(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

JONES v. FLOWERS ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS 

No. 04–1477. Argued January 17, 2006—Decided April 26, 2006 

Petitioner Jones continued to pay the mortgage on his Arkansas home 

after separating from his wife and moving elsewhere in the same city.

Once the mortgage was paid off, the property taxes—which had been 

paid by the mortgage company—went unpaid, and the property was 

certified as delinquent. Respondent Commissioner of State Lands 

mailed Jones a certified letter at the property’s address, stating that

unless he redeemed the property, it would be subject to public sale in 

two years. Nobody was home to sign for the letter and nobody retrieved it from the post office within 15 days, so it was returned to 

the Commissioner, marked “unclaimed.” Two years later, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in a local newspaper. No 

bids were submitted, so the State negotiated a private sale to respondent Flowers. Before selling the house, the Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones, which was also returned unclaimed. 

Flowers purchased the house and had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the property. It was served on Jones’ daughter, who notified him of the sale. He filed a state-court suit against respondents,

alleging that the Commissioner’s failure to provide adequate notice

resulted in the taking of his property without due process. Granting 

respondents summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Arkansas’ tax sale statute, which sets out the notice procedure used 

here, complied with due process. The State Supreme Court affirmed. 

Held: 

1. When mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, a State 

must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to 

the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to

do so. Pp. 4–12.

(a) This Court has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it 

was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent, 
2 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Syllabus 

see, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 

306, 314, but has never addressed whether due process requires further efforts when the government becomes aware prior to the taking 

that its notice attempt has failed. Most Courts of Appeals and State

Supreme Courts addressing this question have decided that the government must do more in such a case, and many state statutes require more than mailed notice in the first instance. Pp. 4–6. 

(b) The means a State employs to provide notice “must be such as 

one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably

adopt to accomplish it.” Mullane, 399 U. S., at 315. The adequacy of 

a particular form of notice is assessed by balancing the State’s interest against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 314. Here, the evaluation concerns 

the adequacy of notice prior to the State’s extinguishing a property 

owner’s interest in a home. It is unlikely that a person who actually

desired to inform an owner about an impending tax sale of a house 

would do nothing when a certified letter addressed to the owner is returned unclaimed. The sender would ordinarily attempt to resend

the letter, if that is practical, especially given that it concerns the 

important and irreversible prospect of losing a house. The State may 

have made a reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, but it had 

good reason to suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was 

no better off than if no notice had been sent. The government must 

consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless

of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38, 40 

(per curiam), and Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146–147. 

It does not matter that the State in each of those cases was aware of 

the information before it calculated the best way to send notice.

Knowledge that notice was ineffective was one of the “practicalities 

and peculiarities of the case” taken into account, Mullane, supra, at 

314–315, and it should similarly be taken into account in assessing

the adequacy of notice here. The Commissioner and Solicitor General 

correctly note the constitutionality of that a particular notice procedure is assessed ex ante, not post hoc. But if a feature of the State’s 

procedure is that it promptly provides additional information to the

government about the effectiveness of attempted notice, the ex ante 

principle is not contravened by considering what the government

does with that information. None of the Commissioner’s additional 

contentions—that notice was sent to an address that Jones provided

and had a legal obligation to keep updated, that a property owner 

who fails to receive a property tax bill and pay taxes is on inquiry notice that his property is subject to governmental taking, and that 

Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands he left his 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Syllabus 

property would alert him if it was in jeopardy—relieves the State of

its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice. Pp. 7–12.

2. Because additional reasonable steps were available to the State, 

given the circumstances here, the Commissioner’s effort to provide 

notice to Jones was insufficient to satisfy due process. What is reasonable in response to new information depends on what that information reveals. The certified letter’s return “unclaimed” meant either that Jones was not home when the postman called and did not 

retrieve the letter or that he no longer resided there. One reasonable 

step addressed to the former possibility would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail, which requires no signature. Certified mail makes actual notice more likely only if someone is there to

sign for the letter or tell the mail carrier that the address is incorrect. 

Regular mail can be left until the person returns home, and might increase the chances of actual notice. Other reasonable follow-up 

measures would have been to post notice on the front door or address 

otherwise undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Either approach would 

increase the likelihood that any occupants would alert the owner, if 

only because an ownership change could affect their own occupancy. 

Contrary to Jones’ claim, the Commissioner was not required to

search the local phone book and other government records. Such an 

open-ended search imposes burdens on the State significantly greater 

than the several relatively easy options outlined here. The Commissioner’s complaint about the burden of even these additional steps is

belied by Arkansas’ requirement that notice to homestead owners be

accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned and by

the fact that the State transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or

tax sale purchaser. The Solicitor General’s additional arguments—

that posted notice could be removed by children or vandals, and that

the follow-up requirement will encourage States to favor modes of delivery that will not generate additional information—are rejected. 

This Court will not prescribe the form of service that Arkansas

should adopt. Arkansas can determine how best to proceed, and the 

States have taken a variety of approaches. Pp. 12–17. 

359 Ark. 443, ___ S. W. 3d ___, reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, 

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., took 

no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–1477 

GARY KENT JONES, PETITIONER v. LINDA K. 

FLOWERS ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARKANSAS

[April 26, 2006]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Court. 

Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid 

taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature

of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 

339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). We granted certiorari to determine whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the 

owner and returned undelivered, the government must take

additional reasonable steps to provide notice before taking 

the owner’s property. 

I 

In 1967, petitioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717

North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in 

the house with his wife until they separated in 1993. 

Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and

his wife continued to live in the North Bryan Street house. 

Jones paid his mortgage each month for 30 years, and the 

mortgage company paid Jones’ property taxes. After 

Jones paid off his mortgage in 1997, the property taxes 
2 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

went unpaid, and the property was certified as delinquent.

In April 2000, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commissioner of State Lands (Commissioner), attempted to notify 

Jones of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the 

property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the 

North Bryan Street address. See Ark. Code Ann. §26–37– 

301 (1997). The packet of information stated that unless 

Jones redeemed the property, it would be subject to public

sale two years later on April 17, 2002. See ibid. Nobody

was home to sign for the letter, and nobody appeared at

the post office to retrieve the letter within the next 15 

days. The post office returned the unopened packet to the 

Commissioner marked “‘unclaimed.’” Pet. for Cert. 3. 

Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public 

sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in 

the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. No bids were submitted, 

which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of

the property. See §26–37–202(b). Several months later, 

respondent Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. 

The Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones 

at the North Bryan Street address, attempting to notify

him that his house would be sold to Flowers if he did not 

pay his taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also 

returned to the Commissioner marked “unclaimed.” Ibid. 

Flowers purchased the house, which the parties stipulated 

in the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for 

$21,042.15. Record 224. Immediately after the 30-day 

period for postsale redemption passed, see §26–37–202(e), 

Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the 

property. The notice was served on Jones’ daughter, who 

contacted Jones and notified him of the tax sale. Id., at 11 

(Exh. B).

Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the

Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commissioner’s failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of

Jones’ right to redeem resulted in the taking of his prop-
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

erty without due process. The Commissioner and Flowers 

moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two

unclaimed letters sent by the Commissioner were a constitutionally adequate attempt at notice, and Jones filed a

cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court 

granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner 

and Flowers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a–13a. It concluded 

that the Arkansas tax sale statute, which set forth the 

notice procedure followed by the Commissioner, complied

with constitutional due process requirements. 

Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 359 Ark. 443, ___ S. W. 

3d ___ (2004). The court noted our precedent stating that

due process does not require actual notice, see Dusenbery 

v. United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held 

that attempting to provide notice by certified mail satisfied due process in the circumstances presented, 359 Ark., 

at ___, ___ S. W. 3d, at ___. 

We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve a 

conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts 

concerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the 

government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a 

property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered. Compare, e.g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F. 3d 

231, 236 (CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, the 

County was required to use ‘reasonably diligent efforts’ to

ascertain Akey’s correct address”), and Kennedy v. Mossafa, 100 N. Y. 2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e 

reject the view that the enforcing officer’s obligation is

always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed

in the tax roll, even where the notice is returned as undeliverable”), with Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium 

Assn., 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N. W. 2d 536, 541 (2000) 

(per curiam) (“The fact that one of the mailings was returned by the post office as undeliverable does not impose

on the state the obligation to undertake an investigation 
4 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

to see if a new address . . . could be located”). We hold that 

when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, 

the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the 

circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps

were available to the State. We therefore reverse the 

judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court. 

II 

A 

Due process does not require that a property owner 

receive actual notice before the government may take his 

property. Dusenbery, supra, at 170. Rather, we have 

stated that due process requires the government to provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of

the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. The Commissioner argues that once the State provided notice reasonably calculated to apprise Jones of the impending tax sale 

by mailing him a certified letter, due process was satisfied. 

The Arkansas statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to 

provide notice, the Commissioner continues, because it 

provides for notice by certified mail to an address that the 

property owner is responsible for keeping up to date. See 

Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997). The Commissioner 

notes this Court’s ample precedent condoning notice by 

mail, see, e.g., Dusenbery, supra, at 169; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 

(1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791, 

798 (1983); Mullane, supra, at 318–319, and adds that the 

Arkansas scheme exceeds constitutional requirements by

requiring the Commissioner to use certified mail. Brief for 

Respondent Commissioner 14–15.

It is true that this Court has deemed notice constitu-
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

tionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach 

the intended recipient when sent. See, e.g., Dusenbery, 

supra, at 168–169; Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. In each of 

these cases, the government attempted to provide notice 

and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone 

awry, and we stated that “[t]he reasonableness and hence

the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be 

defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably

certain to inform those affected.” Id., at 315; see also 

Dusenbery, supra, at 170. But we have never addressed 

whether due process entails further responsibility when

the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its 

attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and 

we have explained that the “notice required will vary with

circumstances and conditions.” Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956). The question presented 

is whether such knowledge on the government’s part is

a “circumstance and condition” that varies the “notice 

required.”

The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have

addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most

have decided that when the government learns its attempt 

at notice has failed, due process requires the government

to do something more before real property may be sold in a 

tax sale.1 See, e.g., Plemons v. Gale, 396 F. 3d 569, 576 

—————— 

1Most Courts of Appeals have also concluded that the Due Process 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Government to take

further reasonable steps in the property forfeiture context. See, e.g., 

United States v. Ritchie, 342 F. 3d 903, 911 (CA9 2003); Foehl v. United 

States, 238 F. 3d 474, 480 (CA3 2001); Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d 

1334, 1337–1338 (CADC 1998); Torres v. $36,256.80 U. S. Currency, 25 

F. 3d 1154, 1161 (CA2 1994); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 

F. 3d 657, 660 (CA5 1996); United States v. Rodgers, 108 F. 3d 1247, 

1252–1253 (CA10 1997); see also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F. 3d 287, 291 (CA7 

2000) (declining to adopt a per se rule that only examines notice at the 

time it is sent, but also declining to impose an affirmative duty to seek out

claimants in every case where notice is returned undelivered). But see 
6 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

(CA4 2005); Akey, 375 F. 3d, at 236; Hamilton v. Renewed 

Hope, Inc., 277 Ga. 465, 468, 589 S. E. 2d 81, 85 (2003); 

Kennedy, 100 N. Y. 2d, at 9, 789 N. E. 2d, at 611; Malone 

v. Robinson, 614 A. 2d 33, 38 (D. C. App. 1992); St. George 

Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 326 

Md. 90, 103, 603 A. 2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Credit 

Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P. 2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989); 

Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P. 2d 778, 780–783 (Alaska 1986); 

Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P. 2d 404, 408 

(1985); Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 

Pa. 288, 296, 489 A. 2d 1334, 1338–1339 (1985). But see 

Smith, 463 Mich., at 429, 617 N. W. 2d, at 541; Dahn v. 

Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶23, 576 N. W. 2d 535, 541–542; 

Elizondo v. Read, 588 N. E. 2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlantic City v. Block C–11, Lot 11, 74 N. J. 34, 39–40, 376 A. 2d 

926, 928 (1977). Many States already require in their 

statutes that the government do more than simply mail 

notice to delinquent owners, either at the outset or as a 

followup measure if initial mailed notice is ineffective.2 

—————— 

Madewell v. Downs, 68 F. 3d 1030, 1047 (CA8 1995); Sarit v. United 

States Drug Enforcement Admin., 987 F. 2d 10, 14–15 (CA1 1993). 2Many States require that notice be given to the occupants of the

property as a matter of course. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §3704.7

(West Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. §48–4–45(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2005); Ill.

Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §§200/21–75(a), 200/22–10, 200/22–15 (West 2004); 

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, §1073 (1990); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann.

§14–836(b)(4)(i)(2) (Lexis 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §211.78i(3)

(West 2005); Minn. Stat. §281.23(6) (2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§15–18–

212(1)(a), (2)(A) (2005); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §57–28–04(3) (Lexis

2005); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, §3118(A) (West Supp. 2006); S. D. Codified 

Laws §10–25–5 (2004); Utah Code Ann. §59–2–1351(2)(a) (Lexis 2004);

Wis. Stat. §75.12(1) (2003–2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39–13–108(e)(v)(B)

(2005). Some States require that notice be posted on the property or at 

the property owner’s last known address either at the outset, see Del.

Code Ann., Tit. 9, §§8724, 8772 (1989 and Supp. 2004); Ga. Code Ann.

§48–4–78(d) (Supp. 2005); Haw. Rev. Stat. §246–56 (2003); Md. TaxProp. Code Ann. §14–836(b)(6) (Lexis 2001); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, 

§3118(A) (West Supp. 2006), or as a followup measure when personal 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

In Mullane, we stated that “when notice is a person’s 

due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 

adopt to accomplish it,” 339 U. S., at 315, and that assessing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires 

balancing the “interest of the State” against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment,” id., at 314. Our leading cases on notice 

have evaluated the adequacy of notice given to beneficiaries of a common trust fund, Mullane, supra; a mortgagee, 

Mennonite, 462 U. S. 791; owners of seized cash and automobiles, Dusenbery, 534 U. S. 161; Robinson v. Hanrahan, 

409 U. S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); creditors of an estate, 

Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S. 478; and tenants living in 

public housing, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982). In 

this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice prior to the

State extinguishing a property owner’s interest in a home.

We do not think that a person who actually desired to 

inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a

house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter 

sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent 

—————— 

service cannot be accomplished or certified mail is returned, see Fla.

Stat. §197.522(2)(a) (2003); Minn. Stat. §281.23(6) (2004); S. C. Code 

Ann. §12–51–40(c) (Supp. 2005). And a few States require a diligent

inquiry to find a property owner’s correct address when mailed notice is 

returned. See Miss. Code Ann. §27–43–3 (2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. 

§361.595(3)(b) (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, §5860.607a (Purdon

1990); R. I. Gen. Laws §44–9–25.1 (2005). 

See also 26 U. S. C. §6335(a) (requiring the Internal Revenue Service to 

make a reasonable attempt to personally serve notice on a delinquent 

taxpayer before relying upon notice by certified mail); 28 U. S. C. 

§3203(g)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (requiring written notice to tenants of real property

subject to sale under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act); 12 

U. S. C. §3758(2)(A)(iii) (requiring written notice to occupants before 

foreclosure by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development);

§3758(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that notice be posted on the property if occupants are unknown). 
8 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

taxpayers, handed them to the postman, and then watched 

as the departing postman accidentally dropped the letters 

down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner’s office to prepare a new stack of letters and 

send them again. No one “desirous of actually informing” 

the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters 

disappeared and say “I tried.” Failure to follow up would

be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were

reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients 

when delivered to the postman.

By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post

office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it 

is practicable to do so. See Small v. United States, 136 

F. 3d 1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This is especially true 

when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns

such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of 

a house. Although the State may have made a reasonable

calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to 

suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was “no 

better off than if the notice had never been sent.” Malone, 

supra, at 37. Deciding to take no further action is not

what someone “desirous of actually informing” Jones

would do; such a person would take further reasonable 

steps if any were available.

In prior cases, we have required the government to

consider unique information about an intended recipient

regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably

calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture proceedings sent to a vehicle owner’s home address was inadequate when the State knew that the property owner 

was in prison. 409 U. S., at 40. In Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956), we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate

when town officials knew that the property owner was 

incompetent and without a guardian’s protection. Id., at 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

146–147. 

The Commissioner points out that in these cases, the

State was aware of such information before it calculated 

how best to provide notice. But it is difficult to explain

why due process would have settled for something less if 

the government had learned after notice was sent, but 

before the taking occurred, that the property owner was in

prison or was incompetent. Under Robinson and Covey, 

the government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the 

normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation 

on the government’s part to take additional steps to effect 

notice. That knowledge was one of the “practicalities and 

peculiarities of the case,” Mullane, supra, at 314–315, that 

the Court took into account in determining whether constitutional requirements were met. It should similarly be

taken into account in assessing the adequacy of notice in

this case. The dissent dismisses the State’s knowledge 

that its notice was ineffective as “learned long after the 

fact,” post, at 7, n. 5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), but the notice

letter was promptly returned to the State two to three 

weeks after it was sent, and the Arkansas statutory regime precludes the State from taking the property for two 

years while the property owner may exercise his right to 

redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. §26–37–301 (Supp. 2005). 

It is certainly true, as the Commissioner and Solicitor

General contend, that the failure of notice in a specific

case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted

notice; in that sense, the constitutionality of a particular

procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post 

hoc. But if a feature of the State’s chosen procedure is 

that it promptly provides additional information to the

government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not 

contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the

government does with that information in assessing the 

adequacy of the chosen procedure. After all, the State 

knew ex ante that it would promptly learn whether its 
10 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

effort to effect notice through certified mail had succeeded. 

It would not be inconsistent with the approach the Court

has taken in notice cases to ask, with respect to a procedure under which telephone calls were placed to owners, 

what the State did when no one answered. Asking what 

the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed 

is not substantively different. 

The Commissioner has three further arguments for why 

reasonable followup measures were not required in this 

case. First, notice was sent to an address that Jones 

provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated. See 

Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997). Second, “after failing 

to receive a property tax bill and pay property taxes, a

property holder is on inquiry-notice that his property is

subject to governmental taking.” Brief for Respondent

Commissioner 18–19. Third, Jones was obliged to ensure

that those in whose hands he left his property would alert 

him if it was in jeopardy. None of these contentions relieves the State of its constitutional obligation to provide 

adequate notice.

The Commissioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to 

comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address 

updated forfeits his right to constitutionally sufficient 

notice, and we agree. Id., at 19; see also Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 5 (quoting Mennonite, 462 

U. S., at 799 (“‘[A] party’s ability to take steps to safeguard its own interests does not relieve the State of its

constitutional obligation’”)). In Robinson, we noted that 

Illinois law required each vehicle owner to register his

address with the secretary of state, and that the State’s 

vehicle forfeiture scheme provided for notice by mail to the

address listed in the secretary’s records. See 409 U. S., at 

38, n. 1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 951⁄2, §3–405 (1971), and 

ch. 38, §36–1 (1969)). But we found that the State had not 

provided constitutionally sufficient notice, despite having

followed its reasonably calculated scheme, because it knew 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

that Robinson could not be reached at his address of record. 409 U. S., at 31–32. Although Ark. Code Ann. §26–

35–705 provides strong support for the Commissioner’s 

argument that mailing a certified letter to Jones at 717 

North Bryan Street was reasonably calculated to reach 

him, it does not alter the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s position that he must do nothing more when the 

notice is promptly returned “unclaimed.” 

As for the Commissioner’s inquiry notice argument, the

common knowledge that property may become subject to

government taking when taxes are not paid does not 

excuse the government from complying with its constitutional obligation of notice before taking private property.

We have previously stated the opposite: An interested 

party’s “knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes 

is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.” 

Mennonite, supra, at 800. It is at least as widely known

that arrestees have the right to remain silent, and that 

anything they say may be used against them, see 

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000) 

(“Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),] has become

embedded in routine police practice to the point where the

warnings have become part of our national culture”), but

that knowledge does not excuse a police failure to provide 

Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a delinquent

taxpayer the right to settle accounts with the State and

redeem his property, so Jones’ failure to pay his taxes in a

timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequate notice. 

Finally, the Commissioner reminds us of a statement 

from Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves 

his property in the hands of one who will inform him if his 

interest is in jeopardy. 339 U. S., at 316. But in this 

passage, Justice Jackson writes of “libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel[,] or entry upon real estate in the name 

of law”—such “seiz[ures]” of property, he concluded, “may

reasonably be expected to come promptly to the owner’s 
12 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

attention.” Ibid. An occupant, however, is not charged

with acting as the owner’s agent in all respects, and it is

quite a leap from Justice Jackson’s examples to conclude

that it is an obligation of tenancy to follow up with certified mail of unknown content addressed to the owner. In 

fact, the State makes it impossible for the occupant to 

learn why the Commissioner is writing the owner, because 

an occupant cannot call for a certified letter without first 

obtaining the owner’s signature. For all the occupant

knows, the Commissioner of State Lands might write to 

certain residents about a variety of matters he finds important, such as state parks or highway construction; it

would by no means be obvious to an occupant observing a

certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner

is in danger of losing his property. In any event, there is 

no record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were

left at 717 North Bryan Street. 

Mr. Jones should have been more diligent with respect 

to his property, no question. People must pay their taxes,

and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax 

delinquency by taking their property. But before forcing a 

citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due

process requires the government to provide adequate

notice of the impending taking. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14; 

Mennonite, supra, at 799. 

B 

In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones

had not received notice that he was about to lose his property, the State did—nothing. For the reasons stated, we 

conclude the State should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The 

question remains whether there were any such available 

steps. While “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the 

form of service that the [government] should adopt,” Greene, 456 U. S., at 455, n. 9, if there were no reasonable addi-
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

tional steps the government could have taken upon return of 

the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing 

nothing. 

We think there were several reasonable steps the State

could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response 

to new information depends upon what the new information reveals. The return of the certified letter marked 

“unclaimed” meant either that Jones still lived at 717 

North Bryan Street, but was not home when the postman

called and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or

that Jones no longer resided at that address. One reasonable step primarily addressed to the former possibility 

would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail, 

so that a signature was not required. The Commissioner 

says that use of certified mail makes actual notice more 

likely, because requiring the recipient’s signature protects 

against misdelivery. But that is only true, of course, when

someone is home to sign for the letter, or to inform the 

mail carrier that he has arrived at the wrong address. 

Otherwise, “[c]ertified mail is dispatched and handled in

transit as ordinary mail,” United States Postal Service,

Domestic Mail Manual §503.3.2.1 (Mar. 16, 2006), and the

use of certified mail might make actual notice less likely in 

some cases—the letter cannot be left like regular mail to

be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be 

retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time. 

Following up with regular mail might also increase the

chances of actual notice to Jones if—as it turned out—he 

had moved. Even occupants who ignored certified mail 

notice slips addressed to the owner (if any had been left) 

might scrawl the owner’s new address on the notice packet

and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or notify Jones 

directly.

Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the 

possibility that Jones had moved as well as that he had 

simply not retrieved the certified letter, would have been 
14 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

to post notice on the front door, or to address otherwise

undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Most States that explicitly outline additional procedures in their tax sale statutes 

require just such steps. See n. 2, supra. Either approach

would increase the likelihood that the owner would be 

notified that he was about to lose his property, given the

failure of a letter deliverable only to the owner in person. 

That is clear in the case of an owner who still resided at 

the premises. It is also true in the case of an owner who 

has moved: Occupants who might disregard a certified 

mail slip not addressed to them are less likely to ignore

posted notice, and a letter addressed to them (even as

“occupant”) might be opened and read. In either case, 

there is a significant chance the occupants will alert the 

owner, if only because a change in ownership could well

affect their own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned of 

the State’s effort to sell his house when he was alerted by

one of the occupants—his daughter—after she was served

with an unlawful detainer notice. 

Jones believes that the Commissioner should have 

searched for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook 

and other government records such as income tax rolls. 

We do not believe the government was required to go this 

far. As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones’ 

mail marked “unclaimed” did not necessarily mean that 

717 North Bryan Street was an incorrect address; it 

merely informed the Commissioner that no one appeared 

to sign for the mail before the designated date on which it

would be returned to the sender. An open-ended search

for a new address—especially when the State obligates the 

taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax collector, see Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997)—imposes

burdens on the State significantly greater than the several 

relatively easy options outlined above. 

The Commissioner complains about the burden of even 

those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Ar-
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

kansas’ current requirement that notice to homestead 

owners be accomplished by personal service if certified

mail is returned, §26–37–301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact 

that Arkansas transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer

or the tax sale purchaser, §26–37–104(a). The Commissioner has offered no estimate of how many notice letters

are returned, and no facts to support the dissent’s assertion that the Commissioner must now physically locate

“tens of thousands of properties every year.” Post, at 10. 

Citing our decision in Greene v. Lindsey, the Solicitor 

General adds that posted notice could be taken down by

children or vandals. But in Greene, we noted that outside 

the specific facts of that case, posting notice on real property is “a singularly appropriate and effective way of 

ensuring that a person . . . is actually apprised of proceedings against him.” 456 U. S., at 452–453. Successfully

providing notice is often the most efficient way to collect

unpaid taxes, see Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 800, n. 5 (more

effective notice may ease burden on State if recipient 

arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to tax sale); Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent properties in 

Arkansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency), but 

rather than taking relatively easy additional steps to

effect notice, the State undertook the burden and expense

of purchasing a newspaper advertisement, conducting an

auction, and then negotiating a private sale of the property to Flowers. 

The Solicitor General argues that requiring further

effort when the government learns that notice was not 

delivered will cause the government to favor modes of 

providing notice that do not generate additional information—for example, starting (and stopping) with regular

mail instead of certified mail. We find this unlikely, as we

have no doubt that the government repeatedly finds itself 

being asked to prove that notice was sent and received. 

Using certified mail provides the State with documenta-
16 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

tion of personal delivery and protection against false

claims that notice was never received. That added security, however, comes at a price—the State also learns

when notice has not been received. We conclude that, 

under the circumstances presented, the State cannot 

simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and

sell the owner’s property—any more than it could ignore

the information that the owner in Robinson was in jail, or

that the owner in Covey was incompetent.

Though the Commissioner argues that followup measures are not constitutionally required, he reminds us that 

the State did make some attempt to follow up with Jones

by publishing notice in the newspaper a few weeks before 

the public sale. Several decades ago, this Court observed

that “[c]hance alone” brings a person’s attention to “an 

advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of

a newspaper,” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315, and that notice 

by publication is adequate only where “it is not reasonably 

possible or practicable to give more adequate warning,” 

id., at 317. Following up by publication was not constitutionally adequate under the circumstances presented here

because, as we have explained, it was possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impending tax sale.

The dissent forcefully articulates some basic principles

about constitutionally required notice, principles from 

which we have no intention to depart. In particular, we

disclaim any “new rule” that is “contrary to Dusenbery and 

a significant departure from Mullane.” Post, at 6. In 

Dusenbery, the Government was aware that someone at 

the prison had signed for the prisoner’s notice letter, and 

we determined that this attempt at notice was adequate, 

despite the fact that the State could have made notice 

more likely by requiring the prisoner to sign for the letter

himself. 534 U. S., at 171. In this case, of course, the 

notice letter was returned to the Commissioner, informing 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

him that his attempt at notice had failed. 

 As for Mullane, it directs that “when notice is a person’s

due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably 

adopt to accomplish it.” 339 U. S., at 315. Mindful of the 

dissent’s concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, that 

someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was 

in danger of losing his house would do more when the

attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed, and there

was more that reasonably could be done.

As noted, “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the 

form of service that the [government] should adopt.” 

Greene, supra, at 455, n. 9. In prior cases finding notice

inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the State’s

notice statute. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S., at 

490–491; Robinson, 409 U. S., at 40; Schroeder v. City of 

New York, 371 U. S. 208, 213–214 (1962); Walker, 352 U. S., 

at 116; Covey, 351 U. S., at 146–147. The State can determine how to proceed in response to our conclusion that

notice was inadequate here, and the States have taken a

variety of approaches to the present question. See n. 2, 

supra. It suffices for present purposes that we are confident that additional reasonable steps were available for 

Arkansas to employ before taking Jones’ property. 

* * * 

There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be

less than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax revenue it needs. The same cannot be said for the State’s 

efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice 

before the State takes action against them. In this case, 

the State is exerting extraordinary power against a property owner—taking and selling a house he owns. It is not 

too much to insist that the State do a bit more to attempt

to let him know about it when the notice letter addressed 

to him is returned unclaimed. 
18 JONES v. FLOWERS 

Opinion of the Court 

The Commissioner’s effort to provide notice to Jones of

an impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to 

satisfy due process given the circumstances of this case.

The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed, 

and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–1477 

GARY KENT JONES, PETITIONER v. LINDA K. 

FLOWERS ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARKANSAS

[April 26, 2006] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and 

JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting. 

When petitioner failed to pay his property taxes for 

several consecutive years, respondent Commissioner of 

State Lands in Arkansas, using the record address that

petitioner provided to the State, sent petitioner a letter by

certified mail, noting his tax delinquency and explaining

that his property would be subject to public sale if the

delinquent taxes and penalties were not paid. After petitioner failed to respond, the State also published notice of 

the delinquency and public sale in an Arkansas newspaper. 

Soon after respondent Linda K. Flowers submitted a purchase offer to the State, it sent petitioner a second letter by

certified mail explaining that the sale would proceed if the

delinquent taxes and penalties were not paid.

Petitioner argues that the State violated his rights

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in his view, the State failed to take sufficient steps to contact him before selling his property to

Flowers. Petitioner contends that once the State became 

aware that he had not claimed the certified mail, it was 

constitutionally obligated to employ additional methods to

locate him. 

Adopting petitioner’s arguments, the Court holds today

that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned un-
2 JONES v. FLOWERS 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

claimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps 

to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before

selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.” Ante, at 

4. The Court concludes that it was practicable for Arkansas to take additional steps here—namely, notice by regular mail, posting notice on petitioner’s door, and addressing mail to “occupant.” Ante, at 13. Because, under this 

Court’s precedents, the State’s notice methods clearly

satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, I

respectfully dissent. 

I 

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from

“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” This Court has held that a State must 

provide an individual with notice and opportunity to be

heard before the State may deprive him of his property. 

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 

306, 313 (1950). Balancing a State’s interest in efficiently

managing its administrative system and an individual’s 

interest in adequate notice, this Court has held that a State 

must provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency

of the action.” Id., at 313–314. As this Court has explained, 

“when notice is a person’s due . . . [t]he means employed

must be such as one desirous of actually informing the

absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id., at 

315. “[H]eroic efforts,” however, are not required. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002). To the 

contrary, we have expressly rejected “[a] construction of the

Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way [of the State].” Mullane, 

supra, at 313–314. Thus, “none of our cases . . . has required actual notice”; instead, “we have allowed the Government to defend the ‘reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method . . . on the ground 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected.’” Dusenbery, supra, at 169–170 (quoting Mullane, 

supra, at 315). 

The methods of notice employed by Arkansas were reasonably calculated to inform petitioner of proceedings 

affecting his property interest and thus satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The State mailed a 

notice by certified letter to the address provided by petitioner. The certified letter was returned to the State 

marked “unclaimed” after three attempts to deliver it. The 

State then published a notice of public sale containing 

redemption information in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette 

newspaper. After Flowers submitted a purchase offer, the

State sent yet another certified letter to petitioner at his 

record address. That letter, too, was returned to the State 

marked “unclaimed” after three delivery attempts.1 

Arkansas’ attempts to contact petitioner by certified

mail at his “record address,” without more, satisfy due 

process. Dusenbery, supra, at 169. See also Mullane, 

supra, at 318; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. 

v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988) (“We have repeatedly

recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide 

actual notice”); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 

U. S. 791, 792, 798 (1983) (holding that “notice mailed to 

[the affected party’s] last known available address” is 

sufficient where a State seeks to sell “real property on 

—————— 

1Though the Court posits that “there is no record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Bryan Street,” ante, 

at 12, the postal carrier was required to leave notice at the address at

each delivery attempt indicating that delivery of certified mail had been

attempted and that the mail could be retrieved at the local post office. 

See United States Postal Operations Manual §813.25 (July 2005), 

http://www.nalc.org/depart/can/pdf/manuals/pom/pomc8.pdf (all Internet materials as visited Apr. 21, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s 

case file) (“The carrier must leave a notice of arrival on Form 3849 if 

the carrier cannot deliver the certifiable article for any reason”). 
4 JONES v. FLOWERS 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

which payments of property taxes have been delinquent” 

(emphasis added)). Because the notices were sent to the 

address provided by petitioner himself, the State had an 

especially sound basis for determining that notice would 

reach him. Moreover, Arkansas exceeded the constitutional minimum by additionally publishing notice in a 

local newspaper.2 See Mullane, supra, at 318. Due process requires nothing more—and certainly not here, where 

petitioner had a statutory duty to pay his taxes and to

report any change of address to the state taxing authority. 

See Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997). 

My conclusion that Arkansas’ notice methods satisfy due

process is reinforced by the well-established presumption 

that individuals, especially those owning property, act in 

their own interest. Recognizing that “‘[i]t is the part of 

common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a 

thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a

situation to protect it,’” Mullane, supra, at 316 (quoting 

The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 (1815)), this Court has concluded that “[t]he ways of an owner with tangible property

are such that he usually arranges means to learn of any 

direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights.” 

Mullane, 339 U. S., at 316. Consistent with this observation, Arkansas was free to “indulge the assumption” that

petitioner had either provided the State taxing authority 

with a correct and up-to-date mailing address—as required by state law—“or that he . . . left some caretaker 

under a duty to let him know that [his property was] being

jeopardized.”3 Ibid. 

—————— 

2The Court found inadequate the State’s attempt at notice by publication, as if that were the State’s sole method for effectuating notice, 

see ante, at 16. But the State plainly used it here as a secondary 

method of notice. 3The issue is not, as the Court maintains, whether the current occupant is “charged with acting as the owner’s agent.” Ante, at 12. 

Rather, the issue is whether petitioner discharged his own duty to 

guard his interests. 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The Court does not conclude that certified mail is inherently insufficient as a means of notice, but rather that “the

government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on

the government’s part to take additional steps to effect

notice.” Ante, at 9. I disagree.

First, whether a method of notice is reasonably calculated to notify the interested party is determined ex ante, 

i.e., from the viewpoint of the government agency at the 

time its notice is sent. This follows from Mullane, where 

this Court rested its analysis on the information the 

sender had “at hand” when its notice was sent. 339 U. S., 

at 318. Relatedly, we have refused to evaluate the reasonableness of a particular method of notice by comparing 

it to alternative methods that are identified after the fact. 

See Dusenbery, 534 U. S., at 171–172. Today the Court 

appears to abandon both of these practices. Its rejection of 

Arkansas’ selected method of notice—a method this Court 

has repeatedly concluded is constitutionally sufficient—is

based upon information that was unavailable when notice 

was sent. Indeed, the Court’s proposed notice methods—

regular mail, posting and addressing mail to “occupant,” 

ante, at 12–14—are entirely the product of post hoc considerations, including the discovery that members of 

petitioner’s family continued to live in the house. Similarly, the Court’s observation that “[t]he Commissioner[’s]

complain[t] about the burden of . . . additional steps . . . is

belied by Arkansas’ current requirement that notice to

homestead-owners be accomplished by personal service if 

certified mail is returned,” ante, at 14–15, is contrary to 

Dusenbery’s “conclusion that the Government ought not be

penalized and told to ‘try harder’ . . . simply because [it] 

has since upgraded its policies,” 534 U. S., at 172 (citation 

omitted).

Second, implicit in our holding that due process does not 

require “actual notice,” see id., at 169–170, is that when 
6 JONES v. FLOWERS 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the “government becomes aware . . . that its attempt at

notice has failed,” ante, at 5, it is not required to take 

additional steps to ensure that notice has been received.

Petitioner’s challenge to Arkansas’ notice methods, and

the Court’s acceptance of it, is little more than a thinly

veiled attack on Dusenbery. Under the majority’s logic,

each time a doubt is raised with respect to whether notice 

has reached an interested party, the State will have to

consider additional means better calculated to achieve 

notice. Because this rule turns on speculative, newly

acquired information, it has no natural end point, and, in

effect, requires the States to achieve something close to 

actual notice. The majority’s new rule is contrary to 

Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane. 

The only circumstances in which this Court has found 

notice by mail and publication inadequate under the Due 

Process Clause involve situations where the state or local 

government knew at the outset that its notice efforts were 

destined to fail and knew how to rectify the problem prior 

to sending notice. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 

38, 39 (1972) (per curiam) (intended recipient known to be

in jail); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 145 (1956) 

(intended recipient known to be incompetent and without

a guardian).

In Robinson, the State, having arrested petitioner and 

detained him in county jail, immediately instituted forfeiture proceedings against his automobile and mailed notice 

of those proceedings to his residential address. 409 U. S., 

at 38. Robinson, who was incarcerated in the county jail

during the entirety of the forfeiture proceedings, did not

receive notice of the proceedings until after he was released and the forfeiture order had been entered. Id., at 

38–39. Because the State knew beforehand that Robinson 

was not at, and had no access to, the address to which it 

sent the notice, this Court held that the State’s efforts 

were not “reasonably calculated” to notify him of the pend-
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

ing proceedings. Id., at 40. Similarly, in Covey, the Court 

concluded that the methods of notice used by the town—

mailing, posting, and publishing—were not reasonably 

calculated to inform Covey of proceedings adverse to her 

property interests because local officials knew prior to

sending notice that she was “without mental capacity to

handle her affairs” and unable to comprehend the meaning of the notices. 351 U. S., at 144, 146. 

By contrast, Arkansas did not know at the time it sent 

notice to petitioner that its method would fail; and Arkansas did not know that petitioner no longer lived at the 

record address simply because letters were returned

“unclaimed.” Pet. for Cert. 3. “[U]nclaimed” does not

necessarily mean that an address is no longer correct; it

may indicate that an intended recipient has simply failed 

or refused to claim mail. See United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), §507, Exh. 1.4.1, 

http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/507.htm.4 Given that the 

State had been using the address provided by petitioner

and that petitioner had a legal duty to maintain a current mailing address with the state taxing authority, 

return of the mail as “unclaimed” did not arm Arkansas 

with the type of specific knowledge that the governments 

had at hand in Robinson and Covey. Cf. ante, at 13. The 

State cannot be charged to correct a problem of petitioner’s own creation and of which it was not aware.5 

—————— 

4The Postal Service uses “Moved, Left No Address” to indicate that 

the “[A]ddressee moved and filed no change-of-address order,” and “Not

Deliverable as Addressed—Unable to Forward” to indicate that the 

mail is “undeliverable at address given; no change-of-address order on 

file; forwarding order expired.” DMM §507, Exh. 1.4.1. 5The Court’s “storm drain” hypothetical, ante, at 7–8, presents the

harder question of when notice is sent—at the precise moment the 

Commissioner places the mail in the postal carrier’s hand or the split 

second later when he observes the departing carrier drop the mail down 

the storm drain. That more difficult question is not before us in this

case because Arkansas learned long after the fact that its attempts had

been unsuccessful. 
8 JONES v. FLOWERS 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Even if the State had divined that petitioner was no 

longer at the record address, its publication of notice in a 

local newspaper would have sufficed because Mullane 

authorizes the use of publication when the record address 

is unknown. See 339 U. S., at 316 (“[P]ublication traditionally has been acceptable as notification supplemental

to other action which in itself may reasonably be expected to convey a warning”). 

II 

The Court’s proposed methods, aside from being constitutionally unnecessary, are also burdensome, impractical, 

and no more likely to effect notice than the methods actually employed by the State.

In Arkansas, approximately 18,000 parcels of delinquent 

real estate are certified annually. Tsann Kuen Enterprises 

Co. v. Campbell, 335 Ark. 110, 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d 822, 

828 (2003). Under the Court’s rule, the State will bear the 

burden of locating thousands of delinquent property owners. These administrative burdens are not compelled by

the Due Process Clause. See Mullane, supra, at 313–314; 

Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U. S., at 

489–490 (stating that constitutionally sufficient notice

“need not be inefficient or burdensome”). Here, Arkansas 

has determined that its law requiring property owners to

maintain a current address with the state taxing authority, in conjunction with its authorization to send property

notices to the record address, is an efficient and fair way

to administer its tax collection system. The Court’s decision today forecloses such a reasonable system and burdens the State with inefficiencies caused by delinquent 

taxpayers. 

Moreover, the Court’s proposed methods are no more

reasonably calculated to achieve notice than the methods 

employed by the State here. Regular mail is hardly foolproof; indeed, it is arguably less effective than certified

mail. Certified mail is tracked, delivery attempts are 
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

recorded, actual delivery is logged, and notices are posted

to alert someone at the residence that certified mail is 

being held at a local post office. By creating a record,

these features give parties grounds for defending or challenging notice. By contrast, regular mail is untraceable; 

there is no record of either delivery or receipt. Had the 

State used regular mail, petitioner would presumably 

argue that it should have sent notice by certified mail 

because it creates a paper trail.6 

The Court itself recognizes the deficiencies of its proposed methods. It acknowledges that “[f]ollowing up with 

regular mail might . . . increase the chances of actual 

notice”; “occupants who ignored certified mail notice slips 

. . . might scrawl the owner’s new address on the notice 

packet,” ante, at 12; and “a letter addressed to [occupant] 

might be opened and read,” ante, at 14 (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, the Court justifies its redrafting of Arkansas’ 

notice statute on the ground that “[its] approach[es] would

increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified 

that he was about to lose his property . . . .” Ibid. That, 

however, is not the test; indeed, we rejected such reasoning

in Dusenbery. See 534 U. S., at 171 (rejecting the argument that “the FBI’s notice was constitutionally flawed 

—————— 

6 Interestingly, the Court stops short of saddling the State with the

other steps that petitioner argues a State should take any time the

interested party fails to claim letters mailed to his record address, see 

ante, at 14, namely searching state tax records, the phone-book, the

Internet, department of motor vehicle records, or voting rolls, contacting

his employer, or employing debt collectors. Here, the Court reasons that 

because of the context—the fact that the letter was returned merely

“unclaimed” and petitioner had a duty to maintain a current address—the 

State is not required to go as far as petitioner urges. Ibid. Though the

methods proposed by petitioner are severely flawed (for instance, the

commonality of his surname “Jones” calls into question the fruitfulness of

Internet and phone-book searches), there is no principled basis for the

Court’s conclusion that petitioner’s other proposed methods would “impos[e] burdens on the State significantly greater than the several relatively easy options outlined [by the Court].” Ibid. 
10 JONES v. FLOWERS 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

because it was ‘substantially less likely to bring home

notice’ than a feasible substitute” (citations omitted)). 

The Court’s suggestion that Arkansas post notice is

similarly unavailing. The State’s records are organized by 

legal description, not address, which makes the prospect of

physically locating tens of thousands of properties every 

year, and posting notice on each, impractical. See Tsann 

Kuen Enterprises Co., supra, at 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d, at 

828. Also, this Court has previously concluded that posting is an inherently unreliable method of notice. See 

Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 453–454 (1982).

Similarly, addressing the mail to “occupant,” see ante, at 

13, is no more reasonably calculated to reach petitioner. It 

is sheer speculation to assume, as the Court does, that 

although “[o]ccupants . . . might disregard a certified mail

slip . . . , a letter addressed to them (even as ‘occupant’) 

might be opened and read.” Ante, at 14. It is at least as 

likely that an occupant who receives generically addressed

mail will discard it as junk mail. 

III 

If “title to property should not depend on [factual] vagaries,” Dusenberry, supra, at 171, then certainly it cannot

turn on “wrinkle[s],” ante, at 5, caused by a property

owner’s own failure to be a prudent ward of his interests.

The meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the

antics of tax evaders and scofflaws. Nor is the self-created 

conundrum in which petitioner finds himself a legitimate

ground for imposing additional constitutional obligations on

the State. The State’s attempts to notify petitioner by 

certified mail at the address that he provided and, additionally, by publishing notice in a local newspaper satisfy 

due process. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of

the Arkansas Supreme Court.