The Fairchild Papers are monograph-length essays of value to the

Air Force. The series is named in honor of Muir S. Fairchild, the

first commander of Air University and the university’s conceptual

father. General Fairchild was part visionary, part keen taskmaster,

and “Air Force to the core.” His legacy is one of confidence about

the future of the Air Force and the central role of Air University in

that future.

insidecover 12/19/01 2:06 PM Page 1
AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Expeditionary Air

Operations in Africa

Challenges and Solutions

KAREN U. KWIATKOWSKI

Lt Col, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

December 2001
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kwiatkowski, Karen U.

Expeditionary air operations in Africa : challenges and solutions / Karen U.

Kwiatkowski.

p. cm. — ISSN 1528-2325

“Fairchild paper.”

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-100-7

1. United States. Air Force--Foreign service--Africa. 2. Aeronautics, Military--Africa.

I. Title

UG633 .K94 2001

358.4'1352'0973--dc21 2001053559

ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Fairchild Paper and others in the series are available

electronically at the Air University Research Web site

http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers”

then “Special Collections.”
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 WHAT THE WORLD KNOWS ABOUT AIR

OPERATIONS CHALLENGES IN AFRICA . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2 WHAT THE USAF KNOWS ABOUT AIR

OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Recent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3 WHAT THE USAF IS DOING ABOUT AIR

OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Some Solutions for Future Improvement . . . . 33

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

4 WHAT AIRCREWS KNOW ABOUT AIR

EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . 55

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

5 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix

A Questionnaire Responses from

Pilots/Aircrews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

iii
B African Airfields Listed in the Airfield Suitability

and Restrictions Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

C Questionnaire Responses from Attachés . . . . . . 119

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Illustrations

Figure

1 African Airfield Survey Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Table

1 ICAO Reported African Air Operations

Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

2 Passenger and Cargo Traffic and Volume Growth

for African Airports, 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3 Air Mobility Command Missions, Selected

African Countries by Volume, Years . . . . . . . . . 9

4 Summary of African Airfield Restrictions . . . . . . 37

5 Selected EUCOM Attaché and Country Team

Ratings of Transportation Infrastructure for

African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

6 Summary of Pilot Ratings on ICAO-Observed

African Flight Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

7 Challenges to Flying, Strategic Mobility, and

Tactical Airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

8 Operator Satisfaction with AMC and Theater

Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

iv
Foreword

Lt Col Karen U. Kwiatkowski’s Expeditionary Air Operations

in Africa: Challenges and Solutions details air operations challenges in Africa. She discusses how the USAF currently meets

or avoids these challenges. She contends that Africa is like the

“western frontier” of America’s history—undeveloped, brimming with opportunity as well as danger, and that it is a place

where standard assumptions often do not apply. Africa has

not been, and is not today, a US geostrategic interest area.

However, as the dawn of the twenty-first century breaks over

a planet made both intimate and manageable by CNN and

DHL Air Express, Colonel Kwiatkowski believes that the winners will be those who understand Africa and can meet the

challenges of air operations on the continent first. Air operations, whether commercial or military, are critical to a continent that has a limited overland transportation infrastructure

of roads, rail, and waterways. Sea and river access to most of

the major population areas of Africa is possible and well used.

But from a US military perspective, water transportation does

not always provide the desired speed or flexibility for contingency or humanitarian response. 

Africa is a continent connected overwhelmingly via airways,

and the USAF will continue to use African airspace and air infrastructures. There are multiple perspectives on the numerous

air and transportation challenges in Africa. The problems—

whether air safety, navigation, ground transportation network

and airport infrastructure immaturity, security, geography,

culture, governmental mismanagement—are often presented

as insurmountable. Ironically, the air transport situation is

often seen as a problem that must be solved collectively by the

53 very different and very burdened states of Africa; and for

this reason, unsatisfactory air operation infrastructures are

accepted as a permanent handicap. A portion of Colonel

Kwiatkowski’s study is dedicated to illustrating how USAF air

transport is really done in Africa on a daily basis, in hopes of

shedding light on lessons the leadership of the world’s most

powerful air force may have missed. She recommends ways to

v
improve our ability to conduct expeditionary air operations on

the continent. 

Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa: Challenges and Solutions is an Institute for National Security Studies-sponsored

research project by Colonel Kwiatkowski. Air University Press

is pleased to present her essay as a Fairchild Paper.

SHIRLEY BROOKS LASETER

Director

Air University Library/Air University Press

vi
Lt Col Karen U. Kwiatkowski is a political-military officer assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Undersecretary

for Policy, Office of African Affairs. Prior to her current assignment, she served on the Air Force Staff, Operations Directorate, at the Pentagon; the staff of the Director of the National

Security Agency (NSA) at Fort Meade, Maryland; and has completed tours in Alaska, Massachusetts, Spain, and Italy.

Colonel Kwiatkowski entered the Air Force in 1983 and was a

recipient of a four-year ROTC scholarship. While she has served

as a political-military officer for the past two assignments, her

basic specialization is communications-electronics; and she

has a secondary AFSC in logistics. She has an MA in government

from Harvard, an MS in science management from the University of Alaska, and is currently a PhD candidate in world politics

at Catholic University. Colonel Kwiatkowski has completed

both Air Command and Staff College and the Naval War College seminar programs. She is married to Hap Kwiatkowski,

and they have four children, Katie, Greg, Betsy, and Michael.

vii

About the

Author

Lt Col Karen U. Kwiatkowski

Preface

Africa is like the “western frontier” of America’s history—

undeveloped, brimming with opportunity as well as danger,

and a place where standard assumptions often do not apply.

Numerous air and transportation challenges exist in Africa,

and the need for Air Force operations to be conducted there

will remain and grow in the twenty-first century. The problems—

whether air safety, navigation, ground transportation network

and airport infrastructure immaturity, security, geography,

culture, governmental mismanagement—are often presented

as insurmountable. Of course, they are not insurmountable;

USAF aircrews overcome the known problems and more every

time they fly there. 

The more important questions addressed in my paper are

these: Is the USAF aware of the problems our aircrews face?

Are we as an organization doing anything about them? Is what

we are doing working? To answer these questions, I look first

at known African civil aviation conditions, then examine the

USAF recorded lessons learned on recent air operations on the

continent. I also examine the kind of responses the Air Force

as an organization is promoting to correct known deficiencies

and solve problems. A survey of pilots and aircrews was conducted via the Web, gathering a wealth of data on what it is really like to conduct air operations in Africa. The results of this

survey are included in their entirety at appendix A and are interesting reading. Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa: Challenges and Solutions makes several recommendations in two

classes: the predictable organizational solutions based on traditional lessons learned—tending to be gradual and keyed on

more funding—and the less traditional and more innovative

recommendations that tend to be procedural and do not require extensive funding. Money needs to be spent, no doubt;

but more than this, our lock-step thought process and ossified

thinking about what we do—the flying business—needs to

change. In the first category of recommendations, we must address the need for operational communications, air traffic control, and reachback on the continent. Air operations planning

for African deployments needs to become more coordinated,

ix
more aware, and more sophisticated. Our embassy support to

air operations is critical, yet underfunded, undertrained, and

undermanned. Security of airframes and people is paramount;

and the dynamic impact of sustained mobility operations on

aircraft, crews, runways, and airports must be understood.

In the second category, my recommendations include perhaps more simple, more focused suggestions. (1) Get the

Global Positioning System and Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System on all airframes that fly in Africa. This has already been mandated, yet is not done, particularly for the aircraft most likely to see Africa flying time. (2) Activate defense

and air attachés for improved air operations by assigning the

right people in the right places and listening to their ideas and

those of aircrews to improve this “saving grace” of African air

operations. (3) Use commercial flight publications and practices when the USAF publications and practices are inadequate. (4) Improve airfield and security databases and information flow by listening, talking, and responding up and down

the chain. (5) Share knowledge among the interested civil and

military air operations community on Africa. (6) Take lessons

on what works and adapt quickly. (7) Spend some USAF mental energy on creatively improving air operations and flight

safety in Africa. 

When we ask our aircrews to do dangerous missions, we

rely on their courage, talent, and dedication. However, when a

nation or a military service asks so much of its people, something is expected back. This paper should provide some of that

back by recognizing and documenting the reality and crafting

a way ahead for safer and more effective air operations in

Africa.

x
Acknowledgments

This study is the result of the work of many people. I thank

the Institute for National Security Studies for funding the research travel and my supervisors on the Air Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for their encouragement. I

thank Capt Kathy Amponin at Air Mobility Command (AMC)

for her previous study on a similar subject; it sparked my curiosity and was very useful. Specific people were exceptionally

helpful. Janice Missildine at the Air Mobility Warfare Center

Library quickly and energetically found many things I knew

existed and some items for which I had only hoped. Maj Pete

Hahn and Capt Roman Isayiw were enthusiastic and inspiring,

and they started me off on the right track. I am grateful for the

assistance of Maria Aurora Hinayon—senior manager, Statistics

and Data Processing, of the Airports Council International—who

E-mailed to me her entire database of airport traffic information

and was supportive of the research. Lt Col Mark J. Surina and

MSgt Kenny of the Air Mobility Battlelab were very helpful, as

were Maj Q Schlortt, Lt Col Joel Wheeler, Lt Col T. J. McCarthy,

and SSgt Sean Horchoff at Headquarters AMC. Col Ken Menzie

was instrumental in editing the final copy. Doug Rohn in Niger

was a great source of help and inspiration, both in his survey

and in person. I am deeply indebted to my family—Katie, Greg,

Betsy, Mike, and Hap for doing their part to make sure everything else did not fall apart while I typed into the night for

many months. I dedicate this paper to all the USAF men and

women who fly in and out of Africa, doing what their nation has

asked them, uncomplaining, quietly reliable, and courageous. I

hope this research will be worthy of you and the work you do.

xi
Chapter 1

What the World Knows about Air

Operations Challenges in Africa

When thinking about air safety in Africa, what comes to mind

for many Americans are the tragic accidents such as the September 1997 midair collision of a USAF C-141 and a German

Tu-154 off the coast of Namibia, the deadly crash of a hijacked

Ethiopian Air jet off the Comoro Islands in November 1996, or

the Kenyan Airways crash out of Abidjan in February 2000.

Accidents involving smaller aircraft—such as the Cape Verde

Airlines charter in August 1999, the Tanzania sightseeing

flight in September 1999, or the January 2000 Swiss charter

crash off the coast of Libya—are worrisome. Perhaps the

shootdown of the UN flight in February 1999 over Angola helps

to form our image of African airspace insecurity. News reports

of Guinean stowaways in wheelwells1 or the June 1999 report

of the Air Zimbabwe pilot being locked out of his cabin during

flight complete the picture.2 Or do they?

The challenges of flying in Africa are not mythological and

punctuated by the spectacular but are instead well documented

and often mundane. Because Africa is not a US priority for either commercial or military air traffic, focused and scientific

attention of the systemic ills of air operations on the continent

is largely absent. But for the USAF aircrews and passengers of

more than 1,000 air arrivals and departures annually from

African countries, recognizing, understanding, and acting on

these systemic ills are critical.3 In a twenty-first century that

envisions increased US trade and travel to Africa and for a

United States that stands ready with its world-class mobility

capability to respond to humanitarian crises on the continent,

understanding African air transport challenges is imperative. 

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in December 1996 reported a wide variety of air operations shortcomings in Africa gathered from several sources.4 These improvement opportunities fall into a variety of categories,

including airfield operations, air traffic control (ATC), commu1

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 1
nication, navigational and surveillance aids and services, aeronautical information systems, training or aeronautical professionalization, and procedures. Identified shortcomings the ICAO

reported are summarized in table 1. These known challenges

to air operations in Africa are reflected to some extent in the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Standards Service International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) Program

established in August 1992. FAA’s IASA rates countries as “1”

(meets ICAO standards) or “2” (does not meet ICAO standards). Of 95 countries rated worldwide, 10 were from Africa.

Of these, Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, and South Africa

met ICAO standards. Five of 10 countries—Côte d’Ivoire,

Gambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic

of the Congo (DROC)—received a “did not meet” rating. The

other 43 African countries were not rated by IASA. Prior to

2000, IASA used a three-category system of “1,” “2” (does not

meet ICAO standards—conditional), and “3” (does not meet).

These ratings were unchanged since the July 1998 IASA listing, with no conditional rating being upgraded to a “meet.”5

While direct flights between African and US airports are increasing—including to unrated Senegal—FAA IASA rating capacity has not matched this growth.

2

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Category Observation Category Observation

Aerodromes/ insufficient control over Communication/ very high frequency (VHF)

Airfield operations persons, animals and Navigation/ voice communications

vehicles due to Surveillance within 150 nautical miles

inadequate fencing (NM) of airport not

implemented

bird hazards unreliable or unusable

high-frequency (HF) radio

deficient power supplies

instrument landing system

deficient fire and rescue (ILS) and very high

services frequency omni-directional

radio-range (VOR)

lack of personnel facilities listed in different

screening stages of serviceability

unauthorized personnel lack of flight plans coordination

accessing secure or between Flight Information

restricted areas Regions

Table 1

ICAO Reported African Air Operations Observations

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 2
IASA ratings, while useful, are not necessarily correlated

with African countries’ share of air traffic volume. The Airports

Council International (ACI) annually ranks airports around

the world for passenger travel, cargo shipment, and volume

(takeoffs or landings). In 1999, 833 airports were included in

3

KWIATKOWSKI

Category Observation Category Observation

runway/taxiway inadequacies absence of VHF

(rubber accretion, surface

breakup, lighting

unserviceable) saturation of HF, poor or no HF reception

instrument landing system

inadequate apron lighting

and layout selective calling facilities not provided or

inadequate

unserviceable anomometers

bandboxing of VHF frequencies in busy 

areas—tower and en route frequency 

nontransmital of pilot reports shared

inadequate en route navigation facilities

(inoperable or partially operative)

NAVAIDs not provided or inoperable

lack of precision approach aids

noncalibrated instrument landing systems

Air Traffic nonimplementation of ATC General noncompliance with International Aviation

Control service within 150 NM from Procedures Organization Standards and Recommended 

(ATC) airport Practices

nonimplementation of Air noncompliance with requirements notice 

Traffic System (ATS) direct to airmen (NOTAM) and all defective

speed circuits (35 cases) facilities

or need for improved ATS 

direct speech ciruits (57

cases)

inadequate traffic separation lack of air traffic controller and air traffic 

information (generally communicator training and competency,

uncontrolled airspace) to include language competency

Aeronautical nonexistent air in-flight publication (AIP)

inadequate provision of Information

air traffic control in Service

“controlled airspace”

outdated AIPs

frequent use of non-English

communications, on HF missing aeronautical charts

and VHF, between ATC

and pilots irregular NOTAMS

inadequate or unreliable airport

weather and wind information for

approach and landing

absence of or inaccuracies in surveys of

surrounding areas.

Table 1 (Continued)

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 3
the ACI survey. Six percent of the reporting airport participants

are in African countries. Selected results of ACI airport rankings for African airports are summarized in table 2. For this

paper, ACI surveyed African participants who are grouped by

overall region (north, south, east, and west); and each region

is presented in the order of highest reported passenger traffic

volume to the least. Central Africa is absorbed in this group

because most airflow in Africa is north-south and remains

close to the relatively better radar coverage near the continental coastal nations and cities. Zimbabwe, DROC, Swaziland—

all with FAA “does not meet” ratings—did not participate in the

voluntary ACI survey nor did Angola, Senegal, Sudan, or

Libya. Even with these absences, the data is useful in understanding air operations trends and status on the continent.

While the worldwide average cargo flow increase was 14.6 percent, Africa averaged 12.1 percent growth. Worldwide average

passenger traffic increased an average of 13 percent; African

passenger traffic grew at a below average rate of 10.5 percent.6

It is not surprising that growth in African air transport would

lag the international average, given the economic condition

and debt structure of many African states. Further examination of the ACI 1999 traffic trends for these 833 airports is

more revealing. While African airports account for only 6 percent of the total participants, they represented 9.6 percent of

airports reporting more than 10 percent annual growth in passenger flows, 9.2 percent of airports reporting more than 10

percent annual growth in cargo flows, and 8.6 percent of airports reporting more than 10 percent annual growth in total

numbers of takeoffs and landings.7 In the area of accelerated,

double-digit percentage growth, African airports are overrepresented in all three categories collected by the ACI.

By examining the regional breakout, it is clear that for 1999

cargo travel increased at well over the international level for

southern and northern Africa—while passenger travel was

lower than average, and the increase in numbers of takeoffs

and landings remained flat. Eastern and western Africa experienced lower than normal cargo flows, strong passenger traffic increases, and—in the case of West Africa—recorded well

above the international average for takeoffs and landings. For

4

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 4
5

KWIATKOWSKI

Table 2

Passenger and Cargo Traffic and

Volume Growth for African Airports, 1999

CITY (AIRPORT) TOTAL % CHG TOTAL % CHG TOTAL % CHG Safe IASA

CARGO PASSENGERS MOVEMENTS Skies Rating

East Africa

NAIROBI (Kenya) 126,621 7.60 2,668,217 13.50 45,624 9.90 Yes NoneADDIS ABABA (Ethiopia) 30,135 -14.20 2,940,400 3.70 22,041 -5.20 1

MOMBASA (Kenya) 2,376 -25.30 2,889,543 9.50 19,386 -16.10 Yes None

DAR ES SALAAM (Tanzania) 8,279 152.70 2,582,166 1.70 21,879 7.30 None

ENTEBBE (Uganda) 25,786 -16.10 ,2448,528 0.50 20,872 -6.30 None

ZANZIBAR (Tanzania) 1,253 -7.50 0,232,902 9.80 12,907 1.60 Yes None

KIGALI (Rwanda) 5,426 12.60 00119,751 -3.10 11,426 15.30 NoneASMARA (Eritrea) 3,387 26.60 20093,007 -25.80 03,070 -67.40 None

BUJUMBURA (Burundi) 3,735 -65.50 20,,57,934 143.00 07,573 52.00 None

Average 7.88% 16.98% (0.99%)

North Africa

CAIRO (Egypt) 221,327 5.90 8,302,212 16.70 86,953 9.60 1CASABLANCA (Morocco) 45,995 5.10 3,421,445 08.20 49,321 6.10 1

TUNIS (Tunisia) 24,713 -3.10 3,373,025 -2.10 47,046 -0.30 NoneALGIERS (Algeria) 19,557 2.30 2,631,807 -2.70 34,412 6.20 NoneJERBA (Tunisia) 1,214 -62.80 2,158,241 16.90 23,389 8.30 NoneASWAN (Egypt) ,n/a n/a 1,790,575 80.20 17,491 17.70 1

MARRACKECH (Morocco) 2,006 20.10 1,292,216 19.50 16,509 1.70 1OUJDA (Morocco) ,600 41.70 0199,593 1.70 03,975 -1.30 1

RABAT (Morocco) 1,867 19.80 0137,380 9.20 04,786 11.50 1

TAMANRASSET (Morocco) ,384 0.00 0111,595 -7.70 02,454 -12.60 1

TOZEUR (Tunisia) ,,,30 32.70 0105,996 -3.60 03,308 -1.50 None

OUARZAZATE (Morocco) ,123 173.10 0079,216 8.70 02,276 1.50 1 

TABARKA (Tunisia) ,,,,,3 61.10 0060,372 34.50 01,030 10.50 None

SFAX (TUNISIA) ,119 -13.40 0057,530 -14.00 03,392 -20.30 None

GAFSA (TUNISIA) ,,,,,,4 n/a 0004,913 .n/a 00,252 .n/a None

Average 21.73% 11.82% 2.65%

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 5
6

FAIRCHILD PAPER Table 2 (Continued) CITY (AIRPORT) TOTAL % CHG TOTAL % CHG TOTAL % CHG Safe IASA CARGO PASSENGERS MOVEMENTS Skies Rating Southern Africa JOHANNESBURG 300,886 1.20 11,339,920 4.70 154,435 1.30 1 CAPETOWN (S. Africa) n/a n/a 4,614,931 -9.40 83,418 12.40 1 DURBAN (S. Africa) 11,764 -32.90 2,523,899 3.70 43,926 4.40 1 NATAL (S. Africa) 8,665 29.10 1,011,027 8.10 22,854 10.30 1

ANTANANARIVO (Mozambique) 13,736 3.40 678,366 10.90 31,819 8.10 noneWINDHOEK (WDH) Namibia) 10,445 162.10 492,957 4.80 12,126 2.30 noneMAPUTO (Mozambique) 4,564 9.80 390,882 18.10 17,344 11.10 noneLUSAKA (Zambia) 14,265 11.50 341,361 0.40 23,770 -11.90 noneLILONGWE (Malawi) 4,593 -2.70 198,924 -4.00 8,881 -8.70 noneWINDHOEK (ERS) (Namibia) n/a n/a 107,952 -7.80 41,460 3.80 noneKIMBERLEY (S. Africa) 244 -0.30 84,165 30.70 9,552 -6.80 1

Average 20.13% 5.47% 2.39%

West Africa

LAGOS (Nigeria) 24,310 27.40 2,389,522 20.20 57,498 10.50 noneABIDJAN (Côte d’Ivoire)* 23,537 18.20 1,250,968 6.50 23,628 0.80 Yes 2LIBREVILLE (Gabon)* 15,474 -17.70 807,159 -7.30 38,766 -12.80 noneABUJA (Nigeria) 437 21.70 687,466 20.60 20,316 29.60 noneACCRA (Ghana) 46,758 9.50 673,661 16.40 12,036 53.10 1DOUALA (Cameroon)* 15,631 2.20 434,744 6.90 14,821 -2.90 noneCOTONOU (Benin)* 4,065 8.10 335,643 3.60 7,722 26.90 noneBANJUL (The Gambia) 3,232 -5.20 317,885 2.80 5,985 -16.00 2 CONAKRY (Guinea) 5,285 10.40 316,866 10.40 9,512 39.60 noneBRAZZAVILLE (Congo)* 10,563 -83.00 259,840 -13.90 12,460 -24.90 noneLOME (Togo)* 4,670 3.80 219,444 -1.40 3,173 6.30 noneYAOUNDE (Cameroon)* 4,371 20.50 179,345 57.70 4,608 -6.10 Yes noneNIAMEY (Nigeria)* 911 -28.80 96,928 -9.40 4,380 -4.20 noneGAROUA (Cameroon)* 522 26.90 69,191 13.00 1,822 7.70 Yes none

Average 1.00% 9.01% 7.69%

Overall Average Growth Cargo 12.1% Passengers 10.5% Volume 3.4%

*Agency for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar members.

Source: Airports Council International World Airport Ranking, 1999, database received via E-mail from Maria Aurora Hinayon.

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 6
1999 these numbers reflect regional conflict, specifically disruptions relating to the Ethiopian–Eritrean war, ongoing unrest in the Republic of the Congo, and the regional impact of

the wars in the DROC, Angola, and Sierra Leone. While this

data represents a snapshot from 1999, air traffic has been increasing rapidly for most of Africa during the past several years.

The removal of apartheid in South Africa fostered a large share

of this increase. After 1994 multiracial elections, sanctions

were lifted and the number of airlines serving the country grew

from 20 to 80, with a doubling of air traffic and with a 300 percent increase in European–South African traffic.8 The latest

International Air Transport Association (IATA) Freight Forecast

estimates that growth in international air freight traffic will average 5.5 percent per annum during 1999–2003;9 all freight

(domestic and international) traffic growth for African airports

in 1999 averaged 11.85 percent.

More air traffic can signify more safety problems, even in

highly developed air support infrastructures. An example of this

impact is seen in air passenger death statistics. The United

States, an example of a relatively well-developed air infrastructure, reported in 1996 a seven-tenths per million air passengers death rate. That year, Africa reported 15 deaths per

million air passengers, a rate 21 times greater than that of the

United States.10 Other statistical trends that prompt FAA and

Department of Transportation (DOT) alarm include not only

the number of accidents but also the types of accidents that

tend to occur in Africa. Accidents experienced by cargo planes

as a result of poor runways and ground infrastructures predominate on the continent. Between 1987 and 1996, 53 such

accidents occurred around the world—49 incidents, or 92 percent, occurred in Africa. For 1996 all 11 recorded cargo aircraft accidents took place in Africa. In part “this reflects the

kinds of operations that they have had to carry out,” such as

support to refugees and deliveries of goods to hinterland airports.11 According to the Flight Safety Foundation, Africa leads

the world in “controlled flight into terrain” accidents.12 Reporting of statistics from the Agency for Air Navigation Safety

in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA) is also alarming. ASECNA

represents 15 largely west African states—including Cameroon,

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Chad, DROC, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal—and

is managed with the significant participation of France. These

seven ASECNA members had 33 of 77 near midair collisions

in 1996.13 Chad—where most north-south and east-west traffic meets—alone had 16.14 The International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) reported that 75 percent of

air traffic infrastructure in Africa is “unable to provide the

services necessary for safe and expeditious operation of

flights.”15

Table 2 also indicates the countries that have received FAA

IASA ratings and are participants in the DOT initiative, “Safe

Skies for Africa.” The FAA ratings—when correlated with regional traffic volume centers and the large list of countries not

rated—show that major traffic centers are simply unknown or

are known to be dangerous. FAA IASA ratings would be useful

to have for those African countries that are experiencing stark

increases in air traffic—specifically Nigeria, Benin, Guinea in

the west, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi in the east, and Namibia in

the south. The DOT Safe Skies for Africa program was implemented in 1998 to address the need for aviation safety improvement on the continent. Eight countries were invited to

participate in the initiative, including Angola, Cameroon, Cape

Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. The

US government is in the process of sending teams to conduct

surveys of the aviation needs of the countries selected and will

assist them in developing work plans to improve and enhance

their aviation infrastructure.16 Safe Skies invitees—Zimbabwe,

Mali, Angola, and Cape Verde—did not provide 1999 ACI air

traffic data; and only two of five African FAA IASA failures,

Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, are included in Safe Skies. The

magnitude of the problem is clear, but the approach by US

agencies toward improving aviation in Africa is noncomprehensive and uncoordinated.

Of the eight countries selected for the DOT program, five

were specifically recommended by the Department of Defense

(DOD) based on frequency of Air Mobility Command (AMC)

sorties.17 To get an idea of where the USAF flies in Africa, table

3 shows where AMC has flown in Africa since 1995. While theater-owned airlift is excluded from this data, the strategic mo8

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bility pattern is helpful in understanding the challenges facing

air expeditionary operations in Africa.

9

KWIATKOWSKI

# Total 2000 Safe FAA Air

Country missions, 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 to Aug Skies IASA attaché

past 5 years

Egypt 2,716 368 621 558 570 393 206 No Meets RO

South Africa 474 18 11 25 131 66 223 No Meets RO

Senegal 436 27 127 91 99 61 31 No N/R none

Tunisia 290 20 70 62 40 57 41 Yes N/R RO

Kenya 199 0 39 14 35 63 48 No N/R OPSCO

Côte d’Ivoire 172 5 13 99 27 21 7 Yes Fails RO

Uganda 156 2 74 27 44 7 2 No N/R NRO

Mozambique 153 0 3 5 7 2 136 No N/R OPSCO

Ghana 143 2 7 34 32 13 55 No Meets none

Gabon 140 0 1 81 15 11 32 No N/R None

Cameroon 111 0 3 42 14 21 31 Yes N/R OPSCO

Djibouti 100 2 11 11 39 7 30 No N/R None

Sierra Leone 97 1 81 10 2 0 3 No N/R None

Namibia 95 3 2 39 18 24 9 No N/R NRO

Botswana 81 2 6 12 39 18 4 No N/R OPSCO

Chad 79 6 14 18 12 18 11 No N/R None

Zimbabwe 74 4 5 20 34 8 3 Yes Fails None

Tanzania 72 4 4 6 24 10 24 Yes N/R None

Mali 71 0 4 41 16 9 1 Yes N/R NRO

Rwanda 67 6 26 12 13 7 3 No N/R None

Congo-B 66 5 7 54 0 0 0 No N/R None

Ethiopia 66 6 12 20 25 1 2 No Meets None

Nigeria 64 1 4 4 6 14 35 No N/R NRO

Eritrea 62 5 12 23 18 2 2 No N/R OPSCO

Liberia 59 0 0 54 4 0 1 No N/R OPSCO

Algeria 42 4 10 9 7 6 6 No N/R OPSCO

Cape Verde 42 4 6 6 15 7 4 Yes N/R RO

Totals for 6,132 495 1,173 1,377 1,286 846 950

higher volume

locations

Table 3

Air Mobility Command Missions,

Selected African Countries by Volume Years

Legend:

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

IASA—International Aviation Safety Assessment

NRO—nonrated officer

OPSCO—senior noncommissioned operations officer

RO—rated officer

Chapter 1 12/19/01 2:09 PM Page 9
The evidence that flying in Africa can be risky is well documented. International pressure and encouragement are both

present, in terms of FAA and ICAO initiatives and specific US

government activities. It is fair to say that African countries

are doing the best they can given their individual economic situations and the level of domestic concern that in most cases

is not focused on improving air traffic safety, reliability, and

satisfaction of international standards. It is also clear from the

types of problems faced on the continent that regional, bilateral, and multilateral attention must be developed and coordinated to ensure limited air operations and infrastructure

budgets are effective over time. Of the countries selected for

the Safe Skies program, Kenya and Tanzania are contiguous—

as are Mali and Côte d’Ivoire—and perhaps could share or mutually develop airspace management responsibilities. Safe

Skies includes only three of 15 African ASECNA members

(Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali) and does not include the

larger countries of ASECNA. Of the countries marked by severe and persistent flight safety challenges, Chad stands out,

yet is not addressed by any US program or initiative. The first

century of human flight has ended with great achievements

around the planet, but the twenty-first century dawns dangerously for African air operations.

Notes

1. Stephen Bates, “Dead Stowaways Left Plea for Africa,” The Guardian,

5 August 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 25 January 2000, available from

http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99aug1/5aug-stowaway.html.

2. Gaby Plattner, “Choppy Skies: A White Knuckle Flight on Air Zimbabwe,” Chicago Tribune, 6 June 1999. This story appeared in the travel section and detailed a case where air passengers on an Air Zimbabwe flight witnessed the pilot being inadvertently locked out of his cabin. Reportedly, he

gained access by using an ax to chop down the door to the cockpit. This

story is disputed by Air Zimbabwe. 

3. Air Mobility Command statistics. See table 3.

4. Kathy Amponin, “Flying in Africa,” paper, Institute for National Security Studies, November 1999, 9–12.

5. “FAA Flight Standards Service International Aviation Safety Assessment Program (IASA),” 12 October 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 20 January

2000, available from http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasa/iasaxls.htm; and

http://www.faa.gov/avr/iasaxls.htm, accessed September 1998. Note: This

Web site accessed on 2 July 2000 indicates that the 1–3 rating scheme has

been altered to “meets/does not meet.” 

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6. Airports Council International (ACI) World Airport Ranking, 1999, calculated from database, also available from on-line, Internet,

http://www.airports.org/.

7. Ibid.

8. Lara Pawson, “Africa’s Deadly Skies,” African Business, March 1997,

8–11.

9. “Muted Outlook for Air Freight,” IATA Press Release PS/01/00, 12

January 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 25 January 2000, available from

http://www.iata.org/pr/pr00janb.htm.

10. Pawson, 10.

11. Ibid.

12. James Ott, “Africa ATC Crisis Escalates,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology, 20 January 1997, 45–47.

13. James Ott, “Safety Groups Respond to African ATC Crisis,” Aviation

Week and Space Technology, 12 May 1997, 66.

14. IATA Air Bulletin, 30 January 1998, accessed 6 January 2000.

15. Pawson, 8–11.

16. “Safe Skies for Africa,” FAA information sheet, 22 March 2000, n.p.,

on-line, Internet, 2 July 2000, available from http://www.intl.faa.gov/AIA300/ssfa.html.

17. E-mail response to questions to Maj Dorotha Biernesser, March

2000, Headquarters AF/XOOA, Washington, D.C.

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Chapter 2

What the USAF

Knows about Air

Operations in Africa

Continually increasing air traffic, poor safety statistics,

persistent airfield and ATC problems, and a relatively sparse

and nonsystemic international approach towards achieving

regional improvement are the sad facts of African air operations. What does this mean for USAF expeditionary operations in Africa? The framework for US air operations in Africa

is limited, not only by national interest and will but also by

the effective ability of our air forces to operate in Africa. For

example, in 1993 only 15 percent of all runways were reported to be able to support a heavy C-130, the USAF’s

smallest tactical transport aircraft.1 Even among the 286

larger African airports or airfields currently reported in the

May 2000 AMC Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report

(ASRR), only 84 percent of major military-surveyed airports

can support C-130 operations. (African airfield data from the

AMC ASRR, 11 April 2000—selected fields—sorted on country, then runway length—is found at appendix B.) The C-17,

designed for better worldwide deployment, still requires a

4,000-foot-long paved runway and can land in less than 65

percent of ASRR-listed major African airfields. Col John L.

Cirafici points out that third world runways tend to average

900 feet long.2 For a variety of reasons, the bulk of the missions flown into Africa use C-130 and C-141 airframes, not

the C-17. There are only 46 primary C-17 aircraft available

in the USAF inventory today. Further, safety of flight, available support and fuel on the ground, and security and standards all compound the simple lack of suitable runways and

defeat the advantage of the C-17’s capability to provide

worldwide response—at least to much of the African continent.

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Chapter 2 12/19/01 2:11 PM Page 13
Recent Operations

Several recent air operations on the African continent provide some insight into what current and expected future air

operations look like in Africa and some of the lessons learned.

The USAF body of experience—from after action reports, interviews, and day-to-day operational procedures—can be instructive. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992–93), Operation Support Hope in Rwanda (1994), Operation Assured

Lift in Liberia (1996), and Joint Task Force (JTF) Eagle Vista—

an operation deployed to support President William J. Clinton’s

1998 visit to Africa—each provide a set of lessons learned regarding the kind of airlift intensive humanitarian style operations we can expect in Africa in the near term. Humanitarian

operations Noble Response in 1998 and the more recent European Command (EUCOM) operation, JTF Atlas Response in

Mozambique, provide additional information on how the USAF

can better approach these kinds of operations.

Operations Provide Relief/Restore Hope,

Somalia 1992–93

Operation Restore Hope involved the airlift of humanitarian

aid into Mogadishu, Somalia, and represented the first major

projection of forces by air mobility assets following AMC command activation in June 1992.3 Lessons learned from the air

mobility side of this operation were extensive and include issues of airfield management, flow control, and security. As

seen eight years later with joint air operations in Tirane, Albania, for Operations Allied Force and Shining Hope, in a dualuse military/humanitarian airhead, support, security, and

army forces often prefer to set up operations in close to the

runway, taxiways, and parking ramps. In Restore Hope,

Cirafici writes “As units poured into Mogadishu, many, out of

necessity or convenience, established their operations on the

airport proper, closing in around the runway and hard surface

areas.”4 Additional operational problems (some of which recurred in Albania almost a decade later) included multiple

chains of command and lack of consolidated airhead management—resulting in management shortfalls in the areas of air14

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field real estate, flow control, ground security integration, and

communications. Sustainment and support problems included

fuel management, logistical support, and shelter availability.5

One issue that recurred in the various forward operating locations (FOL) was poor initial condition of airfield, ramps, and

runways and the impact of repeated heavy aircraft usage on

these runways. Runway deterioration was a significant factor

in Somalia; and this phenomenon has been observed in most

other African operations where heavy lift aircraft, sustained

cargo flow, and limited existent runway repair capabilities coincide. One Joint Universal Lesson Learned System (JULLS)

submission for Restore Hope (1993) stated simply that all problems had been previously documented in JULLS, yet “[W]e end

up paying again to achieve the same undesirable results.”6

One Director of Mobility of Forces (DIRMOBFOR) end-oftour report for Operation Provide Relief—the humanitarian relief operation under way from Kenya that served as a support

for the insertion of troops during Operation Restore Hope—

had several observations on Air Force C-130, Marine KC-130,

British C-130, and German C-160 operations in Mombasa,

Kenya. These included the competition for ramp and parking

space and the challenges of maintaining four different C-130

models (often with further multiple configuration variations

between active and Air National Guard aircraft). Credit for the

success of the operation was given to the resourceful and talented people, particularly the “maintainer’s creative thinking.”

The US Navy’s logistics capability via a nearby carrier resolved

some of the maintenance problems, particularly in the repair

of an auxiliary power unit, as did the use of the contract carrier maintenance personnel at the Mombasa airport.7

Operation Support Hope, Rwanda/DROC 1994

In the summer of 1994, Support Hope represented the US

military response to the massacre of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu by radical Hutu. This slaughter had ended in early

May when exiled Tutsi from Uganda invaded and Paul

Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front took over the Rwandan

government. The defeated Hutu—including many former Hutu

government soldiers—fled west to Zaire (now DROC) and

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south to Burundi where conditions in the overcrowded camps

there had deteriorated badly. The United States deployed 2,100

military personnel to the region and established a JTF headquarters at Entebbe, Uganda, with logistical operations in

Goma and Bukavu, Zaire, Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya, and

Kigali, Rwanda. A 24-hour expanded air logistics site was implemented at Kigali International Airport, which served as the

focal point for United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees/nongovernment organizations (NGO) coordination or

activity and the hub for all relief flights in support of humanitarian relief operations. In support of the operation, the United

States deployed a civil-military operations center, a USAF

Tanker Airlift Liaison and Control Element (TALCE), other staff

and logistical personnel, and a military police detachment for

force protection of US military personnel.8 Support Hope entailed

around 700 sorties of C-141s, KC-135s, and C-5s, hauling

11,000 passengers and 23,000 tons of cargo between July and

September 1994 in and around Goma, Zaire. Regionally, a total

of six TALCEs were deployed to the region to support the air

operation.9

Lessons learned and observations for air expeditionary operations extracted from after action reports include difficulties

in gaining diplomatic clearances in a timely manner, difficulty

in determining airfield capabilities, lack of air refueling tracks

over the Mediterranean Sea for aircraft deploying to Africa,

and communications frequency management shortfalls.10 Recommendations for diplomatic clearance delays included commander in chief (CINC) awareness of the importance of advance notification of overflights and landings, efforts made to

notify host nations as early as possible, and schedule stability

in flight planning. Communications frequency approvals, like

diplomatic clearances, require advanced planning and time—

commodities often in short supply with USAF operations in

Africa. The AMC ASRR lists basic information about the airfield; but it was noted that the theater command-specific information on airfields was not contained in the ASRR database, and often this information was extremely critical.

Further, a simple lack of adequate air bases, both in the area

and en route, was noted.11 Billeting availability, current con16

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struction projects, fueling capabilities, and aircraft parking information are information categories not always reflected in the

ASRR. Consequently, this information for sometimes-obscure

African airfields may or may not be available until rediscovered in the next contingency.

Fueling and air management challenges existed. It was noted

that air refueling track availability could be improved by the

allocation of “call up” tracks that support contingency flights

to Africa from Europe. Currently, all Africa-bound missions refuel using the Greek corridor; and the maximum airflow is limited to 24 airlift missions per day through the refueling track.

Other refueling choke points (on the ground) existed at Mombasa, and it was noted that “putting more assets (crews/aircraft) into an airflow won’t improve throughput if there are

other limiting factors.”12 It was observed that not moving ATC

personnel forward initially exacerbated an already problematic

airflow/air control situation. The lack of radar control in the

area resulted in the need for manual terminal approach control, mobile radar capability, and possibly operational improvements such as traffic sequencing. The US Air Forces Europe (USAFE) Terminal Procedures were credited with being

the most up-to-date information on the African airfields, and

aircrews were encouraged to use them even though they may

not have agreed with published data.13

The limitations of the forward-deployed communications suite

was noted, both in capability and in terms of the outsized cargo

airlift requirements. The absence of a forward and modern fax

capability was problematic for the JTF because in Europe and

the United States, the fax is every man’s data transmission

tool. Lack of access to the global decision support system

(GDSS), an air mobility real-time Internet-based database,

was noted as an impediment early on in the deployment. Beyond equipment, commercial telephone lines in Uganda were

procured by members of the joint special operations task force

(JSOTF), not by the Defense Information Systems Agency support staff in EUCOM (Defense Commercial Communications

Office), the organization with the mission to procure leased

telecommunications for the EUCOM area of responsibility

(AOR), including Africa.

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Other observations included deployment without sufficient

sustainment, particularly a 30-day chemical supply for the

water purification equipment.14 Requirements for sustainment

were not built into the deployment database; and visibility in

sustainment actions needed, ongoing or planned, was limited

throughout the JTF. FOL hazardous material storage was accomplished inappropriately. It was observed that deployment

of personnel to the JTF used the “warm body” technique, resulting in a lack of strategic and tactical airlift expertise of the

JTF staff.15 These types of problems stem from a lack of planning and resourcing, that in turn relates to the reactive nature

of most of our deployments into Africa. However, while expected, this lack of planning and resourcing is inconsistent

with USAFE’s Strategic Vision statement—which includes an

entry on rapid global mobility which provides “airlift, aerial refueling, and en route infrastructure capability to respond

within hours of a tasking” and an entry on agile combat support that can enable “robust, distributed military operations

with time definite sustainment.”16 In discussing lessons learned

in Rwanda, John E. Lange writes in Parameters that “The U.S.

military will need far more than ‘focused logistics’ to be fully

successful when it is selectively engaged in providing humanitarian aid. It will require stronger commitment from its leadership, stronger support in Congress, and closer cooperation

with civilian agencies on both the nature and termination of

its humanitarian mission.”17 The Support Hope after action report described the problems, many of which had been previously identified elsewhere. It reports simply “We don’t learn or

read previous ‘lessons learned.’ ”18

Operation Guardian Assistance,

DROC/Rwanda 1996

Operation Guardian Assistance was conducted two years

later, in November and December 1996, echoing Operation Support Hope in location and purpose. The JTF was sent to assist

in diffusing an expected refugee crisis in the Kivu region of

eastern Zaire (DROC) and Rwanda, caused in part by the continuing low-level warfare between Rwandan Hutu, Zairian

Hutu, and former Rwandan Armed Forces soldiers (who con18

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trolled many of the camps remaining in the area since the

1994 genocide), and the government-backed Rwandan and

Zairian Tutsi. Recent actions by both Zairian and Rwandan

governments had exacerbated the situation, which to the West

appeared to threaten a replay of events in 1994. The US operation never exceeded 400 people in the region, but a variety of

air operations lessons learned were documented. These included a wide range of planning, personnel, deployment communications, fuels, and airfield or flight issues.19

Communications challenges were recorded. A need for landmobile radios and cell phones went unsatisfied due to the diverse units and physical separation. The use of local commercial communications should have been planned and utilized.

Availability of electrical power and generation capability was

extremely limited. The need for a local unclassified message

dissemination system and access to the Internet was identified, particularly in the lack of access to the GDSS and personnel management systems. A shortage of laptop computers

and appropriate software was also noted, as was the slowness

and limited throughput of the DSN switch deployed as part of

the secure tactical communications suite. 

Personnel deployment problems were noted. For example,

some deploying personnel did not have passports; and reliance on a military identification card, as in NATO countries,

was not sufficient. The operational assumption that single aircraft with two aircrews deployed forward in Africa results in a

ready aircraft or crew combination was criticized, with the

comment “splitting up that deployment team [of two aircraft

and crews] jeopardized both missions, which could have failed

from a broken aircraft or sick crewmembers.”20 The air operations center (AOC) was staffed by rated personnel but was devoid of airlift expertise. In Africa the Air Force operations are

almost always airlift intensive and airlift focused; but this is

not the typical orientation of the AOC manning profile, a construct designed to manage fighter or bomber sorties and deliver a deadly payload, not humanitarian aid. Load planners

were also poorly represented in the JTF; and, as a result, all

load planning for redeployment was performed by the TALCE.

The contracting agents deployed with the advance Humanitar19

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ian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) and also with the AMC

TALCE were not authorized paying agents and did not have

the ability to procure contract quarters, vehicles, et cetera. 

Air operational issues persisted. Lack of fuel storage and

mobile refuelers limited overall fuel throughput, and strategic

mobility aircraft were not allowed to refuel at Entebbe but

were required to come in with fuel sufficient to fly on to refuel

at Mombasa or Nairobi. Because the aircraft fuel situation in

the region is limited and infrastructure for fuel transportation

minimal, “[a]ny operations within [Central Africa] must be

looked at from a ‘big picture’ perspective as any heavy uplift of

fuel from any one location will seriously impact numerous

other locations along the fuel lines of communication (domino

effect).”21 Airfield facilities, navigational aids (NAVAID), and

procedures often did not meet US standards. Coordinated airspace with host nations and diplomatic clearances were often

difficult to achieve and in some cases not achieved during the

operation. The lack of current and complete airfield surveys

was noted, resulting in a “last minute rush to accomplish

needed surveys and flight checks critical to safe operations. In

addition, different planning organizations had different data,

which could be a fatal flaw for any plan.”22

Operation Assured Lift, Liberia 1997

Only a few months later, the USAF would have another opportunity to conduct a relatively small air operation in Africa.

Operation Assured Lift, conducted in January and February

1997, organized the transport of the Economic Community of

West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) troops

supporting ongoing peacekeeping operations into Liberia. Assured Lift followed a US noncombatant evacuation operation

(NEO) from Monrovia that had taken place almost a year earlier in April 1996. While the NEO itself was conducted by 352d

Special Operations Group helicopters,23 Assured Lift was led

by the Air Force; and the Third AF (3AF) commander was in

charge of the JTF. The staging base was determined to be

Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire; and jointness was established with the

participation of Special Forces French language-capable

troops and combat control teams to coordinate airfield secu20

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rity and provide liaison or coordination elements at three departure fields and at Roberts International Airport (IAP) in

Liberia.24 A fleet of five C-130s deployed to Abidjan to fly up to

48 missions shuttling soldiers and equipment from ECOMOG

countries into Liberia. C-130s departed from Abidjan for Bamako, Mali, to pick up ECOMOG troops and equipment, fly

them to Roberts, conduct an engine-running offload, and return to Abidjan with a similar pattern established for Ghanaian troops from Accra.25 A total of 49 sorties carrying troops

and equipment were flown into Liberia—29 missions from Mali

and 21 from Ghana—moving a total of 1,160 passengers and

452.1 short tons of equipment.

Major challenges included less than suitable airfields, particularly Roberts IAP, and satisfying maintenance and personnel health issues in the forward locations. Rationale for choosing Abidjan as the staging location over other bases, such as

Bamako, Mali, was heavily argued. The US ambassador to

Mali pointed out Mali’s offer to waive airport fees and to provide cheaper fuel and less congestion. Abidjan, however, was

deemed more centrally located and provided the most flexibility in terms of “aircraft operations and for beddown taking

care of people, quality [of] life.”26 A JTF force protection working group was formed to address issues of physical security,

health and safety threats, and emergency procedures.27 In the

case of Assured Lift, some experiences and lessons learned

from Operation Guardian Assistance were adopted, particularly in the communications arena.28 A robust portable communications suite, including mobile radios, STU-III phones, a

laptop computer, an ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) tactical satellite,

and an international marine/maritime satellite (INMARSAT)

were deployed. Because Assured Lift was conducted under a

strict operating budget, the impact of various airframes on the

cost of strategic airlift from CONUS for major equipment and

repair parts was noted. A cost was incurred due to the USAF

requirement to build up existing airfields such as Roberts IAP

to support C-5 and C-17 strategic airlift operations. A C-5 aircraft was used for redeployment because a broken C-130 had

to leave behind some of its expected redeployment cargo, raising

the remaining strategic lift mission tonnage requirement be21

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yond the load capacity of a cheaper and more efficient C-17.29

Further, Roberts IAP was not militarily certified for C-17 operations until the C-17 verification flight was flown into Roberts

IAP on or about 5 March 1997, after the JTF had conducted

limited repairs on the runway. This check-flight aircraft was

used on its return flight to redeploy some of the JTF personnel

and equipment.

Operation Guardian Retrieval,

DROC/Gabon 1997 

In the spring of 1997, fighting in Rwanda and Zaire (DROC)

had resulted in unstable conditions, impacting the existing

refugee camps and the NGOs working in eastern Zaire. Between 21 March and 20 April 1997, 1,361 passengers and

1,365 tons of cargo were moved by Operation Guardian Retrieval in support of a possible NEO of American citizens and

others from Zaire. One source described the challenges of this

operation as illustrating a typical African military operation

handicapped by lack of transportation infrastructure and vast

distances. 

Re-supply for remote facilities can take several days to transport jet

fuel one way, in extremely difficult terrain. Limited bridger support

(truck-transport) and small storage tanks are commonplace . . . the Air

Force planned missions through Libreville, Gabon, expecting a certain

amount of fuel based on contractor stated capabilities. Their capability was nowhere near this quantity, and the airport even ran out of fuel

at one point.30

While an Army-led operation that called for the use of the 26th

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), this operation was airlift intensive and involved many strategic mobility aircraft—including 28 C-5, 8 C-17, 18 C-141, and 20 KC-135 missions—with

another 44 KC-135 missions flown for support. USAFE aircraft also participated. Recorded official lessons learned discussed a lack of hazardous cargo storage capability at forward

locations, including Libreville, Gabon, and Brazzaville, Congo,

and limited fuel and aircraft parking at staging bases. This

time, a mobility planner was deployed to provide improved

theater mobility expertise to the theater CINC staff.31

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Operation Noble Response, Kenya 1998

Operation Noble Response provided humanitarian assistance airlift in Kenya in late January and February 1998 in response to a regional crisis caused by flooding. An airdrop capability was expected to be used, as some critical areas were

inaccessible. This short-notice US Central Command (CENTCOM) operation augmented a World Food Programme (WFP)

contract relief effort that had been ongoing since December

1997. It placed US forces in a coalition operation with two Belgian C-130s and a Nigerian-based L-382 supporting the ongoing WFP efforts. As seen in the much larger Operation Guardian

Assistance, the nature of the mission and objective was not

entirely clear to the aircrews prior to the execution order.

Noble Response included a C-130 with two aircrews and provided 294 tons of cargo, 94 percent of which was relief aid.

The humanitarian delivery operation included both airland

and airdrop delivery. The airland delivery missions flew out of

Mombasa with eight 4,500-pound (lb) bundles of 110 lb bags

of grain and 30,000 lbs of fuel. The C-130 would land heavy

(148,000 lbs) at Wajir, Kenya, and conduct an engine-running

combat offload. The combat offload basically moves the aircraft out from under the load to be delivered, stressing both

the engine and brakes. The maneuver requires space on the

ramp or runway to accommodate the suddenly light, rolling

aircraft, which immediately reverses thrust to prevent takeoff

or contact with obstructions. This operation was made difficult by the congested parking area at Wajir, the heavy weight

of the aircraft and load, and high temperatures. Brake and oil

overheating was a constant risk and did occur. The airdrop

aspect of the mission was conducted at 650 feet above ground

level—with the same eight 4,500 lb bundles and no parachute—to drop zones spread throughout eastern Kenya. WFP

personnel manned the drop zones; and they would find dry

land, get Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates, mark

the drop zone, and coordinate drops. 

Prior to deployment, aircrews scoured data support systems

and the Internet for existing flight publications; packed meals

ready to eat, water, malaria tablets and stomach drugs, and

deployed with a container delivery system kit and a laptop com23

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puter. Jeppesens (commercial flight information publications

[FLIP]) were not available for the required airfields, and the aircrews planning the mission focused on self-sufficiency before

entering “an aviation wilderness.”32 Upon arrival in the area of

operations, it was noted that flight planning and weather was

“African style”;33 and facilities were decaying, particularly at

some of the forward locations, such as Wajir Airfield. ATC was

reported as reasonable around major airports and nonexistent

elsewhere. A common traffic advisory frequency was used, and

language difficulties were commonplace—even in Kenya, a country where English is spoken.34 Ground services were noted as

difficult to get unless the embassy interceded.

Other air operations challenges included the inability to replenish liquid oxygen and to get spare tires and a replacement

altitude instrument. The heavy landings, heat, and physical

strain on the aircraft of this mission were hard on the airframe; and 20 aircraft write-ups were completed upon return.

E-mail proved invaluable to this operation. While a small operation—with its short notice, aid-oriented nature and aircraft

utilization—Noble Response illustrated many of the air operations challenges faced by US aircrews in Africa.

Operation Eagle Vista, Multiple

Locations, 1998

JTF Operation Eagle Vista was conducted to oversee US military support for President Clinton’s visit to six African nations, 23 March to 2 April 1998. An 800-person task force

supported air operations in Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South

Africa, Botswana, and Senegal from 12 operational support locations across four time zones; and 2,346 passengers and

2,948 tons of cargo were moved using 93 strategic airlift, 39

theater airlift, and 105 air refueling operational missions. Theater airlift included four C-130 aircraft and 13 US Marine

Corps and Army helicopters; and the JTF also tracked the intercontinental movements of C-141, C-5, and C-17 sorties. Additionally, the JTF was assigned a C-21 and a C-9 and administrative control of a MEDEVAC-configured C-141.

Like Operations Support Hope, Guardian Assistance, and

Assured Lift—and as we will see in Atlas Response—Eagle

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Vista did not have the luxury of a geographically, culturally,

and logistically focused or local area of operations. What the

military normally considers theater airlift looks a lot like

strategic airlift when you compare the approximately 3,800 air

miles between the US East Coast and Ramstein Air Base (AB),

Germany, with the almost 6,000 air miles between Ramstein

and Capetown, South Africa, and the 4,200 miles from Ramstein to Entebbe, Uganda. Additionally, this operation—while

not an emergency—was time sensitive and in this way resembles most emergency response and humanitarian operations

we see in Africa. Eagle Vista reflected an unusually extensive

multinational coordination effort for the United States, with

much less time to prepare than normally available for even bilateral exercises in the region. 

Eagle Vista recorded communications, force protection, environmental, and operational coordination lessons learned.

Command, control, and communications were remoted back

to the Crisis Action Team Cell at Ramstein AB, where a 30-

member JTF headquarters element maintained contact and

provided direction and support to about 600 airmen, soldiers,

sailors, and marines supporting the operation down range.

The commercial INMARSAT system was critical to communications and the ability to reachback to the command cell. Selfsufficiency was desired; and all required communications,

medical, and aircraft support equipment was flown into the

various staging areas. This massive lift of equipment prompted

a recommendation that future similar operations do not discount up front the capability of commercial air to move assets.

Some presumed self-sufficiency in airlift may have been, in

fact, unnecessary—or at least equally satisfiable using commercial airlift. 

Medical readiness was a priority. The medical team carried

20 units of blood throughout Africa, and keeping the blood

within the correct temperature range throughout the hot

African climate was a real challenge. A large quantity of ice

was needed at every stop; at some places this was very difficult to obtain. A small refrigerator was deployed to store this

blood, but it could not be used consistently on all the aircraft

because of electrical power incompatibility. Additional air25

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crews were deployed for emergency response capability, but it

was not enough. Because of environmentally induced illnesses, the aircrew readiness rate was lower than expected.

Due to the simple geographic difficulty in getting replacement

support people or on-site immunizations on short notice, food

contamination response and advance immunizations for the

forward deploying teams became more important.

Operating, fueling, and supporting heavy aircraft was particularly challenging. Aircraft support and navigational or

landing fees from commercial airports were 30 percent higher

than expected, often due to the unique aspects of these larger

aircraft; and neither American Express nor Visa was always

the solution. Extensive precoordination on logistics for both

aircraft and people was required, with a unique set of customer relationships established for every one of the more than

10 African FOLs. Aircraft performance in Africa—regardless of

the time of year, at any location where temperatures exceeded

20 degrees Celsius or field elevations are high—was a concern.

Detailed study of airfield data such as runway length and field

elevation was required in advance. Radar and radio coverage

in some parts of Africa traversed was noted as limited and less

than optimal. In addition to these challenges, diplomatic

country clearance for aircraft redeployment up the east coast

of Africa through Cairo and Italy was sporadically problematic.

The US Transportation Command commander sent an after

action message to the vice chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

with information copies shared with the highest levels of the

Air Force, shortly after Eagle Vista. It detailed initial “disturbing” feedback on African airspace, specifically that “Radio coverage is inadequate. . . . Radar coverage was inadequate. . . .

air traffic controllers in African airspace are substandard in

many cases . . . on numerous occasions air traffic controllers

could not or would not speak English, the accepted ICAO

language.”35 Several near misses were detailed in the message, and it concluded with a reiteration of the need for the

Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) on the entire AMC fleet.

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Operation Atlas Response, Mozambique/South

Africa 2000 

Operation Atlas Response commenced in response to torrential rains and flooding in southern Mozambique and South

Africa with the deployment of a EUCOM HAST to Mozambique

and South Africa on 18 February 2000. Atlas Response was

chartered on 3 March to support humanitarian assistance and

disaster relief in southern Africa, to include Mozambique and

neighboring states as required. South Africa agreed to provide

Hoedspruit military airfield as an intermediate staging base

for the humanitarian relief operation. A C-5 carrying part of a

TALCE arrived in Hoedspruit, South Africa, on 5 March. That

same day the first two C-130 aircraft arrived with “Keen Sage”

imagery capability.36 After flying 216 missions, transporting

860 passengers, and delivering 754 tons of relief supplies,

Atlas Response concluded at the end of March.37

The DIRMOBFOR After Action Report noted a lack of strategic mobility resources available to Atlas Response due to the

presidential trip to Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.38 Nonmission-capable C-5s at the commercial Johannesburg Airport strained host-nation relations at one point, and longer

waits than normal were required for even the highest priority

parts delivery to points forward. Other observations from this

humanitarian and airlift-intensive operation in southern

Africa include reachback communications capability, the need

to travel light yet still be self-sufficient, streamlined coordination of forward operating bases and locations, and reliability of

mobility aircraft on the extremely long routes required to fly

from Europe and the United States to this part of Africa. At

one point, C-5 aircraft in support of Atlas Response were nonmission-capable and grounded temporarily in Cairo, Egypt,

Accra, Ghana, and Nairobi, Kenya.

Diplomatic delays occurred in getting clearance into Air

Force Base Hoedspruit. Interestingly, many planners had no

idea where Hoedspruit was or its support capabilities at the

beginning of the planning process; and in fact the South

African military had proposed closing the base two years earlier, when the South African Air Force (SAAF) 1st Squadron of

fighters deactivated. Due to this unit’s deactivation and the

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SAAF desire to keep the base open, it had leased its facilities

and airspace in the interim for short training periods to the

Singapore air force and was ready to quickly assume combined air operations support duties.39 While the use of Headquarters USAFE Contingency Response Group and the Crisis

Action Team Cell at Ramstein AB was invaluable, an afteraction recommendation for communications included a 3AF,

RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom, request for a light and lean

forward communications suite called the reduced footprint initial communications (RFIC) package.40 The JSOTF headquarters

in Biera, Mozambique, deployed with a theater-deployable

communications (TDC) suite, consisting of self-contained data

and voice communications using only four pallets and two

generators. Atlas Response demonstrated the TDC, for the

first time ever, as a primary backbone of a forward communications capability in a humanitarian operation.41 However, the

desired RFIC provides voice, Internet, and Secure IP Router

Network for up to 24 users and deploys at 1,800 lbs on onehalf a pallet. Beyond communications challenges, medical care

for US and other military personnel in southern Africa focused

on minimizing the disease threat of mosquito-borne ailments,

such as malaria and dengue fever (for which there is no vaccination). Finally, manual or hand loading of equipment and relief

supplies at Hoedspruit for delivery to Mozambique locations

was sometimes required due to limitations in or lack of specialized ground equipment.42

Lessons Learned Trends and Indicators

African airlift-intensive operations in the last decade have

produced a variety of air expeditionary lessons learned and

recorded by the standard methods of after action reports or

postoperational studies. These recorded lessons tend to be operationally or system oriented and can be encapsulated in the

following categories.

Command, Control, Communications, and Coordination

across Multiple Locations. The need for smaller, more capable, more networked, cheaper, and easier to use voice and

data communications is repeatedly noted. The airlift-intensive

major communications systems used by tactical combat com28

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munications units are both deficient in desired capability and

excessive in weight and bulk. Ease of leasing local communications capability is lacking and may be the logical direction

to proceed, particularly in humanitarian operations where

classified information or data is not at issue. 

Air Operations Planning, Airfield Suitability, Coordination and Matching of Appropriate Support Equipment,

Airfield and Airframe Requirements. Airfield and weather

information from supporting command, AMC, and commercial

sources can be inaccessible for military aircrews. It is apparently impossible to find all in one place for a quick data pull

prior to a short-notice mission. Forward maintenance and logistics support capability for various airframes, poor local runways, support, fuel, and infrastructures greatly restrict flexibility to support air operation scheduling and planning for

Africa. Further, limited airframe suitability of various locations

in Africa is magnified by limited airframe availability in the

command or in the CONUS. 

Diplomatic Clearance and International Coordination

and Contracting Issues in Forward Locations. Getting

diplomatic clearance and coordination is compounded by

short-notice response missions, the expanse of the airspace

over 53 African countries, and the lack of long-term relationships between the USAF and many African air forces and governments. Further, incomplete or lacking air operations expertise in the US embassies and general instability or

corruption in some African governments can make life difficult

for air operations planners and aircrews.

Operational Security and Force Protection Issues. Security for airframes on the ground, appropriate health maintenance and precautions, operational safety issues, secure

and appropriate storage for hazardous material, and medical

care forward remain constant worries. 

Dynamic Impact of Expeditionary Air Operations. Runway conditions degrade over time, as does airframe or aircraft

performance under conditions of excessive heat, poor runways, foreign object damage, and impure or unreliable fuel

sources. Expeditionary air operations are further challenged

by less than optimal aircraft maintenance, ad hoc operations

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with coalitions of other militaries, and operational demands

placed by nongovernmental and civilian international organizations.

More general issues pointed out by these past operations include a growing resource crunch. At the peak of Restore Hope,

14 C-130s were dedicated to theater support. Assured Lift required five dedicated C-130s; Eagle Vista, six; and at the peak,

almost all available USAFE C-130 aircraft (seven) were at one

point dedicated to southern Africa.43 The workhorse of African

airlift is the C-130, and this versatile airframe is now approximately 45 years old. The next generation global mobility airframe, the C-17, has not yet seen extensive usage in the

African theater. As mentioned earlier, only 181 of 286 African

airports listed in the current ASRR are suitable for C-17 operations. Beyond that, the known risk to airframes flying in

Africa may result in a prudent tendency to preserve these flagship aircraft for more operationally safe and secure locations. 

Many aspects of air operations are captured in these after

action reports, although one can see that the lessons have to

be extracted from a variety of sources, most of which are not

available to the average airman in a unit who is planning that

next short-notice deployment to Africa. Additionally, the lessons learned miss a great deal of what the operators themselves experience because official after action reports are generally written by commanders, staff officers, and historians.

But significantly, two major themes are missing. First of these

is the nature of air operations—the actual flying—that is required in Africa. While mention was made in some reports of

the difficulty in coordinating airspace, the lack of radio and

radar coverage, and diplomatic clearances to land and traverse airspace, there is a cumulative sense that this is the odd

problem. In fact, this is a systemic problem for air operations

in Africa, but it is rarely captured because it is rarely a direct

problem for the command and control side that tends to

record the after action reports. The second theme that is not

captured effectively is the adapt and overcome tactical aspects

of air expeditionary operations in Africa. Again, the operators

who see, creatively adapt and overcome, and succeed in the

tasked operation rarely record in a way that can influence fu30

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ture air operations planners and executors. In many cases,

these two major categories of lessons learned are kept alive

solely through the sharing of war stories. 

Notes

1. This information came from several sources and numbers gained from

the Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center for Mapping, Charting, and

Production, 1993.

2. Col John L. Cirafici, Airhead Operations—Where AMC Delivers: The

Linchpin of Rapid Force Projection (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

March 1995), 69.

3. Ibid., 19.

4. Ibid., 38.

5. Ibid., 57–66.

6. Col Findlay, “AMC Use of Joint Universal Lessons Learned System

(JULLS),” 25 January 1993, JULLS 11558–61000.

7. Col Jon Martinson, “JTF PROVIDE RELIEF DIRMOBFOR End of Tour

Report,” JULLS 80429-34592, 5 December 1992.

8. “Summary - Report to Congress on US Military Activities in Rwanda,

1994 - August 1997,” 15 June 1998, on-line, Internet, 3 July 2000, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rwanda/summary.html.

9. MSgt Charles Starr, “OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE: An Air Force Humanitarian Airlift to Rwanda via Entebbe, Uganda,” History Office, Headquarters 60th Air Mobility Wing, Travis AFB, Calif., September 1995, 16.

10. JULLS 11246-61510, JULLS 11236-95551, JULLS 11155-92755,

and JULLS 11139-41744, n.d., n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 July 2000, available from http://www.amc.af.mil/do/dop/dop. 

11. Lt Col Robert Winkler, “Lack of Adequate Air Bases,” JULLS 11141-

47511, 20 July 1994.

12. “Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Review [AAR],” chap. 2, n.d.,

6, on-line, Internet, 11 July 2000, available from http://www1.eucom.

smil.mil/eccs–or/library/operations/completed/operation_support_hope/osh

_m_02.html.

13. Ibid., 9.

14. Ibid., 1.

15. Ibid., 2.

16. USAFE Strategic Vision 2005, 3d ed., Headquarters USAFE, Ramstein

AB, Germany, August 2000, 31.

17. John E. Lange, “Civilian-Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance: Lessons Learned from Rwanda,” Parameters, Summer 1998,

106–22.

18. SUPPORT HOPE AAR, 3.

19. “Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE After Action Review,” chap. 2,

Air Operations, n.d., 27–47, on-line, Internet, 11 July 2000, available from

http://jcll.jwfc.smil.mil/Other/AARs/GUARDast.htm. 

20. Ibid., 35.

21. Ibid., 39.

22. Ibid., 47; and Col Brian Binn, “Current and Consistent Airfield Survey Information,” JULLS 11745-44991.

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23. Dr. Robert B. Sligh, “Operation ASSURED LIFT: The First Price

Tagged Operation,” Headquarters Third Air Force, History Office, RAF

Mildenhall, U.K., 3.

24. Ibid., 10.

25. Ibid., 7.

26. Ibid., 8. 

27. Ibid., 13.

28. Ibid., 11.

29. Ibid., 20.

30. “Operation Guardian Retrieval,” FAS Military Analysis Network, 27

June 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 August 2000, available from

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/guardian_retrieval.htm. 

31. Lieutenant Colonel Robinson and Major Curran, Guardian Retrieval

JULLS 51653-86663, 51336-17008, and 51335-65169, dated 9 May 1997. 

32. Flt Lt Mick Aspinall, Australian Air Force exchange officer flying for

US Air Force Central Command, After Action Briefing, “Operation NOBLE

RESPONSE Flash 06 and Flash 25,” slide 6, provided to author by Maj Q

Schlortt, AMC/DOK, 18 July 2000. 

33. Ibid., slide 19.

34. Ibid., slide 23.

35. CINCTRANS MSG 271954Z APR 98, “African Airspace Concerns.”

36. EUCOM ATLAS RESPONSE Web page, n.d., n.p., on-line, Internet, 2

July 2000, available from http://www.eucom.mil/operations/SilentPromise/index.htm. 

37. Col Taco Gilbert “JTF ATLAS RESPONSE DIRMOBFOR After Action

Report,” Dover AFB, Del., 4 May 2000.

38. Ibid. 

39. Bryan Purtell, “Teamwork Key to Flood Relief Mission Success,”

ATLAS RESPONSE Cheetah, vol. 1, issue 4, Air Force Base Hoedspruit,

South Africa, 24 March 2000, 2.

40. Maj Gen Joe Wehrle, briefing, “Joint Task Force ATLAS RESPONSE—

A Commander’s Perspective,” May 2000. 

41. Chuck Roberts, “SOCEUR Element Keeps Operation Communications Flowing Smoothly,” ATLAS RESPONSE Cheetah, vol. 1, issue 4, Air

Force Base Hoedspruit, South Africa, 24 March 2000, 4.

42. Jim Perry, “37 AS Delivers the Goods,” ATLAS RESPONSE Cheetah,

vol. 1, issue 3, Air Force Base Hoedspruit, South Africa, 20 March 2000, 4.

43. Ibid.

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Chapter 3

What the USAF Is Doing about

Air Operations in Africa

Even with the breadth of expeditionary air operations experienced in Africa prior to 1997, it is fair to say the seminal USAF

flight safety event in Africa was the midair collision of the US

C-141 and the Tu-154 transport near the coast of Namibia on

13 September of that year. As for most airline and other complicated system mishaps, this tragedy was the result of many

correctable factors converging chronologically.

Some Solutions for Future Improvement

A variety of preventive measures to the mishap, at multiple

stages in the process, could have occurred but did not. As a

result of this one accident, the USAF operational community

initiated or accelerated several initiatives, including:

• Formal proposals to ICAO to assess member country’s

compliance with international standards.

• USAF efforts to support IFALPA and IATA initiatives in

Africa.

• Benchmarking with civil carriers to share procedures and

safety data.

• Continuing the installation of safety systems like TCAS.

• Assigning an Air Force representative to the FAA director

for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

• Contributing ATC training materials via the ICAO TRAINAIR

air traffic controller training program.

• Creating more opportunities for African air traffic controllers

to attend USAF technical training schools.

• Utilizing security assistance funding to install ATC and

safety equipment in African facilities.

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Chapter 3 12/19/01 2:11 PM Page 33
• Moving towards the establishment of a regional airspace

initiative (RAI) for African countries, similar to the current

RAI in Eastern Europe.1

While the latter three of these recommendations were beyond

the scope of the USAF, the seven actions within control of the

USAF were all completed in 1998 and 1999.2 The response to

this accident—clearly the result of radar and flight procedures—speaks to the issues often underexamined at the conclusion of major air operations in Africa that did not experience such an event. To address the previous air operations

challenges, the Air Force has evolved in several areas. 

Communications and Coordination 

A British travel writer observed in the 1950s that “If you

want to telephone from Johannesburg to Lagos, two major

capitals, the call must be routed through London.”3 Fifty years

later, technology has rapidly advanced international communications; and communications satellite networks are in place

over the African continent and are expanding rapidly. Yet, the

best operational solution for military air-supported operations

in Africa still follows a similar reachback solution. Flight communication and radar coverage over the continent is incomplete; but specific tracks tend to be flown following the outer

edges of the continent, near population centers and major airports, where at least some ATC and communication capabilities exist. In major cities, local cell phone networks, Internet,

and CNN access may be leveraged.

Following Atlas Response, 3AF requested funding for an

RFIC.4 While requests for such light and lean communications

suites have been made before, it is in operations in Africa

where the pressures on both communications capability and

on reducing airlift demand for overhead converge and are synergistically compelling. This kind of capability—along with

portable flight planning software (PFPS) for laptop computers

and local command and control capability for Phoenix Raven

teams—is being studied, developed, and fielded. Further, the

Air Mobility Battlelab at Fort Dix, New Jersey, is looking into

miniaturized data feed/flight planning/imagery/intelligence

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media for aircrews.5 The battlelab is part of the Air Mobility

Warfare Center—founded by Gen Ronald L. Fogleman in

1995—and specializes in mobility enhancement concept to

field delivery within 18 months. 

Air Operations Planning

Planning is dependent on information available over time

and on the processes—technical, bureaucratic, and human—

that make the information available to people who need it,

when they need it. Many aspects of information support airmen in Africa. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency

(NIMA) produces a wide variety of airfield data, and both the

theater planners and AMC produce guidance and share information on regional airfields. Integrated decision-support

tools—whether for mobility management, mission planning,

and beddown assessment such as the Headquarters AF/ILXX

sponsored Survey Tool for Employment Planning6—already

exist. African air operations planning tends to be done in a reactive way, whether the operation is a humanitarian response,

VIP travel, or support to NEOs. The vast distances required to

respond on the continent, the lack of forward bases or a significant US interest, and the ad hoc nature of most of our air

operations there compound the difficulty of mission planning.

However, African air operations point the way towards solutions that are outside of the box, innovative, and responsive

and thus are worthy of examining for applicability to the larger

Expeditionary Air Force concept.

To satisfy information needs for mobility air operations,

AMC publishes and maintains the ASRR and GDSS programs.

The ASRR is an on-line database of airfields around the

world—maintained by AMC—that provides a suitability rating

for specific military aircraft and a variety of FAA and other restrictions on air operations. GDSS is a database and set of applications that tracks a variety of past, present, and future

AMC air operational information, including schedules, aircrew

assignments, and shipments. Both ASRR and GDSS databases are continually updated and accessible on-line from any

Internet access point. Airfield surveys are scheduled and con35

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ducted by AMC units, and this information is added to the

databases. 

The AMC airfield suitability process begins with a request

from planners to Headquarters AMC for an assessment of airfield information. After AMC surveys known information about

the airfield, the purpose of the request, the potential classification of the product, and reviews existing DOD and commercial

publications, an analysis of airfield suitability is either updated

or created. If no preexisting airfield survey is available or suitable, the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) may be tasked to

schedule a physical survey of the airfield of interest. The conduct of the actual survey includes itemization of multiple characteristics of the airfield, such as the runway, taxiways, parking aprons, NAVAIDs and instrument approach capabilities,

obstructions, weight bearing capabilities, maintenance capability, terrain, lighting, et cetera. This data is maintained in the

ASRR and GDSS on-line databases for unclassified airfields.

The theater air mobility operations control center (AMOCC)

at USAFE performs a mobility dispatch function, files flight

plans, checks notices to airmen (NOTAM), and sets up weather

for theater flights, including those in Africa. The EUCOM and

CENTCOM air components provide the theater’s specific terminal en route radar procedures system (TERPS) and also conduct airfield surveys for the AOR. In theory, data from theaters

is included in the ASRR and GDSS; in practice, there are often

inconsistencies in theater and AMC knowledge bases. For aircraft flying under the operational control of the theater CINC,

the TACC and theater TERPS apply and overrule other guidance. Further, the theaters may waive AMC or other guidance

that is deemed too restrictive, inappropriate, or impossible to

use to accomplish a particular mission. Examples of such

waivers exist outside the airlift community channels via accident reports, but in fact such theater waivers are a common

and often necessary practice—in some cases simply reflecting

incomplete information in the AMC or NIMA databases. 

Of 286 African airports or runways listed in the current

ASRR, the known suitability for various aircraft types and degree of restrictions paint a partial picture of air operations on

the continent, as seen in table 4. These 286 runways represent

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a small percentage of total airfields and airstrips on the continent, but they constitute the body of USAF knowledge and

serve as a guide. “Daylight only operations” rules are generally

applied as a result of incomplete or uncertain knowledge of

runway and taxiway obstructions, usually due to unrestricted

access to the airport by people, vehicles, and animals or to uncertain information on construction projects in the area.7 The

existence of DOD-published approach is based on whether a

particular approach has been certified by a military aircrew.

Jeppesen approaches and flight publications are commercial

products, and while generally available on a greater number of

locations, more commonly flown approaches, and with frequent updates, the USAF does not authorize reliance on Jeppesen flight publications unless specifically stated or approved for

a particular mission. Instead, the USAF tends to rely on its own

databases, military historical and approved approaches, and

airfield surveys conducted by military survey teams.

Past airfield surveys are recorded from as early as 1988, and

the number of surveys conducted annually are reflected in figure 1. The survey dates tend to cluster in relation to planned

or unplanned air operations; for example, in 1989 there were

airlift supported operations in Angola, Chad, Namibia, Gambia, Ethiopia, and Liberia.8 In 1997 the unforecasted Assured

Lift and Guardian Retrieval operations occurred; but in 1999

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No. of No. of

Airfields Restriction Airfields Suitable for

205 MAJCOM Supplement required 243 C-130

150 Daylight only operations 204 C-21

143 Visual flight rules only 198 C-9

118 AMC approval required 191 C-141B

94 No DOD-published approach available 181 C-17

67 Jeppesen approaches—see GDSS 142 KC-135

54 No C-17 129 KC-10

89 No C-141B 81 C-5

38 No C-21

19 Contact AMC/DOVS for runway width

6 Other restrictions

5 Contact AMC/DOVS for taxiway width

Table 4

Summary of African Airfield Restrictions

Chapter 3 12/19/01 2:11 PM Page 37
and 2000, the increase in airfield surveys seemed to be more

planned and less reactive.

AMC, Air Combat Command, and USAFE initiatives have also

moved the USAF towards streamlined and Web-based availability of ASRR and other flight planning and coordination information. FalconView software—a Windows 95/Windows NT

mapping system that displays various types of maps and geographically referenced overlays—is being made available beyond the original users in the F-16 community to include aircrews and planners for African missions.9 The software allows

pilots to build their flight plans, check safety-of-flight parameters to identify military airspace, and print flight plans, maps,

and imagery.10 The NIMA Web site will soon have FalconView

for distribution to all aircrews. Many types of maps are supported, but the primary ones of interest to most users are

aeronautical charts, satellite images, and elevation maps.

Embassy Support and Coordination

Issues of diplomatic clearance, fees paid at airports, bureaucratic mysteries, language difficulties, logistics support,

and generally all of Murphy’s Laws are resolved effectively—if

they are resolved at all—by the military or air attaché on the

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Figure 1. African Airfield Survey Dates

Chapter 3 12/19/01 2:11 PM Page 38
ground in African FOLs. Diplomatic clearances and local airport support and agreements may or may not exist. In all

cases, air operations are supported heavily by the defense and

air attachés in the various countries. For the first time, in

March 2000 EUCOM collected data from their assigned and

accredited attachés on the state of a variety of categories, including air and transportation infrastructure. Attachés and

country teams were requested to color code their country’s capability to satisfy the objective, using “green” for satisfactory,

“yellow” for sometimes meets, and “red” for a clear lack of a capability to meet the objective. These ratings are very subjective

and cover only the 43 countries in EUCOM’s theater, excluding those in the Pacific Command (Madagascar, Seychelles,

and Mauritius) and CENTCOM area (Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea,

Uganda, Sudan, etc.). Some of the results are summarized in

table 5. The theater command expects to use this data as one

of many factors in determining the kinds of regional engagement activities to be pursued. With these caveats, this data is

helpful in understanding the region. From this table, it could

be concluded that from the perspective of country teams on

the ground, status of forces agreements (SOFA) and acquisition

and cross servicing agreements (ACSA) are lacking in many of

the African countries. According to EUCOM/ECJ4 (Logistics),

as of March 2000 there was a completed ACSA with Tunisia

and active negotiations with South Africa, Senegal, Gabon,

Botswana, and Cameroon.11 For CENTCOM, Kenya, Seychelles, and Djibouti have been determined to be eligible for

ACSAs; but they have not been negotiated at this time.12

SOFAs and ACSAs are typically standard and taken for

granted for much of the rest of the EUCOM theater, but this

development has not evolved similarly in Africa. The ACSAs

themselves are extremely detailed and are “designed to facilitate reciprocal logistic support between the Parties to be used

primarily during combined exercises, training, deployments,

operations, or other cooperative efforts, and for unforeseen

circumstances or exigencies in which one of the Parties may

have a need of logistic support, supplies, and services.”13 They

are established when both parties wish to “further the interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of their respective

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military forces through increased logistic cooperation.”14 Logistic support, supplies, and services are further defined in the

ACSA template to include food, water, billeting, transportation

(including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communication services, medical services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations

support), storage services, use of facilities, training services,

spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. Clearly, given the

lessons learned described in the previous sections, ACSAs

may hold part of the answer. 

Attachés and country teams reported the third most frequently occurring infrastructure shortfall as security for navigational routes, communications, and port and airfield security. However, more interesting are possible disconnects in this

arena of infrastructure, where issues such as language training show up as a more critical or frequently observed shortfall

than current airfield surveys, airfield NAVAID status, and port

and airfield capacity. While language training in nonanglophone countries is expected to be seen as a hindrance, the

currency and completeness of airfield surveys, NAVAID and

flight approach equipment availability and status, and airfield

capacity conceivably are causing more problems for our air operations than lack of local language training. 

The fourth most frequently occurring infrastructure shortfall as reported was port and airfield facilities adequacy; fifth,

the geographical limitations of port linkage to interiors; and

sixth, port and airfield capacity. While these ratings for

African ports and airfields are subjective and undoubtedly related to past experience or lack thereof, an Army Military Traffic Management Command study acknowledges that “forward

airfields are the weak link in the deployment chain.”15 The

study states that the “most daunting problem discovered was

that airfields in possible engagement areas were typically inadequate to handle the number of aircraft that would be required to move an Interim Brigade Combat Team.” This study

looked closely at the Army’s deployment into Kosovo and Albania, but the issues and problems not only apply but are

conceivably much worse for African areas of operation. Fur40

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ther, it is clear that this issue of airfield and port adequacy

and capacity was a recurring problem in all of the African operations discussed in the previous chapter.

There are only 20 air attaché billets in African countries.

Five are rated officer billets, six are nonrated officer billets,

and eight are senior enlisted operations NCOs. Six billets are

either currently unfilled or occupied temporarily by an Army

representative. While five more were funded last year, these

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Table 5

Selected EUCOM Attaché and Country Team Ratings of

Transportation Infrastructure for African Countries

OBJECTIVE Does Not Sometimes % Red or

Meet Meets Yellow Countries Reporting as “Red”

Existing Acquisition and Cross 30 9 90% Most don’t have them

Servicing Agreement

Existing Status of Forces 28 7 81% Majority don’t have them

Agreement

Ability to provide security for 11 18 67% CAR, Chad, Eq. Guinea, Guinea–

navigational routes Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 

Niger, São Tomé & Príncipe, 

Sierra Leone, Libya

Ports/airfield security adequate 5 22 62% Niger, São Tomé & Príncipe,

U.S. logistics forces Libya, Liberia, DROC

Comms, power, water can support 9 14 53% CAR, Chad, DROC, Eq. Guinea,

U.S. force extended presence Liberia, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, 

São Tomé & Príncipe, Sierra 

Leone

Ports/airfield facilities and 2 19 48% Niger, São Tomé & Príncipe 

equipment adequate for U.S.

logistics forces

Host-nation English language 9 11 46% Algeria, CAR, Chad, DROC, Eq.

training Guinea, Libya, Niger, São 

Tomé & Príncipe, Cape Verde

Port/airfield linkage to interior 7 12 44% São Tomé & Príncipe, Libya, Eq.

LOCs Guinea, DROC, Congo, CAR, 

Chad

Prior exercises/events conducted 7 12 44% Burundi, DROC, Libya, Niger,

with US forces Nigeria, The Gambia, Togo

Ports/airfield capacity adequate 3 14 39% Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea,

for US forces Liberia

Proximity to ISBs and/or FOBs 2 15 39% Burundi, DROC

Existing port/airfield survey 2 13 34% Libya, Liberia

Existence of navigation routes 1 9 23% Libya

and aids

Established history of navigational 1 6 16% Libya

route use by United States

Ports/airfields accessible to 1 4 11% Libya

United States

United States allowed to use

navigation routes 1 3 9% Libya

Source: EUCOM summary results collected at the annual Regional Engagement Planning Conference for

Africa, held at Garmisch, Germany, in March 2000. The captured data for Objective Question Sets 7 and 9

E-mailed to author by EUCOM/ECJ5-OR, May 2000.

Chapter 3 12/19/01 2:11 PM Page 41
new billets were not for rated officers; and a lack of operational

airmindedness in our permanent FOLs in African capital cities

is noticeable. A small survey was conducted among random

attachés in African states. The results of that survey are provided at appendix C and include comments and suggestions

on how to get more air operations experience in country and

how to leverage what is currently available. The suggestions

received via this survey both raise additional concerns and

shed light on possible solutions. Several of the suggestions related to sharing knowledge—of air operations and aircrew

needs at forward locations, developing air operations responsiveness on the ground by assigning enough air operationsoriented people to the embassies, sending survey teams to get

the real data set, and working to develop training and liaison

programs with local African air forces. 

Operational Security and Force Protection Issues

AMC implemented the Phoenix Raven program to review airfield security conditions in advance and deploy the appropriate force protection for aircrews and aircraft with AMC aircraft. Ravens are two- to four-person teams specially trained

in antiterrorism, protocol, and negotiation measures who provide security for AMC aircraft and people when traveling to

“hot spots” around the world.16 The concept of operations includes direction to “deter, detect, and counter threats to AMC

personnel and aircraft by performing close-in aircraft security,

accomplishing airfield assessments to document existing security measures and vulnerabilities.”17 Instituted in 1997, it

received the 1999 DOD’s Most Outstanding Antiterrorism Innovation or Action in the Command award. The cross-functional teams are “specifically trained to protect aircraft and

crew members in hostile environments.”18 Phoenix Raven

teams conduct site surveys and utilize information on security

from intelligence and police functional sources. Deployment

locations requiring an associated Phoenix Raven security team

are determined by the AMC Threat Working Group, and a list

of locations is updated frequently. The list as of 11 July 2000

contained 54 locations, 24 of which were in Africa; and African

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locations in the past have constituted a significant percentage

of airfields of concern.19

Incidentally, a commercial combination of both airfield operations and operational security surveys is available, oriented

to commercial and government entities. Companies such as

Air Security International (ASI), Incorporated, and Global Crisis Control International (GCCI), Incorporated, offer airfield

operations and security services to companies and government or nongovernmental agencies needing such services.

GCCI’s comprehensive airfield security and assessment program can overview geographical considerations, location of

flight NAVAIDs, local weather and wind conditions, airspace,

proximity to urban areas, facility characteristics and warehousing capability, ATC frequencies, air traffic history, documentation requirements for entry or exit, and location of resupply and refueling areas. Charts and maps are included in

the deliverable, and country political assessments reports are

optionally available.20 Other optional services include aerial

and satellite imagery and evacuation and medical services. ASI

offers a similar set of services, including an overview of existing threats to facilities, corporations, or personnel; customer’s

specific vulnerability to those threats; potential risks to flight

operations; and the quality of the services under the responsibility of destination airport authorities.21 These companies

often hire experienced former Air Force personnel to conduct

these surveys.

Other force protection proposals to date include a program

to outfit some C-17, C-130, and other transport and tanker

aircraft with lasers capable of jamming infrared (IR) guided

(heat-seeking) shoulder-fired missiles.22 Laydown armor for

mobility aircraft is also used in some missions and some locations. The Air Mobility Battlelab is working a variety of securityrelated initiatives that, while not designed specifically for the

African theater, will enhance air operations in Africa. Portable

intrusion detection sensors, under development at a Hanscom

AFB, Massachusetts, systems program office, offer a variety of

less than lethal force options; and directed-energy defenses

are being monitored by the battlelab. The battlelab is designing night vision lighting for the C-130 cockpit, specifically for

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mobility aircrew wearing night vision goggles that would be

disabled by normal aircraft cockpit lighting. It is a standard

feature in special operations C-130s and would be useful in C130s on African runways undergoing night operations in highrisk or unsafe environments. Other innovations designed—

and soon to be fielded—by the Air Mobility Battlelab include a

bubble hatch for the C-17 and other airframes to improve

threat awareness. The bubble hatch was validated for C-141s

in the fall 1997 Red Flag exercise, with users finding an 85

percent increase in awareness of threats. Even safety features

currently being designed and ultimately fielded—such as remote airfield taxiway illumination and gravel protection devices for C-130s—would be of great value to our operators who

fly into Africa. 

Expensive security enhancements and modifications, such

as TCAS and laser detection, will tend to be placed on higher

value and newer airframes first, which incidentally are those

least likely to see extensive flying time throughout the African

continent for infrastructure and security reasons. A 1995

paper on operational support airlift readiness contained a variety of recommendations for operational security and force

protection, focusing on C-20 and C-21 aircraft. These included

training aircrews in combat airspace management techniques,

combat communications, and establishing complete visual

flight rules operational familiarity. The study also recommended these aircraft be equipped with inertial navigation

systems and modern integrated GPS capability and be included in the AMC Airlift Defensive Systems program.23 These

recommendations are likely to be both confirmed by pilots who

fly aircraft of all types during African peacetime and loudly

lamented today, as they were in 1995.

Dynamic Impact of Expeditionary Air Operations

The issues of runway degradation, repair, and resupply in

forward African locations strain on the medical and personnel

support over time; and dealing with local agencies, NGOs, and

coalition partners are issues that have not been addressed cohesively. USAF Red Horse engineering units (e.g., the US Army

Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center with offices

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in Egypt and Kenya) and commercial firms (i.e., Brown and

Root, Incorporated) have been used successfully to deal with

infrastructure challenges over time. The burden on the already strained strategic airlift system is seen in emergency operations—as in Assured Lift—where the runway repair equipment combined with the needed aircraft parts pushed the

mobility airframe up to a C-5 level vice the cheaper C-17, or

ideally, C-130. It is also seen in standard channel flights,

where one attaché remarked, “We have been trying to get a C130 engine here for three months. AF cannot do it because the

channel flights are full of rations . . . Oreos seem to have priority over an engine.” 

A serious problem for sustained air operations in Africa is

fuel cost, availability, and resupply. A recent paper comparing

the cost of refueling options for sustained African air operations found that fuel costs for African operations—when accounting for the cost of delivery, of aircraft flying heavy with

extra gas, of utilization of limited Mediterranean refueling

tracks, and ground delivery costs—is four times higher than

the normal purchase price of gas.24 Various means of fuel

management for African operations include simple air refueling and ad hoc local purchases, a EUCOM initiative to purchase and store fuel in three strategically located intermediate

staging bases (ISB), a EUCOM initiative to contract for guaranteed deliveries of fuel from ISB locations, and use of the offshore petroleum distribution system (OPDS). OPDS has both

traditional pipeline laydown distribution, as well as a modified

usage as seen in Mogadishu, Somalia, 1993–94, where fuel

trucks on the pier filled from the OPDS ship in port and drove

to the airfields. The study used Operation Support Hope as the

sample deployment and found that all options for fuel for that

size operation would cost about $2 million except for the guaranteed purchase contract, which is not currently possible

based on local capabilities.25 Even Nairobi, Kenya—with a

unique continental storage capacity of over 2.42 million gallons—is handicapped by distribution and imbalance of supply

and demand, as seen and recorded in Guardian Assistance

and other operations.26 Recommendations include formalizing

or legitimizing the tailored in-port OPDS offload to trucks and

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pursuing EUCOM initiatives for ISB fuel storage and contracting agreements. Interestingly, the USAF is not the only one

challenged to get the air operations gas they need. The US

Navy and Marine Corps are considering hiring private companies to provide midair refueling for contingency operations.27

Omega Air, Incorporated, has developed the first commercial

aerial refueling aircraft—refitting a Boeing 707 with a drogue

gas delivery system—specifically with the Navy and Marine

Corps in mind (whose aerial refueling capable aircraft all use

the drogue system instead of the USAF preferred boom delivery system). Omega indicated that the commercial refueler

would be cheaper to fly than the KC-135, with its estimated

2001 flying hour cost of $10,761, and that “the idea is so new

that it may ruffle some feathers in the aerial refueling world.”28

Medical and personnel support over time can be problematic, particularly with the force protection concerns that accompany all US operations. These concerns—whether medical, safety, or simple bureaucracy driven—tend to isolate the

Americans in a humanitarian operation in “American bases.”

In humanitarian environments, personal contact with international partners and local militaries and cooperation with commercial and nongovernmental agencies and the community at

large will solve problems and smooth over operational bumps.

If the US forces cannot make that achievement, the burden

falls to the good offices of the embassy staff. A competent,

present, and engaged US embassy—particularly the military

attaché office and country team—can go far to compensate

and overcome US operating practices that may cause problems in places that run on “Africa time.” An engaged and supportive CINC or his representatives can also do wonders in

building relationships that make things flow instead of stopping them in their tracks. 

In relation to the long-term impact on US expeditionary operations, the current practice is to establish an exit strategy

quickly and hold to it. Aircraft write-ups are fixed upon return,

and the USAF is satisfied. This exit strategy idea has been

around for a long time, and it is becoming the commander’s

mantra in every war and nonwar engagement. Unfortunately,

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national and local agencies spend decades dealing with longstanding problems, US commanders’ emphasis on exit strategy is often insulting and offensive to others involved in the

emergency or humanitarian operations. The after action briefing on Atlas Response made it very clear that the success of

the operation was the early decision on an exit strategy and

the adherence to that plan. For the military, it is the right

thing to do. For long-term political benefit, and possibly for

CINC engagement objectives, the exit strategy should be designed with some follow-on engagement planning that can

build on solutions to problems. It could be that it is not the

military—and certainly not the Air Force’s—responsibility to

develop a postexit strategy engagement plan (even one that is

wholly internal to the Air Force via sharing lessons learned,

contacting programmatic and requirement offices for status

on initiatives, and sharing new solutions from the field). However, the alternative is what we have been doing—recreating

the wheel in terms of relationship, skills, awareness, and putting our people at unnecessary risk.

Regional Airspace and Control Initiatives

The DOT Safe Skies for Africa program has made limited

progress in improving flying safety. Originally funded with

$1.2 million in 1998, it expects to quadruple the number of

African countries that meet the ICAO standards within three

years, to improve airport security at between eight and 12 airports in Africa, and to improve regional navigation services.29

DOT Secretary Rodney E. Slater stated in 1998 that only five

of 53 African countries meet ICAO standards for safety and security: Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, and South Africa.30

This statistic remains true today; but by September 1999, two

surveys had been completed (Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire) with

others planned.31 Secretary Slater also mentioned that a US

Federal Transit Administration safety training program is currently under way in South Africa and that he had intentions

to duplicate the program in other African countries.32 At the

“Aviation in the 21st Century—Beyond Open Skies Ministerial,” Secretary Slater moderated a panel on African aviation, in

which key points were made about African aviation. These

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points included the large number of “politically conceived airlines dependent on state subsidy”; inadequate intra-African

air services; high costs of fuel; maintenance abroad; insurance

premiums; inadequate human resources, especially technically skilled personnel; inadequate infrastructure, both airports and NAVAIDs; and safety and security shortcomings

(many of which are being corrected).33 Cooperation, privatization, and partnerships from abroad were named as the main

solutions to these systemic and regional issues. 

The FAA and ICAO continue to work with regional and international flight safety organizations, such as ASECNA and

IFALPA, to raise awareness and ideally gain solutions to flight

safety for air operations in Africa. In 1997, ICAO endorsed all

128 recommendations of the Africa–Indian Ocean Regional Air

Navigation Meeting held in May of that year.34 Subregional organizations, such as ASECNA, Common Market for Eastern

and Southern Africa (COMESA), IATA, and IFALPA also have

various initiatives for regional airspace and air control initiatives. IATA is sponsoring installation of a network of very small

aperture terminals for satellite communications (SATCOM) in

Africa.35 In 1997, all 14 members of the South African Development Community agreed to replace landline communications between control towers with a SATCOM system and conduct a feasibility study to install a single ATC station for the

upper airspace covering the entire area by 2005.36 After the C141 midair collision in Namibia, a recommendation to develop

a DOD-sponsored RAI for Africa was produced. The RAI currently in place in Eastern Europe is sponsored by the Partnership for Peace, includes a bilateral investment, and can

lead to upgrades in radars among other things.37 It is designed

for Central and Eastern Europe and uses monies appropriated

for that region to develop and encourage civilian and military

cooperation in managing a country’s airspace under a single

manager.38 Even though the C-141 report contained this recommendation, in Africa there is often no military control of

airspace and no military assets capable of adding to the civilian air picture. From the USAF perspective, “the conditions

which made RAI an appropriate bilateral offer of assistance in

Central and Eastern Europe, in the main, do not exist in

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Africa.”39 As of now, this particular concept for Africa is dead

in the water. 

The Air National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is

on a similar track. State partnership programs participate in

bilateral training, exercises, fellowship style internships, and

civic leader visits. While the National Guard SPP is a direct

outgrowth of EUCOM’s Joint Contact Team Program and of

the 30 US states, Puerto Rico, and District of Columbia partnered—none are linked with African countries.40 Overall, DOT,

Department of State, DOD, and even the FAA currently have

little that resembles a cohesive program to begin to interface

with the existing—albeit weak—regional aerospace organizations in Africa. 

A bright spot in the area of regional airspace management

could be the Safe African Skies Group (SASG). This group

came into being after the announcement of the Safe Skies for

Africa program and consists of investment companies, Lockheed Martin Air Traffic Management Division, Africa experts

and analyses firms, with a goal of implementing a state-of-theart satellite-based communications, navigation, and surveillance air traffic management system for Africa.41 By late 1999,

SASG established a partnership with the 21 member states of

the COMESA to implement an air traffic management system

for the region. COMESA includes countries from Egypt to Zimbabwe and could address both upper airspace (above 24,500

feet) and, ultimately, lower airspace control and integration for

the north–south air routes along the eastern half of Africa. The

SASG–COMESA partnership is seen as a way that the private

sector “working with African governments, can undertake

major infrastructure projects without huge public sector subsidies.”42 This private-public sector cooperation towards improved air traffic management may ultimately benefit USAF air

operations in the region. 

Humanitarian Tactics

The nature of airlift operations in Africa tends to be either

exercise support, humanitarian delivery, or evacuation. These

kinds of missions into less than optimal airspace management, airfield condition, or security environment result in a

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kind of quasi-wartime mentality. During Gen John P.

Jumper’s final year as USAFE commander, he demonstrated a

new Humanitarian Expeditionary Force (HEF) concept “similar

in scope to the [1994] Rwanda operation.”43 He indicated the

HEF would include “specialized force protection units, engineers to repair or make airfields, medical personnel, airlift”

and would be prepared to work with NGOs and international

organizations in delivering humanitarian and medical aid, as

well as accompanying attack forces such as the A-10 or AC130U. 

The kinds of tactical ideas that would enhance the operations we do in Africa include a relook at the techniques like the

low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES), a method of

delivering heavy items on poor or no runways. This airlift

technique was previously utilized by the Army for field delivery of a currently discontinued tank. Since 1995 the Army has

not funded LAPES training for Air Force aircrews. While

LAPES as a technique carries a risk to aircrews and cargo, it

may be an option to consider in Africa-style missions. LAPES,

in a low ground-to-air threat environment, could be a useful

technique for low-cost and flexible delivery of runway repair

equipment and/or humanitarian aid, particularly where runways are unsuitable or absent. Another innovation currently

being worked partially as a result of African aircrew experience

is the low-cost combat offload (LCCO). Under development by

the Air Mobility Battlelab, the LCCO is an inexpensive, allwood pallet designed to be left behind instead of unloaded and

returned to the waiting aircraft—delaying takeoff, clogging

congested airfields, and contributing to the types of problems

experienced in African and other humanitarian operations.

The currently used aluminum and wood 463L pallets are often

left behind in the interests of time, safety, and maximum on

ground restrictions. With the 463L pallets and required netting costing around $1,000 each, the LCCO (at around $60

each) is an innovative, safer, and cheaper alternative.44

A flyaway laptop-based PFPS is available where all types of

regional data can be uploaded to compact disc and/or laptop,

and this resource would be available to pilots flying long missions or missions subject to in-flight modification. For African

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missions, often VIP oriented and/or short notice, such a capability would be helpful to otherwise isolated aircrews forced

to plan and replan in midair. Further, attempts to capture lessons learned—often from challenging airlift operations in

Africa—and include them in the Air Force Tactics, Techniques

and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-1, “C/HC-130,” vol. 25, and “C5/C-17/C-141,” vol. 35, was initiated in 1999 with only the

AFTTP volumes to include lessons learned thus far.45

Past experience has led the Air Force to move in certain directions; and for African-specific challenges, it is not expected

that solutions will be well funded. Solutions for African air operations challenges will need to be procedural, process, collaborative, and on the cheap. Much is being done, much more

can be done, and a lot of it without additional spending. Before the summary of recommendations is presented, it will be

illuminating to hear what experienced pilots have to say about

flying in Africa.

Notes

1. Headquarters AF/XOO-CA document, “U-154/C-141 Mishap African

Air Traffic Control Recommendations Course of Action,” 15 January 1998

(FOUO).

2. Maj Dorotha Biernesser, Headquarters AF/XOO-CA, E-mail, 20 January 2000.

3. John Gunther, Inside Africa (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), 8.

4. Maj Gen Joseph Wehrle, briefing, subject: “Joint Task Force Atlas Response . . . A Commander’s Perspective,” May 2000.

5. Lt Col Mark J. Surina, interviewed by author at the Air Mobility Battlelab, 25 July 2000; the Air Mobility Battlelab brochure, 25 July 2000 n.p.;

and E-mail from Colonel Surina, 15 August 2000.

6. Lt Col Tony Dronkers, “Integrated Decision Support Tools to Tailor

Support Forces,” bullet background paper, Headquarters AF/ILXX, 9 September 1999.

7. Lt Col Joel Wheeler and Lt Col T. J. McCarthy, Headquarters

AMC/DOVS, interviewed by author, 18 July 2000.

8. Alan Vick et al., Preparing the US Air Force for Military Operations Other

Than War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Project Air Force, 1997), 137–40.

9. FalconView information sheet, n.d., n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 July

2000, available from http://www.falconview.org.

10. DOD News Release No. 285-97, “AIR RESERVE SOFTWARE PROGRAM WINS WORLDWIDE RECOGNITION,” 3 June 1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 July 2000, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

Jun1997/b060397_bt285-97.html. 

11. E-mail from Maj Ed Davis, USEUCOM/J4-ML, 23 March 2000.

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12. E-mail from Maj Nancy Jean–Louis, CENTCOM/J-5, and Lt Col

Daniel McCabe, CENTCOM/J-4, 13 September 2000. 

13. E-mail from Maj Ed Davis, USEUCOM-J4-ML, data extracted from

ACSA Template Form, 23 March 2000.

14. Ibid.

15. “Army Study: Poor Forward Airfields Jeopardize Deployment Goals,”

Inside the Army, 21 August 2000, 1, on-line, Internet, 21 August 2000,

available from https://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url+/Aug2000/

e20000821armystudy.htm. 

16. Karen Petitt, “Phoenix Raven, Antiterrorism Programs Earn DOD

Awards,” Air Force News, 7 September 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3 July

2000, available from http://www.af.mil/news/Sep1999/n19990907_

991640.html. 

17. AMCI 31-104, Phoenix Raven Program, n.p., n.d., on-line, Internet,

25 August 2000, available from http://amc.scott.af.mil/pubs/amci/31series/31-104.pdf. 

18. Edwina Walton and John Price Jr., “Wing Team Saddles up for First

AMC Rodeo,” MacDill AFB On-line, 19 June 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3

July 2000, available from http://www.macdill.af.mil/Staffagn/pa/news/

tbolt/June19/Rodeo.htm.

19. “Phoenix Raven Required Locations,” 11 July 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 July 2000, available from http://web.amcin.scott.af.smil.mil/

TWG/backup/raven.asp (FOUO).

20. Global Crisis Control International, Inc., ASAP Web site, n.d., n.p.,

on-line, Internet, June 2000, available from http://crisis-control.com.

21. Air Security International, Inc., Web site, n.d., n.p., on-line, Internet,

23 July 2000, available from http://www.airsecurity.com/surveys.htm. 

22. Brian Bender, “Transports to Get Missile Jammers,” Jane’s Defence

Weekly, 16 February 2000, n.p., on-line, Internet, 17 February 2000, available from http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb2000/s20000216transports.htm. 

23. David Dyche, Making Operational Support Airlift Ready for War

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 213–25.

24. Steven Dye, “Improving African Fuel Availability in Support of Humanitarian Relief Operations,” AFIT/GMO/LAC/99E-3, June 1999, 14.

25. Ibid., 46.

26. Ibid., 44.

27. Christian Lowe, “Navy, Marine Corps Consider Privatizing Some Aerial Refueling,” Defense Week, 21 August 2000, 1.

28. Ibid.

29. US DOT News Release, “Safe Skies Initiative Is Improving US–Africa

Air Service, Slater Tells Committee,” 30 July 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 3

July 2000, available from http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1998/dot14498.htm.

30. “Slater to Push African Safety,” Aviation Week and Space Technology,

6 July 1998, 47.

31. Rodney E. Slater, “Closing Remarks at the US–Africa Transportation

Ministerial,” 29 September 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 23 July 2000, available from http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1999/92999sp.htm. 

32. Rodney E. Slater, “US–Africa Ministerial Panel on Economic Partnership,” 16 March 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 23 July 2000, available from

http://www.dot.gov/affairs/1999/31699sp.htm. 

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33. Comments by Côte d’Ivoire Transportation Minister Adama Nibi

Coulibaly, “Aviation in the 21st Century—Beyond Open Skies Ministerial,”

Chicago, Ill., 6–8 December 1999, n.p., on-line, Internet, 23 March 2000,

available from http://www.faa.gov/dotconf/body.html. 

34. “ICAO Endorses Major Recommendations for Improving Safety of

African Airspace,” ICAO press release, 5 December 1997, n.p., on-line, Internet, 6 January 2000, available from http://www.Icao.org/icao/en/nr/

pio9723.htm.

35. “TU-154/C-141 Mishap African Air Traffic Control Recommendations, Course of Action,” Point Paper, Headquarters AF/XOO-CA (Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 15 January 1998), 1.

36. IATA Air Bulletin, 30 January 1998, accessed 6 January 2000. 

37. Point Paper, 4.

38. Dorotha Biernesser, Headquarters AF/XOO-CA, E-mail dated 15 August 2000.

39. Ibid.

40. “National Guard State Partnership Program,” Information Paper, International Affairs Directorate of the National Guard Bureau, Washington,

D.C., 3 January 2000.

41. Jack Edlow and Erastus J. O. Mwencha, “Improving Air Traffic Management in Africa,” Perspectives on Africa, Winter 1999/2000, 46–53.

42. Ibid., 48.

43. Greg Caires, “Jumper: USAFE to Conduct Humanitarian ‘AEF’ Next

Year,” Defense Daily, 22 July 1998, 3.

44. MSgt Thomas Kenney, AMWC Battlelab, interviewed by author, Fort

Dix, N.J., 25 July 2000.

45. Maj Q Schlortt, AMC/DOK, Scott AFB, Ill., interviewed by author, 18

July 2000.

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Chapter 4

What Aircrews Know about Air

Expeditionary Operations in Africa

The previous chapters overview some of the conditions affecting air expeditionary operations in Africa, discuss operational level lessons learned, and share some solutions currently being pursued for future improvement. To meet these

challenges practically today, our pilots, aircrews, and planners adapt to the air operations situation and do their best to

overcome the challenges. Beyond the traditional sources of

data discussed above, we also have the experience of the numerous active and Guard pilots of USAF aircraft who fly routinely into Africa supporting routine channel flights, VIP transport missions, and special assignment airlift missions. These

pilots and aircrews support multinational exercises—such as

the French-sponsored Gabon ’98 and Gabon 2000 in West

Africa, the Blue Crane/Hungwe series peacekeeping exercises

in southern Africa, and Golden Spear series in the Horn—

African Crisis Response Initiative training, small-scale humanitarian delivery, and search and rescue or evacuation missions. As part of research for this paper, a detailed

questionnaire was made available via the Internet and provided to randomly selected pilots with experience flying in

Africa. While the Web-based questionnaire automatically produced anonymous responses, many of the pilots and aircrews

participating provided their E-mail addresses and were available for later clarification and further elaboration of particular

points. The questionnaire with all summarized responses (see

appendix A) basically asked pilots to validate African air operations concerns already identified by the FAA and ICAO and to

comment on the African air operations situation as they saw it. 

The pilots or aircrews completing the survey were about

evenly split between C-130 and C-20/21 pilots and larger airframes (C-5, C-141). The types of missions flown tended to be

humanitarian response, contingency, exercises, and VIP

transport. Pilots were asked to rate the ICAO-documented

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shortfalls listed in table 1 between a “1” to “5,” with “1” meaning the shortfall was rarely observed, and “5” meaning the

shortfall was almost always observed. The categories included

aerodrome conditions (12 questions), air traffic control (six

questions), aeronautical information services (seven questions), communications/navigation (12 questions), and general procedures (three questions). This part of the questionnaire effectively fine-tuned the ICAO study of African

aeronautical challenges based on USAF real-world experience.

The data provided in table 6 reflects only those categories of

challenges that received an average rating of 2.75 or higher by

either strategic mobility (representing heavier airframes) or by

tactical airlift. Inclusion of a problem area in table 6 indicates

it occurs predictably in Africa—problem areas are shown in

priority order in the tactical airlift category.

The condition, capacity, and capability of African airports

and airfields, as documented elsewhere, is a problem for USAF

pilots flying in Africa. The heavier aircraft tend to fly into larger

airports, and the aerodrome-related complaints center on runway and taxiway inadequacies and insufficient security

screening of personnel. For tactical airlifters, the complaints

shared concerns of lack of control of airfields, apron lighting

and suitability (as well as general runway inadequacies), and

deficient fire and rescue services. Given the nature of most

missions to Africa—requiring offload of supplies, aid, and

equipment—deficiencies in the aerodrome category are serious

mission impacters. A pilot-reported security challenge affecting at least one African airport is described as follows: 

In spite of the presence of several armed guards, security is, in my

opinion, severely lacking. There are numerous methods to gain access

to a particular airfield, some due to graft and corruption. . . . Customs

is another area of concern. During one deployment (single aircraft), our

aircraft had numerous maintenance problems requiring aircraft parts

from European bases. These parts came in via FedEx or another civilian carrier. Due to the “work schedule” of the customs officials, it was

next to impossible to gain access to these parts which severely impacted the success of the mission. Bribery was finally used as a last

ditch method to get the parts.

Another example reported from a 1995 experience in Sierra

Leone illustrates some of the infrastructure problems. 

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We arrived at [Sierra Leone] at night with no approach lighting, but determined the moonlight (and a VOR approach) were sufficient to make

a safe landing. [We] landed uneventfully, and taxied to the small ramp

which was filled with little light being provided by the 2–3 AF “lightalls”

on the ramp. A provisional WX/flight plan team was in place via SATCOM. We quickly updated the WX/FP and unloaded our cargo (ramp

ops were hazardous at best). After cleared for takeoff and lining up on

the [runway], airfield lighting was lost. . . . completely. However, communication with the tower remained. We asked tower if this happened

much. He responded “occasionally.” After a few minutes, the lights re57

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Table 6

Summary of Pilot Ratings on ICAO-Observed

African Flight Concerns

Category Average Rating

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Aerodromes (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed)

• Insufficient control over persons, animals, and vehicles due to

inadequate fencing 3.25 3.61

• Lack of personnel screening for security purposes 3.33 3.26

• Inadequate apron lighting and layout 3.08 3.26

• Runway/taxiway environment inadequacies (surface breakup, lighting) 3.42 3.16

• Unauthorized personnel accessing secure or restricted areas 2.58 3.13

• Deficient fire and rescue services 2.67 2.82

• Unserviceable ground equipment 2.50 2.76

Air Traffic Control: (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed)

• Inadequate traffic separation information (generally uncontrolled airspace) 2.79 3.32

• Inadequate provision of air traffic control in “controlled airspace” 2.96 3.03

• Nonimplementation of ATC service within 150 NM from airport 2.67 2.92

• Nonimplementation of air traffic system direct speed circuits 2.50 2.82

• Inadequate use of existing ATC radar 2.67 2.74

• Frequent use of non-English communications between ATC and pilot 2.92 2.58

Aeronautical Information Service: (1= rarely observed, 5= almost

always observed)

• Irregular NOTAMs, lack of NOTAM service 3.08 3.45

• Forecasting/weather support deficient 2.67 3.22

• Absence of or inaccuracies in surveys of surrounding areas 2.92 2.87

• Nonexistent aeronautical information publications 2.50 2.82

• Missing aeronautical charts 2.38 2.79

• Inadequate or unreliable airport weather and wind information for 3.09 2.05

approach and landing

Communications/Navigation (1= rarely observed, 5= almost

always observed) 

• Saturation of HF, poor or no HF reception 3.79 3.50

• Lack of precision approach aids 2.92 3.37

• Lack of flight plans coordination between FIRs 2.92 3.16

• Inadequate en route navigation facilities (inoperative or partially operative) 2.75 3.05

• Unreliable or unusable HF radio 3.33 2.92

• ILS and VOR facilities listed in different stages of serviceability 2.21 2.76

General Procedures (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed)

• Lack of air traffic controller and air traffic communicator training and 2.83 3.18

competency, to include language competency

Chapter 4 12/19/01 2:12 PM Page 57
turned, we were cleared for takeoff only, and told that our en route

clearance would be received from Karthoum on HF. We were unable to

reach Karthoum for one hour after takeoff and proceeded on the route

according to VFR rules while opposite direction IFR traffic passed

above us.

Beyond runway and aerodrome infrastructure, communications is arguably the single biggest air safety problem in the

continent according to Cathy Bill of the Airline Pilots Association of South Africa. Beyond what has already been discussed,

examples in the commercial or private world include flight

plans never reaching the proper ATC authorities due to ineffective communication between pilots and the ground and between control towers, lack of radio coverage, and poorly

trained controllers.1 According to an IATA bulletin, the majority of incidents over Africa relate to a loss of communication

with air traffic controllers.2 As mentioned earlier, in 1996

there were 77 recorded and reported near misses in Africa due

to lack of air control.3

Communication concerns figure prominently for USAF pilots.

Whereas the USAF has gradually phased out HF radio communications in the cockpit, as one pilot said, “HF radio is

Africa Comm.” Following is an anecdote shared by one pilot

that illustrates both this necessity and the disconnect between

USAF policy and reality:

The sole HF radio on the aircraft failed en route to South Africa. The

FAA says HF is required, but AF says it is not a requirement (which is

why there was no backup HF installed). USAF regulations precluded

local repair which was readily available, and a situation that hearkens

the late Joseph Heller—the crew cannot get it fixed, and they cannot

get out of South Africa without HF. The solution was found by waiting

until a team of US-funded contractors came down and did the repairs

on the radio.4

Unfortunately, even if the HF is working, one pilot described

the HF traffic situation as hideous! It was not uncommon to

have four or even five airspace controllers screaming your call

sign—whether you were in their flight information region or not.

An interesting operational procedure that is not generally

taught to Air Force pilots is the African use of 126.9 MHz for

pilot self-control. This in-flight broadcast procedure, developed decades ago, is used by individual pilots to broadcast

traffic information, with all other information communicated

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on the interpilot frequency 126.95 MHz.5 While commercial

carriers and pilots in Africa have long used this VHF location

broadcast system, our pilots “only caught on a few years

ago”—namely after November 1997. Pilots comment on weather

support and procedures in the absence of military weather

and no legitimate alternatives technically allowed from cell

phone networks or national or local commercial teletype services. Other USAF pilot concerns included command and control with dispatchers, and the comparison of Air Force approaches to how commercial carriers such as Lufthansa and

Air France remain in real-time communication with their dispatchers throughout their African flights. The failure of Iridium, Incorporated, was bemoaned by some, as Iridium provided

reliable communications, worked where local cell phones did

not, and was often used by USAF aircrews in Africa.

Another aspect of the survey also asked pilots to rate between a “1” and a “5” other challenges to flying in Africa. In

this case, the following prioritization (shown in descending

order for tactical airlift pilots) was established (see table 7).

For tactical airlift aircraft in Africa, the top observed challenges are the availability of commercial flight publications

(CFP); medical, food, and water support issues; and airframe

security. The next cluster of concerns is related to maintenance forward and reachback for communications. A lack of

Web or Internet access (from which data and information

could be instantly available—making up for lack of current or

complete FLIP, weather data, Web-accessible ASRRs, and

other guidance) is more of a problem for strategic mobility and

likely more of a problem for longer missions. For strategic mobility aircrews, the top four issues were Internet access; medical, food, and water support issues; maintenance of the aircraft; and gaining country diplomatic clearances. A recurring

theme in pilots’ comments was to move to Jeppesens, adopt

commercial procedures, and let the system learn. Expertise for

planning missions in Africa was seen in many cases to be lacking at the combatant command air planning staffs and underemphasized. Comments ranged from “weather support in

Africa is poor—USAFE OWS [Operational Weather Squadron]

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cult time getting the crews good accurate weather forecasts” to

“planning and coordination for these missions is rarely done

well [by CENTAF]. Dip clearances are inadequate, aircraft are

over-grossed, etc.”

Another part of the questionnaire asked pilots to rate their

theater command support and AMC-level support in a variety

of areas. The average results are presented in table 8, this time

with a “1” rating meaning not supportive and a “5” rating indicating great satisfaction with the support currently provided. Not surprisingly, the tactical or theater airlifters felt less

satisfied with the support they have received. Many comments

were provided in these two categories, and a variety of suggestions were made. Key themes included schedule pressures

and variations (particularly among VIP flights) that prevented

complete preparation for African flights, particularly as many

of the materials to plan the flights were outdated, unavailable,

or incomplete. Lack of diplomatic clearance for these types of

flights as well as contingency or humanitarian flights (basically any flight that is not planned with months of lead time),

lack of Jeppesen FLIPs, lack of TERPS approaches, and in60

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Table 7

Challenges to Flying, Strategic Mobility, and Tactical Airlift

Challenges to Flying (1= rarely observed, 5=

almost always observed)

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlfit

Medical, food, and water support issues for aircrew and passengers 2.96 3.00

Availability of Jeppesen products or FLIPs 2.04 2.95

Availability of maintenance or generation equipment 2.63 2.87

Availability of airframe security support (Raven Team or commercial) 2.42 2.68

Reachback to AMOCC or other air force control and support center 2.25 2.61

Communications gear maintenance support 1.29 2.50

Network (Web) access* 3.25 2.43

Unexpected charges from officials 2.29 2.24

Availability of country clearances 2.63 2.18

Availability of appropriate fuel limited at airport 2.33 2.00

Availability of runway space to support your mission 2.29 1.82

Availability of ramp width, length, or weight bearing capability to support 2.25 1.63

your mission

*Note: This challenge was the number one concern for strategic mobility.

Chapter 4 12/19/01 2:12 PM Page 60
consistencies in AMC and theater TERPS evaluations and

standards were cited as problems. Lack of TCAS and general

communications was also a concern for these pilots. The bottom line seemed to be that crews often must develop African

flight plans on their own, on short notice, assuming late or absent diplomatic clearance, with missing or incomplete information and publications, and fly at a risk that would be unacceptable in other theaters and perhaps for other airframes.

“Invariably (95 percent of missions) only one approach is

TERPSed—usually not the one in use. This forces the crews into

an unsafe dilemma—divert (again, available TERPS approaches/dip clc/WX/etc.), or fly a non-TERPSed approach

(normally the one every other commercial flight is flying) and

‘hack’ the mission. This begs the question, why can an airliner

with 400 pax fly a Jeppesen approach, but the United States

DOD cannot?”

In interviews with C-20 and C-21 pilots at Ramstein, a variety of concerns were discussed, many of which are repeated or

confirmed by the survey comments.6 General validity and reliability of information about procedures, airports, and airfields

was questioned. Inconsistencies between FLIPs, Jeppesens,

and AMC and theater records were frequently encountered.

Aircrews need 1:50,000 charts for planning, but they are not

always available. The TERPS system was thought to be undermanned and unable to keep up with requirements. TERPS was

noted as not being standardized across the Air Force and hav61

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Table 8

Operator Satisfaction with AMC and Theater Support

Category of Support Theater AMC

Stratlift Tactical Stratlift Tactical

Scheduling 2.79 3.05 3.13 2.92

Flight Planning 2.33 2.65 2.79 2.71

Execution stage (real-time support) 2.54 2.89 3.00 2.79

Response to concerns identified/process improvement cycle 2.54 2.53 3.50 2.53

Adequate threat briefing/intelligence preparation 3.04 2.45 3.25 3.24

Terminal En route Radar Procedure Systems (TERPS) 2.50 2.79 3.00 2.68

criteria/standards

Airfield Suitability Reports Not rated 3.46 2.79

Summary of Airfield Restrictions Not rated 3.00 2.61

Airfield Surveys Not rated 2.83 2.63

Chapter 4 12/19/01 2:12 PM Page 61
ing no intercommand TERPS interpretation, which effectively

means that “AMC TERPS do not equal USAFE TERPS.” One

pilot wrote that two of the top three problems are TERPS, and

“We need more approaches and departures out of these fields

with current and reliable information. The fact remains that

we will be tasked to fly into these fields. And in many cases we

are forced to make dangerous decisions because we don’t have

the TERPS info we need to get in and out of these fields.”

Often, disconnects between granting of foreign clearance

and the available airports at desired destinations meant clearance was granted into inappropriate or impossible airports,

and/or the suitable airport based on capabilities was not

granted a diplomatic clearance. Pilots pointed out that intelligence threat estimates are different than operations threat estimates and that “intel-safe is not ops-safe!” The issue of cash

required for fuel fees, landing fees, security, and communications services was repeatedly mentioned. Form 1801s, used to

file international flight plans, are not universal; and some

countries and airports have their own unique form (and fees). 

Practical recommendations to improve support to aircrews

flying African missions recognized clearly the relative priority

of African missions over other EUCOM or CENTCOM traditional core focus areas. Recommendations specifically addressed

rigid processes and arbitrary rules, asked for not necessarily

more help but better use of the help and expertise that already

existed, and included a request for simple awareness and understanding among higher up organizations of what African

flying entails. One pilot suggested, “Task folks with theater

planning specifically to Africa and not as an ‘arm’ from east

cell. There are plenty of folks willing to help us in Africa but

they lack information and resources to do this.” Another

pointed out “it is easy to place a statement on the top of every

AFI that states ‘Compliance with this instruction is mandatory,’ to actually comply with the written regulations in many

locations is indeed impossible. For a crew to comply with these

regulations fully, the mission would not happen the way the

leadership expects it to occur” (emphasis added). Again indicating a process and rules problem, one pilot commented that

AMC is “much more operationally flexible than USAFE which

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crippled itself unnecessarily. USAFE [between 1994 and1997]

would require daylight VMC [visual meteorological conditions]

ops throughout Africa because adequate NOTAMs and maps

were not available to perform proper TERPS reviews. AMC

[since 1997] has the same info constraints, but uses innovative solutions like adding a couple hundred feet to the Jeppesen minimums” (emphasis added).

Pilots were also asked to rate NIMA. In general, NIMA support was rated highly in terms of charts, approach and departure plates, and IFR supplements. The lowest average scores

given in NIMA categories related to availability of other flight

publications, in-flight guides, response to concerns, and the

NIMA process improvement cycle. This category generated a

variety of comments that provide insight into a key issue for

flying in Africa, namely that the government system does not

produce or deliver enough or appropriate flight publications

for African destinations and that commercial products are

more current and available (although often illegally or in violation of government policy at some level). One pilot noted that

“the African Approach book is hardly worth publishing—one

approach to places we rarely go is no help.” Another observed

“that NIMA is never as good as Jeppesen because the ‘publishing cycle kills it.’ ”7

Pilots and aircrews were also asked how they handle air operations challenges in real time. Forty-eight responses registered on this survey question, and the breakout is as follows:

69 percent rely heavily on the local defense or air attaché to

resolve problems, 60 percent call back to home station, 50

percent call back to AMC, 48 percent rely on themselves and

plan for self-sufficiency ahead of time, 23 percent refuse or

modify missions, 19 percent avoid known problem airports,

and 10 percent utilize commercial airline service capabilities

or products. Seventeen percent do something else when faced

with problems, suggesting self-sufficiency with suggestions to

bring it with you as part of the deployment, Federal Express

for aircraft parts to small locations, and work with host-nation

military forces, particularly Air Force contacts. One noted,

“Since communication by telephone or HF can be difficult at

best, self-sufficiency is a necessity.” 

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What pilots know about air operations in Africa is extensive,

but their collective perception remains ad hoc and not well incorporated into the Air Force body of knowledge. Many pages

of comments from the 62 pilots and aircrew members who

were contacted and chose to complete a survey are included at

appendix A, and these are worthwhile reading. The extensive

nature of these comments, and in many cases their tone of urgency, contrasts significantly from the official collection of lessons learned and after action reports that “we do not read”

anyway. It is possible that the business practices of more nontraditional learning organizations can be found to apply to the

USAF. For USAF African air operations, improved management of our existing knowledge is clearly indicated. 

Notes

1. IATA Air Bulletin, 30 January1998, accessed 6 January 2000.

2. Ibid.

3. James Ott, “Safety Groups Respond to African ATC Crisis,” Aviation

Week and Space Technology, 12 May 1997, 65.

4. Maj Pete Hahn, Ramstein AB, Germany, interviewed by author, 2 December 1999.

5. James Ott, “African ATC Crisis Escalates,” Aviation Week and Space

Technology, 20 January 1997, 45.

6. Following paragraphs refer to author interviews with a number of pilots at Ramstein AB, Germany, conducted on 2 December 1999.

7. Author interview, 3 December 1999.

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Chapter 5

Summary

Africa faces tough problems: among them the unavoidable

issues of a vast and varied geography, long-standing poverty

in both financial and visionary arenas, and the high cost of

construction and implementation of modern air control and

operations infrastructures and technologies. Open war, simmering conflict, and uncertain government dominate much of

the continent. Due to a widespread lack of transparency, user

fees paid by commercial air carriers and the international

community specifically to improve air infrastructure, estimated

at $6 million per month, are utilized for purposes other than

those intended.1 Money thrown at the problem will not solve it

anytime soon, and the USAF has little money for that purpose

in any case. What can be done, and how should we move forward for safety and effectiveness, frugality, and real impact?

Solutions

This paper presented the ongoing recommendations and activities on the Air Force plate to incrementally improve air operations safety and effectiveness in Africa. The application of

Phoenix Raven teams in some of the tougher air operations

neighborhoods, GPS installation, and TCAS installation on

various airframes address some security concerns; and the

proposal of missile and small arms fire defense systems on airlifters and tankers indicates this concern is expanding. The increase in the number of air attachés in Africa and the progress

the Air Force is making in the major categories discussed in

chapters 3 and 4 are good signs. However, the recommendations received from pilots themselves would indicate that these

solutions are either too macroscopic or too microscopic and

may reflect a certain blissful obliviousness to African air operations and economic realities. The solutions put forth by pilots

who cannot wait for regional technologies and bureaucratic

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protocols are actually quite refreshing, and they are summarized in the following seven categories.

GPS and the TCAS

Get GPS and TCAS on all airframes that fly in Africa, where

they really make a difference. This is simple and obvious; it

costs money; but as recognized in 1997 off the coast of

Namibia, it costs far more to avoid the issue than to address

it. One pilot summed it up, “Interestingly enough, following

the C-141 midair collision over Africa a call went out for all aircraft to get TCAS, this as yet has not happened. Until the

USAF is ready to spend the $$ to support safer operations, addressing this issue is a waste of time.”

Activate Defense and Air Attachés

For improved air operations, activate defense and air attachés now. In the aircrew survey, aircrews indicate that they

rely overwhelmingly on defense and air attachés to make

everything work. Yet, airminded, air operations-oriented attachés are hard to come by in Africa. Of 20 air attaché billets

in Africa, only 16 are currently filled, and only six are rated officers—all but five of these in North Africa. To resolve this expertise and availability concern, increased training and awareness on air operations, air safety and security initiatives,

improved means of sharing information and ensuring adequate transfer of lessons learned from one attaché to the next,

and improved Internet connectivity in embassies would do

wonders for the ability of embassies to enhance their already

critical support to our flyers. Hiring retired, civilian, or foreign

national air operations expertise should be considered. Embassies are the ideal focal point to, as one pilot recommended,

actively “work with host national ATC to improve their training/competency/capability.” Air transportation and air-based

response are the primary means of military deployment on the

continent and will remain so for the foreseeable future. It follows that attachés’ collective perception on the problems facing them and their countries should reflect more of the air operational agenda and should embrace both military, US

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government, and civilian initiatives on air safety and security.

One pilot confirmed, “The embassy support was phenomenal.

They were our saving grace.” The pressures on our attachés

will only increase; and they need the tools, training, and presence to satisfy the needs of air expeditionary forces. 

Adopt the Use of CFPs, Products, and Practices

for Africa

Jeppesens and lack of availability or authorization to use

them for flight planning and operations is a policy concern, a

bureaucratic barrier. As one pilot stated, “The single most significant thing the AF can do to help is to fund and maintain

Jeppesen approach publications for all squadrons who are routinely tasked with accomplishing missions in Africa.” Another

said, “NIMA products also need to be updated and brought into

alliance with Jeppesen-like coverage. Airline service to many of

the fields we operate to or from exists and has for years, and we

limit ourselves if we can’t count on having complete and accurate flight publications.” It would be wise to simply wake up and

see how commercial entities and our European allies fly in

Africa. Our defense of our policy is safety and reliability for our

aircrews, yet clearly from comments and from other evidence—

including lessons learned from past operations—this defense is

increasingly naïve and ludicrous.

Improve the Airfield and Security Databases and

Information Flow

This relates to commercial product availability, but touches

on the more complicated and bureaucratic issue of theater

and AMC processes and upgrading of data in all databases (intelligence, airfields, approaches, security, commercial practices and weather, local logistics, diplomatic clearances, coalition and NGO air operations presence, and procedures). A

pilot says, “Good theater briefs are essential—customs, security, medical issues. Solid insight into logistical support available—ramp space, fuel, food, maintenance, transport, C2

[command and control] connectivity to coordinate mission

needs is critical.” The PFPS properly populated with good in67

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formation and an ability to reach back for updates is a starting point. Attention to customer complaints regarding the

TERPS process and product is warranted. One suggestion was

to create and activate a “crack group of individuals that can

handle short notice requests for TERPS support of approaches

and departures at African airfields and a command and control that can get CFPs and reliable weather to aircrews.” Further, recommendations for advance teams (of military or contractors) to determine and set up communications, NAVAIDs,

and a combat TERPS and weather team were made. 

Share Information among the Africa-Interested

Community on Air Operations

A Web site for all information, lessons learned, and electronic access to what is needed—for pilots and aircrews, planners, schedulers, and attachés or embassies—would be very

useful. PFPS as a user end item is part of this; other parts are

content and real information sharing and knowledge management. There are places from which this kind of initiative can

spring—USAFE, the USAF representative to the FAA

Euro–African region (a position created after the C-141 midair

collision in Namibia), and EUCOM and CENTCOM planning

and operational communities. 

Take Lessons on What Works 

Commercial carriers throughout Africa and NASA flight operations out of Banjul, Gambia, and Morocco use proven procedures, techniques, and support infrastructures. Evacuations routinely occur as necessary without the assistance of

the USAF—or even the US military—by utilizing commercial

air and sea carriers and overland routes. Specific examples of

excellent commercial evacuation plans include those sponsored by major and often multinational corporations and other

nations who have alien workers in African locations. The UN—

and particularly the WFP—airlift tons of aid annually into

often very remote parts of Africa. The capability of the UN to

leverage airlift is extremely high and relatively effective.2 This

is done via competitive contracts to commercial and often local

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air freight carriers. Additionally, NGOs—particularly aid and

religious organizations—utilize contract or organizationally

owned or leased air freight capability to reach their customers.

Beyond this commercial airlift and passenger lift capability,

African militaries using their own or leased assets can respond

internally and externally to humanitarian as well as military

requirements using the same means—owned or leased aircraft. Unfortunately, this has been more often seen of late in

the Ethiopian, Eritrean, or DROC funded use of Ukrainian

and/or Russian fighter aircraft or helicopters than in humanitarian response cases. Certainly the example of ECOMOG—

with integration of both indigenous Nigerian airlift and lift contributed by other nations—is a workable example of how the

need for airlift and air operations will be met in the future.

Leasing of aircraft is just one area where not doing the air operation directly makes sense or looking into a commercial

source of refueling capability should be considered. Another is

prepositioning both fuel, communications, NAVAIDs, and maintenance equipment, or sharing such equipment with African allies via excess defense articles and contractual agreements.

Improve our Ability to Do Africa Operations

Spend some mental energy on figuring out how to creatively

improve our ability to do African operations—emergency response and humanitarian airlift and delivery. This improved

ability could include increased funding and manning for the

remarkably prolific Air Mobility Battlelab and following the

lead of unit and individual innovators at USAFE, AMC, and

throughout the Air Force.3 It could also include ways of capturing and learning from lessons learned instead of learning

them over every time. Corporate knowledge must be captured

and used. There are many good ideas out there; what is

needed is some freedom to act on and develop these ideas. One

pilot commented, “Don’t put fighter guys in charge.” If one

looks more deeply into that comment, it is clear that it could

be saying we need more teaming approaches, less forcing to

make it fit, and more systemic solutions. It could be saying we

need more awareness of our particular challenges in Africa

and more vision. It is a rare fighter pilot who has flown his

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fighter aircraft south of the Mediterranean without a meticulously choreographed and unchanging flight plan. Fighter pilots do tend to show up as commanders of humanitarian, exercise, or contingency operations in Africa. There could be a

disconnect; and if so, it is one more challenge the USAF must

examine and overcome.

Recommendations

In 1973 the USAF conducted a famine relief operation in

Chad and Mali called Operation Authentic Assistance. The historical report of this operation is both interesting and enlightening. “Supplementary maintenance and servicing was purchased from Esso Corporation, Air Afrique, and the French Air

Force contingent . . . [proving] very helpful to the American . . .

personnel . . . unaccustomed to the heat, sand, and dust.”4 Maj

Howie Seaboldt, the Chad mission commander, reported that

“all of the airfields in Chad had two potential hazards in common. . . . Uncontrolled people and livestock transiting the runway . . . [and] lowered visibility when a thunderstorm would create a sudden dust or sand storm.”5 Offloading of humanitarian

supplies was conducted by hand, with one offload in Mali winning the prize for speed with “30,000 pounds of grain off my

craft in 13 minutes, a sack at a time.”6 Operation Authentic Assistance suffered engine failures due to heat, sand, and dust,

and then observed that “spare part supply from USAFE was

poor” but compensated for by the “esprit and resourcefulness of

the maintenance personnel and the cooperation of the Malian

air force and local air line operators.”7 Multiple instances were

observed where safety was compromised or sacrificed in order

to conduct the mission. One of the pilots who flew the operation

stated, “I think we took too many chances, but at the time it

seemed like the right thing to do.”8 While it occurred 27 years

ago, Authentic Assistance would have fit in alarmingly well with

the current operations reviewed in this paper.

Air operations in Africa face unique challenges, and the

USAF is learning to cope with these challenges in various

ways—officially via investment programs for improved information flow and planning capability and unofficially via the

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gradual growth of a body of knowledge and experience with

flight operations on the continent. Challenges relating to incomplete infrastructure on the continent and overcrowding in

African skies are beyond the technical and operational capabilities of most local and national governments or the USAF.

These challenges will remain with us for some time. However,

the requirement for USAF expeditionary and emergency response will remain and could increase as African states struggle to mature and stabilize as democracies and as the natural

resources and people of the continent become more and more

globally integrated. 

US air operations will continue to take place in Africa’s increasingly congested skies because Africa’s importance as a

strategic location, as a humanitarian flashpoint, as a twentyfirst century world market, and as a neighbor in a networked

world is inexorably growing. While the USAF today can continue to rely on pilots and aircrews who will make Africa air

operations happen “because it seems like the right thing to

do,” we need to actively listen and then learn how to make

these air operations both effective and safe. We owe it to the

people we might hope to help in Africa, who simply depend on

us to do it right. We owe it to the US taxpayers who pay us to

get it right. And we owe it to the aircrews, military support personnel and passengers, and their families who—in spite of

their quiet heroism and sometimes bravado—trust the USAF

to get it right.

Notes

1. Lara Pawson, “Africa’s Deadly Skies,” African Business, March 1997, 11.

2. Gregory Giletti, “The United Nations’ Capacity for Strategic Airlift,”

n.d., received via fax 28 January 1998 from United Nations headquarters,

New York. 

3. E-mail, 10 January 2000, from Lt Col Mark J. Surina, stating that

since the completion of this essay, the Air Mobility Battlelab has become the

Air Force’s seventh battlelab.

4. Capt Timothy Fuhrman, “Humanitarian Airlift: USAF Response to

Natural Calamity, 1960–1974,” Research Report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air

Command and Staff College, May 1981), 37.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 38.

8. Ibid., 39. 

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Appendix A

Questionnaire Responses from

Pilots/Aircrews

Pilot and Operator Questionnaire on Infrastructure

and Process Challenges to Expeditionary Air

Operations in Africa

The objective of this questionnaire is to better understand and

evaluate the numerous air and transportation challenges of

African air operations, from an operator and planner perspective, to determine possible future directions for EAF planning

in Africa. These problems may relate to air safety, navigation,

ground transportation network and airport infrastructure immaturity, security, geography, culture, or governmental mismanagement.

This questionnaire is in support of an Institute for National

Security Studies (INSS) sponsored research project by Major

Karen U. Kwiatkowski, Africa Branch, Headquarters United

States Air Force Regional Plans and Issues Division, Washington, D.C. The final report will be written no later than 1 August 2000. 

I am seeking your help because of your ability to share experiences, anecdotes, perspective, insight and suggestions regarding the conduct of military air operations in Africa. Your

anonymity will be protected and your responses will not be attributed to you, if you desire. This questionnaire contains 14

questions, most of which include a simple rating scheme, and

should take twenty to thirty minutes. I greatly appreciate your

assistance and comments.

NOTE: I encourage you to E-mail this questionnaire to any associates, peers, friends, uncles, and fathers who may be able

to share perspective and experience on flying in Africa, including commercial pilots who formerly flew for the USAF and

may fly today over African airspace. The Air Force community

that can shed light on this issue is not exceptionally large—I

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Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 73
need to hear from everyone I can! I can be reached at (703)

695-1539, DSN prefix is 22X. Web site location for this questionnaire is http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xop/xopx/aircrew1.shtml.

Name:

Email Address:

Mail Address (optional):

Phone (optional): 

Fax (optional):

Would like a copy of the completed study mailed to the above

address? Yes/No

1. What aircraft have you flown in Africa (either as pilot, navigator, or aircrew)? (Responses)

C-20 (6) C-5 (24) KC-10 (3) Fighter (please describe)

(None)

C-21 (8) KC-135 (5) C-141 (8) ISR, C3I or C2 platform

(None)

C-47 (1) C-7 (None) C-119 (None) C-12 (1)

C-130 (22) C-17 (0)

Other (please describe): 

• C9 (4)

• AMC airlift ground support from a TALCE perspective (1)

2. On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high) how do you rate your level

of experience as an pilot, navigator, or aircrew member? 8

3. In what timeframe was most of your Africa flying experience gained? 

Before 1965 (None)

Between 1965-1980 (2)

Between 1980-1994 (18)

Between 1994 to present (34)

4. How would you characterize the missions you have been

involved in:

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5. In what parts of Africa is the bulk of your experience (check

more than one if appropriate)?

North Africa (15)

West Africa (25)

East Africa (33)

Central Africa (14)

Southern Africa (19)

6. ICAO, IFALPA and other organizations have identified many

hazards to flying and challenges to air operations in Africa. In

the categories below, please mark or provide a prevalence rating of 1 to 5 for each inadequacy listed. A rating of 1 would indicate this deficiency is rarely observed in your experience, and

a rating of 5 would indicate this deficiency has been almost always encountered or observed in your personal experience.

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Category Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Routine channel and supply flights for embassy support 03 07

Non-routine transports of material (non-emergency) 05 05

Non-routine transport of VIPs (including EAGLE VISTA) 11 12

Support to exercises in the region (Gabon 1998, 06 12

2000, Blue Hungwe/Crane, etc.)

Humanitarian response missions 20 21

Contingency Ops 09 13

NEOs 04 4

Other (please list) 3 5

• Space Shuttle Transoceanic Abort Landing site

support (The Gambia and Morocco)

• Tactical training flights

• Medevac

• Phoenix Banner - Presidential Support

Category Average Rating (1-5)

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Aerodromes (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed) 

• Insufficient control over persons, animals and vehicles due

to inadequate fencing 3.25 3.61

• Bird hazards 1.92 2.37

• Deficient power supplies 2.13 2.50

• Deficient fire and rescue services 2.67 2.82

Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 75
Category Average Rating (1-5)

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Aerodromes (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed) 

• Lack of personnel screening for security purposes 3.33 3.26

• Unauthorized personnel accessing secure or restricted areas 2.58 3.13

• Runway/taxiway environment inadequacies (rubber accretion,

surface breakup, lighting unserviceable) 3.42 3.16

• Inadequate apron lighting and layout 3.08 3.26

• Unserviceable ground equipment 2.50 2.76

• Non-transmittal of Pilot Reports 2.25 1.82

• Contaminated or inadequate fuel 1.79 2.00

• Excessive fees as compared to other theaters 2.42 2.13

Air Traffic Control: (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed) 

• Non-implementation of ATC service within 150 NM from airport 2.67 2.92

• Non-implementation of air traffic system direct speed circuits

or need for improved direct speech circuits 2.50 2.82

• Inadequate traffic separation information (generally 2.79 3.32

uncontrolled airspace)

• Inadequate provision of air traffic control in “controlled airspace” 2.96 3.03

• Frequent use of non-English communications, on HF, UHF and

VHF,between ATC and pilot 2.92 2.58

• Inadequate use of existing ATC radar 2.67 2.74

Aeronautical Information Service: (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed)

• Non-existent aeronautical information publications 2.50 2.82

• Outdated aeronautical information publications 2.38 2.58

• Missing aeronautical charts 2.38 2.79

• Irregular NOTAMs, lack of NOTAM service 3.08 3.45

• Inadequate or unreliable airport weather and wind information

for approach and landing 3.09 2.05

• Absence of or inaccuracies in surveys of surrounding areas 2.92 2.87

• Forecasting/weather support deficient 2.67 3.22

Communications/Navigation (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed)

• VHF voice communications within 150 NM of airport not

implemented 1.96 2.29

• Unreliable or unusable HF radio 3.33 2.92

• ILS and VOR facilities listed in different stages of serviceability 2.21 2.76

• Lack of flight plans coordination between FIRs 2.92 3.16

• Absence of VHF 2.38 2.13

• Saturation of HF, poor or no HF reception 3.79 3.50

• Selective calling (SELCAL) facilities not provided or inadequate 2.29 1.89

• Bandboxing of VHF freqs in busy areas – tower and enroute 1.54 2.24

frequencies shared

• Inadequate en-route navigation facilities (inoperative or 2.75 3.05

partially operative) 

• NAVAIDs not provided or inoperative 2.50 2.08

• Lack of precision approach aids 2.92 3.37

• Non-calibrated Instrument Landing Systems 1.79 1.87

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7. Other challenges to flying in Africa relate to issues of fuel,

logistics support, fees, and security. Please indicate using the

1 through 5 scale, the severity of problems faced in the following areas (1 meaning problems are unusual and rare, 5

meaning you expect problems in this area every time).

8. Theater Command Support: How well does your theater

command and your air component support your specific needs

to fly safely and effectively in Africa? This time, 1 is “does not

support noticeably” and 5 is “supports in a responsive, reliable

and innovative manner.”

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Category Average Rating (1-5)

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

General Procedures (1= rarely observed, 5= almost always observed)

• Noncompliance with ICAO Standards and Recommended 1.63 2.16

Practices (SARPs)

• Noncompliance with requirements to NOTAM and all 2.08 2.16

defective facilities

• Lack of Air Traffic controller and air traffic communicator 2.83 3.18

training and competency, to include language competency

Challenges to Flying (1= rarely

observed, 5=

almost always

observed)

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Availability of appropriate fuel limited at airport 2.33 2.00

Availability of runway space to support your mission 2.29 1.82

Availability of ramp width, length or weight bearing capability 2.25 1.63

to support your mission 

Availability of maintenance or generation equipment 2.63 2.87

Availability of airframe security support (Raven Team or commercial) 2.42 2.68

Unexpected charges from officials 2.29 2.24

Availability of Jeppesen products or FLIPS 2.04 2.95

Availability of country clearances 2.63 2.18

Comm gear maintenance support 1.29 2.50

Medical, food and water support issues for aircrew and passengers 2.96 3.00

Reachback to AMOCC or other air force control and support center 2.25 2.61

Network (web) access 3.25 2.43

Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 77
If you gave an extreme score, can you elaborate?

• HF radio traffic is hideous! It was not uncommon to have

4 or even 5 airspace controllers screaming your call sign—

whether you were in their FIR or not.

• Schedules fluctuate continuously due to users. No flight

planning support is provided except for diplomatic routing which are often in error (wrong airway names, poor

routing). 

• TERPS approval for IMC approaches is a continual and

significant detriment to safety of flight in AFRICA. Invariably (95% of missions) only one approach is TERPSed—

usually not the one in use. This forces the crews into an

unsafe dilemma—divert (again, available TERPS approaches/dip clc/wx/etc), or fly a non-TERPSed approach (normally the one every other commercial flight is

flying) and “hack” the mission. This begs the question,

why can an airliner with 400 pax fly a Jeppesen approach, but the UNITED STATES DOD can’t? This is the

single biggest stressor for crews flying into AFRICA. (The

problem is exactly the same in EASTERN EUROPE.) We

are guilty of not supplying our crews with adequate resources to complete difficult missions—namely IFR (DOD

or Jeppesen) approaches (or at least, improved TERPS action). Diplomatic clearance is another area where we receive lack of support. For Op ATLAS RESPONSE, we

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Support Category (1= not supportive 5=

consistently supportive

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Scheduling 2.79 3.05

Flight Planning 2.33 2.65

Execution stage (real-time support) 2.54 2.89

Response to concerns identified/process improvement cycle 2.54 2.53

Adequate threat briefing/intelligence preparation 3.04 2.45

Terminal En route Radar Procedure Systems (TERPS) 2.50 2.79

criteria/standards

Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 78
tries surrounding the Red Sea—advising them only to “remain in International Waters.” This is a vague and certainly an ATC hassle (bordering on unsafe for lack of ATC

separation) and completely unnecessary for our crews.

(Get correct DIP CLC or delay the mission!) Launching our

crews with vague notions about how to transit African airspace fails to address the problem and force the issue.

(Our crews are highly skilled and creative which is why

the mission succeeded—not because we provided them

with the correct resources or procedures.) TCAS can be a

lifesaver—should be REQUIRED equipment on USAF aircraft in AFRICA—no exceptions. (This would exclude most

of the C130 fleet.) I have two personal examples of TCAS

preventing mid airs. (or at least near mid-airs)

• Filing at certain location in Eastern & Southern Africa

can be difficult with language and cultural barriers.

• AMOCC at Ramstein AB normally flight plans missions

throughout Europe, but when a mission is fragged to

Africa, the mission planning is placed on the crew. Eurocontrol does not process flight plans beyond entry into

North Africa. Subsequent legs must be individually filed

with each facility. There is no centralized control of air

traffic in most of Africa.

• Did not get the TERPS support needed prior to missions.

Required USAFE DO waiver at 0000Z for support.

• Aircraft Commander is responsible for 100% of the planning in Africa for 76 AS missions.

• All flight planning done by crew in USAFE for Africa. Limited TERPs Support.

• In the DV airlift business, the leadership just expects the

crew to make the mission happen. Basically, once the

basic itinerary is cut, the crew is on their own. They rely

on their own experiences, those of other crew members in

the unit and the embassy personnel at each location.

Most of the time the missions are executed safely, however this does not always mean they are conducted IAW

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all of the governing directives. The explanation for this is

simple, while it is easy to place a statement on the top of

every AFI that states “Compliance with this instruction is

mandatory,” to actually comply with the written regulations in many locations is indeed impossible. For a crew

to comply with these regulations fully, the mission would

not happen the way the leadership expects it to occur.

• TERPsed approaches in Africa require so much lead time

for support that in most OSA (DV support) cases the approaches can’t be done in time. Recently had a mission to

Africa carrying an ambassador to Tanzania, Zimbabwe,

Namibia, and Angola. In most cases. Only one airfield had

a TERPsed approach.

• Additionally, weather support in Africa is poor—USAFE

OWS can not fully support our missions into Africa and

has a difficult time getting the crews good accurate

weather forecasts.

• C-130 NEO of Sierra Leone, inadequate “Treat

briefing/intelligence preparation.” ATC was completely

unprepared for us to fly TAA/Ds. Spent extreme amounts

of time explaining to ATC what a TAA/D was. If TAA/Ds

are required then ATC should be notified so we don’t

spend time on the radio discussing it.

• CENTAF routinely controls C-130 traffic in and out of

west [east?] Africa. Planning and coordination for these

missions is rarely done well. Dip clearances are inadequate, aircraft are over-grossed, etc.

• TERPS is a worldwide deficiency.

• We always had a great ops package in place to include Wx,

Tactics, Intel and Mx. (Guard) 

• Flying strat airlift missions in Africa is always challenging. The biggest problems however are beyond the control

of AMC or the TACC. Their support is adequate in most

instances. We have very little contact with EUCOM during

scheduled missions. 

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• Most C-130 contingency missions receive little or no support from HHQ. The nature of the mission is such that

local commanders (for single ship ops its normally the aircraft commander) are given significant latitude in planning and executing missions.

• In most cases, the flying I have done in Africa, was on

contingency (Provide Relief) or Embassy directed (coalition

exercises with a particular African nation) and was therefore supported by a fairly large AMC support network.

Most of the operations were deployments and supported

accordingly. The majority of problems arose due to the national pride most of the individual nations have in their

“ability to support” visiting aircrews. What I mean is that

the host nation base ops personal would bend over backwards to provide us with weather information, flight plan

processing, fuel/airport services, but due to their own situations (poor, lack of first world technology, etc.) they were

unable to support us in a way that we have grown accustomed to. The effort was there, just not the capability. I

have a major problem with security in those areas. In

spite of the presence of severely armed guards, security

is, in my opinion, severely lacking. There are numerous

methods to gain access to a particular airfield, some due

to graft and corruption. This is a way of life for those people and something that is not easily remedied, just something to be aware of. Customs is another area of concern.

During one deployment (single aircraft), our aircraft had

numerous maintenance problems requiring aircraft parts

from European bases. These parts came in via FedEx or

another civilian carrier. Due to the “work schedule” of the

customs officials, it was next to impossible to gain access

to these parts which severely impacted the success of the

mission. Bribery was finally used as a last ditch method

to get the parts. Just another issue that is not easily

remedied. Flying in Africa is definitely challenging, but

not something that cannot be overcome. Additional attention to detail is required and a greater awareness of what

is going on around you, both on the ground and in the air,

is required. Radio communication, airport services, lodg81

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ing are all! things that must be looked at strongly for any

mission entering the AOR. If there are any questions,

please feel free to contact me via E-mail due to the upcoming PCS.

• Here we used USAFE C2 agencies mostly when supporting African missions to Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, or

Rwanda.

• Very little theater command support available throughout

Africa.

• Majority of my answers are based on flying in Angola in

1992 and Morocco and the areas of Egypt and the Sinai.

Focus on TERPs and all the above questions has enhanced greatly since 1993. As a TALCE CC, we provided

the best support we could in the more recent past, but

better support could always be provided for a price.

• In 1995 while in a crew stage at Rota NAS, I was tasked

by TACC to fly supplies to Sierra Leone in support of the

embassy evac. While flight planning I learned the airfield

was day only (ASR). However, I called the ASR POC at

AMC who told me the restriction was due to poor electrical service; further that he had spoke with an Embassy official and the problem had been fixed. I flew to S.L. with

little or no contact with Khartoum on HF during portions

of the flight. We arrived at S.L. at night with no approach

lighting, but determined the moonlight (and a VOR approach) were sufficient to make a safe landing. Landed

uneventfully, and taxied to the small ramp which was

filled with little light being provided by the 2-3 AF “lightalls” on the ramp. A provisional wx/flightplan team was

in place via satcom. We quickly updated the wx/fp and

unloaded our cargo (ramp ops were hazardous at best).

After cleared for takeoff and lining up on the rwy, airfield

lighting was ! lost . . . completely. However, communication with the tower remained . . . we asked tower if this

happened much: he responded “occasionally.” After a few

minutes the lights returned we were cleared for takeoff

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ceived from Karthoum on HF. We were unable to reach

Karthoum for 1 hour after takeoff and proceeded on the

route according to VFR rules while opposite direction IFR

traffic passed above us. Although this is only one incident, it illustrates some of the common problems we have

in Africa.

• Africa missions are rarely dropped with enough time for

adequate mission planning. Along with this, there are not

any approaches or departures for most locations requiring TERPSed Jeppesen approaches. TERPS can not get

these done on time and crews must depart on the mission

without all the tools needed and try and receive the information while crew resting. Users consistently change itinerary keeping execution out of the loop. Keeping contact

with execution is impossible in many parts of Africa without a satellite phone. Actual and real time threat and Intel

support is weak. We receive a briefing before we depart yet

no updates on the road are given. VIP aircraft are routinely sent to locations that are listed as “no go” and high

threat with no capabilities for threat avoidance or defensive countermeasures. Defensive locations. 

• TACC support was adequate at best, however TERPS support was not good when I was in AMC.USAFE/AMOCC

support during execution of the mission in Africa is nonexistent. They cannot file flight plans, nor is USAFE

TERPS much help when in Africa. The USAFE Threat

Working Group that provides threat/intel briefings to the

crews is lacking and inconsistent. Once I was told not to

crewrest in Dakar (where tourists stay), but it was OK to

stay in Kigali (where we heard gunfire outside the hotel all

night!

• AMC runs missions at whatever hours they are required.

It would be easier and safer to operate in some parts of

Africa during normal daylight hours only. AMC handling

of TERPS issues is pretty good. Much more operationally

flexible than USAFE which crippled itself unnecessarily.

USAFE (94-97) would require daylight VMC ops throughout Africa because adequate NOTAMs and maps weren’t

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available to perform proper TERPS reviews. AMC (97-) has

the same info constraints but uses innovative solutions

like adding a couple hundred feet to the Jeppesen minimums.

9. AMC Support: How well do AMC products, programs, services and policies support your specific needs to fly safely and

effectively in Africa? This time, 1 is “does not support noticeably” and 5 is “supports in a responsive, reliable and innovative manner.”

If you gave an extreme score, can you elaborate?

• Lodwar LZ in northern Kenya was described as in “poor”

condition by the surveying TALCE team, yet nothing was

done before the exercise to fix the problems. We had to

raise a stink with the Army and get them to fix it before

we would land there, which caused delays and changes in

the exercise flow.

• ACFP program has several “blocked airways” into Africa

unnecessarily complicating flight planning and increasing

the workload. 

• TERPS again—The answer we get from TERPS is “get in

line—we have millions ahead of you—you have one approach, why would you want one to the opposite runway—or why would you need more than one departure

TERPSed?” Let us fly Jeppesens. 

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Support Category (1= not supportive 5=

consistently supportive

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Scheduling 3.13 2.92

Flight Planning 2.79 2.71

Execution stage (real time support) 3.00 2.79

Airfield Suitability Reports 3.50 2.53

Summary of Airfield Restrictions 3.25 3.24

Airfield Surveys 3.00 2.68

Adequate threat briefing/intelligence preparation 3.46 2.79

Terminal Enroute Radar Procedure Systems (TERPS) 3.00 2.61

criteria/standards

Response to concerns identified/process improvement cycle 2.83 2.63

Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 84
• AMOCC controls USAFE missions into Africa, we do use

the above noted AMC products which are beneficial to

crew mission planning.

• Have never used AMC (TACC) for Africa. All has been with

USAFE

• 76 AS is in USAFE. Generally, they handle our Command

and Control.

• Airfield Restrictions and suitability reports are sometimes

not up-to-date.

• I am in USAFE and have had no AMC support during my

trips to Africa. However, it is interesting to note the almost

conflicting guidance that the ASRR provides when compared to USAFE policy (i.e., night ops, diverse departure

assessments etc.).

• Airfields not covered in the ASSR. USAFE AMOCC was

supportive but could not get the office (24 AOS) in charge

of TERPs issues to complete TERPs surveys in a timely

manner.

• Same as above.

• Again, AMC always provided more than adequate service,

but was limited due to the “end of the food chain” location. On deployments, an AMC C&C facility was always

there to provide required support. But they were also affected by the “end of the food chain” situation.

• Don’t really deal with AMC. There generally seems to be a

lack of info dealing with African airfields, routes, and

navaids. Not our/AMCs fault.

• AMC far more responsive to aircrew requests than theater

command.

• In Angola in 92, we had almost no survey data or airfield

support in Angola other than at our home base of Luanda. We flew VFR only into many fields in the country

and would do a low pass to clear people and animals off

the runway and then land on the second pass. As the

Nav deputy mission commander, I was tasked to design

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letdowns and ARA procedures to support our operations, but none of this was terpsed or really blessed

other than based on experience. Things have changed

and improved based on my TALCE experience, but there

are so many airfields on the continent that we don’t and

never will have sufficient enough data for all of them.

DOD needs a national level airfield survey office that

performs airfield and site surveys for all airfields anticipated of being used by US aircraft, world wide. All the

services and many of the commands within the services

do some level of this, but there is not one consolidation

point that I know of. AMC with its ASSR report is one of

the best sources of information, but to have all the fields

surveyed and kept current that we really need, you

would need 100s of survey teams to do them all. We do

a good job with the capabilities we have, but the program could be improved.

• During multiple missions to Ghana, the Ivory Coast and

South Africa, the crew would get alerted without flight

plans, weather, or dip clearances. The situation was so

bad we would have to transmit via the l-band system to

acquire the needed info. During the most recent flood relief to Mozambique, no one had any water deployed with

them. Basically we were given an alert time and not much

more. The embassy support was phenomenal. They were

our saving grace.

• Same as above. C-5 does not chop to theater control. On

my last Africa trip, Mozambique flood relief, it was like

trying to perform airlift without phones (little to no comm

with C2 was available). You can’t do this mission without

phones. We didn’t have flight plans, Notams, air refueling info to join with tankers, or mission orders for the

day.

10. NIMA Support. How well do NIMA products, programs,

services and policies support your specific needs to fly safely

and effectively in Africa? This time, 1 is “does not support noticeably” and 5 is “supports in a responsive, reliable and innovative manner.”

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If you gave an extreme score, can you elaborate?

• Very few airfields have DOD FLIP published. Enroute

charts coverage is incomplete. Several airways over the

ocean west of Morocco are not depicted (we need to use

Jeppesen products for coverage). Jeppesen products are

readily available but seldom approved for use due to

USAFE TERPS issues and policy. Other FLIP: Foreign

clearance guide is frequently outdated.

• FLIP pubs are OK—but SPARSE—particularly in airfield

info and number of approaches (the AFRICAN Approach

book is hardly worth publishing—one approach to places

we rarely go is no help).

• We need more approaches and SIDs approved and better

airfield surveys.

• This is simple, the NIMA products we receive are not as

updated as they should be. In addition, frequently in

Africa pilots are using MAJCOM approved TERPS products, because the DOD FLIP does not have the procedures

required or they are incomplete. This lends new meaning

to the term “paperless Air Force.” To see examples of this

just view the ASRR under the Jepps approaches and/or

view the USAFE TERPS Web page. In my experience, I

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Support Category (1= not supportive 5=

consistently supportive

Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Approach/Departure Plates 2.54 2.74

En route charts 3.04 3.16

General planning/area planning publications 2.79 3.24

IFR Supplements 2.83 3.11

In-flight guides 2.67 2.63

Other FLIPs 2.17 1.42

Timeliness, currency, and accuracy 3.00 2.97

Availability of Jeppesen products (may speak to unit policy) 2.88 2.97

Response to concerns identified/process improvement cycle 2.61 2.63

Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 87
cause the DOD charts are missing some of the changes

that are incorporated in Jepps.

• We don’t work directly with NIMA.

• NIMA approach/departure plates simply don’t exist for

many areas that may have Jeppesen products available.

Flight planning processes are delayed significantly when

these very necessary pieces of information are not available or hard to get through normal sources.

• No JOGs available for most of our routing. We flew low levels on “other” charts. When asked, NIMA gave us the standard, “we don’t have them and it will take to long for us to

get them.”

• We had airline guys with Jeps. Our charts had coverage

holes in them. Just big white areas. That was 8 years ago.

(Guard)

• Jeppesen products were copied illegally (copyright) and

distributed to the crews.

• With regard to Jeppesen products, our unit maintained

(and funded) its own volumes of Jeppesen products because DOD publications did not cover most of the airfields

we traveled to in Africa as well as South America, FSU

and SEA.

• NIMA products are generally good. Jeppesen and other

products (ASRR, etc.) are good for major airports, but

rarely cover the airfields most C-130 operations must

transit. In many cases, you go with a satellite shot or

nothing at all and make the best of it.

• NIMA products are generally good, but info out of the

African countries is hard to acquire sometimes and they

cant help but be behind.

• Very few DoD approach/departure plates in numerous locations in Africa.

• There are hardly any DOD plates for Africa. Jeppesen are

available but the are not TERPSed and approved in a

timely manner.

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• Products are fine if you only go to major airports. If a contingency kicks off you often go to some hole in the wall or

mil base and have no DOD products. Accuracy varies.

11. How do you usually resolve issues and flight challenges

when preparing for or executing missions in Africa? (Check all

that apply.)

12. How many of the following programs are you familiar with?

Phoenix Raven (48)

Safe Skies for Africa (7)

Falconview (50)

TCAS (55)

Proposal to install anti-ground to air radar on selected

transport aircraft (6)

Contingency Response Group (34)

13. What recommendations do you have for Air Force planners

to improve the safety, reliability and effectiveness of air operations in Africa?

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Strategic Tactical

Mobility Airlift

Call back to home station 12 17

Call back to AMC or theater 24-hour support center 11 13

Rely on the Defense or Air Attaché in country 12 21

Rely on commercial airline services 1 4

Avoid known problem airports 4 5

Refuse or modify missions 1 10

Attempt to be self-sufficient in areas of security, health, maps, 12 11

communications, logistics, maintenance, extra equipment, etc.

Other (please elaborate)

• Bring it with you as part of the deployment Rarely

had problem “teaming” with all agencies supported

by the mission(s)—conference calls work.

• Fed Ex for aircraft parts to small locations

• Work with host-nation military forces, particularly

air force contacts

• Since communication by telephone or HF can be

difficult at best, self-sufficiency is a necessity

Appendix A 12/19/01 2:14 PM Page 89
• Continue to work with host national ATC to improve their

training/competency/capability.

• Need reliable communications (cell phone, satellite phone

or other). Publish more Approaches in FLIP. Encourage

installation of ATC radar in the region.

• TCAS required. Dip CLCs are mandatory. TERPS support

or address the issue of Jeppesen approaches

• The CRG is worth their weight in GOLD!!! Outstanding

support and coordination efforts during Operation Atlas

Response.

• Specialized qualification for aircrews operating in Africa,

with focus on unicom position reporting and flying Jeppesen procedures.

• Issue TERPS for multiple runways for both arrival AND

departures, not just arrivals. Insure crews are versed in

HF procedures transiting Africa (FIH).

• The greatest challenge we have is getting Jeppesen Approaches and SIDs approved in a timely manner. Many

times we go down with only the fields approved we are

going to land at. If there was enough lead time, we may

have one alternate approved. When we go into a place, We

get one approach to each runway (i.e., an approach to

Runway 09 and an approach to Runway 27) and one SID

from each runway. Controllers don’t understand you can

only accept one approach and one SID and may make you

fly something else. Anything else falls on the aircraft

commander to sort out. Approve more approaches for

DOD use would help this. This is also true in Eastern Europe former Soviet Union and many other third world

countries. The second greatest problem is getting Diplomatic landing clearance and visas. These take time which

is not always a luxury we have.

• Avoid uncontrolled air space.

• Senior Leadership needs to realize that there are unique

problems to flying in Africa and that more attention and

time to plan is needed for missions in Africa. 

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• This at present is impossible. All Air Force aircraft must

be equipped with modern technology such as GPS and

TCAS. Interestingly enough following the C-141 midair

collision over Africa a call went out for all aircraft to get

TCAS, this as yet has not happened. Until the USAF is

ready to spend the $$ to support safer operations addressing this issue is a waste of time. Cheap improvements do not help, we need the whole deal, we either commit to safer operations and do what is required or we don’t

and stop giving it lip service. If you can do anything, provide crews plenty of lead time to prepare for these trips. I

have seen crews sent to Africa with less than 24 hour notice, this is less than the 48 hours required to begin the

malaria medicine. I also do not understand why the visa

issue is so painful, if the unit is responsible for these then

they need time to comply with the FCG.

• Every airfield the USAF flies to needs to have at least one

TERPsed approach to each runway and a method of departing the airfield safely (radar, diverse dept, or SID).

Also we need some sort of capability to get accurate

weather forecasts.

• Concentrate on infrastructure within the entire continent.

Specifically, we encountered difficulty in servicing aircraft

oxygen supplies that would have stranded the aircraft had

we not taken extreme measures to fix the problem. Prepositioning maintenance and support equipment or having

these services available and more widespread is essential.

NIMA products also need to be updated and brought into

alliance with Jeppesen-like coverage. Airline service to

many of the fields we operate to/from exists and has for

years and we limit ourselves if we can’t count on having

complete and accurate flight publications.

• Good coordination with other humanitarian relief agencies in order to deconflict airspace. Provide or upgrade

current in-country navigation aids.

• Don’t plan NEOs without supplying JOG’s! 

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• Tell NIMA to publish wildlife areas better so planners

know exact areas to climb over.

• We had to implement our own enroute Air Traffic Control

between Kenya and Somalia. We had a plan using altitudes and airspeeds but some of the other nations didn’t

abide by the plan. We then had to use whatever we had

onboard (i.e., RADAR, TCAS, eyeballs). Don’t make a plan

which relies on a piece of equipment that is not universal

(GPS, TCAS).

• I’ve always had good background info. Keep getting info

from the embassy and reliable sources so that if a contingency pops up you have current info. (Guard)

• The single most significant thing the AF can do to help is

to fund and maintain Jeppesen approach publications for

all squadrons who are routinely tasked with accomplishing missions in Africa.

• If we want to continue to operate over there, and do it

safely, then we should take over the whole operation and

install an ATC structure. If not we should invest in the

ATC structure or abandon missions there.

• We need people who are familiar with the area (politics,

terrain, environmental conditions, populace, airfields, air

structure, etc., to be called in at the beginning if a contingency operation is planned for this AOR. Africa, to a

greater extent than ANY other AOR, is one that planners

must have been to and operated in previously before allowing them to be involved in contingency planning. Its

the old you’ve had to have been there or you cant go. Too

many variables and unique situations that must be conquered by planners in the AOR to let in “newbies” who

need to get their feet wet.

• Get AF planners who are familiar with the conditions on

the ground there. It should be a requirement that planners have in-theater experience before sending a mass

gaggle into a contingency.

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• Just be aware of the limitations aircrews have when in

Africa and provide a certain amount of trust to the aircrews. We should not have our hands held throughout a

particular mission. In my time flying the Herc, I have

gained a lot of respect for Herc crews. They WILL get the

mission done, and for the extreme most part, it is done

safely and efficiently. AMC needs to continue to let us do

our job and provide the trust we both want and need.

• Use of technology today to show aircraft commanders

“pictures” or airfield diagrams of locations to be transited.

Cross-tell between pilots/crews flying into the AOR affected. Good theater briefs are essential—customs, security, medical issues. Solid insight into logistical support

available—ramp space, fuel, food, maintenance, transport

C2 connectivity to coordinate mission needs is critical—

reachback to TACC and/or JTF AME is critical.

• Diplomatic/Intelligence support of operations in the planning/contingency phase to allow full-range forward-deployable support packages to enter before/with military

air mobility ops. When someone (user/DAO for VIP;

TACC/AMOCC planners for contingency/humanitarian)

hasn’t done the full-blown planning before an

aircraft/crew arrives (attempts to arrive)—then the mission goes poorly. When this think-tank process has occurred—then the missions go smoothly.

• TCAS requirement. Stress the training of current procedures. Require Raven teams. Require bottled water and

MREs to be brought with. Ensure POC who has handled

all landing fee issues is awaiting arrival of aircraft.

• Stabilize the continent politically, fiscally, and up their

education level.

• Have a clear mission FIRST, then provide the operators

with the resources (country clearances, airfield surveys,

etc.) so they can accomplish that mission.

• Forward locate contingency supplies at a secure location

within Africa. These supplies should include Mobile Mi93

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crowave Landing Systems (MMLS) or other highly mobile

precision approach systems, along with base perimeter

defense supplies. First aircraft into contingency location

could transport security force team to quickly break out

supplies and defend build up location. USAF ATC personnel could quickly set up the precision approach system

and the contingency op would be safely on its way. 

• As mentioned earlier, create a DOD level office that works

with NIMA to conduct surveys of all airfields that may be

used by C-130 or larger aircraft. Publish the data and

keep it up to date.

• Absolutely all aircraft that fly into areas other than our

usual European NATO countries should have TCAS as a

minimum. The system is almost 20 years old and it seems

irresponsible of our military not to supply it.

• Although contingencies sometimes give little time for

planning, work to establish lines of communication early.

Task folks with theater planning specifically to Africa and

not as an “arm” from east cell. There are plenty of folks

willing to help us in Africa but they lack information and

resources to do this.

• Survey, Implement, and Certify use of portable navaids in

contingency/exercise locations. Implement dispersion of

approach plates to planners/aircrew via WWW.

• More approaches in the DOD Flip and more TERPS support. Also TCAS is almost a must in Africa. It makes

things more challenging without it. TERPS and proper

threat assessments are the biggest issues.

• I have three recommendations: 1. TERPS2. TERPS3. Better weather support. We need more approaches and departures out of these fields with current and reliable information. The fact remains that we will be tasked to fly

into these fields. And in many cases we are forced to make

dangerous decisions because we don’t have the TERPS

info we need to get in and out of these fields. The weather

info I have received in Africa is generally either wrong or

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understated which has led me into several dangerous situations because of low ceilings where none were reported

or T-storms that were more prolific than forecast.

• Keep operations simple, minimize need for air refueling

and stick to major airports.

• An air refueling mission is hard enough to pull off with

adequate information, but very difficult if you can’t get

to a working phone/fax/or E-mail.

• Enhance communication abilities. Issue worldwide cell

phones or satellite phones to crews transiting Africa.

This would solve many problems.

• Operate during normal daylight working hours. This

makes it easier to get aircrew and transportation support; see terrain; and to avoid weather and terrain hazards. 

• En route support agencies really help out and make the

mission possible.

• Stay out of Africa where possible. Too many diseases,

too hot, too dangerous.

• Somehow get the controllers to talk to not only the aircraft, but also to each other!

• TCAS, Dual VHF radios for C-130s.

14. The idea of expeditionary air ops is not new to airlifters.

Do you have any comments or suggestions to help improve

how we do these expeditionary operations in Africa?

• Attack the above problems en-masse. Build web-site for

AFRICA continuity—lessons learned, etc.

• Developing liaisons with flight plan filing and

tower/ground operations are crucial at busy international

airports that might not be used to airlift operations; to include taxiing, up- and downloading procedures, etc.

• Send in advance teams which can TERP potential airfields

to include all data that may be beneficial to crews. I recommend producing an extensive “in-flight” guide for each

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airfields to include any additional information not found

in FLIP or GP. Lufthansa and Britannia airlines fly regular routes throughout Africa. Use their expertise (and perhaps briefers) to make flying safer in Africa.

• Does it really matter? We were not asked to provide input

on the whole expeditionary ops issue in the first place.

Flying operations in Africa requires time to prepare and

experienced personnel to fill in the gaps. Since the AEF

concept is based on short notice deployment and a great

deal of experience is departing the Air Force, we are

primed for a major mishap in Africa.

• We need a crack group of individuals that can handle

short notice requests for TERPs support of approaches

and departures at African airfields and a command and

control that can get CFPs and reliable weather to aircrews. Also, reliable communication systems are a must.

Iridium phones were good but are now bankrupt—regional cell phones can not be relied upon.

• Always bring a contracting officer and finance officer

when deploying to Africa. Put them on the ADVON, keep

them happy. They will make or break your deployment. 

• Take more people than you think you need. There is always plenty of work to do and never enough bodies. I’ve

worked a lot of 12 hour shifts as a planner or Tactics guy

and it decreases performance over time. (Guard)

• Other alternatives [include] no night VFR authorized

without a waiver. Took us a while to get a waiver for night

VFR [and] Review prior mission reports.

• How does the AEF help airlifters? The concept only applies to the fighter/bomber/etc types who know their rotation. It does not apply to airlifters since we are the ones

who continually have to lift them into

• The theater. As far as the AEF concept goes, it is severely

one sided. Its no wonder we cant keep trained pilots. I

wish we could match our Ops Tempo with actual force

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tion of forces yet, the Ops Tempo has increased 300-

400%? Solve that problem and the ensuing expectations,

and you will solve the retention problem.

• Plan to take everything!! Transport, tents, medical, security, fuel, portable TACANs, etc. Do not try to do it with

multiple aircraft on a long term mission with a shoestring

budget. You’ll lose crews, aircraft and material

• See above. [Do] not rely on any host nation support - the

offer is unreliable and the material of questionable serviceability.

• None. AEF is just another name for the scheduled deployments we used to do. All squadrons required to support AEF operations are well versed in flying and know

what has to be done to execute an African mission. Again,

provide the trust and whatever support can be provided. 

• Follow model of C-130s when they deploy—they have

done it for years. Unit integrity—to foster teaming, to take

advantage of “certifying” the UTCs and team to support

the AEF is smart Wings, Squadrons, units like deploying

as a team—want to take their maintenance, support elements with them

• Get no-kidding experienced aircrew involved in the abovementioned think-tank process. The AMC AMWC at Fort

Dix (McGuire) has some of these experienced people and

they need more and the budget to continue the science of

air mobility ops. Then their corporate knowledge must be

published in users guides and then trained toward

TALCE/Stage Mgrs./AMEs, and to DAOs when no

AMC/Theater C2 forward presence is not used.

• Don’t put fighter guys in charge. Most NAFs and MAJCOMS where the AEF CC will come from is a fighter dude.

Need more heavy guys/gals on the staff so they can have

the local “expertise” on hand to do things wisely.

• A band-aid on an amputation is not enough. Relief efforts

in Africa are a waste of resources if not part of a larger

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tries. And I don’t believe that such rebuilding is the responsibility of the U.S. military. I’ve deployed to Kenya

twice for Somalia relief efforts (3 months total) and to

South Africa once supporting Mozambique relief efforts (1

month). The Somalia effort was (in my eyes) more successful because there was a more clearly defined objective. As for the Mozambique effort, to the line flyer it

seemed to be unfocused and more of an effort to prove

that we could deploy - whether we had a mission or not.

• See comments above [regarding prepositioning]. First aircraft in should be carrying base defense assets, followed

by ATC assets. Then the actual operation (movement of

humanitarian supplies, NEO, etc.) could begin in earnest.

• In every AEF package/unit move, include a LOG Planner

UTC in the tasking for each deploying unit, or incorporate

Log Planners into the Aviation UTCs and other support

UTCs so that the arrival, beddown and retrograde/redeployments go smooth.

• My missions into Northern Africa were fairly good, not

many complaints. However I did not have the fortune of

flying into sub-Saharan Africa, only Tunisia and Morocco.

Good luck.

• TCAS More training to enhance familiarity with flying in

Africa. Schedule missions to Take-off/Land during daytime.

• The simplest (small) things have the biggest impact in

stage operations. During stage operations issues such as

fleet service, water, accurate load information, passenger

manifests, etc. For the crews themselves, timely transportation to and from the aircraft is always a nightmare.

Having to wait as much as 2 hours (at the acft) at the end

of the duty day for transport to quarters does not help either. Crews having to sleep on the aircraft (as crew rest)

is unacceptable.

• Develop “primary” vs “alternate” operating locations in

Africa which would cover most contingency locations.

This could be done now. As these relationships could take

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time to mature, sufficient lead time is a must. Airfield surveys could be completed as well as TERPs data. Proposed

contracts or gentlemen’s agreements for things such as

food, water, transportation and lodging could be obtained.

This would be far better than swamping the embassy personnel with 5 aircrews and 3 aircraft at the last minute.

Immediate response to some situations is critical. However, lack of organization impedes progress as much as

non-reaction.

• As a C-5 pilot during ops into Somalia and Kenya/Rwanda,

I experienced difficulty with enroute controllers frequently, but it did not bother me a whole lot. The phase

that was of greatest concern to me was the last 150 miles

into an airport, after the descent was started, while still

under the control of local controllers. It was always a

comforting feeling to be under control of a US military

controller for the final phase of the approach (inside of 30

miles). If US controllers were not established at more austere locations, that was the time I felt the greatest danger

(specifically if weather was a factor).

• Small advance teams (these could be contractors) used to

set up communication/navigation equipment would help

dramatically instead of relying on the host nation approaches.

• Send TERPS and a Combat Weather Team to the region

where the EAF operations are to be conducted.

• It might be advisable to assign only the most experienced

planners to Africa missions, and add an extra level of

planning scrutiny. Too often I have seen Africa missions

planned very poorly with impossible plans - thereby requiring extraordinary efforts from the crews.

• Since the installation of GPS equipment I have noticed

that most other GPS airplanes pass exactly overhead or

underneath. Precision equipment has reduced the margin

of error in flight ops. In Africa where there is little radar

control this could have deadly consequences. We should

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get TCAS soon or consider offsetting from course centerlines. 

• Noteworthy experiences:

• In Ghana the airport ran out of fuel for three days and

could not support C-5 operations. Local national

ground crews were incapable of marshalling our airplanes onto tight ramps but would not allow USAF personnel to do it. These locals later ran a stair truck into

one of the airplanes parked on the ramp. By the end of

the mission the ramp pavement was badly damaged.

• On a return trip from South Africa (a pretty advanced

African country) our flight plan was never transmitted

to other Oceanic control centers. We air refueled over

the ocean and were not able to gain radio contact again

for several hours. None of the areas we transited cared

about our flight plan until we arrived unannounced into

New York Oceanic airspace at which time we became a

traffic conflict and almost got violated.

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101

Appendix B

African Airfields Listed in the Airfield

Suitability and Restrictions Report*

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Appendix C

Questionnaire Responses from Attachés

Questionnaire on Infrastructure and Process Challenges

to Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa

The objective of this questionnaire is to better understand and

evaluate the numerous air and transportation challenges of

African air operations, from an operator and planner perspective, to determine possible future directions for EAF planning

in Africa. These problems may relate to air safety, navigation,

ground transportation network and airport infrastructure immaturity, security, geography, culture, or governmental mismanagement.

This questionnaire is in support of an Institute for National

Security Studies (INSS)-sponsored research project by Maj

Karen U. Kwiatkowski, Africa Branch, Headquarters United

States Air Force Regional Plans and Issues Division, Washington, D.C. The final report will be written no later than 1 August 2000. 

I am seeking your help because of your ability to share experiences, anecdotes, perspective, insight, and suggestions regarding the conduct of military air operations in Africa. Your

anonymity will be protected and your responses will not be attributed to you, if you desire. This questionnaire contains

eight questions, most of which include a simple rating scheme,

and should take about fifteen minutes. I greatly appreciate

your assistance and comments. 

NOTE: I encourage you to E-mail this questionnaire to any associates or peers. I can be reached at (703) 695-1539, DSN

prefix is 22X. Web site location for this questionnaire is

http://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xop/xopx/attache1.shtml.

Name: 

E-mail Address:

Mail Address (optional):

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Phone (optional): 

Fax (optional):

Would like a copy of the completed study mailed to the above

address? Yes/No

1. What country (ies) do you have direct experience with for

purposes of this study?

No significant inputs to report 

2. In what parts of Africa is the bulk of your experience?

# of responses

XX North Africa

West Africa

East Africa

X Central Africa

XX Southern Africa

3. How would you characterize the missions you have been

involved in:

# of Responses

4. Theater Command Support: How well does your theater

command and your air component support your specific needs

to fly safely and effectively in Africa? This time, 1 is “does not

support noticeably” and 5 is “supports in a responsive, reliable

and innovative manner.”

120

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Routine channel and supply flights for embassy support XX

Non-routine transports of material (non-emergency) X

Non-routine transport of VIPs (including EAGLE VISTA) XXXX

Support to exercises in the region (Gabon 1998, 2000, XX

Blue Hungwe/Crane, etc.)

Humanitarian response missions X

Contingency Ops

NEOs

Other (please list) X

• NASA space shuttle support 

Appendix C 12/19/01 2:16 PM Page 120
5. How many of the following programs are you familiar with?

# of Responses

Phoenix Raven XXXX

Safe Skies for Africa 

Falconview 

TCAS 

Proposal to install antiground to air radar on selected

transport aircraft 

Contingency Response Group

ACSA X

6. What are the three top problems facing you in supporting

air operations in your AOR?

• Aside from coordination problems, we have few air op difficulties. We have a lot of refueling stops, because of the effectiveness of our local staff the planes are fueled and back

in the air quickly.

121

KWIATKOWSKI

# and type of

Responses

Support Category 1= not supportive, 5 =

consistently supportive

Scheduling 1, 4, 3, 4

Flight Planning 1, 4, 4, 4

Execution stage (real time support) 1, 4, 4, 4

Response to concerns identified/process 1, 4, 4, 3

improvement cycle

Adequate threat briefing/intelligence preparation 1, 4, 4, 3

If you gave an extreme score, can you elaborate?

• We support USAF (fueling), but receive none (e.g., we

have been trying to get a C-130 engine here for three

months. AF cannot do because the channel flights are full

of rations. In my year here in Niamey we have had no

channel flights. Oreos seem to have priority over an engine. Something’s wrong here).

• Scheduling problems are probably due to VIP short notices to fly. With all the problems happening on the African

continent, there are short notice requirements for VIP

flights. It creates problems in trying to get overflight and

landing clearances for the days requested, some as short

as one or two days.

Appendix C 12/19/01 2:16 PM Page 121
• Lack of resources (only three people in the DAO); Not

enough lead time, or lack of information on the exact intent or needs from the aircrew.

• Timely submission and issue of overflight/landing clearances. There is currently a civil war in Angola. The government strictly controls its airspace and requires prior

permission for overflights and landings, no exceptions.

The issuance of clearances. The government is also at

fault by not issuing the clearances in a timely manner.

Usually they are issues the day before the overflight or

landing. This is due to bureaucracy and ineptness.

• Search and rescue operations (for Angola government). In

1997 a C-141 crashed off the coast of Angola and

Namibia. The government of Angola did not have and capability for search and rescue. It was a day and a half before search and rescue operations could begin. The assistance was from another country.

• Communications and radar. The current airport has no

radar. All operations are accomplished by communications and sight. Communications are usually accomplished by NOTAMS when sending flight plans to the next

destination. They recently installed a VSAT to improve

communications. 

• Uncertified or unpublished approaches.

• High volume vis a vis support staff here.

7. What recommendations do you have for the Air Force to

improve safety, reliability and effectiveness of air operations in

Africa?

• We in Niamey need a permanent military presence. A attaché with good relations with the local military would

make it much easier to coordinate air ops.

• A team should come to Africa to review hands on the different airfields and procedures with each of the embassies

and DAOs in the respective countries.

122

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Appendix C 12/19/01 2:16 PM Page 122
• Work with host country to certify more approaches and

get host military to publish their approaches.

8. The idea of expeditionary air ops is not new. Do you have

any other comments or suggestions to help improve how we do

these expeditionary operations in Africa?

• Train local military folks re US air ops. These guys respect

greatly the US military. They would love to work more

closely with you. Training them about how we do business would make coordination easier and be a great PR

and bilateral relations coup.

123

KWIATKOWSKI

Appendix C 12/19/01 2:16 PM Page 123
Glossary

Abbrevations, Acronyms, Terms, and Explanations

ACI Airports Council International 

ACSA acquisition and cross servicing agreement

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Air Combat Langley AFB, Va.

Command

AMC Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.

AMOCC air mobility operations control center

AOC air operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ASECNA L’agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation

Aérienne en Afrique Et à Madagascar, or Agency

for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar

ASI Air Security International, Inc.

ASRR Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report

(produced by AMC/DOV)

ATC air traffic control

CENTCOM Central Command (also USCENTCOM), MacDill

AFB, Fla.; AOR Horn of Africa 

CFP commercial flight publications

CINC commander in chief

CNN Cable News Network

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

CONUS continental United States

DIRMOBFOR Director of Mobility Forces

DHL DHL Air Express, worldwide air delivery service

DOD Department of Defense

DOT Department of Transportation (US federal 

department)

DROC Democratic Republic of the Congo (prior to 1998,

known as Zaire)

DSN defense switched network 

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States

Military Observer Group

EUCOM European Command (also USEUCOM), Stuttgart,

Germany

FAA Federal Aviation Administration (US federal

agency)

FalconView Georgia Tech Research Institute, developed under

DOD contract, map integration software

FLIP flight information publications

FOL forward operating location

GCCI Global Crisis Control International, Inc.

125

Glossary 12/19/01 2:18 PM Page 125
GDSS global decision support system (AMC Internet

mobility system)

GPS Global Positioning System

HAST Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team

HEF Humanitarian Expeditionary Force

HF high frequency (long-range radio, 3–30 MHz)

IAP International Airport

IASA International Aviation Safety Assessment

IATA International Air Transport Association

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IFALPA International Federation of Airline Pilots’

Associations

INMARSAT international marine/maritime satellite

ISB intermediate staging bases

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

Jeppesen commercial company that produces flight

information publications worldwide

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF Joint Task Force

JULLS joint universal lessons learned system 

LAPES low-altitude parachute extraction system

lb pound

LCCO low-cost combat offload

NAVAID navigational aids

NGO nongovernment organizations

NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency 

(US agency)

NOTAM notice to airmen

OPDS offshore petroleum distribution system

PACAF Pacific Command (Hickam AFB, Hawaii; AOR

Madagascar, Pacific Islands)

PFPS portable flight planning software 

RAI regional airspace initiative (Eastern Europe)

RFIC reduced footprint initial communication (package)

SAAF South African Air Force

SASG South African Skies Group

SATCOM satellite communications

SOFA status of forces agreement

SPP State Partnership Program

TALCE Tanker Airlift Liaison and Control Element

TACC Tanker Airlift Control Center

TCAS Traffic Alert/Collision Avoidance System

TDC theater deployable communications (package)

TERPS terminal en route radar procedures system

126

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Glossary 12/19/01 2:18 PM Page 126
3AF Third Air Force, RAF Mildenhall, UK

(numbered Air Force responsible for most

of sub-Saharan Africa)

UHF ultrahigh frequency (midrange radio, .3–3 GHz)

USAFE United States Air Forces Europe, Ramstein

AB, Germany

very high short-range radio, 30–300 MHz

frequency

VIP very important person

VOR VHF omni-directional radio-range

WFP World Food Programme

127

<HAZDRA>

Glossary 12/19/01 2:18 PM Page 127
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Abidjan, 1, 6, 20–21

acquisition and cross servicing agreement (ACSA), 39–40 

African Crisis Response Initiative, 55

Agency for Air Navigation Safety in

Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA),

7–8, 10, 48 

Air

Afrique, 70

Combat Command, 38 

Force Tactics, Techniques and

Procedures (AFTTP), 51 

France, 59

Mobility Battlelab, 34, 43–44, 50, 69

Mobility Command (AMC), 8, 13–14,

16, 20, 26, 29, 35–38, 42, 44,

61–63, 67, 69

Mobility Operations Command

Center (AMOCC), 36, 60 

National Guard, 15, 49

operations center (AOC), 19

Security International, Inc. (ASI), 43

traffic control (ATC), 1, 3, 13, 17, 24,

33–34, 43, 48, 57–58, 66 

Zimbabwe, 1

aircraft

A-10, 50

C-5, 21–22, 24, 27, 37, 45, 51, 55

C-9, 24, 37

C-17, 13, 21–22, 24, 30, 37, 43–45,

51

C-20, 44, 55, 61

C-21, 24, 37, 44, 61

C-130, 13, 15, 21, 23–24, 27, 30, 37,

43, 45, 55

C-141, 1, 13, 22, 24, 33, 48, 51, 55,

66, 68

C-160, 15

F-16, 38

KC-135, 22, 37, 46

Tu-154, 1, 33

Airfield Suitability and Restrictions

Report (ASRR), 13, 16, 30, 35–36, 38 

Airlift Defensive Systems program, 44

Airline Pilots Association of South Africa,

58

Airports Council International

(ACI), 3–4, 8 

Angola, 1, 4, 7–8, 37

area of responsibility (AOR), 17, 125

Army Military Traffic Management

Command, 40

Bill, Cathy, 58

Blue Crane/Hungwe, 55

Brown and Root, Incorporated, 45

Cape Verde Airlines, 1

Cirafici, John L., 13

civil-military operations center, 16 

Clinton, William J., 14, 24

CNN, 34

commander in chief (CINC), 16, 22, 36,

46–47 

Common Market for Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA), 48–49 

Comoro Islands, 1

Congress, 18

container delivery system, 23 

Contingency Response Group, 28 

CONUS, 21 

Crisis Action Team Cell, 25, 28

Defense 

Commercial Communications

Office, 17

Information Systems Agency, 17 

Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DROC), 2, 4, 7–8, 15, 18, 22, 41, 69 

Department of

Defense (DOD), 8, 36, 42, 49, 61 

State, 49

Transportation (DOT), 7–8, 47, 49

Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR), 15, 27

Economic Community of West African

States Military Observer Group

(ECOMOG), 20–21, 69 

Entebbe, 5, 16, 20, 25

Esso Corporation, 70

Ethiopian Air, 1

Ethiopian–Eritrean war, 7

135

Index

index 12/19/01 2:20 PM Page 135
European Command (EUCOM), 4, 17,

27, 36, 39, 41, 45–46, 49, 62, 68 

Expeditionary Air Force, 35

FAA IASA, 2, 8

FalconView, 38 

Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA), 2, 4,

7–10, 33, 35, 48–49, 55, 58, 68 

Express, 56, 63

Transit Administration, 47

flight information publications (FLIP), 24,

24, 59–61

Flight Safety Foundation, 7

Fogleman, Ronald L., 35

Fort Dix, New Jersey, 34

forward operating location (FOL), 15, 18 

Freight Forecast, 7

French Air Force, 70

Global 

Crisis Control International (GCCI),

Incorporated, 43 

decision support system (GDSS), 17,

19, 35–37 

Positioning System (GPS), 23, 44,

65–66 

Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, 43

Headquarters 

AF/ILXX, 35

AMC, 36

Heller, Joseph, 58

Hoedspruit, 27–28

Humanitarian

Assistance Survey Team (HAST), 20,

27 

Expeditionary Force (HEF), 50 

infrared, 43 

INMARSAT system, 21, 25

intermediate staging bases (ISB), 45–46 

International 

Airport (IAP), 21–22 

Air Transport Association (IATA), 7,

33, 48, 58

Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA),

2–3, 5–6, 8–9 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),

1–2, 10, 26, 33, 47–48, 55–56 

Federation of Airline Pilots’

Associations (IFALPA), 8, 33, 48

Jeppesen, 37, 60–61, 63, 67

Johannesburg, 6, 27, 34

Airport, 27

Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 26,

special operations task force

(JSOTF), 17, 28 

Task Force (JTF), 14, 16–22, 24–25

Universal Lesson Learned System

(JULLS), 15

Jumper, John P., 50

Kagame, Paul. See Rwandan Patriotic

Front

Kenyan Airways, 1

Kigali International Airport, 16

L-382, 23

Lagos, 6, 34

Lange, John E., 18

Libya, 1, 41

Lockheed Martin Air Traffic Management

Division, 49

low-altitude parachute extraction system

(LAPES), 50

low-cost combat offload (LCCO), 50

Lufthansa, 59

Malian Air Force, 70

Marine Corps, 24, 46

Marine Expeditionary Unit

26th, 22

meals ready to eat, 23 

Mediterranean Sea, 16

National Imagery and Mapping Agency

(NIMA), 35–36, 38, 63, 67 

navigational aids (NAVAID), 20, 40

noncombatant evacuation operations

(NEO), 20, 22

nongovernment organizations (NGO),

16, 67 

offshore petroleum distribution system

(OPDS), 45

Omega Air, Incorporated, 46

operations/exercises

136

index 12/19/01 2:20 PM Page 136
Allied Force, 14

Assured Lift, 14, 20–21, 25, 30, 37

Atlas Response, 27–28, 34

Authentic Assistance, 70

Eagle Vista, 14, 24–25, 30

Golden Spear, 55

Guardian Assistance, 18, 21, 23, 25,

45

Guardian Retrieval, 22, 37

Noble Response, 14, 23–24

Phoenix Raven, 34, 42, 65

Provide Relief, 14–15

Red Flag, 44

Red Horse, 44

Restore Hope, 14–15

Shining Hope, 14

Support Hope, 14–16, 18, 25, 45

Pacific Command, 39 

Pallet 463L, 50

Parameters, 18, 38

Partnership for Peace, 48

portable flight planning software (PFPS),

34, 50, 67–68 

RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom, 28

Ramstein Air Base (AB), Germany, 25,

28, 61

reduced footprint initial communications (RFIC), 28

regional airspace initiative (RAI), 34, 48,

126

Republic of the Congo, 2, 7, 

Roberts International Airport, 21–22

Rwandan 

Armed Forces, 18

Patriotic Front, 15

Safe African Skies Group (SASG), 8, 10,

47, 49 

SASG–COMESA, 49

satellite communications (SATCOM), 48,

57

Seaboldt, Howie, 70

Slater, Rodney E., 47

South African Air Force (SAAF), 27–28 

South African Development

Community, 48

special assignment airlift missions, 55

Special Forces, 20

Special Operations Group

352d, 20

State Partnership Program (SPP), 49 

status of forces agreement (SOFA), 39 

Tanker 

Airlift Control Center (TACC), 36 

airlift control element (TALCE), 16,

20, 27 

Tanzania, 1, 5, 8–10

terminal en route radar procedures system (TERPS), 36, 60–63, 68

theater deployable communications

(TDC), 28

Third Air Force (3AF), 20, 28, 34 

Traffic/Alert Collision Avoidance System

(TCAS), 26, 44, 61, 65–66

ultrahigh frequency, 21 

United

Nations, 1, 68

Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, 16

United States

Air Forces Europe (USAFE), 17–18,

22, 28, 30, 36, 38, 50, 59, 62–63,

68–70

Army Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center, 44

Central Command (CENTCOM), 23,

36, 39, 62, 68 

Federal Transit Administration, 47

government, 8, 10

Marine Corps, 24

Transportation Command, 26

USAFE’s Strategic Vision, 18

Wajir Airfield, 24

World Food Programme (WFP), 23, 68

137

index 12/19/01 2:20 PM Page 137
Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa

Challenges and Solutions

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Hattie D. Minter

Copy Editor

Rita B. Mathis

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Vivian D. O’Neal

backcover 12/19/01 2:20 PM Page 1