Productivity Change in U.S. Catch Share Fisheries

John Walden, Juan Agar, Ron Felthoven, Abigail Harley, Stephen Kasperski, 

Jean Lee, Todd Lee, Aaron Mamula, Jessica Stephen, Andy Strelcheck, and 

Eric Thunberg

U.S. Department of Commerce

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

National Marine Fisheries Service

NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-146

October 2014

Productivity Change in U.S. Catch Share Fisheries

John Walden, Juan Agar, Ron Felthoven, Abigail Harley, Stephen Kasperski, 

Jean Lee, Todd Lee, Aaron Mamula, Jessica Stephen, Andy Strelcheck, and 

Eric Thunberg

NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-146

October 2014

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny Pritzker, Secretary 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Kathryn D. Sullivan, Administrator

National Marine Fisheries Service

Eileen Sobeck, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries
ii

Recommended citation:

Walden, J., J. Agar, R. Felthoven, A. Harley, S. Kasperski, J. Lee, T. Lee, A. Mamula, J. Stephen, 

A. Strelcheck, and E. Thunberg. 2014. Productivity Change in U.S. Catch Shares Fisheries. U.S. 

Dept. of Commer., NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-146, 137 p.

Copies of this report may be obtained from:

Rita Curtis, Ph.D.

Office of Science and Technology

National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA 

1315 East West Highway 

Silver Spring, MD 20910

Or online at:

http://spo.nmfs.noaa.gov/tm/ or 

https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/economics/fisheries/commercial/catch-share-program/index
iii

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................... viii

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................1

Lowe Factor Productivity Change Index........................................................................................5

Lowe Output Quantity Index..........................................................................................................6

Lowe Input Quantity Index.............................................................................................................7

Biomass..................................................................................................................................................8

General Procedures and Caveats .....................................................................................................9

Northeast Region..................................................................................................................................12

Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ Program...............................................................................12

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................12

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................13

Mid-Atlantic Surfclam ITQ Program ..........................................................................................18

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................18

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................19

Northeast General Category Atlantic Sea Scallop IFQ Program ....................................24

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................24

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................25

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ Program...............................................................................28

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................28

Estimated Productivity and Discussion ................................................................................29

Northeast Multispecies Sectors Program.................................................................................32

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................32

Estimated Productivity and Discussion ................................................................................34

Southeast Region .................................................................................................................................37

Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ Program..............................................................................37

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................37

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................37
iv

Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ Program........................................................................42

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................42

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................42

West Coast Region...............................................................................................................................46

Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program ................................................................46

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................46

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................49

Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization Program...............................................................52

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................52

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................53

Groundfish Data............................................................................................................................53

Non-whiting Groundfish Productivity Estimate.................................................................54

Shoreside Whiting Productivity Estimate ............................................................................56

Alaska Halibut IFQ Program.........................................................................................................57

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................57

Data...................................................................................................................................................59

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................61

Alaska Sablefish IFQ Program.....................................................................................................64

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................64

Data...................................................................................................................................................66

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................69

American Fisheries Act (AFA) Pollock Cooperatives ...........................................................74

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................74

Data...................................................................................................................................................76

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................79

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program ....................................84

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................84

Data...................................................................................................................................................86

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................88

Non-Pollock Trawl Catcher/Processor Groundfish Cooperatives (Amendment 80) 91

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................91
v

Data...................................................................................................................................................92

Productivity Estimates and Discussion.................................................................................94

Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Cooperatives Program.....................................................97

Fishery Synopsis...........................................................................................................................97

Data...................................................................................................................................................98

Productivity Estimates and Discussion...............................................................................101

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pacific Cod Hook and Line Cooperative (Freezer 

Longliners) ........................................................................................................................................105

Fishery Synopsis.........................................................................................................................105

Productivity Estimates and Discussion...............................................................................107

Discussion .............................................................................................................................................110

Further Research................................................................................................................................112

Effect on Multi-Factor Productivity of Additional Input Data.........................................112

Effect of the Biomass Index on Multi-Factor Productivity ..............................................114

Conclusions...........................................................................................................................................117

References ............................................................................................................................................119

Appendix A: Default Data for Input Prices ...............................................................................123

Appendix B: Biomass Estimates and Sources.........................................................................124

List of Tables

Table 1. Catch Share Programs and Sub-Components Included in the Report.............4

Table 2. Output and Inputs in the Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ Fishery.................16

Table 3. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity for the Mid-Atlantic Ocean 

Quahog ITQ Fishery ............................................................................................................................17

Table 4. Output and Inputs in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam ITQ Program........................22

Table 5. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity for the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam 

ITQ Program...........................................................................................................................................23

Table 6. Output and Inputs in the Northeast General Category Scallop IFQ Fishery27

Table 7. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices for the Northeast 

General Category Scallop IFQ Program.......................................................................................27

Table 8. Outputs and Inputs in the Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish ITQ Fishery ..............31

Table 9. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices in the Mid-Atlantic 

Golden Tilefish ITQ Fishery ..............................................................................................................31
vi

Table 10. Outputs and Inputs in the Northeast Multispecies Sector Allocation 

Program ...................................................................................................................................................36

Table 11. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices in the Northeast 

Multispecies Fishery ............................................................................................................................36

Table 12. Outputs and Inputs for the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ Fishery .........40

Table 13. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices for the Gulf of Mexico 

Red Snapper IFQ Fishery ..................................................................................................................41

Table 14. Output and Inputs in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ Fishery.......44

Table 15 Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish 

Fishery (IFQ Data.................................................................................................................................45

Table 16. Output and Inputs in the West Coast Primary Sablefish Fishery ..................51

Table 17. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the West Coast Primary Sablefish 

Fishery......................................................................................................................................................51

Table 18. Output and Inputs in the West Coast Non-Whiting Groundfish Catch 

Shares Fishery.......................................................................................................................................55

Table 19 Estimated Multi- Factor Productivity in the West Coast Catch Shares NonWhiting Groundfish Fishery ..............................................................................................................55

Table 20. Output and Inputs in the West Coast Shoreside Whiting Catch Shares 

Fishery......................................................................................................................................................56

Table 21. Estimated Multi- Factor Productivity in the West Coast Catch Shares 

Whiting Fishery .....................................................................................................................................56

Table 22. Output and Inputs in the Alaska Halibut IFQ Fishery ........................................60

Table 23. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Halibut IFQ Fishery .....................62

Table 24. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher Vessels in the Alaska Sablefish Fishery ....67

Table 25. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the Alaska Sablefish 

IFQ Fishery..............................................................................................................................................69

Table 26. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher Vessels in the Sablefish 

IFQ Fishery..............................................................................................................................................70

Table 27. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the 

Sablefish IFQ Fishery..........................................................................................................................72

Table 28. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher Vessels in the AFA Pollock Program ...........77

Table 29. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the AFA Pollock 

Program ...................................................................................................................................................79

Table 30. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher Vessels in the AFA Program

....................................................................................................................................................................81

Table 31. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the 

AFA Program ..........................................................................................................................................82

Table 32. Outputs and Inputs in the BSAI Crab IFQ Fisheries...........................................88

Table 33. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the BSAI Crab Fisheries ....................90

Table 34. Output and Inputs in the Alaska Amendment 80 Program..............................93

Table 35. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Amendment 80 Fishery .............95
vii

Table 36. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher Vessels in the Central Gulf of Alaska 

Rockfish Program .................................................................................................................................99

Table 37. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the Central Gulf of 

Alaska Rockfish Program.................................................................................................................100

Table 38. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher Vessels in the Rockfish 

Program .................................................................................................................................................102

Table 39. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the 

Rockfish Program ...............................................................................................................................103

Table 40. Outputs and Inputs in the Alaska Freezer Longline Fishery..........................107

Table 41. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Alaska Freezer Longline Fishery

..................................................................................................................................................................108

Table 42. Multi-Factor Productivity for First Three Years of Catch Share Program 

Implementation...................................................................................................................................111

Table 43. Multi-Factor Productivity for Catch Share Programs Implemented Prior to 

2008........................................................................................................................................................111

Table 44. Summary of Included Input Data by Program ...................................................113

Table 45. Marginal Effect of Additional Input Data on Estimated Multi-Factor 

Productivity...........................................................................................................................................114

Table 46. Marginal Change in Multi-Factor Productivity of Adding Input Data 

Relative to KL-Y ..................................................................................................................................114

Table 47. Effect of the Biomass Index on the Direction of Change and Magnitude of 

Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity ............................................................................................116
viii

Productivity Change in U.S. Catch Share Fisheries

Executive Summary

NOAA Fisheries Office of Science and 

Technology has initiated a national 

program including development and 

reporting of indicators of performance 

for catch share fisheries. The first 

national report of catch share program 

performance was published in 2013.1

That report included an initial set of 

performance indicators that were 

readily available with existing data 

while noting that additional indicators 

of performance were being developed, 

one of which was productivity change. 

In fisheries, productivity is the 

relationship between the quantity of 

fish produced and the amount of inputs 

used to harvest fish. In this context, 

productivity is referred to as “multifactor” productivity since the concern is 

with the production of fish using 

multiple inputs such as capital (e.g. 

fishing vessels), crew, fuel, ice, bait, 

etc. A change in multi-factor productivity (MFP) measures changes in outputs and 

inputs between two time periods. MFP may improve either by harvesting more fish 

with the same amount of inputs or by harvesting the same amount of fish using 

fewer inputs. By ending the “race to fish” catch share programs may be expected to 

 

1 https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/economics/catch-shares/documents/Catch_Shares_Report_FINAL.pdf

Box 1. Selected U.S. Catch Share Programs

and Sub-Components 

Northeast

Northeast General Category Atlantic Sea Scallop IFQ, 

2010 

Northeast Multispecies Sectors, 2010

Mid-Atlantic Surfclam, 1990 

Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ, 1990

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ, 2009

Gulf of Mexico

Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ, 2007

Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ, 2010

Pacific

Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking, 2001

Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization, 2011

Shoreside Non-Whiting IFQ

Shoreside Whiting IFQ

North Pacific

Alaska Halibut IFQ, 1995

Sablefish IFQ, 1995

Catcher Vessels

Catcher/Processors

American Fisheries Act (AFA) Pollock Cooperatives

Catcher Vessels, 2000

Catcher/Processors, 1999

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization

Program, 2005

Non-Pollock Trawl Catcher/Processor Groundfish 

Cooperatives (Amendment 80), 2008

Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Cooperatives, 2012

Catcher Vessels

Catcher/Processors

Bering Sea Freezer Longline Conservation Cooperative, 

2012
ix

lead to improved productivity through the ability to better plan harvesting activities 

to change the mix of outputs and/or make better use of capital and other inputs. 

Productivity gains may also be obtained through the transfer of quota from less to 

more efficient vessels.

Productivity change in most U.S. catch share fisheries including sub-components for 

some programs (see Box 1) was estimated using a Lowe index. The Lowe index is 

an aggregate index that avoids computational problems associated with changes in 

fleet size over time. The Lowe index is computationally easy to construct, less data 

demanding than most alternative productivity measures, and could be applied in a 

consistent manner for all selected U.S. catch share programs. Where biomass data 

were available the Lowe Index was adjusted for biomass change.

Annual MFP was estimated for a total of 20 catch share programs or subcomponents of catch share programs using the Lowe index. Of the 20 programs, 13 

included pre-catch share baseline conditions. In 10 of 13 cases, MFP improved or 

was improving during the first three years after program implementation. These 

productivity gains were maintained in all six catch share programs that have been 

in existence since at least 2007, and MFP continued to substantially improve in five 

of six longer-term programs after the first three years of program implementation.

Ideally MFP would be estimated using full information on inputs including capital, 

labor, energy, materials, and services. In 11 of the 20 fisheries evaluated in this 

report available data were limited to capital and labor. Analysis of the 9 programs 

that included energy and the 5 programs that also included materials found that 

energy made a larger contribution to estimated MFP as compared to capital and 

labor alone or to specifications including only capital, labor, and materials. This 

suggests that new data collection or new methods to estimate fuel use may be a 

priority in improving estimation of MFP in future studies.

The biomass index plays an important role in characterizing changes in MFP in catch 

share programs, as biomass changes may affect the catchability of fish and thus 

harvesting productivity. However, obtaining biomass data was a time consuming 

process, and in some cases, required a stock-by-stock evaluation of the reliability of 
x

the biomass information that was available. In most instances, biomass adjusted 

and biomass unadjusted measures of MFP were consistent in terms of productivity 

change relative to baseline conditions although, unadjusted MFP underestimates

productivity change when biomass is declining and overestimates productivity 

change when biomass is increasing. The magnitude of the difference between 

unadjusted and adjusted MFP increases with the magnitude of the biomass trend. If 

the biomass trend is sufficiently large, then biomass unadjusted MFP may provide a 

false impression of change in MFP. This means that obtaining reliable biomass data 

will be important in any future updates to MFP in catch share fisheries conducted by 

NOAA Fisheries.

1

Introduction

NOAA Fisheries’ Office of Science and Technology initiated development of a 

national set of catch shares performance indicators by convening a workshop of 

NOAA Fisheries’ regional economists, anthropologists and sociologists. The 

workshop was hosted by the Southwest Fisheries Science Center in La Jolla, CA 

during November 2009. The regional experts identified a substantial number of 

potential indicators that were subsequently classified as being Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 

3 metrics based on data availability and relative ease in quantifying each indicator. 

Tier 1 indicators were defined as metrics for which data were readily available, 

could be routinely produced and updated, and could be provided for all catch share 

programs. Tier 2 indicators were defined as metrics that could be produced using 

available data, but required additional research before they could be routinely 

produced. Tier 3 indicators were determined to be measures that would require 

large investments in research or new data collection programs. As research and 

data collection progresses, performance indicators in Tier 2 and Tier 3 will be 

moved up to Tier 1. The Tier 1 metrics were further refined in subsequent 

workshops and the first National report of catch share program performance was 

published in 2013.2

Among the Tier 2 metrics, vessel productivity and productivity change were 

identified as being important indicators of economic performance. Simply put, 

productivity is a measure of the relationship between aggregate output and 

aggregate input and productivity change measures changes in the ratio of outputs 

to inputs between two time periods. Although revenue per boat, which is included in 

the report cited above, is a crude proxy for single period productivity, it cannot 

serve as a measure of productivity change. As a measure of productivity change 

revenue per boat confounds price changes with changes in catch; does not take 

into account the quantity or mix of inputs used; and does not control for biomass. 

 

2 https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/Assets/economics/catch-shares/documents/Catch_Shares_Report_FINAL.pdf
2

To overcome these deficiencies a more comprehensive measure of productivity is 

needed.

Productivity measurement of fishing fleets has received intermittent attention over 

time. One of the earliest works was by Comitini and Huang (1967) who used a 

Cobb-Douglas technology to characterize the production of 32 halibut fishing 

vessels in the North Pacific over a seven-year period. Norton, Miller, and Kenney 

(1985) used aggregated data from vessels fishing in five U.S. fisheries to estimate 

an Economic Health Index, which contained a productivity component that could be 

examined separately. Squires (1988, 1992) published a study measuring 

productivity in the Pacific Coast Trawl Fishery using an index number approach. 

Weninger (2001) examined changes in productivity for surfclam vessels using a 

directional distance function model. More recently Walden et al. (2012) updated 

Weninger’s analysis to examine productivity change in the surfclam and ocean 

quahog ITQ fishery using a Malmquist index. Jin et al. (2002) measured total factor 

productivity in the New England Groundfish Fishery during the period 1964-2003. 

Felthoven and Paul (2004) reviewed past productivity studies and suggested a 

method for productivity measurement to answer questions concerning economic 

performance. Fox et al. (2006) examined changes in capacity, quota trading and 

productivity after a license buyback in Australian fisheries. Hannesson (2007) used 

a growth accounting framework to measure productivity change in Norwegian 

fisheries. Squires, Reid, and Jeon (2008) examined productivity growth in the 

Korean tuna purse seine fishery operating in the Pacific Ocean. Felthoven, Paul, and 

Torres (2009) measured productivity in the Alaskan pollock fishery from 1994-2003 

while incorporating environmental conditions, bycatch and stock effects. Eggert and 

Tveterås (2011) examined productivity change in Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish 

fisheries between 1973 and 2003. Torres and Felthoven (2014) revisited their 

earlier productivity study in the Alaskan pollock fishery using a longer panel (1994-

2009) and improved econometric techniques to account for the mixed distribution 

of the production data.

Productivity measurement in fisheries presents challenges that are different from 

traditional industries. Vessels are harvesting a natural resource stock where the 
3

government typically sets the total harvest level allowed in any given time period. 

Whether the harvest is controlled directly through a total allowable catch or input 

controls, total output is constrained. In many instances, regulations result in 

makeing vessels less productive. For example, biologically more productive areas 

may be closed, forcing vessels to fish less productive fishing grounds. This results 

in vessels using more inputs to catch the same amount of fish as they would in the 

more productive areas. Stock conditions and environmental factors can also 

influence productivity. External drivers such as changing ocean temperatures, can 

impact overall stock conditions. Failing to recognize external conditions when 

setting catch limits may lead to over-harvest in one year, and subsequent harvest 

reductions in the following years. Finally, different technologies (typically gear 

types) can be used to harvest the same resource, and this needs to be factored into 

productivity assessments. We are not attempting to monitor productivity of 

individuals over time among different technologies, but rather to assess 

productivity of a given gear technology applied to a particular fishery3. Given these 

considerations, NOAA Fisheries Office of Science and Technology sponsored a 

workshop held at the Southwest Fisheries Science Center in Santa Cruz to review 

the state of the art in productivity measurement and their potential application to 

fisheries in general and catch share fisheries in particular4. 

Based on this workshop and subsequent review of alternative productivity measures 

the Lowe index of multi-factor productivity was selected for implementation. The 

Lowe index was identified by O’Donnell (2012) as one that satisfies all economically 

relevant axioms for index number theory, including identity and transitivity. We 

construct the Lowe index as an aggregate index at the fishery level, that avoids 

computational problems associated with changes in fleet size over time. This index 

is computationally easy to construct, less data demanding than most alternative 

productivity measures, and can be applied in a consistent manner for all U.S. catch 

share programs. This report provides the estimated productivity change for the 

catch share programs noted in Table 1 using the Lowe index of multi-factor 

 

3

The Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization Program, for example, allows for gear switching, so it now operates 

with the use of multiple gear types.

4 http://swfsc.noaa.gov/publications/TM/SWFSC/NOAA-TM-NMFS-SWFSC-503.pdf
4

productivity. Note that Table 1 includes sub-components for several fisheries due to 

operational differences that may lead to differences in productivity change as well 

as differences in available data. The report is organized as follows. A technical 

exposition of the Lowe index is provided in the next section followed by the 

estimates of productivity for each catch share fishery organized by NOAA Fisheries 

region (Northeast, Southeast, Northwest, and Alaska). For each catch share fishery 

a brief synopsis of the fishery is provided followed by the estimates of productivity 

and a discussion of underlying constraints or external factors that may affect 

productivity. The final section of the report provides a synthesis of productivity 

change across catch share fisheries as well as considerations for further research.

Table 1. Catch Share Programs and Sub-Components Included in the Report

Program 

Implementation 

Year

Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ 1990

Mid-Atlantic Surfclam IFQ 1990

Northeast General Category Scallop IFQ 2010

Northeast Multispecies Sectors 2010

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ 2009

Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ 2007

Gulf of Mexico Grouper/Tilefish IFQ 2010

Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking 2001

Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization 2011

Shoreside Non-Whiting IFQ

Shoreside Whiting IFQ

Alaska Halibut IFQ 1995

Alaska Sablefish IFQ 1995

Catcher Vessels

Catcher/Processors

American Fisheries Act Pollock Cooperatives

Catcher Vessels 2000

Catcher/Processors 1999

Bering Sea and Aleutian Island Crab Rationalization 2005

Non-Pollock Trawl Catcher/Processor Groundfish Cooperatives (Amendment 80) 2008

Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Cooperativesa 2012

Catcher Vessels

Catcher/Processors

Bering Sea Freezer Longline Conservation Cooperativeb 2010

a Estimated productivity in the Rockfish Cooperatives Program includes the Pilot Program years from 

2007-2011.

b The Freezer Longline Conservation Cooperative operates in a manner similar to that of the Northeast 

Multispecies Sector program which is not considered an LAPP under the MSFCMA
5

Lowe Total Factor Productivity Change Index

In the economics literature multi-factor productivity is usually referred to as “total 

factor productivity”, or TFP. This distinguishes it from productivity of a single input 

such as, labor. Simply put, TFP is defined as a ratio of aggregate outputs to

aggregate inputs, and TFP change (



TFP) is the ratio of aggregate output change 

to aggregate input change during a time period, which for our purposes is one year. 

Output and input changes can be measured by constructing output and input 

quantity indices. A complicating factor in constructing indices for fishing fleets 

compared to traditional land-based industries is that TFP can be affected by 

changes in target species biomass. Biomass is an important input for the fishery 

production process, but its level and change between time periods is beyond the 

control of individual vessels in the fishery. Because biomass change may influence 

both outputs produced and the use of inputs by fishing vessels, failure to separate 

biomass from the remainder of the index makes it difficult to disentangle change in 

output and input use from biomass change (Squires, 1992).

The approach used by NOAA Fisheries to measure productivity change in catch 

share fisheries follows the KLEMS-Y format where the initials in KLEMS stand for 

capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), materials (M) and services (S), and Y stands for 

output. We define TFP in year y as the value of all landings in a fishery during year 

y using fixed base output prices 

( )O Qy

, while the denominator is the value of all 

inputs from a fishery during year y, also using fixed base input prices

( )I Qy

, such

that 



O

y

y I

y

Q

TFP

Q

. [1]

As we are interested in changes in TFP, we create Lowe output quantity 



,

( ) O Qy b

and 

Lowe input quantity 



,

( ) I Qy b

indices which represent changes in output quantities 

and input quantities between a baseline period b and year y. Lowe indices are 

“basket” indices, meaning that output and input quantities are aggregated into 
6

output and input indices using fixed reference period prices. We then define the 

Lowe TFP index, which represents the change in TFP between a baseline period b

and year y, as the ratio of the Lowe output quantity index to the Lowe input 

quantity index, such that 



 



,

,

,

O

y b

y b I

y b

Q

TFP

Q

. [2]

In this manner the index results in a measure of productivity change at the 

aggregate fishery level that weights the production of outputs and use of inputs in a 

consistent manner over the entire time period. Below the formulation of the Lowe 

output and input indices, and the Lowe biomass index will be discussed. 

Lowe Output Quantity Index

The Lowe output quantity index represents the change in output quantities between 

a baseline period b and year y, and is defined as



 



,

O r y

y b

r b

p q

Q

p q

, [3]

where q is a vector of output quantities in year y and baseline period b, and p is a 

vector of output prices during the reference period r

5

. It should be noted that the 

reference period chosen for the price vector does not have to be the same as the 

baseline period used for the quantity vector. Because the index is calculated at the 

fishery level and we are attempting to measure TFP changes in catch share 

fisheries, the vector of outputs should include all species landed on trips on which 

catch share species are landed during a given year. The price vector is the deflated 

price (GDP implicit price deflator, base year = 2010) for each species in the 

quantity vector during the reference period. The reference period was determined 

separately for each catch share fishery. Note that this reference period for prices 

could be a single year, or an average of several years, but the selection is constant 

over all years being compared for each catch share fishery.

 

5

In the case of a single species fishery, the quantity index would simply be defined as the ratio of quantities 

between two time periods, qy/qb.
7

Lowe Input Quantity Index

The Lowe input quantity index represents the change in input quantities between 

the baseline period b and year y, and is defined as 



 



,

I r y

y b

r b

w x

Q

w x

[4]

where x is a vector of input quantities in year y and baseline period b, and w is a 

vector of input prices in reference period r. A complete set of input categories would 

include capital (K), labor (L), energy (E), materials (M) and services (S). For each 

input category, price and quantity is required. If only cost data are available, an 

implicit estimate of quantity can be obtained by dividing cost by an appropriate 

price index, such as the GDP deflator. When only quantity data are available, an 

appropriate price index can be used in place of an explicit price. All input prices, 

whether explicit or an index, were deflated using the GDP implicit price deflator 

with base year = 2010 and only reference period prices are used in the calculation 

of the Lowe output and input indices.

Due to differences in data collection among catch share program implementation of 

the full KLEMS-Y approach may not feasible. In these cases the Lowe input quantity 

index can still be estimated by dropping the input for which data are not available

from the quantity index. At a minimum, the input quantity index includes capital 

(K) and labor (L) and the extent to which changes in the use of these two inputs 

reflect changes in overall input use determines the robustness of our measures of 

TFP change in these fisheries. In fisheries where changes in the use of capital and 

labor do not reflect changes in overall input use, a KL-Y approach may result in 

substantially different estimates of TFP change than a KLEMS-Y approach. However, 

this study uses the best data available to provide our estimate of TFP change in 

each of the catch share fisheries presented. 
8

Biomass Index

Changes in biomass can affect the catchability of fish and impact the estimated 

value of TFP change. If not accounted for, the productivity metric will reflect change 

in both biomass and TFP. The relationship between TFP that is biomass influenced 

( ) TFPB

and biomass-adjusted TFP 

( ) TFPBA

in any year y is

 *

B BA TFP TFP B y y y

, [5]

where By is a biomass adjustment factor. Solving for TFPBA yields:



BA B TFP TFP B y y y

. [6]

Because we are interested in productivity change, biomass-adjusted productivity 

change between any two periods, such as base period b and year y, 

BA BA TFP TFP y b

can now be constructed as the ratio of productivity measures in two time periods



BA B

y y y

BA B

b b b

TFP TFP B

TFP TFP B

. [7]

Substituting in equation [1] for 

B TFPy

and 

B TFPb

and simplifying yields



BA O I

y y y b

BA O I

b b b y

TFP Q Q B

TFP Q Q B

, [8]

which can be rearranged as 



BA O O

y y b b

BA I I

b y b y

TFP Q Q B

TFP Q Q B

, [9]

and simplified to 







,

,

BA O

y y b b

BA I

b y b y

TFP Q B

TFP Q B

. [10]
9

Substituting in equation [2] and simplifying yields 

   

, , ,

*

BA B TFP TFP B y b y b b y

, [11]

meaning that the biomass-adjusted index of TFP change is the product of an index 

of unadjusted TFP change multiplied by an index of biomass change. The biomass 

index number is simply a quantity index. In order to maintain consistency with the 

Lowe TFP index, a Lowe quantity index is constructed for biomass change which 

utilizes hybrid expenditure shares as prices such that: 

 

∑ 

 

 

 

 

∑ 

 

 

 

 , [12]

where:

 

 

 

  

∑ 

  

 

 

 

. [13]

Here, 

i

y

sb

is a measure of biomass for species i in year y (equivalent to q in the 

output quantity index), 

 

is the share value of landings for species i using reference 

period r prices and reference period quantities q, and n is the total number of 

species included. The value of shares sums to one. As discussed above, reference 

period r prices and landings quantities can be from a single time period or an 

average over several years. As constructed above, the biomass index is the inverse 

of the usual Lowe quantity index, because base period biomass is in the numerator 

rather than the denominator. Therefore an increase in biomass between the 

baseline period and year y is represented by a biomass index value below 1.00, 

while a biomass index value above 1.00 signifies a decrease in biomass between 

the baseline period and year y.

General Procedures and Caveats

Productivity change in each catch share fishery was estimated by economists in 

collaboration with biologists with experience and expertise with catch share 
10

programs within their region. Although the KLEMS-Y approach was selected to 

measure productivity change, sufficient data on all inputs were not available in any 

of the catch share programs to make full implementation of the approach possible.

For this reason, the term multi-factor productivity (MFP) is used throughout this 

report in place of the conventional reference to TFP. In all cases, capital (K) and 

labor (L) data were available to estimate productivity change. Where reliable data 

on energy (E) and materials (M) were available, these inputs were used in the 

estimates of productivity change. In general, data were available for some (e.g. ice, 

bait, supplies etc.) but not all materials that may be used by vessels harvesting 

fish. This means that the input and output data reported herein cannot be used as a 

measure of net return for two reasons. First, the input data are incomplete relative 

to the more comprehensive data that would be required to assess net return or 

profitability in catch share fisheries. Second, the Lowe input index and output index 

are both constructed with fixed prices meaning that the data cannot be used to 

estimate annual costs, revenues and net returns.

Both output quantities and prices for each catch share program were available at 

the regional level. Similarly, data on input quantities for the factors of production 

used to estimate productivity were available at the regional level, but input price 

data were not routinely collected in all regions. For this reason, a data set of input 

prices (see Appendix A) for labor, fuel, and capital services was constructed from 

secondary sources. Specifically, average hourly earnings of production and 

nonsupervisory employees from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics current 

employment statistics survey was used for the price of labor6. The average price of 

retail sales of No. 2 diesel fuel by refineries from the Energy Information 

Administration was used as the fuel price7. The interest rate for BAA rated bonds 

was used as the capital services price8. Each of these price series were based on 

national averages and unless otherwise noted were used in the absence of 

 

6 Source: http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet

7 Source: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_refoth_dcu_nus_a.htm

8 Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=BAA
11

alternative region-specific data. All input and output prices were converted to 

constant 2010 dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator (see Appendix A).

Estimates of biomass for each catch share program were obtained from several 

sources. These biomass estimates included the managed species/stocks under each 

catch share program as well as species that are not managed under the catch share 

program of interest yet were jointly harvested on catch share program trips. These 

jointly-caught species were further scrutinized to determine which may be jointly 

targeted and which may be incidental. The former may be expected to influence trip 

decision making affecting outputs and the mix of inputs used to harvest fish. Once 

both the catch share species and influential non-catch share species were identified 

biomass estimates were obtained from a combination of the NOAA Fisheries Species 

Information System and recent stock assessment reports. The biomass data and 

sources by species for each catch share program are reported in Appendix B.

The biomass estimates included in this study are meant to proxy for changes in the 

catchability of the target species and embody the assumption that, all else equal, a 

larger biomass will produce a higher level of output for a given level of inputs than 

a smaller biomass. However, changes in biomass may not always lead to changes 

in catchability. As the population of a species declines, the spatial distribution of 

that species may decline as well and the resulting density of fish may remain 

constant (particularly with species that exhibit schooling behavior) and catchability 

can remain relatively constant if these aggregations are easy for fishing vessels to 

locate (Squires, 1992). Since catchability may not be directly related to the size of 

the species biomass, it is possible to follow the approach used in Squires (1992) to 

adjust the biomass estimates based on individual species catchability if species and 

gear specific catchability coefficients are available. This would dampen the impact 

that changes in biomass currently have on biomass-adjusted TFP change for those 

species which exhibit a relatively high degree of schooling behavior. This approach 

is left for future analysis as these catchability coefficients are not currently available 

for all catch share program species.
12

Northeast Region

Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

The ocean quahog is a bivalve mollusk distributed on both sides of the North 

Atlantic. In U.S. waters ocean quahogs occur from Maine to North Carolina although 

the majority of the resource is found exclusively within the Exclusive Economic 

Zone (EEZ) at depths from 20 to 80 meters9. Ocean quahogs are slow growing,

long-lived organisms that do not start to reproduce until age 6 and do not reach a 

commercially harvestable size until around age 20. Ocean quahogs can live for at 

least 200 years10. Ocean quahogs are harvested using a hydraulic clam dredge that 

uses jets of water to remove sand and sediment from clam beds dislodging the 

clams that are retained in the dredge. The spacing of the bars in the dredge allows

smaller clams to pass through while retaining larger clams.

The surfclam and ocean quahog fisheries, managed by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery 

Management Council, were the Nation’s first fisheries to adopt an Individual 

Transferable Quota (ITQ) management system beginning in 1990. In the several 

years prior to ITQ program implementation, surfclams had been the more 

intensively exploited species and were subject to limited access, whereas ocean 

quahogs remained an open access fishery. Compared to surfclams, ocean quahogs 

are distributed farther offshore and the fishery was prosecuted by only the larger 

vessels. Like the surfclam fishery, ocean quahogs were subject to quarterly quotas, 

but the effort limits imposed on surfclam fishing time were not needed in the ocean 

quahog fishery. Thus, the economic problem in the surfclam fishery manifested in

inefficient use of fishing vessels that were idled much of the year were not evident 

in the ocean quahog fishery. Nevertheless, when the Mid-Atlantic Surfclam ITQ 

Program was being considered the ocean quahog fishery was approaching the limit 

 

9

For more information see Jacobson and Weinberg http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/iv/quahog/

10 For more information see 

http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/clams/species_pages/ocean_quahog_clam.htm
13

of its specified optimum yield and there was concern over the transfer of effort from 

surfclams to ocean quahogs if the former became an ITQ system and the latter did 

not. 

In establishing the ITQ program, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council 

sought to i) conserve the ocean quahog resource and stabilize harvest rates, ii) 

minimize public and private costs of managing the resource, iii) bring harvest 

capacity in line with processing and biological capacity to allow industry participants 

to achieve economic efficiency and iv) create a management approach that is 

flexible and adaptive to short-term events or circumstances. 

Initial shares for the Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ Program were primarily based 

on historical participation in the fishery in terms of landings. This meant that initial 

quota shares were allocated to owners of ocean quahog fishing vessels. However, 

the ITQ Program permits the transfer of quota shares to any individual or entity 

provided they are eligible to own a U.S. Coast Guard documented vessel. Quota 

shares may be transferred on a permanent basis or transferred (leased) on an 

annual basis to industry participants (processors or vessel owners) or other entities.

Processors may purchase ocean quahogs from a vessel owner that owns quota 

share or they may operate their own fleet of vessels which may lease additional 

quota from others. Processors may also contract for harvesting services to a fishing 

vessel owner. The variety of possible business arrangements complicates 

interpretation of harvest-level productivity change since business decisions in 

vertically integrated firms may be made to affect the productivity of the entire 

enterprise and not just of the harvesting activity.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

The Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog fishery (along with the surfclam fishery) is the 

longest running ITQ program in the United States. Productivity estimates are for a 

23 year time period (1990-2012), and are only a partial measure compared to the 

other catch share fisheries, because estimates for the key inputs of fuel and 
14

materials are not available. Inputs included in these productivity estimates are only 

capital and labor, meaning this is a Y-KL index (outputs, capital and labor). Outputs 

are bushels of ocean quahogs multiplied by a common price. There is only a single 

vessel type using hydraulic dredge gear to harvest ocean quahogs. Included 

vessels are only those fishing for ocean quahogs in the ITQ fishery, and not those 

that fish for Maine mahogany quahogs in the state of Maine.

One key feature of the ITQ program is that the total output that can be produced 

from the fishery is strictly regulated through the quota setting process. Thus, 

output gains are limited. Reductions in input usage are possible as harvest is 

shifted to fewer vessels, but these reductions may be thwarted if large vessels 

replace smaller vessels. 

Output from the fishery in the first year of the ITQ program decreased slightly from 

the baseline average, and then increased somewhat during the next three years 

(Table 2). For the remainder of the time period, output declined relative to the base 

period. This was likely due to lower demand for ocean quahogs in the final product 

market, and not due to changes in the technology used to harvest clams. Total 

inputs used in the fishery were higher than the baseline time period until 2005, and 

then were relatively stable. This may have been partly driven by a shifting of 

production to newer, larger vessels and increased steaming time spent on trips to 

access ocean quahog beds in deeper water farther from shore. Labor input was 

higher than the baseline time period until 2005, and was lower than the baseline 

time period from 2005-2012. Capital input was lower than the baseline for the 

entire time period which was primarily driven exiting vessels. 

During the first year of the ITQ program (1990), unadjusted productivity declined 

to 0.92, an 8% decline from the base time period (Table 3). Between 1990 and 

1994, productivity was generally less than 1.00, indicating a productivity decline 

compared to the base time period. Between 1995 and 1999, unadjusted 

productivity was greater than 1.00, indicating positive productivity gains, before 

falling below one between 2000 and 2004. Beginning in 2005, unadjusted 

productivity was again above 1.00, which was likely due to substantially lower input 
15

usage as the input index fell from 0.87 to 0.57 in 2005 (a 34% decline), and then 

fluctuated between 0.53 and 0.63 in subsequent years. Between 2005 and 2012, 

the output index was less than 1.00, but was also increasing, representing gains in 

output. This resulted in positive productivity change for the years 2005-2012. 

The biomass index between 1990 and 2012 was generally above 1.00, which 

indicates declining biomass (Table 3). After adjusting the productivity index by the 

biomass index, there were only four years during the entire time period where 

productivity was less than one (1990, 1991, 1993 and 1994). The value of 1.82 in 

year 2012 showed that the fishery was 82% more productive in 2012 than in the 

base time period. Within the increasing biomass adjusted productivity trend, there 

was yearly variation as seen in the yearly productivity change column. Most of the 

years showed slight increases or decreases in yearly productivity. The biggest 

increase was 21% in 2005 (1.21), while the largest decline was 13% in 2000 

(0.87). For the entire time period, the average year-to-year change was three 

percent (1.03).
16

Table 2. Output and Inputs in the Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog ITQ Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputa

1987 28,458,150 774,245 6,011,760 6,786,006 

1988 26,816,238 757,505 6,110,259 6,867,764 

1989 29,575,920 882,594 6,896,824 7,779,418 

Baseline Average 28,283,436 804,782 6,339,615 7,144,396 

1990 27,727,566 719,928 6,875,059 7,594,987 

1991 29,038,944 621,514 7,131,868 7,753,382 

1992 29,555,118 614,719 6,596,288 7,211,007 

1993 28,878,558 572,454 7,229,220 7,801,674 

1994 27,671,898 524,440 6,751,138 7,275,579 

1995 27,769,938 572,663 6,045,644 6,618,307 

1996 26,348,568 549,223 5,398,229 5,947,452 

1997 25,674,354 459,311 5,541,316 6,000,628 

1998 23,384,922 436,595 5,189,974 5,626,569 

1999 22,621,728 392,177 5,194,646 5,586,823 

2000 18,987,762 454,571 5,025,802 5,480,372 

2001 22,146,042 482,158 5,595,497 6,077,655 

2002 23,228,316 478,339 5,604,876 6,083,214 

2003 24,412,488 460,574 5,956,354 6,416,929 

2004 22,947,456 474,701 5,765,082 6,239,784 

2005 17,637,696 390,740 3,661,628 4,052,368 

2006 18,398,016 300,341 3,507,627 3,807,968 

2007 20,182,464 286,968 3,954,269 4,241,237 

2008 20,537,088 297,919 3,950,099 4,248,018 

2009 20,556,918 281,903 3,783,009 4,064,912 

2010 21,322,500 296,276 4,240,140 4,536,416 

2011 18,697,746 281,777 3,752,139 4,033,916 

2012 20,717,532 289,162 4,024,880 4,314,042 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
17

Table 3. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity for the Mid-Atlantic Ocean Quahog 

ITQ Fishery

Year

Output

Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted MFP

Biomass

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to Year

MFP

Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

1990 0.98 1.06 0.92 1.00 0.92 0.92

1991 1.03 1.09 0.95 1.00 0.94 1.02

1992 1.04 1.01 1.04 1.00 1.03 1.09

1993 1.02 1.09 0.94 1.01 0.95 0.92

1994 0.98 1.02 0.96 1.03 0.99 1.05

1995 0.98 0.93 1.06 1.05 1.12 1.12

1996 0.93 0.83 1.12 1.07 1.20 1.08

1997 0.91 0.84 1.08 1.10 1.18 0.98

1998 0.83 0.79 1.05 1.12 1.17 0.99

1999 0.80 0.78 1.02 1.14 1.17 0.99

2000 0.67 0.77 0.88 1.16 1.02 0.87

2001 0.78 0.85 0.92 1.18 1.09 1.07

2002 0.82 0.85 0.96 1.21 1.16 1.07

2003 0.86 0.90 0.96 1.23 1.19 1.02

2004 0.81 0.87 0.93 1.26 1.17 0.99

2005 0.62 0.57 1.10 1.29 1.42 1.21

2006 0.65 0.53 1.22 1.31 1.60 1.13

2007 0.71 0.59 1.20 1.34 1.61 1.01

2008 0.73 0.59 1.22 1.37 1.67 1.04

2009 0.73 0.57 1.28 1.40 1.79 1.07

2010 0.75 0.63 1.19 1.43 1.70 0.95

2011 0.66 0.56 1.17 1.47 1.72 1.01

2012 0.73 0.60 1.21 1.50 1.82 1.06
18

Mid-Atlantic Surfclam ITQ Program 

Fishery Synopsis

The surfclam is a bivalve mollusk that is found in Northwest Atlantic waters from 

the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina11. The surfclam is 

distributed in both state waters and the EEZ at depths ranging from intertidal beach 

zones to 160 feet. The majority of the resource is found in the EEZ off New Jersey, 

the Delmarva Peninsula, and on Georges Bank. Like ocean quahogs, surfclams are 

harvested in coarse-grained sandy bottom using a hydraulic dredge. However, 

compared to ocean quahogs, surfclams are harvested at larger sizes and not 

consumed live, but are processed as clam strips, minced clams sold fresh or frozen, 

and used in soups and chowders.

Managed by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council since 1977, the surfclam 

and ocean quahog fisheries were the Nation’s first fisheries to adopt an Individual 

Transferable Quota (ITQ) management system beginning in 1990. In the thirteen 

years prior to adoption of the ITQ management system, the surfclam fishery was 

managed through limited entry, quarterly quotas, and restrictions on fishing time 

designed to maintain a steady flow of clams available to the market. Although these 

measures were successful in rebuilding the surfclam resource, quota levels were 

maintained by limiting vessels to only 36 hours each quarter. These limitations 

resulted in inefficient use of fishing vessels characterized by significant idle 

harvesting capacity for much of the year since the hydraulic dredge gear used in 

the fishery could not be used in other fisheries.

In establishing the ITQ program, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council 

sought to i) conserve the surfclam resource and stabilize harvest rates, ii) minimize 

public and private costs of managing the resource, iii) bring harvest capacity in line 

with processing and biological capacity to allow industry participants to achieve 

 

11 For more information see 

http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/clams/species_pages/atlantic_surfclam.htm
19

economic efficiency, and iv) create a management approach that is flexible and 

adaptive to short term events or circumstances. 

Initial quota shares for the Mid-Atlantic Surfclam ITQ Program were primarily based 

on historical participation in the fishery in terms of landings. This meant that initial 

quota shares were allocated to owners of surfclam fishing vessels. However, the 

ITQ Program permits the transfer of quota shares to any individual or entity 

provided that they are eligible to own a U.S. Coast Guard documented vessel 

without requiring actual ownership of a vessel. Quota shares may be transferred on 

a permanent basis or quota may be transferred (leased) on an annual basis to 

another entity. Quota shares or quota may be owned by industry participants 

(processors or vessel owners) or other entities. Processors may purchase clams 

from a vessel owner that owns quota share or they may operate their own fleet of 

vessels or may contract for harvesting services to a fishing vessel owner. The 

variety of possible business arrangements complicates interpretation of harvestlevel productivity change since business decisions in vertically integrated firms may 

be made to affect the productivity of the entire enterprise and not just of the 

harvesting activity.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

The Mid-Atlantic surfclam fishery (along with the ocean quahog fishery) is the 

longest running ITQ program in the United States. Productivity estimates are for a 

23 year time period (1990-2012), and are only a partial measure compared to the 

other catch share fisheries in the Northeast region. This is because estimates for 

the key inputs of fuel and materials are not available. Therefore, inputs included in 

these estimates are only capital and labor, meaning this is a Y-KL index (outputs, 

capital and labor). Outputs are bushels of surfclams multiplied by a common price. 

One key feature of the ITQ program is that the total output that can be produced 

from the fishery is regulated through the quota setting process. Thus, output gains 
20

are limited whereas reductions in input usage are possible as harvest is shifted to 

fewer vessels. However, these reductions may be offset if larger vessels replace 

smaller vessels. 

Output from the fishery in the first year of the ITQ program increased relative to 

the baseline time period, and then declined the following year (1991). The years 

1992-1994 saw a slight upturn in outputs, but then outputs declined through 1998 

before increasing again (Table 4). Inputs generally declined through 2000, and then 

increased during the time period 2001-2012, although there were years within the 

period where inputs declined. Much of the decline was due to exiting vessels. 

During the entire time period, outputs fluctuated on a yearly basis, which was a 

function of the available quota and the demand for products produced from 

surfclams in the final output market. The increasing input use between 2000 and 

2012 may have been partly driven by an influx of new, larger vessels, and longer 

steaming time on trips. The labor input rose to its highest level in 2011. Capital 

input also rose between 2000 and 2012, although there were years where it 

declined during the same time period. Vessels in this fishery can also be used to 

harvest ocean quahogs, and there are some vessels that do both in a year. 

Increased fishing by dual use vessels in the ocean quahog (surfclam) fishery would 

lower (raise) the capital input used in the surfclam fishery. 

During the first year of the ITQ program, the unadjusted productivity index 

increased to 1.28, a 28% improvement from the base time period (Table 5). This 

was due to an eight percent gain in outputs (output index 1.08), and a 15% 

decrease in inputs (input index 0.85). The unadjusted productivity index was 

greater than one until 2008, indicating improved productivity compared to the 

baseline time period. After 2008, the unadjusted productivity index was less than 

1.00, indicating declining productivity. After 2008, the output index was less than 

1.00, while the input index was 1.00 or greater in three of the four years. Part of 

the reason for the decline in the output index may be that the fishery was 

harvesting less than the available quota because of declines in demand for 
21

surfclams in the consumer product market. Thus, the productivity metric is also 

reflecting a market issue that hasn’t been fully accounted for in the estimate.

The biomass index between 1990 and 2012 was increasing, which indicates 

declining biomass (Table 5). In 2012, the biomass index was 2.81 meaning the 

biomass was almost a third of the level available during the baseline time period. 

After adjusting the productivity index by the biomass index, the biomass adjusted 

productivity was 2.14 in 2012. On a yearly basis, the biomass adjusted productivity 

increased until 2003, then declined during the last eight years of the time period 

(Table 5). Beginning in the year 2000, the input index began to increase, indicating 

that more inputs were being used to harvest the quota. This is consistent with a 

declining biomass. As the stock declines and becomes more dispersed spatially, 

vessels will need to use more inputs to harvest the same amount of output. This 

also underscores the importance of adjusting the productivity estimate by a stock 

adjustment factor which indicates increasing or decreasing stock abundance.

 
22

Table 4. Output and Inputs in the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam ITQ Program

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputa

1987 30,820,622 1,686,102 4,338,593 6,024,695

1988 33,136,273 1,642,991 4,777,973 6,420,964

1989 30,410,495 1,558,558 3,530,942 5,089,500

Baseline average 31,455,797 1,629,217 4,215,836 5,845,053

1990 34,044,239 1,568,468 3,374,662 4,943,130

1991 29,220,404 736,721 3,245,652 3,982,373

1992 30,738,111 574,773 3,306,013 3,880,786

1993 30,970,865 502,174 3,015,346 3,517,520

1994 31,102,911 457,428 3,369,527 3,826,956

1995 27,820,184 435,454 3,095,924 3,531,378

1996 28,082,657 399,884 3,022,441 3,422,325

1997 26,380,375 392,694 2,845,290 3,237,984

1998 25,845,144 370,610 2,943,074 3,313,684

1999 27,748,417 387,792 2,972,712 3,360,503

2000 28,033,931 352,239 2,798,785 3,151,024

2001 31,206,964 391,952 3,336,176 3,728,128

2002 34,001,437 460,604 3,699,002 4,159,606

2003 35,426,753 438,502 4,183,604 4,622,106

2004 34,296,766 459,209 4,513,361 4,972,569

2005 29,996,205 503,402 3,991,547 4,494,949

2006 33,412,179 420,143 4,520,669 4,940,812

2007 35,314,568 464,048 5,482,549 5,946,597

2008 31,906,790 460,912 5,484,502 5,945,414

2009 28,440,232 510,105 5,400,251 5,910,355

2010 25,491,143 484,877 5,246,696 5,731,573

2011 26,702,504 486,923 5,764,694 6,251,617

2012 25,589,830 534,443 5,697,248 6,231,692

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
23

Table 5. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity for the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam ITQ 

Program

Year

Output

Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted

MFP

Biomass

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted

MFP

Year to 

Year MFP 

Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

1990 1.08 0.85 1.28 1.05 1.34 1.34

1991 0.93 0.68 1.36 1.10 1.50 1.12

1992 0.98 0.66 1.47 1.12 1.65 1.10

1993 0.98 0.60 1.64 1.16 1.90 1.15

1994 0.99 0.65 1.51 1.20 1.82 0.96

1995 0.88 0.60 1.46 1.22 1.79 0.98

1996 0.89 0.59 1.52 1.28 1.95 1.09

1997 0.84 0.55 1.51 1.32 2.00 1.03

1998 0.82 0.57 1.45 1.30 1.89 0.94

1999 0.88 0.57 1.53 1.32 2.03 1.08

2000 0.89 0.54 1.65 1.41 2.32 1.15

2001 0.99 0.64 1.56 1.52 2.36 1.02

2002 1.08 0.71 1.52 1.63 2.47 1.05

2003 1.13 0.79 1.42 1.74 2.48 1.00

2004 1.09 0.85 1.28 1.78 2.28 0.92

2005 0.95 0.77 1.24 1.82 2.26 0.99

2006 1.06 0.85 1.26 1.94 2.44 1.08

2007 1.12 1.02 1.10 2.16 2.38 0.98

2008 1.01 1.02 1.00 2.38 2.37 1.00

2009 0.90 1.01 0.89 2.62 2.35 0.99

2010 0.81 0.98 0.83 2.78 2.30 0.98

2011 0.85 1.07 0.79 2.80 2.22 0.96

2012 0.81 1.07 0.76 2.81 2.14 0.97
24

Northeast General Category Atlantic Sea Scallop IFQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

Atlantic sea scallops are a bivalve mollusk distributed in the Northwest Atlantic from 

Newfoundland to North Carolina. The majority of the Atlantic sea scallop resource is 

concentrated on Georges Bank and the Mid-Atlantic Bight. Sea scallops are patchily 

distributed in so-called beds that may contain large concentrations of scallops. 

Scallops grow rapidly and an area-based management scheme may set side areas 

with particularly large concentrations of juvenile scallops to be harvested later when 

they are larger and more valuable. Scallops are harvested using a scallop dredge. 

The majority of scallops are shucked at sea keeping only the abductor muscle 

although a comparatively small quantity is sold as roe-on.

Most scallops landed in New England and Mid-Atlantic ports are harvested by 

fishermen operating under a limited access program managed by caps on days at 

sea and harvest limits for trips into scallop access areas defined through a 

rotational management area program. However, when the New England Fishery 

Management Council developed the limited access program in Amendment 4, it also 

created an open access permit to accommodate a small boat fishery that came to 

be known as the General Category Scallop fishery. This fishery was comprised of 

smaller vessels that had been harvesting comparatively small quantities of scallops 

(a trip limit of 400 pounds of scallop meats was imposed in 1994) on relatively 

short trips. As regulatory measures became more restrictive in a number of other 

fisheries, the general category scallop fishery increasingly became an alternative 

source of fishing income. Concerned with the growth in landings by the general 

category scallop fleet, in 2007, the Council proposed that a limited access program 

be implemented for the fishery; that small quota allocations be made for incidental 

harvest of scallops and for small-scale fishing in the Northern Gulf of Maine; that 

the fishery be subject to a landings limit of 5% of the total scallop catch limit; and 

that the majority of the fishery be regulated with an Individual Fishing Quota. This 

management program was implemented in 2008 and a start date of 2010 was set 
25

for the IFQ Program. Had the Council not taken action, growth in the fishery would 

likely have continued that may have led to reductions in the limited access days at 

sea fishery.

While recognizing that the fishery had changed over time, the Council’s vision for 

the general category scallop fishery is one of “...a fleet made up of relatively small 

vessels, with possession limits to maintain the historical character of this fleet and 

provide opportunities to various participants including vessels from smaller coastal 

communities.” The goals for the IFQ Program are to: 1) control capacity and 

mortality in the general category scallop fishery and 2) allow for better and timely 

integration of sea scallop assessment results in management. 

Full implementation of the IFQ Program was anticipated to take one to two years. 

To provide for a transition to the IFQ Program, a quarterly quota was set for the 

fishery set at 10% of the total scallop catch limit. In 2010, the IFQ Program’s quota 

was set at its planned level of 5% of the scallop catch limit where it has remained 

ever since. 

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Productivity estimates are for vessels which used scallop dredge gear to land 

scallops, held a general category permit, and took a general category scallop trip 

between 2007 and 2012. The baseline output quantities include scallops, and other 

species which were landed during a general category trip. Inputs included vessel 

capital, labor used (crew times days spent at sea), energy (fuel used on each trip), 

and materials (ice). Days spent fishing on each trip and crew size data were 

obtained from vessel logbook records. Vessel physical characteristics, such as 

length and horsepower, were taken from vessel permit files. Quantities of fuel and 

ice used on each trip were estimated using regression models.12 Trip outputs and 

inputs from each vessel were then aggregated for each year, and then summed 

 

12 Details on the regression models used are available upon request.
26

across vessels in a year to arrive at total output produced from the fishery, and 

total inputs used. 

Because the year 2007 had a large amount of both outputs and inputs, the three 

year baseline average was high compared to the first three years of the catch share 

program. In 2008, there was a large exit of vessels from the fishery, which reduced 

both outputs produced, and inputs used in the fishery. During the first year of the 

Catch Share program (2010), both outputs and inputs fell relative to the baseline 

time period (Table 6). Outputs produced rose in subsequent years (2011 and 

2012), as did input use. 

Although total inputs rose in 2011 and 2012, the years 2010-2012 were a period of 

lower input usage than the base time period. Since outputs rose more than inputs 

during this time period, the unadjusted Lowe index increased (Table 7), indicating a 

productivity gain compared to the baseline time period. The biomass index is 

relatively stable during the same time period, but was lower than 1.00, indicating 

increasing biomass during the time period. This resulted in a slight downward 

revision to the Lowe index. The overall biomass adjusted productivity index in all 

three years was still substantially greater than 1.00. 

The yearly change in the index showed that 2011 had a 27% productivity gain over 

2010 levels, and that in 2012 the productivity gain over 2011 decreased to 2%. 

Because there was a substantial output gain in 2011 compared to 2010, and a 

much lower gain in 2012 compared to 2011, the 2012 overall gain was markedly 

lower. Additionally, input use rose in 2012, compared to 2011. The input use for 

both energy and labor were higher in 2012 than in 2011 (Table 6) which may 

indicate a shift in production to larger vessels. The capital component declined 

somewhat in 2012, which may simply reflect more time spent in other fisheries 

compared to 2011. 

 
27

Table 6. Output and Inputs in the Northeast General Category Scallop IFQ Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Materialsa Total Inputsa

2007 28,639,698 1,804,387 4,248,779 7,389,719 189,454 13,632,339 

2008 12,481,429 637,796 1,459,307 2,047,107 58,885 4,203,095 

2009 16,731,913 725,011 1,843,553 2,987,370 70,693 5,626,627 

Baseline 

Average 19,284,346 1,055,731 2,517,213 4,141,399 106,344 7,820,687 

2010 12,980,136 578,380 1,364,578 2,159,494 51,910 4,154,361 

2011 16,878,613 583,754 1,551,501 2,151,564 51,993 4,338,812 

2012 18,665,677 581,485 1,599,262 2,423,305 50,729 4,654,781 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Table 7. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices for the Northeast General Category 

Scallop IFQ Program

Year

Output 

Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to Year 

MFP Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2010 0.67 0.53 1.27 0.95 1.21 1.21

2011 0.88 0.55 1.58 0.97 1.54 1.27

2012 0.97 0.60 1.63 0.96 1.57 1.02
28

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

Golden tilefish are distributed throughout the Northwest Atlantic from Nova Scotia 

to South America.13 In U.S. waters golden tilefish are harvested from along the 

Atlantic seaboard from Southern New England to Florida and in the Gulf of Mexico.

Given this broad distribution golden tilefish are managed by three Fishery 

Management Councils the Mid-Atlantic (Golden Tilefish Fishery Management Plan), 

South Atlantic (part of the Snapper Grouper Fishery Management Plan), and Gulf of 

Mexico (part of the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan). In the Mid-Atlantic region, 

tilefish are most abundant from Nantucket Island southward to Cape May, New 

Jersey.14 Golden tilefish are a burrowing species that occur primarily in deep water 

canyons. The majority of tilefish are harvested using bottom longline gear although 

incidental amounts of tilefish are caught using otter trawl gear while targeting other 

species such as monkfish.

The Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for the Mid-Atlantic golden tilefish fishery was 

first implemented in 2001. The original FMP implemented a limited entry program 

establishing a tiered permitting system based on level of participation in the fishery. 

The fishery was managed with an overall landings limit that was sub-divided among 

each of the permit categories. The FMP included an open access permit category 

subject to a low trip limit to accommodate incidental quantities of golden tilefish 

that are occasionally landed while fishing for other species. 

Prior to the Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) program the fishery was quota managed. 

After setting aside 5% of the total quota to account for expected incidental landings 

in other fisheries. The remaining 95% of the annual quota was subdivided among 

the limited access permit categories including Full-Time Tier 1, Full-Time Tier 2 and 

Part-Time with two-thirds assigned to the Full-Time Tier 1 permit category, 15% to 

 

13 See Nitschke http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/sos/spsyn/og/tile/

14 See http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/tilefish/species_pages/golden_tilefish.htm
29

the Full-Time Tier 2 category and 19% assigned to the part-time category. 

Fishermen in the Full-Time Tier 1 permit category were able to come to an 

agreement between themselves to manage the quota allocated to the permit 

category as a whole in such a way that harvesting could be timed to market 

conditions. This cooperative agreement allowed individuals in the permit category 

to stay within their collective quota while avoiding market gluts and spreading 

landings throughout the year (Kitts et al., 2007). Fishermen in the other permit 

categories were unable to come to agreement on any similar cooperative 

arrangements resulting in an early closure of the Full-Time Tier 2 fishery in 2005 

and 2006 and the part-time quota was closed early in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. 

These early closures prompted the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council to 

develop a catch share program for the golden tilefish fishery. Amendment 1 to the 

FMP was submitted in 2008 and the IFQ became effective in 2009.

The primary objectives of the IFQ Program are to reduce overcapacity and eliminate 

problems associated with the race to fish golden tilefish. Ending the “race to fish” is 

anticipated to eliminate short fishing seasons, increase market stability, increase 

flexibility and efficiency of fishing operations, improve safety at sea, improve 

management and compliance, and provide biological benefits to golden tilefish and 

other marine resources.

Estimated Productivity and Discussion

The productivity estimates are for vessels which are in the ITQ fishery only. These 

are hook vessels which predominantly land tilefish, although they also land other 

species as by-catch. Both tilefish and the other outputs are included in the output 

index. Inputs include capital, labor (number of crew times days spent at sea), 

energy (fuel used on each trip) and materials (ice). Days at sea and crew size per 

trip were obtained from vessel logbook data. Vessel length data for the capital 

calculation was taken from vessel permit files. Quantities of fuel and ice used on 

each trip were estimated using regression models. There were no estimates of bait 

used on each trip due to a lack of data to construct a regression model for tilefish 
30

vessels. Trip outputs and inputs from each vessel were then aggregated for each 

year, and then summed across vessels in a year to arrive at estimates for total 

output produced from the fishery, and total inputs used in producing the outputs.

Vessels in the golden tilefish ITQ program increased outputs in terms of the 

baseline average during the first full year of the ITQ program, but then decreased 

output the next two years (Table 8). During the same time period, total inputs 

steadily declined and were nearly half the baseline average in 2012. All input 

categories declined between 2010 and 2012 as the number of vessels declined, and 

the overall fishing effort decreased. Between 2010 and 2012, there was an overall 

25% reduction in total days at sea, and a 43% reduction from the baseline 

average, and this led to much lower input costs.

Outputs during the time period 2010-2012 were higher than the baseline time 

period, meaning the output index was above 1.00 (Table 9). At the same time, the 

input index dropped substantially. This resulted in an increasing productivity index, 

with a peak of 2.12 in 2012. Between 2010 and 2012, biomass improved slightly, 

which yielded a declining biomass index (Table 9). This lowered the initial 

productivity gains, and the 2012 index value was 1.75, which is still an impressive 

gain. On a yearly basis, the biggest productivity gain occurred in 2010, the first full 

year of the ITQ program. Gains in 2011 were not as substantial, while in 2012, they 

were less than 1.00, meaning the biomass adjusted productivity declined slightly.
31

Table 8. Outputs and Inputs in the Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish ITQ Fishery

Year Output Capital Labor Energy Materials Total Inputs

2007 3,409,778 66,239 374,080 330,910 51,594 822,822 

2008 3,868,301 107,629 750,945 343,074 98,937 1,300,584 

2009 4,735,154 105,843 797,804 759,196 115,097 1,777,940 

Baseline 

Average 4,004,411 93,237 640,943 477,727 88,543 1,300,449 

2010 4,893,878 97,753 488,636 303,028 83,866 973,283 

2011 4,582,646 73,719 378,122 222,174 41,360 715,376 

2012 4,303,568 67,139 405,360 141,158 44,907 658,565 

Table 9. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices in the Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish ITQ 

Fishery

Year

Output

Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted

MFP

Year to Year

MFP

Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2010 1.22 0.75 1.63 0.96 1.56 1.56

2011 1.14 0.55 2.08 0.86 1.79 1.15

2012 1.07 0.51 2.12 0.83 1.75 0.98
32

Northeast Multispecies Sectors Program

Fishery Synopsis

The Northeast multispecies fishery, hereafter, referred to as the groundfish fishery, 

is managed by the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) and NOAA 

Fisheries. The groundfish fishery is prosecuted using both fixed (gillnet and hook 

gears including bottom longline, tub trawls and rod and reel) and otter trawl gears. 

The groundfish resource is distributed throughout waters of the Gulf of Maine and 

Georges Bank and, to a lesser extent, Southern New England and the Mid-Atlantic 

bight. In all, a total of 19 stocks are managed under the Northeast Multispecies FMP 

(Groundfish Plan) including three Georges Bank stocks of cod, haddock, and 

yellowtail founder that are jointly managed between the U.S. and Canada under a 

transboundary resource sharing arrangement.

The Groundfish Plan was first implemented in 1986 with a combination of minimum 

fish sizes and area-based controls intended to reduce effort and provide spawning 

protection for haddock and yellowtail founder. These measures and a series of Plan 

amendments were not sufficient to meet biological objectives, which eventually led 

to implementation of Amendment 5 in 1994. Amendment 5 included a moratorium 

on issuing groundfish permits and introduced an effort control program based on 

scheduled reductions in days-at-sea (DAS) supplemented by a number of indirect 

effort controls. Neither Amendment 5 nor subsequent Amendments and multiple 

Framework Adjustments were successful in ending overfishing on many key 

groundfish stocks leading to a finding in the 1999 Report to Congress that these 

stocks needed to be rebuilt. This finding initiated what would eventually become 

Amendment 13.

Implemented in 2004, Amendment 13 fundamentally redefined initial allocations of 

DAS and how DAS may be used in the groundfish fishery. More importantly, 

Amendment 13 introduced a new program called “Sector Allocation.” Sector 

allocation provided fishermen with the ability to voluntarily form a sector that would 
33

be bound by a quota instead of the DAS-based effort controls of Amendment 13.

The sector quota allocation is based on the aggregated catch histories of the 

fishermen that join a sector. Additionally, sectors would be allowed to request 

exemptions from certain regulations, and in the subsequent year, the sector’s quota 

would not be reduced (provided the sector did not exceed its own quota) if the 

target catch for the stock as a whole was exceeded by the rest of the groundfish 

fleet. At the time Amendment 13 was implemented only one sector (the Georges 

Bank Cod Hook Sector) had been submitted to the Council for approval. A second 

sector (the Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector) was approved in 2006. 

Prior to 2010, the Groundfish Plan established an annual Target Total Allowable 

Catch (TTAC) for each groundfish stock. The TTAC’s were set based on desired 

fishing mortality rates and were used as a means for determining the need for 

adjustments to the effort control program in the subsequent year. Exceeding a 

TTAC did not result in a cessation of fishing although, for some stocks, an in-season 

adjustment may be triggered to reduce the likelihood that the TTAC would be 

exceeded. It would not be until the 2007 Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization 

requiring the setting of Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) that the NEFMC would transition 

from effort controls as the primary management tool coupled with catch targets to 

output-based controls using sector allocation as the primary management tool. The 

transition from effort controls to sector allocation was finalized through Amendment 

16, implemented in 2010. Although Amendment 16 retained the underlying 

principle that sectors remain voluntary, the Amendment changed the qualification 

period for potential sector contribution (PSC) and provided a means for trading 

assigned quota or annual catch entitlement (ACE) between sectors. Amendment 16 

further specified which of the 19 stocks would be allocated to sectors and which 

stocks would not be allocated. The allocated stocks include Acadian redfish, pollock, 

white hake, witch flounder, American plaice, winter flounder (Georges Bank and 

Gulf of Maine), yellowtail flounder (Georges Bank, Cape Cod/Gulf of Maine, and 

Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic), cod (Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank) and 

haddock (Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank).
34

In keeping with the voluntary nature of the sector allocation program, vessel 

owners may choose to join a sector or remain in the so-called “common pool”. 

Vessel owners that elect to remain in the common pool are principally regulated by 

DAS supplemented by a suite of additional effort controls such as possession limits, 

gear restrictions, and area closures. The common pool is also subject to an ACL. 

Since all vessel permits are assigned a PSC based on catch history, whether or not 

the permit is enrolled in a sector, the common pool ACL for all stocks is determined 

by the combined PSC for all permitted vessels in the common pool. In-season 

accountability measures may be made to specified effort control measures to 

prevent the common pool ACL from being exceeded.

The management objectives for the groundfish fishery are broadly defined in 

biological, social, and economic terms. Biological objectives include promoting 

rebuilding, habitat protection, bycatch monitoring and reduction, and improving the 

timing and quality of stock assessments. Social objectives include minimizing 

adverse impacts on fishing communities, prevention of excessive consolidation to 

protect the day boat component of the groundfish fleet, and maintain a diverse 

groundfish fleet. Economic objectives include matching fleet capacity to resource 

status, achieve goals of economic efficiency, give industry greater control over their 

own fate, and to provide a mechanism for economics to shape the fleet rather than 

regulations. 

Estimated Productivity and Discussion

Productivity estimates are for vessels that used trawl, hook or gillnet gear only to 

land species in the multispecies complex during the years 2007-2012. The baseline 

quantities of outputs and inputs are the yearly average from the 2007-2009 fishing 

years. Total trip landings were counted as output on all trips by vessels any of 

these three gears on trips where groundfish were landed. This means that nongroundfish species were included if they were landed on a groundfish trip. Inputs 

included vessel capital, labor used (number of crew times days spent at sea), 

energy (fuel used on each trip), and materials (bait for hook vessels, and ice for all 
35

vessels). Days spent fishing on each trip and crew size data were obtained from 

vessel logbook records. Vessel physical characteristics, such as length and 

horsepower, were taken from vessel permit files. Quantities of fuel and ice used on 

each trip, and bait usage for hook vessels, were estimated using regression 

models.15 Trip outputs and inputs from each vessel were then aggregated for each 

year, and then summed across all active vessels to arrive at total output produced 

from the fishery, and total inputs used.

During the first year of the Catch Share program (2010), there was a reduction in 

both total outputs and total inputs employed in the fishery, relative to the baseline 

time period (Table 10). This was driven primarily by the exit of vessels from the 

fishery. Vessel exit had started prior to implementation of the catch share program, 

and continued after catch shares were implemented. Under the catch share 

program, vessel owners can lease or sell their shares, and obtain revenue without 

fishing. 

Because the total inputs used in the fishery declined more than outputs in 2010 

(Table 10), overall productivity increased compared to the baseline time period 

(1.12, a 12% increase). When multiplied by the biomass index, the resulting 

biomass adjusted productivity (1.24) was 24% higher than the baseline time period 

(Table 11). The biomass index of 1.11 indicated that biomass declined in 2010 

relative to the baseline time period. 

In 2011, both the outputs produced and the inputs used increased relative to 2010

levels (Table 10). This may have been due to landings being harvested by larger 

vessels than in 2010. Note that both the labor and energy component increased in 

2011, while the capital component declined slightly. A shift to larger vessels may be 

influencing these results, but more research is needed to fully understand these 

numbers. Because the total input index increased more than the total output index, 

the unadjusted productivity declined in 2011 relative to 2010 (1.07,Table 11). At 

the same time, the biomass index increased in 2011, which indicates a biomass 

 

15 Details on the regression models used are available upon request.
36

decline relative to 2010. This results in an increase in the biomass adjusted 

productivity index in 2011 (1.26) relative 2010 (1.24). 

The outcome in 2011 was reversed in 2012, with both a decline in outputs produced 

and inputs used relative to 2011 (Table 10). The resulting output quantity index 

was 0.62, and the input quantity index was 0.71. Because the output index declined 

more than the input index, overall productivity declined in 2012 (0.88). At the same 

time, the biomass improved, and the biomass index declined. This resulted in a 

decline in the biomass adjusted productivity index in 2012 (1.26 to 0.97) relative to 

2011 (Table 11).

Table 10. Outputs and Inputs in the Northeast Multispecies Sector Allocation Program

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Materialsa Total Inputsa

2007 126,242,130 3,979,977 14,291,104 31,232,521 2,852,599 52,356,201

2008 132,379,908 3,528,836 13,742,283 28,343,586 10,229,139 55,843,844

2009 130,258,217 3,247,951 12,785,995 25,853,782 2,149,257 44,036,985

Baseline 

Average 129,626,752 3,585,588 13,606,461 28,476,630 5,076,998 50,745,677

2010 94,228,865 2,123,429 9,550,188 19,564,331 1,729,283 32,967,232

2011 103,882,523 2,113,633 11,114,871 23,089,385 1,734,718 38,052,608

2012 80,772,238 2,103,863 10,532,857 21,708,985 1,430,667 35,776,372

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Table 11. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices in the Northeast Multispecies 

Fishery

Output

Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted

MFP

Biomass

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted

MFP

Year to Year

MFP

Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2010 0.73 0.65 1.12 1.11 1.24 1.24

2011 0.80 0.75 1.07 1.18 1.26 1.01

2012 0.62 0.71 0.88 1.10 0.97 0.77
37

Southeast Region

Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

Gulf of Mexico (GOM) red snapper stocks are managed by the GOM Fishery 

Management Council under the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan. Since 2007, 

the fishery has been managed under an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) program. 

The objectives of the program are to reduce overcapacity and mitigate race to fish 

conditions. GOM red snapper are harvested primarily using vertical lines and, to a 

lesser extent, bottom longlines.

Prior to the 2007 implementation of the Red Snapper IFQ program, commercial 

fishermen raced to harvest the quota before it was met resulting in early closures. 

Limited access fishing permits, trip limits, closed seasons, and quotas were the 

primary management tools used to constrain commercial harvest. Overcapacity and 

overfishing led to progressively shorter fishing seasons, which resulted in quota 

overages, market gluts, and unsafe fishing conditions (Waters, 2001; Hood, 

Strelcheck and Steele, 2007). The five-year review of the Red Snapper IFQ 

Program found that the program had mixed success reducing overcapacity, but was 

successful in mitigating derby fishing behavior and preventing quota overages

(Agar et al., 2014; Solis et al., 2014a; Solis et al., 2014b).

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

The productivity estimates presented are for those vertical line and bottom longline 

vessels that landed at least one pound of red snapper. The data used to construct 

the indices came from three sources: Southeast Coastal Fisheries Logbook Program

(Logbook database), the Accumulated Landings System (ALS database), and the 

Southeast Regional Office Permits Information Management Systems (PIMS 

database). The output quantity index included landings from both red snapper and 

other jointly caught species. These data were obtained from the Logbook and ALS 

databases. The Logbook database contains self-reported trip reports for all trips 
38

that caught reef fish, mackerels, other coastal migratory pelagics, and sharks in 

federal waters. The logbook program also includes an economic add-on, which has 

been administered to a 20% sample of the fleet in the Gulf of Mexico region since 

mid-2005. On the other hand, the ALS contains information on the quantity and 

revenue of landings sold to seafood dealers. The quantity and revenue data were 

used to impute dockside prices.

Input quantities for labor and capital services were estimated from all trips in the 

Logbook database while input quantities for energy and intermediate materials, 

namely bait and ice were based on data collected through the economic add-on. 

The PIMS database, which contains information on vessel characteristics (e.g., 

vessel length, gross tonnage, etc.) was used in conjunction with the Logbook 

database to construct an estimate of capital services.

If input quantities were not available, then we imputed them by dividing 

expenditures by a price index (e.g., ice) or price proxy (e.g., price of a commonly 

used bait species). Trip level outputs and inputs for each vessel were aggregated 

annually and then summed across the fleets to estimate annual total output and 

total input usage. 

During the initial years of the Red Snapper IFQ Program there were significant 

reductions in the amount of harvest and effort devoted to catching red snapper. 

Table 12 reports that aggregate output or landings, which also includes other 

species jointly caught with red snapper, and input usage (e.g., fuel, bait, ice) by 

those vessels that prosecuted red snapper declined until 2009 relative to the 2004-

2006 baseline. This decline was driven by fleet attrition and significant reductions in 

the quota of red snapper. Agar et al. (2014), report that the number of active 

vessels decreased from 443 in 2006 to a low of 296 in 2009. Also, the red snapper 

quota average during the first three years of the IFQ program (2007-2009) was 

about 60% of the average quota for the three years preceding the program (2004-

2006). Nonetheless, these sharp quota reductions did not translate into 
39

proportional reductions in aggregate landings and input consumption because 

fishermen changed their fishing practices. Fishermen began taking fewer but longer 

fishing trips. They also adjusted the composition of their landings by targeting other 

species, particularly vermilion snapper and red grouper (Agar et al., 2014).

Between 2007 and 2009, red snapper landings by weight contributed between 33% 

and 44% of the overall landings indicating that species other than red snapper play 

an important role in trip decision-making, which influences both the outputs and 

input mix. However, recent biomass information was not available for the main 

species jointly caught with red snapper upon which a reliable biomass index could 

be constructed. Therefore, biomass adjusted productivity estimates could not be 

calculated for the red snapper IFQ program.

Starting in 2010, there was an influx of additional vessels as quota levels began to 

increase (SERO, 2013a). In addition, the GOM Grouper-Tilefish IFQ program, which

began in 2010, also attracted new participants since many of the grouper fishermen 

incidentally caught small amounts (by-catch) of red snapper. The incidental catch of 

red snapper became more prevalent in recent years because as the red snapper 

stock rebuilt, it extended its range to traditional grouper fishing grounds in the 

eastern Gulf and West Florida shelf. 

Lowe biomass-unadjusted productivity indices suggest that the productivity of the 

red snapper fleet, on average, increased after the implementation of the IFQ 

program (Table 13). Productivity rose from 1.04 in 2007 to 1.19 in 2012. 

Productivity indices above one indicate that vessels are able to harvest more with 

the same amount of inputs. The realized productivity gains likely stem from the 

combined effects of fleet consolidation, which lowered input usage; the relaxation of 

trips limits (either 2,000 or 200 lbs. of red snapper per trip depending on the type 

of license held- Class 1 vs. Class 2) and the elimination of the 10-day fishing 

seasons (Agar et al., 2014).16 This greater flexibility afforded by the IFQ program

allowed fishermen to harvest, process, and market their catch more productively.

 

16 The fishing season increased from an average season of 109 days to a year-round season (Agar et al., 2014).
40

Although productivity rose by 19% in 2012 relative to the baseline, these gains 

were uneven over time. For example, in 2010 productivity declined to 1.07 from 

1.16 in 2009 but rose again to 1.15 in 2011.We conjecture that this decline 

originated from the introduction of the Grouper-Tilefish IFQ program and the area 

closures ensuing from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill event - both which resulted in 

higher input use. The introduction of the Grouper-Tilefish IFQ program resulted in 

an influx of 80 additional vessels from 296 vessels in 2009 to 376 vessels in 2010 

(Agar et al., 2014). Many of these vessels caught small amounts of red snapper 

incidentally. Also, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill event area closures may have 

forced some fishermen to relocate to other fishing grounds increasing their 

consumption of inputs, especially fuel. Moreover, the oil spill disrupted fishermen’s 

seasonal fishing pattern, forcing them to land a significant share of their red 

snapper allocation later in the year, particularly in December.

Table 12. Outputs and Inputs for the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Materialsa Total Inputsa

2004 21,383,299 1,990,278 5,939,596 2,045,254 1,346,841 11,321,968

2005 19,403,705 1,935,030 5,420,274 1,818,579 719,399 9,893,282

2006 20,883,807 1,965,663 6,068,702 1,992,673 1,139,347 11,166,384

Baseline 

Average 20,556,937 1,963,657 5,809,524 1,952,169 1,068,529 10,793,878

2007 17,551,868 1,600,270 5,044,259 1,301,035 893,624 8,839,188

2008 16,502,048 1,367,772 4,293,677 1,101,674 746,969 7,510,092

2009 16,163,986 1,304,203 4,161,093 1,078,959 761,019 7,305,274

2010 19,043,055 1,937,345 5,087,584 1,344,135 1,010,617 9,379,681

2011 23,581,748 1,972,894 5,927,279 1,543,575 1,344,121 10,787,870

2012 24,926,696 1,854,327 6,189,259 1,580,673 1,386,374 11,010,633

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
41

Table 13. Output, Input, and Multi-Factor Productivity Indices for the Gulf of Mexico 

Red Snapper IFQ Fishery

Year Output Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted

MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00

2007 0.85 0.82 1.04 1.04

2008 0.80 0.70 1.15 1.11

2009 0.79 0.68 1.16 1.01

2010 0.93 0.87 1.07 0.92

2011 1.15 1.00 1.15 1.08

2012 1.21 1.02 1.19 1.04
42

Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

Gulf of Mexico (GOM) grouper and tilefish stocks are managed by the GOM Fishery 

Management Council under the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan. Since 2010, 

the fishery has been managed under an Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) program. 

The objectives of the program are to reduce overcapacity and mitigate race to fish 

conditions. These species are mainly targeted with bottom longlines and vertical 

lines.

The GOM Grouper-Tilefish IFQ Program has five management units: red grouper, 

gag grouper, shallow water groupers (including black grouper, yellowfin grouper, 

scamp, and yellowmouth grouper), deepwater groupers (including yellowedge 

grouper, warsaw grouper, snowy grouper, and speckled hind) and tilefishes 

(including goldface tilefish, blueline tilefish, and golden tilefish). In 2012, the 

following species were removed from the Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ 

Program: rock hind, red hind, misty grouper, anchor tilefish, and blackline tilefish.

Prior to the implementation of the Grouper-Tilefish IFQ Program, the fishery 

experienced race to fish conditions that led to early closures and quota overages of 

certain species. For instance, quotas for deep-water groupers and tilefishes were 

met in four to six months and the shallow-water grouper quota was met six to 10 

weeks prior to the end of the 2004 and 2005 fishing years. Limited access fishing 

permits, trip limits, closed seasons and quotas were the primary management 

tools. Although, the grouper-tilefish IFQ program has not undergone a formal 

review early indications suggest that the program helped reduce the size of the 

fleet and lengthen the fishing season (SERO 2013b).

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

The productivity estimates discussed refer to those bottom longline and vertical line 

vessels that landed at least one pound of those species included in the Grouper-
43

Tilefish IFQ program. These two gear account for the majority of the groupertilefish landings. In a manner similar to that of red snapper, the data used to 

construct the indices came from three sources: Southeast Coastal Fisheries 

Logbook Program (Logbook database), the Southeast Regional Office Permits

Information Management Systems (PIMS database), and the Accumulated Landings 

System (ALS database). The output quantity index included landings from those 

species under the Grouper Tilefish IFQ program plus any other jointly caught 

species. Input quantities were built for capital (capital user cost), labor, energy, 

and intermediate materials, namely bait and ice. Because we only had partial 

records for some of these variables, we estimated input usage and total 

expenditures from the economic add-on to the logbook, which started collecting 

data in mid-2005 (1 1⁄2 years after our baseline). If input quantities were not 

available, then we imputed them by dividing expenditures by a price index (e.g., 

ice) or price proxy (e.g., price of a commonly used bait species). Trip level outputs 

and inputs for each vessel were aggregated annually and then summed across the 

fleets to estimate annual total output production and total input usage.

During the first year of the Grouper-Tilefish IFQ program there were significant 

reductions in the amount of catch and effort devoted to harvesting these species.

Table 14 reports that aggregate landings (output), which also includes other species 

jointly caught with grouper and/or tilefish, and input utilization declined sharply in 

2010 relative to the 2007-2009 baseline. Red grouper landings began decreasing 

in 2009 when area and gear (hook limits) restrictions were first imposed on the 

longline fleet, which is responsible for about 60% of the grouper-tilefish landings. 

These restrictions on longline fleet were in response to a significant take of sea 

turtles, mainly loggerheads, which was well above 85 permitted takes of loggerhead 

sea turtles over a 3-year period.

In 2010, Amendment 31 established an endorsement to use longline gear in the 

GOM. Vessels qualifying for an endorsement had to have an annual landings history 

in excess of 40,000 lbs. All in all, the adoption of the grouper-tilefish IFQ program, 

the longline endorsement requirements, and the area and gear restrictions resulted 
44

in a 30% reduction in the fleet size (from 630 to 447 based on 3 year pre and post 

IFQ averages, SERO 2013b). Starting in 2011, grouper-tilefish landings began 

increasing because the red grouper and gag quotas were increased. In addition,

fishermen began taking shorter fishing trips but landing more red grouper per trip 

(SERO 2013b). Red grouper landings account for between 66 and 74% of the total 

grouper-tilefish landings. 

Lowe biomass-unadjusted productivity indices suggest that the productivity of the 

grouper-tilefish fleet increased after the adoption of the IFQ program (Table 15)

17

. 

Productivity gains show a steady increase from 1.11 in 2010 to 1.35 in 2012. The 

realized productivity gains were likely the result of a combination of factors 

including fleet consolidation, which lowered input usage, and the relaxation of the 

aggregate deep-water and shallow-water grouper commercial trip limit (6,000 lbs). 

Also, the fleet may have benefitted from an extended harvesting season for several 

species, particularly deepwater groupers and tilefish. In addition, the 2010 longline 

endorsements may have played a role in culling less productive vessels. Lastly, 

productivity gains after 2010 may have also partly benefitted from the re-opening 

of the previously closed areas due to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill event.

Table 14. Output and Inputs in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Materialsa Total Inputsa

2007 35,060,880 4,275,123 13,573,535 3,908,087 2,666,229 24,422,973

2008 37,420,193 4,023,762 13,486,802 3,833,396 2,620,141 23,964,102

2009 33,702,290 3,977,631 13,252,194 3,538,689 2,425,467 23,193,980

Baseline 

Average 35,394,454 4,092,172 13,437,510 3,760,057 2,570,612 23,860,352

2010 25,358,084 3,018,979 8,451,716 2,317,247 1,628,698 15,416,640

2011 34,475,570 2,969,404 9,940,596 2,677,102 2,253,382 17,840,483

2012 37,216,683 2,934,864 10,519,456 2,739,891 2,329,216 18,523,427

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

 

17 Recent biomass information was not available upon which a reliable biomass index could be constructed. 

Therefore, biomass adjusted productivity estimates could not be calculated for the grouper-tilefish IFQ program.
45

Table 15 Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish Fishery 

(IFQ Data

Year

Output

Index

Input

Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00

2010 0.72 0.65 1.11 1.11

2011 0.97 0.75 1.30 1.17

2012 1.05 0.78 1.35 1.04
46

West Coast Region

Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program

Fishery Synopsis

Sablefish or “Black Cod” are distributed in the Northeast Pacific Ocean from 

Northern Mexico to the Gulf of Alaska and through the Aleutian Islands.18 Based on 

morphological differences in growth rates, seasonal reproduction, and tagging 

studies, sablefish are divided into Northern and Southern populations. The Northern 

population extends from Northern British Columbia to Alaska. The U.S. portion of 

the Northern population is managed by the North Pacific Fishery Management 

Council whereas the U.S. portion of the Southern population which extends 

throughout the West Coast is managed by the Pacific Fishery Management Council. 

Sablefish is a fast-growing roundfish species reaching sizes of up to three feet. 

Females mature in 6 to 7 years at approximately 2 feet in length while males 

mature in about 5 years at slightly smaller size. Sablefish is a high value species 

that is targeted by both fixed gear (pots, and hook and line) and trawl gear. The 

Pacific Coast sablefish fishery is one of many groundfish species managed by the 

Pacific Fishery Management Council. The Pacific Coast fishery consists of a limited 

entry groundfish trawl fishery, a limited entry groundfish fixed gear fishery, an 

open access fixed gear fishery, and a tribal fishery. Limited entry in the West Coast 

groundfish fishery was established in 1994. The limited entry groundfish trawl and 

limited entry groundfish fixed gear fisheries receive about 80% of the sablefish 

allocation on the West Coast. 

The limited entry trawl, open access, and tribal fisheries are managed separately 

from that of the fixed gear fishery. At the request of non-trawl industry 

representatives, the PFMC pursued a mixed seasonal and regional approach to 

 

18 See http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/cod/species_pages/sablefish.htm
47

management of the limited entry groundfish fixed gear fishery based on differences 

in the manner in which the fishery was prosecuted among northern (above 36o N) 

and southern (below 36o N) fishery participants. The former had traditionally landed 

the majority of sablefish on directed trips while the latter tended to land sablefish in 

a daily trip limit fishery. It is this Northern fishery that is now managed under the 

Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program (referred to as the primary 

sablefish fishery) while the daily Southern fishery continues to be managed under a 

trip limit. 

The Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program manages 85% of the sablefish 

allocated to the limited entry groundfish fixed gear fishery, and the remaining 15% 

is allocated to the daily limited entry fixed gear fishery. As a result, the productivity 

estimates provided in this report reflect only sablefish harvested in the primary 

fishery managed through the permit stacking program. The Pacific Coast Sablefish 

Permit Stacking Program covers approximately 30% of all commercially harvested 

sablefish on the West Coast including tribal fisheries. While any vessel with a 

limited entry fixed gear permit may participate in the daily fishery, only vessels 

having one or more sablefish endorsed limited entry groundfish fixed gear permits 

can participate in the primary sablefish fishery (where up to three permits may be 

“stacked” on one vessel. 

The Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program was preceded by 

implementation of Sablefish endorsement permits in 1997. This permit program 

responded to premature closures that occurred two to three weeks after the season 

opening from 1992-1994 and after only five days in 1996. The program assigned 

equal harvest limits, effectively an Individual Quota (IQ) to each permit. However, 

the Magnuson-Stevens Act moratorium on implementing any individual quota-based 

programs was still in effect at that time and the PFMC adopted a short season of 10 

days. The result was that some vessels were unable to harvest their assigned 

quota. In 1998, the PFMC modified the program by creating a three-tiered quota 

assignment, but still set a 10-day season. Permits in each tier (Tier 1, Tier 2, and 
48

Tier 3 in order of highest to lowest) were assigned the same quota where eligibility 

for each tier was based on landings history.

The tiered allocation system meant that some vessel operators had to reduce their 

fishing activity while others were able to expand. The system provided limited 

capability for fishing vessel owners to scale their business plans up or down 

resulting in reduced efficiency. The short season made it difficult to match harvest 

with market demand resulting in market gluts that lowered product value followed 

by periods when no product was available at all. The short season was also thought 

to result in higher accident rates as fishermen had a short window in which to take 

their allotted quota.

The Magnuson-Stevens Act moratorium on new individual quota programs expired 

in 2000, but was extended through 2002 via a Congressional appropriations bill, 

with an exception for a permit stacking program for the fixed gear sablefish fishery. 

The Permit Stacking Program enabled vessel owners to “stack” up to three sablefish 

endorsed permits onto a single vessel. In effect, this meant that vessel owners 

could use the equivalent of three IFQ Program’s allocations with set amounts on 

one vessel. Perhaps more importantly, the program enabled the season to be 

extended to seven months (April 1 to October 31). Implementation of the Pacific 

Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program began during 2001 and 2002 was the first 

year of complete implementation of the program for the primary sablefish fishery 

within the limited entry groundfish fixed gear fishery.

The Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program includes a number of features 

that were designed to meet its objectives. To prevent concentration of harvest 

privileges, no more than three permits may be stacked onto a single vessel. 

Furthermore, permits may not be owned by partnerships or corporations. An 

owner-on-board requirement assures that the fishery retains its traditional owneroperator character.
49

The program objectives for the Pacific Coast Sablefish Permit Stacking Program 

included promotion of economic efficiency through rationalization of the fixed gear 

fleet, direct benefits toward fishing communities, prevent excessive concentration 

of harvest privileges and promote equity, promote safety, and to improve product 

quality and value.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

The Northwest Fisheries Science Center conducts voluntary cost and earnings 

surveys of vessels operating with a limited entry fixed gear groundfish permit. The 

productivity analysis in this paper is based on survey responses received from 

vessel owners holding one or more sablefish endorsed permits for their vessel. 

Because the cost-earnings survey did not begin until 2003, no input data were 

collected from the three years prior to the implementation of the Pacific Coast 

Sablefish Permit Stacking Program. Instead of the three years prior to 

implementation, the first year of the data collection, 2003, was used as the 

baseline. The voluntary survey collects, amongst other information, vessel 

characteristics including vessel value, average fuel use per day while fishing in the 

fixed gear groundfish fishery, average crew size per day while fishing in the fixed 

gear groundfish fishery, total expenses on fuel, and total expenses on crew and 

captain. With no other information available for days at sea from 2003-2008, we 

used the number of delivery days from fish tickets as a proxy. Fish ticket data also 

provided total annual pounds and an average price for sablefish caught in the 

Primary Sablefish Fishery, used to calculate the output for the vessels that 

submitted complete input data. We have complete input data from 31 vessels in 

2003-2004, 28 in 2007-2008, and 25 for 2009-2010, which represents from 22-

33% of the fishery overall. Due to technical and resource constraints, the survey 

could not be fielded for the 2005-2006 time period. Consequently, input quantities 

could not be estimated for those years.

Wording on the voluntary cost-earnings survey changed between the 2003-2004 

and 2007-2008 surveys and the 2009-2010 surveys where the latter was modified 
50

to reflect the wording of the concurrent Economic Data Collection Survey. This 

primarily affected the productivity estimate in regards to the average fuel used per 

day, which fed into the energy calculation. In 2003-2008, participants were asked 

for average fuel use per hour, which was changed to fuel use per day in 2009-2010. 

To address this change, we calculated an hour per day measure for vessels that 

reported both the daily and hourly statistic, and then multiplied the calculated 

hours per day times the hourly fuel use reported in 2003-2008.

The baseline year, 2003, and the following year had the highest labor and fuel 

inputs, and these categories dropped to their lowest levels in 2007-2008 (Table 

16). The lowest output occurred in 2008, and the highest in 2010. 

Relative to the 2003 baseline, biomass unadjusted MFP increased 24% in 2004 to 

1.24 (Table 17). Unadjusted MFP also increased in 2007 relative to the baseline, 

but was 5% below the baseline in 2008. In both 2009 and 2010, the unadjusted 

productivity index increased to 1.46 and 1.69, respectively. The biomass index for 

sablefish has increased in every year relative to the baseline, indicating decreasing 

biomass throughout the six-year period (Table 17). This stock effect amplifies the 

unadjusted Lowe index after the implementation of the stacking program. 

In 2007, the biomass adjusted Lowe index was 1.74 which represents a 74% 

improvement over the baseline and a 38% increase over MFP in 2004 (Table 17). In 

2008 adjusted MFP was 18% above the baseline, but was 32% below MFP in 2007.

In 2009 biomass adjusted MFP increased to 1.90, which represents a 90% 

improvement over the baseline and a 61% increase compared to the time series 

low MFP of 1.18 in 2008. Biomass adjusted MFP index improved again in 2010 to 

2.32 which was an 22% increase relative to 2009.

The decline in the number of vessels reporting inputs from the baseline through 

2010 could explain the minor decreases in labor and energy inputs, however, the 

output, which is calculated only for vessels that reported input data, does not seem 
51

to follow a corresponding downward effect, which could explain the general increase 

in the Lowe index. 

Table 16. Output and Inputs in the West Coast Primary Sablefish Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Total Inputsa

2003 (Baseline) 417,677 541,317 1,750,298 332,180 2,623,795

2004 539,930 500,111 1,894,413 337,054 2,731,578

2007 531,191 625,717 1,371,415 246,206 2,243,338

2008 345,458 613,922 1,417,904 252,479 2,284,305

2009 574,925 518,750 1,606,183 347,631 2,472,564

2010 651,321 589,527 1,469,042 355,750 2,414,319

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Table 17. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the West Coast Primary Sablefish Fishery

Year

Output 

Index

Input 

Index

BiomassUnadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

BiomassAdjusted 

MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2004 1.29 1.04 1.24 1.02 1.26 1.26

2007 1.27 0.85 1.49 1.17 1.74 1.38

2008 0.83 0.87 0.95 1.25 1.18 0.68

2009 1.38 0.94 1.46 1.30 1.90 1.61

2010 1.56 0.92 1.69 1.37 2.32 1.22
52

Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization Program

Fishery Synopsis

The Pacific groundfish trawl fishery includes several separate components: a nonwhiting trawl fishery that targets a variety of flatfish, roundfish, thornyheads, and 

some rockfish using a bottom trawl, and a whiting fishery that uses a mid-water 

trawl to almost exclusively harvest whiting. The fishery also encounters numerous 

other rockfish species as bycatch – several of these rockfish species have been 

declared overfished. For management purposes, the whiting trawl sector was 

further subdivided into three sectors: a shorebased sector of fishing vessels that 

delivers whiting to shorebased processors; a catcher processor sector that harvests 

whiting and processes it on-board; and motherships, at-sea processors that receive 

whiting catch from catcher vessels. Under the West Coast Trawl IFQ Program, the 

shorebased whiting sector was combined with the non-whiting trawl sector.

Recognizing the differences between the shoreside and at-sea non-whiting and 

whiting sectors, the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC) developed an 

Individual Fishing Quota program (IFQ) program for the shore-based trawl sector 

(vessels that land whiting and other groundfish) and a cooperative management 

structure for the whiting trawl sectors. Prior to the IFQ Program, the non-whiting 

component of the shore-based trawl sector had been managed through an overall 

quota combined with trip limits, seasonal closures, gear restrictions, and area 

restrictions such as the Rockfish Conservation Areas. These measures were adopted 

to rebuild groundfish and avoid bycatch of overfished stocks of rockfish. However, 

as these measures became increasingly restrictive, there was growing concern over 

the economic viability of the non-whiting trawl fishery. Lack of flexibility and 

individual accountability were cited as pressing management concerns. The shorebased whiting industry also was managed in ways to protect overfished species. As 

a result, the PFMC adopted an IFQ Program for the shore-based trawl sector and a 

program of cooperatives for the whiting catcher processor and the whiting 

mothership sectors. Since the whiting catcher-processor sector already was 
53

operating under a voluntary cooperative, this sector was largely left unaltered. (If 

the cooperative disbands, there are regulatory measures in place to convert this 

sector to an IFQ fishery.) Development of the shorebased trawl IFQ Program and 

whiting cooperative programs were initiated in 2003 and implemented for the 2011 

year. Although the IFQ Program and cooperative programs manage two separate 

components (shorebased and at-sea) of the groundfish fishery, the programs are 

referred to collectively as the Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization Program. 

The catch share program indicators including productivity were developed to 

measure the performance of the harvesting sector. Since both the mothership and 

catcher processor components of the Trawl Rationalization Program have a 

significant processing component, a different set of indicators would be better 

suited to evaluate program performance for these components of the Pacific 

groundfish trawl fishery. For this reason this section focuses on productivity change 

in the shorebased IFQ fishery, which comprises the non-whiting and whiting 

trawlers. However, even though there is substantial overlap in terms of 

participating vessels the two fisheries are, by and large, distinct fisheries within the 

shorebased trawl IFQ program and are treated as such below for purposes of 

reporting productivity change.

The goal of the Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization Program was to create and 

implement a capacity rationalization plan that increases net economic benefits, 

creates individual economic stability, provides for full utilization of the trawl sector 

allocation, considers environmental impacts and achieves individual accountability 

of catch and bycatch.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Groundfish Data

Input data for the whiting and non-whiting groundfish productivity estimates comes 

from the Economic Data Collection survey, a mandatory survey for all vessels 
54

registered to a limited entry trawl permit at any point during a calendar year.19 The 

data from this survey thus provides a complete picture of the input of the entire 

West Coast Groundfish Catch Shares Program. The survey also collects information 

about days at sea in the groundfish trawl and fixed gear fisheries. The 

implementation of the catch shares program included a provision for vessels to fish 

Limited Entry Trawl quota with fixed gear, so days at sea reported for fixed gear by 

vessels that participated in both the IFQ fishery with fixed gear as well as the 

primary or open access fisheries were disaggregated by revenue for the 

productivity calculation. The average crew and captain wage was similarly derived 

from a disaggregation of these expenses by revenue. In addition to daily labor 

wage and days at sea, the EDC survey provides average fuel use per day and 

average crew per day for the whiting trawl, non-whiting trawl, and fixed gear 

fisheries. An annual summation of all IFQ-landed pounds and revenue obtained 

from fish tickets provided the average price for whiting and non-whiting groundfish, 

as well as output quantities for each vessel. 

With only two years of catch-share input data available thus far, it is difficult to 

make meaningful observations about trends in productivity rates after the 

implementation of the program. 

Non-whiting Groundfish Productivity Estimate

Because of the allowance for fixed-gear harvesting with the implementation of the 

catch share program, the baseline input and output data for this period only

includes vessels using trawl gear, whereas the years 2011 and beyond include 

vessels with fixed or trawl gears. This inclusion of different gear types in the later 

years may have impacts on productivity independent of the catch share program.

One general caveat regarding the biomass index for non-whiting groundfish: this 

measure includes biomass indices for 23 different species, and some of the 

assessments used have not been updated in five to seven years. Biomass data on 

all species included in the program were not available. However, the species for 

 

19 See http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/research/divisions/fram/economic/economic_data.cfm.
55

which no biomass data is available comprise only about 5% of the landings weight 

over the period, and about 3% of revenue. Biomass data are available for Dover 

sole and sablefish, which combined make up about half of non-whiting groundfish 

biomass and about two-thirds of the revenue. The next highest revenue groundfish, 

Petrale sole, has about 10% of the non-whiting IFQ revenue share but only makes 

up 0.05% of the total biomass.

2009 and 2010 had much larger outputs and inputs than 2011 and 2012, and this 

leads to a baseline average higher than the 2011 and 2012 outputs or inputs (Table 

18). In 2011, biomass unadjusted productivity as measured by the Lowe index,

increased by 27% compared to the baseline (Table 19). Unadjusted MFP in 2012 

was also higher than the baseline. The biomass index in both 2011 and 2012 were 

above 1.0 indicating decreasing biomass although by relatively small amounts of 

4% and 7% respectively. For this reason, the differences between biomass adjusted 

and unadjusted MFP were not large. The biomass adjusted MFP Lowe index was 

1.32 in 2011 and 1.29 in 2012. Thus, while productivity was still above the baseline

in 2011 and 2012, MFP in 2012 was 3% lower as compared to 2011.

Table 18. Output and Inputs in the West Coast Non-Whiting Groundfish Catch Shares Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Total Inputsa

2009 35,307,155 4,210,826 14,582,162 11,943,409 30,736,397

2010 31,310,424 4,021,808 12,027,820 9,979,183 26,028,811

Baseline 

Average 33,308,789 4,116,317 13,304,991 10,961,296 28,382,604

2011 30,649,071 3,753,070 9,267,098 7,466,979 20,487,147

2012 30,132,485 4,075,127 9,434,987 8,010,943 21,521,057

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Table 19 Estimated Multi- Factor Productivity in the West Coast Catch Shares Non-Whiting Groundfish 

Fishery

Year

Output 

Index

Input 

Index

BiomassUnadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

BiomassAdjusted 

MFP

Year to 

Year

MFP

Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2011 0.92 0.71 1.27 1.04 1.32 1.32

2012 0.90 0.76 1.19 1.07 1.29 0.97
56

Shoreside Whiting Productivity Estimate

The capital input for the whiting and non-whiting fisheries are roughly similar, 

despite the former having about a third as many vessels as the latter. Many of the 

shoreside whiting vessels also participate in Alaska fisheries, and these vessels tend 

to be much larger and more capital-laden, which might explain the high capital 

input for the fishery (Table 20). The highest output of all the years, by about 2,300 

MT occurred in 2011, which translates to a 75% improvement compared to the 

baseline average output of $9.8 million. Total inputs used in 2011 declined by 15% 

compared to the baseline resulting in the biomass unadjusted Lowe index to be 

substantially greater than one (Table 21). The unadjusted MFP Lowe index was also 

above 1.0 in 2012.

Due to high variability in recruitment and very fast growth rates, the whiting 

biomass index may fluctuate quite a bit from year to year. The biomass index in 

both 2011 and 2012 were 0.67 and 0.52, respectively indicating that biomass was 

substantially above baseline conditions in both years (Table 21). This means that 

the biomass adjusted Lowe index was substantially lower in 2011 and 2012 than 

unadjusted MFP. 

Table 20. Output and Inputs in the West Coast Shoreside Whiting Catch Shares Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Total Inputsa

2009 7,615,998 3,633,979 4,497,598 5,453,428 13,585,005

2010 11,902,435 4,775,548 6,594,554 9,171,122 20,541,224

Baseline Average 9,759,217 4,204,763 5,546,076 7,312,275 17,063,114

2011 17,061,361 4,095,399 6,475,611 8,991,474 19,562,484

2012 11,065,498 3,429,399 5,731,072 6,494,700 15,655,171

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Table 21. Estimated Multi- Factor Productivity in the West Coast Catch Shares Whiting Fishery

Year

Output 

Index

Input 

Index

BiomassUnadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

BiomassAdjusted 

MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

Base 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2011 1.75 1.15 1.52 0.67 1.02 1.02

2012 1.13 0.92 1.24 0.52 0.64 0.62
57

Alaska Region

Alaska Halibut IFQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

Pacific halibut in the U.S. are distributed in the Northeast Pacific from coastal 

waters in California to Alaska with concentrations in the Central Gulf of Alaska.20

Pacific halibut are among the largest of flatfish weighing up to 500 pounds and 

reaching lengths of 8 feet. Halibut is a high value species that is harvested and sold 

exclusively using hook gear (primarily bottom longline). Bycatch in the fishery 

includes seabirds, juvenile halibut and other groundfish species. The use of 

streamers is designed to reduce seabird takes while larger hook size tends to select 

for larger fish and the use of circle hooks reduces release mortality of discarded 

undersized halibut. The fishery is also subject to depth and area restrictions to 

reduce incidental takes on non-target groundfish species.

The Alaska Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program is managed under two different 

management authorities: The Northern Pacific Halibut Act (Halibut Act; 1937), 

which led to the eventual creation of the International Pacific Halibut Commission 

(established in 1953); and the Magnuson-Stevens Act (1976), which established 

the Regional Fishery Management Council system. The International Pacific Halibut 

Commission (IPHC) is responsible for the biological management of the halibut 

resource, including biological studies, stock assessments, basic regulatory structure 

and establishing the Total Constant Exploitation Yield, which is equivalent to the 

acceptable biological catch (ABC). The North Pacific Fishery Management Council 

(NPFMC) in turn is responsible for establishing Annual Catch Limits (ACLs) and 

allocating the U.S. catch limits among various user groups. 

Halibut fisheries were not overfished prior to the implementation of the IFQ 

Program but the fishery had been overcapitalized since the 1970s. When 

overcapacity was recognized as a major problem in the halibut fishery, it was 

 

20 See http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/halibut/species_pages/pacific_halibut.htm
58

unclear which agency or regulatory body had jurisdiction over limiting access. The 

fishing industry approached the newly formed North Pacific Council in the late 

1970s to develop a limited entry program because such a measure was not 

available through the International Pacific Halibut Commission under the terms of 

the convention establishing the IPHC. The Council’s first groundfish fishery 

management plan was enacted in 1978 and included provisions for establishing 

limited entry; however, jurisdictional issues delayed implementation of limited entry 

within the halibut fishery. This jurisdictional issue was not solved until passage of 

The Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982, which designated that limited entry and 

allocation decisions were under the jurisdiction of the North Pacific Council. The 

Council did not reconsider limited entry in the halibut fishery until 1990, when these 

discussions were combined with the discussions of limited entry in the sablefish 

fishery. The regulatory amendments outlining IFQs as the chosen management tool 

for halibut and sablefish were published in 1992 and later implemented in 1995. 

The Alaska Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program operates within the Bering Sea and 

Aleutian Islands region and the Gulf of Alaska region with multiple area and vessel 

categories. The IFQ Program has 8 area allocations each with 4 vessel classes of 

halibut quota based and 6 area allocations each with 3 vessel classes of sablefish 

quota. Although halibut and sablefish fisheries are managed under the same IFQ 

Program, there are some key differences between halibut and sablefish 

management; therefore, the productivity assessments are presented separately.

The North Pacific Fishery Management Council designed the Alaska Halibut IFQ 

Program to allow eligibility based upon U.S. citizenship (or being a U.S. entity for 

non-individuals) and historical participation. Those eligible for initial allocations had 

to be owners or leaseholders of vessels with landings during 1988-1990. Initial 

halibut quota shares were based upon the best five of seven years of catch history 

from 1984 – 1990. Those who wished to receive quota share by transfer after the 

initial allocation had to demonstrate a minimum amount of active time as 

harvesting crew in any U.S. commercial fishery or be a Community Quota Entity 
59

(CEQ)21. Other U.S. entities are allowed to purchase the “catcher/processor” 

(Category “A”) type of quota share, but entities that are not solely owned and were 

not initial qualifiers for QS may not acquire catcher vessel quota share. 

Both quota shares (as a percentage of the catch limit) and annual IFQ pounds are 

designated by vessel length category and operation type (catcher vessel quota 

shares and freezer boat shares) and by whether the quota share is blocked or 

unblocked and whether or not it may be transferred among vessel classes. A 

transfer from a vessel in a larger size class to another vessel in a smaller size class 

is referred to as being able to “fish down” and vice versa to “fish up”. Blocked quota 

share, which cannot be separated and sold in separate units, was given to initial 

qualifiers if the amount of annual IFQ was less than a specified amount. Holders of 

blocked quota share are limited in the number of blocks that may be held at any 

one time. Quota shares can be sold to other eligible permit holders. Transfers are 

limited by excessive share provisions. Leasing, or annual transfers of quota pounds 

without underlying quota share is unrestricted for freezer shares, but very 

restricted for catcher vessel IFQ. The program also limits the use of shares outside 

of designated vessel type and length categories, although over time the provisions 

on vessel length restrictions on ‘fish down’ and ‘fish up’ have been somewhat 

relaxed. The North Pacific Council also included owner on-board requirements for 

use of catcher vessel shares and limits on the use of hired skippers.

Data

While the Alaska Halibut IFQ program has been in place since 1995, we lack 

important information on the inputs used by harvesting vessels until the Halibut IFQ 

program landings were integrated into the “eLandings” system for the year 2008. 

Prior to 2008, we do not have crew size information (and also lack a precise 

reporting of trip duration to calculate days at sea) and, therefore, are unable to 

present any estimates of multi-factor productivity for this fishery prior to 2008. 

 

21 The CEQ program was implemented in 2002. The program provides for QS to be purchased and held by 

community based organizations for the benefit of resident fishermen. 
60

Given the short time frame of available data, 2008 was selected as both the 

baseline year and reference period for the Lowe input, Lowe output, and biomass 

indices calculated for the Halibut IFQ program.

Data on output quantities and prices include the total net weight (in pounds) and 

total ex-vessel revenues, respectively, from all species caught while on halibut IFQ 

trips. Input quantity data include the number of crew days in the fishery (number of 

crew on a trip multiplied by the days at sea for the trip summed over all vessels 

and trips) and an estimate for the amount of capital involved in the fishery. To 

create a daily labor price, we estimate an opportunity cost wage to value crew days 

using the mean construction laborer hourly wage in Anchorage multiplied by 8 

hours to approximate an opportunity cost daily wage for crew members. We use 

the self-reported vessel values for all vessels that participated in the Halibut IFQ 

program from the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) vessel 

license application to estimate the total quantity of capital involved in the fishery. 

We use this estimate to create an estimated annual value per foot for program 

participants. The total annual quantity of capital in the fishery is then calculated as 

the annual mean value per foot multiplied by each vessel’s length in that year, 

summed over all vessels that participated in the fishery in a given year. We value 

the capital quantity (the capital price) at the rate for BAA grade bonds. Fishery level 

aggregates for output value (net weight in pounds multiplied by reference year 

output prices) and input values, including labor (crew days multiplied by reference 

year labor price) and capital (vessel value multiplied by the reference year capital 

price), are included in Table 22. 

Table 22. Output and Inputs in the Alaska Halibut IFQ Fishery 

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputsa

2008 274,620,670 13,236,475 16,133,059 29,369,533 

2009 241,600,736 13,655,239 15,017,862 28,673,101 

2010 229,301,656 13,433,407 15,553,874 28,987,281 

2011 191,505,214 13,389,059 13,581,861 26,970,920 

2012 163,008,300 13,026,808 12,161,544 25,188,352 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
61

Halibut biomass data are taken from the 2012 IPHC stock assessment. The data 

used for this study are the exploitable halibut biomass (legal sized fish), which is 

apportioned across areas based on the distribution of halibut from that year’s 

assessment survey. The biomass estimate used in this study is the sum of 

exploitable halibut biomass for areas managed under the Alaska Halibut IFQ 

Program (2C, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, and 4E).

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data reported in Table 22 Lowe input and output indices were created and 

are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 23. The biomass unadjusted MFP 

(hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is simply the Lowe output 

index divided by the Lowe input index which represents the change in aggregate 

outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs on an annual basis. Therefore, if 

the index goes above 1.00, it means that MFP growth is positive and the fishery is 

getting more output from a given level of inputs, but if the index is below 1.00, it 

means the opposite. As can be seen in Table 23, there have been declines in MFP 

for each year after the baseline year of 2008, which is by definition set equal to 

1.00. The mean unadjusted MFP index for non-baseline years is 0.80. 

It is possible that this decline in observed unadjusted MFP arose because we have 

not accounted for the declines in the biomass of halibut as an input into the 

production process. The biomass index is included in column 4 of Table 23 and 

represents the change in halibut biomass relative to the baseline period. Recall that 

the baseline year’s biomass is in the numerator of the biomass index and,

therefore, an increase in the biomass is represented by a number below 1.00, while 

an index value above 1.00 signifies a decrease in the halibut biomass. This allows 

the biomass adjusted MFP (hereafter adjusted MFP) index, shown in the final 

column of Table 23, to be calculated as the product of the unadjusted MFP index 

and the biomass index. Higher levels of biomass decrease the adjusted MFP index 

because if there are more fish it is assumed that they are easier to catch and the 

adjusted MFP index is calculated to account for the impact of changes in biomass on 

fishery productivity. Halibut biomass has declined in each year of the study period 
62

relative to the baseline period except for 2012, implying that the adjusted MFP 

index will be greater than the unadjusted MFP index for all years. After accounting 

for the decline in the halibut biomass, the estimated adjusted MFP index varies 

around 1.00 for all years except 2012 when output substantially declined. Overall, 

adjusted MFP averaged 0.98 for non-baseline years which means that there have 

not been many changes in the productivity of the fishery over this period. 

Additional years of data are necessary to determine whether the decline in 2012 

was a one year event or whether the decline in MFP has continued.

Table 23. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Halibut IFQ Fishery

Year Output Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to 

Year MFP

Change

2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2009 0.88 0.98 0.90 1.12 1.01 1.01

2010 0.83 0.99 0.85 1.20 1.02 1.01

2011 0.70 0.92 0.76 1.31 0.99 0.97

2012 0.59 0.86 0.69 1.28 0.88 0.89

The adjusted MFP index is approximately 1.01 for 2009 and 2010, but there is a 

decline in adjusted MFP in 2011 and 2012. In 2011, the decline in biomass no 

longer accounts for the entire decline in unadjusted MFP and the adjusted MFP 

estimate declines slightly below 1.00 in 2011. However, in 2012, the year of the 

small increase in exploitable biomass, there was a substantial decline in the 

unadjusted MFP index as well as the adjusted MFP index which means something 

beyond biomass changes could be driving the decrease in unadjusted MFP; the 

continued decline in halibut biomass can no longer be compensated for using inputs 

more productively. This could also be the result of the way capital is quantified in 

this index. If a vessel participates in the halibut IFQ fishery, the entire capital value 

is deemed to be in the fishery even if they only spend a small amount of time in the 

fishery. The mean number of days for vessels participating in the fishery has 

declined from nearly 21 days in 2008 to less than 17 days in 2012, so this 

alternative specification would alter our estimate of capital use from current values. 

This decline in days fishing is, however, accounted for in our computation of labor 
63

input. Input specification aside, the trends we observe here in MFP, which is 

essentially a multidimensional measure of catch per unit effort (CPUE), provides 

useful information on the productivity of the halibut fishery and could be used by 

the IPHC in conjunction with stock trends when determining the Total Constant 

Exploitable Yield for the commercial fishery.
64

Alaska Sablefish IFQ Program

Fishery Synopsis

Sablefish or “Black Cod” are distributed in the Northeast Pacific Ocean from 

Northern Mexico to the Gulf of Alaska and through the Aleutian Islands.22 Based on 

morphological differences in growth rates, seasonal reproduction, and tagging 

studies, sablefish are divided into Northern and Southern population. The Northern 

population extends from Northern British Columbia to Alaska. The U.S. portion of 

the Northern population is managed by the North Pacific Fishery Management 

Council whereas the U.S. portion of the Southern population, which extends 

throughout the West Coast is managed by the Pacific Fishery Management Council. 

Sablefish is a fast-growing roundfish species reaching sizes of up to three feet. 

Females mature in 6 to 7 years at approximately 2 feet in length while males 

mature in about 5 years at slightly smaller size. Sablefish is a high value species 

that is targeted in the Gulf of Alaska primarily using hook gear and trawl gear.

There are two main vessel types harvesting sablefish in the Alaska Sablefish IFQ 

Program: catcher vessels that catch sablefish and deliver to a shoreside processor, 

and catcher/processor vessels that catch sablefish and process it onboard. We will 

create estimates of total factor productivity separately for each vessel type.

Sablefish was originally managed under its own fishery management plan (FMP) 

and was later combined with the groundfish FMP in the Gulf of Alaska (1978) and 

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (1982). Coincident with the exit of foreign 

harvesters in 1987, the domestic portion of the sablefish fishery grew rapidly during 

the 1980s. In 1985, the North Pacific Council allocated the vast majority of the 

sablefish quota to vessels using hook-and-line and pot gear in the Gulf of Alaska, 

with a small portion allocated to vessels using trawl gear. Pot gear was 

subsequently phased out in the Gulf of Alaska due to gear conflicts. The North 

Pacific Council allocated one-half of the sablefish quota in the Bering Sea to the 

 

22 See http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/cod/species_pages/sablefish.htm
65

fixed gear fleet and the remainder to trawlers. It was not until 1987 that the 

Council began to consider proposals for limited entry in the sablefish fishery. 

The regulatory amendments outlining IFQ Programs as a management tool for 

halibut and sablefish were published in 1992 and later implemented in 1995. The 

Alaska Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program operates within the Bering Sea and

Aleutian Islands region, and the Gulf of Alaska region with multiple area and vessel 

categories. The IFQ Program has 8 area allocations each with 4 vessel classes of 

halibut quota and 6 area allocations each with 3 vessel classes of sablefish quota. 

Sablefish are managed by NOAA Fisheries and the North Pacific Council under the 

authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Halibut and sablefish are combined in the 

same IFQ Program to minimize bycatch and discard mortality.

The North Pacific Fishery Management Council designed the Alaska Sablefish IFQ 

Program to allow eligibility based upon U.S. citizenship (or being a U.S. entity for 

non-individuals) and historical participation. Those eligible for initial allocations had 

to be owners or leaseholders of vessels with landings during 1988-1990. Initial 

sablefish quota shares were based upon the best five of six years of catch history 

from 1985 – 1990. Those who wished to receive quota share by transfer after the 

initial allocation had to demonstrate a minimum amount of active time as 

harvesting crew in any U.S. commercial fishery or be a Community Quota Entity 

(CQE). Other U.S. entities are allowed to purchase the “catcher/processor” 

(Category “A”) type of quota share, but entities that are not solely owned that were 

not initial qualifiers for QS may not acquire catcher vessel quota share.

Both quota shares (as a percentage of the catch limit) and annual IFQ pounds are 

designated by vessel length category and operation type (catcher vessel quota 

shares and freezer boat shares). Quota share is also designated as being either 

blocked or unblocked and whether or not it may be transferred among vessel 

classes. A transfer between a vessel in a larger size class to a vessel in a smaller 

size classes is referred to as being able to “fish down”; the opposite is to “fish up”. 

Blocked quota share was issued to initial qualifiers based on whether the initial IFQ 
66

allocation was less than a specified amount. Blocked quota share cannot be 

separated or sold in separate units. Quota shares can be sold to other eligible 

permit holders. Transfers are limited by excessive share provisions. Leasing, or 

annual transfers of quota pounds without underlying quota share, is unrestricted for 

freezer shares, but very restricted for catcher vessel IFQ. The program also limits 

the use of shares outside of designated vessel type and length categories, although 

over time the provisions on vessel length restrictions on ‘fish down’ and ‘fish up’ 

have been somewhat relaxed. The North Pacific Council also included owner onboard requirements for use of catcher vessel shares and limits on the use of hired 

skippers.

Data 

Similar to other Alaska Region programs, we lack important information on the 

inputs used by harvesting catcher vessels in the Alaska Sablefish IFQ Program prior 

to 2007. However, we are able to gather a consistent set of input and output data 

for the catcher/processor vessels back to 1995, our baseline year. Because the 

Alaska Sablefish IFQ Program was implemented in 1995, we will not be able to 

demonstrate any changes in MFP before and after the Sablefish IFQ Program. 

However, this longer time horizon does provide a better sense of the trends in MFP

for the catcher/processor sector. Given the short time frame of available data for 

the catcher vessels, the baseline year and reference period were selected to be a 

single year (2007), which differs from the 1995 baseline year and reference period 

used for catcher/processors. 

For catcher vessels, data on output quantities and prices were used to construct the 

Lowe output index. Data include the total round weight (in pounds) and total exvessel revenues, respectively, from all species caught while on sablefish IFQ trips. 

Input quantity data used to construct the Lowe input index include the number of 

crew days in the fishery (number of crew on a trip multiplied by the number of days 

at sea for the trip, summed over all vessels and trips) and an estimate for the 

amount of capital involved in the fishery. To create a daily labor price we estimated 
67

an opportunity cost wage to value crew days using the mean construction laborer 

hourly wage in Anchorage multiplied by 8 hours. We use the self-reported vessel 

values for all catcher vessels that participated in the Sablefish IFQ program from 

the CFEC vessel license application to estimate the total quantity of capital involved 

in the catcher vessel sector of the fishery. We use this estimate to create an annual 

value per foot for catcher vessel participants. The total annual quantity of capital 

for the catcher vessel sector is then calculated as the as the annual mean value per 

foot multiplied by each vessel’s length in that year, summed over all catcher 

vessels that participated in the fishery each year.23 We value the capital quantity 

(the capital price) at the rate for BAA grade bonds. Catcher vessel sector 

aggregates for output value (round weight in pounds multiplied by reference year 

output prices) and input values, including labor (crew days multiplied by reference 

year labor price) and capital (vessel value multiplied by the reference year capital 

price), are included in Table 24. 

Table 24. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher Vessels in the Alaska Sablefish Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputa

2007 140,238,353 8,109,917 7,049,414 15,159,331 

2008 135,403,058 9,274,763 6,845,401 16,120,165 

2009 131,330,526 10,014,183 6,977,360 16,991,543 

2010 129,006,290 9,210,910 7,365,194 16,576,105 

2011 127,188,626 9,843,396 7,408,347 17,251,742 

2012 125,372,170 9,689,471 7,718,364 17,407,835 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

For catcher/processor vessels from 1995-2007, data on output quantities and prices 

include the total produced weight (in metric tons) and total product revenues, 

respectively, from all species produced in weeks where some amount of IFQ 

sablefish (sablefish that was part of the Sablefish IFQ Program) was produced. For 

2008 onward, catcher/processors began submitting daily production reports 

(instead of the weekly production reports they submitted between 1995 and2007). 

Therefore, for 2008-2012, data on output quantities and prices represent all species 

produced on days where some amount of IFQ sablefish was also produced. Input 

 

23 There are several outliers at the low and high end that excluded when calculating annual mean values which 

include vessel values less than $49,999 and over $10,000,000.
68

quantity data include the number of crew days (harvesting and processing crew) in 

the fishery and an estimate for the amount of capital involved in the fishery. For the 

period 1995-2007, catcher/processor vessels that submitted a weekly production 

report with some amount of IFQ sablefish produced were assumed to operate for 

4.295 days that week, which is the average number of days per week that these 

vessels were active on weeks where they caught sablefish during the 2008-2012 

period. For 2008 onward, the number of days in the fishery is equal to the number 

of days in which the catcher/processor reported producing some IFQ sablefish. The 

labor input is therefore calculated as the number of days the vessel was in the 

fishery multiplied by the crew size for those days, summed over all vessels. We use 

the same mean construction laborer wage as for the catcher vessels for 

catcher/processor crew members. Similar to the catcher vessels, we use the selfreported vessel values for all catcher/processors that participated in the Sablefish 

IFQ program from the CFEC vessel license application. However, as there are some 

years with no vessels reporting values, we create a single estimate of the value per 

foot for all catcher/processors participants. The total annual quantity of capital for 

the catcher/processor sector is then calculated as the as the mean value per foot 

multiplied by each vessel’s length in each year summed over all catcher/processors. 

We value the capital quantity (the capital price) at the rate for BAA grade bonds.

Catcher/processor sector aggregates for output value (produced weight in metric 

tons multiplied by reference year output prices) and input values, including labor 

(crew days multiplied by reference year labor price) and capital (vessel value

multiplied by reference year capital price), in Table 25.

Sablefish biomass data are taken from NMFS Species Information System (SIS) for 

the 2012 assessment year. The biomass data used in this study included abundance 

of age 2+ sablefish for the Eastern Bering Sea Aleutian Islands, and Gulf of Alaska 

regions in metric tons.
69

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data reported in Table 24, Lowe input and output indices were created 

and are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 26 for the catcher vessel sector. The 

biomass unadjusted MFP (hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is 

simply the Lowe output index divided by the Lowe input index, or the change in 

aggregate outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs, on an annual basis. 

Therefore, an index value above 1.00 means that MFP growth is positive and the 

fishery is getting more output from a given level of inputs, but if the index is below 

1.00, the opposite is true. As can be seen in Table 26, the unadjusted MFP had 

declined every year after the baseline year of 2007, which is by definition set equal 

to 1.00. The input index has increased and output index decreased every year after 

the baseline year. The mean unadjusted MFP index for the sablefish IFQ catcher 

vessels for non-baseline years is 0.83. 

Table 25. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the Alaska Sablefish IFQ Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputs

1995 23,128,840 8,047,373 1,617,261 9,664,634 

1996 20,699,810 5,190,082 1,295,637 6,485,719 

1997 16,965,585 4,595,599 1,053,344 5,648,943 

1998 24,855,126 5,064,211 1,340,277 6,404,488 

1999 23,533,433 7,343,977 1,582,302 8,926,279 

2000 27,023,775 7,414,914 1,719,449 9,134,363 

2001 21,194,527 6,439,475 1,290,259 7,729,734 

2002 14,335,282 5,009,277 985,846 5,995,123 

2003 17,975,291 5,330,761 1,138,052 6,468,813 

2004 19,539,152 5,566,500 1,250,459 6,816,959 

2005 22,781,080 5,909,958 1,263,367 7,173,325 

2006 21,864,864 5,282,753 1,150,423 6,433,176 

2007 21,006,646 5,668,247 1,136,170 6,804,418 

2008 9,033,265 4,542,814 779,703 5,322,518 

2009 14,543,928 4,997,573 1,081,217 6,078,790 

2010 12,834,266 4,762,312 890,392 5,652,704 

2011 15,138,760 4,629,992 1,099,498 5,729,491 

2012 15,927,599 3,357,192 1,089,857 4,447,049 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
70

There have been some small declines in the sablefish biomass that may account for 

some of the declines in the unadjusted MFP. The biomass index is included in 

column 4 of Table 26 and represents the change in sablefish biomass relative to the 

baseline year. Recall that the baseline year’s biomass is in the numerator of the 

biomass index, and therefore an increase in the biomass is represented by a 

number below 1.00, while an index value above 1.00 signifies a decrease in the 

sablefish biomass. This allows the biomass adjusted MFP (hereafter adjusted MFP) 

index, shown in the final column of Table 26, to be calculated as the product of the 

unadjusted MFP index and the biomass index. Higher levels of biomass decrease 

the adjusted MFP index because if there are more fish, it is assumed that they are 

easier to catch. The adjusted MFP index is thus calculated to account for the impact 

of changes in biomass on fishery productivity. Sablefish biomass declined slightly 

in each year, which means that the adjusted MFP index will be greater than the 

unadjusted MFP index in all years. However, even after accounting for the decline in 

the sablefish biomass, the estimated adjusted MFP index is still below 1.00 for all 

years and averages 0.89 for the catcher vessel sector. 

Table 26. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher Vessels in the Sablefish IFQ Fishery

Year Output Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted 

MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2008 0.97 1.06 0.91 1.03 0.94 0.94

2009 0.94 1.12 0.84 1.07 0.89 0.95

2010 0.92 1.09 0.84 1.06 0.90 1.01

2011 0.91 1.14 0.80 1.10 0.88 0.98

2012 0.89 1.15 0.78 1.13 0.88 1.00

Using the same methods as for the catcher vessels, we use the data presented in

Table 25 to create Lowe input and output indices that are presented in columns 1 

and 2 of Table 27 for the catcher/processor sector. As can be seen in Table 27

(column 3), there has been a lot of variation in the unadjusted MFP since the 

baseline year of 1995. The unadjusted MFP index has ranged from 0.71 in 2008 to 

1.62 in 1998. The large variation in MFP between 2007 and 2008 is largely the 
71

result of a large drop in output and labor input from 2007 to 2008. The changes in 

output and labor input could be an artifact of the change in data resolution after 

2007, where we began collecting daily production reports rather than the prior 

weekly production reports (for which we assumed vessels were active on a 4.295-

day week, based on the number of active days during the 2008-2012 period).This 

drop in the output and labor input can be seen in Table 25. However, other than 

this potentially data driven change, unadjusted MFP ranged from 0.95 in 2010 to 

1.50 in 2012 and averaged 1.20 for the catcher/processor sector in non-baseline 

years. In contrast to the catcher vessel sector, which has averaged 408 active 

vessels from 1995-2012 (347 from 2007-2012), the catcher/processor sector only 

averaged 19 active vessels from 1995-2012. Therefore, each catcher/processor 

vessel has a much larger impact on the overall sector productivity estimates, which 

could possibly account for the larger variation in the unadjusted MFP for the 

catcher/processor sector relative to the catcher vessel sector. 

There have been several years of small declines and small increases in the sablefish 

biomass over the study period. The biomass index is included in column 4 of Table 

27 and represents the change in sablefish biomass relative to a baseline year, 

where a number above 1.00 indicates a biomass decrease and a value below 1.00

indicates a biomass increase. The biomass index has ranged from 0.91 in 2004 to 

1.16 in 1998 but averaged 1.03 over the entire period. As there have only been 

relatively small changes in the biomass index, the adjusted MFP index will likely be 

fairly similar to the unadjusted MFP index. The mean adjusted MFP index for nonbaseline years for the catcher/processor sector is 1.23. As shown in Table 25, the 

capital and labor inputs for the catcher/processor sector generally move in the 

same direction (with the exception of 2007-2008), but changes in both the adjusted 

MFP and unadjusted MFP are positively correlated with the percent change in the 

labor input (correlation coefficients of 0.51 and 0.49, respectively) than percent 

changes in the capital input (correlation coefficients of -0.17 and -0.19, 

respectively). 
72

Table 27. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the Sablefish IFQ Fishery

Year Output Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to Year 

MFP Change

1995 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

1996 0.89 0.67 1.33 1.07 1.43 1.43

1997 0.73 0.58 1.25 1.09 1.37 0.96

1998 1.07 0.66 1.62 1.16 1.88 1.37

1999 1.02 0.92 1.10 1.10 1.22 0.65

2000 1.17 0.95 1.24 1.07 1.32 1.08

2001 0.92 0.80 1.15 1.06 1.21 0.92

2002 0.62 0.62 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.78

2003 0.78 0.67 1.16 0.92 1.07 1.14

2004 0.84 0.71 1.20 0.91 1.09 1.02

2005 0.98 0.74 1.33 0.93 1.24 1.14

2006 0.95 0.67 1.42 0.95 1.35 1.09

2007 0.91 0.70 1.29 0.98 1.27 0.94

2008 0.39 0.55 0.71 1.01 0.72 0.57

2009 0.63 0.63 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.46

2010 0.55 0.58 0.95 1.04 0.99 0.95

2011 0.65 0.59 1.10 1.08 1.19 1.20

2012 0.69 0.46 1.50 1.10 1.65 1.39

The trends in unadjusted MFP and adjusted MFP are not consistent across the 

catcher vessel and catcher/processor sectors. For the catcher vessel sector, the 

year-to-year change in adjusted MFP averaged 0.97 for non-baseline years, which 

implies declining productivity at the sector level over the period 2008-2012. In 

contrast, the catcher/processor sector averaged 1.06 for the year-to-year change in 

adjusted MFP for non-baseline years, which implies an increasing productivity for 

the catcher/processor sector over the period 2008-2012. One explanation is that 

the catcher/processor sector outputs are produced weight rather than landed round 

weight for the catcher vessels, which means that the catcher/processor sector is 

potentially able to compensate for lower catch levels by increasing product recovery 

rates or producing additional ancillary products. This would increase their output 

but may not result in very much additional quantifiable input use. Another 

explanation is that catcher/processor vessels are able to take longer and farther 

trips and fish in more dense aggregations of sablefish than the catcher vessels that 
73

have to return to port to deliver their products. This would suggest that the 

catcher/processors may be able to reduce total steaming time between the port and 

fishing grounds, or may be able to fish in more productive areas. It is also possible 

that the catcher/processor sector relies more heavily on an omitted input (such as 

fuel to power the processing lines) than the catcher vessel sector, which would not 

be accounted for in our MFP estimates. Additional investigation would be required 

to assess which explanation is most likely driving these diverging results.
74

American Fisheries Act (AFA) Pollock Cooperatives

Fishery Synopsis

The Alaska pollock fishery is the largest by volume and among the most valuable

fisheries in the U.S. Pacific Walleye pollock are found throughout the Northern 

Pacific Ocean, but are concentrated in the Bering Sea.24 Pollock grow rapidly and 

have relatively short life spans. However, females produce large quantities of eggs 

and reach maturity between 3 and 4 years of age resulting in a robust and 

productive resource. Pollock are harvested using pelagic trawl gear. The fishery 

consists of a number of sectors; some catcher vessels harvest Pollock for delivery 

to shoreside processors, other catcher vessels deliver to motherships that conduct 

processing at sea, and catcher/processors that harvest and process pollock at sea.

The American Fisheries Act (AFA) Pollock Cooperatives Program (or simply AFA 

Program) was established by the U.S. Congress under the American Fisheries Act in 

1998. Prior to the implementation of the AFA Program in 1999 and 2000, the 

fishery was often closed after only two months in order to ensure that the fleet did 

not exceed harvest limits.25 While the pollock fishery was not overfished or 

experiencing overfishing prior to implementation of the catch share program, the 

short season often led to many negative consequences of the “race for fish” and 

there were frequent allocation disputes between the inshore and offshore fleets. 

The AFA Program manages Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands pollock. The AFA 

established participation requirements and authorized the formation of 

cooperatives. Other major components of the AFA were minimum U.S. ownership 

requirements, a permit/vessel buyout, a list of vessels eligible to participate in the 

Program, processor eligibility requirements, the establishment of three harvest 

sectors (and their respective allocations) and, allocations to the Western Alaska 

Community Development Quota (CDQ) Program. When the AFA Program was 

implemented, the buyback of the nine decommissioned vessels cost the 

 

24 See http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/pollock/species_pages/alaska_pollock.htm

25 The AFA allowed catcher/processors to form cooperatives in 1999 but did not allow the formation of mothership 

or inshore cooperatives until 2000.
75

government $90 million. The inshore sector agreed to pay back $70 million by 

paying $0.06 per pound of harvested pollock. The remaining $20 million was borne 

by taxpayers.

The AFA Program was designed to grant eligibility to those meeting the statutory 

requirements within the American Fisheries Act: meeting minimum pollock landings 

criteria, U.S. vessel ownership requirements and minimum delivery thresholds for 

shoreside processors. Eligibility for initial allocations was based upon historic 

participation with different criteria for inshore, offshore and mothership sectors. The 

inshore sector (catcher vessels) had to meet landings thresholds for 1996, 1997 

and 1998. The offshore sector (catcher/processors) was required to be directly 

listed in the American Fisheries Act or meet a minimum landings threshold. 

Motherships were required to be listed in the American Fisheries Act. Shoreside 

processors must have met minimum delivery thresholds in 1996 and 1997 to be 

eligible to receive inshore sector deliveries.

Inshore catcher vessel cooperatives receive exclusive harvest privilege permits 

from NOAA Fisheries. Inshore cooperatives can only form between catcher vessels 

and eligible shoreside processors where the vessel delivered a majority of their 

catch in the previous year. Vessels in shoreside cooperatives are required to deliver 

90 percent of their pollock catch to a member processor. Vessels choosing not to

join a cooperative could operate in a limited access fishery, but must do so under a 

restrictive regulatory framework. Vessel owners choosing to switch cooperatives are 

required to sit out a year in the limited access fishery and are not eligible to 

participate in the cooperative system during that time. The mothership and 

catcher/processor sectors have formed voluntary cooperatives to manage their 

allocations, which then receive an exclusive harvest privilege from NOAA 

Fisheries.26

After 10 percent of the Total Allowable Catch is allocated to CDQ groups and an 

amount (about three percent) is established for incidental catch of pollock outside 

 

26 https://npfmc.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=2742795&GUID=5DE3725D-2728-4B6D-9E48-619C6CF50EAF
76

the Program, the remaining quota is divided among the sectors. The inshore sector 

receives 50% of the remaining total allocation for catcher vessels who deliver their 

harvests to shore-based processors. The offshore sector receives 40% of the 

remaining total allocation and includes catcher/processor vessels and those catcher 

vessels that deliver to catcher/processors. The mothership sector receives 10% of 

the remaining allocation and includes floating processors and the catcher vessels 

that deliver to them. Quota shares and quota pounds (inshore, offshore and 

mothership sectors) can be sold or leased to other participants in the same sector. 

Quota shares transfer with the sale of a vessel. This study groups all catcher 

vessels together into a single sector and examines trends in MFP change separately 

for the catcher vessel sector and for the catcher/processor sector.

Data 

Similar to other Alaska Region programs, we lack important information on the 

inputs used by catcher vessels in the AFA Program prior to 2007. However, we are 

able to gather a consistent set of input and output data for the catcher/processor 

vessels back to 1996 and we use a 3-year average prior to program implementation 

(1996-1998) as the baseline and reference period for the catcher/processor sector. 

Given the short time frame of available data for the catcher vessels, the baseline 

year and reference period was selected to be a single year (2007), which differs 

from the 3-year average used for catcher/processors. 

For catcher vessels, the Lowe output index was constructed using data on the total 

round weight (in pounds) and total ex-vessel revenues, respectively, from all 

species caught while on AFA trips. Input quantity data used to construct the Lowe 

input index include the number of crew days in the fishery (number of crew on a 

trip multiplied by the number of days at sea for the trip, summed over all vessels 

and trips) and an estimate for the amount of capital involved in the fishery. To 

create a daily labor price we estimate an opportunity cost wage to value crew days 

using the mean construction laborer hourly wage in Anchorage multiplied by 8 

hours. We use the self-reported vessel values for all catcher vessels that 
77

participated in the AFA Program from the CFEC vessel license application to 

estimate the total quantity of capital involved in the catcher vessel sector of the 

fishery. We use this estimate to create an annual value per foot for catcher vessel 

participants. The total annual quantity of capital for the catcher vessel sector is 

then calculated as the annual mean value per foot multiplied by each vessel’s 

length in that year, summed over all catcher vessels that participated in the fishery 

each year.27 We value the capital quantity (the capital price) at the rate for BAA 

grade bonds. Catcher vessel sector aggregates for output value (round weight in 

pounds multiplied by reference year output prices) and input values, including labor 

(crew days multiplied by reference year labor price) and capital (vessel value

multiplied by reference year capital price), are included in Table 28. 

Table 28. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher Vessels in the AFA Pollock Program

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputs

2007 200,328,960 19,572,874 8,275,949 27,848,823 

2008 146,522,793 19,310,762 6,504,055 25,814,816 

2009 122,823,730 18,932,512 5,422,805 24,355,317 

2010 121,336,873 16,982,433 5,019,872 22,002,305 

2011 181,616,507 16,363,767 7,189,994 23,553,761 

2012 181,725,618 19,344,390 7,046,779 26,391,168 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

For catcher/processor vessels from 1996-2007, data on output quantities and prices 

include the total product weight (in metric tons) and total product revenues, 

respectively, from all species produced in weeks where some amount of AFA pollock 

(pollock that was part of the AFA Program) was produced. For 2008 onward, 

catcher/processors began submitting daily production reports (instead of the weekly 

production reports they submitted between 1996 and 2007). Therefore, for 2008-

2012, data on output quantities and prices represent all species produced on days 

where some amount of AFA pollock was produced. Input quantity data include the 

number of crew days (harvesting and processing crew) in the fishery and an 

estimate for the amount of capital involved in the fishery. For the period 1996-

2007, catcher/processor vessels that submitted a weekly production report with 

 

27 Two values below $5,000 were dropped because they were considered outliers.
78

some amount of AFA pollock produced were assumed to operate for a full 7 days 

that week. For 2008 onward, the number of days in the fishery is specified as the 

number of days in which the catcher/processor reported producing some AFA 

pollock. The labor input is therefore the number of days the vessel was in the 

fishery multiplied by the crew size for those days, summed over all vessels. 

Unfortunately, the Anchorage construction laborer wage time series used for the 

catcher vessels began in 1997, and therefore we use the annual average hourly 

wage for all U.S. production workers as the opportunity cost wage for the 

catcher/processor sector (shown in Appendix A). To estimate the average value per 

foot for each vessel we use two different valuation survey estimates taken from one 

vessel at different times and create an average.28 This average vessel value is then 

converted to an average value per foot. The total annual quantity of capital for the 

catcher/processor sector is then calculated as the as the mean value per foot 

multiplied by each vessel’s length in each year, summed over all 

catcher/processors. We price the capital quantity at the rate for BAA grade bonds.

Catcher/processor sector aggregates for output value (produced weight in metric 

tons multiplied by reference period output prices) and input values, including labor 

(crew days multiplied by reference period labor price) and capital (vessel value

multiplied by reference period capital price), are included in Table 29.

Pollock biomass data are taken from NMFS stock assessments for Eastern Bering 

Sea pollock and Aleutian Islands pollock for the 2012 assessment year.29 The 

biomass data used in this study are the sum of the estimated age 3+ biomass for 

Eastern Bering Sea pollock and the age 2+ biomass for Aleutian Islands pollock in 

metric tons. The vast majority, 98% of pollock biomass in the two regions is located 

in the Eastern Bering Sea.

 

28 This value is taken from the Amendment 80 Economic Data Report from a vessel that participates in both the 

Amendment 80 Program and the AFA program.

29 Available at: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2012/EBSpollock.pdf and 

http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2012/AIpollock.pdf. 
79

Table 29. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the AFA Pollock Program

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputsa

Baseline 384,389,701 66,307,442 31,862,550 98,169,991

1999 342,405,158 47,444,553 26,323,995 73,768,547

2000 415,724,811 33,577,447 28,999,360 62,576,807

2001 566,611,206 35,635,792 38,315,349 73,951,141

2002 555,679,510 37,760,839 32,867,216 70,628,055

2003 613,310,577 36,054,816 36,709,583 72,764,399

2004 613,307,340 38,341,486 35,467,937 73,809,423

2005 657,152,447 36,054,816 35,605,392 71,660,208

2006 668,186,019 36,054,816 37,362,267 73,417,083

2007 673,393,102 36,054,816 39,311,215 75,366,030

2008 455,762,344 37,760,839 23,022,184 60,783,023

2009 410,713,856 33,615,929 19,723,685 53,339,614

2010 415,483,905 34,172,631 18,373,008 52,545,639

2011 624,455,059 33,968,251 33,137,757 67,106,008

2012 587,043,156 32,466,608 24,927,858 57,394,466

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data reported in Table 28, Lowe input and output indices were created 

and are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 30 for the catcher vessel sector. The 

biomass unadjusted MFP (hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is 

simply the Lowe output index divided by the Lowe input index, or the change in 

aggregate outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs, relative to the 

baseline. Therefore, an index value above 1.00 means that MFP growth is positive 

and the fishery is getting more output from a given level of inputs, but if the index 

is below 1.00, the opposite is true. As can be seen in Table 30, there have been 

three years of substantial decline in the unadjusted MFP after the baseline year of 

2007, which is by definition set equal to 1.00, one year of increase in the 

unadjusted MFP, followed by one year of decline in unadjusted MFP. On average 

unadjusted MFP for non-baseline years was 0.86 for the AFA catcher vessels

suggesting a decline in productivity in the sector. 
80

There have been some substantial changes in the pollock biomass over this period 

that may account for some of the changes that we observe in the unadjusted MFP. 

Pollock biomass began falling in 2005 from a relatively stable population above 10 

million tons, and reached a low in 2008 of slightly below 5 million tons, but has 

since rebounded to approximately 8 million tons from 2011-2013. These biomass 

numbers are used to calculate the biomass index included in column 4 of Table 30, 

which represents the change in annual pollock biomass. Recall that the baseline 

year’s biomass is in the numerator of the biomass index, and therefore an increase 

in the biomass is represented by a number below 1.00, while an index value above 

1.00 signifies a decrease in the pollock biomass. This allows the biomass adjusted 

MFP (hereafter adjusted MFP) index, shown in the final column of Table 30, to be 

calculated as the product of the unadjusted MFP index and the biomass index. 

Higher levels of biomass decrease the adjusted MFP index because if there are 

more fish, it is assumed that they are easier to catch. The adjusted MFP index is 

thus calculated to account for the impact of changes in biomass on fishery 

productivity. Due to the highly variable biomass over this time period, the biomass 

index varies from a low of 0.76 in 2012 to a high of 1.25 in 2008. These large 

swings in the biomass index result in diverging unadjusted MFP and adjusted MFP

indices. The adjusted MFP index is below 1 for all years after the baseline, but the 

impacts are sometimes muted and other times magnified by the changes in 

biomass. For example, a low biomass year in 2008 (biomass index=1.25) resulted 

in an adjusted MFP index of 0.98 from an unadjusted MFP index of 0.79, which 

implies that productivity remained close to constant from 2007-2008 after 

accounting for the declining biomass. In contrast, there was a substantial increase 

in biomass in 2011 (Biomass Index=0.77) which resulted in an adjusted MFP index 

of 0.82. Given the unadjusted MFP index was 1.07, this implies that the productivity 

actually declined after accounting for the increase in biomass. 
81

Table 30. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher Vessels in the AFA Program

Year Output Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to 

Year MFP 

Change

2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2008 0.73 0.93 0.79 1.25 0.98 0.98

2009 0.61 0.87 0.70 0.98 0.69 0.70

2010 0.61 0.79 0.77 1.03 0.79 1.15

2011 0.91 0.85 1.07 0.77 0.82 1.05

2012 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.76 0.73 0.88

 

Using the same methods as for the catcher vessels, we use data presented in Table 

29 to create Lowe input and output indices that are presented in columns 1 and 2 

of Table 31 for the catcher/processor sector. As can be seen in Table 31 (column 

3), there has been a lot of variation in the unadjusted MFP since the baseline 

period, but it has consistently remained above 1.00. The unadjusted MFP index has 

ranged from 1.19 in 1999 to 2.61 in 2012. The change in output and labor input 

between 2007 and 2008 could be an artifact of the change in data resolution after 

2007, where we began collecting daily production reports rather than the prior 

weekly production reports (for which we assumed a 7-day week).This drop in the 

output and labor input can be seen in Table 29. However, even including this 

potentially data driven change, unadjusted MFP averaged 2.07 for the 

catcher/processor sector in non-baseline years. There were also substantial gains in 

unadjusted MFP growth in the three years following implementation of the AFA 

program, as the unadjusted MFP index values were 1.19, 1.70, and 1.96 from 

1999-2001.

As noted above, there have been large changes in the pollock biomass over the 

period of the AFA program. While the biomass numbers are the same for both the 

catcher vessel and catcher/processor sectors, the catcher/processor biomass index

uses a different baseline period (1996-1998) and is included in column 4 of Table 

31. The biomass index reached a low of 0.85 in 2003; however, it reached a high of 

2.14 in 2008, and averaged 1.30 over the entire period. As with the catcher vessel 

sector, the variability in the biomass index results in sometimes amplifying the 
82

adjusted MFP away from a value of 1.00 and at other times muting the adjusted 

MFP toward a value of 1.00. However, as the average biomass index is above 1.00, 

the adjusted MFP index average at 2.70 is greater than the average for the 

unadjusted MFP index. On an annual basis, the year-to-year change in adjusted 

MFP averaged 1.11 over all non-baseline years. This estimate is larger than some 

other studies of productivity gains in fisheries such as Kirkley et al. (2004) which 

suggests a 0.8% annual increase, while other studies suggest a range from 1% 

(Hannesson, 2007) to 4.4% (Jin et al., 2002), but the estimate of 11% is only 

modestly above estimates on this same fleet of 8.8% by Paul et al. (2009) using 

the years 1994-2004 and 8% by Torres and Felthoven (2014) using the years 

1994-2009 (the latter of which accounts for the role of biomass changes). As this 

study only focuses on post-AFA productivity gains, while Paul et al. (2009) and 

Torres and Felthoven (2014) use data back to 1994, it is reasonable that 

productivity gains would be on average higher in this study as many of the gains 

result from incresing flexibility in harvesting and processing decisions after the 

implementation of the catch share program. 

Table 31. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the AFA Program

Year

Output 

Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted 

MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

Baseline 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

1999 0.89 0.75 1.19 0.96 1.14 1.14

2000 1.08 0.64 1.70 1.03 1.75 1.54

2001 1.47 0.75 1.96 1.05 2.06 1.18

2002 1.45 0.72 2.01 1.01 2.03 0.99

2003 1.60 0.74 2.15 0.85 1.82 0.89

2004 1.60 0.75 2.12 0.90 1.91 1.05

2005 1.71 0.73 2.34 1.07 2.52 1.32

2006 1.74 0.75 2.32 1.40 3.24 1.29

2007 1.75 0.77 2.28 1.71 3.91 1.20

2008 1.19 0.62 1.91 2.14 4.09 1.05

2009 1.07 0.54 1.97 1.68 3.30 0.80

2010 1.08 0.54 2.02 1.76 3.55 1.08

2011 1.62 0.68 2.38 1.32 3.13 0.88

2012 1.53 0.58 2.61 1.30 3.40 1.09
83

The catcher vessel sector experienced lower rates of unadjusted and adjusted MFP

growth than the catcher/processor sector over the entire time period. However, just 

comparing the years 2008-2012, the year-to-year change in adjusted MFP growth 

are much more similar at 0.95 for the catcher vessel sector and 0.98 for the 

catcher/processor sector. However, this does not necessarily imply that the catcher 

vessel sector experienced similar overall gains in productivity before and after AFA 

implementation. 

It appears that the biggest driver of productivity gains in the catcher/processor 

sector after AFA implementation was from reducing the use of capital in the fishery 

by nearly half between the baseline and 2000 while labor only fell 9% and output 

actually increased by 8%. The value of the capital in the catcher/processor sector 

has been relatively constant since 2000 and changes in output are largely driven by 

changes in labor input (correlation coefficient=.73). As there were on average 112 

catcher vessels active during the three years prior to AFA implementation for their 

sector (1997-1999) and 98 active vessels in 2000, falling to 89 vessels in 2012, it is 

likely that the catcher vessel sector has experienced similar gains in productivity as 

the catcher/processor sector as a result of the decline in capital used in the fishery. 

However, since the early years after rationalization are not included in our catcher 

vessel estimates, we cannot provide estimates of TFP change due to these effects.
84

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program

Fishery Synopsis

The North Pacific Fishery Management Council developed the Bering Sea Aleutian 

Islands (BSAI) Crab Rationalization Program over a six-year period. In 2005 the 

BSAI Crab Rationalization Program was implemented to address the race to 

harvest, high bycatch and discard mortality, product quality issues and balance the 

interests of those who depend on crab fisheries. The BSAI Crab Rationalization 

Program includes share allocations to harvesters, processors and crew. Processor 

quota was incorporated to preserve the viability of processing facilities in dependent 

communities and particularly to maintain competitive conditions in ex-vessel 

markets. Community interests are protected by Community Development Quota 

(CDQ) and Adak Community allocations as well as regional landings and processing 

requirements. 

The Bering Sea Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Crab Rationalization Program includes most 

species of king and Tanner crabs in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands. The BSAI

Crab Rationalization Program applies to the following Bering Sea and Aleutian 

Islands crab fisheries: Bristol Bay red king crab, Western Aleutian Islands (Adak) 

golden king crab, Eastern Aleutian Islands golden king crab, Western Aleutian 

Islands red king crab, Pribilof Islands red and blue king crab, St. Matthew Island 

blue king crab, Bering Sea snow crab, Eastern Bering Sea Tanner crab and Western 

Bering Sea Tanner crab. The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries 

comprise large industrial vessels using pot gear, a few catcher/processor vessels,

and a large-scale onshore processing sector. 

The fishery management plan (FMP) governing these fisheries, the Bering Sea and 

Aleutian Islands king and Tanner Crab FMP, was approved by the Secretary of 

Commerce on June 2, 1989. The FMP establishes a State/Federal cooperative 

management regime that defers crab management to the State of Alaska with 

Federal oversight. State regulations are subject to the provisions of the FMP, 
85

including its goals and objectives, the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the National 

Standards and other applicable federal laws. The FMP has been amended several 

times since its implementation to limit access to the fisheries, establish a vessel 

license limitation program, define essential fish habitat and associated protection 

measures, amongst other topics. 

Managing capacity in these fisheries has been a challenge since the inception of the 

FMP. Overcapacity in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fishery 

required season limitations to control catch levels, with seasons in some fisheries 

only lasting five days. The resulting “derby fishery” led to unsafe fishing conditions 

and numerous fatalities for crew, particularly in winter months when most crab 

fisheries are prosecuted. Harvesting and processing capacity expanded to 

accommodate highly abbreviated seasons, leading to further economic 

inefficiencies. 

To address overcapacity the North Pacific Fishery Management Council took a series 

of actions to limit access to these resources, including a moratorium on new vessels 

entering the fishery (1996); a vessel license limitation program (2000); a capacity 

reduction (buyback) program (2004); and, in 2005, the BSAI Crab Rationalization 

Program. 

Prior to implementation of the BSAI Crab Rationalization Program, the Bering Sea 

Tanner Crab fishery was closed to fishing due to low stock abundance. Two fisheries 

(Western Aleutian Islands red king crab and Pribilof Island red and blue king crab) 

have been closed to fishing throughout the duration of the Crab Rationalization 

Program. The St. Matthew blue king crab fishery was closed for four of the eight

years of the IFQ Program. In the second year of the IFQ Program and following a 

stock assessment, the Bering Sea Tanner Crab fishery was split into the Western 

and Eastern Bering Sea Tanner Crab fisheries. The Western Bering Sea Tanner crab 

fishery was closed for two of the five years, while the Eastern Bering Sea Tanner 

Crab fishery was closed for one year during the IFQ Program.
86

King and Tanner crab are harvested in nine distinct fisheries that are defined by a 

combination of species and spatial areas. Uniquely, the Council was granted special 

Congressional authority to allocate Individual Processor Quota (IPQ) in addition to 

harvesting quota. IFQ privileges are delineated as quota shares (that provide the 

holder a percentage of the IFQ allocation), which represents the annual harvestable 

pounds (derived from the shares) to harvesters. Harvest quota shares are 

subdivided into “A” shares (90% of the quota share) and “B” shares (10%) of the 

quota share. The former (A shares) must be matched with individual processor 

quota when making a delivery to a processor while the latter may be delivered 

without restriction to any processor. The BSAI Crab Rationalization program also 

includes processor delivery restrictions on A shares among designated regions 

(North, South, and West regions).

The initial allocation issued harvest shares to license limitation program (LLP) crab 

license holders and crew who were state permit holders (typically vessel captains) 

based on creditable historical landings. Processor shares were issued to processors 

with specific history in the crab fisheries. Harvest quota share and processor quota 

share are transferable, subject to limitations. Shares issued to LLP crab permit 

holders comprise 97% of all harvesting quota share; the remaining 3% were issued 

as captain/crew quota share (referred to as C shares, which do not have to be 

matched to IPQ). Both harvest and processor quota share are split into catcher 

vessel shares and catcher/processor shares. Annual individual processing quota is 

issued in the amounts matched to the amounts of catcher vessel LLP harvest quota 

for the nine fisheries. 

Data 

As part of the BSAI Crab Rationalization Program, program participants are required 

to submit an annual economic data report (EDR) to provide additional information 

on input use and the costs incurred by participants. In the first year of the program, 

the EDR also requested cost information for the years 1998, 2001, and 2004 to 

create an economic baseline period against which economic performance of the 
87

rationalized fishery can be compared. These years were chosen because they 

represented a variety of fishing conditions, prices, stock abundances, and TACs. 

The average of these three years will constitute the baseline and reference period 

prior to program implementation. 

Data on output quantities and prices include the total whole weight (in pounds) and 

total product revenues, respectively, from all species caught on trips where some 

amount of any BSAI Crab Rationalization Program species was caught. Input 

quantity data include the number of crew days in the fishery and an estimate for 

the amount of capital utilized in the fishery. The labor input is computed as the 

number of days the vessel was in the BSAI Crab fisheries multiplied by the crew 

size for those days, summed over all vessels. We use the sum of total annual labor 

cost and total annual food and provision cost data from the EDR divided by the 

number of days the vessel participated in the BSAI Crab fisheries to estimate a 

daily cost for crew members. The total annual capital quantity used is the 

replacement value of the vessel reported on their EDR summed over all vessels that 

participated in the fishery in a given year. We price capital using the rate for BAA 

grade bonds. Fishery level aggregates for output value (whole weight in pounds

multiplied by reference period output prices) and input values, including labor (crew 

days multiplied by reference period labor price) and capital (vessel value multiplied 

by reference period capital price), are included in Table 32. 

Only five species that are included in the BSAI Crab Rationalization Program have 

stock assessments: Bristol Bay red king crab, Pribilof Islands red and blue king 

crab, St. Matthew Island blue king crab, Bering Sea snow crab, and Bering Sea 

Tanner crab. Biomass data for these species are taken from NMFS stock 

assessments for each species using the most recent full assessment year, and 

represent mature male biomass.30 These five biomass estimates are then weighted 

by their revenue shares among the BSAI Crab Rationalization Program vessels each 

year and used to create the BSAI Crab species biomass index.

 

30 Available at 

http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/npfmc/PDFdocuments/resources/SAFE/CrabSAFE/CrabSAFE2012.pdf.
88

Table 32. Outputs and Inputs in the BSAI Crab IFQ Fisheries 

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputsa

Baseline 161,150,512 72,300,934 55,871,594 128,172,527 

2005 73,812,134 50,533,800 25,339,144 75,872,944 

2006 97,968,136 31,120,125 32,125,962 63,246,087 

2007 100,457,995 26,940,933 29,229,390 56,170,323 

2008 146,959,566 30,023,530 40,919,832 70,943,362 

2009 132,715,178 29,827,204 37,388,960 67,216,164 

2010 115,319,221 27,839,774 33,179,688 61,019,461 

2011 112,902,988 30,322,135 28,822,162 59,144,297 

2012 169,738,392 36,477,637 46,805,870 83,283,507 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data presented in Table 32, Lowe input and output indices were created 

and are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 33. The biomass unadjusted MFP

(hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is simply the Lowe output 

index divided by the Lowe Input Index, and represents the change in aggregate 

outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs on an annual basis. Therefore, if 

the index goes above 1.00, MFP growth is positive and the fishery is getting more 

output from a given level of inputs, but if the index is below 1.00, the reverse is 

true. As can be seen in Table 33, there have been fairly large changes in 

unadjusted MFP over this time period. Interestingly, there was a dramatic decrease 

in the unadjusted MFP in the first year after program implementation. As can been 

seen in Table 33, there was a relatively larger drop in outputs than inputs, which 

accounted for this change. This result is largely a function of the years used for the 

baseline, which were meant to represent a broad set of conditions in the fishery 

prior to rationalization rather than the three prior to implementation. The 

implication of this is that one of the years chosen (1998) had over 215 million 

pounds of crab landed, while landings in the other baseline years were far lower at 

about 36 million pounds and 43 million pounds for 2001 and 2004, respectively. 

This results in a baseline average output of 98 million pounds of crab, which is 
89

substantially above the combined TACs of these species in the years that 

immediately preceded and followed program implementation. Even taking this datadriven decline in unadjusted MFP into account, the mean index for non-baseline 

years was 1.41, which corresponds to a year-to-year change in unadjusted MFP of 

1.08 indicating a high degree of productivity gains in the fishery.

It is possible that this average increase in observed unadjusted MFP arose because 

increases in the biomass of BSAI Crab species may make the existing technology 

more productive. The biomass index is included in column 4 of Table 33 and 

represents the change in BSAI Crab species biomass relative to the baseline period. 

Recall that the baseline period’s biomass is in the numerator of the biomass index.

Therefore, an increase in the biomass is represented by a number below 1.00, while 

an index value above 1.00 signifies a decrease in the crab species biomass. This 

allows the biomass adjusted MFP (hereafter adjusted MFP) index, shown in the final 

column of Table 33, to be calculated as the product of the unadjusted MFP index 

and the biomass index. Higher levels of biomass decrease the adjusted MFP index,

because if there are more crab available it is assumed that they are easier to catch 

and the adjusted MFP index is calculated to account for the impact of changes in 

biomass on fishery productivity. BSAI Crab species biomass has varied over the 

study period from a low of 0.92 in 2009 to a high of 1.07 in 2012, with an average 

of 0.97, which implies that, on average, the adjusted MFP index will be similar to, 

but slightly below the unadjusted MFP index. The estimated adjusted MFP index 

varies widely between 0.78 in 2005 to 1.73 in 2012, but the average adjusted MFP

for the BSAI Crab fishery over the study period is 1.36, which corresponds to a 

year-to-year change in adjusted MFP of 1.09. This is similar to the unadjusted MFP

index, which implies that there have been steady improvements in productivity for 

the BSAI Crab fisheries. 
90

Table 33. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the BSAI Crab Fisheries

Year

Output 

Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted 

MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

Baseline 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2005 0.46 0.59 0.77 1.01 0.78 0.78

2006 0.61 0.49 1.23 0.94 1.16 1.48

2007 0.62 0.44 1.42 0.95 1.35 1.17

2008 0.91 0.55 1.65 0.97 1.60 1.18

2009 0.82 0.52 1.57 0.92 1.44 0.90

2010 0.72 0.48 1.50 0.95 1.43 1.00

2011 0.70 0.46 1.52 0.93 1.41 0.98

2012 1.05 0.65 1.62 1.07 1.73 1.23

As shown in Table 32, there was a large immediate reduction in the number of 

vessels participating in the BSAI Crab fisheries after program implementation. This 

reduction in capital from an estimated $72 million during the baseline period to an 

average of $30 million from 2006-2012 has lead to impressive increases in MFP

post-rationalization. Comparing the year 2012 with the baseline period, the fishery 

used just over half the capital and 16% less labor input in 2012, but output was 5% 

higher than the baseline average. This rapid vessel consolidation has led many to 

suggest that there have been substantial negative impacts on crew employment 

and payments to crew in this fishery. However, Abbott, Garber-Yonts, and Wilen 

(2010), find that while there are fewer short term jobs (because the derby fishery 

for some crab species pre-rationalization lasted only several days), these were 

made up for with longer duration jobs such that the total number of crew hours 

remained roughly constant. It also appears that in years with large volumes of 

catch, such as 2012, output increased by 50% relative to 2011, but the labor input 

increased by 62% and the capital input only increased by 20%, which suggests that 

crew days are still an important component in overall productivity. 
91

Non-Pollock Trawl Catcher/Processor Groundfish Cooperatives 

(Amendment 80)

Fishery Synopsis

Amendment 80 to the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Groundfish Fishery 

Management Plan was developed to allow the formation of cooperatives with 

attendant quota allocations to catcher/processor vessels using trawl gear that were 

not listed in the American Fisheries Act and was implemented in 2008. This socalled “Amendment 80” fleet receives allocations of Atka mackerel, Pacific cod, 

Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch and three species of flatfish (yellowfin sole, 

rock sole and flathead sole).

Amendment 80 allocates sideboards for pollock, Pacific cod, Pacific Ocean perch

outside of the Aleutian Islands, northern rockfish, pelagic shelf rockfish and a 

prohibited species catch allocation for halibut and crab. Sideboards are intended to 

limit the ability of vessels in rationalized fisheries from exceeding historic levels of 

participation in other fisheries, which otherwise might exacerbate a “race for fish.” 

Sideboards can be collective catch limits that apply to all vessels in a particular 

sector. Vessels subject to a sideboard limit are allowed to fish up to that limit but 

may not exceed it. Amendment 80 vessels that do not join a cooperative are 

eligible to participate in a limited access fishery.

The North Pacific Fishery Management Council designed the Amendment 80

Cooperatives Program to allow eligibility based upon those persons who: 1) did not 

meet the qualification criteria of an American Fisheries Act trawl catcher/processor 

sector as defined in section 219(a)(7) in the American Fisheries Act; and 2) held a 

portion of the catch history of Amendment 80 species during the period from 1998 

to 2004. Initial allocations were issued to eligible vessel owners based on catch 

history.
92

Amendment 80 quota share holders may, on an annual basis, elect to form a 

cooperative with other Amendment 80 quota share holders to receive an exclusive 

harvest privilege for the portion of the catch limit resulting from their aggregated

quota share holdings. This cooperative quota is the amount of annual Amendment 

80 species catch limit dedicated for exclusive use by that cooperative. Quota shares 

can be transferred with vessel and catch history, while annual allocations of quota 

metric tons can be leased annually within and between eligible cooperatives. Those 

quota share holders electing not to join a cooperative participate in the Amendment 

80 limited access sector, which receives an allocation equal to the product of the 

catch limit and the combined share holdings of the sector as a whole.

The Amendment 80 fleet comprises medium to large catcher/processor vessels 

(average length is 159 feet) using trawl gear with limited factory space and 

processing capability. From 2008 – 2010, the majority of vessels were in one 

cooperative, with the remainder being in the limited-access fishery. Since 2011, all 

of the catcher/processors are in one of two cooperatives. These voluntary harvest 

cooperatives manage the target allocations, incidental catch allowances and 

prohibited species allocations amongst themselves.

Data 

Coincident with the implementation of the Amendment 80 Program, program 

participants were required to submit an annual economic data report (EDR) that 

provides additional information on input use and the costs incurred by participants. 

However, the EDR program was not in place prior to program implementation and 

no historic data were collected from participants. As such, there are no cost data 

prior to 2008 in order to assess potential changes in productivity before and after 

Amendment 80 implementation. It is possible to estimate MFP metrics using only 

capital and labor data (as in other Alaska Region programs), but we chose to 

estimate MFP with greater data resolution over fewer years to better understand 

the mechanisms that are driving changes in MFP. Therefore we selected a single 
93

baseline and reference year (2008) instead of a 3-year average prior to program 

implementation. 

Data on output quantities and prices include the total product weight (in metric 

tons) and revenues, respectively from all species caught on days where some 

amount of any Amendment 80 species was also produced. Input quantity data 

include the number of crew days (harvesting and processing crew) in the fishery, 

an estimate for the amount of capital involved in the fishery, and total fuel use by 

the fleet. The labor input is defined as the number of days the vessel was in the 

Amendment 80 fishery multiplied by the crew size for those days, summed over all 

vessels. We use the total annual labor cost data from the EDR divided by the 

number of production days in the Amendment 80 fishery to estimate a daily wage 

for crew members. The annual capital quantity used is the marine survey value of 

the vessel reported on their EDR summed over all vessels that participated in the 

fishery in a given year. We price the capital quantity using the rate for BAA grade 

bonds. The total fuel used and total fuel expenditures (used to calculate average 

fuel prices paid) by the fleet comes from the EDR data. As the EDR data are annual 

data, we prorate all EDR data using the share of a vessel’s total processing days 

where they processed any Amendment 80 species. Fishery level aggregates for 

output value (product weight in metric tons multiplied by reference year output 

prices) and input values, including labor (crew days multiplied by reference year 

labor price), capital (vessel value multiplied by reference year capital price), and 

energy (fuel use in gallons multiplied by reference year fuel price) are included in 

Table 34. 

Table 34. Output and Inputs in the Alaska Amendment 80 Program

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Energya Total Inputsa

2008 278,662,817 16,646,092 72,633,808 42,567,081 131,846,981

2009 263,998,556 16,352,410 63,933,923 36,164,546 116,450,878

2010 294,940,149 18,605,248 69,261,169 37,762,205 125,628,623

2011 300,185,176 18,866,617 65,033,070 38,464,131 122,363,819

2012 306,254,599 20,239,682 65,466,603 36,041,927 121,748,212

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.
94

Biomass data for the 6 primary Amendment 80 species in the BSAI region (Atka 

mackerel, Pacific cod, Aleutian Islands Pacific ocean perch, yellowfin sole, rock sole, 

and flathead sole) are taken from NMFS stock assessments for each species using 

the most recent full assessment year.31 The biomass data used for this study 

include the 2013 estimates of age 3+ biomass for BSAI Atka mackerel, the 2012

estimates of age 3+ biomass for BSAI Pacific ocean perch, the 2012 estimates of 

age 3+ biomass for BSAI flathead sole, the 2012 estimates of age 2+ biomass for 

rock sole, the 2013 estimates of age 3+ Eastern Bering Sea Pacific cod biomass, 

and the 2013 estimate of age 2+ BSAI yellowfin sole biomass. These six biomass 

estimates are then weighted by their revenue shares among the Amendment 80 

vessels in each year and used to create the Amendment 80 species biomass index. 

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data reported in Table 34 Lowe input and output indices were created and 

are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 35. The biomass unadjusted MFP

(hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is simply the Lowe output 

index divided by the Lowe input index, which represents the change in aggregate 

outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs on an annual basis. Therefore, if 

the index goes above 1.00, it means that MFP growth is positive and the fishery is 

getting more output from a given level of inputs, but if the index is below 1.00, it 

means the opposite. As can be seen in Table 35, there have been increases in MFP

for each year after the baseline year of 2008, which is by definition set equal to 

1.00. The mean unadjusted MFP index for non-baseline years is 1.13, which 

corresponds to an average year-to-year change in unadjusted MFP of 1.04. 

It is possible that this increase in observed unadjusted MFP arose because we have 

not accounted for increases in the biomass of Amendment 80 species that may 

make the existing technology more productive. The biomass index is included in 

 

31 A full stock assessment is completed every other year for some species. The 2013 assessment year stock 

assessments are available at: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/stocks/assessments.htm. The 2012 assessment year 

stock assessments are available at: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/stocks/2012_assessments.htm.
95

column 4 of Table 35 and represents the change in Amendment 80 species biomass 

relative to the baseline. Recall that the baseline year’s biomass is in the numerator 

of the biomass index, and therefore an increase in the biomass is represented by a 

number below 1.00, while an index value above 1.00 signifies a decrease in the 

Amendment 80 species biomass. This allows the biomass adjusted MFP (hereafter 

adjusted MFP) index, shown in the final column of Table 35, to be calculated as the 

product of the unadjusted MFP index and the biomass index. Higher levels of 

biomass decrease the adjusted MFP index, because if there are more fish it is 

assumed that they are easier to catch and the adjusted MFP index is calculated to 

account for the impact of changes in biomass on fishery productivity. Amendment 

80 species biomass has declined slightly over the study period, implying that the 

adjusted MFP index will be greater than the unadjusted MFP index. The estimated 

adjusted MFP index is above 1.00 for all years and averages 1.21 for non-baseline 

years which, corresponds to a yearly change of 1.07, and implies that there have 

been steady improvements in productivity for the Amendment 80 fishery. 

Table 35. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Amendment 80 Fishery

Year Output Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to Year

MFP Change

2008 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2009 0.95 0.88 1.07 1.02 1.10 1.10

2010 1.06 0.95 1.11 1.07 1.19 1.08

2011 1.08 0.93 1.16 1.08 1.25 1.05

2012 1.10 0.92 1.19 1.11 1.32 1.05

There are several mechanisms in the Amendment 80 Program that may help 

explain this growth in productivity. First, allocating catch shares to vessels has 

eliminated the race for fish, and could have subsequently reduced fishing costs for 

inputs such as fuel use, which dropped 15% between the first year after 

implementation (2008) and 2012. Second, the cooperative structure of the 

Amendment 80 Program could be improving communication among cooperative 

members and reducing search costs. Third, Amendment 80 changed the way in 

which halibut prohibited species catch (PSC) allocations were made, which has 

likely had a dramatic impact on the vessel’s ability to increase their catch (Abbott, 
96

Haynie, and Reimer, 2014). Prior to the Amendment 80 program, there was a 

sector-wide PSC limit on halibut that was allocated across target species based on 

the anticipated usage of halibut PSC in each target fishery. Once this sector wide 

halibut PSC limit was reached in any target fishery, the entire target fishery would 

close and often resulted in closures of rock sole and yellowfin sole fisheries prior to 

full exploitation of the TAC. The Amendment 80 Program provides for individual 

vessel PSC that is tradable across vessels and also removed the target species PSC 

allocations so the vessels are now able to use their halibut PSC in the most 

profitable fisheries. Because target fisheries are now not closing because of halibut 

PSC limits, this has allowed vessels to increase the number of active days in the 

fishery from an average of 258 days during the three years prior to Amendment 80 

(2005-2007) to an average of 322 days over the period 2008-2012. This added 

flexibility, in addition to increases in quota allocated to the sector, has allowed the 

sector to increase their average catch from 200,346 tons from 2005-2007 to 

241,087 tons from 2008-2012. 
97

Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Cooperatives Program

Fishery Synopsis

In 2007 the Central Gulf of Alaska (GOA) Rockfish Pilot Program was established as 

a two-year program and later extended to five years. The North Pacific Fishery 

Management Council modified the pilot program and implemented the Central Gulf 

of Alaska Rockfish Program in 2012. Note that this study will use the term “Rockfish 

Program” referring to the program as a whole (starting with the Rockfish Pilot 

Program in 2007), but may refer to the Rockfish Pilot Program specifically where 

necessary. While the fishery was not overfished or experiencing overfishing in the 

years leading up to implementation of the Rockfish Pilot Program, the window of 

fishing opportunity was down to a mere three weeks. 

The North Pacific Fishery Management Council designed the Rockfish Program so 

that only those who held valid License Limitation Program (LLP) licenses would be 

eligible to participate. The fleet comprises catcher vessels and catcher/processors, 

both of which are required to form sector-specific cooperatives that receive an 

exclusive harvest privilege based on cooperative member quota share holdings. 

Rockfish quota share can only be harvested through cooperative membership. The 

Rockfish Program also includes an entry-level longline fishery sector that (starting 

in 2012) receives a small allocation of Pacific ocean perch, Northern rockfish, and 

Pelagic shelf rockfish. Therefore, since these vessels are not given an exclusive 

harvesting privilege they are not included in this study. 

The Rockfish Program allocates 97.5% of quota share for eight species (including 

primary species Pacific Ocean perch, northern rockfish, and dusky rockfish as well 

as valuable secondary species, which includes Pacific cod, rougheye rockfish, 

shortraker rockfish, sablefish, and thornyhead rockfish) and a prohibited species 

catch (PSC) allocation for Pacific halibut to LLP license holders based upon catch 

history for the initial allocation. The remaining 2.5% is allocated to LLP license 

holders that participated in the Rockfish Pilot Program entry level trawl fishery from 

2007-2009 based upon catch history. Catcher vessel history for the initial allocation 
98

was based upon license holders’ catch history in the Central Gulf of Alaska for 

2000-2006. Catcher/processor history was based upon processing history in 2000-

2006. Eligible LLP license holders receive quota share based on their catch history 

but do not receive an exclusive harvesting privilege. Cooperatives receive 

cooperative quota (CQ) annually based on its member LLP license holders quota 

share, and can be transferred between cooperatives. Catcher/processors are not 

permitted to receive transfers of CQ from catcher vessel cooperatives, but catcher 

vessel cooperatives are allowed to receive catcher/processor CQ. All transfers are 

subject to excessive share limits.

Data 

Similar to other Alaska Region programs, we lack important information on the 

inputs used by catcher vessels in the Rockfish Program prior to 2007. However, we 

are able to gather a consistent set of input and output data for the 

catcher/processor vessels back to 2004 and we use a 3-year average prior to 

program implementation (2004-2006) as the baseline and reference period for the 

catcher/processor sector. Given the short time frame of available data for the 

catcher vessels, the baseline and reference year was selected to be a single year 

(2007), which differs from the 3-year average used for catcher/processors. 

For catcher vessels, data on the total round weight (in pounds) and total ex-vessel 

revenues from all species caught while on Rockfish Program trips were used to 

construct the Lowe output index. Input quantity data used to construct the Lowe 

input index include the number of crew days in the fishery (number of crew on a 

trip multiplied by the number of days at sea for the trip, summed over all vessels 

and trips) and an estimate for the amount of capital involved in the fishery. To 

create a daily labor price we estimate an opportunity cost wage to value crew days 

using the mean construction laborer hourly wage in Anchorage multiplied by 8 

hours. We use the self-reported vessel values for all catcher vessels that 

participated in the Rockfish Program from the CFEC vessel license application to 

estimate the total quantity of capital involved in the catcher vessel sector of the

fishery. We use this estimate to create an annual value per foot for catcher vessel 
99

participants. The total annual quantity of capital for the catcher vessel sector is 

then calculated as the as the annual mean value per foot multiplied by each 

vessel’s length in that year, summed over all catcher vessels that participated in 

that year’s fishery. We price the capital quantity using the rate for BAA grade 

bonds. Catcher vessel sector aggregates for output value (round weight in pounds

multiplied by reference year output prices) and input values, including labor (crew 

days multiplied by reference year labor price) and capital (vessel value multiplied 

by reference year capital price), are included in Table 36. 

Table 36. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher Vessels in the Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Program 

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputsa

2007 7,012,698 2,171,054 492,812 2,663,866 

2008 8,042,661 2,332,080 502,907 2,834,987 

2009 6,372,891 2,722,516 455,556 3,178,072 

2010 9,624,667 3,386,287 525,868 3,912,155 

2011 12,995,429 3,065,431 641,209 3,706,640 

2012 11,413,739 2,822,416 643,085 3,465,502 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

For catcher/processor vessels from 2004-2007, data on output quantities and prices 

include the total product weight (in metric tons) and total product revenues, 

respectively, from all species produced in weeks where some amount of Rockfish 

Program species (species that was part of the Rockfish Program) was produced. For 

2008 onward, catcher/processors began submitting daily production reports 

(instead of the weekly production reports they submitted from 2004-2007). 

Therefore, for 2008-2012, data on output quantities and prices represent all species 

produced on days where some amount of Rockfish Program species was produced. 

Input quantity data include the number of crew days (harvesting and processing 

crew) in the fishery and an estimate for the amount of capital involved in the 

fishery. For the period 2004-2007, catcher/processor vessels that submitted a 

weekly production report with some amount of Rockfish Program species produced 

were assumed to operate for a full 7 days that week. For 2008 onward, the number 

of days in the fishery is defined as the number of days in which the 

catcher/processor reported producing some Rockfish Program species. The labor 
100

input is therefore calculated as the number of days the vessel was in the fishery 

multiplied by the crew size for those days, summed over all vessels. To create a 

daily labor price we estimate an opportunity cost wage to value crew days using the 

mean construction laborer hourly wage in Anchorage multiplied by 8 hours. Similar 

to the catcher vessels, we use the self-reported vessel values for all 

catcher/processors that participated in the Rockfish Program from the CFEC vessel 

license application. However, as there are some years with no vessels reporting 

values, we create a single estimate of the value per foot for all catcher/processors 

participants. The total annual quantity of capital for the catcher/processor sector is 

then calculated as the as the mean value per foot multiplied by each vessel’s length 

in each year summed over all catcher/processors. We price the capital quantity 

using the rate for BAA grade bonds. Catcher/processor sector aggregates for output 

value (produced weight in metric tons multiplied by reference period output prices) 

and input values, including labor (crew days multiplied by the reference period 

labor price) and capital (vessel value multiplied by the reference period capital 

price), are included in Table 37.

Table 37. Outputs and Inputs of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish 

Program

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputsa

Baseline 12,718,869 1,690,382 1,127,254 2,817,636 

2007 11,736,268 865,371 1,008,574 1,873,945 

2008 8,156,896 1,531,508 502,249 2,033,757 

2009 6,567,966 1,663,952 423,031 2,086,983 

2010 11,188,526 1,794,881 717,575 2,512,456 

2011 15,347,061 1,125,084 895,152 2,020,235 

2012 14,479,246 1,125,084 889,481 2,014,564 

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

We have estimated a separate biomass index for the catcher vessel sector and the 

catcher/processor sector for three reasons. First, while there are 8 species with 

quota share under the Rockfish Program, catcher vessels do not receive quota for 

shortraker or rougheye rockfish, so those two species are not included in the 

biomass index for the catcher vessels. Similarly, the catcher/processor sector does 
101

not receive quota for Pacific cod, and therefore only 7 species are used in the 

biomass index for the catcher/processors. Second, the two sectors derive different 

shares of their revenue from each species, and therefore, the biomass index should 

weight the biomass estimate of the included species differently for each sector to 

account for their differing contributions. Third, the sectors use different baseline 

and reference years. The biomass estimates are taken from NMFS stock 

assessments. The biomass data used in this study are the 2013 estimate of the 

GOA Pacific cod spawning stock biomass, the 2013 estimate of the GOA Pacific 

ocean perch age 2+ biomass, the 2012 estimate of the combined BSAI and GOA 

sablefish age 2+ biomass, the 2013 estimate of the GOA northern rockfish age 6+ 

biomass, the 2013 estimate of GOA dusky rockfish age 4+ biomass, the 2011 

estimate of GOA rougheye rockfish age 6+ biomass, the 2011 estimate of the GOA 

shortraker biomass, and the 2011 estimate of the GOA thornyhead rockfish 

biomass. These biomass estimates are then weighted by their revenue shares 

among the two different sectors in each year and used to create a catcher vessel 

biomass index and a catcher/processor biomass index.

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data reported in Table 36 Lowe input and output indices were created and 

are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 38 for the catcher vessel sector. The 

biomass unadjusted MFP (hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is 

simply the Lowe output index divided by the Lowe input index, or the change in 

aggregate outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs, on an annual basis. 

An index value above 1.00 means that MFP growth is increasing and the fishery is 

getting more output from a given level of inputs, but if the index is below 1.00 the 

opposite is true. As can be seen in Table 38, there have been large changes in the 

unadjusted MFP index in several years, with values ranging from a low of 0.77 in 

2009 to a high of 1.32 in 2011 with a mean index value for the Rockfish Program 

catcher vessels for non-baseline years of 1.07. 

It is possible changes in species biomass and catchability over this period may 

account for some of the changes that we observe in the unadjusted MFP. The 
102

biomass index included in column 4 of Table 38 represents the change in Rockfish 

Program species biomass relative to the baseline. Recall that the baseline year’s 

biomass is in the numerator of the biomass index, and therefore an increase in the 

biomass is represented by a number below 1.00, while an index value above 1.00

signifies a decrease in the rockfish biomass. This allows the biomass adjusted MFP

(hereafter adjusted MFP) index, shown in the final column of Table 38, to be 

calculated as the product of the unadjusted MFP index and the biomass Index. 

Higher levels of biomass decrease the adjusted MFP index because if there are 

more fish, it is assumed that they are easier to catch. The adjusted MFP index is 

thus calculated to account for the impact of changes in biomass on fishery 

productivity. However, it is unlikely that changes in biomass in this fishery have 

affected productivity as the biomass index for catcher vessels average is 1.00 and 

only ranges between 0.96 and 1.02 over the study period. Therefore the adjusted 

MFP index is very similar to the unadjusted MFP index. 

Table 38. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher Vessels in the Rockfish Program

Year Output Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted MFP

Year to Year 

MFP Change

2007 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2008 1.15 1.07 1.09 1.00 1.09 1.09

2009 0.92 1.20 0.77 1.00 0.77 0.71

2010 1.37 1.48 0.93 0.99 0.92 1.19

2011 1.86 1.41 1.32 0.96 1.27 1.39

2012 1.64 1.33 1.24 1.02 1.26 0.99

Using the same methods as for the catcher vessels, we use data reported in Table 

37 to create Lowe input and output indices that are presented in columns 1 and 2 

of Table 39 for the catcher/processor sector. As can be seen in Table 39 (column 

3), similar to the catcher vessel sector, there has been a lot of variation in the 

unadjusted MFP since the baseline period. The unadjusted MFP index has ranged 

from 0.70 in 2009 to 1.68 in 2011. However, the change in output and labor input 

between 2007 and 2008 could be an artifact of the change in data resolution after 

2007, where we began collecting daily production reports rather than the prior 
103

weekly production reports (for which we assumed a 7-day week).This drop in the 

output and labor input can be seen in Table 37, which also shows a drop in capital 

in 2007 as only 4 catcher/processors participated in that year while 7 vessels did 

the year before and after. However, even including this potentially data driven 

change, unadjusted MFP averaged 1.21 for the catcher/processor sector in nonbaseline years, which corresponds to a yearly change in unadjusted MFP of 1.15. 

As noted above, we calculated a separate biomass index for the catcher/processor 

sector and it is included in column 4 of Table 39. However, the index values are not 

meaningfully different from the catcher vessel biomass index as the 

catcher/processor biomass index still has an overall average of 1.00. Therefore the 

adjusted MFP index is very similar to the unadjusted MFP index for the 

catcher/processor sector as well. 

Table 39. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity of Catcher/Processor Vessels in the Rockfish Program

Year

Output 

Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted 

MFP

Year to Year 

MFP Change

Baseline 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2007 0.92 0.67 1.39 1.00 1.39 1.39

2008 0.64 0.72 0.89 1.00 0.89 0.64

2009 0.52 0.74 0.70 0.99 0.69 0.77

2010 0.88 0.89 0.99 0.97 0.96 1.39

2011 1.21 0.72 1.68 1.01 1.70 1.77

2012 1.14 0.71 1.59 1.04 1.66 0.98

Both the catcher vessels and catcher/processors experienced a substantial decline 

in MFP in the year 2009, with the catcher/processors also experiencing a sharp 

decline in 2008, but that change is partially due to changes in the underlying data 

between 2007 and 2008. Outputs declined in both sectors between 2008 and 2009 

by 21% and 19% for the catcher vessel and catcher/processor sectors while their 

labor inputs only declined by 9% and 16% and their capital input actually increased 

in both cases by 17% and 9%, respectively. The average number of days in the 

Rockfish Program by catcher vessels was stable at 24 days between 2007-2010 

before increasing to an average of 32 days for 2011 and 2012. The 
104

catcher/processor vessels spent considerably less time in the fishery at 23 days for 

2004-2007 and only averaged 15 days for 2008-2012 (to some degree this could 

be explained by the change in data source). However, the catcher/processors only 

spent an average of 8 days in the Rockfish Program in 2009 but there were 8 

catcher/processors prosecuting the fishery in that year. Therefore, the amount of 

labor in the fishery was very low and capital was relatively high. The increase in 

capital for the catcher/processors is likely a function of only 8 vessels participating 

in the baseline, which dropped to 4 in 2007, resulting in a near doubling of capital 

between 2007 and 2009. Abundances, TACs, ABCs, and aggregate GOA catch of the 

three primary species were relatively constant over this period so it is unclear why 

the Rockfish Program vessels experienced such a sharp decline in output. However, 

for the period outside of 2008-2009, both sectors experienced substantial increases 

in their MFP, and appear to have done so for different reasons. The catcher vessels 

appear to have increased their outputs by increasing both capital and labor inputs, 

while the catcher/processor sector appears to have reduced capital and labor inputs 

while also managing to increase their output.
105

Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Pacific Cod Hook and Line Cooperative 

(Freezer Longliners)

Fishery Synopsis

The Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Freezer Longline Catcher/Processors 

(hereafter the Freezer Longliners) are a group of catcher/processor vessels that are 

eligible to harvest the hook and line catcher/processor sector allocation for BSAI 

Pacific cod. Since 2003, Freezer Longliners are required to have hook and line 

Pacific cod catcher/processor endorsements on their federal groundfish License 

Limitation Program (LLP) license to target Pacific cod using hook and line gear and 

process the catch onboard. These Freezer Longliners are allocated a fixed 

percentage of the targeted BSAI Pacific cod allocation that is allocated to the hook 

and line catcher/processor sector. From 2000 to 2007, the hook and line 

catcher/processor sector was allocated 40.8% of the BSAI Pacific cod nonCommunity Development Quota (CDQ) total allowable catch (TAC). The passage of 

Amendment 85 increased their share of the BSAI targeted Pacific cod TAC to 48.7% 

from 2008 to the present. These vessels typically produce head and gutted Pacific 

cod with the collar on or collar off, but do not do much processing of ancillary 

products due to limited production and freezer space. 

In 2007, the sector voted to obtain a $35 million NOAA Fisheries loan to purchase 

and retire 4 groundfish LLP licenses with hook and line catcher/processor 

endorsements. The Longline Catcher Processor Subsector Single Fishery 

Cooperative Act was passed by congress in 2010 and allows Freezer Longliners 

participating in the BSAI directed Pacific cod fishery to form a single harvest 

cooperative. The Act also requires NOAA Fisheries to implement regulations to allow 

the establishment of a harvest cooperative within two years of receiving a request 

from at least 80% of the eligible hook and line catcher/processor LLP license 

holders. However, while the vessels participating in this fishery have formed a 

voluntary cooperative (the Freezer Longline Conservation Cooperative or FLCC), 

they have not taken steps that would require NOAA Fisheries to write regulations. 

The voluntary cooperative has been fishing cooperatively since the B season of 
106

2010 (starting August 15th). This sector is included in this report because the 

members of the FLCC have ended their own race for fish and the sector operates 

similarly to how a catch share program would operate.

Data

As the Freezer Longliners began fishing under their voluntary cooperative in the B 

season of 2010, we have chosen to use a 3-year baseline and reference period of 

2007-2009. This does not allow for a strict comparison of immediate short run 

changes that occurred between the A and B seasons of 2010, but comparing the 

baseline with years 2011 and onward will provide useful estimates of the change in 

MFP growth before and after cooperative formation. 

Similar to other catcher/processor sectors in the Alaska Region, there was a change 

in the reporting of these vessels’ production between 2007 and 2008 from a weekly 

production report to a daily production report. Therefore, for one year in the 

baseline (2007), data on output quantities and prices include the total product 

weight (in metric tons) and total product revenues, respectively, from all species 

caught on weeks where some amount of any Pacific cod was produced. In addition, 

the 2007 estimate of total days the catcher/processors participated in the fishery 

was calculated differently from the 2008 – 2012 data. Specifically, we multiply the 

average number of days per week that these vessels processed Pacific cod from the 

period 2008-2009 (5.03) by the number of weeks they produced Pacific cod in 

2007. This difference results in lowering both output and labor values for the first 

year of the data transition (2008). Input quantity data include the number of crew 

days (harvesting and processing crew) in the fishery and an estimate for the 

amount of capital involved in the fishery. To create a daily labor price, we estimate 

an opportunity cost wage to value crew days using the mean construction laborer 

hourly wage in Anchorage multiplied by 8 hours. We use the self-reported vessel 

values for all vessels that participated in the Halibut IFQ program from the CFEC 

vessel license application to estimate the total quantity of capital involved in the 

fishery. We use this estimate to create an estimated annual value per foot for 
107

program participants. The total annual quantity of capital in the fishery is then 

calculated as the annual mean value per foot multiplied by each vessel’s length in 

that year, summed over all vessels that participated in the fishery in that year. We 

value the capital quantity (the capital price) at the rate for BAA grade bonds.

Fishery level aggregates for output value (net weight in pounds multiplied by 

reference period output prices) and input values, including labor (crew days

multiplied by reference period labor price) and capital (vessel value multiplied by 

reference period capital price), are included in Table 40.

Table 40. Outputs and Inputs in the Alaska Freezer Longline Fishery

Year Outputa CapitalaLabora Total Inputsa

Baseline 149,714,045 10,394,834 12,873,280 23,268,114

2010 141,582,863 9,613,803 12,347,963 21,961,766

2011 193,440,559 9,026,895 16,888,822 25,915,717

2012 224,280,697 9,014,469 19,613,356 28,627,825

a Data reported in 2010 constant dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator.

Pacific cod biomass data are taken from NMFS stock assessment for the 2013 

assessment year. The biomass estimate used in this study is the estimate of age 

3+ Eastern Bering Sea Pacific cod biomass. 

Productivity Estimates and Discussion

Using the data presented in Table 40, Lowe input and output indices were created 

and are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 41Error! Reference source not found. The 

biomass unadjusted MFP (hereafter unadjusted MFP) estimate in the third column is 

simply the Lowe output index divided by the Lowe input index, which represents the 

change in aggregate outputs divided by the change in aggregate inputs on an 

annual basis. Therefore, if the index goes above 1.00, it means that MFP growth is 

positive and the fishery is getting more output from a given level of inputs, but if 

the index is below 1.00, the opposite is true. As can be seen in Table 41, there 

have been increases in MFP for each year after the baseline year of 2007-2009,

which is by definition set equal to 1.00. The mean unadjusted MFP index for nonbaseline years is 1.13. 
108

It is possible that this increase in observed unadjusted MFP arose because we have 

not accounted for increases in the biomass of Pacific cod that may make the 

existing technology more productive. The biomass index is included in column 4 of 

Table 41 and represents the change in Pacific cod biomass relative to the baseline. 

Recall that the baseline period’s biomass is in the numerator of the biomass index, 

and therefore an increase in the biomass is represented by a number below 1.00, 

while an index value above 1.00 signifies a decrease in the Pacific cod biomass. 

This allows the biomass adjusted MFP (hereafter adjusted MFP) index, shown in the 

final column of Table 41, to be calculated as the product of the unadjusted MFP

index and the biomass index. Higher levels of biomass decrease the adjusted MFP

index because if there are more fish it is assumed that they are easier to catch and 

the adjusted MFP index is calculated to account for the impact of changes in 

biomass on fishery productivity. Pacific cod biomass has increased substantially 

over the study period (the biomass index average is 0.71), implying that the 

adjusted MFP index will be lower than the unadjusted MFP index. The biomass has 

increased so much relative to the baseline period that the estimated adjusted MFP

index is below 1.00 for all years after the baseline. While the unadjusted MFP

averages 1.13 for the non-baseline period, the adjusted MFP averages 0.79 for nonbaseline years. This implies that, after accounting for the increases in biomass, the 

Freezer Longliner vessels have seen a significant decline in productivity since 

cooperative formation. 

Table 41. Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity in the Alaska Freezer Longline Fishery

Year

Output 

Index Input Index

Biomass 

Unadjusted 

MFP

Biomass 

Index

Biomass 

Adjusted 

MFP

Year to Year 

MFP Change

Baseline 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

2010 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.88

2011 1.29 1.11 1.16 0.65 0.76 0.86

2012 1.50 1.23 1.22 0.61 0.74 0.98

The unadjusted MFP estimates for the fishery suggest a different trend in economic 

performance for the fishery than the adjusted MFP estimates. The relatively sizable 

increases in biomass relative to the baseline, according to the current model 
109

specification, require commensurate increases in catch for a given level of input use 

to keep MFP constant. The Pacific cod biomass hit a low in 2008 of 674,191 metric 

tons but has averaged 1.33 million metric tons for the period 1980-2012 and has 

only been below 1 million metric tons for the years 2006-2010 over that time. 

Therefore, observed increases at such a low threshold may not be uniformly 

distributed across the fishing grounds and one may not expect the same type of 

increase in productivity from an increase in biomass than would occur at higher 

biomass levels. Whether a given percent increase in biomass should generate the 

same increase in catch for given effort level is uncertain. However, this underlying 

construct is consistent with the treatment of the biomass adjustment, and it is 

consistent with assumptions used in a number of studies in the fisheries economics 

literature. The reader is cautioned to interpret the results carefully and recognize 

that the factor that drives inferences about the direction of change economic 

performance is the extent to which biomass increases should result in greater 

catchabilty. For now this can be identified as an area warranting further 

investigation. 
110

Discussion

With the exception of the Wreckfish IFQ and the Alaska CDQ programs, MFP was 

estimated for all U.S. catch share programs using a Lowe index with a fixed time 

period as the base. For some catch share fisheries, MFP was estimated for subcomponents of the fishery based on unique operational characteristics resulting in a 

total of 20 distinct estimates of productivity change. There is an expectation that

catch share programs will, among other things, lead to improved productivity 

through the ability to make better use of capital and other inputs, and through 

quota transfers from less efficient to more efficient vessels. Evaluating this 

expectation requires the time period selected for the base to include years before 

and after catch share program implementation, which is the case for 13 of the 20 

catch share fisheries included in this report. Several of the 13 programs have been 

operating for 10 or more years, while others have been more recently 

implemented. Therefore, productivity change was evaluated for the first three years 

(two years for both Shore-side Whiting and Non-Whiting IFQ programs) for all 13 

fisheries and was evaluated over the longer term for the six programs that were 

implemented in 2007 or earlier. With the exception of the Gulf of Mexico Red 

Snapper and Grouper/Tilefish IFQ programs, this evaluation was based on biomass 

adjusted MFP. MFP was above pre-catch share levels in each of the first three 

years in six fisheries and was above pre-catch share levels in each of the first two 

years for the Non-Whiting Shoreside IFQ program (Table 42). In the Whiting 

Shoreside IFQ, biomass was substantially above baseline levels in 2011 and 2012 

resulting in a two-year average MFP of 0.83, which is 17% lower than the baseline. 

In only the Bering Sea Freezer Longline fishery was MFP below baseline levels in all 

three years, although MFP was below the pre-catch share baseline in years two and 

three in the catcher/processor (CP) subcomponent of the Central GOA Rockfish 

program.

Over the longer term, MFP has remained above pre-catch share time period 

baseline in the Surfclam ITQ, the Catcher/Processor Sub-component of the AFA 

Pollock Cooperatives, and the Red Snapper IFQ program (Table 43). Furthermore, 
111

MFP was above pre-catch share time period baseline levels in the Ocean Quahog 

IFQ for 19 of 23 years and in 7 of 8 years for the BSAI Crab IFQ program. In the 

Catcher/Processor sub-component of the Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish program 

MFP was above the baseline for 3 years and below the baseline for 3 years. In all 

cases, average MFP after the first 3 years of program implementation was higher 

than average MFP during the first 3 years.

Table 42. Multi-Factor Productivity for First Three Years of Catch Share Program Implementation

Program Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

Three Year 

Average

Ocean Quahog ITQ 0.92 0.94 1.03 0.96

Surfclam ITQ 1.34 1.50 1.65 1.50

Atlantic Sea Scallops General Category IFQ 1.21 1.54 1.57 1.44

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ 1.56 1.79 1.75 1.70

Northeast Multispecies Sectors 1.24 1.26 0.97 1.16

GOM Red Snapper IFQa 1.04 1.15 1.16 1.12

GOM Grouper/Tilefish IFQa 1.11 1.30 1.35 1.25

Non-Whiting Shore Side IFQ 1.32 1.29 1.31

Whiting Shoreside IFQ 1.02 0.64 0.83

AFA Pollock CP 1.14 1.76 2.06 1.65

BSAI Crab IFQ 0.78 1.16 1.35 1.10

Central GOA Rockfish CP 1.39 0.89 0.69 0.99

Bering Sea Freezer Longliners 0.88 0.76 0.74 0.79

a Unadjusted MFP, MFP for all other programs are biomass adjusted.

Table 43. Multi-Factor Productivity for Catch Share Programs Implemented Prior to 2008.

Program

Start 

Year

Years 

MFP 

Above 

Baseline

Years 

MFP 

Below 

Baseline

Mean

MFP for 

First 3 

Years

Mean

MFP 

After 3 

Years

Ocean Quahog ITQ 1990 19 4 0.96 1.34

Surfclam ITQ 1990 23 0 1.50 2.19

GOM Red Snapper IFQa 2007 6 0 1.12 1.14

AFA Pollock CP 1999 14 0 1.66 2.99

BSAI Crab IFQ 2005 7 1 1.10 1.52

Central GOA Rockfish CP 2007 3 3 0.99 1.44

a Unadjusted MFP, MFP for all other programs are biomass adjusted.
112

The shorter and longer term inferences about productivity change in catch share 

fisheries need to be considered in context. Estimated productivity change under 

pre- and post-catch share conditions may be affected by differences in input data 

among programs, and in the case of the GOM Red Snapper and GOM Grouper 

Tilefish IFQ programs, the lack of available biomass data. The former may affect 

estimated productivity change particularly for inputs that are not used in fixed 

proportions, while omitting biomass data creates uncertainty over the “true” change 

in MFP. These considerations do not affect the current estimates of MFP as they are 

based on accepted methods and available data. Rather, addressing these 

considerations may affect future studies of productivity change in catch share 

fisheries. Potential avenues for further research are noted below.

Further Research

Effect on Multi-Factor Productivity of Additional Input Data

Although the KLEMS-Y approach was selected for this study, full implementation of 

the approach was not feasible in any catch share fishery because of a lack of data 

on services. This means that all estimates of MFP were based on partial 

implementation of the KLEMS-Y approach subject to available data where capital 

and labor were deemed to be minimally required. In 11 of the 20 assessments of 

MFP, available data were limited to capital and labor (KL-Y) while in four fisheries 

data on energy input was also available (KLE-Y) and there were five fisheries for 

which data on both energy and materials (KLEM-Y) were available (Table 44). This 

provides an opportunity to evaluate the marginal contribution of additional data to 

estimates of MFP so as to identify possible data collection needs to improve NOAA 

Fisheries capability to estimate MFP in the future. 
113

Table 44. Summary of Included Input Data by Program

Program KL-Y KLE-Y KLEM-Y

Ocean Quahog ITQ √

Surfclam ITQ √

Atlantic Sea Scallops IFQ √

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ √

Northeast Multispecies Sectors √

GOM Red Snapper IFQ √

GOM Grouper/Tilefish IFQ √

Sablefish Permit Stacking √

Non-Whiting Shore Side IFQ √

Whiting Shoreside IFQ √

Alaska Halibut IFQ √

Alaska Sablefish IFQ CV √

Alaska Sablefish IFQ CP √

AFA Pollock CV √

AFA Pollock CP √

BSAI Crab IFQ √

Amendment 80 Cooperatives √

Central GOA Rockfish Cooperative CV √

Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish CP √

Bering Sea Freezer Longliners √

Marginal changes in data availability were estimated by first calculating MFP for just 

KL-Y, then sequentially recalculating MFP by adding energy (E), then materials (M) 

and energy and materials, if available. Mean values for KL-Y, KLE-Y, KLM-Y and 

KLEM-Y MFP are reported in Table 45 and average values of the percent change in 

MFP relative to KL-Y are reported in Table 46. Adding energy to capital and labor 

resulted in large changes in MFP in only the Mid-Atlantic Tilefish IFQ (15.5%). By 

contrast, adding energy had little or no effect on estimated MFP in either the GOM 

Grouper/Tilefish or the Sablefish Permit Stacking catch programs. In all other 

programs the absolute value of MFP changed between two and five percent. For the 

five catch share fisheries where data on materials (M) were available, the effect of 

adding materials to capital and labor on the estimated MFP was less than 1.5% in 

absolute value in all but the Multispecies Sectors program. In the Multispecies 

Sector program adding only materials resulted in nearly a 15% increase in MFP as 

compared to estimated MFP with only capital and labor. This effect was moderated 
114

in the Multispecies sector program by adding both energy and materials such that 

KLEM-Y MFP differed from that of KL-Y MFP by only 3.7%. 

Table 45. Marginal Effect of Additional Input Data on Estimated Multi-Factor Productivity

Mean 

KL-Y

Mean 

KLE-Y

Mean 

KLM-Y

Mean 

KLEM-Y

GC Scallops IFQ 1.37 1.43 1.38 1.44

Multispecies Sectors 1.12 1.09 1.28 1.16

Mid-Atlantic Tilefish IFQ 1.48 1.70 1.50 1.70

GOM Red Snapper IFQa 1.09 1.14 1.08 1.13

GOM Grouper/Tilefish IFQa 1.26 1.27 1.24 1.25

Sablefish Permit Stacking 1.69 1.68

Non-Whiting Shoreside IFQ 1.27 1.31

Whiting Shoreside IFQ 0.85 0.83

Amendment 80 1.19 1.22

a Analyis based on unadjusted MFP, MFP for all other programs are biomass adjusted.

Table 46. Marginal Change in Multi-Factor Productivity of Adding Input Data Relative to KL-Y

Program

Mean Marginal 

Change in MFP of 

Adding Energy

Mean Marginal 

Change in MFP of 

Adding Materials

Mean Marginal 

Change in MFP 

of Adding 

Energy and 

Materials

GC Scallops IFQ 4.02% 0.49% 4.70%

Multispecies Sectors -2.08% 14.56% 3.72%

Mid-Atlantic Tilefish IFQ 15.53% 1.01% 15.19%

GOM Red Snapper IFQa 4.68% -0.96% 3.32%

GOM Grouper/Tilefish IFQa 0.84% -1.41% -0.58%

Sablefish Permit Stacking -0.08%

Non-Whiting Shoreside IFQ 2.91%

Whiting Shoreside IFQ -1.52%

Amendment 80 2.46%

a Analysis based on unadjusted MFP, MFP for all other programs are biomass adjusted.

Effect of the Biomass Index on Multi-Factor Productivity

Of the 20 fisheries included in this report updated biomass data were not available 

for many species caught under either the GOM Red Snapper or the GOM 

Grouper/Tilefish catch share programs. Even for programs where biomass data 
115

were available, the timing of assessment updates vary which means that the ability 

to replicate estimates of biomass adjusted MFP in the future will depend on the 

reliability of biomass data. This may be particularly important in multispecies catch 

share programs and in catch share fisheries where a substantial part of decision 

making is influenced by jointly-caught species that may not be included in the catch 

share program. For this reason, we evaluate the performance of biomass 

unadjusted as compared to biomass adjusted MFP.

Changes in MFP in catch share programs may be expected as fishery participants 

alter the timing and mix of outputs as well as changing input use. These effects 

may be confounded by changes in biomass which is accounted for by the biomass 

index. However, unlike the Lowe input and output indices which rely on routine 

annual data collection programs, the biomass index is based on either fishery 

independent survey data or estimates of absolute biomass from stock assessments. 

Fishery independent surveys may not be conducted annually and may more reliably 

sample some species than others. Similarly, some stock assessments may routinely 

be updated while others are not. Projected biomass estimates may be obtained 

from a recent stock assessment, but the “age” of the stock assessment and the 

reliability of projected biomass need to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, 

assembling the biomass data was laborious. Wherever possible, the NMFS Species 

Information System (SIS) was used to obtain biomass data, but some species were 

not included in the SIS. Also, the SIS only includes biomass data as of the most 

recent stock assessment and does not include projected biomass. This meant that 

assessment reports for a substantial number of stocks needed to be tracked down 

to obtain projected biomass data to match the time period over which MFP was 

estimated. The importance of the biomass index may be evaluated by comparing 

the biomass unadjusted MFP to the adjusted MFP in terms of consistency relative to 

the baseline and magnitude. The former was evaluated by whether or not both 

unadjusted and adjusted MFP were simultaneously either above or below the 

baseline. The latter was measured as the percent difference between the adjusted 

and unadjusted MFP. 
116

With the exception of the Bering Sea Freezer Longline program the unadjusted and 

biomass adjusted MFP are consistent indicators of productivity change relative to 

the baseline (Table 47). In the majority of catch share programs both unadjusted 

and adjusted MFP were simultaneously either above or below the baseline in all 

comparison years. In the Ocean Quahog ITQ and Surfclam ITQ programs 

unadjusted and adjusted MFP was consistent in 18 of 23 years and in 19 of 23 

years respectively. Similarly, unadjusted and adjusted MFP was consistent in 16 of 

17 years in the Catcher/Processor sub-component of the Alaska Sablefish IFQ 

program.

Table 47. Effect of the Biomass Index on the Direction of Change and Magnitude of Estimated MultiFactor Productivity

Program

Comparison

Years

Consistent 

Relative to 

Baseline 

Percent 

Consistent

Average

Biomass

Index

Ocean Quahog ITQ 23 18 78.3% 1.19

Surfclam ITQ 23 19 82.6% 1.72

Atlantic Sea Scallop GC IFQ 3 3 100.0% 0.96

Northeast Multispecies Sectors 3 3 100.0% 1.13

Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish 3 3 100.0% 0.88

Sablefish Permit Stacking 5 4 80.0% 1.22

Shore Side Non-Whiting IFQ 2 2 100.0% 1.06

Shore Side Whiting IFQ 2 1 50.0% 0.59

AK Halibut IFQ 4 2 50.0% 1.23

AK Sablefish IFQ CV 5 5 100.0% 1.08

AK Sablefish IFQ CPs 17 16 94.0% 1.03

AFA Pollock CV 5 4 80.0% 0.96

AFA Pollock CP 14 14 100.0% 1.30

BSAI Crab IFQ 8 8 100.0% 0.97

Amendment 80 4 4 100.0% 1.07

Central GOA Rockfish CV 5 5 100.0% 1.00

Central GOA Rockfish CP 6 6 100.0% 1.00

Bering Sea Freezer Longliner 3 0 0.0% 0.71

While adjusted and unadjusted MFP gave consistent indicators of the direction of 

productivity change relative to baseline conditions, the differences between the two 

were related to the biomass index. That is, the biomass index acts as a “shifter” of 

unadjusted MFP change. When the biomass index was greater than 1.00 (biomass 
117

was declining), the adjusted productivity change was higher than the unadjusted 

change and the opposite occurred when the biomass was increasing (i.e. the 

biomass index was less than 1.00). The difference between adjusted and 

unadjusted MFP increases with the magnitude of the direction of change in the 

biomass index. This reflects the underlying concept that biomass change acts as a 

“shifter” of productivity change. For the most part, the trend was similar between 

unadjusted and adjusted MFP; it is just the magnitude of change that is uncertain 

when biomass is omitted. However, as is illustrated for the Bering Sea Freezer 

Longliner program, a large change in biomass can result in a false impression of 

productivity change.

Conclusions

This report provides the first comprehensive estimate of productivity change in U.S.

catch share fisheries. In all, annual MFP was estimated for a total of 20 catch share 

programs or sub-components of catch share programs using a base period Lowe 

index. Of the 20 programs, 13 included pre-catch share baseline conditions. In all 

but three of these 13 cases, MFP improved or was improving during the first three 

years after program implementation. In the three instances where MFP had 

declined relative to the baseline during the first three years, the common 

denominator was a substantial increase in biomass resulting in changes in 

catchability that offset any changes that may have been made in the ratio of 

outputs to inputs used to harvest fish. For programs that have been in existence at 

least since 2007, productivity gains during the first three years were positive, and 

more often than not, MFP continued to improve after the first three years of 

program implementation. 

The KLEMS-Y approach was selected as the most complete measure of MFP while 

recognizing that data would not be available to support full implementation. In 

about half of the fisheries evaluated in this report MFP estimates were based only 

on capital and labor. Evaluation of the potential contribution of having additional 

data on energy and materials showed that in four of the five fisheries where these 
118

inputs were included the contribution of energy to MFP exceeded that of materials. 

This suggests that new data collection or new methods to estimate fuel use may be 

a priority in improving estimation of MFP in future studies. Additional research on 

materials used particularly for catch share fisheries where bait is an important 

input, and services purchased by fishing vessels would also aid in refining future 

MFP estimates.

The biomass index plays an important role in characterizing changes in MFP. 

However, obtaining biomass data was a time consuming process, and in some 

cases, required a stock-by-stock evaluation of the reliability of the biomass 

information that was available. In most instances, biomass adjusted and biomass 

unadjusted measures of MFP were consistent in terms of productivity trends, 

although, unadjusted MFP underestimates s productivity change when biomass is 

declining (biomass index above 1.0) and overestimates productivity change when 

biomass is increasing (biomass index below 1.0). The magnitude of the difference 

between unadjusted and adjusted MFP increases with the magnitude of the biomass 

trend. If the biomass trend is sufficiently large, then biomass unadjusted MFP may 

provide a false impression of change in MFP. This means that obtaining reliable 

biomass data will be important in any future updates to MFP in catch share fisheries 

conducted by NMFS.
119

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123

Appendix A: Default Data for Input Prices

Table A 1 Default data for fuel price, wages, capital services, and GDP deflator

Year

No 2 Diesel Retail 

Sales by Refiners 

($ per gallon)a

Hourly Wages of 

Production 

Employeesb

Moodys BAA 

Ratec

GDP Price 

Deflator 2009 

= 100d

GDP Price 

Deflator 2010 

= 100

1984 $0.82 $8.49 14.19 55.57 54.90

1985 $0.79 $8.74 12.72 57.35 56.66

1986 $0.48 $8.93 10.39 58.51 57.81

1987 $0.55 $9.14 10.58 59.94 59.22

1988 $0.50 $9.44 10.83 62.04 61.30

1989 $0.59 $9.80 10.18 64.46 63.68

1990 $0.73 $10.20 10.36 66.85 66.05

1991 $0.65 $10.51 9.80 69.06 68.23

1992 $0.62 $10.77 8.98 70.64 69.79

1993 $0.60 $11.05 7.93 72.32 71.45

1994 $0.55 $11.34 8.62 73.86 72.97

1995 $0.56 $11.66 8.20 75.40 74.50

1996 $0.68 $12.04 8.05 76.78 75.85

1997 $0.64 $12.51 7.86 78.10 77.16

1998 $0.49 $13.01 7.22 78.94 78.00

1999 $0.58 $13.49 7.87 80.07 79.11

2000 $0.94 $14.02 8.36 81.89 80.91

2001 $0.84 $14.55 7.95 83.77 82.76

2002 $0.76 $14.97 7.80 85.06 84.03

2003 $0.94 $15.38 6.77 86.75 85.71

2004 $1.24 $15.69 6.39 89.13 88.06

2005 $1.79 $16.13 6.06 91.99 90.88

2006 $2.10 $16.76 6.48 94.82 93.68

2007 $2.27 $17.43 6.48 97.34 96.17

2008 $3.15 $18.09 7.45 99.21 98.02

2009 $1.83 $18.63 7.30 100.00 98.80

2010 $2.31 $19.07 6.04 101.22 100.00

2011 $3.12 $19.46 5.66 103.20 101.96

2012 $3.20 $19.77 4.94 105.01 103.75

a Energy Information Administration http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_refoth_dcu_nus_a.htm

b Bureau of Labor Statistics http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet

c Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?s[1][id]=BAA

d Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm
124

Appendix B: Biomass Estimates and Sources

Table B 1 Exploitable Biomass in 1,000 MT Meat Weight for 

Surfclams and Ocean Quahogs

Year Surfclama Ocean Quahogb

1987 1974 2101

1988 1967 2103

1989 1956 2106

1990 1880 2107

1991 1789 2110

1992 1756 2112

1993 1696 2073

1994 1634 2034

1995 1608 1996

1996 1539 1957

1997 1490 1919

1998 1511 1882

1999 1488 1846

2000 1399 1810

2001 1294 1777

2002 1207 1742

2003 1128 1705

2004 1104 1668

2005 1079 1632

2006 1013 1600

2007 912 1567

2008 827 1534

2009 750 1500

2010 706 1466

2011 703 1431

2012 700 1404

a Source Table A25 of 

http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1310/atext.pdf

b Source Table A13 of 

http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1317/crd1317.pdf

2012 data NEFSC personal communication
125

Table B 2 Biomass Estimates in Metric Tons for Stocks Included in the Northeast Multispecies Sector 

Biomass Index

Year

Species/Stocka 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

American Plaice 12,271 15,963 16,919 10,805 11,631 12,171

GOM Cod 8,725 10,282 11,457 11,141 9,903 8,995

GB Cod 10,970 11,520 14,725 17,168 13,216 18,184

GOM Haddock 6,796 4,481 3,864 2,868 2,127 1,711

GB Haddock 252,065 238,744 210,557 167,279 148,422 177,136

Acadian Redfish 241,090 264,670 289,090 314,780 318,300 344,665

White Hake 14,205 15,888 16,017 21,106 26,877 28,886

GB Winter Flounder 6,229 6,457 7,917 9,703 11,864 14,168

SNE/MA Winter Flounder 6,221 5,850 5,729 7,076 9,268 9,903

Witch Flounder 2,710 3,194 3,900 4,099 5,175 5,767

GOM/CC Yellowtail Flounder 824 1,067 1,523 1,680 2,844 2,922

GB Yellowtail Flounder 2,734 3,234 3,227 3,004 2,988 2,593

SNE/MA Yellowtail 1,920 2,336 2,648 3,319 3,873 3,908

Pollock 224,000 227,000 196,000 194,339 168,273 151,248

GOM/NGB Monkfish 51,410 58,230 66,060 74,102 81,907 81,204

SGB/MA Monkfish 129,200 131,090 131,220 131,344 132,243 126,295

a All stocks except monkfish reported as spawning stock biomass, monkfish reported as exploitable 

biomass.
126

Table B 3 Assessment Year and Source Documents for Stocks Included in Northeast Multispecies Sector Biomass Index

Species/Stock

Assessed 

Year Sourcea URL

American Plaice 2010 Table E.12 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1206/americanplaice.pdf

GOM Cod 2012 Table A.85 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1311/texta.pdf

GB Cod 2012 Table B.23 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1311/textb.pdf

GOM Haddock 2012 Table C.31 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1206/gomhaddock.pdf

GB Haddock 2012 Table B.16 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1206/gbhaddock.pdf

Acadian Redfish 2012 Table G8 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1206/Acadian.pdf

White Hake 2013 Table B72 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1310/btext.pdf

GB Winter Flounder 2010 Table B27 http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/saw/saw52/crd1117.pdf

SNE/MA Winter Flounder 2010 Table A.38 http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/saw/saw52/crd1117.pdf

Witch Flounder 2012 Table F.15 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1206/witchflounder.pdf

GOM/CCC Yellowtail Flounder 2012 Table D.30 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1206/cc.gom.yellow.pdf

GB Yellowtail NEFSC Personal Communication

SNE/MA Yellowtail 2012 Table B.53 http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1218/btext.pdf

Pollock 2010 Table C8 http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1017/pdfs/ctables.pdf

GOM/NGB Monkfish 2010 Table A.35 http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1017/pdfs/atables.pdf

SGB/MA Monkfish 2010 Table A.35 http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1017/pdfs/atables.pdf

a Biomass for years not included in each source table were updated via personal communication with NEFSC assessment scientists.
127

Table B 4 Spawning Stock Biomass for Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish and 

Atlantic Sea Scallops

Year

Golden Tilefish Spawning

Stock Biomass (MT)a

Atlantic Sea Scallop 

Spawning Stock Biomass 

(MT Meat Weight)b

2006 4378

2007 4240 114164

2008 4241 116390

2009 4489 121626

2010 4540 123024

2011 4989 120509

2012 5229 121689

a Source: Table B.6 http://nefsc.noaa.gov/publications/crd/crd1404/textb.pdf

b Source: NEFSC Personal Communication
128

Table B 5. Biomass Data in Metric Tons for Species Included in the Biomass Index for Shoreside 

Whiting and Non-Whiting IFQ

Species 2009 2010 2011 2012

Arrowtooth flounder 65625 59139 52993 47804

Aurora rockfish 4237 4240 4275 4326

Blackgill rockfish 6499 6556 6595 6519

Bocaccio rockfish 11334 12184 13920 16561

Canary rockfish 15258 15706 16124 16743

Chilipepper rockfish 32995 30011 27957 26715

Darkblotched rockfish 13212 13979 14736 15692

Dover sole 708295 695649 684685 670394

English sole 56494 42894 35259 31137

Greenspotted rockfish 3015 3110 3208 3308

Greenstriped rockfish 29248 29876 30421 30808

Lingcod 62638 62878 62454 62370

Longspine thornyhead 150302 147020 143964 141150

Pacific sanddab 12130 13069 13244 13479

Petrale sole 8921 9718 12245 15015

Rougheye rockfish 8365 8406 8441 8494

Sablefish 222936 211793 205662 194356

Shortspine thornyhead 140803 139267 137795 136374

Starry flounder 8945 9309 9536 9701

Widow rockfish 67404 67937 68238 67696

Yelloweye rockfish 2263 2308 2351 2388

Pacific Whiting 1221820 1772740 2236730 2903650
129

Table B 6. Sources of Biomass Data for Species Included in the Shoreside Whiting and Non-Whiting IFQ Biomass Index

Species

Assessed 

Date Source Assessment Document

Arrowtooth 

flounder 2007 Table 11 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/ArrowtoothAssess_Aug22.pdf

Aurora 

rockfish 2013 Table 13 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/G3a_ATT1_FULL_AURORA_ASSMNT_2013_postSTAR_SEPT2013BB.pdf

Blackgill 

rockfish 2011 Table 20 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Blackgill_2011_Assessment.pdf

Bocaccio 

rockfish 2013 Table 12 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/F5a_ATT8_BOCACCIO_UPDATE_2013_ELECTRIC_JUN2013BB.pdf

Canary 

rockfish 2011 Table 13 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Canary_2011_Assessment_Update.pdf

Chilipepper 

rockfish Jason Cope Personal Communication

Darkblotched 

rockfish 2013 Table 13 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/F5a_ATT4_DARKBLOTCHED_ASSMT_2013_ELECTRIC_JUN2013BB.pdf

Dover sole 2011 Table 23 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/DoverSole_2011_DRAFT_Assessment.pdf

English sole 2007 Table 12 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2007_English_sole_update_council.pdf

Greenspotted 

rockfish 2011 Table 45 & Table 50 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Greenspotted_Rockfish_2011_Assessment.pdf

Greenstriped 

rockfish 2009 Table 40 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/GreenstripedSAFE.pdf

Lingcod 2009 Jason Cope Personal Communication

Longspine 

thornyhead 2005 Table 22 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/LST_08_30_05.pdf

Pacific 

sanddab 2013

Table 21 http://www.pcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/G3a_ATT11_FULL_DRAFT_SANDDAB_ASSMNT_2013_postSTAR_SEPT2013BB.pdf

Petrale sole 2012

Table 17

http://www.cio.noaa.gov/services_programs/prplans/pdfs/ID_228_STOCK_ASSESSMENT_PETRALE_SOLE_2013_JUN2013.pdf

Rougheye 

rockfish 2013

Table 21 http://www.pcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/G3a_ATT3_FULL_ROUGHEYE_BLCKSPOT_ASSMNT_2013_postSTAR_SEPT2013BB.pdf

Sablefish 2011 Table 15 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Sablefish_2011_Assessment.pdf

Shortspine 

thornyhead 2013 Table 11 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Shortspine_2013_Assessment.pdf

Starry 

flounder 2005 Table 13 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Starry05-final.pdf

Widow 

rockfish 2011 Table 14 http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Widow_2011_Assessment.pdf

Yelloweye 

rockfish 2011 NMFS SIS http://www.pcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/Yelloweye_2011_Assessment_Update.pdf

Pacific 

Whiting 2014 Allen Hicks Personal Communication
130

Table B 7. Biomass Data for Pacific Coast 

Sablefish

Year Biomassa

2003 290,492

2004 285,256

2005 276,343

2006 263,494

2007 248,481

2008 233,025

2009 222,936

2010 211,793

a Source: http://www.pcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sablefish_2011_Assessment.pdf
131

Table B 8 Biomass Data in Pounds for Alaska Halibut

Year Exploitable 

Biomassa,b 

2008 192,240,000 

2009 172,190,000 

2010 159,620,000 

2011 146,970,000 

2012 150,600,000 

a Halibut biomass in pounds for areas managed under the 

Alaska Halibut IFQ Program (2C, 3A, 3B, 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D, 

and 4E) 

b Source: Coastwide totals from 

http://www.iphc.int/publications/rara/2012/rara2012093

_assessment.pdf, exploitable biomass by area are from 

personal communication with Ian Stewart at the IPHC for 

the 2012 assessment year
132

Table B 9 Biomass Data in Metric Tons for 

Eastern Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands Sablefish

Year Biomassa

1995 269,572 

1996 251,551 

1997 246,865 

1998 232,678 

1999 244,127 

2000 253,001 

2001 255,316 

2002 285,778 

2003 292,171 

2004 296,208 

2005 288,797 

2006 283,056 

2007 274,853 

2008 266,571 

2009 258,034 

2010 258,263 

2011 249,897 

2012 244,265 

a Source: NMFS SIS database for the 2012 

assessment year
133

Table B 10 Biomass Data in Metric Tons for Eastern Bering 

Sea and Aleutian Islands Pollock

Year Biomassa,b

1994 11,708,110 

1995 13,403,800 

1996 11,461,600 

1997 10,030,480 

1998 10,111,160 

1999 10,975,900 

2000 10,200,310 

2001 9,991,590 

2002 10,409,380 

2003 12,463,970 

2004 11,691,830 

2005 9,809,320 

2006 7,546,290 

2007 6,148,930 

2008 4,926,620 

2009 6,285,360 

2010 5,992,530 

2011 8,009,420 

2012 8,102,240 

a

Source: Eastern Bering Sea: 

http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2012/EBSpollock.pdf

b

Source: Aleutian Islands: 

http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2012/AIpollock.pdf
134

Table B 11 Biomass Data in Metric Tons of Mature Males for BSAI Crab Rationalization Program 

Species

Year

Bristol Bay 

Red King Craba

Pribilof 

Islands Blue 

King Craba

St. Matthew 

Island Blue 

King Craba

Bering Sea 

Snow Craba

Bering Sea 

Tanner Crabb

1998 27,114 2,453 6,828 390,400 10,560 

2001 30,340 1,454 2,297 179,400 18,200 

2004 28,182 97 1,227 183,000 25,560 

2005 29,477 313 1,276 177,100 43,990 

2006 32,377 137 2,946 186,200 66,890 

2007 30,097 254 4,153 226,200 72,630 

2008 28,809 42 3,336 265,000 59,700 

2009 30,468 452 4,622 279,600 37,600 

2010 29,346 322 8,141 266,200 36,140 

2011 30,875 461 9,516 246,300 46,300 

2012 26,319 644 5,652 233,000 43,150 

a Source: http://www.npfmc.org/wpcontent/PDFdocuments/resources/SAFE/ScallopSAFE/ScallopSAFE2012.pdf

b Source: 

http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/npfmc/PDFdocuments/resources/SAFE/CrabSAFE/CrabSAFE2013.pdf
135

Table B 12 Biomass Data in Metric Tons for Amendment 80 Program Species

Year

BSAI Atka 

Mackerela

BSAI 

Pacific 

Ocean 

Perchb

BSAI 

Flathead 

Solec

BSAI Rock 

Soled

EBS Pacific 

Code

BSAI 

Yellowfin 

Solef

2008

 

518,674 

 

722,295 

 

796,712 

 

1,738,660 

 

674,191 

 

688,110 

2009

 

474,208 

 

710,471 

 

779,516 

 

1,688,750 

 

780,237 

 

648,594 

2010

 

406,848 

 

702,831 

 

759,754 

 

1,634,890 

 

847,845 

 

623,607 

2011

 

335,863 

 

692,564 

 

735,405 

 

1,650,160 

 

1,146,670 

 

601,560 

2012

 

297,682 

 

676,409 

 

726,859 

 

1,626,770 

 

1,169,120 

 

581,630 

a Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2013/BSAIatka.pdf

b Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/docs/2012/BSAIpop.pdf

c Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2012/BSAIflathead.pdf

d Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/docs/2012/BSAIrocksole.pdf

e Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2013/ebspcod.pdf

f Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2013/BSAIyfin.pdf
136

Table B 13 Biomass Data in Metric Tons for Rockfish Program Species

Year

GOA Pacific 

Coda

GOA Pacific 

Ocean Perchb

All Alaska 

Sablefishc

GOA 

Northern 

Rockfishd

GOA Dusky 

Rockfishe

GOA 

Rougheye 

Rockfishf

GOA 

Shortraker 

Rockfishg

GOA 

Thornyhead 

Rockfishh

2004

 

87,923 

 

339,591 

 

296,208 

 

160,287 

 

93,041 

 

40 42,296 98,158 

2005

 

87,611 

 

348,326 

 

288,797 

 

155,403 

 

94,683 

 

41 42,568 94,740 

2006

 

83,399 

 

355,002 

 

283,056 

 

150,111 

 

95,290 

 

42 38,847 89,758 

2007

 

79,240 

 

357,190 

 

274,853 

 

143,617 

 

94,664 

 

42 35,125 84,775 

2008

 

73,601 

 

367,486 

 

266,571 

 

137,022 

 

92,368 

 

42 39,655 81,785 

2009

 

73,230 

 

378,730 

 

258,034 

 

130,113 

 

88,975 

 

43 44,185 78,795 

2010

 

81,752 

 

389,669 

 

258,263 

 

123,314 

 

85,484 

 

43 54,510 70,988 

2011

 

95,863 

 

396,949 

 

249,897 

 

116,783 

 

81,544 

 

43 64,835 63,180 

2012

 

116,606 

 

403,230 

 

244,265 

 

111,153 

 

77,897 

 

43 48,048 73,990 

a Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2013/GOApcod.pdf

b Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/docs/2013/GOApop.pdf

c Source: NMFS SIS database for the 2012 assessment year

d Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/docs/2013/GOAnorthern.pdf

e Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/docs/2013/GOAdusky.pdf

f Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/docs/2011/GOArougheye.pdf

g Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/docs/2011/GOAshortraker.pdf

h Source: http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/docs/2011/GOAthorny.pdf
137

Table B 14 Biomass Data in Metric Tons for Bering Sea 

and Aleutian Islands Pacific Cod

Year

BSAI 

Pacific 

Coda

2007 819,008 

2008 752,091 

2009 887,286 

2010 980,157 

2011 1,313,520 

2012 1,408,210 

a Source: 

http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/Docs/2012/BSAIpcod.pdf