UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7358

DWAYNE DION BACON, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

KATHLEEN GREENE, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:06-cv-00261-AW) 

Submitted: February 25, 2009 Decided: March 24, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. 

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Dwayne Dion Bacon, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Judith LaneWeber, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Dwayne Dion Bacon, a Maryland prisoner, alleged in his 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint that correctional officers at 

the Eastern Correctional Institution failed to intervene during 

an assault and that Kathleen Greene, the warden, ignored his 

request for the names of officers on duty during the incident. 

Greene moved for summary judgment, asserting Bacon failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies. The district court agreed and 

granted summary judgment to Greene. On appeal, Bacon concedes 

that he did not file a request for administrative remedies, but 

he argues, as he did in the district court, that he was unable 

to pursue these remedies because Greene did not provide him with 

the names of correctional officers on duty during the incident. 

 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

de novo, “viewing the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary 

judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and 

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant 

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a 

prisoner to properly exhaust available administrative remedies 

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prior to filing a § 1983 action. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West 

2003); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006) (requiring 

“proper” exhaustion of administrative remedies); Moore v. 

Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing 

“availability” of remedies). “[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement is mandatory,” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., 

Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), and “applies to all 

inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege 

excessive force or some other wrong,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 

516, 532 (2002). 

 We have recognized, however, that “an administrative 

remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, 

through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself 

of it.” Moore, 517 F.3d at 725. Thus, “when prison officials 

prevent inmates from using the administrative process . . ., the 

process that exists on paper becomes unavailable in reality.” 

Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006); see also

Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating 

administrative remedy rendered unavailable when prison officials 

prevent prisoner from using it). Accordingly, the district 

court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in exhaustion 

were not procured from the action or inaction of prison 

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officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 

(10th Cir. 2007). 

 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 

Bacon, we conclude there is a genuine issue as to the 

availability of administrative remedies. Bacon has asserted 

throughout the proceedings that Greene ignored his requests for 

disclosure of information regarding the officers on duty at the 

time of the assault. He further asserted that this lack of 

information rendered him incapable of filing a request for 

administrative remedy that would comply with institution 

procedure. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district 

court and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we do 

not hold that administrative remedies have been properly 

exhausted, but only that there is a genuine issue as to whether 

officials withheld information that made an administrative 

filing futile or impossible. 

 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED