Defense

and air forces reorganized for “more rapidly responsive, scalable,

modular task-organized units, capable of independent combat action as well as integration into larger joint and combined operations”2 sometime after 2006. How the bureaucratic politics of

service-centric operational thinking and single-service modernization will produce this outcome is unclear.

This statement also begs the question, why wait until 2006

to build joint warfighting capabilities with today’s forces and

technologies when the United States needs—and can achieve—

these capabilities now to protect its global interests? Experience

in the private sector demonstrates that successful corporations

do not plan to transform in the distant future; they transform

constantly, just as the world around them transforms. Military

transformation is a process, not an end-state that depends on exotic technologies that may not be available for decades. America

can lose its position of military dominance only by standing still

and investing in the past.

Rethinking Transformation

Transformation—defined as change in the structure of command, control, training, readiness, doctrine, technology, and organization for combat—can produce short-term economies and increased capability well before 2006. Transformation can be phased in

now through continuous adaptation, using today’s forces and technology with reform and reorganization that will result in significant

Overview

We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of

unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be won 

in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will go under.

—General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, 

while serving as Chief of Staff, 1931

The Bush administration took office amid high hopes for the

fundamental transformation of the Armed Forces. Yet within

months, the problem that transformation was designed to solve—

changing a large, expensive Industrial Age structure, especially

the Army, into a leaner, more strategically agile Information Age

force—receded as more pressing issues arose. Instead of being

transformed, Cold War military structures will remain unchanged

for the time being, while morale and quality of life are shored up.

Into this policy vacuum, military leaders have tossed an expensive

collection of wish lists that tend to one of two extremes: a bigger,

faster, better version of some platform already in use, or something out of science fiction with delivery timelines that stretch all

the way to 2032.1 Although these modernization programs are

billed as promoting transformation, they are business as usual.

Fortunately, this is not the whole story. Help may be on the

way. The terms of reference for the current Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) anticipate the emergence of new ground, naval,

September 2001 Defense Horizons 1

Resurrecting Transformation

for the Post-Industrial Era

by Douglas A. Macgregor

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

The National Defense University established the Center for Technology and National Security Policy in June 2001 to study the implications of technological innovation

for U.S. national security policy and military planning. The center combines scientific and technical assessments with analyses of current strategic and defense

policy issues. Its major initial areas of focus include: (1) technologies and concepts that encourage and/or enable the transformation of the Armed Forces, 

(2) developments by defense laboratories, (3) investments in research, development, and acquisition and improvements to their processes, (4) relationships among

the Department of Defense, the industrial sector, and academe, and (5) social science techniques that enhance the detection and prevention of conflict. The staff is

led by two senior analysts who will hold the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy and the Edison Chair of Science and Technology and who can call on the

expertise of the university community and colleagues at institutions nationwide. The papers published in the Defense Horizons series present key research and

analysis conducted by the center and its associate members.

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

SEPTEMBER 2001

Number 2

Horizons
improvements in the quality of life and morale, as well as the fighting power of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

The Bush administration needs a unifying strategic vision for

the post-Industrial Age that can drive transformation. The first step

requires recognizing that the two-major theater war(MTW) capability strategy based on known threats, doctrines, and orders of battle

no longer applies. The second step requires developing a new strategic formula for the use of American military power that is neither

scenario-dependent nor based on service-centric concepts and

structures designed to deploy masses of men and materiel; the focus

must be on critical warfighting capabilities.

Dramatic advances in technology and 10 years of experience

point the way to a paradigm shift in warfare that will reshape the

structure of American military power through the integration of

ground, naval, and air forces within a joint, network-centric system

of warfare. To cope with the new strategic environment, a new operational paradigm based on air, space, missile, and information power

must emerge long before 2006 to support military operations scaled

to meet the requirements of any contingency exactly as envisioned

by the Secretary of Defense in the context of the QDR. At the same

time, a fresh approach to American military strategy and the employment of American military power is needed—an approach that

buttresses the stability of key states around the world, preserves

American access to critical bases and infrastructure, and operates to

prevent regional crises and conflict rather than react to them.

These points raise a host of questions. What conclusions can be

drawn about the direction of the Bush administration’s strategic review process and its impact on transformation? What are the strategic implications of review recommendations? And, finally, how can

the Bush administration move from the implications for change in

strategy, structure, and jointness, derived from the strategic review

process, to implementation of real transformation?

These are big questions, but transformation, strategy, jointness, and, strange as it may seem, readiness, are inextricably intertwined. Otherwise, transformation is reduced to a service-centric,

Industrial Age quest for a new armored vehicle, ship, or airplane

that can transform warfare, as the rifled musket and the machine

gun are thought to have done. That approach would miss the real

promise of the Information Age—the potential for revolutionary

change and transformation through the integration of critical military capabilities across service lines.

Where Is Transformation Headed?

In his speech at The Citadel on September 23, 1999, thenGovernor George W. Bush promised to begin an immediate, comprehensive review of the American military—the structure of its forces,

the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement—conducted by a leadership team under the Secretary of Defense. Bush

also noted that he wanted to move beyond marginal improvements to

replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies and

exploit the opportunity to skip a generation of technology. Shortly after being appointed Secretary of Defense in early 2001, Donald

Rumsfeld used this guidance to create dozens of panels to study a

range of security issues. The reviews ended in June 2001, and administration leanings on the criticality of jointness to transformation

are discernible from the results that have been released.

General James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.), who led a panel on

transformation, presented recommendations on June 12, 2001, that

highlighted the concept of multiservice early-entry “Global Joint Response Forces.” According to McCarthy, these forces would combine

units from different services as tailorable force modules that train

and exercise together and build on common building blocks: command-and-control systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, space-based assets, and joint logistics capabilities. Though few details on the structure of such a force were

provided, McCarthy stressed that the panel was not talking about a

new force, but how to organize, exercise, and train the existing

forces and what capabilities to give them.3

RAND analyst David Gompert led the panel on America’s conventional forces. He echoed McCarthy’s recommendations when he

told reporters in a June 22 briefing that all joint units must be “ready,

rapidly deployable, and employable; tailorable for [a] range of operations; easily integrated and networked; [and] supportable despite

distance and dispersion.”

4 When asked about transformation initiatives during testimony in Congress in June, Secretary Rumsfeld listed

“rapidly deployable standing joint forces” as part of a new approach to

handling military operations in both the near and long term.5

Why is this important? For the first time in recent history, a toplevel defense review did not focus on what used to be the outputs of

defense planning: carrier battlegroups, fighter wings, army divisions,

and marine expeditionary forces. Instead, the defense review posed

the vital question: What are the capabilities that a joint force commander needs today and will need in the future? Asking this question

in the context of defense planning converted the traditional outputs

of defense planning to inputs and equated the results of defense

planning with the capabilities provided to a joint task force (JTF)

pursuing an operational mission. In theory, this overturns the unstated World War II-era assumption (despite the Goldwater-Nichols

Act of 1986) that developing tactical capabilities and conducting operations remain a purely service function. In this sense, the implications are profound for American defense policy and the administration’s subtle advocacy for change.

If implemented as outlined by the panel in its published recommendations, JTFs would become the order of the day. Command

at the three-star level and above would become joint. Service Title 10

functions would be modified to focus exclusively on organizing,

training, and equipping for specific joint roles and missions versus

current service missions. The services would then provide the JTF

building blocks or force modules based on the core competencies of

each branch.

2 Defense Horizons September 2001

Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, USA, is a senior military fellow in the Institute

for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He may be

contacted at (202) 685–2371 or macgregord@ndu.edu.

The author is indebted to Robert Worley, Fred Kagan, Steve Scroggs,VADM

Arthur Cebrowski, USN (Ret.), Steven Daskal, Michael Wood, Price Bingham,

David E. Johnson, and William R. Bode for their advice and suggestions during

the preparation of this paper.
The recommendations also set the stage for legislation to abolish the World War II mode of relatively independent, sequential missions accomplished by service components under a regional

warfighting commander in chief (CINC). This change presumably

would lead to the elimination of single-service, three- and four-star

headquarters that would no longer be required for the command and

control (C2) of joint forces and that otherwise divert needed personnel and financial resources. Finally,

as forces are converted to buildingblock formations for JTFs, the resulting Armed Forces could adopt a

joint rotational readiness base that

would make deployments more predictable and that would identify the

ground, naval, and air forces available at any given time for contingencies. If carried through to its logical end, the new administration’s brand of joint transformation

would end the wasteful practice of pouring billions into the services

to build sufficient capability to compensate for the hopelessly inefficient single-service mode of employment under a weak and inadequate joint command and control structure. All of these measures

could reduce unneeded bureaucratic layers and yield efficiencies

that promise significant resource, dollar, and personnel savings.

However, regardless of the national military strategy, the services will oppose change that does not give their core competencies

due appreciation in defense planning and spending.6 Although the

Goldwater-Nichols Act was supposed to address this problem, so

many single-service headquarters and control structures survived the

process (on the grounds that joint organizations had yet to demonstrate success) that enormous and expensive redundancies remain.

Now that the conceptual groundwork has been laid, the issue is

how to maintain the current readiness of the Armed Forces to conduct operations while transformation is implemented through

changes in organization, doctrine, and technology. 

From Implications to Implementation

As reported in the press,7 the new national military strategy establishes four objectives: to assure friends and allies, dissuade future

adversaries, deter threats and counter coercion, and defeat adversaries if deterrence fails. To these strategic tenets must be added the

administration’s reported willingness to scrap the scenario-based

two-MTW requirement that has driven U.S. military strategy since

the end of the Cold War and to replace it with a one-war-plus policy.

These elegantly formulated tenets of national military strategy

provide neither a formula that translates theoretical goals into attainable strategic military objectives nor guidelines for sizing or employing the force. The problem is not hard to fathom. The absence of

Soviet tank armies poised to invade allied territory on short notice

complicates matters. Only North Korea fields a force designed to attack on short notice, and this force is rapidly declining in capability

and strength. In the meantime, a complex range of threats to American and allied interests is emerging that no single service can address. Accounting for this inability is the fact that future state and

nonstate actors will possess not only some form of weapon of mass destruction but also a limited supply of precision-guided munitions,

modern air defense technology, and access to electronic intelligence

and satellite imagery provided by third powers. (This is why theater

and national missile defense must be seen as part of a broader joint

transformation strategy.) In sum, a broader range of enemies armed

with new mixes of technologies—some Industrial and some Information Age capabilities—will confront the Armed Forces. Adversaries

do not require the ability to defeat those forces, only to frustrate their

employment in some way.

Whatever strategic framework the administration adopts, it

will have certain, unavoidable core

features because it must link the

raw military capability to dominate

the strategic landscape to those

areas of the world where economic

progress and political stability directly benefit American and allied

security. If defense planners will stop trying to predict the future,

they will be able to identify straightforward requirements for America’s military:

■ The Armed Forces must be able to intervene militarily and fight in

areas where the United States and its allies have no presence but have either declared strategic interests that are threatened or a real political stake

in the outcome.

■ They must also maintain an overseas military presence on land, at

sea, and in the air in pivotal states or regions to ensure that the United

States and its allies can either influence or become involved in crises or

fight in conflicts that directly impinge on strategic interests.

This means selectively using JTFs in war and peace to buttress

the stability of key states, primarily around the Eurasian periphery,

the Middle East, and North Africa and operating to prevent regional

crises and conflicts rather than reacting to them. (This regional focus takes into consideration that the rest of the world either is

friendly toward the American people or can present no significant resistance to American military power.) In terms of force design and

employment, the implications for military transformation of this peripheral strategy are clear:

■ JTFs will need highly mobile, rapidly deployable forces-in-being.

These forces must be structured for interoperability within an evolving joint

framework to incorporate and exploit new technology on a continuous basis.

■ Some portion of the ground, naval, and air forces will be forward deployed in key states to preserve American access to critical infrastructure so

that the United States can project military power inland. Forward-deployed

forces provide tangible evidence of American commitment and a link to the

larger strategic power of the United States. In the absence of large forces

poised to attack our allies, fewer forces will be needed in a forward-deployed

posture than previously, which presents the opportunity to reduce, though

not eliminate, expensive overseas garrisons.

What military power remains—the bulk of the Armed Forces—

must be capable of moving rapidly from widely dispersed staging areas overseas and within the continental United States, deploying

into crisis or conflict and initiating offensive operations, all without

pausing. Organizing these ground, naval, and air forces into specialized modules of combat power on rotational readiness so that they

can rapidly assemble into joint task forces is vital.

The 1999 Kosovo crisis illustrates the need for rapidly deployable, ready ground forces to integrate seamlessly into the global

September 2001 Defense Horizons 3

JTFs will need highly mobile,

rapidly deployable forces-inbeing. These forces must be

structured for interoperability
Army Combat 

Forces

Marine Expeditionary 

Forces

Air Force 

Expeditionary Forces

Pre-Deployment 

Training Phase 

Service Control

Army formations 

smaller than divisions, 

larger than brigades

Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade + 3 Marine 

Expeditionary Units

AEF elements

Reconstitution Phase 

Service Control

Army formations 

smaller than divisions, 

larger than brigades

Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade + 3 Marine 

Expeditionary Units

AEF elements

Deployment Phase 

Joint Control

Army formations 

smaller than divisions, 

larger than brigades

Marine Expeditionary 

Brigade + 3 Marine 

Expeditionary Units

Navy Expeditionary 

Forces

Surface combat 

groups, carriers, etc.

Surface combat 

groups, carriers, etc.

Surface combat 

groups, carriers, etc.

AEF elements

6-month phases in an 18-month cycle

Joint Readiness Deployment Cycle

4 Defense Horizons September 2001

strike capabilities that American air, missile, information, and space

power make possible, both to exploit their potential and to guarantee

the safety of the deployed American and allied ground forces. If technology can be exploited to create the conditions for an Inchon-style

operation wherever strikes are concentrated, the development of a

new structure for readiness and training that is inherently joint is

critical. One way to pursue this goal is to treat the forces under service control as a pool of capability

packages and place them into a

joint rotational readiness structure.

This is different from the notion of standing JTFs that would

permanently control large numbers

of forces normally under service

command and control. A glance at

the military organization chart during the Cold War explains why. At

the top was the National Command

Authorities, below which were the

CINCs, then the service component

four-star headquarters, then the three-star numbered Army corps,

fleets, marine expeditionary, and air force headquarters. Below

these were the above-the-line forces such as Army divisions and Air

Force fighter wings. Today, nothing has changed at the top, but the

bottom layer has contracted, which implies greater sharing of the

forces by the same number of higher echelon headquarters.

Clearly, the echelons need to be reduced, but replacing them

with standing JTFs that permanently control the shrunken forces at

the bottom may not be the answer. For example, the two JTFs or

global joint response forces suggested by Gompert would have to be

designed for the full range of missions, from an Operation Desert

Storm to an Operation Sea Angel. This seems unworkable and would

limit flexibility.

Instead, reconfiguring existing single service three- and four-star

headquarters to U.S. Joint Force Command modules and assigning

them to joint command and control in the regional warfighting commands could provide the assets from which the CINCs can establish

operational JTF command structures to command these forces. The

JTFs could be established on the basis of specific mission requirements,

albeit much more rapidly and effectively than is the case today. This

arrangement also avoids the complicated and unrewarding interservice

squabbling associated with the establishment of any one-size-fits-all

JTF headquarters.

The approach outlined here

preserves today’s forces that deploy

and fight by creating a larger, predictable pool of ready, available

ground, naval, and air forces on rotational readiness. These forces

can be rapidly deployed to regional commands with a combination of

strategic air and fast sealift to arrive in strategically pivotal regions

“before the peace is lost.” This approach is vital to the readiness of today’s forces while routine joint experimentation and modernization

are conducted. It also promises to reduce personnel tempo and make

deployments and costs more predictable. A possible structure could

resemble the following:

what military power remains—

the bulk of the Armed Forces—

must be capable of moving

rapidly . . . deploying into

crisis or conflict and initiating

offensive operations, all

without pausing
Training cycle (6 months): Unit and individual training is conducted under service control.

Deployment cycle (6 months): Units are ready for deployment to

joint command and control and become part of the pool that responds

to major theater of war missions, crises, peace support operations, or

whatever mission the National Command Authorities assign.

Reconstitution cycle (6 months): Unit returns to home station

for refitting, modernization (if required), and leave.

Clearly, this structure also facilitates regular joint training of

the forces that are likely to be committed within the readiness windows and makes the commitment of the Armed Forces more comprehensible to the National Command Authorities. Perhaps more important, it allows more humane treatment of the soldiers, sailors,

marines, and airmen who must deploy on a routine basis.

Transforming Concepts and Organization

Secretary Rumsfeld insists that new joint operational concepts

are the keys to both transformation and rationalizing defense. But

what is a joint operational concept,

and how does one develop? A joint

operational concept involves the integration of service core tactical capabilities on the operational level to

achieve unity of purpose and action

in the conduct of military operations. American naval aviators in the

interwar period developed new operational concepts when they experimented with the employment of carrier-based aviation to reverse the

striking and supporting roles of battleships and aircraft carriers. In

fact, American naval tactics evolved throughout World War II, and by

1945 no category of warship except minesweepers was employed for

the purpose for which it originally had been built.

Studies of European and American forces during the interwar

period suggest a pattern of transformation that is still relevant today:

■ A new operational concept

■ A new doctrine and organization to execute the concept that increases fighting power

■ A new joint operational architecture to integrate the technologies of

ground, naval, and air warfare

■ A new approach to modernization, education, training, and readiness.

To this pattern must be added the corollaries that information

processes are also sources of combat power and should drive organizational design for combat and that warfighting systems must evolve

along with concepts and organizations; the current pace of technological development is so fast that static organizational thinking is

impossible. Adaptive structures for the continuous incorporation of

new technologies to provide new capabilities are essential.

The current integration of strike and maneuver assets linked

through a nodal architecture empowered by new terrestrial and

space-based communications is the foundation for a new joint operational concept with enormous potential, but few people are sure

how it would work in a purely joint setting. However, effects-based

operations, which originated in the naval and air forces, present an

opportunity to demonstrate the integrative nature of joint networkcentric warfare in action.

The concept of creating effects to achieve a specific politicalmilitary objective is inherently joint and network-centric; the

ground, naval, and air forces involved must be interconnected or netted to be effective. This condition makes it imperative that all parts

of the joint force see the same picture of the battlespace and that

whatever one part knows is available to the whole force.8 To transform how enemy ground forces are attacked in the future, the United

States must exploit its unique and unprecedented airborne ground

surveillance and precision-targeting capabilities by jointly detecting,

tracking, and targeting a moving or dispersed enemy with ever-increasing speed and precision throughout a large area. This creates

an immensely powerful joint warfighting synergy by enabling a joint

commander to orchestrate ground, naval, and air forces to achieve

effects that complement each other dynamically at the operational

and tactical levels of war. The collection, processing, analysis, fusion,

and dissemination of information must be addressed in a joint operational setting as new technologies

compress events in time and space.

New joint operational concepts

and structures that integrate diverse

service capabilities require a new

joint operational architecture to be

effective because this architecture

breathes life into the concept in two

ways. First, it creates a new set of

command relationships that are different from today’s World War II

legacy single-service warfighting C2

structure. This set of command relationships provides the C2 elements from which CINCs constitute joint task forces. Second, it

drives the services to organize their core capabilities into specialized

modules of mission-focused combat power that can be integrated as

required into JTFs. The first point requires change on the operational level to supplant the multitude of single-service component

commands at home and overseas with joint command and control elements from which JTFs can be constituted. The second point 

requires change on the tactical level to achieve the interoperability

essential to joint operations.

For the naval and air services, grouping forces to become mission-focused capability packages within a joint network-centric

framework is easier than it sounds. Operational thinking in the naval

and air forces is converging on ways to exploit jointly the global reconnaissance-strike complex. The Air Force plan to establish 10 Air

Expeditionary Forces is a critical step in this direction. Air Force

strike packages evolve in response to the required mission and target set. The Navy is accustomed to assembling ships into task forces

for specific missions. While new naval platforms are designed and

built for strike and maneuver operations in the littoral, existing platforms can be equipped and employed differently to provide the capabilities JTF commanders require.

September 2001 Defense Horizons 5

new joint operational

concepts and structures that

integrate diverse service

capabilities require a new

joint operational architecture

to be effective
Future Major 

Regional 

Contingency: 

Respond in 30 days with 

43,600 troops that deploy 

combat capability equal to 

or greater than VII Corps

I

II

XXXX

XXX

XX

X

Major Regional 

Contingency: 

Desert Storm 120+ days to 

move VII Corps (110,000 

troops)

I

II

The Industrial Age Army deployed mass,...

but the Information Age Army must deploy capability

Army 

Headquarters Army Corps

Headquarters

(Joint Capable) Army Division

Headquarters

(Joint Plugs)

Brigade

Headquarters Maneuver Task

Force Battalion

Company / Team

Company / Team

Joint Task 

Force

Army 

Combat Group

Maneuver Task 

Force Battalion

Transforming the Army for Joint Operations

capable of decisive maneuver operations, the Yugoslav forces were

never compelled to mass and present the target array Allied air

forces sought.

General George C. Marshall’s vision and structure for expanding efficiently from an army of 200,000 to one that would grow to

more than 6 million are a legacy of Henry Ford’s assembly line and

cannot remain the Army organization for combat or institutional

strategy today. The contemporary organization for combat and concepts of warfare were developed when theater missile defense, deep

strike operations, JTFs, and real-time information sharing did not

exist. New missions for today’s ground forces that were either unknown or unanticipated 50 years ago make institutional and organizational change imperative. Without fundamental reorganization

and reform of the Army’s warfighting structure, the Army cannot

integrate its ground maneuver formations around and through

massed precision strikes from joint ground, naval, and air forces to

seize the positional advantage in future war.

Summoning the will to transform the whole Army for the future

requires recognizing that the most brilliant victories are not those

that cost the most blood or are achieved with the crushing weight of

numbers but those that are won by surprise, joint strike, and maneuver to paralyze the enemy. This capability cannot be attained if the

Army attempts transformation in isolation from the other services,

nor can it transform by re-equipping the old division-based World War

II force with new platforms whether they are wheeled or tracked.

In recent months, the idea of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade

(MEB) has reemerged. It is, in effect, a specialized module of combat power capable of deploying a force of 5,000 or more marines

quickly and sustaining combat over a wider area than the 2,000-man

Marine Expeditionary Unit can. The MEB is scalable in size and can

execute independent missions within JTFs but without the long deployment timelines for a larger Marine Expeditionary Force—the

Marine equivalent of an Army corps.9

In sum, scaling and equipping naval and air forces for integration into a plug-and-play joint operational architecture may entail

modifications in communications and procedures to facilitate joint

interoperability, but these actions will not necessitate dramatic organizational change. For the Army, however, the challenge of integration for joint interoperability has proved thus far insurmountable.

Recent history provides plenty of evidence for why change in

the American structure for and thinking about warfare is needed

now. In contrast to the German attack on France that split the

French and British forces by maneuver through and around enemy

forces to reach the English Channel, Army ground forces in the Gulf

War were slowly and deliberately deployed against Iraq’s strength,

the Republican Guard Corps. The opportunity to exploit the paralysis achieved in the opening days of the air campaign was lost, and the

strategic realities of Baghdad’s regional influence did not change.

During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Army and the Air Force were

unable to overcome the single-service nature of American warfare.

Because they did not face a robust Allied combat force on the ground

6 Defense Horizons September 2001
Only structural and organizational change and new institutional

policies will cure this problem.

Without structural and organizational change, thinking is unlikely to change, nor will the substance of the future joint force. Until all of the Armed Forces begin to operate differently with existing

assets, the parameters of modernization will not change, unneeded

equipment sets cannot be eliminated, and new requirements will not

be identified. The Armed Forces must emulate successful businesses

by incorporating some new technologies, rejecting others, adapting

practices and structures, narrowing or broadening activities—all in

response to changing conditions.

Defense officials cite the transformational power of the German

Army’s operational concept of blitzkrieg as an example for U.S. forces

to follow. They note that while only 10–15 percent of Germany’s interwar military establishment was actually reorganized and

reequipped for this new concept of warfare, the effect was dramatic.10

However, the comparison should

be extended. The United States is not

converting a horse-drawn 19th-century

Army into a 20th-century force equipped

with combustion engines, aviation

technology, and FM radios. Also,

whereas the Germans were compelled

to develop simultaneously new operational concepts, tactics, and command structures while fielding entirely new sets of equipment, American ships, aircraft, satellites,

tanks, guns, and rockets can support transformation now. Finally,

German transformation was achieved during the Great Depression,

amid political and social turmoil, and in the face of international

criticism, whereas the United States is prosperous, stable, and the

object of international pressure to become more involved militarily

in international developments.

Given these different circumstances, the United States should

take no consolation in the fact that Germany succeeded in transforming only 10–15 percent of its military, an amount that should not

be considered an adequate goal for American efforts. That small portion of Germany’s military was 10 armored divisions—roughly the

size of the U.S. Army today. Moreover, partial transformation ultimately proved disastrous for Germany. The performance of the transformed force could not compensate for the World War I-style infantry

divisions that hampered the German military in Russia.

Winning the Battle of Ideas

Like Rome after the fall of Carthage, America wields supreme

power in the world. But like the victorious Romans, Americans confront new threats and challenges to prosperity and security. America

does not hold the patent on innovative ideas or a monopoly on new

technology. History demonstrates that an early lead in any one area

of military affairs does not convey permanent advantage; Britain introduced the tank in 1916, but Germany exploited it fully.

It is one thing to experiment with a technology or a concept,

however, and quite another to displace existing assets or doctrine to

make way for the new. Efforts at far-reaching change produce powerful resistance. As Niccolo Machiavelli observed, “There is nothing

September 2001 Defense Horizons 7

When applied to land warfare, joint network-centric warfare demands a “dispersed mobile warfare” design that differs radically from

the traditional army, corps, division, and brigade formations of linear

warfare. It requires a transformational design with fewer echelons of

C2 and a faster decision cycle that employs joint sensors forward with

maneuver elements to provide the coverage needed to exploit the

joint potential in the Army’s strike formations, as well as the advanced aviation and ground combat platforms in the Army’s close

combat formations. Maneuver and strike formations are transformed

into nodes of joint combat power—deep, close, or sustaining—that

have the capacity for joint operations on land similar to the operation

of ships at sea.

This necessitates the reorganization of Army forces to become

the mission-focused force packages that provide the building

blocks for the integration of critical Army capabilities into JTFs.

These capabilities range from theater

missile defense assets and rocket artillery to combat maneuver forces and

modern attack helicopters. This

scheme for land power depends on

evolving joint systems and a technical

architecture (a set of building codes)

for successful aggregation.

Reorganizing Army forces for integrated joint operations is essential

because JTFs without powerful ground forces will not control events

in areas of pivotal American strategic interest. Experience shows

that missiles and embargoes can punish governments and societies,

but only ground forces can reach out and fundamentally change

them. Therefore, the question is not whether American dominance

in space, in the air, and at sea can dramatically influence the conduct of all military operations on land as never before. The real question is whether the Army will be compelled to adjust its thinking,

doctrine, and structure to exploit the new strategic reality.

Is Help Really on the Way?

In the Information Age, national military strategy, operational

concepts, and force designs are all inseparable from the creation of

new interdisciplinary teams of armed forces capable of both adaptation and rapid joint employment. This interconnection is why development of forces to operate jointly within a new joint network-centric warfighting structure is vital to transformation. It explains why

simply recapitalizing old warfighting structures will not transform

the way that America fights. Old structures and old thinking are

linked. As Americans in uniform are witnessing the compression of

warfighting operations into a new paradigm of simultaneity, there is

a widening gulf between service transformation programs and transformation at the operational level, which must be joint.

The various service transformation programs, if pursued separately, would tinker on the margins of America’s military status quo

or electrify the horse cavalry, rather than fundamentally reform, reorganize, or change national military capability. The thousands of

junior officers leaving the Army prematurely provide grim testimony

to this fact. They are voting against the status quo with their feet.

missiles and embargoes can

punish governments and

societies, but only ground

forces can reach out and

fundamentally change them
8 Defense Horizons September 2001

that they are not prisoners of the past and that they will not repeat

those mistakes.

Few historical figures have had Theodore Roosevelt’s ability to

recognize changes in the strategic landscape, to conceive the measures necessary for military forces to fight and win in the new environment, and to summon the resolve in himself and others to overcome the inevitable resistance to fundamental change. As America’s

first President of the 20th century,

Roosevelt transformed the Army and

Navy when there was no immediate

threat to American survival. The result was imperfect, but it provided

the foundation for American victory

in two world wars. The question is,

will the first American President of

the 21st century, under similar circumstances, break the deadlock in

defense, resurrect transformation, and convert today’s disjointed

armed services into a truly joint force that can guarantee American

security and influence for the remainder of this century?

Notes1 Fred E. Saalfeld and John F. Petrik, “Disruptive Technologies: A Concept For

Moving Innovative Military Technologies Rapidly to Warfighters,” Armed Forces Journal International (May 2001), 48. 2 Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” The Washington Times,

August 17, 2001, 7. 3 John T. Correll, “Rumsfeld’s Review: The closed-door approach led to problems, and they are not over yet,” Air Force Magazine, July 2001, 2. 4 Nicholas Lemann, “Letter From Washington: Dreaming About War,” The New

Yorker, July 16, 2001, 32.

5 “Joint Operations Reality,” Defense News, July 9–15, 2001, 10. 6 These core competencies include the Navy and Marine Corps’ forward presence around the globe, the Air Force’s global precision strike forces and the Army’s

capacity to seize and hold strategic territory. Elaine M. Grossman, “DOD Is Shaping

Major Review Outcomes Prior to Releasing Strategy,” Inside The Pentagon, June 14,

2001, 1. 7 Thom Shanker, “Defense Chief Will Propose Military Change in Course,” The

New York Times, June 15, 2001, 2. 8 Kenneth Watman, “Global 2000,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 2 (Spring

2001), 76. 9 Christian Lowe, “Marine Corps Resurrects Medium-Weight Force,” Defense

Week, August 20, 2001, 1.

10 Robert Holzer, “Rumsfeld Promises to Shape-Up Pentagon Ways,” Defense

News, June 4–10, 2001, 6. 11 Kenneth Ray Young, The General’s General: The Life and Times of Arthur

MacArthur (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 305–306, 332.

more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a

new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those

who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new.” But difficulty is no excuse for inaction. Transformation is not an option, it is an imperative.

The difficulty of change on the strategic level is what makes the

President’s commitment to transformation so important and difficult. Clearly, the Executive Branch

cannot do this alone. Congress must

also understand the need and sign

on to the policy and plan.

The Nation’s elected representatives are obligated for domestic

political reasons to think about people, bases, and the defense industry.

However, many in Congress would welcome the administration’s lead

if they believed true and comprehensive transformation were a top

priority and were made participants in the process. Since the early

1990s, Congress has sounded a constant theme urging real change

inside the Armed Forces, the Army in particular, during hearings and

private sessions with the Nation’s military leaders because Members

of Congress do not view a smaller Cold War force as either prudent

or affordable for the times. If they saw evidence that they were dealing with true and comprehensive transformation and were not being

asked to support piecemeal reductions in selected defense programs

or preserve today’s forces in an obsolete Cold War configuration,

Members would support administration efforts.

Historic Opportunity

America’s victory over Spain in 1898 marked the beginning of a

new era in world affairs. Overnight, America became a world power.

Realizing that American national security institutions had reached

block obsolescence, President Theodore Roosevelt instructed Secretary of War Elihu Root to devise a new strategy and structure that

would position the United States to play its role in the world as a

great power. Then, as now, American military thinking lagged behind

the technology of war. Then, as now, new thinking and new organizations were required to propel the Nation into the new century.

When the Roosevelt administration bill for Army reform and reorganization came before Congress, many senior officers opposed

Root’s plan to create an Army General Staff, to convert the 25,000-

man Army of cavalry, infantry, and artillery regiments to a force of

100,000 troops and 6 divisions. They asked, “Why change; after all, we

won the Spanish-American War, didn’t we?”

11 Despite the opposition

to change, Roosevelt skillfully maneuvered his bill through Congress,

and within 2 years, Root’s successor, Howard Taft, quietly retired the

bill’s opponents.

America’s military leaders know in principle that obsolete paradigms lead to military disaster. They can cite historical examples

of governments and armies that brought catastrophe on their nations by basing their forces and policies on imperfect or delusional

models of the world. Now they have the opportunity to demonstrate

Defense Horizons is produced by the Publication Directorate of the Institute for National

Strategic Studies (INSS) which publishes books, monographs, and reports on national

security strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy for the National Defense

University. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/

press/ndup2.html. INSS also produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/

jfq_pubs/index.htm.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency

of the Federal Government.

Robert A. Silano William R. Bode George C. Maerz

Director of Publications General Editor, NDU Press Supervisory Editor, NDU Press

without structural and

organizational change,

thinking is unlikely to change,

nor will the substance of the

future joint force