AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

The Role of Rhetorical Theory in

Military Intelligence Analysis

A Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory

GARY H. MILLS

Major, USAF

Fairchild Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

August 2003
Air University Library Cataloging Data

Mills, Gary H., 1967–

The role of rhetorical theory in military intelligence analysis : a soldier’s guide to

rhetorical theory / Gary H. Mills.

p. : ill. ; cm. –– (Fairchild paper, ISSN 1528-2325)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 1-58566-121-X

1. Foucault, Michel. 2. Military intelligence. 3. Rhetoric. 4. Discourse analysis.

5. Intelligence officers. I. Title. II. Series.

358.3432––dc21

ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Fairchild Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.

mil and the Air University Research Web site http://research.

maxwell.af.mil.
Dedicated to

Muir S. Fairchild (1894–1950), the first commander of

Air University and the university’s conceptual father.

General Fairchild was part visionary, part keen taskmaster,

and “Air Force to the core.” His legacy is one of confidence

about the future of the Air Force and the central

role of Air University in that future.
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 LET’S GET RHETORICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

4 [WHAT THE] FOUCAULT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

5 POWER PLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

6 DISCONTINUITY FEVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

7 IN THE TRENCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

v
Illustrations

Figure Page

1 Military Briefing Origins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 Intelligence Organizations (Agencies) . . . . . . . . . 12

3 Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4 Spectrum of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

5 The Panopticon’s Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

6 Power and Knowledge Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

7 Discourse Hierarchies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

8 Discourse Tactical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 34

9 Power Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

10 Influence of Deception Warning Signs on

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

11 Communication Triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

12 Communication Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

13 Enhanced Communication Triangle . . . . . . . . . . 50

Photographs

National Reconnaissance Office Corona

Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

SA-2 Missile Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

U-2 and the Predator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Formal and Tactical Intelligence Briefings . . . . . 18

Iraqi Aircraft Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

C-130s and Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

vi
Photographs Page

E-3 Sentry and E-8 Joint Surveillance, Target

Attack Radar System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Refugees of the Conflict in Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Uncertainties of Conflict: Crews Train in

Chemical Warfare Ensembles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

F-16 Vipers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

US Embassy Damaged by Terrorists in

Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Table

1 Intelligence Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

vii
Foreword

The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis:

A Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory by Maj Gary H. Mills is

another in an Air University Press series of substantive essays

considered too short for publication as monographs but too

lengthy to be journal articles. The purpose of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis is to share Major

Mills’s rhetorical understanding with young officers attending

initial intelligence training. Throughout he infuses key elements

from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence. Major

Mills notes that his target audience is the military intelligence

community. However, Air University Press is pleased to include

this study as one of its Fairchild Papers because many aspects

of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis

can enhance the rhetorical analysis of traditional university students and instructors.

Dr. Shirley B. Laseter

Director

Air University Library & Press

ix
About the Author

Maj Gary H. Mills, USAF, is currently serving as a senior analyst at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Prior to

his current assignment, he was an assistant professor of English in the Department of English and Fine Arts at the United

States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Additionally, Major Mills was design director of War, Literature

and the Arts: An International Journal of the Humanities and

Andre Dubus: Tributes (Xavier Review Press, 2001). He holds a

Master of Arts in technical and expository writing. Major Mills

was commissioned through USAFA in 1990.

xi
Preface

Nimitz’s concept of intelligence was dynamic: Facts were highgrade ore to be sifted carefully, the pure metal of knowledge

extracted and forged into a weapon to defeat the enemy.

—Gordon W. Prange

—Miracle at Midway

I completed training for USAF intelligence-applications officers

more than a dozen years ago. Since then I have used and

adapted the USAF’s practical discourse and analytical skills in a

wide range of situations around the world. However, I never fully

grasped the rhetorical framework behind these critical modes of

communication until I was exposed to discourse theory at the

University of Arkansas at Little Rock. As a result of my studies, I have learned how the rich backdrop of theory adds to the

daily application of intelligence analysis. 

Fortunately, as a result of my rhetorical education, I have a

greater understanding of the critical theory behind each briefing, presentation, and mission-planning product. More importantly, theory focuses a penetrating analytical view on the

power coursing through threat systems and hostile countries.

Clearly, Air Force intelligence specialists will benefit from a detailed look at the ways an understanding of rhetorical theory

enhances intelligence analysis. My purpose is to share my

widened rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout this study, I infuse

key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into

the discourse community that deals with training in military

intelligence. As a result of this union, a powerful discourse

paradigm shift places military intelligence specialists in a

unique rhetorical position—one that will turn rhetorical theory

into a powerful force multiplier.

My target audience is the military intelligence community;

however, many aspects of this study can enhance the rhetorical analysis of traditional university students and instructors.

The same targeted and tailored analytical approach used with

threat systems applies equally well with almost any subject

placed under the rhetorical “crosshairs.” While adapting this

xiii
study to nonmilitary analysis, the reader should feel free to replace the intelligence cycle—discussed later—with processes

specific to his or her discourse community. Additionally, the

unit-level issues—addressed in the chapter titled “In the

Trenches”—are applicable to a wide range of nonmilitary organizations and discourse groups.

Michel Foucault’s rhetorical lens allows a detailed view of

power and discontinuity in a widening range of situations and

organizations. Rhetorical theory’s application, in the enhancement of intelligence analysis, highlights its powerful, universal

utility; with equally powerful utility, other rhetorical masters

are also addressed. Readers should open themselves to the dynamic utility of rhetorical theory and remember that it is a

power tool that continues to shape discourse and perceptions.

For many, theory is an ephemeral element in the course of

day-to-day activities; and in 1994, according to Ferdinand

Saussure, “the very ones who use it daily are [often] ignorant

of it.” Fortunately, for those who can see and wield it, theory

serves as a force enhancement and a catalyst for powerful paradigm shifts. In 1995 Walter J. Ong noted in his book Orality

and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word that rhetorical

theory will continue to surround and shape our human identity. Through a strong rhetorical understanding, we bridge the

gap between theory and application, resulting in the enhancement of our daily operations and analytical growth.

xiv
Acknowledgments

I thank the following professors for their outstanding support and guidance: Brig Gen (USAF, retired) Jack Shuttleworth, PhD, permanent professor and department head, Department of English and Fine Arts, USAFA, Colorado Springs,

Colorado; Dr. Charles Anderson, Dr. Julia Ferganchick, Dr.

Michael Kleine, Dr. Barry Maid, Dr. Roger Munger, and Dr.

Richard Raymond, all from the Department of Rhetoric and

Writing at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. They excelled as academic authorities and, most importantly, professional mentors. I also recognize Naval Doctrine Publication 2,

Naval Intelligence, which served as a key inspiration for my selection of some of the epigraphs for each chapter. Additionally,

the Central Intelligence Agency’s A Compendium of Analytic

Tradecraft Notes bridged a daunting gap between theory and

application, thus helping to open the way for rhetorical theory

in the intelligence career field.

xv
Abstract

As an unconventional analytical source, Michel Foucault

contributes new power perspectives to intelligence analysis;

and he gives a nontraditional look at a growing, evolving threat

environment. As highlighted in The Foucault Reader, Foucault’s analytical edge confronts these threats “by refusing to

separate off knowledge from power.” “His strategy has been to

focus his work, both political and intellectual, on what he sees

as the greatest threat—that strange, somewhat unlikely, mixing of the social science and social practices developed around

subjectivity.” Foucault’s theories address the human behind

the satellite images and database numbers: the result generates a powerful perspective on threat countries, systems, and

situations. 

His power influences resonate in every human system and organization. Specifically, he addresses the flow of power through

organizational hierarchies. Through Foucault’s rhetorical vision,

one can look at an organization as a power being with a rhetorical circulatory structure supporting its existence. Power (discourse and knowledge) flows through the entire organization.

Now, as a power-influenced (human-conceptualized) entity, organizations have spatial, temporal, and social compartmentalizations. These compartmentalizations require a physical means

(conduits) of sharing information in order to allow power to flow.

Additionally, Foucault addresses—in the 1982 book titled The

Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language—how

the power shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities in the conduits

can take on many forms when overlaid against the wide range of

global norms. Most importantly, based on theory’s powerful utility, the seeds of analysis must be planted as early as possible.

Rhetorical theory is the key to enhanced analytical growth—an

outgrowth that serves as a powerful military-intelligence force

multiplier.

xvii
Chapter 1

Introduction

Knowledge is for me that which must function as a protection of individual existence and as a comprehension of the

exterior world. I think that’s it. Knowledge is a means of

surviving by understanding.

—Michel Foucault

As intelligence specialists, the exterior world—more than

260 countries, geographic regions, and their associated political and military challenges—will test your ability to organize,

process, and analyze vast amounts of information.1 You have

joined a skilled community responsible for the tireless analysis of potential and active threats against the United States.

Fleet Adm Ernest King, USN, retired, effectively voiced the demanding requirements and standards for the modern intelligence specialist: “Institute rigorous, continuous examination

of enemy capabilities and potentialities, thereby getting the utmost value of information of the enemy and enabling our

forces to be used with the greatest effectiveness. It is particularly important to comprehend the enemy point of view in all

aspects.”2

Comprehension of the threat point of view requires a rhetorical vision that can be focused only through a fundamental

understanding of how communication (verbal, textual, symbolic, and electronic) influences the intelligence cycle and, ultimately, joint combat operations.3 Simply put, rhetorical theory

(the exploration of communication and its impact, influence,

and relationships in all forms) is in action all around us; it applies to every aspect of human existence. The role of theory in

intelligence analysis is even more pronounced. Theory is a force

multiplier; it is a natural, often overlooked, military enhancement.

An operationally tailored application of rhetorical theory can

make the intelligence community—more importantly, your

day-to-day work—even more effective. Typically, years of train1
ing and operational experience are needed to groom an outstanding analyst. Through a tailored instruction of rhetorical

theory, new intelligence specialists just joining the career field

can develop and mature at faster rates. 

Well-worn steps and checklists are deeply ingrained in the military mind-set; however, the rich tapestry of rhetorical theory is

unfortunately lost in the application of intelligence analysis at

the level of a typical small unit. Dr. Charles Anderson, graduateprogram director of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock’s

Department of Rhetoric and Writing, believes that we all know

what to do come Monday morning, but theory helps us understand why. At unit level, theory takes a backseat to operations tempo, additional duties, and challenging requirements to

meet a growing range of duties with fewer personnel. Typically,

as a mission-oriented community, we tend to shun concepts

and theories that do not appear to directly support the war fighters (soldiers, sailors, and airmen) in the completion of a broadening array of duties ranging from direct, conventional combat

to peacekeeping operations. Theory is a powerful and integral

part of current and future military conflicts. However, a look

at a few unconventional rhetoricians is in order to focus the

power of theory. 

Sherman Kent, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

senior analyst and author, highlights the changing role of theory in intelligence analysis: “Intelligence today is not merely a

profession, but like most professions it has taken on the aspects of a discipline: it has developed a recognized methodology; it has developed a vocabulary; it has developed a body of

theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques.

It now has a large professional following. What it lacks is a literature. From my point of view, this is a matter of greatest importance. As long as this discipline lacks a literature, its

method, its vocabulary, its body of doctrine, and even its fundamental theory run the risk of never reaching full maturity.”4

Kent’s call for a refined and tailored intelligence discourse

makes the need for a solid comprehension of rhetorical theory

even more critical. Additionally, he provides a superb example

of rhetorical theory in action:

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FAIRCHILD PAPER
The literature I have in mind will, among other things, be an elevated

debate. For example, I see a Major “X” write an essay on the theory of

indicators and print it and have it circulated. I see a Mr. “B” brood over

this essay and write a review of it. I see a Commander “C” reading both

the preceding documents and reviewing them both. I then see a revitalized discussion among the people of the indicator business. I hope

that they now, more than ever before, discuss indicators within the

terms of a common conceptual frame and in a common vocabulary.

From the debate in the literature and from the oral discussion, I see

another man [or woman] coming forward to produce an original synthesis of all that has gone before. His [her] summary findings will be a

kind of intellectual platform upon which the new debate can start. His

[her] platform will be a thing of orderly and functional construction

and it will stand above the bushes and trees that once obscured the

view. It will be solid enough to have much more built upon it and

durable enough so that no one need get back in the bushes and earth

to examine its foundations.5

Rhetorical theory can work exactly, and as easily, as Kent

advertises in many settings with impressive results. Unfortunately, many analysts view this process as an administrative

speed bump instead of an intellectual catalyst. Additionally,

Kent’s analytical foundation is only partially constructed if

you fail to bring the right tools to the work site. With luck this

guide will serve as a useful tool kit. 

Application of targeted theory takes on many forms. For example, the CIA calls its process an “analytic tradecraft”—a

process based on creative use of all source information and inhouse best practices, in order to support “individual intelligence

consumer’s concerns.”6 Former deputy director for intelligence

John Gannon—currently chairman of the National Intelligence

Council—clearly recognizes both strengths and challenges of discourse. The growing “revolution in information technologies has

improved our access to sources and our ability to quickly deliver

intelligence.”7 Conversely, the rapid flow of information “has also

made our [intelligence community’s] work more challenging as

we are bombarded with information of varying quality, relevance,

and depth.”8

All too often stereotyped and disregarded as pure academia,

rhetorical theory is at the very core of military analytical development. Additionally, the same theory forms the basis of what

many military intelligence specialists all too easily chalk up to

mere experience. Through an operationally tailored analysis of

Michel Foucault, this study will uncover a rhetorical framework

3

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supporting the military analysis process: a rhetorical template

designed to bridge the application gap between strict checklist

discipline and power analysis, resulting in the highest quality of

intelligence analysis.

Notes

1. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.:

Brassey’s, 1998), n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 June 1999, available from http://

www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/country.html.

2. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence, 1994, n.p., on-line,

Internet, 11 July 2003, available from http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/Library/

Documents/NDPs/ndp2/ndp20001.htm.

3. Lydia A. Fillingham, Foucault for Beginners (New York: Writers and

Readers Publishing, 1993), 100.

4. Sherman Kent, “The Need for an Intelligence Literature,” Studies in Intelligence, spring 1955, 3, on-line, Internet, 2 February 1999, available from

http://www.odci.gov/csi/books/shermankent/2need.html. 

5. Ibid.

6. John Gannon, “Foreword,” in Jack Davis, A Compendium of Analytic

Tradecraft Notes, ed. F. Douglas Whitehouse (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1997), v.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

4

FAIRCHILD PAPER
Chapter 2

Let’s Get Rhetorical

The DI (Directorate of Intelligence) will need greater interaction with outside experts to meet the broad and complex analytic challenges it faces. It must position itself to compete in

a new information age in which consumers increasingly will

have ready access to alternative sources of high-quality

data and expertise.

—Analysis: Strategic Plan

––Central Intelligence Agency

––Directorate of Intelligence

As an integral part of the military’s new information age,

you need to be aware of alternative sources available to enhance your communication and analytical skills. Recently retitled as intelligence operators, intelligence personnel must

apply every available tool in order to support worldwide warfighter operations. As highlighted by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, your effective use of “outside experts will yield useful information and insight, along with constructive challenges

to [your] working assumptions, that can only sharpen [your]

analysis.”1 In this study, Foucault’s discourse theories serve

as the primary rhetorical workshop. As a result, there is a

need to define the wide and essential scope of rhetorical theory, including a brief look at its history. The word rhetoric

brings to mind many different meanings: “The practice of oratory [discourse or speech]; the study of strategies of effective

oratory; the use of language, written or spoken [or electronic],

to inform or persuade; the study of the persuasive effects of

language; the study of the relation between language and

knowledge; the classification and use of tropes and figures;

and, of course, the use of empty promises and half-truths as

a form of propaganda.”2 Intelligence officers interface with

most of these overlapping meanings.3 You even study many influences and forms of propaganda. However, most importantly, you must understand that “rhetoric is an action” and

that it affects communication and analytical perspectives.4 “In

5
one sense, rhetoric is an action human beings perform, and in

a second sense, it is a perspective humans take. As an action,

rhetoric involves humans’ use of symbols for the purpose of

communicating with one another. As a perspective humans

take, rhetoric involves focusing on symbolic [and analytic]

processes.”5 With some luck, this study will effectively communicate the strength of rhetoric’s influence on intelligence—

ultimately changing and shaping your perspective on analysis. 

As service-trained communicators, you use written, spoken,

and electronic discourse on a daily basis. Unfortunately, aside

from military briefing style and training in audience awareness (for aircrews, command staffs, threat working groups,

etc.), military technical schooling provides very little instruction in rhetorical theory. Your job is to organize, analyze, and

share information; yet, ironically, you get very little training in

the formal discipline critical to the core of your military profession—a fifth-century B.C. discipline that was initially established to settle conflicting property claims.6

“A revolution on Syracuse, a Greek colony on the island of

Sicily, in about 465 B.C.” brought about the end of a dictator’s

reign and ushered in a democratic system of government.7 As

a result of this change, Corax of Syracuse saw the need to

equip citizens with skills to settle their property disputes since

“they could not hire attorneys to speak on their behalf as we

can today.”8 “Corax realized the need for systematic instruction in the art of speaking in the law courts and wrote a treatise called the ‘Art of Rhetoric.’ Although no copies of this work

survive, we know from later writers that the notion of probability was central to his rhetorical system. He believed that a

speaker must argue from general probabilities or establish

probable conclusions when matters of fact cannot be established with absolute certainty.”9

It is intriguing to consider that the standard “Probable

Course of Action” portion of our crisis and situation briefings

shares a formal genesis that extends as far back as Corax’s Art

of Rhetoric. Origins of this often elusive and mystic discipline

are based on a very pragmatic and simple need to clarify and

establish truth. 

6

FAIRCHILD PAPER
Development of rhetorical theory has changed dramatically

over the years. “The historical development of rhetoric [is] divided

into conventional chronological periods: the Classical (from the

birth of rhetoric in ancient Greece to about 400 [A.D.]), the Medieval (to about 1400), the Renaissance (to the early seventeenth

century), the Enlightenment (from the seventeenth to the end of

the nineteenth century, a bit longer than in conventional usage),

and the twentieth century.”10 Years can easily be spent studying

each period of rhetorical development. This study includes these

rhetorical divisions to underscore the fact that, much like the

military, rhetorical theory is always changing and establishing

new communication paradigms. 

Intimately tied to origins of the formal art of rhetoric, the classical preparation of a speech or briefing—a principal medium

used to share intelligence information—is particularly important. “Aristotle devoted a large portion of his Rhetoric to invention, or the finding of materials and modes of proof to use in presenting those materials to an audience.”11 Aristotle’s canons

(rules or laws) resulted in the first “pragmatic processes of presentation.”12 The rhetorical process of preparing a speech or

briefing is divided into five stages: “(1) invention, search for persuasive ways to present information and formulate arguments;

(2) arrangement, organization of the part of a speech to ensure

that all means of persuasion are present and properly disposed;

(3) style, use of correct, appropriate, and striking language

throughout the speech; (4) memory, use of mnemonics and

practice; and (5) delivery, presenting the speech with effective

gestures and vocal modulation.”13 These five canons remain the

cornerstone of the study of rhetorical organization, and key elements of this organization are in all effective intelligence briefings (fig. 1).14 Additionally, it is important to note, under the

arrangement stage, that “Aristotle says that all speeches have

four parts: the introduction, the statement of the issue, the argument, and the conclusion.”15

As an essential element in modern intelligence briefings, “classical emphasis on logos [logical appeals used to persuade during

the invention step] is presented as if in recognition that human

beings respond most strongly to rational appeals.”16 Aristotle

codified two additional forms of persuasion: ethos (character and

7

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credibility) and pathos (the production of a certain attitude or

emotion in the audience).17 Obviously, you need to focus on logos

and ethos—a logical analysis shored by credible sources (and a

credible, ethical presenter) will serve you well. Methods you select to shape an audience’s perception greatly influence your

credibility. “As a rule, then, the consumer’s confidence in the analyst’s estimative judgment comes only after he or she has established credentials for expert command over all source information.”18 Importantly, you must respect pathos as a very

powerful form of persuasion; however, please try to avoid emotional appeals—a sure way to crash and burn during a mission

or current intelligence briefing.

Underlying the military’s technical paradigm shifts, from

linear formations to joint warfare and from muskets to precision weapons, exists an even more impressive rhetorical transition that continues to gather strength. Rhetorical theory is

as alive today as it was during the days of its two key architects, Corax and Aristotle. Rhetorical theory is not as murky a

8

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Figure 1. Military Briefing Origins
subject as some may have initially envisioned. You are already

using, adapting, and improving on the rhetorical blueprints of

the greats. “But there is more to say about the marriage of war

[the profession of arms or military analysis] and knowledge.”19

Aristotle, a critical analytical cornerstone, raised an issue of

analytical proficiency that should balance your growth as an

analyst and officer.20 He details the levels of knowledge required for true proficiency:

Every systematic science, the humblest and the noblest alike, seems to

admit of two distinct kinds of proficiency; one of which may be properly called scientific knowledge of the subject, while the other is a kind

of educational acquaintance with it. For an educated man [or woman]

should be able to form a fair offhand judgment as to the goodness or

badness of the method used by a professor [or commander, allied or

enemy] in his [or her] exposition [or leadership/tactics]. To be educated

is in fact to be able to do this; and even the man [or woman] of universal education we deem to be such in virtue of his having this ability. It will, however, of course, be understood that we only ascribe universal education to one who in his [or her] own individual person is

thus critical in all or nearly all branches of knowledge, and not to one

who has a like ability merely in some special subject. For it is possible

for a man [or woman] to have his [or her] competence in some one

branch of knowledge without having it in all.21

You must avoid becoming strictly competent in only one

branch of knowledge. Be “able to tell the difference between

sense and nonsense, as we might say using modern terms,

about the field [of intelligence].”22 You must also be critical of

a wide range of disciplines and be “able to distinguish between

sense and nonsense even when [we are] not . . . specialist[s] in

any one area of knowledge.”23

Rhetorical theory is one of many disciplines at the heart of

Aristotle’s universal education—an education you will need in

order to excel as an analyst.24 Thanks to rhetorical theory, you

can apply discourse-power theory to better understand how

power flows influence real-world threat systems. Additionally,

even without specific technical specialization, you can apply

this rhetorical template to any system, resulting in a honed,

critical perspective: a viewpoint filtered from the nonsense and

focused on threat systems and potential crisis situations.25

Critical analysis is the trademark of the intelligence career

field; however, it is impossible to accomplish without rhetorical theory. Interestingly, the topic of this project has been dis9

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cussed with many of my friends in the intelligence community,

and I have received a wide range of winces and head tilts in response to rhetorical theory. Ironically, rhetorical theory is at

the root of my colleagues’ most basic skills of organization and

discourse: tasks they accomplish daily with little to no understanding of theory’s rich history and framework. It is easy to

live in theory denial; however, if you open yourself to an element of universal education, you will enhance the theory you

are already using—and potentially take into combat. 

Notes

1. Central Intelligence Agency, Analysis: Directorate of Intelligence in the

21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1996),

20.

2. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition:

Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston: Bedford Books, 1990),

1.

3. Ibid.

4. Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, 2d ed. (Prospects Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1991),

14.

5. Ibid., 14.

6. Ibid., 1.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 2.

9. Ibid.

10. Bizzell and Herzberg, 1.

11. Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 4.

12. Ibid.

13. Bizzell and Herzberg, 3–4.

14. Ibid., 4.

15. Ibid., 5.

16. Ibid., 4.

17. Ibid.

18. John Gannon, “Foreword,” in Jack Davis, A Compendium of Analytic

Tradecraft Notes, ed. F. Douglas Whitehouse (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997),

17.

19. Charles van Doren, A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future

(New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 286.

20. Ibid., 135.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 135–36.

23. Ibid., 136.

24. Ibid., 135.

25. Ibid., 136.

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Chapter 3

Intelligence Process

The success of any crisis deployment hinges on the existence of a reliable command and control system and of a

flexible, reliable system for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating strategic and tactical intelligence.

—Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf

––United States Army

––Operation Desert Storm, 1991

Before pressing forward with Foucault’s rhetorical theories,

I will review basic military intelligence pedagogy to highlight

the key process that serves as a rhetorical road map. According to Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to

Military Operations, the intelligence cycle is the “process by

which information is converted into intelligence and made

available to users.”1

As evidenced by the joint (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines)

document on the subject, the cycle is well ingrained into each

military service. It forms a fundamental bond among 13 nationallevel and service-level intelligence agencies (fig. 2).2

Planning and Direction Phase

The intelligence cycle begins with the planning and direction

phase (fig. 3), in which commanders and intelligence analysts

“identify and prioritize information requirements.”3 Key elements

of information are identified, and a plan is then developed to satisfy as many user requirements as possible. “Early discovery of

any requirements that cannot be satisfied through organic (internal to the unit or service), theater, or national intelligence collection resources will highlight potential intelligence gaps.”4

Before continuing, I must highlight a critical distinction between information and intelligence: “Information is data that

have been collected but not further developed through analysis,

interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence.

The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence.”5 A particular style or method of transforming information

11
12

Source: Adapted from Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence, 1994, 24.

Figure 3. Intelligence Cycle

Evaluation

Planning

and

Direction

Dissemination

and

Integration

Processing

and

Exploitation

Collection

Production

Central

Intelligence

Department Agency

of State

Defense

Intelligence

Agency

Department

of Energy

Department 

of the

Treasury

Federal

Bureau of

Investigation

National

Reconnaissance

Office National

Imagery

and Mapping

Agency

Marine

Corps

Intelligence

Air Force

Intelligence

Navy

Intelligence

Army

Intelligence

National

Security

Agency

Independent Agency

Department of Defense Elements

Intelligence

Organizations

Depar mt ental Intelligence Elements (Other than DOD)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Agencies of the US Intelligence Community (USIC): 1998, n.p.,

on-line, Internet, 10 June 1999, available from http://www.cia.gov/ichome.htm.

Figure 2. Intelligence Organizations (Agencies)
into intelligence is also at the core of rhetorical theory. You join

the ranks of the great rhetoricians every time you take a piece of

data, such as an image, troop positions, and so on, and process

it through your experiences or knowledge of past or similar

events. The widening range of information mediums presents additional rhetorical challenges to experience throughout the

course of your career. Unfortunately, military events have proven

that many of you will be “thrown into the mix” with a relatively

limited experience base soon after graduation from intelligence

school. 

Collection Phase

Since 1960 the quality and quantity of artifacts made available

to intelligence analysts have dramatically increased due to many

technical advancements associated with the collection phase of

the intelligence cycle. Collection of intelligence data has a firm,

often infamous, footing in world history. Maj Gen Oleg Kalugin,

the KGB’s first chief directorate, now retired, highlights that

“spying (politically toned as collecting) has been with the human

race from time immemorial; it has often been called ‘the second

oldest profession’ and was used by ruling elites as a major tool

to protect their power from real or imaginary threats and rivals,

both domestic and external.”6 General Kalugin intimately understands how “intelligence-gathering was transformed by satellites,

lasers, computers, and other gadgetry capable of ferreting out secrets from every corner of the globe.”7 Specifically, an example of

one of the most sophisticated collection organizations was publicly unveiled in 1992 with declassification of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).8 NRO also revealed a revolution in

data collection that began with the 1960 launch of the Corona

reconnaissance satellite (photo below).9

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National Reconnaissance Office Corona Satellite
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Former Soviet SA-2 (surface-to-air) missile site, Corona, shown here in 1969.

Examples of the early artifact evolution include more than

800,000 Corona satellite images (one example is provided in the

photograph below) that were declassified in 1995.10 NRO “enable[s] U.S. global information superiority, during peace through

war.”11 A quick look through NRO’s archives clarifies the concerns of former CIA deputy director Gannon about the increasing flow of information. Obviously, since the launch of Corona,

subsequent collection platforms have increased the number,

type, and quality of intelligence artifacts.

In addition to spaceborne satellites, there are air-breathing

(operating within Earth’s atmosphere) collectors spanning

from reconnaissance aircraft (photos shown on next page) all

the way to original air-breathing collectors—humans. “Rulers

and military leaders have always needed to know the

strengths, weaknesses, and intentions of their enemies. Consequently, the trade of spying [intelligence collection and

analysis] is as old as civilization itself. Around 500 B.C., ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote about the importance

of intelligence and espionage networks in his classic book The

Art of War. The Bible [also] contains more than a hundred references to spies and intelligence-gathering.”12 Importantly,

through collection and analysis, rhetorical theory has been

there to put the key pieces together.
Processing and Exploitation Phase

In addition to the collection of information, the processing

and exploitation phase takes information and converts it into

“forms suitable for analysis and production.”13 Processing information includes “translating foreign languages, developing

film from tactical reconnaissance aircraft, generating hard

(paper) or soft (electronic) images provided by electro-optical or

infrared sensors, and converting raw electronic intelligence

data into a standard message format suitable for automated

handling.”14 Suitable analytical forms are often intimately tied

to systems collecting the data, as evidenced by the Corona

satellite images. The exploitation phase is a rich discourse

mechanism for rhetorical research.

Production Phase

The production phase turns planned, collected, and processed

information into “finished intelligence.”15 “Intelligence production is the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of

information from all available sources into tailored, usable intelligence. A key principle in production is the fusion of information from various sources to form a complete and accurate product. Fusion is essential for an effective intelligence production

15

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Left: U-2. Above: The Predator unmanned aerial vehicle flies Navy reconnaissance close to the carrier

USS Carl Vinson.
process that accurately reflects and supports the commander’s

prioritized essential elements of information (EEI).”16 The human

element is not only key to the transformation of information into

intelligence but it also shapes your analytical techniques. 

Additionally, the fusion from multiple sources demands an

understanding of both operational and rhetorical benefits of

each intelligence source (table 1). 

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Table 1

Intelligence Sources

IMINT* Imagery Intelligence

PHOTINT Photographic Intelligence

SIGINT* Signals Intelligence

COMINT Communications Intelligence

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence

TELINT Telemetry Intelligence

RADINT Radar Intelligence

HUMINT* Human Intelligence

MASINT* Measurement and Signature Intelligence

ACINT Acoustical Intelligence

OPTINT Optical Intelligence

ELECTRO-OPTICAL Electro-optical Intelligence

IRINT Infrared Intelligence

LASINT Laser Intelligence

NUCINT Nuclear Intelligence

RINT Unintentional Radiation Intelligence

OSINT* Open Source Intelligence

TECHINT* Technical Intelligence

CI* Counterintelligence

*Primary Sources

Source: Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence, 1994, 22.

Along with accelerated political and military events, advances in technology have accelerated the need for a heightened rhetorical understanding. Unfortunately, at the unit level

(your primary training grounds), analysis is subtly pushed to

the sideline in favor of information management. Technology

provides a wide array of artifacts (imagery, electronic signals,

databases, and so on), and inexperienced personnel often

mistake these artifacts as analyzed intelligence. Rhetoricians
Russell S. Tomlin, L. Forrest, M. M. Pu, and M. Kim highlight the

analytical implications of these artifacts: “This artifact, in

essence, contains the meaning intended by the speaker [or the

reporting-collection platform]. It is conducted to the listener

[or analyst] in either spoken [or visual] or written form. The

text [or image, data, etc.] is then unpacked and its meaning

extracted from the text artifact by the listener [or analyst].”17

Within this process, analysts must extract meaning from data

and images. The collecting system (camera, electronic spectrum

receiver, and so on) may not accurately or adequately frame

meaning or significance with the artifact. An analyst’s difficult

task is further complicated by the nature of the artifact. Without

an associated, precise meaning, “the source, sometimes the only

source [of information],” requires the analyst to engage “actively

in constructing [his or] her own conceptual representation of the

matters [or situation] at hand.”18

Analysis is often confused as a product instead of a key (critical) rhetorical process. Conflict between artifact (product) and

process will continue to complicate intelligence analysis. However, rhetorical theory is integral to the packing and unpacking

of meaning behind modern artifacts.19 Specifically, theory enhances the ability to visualize a battle space or situation when

the artifacts fail to contribute to analytical “knowledge integration.”20 Rhetoricians have focused on challenges that thwart

effective artifact analysis; the problem is twofold. The first

hurdle deals with an analyst’s ability to integrate information

(knowledge integration) into a “coherent representation,” resulting in construction of “concepts and events virtually identical”

to the actual situation.21 Deception and misinformation can

significantly degrade your ability to develop a comprehensive

understanding of a system or event. Equally debilitating, the

second obstacle deals with management and control of the everincreasing information flow (information management) in a

“dynamic, real-time interaction.”22 Knowledge integration and

information management continue to stress and stretch military analysts’ capabilities. Unfortunately, the distinction between intelligence integration and information analysis is often

blurred. “Knowledge integration (analysis) requires effective information management, but effective information management

17

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is not enough to account for knowledge integration.”23 With the

growing number and diversity of artifacts, the intelligence community’s focus on effective integration must remain paramount.

Dissemination and Integration Phase

During the dissemination and integration phase of the intelligence cycle, intelligence is provided directly to the user in a format that is “readily understood.”24 Answers to the commander’s

EEI are satisfied in a “timely manner without overloading the

user and minimizing the load on communications capabilities.”25

Getting the product to the user is the last step in the intelligence cycle;

but, because the cycle is dynamic, the process does not end with dissemination. First, intelligence personnel must ensure that the product is

actually used. This is a particular obligation of intelligence personnel who

are members of operational staffs. They are in the best position to demonstrate the value of intelligence products to commanders and other staff

members. Second, intelligence personnel must see to it that dissemination is refined by gathering feedback from the commander or other users

[aircrews] to ensure that intelligence requirements have been satisfied

and the finished intelligence products are usable.26

Intelligence within this phase is “pushed” and “pulled” (as

seen in photographs below) as analysis flows through intricate

communication networks from command echelons down to individual flights, companies, and naval elements.27

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Left to right: Formal intelligence briefings “push” information to users, but tactical intelligence briefings “pull” it from them.
The intelligence cycle is a proven tool to effectively fulfill many

of the commander’s objectives, as shown in the next photograph.

An operationally focused instruction in rhetorical theory can

19

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Aircraft scored a direct hit on a reinforced Iraqi aircraft shelter.

strengthen this process. Specifically, rhetorical theory can help

ensure that analysis efforts and resources are tasked against

threat pivot points. Seeds of analysis must be planted as

early as possible through a focused interest in theory. Rhetorical theory is key to enhanced analytical growth. We will look to

Michel Foucault, the master rhetorical gardener, for guidance

before this author spreads more fertilizer.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 1996, II-2.

2. Central Intelligence Agency, Agencies of the US Intelligence Community

(USIC): 1998, n.p., on-line, Internet, 10 June 1999, available from http://

www.cia.gov/ichome.htm.

3. Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 2, Naval Intelligence, 1994, 24.

4. Ibid., 25.

5. JP 2-01, II-2.

6. Quoted in H. Keith Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book (New York: DK Publishing, 1996), 7.

7. Ibid.

8. National Reconnaissance Office, Who We Are, n.p., on-line, Internet,

20 March 1999, available from http://www.nro.odci.gov/background.html.
9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Melton, 18.

13. JP 2-01, ix.

14. NDP 2, 26.

15. JP 2-01, ix.

16. NDP 2, 26.

17. Russell S. Tomlin et al., “Discourse Semantics,” in Discourse as

Structure and Process, ed. Teun van Dijk (London: Sage, 1997), 64.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., 65.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. JP 2-01, x.

25. Ibid.

26. NDP 2, 26.

27. JP 2-01, x.

20

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Chapter 4

[What the] Foucault?

I think we should have the modesty to say to ourselves that,

on the one hand, the time we live in is not the unique or fundamental or irruptive point in history where everything is

completed and begun again. We must also have the modesty to say, on the other hand, that even without this solemnity—the time we live in is very interesting.

—Michel Foucault

––Power/Knowledge: Selected

––Interviews and Other Writings

Paul-Michel Foucault—a prominent philosopher, historian,

and rhetorician—was born in Poitiers, France, in 1926.1 School

was an exciting aspect of Foucault’s life from a young age, and

he excelled rapidly through the French school system.2 While in

his teens, Foucault experienced the toils of war as his town fell

under control of German occupation forces during World War II.3

“In his Jesuit school, Paul-Michel wasn’t exactly a war hero [then

again, he was only in his teens], but he did help other kids steal

wood from the Nazis to heat the school.”4 During the German occupation, he experienced his “intellectual, sexual, and political

coming of age” under an oppressive power shift that resulted in

the “disappearance, flight and arrest of teachers, town’s people,

and relatives in the horizon of Nazi authority.”5

Even after the rigors of a trying childhood, Foucault progressed intellectually and academically after the war. “Foucault went from school to school, doing extremely well on his

exams, until he had reached the summit: he scored fourth

among all the students in the country competing for entry to

the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris—the most exclusive

and intellectually intense college-level school in France.”6 His

driven study of philosophy, psychology, and psychopathology

fostered his drive to chart the “independent systems” that

shape discourse and society.7

Foucault never served in the military; however, his firsthand

occupation experience and painstaking study of history,

21
human behavior, and—most importantly—power, made him a

social and intellectual tactician of the highest order. The

breadth of his studies covers many expansive and elusive aspects of society.

Foucault’s early studies concerned the history of mental illness and society’s response to it. Society’s use of the concept of madness in the

17th century is the subject of his Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie

à l’ âge classique (1961; Madness and Civilization). In his book Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (1975; Discipline and Punish: The

Birth of the Prison), he examined the origins of the modern penal system. In these and other books, Foucault put forth the thesis that institutions such as asylums, hospitals, and prisons are society’s devices

for exclusion and that by surveying social attitudes in relation to these

institutions, one can examine the development and uses of power.8

Foucault’s other pivotal works include The Order of Things: An

Archaeology of Human Sciences (1966), The Archaeology of

Knowledge (1969), and History of Sexuality (three volumes,

1976–1984).9

His works are sometimes difficult to read, and he can test the

mettle of even the best students of rhetorical theory. Furthermore, these books do not take up much shelf space in the military community’s libraries. However, do not let this discourage

you from seeking rhetorical sources to help you think and operate outside of the box. Foucault’s work in this study is transplanted into the realm of military analysis, far from his original

target audience. However, contemporary author and rhetorician

Sonja K. Foss highlights the utility of Foucault’s rhetorical theory: “In the area of rhetorical scholarship, Foucault’s originality

lies not in the introduction of totally new concepts for use in

rhetorical theory but in how his notions may be used by others

to stretch existing conceptualizations or may be applied to new

domains.”10 Foucault would frown upon this “institutional” use

of his power analysis. He once stated that “the goal of my work

during the last twenty years has not been to analyze the phenomena [sic] of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such

an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of

the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are

made subjects.”11 Fortunately, Foucault’s analysis of the cultural

modes and norms results in a striking power blueprint: a social

projection that is bolstered by his refusal “to separate off knowledge from power.”12 Most importantly, even as a very reluctant,

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unintentional military tactician, Foucault understood the critical, pivotal elements and practices of society: his most general

aim was to “discover the point at which these practices [social,

political, economic, legal, philosophical, and scientific traditions]

became coherent reflective techniques with definite goals, the

point at which a particular discourse emerged from these techniques and came to be seen as true, the point at which they are

linked with the obligation of searching from the truth and telling

the truth.”13 His detailed studies of mankind reveal critical discourse linkages—such connections are discussed in greater detail later in this paper. 

Interestingly, he superbly catalyzes the domain of tactical

analysis. Specifically, elements of his military applicability are

highlighted during an interview conducted by Alessandro

Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino. Foucault was asked the following question concerning the military model of power: “You

have said about power as an object of research that one has to

invert [Carl von] Clausewitz’s formula so as to arrive at the

idea that politics is the continuation of war by other means.

Does the military model seem to you, on the basis of your most

recent researches, to be the best one for describing power; is

war here simply a metaphorical model, or is it the literal, regular, everyday mode of operation of power?”14 Foucault frames

his power response to the above question and generates even

more compelling questions:

As soon as one endeavors to detach power with its techniques and procedures from the form of law within which it has been theoretically

confined up until now, one is driven to ask this basic question: Isn’t

power simply a form of warlike domination? Shouldn’t one therefore

conceive all problems of power in terms of relations of war? Isn’t power

a sort of generalized war which assumes at particular moments the

forms of peace and the state? Peace would then be a form of war, and

the state a means of waging it. A whole range of problems emerges

here. Who wages war against whom? Is it between two classes, or

more? Is it a war of all against all? What is the role of the army and

military institutions in this civil society where permanent war is

waged? What is the relevance of concepts of tactics and strategy for analyzing structures and political processes? What is the essence and

mode of transformation of power relations? All these questions need to

be explored. In any case it’s astonishing to see how easily and selfevidently people talk of warlike relations of power or class struggle

without ever making it clear whether some form of war is meant, and

if so what form.15

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Foucault’s understanding of power relations serves as a primary

analytical platform. More power specifics are discussed later.

Ever since you were young cadets or officer candidates, an understanding of Clausewitzian principles on the spectrum of conflict formed the basis of your understanding of combat. From

structured, gentlemanly conflict under Gen Baron Antoine Henri

de Jomini’s warfare theory to chaotic conflicts described by

Clausewitz, warfare is a historically prevalent element of human

life.16 Clausewitz’s concepts of fog and friction were readily seen

in the conflict in Kosovo. The fog (uncertainty) of combat is highlighted by smart weapons missing targets, US soldiers being captured, and stealth aircraft (F-117s) being inexplicably uncloaked

(mangled debris) by Serbian television.17 Similarly, the friction

(countless minor complications) of supporting large combat formations with weapons, fuels, maintenance, personnel (aircrews

and ground-support technicians), and accurate intelligence also

complicates modern conflicts.18

At this point you may be asking, “What the Foucault?” Well,

underpinning the entire spectrum of conflict is a complex,

ever-shifting flow of power, ruptures, and discontinuity.19

“One can never be absolutely positive that all enemy capabilities [power pivot points and decisive points] are associated

with evaluating enemy intentions . . . intelligence preparation

of the battlefield can reduce vulnerability to enemy actions by

describing enemy courses of action so that they can be countered, forestalled, or exploited.”20 Power, as briefly discussed

above, is often veiled: its absence is as poignant as its presence. As intelligence officers, your task is to chart the power

plays on the political fronts and battlefields (fig. 4).

Foucault highlights many avenues for the analytical development of power. Conflicts share integral power relations resulting in valuable “concepts of tactics and strategy for analyzing structures and political processes.”21 Most importantly,

Foucault asks, “What is the essence and mode of transformation of power relations?”22 In order to help answer at least a

portion of this critical question, I use Foucault’s understanding of power flows and discontinuity. The effective preparation

of the battle space for the prevention or prosecution of conflict

24

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begins with an understanding of these “warlike relations of

power.”23

All too often you focus on the physical platforms of the profession of arms (aircraft, computers, ships, tanks, etc.); however, it is the human element that allows the entire process to

succeed. By the end of this discussion, I hope you have an appreciation of how rhetoricians such as Foucault can help you

better understand the elusive human element of conflict—and

the analysis of human struggles. As intelligence officers, you

are also instructors, mentors, and subject-matter experts on a

wide range of operational and tactical issues. Along these

lines, you have an obligation to remain current in many forms

of intellectual literacy. Marcus Cicero (106 to 43 B.C.), a famous

Roman statesman, lawyer, and scholar, is remembered as one

of history’s greatest orators.24 Cicero clearly highlighted his

commitment to the arts: “No one should be numbered with the

orators who is not accomplished in all those arts that befit the

25

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Source: Squadron Officer School, “4100-L-1,” lecture, Class 97-D, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1997.

Figure 4. Spectrum of Thought

WAR

Power Shifts

Discontinuities

Ruptures

Thresholds

Considerations:

Physical

Moral

Political

Structured

Principles of War

Clash of

Critical Points

Chaotic

Fog/Friction

Clash of Centers

of Gravity

Spectrum of Conflict

Jomini Clausewitz

Foucault
well-bred; for though we do not actually parade these in our

discourse, it is nonetheless made clear to demonstration

whether we are strangers to them or have learned to know

them.”25 You simply, much like your rhetorical forefathers,

need to remain open-minded to the best available concepts in

all fields. Unfortunately, discourse theory spends little time in

the spotlight. However, as the primary communicators (orators

as Cicero put it) of the military, you need to understand the

underlying concepts of your trade. 

Notes

1. Lydia A. Fillingham, Foucault for Beginners (New York: Writers and

Readers Publishing, 1993), 19.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ronald C. Tobey, Foucault, Michel, n.p., on-line, Internet, 11 March

1998, available from http://www.kaiwan.com/~lucknow/horus/guide/cm

108.html.

6. Fillingham, 20.

7. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on

Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 12.

8. Encyclopedia Britannica, CD-ROM, 1999 ed., s.v. “Michel Foucault.” 

9. Ibid.

10. Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, 2d ed. (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1991),

232.

11. Quoted in Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 7.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 64–65.

15. Ibid., 65.

16. “Leadership: Combat Leadership,” lecture, Squadron Officer School,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1994.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 9.

20. “Leadership,” 15.

21. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 65.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Encyclopedia Britannica, CD-ROM, 1999 ed., s.v. “Marcus Cicero.” 

25. Quoted in Erika Lindemann, A Rhetoric for Writing Teachers, 3d ed.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43–44.

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Chapter 5

Power Plug

Here I believe one’s point of reference should not be to the

great model of language (langue) and signs, but to that of

war and battle. The history which bears and determines us

had the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. 

—Michel Foucault

––Power/Knowledge: Selected

––Interviews and Other Writings

During spring 1999, I watched as 22 aircraft laden with airborne infantry and equipment from the 3d Battalion, 504th

Parachute Infantry Regiment surged forward to form an impressive line of gray and camouflaged aircraft feeding onto the

runway at Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North Carolina (see

photos, next page). Each C-130 turned out of its parking location onto taxiways with near-drill-team precision. I reflected

on the four previous 16-hour days involved in planning and

preparation of the formation, including route analysis, many

modifications, and then the scramble to provide each crew

with mission-ready products. The mission was now under

way. Concept and formation briefings were long since over.

The final mission presentation, the joint mission briefing, was

met with approving head nods and closing remarks from an

Army brigadier general and an Air Force colonel. While standing at the edge of the legendary Green Ramp, the loading area

for airborne troops and equipment, I was overwhelmed by the

roar of 88 propellers cutting through the air. Although this

was just an exercise, I could not help considering the physical

and rhetorical ramifications of the event.

Later that evening, after all the aircraft were aloft, I returned

to the mission-planning area to observe a second rhetorical

event. An Army officer, one of the evaluators of the loading

process, was honing his power-analysis skills and reading

Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. Considering the conflict in Kosovo, the officer’s effort to explore a

27
critical element of rhetorical analysis (history) was impressive––

specifically, the officer’s drive to bridge a daunting, expansive

gap between a volatile region’s history and the potential application of the power, like the force now airborne. Obviously, the two

power events vary greatly in magnitude; yet, they share a common rhetorical thread—a tailored analysis of your own and the

threat’s power infrastructure.

Since you are intelligence specialists, understanding the

power in both your and the adversary’s capabilities and systems

is extremely critical. Sun Tzu clearly understood the value of this

critical examination of adversary and self: “So it is said that if

you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in

a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself,

you win one and lose one; if you do not know others and do not

know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”1

Knowing yourself and others, as Sun Tzu puts it, requires a detailed understanding of the physical (weapon systems, ranges,

guidance types, etc.) and rhetorical (origin, history of use or misuse, supporting institutions, and infrastructure) power coursing

through every aspect of intelligence analysis. 

It is difficult to use power effectively unless it is studied and

observed from an appropriate vantage point. For Foucault, the

vantage point starts at the “panopticon.”2 Foucault adapts Jeremy Bentham’s concept (physical plan) for the panopticon in

order to give each power event its proper perspective.3 “The

panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower in the

center, surrounded by a series of buildings divided into levels

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Left: C-130s parked on the ramp at Pope AFB, North Carolina. Right: Airborne

troops getting ready to board.
and cells. In each cell there are two windows: one brings in

light and the other faces the tower, where large observatory

windows allow for the surveillance of the cells. The cells become ‘small theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly

individualized and constantly visible.’”4 Bentham’s panopticon

represents an actual architectural mechanism for observing

and controlling a subject from a central position.5 Although

not exactingly adapted by Foucault, the panopticon is crucial

to his power analysis.6 Foucault uses the observation point in

his search for power mechanisms and architectures. Figure 5

illustrates a potential hierarchical flow of power or discourse

through two typical organizations. The pyramid on the left—

shown in each of these panoptic illustrations—represents a

sample US organization while the structure on the right represents a look at an adversary’s power connections. The centrally placed observation tower, or panopticon, represents

Foucault’s power-observation position. The transparent cubes

of the pyramid represent the panoptic cells with windows we

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Panopticon

Figure 5. The Panopticon’s Point of View
look through with the help of many intelligence sources.7

Spread before the panopticons are Foucault’s “institutions,

economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, systems

of norms, types of classification, [and] modes of characterization.”8 “The panopticon offers a particularly vivid instance of

how political technologies of the body function. It is a ‘generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations

in terms of the everyday life of men. . . . [I]t is the diagram of

a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form. . . . It is in

fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use.’”9

Analysts can identify the same power infrastructures in

everything ranging from an integrated air defense system to

the training doctrine behind an individual soldier in the field.

There are many operational panopticons in the military. Airborne command, control, and surveillance systems (see photos below) take their place as the high-tech, mobile observation points. These modern advancements embody many of the

essential elements of Bentham’s original concept. Military installations, field camps, and airborne formations depend

heavily on the ability to observe and analyze a battle space or

conflict. “Thus, through spatial ordering, the panopticon

brings together power, control of the body, control of groups

and knowledge.”10 The power analysis “perch” is well defined

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Left: The E-3 Sentry is an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft

that provides all-weather surveillance, command, control, and communications

needed by commanders of US and NATO air defense forces. Right: The E-8 joint

surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) is an airborne platform

equipped with a long-range, air-to-ground surveillance system designed to locate, classify, and track ground targets in all weather conditions. Its capabilities

make JSTARS effective for dealing with any contingency, whether actual or impending military aggression, international treaty verification, or border violation.
and well organized; however, it too is subject to its own level of

control. “As the final step in architectural and technological

perfection, the panopticon includes a system of observing and

controlling the controllers. Those who occupy the central position in the panopticon are themselves thoroughly enmeshed

in a localization and ordering of their own behavior.”11

US military services, especially their service infrastructure,

are built around many of the same “system[s] of observing and

controlling the controllers.”12 From controlling who has information access through panoptic background investigations to

centralized control of access mediums—message traffic, encrypted Internet Web sites, and compartmented programs—intelligence agencies carry many of the same watermarks of

Bentham’s original panopticon blueprint. 

Importantly, the system of checks and controls adds to an

organization’s “economy of power.”13 “That is to say, procedures which allowed [and still allow] the effects of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted,

adapted, and ‘individualized’ throughout the entire social

body.”14 A clear understanding of an organization’s circulatory

system will lead to the heart of its key strengths and weaknesses. Physical and social procedures surrounding the flow

of power serve as key power conduits that you must take a

look at through Foucault’s rhetorical lens.15

Foucault’s analysis techniques not only match the intelligence architecture but they also work as a “focusing lens” for

the organization’s power flow. Additionally, Foucault’s analytical lens works equally well to magnify the often-hidden power

conduits in an adversary’s structure. A detailed understanding of power conduits and the restrictions placed upon them

is needed to apply Foucault’s analytical tools. 

From the combatant commander down to the soldier in the

field, a conceptually simple yet powerfully complex power architecture exists. Each power level in the architecture acts as

a power plug in a “network of relationships that are systematically interconnected” in a series of standard and potential

connections (fig. 6).16 Our routine conduits constitute what is

seen as standard operating procedures; furthermore, these

connections end up in baseline field orders, air tasking orders,

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and special instructions to energize US power architecture

with discourse power. Intelligence officers can excel as “power

boosters” and/or “surge protectors” in order to maintain an

optimal balance in the flow of “juice.”

In this task of adjustment, discipline had to solve a number of problems for which the old economy of power was not sufficiently equipped.

. . . It must neutralize the effects of counterpower that spring from

them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions—anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions. Hence the fact that

the disciplines use procedures of partitioning and verticality; that they

introduce, between the different elements at the same level, as solid

separations as possible; that they define compact hierarchical networks; in short, that they oppose to the intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, individualizing pyramid.17

As you partition your view of yourselves and others, an objective view of critical-power choke, pooling, and stop points

gains strength and clarity. 

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Panopticon

Figure 6. Power and Knowledge Flow

Power, pyramids, and vertical partitions were covered. Just in

case you are wondering—no, you do not need to splice an electrical engineering degree with a course in Egyptology. Just keep

in mind that observation and control of power depends on a

complex group of relations—interactions that depend heavily on
communication.18 For Foucault, “discourse is a form of social action” built on networks of archives, social practices, and institutions (fig. 7).19 “[Foucault] demonstrates the microphysics of

power that resides in the knowledge that is disseminated in discourse and embodied in laws, regulations, tests, and in the very

architecture of hospitals, schools, and prisons, showing the ways

that seemingly diverse discourses come together in formations

that affect social practices and social controls.”20

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Panopticon

Figure 7. Discourse Hierarchies

If you can understand both your own and the adversary’s discourse formation, you can better identify pivot points to reinforce, degrade, or attack. Appropriate action can be initiated if

you can highlight the tactics of power that fulfill Foucault’s three

criteria for “the ordering [structuring] of human [power] multiplicities.”21 These social pivot points serve as critical elements in

power analysis. Key discourse pivot points (fig. 8) and target

areas will exercise power economically (a significant reduction of

hierarchical effort, social resistance, and physical/monetary expense). They will take power to its maximum intensity and range;

they will link power and economy through amplifying mediums

(visual, electronic, tactile, etc.) and organizations (educational,
military, industrial, etc.) in order to add clarity and strength.22 If

you can understand these areas, you will fully realize your own

capabilities. These points are also known as centers of gravity

and decisive points. Additionally, these pivot points will help you

comprehend the enemy point of view.

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Panopticon

Economy

Intensity

Linkage

Figure 8. Discourse Tactical Considerations

The fighters in figure 8 represent just one element of a country’s military capability. Additionally, they embody every aspect of Foucault’s three criteria. For example, the aircraft on

the left represents a US plane, and the one on the right represents a hostile force’s air capability. The corresponding countries’ power structures are directly responsible for employment

of their aircraft. Power flow starts at the top of the discourse

hierarchies and proceeds down a complex system of conduits

(shaped by social and physical procedures, tactics, and strategies) with each aircraft representing the military manifestation

of the power flow. Inside each aircraft, there are several additional sets of power conduits. Each aircraft’s physical power

(speed, range, weapons, etc.) and each pilot’s capability repre-
sent another critical set of conduits. The aircraft’s physical

power is readily seen; however, the pilot’s training (aircraft

systems and procedures), threat knowledge (systems and tactics), and access to information via (a secure and reliable) connection to the main conduit (with the panoptic view of the battle space) are rarely acknowledged. Overall strength of an

allied or hostile power flow is directly tied to the economy, intensity, and linkage of the flow. 

Operation Allied Force (Kosovo conflict), the air campaign

against Serbian forces, is an example of economy, intensity,

and linkage in action. NATO successfully engaged Serbian military infrastructure through an effective use of its own economy, intensity, and linkage. According to DOD News Briefing

(July 1999), NATO’s economy was demonstrated through destruction of 110 Serbian tanks, 210 armored fighting vehicles,

and 449 pieces of artillery and mortars, with loss of only two

aircraft (pilots rescued unharmed) during 78 days of flight operations. The monetary economy or expense of the operation

was considerable. However, the ultimate economy was realized

through preservation of NATO and civilian lives throughout

the operation. According to Secretary of Defense William S.

Cohen, “of the 23,000 bombs and missiles used, only 20 went

astray causing collateral damage.”23 Equally, intensity of the

weapons employed by NATO aircraft was very evident, as highlighted by the number and variety of targets disabled or destroyed. Additionally, unrestricted range and employment of

NATO aircraft highlight the intensity of their employment. Finally, linkage of the employment was underscored by use of

multinational command and control systems, aircraft, and

personnel in attainment of a common objective. The airpower

portion represents only one component during one phase of

the conflict in Kosovo. Operation Joint Guardian, the followon operation, involved employment of NATO peacekeeping

forces (ground troops) in Kosovo. 

During the Persian Gulf War, intelligence analysts effectively

identified Iraqi pivot points as they determined critical targets

against which coalition forces would apply physical power. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning and

Command and Control, experienced intelligence analysts were

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able to chart the flow of power through the Iraqi military architecture.

American intelligence recognized the highly centralized nature of the

Iraqi military and political systems. And this leadership resided in the

person of Saddam Hussein. The CIA, DIA, and State Department devoted a great deal of effort [to] examining him and concluded that he

would remain in power for the foreseeable future despite the presence

of numerous, ineffective, and demoralized opposition groups. . . . Saddam and the Ba’ath Party maintained their power through a pervasive,

effective, and harsh intelligence and security apparatus that periodically infiltrated and decimated internal opposition groups. Thus, both

CENTCOM [Central Command—responsible for the Iraqi area of operation] and CENTAF [Central Command Air Forces] staffs targeted leadership before the crisis erupted, but only the military portion of this

foundation supported the Baghdad regime. The inclusion of additional

political targets into air campaigning occurred only after the United

States was committed to Operation Desert Shield.24

The Iraqi power structure’s economy, intensity, and linkage

were effectively identified. 

Unfortunately, a misapplication or misunderstanding of our

own pivot points can create unwanted entropy that can wreck an

operation. Effective discourse fuses power and knowledge critical

to any successful military operation.25 Again, drawing from Operation Desert Storm, a delayed amplification of our own pivot

points resulted in an initially poor rhetorical economy of power

that was successfully overcome via our superior physical force.26

As in past conflicts, intelligence enabled the planning for Desert Shield

and Desert Storm—it did not formulate it. In the case of defensive

planning for USCINCCENT [US combatant commander of Central

Command] OPLAN [operations plan] 1002–90, intelligence analysts

were caught in the post–Cold War transition from Soviet–European

emphasis to smaller, but more numerous regional threats. As a result

of the region’s relatively low priority before Desert Storm, their information on Iraq was less than comprehensive and woefully out of date.

Even when those analysts who were watching the Arabian Peninsula

detected early signs that Baghdad might be preparing for military operations, they were unable at first to capture the attention of senior

policy makers who, up until the summer of 1990, had been advised

that Iraq had been exhausted by its war with Iran and would limit its

bellicosity to the diplomatic arena.27

Fortunately, thanks to Foucault’s power analysis, the ability

to chart this power flow will help you to operate more effectively during any future conflict—at any echelon (from higher

headquarters down to the unit level). Specifically, use of the

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military’s panopticons can help map the power conduits in

each level of an organization—conduits shaped by the organization’s social hierarchies, physical structures, procedures,

tactics, and strategies. Additionally, an understanding of how

Foucault’s elements of economy, intensity, and linkage dramatically affect the flow of power or discourse through the

conduit structure of any organization, system, or situation will

prove helpful. 

Obviously, our intelligence capabilities do not allow a complete, unhindered view of an adversary’s discourse infrastructures. Moreover, we cannot address discourse mechanisms of

real-world threat systems; doing so would move this discussion

into a classified realm. Discourse and power flows can be encrypted, hidden, duplicated, and circumvented by many highand very low-technology means. From satellite communications

to hand signals, discourse power flows can branch, ebb, and pool

in many ways. However, if you can understand how to isolate,

block, or manipulate the discourse flow of any weapon system,

you have effectively removed it as a threat. As more is learned

about megatons, Mach numbers, cyclic fire rates, and ranges of

a wide array of weapon systems, it is very important to consider

the power plug for each system; it will undoubtedly highlight the

most pivotal characteristics to avoid or exploit. 

Notes

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1988), 82. 

2. Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York:

Pantheon Books, 1984), 18.

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid., 19.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 20.

7. Ibid., 19.

8. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on

Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 45.

9. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 18.

10. Ibid., 19.

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 61.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

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16. Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, 2d ed. (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1993),

224.

17. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 208–9. 

18. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 45.

19. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, eds., The Rhetorical Tradition:

Readings from Classical Times to the Present (Boston: Bedford Books, 1990),

1128.

20. Ibid.

21. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 207.

22. Ibid.

23. Linda Kozaryn, Cohen, Shelton Say NATO’s Patience, Precision Paid

Off, n.p., on-line, Internet, 5 July 1999, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1999/n06111-99906113.html.

24. Eliot A. Cohen, ed., Gulf War Air Power Survey, “Planning,” in vol. 1,

pt. 1, Planning and Command and Control (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1993), 206–7. 

25. Bizzell and Herzberg, 1128.

26. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 61.

27. Cohen, 191.

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Chapter 6

Discontinuity Fever

The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two

opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain

the ability to function.

—F. Scott Fitzgerald

––The Crack-Up

Foucault raises a key question in reference to the flow of power

and knowledge: “What is the essence and mode of transformation of power relations?”1 This discussion has shown how the

panopticon can help identify critical pivot points in the power relations of a given architecture. However, in order to fully evaluate power surges, you must examine the flow with a power analysis focused on complex shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities

underlying the power structure (fig. 9).2 The base-line requirement is to “differentiate the networks and levels to which they

[power events] belong” and to use power analysis to “reconstitute

[detect, characterize, and evaluate] the [discourse] line along

which they are connected and engender one another.”3 Foucault

clearly understands the strengths and difficult consequences of

power analysis: “The notion of discontinuity is a paradoxical one:

because it is both an instrument and an object of research; because it divides up the field of which it is the effect; because it

enables the historian [tactician] to individualize different domains but can be established only by comparing those domains.”4 A “powerful and flexible grid of interpretation with

which to approach relations of knowledge and power” forms the

architecture of the organization.5 You monitor “longer-range continuities in cultural [power] practices” that form Foucaultian

norms in order to highlight trip-wire events.6 Unfortunately, even

norms expand and contract to set new and sometimes dangerous tensions on trip-wire power events.

Power shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities can take on many

forms when overlaid against a wide range of norms across the

globe. For example, the death in 1994 of North Korean leader

Kim Il Sung created a relatively small ripple in the power flow

39
when compared to deaths of other leaders in other regions.

Conversely, the death of Marshal Tito (1892–1980)—anti-Nazi

resistance hero from 1941 to 1945 who served as “godfather of

all Yugoslavs” after the war—created not only a power shift but

a power rupture (creation of new power nodes) with innumerable discontinuities.7 There are many positive and negative

aspects to these power mutations.8 Obviously, Tito’s cohesion

of volatile Balkans came at a high price––specifically, his secret

police and island prisons.9 Power ruptures and discontinuities

continue to surge throughout the former Yugoslavia—as witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo (photo, next page). Also, Iraq experienced a dramatic power shift in 2003. The regime change

there opened many ruptures and discontinuities as this once

repressed country gradually moves toward democracy. Observe the new power nodes that are established, modified, and

removed as Iraq is returned to the control of its people. Importantly, consider how these changes can be viewed and analyzed

with the help of a rhetorical lens.

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Panopticon

Shifts

Ruptures

Discontinuities

Figure 9. Power Analysis
Other countries (the former Soviet Union, Iran, Cuba, etc.)

have faced significant bends in power flow over the years. David

Brownstone and Irene Franck’s Timelines of War: A Chronology

of Warfare from 100,000 BC to the Present exhaustively lists recurring (some ongoing from their very origins) issues behind the

world’s conflicts. The need and the importance of effective intelligence analysis are in no danger of decreasing. James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay comment on the analysis of global strife:

“Wars don’t just happen. Organized violence, like the weather, is

never a complete surprise. There are signs and long-term trends.

You cannot predict exactly what the weather will be at noon tomorrow. You can, however, analyze past and ongoing conflicts

and use the results to project the major trends shaping similar

current and future events.”10 Shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities (trip-wire events) often precede many signs and long-term

trends. You must carefully examine a battle space and help determine a wide array of trip-wire events. Assets, ranging from

local (organic) to national level, can be tasked through the intelligence cycle in order to observe these events. 

Unfortunately, according to Enoch Powell, even with trip

wires, conflicts will remain a permanent part of our history.

“The various techniques through which power is enacted are

acceptable to us only because most of the power is hidden.

The effectiveness of power increases as its visibility decreases.

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Refugees of the Conflict in Kosovo
This disciplinary, normalizing power is far more subtle and

pervasive than the easily identifiable, spectacular, repressible,

and potentially violent types of power, so we acquiesce readily

in ways we would not to more overt forms.”11 As a result of this

hidden potential, trip wires can in no way be redirected from

the power infrastructure into an isolated checklist. Uncertainties of knowledge (photo below) continue to exist even during

our age of high technology.12 

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Uncertainties of Conflict: Crews Train in Chemical Warfare Ensembles

Directly tied to uncertainty is the possibility of deception. The

CIA’s A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes highlights several key warning signs associated with deception.13 An understanding of a target country’s capabilities, opportunities, and

motives helps to scale “the likelihood that a country or organization is engaged in an attempt to distort the analyst’s perceptions.”14 “Knowledge of which secrets an adversary most seeks to

protect adds a distinctive perspective to the analysts’ understanding of the country’s military, political, and economic priorities.”15 Additional warning signs highlight the “anomalies in the

information available to the analyst.”16 Suspicious gaps in collection, suspicious confirmations, and contradictions to carefully

researched patterns represent discontinuities underscored as

key warning signs (fig. 10).17 

Suspicious gaps in collection are generated when “conclusions and judgments received through one collection channel

are not supported to the extent expected from the take of other

collection systems.”18 Although certain patterns of behavior

are subject to rapid change, analysts “should examine criti-
cally information that signals an inexplicable change, for example, in an adversary’s priorities and practices” resulting in

contradictions to carefully researched patterns.19 As a final

warning sign to a deception operation, suspicious confirmations

result “when a new stream of information from clandestine

sources or technical collection seems to reinforce the rationale

for or against a U.S. policy initiative.”20 “In these circumstances,

receiving the same ‘story’ from more than one DO [director of operations, or other source] does not in itself speak to the authenticity of the information.”21

In an attempt to understand power flows and uncertainty or

deception, you must remember that analysis is a process— analytical steps steeped in rhetorical theory. Power and discontinuity analysis represent two effective ways to analyze a foe’s actions

or capabilities. However, prior to initiating any analysis, you need

to understand that power (its conduits and flows) influences

everyone. Consequently, Foucault’s power influences can be

found in every human organization and system. Now, you can

look at an organization as a power being with a rhetorical circulatory structure supporting its existence. Power (Foucault’s discourse and knowledge) flows through the entire organization. As a power-influenced (human conceptualized) entity,

an organization has “spatial, temporal, and social compartmentalizations,”22 which must have a physical means of sharing in43

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Figure 10. Influence of Deception Warning Signs on Analysis
formation in order to allow power to flow. If you understand the

power movement, you can understand the entire organization. 

The simplest example of an organization is two people occupying their individual compartmentalizations just a few feet

away. You can observe them communicate (visually, verbally,

or physically) and can watch what actions take place.23 The

conduits they use are shaped by “social processes, behavioral

patterns, systems of norms, types of classification, [and]

modes of characterization.”24 Through the proper vantage

point (panopticon), you can learn more about how conduits

are socially and physically shaped. You can then understand

how and when power moves from compartment to compartment. The conduit—along with its content—may take the form

of a simple verbal message from one person to another, or it

could take on the form of an encoded satellite communication

link from headquarters to the cockpit of an aircraft many

miles away. Once each actual (suspected or possible) conduit

is identified, you can associate actions and events with each

type of power flow and conduit. Additionally, critical pivot

points—as defined by the Foucaultian elements of economy,

intensity, and linkage—can be isolated, attacked, or avoided.

If you plot and highlight the conduit’s pivot points, you can effectively map the power flow of any organization. 

Power shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities in conduits can

take on many forms when overlaid against a wide range of

global norms. You must be aware that conduits can rapidly

change, fail, and fall from expected norms. According to Foucault, “the problem is no longer one of tradition, of tracing a

line, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting

foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new

foundations, the rebuilding of foundations.”25 Importantly,

many of these power transformations occur naturally. However, you must understand that deception can effectively hide

or disguise transformations. Deception can affect your analysis of an organization: a standard consideration for CIA and

military analysts. The CIA’s Tradecraft Notes underscores a

need to consider the possible use of deception from the beginning of your observation of an organization, system, or situation.

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If uncertainty remains, you continue to focus on the threat

power flow, but now you repeat the intelligence process with a

different rhetorical perspective/lens.26 The views of rhetorical

theorists such as Kenneth Burke, I. A. Richards, and Walter

Ong can also serve as superb perspectives for intelligence

analysis. Power flow is one of an unlimited number of rhetorical tools. Historians and tacticians represent “the diversity of

sources and thought that both enrich and complicate” analysis.27 Hopefully, this (Foucaultian) rhetorical sampler illustrates

at least one way theory can enrich your analytical perspective.

Unfortunately, all too often you underestimate the power

flow and conduit capacity of an organization. You tend to gravitate towards a simple (inadequate) analysis of a threat country’s capabilities. According to Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch,

an inadequate analysis—a setback the Israelis faced during

the 1973 Yom Kippur War—results from “the products of a

failure to think through the many dimensions of a changing

strategic challenge.”28

Moreover, the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] underestimated the import of

substantial improvements in the quality of Arab (and above all, Egyptian)

training and coordination since 1967. Because of intensive Soviet advice

and, more important, their own efforts, the Egyptian and Syrian armed

forces had improved considerably since that war, at virtually every level.

To be sure, the IDF had also made tremendous strides in this period, and

hence many IDF officers then and since have argued that the relative gap

remained the same or had even opened slightly in Israel’s favor. The Israeli conception of relative advantage, however, oversimplified the changing relationship between the two sides.29

Equally devastating, you also tend to overestimate the power flow

and conduit capability of our own military forces. A clear path to

understanding our unintentional self-deceptions starts with a

step towards understanding our (individual) power strengths

and limitations, resulting in an effective “comparative assessment of doctrine and effectiveness”—a penetrating view providing a clear “net assessment” of any situation.30

Each one of us serves as a positive or negative pivot point in

our organization’s power flow. Take the time to learn more about

yourself and the other power players in your unit. Learn from

those who can successfully analyze the key pivot points and trip

wires. Additionally, while in the trenches, document your successes and pass the best analytical processes throughout your

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unit and the intelligence community, thereby establishing a powerful conduit for the “rebuilding of [rhetorical] foundations.”31

Notes

1. Quoted in Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 65.

2. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on

Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 5.

3. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 56.

4. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 9.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay, A Quick and Dirty Guide to War:

Briefings on Present and Potential Wars, 3d ed. (New York: William Morrow

and Co., 1996), 204.

8. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 12.

9. Dunnigan and Bay, 205.

10. Ibid., xv.

11. Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, 2d ed. (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1991), 225.

12. Charles van Doren, A History of Knowledge: Past, Present, and Future

(New York: Ballentine Books, 1991), 338.

13. John Gannon, “Foreword,” in Jack Davis, A Compendium of Analytic

Tradecraft Notes, ed. F. Douglas Whitehouse (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 42.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 43.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 10.

23. Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 14.

24. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 45.

25. Ibid., 5.

26. Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 12.

27. Ferdinand de Saussure, “Nature of the Linguistic Sign,” in Professing

the New Rhetorics: A Sourcebook, ed. Theresa Enos and Stuart Brown

(Boston: Blair Press, 1994), 5.

28. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of

Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 130.

29. Ibid., 129–30.

30. Ibid., 129.

31. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, 5.

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Chapter 7

In the Trenches

But war is not a true adventure. It is a mere ersatz [imitation]. Where ties are established, where problems are set,

where creation is stimulated—there you have adventure.

—Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

––Flight to Arras

Real adventure begins at your first assignment when you interact with your primary customers (commanders, crews, and

support personnel). The schoolhouse world quickly disappears in

a flurry of daily demands. Within your office, you will experience

influences of internal Foucaultian power surges from “innumerable points.”1 Some challenges to face include manpower reductions, equipment shortages, and many deployments, as well as a

wide array of additional duties. High demand for intelligence

support continues to increase as shown in the following photo.

Simply put—you will be expected to do more with less. Fortunately, your understanding of rhetorical theory can help. 

47

The F-16—referred to as the Viper by its pilots—is one of many systems you

will be expected to support.
From force protection to follow-on test and evaluation of new

aircraft and tactics, intelligence support is deeply seeded in daily

military operations. Unfortunately, depending on your specific

situation, the job may turn from intelligence operator to analysis

“medic”—you will hustle to meet operational needs as quickly as

they arrive. Usually, this is when theory takes a backseat to providing time-critical products. Yet, even during times of intelligence triage, a few quick notes concerning discourse analysis

can help. For example, many well-organized briefings, summaries, and reports are readily available in classified and unclassified formats through the Internet. Specifically, your access

to the high-speed Secret Internet Protocol Router Network system makes an incredible array of polished products available. In

the trenches, you will depend increasingly on preanalyzed products as you pull down briefings to satisfy short-notice requests.

These are excellent products; however, you need to keep in mind

that most of these products are not targeted to your specific audience.

Erika Lindemann offers the communication triangle shown in

figure 11 as a simple way to help define rhetorical problems.2 The

48

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Subject

Writer

Briefer

Reader

Listener

Message

Power Point Briefs

Country Studies

Message Traffic

MSIC, DIA, CIA, and so forth

Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures

Legend:

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

MSIC, Missile and Space Intelligence Center

Figure 11. Communication Triangle
problem you will face is rapid adaptation of discourse products

influenced by someone else’s rhetorical perspective in order to

satisfy your customers. As a quick and sound guide, the communication triangle can aid in the formulation of questions concerning the “relationship between terms [corners of the triangle].”3 The triangle can be used to formulate questions

concerning the author’s relationship to the subject and audience

as depicted in Lindemann’s work.4 Basically, you are “reverse engineering” the originating author’s rhetorical process. 

As you use products designed for other audiences, you must

take on positions (fig. 12) of reader, then writer, editor, and, ultimately, briefer to your specific audience (commanders, crews,

and others). Correspondingly, depending on the depth of your

analysis, you can significantly enhance your final presentation.

Audience analysis, directly tied to the communication triangle, is critical to all forms of communication. “As you learn

more about your audience, the possibilities for your own role

as a writer [briefer] will become clearer.”5 This process can be

energized by approaching and asking the audience for input.

A good recommendation is that you should sit down with your

new commanders and crews and ask them what they would

49

MILLS

Message

Writer Audience

Subject

Key Subject

Components

New

“Tailored”

Message

Reader

Writer

Editor

Briefer

Fusion Pyramids

Figure 12. Communication Analysis
like to see. You will build tremendous ethos in the unit and

significantly cut your presentation-tailoring time.

Additionally, analysts must ask some critical questions when

they use the communication triangle. Specifically, you must understand your audience.6 Development of an audience profile

can help narrow and define audiences through a look at their

ages, occupational specialties, and experiences.7 As this writer

(briefer)/reader (listener) relationship grows and matures, your

communication triangle actually shrinks at the base; and your

message moves with greater speed and clarity.8 The new, enhanced triangle in figure 13 represents a comprehensive audience understanding, and the writer can use a medium that optimizes this advantage. The CIA, much like other intelligence

organizations, skillfully uses audience analysis in order to tailor

products “to the individual intelligence consumer’s concerns.”9

50

FAIRCHILD PAPER

Subject

Writer

Briefer

Reader

Listener

Message
Chapter 8

Conclusion

So nations have armies to help them, rulers have ministers

to assist them. When the helper is strong, the nation is secure; when the helper is weak, the nation is in peril.

—Sun Tzu

––The Art of War

Your primary job as analysts is to excel as the military’s

helpers to war fighters and decision makers. Hopefully, this

discussion has assisted your “pursuit of expertise in analytic

tradecraft” through a deeper understanding of rhetorical theory.1 Rhetorical theory builds a superb foundation, enhancing

the intelligence-analysis process at all levels of the discourse

spectrum (from unit-level training to combatant-commander

briefings). Specifically, the force of Foucault’s power and discontinuity analysis provides an insightful analytical perspective.

As Admiral King emphasized, “It is particularly important to

comprehend the enemy point of view in all aspects.”2 Importantly, the enemy point of view is in its greatest state of flux since

the Cold War. The former Soviet Union, our Cold War “enemy,”

has transformed from a power-projection threat into an advanced weapons-proliferation concern. Although this transition

is troubling, smaller, highly unconventional threats (countries,

organizations, and threat systems) are now in the forefront, resulting in some of the greatest challenges for intelligence analysts. Consider the unconventional attacks orchestrated by

Osama bin Laden, resulting in the near-simultaneous bombing

attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es

Salaam, Tanzania, on 7 August 1998. Additionally, the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon underscored a critical need to modify our understanding of

the enemy point of view.

As an unconventional analytical source, Foucault provides

new power perspectives for intelligence analysis, and he gives

55
an unconventional look at an ever-growing unconventional

threat environment. Foucault’s analytical edge helps confront

these threats “by refusing to separate off knowledge from

power.”3 “His strategy has been to focus his work, both political and intellectual, on what he sees as the greatest threat—

that strange, somewhat unlikely, mixing of the social science

and social practices developed around subjectivity.”4 Foucault’s theories address the human behind the satellite images

and database numbers. He reminds you to “distinguish among

events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they

belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another.”5 

Some of you are already using many components of these

powerful rhetorical tools. Some organizations, such as the CIA,

are compiling key elements of these theories that directly apply

to their craft. These theories work to bridge practical application

gaps in the intelligence community—enhancing our ability to

adapt and thwart failure. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, authors of Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, underscore the basic reasons for failure in military organizations:

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FAIRCHILD PAPER

US Embassy Damaged by Terrorists in Tanzania
“failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt.”6 Theory allows you to learn from rhetorical lessons of the past, resulting in an intelligence service that can anticipate and adapt to

power flows, shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities. These authors

also underscore the importance of the skill of adaptation (specifically referencing the US Navy’s recovery from a string of setbacks during its 1940–42 antisubmarine warfare campaign):

“Indeed, the ability to adapt is probably most useful to any military organization and most characteristic of successful ones, for

with it, it is possible to overcome both learning and predictive

failures. In the interim, however, the cost of such failures will

be—and in the case was—high, in terms of blood, treasure, and

time.”7 The end result of an enhanced understanding of theory is

an adaptive intelligence organization that is able to provide a

comprehensive view of the battle space to war fighters. As intelligence operators, you must strive to enhance your analytical

growth through rhetorical theory—a force-multiplying education

that extends our comprehension of an evolving, growing threat

environment.

Notes

1. John Gannon, “Foreword,” in Jack Davis, A Compendium of Analytic

Tradecraft Notes, ed. F. Douglas Whitehouse (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), vi.

2. Quoted in Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval Intelligence, 1994, 24.

3. Quoted in Michel Foucault, The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 7.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 56.

6. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of

Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 26.

7. Ibid., 94.

57

MILLS
Bibliography

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from http://www.af.mil.html. 

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Cohen, Eliot A., and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.

Coulthard, Malcolm. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis. 2d

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Davis, Jack. A Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft Notes. Edited

by F. Douglas Whitehouse. Foreword by John Gannon.

Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1997.

DOD News Briefing. On-line. Internet, n.d. Available from http:

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01sd.html.

Dulles, Allen. The Craft of Intelligence. New York: Harper and

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Dunnigan, James F., and Austin Bay. A Quick and Dirty Guide

to War: Briefings on Present and Potential Wars. 3d ed.

New York: William Morrow and Co., 1996.

Fillingham, Lydia A. Foucault for Beginners. New York: Writers

and Readers Publishing, 1993.

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Foss, Sonja K., Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp. Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric. 2d ed. Prospect Heights, Ill.:

Waveland Press, 1991.

Foucault, Michel. Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology:

Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984. Edited by James

Faubion. New York: New Press, 1998.

––––––. “The Archaeology of Knowledge.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Edited

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“Leadership: Combat Leadership.” Lecture. Squadron Officer

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61
airborne command, control, and surveillance systems, 30

Allied Force. See Operations.

analysis, 1–6, 8–9, 11, 14–19, 22–23,

25, 27–31, 33, 36, 39–41, 43–45,

48–50, 53, 55

analytic tradecraft, 3, 42, 52, 55

Aristotle, 7–9

arrangement, 7

artifacts, 13–14, 16–18

Art of Rhetoric, 6–7

Art of War, The, 14

audience analysis, 49–50

Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through

History, 27

Balkans, 40

Bay, Austin, 41

Bentham, Jeremy, 28

Bosnia, 40

Brownstone, David, 41

Burke, Kenneth, 45

canons, 7

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2–3,

5, 12, 14, 36, 42, 44, 48, 50–52, 56

Cicero, Marcus, 25

Clausewitz, Carl von, 23

Clausewitzian principles, 24

Cohen, Eliot A., 45, 56

Cohen, William S., 35

coherent representation, 17

Cold War, 55

collection, 11–15, 42–43

combatant commander, 31, 36

communication

paradigms, 7

triangle, 48–51

Compendium of Analytic Tradecraft

Notes, 42, 52

Corax of Syracuse, 6

Corona, 13–15

credibility, 8

critical analysis, 9

cultural literacy, 50–51

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 55

deception, 17, 42–44

Desert Shield. See Operations.

Desert Storm. See Operations.

devices for exclusion, 22

Directorate of Intelligence, 5, 51

discourse 

community, 51

formation, 33

infrastructure, 37

mechanism, 15

power flows, 37

dissemination and integration, 12, 18

Dunnigan, James F., 41

11 September 2001, 55

embassy, 56

enhanced communication triangle, 50

essential elements of information (EEI),

16, 18

ethos, 7–8, 50

exploitation phase, 15

F-117, 24

finished intelligence, 15, 18

fog and friction, 24

Fontana, Alessandro, 23

Forrest, L., 17

Foss, Sonja K., 22

Foucault, Michel, 1, 3, 5, 11, 19,

21–25, 27–31, 33–34, 36–37, 39,

43–44, 52–53, 55–56

Franck, Irene, 41

Gannon, John, 3

Gooch, John, 45, 56

Green Ramp, 27

Gulf War. See Persian Gulf War.

Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1,

Planning and Command and Control,

35

Hirsch, E. D., Jr., 50

information, 3, 6–8, 18, 36, 42–44,

51–53

access to, 31, 35

age, 5

analysis, 17

fusion of, 15

key elements of, 11,

management, 16–17

value of information of the enemy, 1

63

Index
integrated air defense system, 30

intelligence, 1–19, 24–25, 28, 30–32,

35–37, 39, 41, 45–48, 50–51, 53,

55–57

analysis, 1–2, 4, 17, 28, 41, 45, 55

community, 1, 3, 10, 12, 18, 46, 56

cycle, 1, 11–13, 18–19, 41

discourse, 2

finished, 15

integration, 17

operators, 5, 57

“pulled,” 18

“pushed,” 16, 18

sources, 16

specialist, 1

Internet, 12, 31, 48

invention, 7

Iraqi

aircraft shelter, 19

area of operation, 36

military architecture, 36

pivot points, 35

power structure, 36

president, 36. See also Saddam

Hussein.

irruptive, 21

Joint 

Guardian. See Operations.

Publication (JP) 2-01, Joint

Intelligence Support to Military

Operations, 11

surveillance, target attack radar system (JSTARS), 30

Jomini, Antoine Henri de, 24

warfare theory, 24

Kalugin, Oleg, 13

Kaplan, Robert, 27

Kent, Sherman, 2

Kim Il Sung, 39

Kim, M., 17

King, Ernest, 1

Kosovo, 24, 27, 35, 40–41

Lindemann, Erika, 48

logos, 7–8

Marshal Tito, 40

memory, 7, 51

message, 15, 31, 44, 50–53

military 

discourse community, 51

literacy, 51

Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of

Failure in War, 56

mnemonics, 7

modern intelligence specialist, 1

modulation, 7

Nairobi, Kenya, 55

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO),

13–14

NATO, 30, 35

Naval Doctrine Publication 2, Naval

Intelligence, 12, 16

Ong, Walter, 45, 52–53

Operations

Allied Force, 35

Desert Shield, 36

Desert Storm, 11, 36

Joint Guardian, 35

operationally focused instruction, 19

oral communication, 53

Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing

of the Word, 52

oratory, 5

Osama bin Laden, 55

panopticon, 28–31, 39, 44

Pasquino, Pasquale, 23

pathos, 8

pedagogy, 11

Pentagon, 55

Persian Gulf War, 35

physical power, 34–35

Poitiers, France, 21

Pope Air Force Base (AFB), North

Carolina, 27

Powell, Enoch, 41

power 

analysis, 4, 22, 29–30, 33, 36,

39–40

architecture, 31–32

flow, 31, 34–36, 39, 41, 44–45

mutations, 40

ruptures, 24, 40

“Probable Course of Action,” 6

processing and exploitation, 12, 15

product, 15, 17–18, 51

production phase, 15

64
propaganda, 5

psychopathology, 21

Pu, M. M., 17

“pursuit of expertise in analytic tradecraft,” 55

reconnaissance aircraft, 14–15

“rhetoric is an action,” 5–6

rhetorical

template, 4, 9

vision, 1

Richards, I. A., 45

Saddam Hussein, 36

secondary orality, 53

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network

system, 48

Serbian military infrastructure, 35

Sicily, 6

Sun Tzu, 14, 28, 55

Syracuse, Corax of, 6

tactician, 22–23, 39

technical paradigm shifts, 8

Timelines of War: A Chronology of

Warfare from 100,000 BC to the

Present, 41

Tomlin, Russell L., 17

trip wire, 41–42, 45

events, 39, 41

tropes, 5

University of Arkansas, 2

warning signs, 42–43

World Trade Center, 55

Yugoslavia, 40

65
The Role of Rhetorical Theory in

Military Intelligence Analysis

A Soldier’s Guide to Rhetorical Theory

Air University Press Team

Chief Editor

Hattie D. Minter

Copy Editor

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Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

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Prepress Production

Mary P. Ferguson

Quality Review

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Joan Hickey

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