United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Argued August 4, 2020 

Decided August 17, 2020 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge 

No. 19-2680 

UNITED STATES, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

KIMBERLY HARRISON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 3:18CR00105-001 

James D. Peterson, 

Chief Judge. 

 

O R D E R 

Kimberly Harrison pleaded guilty to aiding in the preparation of false tax forms. 

The district court sentenced her to 21 months’ imprisonment, but it deferred ruling on 

the amount of restitution that she owed the government. After Harrison appealed, the 

court entered a separate order quantifying the restitution. Harrison now argues that the 

restitution order is void because her notice of appeal divested the court of jurisdiction to 

enter it. But a district court retains jurisdiction to order restitution even after a 

defendant appeals a sentence of incarceration, and a defendant must file a second notice 

of appeal to challenge a deferred restitution order. Because Harrison did not file a 

second notice of appeal, we dismiss her appeal of the restitution order. And because she 

does not provide any reason for reversing her conviction or any other aspects of her 

sentence, we affirm the district court’s initial judgment. 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-2680 Page 2 

I. 

Harrison ran a business as an unauthorized preparer of income tax returns. To 

help her clients receive larger tax refunds, she included false statements on their returns 

(e.g., that her clients were paying college tuition or were self-employed) and claimed 

tax credits for which they did not qualify. The Internal Revenue Service eventually 

discovered the scheme, and a grand jury indicted Harrison on 29 counts of aiding or 

assisting in the preparation of false tax forms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). 

Harrison agreed to plead guilty to one count in return for the government dismissing 

the others. 

As part of her plea agreement, Harrison also agreed to pay restitution for “all 

losses relating” to her illegal tax-preparation business, not just the losses associated 

with the count of conviction. The probation office prepared a presentence investigation 

report and calculated that Harrison’s business cost the government more than $580,000 

in lost revenue. Harrison objected, arguing that the government could verify only the 

losses associated with the 29 tax forms for which she had been charged (roughly 

$130,000), and that any losses caused by her work for other clients were speculative. 

The district court held a sentencing hearing on August 14, 2019. After calculating 

the Sentencing Guidelines range, hearing both parties’ arguments, and considering the 

factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Harrison to 21 months of 

imprisonment and 1 year of supervised release. But because the parties could not agree 

on the restitution amount, the court deferred ruling on the amount of restitution so that 

the parties could continue to negotiate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (allowing district court 

to postpone determination of restitution up to 90 days after sentencing). The court 

entered a final judgment of conviction that set forth the prison sentence, the terms and 

conditions of supervised release, the special assessment, and the waiver of a fine. In the 

section of the judgment for “criminal monetary penalties,” the court listed the amount 

of restitution for the count of conviction and the total amount as “[t]o be determined.” 

Harrison timely appealed the judgment and, to avoid duplicative briefing, 

moved in this court to stay the appeal until the district court made a final determination 

on the amount of restitution. Harrison cited Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266 

(2017), for the procedure to apply when a district court sentences a defendant but defers 

judgment on restitution. (Manrique requires a defendant to file separate notices of 

appeal from each order.) We granted the motion and suspended briefing. 
No. 19-2680 Page 3 

In the meantime, the parties conferred and stipulated that Harrison owed 

$ 176,207 in restitution. In December 2019, the district court accepted the stipulation and 

issued an order awarding that amount. 

Rather than file a second notice of appeal, Harrison filed a status update in this 

court, explaining that the parties had reached an agreement on restitution and that 

Harrison would challenge only the original judgment. Harrison’s lawyer later moved to 

withdraw, explaining that Harrison wanted “a fresh pair of eyes” to look at the case. 

We appointed new counsel, who briefed the appeal. 

II. 

On appeal, Harrison argues only that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 

order restitution after she filed a notice of appeal. She does not challenge any other 

aspect of her conviction or sentence, except for a general argument—tacked on to the 

end of her reply brief and without any citation to authority—that we should grant 

plenary resentencing on remand. To support her argument that the restitution order is 

void, Harrison relies on the general rule that only one court at a time can have 

jurisdiction over a case, and that filing a notice of appeal divests a district court of 

jurisdiction. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). Because 

she had already appealed the judgment, Harrison says, the district court lacked 

jurisdiction to order restitution. 

As the government correctly points out, however, Harrison’s argument is 

foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 

(2010), and Manrique, 137 S. Ct. 1266. In Dolan, 560 U.S. at 611, the Court held that 

district courts retain jurisdiction to award restitution after sentencing, even if (like the 

district court in this case) they do so beyond the 90-day deadline set by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3664(d)(5). There, the Court rejected the defendant’s argument that allowing delayed 

restitution orders would hinder defendants’ ability to promptly appeal their 

convictions, citing several cases in which defendants appealed their convictions while 

final orders of restitution were outstanding and then filed a second appeal from the 

restitution order. Dolan, 560 U.S. at 616–18. The Court did not decide in Dolan whether 

this two-appeal procedure was proper or whether an initial judgment is final 

irrespective of any delay in determining the restitution amount. Id. at 618. But it 

highlighted “strong arguments” supporting the idea that both an initial judgment and a 

deferred restitution order are separately appealable: 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) states that any 

judgment including a sentence of imprisonment is a “final order,” and 18 U.S.C. 
No. 19-2680 Page 4 

§ 3664(o) says the same about any “sentence that imposes an order of restitution.” 

Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618. 

In Manrique, the Court formally adopted this reasoning from Dolan and held that 

deferred-restitution cases involve two separate appealable judgments. 137 S. Ct. 

at 1271–73. As in this case, the district court in Manrique entered a final judgment while 

deferring a ruling on the amount of restitution, and the defendant filed his notice of 

appeal before the court awarded restitution. Id. at 1270. Because the defendant did not 

file a second notice of appeal from the judgment imposing restitution, the Supreme 

Court concluded that he could not challenge it. Id. at 1271–72. The requirement to file a 

second notice of appeal was at least a mandatory claim-processing rule, the Court 

explained, which had to be enforced when the government asserted it. Id.

Under Dolan and Manrique, Harrison’s notice of appeal did not divest the district 

court of jurisdiction to award restitution.1 Instead, it was merely the first step of a 

three-step process in which Harrison should have (1) appealed the judgment (which 

was final even though the amount of restitution was yet to be quantified, see Manrique, 

137 S. Ct. at 1272–73); (2) filed a second notice of appeal from the final restitution order, 

once entered; and then (3) asked us to consolidate the two appeals. See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 

618 (collecting cases that followed this procedure). Harrison’s prior counsel recognized 

this process when he cited Manrique in his request to stay briefing. But rather than file a 

second notice of appeal, he notified us that Harrison decided not to appeal the 

restitution order. 

Notwithstanding prior counsel’s representations, Harrison failed to acknowledge 

either Dolan or Manrique in her opening brief. In her reply brief, she objects to their 

application, but her arguments are meritless. She maintains that Dolan is based on faulty 

reasoning and contends that restitution orders should not be an exception to the general 

rule that a district court loses jurisdiction upon appeal. But adopting Harrison’s 

argument would require us to overrule Supreme Court precedent, something that we 

lack the power to do. See Foreman v. Wadsworth, 844 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Manrique “squarely controls” when a district court enters an initial judgment that 

1 Although not cited by the parties, at least two other circuits have also relied on 

Dolan to state in dicta that a notice of appeal does not divest a district court of 

jurisdiction to quantify a deferred order of restitution. See United States v. Muzio, 757 

F.3d 1243, 1254 n.13 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618); United States v. 

Tulsiram, 815 F.3d 114, 117 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Muzio, 757 F.3d at 1254). 
No. 19-2680 Page 5 

resolves all other sentencing issues but reserves judgment on the amount of restitution. 

United States v. Collins, 949 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir. 2020). 

Also in her reply brief, Harrison challenges the restitution order on grounds 

other than a lack of jurisdiction: She says that the probation office failed to make a 

“complete accounting” of the restitution as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), that the 

district court deferred the restitution order without a requisite finding under 

§ 3664(d)(5) that the losses were “not ascertainable,” and that the district court ordered 

restitution outside of Harrison’s physical presence in violation of Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3). But Harrison waived any challenge to the restitution 

amount when she stipulated to it, and she waived any procedural objections when she 

failed to raise them in her opening brief, see Wonsey v. City of Chicago, 940 F.3d 394, 398 

(7th Cir. 2019), and when her prior counsel affirmatively disavowed any challenge to 

restitution. 

Waiver aside, Harrison cannot challenge the restitution order because she did 

not file a second notice of appeal. See Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1274; Collins, 949 F.3d at 

1055. Harrison acknowledges this problem but argues that we should overlook it 

because, unlike the defendant in Manrique, she missed the restitution hearing because of 

illness and may not have known to file a second notice of appeal. But Harrison’s thenlawyer knew the rule, and he represented to us (and opposing counsel) that Harrison 

decided not to appeal the restitution order after it was entered. Nothing in the record 

suggests that her illness or absence at the hearing were related to that decision. In any 

case, a court of appeals may, in its discretion, overlook defects in a notice of appeal other

than the failure to file it in time. But it surely “may not overlook the failure to file a 

notice of appeal at all.” Manrique, 137 S. Ct. at 1274. 

* * * 

We AFFIRM the district court’s initial entry of judgment because Harrison 

provides no reason for reversing it, and we DISMISS Harrison’s appeal of the restitution 

order.