Our Cover: Combat histories are full of examples of m

rose through the ranks due to their remarkable ab

achieve success in battle. Maj Adolf Galland began h

bat career as a lieutenant in the Condor Legion flying g

attack missions for the German Luftwaffe in the Spani

War. Although he began his Luftwaffe service as an 

pilot, it was his success as a Bf 109 pilot and comma

Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) 26 (JG26) in the B

Britain that gained him the reputation as Germany’s top 

commander in the Second World War. The US Army Air 

had its share of successful squadron and group leade

one would be hard-pressed to find a more successful 

commander—who was also respected and loved by his 

than Lt Col Joseph Laughlin (shown on the cove

colonel, his final wartime rank). Culminating in his co

of the 362d Fighter Group (FG), XIX Tactical Air Co

(TAC), Ninth Air Force, Colonel Laughlin encouraged 

his P-47 pilots from one end of France to the other in s

of Gen George S. Patton’s Third Army in the summer o

Col James R. McCarthy assumed command of t

Strategic Wing on 1 December 1972, just in ti

Linebacker II to begin. Faced with an awesome respon

and paradoxically limited authority, Colonel McCarthy 

wing to success in spite of severe challenges.
caustic––will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them

to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6428.

Thank you for your assistance

......................................................................................

Cut along dotted line 

The Art of Wing Leadership Z

and Aircrew Morale in Combat
AIR UNIVERSITY

The Art of Wing Leadership

and Aircrew Morale in Comb

JOHN J. ZENTNER

Lt Col, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 11

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

June 2001
This CADRE Paper and others in the series are ava

electronically at the Air University Research Web 

http://research.maxwell.af.mil under “Research Pa

then “Special Collections.”

ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are sole

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United 

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleare

release: distribution unlimited.

p. cm. (CADRE paper ; no. 11)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-090-6

1. Air warfare--Case studies. 2. Leadership--Case studies. 3. Morale--Ca

4. Flight crews--Case studies. I. Title. II. Series.

UG700 .Z45 2001

358.4'133041--dc21 20
the Airpower Research Institute of Air Universitys Co

Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (C

Dedicated to promoting understanding of aerospace 

theory and application, these studies are published by 

University Press and broadly distributed to the US Air 

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tions, leading scholars, selected institutions of higher 

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All military members and civilian employees assigne

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iii

Please send inquiries or comments to:

Dean of Research

Airpower Research Institute

CADRE

401 Chennault Circle

Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428

Tel: (334) 953-6875

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Leadership and Morale in Air Combat. . . . . . 

Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . . 

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. 

Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Jagdgeschwader 26 in

the Battle of Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Pilot Morale within

Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 LT COL JOSEPH LAUGHLIN:

362d FIGHTER GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Allied Invasion of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

362d Fighter Group Operations . . . . . . . . . . 

Pilot Morale within the 362d Fighter Group. . . 

v
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 COL JAMES R. MCCARTHY: 

43d STRATEGIC WING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

End of the Vietnam War:

US Withdrawal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

43d Strategic Wing Operations

in Linebacker II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Aircrew Morale within the

43d Strategic Wing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

James McCarthy’s Influence on Morale . . . . 

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Similarities in Aircrew Morale . . . . . . . . . . . 

Morale, Wing Leadership, and Combat . . . . 

Implications for Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Recommendations for the USAF . . . . . . . . . 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Illustrations

Figure

1 Basic Relationship Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Table

1 Jagdgeschwader 26 Kill Claims and

Losses by Month (July–October 1940) . . . . . . 

2 362d Fighter Group Attrition by Month

(June–October 1944) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 43d Strategic Wing Sortie Summary during

Linebacker II: 18–29 December 1972 . . . . . . . 

vi
Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the a

wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew 

during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s 

seeks to identify and define those unique characteristic

ciated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew moral

face of significant losses. 

Colonel Zentner defines aircrew morale as the enth

and persistence with which an aviator flies combat m

He then offers three historical case studies to esta

framework within which aircrew morale can be assess

first case study is of Maj Adolf Galland and Jagdgesc

26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study 

ers Lt Col Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Grou

ing the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. Th

case study examines Col James R. McCarthy and t

Strategic Wing during Operation Linebacker II. Drawin

ily on the results of questionnaires and personal inte

each case study is focused on the importance that a

ascribed to three general areas: individual needs, grou

sion, and unit esprit de corps. 

Colonel Zentner concludes that aircrew control ove

opment of combat tactics was the single most importa

ment affecting morale. This finding supports one of t

damental truths about the employment of air

centralized control and decentralized execution, th

become embeded in the airman’s culture. In each of th

cases studied by the author, morale generally improve

the wing commander either displayed a personal flair 

tical innovation or allowed his subordinates to becom

vative. Conversely, morale declined when higher headq

placed burdensome and unsound restrictions on aircr

tics. In light of the restrictive rules of engagement th

governed recent applications of American airpower, 

Zentner recommends the USAF take steps to modify d

and professional military education in order to relate th

ings of this study to the combat air forces.

vii
College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Ed

(CADRE), the Developing Aerospace Leaders Program O

pleased to support publication of Colonel Zentner’s stu

CADRE Paper and thereby make it available to a wide

ence in the US Air Force and beyond.

viii

CHARLES D. LINK, SES

Major General, USAF, Retired

Director, Developing Aerospace L

Program Office
MBA, University of Phoenix), a senior navigator with 2,

ing hours, is chief, Synchronization Cell, Seventh Air 

Osan Air Base, Korea. He was commissioned throu

Reserve Officer Training Corps, Loyola Marymount Uni

in 1987. Graduating from specialized undergraduate na

training in 1988, he went on to fly the F-111F as a 

systems officer at RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom. 

Zentner flew 25 combat missions in the 1991 Persian G

and transitioned to the F-15E in 1992. He served a 

Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, in the 422d Te

Evaluation Squadron and an operational assignment 

366th Air Expeditionary Wing, Mountain Home AFB, 

Colonel Zentner is a graduate of the USAF Fighter W

School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Sc

Advanced Airpower Studies. 

ix
help I could not have completed this work. I thank 

Caver of the USAF Historical Research Agency, who 

hours assisting me with primary source documents th

out the year. I thank author Donald L. Caldwell an

Wilhelm Goebel of the German Fighter Pilots’ Associa

their assistance in contacting former Luftwaffe pilot

World War II. Also, my colleague Maj B. J. Shwedo was 

stant source of additional information during this pro

he pointed out several useful documents that he discov

the course of his own work. I especially thank Col Jo

Laughlin, USAF, Retired, and Brig Gen James R. Mc

USAF, Retired, for their personal interviews, extensiv

mitment of time, and general support. Additionally, I w

remiss if I did not wholeheartedly thank the fighter pil

bomber crews who took the time to share their comba

riences with me by completing my questionnaires, sen

mails, or calling me on their own “nickel.” The person

tacts I made during this project have been extremely rew

and would not have been possible without the help of 

Horiuchi, Stan Stepnitz, and Mrs. Fern Mann. Most 

tantly, I acknowledge the tremendous love and suppor

wife, Mary Beth, and our daughters, Elizabeth and 

They provided help and understanding throughout.

xi
Introduction

I would describe the morale [of US troops] in the desert 

adequate. 

—Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchi

May 1998

The intensity of aerial combat often masks the brevit

engagement under examination. The fighting spirit of th

batants must sustain them not only through the brief 

death struggles in the air but also through the more m

and more frequent interludes. Wartime morale is sha

the various elements to which airmen are exposed.1 

been argued that the single most powerful influence on 

is exerted by the commander who leads airmen into 

This study explores the relationship between air forc

commanders and aircrew morale during combat in wh

nificant losses are experienced.

Leadership and Morale in Air Combat

The post-cold-war leveling-off of American defense sp

combined with sharp cuts in aircraft major weapon s

procurement could place the United States at a quan

disadvantage against a future adversary. Advanced tech

traditionally has provided qualitative advantages in 

capability, but aircrew morale has demonstrated in t

that it too has been a combat multiplier.3 For centuri

tary commanders have realized that raising troop mora

nifies their combat potential. It stands to reason that 

tent air force leaders will use every means at their disp

capitalize on any advantage in war. This study addre

issue that, in today’s USAF at least, often is either ign

misunderstood.4

1
ing combat engagements in the past 10 years. Losses 

craft and friendly casualties have been extremely lo

though aerial warfare has become the preferred me

American coercion. Although USAF leaders expected 

higher level of attrition in the Persian Gulf War, nothing 

verge of attrition-style combat has been waged since V

However, no one can be certain that in the near fut

United States will not become engaged in much risk

narios that include significant combat losses. The will 

tain heavy losses rests with the political leaders and p

a democracy, yet the psychological burden of conduct

type of warfare is borne by combat leaders and their s

nates. The time and circumstances surrounding comb

are yielded to the enemy; but by trying to understand t

sequences of attrition on morale, future leaders may 

pared for the situation should it arise. 

This study was inspired by the author’s desire to bet

derstand leadership, especially in combat settings. Th

guity of morale has always created a somewhat unsa

perception of the topic, which was highlighted on a rec

tation to Southwest Asia.5 The comment in the epigraph 

beginning of this chapter was made by a well-meaning U

ator after a trip to the area to assess US troop morale

of the deployed aircrew who read the senator’s remark

newspaper were on their third deployment to the dese

months. Issues involving long-range strategic goals, r

engagement, and high operations tempo all affect

morale of the deployed airmen. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutc

perception of adequate morale and that of the airmen i

was not the same. 

Existing Thoughts on Military Morale

Asking military commanders, historians, or psych

for their views about morale in combat situations is aki

story of three blind men trying to describe an elephant

2
morale span the spectrum of interest and depth. While 

touch on aspects of morale, some notable works stand 

hallmark contributions to the body of knowledge re

military morale.

Accounts relating to actual warfare offer some of th

riveting discussions on morale. As a primer on the mos

concept of morale, Leo Tolstoy’s classic War and Peac

trates the importance of the fighting spirit of an army 

ability to increase combat power. Lord Moran dissected 

by studying the human capacity for courage in his Wo

I treatise The Anatomy of Courage. An engaging, thou

troversial, World War II treatment can be found in S

Marshall’s book, Men Against Fire. The unique circum

of the maintenance of morale for bomber aircrews in 

War II have been covered by Mark K. Wells in Courag

Warfare and Allan D. English in The Cream of the Crop

of morale for jet fighter pilots in combat have been 

recreated by Jack Broughton in his two works, Thud 

and Going Downtown. 

The more clinical and abstract viewpoints of psych

and military theorists have contributed to our unders

of military morale as well. A well-researched study on t

tivation of soldiers is presented by Anthony Kellett in 

Motivation. J. F. C. Fuller’s exploration of the interac

various elements in combat relies heavily on morale a

moral domain of war in The Foundations of the Science 

Finally, the seminal work by Ardant du Picq, Battle S

also stresses the importance of morale and cohesion in c

Missing Link

This study addresses an overlooked question connec

actions of the commander with the fighting spirit of 

crew: Is it possible to identify those characteristics of 

ship that show a noteworthy ability to sustain aircrew 

within a combat environment involving significant loss

all the focus on morale across the years, very little ha

3
of combat stress reactions. Even less has been written 

the specific issue of leadership’s impact on aircrew 

Where these topics have intersected, the premise is rar

historical setting of high combat losses. 

Methodology

The approach to this topic involves a historical com

of the combat experience of units that suffered heavy 

yet continued to function effectively. By studying the 

of the unit’s leader and the perception of morale amo

unit’s aircrew in light of the context of the battle, it 

possible to identify some predominant actions that infl

overall morale. Similarities between cases are scrutin

determine if some actions can be prescribed univer

raise or sustain morale in the aircrew. 

The reason for approaching the study in this way is b

historical air battles add flesh to the theoretical skeleto

concepts of aircrew morale. Certainly the study of histo

not answer all the questions of why airmen in combat 

tivated in particular ways, but it can provide a basis t

some general—and, hopefully, useful—observations. Th

ings of this research synthesizes these observations to 

future air commanders a guidepost for reasoned 

History provides lessons for war fighters. The challenge 

ing the correct analogy. This study of history may be n

stitute for personal experience, yet it may be the onl

available for aspiring air force commanders. Honing 

ship skills in combat is always necessary but is som

very costly. Peacetime offers the best opportunity to c

issues of leadership that have been demonstrated by ot

the crucible of combat. 

Other research has studied the effects of combat on 

The emphasis of those works has been on preserving th

ing ability of the warrior in spite of the stresses of comb

study instead focuses on the effects of leadership on 

4
morale, which will lead to good performance, which w

force the perception of good leadership, which will lead 

morale, and so on. Figure 1 illustrates this relationsh

study focuses on the mechanism that connects leader

morale in this chain. Three distinct areas are covered 

duct this research and reach conclusions.

Morale for Aviators

Clarity must be the goal of any discussion. A worka

inition of what morale is and how it is considered in 

plication of airpower must be established. Although 

may be an intangible quality, the scope of the topic n

be bounded in order to frame the research and analysi

this in mind, the concept of morale is specifically defin

fashion that approaches common sense for airmen.

Three Case Studies

The first case study considers a German Luftwaffe 

wing in the Battle of Britain in 1940. The replaceme

weak wing commander by a successful one allows som

parative analysis of leadership styles between th

Additionally, pilot morale during the evolution of the ca

is considered in light of commander actions and the 

and operational results achieved. Primary source inform

employed where possible; however, extensive secondary 

material is used to fill in any apparent gaps where neces

5

Figure 1. Basic Relationship Model
a replacement of the group commander during this ca

invites comparison of leadership styles. Extensive p

source materials provide the details necessary to anal

morale implications of the leader’s actions. This materia

rived from unit histories and also from questionnaire

pleted by surviving members of the unit and from cor

dence between them and the author. 

The third case study examines the morale of B-52 a

flying over Hanoi during the Linebacker II opera

December 1972. The B-52 wing commander remain

same throughout the brief operation; however, changes 

tics and the important influence exerted by higher hea

ters furnish a baseline for understanding the effect of co

actions on aircrew morale. Both primary and secondary 

are used to describe the situation and to afford a b

judgments about the actual versus perceived level of 

Once again, questionnaires and correspondence are 

supplement unit histories.

Conclusions and Recommendations. The implicat

the study are addressed with an emphasis on their re

to the application of airpower in general and the applic

American airpower in particular. Additionally, recom

tions are offered to assist the USAF in the development 

fessional military education (PME) programs and oper

doctrine as they apply to the connection between lea

and morale. 

Limitations

This is a study of morale in wartime. The factors requ

motivate aircrew in peacetime will not be identical t

that are paramount in combat. This study is further lim

the realm of combat that involves suffering casualties 

tion. Considerations of morale made by a commander 

these circumstances may differ from those made by 

mander participating in operations other than war. 

6
wing size (60–120 aircraft and crews). With this in mi

lessons drawn from group or wing commanders may 

applicable to squadron or flight commanders in air 

today. The value of studying groups and wings is th

represent the largest air force units in which the leader 

ically also a tactical war fighter. This perspective allo

wing commander to experience the issues of morale fir

and still have the span of control to achieve an opera

significant effect on the overall success of a campaig

quantity and quality of research material available al

suaded the author that more meaningful conclusions m

made from an analysis of cases involving these larger 

These conclusions hopefully will contribute to the scar

ature available for the study of midlevel combat leader

The small number of case studies analyzed is also a 

factor in this project. The practical length of this st

stricted the quantity of cases that could be explored. A

sult, no statistical validity can be implied by the conc

reached. It is worthwhile to repeat that the issues of 

and leadership addressed seek to provide some co

sense understanding of the topic for airpower practitio

is meant to add to the existing body of knowledge on t

ject, not to be the final word on it. 

Along similar lines, the case studies themselves 

complete historical recounts of the events. A brief sum

the context of the battle and the key personalities inv

enough to provide a background for the morale issu

plored. The bibliography provides the reader with ref

that cover the combat details and operational signific

the battles in more depth.

Finally, many of the primary sources used througho

work contain personal recollections of aircrew who fle

bat in these units. Total historical accuracy is not pos

these personal accounts, especially with regard to issu

inating from outside the unit. The details most useful fro

materials will be individual opinions and perceptions of m

7
are motivated by similar conditions. Also, while air com

periences among the case studies under consideration 

identical, they do overlap in some areas that influence 

morale. These similarities are necessary to compare u

different nationality as well as units of the same nat

participating in different conflicts. This is not to say t

context of battle does not matter—it only implies th

plausible that Western air combat units placed in th

context may react in similar ways.

It is also assumed in this research that aircrews ar

vated and behave differently than ground elements 

same wing. Only an aircrew experiences the environm

dangers of aerial combat. This study does not consider 

plications of commander decisions that affect the mo

support troops within an air unit unless those decision

the aviators as well. 

Findings

The purpose of this research is to understand how s

force leaders kept aircrew morale high in spite of su

heavy losses in combat. Such understanding could be 

value to future commanders who find themselves in 

situations.

Notes

1. Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de C

Handbook of Military Psychology, eds. Reuven Gal and A

Mangelsdorff (Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), 454.

2. Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers 

(Boston: Kluwer–Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 326. A common theme 

out the literature of military morale is the importance of the leader

3. Barbara W. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th 

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 584; and Daniel W. Ja

“Alienation, Anomie, and Combat Effectiveness,” Air University 

September–October 1980, 26–27. For example, in the Battle of A

King Henry V’s men were outnumbered three or four to one but 

8
([], y , 

Command and Staff College, AU-2, Guidelines for Command (Maxw

Ala.: Air University Press, 1995). There is currently no USAF doctri

lation, manual, handbook, or pamphlet that addresses leadership, 

morale. The only current published guidance is found in two Air U

handbooks that compile an eclectic group of leadership articles a

mand issues from more than one hundred independent sources. 

5. The author participated in Air Expeditionary Force VII in S

Asia from March 1998 to May 1998 in support of Operation Southe

to enforce the United Nations imposed “no fly zone” in southern Ir

6. The author is indebted to David R. Jones, M.D., instructor o

neuropsychiatry at the USAF Flight Surgeon’s School, who brou

analogy to the author’s attention. In the story each blind man touc

ferent part of the elephant to gain knowledge about what it must be 

man who touches the leg compares the elephant to a tree; the m

touches the side compares the elephant to a house; and the m

touches the trunk compares the elephant to a snake. 

7. Dale O. Smith, “What Is Morale?” Air University Quarterly 

Winter 1951–1952, 45.

9
The Morale Problem

The art of war is subjected to many modifications by ind

trial and scientific progress. But one thing does 

change—the heart of man. In the last analysis, success 

battle is a matter of morale.

—Col Ardant du P

The purpose of this chapter is to clarify what morale 

how it applies to airmen in battle. There is a wide range 

initions for morale. Each one is based on the perspectiv

author who studied the topic. The impossibility of agre

one definition seems evident, but it is necessary to cho

definition as a reference point for the remainder of thi

Fortunately, some common themes about moral

emerged during the last 50 years. The approach taken 

study is selective and seeks to provide a practical guide 

derstanding morale. Once a common definition is estab

a closer examination is made of the underlying physi

psychological factors that contribute to the definition. 

Who Is the Leader?

Military leadership is challenging for several r

Commanders are selected because of the confidence th

ior officers have in their ability, yet every episode of lea

is still essentially an experiment in group behavior. M

art form than a science, most people will agree that lea

is the ability to influence others to behave in ways the

not ordinarily act in order to reach a group goal.1

Although there are formal as well as informal lea

every group, the focus of this combat study will remain 

formal leader.2 Furthermore, within a given chain o

mand, every commander (from the flight leader up thro

National Command Authorities) should not be consid

11
sonal loyalties to flight leaders or squadron commande

men also need leadership from a higher level.3 This 

level for airmen resides in the group or wing because th

and wing commanders still exert command and still imp

identity on aircrews.4 These larger secondary groups a

sidered in-depth through the case study analysis yet t

The Leader’s Role

The primary responsibility of the combat leader m

mission accomplishment because without that purpos

is no need to have the group. The principal raw materia

to execute the mission are the people who will fly and f

the leader’s first step is to translate objectives receive

higher command authorities into individually accepte

for each of these aircrews.5 Of course, that is easier sa

done. It is the interaction of the human element in the 

of battle that highlights morale as the passageway to 

for the commander. An effective leader must be able 

pher the riddle of morale if the mission is to be achiev

Morale: The Definition

The terms morale and motivation are often used 

changeably when discussing why soldiers fight. Beh

scientists specify that motivation consists of the cost

rationale that soldiers make before taking action.6 The 

to this analysis may be physical or psychological, but t

rooted in the way the soldier thinks. Morale, on th

hand, is not so much a process of reasoning but an a

or feeling.7 Common sense tells us that morale is like

an influence on motivation, but how much of one is le

to debate. The air force commander does not really nee

concerned with a highly academic debate on the issu

enough for the commander to understand that the beh

an aircrew is a manifestation of the intangible qualities 

morale and motivation. For the purposes of this resear

12
With that in mind, defining morale must at least consid

assumption. But first, the difference in perceptions of 

needs some elaboration.

Many Definitions

Not surprisingly, most attempts to clarify military 

have focused on soldiers and the two-dimensional bat

Early twentieth-century instruction by the US Army (U

fined morale as “that instinctive feeling of strength an

riority; that which at the outset gives a feeling of con

and an assurance of victory through . . . unconquerab

ity.”8 This was similar to the concept of morale discusse

C. Baynes in his studies of World War I: “A confident, re

willing, often self-sacrificing and courageous attitude o

dividual to the functions or tasks demanded or expe

him by a group.”9 Later USA doctrine deemphasized th

rior aspect of morale but kept the emotional aspects 

“Morale is defined as the mental, emotional, and s

state of the individual. It is how he feels.”10

The USAF is more comfortable discussing factors tha

morale, rather than stating exactly what it is. As a res

USAF has no doctrinal definition of morale.11 Instead, e

Force manuals reflected a peacetime focus on quality o

sues to frame the discussion of morale.12 That traditi

tinues today with the periodic USAF chief of staff surve

poll airmen on operations tempo and perceptions 

amenities they have available. The goal of those surve

show areas needing improvement so that steps can b

to increase satisfaction and, supposedly, morale. 

Some within the USAF recognize that morale is mo

just a laundry list of comforts. Maj Walter A. Grad

Fuller’s war theory to explain that morale is “the mor

[that] acts to translate desire into action.”13 David R. 

M.D., of the USAF Flight Surgeon’s School, teaches ne

surgeons that morale is an emotion that connects the 

ual to the group.14 Psychologist and organizational b

13
translate into determination to accomplish the mission

Morale for Airmen

The common theme throughout most of these classifi

is that morale is an emotional feeling that motivates a 

to behave as the group requires. It is the drive and ea

to see a task through. It is also a feeling about how sa

accomplishing the mission is to an individual. Dr. Fred

Manning is a military psychologist who has special

morale for the American soldier, but his work has a

peared in USAF journals. He is concise when he de

morale as “the enthusiasm and persistence with w

member of a group engages in the prescribed activity 

group.”16

That definition can apply to an army platoon as eas

can apply to a sales office in any business. To make it 

for pilots and aircrews flying in combat, Manning’s de

is adapted here as follows: aircrew morale is the enth

and persistence with which an aviator flies combat m

The simplicity of this statement should not belie the fa

although morale is relatively easy to define, it is very 

to control. In fact, combat morale does not lend itself 

hancement policies” that focus on easy fixes.17

But now that morale is defined, how should it be s

Undoubtedly, morale is affected by too many factors 

merate. Some factors are very important, while oth

barely noticeable. Some factors can be evaluated, but 

cannot. Here is where the disconnect between ground

versions of morale and air-centric versions occurs. Inv

past efforts to debate morale have centered on discuss

soldiers and have focused on particular factors that ar

ential to their environment and psyche. It seems intuit

at least some factors that are important to foot soldi

gaged in hand-to-hand combat are quite different from 

influencing a pilot flying overhead at 20,000 feet. The 

14
influencing factors, the next section establishes a set of 

components of morale that are broad enough to take i

count these individual factors.18 The purpose of classify

components of morale is to understand more general

issues affect morale and to provide a sounding board 

analysis of the leadership case studies later in this wo

The Power of Three

The armored warfare pioneer and military theorist 

Fuller proposed three elements basic to understanding 

ence of warfare: the physical, the moral, and the 

Within these spheres the principles of war could be d

in order to analyze their importance in a given c

Interestingly enough, the concept of morale can bene

this reductionism as well. Psychologists and historian

analyzed military morale in the past in an effort to unco

cause and effect relationships that exist. Several of th

vised three dominant categories with which to study th

vidual factors at work. 

A study commissioned by the North Atlantic 

Organization in 1980 concluded that military morale c

of three dimensions: personal factors related to self-con

commitment to the group identity, and concern for th

nization’s aims.19 Dr. Manning reached similar conc

and labeled the three areas: individual factors, cohesio

esprit de corps.20 Major Grady’s study of pilots’ motivat

morale looked at the moral domain from an airman’s p

tive. He identified three areas within that domain: relation

self, relationship to others, and relationship to abs

What all of these writers have in common is that the

separated the factors of morale into categories of ind

needs, group relationships, and higher organizational i

For the sake of consistency, these will be addressed a

vidual needs, cohesion, and esprit de corps.

15
pypygpy

various factors that keep the aviator in fighting condit

ready to meet the enemy. They include proper food, rest

ing, shelter, training, and useful equipment (aircra

weapons). 

The psychological needs of airmen tend to center 

confidence in their training and equipment. Ultimate

crews must feel that they have a fighting chance of en

the enemy on favorable terms and have a reasonable e

tion of surviving the encounter. One of the best ways t

that confidence is for aircrews to experience success

balancing of courage and fear in combat is assisted by 

ures that build confidence. Along with confidence, the 

need to feel that their contributions to unit success 

portant. Typically this is achieved when airmen kn

unit’s objective, and they understand how their comb

sions help to reach that goal. 

The importance of these individual needs will vary 

aircrews and situations, but a few observations have 

been made about them. There are examples of soldie

high morale fighting in horrific battle conditions where 

cal needs were neglected, to say the least. As long as 

mum standard of food and shelter are met, the satisfa

physical needs tends to be evaluated by soldiers and 

in relative terms.22 Of all the physical needs, howev

USAF recognizes that additional rest is the best way t

sagging morale in times of stress.23 Even though p

needs tend to withstand the rigors of combat, careful at

must also be given to psychological needs in order 

morale high. At all times, soldiers or airmen need to f

they are contributing, that they have an objective, a

they can—and will—succeed.24

Combat has a way of putting individual needs in p

tive. No one disputes that war is he--, so many soldiers a

men expect hardship to some degree. Gen Douglas Mac

once said, “Morale is not necessarily destroyed by ha

danger, or even calamity”; but when combat losses b

16
of the loss. No one wants to die needlessly in battle. M

weakened if the soldier or airman feels that there is no 

ble return on the investment of lives.”26 Furthermore, 

is influenced by the perception that sacrifices are bein

fairly throughout the unit.27 In short, with regard to p

ing morale in the unit, the perception of the worth of th

and a sense of shared sacrifice is every bit as importan

level of losses. 

Cohesion

Cohesion is the bonding together of soldiers or air

such a way as to maintain commitment to each other 

the mission even when under stress.28 This bonding h

shown to be key to maintaining group morale. Marsh

that cohesion played the crucial role in maintaining th

ing spirit of World War II soldiers. On both sides, the s

perseverance reflected a commitment to the members 

unit rather than a conscious motivation for reasons o

ogy or patriotism. 

Cohesion is the by-product of activities among the 

that reinforce common experiences.29 The activities can 

peacetime or combat settings, they can be either on 

duty, and they can include either positive or negati

comes. Unit traditions and military discipline also affec

sion.30 The bottom line is that cohesion is generally 

when members of the group spend time together. Bon

this type comes from frequent contact between mem

what psychologists call the primary group. 

Although cohesion is a powerful morale builder, the p

group involved is generally fairly small because it mus

frequent interaction between the members. In an air fo

ting, the primary group is a crew, a flight, or per

squadron. Primary groups are those in which the m

know the other members on a personal level. Field M

Bernard L. Montgomery referred to this as comradeshi

17
Standardized training is common among all aircrew me

including pilots. The training is also quite lengthy. It ta

proximately two years to train a pilot or navigator to 

sion ready. When new aircrews arrive in a unit, they 

share an ingrained sense of similarity among the other 

Throughout their careers, additional flying assignmen

force this shared background. Even though newcomer

squadron may have never met the other members, ther

a strong cohesive element in place. It is not necessary f

comers to have a shared flying background with those 

primary group. Of course, additional activities that invo

new primary group strengthen cohesion even more

Grady’s research into the factors that motivated F-10

in Vietnam could not discern cohesion as an influence 

his pilot group. He suggested that perhaps cohesion 

strong among these aviators that it did not vary, and 

could not measure its effect.32 The distinct possibility 

that groups of airmen, by nature, have high cohesive t

cies that are resistant to influence. 

Combat has a remarkably positive impact on co

within armed forces. During wartime, morale in un

been noted to be higher in active combat areas than i

of inactivity.33 That may be because the sense of missio

viously apparent to the soldiers and airmen, but it also 

because combat is a tremendously powerful shared exp

that strengthens cohesion. Witness the hundreds of Wo

II group organizations that have existed for more than 

century. The experience of combat has united men in 

that have lasted a lifetime.

Esprit de Corps

Esprit de corps is pride in and devotion to a formal 

zation beyond the primary group.34 Montgomery call

regimental spirit. The formal organizations that can con

to esprit de corps are generally larger units outside t

mary group to which the individual soldier or airman b

18
ferred to as secondary groups. 

The secondary group is an important factor in mor

cause identifying with its reputation provides a sense of 

valor, and indestructibility that can help offset fear.35 

hinges on the way that people deal with an internal 

power, and identifying with a larger group is one way t

teract that.36 The secondary group also represents the 

tween primary group goals and the national cause.37 Al

the factors of esprit de corps may be weaker than co

and individual needs, they still provide some influe

morale.

Esprit de corps is more important in combat than in 

time. The effects of defeat on a small unit in combat 

damaging to unit morale, particularly when the primar

leader becomes a casualty.38 The secondary group serv

source of identity, but it is “large enough to escape sud

tastrophe at the hands of the enemy.”39 This psych

subtlety may not be a huge factor in maintaining mor

it does provide some support.

Esprit de corps in airmen is found by identifying w

group, wing, or perhaps the air division or air force to 

the aircrew belongs. Unit histories tend to be too dis

provide a useful identity; but recent activities, and c

current reputation, of these groups is the clearest influ

esprit de corps for the aircrew. The evolving USAF oper

concept of air expeditionary forces may some day pr

source of esprit de corps for American airmen who par

in them, but this is a case in which esprit de corps n

be consciously propagated.40 Another peculiarity with a

concerning esprit de corps is the possible connection b

confidence in oneself and pride in the aircraft type 

flown. In some ways, aircrews identify with their equipm

strongly that they in fact draw support from members w

long to that larger group. For example, success by a wi

flies a particular aircraft type can produce pride and 

19
Maintaining Control

When taken as a whole, the three elements of moral

vidual needs, cohesion, and esprit de corps) have one c

theme—they each contribute to providing control in s

situations such as combat. Good morale indicates 

from within.41 Control is important to the morale of an

combat, but aircrews are a unique breed of warriors in 

gard. Flying aircraft requires constant internal and e

control. To lose control often spells disaster. It is not s

ing then that one of the characteristics of most pilots 

they have controlling tendencies.42 Understanding the 

siveness of the need for control is the key to unders

morale for aircrews. 

Notes

1. Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (N

Basic Books, 1976), 214.

2. Mark T. Diebolt, “A Study of Air Force Leadership and Mo

search study, Air Command and Staff College [ACSC], 1971), 15. T

of formal authority is clearly the case where military officers are 

command billets; however, powerful influences can still emanate fr

mal leaders within the group. 

3. Frederick J. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de C

Handbook of Military Psychology, eds. Reuven Gal and A

Mangelsdorff (Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), 468. 

asserts that when fighting spirit is connected too closely to sm

leaders, then that spirit will wither if the commander is killed. The

connection to larger group commanders (group, wing, air force) is 

especially in heavy combat. 

4. Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers 

(Boston: Kluwer–Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 45. Kellett addresses the

group leaders and illustrates that their level of command is differ

the small squad leader but no less important to the motivation o

dier. Others differentiate the larger secondary groups from the sm

sonal primary groups formed from daily contact.

5. Dale O. Smith, “What Is Morale?” Air University Quarterly 

Winter 1951–1952, 49; Manning, 457–58; and Diebolt, 14.

6. Kellett, 6.

20
gy, , 

9. J. C. Baynes, Morale (New York: Praeger, 1967); quoted in M

455.

10. Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership, 228; quoted in M

454.

11. David R. Jones, M.D., instructor of aviation neuropsychiat

USAF Flight Surgeon’s School, telephone interview with the author, 

2000, Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala. Dr. Jones was unaware of 

cific definition of morale used by the USAF in the instruction of fl

geons. Among other topics, Dr. Jones’s course teaches new flight 

how to recognize falling morale among aircrews and ways to impro

12. Air Force Manual 50-3, Air Force Leadership, 104; quoted in 

20. Issues addressed by the Air Force included comfortable quarte

mail service, medical attention, and base exchange facilities amon

13. Walter A. Grady Jr., “The Moral Domain of War: A View 

Cockpit” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 

AFB, Ala., 1993), 22.

14. Jones interview.

15. “Psychological Factors in Morale” (research report, US Nav

of Aviation Medicine, 1954), 2; quoted in Diebolt, 19. 

16. Manning, 455.

17. Kellett, 336. Although Kellett is speaking about the futilit

trolling motivation factors, this concept applies equally to those fac

leaders believe influence morale. 

18. The concept of compartmentalizing individual factors of m

widespread in the literature. The author will use a combination o

nents addressed by Colonel Smith in “What Is Morale?” and Dr. Ma

“Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps.”

19. Manning, 455. Refers to a study made by I. N. Evonic.

20. Ibid., 456–61.

21. Woodruff, 4; Smith, 48; and Diebolt, 26. Each writer emphas

nothing succeeds like success.

22. Manning, 460. Manning uses the term relative deprivation 

trate the fact that soldiers assess their physical needs based upon 

ditions of the moment. 

23. Jones interview.

24. Manning, 460. Manning refers to these needs as a role, a 

self-confidence.

25. Thomas M. Ryan, “A Major Commander Speaks: The 

Combination,” TIG Brief, 14 May 1982, 2.

26. Kellett, 268.

27. Diebolt, 24.

28. Manning, 457.

21
y

Leadership, Morale, and Group Cohesion,” Research Report no. 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: ACSC, 1984), 10; and Kellett, 46.

32. Grady, 51.

33. Smith, 43.

34. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 458.

35. Kellett, 44.

36. Jones interview.

37. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 465.

38. Kellett, 260–61, 268.

39. Manning, “Morale, Cohesion, and Esprit de Corps,” 458.

40. Kellett, 322. Kellett feels that because esprit de corps is focu

group detached from daily activity, the effort to identify with th

group would consist of communicating the reputation of (reasons f

fying with) the group.

41. Havron, 9.

42. “Chapter Nine—Aviation Neuropsychiatry,” USAF Flight S

Guide, n.d. (E-mail copy received from USAF Flight Surgeon’s Sc

February 2000), 5.

22
Maj Adolf Galland:

Jagdgeschwader 26

Only the spirit of attack borne in a brave heart will brin

success to any fighter aircraft, no matter how highly de

oped it may be.

—Adolf Galla

Combat histories are full of examples of men wh

through the ranks due to their remarkable ability to 

success in battle. Maj Adolf Galland began his combat 

as a lieutenant in the Condor Legion flying ground-atta

sions for the German Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civ

Within the span of four years, his consistent skill in th

evated him to the position of senior general of all fighte

in the Luftwaffe. Although he began his Luftwaffe servic

attack pilot, it was his success as a Bf 109 pilot an

mander of Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) 26 (JG26) 

Battle of Britain that gained him the reputation as Ger

top fighter commander in the Second World War. 

Talent at a junior rank does not always translate eq

command potential. Major Galland had the rare quality 

combat leaders that elicited success from his men wh

omizing the example he wished them to follow. His ae

complishments were the envy of every German fighte

His challenge in the summer of 1940 was no eas

Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) was a formidable pee

petitor. Heavy losses among his wing’s three groups a

sheer exhaustion of his pilots would take their toll. Thi

ter examines the role that Major Galland played in mold

combat morale of his pilots during the Luftwaffe’s firs

paign failure of World War II—the Battle of Britain. A fi

at the events surrounding the Battle of Britain will pla

morale in the proper context. 

23
through western Europe, the Luftwaffe was perceived 

most powerful air force in existence. Indeed, the oper

lessons that Germany learned in Spain had played a 

factor in the integration of airpower with both land an

forces in the early campaigns of World War II. Of course, 

fact that was ignored by foreign intelligence experts as 

German strategists was the nature of the Luftwaffe’s p

The Luftwaffe’s early preeminence within the Weh

was due to Hitler’s vision of the offensive capabilities t

air force could bring to bear on the enemy. Natura

bomber received top priority and special prestige bec

was the offensive attack weapon. The fighter force (jag

was merely a subsidiary force designed to enable bomb

land-force successes. The fighters were designed fo

tasks: attacking enemy aircraft, protecting the Luftwaff

air formations, and providing home defense.1 This di

relationship within the Luftwaffe created a mispercep

the strategic strength of the air force. The strength 

Luftwaffe was, in fact, not found in the performanc

bombers but in the cooperation and coordination 

fighters and bombers with the German army.2 Germany 

find this out over time.

After Adolf Hitler defeated France, his next planned m

goal was the conquest of the Soviet Union. Before h

turn his attention fully to the east, he needed to sec

western flank. Although Great Britain was at wa

Germany, Hitler assumed that he could reach some 

understanding with Prime Minister Winston S. Church

ease with which Germany rolled up France and th

Countries must have played a part in Hitler’s assessm

his coercive capabilities, and Hitler had never contem

an all-out war with Britain. However, Hitler’s slow esc

of aircraft attacks against English shipping and—fina

island itself ensured that Churchill would never acqui

The lack of forethought given to war with the 

Kingdom (UK) manifested itself in Hitler’s plans for th

sion of the island nation, code-named Operation Se

24
velop plans for its contribution to an invasion force, b

overall coordination was imposed by the OKW. The res

a bizarre list of preconditions that each service claimed 

sary.3 The Luftwaffe was singled out as the service upon 

all possible invasion plans would rest. It would need to 

total air supremacy over the invasion landing zon

English Channel if the invasion were to be successful.

Hermann Göring had his first taste of failure wh

Luftwaffe could not prevent the evacuation of the 

Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Dunkirk in May and J

1940. Determined to redeem himself with Hitler, he a

the Herculean task required of the Luftwaffe that would 

into the Battle of Britain. The objectives set for the Lu

varied over time. At first, the blockade of England by air 

of shipping was considered most important in order to 

the UK from the rest of the world. Next, in preparation 

invasion force, air superiority was required over the 

zone and channel. This meant that coastal artillery a

fighter capabilities must be eliminated. Finally, the o

most difficult to achieve—the Luftwaffe was directed 

Britain to surrender through total air warfare.5 The wid

of air objectives reflected the inconsistency that charac

the entire campaign. 

Countersea Operations

In the course of the French campaign, the Luftwaffe a

British merchant shipping and naval forces in an effort 

vent assistance from reaching the continent. After the 

the BEF retreated from Dunkirk and France sign

armistice, Hitler continued attacks against British ship

order to keep pressure on the English while he held 

diplomatic efforts to secure a peace deal. The Battle of 

entered its initial phase in this countersea campaign. C

were attacked through July, although the focus of 

against England would shift toward the end of the m

the RAF fighters themselves. 

25
fighters achieved considerable success against the RAF f

whose formations and tactics were inferior to those 

Germans.6 These early victories led the Luftwaffe to belie

the RAF could be beaten in the air through attrition. S

superiority was a prerequisite for the invasion, the em

thus shifted on 24 July to a massive offensive countera

paign of aerial combat pitting the superior Bf 109 again

rior RAF Hurricanes and near-equal RAF Spitfires.7 All t

required was to invite the RAF fighters to join the battle.

The Fighter Battle

During the last week of July, the RAF fighters rose to 

the Germans as soon as British radar indicated that 

aircraft were inbound. The Germans held the upper ha

tially as the RAF fighters struggled to reach altitude wh

dogfights would occur. The British had a steep learnin

during this period and relocated some of their coastal 

bases farther inland to allow more time to climb befo

gling with the Germans. They were also more selec

choosing to do battle. Soon the Luftwaffe realized that t

would not rise to challenge formations devoid of bo

Small formations of bombers were therefore mixed in w

Bf 109s as decoys to encourage RAF fighters to take 

12 August the Luftwaffe concluded that the RAF was n

breaking point. The measured response from British 

combined with the lack of German intelligence misled 

tackers into thinking they were close to achieving air 

ority.9 Unfortunately, the amount of fighting was too lim

make significant gains toward achieving air supe

Anxious to secure the prerequisites for the invasion, 

changed his focus as he launched a new operation.

The Air Offensive—Adlerangriff

Eagle Day, or Adlertag, began an expansion of the o

counterair campaign on 13 August. This was a conce

26
fields in southeastern England, as well as ground or

tions and the radar sites. The fighters accompan

bombers and destroyed as many British fighters as pos

the air. 

A heated controversy began within the Luftwaffe dur

period over the best fighter tactics to protect the bom

these missions. The fighter pilots felt that the more f

they had in formation keeping and maneuvering, th

successful they would be engaging the enemy. The bom

lots felt that when the fighters flew beyond visual r

their escorts, the bombers became more vulnerable to 

Four fighter missions were developed or refined as a r

the debate. The close-escort mission strictly required 

to maintain visual formation around the bombers. T

tached escort mission allowed the fighters to follow the 

routing of the bombers but with some freedom to 

enemy fighters. The free hunt, or freie jagd, mission w

traditional fighter-pilot tactic of sweeping well ahead 

bombers and engaging the enemy before the bombers 

Finally, the fighter-reception mission required that figh

cort arrive in time to meet the bombers as they left th

area. Each fighter unit would take turns conducting th

tics on various missions. 

The weaknesses of German intelligence capabilitie

highlighted again and again as the German OKW, Göri

Gen Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe chief of staff, failed 

preciate the actual effects of the counterair campaign 

RAF Fighter Command. Göring himself intervened to 

tactics on the fighter and bomber commanders to m

losses, although no changes were really needed.1

though German bomber aircraft and aircrew losses w

ing to uncomfortable levels, the RAF was reaching the 

ing point by the beginning of September.11 However, th

sure that Göring was under to produce results by 

September invasion date caused him to doubt his com

ers in the field.12 His own frustration at the lack of vis

27
Demanding retaliation for the bombing of civili

London, Churchill launched his own bombers against G

cities after he perceived that Hitler had switched to a s

of bombing the British capital. This move infuriated 

who responded by directing that his own air offensive 

targeting focus once again, away from the collapsing R

onto London itself.

City Bombing

Reprisal raids against London began on 7 Septembe

Luftwaffe, now under the personal command of 

launched massive raids against the city. The new ta

scheme also brought new risks since the large incr

bombers assembling over the French coast were esco

the same number of German fighters as before. The 

job of fighter escort became that much more demand

the Bf 109 pilots.13 The most critical weakness of the 

was its lack of range. Extra assembly time for the la

packages meant less aerial combat time for the German f

Because of the limited range of the fighters, virtually all 

routing would become straight lines from Calais to Lond

The RAF reacted to the shift in German targeting w

prise and relief. With RAF fighter units and bases abl

constitute their strength after three weeks of relentless 

the British formed an excellent counterpunch to the G

raids on London. The predictability of German tactic

bined with the diminished Luftwaffe fighter engagemen

translated to increasing losses for the German bomb

September alone, the number of German bombers lost o

aged rose some 15 percent over the previous month.14 

was losing bombers and, more importantly, experience

faster than he could hope to replace them. The situatio

to a head on 15 September when two successive Germa

against London were repulsed by British fighters. Thi

coincided with Hitler’s decision that the invasion sho

28
Fighter-Bomber Operations

Göring held his fighter pilots personally to blame 

losses of Luftwaffe bombers. He often told his senior 

commanders that a lack of aggressiveness and discip

the part of Bf 109 pilots in particular, was the reason 

ing bombers over England. In an act of spite and frus

Göring ordered that one-third of all fighters be convert

fighter-bombers (jabos) capable of carrying a 500

bomb. In his view, if the fighters were unable to pro

bombers, then they must deliver the bombs on England 

selves.16

The first jabo raids on London occurred on 20 Sep

and met with very little RAF resistance.17 The British 

fense stations identified the incoming aircraft as fight

did not consider them, by themselves, to be a threat. 

not until the bombs they delivered on London detonat

the RAF fighters were scrambled to intercept the att

Subsequent jabo raids were not as successful at sur

the English. Although innovative as a new tactic, th

raids accomplished little since their payloads were in

cant and the untrained fighter pilots were very impre

their deliveries. The real effect of the jabo raids was to 

pressure on the British while the German bombers w

configured and their crews trained for night bombing ope

Night Bombing

The prohibitive losses taken by German bombers 

daylight attacks over England drove Göring to switch t

operations for these aircraft. Some night bombing attac

been tried earlier in September; but after the 15 Sep

losses, Göring stepped up the night missions. Night ra

creased through October, and by 20 October the Luftw

sentially flew bomber missions only at night while jabo 

continued throughout the day. German fighters con

their escort duties by day, but deteriorating weather a

29
tions signaled to the British that their day fighte

thwarted the German plans for invasion. It was duri

night phase of the Battle of Britain that the stalemate 

obvious to both sides. When the failure of Operation S

became apparent, Hitler shifted his focus to the invasio

Soviet Union. For the Luftwaffe, the Battle of Britain n

ficially ended.18 The emphasis devoted to it simply tap

until such a time as Hitler considered an invasion onc

possible. That possibility, however, never materialized. 

Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Bri

JG26 was composed of four separate combat flying 

zations. Three groups (gruppen), each containing 

squadrons with a total of approximately 40 aircraft and 

formed the bulk of the combat power of the wing. Addit

the wing staff had the capability to launch a very sma

(separate from the groups) of either two or four aircra

their assigned pilots. The logistics of each group requir

they be located at three separate bases in the Calais ar

ing the Battle of Britain, with the wing staff colocat

Group 1 (I/JG26). Command and control was obvious

difficult with this multilocation arrangement, but it was 

insurmountable problem. 

The wing commander (Kommodore) of JG26 w

Gotthardt Handrick when the wing began combat ope

in the Battle of Britain on 24 July 1940. Major Handr

an ineffective and indecisive combat commander by so

counts and took a rather passive role in leading his fig

lots.19 Göring grew frustrated with the lack of aggress

of several of his fighter-wing commanders, and on 22 

he replaced Handrick with the very successful grou

mander of III/JG26, Maj Adolf Galland.20 Galland had 

achieved 22 aerial victories by 15 August in operations 

the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain.21 Gallan

manded JG26 through the remainder of the Battle of B

30
had an impressive kill ratio during the Battle of Brit

table 1 demonstrates. Even more impressive is the fa

four of the wing’s fighter pilots (out of a total of approx

150 pilots) claimed an astounding 31 percent of all ki

further interest is that Major Galland alone claimed 

cent of the wing’s kills.

The aircraft assigned to the wing was the Bf 109 sin

gine fighter. The performance of the Bf 109 was superio

British Hurricane in speed and maneuverability. The 

Spitfire was a closer match. Although the Spitfire was 

miles per hour slower than the Bf 109, its turning ca

was superior; and in slower fights, it could be a formida

ponent. Several variants of the Bf 109 remained with th

throughout the battle. The earlier version Bf 109E-1, 

quately armed with four light machine guns, was ge

flown by enlisted pilots. The modified Bf 109E-4 had in

lethality, with two of its light machine guns being repl

two very effective wing cannons. The latest model of the 

was the E-4/N. It had an improved engine that gave 

craft greater speed at high altitudes.

Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 2

For the purposes of this study, the focus on JG2

morale in the Battle of Britain is from July through the 

31

Table 1

Jagdgeschwader 26 Kill Claims and Losses by Month

(July–October 1940)

July 1940 August 1940 September 1940 October 

Kills Claimed 10 126 97 26

Losses 4 21 18 9

Kill Ratio 2.5 : 1 6 : 1 5.4 : 1 2.
have stated that “there was no lack of stomach for furth

tle amongst any of the fighter pilots in all the Geschw

the Channel Front,” even by the end of October.24

This positive outlook did not remain constant thro

the three-month period. In fact, several factors influen

fighting spirit of the pilots in JG26 during the Battle of 

Individual Needs

Major Galland inherited a fully operational comba

when he assumed command of JG26 on 22 August. Al

food and living conditions varied among the different 

that composed JG26 throughout its deployment on th

nel coast, these factors had little effect on pilot behavi

Rest, however, was an issue that did affect fighter-pilot 

in JG26. Many of the pilots were routinely flying three 

missions per day throughout the campaign.26 There we

10 minutes of loiter time over the objective area, a

Luftwaffe lacked sufficient numbers of aircraft and p

maintain continual operations against the British.27 Th

premium that Göring placed on bomber protection als

the requirement for frequent fighter-pilot missions to 

istic expectations.28 Although Donald L. Caldwell c

states that “no JG26 formation ever suffered such cr

losses that its combat efficiency dropped,”29 Galland 

recognized the manifest fatigue of his pilots. By the 

September, Galland noticed that “the stamina of the s

trained and experienced original [cadre of pilots] was d

a point where operational efficiency was being impaire

early August the German fighter-wing commanders ha

ized that the strain of combat operations would requir

the pilots a day off after every four or five days.31 Althou

policy might have been helpful in the earlier campa

1940, the Battle of Britain soon required the maximum 

of every experienced pilot. The only real rest periods wer

days when operations were cancelled due to poor w

32
the pilots of JG26. Although JG26 losses during the B

Britain were fairly low, overall Bf 109 losses for the Lu

during this time were 660 aircraft.33 If the conservati

duction figure of 125 fighters per month was valid, th

overall replacement capability for the same period abov

have been 625 airplanes.34

Training was not a significant detriment to morale 

JG26 pilots engaged in the Battle of Britain. Most of th

had been experienced veterans of combat action over 

and some had even been active in the Luftwaffe in the 

Legion, albeit not as part of JG26. Sound training th

should have translated into sound tactics througho

Battle of Britain. This was not the case for several r

First, the Luftwaffe was, for the first time, participatin

air campaign without the synergy of the army or navy e

simultaneously with the enemy. Second, tactics were d

by Göring, without an appreciation for the actual nec

of strategic air warfare nor of the advantages and weak

of Luftwaffe aircraft.35 The third reason was that replac

arriving in JG26 were poorer quality than the origina

lost.36 Fourth, although German tactics were initially s

to the RAF fighter units, the British quickly learned t

their tactics to best offset the German strengths. This 

tion led to a conflict between the two significant psych

needs of the fighter pilots—confidence in their aircr

confidence in their tactics.

Perhaps the most significant psychological need of th

pilots that positively influenced morale was the confid

their aircraft. The success of Bf 109s in the Condor Leg

the campaigns in the west, culminating in the B

France, confirmed the relative superiority of that air

the pilots who would fly them in the Battle of Britain. G

was convinced—after minor engagements with the RA

ers at the end of the Battle of France—that although t

pilots were formidable opponents, the Bf 109 was sup

both the Hurricane and the Spitfire.37 His view was st

33
shared Galland’s view in the confidence of their ma

Caldwell states that the pilots of JG26 believed that t

109s were the best single-engine fighters in the world 

time.39 When JG26 began receiving the new Bf 10

model on 7 September, morale in the units rose consid

Even 60 years after the battle, a former JG26 pilot re

the author that the arrival of the new Bf 109 within hi

was a significant event that improved morale.40 Clea

airplane was a central part of pilot morale within JG26

The most significant psychological need of the JG26 

though not met—was for confidence in headquarters-d

fighter tactics. The German fighter pilot at that tim

much identified with the original fighter pilot’s objec

the First World War articulated by Baron Manfr

Richthofen: The mission of the fighter pilot is to find the 

and shoot him down—“anything else is nonsense.

group commander of III/JG26 stated that the most im

factor to maintaining good morale was the mission typ

flown.42 Of the four fighter missions discussed alread

the fighter-sweep mission was truly satisfying to the pi

cause those missions generally yielded the most 

Another JG26 pilot was convinced that “the sole import

tor [for pilot morale] was the single success of aerial b

The close-escort missions protecting the bombers w

most discouraging missions for the pilots. By flying in 

maneuvering, defensive position on the wings of the bo

the fighter pilots lost all of the advantages of the Bf 109 

and climbing/diving ability) and actually magnified t

nerabilities of their aircraft (poor cockpit visibility, 

range, and poor turning capability).45 More than physi

itations, Galland claimed that fighting spirit was also a

when his pilots were tasked with close-escort missions

The worst disadvantage of this type of escort was not aerodynam

lay in its deep contradiction of the basic function of fighter aircr

use speed and maneuverability to seek, find, and destroy enem

craft, in this case, those of Fighter Command. The [Bf 109s

bound to the bombers and could not leave until attacked, thus 

34
When the Battle of Britain exposed the Ju 87 Stuk

bomber to heavy losses in the opening phases, Göring 

that his fighters provide better escort for all bombers. 

rected close-escort tactics that, in fact, contributed to 

heavy bomber losses.47 Göring misunderstood the 

dilemma and blamed the fighter pilots for the loss

fighter pilots felt like chained dogs when they were requ

fly the close-escort missions because they knew the

fighting at a disadvantage.48

Göring further compromised pilot morale in Sep

Göring’s decision to refit one-third of all fighter w

fighter-bombers had an equally damaging influence 

morale of JG26. Not only did the pilots of JG26 lose con

in their aircraft they also resented the new bomber m

they were assigned. When the Bf 109 was flown as a 

lost climb capability as well as speed and maneuver

The pilots were eager to get rid of their bomb at t

chance in order to regain performance. They also kn

the small payload they were carrying and the inaccura

which it was delivered did not have a significant effect 

enemy.49 Galland claimed that the fighter pilots did n

this mission and that requiring them to fly as jabos 

their morale. The jabo pilots were ordered to fly an infer

chine, in a passive role, which ran contrary to their ins

Caldwell believed that exhaustion rather than the jab

sions contributed toward sinking morale. He states t

though the jabos carried bombs, once they released the

were free to tend to the traditional fighter-sweep tact

they enjoyed.51 However, at least through the end of O

none of the JG26 squadrons assigned on jabo m

claimed any air-to-air kills, which implies that their 

pilot measure of satisfaction (shooting down the enem

not met.52 In sum, the jabo missions added to difficulti

pilot morale at a time when it was becoming apparent t

Battle of Britain was not achieving its objectives. 

35
gg g 

mon experiences that these fighter pilots had through

Battle of Britain may have helped bond them to one a

although it is uncertain whether or not this factor 

much of a role in the overall morale of the wing. It could 

gued that fighter pilots who experience high cohesion 

their flights would risk their own lives to protect or a

vulnerable comrade. If so, the author has been unable 

any mention of the sacrifice required of such commitm

any of the literature of this battle. Nevertheless, the abs

such details does not prove that cohesion in small, p

groups was not important in JG26. It merely means th

impossible to relay any conclusions regarding mora

were generated as a result of these influences. 

Esprit de Corps

For the pilots of JG26, there were two secondary grou

influenced overall morale: the fighter wing itself, and 

litical leadership embodied in Göring. The influence o

two sources of support ultimately translated into es

corps and affected morale throughout the Battle of Bri

these two groups, wing reputation provided a positive b

esprit de corps, while Göring’s impact was negative. 

A special reputation was established for JG26 even 

the war. Originally, the wing was named with not onl

merical designation but also after the name of a nation

Leo Schlageter. During the French occupation of the R

1923, Schlageter fought for German independence in t

and was executed by the French. The letter S was pain

each JG26 aircraft and the pilots realized that “the 

(Schlageter) was a special responsibility in the Nationa

tion.”53 JG26’s war reputation complemented that prid

The reputation and successes of JG26 had a signific

fluence on the esprit de corps of the fighter pilots. Es

corps was strengthened by the successes of the wing i

areas: the outcome of the Battle of France, the number 

36
and provided the pilots with a tremendous sense of 

plishment. Accordingly, the successes in May and Ju

tributed to very high morale throughout the wing at 

ginning of the Battle of Britain.54 The pilots were very s

with their wing’s overall performance in France, and th

was honored by Hitler when asked to provide the com

patrol mission overhead the armistice negotiati

Compeigne on 20 June.55 The Battle of Britain contin

bring recognition to JG26.

Throughout the Battle of Britain, JG26 had become 

mier fighter unit with a total of 285 claimed victories 

cost of 56 pilots.56 The pilots were well aware of the

cesses and the relative standings of the other fighter 

Indeed, after Göring replaced several fighter-wing com

ers in August with younger, more successful officers, 

competition among the wings began.57 All pilots wante

long to the wing with the highest score. This competiti

tivated the JG26 pilots to achieve great aerial victories; 

the end of the campaign, seven JG26 pilots had been a

the Knight’s Cross for their success.58

The excellence in the wing also spread to its second

as bomber escorts. Although the pilots disliked the esco

sions, they were regarded as the best wing for the job. G

claimed that all the bomber wings would request JG2

tection on their raids. Early escort raids bear out the 

tence of the wing in the escort role.59 However, later 

missions in which bomber wings lost significant aircraf

the watch of JG26 indicate that the performance leve

vary dramatically.60 Even so, the early reputation as 

escort unit formed an opinion that the wing perform

best of any other fighter wing. This reputation may h

couraged the wing pilots to perform a mission to the 

their abilities even though there was no love for the job

Göring’s actions throughout the Battle of Britain 

pilot morale in at least two ways. First, Göring harsh

cized the valor and competence of all the Luftwaffe’s fig

37
his justification for drawing such conclusions, Göring 

a point to chastise the fighter pilots through their c

command, as well as directly. The fighter pilots and un

manders were “deeply offended by the tone and by the 

fest exaggeration of the accusations” that Göring made

Second, Göring shifted the focus of the fighter missi

quently and without clarity of purpose. Whether issui

tactics from his headquarters at Karinhall—or person

recting the shift from one phase of the operation to the 

his erratic taskings undermined pilot confidence. In co

the fighter pilots felt that their aerial successes were 

the Luftwaffe and Germany to victory, only to have 

change tactics and create unnecessary setbacks.62 The 

pilots of JG26, like the fighter pilots of other Luftwaffe 

were being affected by Göring’s actions. These action

enced lower morale. 

Galland’s Influence on Morale

In the words of one of his own men, Galland was a 

commander; but that was expected of him. “Galland wa

dier. He was clear. He was decisive. He was always re

was an outstanding flyer and an outstanding marksm

had outstanding eyesight and was lightning-quick in h

tions and his decisions.”63 Galland was a man of acti

discipline. He did not care for the Luftwaffe political i

above his wing level. His skill as a fighter pilot was u

tionable. He cared for the well-being of his men, yet he 

firm hand on them at the same time.64 He demanded 

deal of his men and chastised them when their perfo

was below his standard.65 He emphasized efficiency ov

tary show, but he also expected the utmost in military 

from the men of his wing.66 But where Galland dem

much from his men, he also provided the example 

wanted them to follow. 

38
Göring’s mind with respect to the bomber-escort miss

did take immediate actions to improve pilot morale.

The first thing Major Galland did as the new Kommo

JG26 was to replace several ineffective group and sq

commanders with younger, more aggressive, and mo

cessful (in terms of aerial engagements) officers in th

He also increased the wing staff flight from Handrick

ship formation to a more lethal four-ship formation. G

began leading all JG26 packages that were of Geschwa

with his new four-ship staff flight. He was not content 

from behind as his predecessor had been. Instead, G

became the example for his wing. He flew as often as p

and led the most difficult missions. He firmly believed 

leader of fighter pilots could “only receive full recogniti

asked nothing from his men that he was not prepare

himself.”68 The visible change in leadership styles was e

aging for his men, but Galland’s greater quality was fo

his tactical innovation.

The most immediate difficulty was with the escort-m

requirements. Luftwaffe bomber crews wanted visible 

on their raids, but Galland knew tying the fighters to 

formation would raise losses rather than prevent them

veloped a flexible escort system that allowed his pilo

stantly to change altitude, airspeed, direction, and dist

the bombers during these close-escort missions. The 

were superior to those wings that were locked into sta

mations around the bombers. The fighter pilots, while 

tally pleased with the escort role, realized that Ga

method was “the best escort system possible.”69 By the 

the Battle of Britain, JG26 had gained a reputation as 

only two fighter wings that performed escort duties “wi

sistently low losses” to the bombers they were entru

protect.70 The pilots may not have enjoyed this duty, b

were successful at it; and they still were able to find an

down the enemy, if only in reduced quantities. Furthe

because Galland met almost daily with the other win

39
ments were another story altogether. 

Once Göring was committed to reconfigure one-thir

fighter wings to pick up the fighter-bomber mission, G

had to accept the decision. If morale among the fighte

was indeed greatly affected by this new mission, then G

must bear part of the blame for that result. His pilo

clearly not enthusiastic about their new aircraft modifi

and tactics. Galland’s response to the situation was to 

a packaging concept that mixed the Bf 109 jabos in w

Bf 109 fighters in an effort to deceive the enemy and co

their intercept plans. This tactic slowed down the jabo 

but the pilots still felt as though they were “being wa

Galland missed three opportunities to boost morale w

gard to the hated jabo mission. First, although pilots ha

practice with cement bombs, Galland did not capita

training opportunities to improve the bombing accurac

pilots.73 Second, he could have disciplined those pilo

were prone to jettison their bombs at the first oppo

Third, he could have actually participated in the jabo m

instead of merely providing escort for them. Any of th

tions might have conveyed to his pilots that the missio

important enough to warrant his attention. Instead, he 

let the pilots’ contempt for the mission remain unch

Most surprising with regard to Galland’s dismissive a

toward the bombing mission was that he once was a g

attack pilot. He flew He 51s in Spain; and as recently 

Polish campaign in 1939, Galland had flown ground

missions in the Hs 123. In essence he violated his own 

of not asking the men to do something that he himself w

prepared to do. 

The most visible action that Major Galland took to ra

morale of his pilots was one that he never consciously 

focus on—his ability to shoot down enemy fighters. His 

to seek out RAF fighters and score victories was almost 

occurrence. The high-scoring competition that grew b

Galland and Werner Mölders was an inspiration to th

40
overall morale. The jubilation that the pilots felt after G

40th victory is evidence of the high esprit de corps gener

his accomplishments.74 The rising scoreboard for the win

pled with the reputation of the wing for escort mission

enough to convince the pilots that they were successful. 

Conclusions

Surprisingly, the level of German aircraft and pilot 

did not significantly lower morale throughout the B

Britain. The pilots expected war to be costly, but the

other issues that did sway morale. Galland knew that 

demoralizing issues were beyond his ability to change.

so, his record is mixed on purposefully taking action 

morale. In the cases where he was able to boost 

Galland increased the perception of control within his 

His implementation of escort tactics satisfied a psych

need that brought greater mission success to each fligh

ber. Additionally, his success in the air connected the ind

pilots to the wing at large and created a sense of stren

gardless of individual squadron or group successes. 

Unfortunately, Galland did not see an opportunity t

ence morale when he was forced to deal with fighter-

operations. This occurred despite having the attack 

ground to lend credibility to the new mission. He was gi

lemons, but in this case he could make no lemonade. T

stance of low pilot morale leads one to speculate that 

cannot be created in a vacuum. Instead, tactical devel

in combat must serve to attain a national objective, 

that objective is not widely embraced. The benefits of th

fully applying tactics to match objectives is obvious ins

civil-military relations are concerned, but aircrew m

also served well by such an approach.

Notes

1. Walter von Brauchitsch, interrogated by Ninth Air Force Air 

of War Interrogation Unit, 20 August 1945, Report no. 94/1945, ti

41
pg pg

inner working of the Luftwaffe. 

2. Adolf Galland, “Defeat of the Luftwaffe: Fundamental Cau

University Quarterly Review, Spring 1953, 25. 

3. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the 

Fighter Forces, 1938–1945, trans. Mervyn Savill (New York: Henry 

Co., 1954), 20. The army asserted that the navy should provide th

sary shipping, landing, and supply vessels; the navy demanded 

Luftwaffe provide total air supremacy over their fleet operations. 

words, the Luftwaffe was held responsible for getting the operati

way.

4. Wilhelm Keitel, field order directive signed by Feldmarscha

OKW Staff, 2 July 1940, AFHRA file no. 512.621 VII/21, 1. 

5. Adolf Galland, “The Battle of Britain,” report compiled and tr

by the British Air Ministry, 1953, AFHRA file no. K-512.621 VII/

This report is a compilation of a series of articles that Galland pub

an unnamed Argentine magazine in 1953. 

6. Ibid., 13, 15; and Adolf Galland, interrogated by A. D. I. (K) an

Interrogation Unit, 15 August 1945, A. D. I. (K) report no. 373/19

“The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm,” AFHR

512.619B-30, 14.

7. Ibid., 13.

8. Galland, The First and the Last, 25. 

9. Len Deighton, Fighter: The True Story of the Battle of Britain (N

HarperCollins, 1977), 209. 

10. Hermann Göring, directives issued by Reichsmarschall Görin

August 1940, AFHRA file no. 512.621 VII/39 trans. British Air Min

August 1947, 2–5. Göring specifies the number and type of escor

required for each bomber formation and the tactics necessary to f

dive-bombers through their attacks. He also directs personnel ac

garding the experience level of bomber crews. All these actions were 

to minimize losses while still focusing on the “first aim”—destructi

RAF fighters.

11. Deighton, 289–90; and Williamson Murray, Strategy for De

Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1

German bomber losses in August had been 339 (of all types) with 

251 pilots killed, captured, or missing. Between 24 August and 7 Se

the RAF had 466 fighters lost or damaged but was able to offset th

with only 269 replacements. RAF pilot losses were more serious—

wounded, or missing. In any case, by 1 September the Germans w

to achieving air superiority. 

12. Alfred Jodl, situation report signed by General Jodl, OKW 

August 1940, AFHRA file no. 512.621 VII/21, 12; and Wilhelm Ke

42
yg 

Britain” which began on 13 August 1940. Accordingly, Hitler wo

needed results from Göring’s Luftwaffe by 27 August at the latest t

decision on the invasion. To make matters worse, Gen Alfred Jo

OKW Operations Staff (another advisor to Hitler) stated that the 

should have achieved their goal within a week. 

13. “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Fighter Arm

14. British Air Ministry, “German Aircraft Losses: Se

1939–December 1940,” report by the Air Historical Branch, 10 

1949, AFHRA file no. 512.621 VII/83, 12–13. This report was comp

original records of the Quartermaster General’s Department of the 

Air Ministry of aircraft losses throughout the war. In August and Se

figures for bombers destroyed or damaged on operations were 310 

respectively.

15. Alfred Jodl and Wilhelm Keitel, field order directive ini

General Jodl and Feldmarschall Keitel, OKW Staff, 14 Septemb

AFHRA file no. 512.621 VII/21, 16.

16. Galland, The First and the Last, 52.

17. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries (London: MacDo

Co., 1967), 178.

18. Galland, “The Battle of Britain,” 31.

19. Donald L. Caldwell, The JG26 War Diary, vol. 1, 1939–1942 

Grub Street, 1996), 33, 53. Handrick failed to maneuver his flight o

in response to an imminent Hurricane attack in operations over Du

May. His inaction resulted in the shoot down of his wingman. By 1

1940, Handrick’s staff flight was the only combat unit within JG2

zero kills to its credit in the Battle of Britain. Handrick believed that 

effectively lead his wing on combat missions by taking off after th

the wing had launched; however, this position in the formation gu

that he would not encounter enemy fighters.

20. Göring, 5. 

21. Caldwell, 58. 

22. Ibid., 49–84. The individual pilot claims were Galland—

Schoepfel—19 kills, Muencheberg—13 kills, and Sprick—12 kills. 

23. Feldwebel Seeger, of JG2, questionnaire reply to author, 3

2000, facsimile transcript in the hand of Seeger; and Gerhard S

questionnaire reply to author, 30 March 2000, facsimile transcri

hand of Schoepfel. As group commander of III/JG26 during the 

Britain, Schoepfel believed that pilot morale was good.

24. Raymond F. Toliver and Trevor J. Constable, Fighter General

of Adolf Galland (Zephyr Cove, Nev.: AmPress Publishing, 1990), 1

25. Caldwell, 47. Caldwell mentions that the men were initiall

either in tents or in billets in local towns, but no further discussion 

43
of the German Day Fighter Arm, 18.

27. Von Brauchitsch, 12. 

28. Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day 

Arm,” 15; and Bekker, 165. The general ratio of fighters to bomber

sions was 3:1. Bomber crews continued to push for a 5:1 ratio on se

sions.

29. Donald L. Caldwell, JG26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe (New Yo

Books, 1991), 70.

30. Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day 

Arm,” 18. 

31. Ibid., 15.

32. Caldwell, The JG26 War Diary, 64, 67, 80.

33. British Air Ministry, 11–14. Figure represents destroyed sing

fighters from July–November 1940. 

34. Galland, The First and the Last, 14.

35. Bekker, 176.

36. Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day 

Arm,” 18.

37. Ibid., 21.

38. Ibid., 13.

39. Caldwell, JG26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 16.

40. Schoepfel questionnaire. Schoepfel credited the wing com

Major Galland, with having the new Bf 109s delivered. 

41. Toliver and Constable, 105.

42. Schoepfel questionnaire.

43. Galland, “The Battle of Britain,” 20.

44. Johannes Naumann, questionnaire reply to author, 26 Apri

45. Caldwell, JG26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 60.

46. Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day 

Arm,” 17.

47. Ibid., 15.

48. Caldwell, JG26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 60.

49. Galland, The First and the Last, 53. 

50. Ibid., 54; idem, “The Battle of Britain,”28. 

51. Caldwell, The JG26 War Diary, 81.

52. Ibid., 80–84. The 3d, 4th, and 9th squadrons only had one 

from 10 October, when they became fully operational, until 30 Octo

kill was claimed by the 3d squadron on 25 October, but it was duri

cort mission and not a jabo mission.

53. Naumann questionnaire.

54. Ibid.; and Schoepfel questionnaire. 

55. Caldwell, The JG26 War Diary, 41.

44
, p , 

59. Caldwell, The JG26 War Diary, 56, 71. 

60. Ibid., 75.

61. Galland, “The Battle of Britain,” 28.

62. Caldwell, JG26 Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 41; and Wilhelm 

to author, 30 March 2000, facsimile transcript in the hand of Go

Goebel is the head of Germany’s Gemeinschaft der Jagdflieger (Figh

Association) and has previously interviewed many Luftwaffe figh

from the Battle of Britain. 

63. Josef Priller, Geschichte eines Jagdgeschwaders: das J

(Schlageter) von 1937 bis 1945 (Heidelberg: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 19

64. Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day 

Arm,” 43. Galland made it clear to his fighter pilots that he did 

them to marry. He felt that none of them had any right to believe th

live through the war and it would be far better to leave a sorrowf

heart, rather than a grieving widow and children. 

65. Caldwell, JG26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 32. As group com

of III/JG26, Major Galland was not pleased with the success of his 

ing the first week of the Battle of Britain and made it clear to his p

66. Toliver and Constable, 154. Galland sent a highly critical let

higher command at Jafu 2, commenting on the lack of profession

encountered while visiting another base. 

67. Galland, The First and the Last, 31, 33.

68. Ibid., 35.

69. Caldwell, JG26: Top Guns of the Luftwaffe, 48.

70. Ibid., 49.

71. Galland, “The Birth, Life, and Death of the German Day Figh

14.

72. Ibid., 18.

73. Priller, 88.

74. Galland, The First and the Last, 45. Galland claimed that 

event, the wing was in the best of spirits.

75. Ibid., 31.

45
Lt Col Joseph Laughlin:

362d Fighter Group

But soldierly spirit as shown in actual combat, we must 

member, is not merely a question of knowledge and skil

is largely a question of character. [Character-training] a

personal influence upon the men in the ranks are of 

greatest importance, especially in time of war. 

—Squadron Commander’s Manual

1st Fighter Command, 24 June 19

When the United States mobilized for the Second Wor

its greatest strength was the vast quantity of war ma

could send to the front. Much has been written of the t

dous production capability, but an equally important s

reserve held by the United States was the quality of 

that created and sustained frontline fighting power. 

Army Air Forces had its share of successful squadr

group leaders, but one would be hard-pressed to find 

successful combat commander—who was also respect

loved by his men—than Lt Col Joseph Laughlin. 

Culminating in his command of the 362d Fighter 

(FG), XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC), Ninth Air 

Colonel Laughlin encouraged and led his P-47 pilots fr

end of France to the other in support of General Patton

Army in the summer of 1944. The men of the 362d F

sistently faced German 40 mm and 88 mm antiairc

tillery (AAA) as well as sporadic German fighter form

and small arms fire throughout the long summer. Losse

lots and airplanes were high enough to warrant the gr

unofficial nickname, “the 362d Suicide Outfit,” but th

of the fighter pilots was never in doubt under Laughlin

ership.

47
the inevitable ground assault on the continent that w

necessary to defeat the German Wehrmacht. While figh

Italy was fierce, it would not play the primary role in o

ning Germany. Instead, the Allied Eighth and Fifth Ar

Italy would divert as much German strength as possib

the main Anglo–American landing in Normandy, kn

Operation Overlord.1

D Day and the Breakout

As commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Gen 

D. Eisenhower orchestrated a large-scale amphibious l

airborne paratrooper assaults, a complex deception pl

a persistent air interdiction (AI) operation to gain a foot

the European continent in northern France.

The focus of airpower on AI missions was an attemp

late the intended beachhead from German reserves. 

geting the French railroad system well in advance, a

helped reduce—but did not eliminate—German resupply

not thought possible to totally eliminate all German 

tential. But by severing the larger and more critical rai

and arteries, AI would constrict reinforcement attemp

make the surviving lines of communication (LOC) vul

to future fighter-bomber attacks.2 The disruption of 

rail operations began slowly in March but built to a m

scale by D minus 30. The resulting effect on the oper

capability of the rail system was significant by D day. 

rail traffic in France was reduced by 60 percent (from 

March 1944 amount) and in the critical northern sector

east of the planned Normandy landings, rail traffic w

duced by 75 percent.3 The interdiction effort continue

the invasion on 6 June 1944, but the needs of support

assault force shifted airpower priorities. Once the bea

was secure, the massive logistical task began of build

sufficient men and supplies for the eventual breakou

July 1944. During the next six weeks, the Germans sto

48
creased their focus on interdiction targeting and began 

ing and strafing enemy motor transport of all kind

maintenance of air superiority proved relatively easy b

the Allied fighters outnumbered German fighters by 

than five-to-one numerically and a much greater ma

pilot quality. This advantage resulted in Allied tactical 

being able to focus more on interdiction and ground-s

(close air support [CAS]) missions. German supplies 

especially limited in Normandy as a result. The const

tacks on German trucks, rail cars, and equipment pr

the defenders from mounting a counteroffensive wh

Allied buildup continued. Initial air operations continu

bases in England; but once the lodgment area in Nor

became secure, fighter groups were moved onto the 

coast in order to generate more sorties and to allow mor

employment when called upon by the ground units. Th

mand arrangements under these moves changed quite 

Prior to the invasion, the United States Strategic Air 

in Europe, commanded by Gen Carl A. “Tooey” Spa

tained operational control (OPCON) of the Eighth Ai

(AF) and administrative control of the Ninth AF. OP

Ninth AF was given to the commander of the 

Expeditionary Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford 

Mallory. Under this command structure, General Spa

never eager to submit his “strategic” Eighth AF to the 

application of airpower that was directed by G

Eisenhower to support Overlord. In contrast, the Ni

commander, Gen Lewis H. Brereton, wholeheartedly 

his tactical air force to support Gen Omar N. Bradl

First Army as it widened its hold on the Cotentin pen

As the ground lodgment grew, General Bradley activate

tional field armies—first the US Third Army and then 

Ninth Army. General Brereton created complementar

(five to seven fighter groups each) to work in concert w

field armies. The IX TAC would provide primary air sup

the original US First Army, XIX TAC worked with the U

49
assist the armies whenever possible. The British establ

similar air-ground alignment system with their tact

forces. 

By the middle of July, Allied strength in Norman

grown sufficiently strong that General Montgomery la

Operation Goodwood, which was designed to capture 

of Caen. Although Montgomery’s British and Canadian 

were repulsed by the stubborn German defenders on 2

the US First Army prepared to participate in its own 

sive—Operation Cobra—designed to punch through G

defenses near Saint-Lô. The First Army breakout create

sure in the German defensive line that allowed the All

rent to sweep across France. 

Third Army Operations

The US Third Army began arriving in France on 6 J

was immediately included in the First Army’s plans for 

pending offensive. When Operation Cobra achiev

planned breakthrough, Patton’s Third Army came into i

On 1 August the Third Army became fully operational. 

jective was to sweep south, through Avranches, then 

southwest through Rennes and Fougères to capture Br

open the Brittany ports.5 The rapid advance t

Avranches led Patton to alter his objectives.

Once south of Avranches, Patton perceived that Germ

fenses throughout France were quickly crumbling. Cap

on his rapid advance, Patton tasked his VIII Corps to 

responsibility for the original objective of clearing out 

ance in Brittany. With his other three corps, Patton 

south and east in a race for the Seine and, ulti

Germany. In a 30-day period, Patton had driven to wi

miles of the German border and had contributed to the 

of the Germans at the Falaise Gap and to the libera

Paris.6 The tremendous speed with which the Third Arm

tured ground was due in no small part to the air supp

vided by the XIX TAC.

50
achieved by any Western army in the Second World Wa

nine fighter groups comprising the XIX TAC flew groun

port and interdiction missions along the full depth of P

army—some 350 miles at times. Of greatest significanc

armored divisions was the fighter-bomber tactic of “a

column cover” created by Gen Elwood R. “Pete” Quesad

TAC and practiced throughout the Ninth AF.8 During d

hours, a minimum of four fighter-bombers—usuall

Thunderbolts—flew cover over each of Patton’s advanc

mored columns. These aircraft generally patrolled up 

miles ahead of the armored spearhead and were avail

immediate CAS when directed from the air support 

within each division.9 The ground commanders felt th

tactic stood out as the best method for integrating the 

tages of airpower within the armored scheme of ma

Most pilots in the Ninth AF agreed. 

XIX TAC pilots who were not tasked with armored 

cover flew either interdiction or fighter-sweep missi

time the need for missions dedicated to seeking out G

fighters in the air decreased for two reasons. First, th

ing strength of the German air force dwindled in the 

overwhelming opposition. Second, as Allied advances 

the Germans out of forward positions, Luftwaffe squ

began to relocate within Germany’s borders; and they 

much more defensive in nature. Interdiction missions 

ued to be frequently assigned to the fighter-bombe

medium bombers of Ninth AF. Preplanned attacks 

fixed targets were only one-half of the interdiction effo

other portion was classified as armed reconnaissance. 

reconnaissance missions became synonymous with 

and destroy tactics as pilots were given general targe

and locations but had discretion to attack any wor

enemy targets encountered. The XIX TAC’s fighter grou

interdiction targeting to great effect in one of the most 

applications of airpower in the war—screening the 

Army’s right flank. With the physical barrier of the Loir

51
flank. The security enabled the rapid advance of the Thir

362d Fighter Group Operations

On 1 June 1944, the 362d FG flew P-47 Thunderb

craft from an airfield in southern England known as U

Air Force Station 412, Headcorn. It flew primarily esco

sions after becoming operational on 8 February 1944; 

D day drew closer, the group was tasked with an inc

number of ground-attack missions.10 While in Engla

362d was under the administrative control of XIX TA

would not change for the duration of the war. OPCON

ever, varied over time. While in England the IX 

Command of Ninth AF exercised OPCON over the 362d

July the group relocated to Lignerolles, France, in Nor

and OPCON was transferred to IX TAC, which was sup

the US First Army. On 1 August—when the US Third Ar

came operational—OPCON of the 362d was ultimately 

ferred to XIX TAC, which had also just activated.11 Th

moved two more times prior to November. The next mo

on 11 August to Rennes, France, at the eastern end 

Brest peninsula. The third move on French soil was to 

field near Reims on 23 September. 

The original commander of the 362d FG was Col Mo

Magoffin. He led the group from its activation in Marc

until he was shot down near Falaise, France, on 10 

1944. According to many of the young fighter pilots, 

Magoffin had been a difficult commander. He was a We

graduate with an overbearing personality; they belie

focus on mission accomplishment was often at the exp

compassion for his pilots.12 Many of the men became 

ful because of his demeaning approach to discipline. 

occasion, he made three experienced pilots sprint arou

airfield perimeter for failing to salute him.13 In a

episode, Magoffin discovered a group of men lining up 

chow hall too early. As punishment he gave them clos

52
his men. Before he was shot down and captured, he wa

ited with five aerial victories and became one of only thr

in the 362d.15 When Magoffin was shot down, the gro

ing exec,” Colonel Laughlin, became the group command

the end of the war.

Apart from the group headquarters, the combat powe

362d FG rested in three squadrons: the 377th, the 378

the 379th Fighter Squadrons (FS). Each squadron w

thorized 32 P-47 aircraft and 36 pilots.16 The maint

sections of each squadron repaired and serviced an inc

number of battle-damaged aircraft once ground-attac

sions became routine. With sustained battle-damage 

either 12 or 16 aircraft per squadron could consiste

ready to fly on any given mission.17 The group had the 

ity for two full-strength missions per day (roughly 96 s

but on some occasions a third mission could be launc

The P-47, affectionately referred to as the Jug, was or

designed as a pursuit aircraft and had only a 200-mil

without external fuel tanks. With external tanks, its ra

creased to 350 miles; but this was still much less th

600-mile range of the P-51 Mustang with external t

However, the sturdy construction of the P-47 lent i

ground-attack missions much more so than the ligh

Mustang. The P-47 was regarded by XIX TAC as an 

tional aircraft for low-altitude operations even thoug

mained a very capable fighter in air-to-air combat.19 I

tion to .50-caliber ammunition, a normal P-47 weapo

included either one or two 500-pound general-purpose 

For special missions, however, the P-47s could also be 

carry 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs, 250-poun

mentary bombs, 100-pound white phosphorous bom

palm, or air-to-ground rockets. When employed in the g

support role, the flexibility in weapon loads was one 

aircraft’s greatest advantages. 

In the summer of 1944, the pilots of the 362d FG per

missions across the full spectrum of operations tasked 

53
ence.20 The 362d FG was typical of groups that expecte

flying pursuit missions when they arrived in the ET

quickly realized that they needed to be experts in the g

attack role.21

Early 362d FG support for Operation Overlord inclu

corting C-47s towing gliders and flying sweep- or beach

missions. Within days, however, the group was flying 

reconnaissance and fixed-target interdiction sorties ag

variety of rail targets, motorized transports, bridge

troops and equipment in the open. The 362d pilots a

targets throughout the Cherbourg peninsula and acros

of northern France as the Allied armies built up for the 

breakout. On 25 July the group joined more than 3,00

aircraft in a concentrated attack on the Saint-Lô–Pèrier

way that opened the door for the Allied onslaught.22

Although 12 June marked the first true CAS missio

by the 362d FG, the majority of CAS would take pla

linking with General Patton’s Third Army on 1 Augus

Patton broke through at Avranches, the 362d FG sp

next month alternating between interdiction and armo

umn cover missions. During that time, the group playe

role in supporting the VIII Corps’s assault and reductio

Brest peninsula. Farther to the east, group pilots flew 

support missions for Third Army operations that 

Hitler’s failed attempt to strike a counteroffensive from 

to Avranches.23 In spite of the numerous ground-suppo

sions flown, August was also a successful month for ae

tories in the group. Twenty-four enemy aircraft were de

in the air, with two additional probably destroyed, a

damaged.24 The majority of future enemy aircraft kills 

group would be achieved through ground attack. 

Once Brest fell on 18 September, the group devoted 

mary attention eastward to armored column cover an

diction.25 Soon after completing their work in Britta

362d relocated near Reims and began routinely flyin

sions into Germany. Interdiction of rail lines and C

54
River and Germany’s West Wall defensive line. From 

September through mid-November, the front moved ver

Coincidentally, the weather began deteriorating in O

and 362d pilots often had to revert to armed reconna

missions rather than their preplanned ones. Several 

successful missions occurred amidst the intermittent w

when the group bombed and strafed two crowded Germ

fields, destroyed six locks across a canal near Saarebou

saved an infantry division by bombing the dam at Dieu

Early on, the pilots of the 362d FG earned a reputa

carrying out difficult missions regardless of the c

September, XIX TAC was referring to the group pilots 

“fire-eating fighter-bombers of the 362d” because o

tenacity and skill.27 The number of missions flown by th

FG from June through October and its corresponding 

are noted in table 2.

When compared to other P-47 groups in Ninth AF, th

FG suffered slightly higher than average losses.28 H

their pilots were well respected throughout the Ninth A

group had already earned a Presidential Unit Citation 

successful contribution to defeating the Germans at 

55

Table 2

362d Fighter Group Attrition by Month

(June–October 1944)

June 1944 July 1944 August 1944 September 1944 Octo

Sorties 1,515 1,175 1,511 1,208 

A/C Losses 30 9 13 2 

Pilot 27 7 13 2 

Losses

Casualty % 1.78 0.59 0.86 0.16 

Source: “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944–May 1945,” United State

Historical Research Agency file no. GP-362-SU-OP-S(FI), April 1944–May 1945.

Author’s Note: Casualty percentage is based on pilots missing in action or killed in 

pared to number of sorties flown per month.
their nine best target-killing pilots—four of those select

from the 362d FG, one of whom was named the best 

fighter-bomber pilot.30 The most satisfying recognition 

however, came from the ground commanders of the Third 

For example, on occasion General Patton would make c

ulatory phone calls to group commanders.31 By 1 No

the fighter pilots of the 362d FG formed a premier comb

by any standard.

Pilot Morale within the 362d Fighter Gr

This study attempts to qualify or understand morale 

the 362d FG during the June–October period and rel

marily on reviewing personal recollections of group pi

well as examining the abort rates of aircraft on missio

abort rates for this period were in line with the rest o

AF, which suggests that men were not looking for excu

to fly missions.32 A common feeling of the pilots was th

wanted to fly “missions, missions, and more missions

responses from many of the surviving pilots of the 362d 

dicate that morale during the summer of 1944 was exc

ally high.34 This assessment is evident after reviewing 

tors influencing morale at the time.

Individual Needs

The quality of confidence was the most significant 

teristic of the men of the 362d FG during the summer o

Confidence kept pilot morale high in the face of da

losses. A young 21-year-old pilot—who arrived in the 

during the summer—echoed the feelings of many, 

thought we had the world right under our thumb!”35 Th

ical and psychological needs of these fighter pilots wer

number, but the influence of those factors contributed 

to the high level of morale. 

The two most important physical needs of the pilo

their aircraft and the training to use it correctly. P-47 

56
repair of the group’s P-47s was satisfactory for the pac

erations. According to Ninth AF records, the replaceme

of P-47s grew faster than operational losses. By the en

war, Ninth AF had gained 2,766 P-47s for replaceme

poses against 2,105 losses. In the tactical units, P-47 

groups had at least an 80 percent operational rate f

aircraft from June through October 1944.37

The availability of training opportunities was not in

morale factor for the pilots of the 362d. By the end of th

mer, many of the original cadre of pilots had been sho

or were rotating back to the United States after com

their tour.38 The apparent lack of training for new pil

couraged at least a few of the pilots, old and new.39 N

placement pilots stopped off for 30 days of in-theater t

in England en route to their frontline unit, but they w

very green on their initial combat missions. Other tha

training opportunities were virtually nonexistent. Some 

training missions were attempted while the group was 

ing in Brittany, but these were few and far between.40 C

missions would rectify the deficiency in training, but at 

price. 

The other physical needs of the 362d pilots were n

significant in terms of morale. Food and shelter we

quate, at least in relative terms. The pilots always f

however bad living conditions were for them, the soldie

were supporting had it even worse.41 The one interestin

ment about living conditions is that they continued to i

for the group as they made their first three moves in 

From field conditions in Normandy, to vacated Germ

racks in Rennes, to a lavish chateau near Reims—eac

incrementally raised the standard of living with a cor

ding boost to morale. It seemed that as long as physica

remained static or improved, morale followed suit. Subs

experience demonstrated that lowering the standard o

likewise damaged morale.42

57
Replacement aircraft and pilots were arriving month

most pilots felt that they had sufficient rest between m

Additionally, once Paris was liberated, the pilots of th

were given three-day passes to visit Paris; and in some 

rest and relaxation (R&R) was authorized to London as 

Undoubtedly, poor weather conditions drove the flying 

ule as much as mission requirements. While canceled 

due to weather may have provided some additional res

lots, it also lowered individual morale for those eager t

The satisfaction of psychological needs was evidenced 

pilot’s confidence in tactics and confidence in their a

Both of these areas rate high. The evolution of tactics 

group was never formalized, nor was there ever a blata

to make significant changes to existing tactics.46 The 

brought back from the Mediterranean theater serve

baseline from which individual flight leaders could de

satisfy the needs of missions into France. No one in pa

took credit for changing tactics. Changes were simply m

experience showed the way to success. Morale was c

sustained by knowing that the progression of these tact

leading toward victory. 

Tactics were continually improved as new weapons a

missions were created. Low-altitude tactics were cre

deal with the inclement weather and AAA. High-altitud

bombing methods were developed. New weapons type

loaded and tested in combat. Safe-escape maneuvers w

signed to avoid one’s own bomb fragmentation patter

weapons release. The results of these and other suc

tactics were beneficial to pilot morale throughout the 

the words of one group pilot, “the interactions betw

overhead supporting fighters and the controllers 

ground, innovating as necessary to minimize or el

German resistance in front of the tank columns, wa

awesome and inspiring.”47 Tactical improvement was a 

responsibility of the flight leaders in each squadron; d

58
linked directly to the pilot’s confidence in the P-47, wh

rated the best attack aircraft in the world by some pilot

362d FG.48 Other more reserved comments still recogni

P-47 as the right aircraft for the job they were given

men believed in their aircraft. It was an outstanding p

for carrying a large quantity of firepower to the enemy

was recognized by all authorities as the best fighter-bo

the war.50

Cohesion

According to the majority of pilots in the 362d FG, co

was not considered a very important part of maintainin

fighting spirit. Bonding between pilots and other mem

the squadrons obviously took place, but these bonds 

encourage the fighter pilots to fly missions that they ot

would not have flown. Rather than increasing the pil

thusiasm to fly missions, cohesion became linked to 

tensity with which they attacked the enemy. When som

experienced the loss of a comrade due to enemy fir

vented their sorrow and anger at future gunners who 

dare to open fire on the P-47s.51 The creation of close 

did not motivate men to fly their missions, but enemy 

that destroyed these bonds had an influence on perfor

Nevertheless, bonding throughout the squadrons too

on informal levels. Softball games, swimming, and bas

games were all activities in which both flyers and no

participated. The officers had a rudimentary version o

ficers’ club at most locations, and trips into the local 

as well as opportunities for hunting were available to 

terested pilot.52 The most common experience of all th

pilots was combat flying. However, squadron schedul

not make an effort to keep the same flight leads and w

together in formations.53 Friendships formed in the sq

as much from individual choices as from any forced l

flying arrangements. In the case of the 362d FG pilots

59
situation. As far as flying combat missions, comradesh

not a driving factor once the parachute was strapped 

377th FS pilot recalled that they were individual pilo

looked only to their flight leaders for supervision.55 T

role that cohesion played was as a stabilizing influe

morale during nonflying activities. The worst that cou

happened was for morale to erode on a daily basis as a 

of isolated pilots who did not interact with each other. 

then, cohesion is built through daily contact and acts 

vent or slow down the decay of pilot morale under 

combat conditions. The 362d pilot’s experience with co

fits into the latter case. 

Esprit de Corps

Esprit de corps was a positive component of pilot m

the 362d FG. Most of the pilots considered themselve

nate to be part of such an elite organization, and they 

stood that the group was making “a sizable contribu

ward the advance of American armies through France

Army Air Forces at that time had an active public relati

fort throughout the ETO, and it was not difficult to disse

good information about a successful group such as th

Some pilots who did not have frequent personal conta

the group commander felt that the group was a remote 

but the majority of pilots identified with the reputation 

group regardless of how often they interacted with th

mander. 

There were, in fact, two larger (secondary) groups th

erated esprit de corps among the pilots: the 362d FG a

US Third Army. To suggest that esprit de corps alon

vated the men into battle is unfair, but their morale w

tainly bolstered after each unit success story. The co

steps taken by the group public affairs office to docum

publicize particularly dangerous or successful m

helped to unify the pilots above the squadron level. 

stance, the group published a periodic newsletter on t

60
lieved that the 362d FG was a premier (if not the p

fighter-bomber unit in Ninth AF. This feeling was enhan

the destruction of thousands of targets each month, b

specific missions stood out as the most publicized. T

was a group mission to Brest on 25 August on which th

cessfully attacked multiple naval vessels in the harb

sank a German light cruiser. The second mission was 

October when the 378th FS and 379th FS bombed the 

the River Seille at Dieuze.58 The results were publicized 

British Broadcasting Corporation and were published in 

British and American newspapers. 

The army was no less inspirational for the pilots. G

attack missions were difficult and costly for the 362d in 

of pilots and aircraft, yet the connection that the pilot

the soldiers in the field was vivid. Third Army and X

kept the 362d updated on the results of their mission

the positive feedback certainly helped to build this 

with the ground forces.59 “We were Patton’s right flank

common rallying theme.60 The speed at which Patt

vanced convinced the pilots that they were helping to 

war. Their pride was justified. On several occasions X

or Third Army would specifically call on the 362d to pe

difficult mission.61 The destruction of the dam at Dieu

one such occasion.

Joseph Laughlin’s Influence on Morale

Colonel Laughlin may have only assumed command 

362d FG on 10 August, but his presence was a sourc

couragement much earlier. Laughlin was the 379th F

mander when the group arrived in the ETO and move

become the deputy group commander (or flying execut

cer) in April. In addition to being very familiar wi

squadron’s men, his familiarity with those men in the 

FS and 378th FS began immediately upon flying with t

April and continued. Laughlin’s reputation was very fav

61
Bf 109 in February, it was his skill in bombing and 

that was judged most impressive.63

The group pilots generally felt that their morale dur

spring and early summer of 1944 was at least good un

leadership of the first group commander, Colonel Mag

However, most pilots agreed that after Laughlin assume

mand in August, morale became even better. The incr

morale was attributed to their rapport with Laughlin 

they had lacked with Magoffin. Laughlin got to know t

on a personal level because he wanted them to feel that 

concerned.65 Of course, Laughlin could not know all t

equally well, but the pervasive attitude among the pil

that he tried. Other than being well respected as the 

commander, Laughlin took specific actions that subse

raised pilot morale in several key areas. 

Most pilots were confident that Laughlin provided al

gistical necessities possible, but one item is salient. W

group moved near Reims, the pilots again had confiden

Joe Laughlin’s personal intervention made it possible f

the group pilots to live in the comfortable château. E

years later, the pilots remember those accommodations 

best they had during the war. Some referred to it as “th

Avenue of all quarters.”66 The rest and leave policy t

group enjoyed throughout the latter part of 1944 was 

tributed to Laughlin’s actions. He somehow managed to 

a worn-out B-26 bomber and a C-47 cargo plane that 

part of the group. These aircraft were modified for troop 

port and were flown by group pilots to drop off and p

men from the 362d FG who traveled to London and P

short leaves.

Laughlin also was connected to some other conf

building actions that kept pilot morale high. Group pi

that their aircraft were more combat capable than ot

the XIX TAC. After Laughlin became commander, the 

in the 362d FG received some modifications: a bubble 

improved visibility and increased survivability du

62
of the group’s airplanes, although the modifications w

tiated above the group level.68 In addition to the phys

provements to the aircraft in the group, Laughlin p

over the evolution in combat tactics. He was one of th

pilots who traveled to Italy and flew ground-support m

in Twelfth AF in the winter and spring of 1944. He 

those lessons learned with the group upon his return

after, he was recognized as one of the most competent g

attack pilots in the group. When he assumed comman

362d in August, his leadership style encouraged the ne

progression of tactical development among each 

squadrons. During this time, tactical innovation was 

sult of each pilot gaining experience and possessing th

dom to make appropriate changes. 

None of the pilots could recall any influence that L

had on the individual cohesion in the squadrons, but 

tions were more evident in building group esprit de 

Laughlin personally participated in the two most pu

group success stories. On the day of the Brest harbor 

Laughlin flew two separate missions with the 378th 

the 377th FS and scored two hits on the Germa

cruiser.69 He was ultimately given credit for sinking it. 

second of the highly publicized missions, Laughlin p

and led the attack on the dam at Dieuze.70 While it w

clear whether his 1,000-pound bomb caused the break 

sluice gate that successfully drained the dam, the unit 

indicates that his bomb was delivered closest to the 

impact point. Each of these missions helped to bu

strong reputation that the 362d FG enjoyed from 

through October. 

Laughlin also was the focal point for connecting the 

with the Third Army. He made sure that operational u

and army commendations were continually passed to 

lots; in turn, this helped those pilots to understand th

in the greater operation. Laughlin’s credentials as 

bomber and his focus on supporting the army demon

63
factor. 

Conclusions

The fighting spirit of the pilots of the 362d FG was 

the result of their superior individual commitment to 

effort and their mission. Their confidence in success w

primary reason that morale remained high. Wh

Laughlin took command in August, pilot morale impro

a number of reasons. First, the pilots began to clearly s

the end of the war was in sight as soon as Patton’

gained momentum. Second, the men felt that the ne

mander cared at least as much about them as he did t

sion. Third, but most importantly, the pilots were s

that the tactics they were using were appropriate.71 Th

effectively destroying the enemy, and they felt they we

ning the war. Losses in this context were acceptable.

Laughlin’s influence on the level of pilot morale can 

rowed down to one area: he established an atmosphe

encouraged tactical excellence. His individual acco

ments contributed to that atmosphere, but he also nu

his pilots to create their own success. The residual perc

in the minds of the pilots, was that they were masters 

domain; they credit Laughlin’s leadership for making 

ference. Laughlin modestly said that he “just did wha

naturally, and was lucky if it came out right.”72 In ac

Laughlin allowed his pilots to assume as much contr

their own success as possible: the result was a very mo

group of pilots. 

Notes

1. John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking, 1989

2. Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land 

Three American Wars (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force Histor

223–25.

3. Ibid., 238.

4. Keegan, 388.

64
Background, in Brief, 1. 

6. Ibid., Introduction, 1.

7. Keegan, 406–7.

8. W. A. Jacobs, “The Battle for France, 1944,” in Case Studi

Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 271.

9. “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” Notes on Orga

Tactics, and Technique, 3.

10. Mauer Mauer, ed., Air Force Combat Units of World 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 244–45; 

Gianneschi, ed., The 362nd Fighter Group History of WW II: Mogin’s 

(Chicago: D. Gianneschi, 1981), 71.

11. “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” The Backgr

Brief, 1–2; “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 July 1944–31 Ju

AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), July 1944, 1.

12. John L. Hill, questionnaire reply to author, 23 April 2000; 

Baloga, questionnaire reply to author, 12 April 2000; Robert W. C

questionnaire reply to author, 1 May 2000; Joseph Z. Matte, ques

reply to author, 8 May 2000; and Arthur Wildern, telephone interv

author, 4 May 2000, Montgomery, Ala. Fifty-six years after the fac

from various former 362d pilots still recount missions where 

Magoffin led flights but displayed little “wingman” consideration—

several wingmen out of fuel before they reached their home base, 

taking a cavalier attitude about it later in the officers’ club. Also, ep

Magoffin taking his flight through heavy flak for no apparent rea

vinced some men that he was not concerned with their safety. Oth

in the group responded better to Colonel Magoffin’s tough leaders

and had no second thoughts about flying with him. 

13. Jack R. Barensfeld, questionnaire reply to author, 31 Marc

14. Gianneschi, 157. 

15. Ibid., 24. 

16. “Statistical Summary of Ninth Air Force Operations: 16 Oct 19

1945,” report compiled by the 26th Statistical Control Unit, AFHR

168.6005-85, 8. Fighter groups were allocated 96 aircraft and 108 pi

17. Ibid., 8. Actual numbers of aircraft and pilots on hand varie

general, an average of 18 aircraft per squadron were mission-capab

ational for combat) on any given day, although pilot availability w

greater. Pilot availability averaged 27 pilots per squadron on any g

for a crew ratio of 1.5 pilots to aircraft.

18. “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” Notes on Orga

Tactics, and Technique, 5.

19. Ibid., 2–3; and Jacobs, 250.

65
g

21. Damon F. Rarey, ed., Laughter and Tears: A Comba

Sketchbook of World War II Squadron Life (Santa Rosa, Calif.: Visio

International, 1996), 94; and Gianneschi, 445–46. In the spring of 

lect pilots were sent to Italy to observe ground-attack operations 

disseminate techniques to the group. 

22. “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 July 1944–31 Jul

AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), July 1944, 3–4; and “Twelve T

Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” The Background, in Brief, 2. 

23. “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 August 1944–31 Augu

AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), August 1944, 2.

24. “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944–May 1945

compiled of monthly air activity by 362d Fighter Group, AFHRA fil

362-SU-OP-S(FI), April 1944–May 1945. 

25. “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 September 1944–30 S

1944,” AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), September 1944, 3. Seven t

German soldiers in the city of Brest surrendered immediately af

from the 379th Fighter Squadron (FS) completed their bombing ru

September.

26. “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 October 1944–31 Octob

AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), October 1944, 2–4. The two airfield 

destroyed 15 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed an additional e

damaged six. The Dieuze dam required the pilots to bomb only the 

the sluice so as not to let all the water out at once. Pilots from the 3

379th FSs successfully carried out the mission.

27. “Twelve Thousand Fighter-Bomber Sorties,” Air Operations, 

28. “Commanding General Ninth Air Force, Statistical Data,

crew casualty report prepared by 26th Statistical Unit [March 1945

file no. 168.6005-87. For the period July–October 1944, average P

attrition was .475 percent. In the same time period, 362d FG attr

.518 percent, approximately 10 percent higher than average. 

29. “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944–May 1945

dition to the 49-2-11 aerial record, the 362d claimed 28-8-10 enem

on the ground. Ninth AF did not count aircraft destroyed on the gr

ward overall “ace status,” although Eighth AF pilots were able 

ground “kills.” 

30. Gianneschi, 162; and Robert B. Searl, telephone interview b

29 March 2000, Montgomery, Ala. Those chosen were Frank Peppe

Headquarters (top bridge buster, best overall fighter-bomber pilot)

Geyer, 377th FS (top rail line cutter); Wilfred B. Crutchfield, 378th 

rail car buster); and Carroll A. Peterson, 379th FS (top artillery bus

five remaining categories were fielded by pilots from the remaining 

groups. 

66
gy g

ing to congratulate his group for the fine work. After a few moments

Patton told Laughlin that someone else wanted to speak to him—

Spaatz came on the line to offer his appreciation as well. Both men 

exceptionally high spirits that evening.

32. “Statistical Summary, Ninth Air Force Operations, 16 Oct 194

1945”; and “362d Fighter Group OPREP Reports, April 1944–May 19

overall abort rate (including weather, mechanical and other cause

362d FG during this period was 2.6 percent. The overall abort rate du

same period for all P-47s in Ninth AF was also 2.6 percent.

33. Gianneschi, 448.

34. The author sent 38 pilots from the 362d Fighter Group (FG

questions asking for perceptions of morale and leadership during 

mer of 1944. Of those, 30 pilots were either interviewed or return

author answers to those questions. Twenty of these pilots were p

the group during the transition period when Colonel Laughlin 

command. The remaining 10 pilots arrived later or were shot down 

Laughlin becoming the group commander. 

35. Paul O’Dell, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000.

36. Sherwin G. Desens, questionnaire reply to author, 29 April 

37. “Statistical Summary, Ninth Air Force Operations, 16 Oc

May 1945,” 7–8. July 1944 was one exception, when the operationa

to 74 percent. 

38. The rotation policy was not consistent during this time. The 

policy before the invasion was based on number of combat hours 

D day approached, all rotations were canceled until further n

October the older pilots with more than 100 combat missions beg

ing back to the zone of the interior for 30 days leave. These pilots 

did not return to their original combat units. Some became flight in

in the United States, while others were shifted to the Pacific theat

end of their leave. 

39. Desens questionnaire.

40. Searl interview. New pilots were sometimes allowed a few 

against less lethal targets in Brittany. One island in particular ju

coast near Saint Mihiel was used in this way. The Germans hel

many weeks, but the 362d missions against them there were not cr

ward combat rotation missions.

41. Searl interview; and Laughlin interview, 20 March 2000.

42. “362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 September 1944–30 S

1944,” 5; O’Dell questionnaire; Barensfeld questionnaire; and R

Racine, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000. The château w

come change to the living conditions up to that point. Although a gr

to pilot morale at the time, in November the 362d FG moved agai

67
y, , , ; y , , ; g, 

44. Francis A. Connor, questionnaire reply to author, 27 Mar

Robert D. McKee, questionnaire reply to author, 20 March 2000; R

Mower, questionnaire reply to author, April 2000; and A. David Chil

tionnaire reply to author, April 2000.

45. Clifford R. Saari, questionnaire reply to author, April 20

“362d Fighter Group Unit History: 1 June 1944–30 June 1944,” AF

no. GP-363-HI(FI), June 1944, 2.

46. Joseph L. Laughlin, telephone interview by author, 8 Ju

SAAS, Maxwell AFB, Ala. There were no tactics meetings held in th

however, Laughlin placed experienced pilots from other comb

fighter groups equally throughout his squadrons. Captains Pepper

and Bailey were examples of men who had merged into the 362d 

brought with them tactics from the 56th FG and the RAF Eagle Sq

47. James R. Ashford, questionnaire reply to author, 21 April 2

48. Campbell questionnaire.

49. Paul L. Carlisle, telephone interview by author, 30 Mar

Montgomery, Ala.

50. Jacobs, 250.

51. Wildern interview; and “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 

1944–31 October 1944,” 1–2. Wildern lost a good friend to flak in 

mer of 1944. After that, he treated each mission much more serio

his fighting intensity rose as a result. Many of the pilots held a 

grudge against the antiaircraft artillery gunners and took extra effo

lence them. Majors Beeson and Kline of the 378th Fighter Squad

singled out as excelling in this type of operation. 

52. “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 October 1944–31 

1944,” 6. 

53. Hill questionnaire; and O’Dell questionnaire. 

54. Campbell questionnaire. 

55. O’Dell questionnaire. 

56. Connor questionnaire; and Campbell questionnaire. 

57. Joseph L. Laughlin, questionnaire reply to author, 22 Marc

58. “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 August 1944–31 August 

and “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 October 1944–31 October 1

59. “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 October 1944–31 

1944,” 4.

60. Baloga questionnaire; and Ashford questionnaire. 

61. Searl interview.

62. O’Dell questionnaire. Every questionnaire, letter, or inte

ceived by the author reinforced this assessment. These sentiments 

pressed most strongly by the original pilots of the group who had al

under the previous group commander. The newer pilots who arri

68
64. Hill questionnaire. Some rated morale as fair during this 

indicated a sharp improvement after August. 

65. McKee questionnaire; and Barensfeld questionnaire. 

66. Hill questionnaire.

67. Laughlin interview, 8 June 2000.

68. Ibid.

69. “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 August 1944–31 August 

70. “362d Fighter Group Unit History, 1 October 1944–31 

1944,” 4.

71. Searl interview.

72. Joseph L. Laughlin, E-mail correspondence with the au

March 2000, Montgomery, Ala.

69
Col James R. McCarthy:

43d Strategic Wing

The degree of force that must be used against the enemy 

pends on the scale of political demands on either si

These demands, so far as they are known, would sh

what efforts each must make; but they seldom are fu

known—which may be one reason why both sides do 

exert themselves to the same degree.

—Carl von Clausew

In December 1972 US bombers and tactical 

launched a brief—but massive—air campaign thro

North Vietnam, with special emphasis on targets in 

cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. The operation, kno

Linebacker II, was the last major attempt to compel th

Vietnamese government to reach terms of a peace set

with the governments of the United States and South V

After eight years of American air operations in Southea

(SEA), the 11 days of intense bombing during Lineback

nally signaled the end of the war for America. 

Until recently, the tendency has been to generalize t

ious US airpower missions in Vietnam as inappropr

combating the type of war waged by the North Vietnam

Vietcong.1 Linebacker II, however, was a unique applic

airpower in Vietnam. The strategic, operational, and 

considerations of using B-52s in a series of sustain

overwhelming attacks against the North Vietnamese he

changed the scope of the war overnight. This section e

the implications of that change on the morale of B-52 a

in the 43d Strategic Wing (SW), flying those mission

Andersen AFB, Guam. Col James R. McCarthy assume

mand of the wing on 1 December 1972, just in t

Linebacker II to begin. Faced with an awesome respon

71
End of the Vietnam War:

US Withdrawal

After President Richard M. Nixon assumed office in J

1969, he began fulfilling his campaign promise of reduc

American presence in South Vietnam with an eye towar

ual withdrawal from the war. The Vietnamization conc

begun in an effort to reduce US troops in the South 

place them with trained South Vietnamese soldiers wh

combat the North Vietnamese on their own. Complem

this strategy were efforts to negotiate a peace settleme

would provide the United States “peace with hono

American soldiers began redeploying home, Americ

power became an increasingly important part of the rem

military force available to the president. In April 197

only 69,000 Americans remaining in South Vietnam

Vietnam launched a full-scale conventional invasion 

the demilitarized zone. The American response to the 

Offensive was to commit USAF and US Navy aircraft in 

terdiction and CAS campaign designed to isolate the 

Vietnamese and provide relief to the South Vietnamese 

which was losing the defensive battle. 

Several months of American bombing turned the 

South Vietnam. Interdiction and CAS missions weake

striking power of the North’s attack and brought them 

the negotiation table. By the end of the summer, the 

had regrouped and recaptured much of the territory th

lost in April. On 22 October the Office of the Joint C

Staff (JCS) directed a cessation of bombing north of 20 

latitude in North Vietnam, and an apparent peace deal 

hand.3 As happened on numerous other occasions, th

used this respite to reconstitute its forces; and by 6 Nov

enemy supplies were again flowing south to reequip th

Vietnamese Army.4 Peace talks began to deteriorate t

November; and on 13 December, the North Vietnames

tiators once again walked out of the peace confere

72
Pacific Command) and CINCSAC (commander in 

Strategic Air Command [SAC]) to “prepare a 3-day ma

effort by B-52s and TACAIR against essential military a

supporting targets in the heavily defended Han

Haiphong areas.”6 The bombing campaign would ult

last through December and become Operation Lineba

Its objective was to weaken the will of the North Viet

leadership and force them back to the negotiating tabl

SAC Operations in SEA

The B-52 is well remembered for its successful s

bombing missions during Linebacker II; however, SA

been flying B-52s for years in interdiction and CAS r

South Vietnam. The 43d SW and 72d SW(Provisio

Guam and the 307th SW at U-Tapao, Thailand, at on

held more than one-half of the United States’s B-52 

Together, these assets complemented Seventh Air Forc

cal fighters, bombers, and support aircraft and the 

Fleet’s naval aviation assets in ongoing operations in 

Vietnam and the surrounding border areas. From 1

1971, SAC bombers supported ground forces by inte

enemy troops and supplies that were flowing into 

Vietnam. As one of the theater’s only all-weather attac

forms, B-52s—with their six-man crews—could ope

conditions of heavy cloud cover, day or night.7 Capitali

these capabilities and the large bomb load of the airpla

commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

relied upon SAC to plan B-52 operations on a daily ba

The 307th SW at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Air F

Thailand and the 43d SW at Andersen consisted of th

B-52D aircraft. The “D” model was not equipped with 

assisted flight controls and when fully loaded was a ch

for its pilots to fly.8 The D model possessed two strong 

in the conventional combat role. First, its electronic c

measures (ECM) equipment used to degrade the effect

73
bombs.9 In addition the B-52Ds assigned at U-Tapa

reach their targets in and around Vietnam in only two 

instead of the six to seven hours required for the Guam

aircraft. The 72d SW(P) stationed at Andersen had B-5

craft. The “G” model was newer than the D model, was 

to fly, and had more fuel-efficient engines. It had, howev

significant drawbacks. First, its ECM suite had not r

the same upgraded jamming transmitters as the D 

had.10 Only half of the G models that would be assigne

72d would eventually have the more powerful ECM 

ment. Second, the G model was not modified to carry a

conventional bombs as the D model. The G could car

twenty-seven 750-pound general-purpose bombs.11

The chain of command for the B-52 wings operating 

was an unusual arrangement in an unusual war. B-5

considered national assets because of their primacy in 

nuclear deterrent role. Therefore, SAC headquarters 

want to lose control of these aircraft in a war that had 

share of aircraft attrition over the years. Breaking a 

tenet of American airpower employment (centralize

trol/decentralized execution), CINCSAC retained oper

and tactical control of the B-52s fighting the war in V

The chain of command thus went from the NCA, to th

to CINCSAC, to Eighth Air Force, to the Air Divisions 

(57th AD at Andersen, and 17th AD at U-Tapao)—to th

ational wings. The normal combat link to the CINCP

the USAF command in theater (PACAF) was missing. 

Perhaps the greatest organizational difference betwe

units and the tactical air units of Seventh AF was the 

concerning aircrew rotation and the definition of a 

tour. In Seventh AF the fighter pilots, weapon systems o

and electronic warfare officers arrived in the theater fo

manent change of station (PCS) assignment. Genera

length of the tour was one year for these aviators, at 

time they would receive credit for a remote combat 

74
SEA. Only a few crews were rotated to Guam and U-Ta

PCS assignments. Most arrived at these locations on 

rary duty (TDY) orders that stated the length of the T

not to exceed 179 days. While this was a shorter tou

their fighter counterparts, these SAC crews were at a 

disadvantage. For one thing, TDY SAC crews could not 

credit for a remote assignment. The minimum number 

in-theater needed to receive remote credit was 180. This 

that SAC crews returning to the United States after 

were just as likely to be ordered back to SEA as someo

had never gone in the first place. Although most SAC 

did not stay in SEA for the full 179 days, the general cy

came 120 days in-theater, followed by one month back 

United States, followed by a return to SEA for anoth

days and so on. The specialized D-model crews were 

hit by this policy because they had no opportunity to 

out of” the D model and into a stateside “H” model.12 

spring of 1973, some SAC crews had spent more than 

sand days TDY in the SEA theater.

Arc Light and Bullet Shot

Arc Light was the generic name given in 1965 to B-52 

ing missions that attacked enemy forces in South Vie

B-52s and their crews were “fragged” for Arc Light sort

tinely until the war ended in August 1973.14 Some Ar

missions actually crossed into the southern portion o

Vietnam, but the main characteristic of Arc Light m

was that they were expected to be low risk to the ai

Because they usually were low risk, these missions w

payoff. In other words, the significance of mission succ

rarely apparent to the crews. Aircrews sarcastically a

that the real objectives of these missions were to “bom

keys” and “make toothpicks”; however, the official ob

invariably directed crews to “bomb suspected truck pa

“disrupt suspected troop concentrations.” 

75
its infiltration of troops into South Vietnam, and the N

sponded by increasing the number of heavy bombers 

Thailand and Guam.15 In February the first additiona

arrived in-theater, and by December both bases wer

rated with bombers and crews. Two hundred B-52s a

crews were divided between the two bases, with Anders

rying the majority of both.16 Andersen was originally 

support 3,000 personnel, but it later exceeded 10,000

Linebacker I

Seeking a preemptive blow against the growing stre

the South Vietnamese Army, North Vietnam launched 

mored invasion into South Vietnam on 30 March 19

the first time in the long war, North Vietnam fou

American-style battle designed to achieve a decisive 

While initially catching the defending South Vietnames

off guard, the North’s strategy proved vulnerable to 

power. Interdiction and CAS missions by tactical aircr

B-52s successfully blunted the offensive and gave the 

time to launch a counteroffensive.17

Initially called Operation Freedom Train, the Ameri

attacks into North Vietnam became known by its mor

iar name, Linebacker I. Linebacker targeting emphas

terdiction of enemy rail, roads, and war materiel from 

north as the Chinese buffer zone throughout the length 

country. The combination of severing bridges, rail lin

major roads took time, but eventually US interdiction 

slowed the resupply of enemy troops on the front. The 

of North Vietnamese harbors and attacks on power sup

petroleum storage targets added to the physical effect

campaign. By the middle of September, the North was r

resume negotiations; and South Vietnam appeared in 

tion to defend itself once again.

In the renewed period of peace talks, American 

ceased bombing north of 20 degrees latitude, but Ar

and Linebacker I missions still continued through t

76
could not abort these missions for reasons of hostile a

aircraft malfunction. It was in this context that the fir

was lost to a SAM launched by the enemy on 22 No

1972.18 The enemy may have been weakened but was 

not beaten. The success of Linebacker I was in doub

North Vietnamese negotiators walked out of talks in P

13 December.

Linebacker II

President Nixon once again used airpower to motiv

North Vietnamese to return to the peace talks w

launched Linebacker II on 18 December 1972. For the 

days, B-52s and other fighter-bombers relentlessly a

North Vietnam.19 The two main differences between p

operations and those conducted during Linebacker II w

intensity and the location of the attacks. The intens

unique because B-52s became the central weapons pl

Up to 120 B-52s were launched in daily attack pa

Dozens of air-to-air F-4s, fighter-bombers, and suppre

enemy air defense (SEAD) assets were also tied into thi

aging concept. 

Linebacker II targets were mostly located in and arou

two largest cities in North Vietnam—Hanoi and Ha

These two cities had enjoyed a relative sanctuary from 

up to this point, but President Nixon wanted to inten

psychological effect of massive bomber strikes in his ne

paign.20 The types of targets selected were not significan

ferent from those struck during Linebacker I. However, by 

ing the war home to North Vietnam in its heartla

president wanted to achieve strategic effects rather than 

erational effect interdiction normally produced.

The outcome of the Linebacker II bombing missio

largely successful for the limited objectives that the pr

sought. Ultimately, this series of attacks had the goal 

ing the North Vietnamese back to the peace conf

Underpinning such a return was the prerequisite t

77
stantially met the American offer of October 1972, an

finally was at hand.

43d Strategic Wing Operations

in Linebacker II

B-52 crews from the two squadrons of the 43d SW (t

Bomb Squadron and the 63d Bomb Squadron [P]) struc

riety of targets during Linebacker II. These included m

storage areas, rail yards, warehousing compounds, r

repair facilities, power plants, SAM sites, and SAM sup

cilities in Hanoi and Haiphong. In the brief bombing ope

North Vietnam launched every SA-2 SAM and AAA pie

could fire at the B-52s. One estimate put North Viet

SAM launches at 884.21 How many were actually laun

43d SW aircrews will never be known, but every B-52 

Linebacker II was due to successful enemy SAM attack

Of the three B-52 wings in SEA, the 43d SW suffe

least number of aircraft losses during the Linebacker 

ation. The three wings flew a total of 729 sorties in th

paign, and 15 aircraft were shot down as the result of 

SAM launches. The 2 percent loss rate was less than t

inal SAC headquarters estimates given prior to the be

of Linebacker II.22 Even so, with the relative absence 

bat losses prior to December, B-52 crews viewed the 

spike in attrition with alarm. The greatest number o

occurred in the first three days of bombing when miss

peated the same ingress/egress routings and attack ti

each wave of B-52s.23

Compounding the redundant mission-planning flaw

weakness in the G-model ECM capabilities became obv

all who noticed that 66 percent of the losses in the firs

days had been G models. SAC directed both Andersen 

to cease Linebacker II missions on 21 and 22 Decembe

an evaluation of the losses was made. An impromptu 

review conference was held by 43d SW and 72d SW

78
integration of new tactics was introduced when all thre

once again flew Linebacker II missions. 

The single mission on 26 December was historic. 

three B-52Ds from Andersen took part in a total pac

120 B-52s launched from the two bases. This massive 

tion of aircraft overwhelmed the North Vietnamese de

by striking targets in Hanoi and Haiphong within a sin

minute window from multiple attack headings.24 Two 

were lost on the attack, but neither was from the 43d 

the final three days of Linebacker II operations, the 4

lost only one additional aircraft. These later B-52 attac

met by ineffective SAM resistance; and, ironically, Am

air superiority was achieved just as the NCA termina

bombing campaign. 

Table 3 presents the overall mission summary for t

SW during the 11 days of bombing. Four factors restric

43d SW from launching more sorties than its sister 

First, the 43d only had 53 aircraft (and 52 crews) comp

99 G models (and 149 crews) in the 72d SW(P).25 Seco

average 12-hour mission duration for the 43d crews 

that they could not generate as many daily sorties a

contemporaries at U-Tapao. Third, the 43d SW had t

down for three days of Linebacker II missions at the d

of SAC. Finally, on 23 December the 43d SW was ord

transfer 22 B-52D crews to U-Tapao to replace losses a

vide some relief to the overworked crews of the 307th 

79

Table 3

43d Strategic Wing Sortie Summary during Linebacke

18–29 December 1972

December: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 27 2

Sorties 33 27 24 0 0 12 0 33 9 1

Aircraft

Losses 00100000 1 

Source: “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” Air University Library do

M-U 41115-98, 59–313.
SW. The 43d SW sustained a 1.2 percent loss rate co

to 2.7 percent for the 72d SW(P), and 2.1 percent for th

SW.26 Overall, the 43d SW successfully attacked a va

military targets in and around North Vietnam’s two 

cities and contributed to the success that Lineba

achieved. The wing was no more influential than the ot

B-52 wings participating in these attacks, but each win

its own difficulties sustaining combat effectiveness. Win

ers struggled to balance the management of such large 

izations against the human elements of aircrew 

Morale was certainly a complex factor in the combat s

of the 43d. 

Aircrew Morale within the 43d Strategic W

There are many myths surrounding the morale of the 

crews on Guam during Linebacker II. Stories of m

against leadership, raucous behavior at the officers’ clu

crews refusing to fly combat missions have been signi

exaggerated.27 Perhaps the rowdy behavior at the office

was more fact than fiction; however, lack of communic

the wings was the biggest contributor to misreading 

events. The two wings at Andersen were too large to b

tively led using the standard AF wing/squadron temp

reality the crews at Andersen were professional airm

carried out the orders given to them, just as they had ti

again on previous missions. Duty not involving flying 

rates, measured by airmen reporting to the hospital, ro

an average of 35 per day before 18 December to 65 p

during Linebacker II.28 With more than 1,200 crew m

at Andersen, the DNIF rate did not affect combat ca

and was not alarmingly high considering the shift t

tempo operations. Regarding outright refusals to fly, o

B-52 crew member—a pilot at U-Tapao—was relieved o

duties for disobeying a direct order to fly combat.29 T

thor could find no information about how many aircrew

80
time is therefore no simple task.

Aircrew morale in the 43d SW during Linebacker II m

assessed in context before evaluating the various inf

present. The 43d SW was not an ordinary combat un

ing an ordinary war. The best way to understand the 

character is to realize that it was a huge TDY organizati

members on loan from multiple units back in the 

States. Only a few staff personnel were permanently as

For the rest, the novelty of being TDY had worn off lon

By 15 December 1972, Bullet Shot had inflated the 4

to the size of more than three normal stateside B-52 

Approximately 325 individual crew members were assi

the wing, although it is difficult to ascertain the specifi

ber of crews assigned at any one time because it con

changed. New crews arrived daily, while others transfe

U-Tapao and still others deployed back to the United S

unpredictable patterns. Both of the other B-52 wings 

enced this same SAC personnel policy that undermin

cohesion and esprit de corps. Each crew became some

an island unto itself throughout the turmoil of rapid re

ment. Many aircrews did not know the name of the

squadron commander or wing commander and would n

recognized either of them in a crowd. 

The pattern of previous bombing operations also infl

the morale as they began the Linebacker II campaign

peared that their participation in Arc Light missions 

the fall of 1972 was meaningless. One aircraft comman

scribed those missions as “practice bleeding” becau

crews had grown weary of bombing insignificant target

heavy political restrictions.31 This attitude was not con

the 43d SW. A copilot in the 72d SW(P) also “felt [they] 

getting much accomplished.”32

Aircrew morale prior to Linebacker II was quite low 

43d SW. Boredom and lack of motivation were common

cially among the crews that had been on several oth

TDYs in recent months. Even official correspondence b

81
The initial aircrew response to the information receiv

B-52s were finally going to hit targets in Hanoi and Ha

was a mixture of apprehension and approval. Capt Ge

Horiuchi summed up their overwhelming sentiment 

statement. The attacks were “long overdue and somethi

needed to be done. Go in, kick a--, and get it over wi

guys were anxious, nervous, even scared, but morale, 

was generally high.”34 After three days of Linebacker II 

ing, morale fell sharply due to heavy losses; but crew

still motivated to fly, even if SAC headquarters was n

historic 26 December mission brought about a rise in 

that buoyed aircrew spirits through the end of the cam

Since the rise and fall of morale over the brief pe

Linebacker II was noticeable, evaluating the trend in 

may be as instructive as attempts to measure the su

level of fighting spirit at any one time. Individual needs

sion, and esprit de corps are decisive factors in pilot m

Individual Needs

The physical needs of food, clothing, and shelter did 

tract from overall aircrew morale within the 43d SW. Al

overcrowding was a problem, the aircrews had air-cond

quarters which most other personnel—living in tents 

city”—lacked at Andersen. The issue of rest affected a

in various ways. Some crews flew only one Linebacker 

sion, while others flew four or five. In addition to Lineb

sorties, the 43d SW was concurrently tasked to fly Ar

missions in South Vietnam. On flying days the crew’s 

duty day was 24 to 26 hours long. They immediately w

crew rest after completing their debriefing, and mos

had at least one day off between missions. A routine de

in which aircrews would fly, land, drink, and sleep i

seemed a constant cycle.35 One of the recommendatio

aircrews made after Linebacker II was to establish “cre

tion and R/R [rest and recreation] on a scheduled b

order to] maintain crew morale.”36 Rest did not imp

82
One of the planning assumptions made by SAC in th

planning stages for Linebacker II was that no incre

spare aircraft or additional equipment would be ne

Although that assumption was based on a three-day 

mum effort, by 21 December SAC began flying in repla

aircraft and crews to offset the losses. Some aircrew

concerned that Linebacker II could not continue at t

rate of the first three days and felt that losses at the tim

high.38 SAC replacement efforts brought 10 additional 

to Andersen and U-Tapao by 25 December.39 When co

ing the much lower loss rate after 22 December, aircre

cerns did in fact subside as the bombing campaign con

Training was a morale issue for all members of th

Some crews were barely proficient at flying the D 

Although the wing flew the older B-52Ds, the home u

some TDY crews flew G or H models. To prepare them f

assignment to the 43d SW, those aircrews attended 

week upgrade training program before arriving in-the

order to be qualified to fly the D. From a morale stan

these crews had a difficult time adjusting. After Lineba

a SAC staff visit to SEA found that “ ‘G’ crews locked i

‘D’ package have major attitude problems. They gener

like orphans both at home and while TDY. They are al

cerned about the problems of upgrading.”40 There were 

crew comments made concerning this problem 

Linebacker II; however, this attitude was likely to have 

before, during, and after the December bombing missio

equitable opportunity for training is a valid concern for 

morale, as is the concept of “training like you intend to 

Normal training given to B-52 crews in the United 

prepared them for the nuclear-attack role. That train

cused on single-ship, low-altitude penetration of Sovie

air defenses with a particular emphasis on avoidin

warning and SAM radar detection. When they arrived 

the tactics directed from SAC did not mirror what cre

trained for. Instead, the tactics called for high-altitude 

83
B-52s would mitigate the SAM threat. The abandonm

previous training directly affected aircrew confidence in 

tics ordered from headquarters and severely lowered m

The two psychological needs of 43d SW aircrew (con

in tactics and confidence in equipment) were inse

linked. B-52 crews did not specifically address thei

dence in the aircraft itself, but rather in the combinatio

bomber and the tactics. The 43d SW crew confidence 

tics was low after the first three nights of Linebacker 

tactical errors were repeated on each of the first three 

First, wave after wave of B-52s attacked the same targe

high altitude along similar ground tracks. This predic

gave the North Vietnamese defenders a much higher pr

ity of damaging the B-52s in formation. Second, eac

was required to execute a 45-degree bank turn to 

course immediately after weapons release. This turn n

reduced B-52 ECM transmitter antenna coverage agai

SAMS but also turned the B-52s into 100-knot hea

that kept the aircraft within range of the SAM opera

longer periods.42 Aircrews attributed low morale to thes

tactics.43

The difficulty with rectifying the tactical problems wa

lack of imagination but the inherent delay caused by SA

ners locking out changes to the daily missions 42 hours 

they were executed.44 As a rule, the farther removed 

tance and hierarchy) the tactical decision makers are fr

crews flying the missions, the less flexibility there will b

planning process. In this case, 43d SW aircrew mora

fered due to poor tactics and their physical loss of cont

regard to improving the situation. During the stand-d

21 December, aircrews recommended changes to tact

SAC accepted and incorporated as quickly as they cou

future mission plans. Not surprisingly, these new tact

have done more to raise morale than any other factor. W

last Linebacker II mission briefing began on 29 Decem

43d SW commander noticed that morale was at an all-tim

84
to file an Inspector General complaint. Their argument was tha

being a less experienced crew, needed the mission for crew profi

more than the old heads.45

Changing tactics directly led to fewer losses as Lineba

came to a close. The perception of success balanced 

bearable losses finally gave 43d SW crews confidence th

could defeat the enemy.

Cohesion

The level at which 43d SW aircrews most closely bond

with their own six-man crew. With few exceptions

bonds were formed well before Linebacker II began

crews always deployed from their home station togethe

in-theater they could focus on specific mission details 

than having to work through new crew coordinatio

niques with unknown personalities. 

Cohesion continues to boost pilot morale. Several of 

SW aircrews who commented that they kept the sam

throughout Linebacker II also listed—by name and cre

tion—the other members of the crew. Their bonding im

morale in at least two ways. First, there are examples 

vidual crew members that were DNIF just before Lineb

who, upon notification that Linebacker II was about to 

demanded that the flight surgeon restore them to flying 

because they did not want their crew “going North” w

them.46 Second, some crews were willing to fly aircra

known malfunctions just so they could accomplish th

mission over Hanoi. In those cases the enthusiasm to 

a conscious effort to battle the war of nerves felt by thos

ing to participate.47

Esprit de Corps

The ad hoc nature of the 43d SW, with its two 

squadrons, did not lend itself to provide a secondary 

identity for the aircrews that flew within it. The a

85
Linebacker II, many aircrews reflected—not on losses fr

43d SW—but on the losses of B-52s from their home u

There are a few reasons why this secondary group 

may not have formed. First, the transient nature of th

did not encourage new members to invest much effort in 

ing. Second, most aircrews did not interact with squadr

group leaders. Third, the wing had no visible history o

tation upon which to build. The net result was twofold

never broke the secondary bonds established with th

manent unit back home. Even more serious, the crews 

many of the officers in authority outside their own crew 

tached and unsupportive. The absence of a secondary 

left the crews isolated. It is difficult to determine if str

prit de corps among the aircrews would have improved 

dramatically. It may have provided stability through

wing when losses began to rise and before new tactics 

to improve morale. 

James McCarthy’s Influence on Morale

Colonel McCarthy held several other command posit

SEA before assuming command of the 43d SW. As a co

pilot he had previously served two combat tours in Viet

1965 and 1968 before returning in March 1972 to ass

the Bullet Shot and Arc Light operations at Andersen. B

March and December 1972, McCarthy moved three ti

theater to become the 310th SW commander at U-Tap

4104th Refueling Squadron commander at Korat, and 

Guam to serve as the 43d SW vice commander. Whil

Tapao, McCarthy’s KC-135 wing and the B-52 crews 

307th SW participated in Linebacker I. This participat

his first exposure to employing B-52s in North Vietna

second was leading the 43d SW in Linebacker II. 

McCarthy took command of the 43d SW not only wh

crew morale was low due to Arc Light missions but a

time when the wing workload was extremely high bec

86
McCarthy personally responsible for the success or fa

his unit in the largest use of American bombers sinc

War II. However, his authority in the operation was n

mensurate with that level of responsibility. SAC headq

retained absolute control. McCarthy felt much pressure. 

Linebacker II, he worked 20 hours each day in order t

dinate with Eighth AF and SAC for the upcoming m

while simultaneously tending to the time-constraine

planning needs of the crews.49 The stress may hav

tributed to his poor health at the time. He contracted 

monia in mid-December, and the condition worsened th

out Linebacker II.50

McCarthy’s influences, both positive and negative, 

crew morale during Linebacker II were indirect. Mos

considered the wing staff detached from daily combat 

tions and viewed the wing as an administrative tool use

ordinate combat power, not to employ it. McCarthy p

essential logistical support for the crews but was not a 

crew member himself. His major interaction with Line

crews was at the mission briefings, but even there it 

brief appearance. Working behind the scenes, however, 

McCarthy assisted in organizing and supported the 

most important morale issue—the change in combat ta

His previous exposure to fighter operations and Line

I bomber operations convinced McCarthy that the 

negating the North Vietnamese SAM threat was to kee

cells (three-plane formations) close together to maxim

tual ECM protection.51 When he learned at the first Line

II debrief that some crews were breaking formation to 

against SAM launches, he issued an unpopular verbal o

his pilots: “Anyone who broke formation to dodge SAMs 

be court-martialed.”52 His follow-up was a written ord

required each aircraft commander’s signature.53 Al

crews initially protested, they would later come to co

that “the integral cell of three mutually supporting air

the best defense against existing threats,” and furth

87
that contributed to the low loss rate of 43d SW a

Colonel McCarthy also supported other tactical change

On 21 December during the SAC stand-down at An

staffs from the 43d SW and the 72d SW spent the aft

“talking to crews and asking for their ideas on how to i

tactics.”55 McCarthy also distributed a three-section qu

naire to each of his crews on the 21st, the purpose o

was “to get [aircrew’s] ideas on how to improve Comp

type missions.”56 The recommendations from the cr

cluded varying attack headings, decreasing the larg

after the target, varying bomber altitudes, and shorten

attack window. It is unclear where the genesis of the 

changes originated; however, Colonel McCarthy su

these recommendations and—together with the 72d 

commander—forwarded 43d SW inputs to Eighth AF an

to SAC.57 Some of the changes were incorporated for t

sions flown on 23 December, but all of the new tacti

used on the missions flown on 26 December. Al

McCarthy did not have sole authority to change tactics 

significance, he defended his crews by arguing for these c

to SAC. The improved tactics raised morale as soon 

crews saw that they were being used.58

Even though morale climbed with the introduction 

tactics, crews did not attribute the changes to 

McCarthy’s actions. The perception of McCarthy’s influ

the lives of the aircrews was skewed by poor commun

throughout the wing. Three areas related to aircrew es

corps were damaged because of the 43d SW command 

ture. First, the crews did not have access to Colonel Mc

on a frequent basis because of the size and complexity 

SW operations previously discussed.59 Aside from spec

ministrative action, McCarthy’s greatest contact was w

craft commanders.60 Second, Colonel McCarthy could n

tribute to the reputation of his combat wing in the tra

sense—setting the example in battle by piloting an a

Wing commanders in SAC at the time were not memb

88
enth” seat on board—one normally occupied by an ins

pilot or evaluator on training missions. The ABC wa

novel duty in SAC, but for Linebacker II it was mandate

filled by a full colonel who was responsible for the suc

failure of that mission. For security reasons, howeve

was hesitant to grant permission for the wing comman

fill that role. It reflects a high sense of mission dedicati

Colonel McCarthy twice convinced the Eighth AF com

to allow him to fly these missions, even though the flig

geon strongly protested the decision based on his medic

dition. Although McCarthy felt that a commander mus

the dangers that he asked his men to endure, the crews 

at it differently. They viewed the ABC as an outsid

might interfere with mission accomplishment as much 

tribute to its success. Rather than build a bond betw

wing and its individual crews, the ABC role proved 

source of friction and lowered morale.61

Conclusions

The dedicated efforts of the 43d SW were an importa

tor in the success of Linebacker II which, in turn, help

to the release of the American prisoners of war and to t

sequent end of the Vietnam War. The 43d SW history 

that “the Wing [did] not lose a mission due to low mora

ing Linebacker II. In fact morale was quite high. It is i

tive then to look at what caused the noticeable lowe

morale after the third night’s missions. Losses alone 

have contributed to this drop; however, an equal num

wing losses occurred after 26 December when mor

mained high. The only difference between the beginni

the end of Linebacker II was that the aircrews believ

had more control of the environment because SAC p

had followed their tactical recommendations. Their con

was high as a result.

89
realized that their ideas were being heeded, but they 

recognize that McCarthy’s support for their ideas was 

as important as the ideas themselves. Instead, the SA

structure—inappropriate for operations in SEA—cre

block between the crews and wing staff that preven

normal promotion of esprit de corps. Poor commun

lack of rumor control, and low visibility of the win

mander contributed to this problem. In the end a sens

prit de corps may not have increased mission effecti

but it would have increased enthusiasm for flying the m

during those periods when aircrews expressed doubts 

the wisdom of their chain of command.

Notes

1. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bo

North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989). Clodfelter discusses 

successes and failures of individual air campaigns in the Vietnam 

2. Ibid., 148. Nixon proposed a peace settlement that would se

moval of US troops from South Vietnam, a prisoner-of-war exchan

cease-fire throughout Vietnam. 

3. Strategic Air Command (SAC), SAC/HO, “Chronology 

Participation in Linebacker II, 12 August 1973,” USAF Air Universit

document no. M-U 41115-98, 13. 

4. Ibid., 14. 

5. Karl J. Eschmann, LINEBACKER: The Untold Story of the Air R

North Vietnam (New York: Ivy Books, 1989), 73.

6. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 19.

7. The crew consisted of an aircraft commander (pilot), a copilot

navigator (bombardier), a navigator, an electronic warfare officer, a

gunner. All were officers except the enlisted gunner.

8. James R. McCarthy and George B. Allison, “Linebacker II: A V

the Rock,” USAF monograph working papers, 42d Air Division 

February 1978, United States Air Force Historical Research Agen

inafter cited as AFHRA) file no. K416.04-13, vol. 1, 6–29.

9. James R. McCarthy and Robert E. Rayfield, B-52s over Hano

BACKER II Story (Fullerton, Calif.: California State Fullerton Pres

14.

10. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 60.

11. Ibid., 90.

90
, j

13. McCarthy and Rayfield, 13.

14. In this context, the term fragged refers to the daily mission o

outlined each unit’s required combat role for the day. Typically, e

bat wing did not see the overall mission flow for all assets in the 

they merely were issued a fragment of the complete order contain

aircraft tasking.

15. McCarthy and Rayfield, 13.

16. Ibid., 15. Figures were given by the Eighth AF commander

Johnson. Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) had 155 B-52s by Decemb

with the remaining 50 aircraft at U-Tapao. 

17. Eschmann, 11.

18. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 15.

19. A one-day stand-down was granted for Christmas day, so 

number of bombing days was 11.

20. Targets in Haiphong were struck in April 1972 by B-52s but 

briefly. The target set was petroleum storage, and the intent was t

it before it could reach the front. 

21. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 315. Th

was based on Air Force Special Communications Center signals in

collected during the operation. 

22. McCarthy and Allison, 7-6; and James R. McCarthy, ques

reply to author, 4 April 2000. The predicted loss rate due to enemy 

was between 3 and 5 percent. Colonel McCarthy’s own personal opi

that losses might be as high as 10 percent. Other unnamed senio

thought the loss rate could reach 15 to 20 percent during Linebac

23. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 69–135

52s were lost by the third day—three aircraft on 18 December an

craft on 20 December. 

24. Ibid., 222.

25. Ibid., 29.

26. Ibid., 59–313.

27. Earl H. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam 

(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1991), 269. Tilford counte

that the crews mutinied at any of the wings.

28. SAC/HO, “SAC Historical Monograph #204: SAC Bomber O

in the Southeast Asia War, Volume IV,” unclassified excerpts, AFHR

85-TS-AFHRC-29, K416.01-204, V-4, 836. 

29. Ibid., 837.

30. Jack C. Hawley, questionnaire reply to author, 28 April 2

William F. Stocker, telephone interview by author, 16 Apr

Montgomery, Ala. 

31. Hawley questionnaire. 

91
, , y, , 

Message dated 2 October 1972 from 57th Air Division (P) to Eighth 

subject: Impact of Bullet Shot/Constant Guard on Morale and Wel

34. Gerald T. Horiuchi, questionnaire reply to author, 24 April 2

James M. Short, questionnaire reply to author, 12 May 2000.

35. Hawley questionnaire.

36. “History of the 43d Strategic Wing, 1 January 1973–30 Ju

Volume 2,” exhibit 123. Official memorandum from 43 SW/CC 

SW/CC to 57 AD/CC and 8AF/DO, 7 January 1973, subje

Comments and Recommendations on Tactics Used on Com

Missions.

37. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 39. 

38. Bill Beavers, questionnaire reply to author, 25 April 2000; a

A. Klingbeil, questionnaire reply to author, 27 April 2000.

39. “Chronology of SAC Participation in Linebacker II,” 154.

40. SAC/DOTN and SAC/DOXTB, “Operations Staff Visit w

Aircrew Members TDY to SEAsia,” n.d., photocopied memora

General Allen provided to author by William F. Stocker. In addition 

ing several Linebacker II missions, Major Stocker traveled to SEA 

June 1973–13 July 1973 to update aircrews on future SAC presen

area.

41. John S. Sherman, questionnaire reply to author, 9 Ma

Although Captain Sherman flew with the 72d SW(P), his opinion 

training is relevant. He stated, “I believed that the on-the-shelf pl

we trained for) should have been employed vs. [sic] the high altitud

ing (that we hadn’t been trained to do).”

42. The ALT-28 transmitter antennas on the bottom of the B-52 

and rotate their jamming patterns as the aircraft is maneuvered. T

predictable coverage possible is when the aircraft is straight and le

43. Horiuchi questionnaire, 24; Dwight A. Moore, questionnaire 

author, 26 April 2000; and Wildeboor questionnaire. Horiuchi’s opi

shared by members of each of the three B-52 wings. 

44. Harry Cordes to James R. McCarthy, n.d., AFHRA file no. 

13, 77/05/12-78/01/04, V-12; and McCarthy and Allison, 4–7. T

from General Cordes, SAC/DCS for Intelligence, explained the 

making process at SAC during Linebacker II mission planning. T

cally depict the time-consuming process, staff planners had to dr

foot-long time line to illustrate all the specific actions necessary to 

one day’s mission. 

45. McCarthy and Allison, 6-36, 6-37.

46. Horiuchi questionnaire.

47. Steve Kovich, questionnaire reply to author, 28 April 2000. 

had been performing “manned spare” duty for the first few days of 

92
y g

48. Horiuchi questionnaire; and Hawley questionnaire. A poorl

question by the author could also be responsible for this confusion

49. “History of the 43d Strategic Wing, 1 January 1973–30 Ju

Volume 1,” 7 December 1973, unclassified excerpts, AFHRA file n

43-HI, January–June 1973, V-1, Appendix II: Commander’s Summ

50. Ibid., 4, 9.

51. Ibid., 5.

52. Ibid., 6.

53. “History of 43d Strategic Wing, 1 January 1973–30 Jun

Volume 2,” exhibit 179, memorandum from 43 SW/CC, sub

Discipline, 2 January 1973.

54. “Briefing for General Johnson: How B-52 Crews Would 

Attack against the Hanoi/Haiphong Complex Were Such Attac

Necessary,” 21 February 1973, AFHRA file no. K416.04-13, 72

73/04/25, V-13, 5–7. Aircrews were tasked to draw up lessons lear

Linebacker II to present to the Eighth AF commander. 

55. McCarthy and Allison, 4-6; and McCarthy and Rayfield, 10

56. “History of the 43d Strategic Wing, 1 July 1972–31 Decemb

Bullet Shot—Part II, with Emphasis on Linebacker II, Volume 3

168. Commander, 43SW/72SW(P) memorandum to aircraft comm

subject: Compression Mission Questionnaire, 21 December 1972. 

57. “History of 307th Strategic Wing, October–December 1972

1,” AFHRA file no. K-WG-307-HI, October 1972–December 1972, 

The unit history of the 307th SW at U-Tapao states that Col Bill Br

vice wing commander, initiated his own tactics conference on 20 D

1972 and submitted recommendations to Eighth AF afterward. The 

tactics reviews occurred either simultaneously or shortly after Eigh

ceived the recommendations from U-Tapao.

58. McCarthy and Rayfield, 128. The aircrews viewed the chan

relief during the briefing for 26 December.

59. William F. Stocker, questionnaire, 11 May 2000. Those 

members that did have frequent contact with McCarthy recognized 

itive involvement with regard to supporting the crews with tactics 

and providing beer for mission debriefs. Also mentioned is the 

McCarthy tried to meet as many aircrews returning from missions 

ble, but that mission briefings provided the most common contact 

crews.

60. Robert A. Clement, “A Fourth of July in December: 

Navigator’s Perspective of Linebacker II” (research report, U

Command and Staff College, 1984), 25; and McCarthy and Allison

17 December only pilots could attend the initial announcement brie

Linebacker II was about to begin. Even small social engagements 

93
q; y, qpy 

April 2000; and Sherman questionnaire. The crews from both A

wings shared this sentiment.

94
Conclusions

While fighting is a physical act, its direction is a men

process. The better your strategy, the easier you will g

the upper hand, and the less it will cost you. 

—Sir Basil Henry Liddell H

Because the military is an authoritarian organization

agement and leadership isssues confront the militar

mander. Management of the unit deals with the adm

tion and logistics of war—how to feed, house, and sup

force. In theory it is very simple to understand what p

items are required to sustain the troops, given the na

the engagement and resources available.

Leadership is complex and should never be redu

mathematical formulae or prescriptive regulation. Th

many approaches to perfecting this complex concep

this appreciation, a brief analysis of leadership is add

Yet even though there are unique aspects of each of th

ous case studies, there are also some common threa

run through them. 

Similarities in Aircrew Morale

Of the three general areas that contributed to 

morale (individual needs, cohesion, and esprit de cor

satisfaction of individual needs stands out as the most 

tant with regard to maintaining high morale. Cohesion

related to motivating aircrews to fly—was irrelevant f

German and American fighter pilots and only slightly i

tial when it came to B-52 crews. Even esprit de corps

was strong in the first two cases, was not singled out 

pilots as a paramount cause of their motivation. Es

corps was totally lacking in the case of the 43d SW, so 

95
two subsets (physical needs and psychological needs) 

equally as important. Physical needs for these airmen w

ways kept at least at Dr. Manning’s minimum acceptab

but in the case of the 362d FG, a trend was noticed

conditions improved over time, morale improved; bu

conditions declined over time, morale generally suffere

JG26 and the 43d SW displayed no significant cha

physical needs over the periods studied. 

Psychological needs were clearly more important inf

on aircrew morale than any other category. The con

that was developed from valid training and the percei

periority of their aircraft kept aircrew enthusiasm high

tactics is the process of matching training and equ

against a particular opposing capability, it is not diff

see that for the aircrews the influence of tactics durin

three air campaigns had a direct impact on morale. Dur

Battle of Britain, the air-to-air success of JG26 pilots w

sult of innovation and standardization of tactics 

within the wing. The initial high fighting spirit of thes

only dropped once the close escort and jabo missions w

tated by Göring. Even so, after the wing improvised n

tics for escorting bombers, morale stabilized. The jab

sions, however, led to the most dramatic decrease in 

because the wing chose not to develop tactics commen

with the new role. In Manning’s own terms, the jabo pil

neither a goal nor self-confidence. 

The P-47 pilots of the 362d FG had a more consisten

rience with tactics. Although they arrived in Europe t

they would be employed in the pursuit role, they quic

justed to ground-attack missions. The squadrons n

sought experience from the veterans of the Italian ca

but they also measured success primarily by the num

enemy ground positions destroyed. Aerial victories be

secondary measure of success. The validity of their C

tics was reinforced by the rapid advance of the army th

assigned to assist. The wide variety of missions tasked 

96
The B-52 crews of the 43d SW displayed the most no

correlation between morale and the selection of tacti

apparent inflexibility of tactics during the first three 

bombing lowered crew morale because they did not 

that losses needed to be as high as they were. The dist

position of these tactics further alienated the crews wh

risking their lives to complete the missions. Once the 

recommended by the aircrews were reflected in the lat

sions of the campaign, crew morale once again became 

Morale, Wing Leadership, and Comba

The wing commander holds a unique position in com

is close enough to his individual pilots and aircrews 

understands their concerns on a personal level. Never

he is also an important link to higher headquarters an

understand the greater part that his unit plays in meet

tional goals. His job is to satisfy headquarters’ requir

by executing his management and leadership responsi

The motivation of his people becomes a prime leadersh

cern in this endeavor, and maintaining high morale is a

ous necessity. If—as it seems from these three case st

aircrew morale is primarily concerned with the tactics 

fly combat missions, then a wing commander must be i

in that discussion. Each of the three commanders stud

an influence on aircrew morale via tactics. 

Major Galland was the father of most of the improv

in tactics within JG26. By developing his own close-esc

tics and amply demonstrating his successful air-to-air 

throughout the wing, he helped to sustain the moral

men. However, the deficiency in jabo tactics was also 

attributable to Galland. He never accepted Göring’s ob

for the jabos; therefore, he placed little emphasis on su

ing at the mission. Instead, he formed tactics that he

protect the Bf 109 jabos on their attacks rather than d

ing tactics that helped those pilots place bombs on 

97
than the other two units under consideration. It is, th

not as obvious to evaluate Laughlin’s influence on the 

tion of tactics. He was, however, one of the pilots who t

to Italy to learn ground-attack tactics and returned to E

to pass on the lessons learned. In this regard, Laugh

one of the progenitors of all 362d FG ground-attack 

His direct involvement in the attacks on ships in th

harbor and on the Dieuze dam demonstrated how clo

was connected with executing new tactics in the group 

war progressed. 

Colonel McCarthy found his previous B-52 experienc

at U-Tapao a valuable asset in the fostering of new 

from within the 43d SW. In addition to emphasizing 

portance of three-ship cell integrity in degrading SAM 

tiveness, he also was responsible for the tactics revi

sions held during the Linebacker II stand-down period. 

the value in the aircrew recommendations and used hi

ence with higher headquarters to argue for those tact

provements in future missions. The incorporation o

changes added to the complexity of future missions b

significantly raised aircrew morale. 

Lessons for the Commander

The purpose of this study was to attempt to identify 

teristics of wing leaders that were able to sustain aircrew 

in spite of heavy losses in combat. Each of the three com

ers studied had different individual characteristics and 

ship styles, and it became obvious that no all-in

analysis could be made. Even so, one behavioral char

tic did stand out: a wing commander must be flexible 

to encourage tactical innovation in combat if he wi

maintain a high level of aircrew morale, regardless 

heavy losses may be. This effort allows the pilots and a

under his command to exercise additional control o

combat situation. It appears likely that as combat los

crease, this level of control must also increase, or else 

will slip.

98
creating new tactics himself. This may be the most res

method to achieve results (as with JG26,) but it requir

the commander possess excellent tactical awareness 

reputation that translates to mission success and airc

ceptance. The second method is to rely on the ind

squadrons and aircrews in the wing to design new 

Fostering this approach may be most appropriate wh

crew morale is already weakened (as with the 43d SW) 

commander wishes to raise the perception of control 

the crews. Neither method is necessarily preferred; 

some cases, a combination of the two will be most usef

was with the 362d FG. 

Implications for Airpower

Based on the morale areas addressed in this study

are four implications for airpower employment in futu

flicts. First, morale affects airmen differently than s

General Marshall indicated that cohesion was a para

concern for soldiers in World War II. For airmen, howe

hesion hardly matters at all. All that really matters to 

the enthusiasm within the airman to fly missions is the 

(aircraft) to execute the mission and a confidence in h

ity to succeed. 

Second, morale is an issue affected by the context of 

eration. Although the definition of morale does not chan

context of combat versus operations other than war wi

ence the issues most important to airmen. It is not accu

say that tactical innovation equally influences aircrew 

in conventional battle settings as it does to patrolling 

zones. This distinction becomes relevant across the 

spectrum of the utility of airpower. 

Third, aircraft and aircrew losses do not necessarily 

aircrew morale. In only two cases (JG26 and 43d SW

losses mentioned in connection with reduced morale, an

of those instances occurred during periods of poor or sl

99
achieved. 

Fourth, wing commanders will sometimes need to in

in combat for missions that their units have not traine

peacetime. Such was the case for Galland, Laughli

McCarthy. The commander, therefore, must possess an 

knowledge of the missions, technologies, and limitation

aircraft and personnel in his unit. This will be neces

evaluate mission success in light of old and new tactics

seem an obvious statement, but the wing commander 

be a competent crew member in the aircraft assigned 

unit.

Recommendations for the USAF

There are several recommendations that can ben

USAF with regard to the issue of morale and wing comm

responsibilities. The two areas affected are doctrine a

PME system. 

USAF Doctrine

Since the Air Force has recently taken a renewed int

doctrine, it should consider addressing the following is

the next revision of Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD

Force Basic Doctrine, and operational level documents —

2 series. 

Define Morale. Basic Air Force doctrine needs to cla

meaning of morale and then spread its meaning thro

the service. As a suggestion, Manning’s general defin

simple and is applicable to all areas of the Air Force i

of peace or war. 

Create a Doctrine Document for Command. Curr

erational doctrine focuses on Air Force missions but 

also include special volumes for such areas as comman

effort would need to consolidate the various commande

lations and pamphlets that currently exist and also a

the morale issues discussed in this study.

100
College (ACSC), Air War College (AWC), and variou

mander schools are all appropriate venues to look into 

morale and the role of the wing commander in c

Currently, the USAF uses the leader-follower-situation 

model to discuss the role that the commander plays in 

This approach encourages leaders to consider their fo

and the context of the situation in order to choose an 

priate leadership style. This study recommends three c

to studying leadership within the PME system.

1. If the USAF continues to use the L-F-S model in 

ricula, it should place more emphasis on the leader’s a

alter the situation with which he is faced, rather than 

ing it is static. For example, in this study of combat 

the situation is changed when new tactics are introduce

would deemphasize the USAF’s current focus—suggesti

its leaders can change their personality or style to suit 

ation. Instead, it is more likely that a person’s personal

not change simply because he becomes a commander. T

focus should lie on the ability of commanders to cha

situation in such a way as to motivate their followers a

accomplish the mission. All commanders should be 

tors, or at least be able to draw innovation out of their 

dinates and implement it as appropriate. 

2. ACSC and AWC should encourage research into 

related topics, especially as they relate to combat sc

across the spectrum of war. These topics should spe

address the influences on Air Force personnel. 

3. Finally, the USAF group commander and win

mander courses should include instruction specifica

signed to consider morale in various settings. A fo

morale in multiple career fields and conditions would 

future commanders to the issues that really generate e

asm for mission accomplishment.

101
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103
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104
Manuals 

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Effectiveness.” Air University Review 31 (Sept

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Carlisle, Paul L. Telephone conversation. Montgomer

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105
29 March 2000.

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26 April 2000. 

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Surgeon’s Guide. Electronic copy received from th

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Cockpit.” Master’s thesis, SAAS, 1993.

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106
United States Air Force Historical Research Agenc

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War.” Interrogation report no. 94/1945, Air Fo

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VII/39.

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107
“History of 43d Strategic Wing, 1 January 1973–30 Jun

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1972) of the 43d Strategic Wing and the Strateg

Provisional, 72d, Volume 1.” Classified unit 

AFHRA file no. TS-HOA-73-133, K-WG-43-HI 

18–29 December 1972. 

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S(FI), April 1944–May 1945.

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1944.” Unit history. AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI

1944.

———. “1 July 1944–31 July 1944.” Unit history. AFH

no. GP-362-HI(FI), July 1944.

108
AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), September 1944.

———. “1 October 1944–31 October 1944.” Unit 

AFHRA file no. GP-362-HI(FI), October 1944.

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Questionnaire Responses to Author

Ashford, James R., 21 April 2000.

Baloga, John M., 12 April 2000.

Barensfeld, Jack R., 31 March 2000.

Beavers, Bill, 25 April 2000. 

Bynum, Joe, 27 April 2000.

Campbell, Robert W., 1 May 2000.

Childs, A. David, April 2000. 

Connor, Francis A., 27 March 2000.

Desens, Sherwin G., 29 April 2000.

Freese, James D., 28 May 2000.

Hambey, Ronald, 15 May 2000.

Hawley, Jack C., 28 April 2000.

Hill, John L., 23 April 2000.

Hope, Kenneth, 8 May 2000.

Horiuchi, Gerald T., 24 April 2000. 

Humphries, Fred L., 19 May 2000.

Klingbeil, Roger A., 27 April 2000.

Kovich, Steve, 28 April 2000. 

Laughlin, Joseph L., 22 March 2000.

Matte, Joseph Z., 8 May 2000.

McCarthy, James R., 4 April 2000. 

McKee, Robert D., 20 March 2000.

Moore, Dwight A., 24 April 2000. 

109
Racine, Robert J., April 2000. 

Saari, Clifford R., April 2000. 

Schoepfel, Gerhard, 30 March 2000. Facsimile trans

the hand of Mr. Schoepfel.

Searl, Robert B., April 2000.

Seeger (given name omitted). Facsimile transcript in th

of Seeger, 30 March 2000. 

Sherman, John S., 9 May 2000. 

Short, James M., 12 May 2000.

Stocker, William F., 11 May 2000.

Wildeboor, Ed, 26 April 2000.

110
The Art of Wing Leadership and

Aircrew Morale in Combat

Air University (AU) Library/AU Press Team

Chief Editor

Hattie D. Minter

Copy Editor

Rita B. Mathis

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Vivian D. O’Neal