Ground Truth: The Implications of Joint 

Interdependence for Air and Ground Operations 

by 

Colonel L. Ross Roberts, USMC 

March 2006 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy 

and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national 

security. Copies of No. 52 in this series are available from the Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, AL 36112, or on the CSAT web site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awccsat.htm. The fax number is 

(334) 953-6158; phone (334) 953-6150. 

Occasional Paper No. 52 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 
 

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the 

authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US 

government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force 

Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United 

States government and is not to be reproduced or published without the 

written permission of the Air War College. 

ii
 

Contents 

Page 

 ABSTRACT......................................................................IV 

 PREFACE.........................................................................V 

 INTRODUCTION................................................................1 

 VIGNETTE........................................................................4 

 ANALYSIS.......................................................................10 

 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND......................................... .....21 

 FRICTION POINTS............................................................ 24 

 DOCTRINAL FRICTION POINT: FSCL.............................. .....33 

 THE FSCL DEBATE...................................... ......33 

 THE FSCL.................................................. ......34 

 ORGANIZATIONAL SEAMS AND PERSONNEL ISSUES............42 

 RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................52 

 DOCTRINE......................................................53 

 ORGANIZATION...............................................62 

 PERSONNEL....................................................71 

 UNIT TRAINING...............................................73 

 CONCLUSION..................................................................78 

 

 BIBLIOGRAPHY...............................................................81 

 ENDNOTES.....................................................................87 

iii
 

Abstract 

Joint interdependence grows out of the growing reliance of the Army 

on the Air Force as it becomes more agile and sheds some of its organic 

fires. Therefore, this research paper only addresses those areas where air 

and ground operations merge, on the battlefield. There are four questions 

addressed herein: What are the implications of joint interdependence? 

What are the doctrinal friction points? Where is the potential for 

operational seams? What might be the options for a way ahead? 

Organizing the services to become more interdependent makes sense 

operationally and strategically. Yet, experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq 

demonstrate that the services have much to accomplish to institutionalize 

joint interdependence despite the spirit of cooperation that now exists 

between the air and land services in both areas of operations. The 

simultaneous ground operations of the US Army’s V Corps and the US 

Marine Corps’ I MEF during Operation Iraqi Freedom provides a unique 

opportunity to evaluate the issues of joint interdependence and propose 

potential solutions towards creating mutually enabling air and ground 

operations. This recent experience combined with the historical accounts 

of past air-ground cooperation provides some of the answers to the 

questions posed above and is also indicative of the difficulty in actually 

institutionalizing the organizational, training, and doctrinal changes 

necessary to make an interdependent land and air force. This will be hard 

work. Understanding the implications of creating a truly interdependent 

force capable of withstanding the pressures of the next inter-war period is 

the first step. 

iv
 

Preface

The observations, analysis and recommendations expressed in this 

research paper are filtered through the lens of my Marine Corps 

experience. This perspective may seem parochial and even myopic. But it 

is a perspective shaped by the experience of being a member of both sides 

of an air-ground team that has demonstrated its tactical effectiveness many 

times over. The aviation arm of the Marine Corps is a tactical air force 

organized and trained to be an element of the Marine Air Ground Task 

Force. It is therefore easy for one to assert that the organizational 

structure of the MAGTF that makes its air and ground forces 

interdependent may not have application when applied on a larger scale, 

i.e., molding a joint, interdependent land force and air force. Today, 

perhaps a more appropriate analogy is that the Marine Corps’ air-ground 

system evolved within a notoriously paranoid culture whereby combat and 

sometimes service survival depended upon finding efficiencies in 

maximizing combat power while reducing the deployment footprint. 

Finely honing the art of aviation employment at the expense of heavier 

and less mobile forms of fires like self-propelled artillery resulted in an 

interdependent ground force and air force. 

However, before the perspective presented herein can be 

considered a perspective perhaps unaware of larger issues that may trump 

the interdependence initiative, one should consider the public statements 

of the US Air Force Chief of Staff, General T. Michael Moseley, US 

Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker, and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. Joint interdependence is 

now a priority for the Air Force, Army, and the Joint Staff. In fact, the Air 

Force Doctrine Center sponsored the topic of this research paper “the 

implications of joint interdependence” for the Air War College class of 

2006. The collection of books and studies written by Benjamin Cooling, 

John Schlight, Benjamin Lambeth, Robert F. Futrell and Bruce Pirnie et 

al. adds weight to the importance of joint interdependence.1

 It is the 

collective opinion of these authors—aviation experts, Air Force historians, 

former Air Force pilots, and members of Rand Corporation’s Project Air 

Force--that since airpower became a major contributor to warfare each 

conflict fought with airpower demonstrated an air-ground coordination 

maturation process whereby an initially dysfunctional air-ground system 

evolved into a system that was fairly effective. Alternatively, each of 

these authors uses the Marine Corps’ system of air-ground coordination as 

a constant by which to measure the other services’ air-ground system. 

v
 

Yet, invariably their complementary analogies are qualified with 

statements that imply that the Marine air-ground system does not have 

application on a grander scale and is not in consonance with the hardlearned lessons of Operation Torch. A common opinion expressed to me 

among many Air Force and Army officers was that the reason the Marine 

Corps system functioned so well was because “...that’s all Marine 

aviation exists for.” 

This opinion of the Marine air-ground system does not capture the 

seemingly simple, but in practice, very difficult process of air-ground 

coordination supported by a complex organization that melds the Marine 

Corps’ air arm and ground arm into seamless functionality and 

interdependence. One should also consider that during opening days 

Operation Iraqi Freedom this air-ground system accepted a crushing load 

of unplanned coalition air often with just ten minutes of fuel remaining, 

with relative ease. The Marine air-ground system utilized this excess air 

with devastating effect on the Iraqi forces located throughout the depth of 

the MEF battlespace. Yet, when the Marine Corps’ air-ground 

interdependence is indicted by airpower proponents for being wasteful by 

needlessly aligning valuable airpower for the sole use of Marines at the 

expense of the overall air effort they do so without full understanding of 

the entire Marine Air Command and Control System that is specifically 

designed to efficiently meld airpower into the ground scheme of 

maneuver. During OIF this system demonstrated its effectiveness to not 

only employ Marine Airpower, but also the unplanned and unanticipated 

weight of coalition airpower provided to, but not used by V Corps. 

Taken in this context, an un-biased outsider’s view of the 

challenges faced by the Army and the Air Force in becoming a jointly 

interdependent air and ground force may be of some value. As the Army 

sheds up to one-third of its organic fires and reduces its deployment 

footprint without a corresponding reduction in net combat power, as the 

Air Force faces its most challenging recapitalization efforts ever, the ideas 

expressed herein may offer some insight towards a potential road ahead as 

the air and land force transform to meet an ever changing threat and 

environment. The Marine Corps has traveled this road before. 

vi
Introduction 

 Joint Pub 3-3 defines joint interdependence as: 

The synchronized employment of land, air, sea, space, and 

SOF, therefore, provides the joint commander with the 

widest range of strategic, operational, and tactical options. 

Although each Service contributes its own unique 

capabilities to the joint campaign, each dominating its own 

environment, their operational and even tactical 

interdependence is critical to overall joint force 

effectiveness. Joint interdependence is achieved through 

the deliberate reliance of each service on the capabilities of 

others to maximize its own effectiveness, while minimizing 

its vulnerabilities. 

That definition of joint interdependence as written is seemingly 

comprehensive. 

However, lurking between the lines of the definition are the realities that 

confront the land and air forces in achieving joint interdependence for air 

and ground operations by relying upon each other’s capabilities to be 

successful. This is particularly daunting considering the friction points that 

exist among land and air forces. These points are burned into the culture 

(people) of each service by the ever present defense budget battles. The 

frictions blocking interdependence are in part a by-product of the Title 10 

delineation of roles and missions and the service responsibilities for 

organizing, training and equipping the forces independently and then 

employing them to battle and win the nation’s wars jointly. They are also 

caused in part from service cultures that since the end of WWII have 

grown to rely upon each other “sequentially” and not depend upon each 

other “reciprocally” particularly in combat.2

 Therefore, the thrust of this 

paper is focused on joint interdependence and the implications for air and 

ground operations. More specifically, the definition of joint 

interdependence above can be narrowed to mean the deliberate reliance of 

the land forces upon the capability of the air forces and vice versa, for 

mutually enabling effect. 

The institutional, organizational and training implications of 

interdependence are complex. Perhaps nowhere are the implications as 

important as they are for interdependence for air and ground operations. 

At a minimum, misunderstanding this or waving off interdependence by 

applying the common excuses of not enough people, money, or the 

ultimate excuse of “we already learned the lessons, we’ve got it figured 
 

out” will undermine the capabilities of the Army and the Air Force. But 

ultimately, these excuses will undermine the soldier and the Airman by not 

providing them with the best possible organization to battle and win our 

nation’s wars in a militarily efficient manner: quickly and with the fewest 

casualties. If we don’t get the air-ground team right we either lose in 

battle, or we win at higher cost, slowly and with higher casualties. 

 The lack of trust between the services underpins the frictions 

preventing interdependence for air and ground operations. This mistrust is 

so severe and has lasted so long that rebuilding trust while addressing the 

Quadrennial Defense Review and transformation will require bold 

leadership and difficult choices. What will be required is the 

establishment of deliberate dependencies upon each other’s core 

capabilities codified by doctrine and organizational changes that can 

withstand the inter-war period. Trust, not technology, is what will enable 

joint interdependence. Therefore restoring that trust will be largely a 

human endeavor. Most of my research has centered on those aspects of 

joint interdependence for air and ground operations where the interaction 

of soldiers and Airmen can be improved and thereby their mutual trust 

restored. 

Perhaps the reality is that interdependence may be impossible to 

institutionalize. Long ago officers like Patton and Weyland, Quesada and 

Bradley figured joint interdependence out. They knew the answers; they 

knew what was at risk if they were not jointly interdependent: failure in 

combat. The typical post-war drawdown that is the aftermath of each 

conflict often proves to be a more capable adversary to jointness and the 

services than the enemy just defeated. Processes emerge where each 

service is independently forced to justify their budget, force structure and 

procurement in anticipation of the next war while having just defeated the 

adversary jointly in the past war. This has historically repeated itself 

following the conclusion of every major conflict America has fought since 

achieving independence. A process that ignores the battlefield successes 

and the importance of personal relationships forged and tested in combat 

is not a sound basis for doctrine. 

Yet, moving the air and land forces forward towards joint 

interdependence makes sense financially, operationally and strategically. 

The Air Force’s commitment to back fill the Army’s reduction in organic 

fires with aerial fire support as the Army transforms raises the stakes. 

This point is very important and must not be misunderstood by the reader. 

A critical part of the Army’s transformation plan is to reduce its organic 

fires (artillery) capability by 30-40% in order to “lighten” their 

deployment footprint. This is significant and portends many implied tasks 

2
 

for the air and land services if aerial fires are to compensate for the 

divestiture while simultaneously adhering to the tenets of airpower. 

Inefficiencies in the current military model—the luxury of redundancy—

are no longer affordable or even desirable. More importantly, redundancy 

can no longer be a crutch for unsound doctrine and service organization 

that does not engender interdependence. 

The author understands that the leadership of the Army and the Air 

Force are beyond the issues of Anaconda.3 They have learned the lessons 

just like the organizations did after WW II, the Korean War, and the 

Vietnam War. But, unless there are organizational changes instituted in 

both services to ensure the “lessons learned” are not re-learned after the 

next inter-war period, Operation Anaconda could happen again. For joint 

interdependence of air and ground operations to work, it must be 

institutionalized through organizational and training changes designed to 

strengthen the bonds between the land and air service. The Air Force has 

many competing demands of which close air support is just one, 

particularly during the opening phase of a joint campaign. The challenge 

for joint interdependence for air and ground operations then is to 

determine how to best balance the air component’s capability with the 

ground component’s capability for mutually enabling strategic effect. In 

the process, the polarizing opinions of land power proponents (“the Air 

Force is never there when I need it”) and air power proponents (“all the 

Army wants us to do is be flying artillery”) will move closer towards the 

middle. 

Ultimately, if the services fail to achieve joint interdependence for 

air and ground operations, America will be the bill payer in the form of 

potentially more casualties and longer conflicts. The goal here is to 

provide options for a the road ahead to achieve joint interdependence for 

air and ground operations that is both effective and more efficient than 

current methods while increasing the relevance of the services’ core 

missions. This will require top down leadership and hard decisions. 

Overall success in this endeavor depends upon mutual trust between air 

and ground forces. What follows is an assessment of what is required to 

insure this occurs. 

3
 

Vignette 

So I want y'all to understand where an Air Chief is coming from when I 

talk about interde-pendence. I mean that. I mean that relative to jointness 

and I mean that relative to fighting a long war on terrorism as a member 

of the joint team. So my priorities are to look at ways to continually 

improve the joint warfight... So, to continue to improve the joint war- fight 

and to continue to focus on the notions of being truly interdependent really 

matter to me. 

 Gen T. Michael Moseley CSAF4

Does this quotation demonstrate a necessity to improve the ‘joint 

warfight’ by “focusing on the notions of being truly interdependent?” Is 

the renewed interest in joint interdependence based upon recent 

experience during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom? If 

so, then one would probably agree that there are service friction points and 

operational seams that need to be examined and understood before joint 

interdependence for air and ground operations can be achieved. The 

following vignette describing air operations within the I Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) Area of Operations during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) is useful in highlighting the friction points and seams 

between the Air Force and Army. In turn, this will suggest 

recommendations that offer a potential road ahead for the Army and the 

Air Force to achieve joint interdependence for air and ground operations. 

From the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom the Marine FA18D Airborne Forward Air Controller (FACA) crews witnessed the 

Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) of the 1st Marine Division march up 

from Kuwait. They were very familiar with the current location of RCT-5 

and the division’s other regimental combat teams. The FACA crews had 

previously flown with many of the air officers and forward air controllers 

now on their ground tour working for and advising the infantry 

commanders on employing rotary-wing and fixed-wing air. In fact, voice 

recognition over the radio was the norm and they were intimately familiar 

with what the ground commanders wanted attacked and left alone. This, 

they accomplished through meetings and rehearsals that were held 

between the Marine aviators and the Marine ground commanders well 

before OIF began. 

During the months leading up to OIF Marine aviators attended 

numerous “Rehearsal of Concept” sand table exercises or “ROC drills” 

hosted by the infantry commanders. During the last ROC drill just days 

before the war began MajGen Mattis, the 1st Marine Division Commander, 

4
 

was very clear in articulating his concerns and his desires for Marine 

Aviation. At the conclusion of the drill, the two thousand or so leaders in 

attendance broke up into the typical ‘what do you think’ side bar 

discussions. The Marine aviators attending the drill were the normal mix 

that represented the capability of Marine Air Wings. Cobra, Harrier, 

Hornet pilots and Hornet Weapons and Sensors Officers stood in a circle 

discussing their observations of the division’s scheme of maneuver. There 

were other Marine aviators among the group. These aviators were the 

division’s Forward Air Controllers (FACs) and Air Officers (AOs). 

Serving a twelve to eighteen month tour with the infantry, it was their job 

to share their aviation expertise with the “grunts” and coordinate and 

control Close Air Support (CAS). They too represented the mix of rotarywing and fixed-wing aviation of the Marine Air Wing and they understood 

they were critical to the infantry’s success. 

It was at this that point MajGen Mattis unexpectedly broke into the 

aviator’s circle and laid his personal battle map, an aviation Joint 

Operational Graphic on the sand in the center of the aviators. 

“Gents, let me explain one more time my intent for Marine 

aviation.” “Chaos” (Maj Gen Mattis’ call sign) explained to the aviators 

in explicit detail the routes of maneuver and expected timeline for the first 

thirty-six hours of the war. He then explained with less clarity where he 

expected to maneuver his regimental combat teams, a close equivalent to 

an Army Brigade, for the remainder of the campaign ultimately stopping 

at Baghdad six to seven weeks later. 

“My principal enabler for speeding the division’s advance is 

Marine Aviation. Therefore, my biggest concern is Marine Aviation’s 

ability to find Iraqi artillery and surface to surface missiles capable of 

delivering chemical munitions thus slowing our speed of advance. I don’t 

want you concerned too much about Iraqi tanks, I have the best anti-tank 

weapon in the world, and that’s the M-1. Where are my Cobra guys?” 

Three to four pilots, one of them a squadron commander, raised 

their hands and MajGen Mattis again points to the map and says “you 

guys need to be just behind but no further than my forward lines and 

looking for targets to my immediate front and to the maximum range of 

your TOW and Hellfire missiles. If there’s armor to our front, you will be 

directed to attack key vehicles before they get within range of my M-1’s. 

If there’s nothing going on, I want you to land behind my lines and save 

gas. If there’s something big I’ll expect your FACAs to work with the 

fixed-wing CAS and direct them where you need them. Where are my 

fixed-wing guys?” 

About ten aviators raise their hands. 

5
 

“You guys are equally as critical; you need to be ranging from five 

clicks to sixty miles to my front and along the flanks of my route of 

advance and find and kill Iraqi artillery, surface to surface missiles, 

command posts, and armored columns in that order of precedence. You 

also need to screen my eastern flank and alert me of any Iraqi movement 

towards the west. After that, fly deeper and look for and kill surface to 

surface missiles, command posts, and massed Iraqi forces. I will also 

want you to be available for CAS, but I don’t expect that to happen often. 

The Cobra is my best CAS asset and that’s what I plan on using it for. 

Above all else, I am most vulnerable to Iraqi artillery capable of delivering 

chemical munitions. You fixed-wing guys are the eyes of my division; 

you have to find and destroy the Iraqi artillery before it can engage my 

Marines and I’ll engage or maneuver around the rest; any questions?”5

 There weren’t. And as operations began, things worked well. An 

illustration can be seen in the mission of “Akimbo 42.” His story follows. 

“Akimbo 42,” a Marine FA-18D crew flying a scheduled nighttime 

Airborne Forward Air Controller (FACA) mission for the 1st Marine 

Division, had twenty minutes of fuel remaining after being airborne over 

four hours. The FACA crew was performing Strike Coordination and 

Reconnaissance (SCAR) strikes in an open killbox about sixty miles in 

front of Regimental Combat Team five (RCT-5). The target area they 

were working was an Iraqi vehicle convoy that was passed to them by the 

Joint Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance System 

(JSTARS). They had coordinated the attacks of Marine, Navy, and Air 

Force aircraft and there were still many targets to attack. But Akimbo 42 

was at the end of their assigned time on station, and the relief FACA crew 

was now on station. They had expended all of their ordnance over an hour 

before but were using their targeting pod to generate target coordinates 

and guide the laser weapons for the strike aircraft as they arrived on 

station. After passing the pertinent information about their target area to 

the oncoming FACA they then called “Tropical,” the Marine Tactical Air 

Operations Center (TAOC), and passed their mission report. They also 

informed Tropical that they intended to conduct a visual reconnaissance 

with their remaining fuel for Iraqi activity as they flew home towards 

Kuwait. The “backseater” or Weapons and Sensors Officer (WSO) of 

Akimbo 42 tuned the second radio to “Blacklist” the 1st Marine division’s 

Direct Air Support Center (DASC) frequency and passed the same 

information. 

The pilot and WSO of Akimbo 42 searched for signs of Iraqi 

convoy movement along one of the major highways that connected Al Kut 

and Baghdad, about ten miles in front of RCT 5. After about eight to ten 

6
 

minutes, they detected six pairs of closely spaced lights moving east along 

Highway 6 towards RCT-5. The pilot of Akimbo 42 maneuvered the jet to 

get the Hornet’s targeting system centered on the vehicles. “Blacklist” had 

previously told Akimbo 42 that RCT 5 was stationary for the night. As 

Akimbo 42 approached the suspicious convoy, the pilot descended low 

enough to positively identify the vehicles as Iraqi artillery. Recording the 

target coordinate from their targeting system, both aviators plotted the 

artillery battery on their 1:100,000 grid chart. The target was definitely 

short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL), but more importantly it 

plotted inside an open killbox. Simultaneously the WSO called Blacklist 

to forward the information and target location of the Iraqi artillery. The 

WSO then changed frequencies and talked directly to RCT-5’s air officer. 

Major “Fingers” Ferringa, a FA-18 pilot, was serving a one-year air 

officer tour with the Regiment. He confirmed that the regiment had no 

friendly units in that location, “key pad seven” and added the killbox is 

open but overlays the division’s battlespace, “contact them to get attack 

clearance” he said. 

The Iraqi artillery battery was in an “open killbox.” This meant 

that there were no friendly units in the area and the aviators were cleared 

to attack any targets found in the 30’ X 30’ kill box, roughly thirty 

nautical miles square without detailed coordination with the ground forces 

that owned the killbox. If it was closed, they would have to clear their 

fires with the division air officer. Each killbox was further subdivided 

into nine squares 10’ X 10’ or roughly ten by ten nautical miles. The 

squares are numbered like the keypad on a telephone, one through nine. 

The killbox was short of the Fire Support Coordination Line, but the 

Akimbo 42 aviators at this point had come to rely upon the killbox system 

of fire support coordination more than the traditional fire support 

coordination line they had habitually trained to during their careers. Due 

to the rapid movement of the ground forces, the aviators operating within 

the MEF Area of Operations found that the killbox system was much 

effective than traditional fire support coordination measures; it was a very 

flexible system, particularly in such a fast paced battle. However, the 

unique flexibility of killboxes allowed them to be opened and closed 

instantly as the ground situation changed and about one hour had elapsed 

since they were updated on the status of the killbox by “Tropical.” The 

amount of caution displayed by Akimbo 42 was normally not required 

since the FACA crew was briefed by “Tropical” that killbox 87AU was 

‘open.’ They were exercising extra caution in case its status may have 

changed since they last checked. 

7
 

By this time the FACA crew identified the convoy as an Iraqi 

artillery battery and noticed that the battery had moved off the road and 

began to set up in a field with their tubes oriented towards RCT-5. The 

WSO of Akimbo 42 rolled the frequency knob of his radio to “Blacklist” 

and passed the new Iraqi artillery location to them. “Blacklist” also 

confirmed that no other friendly units were operating in the open kill box. 

Akimbo 42 asked if there were any additional aircraft in the area that 

could be used to attack the artillery battery before they began to fire on the 

Marines. “Blacklist” replied that no aircraft were currently working with 

the division but a section of A-10s was due in about 15 minutes and to 

contact the “Tropical” for approval to divert them. With this information 

Akimbo 42 was about to ask “Tropical” for available aircraft to attack the 

battery before it could fire on RCT 5. Just before the WSO of Akimbo 42 

keyed the mike, the FACA crew heard “Degree 77” check in with 

“Tropical” on the TAOC frequency. 

Degree 77, a section of F-15E Strike Eagles had just spent the last 

twenty five minutes supporting V Corps by holding in a CAS stack with 

about six other sections of CAS aircraft. It was clear to them that either 

there was way too much air supporting the CAS requirements of the 3rd

Infantry Division or something was preventing the efficient use of CAS; 

they just couldn’t identify what the problem was. For some reason, it took 

an inordinate amount of time to get called out of the CAS stack and 

assigned to either a ground terminal attack controller or to work a killbox. 

They experienced this frustration many times since the ground offensive 

began. One thing appeared certain; tonight may turn out like the othersthey would finish their assigned time on station without being assigned a 

mission. However, during the planning for tonight’s mission they learned 

from squadron mates that if “Warhawk,” V Corps Air Support Operations 

Center (ASOC), couldn’t gainfully employ the Strike Eagle crews by the 

end of their time on station they should use a “DASC bingo.” More 

specifically, save some gas in order to expend their ordnance in the 

Marine area of operations to avoid heading home with all of their bombs. 

They heard that the Marines always had targets available and developed a 

reputation for employing aircraft even with just five-ten minutes of fuel 

remaining. Hoping to avoid last night’s experience, at the end of their 

assigned thirty-minute time on station they called “Warhawk” and 

declared “Degree 77 bingo, returning to base.” Climbing to 37,000 feet to 

transit the Marine Airspace on their way home, they contacted the TAOC 

checked in. 

“Tropical, Degree 77?” 

8
 

The Marine TAOC replied, “Degree 77, Tropical, say ordnance 

and time on station remaining.” 

The pilot remarked to the WSO over the ICS...“hell I’m surprised 

they even acknowledged our call sign since we’re not on the ATO to 

support the Marines tonight.” The WSO responded by keying the mike. 

“Tropical, Degree 77 is a section of Strike Eagles with eight-GBU12’s (500 lb laser guided bombs) each and 15 minutes time on station 

remaining...do you have any work for us?” 

Tropical replied, “Degree 77, Tropical, proceed to killbox 87AU 

and contact Akimbo 42 on Mauve 15,” the killbox coordination frequency 

for the southern area of operations. 

 “Akimbo 42, Degree 77” called the WSO from the lead plane of 

the F-15Es. “Degree 77, Akimbo 42 stand by for target coordinate and 

target area brief, say type aircraft, ordnance and time on station.” 

The Strike Eagle WSO replied, “Akimbo 42, Degree 77 is a flight 

of two Strike Eagles, 8 GBU 12’s each, 15 minutes time on station 

remaining, LANTIRN capable” announced the WSO of the lead Strike 

Eagle. 

The WSO of Akimbo 42 remarked to his pilot over the intercom 

“what a waste of capability...all that gas and all those bombs and two 

guys per plane and there’re just a couple of bomb trucks...do you think 

the Air Force will ever let them do FACA?” 

The pilot quipped, “Knowing the Air Force, I doubt it.” 

Akimbo 42 WSO sent the target coordinates to the Degree 77 and 

the F-15E WSO read it back to Akimbo 42 to verify its accuracy. Both the 

pilot and the WSO concurred it was correct. Akimbo 42 WSO said 

“Degree 77 proceed to keypad five. Commence your attack from the 120 

degree radial, right turn off target and then back to keypad 5.” 

After confirming the laser code of the Strike Eagle’s first bomb the 

FA-18D pilot maneuvered his aircraft to guide the F-15E’s first bomb into 

the artillery battery just six minutes after establishing contact with the 

Degree 77. The resulting explosion and fire of the burning vehicle 

provided a great “mark” from which Degree 77 could orient the rest of 

their attacks. As Akimbo 42 observed the impact of the laser guided bomb 

they determined that their fuel state was now critical; the FACA WSO 

handed off the target area to the Strike Eagle crew as the SCAR manager 

and returned to base. 

This vignette highlights key differences between two ground forces 

operating independently towards a common objective in the employment 

of coalition airpower in consonance with maneuver. The next section 

analyzes these differences in more detail. 

9
 

Analysis 

There's no central focus on the striking of the primary targets of an 

opponent as much as it was just trying to stay out of each other's way. 

There's no central planning with that, there's no central focus, there's no 

central metric. That takes you nowhere other than, again, just staying out 

of each other's way. 

 Gen Michael Moseley, CSAF 

Perhaps the best way of comparing the V Corps experience to the I 

MEF experience is to correlate it with methods of inventory management. 

The V Corps example was “first in first out” form of Close Air Support 

(CAS) aircraft inventory management. Coalition CAS aircraft were 

‘pushed’ to the V Corps area of operations where they were stacked in 

altitude by the air support operations center while waiting to be called out 

of the stack and employed before their time on station expired. The I 

MEF example can be equated to “just in time” CAS aircraft inventory 

control. 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft were ‘pushed’ to the I MEF 

Area of Operations (AO) where they were assigned an agency and / or 

area to operate based upon their mission assignment and qualification. 

Each approach to planning for CAS aircraft is sound but the conditions on 

the battlefield to which each method is applied differ. 

Both inventories of CAS aircraft were sourced, coordinated, and 

centralized under the air component commander by pushing aircraft to the 

V Corps or I MEF area of operations. During the planning phase of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom the preponderance of 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing 

sorties were dedicated to I MEF and the preponderance of Air Force and 

Navy tactical fixed-wing sorties were dedicated to the V Corps area.6

 

This issue is always a source of friction between Marines and 

Airmen, and OIF was no different. Anticipating this friction, during the 

summer of 2002 the Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander Lt 

Gen Moseley met with the leadership of I MEF. In preparation for OIF, 

the Marine leadership briefed him on Marine Aviation and the Omnibus 

Agreement that was a footnote to the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986. 

Specifically, the Omnibus Agreement allowed the MEF commander to 

maintain control of Marine fixed-wing sorties since they directly support 

the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The Marine leadership desired to 

discuss the implications of the Omnibus agreement with General Moseley 

in order to alleviate any potential frictions over the control of Marine 

fixed-wing sorties. 

10
 

An agreement was reached between General Moseley and the 

Marine leadership. Marine fixed-wing sorties had to be “processed” 

through the CFACC in the form of a “direct support” Marine Air Tasking 

Order (ATO) embedded within the CFACC ATO. In exchange, the MEF 

would provide their “best 0-6” to the CFACC staff to head up the CAS 

effort for the entire Area of Operations, not just the Marine Area of 

Operations. This compromise worked both ways. The MEF had a trusted 

agent working CAS issues for the MEF, and in return General Moseley 

and the CFACC gained a form of “access” to the Marine fixed-wing 

sorties of the 3rd MAW. The CFACC’s position was that there may be 

times that require Marine FA-18s to fly long range missions and their 

sortie equivalent would be replaced with A-10 sorties. The bottom line is 

that the friction between the CFACC and the Marine Air Wing over the 

control and use of Marine sorties was reduced through a mutual 

understanding and commitment among leaders.7 

Lt Gen Moseley reinforced the fact that he was not looking to 

control Marine CAS sorties. Contrarily, he promised the entire weight of 

the USAF’s low density high demand assets like AWACS, JSTARS, 

Global Hawk, and Rivet Joint would support the MEF and V Corps 

equally. Nothing would be put in writing guaranteeing this; his word to 

the Marine leadership was that they will get everything the CFACC had 

and more. The interesting footnote to this meeting was that the MEF’s 

original purpose of keeping Marine tactical sorties solely for the support 

Marines turned out to be unfounded. By the third day of the conflict the 

MEF was employing an almost equal amount of CFACC sorties as 3rd

MAW sorties.8

 However, the majority of additional CFACC sorties sent 

to support the MEF were sorties originally planned to support V Corps. 

Long standing inter-service doctrinal issues between the Army and the Air 

Force manifested itself in a unique way. Coalition aircrew scheduled to 

support V Corps, but ultimately not used, developed a “DASC bingo” to 

save enough fuel after their assigned time on station supporting V Corps to 

look for “opportunity” CAS within the MEF AO. The inefficiency of the 

V Corps air-ground coordination stood in stark contrast to the efficiency 

of I MEF’s. This manifested itself into an unplanned system of just in 

time close air support that the MEF employed with devastating effect. 

The Coalition Force Air Component Commander maximized the 

sortie capability of the multiple squadrons and locations from which they 

emanated in accordance with joint doctrine and the allocation and 

apportionment agreed to by the land component and the air component 

and approved by the Coalition Force Commander. Yet, the V Corps 

example kept the CAS aircraft in stacks tightly controlled by the Air 

11
 

Support Operations Center (ASOC) while the I MEF example allowed the 

pushed sorties to flow to multiple agencies all working in consonance with 

each other.9

 

The CAS aircraft inventory allocation was doctrinally centralized 

under the CFACC through the use of the Air Tasking Order (ATO). In the 

V Corps Area of Operations (AO) the employment mechanism was 

decentralized to the ASOC, an organization led and run by Air Force 

aviators and certified Airmen. The former were rated Air Force aviators 

representing the fighter and bomber community and the latter were either 

certified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) or in training to be 

JTACs. In contrast, in the I MEF Area of Operations the execution 

mechanism was decentralized to the 1st Marine Division’s Direct Air 

Support Center (DASC), an organization led and run by formally trained 

air control specialists similar to Air Force Air Battle Managers consisting 

of Marine company grade officers and enlisted personnel.10 Both 

organizations are comparable in size. 

At first glance, the centralized control and decentralized execution 

worked. Unused CAS sorties flowed from an AO that didn’t need them to 

an AO that did. Airpower proponents would probably agree that this is 

precisely the strength of airpower when it is not tightly controlled using a 

‘penny packet’ approach. It can be flowed from one area to another 

rapidly and efficiently demonstrating its inherent flexibility. However, 

deeper analysis demonstrates something quite different was happening. 

A relatively new method of aerial fires coordination was employed by 

CENTCOM during OIF. Killbox interdiction / Close Air Support 

(KI/CAS) was a maturation of the killbox reference system used during 

Desert Storm. KI/CAS was designed to enhance airspace deconfliction 

and the rapid shifting of aviation assets through the area of operations. It 

also enhanced the navigation and assignment of rotary-wing and fixedwing aircraft in the conduct of CAS, FACA, SCAR, air interdiction, and 

armed reconnaissance long and short of the FSCL. 

The ‘killbox’ is a 30 by 30 minute grid system that’s roughly 30 

nautical miles square and is delineated by the lines of latitude and 

longitude depicted on an aviation graphic chart. The box will always be 30 

nautical miles in depth but its width will vary depending where it is 

geographically on the earth’s surface. CENTCOM planners further 

subdivided each killbox into 10 X 10 minute sub-squares. Each killbox 

was named by an alpha-numeric designator and each of the nine sub 

squares was numbered like the keypad on a telephone (see figure 1). 

12
 

Figure 1. Killbox Reference System 

Using this model, CENTCOM planners built charts that depicted the 

killbox reference system overlaying traditional fire support coordination 

measures and unit boundaries between V Corps and I MEF. Those 

killboxes and keypads that overlaid the area between the forward line of 

troops and the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) were “closed” to 

air attack unless the ground commander opened the kill box through his 

representative in the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Killboxes 

long of the FSCL were “open” for air attack unless the responsible ground 

commander coordinated through his representative in the CAOC to close 

it. Employed in this manner, killboxes took on the fire support 

coordination requirements of the area of which they overlaid. 

Essentially, a closed killbox had two meanings, depending upon one’s 

perspective. For the ground commander, it meant that he was responsible 

for the timing, priority, and effects of all fires employed within it. In the 

case of V Corps, long-range organic fires consisted of Army Tactical 

Missile System (ATACMS) and the Apache attack helicopter. This meant 

that organic fires had to be coordinated with aviation fires. For the 

aviator, a closed killbox meant that attacking targets within it required 

close coordination with the agency that owned it, because other fires like 

artillery and rockets were sharing the same airspace he was flying in. It 

also meant that there was a high probability of friendly units operating 

within the closed killbox. 

Therefore, V Corps placed the FSCL at a distance that maximized the 

effects of the corps’ organic fires, or in the case of OIF, between 100-140 

kilometers in front of the forward line of troops. Killboxes overlaying this 

13
 

area were originally planned to be closed so the corps commander could 

shape his battlespace with systems like ATACMS and / or Apache attack 

helicopters operating as a deep maneuver element. The organic fires of I 

MEF consisted mostly of fixed-wing aviation, augmented by a battery of 

ATACMS. Therefore, a slightly different approach was developed to 

maximize the use aviation delivered fires in conjunction with long-range 

organic fires. 

I MEF placed a Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) at the maximum 

range of the division’s artillery, or about 20-30 kilometers in front of the 

forward line of troops (see figure 2). Killboxes that overlaid the area 

between the BCL and the FSCL (shaded boxes of figure 2) were “open,” 

enabling the MEF to effectively use its primary deep shaping force, 

Marine Aviation for maximum effect. Killboxes overlaying the area 

between the forward line of troops and the BCL (white boxes of figure 2) 

were closed and aviation attacks in this area had to comply with the close 

coordination requirements of the entity that owned the killbox. This 

ensured aviation freedom of action between the FSCL and BCL and air 

actions short of the BCL were conducted with close coordination with 

ground forces. 

Figure 2. Killboxes and Traditional Fire Support Measures 

Control of interdiction sorties long of the FSCL was coordinated by 

the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). KI/CAS sorties in 

closed killboxes and keypads short of the FSCL were coordinated by the 

ASOC / DASC, depending upon the area of operations assigned. KI/CAS 

sorties were planned to attack targets assigned on the Air Tasking Order 

(ATO) or to attack targets that were changed or modified from the plan on 

14
 

the ATO. In the V Corps AO changes to the ATO assigned targets were 

delegated to the ASOC, and the DASC was delegated this authority in the 

I MEF AO. 

The importance of understanding the impact of proper positioning 

and use of fire support coordination measures, such as the fire support 

coordination line (FSCL) and killboxes is essential if both are to be used. 

V Corps and I MEF used traditional fire support coordination measures in 

addition to KI/CAS, yet each experienced different results. Coalition 

aircraft supporting V Corps spent more time in CAS stacks and returned to 

base with unexpended ordnance more often than aircraft supporting the 

MEF.11 The vignette demonstrates a joint air effort that worked in the I 

MEF AO but had difficulty in the V Corps AO.12 The efficiencies that 

enabled the excess flow of sorties were achieved because a more effective 

air-ground organization existed in one AO and not the other. Familiar 

inter-service arguments over the meaning and use of the FSCL limited 

airpower’s effectiveness on one half of the battlefield but not the other. 

The battlespace of V Corps was essentially divided into three zones. 

The first zone was that portion affected by 3 ID’s organic fires extending 

about 30 kilometers (km) to its front. The next zone was that portion able 

to be ranged by V Corps’ organic fires, such as Army Tactical Missile 

System (ATACMS) and attack helicopters. This area began at about 30 

km and ended between 100 and 140 km from the forward lines of the 3 ID. 

Bounding this outer limit was the FSCL. Air component sorties, such as 

CAS and AI, were planned for each of the three areas. V Corps used 

terms such as “Division” CAS, “Corps” CAS, and aerial interdiction to 

indicate the distribution of sorties that would be dedicated to each zone.13 

The execution of the plan fell short of its desired effects. Corps assets 

such as ATACMS and AH-64 attack helicopters were planned to range 

and attack the Iraqi forces in the corps’ zone as described above. As 

discovered, helicopters operating deep in uncontrolled enemy territory 

were not survivable without close coordination with fixed-wing aircraft, 

and their contribution to the deep battle was largely curtailed after their 

experience in Najaf.14 Additionally, long range systems like ATACMS 

are dependent upon external Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) systems for targeting. Insufficient ISR assets 

prevented effective and timely targeting of ATACMS over such a large 

and expansive area, while the potential for their use hamstrung fixed-wing 

operations from operating in the Corps’ zone.15 Therefore, the planned 

shaping of V Corps’ zone with its organic assets from 30 km in front of 3 

ID to the FSCL failed to accomplish its intended effect. 

15
 

CFACC air designated as “corps CAS” and “killbox interdiction” was 

also planned to operate over this battle space and within the killboxes 

overlaying it.16 This “new” concept of “corps CAS,” operating without a 

deep battle manager, quickly overwhelmed the corps’ ability to coordinate 

and direct their efforts. Complicating matters, those killboxes covering 

the division and corps zone of action were short of the FSCL and were 

therefore “closed.” By definition aircraft operating in a closed killbox 

“can only attack if under type 1, 2 or 3 terminal control 

(FAC/FAC(A)).”17 During the first five days of operations, the V Corps 

commander was hesitant to open killboxes short of the FSCL for fixedwing interdiction even though there were no friendly forces in the 

killboxes.18 This had a cascading effect of stacking “killbox interdiction 

sorties,” “corps CAS” sorties with the “division CAS” aircraft in CAS 

stacks. The stacks were positioned to keep aircraft clear of the trajectories 

of tube launched and rocket artillery and were normally over friendly 

territory. The net result was wasted air effort for the deep battle and an 

over-stocked inventory of CAS for the close battle. This imbalance 

created the unintended consequence of creating a critical enemy sanctuary 

within the V Corps zone short of the FSCL and was a result of holding the 

coordination and employment of CAS at too high an echelon, in this case 

the corps. 

According to the KI/CAS plan, sorties not used were expected to “go 

deep” and conduct aerial interdiction. The problem with this process was 

that the deep battle was typically sixty to one hundred miles farther from 

home base, potentially adding an additional 200 miles onto a mission. 

Additionally, the Air Force ASOC, and Control and Reporting Center 

(CRC) architecture in the V Corps Area of Operations lacked the ability to 

quickly direct the CAS aircraft to new target sets many of which were 

mobile in V Corps’ deep battle before fighters had to return to base for 

fuel. Fighters either brought their bombs home or checked in with the 

Marine Area of Operations, hoping for a quick target assignment to drop 

their ordnance on before returning to base. 

Those sorties fortunate enough to be put in contact with a SCAR or 

FACA aircrew after being “re-roled” from CAS to interdiction had a much 

greater chance of successfully finding a target since the SCAR / FACA 

crew would have already performed the work of finding, identifying, and 

prioritizing targets by the time the CAS aircraft arrived on station. More 

importantly, they were ‘present’ in the battle space forward of the leading 

edge of the battle conducting attack, reconnaissance, or even helping with 

C2. This proactive method of pushing SCAR/FACA aircraft forward 

enabled the flexibility in the MEF AO described in the vignette. Aircraft 

16
 

with critical fuel reserves just had to arrive in a particular killbox, get the 

target coordinate and area brief from the FACA, drop their bombs, and go 

home. 

In the V Corps Area of Operations, unused aircraft were stacked up, 

waited for a CAS mission, and either left at the end of their time on station 

or when they reached a pre-determined fuel state that allowed time to 

employ their ordnance in the MEF Area of Operations. As demonstrated 

in the vignette, this proved to be an extremely inefficient method of 

planning and employing fixed-wing aircraft in support of the maneuver 

forces in the V Corps AO but turned out to be an efficient use of fixedwing air in the I MEF AO. From the ground commander’s perspective 

and that of the infantryman within V Corps, the CAS log jam appeared to 

be a good thing. When they called for CAS, they got it very quickly and it 

was always there for them. But this came at the expense of the corps’ 

deeper battle and the long term perspective. The “excess air” should have 

been operating deeper shaping and attacking targets within and beyond the 

range of organic fires and short of the FSCL. A critical element of this 

very important event is that as the excess air from V Corps flowed into the 

MEF’s AO and was an instant contributor to the deep battle by flowing 

through the DASC, directly adjacent to the 1st Marine Division 

headquarters, not the MEF headquarters. 3rd Infantry Division (3 ID) after 

action reports made the point that V Corps was one echelon too high to 

have to sufficient situational awareness of 3 ID’S close battle and the deep 

battle, which contributed to its inability to effectively manage airpower 

between the two. 

In the I MEF area of operations, fixed-wing FACAs operated 

forward of friendly lines and used their skills to coordinate attacks in open 

and closed killboxes short of the FSCL with commander’s intent.19 Cobra 

pilots qualified as rotary-wing FACAs used their skills to coordinate aerial 

attacks in the close battle. Together they operated as extensions of the 

ground Forward Air Controllers (FACs), the Air Officers (AOs), the 

Direct Air Support Center (DASC) and the Tactical Air Operations Center 

(TAOC). Their capabilities were understood by all levels of command 

and therefore were given more autonomy over the battlefield. Marine 

liaison officers assigned aboard Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS) and Joint Surveillance Tracking and Reconnaissance System 

(JSTARS) aircraft were enablers in the process of flowing V Corps CAS 

to the I MEF AO.20 The DASC, ground FACs, and the air officers within 

the Marine maneuver units knew that when they were talking to a FACA 

he was qualified to coordinate air attack in consonance with maneuver. 

This mindset allowed FACAs to act as a relief valve for the Marine 

17
 

command and control nodes like the DASC and TAOC.21 This system 

was well practiced leading up to OIF and engendered a sense of trust 

among all participants. 

The 1st Marine Division ground commanders from the company 

level to the division commander himself trusted Marine aviators--rotarywing and fixed-wing--to carry out their intent. The aviators in turn trusted 

the ground commanders to employ their capabilities in such a way that 

maximized their strengths and minimized their weaknesses for a combined 

effect of speeding the advance of the division to their objective. The 

enabling function of this process was the command and control that 

understood the capability of each entity, to include the FACA operating in 

depth over the battlefield. It was a matter of trust developed by deliberate 

cross pollination of the air-ground team at all levels of command and 

training specifically designed to exercise that trust.22 

Air Force and Army aviators reading this paper would most likely 

approve of the direct guidance given by the Division commander to the 

Marine aviators in the above vignette. Achieving the level of knowledge 

of aviation planning and employment of rotary-wing and fixed-wing fires 

displayed by the division commander in the vignette is demonstrative of a 

career of cross pollination. Contrast that experience with the following 

experience of a brigade commander in Iraq two years after OIF began and 

a full three years after the Army and the Air Force learned the lessons of 

Anaconda: 

In my first few months in country, I rarely put air into my 

plan—this was because we did not understand how it 

could assist us in a counter insurgency battle—then I saw 

the incredible results in Fallujah and in our follow-on 

operations. After that, in our North Babil operations and 

election prep, I never left without my JTAC and always 

requested air to support our operations.23 

 

Soldiers and Airman should not be doing this the first time in combat, and 

this point is reinforced by the former 3rd Marine Air Wing Commander, 

Maj Gen Stalder. “Joint interdependence [for air and ground operations] 

means much more than the Army and Air Force understand. It means a 

changed sense of identity. It requires the air guys to establish the 

relationship with the ground force at all levels.”24 Even in the Marine 

Corps, an organization that is purposely organized to depend upon its 

aviation arm, aviators have to ensure aviation is properly injected into the 

planning process. 

18
 

Ultimately, joint interdependence for air and ground operations is a 

mindset. The reason why the Direct Air Support Center outperformed the 

Air Support Operations Center is because the DASC is the focal point of 

an air ground team, yet it is not a single point of failure.25 It is an airground team purposely organized to depend upon each other for success or 

to be reciprocally interdependent.26 By design, the MEF air–ground 

system is one with multiple overlapping complementary capabilities. 

True, much of the air–ground coordination came through the DASC, like 

the ASOC functioned for the corps. But, when the DASC became 

overwhelmed, it had other agencies that provided a relief valve. 

Subordinate air support agencies named Air Support Elements (ASEs) 

were assigned to Task Force Tarawa and the 1st UK Division, since they 

functioned as individual maneuver elements of the 1st Marine Division.27 

FA-18D Airborne Forward Air Controllers operated as extensions as the 

ground FACs or deeper on the battlefield in killboxes as SCAR aircrews. 

FACA-qualified attack helicopter pilots worked closely with ground 

Forward Air Controllers and CAS aircraft. The Tactical Air Operations 

Center worked closely with the DASC, airborne DASC operating from a 

C-130, FACAs, SCARs, and through Marine liaison officers on AWACS 

and JSTARS aircraft. The CFACC assigned an Air Liaison Officer to 

Task Force Tarawa’s Air Support Element, since Task Force Tarawa was 

the adjacent unit to V Corps’ right flank. It was a system where one entity 

was the focal point where air-ground coordination occurred for fixed-wing 

and rotary-wing aircraft.28 For I MEF air-ground coordination occurred at 

all echelons; yet, it was not a new concept.29 

If the above analysis is not sufficient to demonstrate the 

effectiveness of an air-ground team, then the battles of Fallujah occurring 

in April and November of 2004 should be. During the first battle the 1st

Marine Division once again found itself engaged in Iraq just seven months 

after returning to the US. This time, however, the only organic aviation 

fires the division employed were from Marine attack helicopters. Marine 

organic fixed wing squadrons were not deployed since planners thought 

that they would not be needed after the major ground combat ceased in 

2003. The one factor that prevented Operation Phantom Fury from 

yielding similar results to Anaconda was that the Division deployed with 

all of its organic Forward Air Controllers and Air Officers and the Air 

Wing deployed the DASC. When the Division attacked Fallujah in April 

2004, the entire weight of fixed wing support was provided by the 

CFACC, both naval-based and land-based. During the second battle of 

Fallujah in November, there were two organic Marine squadrons 

supporting the Division, in addition to a preponderance of coalition 

19
 

airpower. Both battles very successfully employed airpower in the most 

difficult of circumstances, an urban environment. The common thread 

that can be attributed to the successful integration of ground maneuver and 

coalition airpower in these two examples is the air-ground system that 

coordinated and controlled the joint aviation fires. The exact same system 

as described earlier in the analysis but in an urban combat. 

The questions remain. Are the Army and the Air Force leadership 

capable of moving interdependence forward to achieve seamless 

application on the battlefield? Are the ramifications of interdependence of 

air and ground operations fully understood by the senior leadership? Are 

the services capable of achieving joint interdependence for air and ground 

operations in an era where budget pressure will continue to squeeze 

funding for service specific weapon systems and capability? Are the 

services capable of making the organizational, doctrinal, and training 

tradeoffs required to institutionalize interdependence for air and ground 

operations in this environment? 

“The Air Force doesn’t want to be a bill payer for the Army’s 

transformation plan. The Air Force is getting very little publicity in the 

current battle in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this has the leadership 

worried.”30 Achieving joint interdependence for air and ground 

operations will not be easy. It will be a large institutional shift for the 

Army and the Air Force. Service stovepipes create organizational seams 

that prohibit effective cross pollination of Army and Air Force officers. 

This is an old problem with lots of “service baggage” that may require top 

down intervention similar to the automobile industry being mandated to 

install seat belts in cars to make them safer. 

20
 

Historical Background 

Indeed, with the rapid expansion of the air arm ...planners made a 

conscious decision to provide the army primarily with light and medium 

artillery and to rely on tactical aviation for additional heavy artillery 

support. 

 War Department Plans, 1941.31 

The land forces and air forces of the United States have 

demonstrated an ability to overcome doctrinal difference during time of 

war. Current airpower doctrine--specifically establishing priorities for 

airpower in a campaign--owes its beginnings to the mistakes of the early 

days of WWII. Getting the doctrine right was often discovered in combat. 

The successes and failures of Operation Torch were arguably the impetus 

behind establishing priorities for the successful employment of air forces 

and land forces for mutually enabling effect. Perhaps the greatest lesson 

from this experience is the role personal relationships had in establishing 

mutually enabling air and ground operations. But personal relationships 

change, particularly after war. The lessons forged in combat are often 

ignored or considered no longer valid as time and technology distances 

one from the environment in which they were first learned. 

The greatest examples of air forces and land forces operating 

interdependently for common objectives are demonstrated by several 

WWII experiences. General Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command and 

General Quesada’s IX Tactical Air Command are just two examples where 

highly adaptive and flexible tactical airpower was effectively employed in 

concert with ground forces, often against standing doctrine. Generals 

Quesada and Weyland proved the efficacy of joint interdependence for air 

and ground operations during WW II. Many airpower proponents point 

out that the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands headed by Weyland and 

Quesada were established for the sole mission of ground support for the 

3rd and 1st Army. In that role they did not have to contend with competing 

missions like air superiority and strategic bombing. “In the charged 

atmosphere of that day, critics often found fault with the air-ground 

relationship forged during the Second World War and returned to doctrinal 

citation and interpretation when supporting one position or another in airground disagreements or other controversy.”32 The doctrinal friction 

points that were overcome in war by shear personality and teamwork of 

commanders have been laid bare during each inter-war period since 1945. 

By the outbreak of the Korean War, service politics and partisan brokering 

21
 

trumped the successes of cooperative wartime air-ground interdependence 

demonstrated by Bradley-Quesada and Weyland-Patton. 

 The doctrinal agreement on a single air component commander 

was solid doctrine based upon the experiences of North Africa and 

Europe. However, it failed in application on the Korean Peninsula, 

particularly in light of the poor performance of the newly minted Air 

Force in the CAS mission.33 This experience was highlighted by the fact 

that essentially three separate air forces were operating in close proximity 

of each other but originating from service-specific bases supporting two 

land components. Navy and Marine aircraft operated from aircraft 

carriers, Marine Aviation to deployed forward expeditionary air fields, and 

the Air Force operated initially from mainland Japan. The interservice 

competition and widely varying levels of performance that abounded 

during the first year of the Korean War evolved into a fairly effective joint 

system of CAS, service parochialism notwithstanding. By the end of the 

Korean War, the organizational changes and practices employed by the 

Air Force and Army were implemented through the ‘school of hard 

knocks’ approach, even though the experiences of World War II had 

validated many of them just five years prior. Two wars fought and 

concluded within ten years of each other validated the same lessons 

concerning the integration of aviation with ground maneuver. Yet, at the 

beginning of the Vietnam War, the Army and the Air Force were once 

again unprepared for the integration of air and ground forces for enabling 

effect. 

In Vietnam, effective CAS doctrine was once again ‘hammered out’ 

between the land and air forces, culminating in the organizational and 

procedural changes just as occurred during the previous two wars but only 

after many mistakes and losses.34 The Army’s pursuit of the armed 

helicopter became the catalyst for re-energizing the argument over what 

service was best suited to have jurisdiction of the CAS mission.35 Yet, 

nearly 60 years after the lessons of Operation Torch--encompassing three 

wars and the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act Operation Anaconda 

serves to remind us that previous successes in achieving interdepen-dence 

during war are temporary and are swept aside during the interwar years. 

The parochial budget battles spawned by the competing relevance of one 

service over the other are often justified through imaginative doctrine 

touting the efficacy of a new weapon system to obviate the requirement of 

another service’s weapon or capability. Written to justify one 

component’s weapons systems, effectiveness, and budget independently of 

another service, this doctrine undermines the lessons of the past conflict 

and ultimately fails the test of the next conflict.36 

22
 

The issue that has arisen since airpower doctrine’s early development 

is the emergence of the armed helicopter and its expanding role on the 

battlefield during the 1980s and 1990s. The armed helicopter should have 

helped to defuse the debate over CAS sortie allocation for the ground 

commander. Arguably, its capability is additive to fixed-wing close air 

support, a luxury our airpower forefathers did not have. Yet the evolving 

mission of the attack helicopter was written into doctrine, whereby it 

competed for market share not in the close air support role, but in deep 

attack, a mission traditionally performed by fixed-wing aviation. 

Therefore, as the Army and the Air Force move towards joint 

interdependence by using one service’s capability to supplant another’s all 

in terms of better agility and deployability, does the Marine Corps model, 

illustrated in the vignette, suggest a better way of integrating rotary-wing 

and fixed-wing fires with ground maneuver for mutually enabling effect? 

Is there a way for the Army to shed a percentage of its organic fires and 

increase the lethality of aerial fires, rotary-wing and fixed-wing? If so, the 

critical question remains then, how does one achieve institutionalized 

interdependence so it survives the next inter-war period? The vignette is 

useful in evaluating the organizational seams and doctrinal friction points 

that prohibit institutionalizing joint interdependence for air and ground 

operations. 

23
 

 

Friction Points 

 Fire and maneuver win battles. The purpose of movement is to get fires in 

a more advantageous place to play on the enemy. Air and Ground 

commanders must be constantly on the alert to devise and use new 

methods of cooperation...for there can never be too many projectiles in 

battle. 

 Gen George S. Patton Jr., USA 

If one seeks to develop a roadmap to achieve interdependence, 

what are the friction points and operational seams that may exist between 

the Army and the Air Force that must be considered? 

America’s ground forces depend upon air, rotary-wing and fixed-wing, 

for success. Once air superiority has been achieved, America’s air forces 

depend upon ground forces for follow-on success; OEF and OIF 

exemplify this.37 To this end, the CFACC ensured coalition aviation 

planning in support of OIF was thorough and consistent for both land 

forces. From the perspective of the soldier and the Marine, the CFACC’s 

execution of the air plan was equally thorough and effective in speeding 

the ground forces towards their objectives. Yet, OIF demonstrated 

significant service frictions related to methods of employing rotary-wing 

and fixed-wing air in consonance with maneuver. These frictions are 

indicative of a seam that has developed between the ground forces and air 

forces that must be addressed if joint interdependence for air and ground 

operations is to succeed. Left as is, a capable adversary will easily exploit 

this seam. 

The air component commander devised a joint battlefield fires 

template to minimize seams between the air and ground components 

during OIF. Yet the priority, timing, and effects of aviation fires and 

organic surface fires in concert with maneuver were inconsistent between 

V Corps and I MEF.38 How could such a disparity in aviation fires exist 

between the two ground components fighting side by side but in separate 

areas of operations? What caused the seam to develop between coalition 

airpower and V Corps? Was it the Air Liaison Officers (ALO) at the 

brigade and division headquarters? Was it the battalion, brigade, division, 

and corps commanders? Was it the ASOC operating as the direct 

representative of the CAOC? Did the enlisted Joint Terminal Attack 

Controllers (JTAC) and ALOs poorly advise their respective ground 

commanders on the employment of air in concert with their maneuver? 

Did the Battlefield Coordination Detachment at the CAOC get the CAS 

apportionment wrong? Was it the Air Force aviators that didn’t 

24
 

understand the ground scheme of maneuver? Was it the “centralized 

control and decentralized execution” of “air and space power...controlled 

by an Airmen...maintaining a broad strategic and/or theater perspective in 

prioritizing the use of limited air and space assets” that broke down? 

There were many factors that led to such inconsistent use of airpower. 

The end result was that the ground force commander and the air 

component commander failed to employ aviation and ground component 

fires for mutually enabling effect. Service doctrine and parochialism 

perpetuated misinterpretations and misunderstandings of permissive fire 

support coordination measures like the Fire Support Coordination Line 

(FSCL).39 Eliminating this major source of friction and mistrust between 

the land force and the air force is essential to closing this doctrinal seam 

and achieving joint interdependence for air and ground operations. 

The land forces and air forces of the United States have demonstrated 

an ability to overcome doctrinal difference during time of war. Current 

airpower doctrine specifically, establishing priorities for airpower in a 

campaign owes its beginnings to the mistakes of the early days of World 

War II and was the source of much debate and consternation between the 

services. The successes and failures of Operation Torch were arguably the 

impetus behind establishing priorities for the successful employment of air 

forces and land forces for mutually enabling effect. The importance of 

personal relationships in establishing mutually enabling air and ground 

operations, partnerships built upon trust, is critical.40 But more often than 

not, lessons from the past, particularly those forged in combat, are often 

ignored or considered doctrinally insignificant as time and budget battles 

weaken the institutional memory of the environment in which they were 

first learned. 

This issue has been written about before. Here is one example: 

“LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND 

INTERDEPENDENT FORCES; NEITHER IS AN AUXILIARY OF 

THE OTHER.” In today’s environment, with our services engaged in war 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, the service chiefs have made joint 

interdependence a key element, and any reader would be hard pressed not 

to agree with it. Yet, this is not a quote from the Air Force Chief of Staff 

or the Army Chief of Staff. It was taken from Army Field Manual FM 

100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, issued July 21, 1943. 

Although used in a different context following Operation Torch, 

Command and Employment of Air Power was written to ensure equal 

billing for air power as compared to land power. It established critical 

priorities that must be followed if airpower is to be successfully employed: 

air superiority, interdiction, and close air support, in that order. Arguably, 

25
 

the primary purpose of FM 100-20 was to establish airpower as a co-equal 

to ground power.41 As controversial as FM 100-20 was for Army 

commanders, by the time it was published, key commanders of the airground team had already established relationships that transcended the 

inter-service rivalries associated with the early days of establishing 

interdependent air and ground operations. More importantly, ground 

commanders like Patton understood the importance of establishing air 

superiority as a precondition for success of their ground forces. Maybe 

it’s time for the same thinking to be applied in the way helicopter attack 

aviation and fixed-wing attack aviation are employed on the modern 

battlefield. Could the attack helicopter be the solution for the land forces 

enduring requirement for a simple aircraft dedicated to the close air 

support mission that can not be called away to perform other tasking as 

directed by the air component commander? 

A brief comparison of the following statements may help articulate 

two points of view concerning the employment of attack helicopters on the 

modern battlefield: 

We were very concerned about enemy shoulder launched 

missiles and wanted to keep the Cobras just behind our 

lines or right over our heads, maybe a short distance in 

front (where we could observe the ground/put fires on the 

enemy), desiring to avoid what we called "recon by death" 

by the Cobras.42 

...AH-64s best support Army ground combat forces by 

establishing the operational conditions that will either 

preclude a close battle or severely degrade an adversary’s 

combat power prior to his closure with the friendly ground 

force. Apaches can perform a close air support role but 

optimally, Army Aviation planners should strive to employ 

them in ways that mitigate the need for last minute close air 

support mission.43

These diametrically opposed opinions concerning the employment of 

rotary-wing aviation were formed well before the commencement of 

hostilities during OIF. Perhaps most importantly, the latter opinion is 

indicative of the seam that has grown within the Army over the proper use 

of the attack helicopter, an aircraft developed and procured by the Army to 

support its own soldiers. 

During the course of my research, I discovered that some of the 

sources of doctrinal friction prohibiting joint interdependence for air and 

26
 

ground operations existed in unexpected places. The first source of 

friction is between the Army’s ground forces and its own helicopter attack 

aviation forces. The second source of friction surrounds the doctrine and 

debate over fixed-wing aviation doctrine applied in concert with ground 

force maneuver. Understanding the sources of both forms of friction is 

essential if joint interdependence for air and ground operations is to 

succeed. 

Since the fielding of the AH-64 Apache, Army attack aviation 

doctrinally trains as a maneuver branch instead of a fires branch.44 Air 

Land Battle doctrine exemplified this operational concept and the 

experiences of Operation Desert Storm reinforced it. Operation Allied 

Force, and more specifically the experiences of Task Force Hawk, began 

the discussion of the logistical issues associated with deploying Army 

attack aviation to an expeditionary environment. More importantly, it also 

began the discussion that questioned the relevance of deep attack 

helicopter operations. 

There is no question that Army attack aviation exists to support 

Army ground forces. However, the friction evident within Army aviation 

doctrine exists in the arguments of where attack helicopters are best 

employed on the battlefield. Should attack helicopters set the operational 

conditions prior to the decisive engagement of ground forces? Or, as the 

vignette demonstrates, should helicopter attack aviation be reserved for the 

close battle, maximizing its potential and capability for close combat 

attack in direct support of ground forces, while fixed-wing air shapes the 

deep battle?45 Answering these questions will demonstrate the division 

that exists within the Army concerning the use of its organic attack 

aviation. 

Combat experience since October of 2002 suggests there is a shift 

in opinion towards the latter argument.46 More specifically, the relevance 

of helicopter attack aviation during Operations Enduring Freedom 

(Anaconda) and Iraqi Freedom reinforced the dangers of operating 

helicopters deep in an adversary’s territory. In fact, the after action reports 

I examined, combined with the personal interviews of recent war veterans, 

prove the worth of the attack helicopter in the CAS role. 

The lessons of Operation Anaconda should have prevented the 

need to relearn the lesson of the battle of Najaf. The events of 23 Mar 

2003 during the battle of Najaf served as a wakeup call for the 101st

Aviation Brigade.47 After that battle, helicopter tactics for the remainder 

of OIF were modified and are still in use today. “For the remainder of the 

war, Apache helicopters adopted a close shaping role instead of 

conducting deep attacks and provided aviation close fires in support of 

27
 

ground maneuver forces.”48 Essentially, from that point on, attack 

helicopters operated primarily in direct support of ground forces. All “not 

so deep” or “close shaping” attack helicopter operations were conducted in 

close coordination with coalition fixed-wing aircraft in close proximity to 

ground forces and were highly successful. 

This should not be misconstrued as a dim future for attack 

helicopter aviation. On the contrary, current operations demonstrate the 

capability of the attack helicopter in the direct support role of ground 

forces. This is well documented and continues to be an enormous 

contributor to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.49 But what 

should not be lost by the reader is that the mutually enabling effect of 

attack helicopter and fixed-wing aviation on the modern battlefield does 

not occur in the deep battle, it occurs in the close battle. 

After 23 March 2003, V Corps sharply curtailed deep attack 

helicopter operations, but still conducted limited objective attacks (LOAs). 

However, these LOAs were closely coordinated with Air Force A-10 and 

F-16, missions utilizing the principles of Joint Air Attack Tactics (JAAT). 

The most successful of these occurred on 28 March 2003. On this date the 

101st Aviation Brigade of V Corps conducted a deep attack against the 

14th Brigade of the Medina Republican Guard Division. The attack 

helicopters of the 101st used in-depth zone reconnaissance coordinated 

with CFACC fixed-wing aviation. Predictably the attack helicopters 

encountered similar ground fire and tactics as on the 23rd of March. But 

this time they were able to pull back, and directed coalition fixed-wing 

CAS to suppress and eliminate enemy resistance with very little damage to 

attack helicopters.50 However, while helicopter battle damage was 

minimal in this case, it was the fixed-wing aircraft that inflicted the 

majority of damage on the Iraqi forces. 

The reality for deep helicopter attack missions is that they require a 

tremendous amount of fixed-wing effort to be successful against 

moderately defended targets. As demonstrated during OIF, rotary-wing 

aviation operating deep is more survivable when operating in close 

coordination with fixed-wing aircraft. Questions arose about the utility of 

sending attack helicopters with Hellfire missiles on deep attack missions 

when fixed-wing aircraft with ordnance were capable of achieving the 

desired effect.51 If fixed-wing aircraft could accomplish a deep attack 

mission with minimal risk and less overhead support, such as suppression 

of enemy air defenses, then why send attack helicopters? For the 

remainder of the major combat operations phase, despite the 

preponderance of doctrine to the contrary, and the current ongoing 

operations in OIF, attack helicopters adopted a “close shaping” role. In 

28
 

other words, attack helicopters provided close combat attack, or CAS, in 

support of ground maneuver forces. And they did this with tremendous 

effect.52 

The fact that fixed-wing aviation was able to operate in this 

environment with relative impunity was not lost by participants and 

observers of both operations. As demonstrated in the earlier vignette, the 

limitations of helicopter attack aviation in deep operations were well 

understood by Maj Gen Mattis and his air-ground team. Rotary-wing and 

fixed-wing aviation was planned to operate with mutually enabling effects 

in support of his ground forces. This close integration maximized the 

inherent strengths of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in order to 

speed the movement of ground forces and to minimize casualties, with 

strategic effect.53 

Attack aviation’s success, when combined with fixed-wing 

aviation in thte current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is well 

documented. Here are two recent examples, one from an airman and one 

from an infantryman: 

After the combined arms rehearsal for Operation 

Wishbone, a 39 BCT mechanized operation north of 

Baghdad, the Apache troop commander explained to the 

visiting Air Liaison Officer how commonplace Joint Air 

Attack Tactics [JAAT] had become, noting that almost 

daily they came up on common frequencies with local 

JTACs and overhead fighters, using the team to develop 

situational awareness.54 

On that morning we had several "runners" that UAVs or F16s ID'd. The F-16s sparkled [the runners] and did an onthe-net handover to the Kiowas [OH-58D helicopters] that 

came in low on the targets and fixed them in place until 

ground forces could capture them.55

These experiences mirror the author’s own OIF experience as an FA-18D 

pilot and would suggest that a significant shift in attack aviation doctrine 

for the Army is underway. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Not only is 

the draft version of FM 3-04.111. Aviation Brigades still centered on the 

deep attack mission but references to joint operations to ensure the type of 

success described above appear almost as a footnote to the deep attack 

mission. The mission of deep attack aviation is still described as the 

attack helicopter’s primary role in the following paragraph: 

29
 

The aviation brigade has the organic capability to strike an 

enemy throughout the depth of the corps AO from multiple 

directions, either in support of the BCTs or independently

in a noncontiguous battlespace. Attack reconnaissance 

aircraft carry a combination of missiles, rockets, and 

conventional ammunition to destroy high priority targets, 

shield the maneuver forces as they move out of contact, and 

enable shaping of the battlespace. In addition to the 

traditional attack functions, the attack reconnaissance unit 

executes all the functions that air cavalry has performed 

throughout the ages. As an armor killer, it is deadly against 

massed moving targets, and is also effective against enemy 

FA, AD, communications, logistics units, and point targets 

(bunkers, caves, windows in buildings). 

...The mobile strike capability of the aviation 

brigade, particularly when coupled with Army and joint 

fires and effects, provides the commander with a significant 

capability to extend the battle to the maximum range of 

organic and supporting sensors.56

Helicopter deep attack missions were employed in OEF and OIF with poor 

results.57 Clearly, if deep attack helicopter aviation is going to be 

employed, it should be coordinated with fixed-wing aviation to increase 

effectiveness and survivability. But even then, one has to ask why a 

commander would embark upon such a highly complex and risky 

operation at ranges up to 60 miles in front of the maneuver units when 

other joint assets could accomplish the mission more effectively and at 

less cost? 

It is the “we got them, we have to use them” paradox. Since the 

development and fielding of advanced attack helicopters, deep attack 

became the primary mission. Perhaps the high cost of the advanced attack 

helicopter was justified by an expanded mission set. Or perhaps it was 

because the Air Force’s interest in CAS during the eighties and nineties 

was waning resulting in a deepening lack of trust between the services, 

best described as “if I don’t own them, I can’t depend on them.” It was 

most likely a combination of the two. 

Will joint interdependence for air and ground operations mean a 

shift in the focus of Army deep attack helicopter operations to close 

combat attack in support of the brigade and or division? Will joint 

interdependence for air and ground operations finally move Army attack 

aviation and Air Force CAS and aerial interdiction into more mutually 

30
 

enabling and survivable operations? The author contends that many 

within the Army are of the same opinion. “There is a disconnect between 

Army Aviation and Army ground forces.”58 Unless the frictions that exist 

between Army aviation and Army ground forces are resolved, this internal 

struggle within the Army will continue to be a stumbling block for joint 

interdependence for air and ground operations. Yet there is also a unique 

opportunity to seize upon the lessons of the current war concerning rotarywing and fixed-wing aviation and move the Army and the Air Force 

towards interdependence. 

The discussion over the primary role of attack helicopter aviation 

is directly related to the second source of friction within the Army, that is, 

the friction between the division’s battle and the corps’ battle. 

Coordinating the efforts of organic fires in both zones created significant 

debate between the division and the corps during OIF.59 The corps sees 

the attack helicopter and ATACMS as its primary means to shape its zone. 

The division uses its organic artillery and CAS. CAS can be planned to 

support the corps and division and is coordinated in and around the fires of 

helicopters and rockets.60 During OIF the 3 ID after action reports cite 

that the corps had difficulty coordinating the priority, timing, and effects 

of fires within an area of operations defined by a Fire Support 

Coordination line placed too deep within the Corps’ Area of Operations. 

As a result, they had little situational awareness of the division and corps 

zone of operations and were therefore ill-equipped to coordinate 

operations there.61 Army doctrine, as cited above, envisions an almost 

exclusive role for attack helicopters and ATACMS as the primary shaping 

fires of the corps zone. 

By design, the Army’s transformation plan will force the division 

and corps to increase their reliance upon joint fires, like fixed-wing 

aviation for battlefield shaping. In this process the reevaluation of 

employment priorities of attack helicopter aviation will be an important 

aspect. Should they be used by the Unit of Employment (UEx) or corps 

and division to shape the deep battle? Or, should the corps and division 

apportion their helicopter aviation brigades to support the close battle? 

The issue is not that attack aviation has become irrelevant. But, did the 

combat experience of the past three years invalidate the last 20 years of 

helicopter deep attack beliefs and doctrine? Perhaps, but more 

importantly, it re-validated the utility of the attack helicopter in the CAS

role. 

If the experiences of OEF and OIF are valid in redefining the role 

of attack helicopter employment, then the implications concerning how 

attack aviation is utilized can be another source of friction within the 

31
 

Army and between the Army and the Air Force. Will attack helicopters 

have to be on the ATO if used solely for CAS? If helicopter attack 

aviation is on the ATO, will there be a requirement for a written 

agreement similar to the Omnibus Agreement to disarm the 

misunderstandings over who controls the attack helicopter sorties? Will 

the Air Force be threatened by the Army assuming the CAS mission, a 

mission that the Air Force thinks it can’t afford to give up, if only for 

market share, as it faces the looming budget battles? Is there a doctrinal 

middle ground that can be reached to merge the two highly enhancing 

forms of close air support, attack helicopter close combat attack and fixedwing close air support? 

The 1st Marine Division Commander’s employment concept for 

aviation, as described in the opening vignette, demonstrates a possible 

solution or, middle ground, with strategic effect. Here, strategic effect 

means speed and reduced casualties. Accomplishing this will require the 

Army and the Air Force to jointly reevaluate their doctrine and 

organizational structure to close the seams and reduce the friction points in 

order to capitalize on the mutual enabling capabilities of each service. 

32
 

Doctrinal Friction Point: FSCL 

As alluded to earlier, the FSCL remains a significant source of friction 

between the services and should be examined for relevance. The FSCL is 

defined as “A fire support coordinating measure that is established and 

adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their 

boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and 

affected commanders.”62 At first glance, this is a pretty straight forward 

definition. However, its “establishment and adjustment” on the map 

creates friction between the land and air component, and OIF was no 

exception. The FSCL largely served to mark where each component’s 

freedom of action ended and the other’s began. The FSCL served to 

deconflict their operations, rather than coordinate, as was the intent of the 

definition. In fact, the placement of the FSCL created debate and ultimate 

disagreement between 3 ID and V Corps, centered on the range of each 

unit’s organic fires.63 Ironically, the placement of the FSCL during OIF 

140km in front of the lead elements of 3 ID at its deepest point—

hampered the desired effects V Corps was attempting to achieve. As a 

result of the FSCL placement, V Corps’ ability to affect the deep battle 

with organic and aerial fires, when compared to I MEF, was severely 

limited.64 

The FSCL Debate 

Much ink has been spilled over the FSCL debate. The debate and 

emotion regarding the placement and utility of the FSCL is perhaps 

associated with the JFC’s apportionment of air effort. This captures the 

fundamental argument concerning tactical air power. Is airpower more 

effective against enemy forces before they are engaged by friendly forces 

or after? These are key elements of the debate from the ground 

perspective and the air perspective. Both arguments have merit, based 

upon the inherent strengths of each force and how one culture sees the 

other’s capabilities. 

Airmen contend that the placement of the FSCL should be as close to 

the forward line of troops as possible. This will maximize the speed and 

flexibility of airpower in attacking the enemy before he can get within 

range of land forces. The inherent strengths of airpower make it well 

suited for this interdiction mission and, as a result, should be controlled by 

the air component commander. Placing the FSCL within 30 km of the 

friendly forces would allow airpower to maximize its strengths and not 

inhibit its freedom of action by having to closely coordinate its actions 

with those of the ground commander. Close coordination with ground 

maneuver is a difficult process. It is a process that demands highly skilled 

and disciplined aviators and well trained aviation counterparts on the 

33
 

ground coordinating and clearing their attacks. Given this effort, CAS 

becomes nothing more than airborne artillery. Therefore, Airmen argue 

that CAS is an inefficient use of airpower that negates airpower’s 

strengths and is merely additive to the close battle. On the other hand, 

most land power proponents don’t know how to use airpower to its fullest 

potential. Although most Airmen would agree that CAS is required in 

some quantity, the question remains just how much of the air effort the 

JFC should devote to CAS and how much should be devoted to other 

missions like aerial interdiction and strategic attack? Ultimately, the 

Airman desires to maximize the tenets of airpower by attacking and 

destroy enemy targets before they get within lethal range of the ground 

forces. 

Land power proponents argue for the FSCL to be placed at the deepest 

range of their organic fires. As the responsible commander for the timing 

priority and effects of fires in his assigned area of operations, an area that 

includes the deep battle, the ground commander argues for maintaining his 

flexibility in employing long range systems. This opinion is conditioned 

through the experiences of commanders that have ‘learned’ not to depend 

upon air because it may not be there when it is required. Airpower is also 

‘harder’ to plan and employ than artillery and attack helicopters. Land 

power proponents often cite that Air Liaison Officers and JTACs are in 

short supply and thus are sometimes not present for training evolutions 

due to higher priority commitments. Therefore, infantryman would rather 

not build fixed-wing as a critical element to the success of their plan so the 

plan won’t fail when it doesn’t arrive where and when it’s needed. In 

other words, they plan not to use airpower interdependently. Years of 

training doctrinally with deep attack aviation and an abundance of artillery 

have reinforced this airpower opinion into the land service. Ultimately, 

the opinion is that the CFACC is rarely able to adequately address the 

Corps’ fires and targeting requirements in the face of other competing 

requirements for CAS and aerial interdiction, particularly during the 

beginning of a campaign.65

The FSCL 

The original purpose of the FSCL was to aid attack pilots employing 

dead reckoning navigation in determining where they had to conduct 

“detailed coordination with ground forces” and where they could attack 

targets with reasonable confidence of not committing fratricide. In this 

context it was placed along recognizable terrain features so that aviators 

clearly understood when they were operating on one side of the FSCL 

versus the other. In fact, its placement is still defined this way in joint 

doctrine.66 Yet, as the range of organic fires increased exponentially, its 

34
 

placement came to mean more along the lines of deconfliction between air 

and land forces, not one of coordination.67 

Most combat aircraft now operate with global positioning system 

(GPS) as their primary means of navigation and targeting precision 

munitions. Ground forces operate extensively with GPS as their primary 

means of navigation and determining target location. GPS-guided rocket 

artillery is already operational, and GPS-guided artillery is very close to 

reaching operational capability. Therefore, determining one’s location, 

whether airborne or on the ground, is much simpler and more accurate. 

And, whereas a terrain-feature based FSCL cannot be seen at night, GPS 

and modern navigation systems solve this problem. 

Fire support coordination measures are ‘temporally’ fixed objects on a 

map that hinder maneuver. The speed of movement of the ground forces 

normally outpaces the ability to move and update the placement of the 

FSCL.68 This continually compressing distance between the lead 

elements of the maneuver units and the FSCL ultimately challenge the 

very logic used for its initial placement, particularly when units can move 

at paces close to 15-20km / hr.69 Additionally, the lines as drawn on the 

map are normally perpendicular to the route of advance of the ground unit. 

Figure 3 depicts a geometry problem that was experienced by the ground 

units during OIF. I MEF used two coordination measures, a Battlefield 

Coordination Line and a Fire Support Coordination Line. Since the 

Combined Forces Land Component Commander is responsible for the 

placement and movement of the FSCL, it has to be moved based upon the 

concurrence of both land force commanders, V Corps and I MEF. This is 

a lengthy process and one that could hinder Marine aviation’s support to 

ground maneuver. Therefore, I MEF used a Battlefield Coordination Line 

placed at the range of its organic artillery, or about thirty kilometers in 

front of the forward line of troops. This allowed Marine aviation to 

operate short of the FSCL but long of the BCL, attacking targets without 

close coordination with maneuver forces. 

As the independent maneuver units of V Corps and of the I MEF 

advanced towards Baghdad, they did so as a series of columns at different 

speeds. Consequently, gaps formed between the maneuver units. Yet, as 

they advanced to the next limiting fire support coordination measure 

drawn perpendicularly to their lead elements, the FSCL was snapped 

forward. This was based upon a pre-determined distance that may or may 

not have anything to do with the enemy disposition or the rate of advance 

of other units. In the case of V Corps, this process created unintended 

sanctuary for enemy forces. 

35
 

The advance to Baghdad was so fast that the Army 

overran an established FSCL within an hour after it was 

established. Because the process of “moving” the line 

took 8 to 10 hours, air strike operations forward of the 

line had were impeded until it was “moved.” After 

finding that this same situation occurred several days in 

a row, they moved the line far to the north. As a result, 

planned air strikes were precluded over an extensive 

region.70

Clearly, such a system is unacceptable. It degrades US combat capability 

and aids our adversary. In the best case, coordination measures like BCLs 

and FSCLs doctrinally take four to six hours to change among the 

components and then put into effect. What if there were pockets of Iraqi 

forces left in between the two maneuver units? How could one redraw a 

BCL or FSCL to take into account a non-linear example of maneuver 

warfare where one maneuver unit had to turn ninety-degrees to meet an 

unanticipated enemy counter while the adjacent maneuver unit continued 

along its original line of advance? As such, the lines drawn to signify fire 

support coordination measure on a two-dimensional map without the 

‘vote’ of the enemy quickly become irrelevant when compared with their 

originally designed intent. 

The development and use of the battlefield coordination line (BCL) by 

I MEF during OIF negated the debilitating effect of a deep FSCL. The 

BCL was developed and is in use on the Korean peninsula. During OIF its 

functionality was applied by I MEF only in its area of operations, as 

depicted in figure 3. The BCL was used as a “fire support coordination 

sub-measure” to enable the MEF to effectively use its primary deep 

shaping force, Marine aviation, without the air support coordination 

problems experienced by V Corps. This ensured aviation freedom of 

action between the FSCL and BCL, and air actions short of the BCL were 

conducted with close coordination with ground forces. 

Despite the apparent success by I MEF, as opposed to V Corps in 

employing the FSCL and BCL during Operation Iraqi Freedom, an even 

better system for employing permissive fire support measures exists that 

enables the mutually enabling operations of air forces and land forces.71 

Ground combat movement is not always symmetric to the fire support 

coordination measures placed in front of their axis of advance. For 

example, during OIF, units normally moved in a linear fashion and, 

particularly during high intensity mechanized operations, they moved in 

armored columns that are longer than they are wide and often at different 

36
 

rates (see figure 1). Employing a linear control measure like a FSCL / 

BCL is not conducive to these types of operations, and, more often than 

not, will create enemy sanctuaries that fall within the doctrinal rules that 

govern its placement and subsequent movement. 

Even if there was agreement on the placement the FSCL, it would still 

be very difficult to place along recognizable terrain features with sufficient 

fidelity to be relevant in a maneuver battle. Furthermore, due to the 

complexity of reaching agreement on the appropriate distance that it 

should be placed in front of the friendly lines, its movement would be 

equally difficult. Lastly, it is not being used in the counterinsurgency 

operations underway in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet there is still a 

requirement for coordination of air and ground component fires. 

Figure 3. FSCL Placement in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

Source: Colonel Lee Elder, USMC, MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP), 

“MAGTF Aviation, Aviation Combat Element (ACE).” On-Line. 

Internet. Available from 

http://www.mstp.usmc.mil/spts/MAGTFBranch/ace/default.aspx. 

After action reports written by the Army and the Air Force state that 

the seam that developed in the V Corps area of operations was a result of 

the FSCL mistrust and debate.72 The opening vignette is also indicative of 

this seam. Ultimately, what is required is a joint system that defines 

which entity has sole authority for determining the priority, timing, and 

effects of the fires in a particular battlespace, and what entities should 

share this responsibility. What is required is a virtual system of fire 

support coordination that can be employed real time with equal meaning 

and interpretation for air and ground forces. To ensure seamlessness, the 

system should exist ‘temporally’ and cannot be a line along a geographic 

37
 

feature. The system has to exist in the thought processes of all users. It 

cannot be a line that keeps land force organic fires on one side and air 

force fires on the other. Tactical aviation, trusted equally by the land and 

air component commanders, combined with flexible and temporal fire 

support coordination measures may be the answer. 

The lessons of OIF demonstrate multiple examples where particular 

aircrew capabilities were not used to their full potential, excessive 

numbers of aircraft were held in CAS stacks, and a paucity of aircraft were 

operating throughout the depth of battlespace. The primary cause of this 

was a command and control system that became quickly overwhelmed 

with a pressing load of combat aircraft without a relief valve to flow the 

aircraft deeper into the Corps’ battlespace. As a result, multiple aircrews 

capable of operating short of the FSCL but beyond the division’s area of 

influence, with commanders’ intent, were underutilized. The corps lost 

the opportunity to coordinate the efforts of attack aircraft in its deep battle 

area. These valuable sorties were either relegated to missions more suited 

for less qualified crews or not used at all. Or, as demonstrated in the 

vignette, they side stepped to the I MEF Area of Operations and supported 

the MEF’s deep battle like water finding the path of least resistance. 

As noted above, closed kill boxes extending to the FSCL in V Corps’ 

zone contributed to the log jam of CAS aircraft and prevented air to shape 

the Corps’ deep battle. Additionally, the theater air control system failed 

to employ sufficient numbers of seasoned and highly experienced FACA 

crews throughout the depth of the Corps’s zone. A layered division of air, 

further subdivided by mission capability commensurate with the planned 

zone of operations, would have helped alleviate the logjam and 

inefficiencies. 

For example, in the I MEF AO two-seat FA-18Ds were planned to 

primarily conduct FACA missions. In this role they doctrinally operated as 

extensions of the ground FAC or TACP. But they also operated as 

extensions of the DASC and the TAOC, depending on how deep they 

operated in the battlespace. Analyzing the 1st Marine Division’s and the I 

MEF battlespace during pre-mission planning, the 3rd Marine Air Wing 

determined that three FACA crews would be required to be airborne 

simultaneously in order to comply with the division commander’s intent 

for aviation and would nee to range 5 km to 30 miles in front of his 

maneuver elements.73 Reverse planning from that requirement determined 

a minimum number of FA-18D FACAs that would be tasked to cover a 

specific time on station and battlespace. 

Using the killboxes as a time and space management tool, the 

Division’s requirements and depth of battlespace were divided between 

38
 

FACA, CAS, SCAR, and aerial reconnaissance requirements in that order 

of precedence. The three FACA aircraft sorties were typically divided and 

assigned one killbox each for the duration of their time on station, usually 

a four-hour block interspersed with three tanker periods. Marine fixedwing CAS aircraft were planned to launch at 15-20 minute intervals from 

land bases and amphibious ships to fill the CAS requirement for a 24-hour 

period, and then repeated. Cobra gun ships filled in the CAS gaps by 

essentially providing direct support CAS coverage by flying in support of 

the division and subordinated units or shutting down behind the division’s 

lines and waiting to be called when required. This combination of 

‘general support’ fixed-wing CAS and ‘direct support’ rotary-wing CAS 

maximized the capabilities of each platform. This preserved the tenets of 

fixed wing airpower while leveraging the attack helicopter for the close 

battle. 

FACA aircraft not required for the close battle reverted to strike 

coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR) when they supported the 

Division’s or MEF’s deep battle beyond the BCL and/or FSCL. Marine 

single seat CAS aircraft are not FACA qualified and therefore can only 

conduct CAS or SCAR missions. If they were not required for CAS, the 

DASC sent the CAS section back to the TAOC, where they were either 

assigned to work with a FACA or were sent to another killbox to conduct 

SCAR.74 Through this process, all aircraft were kept appraised of open 

and closed killboxes and what aircraft and corresponding mission 

qualification were working in each location. The TAOC and DASC were 

able to ensure long-range fires could be deconflicted with deep air 

operations and also knew what FACA aircraft were operating 

autonomously or with other CAS aircraft. Deep air operations could be 

further restricted from other operations by the DASC and TAOC through 

the closing of particular keypad or pads of a killbox that may represent a 

no-fire area or a surface danger area for a pending ATACMS strike. 

It was this method of planning, scheduling, and operating close and 

deep air that enabled the rapid absorption and timely execution of the 

unscheduled air described in the vignette. If the FACA could not work the 

CAS aircraft, either for lack of targets or because he was working with too 

many aircraft, he would send the CAS back to the TAOC for assignment 

or pass a known target location for them to attack on their own accord. In 

this mode the CAS aircraft reverted to SCAR in the particular killbox they 

operated in and could hand off their target to another section of CAS 

aircraft. 

Selecting from the available aircraft within the Marine Air Wing, the 

direct support ATO used to support the 1st Marine Division was developed 

39
 

using exclusively Marine aircraft. To use a form of comparison, it was a 

method of supply that pushed a requisite number of aircraft to a 

battlespace using the “just in time” management concept.75 Using a 

“reconnaissance pull” (FACA / SCAR) demand with a push CAS supply, 

the MEF was able to orchestrate efficient and highly adaptable air support. 

If the CAS aircraft operating as SCAR or with a FACA was suddenly 

required for immediate CAS, they were “pulled” from the deep battle to 

the close battle or diverted before they flew to the killbox assigned. Even 

at depths of up to 100 miles, it was a nine to ten minute flight to the 

ground FAC requiring the CAS. In most instances, it was much closer. 

This method of “pull CAS” is a direct contrast to traditional forms of pull 

CAS, like ground alert or aircraft waiting for a mission while holding in a 

CAS stack, and simultaneously answers the concerns of the ground and air 

commanders for flexible and responsive airpower. 

FACA-capable crews were planned to fly during the same time period, 

in the same general vicinity, and with units that they supported as much as 

possible. In accordance with the division commander’s intent, they were 

primarily employed as reconnaissance elements searching the 5 km-60 

miles to the front of the division’s maneuver elements. The Tactical Air 

Operation Center and the Direct Air Support Center kept track of the 

FACA location and managed his area assignment through the use of the 

TAOC radar and procedurally via killboxes. Both control agencies could 

alert the FACA crews of pending ATACMS missions or of inbound strike 

aircraft that need to be worked. Using this method, three FACA crews 

could cover an area approximately 90 miles wide and 30 miles deep, or 

could be tasked 30 miles wide and 90 miles deep. CAS aircraft were then 

planned to operate as pairs that would either attach themselves to a ground 

FAC or flow forward or attach themselves to a FACA. Lastly, in 

instances where the FSCL has no application, killbox operations make the 

most sense. The fire support coordination measures that were important 

for maneuver warfare are equally important for security and stability 

operations. 

Technology may finally invalidate the arguments surrounding the 

FSCL debate. The use of GPS and precision guided weapons will 

continue to cause enemy forces to disperse and employ asymmetric 

tactics. Carefully planned and well timed ground operations expose the 

enemy to aviation’s effects. As the combat operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have proven, attack helicopters are a more versatile weapon 

in the close combat attack role, or CAS, than in deep attack. Fixed-wing 

tactical aircraft excel in the deep battle and are effective on either side of 

the FSCL. Interleaving fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation in the close 

40
 

battle is a more efficient use of mutually enabling aviation fires to counter 

the tactics of dispersed operations. 

The Army’s transformation plan requires an increased dependence 

upon CFACC aviation. Interleaving CFACC air with the corps’ organic 

fires and shaping operations will require a mutual understanding of the 

deep battle. Defense transformation will pressure the services to shed 

overlapping capacity or redundant capability, particularly if it exists in like 

form in another service. The services will no longer have the luxury of 

conducting largely independent yet coordinated actions in pursuit of a 

common objective. 

Joint interdependence of air and ground operations will require the 

capabilities of one service to leverage the capabilities of another. The 

choice of using organic fire exclusively over aerial fires will no longer be 

an option or the Army. Air forces, naval forces, and land-forces based 

will have to interleave their effort with that of the ground force 

commander’s scheme of maneuver and be able to cover his close and deep 

battles while shaping the battlespace for the joint force commander. This 

will require an efficiency and level of effort that is not represented in the 

current fire support control measures in use today. Measures that were 

developed years before precision navigation and targeting now constrain 

the fires process and its efficiency. Options to correct this deficiency will 

be discussed in the recommendations section. 

41
 

Organizational Seams and Personnel Issues 

Equally critical will be the actual implementation of the many lessons we 

have gained in the course of this ongoing battle. Lessons learned must be 

tied to executable actions, for without implementation, lessons are never 

truly learned.76 

A comparison between the Army / Air Force method of air-ground 

coordination and the Marine Corps’ method of air to ground coordination 

is warranted. The intent is not to claim one method is superior to the 

other. Rather, it is to represent the facts as they are and let the readers 

form their own conclusion on the merits of one method over the other. 

Proposed recommendations for the Army and the Air Force will be in the 

conclusion section of this paper. 

The current construct the Air Force uses to man the organization 

that is responsible for coordinating air support for the Army is a seam that 

may have contributed to the disparity in employing air power, as described 

in the vignette. Air Liaison Officers (ALOs) and Joint Terminal Attack 

Controllers (JTACs) make up the primary Air Force element responsible 

for this mission; it is called the Tactical Air Control Party, or TACP. They 

maintain their Air Force command structure but work closely with the 

Army in requesting and controlling Air Force Close Air Support (CAS) 

and integrating airpower with the Army’s scheme of maneuver on the 

battlefield. The principal air control agency of the theater air control 

system responsible for the direction and control of air operations directly 

supporting the ground combat element is the Air Support Operations 

Center (ASOC). It processes and coordinates requests for immediate air 

support and coordinates air missions requiring integration with other 

supporting arms and ground forces. It normally collocates with the Army 

tactical headquarters senior fire support coordination center (usually the 

corps headquarters) within the ground combat element. The Army’s 

transformation plan will challenge ongoing efforts aimed to close this 

seam. The Army will add ten to fifteen additional Brigade Combat Teams 

(BCTs) in the active forces and nineteen BCTs and eight division 

headquarters in the National Guard force. Sourcing the additional units 

will require approximately 50-60% more Joint Terminal Attack 

Controllers (JTAC) and 40-50% more ALOs under the current manning 

policy.77 

The Air Force agreed to support the Army’s transformation plan by 

adding an additional 900-1,000 JTACs. Training and certifying the 

JTACs required under the Army’s transformation plan, as the Air Force 

42
 

transitions from the current legacy force fighters to the F-22 and F-35, will 

reduce the available number sorties the Air Force can provide to train and 

certify JTACs.78 The corresponding net reduction in the sourcing pool of 

pilots and WSOs for the important ALO billets will compound matters 

further. New efficiencies in training and joint personnel assignments will 

be required to address these challenges and meet the critical currency and 

training standardization requirements of all individuals associated with the 

controlling and coordination of aviation fires. 

The Air Force currently mans a total of six ASOCs, four active 

duty and two Air National Guard.79 Sourcing the ASOCs is accomplished 

by specialized Air Support Operations Squadrons (ASOS) that are manned 

and equipped to perform the C2 role of the ASOC. Each ASOC is divided 

into a command section, an operations section, and a logistics section 

consisting of about 100 personnel, ten of whom are dedicated to 

operations and the rest to maintenance and logistics.80 

The operational side consists of four officers and six enlisted. 

Three officers are rated aviation officers-typically consisting of one pilot, 

one navigator, and one air battle manager-and the fourth is an intelligence 

officer. Of the six enlisted Airmen, five are “1C4” Airmen (JTACs), and 

one is an intelligence specialist. Some of the enlisted Airmen billets in the 

ASOC are certified JTACs and some are filled by those serving in an 

apprentice position in order to become certified JTACs. Prospective 

JTACs will spend about two years as a JTAC apprentice in the Tactical 

Operations Center, TACP, or ASOC or as the radio operator and driver for 

a certified JTAC. The average length of time required for an Airman to 

become certified as a JTAC is between three to five years, depending upon 

the individual.81 The senior enlisted billet within the ASOC is normally a 

certified JTAC and can also function as a Battalion Air Liaison Officer 

(BALO). 

Air Support Operations Groups (ASOGs) are physically stationed 

on Army installations but are operationally controlled by the Numbered 

Air Force Headquarters. Air Support Operations Squadrons are 

subordinate to the ASOGs and provide the JTACs and ALOs for Army 

maneuver elements during training and combat. Increased operational 

tempo and shortages in manning sometimes require the Air Force to 

source the JTAC, ALO, and ASOC personnel requirements from across 

the force. This practice has made it difficult to build habitual relationships 

between the ground forces and air forces prior to deployment. 

The Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) consist of 

JTACs and ALOs and are manned by Air Force personnel consisting of 

certified Enlisted Terminal Attack Controllers, rated Air Force aviators 

43
 

trained as Terminal Attack Controllers, and rated Air Force Officers 

trained as ALOs. Rated aviators that are qualified as Terminal Attack 

Controllers normally serve with specialized units like Ranger Battalions. 

The majority of infantry battalions are supported by enlisted Airmen 

qualified as JTACs. The JTAC billets are a permanent specialty for 

enlisted Airmen, while the officers assigned to the ASOS/ASOGs are 

rated aviators serving in the ALO billet for two years and the ASOC billet 

for normally three years. ALO assignments are normally two years in 

CONUS units and one year if stationed in Korea. 

The corps Air Liaison Officer is a rated Air Force officer and is 

normally designated as the director of the ASOC when it is stood up for 

training or combat. The commander of the Air Support Operations 

Squadron tasked to provide the ASOC capability is assigned as the deputy 

ASOC director. The rated officers assigned as brigade and division ALOs 

remain under the operational control of the ASOS commander, not the 

Army unit commander the ALO advises. Upon the completion of their 

tour, they normally return to a flying billet. 

All ALOs attend an Air Liaison Officer course prior to reporting to 

an ASOS for their liaison tour. ALOs are not required to be terminal 

attack control certified and most are not. Current Air Force policy is to 

only assign ALOs to the brigade and corps level. Senior certified JTACs 

are assigned at the battalion level, are called Battalion Air Liaison Officers 

or (BALOs), and are normally an E-6 or E-7.82 

Based upon their availability for deployment, ALOs may or may 

not develop a permanent relationship with the unit, which they support. 

At times this assignment policy can lead to a ‘pick up’ game atmosphere 

because there are not enough Air Liaison Officers to man every brigade in 

the Army. This is a source of friction between the Army commanders and 

the Air Liaison Officers as they attempt to establish working relationships. 

Some battalions go without an assigned BALO (senior JTAC) or may 

have their BALO be reassigned based upon the needs of other units with 

higher priorities prior to or during a deployment. Decisions to move an 

ALO from one unit to another must be approved by the ASOG 

commander and are made in coordination with the brigade commander 

based upon his priorities.83 

Maintaining sufficient numbers of combat mission ready (CMR) 

certified JTACs to coordinate and control fixed-wing and rotary-wing 

terminal attack is a daunting task for the Air Force and is a process that 

takes to three-five years, depending upon the individual.84 Certifying 

officers, particularly those with experience in a fighter background, is a 

significantly quicker process, about six months.85 In my conversations 

44
 

with Chief Master Sergeant Brian Brock, head of JTAC training and 

certification at Langley AFB, he confirmed Col Belote’s observations. 

When I asked him his opinion concerning helicopter pilots trained as 

terminal attack controllers, he replied, “Marine Cobra pilots generally 

learned terminal attack control skills just as quickly as fighter aircrew due 

to the fact that Marine attack helicopters pilots routinely perform CAS. 

Apache pilots don’t and would probably take a little more effort, but 

certainly not as long as a JTAC.”86 Both sources confirmed that training 

enlisted Airmen as certified JTACs required more effort and sorties than 

training rated officers, particularly if they had a fighter or attack helicopter 

background. In fact, the Marine Corps TACP course trains and certifies 

rated officers in terminal attack control in three weeks, regardless of their 

aviation background. Committed to maintaining the high standards 

required to be a certified JTAC, the Air Force is faced with a dilemma. 

Realizing the increased numbers of certified JTACs to support the Army’s 

transformation plan will take a minimum of three years and require a yet 

to be determined number of attack sorties dedicated to their training and 

certification. 

Sourcing the requisite number of Air Liaison Officers is a difficult 

task for the Air Force, and the Army’s transformation plan will make this 

problem more difficult. As rated Air Force officers complete their first 

flying assignment, they are generally considered for follow-on assignment 

based upon their performance during that first tour. Based upon my 

conversations with many Air Force officers, the typical career track for a 

rated aviator after he completes his first assignment can be summarized as 

follows: A select few of the highest performers stay in their community 

and are sent to the Air Force Weapons School. The middle group of pilots 

is eligible for a replacement training unit to train new pilots in a tactical 

jet. The bottom group of pilots is considered for flight instructor duty, 

transition to bombers, or Air Liaison Officer duty and unmanned aerial 

vehicles, in that order.87 

There are always exceptions to this unwritten assignment process, 

and in fact many Air Force colonels that I consulted for this research paper 

served as ALOs at some point in their career and continued to be very 

successful. However, this fact does not remove the negative connotation 

that surrounds the ALO assignment nor does it stop these same colonels 

from admitting that ALO assignments are generally not considered career 

enhancing tours for pilots and WSOs when compared to other career 

options. The A-10 community is perhaps the only exception to this 

assignment trend. Over the last 20 years, it sourced the largest percentage 

of ALOs compared to the other communities in the Air Force. This policy 

45
 

has recently changed, and now the Air Force sources ALO billets from 

communities within the combat air force.88 Perhaps the former ALO 

assignment policy is the reason why Air Force leaders question the 

Army’s penchant for requesting the A-10 for CAS instead of requesting 

CAS “effects.” This seemingly platform-centric affinity for the A-10 is 

bothersome for Air Force leaders.89 It is obvious to the author that if the 

preponderance of ALOs over the last 20 years originated from the A-10 

community, then there would be a natural inclination for Army leadership 

to understand more about the A-10 and, more importantly, the culture of 

the pilots flying them, than other platforms within the Air Force. Marine 

infantrymen have this same affinity with their Marine aviators when 

presented with a choice of joint CAS. A Marine will always ask for a 

Marine aviator to provide his CAS over other services. He already knows 

“effects” of this choice. The challenge for the Air Force then is to 

engender a community wide affinity for Air Force tactical aviation similar 

to the Army’s affinity for the A-10 or the Marine’s affinity for Marine 

CAS. Using an “effects-based” approach may not be the whole answer. 

To reinforce the above discussion, I have observed an interesting 

paradox through the course of my research and while attending the Air 

War College. There are two general observations made by many, if not 

all, Air Force aviators interviewed for this paper, including general 

officers. First, on average the Air Force does not send strong performers 

to fill the ALO billets to represent the capabilities and limitations of 

airpower to ground commanders.90 Second, the Army leadership, to 

include the land component commanders, does not fully understand the 

use of airpower. This is a compelling paradox: the Army leadership does 

not understand air power; yet the Air Force sends its poorer performing 

aviators to serve as ALOs and then only down to the brigade level. The 

second order effect is that there is a perception that serving an ALO is 

detrimental to one’s chance of promotion when compared to a more 

traditional career track. The net result is that a percentage of ALOs either 

leave the Air Force after their ground tour or, for varied reasons, fail to 

return to an operational squadron. The current “unwritten” assignment 

policy prevents a healthy cross-pollination between aviators and ground 

officers. The ground experienced aviator has less of a chance of returning 

to an operational squadron where he can articulate the unique challenges 

faced by the end user of fixed-wing and rotary-wing airpower to his 

squadron. 

 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the Army possesses 

an institutional bias to not train with or incorporate fixed-wing aviation 

into combat operations until it is almost too late. It should also be of no 

46
 

surprise that many leaders in the Air Force complain that their ground 

contemporaries poorly plan for aviation or have little understanding of its 

capabilities and limitations beyond the A-10. Analyzing the ALO tour 

assignment practice is a requirement for joint interdependence to work. 

While the trend recently has shown a slight reversal, there is a significant 

stigma associated with a ground tour with the Army, expressed by the 

viewpoint that “Air Force aviators didn’t sign up for that (ALO tours).”91 

There may be second and third order effects of increasing the 

number of enlisted JTACs and, subsequently, the Air Force policy of 

assigning senior enlisted JTACs as Battalion Air Liaison Officers. 

Shortages in the JTAC career field have caused younger and less 

experience JTACs (SrA and SSgt) to routinely serve as the BALOs, a 

position where they are tasked with advising a battalion commander on the 

employment of airpower.92 The ability of a JTAC to inject himself into 

the battalion’s planning, or even to disagree with the battalion commander 

on an aspect of airpower employment, rests largely on the JTAC’s 

personality, experience, and aggressiveness. Yet even if experienced, 

there can be an institutional barrier for a battalion commander to allow an 

E-6/7 BALO, an individual that has never seen the inside of a cockpit, into 

his inner circle of advisors and planners or to speak with authority about 

the capabilities and limitations of airpower, regardless of the BALO’s 

skill. As the Air Force enlarges the JTAC career field to meet the Army’s 

growing requirements as it transforms, fewer aviators will be exposed to 

the ground force point of view, with the net result a divergence between 

airpower culture and ground power culture, which is precisely the opposite 

intent of joint interdependence. If the Air Force wants to ensure the Army 

leadership understands airpower, the organizational process of BALO and 

ALO assignments should be re-evaluated. 

Complicating the training of Air Force officers and enlisted 

assigned as ALOs and JTACs is the significant amount of time required 

just to get them sufficiently trained to operate effectively in a service with 

such a different culture than the Air Force. According to Colonel Belote, 

the commander of the 3 ASOG at Fort Hood, Texas, one aspect that adds 

to the training timeline of ALOs and JTACs are training requirements in 

order to sufficiently prepare Air Force personnel in the areas of personal 

weapon use, urban combat, counterinsurgency, and land warfare in 

general.93 Some of these training deficits are being addressed by changes 

to the entry level training for those entering the Air Force, but they will 

still not be sufficient for JTACS and ALOs, or more appropriately, 

“battlefield Airmen.” These individuals will spend a significant amount of 

47
 

time with the Army in a combat environment, particularly the JTACs 

operating directly with the maneuver units. 

The three to five year period required to train JTACs is an 

enormous investment. The recent commitment by the Air Force to train 

an additional 900-1000 JTACs to support the Army’s transformation plan 

is a significant commitment by the Air Force. But the reality is that the 

trained JTAC will not be certified in the actual control of aircraft until 

three years after he begins training at the earliest. The JTAC in training 

does provide an important service, such as radio operator, driver, before he 

becomes fully qualified. However, could there be a better way to train 

certified JTACs that leverages the longevity of a fully certified and 

proficient JTAC with that of a rated aviator certified in terminal attack 

control? This problem is unique to the Air Force. Marines shifting from 

aviation duty to service with their ground counterparts do not have the 

same challenges. This leads to an explanation of the organization that 

enables joint airpower to support the Marine infantryman. 

Each of the three Marine infantry divisions is habitually aligned 

and supported by a DASC manned by specialists that are sourced from the 

Marine Air Support Squadron, a subordinate unit of the Marine Air Wing. 

Being a “DASC-kateer” is a permanent career field for officers and 

enlisted. For officers, it is a career field with command opportunity at the 

squadron and group level, where they are eligible to command a Marine 

Air Support Squadron and then a Marine Air Control Group. Similar in 

size and function to the ASOC, the DASC is attached to the division 

headquarters, not the MEF, which is one command echelon below where 

the ASOC is attached (see figure 4 for a graphical depiction of the Theater 

Air Ground System). The typical DASC is manned by 12-17 officers and 

enlisted, depending upon the mission, and is tactically controlled by the 

division but remains under the operational control of the Marine Air Wing. 

Sub-elements of the DASC, called Air Support Elements (ASEs) and Air 

Support Liaison Teams (ASLTs), can be formed with similar but limited 

capability as the DASC. The ASEs and ASLTs are representative slices of 

the DASC and can be assigned to commands subordinate to the division. 

Normally though, they come out of the DASC’s end strength. For 

example, during OIF, in addition to the DASC supporting the 1st Marine 

Division, two ASEs were formed one for Task Force Tarawa and one for 

the British 1st UK Division. Also, one ASLT was formed to support 

Regimental Combat Team 2.94 Since the 1st Marine Division was 

reinforced with three additional maneuver elements, the ASEs and ASLT 

were not formed from the 1st Marine Division DASC but were formed 

from the DASC that traditionally supported the 2d Marine Division. The 

48
 

DASC is also responsible for coordinating helicopter attack and assault 

support operations. An airborne DASC or “DASCA” was also formed, 

and operated from the cargo hold of a C-130, with the primary mission of 

coordinating helicopter assault support. 

Figure 4. Theater Air Ground System Coordination Links (JP 

3-09.3) 

During OIF the combined size of the DASC, ASE, ASLT, and the 

DASCA was significantly larger than the ASOC supporting V Corps. 

Additionally, the DASC was responsible for procedural control of rotarywing and fixed-wing aircraft operating in the airspace out to about 20 

miles in front of the forward line of troops, which was well short of the 

FSCL. The ASOC supporting V Corps was responsible for the procedural 

control of fixed-wing aircraft operating out to the FSCL, or about 60-80 

miles to its front. The Control and Reporting Center (CRC) is equivalent 

to the Marine Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC) and is purposely 

omitted from this comparison since both organizations are responsible for 

other tasks besides air-ground coordination. 

By comparison, the Marine Corps currently assigns only rated 

naval aviators to function as forward air controllers (FACs) and Air 

Officers (AOs), the equivalent to Air Force JTACs and ALOs.95 Air 

officers, the equivalent billet to Air Force ALOs, are normally fully 

qualified to terminally control air support. Forward Air Controllers and 

AOs work directly for the maneuver commander at the division, regiment, 

and battalion level to function as his air advisor. In these positions they 

function similarly to the Air Liaison Officers of the Air Force. 

49
 

All rated naval aviators in the Marine Corps are candidates for 

duty as Air Officers and Forward Air Controllers. Therefore, an air shop 

at the battalion and regiment level will represent a typical mix of 

helicopter, fighter, and transport pilots. Company grade officers will serve 

as Forward Air Controllers, and field grade officers serve as Air Officers. 

The FACs work for the Air Officer, the senior aviator within the air shop. 

The Air Officers work for the commander of the unit as his principal staff 

officer on all matters pertaining to aviation. FACs and AOs are assigned 

to these tours for 12-18 months, depending upon the training and 

deployment cycle of the unit to which they are assigned. 

The selection process for aviators assigned to be a Marine ground 

FAC is competitive and is considered to be career enhancing among those 

considered. The second assignment Marine aircrew selected for a ground 

forward air control billet serves in this capacity about 12-18 months, upon 

completion of a three week tactical air control party school. He leaves the 

school fully certified to terminally control rotary-wing and fixed-wing 

close air support aviation. Upon the completion of a ground tour, the 

aviator can expect to be assigned back to an operational squadron, where 

he will most likely be slated to attend the Marine Corps Weapons and 

Tactics Instructor course, the most coveted school for an aviator. The 

quick turnaround time for the forward air controllers and the air officers 

minimizes their out of the cockpit time. Perhaps most importantly, the 

experience gained while serving with the infantry is brought back to the 

operational squadron and put into instructional use when the aviator fills 

the pilot training officer billet of the squadron. This process is repeated 

every twelve to eighteen months, and the infantry units and all the flying 

squadrons are updated on the latest tactics, techniques and procedures of 

the air and ground operations and interdependence. 

On the surface there may appear to be many similarities between 

the Air Force / Army air relationships and the Marine Corps’ air-ground 

relationship. However, there are significant differences between the 

services in the assignment policies of aviation representatives to the 

ground forces. Rated Air Force aviators and certified JTACs assigned at 

the battalion, brigade, and corps level remain under the operational control 

of the ASOS commanders. By comparison, Marine aviators assigned to 

billets as Forward Air Controllers or Air Officers are under the operational 

control of the ground unit commander to which they are assigned. The 

personnel manning the DASC remain a component of the Marine Wing 

Control Group, a subunit of the Marine Air Wing, and thereby maintain a 

separate chain of command. Proponents of the Air Force assignment 

method argue that in order for Airmen to provide unvarnished advice to 

50
 

ground commanders concerning the employment of airpower, they must 

be able to do so without fear of reprisal. The current USAF organization 

supports this. Therefore, it is best to maintain the operational control of 

JTACs and ALOs within the ASOS and ASOG not the battalion, brigade, 

or corps. Others argue that the current assignment policy institutionalizes 

a seam between the ground forces and air forces. Although the ASOSs 

and ASOGs are physically collocated and habitually associated with the 

ground units they support, the day-to-day working routine for the JTAC 

and ALO is within the ASOS, not the battalion or brigade. 

Opportunities to strengthen the mutual understanding between 

ground forces and air forces may be missed through the lack of day to day 

interaction and can only be achieved through training evolutions and 

deployments as the JTACs and ALOs are assigned to support the ground 

units. There are many intangible benefits to an Air Liaison Officer 

operationally assigned to a unit that are missed by the current assignment 

policies. Perhaps among the most important is team building that would 

supplant misperceptions of an implied “you are not in my chain of 

command” attitude that may impede the strengthening of organizational 

bonds. A ground force and an air force designed to be dependent upon 

each other’s strengths must be seamless at the very location that is tasked 

to fuse air and surface operations, the ASOC and its subordinate elements, 

the TACP and ALOs. Perhaps it is time for the Air Force leadership to 

address their concerns with their ground counterpart’s lack of aviation 

knowledge through the implementation of innovative personnel 

assignment policies.96 If the reader agrees that joint interdependence 

requires a paradigm change, then perhaps a detailed analysis of the current 

assignment policies are in order to address this seam that may prohibit 

joint interdependence for air and ground operations. 

Opponents of this recommendation will argue that there are not 

enough Air 

Force aviators to fully man the current JTAC, ALO, and ASOC positions, 

let alone the increased requirement to support the Army’s transformation 

plan. This, combined with the recapitalization of the fighter force and the 

reduction of end strength, will make this problem even more difficult to 

solve. The argument gets stronger when one considers that under the 

current joint paradigm the Air Force is responsible for the strategic lift of 

all the services, and is increasingly called upon to provide transportation, 

security, and intelligence personnel to support other services. Potential 

joint solutions to this manning dilemma that close this obvious 

organizational seam will be explored in the recommendations section. 

51
 

Recommendations 

I grew up not trusting CAS, because at NTCs and Warfighters it was too 

hard to coordinate and was never [there] where or when I needed it. But 

here, every time I asked the JTAC to get air—every time—you guys 

answered the call.97

Success in one will support success in others, while delay in one will 

impede success in others. We must aggressively identify those factors 

impeding our success, develop plans to overcome them, and establish 

metrics with which to assess our progress.98

 

Joint interdependence for air and ground operations will require 

rebuilding individual trust between the soldier and the Airmen and 

rebuilding the institutional trust between the services. The individual trust 

is easy, that is accomplished through training. Institutional trust will 

require personnel policies and organizational changes to back up the 

speeches and resist the interwar tendencies. Changing the institutional 

inertia of a force accustomed to relying upon a near limitless supply of 

organic fires, a percentage of which are now supplanted by aviation fires, 

to rely more on aviation fires will require innovative thought and 

deliberate effort from both services. Therefore, it is in the interest of the 

land and air components to make this work if they are to make 

interdependence work. It will require a level of cross-pollination to 

educate one another while simultaneously becoming reliant upon one 

another. Perhaps nowhere is this more important than the integration of 

rotary-wing and fixed-wing fires with long-range organic fires. An 

architecture that meets the needs of the soldier while maximizing the 

potential of airpower is essential. Maybe the litmus test for achieving 

joint interdependence will be when the corps commander can cede his 

deep battle to the CFACC much like the 1st Marine Division commander 

ceded his deep battle to 3rd Marine Air Wing and the coalition sorties 

provided by the CFACC. 

 Accomplishing this will require an adaptable system that 

engenders trust between the services while enabling high initiative 

between those that control, coordinate and deliver aerial and surface to 

surface fires. New thinking and unified mission focus must transplant 

traditional service specific or component agendas to increase the 

flexibility and initiative of airpower employed in support of an Army 

transformed. 

52
 

Doctrine 

1. Establish the Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS) as a 

fire support control measure. 

The Common Geographic Reference System (CGRS) is a control 

measure that can de-energize the FSCL debate and improve the 

coordination and control of aviation and ground fires upon the joint 

battlefield by eliminating the seams and friction that the FSCL now 

creates.99 In fact a CGRS was in use during OIF (as described in the 

analysis) but it overlaid traditional fire support coordination measures like 

the FSCL and the BCL. Termed Killbox Interdiction/Close Air Support 

(KI/CAS) concept of operations by air component planners, its level of 

success as a fire support coordination measure depended upon what area 

of operations the user was in. 

First used in rudimentary form during Operation Desert Storm, 

CGRS was improved upon during Operation Allied Force. Its relevance 

came of age during the planning process leading up to OIF but it still 

could not supplant traditional measures like the FSCL / BCL. It greatly 

enhanced the ability of the air and ground component to quickly and 

effectively direct the flow of attack aircraft in the close battle and the deep 

battle. 

Since lines of latitude and longitude delineate the killbox they, 

exist as a common reference system throughout the world. A killbox 30 

nautical miles from south to north is exactly 50 km deep and roughly 50 

km wide. Each of the nine squares subdividing each box is approximately 

16.5 km deep and about 16 km wide (see figure 5). More importantly, 

killboxes, once commonly understood by air and land forces have the 

potential to obviate the requirement for a FSCL all together. The obvious 

question is if the killbox subsumed the same control measures of the 

traditional fire support control measure it overlaid, what are the 

implications for using the killbox method exclusively for fire support 

coordination? 

53
 

Figure 5. Killbox Dimensions 

There are good attempts at improving killboxes in order for them to be 

used as fire support coordination measures.100 The killbox concept as 

described in the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) publication FM 

3-09.34 is the most comprehensive but can be improved to make a more 

effective means for ground and aerial fires coordination and supplant 

traditional fire support coordination measures. The ALSA pub improves 

the killbox system employed by CENTCOM by assigning ‘entity 

ownership’ to the killboxes through a color system. For example, a blue 

killbox is owned by the JFACC and is coordinating authority for fires 

employed in that box (see figure 6). Land and Maritime component 

commanders must coordinate with air component commander in order to 

deliver surface-to-surface fires in a blue killbox. Similarly, a purple 

killbox is jointly owned by the land and air component commander but is 

established by the ground component. It is a three dimensional box that 

has a pre coordinated minimum altitude or floor designated. Aircraft can 

attack targets in the purple killbox without coordination with the ground 

component as long as the stay above the floor. 

54
 

Figure 6. Killbox Ownership (Figure B-2, FM 3-09.34) 

 Surface-to-surface fires can engage targets within the purple 

killbox without coordination with the air component as long as the 

maximum ordinate of the projectile trajectory does not go above the floor 

of the killbox. When ground units approach within a pre-identified 

distance of the killbox they are automatically deactivated.101 

Killbox operations as defined in the Korean Theater of Operations 

are similar. However, while killboxes are only established long of the 

FSCL, Airspace Coordination Areas are established short of the FSCL and 

essentially take on the same characteristics as the purple killbox described 

in the ALSA pub. They are color coded to depict the component that that 

owns the killbox. However, both publications discuss the cumbersome 

process of gaining approval to establish the killbox and both publications 

still recommend the employment of traditional fire support coordination 

measures like the FSCL.102 Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated that 

killboxes offered a flexible method of fire support coordination due to 

their ease of use and the ability for commanders to rapidly open and close 

them based upon the maneuver elements pace of movement. 

In order to move beyond the issues associated with the FSCL 

debate, a killbox system is required that captures the above discussion 

about entity ownership while facilitating all fires in conjunction with 

maneuver. Both of the examples of killbox employment described above 

fall short in developing a system that moves physically and temporally 

with the maneuver units. As depicted in the ALSA publication and the 

Combined Forces Korea instruction, there is no discussion of establishing 

and maintaining killboxes that are owned by the ground commanders. For 

55
 

this purpose they use Airspace Coordination Areas. As depicted in figure 

4, killboxes are opened and closed individually, by the appropriate HQ 

that owns the timing, priority, and effects of fires within that particular 

killbox. Figure 7 depicts how a FSCL can be placed along the boundaries 

of the killboxes, and it is readily apparent that placing the FSCL in this 

manner over the CGRS is redundant. More importantly, this process will 

be cumbersome. 

Figure 7. FSCL Placement Along Killbox Boundaries (Figure 1-3 

from FM 3-09.34) 

The dimensions of the killbox assigned to a brigade, division, or 

regiment killbox can be tailored based upon the mission, enemy, and 

terrain (see figure 8). Note that there is no FSCL in figure 8. More 

importantly the purple shaded area is an area of shared responsibility that 

eliminates a clear “division” of responsibility that the FSCL now 

represents. Figure 7 uses colored killboxes and key pads to represent the 

entity responsible for the timing, priority and effect of fires in the killbox. 

Also note that the colors change based upon unit position and speed of 

movement. Used in this manner, this version of a killbox essentially 

incorporates the Battlefield Coordination Line and Fire Support 

Coordination Line employed by I MEF during OIF into a more flexible 

and understandable system for all participants. 

56
 

Figure 8. Tailoring Killbox Dimensions 

The colored killbox width or lateral boundary can vary depending 

upon the terrain and disposition of attack formations of the ground units 

and the distance between units. Its depth could be established to the 

maximum range of the ground commander’s organic fires, or about 20-30 

km (about 15-20 miles) in front of the division / brigade. All timing, 

priority, and effects within that killbox are coordinated by the division / 

brigade; as such it is colored green. Because this is the region that 

typically defines CAS, the keypads of the killbox that fall within the range 

of the 20-30 km range would be closed. Thereby, aviation fires delivered 

in a closed killbox require the terminal control of a JTAC / FAC/ FACA. 

As the maneuver units move forward, the keypads / killbox that fall within 

the 20-30km range of the lead units automatically close. 

The next 30 nautical-mile sequential killbox is jointly owned by the 

land component and the air component and would be colored purple. This 

box would function as described above in the ALSA pub. The maximum 

distance from the forward edge of the division to the end of this boundary 

will be 60 nautical miles or 100km. All timing, priority, and effects within 

that killbox would be coordinated jointly by the corps / MEF and its 

appropriate air component agency, the DASC / ASOC. Pre-established 

ceilings and floors would make combined joint fires in the purple boxes 

very easy to deconflict and thereby coordinate and execute. Additionally, 

CFACC or Marine Air Wing aircraft capable of conducting SCAR and 

FACA would be designated the killbox managers or “trusted agents.” In 

this manner, FACA crews could be assigned to green (closed) and or 

purple (shared) killboxes and SCAR managers could be assigned to blue 

(open) killboxes and is just one example. CAS aircraft could then be 

57
 

“pushed” to an assigned killbox to operate through the designated “trusted 

agents” and their attacks would be in accordance with commander’s 

intent, as executed by the FACA or SCAR manager executing from a 

prioritized target list. During periods of high mobility, a Tactical Air 

Coordinator (Airborne) aircrew could be added to function as an “airbattle manager,” essentially maintaining the big picture and monitoring the 

flow of aircraft from one killbox to another based upon the ground battle. 

The next sequential killboxes are “blue” and are owned by the 

CFACC. They can extend from 60 nm to the boundary of the AO. All 

priority, timing, and effects would be determined by the CFACC and 

coordinated by the CAOC, with the JSTARS, AWACS, or CRC acting in 

accordance with the CFACC’s guidance for timing, priority, and effects. 

Air delivered fires can operate freely in blue killboxes. Employing 

surface-to-surface fires in blue killboxes would require the approval of the 

CFACC. Depending upon the mission, enemy, and terrain, all of the 

killboxes and keypads can be easily adjusted to accommodate maneuver 

space and enemy disposition. 

For example, if the battle becomes static, the brigade / regiment zone 

of control may stretch the distance of one keypad of a killbox, or about 18 

km. The important issue to resolve would be the span of control 

designated to each element owning the killboxes, while the responsibility 

of fires coordination in the killbox remains constant. As the maneuver 

units approach the limits of the current closed keypad and pass into 

another, the next keypad or killbox automatically becomes closed and the 

next segments of the subsequent boxes and the control of the timing, 

priority, and effects shift according to the next agency Corps / CFACC. 

The process would be equivalent to the same ‘yardstick’ of control being 

linked to the location and rate of movement of the ground force, thereby 

achieving a “temporal” effect of fire support coordination that deenergizes the FSCL debate. 

The other advantage of this type of killbox employment is that it does 

not require any one entity or group of people to decide when or where to 

move it. The process is linked to the movement of the ground forces. 

Essentially, the ground units maneuver underneath the CGRS and based 

upon the previous agreed to depth of killbox ownership per entity, the 

killbox is closed or subdivided key pads are closed. Any fires employed 

in a closed killbox require the approval and coordination of the entity that 

owns it. This method will also naturally accommodate fast moving 

column like movements of ground forces much easier as compared to 

traditional fire support coordination measures. The end result is a stepped 

approach towards the coordination of aviation fires with maneuver. The 

58
 

closer aviation is to the ground forces and the range of their organic fires, 

the more coordination is required and vice versa. Instead of the all or 

nothing approach caused by traditional fire support coordination measures, 

killbox interdiction and close air support enables a more fluid flow and 

coordination of aerial fires with ground maneuver. 

Aviation and long-range organic fires can exploit this type of 

battlespace coordination more effectively. Instead of the space between 

the FLOT and the FSCL varying based upon individual maneuver units as 

the units maneuver at different rates towards the fixed FSLC, the closed 

and open kill boxes move commensurately with the units, thereby 

preserving the agreed to ‘yardstick’ and the degree of coordination 

associated with it. This way, one maneuver unit slowed down by terrain 

or enemy action would have the same yardstick of coordination as another 

moving at 20km/hr. As distance opened between two adjacent maneuver 

units, it could be ‘opened,’ thereby allowing aviation to screen for and / or 

attack potential enemy forces they may be in the area between the 

maneuver forces. 

2. Employ “Just in Time” CAS and the “Deep Battle Manager.”

 “Push CAS” and “Pull CAS” are terms used to describe how CAS 

sorties are scheduled and flowed into the battlespace. Under the push 

CAS construct, a predetermined number of CAS sorties—based upon 

ground commander’s intent and the apportionment—are scheduled to flow 

into the battlespace regardless if they are required (the process employed 

by CFACC during OIF). If not, after a specific time period they are 

normally released from the CAS controlling agency and are free to 

conduct interdiction or reconnaissance, depending upon the situation. 

Push CAS may also be the best method of scheduling CAS aircraft in a 

static battlefield. A recent example is Operation Phantom Fury, where US 

joint ground forces attacked the insurgent forces holding the city of 

Fallujah in November 2004.103 

The “pull CAS” construct normally implies a set number of CAS 

sorties are set aside in some form of alert posture, normally ground based. 

When they are needed, they are launched on order, or essentially pulled 

forward. Using a killbox system that has more fidelity than the one 

described in FM 3-09.23 and employed in OIF air forces can more 

efficiently plan and execute planned and emergent CAS requests while 

simultaneously satisfying interdiction requirements. 

For example, the battlespace divided into killboxes can be used as a 

sortie modeling tool optimized for enemy disposition, terrain, weather, 

sortie capacity (rotary-wing and fixed-wing), that accounts for volume of 

airspace in the AO, desired aircraft density per square mile of air space, 

59
 

type aircraft, ordnance load, enemy concentration, and terrain. To 

illustrate, a two-ship of F-16s carrying three precision guided munitions 

and thirty minutes of available time on station may be only planned to 

operate in one to two killboxes per time on station, as compared to a twoship of F-15Es with 8 PGMs each and 45 minutes time on station. The 

Strike Eagles may be assigned to cover four to five killboxes and/or be 

charged to act as a SCAR box manager for an additional two or three 

sections of interdiction or CAS. Using this method commanders predetermine a specific aircraft density per square mile (killbox) depending 

upon the situation. The weight of ‘pre-planned’ CAS and “on-call’ CAS 

in the form of aircraft scheduled to operate in the corps’ close or deep 

battle can be predetermined and scheduled appropriately. This process 

reduces the amount of CAS aircraft inventory that are tied up by being 

placed on the “shelf” via a CAS stack and creates a pre-planned number of 

“just in time” inventory of CAS aircraft. The “just in time” CAS aircraft 

are planned to operate in the middle and deep battle (purple and blue 

killboxes and their corresponding restrictions) 30 kilometers to 100 miles 

deep, at most just ten minutes from being called back to support an 

emerging troops in contact mission. They are essentially flying 

interdiction missions short or long of the FSCL, to use a familiar 

definition’ but under the killbox concept of operations they would be 

operating in a purple or blue killbox under the control and coordination of 

a “trusted agent” FACA or SCAR specialist. The ‘insurance factor’ 

underwriting this “pull CAS” concept is the percentage of attack 

helicopter aviation factored into the ‘CAS inventory’ and the number of 

FACA / SCAR aircraft operating as deep battle managers. Additionally, 

all CAS aircraft planned and flowed into the killbox “inventory” become 

“CAS in waiting.” As they flow through the “close battle” into the deeper 

battle, they can be diverted enroute from their originally planned deep 

killbox. Alternatively, killbox interdiction aircraft operating in blue 

killboxes can even be “pulled” back for CAS or even be assigned time 

sensitive strike missions. This process is similar to current operations in 

Iraq, where “troops in contact missions” can be supported with already 

airborne “pipeline security missions” for example. 

As part of achieving a baseline minimum number of sorties, 

possessing an average capability a sub-optimum mix of ordnance loads for 

a particular mission and decreased situational awareness may result. 

However, this method provides a highly adaptive and flexible approach to 

aviation planning and execution that minimizes wasted effort and 

maximizes the inherent capabilities of airpower. This concept can be 

further enhanced through the deliberate inclusion of attack helicopters. 

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3. Modify army attack aviation doctrine.

Army attack helicopter doctrine should be modified so that it 

recognizes recent combat experience. Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) 

doctrine and the survivability it affords helicopter attack aviation during 

OEF and OIF is thoroughly documented in after action reports. “The 

Multi service JAAT is a coordinated attack by rotary and fixed-wing 

aircraft, normally supported by artillery or naval surface fire support. 

JAAT operations support the joint force commander in offensive and 

defensive operations day or night.”104 The procedures required for 

successful JAAT missions are precisely those that engender close 

cooperation between rotary-wing, fixed-wing aviation and the ground 

maneuver elements. JAAT tactics techniques and procedures are a “nobrainer” and are easily executed by experienced ALOs and rotary-wing 

aviation planners. 

Yet, JAAT as written holds an almost mystical position in the 

maneuver commander’s toolkit and service field manuals. Doctrinally, it 

requires “approval from the maneuver commander responsible for the area 

of operations” where JAAT is scheduled to take place, i.e., a corps 

commander.105 JAAT tactics are common sense to all participants and are 

being planned and executed real time during current combat operations. 

Unfortunately, JAAT is not common practice during training leading up to 

unit deployments and common feedback from OIF experienced ALOs and 

JTACs is that the Joint Air Attack Team is the norm, not the exception. 

JAAT tactics should be a primary tenet of Army attack aviation doctrine 

and it should supplant Army autonomous attack helicopter deep 

operations. In this manner, rotary-wing and fixed-wing aviation planning 

and execution will become the norm, not treated as a special event 

requiring maneuver commander’s sanction. 

The Army should name armed helicopter Close Combat Attack what it 

really is, CAS. Naming attack helicopter operations requiring close 

coordination with that of ground maneuver anything but CAS 

institutionalizes a “what is mine is mine” seam between the land and air 

forces that is an outgrowth of the emotional debates of the 1960s 

concerning the fielding of the armed helicopter. The services should be 

beyond this debate over semantics. More importantly, “close combat 

attack” and “close shaping” fails to recognize the full capability the attack 

helicopter brings to the battlefield and the soldier. Attack helicopter 

aviation offers a unique capability to the infantryman as compared to 

fixed-wing aviation, and it is time to doctrinally re-link the Army’s ground 

force with it aviation arm. 

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Organization 

1. Establish a joint architecture for the Brigade Aviation Element. 

One potential organizational solution may be a joint architecture 

for the Army’s Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) currently being proposed 

for each brigade combat team. According to draft Army publication TC 1-

400 FDFD, dated 13 Marcg 2005, the BAE would be a permanent function 

of the brigade staff “for integration and synchronization of aviation into 

the brigade commander’s scheme of maneuver.” The concept is modeled 

after the successful aviation planning cell used by the Army’s Air Assault 

divisions. The BAE uses the aviation planning cell construct where a 

specific planning cell was dedicated to each of the maneuver brigades of 

the air assault division. The Army Aviation Task Force Study dated 

November 2003 recognized that the use of a dedicated aviation element at 

the air assault brigade combat team headquarters developed a unique 

chemistry between the aviation planning cell and their infantry 

counterparts. As a result, aviation and maneuver were fully integrated into 

every operation. “The challenge is to provide BAE teams comprised of 

well-rounded aviators, who can coordinate and assist the BCT in using 

aviation across the broad spectrum of aviation missions. Each member of 

the BAE must be an advocate for aviation and the BCT.”106 Ironically, 

this organizational change only addresses Army Aviation and is perhaps 

indicative of the gulf that developed over the years between attack 

helicopter aviation and the non-air assault maneuver units. This divide 

was evident in the assignment policies of helicopter squadron liaison 

officers to the brigade staff that mirrored the observations made in the 

unwritten ALO assignment policies of the Air Force. 

The primary purpose of the liaison team is to keep the brigade 

commander and his staff apprised of the aviation issues related to the unit 

that the liaison officers represent. Specifically, the liaison officer’s job is 

to articulate crew rest requirements of the pilots, employment 

considerations and maintenance requirements as well as advise the 

commander of planning and executing helicopter operations. National 

Training Center (NTC) exercise after action reports cited numerous 

problems with the Army aviation’s current liaison officer assignment 

process.107 Most of the problems centered on the liaison officers being 

too junior or inexperienced. This was exacerbated by the fact that they 

were normally ‘expendable’ for the unit they represented; they were poor 

performers and the squadron would not miss their presence.108 

The Army’s transformation plan proposes to rectify this issue 

through the establishment of permanent liaison teams at the brigade 

headquarters, staffed normally by second tour captains possessing the 

62
 

experience and credibility of the community they represent. The liaison 

teams, in addition to the BAE, represent a significant improvement in the 

aviation expertise that will reside within the brigade headquarters. 

However, there is potential to make the improvements even better. 

The BAE as proposed will be headed by a helicopter pilot, an 

Army major that is “branch qualified” meaning that the individual 

possessed the requisite aviation credibility and expertise. Assisting him is 

another helicopter pilot of the rank of captain and one warrant officer that 

is a non-rated. The BAE would also have three enlisted flight operations 

specialists. This structure was specifically designed so it would match the 

Brigade Fire Support Element in rank and size.109 Supplementing the 

BAE on the brigade staff are the temporarily assigned liaison officers 

described above. However, there is a potential opportunity that exists in 

this organizational change by expanding the qualifications of the liaison 

officers through qualifying them as terminal attack controllers, or TACs. 

This process would only take three weeks if the program was 

similar to the Navy and Marine Corps’ Tactical Air Control Party School, 

and the aviator would graduate from the school a qualified TAC. This 

would immediately solve two outstanding problems. First, the liaison 

officer / TAC would then hold essentially two billets, acting as an advisor 

to the brigade commander on all issues related to attack helicopter aviation 

as well as being certified TAC. This would help alleviate the TAC 

shortage within the Army and ease the difficulty of the Air Force in filling 

them as the Army transforms. Second, this would start a process of crosspollination between Army aviation and Army infantry while 

simultaneously enhancing cross-pollination between rotary-wing and 

fixed-wing aviation for the Air Force and the Army. Training liaison 

officers as ground forward air controllers would not require more 

personnel but would require additional training for the individual liaison 

officers chosen to be qualified as JTACs. Qualifying Army helicopter 

pilot liaison officers as JTACs will add additional JTACs to the Army 

brigades quicker and with less overhead than training enlisted JTACs. 110 

The BAE as proposed would consolidate Army aviation expertise 

in one location at the brigade level. However, there is room for improving 

this critical staff section. For example, consolidating joint aviation 

expertise in one staff section, at the brigade and corps level, working for 

the respective commander would help build strong working relationships 

between soldiers and Airmen of rotary-wing and fixed-wing background 

and provide a venue to seamlessly integrate the planning and execution of 

all aviation fires for mutually enabling effect. Brigade ALOs assigned to 

lead the BAE for non-air assault brigades would allow the fixed-wing 

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ALO and the rotary-wing liaison officers to present a joint aviation 

solution to the brigade commander. In the process all within the staff 

section and key leaders throughout the brigade would cross-pollinate 

concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures on rotary-wing and fixedwing employment. 

2. Assign a percentage of ALO billets to be filled by rated Naval 

aviators.

The Navy, along with the Air Force, should share the responsibility 

for manning Brigade ALO billets. Navy aviators are equally qualified to 

perform in this billet, and because carrier aviation is an integral part of 

each combined force air component commander’s plan, the Navy should 

fill a portion of the ALO requirements. Perhaps this can be instituted 

initially through volunteers, eventually evolving into a percentage of 

mandatory quotas phased in as the Army continues its transformation. 

The cross-pollination benefits to the Navy will pay huge dividends in 

better integrating carrier aviation with the ground scheme of maneuver. 

Naval aviation plays a significant role in CJFACC operations and 

supporting the land component. Their FACA qualified aircrews are all 

graduates of the Marine Corps Tactical Air Control Party School and are 

certified as ground terminal attack controllers before they receive their 

airborne qualification. Their contributions to the CJFACC air effort and 

maneuver commander can be enhanced through ALO tours that will round 

out their experience and their perspective. Perhaps their greatest 

contributions will be when they bring their ground experience back to 

their squadrons to educate their fellow aviators on the ground 

commander’s perspective, a point of view they have never seen before. 

Majors and Navy officers selected for ALO positions should serve in 

these positions at a point in their career where they are considered eligible 

for duty as a member of their respective service or a joint staff. This 

assignment policy would preclude an aviator from having multiple out of 

the cockpit tours and keep the individual competitive for promotion and 

follow-on command. This option would essentially create two joint staff 

officer career tracks, one operationally oriented at the combat level and the 

other traditionally oriented at the service component staff level or the 

combatant commander level. Aviators serving in the BAE position for 

more than 22 months should be considered for joint credit, just as they 

would if they served on a joint staff. This would further alleviate the 

negative career connotations associated with ALO billets and increase the 

number of quality aviation officers available to cross-pollinate with their 

ground officer counterparts, producing multiple benefits. The ALO would 

bring the “ground perspective” back to a squadron, most likely in a 

64
 

leadership role, and the ground commander would receive first rate advice 

on rotary and fixed-wing air employment. 

3. Establish the TACP organization under the operational control of 

the supported commander. 

The joint BAE organization described above should remain under the 

operational control of the respective brigade commander and be 

responsible for articulating the all the issues associated with aviation and 

ground operations. This team should be formed at an appropriate period 

during the “reset” or “ready” force cycle so that it can be in position to 

train when the battalion and brigade phase training begins. This process 

will enable the BAE to get the appropriated training while minimizing the 

added personnel burden of manning the BAE during the entire unit 

regeneration cycle. For example, the BAE might be manned for just the 

nine months prior to the “available for deployment.” phase of the “Army 

Forces Generation Cycle.”111 

Air Force aviators and Army aviators staffing the BAE on a permanent 

basis would also bring that officer’s “rolodex” to the brigade, enhancing 

their ability to align small unit training and better plan for large scale 

exercises. This process would not only institute a process of habitual 

relationships with the brigade aviation shop, but it would also begin the 

process of establishing relationships with external squadrons. They would 

also be the link to the Army and Air Force pilots operating as Airborne 

Forward Air Controllers (AFACs), or “airborne extensions” of the BAE 

and ASOC. 

Ultimately, rotary-wing and fixed-wing fires expertise would be 

consolidated in one staff section beginning at the brigade level. This 

manning construct would also enable the BAE to take on an “ASOC light” 

mission. In this capacity they could function similar to the Marine Corps 

sub-element to the DASC, the Air Support Element (ASE) if required by 

the mission. In this capacity, the BAE would be able to act as a pressure 

relief valve as well as coordinate the aviation fires, rotary-wing and fixedwing of the brigade. 

4. Certify Army and Navy pilots as ground FACs. 

An alternate solution to the BAE organization is to consider 

training Army and Navy pilots as ground FACs in addition to those that 

are filling the BAE and the liaison officer billets. A typical pilot could be 

eligible for Tactical Air Control Party School after he successfully 

completed at least three years in a squadron and obtained a favorable 

endorsement from his commanding officer. Army and Navy aviators 

selected for this program would serve 12-18 months as a ground FAC and 

then return to their squadron, achieving cross-pollination benefits similar 

65
 

to those described above. The Marine Corps successfully uses this 

concept, and it would further the air-ground partnership between the Army 

and the often overlooked source of airpower, the Navy. The Army pilots 

selected to be trained as FACs could be put into service much quicker than 

their Air Force enlisted or officer counterparts, since they are already 

“acclimatized” to the Army and have the additional skill of being familiar 

with aviation terminology and communication.112 There already exists 

within the Navy a certified pool of FACs. By requirement, Navy aircrew 

qualified as Airborne Forward Air Controllers attend the Marine Corps’ 

TACP School before they earn their FACA qualification in the F-14 and 

FA-18F. Therefore, they are fully qualified ground Forward Air 

Controllers as well as FACAs. Naval aviators could serve a year with the 

Army in a ground FAC billet and return to their squadron without having 

to attend aircraft refresher training. Their presence would help explain the 

nuances associated with employing naval aviation to Army officers. 

Seasoned Army helicopter pilots trained as ground FACs would 

arguably require less training effort than enlisted soldiers and Airmen 

undergoing initial JTAC certification. Marine and Navy aircrew, rotarywing and fixed-wing, are certified forward air controllers after they 

complete a three week training course conducted by Expeditionary 

Warfare Training Group Atlantic / Pacific. Since the Army routinely 

sources liaison officers to higher headquarters, it would make sense to 

qualify the liaison officers as ground FACs within the process and thereby 

eliminating helicopter squadrons from losing an additional pilot. 

5. Establish airborne extensions of the TAGS. 

Battlefield command and control is the glue that enables land forces 

and air forces to achieve operational and strategic effect. The now 

decommissioned Airborne Battlefield Command Control Center (ABCCC) 

was designed for this mission and employed specifically trained C2 

specialists to operate as an airborne extension of the ASOC. The extensive 

communications suite, combined with the specifically trained Airmen 

within the EC-130 platform, enabled the ABCCC to fulfill a critical niche 

in coordinating air with land force maneuver. AWACS and JSTARS 

crews now perform this mission, but their performance in filling the 

airborne battlefield command and control niche in addition to their 

primary duties was marginal during OEF and OIF. Mission specific 

platforms like AWACS and JSTARS were not designed for battlefield 

management and are deficient in the communications suite and aircrew 

training to perform air battle management in addition to their primary 

missions.113 This combined with the time and effort to manage the sensor 

66
 

suite aboard both platforms limits the controller’s ability to gain and 

maintain battlefield situational awareness. 

The potential for tactical fighter crews to operate as “air-ground battle 

managers” entrusted with specific C2 authority should be explored. Twoseat Marine FA-18D squadrons perform this mission and their success 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom is well documented.114 FACA qualified 

A-10 and F-16 pilots operating throughout the depth of the battlespace 

coordinated by F-15E “air battle managers” may be a suitable alternative 

to the loss of the ABCCC capability. On board systems like Link 16 would 

be a force multiplier in coordinating their efforts with JSTARS and 

AWACS and would establish a flexible, layered, and redundant battlefield 

management system. 

This aircraft / crew combination could be made even more versatile if 

the crew obtained the AFAC qualification as a prerequisite to gaining a 

qualification in “air-ground battle management” or “TAC / AFAC 

manager.” Strike Eagles performing these roles while actually seeing and 

hearing the battle unfold may prove to be an effective air battle manager 

“gap filler.” 

Command and Control elements like the ASOC, AWACS, JSTARS, 

and Marine DASC should have joint representation. Land force and air 

force expertise must be represented in order to institutionalize the trust 

between the components. Perhaps nowhere is this more important than the 

Air Support Operations Center, the agency that is responsible for ensuring 

air and ground forces are best used for operational effect. If JSTARS 

continues to assume the mission of the former ABCCC, it too will have to 

be a representation of institutionalized joint interdependence. Operation 

Iraqi Freedom has proven the merits of manning the C2 nodes that by their 

nature span service specific command elements. Command and control 

elements like AWACS, JSTARS, and the 1st Marine Division’s DASC 

were manned with liaison officers from other services with great 

success.115 But at best, this is an ad-hoc approach. Achieving 

interdependence will require a critical evaluation of what service 

command and control nodes should be manned on a permanent basis with 

joint representation. 

To be effective on the maneuver oriented battlefields of the future, 

joint command and control elements should permanently incorporate 

personnel that represent the land and air forces. Liaison officers 

temporarily assigned to fulfill these roles do not form the lasting 

relationships between services that are required to build effective teams. 

At a minimum, the ASOC, DASC, JSTARS, and AWACS should be 

studied to evaluate what billets can be manned by permanent joint service 

67
 

equivalent qualifications. Additionally, the joint billets should be 

evaluated to determine which one should rate joint credit. 

The Army should consider training attack helicopter pilots as 

Airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACAs), to operate as “airborne 

extensions” of the JTACs and BAE. The idea of training Army aviators as 

FACAs and ground FACs is foreign to most in the Army and will largely 

serve to re-orient the soldier with his aviation supporting arm and vice 

versa. Considering Army aviation as an air maneuver element “...is 

probably a mistake, and providing FAC capability to helicopter units a nobrainer."116 Heliborne FACAs should be qualified at calling in and 

adjusting artillery in addition to controlling the attacks of fixed-wing 

aircraft similar to Marine heliborne FACA and should be certified under 

the Joint FACA syllabus. The “heliborne” FACA could serve as a link 

between Army’s artillery forward observers and be qualified as a “JTAC 

light” or a “Joint Fires Observer” operating as a “disaggregated JTAC” as 

described by Bruce Pirnie and Alan Vick in Beyond Close Air Support.117 

There will be a personnel bill associated with qualifying Army aviators as 

FACAs and ground FACs that will require ‘top down’ leadership. But the 

Army’s transformation plan and the joint interdependence initiative should 

not stop with the Army and the Air Force. Including Naval aviation will 

help alleviate the manning dilemma faced by the Air Force. Additionally, 

to free up multi-mission fighters to be more relevant on the battlefield, the 

Air Force must take a hard look at Cold War legacy missions that are 

perhaps more suited for single mission platforms like long range bombers. 

6. Train F-15E squadrons in the FACA mission. 

The Air Force should consider training F-15E squadrons to the 

FACA mission. The F-15E is a platform that is ideally suited for the 

FAC(A) mission because of its “two-seat design (reduced task load on 

pilot, greater overall focus on mission by pilot / WSO team), advanced 

avionics (synthetic aperture radar, latest generation target pods, LINK-16 

Fighter Data Link), extended loiter time, and large, very flexible, 

munitions payload.”118 The background paper referenced details the 

training syllabus, time required to certify crews, and the cost benefit 

analysis of this initiative, while acknowledging that a re-prioritization / 

reduction of the F-15E community’s current mission set will be required. 

The F-16 and the A-10 are currently the only squadrons that are 

qualified as FACAs in the Air Force. Granting this qualification to the 

Strike Eagle will increase the number of squadrons capable of filling 

requests for forces requiring FACA mission qualifications and / or 

increase the density of FACAs available to coordinate air for the deep 

battle. The author’s own experience during OIF validates the two seat 

68
 

concept as a force multiplier for the very dynamic and high task loading 

FACA mission. As this concept matures, corps commanders and 

CJFACCs will come to trust and eventually rely upon FACA crews to 

facilitate the deep battle in a way that transcends the old CAS versus 

interdiction argument. Additionally, the two-man crew has the potential to 

be more capable as a “super FACA,” whereby it assumes a battle manager 

or super SCAR role for the corps / CFACC in the deep battle. As 

demonstrated during OIF, there is a requirement for an entity to bridge the 

gap between the brigade / division close battle and the corps’ deep battle 

and the JFACC’s interdiction responsibilities. Ironically, the Air Force is 

the only service that does not use a two-seat aircraft in this role. 

The potential for Strike Eagle crews to operate as “air-ground 

battle managers” or “TAC/FACA managers” entrusted with specific C2 

authority as an extension of the TACP, BAE, and Air Support Operations 

Center may fill the airborne battle manager gap left by the ABCCC. This 

is not an initiative to turn the Strike Eagle into a “communications relay” 

platform. On the contrary, this aircraft / crew combination is unique in the 

Air Force and will lend significant firepower and situational awareness to 

the battlefield and aviators flying over it. Strike Eagles performing these 

roles while actually seeing and hearing the battle unfold may prove to be 

more effective than the ABCCC that traditionally operated as a 

communications relay at some distance from the battle. 

7. Ensure joint representation over the joint battlefield. 

Command and Control elements like the ASOC, AWACS, JSTARS, 

and Marine DASC should have joint representation. Land force and air 

force expertise must be represented in order to institutionalize the trust 

between the components. Perhaps nowhere is this more important than the 

Air Support Operations Center, the agency that is responsible for ensuring 

air and ground forces are best used for operational effect. If JSTARS 

continues to assume the mission of the former ABCCC it too will have to 

be a representation of institutionalized joint interdependence. Operation 

Iraqi Freedom has proven the merits of manning the C2 nodes that by their 

nature span service specific command elements. Command and control 

elements like AWACS, JSTARS, and the 1st Marine Division’s DASC 

were manned with liaison officers from other services with great 

success.119 But at best, this is an ad-hoc approach. Achieving 

interdependence will require a critical evaluation of what service 

command and control nodes should be manned on a permanent basis with 

joint representation. 

To be effective on the maneuver oriented battlefields of the future, 

joint command and control elements should permanently incorporate 

69
 

personnel that represent the land and air forces. Liaison officers 

temporarily assigned to fulfill these roles do not form the lasting 

relationships between services that are required to build effective teams. 

At a minimum, the ASOC, DASC, JSTARS, and AWACS should be 

studied to evaluate what billets can be manned by permanent joint service 

equivalent qualifications. Additionally, the joint billets should be 

evaluated to determine which one should rate joint credit. 

8. “Weaponize” the ASOC.

The Air Combat Command’s (ACC) draft ASOC Enabling 

Concept proposes significant revisions for the ASOC organization and 

training in order to better support the Army’s modular Brigade Combat 

Team construct.120 These efforts are far reaching and promise to bring 

meaningful changes to the Air Force’s ability to better integrate aviation 

fires with traditional ground maneuver forces and non-traditional forces 

like Special Operations Task Forces. However, more can be done. 

The most significant challenge facing the Air Force in 

accomplishing the ASOC enabling concept will admittedly be the 

training.121 It is in this area that the draft enabling concept falls short. 

The Air Force should leverage the initiative to “weaponize” the Air 

Operations Center into a training and manning construct for the ASOC to 

support the modular Army. These should be a top to bottom review of the 

billets, to include the Air Force Specialty Codes of the individuals 

manning the operations side of the ASOC and those billets that support the 

maneuver units of the Army that are manned by Air Force personnel 

(JTACs, ALOs). 

The personnel manning the ASOC should be “weaponized” by 

rounding out the officers and enlisted ASOC force structure so they form a 

professional and specialized command and control career field. This 

would enable the ASOC to retain an institutional memory concerning the 

lessons of past conflicts as normal personnel rotations take place. Tour 

lengths should be a minimum of three years, which would also prevent the 

ASOCs from becoming an organization that comes together prior to a 

deployment, sometimes in an ad-hoc manner, depending upon the timing 

and unit deployment schedule of the Army unit to which it will be 

attached. Career aspirations can be enhanced for the ASOC specialist by 

affording him the opportunity to command the Air Support Operations 

Squadron and the Air Support Operations Group. The billets filled by 

rated Air Force aviators and JTACs that formally man the ASOC could 

then be used to help alleviate the shortage of ALOs and JTACs. This 

manning solution should also include Army C2 specialists capable of 

integrating helicopter operations with that of fixed-wing aviation. 

70
 

Another proposal worth pursing would be changing the operational 

control of the ALOs and JTACs assigned to the Army. The ASOC 

organization should remain operationally controlled by the numbered air 

forces and the AOC. However, manning ASOCs by C2 specialists allows 

the ALOs assigned to the corps and below to be assigned under the 

operational control of the Army headquarters to which they are assigned. 

This will enable them to devote their full effort to becoming a permanent 

member of the ground commander’s staff enhancing the ALO’s ability to 

plan, coordinate airpower, and ultimately educate the commander on the 

employment of airpower. Airpower experts can then build the bonds with 

their Army counterparts to enhance air / ground cooperation while 

preserving the tenets of a single air component commander-centralized 

command, decentralized execution. 

Personnel 

1. Modify rated aviator career progression.

Army and Air Force aviator training and career progression to 

paths should be changed so as to institutionalize joint interdependence. 

The current two year tour out of the cockpit assignment for Air Force 

ALOs makes it difficult for Air Force aviators to maintain a competitive 

edge with those remaining in the cockpit. Because this process makes it 

difficult to get ‘volunteers,’ squadrons are forced to send those that are 

‘expendable.’ The Air Force, along with the Navy and Army, should 

examine the ramifications of sourcing Officer TAC / ALO billets for 12-

18 months, aligned with the brigade’s deployment cycle (see figure 9). 

The columns represent a typical aviator career path between the three 

services indicated. The “ALO” note after the years indicated under the 

Air Force column indicates where an ALO captain or ALO major is 

normally selected. The middle column indicates the timing during a 

Marine aviator’s career where he can expect to serve as a Ground Forward 

Air Controller or Air Officer with an infantry unit in a billet capacity 

commensurate with his rank and experience. A typical Marine captain 

interested in career progression will either attend career school or take a 

Ground Forward Air Controller billet after he has served about three years 

in his first operational squadron.122 Both are considered career enhancing 

and both equate to roughly the same amount of time out of the cockpit. 

However, given two aviators with similar records, one with career level 

school and one with a Ground Forward Air Controller tour, the one with 

the ground tour will be more competitive. 

71
 

Typical Career Aviator Progresión: USAF VS USMC VS USA* 

 USAF USMC USA

GO 23-26 years 26+ years 26+ years 

CO Wing /Group/Reg 20-21 24-26 23-26 

Ops officer / CO Sqn/Bn 17-20 18-21 18-21 

Staff 14-16 15-18 Air Officer (Div) 14-16 

Squadron / Bn Staff 12-14 ALO 11-15 Air Officer (Reg) 12-14 

ACSC 10-12 10-12 10-12 

Company Command NA NA 5-7 

Company grade school 6-8 6-8 4-5 

UPT to squadron 2-11 ALO 3-10 GFAC (Bn) 2-4 

Figure 9. Comparison of Aviator Career Progression Across the 

Services 

*(These numbers represent an average career track for an aviator in 

each service and are by no means scientific. The ranges indicated were 

determined from speaking to members of each service and only indicate a 

consensus of opinion.) 

Expanding this concept to the Army / Air Force / Navy would gain 

the same benefits. For example, company grade officers completing their 

first three years in a squadron can either attend career level school or 

complete a one year assignment with the Army as a BALO dual qualified 

as a JTAC. Officers selected for these billets should be considered 

‘promotable’ and possess sufficient credentials to earn a seat at the Air 

Force weapons school or, in case of the Army, be considered for company 

command. This would entice aviators to look at the land service from a 

different perspective. The intended benefit would be that the squadron 

would get more pilots with ground experience and the infantry commander 

would get quality aviation experts. The quick turn out of the cockpit will 

lesson the impact of the current two year tours, particularly for captains 

completing their first tour. 

Air Force and / or Navy ALOs should be selected based upon their 

ability to represent the issues surrounding airpower and above all else their 

ability for career advancement. Their return to a flying billet after their 

12-18 months should be a guarantee so cross pollination among the 

ground and aviation communities is achieved. Nominees for ground tours 

should be closely screened to ensure they have potential to return to their 

squadron capable of attending the Fighter Weapons School or its 

equivalent. This process would ensure the “trainers” get a well rounded 

experience of specific ground and aviation experience. Of course, 

implementing this assignment policy would be a significant career path 

72
 

shift for the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. Top down leadership would 

be required to ensure its success. This recommendation helps ease the 

shortage of Air Force pilots required to fully man the ALO and ASOC 

positions let alone the increase requirements to support the Army’s 

transformation plan. 

2. Increase the number of aircrew qualified as a FACAs.

Shortfalls in sourcing current TAC requirements accurately predict 

the problems with sourcing more TACs, as required by the Army’s 

transformation plan. “Disaggregating” some TAC functions to qualified 

Army enlisted controllers, properly networked and coordinated, and 

qualifying Army helicopter pilots as FACAs is just one solution.123 

Additionally, expanding the FACA mission to the Strike Eagle and the 

Army attack helicopter communities increases rotary-wing-fixed-wing 

integration as each community requires the other to act as “training” aides 

in order to achieve FACA qualifications. This in turn would force 

improved working relationships between the Army and the Air Force as 

they schedule more routine training evolutions designed for mutual 

qualification. This “cross-certification” could occur at informally 

arranged small-scale upgrade flights or during large force exercises. 

Unit Level Training 

We must transition from an interoperable to an interdependent force 

where different capability sets can be rapidly integrated to achieve desired 

effects. Innovative operations concepts, training, and experimentation 

along with a focus on team-work are key to success.124

One should not count on a very great effect from air support until air units 

had trained extensively with ground forces. 

 Gen George S. Patton 

1. Reestablish the trust. 

The only way to engender the trust required to make joint 

interdependence for air ground operations work is through joint training 

specifically designed to score air-ground interaction. The two largest 

training exercises held at the National Training Center and Red Flag are 

the first places to start. These exercises, along with the smaller and 

service specific exercises, like the Navy’s Air Wing Fallon exercise and 

the Marine Corps’ Combined Arms Exercises, must be part of the overall 

joint training picture to ensure seamless interaction among the services 

while still accomplishing service specific mission performance standards. 

73
 

There are elements of each of the exercises above that can be modified 

without jeopardizing service culture or effectiveness while nurturing trust 

and teaching the very important lessons of air and ground operations. 

The National Training Center (NTC) has traditionally served as 

training venue for a helicopter supported mechanized maneuver force 

against a living, breathing, mechanized opposition force.125 It was 

specifically designed to test brigade and corps level application of current 

Army doctrine. All fires are simulated, allowing commanders to test their 

planning and decision making criteria as the battle unfolds. A common 

complaint heard among Air Force leaders is that it is not designed to test 

the impact fixed-wing air would have upon a mechanized force before it 

came within range of corps level organic fires.126 As structured, the 

exercise gives credit to Apaches and ATACMS for the destruction of 

enemy forces but does not give credit to fixed-wing interdiction as the 

opposition closes with range of the Corps / Brigade fires. NTC does not 

test the ground component commander’s planning considerations and 

opportunity costs associated with fire support control measures that may 

enhance the use of organic fire support agencies at the exclusion of 

another. Lastly, NTC exercises do not test the understanding of one 

service’s knowledge of the other service’s core missions. 

RED FLAG exercises can be considered the opposite of NTC 

exercises. They are designed to replicate the opening days of a war and 

are centered on those missions the CJFACC will be tasked to conduct to 

establish air superiority among others. Red Flags are an air centered 

exercise focusing on large force employment at the tactical level of war. 

To a limited extent, they also exercise the Air Operation Center’s ability to 

control. Red Flag exercises have evolved to where they incorporate a 

larger percentage of CAS, SCAR, and FACA, but these missions are not 

conducted in coordination with ground maneuver and organic fires such as 

attack helicopters and the Army Tactical Missile System. Testing the air 

apportionment process (strategy) and sortie allocation (plans) in 

coordination with organic maneuver unit fires does not occur. Killbox 

operations are part of the exercise but are absent the frictions associated 

with the injection of ground maneuver forces. Effectiveness of supporting 

commander’s intent or grading the performance of Air Liaison Officers, 

JTACs, and the ASOC are beyond the scope of the exercise. Recent 

changes have instituted FACA and SCAR control of air operations in 

killboxes short of the FSCL and also include elements of the Air Support 

Operations Center. 

Combined Arms Exercises (CAX) are designed to train and test 

Marines in the integration of air and surface fires at the battalion level in 

74
 

the form of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Much smaller in 

scope than NTC exercises they are an air-ground exercise utilizing live 

fire against a notional enemy based upon a building block approach. 

There is a heavy focus on close air support in conjunction with artillery 

and mortar indirect fire supporting blue force maneuver. Each CAX 

consists of the four elements that make up a MAGTF-a ground combat 

element, air combat element, combat service support element, and a 

command element. The Fire Support Coordination Center and the Direct 

Air Support Center’s ability to integrate aviation and organic fire support 

with the ground scheme of maneuver is evaluated and critiqued through a 

number of scripted, short duration exercises designed to test fires 

coordination in the offense, and defense under different enemy scenarios. 

This is the critical part of CAX training. Not only are the ground units and 

aviation units trained to specific objectives, but the DASC and the fire 

support coordination center are trained and tested in their execution of the 

command and control of air in concert with maneuver during each and 

every CAX training event. 

CAX training is much smaller in scope as compared to NTC and 

Red Flag. Though CAXs offer limited fixed-wing aviation value beyond 

close air support and the employment of live munitions the training 

evolutions provide a tremendous value in enabling infantry, aviation and 

command and control to interact personally on a daily basis. This 

interaction pays huge dividends in the development of air and ground 

leaders in the mutually enabling effects of air and land power. 

A sub element to the CAXs is the Weapons and Tactics Instructor 

course hosted twice a year by Marine Aviation and Weapons Training 

Squadron-One in Yuma, Arizona. Elements of the MAGTF are brought 

together to “train the trainer” in the employment of all aviation elements 

of the MAGTF, fixed and rotary aviation employment, and command and 

control. Graduates of the course return to their squadrons to become 

training officers. 

Air Wing Fallon training exercises are the Navy’s version of Red 

Flag Exercises. The exercises are focused on a crawl, walk, run approach 

that gradually integrates all elements of the carrier air wing similarly 

focused on the first days of a campaign. It consists of scenarios that span 

the mission width and breadth of those capabilities resident in a carrier air 

wing. Like the Red Flag exercises, they practice elements of ground 

support but only at the terminal attack controller level and do not exercise 

75
 

their ability to integrate with a coordination center like the ASOC or 

DASC. There is no integration with the Air Wing with organic ground 

fires or ground maneuver. 

2. Tailor joint interdependent training. 

 Tailoring elements of each of the service’s training exercises can 

make significant improvements to the joint training of CFACC aviation. 

These are listed below: 

a. The close proximity of Fort Irwin, Nellis AFB, 29 Palms, Navy Fallon, 

and WTI at Yuma Marine Corps Air Station offers unique opportunities to 

align service-specific training opportunities so that portions of each 

exercise overlaps to test joint integration when ever possible. Joint Forces 

Command should coordinate this effort. 

b. The National Training Center at Ft Irwin should evolve into a true joint 

exercise structured to test joint learning objectives centered on employing 

air and ground capability for mutually enabling effects. Recognizing the 

fact that armor and attack helicopters still need to train against a strong 

opposition force, NTC can be restructured to test the integration of fixedwing fires and ATACMS in a deep battle, and then the exercise can be 

reset to test the closer battle and the integration of artillery, close combat 

attack, and close air support against the “reconstituted” opposition. 

c. NTC exercises should highlight Joint Air Attack Tactics for rotary-wing 

and fixed-wing operations as a cornerstone element of the close battle. 

The complexities of JAAT necessitate frequent exposure to the nuances of 

putting all of the moving parts of JAAT together so that it becomes second 

nature during time of war. 

d. A joint schoolhouse or joint weapons school should be chartered and 

tailored to “train the trainers” in planning and employing interdependent 

capabilities like rotary-wing and fixed-wing aviation. Army aviation does 

not currently have a “weapons school” designed for the development of 

training officers that is equivalent to the Air Force’s Weapons School, 

Navy’s Top Gun, or the Marine Corps’ WTI program. As the primary end 

user of fixed-wing aviation the Army should take the lead in developing 

such a school in conjunction with service partners. 

As shown above, although there is a significant training investment 

being made by the services to prepare America’s forces for combat, most 

of the investment only exercises service-specific training goals. Many of 

the exercises are joint, but they are not focused to evaluate joint 

interdependence. By taking a joint interdependent approach, perhaps 

76
 

coordinated through Joint Forces Command, they can achieve the 

interdependence envisioned by the service chiefs. 

77
 

Conclusion 

The only thing we learn from history is that we don’t. 

- Unknown 

-

Ultimately, the last question remaining to be answered is “so 

what?” If nothing is done to institutionalize a culture of 

interdependence—or more specifically, not institutionalize the lessons of 

the current conflict and the ones that preceded it—the services will do 

what they have always done and ultimately use the spirit of cooperation 

and the strength of personal relationships to compensate for doctrinal 

frictions and organizational seams by working things out real time in a 

conflict. After all, under the Title 10 responsibilities for each of the 

services, the service chiefs are responsible for the organization, training, 

and equipping of their components for the joint commander, not to ensure 

they are interdependent. 

Therefore, my answer to the “so what?” question is that in the next 

war the Joint Force Commander may not have the opportunity to fix the 

problems of non-interdependent forces, exemplified through redundant 

and overlapping service capability, before the inefficiencies of increased 

casualties and lengthier campaigns have a negative strategic effect upon 

the democracy that we serve. Operation Anaconda is just one example 

where throwing more airpower into a poorly planned, non-interdependent 

operation was the wartime equivalent to sending good money after bad.127

Addressing the issues to reduce the areas of friction and close the 

seams between the land forces and the air forces that are outlined in this 

paper cannot be left up to the services alone to implement. Title 10 

“deconfliction” must give way to interdependent doctrine, force structure, 

training exercises, and personnel policies. It will require a top down “31 

Initiatives” like approach; but this time it must be carried through to 

fruition. However, the inter-war periods of the last 60 years prove that the 

service components have so far been incapable of such a feat. Therefore, 

developing a culture of interdependence will require much bottom up and 

top down leadership and will have associated costs. But such joint 

leadership from the service chiefs is necessary if these problems are to be 

resolved. 

If we continue along our current track of applying incremental changes 

that move us closer to interdependence without ever achieving it, our costs 

will be in the form of higher casualties, longer time, more money, and 

perhaps, ultimately, failure of the campaign. All indications are that under 

the Department of Defense’s transformation plan these inefficiencies of 

78
 

the past will no longer be able to be compensated for with overlapping and 

redundant service capability. Excess capacity is becoming a scarce 

commodity. Implementing interdependence will be expensive but only in 

terms of money. Perhaps the most plentiful resource our democracy 

possesses. 

Experience over the past 60 years proves we know what the problems 

are. It also proves we know what the answers are. But these past six 

decades demonstrate that joint interdependence for air and ground 

operations is elusive. Perhaps this experience is best characterized 

mathematically. Following each conflict the land forces and the air forces 

recognize the deficiency. While their intentions are good, their steps only 

move them halfway towards a solution. Though progress is made for each 

step taken, they never arrive at their desired goal. There is always half the 

distance between the lessons learned of the last war and solutions to 

prevent their being re-learning during the next. Therefore, my only 

“unanswerable” question is: “why do we still have the problem?” 

79
 

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80
 

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Monmeyer, General William W.(Retired) Airpower in Three Wars 

(WWII, Korea, Vietnam), U.S. Government Printing Office, 

Washington, D.C. 1978. 

Moseley, General Michael, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM by the Numbers, 

30 April, 2003. 

Ohno, Taiichi, Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale 

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Ohnno, Taiichi, Just In Time: For Today and Tomorrow. Cambridge, Ma. 

Productivity Press, 1986. 

Paparone, Colonel Christopher, Crupi, PhD James A, What is Joint 

interdependence Anyway? Military Review July-August 2004. 

Pirnie, Bruce R., et al. Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New AirGround Partnership, Santa Monica, CA.: The RAND Corporation, 

2005. 

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrated Fire 

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Roberts, Lt Col Lawrence R.; Farnam Maj John P. “Airborne Recon 

Supported Marines’ Advances in Iraq” USNI Proceedings, (June 

2004), 42-44. 

Schmidle, Brigadier General Robert E., “Distributed Operations: From the 

Sea.” In Marine Corps Gazette, (July 2004), 37-41. 

Spires, David N., Air Power For Patton’s Army: The XIX Tactical Air 

Command in the Second World War, Washington, D. C.: Air Force 

History and Museums Program, 2002. 

84
 

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10 Nov 1999. On-line. Internet, 18 Feb 2004. Available from 

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United States Central Command Air Forces, Kuwait CFLCC Air 

Component Coordination Element (K-ACCE) Operation Iraqi 

Freedom After Action Report, 28 April 2003. 

West, F. J. Bing, “Maneuver Warfare: It Worked in Iraq,” Naval Institute 

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86
 

Endnotes 

 

1

 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, “Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support,” 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force), 1990. 

John Schlight, “Help From Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army 1946-

1973,” (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program), 2003. 

Benjamin Lambeth, Airpower Against Terrorism: America's Conduct of Operation 

Enduring Freedom. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.), 2005. 

Robert F. Futrell, “The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953” (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force), 1983. 

Bruce Pirnie et al., “Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air Ground Partnership,” 

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.), 2005. 

2

 Col Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army, and James A. Crupi, Ph. D. “What is Joint 

interdependence Anyway?” Military Review, July-August 2004. p. 38. 3

 Richard L. Kugler et al., “Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations,” 

(Washington D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National 

Defense University) 8 September, 2003. See page 6 Key Lessons. They are: 1. Joint 

forces must continue to improve efforts to create unity of command, joint command 

structures, forward-deployed joint staffs, and joint planning processes for expeditionary 

operations. 2. Accurate intelligences estimates, well-constructed battle plans, and jointly 

prepared branches and sequels (adaptive plans), which continue to be critical for 

successful joint combat operations with small mobile forces, remain a necessity. 3. U.S. 

Joint forces need improvements in conducting integrated air-ground operations in such 

battles. Improvements are needed in creating a common understanding of joint force 

employment concepts, establishing effective information networks and joint 

communications systems, as well as in ensuring appropriate command and control of air 

strikes in support of ground force operations. 4. U.S. forces in battle require adequate 

mission orders, rules of engagement (ROE), and associated fire restrictions that give clear 

guidance and exert proper controls while providing force commanders the authority and 

latitude to execute their missions. 5. Joint forces must be fully equipped and jointly 

trained for impending combat operations and (to the extent possible) unanticipated 

surprises. Multilateral operations with allies must be well construed. Joint forces must 

understand the implications for training, equipping, and operating forces. 6. Defense 

transformation should be pursued with joint operations, as well as mastering the airground interaction down to the tactical level, clearly in mind-including the areas of 

materiel and nonmaterial solutions as well as joint training transformation. 4

 General T. Michael Moseley, “Future of the Air Force,” Speech, to the American 

Enterprise Institute, November 2005. 

5

 LtGen James N. Mattis, comments are as recollected by the author and confirmed 

accurate via email confirmation with LtGen Mattis. 15 November 2005. 6

 LtGen T. Michael Moseley, Commander USCENTAF Shaw AFB. Task Force 

Enduring Look Interview transcript, 25 June 2005. This transcript details the personal 

commitment of the CFACC to keep the preponderance of Marine Aviation supporting I 

MEF through the use of a Direct Support ATO. LtGen Moseley stated his commitment 

to supporting the MEF with all available Joint Assets like AWACS, JSTARS and RIVET 

JOINT. In return I MEF provided a Colonel to head up the joint CAS planning effort at 

the CFACC. At the end of hostilities (May 2003) the 3rd MAW commander expressed his 

gratitude to General Moseley by presenting him an enlisted sword to commemorate the 

superb support the USAF provided to the MEF. The enlisted sword symbolized the many 

87
 

 

Marines that were undoubtedly saved by coalition airpower. This is in stark contrast with 

the wary cooperation between the Marine aviators and the Air Force leadership leading 

up to the war. 

7

 Dr. Rebecca Grant. The details of this meeting between General Moseley and the 

leadership of the MEF were captured in an interview of General Moseley conducted by 

Dr. Grant. Transcript of the interview was the basis for Dr. Grant’s article 600 Days. Air 

Force Historical Research Agency, TFEL. Interview conducted 24 July 2003. 8

 LtCol Lawrence R. Roberts and John P. Farnam, USMC “Airborne Recon Supported 

Marines’ Advances in Iraq” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jun 2004, p.45. 9

See Killbox Interdiction / CAS Debrief. USCENTAF. Majors Greg Skidder Defore, and 

Mike ‘Homey’ Cedarholm. 

10 Major Mark Tobin. Interview conducted by the author 20 Jan 2006. Major Tobin was 

a member of Marine Air Support Squadron One, tasked with providing DASC capability 

for Task Force Tarawa and the British 1st UK Division. 11 Col David Larivee USAF. CFACC Briefing to USAFE, his notes from the brief. 5 

May 2003. Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell, AFB. Montgomery 

Alabama. 

12 Ibid. 

13 “Corps CAS” was a non-doctrinal term developed by V Corps to use air to work in the 

area between the division’s forward boundary and the FSCL. Aircraft schedule for this 

mission fell under the apportionment guidance for “CAS.” Actually, these Corps CAS 

sorties should be apportioned as AI even though they were planned to be employed short 

of the FSCL. 

14 Cassidy, Major Robert M. Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Battle.

Military Review. July-August 2003 p. 42. 15 http://call.army.smil.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch12.asp, Issue: Corps shaping 

versus combined air operations center air interdiction for deep shaping operations. 16 http://call.army.smil.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch12.asp: See Topic B- Fire 

Support Coordination and Control Measures 

17 USCENTCOM KI/CAS CONOPS, US Air Force Historical Research Center. 09 Feb 

2003. p5. 

18 http://call.army.smil.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch12.asp: See Topic B- Fire 

Support Coordination and Control Measures 

1919 LtCol Lawrence R. Roberts and John P. Farnam, USMC “Airborne Recon Supported 

Marines’ Advances in Iraq” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jun 2004, p.45. See also, 

Killbox Interdiction / CAS Debrief. USCENTAF. Majors Greg “Skidder” Defore, and 

Mike “Homey” Cederholm, 5 May 2003. The reaction of Iraqi ground forces in response 

to the rapid advances of the US ground forces necessitated a more reactive targeting 

process than that provided by JSTARS and UAV’s. This requirement was largely filled 

by SCAR and FACA aircrew operating in the deep battle attacking targets based upon the 

ground commander’s target priorities. The 72 hour targeting cycle could not keep pace 

with the ground operation. 

20 See MACG-38 LL ID# 2003IPOS2291, Issue #260 04/27/2003. In this role the liaison 

officers provided a “clearing house” function aboard AWACS between the DASC, 

TAOC, JSTARS Air Support Elements. The daily average of V Corps Sorties pushed to 

the I MEF was 150-225 per day, totaling 5600 additional sorties in support of I MEF. 21 Major Mark Tobin, USMC. He was assigned to Air Support Element (a sub-element 

of the DASC) for Task Force Tarawa. Email to author 7 Dec 2005. 

88
 

 

22 LtCol Lawrence R. Roberts and John P. Farnam, USMC “Airborne Recon Supported 

Marines’ Advances in Iraq” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jun 2004, p.45. 23 Quoted in Col Howard D. Belote, “Counterinsurgency Airpower—The View From 

Baghdad.” 25 May 2005. 

 p.10. Unpublished paper. Comment made by COL Michael Formica, “Black Jack” 

Brigade Commander and is as quoted in the paper. Col Belote is the Commander of the 

3rd Air Support Operations Group Fort Hood Texas. He serves as the III Corps Air 

Liaison Officer a position held in Baghdad from September 2004-February 2005. 

24 Maj Gen Keith Stalder, USMC. Former 3rdMAW commander and Commander 

Training and Education Command, Quantico Va. Interviewed by author 15 Sep 2005. 

25 Col David Larivee, briefing notes on CFACC briefing to USAFE. 5 May 2003. “DASC 

out produced the ASOC” TFEL US Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, 

Montgomery, Al. 

See also Rebecca Grant’s article titled “Marine Air in the Mainstream.” Air Force 

Magazine Online, vol. 87, no. 6 June 2004, pp. 1-11 26 Cristopher R. Paparone, COL, USA James A. Crupi, Ph.D. “What is Joint 

interdependence Any Way?” Military Review, July-August 2004, p. 39. 27 Major Mark Tobin, Operations Officer for Marine Air Support Squadron-1. email to 

author 8 Dec 2005 

28 See MCLL, MACG-38 LL ID# 2003IPOS2291, Issue #260 04/27/2003. 

30 LtGen Michael Short (Retired). Interviewed by the author 01Sept 2005. 

31 David N. Spires, Air Power for Patton’s Army: The History of the XIX Tactical Air 

Command in World War Two. (Washington, DC. 2002) Air Force History Program, p. 

46. 

32 David N. Spires, Air Power for Patton’s Army: The XIX Tactical Air Command in the 

Second World War. (Washington, DC. 2002) Air Force History and Museums Program. 

P. viii. 

33 Benjamin Franklin Coolie, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. 

(Washington, DC Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1990). p. 542. 34 Ibid, p. 543. 

35 The Army calls helicopter attack aviation in support of the ground forces close combat 

attack. The DOD Dictionary defines close air support as: “air action by fixed- and rotarywing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that 

require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those 

forces” [emphasis added]. Close combat attack versus close air support, what is the 

difference? As defined by FM 3-04.111 close combat attack (CCA) is “the application of 

Army aviation into the close battle using integrated air-ground operations.” Joint 

doctrine does not recognize the term close combat attack. As attack helicopter aviation 

moves into the emotional and highly fought over mission of close air support, it must be 

done in a way that recognizes the mutually enabling characteristics of rotary-wing and 

fixed-wing in the close air support role. 

36 Bruce R. Pirnie, et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground 

Partnership, (Santa Monica, CA. The RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 55. 

See also LtGen T Michael Moseley. Commander USCENTAF Interview conducted by 

Rebecca Grant on behalf of Task Force Enduring Look, USAF Historical Research 

Center, Shaw AFB, 25 June 2005. 

89
 

 

See Center for Army Lessons Learned website, 

http://call.armylsmil.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch5.asp: Helicopter Operations in the 

Offense. All three references detail the ramifications of operating attack helicopters 

during deep shaping operations. 

37 Bruce R. Pirnie, et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground 

Partnership, (Santa Monica, CA.: the RAND Corporation, 2005), pg. 27. Their point is 

US Airpower superiority will cause enemy forces to disperse and or hug civilian 

population. 

38 Majors Greg Defore, Mike Cederholm. TFEL, US CENTAF KI/CAS Debrief, 5 May 

2003. US Air Force Historical Research Institute. Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, AL. 

39 Ibid 

40 David N. Spires, Air Power For Patton’s Army: The XIX Tactical Air Command in the 

Second World War, (Washington, D. C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

2002). See chapter 2. 

41 Ibid, p.18. 

42 LtGen James N. Mattis, Commanding General of Task Force 58 during Operation 

Enduring Freedom, Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. Email correspondence between the author and LtGen Mattis, 14 Nov 

2005. 

43 Colonel Brad Mason, USA, US Army Attack Helicopters and US Air Force 

Expeditionary Forces: Implications for Future Military Operations. Occasional Paper 

No. 22, Center For Strategy and Technology. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 

Jun 2001), p. 7. 

44 Colonel Allen Raymond USA, Colonel Gene Smith USA Faculty members, Army War 

College. Phone interview with author 7 Nov 05. 

45 Close Combat Attack is a term used only by the US Army. The DOD definition for 

CAS includes “rotary-wing aircraft.” 

46 See Benjamin Lambeth Airpower Against Terrorism: America's conduct of Operation 

Enduring Freedom. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.), 2005. Operation Anaconda 

during OEF and the Battle of Najaf during OIF I demonstrate the vulnerability of attack 

helicopters operating forward of friendly positions. 47Cassidy, Major Robert M. “Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the Close Battle.” 

Military Review. July-August 2003 p. 42. 48Ibid., p. 42

49 http://call.army.smil.mil/products.aar.asp.3IDAAR/ch5.asp 50 Brief given by US Army Aviation Doctrine Division Fort Rucker Al. Comments made 

during question and answer period following a briefing to AWC students on Aviation 

Transformation. Briefing attended by the author 17 Sep 2005. 

51 LtGen T. Michael Moseley. Interview with Dr. Rebecca Grant, TFEL, USAF Research 

Center, Maxwell AFB, 25 June 2005 

52 : http://call.army.smil.mil/products.aar.asp.3IDAAR/ch5.asp 53 Alan Vick, co-author of Beyond Close Air Support. Email correspondence to the author 

21 Sep 2005. “The seamless integration of attack helos and fast movers by the USMC 

was especially impressive to me. When we briefed this work [Beyond Close Air Support] 

to Marine aviators on the joint staff their reaction was generally along the lines of "It sure 

took you USAF and Army guys long to figure this out.” 

54 Colonel Howard D. Belote. “Counterinsurgency Airpower-The View from Baghdad 

May” 2005. Unpublished article. 

90
 

 

55 Ibid. 

56 FM 3-04.111 Draft. US Army Aviation Doctrine Command, Fort Rucker Alabama. 

57 See “Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations.” Richard L. Kugler, Michael 

Baranick, and Hans Binnendijk. Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 

National Defense University. September 8, 2003. See Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

http://call.army.smil.mil/products.aar.asp.3IDAAR/ch5.asp Also see Beyond Close Air 

Support; Forging a New Air Ground Partnership Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan Vick, Adam 

Grissom, Karl P. Mueller, David T. Orletsky. 2005 Rand Corporation 58 King, Grady LTC. Army Aviation Doctrine Command. Interview conducted 17 Sep 

2005 by the author. 

59 : http://call.army.smil.mil/products.aar.asp.3IDAAR/ch5.asp 60 : Ibid. 

61 : Ibid. This discussion was over the placement of the FSCL. Division wanted it about 

30km from their forward lines, Corps placed it on average 100km deep. 62 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/f/02070.html 63 http://call.army.smil.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch12.asp See topic B-Fire Support 

Coordination and Control Measures. 

64 Ibid. See also Task Force Enduring Look, Volume II “Operation Iraqi Freedom: 

Shaping the Battlespace and Decisive Operations.” 19 March-30 April 2003. HQUSAF, 

March 2004. USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Pg. 2-34-35. 65 Ibid. 

66 JP 3-09.3 Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support, p. GL-10. 67 For a detailed analysis of the FSCL debate see LtCol R. Kent Laughbaum, USAF 

“Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle.” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education), January, 1999. p. 16. 68 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrated Fire Support in the 

Battlespace, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), October 2004, p. 62. 69 Ibid p. 64 

70 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrated Fire Support in the 

Battlespace, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), October 2004, 

Pg. 62 

71 Bruce R. Pirnie, et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground 

Partnership, (Santa Monica, CA.: the RAND Corporation, 2005), p.83 72 http://call.army.smil.mil/products/aar/asp/3IDAAR/ch12.asp, See also Task Force 

Enduring Look, Volume II “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Shaping the Battlespace and 

Decisive Operations.” 19 March-30 April 2003. HQUSAF, March 2004. USAF 

Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Pg. 2-34-35. 

73 Majors Greg Skidder, Mike Cederholm. US CENTAF Lessons Learned debrief. 5 May 

2003. V Corps’ requirement was for one FACA to support 24/7 coverage. 

74 Major Mark Tobin, USMC. He was assigned to Air Support Element (a sub-element 

of the DASC) for Task Force Tarawa. Personal interview with the author 14 Dec 2005. 75 Ohno, Taiichi. Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production. 

Productivity Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. p.5. It was a process of “planning parts 

backwards” from the finished product, in this case it was CAS aircraft on station. 76 General Peter Pace, USMC. “The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff.” Joint 

Forces Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st Quarter 2006. p 3. 

91
 

 

77 HQ USAF / XOOY brief, TACP/ASOC Integration With Modular Army 26 Oct 05 78 HQ USAF / XOOY brief, TACP/ASOC Integration With Modular Army 26 Oct 05 79 The Air Force is currently studying significant changes to the ASOC organization 

described in this chapter. However, this is the ASOC that supported V Corps although it 

was augmented with additional personnel for OIF. The proposed changes to the ASOC 

organization and will address billet qualifications, training standards and propose a new 

organizational structure to better support the Army’s transformation plan. However, it 

will largely retain its current functionality. 

80 Joint Firepower Course Student Workbook, Nellis AFB. C2-06, Page 4 

81 Col Howard D. Belote, CC of 3 ASOG, Fort Hood Texas. Phone conversation with the 

author 5 December 2005. Master Sergeant Brian Brock, Langley AFB. Phone call with 

the author 18 October 2005 

82 Col Howard D. Belote. Phone conversation with the author, 5 December 2005. 83 Col Belote. 

84 See Air Force Instruction 13-112, Terminal Attack Controller Training Program, 28 

September 2005. 

85 Col Howard D. Belote. Phone conversation with the author, 5 December 2005. 

87 This “unwritten” personnel policy was supported by multiple USAF sources that I 

interviewed. LtGen Michael Short USAF (RET), LtCol Brian Fujimoto, former 

personnel assignment officer Air Force Personnel Center, to reference just two. 88 Col. Belote. 

89 Lt Gen Short. During my interview with General Short he was forcefully advocating 

that the Army needs to get over their desire to always request the A-10 over other CAS 

capable platforms. The Army should be asking for an “effect” not a platform. “They 

have to get over the misconception that effective CAS can only be delivered by a lowflying A-10.” He used the following comparison: “F-16’s employing laser guided 

munitions with a Lightning pod from 15,000’ can deliver the same CAS effect as an A-10 

from lower altitudes.” 

90 Col. Belote. However, Col Belote has observed a reversal in this trend over the past 

couple of years, mostly attributed to the GWOT and a genuine desire for Air Force 

officers to control airpower for the Army in combat. 

91 Statement made to the author by an Air Force officer following a discussion of why the 

Air Force personnel system does institutionalize career incentives for those serving in 

ALO tours. 

92 Col Belote. Phone conversation with the author, 15 Dec 2005 

93 Col Belote. Phone conversation with the author, 15 Dec 2005. According to Col Belote 

it takes at least six months to fully prepare an Air Force ALO / JTAC for operations with 

the Army. See also 18 ASOG AAR commander’s comments, posted on CENTAF 

website. 

94 Major Mark Tobin, email to the author 9 Dec 2005. Major Tobin was a member of 

Marine Air Support Squadron -1 the squadron assigned to augment the 1st Marine 

Division DASC (organized and manned by 3rd MAW control group personnel) by 

forming two Air Support Elements during OIF. 

95 The Marine Corps will soon begin training its own JTACs in order to meet the 

demands of Distributed Operations. However, Marine JTACs will not supplant the 

requirement to train the traditional number of ground FACs and AOs. 

92
 

 

96 The author’s experience while in attendance at the Air War College. There is a 

common trend among the Air Force senior leadership guest speakers to speak of the 

Army’s senior leadership lack of airpower understanding. 

97 Col Howard D. Belote, CC of 3rd ASOG and III Corps ALO during Sep04-Feb 05. This 

quote was a compilation of responses he received from ground force commanders at the 

battalion and brigade level when asked their opinion on the quality of CAS received by 

the JFACC. 

98 General Peter Pace, USMC. ChAirman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “The 16th

ChAirman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff.” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st Quarter 

2006. p 2. 

99 Bruce R. Pirnie, et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground 

Partnership, (Santa Monica, CA.: the RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 82. 100 FM 3-09.34 Multi Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Kill Box 

Employment. Air Land Sea Application Center. June 2005. Also see CFCD-OP-A. 

Head Quarters Combined Forces Command, Killbox Operations-Korea. 101 Ibid, pp II-4,5 102 CFCD-OP-A. Head Quarters Combined Forces Command, Killbox Operations-Korea. 103 Col Howard D. Belote. 104 FM 90-21 JAAT: Multi Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operation. Air 

Land Sea Application Center, June 1998, p 1-1. 

105 FM 90-21 JAAT: Multi Service Procedures for Joint Air Attack Team Operation. Air 

Land Sea Application Center, June 1998, p 1-1. 

106 Draft Army Publication TC 1-400 FDFD dated 13 May 2005, Headquarters Army 

Aviation Center, Fort Rucker Alabama. p. 1-1. 

107 Typical LNO was sent at the last minute, thereby creating ‘ad-hoc’ relationship. He 

was considered “expendable” and therefore did not represent the battalion well from 

which he came. 

108 LtCol Grady King, USA. Army Aviation Doctrine Command, Fort Rucker Al. 

Interviewed by the author 17 September, 2005. 

109 Brigade Aviation Element Overview. Powerpoint brief given at Army Aviation 

Doctrine Center, Fort Rucker Al. 17 Sept, 2005. Brief attended by the author. 

110 CMSgt Brian Brock, USAF Air Combat Command, A3YC Langley AFB. Interviewed 

by author, 20 September 2005. Chief Brock is a certified JTAC and is in charge JTAC 

training in the USAF. His observations of JTAC training includes monitoring the 

progress of enlisted and officer JTAC training. He said that rated aircrew require fewer 

controls to certify than their enlisted counterparts. On average Marine Cobra pilots 

became certified in similar time and effort as fixed-wing fighter pilots. On average, 

enlisted JTACs under training took the longest since they had minimal radio experience 

and were less experienced overall than their rated aviator counterparts. The disparity of 

training time for a young enlisted JTAC with only a few months in the Air Force 

compared to a rated aviator with typically 5-6 years of experience is a compelling 

comparison that lends weight to training qualified Air Force, Navy and Army aviators to 

this skill set. 

111 See TACP/ASOC Integration with Modular Army brief give by Major Robert Nelson, 

HQ USAFE/XOOY, 26 October 2005. The brief proposes aligning ASOCs with the 

Army Forces Generation Cycle. Essentially, each Army brigade is on a three-year cycle. 

Reset-retrain first year, ready for deployment second year, available for deployment third 

year, cycle repeats. Aligning ALO / JTAC assignments and ASOC standup with this 

93
 

 

process will better incorporate a “team” mindset and alleviate the often ad-hoc 

procedures the current process causes. 

112 Col Howard D. Belote, Commander, 3 ASOG, Fort Hood Texas. Phone conversation 

with the author 5 December 2005. Air Force ALOs and enlisted JTACs require up to six 

months of Army acclimatization before they can be considered proficient and familiar 

with Army operations. 

113 Colonel Mick Cantrall USAF. Col Cantrell is a C2 specialist that was the commander 

of a JSTARS squadron aircraft during OIF. He remarked that the JSTARS crews have 

difficulty managing the airborne battlefield command, control, and communication 

tasking simultaneously with the battlefield sensors aboard the aircraft. Radio limitations 

combined with managing sensors and battlefield situation understanding became very 

difficult. 

113 Colonel John Terrell, USA, US Army War College. Email conversation with the 

author, 7 Nov 2005. 

114 LtCol Lawrence R. Roberts and John P. Farnam, USMC “Airborne Recon Supported 

Marines’ Advances in Iraq” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jun 2004, p.45. 115 Colonel Mick Cantrall USAF. 116 Colonel John Terrell, USA, US Army War College. Email conversation with the 

author, 7 Nov 2005

117 Beyond Close Air Support; Forging a New Air Ground Partnership Bruce R. Pirnie, et 

al., (Santa Monica, CA.: the RAND Corporation, 2005). p. 154. 

118 Col Kenneth Laughbaum, CC of 48th Operations Group, Mildenhall, England. 

Background Paper on F-15E Forward Air Controller (Airborne) Mission at the 48th

Fighter Wing, Mildenhall, England. Paper emailed to the author 2 December 2005 by 48th

OG Commander. 

119 Colonel Mick Cantrall USAF. 120 Headquarters Air Force ACC/A3YC Draft ASOC Enabling Concept, undated 2005. p. 

1. 

121 Ibid, p.3. 122 The process by which these officers are selected is not scientific. A typical squadron 

will have to fill about two-three ground FAC billets during a year. Candidates have the 

option of volunteering or are selected based upon their time on station and reputation / 

ability to represent Marine Aviation. Their normally return to the parent unit of the 

squadron the previously served and then are considered for placement and training as a 

training officer the most coveted billet for a junior officer in a squadron. 123 Bruce R. Pirnie, et al., Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground 

Partnership, (Santa Monica, CA.: the RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 27. 124 General Peter Pace, USMC, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “The 16th

Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 40, 1st Quarter 

2006. p 3. 

125 For years NTC operated in this manner. However, NTC was recently changed to 

replicate current conditions in Iraq focusing on urban operations and stability and support 

operations. 

126 LtGen Michael Short, USAF (RET). Interviewed by the author 15 Sept 2005. 127 Ben Lambeth, Franklin Cooling, Robert F. Futrell, John Schlight, Bruce Purnie. 

94