestones

 Inventory of A-12s

 BLACK SHIELD Missions

 The OXCART “Family”

 Bibliography

CONTENTS

v

FROM DRAWING BOARD TO FACTORY FLOOR
A depiction of the A-12 on its first operational flight in May 1967. Entitled 

“Untouchable,” the painting, by artist Dru Blair, hangs in CIA’s Intelligence 

Art Gallery. @ Dru Blair.
From Drawing Board to Factory Floor 1

The Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947 principally to provide US leaders with 

strategic warning of attack by the Soviet Union. The 

Agency’s main mission during its first decade and a 

half was to deploy its collection and analytic assets 

to detect and preempt a nuclear Pearl Harbor. No 

other intelligence question had greater implications 

for the national interests of the United States—and 

its very survival—than determining what kinds 

of strategic weapons, and how many of them, 

the Soviet Union had, and how it intended to use 

them. With the USSR proving to be an extremely 

hard target for traditional espionage operations, the 

United States had to turn to technical collection to 

peer beyond the Iron Curtain.

In 1954, CIA retained the Lockheed Corporation to 

build the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Essentially 

a jet-powered glider, the U-2 could fly at the 

unprecedented height of 70,000 feet—beyond the 

range of Soviet fighters and missiles—and take 

detailed photographs of Soviet Bloc military facilities. 

The aircraft was ready for operations in June 1956. At 

the time, CIA project officers had estimated that the 

U-2 would be able to fly safely over the Soviet Union 

for two years at most before it became vulnerable 

to Soviet air defenses. The Soviets tracked the U-2 

from its first mission, however. The estimate had 

proven too optimistic, especially after initial efforts 

to mask the U-2’s radar image proved ineffective. 

A more radical solution was needed—an entirely 

new aircraft.

Genesis of the A-12 Design—GUSTO

After a year of discussion with aviation companies 

beginning in the late summer of 1956, CIA focused its 

attention on building a jet that could fly at extremely 

high speeds and altitudes while incorporating 

state-of-the-art techniques in radar absorption or 

deflection. This effort was codenamed GUSTO. In 

the fall of 1957, U-2 project manager Richard Bissell 

established an advisory committee to help select a 

design for the U-2’s successor. Chaired by Polaroid 

chief executive Edwin Land, the committee met 

seven times between November 1957 and August 

1959. Designers from several aircraft manufacturers 

and senior officials from the Navy and Air Force 

attended some of the meetings. The two most 

prominent firms involved in the process were 

Lockheed, which already was investigating designs 

for the U-2’s replacement, and Convair, which was 

building a supersonic bomber for the Air Force, the 

B-58 Hustler.

Lockheed’s chief engineer, Clarence “Kelly” Johnson, 

said that “It makes no sense to just take this one or 

two steps ahead, because we’d be buying only a 

couple of years before the Russians would be able to 

nail us again....I want us to come up with an airplane 

that can rule the skies for a decade or more.” On 

21 April 1958, Lockheed’s Advanced Development 

Projects component, jokingly nicknamed the “Skunk 

Works” after the backwoods moonshine still in the 

comic strip Li’l Abner and already responsible for so 

many cutting-edge aviation achievements, began 

designing an aircraft that would cruise at Mach 3.0 at 

altitudes above 90,000 feet. “The higher and faster 

we fly, the harder it will be to spot us, much less stop 

us,” Johnson asserted.1 On 23 July 1958, Johnson 

presented his concept to Land’s committee, which 

expressed interest in the approach. By September, 

the Skunk Works had studied various configurations 

called “Archangel-1,” “Archangel-2,” and so forth—a 

carryover from the original moniker of “Angel” given 

to the U-2 during its development. The nomenclature 

soon became simply “A-1,” “A-2,” etc.

That same month, the Land committee met to 

review all concepts proposed so far. It rejected 

two Lockheed designs—for a tailless subsonic 

aircraft and a new supersonic model, the A-2—

and approved continuation of Convair’s work on a 

Mach 4 “parasite” aircraft called the FISH that would 

be launched from beneath a modified Hustler called 

the B-58B. In November, Lockheed submitted its 

design for the A-3, which was much smaller and 

lighter than the previous concepts. Upon receiving 

recommendations from the committee, President 

Dwight Eisenhower in December approved funding 

for further R&D on the U-2’s successor. Bissell asked 

Convair and Lockheed to turn in detailed proposals. 

Both firms did by the summer of 1959.

Lockheed worked on seven more designs in 

the ensuing months. None of them met all the 

requirements for speed, altitude, range, and 

radar cross section (RCS). Johnson decided not 

1Rich and Janos, 193.
“Johnson was creative, dynamic, 

ambitious, and unafraid to question 

others’ expertise and ideas”

A sampling of Johnson’s drawings, including the A-3 and Convair FISH
Clarence Leonard “Kelly” Johnson was a pathbreaking aeronautical engineer who worked for 

Lockheed Aircraft for over four decades. Born in Ishpeming, Michigan, on 27 February 1910, 

he graduated from the University of Michigan with an M.S. in aeronautical engineering in 1933 

and joined Lockheed that same year. 

Johnson was creative, dynamic, ambitious, and unafraid to question others’ expertise and 

ideas. Soon after arriving at Lockheed, he told his employers that the design of a new aircraft 

they were working on was flawed and would make the plane dangerously unstable. Instead of 

firing him, Lockheed asked him to work on the problem. He developed the double vertical tail 

configuration that became one of the trademark features of the company’s aircraft, including 

the A-12.

From there, Johnson rose quickly and became Lockheed’s chief research engineer in 1938. 

In 1952 he was appointed chief engineer of the firm’s Burbank, California, plant and then vice 

president of research and development in 1956, and vice president for advanced development 

projects in 1958. Johnson became a member of Lockheed’s Board of Directors in 1964 and 

senior vice president of the corporation in 1969. He retired in 1975, but he served on as a 

consultant at the Skunk Works until 1980. He died at the age of 80 on 21 December 1990.

Johnson’s contributions to advanced aircraft design were extraordinary. He designed or 

contributed significantly to the development of 40 well-known and important military and 

civilian aircraft. In addition to the U-2, the A-12, and the SR-71, they included the P-38 

Lightning, the Constellation, the PV-2 Neptune, the F-80 Shooting Star, the F-94 Starfire, the 

F-104 Starfighter, the B-37 Ventura, the C-130 Hercules, the C-140 Jetstar, and the AH-56 

Cheyenne attack helicopter. His accomplishments were founded on a hard-charging but 

informal management style and an openness to experimentation that brought out the best in 

his coworkers. Among his numerous awards and honors from industry, professional societies, 

and the Air Force, are two Collier Trophies (1959 and 1964), the National Medal of Science 

(1966), the nation’s highest civilian award, the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1967), the CIA 

Distinguished Intelligence Medal (1975), and the National Security Medal (1983). He was 

elected to the Aviation Hall of Fame in 1974.

Lockheed’s Aviation Genius
4

to sacrifice aerodynamic capability to achieve a 

smaller RCS.

In March 1959, Lockheed developed a design for 

the A-11. It would have a top speed of Mach 3.2, 

a range of 3,200 miles, and an altitude of 90,000 

feet, and could be ready by January 1961. The 

A-11’s main drawback was that it would be more 

detectable than Convair’s much smaller FISH. That 

manned, ramjet-powered vehicle was designed 

to fly at Mach 4.2 at 90,000 feet with a range of 

3,900 miles, and also could be ready by January 

1961. Three substantial uncertainties beset the 

FISH, however: the unproven technology of ramjet 

engines; the unavailability of the B-58B that would 

fly fast enough to launch it; and the possibility that 

the B-58B could not reach the necessary speed, 

or that if it did, the FISH could not operate under 

post-launch conditions. The Air Force’s cancellation 

of the B-58B project in June 1959 took the FISH out 

of the running, but the Land committee also rejected 

the A-11 because its RCS was still too large. The 

competition continued.

Convair and Lockheed completed new proposals 

in August 1959. Convair’s entry, known as the 

KINGFISH, was a ground-launched, single-pilot jet 

with two Pratt & Whitney J58 engines—the most 

powerful available—and a small RCS. Lockheed’s 

design, the A-12, also would use the J58 engines. 

It would reach Mach 3.2 at up to 97,600 feet and 

have a range of around 4,600 miles. To save weight, 

Johnson decided not to construct the aircraft out of 

steel. Because standard lightweight metals such as 

aluminum could not withstand the heat generated at 

Mach 3 speeds, Johnson chose a titanium alloy. The 

A-12’s design incorporated a continuously curving 

airframe, a forebody with tightly slanted edges 

called chines, engine housings (nacelles) located 

mid-wing, canted rudders, and nonmetallic parts 

to decrease the RCS. A cesium fuel additive would 

reduce the radar detectability of the afterburner 

plume.

The two firms submitted their designs to a selection 

panel with members from the Department of 

Defense, the Air Force, and CIA on 20 August 

1959. The A-12’s specifications were slightly 

better than the KINGFISH’s, and its projected cost 

Earliest Design Concepts
From Drawing Board to Factory Floor 5

was significantly less. Convair’s design had the 

smaller RCS, however, and CIA’s representatives 

initially favored it for that reason. The companies’ 

respective track records proved decisive. Convair’s 

work on the B-58 had been plagued with delays and 

cost overruns, whereas Lockheed had produced the 

U-2 on time and under budget. In addition, it had 

experience running a “black” project. On 28 August, 

Johnson wrote in his project log,

Saw Mr. Bissell alone. He told me that we 

had the project and that Convair is out of the 

picture. They [CIA] accept our conditions (1) 

of the basic arrangement of the A-12 and 

(2) that our method of doing business will 

be identical to that of the U-2. He agreed 

very firmly to this latter condition and said 

that unless it was done this way he wanted 

nothing to do with the project either.2

Much of the eventual success of the OXCART 

program can be attributed to CIA and Lockheed 

following the best practices from the U-2 project that 

Johnson and Bissell tacitly referred to: complete 

trust between customer and contractor, individual 

responsibility and accountability, start-to-finish 

ownership of design, willingness to take risks, 

tolerance for failure, and streamlined bureaucracy 

with minimal staffing and paperwork.

On 29 August 1959, the selection panel voted for 

the A-12 but required Lockheed to demonstrate by 

1 January 1960 that it could reduce the aircraft’s 

RCS sufficiently. CIA awarded a four-month contract 

to Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, 

aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering 

designs. Project GUSTO was terminated, and “by 

a sort of inspired perversity,” an Agency officer later 

wrote, OXCART was selected from a random list of 

codenames to designate this R&D and all later work 

on the A-12.3 The aircraft itself came to be called 

that as well. Funding for the four-month period was 

$4.5 million.

During tests over the trial period conducted along 

with contractor EG&G, Lockheed showed that 

its concept of shape, nonmetallic parts, and fuel 

additive would produce the needed reduction in 

RCS. In the course of this phase of radar testing and 

Intermediate Design Concepts

2Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 7.

3McIninch, 1. 
6

after, which required a full-scale, pylon-mounted 

mock-up, and further wind tunnel tests, the A-12 

took on more of its distinctive cobra-like shape 

that allowed for better dispersion of radar pulses. 

To further reduce those reflections, the two canted 

rudders were fabricated from laminated nonmetallic 

materials—the first time such substances had been 

used for an important part of an aircraft’s structure. 

(Later on, the production aircraft would be painted 

with a radar-absorbent coating of ferrite particles in 

a plastic binder.)

To Bissell’s great distress, however, the changes 

also reduced the aircraft’s performance below what 

he had told the president it could achieve. Johnson 

had to reduce the A-12’s weight by 1,000 pounds 

and increase its fuel load by 2,000 pounds so it could 

reach the target altitude of 91,000 feet. He noted in 

his project log: “We have no performance margins 

left; so this project, instead of being 10 times as hard 

as anything we have done, is 12 times as hard. This 

matches the design number, and is obviously right.”4

These modifications worked. On 26 January 1960, 

Bissell notified Johnson that CIA was authorizing the 

design, construction, and testing of the new aircraft. 

Four days later the official word came, and the 

contract for 12 A-12s was signed on 11 February. 

Lockheed’s original price quotation was $96.6 

million, but technical difficulties soon made that 

figure impossible to meet. CIA included a clause 

providing for periodic reevaluation of costs. That 

provision had to be invoked a number of times over 

the next five years as the A-12’s price rose rapidly. 

With U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union no longer 

possible after Francis Gary Powers’s aircraft was 

shot down on 1 May 1960, the reliability of the new 

CORONA satellite still undetermined, and no other 

aerial or space vehicle considered feasible for the 

mission, US leaders were willing to pay handsomely 

to collect vital intelligence on America’s principal 

Cold War adversary.

Finding a Test Site

Lockheed could not do R&D work on the A-12 at 

its Burbank plant because the runway there was 

too short and the facility was too public. Ideally, 

the test site would be remote from metropolitan 

areas and aviation flight routes, easily accessible 

by air, fairly close to an Air Force installation, able 

to accommodate large numbers of personnel, and 

have good weather all year, fuel storage facilities, 

and a runway at least 8,000 feet long. No such 

place existed. After considering 10 Air Force 

bases slated for closing, as well as Edwards Air 

Force Base in California, Bissell picked a secluded 

facility in Nevada. It lacked adequate personnel 

accommodations and fuel storage, and its runway 

was too short, but security conditions were optimal, 

and the needed structures could be built fairly easily.

Construction began in September 1960, with a 

weekly air shuttle ferrying work crews from Burbank 

The Finalists

4Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 20.
From Drawing Board to Factory Floor 7

to Las Vegas and then to the test site. Daily 

commuting was not feasible. Workers at first lived in 

trailers in Spartan conditions. Later on, surplus Navy 

housing structures were transported to the base 

and assembled, and more amenities were added 

for the residents. By November the new runway had 

been completed—the old one could not handle the 

A-12’s weight—but the fuel tank farm was not ready 

until early 1962. Until then, the 500,000 gallons of 

aircraft fuel needed each month were trucked in. 

All essential facilities at the site were ready for the 

delivery of the first A-12 scheduled for August 1961. 

By the time the testing ended more than four years 

later, the site had a population of over 1,800, and 

three shuttle flights arrived every day from Burbank 

and Las Vegas.

Picking the OXCART Drivers

The pilots who would fly the A-12 also had to satisfy 

a rigorous set of “design specifications.” The Air 

Force, with advice from Kelly Johnson and CIA, drew 

up the selection criteria. Pilots had to be currently 

qualified and proficient, with at least 2,000 total flight 

hours, 1,000 of them in the latest high-performance 

fighter jets; married, emotionally stable, and well 

motivated; between 25 and 40 years old; and under 

six feet tall and 175 pounds so they could fit in the 

A-12’s cramped cockpit. Extensive physical and 

psychological screening of Air Force personnel 

files produced 16 candidates. CIA put this group 

through an intensive security and medical review. 

The process was kept so secret that the candidates’ 

superiors did not know what their subordinates were 

doing. Those who survived the screening were 

approached to work for the Agency on a highly 

classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. 

By November 1961, only five had agreed.

A second search and screening produced six more. 

The 11 pilots selected to fly missions in the A-12 

were Kenneth B. Collins, Ronald J. “Jack” Layton, 

Francis J. “Frank” Murray, Walter L. Ray, Russell 

J. Scott, William L. Skliar, Dennis B. Sullivan, Mele 

Vojvodich Jr., Alonzo J. “Lon” Walter, Jack W. 

Weeks, and David P. Young. These pilots—known 

as “drivers,” like their U-2 counterparts—were then 

“sheepdipped” from Air Force to CIA employment, 

with compensation and insurance arrangements 

similar to those provided for the U-2 pilots. Scott, 

Walter, and Young left the program before the 

A-12 became operational. Skliar was attached to 

the Air Force portion of OXCART that developed a 

supersonic fighter-interceptor, the YF-12A, and did 

not fly the A-12 operationally. In addition, Ray W. 

Schrecengost flew the two-seat trainer version of 

the A-12. Lockheed test pilots were: Jim Eastham, 

Bob Gilliland, Darrell Greenamyer, Bill Park, Art 

Peterson, Lou Schalk, and Bill Weaver. After the 

A-12 was decommissioned in 1968, the six surviving 

operational pilots—Collins, Layton, Murray, Skliar, 

Sullivan, and Vojvodich—returned to the Air Force. 

To test its radar cross section, a full-size model of 

the A‐12 was placed in various positions on a pylon 

as radar readings were taken.

CIA’s A-12 “drivers” and managers: (l. to r.) Layton, 

Sullivan, Vojvodich, Barrett, Weeks, Collins, Ray, BGen 

Ledford, Skliar, Perkins, Holbury, Kelly, and squadron 

commander Col. Slater.
8

(Ray and Weeks died in A-12 crashes in 1967 and 

1968.) Collins and Skliar flew that service’s version 

of the A-12, the SR-71 Blackbird, as test or instructor 

pilots, and Layton flew the YF-12A.

Partnership with the Air Force

In addition to providing pilots and assisting with 

their processing, the Air Force filled several 

indispensable roles in supporting the OXCART 

program. The service dispatched to the test site 

more than a dozen aircraft that were used for training 

and proficiency flights, cargo transport, search and 

rescue, administrative travel, and chase flights. (Two 

of the chase planes and their pilots were lost during 

the program’s testing phase.) The A-12 consumed 

huge amounts of fuel—22,000 pounds per hour at 

cruising speed and altitude—and had to be refueled 

during its missions. Massive amounts of fuel had 

to be positioned at special tank farms at several air 

bases outside the contiguous United States: Eielson, 

Alaska; Thule, Greenland; Kadena, Okinawa; and 

Adana, Turkey. The Air Force’s 903rd Air Refueling 

Squadron at Beale Air Force Base was given 

KC-135 tankers for the refueling operations, and the 

Air Force detailed most of the support personnel and 

facilities at Kadena Air Base for Operation BLACK 

SHIELD, the reconnaissance activity the A-12 would 

undertake in East Asia. Also, the North American 

Air Defense Command established procedures so 

that its radar stations would not report detections of 

high-performance aircraft. Lastly, Air Force orders 

for the YF-12A and SR-71 variants of the A-12 

helped lower development and procurement costs 

on the OXCART program.

Patches made for OXCART crew members. CYGNUS was the name given the A-12 in 

testing. The 1129th SAS was the unit designation of the A-12 team assigned to Kadena 

Air Base in Okinawa.
BREAKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIERS
10

 “The A-12 ‘practically spawned its own industrial base’ and the 2,400 or so machinists, 

mechanics, and fabricators could do their own milling and forging.” The sign at the top, “Stamp 

out F.O.D.” was an exhortation to “Stamp Out Foreign-object Damage,” a problem of engine 

failure sometimes caused by small objects inadvertently dropped and left in nacelles during 

fabrication.
Breaking Through Technological Barriers 11

Completion of the first A-12 was delayed several times because the performance specifications 

it had to meet put Johnson and the Skunk Works 

in uncharted territory. The aircraft, over 101 feet 

long and weighing up to 62 tons fully loaded, had 

to fly at Mach 3.2, or 2,150 miles per hour—as fast 

as a rifle bullet—at a mid-range altitude of 91,000 

feet. The A-12 was expected to be over four times 

faster than the U-2 and go almost three miles higher. 

Moreover, the aircraft had to have the smallest 

feasible RCS to minimize the risk of detection and 

shootdown. To meet all these demands would 

require developing new structural materials, tools, 

and fabrication techniques, and special fuels, fluids, 

lubricants, sealants, paints, plastics, electronics, 

cables, windshields, fittings, fixtures, and tires. 

Bissell recalled that the A-12 “practically spawned 

its own industrial base,” and the 2,400 or so 

machinists, mechanics, and fabricators working on 

the project could do their own milling and forging.1 

No assembly line techniques could be employed; 

every aircraft was essentially handmade. At the 

peak of production in the mid-1960s, nearly 8,000 

workers were delivering an A-12 or a variant each 

month.

Getting to that point was long, hard, and expensive. 

As a consequence of the technical difficulties, the 

delivery date of the first aircraft began sliding and 

costs started rising. Originally promised for May 

1961, delivery was moved to August and the first 

flight was moved to December. A vexed Bissell—

then preoccupied with the fallout from the Bay 

of Pigs debacle that he had overseen as head of 

CIA’s covert operations—wrote to Johnson that 

“[t]his news is extremely shocking on top of our 

previous slippage.... I trust this is the last of such 

disappointments short of a severe earthquake in 

Burbank.”2 But it was not. In July, Johnson wrote in 

his log that Lockheed was “[h]aving a horrible time 

building the first airplane ...everyone on edge...and 

we still have a long, long way to go.”3 To reduce 

expenditures—already at $136 million by October 

1961 and still climbing—project officials decided 

to reduce production to 10 aircraft, at a total cost 

of over $161 million, and assigned a top-level 

CIA aeronautical engineer to work at Lockheed to 

monitor the program.

Finding the Right Metal

The most formidable set of challenges Lockheed 

faced was dealing with the great heat produced by 

air friction at the high speed the A-12 would reach. 

Most of the aircraft’s skin would be subjected to 

temperatures between 500 and 600 degrees F., 

and over 1,000 degrees F. at some spots near the 

engines. No metal used in aircraft production up to 

then could withstand such heat. The metals that 

could stand up under the conditions were too heavy 

for this project. 

After evaluating many materials, Lockheed chose to 

build over 90 percent of the A-12’s airframe out of a 

titanium alloy. It was almost as strong as stainless 

steel but weighed half as much and could handle the 

intense heat. (The rest was made of radar-absorbing 

composite materials.) Lockheed’s supplier of the 

alloy had trouble delivering material of the requisite 

quality at first—95 percent was rejected—and the 

base metal was scarce enough that some had to be 

obtained covertly from the country with the largest 

known reserves—the Soviet Union.4

Titanium proved to be very difficult to work with, 

however. Its extreme hardness caused problems in 

machining and shaping the material. Drills broke and 

tools snapped, and new ones had to be devised. By 

the end of the program, drill bits could make 100 

holes before resharpening. Titanium also was very 

sensitive to contaminants such as chlorine and 

cadmium. Pentel pens could not be used to draw on 

sheets of the metal because their chlorine-based ink 

left etch marks. Wing panels that were spot welded 

in the summer failed within six or seven weeks, but 

those made in the winter lasted indefinitely. The 

problem was traced to Burbank’s water, which was 

heavily chlorinated in the summer to prevent algae 

growth but not in the winter. Switching to distilled 

water to wash the panels after acid treatment 

prevented a recurrence. When bolt heads dropped 

off under high heat, Skunk Works troubleshooters 

found that cadmium-plated wrenches left enough 

residue to weaken the fittings. Hundreds of tool 

boxes had to be inspected to get rid of the nowuseless implements.

1Bissell, 133.

2McIninch, 10.

3Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 49.

4Rich and Janos, 203.
12

Fuels, Lubricants, and Sealants

To operate at design speeds and temperatures, 

the A-12 required fuel, lubricants, hydraulic fluids, 

and sealants that had not been invented yet. The 

fuel tanks, holding almost 11,000 gallons, made up 

the largest proportion of the aircraft and would heat 

up to about 350 degrees F. At that temperature the 

most advanced fuel blends then in use would boil 

off or blow up. Instead, a special fuel, called JP-7, 

with a low vapor pressure and high flash point had 

to be developed; a lighted match would not ignite 

it. A liquid chemical that exploded on contact with 

air would start the engines. Through the use of heat 

exchangers and smart valves, the fuel would also 

act as an internal coolant. 

Synthetic lubricants were formulated to work at 

the extreme temperature range between Mach 

3.1 missions and subsonic refueling. They were 

practically solid at room temperature and had to 

be heated before each flight. A hydraulic fluid that 

would not vaporize at high speed but was still usable 

at low altitudes was eventually found.

No sealant for the fuel tanks was ever developed 

that was simultaneously impervious to chemical 

effects caused by the fuel, and elastic enough to 

expand and contract as the tanks heated and cooled 

and were subjected to large pressure changes. 

Consequently the A-12’s tanks leaked, a quirk that 

was not detected until the first aircraft was delivered 

to the test site and filled with fuel, setting off a 

reaction that broke down the sealants. A “leak rate” 

of between five and 60 drops per minute, depending 

on the source, was considered acceptable. When 

the A-12 was about to go off on a test or mission, 

it would receive only enough fuel to get airborne. 

It would then rendezvous with a KC-135, top off 

its tanks, and immediately climb to operating 

altitude, which caused the metal to expand and the 

leaks to stop.

The Engines

The J58 turbojet engines that would enable the 

A-12 to fly so high and fast were the most persistent 

problem. Designed in 1956 for a Navy aviation project 

that was canceled, the engines had to undergo major 

modifications to turn them into the most powerful airbreathing propulsion devices ever made. Just one 

J58 had to produce as much power as all four of the 

Dealing with the extreme temperatures of Mach 3+ flight was the most formidable 

challenge.
Breaking Through Technological Barriers 13

Queen Mary’s huge turbines—160,000 horsepower 

or over 32,000 pounds of thrust. To crank it up, two 

Buick (later, Chevrolet) racecar engines on a special 

cart were used. The unmuffled, big block engines 

put out over 600 horsepower and made a deafening 

roar. The J58s themselves put out an almost 

incredible din. Recalling his visit to the test site to 

watch a midnight takeoff, DCI Richard Helms wrote 

that “[t]he blast of flame that sent the black, insectshaped projectile hurtling across the tarmac made 

me duck instinctively. It was if the Devil himself were 

blasting his way straight from Hell.”5

As with so much else on the A-12, getting the 

engines to work at design specifications posed 

never-before-encountered troubles with fabrication, 

materials technology, and testing. Not the least of 

them was the superhot conditions. Maximum fuel 

temperatures reached 700 degrees F.; engine inlet 

temperatures climbed to over 800; lubricants ranged 

from 700 to 1,000; and turbine inlets reach 2,000 

degrees F. and above. A Pratt & Whitney engineer 

later wrote that “I do not know of a single part, down 

to the last cotter key, that could be made from the 

same materials as used on previous engines.”6

Pratt & Whitney’s continuing difficulties with the 

weight, performance, and delivery of the J58 forced 

delays in the completion of the first A-12. After 

meeting with the manufacturer in early January 

1962, Johnson noted in his log that 

[t]heir troubles are desperate. It is almost 

unbelievable that they could have gotten this 

far with the engine without uncovering basic 

problems which have been normal in every 

jet engine I have ever worked with... Prospect 

of an early flight engine is dismal, and I feel 

our program is greatly jeopardized.7 

To prevent further scheduling setbacks, Johnson 

and CIA officials already had decided to use the 

less powerful J75 in early flights. The airframe had 

to be slightly altered to accommodate the substitute 

engine, which could power the craft only up to Mach 

1.6 and 50,000 feet. Despite enormous development 

costs of the J58, the engines were not ready until 

The J58 jet engine during a static test. A modified version of an engine designed for 

another program four years earlier, the jet generated as much power as the turbines 

of the ocean liner the Queen Mary.

5Helms, 266.

6Brown, 17.

7Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 56.
14

January 1963, and the A-12 did not reach Mach 3 

speed until the following July—more than a year 

after the first test flight.

The design feature that ultimately made it possible 

for the J58s to generate the power needed to fly 

at planned speed was a pair of retractable, spikeshaped cones that protruded from the engine 

inlets. The “spikes,” as they were known, served 

as regulators that would decelerate, compress, and 

superheat incoming air, which was further squeezed 

and heated by the bypass engines before fuel was 

added. The supercharged air was then expanded 

through the turbine and fed into the afterburners. 

This gas-air mix combusted at 3,400 degrees F., 

just 200 degrees below the maximum temperature 

for burning hydrocarbon fuels. Without the spikes, 

the J-58s would have produced only about 20 

percent of the power the A-12 needed. Ben Rich, 

Lockheed’s lead propulsion engineer, recalled that 

“developing this air-inlet control system was the 

most exhausting, difficult, and nerve-racking work of 

my professional life.”8 Rich and his colleagues did 

much of the testing in wind tunnels at a NASA facility 

in northern California. They had to work mostly at 

night because the tests drained too much electricity 

from the local power grid during the day.

The main issue with the inlets was that the system’s 

mechanical controls did not respond quickly enough 

to shock-wave-induced variations in the incoming air 

flow to prevent engine “unstarts” that would cause 

violent buffeting and severe yawing, and sometimes 

smash the pilot’s head against the cockpit. The 

unstarts and the “popped shocks” occurred at speeds 

between Mach 2.5 and 2.9 while the aircraft was on 

an accelerated climb to design speed. After more 

than a year and a change in subcontractors, a new 

electronic control was developed that, along with 

some other modifications, took care of the problem 

at lower speeds, but ultimately the inlet system had 

to be redesigned. In the new configuration, the spike 

could be moved in or out as much as 26 inches at 

In this photo, one of the first of the A-12 released by CIA, the adjustable inlet cones in front of the engines 

are clearly visible. Called “spikes,” the devices regulated the incoming air flow to maximize thrust and 

prevent interruptions in fuel combustion at high speeds.

8Rich and Janos, 209.
Breaking Through Technological Barriers 15

supersonic speeds to capture and contain the shock 

wave.

The Cockpit and Flight Suit

Providing for the pilots’ safety and comfort was 

difficult because the external temperatures would 

make the uninsulated cockpit feel like the inside 

of a moderately hot oven. To cut weight, Lockheed 

did not even try to insulate the aircraft’s interior; 

instead, it counted on the pilot’s suit to protect him. 

Pilots would have to wear a type of space suit with 

its own cooling, pressure control, oxygen supply, 

and other life support capabilities. Two Lockheed 

subcontractors, the David Clark Company and the 

Firewel Corporation, developed a full-pressure suit 

and oxygen supply system based on ones created 

for pilots of the X-15 rocket aircraft. The aluminized 

suit and breathing apparatus would protect the pilot 

from heat radiated from the 400 degree F. windshield 

and the effects of depressurization and extreme 

cold encountered during a high-altitude bail-out. 

The S-901 suits were custom-made and each cost 

$30,000 in the mid-1960s.

To further protect the pilots, the cockpit had an air 

conditioning system. It was tested by putting a pilot 

inside what one engineer described as “a broiler big 

enough to roast an ox medium rare”9—a cylinder 

was cooled to 75 degrees F. while the outer skin was 

heated to about 600 degrees F. Additionally, if the 

pilot had to eject from the cockpit, his feet would be 

held against the seat with cables while it cleared the 

aircraft, and a stabilization parachute would keep 

him from spinning and rotating as he descending 

more than 12 miles in around seven minutes to 

approximately 15,000 feet, when the main parachute 

would deploy and separate the pilot from the seat.

The Photo Gear

Notwithstanding its innovations in aeronautical 

engineering, the A-12 was a photographic 

reconnaissance platform, so the whole OXCART 

program would have been pointless if worthwhile 

pictures could not be taken. Project managers 

decided to have three different camera systems 

developed to provide a range of photography, 

9Ibid., 216.
16

from high-ground-resolution stereo to very-highresolution spotting data.

Perkin-Elmer was the primary manufacturer. Its 

stereo camera, called Type I, had a 5,000-foot 

film supply and produced pairs of photographs 

covering a 71-mile swath with a ground resolution 

of 12 inches. To meet severe design constraints 

on size, weight, thermal resistance, coverage, and 

resolution, Perkin-Elmer employed concepts never 

before used in camera systems. Perkin-Elmer’s 

camera was installed on all 29 A-12 missions and 

failed only once, halfway through a sortie.

In case Perkin-Elmer ran into production problems, 

Eastman Kodak was also asked to build a camera. 

Called Type II, it had an 8,400-foot film supply and 

produced stereo photographs covering a 60-mile 

swath with 17-inch resolution. A third firm, Hycon, 

built an advanced version of the spotting camera 

used on the U-2. Hycon’s device, Type IV, had a 

12,000-foot film supply and covered a 41-mile-wide 

swath with a resolution of eight inches.

The integrity of the double quartz camera window 

demanded special attention because optical 

distortion caused by the effect of great heat (550 

degrees F.) on the outside of the window and a 

much lower temperature (150 degrees F.) on the 

inside could keep the cameras from taking usable 

photographs. Three years and $2 million later, the 

Corning Glass Works came up with a solution: the 

window was fused to its metal frame by a novel 

process using high frequency sound waves.

In addition to the film cameras, other collection 

devices were developed or planned for the A-12: 

an infrared camera, a side-looking radar, a gamma 

spectrometer, and a particulate sampler. None of 

these was used on an A-12 mission.

Defenses

Finally, although it was intended to fly too high and 

too fast to be detected or shot down, the A-12 was 

equipped with several electronic countermeasures 

(ECMs) to foil hostile air defenses. The ECMs would 

warn the pilot his aircraft had been “painted” by a 

radar or missile guidance signal, and then jam or 

confuse them.

In the Air: “A Wild Stallion”

At last, the first A-12, known as Article 121, was 

built and ground tested in Burbank during January 

and February 1962. Because the aircraft was too 

secret to fly to the test site and too large to carry 

on a cargo plane, it had to be trucked. During the 

night of 26 February, a specially designed trailer 

truck loaded with a huge crate (35 feet wide and 

105 feet long) containing the disassembled aircraft’s 

fuselage left the Skunk Works for the two-day trip to 

the Nevada facility, escorted by the California and 

Nevada highway patrols and CIA security officers. 

The box was so wide that some road signs had 

to be removed, trees trimmed, and road banks 

leveled. The wings were shipped separately and 

attached on site.

The A-12’s first flight—unofficial and unannounced 

in keeping with a Lockheed tradition—took place 

on 25 April 1962 and almost caused the loss of the 

only OXCART aircraft built so far. Lockheed test 

pilot Lou Schalk flew the plane less than two miles, 

at an altitude of about 20 feet, because serious 

wobbling—Johnson described the movements as 

“lateral oscillations which were horrible to see”—

caused by improper hookup of some navigational 

controls. Instead of circling around and landing, 

Schalk put it down in the lake bed beyond the end 

of the runway. When the A-12’s nose appeared out 

of a cloud of dust and dirt, Johnson’s angry voice 

erupted over the radio, “What in Hell, Lou?”10 

The next day, Schalk tried again, this time with the 

landing gear down, just in case. The flight lasted 

about 40 minutes. The takeoff was perfect, but after 

the A-12 got to about 300 feet it started shedding all 

the “pie slice” fillets of titanium on the left side of the 

aircraft and one fillet on the right. (On later aircraft, 

those pieces were paired with triangular inserts 

made of radar-absorbing composite material.) 

Technicians spent four days finding and reattaching 

the pieces. Nonetheless, the flight pleased Johnson. 

“We showed that the first flight troubles were not 

caused by basic aircraft [in]stability.”11

10Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 64; Rich and Janos, 219.

11Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 65. 
Breaking Through Technological Barriers 17

Once the fillets were repaired, Article 121 was rolled 

out for its first official flight on 30 April, just under 

one year later than originally planned. A number 

of senior Air Force officers and CIA executives, 

including Deputy Director for Research Herbert 

Scoville and former project chief Bissell (who left 

the Agency in February 1962), witnessed the longawaited event. Schalk again was the pilot. He took 

the aircraft up for 59 minutes and reached 30,000 

feet and just under 400 mph; most of the flight was 

made at under 300 mph. He reported that the A-12 

responded well and was extremely stable. Johnson 

said this was the smoothest official first flight of any 

aircraft he had designed or tested. On 4 May, with 

Schalk at the controls, Article 121 made its first 

supersonic flight, reaching Mach 1.1 at 40,000 feet. 

Problems were minimal. DCI John McCone, who 

had shown a keen interest in the OXCART program 

since becoming director in November 1961, sent 

Johnson a congratulatory telegram.12

Now began the arduous and often discouraging 

task of bringing the aircraft—christened “Cygnus” 

after the swan constellation in the northern sky—up 

to operational performance requirements. Ben Rich 

later called the A-12 “a wild stallion of an airplane. 

Everything about it was daunting and hard to 

tame...so advanced and so awesome that it easily 

intimidated anyone who dared to come close.”13

By the end of 1962, four more aircraft had arrived at 

the test site, and two were engaged in flight testing. 

Article 122, which arrived in late June, initially 

was used principally for checking electronic and 

propulsion systems and RCS. Its first test flight was 

in January 1963. During its delivery, a Greyhound 

bus traveling in the opposite direction grazed the 

35-foot-wide crate carrying a portion of it. Project 

managers quickly authorized the payment of nearly 

$5,000 for damage to the bus so that no insurance 

or legal inquiry would take place and compromise 

the program. Articles 123 and 125, after arriving in 

August and December, respectively, were outfitted 

for operational use.

Article 124, a trainer version nicknamed the 

“Titanium Goose,” was delivered in November. It 

was fitted with the less powerful J75 engines, could 

only reach Mach 1.6 and 40,000 feet, and was the 

only A-12 that Kelly Johnson ever flew in. (The CIA’s 

first deputy director for science and technology, 

Albert “Bud” Wheelon, also took a ride in the trainer 

to demonstrate his confidence in the A-12. John 

McCone, the director of central intelligence, “roundly 

criticized” him for “risking my person” that way, 

Wheelon recalled.)14

The remaining 10 aircraft in the fleet would arrive 

at the test site by mid-1964. Of those, eight were 

designated for reconnaissance missions, and two 

would become the “mother ships” for the D-21 

drones in the TAGBOARD project.

Hauled disassembled and in boxes to its Nevada 

test site, the A-12 posed a significant traffic hazard. 

Once, an oncoming bus grazed a crate.

12Scoville telegram to CIA Office of Special Activities (OSA) Deputy Director James A. Cunningham (Cable 4377, IN 35479),

 30 April 1962; Scoville memorandum to McCone, “OXCART Program,” 7 May 1962.

13Rich and Janos, 220.

14Wheelon, 76.

FULL STRESS TESTING
20

Throughout testing, flight procedures evolved; in effect, pilots were testing and training simultaneously. 

Here, the only A-12 trainer built—the “Titanium Goose”—is about to refuel, a process that took the A-12 

close to stall speed when it was filled up.
Full Stress Testing 21

Most test flights were short, averaging scarcely an hour. Through 1963, 573 flights had taken 

only 765 hours. More air time was not necessary 

for the earlier tests, and brief flights helped maintain 

security. Project and test pilots and systems 

engineers closely critiqued each flight, constantly 

reviewed data and procedures, and regularly made 

changes to the latter, in flight and during debriefings 

afterward. The pilots in effect were performing 

flight testing and training themselves at the same 

time. They kept extremely busy in the tight-fitting 

cockpit, seated amid hundreds of dials, switches, 

buttons, gauges, and breakers, keeping control of 

the aircraft with a three-button stick and adjusting for 

variations in sensitive performance indicators, while 

navigating at speeds far faster than they had ever 

flown before. For such a state-of-the-art aircraft, 

the instrumentation was surprisingly old-fashioned, 

in keeping with Johnson’s preference for tried-andtrue systems.

The pilots also practiced aerial refueling with Air 

Force tanker crews. The first successful hook-up 

occurred in early 1963. An Agency engineer on 

the project recalled that connecting with the boom 

hanging from the back of the KC-135s at around 

30,000 feet was tricky. The tanker had to fly as fast 

as it could, while the A-12 was throttled way back, 

practically stalling out when it filled its tanks.1

Some achievements came quickly. The first 

supersonic flight occurred within a week after 

testing began, and a speed of Mach 2.16 and an 

altitude of 60,000 feet were achieved in November 

1962. But further progress could not be made 

because of delays in delivering the J58 engines and 

inadequacies in those that arrived. “By the end of 

the year,” complained McCone, “it appears we will 

have barely enough J58 engines to support the flight 

test program adequately.”2 One of the two flight test 

aircraft used two J75 engines, and the other used 

one J75 and one J58. The first A-12 equipped 

with two J58s flew on 15 January 1963. Ten of the 

engines were available by the end of the month, and 

from then on all A-12s but the trainer were fitted with 

the required propulsion system.

Other performance benchmarks were reached 

slowly because of continued difficulty sustaining 

Mach 3 speeds. The first flight to fly briefly at Mach 

3 was in July 1963, and the first sustained flight at 

operational conditions—Mach 3.2 at 83,000 feet for 

10 minutes—did not take place until February 1964. 

A year later, the A-12 fleet had made 1,234 flights 

totaling almost 1,745 hours, but only 80 of them had 

been at Mach 3 or faster (one reached Mach 3.27) 

and for a total of only just over 13 hours.3 

Progress came more quickly during the 

rest of 1965 and into 1966. Following a one-hourand-forty-minute, 3,000-mile flight mostly above 

Mach 3.1 in January 1965, an operationally outfitted 

A-12 (Article 128, not a test aircraft) first attained 

Mach 3 in March. Peak speed and altitude—Mach 

3.29 (over 2,200 mph) at 90,000 feet—were 

reached by separate aircraft in May and August; 

289 flights above Mach 3 lasting over 84 hours were 

made by October; a maximum stress flight of nearly 

six-and-a-half hours was completed in November, 

with portions at peak speed and altitude; and as of 

mid-March 1966, over 146 out of nearly 2,750 hours 

flown were above Mach 3.4 

Not surprisingly, people living around the test site 

and along the flightpaths filed many complaints 

about sonic booms, especially after the public 

announcement about the OXCART project in 

February 1964. Another consequence of all this 

flight activity was an increase in UFO reports. As with 

the U-2 in the 1950s, there is a strong correlation 

between the A-12 flight schedule and “alien aircraft” 

sightings submitted in the early and mid-1960s.5

Many other hurdles besides the engines had to be 

surmounted, turning OXCART into a regular “fouralarm fire” that undermined CIA’s “reputation for 

doing things on the cheap [and] quickly,” according 

to Bud Wheelon.6 In April 1963, after assessing the 

capabilities of the Soviet Union’s new computer1Norman Nelson, quoted in Rich and Janos, 223.

2McIninch, 13.

3“Briefing Note for the Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: OXCART Status Report,” 26 February 1965.

4[OSA,] “Project OXCART and Operation BLACK SHIELD Briefing Notes,” 20 October 1965; Memorandum from CIA Acting 

Director of Special Activities to CIA Assistant to the Director of Reconnaissance, “OXCART Status Report,” 18 March 1966; [OSA,] 

OXCART Development Summary and Progress (1 October 1966–31 December 1966),” 31 December 1966; OSA, “Report—

OXCART A-12 Aircraft Experience Data and Systems Reliability,” 15 January 1968.
22

equipped TALL KING radar, CIA directed Lockheed 

to rebuild the chines to change the A-12’s RCS—an 

expensive and, it turned out, undesirable change.7

Costs soared as a result of other miscalculations, 

delays, and difficulties. By late November 1963, 

McCone reported to President Johnson that $400 

million had been spent, and $300 million more would 

be needed, to produce the 15 OXCART aircraft CIA 

and the Air Force had ordered.8

Some of the problems encountered were mundane, 

but serious nonetheless. One was foreign object 

damage, which by July 1963 had resulted in 18 engine 

removals and extensive nacelle modifications.9

During the aircraft’s assembly at Burbank, small 

items such as bolts, nuts, screws, pens, and metal 

shavings would fall into the nacelles. When the 

engines were started at the test site, these objects 

were pulled into the power plant and damaged its 

internal parts. Taking X-rays, shaking the nacelles, 

installing screens over air inlets, and even having 

workers wear coveralls without breast pockets 

largely controlled the problem.

Another issue was debris on the taxiways and 

runway. Like huge vacuum cleaners, the giant 

J58 engines would suck up anything loose on the 

pavement—fasteners, clamps, rocks, chunks of 

asphalt—as they propelled the A-12 toward takeoff. 

Site personnel had to sweep and vacuum the 

runway before each test flight.

Although most of the A-12’s systems proved 

acceptably reliable in the less stressful earlier 

phases of testing, other difficulties arose as the 

aircraft was put through longer flights at higher 

speeds and temperatures. As late as March 1965 

the inlet control was still a problem, even after 

well over 10,000 wind tunnel tests, and several 

months later electrical problems caused by high 

temperatures persisted. Failed wiring connectors 

and components incapacitated the inlet controls, 

communications equipment, ECM systems, and 

cockpit instruments. The superhot temperatures, 

structural flexing, vibrations, and sonic shock were 

more than the materials could stand. Much of the 

aircraft had to be rewired, and electrical components 

required redesign.

Crashes

During the first three years of pre-operational 

testing, three A-12s crashed—two from mechanical 

malfunctions, one because of ground crew error. All 

pilots ejected safely. The first loss, of Article 123, 

occurred on 24 May 1963 during a low-altitude, 

5Haines, 73.

6Richelson, 98.

7Johnson, “History of the OXCART Program,” 14.

8McCone memorandum for the record, “Meeting with the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Bundy and DCI,” 

29 November 1963.

9Chief/OSA Aircraft Systems Division memorandum for the record, “Factors Affecting A-12 Flight Test and Mach Number Extension,” 

21 July 1963.

A rare photo of an airborne A-12 with landing gear visible, here on its second flight ever.
Full Stress Testing 23

subsonic flight to test an inertial navigation system. 

While flying in heavy clouds above 30,000 feet, CIA 

pilot Ken Collins saw erroneous and confusing air 

speed and altitude readings just before the A-12 

pitched up, stalled, and went into an inverted spin. 

Unable to regain control of the aircraft, Collins 

“punched out” at around 25,000 feet. The A-12 

spiraled down and crashed.

After parachuting to earth, Collins made his way 

back to the test site. Wearing a standard fabric 

flight suit, he avoided having to make difficult 

explanations to protect OXCART’s cover. According 

to the story given to the press, the accident involved 

an F-105. The wreckage was recovered in two days, 

and witnesses were identified and required to sign 

secrecy agreements. The A-12 fleet was grounded 

for a week until the cause was determined. So 

great was the need to find out what went wrong that 

Collins willingly took truth serum to help his memory. 

Finally, the inquiry concluded that ice had plugged 

a tube used to determine airspeed, causing faulty 

readings that led to the stall and spin.

The next crash occurred on 9 July 1964 while Article 

133 was approaching the runway after a Mach 3 

check flight. At about 500 feet and 230 mph the 

aircraft began a steady leftward roll that Lockheed 

test pilot Bill Parks could not correct. A component 

of the roll-and-pitch control had frozen. Although 

only about 200 feet off the ground when he ejected, 

Parks escaped injury. No news of the accident 

filtered out of the test site.

On 28 December 1965, barely a month after the 

A-12 was declared operationally ready, Article 126 

crashed less than 30 seconds after takeoff because 

an electrician had crossed the wiring to the yaw and 

pitch gyros, in effect reversing the aircraft’s controls 

and making it unflyable. Like Parks, CIA pilot Mele 

Vojvodich ejected close to the ground but was not 

injured. DCI William Raborn ordered an investigation 

into the possibility of sabotage. Simple negligence 

was found to be the cause, and Lockheed instituted 

stringent corrective measures. As with the previous 

crash, there was no publicity about the incident.

Amid increasing concern that the A-12 would not be 

ready in time for its planned mission to East Asia 

(Operation BLACK SHIELD), the senior CIA project 

officer, John Parangosky, met with Kelly Johnson 

on 3 August 1965 to discuss the problems. They 

had a frank discussion, and Johnson decided that 

he needed to assign more top-level supervisors to 

OXCART and move to the test site himself full time 

if the A-12’s remaining flaws were to be worked out 

expeditiously. He wrote in his log that

I uncovered many items of a managerial, 

materiel and design nature...I had meetings 

with vendors to improve their operation... 

Changed supervision and had daily talks 

with them, going over in detail all problems 

on the aircraft...Increased the supervision in 

the electrical group by 500%...We tightened 

up inspection procedures a great deal and 

made inspection stick.

It appears that the problems are one-third 

due to bum engineering...The addition of 

so many systems to the A-12 has greatly 

complicated the problems, but we did solve 

the overall problem.10

10Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 98–99.

HIDING OXCART IN PLAIN SIGHT
26

YF-12A
Hiding OXCART in Plain Sight 27

While the A-12 was being tested and refined, US officials mulled over two major issues 

concerning it. The first was whether to publicly 

disclose the OXCART program. The Department 

of Defense had grown concerned that it could not 

overtly explain all the money the Air Force was 

spending on its versions of the A-12. At the same 

time, some CIA and Pentagon officials recognized 

that crashes or sightings of test flights could 

compromise the project. With a turning radius of no 

less than 86 miles at full speed, the A-12 overflew 

a vast expanse of unrestricted territory. Soon after 

the first flights in April 1962, CIA and the Air Force 

changed the program’s cover story from involving 

an interceptor aircraft to a multipurpose satellite 

launch system.1

In late 1962 and early 1963 the Department of 

Defense considered surfacing the YF-12A to 

provide a cover, reasoning that divulging the 

existence of a purely tactical aircraft would not 

reveal any clandestine collection capabilities. 

Voiced principally by CIA officials and James 

Killian and Edwin Land of the President’s Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the contrary 

argument—disclosing any version of the A-12 would 

compromise its design innovations, enable the 

Soviets to develop countermeasures, and destroy 

its value for reconnaissance—prevailed for the 

time being. The surfacing issue lingered, however, 

because OXCART technology would be useful for 

the Air Force’s supersonic B-70 bomber then under 

development, and for the proposed commercial 

supersonic transport that Congress was thinking 

about subsidizing. President Kennedy told CIA and 

the Pentagon to develop a plan for surfacing the 

OXCART program but to wait further instructions 

before proceeding.

By early 1964 the argument for disclosure had 

become persuasive. More A-12s were arriving at 

the test site and making more flights. The aircraft’s 

existence probably would be revealed eventually 

under circumstances the US government could not 

control, such as a training accident or equipment 

malfunction, or through a news leak. Commercial 

airline crews had sighted the A-12 in flight, and 

the editor of Aviation Week indicated that he knew 

about highly secret activities at the Skunk Works 

and would not let another publication scoop him. A 

key factor was that the Soviets’ TALL KING radar 

would be able to identify and track the A-12 despite 

its small, nonpersistent radar return. Finally, the 

White House’s reluctance to resume flights over 

Soviet territory would soon force a change in the 

A-12’s mission. Instead of flying over denied areas 

to collect strategic intelligence, it would most likely 

be used as a quick-reaction surveillance platform 

in fast-moving conflicts—a tactical function the Air 

Force should carry out, not CIA.2

On 29 February 1964, the National Security 

Council decided to surface OXCART. Later that 

day, the White House announced the successful 

development of an

advanced experimental aircraft, the A‐11, 

which has been tested in sustained flight 

at more than 2,000 miles per hour and 

at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The 

performance of the A-11 far exceeds that 

of any other aircraft in the world today. 

The development of this aircraft has been 

made possible by major advances in aircraft 

technology of great significance for both 

military and commercial applications. The 

A‐11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force Base 

are undergoing extensive tests to determine 

their capabilities as long-range interceptors.3

For security reasons, the Air Force’s YF-12A 

interceptor was surfaced, not the A-12, and it 

was referred to as the A-11, at Kelly Johnson’s 

suggestion. None of the aircraft were already at 

Edwards, so two had to be rushed from the test 

site to support the cover story. Johnson recalled 

that “the aircraft were so hot that when they were 

moved into the new hanger the fire extinguishing 

nozzles came on and gave us a free wash job.”4

Testing of the A-12s continued at the secret facility; 

CIA’s involvement in the project remained classified, 

although it was widely assumed.

Surfacing the “A-11” unexpectedly embroiled 

program managers and technicians in a debate 

over using an OXCART aircraft to publicly set a 

world speed record. The presidential announcement 

stated that “[t]he world record for aircraft speed, 

1Scoville to Joseph Charyk (Undersecretary of the Air Force), “Interdepartmental Cover Support for Project OXCART,” 29 May 1962.

2McCone untitled memorandum to DDCI Marshall Carter, 10 February 1964; “Briefing Note for the Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence...Factors Influencing Decision to Surface the A-11,” 10 March 1964.

3Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, 1:322-23.

4Johnson, “History of the OXCART Program,” 15-16.
28

currently held by the Soviets [1,665 mph], has been 

repeatedly broken in secrecy by the...A-11. The 

President has instructed the Department of Defense 

to demonstrate this capability with the procedure 

which, according to international rules, will permit 

the result of the test to be entered as a new world 

record.” CIA leaders strongly opposed using any of 

the A-12s to attempt this aeronautical feat. Of the 

four aircraft used in test flights, only Article 121 had 

reached the cited speed. Using it in the record trials 

would set back the testing schedule, jeopardize the 

aircraft, and undermine the security of the program 

because the differences between the CIA and Air 

Force versions would be noticed, and the record 

would have to be set under the auspices of an 

uncleared international aviation organization.5

Consequently, the A-12 was kept out of the 

competition. No YF-12As were put forward right 

away because managers of that program were 

concentrating on armaments rather than speed. At 

the time, the interceptor had not flown above Mach 

2.6. A plane was not ready for the speed trial for over 

a year. Then on 1 May 1965, a YF-12A set speed 

and altitude records of 2,070.1 mph and 80,257.65 

feet—the first of many for OXCART aircraft.

5Jack C. Ledford (Assistant Director, OSA) memorandum to Wheelon, “Effect on OXCART Program if Aircraft S/N 121 is Used 

for Speed Record Attempt,” 19 August 1964; Ledford memorandum to McCone, “Effect of Using OXCART 121 for Speed 

Record Attempt,” 20 August 1964; Carter letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance, 24 August 1964; Cunningham 

memorandum to McCone, “Establishment of World Record of Aircraft Speed by the A-11,” 28 April 1964.
FINDING A MISSION
30

All of the OXCART’s operational missions were flown 

out of Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, shown here.
Finding a Mission 31

Facing changed circumstances in relations with the Soviet Union and in US satellite 

development, US policymakers and intelligence 

officials had to come to grips with how best to use the 

A-12 as it neared completion. Its intended purpose, 

replacing the U-2 in overflights of the Soviet Union, 

had become less and less likely well before the A-12 

was operational. Soviet air defenses had advanced 

to the point that even an aircraft flying faster than a 

rifle bullet at the edge of space could be tracked. In 

any event, President Kennedy had stated publicly 

that the United States would not resume such 

missions. DCI McCone was determined to find 

a use for the aircraft—which he later described 

as “quite invulnerable except under miraculous 

circumstances” when it met design specifications.1

But he lost the argument then, as well as later, when 

making the case for deploying the A-12 to help 

determine whether the Soviets had constructed an 

antiballistic missile system around Leningrad. By 

1965, moreover, the photoreconnaissance satellite 

programs had progressed to the point that manned 

flights over the Soviet Union were unnecessary to 

collect strategic intelligence.

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 drew 

attention to the OXCART program because of the 

threat the U-2 faced from Cuban air defenses. U-2s 

regularly overflew the island after nuclear missiles 

were discovered there in mid-October, but two 

weeks after the discovery, a U-2 was shot down 

by a Cuban surface-to-air missile. Regular highaltitude reconnaissance of Cuba might no longer 

be possible. The A-12 now had a potential mission, 

and achieving operational status became a priority. 

Because of continued difficulties in achieving design 

requirements with the J58 engine, however, the 

A-12 would have to be flown only at up to Mach 2.8 

at below 80,000 feet.

This risky program, codenamed SKYLARK, was 

accelerated during the summer of 1964, after Soviet 

Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared that after the US 

elections in November, U-2s flying over Cuba would 

be shot down. In August, Acting DCI Marshall Carter 

ordered that SKYLARK be operationally ready by 

5 November 1964 in case Khrushchev carried out 

his threat.2 A detachment of five pilots and ground 

crew was organized to validate camera performance 

and qualify pilots for Mach 2.8 operations. They 

would have to go into action without the full 

complement of ECMs, as only one of the several 

devices planned would be available by the deadline, 

and Agency technical officers were certain that the 

Cubans would detect the flights and could shoot 

down the A-12s.

In the end, Khrushchev’s threat was bluster, and 

the A-12 never was used against Cuba. US officials 

were still discussing the possibility nearly two years 

later, however, and CIA officials regarded Cuban 

overflights as a potentially productive way to test the 

A-12’s ECMs in a hostile area where weather was 

a factor. Agency analysts judged that the Soviets 

most likely would react to the flights privately and in 

low key. The 303 Committee—the NSC group that 

reviewed sensitive intelligence operations—rejected 

the idea because it “would disturb the existing calm 

prevailing in that area of our foreign affairs.”3

East Asia was the next area US leaders considered 

using the A-12. The People’s Republic of China 

(PRC) had successfully tested a nuclear device in 

October 1964, and US military activity in Vietnam 

was increasing. Overhead collection would be the 

most important method for monitoring the Chinese 

program and the military situation in Vietnam, but 

satellites did not have a quick reaction capability, 

and several U-2s and drones had been lost over 

China. US military and intelligence officials drew up 

a plan for flying OXCART aircraft out of Kadena Air 

Base on Okinawa under a program called BLACK 

SHIELD. The Pentagon made available nearly 

$4 million to provide support facilities on the island, 

which were to be ready by early fall 1965.

Meanwhile, North Vietnam was starting to deploy 

SAMs around Hanoi, and a concerned Secretary 

of Defense McNamara inquired in June 1965 about 

substituting A-12s for U-2s for reconnaissance over 

the North. CIA said that BLACK SHIELD missions 

could be flown over Vietnam as soon as operational 

1McCone memorandum for the record, “Discussion at NSC Meeting—5 May 1964,” 5 May 1964.

2Carter memorandum to Wheelon, “SKYLARK,” 22 August 1964.

3[DS&T,] “Vulnerability of the OXCART Vehicle to the Cuban Air Defense System,” 15 September 1964; NRO Acting Director 

memorandum to Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs et al., “OXCART Reconnaissance of Cuba,” 6 September 1966; 

Peter Jessup (NSC) memorandum, “Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 September 1966,” 16 September 1966; 

Wheelon to McCone, “Considerations bearing on OXCART use over Cuba,” 7 September 1966; CIA Board of National Estimates to 

Helms, “Probable Communist Reactions to Use of the OXCART for Reconnaissance over Cuba,” 6 September 1966; Pedlow and 

Welzenbach, 44. 
32

performance requirements were achieved. With an 

overseas deployment looming, personnel at the 

A-12 test site went all out to have the aircraft meet 

mission requirements by late 1965. Improvements 

came faster than expected.

In August, DCI Raborn, who replaced McCone in 

April 1965, notified President Johnson that an A-12 

had successfully simulated an operational mission 

with two refuelings and three cruise legs. On each 

leg the aircraft reached its design cruising speed of 

Mach 3.1 at altitudes between 80,000 and 90,000 

feet. The flight covered a total distance of 7,480 

miles in just under five and a half hours; forty percent 

of that time was spent at cruising speed. Only three 

minor malfunctions occurred; significantly, none 

involved the air inlets and electrical systems or were 

related to high heat.4 

“The Bird Should Leave Its Nest”

Kelly Johnson’s firm managerial hand had gotten 

OXCART back on track. Four A-12s were selected 

for BLACK SHIELD, and final validation flights were 

conducted during the fall. During them, the A-12s 

flew faster, higher, and longer than ever before. On 

12 November 1965, the CIA’s director of special 

activities in charge of the program wrote to the 

Agency’s director of reconnaissance that he was 

“very pleased to announce that, in my judgment, 

the A-12 aircraft, its technical intelligence sensors, 

and its operating detachment are operationally 

ready.... The detachment is manned, equipped, and 

highly trained.... The aircraft system is performing 

up to specifications with satisfying reliability and 

repeatability.” Because of “some as yet unexplainable 

phenomena at cruise conditions,” the A-12 could not 

fly as far as originally intended, but missions could 

be designed to take that deficiency into account. By 

20 November, the validation flights were complete, 

and all the pilots were Mach 3 qualified. Two days 

later, Johnson told the Agency that “the time has 

come when the bird should leave its nest.”5 

Soon after, CIA’s Board of National Estimates (BNE) 

issued an assessment of the potential political 

implications of BLACK SHIELD. The Agency’s 

most senior analysts judged that the PRC would 

quickly track overflights of its territory but would not 

start a diplomatic controversy about them unless 

it shot down an aircraft. Doing so would occasion 

a major political and propaganda campaign, but 

“[w]e do not believe that OXCART missions, whether 

or not any aircraft came down inside China, would 

significantly affect Peiping’s broader calculations 

governing its policy toward the war in Vietnam.” 

North Vietnam, “already subjected to heavy US 

air attack and reconnaissance...would attach little 

extra significance to the OXCART operation.” Lastly, 

through various sources, the Soviet Union would 

soon get a fairly complete picture of the scope of 

BLACK SHIELD but “would probably take no action 

and make no representations on the matter.”6

Analyses such as the BNE’s informed the approval 

process for proposed OXCART missions. The 

steps were the same as for U-2 flights: an 

NSC-level recommendation and a presidential 

authorization. After the A-12 passed its final tests, 

in early December the 303 Committee ordered the 

development and maintenance of a quick-reaction 

capability by 1 January 1966, with deployment to 

Okinawa 21 days after the president issued his go 

order.

Then, nothing happened for more than a year. 

The 303 Committee approved none of CIA’s five 

deployment requests, submitted with support in 

most instances from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

PFIAB. Community analysts continued to believe 

the Chinese, North Vietnamese, or Soviets would 

not react publicly and belligerently to the missions. 

Siding with top State and Defense officials, however, 

the committee did not believe the intelligence 

requirements at the time—including warning of 

Chinese intervention in the Vietnam war—were so 

urgent as to justify the political risk of basing the 

detachment at Okinawa or revealing some of the 

A-12’s capabilities to hostile nations. 

In addition, some reluctance to use the A-12 was 

related to the discussion that had already begun 

about phasing out the CIA program. In mid-August 

4Raborn, “Memorandum For the President,” 20 August 1965.

5CIA Director of Special Activities to CIA Director of Reconnaissance, “Operational Readiness of the OXCART System,” 12 November 

1965; McIninch, 23.

6Board of National Estimates, “Political Problems Involved in Operating OXCART Missions from Okinawa over Communist China and 

North Vietnam,” 29 November 1965.
Finding a Mission 33

1966, President Johnson listened to the divergent 

views and upheld the 303 Committee’s decision not 

to fly actual missions for the time being.7

Biding Time, Sharpening Procedures

During these months OXCART personnel worked 

on refining mission plans and flight tactics, testing 

the aircraft and systems, training, and preparing 

the forward base at Kadena. The delay was 

beneficial. Even though the A-12 had been declared 

operationally ready, important components in the 

propulsion system still needed correction. More 

efficient procedures reduced the time required to go 

from mission notification to deployment from 21 to 

15 days. Six operationally configured aircraft were 

constantly training and engaging in operational 

flight simulations.

In October 1966, one week after its first flight, Article 

127 flew for seven hours and 40 minutes, the longest 

time in air so far. Two months later, Lockheed 

test pilot Bill Parks completed an impressive 

demonstration of the A-12’s capabilities by flying 

10,198 miles in six hours at an average speed of 

1,659 mph (including slowdowns for refueling)—

setting a speed and distance record unattainable by 

any other aircraft. By mid-February 1967, 2,299 test 

and training flights had been flown over 3,628 hours, 

with more than 332 of those at Mach 3 or higher.8 

The first fatality of the OXCART program occurred 

on 5 January 1967, when Article 125 crashed, 

killing CIA pilot Walter Ray. Because of a faulty fuel 

gauge and related electrical equipment problems, 

the aircraft ran out of fuel while on its descent to 

the test site. Ray ejected at between 30,000 and 

35,000 feet but did not separate from the seat. That 

kept the parachutes from deploying, and he fell to 

earth, dying on impact. To protect the security of 

the A-12 program, the Air Force informed the media 

that an SR-71 was missing and presumed down, 

and identified the pilot as a civilian. Like the three 

crashes that preceded it, Ray’s involved a problem 

inherent in any new aircraft—a malfunction of a part 

specifically designed and built for it. None of the 

four incidents occurred while the A-12 was being 

subjected to the unprecedented rigors of design 

speeds and altitudes.

Missions Begin: Spying on the Enemy

By early 1967, the Johnson administration was 

growing anxious that the North Vietnamese could 

deploy surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) targeted 

at the South without being detected. When the 

president asked for a collection proposal, CIA 

suggested that the A-12 be used, noting that its 

camera was better than those on drones or the U-2, 

and that it was much less vulnerable than those 

platforms and more versatile than the CORONA 

satellites.9 DCI Helms brought up the idea at a 

luncheon with the president on 16 May and got 

his approval. The Agency put the BLACK SHIELD 

deployment plan into effect later that day.

On 17 May, the airlift of personnel and equipment to 

Kadena began, and Articles 131, 127, and 129, flown 

by Vojvodich, Layton, and Weeks, arrived between 

22 and 27 May. The first two flew non-stop from 

Nevada to Kadena; the third diverted at Wake Island 

to correct an equipment malfunction and finished 

the trip the next day. The unit, which at its inception 

had been designated for security purposes as the 

1129th US Air Force Special Activities Squadron 

(SAS), Detachment 1, comprised three A-12s, six 

pilots (three deployed at a time; later two), and over 

250 support personnel. Its commander was Col. 

Hugh “Slip” Slater, who had worked with CIA on 

the U-2 program and at the OXCART test site. The 

1129th SAS was ready for operations by the 29th. 

The call came the next day to fly the first mission on 

the 31st over North Vietnam.

Piloted by Vojvodich (Layton was the secondary, 

and Weeks was the backup), Article 131 took off just 

before 1100 local time in a torrential downpour. The 

A-12 had never operated in heavy rain before, but 

the weather over the target area was forecast to be 

satisfactory, so the flight went ahead. It lasted three 

hours and 39 minutes and was flown at Mach 3.1 at 

80,000 feet. Vojvodich crossed the coast of North 

Vietnam at 1014 local time (Vietnam is two hours 

ahead of Okinawa), flew the planned single-pass 

7Peter Jessup (NSC) memorandum for the President, “Proposed Deployment and Use of A-12 Aircraft,” 11 April 1966; Raborn 

memorandum to the President, “OXCART Deployment Proposal,” 29 April 1966; Raborn memorandum to the 303 Committee, 

“OXCART Deployment,” 15 June 1966; Special National Intelligence Estimate 10-2-66, “Reactions to a Possible US Course of 

Action,” 17 March 1966; “OXCART Development Summary and Progress (1 October 1966-31 December 1966).”

8[OSA,] “Briefing Note for the Director of Central Intelligence...OXCART Status Report,” 15 February 1967

9Helms memorandum to the 303 Committee, “OXCART Reconnaissance of North Vietnam,” with attachment, 15 May 1967.
34

OXCART’s first 

mission over 

Southeast Asia, 

31 May 1967. With 

pilot Vojvodich in the 

cockpit, Article 131 

refueled three times 

during its

3 hour 39 minute 

flight.

This image of 

Hanoi area was 

taken during the 

fourth mission, on 

30 June 1967.
Finding a Mission 35

route in less than nine minutes, refueled over 

Thailand, exited near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) 

at 1122, and touched down at Kadena in the rain at 

1233 local time. 

The mission was a success, photographing 70 of the 

190 known SAM sites and nine other priority targets, 

including an airfield, a military training area, an army 

barracks, and the port at Haiphong. No SSM facilities 

were located. Contrary to some published accounts, 

neither Chinese nor North Vietnamese radar tracked 

the aircraft, nor did North Vietnam fire any missiles 

at it. Those hostile reactions did not occur until the 

third and 16th missions, respectively.10 

Through 6 May 1968—the date of what would 

become the last flight—the A-12 pilots at Kadena 

flew 29 missions out of 58 they were put on alert 

to perform: 24 over North Vietnam; two over 

Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ; and three over North 

Korea. The flights were distributed among the pilots: 

Collins and Layton had six, Vojvodich and Weeks 

got five, Murray did four, and Sullivan was on three. 

The aircraft were flown at between Mach 3.1 and 3.2 

and a bit above 80,000 feet. At that height, above 

the jet stream, air turbulence was minimal, and the 

curvature of the earth showed beneath the black, 

star-flecked sky.

The A-12s’ aeronautical components and 

photographic systems proved very reliable. Twentyseven of the sorties were judged successful, based 

on the quality of photography returned; two were 

deemed partially successful or unsuccessful due to 

cloud cover or a camera malfunction. One mission 

had to be cut short after one pass because of an 

engine problem. None of the 29 cancelled alerts 

were the result of mechanical concerns; bad weather 

caused all but three, which were due to operational 

decisions. The A-12s were so fast that they 

typically spent only about 12.5 minutes over North 

Vietnam on a single-pass mission and 21.5 on a 

double-pass route.

Project headquarters in the Washington DC area 

planned and directed all the A-12 missions. Their 

preparation followed this procedure: Each day at 

1600 local time a mission alert briefing took place. 

If the weather forecast—the key variable in deciding 

whether to go ahead or cancel the sorties—seemed 

favorable, Kadena was alerted and given a flight 

profile about 28 to 30 hours before takeoff. The 

primary and back-up aircraft and pilots were 

selected. The A-12s—painted black and bearing 

no markings other than red tail numbers that were 

changed every mission—got thorough inspections 

and servicing, all systems were checked, and the 

cameras were loaded into the bays. On the evening 

before the day of the flight, the pilots received a 

detailed briefing of the route. Twelve hours before 

takeoff (H minus 12), headquarters again reviewed 

the weather over the target. If it was still favorable, 

preflight procedures continued.

On the morning of the flight, the pilots got a final 

briefing. The aircraft’s condition was reported, 

weather forecasts were reviewed, and changes in 

the mission profile and relevant intelligence was 

communicated. At H minus 2, headquarters issued 

a “go/no-go” decision. At this point the weather 

forecast also had to be good for the refueling areas. 

If the mission was still on, the primary pilot received 

a medical examination, suited up, and squeezed 

himself into the aircraft. If any malfunctions 

developed, the back-up would be ready to fly one 

hour later. This proved necessary only once. On 

the second mission on 10 June 1967, the primary 

A-12 lost a fillet panel during refueling and returned 

to base, and the back-up completed the mission. 

On most BLACK SHIELD flights, the A-12s were 

airborne about four hours. The shortest complete 

mission in Southeast Asia lasted just over 3.5 hours; 

the longest took nearly 5.5 hours. The aircraft took 

on fuel two or three times, depending on the planned 

route, on each operational flight: once, soon after 

takeoff south of Okinawa, and once over Thailand 

for each pass it would make over the target area 

before it returned to Kadena.

After the A-12s landed, the camera film was removed 

from the aircraft, boxed, and sent by courier plane to 

a processing facility. At first the film was developed 

at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. 

That trip took too long for US military commanders 

10[OSA,] “Critique for OXCART Mission BSX001,” 6 June 1967; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 31 May-15 

August 1967,” 22 September 1967, 3-4; National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), “BLACK SHIELD Mission X-001, 31 

May 1967,” NPIC/R-112/67, June 1967; [OSA,] “Critique for OXCART Mission Number BX6705,” 26 June 1967, and “Critique for 

OXCART Mission Number BX6732,” 3 November 1967.
36

who wanted the intelligence more quickly. By late 

summer, processing was shifted to an Air Force 

center in Japan, and the photography could be 

available to the US military in Vietnam within 

24 hours after a mission was completed.

Less than two months into BLACK SHIELD, analysts 

had enough evidence to conclude that North Vietnam 

had never deployed SSMs. By the end of 1967, the 

A-12 had collected clear, interpretable photography 

of all of North Vietnam except for a small area along 

the border with the PRC. The BLACK SHIELD 

missions provided valuable imagery of SAM sites, 

airfields and naval bases, ports, roads, and railroads, 

industrial facilities, power plants, and supply depots. 

Military planners and photo interpreters used the 

information to develop air and air defense order 

of battle estimates, assess bomb damage, and 

develop flight routes and target sets for bombing 

runs, enabling US pilots to accomplish their missions 

more effectively and in greater safety. Analysis of 

photography of the DMZ gave insights into North 

Vietnamese infiltration and supply routes and North 

Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop deployments.11 

President Johnson’s national security adviser, 

Walt Rostow, recounted that the A-12 missions 

(along with those of the SR-71) “were invaluable 

to the president.” Without them, he “would never 

have allowed any tactical air operations in the 

North because he was extremely sensitive...to the 

possibilities of a bomb accidentally hitting a Chinese 

or Russian ship while it was unloading in the 

harbor, and he also was determined to keep civilian 

damage and casualties to a minimum.” Johnson 

“usually chose the targets personally and insisted 

on approving each and every raid into the North.... 

Before signing off on a mission he calculated in 

his own mind whether the anticipated losses were 

worth the anticipated gains.” The A-12 and SR-71 

photographs “were the decisive factors in helping 

him to make up his mind.”12

Under Fire over Vietnam

North Vietnam fired SAMs at BLACK SHIELD A-12s 

three times but caused damage only once. The first 

attempted shootdown occurred on the 16th mission 

on 28 October 1967. Flown by Dennis Sullivan, the 

aircraft was on its second pass, approaching Hanoi 

from the west, when an SA-2 was launched at it. 

Photographs taken during the mission show missile 

smoke above the SAM site and the missile and its 

contrail, heading down and away from the aircraft. 

The A-12’s ECMs worked well, and the SAM, which 

was fired too late, was never a threat.13

The second incident, two days later, on the 18th 

mission, was the closest an OXCART aircraft ever 

came to being shot down. Sullivan again was the 

pilot. On the first pass between Hanoi and Haiphong, 

radar tracking detected two SAM sites preparing to 

launch, but neither did. On the second pass toward 

Hanoi and Haiphong from the west, at least six 

missiles were fired from sites around the capital. The 

A-12 was flying at Mach 3.1 at 84,000 feet. Looking 

out the rear-view periscope, Sullivan reported 

seeing six vapor trails go up to about 90,000 feet 

behind the aircraft, arc over, and begin converging 

on it. He saw four missiles—one as close as 100 

to 200 yards away—and three detonations behind 

the A-12. Six missile contrails appeared on mission 

photography. 

A post-flight inspection at Kadena found that a 

piece of metal, probably debris from an exploded 

missile, had penetrated the lower right wing and 

lodged near the fuel tank. A BLACK SHIELD officer 

at Kadena noted that the A-12 pilots were “showing 

considerable anxiety about overflying this area 

before we get some answers.” Helms ordered that 

missions be temporarily suspended. None was 

flown until 8 December. It and the following one 

two days later photographed the Cambodia-LaosSouth Vietnam triborder area and were not sent 

over the North.14

11OSA mission critiques, 16 June 1967-15 May 1968; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 

1967,” 31 January 1968, and “BLACKSHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968.”

12Quoted in Rich and Janos, 244.

13DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967,” 31 January 1968, 18-22; D/OSA memorandum 

to DDS&T, “Analysis of Surface to Air Missile Engagements for OXCART Missions BX6732 and BX6734,” 27 November 1967.
Finding a Mission 37

Sorties over North Vietnam resumed on 

15 December and continued until 8 March 1968—

the next-to-last BLACK SHIELD flight. The first two 

flights took different paths than the Hanoi-Haiphong 

route followed by the A-12s that were shot at in late 

October. Another SAM was fired on mission 23 on 

4 January 1968; that aircraft took the same route as 

those that had been attacked. The missile, fired on 

the second pass like the others, was captured on 

photography from launch to detonation, well over a 

mile from the aircraft. Two of the next three flights 

over North Vietnam came in from the south rather 

than the east, and all three stayed farther away from 

Hanoi and Haiphong than those that had been shot 

at. The general times when these flights were made 

did not change despite the SAM attacks; all crossed 

into North Vietnamese territory in the late morning.15

Looking for the Pueblo

The North Korean seizure of the US Navy ship 

Pueblo while it was on a SIGINT mission in 

international waters on 23 January 1968 enabled 

the A-12 to demonstrate its superiority as a quickreaction collection platform. Although the US 

military had indicated its interest in BLACK SHIELD 

overflights of North Korea even before the incident, 

the Department of State had opposed them, and 

none was planned when the Pueblo was captured. 

Walt Rostow remembered that “[t]he whole country 

was up in arms over this incident. The president 

was considering using airpower to hit them [the 

North Koreans] hard and try to shake our crewmen 

loose. But when we cooled down, we had to suck in 

our gut and hold back until we were sure about the 

situation.”

Helms urged use of the A-12 to find the missing 

ship. Johnson was reluctant at first to offer such a 

“tempting target” but was assured that the aircraft 

“could photograph the whole of North Korea, from 

the DMZ to the Yalu River, in less than 10 minutes, 

14DDS&T Carl Duckett memorandum to DCI Richard Helms, “OXCART Operations on 27, 28, 29 October (local time)”; DS&T, 

“BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967,” 31 January 1968, 25-35; D/OSA memorandum 

to DDS&T, “Analysis of Surface to Air Missile Engagements for OXCART Missions BX6732 and BX6734,” 27 November 1967; 

Cable OPCEN 2898, 30 October 1967; Cable from Kadena, IN 91487, 1 November 1967; Donald Smith (EA/DDCI) untitled 

memorandum to Duckett, 6 November 1967. 

15DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 16 August-31 December 1967,” 36-39; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance 

Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968,” 30 April 1968, 3-8, 10-11, 13-14.

The photo above was taken by Article 

131 on 26 January 1968, the only time an 

A‐12 camera took an image of the Pueblo. 

On 6 May 1968, Article 127 made the last 

operational reconnaissance flight of an 

A-12, making two passes over the Korean 

Peninsula. 
38

and probably do so unobserved by air defense 

radar. Which is precisely what happened.”16

On 24 January the Pueblo advisory group—

comprising senior officials from the White House, the 

Departments of Defense and State, and CIA—had 

Helms draw up a reconnaissance plan that included 

A-12s. President Johnson approved their use later 

that day.17 On the 26th, Jack Weeks flew a threepass mission over the southern part of North Korea 

and the Demilitarized Zone. The purpose was to 

determine whether Pyongyang, which claimed it had 

caught the United States spying inside its territorial 

waters, was mobilizing for hostilities. Chinese radar 

tracked the A-12, but no missiles were fired during 

the highly successful mission.

Substantial intelligence was acquired on North 

Korea’s armed forces; no signs of a military 

reaction were detected; and the Pueblo, apparently 

undamaged, was found in a small bay north of 

Wonsan accompanied by two patrol boats.18

“So we had to abandon any plans to hit them 

with airpower,” according to Rostow. “All that 

would accomplish would be to kill a lot of people, 

including our own.” But the A-12’s photographs 

“provided proof that our ship and our men were 

being held. The Koreans couldn’t lie about that, 

and we immediately began negotiations to get them 

back.”19 After difficult and protracted discussions, 

North Korea released the surviving crewmembers 

11 months later.

The US military wanted a second overflight of North 

Korea, but the Pueblo advisory group decided not 

to recommend any more right away because the 

“excellent” photography taken on the 26th, along 

with other information, was deemed sufficient to 

answer the crucial questions. By mid-February, 

however, the need returned. After the Department 

of State accepted assurances that it was highly 

unlikely the A-12 would come down in hostile 

territory if something went wrong, the 303 Committee 

approved two more missions over the peninsula. 

They were flown on 19 February and 6 May. On 

the first sortie, scattered clouds concealed the area 

where the Pueblo had been spotted. (The ship had 

been moved by then.) The second flight—the last 

A-12 mission, as it turned out—was piloted by Jack 

Layton. Like the other missions over North Korea, it 

found no sign of a military buildup.20

16Quoted in Rich and Janos, 245.

17“Summary Minutes of Pueblo Group” and “Notes of the President’s Meeting,” both 24 January 1968, Foreign Relations of the United 

States, XXIX, Part 1, Korea, 474, 475, 494; Helms memorandum to Walt W. Rostow et al., “OXCART Reconnaissance of North 

Korea,” 24 January 1968.

18NPIC, “North Korea Mission BX 6847, 26 January 1968, Highlights,” NPIC/R-17/68, January 1968; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD 

Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968,” 30 April 1968, 8-10.

19Quoted in Rich and Janos, 245.

20Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA) memorandum to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Requirement for a Second BLACK SHIELD 

Mission Over North Korea,” 29 January 1968; “Report on Meeting of the [Pueblo] Advisory Group” and “Notes of the President’s 

Luncheon Meeting with Senior American Advisors,” both 29 January 1968, FRUS, XXIX, Part 1, 557, 565; DS&T, “BLACK SHIELD 

Reconnaissance Missions, 1 January-31 March 1968,” 30 April 1968, 11, and “BLACK SHIELD Reconnaissance Missions, 1 April-9 

June 1968,” 7 August 1968, 2-3; CIA Intelligence Information Cable, “Implications of Reported Relocation of USS Pueblo,” 12 

February 1968, Declassified Documents Reference System, doc. no. CK3100137943.
A FUTILE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL
40

With the OXCART program cancelled, the A-12s flew back to the United States and were placed 

in storage.
A Futile Fight for Survival 41

aircraft would remain uniquely capable of conducting 

tactical reconnaissance missions during periods of 

international tension and hostilities but that toward 

the end of the decade certain satellites and drones 

could supplant them.2 

On 12 December 1966—more than five months 

before Article 131 would fly the A-12’s first 

operational mission—four senior US officials met to 

consider the options. Over DCI Helms’s objections, 

Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance, BOB 

Director Charles Schultze, and presidential scientific 

advisor Donald Hornig decided on the third course. 

The United States would end the A-12 program. 

Hoping in some way to keep a supersonic 

reconnaissance capability for the Agency, Helms 

then asked that the SR-71s be shared between 

CIA and the Air Force. After hearing that the SR-71 

most likely would not be ready by the time the A-12s 

were taken out of service and that its performance 

characteristics made it more vulnerable than the 

CIA aircraft, the DCI again urged continuation of the 

A-12 program. In late December, however, President 

Johnson chose to close it down by 1 January 1968.3 

CIA now had to develop a plan for decommissioning 

the A-12. Project managers informed Vance on 10 

January that four aircraft would be placed in storage 

in June 1967, two more by December, and the last 

four by the end of January 1968. (The sequencing 

changed later on.) On the personnel side, over 

2,000 government and contractor employees, 

including 420 from CIA and the Air Force, would also 

have to be reassigned or dismissed. In May, Vance 

directed that the SR-71 take over the contingency 

responsibility for Cuban overflights as of 1 July 

and that it handle all Southeast Asia missions by 1 

December. In the meantime, the A-12 detachment 

was to maintain its capability to deploy to East Asia 

in 15 days and over Cuba in seven.4 

All this planning took place before the A-12 had flown 

a single mission. Once those began in May 1967 

and produced very useful intelligence, and with the 

SR-71 not ready yet, high-level US officials—notably 

Two major ironies run through the history of the A-12. One is that it was never used for its 

intended purpose of overflying the Soviet Union to 

collect strategic intelligence on Moscow’s nuclear 

weapons capabilities, and instead was deployed 

as a tactical collection platform in a conventional 

military conflict. The other is that just as the A-12 

was about to be declared operationally ready, US 

policymakers had decided to replace it with the 

Air Force’s OXCART reconnaissance variant, the 

SR-71. The most advanced aircraft ever built was 

decommissioned after less than a year in service, 

not from any shortcomings in its design but because 

of fiscal pressures and competition between the 

reconnaissance programs of CIA and the Air Force.

The first step in the A-12’s phase-out came in 

November 1965, when the Bureau of the Budget 

(BOB) expressed concern about the costs of the 

two programs. It questioned both the total number of 

aircraft required for the combined fleets and the need 

for a separate CIA unit. Among several alternatives, 

BOB recommended closing down the A-12 program 

by September 1966 and halting acquisition of more 

SR-71s. It asked CIA and the Pentagon to explore 

the options. A senior OXCART manager summed up 

CIA’s position: the BOB proposal would “deny the 

United States Government a non-military capability 

to conduct aerial reconnaissance of denied areas in 

the world in the years ahead.” Secretary of Defense 

McNamara rejected the BOB recommendation, 

probably because the SR-71 would not be mission 

ready by that date.1

Nothing more happened on the matter until June 

1966, when a study group that BOB proposed 

was set up to look at ways to reduce expenses in 

the OXCART program. The group, which included 

representatives of BOB, CIA, and the Pentagon, 

identified three alternative courses: continue both 

fleets at current levels; mothball all A-12s while 

sharing SR-71s between CIA and the Strategic Air 

Command (SAC); or—assuming the SR-71 was 

available by then—end the A-12 program in January 

1968 and assign all missions to the Air Force fleet. 

The group noted that for the next several years, both 

1Ledford, “Briefing Note for the Director of Central Intelligence...Bureau of the Budget Recommendations for the OXCART Program,” 

16 November 1965.

2C. William Fischer (BOB), Herbert D. Benington (DOD), and John Parangosky (CIA), “Advanced Reconnaissance Aircraft Study,” 

November 1966. 

3Parangosky memorandum for the record, “12 December 1966 Meeting with Mr. Helms re OXCART/SR-71,” 15 December 1966; 

DDCI Rufus Taylor memorandum to Helms, “Reduction of A-12/SR-71 Fleets,” 29 December 1966.

4[OSA,] “Briefing Note for the Director of Central Intelligence...OXCART Status Report,” 15 February 1967; Helms memorandum to 

Rusk, “OXCART,” 28 July 1967; Vance memorandum for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff et al., “SR-71 Plans,” 9 May 1967.
42

the president’s national security adviser, the PFIAB, 

and the president’s Scientific Advisory Committee—

and some members of Congress started having 

reservations about stopping the CIA program. 

Administration officials considered extending the 

A-12’s operational mission beyond the end of the 

year. Helms pressed the Pentagon for a decision 

soon because maintenance and readiness would 

suffer with further delay, but the administration took 

no immediate action.5

One way to help decide whether to keep one or both 

aircraft was to determine which performed better. 

CIA contended that the A-12 did because it flew 

higher and faster and had superior cameras. The Air 

Force countered that the SR-71 was preferable for 

intelligence purposes because it had three different 

cameras—for area search, spotting, and mapping—

and carried sensors the A-12 did not at the time—

infrared detectors, side-looking airborne radar, and 

ELINT-collection devices needed for its mission of 

post-nuclear-strike reconnaissance. 

To resolve the question, the aircraft competed 

one-on-one in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. 

Between 20 October and 3 November 1967, A-12s 

and SR-71s flew three identical routes along the 

Mississippi River about one hour apart with their 

collection systems on. Representatives from CIA, 

the National Photographic Interpretation Center, 

the Defense Intelligence Agency, and other military 

intelligence organizations evaluated the data 

collected. The results were inconclusive. The A-12’s 

camera worked better—it had a wider swath and 

higher resolution—but the SR-71 collected types 

of intelligence the CIA aircraft could not, although 

not yet of very good quality.6 However, some of its 

sensors would have to be removed to make room for 

ECM gear—a salient point now that North Vietnam 

had shot at two BLACK SHIELD aircraft.

Because of its track record and continued delays with 

the SR-71, the A-12 won a temporary reprieve in late 

November 1967 when the Johnson administration 

decided to keep both fleets temporarily. A month 

later, the Pentagon announced that five A-12s would 

be kept operational through 30 June 1968 while the 

SR-71 was prepared to begin missions over North 

Vietnam “as rapidly as ECM implementation and 

other program considerations will permit.”

With expenditures of the Vietnam War rising 

steadily, US policymakers revisited the question. 

Another study of the subject was completed in 

the spring of 1968. It came up with new scenarios 

involving combinations of closures, transfers, and 

decommissioning, along with the Air Force takeover 

and status quo options. Helms did not bend and 

argued for the last, underscoring the importance 

of a covert reconnaissance capability under 

civilian management.7 

On 16 May 1968, however, the new secretary 

of defense, Clark Clifford, reaffirmed the original 

decision to end the A-12 program and mothball 

the aircraft. The president concurred five days 

later. The A-12 sortie on 8 May would be its last. 

Agency personnel at Kadena started packing up 

and preparing to return home. Project headquarters 

designated 8 June as the earliest date for phasing 

out all the aircraft. Those at the test site were placed 

in storage in a hangar at Palmdale, California, and 

those at Kadena were readied for flights back.

The second pilot fatality in the program occurred 

during this drawdown. On 4 June 1968 Jack Weeks 

was in Article 129 on a checkout flight after an engine 

change for the trip to the United States. He was last 

heard from 520 miles east of Manila. No trace of the 

plane was found, and an investigation turned up no 

clue about the cause of the crash. Signals received 

about a half hour into the flight from the onboard 

BIRDWATCHER monitoring system indicated 

engine trouble; a catastrophic failure was the most 

likely explanation.8

The other two A-12s left Okinawa on 8 and 19 

June. Frank Murray made the final flight of an A-12, 

in Article 131, on 21 June from the Nevada test 

facility to the California storage site. The only major 

components of the aircraft that could be salvaged 

for its successor were the J58 engines. The PerkinElmer Type I’s were too big to fit in the SR-71’s 

camera bay.

5Helms letter to McNamara, 13 September 1967; [National Reconnaissance Office,] “NRP Executive Committee, Minutes of Meeting 

Held September 29, 1967, Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense,” 29 September 1967.

6Duckett memorandum to Helms, “OXCART/SR-71 Information for EXCOM Meeting,” 19 December 1967.

7Helms memorandum to Paul Nitze (DOD) and Hornig, “Considerations Affecting OXCART Program Phaseout,” 18 April 1968.

8OSA memorandum to Lockheed, “A-12 Accident Report—Aircraft 129,” 21 June 1968.
A Futile Fight for Survival 43

On 26 June, the A-12 operational pilots—Ken 

Collins, Jack Layton, Frank Murray, Dennis Sullivan, 

Mele Vojvodich, and Jack Weeks (posthumously)—

were awarded the CIA Intelligence Star for valor. 

Other members of the 1129th SAS, nicknamed the 

Roadrunners, received awards as well. The unit’s 

commander, Col. Slater, and his deputy, Col. Maynard 

“Am” Amundson, were given the Air Force Legion of 

Merit, and the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award was 

presented to all the detachment’s members. The 

pilots’ wives attended the ceremony and learned for 

the first time what their husbands really had been 

doing for the past several years. Kelly Johnson, a 

guest speaker at the event, gave a moving address 

in which he lamented the demise of the enterprise 

that represented his pinnacle accomplishment as 

Lockheed’s most creative aeronautical engineer. 

Two days earlier, he had written that “[i]t’s a 

bleak end for a program that has been overall as 

successful as this.”9

Assessing the A-12’s Contribution

The value of the A-12 must be determined by two 

standards: aviation and intelligence. In the first 

instance, the OXCART program must be judged 

a categorical success. It produced what it was 

intended to: a reconnaissance aircraft that could fly 

at unprecedented speeds and heights for unequaled 

ranges, and was essentially invulnerable to 

enemy attack. OXCART represented a pioneering 

accomplishment in aeronautical engineering. Well 

over 40 years after it first flew, the A-12’s maximum 

speed and altitude have not been equaled by a 

piloted operational jet aircraft. The exceptionally 

demanding design requirements for speed, altitude, 

and stealth produced innovations in aerodynamic 

design, engine performance, cameras, metallurgy, 

use of nonmetallic materials, ECMs, RCS 

suppression, and life support systems that were 

used for years after and helped lay the foundation 

for future stealth research. Finally, no A-12 or its 

operational successor, the SR-71, was shot down 

despite hundreds of attempts while they conducted 

nearly 3,600 operational missions over nearly a 

quarter century.

As an intelligence collector, the A-12’s record is 

commendable but less striking, although not due to 

anything about the aircraft itself. US policymakers 

decided not to use the A-12 for its original purpose. 

The technological breakthroughs that made the 

aircraft possible took longer than expected, and 

between the time Lockheed conceived the idea of the 

OXCART and the time the aircraft was operationally 

ready, the international and technological situation 

had changed. The U-2 shootdown in May 1960 

made overflights of the Soviet Union politically 

unfeasible, and by the early 1960s spy satellites 

were collecting the required information on Soviet 

military developments.

US leaders considered use of the A-12 to collect 

strategic intelligence on the PRC but chose to 

rely principally on satellites. In the end, the A-12 

contributed little to the Agency’s strategic intelligence 

mission. In addition, the complexities of running 

A-12 sorties—planning routes, mobilizing several 

hundred personnel, deploying fuel and tankers, and 

programming guidance systems—made the aircraft 

very costly to operate and less useful as a quickresponse platform than the U-2, which remained in 

service despite the presence of its replacement.

When it did fly intelligence missions, however, the 

A-12 performed superbly. During BLACK SHIELD 

the A-12 acquired timely and usable photography 

of North Vietnam’s air defense network, key military 

and economic targets, and war-related activities 

that enabled US military commanders to plan 

more effective bombing routes while keeping US 

pilots farther out of harm’s way. Analysis of A-12 

photography quickly enabled the US government 

to determine that North Vietnam had no SSMs, 

dispelling a growing concern that a serious 

escalation of the war was imminent. And during the 

tense time after the Pueblo seizure, A-12 missions 

over North Korea allayed US fears that Pyongyang 

was preparing for military action in the wake 

of the incident.

As a tactical intelligence collector, the A-12 had a 

near-perfect record, but it fell victim to budgetary 

pressures and interdepartmental differences over 

9Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 108.
44

how best to use the expensive aerial reconnaissance 

assets of the United States. As an Agency history 

of overhead reconnaissance observed, “[t]he 

most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had 

become an anachronism before it was ever used 

operationally.”10 Yet the two men most responsible 

for bringing the A-12 into existence and making it 

work, the visionary engineer Kelly Johnson and the 

realist technocrat Richard Bissell, anticipated this 

outcome. In his project log in 1967, Johnson wrote:

I think back to 1959, before we started this 

airplane, to discussions with Dick Bissell 

where we seriously considered the problem 

of whether there would be one more round 

of aircraft before the satellites took over. 

We jointly agreed there would be just one 

round, and not two. That seems to have 

been a very accurate evaluation.11

10Pedlow and Welzenbach, 50.

11Johnson, “Archangel Log,” 105.
REFERENCES

References 47

A-12 Schematic

V
48

26 April

Timeline of OXCART Milestones

First design 

studies for U-2 

successor begin

1 July

Lockheed begins 

design studies for 

Mach 3 aircraft

21 April

Joint CIA/

Air Force 

panel selects 

Lockheed’s 

A-12 design

29 August

CIA and 

Lockheed sign 

contract for 12 

A-12s

11 February

First A-12 

completed, leaves 

Skunk Works for 

test site

First test flight

First official flight

First supersonic 

flight

First flight at 

Mach 2

26 February

30 April

4 May

6 November

20 July

First flight using 

two J58 engines

First flight at 

Mach 3

First flight of 

YF-12A variant

15 January

7 August

1957 1958 1959 1960 1962 1963
References 49

26 January

Air Force cancels 

YF-12A program

First overflight 

of North Korea; 

Pueblo located

Air Force directs 

Lockheed to destroy 

tooling for all 

OXCART aircraft

First SR-71 mission, 

over North Vietnam

Last (29th) A-12 

mission, over North 

Korea

5 January

5 February

21 March

6 May

23 May

Pilot Walter Ray is 

killed after ejecting 

from A-12

First A-12 flight across 

Pacific

First BLACK SHIELD 

mission, over North 

Vietnam

5 January

31 May

12 November

A-12 flies for one hour 

and 40 minutes above 

Mach 3.1 for distance 

of 3,000 miles

CIA declares A-12 

operationally ready

Maximum speed and 

altitude reached by 

one A-12 (Mach 3.29 

at 90,000 feet)

27 January

20 November

29 February

First sustained flight 

at design conditions 

(Mach 3.2 at 83,000 

feet for 10 minutes)

President Johnson publicly 

announces existence of 

OXCART program

Last A-12 completed at 

Skunk Works

First SR-71 arrives at 

test site

First flights of SR-71 and 

M-21 carrying D-21 drone

3 February

25 March

29 October

22 December

President Johnson 

decides to end 

A-12 program by 

January 1968 (later 

extended to July)

28 December

First launch of 

D-21 drone from 

M-21

5 March

D-21 collides with 

M-21 just after launch, 

causing death of one 

crewman and leading 

to termination of 

program

30 July

A-12/SR-71 flyoff

20 October- 3 

November

21 June

President Johnson 

reaffirms earlier 

decision to end A-12 

program

Last A-12 flight, from 

test site to storage 

facility in California

CIA Intelligence Star 

awarded to BLACK 

SHIELD pilots 

21 May

26 June

TAGBOARD 

program 

discontinued

15 July

4 June

Pilot Jack Weeks dies 

when A-12 crashes in 

checkout flight

1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1971
50

Inventory of A-12s

Aircraft 

Number

Serial 

Number

Configuration Number of 

Flights

Number of 

Hours Flown

Disposition

121 60-6924 Flight testing 332 418.2 Blackbird Airpark, Palmdale, CA

122 60-6925 Systems and flight 

testing

122 177.9 USS Intrepid Sea-Air-Space 

Museum, New York, NY

123 60-6926 Operations 79 135.3 Crashed 24 May 1963

124 60-6927 Training 614 1076.4 California Science Center, Los 

Angeles, CA

125 60-6928 Operations 202 334.9 Crashed 5 January 1967

126 60-6929 Operations 105 169.2 Crashed 28 December 1965

127 60-6930 Operations 258 499.2 Alabama Space and Rocket 

Center, Huntsville, AL

128 60-6931 Operations 232 453.0 CIA Headquarters, Langley, VA

129 60-6932 Operations 268 409.9 Crashed 4 June 1968

130 60-6933 Operations 217 406.3 San Diego Aerospace Museum, 

San Diego, CA

131 60-6937* Operations 177 345.8 Southern Museum of Flight, 

Birmingham, AL

132 60-6938 Operations 197 369.9 USS Alabama Battleship 

Memorial Park, Mobile, AL

133 60-6939 Operations 10 8.3 Crashed 9 July 1964

134 60-6940 Drone operations 80 123.9 Museum of Flight, Seattle, WA

135 60-6941 Drone operations 95 152.7 Crashed 30 July 1966

*Numbers 6934 to 6936 were used for the Air Force’s YF-12A fighter-interceptor 

version.
References 51

SINGAPORE

THAILAND

PHILIPPINES

MALAYSIA

MALAYSIA

Taiwan

Sumatra 

Java 

Luzon 

Borneo 

Celebes Ceram 

New Guinea 

SOUTH

KOREA JAPAN

C H I N A

A U S T R A L I A 

I N D O N E S I A

VIETNAM CAMBODIA

BRUNEI 

EAST 

TIMOR 

PAPUA 

NEW 

GUINEA 

LAOS

INDIA 

BANGL. 

BHU. 

NEPAL 

BURMA 

M O N G O L I A 

KAZAKHSTAN 

NORTH

KOREA

R U S S I A 

Northern 

Mariana 

Islands

(U.S.) 

Guam

(U.S.) 

NORTH 

PACIFIC 

OCEAN 

SOUTH 

PACIFIC 

OCEAN INDIAN OCEAN 

South

China

Sea

Tasman 

Sea 

Great Australian 

Bight 

Timor 

Sea 

Gulf of 

Carpentaria 

Arfura 

Sea 

Banda Sea 

Java Sea 

Celebes 

Sea 

Sea of 

Okhotsk 

Philippine

Sea

Boundary representation is 

not necessarily authoritative. 

DI Cartography Center/MPG (G00503) 1-06 

G00503 

Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area 

CP 5N 122E 

Scale 30.5M 

BLACK SHIELD Missions

Number Pilot Aircraft Date

BSX001 Vojvodich 131 31 May 1967

BSX003 Weeks 131 10 June 1967

BX6705 Layton 129 20 June 1967

BX6706 Weeks 129 30 June 1967

BX6708 Collins 127 13 July 1967

BX6709 Sullivan 131 19 July 1967

BX6710 Collins 129 20 July 1967

BX6716 Vojvodich 131 21 August 1967

BX6718 Layton 127 31 August 1967

BX6722 Weeks 129 16 September 1967

BX6723 Collins 131 17 September 1967

BX6725 Collins 127 4 October 1967

BX6727 Murray 131 6 October 1967

BX6728 Collins 131 15 October 1967

BX6729 Murray 129 18 October 1967

BX6732 Sullivan 131 28 October 1967

BX6733 Murray 127 29 October 1967

BX6734 Sullivan 129 30 October 1967

BX6739 Vojvodich 127 15 December 1967

BX6740 Layton 131 16 December 1967

BX6842 Layton 127 4 January 1968

BX6843 Weeks 131 5 January1968

BX6851 Collins 127 16 February 1968

BX6856 Vojvodich 127 8 March 1968

Number Pilot Aircraft Date

BX6847 Weeks 131 26 January 1968

BX6853 Murray 127 19 February 1968

BX6858 Layton 127 6 May 1968

Number Pilot Aircraft Date

BX6737 Vojvodich 131 8 December 1967

BX6738 Layton 131 10 December 1967

Target: North Korea

Target: Cambodia and Laos

Target: North Vietnam
52

KEDLOCK: The YF-12A

In October 1962, the Air Force ordered three 

interceptor variants to replace the cancelled F-108A 

Rapier. The modified A-12, first designated the AF-12 

and then the YF-12A, was designed and built under a 

project codenamed KEDLOCK. The aircraft’s mission 

was to intercept new Soviet supersonic bombers 

long before they reached the United States. It carried 

three air-to-air missiles and a second crewman who 

worked the fire control system. The Air Force initially 

envisioned a fleet of as many as 100, but only three 

were built and delivered during 1963-64. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara cancelled KEDLOCK in 

early 1968 as a cost-cutting measure, and the aircraft were never deployed operationally. CIA was involved 

with the project only in giving up three A-12 airframes and helping write “black” contracts. The Air Force 

bore all the costs of the YF-12A, which was superseded by the F-111. Two of the aircraft were given to the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research, and one was converted into a trainer for the 

SR-71 program.

TAGBOARD: The M-21 and D-21

In October 1962, CIA authorized the Skunk Works 

to study the feasibility of modifying the A-12 to 

carry and deploy a reconnaissance drone for 

unmanned overflight of denied areas. The project 

was codenamed TAGBOARD. The mother ship, 

redesignated the M-21 to avoid confusion with the 

A-12, was fitted with a second seat for a launch 

control officer (LCO) for the drone, called the 

D-21. It was 43 feet long, weighed over five tons, 

had a ramjet engine, could reach a speed of over 

Mach 3.3 at 90,000 feet, fly over 3,000 miles, and 

had the smallest RCS of anything Lockheed had 

yet designed. The drones would be launched well away from targets, fly their missions, and return to a 

preprogrammed location in international waters. There they would jettison a payload that a C-130 would 

snag in midair, and then self-destruct with a barometrically activated explosive device. In June 1963, the Air 

Force took over the project because it had overall charge of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Lockheed 

eventually built two M-21s and 38 drones, and its test pilot Bill Park flew all the M-21 flights. On the fourth 

TAGBOARD test on 30 July 1966, a launch mishap caused the mother ship to crash, killing LCO Ray Torick 

and prompting Kelly Johnson to end the program. Afterward the Air Force used B-52s to launch the drones 

against Communist Chinese targets in a project called SENIOR BOWL. Four missions were flown starting 

in November 1969. None was completely successful, and SENIOR BOWL was cancelled in July 1971.

The OXCART “Family” The A-12’s unique design and characteristics 

became the foundation for three other versions of 

supersonic aircraft that Lockheed built for CIA and 

the Air Force: the YF-12A, the M-21, and the SR-71. 
References 53

SR-71 Blackbird

The best known version of the A-12 (above right) is the SR-71 Blackbird (above left), whose nickname 

has become eponymous with the entire set of OXCART variants. In December 1962, the Air Force 

ordered six “reconnaissance/strike” aircraft for high-speed, high-altitude flights over hostile territory 

after a nuclear attack—hence its original designator RS. Compared to the A-12, the SR-71 was about 

six feet longer, weighed 15,000 pounds more fully loaded, had more prominent nose and body chines 

and a two-seat cockpit, and carried additional optical and radar imagery systems and ELINT sensors in 

interchangeable noses. 

With the added weight, the aircraft flew slower and lower than the A-12 or the YF-12A, but it carried more 

fuel and had a longer range. After an initial contract for six RS-71s, the Air Force ordered 25 more in August 

1963. When President Johnson disclosed the aircraft’s existence in July 1964, he mistakenly transposed 

the designator letters. Air Force officials let the error stand and came up with the Strategic Reconnaissance 

(SR) category instead. The fleet, based in the United Kingdom, Okinawa, and California, flew over 

3,500 sorties from March 1968 until November 1989, when it was deactivated. In September 1994 Congress 

allocated funds to reactivate three SR-71s. Two aircraft and crews became operational during 1995 and 

1996. In October 1997, President Bill Clinton vetoed further funding, and in June 1999 the SR-71 program 

was shut down again.
54

Bissell, Richard M., Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo. Reflections of a Cold 

Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996.

Brown, William H. “J58/SR-71 Propulsion Integration,” Studies in Intelligence 26:2 (Summer 

1982), 15-23.

Crickmore, Paul F. Lockheed SR-71: The Secret Missions Exposed. London: Osprey, 

1996.

Drendel, Lou. SR-71 Blackbird In Action. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 

1982.

Goodall, James. SR-71 Blackbird. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1995.

Goodall, James and Jay Miller. Lockheed’s SR-71 “Blackbird” Family: A-12, F-12, M-21,

D-21, SR-71. Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing, 2002.

Graham, Richard H. SR-71 Blackbird: Stories, Tales, and Legends. St. Paul, MN: Zenith 

Press, 2002.

———. SR-71 Revealed: The Inside Story. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International 

Publishing, 1996.

Haines, Gerald K. “The CIA’s Role in the Study of UFOs, 1947-90,” Studies in Intelligence 

41:1 (1997), 67-84.

Helms, Richard with William Hood. A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central 

Intelligence Agency. New York: Random House, 2003.

Jenkins, Dennis R. Lockheed SR-71/YF-12 Blackbirds. North Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 

1997.

Johnson, Clarence L. “Development of the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird,” Studies in 

Intelligence 26:2 (Summer 1982), 3-14.

Johnson, Clarence L. “Kelly” with Maggie Smith. Kelly: More Than My Share of It All. 

Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985.

Landis, Tony R. Lockheed Blackbird Family: A-12, YF-12, D-21/M-21 and SR-71 Photo 

Scrapbook. North Branch, MN: Speciality Press, 2010.

McIninch, Thomas P. “The OXCART Story,” Studies in Intelligence 15:1 (Winter 1971), 1-25.

Merlin, Peter. From Archangel to Senior Crown: Design and Development of the Blackbird. 

Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2008.

Miller, Jay. Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works. Leicester, UK: Midland Publishing, 1995.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published Sources
References 55

Pedlow, Gregory W. and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and 

Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974. Washington: 

Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. Chapter 6 on OXCART declassified October 2004.

Remak, Jeannette and Joseph Ventolo, Jr. A-12 Blackbird Declassified. St. Paul, MN: MBI 

Publishing Co., 2001.

———. The Archangel and the OXCART: The Lockheed A-12 Blackbirds and the Dawning 

of Mach III Reconnaissance. Bloomington, IN: Trafford Publishing, Co., 2008.

Rich, Ben R. and Leo Janos. Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed. 

Boston: Little, Brown, 1994.

Richelson, Jeffrey T. The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and 

Technology. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.

Suhler, Paul A. From Rainbow to GUSTO: Stealth and the Design of the Lockheed 

Blackbird. Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2009.

Sweetman, Bill. Lockheed Stealth. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing, 2001.

Wheelon, Albert D. “And the Truth Shall Keep You Free: Recollections by the First Deputy 

Director of Science and Technology,” Studies in Intelligence 39:1 (Spring 1995), 73-78.

Whittenbury, John R. “From Archangel to OXCART: Design Evolution of the Lockheed 

A-12, First of the Blackbirds.” PowerPoint presentation, August 2007.

Wings of Fame. London: Aerospace Publishing, 1997.

Reference Documents

Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Special Activities. “Chronology, 1954-68.” 

Declassified, June 2003.

Johnson, Clarence L. “Archangel Log.” Undated.

———. “History of the OXCART Program.” Burbank, CA: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 1 

July 1968. Declassified, August 2007.

Web Sites

http://blackbirds.net

http://roadrunnerinternationale.com

http://www.habu.org

http://www.lockheedmartin.com