25 August 2010

Public Affairs

Joint Publication 3-61
i 

PREFACE 

1. Scope 

This publication provides fundamental principles and guidance for public affairs support 

to joint operations. It also addresses public affairs operations and the role of public affairs in 

strategic communication. 

2. Purpose 

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the 

Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for 

interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It 

provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other 

joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for joint operations, education, 

and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their 

appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC 

from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most 

appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective. 

3. Application 

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of 

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of 

these commands, and the Services. 

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be 

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate 

otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of 

Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of 

a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine 

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the 

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s 

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and 

doctrine. 

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY 

VADM, USN 

Director, Joint Staff 
Preface 

ii JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
iii 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-61, DATED 9 MAY 2005 

 Updates the mission of joint public affairs (PA) to better reflect its 

contribution to joint operations 

 Amends the responsibilities for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public 

Affairs 

 Adds an overview of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint 

Communication responsibilities 

 Incorporates an overview of the Defense Media Activity responsibilities 

 Adopts the term media operations center to represent any type of media 

support facility instead of joint information bureau or combined press 

information center 

 Adds a discussion of the Joint Public Affairs Support Element throughout 

the document 

 Discusses capabilities of “visual information” in support of the joint force 

commander’s operational and planning requirements 

 Adds a discussion of joint PA in domestic operations 

 Introduces the term “community engagement” replacing the term 

“community relations” 

 Addresses “strategic communication,” its principles, and how it relates to PA 

 Adds new appendix describing development and execution of the 

commander’s communications strategy 

 Establishes the new terms and definitions for inclusion in Joint Publication 

(JP) 1-02 for community engagement, joint PA support element, and media 

operations center 

 Modifies the terms and/or definitions in JP 1-02 for American Forces Radio 

and Television Service, combat camera, command information, external 

audience, internal audience, message, PA, public affairs guidance, public 

diplomacy, public information, security review, and visual information 
Summary of Changes 

iv JP 3-61 

 Removes the terms and definitions from JP 1-02 for combat visual 

information, community relations, community relations program, joint 

information bureau, and PA ground rules 
v 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii 

CHAPTER I 

 OVERVIEW 

• Introduction ................................................................................................................ I-1 

• Public Affairs and the Operational Environment ...................................................... I-2 

• Public Affairs Roles ................................................................................................... I-4 

• Public Affairs Fundamentals ..................................................................................... I-7 

• Public Affairs and Strategic Communication ............................................................ I-9 

CHAPTER II 

 MISSION, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS 

• Mission .....................................................................................................................II-1 

• Responsibilities .........................................................................................................II-2

• Relationships .............................................................................................................II-8 

CHAPTER III 

 PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS 

• Public Affairs Overview ......................................................................................... III-1 

• Requirements .......................................................................................................... III-2 

• Planning .................................................................................................................. III-6 

• Execution .............................................................................................................. III-20 

• Assessment ........................................................................................................... III-28 

CHAPTER IV 

 JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 

• Overview ................................................................................................................. IV-1 

• Requirements .......................................................................................................... IV-2 

• Planning .................................................................................................................. IV-2 

• Execution ................................................................................................................ IV-3 

• Assessment ............................................................................................................. IV-6 

APPENDIX 

 A Commander’s Communications Strategy .................................................. A-1 

 B Annex Development ...................................................................................B-1 

 C Guidelines for Release of Information .......................................................C-1 

 D Sources for Defense Media Activity ......................................................... D-1 
Table of Contents 

vi JP 3-61 

 E Joint Public Affairs Support Element ......................................................... E-1 

 F References .................................................................................................. F-1 

 G Administrative Instructions ....................................................................... G-1 

GLOSSARY 

 Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................. GL-1 

 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4 

FIGURE 

 I-1 Elements of News ........................................................................................ I-3 

 I-2 Public Affairs across the Range of Military Operations ............................. I-5 

 I-3 Principles of Strategic Communication ....................................................... I-9 

 III-1 Public Affairs Communications Requirements ........................................ III-5 

 III-2 Joint Operation Planning Process and Public Affairs Actions ................. III-7 

 III-3 Public Affairs Planning Considerations ................................................... III-8 

 III-4 Department of Defense Media Pool Support ......................................... III-21 

 III-5 Sample Joint Force Public Affairs Organization .................................... III-22 

 III-6 Sample Media Operations Center .......................................................... III-25 

 IV-1 Joint Information Center Organizational Chart ........................................ IV-5 

 A-1 Communications Strategy Coordination Process ...................................... A-2 

 E-1 Joint Public Affairs Support Element Organization: 

Tiered Readiness Focus .............................................................................. E-2 

 E-2 Joint Public Affairs Capabilities ................................................................ E-3 

 E-3 Joint Public Affairs Support Element Deployment Process ....................... E-5 
vii 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW 

 Addresses the Military’s Obligation to Communicate with the American 

Public 

 Discusses Public Affairs (PA) Roles 

 Delineates the Principles of Information 

 Lists the Tenets of PA 

 Discusses PA in Joint Operations 

 Describes Joint PA in Domestic Situations 

Overview 

The First Amendment 

Guarantees the Freedom of 

the Press.

The US military has an obligation to communicate with 

the American public, and it is in the national interest to 

communicate with the international public. Through the 

responsive release of accurate information and imagery to 

domestic and international audiences, public affairs (PA) 

puts operational actions in context, facilitates the 

development of informed perceptions about military 

operations, helps undermine adversarial propaganda 

efforts, and contributes to the achievement of national, 

strategic, and operational objectives. 

Information Either 

Contributes or Undermines 

the Achievement of 

Operational Objectives. 

Information relating to the military and its operations is 

available to the public from the Department of Defense 

(DOD) as well as national unofficial sources (e.g., 

information disseminated by the members, distributed by 

the public, the media, or by groups hostile to US interests). 

Regardless of the source, intention or method of 

distribution, information in the public domain either 

contributes to or undermines the achievement of 

operational objectives. Official information can help 

create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of national interests and policies and 

mitigate any adverse effects from unofficial, misinformed, 

or hostile sources. 
Executive Summary 

viii JP 3-61 

Joint Force Commanders 

(JFCs) Play a Crucial Role 

in Successful Public 

Affairs (PA) Operations. 

Official communication with internal and external 

audiences may have a significant effect on the operational 

environment. Good planning and message development 

can have a positive impact on operations. Poor planning 

and message development can turn operational success 

into strategic failure. Credible PA operations support 

the commander’s mission and maintain essential public 

relationships. 

The Public Affairs Officers 

(PAOs) are an Integral 

Part of the Staff. 

The public affairs officer (PAO) is the joint force 

commander’s (JFC’s) principal spokesperson, senior PA 

advisor, and member of the personal staff. The PAO must 

have the resources to provide information and imagery to 

the JFC, the public, the media, and subordinate and 

supporting commanders in near real time. PAOs and PA 

staffs should be involved in planning, decisionmaking, 

training, equipping, and executing operations as well as 

integrating PA activities into all levels of the command. 

This requires them to have the appropriate level clearances 

to participate in these processes. 

PA Roles PA roles include: 

Providing Trusted Counsel to Leaders. This core 

competency includes anticipating and advising JFCs on 

the possible impact of military operations and activities 

within the public information realm. 

Enhancing Morale and Readiness. PA activities enable 

military personnel and their family members to better 

understand their roles by explaining how policies, 

programs, and operations affect them. 

Fostering Public Trust and Support. Effective PA 

supports a strong national defense by building public trust 

and understanding for the military’s contribution to 

national security. 

Creating Global Understanding. JFCs should employ 

PA in concert with other information capabilities to 

develop and implement communication strategies that 

inform audiences about the impact of US military during 

operations. 
Executive Summary 

ix 

Supporting the Command Strategy. The synchronization of actions, images, and words leads to the 

successful execution of command strategy. 

Deterring Adversaries. The credible threat of 

counteraction is a deterrent to adversary action. PA assists 

combatant commanders in planning deterrence efforts and 

disseminates information and imagery to convey to the 

adversary possible countermeasures, potentially avoiding 

the need to use force. 

Principles of Information It is the responsibility of DOD to make available timely 

and accurate information so that the public, Congress, 

and the news media may assess and understand facts 

about national security and defense strategy. Requests 

for information from organizations and private citizens 

shall be answered quickly. In carrying out DOD policy, 

the following DOD principles of information shall apply: 

Information shall be made fully and readily available,

consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is 

precluded by national security constraints or valid 

statutory mandates or exceptions. The provisions of the 

Freedom of Information Act will be supported in both 

letter and spirit. 

A free flow of general and military information shall be 

made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the 

men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, 

including civilian employees, contractors, and their 

dependents. 

Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld 

to protect the government from criticism or 

embarrassment. 

Information shall be withheld only when disclosure 

would adversely affect national security or threaten the 

safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed 

Forces. 

DOD’s obligation to provide the public with information 

may require coordination with other government 

agencies(OGAs). Such activity is to expedite the flow of 

information to the public. 
Executive Summary 

x JP 3-61 

Propaganda has no place in DOD PA programs. 

Tenets of PA Effective application of the PA tenets normally results in 

more effective and efficient execution of PA operations 

and relationships with the media. They complement the 

DOD principles of information and describe best practices. 

The tenets should be reviewed and appropriately applied 

during all stages of joint operation planning and execution. 

The tenets are: 

Tell the Truth. JFC’s PA personnel will release only 

accurate information of officially released information. 

Provide Timely Information and Imagery. 

Commanders should be prepared to release timely, factual, 

coordinated, and approved information and imagery about 

military operations. 

Practice Security at the Source. All DOD personnel and 

DOD contractors are responsible for safeguarding 

sensitive information. 

Provide Consistent Information at All Levels. The 

public often receives simultaneous information from a 

variety of official DOD sources at various levels. 

Tell the DOD Story. Although commanders designate 

only military personnel or DOD civilian employees as 

official spokespersons, they should educate and encourage 

all their military, civilian employees, and contractors to 

tell the DOD story by providing them with timely 

information that is appropriate for public release. 

Mission, Responsibilities, and Relationships 

PA Mission The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, and 

synchronize US military public information activities 

and resources in order to support the commander’s 

intent and concept of operations. 

PAO Responsibilities The PAO advises the JFC on the implications of command 

decisions, actions, and operations on foreign and domestic 

public perceptions and plans, executes, and evaluates PA 

activities and events to support overall operational 

success. PA is also responsible, in conjunction with 

information operations, for generating the information 
Executive Summary 

xi 

requirements to assess the public perceptions of foreign 

audiences, and integrating that information into mission 

planning. 

Responsibility and Benefits 

of Communicating

US civilian and military leadership is accountable and 

responsible to the American people for supporting and 

defending national interests worldwide. By providing 

accurate and timely information, imagery, and clear 

explanations of its activities, DOD contributes to the 

public’s understanding of military operations. JFCs must 

recognize their responsibility to communicate with the 

American people and the benefits of communicating with 

international audiences. 

Public Affairs in Joint Operations

PA Functions PA activities are divided into public information, 

command information, and community engagement 

supported by planning and analysis and assessment 

throughout the course of operations. 

PA Requirements PA activities require facilities, personnel, equipment, 

transportation assets, and communication capabilities. 

Anticipated PA resource requirements should be identified 

and addressed as early in the planning process as possible, 

since PA requirements often exceed available resources. 

Planning considers specific measures to augment PA 

personnel and procure, lease, or assign other necessary 

resources. This generally requires assistance from the 

supporting combatant commands, Services, and the 

military departments. 

PA Planning PA planners establish and maintain a routine, ongoing 

relationship with other planners within the combatant 

command and joint task force. Synchronization across the 

staff facilitates the availability of services and support 

required to execute PA activities. PA planning should 

include coordination with the host nation, the country 

team, OGAs, intergovernmental organizations, and 

nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate. 

PA Planning 

Considerations

During initial planning it is critical to synchronize PA 

planning and activities across the joint force and with 

other agencies as necessary. Authorities to plan, integrate, 

approve, and disseminate appropriate information and 

imagery should be clearly established. Legal 

considerations regarding release of information on 
Executive Summary 

xii JP 3-61 

investigations in the joint operations area, including those 

regarding alleged law of war violations, should be 

addressed as early as possible in the public affairs 

guidance (PAG). Coordination of overall themes, as well 

as a plan to support media coverage and all applicable 

PAG, should be approved prior to hostilities in order to 

effectively shape the information environment. 

PA Support for Specific 

Operations

Commanders should ensure PA activities are tailored to 

support the joint forces across the range of military 

operations. While the public and the media are interested 

in the essential facts of any situation, that information is 

incomplete without an understanding of the background, 

underlying rationale, and other fundamental elements 

particular to a certain type of operation. Experience shows 

that media interest in civil support, foreign humanitarian 

assistance, managing the consequences of incidents, peace 

operations, and similar operations often peaks early, then 

diminishes gradually. PA planning should take this into 

account. 

There is a Need for 

Continuous Dialogue 

between the Joint Force 

and the Media.

Open and independent reporting are the principal 

means of coverage of military operations. Commanders 

should seek regular opportunities to work with the media. 

Media coverage of potential future military operations can, 

to a large extent, shape public perception of the joint force 

and national security environment. Thus, JFCs and their 

PAOs continually assess their understanding of the direct 

and indirect effects of potential actions and signals on 

perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs, and should formulate 

and deliver timely and culturally attuned messages. 

PA personnel should act as liaisons but should not 

interfere with the reporting process. The PA mission 

includes helping media representatives understand joint 

force events and occurrences so that media coverage is 

accurate. The JFC, or a designated representative, should 

conduct frequent operational briefings to inform internal 

and external audiences of current military operations and 

respond to media questions. 

The Criteria for 

Credentialing Journalists 

are Established by the 

Joint Force PAO or the 

media operations 

Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or 

means to restrict certain media outlets from access. It is 

primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists 

and providing them with information that enhances their 

ability to report on activities within the operational area. 
Executive Summary 

xiii 

centers (MOCs) Director. Credentialing media representatives also ensures that, if 

captured, they are recognized as journalists and treated 

accordingly under the law of war. 

Ground Rules Ground rules are developed to protect members of DOD 

from the release of information that could threaten their 

security or safety during ongoing operations yet facilitates 

the media’s access to timely, relevant information. 

Ground rules reconcile the desire of the media to cover 

military operations with DOD security and safety concerns 

and are in no way intended to prevent release of 

derogatory, embarrassing, negative, or noncomplimentary 

information. Media ground rules include requirements 

designed to protect the security, health, and welfare of the 

media. 

The Joint Force PAO is 

Responsible to the JFC for 

Directing PA Activities. 

The joint force PAO, with appropriate staff support, is on 

the commander’s personal staff and is directly responsible 

for all the JFC’s PA requirements. The joint force PAO 

provides PA counsel and support to the commander and 

provides oversight of all the PA functions and subordinate 

media operations centers (MOCs). The MOC director, 

with supporting MOC staff, is responsible for coordinating 

all media operations within the operational area, and 

provides and coordinates support to the JFC through the 

joint force PAO. 

The Early Establishment of 

MOCs is an Important Step 

in the Responsive and 

Efficient Facilitation of 

Media Operations. 

Media operations may be the sole purview of a MOC or 

conducted by a media operations section; the requirements 

remain basically the same. A MOC is the central point of 

contact between the military and media representatives 

covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders 

and PA staffs to discuss their units and their roles in the 

joint operation and helps journalists obtain information 

quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex 

activities. It should be staffed to support local and 

regional non-English speaking media. It may also support 

command information activities. 

Joint Public Affairs in Domestic Operations

The Conduct of PA in 

Domestic Operations is 

Somewhat Different for 

Department of Defense. 

By Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, DOD PA 

operates in accordance with guidance in the National 

Response Framework incident communications 

emergency policy and procedures, which provides detailed 

guidance to all federal incident communicators during a 

federal response to an event. It establishes mechanisms to 
Executive Summary 

xiv JP 3-61 

prepare and deliver coordinated and sustained messages, 

and provides for prompt federal acknowledgement of an 

incident and communication of emergency information to 

the public. 

Domestic Operations are 

Planned and Executed in 

Three Phases 

DOD PA support evolves as follows: 

Shaping. The DOD is rarely a “first responder” for 

domestic situations. In this phase PA manages 

expectations regarding DOD’s response among both the 

public and the other responding agencies. PA activities 

include developing themes and messages that clearly 

explain the scope and timing of the DOD response. 

Engagement. This is the phase where military forces are 

actually on-scene supporting an incident and PA is 

actively informing the public about DOD activities via 

releases of information and imagery, press conferences, 

and site visits. 

Transition. This is the phase where military forces begin 

to disengage from incident response support. It is critical 

that PA activities in this phase articulate why DOD 

support is no longer required. 

Joint Information Center 

(JIC) 

A substantial portion of the overall PA effort will be 

supporting the media to ensure affected populations are 

receiving necessary information. In order to coordinate 

the timely release of emergency/incident-related 

information, imagery, and other PA functions, a joint 

information center (JIC) may be established. 

JIC Location The JIC is normally located close to the best sources of 

information about the situation, such as an incident 

command post or emergency operations center. Note that 

DOD and other agencies will often have a separate staff 

performing PA duties/functions on behalf of their own 

agency. In the absence of a JIC, coordination still needs to 

occur between DOD, other agencies, and the primary 

agency. 
Executive Summary 

xv 

CONCLUSION 

This publication provides fundamental principles and 

guidance for PA support to joint operations. It also 

addresses PA operations and the role of PA in strategic 

communication. It adds a discussion of joint PA in 

domestic operations. 
Executive Summary 

xvi JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
I-1 

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW 

1. Introduction 

 a. The US military has an obligation to communicate with the American public, and it is 

in the national interest to communicate with the international public. Through the responsive 

release of accurate information and imagery to domestic and international audiences, public 

affairs (PA) puts operational actions in context, facilitates the development of informed 

perceptions about military operations, helps undermine adversarial propaganda efforts, and 

contributes to the achievement of national, strategic, and operational objectives. 

 b. The First Amendment guarantees freedom of the press, but this right must be 

balanced against the military mission that requires operations security (OPSEC). The 

military’s operational mission requires that OPSEC be practiced at all levels of command to 

protect the lives of American or multinational forces and the security of ongoing or future 

operations. These competing goals sometimes lead to friction between the media and the 

military. 

 c. The tempo of military operations, OPSEC concerns, and the number and variety of 

other information sources competing for the attention of the populace complicate the joint 

force commanders’ (JFCs’) ability to provide accurate information to internal and external 

audiences at the same pace as the media and other sources release their perspective on a 

usually sensational and emotional event. The ability of anyone with Internet access to 

communicate and provide graphic visuals as an event unfolds, often without validating facts, 

further complicates the military’s effort to accurately inform the media and populace. JFCs 

and public affairs officers (PAOs) should evaluate missions to identify information and 

imagery requirements, as well as the means to acquire and move those products in a timely 

THE CHALLENGE 

“...I say to you: That we are in battle, and more than half of this battle is taking 

place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for 

the hearts and minds of our Umma...” 

Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musa al-Zarqawi, 2005 

THE MEDIA AND THE MILITARY 

“Today, I want to encourage you always to remember the importance of the two 

pillars of our freedom under the Constitution: the Congress and the press. Both 

surely try our patience from time to time, but they are the surest guarantees of the 

liberty of the American people.” 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

Speech at the 2007 US Naval Academy Graduation
Chapter I 

I-2 JP 3-61 

manner. PA planning should include considerations to reduce the time lag between an event 

and what can be communicated. 

 d. Information relating to the military and its operations is available to the public from 

the Department of Defense (DOD) as well as unofficial sources (e.g., information 

disseminated by Service members, distributed by the public, the media, or by groups hostile 

to US interests). Regardless of the source, intention or method of distribution, information in 

the public domain either contributes to or undermines the achievement of operational 

objectives. Official information can help create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable 

for the advancement of national interests and policies and mitigate any adverse effects from 

unofficial, misinformed, or hostile sources. 

 e. JFCs play a crucial role in successful PA operations. Official communication with 

internal and external audiences may have a significant effect on the operational environment. 

Good planning and message development can have a positive impact on operations. Poor 

planning and message development can turn operational success into strategic failure. 

Credible PA operations support the commander’s mission and maintain essential public 

relationships. 

 f. The PAO is the JFC’s principal spokesperson, senior PA advisor, and member of the 

personal staff. The PAO must have the resources to provide information and imagery to the 

JFC, the public, the media, and subordinate and supporting commanders in near real time. 

PAOs and PA staffs should be involved in planning, decisionmaking, training, equipping, 

and executing operations as well as integrating PA activities into all levels of the command. 

This requires them to have the appropriate level clearances to participate in these processes. 

 g. Public support for the US military’s presence or operations is not uniform throughout 

the operational area. The PAO must provide the JFC with an assessment of public support 

within the operational area and provide feedback on trends in public opinion based on media 

analysis, published polling data, and professional assessments. 

2. Public Affairs and the Operational Environment 

 a. General. Information in the public domain impacts the operational environment. 

Commanders need to understand the relationship between the physical and information 

components and the impact various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions, images, and 

words have on the operational environment. 

b. The Pervasive Backdrop. Information is the pervasive backdrop to the operational 

environment and is continuously changing. Plans and operational decisions are driven by the 

constant monitoring, assessment, and analysis of the information environment. The 

operational environment is saturated; signals compete for the attention of their audiences, so 

it is important for the joint force to coordinate its messages—and to integrate those messages 

with its partners’ as part of the ongoing synchronization to maintain unity of effort. 

For additional guidance on the operational environment, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, 

Joint Operations. 
Overview 

I-3 

 (1) Preeminence of Information. The power of first impressions on the 

perceptions and attitudes of decisionmakers, leaders, and other individuals should not be 

underestimated. The timeliness of information is a recognized element of news (see Figure 

I-1.) Adversaries take advantage of the speed with which information travels and can often 

communicate lies or misleading information faster than we can communicate the truth. First 

impressions influence later perceptions and judgments and also bias how information 

received later is processed. Additionally, information that contradicts first impressions may 

be dismissed all together. Traditionally, the US military has been hesitant to release 

information that is incomplete or to acknowledge events until a fairly good level of 

granularity is available. The information environment is in a constant state of flux, and the 

JFCs should be prepared to assume some risk in order to ensure that public communication 

activities can be executed in time to ensure the most accurate and contextual information is 

publicly available. 

 (2) Recency and Repetition. Recency is a key component of what makes 

information newsworthy. It is also a factor in information retention as is repetition of the 

information being provided. It is not always enough to simply make a public statement. For 

information to be effectively processed, individuals must receive the information in a timely 

fashion, multiple times, and from multiple sources. Continuous public engagement 

throughout an operation provides the best chance of success in supporting strategic 

communication (SC) themes and in achieving operational objectives. 

 (3) The Influence of Culture. News is considered a cultural narrative produced by 

people who generally espouse and adhere to the values and cultural system of the society 

they serve. Ideology often provides the framework through which events are represented. 

Media coverage does not always reflect reality, but frames reality by choosing what events to 

cover and how to present them. The world looks different to people because the information 

they receive is influenced by their ideology, ethnocentricity, and culture. Consideration of 

the impact of culture on how news and information is presented and on how that then affects 

ELEMENTS OF NEWS

Impact

Timeliness

Prominence

Oddity

Conflict

Proximity

Personal significance or consequence

More recent, more newsworthy

Well-known individuals or institutions are subjects

Unusual, unorthodox, or unexpected

Controversy and open clashes are present

Closeness of the event to the consumer of news

Figure I-1. Elements of News 
Chapter I 

I-4 JP 3-61 

information consumers must become second nature. Attempts to mitigate the impact of 

actions on public opinion after the fact are often ineffective. 

 (4) Impact of Propaganda. Propaganda is any form of adversary communication, 

especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, 

attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or 

indirectly. The traditional factors that make information about an event newsworthy are the 

same factors that make propaganda compelling. People are drawn to conflict or violence, 

and our adversaries have mastered the art of using it, real and contrived, to influence 

information consumers to further their objectives and minimize our effectiveness. 

Anticipating those actions that the adversary may exploit with propaganda and limiting that 

potential with preemptive release of information is paramount. When operations do not 

allow for such actions, being prepared to respond quickly to counter propaganda is critical. 

c. PA is Critical across the Range of Military Operations. The United States 

employs military capabilities to support national security goals at home and abroad in a 

variety of operations. Operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity that extend 

from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response 

and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. PA 

is inherent in all military activities spanning the range of military operations as depicted in 

Figure I-2. It is a key enabler for managing and delivering public information on a daily 

basis as well as supporting military operations. A synchronized and coordinated PA effort 

with interagency partners can facilitate success in other military operations. 

3. Public Affairs Roles 

 a. Providing Trusted Counsel to Leaders. This core competency includes 

anticipating and advising JFCs on the possible impact of military operations and activities 

within the public information realm. This also includes preparing JFCs to communicate with 

audiences through the media and other methods of communication, as well as analyzing and 

interpreting the information environment, monitoring domestic and foreign public 

understanding, and providing lessons learned from the past. 

“The emotionally gripping pictures of the war had a huge impact on Egyptian 

viewers. Egyptian families became emotionally involved, expressing waves of 

rage, disgust, and anger at seeing pictures of Iraqi bodies torn to pieces littered 

everywhere, bloodshed, and the destruction of Arab cities and population centers. 

The image of an American flag draped over Saddam Hussein's statue was 

transmitted to tens of millions of Arab viewers and contributed to a sense of the 

humiliation of their Arab brothers and their fears of American imperialism. This is 

an excellent example of the power of transnational satellite broadcasts—one 

soldier makes an individual gesture and an entire region watches in astonishment.” 

Hussein Amin 

Senior Editor 

Transnational Broadcasting Studies 

"Watching the War" in the Arab World 

No. 10, Spring/Summer 2003
Overview 

I-5 

 b. Enhancing Morale and Readiness. PA activities enable military personnel and 

their family members to better understand their roles by explaining how policies, programs, 

and operations affect them. Uncertainty and concern regarding living conditions in the 

operational area and at home, the duration of separation, the lack of daily communications 

between family members, and many other factors impact morale and readiness at home and 

within the unit. PA activities can help alleviate some of these issues. PA activities can also 

counter adversary propaganda efforts and address incomplete or misinformed media reports, 

thus reducing the stress and uncertainty felt by Service members and their families. 

Additionally, as media interest expands to include “human interest stories,” military 

personnel and family members can expect the media to cover the impact of military 

operations on their lives and livelihood, to include their daily activities. Family members, 

including spouses and children, may be approached for interviews. This will have a direct 

and indirect impact on morale. PA’s ability to assist Service members and their families in 

understanding how to deal with the media and to assist in providing relevant and responsive 

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Crisis Response and

Limited Contingency Operations

Major Operations and 

Campaigns

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACROSS THE

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Build Partnerships

Deter Adversaries

Enhance Allied Support

Further US Security Interests

Inform Expectations/Opinions

Counter Inaccurate Information, 

Deception, and Adversary 

Propaganda

Reinforce Military Success

Support Military Objectives

Provide Operational Context

Articulate Military Capabilities

Communicate US Actions/Policy

Support Strategic Communication 

Themes and Goals

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Figure I-2. Public Affairs across the Range of Military Operations
Chapter I 

I-6 JP 3-61 

information on topical issues requires planning and resources and should be incorporated 

into the command’s planning efforts. 

 c. Fostering Public Trust and Support. Effective PA supports a strong national 

defense by building public trust and understanding for the military’s contribution to national 

security. PA gives the American public the information needed to understand military roles 

and missions. This understanding is critical to sustaining American public support for 

military operations. 

 d. Creating Global Understanding. JFCs should employ PA in concert with other 

information capabilities to develop and implement communication strategies that inform 

audiences about the impact of US military during operations. Making these audiences aware 

of US military capabilities and US resolve to employ them can enhance support from allies 

and friendly countries. 

 e. Supporting the Command Strategy. The synchronization of actions, images, and 

words leads to the successful execution of command strategy. PA can provide a continuous 

flow of credible, reliable, timely, and accurate information and imagery to internal and 

external audiences. This capability allows PA to help deter efforts to diminish national will, 

degrade morale, and turn world opinion against friendly operations. PA must be engaged in 

operational planning, have access to open source reports and relevant intelligence, 

understand common adversary propaganda techniques, and be very aggressive in anticipating 

adversary propaganda—putting accurate information out first so that friendly forces gain the 

initiative and remain the preferred source of information. Gaining and maintaining the 

information initiative in a conflict can help discredit and undermine adversary propaganda. 

The first side that presents the information sets the context and frames the public debate. It 

is extremely important to get accurate information and imagery out first—even information 

that portrays DOD in a negative manner. This helps disarm the adversary’s propaganda and 

defeats attempts by the adversary to use these mistakes against friendly forces. Credibility 

must be maintained. PA professionals require the knowledge, skills, resources, capabilities, 

and authority to rapidly release information, in accordance with DOD policy and guidance, 

to various publics to effectively support the command strategy. 

 f. Deterring Adversaries. The credible threat of counteraction is a deterrent to 

adversary action. PA assists combatant commanders (CCDRs) in planning deterrence efforts 

and disseminates information and imagery to convey to the adversary possible 

countermeasures, potentially avoiding the need to use force. PA clearly communicates US 

military goals and objectives, what we expect the adversary to do to satisfy international 

concerns, why the US concern is important, and what the US intends to do if the adversary 

refuses to comply. Additionally, adversary propaganda frequently targets the resolve of the 

American public. PA’s counterpropaganda efforts are aimed at informing the American 

public of this threat and affirming its trust in and resolve with the Armed Forces. PA 

activities may involve highlighting the military’s deployment preparations, activities, and 

force projection to show the domestic, multinational, and adversary public what the 

commander is actually doing to prepare for conflict. When adversaries are not deterred from 

conflict, information about US capabilities and resolve may still shape the adversary’s 

planning and actions in a manner beneficial to the US. 
Overview 

I-7 

4. Public Affairs Fundamentals 

 a. Principles of Information. It is the responsibility of DOD to make available timely 

and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and 

understand facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from 

organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out DOD policy, 

the following DOD principles of information shall apply: 

 (1) Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory 

requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory 

mandates or exceptions. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be 

supported in both letter and spirit. 

 (2) A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without 

censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States, 

including civilian employees, contractors, and their dependents. 

 (3) Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the 

government from criticism or embarrassment. 

 (4) Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect 

national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed 

Forces. 

 (5) DOD’s obligation to provide the public with information may require 

coordination with other government agencies (OGAs). Such activity is to expedite the flow 

of information to the public. 

 (6) Propaganda has no place in DOD PA programs. 

 b. Tenets of Public Affairs. Effective application of the PA tenets described below 

normally result in more effective and efficient execution of PA operations and relationships 

with the media. They complement the DOD principles of information discussed above and 

describe best practices. The tenets should be reviewed and appropriately applied during all 

stages of joint operation planning and execution. 

 (1) Tell the Truth. JFC’s PA personnel will release only accurate information. 

The long-term success of PA operations depends on maintaining the integrity and credibility 

of officially released information. Deceiving the public undermines trust in the Armed 

Forces. Accurate, balanced, credible presentation of information leads to confidence in the 

Armed Forces and the legitimacy of operations. Attempting to deny unfavorable information 

or failing to acknowledge its existence leads to media speculation, the perception of coverup, and lost public trust. These issues should be openly and honestly addressed as soon as 

possible. 

 (2) Provide Timely Information and Imagery. Commanders should be prepared 

to release timely, factual, coordinated, and approved information and imagery about military 

operations. Information and imagery introduced into the public realm has a powerful effect 
Chapter I 

I-8 JP 3-61 

on friendly, neutral, and adversary decision-making cycles and perceptions. The source that 

releases more timely and accurate information and imagery often enjoys the benefit of 

becoming the media’s preferred source of information. PAOs need to establish expeditious 

processes for release of information. 

 (3) Practice Security at the Source. All DOD personnel and DOD contractors are 

responsible for safeguarding sensitive information. As sources of information, each DOD 

member should be aware of OPSEC issues, whether being interviewed by the media or 

sharing information and imagery with family or friends including through social media. 

Therefore, it is important that official information and imagery be approved for release prior 

to dissemination to the public. 

 (4) Provide Consistent Information at All Levels. The public often receives 

simultaneous information from a variety of official DOD sources at various levels. When 

this information is conflicting, DOD’s credibility is put in jeopardy. Information and 

imagery must be appropriately coordinated and in compliance with official DOD and the 

supported commander’s guidance before it is released to the public. 

 (5) Tell the DOD Story. Although commanders designate only military personnel 

or DOD civilian employees as official spokespersons, they should educate and encourage all 

their military, civilian employees, and contractors to tell the DOD story by providing them 

with timely information that is appropriate for public release. By projecting confidence and 

commitment during interviews or in talking to family and friends, DOD personnel can help 

promote public understanding of military operations and activities. 

c. Audiences 

 (1) American Public. Commanders have an obligation to inform the American 

public about their nation’s military. This communication enhances morale and readiness and 

increases public trust and support. Through active engagement, the military demonstrates it 

is a community partner and a responsible steward of national resources. 

 (2) International. Current information technology allows information and 

imagery to be available worldwide. International interest in military operations may be just 

as high, and sometimes higher, than US media interest, especially in military operations 

conducted overseas. DOD, in coordination with Department of State (DOS), host, and 

partner nations, should keep the international community informed about US military 

operations and activities within the constraints of OPSEC. 

 (3) Internal. Command information programs are the primary means commanders 

use to communicate with military members, DOD civilian employees, contractors, and 

family members. As used in this document, military members include Active Component 

(AC), Reserve Component (RC) (which includes the National Guard), as well as retired 

officers and enlisted personnel. 

 (4) Adversaries. PA distributes timely, truthful, and accurate information 

regarding US intentions and actions to adversary audiences to counter misinformation, 

disinformation, and propaganda and to deter adversary actions. It is critical that PA and 
Overview 

I-9 

information operations (IO), especially psychological operations (PSYOP), synchronize their 

communications efforts with respect to the adversary due to the fluidity of the information 

environment. 

5. Public Affairs and Strategic Communication 

 a. SC requires the integration and synchronization of actions, images, and words in 

order to communicate desired themes and messages in support of greater US and DOD 

objectives. SC is focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage 

key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of 

USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, 

themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national 

power. DOD supports the principles of SC in Figure I-3. 

 b. As an SC primary capability, PA activities are coordinated and synchronized with all 

other activities (visual information [VI], defense support to public diplomacy [DSPD], IO, 

and operational actions). 

 c. SC planning must be integrated into military planning and operations, documented in 

operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders (OPORDs), and coordinated and 

synchronized with OGAs and multinational partners. Use of synchronized themes, 

messages, images, and actions by the joint force can be critical to mission accomplishment. 

SC includes national activities not under the direct control of the JFC, adding complexity for 

PRINCIPLES OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Leaders Must Lead Communication Process

Credible

Dialogue

Unity of Effort

Responsive

Perception of truthfulness and 

respect

Multifaceted exchange of ideas

Integrated and coordinated

Right audience, message, time, 

and place

Understanding

Pervasive

Results-based

Continuous

Deep comprehension of others

Every action sends a message

Tied to desired end state

Analysis, planning, execution, 

and assessment

Figure I-3. Principles of Strategic Communication 
Chapter I 

I-10 JP 3-61 

planning and execution. Using approved SC themes requires conscious and collaborative 

coordination. Assessment measures, methods, and resources must be developed and 

incorporated in planning and execution. Measuring progress toward mission 

accomplishment assists commanders in decisionmaking and adjusting operations to achieve 

military objectives and reach the desired end state. 

 d. Communication objectives and efforts should be fully integrated in command 

operational planning and execution processes, so there is consistency in intent between 

command actions and information disseminated about those actions. The JFC, as part of the 

SC effort, should ensure planning for PA, IO, and DSPD is coordinated to make certain 

consistent themes and messages are communicated that support the overall USG SC 

objectives. Some commanders use the commander’s communications strategy model to 

ensure their communication activities are nested with actions and strategies at all levels. 

Messages should support themes at each level and should support (or be nested under) the 

next higher-level themes. Themes at all levels should support strategic and national level 

objectives. This ensures consistent communications to global audiences. Appendix A, 

“Commander’s Communications Strategy,” provides additional detail. 

 e. The operational environment is influenced by a combination of actions, images, and 

words. The increasing transparency of military operations resulting from the nearly 

continuous media coverage and the growing use of personal communication devices to 

document events puts US forces and their actions under constant scrutiny. It can turn a 

seemingly innocuous tactical incident into one of strategic significance. If the escalation of 

an action does not occur on its own, adversaries have proven adept perception of a crisis to 

force us into a reactive posture. Commanders must be as involved in shaping the 

information narrative as they are in planning and conducting operations. Carefully planned 

communication objectives and efforts are key to this effort. Official information released in 

a timely manner—in some cases ahead of military action—can put operational actions into 

context and help counter enemy propaganda. What US forces do is often more important in 

terms of influencing the operational environment than what DOD conveys with official 

information. 

“General Petraeus understood the power of messaging. He knew that at times a 

message sent by our actions had much more impact than a carefully crafted sound 

bite delivered at a press conference. He also understood that our words 

sometimes led our actions. Regardless, our communication efforts helped put into 

proper context, characterization, and accuracy the actions we took.” 

Rear Admiral Greg Smith, US Navy 

Director of Communications 

US Central Command 

September 2008 
II-1 

CHAPTER II

MISSION, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS 

1. Mission 

a. The mission of joint PA is to plan, coordinate, and synchronize US military public 

information activities and resources in order to support the commander’s intent and concept 

of operations (CONOPS). The PAO advises the JFC on the implications of command 

decisions, actions, and operations on foreign and domestic public perceptions and plans, 

executes, and evaluates PA activities and events to support overall operational success. PA 

is also responsible, in conjunction with IO, for generating the information requirements to 

assess the public perceptions of foreign audiences, and integrating that information into 

mission planning. 

 b. US civilian and military leadership is accountable and responsible to the American 

people for supporting and defending national interests worldwide. By providing accurate 

and timely information, imagery, and clear explanations of its activities, DOD contributes to 

the public’s understanding of military operations. JFCs must recognize their responsibility 

to communicate with the American people and the benefits of communicating with 

international audiences. Even with the proliferation of information sources, traditional 

media are still the principal means of communicating with the public. The Internet also 

provides numerous options and challenges for unfiltered communications with various 

audiences. 

 (1) JFCs must recognize the changing nature of how people get information. The 

speed and methods with which people and organizations can collect and convey information 

to the public makes it possible for the world populace to quickly become aware of military 

activity. Internet sites have become our adversaries’ preferred means to engage global 

audiences. This instantaneous, unfiltered, biased, and often incomplete or factually incorrect 

information requires PA to be operationally nimble to help disarm the adversaries’ efforts 

with fast, complete, factual, and credible information. 

 (2) The joint force PA staff should develop well-defined and concise plans to help 

accomplish operational objectives and minimize the adverse effects of inaccurate 

information and analysis, and counter propaganda and the spread of disinformation and 

misinformation while taking OPSEC considerations into account. Well-planned PA 

activities should be incorporated in every phase of joint operations. Any PA CONOPS 

should provide open, independent reporting and dissemination of information with maximum 

disclosure and minimum delay, as well as create an environment that encourages balanced 

coverage of operations. Commanders need to determine the lowest level authority in which 

“Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, 

nothing can succeed.” 

Abraham Lincoln 

Lincoln-Douglas Debate at Ottawa 

21 August 1858 
Chapter II 

II-2 JP 3-61 

information can be released to ensure timeliness. Release should be in accordance with 

DOD policy and guidance. 

2. Responsibilities 

 a. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]):

 (1) Determines who should serve as the initial source of release of information 

about joint, multinational, and certain single-service operations and delegates PA release 

authority to the appropriate commander as soon as practical. 

US FIGHTS AN INFORMATION WAR IN AFGHANISTAN 

BAGRAM AIR BASE, AFGHANISTAN—The accusation was damning: US 

soldiers were said to have tossed a grenade into a crowd of Afghans in the 

eastern province of Kunar on Tuesday, killing two civilians and wounding 

five to 50 others. 

American public affairs officers previously have been slow in responding. 

US military officials here complain that Taliban leaders are often better and 

faster at spreading their versions of deadly events. 

This time, however, public affairs officers mounted a swift and detailed 

information operation. Within 24 hours, a public affairs team at Bagram air 

base released a video showing an explosion as US soldiers worked to free 

an American military vehicle stuck on a median in the town of Asadabad. It 

also provided technical details it said proved the grenade was a Russianmade version commonly used by insurgents. 

It is not clear from the murky video, taken at a distance, who threw the 

grenade. But no American soldier is seen throwing anything. 

The unusually rapid release of the video was clearly intended to show that 

American soldiers working on a marooned vehicle were hardly likely to 

detonate a grenade next to their own vehicles and comrades, three of whom 

were slightly wounded. 

The video was posted on Facebook and YouTube, part of a burgeoning US 

effort to use social networking sites to build support for coalition forces 

locked in a struggle to win over the Afghan population in the face of an 

entrenched Islamic insurgency. The US military regularly issues statements 

denying accusations of misconduct, but release of combat videos has been 

rare. 

The overnight posting of the video underscores the long-held belief within 

the US military that it needs to be faster and more sophisticated in 

responding to false allegations...

David Zucchino 

Los Angeles Times, 11 June 2009 
Mission, Responsibilities, and Relationships

II-3 

 (2) Approves and disseminates PA guidance (PAG), PA plans, and PA annexes. 

 (3) Facilitates deployment of the DOD Media Pool as required. 

 (4) Oversees the employment of joint combat camera (COMCAM) teams and the 

distribution of their products, including follow-on use/release of still and motion pictures 

supporting operations including PA, as established in Department of Defense Instruction 

(DODI) 5040.4, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program. 

 (5) Establishes, as necessary, a crisis and/or wartime PA cell at the Pentagon. 

 (6) Facilitates the deployment of American Forces Radio and Television Service 

(AFRTS) resources and equipment, for command information programs as established in 

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5120.20, American Forces Radio and Television 

Service (AFRTS), and DOD, 5120.20R, Management and Operation of American Forces 

Radio and Television Service. 

 (7) Coordinates PA policy with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), 

the Military Departments, combatant commands, and political or military authorities within 

host nations (HNs), alliances, and coalitions. 

 (8) Ensures PAG contained in CJCS warning, planning, alert, deployment, and 

execute orders (EXORDs) is in accordance with established guidance and intent. May 

provide periodic US military training, familiarization training, and education to accredited 

national and international media to support media embed programs with operational units. 

 (9) Supports deployed PA staffs with media analysis. 

Additional responsibilities and guidance are contained in DODD 5122.05, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]), and DODI 5400.13, Public Affairs (PA) 

Operations.

 b. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint Communication: 

 (1) Focuses on two major mission areas—SC, which includes future 

communication planning and coordination within DOD, and joint PA oversight, which 

includes helping ensure DOD’s PA capabilities are properly organized, trained, and 

equipped. 

 (2) Prepare SC proposals and products for review by the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense and Secretary of Defense (SecDef), as required. 

 c. The Director, Defense Media Activity (DMA). The DMA is a DOD field activity 

created by the consolidation of the Army Broadcasting Service, Soldiers Radio/Television 

(TV), Soldiers Media Center, Naval Media Center, Air Force Public Affairs Agency, 

American Forces Information Service (AFIS), and the Joint Hometown News Service. 
Chapter II 

II-4 JP 3-61 

 (1) Provides information products to DOD and external audiences through all 

available media, including motion and still imagery, print, radio, TV, Internet, and related 

communication technologies. 

 (2) Provides US radio and TV news, information, and entertainment programming 

to military Service members, DOD civilians, and contract employees and their families 

overseas and on board Navy and Coast Guard ships and other authorized users. 

 (3) Provides joint education and training for military and civilian PA/visual 

information (VI) personnel at the Defense Information School (DINFOS). 

For more information on how to access DMA services, see Appendix D, “Sources for 

Defense Media Activity,” and DODD 5105.74, Defense Media Activity. 

 d. The Secretaries of the Military Departments: 

 (1) Develop PA policies and Service doctrine and provide resources (personnel and 

standardized and/or compatible equipment) necessary. Ensure the immediate readiness and 

prompt availability of necessary AC and RC PA resources to support any assigned mission 

and validated requests for PA augmentation by CCDRs. 

 (2) Organize, train, equip, and provide AC/RC PA and VI personnel and units to 

conduct PA activities in support of CCDRs. Personnel should be trained to function in 

domestic, joint, and multinational environments and should receive predeployment training 

tailored to the specific needs of the operation. 

DEFENSE INFORMATION SCHOOL 

THE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR VISUAL INFORMATION 

AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 

The Defense Information School (DINFOS), located at Fort George G. Meade, 

Maryland, is the Department of Defense (DOD)-directed school that conducts 

career-long training and development of public affairs (PA) and visual 

information (VI) professionals. Its mission is to grow and sustain a corps of 

professional organizational communicators capable of fulfilling the needs of 

military leaders and audiences under the most demanding operational 

conditions. Instruction is given to DOD officers, enlisted personnel, and 

civilian employees. Limited class space is available for civilian employees of 

other US Government departments and international officers. Resident 

courses offer entry level and advanced training in courses covering PA, 

journalism, broadcasting, broadcast systems maintenance, graphics, 

electronic imaging, photojournalism, video production, and VI management. 

Also, organizational communicators receive professional support through 

the school’s web site (www.dinfos.osd.mil). There, they can access distance 

learning courses, search PA-focused databases, or request professional 

guidance from DINFOS faculty and staff. 

Various Sources 
Mission, Responsibilities, and Relationships

II-5 

 (3) Conduct Service-specific PA programs, as required, in support of joint and 

multinational operations. 

 (4) Should consider the appropriate security clearance levels necessary for PA and 

VI personnel, including RC augmentees, to participate in the appropriate operational 

planning, execution, and assessment processes. 

e. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

 (1) Promulgates joint PA doctrine. 

 (2) Ensures that existing and new PA annexes to joint operation and exercise plans 

and orders prepared by the CCDRs comply with published joint PA doctrine, policy, and 

regulations. 

 (3) Provides a PA representative to augment the National Military Command 

Center response cells during times of crisis and conflict to serve as Joint Staff liaison on PA 

activities to ASD(PA). 

 (4) Supports DOD in explaining various aspects of joint operations by providing 

senior officers with the necessary expertise and experience to communicate with the media 

and internal and external audiences. 

 (5) Provides PA coordination and planning assistance for the DOD Media Pool 

deployment. 

 (6) Ensures CJCS warning, planning, alert, deployment, and EXORDs contain 

appropriate PA guidance paragraphs. 

 f. The Combatant Commanders:

 (1) Coordinate and, when appropriate, synchronize the SC primary communication 

supporting capabilities. 

 (2) Develop detailed PA annexes, coordinated and synchronized with SC guidance 

and associated capabilities, to OPLANS to ensure that foundational SC guidance, including 

and in support of greater DOD/USG objectives, is available for communication efforts. 

Develop detailed PA annexes to OPLANs to ensure that required PA support is available. 

 (a) Conduct appropriate planning for priority in-theater air and ground 

transportation for movement of media representatives, military personnel supporting the PA 

mission (may include PA, VI, and COMCAM personnel), the media, and their equipment. 

 (b) Develop plans to provide for appropriate PA resources and establish 

priorities for the movement of PA assets. 
Chapter II 

II-6 JP 3-61 

 (c) Develop plans to provide for appropriate communications assets, including 

Internet access and/or satellite or mobile telephones for the deploying PA staff and AFRTS, 

if applicable, as well as for use by the media if no other means of communications exist. 

(3) Consider bandwidth and other communications/information technology 

requirements. Commanders should prioritize requirements and allocate resources based on 

their intent, CONOPS, available resources, and the operational environment. 

 (4) Plan for the support of media representatives and military personnel supporting 

PA from the earliest predeployment stages of any operation. When operationally feasible, 

commanders should grant media representatives and military personnel supporting PA all 

possible access to activities without compromising the mission or OPSEC. Develop a 

command climate and procedures that will allow for full, reasonable access for media 

representatives. 

 (5) If requested by ASD(PA), develop and submit proposed PA guidance (PPAG) 

for approval. PPAG should address PA policy, proposed contingency statements, levels of 

authority for release or classification of information, declassification guidance, themes, 

messages and talking points, and responses to anticipated media questions. 

 (6) Prepare for and assist in the deployment, reception, and operation of the DOD 

Media Pool. Designate personnel to support the DOD Media Pool when activated. 

 (7) Establish media operations centers (MOCs), as appropriate, to provide timely 

public and command information products and services. In coordination with ASD(PA), 

provide direct PA support, policy guidance, and oversight to subordinate JFCs and their 

respective MOCs. Be prepared to coordinate US military participation in MOCs established 

by the responsible multinational force commander and supported by the contributing nations. 

The term MOC will be used throughout this publication to represent any type of media 

support facility (e.g., joint information bureau, combined press information center).

 (8) Assist media representatives and military journalists in gaining access to 

military units and personnel conducting joint and multinational operations, to include 

commanders, officers, and enlisted personnel directly involved with the military operations. 

In addition, CCDRs should plan for designated spokespersons to speak with the media 

regarding the US contribution to the multinational force. 

 (9) Support other information and imagery requirements as directed. 

 (10) Plan command information programs to support deployed forces, their home 

stations, and their family members. Establish ground rules to release information and 

imagery to civilian media. Information approved for media release should also be provided 

to the command information staff. 

 (11) Coordinate and approve resourcing and training for appropriately sized PA 

organizations in all force packages developed to support joint operations, including civil 

support (CS) operations as appropriate. 
Mission, Responsibilities, and Relationships

II-7 

 (12) If tasked as a supporting commander, provide PA resources (personnel, 

equipment, transportation, and communications) to the supported CCDR as identified in 

approved plans. Be prepared to reinforce the supported CCDR to meet unplanned resource 

requirements. 

 (13) Identify COMCAM imagery requirements during operational planning and 

coordinate with appropriate sources to obtain imagery collection, editing, and transmission 

requirements and integrate those requirements into COMCAM missions. 

 (14) Forward imagery that supports joint operations to the Defense Imagery 

Management Operations Center (DIMOC), DOD’s central reception and distribution point 

for joint interest imagery. Develop procedures to review imagery for security concerns and 

clear it for public release at the lowest appropriate level. 

 (15) Employ organic PA capabilities of AC and RC units and individuals mobilized 

and deployed into an operational area. Provide family members and hometown media with a 

continuous flow of information to dispel rumors and anxieties, sustain public awareness, and 

increase understanding of the joint force’s missions. 

 (16) Properly identify individual PA augmentation needs to meet operational 

requirements. 

 g. The Subordinate JFCs:

 (1) Provide overall direction and focus to PA activities in the assigned operational 

area. 

 (2) Provide the media and military personnel supporting PA activities access to 

military operations, to include access to command and staff personnel for briefings and 

interviews, and appropriate logistics support to accomplish the PA mission. 

 (3) Designate a joint task force (JTF) PAO and a MOC director, as appropriate. 

 (4) Select a trained and capable officer to serve as media briefer. 

 (5) Conduct media interviews when feasible. 

 (6) Designate an officer to accomplish a security review of VI. VI approved for 

release should be provided to the MOC as soon as possible for potential release to the media. 

 (7) Ensure PA participation/coordination in all cross-functional staff organizations. 

h. The Director, Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE). The JPASE is part 

of US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Enabling Capability Command. The unit 

provides joint PA training for the JFC and staff during joint exercises, seminars, and 

planning events. JPASE has the capability to rapidly deploy in support of geographic 

CCDRs’ PA requirements. The JPASE director has the responsibility to: 
Chapter II 

II-8 JP 3-61 

 (1) Provide JTF PAO if tasked. 

 (2) Provide or augment JTF PA staff. 

 (3) Support/conduct forward media operations. 

 (4) Provide combatant command/JTF PA planning capability. 

 (5) Provide COMCAM/VI coordination. 

See Appendix E, “Joint Public Affairs Support Element,” for additional information on 

JPASE. 

 i. The Service Component Commanders:

 (1) Provide a JTF staff PAO and MOC director, if tasked. 

 (2) Provide media support personnel and equipment. 

 (3) Coordinate Service component release of information and imagery with higher 

headquarters PA. 

 (4) Support the movement of media representatives as feasible. 

 (5) Assist commercial media otherwise unable to file their products in a timely 

manner. 

 (6) Plan for and provide necessary VI documentation teams if tasked. 

 (7) Conduct command and public information programs per guidance provided by 

the JFC. 

3. Relationships 

 a. Intelligence. PA is a customer of intelligence support and uses intelligence products 

to support PA planning and enhance media analysis, as appropriate. Intelligence 

requirements are coordinated with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2). 

Intelligence’s historical and human factors analysis of the adversary gives PA a context from 

which to understand and anticipate propaganda and disinformation. Additionally, PA may 

require access to relevant intelligence (including imagery) products to assist in the execution 

of the PA mission. 

 b. Visual Information

 (1) The VI function represents a broad spectrum of imagery products derived from 

a variety of sources that includes unmanned aerial systems, photo journalists, intelligence 

assets, weapons systems cameras, and military broadcast organization. PA relies on VI 

products from many sources to accomplish its mission. 
Mission, Responsibilities, and Relationships

II-9 

 (2) The acquisition of VI by imagery-producing capabilities to support PA must be 

planned in advance. Imagery requirements need to be synchronized with the operational 

plans of the imagery-producing capabilities so that imagery captured in support of other 

mission areas can be exploited by PA.

Additional information on VI CONOPS can be found at http://www.defenseimagery.mil. 

 c. Combat Camera

 (1) COMCAM provides VI in support of the JFC’s operational and planning 

requirements. 

 (2) The deployment of joint COMCAM teams offer a capability to enhance 

operational and PA missions and JFCs plan for sufficient COMCAM assets. Imagery 

produced provides operational information for internal and external use. COMCAM teams 

oftentimes have access to events and areas unavailable to PA, other VI personnel, or media 

representatives. Furthermore, COMCAM teams have a technological capability for the 

timely transmission of images during fast-moving operations and the documentation of 

operations in austere environments. 

 (3) Because deployed COMCAM teams are usually operationally controlled by the 

operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) and support the entire spectrum of an operation, it 

is essential that the JFC prioritizes PA imagery requirements throughout the planning cycle. 

Planning includes in-theater declassification and delegation of in-theater release of 

unclassified COMCAM products to PA to meet time-sensitive media requirements. A 

COMCAM liaison team is assigned to coordinate imagery requirements and release of 

imagery products to the media. The COMCAM headquarters management team ensures the 

timely fulfillment of internal imagery requirements and imagery requests by PA. 

For additional details regarding COMCAM policy, procedures, and tasking of COMCAM 

assets, and appropriate use and distribution of products, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3205.01B, Joint Combat Camera, DODI 5040.04, Joint Combat 

Camera (COMCAM) Program, and Field Manual (FM) 3-55.12/Marine Corps Reference 

Publication (MCRP) 3-33.7A/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-13.12/Air 

Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Publication (AFTTP) 3-2.41, Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera Operations. 

d. Information Operations. PA and IO activities directly support military objectives; 

counter adversary propaganda, misinformation and disinformation; and deter adversary 

actions. Although both PA and IO plan and execute public information activities and 

conduct media analysis, IO may differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent. As such, 

they are separate functional areas. JFCs ensure appropriate coordination between PA and IO 

activities consistent with the DOD principles of information, policy, or legal limitation and 

security. 

For additional guidance on the relationship of IO and PA, see JP 3-13, Information 

Operations.
Chapter II 

II-10 JP 3-61 

 (1) Psychological Operations. PSYOP are used to influence the attitudes, 

opinions, and behaviors of specific foreign audiences through the dissemination of 

information. The respective activities of PA and PSYOP affect each other and require 

continual coordination. 

 (a) The PA and PSYOP planning process should focus on deconflicting 

activities to avoid countering each other while executing their respective plans to accomplish 

objectives. Normally PSYOP and PA activities are coordinated in an IO working group or 

cell. However, when there is no IO coordination capability, PA and PSYOP coordinate 

directly with each other.

 (b) Under law, PSYOP will not be conducted against US persons. However, 

PSYOP personnel and equipment may be used to support approved homeland defense or as 

part of civil authority information support element (CAISE) activities such as information 

dissemination, printing, reproduction, distribution, and broadcasting. PSYOP units in 

support of CAISE act to inform rather than to influence. All CAISE efforts are coordinated 

with lead federal agency PA efforts. 

For additional guidance on PSYOP, see JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

 (2) Operations Security. OPSEC measures are designed to identify, control, and 

protect generally unclassified information that is associated with sensitive operations and 

activities. OPSEC is concerned with denying “critical information” about friendly forces to 

the adversary. 

 (a) PA releases information to the public and must be aware of OPSEC 

considerations. Security at the source is the primary means of protecting classified and 

sensitive material and should govern discussions with the public. 

 (b) PAOs should provide their assessment on the possible effects of media 

coverage of the joint operation. They should work closely with OPSEC planners to develop 

guidelines that can be used by military and media personnel to avoid inadvertent disclosure 

of sensitive information. PA representatives should be involved in OPSEC planning, 

surveys, and security reviews to protect critical information from public release. A typical 

OPSEC survey team contains multidisciplined expertise and should include PA. 

 (c) There is a natural tension between OPSEC and the need to release 

information and imagery. Decisions as to when to release information and imagery must 

reflect an understanding of OPSEC. Ground rules allowing temporary transmission delays 

of potentially sensitive information have proven to be acceptable to the media and effective 

in balancing short-term security concerns with media coverage requirements. 

 (d) PA should consider OPSEC issues relating to the use of media and 

information technology capabilties, such as blogging, cell phones, social networking sites, 

portable media players, multimedia smart phones, and streaming media.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, see JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
Mission, Responsibilities, and Relationships

II-11 

 (3) Military Deception (MILDEC) 

 (a) MILDEC includes actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary 

decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby 

causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the 

accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC can be employed during all phases of 

military operations. Safeguarding MILDEC-related information is critical to the success of 

the operation; as such, details are classified accordingly. 

 (b) PA operations should be planned, coordinated, and deconflicted with 

MILDEC operations consistent with policy, legal limitations, and security. The coordination 

between PA and MILDEC operations must safeguard the essential elements of deception 

plans and maintain the integrity, reputation, and credibility of PA as a source of truthful 

information. 

For additional guidance on MILDEC, see JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(4) Computer Network Operations (CNO) and Electronic Warfare (EW). The 

employment of CNO and EW capabilities can impact aspects of the PA mission. PA and 

CNO/EW activities should be coordinated to avoid conflicts. 

e. Special Operations. Special operations forces (SOF) units have assigned PA 

personnel at the group, regiment, and wing levels, as well as all higher echelons. The SOF 

PAO advises special operations commanders on the impact their operations are likely to have 

within the public realm. They ensure the PA policies of higher headquarters are adhered to 

and balance higher headquarters’ need for information and imagery with the sensitive and/or 

classified nature of their operations. Additionally, the SOF PAO serves as the joint special 

operations task force (JSOTF) spokesperson and is integrated into all phases of SOF 

operations. If a SOF PAO is not available, the JFC PAO will assume spokesperson 

responsibility and will work closely with the JSOTF staff, the theater special operations 

command PAO and, if needed, US Special Operations Command PA. PPAG referencing 

SOF operations will normally be provided by the JSOTF PAO. During foreign internal 

defense and unconventional warfare operations and those missions involving extensive 

interaction with an indigenous population, the SOF PAO may serve as the link between the 

command and the senior US DOS representative and/or other designated authority 

responsible for releasing information to the HN media.
Chapter II 

II-12 JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
III-1 

CHAPTER III 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN JOINT OPERATIONS 

1. Public Affairs Overview 

 a. Public Affairs Functions. PA activities are divided into public information, 

command information, and community engagement supported by planning and analysis and 

assessment throughout the course of operations. 

 (1) Public information is information of a military nature, the dissemination of 

which is consistent with security and the DOD principles of information. While 

telecommunications technology continues to provide new public information opportunities, 

military public information is still largely a matter of ensuring media have access to 

information they need to report on military operations. Media relations activities are 

designed to provide information to the domestic and international publics. Commanders and 

their PA staffs should conduct briefings, issue statements, conduct interviews, respond to 

queries, arrange for access to operational units, and provide appropriate equipment, 

transportation and communications support to the media. Plans should include specific 

provisions for each phase of the operation and, as appropriate, the inclusion of media on 

deploying aircraft, ships, and with deploying units. 

 (2) Command information is communication by a military organization directed 

to the internal audience to help them understand the goals of the organization, its role in joint 

operations, as well as significant developments affecting them. Base and organizational 

publications are traditional ways of reaching these groups. During a joint operation, 

commanders should consider all dissemination capabilities available, particularly the 

Internet, to communicate details about the operation and the role of the joint force. When 

military families are kept informed, affected Service members may be more focused on the 

mission, particularly when forward deployed. 

 (3) Community engagement is the process of working collaboratively with, and 

through, groups of people affiliated by geographic proximity or special interest to 

enhance the understanding and support for military operations. During joint operations, 

any number of personnel may be involved in activities that engage the community, including 

but not limited to, PA, civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, military health specialists, lawyers, and 

engineers. All community engagement activities should support the overall civil-military 

operations (CMO) plan. Senior military leaders have responsibilities to engage key leaders 

in their operational areas, including those from OGAs and nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs). PA assists in identifying key leaders and recommending opportunities for military 

engagement. 

“The press is not the enemy and to treat it as such is self-defeating.” 

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 

May 2007 
Chapter III 

III-2 JP 3-61 

 b. Considerations. The JFC should consider the following in anticipation of 

conducting joint operations. 

 (1) Military operations will draw attention. Commanders and staffs at all levels 

must anticipate interest in operations as part of the normal planning process. Unit alerts, 

increased aircraft activity, and rail or ship loading are highly visible and will almost 

inevitably lead to media inquiries. Such activities may also cause concern among unit 

personnel and family members. 

 (2) PA should be incorporated in every phase of operations. Consistent with 

current DOD PA guidance, and within the constraints of OPSEC, information security 

(INFOSEC), safety, and privacy of US military personnel, their families, and DOD civilians, 

PA shall: 

 (a) Provide accurate and timely information about US military operations and 

objectives to external (domestic and international) and DOD internal audiences. 

 (b) Support US and international media coverage of US military operations. 

 (c) Contribute to global understanding and deterrence by making audiences 

aware of US resolve, capabilities, and intent. 

 (d) Mitigate and counter adversary disinformation (propaganda) and 

misinformation by actively using accurate and timely public information and imagery to 

preempt and respond to inaccurate information and deception. 

 (3) Commanders must evaluate communication activities and associated 

results. PAOs should look to all feedback sources to assist in determining the effectiveness 

of their activities. Results should also be used to inform future plan and strategy 

development. 

2. Requirements 

 a. General Overview

 (1) PA activities require facilities, personnel, equipment, transportation assets, and 

communication capabilities. Anticipated PA resource requirements should be identified and 

addressed as early in the planning process as possible, since PA requirements often exceed 

available resources. Planning considers specific measures to augment PA personnel and 

procure, lease, or assign other necessary resources. This generally requires assistance from 

the supporting combatant commands, Services, and the military departments. 

(2) All personnel and equipment should be deployable and provided on a dedicated 

basis so that the responsible commander can sustain PA operations. Initial PA personnel and 

equipment should be capable of being carried on both military and commercial aircraft for 

quick deployment. Follow-on items are given appropriate priority for deployment through 

logistics channels. The organization and staffing of PA staffs are influenced by the volume 

and diversity of media assets and the differing nature of their reporting interest. Manning 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-3 

and operational procedures should also consider the ability of the media to surge for different 

events at separate locations. 

 b. Facilities. When feasible, facilities with appropriate infrastructure are designated for 

PA and may include the requirement for establishing and operating a MOC. Specific 

requirements might include staff and media work areas, equipment storage, imaging 

facilities, access to helicopter landing zones, and vehicle parking areas. Additionally, work 

areas are necessary for those personnel conducting the community engagement and 

command information missions. This includes AFRTS broadcast and transmission facilities. 

Billeting and messing requirements should also be considered. 

 c. Personnel. The peacetime staffing of most PA offices is likely to be inadequate to 

respond to the inevitable increase in media and public interest surrounding a crisis. 

Contingency and crisis action planning (CAP) must address the need for rapid expansion of 

PA personnel to meet this challenge, especially in the earliest stages of the operation. 

Augmentation requirements are prioritized and can be filled in the following ways: 

 (1) Active Component and Reserve Component PA Units. Commanders 

identify the specific skills and capabilities needed to accomplish the PA mission. OPLANs 

or OPORDs requests for forces (RFFs) should reflect the specific skill sets required. 

Members of these organizations should train regularly to support these plans and should be 

provided with sufficient equipment, transportation, and communications support to 

accomplish the PA functions. 

 (2) Individuals. Service component commanders and supporting CCDRs may also 

be tasked to support the JFC through the deployment of individual PA personnel. Billets 

should be identified in advance and individuals matched to specific requirements in support 

of each operation. 

 d. Equipment. Based on mission requirements, the PAO should identify the equipment 

necessary to support PA. The planning process should precisely identify the PA 

infrastructure requirements for each contingency and then identify who will provide them. 

Maintenance and services essential to sustain the resource packages are also considered. 

 (1) Every effort should be made to standardize equipment to facilitate 

interoperability and to minimize additional training requirements, especially in a contingency 

environment. Specific hardware, software, and digital imaging requirements should be 

identified to support all PA activities. Considerations include logistic and administrative 

needs, media and event coordination and scheduling, briefing preparations, and operation of 

contingency unclassified and classified Internet sites. PA staff, translators, and analysts will 

generally require TV monitors, video/digital recorders, and reception capability to review 

newscasts in support of media analysis and assessment. 

 (2) Deployable AFRTS distribution packages (over air radio/TV broadcast, cable, 

L-Band downlink), if available, should be considered in the overall requirements. Most of 

these items must be requested by the CCDR, especially those which support the DOD Media 

Pool, the command’s primary MOC, and other PA offices supporting the operation in its 
Chapter III 

III-4 JP 3-61 

earliest stages. Broadcast frequencies required should be provided by the communications 

system directorate of a joint staff. Subsequent resource needs should be met by balanced 

support provided by the responsible CCDR, the supporting CCDRs, and the Military 

Departments. 

e. Transportation 

 (1) When required, the mobility of the PA effort should match that of other 

operational forces. 

 (2) A package of transportation assets, in a combination appropriate to the assigned 

operation, may include: 

 (a) Vehicles (with drivers and communications) to support PA administrative 

and logistics activities. 

 (b) Vehicles (with drivers and communications) to support the movement of 

media and PA personnel covering operations. 

 (c) Force protection assets to travel with PA staffs and media in hostile or 

unsecured areas. 

 (d) Aircraft, both fixed- and rotary-wing, to support the movement of media 

and military journalists. 

 (e) Surface and air transportation to assist in moving information and imagery 

products. 

 f. Communications. Specific communications concerns include: 

 (1) Bandwidth priority to ensure timely (to include near real time or live) 

transmission of PA and VI products both intertheater and intratheater, to multiple users 

simultaneously. 

 (2) Bandwidth allocation for PA products, both classified and unclassified, as files 

can routinely be more than 250 megabytes in size and during surge events, streaming live at 

5 megabytes per second. 

 (3) Internet access to include unfiltered external access for information and 

imagery release, local area network access, and establishment and operation of unit and/or 

contingency unclassified and classified web-based sites. 

 (4) While communications requirements vary in each situation, an appropriate mix 

of the capabilities shown in Figure III-1 is needed to support PA. 

 g. Other Support. The PA staff may require certain specialized support based on the 

type of operation. They should have access to contracting support and a government 

purchase card in order to obtain goods and services not available within the joint force to 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-5 

establish and execute PA activities throughout the joint operations area (JOA). This may 

include: 

 (1) Contracts for publication of command information products (e.g., newsletters, 

newspapers, photographs). 

 (2) Contracts for products, services, and equipment to support media analysis and 

assessment. 

 (3) Maintenance and service contracts to ensure sustainability of equipment. 

 (4) Contracted translation services. 

 h. Training and Exercises

 (1) PA personnel and appropriate staff members should be trained in the joint 

operation planning process (JOPP) and in the tasks involved with joint PA activities. PA 

training objectives should be included in the command exercise objectives and involve the 

entire command staff. Prior identification and training of personnel in exercises is essential 

to their future success in contingency operations. 

 (2) All aspects of the PA process should be exercised with particular attention paid 

to coordination with the operational staff, the resourcing of all PA functions, and identifying 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS















Telephone lines with 

international access

Secure communications

Mobile radios

Portable phones

Answering machines

Facsimile machines

Tactical communications 

devices (secure and 

nonsecure)













Live video

Electronic still photo and 

video

Internet access

Classified and unclassified 

e-mail accounts

Dubbing equipment

Access to satellite uplink 

equipment

Figure III-1. Public Affairs Communications Requirements 
Chapter III 

III-6 JP 3-61 

and addressing OPSEC concerns. PA universal joint tasks should be used to drive training. 

Operational scenarios should include events specifically designed to assess the readiness of 

PA personnel. 

3. Planning 

 a. Overview. Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into executable 

OPLANs or OPORDs for contingencies and crisis action responses. Joint operation planning 

includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation—the 

mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces. Effective 

PA planners participate throughout the entire planning process. 

 b. Public Affairs and the Planning Process 

 (1) The first consideration in PA planning is the commander’s intent and desired 

end state. PA planners consider how desired and undesired effects of PA activities influence 

the information environment and the accomplishment of the JFC’s mission. 

 (2) PA planners establish and maintain a routine, ongoing relationship with other 

planners within the combatant command and JTF. Synchronization across the staff 

facilitates the availability of services and support required to execute PA activities. PA 

planning should include coordination with the HN, the country team, OGAs, 

intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and NGOs, as appropriate. 

 (3) Joint Operation Planning Process. JOPP is a proven analytical process, 

which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any 

point before and during joint operations. Examples of specific PA activities taken during 

JOPP are depicted in Figure III-2. 

 (a) Mission Analysis. PA planners focus on developing situational 

understanding of the operational environment to include media infrastructure, capability and 

bias, as well as the social and cultural characteristics of key areas. PA planners analyze the 

mission, the end state, and objectives, and review applicable strategic guidance to identify 

the PA tasks (specified, implied, and essential) and develop initial PA staff estimates. 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE 

Public affairs guidance (PAG) supports the public discussion of defense 

issues and operations and serves as a source document when responding to 

media representatives and the public. PAG also outlines planning guidance 

for related public affairs responsibilities, functions, activities, and resources. 

The development and timely dissemination of PAG ensures that all 

information is in consonance with policy when responding to the information 

demands of joint operations. PAG also conforms to operations security and 

the privacy requirements of the members of the joint forces. 

Various Sources 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-7 

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS AND

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS

AFRTS American Forces Radio and 

Television Service

DOD Department of Defense

JFC joint force commander

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment

LEGEND

JOA joint operations area

JOPP joint operation planning process

PA public affairs

PAG public affairs guidance

SC strategic communication

JOPP Step Public Affairs Actions

7. Plan or Order

Development

1. Initiation

2. Mission Analysis

3. Course of Action (COA) 

Development

4. COA Analysis and 

Wargaming

5. COA Comparison

6. COA Approval

















Provide PA perspective during mission analysis

Identify intelligence requirements for PA support to planning

Identify specified, implied, and essential PA tasks

Develop PA input to the mission statement

Conduct initial PA force structure analysis including the need for imagery 

support, AFRTS, and the DOD Media Pool

Develop PA facts and assumptions

Develop PA estimates

Participate in all cross functional staff organizations related to planning







Begin analysis of the operational environment

Participate in JIPOE

Review the following for PA implications:











Participate in COA development; identify needed PA capabilities and 

forces required as well as shortfalls

Participate in COA analysis and wargaming; identify advantages and 

disadvantages of each COA from a PA perspective

Revise the PA staff estimate as needed based on wargaming

Provide PA input on COA recommendation

Continued participation in all cross functional staff organizations

















Refine PA requirements (capabilities, force structure, 

equipment/logistics, and other resources) to support the COA

Provide PA personnel requirements of the request for forces

Participate in the time-phased force and deployment data build/validation 

as applicable

Continued participation in all related 

to planning

Provide input to the operational planning process for all applicable 

annexes including B, C, D, G, O, V, and draft annex F

Coordinate any administrative or contracting requirements

Develop and submit proposed PAG to higher headquarters for 

review/approval

Coordinate with subordinate PA staffs to ensure plan synchronization 

and a smooth transition to deployed operations

cross functional staff organizations









National strategic guidance

SC guidance

Higher headquarters planning directive

Initial JFC intent

Figure III-2. Joint Operation Planning Process and Public Affairs Actions 
Chapter III 

III-8 JP 3-61 

 (b) Course of Action (COA) Development. PA participates in the 

development, analysis and wargaming, comparison, and approval of COAs. 

 (c) Plan or Order Development. PA planners apply the PA planning 

considerations in subparagraph 3c, “Public Affairs Planning Considerations,” to refine 

requirements and develop annex F (Public Affairs) of the OPLAN and the PPAG, and 

support the development of other annexes as appropriate. 

 1. Annex F (Public Affairs). Annex F of an OPORD should address all 

PA-related transportation, communications, billeting, equipment, and personnel resources 

required to support the plan. Additional planning considerations that should be captured in 

the annex are included in Figure III-3. The PA annex to the plan or order complements and 

supports, but does not replace, the PPAG forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]). A sample annex F (Public Affairs) is at Appendix 

B, “Annex Development.” 

 2. Annex Y (Strategic Communication). This SC annex content is 

spelled out in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03C, Joint 

Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats. Content 

includes the situation and CONOPS focusing on important SC-related elements, such as the 

overview of the information environment, opposition, lines of operation, measures of 

effectiveness, tasks, and coordination instructions. PA planners will contribute to the 

development of annex Y and use the information included to inform the development of 

annex F. 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS





















Security

Host nation

Multinational partners

Country team

Government agencies and 

nongovernmental organizations

Interagency coordination

Dissemination of interagency 

guidance

Analysis and feedback

Counter adversary propaganda

Public affairs guidance























Exercises

Media access

Visual information

Media operations centers

Embedding/media pools

Intelligence support

Technology support to public 

affairs

Command information

American Forces Radio and 

Television Service

Communications guidance

Internet based 

products/releases

Figure III-3. Public Affairs Planning Considerations 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-9 

 3. Proposed Public Affairs Guidance. The JFC submits PPAG through 

CCDRs to OASD(PA) for approval and publication as PAG. PPAG should include 

recommended PA policy, background, contingency statements, message points, answers to 

anticipated media questions, community engagement guidance, and details governing the 

release of information to the public. It should be developed in sufficient time for all required 

coordination to be complete and initial PAG to be published in conjunction with the receipt 

of an EXORD. OASD(PA) will staff the PPAG and issue a PAG message approving, 

approving with modifications, or disapproving the PPAG. PPAG is not used without 

approval of OASD(PA) or the JFC. At the very latest, approved PAG should be published 

prior to the start of any deployment activities. Development of additional or supplemental 

PPAG continues as needed throughout the operation or campaign. The JFC’s PA staff 

recommends additional PA policy, drafts appropriate statements, and identifies any issues

and the responses most likely to address the questions, concerns, and interests of external and 

internal audiences. 

 4. Crisis Action Planning. In CAP, the JOPP steps are time sensitive and 

often require accelerated decisionmaking to respond to an actual or imminent crisis. In as 

little as a few days, commanders and staffs must develop and approve a feasible COA, 

publish the plan or order, prepare forces, ensure sufficient communications systems support, 

and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces. Public and media 

inquiries may quickly overwhelm organic PA assets and impact PA planning capability. 

Immediate augmentation of the PA staff may be necessary in order to have the requisite 

personnel available for planning while simultaneously dealing with increased operational 

tempo associated with intense public and media interest in the DOD response. 

For additional information on joint operation planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning, and CJCSM 3122 Series, The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. 

c. Public Affairs Planning Considerations 

 (1) Overview. During initial planning it is critical to synchronize PA planning and 

activities across the joint force and with other agencies as necessary. Authorities to plan, 

integrate, approve, and disseminate appropriate information and imagery should be clearly 

established. Legal considerations regarding release of information on investigations in the 

JOA, including those regarding alleged law of war violations, should be addressed as early as 

possible in the PAG. Coordination of overall themes, as well as a plan to support media 

coverage and all applicable PAG, should be approved prior to hostilities in order to 

effectively shape the information environment. 

 (a) As planning continues and preparations for operations begin, the 

requirement for public information activities increases, as people realize that forces are 

preparing for a deployment. 

 (b) With increased public and media interest, the need for PA programs, 

activities and personnel will continue to expand. PA demands are highest at the outset of 

operations or outbreak of hostilities. OASD(PA) may embed media and require a MOC 

and/or subordinate MOCs in geographic areas where operations attract a high concentration 
Chapter III 

III-10 JP 3-61 

of media. Where direct access to operations is not possible, OASD(PA) may require media 

pools to be established and supported. It is important to continue the synchronization and 

integration of PA across the staff and with DOD and USG activities (e.g., daily press 

briefings, response to query, and COMCAM documentation) to counter propaganda. 

 (c) Many of the same PA activities continue throughout an operation. PA 

activities should support the return of control to a competent, credible civilian authority, 

repair of essential information infrastructure, selected augmentation of HN radio/TV/print 

infrastructure when required to meet the conditions for a transition to civil control or meet 

end state conditions, and support redeployment activities/coverage. 

 (2) Higher Headquarters and Organizational Strategic Communication Goals

 (a) CCDRs develop goals, objectives, strategic estimates, strategies, and plans 

to accomplish their assigned missions based on strategic guidance and direction, including 

SC guidance. Similarly, PA planners conduct analysis of strategic direction, SC guidance, 

and goals to develop their communications strategy and supporting PA plans. SC guidance 

should be understood by planners from the initial stage of planning and incorporated 

throughout the process. PA planners should ensure that execution of PA activities not only 

supports the commanders’ operational objectives, but also is aligned with SC guidance. 

During the planning process, specific intended audiences, themes, messages, actions, desired 

effects, and objectives should be identified. 

 (b) Synchronized planning for incorporation of PA, DSPD, IO, and other SCrelated capabilities is essential for effective SC. Interagency efforts promote international 

support from nations in the region and provide an opportunity to advance regional and global 

partnerships. Therefore, CCDRs should ensure that planning for SC supporting capabilities 

is consistent with overall USG SC objectives. There also is a mutually supporting 

relationship between the military’s PA and DSPD efforts and similar PA and public 

diplomacy (PD) activities conducted by US embassies and OGAs. 

 (3) Intelligence. Understanding the operational environment is fundamental to 

joint operation planning. Intelligence analysts use the joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment (JIPOE) process to analyze, correlate, and fuse information 

pertaining to all relevant aspects of the operational environment. Developing a systems 

perspective is one methodology used by intelligence analysts during JIPOE to identify 

links, nodes, and relationships within and across networks. This could include 

identification of critical community organizations and individuals that influence the 

population, media, etc. In order to satisfy information requirements, PA may request 

that certain platforms conducting surveillance and reconnaissance missions for 

intelligence purposes also gather imagery to support the PA mission. Accordingly, PA 

may require access to relevant intelligence products to assist in the development of PA news 

releases. 

See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military 

Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, 

for additional guidance.
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-11 

 (4) Media Operations. Media want to be at the action. It is essential that 

commanders understand that members of the press desire to move as close as possible to the 

action in order to gain a complete understanding of the operation. 

 (a) PA plans should include detailed processes, procedures, and supporting 

requirements to give media the opportunity to meet the personnel actively conducting 

operations. Commanders may embed media with selected units for certain operations or 

periods of time whenever feasible. This practice enables media to provide much more indepth reporting by staying with a particular unit or following an operation to its termination. 

When embedding media, it is essential that specific ground rules be established and that they 

are thoroughly understood by both the media and the embedded unit. Planning should 

include detailed provisions for accommodating and supporting the media when deployed 

with the joint force and escorted by those not formally trained in PA. The commander’s 

security concerns are also addressed when determining what areas the media are allowed to 

visit. 

 (b) Commanders also have the option to have media accompany them when 

they conduct visits to their operating unit in the field. This concept is desirable to media who 

cannot embed for long periods of time. Media have the opportunity to meet the personnel 

conducting the operations and have the perspective from senior leaders. 

 (c) PA should have the capability to support local and regional media 

consistent with the JFC’s instructions and other guidance. Effective public communications 

requires both cultural and language capabilities. Media facilitation, media response, and 

media escort operations should be able to accommodate non-English-speaking reporters, 

especially those of the HN or regional media outlets. News releases and public information 

Internet sites should have a local/regional language capability. Media analysis must take into 

account cultural context to provide nuanced evaluation of PA efforts. 

 (5) Timely Coverage. It is critical that plans are developed to assist the media in 

getting the information out in an accurate and timely manner in order to compete in the 

information environment. PA plans facilitate the media getting a first-hand look at joint 

operations. To this end, operational planning should: 

 (a) Commit equipped and trained joint PA teams. 

PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUESTING INTELLIGENCE IMAGERY SUPPORT 

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, public affairs personnel in the Joint Air 

Operations Center monitored current operations for the prosecution of 

sensitive targets. Public affairs planners in the operations center 

recommended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms 

gather imagery on sensitive targets to prove coalition aircraft struck the 

intended military target rather than surrounding civilian buildings and 

infrastructure. The imagery was declassified for public release. 

Various Sources 
Chapter III 

III-12 JP 3-61 

 (b) Determine lift and logistic support to move PA and media personnel and 

media products to and from forward locations as appropriate. 

 (c) Hold frequent briefings in theater with international and US media—

several per day if needed to keep them apprised of operations as appropriate. 

 (d) Institute processes for the rapid dissemination of weapons systems video, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, and COMCAM products as appropriate. 

 (e) Delegate the authority for the release of information and imagery to include 

COMCAM and other related products to the lowest possible level. 

 (6) Visual Information and Combat Camera. When developing and 

coordinating plans, PA planners work closely with the staff element that has supervisory 

responsibility for VI and COMCAM operations to ensure PA requirements are identified and 

taken into consideration. Commercial multimedia products are copyrighted and cannot be 

used without consent from the copyright holder. 

(7) Command Information. Commanders should plan for the inclusion of 

command information personnel in operations. The DOD command information program 

assists commanders in their leadership communications functions. 

(8) American Forces Radio and Television Service. The deployment of AFRTS 

offers the JFC and PAO an important means to communicate directly to DOD personnel in 

the operational area, as well as DOD personnel and family members in other locations. 

(a) AFRTS has a wide range of deployable equipment systems, from small 

unmanned satellite radio and TV decoders used to provide service at small base camps or 

messing areas to large scale network radio and TV systems. Additionally, AFRTS can 

provide a MOC with video newsgathering capability for joint command messages. 

 1. During the initial stages of an operation, AFRTS is one of the timeliest 

channels to get the CCDR’s message to the deployed force. 

 2. Initial consideration for staffed AFRTS facilities should center on radio 

service to bare-base and forward areas, with TV considered for rear areas and further 

“During World War II the US Army undertook an aggressive hometown news 

approach when US troops on the stalemated front in Italy came to believe that they 

had been forgotten by the folks back home. An aggressive Public Affairs program 

aimed at telling individual soldiers’ stories to their hometown news resulted in a 

flow of personal mail back to the front, which let the troops know that they were not 

forgotten.” 

Charles Moskos 

Reporting War When There Is No War 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-13 

expansion as an operational area matures. PA should anticipate the desire of the DOD 

leadership to communicate directly to deployed forces. 

 3. Additionally, AFRTS can be used to transmit immediate 

announcements to DOD personnel when approved by the CCDR. AFRTS TV capabilities 

should be considered for installation at messing and recreational facilities and further 

expanded as the operation develops. A wide range of AFRTS options are available to meet 

operational requirements. 

 4. In austere environments, AFRTS is capable of providing a small 

satellite system to receive radio and TV news coverage, obtain electronic copies of DOD 

products such as the “Early Bird” and “Stars and Stripes Lite,” and other command 

information releases. 

(b) Deployment of AFRTS assets into an operational area usually requires 

special approvals for frequencies, real estate, and facilities which must normally be 

coordinated by the MOC. The senior AFRTS officer commands the AFRTS station and 

serves as a member of the MOC. 

(c) AFRTS outlets may not be used for any type of political purpose or PSYOP 

and may not produce or broadcast programming to serve interests other than the DOD 

internal audience. 

Refer to Appendix D, “Sources for Defense Media Activity,” or contact the DMA 

(www.dma.mil) for assistance with AFRTS planning. 

 (9) Community Engagement. PA provides specialized skills in planning and 

developing relationships for commanders seeking to successfully interact within local 

communities while conducting operations. PA should be involved in the planning, 

preparation, and execution of engagements within the local/HN communities to support the 

CMO plan. PA planners should look for creative ways to employ community engagement 

capabilities. 

 (10) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. DSPD consists of activities and 

measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG PD efforts. DSPD 

ensures that DOD sends a coherent and compelling message in concert with other USG 

agencies. It is critical that all DOD information activities be conducted in concert with the 

broader USG communications strategy and support the National Security Strategy. As such 

DSPD requires coordination across the interagency and among DOD components. 

 (11) Country Team. The country team consists of key members of the US 

diplomatic mission or embassy and work directly with the HN government. Its purpose is to 

unify the coordination and implementation of US national policy within each foreign country 

under direction of the chief of mission (COM). Country teams meet regularly to advise the 

COM on matters of interest to the United States and review current developments in the 

country. The COM, as the senior US representative in each HN, controls information release 

in country. The PA staff should coordinate all themes, messages, and press releases 

impacting a HN through the respective US embassy channels. 
Chapter III 

III-14 JP 3-61 

 (12) Interagency Coordination. CCDRs operate in a public information arena 

with interagency partners who may not be part of the country team, but whose actions and 

information can affect public understanding of the facts. Communicating a consistent 

message that supports approved themes is essential during operations. All participating 

agencies and organizations need to establish and agree early in the planning process on 

procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and 

transporting media members and their equipment. The Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs plays a key coordinating role in this process. OASD(PA) 

interfaces with the combatant commands, normally through their joint interagency 

coordination group, and passes the information down through PAG. 

 (a) The Executive Office of the President is the lead for SC. The DOS’s 

Bureau of International Information Programs engages international audiences on issues of 

US policy, society, and values to help create an environment that can be receptive to 

America’s national interests. Commanders and their staffs should plan for PA activities to 

function in coordination with these and other national-level communication initiatives. 

 (b) Public Diplomacy. PD consists of overt international public information 

activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking to 

understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers. It is critically 

important that PA and PD are coordinated in order to ensure consistency of their respective 

messages and to maintain credibility with their respective audiences. 

 (c) Interagency Guidance. Information from the interagency process, DOD, 

and various levels of command is disseminated through PAG. This guidance is essential to 

ensure a consistent message is projected. The guidance can change weekly, daily, or hourly 

as the political and military situation changes.

 (13) Intergovernmental Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations. 

Close coordination with IGOs and NGOs also can be an important PA responsibility. For 

example, if DOD is providing foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), there may be many 

non-DOD or non-US agencies (e.g., United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 

Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross) involved. There will be public and 

media interest in their activities as well as those of DOD. Close coordination by the joint 

forces with other involved agencies will help ensure consistent information is presented 

about the total US response effort. 

 (14) Host Nation. PA planners should consult with HN governments as 

appropriate to identify local issues and concerns that should be reflected in the PAG. This 

coordination normally is established through the PAO at the respective embassy and in close 

coordination with IO planners. 

(15) Multinational Partners. US military forces will rarely work alone to solve 

an international crisis, thus PA planning should reflect the possibility of multinational 

partners joining in the effort. In addition to HN sensitivities, the MOC staff should also be 

cognizant of multinational partners’ concerns when communicating with the media and the 

public. 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-15 

 d. Public Affairs Planning for Specific Operations 

 (1) Overview. Commanders should ensure PA activities are tailored to support the 

joint forces across the range of military operations. While the public and the media are 

interested in the essential facts of any situation, that information is incomplete without an 

understanding of the background, underlying rationale, and other fundamental elements 

particular to a certain type of operation. Experience shows that media interest in civil 

support, FHA, managing the consequences of incidents, peace operations (PO), and similar 

operations often peaks early, then diminishes gradually. PA planning should take this into 

account. Commanders and their PA personnel should be prepared to discuss, among other 

topics, organizational structure, strategy, objectives, tactics, training, logistics, intelligence, 

and troop support issues. Explaining the details of such areas reinforces the media and 

public awareness of how the military functions within the context of the stated political 

goals. 

 (2) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. FHA operations are conducted to relieve 

or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters. FHA provided by US forces is 

generally limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement 

or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary 

responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. 

 (a) These missions involve a delicate balance of political and military 

objectives. FHA missions include operational and informational coordination with NGO 

relief organizations. Intense media and public interest in FHA operations may require more 

than usual PA capabilities. The potential for involvement of multiple USG agencies and 

IGOs and often the representatives of other involved nations can complicate the coordination 

required to get approval for the release of information and imagery. JFCs and their PA staffs 

must exercise care so that, in their attempts to demonstrate DOD responsiveness, concern 

and assistance do not preempt the authority of the political leadership or HN or appear to be 

taking credit for successes at the expense of other contributing parties. 

(b) If a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is established to coordinate 

relief efforts, PA will work through the CMOC to coordinate activities. In the absence of a 

CMOC, PA activities will be coordinated through the JTF staff and with other USG agencies 

involved via the country team. 

See JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for additional guidance. 

(3) Counterdrug (CD) Operations. There are a number of specific actions taken 

to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking that require special attention during planning. 

Most significantly, there are legal and law enforcement aspects of CD that are extremely 

sensitive and generate additional concerns in the release of information to the public. 

Commanders and PA planners must consider the intended and unintended effects of 

communication when deciding how and when to release information regarding CD 

operations. The release of information could impact the safety of military personnel, civilian 

law enforcement officials, and other participants pending judicial cases and the security of 

intelligence systems and sources. Additionally, DOD most commonly operates in a 
Chapter III 

III-16 JP 3-61 

supporting role as part of an interagency effort; close coordination with agency PA 

counterparts is critical to ensure a consistent whole of government PA message. PA plans 

should account for the appropriate release of information to the public as well as OPSEC 

measures. 

See JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations, for additional guidance. 

(4) Combating Terrorism. Terrorist threats and acts occur in media-intense 

environments. That, in turn, may make it impossible to prevent coverage that could reveal 

tactics, techniques, and procedures used in combating terrorism. That means PA planners 

have to anticipate and make accommodations for the probability of live and near live direct 

media coverage and strive to provide as much information to the public about DOD activities 

as possible, consistent with OPSEC, technology security, and INFOSEC. In making 

information available to the media, PA personnel must balance the legitimate information 

needs of the public against its value to terrorists. Principal PA objectives of an antiterrorism 

plan should be to ensure accurate information is provided to the public (including media) and 

to communicate a calm, measured, and reasoned reaction to the ongoing event. OASD(PA) 

is the single point of contact for all PA aspects of US military antiterrorism and 

counterterrorism operations. 

For additional guidance on combating terrorism, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, and JP 3-26, 

Counterterrorism.

 (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)

 (a) NEOs are conducted to assist the DOS in evacuating noncombatants, 

nonessential military personnel, selected HN citizens, and third country nationals whose 

lives are in danger from locations in a foreign HN to an appropriate safe haven. 

 (b) The JTF PAO, working with embassy personnel, should plan and 

coordinate releases concerning the NEO and ensure that the COM or the designated 

representative has approved all PA announcements. Based on the rapid development of this 

type of operation, PAOs need to be prepared to conduct media operations in any kind of 

environment, including afloat (e.g., Lebanon NEO in July 2006).

See JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, for additional guidance.

 (6) Peace Operations. PO include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, 

peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. Peacekeeping operations are 

designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic 

efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. A primary PA concern during PO is that the 

parties to a dispute may release information that is slanted to support their position. These 

activities may grow into an orchestrated media operation making it difficult for PA personnel 

to set the record straight. PA can reduce the level of speculation in the news by providing 

the media with releasable information on a timely basis. 

See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, for additional guidance.
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-17 

 (7) Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs

 (a) CMO encompass the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, 

influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental 

civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or 

hostile operational area. The JFC is responsible for CMO in a joint operation. All CA 

activities support CMO. By their nature, their missions are normally positive and the results 

are of interest to the local populace and their media representatives. PA personnel and CA 

assist in the dissemination of information to local populations. PA personnel have the 

responsibility to engage the local media and can assist CA with passing information to the 

appropriate audiences through those media outlets. 

 (b) PA elements also have the responsibility, through command information 

outlets, to keep military elements informed of the displaced civilian situation, methods and 

procedures for their orderly withdrawal from the operational area, and any other information 

on this issue deemed appropriate by the JFC. 

 (c) Coordination is required to ensure information released about CMO or CA 

by PA does not conflict with or complicate the work of the other. Coordination is primarily 

established through the CMOC, although normal staff coordination takes place through other 

agencies, such as the IO cell, on a regular basis. 

See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, for additional guidance.

 (8) Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 (a) Combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) and chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear consequence management (CBRN CM) are global 

missions crossing area of responsibility boundaries, requiring an integrated and synchronized 

effort, and requiring numerous interagency and multinational partners for effective mission 

accomplishment. DOD will often be acting in support of another lead agency, or even 

supporting a multinational effort. 

 (b) PA should work with USG agencies and NGOs to quickly and effectively 

communicate risk and response information to the public in order to avoid confusion and 

hysteria. 

 (c) The release of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) information may 

require non-DOD lines of communications and authority such as DOS and other diplomatic 

points of contact. 

 (d) Because of their multimedia capabilities, PA assets can often be utilized to 

support CWMD and CBRN CM missions. If appropriately tasked, units such as COMCAM 

can provide valuable support for the documentation of WMD sites and CWMD activities. 

For additional information, see JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction; JP 3-41, 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management; JP 3-11, 
Chapter III 

III-18 JP 3-61 

Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments; and 

classified CJCSM 5225.01B, Classification Guide for Counter Proliferation Information. 

e. Media Access 

 (1) There is a need for continuous dialogue between the joint force and the media 

who are covering its activities. Open and independent reporting are the principal means of 

coverage of military operations. Commanders should seek regular opportunities to work 

with the media. Media coverage of potential future military operations can, to a large extent, 

shape public perception of the joint force and national security environment. Thus, JFCs and 

their PAOs continually assess their understanding of the direct and indirect effects of 

potential actions and signals on perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs, and should formulate and 

deliver timely and culturally attuned messages. This is true for the US public; the public in 

allied or partner nations, whose opinion have an indirect effect on unity of effort; and publics 

in countries where the US conducts operations, as well as in adjoining and other regional 

countries, whose perceptions of the US can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. 

 (2) PA personnel should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting 

process. The PA mission includes helping media representatives understand joint force 

events and occurrences so that media coverage is accurate. The JFC, or a designated 

representative, should conduct frequent operational briefings to inform internal and external 

audiences of current military operations and respond to media questions. 

 f. Media Credentials and Ground Rules

(1) The criteria for credentialing journalists are established by the joint force PAO 

or the MOC director. Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to 

restrict certain media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals 

as journalists and providing them with information that enhances their ability to report on 

activities within the operational area. Credentialing media representatives also ensures that, 

if captured, they are recognized as journalists and treated accordingly under the law of war. 

Some media will embed with the units for an extended period of time. Embedded reporters 

will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials or, as appropriate, 

Geneva Convention cards. 

 (2) The MOC serves as a logistic and information base for media relations 

operations. Journalists seeking credentials from the MOC are asked to agree to ground rules 

tailored to the specific, ongoing joint operation. Commanders should not provide 

information to non-credentialed, unregistered journalists without guidance from the joint 

force PAO or the MOC director. 

 (3) The CCDR should take reasonable steps to ensure all media representatives 

have proper credentials in a combat zone, although the increasingly open information 

environment and the large number of journalists who just “show up” in an operational area 

make it very unlikely that all journalists will have the proper credentials. Even though 

journalists not credentialed by DOD may not necessarily be given the same access as those 

who have credentials, all journalists should still be considered for media pools and should be 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-19 

strongly encouraged to register with the MOC. During registration, the MOC director should 

request that non-credentialed journalists abide by the same established media ground rules. 

Absent unusual circumstances, participating in DOD-hosted training for the media will not 

be used as a prerequisite for accompanying US forces. The decision to suspend credentials 

or expel a reporter should only be made with the concurrence of the JFC and the CCDR. 

 (4) Ground rules are developed to protect members of DOD from the release of 

information that could threaten their security or safety during ongoing operations yet 

facilitates the media’s access to timely, relevant information. Ground rules reconcile the 

desire of the media to cover military operations with DOD security and safety concerns and 

are in no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, negative, or noncomplimentary information. Media ground rules include requirements designed to protect 

the security, health, and welfare of the media. For example, media ground rules should 

include the process for release of information, media access to the commander, and access to 

the Internet if not commercially available, and the process for unintentional exposure to 

classified information. 

(5) In multinational operations, responsibilities for establishing media ground rules, 

credentialing media, and, if necessary, expulsion of media, are developed and implemented 

through appropriate multinational command and staff channels. Media outlets, owned in 

whole or in part by governments or citizens of rival states, might not receive the same 

considerations as those working for outlets owned by governments or citizens of friendly 

nations. However, as in joint operations, non-credentialed journalists may not be given the 

same access to a combat zone as those who have credentials. They should be encouraged to 

register at the appropriate information center. 

(6) Often the media will not be accompanied by PA personnel. US commanders, 

with the assistance of PA personnel, should identify shortages of escorts and provide training 

for non-PA personnel who will serve as escorts. Commanders must develop unit plans 

tailored to local conditions to accommodate reporters operating under this provision and 

issue guidance about what information and support they will receive. Appendix C, 

“Guidelines for Release of Information,” contains general guidance on support and 

information to be provided to media representatives. 

g. Media Pools

(1) Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US military operations. 

In fact, current communications technology and open media access to most segments of any 

operational area make media pools more unlikely than in past operations. However, pools 

may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. 

Pools should be as large as possible and be disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 

to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools does not cancel the principle of 

independent coverage for journalists already in the area. 

(2) Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific 

events, such as those at extremely remote locations, on ships, or where space is limited. In 

such circumstances, PA plans should specify the number and types of media (including 
Chapter III 

III-20 JP 3-61 

internal media) who will form the pool. The military determines the size and composition of 

the pool, usually establishing categories such as, but not limited to, print, broadcast, and 

trade media to ensure adequate scope and distribution of coverage. The media 

representatives should determine who fills the spaces in the pool. 

(3) The military is responsible for the transportation of pools. To ensure the most 

complete coverage, commanders should provide dedicated transportation if able. Under 

conditions of open coverage, JFCs should authorize field commanders to permit journalists 

to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. Commanders should also follow 

the guidelines in The Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2, Department of Defense Civilian 

Personnel, to ensure standardization of policy and procedures. 

(4) Consistent with capabilities and the operational conditions, the commander 

supplies PA personnel with facilities to ensure timely, secure, compatible transmission of 

pool and independent material. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, media, 

as always, file by any other means available. As with transportation support, commanders 

employing media pools are responsible for providing access to communications facilities for 

news products prepared by the pool. Similar assistance should be provided on a spaceavailable basis for those reporters involved in independent coverage. Commanders should 

understand the sophisticated communications capabilities available to the media and 

recognize that early and regular discussions with the media help ensure deconfliction of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. 

(5) Figure III-4 outlines some specific considerations for supporting the DOD 

Media Pool. 

(6) Commanders should realize that the formation of a pool places additional 

media support requirements on the organization. In those cases in which commanders decide 

that media pools are necessary, PA planning should include reimbursement from the media 

depending on location and availability of commercial transportation. 

 h. Security Review. As noted earlier, PA officers should work closely with OPSEC 

planners to develop guidelines to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of critical information. 

PA supports OPSEC through strict adherence to established security review programs and 

other measures to ensure critical information is protected. 

4. Execution 

a. Overview

 (1) Organization. The size and organization of a joint force PA staff varies to 

accommodate mission requirements. PA organizations have evolved to improve PA support 

to the JFC in the information environment. The PA staff should be organized and have staff 

members dedicated to management, plans (future operations and future plans), media 

operations/MOC, analysis and assessment, command information community engagement, 

Internet, and administration. Figure III-5 depicts the potential structure of a joint force PA 

organization. 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-21 

(2) Location. The command’s PA staff is located with the headquarters element. 

If an independent MOC is established, it should be at a secure location convenient to the 

media. Regardless of location, coordination between the joint force PAO and MOC staff is 

essential. 

b. Public Affairs Management

 (1) The joint force PAO is responsible to the JFC for directing PA activities. 

 (a) The joint force PAO, with appropriate staff support, is on the commander’s 

personal staff and is directly responsible for all the JFC’s PA requirements. The joint force 

PAO provides PA counsel and support to the commander and provides oversight of all the 

PA functions and subordinate MOC(s). 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MEDIA POOL SUPPORT















Frequent, comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for pool 

personnel.

Access to areas of ongoing combat or exercise operations. The personal 

safety of the news media is not a reason for excluding them. The goal is to 

treat the news media as noncombatants accompanying forces, allowing 

them to accompany the organizations in the conduct of their missions.

Reasonable access to key command and staff personnel.

An officer from the supported command in the grade of 0-5 or 0-6 to 

coordinate news media pool requirements.

Itinerary planning that will enable news media pool members to disperse 

throughout the operational area.

Cooperation from all forces participating in the operation or exercise on a 

not-to-interfere basis.

Supported command planning for logistic support for pool and escort 

personnel out of existing contingency or exercise funds. Required support 

may include, but may not be limited to:











Airlift from the continental United States to the operational area or 

exercise.

Theater ground, sea, and air transportation to allow pool coverage of 

operations.

Messing and billeting on a reimbursable basis.

Issuance of equipment considered appropriate to the situation 

(helmets, canteens, flak vests, and cold weather clothing).

Access to communications facilities to file stories on a priority basis.

Figure III-4. Department of Defense Media Pool Support
Chapter III 

III-22 JP 3-61 

 (b) The MOC director, with supporting MOC staff, is responsible for 

coordinating all media operations within the operational area, and provides and coordinates 

support to the JFC through the joint force PAO. 

 (2) JFCs may opt to have traditional functions of the MOC subsumed under a more 

robust media operations section, and the joint force PAO may be the sole individual 

responsible to the JFC for the PA program. Regardless of how the PA staff is organized, 

typical PA actions or tasks conducted during joint operations are as follows: 

 (a) Participate in operational analysis, planning, execution, and assessment. 

SAMPLE JOINT FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION

LEGEND

AFRTS American Forces Radio and 

Television Service

MOC media operations center

Internet access

conduct analysis and assessments

Joint

Force Commander

Joint Force

Public Affairs Officer

Public Affairs

Deputy Director

Plans

Internet Analysis and

Assessment

Future

Operations

Media

Operations/MOC

Community

Engagement Administration Command

Information

AFRTS Future

Plans

Potential

Public Affairs

Organization

Figure III-5. Sample Joint Force Public Affairs Organization
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-23 

 (b) Participate in all applicable cross-functional staff organizations (e.g., 

boards, centers, cells). 

 (c) Develop and coordinate communication strategies and guidance. 

 (d) Prepare PA annexes and support other annex development, as required. 

 (e) Execute and assess communication strategies and plans. 

 (f) Evaluate PA resources and provide assessments. 

 (g) Make recommendations on future PA priorities, near and long term. 

 (h) Coordinate PA activities with other US agencies, HN, and NGOs as 

appropriate. 

 (i) Identify intelligence requirements to support PA planning and assessment. 

 (j) Identify VI and imagery requirements to the J-3 or designated 

representative. 

 (k) Establish and manage a MOC as appropriate. 

 (l) Monitor/assess public opinion, media coverage, and sentiment analysis. 

 (m) Modify communication strategies and plans based on assessments. 

 (n) Plan, coordinate, and assess community engagement activities. 

 (o) Develop, execute, and assess command information programs. 

 (p) Provide content for publicly accessible websites. 

 (q) In accordance with (IAW) with DOD policy, integrate social media into all 

PA activities. 

 (r) Provide media training to potential spokespersons. 

 (s) Disseminate timely, accurate information about military activities. 

 (t) Respond to media and public inquiries. 

 (u) Educate JFCs and staffs on the role of information and PA in operations. 

 c. The administrative section provides broad administrative support for the entire PA 

staff. This section is also responsible for resource support for the PA staff and monitors the 

status of manning levels and readiness. Additionally, this section may contract for cultural 

or linguistic assistance as required. 
Chapter III 

III-24 JP 3-61 

 d. Plans. PA planners support future operations and future planning, and they 

coordinate PA planning throughout the JOA. They participate in all applicable boards, 

bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups, and convert strategic guidance into PA plans for 

future OPORDs, fragmentary orders, and future plans. 

 e. Community Engagement. This section is responsible for providing PA planning 

and execution support for activities that promote the interaction of US forces, multinational 

partners, and HN populations throughout the JOA. It requires close coordination with the 

country team and HN as well as the CMOC and IO cell/planners to identify community 

engagement opportunities for the JFC and key staff. 

 f. Analysis and Assessment. This section supports both plans and media 

operations/MOC. They represent PA in all assessment-related cross-functional 

organizations and work with the J-2 staff to identify PA assessment requirements and 

support PA current operations and plans sections with assessment products. For 

additional information on assessment, see paragraph 5, “Assessment.”

 g. Media Operations Center. Media operations may be the sole purview of a MOC or 

conducted by a media operations section; the requirements remain basically the same. 

 (1) A MOC is the central point of contact between the military and media 

representatives covering operations. It offers a venue for commanders and PA staffs to 

discuss their units and their roles in the joint operation and helps journalists obtain 

information quickly and efficiently on a wide variety of complex activities. It should be 

staffed to support local and regional non-English speaking media. It may also support 

command information activities. The early establishment of MOCs is an important step in 

the responsive and efficient facilitation of media operations. 

 (2) The size and specific structure of a MOC may vary depending on the mission. 

A sample organizational structure of a MOC is shown in Figure III-6. The functions listed 

below are common to all MOCs and require appropriate planning and resourcing to 

effectively support the media relations mission. In small MOCs, each assigned staff member 

may be responsible for more than one function. 

 (3) The MOC director is responsible for all activities conducted by the MOC 

staff. This includes close coordination with the J-2, J-3, and foreign disclosure officer to 

ensure that releasable information is accurate, timely, and issued within current OPSEC 

guidelines. The MOC director also considers HN sensitivities and media guidelines. The 

MOC director should develop an appropriate mix of activities to provide maximum 

opportunity for the media to cover operations directly when possible and practicable as well 

as acquire and disseminate releasable information and imagery about the conduct of 

operations and the forces executing the mission. The MOC should also provide materials to 

the Services’ hometown news centers and Services’ PA offices. Potential MOC tasks 

include: 

 (a) Credential media. 

 (b) Maintain a media database. 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-25 

 (c) Coordinate media embeds. 

 (d) Identify logistic requirements. 

 (e) Obtain/provide vehicles (armored as required) and escorts (armed as 

required) in order to move media to cover events. 

 (f) Provide necessary force protection gear to media representatives. 

 (g) Coordinate subordinate unit PA coverage of critical events. 

 (h) Coordinate the acquisition and transmission of imagery, information, and 

interviews to support the PA strategy. 

 (i) Coordinate requirements for VI support (including COMCAM) with 

appropriate staff. 

SAMPLE MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTER

LEGEND

AFRTS American Forces Radio and 

Television Service

COMCAM combat camera

may be separate or part of the media 

operations center

coordination

Media Operations 

Center

 Deputy Director

Media 

Support

Marketing/ 

Outreach Press Desk Monitoring Web

Regional 

Media 

Engagement

Media Operations 

Center

Director

Visual 

Information/ 

COMCAM

Command 

Information/ 

AFRTS

Figure III-6. Sample Media Operations Center 
Chapter III 

III-26 JP 3-61 

 (j) Facilitate the review of all imagery and information OPSEC and INFOSEC 

issues. 

 (k) Edit as necessary and post content to the publicly accessible website(s). 

 (l) Cover military operations and produce information packets, news releases, 

and stories for distribution to external and internal audiences. 

 (m) Translate all releases and disseminate in the major languages indigenous to 

the people in the operational area and other intended audiences. 

 (n) Coordinate interview requests. 

 (o) Coordinate briefings for local and regional media. 

 (p) Coordinate briefings from the operational area with US media. 

 (q) Receive, respond, and track media queries. 

 (r) Support command information activities. 

 (4) The deputy MOC director assists in the management of the MOC and 

performs the functions of the director when necessary. Responsibilities include oversight of 

military-media communications, assessment of available published media products, and 

liaison with the joint force operations staff and subordinate commands to ensure a 

continuous flow of timely information. 

 (5) Personnel working the press desk interact directly with the media and serve as 

the primary point of information exchange. Responsibilities include responding to media 

inquiries, preparing and issuing news releases, arranging for interviews, and conducting 

briefings. Additional tasks involve preparing joint force operational briefers, assisting senior 

commanders in their encounters with the media, supervising/integrating activities of the 

media support and HN engagement team sections. This section may include 

representatives from non-DOD agencies, NGOs, and the HN directly involved with the 

operation to facilitate coordination of publicly released information among all key 

players. Additionally, there may be a requirement to send press desk personnel as 

liaisons to these organizations to ensure a timely, efficient, and accurate exchange of 

information. In multinational operations PA personnel from other countries may work 

in the press desk section to represent their nation’s interests with the media.

 (6) The media support section is responsible for helping the media cover joint 

force activities. Specific tasks include coordinating/managing transportation, 

communications, and logistic support; credentialing media; and supporting media pools. In 

cases where escorts are required, this section matches the media with knowledgeable persons 

to facilitate their movement around the operational area. If a security review is required, the 

media support section ensures that it is done efficiently. 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-27 

 (7) The marketing/outreach section is responsible for conducting liaison with 

media outside the JOA to determine interest in ongoing operations and repurpose 

existing PA products (video, audio, still imagery, print, and web) or arrange for new PA 

products to support their needs as well as coordinating remote interviews with 

commanders and subject matter experts. This section also coordinates holiday greetings 

and special events programming. Additionally, they produce opinion pieces, speeches, 

and presentations to support outreach efforts and coordinate speakers for organizations 

in the United States.

 (8) New Media 

 (a) Public Website. Using the Internet provides the JFC with a powerful tool 

to convey information quickly and efficiently on the nature and scope of the JFC’s mission, 

put operational actions into context, and counter adversary propaganda supporting both 

public and command information activities. This section is responsible for the management 

and content maintenance of the site. 

 (b) Interactive Internet Activities. JFCs may allow the use of interactive 

Internet activities (email, blogs, chat rooms, and social media) to support operations. Such 

use will be IAW current DOD guidance. Under the scope of such an effort, unless otherwise 

approved, only PA personnel engage in interactive Internet activities with journalists 

employed by media organizations or with individuals and websites that may be considered 

equivalent to an established news organization. Additionally such activities should be 

conducted in the language and idiom of the intended audience, and special attention should 

be given to use only culturally appropriate messages and materials. 

 (9) Monitoring Section. This section is responsible for monitoring electronic 

and print media. They develop and distribute summaries and transcripts of media 

coverage, press conferences, and other significant events.

 (10) Regional Media Engagement. The section is responsible for establishing 

and maintaining relations between the joint force and the local and regional non-English 

media. They facilitate media events with and distribute press releases to local and 

ESCORTS 

It is mutually beneficial to both the joint force commander and the media to 

have escorts available to assist the reporters as they move about the 

operational area. These escorts need not be trained public affairs personnel, 

but should be knowledgeable members of the visited organizations who 

have received training in media relations. These individuals support the 

joint force by serving as facilitators to assist the media. They should neither 

interfere with the process of reporting nor attempt to inhibit military 

personnel from talking about their jobs or missions consistent with security 

and operational restrictions. 

Various Sources 
Chapter III 

III-28 JP 3-61 

regional media as well as monitor and translate their coverage. This section is staffed 

with linguists as required to conduct translations.

 (11) Command Information. While command information is primarily a Service 

responsibility, a properly manned MOC should include staffing to support this vital mission. 

 (a) At a minimum, the MOC director should ensure internal media are treated 

fairly and equally with external media and allotted an appropriate share of limited resources 

such as PA seats on military transportation. Further, commanders should provide all external 

news releases, along with any responses to query, to command information channels. 

 (b) AFRTS is resourced to supplement the PA’s command information mission 

and will generally be a division within the MOC working for the MOC director. MOCs 

employ AFRTS capabilities, including use of the Internet and use of print products to convey 

joint command messages not only to the deployed force, but also to the home station and to 

family members. The MOC director ensures the information provided through external and 

internal channels is coordinated and consistent. 

 (12) COMCAM. While PA usually has organic imagery acquisition capability, it 

may require imagery from other VI capabilities. COMCAM is a principle provider of VI and 

generally receives operational tasking from the J-3. PA should identify and coordinate 

imagery requirements that exceed organic capabilities with the J-3 staff member in charge of 

tasking COMCAM. Additionally, all COMCAM imagery should be available to PA for 

review and possible use consistent with OPSEC and INFOSEC. 

 (13) Sub-MOCs. The PAO may recommend the establishment of sub-MOCs 

based on the size of the operational area, the dispersion of the joint forces, the diversity of 

Service components, and the variety of concurrent missions. Normally smaller than the main 

MOC, a sub-MOC should perform the same functions assigned to any information bureau. 

A sub-MOC may be set up temporarily to support a specific mission or at an established 

location to assist covering a particular sector of the operational area. Sub-MOCs could also 

be established afloat to support maritime aspects of a joint operation. 

5. Assessment 

 a. Assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission 

accomplishment. It occurs at all levels and across the range of military operations. 

Continuous assessment helps the JFC and joint force component adjust operations to ensure 

objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. The primary emphasis of the PA 

assessment is identifying, measuring, and evaluating implications within the operational 

environment that the commander does not control, but can influence through a coherent, 

comprehensive communications strategy established by early integration in the planning 

process. 
Public Affairs in Joint Operations

III-29 

 b. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and 

staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward 

accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving objectives. To enable assessment 

during execution, baselines for what is going to be measured should be established at this 

point. 

 (1) PA planners should determine objectives for PA activities that support 

achievement of the JFC’s strategy as well as relevant assessment measures and criteria to 

determine success. The PA staff collaborates with members of the joint force staff on 

assessment development. 

 (2) This initial set of criteria becomes the basis for future assessment. 

 c. PA assessments require monitoring, measuring, and analyzing relevant information 

(media coverage, Internet content, polls, intelligence products, etc.) to evaluate the success of 

PA activities. During execution, assessments drive adjustments to both current operations 

and future planning to improve effectiveness. In addition to modifying activities, 

assessments may identify a requirement to revalidate PA resources and modify them 

accordingly. 

CRITERIA USED IN IRAQ 

Criteria that formed the basis for assessment used by Multi-National ForceIraq for strategic communication activities to determine alignment among 

facts on the ground, media framing of events, and Iraqi perceptions are 

provided as follows: 

 Understanding of the Iraqi and Pan-Arab media. 

 Media penetration of key themes. 

 Alignment of key messages. 

 Understanding Iraqi perceptions. 

 Prevalence of misinformation and disinformation in media stories. 

 Resonance of press conferences and key themes and messages. 

Operation Iraqi Freedom Strategic Communication 

Analysis and Assessment 

Thomas M. Cioppa 

Media, War, and Conflict, April 2009, Vol. 2, pp. 25-45 
Chapter III 

III-30 JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
IV-1 

CHAPTER IV

JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 

1. Overview 

 a. The conduct of PA in domestic operations (within the US and its territories and 

possessions) is somewhat different for DOD in terms of planning and execution; however, 

unless addressed specifically in this chapter, doctrine for non-domestic joint operations 

applies. 

 b. Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, DOD PA operates in accordance 

with guidance in the National Response Framework (NRF) incident communications 

emergency policy and procedures (ICEPP), which provides detailed guidance to all federal 

incident communicators during a federal response to an event. It establishes mechanisms to 

prepare and deliver coordinated and sustained messages, and provides for prompt federal 

acknowledgement of an incident and communication of emergency information to the public. 

The ICEPP is comprised of two annexes contained in the NRF: 

 (1) PA Support Annex. Describes the interagency policies and procedures for 

incident communications with the public. 

 (2) Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15—External Affairs Annex with 

Standing Operating Procedures. Outlines the functions, resources, and capabilities for 

external affairs including PA. 

 c. Under the NRF, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) retains the lead for 

federal public communications and is responsible for activation of ESF #15. DOD typically 

acts as a supporting agency to a primary or coordinating agency. 

 d. Federal assistance, including assistance from DOD, can be provided to state, tribal, 

and local jurisdictions, and to other federal departments and agencies, in a number of 

different ways through various mechanisms and authorities. Often, federal assistance does 

not require coordination by DHS and can be provided without a Presidential major disaster 

or emergency declaration. Examples of these types of federal assistance include that 

described in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the 

Mass Migration Emergency Plan, the National Search and Rescue Plan, and the National 

Maritime Security Plan. These and other supplemental agency or interagency plans, 

“...Without timely, accurate information or the ability to communicate, public 

affairs officers at all levels could not provide updates to the media and to the 

public.... Federal, State, and local officials gave contradictory messages to the 

public, creating confusion and feeding the perception that government sources 

lacked credibility.” 

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
Chapter IV 

IV-2 JP 3-61 

compacts, and agreements may be implemented concurrently with the framework, but are 

subordinated to its overarching coordinating structures, processes, and protocols. 

For further information on CS, see JP 3-28, Civil Support, and JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

2. Requirements 

a. Personnel. PA and VI personnel requirements for domestic operations vary based on 

the situation. There are existing joint OPLANs and joint manning documents that specify 

the personnel requirements for certain potential operations. Additionally, the CJCS issues a 

standing defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) EXORD annually that allows force 

providers to consider potential requirements and place needed personnel in a prepare to 

deploy order status. 

 b. Facilities. Normally, PA operations are conducted in fixed buildings (hotels, 

armories, office buildings, etc.) when supporting domestic operations. In many situations, 

commercial telephone and Internet connections (wired, wireless, and cellular) will be 

available. In the case of state funerals or other planned operations, the facilities may be predesignated and wired to support PA. Personnel supporting PA operations will generally use 

commercial lodging and local restaurants. 

 c. Equipment. When required, PA and VI personnel, who deploy in support of 

domestic operations, should have a cellular phone and a laptop computer with wireless 

access or an aircard. PA personnel with access to portable broadcast quality imagery 

transmission systems should be prepared to deploy with and support operations with those 

systems. PA and VI personnel should deploy with digital cameras and have still and motion 

imagery editing and data transfer software on their laptops. Note: Personnel will not always 

have access to the “.mil” domain during domestic operations. 

 d. Training. All PA and VI personnel ordered to deploy in support of domestic 

operations should have working knowledge of the NRF as it pertains to PA. Online Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training courses are available at 

http://training.fema.gov. 

3. Planning 

 a. PA planning for domestic operations essentially follows the same phases as for other 

joint operations. PA plans for DSCA are tailored to support the ESF #15 requirement to 

provide accurate, coordinated, timely, and accessible information to affected audiences, 

including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace, including the 

special needs population. It is critical that PA activities are planned, coordinated, and 

integrated across jurisdictions, agencies, and organizations both government and private. 

 b. PA planners ensure that plans and associated annexes delineate responsibilities, 

processes, and logistics as appropriate in support of ESF #15 as follows: 

 (1) Coordination of messages with federal, state, tribal, and local governments. 
Joint Public Affairs in Domestic Operations 

IV-3

 (2) Support for the MOC. 

 (3) Gathering information on the incident. 

 (4) Providing incident-related information and imagery through the media and 

other sources in accessible formats and multiple languages (as necessary) to individuals, 

households, businesses, and industries directly or indirectly affected by the incident. 

 (5) Monitoring news coverage to ensure that accurate information is disseminated. 

 (6) Handling appropriate special projects such as news conferences and press 

operations for incident area tours by government officials and other dignitaries. 

 (7) Providing basic services, such as communications and supplies, to assist the 

news media in disseminating information to the public. 

 c. Exercises are a key element for successful domestic operations and support the 

planning effort. PA and VI personnel participate in exercises and conduct objective 

assessments of capabilities so that issues are identified and remedied prior to a real incident. 

 (1) Exercise Planning. Exercise planning provides an exceptional opportunity to 

inform other agencies about DOD PA roles, responsibilities, and capabilities. Interagency 

PA working groups should be integrated into the joint exercise lifecycle process. These 

groups should include PA and VI participants from DOD as well as participating federal, 

state, tribal, and local agencies. Note: Planners need to be aware that there will be both a 

significant “real-world” and “simulated media” requirement which must be supported. 

 (2) Exercise Execution. During exercises, DOD PA and VI participants have the 

opportunity to perform PA operations in the exercise’s scenario being simulated, participate 

in dissemination of real-world information to exercise participants, and practice with other 

agencies during events that can draw significant media and public attention. 

4. Execution 

 a. Domestic situations which require a military response are generally short or no notice 

events. Specific DOD PA responsibilities are outlined in various combatant command plans 

and standing PAG. The EXORD for the incident will provide the PA posture and media 

engagement policy. Incident specific guidance will be developed by the primary agency in 

coordination with participating agencies. 

 b. Domestic operations are planned and executed in three phases, consistent with the 

DHS operations. DOD PA support evolves as follows: 

 (1) Shaping. The DOD is rarely a “first responder” for domestic situations. In this 

phase PA manages expectations regarding DOD’s response among both the public and the 

other responding agencies. PA activities include developing themes and messages that 

clearly explain the scope and timing of the DOD response. 
Chapter IV 

IV-4 JP 3-61 

 (2) Engagement. This is the phase where military forces are actually on-scene 

supporting an incident and PA is actively informing the public about DOD activities via 

releases of information and imagery, press conferences, and site visits. 

 (3) Transition. This is the phase where military forces begin to disengage from 

incident response support. It is critical that PA activities in this phase articulate why DOD 

support is no longer required. 

 c. Initial DOD PA involvement in DSCA will be through the defense coordinating 

officer (DCO) assigned to the applicable DHS/FEMA region involved and the defense 

coordinating element (DCE) if established. The DCO and the DCE process requirements for 

military support, forward mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations 

through DOD-designated channels, and assign military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated 

ESFs. 

 (1) PA personnel provide initial assessments of situation to the DCO, DCE, and 

combatant command PA staff in terms of requirements for personnel and equipment. They 

provide initial interface with other deployed federal public information officers (PIOs), and 

serve as the DOD liaison for the media. 

 (2) As the DOD response grows, PA personnel deploy with the operational 

command post or joint force lead element to coordinate DOD PA activities and involvement 

in the incident. 

 (3) Other units tasked to deploy in support of domestic operations should also 

include a PA element in their headquarters staff. This PA element should be prepared to 

actively engage the media to show how the unit is supporting the federal response. 

 d. Joint Information Center. A substantial portion of the overall PA effort will be 

supporting the media to ensure affected populations are receiving necessary information. In 

order to coordinate the timely release of emergency/incident-related information, imagery, 

and other PA functions, a joint information center (JIC) may be established (see Figure 

IV-1). 

 (1) The JIC is normally located close to the best sources of information about the 

situation, such as an incident command post or emergency operations center. Note that DOD 

and other agencies will often have a separate staff performing PA duties/functions on behalf 

of their own agency. In the absence of a JIC, coordination still needs to occur between 

DOD, other agencies, and the primary agency. 

 (2) When a JIC is established, the responsible commander ensures that adequate 

PA personnel are assigned whenever DOD forces deploy. However, the bulk of DOD PA 

personnel supporting the incident will be assigned to the JFC. 

 (3) A JIC is most useful when multiple agencies and organizations come together 

to respond to an emergency or manage an event and need to provide coordinated, timely, 

accurate information to the public and other stakeholders. Under the Incident Command 
Joint Public Affairs in Domestic Operations 

IV-5

System, the PIO is one of the key staff supporting the command structure. The JIC carries 

out the PIO’s responsibilities and has three primary responsibilities: 

 (a) Gather incident data. 

 (b) Analyze public perceptions of the response. 

 (c) Inform the public and serve as the source of accurate and comprehensive 

information about the incident and the response to a specific set of audiences. 

For detailed guidance on JIC structure and function, refer to The National Response Team 

Joint Information Center Model.

 (4) DOD PA releases its own information and imagery, and conducts media 

operations, but the products should be coordinated with either the primary agency or the JIC 

to ensure consistent messages and avoid the release of conflicting or incident-sensitive 

information. 

e. During DSCA, combatant command PA personnel monitor the National Incident 

Communications Conference Line (NICCL) that is used for transmission and exchange of 

JOINT INFORMATION CENTER ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

A JIC is a central location where personnel with public information responsibilities perform critical 

emergency information functions, crisis communications, and public affairs functions. JICs may be 

established at various levels of government or at incident sites, or can be components of Multiagency 

Coordination Systems. A single JIC location is preferable, but the system is flexible and adaptable 

enough to accommodate virtual or multiple JIC locations, as required.

JOINT INFORMATION CENTER (JIC)

Broadcast

Manager

Administrative

Specialist

Photography/

Videography

Manager

News

Desk

Manager

Media

Analysis

Manager

Field

Manager

Special

Projects/

Events

Manager

Media Relations

Unit Leader

Operations

Unit Leader

Assistant External Affairs 

Officer

Figure IV-1. Joint Information Center Organizational Chart
Chapter IV 

IV-6 JP 3-61 

critical and timely (e.g., “breaking”) incident information among federal and affected state, 

local, and tribal authorities. It is a key source of emerging information for PA activities and 

communications synchronization. 

 (1) If the nature of the incident is of critical importance and urgency, DHS PA may 

continuously monitor the NICCL to receive updates from departments and agencies. The 

DHS PA staff will maintain a summary of key NICCL communications and interagency 

coordination actions to inform DOD and other agencies’ PA activities. 

 (2) DOD and combatant command PAO will receive DHS issued incident PAG and 

daily summaries via the NICCL when ESF #15 is activated. 

 (3) During sustained incident management activity, the NICCL will be used for 

daily or other incident communications coordination calls. The combatant command PAO 

will maintain and distribute NICCL information to subordinate PA participants in a timely 

manner. 

 (4) There are more than 80 federal interagency partners, 54 states and territories, 

the District of Columbia, 562 tribal entities, and thousands of local governments that may be 

involved in domestic operations. This creates a significant challenge for PA coordination. 

The NICCL and state incident communication coordination lines are invaluable for 

coordinating PA efforts. 

 f. DOD Public Affairs Guidance. The OASD(PA) will develop PAG for domestic 

operations that is consistent with that of other operations and DHS PAG, but also includes 

relevant information from non-DOD participants. Additionally, while DOD PAG does not 

apply to other agencies, it should be coordinated with and distributed to all participating 

organizations. The PAO may produce a PA strategy document where PAG is not 

appropriate or feasible. 

 g. Command Information. Based on the ubiquitous nature of the media and multiple 

channels of communication, command information requirements are not significant in 

domestic operations. However, in extended domestic operations, it may take on a larger role. 

5. Assessment 

 As with all military operations, on-going assessment of public communication activities 

by DOD PA personnel is critical to support follow-on planning as well as inform future 

operations. How the USG responds to domestic situations will be of interest to other 

countries and covered by their media. PAOs and PA staffs conduct analysis of international 

coverage of DOD activities to assess the character of their reporting as well. 
Joint Public Affairs in Domestic Operations 

IV-7

NOTIONAL DOMESTIC RESPONSE 

When a no-notice incident occurs, the local jurisdiction handles the initial 

response including public information and may establish a joint information 

center (JIC) to integrate the public communications efforts of local agencies. 

If the Department of Defense (DOD) is involved at this point, a military public 

affairs officer (PAO) should participate in the local JIC. 

When a Federal response is required, usually the first integrated public 

affairs (PA) action is for the Department of Homeland Security to conduct a 

National Incident Communications Conference Line (NICCL) call. During this 

call, the initial integrated public affairs guidance (PAG) is crafted where 

control (lead agency for public communications effort), coordination (how 

supporting agencies will coordinate public communication), and 

communication (key messages) are addressed. The supported combatant 

commander’s PAO and Office of the Secretary of Defense PAO should be 

participants in the call. The combatant command promulgates resulting 

guidance to responding DOD forces. 

As the event evolves, emergency support function #15 and a JIC for federal 

responders is established. This JIC may be integrated with the local JIC or 

become a stand alone center. All participating Federal agencies provide 

representatives to this JIC to represent their agency and serve as the JIC 

staff. The combatant command PAO recommends PA personnel for the JIC. 

Personnel assigned to the JIC will perform tasks assigned by the JIC 

manager. 

As military forces arrive at the incident, the joint task force (or similar 

headquarters element) will establish a PA function primarily to perform 

significant media support operations. Based upon the PAG, DOD PA 

personnel will facilitate media access and coverage of the DOD activities. 

DOD PA efforts will be coordinated with other agencies through subsequent 

NICCL calls and through the JIC. 

The JIC will usually produce products dealing with the overall federal 

response and coordinate and conduct joint press conferences at or near the 

incident site. DOD efforts at the incident will be coordinated with the JIC so 

that federal communication efforts are consistent and mutually supportive. 

DOD will often participate in or provide subject matter expert support to joint 

media events. 

Note: The term “joint” when used in JIC, refers to “multi-agency.” 

SOURCE: US Northern Command Joint Public Affairs Support Element 
Chapter IV 

IV-8 JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
A-1 

APPENDIX A 

COMMANDER’S COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY 

1. Overview 

 a. Successful military communication that supports the achievement of joint force 

objectives as well as those up to and including that of the USG requires carefully coordinated 

and synchronized communication strategies. At the operational level, the ability for the 

military commander to promulgate information informing and influencing selected audiences 

is a critical element to successful operations. Commanders who develop and execute 

communication strategies derived from and aligned with SC themes and messages increase 

the opportunity for success. 

 b. The commander’s communications strategy should be an element of the 

commander’s larger overall strategy and is supported by the broader SC effort. An effective 

communications strategy is commander driven, proactive, and ensures that the potential 

results of tactical actions on the information environment are considered and addressed prior 

to execution. While any action taken by the joint force may influence the information 

environment, PA, IO, and DSPD activities are planned specifically to shape it. 

Communications strategy facilitates coordinated communication efforts focused on reaching 

individual audiences via the most credible and effective means available. 

2. Strategy Development 

 a. Developing a comprehensive communications strategy requires an integrated process 

that synthesizes all means of communications and information delivery. In addition to 

synchronizing the communication activities within the joint force, an effective 

communications strategy is developed in concert with OGAs as well as multinational 

partners and NGOs as appropriate. Additionally, commanders should be cognizant of the 

impact that joint force communications activities have on the other three instruments of 

national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) as well as their implications for 

the total operational environment including political, military, economic, social, information, 

and infrastructure systems. 

 b. Initial planning guidance sources used to develop the communications strategy 

include the overall USG strategy and SC guidance, SecDef and Joint Chiefs of Staff 

guidance as well as the associated combatant command regional strategy and the joint force 

mission. Within the joint force, communications strategy planners use the theater campaign 

plan, operation plan, commander’s planning guidance, and desired outcomes to shape their 

work across the current operations, future operations, and future plans horizons. 

 c. Communications strategy development is often accomplished in a cross-functional 

working group as depicted in Figure A-1. Input from key functional staff members informed 

by information from various levels above and below the joint force headquarters as well as 

assessment of past activities helps communication planners refine future efforts and 

messages to better meet stated communication objectives. 
Appendix A 

A-2 JP 3-61 

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY COORDINATION PROCESS

CCDR combatant commander

CCMD combatant command

CMO civilian-military operations

EMB embassy

ENG engineers

HN host nation

IA interagency

IO information operations

KLE key leader engagement

LEGEND

Communications 

Strategy Working 

Group

HN

Stakeholders:

HN

Interagency Partners

CCDR

Regional Organizations

IA US EMB

Strategic 

Communication 

Process

Assessment and 

Planning Groups

Other

J-Codes

(Insights)

POLAD

(Political 

View)

SJA

(Legal 

View) CMO/ENG

(Projects)

KLE

(Face-to-Face)

PA

(PA Guidance/ 

Products)

IO

CMO WG

IO WG

USG/CCMD

PAG

PA public affairs

PAG public affairs guidance

PD public diplomacy

POLAD political advisor

SJA staff judge advocate

US United States

USG United States Government

WG working group

Figure A-1. Communications Strategy Coordination Process 
Commander’s Communications Strategy 

A-3 

3. Strategy Execution 

 PA plays a large role in the execution of the communications strategy through the 

dissemination of information and other traditional communication products to various 

audiences. Commanders also support strategy execution through key leader engagements 

with local leaders and civilians, and civil-military operation projects are planned to reinforce 

themes and messages. In addition, supporting the execution of the communications strategy 

in the competitive information environment requires the attention of everyone in the joint 

force, from the commander to the individual servicemember whose actions as well as words 

can be exploited by the adversary. 
Appendix A 

A-4 JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
B-1 

APPENDIX B

ANNEX DEVELOPMENT 

 The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of annex F (Public Affairs) of 

the OPLAN format found in CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning Formats. 

1. Situation 

a. General. Assigns responsibilities and guidance for military PA actions (public 

information, command and internal information, and community engagement). 

b. Enemy. Identify expected actions of adversary forces and forces hostile to US 

interests. 

c. Friendly. Identify friendly agencies not under JFC control that will contribute to the 

PA effort. Include OASD(PA), DOS, US ambassadors, and multinational partners’ PA 

programs, as appropriate. 

d. Assumptions

(1) Describe HN preferences and/or sensitivities to be considered in developing and 

executing PA programs. 

(2) CCDRs should be prepared to host the DOD Media Pool during all stages of 

operations. 

2. Mission 

 State clearly and concisely the essential PA tasks to be accomplished as they relate to 

the overall operation. 

3. Execution 

a. Concept of Operations. Outline PA efforts for the operation as part of JFC’s 

mission and concept of the operation. 

b. Tasks. Outline the PA tasks to be completed during the above listed phases. 

(1) Provide any additional information to the supported CCDR and other 

supporting commands to include release authority and guidance on casualty and mortuary 

affairs, US and multinational prisoner of war (POW) or missing in action, and enemy 

prisoner of war (EPW) matters. Consider the establishment of a MOC. Outline PA VI and 

COMCAM requirements. 

(2) Provide detailed personnel and equipment support requirements to component 

commands. Address the following: access to the on-scene commander (OSC), supported 

CCDR, and the DOS representative, and to the secure voice circuit that connects the MOC; 
Appendix B 

B-2 JP 3-61 

access to hard copy message facilities between the same points; intertheater and intratheater 

transportation for escorted media; access to secure and nonsecure Internet access that 

connects the MOC to other PA outlets; access to digital imagery receiver equipment (could 

be through an intranet source); access to equipment for review and release of battle damage 

assessment-type video footage (could be through COMCAM). Coordinate this annex with 

logistics, communications, IO, and other planners to ensure required support is detailed. 

(3) List Service, component command, and other supporting commands’ support 

requirements. 

 c. Coordinating Instructions. Identify procedures for the following areas: 

 (1) Coordination of Release of Information. Provide detailed procedures for all 

supporting commands for handling or forwarding to the supported command queries, 

responses, and proposed news releases for clearance. 

 (2) PA Support to IO. Coordinate elements of PA with IO, as appropriate. 

 (3) Coordination of requests for interviews and news conferences with the 

individual’s unit and Service PA offices for returned US personnel, and with the supporting 

staff judge advocate for EPW or detained personnel. 

 (4) Outline required PA coordination with other staff elements involved in release 

of information outside the command. 

 (5) Establish procedures for keeping PA historical records. 

 d. Media Ground Rules

 (1) Release of Cleared Information. Establish means for release of information to 

be cleared and made available to the press. 

 (2) Categories of Releasable Information. Provide precise guidance for release of 

specific categories of information to the media. 

 (3) Categories of Information Not Releasable. Provide guidance on specific 

categories of information not releasable to the media. 

4. Administration and Logistics 

 a. Identify administration and logistics requirements for PA support. Identify 

OPSEC procedures for PA personnel, include security review procedures. Identify 

procedures for providing PA, audio-visual, and VI coverage of the operation, including 

COMCAM requirements. Identify internal information requirements for subordinate and 

component commands. 

 b. Identify detailed personnel and equipment support requirements. Address the 

following: 
Annex Development 

B-3 

 (1) Secure voice and data connectivity between the MOC and OSC, supported 

commander, and the DOS representative. 

 (2) Intertheater and intratheater transportation for escorted media. 

 (3) Secure and nonsecure Internet between the MOC and other PA outlets. 

 (4) Digital imagery receiver equipment. 

 (5) Equipment for review and release of battle damage assessment-type video 

footage. 

 c. MOC/Sub-MOC Support

 (1) Personnel. Identify required personnel. 

 (2) Equipment. Identify additional standard equipment required to allow MOC or 

sub-MOC operation in the operational area. Include tentage and individual field equipment 

on the same basis of issue as the accompanied unit. 

 (3) Services. Include basic food and shelter, water, office space and materials, 

clothing, transportation, etc., including portable copying machines, communications, 

automated data processing support, Internet and World Wide Web (www) access, and 

facsimile machines. 

 d. Media/Media Pool Support. Identify details on supporting the media to include: 

facilities, messing, billeting, force protection, immunizations, emergency medical treatment, 

transportation and communications, access to unclassified operational information, media 

pools, and other support. 

 (1) Outline plans for support of the media pool. 

 (a) Daily, comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings. 

 (b) Access to areas of ongoing operations. 

 (c) Access to key command and staff personnel. 

 (d) Designated officer from the supported command assigned to coordinate 

media pool requirements. 

 (e) Itinerary planning to enable media pool to disperse throughout the combat 

area to provide coverage of operations and to regroup periodically to share information and 

file stories. 

 (2) Required Logistic Support. Outline supported commander responsibilities for 

planning logistics support for pool and escort personnel. Support should address: 

 (a) Existing airlift to/from the point of origin and the operational area. 
Appendix B 

B-4 JP 3-61 

 (b) Theater ground, sea, and air transportation available to the media. 

 (c) Messing, billeting, and reimbursement requirements. 

 (d) Issuance of any equipment considered appropriate to the situation (e.g., 

helmets, canteens, protective vest, and chemical protective gear). 

 (e) Access to communications facilities to file stories on an expedited basis. 

 (f) Medical support. 

 (g) Religious support. 

5. Command and Control 

Identify command relationships for PA including IOs cell participation (see Information 

Operations annex). 
C-1 

APPENDIX C

GUIDELINES FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION

1. Release of Information 

 a. Release Authority and Public Statements

 (1) Until release authority is delegated to them, units should forward queries and 

proposed news releases to the combatant command PAO. 

 (2) No public statements concerning operations should be made by subordinate 

units without prior coordination with the combatant command PAO. 

b. Assumptions

 (1) All statements will be “on the record.” 

 (2) News media will have the ability to transmit instantaneous live reports from the 

operational area. Failure to plan for and accommodate the media will not stop them from 

reporting. 

 (3) News media coverage will be highly competitive, with a tendency to seek 

access to the operational area and report events as they happen. 

 (4) News media already on the scene may find ways to get to the operational 

area(s) and report the activities as they happen without regard for security concerns. 

 (5) Independent media may be simultaneously deployed with the DOD Media Pool 

at the invitation of the Service component headquarters, under guidelines established by 

combatant command PAO that differ from those which apply to the DOD Media Pool. 

 c. Security Instructions

 (1) PAOs submitting or staffing proposed products for public release must ensure 

that the information contained therein is fully coordinated and properly classified until 

approved for release. 

 (2) Media are not usually given access to classified information that could 

jeopardize operations or endanger lives. In circumstances where this may be appropriate, 

PAOs must gain specific approval from the JFC. 

 (3) Some members of the media may be briefed on planned operations prior to 

execution if they agree to withhold release until permitted to do so by the appropriate 

military authorities. Security of classified material is the responsibility of the information 

source (“security at the source”) and is the normal method to ensure classified information is 

not compromised. 
Appendix C 

C-2 JP 3-61 

d. Release below the JFC Level

 (1) Upon delegation of release authority, component and subordinate commanders 

may release information within the bounds of policy and guidance set forth by the joint force 

PAO or MOC director. 

 (2) A verbatim record of releases and news conferences should be maintained. 

 (3) Subordinate commanders should report the substance of any interview or 

responses to query to the MOC. 

 (4) News conferences should be videotaped or audiotaped. 

e. Department of Defense Directive 5400.07, Freedom of Information Act Program. 

Requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act Program should be 

coordinated through the command’s designated Freedom of Information Act representative 

or the servicing staff judge advocate or legal advisor if no such representative exists. 

f. Title 5, US Code, Section 552, The Privacy Act. DOD personnel shall not disclose 

any personal information contained in any system of records except as authorized by DOD 

5400.11-R, DOD Privacy Program, or other applicable law or regulation. Personnel 

willfully making such a disclosure when knowing that disclosure is prohibited are subject to 

possible criminal penalties and/or administrative sanctions. 

2. Discussions with the Media 

 a. Preparation. Preparation results in more effective discussions with the media. 

Central to the process is identifying what information is to be released based on prevailing 

PAG and OPSEC. Commanders, briefers, and PA personnel should be aware of the basic 

facts of any operation and sensitive to the various consequences of communicating them to 

the public. 

 b. Security. “Security at the source” serves as the basis for ensuring that no 

information is released which jeopardizes OPSEC or the safety and privacy of joint military 

forces. Under this concept, individuals meeting with journalists are responsible for ensuring 

that no classified or sensitive information is revealed. This guidance also applies to 

photographers, who should be directed not to take pictures of classified areas or equipment 

or in any way to compromise sensitive information. 

 c. Public Affairs Assessment. Each operational situation will require a deliberate PA 

assessment in order to identify specific information to be released. The following categories 

of information are usually releasable, though individual situations may require 

modifications: 

 (1) The arrival of US units in the operational area once officially announced by 

DOD or by other commands in accordance with release authority granted by the OASD(PA). 

Information could include mode of travel (sea or air), date of departure, and home station or 

port. 
Guidelines for Release of Information 

C-3 

 (2) Approximate friendly force strength and equipment figures. 

 (3) Approximate friendly casualty and POW figures by Service. Approximate 

figures of adversary personnel detained during each action or operation. 

 (4) Nonsensitive, unclassified information regarding US air, land, sea, space, and 

special operations, past and present. 

 (5) In general terms, identification and location of military targets and objectives 

previously attacked and the types of ordnance expended. 

 (6) Date, time, or location of previous military missions and actions as well as 

mission results. 

 (7) Number of combat air patrol or reconnaissance missions and/or sorties flown in 

the operational area. Generic description of origin of air operations, such as “land” or 

“carrier-based.” 

 (8) Weather and climate conditions. 

 (9) If appropriate, allied participation by type (ground units, ships, aircraft). 

 (10) Conventional operations’ unclassified code names. 

 (11) Names of installations and assigned units. 

 (12) Size of friendly force participating in an action or operation using general 

terms such as “multi-battalion,” or “naval task force.” 

 (13) Types of forces involved (e.g., aircraft, ships, carrier strike groups, tank, and 

infantry units). 

d. Classified Information. Classified aspects of equipment, procedures, and operations 

must be protected from disclosure to the media. In more general terms, information in the 

following categories of information should not be revealed because of potential jeopardy to 

future operations, the risk to human life, possible violation of HN and/or allied sensitivities, 

or the possible disclosure of intelligence methods and sources. While these guidelines serve 

to guide military personnel who talk with the media, they may also be used as ground rules 

for media coverage. The list is not necessarily complete and should be adapted to each 

operational situation. 

 (1) For US (or allied) units, specific numerical information on troop strength, 

aircraft, weapons systems, on-hand equipment, or supplies available for support of combat 

units. General terms should be used to describe units, equipment, and/or supplies. 

 (2) Any information that reveals details of future plans, operations, or strikes, 

including postponed or canceled operations. 
Appendix C 

C-4 JP 3-61 

 (3) Information and imagery that would reveal the specific location of military 

forces or show the level of security at military installations or encampments. For datelines, 

stories will state that the report originates from general regions unless a specific country has 

acknowledged its participation. 

 (4) Rules of engagement. 

 (5) Information on intelligence activities, including sources and methods, lists of 

targets, and battle damage assessments. 

 (6) During an operation, specific information on friendly force troop movement or 

size, tactical deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize OPSEC or lives. This 

would include unit designations and names of operations until released by the JFC. 

 (7) Identification of mission aircraft points of origin, other than as land- or carrierbased. 

 (8) Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of weapon systems and 

tactics (to include, but not limited to adversary camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, 

direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures). 

 (9) Specific identifying information on missing or downed personnel, aircraft, or 

sunken ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway. 

 (10) SOFs’ methods, equipment, or tactics which, if disclosed, would cause serious 

harm to the ability of these forces to accomplish their mission. 

 (11) Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could be used 

against US or allied units until that information no longer provides tactical advantage to the 

adversary and is, therefore, released by the JFC. Damage and casualties may be described as 

“light,” “moderate,” or “heavy.” 

 (12) Specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., offensive and defensive tactics or 

speed and formations). General terms such as “slow” or “fast” may be used. 

 (13) Requests for interviews or filming of EPWs or detained personnel must be 

coordinated through the staff judge advocate to ensure compliance with applicable laws and 

regulations including the law of war. Generally, photographing, filming, or other 

videotaping of EPWs or detained personnel for other than internal detention facility 

management purposes is likely to be prohibited. No individual in the custody or under the 

physical control of the USG, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to 

cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Moreover, EPWs must at all times be 

protected against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity. 

Photos taken and used for nonofficial purposes may depict detainees in a degrading manner, 

thus violating international and US law. 
D-1 

APPENDIX D

SOURCES FOR DEFENSE MEDIA ACTIVITY 

1. Defense Media Agency

The DMA is a consolidation of several DOD and Service media capabilties. Joint force 

PA staff may contact the DMA through www.dma.mil to request the following capabilities: 

2. American Forces Radio and Television Service Assets 

 a. DOD 5120.20-R, Management and Operation of American Forces Radio and 

Television Service, outlines basic procedures to obtain AFRTS service. Contact the DMA 

for additional guidance and planning assistance. 

 b. The DMA can assist combatant command PA offices in planning and developing 

AFRTS systems to meet their contingency and CAP needs. Combatant command PA 

officials are responsible for planning for AFRTS in any operation as a joint command PA 

asset. The DMA encourage PA planners to involve the DMA in planning for exercise and 

during contingency operations. Extensive coordination may be required with other staff 

elements to coordinate communications frequency, power, and logistic requirements, based 

on the level of AFRTS support required for the operation. 

 c. AFRTS has several flexible response options available to support any operational 

requirement. Deployable equipment systems range from a small satellite receiver that can be 

connected to a TV in a common viewing area with an approximate weight of 100 pounds, 

through a staffed radio station with an approximate weight of 550 pounds and four 

personnel, to a staffed radio and TV network designed to cover an entire operational area. It 

should be noted that the small satellite receiver systems are being obtained by individual 

units to be deployed as unit equipment. AFIS and/or AFRTS encourages individual units to 

obtain these systems. A listing of units with these receiver systems can be obtained from 

AFIS and/or AFRTS. 

3. Imagery 

 The DMA’s DIMOC receives, processes, stores, and distributes classified and 

unclassified imagery products created by globally stationed and deployed DOD imagery 

producing personnel. PA officials can get customer service and request imagery through 

http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil/index.html. The DIMOC also coordinates strategic VI 

requirements and plans with the DOD’s operational forces. This includes assisting planners 

with VI plans (http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil/about/dimoc.html). 

4. Public Worldwide Web Operations 

 The DMA provides infrastructure for public-facing web pages for DOD customers. The 

DMA provides services necessary to create, sustain, maintain, and improve public-facing 

websites and their content. 
Appendix D 

D-2 JP 3-61 

5. Hometown News Program 

 The DMA provides hometown news program support to the DOD and military 

departments. PA staffs submit DD Form 2266, Hometown News Release Information. 

DMA develops and provides the American public (through over 10,000 subscribing 

commercial media outlets) news releases about individual members of the Services including 

AC and RC members, academy/Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets, and civil servants. 

6. Afloat Media Systems Engineering and Maintenance Support 

 The DMA supports port-based support for shipboard direct-to-sailor TV receivers; the 

Shipboard Information, Training, and Entertainment System; shipboard distribution systems; 

and shipboard media department systems. 

7. Blogger Engagement Services 

 The DMA facilitates DOD-wide PA operations by linking citizen journalists (bloggers) 

with DOD leaders. This includes telephone conferencing and transcription services. 

8. Public Affairs and Visual Information Training 

 The DMA’s DINFOS delivers PA, broadcasting, and VI training and education to initial, 

intermediate, and advanced-level DOD and interagency students 

(http://www.dinfos.dma.mil/). 

9. Emerging Media Training, Education, and Testing 

 The DMA contributes to PA community proponency activities through the assessment, 

research, and testing of emerging media tools, techniques and technologies that may be of 

use within the DOD. This includes transfer of emerging media tools, techniques, and 

technologies to DOD components for practical application in PA operations. 
E-1 

APPENDIX E 

JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT ELEMENT 

1. Overview 

 a. The JPASE improves the ability of joint forces to operate successfully in today’s 

complex information environment. 

 b. JPASE provides a trained, equipped, scalable, and expeditionary PA capability to 

include planning and media operations. JPASE is DOD’s only joint PA unit and deploys 

globally to support JTF commanders’ needs and provides scalable options that allow 

requesting combatant commands to tailor required capabilities. 

 c. JPASE provides PA training for JFCs and staffs through participation in major 

exercises, seminars, and planning events. 

2. Organization

JPASE is organized to support the readiness demands of the global response force 

mission without sacrificing in the areas of training and proponency as shown in Figure E-1. 

The designation of global response force red, amber, or green relates to the degree of 

readiness of the team to deploy, with green being ready. This organization facilitates the 

integration of the JPASE reserves into operations and enhances command and control. 

3. Operational Support 

 a. Introduction. JPASE serves as a standing joint PA capability for JFCs. JPASE can 

be rapidly deployed, in whole or in part, to support a variety of operational requirements 

through approved force request processes (e.g., RFF process). 

 (1) The deployment of all or part of JPASE provides the JFC with a standing 

mission-ready joint PA capability whenever and wherever needed. JPASE can respond to a 

CCDR’s request for joint PA planning for potential contingencies, as well as for direct 

support of operations. As cohesive joint units, JPASE teams fit easily into force deployment 

packages but require logistical and life support from the requesting command. 

 (2) JPASE forces can be thought of as DOD “first responders” for joint PA. Like 

similar on-call forces, they are designed to respond quickly to the emergent situation until 

long-term forces are deployed. 

b. Capabilities. Figure E-2 shows the joint PA competencies and capabilities that 

JPASE can provide to a JFC with scalable crisis response teams, as well as those capabilities 

JPASE can manage if augmented with additional forces, such as an Army mobile PA 

detachment and/or other Service capabilities. The size of the JPASE team and equipment 

required for support will depend upon the capabilities requested. Capabilities required are 

based on a PA mission analysis conducted by the appropriate combatant command PA staff 

in conjunction with JPASE leadership. Capabilities not organic to JPASE are noted in the 

far right column. 
Appendix E 

E-2 JP 3-61 

c. Deployment Considerations 

 (1) JPASE deploys upon approval by the Commander, United States Joint Forces 

Command (CDRUSJFCOM), as shown in Figure E-2. JPASE provides joint PA teams for 

emergent events or preplanned contingency operations. In the latter case, the requirement for 

JPASE capabilities should have been previously identified and coordinated between the 

supported CCDR and JPASE. 

LEGEND

JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT ELEMENT ORGANIZATION:

TIERED READINESS FOCUS

Joint PA

Proponency

Support

Logistics

Admin

CDR

JPASE

DCDR

Operations

Training

Readiness

Reserves

Reserve

Forces

Reserve

Forces

Training

Support

Training

Support

GRF

Green

GRF

Green

GRF

Amber

GRF

Amber

GRF

Red

GRF

Red

Admin administration

CDR commander

DCDR deputy commander

GRF global response force

JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element

PA public affairs

support to/from deployable teams

Operations

Figure E-1. Joint Public Affairs Support Element Organization: 

Tiered Readiness Focus 
Joint Public Affairs Support Element 

E-3 

JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES 

Capability 

Area Specific Capabilities Organic 

Support 

Needed 

Advisor Advise the commander on the requirements and 

employment of joint public affairs (PA) assets 

X 

Participate in strategic communication planning X 

Provide joint PA advice/counsel on the impact of 

proposed policy and operational decisions on public 

perception 

X 

Advise the commander on public impact of 

emerging events 

X 

Coordinate with higher and subordinate units on 

joint PA matters 

X 

Planning and 

Operations 

Participate in the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, 

and working group process 

X 

Direct joint PA operations in a joint operations area X 

Identify communication infrastructure requirements X 

Develop joint PA strategy X 

Develop/coordinate public affairs guidance (PAG) 

as necessary 

X 

Distribute PAG to subordinate units X 

Summarize media coverage of operations X 

Coordinate with combat camera (COMCAM)/visual 

information (VI) assets 

X 

Conduct public information assessments (reach 

back) 

 X 

Media 

Operations 

Identify requirements for media support 

facilities/media operations centers (MOCs) 

X 

Coordinate establishment of necessary 

facilities/MOCs 

X 

Develop a media support plan X 

Conduct media accreditation X X 

Provide information to the media X 

Conduct/facilitate press briefings X 

Produce live uplink capability (Digital Video 

Information Distribution System) 

X 

Facilitate media embedding as appropriate X 

Coordinate with COMCAM/VI assets X 

Coordinate intratheater transportation for media. X 

Conduct media training for staff X 

Publicly 

Accessible 

Websites 

Coordinate content for established publicly 

accessible websites 

 X 
Appendix E 

E-4 JP 3-61 

JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS CAPABILITIES 

Capability 

Area Specific Capabilities Organic 

Support 

Needed 

Command 

Information 

Manage/coordinate non-organic command 

information assets 

X 

Identify command internal information requirements X 

Develop a command internal information plan X 

Coordinate for a broadcast capability X 

Produce command internal information products X 

Defense 

Support to 

Public 

Diplomacy 

US embassy/consulate PA liaison X 

Other government agency coordination X 

Visual 

Information 

Develop a VI collection and dissemination plan X 

Coordinate VI acquisition requirements with 

COMCAM 

X 

Disseminate VI products * X 

Community 

Engagement 

Identify community engagement requirements X 

Identify key publics and influencers X 

Develop a community engagement plan X 

Facilitate command interaction with local officials X 

* JPASE has limited imagery distribution capability 

Figure E-2. Joint Public Affairs Capabilities

 (2) To ensure optimum availability of JPASE personnel for prescribed 

deployments, JPASE does not fill joint PA billets for which permanent party personnel are 

not assigned, provide individual augmentees to fill positions on joint manning documents, or 

participate in standard rotation of forces. Similarly, JPASE should not be requested unless 

combatant command and subordinate PA assets are fully engaged and unable to respond to 

the situation or are unable to provide the required capabilities. Figure E-3 depicts the 

deployment process as well as considerations for deployment. 

 d. Size and Duration. The capacity of JPASE to support deployments will vary 

based on personnel available and other operational requirements. JPASE typically 

maintains a ready team of eight personnel capable of responding to missions for a 

duration of 90-120 days. In the event that a deployment will exceed established JPASE 

limits, CCDRs are responsible for identifying requirements and fielding follow-on joint PA 

forces. If JPASE can support a deployment request, team members should be available on 

site 72 hours after notification (N+48). 

 e. Requests for Joint Public Affairs Support Element

 (1) Commands request JPASE through approved force request processes in 

accordance with the USJFCOM joint enabling capability instructions. The CDRUSJFCOM 

has authority to approve JPASE deployments via a standing prepare to deploy order. 
Joint Public Affairs Support Element 

E-5 

Requests must identify specific joint PA capabilities required by the scope and breadth of the 

operation not the number of people. 

 (2) Past deployments demonstrate the need to get JPASE involved in force 

requirement discussions early to ensure that requesting commands know what capabilities 

JPASE has available at the time of the deployment and what capabilities would need to be 

sourced through other means. Informal coordination between the requesting command PAO 

and JPASE should be initiated at the earliest indication of a potential need. Once the 

required capabilities are identified, the requesting command PAO must formally identify the 

requirement for JPASE (and any other needed joint PA personnel) through the combatant 

command J-3. 

 f. Operational Planning. Early involvement of JPASE personnel in mission planning 

will help JFCs develop an integrated communications strategy that enhances and guides 

LEGEND

JOINT PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT ELEMENT

DEPLOYMENT PROCESS

C2 command and control

GRF global response force

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element

N + notified for deployment

PA public affairs

PTDO prepare to deploy order

RFF request for forces

SecDef Secretary of Defense

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

Considerations

Status of combatant 

command/subordinate

PA forces available

Availability of JPASE

Nature of

deployment

(emergent/contingent)

Nature of operations

and

capabilities needed

Funding source

Ability to provide C2

sustainment

and logistics support

GRF

PTDO

JCS-SecDef

Notification

N + 24

USJFCOM

Coordination

Decision

to Deploy

Formal

RFF

JPASE Team

Arrives

Per RFF

JPASE Team

Arrives

N + 72

PA 

Capability

Required

Figure E-3. Joint Public Affairs Support Element Deployment Process 
Appendix E 

E-6 JP 3-61 

initial planning and operations. JPASE personnel are readily available to participate in 

operational planning (via teleconference or in person) for emergent events prior to 

deployment approval and the movement of the JPASE team into the operational area. 

Including JPASE in plan development will ensure the best use of follow-on JPASE team 

members and the best joint PA support to the commander. 

g. Required Support

 (1) Communications Systems. JPASE has very limited organic communications 

and information technology capability. Requesting commands must be prepared to provide, 

at a minimum, classified and unclassified connectivity, computers, and phones. Additional 

capabilities may be required based on the specific situation. 

 (2) Logistics. JPASE will require work spaces, billeting, messing, power, and 

transportation. Based on the need to move media from place to place, dedicated vehicular 

support may be required. 

 (3) Force Protection. JPASE personnel maintain ready inventory of personal 

protective equipment and are qualified with the 9mm pistol. 
F-1 

APPENDIX F

REFERENCES 

The development of JP 3-61 is based upon the following primary references: 

1. Department of Defense Issuances 

 a. DODD 3600.01, Information Operations (IO).

 b. DODD 5105.74, Defense Media Activity (DMA). 

 c. DODD 5120.20, American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS). 

 d. DODD 5122.05, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD[PA]). 

 e. DODD 5122.8, Use of Military Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes. 

 f. DODD 5122.11, Stars and Stripes Newspapers and Business Operations.

 g. DODD 5230.09, Clearance of DOD Information for Public Release. 

 h. DODD 5400.07, DOD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program. 

 i. DODD 5410.18, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy.

 j. DODI 5040.04, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program.

 k. DODI 5200.01, DOD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive 

Compartmented Information. 

 l. DODI 5230.29, Security and Policy Review of DOD Information for Public Release.

 m. DODI 5400.13, Public Affairs Operations. 

 n. DODI 5400.14, Procedures for Joint Public Affairs Operations. 

 o. DODI 5405.3, Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG). 

 p. DODI 5410.19, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy Implementation. 

 q. DODI 5435.2, Delegation of Authority to Approve Travel In and Use of Military 

Carriers for Public Affairs Purposes. 

 r. DOD 4515.13-R, Air Transportation Eligibility.

 s. DOD 5120.20-R, Management and Operation of American Forces Radio and 

Television Service (AFRTS). 
Appendix F 

F-2 JP 3-61 

 t. Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-026, Responsible and Effective Use of 

Internet-based Capabilities.

 u. Joint Travel Regulations, Volume II, Department of Defense Civilian Personnel. 

 v. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010.

2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Issuances 

 a. CJCSI 1301.01C, Individual Augmentation Procedures. 

 b. CJCSI 3205.01B, Joint Combat Camera. 

 c. CJCSI 3210.01B, Joint Information Operations Policy.

 d. CJCSI 3213.01C, Joint Operations Security.

 e. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I, 

Planning Formats. 

3. Joint Publications 

 a. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

 b. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

 c. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 

 d. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

 e. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. 

 f. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. 

 g. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

 h. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

 i. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations. 

 j. JP 3-13, Information Operations. 

 k. JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations. 

 l. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security. 

 m. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception. 

 n. JP 3-14, Space Operations. 
References 

F-3 

 o. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense. 

 p. JP 3-28, Civil Support. 

 q. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

 r. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. 

 s. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

 t. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System. 

4. Multi-Service Publication 

FM 3-55.12/MCRP 3-33.7A/NTTP 3-13.12/AFTTP 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Combat Camera Operations. 
Appendix F 

F-4 JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
G-1 

APPENDIX G 

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS 

1. User Comments 

 Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: 

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: 

Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These 

comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), 

writing, and appearance. 

2. Authorship 

 The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command, Public 

Affairs. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Joint Staff, Public 

Affairs. 

3. Supersession 

 This publication supersedes JP 3-61, 9 May 2005, Public Affairs. 

4. Change Recommendations 

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: 

TO: CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JO1P// 

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// 

 CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DEG// 

 b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Commander, Joint 

Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group, and info the Director for Operational 

Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7)/Joint Education and Doctrine Division (JEDD), via 

the CJCS Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. 

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change 

source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a 

proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services 

and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7, when changes to source 

documents reflected in this publication are initiated. 

d. Record of Changes: 

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED 

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 

____________________________________________________________________ 
Appendix G 

G-2 JP 3-61 

5. Distribution of Publications 

a. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is 

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint 

publications must be in accordance with DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. 

b. The Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions 

are available on JDEIS at https://jdeis.js.mil (NIPRNET), or https://jdeis.js.smil.mil 

(SIPRNET) and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET). 

c. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the 

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication 

to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy 

(Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Bolling 

AFB, Washington, DC 20340-5100. 

d. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and 

deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. 
GL-1 

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

AC Active Component 

AFIS American Forces Information Service 

AFRTS American Forces Radio and Television Service 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

ASD(PA) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 

CA civil affairs 

CAISE civil authority information support element 

CAP crisis action planning 

CBRN CM chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

consequence management 

CCDR combatant commander 

CD counterdrug 

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 

CMO civil-military operations 

CMOC civil-military operations center 

CNO computer network operations 

COA course of action 

COM chief of mission 

COMCAM combat camera 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CS civil support 

CWMD combating weapons of mass destruction 

DCE defense coordinating element 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIMOC Defense Imagery Management Operations Center 

DINFOS Defense Information School 

DMA Defense Media Activity 

DOD Department of Defense 

DODD Department of Defense directive 

DODI Department of Defense instruction 

DOS Department of State 

DSCA defense support of civil authorities 

DSPD defense support to public diplomacy 

EPW enemy prisoner of war 

ESF emergency support function 
Glossary 

GL-2 JP 3-61 

EW electronic warfare 

EXORD execute order 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FM field manual (Army) 

HN host nation 

IAW in accordance with 

ICEPP Incident Communications Emergency Policy and 

Procedures 

IGO intergovernmental organization 

INFOSEC information security 

IO information operations 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff 

JFC joint force commander 

JIC joint information center 

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPP joint operation planning process 

JP joint publication 

JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JTF joint task force 

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication 

MILDEC military deception 

MOC media operations center 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NICCL National Incident Communications Conference Line 

NRF National Response Framework 

NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures 

OASD(PA) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public 

Affairs) 

OGA other government agency 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

OSC on-scene commander 
Glossary 

GL-3 

PA public affairs 

PAG public affairs guidance 

PAO public affairs officer 

PD public diplomacy 

PIO public information officer 

PO peace operations 

POW prisoner of war 

PPAG proposed public affairs guidance 

PSYOP psychological operations 

RC Reserve Component 

RFF request for forces 

SC strategic communication 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SOF special operations forces 

TV television 

USG United States Government 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

VI visual information 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
GL-4 JP 3-61 

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 

American Forces Radio and Television Service. A worldwide radio and television 

broadcasting organization that provides United States military commanders overseas 

and at sea with sufficient electronic media resources to effectively communicate theater, 

local, Department of Defense, and Service-unique command information to their 

personnel and family members. Also called AFRTS. (Approved for replacement of 

“Armed Forces Radio and Television Service” in JP 1-02.) 

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, 

trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civilmilitary operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, 

or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian 

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve 

operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by 

military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, 

regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or 

subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of 

other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated 

civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other 

forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

civil-military operations center. An organization normally composed of civil affairs, 

established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the 

United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, 

intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, 

and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called 

CMOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

combat camera. The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of 

operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and 

during joint exercises. Also called COMCAM. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02.) 

combat visual information support center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

command information. Communication by a military organization directed to the internal 

audience that creates an awareness of the organization’s goals, informs them of 

significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their 

effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and keeps them informed about what 

is going on in the organization. Also called internal information. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-5 

community engagement. Those public affairs activities that support the relationship 

between military and civilian communities. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

community relations. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

community relations program. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the 

chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each 

represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic 

mission. Also called CT. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.4) 

external audience. All people who are not US military members, Department of Defense 

civilian employees, and their immediate families. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02.) 

host nation. A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, and/or 

NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. 

Also called HN. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-57) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic 

warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and 

operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 

influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 

while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13) 

internal audience. US military members and Department of Defense civilian employees 

and their immediate families. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

joint information bureau. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 

Joint Public Affairs Support Element. A deployable unit assigned to assist a joint force 

commander in developing and training public affairs forces in joint, interagency, and 

multinational environments. Also called JPASE. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

media operations center. A facility established by the joint force commander to serve as 

the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct 

of joint operations. Also called MOC. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.) 

media pool. A limited number of news media who represent a larger number of news media 

organizations for purposes of news gathering and sharing of material during a specified 

activity. Pooling is typically used when news media support resources cannot 

accommodate a large number of journalists. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) 

message. 1. Any thought or idea expressed briefly in a plain or secret language and 

prepared in a form suitable for transmission by any means of communication. (JP 6-0) 
Glossary 

GL-6 JP 3-61 

2. A narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a 

specific theme. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 6-0 as the source JP 

for Definition #1.) 

military journalist. A US Service member or Department of Defense civilian employee 

providing photographic, print, radio, or television command information for military 

internal audiences. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) 

news media representative. An individual employed by a civilian radio or television 

station, newspaper, newsmagazine, periodical, or news agency to gather and report on a 

newsworthy event. Also called NMR. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) 

official information. Information that is owned by, produced for or by, or is subject to the 

control of the United States Government. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with 

JP 3-61 as the source JP.) 

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently 

analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. 

identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. 

determine indicators that adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be 

interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to 

adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable 

level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called 

OPSEC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.3) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 

and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 

individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 

attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 

1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-13.2) 

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 

engagement activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest 

in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 

1-02.) 

public affairs assessment. An analysis of the news media and public environments to 

evaluate the degree of understanding about strategic and operational objectives and 

military activities and to identify levels of public support. It includes judgment about 

the public affairs impact of pending decisions and recommendations about the structure 

of public affairs support for the assigned mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-61) 

public affairs ground rules. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-7 

public affairs guidance. Constraints and restraints established by proper authority 

regarding public information, command information, and community relations activities. 

It may also address the method(s), timing, location, and other details governing the 

release of information to the public. Also called PAG. (Approved for incorporation 

into JP 1-02.) 

public diplomacy. 1. Those overt international public information activities of the United 

States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by 

seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and 

by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their 

counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an 

understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through 

public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote 

and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the 

region and in the larger international community. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-07.3) 

public information. Within public affairs, that information of a military nature, the 

dissemination of which is consistent with security and approved for release. (Approved 

for incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

security review. The process of reviewing information and products prior to public release 

to ensure the material will not jeopardize ongoing or future operations. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

strategic communication. Focused United States Government efforts to understand and 

engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the 

advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the 

use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with 

the actions of all instruments of national power. Also called SC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: 

JP 5-0) 

visual information. Various visual media with or without sound. Generally, visual 

information includes still and motion photography, audio video recording, graphic arts, 

visual aids, models, display, visual presentations. Also called VI. (Approved for 

incorporation into JP 1-02.) 

visual information documentation. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.) 
Glossary 

GL-8 JP 3-61 

Intentionally Blank 
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICS COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM PLANS

JP 1

JOINT

DOCTRINE

JP 1-0

PERSONNEL

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS

JP 2-0

INTELLIGENCE

STEP #4 - Maintenance









JP published and continuously

assessed by users

Formal assessment begins 24-

27 months following

publication

Revision begins 3.5 years after

publication

Each JP revision is completed

no later than 5 years after

signature

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

STEP #1 - Initiation







JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for

signature













LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the

first draft (FD)

PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to

JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC

comment matrix

FC Joint working group













Joint Doctrine Development

Community (JDDC) submission to fill

extant operational void

US Joint Forces Command

(USJFCOM) conducts front-end

analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference

validation

Program Directive (PD) development

and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,

outline, milestones, and draft

authorship

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and

releases PD to lead agent (LA)

(Service, combatant command, JS

directorate)

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the

development process:

Joint Publication

(JP) 3-61 Operations