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ODNI STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES

CALENDAR

YEAR

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Statistical Transparency Report

Regarding the Use of National Security Authorities

Calendar Year 2018

Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency

April 2019

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2018INTRODUCTION FIGURES FISA PROBABLE CAUSE AUTHORITIES

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Table of Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 4

A. Background ..................................................................................................................................................................4

B. Areas Covered in this Report......................................................................................................................................4

C. Context and Clarity.....................................................................................................................................................5

D. Key Terms.....................................................................................................................................................................6

FISA Probable Cause Authorities ............................................................................................... 8

A. FISA Titles I and III....................................................................................................................................................8

B. FISA Title VII, Sections 703 and 704.......................................................................................................................8

C. Statistics........................................................................................................................................................................8

FISA Section 702.........................................................................................................................10

A. Section 702 .................................................................................................................................................................10

B. Statistics—Orders and Targets................................................................................................................................12

C. Statistics—U.S. Person Queries...............................................................................................................................13

D. Section 702 and FBI Investigations.........................................................................................................................16

E. NSA Dissemination of U.S. Person Information under FISA Section 702.........................................................17

FISA Criminal Use and Notice Provisions................................................................................22

A. FISA Sections 106 and 305 .....................................................................................................................................22

FISA Title IV—Use of Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) Devices...........................23

A. FISA PR/TT Authority.............................................................................................................................................23

B. Statistics ......................................................................................................................................................................23

FISA Title V—Business Records...............................................................................................25

A. Business Records FISA..............................................................................................................................................25

B. Statistics—Title V “Traditional” Business Records Statistics Orders, Targets & Identifiers ..........................26

C. Statistics—Call Detail Record (CDR) Orders, Targets & Identifiers.................................................................27

D. Statistics—Call Detail Record Queries ..................................................................................................................31

National Security Letters (NSLs)...............................................................................................32

A. National Security Letters .........................................................................................................................................32

B. Statistics—National Security Letters and Requests for Information..................................................................32

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Table of Figures

Figures 1a and 1b: FISA “Probable Cause” Court Orders and Targets ..........................................................................9

Figures 2a and 2b: FISA “Probable Cause” Targets Broken Down by U.S. Person Status...........................................9

Figure 3: Section 702 Orders...............................................................................................................................................13

Figure 4: Section 702 Targets..............................................................................................................................................13

Figure 5: How the IC Counts U.S. Person Query Terms Used To Query Section 702 Content...................................14

Figure 6: U.S. Person Query Terms Used To Query Section 702 Content .....................................................................14

Figure 7: How the IC Counts U.S. Person Query Terms Used To Query Section 702 Noncontents ............................ 15

Figure 8: U.S. Person Queries of Noncontents of Section 702.........................................................................................15

Figure 9: Required Section 702 Query Reporting to the FISC........................................................................................16

Figure 10: Number of FBI Investigations Opened on USPs Based on Section 702 Acquisition ................................16

Figure 11: Section 702 Reports Containing USP Information Unmasked by NSA.....................................................20

Figure 12: Section 702 USP Identities Disseminated by NSA........................................................................................20

Figure 13: Number of Criminal Proceedings in Which the Government Provided Notice of Its Intent 

To Use Certain FISA Information ......................................................................................................................................22

Figures 14a and 14b: Number of PR/TT Orders, Targets and Unique Identifiers Collected......................................24

Figure 15: FISA PR/TT Targets—U.S. Persons and Non-U.S. Persons........................................................................24

Figure 16a: Title V “Traditional” Business Records Orders, Targets, and Unique Identifiers Collected...................26

Figure 16b: “Traditional” Business Records Orders and Targets...................................................................................27

Figure 16c: “Traditional” Business Records Unique Identifiers......................................................................................27

Figures 17a and 17b: CDR Orders and Targets ...............................................................................................................28

Figure 18: Call Event Hop Scenario and Method of Counting .......................................................................................29

Figure 19: CDRs Received Arising from Such Targets .....................................................................................................30

Figure 20: Unique Identifiers in the CDRs Received ........................................................................................................31

Figure 21: CDRs—U.S. Person Query Terms...................................................................................................................31

Figure 22a: NSLs Issued and Requests for Information .................................................................................................33

Figure 22b: Total NSLs Issued and Total ROIs Within Those NSLs ............................................................................33

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Introduction

Today, consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended (codified in 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1873(b)), and the Intelligence Community’s 

(IC) Principles of Intelligence Transparency, we are 

releasing our sixth annual Statistical Transparency 

Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities

presenting statistics on how often the government 

uses certain national security authorities. Providing 

these statistics allows for an additional way to track 

the use of FISA authorities and National Security 

Letters (NSLs). The statistics also add further context regarding the IC’s rigorous and multi-layered 

oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of 

United States person (U.S. person or USP) information and non-U.S. persons’ information acquired 

pursuant to these national security authorities. This 

report goes beyond the government’s statutory 

duty of providing statistics by further providing the 

public with detailed explanations as to how the IC 

uses its national security authorities. This document 

should be read in conjunction with the national 

security-related materials that the government has 

already released publicly, especially the documents 

that have been highlighted through the hyperlinks 

embedded in this report, as well as the statistical 

report provided by the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (50 U.S.C. § 1873(a), 

available on the AOUSC website).

Additional public information on national security 

authorities is available at the Office of the Director 

of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) website, www.

dni.gov, the Intelligence Community’s public website, www.intel.gov, and ODNI’s public Tumblr site, 

IC on the Record at IContheRecord.tumblr.com.

A. Background

In June 2014, the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI) began releasing statistics relating to the use 

of critical national security authorities, including 

FISA, in an annual report called the Statistical 

Transparency Report Regarding Use of National 

Security Authorities (hereafter the Annual Statistical 

Transparency Report). Subsequent Annual Statistical Transparency Reports were released in 2015, 

2016, 2017, and 2018.

On June 2, 2015, the Uniting and Strengthening 

America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (USA 

FREEDOM Act) was enacted, amending FISA by 

requiring the government to publicly report many 

of the statistics already reported in the Annual Statistical Transparency Report. The USA FREEDOM 

Act also expanded the scope of the information 

included in the reports by requiring the DNI to 

report information concerning USP search terms 

and queries of certain FISA-acquired information, 

as well as specific statistics concerning call detail 

records. See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b). On January 19, 

2018, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization 

Act of 2017 was signed, further codifying that 

additional statistics must be publicly released, 

including many statistics that the government 

previously reported pursuant to its commitment 

to transparency. 

B. Areas Covered in this Report

This report provides statistics in the following 

areas (the terms used below are defined and explained later in this report):

 FISA PROBABLE CAUSE AUTHORITIES. The number of 

orders—and the number of targets under those orders—for the use of FISA authorities that require 

probable cause determinations by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), under Titles 

I and III, and Section 703 and 704, of FISA.

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 FISA SECTION 702.

▶ The number of orders—and the number of 

targets under those orders—issued pursuant 

to Section 702 of FISA.

▶ The number of U.S. person queries of Section 

702-acquired content.

▶ The number of U.S. person queries of Section 

702-acquired metadata.

▶ The number of instances in which Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) personnel 

received and reviewed Section 702-acquired 

information that the FBI identified as concerning a U.S. person in response to a query 

that was designed to return evidence of a 

crime unrelated to foreign intelligence and 

conducted in connection with a predicated 

criminal investigation. 

▶ The number of instances in which the FBI 

opened, under the Criminal Investigative Division, an investigation of a U.S. person who 

is not considered a threat to national security 

based wholly or in part on Section 702-acquired information.

▶ The number of National Security Agency 

(NSA)-disseminated Section 702 reports 

containing U.S. person identities (various 

statistics relating to reports where the U.S. 

person identity was openly named or originally masked and subsequently unmasked).

 USE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. The number of 

criminal proceedings in which the United States 

or a State or political subdivision provided 

notice under FISA of the government’s intent 

to enter into evidence or otherwise use or 

disclose any information derived from electronic surveillance, physical search, or Section 

702 acquisition. 

 PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES. The 

number of orders—and the number of targets 

under those orders—for the use of FISA’s pen 

register/trap and trace devices, and the number 

of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to those orders. 

 BUSINESS RECORDS. The number of business records 

are reported with distinction made between 

records obtained under Section 501(b)(2)(B)—

commonly referred to as “traditional” business 

records—and call detail records obtained under 

Section 501(b)(2)(C). Specifically: 

▶ The number of traditional business record orders—and the number of targets under those 

orders—issued pursuant to FISA’s traditional 

business records authority, and the number of 

unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to those orders. 

▶ The number of call detail record orders—and 

the number of targets under those orders—

issued pursuant to FISA’s call detail records 

authority for the ongoing production of 

call detail records, the number of call detail 

records received from providers and stored in 

NSA repositories, and the number of unique 

identifiers used to communicate information collected.

 NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS. The number of National 

Security Letters (NSLs) issued, and the number 

of requests for information within those NSLs.

C. Context and Clarity

Consistent with the IC’s Principles of Intelligence 

Transparency, and in addition to the mandatory 

reporting required by FISA, this report provides 

transparency to enhance public understanding 

about certain activities the IC undertakes to accomplish its national security mission. Specifically, this 

report provides context concerning how the IC implements FISA, including the circumstances under 

which such activities are conducted and the rules 

that are designed to ensure compliance with the 

Constitution and laws of the United States. While 

the statistics contained herein provide an important 

point for understanding the use of these authoriINTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
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ties, the statistics have limitations in explaining the 

complexities of how the IC implements FISA; thus, 

this report is intended to be read in conjunction 

with other related publicly released information for 

a more comprehensive understanding. The statistics 

fluctuate from year to year for a variety of reasons. 

These include changes in operational priorities, 

world events, technical capabilities, target behavior, 

the dynamics of the ever-changing telecommunications sector, and the use of technology to automate 

the delivery of marketing and other communications. These reasons often cannot be explored in 

detail in an unclassified setting without divulging 

information necessary to protect national security. 

Moreover, there may be no relationship between a 

decrease in the use of one authority and an increase 

in another.

D. Key Terms

Certain terms used throughout this report are 

described below. Other terms are described in the 

sections in which they are most directly relevant. 

These terms will be used consistently throughout 

this report.

 U.S. PERSON. As defined by Title I of FISA, a U.S. 

person is “a citizen of the United States, an alien 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as 

defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated 

association a substantial number of members of 

which are citizens of the United States or aliens 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a 

corporation which is incorporated in the United 

States, but does not include a corporation or an 

association which is a foreign power, as defined 

in [50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3)].” 50 

U.S.C. § 1801(i). Section 602 of the USA 

FREEDOM Act, however, uses a narrower 

definition. Since the broader Title I definition 

governs how U.S. person queries are conducted 

pursuant to the relevant minimization procedures, it will be used throughout this report.

 TARGET. Within the IC, the term “target” has 

multiple meanings. With respect to the statistics 

provided in this report, the term “target” is used 

as a noun and defined as the individual person, 

group, entity composed of multiple individuals, 

or foreign power that uses the selector such as a 

telephone number or email address. 

The IC also uses the term “target” as a verb, especially as it relates to Section 702. Specifically, Section 702 authorizes the targeting of (i) non-United States persons (ii) reasonably believed to be 

located outside the United States (iii) to acquire 

foreign intelligence information. To ensure that all 

three requirements are appropriately met, Section 

702 requires targeting procedures. Additional 

information on targeting is detailed below in the 

Section 702 discussion. 

Targeting for intelligence purposes must be 

informed by the National Intelligence Priorities 

Framework (NIPF). The NIPF is the high-level 

mechanism to manage and communicate national intelligence priorities, facilitating the IC’s 

ability to allocate finite resources to address the 

most pressing intelligence questions and mission 

requirements. Guidance from the President and 

the National Security Advisor, with formal input 

from cabinet-level heads of departments and 

agencies, determine the overall priorities of the 

top-level NIPF issues. Once the IC determines 

that a particular target meets an intelligence need 

under the NIPF, the IC must then apply applicable legal authorities (e.g., certain acquisitions 

authorized under FISA, Executive Order 12333) 

to begin targeting. 

 ORDERS. There are different types of orders that 

the FISC may issue in connection with FISA 

cases, including orders granting or modifying the government’s applications to conduct 

foreign intelligence collection including orders 

granting or modifying the government’s applications to conduct foreign intelligence collection 

pursuant to FISA; orders directing electronic 

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communication service providers to provide any 

technical assistance necessary to implement the 

authorized foreign intelligence collection; and 

supplemental orders and briefing orders requiring the government to take a particular action or 

provide the court with specific information. As 

with past years, this report only counts orders 

granting the government’s applications.

The FISC may amend an order one or more 

times after it has been granted. For example, an 

order may be amended to add a newly discovered account used by the target. This report does 

not count such amendments separately.

The FISC may renew some orders multiple times 

during the calendar year. Each authority permitted under FISA has specific time limits for the 

FISA authority to continue (e.g., a Section 704 

order against a U.S. person target outside of the 

United States may last no longer than 90 days, 

but FISA permits the order to be renewed, 

see 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(c)(4)). Each renewal 

requires a separate application submitted by the 

government to the FISC and a finding by the 

FISC that the application meets the requirements of FISA. Thus, unlike amendments, this 

report counts each such renewal as a separate order 

granting the requested FISA authority.

 “ESTIMATED NUMBER.” Throughout this report, 

when numbers are estimated, the estimate comports with the statutory requirements to provide 

a “good faith estimate” of a particular number. 

 DISSEMINATION. Dissemination refers to the sharing 

of minimized information. As it pertains to FISA 

(including Section 702), if an agency (such as 

NSA) lawfully collects information pursuant to 

FISA and wants to disseminate that information, 

the agency must first apply its minimization 

procedures to that information. 

 FISC. The FISC was established in 1978 when 

Congress enacted FISA (see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-

1885c). The Court is composed of eleven federal 

district court judges who are designated by the 

Chief Justice of the United States. Pursuant to 

FISA, the Court entertains applications submitted by the United States Government for 

approval of electronic surveillance, physical 

search, and other investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes. 

 AMICUS CURIAE. In 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act 

established a framework under which qualified 

individuals are appointed as amicus curiae to 

assist the FISC and the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Court of Review (FISC-R) in the 

consideration of matters (including matters that 

present a novel or significant interpretation of the 

law or matters dealing with technical 

expertise) before those courts. See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1803. Individuals designated as amici must 

have expertise in privacy and civil liberties, intelligence collection, communications technology, 

or other areas that may lend legal or technical 

expertise to the FISC and FISC-R and must also 

be eligible for access to classified information. 

When appointed, amicus curiae provide those 

courts, as appropriate, with legal arguments that 

advance the protection of individual privacy and 

civil liberties; information related to intelligence 

collection or communications technology; or legal arguments or information regarding any other 

area relevant to the issue presented to the court.

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FISA Probable Cause Authorities 

A. FISA Titles I and III

With limited exceptions (e.g., in the event of 

an emergency), to conduct electronic surveillance or physical search of an individual under FISA Title I or FISA Title III, a probable cause 

court order is required regardless of U.S. person status.

Under FISA, Title I permits electronic surveillance and 

Title III permits physical search in the United States 

of foreign powers or agents of a foreign power when 

the government has a significant purpose to obtain 

foreign intelligence information. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 

and 1823. Title I (electronic surveillance) and Title III 

(physical search) are commonly referred to as “Traditional FISA.” Both require that, following submission 

of a government application, the FISC make a probable cause finding, based upon a factual statement in the 

government’s application, that (i) the target is a foreign 

power or an agent of a foreign power, as defined by 

FISA and (ii) the facility being targeted for electronic 

surveillance is used by or about to be used, or the 

premises or property to be searched is or is about to 

be owned, used, possessed by, or is in transit to or 

from a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. In 

addition to meeting the probable cause standard, the 

government’s application must meet the other requirements of FISA. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a) and 1823(a). 

B. FISA Title VII, Sections 703 and 704

FISA Title VII Sections 703 and 704 similarly require 

a court order based on a finding of probable cause for 

the government to undertake FISA collection targeting U.S. persons located outside the United States. 

Section 703 applies when the government seeks to 

conduct electronic surveillance or to acquire stored 

electronic communications or stored electronic data 

inside the U.S., in a manner that otherwise requires 

an order pursuant to FISA, of a U.S. person who is 

reasonably believed to be located outside the United 

States. Section 704 applies when the government 

seeks to conduct collection overseas targeting a U.S. 

person reasonably believed to be located outside 

the United States under circumstances in which the 

U.S. person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 

and a warrant would be required if the acquisition 

were conducted in the United States. Both Sections 

703 and 704 require that the FISC make a probable 

cause finding, based upon a factual statement in the 

government’s application, that the target is a U.S. 

person reasonably believed to be (i) located outside 

the United States and (ii) a foreign power, agent of 

a foreign power, or officer or employee of a foreign 

power. Additionally, the government’s application 

must meet the other requirements of FISA. See 50 

U.S.C. §§ 1881b(b) and 1881c(b). 

C. Statistics

HOW TARGETS ARE COUNTED. If the IC received authorization to conduct electronic surveillance and/or 

physical search against the same target in four separate applications, the IC would count one target, not 

four. Alternatively, if the IC received authorization 

to conduct electronic surveillance and/or physical 

search against four targets in the same application, 

the IC would count four targets. Duplicate targets 

across authorities are not counted. 

FISA Title I, Title III, and Title VII 

Section 703 and 704

 All of these authorities require individual 

court orders based on probable cause. 

 Titles I and III apply to FISA collection 

targeting persons within the United States.

 Sections 703 and 704 apply to FISA collection targeting U.S. persons outside the 

United States.

FISA PROBABLE CAUSE AUTHORITIES
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FISA PROBABLE CAUSE AUTHORITIES

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(1) and 1873(b)(1)(A).

 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(1)(B) and 1873(b)(1)(C) for rows one and two, respectively.

*Although providing this statistic was first required by the USA FREEDOM Act, the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 enumerated this 

requirement at 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(1)(A).

*Previously the IC was not statutorily required to publicly provide these statistics but provided 

them consistent with transparency principles. The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 

2017 codified this requirement at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(1)(B) and 1873(b)(1)(C).

Figures 1a and 1b: FISA “Probable Cause” Court Orders and Targets

Figures 2a and 2b: FISA “Probable Cause” Targets Broken Down by U.S. Person Status

Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 

704 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders 1,767 1,519 1,585 1,559 1,437 1,184

Estimated number of targets of 

such orders* 1,144 1,562 1,695 1,687 1,337 1,833

Titles I and III and Sections 703 

and 704—Targets CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Estimated number of targets 

who are non-U.S. persons* 1,351 1,038 1,601

Estimated number of targets 

who are U.S. persons* 336 299 232

Percentage of targets who are 

estimated to be U.S. persons 19.9% 22.4% 12.7%

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total court orders Estimated total targets*

1,767

1,519 1,562 1,585 1,695

1,559

1,687

1,437 1,337

1,184

1,833

1,144

FISA PROBABLE CAUSE AUTHORITIES

Estimated USPER targets*

Estimated non-USPER targets*

CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

1,351

1,687 TOTAL

1,038

1,601 336

299

232

1,337 TOTAL

1,833 TOTAL

(19.9% 

of total)

(22.4% 

of total)

(12.7% 

of total)
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FISA Section 702

A. Section 702

Title VII of FISA includes Section 702, 

which permits the Attorney General and 

the DNI to jointly authorize the targeting 

of (i) non-U.S. persons (ii) who are reasonably 

believed to be located outside the United States 

(iii) to acquire foreign intelligence information. See

50 U.S.C. § 1881a. All three elements must be met. 

Additionally, Section 702 requires that the Attorney General, in consultation with the DNI, adopt 

targeting procedures, minimization procedures, 

and querying procedures that they attest satisfy 

the statutory requirements of Section 702 and are 

consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Additional information on how the government uses 

Section 702 is posted on IC on the Record including 

a Section 702 Overview.

SECTION 702 TARGETS AND “TASKING.” Under Section 702, 

the government “targets” a particular non-U.S. person, including non-U.S. person groups or entities, 

reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information 

by “tasking” selectors (e.g., telephone numbers 

and email addresses). Before tasking a selector for 

collection under Section 702, the government must 

apply its targeting procedures to ensure that the 

selector is used by a non-U.S. person who is reasonably believed to be located outside the United 

States and who is expected to possess, receive, 

and/or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence information. The foreign intelligence 

information must fall within a specific category 

of foreign intelligence information that has been 

authorized for acquisition by the Attorney General 

and the DNI as part of a Section 702 certification.

In addition to the requirement that the type of 

foreign intelligence information sought must be 

authorized as part of a certification approved by 

the FISC, agencies must also apply protections 

required by Presidential Policy Directive 28 

(PPD-28), Signals Intelligence Activities, to 

Section 702-acquired information. PPD-28 

reinforces longstanding intelligence practices that 

protect privacy and civil liberties, while requiring 

agencies to implement new procedures to ensure 

that U.S. signals intelligence activities continue to 

include appropriate safeguards for the personal 

information of all individuals, regardless of the 

nationality of the individual to whom the information pertains or where that individual resides. 

NSA and FBI task selectors pursuant to their respective Section 702 targeting procedures, which are discussed below. All agencies that receive unminimized 

(i.e., “raw”) Section 702 data—NSA, FBI, Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—handle the Section 

702-acquired data in accordance with minimization 

procedures, which are explained below. 

THE FISC’S ROLE. Under Section 702, the FISC determines whether certifications executed jointly by the 

Attorney General and the DNI meet all the requirements of Section 702. In deciding whether to approve a certification application package, the FISC 

reviews the certifications and the minimization, targeting, and querying procedures to ensure compliance with both FISA and the Fourth Amendment. 

FISA SECTION 702

FISA Title VII— Section 702

 Commonly referred to as “Section 702.”

 Requires individual targeting determinations that the target (1) is a non-U.S. person (2) who is reasonably believed to be 

located outside the United States and (3) 

who has or is expected to communicate or 

receive foreign intelligence information. 
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The Court’s review is not limited to the procedures 

as written, but also includes an examination of how 

the procedures have been and will be implemented. 

Accordingly, as part of its review, the FISC considers the compliance incidents reported to it by the 

government through notices and reports. 

If the FISC determines that the government’s certification application package meets the statutory 

requirements of Section 702 and are consistent with 

the Fourth Amendment, then the FISC issues an order and supporting statement approving the certifications. The 2016 FISC order and statement approving 

the certifications was publicly released, in redacted 

form, in May 2017 and posted on IC on the Record. 

CERTIFICATIONS. Under Section 702, the Attorney 

General and DNI jointly execute certifications under which the Intelligence Community intends to 

acquire specified foreign intelligence information. 

The certifications identify categories of foreign intelligence information to be collected, which must 

meet the statutory definition of foreign intelligence 

information, through the targeting of non-U.S. 

persons reasonably believed to be located outside 

the United States. The certifications have included 

information concerning international terrorism and 

other topics, such as the acquisition of information 

concerning weapons of mass destruction. Each 

annual certification must be submitted to the FISC 

for approval in a certification application package 

that includes the Attorney General and DNI’s 

certifications, affidavits by certain heads of intelligence agencies, targeting procedures, minimization 

procedures, and, as described below, querying 

procedures. Samples of certification application 

packages have been publicly released on IC on the 

Record, most recently in May 2017. 

TARGETING PROCEDURES. Each set of targeting procedures are adopted by the Attorney General and 

then reviewed, as part of the certification package, 

by the FISC, which reviews the sufficiency of each 

agency’s targeting procedures including assessing 

the IC’s compliance with the procedures. Only 

agencies that have Attorney General-adopted 

targeting procedures that the FISC finds sufficient 

as part of a certification package may task selectors 

pursuant to Section 702; only two agencies, NSA 

and FBI, have targeting procedures and thus are 

permitted to task selectors. 

NSA includes the targeting rationale (TAR) in the 

tasking record, which requires the targeting analyst 

to briefly state why targeting for a particular selector 

was requested. The intent of the TAR is to memorialize why the analyst is requesting targeting and 

provide a linkage between the user of the selector 

and the foreign intelligence purpose covered by 

the certification under which it is being tasked. The 

TAR is reviewed by the ODNI and Department of 

Justice oversight teams as part of their routine review of the tasking records. More information about 

these oversight reviews is provided in the Attorney 

General and DNI’s joint Semiannual Assessment of 

Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued 

Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 

Surveillance Act (commonly referred to as the Joint 

Assessment of 702 Compliance or Joint Assessment), 

most recently released in February 2019 on IC on 

the Record. NSA’s 2016 targeting procedures and 

FBI’s 2016 targeting procedures have been publicly 

released on IC on the Record.

MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES. The minimization procedures detail requirements the government must 

meet to use, retain, and disseminate Section 702 

data, including specific restrictions regarding 

non-publicly available U.S. person information 

acquired from Section 702 collection of non-U.S. 

person targets, consistent with the needs of each 

agency to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign 

intelligence information. Each agency’s Section 

702 minimization procedures are adopted by the 

Attorney General. The FISC reviews the sufficiency of each agency’s minimization procedures as 

part of the certification application package. Such 

reviews include assessing the IC’s compliance with 

past procedures. The 2016 minimization procedures have been released on IC on the Record.

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Non-U.S. persons also benefit from many of the protective rules prescribed by the targeting and minimization procedures. Under Section 702, collection is 

targeted (not bulk), and must be limited to non-U.S. 

person targets located outside the United States who 

are likely to possess, receive, and/or are expected to 

communicate foreign intelligence information that 

is linked to one of the FISC-approved certifications. 

See Status of Implementation of PPD-28: Response to 

the PCLOB’s Report, October 2018 at 9. Additionally, 

“as a practical matter, non-U.S. persons also benefit 

from the access and retention restrictions required by 

the different agencies’ minimization and/or targeting 

procedures.” See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 

Board Report on the Surveillance Program Operated 

Pursuant to Section 702 of FISA ( July 2, 2014) at 100.

QUERYING PROCEDURES. With passage of the FISA 

Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Congress amended Section 702 to require that querying 

procedures be adopted by the Attorney General, 

in consultation with the DNI. Section 702(f)(1) 

requires that the querying procedures be consistent 

with the Fourth Amendment and that they include a 

technical procedure whereby a record is kept of each 

U.S. person term used for a query. Similar to the 

Section 702 targeting and minimization procedures, 

the querying procedures are required to be reviewed 

by the FISC as part of the certification package 

for consistency with the statute and the Fourth 

Amendment. Congress added other requirements 

in Section 702(f), which pertain to accessing certain 

results of queries conducted by FBI; those requirements will be discussed later in this report. 

Query terms may be date-bound, and may include 

alphanumeric strings, such as telephone numbers, 

email addresses, or terms, such as a name, that can 

be used individually or in combination with one 

another. Pursuant to court-approved procedures, 

an agency can only query Section 702 information 

if the query is reasonably likely to return foreign 

intelligence information or, in the case of the FBI, 

evidence of a crime. This standard applies to all 

Section 702 queries, regardless of whether the term 

includes U.S. person or non-U.S. person identifiers. 

As explained in the March 2019-released Joint Assessment of Section 702 Compliance, NSA personnel 

are required to obtain Office of General Counsel 

approval before any use of United States person 

identifiers as terms to query the content of Section 

702 information. Additional information about U.S. 

person queries is posted on IC on the Record.

COMPLIANCE. The IC’s application of the targeting, 

minimization, and querying procedures is subject 

to robust internal agency oversight and to rigorous 

external oversight by DOJ, ODNI, Congress, and 

the FISC. Every identified incident of non-compliance, regardless of the U.S. person status of individuals affected by the incident, is reported to the FISC 

(through notices or in reports) and to Congress in 

semiannual reports. Depending on the nature of 

the incident, the FISC may order remedial actions, 

which could include deleting improperly collected 

information, recalling improperly disseminated 

information, and re-training IC employees. DOJ 

and ODNI also jointly submit semiannual reports 

to Congress that assess the IC’s overall compliance 

efforts. Past Joint Assessments of Section 702 Compliance have been publicly released. 

B. Statistics—Orders and Targets

COUNTING SECTION 702 ORDERS. As explained above, 

the FISC may issue a single order to approve 

more than one Section 702 certification to acquire 

foreign intelligence information. Note that, in its 

own transparency report, which is required pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(a), the Director of the 

Administrative Office of the United States Courts 

(AOUSC) counted each of the Section 702 certifications associated with the FISC’s order. Because 

the number of the government’s Section 702 certifications remains a classified fact, the government 

requested that the AOUSC redact the number of 

certifications from its transparency report prior to 

publicly releasing it.

FISA SECTION 702 FISA SECTION 702
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Section 702 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders issued 1 1 1 0* 1 1

Figure 3: Section 702 Orders

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2).

* In 2016, the government submitted a certification application package to the FISC. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), the FISC extended its review of the 

2016 certification package. The FISC may extend its review of the certifications “as necessary for good cause in a manner consistent with national security.” See 

50 U.S.C. § 1881a(j)(2), subsequently codified under § 1881a(k)(2) with the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017. Thus, because the FISC did 

not complete its review of the 2016 certifications during calendar year 2016, the FISC did not issue an order concerning those certifications in calendar year 

2016. The 2015 order remained in effect during the extension period. On April 26, 2017, the FISC issued an order authorizing the 2016 certifications.

ESTIMATING SECTION 702 TARGETS. The number of 702 

targets, provided below, reflects an estimate of the 

number of non-U.S. persons who are the users of 

tasked selectors. This estimate is based on information readily available to the IC. Unless and until the 

IC has information that links multiple selectors to 

a single foreign intelligence target, each individual 

selector is counted as a separate target for purposes 

of this report. On the other hand, where the IC is 

aware that multiple selectors are used by the same 

target, the IC counts the user of those selectors as 

a single target. This counting methodology reduces 

the risk that the IC might inadvertently understate 

the number of discrete persons targeted pursuant 

to Section 702. 

Section 702 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Estimated number of targets of 

such orders** 89,138 92,707 94,368 106,469 129,080 164,770

Figure 4: Section 702 Targets*

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(A). 

 *Recall that only non-USPs are targeted

**Previously the IC was not statutorily required to publicly provide this statistic but provided it consistent with transparency principles. The FISA 

Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 codified this requirement at 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(A).

C. Statistics—U.S. Person Queries

In July 2014, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB or Board) issued a report on 

Section 702 entitled, “Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act”(PCLOB’s Section 702 

Report), which reported U.S. person query statistics 

for calendar year 2013. See PCLOB’s Section 702 Report at 57-58. The USA FREEDOM Act, enacted in 

2015, added a requirement to report publicly certain 

statistics regarding the number of U.S. person queries of Section 702. Specifically, the Act requires reporting of the “number of search terms concerning 

a known United States person used to retrieve the 

unminimized contents [...]”—referred to as “query 

terms of content”—and “the number of queries 

concerning a known United States person of unminimized noncontents information [...]”—referred to 

as “queries of metadata.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)

(B) and (b)(2)(C), respectively. Thus, ODNI began 

reporting on these statistics in the Annual Statistical 

Transparency Report covering CY2015. 
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Below are statistics for U.S. person queries of raw, 

Section 702-acquired data.1

 The U.S. person statistics are based on (a) U.S. person query terms used 

to query Section 702 content and (b) U.S. person 

queries conducted of Section 702 noncontents (i.e., 

metadata). It is important to understand that these 

two very different numbers cannot be combined 

because they use different counting methodologies

(query terms versus queries conducted) and different data types (content versus noncontents).

COUNTING U.S. PERSON QUERY TERMS USED TO QUERY SECTION 

702 CONTENT. The NSA counts the number of U.S. 

person identifiers it approved to query the content 

of unminimized Section 702-acquired information. For example, if the NSA used U.S. person 

identifier “johndoe@XYZprovider” to query the 

content of Section 702-acquired information, the 

NSA would count it as one regardless of how many 

times the NSA used “johndoe@XYZprovider” 

to query its 702-acquired information. The CIA 

started using this model in 2016 for counting 

query terms and those statistics were included in 

the Annual Statistical Transparency Report covering 

CY2016. When the NCTC began receiving raw 

Section 702 information, NCTC followed a similar 

approach of counting U.S. person query terms that 

were used to query Section 702 content. 

FISA SECTION 702

Figure 5: How the IC Counts U.S. Person Query Terms Used To Query Section 702 Content

QUERY TERMS USED

QUERY EVENTS

johndoe@XYZprovider

johndoe@XYZprovider

johndoe@XYZprovider

johndoe@123company

marydoe@XYZprovider

marydoe@XYZprovider

1. johndoe@XYZprovider

2. johndoe@123company

3. marydoe@XYZprovider Counted as 3 USPER query terms, not the 

6 instances that the query terms queried 

the content.

Raw Section 702

CONTENT

1

 With the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act in 2017, Congress codified new requirements regarding the access to results of certain queries conducted by 

the FBI. Specifically under Section 702(f)(2)(A), an order from the FISC is now required before the FBI can review the contents of a query using a U.S. person 

query term when the query was not designed to find and extract foreign intelligence information and was performed in connection with a predicated criminal 

investigation that does not relate to national security. Before the FISC may issue such an order based on a finding of probable cause, an FBI agent must apply 

in writing, to include the agent’s justification that the query results would provide evidence of criminal activity, and the application must be approved by the 

Attorney General. 50 U.S.C. Section 1873(b)(2)(A) requires annual reporting of the number of times the FBI received an order pursuant to 702(f)(2)(A).

Section 702 of FISA CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Estimated number of search terms concerning a known U.S. 

person used to retrieve the unminimized contents of communications obtained under Section 702 (excluding search 

terms used to prevent the return of U.S. person information)*

4,672 5,288 7,512 9,637

Figure 6: U.S. Person Query Terms Used To Query Section 702 Content

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(B). 

*Consistent with 50 U.S.C. § 1873(d)(2)(A), this statistic does not include queries that are conducted by the FBI. 
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COUNTING QUERIES USING U.S. PERSON IDENTIFIERS OF 

NONCONTENTS COLLECTED UNDER SECTION 702. This 

estimate represents the number of times a U.S. 

person identifier is used to query the noncontents 

(i.e., metadata) of unminimized Section 702-acquired information. For example, if the U.S. person 

identifier telephone number “111-111-2222” was 

used 15 times to query the noncontents of Section 

702-acquired information, the number of queries 

counted would be 15.

Figure 7: How the IC Counts U.S. Person Query Terms Used To Query Section 702 Noncontents

QUERY TERMS USED

QUERY EVENTS

111-111-2222

111-111-2222

111-111-2222

333-333-4444

555-555-6666

555-555-6666

1. 111-111-2222

2. 333-333-4444

3. 555-555-6666 Counted as 6 USPER queries (each individual query event is counted).

Raw Section 702

NONCONTENT

(i.e. metadata)

The CIA, had been previously unable to provide 

the number of queries using U.S. person identifiers of unminimized Section 702 noncontents 

information. Beginning in 2018, CIA was able to 

estimate the number of these queries and, as such, 

this new information is included in the CY2018 

statistic below.

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(C). 

*Consistent with 50 U.S.C. § 1873(d)(2)(A), this statistic does not include queries that are conducted by the FBI. 

**Beginning with CY2018, this statistic includes all elements that are required to report this number. As explained above, prior to CY2018, CIA had been 

unable to provide this number.

Figure 8: U.S. Person Queries of Noncontents of Section 702

Section 702 of FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018**

Estimated number of queries concerning 

a known U.S. person of unminimized 

noncontent information obtained under 

Section 702 (excluding queries containing information used to prevent the 

return of U.S. person information)*

9,500 17,500 23,800 30,355 16,924 14,374
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FISC ORDER REQUIRING CERTAIN SECTION 702 QUERY REPORTING BY FBI. On November 6, 2015, the FISC 

granted the government’s application for renewal 

of the 2015 certifications and, among other things, 

concluded that the FBI’s U.S. person querying 

provisions in its minimization procedures, “strike a 

reasonable balance between the privacy interests of 

the United States persons and persons in the United States, on the one hand, and the government’s 

national security interests, on the other.” Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 6, 2015, at 

44 (released on IC on the Record on April 19, 2016). 

The FISC further stated that the FBI conducting 

queries, “designed to return evidence of crimes 

unrelated to foreign intelligence does not preclude 

the Court from concluding that taken together, the 

targeting and minimization procedures submitted 

with the 2015 Certifications are consistent with the 

requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

Nevertheless, the FISC ordered the government 

to report in writing, “each instance after December 

4, 2015, in which FBI personnel receive and review

Section 702-acquired information that the FBI 

identifies as concerning a United States person in 

response to a query that is not designed to find and 

extract foreign intelligence information.” (Emphasis added). Id. at 44 and 78. The FISC directed 

that the report contain details of the query terms, 

the basis for conducting the query, the manner 

in which the query will be or has been used, and 

other details. Id. at 78. In keeping with the IC’s 

Principles of Intelligence Transparency, the DNI 

declassified the number of each such query reported to the FISC in calendar year 2016 and for applicable calendar years thereafter. These numbers are 

reported in Figure 9.

FISA SECTION 702

Section 702 of FISA CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Per the FISC Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 6, 2015: 

Each reported instance in which FBI personnel received and reviewed

Section 702-acquired information that the FBI identified as concerning a 

U.S. person in response to a query that was designed to return evidence of 

a crime unrelated to foreign intelligence.

1 0 0

Figure 9: Required Section 702 Query Reporting to the FISC

See FISC Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 6, 2015.

D. Section 702 and FBI Investigations

With the enactment of the FISA Amendments 

Reauthorization Act of 2017, FISA now requires 

that the FBI report on the number of instances in 

which the FBI opened, under the Criminal Investigative Division, a criminal investigation of a U.S. 

person, who is not considered a threat to national 

security, based wholly or in part on Section

 702-acquired information. See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1873(b)(2)(D). This statistic will provide 

transparency with regard to how often Section 702 

collection is used for non-national security investigations conducted by the FBI. Figure 10 provides 

the required statistic.

Section 702 of FISA CY2017 CY2018

The number of instances in which the FBI opened, under the Criminal Investigative Division or any successor division, an investigation of a U.S. person (who is 

not considered a threat to national security) based wholly or in part on an acquisition authorized under Section 702.

0 0

Figure 10: Number of FBI Investigations Opened on USPs Based on Section 702 Acquisition 

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(2)(D).
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E. NSA Dissemination of U.S. Person 

Information under FISA Section 702

BACKGROUND ON NSA DISSEMINATING U.S. PERSON INFORMATION UNDER SECTION 702. In July 2014, the PCLOB’s 

Section 702 Report contained 10 recommendations. 

Recommendation 9 focused on “accountability 

and transparency,” noting that the government 

should implement measures, “to provide insight 

about the extent to which the NSA acquires and 

utilizes the communications involving U.S. persons 

and people located in the United States under the 

Section 702 program.” PCLOB’s Section 702 Report

at 145-146. Specifically, the PCLOB recommended that “the NSA should implement processes to 

annually count [...] (5) the number of instances in 

which the NSA disseminates non-public information about U.S. persons, specifically distinguishing 

disseminations that includes names, titles, or other 

identifiers, such as telephone numbers or e-mail 

addresses, potentially associated with individuals.” 

Id. at 146. This recommendation is commonly 

referred to as Recommendation 9(5). In response 

to the PCLOB’s July 2014 Recommendation 9(5), 

NSA previously publicly provided (in the Annual 

Statistical Transparency Report for calendar year 

2015) and continues to provide the following additional information regarding the dissemination of 

Section 702 intelligence reports that contain U.S. 

person information. Because the PCLOB issued its 

recommendation in 2014, these statistics were not 

included in Annual Statistical Transparency Report

for calendar years 2013 or 2014.

NSA has been providing similar information to 

Congress since 2009, in classified form, per FISA 

reporting requirements. For example, FISA Section 702(m)(3) requires that NSA annually submit 

a report to applicable Congressional committees regarding certain numbers pertaining to the 

acquisition of Section 702-acquired information, 

including the number of “disseminated intelligence 

reports containing a reference to a United States 

person identity.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(m)(3)(A)

(i) (prior to the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 under § 1881a(l)(3)(A)(i)). Section 702(m)(3)(A) also requires that the number 

of “United States-person identities subsequently 

disseminated by [NSA] in response to request for 

identities that were not referred to by name or 

title in the original reporting.” See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1881a(m)(3)(A)(ii). This second requirement 

refers to NSA providing the number of approved 

unmasking requests, which is explained below. 

Additionally, the Attorney General and the DNI 

provide to Congress the number of NSA’s disseminated intelligence reports containing a U.S. person 

reference as part of the Attorney General and the 

DNI’s Joint Assessment of Compliance. See 50 

U.S.C. § 1881a(m)(1) (prior to the FISA 

Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 under 

§ 1881a(l)(1)).

Prior to the PCLOB issuing its Section 702 Report, 

NSA’s Director of the Civil Liberties, Privacy, and 

Transparency Office published “NSA’s Implementation of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Section 

702,” on April 16, 2014, (hereinafter “NSA 

DCLPO Report”), in which it explained NSA’s dissemination processes. NSA DCLPO Report at 7-8. 

NSA “only generates classified intelligence reports 

when the information meets a specific intelligence 

requirement, regardless of whether the proposed 

report contains U.S. person information.” NSA 

DCLPO Report at 7. 

Section 702 only permits the targeting of non-U.S. 

persons reasonably believed to be located outside 

the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 

information. Such targets, however, may communicate information to, from, or about U.S. persons. 

NSA’s minimization procedures (publicly released 

on August 11, 2016) permit the NSA to disseminate U.S person information if the information is 

necessary to understand the foreign intelligence. 

By policy, generally, the NSA masks the information that could identify the U.S. person. NSA’s 

minimization procedures define U.S. person identi-
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fying information as “(1) the name, unique title, 

or address of a United States person; or (2) other 

personal identifiers of a United States person [. . . ]”. 

See NSA’s Minimization Procedures 2(f). 

The minimization procedures also permit NSA to 

disseminate U.S. person identities only if doing so 

meets one of the specified reasons listed in NSA’s 

minimization procedures, including that the U.S. 

person consented to the dissemination, the U.S. 

person information was already publicly available, 

the U.S. person information was necessary to 

understand foreign intelligence information, or the 

communication contained evidence of a crime and 

is being disseminated to law enforcement authorities. For example, a Section 702 target may communicate information about a U.S. person that the 

target intends to victimize in some way; NSA may 

need to disseminate the identity of affected U.S. 

persons to appropriate authorities so that they can 

take appropriate protective, preventive, or investigative action. 

Even if one these conditions applies, as a matter of 

policy, NSA may still mask the U.S. person identity and will include no more than the minimum 

amount of U.S. person information necessary to 

understand the foreign intelligence or to describe 

the crime or threat. Id. In certain instances, however, 

NSA makes a determination that it is appropriate to 

include in the original report the U.S. person’s identity, using the same standards discussed above. 

 MASKED U.S. PERSON INFORMATION. Agency minimization procedures generally provide for the 

substitution of a U.S. person identity with a 

generic phrase or term if the identity otherwise 

does not meet the dissemination criteria; this 

is often referred to as “masking” the identity of 

the U.S. person. Information about a U.S. person 

is masked when the identifying information 

about the person is not included in a report. 

For example, instead of reporting that Section 

702-acquired information revealed that nonU.S. person “Bad Guy” communicated with 

U.S. person “John Doe” (i.e., the actual name of 

the U.S. person), the report would mask “John 

Doe’s” name, and would state that “Bad Guy” 

communicated with “an identified U.S. person,” 

“a named U.S. person,” or “a U.S. person.” Other 

examples of masked U.S. person identities would 

be “a named U.S. entity,” “a U.S. person email 

address,” or “a U.S. IP address.” 

 UNMASKING U.S. PERSON INFORMATION. Recipients of 

NSA’s classified reports, such as other federal 

agencies, may request that NSA provide the U.S. 

person identifying information that was masked 

in an intelligence report. The requested identity 

information is released only if the requesting 

recipient has a “need to know” the identity 

of the U.S. person and if the dissemination of 

the U.S. person’s identity would be consistent 

with NSA’s minimization procedures (e.g., the 

identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance), 

and additional approval has been provided by a 

designated NSA official. 

As part of their regular oversight reviews, DOJ 

and ODNI review disseminations of information 

about U.S. persons that NSA obtained pursuant to 

Section 702 to ensure that the disseminations were 

consistent with the minimization procedures.

Additional information describing how the IC protects U.S. person information obtained pursuant 

to FISA provisions is provided in recent reports

by the civil liberties and privacy officers for the 

ODNI (including NCTC), NSA, FBI, and CIA. 

The reports collectively documented the rigorous 

and multi-layered framework that safeguards the 

privacy of U.S. person information in FISA disseminations. See ODNI Report on Protecting U.S. Person 

Identities in Disseminations under FISA and annexes 

containing agency specific reports.

STATISTICS OF NSA’S U.S. PERSON DISSEMINATING INFORMATION. Below are statistics and charts to further 

explain how NSA disseminates U.S. person infor-
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mation incidentally acquired from Section 702 in 

classified intelligence reports. NSA may:

i. openly name (i.e., originally reveal) the U.S. 

person identity in the report, 

ii. initially mask (i.e., not reveal) the U.S. person 

identity in the report, or

iii. in the instances where the U.S. person identity 

was initially masked, upon a specific request, 

later reveal and unmask the U.S. person identity 

but only to the requestor.

Consistent with the CY2017 Annual Statistical 

Transparency Report, this year’s report presents the 

dissemination numbers in a different format from 

the CY2016 and prior year reports to facilitate understanding and to provide consistency with NSA’s 

classified FISA Section 702(m)(3) reports to Congress. This report separates the number of reports

(in Figure 11) from the statistics relating to the U.S. 

person identities later disseminated (in Figure 12). 

NSA applies its minimization procedures in preparing its classified intelligence reports, and then disseminates the reports to authorized recipients with 

a need to know the information in order to perform 

their official duties. Very few of NSA’s intelligence 

reports from Section 702 collection contain references to U.S. person identities (whether masked or 

openly named). 

The first row of Figure 11 provides “an accounting 

of the number of disseminated intelligence reports 

containing a reference to a United States-person 

identity.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(m)(3)(A)(i). NSA’s 

counting methodology is to include any disseminated intelligence report that contains a reference to 

one or more U.S. person identities, whether masked 

or openly named, even if the report includes information from other sources. NSA does not maintain 

records that allow it to readily determine, in the case 

of an intelligence report that includes information 

from several sources, from which source a reference 

to a U.S. person identity was derived. Accordingly, 

the references to U.S. person identities may have 

resulted from Section 702 authorized collection or 

from other authorized signals intelligence activity 

conducted by NSA. This counting methodology 

was used in the previous report and is used in NSA’s 

FISA Section 702(m)(3) report. 

Note that a single report could contain multiple 

U.S. person identities, masked and/or openly 

named. For example, a single report could include 

of a large number of U.S. identities that a foreign 

intelligence target is seeking to victimize; each of 

those identifiers would be counted.

As noted above, a U.S. person is “a citizen of the 

United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or 

aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, 

or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States, but does not include a corporation or an 

association which is a foreign power, as defined in 

[50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (2), or (3)].” See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1801(i). Thus the numbers below include U.S. 

person identities not only of U.S. persons who are 

individuals, but also of U.S. persons that are corporations or unincorporated associations.

The second row of Figure 11 provides the number 

of reports containing U.S. person identities where 

the U.S. person identity was masked in the report.

The third row provides the number of reports containing U.S. person identities where the U.S. person 

identity was openly included in the report. 
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Figure 12 provides statistics relating to the numbers of U.S. person identities that were originally 

masked in those reports counted in Figure 11 but 

which NSA later provided to authorized requestors (i.e., unmasked). This statistic is the number 

required to be reported to Congress in NSA’s 

FISA Section 702(m)(3) report. In other words, 

Figure 12 provides “an accounting of the number 

of United States-person identities subsequently 

disseminated by [NSA] in response to requests for 

identities that were not referred to by name or title 

in the original reporting.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(m)

(3)(A)(ii). This number is different than numbers 

provided in either CY2015 or the CY2016 Annual 

Statistical Transparency Report. NSA has decided to 

declassify the total number of U.S. person identities unmasked in response to a request. 

The CY2015 and CY2016 Annual Statistical 

Transparency Reports focused on responding to 

the PCLOB’s report recommendation 9(5) by 

counting only those U.S. person identities where 

the proper name or title of an individual was 

unmasked; it did not count other identifiers such 

as email addresses, telephone numbers or U.S. IP 

addresses; nor did it count identifiers pertaining 

to U.S. corporations or associations. Rather than 

distinguishing between the different ways a U.S. 

person might be named in an intelligence report, 

NSA now provides the total number of U.S. person 

identities unmasked in response to a specific 

request from another agency. This is the same 

metric that NSA reports to Congress pursuant to 

FISA Section 702(m)(3) reporting requirements. 

Prior to CY2017, NSA’s FISA Section 702(m)

(3) reports covered the time period of September 

through August. For CY2017 and going forward, 

both reports now cover the same timeframe and 

follow the same reporting methodology.

FISA SECTION 702

Figure 12: Section 702 USP Identities Disseminated by NSA

Section 702—U.S. Person (USP) Identities Unmasked by NSA 12-month period 

Sep 2015–Aug 2016 CY2017 CY2018

The number of U.S. person identities that NSA unmasked 

in response to a specific request from another agency 9,217 9,529 16,721

Rows 2 and 3 will not total row 1 because one report may contain both masked and openly named identities

Figure 11: Section 702 Reports Containing USP Information Unmasked by NSA

Section 702 Reports Containing U.S. Person (USP) Information Disseminated 

by NSA CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

REPORTS—Total number of NSA disseminated § 702 reports containing 

USP identities regardless of whether or not the identity was openly 

included or masked.

3,914 4,065 4,495

REPORTS—Total number of NSA disseminated § 702 reports containing 

USP identities where the USP identity was masked. 2,964 3,034 3,442

REPORTS—Total number of NSA disseminated § 702 reports containing 

USP identities where the USP identity was openly included. 1,200 1,341 1,379
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Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 

107.1, Requests for Identities of U.S. Persons in 

Disseminated Intelligence Reports, requires all IC elements to have procedures to respond to requests 

for the identities of U.S. persons whose identities 

were originally masked in a disseminated intelligence report. ICPG 107.1 applies to information 

regardless of the legal authority under which the 

information was collected (i.e., including, but not 

limited to, FISA Section 702). The ICPG further 

requires the DNI to report, on an annual basis, 

certain statistics to track requests made pursuant to 

ICPG 107.1. 

Since issuance of ICPG 107.1, all IC elements have 

finalized their procedures. As of January 1, 2019, 

all IC elements began tracking the applicable requests. Accordingly, ODNI will be able to provide 

these numbers for CY2019 in next year’s Annual 

Statistical Transparency Report.

FISA SECTION 702
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FISA Criminal Use and Notice Provisions

A. FISA Sections 106 and 305 

F

ISA Section 106 requires advance authorization from the Attorney General before any information acquired through Title I electronic 

surveillance may be used in a criminal proceeding. 

This authorization from the Attorney General is 

defined to include authorization by the Acting Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, or, upon 

designation by the Attorney General, the Assistant 

Attorney General for National Security. Section 106 

also requires that if a government entity intends to 

introduce into evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding, against an “aggrieved person,” information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance, it must notify the aggrieved person and the 

court. The aggrieved person is then entitled to seek 

suppression of the information. FISA Section 706 

requires that any information acquired pursuant to 

Section 702 be treated as electronic surveillance 

under Section 106, including for purposes of the 

use, notice, and suppression requirements.

FISA Section 305 provides comparable requirements 

for use of information acquired through Title III 

physical search (i.e., advance authorization, notice, 

and opportunity to suppress) in a legal proceeding. 

B. Statistics

The FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 

2017 codified a requirement that certain statistics 

concerning criminal proceedings must be provided 

to the public pertaining to Sections 106 and 305, 

including Section 702-acquired information. Specifically, Figure 13 provides that the government 

filed notice of intent to use FISA-acquired information, pursuant to Section 106 or 305, in seven 

(7) separate proceedings in 2017 and in fourteen 

(14) separate criminal proceedings in 2018.

FISA CRIMINAL USE

FISA Sections 106 and 305—

Criminal Use and Notice Provisions 

 Commonly referred to as the “criminal 

use provision.”

 Section 106 applies to information acquired 

from Title I electronic surveillance and Section 702; Section 305 applies to information acquired from Title III physical search.

 Attorney General advance authorization 

is required before such information may 

be used in a criminal proceeding; if such 

information is used or intended to be used 

against an aggrieved person, that person 

must be given notice of the information and 

have a chance to suppress the information. 

 The FISA Amendments Reauthorization 

Act of 2017 codified that statistics must 

be provided to the public as it pertained 

to Section 106, Section 305, as well as 

Section 702 acquired information.

CY2017 CY2018

The number of criminal proceedings in which the United States or a State or political subdivision thereof provided notice pursuant to Section 106 (including with 

respect to Section 702-acquired information) or Section 305 of the government’s 

intent to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose any information obtained 

or derived from electronic surveillance, physical search, or Section 702 acquisition. 

7 14

Figure 13: Number of Criminal Proceedings in Which the Government Provided 

Notice of Its Intent To Use Certain FISA Information

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(4).
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FISA Title IV—Use of Pen Register and Trap 

and Trace (PR/TT) Devices

A. FISA PR/TT Authority

Title IV of FISA authorizes the use of pen register 

and trap and trace (PR/TT) devices for foreign 

intelligence purposes. Title IV authorizes the 

government to use a PR/TT device to capture 

dialing, routing, addressing or signaling (DRAS) 

information. The government may submit an 

application to the FISC for an order approving the 

use of a PR/TT device (i.e., PR/TT order) for 

(i) “any investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 

information not concerning a United States person 

or” (ii) “to protect against international terrorism 

or clandestine intelligence activities, provided 

that such investigation of a United States person 

is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities 

protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.” 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a). If the FISC finds that 

the government’s application meets the requirements of FISA, the FISC must issue an order for 

the installation and use of a PR/TT device. 

B. Statistics

COUNTING ORDERS. Similar to how orders were counted 

for Titles I and III and Sections 703 and 704, this 

report only counts the orders granting authority to 

conduct intelligence collection—the order for the 

installation and use of a PR/TT device. Thus, renewal orders are counted as a separate order; modification orders and amendments are not counted. 

ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF TARGETS. The government’s 

methodology for counting PR/TT targets is similar 

to the methodology described above for counting 

targets of electronic surveillance and/or physical 

search. If the IC received authorization for the

installation and use of a PR/TT device against the 

same target in four separate applications, the IC 

would count one target, not four. Alternatively, if 

the IC received authorization for the installation 

and use of a PR/TT device against four targets in the 

same application, the IC would count four targets. 

ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS. This 

statistic counts (1) the targeted identifiers and (2) 

the non-targeted identifiers (e.g., telephone numbers and email addresses) that were in contact with 

the targeted identifiers. Specifically, the House 

Report on the USA FREEDOM Act states that 

“[t]he phrase ‘unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to such 

orders’ means the total number of, for example, 

email addresses or phone numbers that have been 

collected as a result of these particular types of 

FISA orders—not just the number of target email 

addresses or phone numbers.” [H.R. Rept. 114-

109 Part I, p. 26], with certain exceptions noted.

FISA Title IV 

 Commonly referred to as the “PR/TT” 

provision.

 Bulk collection is prohibited.

 Requires individual FISC order to use PR/

TT device to capture dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling (DRAS) information.

 Government request to use a PR/TT device on U.S. person target must be based 

on an investigation to protect against 

terrorism or clandestine intelligence 

activities and that investigation must not 

be based solely on the basis of activities 

protected by the First Amendment to the 

Constitution. 

FISA TITLE IV
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See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(3), 1873(b)(3)(A), and 1873(b)(3)(B). 

See 50 U.S.C. §§1873(b)(3)(A)(i) and 1873(b)(3)(A)(ii) for rows one and two, respectively.

*Pursuant to § 1873(d)(2)(B), this statistic does not apply to orders resulting in the acquisition of information by the FBI that does not include email 

addresses or telephone numbers. 

•This number represents information the government received from provider(s) electronically for the entire calendar year. The government does not have a 

process for capturing unique identifiers received by other means (such as hard-copy or portable media). 

‡For the CY2016 report, FBI erroneously provided the estimated number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to orders 

for business records instead of the number of the unique identifiers collected pursuant PR/TT orders. As noted below, FBI erroneously provided the estimated 

number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to orders for PR/TT orders under the statistics for business records.

*Previously the IC was not statutorily required to publicly provide these statistics, but provided them consistent with transparency principles. The FISA 

Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 codified this requirement at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(3)(A)(i) and 1873(b)(3)(A)(ii).

Figures 14a and 14b: Number of PR/TT Orders, Targets and Unique Identifiers Collected

Titles IV of FISA

PR/TT FISA CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders 131 135 90 60 33 34

Estimated number of targets of 

such orders 319 516 456 41 27 29

Estimated number of unique 

identifiers used to communicate 

information collected pursuant to 

such orders*

134,987• 81,035•‡ 56,064• 132,690

Figure 15: FISA PR/TT Targets—U.S. Persons and Non-U.S. Persons*

PR/TT Targets CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Estimated number of targets who are non-U.S. persons* 23 16 15

Estimated number of targets who are U.S. persons 18 11 14

Estimated percentage of targets who are U.S. persons 43.9% 40.7% 48.3%

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders Estimated number of targets

131 135

516

90

456

60 41 33 27 34 29

319

Estimated USPER targets

Estimated non-USPER targets

23

16 15

18

11 14

(43.9% 

of total) (40.7% 

of total)

(48.3% 

of total)

FISA TITLE IV
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FISA Title V—Business Records

A. Business Records FISA

Title V of FISA authorizes the government to 

submit an application for an order requiring 

the production of any tangible things for 

(i) “an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 

information not concerning a United States person 

or” (ii) “to protect against international terrorism 

or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that 

such investigation of a United States person is not 

conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.” 50 

U.S.C. § 1861. Title V is commonly referred to as the 

“Business Records” provision of FISA. 

In June 2015, the USA FREEDOM Act was signed 

into law and, among other things, it amended Title 

V, including by prohibiting bulk collection. See

50 U.S.C. §§ 1861(b), 1861(k)(4). The DNI is 

required to report various statistics about two Title 

V provisions—traditional business records under 

Section 501(b)(2)(B) and call detail records under 

Section 501(b)(2)(C). On November 28, 2015, in 

compliance with amendments enacted by the USA 

FREEDOM Act, the IC terminated collection of 

bulk telephony metadata under Title V of FISA 

(the “Section 215 Program”). Solely due to legal 

obligations to preserve records in certain pending civil litigation, the IC continues to preserve 

previously collected bulk telephony metadata. 

Under the terms of a FISC order dated November 

24, 2015, the bulk telephony metadata cannot be 

used or accessed for any purpose other than compliance with preservation obligations. Once the 

government’s preservation obligations are lifted, 

the government is required to promptly destroy all 

bulk metadata produced by telecommunications 

providers under the Section 215 Program.

On November 30, 2015, the IC implemented certain provisions of the USA FREEDOM Act,

including the call detail records provision and 

the requirement to use a specific selection term. 

Accordingly, only one month’s worth of data for 

calendar year 2015 was available with respect to 

those provisions. Any statistical information relating to a particular FISA authority for a particular 

month remains classified. Therefore, the Title V 

data specifically associated with December 2015 

was only released in a classified annex provided to 

Congress as part of the report for CY2015. After 

CY2015, statistical information was collected for 

an entire year and those statistics were included in 

subsequent reports. 

Statistics related to traditional business records 

obtained under Title V Section 501(b)(2)(B) are 

provided first pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(5). 

Statistics related to call detail records obtained under 

Title V Section 501(b)(2)(C) are provided second 

pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(6). 

FISA Title V 

 Title V has two key provisions: (1) traditional business records and (2) Call Detail 

Records (CDRs).

 Request for records in an investigation 

of a U.S. person must be based on an 

investigation to protect against terrorism 

or clandestine intelligence activities and 

provided that the investigation is not conducted solely upon activities protected by 

the First Amendment to the Constitution. 

 CDRs may be obtained from a telephone 

company if the FISC issues an individual 

court order for the target’s records.

 Bulk collection of CDRs is prohibited. 

FISA TITLE V
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B. Statistics—Title V “Traditional” 

Business Records Statistics Orders, 

Targets & Identifiers 

Business Record (BR) requests for tangible things 

may include books, records, (e.g. electronic communications transactions records), papers, documents, and 

other items pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(B), 

also referred to as Section 501(b)(2)(B). These are 

commonly referred to as traditional business records.

ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS. This is an 

estimate of the number of (1) targeted identifiers 

(e.g., telephone numbers and email addresses) and 

(2) non-targeted identifiers that were in contact 

with the targeted identifiers. The number of identifiers used by targets to communicate can vary 

significantly from year to year, which in turn will 

impact the number of non-targeted identifiers in 

contact with the targeted identifiers. Furthermore, 

this metric represents unique identifiers received 

electronically from the provider(s). The government does not have a process for capturing unique 

identifiers received by other means (i.e., hard-copy 

or portable media). For example, the FBI could 

obtain, under this authority, a hard-copy of a 

purchase receipt from a company. That purchase 

receipt could contain a unique identifier such as a 

telephone number, which would not be counted.

EXPLAINING HOW WE COUNT BR STATISTICS. As an example 

of the government’s methodology, assume that 

in 2017, the government submitted a BR request 

targeting “John Doe” with email addresses 

john.doe@serviceproviderX, john.doe@serviceproviderY, and john.doe@serviceproviderZ. The 

FISC found that the application met the requirements of Title V and issued orders granting the 

application and directing service providers X, Y, and 

Z to produce business records pursuant to Section 

501(b)(2)(B). Provider X returned 10 non-targeted email addresses that were in contact with the 

target; provider Y returned 10 non-targeted email 

addresses that were in contact with the target; and 

provider Z returned 10 non-targeted email addresses that were in contact with the target. Based on this 

scenario, we would report the following statistics: 

A) one order by the FISC for the production of tangible things, B) one target of said orders, and C) 33 

unique identifiers, representing three targeted email 

addresses plus 30 non-targeted email addresses.

FISA TITLE V

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(5), 1873(b)(5)(A), and 1873(b)(5)(B). 

*For the CY2016 report, FBI erroneously provided the estimated number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to orders for 

PR/TT devices instead of the number of the unique identifiers collected pursuant business records orders. As noted above, FBI erroneously provided the estimated 

number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to orders for business records orders under the statistics for PR/TT devices.

Figure 16a: Title V “Traditional” Business Records Orders, Targets, and Unique Identifiers Collected

Business Records “BR” - Section 501(b)(2)(B) CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders issues pursuant to applications under 

Section 501(b)(2)(B) 84 77 56

Estimated number of targets of such orders 88 74 60

Estimated number of unique identifiers used to communicate 

information collected pursuant to such orders 125,354* 87,834 214,860

FISA TITLE V
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C. Statistics—Call Detail Record (CDR) 

Orders, Targets & Identifiers

Call Detail Records (CDRs)—commonly referred 

to as “call event metadata”—may be obtained from 

telecommunications providers on an ongoing 

basis pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(C). Title 

V of FISA defines a CDR as session identifying 

information (such as an originating or terminating telephone number, an International Mobile 

Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, or an International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI) 

number), a telephone calling card number, 

or the time or duration of a call. See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1861(k)(3)(A). By statute, CDRs provided to 

the government may not include the content of any 

communication, the name, address, or financial 

information of a subscriber or customer, or cell site 

location or global positioning system information. 

See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(k)(3)(B). CDRs are stored 

and queried by the service providers. See 50 U.S.C. 

§ 1861(c)(2). After NSA receives the CDRs from 

the providers pursuant to a FISC order, NSA stores 

and queries those lawfully obtained CDRs. 

FISA TITLE V

Figure 16c: “Traditional” Business Records Unique Identifiers

*For the CY2016 report, FBI erroneously provided the estimated number of unique 

identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to orders for PR/TT 

devices instead of the number of the unique identifiers collected pursuant business 

records orders. As noted above, FBI erroneously provided the estimated number of 

unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to orders 

for business records orders under the statistics for PR/TT devices.

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(5), 1873(b)(5)(A), and 1873(b)(5)(B). 

FISA TITLE V

CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

125,354*

87,834

214,860

Figure 16b: “Traditional” Business Records Orders and Targets

CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders

Estimated number of targets

84 88 77 74

56 60
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CHANGES IN TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES TO COUNT UNIQUE 

IDENTIFIERS. While the USA FREEDOM Act directs 

the government to provide a good faith estimate of 

“the number of unique identifiers used to communicate information collected pursuant to” orders 

issued in response to CDR applications (see 50 

U.S.C. § 1873(b)(5)(B)), in the past, the government did not have the technical ability to isolate 

the number of unique identifiers within records 

received from the providers. Since the previous Annual Statistical Transparency Report, NSA 

developed a new technical solution to allow NSA 

to produce a good faith estimate of the number of 

unique identifiers. This new technical solution was 

put into place after the deletion of records in May 

2018, so NSA will provide this partial-year count. 

The deletion of records was publicly discussed in 

a June 28, 2018 public notice by NSA and is also 

discussed below.

In previous years, this report has included an 

alternate metric that represents the number of 

records received from the provider(s) and stored 

in NSA repositories (records that fail at any of a 

variety of validation steps are not included in this 

number). CDRs covered by § 501(b)(2)(C) include call detail records created before, on, or after 

the date of the application relating to an authorized investigation.

Both metrics are included in this report. NSA 

counting for CY2018 includes (1) the total 

number of CDRs received for the year as we have 

reported in previous years, as illustrated in Figure 

19 and (2) the unique identifiers within the CDRs 

received for the portion of the year NSA was able 

to count them, as illustrated in Figure 20.

THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CDRS RECEIVED FROM 

PROVIDERS. As explained in the 2016 NSA public 

report on the USA FREEDOM Act, the metric 

provided is over-inclusive because the government 

counts each record separately even if the government 

receives the same record multiple times (whether 

from one provider or multiple providers). Additionally, this metric includes duplicates of unique 

identifiers – i.e., because the government lacked 

the technical ability to isolate unique identifiers, 

the statistic counts the number of records even if 

unique identifiers are repeated. For example, if one 

unique identifier is associated with multiple calls 

to a second unique identifier, it will be counted 

multiple times. Similarly, if two different providFISA TITLE V

See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1873(b)(6) and 1873(b)(6)(A).

CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders

Estimated number of targets

40 42 40 40

11 14

Figures 17a and 17b: CDR Orders and Targets

Business Records (BRs)—Section 501(b)(2)(B) CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number of orders issues pursuant to applications under 

Section 501(b)(2)(C) 40 40 14

Estimated number of targets of such orders 42 40 11
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Assume an NSA intelligence analyst learns that 

phone number (Phone Number A) is being used by 

a suspected international terrorist (target). Phone 

Number A is the “specific selection term” or “selector” that will be submitted to the FISC (or the Attorney General in an emergency) for approval using the 

“reasonable articulable suspicion” (RAS) standard. 

Assume that one provider (provider X) submits a 

record showing Phone Number A called unique 

identifier Phone Number B—what is referred to as 

a “call event.” This is the “first hop.” In turn, assume 

that NSA submits the “first-hop” Phone Number 

B to the provider X, and finds that unique identifier 

was used to call another unique identifier Phone 

Number D. This is the “second-hop.” If the unique 

identifiers call one another multiple times, then 

multiple CDRs are produced and duplication occurs. 

Additionally, the government may receive multiple 

FISA TITLE V

Figure 18: Call Event Hop Scenario and Method of Counting

PHONE A

PHONE B

PHONE D

PHONE F PHONE C

PHONE E

PHONE G

First hop

Second hop

500 calls

500 calls

500 calls

500 calls

500 calls

500 calls

Target uses Phone Number A which is the FISC-approved selector in the FISC order. 

This would be counted as 1 order, 1 target, 7 unique identifiers(phone numbers A,

B, C,D, E, F, G) and, assuming 500 calls between each party (1,000 records), 6000 

CDRs. CDRs may include records for both sides of a call (for example, one call from 

Phone Number A to Phone Number B could result in 2 records).

FISA TITLE V

ers submit records showing the same two unique 

identifiers in contact, then those would also be 

counted separately. This statistic includes records 

that were received from the providers in CY2018 

for all orders active for any portion of the calendar 

year, which includes orders that the FISC approved 

in CY2017. Furthermore, while the records are 

received from domestic communications service 

providers, the records received are for domestic 

and foreign numbers. More information on how 

NSA implements this authority can be found in the 

DCLPO report, in particular see page 5 

for a description and illustration of the USA 

FREEDOM Implementation Architecture.
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THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS IN THE CDRS 

RECEIVED. On June 28, 2018, NSA issued a public 

notice stating that on May 23, 2018, NSA began 

deleting all CDRs acquired since 2015 under Section 

501(b)(2)(C) of FISA. NSA deleted the CDRs 

because earlier in 2018 NSA analysts noted technical 

irregularities in some data received from telecommunications service providers. These irregularities also 

resulted in the production to NSA of some CDRs 

that NSA was not authorized to receive. Because it 

was infeasible to identify and isolate properly produced data, NSA concluded that it should not use 

any of the CDRs. Consequently, NSA, in consultation with the Department of Justice and the ODNI, 

decided that the appropriate course of action was 

to delete all CDRs. NSA notified the Congressional 

oversight committees, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board, and the Department of Justice of 

this decision. The Department of Justice, in turn, 

notified the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 

The root cause of the specific problem that led to the 

deletion was addressed at that time. Additionally, 

NSA reviewed and revalidated its intelligence reporting to ensure that the reports were based on properly 

received CDRs. 

During the reporting period, NSA subsequently 

re-submitted the already FISC-approved selectors 

to the providers and also submitted new selectors 

that were approved by the FISC. NSA ingested and 

stored CDRs produced by the providers in response 

to these submissions during CY2018. Additionally, 

during this time, NSA implemented a new technical 

means of counting the unique identifiers as opposed 

to counting all records stored in NSA’s repositories. 

The new counting process was applied as the records were delivered by the providers beginning on 

May 23, 2018, when the process was initiated.

The new process counts each type of identifier 

separately, and includes counts for phone numbers, 

International Mobile Subscriber Identities 

(IMSIs), and International Mobile Equipment 

Identities (IMEIs). An IMSI is a 15-digit number 

associated with the SIM card in a mobile phone. 

An IMEI identifies the specific physical device, 

much like a serial number. In the CDRs NSA receives under UFA, IMSIs and IMEIs are associated 

with a phone number, so the phone number count 

below represents the number of unique phones 

associated with UFA CDRs.

Figure 19: CDRs Received Arising from Such Targets

*While the statute directs the government to count the unique identifiers, until May of 2018, the government was not technically able to isolate the number 

of unique identifiers; thus, the number reported above counts total CDRs received for the year and includes duplicate records. Additionally, the number of 

records contains both domestic and foreign numbers, including numbers used by business entities for marketing purposes.

Call Detail Records (CDRs)—Section 501(b)(2)(C) CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Estimated number of call detail records arising from 

such targets that NSA received from providers pursuant 

to Section 501(b)(2)(C) and stored in its repositories*

151,230,968 534,396,285 434,238,543

FISA TITLE V

CDRs for a single call event. NSA may also submit 

the specific selection Phone Number A to another 

provider (provider Y) who may have CDRs of the 

same call events.

Not all CDRs provided to the government will be 

for domestic numbers. The targeted “specific selection term” could be a foreign number, could have 

called a foreign number or the “first-hop” number 

could have called a foreign number; thus, these 

CDRs statistics contain both domestic and foreign 

number results. Furthermore, CDRs provided to 

the government include call events with business 

entities, such as calls for marketing purposes. 
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D. Statistics—Call Detail Record Queries

THE NUMBER OF SEARCH TERMS ASSOCIATED WITH A U.S. 

PERSON USED TO QUERY THE CDR DATA. In 2018, NSA 

streamlined and upgraded its analytic tools to 

improve performance and compliance capabilities. 

This gave NSA analysts an increased ability to group 

related query terms together and run those query 

terms against multiple repositories that the analyst is 

authorized to query. NSA analysts must still comply 

with all applicable restrictions, controls, and training 

that apply to each query term and each repository. 

Due to the technical parameters of the tool, in 

order to generate a count of CDR queries, NSA 

must count all query terms, even if query terms 

would never return CDR results (e.g. using an email 

address as a query term will never return a hit from 

CDR data). Additionally, the parameters of the tool 

do not allow NSA to distinguish which specific query terms are U.S. persons and which are not when 

multiple query terms are used. For example, a single 

query using 20 query terms counts as 20, even if 

only one of those terms is a U.S. person phone number, and the remaining 19 are either not associated 

with a U.S. person or are email addresses.

Figure 21: CDRs—U.S. Person Query Terms

* Consistent with § 1873(d)(2)(A), this statistic does not include queries that are conducted by the FBI. 

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(6)(C). 

Call Detail Records (CDRs)—Section 501(b)(2)(C) CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Estimated number of search terms that included information concerning a U.S. person that were used to query any database of call detail records obtained through 

the use of such orders.*

22,360 31,196 164,682

FISA TITLE V

*Identifiers include both domestic and foreign numbers, including numbers used by business entities for marketing purposes. 

Call Detail Records (CDRs)—Section 501(b)(c)(C) 23 May to 31 December 2018

The number of unique identifiers used to communicate information 

collected pursuant to such orders under Section 501(b)(2)(C)*

19,372,544 Phone Numbers, which 

are associated with 7,285,362 IMSIs 

and 5,305,578 IMEIs

Figure 20: Unique Identifiers in the CDRs Received
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National Security Letters (NSLs)

A. National Security Letters 

I

n addition to statistics relating to FISA authorities, we are reporting information on the 

government’s use of National Security Letters 

(NSLs). The FBI is statutorily authorized to issue 

NSLs for specific records (as specified below) only 

if the information being sought is relevant to a national security investigation. NSLs may be issued 

for four commonly used types of records: 

i. telephone subscriber information, toll records, 

and other electronic communication transactional records, see 18 U.S.C. § 2709; 

ii. consumer-identifying information possessed by 

consumer reporting agencies (names, addresses, 

places of employment, institutions at which a 

consumer has maintained an account), see 15 

U.S.C. § 1681u; 

iii. full credit reports, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681v (only 

for counterterrorism, not for counterintelligence investigations); and 

iv. financial records, see 12 U.S.C. § 3414. 

B. Statistics—National Security Letters 

and Requests for Information

COUNTING NSLs. Today we are reporting (1) the total 

number of NSLs issued for all persons, and (2) the 

total number of requests for information (ROI) 

contained within those NSLs. When a single 

NSL contains multiple ROIs, each is considered 

a “request” and each request must be relevant to 

the same pending investigation. For example, if 

the government issued one NSL seeking subscriber information from one provider and that NSL 

identified three e-mail addresses for the provider to 

return records, this would count as one NSL issued 

and three ROIs. 

v.

vi.

 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S REPORT ON NSLs. In April 

2019, the Department of Justice released its 

Annual Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Report 

to Congress. That report, which is available 

online, provides the number of requests made 

for certain information concerning different U.S. 

persons pursuant to NSL authorities during calendar year 2018. The Department of Justice’s report provides the number of individuals subject 

to an NSL whereas the ODNI’s report provides 

the number of NSLs issued. Because one person 

may be subject to more than one NSL in an annual period, the number of NSLs issued and the 

number of persons subject to an NSL differs.

WHY WE REPORT THE NUMBER OF NSL REQUESTS INSTEAD 

OF THE NUMBER OF NSL TARGETS. We are reporting the 

annual number of requests for multiple reasons. 

First, the FBI’s systems are configured to comply 

with Congressional reporting requirements, which 

do not require the FBI to track the number of 

individuals or organizations that are the subject of 

an NSL. Even if the FBI systems were configured 

differently, it would still be difficult to identify the 

number of specific individuals or organizations 

that are the subjects of NSLs. One reason for this 

National Security Letters

 Not authorized by FISA but by other 

statutes.

 Bulk collection is prohibited, however, by 

the USA FREEDOM Act.

 FBI may only use NSLs if the information sought is relevant to international 

counterterrorism or counterintelligence 

investigation.

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS
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is that the subscriber information returned to 

the FBI in response to an NSL may identify, for 

example, one subscriber for three accounts or it 

may identify different subscribers for each account. 

In some cases this occurs because the identification information provided by the subscriber to the 

provider may not be true. For example, a subscriber may use a fictitious name or alias when creating 

the account. Thus, in many instances, the FBI 

never identifies the actual subscriber of an account. 

In other cases, this occurs because individual 

subscribers may identify themselves differently 

for each account (e.g., inclusion of middle name, 

middle initial, etc.) when creating an account. 

We also note that the actual number of individuals 

or organizations that are the subject of an NSL is 

different than the number of NSL requests. The 

FBI often issues NSLs under different legal authorities, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1681u(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681v, and 18 

U.S.C. § 2709, for the same individual or organization. The FBI may also serve multiple NSLs for 

an individual for multiple facilities (e.g., multiple 

e-mail accounts, landline telephone numbers and 

cellular phone numbers). The number of requests, 

consequently, is significantly larger than the 

number of individuals or organizations that are the 

subjects of the NSLs. 

As is the case with other statistics in this report, 

statistics often fluctuate from year to year for a 

variety of reasons. The IC is committed to sharing 

statistical data and engaging the public about how 

the IC uses its national security authorities and for 

what purposes.

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS

Figure 22a: NSLs Issued and Requests for Information 

Figure 22b: Total NSLs Issued and Total ROIs Within Those NSLs 

See 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)(6).

National Security Letters (NSLs) CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

Total number NSLs issued 19,212 16,348 12,870 12,150 12,762 10,235

Number of Requests for 

Information (ROI) 38,832 33,024 48,642 24,801 41,579 38,872

NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS

CY2013 CY2014 CY2015 CY2016 CY2017 CY2018

19,212 16,348

33,024

12,870

48,642

12,150

24,801

12,762

41,579

10,235

38,872 38,832

Total NSLs issued

Number of ROIs within those NSLs
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